JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10012
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA FOR MEETING OF MARCH 8-9, 1963 (THE BOARD MET WITH THE PRESIDENT ON MARCH 9, 1963)
DATE : 03/08/63
PAGES : 28
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR MARCH 8 AND 9, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF MARCH 8 AND 9, 1963 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/14/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEETING OF MARCH 8 - 9, 1963 (The Board met with the President on March 9, 1963)

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

206-10001-10012

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF MARCH 8 - 9, 1963

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		March 8th
1.	10:00 - 10:30	The Chairman's Time
2.	10:30 - 11:00	Status Report on Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations Mr. Russell Ash
3.	11:00 - 12:00	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence Mr. John McCone
4.	12:00 - 12:30	Intelligence Briefing on the Current Situation in Cuba Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, DDP Staff, CIA
5.	12:30 - 1:30	Lunch
6.	1:30 - 2:30	Review of DCI's Comments on Board's Interim Report to the President dated December 28, 1962
7.	2:30 - End of Day	Preparation of Report to the President
		March 9th
8.	9:00 - 9:55	Resume Consideration of Item No. 7
9.	10:00 - 10:30 (Approx.)	Meeting with the President
10.	10:30 - END	Discussion of Future Board Business

SPECIAL LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: March 8 and 9, 1963 Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The Board meeting of March 8 convened at 10:00 a.m., with the following in attendance: Messrs. Killian, Baker, Clifford, Doolittle, Gray, Land, Langer, Ash and Coyne. (Mr. Pace was unable to attend the two-day meeting because of absence from the country; Mr. Murphy was unable to join the meeting until later in the day.)

As the first order of business, in executive session, the Chairman reported on a number of items including the following.

The Chairman advised that on the previous day Mr. Murphy had informed Mr. Coyne that he had received a telephone call at his offices in New York from the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. McCone indicated to Mr. Murphy that the President had talked with him about the Board's final report on the Cuba situation dated February 4; that the President had shown Mr. McCone a copy of the report, indicating that no other distribution was being made of the report at this time. Mr. Murphy advised that Mr. McCone was quite emotional in discussing the Board's report, stating that if the Board is going to insist on submitting the report, the top five people in CIA, including Mr. McCone, would have to resign from the Agency. Mr. Murphy pointed out to Mr. McCone that the report had already been formally submitted to the President by the Board. Mr. McCone then expressed to Mr. Murphy his concern and disagreement with the references in the report to the failure of intelligence. Mr. Murphy advised Mr. McCone that in his judgment, and indeed he thought in the judgment of all of the Board members, there was in fact a failure of intelligence and it was the duty of the Board to so state in its report to the President. Mr. Murphy expressed the view that the report was really mild. Mr. McCone indicated that even in retrospect there were only about seven of the thirty-five indicators listed in the report of offensive missiles in Cuba which might be considered valid. Mr. Murphy reiterated that Mr. McCone was quite emotional in discussing the above matter, saying if the report stood it could lead to resignations from DIA as well as CIA. At this point he mentioned to Mr. McCone that he was in New York at a meeting with others and didn't like discussing this aspect on the telephone and suggested they discuss the matter further when they next met.

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

IDEALIST/CORONA/OXCART

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

Moving to another subject, the DCI said that he was concerned about the prospects of a future nuclear explosion in Communist China, and to a lesser degree he was concerned about the prospects of such a development in Israel. He thought that the prospects of these developments brings up a most serious problem from the standpoint of psychological effect upon other nations should these developments take place, although there does not seem to be anything we can do about them.

Insofar as U-2 overflights of Communist China by Chinese Nationalist pilots are concerned, these missions are being flown in "Category 3" weather (instead of Category 2 weather conditions involving a maximum of 25% cloud cover) because there is a need for frequent missions. The DCI said that although these missions have not produced evidence of a reactor in operation in Communist China, there are some indications, e.g., a test area in Tibet, and the President has been alerted to this possibility.

The DCI said that somewhat of a problem is presented in Israel. Although we are close to the Israeli government, it appears to be withholding information on the extent of its nuclear activities. As in the past France is assisting Israel and the French government is helping the Israeli government build a nuclear reactor at the present time. In a building next to the reactor there is an installation which could be a chemical separation facility, but the Israelis deny that this is the case. Moreover, the DCI pointed out, the Israelis refuse to submit to international safeguards prescribed by the international atomic energy agency. Mr. McCone stated that he believes that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by Israel would have most serious effects on countries of the Middle East and, therefore, Mr. McCone is ready to repeat recommendations which he previously made to President Eisenhower that unless Israel joins in the international safeguards we should take certain economic reprisals against Israel. Mr. McCone observed that our government permits tax deductions on Israeli bonds, and we have given Israel billions of dollars in aid. Despite this the Israelis could well be proceeding without full knowledge on our part on an atomic energy program which could trigger grave trouble in the Middle East.

Finally, Mr. McCone reported that CIA has concluded that our policy on intelligence collection within the United States is wrong and particularly as it applies to Soviet Bloc Embassies and to telephone intercept coverage as well as exploitation of official Soviet Bloc personnel in the United States. Mr. McCone stated that he was going to propose that the CIA intensify its activities on these matters or that the FBI be directed to intensify their activities in these areas. He noted that basically this is an FBI responsibility but that it is his own view that this responsibility could more properly be carried out by the CIA. Mr. Clifford inquired as to whether the DCI would not encounter difficulty in trying to get this function transferred from FBI to CIA, and Mr. McCone responded that he does not care who carries out the responsibility as long as it is appropriately done and he added that he believes the CIA is qualified to do it. Dr. Land observed that this activity does not belong with the FBI; that coverage of an espionage agent is one thing but that exploiting Soviet Bloc coverage for intelligence collection purposes is quite another.

Mr. McCone advised that there is another dimension to this problem which involves increasing the number of CIA intelligence representatives in Moscow. He noted that CIA has only three employees in the Moscow Embassy. He pointed out that in Washington, D. C. and New York City out of a total of 392 Soviet official representatives CIA has identified 176 as intelligence officers of the KGB and GRU, a proportion of 45%. He added that 23% of the Soviet official representatives in London are intelligence officers and in France the figure is 36%.

Before departing the meeting Mr. McCone displayed to the Board a photograph demonstrating the success of the latest infrared photography taken of terrain from an altitude of 3500 feet.

Dr. Killian asked the DCI if the Board could have a copy of the new draft NRO agreement, and in response to this the DCI made a copy of the draft available later on in the day. Before Mr. McCone left the meeting he suggested that if the Board had any questions regarding the terms of the draft NRO agreement it would be appropriate to raise them with the Secretary of Defense or Mr. Gilpatric or Mr. McCone himself, rather than raising such questions at working levels at the Defense Department or the CIA. The DCI said that he did not want to inhibit in any way the discussions that the Board might want to have at any level at any time, and he noted that Dr. Land was to confer with Secretary Gilpatric the following day. (Dr. Land assured the DCI that the scheduled meeting was to be confined strictly to a technical discussion.)

This concluded the DCI's meeting with the Board and he and Mr. Kirkpatrick departed the meeting at 12:30 p.m.

IDEALIST/CORONA/OXCART

At 12:30 p.m., Mr. Arthur Lundahl of the NPIC, and Mr. William Tidwell joined the Board meeting. (Before beginning their presentations, Mr. Lundahl answered a question from a Board member by stating that the NPIC moved into its new quarters at the Naval Gun Factory on January 1, 1963, and it occupies the entire facility except for the occupancy of a part of one floor by the U. S. Geological Survey.) Mr. Tidwell proceeded to give the Board a briefing on the internal situation in Cuba. In essence Mr. Tidwell said that Cuba is a good example of Latin American Communism in action. The Castro regime has established very good security, but the internal political situation is considerably messed up in a controversy between the Castroites and the old-line members of the Communist Party of Cuba.

The sugar crop in Cuba is off one-third this year. The country will have a hard time economically next year and the Soviets will have to provide further substantial aid. Although the rationing program is difficult to enforce in Cuba, the people have by no means reached a starvation level. Bloc shipping carries most of the imports into the island, and non-Bloc shipping is negligable.

Because of the efficiency of the Castro internal security program, any significant organized revolt efforts have been prevented. Fifty per cent of the refugees who were interrogated during January thought that as of last summer there was a good chance of a successful revolution against Castro. After the Soviets reached a peak of introducing personnel and armaments in July, only five per cent thought that a revolt could succeed. When the Russians subsequently withdrew strategic missiles from Cuba fifteen per cent of the refugees thought that a revolt might succeed.

Some 1500 students from other Latin American countries have been given guerilla warfare training in Cuba. Castro's radio propaganda is urging other Latin American countries to follow the Cuban example. In answer to a question by Dr. Killian, Mr. Tidwell said that the Cubans are jamming U. S. radio broadcasts beamed at Latin America, but Mr. Tidwell had no information to indicate that our Government was jamming the Cuban broadcast activity. Mr. Tidwell then summarized information on the Cuban and Soviet orders of battle, along the lines of information contained in Current Intelligence Bulletins.

Dr. Baker raised a rhetorical question as to whether the Soviets were not in fact establishing in Cuba a command-and-control post for use in the event of a military offensive against the Western Hemisphere, and Dr. Baker asked if it were not true that never before

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

This document consists of 5 pages
No. 1 of 4 Copies, Series A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

Subject: Board Meeting with the President, March 9, 1963

At 10:00 A.M., on March 9, 1963, the Board met with the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House for the purpose of presenting the Board's report and recommendations growing out of its completed review of the foreign intelligence aspects of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba. Those present were Messrs. Killian, Doolittle, Land, Langer, Gray, Clifford, Baker, Murphy, and Messrs. Coyne and Ash. Mr. McGeorge Bundy was also present.

Dr. Killian informed the President that the Board had recommendations to present based on the Cuba episode. He recalled to the President that the Board had submitted two previous reports, one - an interim report dated December 28, 1962, containing recommendations of such urgency that the Board forwarded them prior to completing its review of Cuba; and a more comprehensive report dated February 4, 1963, in which the Board set forth its complete findings based on a detailed investigation of the Cuba situation from the standpoint of foreign intelligence coverage. Dr. Killian said that the recommendations which the Board was now presenting should be considered in the light of the two previous reports, particularly the report dated February 4, 1963.

Dr. Killian then presented the Board's recommendations, reading from the written report which was forwarded to the President under date of March 8, 1963. In reading this report to the President, Dr. Killian directed attention to the fact that most of the recommendations which were being presented were an outgrowth of the Board's study of Cuba, but that two of the recommendations dealt with major problems affecting the over-all foreign intelligence effort.

Dr. Killian stated Recommendations 1 through 4 of the March 8, 1963 report.

Following Dr. Killian's statement of Recommendation 4 regarding low-level aerial surveillance flights over Cuba, the President observed that such flights had not been suspended but were being reserved for coverage of particularly critical intelligence targets should the situation warrant, as, for example, the February 9, 1963 low-level mission. Mr. Bundy commented that two or three important targets in Cuba have been identified since the February 9 low-level mission, but the approval of low-level coverage of these new targets is being held in abeyance pending the completion of efforts by Attorney Donovan to obtain the release of some twenty Americans held prisoner in Cuba, including three individuals whom the United States is particularly desirous of returning to this country. The President asked for elaboration on the Board's recommendation for the development of long focal length cameras to be used in U-2 aircraft. Dr. Land explained that some time ago an effort was made to develop such a camera but the earlier version was not a success, and the development efforts were suspended because there was not an immediate need for a camera having this particular capability, although at the present time such a camera would be most useful in covering such Cuban targets as caves and other installations suspected of being used for concealment of materials and equipment. Dr. Land thought that the cost of developing a long focal length camera would be relatively inexpensive in comparison to the cost of such projects as DISCOVERER.

Dr. Killian then presented Recommendations 5 through 7 of the March 8 report.

When Dr. Killian stated Recommendation 8 concerning proposals for and the monitoring of unique intelligence operations, Mr. Bundy made the comment that the Special Group fully agrees with this recommendation and has instituted procedures designed to assure that the Special Group is informed regarding operational delays encountered in the course of carrying out surveillance missions previously approved by the Special Group.

Dr. Killian then stated Recommendation 11 of the Board's report dated March 8.

In connection with Dr. Killian's statement of Recommendation 12 on the need for improving national intelligence estimates, Mr. Bundy reiterated the point which the Board had made to the effect that the present system for producing national intelligence estimates is being run by the originators of the system, and the present mechanism for producing such estimates is a "founders' body." Dr. Langer said it is true that the estimative group has a highly trained staff which has been in existence for many years, but the Board has not yet conducted a specific study of its operations. Dr. Killian summarized the tenor of this recommendation of the Board by saying that a monolithic point of view is not necessarily the best estimate.

Turning next to two recommendations of a general nature, Dr. Killian stated Recommendations 13 and 14 of the March 8 report dealing with the subjects of scientific intelligence resources and the effective organization and management of the National Reconnaissance Office.

Following Dr. Killian's presentation, the President expressed his appreciation for the Board's efforts and said that he would follow through on the recommendations which had been made.

Referring to the thirty-five intelligence reports containing indicator-type data which were dealt with in the Board's February 4 report, the President observed that these indications were "pretty thin." The President observed that first there was the Berlin Wall incident and then the Cuba development, and in retrospect the President found it extraordinary that our Government had not obtained more advance information with respect to those situations.

The President said that we should have accomplished a penetration of the Castro regime at a relatively high level in the Cuban Government.

Dr. Land stated that he and Dr. Langer had been engaged in recent discussions of Dr. Land's concern about the manner in which our national intelligence estimates are produced. Dr. Land thought that, under the present system, it seemed that no meaning could be derived from particular facts or information unless the information could be fitted into patterns which the estimators already had in mind. The Board is therefore suggesting, Dr. Land said, that the CIA see if there is not a need for trained professionals who are not only open-minded, but whose careers are devoted to fitting intelligence information into all possible patterns. In the Cuba situation, Dr. Land pointed out, there was a fixed pattern in the minds of estimators to the effect that refugee reports concerning offensive missiles were in reality reports concerning surface-to-air missiles and installations. Dr. Land said that the Board was not proposing a policy under which the President would review raw intelligence reports, but the Board felt that the estimators should form the various alternative patterns which can be reliably derived from an analysis of intelligence, in order that policy makers may have the benefit of such alternatives. Dr. Langer said that on the other hand the estimators have to act on rationality and cannot assume that the enemy is acting on an irrational basis.

The President said that looking back on the Cuba situation it is now apparent that the SAM sites were related to the deployment of offensive missiles. The President observed that there has not been made, to his knowledge, an analysis of the assumption under which the Soviets operated in Cuba, and it would be of some academic interest, at least, to know why the Soviets did not use their SA-2's against our overflight operations. Dr. Land observed that if the Soviet camouflage teams in Cuba had been up to schedule along with the Soviet schedule for deployment of offensive missiles, we would not have found the missiles, and it was by the grace of God that we did find them.

Mr. Clifford, referring to earlier references to the need for clandestine agent penetration of Cuba, said that the Board had concluded that the absence of clandestine coverage is attributable to a lack of imagination on the part of our intelligence elements over a long period of years during which we enjoyed close relations with the Cuban Government. Therefore, Mr. Clifford said, the Board is concerned about the adequacy of such coverage at the present time in places like Brazil and Argentina. Mr. Murphy observed that originally the CIA set out to use U. S. diplomatic establishments as a cover for CIA intelligence operations only for an initial period, but these cover arrangements became permanent. Mr. Murphy noted that in discussion with the Board the Director of Central Intelligence has said that it is difficult to achieve deep cover for clandestine agent operations, and while Mr. Murphy agrees that this task is of course difficult, he has seen no evidence that concerted efforts have been made, for example, to penetrate the Castro regime. Mr. Clifford recalled that on the preceding day Mr. McCone had directed the Board's attention to the fact that whereas the CIA has three operatives in Moscow, the Soviet Union has some 153 intelligence officers in the United States. Dr. Killian informed the President that the Board lays great stress on the need for a real effort to increase our clandestine agent operations.

Referring again to the reports and findings of the Board, the President said that one problem is reflected in the instance where the Secretary of State had recommended that a particular U-2 surveillance mission over Cuba be broken up into four overflight missions. The President said he was not suggesting that this was not a prudent suggestion by the Secretary of State, but that this made him conscious of the fact that there is perhaps a lack of expertise on the part of policy makers with respect to certain intelligence operations. The President commented that one flight was flown over an area where the aircraft could well have been shot down.

The President then referred to the fact that Dr. Killian was retiring as Chairman of the Board in May. The President expressed deep appreciation for the work which Dr. Killian has done and the valuable contribution which Dr. Killian has made to the country. The President recalled that the Board has conducted three post-mortems on intelligence situations, and that these efforts of the Board have been most useful, particularly in the case of Cuba. The President added that he wished to express his appreciation for the effective manner in which the Board has carried out its duties in the past. He stated that the Board's contribution has been most valuable. In addition to its being valuable to the President, the Board has also contributed in an important way through the awareness which it has created in the intelligence community of its continuing operations and continuing review of intelligence activities. The President said that he was very much indebted to all of the Board members and is hopeful that the Board will continue its present operations for he considered them to be invaluable.

Dr. Killian expressed his gratitude for the President's comments, and then said that, as a footnote to the Board's present report, the members wished to say to the President that he has a right to expect high quality performance on the part of the intelligence community, and the Board suggests that the President see fit to emphasize to the intelligence community the necessity for producing adequate information.

The President then referred to current criticisms and inquiries which have been received from various quarters concerning the role of the Government in the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the President wondered whether the Board felt that the Administration should be more responsive to such criticisms and inquiries. Mr. Murphy commented that we would be well advised to follow the practice of Prime Minister Macmillan who responds to such criticism and inquiries with a statement to the effect that we do not discuss our intelligence activities in public.

Dr. Killian assured the President that members of the Board feel that to the greatest extent possible the Administration should refrain from making intelligence disclosures with respect to the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr. Clifford thought that the situation had been summed up humorously and accurately in a recent statement by Congressman Mahon who questioned whether the real problem was a lack of intelligence information or, on the other hand, a lack of intelligence on the part of self-appointed critics. The President stated that he too was impressed with Congressman Mahon's statement and, in fact, after the statement appeared in the press, he called Congressman Mahon and commended him on its content.

The one-hour meeting with the President terminated with the President repeating his expressions of appreciation for the work of the Board.

A. R. Ash

January 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Interim Report to the President by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, dated December 28, 1962

We have set down the several paragraphs of the subject report followed by our comments.

1. The recommendation of the Board. Great uncertainties about present Soviet efforts in Cuba indicate the necessity of a continuing aggressive intelligence effort to equip our policy makers with timely and adequate information to meet the possibility of continuing Soviet confrontation in Cuba. We must resist any tendency towards a let down in our intelligence effort against Cuba in the wake of intelligence successes resulting from our military reconnaissance missions over the island. In making this observation we are mindful that in a quite different atmosphere the Central Intelligence Agency did not mount effective clandestine intelligence collection operations in Cuba for an eight-month period following the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Comment. We agree with the principle stated in the first sentence of the recommendation and the need to continue an aggressive intelligence effort against Cuba. This view was advanced by the Director of Central Intelligence at the meeting of the President's Board on December 7, 1962 and again at the meeting of the Board on December 28. The DCI informed the Board at these meetings that it was important that there be extensive intelligence operations to find out the trend of developments in Cuba and that efforts to get agents into Cuba were being intensified. It should be noted, however, that in clandestine intelligence operations the allocation of additional manpower and funds to a task, although helpful, does not necessarily assure a corresponding improvement in production or accomplishment.

Since early 1962 the CIA has increased its effort to collect intelligence information on Cuba. The operations for this purpose have been

Copy 4

SC 01539-63

conducted vigorously as a matter of urgency. Following the misfortune at the Bay of Pigs, there was a decrease in the clandestine effort against Cuba. Even so, from April 15, 1961 through December 1961 the Clandestine Services of CIA disseminated 608 information reports on Cuba, of which 406 reports came from sources inside Cuba. The Contact Division/OO of CIA disseminated 1764 reports on Cuba during the period April 8 to December 1961. During the period from April 1961 through December 1961, seventeen resident agents were recruited in Cuba and are still active. In addition, five resident assets, two with sub-assets, recruited prior to April 1961, were maintained during this same eight-month period and are still active. There were other recruitments and numerous attempts that failed.

The period of sixty days following the Bay of Pigs invasion was a difficult one for the Agency. The Taylor Committee, composed of General Taylor, the Attorney General, Mr. Allen Dulles, and Admiral Burke, began its survey of the Bay of Pigs operation on April 22 and continued throughout May and June. This Committee took much of the time and effort of precisely those people responsible for Cuban operations, both in Miami and in Washington. There were demands for written papers and documents, as well as personal interviews of key people. Changes in the top echelon of the Agency, anticipated during the summer and implemented in the fall of 1961, had their effect on Cuban operations. While it was generally agreed and understood that our effort to collect information must continue, specific policy guidance was not given to CIA and funds necessary to carry out expanded programs were not approved by higher authority until August 4, 1961.

The newly appointed DCI, following his review of the situation in mid-December 1961, directed that the effort against Cuba be intensified. This led to the establishment, on March 8, 1962, of Task Force W as a separate entity within the Agency for the purpose of mounting a maximum effort, particularly in the collection of information, against Cuba. As of March 8, 1962 the Task Force had a personnel strength in the field and at Headquarters of 335. As of January 1, 1963, the total number of personnel devoting full time to the efforts of the Task Force was 594. Of this 594, 147 were from other agencies and other components of the Agency outside the Clandestine Services. Total financial obligations during fiscal year 1962 were $17,291,000. Estimated obligations for fiscal year 1963 totaled $28,200,000, but now have been scaled to $24,000,000 with the final figure dependent upon future policy.

2. The recommendation of the Board. We recommend intensified, hard-hitting efforts to increase our capability for obtaining significant intelligence through clandestine collection operations (espionage). Despite noteworthy intelligence results obtainable through scientific and technical means, we still have as great a need as ever for carefully selected, human-resource espionage operations, professionally executed on the basis of the soundest planning judgments and the most competent target selection processes which the intelligence community can achieve. The Cuban experience is a case in point, for we now have few meaningful espionage assets on the island and without such assets we have little hope of developing the kind and degree of hard intelligence which is required on such critical matters as: a) the plans and intentions of the Soviet Government and the Castro regime for future operations within Cuba or for future operations launched from Cuba against other Latin American countries; b) the alleged concealment of offensive weapons in caves or other locations which are incapable of being probed by technical intelligence means; and c) the actual numbers of Soviet troops in Cuba, their precise deployments, equipments, activities and objectives.

In numerous countries our serious lack of clandestine agent resources is compounded by heavy reliance on the use of official cover as a cloak for our intelligence-gathering activities abroad. Again, Cuba provides an important lesson. When the rupture of diplomatic relations in January 1961 forced the recall of U. S. intelligence personnel who had been operating under diplomatic cover provided by the American Embassy in Havana, we did not have remaining on the island - and we still do not have - adequate, deep-cover, clandestine agent networks on which to rely. Priority U. S. intelligence requirements in Latin America and elsewhere call for intensive efforts by the appropriate intelligence agencies of the Government to lay the groundwork for deep-cover, clandestine intelligence operations which are not dependent upon official cover and which will not be affected by a breach in diplomatic relations.*

Events of the past few years suggest that dramatic advances in advanced intelligence methods such as high altitude and satellite photography have obscured the role of human beings as collection and transmission media, trained and equipped with the most sophisticated technical aids, and supported by essential logistics and communications. We are gravely concerned about the progressive loss of our capability in the field of clandestine intelligence operations and in our view there is a need for the preparation of new plans for the recruiting, training and equipping of agents for comprehensive clandestine intelligence collection, particularly in Latin America.

---

* The need for clandestine intelligence coverage has been emphasized previously in reports of advisory bodies constituted by the President to review our foreign

intelligence activities. These advisory groups, which incidentally included some of the members of your present Board, have made specific recommendations on the subject. In 1954 the Doolittle Committee emphasized the need for: a) developing nonofficial cover facilities; b) the placement of "deep-cover sleeper agents" with a corresponding decrease in dependence upon official cover; c) the creation of a long-range, deep-cover planning system; and d) the promulgation of cover doctrine and procedure. In 1955 the Technological Capabilities Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, noting that "we should today be laying the groundwork for extensive covert operations in every country available to our agents", recommended that "a heavy long-term investment should be made in the preparation of covert agents as eventual sources of high-level intelligence." More recently, in its report of July 2, 1961, your Board recommended that the new Director of Central Intelligence consider the desirability and means of achieving a deeper cover for all clandestine and covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and that the disproportionate number of CIA personnel operating under diplomatic cover be reduced on an orderly basis, having in mind their replacement by agents under deep cover.

Comment. We agree with the principle of intensifying hard-hitting efforts to increase the production of significant intelligence information through espionage. This we will continue to do on a worldwide basis within the limits of our resources. We strongly support the principle expressed in the second sentence above. We agree that it is important for those responsible for the collection of intelligence information to bear in mind that there is much sorely needed information that cannot be collected by scientific and technical means. Such information is often in the human mind or the written word. Frequently information collected by scientific and technical means must be supplemented by information derived from human sources to interpret it or to give it true significance. As Mr. Helms informed the Board on December 7, 1962, there is an impressive illustration of this interplay of information from technical and human sources in the identification of missiles and their sites in Cuba. Material derived from classic espionage played a vital role in the community's analysis of Soviet missile activities in Cuba last October. Specifically, Soviet TOP SECRET documents acquired by a CIA agent concerning the preparation of R-12 MRBM's for launching, and the layout of sites for such missiles, provided the primary basis for evaluating the degree of completion and the state of readiness of the MRBM's in Cuba. These reports also complemented photo intelligence by providing organizational facts on R-12 units, and identifying specific ground support equipment which appeared in photographs.

Material from agent operations also helped interpret COMINT relating to Soviet activity in Cuba. Letter-number designations for components of Soviet missiles and their ground support equipment which appear in material supplied by a CIA agent have enabled NSA to identify items being shipped from the USSR to Cuba.

In considering the statement that "we now have few meaningful espionage assets on the island" it should be remembered that meaningful intelligence is obtained not only on the island but elsewhere as well. We do have assets which report on Cuba, such as Cuban diplomats, liaison services, Cuban seamen, and audio operations against Cuban installations abroad, all of which are not on the island but do provide meaningful information about events inside Cuba. Among these assets are some that do provide us with insights into the Castro regime's plans and intentions. We have on the island itself over 130 resident singleton agents who have been and are providing us with a variety of intelligence information on Cuba. Among these are those agents who furnished the intelligence community with significant reports on aspects of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba last summer, particularly on SAM's, cruise missiles, MIG-21's, IL-28's, and strategic missiles. These agent reports, combined with refugee reports, initially resulted in the targeting for the U-2 flights which identified the SAM's and other weapons and later contributed to the targeting for the U-2 flight of October 14 which discovered the MRBM site at San Cristobal. Today, there are among the more than 130 resident agents in Cuba approximately twenty agent sources with a capability of providing significant information on military developments and approximately ten with access to significant political information. We do not have sources with complete access to the "plans and intentions" of the Castro regime. It must be remembered, however, that agents inside Cuba are operating within a classic denied area with ever-increasing police controls and where Cubans are largely excluded from Soviet military installations. We will never be satisfied that we have a sufficient number of agent resources on the island of Cuba; however, the quantity of agents is not the most difficult problem. Reaching the targets within a country organized as Cuba is now organized is the greatest difficulty.

The second paragraph of this recommendation appears to confuse American operatives under nonofficial cover with sources under deep cover who can survive and report after the severance of diplomatic relations.

There is an inclination by some critics of the current clandestine effort to consider an increase in nonofficial cover with a corresponding decrease in official cover as the solution to many of the problems of clandestine activity in foreign areas. Nonofficial cover as used in this sense means an arrangement which provides a plausible reason for the American representative being in the foreign area in a capacity other than as a representative of the Government of the United States. The repetitive advocacy of more nonofficial cover and less official cover is usually for reasons other than the superiority of nonofficial cover in the clandestine collection of intelligence information. We realize that there are other important considerations which make it undesirable to have a disproportionate number of intelligence operatives under diplomatic and consular cover. We contend, however, that only under proper and special conditions is nonofficial cover superior to official cover in the clandestine gathering of information. By and large official cover is more productive. The question of establishing and maintaining under viable deep cover, sources of information who can survive and report through clandestine channels is quite another matter and really has little to do with whether our American intelligence officers are under official or nonofficial cover. These deep cover sources must be of foreign nationality, at least appear to be so, to operate effectively in a country hostile to the United States and especially in a police state after diplomatic relations have been broken. But the recruitment of such sources and their organization can usually be done more effectively by American representatives under official cover than by Americans under nonofficial cover. Had all the CIA representatives in Cuba at the time diplomatic relations were severed in 1961 been there under nonofficial cover they would probably have been able to remain only a short time longer than our representatives under official cover and those who did remain could not have operated effectively under the surveillance that would have undoubtedly been placed on them. We do agree, of course, that selectively we should make an effort to lay the groundwork for deep cover, clandestine operations that can survive a break in diplomatic relations and other crises.

It is in order to consider briefly the nature, advantages and limitations of nonofficial cover. It is to be noted first and foremost that the CIA as a matter of avowed policy, is committed to the use of nonofficial cover in all instances, where it is available and its use is justified. In many areas of the world, however, nonofficial cover does not exist or, if it does, it exists under such circumstances as to have little use for the conduct of espionage. This is true of the denied areas, more particularly the Bloc countries; the quasi-denied areas such as Iraq and Egypt; and the under-developed countries, where there are no facilities of science, commerce and education from which cover might devolve within the society. In those areas where nonofficial cover may provide legality for an agent's residence in the area and concealment of his ultimate objectives, it still may not give him access to designated targets. Unless it does, nonofficial cover is unproductive. The identification of a target and access to it through a viable cover instrument is an essential combination in the employment of nonofficial cover.

The more tactical operations (particularly in those countries where CIA presence is welcome or at least tolerated) are better done by individuals under official cover. For example, liaison and joint operations are more effectively and more cheaply carried on from an official installation than from a nonofficial one, for the simple reason that secure files, work space and communications are readily at hand. It is poor economy of manpower and overseas dollars to conduct this collaborative effort through the usage of the much more expensive nonofficial cover unless some clear advantage is gained thereby.

No sweeping or general conclusion can be applied to a relationship of official cover to nonofficial cover, except in those few places where there is relatively a free choice between the two. But since there are not very many of those, each country must be considered as a problem in itself. The augmentation of nonofficial cover assets lies in closer examination of the operational possibilities of nonofficial cover in each individual station to insure that it is employed in instances where it is available and will enable the representative to do his job or accomplish his task. We must start with a consideration of our objective in a given area and determine if we can reasonably expect to reach it through nonofficial cover.

To this end, some months ago the CIA initiated a worldwide planning program. Each station and base chief was asked to evaluate his operations, present and projected, to determine the most efficient balance between staff under official cover and staff under nonofficial cover, to be achieved, as a target date, five years hence. Practically all of these plans have now been received in Washington and are in process of Headquarters evaluation. It was clear even before the planning was undertaken, that certain stations needed seasoned officers under nonofficial cover and that there was a big void in the category of the officer who, as a young man, might locate under nonofficial cover in a given community and spend the better part of his career serving both the purposes of his cover and CIA.

During the past year there has been a gratifying improvement on both counts. These programs will continue to have high priority and be the subject of intensive efforts.

As evidence of our concentration on this important subject we have recently established in the Clandestine Services of CIA a new component, the Domestic Operations Division and Station (DODS), which will be responsible for the management of relations between the Agency and private enterprise in the United States. In this component has been placed responsibility for the maximum utilization of the facilities offered by business, education, foundations, etc. in furthering and supporting the activities of the Agency. We expect that the effort of this component will lead to improved nonofficial cover and more extensive assistance by the nonofficial resources of the U. S. in many aspects of the Agency's activity.

The best possibility of attaining intelligence assets after a break in diplomatic relations or a hostile takeover lies in the creation and maintenance of a dormant skeletal network prior thereto, with activation on signal from without at some future date. This plan has actually been followed in cooperation with local Services in certain European areas and it has proved to be burdensome and very costly in terms of both manpower and money. CIA does not have the capability in addition to its current operations to create and maintain this type of staybehind on a very large scale. This does not mean that nothing should be done in those cases where a hostile takeover or a break in relations appear probable. Efforts to penetrate the communist apparat and communist cadres should be heavily augmented. Other minority groups should also be penetrated. Individuals who have not been active in either espionage or national politics and who might survive the takeover should be identified, cleared and even approached at a given point in the developing situation. All in all, more should and can be done in those cases. The answer to the problem of the survival of networks after takeover, however, does not lie in the deployment of more Americans under nonofficial cover.

In each of the last two years, the Department of State and CIA have jointly made a searching examination of the officer manpower at all posts (stations and bases) of which there are 165. Officer ceilings for CIA as of August 1, 1962, were fixed at 470 positions, or an average of 2.8 positions per post. Giving effect to reductions and adjustments resulting from that examination, there are at present 7 posts where there are 10 or more FSR positions, and in addition only 20 posts where the FSR positions are 5 or more, but less than 10.

An informed current estimate is that the Soviet Union employs worldwide under official cover more than 1300 operations officers (known or suspect KGB, 652; known or suspect GRU, 328; known or suspect RIS (Service unidentified), 312). There are about 370 Soviet permanent officials serving in New York City and Washington, D. C. Of these 370 permanent Soviet "officials", there are 140 positively identified intelligence officers and 33 who are suspects. In addition, there are hundreds of Soviets who visit the United States with the U.S. General Assembly or with other Soviet delegations and groups. Almost without exception, these groups contain Soviet intelligence officers under official cover. While the Soviet official representation in the U.S. has included 140 individuals known to be engaged in intelligence activities the CIA has never had more than four on duty in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Overseas, the present total of American operatives under non-official cover is 1,000, plus or minus, including a hard core of 300 staff agents and career agents. The figure of about 1000 compares with a figure of 550 in 1955, the first year the consolidated figures are available. Perhaps more significant is the fact that the "hard core" totals have risen to 300 from a total of 200 in 1959. When it comes to the employment of foreign nationals, figures are much less reliable because the records of secondary agents often exist only in operational reports. However, in terms of primary agents of foreign nationality on a worldwide basis, the number is on the order of 10,000.

There has not been a progressive loss of our capability in the field of clandestine intelligence operations. On the contrary our capability has increased. As an example during the last half of 1960, 2514 sources produced 23,034 positive information reports disseminated by the Clandestine Services of CIA. During the last half of 1962, 2850 sources produced 22,256 positive information reports disseminated by the Clandestine Services of the CIA. The smaller number of reports during the second period resulted from a concerted effort to reduce marginal reporting and encourage fewer but better reports.

On the situation in Latin America, the South America Assessment Team in its report of January 10, 1962 stated that in general CIA had established a healthy foundation for the collection of intelligence information;

that this base should be retained; that what was needed from then on was expansion, strengthening and refinement of capabilities in various fields of activity. During the past year CIA has made progress in expanding, strengthening and refining its capability in the clandestine collection of intelligence information in Latin America. CIA has opened new stations in Kingston, Jamaica; Georgetown, British Guiana and the Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana and has opened bases in Cordoba, Argentina; Merida, Mexico and in Belem, Belo Horizanto, Curitiba and Salvador, Brazil. During the past year, CIA personnel in the field in Latin America has been increased by 54, including 24 officers under nonofficial cover. This makes a total of 355 officers in Latin America. A substantial additional number of officers under non-official cover will be assigned to the field during the coming year. Increased emphasis on the collection of intelligence information in Latin America during the past year has resulted in the activation of 263 additional clandestine sources of information. CIA now has 1949 agents approved for use in Latin America - an increase of 242 in the past year. Penetrations of Communist Parties and Front Organizations in Latin America now number 142.

3. The recommendation of the Board. We recommend, while it is still possible, continued high-level and low-level (as required) aerial reconnaissance of Cuba as one means of acquiring photographic and signals intelligence concerning the military installations, the military forces, the modern military weaponry and the highly sophisticated communications facilities which the Soviets retain in Cuba. This surveillance effort must be accompanied by priority planning for the development of acceptable substitutes (such as drones, improved satellite reconnaissance, etc.) in lieu of present aerial reconnaissance coverage, when and if such coverage is denied us by air defense systems now being installed by the Soviets in Cuba on a scale matched only by Soviet air defense installations in the areas of Moscow and Leningrad. We also recommend the launching at the earliest possible date of a vigorous clandestine agent program to provide surreptitious collection of on-the-ground photography of intelligence targets in Cuba, as an essential supplement to aerial surveillance of the island.

Comment. We agree in general with this recommendation. High-level aerial reconnaissance of Cuba acquiring both photographic and signals intelligence concerning the military installation, the military forces, the modern military weaponry, and highly sophisticated communications facilities in Cuba is continuing. At present low-level reconnaissance is not included in the Cuban reconnaissance program. Authority will be sought for its use should a sufficiently suspicious objective of potentially offensive character be reported which cannot be covered by high altitude photography or other sources.

The United States Intelligence Board has approved SIGINT requirements for the use of a drone against Cuba when the circumstances require. A photographic drone capability exists and separate requirements for its use can be generated when necessary. This capability is now on a standby basis and could be activated within 10 days. Present satellite reconnaissance capabilities cannot provide the detailed information necessary for meeting our requirements in Cuba. Even though a decision were made to program a satellite for the southern latitudes, sacrificing the presently achievable resolution over priority targets in the USSR, it is felt that the results would not be satisfactory. The best resolution that might be obtained falls far short of the present requirement. The asset cannot be used on an "on-call" basis either in terms of launching or in terms of insuring that a pass will cover Cuba, and if it does that such pass could occur in satisfactory weather conditions. Whereas improved satellite performance is in the offing, these factors would still apply for the foreseeable future.

With regard to on-the-ground photography of targets in Cuba, as pointed out above we are vigorously attempting to infiltrate or recruit agents in Cuba. Selected agents will be provided photographic equipment. It should be realized, however, that the photographing of prime intelligence targets in a denied area, even with cleverly concealed cameras, is difficult.

4. The recommendation of the Board. We urge that without further delay a major clandestine agent effort be directed to the obtaining of vitally-needed signals intelligence available from the array of extraordinarily sophisticated communications equipment which is being installed and operated in Cuba by the USSR. Some of the systems already identified appear to be under command control running from the Ministry of Defense in Moscow to key Soviet ground, naval and air force commands in Cuba, and their permanent installation on the island marks the first time that they have been deployed at such distances from the protected confines of the Soviet domain. The proximity to the United States of this communication equipment presents our intelligence collectors with unique opportunities to seek the means for "reading" not only the current traffic carried on highly secure communications systems of the USSR, but also back traffic which has been so securely protected as to defy our most sophisticated efforts to break it. We recognize

that continued priority must be devoted to attacking this problem through our present and planned use of intercept and direction finding facilities employed at vantage points on land, in the air and at sea. In addition to such coverage we strongly recommend that: a) clandestine agent programs be devised and set in motion at once in Cuba, with a view to acquiring through surreptitious means, including the use of portable recording equipment capable of concealment on an agent's person, the emanations from Soviet encoding machines which are captureable at reasonable distance from the communications centers at which they are employed, and b) that steps be taken to ensure the readiness of commando-type or covert action plans and task forces as may be required for the pre-emption of Soviet communication sites and encryption machines in the event that opportunities for such action should be provided under circumstances of successful internal revolt or invasion.

Comment. The collection of Signals Intelligence from within Cuba has been under way for some time. The most sophisticated of Soviet equipments were not identified as being in Cuba until October 28, 1962, and it has not yet been possible to identify their precise location, through either electronic or agent means. Arrangements are now underway which may enable NSA to provide the Clandestine Services with considerably more accurate supplementary D/F results. An airborne D/F "homing" technique will be utilized to attempt to pinpoint the locations of transmitters in other than heavily populated areas. The first target mission is now scheduled for approximately February 1, 1963. Under most favorable conditions, however, it is not anticipated that this effort would yield position accuracy of better than a kilometer. Further refinement of such results would be dependent upon a clandestine close-in effort to determine the exact locations where the devices are being used. There is no information available to indicate that these installations are "permanent", although there is no doubt, as of this date, that they are under complete Soviet control. Without question, Cubans are not permitted access to the areas in which the machines are located nor are Cubans being trained in the use of the machines. The identification of the more sophisticated equipments comes from Signals Intelligence, and the variety of agent sources available to us in Cuba has not reported on any aspect of this equipment, indicating that the Cuban officials themselves with whom our agents are in touch are not aware of the nature of the equipment the Soviets have put into Cuba.

Inasmuch as the only information on these devices has been derived by purely cryptanalytic attack, no data are available concerning their technical or possible radiation characteristics. Since it is virtually certain that the Soviets are aware of the existence of possibly compromising radiations from cipher equipments as well as from electromechanical printing devices which are at times associated with them, it is not considered likely that a radiation attack can be accomplished using simple detection devices. Additional support is lent to this opinion by the complete absence of Soviet use of any enciphering equipment in any embassy or mission outside the iron curtain. The only exception in the past has been the use of one or two cipher equipments by very special VIP parties on Soviet naval vessels. In the event that the machines do not have electrical circuits, there would be in such case no radiation or emanations which would be captureable at any distance from the centers in which the machines are located. Considerable research is currently being conducted to overcome the technical difficulties in portability and sensitivity which are inherent in an effort to intercept by means of clandestine agents emanations from Soviet equipments.

In view of the lack of information noted above, the clandestine effort against Soviet COMINT in Cuba must consist of (a) first attempting to locate the machines themselves, and (b) devising possible means of access to the machines. CIA is currently reviewing all possible locations in Cuba where the machines may possibly be located in an effort to develop target data on each location, including terrain, security factors, order of battle of Soviet units, and personalities on each possible installation. In the absence of adequate D/Fing and with the lack of information on the location of the machines, we cannot be too sanguine about locating the target installation with sufficient accuracy to devise ways and means of creating a feasible operational situation within any scheduled phasing. Every effort is being made, however, to develop more precise targeting data. These efforts to locate the targets and to identify the facilities and agents who may eventually be used, have been given the highest priority.

The Board's recommendation that there be available commando-type or covert action plans and task forces to take advantage of an internal revolt or an invasion has been the subject of past and present planning and preparation by CIA, and discussions have been held with NSA concerning the best means of achieving this end. These discussions will continue with NSA and with DOD with the objective of creating the needed stand-by facility and incorporating it into the appropriate military plans with specific assignment of responsibilities. In addition, CIA has in being externally held assets which can be utilised for a commando-raid operation, in the event of a significant internal uprising. Without the precise location of the machines, however, even at such a time it will be difficult to target the commando raid with any assurances of success. It must be borne in mind, however, that any such direct action, short of open U. S. military invasion, is likely to lead to Soviet reprisals in one form or another against sophisticated U. S. communications equipments. The Soviets will probably, in such event, not be hampered by as many considerations as would the U. S., should this lead to a chain reaction on the part of the Soviets. At the same time, the intelligence value of the equipments obtained must be constantly reviewed if the information is to be obtained by other than surreptitious means.

In sum, therefore, this is a problem with which the intelligence community has long been troubled. There are no panaceas, and even though the location of the equipment, for the first time so close to U. S. shores, seems, therefore, to make it appear easier to obtain the required intelligence, the facts of the matter are to the contrary in that the Soviets are still maintaining full and complete control over the equipment just as they have done in the past in more contiguous areas to the Soviet Union.

5. The recommendation of the Board. In instances where exceptional intelligence collection techniques involving unusual risks are proposed to meet priority intelligence objectives and their use is opposed on ground that elements of risk are present, the matter should be referred to the Presidential level for final decision. We recommend this procedure because our Government may well be faced with the necessity of assuming increasing risks if we are to acquire a firm intelligence basis for estimating present and future Soviet capabilities and intentions in Cuba and in other potential trouble spots.

Comment. We concur in this recommendation. We assume that term "Presidential level" means the President.

6. The recommendation of the Board. In view of evidence from Cuba that the Soviets are resorting to use of camouflage of missile installations, we recommend that the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) assign a high priority to experiments, under controlled conditions, to determine the effectiveness of short and long range photography against various types of camouflage and concealment of photographic targets. We believe that new sensing and illumination methods may now be available which would be of assistance in reaching a solution of this critical problem.

Comment. We agree. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance already has recommended the use of camouflage detection film in reconnaissance of Cuba. This has never been tried so the COMOR has requested that tests be made of the available camouflage detection film and that the results be reported to COMOR in order that it may be aware of the full nature of the capability should requirements indicate a need for its use. In addition, the Committee has requested a briefing by the Joint Reconnaissance Center on the full range of FLASH LIGHT photography both low- and high-altitude so that it may be fully aware of the assets available to meet requirements.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

27 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

SUBJECT: Interim Report to the President by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, dated December 28, 1962

At its last meeting the Special Group considered Recommendations 3 and 5 of your Interim Report to the President dated December 28, 1962, along with comments on these recommendations from the DCI, CIA, State and Defense.

The Group agreed with the objectives of Recommendation 3, and it has under continual review the question of adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba. With respect to satellite coverage, it appears that within the reasonably near future the technical characteristics of these vehicles will make it impossible to cover the intelligence requirements adequately. Drones are available on a standby basis and could be employed if necessary.

The Group agrees further that on-the-ground photography in Cuba is highly desirable, and some clandestine agents will be provided with appropriate equipment. It was recognized, however, that this is a highly risky endeavor with limited chances of success under existing circumstances.

Recommendation 5 was noted by the Special Group. The members agreed completely with the view that unusually risky intelligence operations be referred to the Presidential level for decision whenever there is a serious need to balance opportunity against risk. On matters of this kind the Group frequently refers the decision to the President, and in such cases considers itself simply as advisory to him. This procedure will continue to be followed.

McGeorge Bundy

Rec'd.
2-28-63 B—
[illegible]
P.B. #1186

cc: Special Group Members

SC-02206-63-TKH

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

Cy 1 of 6 Cys

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10013
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF JUNE 4, 1964
DATE : 06/04/64
PAGES : 29
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR JUNE 4, 1964 MEETING

SUMMARY OF JUNE 4, 1964 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF JUNE 4, 1964

206-10001-10013

Bd. Minutes

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dr. Baker 9:30
Mr. [illegible] 10:00

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JUNE 4, 1964

Gen. Doolittle
absent

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
1.	9:00 - 9:30	Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - 9:45	National Reconnaissance Program - Status Report Mr. Coyne
3.	9:45 - 10:00	Audio Penetrations of U.S. Embassy, Moscow Dr. Baker and Mr. Coyne
4.	10:00 - 10:15	Executive Session
5.	10:15 - 11:00 [illegible]	USIB Actions Related to Audio Pentrations--Moscow Mr. Robert Bannerman Chairman, Security Committee, USIB Mr. G. Marvin Gentile Director of Security, Department of State
6.	10:30 - 12:00 ~~11:00~~ - ~~11:45~~	Assessment of Potential Damage to Cryptographic Systems Caused by Audio Penetrations--Moscow Lt. General Gordon Blake Director, National Security Agency Dr. Louis Tordella Deputy Director, National Security Agency
7.	12:00 - 12:15 ~~11:45~~ - ~~12:00~~	Executive Session
8.	12:15 12:00 - 1:00	Lunch - The White House Mess
9.	2:15 1:00 - 2:00	Current Intelligence Briefing on:

a. Chi-Com Capabilities and Intentions as related to Southeast Asia, India and USSR

b. The Situations in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam

c. The Cyprus Situation

d. The Cuba Situation

~~Mr. Ray Cline~~ R. Jack Smith
Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA
with Mr. Clinton B. Conger

~~TOP SECRET~~

AGENDA FOR JUNE 4, 1964 (Continued):

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
10.	2:15 ~~2:00~~ - 2:45	Status Report on Military (peripheral and overflight) Reconnaissance Programs (other than satellite) Colonel Ralph D. Steakley, USAF Director, Joint Reconnaissance Center, Pentagon Sgt. McCoy
11.	2:45 - 3:00	Executive Session
12.	8:00 - 8:45 ~~3:30~~	On-the-Scene Review at Moscow Embassy of State Department's Counter-audiosurveillance Measures to Safeguard U. S. Classified Systems and Information Dr. Jerome Wiesner / with [illegible] S. Keeny M.I.T. (White House Consultant and former Science Advisor to the President)
13.	3:30 - 4:00	Status Report on the Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations Mr. Ash
14.	4:00 - 6:30 ~~5:30~~	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence Mr. John A. McCone / with Mr. Kirkpatrick Desmond Fitzgerald + Robert Myers
15.	~~5:30 - 6:30~~	~~Executive Session~~
16.	6:30 - 8:00	Dinner - Metropolitan Club
17.	7:45 ~~8:00~~ - End of Day 9:30	a) Discussion of peripheral and overflight reconnaissance b) Discussion of audio problem c) Consideration of up-dated requirements for Annual Reports to the Board by State, Defense, CIA, and the DCI.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This document consists of 19 pages
No. 1 of 2 Copies, Series a

June 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Meeting, June 4, 1964.

This regularly scheduled meeting of the Board convened at 9:00 a.m., June 4, 1964, in the Board offices, 297 Executive Office Building. Previously scheduled as a 2-day meeting, it was compressed into one day in order to accommodate other commitments and to permit the holding of Board Panel sessions on the following day. Present were Chairman Clifford and Messrs. Pace, Murphy, Langer and Gray; and J. Patrick Coyne and A. R. Ash. General Doolittle was unable to attend because of transportation difficulties in Alaska. Messrs. Baker and Land were unavoidably late in arriving, and upon their arrival later in the morning received a fill-in from the Chairman concerning the matters which had been discussed up to that point.

Chairman Clifford pointed out that the business of this meeting was confined to major subjects of particular importance: (1) recent developments following the submission to the President of the Board's May 2 report and recommendations on the National Reconnaissance Program (2) the recent discovery of extensive microphone installations in the U. S. Embassy, Moscow -- a most serious penetration which had prompted the Chairman to request a Board Panel study immediately upon his learning of the discovery, and (3) the subject of acquiring intelligence on Communist China, a problem highlighted by remarks of the Secretary of Defense when he was recently visited by Chairman Clifford, Dr. Baker and Mr. Coyne -- at which time Secretary McNamara expressed deep concern over the absence of meaningful intelligence on Chinese capabilities, intentions and activities (Mr. McNamara said that the USIB is not adequate for his purposes in this regard; he has to make decisions without the benefit of adequate intelligence support; if he can't get help from the USIB and CIA he will attempt to get the required intelligence through other sources; and he would welcome any assistance the Board might provide as a means of resolving this intelligence collection problem.)

With reference to the Board's report on the National Reconnaissance Program, Mr. Clifford said that it had gone to the White House on May 2. Thereafter two appointments with the President had to be cancelled, thereby preventing discussion of the report with the President. Accordingly, Mr. Clifford suggested to Mr. McGeorge Bundy that the matter was urgent. The same day, Mr. Bundy took up the report with the President, with the resulting decision that Mr. Bundy would obtain the views and comments of the Secretary of Defense and of the DCI, Mr. McCone, concerning the Board's report and recommendations, in order that further consideration might be given by the President.

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

IDEALIST/CORONA/OXCART
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

At Mr. Clifford's request, Mr. Coyne summarized the comments which had been submitted on the NRP report by the two officials in response to Mr. Bundy's memorandum. The June 2, 1964, response from Deputy Secretary Vance expressed concurrence of the Department of Defense in the report and its readiness to carry out the recommendations when instructed to do so. However, in his May 28 memorandum to Mr. Bundy, the DCI reported that he found it difficult to distill his thoughts in time for a written expression of views for immediate consideration; that he would be able to discuss the matter orally with the Board at this meeting; that his written views could be submitted by June 15; and that meanwhile he intended to discuss with the Director, NRO, any management problems the latter might have in mind.

Chairman Clifford thought it gratifying that the Defense Department had accepted the Board's NRP report and recommendations in toto, and he referred to informally received indications that the Department of Defense is anxious to get on with the actions proposed in the Board's report. Noting that the preliminary reply from the DCI was noncommital, Mr. Clifford thought it best that the Board not engage in a discussion of the NRP report with the DCI when he joined the Board meeting later in the day. Mr. Clifford observed that the Board had studied the subject in depth; it had reached conclusions and made recommendations to the President; Mr. Bundy had asked for comments to the President by Messrs. McNamara and McCone; and it was desirable to keep the matter in that channel, rather than reopening discussions with the DCI at this Board meeting.

(Dr. Baker arrived at the Board meeting at this point.)

At the Chairman's request, Mr. Coyne summarized for the Board the reported successes and failures of satellite reconnaissance photographic missions since January 1, 1964 (4 successful missions; 3 failures) and the NRO mission schedule for the remainder of the year. (He also referred to the NRO report that OXCART has been flown at Mach 3.2 at 81,700 feet.)

Chairman Clifford noted that the manner in which the NRO reports on its satellite missions leaves much to be desired. He felt that the Board should ask for more meaningful reports from NRO, reflecting the number of missions scheduled, the number that were launched, how many succeeded, and how many failed and why. Also Mr. Clifford thought that the Board should be fully informed on how the USIB determines that the NRO has a capability to meet specified intelligence requirements through the launching of "X" number of missions over a given future period, e.g., "two flights per month".

Discussed [illegible] 6/22/64

Dr. Baker added that no one has efficiently organized the process of analyzing the photographic take from satellite missions, for the purpose of identifying intelligence targets which warrant further "point search" on future missions.

Turning to the matter of the technical penetration of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow, Mr. Clifford recalled that he had asked the Board's Baker Panel and Mr. Coyne to go into the subject immediately upon Mr. Clifford's learning of the discovery of the first of the 41 microphones on April 23. He noted that Mr. Bundy had asked Dr. Jerome Wiesner to make an on-the-scene assessment of the penetration during Dr. Wiesner's visit to Moscow this past week on other business, and he would join the Board meeting later in the day to report on that assessment. Also, Mr. Clifford noted, the Board meeting would later be joined by Dr. Tordella of NSA, Mr. Bannerman of CIA who chairs the USIB Security Committee, and Mr. Gentile who serves as Director of Security in the State Department.

Mr. Coyne summarized for Board members the highlights of the discovery of the technical penetration of the Embassy in Moscow, with indications that the 41 microphones, the 3 coaxial cables, the wiring, and the fixed antenna in the wall, have all been in place since 1952 when the Soviet Union completed construction on the Embassy building in preparation for U. S. occupancy which took place in 1953.

(Dr. Land arrived at the Board meeting at this point.)

Mr. Coyne drew attention to the fact that the microphone installations included coverage of the Embassy code room. He referred in this connection to the NSA damage evaluation dealt with in Tab C of the June 1 "Preliminary Damage Assessment" which had just been received from the USIB Security Committee. Mr. Coyne thought it regrettable that the State Department security people in Moscow had cut the cables upon discovery of the microphone and related installations. Mr. Clifford agreed, recalling that when he first learned of the development from Mr. Coyne he urged that efforts be made to keep the discovered items in place for the time being. Mr. Coyne said that this was urged on the State Department but certain State Department officials thought the Board was getting into operations, and a cable went out to Ambassador Kohler instructing him to proceed and to lodge a protest with the Soviet government.

Mr. Coyne called Board members' attention to the summary of U. S. Ambassadors' assessments (appearing in the USIB's Security Committee report) which discounted the likelihood of damage to the U. S. from the technical penetration of the Embassy.

Mr. Coyne pointed to the 1962 report of the Soviet defector who informed CIA (which in turn informed the State Department) that the Embassy in Moscow was bugged at various strategic locations. Mr. Coyne said that he had recently asked State Department representatives what had been done on the basis of the defector's 1962 report, and it appeared that no action had been taken by State Department security technicians -- until recent digging operations were begun following receipt of a report from a second Soviet defector early in 1964 that microphones were in place in specific Embassy office locations. Mr. Coyne also related the substance of his inquiries made of the State Department Chief of Communications (Mr. Coffey) in the summer of 1963 when Khrushchev boasted to Governor Harriman that he could produce a copy of a message which Ambassador Kohler had sent to Washington regarding the U. S. position on Soviet pipe-line negotiations with West Germany (Mr. Coffey's finding was to the effect that no communications penetration could in fact be established).

Chairman Clifford expressed the view that there appeared to have been raised in this discussion a fundamental question to which the Board might well give its attention -- i.e., the overall attitude of the U. S. Government toward counterintelligence, intelligence and the security of intelligence matters. In this instance the Board had raised an important point in urging that the penetration cables not be cut precipitously when discovered in the Embassy, but the Board's urging was ignored. Mr. Clifford thought it appropriate to determine just what forum does have cognizance in such important developments as this one, i. e., whether the USIB, or the Special 5412 Group, or other group, has cognizance in these matters. Mr. Coyna read from NSC 5618 the policy requirement that upon the discovery of listening devices, U. S. agencies are required to obtain high level determinations as to whether the devices should be left in place for purposes of exploitation against the foreign intelligence service involved.

Mr. Gray expressed concern about the possibility that the Moscow penetration enabled the Soviets to learn what the U. S. was doing and about to do with regard to Cuba in the Fall of 1962.

In answer to the Chairman's inquiry, Mr. Coyne reported that U. S. security technicians do not today have a device capable of detecting a shielded cable microphone imbedded 7 inches in the wall, as in the case of the 41 microphones found in the U. S. Embassy, Moscow.

At 10:30 a.m. the Board meeting was joined by Mr. Bannerman of CIA (Chairman of the USIB Security Committee); Dr. Tordella, Deputy Director of NSA; and Mr. Marvin Gentile, since March 1964, Director of the Office of Security, U. S. Department of State. Mr. Clifford indicated the Board's interest in being fully informed on the facts relating to the recent discovery of the penetration in Moscow; the effectiveness of detection methods used at the Embassy previously and those available at present; and the information which led to the recent discoveries. Mr. Bannerman said that he could speak to the assessment of damage, leaving to Mr. Gentile the discussion of the history and effectiveness of tests to detect the presence of listening devices.

Referring to the USIB Security Committee's June 1 "Preliminary Damage Assessment", Mr. Bannerman explained that Army, Navy and Air Force had conducted interviews of personnel formerly assigned to the Embassy (now scattered) but the inquiries were along the line of possible compromise of military attache type of information, exclusive of the compromise of communications. On the other hand, State Department interviews of personnel previously assigned at the Embassy were made on the assumption that the Soviets had access to conversations and to communications as well. (Army, Navy and Air Force are still in the process of reviewing their old traffic in an effort to see whether their communications were compromised.) Mr. Bannerman pointed to the State Department conclusion that no damage to U. S. foreign policy can be detected as a result of the bugging of our Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Bannerman pointed to the conclusion in the USIB assessment to the effect that the Soviets did get information on operations, and on military attache movements, and on the intelligence targets in which they were interested. He pointed out that the agencies report that important decisions were not discussed aloud, but in whispers or in the form of written notes.

(Chairman Clifford thought it remarkable that such precautions would have been consistently maintained over such a long period of 11 years.)

In answer to Mr. Coyne's inquiry, Mr. Bannerman said that the Security Committee's preliminary assessment had been "noted" by the USIB and USIB had approved the recommendations, with the request that the Security Committee complete a final assessment.

Mr. Bannerman said that it is most difficult to attempt to assess the damage to U. S. interests resulting from the Moscow penetration. First is the task of identifying information to which the Soviets may have obtained access. The next task is to try and find instances in which Soviet reaction provides evidence that a compromise of information was effected. Moreover, since this was a Soviet intelligence operation, the information obtained by the intelligence operators would not be passed on to Soviet political desks or to Soviet bloc allies without attributing to some source other than the technical penetration. Dr. Langer thought that, nevertheless, all such information obtained by technical penetration of the U. S. Embassy would be reviewed and utilized where possible by the Soviet government. Mr. Bannerman acknowledged that this would be the case, but he emphasized the difficulty in observing and identifying Soviet reactions and actions as being based on compromised U. S. information or communications. Dr. Land expressed the view that it is dangerous to assume that our information was not compromised because we cannot observe specific Soviet reactions to such information. Dr. Baker wondered whether the assessment of the 3 U. S. Ambassadors that no damage was done is in essence a finding that intelligence is worthless, is not needed, or is not used when it is obtained.

Chairman Clifford asked whether it is possible to relate compromised U. S. information to Soviet actions with respect to Cuba. Mr. Bannerman referred to the USIB Security Committee assessment on that point. Mr. Gentile pointed out that by 1962 an acoustically shielded conference room and an electronically shielded code room had been installed in the Embassy, and in addition the practice has always been followed of writing out sensitive information. Mr. Gray thought that the State Department assessment referred to in the Conclusions of the USIB Security Committee report should be amended by adding to the effect that "or, if the information was compromised, it was used by the Soviets with such skill as to conceal whether in fact the information was compromised".

Mr. Pace wondered whether information obtained by the Soviets through this technical penetration of our Embassy might not have resulted in the Soviet identification of any defectors serving as intelligence agents for the U. S. Mr. Bannerman said that this is a possibility in the Penkovsky case, and CIA is awaiting the assessment reports of other agencies in order to study this possibility further.

Mr. Pace asked whether the USIB, in accepting other agencies' own assessments of whether their information had been compromised, was not in effect accepting self-serving statements rather than performing an abstract assessment. Mr. Bannerman said that each agency is considered to have the greatest competence in assessing the extent of any compromise of its own information.

Mr. Gentile informed the Board that the Embassy in Moscow was first designed and built as an apartment house. Then in 1952 it was made available to the U. S. for lease and occupancy as an Embassy building and apartment living quarters. The U. S. accepted the building, and in 1952 the Soviets added three top floors for use as Embassy offices. During the construction period no U. S. technical inspections were possible because access to the construction work was limited to cursory inspections. For a period of 3 weeks in March 1953 no Americans were given access to the building, and the construction area on the top three floors was covered by plywood screens said to have been put up to hasten the drying of plaster. The U. S. occupied the Embassy on May 1, 1953, under the lease. Since that time there have been 27 inspections in an effort to locate listening devices. Plaster was chipped in spots, floors were taken up in some locations, and various searches made short of tearing rooms apart -- all without locating any devices. Meanwhile, over the years Embassy personnel have been briefed and cautioned on the assumption that the Embassy was penetrated by listening devices.

On June 20, 1962, Mr. Gentile continued, his predecessors in the State Department Office of Security received from CIA the Soviet defector's 1962 report that the Embassy was bugged. This was made known to the State Department resident security technician who went to Moscow 3 months later. There is nothing in the files to indicate if any instructions went out or any action taken on the basis of the 1962 defector report. There is no indication that the Ambassador was informed.

In February 1964 the State Department resident security technician in the Moscow Embassy returned to Washington and there was discussed the question of the possible total destruction of an Embassy room in an effort to find listening devices. In March 1964 the State Department Security people received the report given by the second Soviet defector, pinpointing locations of concealed microphones. Accordingly, the destruction of one room was authorized by the Department of State Security Office (Room 10008 on the top floor) and on April 23, 1964, the first of the 41 microphones was uncovered.

Mr. Coyne asked about the cutting of the cables. Mr. Gentile said that this occurred two days after the discovery of the first microphone on April 23. The decision was made in the Security Office of State, not by the chief technician in Moscow. Mr. Clifford asked whether it had occurred to responsible officials to consider the possibility of exploiting the microphones found. Mr. Gentile said that in the first place it was assumed that the Soviets had spotted the technical men who were sent in by State Department, and that the noise of the jackhammer and other digging operations had alerted the Soviets that the discoveries had been made. Moreover, the microphones discovered were not considered unique finds requiring any unique technical study. Moreover, as part of standing operations procedure, State notified the CIA and other interested agencies immediately on making the first find, although this notification was not made at the Secretary level. It was decided that exploitation was not feasible.

The decision to cut the cables, however, was made by State Department, Mr. Gentile said. In answer to Mr. Murphy's question he said that State Department desk officers and the Ambassadors were told, but their judgments were not sought as to the matter of cutting the cables.

Mr. Bannerman stated that the prescribed procedure was followed on the question of possible exploitation. State Department people discussed this with counterintelligence officers in CIA (including Mr. Angelton) and it was decided that no exploitation was possible because the Soviets had undoubtedly learned of the discovery of the microphones uncovered by extensive and noisy digging operations.

Mr. Gentile said that much remains to be done, including (1) a complete technical assessment of the fidelity of the Soviet devices (2) completion of the examination of the North Wing of the Embassy, and (3) the initiation of a search of the South Wing.

Mr. Bannerman observed that a key factor is the tremendous disadvantage to the U. S. resulting from Soviet control of the construction of buildings to be occupied by U. S. personnel.

As for the level of Soviet capability evidenced by the quality and kind of microphones discovered, Dr. Tordella said that they are better than the ones we have for this particular kind of installation.

Dr. Tordella expressed the opinion that the Moscow installation resulted in a compromise of our encrypted communications, particularly if you accord to the Soviets the capability of the U. S., U. K., and Germans. From 1953-1959 State used the MCB code machine (identical to that used by U. S. military attaches, 1953-1954) which is vulnerable to audiosurveillance which can detect the plain text being printed by the machine. Also the MCB machine could be cryptographically reconstructed by the opposition. (In 1948 an Army code room Sergeant defected under circumstances indicating that he had photographed materials which would have given complete information on the machine.) So, from 1953-1959 we must assume the Soviets were capable of reconstructing the machine, and also of reading the plain text from which the encryptions were made. All incoming and outgoing encrypted traffic of the Embassy could have been read, as well as traffic of other Iron Curtain U. S. posts using this system. From 1959-1962 (before installation of the electronically shielded code room in the Embassy) all Confidential encyphered material was subject to audio attack. Secret traffic was vulnerable until 1961, as was Top Secret until 1960 when the use of 1-time pads was required. After December 1962 (when the electronically shielded room was installed), according to tests run by NSA, there was no compromise of Embassy traffic through audio or electromagnetic penetrations. The screen grill antenna found in the wall of the North Wing of the Embassy, with coaxial cables attached, probably served as a Soviet means of electronic intercept of emanations from the U. S. 1-time teleprinter in the Embassy (and although this effort was frustrated in October 1960 when such machines were not permitted to be used at U. S. posts behind the Iron Curtain, that rule was lifted with respect to our Embassy in the USSR when the acoustically shielded room was installed in Moscow.)

As for the microwave energy signal which has been beamed at the Embassy building at least since 1957, Dr. Tordella believes that the purpose of the signal is to harrass us.

At 12:05 p.m. Messrs. Tordella, Bannerman and Gentile departed the Board meeting with the thanks of the Chairman for their assistance.

Following lunch, the Board resumed its meeting at 1:00 p.m. at which time Mr. R. J. Smith of CIA (Deputy to Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy DCI for Intelligence) presented a briefing of the situation in Laos, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. (Chairman Clifford left the meeting in response to a telephone call from the President.)

Mr. Smith outlined some CIA views concerning intentions and capabilities of the Chinese Communists: (1) the Chicoms hope to see China become a center of Communist authority world-wide, setting policy even for the USSR (2) the Chicom leaders presently wish to avoid high risk actions (3) Communist China has not achieved a nuclear production capability (4) of the 15 SAM sites in China, only 4 are operational, and the others lack equipment, and (5) the Chicom Air Force is deteriorating and replacements are slow in coming. CIA believes that Communist China will encourage Hanoi to keep high level of pressure going in Laos and South Vietnam; will continue efforts to subvert Malaysia; will avoid hostilities with the U. S.; will avoid a formal breach with the USSR, preferring to erode Soviet influence around the world; and will continue to support militant elements of Communist Parties in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia.

In answer to a question by Mr. Pace, Mr. Smith expressed the opinion that if the U. S. moved against Hanoi in the Air, the Chicoms would not react.

Mr. Smith also mentioned briefly the situations in Cuba and in India. Mr. Smith concluded his presentation and left the Board meeting at 2:05 p.m.

At 2:10 the Board meeting was joined by Colonel Steakley, Director of the Joint Reconnaissance Center of the JCS. Colonel Steakley described in some detail the various COMINT, ELINT, Telemetry, and photographic collection programs which are carried out through peripheral and overflight aircraft missions under the monitorship of the JRC (including surface ship and submarine collection of COMINT and ELINT along the China coast). Colonel Steakley referred to the ELINT collection (plus some COMINT and telemetry) through RA-3B peripheral flights in the Artic; C-130 peripheral flights for COMINT collection in the Pacific, European and Cuban areas, including KC-135 missions near the Soviet border; photographic missions (BOW TIE) flown with RF-101 aircraft by Chinat pilots over coastal areas of Southeast China; covert photo collection on MATS (C-97 G) flights over Europe and Indonesia; C-135 telemetry collection missions near the launch areas and impact areas involved in Soviet space and missile activities; and collection of telemetry from satellites over Africa.

Colonel Steakley described the main functions of the JRC as pertaining to (1) monitoring of military reconnaissance programs (2) review and evaluation of missions proposed by the military (3) coordination of reconnaissance operations at the national level (4) U. S. and allied cooperation (5) monitoring of actual reconnaissance operations (6) coordination of policies and procedures, and (7) monitoring of special OPLANS.

In response to a query from Dr. Baker, Colonel Steakley acknowledged that our reconnaissance activity gives the Soviets "training" in detection and in the development of countermeasures.

Mr. Coyne asked whether there is not considerable duplication of intelligence collection as a result of the multiplicity of reconnaissance missions being flown in the same target areas. Colonel Steakley said that some duplication results, but in any event a single ELINT mission will not always pick up all the desired intelligence, whereas follow-on missions will pick up emissions which might not have been encountered on the previous run.

A question was asked by Mr. Coyne about the JRC's working relationship with the NRO. Colonel Steakley said that this is satisfactory, even though not documented.

Dr. Baker asked whether the system is fast enough to accommodate urgent intelligence requirements which might be formulated by non-military agencies, calling for overflights of denied territory, for example. Colonel Steakley said that this capability is adequate and he cited the example of the recent Alaskan earthquake, photographs of which were delivered to Washington within 15 hours after the request was made for them. In answer to a query by Dr. Baker along this same line, Colonel Steakley said that the System is capable of exercising straight-line channel of command to meet intelligence requirement which, e.g., the Secretary of Defense might suddenly need to have fulfilled -- such as a carrier-based U-2 mission over a particular intelligence target all of a sudden. Colonel Steakley expressed confidence that the JRC mechanism and resources are such that suddenly-arising intelligence reconnaissance needs can be met quickly.

Colonel Steakley's visit with the Board was completed and he departed the meeting at 3:30 p.m.

In executive session (with Dr. Baker in the chair during Mr. Clifford's absence) Board members considered and approved proposed letters from the Chairman requesting that State, Defense, CIA and the DCI up-date and revise the scope and coverage of their respective annual reports to the Board concerning the conduct of their intelligence-related responsibilities. These letters were approved and subsequently dispatched by the Chairman.

At 3:55 p.m. Chairman Clifford returned from the President's office and rejoined the Board meeting.

The Board meeting was joined at this point by the DCI, Mr. McCone; and Messrs. Kirkpatrick, Fitzgerald, and Meyers of CIA. Chairman Clifford said that the Board would appreciate hearing from the DCI concerning items of interest to Board members as set out in the list previously provided to the DCI, as well as any other matters which the DCI might wish to cover.

At the DCI's suggestion, Mr. Fitzgerald took up the subject of Cuba which he had discussed previously at the meeting of the Board in April. He reported the recent defection to the U. S. of a Cuban military officer who has been attached to Castro's security service since Castro came to power, and who is in the process of being interviewed concerning the structure of Castro's intelligence organization (the defector being primarily knowledgeable of Cuban external intelligence activities in other Latin American countries).

Mr. Fitzgerald said that there is still the problem of getting agent photography out of Cuba for examination in the U. S. At present the photographs are delivered by agents inside Cuba to a friendly foreign diplomatic mission which forwards them to the CIA in the U. S.

Efforts are still being made to locate the Soviet SIGINT installations in Cuba. A talkative Soviet truck driver who formerly had access to one of the Soviet installations has been transferred back to the Soviet Union, so that source is no longer available.

New miniaturized radios have now been supplied to 8 agents of the CIA in Cuba. There has been some difficulty encountered in the operation of an electronic "dead drop" which involves the use of a static receiver in a friendly Embassy in Havana, which picks up messages from an agent coming within a quarter of a mile of the Embassy.

Referring to newspaper reports of exile raids and attempted raids on Cuba, Mr. Fitzgerald said that there have been successful raids on sugar centrals. The reported executions of 7 "CIA agents" did include 3 who were once serving as agents but who had been doubled some time ago. The British capture of a "raiding party" in the Bahamas actually involved the seizure of Manuel Ray, his female secretary, and two or three others. In any event, these incidents did cause the Castro government to set up the biggest military alert in Cuba to date -- which indicates the uneasiness prevalent there.

(Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting at this point.)

Mr. McCone observed that 2 Soviet ships have left Cuba for Russia in the last few weeks, and 4 others are enroute to Cuba, so a further withdrawal of Soviet personnel is expected. CIA does not know whether the SAM's have been turned over to Cuban control yet. Castro has said he will shoot down our U-2's. Khrushchev told Drew Pearson in Cairo that U. S. U-2 flights over Cuba are unacceptable and that the U. S. should rely on its satellite reconnaissance coverage instead. The word sent by the U. S. to Khrushchev and Castro is that we will continue U-2 surveillance of Cuba. We are in a difficult weather season now but are getting satisfactory results from the 2 or 3 U-2 flights flown each week, Mr. McCone said.

Chairman Clifford asked about Cuban capabilities for bringing down our U-2's. Mr. McCone said that they have that capability. He recalled that a year ago CIA equipped its U-2's with ECM's, but there is a difference of view within the military as to whether this will be effective; and, moreover, the JCS do not want the ECM's to be used over Cuba because this might compromise the SIOP's. (Mr. McCone said that the Secretary of Defense is not much worried about the latter.) Mr. McCone expressed the belief that U. S. reaction would be violent if a U-2 is shot down, and plans are in readiness for such an eventuality. However, if a U-2 is lost it may not be possible to ascertain for certain what happened to it. (We lost a U-2 six months ago and found

Mr. Myers referred to the difficulties of effecting agent penetration of North Vietnam and Laos. South Vietnamese locals are being trained for infiltration into North Vietnam at the present time. (Mr. Myers concluded his briefing of the Board at this point.)

Mr. McCone answered a question from Mr. Murphy by saying that he feels that the intelligence situation in Saigon is unsatisfactory. When Diem was overthrown, the new regime rolled up the former agents of Nu who were operating under CIA supervision in a penetration of the Viet Cong. One of the problems is that U. S. military elements in South Vietnam are less interested in broader national intelligence objectives and are more interested in such data as order-of-battle information; however, USMACV is planning to drop 6-man teams into North Vietnam.

With regard to USIB consideration of increased intelligence coverage of China, Mr. McCone referred to the scheduling of satellite missions and to the beginning effort in the field of clandestine agent coverage. However, Mr. McCone observed, China is a difficult intelligence target. There appear to be few chances for exploitation of dissensions among the Chicoms, even though the economy is a shambles, and even though the military are not being supplied with the equipment they have been expecting. At the same time, the Chicoms seem to be forging ahead in an effort to achieve missile and nuclear capability.

In answer to a question by Mr. Pace, the DCI said that COMINT has proved to be of great value in covering Chicom troop deployment, i.e., traffic analysis of Chicom communications has produced such information. Mr. McCone agreed with Mr. Murphy's comment that the absence of an intelligence capability out of Taiwan is a disappointment, particularly in view of the fact that large numbers of the Chicom military force were once under the command of Chiang. Mr. McCone said that during the last 6 months the Chinats have lost a dozen 6-man intelligence teams sent into China.

Turning to the recent discovery of audio penetration of the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, Mr. McCone noted that the Board had heard from Mr. Bannerman on this subject earlier in the day. The DCI said that he was astounded as anyone else at this development, because he had received the impression that technical sweeps were made of the Embassy. CIA feels that there was an audio penetration of our communications. He said that the problem of fixing responsibility is still being studied, and that as yet no one has gotten to the bottom of the matter. Dr. Land wondered whether there should not be an over-riding responsibility and authority to deal with such problems, rather than leaving them to the individual agencies to solve. Mr. McCone said that he is still studying that question but is not yet ready to make recommendations. He said that there is a need for centralizing research and development efforts in the audio field (For instance, Mr. McCone pointed out that CIA had developed a paint which could have prevented the audio penetration in Moscow, but CIA could not get it approved for use because the color did not appeal to some users). He said that State, Defense and CIA have differing views on how to proceed in the audio field, and there are several NSC directives which Mr. McCone wishes to sort out before he makes any recommendations. CIA has found that security instructions were ignored by officials and other personnel of some agencies, e.g., sensitive information was dictated and was subject to audio intercept. In the DCI's opinion, great damage was done to the U. S. by the Soviet Technical penetration of the Embassy in Moscow.

Mr. Gray pointed out that assessments appearing in the June 1 preliminary report of the USIB Security Committee differed from the DCI's estimate that serious damage was done. Mr. McCone said that General Carter and Mr. Bannerman of CIA think that the damage was very severe; but the DCI added that he had not studied the USIB report inasmuch as he was out of the country attending the Honolulu conference.

Chairman Clifford remarked that the Moscow incident indicates a disregard for security on the part of the U. S., for example, the 1962 report of the Soviet defector was not acted upon. Mr. Clifford thought the question is what can we as Americans do to bring attention to and correct this fouled-up situation. Mr. McCone replied that in CIA there is an extremely competent group which is devoted to personnel and other security matters. The Dunlap case study showed that CIA's personnel security program is particularly good. Now there is a need for the State Department or some agency to be designated as responsible for not only technical security sweeps but physical security matters as well. There must be an insistence on conformance with security safeguards. (Here Mr. McCone recalled that in Bangkok the U. S. Ambassador mentioned that he had sent his furniture out to be upholstered by local people; and when the DCI asked about the possibility of listening devices being planted in the furniture, the Ambassador said that this had not occurred to him. Mr. McCone observed that in various parts of the world, CIA would be happy for an opportunity to take advantage of a situation of that kind, for intelligence purposes.)

Chairman Clifford pointed to the loose security attitude that prevailed in the Moscow situation, e.g., the cables were cut right away. The DCI thought that the proper procedure was followed with regard to State and CIA consultation to determine exploitation possibilities when the first microphone was found -- leading to a decision that the Soviets had by then been alerted to the discovery, making exploitation infeasible. However, Mr. McCone thought that the cutting of the coaxial cable was improper. Mr. McCone agreed with Mr. Clifford's statement that there is a need to place responsibility on some appropriate agency to ensure that security precautions are followed.

Mr. Pace said that there is also a need to ensure effective management of research and development in the audio field. Mr. McCone replied that there are jurisdictional problems; the Department of State has responsibility under NSC directives; and Mr. McCone wants the USIB to consider the matter, and meanwhile he would defer making any recommendations for now.

Chairman Clifford asked if Mr. McCone would comment on the status of the DCI's efforts to coordinate the total U. S. intelligence activity. Mr. McCone said that with regard to the Board's recent report on the National Reconnaissance Program, he would have some alternative proposals to make along the lines of a different approach to the problem, but he preferred to reserve this for a later time.

In another area of the coordination effort, Mr. McCone said that the intelligence community is faced with the question of the continued availability of certain overseas bases which are used for intelligence purposes -- such as intercept stations on Cyprus; bases in Pakistan; and AFTAC sites at locations around the world. In the USIB, an inventory of all overseas intelligence-related bases is being made with a view to analyzing alternative courses of action open to us if we lose specific bases, classified and otherwise.

In the audio field, Mr. McCone said that the USIB will have some recommendations to make.

As for information processing, the DCI referred to the SCIPS study which was recently made in the USIB. He considered this study to be a good approach, although it is difficult to apply a uniform program in all intelligence agencies, e.g., the State Department requires a coding system different from that which might be used as a central system in the intelligence community. So, Mr. McCone is urging that the SCIPS study be used by each agency as a model approach to the problem.

With reference to contacts with the President, Mr. McCone said that the CIA sends a daily check list to the President but he does not necessarily wish to read it every day. CIA also sends over special intelligence items and a weekly check list which General Clifton hands to the President for reading. Mr. McCone said that he sees the President frequently including occasions when others are present, e.g., at conferences on South Vietnam. Some items the DCI takes to the President directly, when they are of such critical or sensitive nature that Mr. McCone does not want to handle them through routine channels. The DCI said that he personally would prefer opportunities for intelligence briefings of the President with the Secretaries of State and Defense present, in order that these officials could express any differing views to the President (for example, it is the Secretary of Defense's view that U-2 overflights of Cuba are not required, whereas Mr. McCone says he feels that there is a need for them).

With regard to the situation in South Vietnam, Mr. McCone said that this had been discussed at the Honolulu meeting from which he had just returned. Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland reported a deterioration of the situation. For one thing General Khahn has not gained control of the people as he claimed he would. Mr. McCone said that he differed from others at the Honolulu meeting who are of the opinion that the situation in South Vietnam has "bottomed out". To the contrary, Mr. McCone believes that the situation may well deteriorate further and planning should be made on that basis. He recalled Ambassador Lodge's comment that South Vietnam is not a country but a place where a lot of discordant people live.

As for Laos, Mr. McCone noted that the Pathet Lao had stopped its advance after over-running the western part of the Plain de Jarres. Mr. McCone believes that the Pathet Lao forces can take over the country if it wants to, without the aid of the North Vietnamese.

In Mr. McCone's opinion, a token air strike on North Vietnam would probably not produce a military reaction from either Communist China or North Vietnam. If a strike were made by South Vietnamese pilots accompanied by U. S. "instructors" (project FARM GATE) more damage would be done and more reaction would result. An A-bomb attack would probably produce a strong Chicom reaction. In any event, the U. S. will have to guarantee to Khahn that we will bail him out as necessary.

Also, U. S. forces would have to be extensively deployed to meet any reaction, and the American people would have to be prepared for the situation. Mr. McCone feels that U. S. public opinion could best be prepared by the adoption of a Congressional resolution, which would also serve as a meaningful signal to the Chinese.

In answer to Dr. Langer's question, Mr. McCone thought it unlikely that Khahn would be unseated by a military coup in South Vietnam, although there are disgruntled factions for him to contend with.

In answer to Mr. Murphy's query, the DCI saw no immediate prospect for a South Vietnamese penetration of North Vietnam along the lines of the successful penetrations which have been made of South Vietnam from the North. He said that CIA had plans for such penetration, but they were taken over by U. S. military forces the first of this year, and the military are now organizing such activity.

Mr. McCone made reference to the recently published book "Bay of Pigs" as being most damaging to the CIA. A most serious claim in the book is the statement the invasion brigade was told by CIA to be prepared to go ahead with the invasion even if President Kennedy should call it off. Mr. McCone said that he had caused a thorough inquiry to be made of this allegation, including interviews of the Cubans who were supposed to have made the allegation. Mr. McCone said that the inquiry produced no evidence whatsoever that any Deputy DCI or other CIA official ever issued any such order, nor any CIA representative outside of Washington, and the official records do reflect the issuance of any such instruction. At most, the DCI's inquiry turned up only an instance or two where in the heat of the operation statements were made to the effect that the operation was ready and nothing could make it fail.

Mr. McCone also referred to the book, "Invisible Government", which is about to be published and has been reviewed in Look Magazine. The book makes a complete disclosure regarding the Radio Free Europe program and other CIA proprietaries; it identifies CIA-personnel whose names have never appeared in public print before; and specific reference is made to the Special NSC 5412/2 Group by name and function. The authors came to see Mr. McCone last August and he had a luncheon meeting with them. The authors said that they were just starting preparation of the book. Mr. McCone asked them to come see him again, and to submit the manuscript for checking as to accuracy and security, but they did not do so. CIA later obtained a manuscript copy from Random House covertly. Mr. McCone tried to get the publishers to kill the book but was told that it had already been paid for. Some 2000 copies have already been printed, and the book is most damaging to the CIA, Mr. McCone said.

Following dinner at the Metropolitan Club, the Board meeting resumed. Dr. Jerome Wiesner (and Spurgeon Keeny) who had just returned from a science meeting in Moscow, gave the Board a preliminary report on Dr. Wiesner's review of the recently-discovered microphone penetration of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow. Dr. Wiesner said that a surprising job had been done by the Soviets. Most of the microphones found were still operable after 11 years. They were imbedded in the walls 8 inches deep, with wooden tubes extending out to the wall surface.

The wires from the microphones ran out inside the exterior building walls to avoid detection. During construction before the U. S. occupied the building as an Embassy, our people gave instructions to the Soviets as to where to run telephone and electrical wiring to serve Embassy offices -- in effect almost giving the Soviets an advance blueprint of the layout of Embassy offices. As a result of the Soviet technical installation they had access to the sounds of machines and conversations in the Embassy up to the time that shielded rooms were installed. They had microphones in the Embassy rooms where U. S. intercept operations were going on. The State Department's resident security technician on the scene (Mr. Musser) is still surveying the situation, including the significance of the coaxial cables and grid antenna which have been uncovered in the walls of the Embassy. There is as yet no real evidence that the Soviets were able to pick up brush sparks from the U. S. cryptographic machines, but they were certainly able to pick up acoustic signals. (There was an operable microphone right next to the printer location prior to installation of the shielded room.) The microwave signal which is known to have been beamed at the Embassy since 1957 may be a diversionary activity, or it could be illuminating passive devices. (The trouble is that Mr. Musser does not have the resources to determine the use to which the signal is being put.) An effort should be made to intercept the signal outside the Embassy building in a line with the direction of the beam which is coming from a Soviet-guarded apartment building nearby. (For a long time now no active countermeasures have been tried against the signal, and the attitude seems to have been not to disturb it.)

Dr. Wiesner said that even if our Embassy security people had dug a trench around the rooms where microphones were installed this would probably not have uncovered the devices.

Dr. Wiesner feels that Mr. Musser is an able man but doesn't have the resources to help him do the job. There is a need for trained people to use adequate detection devices, and experts to oversee the job. There should be installed such equipment as a standard video alarm in Embassy rooms, and it should be possible to develop and use transistorized devices to detect radiation. (Mr. Musser stated his belief that there could be a duplicate of the Soviet system as yet undiscovered.) Dr. Wiesner thinks that the teletype machines are well protected in the electro-shielded rooms. But Mr. Musser needs help which he seems reluctant to ask for because "hit-and-run" visits by various experts would hinder the efforts he is now trying to make.

Chairman Clifford asked what measures Dr. Wiesner would take if he were charged with responsibility for security of the Moscow Embassy. Dr. Wiesner said that he would (1) complain to the Soviets about the microwave signal (2) do a more thorough tearing down of a room to see if other systems are present, and (3) scan the walls and floors with an appropriate radiation device, e.g., radioactive cobalt taken in on the Ambassador's plane -- although you could not be sure even then that an eavesdropping system was not installed. He added that there is a view that the acoustically shielded rooms should also be given electromagnetic shielding.

Mr. Clifford asked whether a defense could be devised, assuming that we are unable to ~~[illegible]~~ determine that concealed microphones remain in place. Dr. Wiesner said that aside from the measures already mentioned, one could literally destroy 1 or 2 rooms, i.e., take them apart thoroughly and rebuild them. It might also be well to panel, or paint, the office walls, starting with the offices of the Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and the military attaches -- but you could not be certain that this defense would be totally effective.

Dr. Wiesner said that he and Mr. Keeny had visited the 2 intercept rooms in the Embassy, and the operating personnel talked freely about what they were doing, with no apparent fear that they were being overheard by the Soviets.

Mr. Gray asked why the Soviets would damage the Embassy switchboard and leave it out of commission as reported in a dispatch just received from Ambassador Kohler. Dr. Wiesner said one could speculate that this was done to salvage something left behind in the switchboard or telephone system. He added that the switchboard is on the ground floor area of the Embassy which is guarded by Soviet guards; and Messrs. Wiesner and Keeny and their wives found it easy to walk through the ground floor area unchallenged. (Dr. Wiesner and Mr. Keeny were not told of the burglary entry and damage to the switchboard even though they were in conversation with the Ambassador and other Embassy officials after the incident occurred. They heard about it from their wives who had learned of the incident in conversations with Embassy personnel.)

Dr. Wiesner also questioned the security of the Embassy practice of sending so many information copies of coded messages to other U. S. posts. He said that he found no evidence of particular concern on the part of Embassy personnel with regard to the bugging development. Mr. Musser, on the other hand, was working around the clock. Dr. Wiesner said that he had lunch with Ambassador Thompson who said he felt that any Soviet intercept of his conversations in the Embassy, and of his messages, would only have served to confirm to the Soviets the sympathetic attitude with which he looked upon the problems faced by the Soviets.

Chairman Clifford, on behalf of the Board, asked Dr. Wiesner to give the Board a brief memorandum suggesting steps which the U. S. Government should consider taking in the direction of getting complete security of the Embassy in Moscow. Dr. Wiesner said he would do so, but pointed out that his suggestions would probably be those already proposed and considered by others, but not acted on for various reasons including lack of funds. He said that Mr. Musser's principal need is for more experts on the scene.

Memo has arrived received from Wiesner ?

Dr. Wiesner and Mr. Keeny completed their visit with the Board and departed at 9:00 p.m.

In executive session, Chairman Clifford emphasized the gravity of the Moscow penetration development, and stated his intention to have a special Board Panel study made, as soon as the USIB completes its appraisal and report on the subject.

With regard to the Board's May 2 report to the President on the National Reconnaissance Program, Mr. Clifford said that when the DCI's comments are received at the White House, and if the White House asks for Board recommendations, the President will be informed of the Board's view that a Presidential Directive should be issued along the lines already proposed. Mr. Pace thought that the Chairman should proceed in that fashion without necessarily having to call another Board meeting on the subject.

The Chairman noted approval given to the proposed letters he would send to Defense, State, CIA and the DCI requesting updated coverage of matters dealt with in their annual reports to the Board on their intelligence activities.

The next regularly scheduled meeting of the Board was set for August 6 and 7.

The Board adjourned its meeting at 9:35 p. m.

A. R. Ash

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Audio Penetrations of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow

REFERENCE: Board Agenda Items 3, 5, 6, 12

Since the last meeting of the Board there have been discovered 41 microphones concealed in the walls of our Embassy in Moscow. These have been located at strategic points covering virtually all of our key offices including those of the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, the Army Communications and Code Center, State Department Code Room, Embassy conference and typing rooms, the office of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Political, Economic, Agricultural Attaches, etc. In addition to conventional bugs deeply imbedded in the walls of the Embassy, there also have been discovered three coaxial cables and a large (3' x 9') antenna which may be associated in some manner with the unusual signal which is known to have been targeted against key offices in the Embassy for at least seven years.

Immediately following the discovery of the first of the 41 microphones, the Chairman directed that appropriate inquiry be initiated. In line therewith the Baker Panel was convened, and discussions were held with appropriate personnel of the White House, the State and Defense Departments, the NSA, CIA, etc. In addition at the request of Mr. Bundy, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, former Science Advisor to the President, was briefed on the subject preparatory to his making an on-the-scene review in Moscow of the steps being taken by the State Department with respect to this development. Further, special studies were requested on behalf of the Board relative to the degree of jeopardy which may have resulted to our encryption systems as a consequence of these penetrations. (A couple of weeks after the Chairman initiated Board inquiries concerning this matter, the USIB began a review of the subject and at that time the USIB was requested by Mr. Bundy to report the results of its findings and recommendations to the Board in time for consideration at this meeting.)

In keeping with the foregoing, the Board will be briefed on the following significant aspects of the subject (as reflected in the agenda):

~~SECRET~~

Agenda item 3: The writer will brief the Board on the details of these penetrations. Dr. Baker will brief the Board on the technical judgments which have been made on the subject by the Baker Panel. (See enclosed draft report prepared by the Panel.) This Panel consists of the following individuals:

Dr. William O. Baker - Board Member
Dr. Edward E. David - Director, Visual & Acoustic Research, Bell Telephone Laboratories
Dr. Andrew M. Gleason- Department of Mathematics Harvard University
Dr. John W. Tukey - Department of Mathematics Princeton University
Mr. J. R. Pierce - Research Staff Bell Telephone Laboratories

Agenda item 5: Mr. Robert Bannerman, Chairman of the USIB Security Committee, will brief the Board on the highlights of the study which his Committee has made thus far with respect to the general security implications of the audio penetrations of the Embassy in Moscow. (Hopefully, by Board meeting time, we will be in possession of a written USIB report on this subject as requested by Mr. Bundy.) Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of Security, Department of State, will join the Board for Mr. Bannerman's presentation and will be prepared to respond to any questions which the members may have relative to the internal operations of the State Department's security system. (In Iron Curtain countries the State Department is primarily responsible for the security "sweeps" and associated actions which are taken in an effort to detect and counter hostile penetrations which may be attempted against official U. S. installations, personnel and classified information in those countries.)(See enclosed State memo to Coyne, dated 6-1-64.)

Agenda item 6: General Blake, Director of NSA, and/or his Deputy, Dr. Tordella, will brief the Board on the technical assessments thus far made at NSA relative to the impact, if any, of these penetrations on the cryptographic systems which are employed by elements of the State and Defense Departments and CIA in the handling of classified communications between Washington and our official installations in Iron Curtain countries and elsewhere.

Agenda item 12: Dr. Jerome Wiesner will discuss with the Board any findings, conclusions and recommendations which may have resulted from his examination at the Moscow Embassy of the actions taken and contemplated with respect to these very serious penetrations.

J. Patrick Coyne
J. Patrick Coyne

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 2 pages
Number 2 of 5 copies, Series A.

June 1, 1964

TO: Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
Member, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
The White House
Washington, D. C.

FROM: G. Marvin Gentile
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security

In reply to your verbal request for information concerning the 7 June, 1962 CSCI/3/770,797 defector report, the following persons were appraised of the contents of this report in addition to Mr. John F. Reilly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security:

Mr. Maclyn Musser - Resident Engineer, Moscow
Mr. Edwin R. Hiller - Officer in Charge of the Frankfurt Test Center
Mr. Elmer D. Hill - then Chief of the Division of Technical Services.

The referenced document was received in the Division of Technical Services on June 21, 1962, just prior to Mr. Hiller's departure for Frankfurt where, as Officer in Charge of the Frankfurt Test Center, he was responsible for all of the Moscow technical inspections.

Mr. Musser, the now Resident Engineer in Moscow, departed for Moscow in October of 1962 and was aware of this information prior to his arrival in Moscow.

This report stated the defector "saw reports with the red stripes, in connection with which were mentioned, he believes, the room or office of the Ambassador, the Counselor, 'or like that'. Source stated that living quarters and 'the dacha' are 'beyond question' bugged, as are any Embassy rooms to which Soviet citizens are permitted access, but that some rooms in the Embassy might not be covered." Other than calling this memorandum to the attention of personnel directly involved in the technical program, the records of this Office indicate no specific action was taken by the Office of Security since the contents of the report apparently were considered only a re-confirmation of convictions held that such installations were indeed present. Since Mr. Reilly

Rec'd 6-2-64
PFIAB
PB# 1992

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

and Mr. Hill are no longer connected with this Office exact reasoning can not be supplied and only surmised. Inquiry will be made of Mr. Hiller and Mr. Musser to determine whether they can furnish further pertinent details concerning this matter. The results of this inquiry will be furnished to you as soon as possible

It should be noted that primary interest in Moscow at that time was in the resolution of the nature of the microwave signals directed at the west wall of the Embassy, as little was actually known prior to Mr. Musser's arrival of the exact characteristics of the signal.

In regard to your request for the position of the Department of State in connection with Mr. Khrushchev's allegation that he possessed a State cable, Mr. John W. Coffey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Communications, has furnished the following statement:

> "In response to Mr. Coyne's request we have reviewed the position of the pipe embargo message as stated last September in the light of the discovery of microphones in the American Embassy Moscow.
>
> "On the basis of evaluations to date, we assume the possibility that the bulk of classified telegraphic information handled at Moscow between occupancy of the building in 1953 through 1962 may have been compromised. Classified telegraphic communications exclusive of Iron Curtain posts would not have been affected. We assume no penetration of cryptographic systems at Moscow since the installation of the shielded enclosure in late 1962 for the communications operations.
>
> "The microphone discovery does not alter our position with respect to Mr. Khrushchev's allegation unless it is assume that a telegram originated in Moscow prior to December 1962 is that in question. As you know, Ambassador Kohler, in paragraph 2-c Embtel 3577 of 24 May 1964, reiterated his earlier position denying the existence of the alleged telegram."

Britain did little to dissip[illegible] the feeling among many informed A[illegible] that the Russian Premier had overstayed his welcome in Egypt. Right up to the final day of his visit, Nikita continued to shock Arab sensibilities. But long before then he might have profited from an old Bedouin saying as colorful as one of his own earthy proverbs from the Ukraine: "Drink your milk while fresh, for it will turn sour if long kept."

RUSSIA:

The Walls Have Ears

Twelve years ago this summer Joseph Stalin abruptly ordered the U.S. Embassy in Moscow moved out of the center of town so that he would not have to look at it every time he went in and out of the Kremlin. Not long afterward Stalin died—whereupon the Soviet Foreign Office apologetically called up U.S. officials and told them that the embassy need not move after all. But U.S. security experts, declaring that the new building selected for the embassy was a "dream" from the security point of view, insisted on going through with the move.

Associated Press

Associated Press

U.S. 'stronghold' in Moscow: More than 40 mikes were listening

Last summer it turned out that what security men thought was a dream had turned into a nightmare. The tip-off came when Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev informed Averell Harriman that he knew U.S. Ambassador Foy Kohler was opposed to West Germany selling the Russians steel pipe. "Don't try to deny it," he told Harriman. "We didn't learn that from our spies." With that, intelligence agents began looking inside the U.S. Embassy's walls. After a series of tests by technicians loaded down with metal-detecting devices, the U.S. Marine guards at the embassy were ordered to tear down the office normally occupied by the embassy's [illegible]ister counselor, who acts as depu[illegible] chief of mission.

With crowbars and drills the Marines took down the inside walls and carefully carted the debris down to the embassy basement for sifting. After the wrecking operation was completed, Washington revealed last week, more than 40 tiny microphones were found in the debris.

Though the "bugs" had apparently been installed by Russian workmen eleven years ago, when the new embassy was readied for U.S. occupation, many were still in working order. Washington, however, feebly attempted to minimize the security leakage by insisting that the microphones could not have done serious damage since matters of real importance are generally discussed only in "safe rooms" inside the embassy. (A safe room is a room within a room which gives the appearance of being suspended in space. Its walls, ceiling, floor and even supports, are made of transparent plastic so that nothing can be inserted without being detected.)

Undoubtedly, more safe rooms will now be installed in the Moscow embassy. But the fact that the Soviet wall microphones had survived three ambassadors and eleven years of security tests before being discovered could scarcely fail to arouse among laymen some doubts as to the security experts' assurances that safe rooms are, in fact, safe.

RUMANIA:

Dynamite

A Rumanian delegation came to Washington last week on what seemed the dullest of errands—negotiating a trade-expansion agreement. But the mission involved more potential political dynamite for Eastern Europe than anything since the 1956 Hungarian revolt.

For some months, the Rumanians have been trying to pull loose from Russian domination. Already exploiting the Sino-Soviet quarrel, they publicly affirmed the equality of all world Communist parties in their now-famous April 22 declaration of independence. In private, they have gone even further. Rumanian party leaders are currently traveling throughout the country, bluntly denouncing the Russians to their own rank and file.

Secret Flights: Moscow, Rumanians are being told, has milked their economy mercilessly for fifteen years. When President Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej refused to subordinate the nation's industrial development to the Kremlin's plans for Eastern Europe, Soviet security agents tried to incite Rumanians to overthrow his government—and Premier Nikita Khrushchev twice flew secretly to Bucharest to threaten the use of Soviet troops. Finally, Rumanians are being warned—as Poles were in 1956 by Wladyslaw Gomulka—to be prepared to resist "with all possible means."

In this explosive situation, what the Rumanians want most is a statement of U.S. sympathy for their neutral stance in world affairs. Concretely, Deputy Premier Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, who wrote most of the April 22 declaration and heads the current delegation, would also like Washington to restore its legation in Bucharest to embassy status. The U.S. is all for Rumanian independence, but at the same time would like to serve its own interests in Eastern Europe by getting the Rumanians to agree to internal liberalization as a *quid pro quo*. To Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman has fallen the delicate task of advancing both causes, and next week's joint communiqué will show just how successful he has been.

CYPRUS:

Crossed Fingers

It seemed too good to be true. For more than four nights not a shot had been fired in the blood-drenched streets of Nicosia. "The situation in Cyprus is improving tremendously," said U Thant's special representative Galo Plaza. "Of course," he added, "we are keeping our fingers crossed."

And for a fleeting span last week it indeed appeared that Cyprus was at peace. Greek and Turkish Cypriots were busily harvesting their crops beneath a warm Mediterranean sun. To add a sentimental touch to the springtime amity, the U.N. announced that one of its 7,000 soldiers had become engaged to a Greek Cypriot girl.

But the lull was short-lived. A patrol of Finnish U.N. troops sent to a wheat

2992

~~File~~

Brief

Coyne

~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

3 June 1964

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
For National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Bundy:

As requested in your memorandum of 14 May, the attached Preliminary Damage Assessment of the Technical Surveillance Penetration of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow, is transmitted herewith.

The United States Intelligence Board today noted the attached Security Committee report and approved the recommendations as contained therein.

As you also requested, copies of the attached report have been furnished to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) Marshall S. Carter

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Rec'd.
6-4-64
B 2048

PB#2017
Taken up at
Bd Meeting of
6-4-64

Attachment

cc: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

TS-188539-64
Copy No. 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

May 29, 1964

Dear John:

The next meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is scheduled to be held on June 4, 1964, and in line with established practice it would be very much appreciated if you would meet with us on the afternoon of that day, beginning at 4:00 p.m.

At the time of your meeting with us, it would be helpful if you would be prepared to discuss the subjects outlined in the attachment.

Sincerely,

/s/

Clark M. Clifford
Chairman

Attachment (BYE 0041/64)

Mr. John A. McCone
Director of Central Intelligence
Langley, Virginia

JPC:MMC

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

This document consists of 2 pages
No. 3 of 7 Copies, Series a

BYE 0041/64

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Subjects Suggested by Board Members for Discussion by the Director of Central Intelligence When He Meets with the Board on June 4, 1964

1. Intelligence Community Capabilities for Coverage (other than SIGINT) of Significant Targets on the China Mainland and in South East Asia.

a. Extent of photographic coverage in past twelve months (particularly of Chicom and North Vietnam targets) through satellite and manned vehicles.

b. Extent of clandestine agent coverage in past twelve months (particularly as regards the China Mainland, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and Chicom-NVN support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam).

c. Measures contemplated by the United States Intelligence Board to improve collection capabilities relating to a and b, above.

2. Cuba

a. Progress achieved thus far in obtaining significant intelligence on Cuba through the implementation of the series of earlier Board recommendations to the President on this subject.

b. Status of planning for mounting innovative clandestine collection activities on Cuba, including agent collection and excluding collection by satellite, aircraft and drone reconnaissance.

3. Counterintelligence Responsibilities Relating to Audio Penetrations of U. S. Installations in Communist Countries.

a. Any oral comments the DCI may wish to make in amplification of the report on the bugging of the Moscow Embassy to be submitted by the USIB for consideration at the June 4 meeting of the Board. (See Mr. Bundy's memorandum of May 14, 1964.)

b. Relationship of this problem to the DCI's responsibility for protection of intelligence, and intelligence sources and methods.

CORONA/GAMBIT/IDEALIST/T[illegible]

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

c. Views as to whether either the CIA or elements of the Department of Defense should perform any operational audiosurveillance countermeasure role in U. S. installations behind the Iron Curtain.

4. Coordination of U. S. Foreign Intelligence Activities

Identification of major problems, gaps and deficiencies encountered by the DCI in areas involving the coordination of the U. S. Foreign Intelligence effort; remedial actions taken or contemplated.

5. Any other matters which the DCI may wish to raise with the Board.

CORONA/GAMBIT/IDEALIST/T[illegible]

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10014
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM : A.R. ASH
TO : THE FILE
TITLE : COVERT ACTION PANEL MEETING 6/5/64 (DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY, SPECIAL GROUP, ET AL.)
DATE : 06/05/64
PAGES : 6
SUBJECTS : COVERT ACTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~09/08/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 10, Covert Operations, 1954-1967.

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

206-10001-10014

Box 10

Covert Operations
1954-1967

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

206-10001-10014

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Panel file

June 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Covert Action Panel Meeting 6/5/64
(Discussion With Secretary, Special Group, et al.)

On 6/5/64, at the Board's offices, Mr. Murphy held a meeting of the Board's Covert Action Panel (Messrs. Murphy, Gray and Langer) also attended by General Doolittle; J. Patrick Coyne; and A. R. Ash.

At the invitation of Chairman Murphy the meeting was joined by Mr. Peter Jessup who since January 20, 1964, has been serving as Secretary of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group.

In answer to questions asked by Panel members, Mr. Jessup provided a description of the Special Group and its activities, as follows:

The Special Group is chaired by Mr. McGeorge Bundy; Mr. Alexis Johnson represents the State Department; Mr. Cyrus Vance represents the Secretary of Defense; and Mr. McCone the CIA. These Group members are back-stopped by small staffs in their respective agencies.

Meetings of the Special Group are held once each week. They are "action" meetings not talk-fests, and the members have done their homework beforehand. The Chairman of the JCS attends when the agenda includes subjects of particular JCS interest (since January he has attended two meetings for discussion of Cuba matters).

Most of the covert actions considered by the Special Group are CIA proposals, although other members suggest actions (for example, State Department brought up for discussion the matter of supplying arms in Tangayika). The State Department is considered to serve as the "conscience" of the Special Group in its consideration of proposed covert actions. During the current year some 23 of 39 proposals were favorably considered by the Group.

About 50 per cent of the covert actions coming before the Special Group are carried out by the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) of the JCS, in the aerial reconnaissance field. Since January 1, the Group has approved actions with respect to Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Panama, Chile, Congo, Angola, Tibet, Zanzibar, and China, among others. For example, the April 29, 1964, meeting included discussions of the Chilean elections; Cuba; a JRC forecast of peripheral missions; and reconnaissance coverage from India of a Chinese Communist test range.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Minutes of Special Group meetings are provided only to the members. (In answer to a specific question from Mr. Murphy, Mr. Jessup said that to his knowledge there has been no systematic review by the Special Group concerning the results of actions taken pursuant to previous Group approvals.)

The Group follows the policy of referring to the President those proposed actions as to which Group members have differences of opinion regarding the probability and acceptability of "noise levels" which would result from the actions. Since January, the subject of Cuba has been taken up with the President with a view to obtaining guidance on the level of covert action activity desired during this election year.

Mr. Jessup concluded his visit with the Board Panel and departed the meeting at this point.

HT
not very busy down Castro

Next, the Board Panel meeting was joined by Messrs. Dick Helms and Cord Meyer of CIA.

Mr. Helms said that with regard to Cuba there has been an effective stand-down in externally-mounted sabotage operations since February. Policy approvals have been given only to oddments of "passive sabotage", such as supplying agents with incendiary pencils, etc.; a mattress factory and a plastic works were burned down; but CIA does not consider that such operations are enough and they are not the whole program that CIA wants to conduct. The "Track II" paper in the State Department calls for CIA support of Cuban exile group activity, but no CIA direction and control; and few results are possible from such an approach, with Artime burning down a sugar mill, but Manolo Ray getting arrested by the British. There have been acts of sabotage performed on tractors carried by vessels en route to Cuba. On the economic front, after Castro had put out false rumors of an expected short sugar crop, in order to run up the world market price, the CIA countered by assembling correct information which when published brought the price down again.

With regard to Soviet personnel in Cuba, Mr. Helms estimated that there are from 15,000 to 18,000 on the Island, although U. S. intelligence community estimators place the figure at from 4,000 to 5,000.

Concerning Chile, Mr. Helms said that the coming Presidential elections there on September 13 are viewed with serious concern. The Socialists there are more radical than the Communists, and candidate Allende (backed by the FRAP party) may have a strong chance of winning. Moreover, the constitutional-minded Chileans would accept a regularly-elected Communist as President and would not take coup action to put him out of office. Allende is being supported by the USSR at the rate of about one-quarter million dollars a month, and his success at the polls is important to the Soviets who can then point to the election as an example of a "peaceful" Communist victory.

CIA support of Chilean Christian Democrat candidate Frei included $750,000 in March; and on May 14, another $1.25 million was added following the urgings of major business elements in Chile and the U. S. Some support is also being given to anti-Communist candidate Edwards; to Protestants; and to poll-taking groups.

Referring to Panama, Mr. Helms observed that CIA appeared for the moment to have backed the right candidate -- Robles.

With reference to Brazil, Mr. Helms said that the coup was Brazil - inspired and spontaneous, not a U. S. operation. He added that Brazil had come close to being lost to the Communists through subversion from the top (Goulart).

Turning to the subject of Southeast Asia, Mr. Helms said that there have been many lengthy discussions about South Vietnam and about getting the Viet Cong out of that country. This objective has been talked to death, and all possibilities considered; but no one seems to be preoccupied with finding a way to replace the political fabric that was lost in South Vietnam when the Diem regime was overthrown. The present government is all a military show. Mr. Helms added that the Bhuddists are a political group but not cohesive. As for prospects of effecting intelligence infiltration of North Vietnam, Mr. Helms said that CIA had been trying, but the target country is small and there is not much intelligence to obtain there. At present MACV is in charge of sabotage efforts against North Vietnam. In Mr. Helms' opinion there is a clear need to create a new political structure in South Vietnam or else there will be little use in "striking against the North".

In Laos, Mr. Helms said, the Pathet Lao can take over at will. He noted that the Meo's are still intact (only one battalion) and are being supplied by CIA air drops (from Thailand) of weapons, food and medicines.

Mr. Cord Meyer referred to the crisis of the Adoula government in the Congo. There are 200 men in Brazzaville, with Chicom support, ready to assassinate cabinet officers. When the UN forces leave on June 30 the 30,000-man Congolese National Army will have a big job to do. Mobutu and officers of the Army are wary of providing much training down to the platoon level, because they distrust these troops in arms. Meanwhile, CIA has supplied the Army with 6 airplanes and pilots, and authority has now been received by CIA to double this support.

Regarding Cyprus, Mr. Helms said that the Turks are threatening to go onto the island with troops within 24 hours.

Messrs. Helms and Meyer left the Panel meeting at this point.

The Board Panel meeting was next joined by Mr. Alexis Johnson of the State Department. He filled the Panel members in on the latest Cyprus development including the President's message to the head of the Turkish government; and General Lemnitzer's trip to Turkey to point out the hazard to Turkey's NATO relationships if Turkey moved into Cyprus with troops.

Panel Chairman Murphy asked Mr. Johnson for any comments he might have regarding State Department relationships with the Special Group, and with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Mr. Johnson said that as State Department representative on the Special Group he tries to do the difficult job of viewing the risks against the gains involved in proposed covert actions. Issues rarely arise in the Special Group because problems are first staffed in the member agencies. In State Mr. Johnson is staffed by Mr. Scott of INR who maintains contacts with FBI and CIA -- the relation with FBI having been recently regularized as had been done earlier in the case of CIA. Mr. Scott consults Mr. Johnson on all covert operations and any issues, and also focuses on NRO matters for Mr. Johnson. In all, Mr. Johnson feels that the Special Group system is satisfactory. He acknowledged, however, that the Special Group does not have a procedure for systematic look-back at the results of programs previously approved. From State's point of view, he could see the need for such a procedure, for he never hears about projects once they are approved -- unless something goes wrong. Mr. Johnson said that within State a quarterly review is made of political action programs, and he sees a need for monitoring of programs in the Special Group.

As for State's relations with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Mr. Johnson recalled that one problem arose with the Board's November 22 report on the Dunlap case, which caused him considerable concern -- particularly the discussion language supporting the Board's recommendations on subjects involving State, CIA and FBI. Mr. Johnson thought that he should have been given an opportunity to comment to the Board concerning the FBI and CIA complaints which were reflected in the recommendations.

Mr. Coyne then gave Mr. Johnson some of the background of one of the Board's recommendations which involved State-CIA-FBI and which pertained to a development of such sensitivity as to closely restrict the Board's disclosure of it. (Mr. Coyne took the initiative, after the Panel meeting, to suggest to FBI that Mr. Johnson be briefed on this sensitive item, in order that State Department might be in a position to assist, and not unwittingly hinder, related operations of FBI and CIA interest abroad. FBI did this soon afterward, and Mr. Johnson expressed to Mr. Coyne his satisfaction at this handling of the matter.)

Mr. Murphy next brought up the subject of the recently discovered audio penetration of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow. Mr. Murphy noted that the preliminary USIB damage assessment contained State Department comments to the effect that the compromise was not too serious, and he wondered if this accurately reflected the State Department view of the matter. Mr. Johnson said that during the audio penetration period the State Department sent many messages to our Ambassador in Moscow, telling him to make certain representations to the Soviets; and in turn the Ambassador sent messages to Washington reporting on what he had said to the Soviets and what they said to him; so, Mr. Johnson felt that no damaging breach had occurred in this regard -- except for perhaps any Department or Embassy analyses that might have appeared in messages intercepted by the Soviets. Mr. Johnson added that our people at posts behind the Iron Curtain assume that they are "bugged" and they behave accordingly; and Mr. Johnson related to the Panel his own experience while serving at Prague where "he dug out 35 mikes".

Mr. Murphy raised with Mr. Johnson the question as to whether subordinates should be allowed to make decisions such as the cutting of the co-axial cables discovered leading out of the Embassy in Moscow -- Mr. Murphy pointing out that such action appeared premature and prevented the technicians from making technical examinations of value and importance. Mr. Murphy also noted that subordinates in State and CIA had assumed responsibility for the decision that no attempt would be made to exploit the devices found in Moscow. Mr. Johnson was unaware of policy direction regarding such matters, and Mr. Coyne made known to him the provisions of NSC 5618 covering the subject.

With reference to North Vietnam, Mr. Johnson noted that the situation is most discouraging insofar as covert infiltration actions are concerned. He said that CIA had tried hard, and the activity has now been transferred to MACV in Saigon.

Mr. Johnson concluded his visit with the Board Panel and departed the meeting.

In executive session, Panel Chairman Murphy asked that the Board Staff's review of the Special Group minutes include summaries of items pertaining to Vietnam and Cuba, for later study by the Panel.

done

The Panel Meeting adjourned at 12:15 p.m.

A. R. Ash

Date : 09/24/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10015
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSC
FROM : A. RUSSELL ASH
TO : THE FILE
TITLE : CUBA (REVIEW ON 1/10/63 OF RECORDS OF THE SPECIAL NSC 5412/2 GROUP
DATE : 01/11/63
PAGES : 13
SUBJECTS : CUBA

SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : ~~RELEASED WITH DELETIONS~~ OPEN IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/14/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 10, Covert Operations, 1954-1967. Duplicate contained in 206-10001-10011.

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

206-10001-10015

Box 10

Covert Operations
1954-1967

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

206-10001-10015

Box 10

Covert Operations
1954-1967

206-10001-10015

NSC — 5412 Act.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: CUBA (Review on 1/10/63 of Records of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group)

On 1-10-63 the writer reviewed in the offices of Mr. Tom Parrott, Executive Secretary, Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the records of the Special Group which Mr. Parrott identified as relating to considerations given by the Special Group to reconnaissance and covert action operations with regard to Cuba. (Attached hereto is a copy, supplied by Mr. Parrott from his records, of a "Memorandum for the Record" dated 10/21/62 on the subject "Reconnaissance of Cuba" which Mr. Parrott had prepared for another purpose.)

There follows a detailed summary of the results of a review made by the writer of the Cuba items referred to in Mr. Parrott's summary memorandum, and of other items which the writer reviewed in the Special Group records pertaining to Cuba.

Minutes of Meetings of the Special Group (Augmented) - "MONGOOSE"

Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented)

Those present were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, General Carter, General Lemnitzer, General Lansdale, and Dr. Cline (for part of the meeting).

The Group noted a paper presented by the State Department member concerning "Guideline for a post-Castro Political Program."

General Lansdale briefed the Group on the number of agents now in Cuba, including legal residents, plus infiltrated teams. It was decided that a CIA proposal, for resupply of agent teams and possibly of resistance groups, should be deferred pending a broader review of the entire situation. General Taylor specified, however, that if an urgent need arose for air supply at any time, the proposal could be made to the Special Group (Augmented).

Mr. McCone and General Lansdale stated that a sizable number of intelligence reports were coming out of Cuba, largely on political and economic matters. Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetration of the Cuban Government had been achieved. In answer to a question from the Attorney General, General Lansdale said that intelligence indicated that although there was widespread dissatisfaction with Castro, there was no rallying point for active opposition.

The Attorney General and Mr. Johnson emphasized the need for an effort to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by the Castro regime in the Hemisphere, Mr. McCone noting that such efforts to date had been fruitless.

Dr. Cline showed the Group the extent of reconnaissance coverage of Cuba. Mr. McCone emphasized that this program has developed complete information on deployments and facilities for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and he particularly noted that these missions have verified that there is sufficient logistic support for a 75,000-man military force. "No missile sites have been found."

The Group agreed on a complete review of MONGOOSE toward the end of July, with participation by the Secretaries of State and Defense. General Taylor emphasized that in the preparation for such review, there would be a need for summaries of results obtained to date, of intelligence developed, and of future alternatives opened to the United States (including possible activities in other parts of Latin America).

Mr. Johnson said that the State Department is investigating the possibilities for subsidizing Japanese purchases of Dominican sugar to divert purchases from Cuba and thereby deprive Cuba of a source of dollars, and Mr. Johnson asked that MONGOOSE operational representatives look into this further. Mr. McCone said that the CIA could use unvouchered funds for this purpose, but it would be illegal to use covert funds as a means of evading the intent of Congress.

Minutes of the October 4, 1962 Meeting
of the Special Group (Augmented)

Those present for this meeting with regard to Operation MONGOOSE were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lansdale, Mr. McCone, General Carter, and Mr. Wilson.

The Attorney General informed the Group that higher authority was concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and felt that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations. The Attorney General wondered if a new look were not required in view of the meager results obtained, especially in the sabotage field, and he urged "massive activity" within the entire MONGOOSE framework.

General Lansdale thought that another attempt should be made against the major target which had been the subject of three unsuccessful missions and he said that six new missions were in the planning stage.

Mr. Johnson said that the "massive activity" would have to come from within, and he hoped to be able to present soon to the Group a plan for giving Cuban exiles more of a free hand, fully realizing that this will give additional visibility to their activities. Mr. McCone reserved judgment on the feasibility and desirability of such a program, and Mr. Johnson agreed that he had reservations as well.

Mr. McCone said that he had received the impression that although high levels of our Government wanted increased activity, they still want to keep it at a low noise level, but Mr. McCone did not believe this would be possible and he felt that any sabotage would be blamed on the United States. Mr. McCone cited the enormous number of telephone calls directed at CIA at the time the skin divers landed in east Cuba, and the time that the Cuban exile students shot up the apartment house. Mr. McCone therefore urged that responsible officials be prepared to accept a higher noise level if they want to get on with operations.

The Attorney General, in partial rebuttal, said that the reasons people had such concern were (a) the fact that the skin divers were Americans, and (b) the fact that the student activity was irresponsible and foolish -- and if either of these had in fact been engineered by the United States it would have been a great mistake. The Attorney General also related the possibility of attributability to the importance of the particular undertaking, and he questioned whether we are going down the right road or whether more "direct action" were not indicated. He urged that alternative and imaginative plans be developed.

Mr. McCone said that internal restrictions are so rigid that internal uprisings would surely be brutally suppressed. (It was agreed that the current guidelines did not call for inciting such an uprising.)

Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous efforts necessary to insure that operations such as the sabotage operation previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on the United States. (After discussion, the Group agreed that it was not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to insure nonattribution, and that short cuts were desirable.)

Mr. Gilpatric informed the Group that the Defense Department was hard at work on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recruits would be trained from four to five months and then placed on call for any future action.

General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff is refining various contingency military plans based on a variety of possible situations, including Soviet action against Berlin; "the presence of bloc offensive weapons in Cuba"; an attack against Guantanamo; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere; and "the establishment of a direct threat to the United States."

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present at this Group meeting for an item regarding reconnaissance of Cuba. It was pointed out that the CIA is "restricted to using its high-performance vehicle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba, because of SAM sites." It was questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at that time, particularly when SAMs were almost certainly not operational. *

Colonel Steakley and Dr. Scoville described a spectrum of reconnaissance activities which could be undertaken, ranging from low-level, Navy fighters through drones, up to the Agency's capabilities, particularly equipped with new radar countermeasures. As a result of the discussion there was agreement that the Department of Defense and the CIA should get together on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require coverage, and on recommendations as to how to achieve this coverage. A meeting was set for the following Tuesday when Defense and CIA were to be prepared to discuss all possibilities, including requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.

There was some discussion of the desirability of mining Cuban waters, using nonattributable mines appearing to be homemade and laid by small aircraft operated by Cubans.

It was agreed that the Attorney General would act as Chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) for the time being.

It was agreed that four major points which had emerged from this meeting were: (1) we ought to go all-out for increased intelligence; (2) there should be considerably more sabotage; (3) restrictions on attributability can be relaxed so that training and preparations can be subject to short cuts; and (4) all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.

---

* In the "Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject

(Continuation of footnote from previous page)

"Reconnaissance of Cuba" it is stated: "The DCI pointed out that the Agency is now restricted to using the U-2 in the southeastern quadrant of Cuba, because of SAM sites. It was questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly since the SAMs were almost certainly not operational." Beside this item in the summary memorandum, there appears the penciled notation "Also agreed should go all out for intel."

Minutes of the October 9, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented)

Present for this meeting were the Attorney General, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Wilson, Dr. Charyk, Dr. Scoville, Colonel Steakley, and Colonel Ledford, CIA.

The Group discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from low-level coverage by tactical aircraft to high-performance aircraft and drones. Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed. It was agreed that the first priority is one high-performance mission in the western part of the island, to be accomplished by all-out ELINT support, and depending on the results of this, a number of similar sorties might be mounted. (The first mission was later approved by higher authority, with the decision on the second proposition left open. The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB and by the Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10.)

Along with the minutes of this October 9 Meeting there was in file a memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, dated October 11, 1962. It was reflected in Mr. Parrott's memorandum that Mr. Gilpatric had called at 2:15 P.M. to say he and Mr. McCone had finally agreed that the one high-performance flight would be flown as a military flight with a SAC pilot. CIA had wanted to stick to the existing system for the first flight, simply to avoid any delay. The SAC pilot would require some additional training because the equipment in the improved vehicle was new to him, but Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone apparently felt that this was an acceptable delay and it was hoped to get the flight off over the weekend. It was further stated in Mr. Parrott's memorandum that it seemed agreed that within the terms of the authorization given by higher authority it would be necessary to go back for approval of the next phase, contemplating two or three more high-performance missions, and Mr. Gilpatric seemed to feel that the discussion which had taken place with higher authority was explicit enough to get an emergency authority by telephone. Mr. Parrott further informed Mr. Bundy that the Cover Committee (Messrs. Charyk, Hilsman, Scoville, Parrott, "et al") had met that morning and had agreed on a new cover story for a military pilot and a revised cover story for civilian pilots, and with the necessary changes it was thought that the cover story would be ready that afternoon. Mr. Parrott pointed out to Mr. Bundy that, on the military side, the flight is characterized as military reconnaissance of the periphery of the target area, with particular reference to the Secretary of State's recent comments to the OAS Ministers to the effect that we are increasing surveillance activities. (A penciled note on the file copy of this memorandum read: "Later was delayed due to disagreement on account of training required."

There was also an October 12, 1962 addendum to the abovementioned October 11 memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, stating: "Later." The memorandum related that, according to Mr. Knocke, Mr. McCone had decided the day before (October 11) that these flights must be either entirely overt or entirely covert, and he didn't particularly care which so long as they were accomplished as soon as possible. In Mr. McCone's absence, General Carter had come to an agreement with General McKee, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, along those lines on October 11; later, however, Mr. Gilpatric said that this was not his understanding of the terms of authorization from higher authority. Mr. Gilpatric felt that the idea was that a uniformed pilot should operate the Agency's vehicle.

On October 12 at 12:45, General Carter had a meeting with Mr. Bundy and at that time General Carter stated that the Agency operation was ready to go except for weather, and that this would hold it up until at least Sunday, and meantime the SAC pilot would have received the necessary training. It was agreed that if the pilot was sufficiently trained by the earliest time the mission could be mounted, the flight would go, with all other arrangements within the Agency framework. If the pilot were not ready by the time the vehicle was ready, the mission would be mounted as a completely Agency operation, i.e., with a civilian pilot. According to Mr. Lay, the USIB had taken the following actions at its October 10, 1962 meeting with respect to the targets listed in the COMOR paper of October 6: (1) The Group I targets were not discussed by USIB, the implication being that there was no problem from the point of view of USIB's jurisdiction. (2) Groups II and III should be covered as rapidly as possible initially, and after that the frequency of coverage would be further examined. (3) COMOR was to re-do the section of the October 6 paper dealing with Group IV, with targets to be broken out in categories of priorty, and USIB would consider this new paper on October 17. USIB did not consider any operational aspects, but confined themselves to the importance of the targets and the frequency of coverage.

Minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group

The following summarizes the minutes of the Special Group Meetings which were identified by Mr. Parrott as including consideration of the subject of Cuba.

Minutes of February 1, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. Helms.

On the subject of Cuba, the Chairman read his memorandum to higher authority dated January 26, summarizing progress up to that time. The memorandum from General Lansdale suggesting a different approach to the content of the minutes of the meeting of the preceding week on Cuba was discussed, and it was agreed that the minutes would stand as prepared. General Lansdale's report of February 1 on popular support for the OAS meeting was distributed. Mr. Parrott's summary states that the Cuba missions were stepped up from one per month to two per month.

Minutes of June 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter.

On the subject of "Request for Special Cuban Missions," it was stated that the COMOR proposal dated June 13, 1962 was approved. (A handwritten notation on the file copy of these minutes stated that "Higher authority informed June 15 about possibility of uprising," and there was also a notation that the June 13 memorandum regarding the COMOR request had been "rewritten for book.")

Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

The Group agreed to recommend approval of various requests for authorizations. In the case of Cuba, the minutes reflect agreement to continue with the presently authorized schedule of two flights per month. General Taylor asked that for the purpose of discussing this matter with higher authority, CIA should prepare a paper on Cuba, setting forth a summary of information which had been obtained to date, the number of missions mounted, what is proposed to be looked at in the future, and the frequency of further coverage desired.

Memorandum for the President from the Special Group, July 20, 1962

The Special Group records contain a memorandum for the President from General Taylor dated July 20, 1962, bearing a handwritten notation by General Taylor, "Approved by H. A. (presumably 'higher authority') 20 July 1962." In essence, the memorandum to the President was as follows:

> In the Special Group we are aware that we have been proceeding on a day-by-day basis in requesting authority for overflight reconnaissance. At our meeting yesterday, we took a long look ahead at the estimated requirements for the next few months and agreed that the following program is the minimum which meets military requirements . . . . Cuba: Two flights monthly . . . . all U-2 flights with CIA civilian pilots. . . . . We would like to get your approval in principle of the foregoing program with the understanding that on the first of each month you will be presented with the specific flights recommended for that month.

Minutes of August 9, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman, and Mr. William Bundy.

On the subject of "Cuba Reconnaissance" it was stated that the Group agreed that the second mission authorized for August should be flown whenever the DCI decides that the immediate situation with respect to Soviet materiel justifies it. It was noted that this would use up existing authority for August, and if a third mission should become necessary later in the month, it should be considered on its merits at that time.

Minutes of August 30, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and Mr. Bundy.

The minutes reflect that in connection with the Agency's monthly forecast, General Carter mentioned that there might be an additional requirement for flights over Cuba. (In the "Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject "Reconnaissance of Cuba," attached hereto, there appears beside the item dealing with this meeting the penciled notation "primarily low-level.")

Minutes of September 10, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present at this meeting, which took place in Mr. Bundy's office, were the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, "and others."

The Secretary of State expressed concern at the Agency's planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He said he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba at this time. He felt, however, that it was unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flights would draw undue attention to the mission and, further, should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the United States in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

Taking these views into account, the Agency's plans to break this proposed coverage into four parts: the Isle of Pines; the area roughly east of longitude 77 west; and two legs along the coast, one north and one south.

Within this framework, higher authority gave approval this morning for two additional missions to be added to the one for which authority is currently outstanding. Priority will be given to the two overflights. (A notation on the file copy of these Special Group minutes states that as of this morning it appears that weather will not permit a flight until at least Friday, and longer range weather prospects are not very good, consequently it will be some little time before these three authorizations are used up.)

In connection with the minutes of this meeting, the Special Group records contain a note for the file dated October 25, 1962, stating that COMOR later recommended that the Bay of Pigs area should be looked at since it had not been seen since June . . . . Time over mainland would be 12½ minutes for a total of 75 miles . . . . depth of penetration, 13 miles . . . . nearest known SAM site, 35 miles away. The file note further stated that after considerable negotiation with the Department of State it was agreed that this additional coverage would be accomplished.

(In quoting the minutes of this September 10 meeting in a memorandum from Mr. Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962, there was an addendum which stated: "N.B. Mr. Bundy said on 13 September 1962 that he thought the intent of higher authority's approval was such that the entire number of four missions would be considered as being approved. This thus extends the outstanding authorizations from three to four.")

Minutes of September 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Nitze, General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

The minutes of this meeting reflect that a JCS representative (Colonel Steakley) outlined the capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area became available. General Carter said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations, the nature of which is not clear at present. Colonel Steakley distributed charts for the monthly book, on supplementing ELINT coverage of Cuba which was begun today. The Group had no objection to these missions. It was agreed that the Joint Reconnaissance Center should keep an eye on all military reconnaissance or surveillance flights in the Cuban area. (The Special Group record of these minutes is contained in a memorandum dated November 30, 1962, from Mr. Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric.)

Minutes of September 27, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

CIA's October forecast of reconnaissance activities was noted. The special mission request for Cuba was approved. This brings the number of authorizations for this area back to four, i.e., four had been previously authorized and one has been successfully completed, leaving authority for three outstanding.

Minutes of October 15, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

A memorandum prepared for the Special Group records by Mr. Parrott reflected that at a special meeting on this date two U-2 missions, designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved, and that these were concurred in by higher authority. It is reflected that after the 15th of October additional coverage was agreed on at other meetings, but the Special Group was not convened for this purpose.

Memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, November 30, 1962

The Special Group records contain a copy of a memorandum (previously referred to) from Mr. Thomas A. Parrott to Deputy

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

Via BYEMAN
ntrol System

Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962. The memorandum began with the statement that it had been prepared in answer to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric's request on the preceding day for minutes of the special meetings of the Special Group which bore on Cuban reconnaissance, in order that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor might be informed. It was stated in the memorandum that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor had been present on August 30 and had then returned to the Group on September 27. It was further stated that at the meetings of the 6th and 20th of September the subject of Cuba reconnaissance did not arise. The memorandum then pointed out that the meeting of September 10 was not a regular meeting of the Special Group but had nevertheless resulted in particularly significant decisions. The memorandum then went on to set forth the minutes of the meetings of September 10, 14 and 27.

A. Russell Ash

Attachment

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10016
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSC
FROM : A.R. ASH
TO : THE FILE
TITLE : BOARD PANEL ON COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS
DATE : 09/10/63
PAGES : 7
SUBJECTS : COVERT ACTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 10, Covert Operations, 1954-1967. Duplicate contained in 206-10001-10001.

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Box 10

Covert Operations
1954-1967

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

206-10001-10016

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Panel on Covert Action Operations

The Board Panel met in the Board's offices on September 6, 1963. Panel members present were Mr. Robert Murphy, Chairman; Mr. Gordon Gray; and Dr. William Langer. Messrs. Coyne and Ash also attended the meeting.

During the course of its meeting the Panel was briefed by Mr. Richard Helms (Deputy DCI/Plans, CIA) and his assistants, Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald (head of CIA's headquarters staff dealing with Cuba). Highlights of the briefings were as follows:

MESSRS. HELMS and MEYER

British Guiana

For a 79-day period ending in July, the anti-Jagan Trades Union Congress maintained a general strike which was directed against the Jagan regime, and had wide support among agrarian and industrial workers in protest against an oppressive Labor Bill proposed by Communist-oriented Jagan. CIA worked out with George Meany a program of CIA financial support ($435,000) to the strike under the cover of "AFL-CIO contributions." A CIA cover representative ran the strike program. The activity was tricky because the United States and the British desired to avoid violence; and the situation was complicated by the fact that the British Governor-General opposed the strike. CIA assesses the operation as a success because even though Jagan was not unseated, the oppressive Labor Bill was withdrawn and the TUC survived.

The strike activity took place against a background of agreement between President Kennedy and MacMillan that the British will not pull out of Guiana for an indefinite future period, in the hope that a Communist government will not fill the vacuum when the British do withdraw.

Cuban influence in the strike was in the form of a $1 million advance from Cuba to the Guiana Import-Export Corporation (an arm of Jagan's East Indian Peoples Progressive Party) which in turn was borrowed by the Jagan regime. Soviet help was indicated by a rumored transfer of over $100,000 to Jagan's Party through banks.

CIA at present is providing $5,000 to the PNC Party made up of anti-Jagan Africans in Guiana, and CIA is sending a Negro cover representative from New York to aid the African Party.

(CIA considers that Mrs. Jagan, a known Communist from Chicago, is the brains and guts of the Jagan operation.)

Haiti

CIA has surveyed the intentions and capabilities of various Haitian exile groups and has supplied them with token amounts of money to test them out. Efforts of the groups to form a united front have failed, and in the Dominican Republic Juan Bosch has reversed his intention to help unseat Devalier for the present. Ten days ago CIA dropped 100 rifles and ammunition to one Haitian exile group which has been given sanctuary by a Dominican Republic commander stationed on the border.

Dominican Republic

In this country there is a lack of democratic institutions, political party structure, labor unions, or cooperatives of an effective nature. Juan Bosch spends more time debating charges by political opponents than in performing the administrative job of running the country.

Bosch is an extreme conservative, economically, and refuses to spend moneys in excess of assured revenues. A twenty per cent unemployment figure is a major problem. Bosch has strengthened his Cabinet at the urging of the U. S. Ambassador, and has made peace with church elements (with CIA's help).

Opposition to Bosch is from the right and from parts of the Army. He has met individual Communist moves as they arise (e.g., an attempted infiltration of the Planning Commission), but he is not pursuing an over-all anti-Communist program or crusade. Although Bosch is considered by CIA to be anti-Castro and anti-Soviet, he has not clamped down on returning trainees from Cuba.

The twenty per cent unemployment situation provides the basis for a coup in the months ahead. Meanwhile the Army strong-man Embert (one of Trujillo's assassins) waits in the wings.

Vietnam

CIA's role in Vietnam during the past two years has been two-fold:

(1) Total support of the war against the Viet Cong, including the training of some 43,000 irregulars (now turned over to U. S. Special Forces); support to the mountain people in operations against the Viet Cong; and CIA training of U. S. Special Forces in South Vietnam.

(2) CIA support of infiltration operations in North Vietnam. (Not a great success. High losses of teams.)

In response to a question based on recent U. S. press allegations that CIA is attempting to overthrow the Diem government: "CIA has never engaged in any such operations whatsoever -- no instigation of the Buddhists -- nothing." CIA considers that anti-CIA expressions of this kind originate with Madame Nhu. The Viet Cong has been working on the Buddhists, but the Buddhist leader who took sanctuary in the U. S. Embassy has indicated that the Buddhist activity is motivated by a desire to unify what is a loosely-joined, individual-Pagoda-type religious movement.

August 20 saw the temple raids, martial law, and then the arrests of students. One U. S. reaction was an August 24 cablegram from the State Department (presumably hastily prepared) which, in nice diplomatic language to State Department representatives in Saigon, gave the word to "unload the Nhus" -- i.e., indicate to the anti-Diem plotters among the Generals that they should get moving. However, the Generals proved to be lacking in any intention to pursue their previously-professed anti-Diem sentiments. CIA considers that the August 24 State Department cablegram was the result of a miscalculation of the General's true capabilities and intentions. CIA understands that subsequently the Executive Committee of the NSC has met frequently on the subject, and more recent State Department cables have reflected a revision of the earlier "unload the Nhus" message.

As yet the political situation in South Vietnam has not had an adverse effect on the military effort, nor any increased Viet Cong moves to capitalize on the situation. (Mr. Helms departed at this point.)

Italy

With approval by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the Christian Democratic Party was supported by CIA to the tune of $1 million in the campaign leading to the June elections (plus $600,000 to other political elements in Italy). CIA's rationale for the loss of CDP strength in the elections is that (1) there was a loss of votes among the workers from the south who were given the Communist treatment when they moved to the northern cities;

(2) Fanfani, and (3) the Papal audience given to Khrushchev's son-in-law had an effect on anti-Communist religious Italians, including wives of the workers who had previously been able to persuade their husbands to vote against the Communist candidates. Meanwhile the Special Group has authorized CIA to spend $125,000 to support the CDP in current developments looking toward the establishment of a center-left government coalition.

Bolivia

The Special Group has authorized a unique effort by CIA in support of Paz Estancero's program to "rationalize" the tin mines -- i.e., a project calling for the firing of surplus tin miners and resettling them in new jobs. This will take some time, but may result in breaking the leftist influence among the Bolivian miners.

Brazil

Goulart is engaged in coordinated efforts to (1) discredit the legislature, (2) obtain backing of the Army, and (3) make a demagogic appeal to the Brazilizn people as the only leader who can serve their interests.

CIA is carrying out covert action in the labor movement and CIA believes that Communist control can be weakened. In student groups, a number of CIA operations are going and assets are in place (e.g., in the top executive committee of the Students' Federation). However, there is no large-scale CIA political operation in Brazil now.

MR. FITZGERALD
(On the subject of Cuba)

In June the NSC Special Group approved a CIA proposal for a package of covert actions against Cuba. The covert program assumes that means short of military action are to be attempted on the premise that at the present rate of progress, the Castro regime will be even more firmly entrenched because the passage of time runs in Castro's favor.

Mr. Fitzgerald turned to a listing of the approved CIA covert actions, remarking that if they seemed familiar proposals which were previously under consideration, it should be kept in mind that they have now been approved as "interdependent" actions. The actions call for (1) covert collection of intelligence, (2) propaganda action to stimulate "low-key sabotage", (3) stimulate disaffection among the Cuban military, (4) an economic denial program aimed at precluding acquisition of spare parts for industrial machinery, and other products needed by Cuba, (5) a sabotage program of a general nature, and (6) support of anti-Castro autonomous groups, by giving them money and the means to act, but under an arrangement which insures against attribution to the United States, and which precludes operations from U. S. or British soil. (The CIA philosophy is to back only the potentially powerful and effective anti-Castro groups, and the military is felt to be the best bet.)

The CIA effort represents a shift from external raids to internal sabotage actions. CIA mounts about 10 "black" operations a month, and Castro security forces have taken their toll among the CIA teams. Three operations were conducted on August 17 and 18, and among other things the objective is to give encouragement to dissident Cuban elements such as military officers who see no professional future under Castro who is unloading military elements which aided him in his initial seizure of the government. (The Special Group, Mr. Bundy and other White House staff note the successful mounting of CIA's sabotage operations and have asked for more to be conducted. CIA has found it necessary to resist any such pressures for these operations to be increased beyond the present effective capacity which CIA has at this time.)

Again, referring to the Cuban economy, it is hurting badly. The United States has a monopoly on the spare parts for industrial machinery needed by Cuba, and the USSR cannot supply them. The Cuban electrical industry is particularly hard hit in this respect. Castro's re-emphasis on an agricultural step-up means increased efforts to produce sugar, a crop which presents a good sabotage target. Finally, the Soviet aid at a rate of $1 million a day (military and economic) is not enough to keep the Cuban economy going. Cubans are not starving but they do not eat "comfortably" even in the larger cities. CIA finds that a major problem for their "black" teams is food re-supply in areas where the Cubans are hard put to feed themselves.

CIA assets being used against Cuba:

Staff: 384 (Washington and Miami)
U. S. contractor personnel: 83
Foreign nationals: 525 (mostly Cubans)
Personnel at overseas posts: 45
DD/I staff: 12
NPIC: a big effort on U-2 photography of Cuba.

CIA considers that of all nationalities, the Cubans are the most unreliable (prone to exaggerate). The best information comes from non-Cuban agents.

There are 108 agents in Cuba, including friendly diplomatic personnel. There are two illegal teams working, one of which has 200 sub-agents. There are 44 legal travelers working; 60 agents in Cuban shipping; and there are 31 penetrations of Cuban installations abroad.

As to Soviet shipping into Cuba, CIA has an agent in every port, but observers cannot say what is in the crates they see being off-loaded.

Since January CIA has disseminated 150 photographs taken by agents on-the-ground in Cuba. Also CIA has furnished its agents in Cuba more and better radio equipment.

CIA's estimate of bloc personnel in Cuba: 12,000 Soviet troops; 150 Chinese (mostly diplomatic personnel); an unknown number of Soviet civilian technicians; and "a lot" of Czech and other bloc technicians working with the Cuban military forces.

CIA considers that in the past 9 months progress has been made in (1) intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, and (2) effectiveness of the economic denial program. CIA feels that the "X" factor is the volatility of the Cuban people whose resignation to their lot under Castro would change overnight if they see evidence of successful sabotage operations against the Cuban government.

CIA penetration of the Cuban military got under way in April. An agent brought out a Cuban Army major and he is being sent back into Cuba next week. The major says that there is a medium level acceptance among the military of the idea of overthrowing Castro, but although this view is held by individual members of the military they are fearful of communicating it to others within Cuba. The wife of the chief of training of the Cuban Army is a CIA source. Defectors are naming military personnel to be contacted. There is, however, a fear of the Castro security system.

The subject of specific kinds and amounts of Soviet military equipment in Cuba is an area of the worst exaggeration and reporting by nonprofessional observers. However, there is no evidence of offensive missiles. There are 47 MIG-21's operated by Cuban pilots. Cubans are at the SA-2 sites and are being trained to operate them. We don't know what is in the caves, exactly. Neither CIA agents nor Cubans (nor even Castro) has access to the Soviet armored camps.

A. R. Ash

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10017
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CONSIDERATION OF COVERT ACTION MATTERS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 25
SUBJECTS : COVERT ACTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~09/08/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 11, Covert Operation (Bulk), March 29, 1971, Staff Paper on Covert Action to Chairman, PFIAB, Tab B.

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

206-10001-10017

Box 11

Covert Operation (Bulk)

Mar, 29, 1971

Staff Paper on Covert Action
to Chairman, PFIAB

Tab B

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

206-10001-10017

TAB B

"KENNEDY BOARD"

CONSIDERATIONS OF COVERT ACTION MATTERS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Briefing of President by DCI, June 28, 1961

References to Covert Actions, Board Reports to President

CIA Report on USSR and Communist China Expenditures

Briefing of Board Panel by Secretary, Special Group, May 11, 1962

Chairman's Discussions of Covert Action Matters with DCI, May 1962

Discussion with General Taylor, June 29, 1962

CIA Briefing of Board Panel, July 20, 1962

CIA Briefing of Board Panel, November 1, 1962

Board Discussion with General Taylor, Chairman, JCS, January 26, 1963

CIA Briefing of Board Panel, April 15, 1963

CIA Briefing of Board Panel, September 6, 1963

State Department Briefing of Board Panel, September 6, 1963

Discussions with McGeorge Bundy, September 23, 1963

Excerpts, Minutes of Board Meetings, 1961--1963

CIA BRIEFING OF THE BOARD'S COVERT ACTION PANEL

APRIL 15, 1963

On April 15, 1963 Mr. Cord Meyer of CIA met at the Board's offices with the Board's Panel on Covert Actions (Messers. Murphy, and Gray); Mr. J. Patrick Coyne; and Mr. A. Russell Ash.

Mr. Meyer briefed the Board Panel on the major covert action programs of the CIA (with the exception of programs relating to Cuba, a subject scheduled to be covered in a briefing of the full Board on April 23, 1963). Mr. Meyer described the political action programs which had been pursued with respect to Chile. In his briefing Mr. Meyer also covered programs with respect to Argentina, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Japan, Congo, Kenya, Italy and France.

(As a follow-up to the above mentioned briefing of the Board Panel on Covert Actions, Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne were given a further briefing on the subject at CIA Headquarters on May 16, 1963, with a number of CIA representatives participating from the DDP Staff. This briefing included considerable information with respect to the nature and level of Soviet espionage activities being conducted in various areas of the world.)

BRIEFING OF BOARD'S COVERT ACTION PANEL

BY STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES

September 6, 1963

Mr. Murphy, Dr. Langer and Mr. Coyne met with Mr. Thomas Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State on September 6, 1963, for a discussion of several matters in the intelligence area.

With regard to covert action matters Mr. Hughes said that his Bureau in the Department of State is responsible for coordinating all NSC 5412/2 matters throughout the Department. Mr. Hughes felt that this job was being performed satisfactorily but he regretted that the State Department played a relatively minor role in Special Group activities. Mr. Hughes also expressed concern about the DCI's failure to provide sufficient time in advance of Special Group meetings for the coordination of covert action proposals which are to be discussed at the meetings and concerning which the Department of State has an interest.

In a discussion with Under Secretary Alexis Johnson, the Panel was told that in Mr. Johnson's opinion CIA is now coordinating its covert action programs with the appropriate elements of the Department of State. He did comment, however, that new programs are submitted to the Department at the very last moment, because the Director of Central Intelligence wishes to sign off personally on new covert action proposals before they are submitted to the Department of State or to the Special Group.

Secretary Johnson, in reply to a question posed by the Panel, said that the Special Group does not follow the general practice of reviewing periodically the status of implementation of covert action programs approved by the Special Group; and he thought it would be a good idea to have such reviews made, possibly by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department.

CIA BRIEFING OF THE BOARD'S COVERT ACTION PANEL

September 6, 1963

The Board's Covert Action Panel met on September 6, 1963. Present were Mr. Robert Murphy, Chairman; Mr. Gordon Gray; Dr. William Langer; and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

During the course of the meeting the Board Panel was briefed by Mr. Richard Helms (Deputy DCI/Plans, CIA) and CIA representatives Cord Meyer and Desmond Fitzgerald. The briefings were on the subject of covert action programs with respect to British Guiana, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Bolivia, Brazil and Cuba.

Mr. Coyne

EXCERPTS FROM MINUTES OF PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD MEETINGS WITH RESPECT TO COVERT ACTIONS MATTERS

Meeting of May 15, 1961:

The then DCI, Mr. Allen Dulles, joined in a discussion of the highlights of CIA's activities. In the covert actions field Mr. Dulles suggested that the Board look into the future relationship of CIA to paramilitary activities -- Mr. Dulles being of the opinion that paramilitary operations should not be conducted by the CIA. Mr. Dulles thought that the Board should look at such CIA activities as the use of proprietary organizations including Radio Free Europe, REA, the Afro-American Institute, and various labor and youth groups. Mr. Dulles was asked whether a removal of paramilitary activities from CIA responsibility would permit a significant cut in the CIA budget and personnel figures, and Mr. Dulles replied that such was not the case because of the extensive activities being carried on by the International Organizations Division of the DDP, and because of the many proprietary activities in which CIA is involved. (Dr. Land said that he was both shocked and indignant to learn that Radio Free Europe is a proprietary organization of the CIA. Mr. Clifford said that he had been on the Board of Directors of RFE for the past three years and this was the first time he had known it was connected with CIA. Mr. Dulles was asked what was the extent of the knowledge of American business men concerning the RFE-CIA connection and Mr. Dulles replied that certain American business men are aware of the connection, but not the man-in-the-street who makes dollar contributions to the tune of $3 million a year.)

Board Chairman Killian appointed himself and Messrs. Murphy, Langer and Taylor to serve on a Panel of the Board to study the extent to which the Government should be involved in political, psychological, propaganda, and paramilitary activities; and the policy which should be pursued by the U. S. Government in these matters.

President Kennedy joined the Board meeting, and when the discussion turned to a recommendation of the prior Board, the President referred to a recommendation that covert action programs of the CIA may not have been worth the risk nor worth the great expenditure of manpower and money; that CIA concentration on such activities had tended to detract substantially from the execution of its primary intelligence-gathering mission; and that there should be a total reassessment of U. S. covert action policies and programs. The President indicated that except for Laos and Cuba, he did not have extensive knowledge of other covert operations being conducted by the CIA; he said that he had the feeling that someone in the White House should be constantly in touch with and on top of covert operations; and he observed that the Congress believes that someone in the White House is keeping close watch on such matters. After a discussion of the Indonesia situation, President Kennedy thought that the Cuba fiasco was "Indonesia all over again," and he wondered if the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should not be better informed regarding these matters. The President also expressed concern over the recent development in Singapore which involved some bungled efforts on the part of CIA to penetrate the Singapore police. Following expressions of views by General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and Mr. Gray, the President agreed that in addition to the need for staffing of NSC 5412/2 matters, the President needed to be kept informed with respect to these programs on a continuing basis.

Meeting of May 26, 1961:

In this second meeting of the PFIAB the discussion included a statement by General Doolittle that proposed reorganization steps with respect to the CIA would involve the question of the interference of covert operations with intelligence collection. General Doolittle had found, he said, that the "covert operations dog is wagging the intelligence tail" when in fact this should be reversed. General Doolittle added that a great number of people in the CIA are more interested in the political, psychological, propaganda and paramilitary than they are in the dry, difficult but important task of collecting, interpreting and distributing intelligence--a matter which General Doolittle thought could be corrected by a change of emphasis and by a change in organization.

At one point in the meeting when the DCI, Mr. Allen Dulles, was present, that official said that with respect to organizational matters he favored transferring paramilitary activities to the Defense Department; he opposed the separation of other covert action activities from foreign intelligence activities; and he was opposed to separating the post of DCI from that of Head of the CIA.

Meeting of June 7, 1961:

Upon the completion of its third meeting on June 7, 1961, the Board met that evening with President Kennedy (the Attorney General and Mr. McGeorge Bundy were also present.) In connection with a statement by the President that he was receiving inadequate information concerning developments in a number of countries, Board Chairman Killian said that it was the general consensus of the Board that the CIA was placing too much stress upon covert action activities, with insufficient emphasis placed upon the acquisition of intelligence. Later in the discussion, Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that in line with the President's wishes, a list was being prepared of all programs involving covert support to political parties abroad, and support to individuals associated with political parties, with a view to assessing the direction and value of those programs--Mr. Bundy noting that certain of these problem areas which had been referred to by Ambassador Galbraith in connection with covert actions in India had been recently reviewed by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. Board Chairman Killian informed the President that in the Board's view the responsibilities of the U. S. Ambassadors should be clarified to make sure that each Ambassador is cognizant of the intelligence collection and covert action activities which are conducted in or from his country of assignment and for the purpose of assuring that such activities are consistent with the over-all national security policies of the President. Later on in the discussion, the President commented on a suggestion that he not be publicly identified with clandestine or covert action activities, saying that he thought this raised a question about the desirability of setting up on the White House staff a "Special Assistant for Intelligence." (Mr. Bundy thought it would be all right to establish such a position, provided that the Special Assistant was himself not publicly identified with any responsibility for covert operations.)

Meeting of June 30-July 2, 1961:

A portion of this Board meeting was attended by Mr. McGeorge Bundy who, at one point, read to the Board the letter from President Kennedy appointing General Taylor as Military Representative. Mr. Bundy emphasized that General Taylor's appointment was not exclusively military in character, for the President desired that General Taylor counsel him with respect to certain intelligence matters, and in the field of covert action activities the President wished to look to General Taylor for special guidance; and therefore the President had appointed General Taylor to serve as Chairman of the Special 5412/2 Group. Mr. Bundy mentioned that recently a two-hour briefing had been provided to the President, Mr. Bundy, General Taylor and Mr. Coyne by Messrs. Dulles and Bissell concerning major covert action programs currently being carried out by the Agency.

At another point in the meeting the Board heard comments from Mr. Roger Hilsman, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State. Among other things, Mr. Hilsman felt that the U. S. Government was not making full use of covert action operations in providing assistance to foreign political parties. He thought that such operations were important and could be helpful if done skillfully. Mr. Hilsman expressed criticism of the fact that the Department of State was brought into CIA's planning in the NSC 5412/2 area only at the last moment, which made it difficult for the State Department to take a position without knowledge of the extent and nature of the CIA resources that would be involved. Mr. Hilsman went on to say that he favored reorganizing the CIA along the general lines of the British Intelligence System; he would place clandestine collection and covert political action operations under the Department of State; and he would require that the State Department exercise policy control over all aspects of intelligence including political, psychological, propaganda, paramilitary and related covert activities.

Meeting of July 18, 1961:

In the course of this meeting, Mr. Bissell of CIA was invited to discuss with Board members his views on possible reorganization steps that might be taken with respect to the CIA. At one point in the discussion Mr. Bissell volunteered the suggestion that perhaps a step might be taken by the President to obtain a better public understanding and acceptance of the CIA's responsibilities. Mr. Bissell suggested that perhaps the President could make an appropriate announcement which would include recognition of the existence of the body known as the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, telling of the Group's duties and who compose it, without giving the public any information on the actual nature of the covert operations performed by the CIA.

Meeting of October 16-17, 1961

During the Board meeting of October 16-17, 1961 the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles, commented that the "principle of compartmentation" was being violated by CIA in its dealings with the PFIAB because of the CIA's effort to meet the convenience of the Board. Mr. Dulles said that one example of this was the action taken by CIA in furnishing the detailed compilation concerning the proprietary and other cover organizations with which CIA has dealings in its covert action programs. Mr. Coyne observed that material received by the Board from the CIA, and more sensitive information received from other U. S. intelligence agencies, is given a greater degree of security in the Board than in the CIA itself. (For use at this Board meeting a 17-page summary had been prepared in the Board's offices based on an undated document from CIA marked "Top Secret--Eyes Only--Extremely Sensitive" containing a listing and brief description of all CIA cover organizations and proprietary activities, including references to the Asia Foundation, Radio Free Europe, Institute of National Labor Research, World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession, U. S. National Student Association, and many others.)

Mr. Dulles told the Board that the CIA can play a helpful but relatively modest, role with regard to the Laos and South Vietnam problems, and he thought it would be well if the Board would suggest ways in which the CIA could more effectively utilize its resources in meeting such problems. The DCI observed that the CIA must do more in all covert action fields because the U. S. faces the most formidable covert action apparatus ever seen. He said that this apparatus is the most effective one ever established, and the U. S. has nothing like it.

During an executive session on October 17, 1961, Board Chairman Killian suggested that Board members give serious thought to the CIA's use of Foundations as covers for operations, and he cited the Asia Foundation and the International Commission of Jurists as examples. Dr. Killian felt that there is danger that the entire Foundation systems in the U. S. would be discredited if there were a disclosure of CIA's connection with them. It was Dr. Killian's view that the CIA should not place clandestine cover on any student, and he felt that it would be very serious should it become known that the National Student Federation, for example, was being financed by CIA as a cover organization. Dr. Langer expressed agreement with this, but felt that CIA would be justified in using foundations as a cover in combatting communist influence in such activities as labor unions. Mr. Clifford thought that perhaps Dr. Killian's concern with regard to educational foundations might be possibly met by the use of cut-off organizations between the CIA and the foundations, as a means of concealing CIA financial support to the foundations. Mr. Coyne reminded Board members of the Board's recommendation of last July, that all existing covert action programs be reviewed by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. In answer to a question from General Doolittle, Mr. Coyne told the Board that written summaries which had been furnished to the Board members concerning CIA's cover organization activities, were being given special security handling and strict accountability.

The Board meeting was joined by CIA representatives Lyman Kirkpatrick, Richard Helms, Cord Meyer, and others, for an oral presentation and discussion with respect to CIA cover organizations, including commercial organizations and such foundation-supported student groups as the National Student's Federation. After Mr. Helms had discussed the use of non-official covers for individual CIA personnel, Mr. Cord Meyer described the CIA's use of foundations and proprietary organizations. Mr. Meyer then described such large scale CIA cover organizations as Radio Free Europe (where the objective is propaganda) and other organizations which CIA directs against Soviet front organizations (where the effort is to exert influence and at the same time do genuine work for the benefit of the cover organization and its program, as in the case of the Asia Foundation and the Afro-American Institute which are based in the U. S. and whose activities are subject to CIA influence in the form of money and a degree of policy direction).

In answer to questions from Board members as to the danger of a disclosure of CIA's relationship to these various foundations, Mr. Meyer said that there was no grave danger of a "cultural U-2 incident", and the risk of a disclosure, by a defector, for example, was less than the risk of a U. S. news story or a disclosure resulting from gossip among members of the U. S. "foundation community". Mr. Meyer considered it inevitable that the Asian mentality would suspect that there is U. S. government influence in all U. S. based foundations; Chinese communist propaganda continually charges that U. S. government or Wall Street control exists in these foundations, even in the Ford Foundation where this is not the case;

nevertheless the cover foundations which are in fact influenced by CIA continue to do legitimate work as, for example, in the case of a labor training school supported by the Asia Foundation in Pakistan, and in the case of a teacher-training grant at the University of Rangoon; and in the case of the National Student's Federation, Mr. Meyer pointed out that CIA financial support is normally funneled through a variety of channels and CIA money goes to the National Educational Association through a cut-out arrangement. Mr. Meyer expressed the opinion that CIA's budgetary control over the use of moneys contributed to international student groups would deter any effort to impose foreign influence upon U. S. student organizations.

Mr. Meyer informed the Board that CIA cover organization activities are approved by the CIA Project Review Committee with the State Department being made knowledgeable. Mr. Helms stated that since January 20, 1961, there had been no review of such activities by the NSC nor by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group.

Next the Board was briefed by CIA representatives Amory, Breitweiser, and others concerning CIA paramilitary involvement in Laos and South Vietnam (in the latter country this activity included ground reconnaissance teams and intelligence teams, and a recent requirement on CIA "to harrass Soviet air drops of supplies" in the Southeast Asia area).

When the Board met with President Kennedy, on the afternoon of October 17, 1961, the Chairman read to the President the text of the Board's report on paramilitary activities, and he mentioned to the President the highlights of presentations which the Board had heard earlier that day concerning developments in Laos. The President directed Mr. Coyne to discuss this subject with Mr. McGeorge Bundy, with a view to a review of paramilitary activities in Laos, to be conducted by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group (this was discussed by Mr. Coyne with Mr. Bundy who said that he would have the review made of the paramilitary activity in Laos and the question as to whether the responsibility for the activity was properly assigned to the CIA).

Meeting of December 9, 1961

During this meeting of the Board an opportunity was given to Mr. Gray to present some of the highlights of Mr. Gray's and Mr. Coyne's findings in the course of their on-the-scene review of U. S. foreign intelligence activities in seven Middle East countries. One of the recommendations of Mr. Gray's report to the Board, which the Board subsequently adopted and submitted to the President, called for a review of NSC 5412/2 and related NSC Intelligence Directives to insure that adequate guidance is given to Ambassadors and CIA Station Chiefs with respect to covert actions generally; and that the station in Cyprus be reviewed with a view to placing increased emphasis on covert operations, particularly in the newspaper and trade unions fields, with appropriate support to be furnished by the CIA stations in Athens and Ankara. Subsequently, at the request of General Taylor, Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne briefed the Special NSC 5412/2 Group concerning covert action-related matters which had been reviewed during the Middle East trip.

Meeting of January 19-20, 1962

In the course of this Board meeting discussions were had with the newly-appointed DCI, Mr. John McCone. During a discussion of possible ways to reorganize and strengthen the CIA, the DCI said that he might decide to separate the functions of the DD/P area within the CIA. Mr. McCone thought that he might possibly name one assistant who would specialize in "conventional covert operations", including the management of the clandestine services world-wide and designate another assistant in the DD/P area who would be in charge of such matters as COMINT, ELINT, satellite reconnaissance, etc. Mr. McCone added that he thought he would pick a military man to head up covert operations and to handle paramilitary activities in order that these functions would be conducted on an absolutely professional basis, without disturbing the lines running from the DD/P to the CIA Station Chiefs.

Further on in the discussion with the DCI, Mr. McCone expressed concern over the fact that in the CIA organizational responsibility for financing was placed at a rather low level in the headquarters organizational set-up, and therefore the DCI desired to place this responsibility upon a higher level official who would serve as Comptroller in the Office of the DCI. Mr. Gray asked whether this would increase problems with the Bureau of the Budget if the DCI made the Comptroller responsible for all funding, including covert operations; and the DCI replied that in his opinion he could compartmentalize the work of the Comptroller in a way which would facilitate dealing with the Bureau of the Budget concerning covert action matters.

Meeting of March 23-24, 1962

During a discussion in Executive Session, Board Chairman Killian noted that President Kennedy had accepted the Board's recommendations concerning a re-definition of the role of the DCI, and regarding reorganization of the CIA. Dr. Killian thought that the point had now been reached in the Board's efforts when it should serve the President by examining selected areas of the government's intelligence effort, and he mentioned as an example, covert actions carried out under NSC 5412/2.

At another point in the Board meeting, Chairman Killian again pointed out that there was a need for the Board to explore thoroughly the activities being carried out in the NSC 5412/2 area; Dr. Killian thought that a general session with General Taylor at the next Board meeting would give the Board an opportunity to become acquainted with the present status of the specific programs being carried out under the Special NSC 5412/2 Group; the Chairman thought that it would be advantageous if the DCI were present at such a Board meeting; and Dr. Killian added that the Board lacks clear information on covert action programs with respect to Cuba.

Later on in the meeting, the Chairman made several Panel assignments to various Board members. Dr. Langer was asked to obtain information concerning covert actions being carried out under auspices of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, in order that the Board might be informed in depth with regard to such activities. The Chairman said that Dr. Langer's report to the Board should include information concerning covert actions with respect to Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, and Guatemala, among other countires.

In another reference to covert action matters, during an Executive Session of this Board meeting Mr. Coyne suggested that consideration be given to having one or more of the Board members take an on-the-scene look at covert operations which are being carried out abroad, particularly in South America. Dr. Killian agreed that this should be done.

Meeting of May 11-12, 1962

During this meeting, Board Chairman Killian reported to the Board concerning a talk he had had with Mr. McGeorge Bundy about the role of the President's Board. It was

Mr. Bundy's view that the Board must continue to keep itself fully informed about the foreign intelligence program, and Mr. Bundy emphasized the need for the Board to be completely informed regarding covert action operations taking place in the NSC 5412/2 area.

In an Executive Session, Mr. Coyne reported on a discussion which he had had with the newly-appointed DCI, Mr. McCone, for the purpose of outlining the various Board Panel assignments, and for the further purpose of scheduling CIA briefings for the members of the various Board Panels. Mr. Coyne reported that the DCI's reaction was to indicate his belief that the Board Panel activities seemed to be concerned with matters which were appropriate for the DCI himself to pursue. Chairman Killian said that following this discussion between Mr. Coyne and the DCI, Dr. Killian had contacted the Deputy DCI, General Carter, to pursue the request that CIA furnish briefings to the various Board Panels. General Carter replied to Chairman Killian that the DCI wanted to hold up on such briefings, for example, the briefing of the Board Panel on NSC 5412/2 activities, because the reorganization process was still underway in CIA. Chairman Killian also reported that when he contacted General Carter a week later on this same subject, it appeared that the CIA was reluctant to furnish the desired briefings, but Chairman Killian took a firm stand in requesting them.

During an Executive Session, Chairman Killian asked for suggestions concerning subject matters to be discussed with the DCI when that official joined the Board meeting the following day. With respect to the Langer-Gray-Murphy Panel, Dr. Langer said he had no particular questions to raise with the DCI concerning activities carried out under the NSC 5412/2 Group. Dr. Langer observed that he was impressed by the way the Special Group checks up on the implementation of covert operations. Chairman Killian referred to various indications he had received that General Taylor was doing a very good job in this respect. Mr. Gray thought that if the Board is going to try to protect the President in this particular area, the Board must have a better flow of information to the Board concerning NSC 5412/2 activities, in order that the Board may make a necessary evaluation of the covert action programs involved. Chairman Killian agreed with a suggestion by Mr. Coyne that the Board Panel on NSC 5412/2 activities should remain in existence on a continuing basis in order that the Board might be kept informed concerning these activities.

Dr. Killian remarked to Dr. Langer that the Board Panel on NSC 5412/2 matters should conduct a continuing review, with the objective of the Panel becoming fully informed regarding covert action programs, following which the Board would determine the next step to be taken.

Meeting of June 25-26, 1962

In Executive Session Chairman Killian informed Board members that recently there had been scheduled a CIA briefing of the Board Panel on covert action programs. However, the day before the briefing was to have been given by CIA officials Chairman Killian received a telephone call from the DCI, Mr. McCone, who said that he hesitated to provide the information requested by the Board Panel because only the President was privy to some of the covert operations involved. Mr. McCone told Chairman Killian that he had discussed this matter with the President who had concurred in the DCI's suggestion that the briefing of the Board Panel be limited to procedural aspects of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. Dr. Killian's reply to the DCI was to the effect that this would be a waste of time because the Board was already fully informed concerning these procedural matters, and therefore the Chairman expressed his intention to discuss this matter with the President, and the DCI indicated that he favored this course of action. Thereafter, Chairman Killian discussed the problem with Mr. McGeorge Bundy who felt that under the Board's Directive it should have full information in order to carry out its duties. Continuing his report to the Board, Dr. Killian said that on the preceding evening he had dined with the DCI who on this occasion said that he was prepared to give the Board whatever information it needs, including information on CIA operations in the covert action field. The Chairman added that Mr. McCone planned to brief the Panel himself from a book prepared for the first time in CIA with regard to all of the activities involved. Mr. Gray stated that the ability of the Board to get complete information concerning covert action activities was essential if the Board were to be able to discharge its responsibility to the President. Mr. Clifford thought that the gravity of this issue with the DCI was such that it warranted mention to the President when the Board met with the President the following day, and the President should be told the background of the problem and how the matter had been resolved.

At another point in the Board meeting there was a discussion of the need for identifying the President with clandestine intelligence and covert action activities. One Board member suggested that in any event the public probably has an idea that the President is fully aware of covert actions undertaken by our Government; however, Mr. Clifford pointed out that an attempt has always been made to maintain a separation of the President from intelligence agency operations all down the line in Government, and this separation should be preserved.

Chairman Killian observed to Board members that when the DCI arrived at the Board meeting later in the day the matter of previously withholding information from the Board concerning covert operations would not be brought up unless the DCI himself should bring it up for discussion. Dr. Killian added that steps should be taken by Mr. Coyne to contact the DCI and re-schedule the CIA briefing of the Board Panel on Covert Actions, preferably within the next two weeks.

When the DCI, Mr. McCone, joined the Board meeting for a discussion of intelligence matters, at one point the DCI referred to his recent extensive field trip in South Vietnam. Mr. McCone said that training is being given to South Vietnam villagers in civil defense, arms and training are being supplied to hamlet leaders who train and arm others, and there are plans for additional similar projects if the Special NSC 5412/2 Group approves. The DCI described the extent to which CIA is involved in the conception and administration of these programs which are backed by U. S. military teams. He added that CIA trains mountain people as trail watchers to report on the infiltration of communist forces from North Vietnam; and CIA is installing communications between villagers and is equipping military units with communications.

In the course of a discussion with the DCI concerning CIA budgetary matters, Mr. Gray observed that at times in the past the Budget Bureau had been prone to look into policy decisions which had been arrived at with respect to covert action programs in the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. Mr. McCone said that he anticipated no such problem in the Bureau of the Budget in the future, with the recent appointment of Mr. Robert Amory (formerly DD/I at CIA) to fill the Budget Bureau post which is concerned with CIA budgetary matters.

In his further remarks to the Board members at this meeting, Mr. McCone took up the subject of covert action programs which he then proceeded to describe to the extent that they involved aerial reconnaissance missions over China following consideration and approval by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group.

Later on in the meeting, the Board was briefed by Mr. Helms of CIA concerning Cuba. Mr. Helms said that after the abortive Cuban invasion there was a relaxation of covert action and intelligence collection efforts for several months with respect to Cuba; however, since December 1961 a major intelligence effort has been aimed at Cuba, involving U-2 overflights, interrogations of Cuban refugees in Florida; and the obtaining of intelligence reports. In answer to a question by a Board member, Mr. Helms said that thought had been given to sabotaging petroleum which is enroute to Cuban refineries, but such a covert action project was awaiting further policy consideration. General Taylor joined the Board meeting at another point, in response to the Chairman's invitation, and among other things he discussed the subject of covert action activities. General Taylor asked whether the Board wished to indicate any reaction it might have to its current review of NSC 5412/2 matters, and Dr. Langer responded with a comment that as yet the Board's discussions had not gone beyond a briefing on procedures given by the Secretary of the Special Group. In answer to a question by Dr. Langer, it was General Taylor's opinion that the Special NSC 5412/2 Group is not set up nor equipped to run a continuing check on the implementation of all covert action projects, and for this reason the Special Group places dependence upon the PFIAB.

(When the Board met with the President on the afternoon of June 26, 1962, Chairman Killian mentioned to President Kennedy, among other things, the problem of assuring appropriate political control of covert actions conducted by the CIA or other elements of the government. Chairman Killian observed that the Special NSC 5412/2 Group was functioning effectively. As a footnote to its report to the President, Chairman Killian informed President Kennedy that the Board was happy to state that there had been resolved a problem which had recently arisen with respect to the Board's need-to-know regarding certain intelligence and covert action programs; and Dr. Killian felt that with the resolution of this problem, the Board could expect to receive the information which it had to have in order to carry out its responsibilities to the President. Dr. Killian added that based on briefings which had been received by the Board there appeared to be a lack of information on the overall plan with respect to covert actions regarding Cuba which prompted General Taylor to explain that he had not yet had an opportunity to give the Board a thorough fill-in concerning covert actions against Cuba, which had been considered in the Special Group. After the Board meeting with the President, General Taylor summarized briefly for the Board the intelligence programs being established with respect to Cuba, pointing out that such programs were the first phase of the effort against Cuba at this time.)

PJT no JS objection
subject to PFIAB
approval. 9/2/98

Meeting of September 28, 1962

During this meeting of the Board, Mr. Murphy presented an oral report of the Board's Panel on Covert Actions Operations, based on a detailed report which had been prepared by Mr. Coyne with respect to the recent meeting which the Panel had had with the DCI. Mr. Murphy touched on some of the highlights of the information which had been supplied by the DCI and by Mr. Helms, and Mr. Murphy suggested that Board members read the memorandum report which Mr. Coyne had prepared. Mr. Murphy thought that a good rapport had been established by the Panel with the DCI and he indicated that the Panel would continue to review the subject periodically with Messrs McCone and Helms. Dr. Baker, Acting Board Chairman, emphasized the need for the Board to obtain full and accurate information concerning covert operations being conducted with respect to Cuba and with respect to other matters.

Meeting of November 9, 1962

At the beginning of this meeting, it was announced that Mr. Pace was absent on a trip to South America, in the course of which he would, on behalf of the Board, look into some foreign intelligence and covert action activities in Argentina and Uruguay.

Meeting of December 6-7, 1962

During this meeting Mr. Coyne suggested that the Board consider the advisability of a recommendation to the President that the Board be granted continuing access to records of the

Special NSC 5412/2 Group in order that the Board's responsibilities to the President may be fullfilled; Chairman Killian said that he would see to it that this was accomplished in another way.

Meeting of December 27-28, 1962

During this meeting of the PFIAB, and in the course of the discussions had with DCI McCone, the DCI made reference to the "MONGOOSE" program with respect to Cuba. He said that Phase I of the program consisted of obtaining intelligence on the possibilities for organizing and supplying resistance groups within Cuba. The DCI said that it had not yet been considered an appropriate time for the execution of plans for "violent actions" of a sabotage nature within Cuba. Mr. McCone had thought that such actions would not be appropriate because of his own speculation in August 1962, that the U. S. would be faced with MRBM's. In any case, the DCI said, the "MONGOOSE" effort became diverted by considerations of Soviet activities in Cuba.

Meeting of January 25-26, 1963

For use in connection with the Board meeting of January 25-26, 1963, primarily on the subject of Cuba, A. R. Ash prepared a memorandum for the file, dated January 11, 1963, summarizing the results of a review of minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, and of the Special Group "Augmented" (the latter group including the Attorney General, concerned with the "MONGOOSE" program directed at the Castro regime in Cuba). At the August 4, 1962 meeting of the Special Group "Augmented", the Attorney General stated that the President felt that more priority should be given to mounting sabotage operations, and the Attorney General urged massive activity within the entire framework of the "MONGOOSE" program. It was agreed that one of the objectives of the Special Group "Augmented", under the chairmanship of the Attorney General, would be to develop new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime. (The review of minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group with respect to Cuba, reflected that this body was concerned primarily with reconnaissance overflight questions during the period leading up to the Soviet missile crisis.)

Meeting of March 8-9, 1963

In the course of this Board meeting the only consideration of any significance given to covert action matters was in connection with the visit of the DCI for a discussion of intelligence-related problems with members of the Board. The DCI, Mr. McCone, mentioned that CIA had traditionally carried out activities in the paramilitary field; however, the Department of Defense now has Special Forces operating in the paramilitary field in South Vietnam and elsewhere, which has resulted in conflicts between the CIA and DOD elements in those areas.

Meeting of April 23, 1963

At this meeting, in the course of a discussion of covert action matters, the question was raised as to whether the Board should not ascertain specifically whether the President desired that the Board go into covert action programs deeply, and if that proved to be the President's wish then the Board should take steps to insure that it received full briefings from the agencies concerned. Chairman Killian stated that there were no limitations on the Board's access to such information and that this is well established.

At the request of Chairman Killian, Mr. Murphy briefly informed the Board concerning the meeting which he, and Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne had recently with Mr. Cord Meyer of CIA on the subject of covert action programs. Mr. Murphy said that the briefing covered operations in certain Latin American countries (the subject of Cuba was excluded because that was to be covered at today's Board meeting) and the briefing consisted primarily of "light touches", and was of such routine nature that it seemed to downgrade the importance which the Board attached to covert action operations and requirements.

Mr. Coyne informed the Board of a request from Mr. Kirkpatrick of CIA who asked that the scheduled CIA briefing of the Board on clandestine operations with regard to Cuba, be scheduled outside of the presence of Mr. Cottrell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, who was scheduled to join the Board meeting at the same time that the CIA briefing was to be given. Mr. Kirkpatrick explained that the DCI urged these briefings to be separate because the CIA briefing would include a discussion of covert action operations which Mr. Cottrell was not privy to.

Later in this Board meeting, during discussions with the DCI, Mr. McCone was asked whether the terms of the U. S.-Cuba Prisoner Exchange Agreement were of a nature which would affect the conduct of present or future U. S. intelligence and covert operations with respect to Cuba. The DCI replied that Castro had not imposed any conditions which would preclude the U. S. from the conduct of such activities.

The Board was briefed by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald of CIA. Mr. Fitzgerald said that the intelligence teams that CIA was sending into Cuba were primarily confined to intelligence-gathering missions rather than covert action, although the teams would have missions involving "low key resistance and subtle sabotage". The CIA representative stated that monthly plans of the CIA for infiltrating these teams into Cuba were approved by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. Mr. Fitzgerald added that CIA was not receiving policy guidance with respect to positive covert action programs of a specific sabotage nature, and he indicated that a decision regarding this was being sought during the coming week.

The Board meeting was joined by Mr. Cottrell of the Department of State who explained that he was serving as Chairman of an Inter-Departmental Coordinating Committee established at the direction of the President, to provide a focal point for co-ordinating policy recommendations and the execution of approved policies with respect to Cuba. Mr. Coyne raised the question which had been brought up earlier by Mr. Fitzgerald concerning the absence of policy guidance with respect to covert actions conducted by CIA. Mr. Cottrell said that with the release of prisoners in Cuba, in his opinion, the time had come for more aggressive sabotage operations with respect to Cuba.

Meeting of June 25-26, 1963

A large part of this meeting was taken up with reports by various Board Panel Chairmen concerning the status and adequacy of the implementation of recommendations which the Board had made to date. As Chairman of the Panel on CIA, General Doolittle reported on those Board recommendations concerning CIA which were being acted upon; and Board Chairman Clifford asked that at the next Board meeting General Doolittle identify areas in which CIA was not carrying out Presidentially-approved recommendations of the Board (one of the CIA-related recommendations which was presumably to be included in General Doolittle's next report would be one in which the Board recommended deeper cover for CIA's covert action operations).

In the course of giving the report of his Panel on CIA organization and related matters, Chairman Clifford included a reference to the Board recommendation that the President be protected against identification with clandestine and covert action programs. Mr. Clifford said that the need for this was pretty well understood in appropriate quarters.

At another point in the Board meeting, when the DCI, Mr. McCone, was reporting to the Board on CIA operations against Cuba, the DCI referred to certain covert actions. Among these were operations (approved by the Special 5412/2 Group) to promote disaffection in the Cuban military; hampering the Cuban economy; and sabotage.

Meeting of September 12-13, 1963

This Board meeting was attended by Mr. McGeorge Bundy whom Chairman Clifford had invited for a discussion of several subject matters listed in the Chairman's memorandum of invitation. As to the subject of covert actions, Mr. Bundy said in frankness that he did not know precisely how the Board went about its coverage of NSC 5412/2 matters. He said that he looks to CIA from time to time for reports on the status of particular covert action programs, but preferred not to have in his office a current compilation of all of them. However, Mr. Bundy said that he was prepared to facilitate any review of covert action programs that a Board Panel might want to make.

Meeting of November 21-22, 1963

During a report given at this Board meeting by the DCI, Mr. McCone urged that the Board urge President Kennedy to take actions (public statements, for example) to correct the bad public image which CIA was acquiring as the result of charges that CIA had engineered the anti-Diem coup in South Vietnam, and was acting as a "Third Government" in that country. The DCI asserted that the CIA role in Vietnam was not to overthrow governments, but to carry out other tasks. Referring to paramilitary operations in Vietnam, the DCI said that there were problems involving the question as to whether CIA or Special Forces should have the responsibility for such activities (Mr. Colby of CIA later told the Board that paramilitary matters in Vietnam were being transferred to U. S. Special Forces).

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Clipping of article "The Kennedy Murder and the Secret Services of the USA"

FROM: WE/4/INT Arthur P. Iorio

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 26 March 1964

Oswald case (from Reichms

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI Staff Birch O'Neil Room 2B03			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			18

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

The attached article, which may be of interest to you, appeared in the 7 March issue of the Italian Communist Party weekly Rinascita. The writer, Gianfranco Corsini, has been on and off US correspondent for the Italian Communist press.

Note that in the section pencilled in red rumors are referred which suggest that ~~that~~ it was the Agency to organize the murder of President Kennedy.

Clipping not retained

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Date: 05/08/96
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10004-10143
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 201-289248

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : DISCUSSION BETWEEN MEMBER SR DIVISION CONCERNING OSWALD'S STAY IN HELSINKI.
DATE : 06/01/64
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : HELSINKI TRIP
USSR CONSULATE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/12/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : OSW10:V43 1993.06.12.10:33:55:150000:

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Vol. 43

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO. / DATE
CIRA/RS 2B23		NO. SX-25605 DATE 1 June 64

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/AN	5 MAR 1975			Please assign SX # and classify to 201-289248
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. IP/EDI				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. IP/FILES Attn: Doris Miller				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

Document Number 716-838
for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SX-25605

1 June 1964

O Discussion between Member SR Division and COS Helsinki concerning timetable of Oswald's stay in ~~[illegible]~~ Helsinki

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

1. At 0900 this morning I talked with Frank Friberg recently returned COS Helsinki re Warren Commission inquiry concerning the timetable of Oswald's stay in Finland in October 1959, including his contact with the Soviet Consulate there. (Copy of the Commission letter of 25 May 64 and State Cable of 22 May 64 attached.)

2. Friberg gave me the following information:

a. It takes 25 minutes to drive from the airport to downtown Helsinki;

b. By taxi, it would take no more than 5 minutes to reach the Soviet consulate;

c. The Soviet consulate probably closed at 1300 hours local time on Saturdays in 1959;

d. Passenger lists (manifests) at the U.S. Consulate in Helsinki are retained for six months only and then are destroyed. Mr. Robert Fulton (CIA) was U.S. consular official there at the time.

e. A copy of State's cable inquiry would go to the Helsinki Station and they would assist in preparation of a reply.

3. Mr. Friberg agreed that it would be worthwhile to cable the Station concerning points not covered by State in their inquiry. He suggested changes incorporated into the cable sent to Helsinki.

Lee H. Wigren
C/SR/CI/R

IP/EDI		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
	X	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/FIS		PREPARE FOR FILMING	
IP/PH		FILM	
ISO/DCU		CODE NO. (2, 3, 4)	
		RYBAT REST. CODE	
		CABLE IDEN (11)	
		NFD (8)	
IP/FILES		FOR FILING	

Document Number 716-838

for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

SAME AS RELEASED DOC # -340

RECORD COPY

1 Jun 64

201-289248

Box 8

13-00000

Sx-25605

1 June 1964

Discussion between Member SR Division and COS Helsinki concerning timetable of OSWALD's stay in ~~[illegible]~~ Helsinki

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

1. At 0900 this morning I talked with Frank Friberg recently returned COS Helsinki re Warren Commission inquiry concerning the timetable of Oswald's stay in Finland in October 1959, including his contact with the Soviet Consulate there. (Copy of the Commission letter of 25 May 64 and State Cable of 22 May 64 attached.)

2. Friberg gave me the following information:

a. It takes 25 minutes to drive from the airport to downtown Helsinki;

b. By taxi, it would take no more than 5 minutes to reach the Soviet consulate;

[illegible] consulate [illegible] probably [illegible] time on Saturdays in 1959;

d. Passenger lists (manifests) at the U.S. Consulate in Helsinki are retained for six months only and then are destroyed. Mr. Robert Fulton (CIA) was U.S. consular official there at the time.

e. A copy of State's cable inquiry would go to the Helsinki Station and they would assist in preparation of a reply.

3. Mr. Friberg agreed that it would be worthwhile to cable the Station concerning points not covered by State in their inquiry. He suggested changes incorporated into the cable sent to Helsinki.

Lee H. Wigren
C/SR/CI/R

		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
IP/EDI	2X	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/FIS		PREPARE FOR FILING	
IP/PH		FILM	
ISO/DCU		CODE NO. (2, 3, 4)	
		RYBAT REST. CODE	
		CABLE IDEN (11)	
		NFD (8)	
IP/FILES		FOR FILING	

Document Number 716-838

for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

SAME AS RELEASED DOC # -340

RECORD COPY

1 Jun 64
201-289248

Box 8

~~SECRET~~

1 June 1964

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

1. At 0900 this morning I talked with Frank Friberg recently returned COS Helsinki re Warren Commission inquiry concerning the timetable of Oswald's stay in Finland in October 1959, including his contact with the Soviet Consulate there. (Copy of the Commission letter of 25 May 64 and State Cable of 22 May 64 attached.)

2. Friberg gave me the following information:

a. It takes 25 minutes to drive from the airport to downtown Helsinki;

b. By taxi, it would take no more than 5 minutes to reach the Soviet consulate;

c. The Soviet consulate probably closed at 1300 hours local time on Saturdays in 1959;

d. Passenger lists (manifests) at the U.S. Consulate in Helsinki are retained for six months only and then are destroyed. Mr. Robert Fulton (CIA) was U.S. consular official there at the time.

e. A copy of State's cable inquiry would go to the Helsinki Station and they would assist in preparation of a reply.

3. Mr. Friberg agreed that it would be worthwhile to cable the Station concerning points not covered by State in their inquiry. He suggested changes incorporated into the cable sent to Helsinki.

Lee H. Wigren
C/SR/CI/R

Document Number 780-340

for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

SAME AS 716-838

~~SECRET~~

See Sanitized File H

Number 335

For sterile copy [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

YM7-27221

9 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Discussion with Warren Commission Staff Member

REFERENCE: Letter from J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of the President's Commission, to Mr. Richard Helms dated 3 July 1964

> o SR/CI discussion with SLAWSON 9 July on questions of Soviet policy towards Russian wives of Americans and visa procedures.

1. With the approval of C/SR and the DDP, I met with Mr. W. David Slawson of the staff of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy at 1400 hours on this date in the Commission's offices at 200 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss apparent inconsistencies in material provided the Commission by CIA and by the Department of State which were called to our attention in a letter from the General Counsel of the Commission to Mr. Helms, dated 3 July 1964.

2. By way of introduction, Mr. Slawson said that in the portion of the Commission's report that he was writing, he would have to deal with the question of whether or not the OSWALDs' departure from the USSR - and the circumstances (i.e. timing) of that departure - were unusual or suspicious in any way. He expressed his belief that they probably were not and cited Soviet relaxation in such matters in the post-Stalin era. However, he wanted to be sure in his own mind that our information was not in conflict with that which the Commission had received from State since all of that information would remain in the records of the Commission.

3. After stating my belief that there was no real disagreement or inconsistency between the information from CIA and that from State, I expressed the view that the matter resolved itself into three questions:

/a. Do the Soviet

Document Number 767-864

for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

CS COPY

iatt.

~~SECRET~~

201-289248

a. Do the Soviet authorities normally permit Soviet citizens married to foreign nationals to emigrate from the Soviet Union to the homelands of their spouses?

b. Do they normally permit such Soviet citizens to accompany (i.e. depart simultaneously with) their spouses from the Soviet Union?

c. How long does it take such Soviet citizens to get Soviet exit visas for such a purpose (time lapse from application to granting of visas)?

4. Concerning the first two questions (3a and 3b above) I pointed out that we had addressed ourselves mainly to the question of Soviet citizens being allowed to accompany their spouses abroad while State dealt only with the larger question of Soviets married to foreigners being allowed to emigrate without reference to whether or not they left simultaneously with or at another time from their spouses. Mr. Slawson commented that this explanation was most helpful and he reread what both we and State had said in that light.

5. By way of further explanation, I said that the statements in paragraph 6 of our memorandum of 6 April 1964 concerning Soviets being permitted to accompany their foreign spouses abroad were based on a review of 26 cases, of which 10 involved Americans. In only four of these cases did a Soviet wife leave the USSR in the company of her foreign husband; in 14 of the cases the foreign spouse departed alone; and in the remaining seven cases insufficient details are known to permit us to categorize them. I added that although State's information began by citing the issuance of 724 quota and non-quota immigrant visas by the American Embassy in Moscow during the period FY 1954 to December 1963, it did not indicate how many of these visas were for Soviet citizens who had married U.S. nationals. Actually State provided detailed information for only sixteen cases and did not indicate in many of these whether or not the Soviet was permitted to accompany the foreign spouse.

/6. In response to

6. In response to a question from Mr. Slawson I stated that most of the 26 cases upon which we based our statements involved foreign students, exchange teachers and other relatively transient persons, and while a number of cases have certain points in common, they bear little similarity to the OSWALD case in that none involved a defector who married prior to repatriating. I noted that paragraph 6 of our 6 April 1964 memorandum to the Commission had pointed this out. Mr. Slawson indicated that he was now satisfied on this matter.

7. Concerning the length of time taken by Soviet authorities to process exit visas for Soviet citizens married to foreign nationals (question 3c above), I stated that, in my opinion, the information provided by State (in the third enclosure to Mr. Meeker's letter) substantially corresponded to the views expressed in paragraphs 6 and 7 of our memorandum to the Commission dated 6 April 1964. Mr. Slawson asked if it would be possible to elaborate paragraph 7 of our memorandum of 6 April by providing a statistical breakdown of the cases on which our statements were based. I indicated that this could be done.

8. At this point Mr. Slawson stated that as a result of our discussion he felt that the question of possible inconsistencies had been resolved. However, he asked that we send a brief written reply to the Commission's letter of 3 July 1964 embodying the substance of what I had said concerning the basis for statements included in our 6 April 1964 memorandum. [This would include the gist of the draft reply to the Commission which I showed to C/SR on 8 July plus an elaboration of our statements concerning Soviet visa applications.]

9. Mr. Slawson indicated that he would be sending parts of his report dealing with the Soviet intelligence services to CIA for checking as to their accuracy. He did not say when this would occur.

10. After concluding the meeting with Mr. Slawson, I read Volume 52 of the transcript of testimony before the Commission. This included the reinterview of Marina OSWALD.

Lee H. Wigren
C/SR/CI/Research

201-289248

① Do Sovs normally permit Sov. citizens married to forn natls to emigrate from SU to homeland of spouse?

- State says yes – cites 724 visa applications (probably minority are spouses; majority relatives etc)

- We cite absence of law; do not say

② Do Sovs normally permit Sov. cits married to forn natls to accompany (ie depart simultaneously w.) spouses from SU to homelands of spouses

- State does not say

- We cite evidence that they do not

③ How long does it take Sov cits to get Sov exit visas to emigrate to homelands of forn spouses?

- Our #7 and [illegible] State's info in cases in which it knows agree

Notes used by L Hood in discussion with Mr David Slawson of Warren Commission on 19 Jun 64

201-289248

att 1 to XAAZ-27221

CS COPY

①

- Our reply addressed to legality & [illegible] of Soviet citizens accompanying (i.e. departing simultaneously with) foreign spouses out of SU.

Based on review of 26 cases (10 US) in which foreigners married Soviet citizens in SU

— Sov wife left SU in company of husband — 4

- 1 case of [illegible]
- 2 cases of [illegible], married [illegible]
- 1 case [illegible], [illegible]

— For. husband (wife) then left SU alone — 14

— Sequence not known ——— 7

13-00000

② Info in our #7 re: [illegible] of time taken by Sov authorities to process visa applics of Sov spouses of Am citzs substantially agrees w State's info on time taken by Sovs to process visa applics of Sov wives of U.S. cits (14)

13-00000

[illegible] of 29 pages

Gist of State's info

- info concerning length of time taken by Sov authorities to process visa application of Sov wives of Am cits in SU -

- info in response to request for names of all Sov wives of US cits who received in last 10 yrs exit visas to leave SU & length of time between dates of application [illegible] approval by Sov authorities

---

① 724 immigrant visas issued by Amer Embassy from [illegible] 54 - Dec 63

[illegible] down

- non-quota visas for spouses & children of Am cits
- quota visas for spouses & children of legally admitted aliens in US.

② Dates of application for Sov exit visas known (or deduced) in 14 of these cases. Noted.
[10 days - 14 yrs]

③ Presumption that all others were processed routinely

- 10 days to 14 yrs
- Can't tell how [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] persons out of SU
- We had [illegible] US [illegible]

13-00000

Memo of 2 Jul, 64

- Info obtained from 2d enclosure to State's letter of 29 Jan 64 seems inconsistent w. comments made in para 6 of our memorandum of 6 April 64.

201-289248

9 July 64

Analysis of 26 cases cited to Warren Comm in

a) discussion w/ David Slawson (see memo for record, 9 July 64 paras 5,6,7

b) Memo for Mr. Rankin from Richard Helms dated 22 July 64, paras 2 & 3

	CASE	SOV CUT	CONCURRENT TRAVEL	TIME TO PROCESS VISA
1.	American woman who met and married Soviet citizen in USSR	X	na	na
2.	American student	✓	X	?
3.	American clergyman	✓	X	?
4.	American tourist	?	X	
5.	American student or tourist		X	
6.	American correspondent	✓	X	?
7.	Italian student	?	X	
8.	Italian student	?	X	
9.	Italian student	?	X	
10.	Iranian returnee	?	X	
11.	West German student	✓	X	long
12.	Swedish student	✓	X	months
13.	Swedish student	✓	X	months
14.	Swedish businessman	✓	X	months
15.	Swedish student	✓	X	months
16.	American teacher	?	?	?
17.	Americanbusinessman	✓	?	?
18.	Frenchman on trip to USSR; student?	?	?	?
19.	Chilean residing and working Moscow	?	?	?
20.	Italian student	?	?	?
21.	Finnish student	?	?	
22.	Apparently Greek; details unknown	?	?	
23.	American tourist (unbalanced, Russian-born father under FBI survey)	✓	✓	6 months
24.	Italian communist journalist	✓	✓	
25.	Swedish student	✓	?	
26.	American businessman	✓	✓	few months

JC

13-00000

TOTAL CASES: 26

FOREIGNER LEFT USSR WITHOUT SOVIET SPOUSE

Known: STERN-ZASLAVSKIY Arlene
KIRSCH Leonard
OLSEN Clark
U.S. NELSON Phillip
HEGARTY Thomas
TUCKER Robert
BASSANI Luciano
Italian CELATI Amilcare
BELLINZONA Giovanni
Iranian YEVNICH Stepan C.
W. German BETTIN Arnulf
JOHANSSON Kurt
Swedish NORDENSTAM Gunnar
LUNDAHL Hugo
THELIN Nils

NOT KNOWN WHETHER THEY LEFT USSR TOGETHER

US LEHRMAN Edgar
PENDILL C. Grant
Italian (AEFRAPPE)
Chilean CRUZ OCAMPO Alvaro
Italian GRIECO Ruggiero
Finnish LAVIKKALA Asser
Greek? LYMBOURIDES Achilleis

SOVIET SPOUSE ACCOMPANIED FOREIGNER

US PACKLER Allen David
Italian SCOGNAMIGLIO Mario
Swedish KRONSJO Tom
US SANDOR John (but note that he wanted to take her out with him prior to their marriage, since she was still technically married to someone else, but Soviets refused exit visa, and he had to return later to marry her and then await granting of exit visa in order to bring her out.)

JC

NAME	OUT	TIME LAPSE BETWEEN MARRIAGE AND ARRIVAL/EXIT OF SOVIET SPOUSE
Stern-Zaslavskiy	no	not as of three years after marriage
Kirsch	yes	9 mo.
Olsen	yes	under 5 mo.
Nielson	yes	6-7 mo.
Hegarty	no	not as of 4 months after marriage
Tucker	yes	10 years
Sassani	no	not as of 3 months after marriage
Celati	no	
Bellinzona	yes	11 mo.
Yevnikh	?	
Bettin	yes	at least a year
Johansson	yes	9 mo. Visa took either 6 weeks or 7 months.
Nurdenstam	yes	7 mo. or more
Lundahl	no	not as of 3 months after marriage
Thelin	yes	11 mo. or more
Lehrman	?	
Pendill	yes	
(Frenchman)	yes	married 1959 or 60; out as of 21 May 1962.
Cruz Ocampo	no	not as of 3½ years after marriage
Grieco	?	
Lavikkala	yes	
Lymbourides	?	
Packler	yes	13 mo. Visa took 6 months.
Scognamiglio	yes	9 mo.
Kronsjo	yes	married prior July 1962. Applied for Norwegian visas for period 7 July - 20 August 1962. To go from there to Sweden permanently. Supposedly did.
Sandor	yes	5 mo.

TIME FOR SOVIET SPOUSE TO GET VISA

Known:	Packler	6 mo.
	Scognamiglio	9 mo.
	Sandor	5 mo.
	Johansson	7 mo. or about 6 weeks
Implied:	Kirsch	not over 9 mo.
	Olsen	" " 4-5 mo.
	Nielson	" " 6-7 mo.
	Bellinzona	" " 11 mo.
	Tucker	ten years
	Bettin	at least a year
	Nurdenstam	7 mo. or more
	Thelin	11 mo. or more

JC

In three cases there was a lapse of several months between application and issuance of the Soviet exit visa (five months in one case, six in the second, and nine in the third). In another case the western husband was reluctant to leave the USSR without his Soviet wife. He did so some six months after the wedding only because the Soviet authorities told him that her exit application could not be processed until he had left. The visa was issued only about six weeks after his departure, but it may have been applied for when they were married or at any time during the next six months.

In four other cases it is possible to infer approximate time limits for the granting of an exit visa. One was granted within four to five months, the second within six to seven months, the third within nine months, and the fourth within eleven months. In three additional cases visa issuance took a minimum of seven, eleven, and twelve months respectively.

JC

CASE	MARRIAGE DATE	EXIT VISA APPLICATION	ARRIVED IN WEST
STERN-ZASLAVSKIY Arlene	26 Aug 61	Soon after	Never
KIRSCH Leonard	latter May 61		US - Feb 62
OLSEN Clark	30 Jan 60		US - 21 May 60
NIELSON Philip	Feb or Mar 62		Paris - Sept 62
HEGARTY Thomas	28 May 59		not out yet Sept 59
TUCKER Robert	1943		US 1953
BASSANI Luciano	10 May 61	immediately	not out yet Aug 61
CELATI Amilcare			expected June 62
BELLINZONA Giovanni	Aug 61		Italy - July 62
YEVNIKH			
BETTIN Arnulf	July 61	immediately	not out yet spring/62
JOHANSSON Kurt	9 July 61	" or Jan 62	Sweden - April 62 visa mid-Feb
NURDENSTAM Gunnar	Aug 61 or prior		Sweden - Mar 62 visa Feb 62
LUNDAHL Hugo	21 Dec 61		not yet out Mar 62
THELIN Nils	mid-61 or prior	immediately	Sweden - spring 62?
LEHRMAN Edgar	28 Mar 63	immediately	
PENDILL C. Grant	mid 50's or prior		US - mid 50's
[illegible] Frenchman	1959 or 60		France - as of 21/May 62
CRUZ OCAMPO Alvaro	early 1947	mid-47	not yet out Aug 51
GRIECO Ruggiero			
LAVIKKALA Asser	fall 59 or prior		Finland - ?
LYMBOURIDES Achillefs			
C - PACKLER Allen	17 Feb 62	Aug 62?	Italy - March 63
SCOGNAMIOLIO Mario	Aug 60	Dec 60	Italy - 6 May 61
? C - KRONSJØ Tom	prior Jul 62		Norway - 7 Jul 62?
C - SANDOR John	2 Nov 57	immediately	US- 31 Mar 58

C = [illegible]

13-00000

TOTAL CASES: 26

8 July 64

FOREIGNER LEFT USSR WITHOUT SOVIET SPOUSE

Known:
- STERN-ZASLAVSKIY Arlene
- KIRSCH Leonard
- OLSEN Clark
- NIELSON Philip
- HEGARTY Thomas
- TUCKER Robert
- BASSANI Luciano
- CELATI Amilcare
- BELLINZONA Giovanni
- YEVNIKH Stepan G.
- BETTIN Arnulf
- JOHANSSON Kurt
- NORDENSTAM Gunnar
- LUNDAHL Hugo
- THELIN Nils

NOT KNOWN WHETHER THEY LEFT USSR TOGETHER

- LEHRMAN Edgar
- PENDILL C. Grant
- (AEFRAPPE)
- CRUZ OCAMPO Alvaro
- GRIECO Ruggiero
- LAVIKKALA Asser
- LYMBOURIDES Achillefs

SOVIET SPOUSE ACCOMPANIED FOREIGNER

- PACKLER Allen David
- ~~SCOGNAMIGLIO Mario~~
- ? KRONSJØ Tom
- SANDOR John (but note that he wanted to take her out with him prior to their marriage, since she was still technically married to someone else, but Soviets refused exit visa, and he had to return later to marry her and then await granting of exit visa in order to bring her out.)

CASE	MARRIAGE DATE	EXIT VISA APPLICATION	ARRIVED IN WEST
STERN-ZASLAVSKIY Arlene	26 Aug 61	Soon after	Never
KIRSCH Leonard	latter May 61		US - Feb 62
OLSEN Clark	30 Jan 60		US - 21 May 60
NIELSON Philip	Feb or Mar 62		Paris - Sept 62
HEGARTY Thomas	28 May 59		not out yet Sept 59
TUCKER Robert	1943		US 1953
BASSANI Luciano	10 May 61	immediately	not out yet Aug 61
CELATI Amilcare			expected June 62
BELLINZONA Giovanni	Aug 61		Italy - July 62
YEVNIKH			
BETTIN Arnulf	July 61	immediately	not out yet spring/ 62
JOHANSSON Kurt	9 July 61	" or Jan 62	Sweden - April 62 visa mid-Feb
NURDENSTAM Gunnar	Aug 61 or prior		Sweden - Mar 62 visa Feb 62
LUNDAHL Hugo	21 Dec 61		not yet out Mar 62
THELIN Nils	mid-61 or prior	immediately	Sweden - spring 62?
LEHRMAN Edgar	28 Mar 63	immediately	
PENDILL C. Grant	mid 50's or prior		US - mid 50's
XXXXXXXX Frenchman	1959 or 60		France - as of 21/ May 62
CRUZ OCAMPO Alvaro	early 1947	mid-47	not yet out Aug 51
GRIECO Ruggiero			
LAVIKKALA Asser	fall 59 or prior		Finland - ?
LYMBOURIDES Achillefs			
C — PACHLER Allen	17 Feb 62	Aug 62?	Italy - March 63
SCOGNAMIGLIO Mario	Aug 60	Dec 60	Italy - 6 May 61
?C — KRONSJO Tom	prior Jul 62		Norway - 7 Jul 62?
C — SANDOR John	2 Nov 57	immediately	US - 31 Mar 58

C = [illegible]

1. Paragraph 6, of our memorandum of 6 April 1964 was a response to question #3 of your memorandum of 12 March 1964 entitled: 'Questions Posed by State Department Files.' That question read as follows:

> "At the time that L.H. OSWALD and M. OSWALD left Russia for the United States was it legal and normal under Soviet law and practice for a Russian national married to an American to be able to accompany him back to his homeland? Was the rapidity with which L. H. OSWALD was able to accomplish this and Marina's return in any way unusual?"

2. Our reply addressed itself to the legality and normality of Soviet citizens accompanying (i.e.: departing simultaneously with) foreign spouses out of the USSR. It was based on a review of 26 cases, of which 10 involved Americans, in which foreign nationals married Soviet citizens in the USSR. In only four of these 26 cases, did the Soviet wife leave the Soviet Union in the company of her husband. In one of these four cases, an Italian Communist

/ Party member married

Party member married in the USSR and by prevailing upon the Italian Embassy to hold up Italian visas for Soviet seamen, was able to arrange for his wife to accompany him to Italy. In two more of the cases, an American met his future wife on a visit to the USSR, married her on a subsequent trip, and brought her back to the U.S. No details are available on the fourth case, which involved a Swedish student who married a Soviet student and apparently brought her out with him.

3. In 14 of the remaining cases, a foreign husband (in one case a wife) departed alone. In another case the wife preceded her husband because he had been jailed a month or two previously for violation of travel regulations and in 7 additional cases the sequence is not known.

4. The information in the third enclosure to Mr. Meeker's letter regarding length of time taken by Soviet authorities to process visa applications of Soviet wives of American citizens substantially corresponds with the conclusions which we expressed in paragraph 7 of our memorandum of 6 April 1964. The material from Mr. Meeker provides useful additional data

/regarding Soviet visas

regarding Soviet visa processing, and does not materially alter the conclusions stated in paragraph 6 of our memorandum. We feel that any apparent inconsistencies may stem from the different approaches to the problem by the State Department and this Agency.

ee -
For inclusion
th Oswald
otes — re
reigners
urging Sovs.

DBA - 76999, 9 July 64, p. 4

On 28 May 64 Philip R. NIELSEN remitted $275.0
to Boris KUNGUROV 63 Lomonosovskiy Prospekt, Apt 283, Moscow 1311) through Harris Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago.

A govmt agency conducting security investigation advised in April 62 that Philip R. NIELSEN, a US citizen, wanted marry Tamara Stepanovna KUNGUROVA, "who may be connected with Sov intell or may have been utilized by Sov intell."

Immigration & Naturalization Service, NY, advised on 17 Dec 62 that Philip Robert NEILSEN [sic] and Tamara Stepanovna NEILSEN arrived in NYC 17 Dec 62 and planned live [illegible], Ill.

DBA - 79641, 22 July 64

FBI agents interviewed Tamara 31 Jan 63. She said had married Philip in Moscow, entered US Dec 62. Her brother Boris KUNGUROV — born 1936 — employed Moscow as translat. Tamara became naturalized US citizen on 27 Feb 64.

Material on marriages of Sov to Westerners. Used in preparing reply to memo re apparent inconsistencies between CIA & State.

1. On 9 July 1964 Mr. W. David Slawson and a representative of CIA discussed the question of apparent inconsistencies in material provided the Commission by CIA and by the Department of State. At that time the question was resolved to Mr. Slawson's satisfaction, and it was agreed that CIA would furnish a statistical breakdown of the cases on which CIA based the statements in paragraph 7 of its memorandum of 6 April 1964.

2. Paragraph 7 of the 6 April memorandum addressed itself to the legality and normality of Soviet citizens departing the USSR simultaneously with their foreign spouses. Statements were based on a review of 26 cases (ten involving Americans) in which foreign nationals married Soviet citizens in the USSR. In only three of these 26 cases did the Soviet wife leave the USSR in the company of her husband. In two of the cases an American met his future wife on a visit to the Soviet Union, married her on a subsequent trip, and brought her back to the U.S. No details are available on the third case, which involved a Swedish student who married a Soviet student and apparently brought her out with him. In

parted alone. In one more of the 23, the wife preceded her husband because he had been jailed a month or two previously for violation of travel regulations, and in the seven other cases the sequence is not known.

3. The information in the third enclosure to Mr. Meeker's letter regarding length of time taken by Soviet authorities to process visa applications of Soviet wives of American citizens substantially corresponds with the conclusions which we expressed in paragraph 7 of ~~the~~ our 6 April memorandum. In eleven of the 26 cases, this time period is known fairly definitely or can be inferred. In three cases it took from five to nine months. Inferring in the other eight cases, three ~~took~~ required this long about six months, two more were issued in not more than nine to eleven months, and three ~~took~~ required a minimum of seven to twelve months. Apparent inconsistencies between these statistics and those provided by the State Department undoubtedly arise from a difference in approach by the State Department and CIA.

In three cases there was a lapse of several months between application and issuance of the Soviet exit visa (five months in one case, six in the second, and nine in the third). In another case the Western husband was reluctant to leave the USSR without his Soviet wife. He did so some six months after the wedding only because the Soviet authorities told him that her exit application could not be processed until he had left. The visa was issued only about six weeks after his departure, but it may have been applied for when they were married or at any time during the next six months.

In four other cases it is possible to infer approximate time limits for the granting of an exit visa. One was granted within four to five months, the second within six to seven months, the third within nine months, and the fourth within eleven months. In three additional cases visa issuance took a minimum of seven, eleven, and twelve months respectively.

/

Miscellaneous notes on Sovs married to foreigners

Arlene F ZASLAVSKIY has Sov husband; has hired Prof Harold BERMAN to plead case & get him out of USSR. (2 Oct 62) [redacted]

Leonard KIRSCH's Sov wife Yelena KNYAZKINA has arrived in USA. 2.10.62

Joseph A. FONDEM, resident of former Brit Cameroons. Came to USSR 24.12.60. Has been visiting AmEmb re continuing his studies in U.S. Married to Sov girl. Claims she ostracized by family & friends — she, he, & baby son have to scrounge housing in Moscow by ~~letting~~ renting people's extra rooms (at 30-40 rubles per month) which illegal. Claims his plight shared by a number of other African students married to Sov girls. Sov authorities compound problem by not letting wives leave country. Embassy rates FONDEM as questionable and opportunistic. AmEmb Moscow Despatch A-308, 31.8.62.

Edgar LEHRMAN, aged 36 US exchange prof at Moscow U.; prof of lit at Emory Univ, Atlanta, Ga. To be married tomorrow to Miss Ruth MAKAKOVA, 24-yr old hist of art student at Moscow Univ. Today they submitted a certificate of

⊕ Moscow or Fnory?

sanity for her to marriage bureau offs. Proofs of sanity had been demanded by Sov authorities. LEHRMAN would not confirm story - no comment for reporter; but university⊕ sources said the couple was told no wedding till she got certif of sanity. Emb officials said they had never heard of such a reqmt. Moscow AP, 3/27. What year?

Lee Harvey OSWALD. Abstract: DBA-20883, 201-289248 30.8.62

Nils THELIN. Swedish exchange student of 1960-61 program. Has not yet been able to bring out Russian wife, which may explain his "pro-Sov friendliness" at present. Nils is one of the three in that year's group (74) who married Sov girls. TICRYSTAL-1 // contact rpt 10 Apr 62. Nils was acq. of AEGRISTLE-1 & wife Rimma KRAVTSOVA, who married in Lgrad July 61.

Kurt JOHANSSON, Swedish exchange student married Tamara SEREBRENNIKOVA, who was TASS journalist. AEPROMISE (201-274504) Married July 61; finally united in Sweden in April 62 "after various difficulties". He the third of the Swed-Sov scholarship students to marry Sov gal; the other 2 were able to bring their wives home

3/ Tamara insisted on church wedding as well as registration.

recently. She hopes "take up her work again" when Swedish good enough. He was recruited by us. Station suspects RIS involvement in this marriage. She supposedly daughter of purged Sov ofcr, Komsomol member (or party), impt job in TASS. See more info in Re – OSSA 11545 15.6.62: Her close friends & family were on her side about wanting marry foreigner, but casual acquaintances gave her hard time. Sov police "surprisingly nice to her", she said. Husband had not had too much difficulty getting her out: she got out faster than the other 2 – one took 4 mo, one not out yet. He considers her processing time ½ [illegible]. altho' they married last July. Her processing could not begin until he ready to leave USSR, so he left Jan 62 when scholarship ended. Her proc then began, & he was told mid-Feb that he could come get her. Illness delayed. She carries "lifetime Sov external passport." They have called at Sov Emb re "possibility of returning to USSR." Told that he could go as tourist any time but that it would take c 4 mo to process for her to enter USSR w/plans to leave

4/

again.

Gunnar NORDENSTAM. One of the 4 1960-61 Swed exchange students. Married Natalya Korshinskaya, Inturist guide in Leningrad. He left Lgrad Aug 61, home to Gothenburg. As of spring 62, wife not yet out. (Acc to press acct, tho, she got out c. April. See her 201 under Nordenstam. Another ref says she got visa Feb 62 and joined him in March.

John SANDOR 201- 201207 ~~27646~~9, American of Hung extraction. Lawyer born 1914. First wife killed in train wreck during WW II. July 1956 he was in Moscow as memb of tourist group from Natl Editorial Assoc. Love at first sight w/ Viktoriya Ivanovna KOCHUROVA 201-276469, Inturist interpreter/guide at Hotel Moskva. Proposed same day, she accepted next day tho still married to Sov husband BLINKOV Aron Moseyevich (sic). JS's visa ran out before they could marry. [Gap in story]. She

5/

DOB
29.12.26.

divorced from BLINKOV May 57. Viktoriya still Internist at Moskva July 57. Married JS 2 Nov 57. Lived (she or they?) at Hotel National till departure from USSR.

JS had appar tried to get Sov visa for 6 mo ~~not~~ before returning to USSR Nov 57. Sov govt gave JS permission to stay USSR till her exit permit recd. They arrived NY 31.3.58

Sept 59 SR/3/PP interested in using JS for contacting Sov tourists - but never did. Not approved? She had numerous relatives in USSR as of 1961.

Asser or Touko LAVIKALA. Finnish law student. To USSR on exch Oct 58 for 58-59 year. Married Sov girl at unknown date. Afterwards KGB informed him he must work for them or no exit visa for her. He finally signed but told VALINK when got home.

Allen David PACKLER U.S. citizen; married Lilya LYOVINA (see Bio card for 201 #).

LUNDAHL: Married ZELENKOVA 201-332736.

Achilles LYMBOURIDES Married Aelita Borisovna DYOMINA or DEMINA in Aug 59. 201-312213.

SCOGNAMIGLIO was ~~practically~~ excluded from PCI b/c he "made as much difficulty about getting his wife out" of USSR. Sovs made much diffic about her exit visa - maybe just for effect, since she admittedly KGB while at Lgrad Univ.

Colyn CRANE-ROBINSON, 26-yr old Brit scientist from Manchester, has been studying in USSR, Leningrad. Was to marry 24-yr old Irina Mikhailovna RUSANOVA on 23 June (year?) at Palace of Marriages, but his living permit expired 22.6. ~~and they~~ He requested extension but the authorities "simply said it was unfortunate" that his time had expired & were afraid they could

7

~~Precedents~~

not make exception "for ~~[illegible]~~ this sort of thing." Asked him to leave, so crash packing + out that night on BALTIKA. Offcls supposedly told him no reason believe he wouldn't get visa to return. Colyn said he had been told that "if someone married a Soviet girl she would be able to leave the country."

Alvaro OCAMPO, son of ~~Cuban~~ Chilean Amb to USSR, married Sov Lidiya LIESSINA (Chambermaid in Braz Amb's residence [and hence KGB]) in 1947 when he 23 yrs old. Mid-47 father transferred. Sovs refused allow girl leave, despite Chilean severance of diplo rels w/ USSR in Nov 47. Chil Amb stayed in Mosc till Sept 49 (as private cit?), in futile attempt to change Sov Gov position. Alvaro stayed on, working at Argentine Emb. Matter unsuccessfully introduced at UNGA Paris 1948. Latest State knows is remark in Aug 61 personal letter from FSO in Moscow to friend in USSR Desk Wash, saying

8/

Alvaro still in Moscow married to Lidiya.

AEMYRIAD/1 married Ol'ga KASMIN, geology student. When they engaged, she called to dean's ofc + interviewed by 2 KGBniks who said she would never be allowed to leave + marry him unless she accepted recrmt - which she supposedly would not do.

FOLDERS NOT CHECKED:
Italians
US 1961-62
Americans
LUNDAHL Lidiya nee ZELENKOVA 201-352736

See 201-234750 on Tamara S.KUNGUROVA.

On his second trip to the USSR in January 1959, Philip Robert NIELSON, REDSKIN agent, was given an INTURIST interpreter/guide named Tamara Stepanovna KUNGUROVA. A romance developed between them and NIELSON became determined to marry her, which he finally did in the spring of 1962. His family did everything in their power to discourage this romance and John Haines of the State Deptartment received letter from NIELSON's father re affair. Not seeking help but advice on what to do.

NIELSON later received letter from his father in fall 1960 giving in details the contents of a conversation father had had with John Hanes of State. Hanes stated that:

a. All American-Soviet marriages had turned out to be unsuccessful.

b. The Soviets never let one of their nationals out of the country under such circumstances unless the person had been recruited as a spy.

c. The Soviets will probably not given NIELSON a visa (he tried unsuccessfully all summer and fall 1960 and in 1961 to get Sov visa).

With regard to the marriage of a Soviet to a foreigner, Nora KORZHENKO (who married a British diplomat in the 1940's) has this to say: "Most of the women who have married foreigners must have agreed at one time or another to carry out some sort of spy work for the Soviets. Otherwise, they would not have been given permission to marry foreigners, for even the marriage certificate has to be issued by the secret police." Nora, herself, was recruited by State Security through coercion and only allowed to leave the country by agreeing to work for ~~Soviet~~ State Security. This she never did ~~so~~ because, once out of the country, she broke completely with the Soviets and it is presumed that she has furnished information on that organization to the British Services. (see "I Spied for Stalin", by Nora Murray).

Petr DERYABIN, State Security officer who defected in 1954, has this to say about the Soviet women who have contact with or who marry foreigners: Soviet women associating with foreign men will be recruited by State Security when the association is first begun, or after it has developed, or when plans for marriage have been made. " Even if only 5% of these women are 100% loyal State Security workers, and the others work less loyally, it is still considered a worthwhile operation. No woman known to be anti-Soviet would ever be given a visa to leave the country, even if she were married to an ambassador. The Soviets instruct all persons in this category to make remarks against the Soviet Union when abroad, but these remarks are not to be too strong, nor are they made for publication by press or radio."

In the early 1960's, when anyoung American was thinking of marrying an INTURIST guide, his father contacts a knowledgeable official of the State Department who made the following remarks:

1. All American-Soviet marriages had turned out to be unsuccesful
2. The Soviets never let one of their natioanls out of the country under such circumstances (marriage to a foreigner) unless the person had been recruited as a spy.

It is believed that the Counterintelligence Directorate, (Kontrrazvedyvatelnoye upravleniye-KRU), of the KGB initiates operations against foreigners inside the USSR. When the operation leads outside the USSR into foreign countries, i.e., when the probable recruitments have been achieved, and the persons in question leave the USSR, the operation is then turned over to the Foreign Intelligence Directorate (Inostrannoye upravleniye-INU) which ~~who~~ continues the operation until such time as it is terminated.

John SANDOR - Met and proposed to Viktoriya KOCHUROVA in 1956, but had to leave USSR before they could get married. Returned in 1957 and married her Nov. Arrived together in US in March 1958.

Folder "Americans"

✓ STERN Arlene. Never got her husband out.

[illegible] Edgar. Married March 62

PENDILL O Grant. Married in . Wife to US mid-50's. Also [illegible] 201-28946 :

✓ KIRSCH Leonard. Yelena KHIAZKINA. He alone. ~~Together~~

MELSON Philip. Married ~~[illegible]~~
Intour guide Tamara [illegible] spring 62.

✓ OLSEN Clark. Lyudmila [illegible] 60. [illegible] married
March 61 she residing w/ parents Moscow.
He left alone.

✓ HEGARTY Thos. J. 28 May 59 married Lyuba
IVANOVA. He ret US alone 10.59.

Sally

26 July 1963

Soviet women married to other nationals

BORISOVA, Natalya (201-311072)	- married to Italian Scognamiglia whom she left. Living with another Italian, ACONE--
LYOVINA, Lilya	- married to Allen David PACKLER, U.S. citizen. She has 201 file. See SR/6/Bio card for number.
ZELENKOVA,	- married to LUNDAHL. 201-332736
LNU, Natalya	- married Gunnar NORDENSTAM from Bothenburg. Now living in Jutteborg.
SEREBRENIKOVA, Tamara	- Married AEPROMISE/1 - SEE SR/2
SMOLOVA, Tamara	- Leningrad Univ. born ca. 1936-37. Former INTURIST guide. My records do not indicate to whom she is married.

Louise

LIMBOURIDI, Aelita Borisovna nee DYOMINA aka DEMINA	- Born Yalta, 29 May 1934. Married to Achillefs LIMBOURIDES in August 1959. 201-312213.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

9 R. Dumm 12-62

M. Paul Hartman
CI/R&A
x6748
30 September '64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-4524

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

30 SEP 64 22 04z

BONN, FRANKFURT, BERLIN, COPENHAGEN,
REYKJAVIK, PARIS, STOCKHOLM MUNICH
THE HAGUE BRUSSELS
DIRECTOR

C/CI

~~SIG CEN~~
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

53690

C/EE3, C/WE2, VR, FILE

N, FRAN, BRLN, COPE, GMNY
, PARI, STOC, MUNI, HAGU, BRUS

CITE DIR

AT/KUDESK/TPMURILLO/CATIGE

1. REQUEST TRACES JOACHIM JOESTEN DPOB 29 JUL 07 COLOGNE. ITER ENTIRE ADULT CAREER AND AUTHOR CA 30 BOOKS AND NUMEROUS SPAPER ARTICLES. POST WWII WORKS VERY ANTI-KUBARK. LAST OK TITLE - OSWALD: ASSASSIN OR FALL GUY? HAS WRITTEN UNDER UE NAME AND UNDER PSEUDONYMS: FRANZ VON NESSELRODE; H.F. LIKIN; WALTER KELL; PAUL DELATHUIS.

2. ACCORDING CAPTURED GESTAPO DOCS HE JOINED GERM CP ON AY 32 AND HAD MEMBERSHIP NO. 532315. OWNED LENDING LIBRARY LN AND SOME TIME AFTER MAY 32 WENT USSR WHERE REMAINED UNTIL 33. DURING ABSENCE HIS LIBRARY MANAGED BY FIANCEE ANNA SCHINSKY. LAST RESIDENCE GERMANY BRLN LUETZOWSTRASSE 40 BEI HESS.

Document Number 888-906
for FOIA Review on JUL 1976

CONTINUED . . . .

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Cor

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

12-62

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR [redacted]

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

63690

TO INFO CITE DIR

3. IN MAY 33 FLED TO FRANCE. WAS IN COPE 36-37 BUT EXPELLED (OR LEFT) BECAUSE HIS ANTI-DANISH GOVT WRITINGS. LEFT DENMARK FOR FRANCE VIA ICELAND. IN 40 IN SWEDEN, MARRIED MAY NILSSON. CAME US VIA USSR IN 41 AND NATURALIZED CITIZEN SINCE 48

4. WOULD APPRECIATE AS FULL A CHECK AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING LOCAL SERVICES AND AVAILABLE OVERT LOCAL PRE-WWII REFERENCES (PRESS, BOOKS, ETC.) ON JOESTEN AND FIANCEE.

5. FOR BRLN: PLS ALSO CHECK BDC AND REQUEST PHOTOSTATS ANY DOCS. CAN ADDRESS AND NAME HESS BE CHECKED? ANY CHANCE LOCATE FIANCEE?

6. ALL ADDRESSEES PLS HANDLE REQUEST URGENTLY AS MATTER ALSO OF INTEREST TO WARREN COMMISSION. CABLE SUMMARY RESULTS AND POUCH DETAILS INCLUDING ALL COPIES AVAILABLE JOESTEN PRE WWII WRITINGS.

CONTINUED ....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy

13-00000

~~SECR~~

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE:

INDEX

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

PAGE THREE

☐ DEFERRED

☐ ROUTINE

INFO

CITE DIR

[illegible] PARAS 1 THROUGH 3 ABOVE IN PUBLIC DOMAIN, BUT [illegible] INTEREST THIS TIME SENSITIVE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/EE
C/WE/X

RELEASING OFFICER

C/EE/C
C/WE/1
C/WE/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/CI/R&A

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

~~SECRET~~

FROM: *(Requester's name)* ①	BADGE NO.	**NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST**	
BRANCH	ROOM	EXTENSION	DATE	RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS	CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
RID/INDEX	DT-5					
REQUESTER					②	
RID/FILES	DT-6					
REQUESTER					③	
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7					
RID/201	DW-6					
RID/MIS	GT-6					
RID/INDEX	DT-5					

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: DEDKOV,

GIVEN NAMES: Roman Fedorovich or Vilasa Nikolaevna

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, sex, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*: Poss. at Sov. Emb in New Delhi, Ind.

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
			USSR	Minsk USSR

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐	NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	COMMENTS
☐	CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into **201-**

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION *(If any)*	CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED ☐ YES ☐ NO
OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS	FILE TO BE KEPT ☐ RID ☐ DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

~~2.~~ One Roman Fedorovich DEDKOV, born 28 March 1927 in Ariansk, USSR, and his wife Vilasa Nikolayevna DEDKOV, born 31 December 1930 in Minsk, USSR, ~~applied for~~ were listed as applicants for entry visas to India sometime prior to April 1962. DEDKOV, who was issued Soviet passport number 207461 on 17 September 1960, was scheduled to arrive in New Delhi for two years as an English language teacher at the Soviet Embassy. It is not known ~~whether or not~~ IF DEDKOV actually arrived in New Delhi.

Not sent because it shows liaison to Indians, a orig "Name List" not classified.

SCW
10 Aug '964

INDIA 1 00

DEDKOV, Roman Fedorovich

Subj scheduled to arrive New Delhi for two years as an English teacher at the Soviet Embassy; Ppt 207461 iss 17 Sept 60 (Hqs Comment: Subj is presumed to have arr sometime after Sept 60). NBDA-8509, 24 Apr 62

40-8-5

RI Files

Wife: Vilasa Nikolayevna (DPOB: 31 Dec 1930; Minsk)

DPOB: 28 Mar 1927; Ariansk

201-756978

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Document Number 988-927 BD
~~for FOIA Review on~~ SEP 1976

FROM: Chief, CI/R&A 2 C 17	EXTENSION x7468	NO. BD-7-2-c DATE ~~24 December 1964~~ 27 Feb 65	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, AF 7 C 32		24 Dec.		For Coordination
2. Chief, EE 3 D 31 07	24 DEC 1964	24 DEC 1964		DEFERRED RID PROCESSING SUSPENDED PLEASE INDICATE HANDLING
3. Chief, FE 5 D 31 07			WEC	☐ Retain in
4. Chief, NE 6 D 31 07				☐ Index as In
5. Chief, WE 4 B 44 05	30 DEC 1964			☐ Destro Integ Records Required. If Retention of Desk Working This Box
6. Chief, WH 3 B 44 03	30 Dec	30		NOTE: This Document Outside of the CS Records System Until the Desired Handling is Checked Above and the Document Returned to RID.
7.				
8. DDP 3 C 20 16		31 DEC 1964		For Signature and Release
9.				BY HAND PLEASE CALL
10.				
11. CI/R&A 2 C 17		29 JAN 1965		X 6663
12.				
13. ~~PSD~~ ~~G-156~~			WFA	~~For Printing~~ 201-289248
14.	CI/RA			~~100~~ 300 ABSTRACT ☒
15. RID GB28			CBV	DATE 2 Feb 1965

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chiefs of all Stations

INFO.

FROM
Chief, KUDOVE

SUBJECT
0 Warren Commission Testimony - Selected Excerpts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

1. The Warren Commission's Report on the assassination of President Kennedy focused attention on the magnitude of the problems involved in the protection of the Chief Executive. As you know, it is our responsibility, overseas and in headquarters, to render every support possible to the Secret Service in the conduct of its statutory responsibilities in the United States, and especially when the President travels abroad.

2. The circumstances confronting the Warren Commission produced discussion and testimony on various aspects of the problem of Presidential protection and on interagency operational cooperation, which normally do not find their way into the public domain. These include the acquisition and dissemination of information, consultation, coordination, and operational interchanges. I believe you will be interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren Commission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pertinent portions have been side lined. I commend these materials for reading by all officers in positions of senior responsibility in headquarters and overseas.

Document Number 988-927 BD
for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

FLETCHER M. KNIGHT

201-259245
~~100-300-12~~
[redacted]

2 [illegible] 1965

CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
23 Dec. 1964	2 FEB 19[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
Book Dispatch No. 4726

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
100-300-12

CLASSIFICATION ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CI/R&A	Raymond G. Rocca	gwh	7468

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DDP		

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
CI/R+A	

FORM 5-60 53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

HQ COPY

DISPATCH

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

AF Division

- Abidjan ✓
- Accra ✓
- Addis Ababa ✓
- Algiers ✓
- Bamako ✓
- Brazzaville ✓
- Bujumbura ✓
- Conakry ✓
- Dakar ✓
- Dar-es-Salaam ✓
- Freetown ✓
- Kampala ✓
- Khartoum ✓
- Lagos ✓
- Leopoldville ✓
- Lome ✓
- Lusaka ✓
- Mogadiscio ✓
- Monrovia ✓
- Nairobi ✓
- Pretoria ✓
- Rabat ✓
- Salisbury ✓
- Tananarive ✓
- Tripoli ✓
- Tunis ✓
- Yaounde ✓

The above listing has been reviewed in the AF Division.

(Initials)

EE Division

- Athens ✓
- Bern ✓
- Frankfurt 2 ✓
- Nicosia ✓
- Vienna ✓

The above listing has been reviewed in the EE Division.

(Initials)

FE Division

- Bangkok ✓
- Djakarta ✓
- Hong Kong ✓
- Honolulu ✓
- Kuala Lumpur ✓
- Manila ✓
- Melbourne ✓
- Okinawa ✓
- ~~Phnom Penh~~
- Rangoon ✓
- Saigon ✓
- Seoul ✓
- Taipei ✓
- Tokyo ✓
- Vientiane ✓
- Wellington ✓

The above listing has been reviewed in the FE Division.

(Initials)

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

NE Division

- Aden ✓
- Amman ✓
- Ankara ✓
- Baghdad ✓
- Beirut ✓
- Cairo ✓
- Colombo ✓
- Damascus ✓
- Jidda ✓
- Kabul ✓
- Karachi ✓
- Kathmandu ✓
- Kuwait ✓
- New Delhi ✓
- Tehran ✓

The above listing has been reviewed in the NE Division.

(Initials)

WE Division

- Brussels ✓
- Copenhagen ✓
- The Hague ✓
- Helsinki ✓
- Lisbon ✓
- London ✓
- ~~Luxembourg~~
- Madrid
- Oslo ✓
- Ottawa ✓
- Paris ✓
- Paris/LCPIPIT ✓
- Reykjavik ✓
- Rome ✓
- Stockholm ✓

The above listing has been reviewed in the WE Division.

(Initials)

Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

WH Division

Asuncion ✓
Bogota ✓
Buenos Aires ✓
Caracas ✓
Georgetown ✓
Guatemala City ✓
Kingston ✓
La Paz ✓
Lima ✓
Managua ✓
Mexico City ✓
Montevideo ✓
Panama City ✓
Paramaribo ✓
Port-au-Prince ✓
Port of Spain ✓
Quito ✓
Rio de Janeiro ✓
San Jose ✓
~~San Juan~~
San Salvador ✓
Santiago ✓
[redacted]
Santo Domingo ✓
Tegucigalpa ✓

The above listing has been
reviewed in the WH Division.

(Initials)

Headquarters Distribution for
Book Dispatch No. 4726

2	DDP
1	ADDP
1	C/OPSER
1	C/TSD
1	C/CA
1	C/CCS
1	C/SOD
1	C/CI
1	C/FI
2	C/AF
1	C/AF/1
1	C/AF/2
1	C/AF/3
1	C/AF/4
1	C/AF/5
1	C/AF/6
2	C/EE
1	C/EE/G
1	C/EE/K
1	C/EE/SA
2	C/FE
1	C/FE/CH
1	C/FE/HULA
1	C/FE/JKO
1	C/FE/PMI
1	C/FE/TBL
1	C/FE/VNC
2	C/NE
1	C/NE/1
1	DC/NE/AA
1	C/NE/4
1	C/NE/5
1	C/NE/6
2	C/WE
1	C/WE/1
1	C/WE/2
1	C/WE/3
1	C/WE/4
1	C/WE/5
1	C/WE/BC
2	C/WH
1	C/WH/1
1	C/WH/2
1	C/WH/3
1	C/WH/4
1	C/WH/5
1	WH/COPS
1	WH/POA
1	WH/POB
1	WH/Plans
2	CI/R&A
1	CI/LIA
1	CI/OPS/AF
1	CI/OPS/EE
1	CI/OPS/FE
1	CI/OPS/NE
1	CI/OPS/SS
1	CI/OPS/WE
1	CI/OPS/WH
1	RID

Originated by: Chief, CI/R&A, Ext. 7468/23 December 1964

~~SECRET~~

FIELD DISTRIBUTION - BD #5847

AF DIVISION

Johannesburg
Lagos
Nairobi
Pretoria
Rabat
Salisbury

EUR DIVISION

Barcelona
Berlin
Bern
Bonn
Brussels
Copenhagen
Geneva
The Hague
Hamburg
Helsinki
Lisbon
London
Madrid
Milan
Munich Liaison Base
Munich Ops. Base (Laurion)
Oslo
Ottawa
Paris
LCPIPIT
Rome
Salzburg
Stockholm
Vienna
Zurich

NE DIVISION

Ankara
Athens
Beirut
Calcutta
Colombo
Istanbul
New Delhi
Rawalpindi
Teheran

FE DIVISION

Bangkok
Djakarta
Hong Kong
Honolulu
Kuala Lumpur
Kuching
Manila
Medan
Melbourne
Okinawa
Rangoon
Saigon
Seoul
Singapore
Taipei
Tokyo
Vientiane
Surabaya
Wellington

WH DIVISION

Asuncion
Bogota
Brasilia
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Georgetown
Guatemala City
Guayaquil
JMWAVE
Kingston
La Paz
Lima
Managua
Mexico City
Monterrey
Montevideo
Norfolk (REPLANT)
Panama City
Port au Prince
Porto Alegre
Quito
Recife
Rio de Janerio
San Jose
San Salvador
Santiago
Santiago de los Caballeros
Santo Domingo
Sao Paulo
Tegucigalpa

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

HQS DISTRIBUTION - BD #5847

CA STAFF

DC/CA
CA/COPS
CA/PROP
CA/LO
CA/B1
CA/B2
CA/B3
CA/B4
CA/B5

AF/COPS/CA
AF/1
AF/2
AF/3
AF/4
AF/5
AF/6

FE/CA 14
C/CO/CA

SB/CA

DO/CA 3

CI/R&A 10

EUR DIVISION

E/CA
E/SC
E/BNL
E/F
E/I
E/IB
E/G
E/AS
E/BC

NE DIVISION

NE/COPS
NE/GTI/G
NE/GTI/T
NE/GTI/I
NEAA/I
NEAA/AP
NEAA/S&L
NESA/RE
NESA/C&N
NESA/I
NESA/P

WH DIVISION

WH/CA
WH/C
WH/C/CA
WH/1
WH/1/Mexico
WH/2
WH/2/G
WH/2/P
WH/H/S
WH/2/CR/N
WH/3
WH/3/B
WH/3/CO
WH/3/E
WH/3/P
WH/3/V
WH/4
WH/4/AR
WH/4/CH
WH/4/P/U
WH/5
WH/5/Brazil
WH/6
WH/7
WH/7/HT
WH/7/GU
WH/7/DR
WH/7/JTS

SECRET

DD/P 8-4635/1

26 NOV 1968

Sir Charles C. F. Spry
Director General
Australian Security Intelligence Organization
G. P. O. Box 5105BB
Melbourne

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 15 October recommending against the declassification of Warren Commission document CD-971. I might mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968) was in anticipation of further pressure for the release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is not, at the present time, any intention to release CD-971.

Should the question be raised at some future time, the points made by you in your letter provide every reason to keep the document out of the public domain.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

CORRES RELATING TO THIS — INCLUDING NAVY'S OF 27 June 68 TO RELEASE — FILED IN MAIN OSWALD FILE

Document Number 1042-947C

for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

cc: DDCI

Signature Recommended:

/s/ Thomas H. Karamessines

Deputy Director for Plans

2 [illegible] 1968
Date

Distribution:
Orig - Addee
2 - DCI
1 - DDCI
2 - DDP
1 - ADDP
1 - CFE
1 - PMI
1 - PMI/AN

DDP/FE/PMI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X ~~5502~~ 5681):aib (25 November 1968)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

21 MAY 1982
US/82/71

Dear Anthony,

Regarding your letter 6/705 of 10 May 1982, our records indicate that Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov traveled to Mexico, France, Spain, the U.S. and Cuba during the period 1959-61. In 1961, he was assigned permanently to Mexico City as a consular officer and served there until August 1965. He was variously described as a translator, vice-consul, and attache. During this tour he attempted to cultivate a U.S. Government employee assigned to our embassy in Mexico City.

201-

In September/October 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald approached the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt to get a visa allowing him to return to the USSR. Kostikov, as a consular officer, handled this visa request. We have no information which indicates any relationship between these individuals other than for the purpose of Oswald's making his visa request.

Kostikov returned to Mexico City for a second tour of duty in July 1968. During this tour he was again assigned to the consular section and was a second secretary. It appeared that he was tasked with following the activities of the Central American communist parties and left-wing groups, and he met often with members of these groups, reportedly providing them with funds and technical guidance. In July/August 1969, Kostikov made an unusual TDY trip to Moscow lasting three weeks. (His family remained in Mexico.) In July 1970 he made a four-day trip to Havana.

Kostikov's tour in Mexico ended unexpectedly in September 1971. Our information indicated that he was not due to leave for another three to four months, and at the time of his departure, there was some speculation that the suddenness of his departure was due to the fact that he was known to Lyalin.

100 - 2 - 95

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-289248
DO NOT DESTROY

Form

RECORD COPY

D050-005-003
~~D201-289248~~
D201-305052

XAF-09222
21 MAY 82
100-2-95

~~SECRET~~

While in Mexico he was considered by some to be the most effective and dangerous of intelligence officers in Mexico. He has been described as being without morals, education, and manners. Shortly after his arrival in Mexico in 1968, he was arrested in front of a house of prostitution after becoming involved in a fist fight with some locals. It appears this incident did not affect his position in Mexico City, despite the fact that it received a good deal of press coverage.

We are aware only that Kostikov arrived in Beirut in June 1978. We are unable to confirm his presence there now.

Although our file indicates that Kostikov may have been a member of Department 13 (Executive Action) (Department V's predecessor), we have been unable to confirm this. Also, to the best of our knowledge the KGB has not engaged in such executive action since 1959.

Sincerely,

/s/ David

David H. Blee

Mr. Anthony C. M. DeVere

PHOTO ATTACHED



DDO/CI/RA/Joan Paxson (21 May 1982)

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - Adse
1 - CI/RA Chrono
1 - 100-2-95 ✓
1 - Reading Board
1 - Paxson

~~SECRET~~

100-2-95

~~UK SECRET~~

6/705

10 May 1982

Dear David,

VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV

1. Please refer to our conversation of 6 May. KOSTIKOV, born 17 March 1933, Moscow, was posted to Beirut in 1978 as 1st Secretary and may still be there. He is identified KGB and served in Mexico City from 1961-71. There is a reference to him on page 307 of BARRON's KGB which suggests that he may have been Department V. We do not appear to have asked LYALIN about him, and are now doing so.

2. We also note that EPSTEIN in "Legend" claims that according to a CIA telecheck KOSTIKOV was Lee Harvey OSWALD's KGB case officer in Mexico City. According to BARRON (page 335) OSWALD was in Mexico between September and November 1963 and was seeking to obtain a Soviet visa. There was certainly a KGB interest in OSWALD, although according to NOSENKO this was defensive.

3. The reason for our current interest in KOSTIKOV will be obvious. As you are aware, our Embassy in Beirut, in common with other Western Missions, has been subject to threats and violence in recent months, and in view of earlier hostile attentions from the KGB, we have been reviewing our records of KGB staff in the area who might have been involved in promoting strong-arm tactics.

4. We would be grateful for your views as to whether the KGB are likely to be behind any of the recent incidents (possibly through the Syrians) and for any information on KOSTIKOV and his activities in Mexico and in Beirut. In particular, what are your comments on the OSWALD story; can you confirm that KOSTIKOV is still in Beirut; is there anyone else in Beirut or Damascus whose trace record suggests an Active Measures role, or worse?

5. We should be grateful for an early reply and as I said on 6 May will treat anything you can tell us on a strictly Service to Service basis.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-289248
DO NOT DESTROY

[illegible]

Yours ever

100-2-95

Form 547a Processed

~~D 201-289248~~

A C M de Vere

XAF 09218

10 MAY 82

15 50-5-3

Mr David Blee

D 201-285057

100-2-95

~~UK SECRET~~

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: E/BC 4C 20 Hqs	EXTENSION 1413 7220	NO.	DATE 3 APR 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI/R+A				This is the ACTION/INFO copy of a communication received on ______ from MI- 6 in Washington.
2. Hausman	4 APR 1978		a	
3. Russ Holmes				Another copy is being held in E/BC.
4. 3D57				Any reply should be directed to E/BC for forwarding to Liaison.
5.				Processing by IP is to be determined by ______.
6.				Coordination with E/BC is required prior to any dissemination of this information outside the DDO.
7.				
8.				
9.				NB: Richard A. SPRAGUE, Chief Counsel and Director of HSCA, saw a copy of attached document. See his attached letter to Sergyj CZORNONOH, 04 December 1976. RBH
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OP-187

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Our ref: GEN 1

Dear Art,

30 March 1978

Please find attached correspondence received from one Sergyj CZORNONOH who claims that he provided information about Lee Harvey OSWALD to the American Vice Consul (presumably Tom Blackshear) in Sofia, Bulgaria, in August 1963.

2. I have sent copies of these letters to the FBI and to my Head Office in London.

D H Jones
for G M L Blackburne-Kan

Mr A H Stimson

Enc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERGYJ CZORNONOH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA
95814

TO ASSEMBLE
USA 9c
UNITED STATES
EUGENE O'NEILL
PLAYWRIGHTS
UNITED STATES
EUGENE O'NEILL
PLAYWRIGHTS

SACRAMENTO STATE CAPITOL STA.
MAR 15 1978

M. Waller

TO BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RETURN RECEIPT
REQUESTED

REGISTERED
NO. 257254

201-289248

SERGYJ CZORNONOH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA. 95814

MARCH 15, 1978

TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR
BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE. N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR SIR.

i WROTE LETTER ON FEBRUARY 15, 1978 TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN PRIME MINISTER i ENCLOSED REGISTERED MAIL NO. 251067.

ON JULY 18, 1963 i WAS IN LONDON ENGLAND AT THE AIRPORT IMMIGRATION OFFICER NO. 175 i HAD NO VISA IMMIGRATION PLACE ME UNDER HOUSE ARREST, MR. SMITH IN POLICE UNIFORM SECRET SERVICE BROUGHT ME STEAK DINNER AND POLICE OFFICER INTERROGATED ME, HE ASKED ME WHAT THE EMBASSY OF U.S.S.R. SAY WHAT DID YOU HEARD IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, i SAID i HAVE HEARD THAT ONE AMERICAN DEFECTOR (MR. LEE HARVEY OSWALD) TO RUSSIA AND HE RETURNED TO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THIS MAN HE PREPARING TO KILL TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER ASKED ME DO YOU KNOW HIS NAME, i SAID HIS NAME START ON "O" HIS NAME WAS PUBLISHED ONE TIME IN NEWS PAPER IN WASHINGTON POST, MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER SAID IT EASY TO FIND.

I DO SEARCHING FOR THIS FILE IN BRITISH
POLICE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND BRITISH
IMMIGRATION, I ASKING YOUR EMBASSY TO
HELP TO FIND THE TRUTH AND I ASK YOUR
GOVERNMENT TO FORWARD MY RECORD OF
JULY 18, 1963 TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER
AND SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLI-
GENCE I ENCLOSE HIS COPY LETTER TO [illegible]
ALSO I ENCLOSE YOU COPY LETTER I SENT
ON FEBRUARY 17, 1978 TO RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR
YOUR JUSTICE ALWAYS WILL BE APPRECIATED
MY INCOMING MAIL IS CONTROL BY THE
F.B.I. AGENTS SOME OF THE MAIL I [illegible]
GET NOT FORWARD TO ME F.B.I. SUPPRESS I
MY INFORMATION AND TORTURE ME BY DRUG
RESPECTFULLY YOURS
Sergyj Czorn[illegible]

U.S. PASSPORT No. D027000

February 17, 1978

Copy 10 -
BRITISH AMBASSADOR

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 - 11th Street
Sacramento, California 95814

To Russian Ambassador
Embassy of U.S.S.R.
1125 - 16th Street
Washington, D. C.

This is retyped letter from hand written

Dear Sir:

Mr. Wasilev Consul gave me order to transmit this information to U. S. Government, on August 9, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria. Mr. Wasilev, Consul of Embassy of U.S.S.R., gave me this information about Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald on August 14, 1963. Mrs. Besera Asenova, girl friend of Russian Consul came to my room and repeated that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assassin. He will kill President Kennedy.

On August 15, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria, at the airport in embassy car, I told to Mr. Blackshire, American Vice Consul, that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assissin. He has a weapon or has ordered one. Mr. Blackshire said it seems like he will kill someone. I said that Mr. Lee H. Oswald is preparing to kill President of the United States, John F. Kennedy. Mr. Blackshire said where will it happen. I said they (right wing) will invite President, criticize him in the newspaper, then kill him. Mr. Blackshire told me he will give the telegram to Department of State and he gave me the address where to report.

At 9 a.m. on August 19, 1963 in Washington, D. C., I went to see (Mr. Kippingan) Director of Special Counselor Service Department of State at 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue-11th floor. I told the Director that I have information about President Kennedy. The Director said do not mention name of President Kennedy, only respond to the questions. The Director said tell us what will happen to Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald then. I said Mr. Lee H. Oswald will be killed after kill Kennedy. I said I will take the truth drug to tell the truth. Director tell us who else get killed in this country. I said as I heard, that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. will be killed. Who will kill Dr. King, Jr. Negro leader? I said a man who is in prison at this time. (Mr. James Earl Ray was in prison at that time.) Director asked where assassination will happen. I said in Dallas, Texas. Director said if someone gave this information here I would expel the man. Director did call on F.B.I. agents after F.B.I. use anesthesia gas to freeze me to drub me to keep amnesia.

I told Director Department of State that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald have a weapon. Go see him. Director told me you too can have weapon--so what if Oswald got weapon.

Sincerely,

Sergyj Czornonoh

Sergyj Csornonoh
U.S. Passport Z0027000

U.S House of Representatives
Select Committee on Assassinations told me to write letter to Embassy in early 1977.

Sergyj Czornonoh
3/15/78

[illegible] TO CITY HALL
CITY MANAGERS
ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
BRITISH EMBASSY

Sergyj Czornonoh
Regis Hotel
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

February 6, 1978

Mr. John M. Price
District Attorney
Sacramento, California

Dear Mr. Price:

This is a retyped letter. I visited Mr. Ferry , Deputy District Attorney, on August 16, 1977. I told in the office that F.B.I. agents and Secret Service use police department to harass me. Police department do supply pencil of anesthesia gas to the manager of the building I live. The manager do or use certain people to freeze me by anesthesia gas - then push drugs, poison in my mouth to torture me - to take my sleep away - or bleed by rectal and they use many other chemicals to brainwash me to use me in political assassination which I refused. On January 20, 1976 in Sacramento on 8th and I Streets, man came to me from police or post office, U.S. Department of Justice and freeze me by gas and told me to take gun, pistol and we will tell you where to go to shoot - to kill - Mr. Sargent Shriver. I refused. Manager, Mr. Sisel, of Marshall Hotel, call on the man to tell me this on the street. In February 1976, police intelligence told me that assassination will not happen here. How about to move to Maryland state.

In this letter I ask you to get report from Dr. Frederick S. Baker, M.D. - colon and rectal surgery on January 31, 1978. His phone - 452-4095. I do bleed today very much and I am weak. In this letter I ask you to give restrain order or respond to me what could be done. The right wing in America made record to use me in assassination. I refuse. I am human and I like to be treated as human. Police put frame up on me - just to take advantages on me. Police use lie, police use mental case to take advantages on me and tell me that right wing do use such people like me. To prove I enclose copy midnight June 14, 1976. Also I enclose copy letter I sent to Mr. Ted Sheedy, Supervisor, on January 26, 1978 and copy of his reply to me.

Please respond to me. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Sergyj Czornonoh
Sergyj Czornonoh

Mr. Sargent Shriver was run for President in 1976.

Sergyj Czornono

Legal Center For The Disabled

1722 J STREET, SUITE 19 • SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
Telephone: 446-4851

March 3, 1978

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Mr. Czornonoh:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter regarding difficulties you have encountered with the police and the FBI.

In the event that there is legal action taken by the police or the FBI to institutionalize you this office will provide you with legal representation.

If you have any further legal problems please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Leslie Kay
LESLIE KAY
Paralegal

CATHERINE HUGHES
Staff Attorney

LK:ab

REGISTERED NO. 251067
Value $ NO
Reg. Fee $ 2.10
Handling Charge $
Postage $ .93
Special Delivery $
Return Receipt $ .32
Restricted Delivery $
☒ AIRMAIL
POSTMASTER (By) M
POSTMARK OF MAILING OFFICE
SACRAMENTO STATE CAPITOL STA.
FEB 15 1978
FROM Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th 95814
TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN
Mr. James Callaghan
OFFICE OF MINISTRY
London England
LONDON ENGLAND
1973 O — 599-283

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ USE ONLY ☐ CONF TIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RD/FIR GE 66			EXTENSION 4413	NO. RD-66
				DATE 19 July 1968
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				Document Number 127-987
5.				for FOIA Review on SEP 1976
6. mcf RD/FIR GE 66	10 Jul	17 Jul	Dnef	
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-289248

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO.
Chiefs, Certain Stations and Bases

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WOLIME

SUBJECT D Warren Commission Report: Article on the Investigation Conducted by District Attorney Garrison

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. We are forwarding herewith a reprint of the article "A Reporter At Large: Garrison", published in THE NEW YORKER, 13 July, 1968. It was written by Edward Jay Epstein, himself author of a book, ("Inquest"), critical of the Warren Commission Report.

2. The wide-spread campaign of adverse criticism of the U.S., most recently again provoked by the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy, appears to have revived foreign interest in the assassination of his brother, the late President Kennedy, too. The forthcoming trial of Sirhan, accused of the murder of Senator Kennedy, can be expected to cause a new wave of criticism and suspicion against the United States, claiming once more the existence of a sinister "political murder conspiracy". We are sending you the attached article--based either on first-hand observation by the author or on other, identified sources--since it deals with the continuing investigation, conducted by District Attorney Garrison of New Orleans, La. That investigation tends to keep alive speculations about the death of President Kennedy, an alleged "conspiracy", and about the possible involvement of Federal agencies, notably the FBI and CIA.

3. The article is not meant for reprinting in any media. It is forwarded primarily for your information and for the information of all Station personnel concerned. If the Garrison investigation should be cited in your area in the context of renewed anti-U.S. attacks, you may use the article to brief interested contacts, especially government and other political leaders, and to demonstrate to assets (which you may assign to counter such attacks) that there is no hard evidence of any such conspiracy. In this context, assets may have to explain to their audiences certain basic facts about the U.S. judicial system, its separation of state and federal courts and the fact that judges and district attorneys in the states are usually elected, not appointed: consequently, D.A. Garrison can continue in office as long as his constituents re-elect him. Even if your assets have to discuss this in order to refute--or at least weaken--anti-U.S. propaganda of sufficiently serious impact, any personal attacks upon Garrison (or any other public personality in the U.S.) must be strictly avoided.

Document Number 1127-987
for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

Brian K. Slaght
BRIAN K. SLAGHT

Attachment: 1 unclassified article, per para 1

CROSS REFERENCE TO
1att h/w

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
BD - 6614
CS COPY

DATE
19 July 1968
30 JUL 1968

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-289248

13-00000

DISTRIBUTION TO BD - 66

BD 6614?

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

AF Division

Abidjan
Accra
Addis Ababa
Asmara
Bangui
Cotonou
Dakar
Dar es Salaam
Kampala
Freetown
Khartoum
Kinshasa
Kaduna
Lagos
Lusaka
Mogadiscio
Monrovia
Nairobi
Rabat
Tripoli
Yaounde

EUR Division

Berlin 3
Bern
Bonn 5
Brussels
Copenhagen
Frankfurt
Geneva
Helsinki
LCFIPIT 4
London
Madrid 2
Munich (Lawrion) 3
Oslo
Paris 3
Rome 2
Stockholm
The Hague 2
Vienna
Zurich

WH Division

Asuncion
Bogota
Brasilia
Buenos Aires
Caracas 2
Georgetown
Guatemala
Guayaquil
Kingston
La Paz
Lima
Mexico City 2
Montevideo
Panama
Porto Alegre
Port Au Spain
Quito
Recife
Rio de Janeiro 2
San Jose
San Salvador
Santiago 2
Santo Domingo
Sao Paulo
Tegucigalpa
Madrid 2

FE Division

Bangkok 3
Djakarta 2
Hong Kong 2
Honolulu
Kuala Lumpur
Manila 4
Melbourne 2
Okinawa
Rangoon
Saigon 2
Seoul 3
Singapore 2
Surabaya
Taipei 2
Tokyo 2
Vientiane
Wellington

NE Division

Amman
Ankara 2
Athens 5
Beirut
Bombay
Calcutta
Colombo
Dacca
Istanbul
Jerusalem
Jidda
Kabul
Karachi
Katmandu
Kuwait
Lahore
Madras
New Delhi
Nicosia
Rawalpindi
Teheran

SB/Division

C/SB
SB/CA
SB/BR 3
SB/C 2
SB/YA
SB/P
SB/CI

WH/C/CA/PROP 2
WH/CA
WH/1,2,3,4,5
WH/7/JTS, GU

1-DO/RR
2-DO/CA
CI/R&A
CI/ICG
FBID/Weiss
OTR/SIC
OTR/Isolation Library
FI/SPG
MPS/PSG

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

AF/COP/CA
AF/1
AF/2 2
AF/3
AF/4
AF/5
AF/6-Ethiopia
C/EUR
E/OPS/CA
E/G
E/AS
E/SC
E/BNL
E/BC
E/F
E/I
E/IB

FE/CA 16

NE/SA/A
NE/GTI/I
NE/GTI/G
NE/GTI/T
NE/COPS
NESA/I
[illegible]

CS Special Group Office

C/CA - DC/CA
C/CA/PEG
CA/B1 3
CA/B3 3
CA/B4
CA/CP
CA/PROP

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Far East Division	EXTENSION	NO.
		DATE 20 Nov. 68

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, CI Staff	27 NOV 1968	27 NOV 1968		
2. CI/R&A				
3. Mr. Dooley			O	for file
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				CD 971 Not att'd
10.				
11.				Document Number 1128-988
12.				for FOIA Review on SEP 1976
13.				
14.				
15.				201-289248

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

~~26 Nov. 68~~

FROM: CI/RA/RS 2B23		EXTENSION	NO. XAAZ-35926	
			DATE 26 NOV 68	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/AN			@	1 Please assign XAAZ # and classify to 201-289248
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. IP/EDI		05 May 75	Cf	Date: ~~2~~ 26 NOV 68
6.				
7.				Subject: Correspondence between CIA and ASIO. Re: ~~[illegible]~~ release of information by Warren Commission
8.				
9. IP/Files				
10. IP/RMS		20 MAY 1975		
11.				
12.				
13.				(CD771 NDI CH'D)
14.				
15.				

Document Number 1128-988
for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

SECRET

DDP 24635

Executive Registry
68-5160/a

20 NOV 1968

XAAZ-35926

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Letter for Director from Sir Charles Spry (ASIO)

1. Attached is a sealed letter from Sir Charles Spry, Director General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (who provided a copy of the letter to the Chief of Station, Melbourne), and a suggested reply for your signature.

2. Sir Charles' letter to you recommends against declassification of the Warren Commission document CD-971, which refers to our investigation of anonymous telephone calls to the Canberra Embassy before and after the assassination of President Kennedy.

3. I consider the points made by Sir Charles in his letter to be valid and accordingly recommend against the declassification of CD-971 in the foreseeable future. CI Staff concurs with this recommendation.

Document Number 1128-988

for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

William E. Nelson
Chief, Far East Division

IP/ERI		TOPICAL PROGRAM	
	X	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/FI		PREPARE FOR FILMING	
IP/FI		FILE	
ISG/CCU		CS FILE NO. (2, 3, 4)	
		SUBJ. REST. CODE	
		CABLE (CSN (11)	
		NBR (8)	
IP/FILES		FOR FILING	

Attachments, 5
- A. Letter from Sir Charles Spry
- B. Letter Replying to Sir Charles Spry
- C. FAMA 5838, subject: Declassification of Warren Commission Document CD-971
- D. Copy of CD-971
- E. FAMW 3636, subject: Request for Release of Warren Commission Document

cc: DDCI

DDP/FE/PMI/AN:Amos Taylor, Jrl:arc (19 November 1968)

Distribution
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
2 - DDP
1 - ADDP
1 - C/CI Staff
1 - CFE
1 - CFE/PMI
1 - CFE/PMI/AN

RECORD COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

26 Nov 68

201-289248

SECRET

SECRET

68-5160/a

RD/P 8-4635/1

26 NOV 1968

FILE

Sir Charles C. F. Spry
Director General
Australian Security Intelligence Organization
G. P. O. Box 5165BB
Melbourne

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 15 October recommending against the declassification of Warren Commission document CD-971. I might mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968) was in anticipation of further pressure for the release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is not, at the present time, any intention to release CD-971.

Should the question be raised at some future time, the points made by you in your letter provide every reason to keep the document out of the public domain.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
Orig - Addee
2 - DCI
1 - DDCI
2 - DDP

cc: DDCI

1 - ADDP
1 - CFE
1 - PMI
1 - PMI/AN

Signature Recommended:

Deputy Director for Plans

Date

DDP/FE/PMI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X 5502):aib (25 November 1968)
5681

201-289248

~~SECRE~~T

99
IMS FABOSS

/ / SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , , ,

STAFF

99
ACTION: C/EUR/NOR (729) INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/LGL, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, 99
DC/EURN, CIC/EUR (3/W)

---

96 3123036 ASO PAGE 001 IN 3123036
TOR: 081248Z FEB 96 COPE 94608
19-6

S E C R E T 081247Z FEB 96 STAFF

19-6
CITE COPENHAGEN 94608

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

99 99 99 99
FOR: LIMIT EUR/NOR INFO DC/EURN, CIC/EUR, EUR/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

REF: DIRECTOR 633349 96 3117723

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE PARA 2.

14-6 14-6
2. THE FAX STATION RECEIVED APPEARS TO BE INCOMPLETE. IT CONTAINED A COVER SHEET, A ONE-PAGE COPENHAGEN CABLE STATING "NO TRACES" AND THE FIRST PAGE OF A DIRECTOR CABLE REQUESTING TRACES ON LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD)). UNLESS THE MISSING PORTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR CABLE HAVE SOME BEARING ON DENMARK, STATION CANNOT MAKE A CASE AGAINST RELEASE OF THIS MATERIAL 14-6 WE WOULD INSIST, HOWEVER, THAT CRYPTS BE DELETED - AS REF INDICATED WOULD BE THE CASE.

3. PLEASE KEEP US APPRISED OF DATE THESE DOCS WILL BE RELEASED SO THAT STATION MAY INFORM AMBASSADOR AND OUR LIAISON SERVICE CHIEFS.
14-6 24

4. CL BY: 0716497 CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1

4. FILE: 021-120-004/1. DECL DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

DO NOT DESTROY
CROSS FILE COPY FOR:
201-0289248

~~SECRE~~T

14/12

SECRET

```
****************************************************************************************
*   OPERATOR : SEEGER, EDWA    BADGE:   KT283             DATE    : 14 SEP 93   *
*   OFFICE   : IMS/FABOSS      PHONE:   047552            TIME    : 15:24       *
*   ROOM     : GC520HB         PRINTER: TO19              PAGE    : 001         *
*   REQUESTER: HM877                                                            *
*   DSN: SPET 21162       DOC DATE: 20 NOV 91    MHF#: 91-6320813               *
***********************************  COMET  ****************************************
```

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: SE/USSR/IO-3 (752) INFO: C/ORMS, DOMDS, LIMITO, ODPD, SEDORECORD, FILE, DDO-2, SE/RR-3 (9/W)

---

91 6320813 ASR PAGE 001 IN 6320813
TOR: 201455Z NOV 91 SPET 21162

SECRET 201454Z NOV 91 STAFF

CITE ST PETERSBURG 21162

TO: MOSCOW INFO DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT SE/USSR/IO INFO SE/RR

SLUGS: WNINTEL GTDANCER

SUBJECT: KGB OFFICIAL NIKONOV

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE.

2. DURING THE WEEK OF 3-9 NOVEMBER 1991, U.S. PROFESSOR E.B. ((SMITH)), HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW WITH "SLAVA" ((NIKONOV)), WHO IS A LONGTIME FRI?ND AND NOW DEPUTY TO KGB DIRECTOR ((BAKATIN)). THE PROFESSOR HAS KNOWN NIKONOV WELL SINCE 1976. HE CURRENTLY IS INSTRUCTING ON A FULBRIGHT GRANT AT ST PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY UNTIL 22 DECEMBER 1991. SEE PARA 7 FOR BIO ON THE PROFESSOR. DCOB STEVEN R. HEIBERG HAS BEFRIENDED THE PROFESSOR, WHO WAS DINNER GUEST AT HEIBERG'S HOME ON 10 NOVEMBER AND PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFO ON NIKONOV AND HIS NEW KGB JOB.

3. NIKONOV IS THE GRANDSON OF FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV. THE U.S. PROFESSOR TAUGHT NIKONOV IN 1976 AT MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY WHILE A FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR. NIKONOV WAS REGARDED AS EXTREMELY INTELLIGENT AND CAPABLE BUT GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS AN IDEOLOGICAL HARDLINER. THE PROFESSOR BELIEVED THAT HE WAS LIKELY TO BE A RISING STAR IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDED HIM FOR AN IREX-SPONSORED VISIT TO THE U.S. AS EXPECTED, NIKONOV'S VIEWS AND RHETORIC MODERATED VERY VISIBLY AFTER HIS FIRST DIRECT EXPOSURE TO ?HE U.S. HE HAS HAD AT LEAST ONE ADDITIONAL IREX-SPONSORED TRIP TO THE U.S. AND HAS SPENT PERIODS OF TIME AS A PERSONAL GUEST AT THE HOME OF THE U.S. PROFESSOR IN MARYLAND.

4. NIKONOV CAME TO WORK IN HIS POSITION AT THE KGB AS A RESULT OF BEING A CLOSE FRIEND OF BAKATIN. DURING THE AUGUST 1991 COUP ATTEMPT NIKONOV SAID THAT HE REFUSED TO FOLLOW HIS BOSS'S ORDER TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECLARED STATE OF EMERGENCY. HE WAS DISMISSED BY HIS BOSS (NFI) FROM THIS POSITION AND CALLED BAKATIN TO SEEK ADVICE. BAKATIN SAID HE WAS ALSO OPPOSING THE COUP AND WOULD LOOK OUT FOR NIKONOV ONCE ORDER WAS RESTORED. SOON AFTER THE COUP BAKATIN CALLED HIM TO ASK THAT HE ASSIST WITH RESTRUCTURING THE KGB. AFTER IT WAS AGREED THAT NIKONOV COULD DECLINE TO ACCEPT TWO-STAR MILITARY KGB RANK AND WORK IN THE JOB FOR AN EQUIVALENT CIVILIAN COMPENSATION PACKAGE, HE CAME TO THE KGB AS BAKATIN'S DEPUTY. NIKONOV SAID HIS FRIENDS WERE DELIGHTED THAT HE HAD DECLINED THE KGB COMMISSION.

5. NIKONOV'S FIRST ASSIGNMENT FROM BAKATIN WAS MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE KGB-CIA LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS NOW COME INTO BEING. IN PREPARATION FOR ONE POSSIBLE QUESTION

WHICH MIGHT BE RAISED, NIKONOV PERSONALLY REVIEWED KGB FILES TO DETERMINE IF LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD)) HAD BEEN A KGB AGENT. HE REVIEWED FIVE THICK VOLUMES OF FILES ON OSWALD. NIKONOV IS NOW CONFIDENT THAT OSWALD WAS AT NO TIME AN AGENT CONTROLLED BY THE KGB. FROM THE DESCRIPTION OF OSWALD IN THE FILES HE DOUBTED THAT ANYONE COULD CONTROL OSWALD, BUT NOTED THAT THE KBG WATCHED HIM CLOSELY AND CONSTANTLY WHILE HE WAS IN THE USSR. HE COMMENTED THAT OSWALD HAD A STORMY RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS SOVIET WIFE, WHO RODE HIM INCESSANTLY. THE FILE ALSO REFLECTED THAT OSWALD WAS A POOR SHOT WHEN HE TRIED TARGET FIRING IN THE USSR.

6. IN PREPARATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SWEDISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, NIKONOV PERSONALLY PERFORMED AN INQUIRY FOR BAKATIN INTO THE FATE OF SWEDISH DIPLOMAT RAOUL ((WALLENBERG)). THERE IS STILL PRESSURE FROM THE SWEDISH SIDE TO HAVE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER ON THIS MATTER BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE WALLENBERG FAMILY. NIKONOV WAS AMAZED TO FIND OUT THAT THE KGB HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISH WHETHER WALLENBERG HAD DIED AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WAS ABLE TO FIND PARTIAL EVIDENCE FROM FOURTEEN DIFFERENT SOURCES (NFI). NIKONOV NOW BELIEVES, BUT FOUND NO CONCLUSIVE PROOF, THAT WALLENBERG WAS EXECUTED LATE IN 1947. THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT WALLENBERG WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING CONTACTS WITH OTHERS WHO WERE ACCUSED OF PROVIDING FALSE DIPLOMATIC IDENTITY DOCUMENTS TO OTHERS BEYOND JEWS SAVED FROM THE HOLOCAUST. AMONG THESE WERE NAZI WAR CRIMINALS WHO WERE ALLOWED TO ESCAPE. THERE WAS NO PROOF OF WALLENBERG'S GUILT IN ANY OF THESE CHARGES.

7. FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR WHO IS NIKONOV'S FORMER PROFESSOR AND FRIEND IS:
NAME: E.B. ((SMITH))
DOB: C.1920
CIT: USA
OCC: PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, RETIRED
LOC: RESIDES NEAR ANNAPOLIS, MD
OTHER: FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR FOR WINTER 1991 TERM IN ST PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY, USSR; TWO PREVIOUS FULBRIGHT ASSIGNMENTS IN MOSCOW AND SEVERAL IN PRC AND GERMANY; HOSTS FORMER STUDENTS FROM USSR AND PRC ON U.S. VISITS

THERE ARE NO BASE TRACES ON SMITH. HE SERVED IN THE MILITARY AND IS VERY WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HE VOLUNTEERED INFO ON NIKONOV AND OTHER USSR, PRC AND GERMAN CONTACTS TO HEIBERG AND CAN PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE BIO AND ASSESSMENT INFO ON THEM.

074-005-011, 201-0005925

8. FILE: DEFER. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

***

END OF DOCUMENT

SECRET

MHFNO: 93-4732005 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA/CCGRR (056) INFO: C/ORMS, LA/CCG, LA/MCGRR, LA/MCGSGH,
LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/W)

---

93 4732005 ASR PAGE 001 IN 4732005
TOR: 030148Z DEC 93 TEGU 43599

S E C R E T 022047Z DEC 93 STAFF

CITE TEGUCIGALPA 43599

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT LA/CCGRR INFO LA/CCG, LA/MCGRR, LA/MCGSGH

SLUGS: WNINTEL INTEL SWANLACE REAM SWCONTROL SWRACK

SUBJECT: CUBA TIDBITS FROM LATE NOVEMBER SWRACK

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 43580 93 4718127

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE. FYI.

2. SWRACK TRANSCRIPTS OF 26-27 NOV 93 CONTAINED CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN AMERICA DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL RAMIRO ((ABREU)) QUINTANA AND HONDURAN NATIONAL PARTY COMPTROLLER TEOFILO ((MARTEL)). DURING THIS CONVERSATION, ABREU STATED THAT CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL ((CASTRO)) RUZ WAS UNHAPPY WITH THE PROSPECT OF CUBAN ELECTIONS THAT ARE TO BE HELD IN HAVANA IN DEC 1993. THE HONDURAN OFFICIAL SAID THAT ALTHOUGH ELECTIONS WERE ALREADY HELD IN 1993, THEY ARE GOING TO BE REPEATED AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT CASTRO WILL LOSE.

3. IN MID-MAY 1993, NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS PRESIDENT RODOLFO ((IRIAS)) NAVAS, MIGUEL ((FACUSSE)), AND MARTEL TRAVELED TO CUBA ON AN UNOFFICIAL VISIT. AT THAT TIME THE THREE MEN WERE WINED AND DINED BY FIDEL CASTRO. IT IS APPARENT FROM ABREU'S CONVERSATION WITH MARTEL THAT HE IS A TRUSTED FRIEND OF THE CUBANS.

4. ON 27 NOV CUBAN OFFICIAL RUBEN ((SUAREZ)) SPOKE WITH ANOTHER CUBAN OFFICIAL POSTED IN MANAGUA, MARIA ((LOPEZ)), ABOUT
*THE<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION.> LOPEZ CLAIMED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL FABIAN ((ESCALANTE)) FONT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WAS HANDLING THE MATTER AND THAT HE HAD INFORMATION THAT COULD

*POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE<KENNEDY>ASSASSINS.

5. FILE: SWRACK. DECL OADR DRV HUM LIA 1-87.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: NR/LGL (550) INFO: C/ORMS, LIMITO, MDSX, NR/PGO, NR/SEC, NRDORECORD, ODPD, OGC/LD, PCS/CL, FILE (0/W)

96 3068322 ASR PAGE 001 IN 3068322
TOR: 022143Z FEB 96 DENV 20829

SECRET 022130Z FEB 96 STAFF

CITE DENVER 20829

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT NR/LGL INFO NR/SEC, PCS/CL/L, NR/PGO, OGC/LIT

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: WRITE-IN TO NVTAG BY INDIVIDUAL CLAIMING FORMER ASSOCIATION WITH NWBOLTON

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: IF YOU WANT US TO FAX THE BELOW MESSAGES TO HEADQUARTERS PLS ADVISE.

2. THE FOLLOWING FAX WAS SENT TO THE DENVER NVTAG OFFICE AND THEY (DEPUTY OF THE FCI SQUAD) IN TURN SENT IT OVER TO US ON 2 FEBRUARY 1996 FOR OUR BACKGROUND. NVTAG PLANS NO FOLLOW-UP UNLESS THERE IS SOME INTEREST BY NWBOLTON.

3. NVTAG DENVER RECEIVED AN UNSOLICITED TWO PAGE FAX FROM A ROBERT ((PLUMLEE)) AKA WILLIAM H. ((PEARSON)). THE FIRST PAGE WAS AN INFORMAL NOTE TO NVTAG AND THE SECOND PAGE WAS AN ACTUAL LETTER. THE TEXT OF BOTH PAGES IS PROVIDED BELOW. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE WRITER REFERS TO A TIME PERIOD OF 1980 AND ALSO CONTACT WITH A PAUL LEE OF THE NWBOLTON DENVER CONTACT DIVISION. THIS IS PROBABLY FORMER DENVER COS PAUL LEADEM. (WE FIND NO RECORD OF PLUMLEE OR PEARSON IN OUR CURRENT CARD FILES.)

TEXT OF PAGE ONE:

"TO DIRECTOR (NVTAG) AND DENVER (NVTAG)

I THINK YOU PEOPLE SHOULD KNOW WHAT IS COMING DOWN THE PIKE, IN CASE THERE IS A BAD PLAY FROM SOME PEOPLE I KNOW IN REFERENCE TO MATTER'S I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE HOUSE. (CLOSE DOOR TESTIMONY 1990 AND 1992.) I DO NOT WANT TO ESTABLISH ANY FORM OF CONTACT WITH THE (NVTAG) OTHER THAN THIS FAX. HOWEVER, I FELT I SHOULD MAKE SOME FORM OF CONTACT BEFORE THE FACT JUST IN CASE SOMETHING GOES

SOUR IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. I STILL LIKE TO CONSIDER MYSELF AS A FRIEND OF THE (NVTAG). BUT SOMETIMES YOU PEOPLE MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. THE ENCLOSED FAX IS JUST INTELL MATTER THAT SOMEDAY MAY PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLL IN ONE OF YOUR INVESTIGATIONS."

TEXT OF PAGE TWO:

"TO: ROBERT VERNON
FROM WM R PLUMLEE AKA WM H PEARSON JANUARY 28, 1996

DEAR BOB:

IN NOVEMBER 1980, I SABOTAGED THE DENVER MAGAZINE *ARTICLE, "FEAR AND LOATHING ON THE<ASSASSINATION>TRAIL", BECAUSE THE DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION I WAS GIVING TO THE MAGAZINE, TO VERIFY CERTAIN EVENTS I ALLEGED, WAS BEING GIVEN TO THE DENVER (NVTAG).

BOXES OF GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, PICTURES, NAMES AND DATES, WERE TURNED OVER TO DENVER MAGAZINE -DORIS KELLER (?) EDITOR, PETER BOYLES, WRITER, DOUGH VAUGHN, RESEARCHER. FROM THESE DOCUMENTS, DOUGH VAUGHN, AND OTHERS, USED THE DOCUMENTS, AND MY STATEMENTS, TO VERIFY THE FACT SHEET THAT IS CONTAIN WITHIN THE ARTICLE.

THE (NVTAG) CAME TO MY PLACE BEFORE THE ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED AND TALKED TO ME ABOUT "INCRIMINATING" STATEMENTS I HAD MADE TO DENVER MAGAZINE. SHORTLY AFTER THAT I CHANGED NAMES AND DATES IN THE ARTICLE IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT THE ARTICLE AND MYSELF. I DID NOT WANT TO BE PART OF ANY GOVERNMENT PROBE INTO MY PAST ACTIVITIES IN BEHALF OF THE (NWBOLTON) AND THE CUBAN DESK....AND MY CUBAN FRIENDS.

I NEVER SAW THE ARTICLE BEFORE IT WAS PUBLISHED...., NEVER WANTED TO, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE MEETING WITH THE (NVTAG) AND PAUL LEE OF THE (NWBOLTON)-DENVER CONTACT DIV. I SAID TO *HELL WITH THEM AND ALL ASSOCIATED WITH THE<KENNEDY-(NWBOLTON)> MESS. SHORTLY AFTER THAT MY HOUSE IN GRANT COLORADO WAS "FIRE-BOMBED" AND I WAS ATTACKED AND BEAT UP OUTSIDE A RESTURANT IN EVERGREEN COLORADO (WITNESSES AND POLICE REPORTS ON FILE AS THE EVENT TOOK PLACE IN AUGUST OF 81)

I MADE PEACE WITH MY ENEMIES AND WENT BACK TO WORK AS A PILOT, UNTIL THE CONTRA THING BLEW UP AND I TESTIFIED THREE *TIMES TO THE SENATE AND THE CONGRESS. THE<KENNEDY>MATTER IS CONTAINED WITHIN THAT TESTIMONY, AS WELL AS THE BOYLE ARTICLE. THAT TESTIMONY IS CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET, COMMITTEE SENSITIVE, TODAY.

SOMEDAY IT WILL BE DECLASSIFIED AND THEN I'LL TALK SOME MORE.

I HOPE THIS HELPS YOU AND YOUR PENDING PROJECT. HOWEVER, I CAN'T SEE HOW I CAN BE OF ANY HELP TO YOU. I AM NOT

A CREDITABLE SOURCE--BY MY ON DOING. THAT'S THE WAY ITS SUPPOSE TO BE. THAT'S THE WAY IT WAS SET UP.

JOE AND I TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT THIS IN CALIFORNIA, AFTER OUR MEETING WITH OLIVER STONE, EVEN TALKED WITH STONE AND HIS PEOPLE ABOUT IT.

HANG IN THERE AND I WISH ALL OF YOU THE BEST AS YOU TRY TO UNTANGLE THE MAZE AND MINE FIELDS THAT ARE STILL OUT THERE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNATURE) 1-28-96
ROBERT PLUMLEE
RA-18389060
OMC-235, MIAMI STATION,
CUBAN DESK, JM/WAVE, AKA
WILLIAM H. PEARSON"

4. CL BY 0543646 CL REASON: 1.5 (C) DECL ON: X1

5. FILE: $X NAME: PLUMLEE, WILLIAM ROBERT AKA: PEARSON, WILLIAM H. SOURCE: DENVER NVTAG 2 FEB 96 TEXT: WRITE-IN TO DENVER NVTAG OFFICE; MENTIONS PRIOR CONTACT WITH NWBOLTON $$. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / ** PL ** LA 26. SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

ADV: LA/CCG (2008Z) STAFF

ACTION: LA/CCG (287) INFO: CIC/LA, DDOPLS, LA/CCGEO, LA/CCGPL, LA/SCGAPUC, LADORECORD, MDSX, ODPD, PLDO, FILE, C/CIC, C/LA/RB1, DC/LA/RB1, DDO (5/W)

94 5394206 ASO PAGE 001 IN 5394206
TOR: 042008Z FEB 94 MONT 66786

S E C R E T 042002Z FEB 94 STAFF

CITE MONTEVIDEO 66786

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT LA/CCGEO INFO LA/SCGAPUC, CIC/LA

SLUGS: WNINTEL PLSLINGSHOT SLLARCENY

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SLLARCENY/1 BY FGFORK/86

REF: MONTEVIDEO 66777 94 5389683

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE PASS TO NOC SIDNEY B. CALLICRATE PRIOR TO HIS TDY DEPARTURE TO MONTEVIDEO.

2. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS ASSESSMENT DATA FROM FGFORK/86 (F/86) ON SLLARCENY/1 (L/1), BASED ON F/86'S OBSERVATIONS OF, AND DISCUSSIONS WITH, L/1 AND FAMILY DURING THEIR REF OUTING TO CHUY IN EARLY JAN 94.

3. L/1 DID THE DRIVING FROM MONTEVIDEO TO CHUY. HE DOES NOT LIKE DRIVING AT NIGHT OR IN THE RAIN. IN CONTRAST WITH HIS NORMALLY PLEASANT PERSONALITY, L/1 BECOMES AGGRESSIVE AND NERVOUS BEHIND THE WHEEL.

4. WHILE FAMILIES WERE STAYING TOGETHER IN RATHER SMALL BEACH HOUSE, L/1 AND HIS WIFE GOT INTO A FIGHT. SHE APPEARED TO BE THE INSTIGATOR. F/86'S WIFE LATER TALKED TO L/1'S WIFE IN PRIVATE. L/1'S WIFE SAID SHE BLAMES L/1 BECAUSE WHEN L/1 DIVORCED HIS PREVIOUS WIFE, HE GAVE HER HIS APARTMENT. THUS L/1 AND HIS CURRENT WIFE WILL NOT HAVE THEIR OWN PLACE TO LIVE WHEN THEY EVENTUALLY RETURN TO CUBA. THAT IS WHY, DURING THEIR PREVIOUS TRIP TO CUBA FROM URUGUAY, L/1 AND WIFE BUILT AN EXTRA ROOM ONTO HOUSE OF MRS. L/1'S PARENTS IN GUANABO.

5. MRS. L/1 ALSO SAID THAT L/1 IS "MUY CONSUMISTA" (I.E., A COMPULSIVE SHOPPER), AND THAT SHE HAS TO CONTROL HIM WHEN THEY GO TO THE SUPERMARKET BECAUSE L/1 ALWAYS BUYS TOO MUCH. MRS. L/1 EXPLAINED THAT L/1 GREW UP IN A VERY POOR FAMILY. THAT IS WHY HE NOW BUYS TOO MUCH OF EVERYTHING. SHE ALSO

CRITICIZED L/1 FOR SPOILING THEIR CHILDREN (HIS OLDER DAUGHTER BY PREVIOUS MARRIAGE AND THEIR YOUNGER DAUGHTER), BY GIVING THEM WHATEVER THEY ASK FOR. MRS. L/1 HAS A POOR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OLDER DAUGHTER. SHE ADDED THAT L/1'S RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS TWO GROWN SONS IS GOOD BUT SOMEWHAT DISTANT.

6. F/86 PERSONALLY OBSERVED L/1'S COMPULSIVE SHOPPING WHEN THEY ALL WENT TO CHUY ON 8 JAN. BOTH L/1 AND HIS WIFE BOUGHT LARGE NUMBER OF ITEMS TO SEND TO THEIR FAMILY IN CUBA. AT ONE POINT, L/1 TOLD HIS WIFE THAT HE WOULD DO THE BUYING AND SHE SHOULD BE THE HOUSEWIFE. MRS. L/1 CALLED HIM A "DUMB SPANIARD" ("GALLEGO BRUTO"). F/86 SUSPECTS THAT L/1 AND WIFE HAVE OTHER PROBLEMS, POSSIBLY DUE TO L/1'S INFIDELITY. DURING THEIR SPATS, MRS. L/1 WAS USUALLY THE AGGRESSOR, WITH L/1 TRYING TO KEEP PEACE OR SIMPLY REMAINING QUIET. MRS. L/1 ALSO GOT INTO ARGUMENTS WITH SOME OF THE PALESTINIAN MERCHANTS IN CHUY.

7. ONE OTHER ASPECT OF L/1'S FAMILY WHICH F/86 FOUND DISAGREEABLE WAS BEHAVIOR OF L/1'S OLDER DAUGHTER. F/86 AND HIS WIFE WERE BOTH OFFENDED BY DAUGHTER'S FREQUENT SEXUAL REFERENCES IN FRONT OF F/86'S YOUNGER CHILDREN. F/86 SAID THAT L/1'S DAUGHTER ACTED JUST LIKE A CUBAN HOOKER.

8. ON A MORE ELEVATED PLANE, F/86 ALSO HAD SOME PRIVATE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WITH L/1. IN RESPONSE TO F/86'S DIRECT QUESTION, L/1 SAID THAT THE WRITERS WHO HAVE INFLUENCED HIM THE MOST ARE MARX, HEGEL AND KANT. L/1 SAID THAT LENIN'S MAIN ACHIEVEMENT WAS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR ONLY ONE PARTY. L/1 CONSIDERS LENIN TO HAVE BEEN AN INTEPRETER OF MARX BUT NOT A GREAT THEORETICIAN. TO SOME EXTENT, L/1 DEFENDED LENIN'S SO-CALLED "LAW OF ECONOMIC PRUDENCE", A MEANS OF ECONOMIC PLANNING WHICH LENIN UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED TO IMPLEMENT IN USSR. AFTER LENIN'S DEATH, IT BECAME EXCESSIVELY BUREAUCRATIZED AND ATROPHIED, ALTHOUGH THIS SYSTEM DID WORK WITH SOME SUCCESS IN BULGARIA.

9. L/1 ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED NEED FOR "NEOLIBERAL MEDICINE" TO REFORM CUBAN ECONOMY, BECAUSE THERE IS NO OTHER SOLUTION. L/1 ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT REFORMS SHOULD BE INSTITUTED WITH MINIMUM SOCIAL AND POLITICAL COSTS. WHILE STATE SHOULD NOT BE EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST IN ECONOMY, L/1 WANTS STATE TO RETAIN ITS PROTECTIVE SOCIAL ROLE, BECAUSE MARKET ECONOMY ALSO HAS ITS FAULTS.

10. L/1 TALKED ABOUT ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY. ACCORDING TO L/1, IN 1969, L/1 PERSONALLY SAW FIDEL CASTRO RECEIVE A GROUP OF U.S. RADICALS. CASTRO TALKED TO THEM FOR TWO HOURS ABOUT WHY JUST ONE ASSASSIN COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE KILLED KENNEDY. CASTRO ORDERED A REENACTMENT OF THE CRIME, USING HIS BEST MARKSMEN, AND THEY COULD NOT DUPLICATE *WHAT<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>SUPPOSEDLY DID BY HIMSELF. L/1 SAID THAT THREE GROUPS WERE INVOLVED IN KILLING THE PRESIDENT: ONE GROUP OF CUBANS, ONE GROUP O "MAFIOSOS" AND A THIRD GROUP OF MERCENARIES. THE THIRD GROUP INCLUDED A MAN WITH A GREEK NAME. L/1 TOLD F/86 THAT IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER ANY OF THESE

GROUPS EVER HAD ANY CONNECTION WITH PNINFINITE. IN THIS REGARD, F/86 REPORTED TO STATION THAT L/1 IS ALWAYS CAREFUL NOT TO ATTACK PNINFINITE WHEN F/86 IS PRESENT.

11. STATION REPORTING ADDITIONAL INFO FROM F/86 SEPARATELY.

12. FILE: 201-1454795. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: DE SENSITIZE

Signed: R. Hartman

R.O. #1 - Unit CI/R&A

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

: DIRECTOR

: MELBOURNE

: C/WH 4

: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, C/CI, C/CI/SI, VR

CS COPY

S E C R E T 020422Z

DIR INFO CNBR CITE MELB 2517 (ROLLOFIER ACTING)

~~RYBAT~~ GPFLOOR

2 DEC 63 IN 71187

REF DIR 85690*

1. SQUARE PRELIMINARY CHECKS ON RECORDED CONVERSATIONS REVEAL FOLL:

A NO TRACE 1952 DARK BLUE BUICK BELONGING SOVIET OR BLOC INSTALLATION CNBR OR SYDNEY.

B NO LICENSE PLATE IDENTICAL TO ONE MENTIONED BUT FOLL N.S.W. VARIANTS CHECKED: CCC 012, 1960 VAUXHALL, TWO-TONED BLUE, HERMAN SATRAPINSKY, 149 WENTWORTH AVE, WENTWORTHVILLE; CCC 122, 1949 STANDARD, FAUN, WILLIAM JOHN SIMS, BINALONG; CCO 122, 1960 HOLDEN, BIEGE, KEITH BETHKE, 28 HEWITT AVE, WAHROONGA. NO SQUARE DEROG ON ABOVE.

C NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON AUSSIE MENTIONED CNBR 0591. (IN 68838)

D FRASERS MENTIONED SAME REF ARE ALP MPS.

E INDON FIRST SECY POSSIBLY IDW R. WILLY SASTRANEGARA HAS MOUSTACHE; RUSSIAN CAPABILITY NOT KNOWN TO SQUARE; NOT NOTICEABLY CLOSE TO SOVS CNBR.

Document Number 270-676 for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1976
E2 IMPDET CL BY 012208

201-289248

D: 2000-5-41

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

2. SQUARE HAS ARRANGED WITH PMG LIAISON OFFICER TED YOUNG TRACE ANY FURTHER CALLS MADE. EMBASSY IN CLOSE CONTACT SQUARE REP CNBR.

3. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: Hqs requested information on the Polish driver connected with the Russian diplomatic establishment in Australia.

Document Number ——— for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                          201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26       POB GERM, BERLIN        TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                  OCC PHARMACIST          OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53 OCC CODE CHEM           RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                            30 NOV 70          00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISG Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISC. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

OI

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files CC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-______________. ☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier) ☐ Non-Restricted Dossier For Split Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to ________ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ________ (date) retained at ____________ desk.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	EXT.

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REG. NO.

FORM 1-73 2377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CONFIDENTIAL CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A

RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______ (NAME)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B

REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



FUL 4 CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0238859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0098		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, PANCIAPIA, PORT ARTH		CHAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1108/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CHAT	0069796			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1108/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CHAT	0832855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/495		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091803			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040289			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-PAO	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2585/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CHAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHUAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,HUAN TANG IS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2595/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CHAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2585/2797	A	C18C22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0988577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3185/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0054759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2885/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2855/8133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179622			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2585/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CHAT	0839156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0547/009		C18C21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0858440			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CHAT	0096947			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/		15APR30	CHIN,CHENGHAI	CHMD	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2895/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0085119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103289			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2885/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763916			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TEH /975/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013991			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639		C18C75	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2885/2737/	-	18MAR17	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0747442			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0337/	A	02FEB08				0151329			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-TAU /7115/2855/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093196			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2885/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN,FANG CHEN KW		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		09OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CHAT	0349628			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB38	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0313810			CHIN	DENK	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0144010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

PAGE 150

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location
(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
(3) Citizenship
(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname
(b) Given name
(c) Date of birth
(d) Country of birth
(e) Citizenship
(f) OI code
(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

14-00000

SECRET

'DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)* 29

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth* 11

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS). 24+28

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS). 29

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel* 11

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

SECRET

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

14-00000

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Resc by
Annex B to Chpt III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dat
1 Oct 62 -

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Af SAA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
Special Activities Report on JMWAVE's Relationship with AMCARBON-1

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 10
REFERENCES : A. WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962 no reference to Security
B. WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962 no reference to Security
C. WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962 no, ref to Secur
D. DIR 40975, dated 6 October 1962 no ref to secur
E. UFGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964 no ref to Secur,

1. INTRODUCTION. In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review of the nature of its relationship with AMCARBON-2. This review indicates that the relationship with AMCARBON-2 evolved from that action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the establishment of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT South Campus as a result of security restrictions which were in some way related to JMDUSK. While the relationship with AMCARBON-2 stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the Identity 3 was an objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain. As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made that JMWAVE be given approval to contact the major South Florida news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these news media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity spotlight on those KUBARK activities in South Florida which might come to their attention. Thus, when a relationship was established with AMCARBON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3, which would simultaneously insure the security of JMWAVE's operations and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for surfacing certain select propaganda items. In the period October to

(CONTINUED)

Attachments: USC
A - Five Newspaper Clippings
B - Identities

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SAS, w/atts.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~1~~ - RI Chrono
1 - 201 file (O/COS)
1 - COS Chrono

DATE TYPED 19 March 64	DATE DISPATCHED APR 2 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-14781	
CROSS REFERENCE TO	
CLASSIFICATION ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT.
COS	Andrew K. REUTEMAN/vtp	251

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		D002244
ESEC	1 Apr 64	DUDLEY R. WILLINGS

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
COS/JMWAVE	30 Mar 64	Andrew K Reuteman ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

December 1962, all of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3 was handled via AMCARBON-2. In mid-December 1962, AMCARBON-2 made the suggestion that he introduce REUTEMAN to AMCARBON-1 in order that there be a backup contact, in the event that AMCARBON-2 were out of town or unavailable at such times as REUTEMAN might require assistance from the Identity 3. REUTEMAN agreed to AMCARBON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, AMCARBON-2 hosted a luncheon on 12 December 1962 at the Miami Club in the Hotel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN. As a result of this initial meeting on 12 December 1962, an operational relationship has developed with AMCARBON-1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes to the fulfillment of the over-all JMWAVE mission. In view of this, a special activities report is being submitted to cover the nature of JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

2. FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR JMWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMCARBON-1. When AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN, AMCARBON-2 reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating with REUTEMAN. This review was conducted for AMCARBON-1's benefit, in order that he might clearly understand the frame of reference which should prevail in his relationships with REUTEMAN. In this review, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that it was the policy of the Identity 3 that it would take no action which would purposely embarrass KUBARK or its South Florida operations. As a result, if any embarrassing items relative to KUBARK's operations in South Florida did come to the attention of the Identity 3, this material would be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate attention. AMCARBON-2 made it clear to AMCARBON-1 that such items should be discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner. In addition, AMCARBON-2 made the point that, after an item was discussed, AMCARBON-1 should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative to how any particularly embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, so that it would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the same time, would not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of the Identity 3. In addition, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that, if AMCARBON-1 brought a potentially embarrassing item to REUTEMAN's attention and remedial action on the matter was not taken by REUTEMAN within a reasonable period of time, then the Identity 3 would feel free to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's part. AMCARBON-2 pointed out that in return for this cooperation from the Identity 3, REUTEMAN had agreed that he would be available for contact by telephone or periodic personal meetings at which AMCARBON-1 and AMCARBON-2 could discuss broad trends and developments in Latin American affairs. AMCARBON-2 advised AMCARBON-1 that this arrangement did not mean that AMCARBON-1 could expect to obtain any classified information from REUTEMAN. The point was also made that AMCARBON-1 should not press for the obtaining of classified information, but he should be alert to steering tips which REUTEMAN might furnish him on fast-breaking news stories. AMCARBON-1 indicated that he understood the frame of reference which had been outlined by AMCARBON-2. This frame of reference has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER. AMCARBON-1 originally started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk, and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment which entailed covering major political developments in Florida. At a later date, AMCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the Identity 3. Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant

promotion for AMCARBON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by the Identity 3 management. AMCARBON-1 is by no means an expert on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a long-term Latin American specialist. QDELF has been questioned about AMCARBON-1, and he has indicated that AMCARBON-1 is regarded in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has a keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American affairs. It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse of time, AMCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles. AMCARBON-1 has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting to improve his language fluency. It is REUTEMAN's opinion that AMCARBON-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist, and he will continue to grow in this field. Thus, he is a contact who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing in mind that he does have long-term potential.

4. AMCARBON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES. In keeping with the traditional pattern of source protection which is common to newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers, AMCARBON-1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his sources. On the other hand, when pressed, AMCARBON-1 has identified some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations could be made of that information which AMCARBON-1 had passed to KUBARK. As a result of these occasional witting identifications of his sources, and, as a result of general conversations with AMCARBON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that AMCARBON-1's sources include the following persons:

a. Luis *FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766), secretary general of the DRE.

b. Manolo *RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE.

c. Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct Havana Times.

d. AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437)

e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-019245), leader of the AAA

f. Edmund *LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau. AMCARBON-1 regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.

g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and adventurer.

h. Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR.

i. Luis *MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico.

j. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201-103272), former president of the Dominican Republic.

k. Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.

l. Jorge *VOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252), an employee of USIA in Miami. AMCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY is a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this does not deter AMCARBON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a source of information.

5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, AMCARBON-1 is used to carry out certain operational support tasks. In such instances, AMCARBON-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The use of AMCARBON-1 for operational support tasks enables JMWAVE to harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3. Several examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been used in operational support tasks are outlined below:

a. Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO Camps, DPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived in Miami and was given routine CAC processing. The details of this processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963. After being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and a sensational story was developed. In view of this story, JMWAVE tried to locate ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productive, thus AMCARBON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO. AMCARBON-1 did locate ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for details.

b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group. In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201-309611) of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims relative to his faction invading Cuba. Headquarters' interest in discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-1. As a result of Headquarters' interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had a luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which AMCARBON-1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was less than accurate in its claims relative to its activities in Cuba. In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction might release. AMCARBON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN's comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would ignore the BANDIN faction in the future. Once BANDIN was discredited with AMCARBON-1, the word was soon leaked by AMCARBON-1 to other newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source. As a result of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage in South Florida since September 1963.

6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. In the period February 1963 to February 1964, AMCARBON-1 has furnished JMWAVE with operational intelligence as outlined below:

a. In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that AMBEND-1 was back in Miami and was the object of a great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from a Havana prison. AMCARBON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements. Subsequent developments revealed that AMCARBON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1, and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the publicity stir that was initially anticipated.

b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical situation. In this connection, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was

thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. *CARLSON, residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the Bay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON-1 stated that, if CARLSON were of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would soft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of the opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt of this operational intelligence enabled JMWAVE to brief CARLSON on the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn, enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting with AMCARBON-1. While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish his research.

c. In WAVE 0904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that Mr. Trevor *ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.

d. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1 gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with AMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963. This information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1 was telling the press.

e. In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 with AMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligence was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's representatives were telling the outside world about their operational activities.

f. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK vessels which were located in South Florida waters. This information alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny was going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warning, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicity repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5.

g. In WAVE 7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE, Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was no real operational potential in this lead. This incident did underscore the fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant operational leads to JMWAVE's attention.

h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calls indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected from a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previously been seen in Miami during November or December 1963. At the same time, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who was being used as a means of creating an incident which would embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating

United States territorial waters. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that KUBARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation against the GOC. At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result of this conversation, arrangements were made for JMWAVE to check out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time, AMCARBON-1 was prevailed upon not to write a story which might lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC.

7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET. AMCARBON-1 has been used successfully, during the period covered by this report, as a propaganda outlet through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in the free world press. Examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been harnessed in this field are outlined below:

a. AMCRAB-1. The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally surfaced in the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo. The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-1's information relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers in the Miami area. As a result, it was decided to do a series of feature stories on AMCRAB-1, pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1 was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions of obscurity once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. AMCARBON-1 was briefed in detail on the AMCRAB-1 story, and he was given an opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a JMWAVE safehouse. After completing his debriefing, AMCARBON-1 wrote a series of feature articles on AMCRAB-1. The first article in the series received front page headline play. The series of articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an excellent peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other propaganda assets. AMCARBON-1's story on AMCRAB-1 was picked up by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America. The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated 14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174, dated 21 October 1963.

b. Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story. On 26 February 1964, JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN's sons went to Cuba to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over to them. It was believed that this information would make a good human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items from the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States territorial waters. In view of this opinion, a steering tip was given to AMCARBON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in Key West interview Mr. GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out, and an article outlining the points which were of interest to JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

c. LAYC Story. The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santiago, Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted AMCARBON-1 on 5 March 1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the Identity 3 should pursue. AMCARBON-1 was grateful for this steering tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

(COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through c above are attached for Headquarters information.)

8. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. Attempts have been made to obtain disseminable positive intelligence from AMCARBON-1 during the period covered by this report. This attempt has been generally unsuccessful, in that AMCARBON-1 does not have a great number of contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile intelligence appreciably in advance of the information appearing in the overt press. As a result, AMCARBON-1 is usually not aware of inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently, he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence. As a matter of fact, AMCARBON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive intelligence than most journalists. This is attributable solely to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American political scene. It is believed that AMCARBON-1 will ultimately overcome this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him for the collection of positive intelligence.

9. COMMENT. In the period covered by this report, AMCARBON-1 has been found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest, cooperative and who understands the need for security. Our relationship also indicates that AMCARBON-1 is an accurate reporter of that information which he passes to KUBARK. In view of this, JMWAVE plans to continue to harness AMCARBON-1 in the same manner that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our relationship with AMCARBON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our operational mission in a secure manner. In addition, this relationship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have difficulties with the media outlets in the South Florida area. As a result of our continuing relationship with AMCARBON-1, a special activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.

10. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARBON-1 and that JMWAVE be advised of the number.

END OF DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER Separate Cover Attachme t B to UFGA-14781

Identities - 1 - The Miami News

2 - Sunland Training Center for Retarded Children

3 - The Miami Herald

4 - Latin American Editor

5 - The LEDA

DISTRIBUTION:
- 3 - Chief, SAS
- 1 - RI Chrono
- 1 - AMCARBON-1 201
- 1 - COS Chrono

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

D002244

SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL

38

From: BOGOTA   Report No: TLB-1624   Local File No:

No. of Pages: Two   No. of Enclosures: None

Report Made By: George S. Vincent/maf   Approved By: G. S. Vincent

Distribution:
By copy to:
Washington - 2
Guatemala City - 1
Quito - 1
Guayaquil - 1
Havana - 1
Caracas - 1
Maracaibo - 1
Files - 2

Orally to:

Source Cryptonym: See below   References: None

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

The information in this report was obtained from a local detective who works for the National Police. An informant of the Police in Paris provided a report to the latter concerning activities of the Colombian delegation, and he added names of delegates of certain other countries. This informant is studying in Paris and he accompanied the delegates to Berlin. It is likely that the interested stations have this information, but it is thought it might serve to confirm, or possibly add a bit to, the material already on hand.

50-77991

Liasone
file
Re May Gonzalez

IR COPY

Classification CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

38

FORM NO. 51-90
FEB 1949

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Delegates to Youth Festival in Berlin

Report No: TLB - 1624

Date of Information: August-September 1951

Place Acquired: Colombia, Bogotá

Date Acquired: January 1952

Evaluation: C - 2

Date of Report: 29 January 1952

Source: Local Detective

1. Source reports that an informant in Paris has submitted information to the local Police concerning delegates of certain other countries to the III Festival Mundial de la Juventud held in Berlin in August and September 1951. These names together with the comments of the informant are included in the following paragraphs.

2. The delegation of Guatemala consisted of the following:

   Edelberto TORRES Rivas, Novena Ave. S. No. 110
   Octavio REYES Ortis, 17 C. O. No. 78
   Hugo → Hubo BARRIOS Klee, 12 Calle Oriente No. 58
   José Victor GONZALEZ, 2 Ave. Sur No. 11

in addition to these four names were Humberto ALVARADO and Elena CHAVEZ (TLB-1351)

3. The following is a list of the Venezuelan delegates:

   Juvenal HERRERA, estudiante de derecho
   Francisco MIERES, peligroso
   Cordova ARMANDO, estudiante de derecho in Cumaná
   Nicolas CURIEL Acosta, escritor de teatro
   Juan Pedro ROJAS, pintor
   Yolanda Steffens de ROJAS, casada con el anterior

4. The Ecuadoran delegates are as follows:

   Enrique GIL Gilbert, escritor
   Enrique QUINTBERO
   Patricio CUEVAS, estudiante de medicina en Praga

5. The delegation of Cuba consisted of the following:

   ✓ Nicolas GUILLEN, poeta y escritor
   ✓ Santiago GRAJALES, obrero
   ✓ Antonio NUNEZ-Jimenez, profesor de Pedagogía y "responsable de la delegación de Cuba". Es peligroso y cuando hubo necesidad de retratarlo en París no se dejó.
   ✓ Francisco GARCIA Benites, comerciante de Holguín
   ✓ José CAMETTI, comerciante en Santiago de Cuba

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

02316

SECRET

23 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Call from Jon French of DCD Concerning Frank STURGIS

1. The following information was provided to Jon French by his DCD Miami office on 23 August. The information was given to the DCD Miami office by a contact (not identified) on 23 August who obtained it from Oscar FREELY. FREELY is writing a book on Frank STURGIS.

2. STURGIS is to appear on the Tomorrow Show at 2 a.m. on 24 August, which is to be narrated by Tom Schneider. STURGIS just recently returned to Miami from taping the show in New York.

3. While in New York STURGIS saw Marita LORENZ and obtained from her a book which, according to source, appeared to be cryptographic material and seemed to relate to Albania. The DCD source saw a "few copies" of what he described as "mathematical matrix" material.

4. STURGIS currently (today - 23 August) is attempting to contact Senator Baker to turn over the material to him. DCD plans to ask the source to monitor the situation and advise whether the material in fact is turned over to Baker.

File

Chris Hopkins
LA/COG/CIOS

201- 242256 STURGIS

Told Jon French that DCD should alert ADDO & Phil Fendig - he will do.
8/23

D-002140

SECRET

20 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Highlights of Tape-Recorded Conversation in Miami Between Mr. William D. Pawley and an Unidentified Cuban during Period 17-18 October

1. On 20 October the undersigned and Owen Faust of WH/3 listened to the play-back of a tape, brought to Washington from Miami and given to Colonel King by Mr. Pawley on 19 October, which was a recording of Mr. Pawley's conversations with two Cubans during the period 17-18 October. The first conversation was with an unidentified Cuban, believed to be a member of a group of wealthy anti-CASTRO Cubans, members of which have talked to Mr. Pawley recently about their plans for sabotage of the coming sugar harvest as reported in UFWA-32 dated 2 October. The second Cuban was AMPACA-1, a Cuban journalist of operational interest to Station Habana, and a separate memorandum is submitted on that conversation.

2. The unidentified Cuban, who had somewhat of an accent and spoke indistinctly, was difficult to understand. He mentioned a meeting "with some of our people who came up from Cuba" to discuss plans. He said his group had been contacted by a representative of General Jose Eleutorio PEDRAZA, leader of Cuban revolutionary groups in the Dominican Republic, who wanted to know what action their group had taken and was told that they had a plan "to start sabotage". The Cuban said the PEDRAZA representative said their group (the PEDRAZA group) had four provinces organized in Cuba, mentioning Camaguey and Santa Clara, and that they had two provinces yet to be organized -- Habana and Matanzas.

3. The Cuban said his group needed two things -- moral backing and money; he pointed out that Cubans in Cuba are afraid to start an underground movement, and there was no way to raise funds, etc. Mr. Pawley gave him no encouragement on the money angle, saying that even if there were Americans willing to run the risk of becoming involved in Cuban revolutionary activities by furnishing money for such a movement, which he doubted, he felt that at the present time it would be like "putting money down a rat-hole" for the following reasons: (1) there is no unity among the anti-CASTRO groups, and there are at least 10 that he knows of who are working absolutely independently of one another; and (2) CASTRO is in control of the country and has the support of a large number of Cubans, especially the under-privileged. Mr. Pawley said he felt the Cuban economic situation was worsening fast and that if it gets bad enough, a large number of Cubans will turn on CASTRO; but until that time comes it would be dangerous to try to organize a revolutionary movement.

SECRET

201-77378

D00676

4. Mr. Pawley asked the Cuban if his group felt they had moral support of the U. S. and the Cuban replied that they wanted U. S. moral support but whether they had it or not, they felt they were obliged to carry through with their plans. Mr. Pawley said he didn't know what to tell him -- would have to think about it and see if anything could be done. He said, "having been connected with the U. S. Government, I can't get involved in revolutionary movements". Also said he would hate to see the Dominican Government get involved, which might be difficult to avoid with so many Cuban exiles there, but commented that he understood "the Dominican Government hasn't given them a dime".

Martha Tharpe
WH/III/CARIB

VIA: A I R (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

MICROFILMED
JUL 1 1983
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HDCA-1382

1P

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 12 June 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Ciudad Trujillo

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— PAWLEY Business Interests in the Dominican Republic

ACTION REQUIRED: For info only.

1. In addition to minerals exploitation in which Mr. William D. PAWLEY has substantial investments, negotiations are being concluded for the purchase by PAWLEY of the Hotel Hamaca in Boca Chica, a resort town near the almost-completed new international airport, about 30 km east of Ciudad Trujillo.

2. Another activity which is kept very much under wraps is the concession granted PAWLEY for procurement and world-wide sale of all new issues of Dominican postage stamps. This activity is managed by Edward P. PAWLEY, brother of William, whose office is in the Dominican post office building. D. Pawley

3. The source (considered sensitive) of the information in paragraph 2. is Mrs. Nora BRITZIUS, a U. S. citizen employed by PAWLEY Wm. D in the stamp business. The source volunteered the information on a very confidential basis to Helene I. DAHLERUP at a social gathering.

D. Republic

Edward F. Stoneset
EDWARD F. STONESET

10 June 1958

Distribution:
3 - Hqs.

CS COPY

INDEX

12 June 58

FORM NO. 51-28A MAR. 1949

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-77378

DO0708

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

02680

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Document Number 1271-1029
for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. /The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department [redacted] 'DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States./

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens
M. D. Stevens

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.


1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                             201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26         POB GERM, BERLIN         TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                    OCC PHARMACIST           OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53   OCC CODE CHEM            RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                                 30 NOV 70         00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records systêm and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. ***Requesting a 201 File Opening***

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor-organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-______________. ☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier) ☐ Non-Restricted Dossier For Split Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to ________ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ________ (date) retained at __________ desk.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

CL. BY: 007622

FORM 9-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

15 November 1974

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	EXT.

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REQ. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL. BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

15 November 1974

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______________________
(NAME)
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______________ R.O. No. ________
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CONFIDENTIAL E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



```
FUI A CHINA                                  SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
      201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
      03 OCT  1973

          NAME                     TYPE   DOB      BIRTHPLACE                OCC.  CIT.    201      OI-1  OI-2  ACT.  LOC.  INT.
                                   NAME  DA/MO/YR  CTRY  CITY                                                   CTRY  CTRY  CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/9030/          17JUL14   CHIN,KWANGTUNG                  CHIN?   0165401               CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/                                               DIPT          0230859               CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/     A    24JAN11                                           0178653               CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038          90        CHIN,AMOY                 BUSP  CCOM?   0043751               CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU MEI                          04JAN19   CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.             CHIN?   0234629               CHIN  CUBA
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690          21OCT08   CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH      CNAT    0179620               CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001     A    12NOV22   CHIN, HUNAN                     CNAT    0069786               CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-TAO                          18MAR45   CHIN                      DIPT  CCOM    0905390               CHIN  MALT
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1           C41       CHIN, CANTON              ENGR  CNAT    0832855               CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807          02SEP26   CHIN, LIAONING PRO              CHIN?   0130415               CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/499           12JAN18   CHIN, FUKIEN                    CCOM?   0091803               CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-YI                           09JUN99   CHIN, CANTON              PROF  CHIN?   0040288               CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU-SAN                      A    19DEC19   CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV            CNAT?   0052638               CHIN  HWAI
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2895/6930          02JUL30   CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.     ARMY  CNAT    0328328               CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122          19        CHIN,HUAN TANG TS               CHIN?   0124438               CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2895/2            NOV30     HK                        TSEA  CNAT    0797335               CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2895/2797     A    CIRC22    CHIN,PEILIU                     CHIN?   0200223               CHIN
CHEN, SHU FEN                      R                                                      0988577               CHIN  ETHI
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3185/          08JUL14   CHIN,KWANGTUNG                  CHIN?   0179621               CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74          10        CHIN,FUKIEN                     CHIN?   0044759               CHIN
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2885/7           23FEB07   CHIN, KWANGTUNG                 CCOM?   0073195               CHIN
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2895/8133          05MAY18   CHIN,FOOCHOW                    CHIN?   0179622               CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-HUA                           30MAR26                             DIPT  CCOM    0223161               CHIN  CEY
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2895/9030/       A    06FEB16   CHIN, HOPEI               DIPT  CNAT    0239156               CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2895/2710          27NOV23   CHIN,FANG CHENG           PROF  CHIN?   0179623               CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LAN                      R              CHIN                            CCOM    0221972               CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0547/009          CIRC21    CHIN                      DIPT  CHIN?   0223162               CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/          25NOV20   CHIN,FENGSHUN                   CHIN?   0179624               CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010           01JUL29   CHIN, KIANGSU             MILA  CCOM    0858450               CHIN  LAOS
CHEN, SHU-MIN                      A    20SEP20   CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU      CNAT    0096947               CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/          15APR30   CHIN,CHENGHAI             CRMO  CHIN?   0179625               CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/          19DEC19   CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.           CNAT?   0052638               CHIN  HWAI
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2895/2773/     A    10DEC26   CHIN,KWANGTUNG                  CHIN?   0005119               CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091           27JAN25   CHIN, FUKIEN PROV               CHIN?   0103289               CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2895/1795/           21DEC37   CHIN, SHANGHAI            GEOL  CHIN?   0763816               CHIN  BURM
CHEN, SHU TEH /M75/                V    27MAR20   CHIN, CHANG SHU                         0013991               CHIN
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639          CIRC75    CHIN,HANG CHOW                  CHIN?   0153929               CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2895/2737/          18MAR17   CHIN                      FIN   CCOM    0767442               CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0037/     A    02FEB06                                           0151329               CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YAU /7115/2895/1031           11NOV06   CHIN, KWANGTUNG                 CCOM?   0093196               CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YIN                      V    05APR17   CHIN,PEIPING                    CHIN?   0107336               CHIN  CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2895/5391/          15JUN06   CHIN,FANG CHEN KW               CHIN?   0179626               CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/          07OCT30   CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN ARMY CNAT    0343528               CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-YU                            17FEB39   CHIN, CHEKIANG            INT   CCOM    0313610               CHIN  DENK
CHEN, SHU-YU                            21APR21   CHIN, SHANGHAI                  CHIN?   0044010               CHIN
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/      V    04SEP28   CHIN, SZECHWAN                  CHIN?   0144750               CHIN  TAIW

                                             SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY                           PAGE  150
                                             E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location
(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
(3) Citizenship
(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname
(b) Given name
(c) Date of birth
(d) Country of birth
(e) Citizenship
(f) OI code
(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

   All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

CSHB ~~43-1-1~~ 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Resc by
Annex B to Chpt III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dat
1 Oct 62

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
X ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.
Chief, SAS; Chief of Station, WAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Contact Report/LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PBRUMEN LITAMIL 9

Attached herewith are contact reports of meetings with LITAMIL-9 on 17 and 29 July 1963.

Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/2/att
2 - C/SAS w/2/att
2 - COS WAVE w/2/att
3 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21849

DATE
31 July 1963

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201 - 330173

0 3628

18 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE [illegible]

FROM : Lawrence [illegible]

SUBJECT : Meeting with LITAMIL-9, 17 July 1963

1. An unexpected meeting was held with LITAMIL-9 at 2106 hours 17 July -- Barker had a scheduled meeting with AMSAIL-1 at the corner of Ejercito Nacional and Melchor Ocampo at 2100 hours but A-1 was not in place at 2103 when B made his second pass -- B then stopped by the corner of Gutenberg and Thiers where there is a pay phone -- to make a call to A-1 -- but as B's car pulled up LITAMIL-9 stepped out of the bushes and said, in English, "Here I am." L-9 got in the car and BL drove away -- the mystery was clarified then L-9 explained that he had called B's home about 2030 hours and spoken with B's wife who said B was out and would probably be back in about half an hour -- L was on his way to phone again (from the pay phone at Gutenberg & Thiers -- usual pick up point) when he saw Barker pass by -- later spotted the car pull up to the corner -- he assumed by this time that Barker had spoken with his, B's wife, and received the word that L was looking for him that night -- thus a coincidence. I explained his presence in the area (partly true) by saying he was casing for better pick up points -- no mention was made of another scheduled meeting (with A-1). BL drove out the Queretaro highway to the vicinity of the Dawn Motel where the meeting was held. L-9 was dropped off at 2325 hours.

2. L revealed again his concern about security since the new ambassador and cultural counselor are such sharp people, hence much more dangerous. The elements of a complete clandestine communications system were explained to L -- regular, scheduled and non-scheduled; recontact and warning -- and some progress was made in working out the details.

3. L reported that he is going to Tampico to inaugurate an exhibit of Cuban engravings, [illegible] in connection with the Escuela de Comercio, Avenida [illegible] No. [illegible] on the night of 20 July; L will leave about [illegible] July -- return about 21 July. [illegible] Cuban Consulate [illegible] -- and will last about two weeks.

4. He reported the following additional developments:

(a) A big celebration of the 26th of July ANNIVERSARY will be held in [illegible], suburb of Tampico. This celebration -- sponsored by the Grupo Jose Marti -- will take place in the salon of the Cerveceria [illegible] Corona (Brewery). The principal speaker will be Hector RICO Galan. The event will take place at [illegible].

L-9 suggested we might want to have a photographer there and might want to drop a stink bomb or two.

(b) [illegible] DE LA [illegible], who was introduced to Jacqueline KENNEDY during the President's trip to Mexico, a supporter of [illegible] and who apparently piqued the interest of Mrs. Kennedy, has been invited "to make an exposition" in the United States and is planning to go there. L had no further details.

~~[illegible]~~ to HMMA 21849 CS COPY

201-329609

She was introduced to the First Lady by (fnu) BARRIOS. Sa[illegible] (phonetic).

(c) [illegible], the new Cultural Counselor, told L that [illegible] ([illegible]), Cuban Ambassador in Moscow is going to be recalled soon because he has done much harm there to Cuban-Soviet relations.

(d) APARICIO also reported that the magazine [illegible] in Cuba is having serious trouble obtaining newsprint.

(e) APARICIO said that when he was in Prague he had trouble with the climate -- asked to be sent to some other European country -- was surprised at the suddenness of his transfer to Mexico.

(f) (In response to a question as to who would be the man we might most easily recruit among the Embassy staff) L said he has doubts about JORRIN's loyalty to the Castro regime. Believes JORRIN might be recruitable but wouldn't dare do it himself (I assured L we would never ask him to undertake such a risky venture). JORRIN goes window shopping along San Juan de Letran often -- might be approachable there.

(g) Only two Cubans were invited to the French Ambassador's residence on Bastille Day (14 July) -- Ambassador HERNANDEZ Armas and L-1. Each went separately but L returned in the Ambassador's car. The Amb was clearly impressed with L's standing with the French -- L is a close friend of the French Military Attache to whom he introduced the Amb -- and the Amb kept L by his side during the celebration -- L speaks good French. At this affair, DUB[illegible] of the Soviet Embassy spoke in a superficial manner of international politics and it became clear that the Cuban did not [illegible] of the Soviets in the dispute with the Chinese. D[illegible] remarked that he would be leaving soon but would be replaced with "another young man, just as sharp as I am." D[illegible] and the Amb agreed that current American policy for Latin America is designed to give the impression that such governments as the one in Argentina represent a democratic advance whereas in fact they are fronting for the military.

(h) An Ecuadorean youth named Ulises ESTRELLA was in the Embassy on 17 July -- spoke with APARICIO. He represents a group of pro-Castro writers in Ecuador and is trying to go to Cuba -- will probably get there. He has [illegible] and beard -- brought a book as a gift for APARICIO.

(i) APARICIO is busy working on the forthcoming Congress of Architects which is to take place in Havana. He is dealing [illegible] with a man named IANEZ on this matter. [illegible] says that the US Government has been [illegible] lots of pressure to have the seat of the congress [illegible] to some other country -- without success. A check for [illegible] dollars, representing inscription fees paid by Mexican delegates to the congress, has been sent to Havana.

(j) [illegible] in the Embassy seems unduly upset by US restrictions on dollar currency transactions with Cuba.

(k) L turned over to B (for return) a handbill put out by the Escuela Normal Rural de Santa Teresa Coahuila, dated 10 June 1963, explaining that schools invitation to Fidel Castro to act as sponsor of the 1958-1963 graduating class. Copy attached.

(l) L turned over a pornographic cartoon (for return) distributed by pro-Castro elements in Tampico. Copy not attached.

(m) Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa CALDERON has a sister residing in Reynosa, Tamps, married to an American of Mexican descent. Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon -- or her mother may make the trip -- details not clear.

5. L-9 reports that he is very well "in" with the new ambassador who seems to respect him highly and to admire him for his contacts. He is also getting along very nicely with his new boss, APARICIO. His information gathering method is still to keep his eyes and ears open and ask no questions -- thus he often gets only fragments -- while questions or discreet elicitation might fill in detail he is extremely wary lest he arouse any suspicion.

6. While he suggested we might want to toss a few stink bombs at the engraving exhibit on the 20th in Tampico and the subsequent celebration of the 26th in Ciudad Madero -- he was also concerned lest any disruption might get him in trouble since he is the principal organizer of both affairs -- felt that the Mexican Government might think the disruption was engineered by the Castro Cubans, themselves, to throw suspicion on the anti-Castroites.

7. L-9 is really worried about his security and it will be up to us to take every practical precaution to protect him. He loves to talk -- quite a conversationalist -- and needs constant encouragement and shoring-up. He is inclined to pat himself on the back quite often and wait for a further pat from his case officer (which B is always quick to add). This characteristic comes out in his conversation when he stops and says, "I did very well there, didn't I?" or "That was a good idea I had, wasn't it?" or " I think my ideas on handling such-and-such are pretty clever, don't you?"

8. For the present it has been decided to keep holding meetings in B's car -- always at night. The pick up point has been abandoned in favor of a mobile pick up -- L will start at the corner of Thiers and Melchor Ocampo at the prescribed hour and move slowly up the street to Thiers and Gutenberg -- then, without tarrying, will work his way back down the opposite side of the street to Melchor Ocampo -- B will cruise by in his car and make the pick up while L is walking. Other commo details will be worked out at the next meeting.

Lau[illegible] F. [illegible]

201-329609

SECRET

Chief of Station, Bangkok X
Chief of Station, Rangoon
Chief, Far East Division

Chief of Station, Melbourne

Ø Patrick PO HLA

References: A. DIRECTOR 34594
B. BANGKOK 3988
C. MELBOURNE 6905
D. BANGKOK 3809

Action Required: Please advise if still desired that Melbourne Station contact subject

1. In response to a brief letter from the undersigned, which queried his general plans, subject has replied per attachment. Please note that he can make himself available after 4 November 1968 for discussions with Melbourne. The Station defers to Bangkok and Director whether it is still desired that we summon subject to Melbourne for talks along the lines indicated in reference D.

2. For Rangoon: Note penultimate paragraph of subject's letter in which he indicates that his daughter and family are planning to leave Rangoon permanently. The manner in which this is phrased leaves it unclear whether they are attempting this overtly or working behind the scenes. The Station notes from BANGKOK 9542 of 1 May 1968 that the daughter is married to a Burma Air Force pilot. Since we do not have any names, it may be unlikely that Rangoon would have any information on the case.

Leslie N. GEWOLB

Attachment: herewith
Letter

Distribution:
2 - COS, Bangkok w/att 1 cy
1 - COS, Rangoon w/att 1 cy
✓2 - C/FE w/att 2 cys

201-073217

FAMA 5803

10 October 1968
(8 October 1968)
Not known

1 att.

SECRET

CS COPY

10 October 1968

14-00000

Patrick Vohla,
C.M.A.E.
Kieta,
Bougainville,
New Guinea.
2nd October 1968

Dear Mr.

I thank you for your letter of 23rd September, re-routed here.

I am sorry I couldn't come and see you on my way here when passing through [illegible] about a week ago.

I know I have an idea of the subject you wish to discuss with me. I met a friend in Thailand while en route to Perth and he wanted me to join his business. Anticipating to hear further from this source, I remained without taking up any job for nearly six months. I have now rejoined the Conzinc Rio Tinto as Assistant Personnel Officer on the Copper Project here. This job can be terminated at one month's notice on either side although it's on a permanent basis.

I am an ardent anti-communist and dedicate my whole life to combating this enemy which is aiming to destroy our freedom. However, one must make plans for ones future, I am reluctant to take up anything on a short-term basis. I would not like to be in another position like that of the old contract in Viet-Nam, when renewal was not considered when it expired after two years, ~~despite~~ an ~~assurance~~ when the offer was made, that there would be [illegible]

d/to FAMA [illegible]

I worked very hard in Vietnam and my superiors and the National Police of Viet Nam appreciated my work. The Vietnamese Government awarded me with the rare award of the National Police Medal of Honour. I felt gratified though that my work was found meaningful although I could not understand the termination of service.

I am still very keen and will gladly come over to discuss with you after 4th November when the Personnel Officer returns to duty, if you want me to. There is a very important point I wish to discuss concerning a personal matter which can delay my future work by a few months if everything works out satisfactorily after discussion. It concerns my daughter, son-in-law and grandson who are intending to leave Rangoon for good for Australia.

I look forward to hearing from you in due course. Once again I thank you for your letter.

With best wishes,

Yours Sincerely,

[redacted]

([redacted])

VIETA

BOUGAINVILLE.
NEW GUINEA.
2nd. October. 1968

Attd
Xeroxed
(s) (tested)
letter appears in
file

Dear [redacted],
I thank you for your letter of 23rd
September, re-routed here.
I am sorry I couldn't come and see
on my way here while passing through Melbourne a
a week ago.
I think I have an idea of the subjec
you wish to discuss with me. I met a friend in Th
[illegible] en route to Perth and he wanted me to join his b
Anticipating to hear further from this source, I remain
without taking up any job for nearly five mont
I have now rejoined the Conzinc Rio Tinto as Asst
Personnel Officer on the Copper Project here. T
job can be terminated by one month's notice on s
side although it's on a permanent basis.
I am an ardent anti-communist and can
dedicate my whole life to combating this enemy
is aiming to destroy our freedom. However, a
one must make plans for ones future, I am
reluctant to take up anything on a short-term
basis. I would not like to be in another posit
like that of the old contract in Viet-nam when
renewal was not considered when it expired after
two years, despite an assurance when the Offer
was made, that there would be no difficulty abo
the extension after the initial two years.

I worked very hard in Vietnam and my superiors and the National Police of Vietnam appreciated my work. The Vietnamese Government awarded me with the rare award of the National Police Medal of Honour. I felt gratified though that my work was found meaningful although I could not understand the termination of service.

I am still very keen and will gladly come over to discuss with you after 4th November when the Personnel Officer returns to duty, if you want me to. There is a very important point I wish to discuss concerning a personal matter which can delay my future work by a few months if everything works out satisfactorily after discussion. It concerns my daughter, son-in-law and grandson who are intending to leave Rangoon for good for Australia.

I look forward to hearing from you in due course. Once again I thank you for your letter.

With best wishes.

Yours Sincerely,

Natuek

(C JOHLA)

201-073217

FF HOLMES RUSSELL B HM-788
CI/EXO 2D4921
EXT. 1253 TUBE CT5

BR

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE 28 SEP 1977

IP/FI CONTROL NO. 04 OCT 13 77

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	28	9	
REQUESTER					
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52			05
REQUESTER					
IP/RMS	DW-6	GA-20			

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO *(Doc. Ref.)*

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(TO IP/IN)*

So: references [illegible] and ordered for [illegible] IP/[illegible]. [illegible]

Requester: This form and attached STAR listing must be returned to IP/RMS — GA 20 for index correction.

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME DAVIS

GIVEN NAMES Howard

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED

201 NO. IF KNOWN 201-

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*

SEX

DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP

RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

☐ NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT

☐ SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES

☒ INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED

☐ THERE ARE ________ RECORDS OF WHICH ________ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS

1-201 fnu listed

3 fnus w/ listed w/ checked

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME

1977 SEP 28 AM 9:53

280366

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 3-74 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-8-38)

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS (See DOI 70-20)

1. IF SUBJECT HAS A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH THE INDEX RECORDS MARKED IN GREEN TO REFLECT THE CONSOLIDATION ACTION TAKEN. **(Documents should then be placed in the 201, by the Researcher).**

2. WHEN SUBJECT HAS NO 201 FILE, BUT MEETS THE REQUIREMENT FOR OPENING A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH:

   A. A COMPLETED FORM 831.

   B. ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS, EXTRACTS, AND PROPERLY EDITED RECORDS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF THE FILE BY IP/RMS.

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER	DATE

CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES: REQUESTER SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER TRACING THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WHICH ARE NOT SEARCHED BY IP/INDEX *(SEE NAME TRACE HANDBOOK)*.

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">SOURCE</th><th>DATE REQUESTED</th><th>DATE RECEIVED</th><th>SOURCE</th><th>DATE REQUESTED</th><th>DATE RECEIVED</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">DO AREA DESKS</td><td></td><td></td><td>CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">IP/ARCHIVES</td><td></td><td></td><td>CIA LIBRARY</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">COMINT NAME CHECK</td><td></td><td></td><td>OFFICE OF SECURITY</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">SB BIOGRAPHICS BRANCH</td><td></td><td></td><td>OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">TRAVEL PROGRAMS</td><td></td><td></td><td>DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">NAME OF BEARER FILE/OTS</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">CIA APPLICANTS FILE/OFFICE OF PERSONNEL</td><td></td><td></td><td>DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP-SS/IL <i>(WFTU)</i></td><td></td><td></td><td>DEFENSE CENTRAL INDEX</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF</td><td></td><td></td><td>CENTRAL REGISTRY - EUROPE</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">OPERATIONS STAFF</td><td>RESERVE OFFICERS FILE</td><td></td><td></td><td>FBI</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>INTERAGENCY SOURCE REG.</td><td></td><td></td><td>I & NS</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">CI OPERATIONS: CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS</td><td></td><td></td><td>DEPARTMENT OF STATE</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">E/G PROGRAM</td><td></td><td></td><td>SECRET SERVICE</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">WH SUBVERSIVES PROGRAM</td><td></td><td></td><td>DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
</table>

REMARKS

```
                                  S-E-C-R-E-T

                             MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE                      280365      010
                                                                               ***PRIORITY***
REQ NO: 280365A02    REQUESTER: HM788  HOLMES R B    CI/EXO   2D4921  1253  CT5

NAME: DAVIS,HOWARD                                       YOB:        SEX:   CIT:
 ORIGIN:A   DOR:    PURPOSE:FDS   PRTY:P   OTPT:D999  FNU:    SPELL:    MASK:   MAT:

CONTROL CODE 010-MTM-770928-095711-00017    095653
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

0001 DAVIS, HOWARD                                               201-0001513
     RCA BUILDING, EXHIBIT HALL, NEW YORK CITY                   DFB-05156
                                                                 SER-1
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                         APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DFB-05156                                 01 JAN 58  08988498


0002 DAVIS, HOWARD /MR/                                          201-0189473
     SEX M DOB 31                    POB USA, CHICAGO, ILL.      WAVE-09172
     CIT USA                         OCC PILOT                   08SEP67
     < USA, FLA., MIAMI, 3350 N.W. 18TH TERR. FLYING FOR
     UNIDENTIFIED AIRLINE BETWEEN N.Y., CHICAGO, AND
     DETROIT. WAS W/CAPT. WILLIAM MORGAN IN CUBA. CONTACT
     OF SUBJ OF 201-189473. MARRIED TO CUBAN WHO WORKS AS
     TECHNICIAN FOR UNIV OF MIAMI.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     WAVE-09172C0967                           22 DEC 67  02316937




                                                                           PAGE 0005
---CONTINUED---     HM788                                                280365      010
                         S-E-C-R-E-T   E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

5
25/8/50

not applicable

RECORD COPY ATTACHED
PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY

✓

```
0006 DAVIS, H.                                               06FEB45
     CIT UK?                                                 XX 5315
     BRITISH AGENT IN ZURICH                                 BB/038
     FORMERLY: DSN NO DSN,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     UNKNOWN-010772                     29 JAN 59  03018861


0007 DAVIS, H.                                               12JAN56
     CIT UK?                                                 FPX-1975
     BRITISH AGENT IN ZURICH                                 BG/001
     FORMERLY: DSN NO DSN,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     UNKNOWN-008397                     29 JAN 59  05540332


0008 DAVIS, HOWARD THURMAN                                   201-0010111
                                                             DFB-17565A01
                                                             28APR52
                                                             SER-3
                                                             ENC. 1
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     DFB-17565                          28 APR 52  01719064
```

13-00000

```
0009 DAVIS, HOWARD THURMAN SMUT                                  201-0010111
                                                                 DFB-19649A01
                                                                 17JUL52
                                                                 SER-8
                                                                 ENC. 1
     FORMERLY: FCN 201-0010111,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DFB-19649                                 17 JUL 52  08972827


0010 DAVIS, HOWARD K.                                            100-300-017
     SEX M                                                       XAE-01035
     CIT USA                                                     02JUL62
     RES USA. FRANK BARTES /201-0289885/ REPORTED LARIC
     LABORDE, HEMMING JR AND HOWARD K. DAVIS WERE ANXIOS TO
     BEGIN TRAINING A GROUP OF CUBAN REFUGEES FOR
     INFILTRATION INTO CUBA AS GUERILLA FIGHTERS
     ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO C/CI/RA, 281405 , 1345, 04/08/67
     XAE-01035                                 23 JUL 76  09391926


0011 DAVIS, HOWARD KENNETH                                       100-300-017
     SEX M DOB 11AUG30            POB USA, ILL, CHICAGO          WAVE-09537
     < USA, FLA, MIAMI HAS WIDE CIRCLE OF ACQUAINTANCES          30DEC67
     IN MIAMI AREA AMONG ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN ANTI-DIVALIER
     HAITIAN GROUPS +#RYBAT
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     WAVE-09537C1267                           23 MAY 72  02316875
```

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

S-E-C-R-E-T

```
0012 DAVIS, H. WEIR                                                 016-006-119
                                                                    FJYA-02332A01
                                                                    29JUN53
                                                                    ENCL 1
                                                                    PAGE 4
     FORMERLY: FCN NO FCN,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - SC-52
     FJYA-02332                                29 JUN 53  08851067


0013 DAVIS                                                          201-0249164*
     SEX M DOB C25                 POB GUAT                         TYPE NAME A
     CIT GUAT                      OCC TEACHER                      RCD DATE 59
     REF HMMA-37648, 07 AUG 69     OCC CODE PROF
     RES GUATEMALA a OF MARIO ALFREDO SILVA-JONAMA MBR
     CENTRAL COMM OF GUAT COMMUNIST PARTY DIED 27 SEP 72
     PER HGG-5931
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - SC-52
                                               04 OCT 72  00394007

                           END OF REPLY - 0013 RECORDS LISTED
```

S-E-C-R-E-T

```
0003 DAVIS, HOWARD                                                100-500
          DOB C28                                                  XAAZ-00001
                                                                   21OCT58
                                                                   RID-50/758
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     XAAZ-00001                            09 DEC 58   05672203
```

Same

```
0004 DAVIS, HOWARD                                                100-500
     SEX M DOB C28                                                 XAAZ-00001
     CIT USA?                                                      21OCT58
     REFERS TO CI/CA INFO.CORR. CARD                               RID-50/758
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     XAAZ-00001                            19 FEB 62   05672201
```

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

("GUATEMALA CITY"
SHOULD HAVE BEEN
REDACTED EARLIER, BUT WAS NOT.)

T 204685 PAGE 01 IN 984716
TOR:3021392 APR 73 JUN 1977 GUAT 15623

AN K
AB /
FY 2
DESENSITIZED

~~S E C R E T~~ 3020512 APR 73 STAFF

CITE GUATEMALA CITY 15623

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

4P

REF: A. DIRECTOR 394347

B. MEXICO CITY 23403 (891718)

C. TEGUCIGALPA 21154 (894188)

D. GUATEMALA CITY 15590 (* NO RECORD IN cs

E. SAO PAULO 13035 (899007)

F 201-914226

1. ESLOGIC-27 (DIGN) REPORTS MARIA PAULA SOUZA FREITAS CARRYING BRAZILIAN DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT 006350 ACCOMPANIED MIGUEL RUSSO INTO EL SALVADOR VIA VALLE NUEVO IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINT 29 JAN 73 TRAVELLING IN AUTOMOBILE WITH U.S. FLORIDA STATE PLATES - 10120921. RETURNING TO GUATEMALAN TERRITORY VIA CUIDAD PEDRO DE ALVARADO IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINT ON 30 JAN 73.

2. ESLOGIC-27'S EFFORTS OBTAIN RUSSO'S LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE TOLLS REVEALED HE OFTEN USED TELEPHONE OF FRIEND AMAURY MOREIRA DE SOUZA. LATTER IS OLD ACQUAINTANCE OF ESLOGIC-27 WHO AGREED COOPERATE INVESTIGATION RUSSO ACTIVITIES.

~~S E C R E T~~

[redacted]

RECORD COPY

201-914226

[redacted]

30 APR 1973

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

*D 001213

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

~~S E C R E T~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

I N F O RF FILE VR.

ACTION #

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 204485 PAGE 02 IN 984718

TOR:302139Z APR 73 GUAT 15623

MOREIRA SAID HE HAD HELPED RUSSO MOVE WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS CONTRABAND BUT NOW BELIEVES NARCOTICS ALSO INVOLVED. RUSSO HAS TWO SETS FALSE DOCUMENTATION: ONE CITING BIRTH BELICE (BRITISH HONDURAS), THE OTHER SPAIN. IN ADDITION, HOLDS BRAZILIAN DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT WHICH MOREIRA CLAIMS MARIA PAULA SOUZA FREITAS OBTAINED FOR HIM. LATTER ALSO HAS BEEN RUSSO CONTRABAND COLLABORATOR ACCORDING TO MOREIRA. MOREIRA SAID HE RECENTLY ASKED BY RUSSO TO CARRY UNDISCLOSED PACKAGE TO MIAMI FOR $5,000. ESLOGIC-27 SAID HE COULD ARRANGE WITH AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS PROTECTION MOREIRA AS COLLABORATOR IF HE WOULD AGREE CARRY PACKAGE TO MAKE POSSIBLE DETECTION MIAMI CONTACT. MOREIRA RELUCTANT BECAUSE HE CLAIMS "YEARS AGO" HE TRIED COOPERATE WITH INTERPOL AND ALMOST LANDED IN MIAMI JAIL AS INTERPOL FAILED HIM. ESLOGIC-27 FEELS, HOWEVER, HE CAN PERSUADE MOREIRA.

3. MOREIRA QUERRIED BY E-27 ON OTHER RUSSO CONTACTS: SAID LATTER WAS TO TRAVEL TO HONDURAN BORDER (AGUASCALIENTES CHECKPOINT) 28 APRIL TO CONTACT PERSON WHO HELPS HIM BRING IN CONTRABAND FROM HONDURAS. THIS PERSON TURNED OUT TO BE LOCAL IMMIGRATION CHIEF (ALSO IN CHARGE OF CUSTOMS), JOSE "CHEPE" DUARTE, JR, ESLOGIC-27 SAID DURATE FROM CHIQUIMULA, SON OF FORMER CLOSE FRIEND OF PRESIDENT ARANA, JOSE "CHEPE" DUARTE SENIOR, WHO KILLED BY

~~S E C R E T~~

IMPDET

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ UNCLASSIFIED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

~~S E C R E T~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 284485 PAGE 03 IN 984710

TOR:3021398 APR 73 GUAT 15623

TERRORISTS 1972. DUARTE JR. HAS REPUTATION INVOLVEMENT SHADY DEALS. BUT ESLOGIC-27 HAD TO APPOINT HIM IMMIGRATION OFFICER AGUASCALIENTES ON PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS. ESLOGIC-27 SAID HE ADVISED PRESIDENT ARANA ALLEGED DUARTE CONNECTION WITH SUSPECTED TRAFFICKER RUSSO. PRESIDENT GAVE E-27 GREEN LIGHT INVESTIGATE AND "TAKE NECESSARY ACTION". ESLOGIC-27 SENT ESMETRIC TEAM AGUASCALIENTES 28 APRIL TO VERIFY RUSSO-DUARTE CONTACT, WHICH AS OF 30 APRIL HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE.

4. MOREIRA ALSO REPORTED A FREQUENT AMERICAN CONTACT OF RUSSO IS MIAMI RESIDENT ✓JOHN X MARTINO, U.S. PASSPORT K-169259, WHO CURRENTLY STAYING AT HOTEL MAYA EXCELSIOR GUATEMALA CITY. PERSONAL CHECK BY ESLOGIC-27 REVEALED MARTINO CLOSE FRIEND OF ✓ARTURO X ARANA, PRESIDENT'S BROTHER, AND HAS TAKEN ARTURO ON ALL EXPENSES PAID PLEASURE TRIPS TO MIAMI. ESLOGIC-27 COMMENTED PRESIDENT ARANA FULLY AWARE BROTHER ARTURO IS INFLUENCE PEDDLER WHO HAD TO BE RETIRED FROM GUATEMALAN TELECOMMUNICATION JOB DUE EXCESSIVE GRAFT.

6. ESLOGIC-27 AGREED NOT TO ARREST ANYONE UNTIL MEMBERS RUSSO NETWORK UNCOVERED AND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OBTAINED TO ESTABLISH BONA FIDES MOREIRA. HE OBSERVED ESMETRICS ARE ONLY ARM AVAILABLE

~~S E C R E T~~

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

~~S E C R E T~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 204405 PAGE 04-04 IN 904710

TOR:302139Z APR 73 GUAT 15023

TO HIM TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATION (WHICH HE MUST DO VIA ACTING ESMETRIC CHIEF), AND THAT ESMETRICS LACK NARCOTICS TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE.

7. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

8. FILE: 200-11-11/2. DEFER INDEX. E2, IMPDET.

~~S E C R E T~~

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET 092100Z MAR 72 CITE OTTAWA 19665

9 MAR IN 556666

IP m

DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK SMABOVE initials to

REF: OTTAWA 19664 (IN 556675)

IDENS: A. MR. GERARD M C N E I L, CANADIAN PRESS [illegible] CANADA #[illegible] CANADA ? [illegible] [illegible] Canada, Ottawa

B. MR. ROBERT M C K E O W N, FREE LANCE [illegible] Canadian

WRITER [illegible]

SECRET

H

AH

AB

IN

VC

BI 2,11

DBS NFD

PI

9 Mar 72

14-2-11

CS COPY

SECRET

#D000262

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Indications of the Scope and Possible Damage of New Allegations by Ramparts Magazine

FROM: C/CCS GH 56 HQS	EXTENSION 9328 5071	NO.
		DATE 25 November 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CIOP/DO 2 B 23 HQS				ATTENTION: Mr. Richard Ober BY HAND
2. M.W			mk	
3. Paul Heffner SCB/1PG/ISS GB-1907				
4.				
5.				SENSITIVE SECRET
6. RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1968
22 NOV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Indications of the Scope and Possible Damage of New Allegations by Ramparts Magazine

1. This memorandum is furnished for information only.

2. Early in April 1968 the Office of the General Counsel made available to Central Cover Staff (CCS) a copy of a letter and an attached list of organizations sent to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by Mr. Jon Frappier of Ramparts Magazine. The letter, dated 5 April 1968, had been furnished OGC through IRS liaison channels. The letter appended a list of 145 tax-exempt organizations and indicated that all were suspected of having been funded by or having cooperated with CIA.

3. The letter indicated that the listed organizations were only a part of the organizations being scrutinized by Ramparts and that other available sources of information on these and other suspect organizations had already been examined. The other sources of information were stated as including the literature of the organizations and interviews with their staff members; records available in the Attorney General's offices in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York; data available at the National Information Bureau in New York, Group Research, Inc., in Washington, D.C., and the Foundation Library Centers in New York and Washington; and the 990-A returns available at the district offices of the IRS. The letter requested 990-A

03979

returns for specified years and in most cases the Form 1023 Application for Tax Exempt Status. Ramparts asked the IRS to make these materials available for inspection at a mutually convenient time.

4. A review of available CIA data on the listed organizations has shown that 89 of them were at one time or another somehow associated with CIA. Only two of these

are of current operational interest. These two activities and 45 organizations formerly of interest to CIA were mentioned in the American press during MHDOWEL.01 Forty-two other listed organizations which were in fact associated ✓ with CIA were not exposed during MHDOWEL.01 We have found no evidence that 55 organizations on the list were ever directly or indirectly associated with CIA. (Because two of the names on the list are successive names for the same organization, the actual total number of organizations listed is 144 rather than 145.) Three additional project organizations, not included in the Ramparts list, may be vulnerable because they were covertly funded by hitherto unexposed foundation funding instruments included in the list. Only one of these, is of current operational interest.

5. The CA Staff was furnished a copy of the Ramparts letter and list and has checked out the organizations of possible previous CA Staff interest. All organizations not readily identifiable with known project organizations or as CCS funding instruments have been traced with RID, with CS area divisions that might logically have had an interest in them and against CCS Registry files. Through arrangements with the IRS, representatives of CCS and OGC also examined available IRS data (990-A's and Forms 1023) on the listed organizations. This was done before the IRS documents were made available to Ramparts, in order to be sure that restricte 990-A, Part I data would not be furnished to Ramparts and to try to establish the reasons for Ramparts' interest in the organizations. Our current findings are the results of these various file reviews.

6. Attached hereto are annexes listing and discussing the several categories of organizations on the Ramparts list. Annex A deals with the two organizations on the list which are still of active operational interest. Both received

21BR

SENSITIVE
SECRET

press mention during MHDOWEL. 01 Annex B lists and discusses under several sub-categories the 42 organizations with which the Agency has had some direct or indirect operational ties in the past which were not cited in the press during MHDOWEL. 01 Annex C lists the 45 organizations included in the April 1968 list which had former Agency operational ties which were subject to press allegations during MHDOWEL. 01 Annex D lists and briefly discusses the 55 organizations included in the Ramparts list that had no known operational connection with CIA. Annex E lists and discusses three hitherto unexposed operational activities that are not included in the April 1968 Ramparts list but which are vulnerable because they were covertly funded by hitherto unexposed funding instruments included in the Ramparts list. Annex F shows a copy of the full April 1968 Ramparts list.

7. The 42 former project organizations listed and described at Annex B which have not previously been charged with CIA association in American press comment fall into five general categories:

a. Foundations and other organizations used as witting funding conduits for covert subsidies to project organizations and other operational activities. Sixteen organizations fall into this category. Eleven of them are multipurpose legitimate foundations which were recuited by CCS. Four were created or recruited for exclusive use in funding one project each and one was used for a one-time travel grant.

b. Witting legitimate foundations and organizations used exclusively to provide funding and status cover for singleton agents. Six organizations were used in this way and provided cover for seven agents in various parts of the world. Some of these organizations also provided one-time support for unwitting individuals of operational interest.

c. Proprietary or subsidy project organizations. There are six of these: Projects CAMANTILLA, 01 WUHUSTLER, 01 FOCLPROOF, 01 ETNAMABLE, 01 SGPANFISH, 01 and AESTRIKER. 01

d. Three organizations with which there were witting operational contacts to obtain information and leads but which were not actively involved operationally.

9-18R

e. Eleven unwitting organizations which received grants from project organizations for operational or cover reasons or which cooperated with project organizations.

8. We cannot say with complete assurance that all 55 of the apparently innocent organizations on the Ramparts list in fact never had any Agency ties. Our researches have shown that RID indices are often incomplete. We have found operational use data in CCS files on organizations with no record in RID. The same is true in other cases where information was available in CA Staff or area division files on organizations which drew a blank in RID. It seems likely, however, that any undetected operational interest in the organizations was in the period of the early 1950's and of a marginal nature.

9. In reviewing available information on the listed organizations we attempted to determine whether there was a logical external basis for Ramparts' interest in the organizations or whether some form of internal Agency leak might be involved. Our reviews and analysis show fairly conclusively that Ramparts has been proceeding on the basis of overtly available information, supplemented by interviews with project personnel:

a. All but three of the 42 terminated but hitherto unexposed project organizations and 24 of the 55 organizations which actually had no Agency ties are somehow related to project organizations or funding instruments previously exposed. Some of the organizations made legitimate or covert grants to previously exposed organizations, others received covert or legitimate grants from previously exposed funding instruments or from innocent foundations that had made legitimate grants to exposed organizations, and still others had officers who were associated with exposed CIA organizations.

b. Thirty-one innocent organizations on the Ramparts list and three of the hitherto unexposed organizations of former interest to the Agency have no such known ties to exposed Agency organizations. In most of these cases, however, the names of the organizations are similar to those of exposed organizations or are of a nature that makes them suspect.

10. It seems likely that Ramparts' interest in a number of the 42 unexposed project organizations is based on factors unrelated to the actual CIA dealings with them.

11. The Headquarters elements that are or were responsible for the projects and activities that could be implicated by new Ramparts allegations have been notified of the foregoing findings. No further action is required at this time.

Charles Katek 03
CHARLES KATEK
Chief, Central Cover Staff

Attachments
(Annexes)

cc: C/CA
C/CI
*C/CIOP/DO
C/FI/OPS

03
DDP/OPSER/CCS/PRG/WMPillsbury:fl (5071/9328)

7/BR

28.

D.

Three Organizations with Which There Have Been Some Witting Contacts

29.

30. **International Rescue Committee, Inc. (IRC) - Manhattan, New York (93)**

Under Project QKGAUNT, $2,500 was furnished IRC in 1950 - 1951 to obtain biographic data on defectors. In December 1962, IRC Chairman Leo Cherne offered cover and FI use of IRC to Emmons Brown, DC/CA. C/EE declined the offer, indicating there already were useful contacts.

IRC received legitimate grants from J. Frederick Brown Foundation (34) and J. M. Kaplan Fund (101).

31.

[illegible]

SECRET

22 NOV 19[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Indications of the Scope and Possible Damage of New Allegations by Ramparts Magazine

1. This memorandum is furnished for information only.

2. Early in April 1968 the Office of the General Counsel made available to Central Cover Staff (CCS) a copy of a letter and an attached list of organizations sent to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by Mr. Jon Frappier of Ramparts Magazine. The letter, dated 5 April 1968, had been furnished OGC through IRS liaison channels. The letter appended a list of 145 tax-exempt organizations and indicated that all were suspected of having been funded by or having cooperated with CIA.

3. The letter indicated that the listed organizations were only a part of the organizations being scrutinized by Ramparts and that other available sources of information on these and other suspect organizations had already been examined. The other sources of information were stated as including the literature of the organizations and interviews with their staff members; records available in the Attorney General's offices in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York; data available at the National Information Bureau in New York, Group Research, Inc., in Washington, D.C., and the Foundation Library Centers in New York and Washington; and the 990-A returns available at the district offices of the IRS. The letter requested 990-A

SECRET

returns for specified years and in most cases the Form 1023 Application for Tax Exempt Status. Ramparts asked the IRS to make these materials available for inspection at a mutually convenient time.

4. A review of available CIA data on the listed organizations has shown that 89 of them were at one time or another somehow associated with CIA. Only two of these Institute for International Youth Affairs (CA/B3 Project QRTROW) and African-American Labor Center, Inc. (CA/B4 Project QRSTUMP) 09,29,01,24 are of current operational interest. These two activities and 45 organizations formerly of interest to CIA were mentioned in the American press during MHDOWEL. 01 Forty-two other listed organizations which were in fact associated ✓ with CIA were not exposed during MHDOWEL. 01 We have found no evidence that 55 organizations on the list were ever directly or indirectly associated with CIA. (Because two of the names on the list are successive names for the same organization, the actual total number of organizations listed is 144 rather than 145.) Three additional project organizations, not included in the Ramparts list, may be vulnerable because they were covertly funded by hitherto unexposed foundation funding instruments included in the list. Only one of these, World Veterans Federation (CA/B3 Project TPGLARE) is of current operational interest. 29,01,24

5. The CA Staff was furnished a copy of the Ramparts letter and list and has checked out the organizations of possible previous CA Staff interest. All organizations not readily identifiable with known project organizations or as CCS funding instruments have been traced with RID, with CS area divisions that might logically have had an interest in them and against CCS Registry files. Through arrangements with the IRS, representatives of CCS and OGC also examined available IRS data (990-A's and Forms 1023) on the listed organizations. This was done before the IRS documents were made available to Ramparts, in order to be sure that restricted 990-A, Part I data would not be furnished to Ramparts and to try to establish the reasons for Ramparts' interest in the organizations. Our current findings are the results of these various file reviews.

6. Attached hereto are annexes listing and discussing the several categories of organizations on the Ramparts list. Annex A deals with the two organizations on the list which are still of active operational interest. Both received

01
press mention during MHDOWEL. Annex B lists and discusses under several sub-categories the 42 organizations with which the Agency has had some direct or indirect operational ties in the past which were not cited in the press during MHDOWEL. 01 Annex C lists the 45 organizations included in the April 1968 list which had former Agency operational ties which were subject to press allegations during MHDOWEL. 01 Annex D lists and briefly discusses the 55 organizations included in the Ramparts list that had no known operational connection with CIA. Annex E lists and discusses three hitherto unexposed operational activities that are not included in the April 1968 Ramparts list but which are vulnerable because they were covertly funded by hitherto unexposed funding instruments included in the Ramparts list. Annex F shows a copy of the full April 1968 Ramparts list.

7. The 42 former project organizations listed and described at Annex B which have not previously been charged with CIA association in American press comment fall into five general categories:

a. Foundations and other organizations used as witting funding conduits for covert subsidies to project organizations and other operational activities. Sixteen organizations fall into this category. Eleven of them are multipurpose legitimate foundations which were recuited by CCS. Four were created or recruited for exclusive use in funding one project each and one was used for a one-time travel grant.

b. Witting legitimate foundations and organizations used exclusively to provide funding and status cover for singleton agents. Six organizations were used in this way and provided cover for seven agents in various parts of the world. Some of these organizations also provided one-time support for unwitting individuals of operational interest.

c. Proprietary or subsidy project organizations. There are six of these: Projects CAMANTILLA, 01 WUHUSTLER, 01 FOOLPROOF, 01 HTHAMABLE, 01 SGPANFISH, 01 and AESTRIKER. 01

d. Three organizations with which there were witting operational contacts to obtain information and leads but which were not actively involved operationally.

9/BR

e. Eleven unwitting organizations which received grants from project organizations for operational or cover reasons or which cooperated with project organizations.

8. We cannot say with complete assurance that all 55 of the apparently innocent organizations on the Ramparts list in fact never had any Agency ties. Our researches have shown that RID indices are often incomplete. We have found operational use data in CCS files on organizations with no record in RID. The same is true in other cases where information was available in CA Staff or area division files on organizations which drew a blank in RID. It seems likely, however, that any undetected operational interest in the organizations was in the period of the early 1950's and of a marginal nature.

9. In reviewing available information on the listed organizations we attempted to determine whether there was a logical external basis for Ramparts' interest in the organizations or whether some form of internal Agency leak might be involved. Our reviews and analysis show fairly conclusively that Ramparts has been proceeding on the basis of overtly available information, supplemented by interviews with project personnel:

a. All but three of the 42 terminated but hitherto unexposed project organizations and 24 of the 55 organizations which actually had no Agency ties are somehow related to project organizations or funding instruments previously exposed. Some of the organizations made legitimate or covert grants to previously exposed organizations, others received covert or legitimate grants from previously exposed funding instruments or from innocent foundations that had made legitimate grants to exposed organizations, and still others had officers who were associated with exposed CIA organizations.

b. Thirty-one innocent organizations on the Ramparts list and three of the hitherto unexposed organizations of former interest to the Agency have no such known ties to exposed Agency organizations. In most of these cases, however, the names of the organizations are similar to those of exposed organizations or are of a nature that makes them suspect.

10. It seems likely that Ramparts' interest in a number of the 42 unexposed project organizations is based on factors unrelated to the actual CIA dealings with them.

11. The Headquarters elements that are or were responsible for the projects and activities that could be implicated by new Ramparts allegations have been notified of the foregoing findings. No further action is required at this time.

Charles Katek 03
CHARLES KATEK
Chief, Central Cover Staff

Attachments
(Annexes)

cc: C/CA
C/CI
xC/CIOP/DO
C/FI/OPS

03
DDP/OPSER/CCS/PRG/WMPillsbury:fl (5071/9328)

21BR

NOTE:

The numbers in parentheses following listed or named organizations in Annexes A through E are the item numbers or organizations included in the 5 April 1968 Ramparts list (Annex F).

ANNEX A

ORGANIZATIONS ON 5 APRIL 1968 RAMPARTS LIST

THAT ARE OF CURRENT OPERATIONAL INTEREST

29

1. African-American Labor Center, Inc., (AALC), Manhattan, New York (2) 08 24,01,06

CA/B4 Project QRSTUMP. Irving Brown (T) continues as 29 AALC Executive Director and uses this relationship as status cover for operational travels in African and Europe. 10 Although covert funding of AALC has been suspended, 29 24,06 black-bag payments to Brown and by him to operational contacts may be implicity attributed to AALC. 29

29 AALC received press publicity during MHDOWEL. 01 Brown 06 was named as a CIA agent in the Braden Saturday Evening Post article.

29

2. Institute for International Youth Affairs, Manhattan, New York (IIYA) 29 (79) 08

24,11 CA/B3 Project QRTROW. Under Katzenbach guidelines and DDP decisions, IIYA was to be re-established abroad 29 as a condition for continuation of the project. Various possibilities in Europe have been explored and vetoed. Steps are currently being taken to relocate the activity in Belgium. 11

29 IIYA received limited press mention during MHDOWEL 01 and only in the context of its Free Europe Committee origins 29 and its former funding by the International Development 29 Foundation (terminated WH Project GOALIBI) 01 (88).

29 IIYA is vulnerable because of its former funding by the Colt (41) and Ronthelym (129) Foundations, as well 29,29 as by the Helena Rubinstein Foundation (not on the 5 April 29 1968 list but of known interest to Ramparts) and by the 29,29 Florence (58) and W. Alton Jones (99) Foundations (exposed during MHDOWEL). 01

27/8R

SENSITIVE
SECRET

ANNEX B

FORTY TWO PREVIOUSLY UNEXPOSED ORGANIZATIONS WITH FORMER CIA OPERATIONAL TIES

A.

Sixteen Witting Conduits Used for Attributed Covert Subsidy Funding

29 08

1. Branta Foundation - White Plains, New York (32)

01

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/69). Used in 1964 for a covert grant to the unexposed Freedom Fund, Inc. (61) 29 and in 1965 for a covert grant to the exposed International Development Foundation (88). 29 Branta 29 is the family foundation of Jean and Harvey Picker. 06 Jean 06 Picker was president of the exposed Committee of Correspondence (44) 29 (CA/B3 Project JEFERVENT). 01

29

2. Colt Foundation, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (41)

01

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/24). Used 1960 - 1966 for covert grants to the following exposed project organizations: AMSAC (24) (TPFOUMART), 29,01 CCS (QKOPERA), AFFJ (17) (QKFEARFUL), IDF (88) (QKBEND/ 29,29,29,01,01,01 UOALIBI), AAI (1) (YQFLUENT), TAF (DTPILLAR), USNSA 29,29,29,01,01,01 (WSCHILD), IRS (76) TPPAPMENT), and IIYA (79) (QRTROW). 29,29,01,01,01

29

Colt was also used for 1962 - 1965 covert grants to the hitherto unexposed project organization SEI (132) (HTNAMABLE).
08 01

29,10

3. Little Foundation, Wiloughby - Providence, Rhode Island (107)

01

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/32). 29 Used 1961 - 1964 for covert grants to exposed AMSAC (24) 01 (TPFOUMART), IDF (88) (QRBEND/UOALIBI) and AAI (1) (YQFLUENT/QRFLUENT). 29,29,01,01

SENSITIVE
SECRET

21/BR

29 08

4. Magowan Family Foundation - Manhattan, New York (108)

01

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/84). 29,01
Used in 1965 for covert grants to the exposed RFEF (TPTONIC) and the unexposed SEI (132) (HTNAMABLE). 29,01

29

5. Meek Foundation - Greenwich, Connecticut (110) 10

01

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/45).
Used 1961 - 1965 for covert grants to the exposed AAI
29,01,01 (1) (YQFLUENT/QRFLUENT), IDF (88) (QRBEND/UOALIBI) and
29,01 TAF (DTPILLAR). Name was listed as a contributor in an
29 AAI (1) publicity brochure.

29 08

6. Munson Foundation - Manhattan, New York (112)

01

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/42).
Used 1961 - 1964 for covert grants to exposed AAI (1) 29
29,01,01 (YQFLUENT/QRFLUENT) and IDF (88) (QRBEND/UOALIBI). Reimbursed by Patman-exposed Edsel and Beacon.
06 29

29

7. Olin Foundation, Spencer T. and Ann W. - Alton, Illinois (117) 29,10

01

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/6). 01
Used 1958 - 1966 for covert grants to exposed (TPTONIC)
29,01 and IDF (88) (QRBEND/UOALIBI) and the unexposed WVF 29
01 (TPGLARE). "Olin Foundation" appears as contributor as in 29
29 AAI brochure, but this was the John Olin Foundation 29
01 (LPCORSET/13) which is not on the Ramparts list. Spencer 29
T. and Ann W. Olin was reimbursed 1958 - 1963 by CCS instruments exposed by Patman in 1964.
09 06

29 29

8. Robison Foundation, James E. - Manhattan, New York (128) 08

01

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/43).
Used 1961 - 1964 for covert grants to the exposed AAI (1) 29
29,01,01 (YQFLUENT/QRFLUENT) and IDF (88) (QRBEND/UOALIBI). Listed as contributor in AAI (1) brochure.
29

9. Ronthelym Charitable Trust - Boston, Massachusetts (129) 29,10

01

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/54).
Used 1964 - 1966 for covert grants to the exposed OPR (119) 29
(LPCORSET/75/JMTUBA/IUEXTEND), AFFJ (17) (QKFEARFUL), IDF (88) (QRBEND/UOALIBI), PAF (122) (JMPOPLAR/10), FISEE (65) (QRSENSE/KMOCHROID), IIYA (79) (QRTROW), AMSAC (24)

29,29,29,29,29,01,01,
01,01,01,01

01 29,01 29
(TPFOUMART), and CCF (QKOPERA), and the unexposed Freedom Fund, Inc. (61) (AEMIRROR/WUHUSTLER). 01

10. Sonnabend Foundation - Boston, Massachusetts (133) 29,10

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/49). 01 Used 1962 - 1966 for covert grants to the exposed AAI (1) 29 29,29,01,01 (YQFLUENT/QRFLUENT), IDF (88) (QRBEND/UOALIBI), AFFJ (17) 29,01,01 (QKFEARFUL) and CCF (QKOPERA) and to the unexposed Human Ecology Fund (HEF) (MKCOTTON). 29,01

11. Sunnen Foundation - Maplewood, Missouri (135) 29,10

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/29). 01 29 Used 1961 - 1966 for covert grants to the exposed AAI (1) 29,29,01,01,01 (YQFLUENT/QRFLUENT), CC (44) (JBFERVENT), IDF (88) (QRBEND/UOALIBI), CCF (QKOPERA), VF (DTLAMPREY) and LISCD (FJGONDANG/ZRCANNY) 29,29,29,01,01,01 01 and to the unexposed SEI (132) (HTNAMABLE) and MSI (ZROCCUR/PASHELL). 29,29,01,01

12. Homeland Foundation, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (74) 29 08

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/35) 01 used 1962 - 1966 exclusively for covert grants to FICD (64) 29 (WSFLUFFER). 01 Its ties to FICD were presumably learned from 10 Illinois state records. 29

13. Institute for International Order, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (78) 29 08

CCS-recruited legitimate foundation (LPCORSET/5) 01 used once in 1958 for a covert grant to CC (44) (JBFERVENT). 29,01 29 The Institute made legitimate grants to WVF (TPGLARE), 29,01 Overseas Education Fund of League of Women Voters (120), Institute of International Education (82), and Institute for Social Science Research (81). 29,29,29

14. American Heritage Foundation - Manhattan, New York (18) 29 08

Legitimate foundation recruited by former IO Division as a funding conduit and fund-raising organization for 29,29,01,01 FEC (TPTONIC) and TAF (DTPILLAR), both mentioned during 01 MHDOWEL. Used in early 1950's. 09 General W. Bedell Smith (former DCI) became president of the Foundation in 1955. 08

15. Council on Race and Caste in World Affairs, Inc. - 29
Manhattan, New York (48) 08

Proprietary funding conduit established by CA/B3 for covert funding of the exposed AMSAC (24) (TPFOUMART). 24 29,01

16. Governmental Affairs Institute (GAI) - Washington, D.C. 29
(68) 08

Legitimate organization recruited by CCS for one-time witting use in 1957 to handle the U.S. travel arrangements for a visiting Indonesian delegation under an FE project. 24 The travel was ostensibly sponsored by a law firm, Dillon & Dillon, 29 which reimbursed the Institute. 29 The Institute 29 was subsequently used on an unwitting working-level basis as a conduit for funds attributed to the State Department 32 to support a Soviet realities breifing center in New York City under SB Project AECOMITAS. 08,10,01

06,29 GAI 29 is overtly tied to exposed organizations because Kirkpatrick of APSA (23) and OPR (119) (JMTUBA/IUEXTEND) 29,01 06,29 and Gulick of IPA (84) were GAI board members. GAI has 29 received legitimate grants from the Carnegie Endowment (35). 29

B.

Six Witting Organizations Used as Status and Funding Cover For Singleton Agents Abroad 24

17. Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, Inc. (ARCI) - 29 29
Manhattan, New York (5) 08

10,29 Hong Kong branch of ARCI was used in the early 1950's 13-14 by Hong Kong Station as a source of leads. ARCI was 29 financed by State Department USEP. 32 Through arrangements 32 with USEP cover was provided by ARCI in Hong Kong for 29,10 contract agent William H. POISSANT (P) (201-148106) 1958 - 06,23 1960 under Project STGATE. POISSANT (P) received a legiti- 01,06 mate (unreimbursed) ARCI salary supplemented by black-bag. He was terminated in 1960. 29

SENSITIVE
SECRET

32/BR

06, 29

Mr. Travis L. Fletcher (T), ARCI field representative 10 in Hong Kong, was reportedly a witting U.S. Army intelligence source.

29 29

18. American Korean Foundation, Inc. (AKF) - Manhattan, New York (21) 08

10

Provided cover in Seoul, Korea, 1957 - 1958 for staff 03 agent Ray H. PECKERMAN (P) under Project DNTANGE for 01 spotting and assessing students. PECKERMAN's (P) salary 29, 03 was reimbursed by attorney James S. McGoldrick of Sheils 06, 29 and McGoldrick. CCS made the arrangements. PECKERMAN (P) 03 resigned from CIA in 1958 to join the Foundation legitimately. 29

06 29

Dr. Howard A. Rusk, president of AKF, was actively associated with FI/SIG Project UCOMET. 01 He was also an unwitting consultant to WVF. (TPGLARE) and collaborated 29, 01 in a project to bring Algerian 11 war veterans to the U.S.

19. American Political Science Association (APSA), - Washington, D. C. (23) 08 29

29

Provided status cover (funding was by N-36, Academic Research Society) for Jonathan M. SMIGELOW (P), a con- 03 tract employee, in Washington, D.C., April - November 1956, and in Bangkok, Thailand, 10 November - December 1956. 03 SMIGELOW (P) subsequently served with WVF (TPGLARE) 29, 01 10 in Paris, 1957 - 1959, and with AFME (ZRTINDER) in New 29, 01 York, 1962 - 1967. He was terminated at the end of 1967.

29

APSA served as the ostensible sponsor of travel by 06 Bek Bahadur Thapa (T) from California to D.C. for the July 1959 APSA annual meeting. Funding was via other channels. 29

29

APSA was used in October 1965 as the point of contact in D.C. for an individual whose travel to the U.S. was sponsored by TAF (DTPILLAR).

29, 01 06

The Executive Director of APSA has long been Evron Kirkpatrick, who heads the exposed OPR (119) (JMTUBA/ 29, 01 IUEXTEND). APSA received a legitimate 1966 grant from 29 J. M. Kaplan Fund (101).

29

351BR

SENSITIVE
SECRET

29

20. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Manhattan, New York (35) 08

06

Used on a negotiated basis in 1956 to provide an ostensible grant to CAZAR for residence in Germany. Actual payments were by black-bag. 10

29

Made legitimate grants to Foreign Policy Association (59) and Governmental Affairs Institute (68). 29

29 08

21. Middle East Institute (MEI) - Washington, D.C. (111)

Provided CCS-negotiated cover for Geoffrey D. LEONAR (P) 06
10 in Baghdad, Iraq, 1959 - 1961, supplementing a cover grant
from the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) (84) 29
which was reimbursed by the exposed Marshall Foundation, 29
in turn reimbursed by the Patman 06 exposed Beacon Fund. 29
06 LEONDAR (P) remained in Baghdad 1961 - 1963 under the 10
cover of the subsequently exposed IPA (84) and the vul- 29
nerable notional Academic Research Society (N-36). He 29
10 was in Beirut and the U.S. 1963 - 1967 under other no- 32
tional covers. He was denounced as CIA by the UAR press 11
in 1964. He converted to a staff employee under nominal
Army civilian cover in June 1967 for Headquarters duty.

29 10 06

MEI provided cover in Cairo, 1960 - 1963, for Fred K.
NELDIN (P) an Army employee under ACSI Project CRAZY- 01
BONES. 29 MEI was reimbursed by CCS notional Academic Re- 29
search Society (N-34).

01

22. 29 Phelps-Stokes Fund - Manhattan, New York (LPCORSET/23) (125)

03

Provided cover for Bruce E. DAMASKUS (P), a former 11
29, 01 USNSA (WSCHILD) official, in Kenya and East Africa 1963 -
1965 under Project HBEPITOME. 01 DAMASKUS (P) received two 03
08 grants ($6,034 and $4,000) 08 from Phelps-Stokes, which 29
were reimbursed by the MHDOWEL-exposed Tower Fund. 29
03 DAMASKUS (P) resigned from the Agency in 1965.

29

Phelps-Stokes is listed as a cooperating group in an AAI (1) (QRFLUENT) publicity brochure.

29, 01

SENSITIVE
SECRET

SENSITIVE
SECRET

C.

Six Project Organizations

23. American Friends 29 of Refugees, Inc. (AFR) 29 - Manhattan, New York (13) 08

Instrumentality of Project 01 AEMANTILLA/CAMANTILLA, which provided resettlement support of Defector Reception Center in Germany. 29,10

The 06 P/A, Augustus G. Elmendorf (T), was also an officer 29 of the Tolstoy Foundation (138) and International Research 29,01 on Communist Techniques (95) (AESTRIKER). AFR 29 was funded by the exposed San Jacinto 29 Fund.

23a 29 American Friends of Russian Freedom - Manhattan, New York (14) 08

Former name of 29 American Friends of Refugees, Inc. 08 (23). (See above.)

24. International Research 29 on Communist Techniquest (IRCT) - Manhattan, New York (95) 08

Successor organization to 29,01 Committee to Combat Soviet Kidnapping (CCSK) (AEPROCESS) which was established in 1954 at the initiative of Vladimir Rudin, head of the 06 08 American branch of the Russian emigre organization NTS, 29 following the Khokhlov affair. 08 (NTS was and is subsi- 29 dized under SB/CA Project AEGIDEON.) 01 CCSK changed its 29 name to IRCT. 29 The two organizations successively received sterile grants under Project AESTRIKER, 01 FY 1954 - 08 1956, at $14,585 a year. IRCT published a magazine, 29 29 *Behind the Soviet Lines,* which was distributed in the U.S. and the U.K. 11 to generate opposition to Soviet acts of violence.

In addition to 06,29 Rudin, IRCT officers included 06 Augustus G. Elmendorf (T) (who was also associated with AFR (12) 29 01 Project CAMANTILLA) and the Tolstoy Foundation (138) 29 06 and Eugene Lyons (T) /former president of American Committee 29 for Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR (Project QKACTIVE)/. 01 Its attorney was John F. B. Mitchell, 06 Jr. (T), former OGC staffer and currently the backstop for Victoria Projects, 29 an entity under DO Project WUPSYCHE. 01

SENSITIVE
SECRET

41/BR

29 08

25. [Freedom Fund], Inc. - Manhattan, New York [(61)]

01

Established under SB Project [AEMIRROR] and transferred around 1962 to DO as Project [WUHUSTLER], 01 CIA support terminated in 1967. Headed from its inception by [Carl T. Chadsey, Jr. (T)], 06 it was used until 1961 as a funding channel for the [NTS (Project AEGIDEON)], as well as a propaganda outlet. 29,01

29

[Freedom Fund], Inc. was covertly funded by the [Branta (32) Renthelym (129), J. Frederick Brown (34)], 29,29,29 and 29 [Pappas Foundations]. The latter two were exposed during [MHDOWEL]. 01

29,10

26. [International Research Institute, Inc. - Princeton, New Jersey (94)]

This is probably a new name for the [International Institute for Social Research (IISR) in Princeton, New Jersey], 29,10 which was cited in the New York Times on 09 [26 October 1958] as receiving funds from the subsequently 29 exposed [Dearborn Foundation (49)]. 29 [Dearborn] provided substantial covert funds, 1955 - 1962, to the [Research Council], 29 Inc. (as affiliate of the [Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research]) 29 for [IISR] 29 under RQM/OIS Project [FOOLPROOF] 01 for in-depth opinion studies carried out by [Lloyd Free (T)] and [Hadley Cantril (T)] 06 in selected countries throughout the world.

In 1961, through a clerical error, [Dearborn (49)] 29 checks for [FOOLPROOF and HTNAMABLE] (see below) were reversed, making these organizations mutually witting. 01,01

29,10

27. [Scientific Engineering Institute, Inc. (SEI) - Cambridge, Massachusetts (132)]

01

DD/S&T proprietary Project [HTNAMABLE]. Ramparts has recently sought to interview some of the project principals. 29 [SEI] has special sensitivity because of its prestigeous and well-connected principals. It was covertly funded through the [Colt (41), Magowan (108), Sunnen (135), W. Alton Jones (99), Dearborn (49)], 29,29,29,29,29 and [Ridgefield Foundations]. 29 Its own 1966 990-A will show grants 08 of [$1,245,000] to [Dearborn (49), Jones (99), Magowan (108), Sunner (135)], 29,29,29,29 and [Ridgefield Foundations]. 29

29 29

28. People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc. (PPHF) - Washington, D.C. (124) 08

29

Also known publicly as Project HOPE, this organization is related to the former FI/OPS Project SGPANFISH. 01 It was mentioned during MHDOWEL in the context of a legitimate 01 grant by the exposed Hobby Foundation (71) PPHF was 29, 29 covertly funded by the exposed Dearborn (49) 29 and Marshall 29 Foundations. It also received legitimate grants from the Catherwood Foundation (36) and McGregor Fund (109).

29 29

D.

Three Organizations with Which There Have Been Some Witting Contacts

29

29. American Universities Field Staff, Inc. (AUFS) - Manhattan, New York (25) 08

06 06

Kermit Roosevelt had contact in 1950 with AUFS Executive Director, Philip Talbot (T), on possible cover use 29 of AUFS. In 1956, OO/Contacts reported a continuing re29 lationship with AUFS for exchange of information. There apparently was some covert exploitation until Book Dis23 patch No. 5167 of 4 October 1965 prohibited further use. 06, 29 Henry M. Wriston (T), President of AURS and of Brown University was contacted in 1952 on use of a separate Brown University facility for agent cover.

29

30. International Rescue Committee, Inc. (IRC) - Manhattan, New York (93)

Under Project QKGAUNT, $2,500 was furnished IRC in 1950 - 1951 to obtain biographic data on defectors. In December 1962, IRC Chairman Leo Cherne offered cover and FI use of IRC to Emmons Brown, DC/CA. C/EE declined the offer, indicating there already were useful contacts.

IRC received legitimate grants from J. Frederick Brown Foundation (34) and J. M. Kaplan Fund (101).

29

31. Iran Foundation (IF) - Manhattan, New York (98) 08

24 01 29

Under NE Project BGBERLED, three officers of the Foundation were cleared and apparently contacted by staff agent

06,09 10
[Donald Wilbur in 1954]- 1956 for planned cover use of 08 IF in placing a [physician] in [Iran] under [medical] cover. 08 The proposal aborted when the agent prospect resigned in 1956.

E.

Eleven Unwitting Organizations Which were Funded by or Collaborated with Project Organizations

29
32. [American Student Aid Fund, Inc.] - Manhattan, New York [(4)] 08

29
Received a cover grant from [Farfield Foundation (56)] 01 [(Project QKOPERA)] in 1966.

29
33. [Association for International Development] (AID) - Paterson, New Jersey [(27)] 08

29,01 06
May have received funds from [FYSA (SGGUESSER)]. [Thomas P. Melady], Vice Chairman of [African Service Institute] 29 [(YQZEUS)] was on [AID] board.
01 29

29
34. [Commission for International Development] - Manhattan, New York [(42)] 08

A proprietary funded and controlled through FYSA 01 [(SGGUESSER)] 1961 - 1966.

29,10
35. [Experiment in International Living, Inc. - Putney, Vermont (55)]

29,01
Received cover grants from [FYSA (SGGUESSER)], 1955 - 1966. Listed as a cooperating group in [AAI (1) (QRFLUENT)] brochure.
29,01

29
36. [International Center for Social Research, Inc.] - Manhattan, New York [(27)] 08

29,01
Formed by [FEC (TPTONIC)] and operated by [IDF (88)] 29 [(QRBEND)] until 1965.
01

29 08

37. International Peasant Union - Washington, D.C. (92)

29,01

Supported by FEC (Project TPTONIC) for fifteen years.

29

38. Kossuth Foundation, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (102) 08

29,01

Supported successively by FEC (TPTONIC) and IDF (88) 29 (QRBEND) for many years.

01 29

39. American Council for Emigres in the Professions, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (9) 08

29,01

Provided useful employment leads to FEC (TPTONIC) and may have received FEC funds in early 1950's.

29 29

40. Overseas Education Fund of the League of Women Voters - Washington, D.C. (120) 08

29

06,06 Cooperated with the Interchange Foundation /headed by Anna Lord Strauss and Mrs. Harvey Picker of CC (44) (Project JEFERVENT)/ 01 in what proved an abortive effort under a joint CA-SR project to sponsor the U.S. visit of a group of prominent Soviet women. Interchange Foundation 08,29 08 received $3,579 from the Independence Foundation 29 (75) for its share. The funds were redirected to a feasibility survey on establishing an international 08 women's organization.

29 29

41. American Friends of Viet Nam, Inc. (AFVN) - Manhattan, New York (15) 08

01 08

29 Under Project TUSPUN, 06 a $5,000 grant was made to AFVN in 1958 by the Patman-exposed Michigan Fund to 29 defray the costs of a trip to Viet Name by Lt. Gen. John 11,06 W. O'Daniel (Retired), President of AFVN. Allegedly, 29 neither Gen. O'Daniel nor AFVN was aware of CIA sponsorship. 06 29

29,10

42. United States - South Africa Leadership Exchange Program, Inc. (US - SALEP) - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (139)

29

Before December 1960, US - SALEP operated as a program of AAI (1) (YQFLUENT).

29,01

SECRET

36/BR

NOTE:

The numbers in parentheses following listed or named organizations in Annexes A through E are the item numbers of organizations included in the 5 April 1968 Ramparts list (Annex F).

SENSITIVE
SECRET

ANNEX C

FORTY-FIVE TERMINATED COVERT FUNDING CONDUITS AND PROJECT ORGANIZATIONS ON 5 April 1968 RAMPARTS LIST THAT WERE NAMED IN PRESS DURING [MHDOWEL] 01

A.

Eighteen CCS Multipurpose Funding Conduits (Legitimate and Proprietary)

29,01,10

✓ 1. [Anderson Foundation, M.D. - Houston, Texas (LPCORSET/11) (26)]

29

2. [Benton Foundation, William] - Manhattan, New York [(LPCORSET/18) (30)] 01

29,10,01

✓ 3. [Broad-High Foundation - Columbus, Ohio (LPSIPHON/10], CCS proprietary) [(33)] 08

✓ 4. [Brown Foundation, J. Frederick - Boston, Massachusetts (LPCORSET/20) (34)] 29,10,01

29,10

✓ 5. [Catherwood Foundation - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania] (CCS File No. CS-1820) [(36)] 08

29,10

6. [Dearborn Foundation - Chicago, Illinois (QKBOTTOM,] CCS proprietary) [(49)] 08

29,10

✓ 7. [Dodge Foundation, Inc., Cleveland H. - Manhattan, New] York [(LPCORSET/26) (50)] 01

29,10,01

✓ 8. [Florence Foundation - Dallas, Texas (LPCORSET/8)] (58)

29,10,01

✓ 9. [Granary Fund - Boston, Massachusetts (LPSIPHON/7], CCS proprietary) [(69)] 08

29,10,01

✓ 10. [Hobby Foundation - Houston, Texas (LPCORSET/51)] (71)

SENSITIVE
SECRET

17/BR

29,10,01

✓11. [Hoblitzelle Foundation - Dallas, Texas (LPCORSET/3) (72)]

29,10

✓12. [Independence Foundation - Boston, Massachusetts] (LPFUNNEL/2, CCS proprietary) [(75)] 08

29

13. [Jones Foundation, Inc., W. Alton] - Manhattan, New York [(LPCORSET/1) (99)] 01

29,10,01

✓14. [Jones-O'Donnell Foundation - Dallas, Texas (LPCORSET/25) (100)]

29

✓15. [Littauer Foundation, Inc., Lucius N.] - Manhattan, New York [(LPCORSET/50) (106)] 01

29,10,01

✓16. [McGregor Fund - Detroit, Michigan (LPCORSET/32) (109)]

✓17. [Rabb Charitable Foundation, Sidney and Esther - Boston, Massachusetts (LPCORSET/59) (126)] 29,10,01

✓18. [Rosenthal Foundation, Benjamin J. - Chicago, Illinois (LPCORSET/22) (130)] 29,10,01

B.

24

Two CA/[B1] Project Organizations

29

✓19. [Committee for Self-Determination, Inc.] - Manhattan, New York [(43)] 08

01

Established under Project [TPTONIC] and taken over by 29,01 [International Development Foundation (88) (IDF) (CA Project QRBEND)]. FY 1964 - 1965. Phased out before WH took over [IDF (88) under Project UOALIBI]. 29,01

29

✓20. [Paderewski Foundation, Ignacy Jan] - Manhattan, New York [(191)] 08

01

Funded under [TPTONIC] for many years, and thereafter by [IDF (88)]

29

C.

24

Eleven CA/[B3] Project Organizations

SENSITIVE
SECRET

221BR

SENSITIVE
SECRET

29

21. [American Committee for Cultural Freedom] - Manhattan, New York [(8)] 08

29

An unwitting American affiliate of the exposed [Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF)] [Project QKOPERA]. 01 It raised legitimate funds for [CCF]. 29

29 10

22. [American Fund for Free Jurists], Inc. - [Wilmington, Delaware (17)]

Proprietary funding conduit for [International Commission of Jurists under Project QKFEARFUL]. 29,01

29

✓23. [American Society of African Culture] - Manhattan, New York [(24)] 08

01

Action organization under Project [TPFOUMART].

29

✓24. [Committee of Correspondence, Inc. (CC)] - Manhattan, New York [(44)] 08

08,01

Action organization for [international women's activities under Project JBFERVENT].

29 08

✓25. [Farfield Foundation, Inc.] - Manhattan, New York [(56)]

29

Funding conduit for [CCF] and other activities under Project [QKOPERA]. 01

29

26. [Whitney Trust for Charitable Purposes, John Hay], u/d dated 29 December 1959 - Manhattan, New York [(141)] 08

01

Funding conduit under Project [QKOPERA (LPCORSET/68)]

29

27. [Whitney Trust for Charitable Purposes, John Hay], u/d dated 29 December 1958 - Manhattan, New York [(142)] 08

Funding conduit under Project [QKOPERA (LPCORSET/68)] 01

28. [Fund for International Cooperative Development - Chicago, Illinois (64)] 29

29,01

Funding conduit for [Cooperative League of the U.S.A. (CLUSA) under Project WSFLUFFER].

29 29

✓ 29. [Institute of International Labor Research], Inc. [(ILLR)] - Manhattan, New York [(83)] 08

SENSITIVE
SECRET

29/6R

01

Roof action organization under Project [DTRACCOON].

29 08

✓ 30. [Kaplan Fund, Inc., The J. M.] - Manhattan, New York [(101)]

29

01 Funding conduit used for [IILR] (83) under Project DT-[RACCOON]. Its exposure by [Congressman Patman] in August 06 1964 implicated eight [CCS notional and proprietary funding conduits and facilitated many MHDOWEL exposures]. 29,24,01

29

✓31. [National Education Association of the United States] - Washington, D.C. [(113)] 08

29

U.S. affiliate of [World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP)] under Project [DTLAMPREY]. 01

D.

24 24 08

Three CA/[B3] (Formerly CA/[B5]) [Youth] and 08 [Student] Organizations

29 08

✓ 32. [Independent Research Service] - Manhattan, New York [(76)]

01

Roof organization under Project [HBEPITOME/TPDAPHEAT] for combatting [World Youth Festivals]. 08

29

33. [World University Service] - Manhattan, New York [(143)] 08

01

Witting recipient of FYSA funds under Project [HBIPITOME/HBINHAUST].

29

34. [Operation Crossroads Africa], Inc. - Manhattan, New York [(118)] 08

Unwitting recipient of cover grants, 1955 - 1956, by FYSA (Project [HBIPITOME/SGGUESSER]). 01 It may have been 29 supported by [AMSAC (24)] (Project [TPFOUMART]). 01 It received legitimate grants from [J. Frederick Brown Foundation (34) (LPCORSET/20)]. 29,01

E.

24

Two CA/[B4] Project Organizations

29/BR

✓ 35. Fund for International Social and Economic Education (FISEE) - Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (65) 29,10

Funding conduit for international 08 labor operations under Project QRSENSE/KMOCHROID. 01

Ramparts April 1968 listing incorrectly states FISEE 29 was formerly Center for Rural Development (CRD) - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 29,10 CRD actually replaced FISEE. 29 29 29

36. Peace with Freedom, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (123) 08

Action organization under Project QRBIBB. 01 Related to Projects FOMAIDEN, QRSHEER, VPDAMSEL, QRPLUTO and cer- 01,01,01,01 08 tain European socialist activities. These are known to be of current interest to Ramparts.

F.

Eight Area Division Project Organizations

✓ 37. 29 African-American Institute - Washington, D.C. 08 (1)

Action organization under 24 AF Project YQFLUENT. 01 Transferred to CA Staff (at that time IO Division) in 1961 as Project QRFLUENT 01 and terminated shortly thereafter.

38. 29 Friends of India Committee - Washington, D.C. (63) 08

Organization under 24 NE Project 01 PAFANFARE.

39. Synod of Bishops of the Russian 29 Orthodox Church Outside of Russia - Manhattan, New York (136) 08

An organization subsidized under 24 SB Project 01 AESILVER.

40. International 29 Development Foundation, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (88) 08

Developed by CA Staff under Project 01 TPTONIC, later redocumented as separate CA Staff Project QRBEND 01 and then transferred to WH as Project UOALIBI. 01

41. Pan American 29 Foundation - Washington, D.C. (122) 08

24 WH funding mechanism under Project JMPOPLAR/10. 01

34/6R

SENSITIVE

SECRET

✓ 42. Operations and Policy Research, Inc. - Washington, D.C. (119) 08 29

Recruited by CCS in 1960 as LPCORSET/75 01 for multi-purpose subsidy funding and agent cover support. Subsequently integrally related to WH 01 Project JMTUBA and SO 24 Project IUEXTEND 01 as a research action organization.

43. Institute of Public Administration 29 - Manhattan, New York (84) 08

Recruited by CCS in 1955 and exclusively used for agent cover and support (not for organizational subsidies) abroad. Used operationally until 1967. Provided cover 03 for Wesley W. HARTH (P) in Pakistan, Roger G. ORAPELLO (P) 03 in the Philippines, Ulysses P. SHOULER (P) in Nigeria, 03, 11 03, 11 Geoffrey D. LEONDAR (P) in Lebanon, and Anthony M. PABACKA (P) in Africa. 03, 10

44. Tolstoy Foundation, Inc. 29 - Manhattan, New York (138) 08

Recruited by CCS for agent cover in 1952. Provided cover in Germany for SB staff agent Frederick G. PERSHAM (P), 03 1952 - 1958, under Project AEDRAG. 01 Used by DCS 28 for leads and assistance in handling defectors.

G.

Unwitting Recipient of Cover Grants

45. Institute for International Education, Inc. 29 - Manhattan, New York (82) 08

This unwitting legitimate organization received small cover grants from Dearborn Foundation (49) 29 (CCS proprietary, Project QKBOTTOM) 01, Farfield Foundation (56) 29 (CA 24 proprietary, Project QKOPERA) 01, and the Asia Foundation 29 (Project DTPILLAR) 01.

It also received legitimate grants from six foundations used as cooperating covert funding mechanisms /McGregor Fund (109), John Hay Whitney Charitable Trust (141 - 142) Aaron Norman Fund, Cleveland Dodge Foundation (50), William Benton Foundation (30), and Brown Foundation (Houston)/.

24, 29, 29, 29, 29, 29, 29

SENSITIVE

SECRET

521BR

NOTE:

The numbers in parentheses following listed or named organizations in Annexes A through E are the item numbers of organizations included in the 5 April 1968 Ramparts list (Annex F).

NOTE:

The numbers in parentheses following listed or named organizations in Annexes A through E are the item numbers of organizations included in the 5 April 1968 Ramparts list (Annex F).

SENSITIVE
SECRET

ANNEX D

FIFTY-FIVE ORGANIZATIONS WITH NO KNOWN CIA CONNECTIONS

A.

Five Organizations Which Made Legitimate Grants to CIA Project Organizations and Suspect Organizations

1. Avalon Foundation - Manhattan, New York (29) 08

   Made legitimate 1954 grant to Tolstoy 29 Foundation (138). 08

2. Church Foundation, Frederic C. - Boston, Massachusetts (40) 08

   Made legitimate grants to RFE 29. Mr. Church was cleared but never used operationally.

3. Harnischfeger Foundation - Milwaukee, Wisconsin (70) 08

   29, 29, 29, 29
   Made legitimate grants to American Heritage Foundation, (18) Committee for Tibetan Refugees (11), Foreign Policy Association (59), Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship (51).

4. Hochschild Fund, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (73) 08

   Gave legitimately to AAI 29 (1) (QRFLUENT) 01.

5. Lindsley Fund, John - Manhattan, New York (105) 08

   Gave legitimately to AAI 29 (1) (QRFLUENT) 01.

B.

Eight Organizations Which Received Legitimate Grants From Foundations (LPCORSETS) 01 Used by CIA

SENSITIVE
SECRET

14/BR

29
6. American-Asian Educational Exchange, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (7) 08

May have received a legitimate grant from J. Frederick Brown Foundation (34). 08

29
7. American Council for Nationalities Service - Manhattan, New York (10) 08

Received a legitimate grant from Littauer Foundation (106). 08

29
8. Center for Information on America - Washington, Connecticut (38) 08

Received a legitimate grant from American Heritage Foundation (18) 08

29
9. Committee of Seventy, Inc. - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (39) 08

Received a legitimate grant from Catherwood Foundation (36). 08

29
10. Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, Inc. - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (51) 08

08 Received legitimate grants from Catherwood Foundation (36) and W. Alton Jones Foundation (99).

29
11. Foreign Policy Association - Manhattan, New York (59) 08

Received legitimate grants from Catherwood (36) 08 and Hobby Foundations (71). 08 Also from Harnischfeger Foundation (70) which had no CIA ties.

29
12. Freedom House, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (62) 08

Received legitimate grant from J. M. Kaplan Fund (101). 08

29
13. Near East Foundation - Manhattan, New York (115) 08

Received legitimate grants from Cleveland Dodge Foundation (50) 08

25/BR

C.

Three Legitimate Donors to Suspect Organizations

29

14. Bodman Foundation - Manhattan, New York (3) 08

Gave legitimately to youth organizations.

29 08

15. Old Dominion Foundation - Manhattan, New York (116)

Gave legitimately to Institute of International Education (82), 08 Center for Cross Cultural Communication (37), 08 and Yale-in-China Association (145). 08

29

16. Institute for Social Science Research, Inc. - Washington, D.C. (81) 08

Legitimately sponsored Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies.

D.

Two Organizations which Received Legitimate Grants From Suspect Donors

29

17. American Emergency Committee for Tibetan Refugees - Manhattan, New York (11) 08

Received legitimate funds from Harnischfeger Foundation (70). 08

29

18. Yale-in-China Association, Inc. - New Haven, Connecticut (145) 08

Received legitimate funds from Old Dominion Foundation. (116) 08

E.

Six Organizations Whose Officers/Directors Were Associated with CIA Projects

15/BR

SECRET

29 08

19. English Speaking Union - Manhattan, New York (52)

06

Arthur Houghton, Jr., President of FYSA (SGGUESSER) 01 was an officer.

29 08

20. English Speaking Union - San Francisco, California (53)

See above. There may be a tie to TAF (DTPILLAR) officers.

29,01

29 08

21. English Speaking Union - Chicago, Illinois (54)

See above.

29 08

22. Institute for American Strategy - Chicago, Illinois (77)

06

Advisory committee includes Frederick Barghoorn (used in Project AEWILDFIRE), Evron Kirkpatrick of OPR (119) 01,06,29 29 and APSA (23) and Dr. Kurt London, former DDI staff employee. 06 Received legitimate grants from Carnegie Endowment (35). 08

29

23. League of Women Voters Education Fund - Washington, D.C. (104) 08

06,06

Mrs. Jean (Harvey) Picker and Ann Lord Strauss who were 08 on CC (44) (JBFERVENT) board were active in League of Women Voters. 01

29

24. Roxco Foundation - Boston, Massachusetts (131)

06,29

Trustee is Paul Hellmuth of J. Frederick Brown Foundation (34) and Independence Foundation (75).

29

F.

Thirty-One Organizations With no Evident Connections To the Others, Except That Their Names May be Suspect

25. African-American Students Foundation, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (3) 08

SECRET

25/BR

SECRET

26. American Academy of Political and Social Science (no address) (6) 08

27. American Foundation for Overseas Blind - Manhattan, New York (12) 08

28. American Fund for Czechoslavak Refugees, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (16) 08

29. American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (19) 08

30. American Institute for Research in the Behavioral Sciences - Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (20) 08

31. American Labor Conference on International Affairs, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (22) 08

32. Atlantic Council for the United States, Inc. - Washington, D.C. (28) 08

33. Center for Cross Cultural Communication - Washington, D.C. (37) 08

34. Center for the Study of International Development - Boston, Massachusetts (39) 08

35. Community Development Foundation, Inc. - Norwalk, Connecticut (46) 08

36. Council for International Programs for Youth Leaders and Social Workers, Inc. - Cleveland, Ohio (47) 08

37. Farmers and World Affairs, Inc. - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (57) 08

38. Free China Fund for Medical and Refugee Aid - Manhattan, New York (60) 08

39. Fund for the Relief of Cuban Exiles, Inc. - Coral Gables, Florida, (66) 08

40. Fund for the Relief of Russian Scientists and Writers in Exile, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (67) 08

41. Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Inc. - Manhattan, New York (80) 08

16/8R

[illegible]

42. Institute of World Affairs - Manhattan, New York [(85)] 08

43. Inter-American Press Association Scholarship Fund, Inc. - Manhattan, New York [(86)] 08

44. International Development Services, Inc. - Manhattan, New York [(89)] 08

45. International Legal Aid Association - Dover, Delaware [(90)] 08

46. International Mass Education Movement, Inc. - Manhattan, New York [(91)] 08

47. International Service of Information Foundation - Baltimore, Maryland [(96)] 08

48. International Social Service, American Branch, Inc. - Manhattan, New York [(97)] 08

49. League for Industrial Democracy - Manhattan, New York [(103)] 08

50. Near East College Association, Inc. - Manhattan, New York [(114)] 08

51. Randolph Educational Fund, A. Philip - Manhattan, New York [(127)] 08

52. Stevenson, Adlai E., Memorial Fund - Chicago, Illinois [(134)] 08

53. Tall Timbers Research, Inc. - Tallahassee, Florida [(137)] 08

54. United States Committee for Refugees, Inc. - Manhattan, New York [(140)] 08

55. World Wide Broadcasting Foundation, Inc. - Manhattan, New York [(144)] 08

SENSITIVE
SECRET

141BR

SENSITIVE
SECRET

ANNEX E

THREE FORMER PROJECT ORGANIZATIONS NOT INCLUDED IN April 1968 *Ramparts* LIST BUT VULNERABLE BECAUSE THEY WERE FUNDED BY ORGANIZATIONS ON THE LIST THAT FUNDED EXPOSED ORGANIZATIONS

schedule unrelated

29
1. Medical Services International (MSI)

01
29 FI/OPS - MS Project ZROCCUR. Covertly funded by 29 Sunnen Foundation (135) 1962 - 1966 and by Littauer 29 Foundation (106) in 1965. 29 Sunnen (135) covertly funded six other project organizations. Littauer 29 (106) also funded six others, four of them also funded 29 by Sunnen (135). 29 MSI was used in NE Project PASHELL, 24, 01 which involved a Sunnen (135) grant. 29

29
2. Human Ecology Fund (HEF)

01
29 29 29 TSD Project MKCOTTON. HEF was covertly funded by 29 Sonnbend (133), Littauer (106), and Baird Foundations. Baird was previously exposed. The three foundations, respectively, covertly funded four, six, and three other projects.

29
3. World Veterans Fund (WVF)

24 01, 29
29 CA/B3 Project TPGLARE (World Veterans Federation). WVF received substantial covert grants the Spencer T. 29 and Ann W. Olin Foundation (117) 1962 - 1966. Olin (117) covertly funded two other project organizations, RFEF (TPTONIC) and IDF (88) (QRBEND/UOALIBI).

29, 01 29, 01

SENSITIVE
SECRET

21/BR

Ramparts

203 W. 107th Street, Apt. 4C
New York City, New York
10025

April 5, 1968

Mr. Joe Rosapepe
Public Information Division
Internal Revenue Service
1111 Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20224

Dear Mr. Rosapepe:

Ramparts Magazine is under contract to McGraw-Hill Publishing Company to produce a book dealing with organizations that were funded by or cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency. We have already obtained much of the background information on these organizations from the following sources:

1) Inspection of the organization's literature and interviews with their staff members;
2) Inspection of records obtained from the Charitable Organizations Division of the Attorney General's office in the states of Illinois, Massachusetts and New York;
3) The National Information Bureau in New York;
4) The Foundation Library in New York and Washington, D.C.; and
5) Group Research, Inc. in Washington, D.C.

In order to complete the research, it is very important for us to inspect the 990-A tax forms of organizations which, for various reasons, we have been unable to inspect at the district offices of the Internal Revenue Service.

Following your suggestion during our telephone conversation, we are submitting an alphabetical list which includes the location of the organization and the years of the 990-A forms that we still need to inspect. All of the organizations listed appears in Cumulative List- Organizations Described in Section 170 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Publication No. 78 (Revised to December 31, 1966), and the Supplement No. 1967-5.

Although this is a sizeable list, we have narrowed it to the most essential organizations currently under investigation.

We will call next week to clarify any questions you may have and to make an appointment for the inspection. If it is agreeable with you, several of our researchers will come to your Washington office when the files are ready, so that we may complete the work as quickly as possible.

If there are any questions of an immediate nature, my telephone number is (212) 222-1116.

Respectfully yours,

Jon Frappier

Jon Frappier

14-00000

Ramparts

/

List of organizations for which 990-A tax forms are requested
Years requested: 1963, 64, 65, 66- unless otherwise indicated
* 1023 tax forms also requested

1 African-American Institute, The* Wash, D.C.

2 African-American Labor Center, Inc.* NY, NY(Man)

3 African-American Students Foundation, Inc.* Manhattan, NY

4 African Student Aid Fund, Inc.* Man., NY

5 Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, Inc.* Man., NY

6 American Academy of Political and Social Science

7 American-Asian Educational Exchange, Inc.* Man., NY
(before 1966: American Afro-Asian Educational Exchange, Inc.)

8 American Committee for Cultural Freedom* Man., NY

9 American Council for Emigres in the Professions, Inc.* Man., NY

10 American Council for Nationalities Service* Man., NY

11 American Emergency Committee for Tibetan Refugees, Inc.* Man., NY

12 American Foundation for Overseas Blind* Man., NY

13 American Friends of Refugees, Inc.* N Man., NY

14 American Friends of Russian Freedom* N Man., NY

15 American Friends of Viet Nam, Inc.* Man., NY

16 American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, Inc.* Man., NY

17 American Fund for Free Jurists, Inc.* Wilmington, Del.

18 American Heritage Foundation, The Man., NY

19 American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.* Man., NY

American Institute for Research in the Behavioral Sciences* Pittsburgh

21 American Korean Foundation, Inc., The* Man., NY

22 American Labor Conference on International Affairs, Inc.* Man., NY

23 American Political Science Association, The Wash., D.C.

24 American Society of African Culture* Man., NY

American Universities Field Staff, Inc* Man., NY

14-00000

Ramparts

✓

X Anderson Foundation, M.D.*	Houston, Texas	1965,66
Association for International Development*	Paterson, N.J.	
Atlantic Council for the Unites States, Inc.*	Wash., D.C.	
Avalon Foundation	Manh., NY	
30 X Benton Foundation, William*	Man., NY	1966
31 Bodman Foundation, The*	Man., NY	
32 X Branta Foundation* N	White Plains, NY	1966,
33 X Broad-High Foundation*	Columbus, Ohio	
34 X Brown Foundation, The J. Frederick*	Boston, Mass.	1966
35 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	Man., NY	
36 X Catherwood Foundation, The*	Philadelphia, PA.	
37 X Center for Cross Cultural Communication	Wash., D.C.	1964,65,66 —
38 Center for Information on America, The*	Washington, Conn.	
39 Center for the Study of International Development*	BostonMass	1966
40 Church Foundation, Frederic C.*	Boston, Mass.	1965,66
41 X Colt Foundation, Inc.* N	Man., NY	1965,66
42 Commission for International Development*	Man., NY	
43 Committee for Self Determination, Inc.*	Man., NY	
✓ 44 X Committee of Correspondence, Inc.*	Man., NY	
45 Committee of Seventy, Inc.*	Phila., Pa.	
46 Community Development Foundation, Inc.*	Norwalk, Conn.	
47 Council of International Programs for Youth Leaders and Social Workers, Inc., The*	Cleveland, Ohio	
48 X Council on Race and Caste in World Affairs, Inc.* (Deductilibity terminated as of Dec. 31, 1966)	Man., NY	
49 X Dearborn Foundation*	Chicago, Ill.	
50 X Dodge Foundation, Inc. Cleveland H.	Man., NY	1966
51 Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship, Inc.*	Phila., Pa.	
52 English Speaking Union*	Man., NY	

53		English Speaking Union*	San Francisco, Cal.	
54		English Speaking Union, Chicago Branch*	Chicago, Ill.	
55		Experiment in International Living, Inc., The*	Putney, Vt.	
56	X ✓	Fairfield Foundation, Inc.*	Man., NY	1966
57		Farmers and World Affairs, Inc.*	Phila., Pa.	
58	X	Florence Foundation, The*	Dallas, Texas	1965,66
59		Foreign Policy Assodation	Man., NY	
60		Free China Fund for Medical And Refugee Aid, The*	Man., NY	
61	X	Freedom Fund, Inc.*	Man., NY	
62		Freedom House, Inc.*	Man. NY	
63	X	Friends of India Committee*	Wash., D.C.	
64	X	Fund for International Cooperative Development*	Chicago, Ill.	
65	X	Fund for International Social and Economic Education* (formerly: Center for Rural Development- Phila., Pa.)	Pittsburgh, Pa.	
66		Fund for the Relief of Cuban Exiles, Inc.*	Coral Gables, Fla.	
67		Fund for the Relief of Russian Scientists and Writers in Exile, Inc.*	Man., NY	
68	X	Governmental Affairs Institute*	Wash., D.C.	
69	X	Granary Fund, The*	Boston, Mass.	1966
70		Harnischfeger Foundation*	Milwaukee, Wis.	
71	X	Hobby Foundation*	Houston, Texas	1966
72	X	Hoblitzelle Foundation*	Dallas, Texas	1965,66
73		Hochschild Fund, Inc.	Man., NY	1966
74	X	Homeland Foundation, Inc.* N	Man., NY	
75	X	Independence Foundation, The*	Boston, Mass.	1966
76	X	Independent Research Service	Man., NY	
77		Institute for American Strategy*	Chicago, Ill. Yes, but no funding —	
78	X	Institute for International Order, Inc.*	Man. NY	
79	X	Institute for International Youth Affairs*	Man., NY	

Ramparts

3/5

Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Inc.* Man., NY

Institute for Social Science Research, The, Inc.* Wash., D.C.

82 Institute of International Education, Inc. Man., NY

83 Instituteof International Labor Research, Inc. Man., NY

84 Institute of Public Administration Man., NY

85 Institute of World Affairs* Man., NY and Warner, N.H.

86 Inter-American Press Association Scholarship Fund, Inc.* Man., NY

87 International Center for Social Research, Inc.* Man., NY

88 International Development Foundation, Inc.* Man., NY

89 International Development Services, Inc.* Man., NY
(Deductibility terminated as of Dec. 31, 1959)

90 International Legal Aid Assocaation* Dover, Del.

91 International Mass Education Movement, Inc.* Man., Ny up to 1964,
then Wash., D.C.

92 International Peasant Union* Wash., D.C.

93 International Rescue Committee, Inc. Man., NY

94 International Research Enstitute, Inc.* Princeton, N.J.

95 INternational Research on Communist Techniques* Man., NY

96 International Service of Information Foundation* Baltimore, Md. to 1963,6

97 International Social Service-American Branch, Inc.* Man., NY

98 Iran Foundation, The* Man., NY

99 Jones Foundation, Inc., W. Alton Man., NY 1966

100 Jones-O'Donnell Foundation Dallas, Texas 1965,66

101 Kaplan Fund, Inc., The J.M.* Man., NY 1965,66

102 Kossuth Foundation, Inc., The* Man., NY

103 League for Industrial Democracy Man., NY

104 League of Women Voters Education Fund Wash., D.C. — ?

105 Lindsley Fund, John* Man., NY 1965,66

106 Littauer Foundation, Inc., The Lucius N.* Man., NY 1966

14-00000

Ramparts

107 Little Foundation, Wiloughby* N Providence, R.I.

108 Magowan Family Foundation, Inc., The* N Man., NY 1965,66

109 McGregor Fund* Detroit, Mich. 1965,66

110 Meek Foundation* Greenwich, Conn. N 1966

111 Middle East Institute, The* Wash., D.C.

112 Munson Foundation* Man., NY N 1966

113 National Education Association of the U.S., The Wash., D.C.

114 Near East College Association, Inc.* Man., NY

115 Near East Foundation Man., NY 1965,66

116 Old Dominion Foundation, The Man., NY 1965,66

117 Olin Foundation, Spencer T., Ann W.* N Alton, Ill.

118 Operation Crossroads Africa. Inc.* Man., NY

119 Operations and Policy Research, Inc* Wash., D.C.

120 Overseas Education Fund of the League of Women Voters* (Wash, D.C. to 1964)

121 Paderewski Foundation* (Ignacy Jan). Man., NY 1965,66

122 Pan American Foundation Wash., D.C. 1966

123 Peace with Freedom, Inc.* Man., NY 1964,65,66

124 People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc., The* Wash., D.C. —

125 Phelps-Stokes Fund, The Trustees of the N Man., NY

126 Rabb Charitable Foundation, the Sidney and Esther Boston 1965,66

127 Randolph Educational Fund, A. Philip* Man., NY

128 Robison Foundation, James E. N Man., NY 1965,66

129 Rontheim Charitable Trust* N Boston, Mass 1965,66

130 Rosenthal Foundation, Benjamin J. Chicago, Ill. 1966

131 Roxco Foundation* Boston, Mass

132 Scientific Engineering Institute, Inc.* Cambridge, Mass

133 Sonnabend Foundation, The* N Boston, Mass. 1965,66

134 Stevenson, Adlai E., Memorial Fund* Chicago, Ill.
(after 1964 name is Stevenson Institute of International Affairs, Chica

Ramparts

	Sunnen Foundation*	Maplewood, Mo.	1966
136	Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia*	Man., NY	
137	Tall Timbers Research, Inc.*	Tallahassee, Fla.	
138	Tolstoy Foundation, Inc,	Man., NY	
139	United States South Africa Leadership Exchange Program, Inc.*	Phila., Pa.	
140	United States Committee for Refugees, Inc.*	Man., NY	
141	Whitney Trust u/d dated Dec.29,1959 for Charitable Purposes, John Hay*	Man., NY	
142	Whitney Trust u/d dated Dec.29,1958 for Charitable Purposes, John Hay*	Man., NY	
143	World University Service	Man., NY	
144	World Wide Broadcasting Foundation, Inc.*	Man., NY	1963,65,66
145	Yale-in-China Association, Inc.*	New Haven, Conn.	

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
H. Clark Schor
C/CCS/PRG GH-44 Hqs.

EXTENSION: 1849 5004

NO.:

DATE: 27 January 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. SA/DO/O 2 D 0109 Hqs.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce
14.				
15.				06257

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

27 JAN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : H. Clark Schor
Chief, Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Request

REFERENCES : A. Memo for SA/DO/O fr C/CCS/PRG, dtd 25 Jan 78, Same Subject

B. Memo for SA/DO/O fr OLC (OLC 78-0070/1), dtd 12 Jan 78, Same Subject

C. Letter for OLC fr Chief Counsel/Director of HSCA, dtd 6 Jan 78

1. This memorandum supplements Reference A and provides the additional information per paragraph 6. therein, in response to the request in Reference B.

2. CCS files contain information on individuals and entities cited in certain numbered items of Reference C as follows:

a. Item 5 - George DeMohrenschildt -- five documents comprising four contact reports with a commercial asset who was in touch with Subject regarding a business activity in Haiti, and one memorandum detailing the results of a trace request on Subject. The dates of the documents range from 25 April to 21 Mar 1963.

b. Item 9 - Leo Cherne -- 21 documents (six-1954; one-1955; two-1957; two-1958; one-1960; four-1962; and one each-1965, 1967, 1968, 1976, 1977) all of which 24 concern the establishment, maintenance, and use of cover provided by Subject from 1954 to 1965 for a NOC officer assigned to Paris. Additionally, CCS maintains a file on the Research Institute of America, of which Leo Cherne was Executive Director, comprising approximately 100 documents covering the period 1949 to 1964; Mr. Cherne's name appears throughout this file.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 004925

06257

SECRET

c. Item 17 - William Harvey -- Approximately 50 documents, virtually all of which concern the establishment, maintenance, and use of cover for Subject during his career with the Agency as a Staff Employee from 1947 to 1967.

d. Item 27

(1) International Rescue Committee -- 12 documents (1962 to 1976) addressing Agency non-use of IRC, and FOIA requests.

(2) Alexander Rorke -- No record in CCS.

e. Item 29

(1) Richard Helms -- Approximately 25 documents (1956 to 1974) concerned primarily with TDY travel orders, cover documentation, and clearance verifications.

(2) James Angleton -- Approximately 25 documents (1950 to 1975) concerned primarily with TDY travel orders, cover documentation, and retirement processing for Subject who was a Staff Employee of the Agency from 1947 to 1974.

(3) Raymond Rocca -- Approximately 25 documents (1964 to 1975) concerned primarily with cover matters pertaining to Subject who was a Staff Employee.

f. Item 30 - No record in CCS of correspondence or other communications on the matters identified involving Messrs. Helms, Angleton, and Rocca.

g. Item 36

(1) Southern Research Corporation -- No record in CCS.

(2) Wackenhut Corporation -- 100 to 150 documents covering the period 1963 to 1977 and concerning primarily [contacts with]24 Wackenhut officials.

H. Clark Schor

1
BR

SECRET

27 JAN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : H. Clark Schor
Chief, Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Request

REFERENCES : A. Memo for SA/DO/O fr C/CCS/PRG, dtd 25 Jan 78, Same Subject

B. Memo for SA/DO/O fr OLC (OLC 78-0070/1), dtd 12 Jan 78, Same Subject

C. Letter for OLC fr Chief Counsel/Director of HSCA, dtd 6 Jan 78

1. This memorandum supplements Reference A and provides the additional information per paragraph 6. therein, in response to the request in Reference B.

2. CCS files contain information on individuals and entities cited in certain numbered items of Reference C as follows:

a. Item 5 - George DeMohrenschildt -- five documents comprising four contact reports with a commercial asset who was in touch with Subject regarding a business activity in Haiti, and one memorandum detailing the results of a trace request on Subject. The dates of the documents range from 25 April to 21 Mar 1963.

b. Item 9 - Leo Cherne -- 21 documents (six-1954; one-1955; two-1957; two-1958; one-1960; four-1962; and one each-1965, 1967, 1968, 1976, 1977) [all of which concern the establishment, maintenance, and use of cover provided by Subject from 19540to 1965 for a NOC officer assigned to Paris]. 24 Additionally, CCS maintains a file on the Research Institute of America, of which Leo Cherne was Executive Director, comprising approximately 100 documents covering the period 1949 to 1964; Mr. Cherne's name appears throughout this file.

SECRET

1/BR

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 004925

c. Item 17 - William Harvey -- Approximately 50 documents, virtually all of which concern the establishment, maintenance, and use of cover for Subject during his career with the Agency as a Staff Employee from 1947 to 1967.

d. Item 27

(1) International Rescue Committee -- 12 documents (1962 to 1976) addressing Agency non-use of IRC, and FOIA requests.

(2) Alexander Rorke -- No record in CCS.

e. Item 29

(1) Richard Helms -- Approximately 25 documents (1956 to 1974) concerned primarily with TDY travel orders, cover documentation, and clearance verifications.

(2) James Angleton -- Approximately 25 documents (1950 to 1975) concerned primarily with TDY travel orders, cover documentation, and retirement processing for Subject who was a Staff Employee of the Agency from 1947 to 1974.

(3) Raymond Rocca -- Approximately 25 documents (1964 to 1975) concerned primarily with cover matters pertaining to Subject who was a Staff Employee.

f. Item 30 - No record in CCS of correspondence or other communications on the matters identified involving Messrs. Helms, Angleton, and Rocca.

g. Item 36

(1) Southern Research Corporation -- No record in CCS.

(2) Wackenhut Corporation -- 100 to 150 documents covering the period 1963 to 1977 and concerning primarily contacts with Wackenhurt officials.

24

H. Clark Schor

BR

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

27 MAY 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/S-HB

ATTENTION : Mr. Joseph E. Murphy, Jr. G G 14

SUBJECT : PUGH, Robert West 03
#789 656 08

1. Reference is made to your request dated 4 January 1966 wherein you requested a Covert Security Approval to permit Subject's use as First Officer in the Far East under Project HBILKA/ 02 JBGREED. 02

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a Covert Security Approval is granted for the use of the Subject as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of Covert Security Approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Covert Security Approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-3. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

for
Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(IOS)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

0458

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

4/PN

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

SECRET

27 MAY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Executive Officer
Project HBILKA/JBGREED

SUBJECT : PUGH, Robert West
#789 656

1. Reference is made to your request dated 4 January 1966 for a Covert Security Approval to permit Subject's use as a First Officer in the Far East under Project HBILKA/JBGREED. Concurrent with issuance of the approval, the following is offered for your information.

2. Investigation has recently been completed with generally favorable results. However, Subject's military file indicated that he had been found unfit for duty due to excessive drinking, and had been allowed to retire in the best interests of the Navy. His Navy record stated that this drinking problem adversely affected his judgment, reliability, and personal behavior. This weakness had been discussed to no avail with Subject on several occasions. It should be noted that domestic inquiries developed no indication of over-indulgence since his departure from the military on October 1964.

3. Additionally, it was developed that Subject's brother Bartholomew, aka: Bart PUGH, was the Subject of an FBI investigation in 1941, which was conducted to resolve allegations regarding the loyalty of Subject's brother. Subject's brother was determined to have been associated with known Communists and was active in Communist matters in the Los Angeles, California area during this period of time. However, it was noted that these activities had caused a break with this individual and his family, who were not in sympathy with his viewpoints and activities. There was no

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

see 00
#45

SECRET

information developed during the course of this investigation which indicated any association between Subject and his brother.

4. Dissemination of the above information should be limited to Staff and Project Officials on a strict "need to know" basis.

James P. O'Connell
for Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

cc: DD/S

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET [redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, 13-6 Taipei --- ATTN: Chief, 02 HBILKA

INFO

FROM
Chief, Far East

SUBJECT
IDEN -- 02 HBILKA/KUSODA

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

1. A Covert Security Approval was granted IDEN on 27 May 1966 however the following information is forwarded for your information.

Investigation has recently been completed with generally favorable results. However IDEN's military file indicated that he had been found unfit for duty due to excessive drinking, and had been allowed to retire in the best interests of the Navy. His Navy record stated that this drinking problem adversely affected his judgment, reliability, and personal behavior. This weakness had been discussed to no avail with IDEN on several occasions. It should be noted that domestic inquiries developed no indication of over-indulgence since his departure from the military in October 1964.

Additionally, it was developed that IDEN's brother 06 Bartholomew, aka: Bart, was the subject of an FBI investigation in 1941, which was conducted to resolve allegations regarding the loyalty of IDEN's brother. IDEN's brother was determined to have been associated with known Communists and was active in Communist matters in the Los Angeles, California area during this period of time. However, it was noted that these activities had caused a break with this individual and his family, who were not in sympathy with his viewpoints and activities. There was no information developed during the course of this investigation which indicated any association between IDEN and his brother.

2. Dissemination of the above information should be limited to Staff and Project Officials on a strict "need to know" basis.

HUGH C. PARDEE

Attachment:
- IDEN (u/s/c)

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressees

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS DESTROY AFTER USE

DOC# 04589

1. A Covert Security Approval was granted IDEN on 27 May 1966 however the following information is forwarded for your information.

Investigation has recently been completed with generally favorable results. However IDEN's military file indicated that he had been found unfit for duty due to excessive drinking, and had been allowed to retire in the best interests of the Navy. His Navy record stated that this drinking problem adversely affected his judgment, reliability, and personal behavior. This weakness had been discussed to no avail with IDEN on several occasions. It should be noted that domestic inquiries developed no indication of over-indulgence since his departure from the military in October 1964.

Additionally, it was developed that IDEN's brother [Bartholomew, aka: Bart,] 06 was the subject of an FBI investigation in 1941, which was conducted to resolve allegations regarding the loyalty of IDEN's brother. IDEN's brother was determined to have been associated with known Communists and was active in Communist matters in the Los, Angeles, California area during this period of time. However, it was noted that these activities had caused a break with this individual and his family, who were not in sympathy with his viewpoints and activities. There was no information developed during the course of this investigation which indicated any association between IDEN and his brother.

2. Dissemination of the above information should be limited to Staff and Project Officials on a strict "need to know" basis.

HUGH C. PARDEE

Attachment:
- IDEN (u/s/c)

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressees

[illegible] DCI 70-1[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER 22 [FCTS]- 8572	DATE 14 JUL 1966 13 July 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER

Distribution:
1 - OS/ID/1
1 - ID/S-EB

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
ID/S-EB	J.E. MURPHY	ms	6862

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
OS/ID/1	7/13/66	
28 FE/[TSM]		
FE/SECUR	13 JUL 1966	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/FE	14 July 66	WILLIAM E. COLBY

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

3/17

14-00000

RYBAT

SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
[FCIS]-8572
22

IDENTITY SHEET

03

IDEN ------------------------------- [MR. ROBERT WEST PUGH]

[redacted]

SECRET RYBAT

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

2/pJ

Cao Nr. #

2 - 10/4/66

108 Chung Shan Road, North, 2nd Section
Taipei, Taiwan

REC'D WAS OCT 4 1966

PND-DP-66/4427 27 September 1966

03
[Mr. R. W. Pugh]
[Taipei, Taiwan] 13-6

03
Dear [Mr. Pugh:]

This letter will confirm acceptance of your resignation effective 27 September 1966 at the close of business.

A final pay check representing any unpaid salary due you less any debits you may have on the Company books will be forwarded to your bank:

Bank of America
[4th Street 08
Santa Rosa,] California.

You have given us your forwarding address as:

[756 Baird Road 08
Santa Rosa], California
U. S. A.

We thank you for your past service and wish you success in the future.

Sincerely yours,

David R. Traylor
Director of Personnel

L/cc: Paymaster
CaCA
Assistant for Personnel via [illegible], President

03
[Mr. R. W. Pugh] F/O T.C, EOD 8 February 1966

03
[Mr. Pugh] resigned effective 27 September 1966 cob. He indicated to us that he wished to quit flying and go home.

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

7/PV

14-00000

SECRET

A

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ OS/ID/1

FROM: (Division) DD/S-HB (Case officer) J.M.Clark (Extension) 6862

SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used): 03 [Pugh, Robert West]

NAME SHOWN IS: ☒ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☐ CRYPT

CI/OA NO.: 08 [789656]

201 NO.: 08 [789 656]

PROJECT: 02 [JB]GREED

DATE OF BIRTH: Unknown

PLACE OF BIRTH: Unknown

AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD: ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

Subject has resigned his employment with 02 [HB]ILKA.

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

201-789656

DATE: 6 Oct 66

SIGNATURE: for Jack M. Clark

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

4591

5/PJ

14-00000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

~~SECRET~~

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 4 January 1966

TO:	☐	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
	☒	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
	☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: DD/S-HB

SUBJECT: *(True name)* 03 [PUGH, Robert West]

PROJECT: 02 [JB]GREED

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-[789 656] 08

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☒	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Far East (General)

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

First Officer, 02 [HB]ILKA.

Dhv

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
JOSEPH E. MURPHY	6862	

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

~~SECRET~~

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

4/W

11507

— Mrs Egerter —

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE 29.7.68

SUBJECT OSWALD — Nosenko

FILE NUMBER

1. On 26 July Mr. Rocca C/CI/R&A called to my attention an aspect of Nosenko's information which must be thoroughly examined when we attempt to assess analyze Nosenko's story about the OSWALD case. Rocca has been reading all the latest from N re OSWALD and it is his impression there are not only gaps in the info from the standpoint that N should know more but also some aspects which don't ring true.

2. Recently Rocca received from the [British] information about the activities of RIMA SHURAKOVA who has been in the UK [in touch with a British controlled source (a gov't clerk) judged]

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

FORM 1954

CLASSIFICATION

525-126

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE	
SUBJECT	
FILE NUMBER	

[to be reliable] It is ROCCA's impression (I have not examined this case thoroughly) that the Soviets have initiated to try to make SHURAKOVA look clean, i.e., that she has not had a KGB role and is only an Intourist interpreter — to support N's thesis. This is questionable on its surface. At any rate the [controlled British] source and SHURAKOVA visited Mme Toussad's Wax works museum where SHURAKOVA had a visible reaction when seeing OSWALD display, although this visit was entirely innocent on the part of the source [—] [British] i.e., it was not done deliberately. SHURAKOVA's reaction indicated suspicion that this was a provocation

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

FORM 7-62 1954

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

SECRET
SENSITIVE

IG 75-0509

7 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Requests from Mr. Ober for Basic
Documentation Circa Mid-1967

1. Subsequent to his second appearance before the Rockefeller Commission on 3 February 1975, Mr. Ober returned to Headquarters the afternoon of 6 February and the morning of 7 February to continue his review of the files he had developed while Chief, CI/SO. At the request of the Commission, he was particularly interested in locating documentation which supported the creation of the Special Counterintelligence Operation.

2. He had previously taken note of the 15 August 1967 memorandum from the DDP to C/CI but was interested in determining whether there was any other documentation that could be used. In this context I showed him the following list of documents which I had unearthed in various and sundry places:

TAB A	4 August 1967 memorandum from Mr. Fred Vinson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice to the Director of Central Intelligence
TAB B	The Director's response to TAB A
TAB C	DIRECTOR 25628, 4 August 1967 -- book message originated in WH Division in response to TAB A
TAB D	WH/COG 67-259, 10 August 1967 -- Memorandum from Mr. Broe, C/WH Division, to Mr. Houston, General Counsel, detailing actions taken to respond to the 4 August letter of Mr. Vinson (TAB A)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014848

SENSITIVE
SECRET

5862
([illegible])

TAB E	Relay of DIRECTOR 25628, 9 August 1967, to Brussels
TAB F	DIRECTOR 26741, 10 August 1967, sending essentially the same message as DIRECTOR 25628 to additional European stations, specifically Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo, Stockholm.
TAB G	DIRECTOR 27069, 11 August 1967, to Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo, Stockholm, asking for cabled replies to DIRECTOR 26741 (TAB F)
TAB H	DIRECTOR 32283, 31 August 1967, bearing on DIRECTOR 26741 (TAB F)
TAB I	21 September 1967 memorandum from J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice, to Mr. Lawrence Houston, General Counsel, CIA
TAB J	22 September 1967 memorandum from the General Counsel to the Director of Current Intelligence, Subject "Stokely Carmichael"
TAB K	28 September 1967 memorandum from J. Walter Yeagley to Mr. Lawrence Houston
TAB L	28 September 1967 memorandum from J. Walter Yeagley to Mr. Houston
TAB M	3 October 1967 memorandum from Mr. Houston to Mr. Yeagley

TABs I through M were located in a file held by the Office of General Counsel entitled "Stokely Carmichael". The original letter to Mr. Helms (TAB A) and his reply (TAB B) were located in a file held by C/WH Division, as was a copy of the memorandum from Mr. Broe to Mr. Houston (TAB D). The cables (TABs C, E, F, G and H) were located in DDO/OPS/ITG RYBAT MHALPHA/MHPASHA chronos.

3. In the OGC file (Subject: Stokely Carmichael), there is a series of memoranda from the DDI to Mr. Houston which is obviously in reply to the Department of Justice requests for information on Stokely Carmichael and his travels to Europe and Africa in the fall of 1967. Mr. Houston obviously served as the point of relay for these memoranda to the Department of Justice.

4. Mr. Ober's second request was to try to locate documentation from either the President or the White House to the Director in mid-to-late October 1967 wherein the President asked the Director to prepare a study on "International Connections with the United States Peace Movement".

5. A 31 October 1967 memorandum for the record prepared by Mr. Ober details a meeting held by C/CI Staff wherein C/CI states that the President has directed such a study be made and indicates that the CI Staff will be the DDP unit responsible for providing DDP information to the DDI which will be charged with writing the study.

6. A 1 November 1967 memorandum for the record written by Mr. Ober details the first meeting between the DDI and the DDP on the subject of this study. Mr. Ober represented the DDP while Mr. Godfrey (Director of OCI), Mr. Lehman and Mr. Peter Dixon Davis represented the DDI. Mr. Davis was designated by the Director, OCI to draft the study.

7. A third memorandum for the record prepared by Mr. Ober on 1 November 1967 entitled "Progress Report" details action which he had taken at the request of Mr. Angleton to set in motion the necessary actions to collect information not only from DDP overseas stations but from other government agencies which would be necessary in order for the DDI to properly prepare this study.

8. DIRECTOR 49260, dated 2 November 1967, sent from the Assistant DDP, Mr. Cord Meyer, slugged RYBAT MHPASHA, levied the requirement on all field stations to produce information which could contribute to this study.

9. I was unable to locate any document from the President or the White House in CI/SO records and finally contacted Mr. Dixon Davis in OCI. He stated that the DDI has also searched its records looking for a memorandum from the White House requesting a study but had been unable to locate one. He did, however, have a copy of two memoranda, apparently prepared as cover sheets to transmit the finished study to the President on 15 November 1967. Xerox copies of these two memoranda are attached as TABs N and O.

10. Mr. Ober was specifically desireous of taking copies of TABs N and O with him to use in his next appearance before the Rockefeller Commission. He recognized that, under the current ground rules, he had to clear this with Mr. Knoche. I arranged for Mr. Knoche to call Mr. Ober. As a result of a series of conversations between Mr. Knoche and Mr. Ober, Mr. White and Mr. Knoche and myself and Mr. Knoche, Mr. Knoche authorized Mr. Ober to take copies of TABs N and O as reference material. If asked, Mr. Ober could show these to the Rockefeller Commission but he was not authorized to leave these papers with the Commission. He was told to advise the Commission that, if they wanted copies, they would have to request same through Mr. Knoche.

11. At the request of Mr. Knoche, I am making available a copy of this memorandum to the Inspector General, specifically TABs N and O which Mr. Knoche felt had not previously been made available to that office.

Robert D Brown
Robert D. Brown, Jr.
Deputy Chief, East Asia Division

Attachments

Distribution:
1 - IG, w/atts
1 - Mr. Knoche, w/atts
1 - DC/OPS, w/atts
1 - ADDO, w/atts
1- DCEA, w/atts

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WE

ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
▨ ABSTRACT
▨ MICROFILM

SUBJECT Liaison/UNION
Report on Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echasabal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: DIR 39176, 1 February 1962

1. As stated in reference, attached for passage to UNION are two copies of a report on Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echasabal; the original of this report was given to UNION/11 on 6 February 1962.

2. The last paragraph of attachment contains our request for the results of the debriefing of Subject.

MORTIMER F. BINGHAM

Attachment:
Report (2 cc u.s.c.)

Distribution:
3 - Paris

2 - WE/3 w/att
1 - RI w/att

D4170

DATE TYPED 7 Feb 1962	DATE DI 12
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFPW-32716	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-244918	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST
WE/3	Anne Silbert	nes

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

5 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : M. de Vosjoli

SUBJECT : Report on Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echazabal

Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echazabal was born in Cuba on 17 August 1913. He has a master's degree in agriculture, professedly has no religion but is a Mason. RODRIGUEZ is married to Edith JONES, who was born in Cuba on 10 March 1917; she is, however, of Haitian origin, being the daughter of a former Haitian Ambassador to Belgium, and she is a devout Episcopalian. The couple is known to have three children: a son who was last reported to be in Havana, Cuba; a daughter married to a man of German birth who was employed in the Castro land-reform organization until his departure for Germany in December 1961; and a son, Antonio RODRIGUEZ Jones, born 24 August 1943 at Havana, who was studying at the Ecole Francaise Internationale in Washington, D.C. in 1961. This son has been reported to be anti-U.S. and to have requested permission of his father to go to Cuba or to another "socialist" country to continue his education.

Antonio RODRIGUEZ Jones resided in Washington, D.C. with Yvonne JONES, his aunt and sister of the wife of Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echazabal. Miss JONES was born 10 April 1910 at Antwerp, Belgium; she was unmarri and was a secretary at the Pan American Health Organization. She became a U.S. citizen in 1959. Since the Castro regime has come to power, Miss JONES is said to have spoken quite openly for Castro and against the U.S. Government.

RODRIGUEZ lived in Haiti for about eighteen years prior to the commencement of his diplomatic career, having been barred by the Batist government from returning to Cuba. He became a Haitian citizen and was the owner of a Port-au-Prince meat market called "El Oso Blanco". Whe Castro assumed power in Cuba, RODRIGUEZ took over the Cuban Embass in Port-au-Prince in January 1959 after the Batista-appointed officials had fled to the Dominican Republic. Soon thereafter he was named Ambassado to Haiti.

Following his appointment to the diplomatic post, RODRIGUEZ continu to maintain contact with persons in opposition to President Duvalier of Hai

Citizen of Cuba NOV 1957

[illegible]

In late July 1959, Haiti was invaded by a small group of Cubans, supposedly as a prelude to an invasion of the neighboring Dominican Republic. The incursion was successfully repelled by the Haitian Government, which publicly charged RODRIGUEZ with complicity in the raid. RODRIGUEZ the closed the Cuban Embassy and returned to Cuba after selling his private property in Haiti.

While RODRIGUEZ was still in Haiti, two attempts were made on his life. He accused the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic and, indirectly, the Haitian Government of complicity in those attacks.

In November 1959, RODRIGUEZ went to Guatemala as Cuban Ambassado There, he appears to have associated freely with pro-Communist groups. I March 1960, he was requested by the Guatemalan Government to leave the country on the ground that he was engaging in activities inimical to the best interests of Guatemala.

In November 1960, RODRIGUEZ reported to Karachi, Pakistan, as Cub Ambassador. His wife accompanied him there and served as his chief secretary. During the initial months of his tour there, his closest relation in the diplomatic colony were with officials of the Belgian Embassy, presumably as a result of the fact that Belgium had represented Cuba when there was no Cuban representative in Karachi. During 1961, however, his social contacts were almost exclusively with Soviet, satellite and Chinese Communist diplomatic personnel.

In late 1961, when RODRIGUEZ apparently had decided to defect, he confided to an acquaintance in the diplomatic colony that he was finished with politics and wanted to devote the rest of his life to agriculture. He ho at the time to go to the Dominican Republic or to another, unspecified Sout American nation. At the time of his departure from Karachi by air for Germany in early 1962, RODRIGUEZ reportedly made only a very limited statement at the airport regarding his defection. The event apparently received very little, if any, press notice in Pakistan.

Insufficient information exists at present to permit a determination as t the genuineness of RODRIGUEZ's disaffection with the Castro regime. Fo reasons which have not as yet been fully reported, the Department of State denied a visa to RODRIGUEZ, apparently after he had made the decision t resign his post in Pakistan. We understand, however, that, following his

[redacted]

Citizen of Cuba
[illegible]

arrival in France in January 1962, he received permission from French authorities to travel to and reside in Martinique. It appears that he left France on 31 January 1962 en route to Martinique.

This service would appreciate having the results of any debriefing of RODRIGUEZ by French authorities, with particular reference to the reasons for his resignation and his plans for the future.

1. QJWIN
2. WIROGUE
3. DOUGLAS L. FREAPANE
4. ZRMETAL
5. Jim ARETZ
6. JACK MALONE
7. MICHAEL MALONE
8. PHILLIP G. ELMARD
9. AMRAZZ-1
10. AMKNOB-1
11. CUIS

12. AMSWIRL-1
13. AMLEO-3
14. DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS (all aliases and pseudos
15. MICHAEL J. KING (all aliases and pseudos)

14-00000

Crypt request- from Leslie Wizelman
2/15/78

1. AMBLEAK-1
2. TYPIC
3. AMPANIC-2
4. AMPORT
5. AMLOON-1
6. AMJAG
7. PACHUKE
8. AMBANG-5
9. ~~JA*~~ JMZIP
10. AMBRONC-1
LL. AMOT-2 (201-266348)
12. ESVEHICLE-1
13. QDDALE
14. MADD
15. AMBUT
16. JMATE
17. BELL (pseudo)??
18. AMCORE 2
19. QDBIAS
20. LITAINT
21. AMTIKI-1
22. AMGUPPY-1
23. AMFACET-1
24. AMBANG
25. Nodal
26. AMBUD-1
27. ESCOLEO 1
28. Ponchay
29. KOLASO
30. JMTIDE
31. JMFIG
32. AMCLATTER-5 9 (201-262# 136)
33. AMBRUSH
34. AMCOOP-1
35. AMMOT-87 (201-292118)
36. AMPATROL
37. AMCONCERT-1
38. AMSPELL
39. Scorgory
40. HULAKE-1
41. Willard Carr
42, Wallace Parlett
43. Corbuston
44. AMABILE
45. AMPALMS
46. HUMAIL
47. Guymers
48. JMRAND

14-00000

Wrzelman

1 x AMCLATTER 1
2 x Parlett, Wallace A.
3 x AMPALM 5
4 AMNorm - Nino Diaz
5 ✓ Alberto Fernandez Echevarria - Don Hogan's friend
6 CIRAKE 3
7 CIRAKE 6
8 AMECRU-1
9 AMSLAW-1
10 AMIRON
11 AMJAG
12 QD-DALE
13 Playdon
14 ODOATH
15 AMJUT or AMJUTE-1
16 AMRUNG-1
17 AMGLEN-1
18 AMPANIC-14
19 NOTLOX
20 POLBUP
21 PEKRED
22 Maestre
23 Jim Pekich - True name - Office of Security
24 NYONE
~~25~~ ~~A-1~~
25 ODURGE
26 ORRISON
27 OLien
28 JMNET

Bender = Droller -
Gupton

~~1 [illegible]~~
~~2 [illegible]~~
~~3 [illegible]~~
4 AMNorm - Nino Diaz
5 Alberto Fernandez Echevarria - Don Hogan's friend
~~6 CIRAKE 3~~
~~7 CIRAKE 6~~
~~8 [illegible] 1~~
~~9 AMSLAW 1~~
~~10 AMIRON~~
~~11 AMJAG~~
~~12 QDDALE~~
13 Playdon
14 DOATH
15 ~~[illegible]~~
~~16 [illegible] 1~~
~~17 AMGLEN 1~~
~~18 [illegible] 14~~
19 NOTLOX
20 POLBUP
21 PEKRED
22 Maestre
23 Jim Pekich - True name - Office of Security
24 NYONE
~~25 A 1~~
~~25 ODURGE~~
~~26 ORRISON~~
~~27 [illegible]~~
28 JMNET

14-00000

All Pseudos and aliases of ([illegible]
E. Howard HUNT —
(fill in name) TRATHCANTE —
(fill in name) ROSELLI —
~~GILLESPIE~~
AMEER
CIGAR
KUTUBE
AMPATROL
ZRCHEST
MARTEGANI, EDGAR B.
AMCLATTER-1
AMPALM-5
AMCLATTER-5
AMHAWK-2
AMHAWK-1
BGACTRESS
CIRAKE-1
JMNET
MEIGS, JOHN R.
LANGTRY,
MASH
AMCHIRP
AMPALM-4
AMWAIL-3
HUMAIL
QDCOVE
GALBOND

14-00000

All Pseudos and aliases of: (include DOA:)
E. Howard HUNT — listed on back
(fill in name) TRATHCANTE — no Record
(fill in name) ROSELLI — No Record
~~GILLESPIE — need more information~~
AMEER — LA/Reg. Cuba
CIGAR — LA/Reg.
✓ KUTUBE — old crypt for: Foreign Int. Staff — New crypt: WO Duster now PCS Staff
AMPATROL — LA/Reg.
✓ ZRCHEST — special cable Routing ind. for sensitive CI CASE
✓ MARTEGANI, EDGAR B. — (T) Kinsman, Norman Richard DOA: 16 Jul 62
AMCLATTER-1 — LA/Reg.
AMPALM-5 — LA/Reg.
AMCLATTER-5 — LA/Reg.
AMHAWK-2 — LA/Reg.
AMHAWK-1 — LA/Reg.
✓ BGACTRESS — old crypt for International organization Div — New crypt: RT Winner now CA Staff
CIRAKE-1 — LA/Reg.
JMNET — LA/Reg.
✓ MEIGS, JOHN R. — (T) Jacobs, Arthur L. DOA: 13 DEC 54
✓ LANGTRY, ELMO R — (T) Rastetter, Richard Wm.
MASH — EUR/Reg.
AMCHIRP — LA/Reg.
AMPALM-4 — LA/Reg.
AMWAIL-3 — LA/Reg.
HUMAIL — LA/Reg.
QDCOVE — LA/Reg.
GALBOND — EUR/Reg.

Dunlam x1253

Hunt-

(P) TERENCE S. CRABANIC

DOA: 02 DEC 60

(P) TWICKER, WALTER C.

DOA: 26 DEC 50

COMPROMISED: 02 DEC 60

(P) RITTENHOUSE, JOHN F.
DOA: 12 SEP 50
CANC: 26 DEC 50

(P) CHUMLEY, BERNARD F.
DOA: 09 DEC 49
CANC: 12 SEP 50

POST OFFICE ALIAS NEWSTEAD, HUGH W.
DOA: 09 DEC 49

ALIAS - HAMILTON, EDWARD J.
DOA: 20 SEP 60

ALIAS - HAMILTON, EDUARDO J.

DOA: 20 SEP 60

14-00000

All Pseudos and aliases of (manual

E. Howard HUNT —

(fill in name) TRAFFICANTE —

(fill in name) ROSELLI —

BS

~~GILLESPIE~~

~~AMEER/1 - 4844 - Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango~~

~~CIGAR - NR~~

~~KUTUBE - 2345 - Foreign Intelligence Staff~~

~~AMPATROL - NR~~

~~ZRCHEST~~

~~MARTEGANI, EDGAR B. - 22335 - Norman Richard KINSMAN~~

~~AMCLATTER-1 - 2531~~

~~AMPALM-5 - [illegible] - Luis Felipe BALLORIN~~

AMCLATTER-5 - 3905 - Alberto de Jesus ALBERTY Garcia

~~AMHAWK-2 - 4575 - Jesus Exposito LORENZO~~

~~AMHAWK-1 - 1397 - Manuel Antonio VARONA~~

BGACTRESS - 2633 - IO Division

~~CIRAKE-1 4698 - Jose SOBRINO Duguez~~

JMNET NR

MEIGS, JOHN R. - 5479 - Arthur JACOBS

LANGTRY, ELMO R. - 2939 - Richard W. RASTETTER

~~MASH NR~~

AMCHIRP (6) different ones

AMPALM-4 - 4375 - Angel FERNANDEZ Varela

~~AMWAIL-3 - 4349 - Joaquin SANJENIS Perdomo~~ DEAD

HUMAIL (2) different ones

QDCOVE - 3849 - Ricardo Luis de la LORIE Bals

GALBOND, ~~Oliver G. 2745~~ J. Caldwell KING DEAD

~~[illegible]~~

~~- E. Howard Hunt -~~

~~(Italian name) TRATHCANTE -~~

~~(Italian name) ROSELLI -~~ Barbara / CH

~~GILLESPIE~~)

~~AMEER~~

~~CIGAR~~

~~KUTUBE GILLESPIE~~, (Pseudo)

~~AMPATROL~~

~~ZRCHEST TRATHCANTE~~, (Pseudo)

~~MARTECANI, EDGAR B.~~

~~AMCLATTER~~-1

~~AMPALM-5~~

~~AMCLATTER-5~~

~~AMHAWK-2~~

~~AMHAWK-1~~

~~[illegible]~~

~~CIRAKE-1~~

~~JMNET~~

~~[illegible], JOHN R.~~

~~LANGTRY ROSELLI~~, (Pseudo)

~~(JM)MASH~~

~~AMCHIRP~~

~~AMPALM-4~~

A~~MWAIL~~-3

~~HUMATE~~

~~QDCOVE~~

(Pseudo ~~GALBOND~~)

14-00000

SECRET

16 February 1978

SUBJECT: Request for Cuba Desk Crypts by
House Select Committee on Assassinations

1. CI Staff asked that we provide the identity of the following crypts and pseudos in response to a request from the HSCA. In responding, I asked the CI Staff to please let us know, in advance, any such future requests from the HCSA relating to Cuba and Cuban operations.

41	AMEER	I assume this is AMEER-1 who is Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango 201-19245
	CIGAR	(Check with Venezuela Branch - the CI digraph was assigned to that area).
	KUTUBE	Foreign Intelligence Staff
42	AMPATROL	We have a AMPATROL-1 201-743531 - Jose Antonio GOMEZ Perez
	Gillespie (p)	?
	TRATHCANTE (pseudo)	This no doubt is the Mafia figure, true name Santos TRAFFICANTE.
43	AMCLATTER-1	Bernard L. Barker (true) 201-251689
44	AMPALM-5	Jose Ignacio Augusto RASCO y Bermudez 201-274330

SECRET

#4474

45	AMCLATTER-5	Alberto de Jesus ALBERTY Garcia 201-262136
	AMHAWK-2	Jesus EXPOSITO Lorenzo 201-281692
	AMHAWK-1	Manuel Antonio VARONA y Loredo 201-196435
	CIRAKE-1	Check with Venezuela Desk. CI digraph was assigned to that desk.
	JMNET	
	Roselli (pseudo)	This no doubt is the Mafia type, Johnny Roselli.
	MASH	
	AMCHIRP	Which number? there are several.
46	AMPALM-4	Angel FERNANDEZ Varela 201-273453
47	AMWAIL-3	Joaquin SANJENIS Perdomo 201-266348 - Deceased.
	HUMAIL	Which number, there are several. Check with the appropriate area deak assigned the digraph HU Costa Rica
48	QDCOVE	Ricardo Luis de la LORIE-Bals 201-262328
49	GALBOND (pseudo)	This was Oliver G. GALBOND, pseudo for former C/WHD, Col. J. Caldwell King, deceased.

	BGACTRESS	IO Division
	Meigs, John R	Arthur Jacobs (true name)
	Langtry, Elmo R.	Richard W. Rastetter (true name)
50	PARLETT, Wallace L.	Gerard Droller (true name-retired)
	AMNORM	Which number - there are several.
	CIRAKE-3	
	CIRAKE-6	
51	AMECRU-1	Guillermo ALONSO Pujol
52	AMSLAW-1	Pedro Julio MARTINEZ Fraga y Fernandez
53	AMIRON	(FRD) Frente Revolucionario Democratico-(Revolutionary Democratic Front)
54	AMJAG	Justo A. CORRILLO Hernandez
55	QDDALE	William D. Pawley (true name-deceased)
	PLAYDON	William D. Playdon (pseudo)
	AMJUT	No record
56	AMJUTE-1	Arnesto Napoleon RODRIGUEZ y Gonzalez
57	AMRUNG-1	Rogelio GONZALEZ y Corzo
58	AMGLEN-1	Jesus A. VALDES Cardenas

59	AMPANIC-14	Juan de Jesus ARBELO Zabaleta
	NOTLOX	Commo Circuit
	POLBUP	Commo Circuit
	PEDRED	Commo Circuit
	MAESTRE	Need more information.
	NYONE	No record
60	Orrison	Samuel G. ORRISON (pseudo); Stanley Moos (true name)
61	Olien	Woodrow C. Olien (pseudo); James A. Noel (true name - retired)

Chris Hopkins
LA/COG/CI

2. The above list constitutes those passed to Chris Hopkins and Bill Sturbitts by the CI Staff.

No. 4.

1. Jose Marie Andre Mankel
2. David Tzitzichvilli
3. DAVID U. GROVES
4. WASHINGTON, D.C.
5. ———
6. Asset – Deceased
7. Same as #6
8. JOHN P. DIMMER, JR. – RETIRED
9. JOAQUIN GODOY SOLIS
10. PIERO FEDELI MEDICI
11. Cuban Intel Service

12, Cesar DIOSADO - Customs

13, Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez
(Believe still in Cuba)

14. Walter A. BRACTON (A)
Michael M. CHOADEN (P)
Paul D. ~~AA~~ LANGEVIN (P) (com.)
David A. PADDACK (A)

15. None

1. GPIDEAL
2. LCIMPROVE
3. Gerald F. GESTETNER
4. JMJIP
5. LICALLA
6. Raymond H. GERENDE
7. ODFOAM
8. OK → LITAMIL 9
9. OK → LITAMIL
10. Lawrence F. BARKER
11. Michael M. CHOADEN (P) DOA: 21 Dec. 56
12. Walter B. BRACTON (A) DOA: 26 June 56
13. LITEMPO-4
14. OK → LITENSOR
15. LIENVOY
16. QDBIAS
17. CITASTE
18. JMARC (Cuban operations
19. AMWAIL
20. AMHAWK
21. AMYUM
22. AMYUM/1
23. GUPTON, (P)
24. JMATE
25. AMLOON/1
26. KUHOOK
27. ODURGE
28. AMDIP/1
29. AMDIP/2
30.
31.
32.

1. President John F. Kennedy
2. Counter Espionage involving Soviet Intelligence Services (World wide)
3. Herbert (NMI) MANELL
4. LA routing indicator
5. Soviet Embassy, House adjacent to Embassy backyard.
6. Ramon Joseph ALVAREZ DURANT
7. Secret Service, within Department of Treasury
8. Luis ALBERU Sonto
9. Cuban Operations
10. Robert Tyler SHAW
11. David A. PHILLIPS
12. David A. PHILLIPS
13. Liaison
14. Former Mexico President
15. Joint teletap operation
16. Pedro Luis DIAZ Lanz
17. Walter DONNELLY, Jr.
18. Overall Cuban operations
19. Justo CARRILLO Hernandez
20.
21. MRR (Revolutionary Movement)
22. Lino Benabe FERNANDEZ Martinez
23. George O. WITNER
24. Overall Cuban operations
25/ Ricardo Rafael SARDINAS Sanchez
26. Paramilitary Operations Staff
27. Imigration and Naturalization Service
28. Manuel Antonio DE VARONA
29. Jesto Exposito LORENZO
30.
31.
32.

14-00000

Lloyd K. Desmond

Leslie x 1975

Bernard REICHART

GALBOND

~~[illegible]~~

TWICKER -

GILLESPIE AMEER

CIGAR

KUTUBE

late 50's & 60's AMPATROL

Pseudos & Alias AMCLATTER-5

E. Howard HUNT Langley

" " TRATHCANTE AMCHIRP

" " ROSELLI AMPALM-4

AMWAIL-3

HUMAIL

QDCOVE

CIRAKE / 1

JMMASH (JMASH)

RBACTRESS

JMNET

AMHAWK-2 (+1)

A.R.P.

TWICKER = 1975, 9366

AMEER =

AMHAWK (DIP-1)

GALBOND - Col. King CS 3/414,382
9 October 1959.

✓ QDBIAS -
Bernard REICHART (CIA)
✓ AMULAR BOAC - Bloque de Org. Anticomunistas
✓ CITASTE
✓ JMARC (umbrella proj. for calm-Miami station ops) PONCHAY (?)? (CIA) Esteban
✓ JMNET
✓ AMBIDDY/1 - Artime
✓ AMWAIL - 1491
✓ AMHAWK - Varona?
✓ JMMASH.
BENDER - Droller (CIA)
✓ AMYUM -
✓ ZRMETAL - Wash D.C.
✓ GUPTON.
✓ AMRASP - FRD.
✓ JMATE (JMWAVE station umbrella crypt)
✓ JMZIP
✓ AMLOON/1
GILLESPIE 18-63-78

14-00000

✓ QDBIAS - Pedro Luis DIAZ Lanz
contact LA/Reg.

— Bernard REICHHART (P) ?

✓ AMULAR Ken M. CROSBY
contact LA/Reg.

A. CITASTE - Walter DONNELLY, Jr.

✓ JMARC - Ops for Cuba, overall

✓ — JMNET - no record

✓ AMWAIL - Justo CARRILLO Hernandez

✓ AMHAWK - AMDIP/1 - Manuel Antonio [redacted] VARONA
AMDIP/2 - Justo Exposito LORENZO

✓ — JMMASH - no record

✓ AMYUM - MRR (Revolutionary Movement)
/1 - Lino Benabe FERNANDEZ Martinez

✓ GUPTON (P) (T) Witwer, George O.

✓ JMATE - Ops for Cuba, overall

✓ ~~JMZIP~~ - routing indicator

✓ AMLOON/1 - Ricardo Rafael SARDINAS Sanchez

✓ KUHOOK Paramilitary Operations Staff

✓ ODURGE - Imigration + Naturalization
Service

Terry
x 1767

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO: Barb

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☒ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Dan Hardway

OF (Organization)

☐ PLEASE CALL ⟶ PHONE NO. CODE/EXT.

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

True names for Pseudos (7)

need (over)

RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME

STANDARD FORM 63 GPO : 1969—o48—1 41-1 332-389 63-108
REVISED AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

R. L. EASBY — la garnes. A. P. White

J. ~~R~~. BENEDUM

— ARENHART Charles E. Flick.

— Dudley ~~Ji~~ KENTONS — D. Deeling Danielson

— ~~OBOLD~~, [illegible] Victor ? ← NOC IN EUR

Orville 2 HORSFALL — Flosyan Rudolph KARTY (R) 1972

HAROLD E., DAHLGREN

3 br. 3 baths

June 1st

(T)

16th of May

6617

[illegible]

650

280

35 mm microfilm reader

GPIDEAL

LCIMPROVE

G F, GESTETNER

[redacted]

IX

JMZIP

LICALLA

GERENDE

AC.

1. AMPATROL (Project) N.R. no project - FI Reporting asset

Monteres de Zuloette

2. HUMAIL-1 - 4414 - Eduardo Alfiedo ESPINOSA de Los

(IILR) Relations

3. DTRACCOON - 10740 - International Institute of Labor
4. AMWAIL-5 - 4166 - Manuel F. GOUDIE

Executive Committee

5. AMCIGAR - 5082 Frente Revolucionario Democratico

Piedad

6. AMDIP-3 - 5812 - Ramon Augusto RUISANCHEZ y
7. LITAINT-1 - 3819 - Manuel VILLAFANA Martinez
8. KUSODA - 2332 - office of Security

Garcia

9. AMCLATTER-5 - 3905 - Alberto de Jesus ALBERITY
10. AMOT-3 - 5632 - Vincente Rafael ZORRILLA Zorrilla

1. Peter N. LICARI - 4404 - Willard H. Carr.
2. SOTHERN, Richard D - 2699 - Walpole Davis
3. GEBIEN, Sherwood M. - 2639 - Keith MacPhee
4. Jim SMITH NR
5. ENZEL, Wesley B. - 4831 - Fravel S. Brown
6. KEATOR, Eustace G. - 5701 - J. Andy Rogers.

AMCLATTER-1
PARLETT, WALLACE A.
AMPALM-5
AMNORM
CIRAKE 3
CIRAKE 6
AMECRU-1
AMSLAU-1
AMIRON
AMJAG
QDDALE
PLAYDON (Pseudo?)
AMJUT
AMJUTE-1
AMRUNG-1
AMGLEN-1
AMPANIC-14
NOTLOX
POLBUP
PEKRED
MAESTRE
NYONE
ORRISON
OLIEN
JMNET

1. AMPATROL (Project)
2. HUMAIL-1
3. DTRACCOON
4. AMWAIL-5
5. AMCIGAR
6. AMDIP-3
7. LITAINT-1
8. KUSODA
9. AMCLATTER-5
10. AMOT-3

1. Peter N. LICARI
2. SOTHERN
3. GEBIEN
4. Jim SMITH
5. ENZEL
6. KEATOR

14-00000

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9. Alberto de Jesus ALBERTY
10

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

14-00000

1. No project — A1 was an FI reporting asset
2. Eduardo Alfredo ESPINOSA de los Monteros de Zubieta
3. IILR- International Institute of Labor Relations
4. Manuel F. GOUDIE
5. Frente Revolucionario Democratico — Exec. Committee
6. Ramon Augusto RUISANCHEZ y Piedad
7. Manuel VILLAFANA Martinez
8. Office of Security
9. Alberto de Jesus ALBERTY
10. Vincente Rafael ZORRILLA Zorrilla
11. Luis CONTE Aguero

1. Willard H. CARR
2. Walpole DAVIS
3. Keith MacPhee
4. N.R.
5. Frank S. BROWN
6. J. Andy ROGERS

1. AMPATROL (Project)
2. HUMAIL-1
3. DTRACCOON
4. AMWAIL-5
5. AMCIGAR
6. AMDIP-3
7. LITAINT-1
8. KUSODA
9. AMCLATTER-5
10. AMOT-3
11. AMCORE-2

1. Peter N. LICARI
2. SOTHERN, RICHARD D.
3. GEBIEN, SHERWOOD M.
4. Jim SMITH
5. ENZEL, WESLEY B.
6. KEATOR, EUSTACE G.

Please fill in first names & initials

71 EASBY, Robert L. (T) White, Alan P.

72 BENEDUM, J. K.
Benadum, Jeremy K. (T) MunRO, George Frederick

73 AREHART, ARNOLD F. (T) Flick, Charles E.

74 JENTONS, DUDLEY P. (T) DANIELSON, J. Deering

75 HORSFALL, ORVILLE R. (T) KARTY, Floryan Randolph

76 DAHLGREN, HAROLD E, (T) Primack, Oliver N.

70 OBOLD, Victor W. — Do not need true name, only complete pseudo

Barbara
X1253

14-00000

Barbara
x1253

Most of these may be pseudos?
(If so, need first names & initials, too)

62 PLAYDON (Pseudo)? William D. (T) BARNES, Charles T.

63 ODOATH - Dept. of The NAVY New crypt: LNTUCK

NOTLOX - Possible crypt for NE DIV.

POLBUP - Possible crypt for EA

PEKRED - Possible crypt for NE

64 MAESTRE (MAESTRI), MORGAN D. (T) Lyons, Roddy B.

NYONE - No Record

JMNET - Possible crypt for LA

65 GUYMERS, Charles S. (T) Romualdi, Serafino

66 CORBUSTON, Oliver H. (T) Kent, William M.

CARR, WILLARD - No Record

67 SCORGORY, GEORGE D. (T) Sileo, Anthony L.

KOLASO - No Record

68 PONCHAY, Anthony R. (T) Esterline, Jacob D.

NODAL - Possible crypt for NE

BELL - Need more Information

MADD - NEED MORE INFO

69 PACHUKE, Dudley J. (T) MOOS, STANLEY M.

(THIS IS PART OF HIS PSEUDONYM - NOT A DIGRAPH!)

SECRET

Crypt request- from Leslie Wizelman
2/15/78

1. AMBLEAK-1 - 7370 - Estaben Jiaquin BLANCO Sanchez
2. TYPIC - Anon INDICATOR
3. AMPANIC-2 - 4594 - Antonio SANTIAGO Ruiz
4. AMPORT - 5731 - Frente Revolucionario Democratico Executive Committee
~~5. [illegible]~~
~~6. [illegible]~~
7. PACHUKE, [redacted] Staff employee
8. AMBANG-5 - ~~[illegible]~~ 6269 - Oswaldo Rodriguez MOURA
~~9. [illegible]~~
10. AMBRONC-1 - 5305 - Eduardo MARTIN y Elina
LL. AMOT-2 (201-266348) - 5631 - Jose Jeaquin SANJENIS Perdomo
12. ESVEHICLE-1 - 1143 - Miguel YDIGORAS Fuentes
~~13. [illegible]~~
14. MADD - NR
15. AMBUT - NR
~~16. [illegible]~~
17. BELL (pseudo)?? (Alias), [redacted] Employee
18. AMCORE 2 - 4848 - Luis CONTE Aguero
~~19. [illegible]~~
20. LITAINT (13) different ones
21. AMTIKI-1 - 5098 - Juan Argee PAULA y Baez
22. AMGUPPY-1 - 5336 - Ricardo Rafael SARDINAS Sanchez
23. AMFACET-1 - 6190 - Umberto FIGUERES Gonzalez
24. AMBANG - 2286 - Manuel Antonio RAY y Rivera
25. Nodal - NR
26. AMBUD-1 - 6466 - Jose MIRO Cardona
27. ESCOLEO 1 - NR
28. Ponchay - STAFF EMPLOYEE RETIRED ~~[illegible]~~
29. KOLASO - NR
30. JMTIDE - 5615 - Cabezas, Nicaragua (area 8)
31. JMFIG - 5475 - OPALOCKA (Naval Base)
~~32. AMCLATTER 5 9 (201-[illegible]36)~~
33. AMBRUSH - 7622 - Intel Section of The F. R. D.
MCOOP-1 - 6379 - Miguel XIQUES Macias
35. AMMOT-87 (201-292118) - 6391 - Mercedes Maria de los Angeles MEANA Comdina
~~36. [illegible]~~
37. AMCONCERT-1 - 2731 - Francisco Wilfredo VARONA Alonso
38. AMSPELL - NR
39. Scorgory CURRENT STAFF EMPLOYEE ~~[illegible]~~
0. HULAKE-1 - 8512 - Flores Fernando VEGA Lopez
1. Willard Carr NR
~~2. [illegible]t~~
3. Corbuston CURRENT STAFF EMPLOYEE ~~[illegible]~~
4. AMABILE - NR
5. AMPALMS - (26) different ones (op not identified)
6. HUMAIL - (2) different ones
7. Guymers, Charles S. - 2660 - Serafino ROMUALDI ✓
8. JMRAND - NR
9. AMNORM - (9) different ones

SECRET

14-00000

1. 78 Estaben Jacquín BLANCO Sanchez
2. 79 Action Unificator
3. 80 Antonio SANTIAGO Ruiz
4. 81 Frente Revoluccionario Democratico
[illegible] 82 Executive Committee
✓ 5. 83 Employee
6. 84 Oswaldo Rodriguez MOURA
7. 85 Eduardo MARTIN y Elena
8. 86 Jose Joaquin SANJENIS Perdomo
9. 87 Miguel YDIGORAS Fuentes
10. N.R.
11. N.R.
12. 88 ~~Employee~~ 1983 Restricted - Employee
13. 89 ~~N.R.~~ Luis CONTE Aguero
14. [illegible] Need number
15. ~~90~~ 91 Juan Argee PAULA y Baez
16. 92 Ricardo Rafael SARDINAS Sanchez
17. 93 Umberto FIGUERES Gonzalez
18. 94 Manuel Antonio RAY y Rivera
19. N.R.
20. 95 Jose MIRO Cardona
21. N.R.

14-00000

35

~~AMCLATTER-1 - Bernard Barker~~

~~PARLETT, WALLACE A. L.~~ - 5042 - Gerard DROLLER

~~AMPALM-5~~

~~AMNORM (9) different ones.~~

CIRAKE 3 - 5079 - Salvador ROMANI

CIRAKE 6 - 5215 - Carlos ROMERO Gonzalez

Guillermo ~~Alfonso Pujol~~ aka

AMECRU-1 - 5057 or 5062 - Guillermo ALFONSO Pujol

AMSLAW-1 - 5332 - Pedro Julio MARTINEZ Fraga y Fernandez

AMIRON - 5730 - (FRD) Frente Revolucionario Democratico

Justo A. CARRILLO Hernandez

AMJAG - 5136 - ~~Georgia M. APPLEBY~~

QDDALE - 4012 - William D. PAWLEY DEAD

PLAYDON (Pseudo?), William D. - 5037

AMJUT ~~1 - 4607~~ NR

AMJUTE-1 - 4607 - Arnesto Napoleon RODRIGUIZ y Gonzalez

AMRUNG-1 - 5293 - Rogelio GONZALEZ Corzo

AMGLEN-1 - 4606 - Jesuz A. VALDES Cardenas

AMPANIC-14 - 5203 - Juan de Jesus ARBELO Zabaleta

NOTLOX - ~~NR Commo circuit~~

POLBUP - 5728 - Commo Circut

PEKRED - ~~NR~~ " "

Julio GARCIA Garcia

~~need my~~ ugs. MAESTRE (MAESTRO Torres, Ramon Eduardo) - 21579

NYONE - NR

ORRISON, Samuel G. - 3090 - Stanley MOOS (G)

OLIEN, Woodrow C. - 2832 - James A. NOEL (7)

~~FRANET~~

To LESLIE 3/3/78

1 x AMCLATTER-1
2 x Parlett, Wallace A.
3 x AMPALM 5
4 AMNORM - Nino Diaz
5 ✓ Alberto Fernandez Echevarria - Don Hogan's friend.
6 CI RAKE 3
7 CI RAKE 6
8 AMECRU-1
9 AMSLAW-1
10 AMIRON
11 AMJAG
12 QD-DALE
13 Playdon
14 ODOATH
15 ~~AMJUI~~ or AMJUTE-1
16 AMRUNG-1
17 AMGLEN-1
18 AMPANIC-14
19 NOTLOX
20 POLBUP
21 PEKRED
22 Maestre
23 Jim Pekich - True name - Office of Security
24 NYONE
~~25~~ ~~A-1~~
25 ODURGE
26 ORRISON, Samuel B.
27 OLIEN, Woodrow C.
28 JMNET

1. Bernard L. BARKER
2. Gerard DROLLER
3. Jose Ignacio ~~Ag~~ Augusto RASCO y Bermudez
4.
5. ——
6.
7.
8. Guillermo ALONSO Pujol
9. Pedro Julio MARTINEZ Fraga y Fernandez
10. FRD
11. Justo A. CORRILLO Hernandez
12. William D. PAWLEY
13.
14. Dept of NAVY
15. Arnesto Napoleon RODRIGUEZ y Gonzalez
16. Rogelio GONZALEZ y Corzo
17. Jesus A. VALDES Cardenas
18. Juan de Jesus ARBELO Zabaleta
19.
20.
21.
22.
23. True name — Office of Security
24.
25. Immigration & Naturalization Service
26. Stanley MOOS
27. ~~Immigrat~~ + James A. NOEL
28.

AMLASH 2 –

AMLASH 3

UFGA

QU HOPS-1

QUSPORT 1

QU DOZE

AM CONCERT

AM NIP –

[redacted]

AM whip 1

AM BANG 1

UN SNAFU 9

201-306319 019-009-001

201-297748

201-285147

14-00000

[redacted]

Real names or Pseudos?

1- AMPATROL PROJECT

[redacted]

2- HUMAIL-1

3- DTRACOON "Talks

4- AMWAIL-5

5- AMCIGAR

6- AMDIP-3

7- LITAINT-1

[redacted] 8- Kusoda

9- AMCLATTER-5

10- AMOT-3

1- Peter N. Licari

2- Sothern

3- Gebien

4- Jim Smith.

5- Enzel

6- Keator

MKCHARITY [redacted] OTS

~~Allard~~
827-0396

14-00000

Forward operating base
Radio network

22, 96 Employee Restricted
23. N.R.
24, 97 CABEZES Nicaragua
25, 98 OPA LOCKA (Naval Base)
26. 99 Intel Section of the FRD
27, 100 Miguel XIQUES Macias
28. 101 Mercedes Maria de los Angeles MEANA Condina
29. 102 Francisco Wilfredo VARONA Alonso
30, 103 [illegible] D.R.E.
31, 104 Employee Restricted
32, 105 Florfa Fernando VEGA Lopez
33. ~~N.R.~~ True name employed
34. 106 Employee Restricted
35. N.R.
36. Need number - Media assets
37. Need number
38. 109 Serafino ROMUALDI
39. N.R.
40. Need number
41. [illegible] 90 Ricardo Luis da la LORIE Bals

David Ferrie

Pedro Diaz Lanz

Victor Dominado Espinosa Hernandez

✓ Carlos Evardo 278755 Hernandez-Sanchez

Acelo Pedro Amores

Bernardo DeTorres

Mike McLaney

Fred Lee Crisman

ESPIN

Leslie W.

1. AMBLEAK-1
2. TYPIC
3. AMPANIC-2
4. AMPORT
5. Dalley J. PACHUKE- Sam formerly Orrison
6. AMBANG-5
7. AMBRONC-1
8. AMOT-2
9. ESVEHICLE-1
10. MADD
11. AMBUT
12. BELL, Leroy
13. AMCORE
14. LITAINT
15. AMTIKI-1
16. AMGUPPY-1
17. AMFACET-1
18. AMBANG
19. NODAL
20. AMBUD-1
21. ESCOLED-1
22. PONCHAY

23. KOLASO
24. JMTIDE
25. JMFIG
26. AMBRUSH
27. AMCOOP-1
28. AMMOT-87
29. AMCONCERT
30. AMSPELL
31. SCORGORY
32. HULAKE-1
33. WILLARD CARR
34. CORBUSTON
35. AMABILE
36. AMPALMS -
37. HUMAIL
38. GUYMERS
39. JMRAND
40. AMNORM
41. QDCOVE

MAJOR
ZR/~~[illegible]~~

for Ed Lopez

Crypts

JM/BAR

WO/FIRM

KUBARK

~~KO/BARK~~

ODYOKE

KUSODA

LNYAPA

ODENVOY

AMBARB-1

AMSHAG-1

SMSWIRL-I

1. REDWOOD
2. KUJUMP
3. ODACID
4. LPOVER
5. KUDOVE
6. AEOCEAN
7. REDCOAT
8. SATINWOOD
9. AEFAIRWAY

14-00000

ODFOAM —

LITEMPO-4

Liaison

LITENSOR

Former Pres Mexi

LIENVOY

Joint TELTAP

MEXI 7014 (IN 66781)

@ ~~Oct~~ 63

1. ACTION INDICATOR FOR SE DIVISION.
2. OFFICE OF OPERATIONS (OO)
3. STATE DEPARTMENT
4. CONOVER-MAST PUBLICATIONS, INC.
5. DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS/CS
6. PERSONS TRAVELLING LEGALLY OR PLANNING TRAVEL TO USSR (FI)
7. INFO INDICATOR FOR SE DIVISION.
8. FOREIGN LIAISON SERVICE.
9. CONTRACT AGENT - (LEGAL TRAVELLER)

Umbrella
FI Project for
indiv.
travelling [illegible] to
on [illegible] legally
USSR
Redskin

1. REDWOOD

2. KUJUMP

3. ODACID

4. LPOVER

5. KUDOVE

6. AEOCEAN - ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ Field agent living in Stockholm, attending Moscow Youth Festival 25 July 57

7. REDCOAT

8. SATINWOOD

9. AEFAIRWAY - Contract agent (Student) (Legal Traveller) David Dinsmore COMEUP

Leif HEILBERG
Wm D. BEAL
Phil Robert NIELSEN
Sharon SHAPIRO
Alfred
Cmdr. Charles PALMER, Jr.
Janice FJELLMAN

Adolf RAFALOVICH
Yura MEKLER

14-00000

1 REDWOOD - Action Indicator FOR SR Div.

2 KUJUMP - office of OPERATIONS

4 LPOVER - For info. call CCS/Reg.

5 KUDOVE - Deputy Director FOR Plans
Clandestine Services

6 AEOCEAN - SE/Reg - (For info. call)

7 REDCOAT - Info. Indicator FOR Soviet/East
European Division

8 SATINWOOD - For info. call EUR/Reg.

9 AEFAIRWAY - Se/Reg. (FOR info. call)

All aliases & pseudos of:

① DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS
(P) Langevin, Paul D. (com.)
– (P) Choaden, Michael M.
✓ (A) Bracton, Walter B.
(TA) Paddack, David A.

② MICHAEL J. KING

14-00000

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO:

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Betsy Palmer

OF (Organization)

☐ PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. ______ ☐ FTS

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

Iden of

AMSHOT/1 ?

Asset

RECEIVED BY E	DATE	TIME

63-109

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

☆U. S. GPO:1977-0-234-508

Betsy Palmer

WOFACT

CIA

1. REDWOOD
2. KUJUMP
3. ODACID
4. LPOVER
5. KUDOVE
6. AEOCEAN
7. REDCOAT
8. SATINWOOD
9. AEFAIRWAY

Canada

KEYWAY — EUR action indicator

SMABOVE-9 — John Starnes Director General of RCMP Security Service

SMABOVE — RCMP Security Service

LNERGO — FBI

SMABLE RCMP

Tony! U.S. and Canada!

3530

7676

Cindy Miller

~~George~~ Bondlick

Geo. 1106

Terry 9359

C.U. Igloo 2:30

today 3:45 IE74

Dottie Pullen

[redacted]

Elaine X5441

Panorama 5 Thursday

Epstein X7407

John J. Maury-Terry

W. H. HARVEY

1 x AMCLATTER 1
2 x Parlett, Wallace A.
3 x AMPALM 5
4 AMNorm - Nino Diaz
5 Alberto Fernandez Echevarria - Don Hogan's friend
6 CIRAKE 3
7 CIRAKE 6
8 AMECRU-1
9 AMSLAW-1
10 AMIRON
11 AMJAG
12 QD-DALE
13 Playdon
14 SDOATH
15 AMJUT or AMJUTE-1
16 AMRUNG-1
17 AMGLEN-1
18 AMPANIC-14
19 NOTLOX
20 POLBUP
21 PEKRED
22 Maestre
23 Jim Pekich - True name - Office of Security
24 NYONE
~~25 A-1~~
25 ODURGE
26 ORRISON
27 OLien
28 JMNET

SECRET

1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]
3. DOUGLAS L. FREAPANE
4. ZRMETAL - Washington D.C.
5. Jim ARETZ - Need more info
6. [~~JACK MALONE~~] Asset - Deceased
7. [~~MICHAEL MALONE~~] Same as 6
8. PHILLIP G. ELMARD
9. AMRAZZ-1
10. AMKNOB-1
11. CUIS - Cuban Intel Service

SECRET

SECRET

12. AMSWIRL-1

13. AMLEO-3

~~14. DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS (All aliases and pseudos)~~

~~15. MICHAEL J. KING (All aliases and pseudos)~~

Check ISS

SECRET

LNERGO - FBI

BKTRUST - CIA

LNAGON - Bureau of Narcotics
LNAGON
& Dangerous Drugs

?
BKCLOWN - EA

BKHERALD - CIA

SECRET

3. DAVID V. GROVES

8. John P. Dimmer, Jr.   Retired

9. Joaquin GODOY Solis

10. Piero FEDELI Medici

14. Cesar DIOSDADO - Customs

13 Jose Richardo RABEL Nunez
(Believe still in Cuba)

SECRET

1. Jose Marie Andre Mankel
2. David Tzitzichvilli
3. DAVID U. GROVES
4. WASHINGTON, D.C.
5. —
6. Asset – Deceased
7. Same as #6
8. JOHN P. DIMMER, JR. – RETIRED
9. JOAQUIN GODOY SOLIS
10. PIERO FEDELI MEDICI
11. Cuban Intel Service

12, Cesar DIOSADO - Customs

13, Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez
(Belive still in Cuba)

14, Walter A. BRACTON (A)
Michael M. CHOADEN (P)
Paul D. LANGEVIN (P) (com.)
David A. PADDACK (A)

15, None

14-00000

For → Pat ORR - HSCA

AMTAUP-2 - Oscar ANGULO Reyes
AMLAME-1 Arturo SUEIRAS y Cruz
AMBLEAK-1 - Fernando F. CABADA Jr.
AMICE 27 - Nestor Antonio MORENO Lopez
AMING-1 abel MESTRE

all alia's + psydonyms used by:
1 David Atlee Phillips
2 Micheal J. King.

Id. of

3 QJWIN
4 WI ROGUE
5 Douglas L. FrEAPANE
6 ZR METAL
7 FNU ARETZ
8 JAck MAlONE
9 MichEAl MAlONE
[redacted]
10 Phillip G. ELMARD
11 AMRAZZ/1

12 AMKNOB/1
13 CUIS
14 AMSWIRL/1
15 AMLEO/3

14-00000

19 Jan

a. COL. SPORL
b. F. LEE Chrisman
c. LAVERNE CrAFArd
d. Charles J. STEIN
e. LEMAR WiLSON
f. Louis P. DAVIS
g. CHARLES SIRAGUSA
h. JAMES EARL RAY
i. ARTHUR HANES

were above employees agents or informants

591-1026

⑨ 6:30

Gail [redacted]

591-6948



137

15

Joe Griffith

Ed [redacted] SCANNELL

[redacted] Ⓣ

Frias Ramirez [redacted]

Ⓣ Juan Nepomuseno

Ⓟ OLIVER G. SCANTLING, 9

AMSTRUT-2

9/4/61

14-00000

R WILL CHEC. SIFICATION TOP A

☐ LASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	PCS/LOC/Sheppeck		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: Shep: Before passing identities to HSCA please advise Scott. I am concerned with HSCA trying to contact former assets without our knowledge.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67

14-00000

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE.
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. Psychological & Paramilitary Ops Staff (PP)
2. Overall operation for Cuba
3. Artime Project
4. JACK STEWART (Retired)
5. Deceased Staff Employee - David Morales
6. DELIA FAILDE
7. Robert F. KENNEDY
8. JULIO LOBO
9. Carlos A. VALDES - FAULI MONTAZU
10. Political Action - Propaganda Against Cuba
(URBANO ARAGON)
11. ERNESTO URBANO ARAGON GODOY

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

L.Wizelman

KUCAGE
JMATE
AMWORLD PROJECT
MERTON
Staley R. ZAMKA
AMCOO
GPFOCUS
AMEMBER-1

AMLUNCH-1
AMSPELL-1
AMTOUT or TOOT (1)

Cynthia Cooper

LIETEMPO-1	
ERTHYROID-3	
PBSWING	
ODYOKE	
FBRUMEN (PBRUMEN)	Cuban
LITAMIL 9	
LITAMIL 7	
~~MANAGUA~~	
LIENVOY	
ODACID	State Dept
KUBARK	CIA
KUSOD (KUSODA)	Off of Security

1. Psychological & Paramilitary Operations Staff (PP)
2. Overall operations for Cuba
3. Artime project
4. Jack Stewart (retired)
5. Former staff employee
6. American ship owner.
7. Robert F. Kennedy
8. Cuban asset.
9. Cuban asset.
10. Political action - Propaganda against Cuba
11. Cuban asset

1. Psychological & Paramilitary operations Staff (PP)
2. Overall Operation for Cuba
3. artime Project
4. Jack Stewart (retired)
5. Deceased Staff Employee
6. american Shipowner
7. Robert F. Kennedy
8. Cuban asset
9. Cuban asset
10. Political Action - Propaganda against Cuba
11. Cuban asset

1 x AMCLATTER 1
2 x Parlett, Wallace A.
3 x AMPALM 5
+4 AMNORM - Nino Diaz
+5 Alberto Fernandez Echevarria - Don Hogan's friend
+6 CIRAKE 3
+7 ~~CIRAKE 6~~
8 AMECRU-1
9 AMSLAW-1
10 AMIRON
11 AMJAG
12 QD-DALE
+13 Playdon
+14 ODOATH
15 AMJUT or AMJUTE-1
16 AMRUNG-1
17 AMGLEN-1
18 AMPANIC-14
+19 NOTLOX
+20 POLBUP
+21 PEKEED
+22 Maestre
23 Jim Pekich - True name - Office of Security
+24 NYONE
~~25~~ ~~A-1~~
25 ODURGE
26 ORRISON
27 OLien
+28 JMNET

+ missing

SECRET

15 JUN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/ISS/IP/FIS

FROM : M. L. Latta
Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Request

REFERENCE : Letter for OLC fr Chief Counsel/Director of HSCA, dtd 8 Jun 78 (OLC #78-2039)

1. In response to the request in Reference, CCS files contain information on a Marie L. PRISBECH, a pseudonym officially assigned to Heda Massing, U.S. citizen, born 6 January 1900, who was an Agency contract agent from 1956 until her retirement in 1975. The information is contained in approximately 60 documents, virtually all of which concern the establishment and maintenance of cover.

2. CCS files contain no information on the remaining individuals listed.

/s/ M. L. Latta
M. L. Latta

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SA/DO/O
1 - 10-4H (HSCA)
1 - 19984 (Massing)
1 - CCS/PRG chrono via board
1 - MLL chrono

MLLatta:acn

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026009

[illegible]

SECRET

#4542

SECRET

10-4H (HSCA)

24 MAR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/ISS/IP/EIS

FROM : M. L. Latta
Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Request

REFERENCE : Letter for OLC fr Chief Counsel/Director of HSCA, dtd 8 Mar 78

1. In response to the request in Reference, CCS files contain information on five of the 19 individuals listed, as follows:

a. Mrs. G. Stanley Brown - Four documents contain references to Verna Deane Stebbens Brown, born 12 August 1928 in Waynoka, Oklahoma, wife of George Stanley Brown, born 18 May 1926 in Fargo, Oklahoma, an Agency employee from 1952 to 1962.

b. David E. Murphy - Approximately 100 documents concerning primarily the establishment, maintenance and use of cover for Subject during his Agency career as a Staff Employee from April 1948 to July 1975.

c. Grayson (Grayston) Lynch - Approximately 60 documents concerning the establishment, maintenance and use of cover for Subject during his Agency career from February 1961 to September 1971. Upon retirement in 1971, Subject gave Tampa, Florida, as his forwarding address.

d. Robert Moore - Approximately 50 documents concerning Robert Butler Moore, born 21 June 1913 in Hattisburg, Mississippi, an Agency Staff Employee from June 1950 to December 197[illegible]. The documents concern primarily the establishment, maintenance and use of cover for Subject during his Agency career. Among other assignments, Subject served in Miami, Florida, from 1961 to [illegible]. Upon retirement in 1970, Subject gave as

24 OS

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

#5679

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

2/PJ

SECRET

his forwarding address the following: 5711 Turner Lane, Chevy Chase, Maryland. In connection with the HSCA's desire to interview Subject - if he is identical to the subject of Reference request - CCS files indicate that Subject retired in covert (DAC) status. The HSCA should be advised that Subject's Agency affiliation remains classified information requiring protection. CCS files also contain approximately 25 documents on a Robert T. Moore, Jr., born 19 May 1937 in Woodland, California, who was an Agency Staff Employee from September 1962 to July 1972.

24,08

e. Bill Logay - Approximately 25 documents concerning William John Logay, born 27 May 1942 in Chicago, Illinois, an Agency employee from October 1967 to January 1972. The documents concern primarily the establishment, maintenance and use of cover for Subject during his Agency career. Upon resignation in 1972, Subject left no forwarding address.

2. CCS files contain no information on the remaining individuals listed in Reference request.

03

/s/ M. L. Latta
M. L. Latta

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SA/DO/O
1 - 10-4H (HSCA)
1 - RC-5128 (Brown)
1 - RC-10495 (Murphy)
1 - RC-16402 (Lynch)
1 - RC-4271 (Moore)
1 - RC-15719 (Logay)
1 - CCS/PRG chrono via board
1 - MLL/chrono

25

2

SECRET

3/7

BECKMAN, GUNNAR
3607 Jones Bridge Rd.
Chevy Chase, Md. 20015
Ret.

BAGLEY, Tenant (Tete)
56 Chemin du Gros Tienne
1328 Ohain
Belgium

ANGLETON, JAMES J.
4814 N. 33rd Rd
Arlington, Va 22207

BRICKHAM, NELSON Ret.

8409 Fenway Rd.
Bethesda, Md. 20034

Tele: ~~469-8008~~ 301-261-7328

C/SR-6 Mar 58 - Oct 1960

~~Do not know if interviewed~~

19 Dec - Goldsmith said
not interviewed
and requested interview

Called Brickham who will
call Goldsmith Collect.

Breen, George

3608 Mason St
Fairfax, Va 22030

In Tokyo

Breen, Eleanor K

In Tokyo

BULIK, Joseph J. Resigned

2425 Panorama ave.
Boulder, Colo. 80302

No phone listed

Re: C/SR-9 Dec 56 - apr 64

No way to confirm that
he is still alive [illegible]

Broe, William V.
111 Indian Trail
North Scituate, Mass 02060

tel (617) 545-6113

Interviewed at home

BRIGHT, WILLIAM C.
~~8208 Smithfield~~
Currently emp

CHRIST, AKA CARSWELL, DAN

Interviewed under alias by Cornwell & Hardway.

Chavchavadze, David Ret

3801 Wendom Pl., N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Tele: 363-7362

Re: DC/SR-6 - May-Nov 1961

234-5132

~~#~~

Bustos-Videla, Charlotte

1

pseudo ~~alias~~ Elsie Scarlatti

DONNELLY, WILLIAM S.

Current Employee

Deposed

Delaney, James E. (Jim)

[redacted]

COS Bangkok

CONEIN, LUIS (LUIGI)

Edgarton, Mildred

Sept 57 - apr 64 or Dec 6 in Research Sect Br 6 SRDiv

4415 Volta Place NW
Wash DC 20007
333-1477

Micky Goldsmith, HSCA, called and she suggested Blanche O'Connell who retired in 1977

Drury, alfred C. Ret

414 East Hewett ave
Marquette, Mich 49855
Tele: (906) 228-9855

C: DC/SR-6 - aug 54 - Mar 61

DOOLEY, Arthur Edward

FELDMAN, Robert
12412 Over Ridge Rd.
Potomac, Md. 20854

x 279-7359

ESTANCONA, Frank
Current emp. x 9439

Interviewed 28 Mar '78 1130 AM

EGERTER, ANNE (BETTY)

7

FLINT, JAMES M. (P.) Walter P. Haltigan - June 78

Current emp SE Div - 9157

Interviewed 13 June 78

Fleck, Charles E.

Ave. de los Bosques 63
Lomas de Tecamachalo 10
Edo de Mexico, Mexico.

FILL, George A (Ret)

27 Bay Tree
North Myrtle Beach, S.C. 29582

In Tokio 5/29/60 - 7/5/64

Tele: Radio St (803) 249-1610 or 2336
Home (803) 249-3192

Garbler, Paul

DC or C of SR-10 1959-62 ?

6222 W. Miramar Dr
Tuscon, Arizona 85715
(602)-885-6692

FOX, Jerome (Jerry,
PO Box 593514
Miami, Fla 33159


BERTRAM MARINE

JEROME FOX
Project Manager

3663 N.W. 21 STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33142/TELEPHONE: (305) 634-2997
A DIVISION OF Whittaker CORPORATION
TELEX: 518268

Was not in Tokyo 1963-64

" in Tokyo (Sept 59 to 23 Sept 1962 as DDI. Transferred to DDO in HQS on 29 april 1963.

This is man Wilcott identified as having told him Oswald was an agent. Leap spoke to him in Florida

---

FLORES, DANIEL

STA. IN MEXICO

Re AMMUG-1

HASHIMA, Robert S

Contract emp Tokyo

Harris, Vergil L Ret

1858 E. Glencove St.
Mesa, Arizona 82503
(602) 833-7243 (485)

Re: C/SR/6 · oct 62 - Mar 64

Goodpasture, Anne

PO BOX 372

LIVINGSTON, TENN 38570

HIDALGO, BALMES N. (BARNEY) Ret

403 Silver Rock Rd.
Rockville, Md 20851

Tele: office: 340-9354
Home: 762-1417

Re AMMUG

WAS SUBPOENED

HICKS, CALVIN Ret. Med Dis 1974

1608 Imperial Ridge
Lascruces, N. Mexi 88001

485 (505)
info: 522 7905

21aug78 In N. Dekota back in 2 weeks

Pseudo: Ledbetter, Wallace K - oct 1950

alias: Calvin Wilson Carl - Sept 1963

HELMS, Richard

4649 Garfield St NW
Washington D.C. 20007

TADATOSHI IZUMOTO (Ret Japan)
1998 Shimosaku-Nobi
Takatsu-Kui
Kawasaki-shi
Kanagawa-ken, Japan

ITO, Chester
9327 Boothe St
Alexandria, Va 22309

HUNT, Howard E
1245 NE 85th St
Miami, Florida 33138

Keenan, Thomas

Current Employee LA Div x ~~1948~~
x 9011

Interviewed 24 Mar 78 1030 AM

KARTY, Florgan Randolph
2063 Dewberry Court
West Lake Village, California 91361

KARAMESSINES, THOMAS
6726 Kennedy Lane
Falls Church, Va 22043

DEAD

534-1325

KENT, WILLIAM

836 Van Buren St
Herndon, Va 22070

437-3162

interview 22 aug '78

alias Douglas Gupton

Kenner, Rodham

P.O. BOX 3653

INDIALANTIC, FLORIDA 32903

(305) 723-0802

DC/SR-9 Dec 61 - Nov 1963

KEITH, Robert M
c/o Mrs. E. D. MORAN
115 E. Coleman
Sanford, Florida 32771 (no phone)

In Tokyo 11/30/58 to 8/30/63

LYNCH, GRAYSTON Ret. 1972

Key west Towers
apt 411 A
S. Roosevelt Blvd
Key west, Fla 33040

LEVY, Frank A. Ret (contract)

6504 Smoot Drive
McLean, Va 22101

Tele 356-7141

Re: DC/SR-9 Sept 56 - June 1960

KISEVALTER, George
1415 Julia Ave
MCLEAN, VA. 22101
356-2545

DC/SR 9

MARTIN, ELWOOD D

Route 2 Box 100
Fallston, Md. 21047

Manell, Herbert + Barbara

Currently emp.

MAGGARD, Peggy

Current Emp. 1349

Interviewed 28 Mar 78 at 1400

14-00000

McCONE, JOHN
VIA Walt Elder
CALIFORNIA

MATSUI, TOM

Still employed by Tokyo - Contract

MASON, Hope I
Current emp.

In Tokyo 6/19/61 to aug 63

Interviewed 7 apr 78

Miler, (Scotty) Newton
Star Route, Box 344
Placitas,
New Mexico 87043

McPHEE, Raymond   Resigned 1964
6003 Big Oak Road
Yardley, Penn. (in '64)
In Tokyo 1960 - oct 1963

McMILLAN, PRISCILLA Johnson

INTERVIEWED EXEC SESSION.
OWN ATTORNEY.

INFORMANT

MUNRO, George Frederick

MURPHY, DAVID

356-9523

Interviewed & deposed

NIESCIUR, DAN

current employee

14-00000

ORR, Howard

8405 Weller ave
McLean, Va 22101
893-3325
790-1990

In Tokyo 6/11/61 to 11/24/63

Interviewed 11 apr 78

OJIRI, Robert (BOB)

Contract – Log – Off. TOKYO

O'Connell, Blanche –

Biographic Section
51 Hunter St
Warrenton, Va 22186

703-347-7601

14-00000

Poole, Donald E
c/o Marvin Hayes
3006 Scotty Drive
Jacksonville, Florida 32216

(904) 731-~~3907~~ 4729

Research Sect. of ~~[illegible]~~ SR-6 fm Nov 57-apr 64

Picollo, JOSEPH

Current Emp.

Interview 11 aug 78 here

Phillips, David A.
8224 Stone TRAIL DR.
Bethesda, Md 20034
365 2238

Randall, Jack
440 Bird Key Drive
Sarasota, Florida 33577

3508 Frederick Place
Kensington, Md. 20795

Randall, Frederick
Current employee

Interview 24 Mar 78 - 1400 hrs

PUCKETT, LUIS D.

OTR - Ret.

Rocca, Raymond
400 Linden Lane
Falls Church, Va 22042

534-5110

Richardson, Jacques   Ret.
c/o COS Paris
Residing in Paris. Known to HSCA
by pseudo: Thomas P. Cassasin
Paris Sta can contact but HSCA has not responded requesting it.
Re: C/SR-6 oct 60 - aug 62

Reed, Eleanore E.

Nov 1956 - Jan 1964 in Research Sect of SR-6
1319 N. Jackson St
Arlington Va. 22201
(1970 address) - Not in phone book
527-3242

- Under nurses care for emphasemia -
Cannot speak

KYOSHI SAKI or SASAKI
~~26 Condon Court~~
San Mateo, California 94403
(451) 349-7287

Rosenbaum, LEO
1815 Apalocha Drive
McLean, Va 22101
Tele 356-5283
In Tokyo 5-29-60 to 10-25-65
Interviewed 10 apr 78.

Ronis, David
9704 Forest Glen Court
Silver Springs, Md 20910
office: 949-4338 Century 21
Home: 588-2953

OLC-78-3010 - 17 aug 78
Interview. 31 Aug 1978 - 12/00 hrs.

MLS
Century 21
SUBURBAN PROPERTIES
REALTOR
11037 viers mill road silver springs, maryland 20902
"Each office is independently owned and operated"
DAVID RONIS/property manager
bus. (301) 949-4338 res. (301) 588-2953

SAWICKI Robert

938-0664

Car DC SR-10 — 59-62(?)

Interview 21 Dec 78

SATO, HAYAMI (Ret)

3051 ala Piadla Place

Honolulu, Hawaii 96818

In Tokyo 1/10/52 - 8/2/64

ZAMBERNARDI, Robert J

Mexico Ret

SMITH, Joseph Burkholder

1301 South First Street Ocean 14
Jacksonville Beach, Fla 32250

(This is "Little Joe" author of
"Portrait of a Cold Warrior")

SLOBOGIN, Peter M. (Ret)

MISTIC AVE
Rockport, Maine 04853

In Tokyo 6-11-61 – 10-11-64

SHAW, Robert T.

3715 Acosta Road
Fairfax Va 22030

591-6445

Currently employed IG

.l..borrowed

STETSON, SHIRLEY
DCD STA. Chief

SOCALOW, SASHA.
951-0018

SNYDER, Richard E.

Brief employment

Swenson, Harold F. Ret.

Director of Corporate Security
Cesebrough - Pond's Inc
33 Benedict Place
Greenwich, Conn 06830

Tele: office: (485)(203) 661-2000 EXT 667
Home: (203) 661-1146

Re: AMMUG

approx date = post 25 July 1978 : Interviewed in DC. in Aug for 5 hours

---

Stuckey, Mary Elizabeth

Oct 1958 - Oct 1962 Research sect, SR-6

Resigned & went to NSA in 1964

1964 address: 2737 Devonshire ~~Place~~ NW
Wash 20008

ME Stuckey
4514 Connecticut ave NW
Wash DC
686-8897

may not be Mary Elizabeth

19 & 20 Dec No answer

Stewart, Averill T. Ret.

304 Cedar Lane
Largo, Florida 33540

Tele (813) 584-8020

Re: DC/SR-6 oct 61 - oct 62

TYLER, Royall
Resigned 9-17-65

To attend Columbia
3299 Cambridge Ave
apt 6K, N.Y., N.Y.

TOVAR, HUGH
Current employee

Deposed

SWIDER, Raymond
Current employee x9556

Interview 27 Mar '78/1400

Von Bretzel George J (Ret)

14801 Springfield Rd.
Germantown, Md. 20767

Tele 948-6908

In Tokyo 5-26-63 - 6-6-65

Interviewed 13 april 1978

VITALE, GUY Ret 1969
DOB 1917

107 N. Va. Ave.
Sanford, Fla 32771
485 (305) - 323 5369

Called 21 aug '78 -

Pseudo: Jeston, Hugh C. 20 Dec 1956

MINA E. VANCE (nee Voellmey)

6215 Garrett Dr.
Chevy CHASE, MD

654 - 3439

WHEELER, Robert (Pete)

6600 Millwood Rd.
Bethesda, Md. 20034
Tele 229-6368

Interviewed 13 apr 78

WATANABE, KAZUO

Contract TOKYO

(5007 Briston Dr.
Annandale, va 22003)

WATANABE, DORIS

Contract - TOKYO

WILSTED, David

Ret. MEXICO

WHITTEN, JACK

AUSTRIA - Contact VIA Station

Interviewed [illegible] IN WASHINGTON

WHITE, ALLEN P.

4100 Downing ST.

Annandale, Va 22003

YAMADA, SHIZUO
1131 University Blvd, West
apt 1109 or 1114
Silver Springs, Md 20902

WOODS, James + Louise (wife)
Current employee

Interview 27 Mar 78 0900 hrs

WINCH Richard L.
11707 Tifton Dr.
Potomac, Md. 20854

299-3530

~~Sep~~ ~~oct~~
Research Sect of SR-6 oct 60 - apr 64

33

13

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET ☐

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Bob Baker, FR/Plans		
2	BU-6		
3			
4			
5			
6	SUSAN WATKINS		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Russell Brines - POSSIBLE
Claudio Benedi
Mary Ellen Scott - POSSIBLE
Gladys Benedi - RESIGNED 29 Feb 68
Jose Manuel Berenguer
Walter Briggs
Enoc Waters POSSIBLE
Leonard J. Desmond POSSIBLE
Howard Hao-Sheng Chao ← ACTIVE - CURRENTLY NY.
Edward Hau-Sang Lee
Russell Brines - POSSIBLE
Fred Zusy - POSSIBLE
Peter Knauer
Francisco Chen

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Susan Watkins CAS 1323	29 Mar 7

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET ☐

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE

TO:

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:

Ret – Orr, Howard M. 005619
at work 790-1990

Ret. – Rosenbaum, Leo ✱ 006678

Mason, Hope J – 018943

HGS

CI 1902

Tyler, Royall ✱ 029615

~~Solobg~~

Sancomb, Rudolph W. 029582

FROM:

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

1. Jim Woods & Wife (Louise) Mon 27 Mar 0900

2 >

---

3. Fred Randall ~~[illegible]~~ Fri. 24 Mar 1400

---

4. Ray Swider - 27 Mar 1400

5. Pete Wheeler 28 Mar 78
- 10 AM -

6. Thomas Keenan -
10 30 Fri 24 Mar.

---

7. Frank Estancona
1130 28 Mar.

8) Peggy Maggard
1400 28 Mar

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	SA/DO/O		
2	SHEPANEK		
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks: This is what I worked out with Susan Watkins. She will review the subject files and she will also call Tom Crawford in Contract personnel.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Bob Baker	30 Mar 75

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

(40)

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
C/FR/Elans
2 E 19

EXTENSION 1895

MAR 31 10 28 AM '78

DATE 30 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, CAS (3D0004) EW-7 Attention: Susan Watkins				Per our telecon yesterday, I am re turning the list of names you pro vided me for checking. I am only concerned about the protection of Howard Hao-Sheng Chao. He is a current asset of the FR Base, New York. I would appreciate it if in the course of sanitizing any of the other names listed on the at tached routing slip, you would delete Howard's as well. Many thanks. Bob Baker
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				#4476

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

file 10-1H

24 JAN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : H. Clark Schor
Chief, Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations
(HSCA) Request

REFERENCES : A. Memo for SA/DO/O fr C/CCS/PRG, dtd
25 Jan 78, Same Subject

B. Memo for SA/DO/O fr OLC (OLC 78-0070/1)
dtd 12 Jan 78, Same Subject

C. Letter for OLC fr Chief Counsel/Director
of HSCA, dtd 6 Jan 78

1. This memorandum supplements Reference A and provides the additional information per paragraph 6. therein, in response to the request in Reference B.

2. CCS files contain information on individuals and entities cited in certain numbered items of Reference C as follows:

a. Item 5 - George DeMohrenschildt -- five documents comprising four contact reports with a commercial asset who was in touch with Subject regarding a business activity in Haiti, and one memorandum detailing the results of a trace request on Subject. The dates of the documents range from 25 April to 21 May 1963.

b. Item 9 - Leo Cherne -- 21 documents (six-1954; one-1955; two-1957; two-1958; one-1960; four-1962; and one each-1965, 1967, 1968, 1976, 1977) all of which concern the establishment, maintenance, and use of cover provided by Subject from 19540to 1965 for a NOC officer assigned to Paris. Additionally, CCS maintains a file on the Research Institute of America, of which Leo Cherne was Executive Director, comprising approximately 100 documents covering the period 1949 to 1964; Mr. Cherne's name appears throughout this file.

#5690

E2 IMP
CL BY

c. Item 17 - William Harvey -- Approximately 50 documents, virtually all of which concern the establishment, maintenance, and use of cover for Subject during his career with the Agency as a Staff Employee from 1947 to 1967.

d. Item 27

(1) International Rescue Committee -- 12 documents (1962 to 1976) addressing Agency non-use of IRC, and FOIA requests.

(2) Alexander Rorke -- No record in CCS.

e. Item 29

(1) Richard Helms -- Approximately 25 documents (1956 to 1974) concerned primarily with TDY travel orders, cover documentation, and clearance verifications.

(2) James Angleton -- Approximately 25 documents (1950 to 1975) concerned primarily with TDY travel orders, cover documentation, and retirement processing for Subject who was a Staff Employee of the Agency from 1947 to 1974.

(3) Raymond Rocca -- Approximately 25 documents (1964 to 1975) concerned primarily with cover matters pertaining to Subject who was a Staff Employee.

f. Item 30 - No record in CCS of correspondence or other communications on the matters identified involving Messrs. Helms, Angleton, and Rocca.

g. Item 36

(1) Southern Research Corporation -- No record in CCS.

(2) Wackenhut Corporation -- 100 to 150 documents covering the period 1963 to 1977 and concerning primarily contacts with Wackenhurt officials.

H. Clark Schor

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Adse
1 - DDO/ISS/IP/EIS
1 - 10-4H (HSCA)
1 - CS-2829 (DeMohrenschildt)
1 - CS-1337 (Research Institute of America)
1 - 18382 (Cherne mentioned)
1 - R.C. 2395 (Harvey)
1 - MO-296 (International Rescue Committee)
1 - R.C. 14876 (Helms)
1 - R.C. 801 (Angleton)
1 - R.C. 12860 (Rocca)
1 - CS-2793 (Wackenhut)
1 - CCS/PRG chrono via board

HCS/vir

14 H

SECRET

15 JUN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/ISS/IP/FIS

FROM : M. L. Latta
Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Request

REFERENCE : Letter for OLC fr Chief Counsel/Director of HSCA, dtd 8 Jun 78 (OLC #78-2039)

1. In response to the request in Reference, CCS files contain information on a Marie L. PRISBECK, a pseudonym officially assigned to Heda Massing, U.S. citizen, born 6 January 1900, who was an Agency contract agent from 1956 until her retirement in 1975. The information is contained in approximately 60 documents, virtually all of which concern the establishment and maintenance of cover.

2. CCS files contain no information on the remaining individuals listed.

/s/ M. L. Latta
M. L. Latta

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SA/DO/O
1 - 10-4H (HSCA)
1 - 19984 (Massing)
1 - CCS/PRG chrono via board
1 - MLL chrono

MLLatta:acn

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

SECRET

6297

SECRET

2 4 MAR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/ISS/IP/EIS

FROM : [illegible]
Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Request

REFERENCE : Letter for OLC fr Chief Counsel/Director of HSCA, dtd 8 Mar 78

1. In response to the request in Reference, CCS files contain information on five of the 19 individuals listed, as follows:

a. Mrs. G. Stanley Brown - Four documents contain references to Verna Deane Stebbens Brown, born 12 August 1928 in Waynoka, Oklahoma, wife of George Stanley Brown, born 18 May 1926 in Fargo, Oklahoma, an Agency employee from 1952 to 1962.

b. David E. Murphy - Approximately 100 documents concerning primarily the establishment, maintenance and use of cover for Subject during his Agency career as a Staff Employee from April 1948 to July 1975.

c. Grayson (Grayston) Lynch - Approximately 60 documents concerning the establishment, maintenance and use of cover for Subject during his Agency career from February 1961 to September 1971. Upon retirement in 1971, Subject gave Tampa, Florida, as his forwarding address.

d. Robert Moore - Approximately 50 documents concerning Robert Butler Moore, born 21 June 1913 in Hattisburg, Mississippi, an Agency Staff Employee from June 1950 to December [illegible]. The documents concern primarily the establishment, maintenance and use of cover for Subject during his Agency career. Among other assignments, Subject served in Miami, Florida, from 1961 to [illegible]. Upon retirement in 1970, Subject gave as

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

SECRET

6308

his forwarding address the following: 5511 Turner Lane, Chevy Chase, Maryland. In connection with the HSCA's desire to interview Subject - if he is identical to the subject of Reference request - CCS files indicate that Subject retired in covert (DAC) status. The HSCA should be advised that Subject's Agency affiliation remains classified information requiring protection. CCS files also contain approximately 25 documents on a Robert T. Moore, Jr., born 19 May 1937 in Woodland, California, who was an Agency Staff Employee from September 1962 to July 1972.

e. Bill Logay - Approximately 25 documents concerning William John Logay, born 27 May 1942 in Chicago, Illinois, an Agency employee from October 1967 to January 1972. The documents concern primarily the establishment, maintenance and use of cover for Subject during his Agency career. Upon resignation in 1972, Subject left no forwarding address.

2. CCS files contain no information on the remaining individuals listed in Reference request.

/s/ M. L. Latta

M. L. Latta

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SA/DO/O
1 - 10-4H (HSCA)
1 - RC-5128 (Brown)
1 - RC-10495 (Murphy)
1 - RC-16402 (Lynch)
1 - RC-4271 (Moore)
1 - RC-15719 (Logay)
1 - CCS/PRG chrono via board
1 - MLL chrono

SECRET

10-11H

27 JAN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : H. Clark Schor
Chief, Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Request

REFERENCES : A. Memo for SA/DO/O fr C/CCS/PRG, dtd 25 Jan 78, Same Subject

B. Memo for SA/DO/O fr OLC (OLC 78-0070/1) dtd 12 Jan 78, Same Subject

C. Letter for OLC fr Chief Counsel/Director of HSCA, dtd 6 Jan 78

1. This memorandum supplements Reference A and provides the additional information per paragraph 6. therein, in response to the request in Reference B.

2. CCS files contain information on individuals and entities cited in certain numbered items of Reference C as follows:

a. Item 5 - George DeMohrenschildt -- five documents comprising four contact reports with a commercial asset who was in touch with Subject regarding a business activity in Haiti, and one memorandum detailing the results of a trace request on Subject. The dates of the documents range from 25 April to 21 May 1963.

b. Item 9 - Leo Cherne -- 21 documents (six-1954; one-1955; two-1957; two-1958; one-1960; four-1962; and one each-1965, 1967, 1968, 1976, 1977)[all of which 24 concern the establishment, maintenance, and use of cover provided by Subject from 1954 to 1965 for a NOC officer assigned to Paris.] Additionally, CCS maintains a file on the Research Institute of America, of which Leo Cherne was Executive Director, comprising approximately 100 documents covering the period 1949 to 1964; Mr. Cherne's name appears throughout this file.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

30

c. Item 17 - William Harvey -- Approximately 50 documents, virtually all of which concern the establishment, maintenance, and use of cover for Subject during his career with the Agency as a Staff Employee from 1947 to 1967.

d. Item 27

(1) International Rescue Committee -- 12 documents (1962 to 1976) addressing Agency non-use of IRC, and FOIA requests.

(2) Alexander Rorke -- No record in CCS.

e. Item 28

(1) Richard Helms -- Approximately 25 documents (1956 to 1974) concerned primarily with TDY travel orders, cover documentation, and clearance verifications.

(2) James Angleton -- Approximately 25 documents (1950 to 1975) concerned primarily with TDY travel orders, cover documentation, and retirement processing for Subject who was a Staff Employee of the Agency from 1947 to 1974.

(3) Raymond Rocca -- Approximately 25 documents (1964 to 1975) concerned primarily with cover matters pertaining to Subject who was a Staff Employee.

f. Item 30 - No record in CCS of correspondence or other communications on the matters identified involving Messrs. Helms, Angleton, and Rocca.

g. Item 36

(1) Southern Research Corporation -- No record in CCS.

(2) Wackenhut Corporation -- 100 to 150 documents covering the period 1963 to 1977 and concerning primarily contacts with Wackenhurt officials.

H. Clark Schor

18 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Information Review Committee

ATTENTION: Mr. H. G. Bean, Assistant for Information

SUBJECT: FOIA Appeal--John W. Donovan (75-577)

REFERENCE:
A. Original Request dated 28 March 1975
B. IPS Reply dated 7 October 1975
C. Appeal Letter dated 13 October 1975

1. Summary of Recommendations:

a. Pass requester four Agency documents in sanitized form--excised portions exempted as appropriate under Title 5 U.S.C. (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6).

b. Refer one Department of Army name check form DA 340 to Army for their action.

2. Background: In CIA response of 7 October 1975, two DDO originated documents were passed to Subject in sanitized form and two DDO documents were denied to Subject in toto. For unknown reasons, Subject was not informed of the DA document in our records, nor was this document referred to DA for their action.

3. Recommendations:

a. On the basis of this review, all the documents classified SECRET have been downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL.

b. Memorandum dated 5 March 1962--I recommend that further information be released to the requester, as noted in Tab B1, and the remainder withheld on the basis of Title 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). The

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

deletions were made to protect our proposed operational use of Subject as outlined in Paragraph 5, the name of an Agency employee and internal organizational data. a cryptonym.

c. Memorandum dated 30 March 1962--I recommend that further information be released to the requester, as noted in Tab B2, and the remainder withheld on the basis of Title 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). The deletions were made to protect the names of Agency employees, and internal organizational data.

d. 3 March 1950 memorandum for the FBI--originally denied in toto under Title 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(5). I recommend a sanitized version be passed to Subject. The deletions were made to protect the privacy of other individuals, the names and initials of Agency employees, internal organizational data, and a file number. The excised portions are exempt under Title 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6). (See Tab B3)

e. 29 September 1954 memorandum for the Army--originally denied in toto under Title 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(5). I recommend a sanitized version be passed to Subject. The deletions were made to protect the privacy of other individuals, the names and initials of Agency employees, internal organizational data. The excised portions are exempt under Title 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6). (See Tab B4)

f. Attached as Tab C is one Department of the Army Name Trace Request which is not considered a "record" per 32 CFR 1900.3 (g)(4). Please refer this document to the Army for their action. Also, advise the Army we cannot produce a more legible copy of this document.

4. The records on Subject exist in microfilm form only--in two instances (Tabs B3 and B4) it was impossible to provide a legible copy. Therefore, in these instances a new copy has been typed and is attached to the original copy in both versions (full text and sanitized). Please make a note of this to requester.

5. Mr. Strickland of OGC has concurred in these recommendations.

A. B. Swider
DDO Appeals Officer

Attachments:
- Tab A - References A-C
- Tab B - Full Text and Sanitized Versions
- Tab C - Army Document for Referral

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO: Shep

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Pat Ben[illegible]

OF (Organization)

☐ PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. 1958 ☐ FTS

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

Mar. 6

RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME

109 STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
GPO:1977-0-234-508

MEMORANDUM FOR: Shep

from Doris
Houdesheldt
OP/FOIA
x6616 (Pat) If you
have any question

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

#1 Retired from CI Staff in 1969 - Open - Last known address: - unknown

#2 Retired under Cover from FI Staff in 1972. Last Known address (Dec 71) 3607 Jones Bridge Road
Chevy Chase, Md 20015

*#3 - State Cover - DDO/E PDS/Eval Group
#9 NR

*#6 Contract Terminated in the field (Mexico City) 28 Feb 1977. "no cover problems of consideration" per memo of 30 Jan 77 in CPD file. Suggest Bill Stuebitts, LA Div, be contacted ~~before~~ for further details as he was NOC. Contract Agent from Nov 51 - March 73 in Mexico City when he retired. Rehired as Independent Contractor 7 Feb 76.
Living in Mexico City

*#5 State Cover - LA Division

#6

#7 Retired from OTR in July 1975 - Open -
No address Shown

*#8 - Retired under State Cover from LA Division, 12/31/77. Suggest LA Div be contacted. Last Known Address: 12412 Over Ridge Road
Potomac, Md. 20854

#9 - NR

*#10 State Cover - LA Division

14-00000

SECRET

List #1

Contact:
Addressee:

Ret 1. Anne Egerter - Interviewed 31/III/78

2. Gunnar Beckman -

HQs 3. Ray Swider [illegible] - 9556 - Interviewed 27/III/

4. Prentice Marheine - NR

5. Thomas Keenan - LA Div x1948 Interviewed 24 III/78

6. David Wilsted - [illegible] -

7. Luis D. Puckett - OTR

8. Robert Feldman Md - 279-7359

9. Glen Widden - NR

10. Frank Estancona - HQs - Staff C. x39 - Interviewed 28/III/7

LA 11. Peggy Maggard - Casablanca x1349 - Interviewed 28/III/7

SECRET

#4478.

*# 10 State Cover - LA Division

14. Takai, Kam
No Record

15. ~~Cor~~ Watanabe, Doris (Contract covert
EA HQS "3" USFJ/ALCD (OL-1)
/APO SF CA
96403

16. Watanabe, Kazuo covert
5007 Bristow Dr
Annandale, Va 22003

USFJ/ALCD (OL-1)
APO SF CA 96403

17 —

18 —

19 —

20. Yamada, Shizuo open
1131 University Blvd West
apt 1109
Silver Springs, Md 20902

7. Foy, Jerry (Jerome) open
(last known address Feb 77
P.O. Box 593514
Miami, Florida 33159

8. Hashima Robert S.
appears to be still employed under noc
as support agent to Tokyo Station

9. Ito, Chester covert
Ret 12/31/71
9327 Boothe St.
Alexander, Va 22309

10. Martin, Elwood D overt
Last Known address
Route #2 Box 100
Fallston, Md 21047

11. Ojiri, Bob covert
Still employed as Contract Employee
Log officer - Tokyo

12. —— open

13. Randall, Jack 440 Bird Key Drive
ret: 1/18/72 Sarasota, Florida
33577

Confidential

OLC 78-0433/1
6 March 1978

1. —

2. —

3. Breen, George DOB: 12/31/18 block removed
Ret: 6/28/74
3608 Mason St.
Fairfax, Va. 22030 (Tokyo)?

4. Breen, Eleanor K. Covert PM
EA -7 Hdqs "3." HQs 5th DACF D
42 Emerson St. APO SF CA
New Bedford, Mass 02740 96503
Tokyo

5. Broe, William V. DOB: 8/24/13
(last known address) ret: 6/29/73
open
111 Indian Trail
North Scituate, Mass 02060

6. Delaney, Jim (James E. D) Covert
EA HQS "3" American Embassy
8420 Tuckerman Lane APO SF CA
Potomac, Md 20854 96346
Bangkok

6-16-78

FROM ROBERT GENZMAN, HSCA
(Delivered by Betsy Wolf.)

NEED DDO INFO ON: ~~#3~~

WILLIAM GEORGE GAUDET
DOB SEPT. 21 1908, POB ST. JAMES, LA.
~~[illegible]~~ Security File # 401 996-B TSE 1321-A0
✓ PROJECT OF OFFICE OF OPERATIONS
#00-48-50
1951

(NEED SUBSTANCE OF GAUDET'S REPORTS)

Nov 3, 1977 - request - OS - NO DDO info
Jan 19, 1978 - request - 1
Ref. b. → Jan 27, 1978 - Response

~~23 Jan 1976 Memo~~ -
SSC

~~File destroyed~~ -
~~Bob Starling 3126~~
~~Calling on Monday~~

Jan.

14-00000

SECRET

Memo for OLC

From: SA/DDO

Subject: House Select Committee on Assassinations Requests

Ref: A. OLC 78-0443/1

B. undated list of 11 names starting with Egerter and ending with Maggard.

1. The following Interviews with personnel identified in reference have been arranged to take place in headquarters at the indicated time and date

A. Frederick Randall - 1400 - 24 March 78
B Thomas Keenan - 1530 24 March 78
C. Jim Woods - 0900 - 27 March
D Louise Woods - 0900 - 27 March
E Ray Swider - 1400 - 27 March
F. Robert (Pete) Vader - 1000 - 28 March
G. Frank Estancona 1130 - 28 March

14-00000

#11 - Still employed with LA/Caribbean Branch -
State Cover

12 [illegible] Cover - LA Division

14-00000

**MEMORANDUM
OF CALL**

TO:

Hope

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Shepp

OF (Organization)

☐ PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. 1542 ☐ FTS

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

Shirley A. Martin
alias for Hope Mason

RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME

63-109

☆ U.S. GPO:1977-0-234-508

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

14-00000

Tadatoshi Izumoto
- Ret. Japan.
(1998 Shimosaku-Nobe,
Takatsu-Ku,
Kawasaki-Shi,
Kanagawa-ken,
Japan)

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Anne Goodpasture Not under cover
RET P.O. BOX 372
LIVINGSTON TENN 38570
Done

2. David A. Phillips not under cover
RET 8224 STONE TRAIL DRIVE
BETHESDA MD. 20034

3. Robert T. Shaw Act IG not under cover
(DOB 6-18-25)
3715 ACOSTA ROAD
FAIRFA VA 22030 591-6445
Done

~~Robert A. Shaw (10-21-40)~~
~~COB 8-4-73~~
NO RECORD
Done

4. Zambernardi Robert Blocked
DOB: 5-9-35
COB 8-20-65
NO RECORD
In Mexico
Done

#7479

E2 IMPDET CL [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

5. William C. Bright Blocked
Still with us.
(DOB: 6-17-33)
Act-CIS
8208 SMITHFIELD AVENUE
SPRINGFIELD VA VA 22152
451-8404

William H. Bright (DOB 9-22-22)
Still with us. blocked
Act-PERS removed
836 WHANN AVENUE
MCLEAN VA 22101
356-4641

6. Manell, Herbert still with us
DOB: 9-15-25
Act-LA
7341 ELDORADO STREET
MCLEAN VA 22101
821-0611 blocked

7. Manell, Barbara (DOB: 12-4-27)
COB 9-4-59
NO RECORD blocked

8. White, Allen
DOB: 3-8-17
Ret: 7-31-73
blocked
ALAN P WHITE
RET
4100 DOWNING
STREET
ANNANDALE
VA 22003

9. Richard Helms DOB: 3-30-13
Ret: 2-2-73
4649 Garfield St. N.W.
Washington D.C. 20007
as of Jan 74
NO LOCATOR
CARD

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 045330

CONFIDENTIAL

10. Angleton, James — blocked removed
DOB 12/9/17
ret: 12/31/74
RET 4814 NORTH 33RD ROAD
ARLINGTON VA 22207

11. Rocca, Raymond G. DOB: 2-22-1
ret: 12-31-74 — not under cover
RET 400 LINDEN LANE
FALLS CHURCH VA 22042

12. Hunt, E. Howard — not under cover
ret: 4-30-70
RET 1245 NE 85th STREET
MIAMI FLORIDA 33138

13. Karamessines, Thomas DOB: 7/5
~~NO RECORD~~ COB: 3-2-73
6726 ~~Randy~~ Kennedy Fall Church — not under cover

14. Durant NR Ramon - Joseph Alvarez NR
Robert J. Durant, Jr.
DOB: 11-10-20
COB: 6-1-73 — block removed

15. ~~N.R.~~ Blocked Vienna Rel

16. Bustos, Charlotte — blocked
~~NO RECORD~~ C. Z. Busto - Violala
DOB: 1-12-29
ret: 12-31-77

CONFIDENTIAL

17. Smith, Joseph Burkholder block removed
ret: 6-30-73

RET: 1301 South First Street Ocean 14
Jacksonville Beach Florida
32250

18. N.R

19. Flick, Charles E under cover
DOB: 4-12-19
ret: 6-29-73

RET: Ave De Los Bosques 63, Lomas De
Tecamachalco-10
20 NR Edo De Mexico Mexico

21. Dooley, Arthur Edward not under cover
No ~~Record~~ DOB 1/21/17
ret. 6/29/73

22, 23, 24, - NR

25. Coleman, William E. not under cover
NO RECORD Mil Dis: 12-9-54
COB 4-23-55

CONFIDENTIAL

25. ~~William E. Coleman~~
~~DOB: 2/12/30~~
~~COB: 4/23/54~~
~~NO RECORD~~

not under cover

~~William F. Coleman~~
~~COB: 5-14-50~~
~~DOB: ?~~

~~NO RECORD~~

not under cover

26. Stern Samuel L.
DOB: 5-30-14
NO RECORD EOD: 1-12-46

not under cover

27. NR

28. NR.

29. Marty, Florijan Randolph
DOB: 1-6-12
RET ret: 1-31-72
2063 DEWBERRY COURT
WESTLAKE VILLAGE CA 91361

not under cover

30. NR

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 065530

Memorandum for OLC
attn: Patrick L. Carpentier

From Norbert A. Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O

~~Re~~ Subject: HSCA Interviews of Tokyo Station/SR Div Officers (5)

Ref: A OLC 78-0443/3, 5 April 1978
B OLC 78-0443/1, 6 March 1978
C OLC 78-1455/1, 11 April 1978

1. ~~In response to reference Their~~ In response to references B+C and oral requests, there follows a list of ~~SR Division~~ DDO officers assigned to the Soviet Branch of the Tokyo Station, ~~who were stationed in Tokyo~~ in 1963:
(* Info provided to Mr. Leap, HSCA investigator on 7 April 1978):

Radio Sta
249-4610

Tele: 803-249-3192
News analyst now. Had to know.

A. George A. Fill (Retired) *
27 Bay Tree
North Myrtle Beach, S.C. 29582.
(In Tokyo from 5/29/60 to 7/5/64.)

B. Robert M. Keith (Retired) *
c/o Mrs. E.A. Moran
115 E. Coleman
Sanford, Florida 32771 (no phone)
(In Tokyo from 11/30/58 to 8/30/63)

C. Hayami SATO (Retired) *
3051 Ala Pi'ailia Place
Honolulu, Hawaii 96818
(In Tokyo from 1-10-52 to 8-2-64.)

D. Peter M. Slobogin (Retired)*
Mystic ave
Rockport, Maine (04853)
(In Tokyo from 6-11-61 to 10-11-64.)

E. RoYall Tyler (Resigned 9-17-65)*
To attend Columbia U.
(5 Oct 64 went on L.W.O.P.)
~~[illegible]~~
3299 Cambridge ave
apt 6K, N.Y., N.Y.
(In Tokyo from 3/4/62 to 3/15/64.)

F ~~Rudolph W. [illegible]~~
Raymond McPhee (Resigned [illegible])
22 Sept [illegible] - 20 July [illegible]
In Tokyo 1960 to oct 1983

G. Leo Rosenbaum (Retired)
1815 apalocba Drive
McLean, Va 22101 (356-5283)
(In Tokyo from 5-29-60 to 10-25-65)
Interview arranged: 10 April 1978, 11:30 hours.

H. George J. Von Bretzel (Retired)
14801 Springfield Rd
Germantown, Md. 20767 (948-5908)
(In Tokyo from 5-26-63 to 6-6-65.)
Interview arranged: 13 april 1978, 1330 hrs.)

I. Howard M. ORR (Retired)
8405 Weller Ave.
McLean, Va 22101 (893-3325)
(In Tokyo from 6/11/61 to 11/24/63.)
Interview arranged: 11 april 1978, 1100 hours.

3.

J. Hope I Mason ~~B~~
Currently employed
(In Tokyo from 8/19/61 to Aug 1963)
(Interview ~~ed~~ arranged: a 7 april 1978, 10 30 hours)

2. In addition the ~~following~~ ~~station~~ officers requested in ~~[illegible]~~ ref B, are provided per your oral ~~requ~~ request: ~~B~~ a: William V. Birk (Ret)
111 Indian Trail, North
Scituate, Mass. 02060
Tele: 617-545-6113

In Tokyo from

B. Robert (Pete) Wheeler (Ret)
6600 Millwood Rd
Bethesda, Md 20034
Tele. 229-6368
Interview arranged: 13 april 1978, 1000 hrs.

3. also per your oral request and ref B: ~~Jerome~~ ~~Jerry~~ Fox (Ret)
P.O. Box 593514 AMF
Miami Florida 33159.
~~July~~ 1 Sept 59 - ~~Dec~~ 23 Sept 1962. DDI Fact Marking?
GS-11

Please note that Mr. Fox was not in Tokyo in 1963-64 according to our records. He was in Tokyo from Sept 1959 to 23 Sept 1962, as a DDI, not a DDO officer. (He transferred to the DDO after his return to headquarters on 24 april 1963.

~~check~~ US [illegible]
20 ~~apr~~ 67-OPS.

4. a review of our records ~~[illegible]~~

indicates the following contract

personnel were assigned to the Soviet section of Tokyo Station:

4. Tom Izumato (Ret in Japan)

B Tom Matsui (~~St~~ Still employed by Station)

C. Masaaki Nagai (Ret)
24 Condon Court
San Mateo, California 94403
Tele. (415) 349-7289

d. Kyoshi ~~Sato~~ Sasaki

14-00000

Will Dunham - superior of Wolcott.

Contract Tommy Izumoto - Ret Tokyo

Contract " Matsui - Tokyo - still employed

Contract Masaaki Nagai - Calif. Ret.
Chief Surveillance Team
Worked in Sta.

Kyoshi Saki \ 26 Condon Court
San Mateo, Calif
94403
1 415-349-7289

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

14 April 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Gary M. Chase
Office of Legislative Counsel
Coordination and Review Staff

FROM : Maurice A. Sovern
Office of the Special Assistant
to the DDO for External Oversight

SUBJECT : Fraser Committee Request for
Interviews with Retired DDO Staff
Officers

1. With reference to our several conversations on this subject, the following are the addresses for the four retired former DDO officers whom the Fraser Committee staff wish to interview:

JAMES J. ANGLETON
4814 N. 33rd Road
Arlington, Virginia 22207
Tel: KE8-4348

GEORGE C. CONSTANTINIDES
10819 Old Coach Road
Potomac, Maryland 20034
Tel: 299-7430

THOMAS H. KARAMESSINES
6726 Kennedy Lane
Falls Church, Virginia 22043
Tel: 534-1325

WILLIAM E. NELSON
15 Tiburon Bay Drive
Corona Del Mar, California 92625
Tel: (714) 644-1781

2. Messrs. Nelson and Constantinides have already been alerted to the Committee's interest and the remaining two will be alerted shortly.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 062028

#4480

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Telephonic Request for Addresses and Phone Numbers - Pete Bagley and Newton Miler

FROM:
Doris J. Houdesheldt
C/FOIPB/OP
5E13

EXTENSION: R1958

NO.:

DATE: 13 April 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Rodger Gabrielson OLC 6D0120			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Rodger:

Per your telephonic request of yesterday afternoon, here are the last known addresses for "Pete" Bagley and Newton S. Miler. We have no phone numbers.

Mr. Bagley retired COVERTLY so Shep's and my recommendation is that if he is contacted he should be approached in a discreet manner so his cover is not blown. Additionally, he has retired in Europe so it might be wiser not to interview him at all unless it is absolutely necessary. His last known address is:

56 Chemin du Gros Tienne
1328 Ohain
Belgium

(NOTE: Rodger - please call me for additional information on "Pete".)

Mr. Miler retired openly; his last known address is:

Star Route, Box 344
Placitas
New Mexico 87043

Doris Houdesheldt
Doris Houdesheldt

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

#4081

14-00000

1) NR

2) [redacted] MAYCRINK - Last Known Residence
AF

3) Retired 6/28/74 - ~~Last Known Address~~ (July 1974)
open
3608 Mason Street
Fairfax 22030

4) ~~still employed~~ - blocked - [illegible]

X 5) Retired 6/29/73 - open — Last Known address (Aug 73
Consultant Termination 6/30/74
111 Indian Trail
Scituate, Mass 0206

↑ 6) Still employed
Under cover - State Nominal - DCOS/Bangkok

X 7) Retired 5/14/75 - open
Last Known Address (Feb 77
P.O. Box 593514 AMF
Miami, Florida 33159

* 8) Appears to be still employed under MOC as support agent to Tokyo Station

9) Resigned 12/31/71
Retired as Career Agent 4/30/77

10) Resigned ~~Retired~~ 1/9/69 - overt - Last Known Address (Apr 73)
Route #2, Box 100
Fallston, Maryland 21047

11) Still employed as Contract Employee - Log Officer - Tokyo

12) Still employed - blocked - ISS/PIAB

14-00000

13) Retired - open Jan 1972
[redacted]

14) No file - our record reflects he was military detailee in 1958 with FE Div - location unknown

15) Still employed - Contract Employee under cover in Tokyo

16) Still employed under cover as Ops Officer in Tokyo

* 17) Still employed as Records Admin Officer in NE/Plans Staff - open

* 18) Former contract employee - wife of #17 above

19) Retired - open - Dec 1973
apr 74: 6 [redacted]

20) Retired from FBIS - 7/31/69 - no record in file [redacted] of cover status at time of retirement.
Independent Contractor w/ JPRS 1 June 72 - 17 May 1976
Last Known Address (July 1969)
1131 University Boulevard, West
Apt 1114
Silver Spring, Md 20902

Trac

14-00000

Jerry Fox - Soviet Russia Div.
Elwood D. (Pete) Martin - Dep. Chief of Finance
Kan Takai - Japan Branch

For S' φ (for HSCA)

Pencil in address + phone #:

1. Beckman, Gunnar (Ret. 1972)
   3607 Jones Bridge Rd, Chevy Chase, Md 20015?

2. Wilsted, David
   Residing in Mexico City. (Indep. Contr. 1976)?

3. Puckett, Luis D. (Ret. from OTR July 1975)

4. Feldman, Robert (Ret. 12/31/77)
   12412 Over Ridge Rd
   Potomac, Md 20854
   ~~x 869-5477~~ 279-7359

Nosenko List

1. Tennant Bagley (Pete)

2. Newton Scott Miller

2.

1 March 78 Request

1 Maycrunk - (Wirogue)

2. George Breen
3608 Mason St
Fairfax, Va 22030 } Tokyo Field

3. Elenor Breen
Tokyo - Last May - Dep. } Tokyo Field

4 William Broe
Mass. -

5. Jim Delaney - cover - Field
(Bangkok) DC OS

6. Jerry Fox (SR off) Ret Fla.
P O Box 593514 AMF
Miami, Fla 33159

3.

7 Robert S. Hashima (Tokyo field contract)
cover

8 Chester Ito – Ret. Calif?
Blocked –

9. Elwood D. Martin –
Route #2, Box 100
Fallston, Maryland 21047

10 Bob Ojiri – Log off Tokyo

11. Jack Randall
3508 Frederick Place
Kensington, Md. 20795
upon Ret Jan 1972 –

14. Kan Takai (NR) TAGAMI
Head Liaison Tokyo

15. Shizuo Yamada
1131 University Blvd. West
apt 1114
Silver Spring, Md. 20902

	PI FINDINGS	AFS FINDINGS	MPB	CPD FINDINGS
1. BISHOP, Maurice, aka John Bishop, and FNU FIRGAULT, Jim Bishop, ~~John L. Bischoff~~ ~~27 Feb 50 - 10/27/62~~ ~~DOB: 5/25/10~~ ~~Blocked 7/16/62~~	NR under Maurice Bishop Bishop, John A. Dat: DOB: 9-23-36 EE Term: 4-4-62 ~~Bishop, John C. EUR-A~~ ~~EOD: 5-20-62~~ ~~DOB: 1-18-38~~ ~~Still on board Blocked~~ ~~James C. Bishop LOGS~~ ~~EOD: 7-1-53~~ ~~DOB: 3-23-12~~ ~~COB: 2-3-61~~ ~~DET:9-27-51 SEP:6-30-53~~ [illegible]	No Record on Maurice John Bishop (No DOB) applied in 1974 #169122 John Byron Bishop DOB: 11/5/42 applied in 1966 #052734 John Elbert Bishop DOB: 3/24/43 applied in 1967 #062584 John Kenneth Bishop DOB: 9-6-49 applied in 1969 #107641 John Lee Bishop DOB: 4-24/32 Applied in 1967 #063819	No Record	No Record See attached list
✓ 2. WIROGUE -	No Record	No Record	No Record	None See attached ca
✓ 3. BREEN, George Personal info	X George A. Breen EOD: 2-3-47 SS DOB: 12-31-18 blocked RET: 6-28-74 removed 8-9-73		No Record	See attached ca No file
* 4. BREEN, Eleanor ✓ (card saying this person not re-employable per security)	(under contract) Dates:2-15-55 through 7-27-56	No Record (	No Record	See attached ca
✓ 5. BROE, William V. Personal info	EOD: 6-21-48 DOB: 8-24-13 RET:6-29-73 blocked rem:6-1-69	No Record	No Record	No Record
✓ * 6. DELANEY, Jim still with us - blocked	James E. EA f EOD: 7-31-51 DOB: 5-26-30 blocked 6 Jun 77 still with us	~~James Bryan Delaney~~ ~~DOB: 11/9/46~~ ~~applied in 1969~~ ~~#110386~~	No Record	No Record

14-00000

	PI FINDINGS	AFS FINDINGS	MPB FINDINGS	CPD FINDINGS
7. FOX, Jerry ✓ needs personal info enveloped	Jerome Fox DOB: 10-9-28 EOD: 6-15-55 RET:5-14-75 B Rem: 9-6-74	Jerry M. Fox FROM Boldor Colorado interviewed by field Rec rejected 3/15/76 Jerry Lewis Fox DOB: 7/2/39 applied in 67 #063916		
*(4 continued) BREEN, Eleanor	Eleanor K. Breen, DDO-~~H~~ EA EOD: 4-23-61 DOB: 10-17-21 still with us blocked 5/9/77			
? ✓8. ASHIMA, Robert S. still with us	No Record on a Robert S. HASHIMA,	a Robert M. Hashimoto	N R	HABBLITZ, Zachary H.
—9. ITO, Chester Has some personal info in file ✓	EOD: 5/1/52 FE DOB: 9/5/24 COB: 12-31/71 BLOCKED 3/29/77	No Record	No Record	See attached card need card for file
✓10. MARTIN, Elwood D. (Pete)	FIN EOD: 12/31/48 ~~BLOCKED FROM~~ DOB: 1/2/26 ~~10/19/62~~ COB: 1/6/67 Overt	No Record	No Record	See Attached Name List
✓11. OJIRI, Bob still with us	No Record	No Record	No Record	~~See attached card~~ yes
✓12. RANDALL, Frederick C. still with us blocked	EOD: 9-10-51 ~~FRD-G~~ DOB: 10-28-26 BLOCKED	~~Frederick F. Randall~~ ~~DOB: Aug 35~~ ~~applied in 1973 #162791~~	No Record	See attached Name List
13. RANDALL, Jack	EOD: 3-23-53 BLOCKED REMOVED DOB: 4-27-20 1-12-72 RET: 1-14-72	No Record	No Record	See Attached Name List
14. TAKAI, Kan TAGAMI	No Record	No Record	No Record	~~No Record~~ See attached card
✓15. WATANABE, Doris still with us - blocked	No Record	No Record	No Record	~~See attached card~~ yes
Kazuo	yes	No Record	No Record	No Record

		PI FINDINGS	AFS FINDINGS	MPB FINDINGS	CPD FINDINGS
√17.	WOODS, Jim Still with us - open James B	EOD: 4-21-52 CCSH DOB: 2-20-28 STILL WITH US BLOCKED REMOVED ~~Woods, James W.~~ ~~MIL DET: 12-20-66~~ ~~DOB: 8-29-33~~ ~~SPPS - 6-15/69~~	WOODS, Jim ~~James Cameron Woods~~ ~~DOB: 7/6/30 Applied in 73~~ ~~Control #162100~~ ~~James F. Woods~~ ~~DOB: 4/22/52 Applied in 74~~ ~~#170079~~ ~~James Franklin Woods~~ ~~DOB: 12/5/33 applied in 65~~ ~~#006073~~ ~~James Joseph Woods~~ ~~DOB: 10/14/39 applied in 67~~ ~~#059618~~ ~~James L. Woods~~ ~~NO DOB GIVEN applied in 69~~ ~~#103511~~ ~~James Michael Woods~~ ~~NO DOB GIVEN applied in 74~~ ~~#171144~~ ~~JamesC. Woods Jr.~~ ~~DOB: 10/20/46~~ ~~Holiday Village Address~~ ~~Commerce, Texas interviewed~~ ~~by recruiter and rejected 8-4-76~~ ~~Woods, James K.~~ ~~DOB: 11/21/51 in active 5/5/77~~	No Record	No Records
✓18.	WOODS, Louise	NO RECORD	No Record	No Record	Have file See attached c
19.	WHEELER, Pete Robert	Robert Prentiss Wheeler PS Div H EOD: 9-28-52 BLOCKED REMOVED DOB: 10-04-15 11-26-73 RET: 12-31-73	No Record	No Record	No Record
✓20.	YAMADA, Shizuo	DOB: 1-07-11 PB/S	No Record	No Record	See attached

1. GOODPASTURE, Anne — EOD: 2-29-44 ret: 6-30-73 — DOB 11-28-18 — blocked rem. 6-14-72

2. PHILLIPS, David
EOD: 4-1-55
COB: 8-13-58
EOD: 3-14-60
DOB: 10-31-22
RET: 5-9-75
Blocked Removed 3-27-75

* 3. SHAW, Robert

Robert T. Shaw WH — Still with us
EOD: 3-8-48
DOB: 6-18-25
blocked 3-19-73

Robert A. Shaw NPIC — No under Cover
EOD: 6-25-67
DOB: 10-21-40
COB: 8-4-73

Robert L. Shaw — Mil Det 1-9-73 SOD F
DOB: 6-10-43
SEP: 9-15-73

Robert M. Shaw, Jr.
EOD: 7-17-66
SEP MIL 10-20-66
MIL DET 2-15-68 — DOB: 5-24-43
SRTPS 1-3-69 — DOB: 2-9-69
REEMPLOYABLE 1-4-69
Blocked removed
all periods except from 1 Nov 66 through 4 Jan 69 (M 1-7-6)

* 4. ZAMBERNARDI, Robert
EOD: 7-30-56 — TSD-H — Blocked 5-4-64
DOB: 5-9-35
COB: 8-20-65

5. BRIGHT, William ?

William C. Bright, EUR
EOD: 2-4-57
DOB: 6-17-33
Blocked 9/7/76

William H. Bright AF
EOD: 1-30-56
DOB: 9-22-22
Blocked Removed 10/18/77

~~William H. Bright~~
~~MIL DET: 5-15-66~~
~~DOB: 11-29-37~~
~~SPTRS 12-10-68~~

* 6. MANELL, Herbert
EOD: 6-11-51 WH G
DOB: 9-15-25
blocked

* 7. MANELL, Barbara
EOD: 10-25-51 SR blocked 7-10-58
DOB: 12-4-27
COB: 9-4-59

3/4/ [illegible]
[illegible]

8. WHITE, Allen Alan P. EOD: 10-20-46 BLOCKED
DOB: 3-08-17
RET: 7-31-75

9. HELMS, Richard EOD: 10-20-46 DCI - F
DOB 3-30-13
RET: 2-2-73

10. ANGELTON, James EOD: 12/30/47 DOB: 12/9/17
Retired 12/31/74
Block Removed 6/19/68

11. ROCCA, Raymond DDP/CF NOT UNDER COVER ON CARD
EOD: 10-20-46
DOB: 2-22-17
RET: 12-31-74

12. HUNT, E. Howard EOD: DDH - H
DOB:
RET: 4-30-70
BLOCKEDREMOVED 1-14-70

~~under~~ not under cover

13. KARAMESSINES, Thomas EOD: 1-7-47
DOB: 7-25-17
COB: 3-2-73 RETIRED

14. DURANT, Ramon-Joseph Alverez Robert J. Durant Jr. blocked removed 4-3-73 — Check to see if ever Div chief
EOD: 8-11-63
DOB: 11-10-40
COB: 6-1-73

15. WHITTEN, Jack No Record - Deciding
Recheck under John

16. BUSTOS, Charlotte C. Z. Bustos-Videla WH C BLOCKED 12/28/77
EOD: 8-27-51
DOB: 1-12-29
RET: 12-31-77

17. SMITH, Joseph Burkholder
EOD:
DOB:
RET: 6-30-73
BLOCKED REMOVED

18. BRUNO, Rudy No Record

? 19. FLICK, Charles
EOD: 4-16-51
DOB: 4-12-19
RET: 6-29-73
WHG
~~UNDER~~ UNDER COVER

20. VOGEL, ~~Dan~~ DON's ~~No Record~~

21. DOOLEY, Arthur

Arthur Edward Dooley
EOD: 8/29/55 CI - I
DOB: 1/21/17
~~RET: 6/29/73~~
NOT UNDER COVER

Arthur E. Dooley, Jr.
EOD: 6/17/65
DOB: 10/8/46
COB: 7/10/65
SUMMER ONLY

22. LEIBELER, Wesley J. No Record

23. WILLINS, Howard P. No Record

24. SLAWSON, W. David No Record

ask committee

25 COLEMAN, William

William E. Coleman
MIL DET: 12-9-54
COB: 4-23-55
NOT UNDER COVER

William E. Coleman
DOB: 2/12/30 NOT UNDER COVER
EOD: 12/9/54
COB: 4/23/55

William F. Coleman
EOD: 8-8-48
COB: 5-14-50
NOT UNDER COVER

26. STERN, Samuel
N.R.
EOD: 1-12-42
DOB: 5-30-14
COB: 4-12-46
NOT UNDER COVER
OSS

27. MUNRO, George Frederick No Record

28. DAVIDSON, J. Deering No Record ck Danielson
DANIELSON

29.	KARTY, Floryan Randolph	EOD: 1-28-52 DOB: 1-6-12 RET: 1-31-72	ISD	NOT UNDER COVER
30.	PRIMACK, Olver N.	No Record		

14-00000

4

Watanabe, Doris } Tokyo
Larry }

David A. Phillips
8224 Stone Trail Drive
Bethesda, Md. 20034

– Zambernardi, Robt – TSD-A
Blocked – No address?

TYPES

Raymond ~~H~~ H. McPHEE (Non official cover - not in Station)
1003 Big Oak Road
Yardley, Pennsylvania
in 1967

Hugh Tovar
+ 1542
Need a year
call back?

Pat and
Dick Long 048
13 Mar

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6	~~Jim~~ Medic knew him		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks: ~~Tom Ryan~~

→ Leo Rosenbaum will call

10 APRIL
10:30 356-5283 after 6 P.M.

~~11:30 appt~~

Howard Orr will call
893-3325

George Von Bretzel ~~12 Noon Tue 11 Apr.~~
948-6908

→ 1 30 Thur 13th 948-0997

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

☆USGPO: 1976 — 202-953 (40)

For Step
all were allegedly assigned Tokyo S R Sec 1963-64

Empl. No.

1 George A. FILL * - 061789

✓ 27 Bay Tree
North Myrtle Beach, SC 29582

2. Robert M. Keith - 056491

④ Mrs. E.A. Moran
115 E Coleman
Sanford, Fla.
32771 - no phone

~~317 Westview Court~~
~~Vienna, Va. 22180~~
~~Tel# (703) 938-5632~~

31 Dec 1

(532-9900)

3. Hayami SATO * 059317

✓ 3051 Ala Piadla Place
Honolulu, Hawaii 96818

4. Peter M. SLOBOGIN * - 008771

✓ Retired o/s

mistic
~~[illegible]~~ Ave
Rockport, Maine
04853
(covert)

③ 5. George J. Von Bretzel * 006373

Retired 6-29-73

14801 Springfield Rd.
Germantown, Md.
20767

appt: 13 apr
1330 hours

(948-6908)

② 6. Howard M. ORR 005619

8405 Weller Avenue
Mc Lean, Va. 22101
Tel # (703) 893-3325

① 7. Leo Rozenbaum * 006678

appt. 11:30 AM
10 apr.

1815 Opalocka Drive
Mc Lean, Va 22101

(356-5283)

8. Royall Tyler Terminated 9-17-65 029615

9. Rudolph W. SANCOM (?B) 0295(?)2
no record
3
8

Mr. Shepanek APR 7 11 38 AM '78

Harry Ahn of EA/J (Ext. 1388) called and gave the following names and addresses of people you had requested regarding a request from the CI Staff for addresses and telephone numbers of individuals identified by James Wilcott:

Shizuo Yamada
1131 University Boulevard, West
Silver Spring, Md.

Telephone: 301 649-1661

William V. Broe
111 Indian Trail, North
Scituate, Mass. 02060

Tele: 617 545-6113

Chester Ito
9327 Boothe Street
Alexandria, VA.

Tele: 780-0173

John Randall
440 Bird Key Drive
Sarasota, Florida 33577

Tele: 813 366-0790

Elwood D. Martin (Will provide his address when they get it)

Mr. Ahn said there were others on the list who are presently assigned to Tokyo Station.

1. George A. Fill (Ret.)
27 Bay Tree
North Myrtle Beach, S.C. 29582

5/29/60 - 7/5/64

2. Robert M Keith (Ret)
C/o Mrs. E.A. Moran
115 E. Coleman
Sanford, Fla 32771

11/30/58 - 8/30/63

3 Hayami Sato (Ret)
3051 Ala Pualla Place
Honolulu, Hawaii 96818

1/10/52 - 8/2/64

4 Peter M. Slobogin (Ret)
Mystic Ave
Rockport, Maine 04853

6/11/61 - 10/11/64

35 Royall Tyler (Resigned 9/17/65)
3899 Cambridge Ave
apt 6 K
N.Y., N.Y.

3/14/62 - 3/15/64 (went on LWOP 1964)

6

L P Globe

Raymond
MCPHEE

1964 -

1003 Big Oak Rd
Yardley, Pa

Fathers
Raymond Hector
Mo. Harriet Nelson

Harry Ahn

— Pope -

1 Tommy [illegible]
2 " [illegible]

1956 Still out there
Kozoui - Career associate
Somerset Rd
out 1980

→ [illegible]
→ [illegible]

Way [illegible]

Kerry [illegible]

- officer -

Geyhnsway

Mahoney - 6-9-62 Resignation

Joan Lieberman - aka Klein - EOD Jun 52 51
Term 5-26-61
no info -
(Bertha Bond)

Doris will check further

Mahoney 1950
1125 Michigan St
Ann Arbor, Mich

Mahoney
329 Burgess Ave
Alexandria, Va
Ma
Rt 1
Berkeley Springs, W. Va.

	NAMES	OLC MEMEMORANDUM & DATE	
1.	AASE, Jean aka Jean West	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
2.	ADAMCIK, John P.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
X 3.	ANGLETON, James ✓	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
4.	ARCE, Danny Garcia	78-1057	8 Mar 78
5.	ARTHUR, Edward Ivan	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
6.	ARTIME, Manuel	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
7.	AYERS, Colonel Bradley E.	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
8.	AZCUE, Eusebio	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78
9.	AVILA, Orlando Bosch	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
10.	AQUERO, Luis Conte	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
11.	ALAMO, Duney Perez	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
12.	AMORES, Acelo Pedroso	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
13.	AE/LADLE, AE/DIPPER-20	78-0070/40	29 Mar 78
14.	ARCHER, Evelyn Eleanor aka Ruby Archer, Ruby Korbin Mrs. Walter Korabials	78-1534/1.	25 April 1978
1.	BAKER, Barney	78-0070/22	28 Feb 78
2.	BALBUENA, Luis	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
3.	BANNISTER, W. Guy	78-0070/9	1 Feb 78
4.	BARNETT, Welcome Eugene	78-1057	8 Mar 78
5.	BARTES, Frank aka Frank Bardes, Bartez	78-0070/9	1 Feb 78
6.	BARTONE, Dominick E.	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
7.	BENTON, Sam	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
8.	BINION, Benjamin	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
9.	BISHOP, Martin	78-0070/9	1 Feb 78
10.	BISHOP, Maurice, John Bishop, Jim Bishop	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
11.	BLEDSOE, Mary	78-1057	8 Mar 78
12.	BOND, Joe aka Joseph Lucerto	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
13.	BOYD, Elmer L.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
14.	BRADEN, James (Eugene Hale Brading)	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
15.	BREEN, Bunny aka Eileen Curry aka Carol O'Connor	78-0070/22	28 Feb 78
X 16.	BREEN, Eleanore	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
X 17.	BREEN, George	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
18.	BRENNAN, Howard Leslie	78-1057	8 Mar 78
19.	BREEN, James Eckford	78-0070/22	28 Feb 78
20.	BREWER, E. D.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
21.	BRIAN, V.J.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
X 22.	BRIGHT, William	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
23.	BROWDER, Edward Jr.	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78

	24.	BROWN, Mrs. G. Stacy	-0070/17 21 Feb 78
X	25.	BROE, William V.	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
	26.	BROWN, Morgan Holbert	78-0588/1 16 Feb 78
	27.	BRUNO, Rudy	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
	28.	BUFFALINO, Russell Herbert	78-1070/1 15 Mar 78
X	29.	BUSTOS, Charolotte	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78 , 78-14
	30.	BUTLER, Ed	775685/2 28 Dec 77
	31.	BRINGUIER, Carlos Jose	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
	32.	BERMUDA, Dr. Jose Ignacio Rasco	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
	33.	BADUA, Fernandez	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
	34.	BOSCH, Orlando	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
	34.	BUEZA, Manuel Artime	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
	35.	BETANCOURT, Ernesto	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
X	36.	BAGLEY, Tennent "Pete"	78-0070/40 29 Mar 78
	1.	CABELL, Mrs. Earle	78-1057 8 Mar 78
	2.	CAMPISI, Joe	78-0588/1 16 Feb 78
	3.	CAMPISI, Sam	78-0588/1 16 Feb 78
X	4.	CARSWELL, Dan	77-5685/2 28 Dec 77, 0070/17
	5.	CASTER, Warren	78-1057 8 Mar 78
	6.	CELLINI, Dino	78-0351/1 19 Jan 78
	7.	CHEEK, Bertha	78-0588/1 16 Feb 78
	8.	CHERNE, Leo	78-0070/1 12 Jan 78
	9.	CIVELLO, Joseph Francis	78-0588/1 16 Feb 78
	10.	COLEMAN, William	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
	11.	CONFORTO, Janet aka Jada	78-0588/1 16 Feb 78
X	12.	CONEIN, Lucien	77-5685/2 28 Dec 77, 0070/17
	13.	COUCH, Malcolm V.	78-1057 8 Mar 78
	14.	CRAFORD, Laverne "Larry"	78-0095/1 30 Jan 78
	15.	CRISMAN, F. Lee	78-0095/1 30 Jan 78, 78-0070/
	16.	CARILLO, Justo	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
	17.	CROZIER, Ross aka "Roger"	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
	18.	CRUZ, Miquel Mariano	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
	19.	CHAYES, Abram NR	78-0986/1 12 Apr 78
	20.	COLOSACCO, Anthony	78-1534/1 25 Apr 78

	NAMES	MEMORANDUM & DATE	
1.	DAVIDSON, J. Deering (probably Danielson)	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
2.	DAVIS, Louis P.	78-0095/1	30 Jan 78
3.	DAVIS, Richard Rudolph or Ricardo Davis	78-0070/9	1 Feb 78
4.	DAVIS, Thomas III	78-0070/22	28 Feb 78
5.	DAVISON, Alexis	77-5685/2	28 Dec 77
6.	DAVISON, Mrs. Hal	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78
7.	DAY, J.C.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
8.	DELANEY, Jum	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
9.	DeMOHRENSCHILDT, George	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78
10.	DEPUGH, Robert	78-0674/1	13 Feb 78
11.	DETORRES, Bernardo	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78
12.	DEVARONA, Manuel, Antonio	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
13.	DHORITY, C.N.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
14.	DIOSDADO, Cesario	77-5685/2	28 Dec 77
15.	DONOVAN, John E.	78=0070/1	12 Jan 78
16.	DOUGHERTY, Jack Edwin	78-1057	8 Mar 78
17.	DOUGHTY, Captain George	78-1057	8 Mar 78
18.	DURAN, Horatio	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78
19.	DURAN, Silva	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78
20.	DOOLEY, Arthur	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
21.	DURANT, Ramon-Joseph Alveraz	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
22.	DIAZ, Rogelio Cisneros	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
23.	DUNKIN, Tom aka John Thomas Dunkin	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
24.	DALZELL, William aka Billy Littlehorse	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
25.	DIAZ, Hignio aka "Nino"	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
26.	DAVIS, Eugene	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
27.	DIAZ, Eugenio Cisneros (No. 65)	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
28.	DE LA BARRE, Frank	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
29.	DOLAN, James Henry 10/25/14	78-1534/1	25 Apr 78
1.	EDWARDS, Robert E.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
2.	EUINS, Amos Lee	78-1057	8 Mar 78
3.	ESTRADA, Antonio Carvajal	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
4.	EPSTEIN, Edward Jay - NR	78-1455/1	5 Apr 1978

	NAMES	OLC MEMORANDUM & DATE
1.	FAULKNER, Jack W.	78-1057 8 Mar 78
2.	FERRIE, David	78-0351/1 19 Jan 78
3.	FIELDS, Dr. Edward	78-0674/1 13 Feb 78
4.	FISCHER, Ronald B.	78-1057 8 Mar 78
X 5.	FLICK, Charles	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
X 6.	FOX, Jerry	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
7.	FOX, Martin Zamora & Petro Fox	78-0588/1 16 Feb 78
8.	FRAZIER, Bueli Wesley	78-1057 8 Mar 78
9.	FREERS, Edward L.	78-1035/1 15 Mar 78, 78-0070/1
10.	FRITZ, J.W.	78-1057 8 Mar 78
11.	FERNANDEZ, Santiago	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
12.	FALLA, Laureano Batista	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
13.	FURADO, Humberto Solis (No. 72)	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
1.	GARRISON, Jim	78-0070/1 12 Jan 78
2.	GIVENS, Charles Douglas	78-1057 8 Mar 78
3.	GOLDBERG, Abraham Isaac	78-1069/1 15 Mar 78
4.	GOLDSTEIN, Frank Richard	78-0588/1 16 Feb 78
5.	GOLUB, Gregory Yeugenyvick	78-0070/1 12 Jan 78
X 6.	GOODPASTURE, Ann	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78, 78-1455/
7.	GRANDA, Martin	78-0070/27 1 Mar 78
8.	GROOM, Dewey F.	78-0070/22 28 Feb 78
9.	GUARISCO, Peter	78-0070/22 28 Feb 78
10.	GENE, John Koch	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
11.	GONZALES, Max Gorman	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
12.	GIL, Manuel	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
13.	GRIMADER, Carlos	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
14.	GUITART, Augustine	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
15.	ISRAEL, Mesa GONZALES (No. 68)	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
16.	GUTIERREZ, Gervelio (No. 68)	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
17.	GODOY Y SOLIS, Joaquin	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
18.	GEIZZAFFI, John M. 8/7/27	78-1534/1 25 Apr 78

	1.	HALL, Harvey aka Harry Haller, Harry Helfgett	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78	
	2.	HANES, Arthur	78-0095/1	30 Jan 78	
	3.	HARGRAVES, Roy Emory	78-0070/9	1 Feb 78	
X	4.	HARVEY, William	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78	
X	5.	HASHIMA, Robert S.	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78	
	6.	HAYGOOD, Clyde A.	78-1069/1	15 Mar 78	
X	7.	HELMS, Richard	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78	
	8.	HERNANDEZ, Victor Dominador Espinosa	78-0070/9	1 Feb 78	
	9.	HICKS, Johnny B.	78-1069/1	15 Mar 78	
	10.	HILL, Gerald Lynn	78-1069/1	15 Mar 78	
	11.	HOKE, John Lindsay	78-0070/3	26 Jan 78	
	12.	HOKE, Sylvia Ludlow	78-0070/3	26 Jan 78	
	13.	HOLMES, Harry D.	78-1069/1	15 Mar 78	
	14.	HOPKINS, Louis	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78	
	15.	HOWARD, Lawrence aka Lorenzo Salcedo	78-0070/9	1 Feb 78	
	16.	HOWARD, Dr. Rex J.	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78	
	17.	HOWARD, Dr. Rex Z.	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78	
X	18.	HUNT, E. Howard	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78	0433/1
	19.	HYDE, Loretta	78-0070/17	21 Feb 78,	78-0986

20.	HERNANDEZ, Celso (No. 15)	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
21.	HECHEVARRIA, Alberto Hernandez	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
22.	HERNANDEZ, Celso Macario	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
23.	HERNANDEZ, Carlos	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
24.	HEMMING, Gerald Patrick (No. 64)	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
25.	HIRIGOYEN, Mario A.	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78

J CONTINUED

8.	JOHNSON, William	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78

1.	ISAACS, Harold	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78, 0070/17
X 2.	ITO, Chester	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
3.	IVY, Ronald	78-1523/1	24 Apr 78

1.	JACKSON, John C.	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
2.	JAFFEE, Milton	78-0070/22	28 Feb 78
3.	JAMES, Earl Anglin	78-1069/1	15 Mar 78
4.	JARMAN, James Earl	78-1057	8 Mar 78
5.	JOHNSON, Marvin	78-1057	8 Mar 78
6.	JONES, Paul Roland	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
7.	JONES, Robert E.	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78

1.	KAISER, Frankie	78-1057	8 Mar 78
X 2.	KARAMESSINES, Thomas	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
X 3.	KARTY, Floryan Randolph	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
4.	KORCHUNOVA, Olga	78-0070/27	1 Mar 78
5.	KORENGOLD, Robert J.	78-1069/1	15 Mar 78
6.	KOSTIKOV, Valerie Vlademirovich	78-0070/3	26 Jan 78
7.	KUTNER, Louis aka Louis Cutner	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
8.	KRULEWITZ, William aka William Kroll	78-1128	22 Mar 78
9.	KANTOR, Marvin NR	78-1455/1	5 Apr 78
10.	KRAMER, Monica NR	78-0986	12 Apr 78
11.	KIMBLE, Jules Rocco (DOB: 8/3/43	78-1524/1	21 Apr 78

14-00000

	NAMES	OLC MEMORANDUM & DATE	
1.	LaBORDE, Lawrence aka John Tebault	78-0070/9	1 Feb 78
2.	LANZ, Pedro Diaz	78-1035/1	15 Mar 78
3.	LAUCHLI, Richard	78-0070/9	1 Feb 78
4.	LAVERDE, Juan aka C.J. Fortes	78-0070/27	1 Mar 78
5.	LEGIS, Frank Lee	78-0674/1	13 Feb 78
6.	LEIBELER, Wesley J.	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
7.	LELAND, Lee	78-0674/1	13 Feb 78
8.	LEONARD, Patrick	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
9.	LOGAY, Bill	78-1069/1	15 Mar 78
10.	LORENZ, Marita	78-1069/1	15 Mar 78
11.	LOVELADY, Billy Nolan	78-1057	8 Mar 78
X 12.	LYNCH, Grayson	78-1069/1	15 Mar 78
13.	LANZ, Marcos Diaz	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
14.	LUCE, Claire Booth	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
15.	LESNICK , Max	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
16.	LANUSA, Jose Antonio Gonzalez	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
17.	LORIE, Ricardo (No. 69)	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
18.	LEGON, Jose Lopez (No. 70)	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
19.	LOPEZ, Gilberto (DOB: 1/26/40	78-1129	23 Mar 78
20.	LERNER, Maurice	78-1534/1	25 Apr 78

X	1.	MANELL, Barbara	-0433/1	6 Mar 78
X	2.	MANELL, Herbert	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
X	3.	MARTIN, Elwood D.	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
	4.	MARTIN, Mrs. James Herbert	78-0070/22	28 Feb 78
	5.	MARTIN, James Herbert	78-0070/22	28 Feb 78
	6.	MARTINO, John	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
	7.	MASFERRER, Rolando aka Rolando Masferrer Rojas	78-1035/1	15 Mar 78
	8.	MATTHEWS, Russell Douglas	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
	9.	MEDLEVINE, Maurice	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
	10.	MEROLA, Joseph Raymond	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
	11.	MOLINE, Joe R.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
	12.	MONTGOMERY, Leslie Dehl	78-1057	8 Mar 78
	13.	MOORE, Henry M.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
	14.	MOORE, Robert	78-1069/1	15 Mar 78
	15.	MORGAN, Captain William Alexander	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
	16.	MORGAN, Edward P.	78-0070/22	28 Feb 78
	17.	MOSBY, Aline	78-0070/17	21 Feb 78
	18.	MOSS, Edward K.	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
	19.	MURPHY, David E.	78-0448/1	9 Mar 78, 1035/1
X	20.	MUNRO, George Frederick	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
	21.	MURRET, Marilyn Dorothy	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78

	22.	MARTINEZ, Carlos Zarraga	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
	23.	MARTINEZ, Jorge Soto aka Jorge Antonio Martinez Soto	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
	24.	MARTINEZ, Paulino Sierra aka "Dr Martinez"	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
	25.	MENOYO, Eloy Gutierrez (No. 61)	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
	26.	MASIVDAL, Justo	78-1179/1	22 Mar 70
	27.	MIYAR, Evelio Duque	78-1179/1	22 Mar 70
X	28.	MILER, Newton Scott	78-0070/40	29 Mar 78
	29.	MEADOWS, Albert	78-1534/1	25 Apr 78
	30.	MILLER, Isadore	78-1534/1	25 Apr 78

1.	McCARTHY, Justin	78-1069/1 15 Mar 78
2.	McCURLEY, A.D.	78-1057 8 Mar 78
3.	McLANEY, Michael aka McClainey	78-0351/1 19 Jan 78
4.	McMILLIAN, K.C.	78-1069/1 15 Mar 78
X5.	McMILLAN, Priscilla Johnson	77-5685/2 28 Dec 77
6.	McVICKAR, John A.	78-0070/1 12 Jan 78
7.	McWATTERS, Cecil J.	78-1057 8 Mar 78

1.	NORMAN, Harold Dean	78-1057 8 Mar 78
X 2.	NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich	78-0070/3 26 Jan 78
3.	NEWBROUGH, Joseph	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
4.	NOBREGAS, George	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
5.	NAMAN, Rita NR	78-0986 12 Apr 78

1.	OBYEDKOV, Ivan	78-0070/1 12 Jan 78
X 2.	OJERI, Bob	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
3.	ORTEZ, Antillio Ramerez	78-0588/1 16 Feb 78
4.	OSWALD, Lee Harvey	78-0070/1 12 Jan 78, 78-1179/1
5.	OSWALD, Marina Nekolaevna Prussakova	78-0070/1 12 Jan 78
6.	OXFORD, J.L.	78-1057 8 Mar 78
7.	ODIO, Joseph A.	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
8.	OSTER, Joseph A.	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
9.	OTERO, Rolando	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78

1.	PAINE, Michael Ralph	78-0070/3 26 Jan 78
2.	PAINE, Ruth Hyde	78-0070/3 26 Jan 78
3.	PECORA, Nofio	78-0070/22 28 Feb 78
4.	PEREZ, Evalio Alpizar	78-0070/27 1 Mar 78
X5.	PHILLIPS, David Atlee	77-5685/2 28 Dec 77, 0433/1 6
6.	PHILLIPS, Juanita Dale aka Candy Barr	78-0588/1 16 Feb 78
7.	PIPER, Eddie	78-1057 8 Mar 78
8.	PLUMLEE, William Robert	78-0351/1 19 Jan 78

9.	PORSCH, Dr. Gus	78-0674/1	13 Feb 78
10.	POSADA, Louis	77-5685/2	28 Dec 77
11.	POTTS, Walter Eugene	78-1057	8 Mar 78
12.	PRIMACK, Oliver N.	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
13.	PRIO, Carlos	78-0070/27	1 Mar 78
14.	PANEQUE, Victor aka Captain Diego	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
15.	PENA, Orest	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
16.	PICO, Reinaldo	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
17.	PELEAZ, Rolando aka Rolando Pelaez	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
18.	POSEY, Buford Wallace	78-1524/1	21 Apr 78
19.	PEASNER, Thomas R. 10/19/29	78-1534/1	25 Apr 78
20.	PERIERA, Victor	78-1534/1	25 Apr 78
21.	POPE, Harry Raymond	78-1534/1	25 Apr 78
18.	PRIO, Carlos	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78

1.	QUEROGA, Carlos	78-1035/1	15 Mar 78
2.	QUESADO, Carlos Rodrieguez	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78

1.	RAIKIN, Spas T.	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78
X 2.	RANDALL, Frederick	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
X 3.	RANDALL, Jack	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
4.	RANDLE, Linnie Mae	78-1057	8 Mar 78
5.	RATHMAN, Norman aka Roughhouse	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
6.	RAY, James Earl aka Eric Stavro Galt, Harvey Lowmeyer	78-0095/1	30 Jan 78
7.	RAY, Jerry William	78-0674/1	13 Feb 78
8.	RAY, John Larry	78-0674/1	13 Feb 78
9.	RAYNES, James Earl, Rayns, Ryan	78-0674/1	13 Feb 78
10.	REID, Mrs. Robert A.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
11.	REY, Manolo - Manuel Ray	78-1035/1	15 Mar 78
12.	REYNOLDS, Robert J.	78-01069/1	15 Mar 78
13.	ROAN, Helen Afance aka Helen Afance Cooley	78-0070/22	28 Feb 78
X 14.	ROCCA, Raymond	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
15.	ROBERTS, Earlene	78-1057	8 Mar 78
16.	ROMACK, James Elbert	78-1057	8 Mar 78
17.	RODREGUEZ, Carolos Enrique	78-0070/27	1 Mar 78
18.	ROSE, Guy	78-1057	8 Mar 78
19.	ROSELLI, John	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
20.	ROSENSON, Randolph	78-0674/1	13 Feb 78
22.	RAVEL, Luis Rabel aka Luis Ravel	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
23.	RIVERO, Manolo Ray	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
24.	ROBERTS, Delphine ROINTS	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78

21.	ROWLAND, Arnold	7[illegible]057	8 Mar 78
26.	RODRIGUEZ, Arnesto , Jr.	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
27.	ROQUE, Juan Manuel Salvat	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
28.	RODRIGUEZ, Santiago Alvereaz	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
29.	RUBENSTEIN, Jack aka Jack Rubin	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
1.	SANCHEZ, Carlos Eduardo Hernandez	78-0070/9	1 Feb 78
2.	SCIBOR, Mitchell J.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
X 3.	SHAW, Robert	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78 ✓
4.	SHELLEY, William H.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
5.	SHIRAKOVA, Rima	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78
6.	SHORE, Michael (Mike)	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
7.	SIEBAND, Sidney	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
8.	SIMS, Richard M.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
9.	SIRAGUSA, Charles	78-0095/1	30 Jan 78
10.	SLATIN, Joseph E.	78-0070/22	28 Feb 78
11.	SLAWSON, W. David	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
✓ 12.	SMITH, Joseph Burkholder	78-0070/17	21 Feb 78
13.	SMITH, L.C.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
14.	SMITH, Seigio Arcacha	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
15.	SPOIL, Col Jonas C.	78-0095/1	30 Jan 78
X16.	SNYDER, Richard	77-5685/2	28 Dec 77
17.	STEIN, Charles Joseph	78-0095/1	30 Jan 78
18.	STERN, Samuel	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
19.	STINNEWIYN, Robert	78-0674/1	13 Feb 78
20.	STONER, Jessie B.	78-0674/1	13 Feb 78
21.	STUCKEY, William	77-5685/2	28 Dec 77
22.	STURGIS, Frank aka Frank Fiorino	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
23.	STOVALL, Richard S.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
24.	SWEATH, Allan	78-1057	8 Mar 78
25.	SUN, Loo Mrs.	78-1035/1	15 Mar 78
26.	SHAW, Clay	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
27.	SARGENT, Andres Nazar (No. 59)	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
28.	SAMUEL,	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
29.	STURGIS, Frank (See No. 22)	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
30.	SMITH, Helen Kay aka Pixie Lynn	78-1534/1	25 Apr 78
31.	STONE, John Eli	78-1534/1	25 Apr 78

	NAMES	OLC MEMORANDUM & DATE
1.	WALDMAN, William J.	78-1057 8 Mar 78
2.	WALTHERS, Eddie Raymond	78-1057 8 Mar 78
3.	WALTERS, Ralph	78-1057 8 March 78
4.	WATANABE, Doris	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
5.	WATANABE, Kuzuo	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
6.	WEATHERFORD, Harry	78-1057 8 Mar 78
7.	WEINSTEIN, Abraham	78-0588/1 16 Feb 78
8.	WEITZMAN, Seymour	78-1057 8 Mar 78
9.	WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston, III	77-5685/2 28 Dec 77
10.	WHALEY, William Wayne	78-1057 8 Mar 78
11.	WHEELER, Pete	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
12.	WHITTEN, Jack	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
13.	WHITEHOUSE, Eduardo	78-0351/1 19 Jan 78
14.	WHITE, Allen	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
15.	WILCOTT, James	78-0448/1 8 Mar 78
16.	WICKS, Alistair	78-0674/1 13 Feb 78
17.	WILSON, Lemar	78-0095/1 30 Jan 78
18.	WILLIAMS, Bonnie Ray	78-1057 8 Mar 78
19.	WILLINS, Howard P.	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
20.	WISEMAN, John	78-1057 8 Mar 78
21.	WOODS, Jim	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
22.	WOODS, Louise	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
23.	WORRELL, James Richard , Jr.	78-1057 8 Mar 78
24.	WRIGHT, George	78-0674/1 13 Feb 78
25.	WILSON, Carlos John aka John Wilson-Hudson aka Carl John Wilson Hudson	78-1179/1 22 Mar 78
26.	WIGREN, Lee H.	78-0070/40 29 Mar 78
1.	YAMADA, Shizuo	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78
1.	ZAMBERNARDI, Robert	78-0433/1 6 Mar 78

	NAMES	OLC MEMORANDUM & DATE	
1.	TAKAI, Kan	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
2.	TARASOFF, Anna	78-0448/1	8 Mar 78
3.	TARASOFF, Boris	78-0448/1	8 Mar 78
4.	TONAHILL, Joe H	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
5.	TODD, Robert James	78-0588/1	16 Feb 78
6.	TRAFFICANTE, Santo	78-0351/1	19 Jan 78
7.	TRULY, Roy Sansom	78-1057	8 Mar 78
8.	TURNER, F. M.	78-1057	8 Mar 78
9.	TAMAYO, Francisco Rodriguez	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
10.	THORNLEY, Kerry Wendall	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
11.	TAYLOR, Calvin	78-1523/1	24 Apr 78
12.	TOURINE, Charles aka Charles White, Charles the Blade. DOB: 3/26/06	78-1534/1	25 Apr 78
1.	UGARTE, Alverado Gilberto Nolasco	78-0070/1	12 Jan 78
1.	VALENCIA, Pedro Gutierrez	78-0070/3	26 Jan 78
2.	VALLE, Antonio Cuesta	78-1035/1	15 Mar 78
3.	VALVERDE, Juan	78-0070/27	1 Mar 78
4.	VAZQUE, Antonio Soto	78-1070/1	15 Mar 78
5.	VECIANA, Antonio Blanch	78-1035/1	15 Mar 78
6.	VOGEL, Dan	78-0433/1	6 Mar 78
7.	VARONA, Juan Antonio	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
8.	VILLODAS, Joaquin	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78
9.	VEGA, Rolando (No. 59)	78-1179/1	22 Mar 78

SR-6 - Research SECTION
1960 - 1962.

Jan 60 - No Chief -
Ranking officer was
DONALD E. POOLE, Ret.
c/o Marven Hayes
3006 Scotty Drive
Jacksonville, Fla 32216
Tele: (485 (904) 737-3967

Was assigned from Nov 1957 - apr 1964.

No deputy.

Mar 61 - ops officer

Chief sept 1961-62 Rudolph Balaban, resigned 13.5.70.
No address.

assigned aug 1960 - apr 1964

June 1962 became ops support section

Richard L. Winch, ret. 73
11707 Tifton Dr.
Potomac Md 20854
Tele: 299-3530
assigned oct 1960 - apr 1964.

Wisconsin (414) 849-4344

14-00000

John E. [illegible] - CR/6 - op: SE/Dev Com
(blocked)

1st appeared Dec. 62

Jan 60 - no chief; Don E. POOLE highest
[open] Nov 57 - Apr. 64
Ret. 1975 -
c/o Hayes 3006 Scotty Dr.
Jacksonville, Fla
32216.

McMahon
was predecessor

no deputy

(12 Florence E. REED - ret. 7.31.70
Nov. 56 - Jan 64 no address

(12) Mary E. STUKEY - 17.10. ~~10.~~ .74
(NSA?)
10.57 - 10.62

Mar. 61 - ops officer chief
Rudolph ~~Balan~~ Balaban
Res. 13.5.70
Aug. 60 - Apr. 64 became chief Sep. 61 - 62

6.62

Research disappeared
became Ops support

Oct. 60 -
Apr. 64

1st person Richard L. WINCH
Ret. ^{11}6.73 CIARDS
- 11707 Tifton Dr. Potomac. 20854

Mildred Edgerton - Sep. 57 - Apr. 64 or Dec. 66
Res. ^{30}6.72 -

others assigned:

1) Eleanore E. Reed, ret ~~8~~ 7.31.70 (12)
no address

assigned Nov 56 - Jan 64

2. Mary E. Stukey — ret 17.10.74 (12)

assigned 10.58 - 10-62 (NSA ?)

3. Mildred Edgerton Res 30.6.72
assigned Sep 57 - apr 64 or Dec 1966

14-00000

OLC 78-2637, 13 July 78

* 1. Harold F SWENSON ~~retired~~
address: ~~5005 EDGEMORE LANE~~
~~Bethesda, Md 20014~~

Tele: ~~986-1343~~
Blocked [✓ open]

BALMES N.
2 (Barney) HIDALGO, Jr. ~~retired~~
address: 403 Silver Rock Rd
Rockville, Md. 20851

Tele: 762-1417 Home <
340-9350 office
Blocked [✓ open]
→ 10 A.M. - 24 July - OGC
0

3. FNU LANGOSCH - pseudo of SWENSON

4. Daniel FLORES
OVERSEAS + Non Official Cover
$ · Can recall if Desired.

Home — 203-661-1146

* Harold F Swenson - Tele: 485-203-661-2000 EXT 667
Director of Corporate Security
Chesebrough - Pond's Inc.
33 Benedict Place
Greenwich, Conn. 06830

14-00000

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO: Skip

☑ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Tom Ryan

OF (Organization)

☑ PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. 1315

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

~~[illegible]~~ 485-

203-
661-7000
EXT 667

Dir Corp Security
Cheseborough-
Pond's Inc
33 Benedict Pl
Greenwich Conn
06830

RECEIVED BY | DATE | TIME 2:25

STANDARD FORM 63 GPO : 1969—048—16—80341-1 339-089 63-108
REVISED AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

Re 2 Mar 78 request OLC-78-0443/1

Para 1 & 2 done
[illegible] On March 20, 1978, Pat Carpentier instructed us to disregard 3-20.
However:
5) Wm Broe was interviewed (ref: N.Eng.)
7) Jerry Fox was interviewed (ref Fla)
12) Frederick Randall was interviewed
17 & 18 were interviewed
~~18~~
19 was interviewed

~~of the~~ They received the omnibus letter - which satisfied needs of last para. They have interviewed following to our knowledge: [illegible]

Anne Goodpasture.
David Phillips
Robert Shaw.
Robert Zambardini.
Herbert Manell
Barbara Manell.
Allen White.
Jack Whitten.
Charlotte Bustos
Charles Flick
Dan Vogel
George Monroe

Since we provided 1 & 2
and were pulled off of 3-20,
and provided letters for others.
This requirement fully met -
if we met last Para.
Fep

2 Mar Request } See reverse side
Who interviewed }

additional { 8 Mar 78-1035 - { items 16 - applicant file.
17
18 - More info
19 - NR
Note they have [illegible]

7 May - 78-1565/1

Brisbeck

(17) Grayston Lynch - ret.
Keywest Towers
apt 411-A
S. Roosevelt Blvd,
Key West 33040 - in 1972

14-00000

Call Norris

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE in Tokyo

TO: SR office

[redacted]

ROOM NO. BUILDING Soviet Br.

REMARKS:

June 63 - Mar 64

~~Bob Keith~~

Ret [illegible] A. Fill * 061709

Ret Rolf M. Keith 056495

Sato, Hayama * 059317

Ret - Slobogin, Peter M. * 008771

Ret VON BRETZEL, Heo * 006373

FROM:

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

draft

MEMORANDUM FOR OLC/C&R

Attn: Patrick L. Carpentier

FROM: Norbert A. Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O

SUBJECT: Names of Tokyo Station/SR Branch Personnel Requested in References.

REF: A. OLC 78-0443/3, 5 April 1978

B. OLC 78-0443/1, 6 March 1978

C. OLC 78-1455/1, 11 April 1978.

1. In responese to the above referenced memos and various oral requests, there follows a list of DDO personnel assigned to the Tokyo Station/ SR Branch during the indicated ~~time f~~ time frame:

A. Geroge A. Fill (Retired) *
27 Bay Tree
North Myrtle Beach, S.C. 29582
Telephone: (803) 249-3192
In Tokyo from May 1960 to July 1964.

B. Robert M. Keith (Retired) *
c/o Mrs. E.A. Moran
115 E. Coleman
Sanford, Florida 32771
In Tokyo from November 1958 to August 1963.

C. Hayami Sato (Retired) *
3051 Ala Piadla

SECRET

W'gate file

8 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Media Inquiry to Cuban Exile Journalist in Miami re Cuban Involvement in Watergate Case and Attitudes in Miami Area

1. This memorandum is for your information only.

2. On 7 May 1973 we were advised by Station WH/Miami that two employees of a Station WH/Miami proprietary had told the Station that one Rene VIERA Gonzalez, a Cuban exile journalist who writes for Diario Las Americas and owns the Westchester Mall Bookstore in Miami received a call in early May from one FNU GOTTLIEB who said he worked for the Times in Washington. (GOTTLIEB is believed to be Sanford GOTTLIEB, 11102 Brandywine St., Kensington, Md. who was formerly an employee of the National Committee on Sane Nuclear Policy". A pretext call to the Washington bureau of the New York Times verified that one "Sandy" Gottlieb was employed there.) GOTTLIEB asked VIERA what people in Miami were saying about the Watergate case and what participation the Cubans had in it. He specifically asked about the activities of Reinaldo PICO (former 2506 Brigade member), Orlando PIEDRA (former Chief of Cuban Bureau of Investigation in Batista Government), and Rolando MASFERRER (former Cuban Senator and self-admitted former Communist). He also asked if ITT had an office in Miami, whether Joaquin SANJENIS Perdomo (former Chief of a WH/Miami proprietary who was amicably terminated in 1972) and Juan A. PAULA (former WH/Miami proprietary employee and former Controller of Revolutionary Democratic Front-FRD-and currently employed by an OGC proprietary) were still in the Miami area. He was also interested in Edgardo BUTTARI, a Cuban born in West Tampa, Florida, a former Cuban Congressman and Minister of Commerce who is reportedly associated with Mr. Charles "Bebe" REBOZO. According to GOTTLIEB, BUTTARI was appointed as "political chief in the Republican Party".

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 005555

#4308

3. GOTTLIEB apparently has current information on the activities of the persons he mentioned; for example, he knew that Juan A. PAULA was involved in the jewelry business (PAULA and Antonio Felix GENOVA Corzo, a WH/Miami proprietary employee recently purchased a jewelry business) and he knew that Reinaldo PICO had resided in Venezuela and had recently returned to the United States. The phone conversation lasted about 45 minutes and GOTTLIEB told VIERA that if he came to Miami they would have lunch together.

4. VIERA does not know GOTTLIEB but talked to him because GOTTLIEB said he was recommended by Ernesto BETANCOURT who has resided in the Washington area for more than ten years. BETANCOURT was a former Agency asset and is currently Chief of Economic Planning and Budget, OAS. The conversation was initially in English but continued in Spanish. VIERA said he provided no information to GOTTLIEB on the basis that he is a Cuban exile and did not want to get involved in internal U.S. affairs. We do not know why GOTTLIEB was interested in Joaquin SANJENIS or Juan A. PAULA. (Attached are summary biographies of persons of interest to GOTTLIEB.)

5. On 7 May 1973 Marvin L. EVANS, Chief, MHMUTUAL, was briefed on the substance of the report from WH/Miami pertaining to Juan A. PAULA, who works for the MHMUTUAL proprietary, McKERCHER and AVANT which utilizes NORTHWEST MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. as office space cover. Among other duties performed by the proprietary are the monthly checks sent to the dependents of imprisoned assets which are signed in true name by PAULA. EVANS was unaware that PAULA had purchased a new jewelry business in association with Antonio GENOVA; however, he feels that MHMUTUAL is protected and compartmented from the WH/Miami proprietary and he has the utmost confidence in the proprietary being able to field any questions. MHMUTUAL communication with the proprietary is by unlisted phone and a post office box. EVANS said that McKERCHER and AVANT could possibly be linked to NORTHWEST MANAGEMENT but the trail would end there. He feels that either proprietary could only be linked to the Agency by innuendo. (He did say that Howard HUNT was aware of MHMUTUAL when he served as C/CA/EUR.) EVANS feels secure as far as NORTHWEST MANAGEMENT and McKERCHER and AVANT are concerned.

6. EVANS mentioned that the bona fide law firm occupying the other portion of the MHMUTUAL offices are the attorneys for John DEAN. (These lawyers are cleared and witting.) One of the lawyers told EVANS that DEAN will be the "biggest canary singer of the year". The common receptionist area is manned by MHMUTUAL employees who also monitor all telephone calls, incoming and outgoing for the other law firm. EVANS mentioned that there have been numerous calls from the media and outgoing overseas calls to such places as Japan and Europe.

7. EVANS will be traveling to Nassau and returning via Miami on 10 May 1973. He intends to talk with his proprietary people at that time on other MHMUTUAL business and will also contact COS, WH/Miami. (The COS has been alerted to expect a call from EVANS on 10 May 1973.)

James E. Flannery

James E. Flannery
Acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: Director of Security

Attachments: A-F Biographic Summaries

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Newark, New Jersey
August 19, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

[redacted]

SECRET

LAZARO EDDY ESPINOSA BONET
ESPIONAGE - CUBA

NK T-1, a Cuban refugee who is in a position to furnish reliable information, advised as follows:

On August 4, 1969, the source was contacted by telephone at his place of employment in Carlstadt, New Jersey, by Lazaro Eddy Espinosa Bonet, Third Secretary to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN). Espinosa requested the source to meet him at 11:00 AM, August 5, 1969, on the corner of Bronx Park East and Allerton Avenue, Bronx, New York. The source went to designated meet area on August 5, 1969, arriving at approximately 10:50 AM and remaining until 11:25 AM. No attempt to contact source was made during that interval.

On August 11, 1969, source's wife received a telephone call at the source's home, in Union City, New Jersey, from an individual who did not identify himself. A message was left for source which instructed him to appear at the previously mentioned meet location at 11:00 AM, August 12, 1969.

The source arrived at the meet site at the intersection of Bronx Park East and Allerton Avenue, Bronx, New York, at approximately 10:30 AM, whereupon he was immediately contacted by Espinosa, who had been waiting in a parked car on Allerton Avenue. Espinosa and source proceeded on foot a short distance toward the interior of Bronx Park and sat down on the grass in a shady area. Espinosa took out from a small handbag which he was carrying a Sony Miniature Tape Recorder which measured approximately 9 inches by 4 inches by 3 inches. The tape recorder was placed between the two on the grass as they talked. The source observed approximately 20 small reels of tape in the bag carried by Espinosa.

~~([illegible])~~
(this seems to be a different source than the prior Cuba-47 things)

SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

6

201-816438

535-CC-47
#5615

During the ensuing conversation which lasted from 10:30 AM until 7:30 PM, the source counted three or four reels of tape utilized by Espinosa and each reel would record for about one hour, or approximately thirty minutes on each side. Espinosa, whose true identity had not been revealed to the source, requested him to call him "Esteban." Referring to a report prepared by source and left at a drop site in Union City, New Jersey, on May 18, 1969, Espinosa stated that the report had been poorly prepared and lacked necessary detail. He directed the source to be more specific and thorough in answering any questions for future reports.

Espinosa proceeded to review with the source the information furnished by source in the previous report. Espinosa was quick to cite any small discrepancy between the information contained in the report and that which was furnished by the source during their conversation.

Espinosa queried the source in connection with individuals in Miami with whom the source had been familiar. The questions concerning these individuals included their current addresses, general background and sympathies, activity in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations, etc.

Espinosa displayed a photograph of (First Name Unknown) Mellado and asked source if he recognized him. Mellado was described as male, of Caucasian race, who appeared to be Cuban, 32-35 years old, husky build, dark hair and dark eyes. The source could not recognize the individual photographed.

Espinosa made several inquiries about "Frank", a non-existent individual who the source intentionally included in his prior report as a principal agent for CIA. The source advised Espinosa that he met "Frank" on only two or three occasions and knew nothing more specifically about him.

While the source was answering a question concerning an individual named "Piche", Espinosa inadvertently referred to "Piche" as Epifanio Romero, which the source knew as the true name of "Piche." Romero is known by Espinosa to have been previously connected with CIA

Source of Cuba-20

operations in Africa as well as the Miami area. He was especially interested in whether the source knew any dates of forthcoming infiltration runs into Cuba in which Romero might be involved.

Espinosa mentioned Raul Villaverde and asked the source if Rafael Villaverde is the brother of Raul. He further questioned the source whether or not Raul is still a CIA instructor in the use of explosives. The fact that Raul was in any way connected with instruction in the use of explosives was never mentioned previously by source in his report and must have been obtained by Espinosa from other sources.

The source happened to mention "La Osa", a nickname for a past team member for infiltration runs into Cuba. Referring to "La Osa", Espinosa interrupted and stated "Oh, Filiberto Leon Delgado." Source had forgotten the true name of "La Osa" and said that this identity must have been furnished to Espinosa through other sources.

Also asked of the source was whether Justo Luis Llorett, a colleague of source, was still operating for CIA. The source replied he did not know, inasmuch as he had been too long removed from Miami area to be accurate in his reply.

Espinosa made inquiries on the following individuals with whom the source had been thought to associate in Miami area; specifically, he wanted to know any background information and whether or not the individuals were being directed by CIA:

Otto (Last Name Unknown), previously of operational interest to CIA in the Miami area.

Javier Souto, previously a principal agent in the Miami area for CIA.

Edgar Sopo, active in anti-Castro radio broadcasts to Cuba from the Miami area.

Manuel Artimes, a leader in Bay of Pigs Invasion and subsequently connected with anti-Castro organizations, including MRR.

Arturo Mallan, performed infiltration operations into Cuba with source. Espinosa specifically indicated that source was to attempt to make contact with Mallan to get any information of value when in the Miami area.

Dr. Rafael Molinas Salvucedo, previously attached to anti-Castro movements and alleged to be of operational value to CIA.

Andres Romero, known by Espinosa to have participated in CIA directed operations in Africa. Source was directed to specifically contact Romero for any information of value pertaining to CIA activity when in the Miami area.

Caridad Gonzalez Machin, involved with exfiltration runs from Cuba.

Heriberto Delgado, a cousin of source who lives in Venezuela, a brother of Adolfo Delgado who was killed in 1957 during an assault on the Batista Palace in Cuba. He is thought by the source to be a communist.

Source furnished little information regarding the above individuals and used as an excuse that although he was on close terms with most of them, he has had little or no contact with them since leaving the Miami area.

Of all the individuals named by Espinosa, he appeared most concerned in obtaining any information on Dr. Cesar Baro and Dr. Fernando Cabezas. Both individuals had been associates of the source in Havana and Cabezas had worked with the source in Havana. He advised Espinosa that although both are known to be anti-Castro, he did not feel either had any connection with CIA.

On at least three occasions, Espinosa asked the source about the degree of fluency of the latter's spoken and written English and asked if he is able to relate with Americans. He was seemingly impressed when the source answered affirmatively and explained that he had attended night school in the New Jersey area.

Espinosa queried the source about some infiltration runs into Cuba that the source had led. Espinosa mentioned specific runs in which the source participated which had not been mentioned previously by the source. He seemed to be very well prepared and gave the impression that he knew the answers to all the questions directed at the source. He was interested in any problems that the source's team might have experienced when entering and leaving Cuba during CIA operations.

He inquired about the control methods of CIA infiltration teams, whether members of the teams were ever surveilled in the United States, the chain of command for a team, and to whom team leaders report. The source answered that each member was responsible only to himself. Concerning security rules on the mother vessel during infiltration and exfiltration operations, the source stated that each team leader was responsible for the performance of his team and each team member was held responsible for each piece of equipment issued to him.

Source was requested to identify any mother vessel, the bases from which they operate, and the crew members. The source stated he could not answer these questions due to the length of time passed since the source was connected with CIA operations in Miami.

The source was further questioned regarding the methods of infiltration into Cuba, the role of the mother vessel, intermediary vessels, landing crafts, and the establishment of intelligence nets inside Cuba. Apparently noting that the source was not furnishing full details of the question, Espinosa interrupted and requested the source to verify Espinosa's explanation. Espinosa proceeded to relate concisely the plans and methods utilized in CIA operations.

Asked how teams were able to build sheds and living quarters in the mangrove swamps inside of Cuba without being noticed by natives in the same area, the source replied that everyone in the vicinity of the infiltration points were sympathetic to the teams. The source explained that one person in charge of an observation post approximately one mile away from one infiltration point cooperated with the teams and was later taken out of Cuba by the source.

Espinosa asked if there are still any collaborators or persons sympathetic to the United States Government on the Cuban coast with whom the infiltrators worked. Source replied that to his knowledge all those who were of assistance have been either jailed or killed.

Espinosa was also concerned about the employment of CIA personnel in the Keys off of Florida and asked the source as to why CIA would maintain personnel in that area. Source stated he did not know unless it was to guard against infiltration by Cuban fishing vessels.

Questioned again about his reasons for cooperating with the CMUN, the source replied that he is an individual completely independent of any political belief. He said that he was initially motivated against the regime of Fidel Castro because he had seen his parents work hard and save for 40 years in order to afford a few luxuries in their later lives, only to see the Cuban Government intervene and claim possession of everything, including their home. He further explained that it appears the United States will never force Castro out of Cuba but that the fact remains he is Cuban and Cuba is his fatherland. He said he is willing to cooperate only to the extent that his parents will receive fair treatment from the Cuban Government.

Espinosa had information that the source was suspected at one time by Cubans in Miami of possibly being connected with the Cuban G-2, which information caused a United States Government investigation. Source replied that this was probably due to his number of successful runs into Cuba without incident which prompted others to suspect he had to have connections with G-2.

On one run, the source was out of contact with CIA for ten days which added further to the possibility that he had either defected or was working with G-2. Most of the rumors were quelled however when he submitted to a CIA lie detector test which resulted negatively. He credited his ability to avoid ambushes and misfortune to the experience he had in infiltration exercises as well as extensive CIA training.

Approximately one half hour of the meeting between the source and Espinosa entailed ascertaining the proficiencies of the source in the training of demolitions radio operation, weaponry, seamanship, etc., which he received from CIA. Nothing was mentioned concerning any intentions by CMUN to utilize the source in connection with any of his previously mentioned fields of training.

The source informed Espinosa that he had been contacted since their last meeting by Jose Ramon Egues, who is currently reorganizing the Vanguardia Revolucionaria Cubana, an anti-Castro organization. The source has been designated by Egues to lead the military faction of the organization. It was explained to Espinosa that Egues has goals of ultimately bombing the CMUN at New York City by means as yet not disclosed to the source. The source was instructed that in the future he is to spend as much time as possible with Egues in determining that organization's plans of action against the CMUN and Government of Cuba.

At different times throughout the meeting, Espinosa was observed to lean back on the ground which exposed a weapon tucked inside his trousers at the waist, which was described by the source to be a black Waltham 9MM Automatic Pistol.

At a point of about two hours through the interview, Espinosa took the source on foot to the Allerton Luncheonette at 649 Allerton Avenue, where each bought a fountain drink. While the source sat at the bar, Espinosa went into one of the two telephone booths located nearest the rear wall of the luncheonette. He was in the booth about 30 seconds but did not make a call. He did not indicate his reason for entering the booth. Finishing their drink, they returned to a shady area in the same section of the park and continued their discussion. At this point the source noted for the first time a person of Cuban appearance sitting on a nearby park bench who remained in the area through the entire meeting. The source suspected this person as being connected with counter surveillance of the meeting.

Espinosa instructed the source to prepare in report form the answers to the second portion of the list of questions furnished to the latter on May 13, 1969. The answers in report form are to be placed in an empty cigarette package and dropped at 11:00 AM on August 20, 1969, or August 22, 1969, behind an iron gate fence at the northwest corner of Bronx Park East at Allerton Avenue, from two to five feet north of the concrete stone pillar which anchors the fence. The source is to return to the drop site at 1:00 PM to check if the drop was covered. Two dates for the pickup were provided in the event there were too many persons in that area to risk covering the drop.

Espinosa asked the source if he would be agreeable to go to Miami for a month in an effort to contact friends and ex-associates of CIA. The source stated he was not, in view of his family and employment obligations, but agreed to go for a short period, possibly three or four days. Espinosa told him that while in Miami, the source's mission would consist of determining current activities of the CIA, identities of any new CIA teams, identities of Government vessels currently in or out of service, new principal agents, CIA instructors, and any CIA activities including the deployment of Cubans to South American regions for CIA operations.

The date agreed upon on which source will go to Miami is August 25, 1969, but the source will indicate to Espinosa in the report to be left at the next drop that he will delay his departure until Saturday morning, August 30, 1969, in order to pick up his next pay check, and will not return until Tuesday morning, September 2, 1969. The source was instructed by Espinosa to meet him following his return to New Jersey at 11:00 AM on September 17 or September 20, 1969, at the intersection of Gun Hill Road and White Plains Road, New York, at which time results of the Miami mission will be disclosed.

The source suggested that the next meeting take place in Carlstadt, New Jersey, to which suggestion Espinosa replied he does not like to schedule meetings in New Jersey unless absolutely necessary.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OLC 74-0179

4 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities Testimony of 4 February 1974

1. This, the first day of hearings involving Agency witnesses to testify under oath in executive session with Vice Chairman Howard Baker presiding, was held in S. 1418, Dirksen Office Building. Although scheduled to commence at 0930 hours, Senator Baker did not show up to swear in the witnesses until 1025 hours at which time he administered the oath to Mary McGillen, Robert Ritchie, Martin Lukoskie, and Erich Isenstead and then left.

2. Background:

a. As a result of previous sessions with Senator Baker and his counsel the following Agency witnesses were scheduled: Mary McGillen, Robert Ritchie, Martin Lukoskie, Erich Isenstead, James Angleton, Richard A. Krueger, Steven Greenwood, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Thomas Karamessines, Frank O'Malley, and Jacob Esterline.

b. Those witnesses who were able to assemble were met as a group on Saturday, 2 February, with Mr. Lansdale, Office of General Counsel, and myself meeting each one individually. It was pointed out to all that:

(1) Their appearance before the Committee was voluntary; the Agency was not directing them to appear, but, of course, the Committee had the power of subpoena.

2 Signer

#4182

(2) They had the right to a private counsel and that Mr. Lansdale and I would sit in with them during the session and that our principal role would be to assure that the questioning did not get into sensitive areas unrelated to "Watergate."

c. Early in the hearing of 4 February 1974 it became clear that the Committee could in no way handle the five witnesses scheduled for the day, and that the Committee counsels had not had sufficient time to absorb the voluminous written material that we had provided them earlier in the week. As a result, with the agreement of Committee counsel we unplugged for now Messrs. Isenstead, Angleton, and O'Malley. Also, following the day's testimony which ended in the late afternoon, I stayed on into the evening to review all of the material that we had provided to the counsels to make sure that they would make better use of the time of all involved.

3. Presession Agreements:

Prior to the hearings Thompson agreed:

a. To the security arrangements which I outlined (see attachment).

b. To treat the testimony as exhibits under the 1 February 1974 understanding reached with Senator Baker.

c. That he thought it would be all right for us to have a copy of the transcript, but he didn't want us to show it to scheduled witnesses. (This is a fairly remote possibility because of the delay in getting transcripts.)

4. Mary Louise McGillen:

(Saturday Miss McGillen had mentioned that she had had a roommate who somehow knew Marchetti and that the former roommate had told her the Committee might be interested in talking to her, feeling that she had information relating to McCord's employment in the Agency.)

Miss McGillen testified from 1025 hours until 1040 hours and her testimony was completely uneventful. She identified Mr. Hollis Whitaker. Also, her uncertainty over whether McCord retired in 1970 or 1971 raised a possibility that she had seen McCord in Agency Headquarters in 1971 after McCord had retired, but eventually it was clarified that she had seen McCord before his retirement and not after it.

5. Robert Ritchie:

Mr. Ritchie testified from 1040 hours until 1235 hours, with Thompson questioning Ritchie for about 65 minutes. Ritchie acquitted himself extremely well and there were no surprises in his testimony.

a. Liebengood brought out the sudden TDY to Headquarters from Miami following the Watergate incident.

b. Some confusion arose because Ritchie was not sure of the date he took over Martinez, he thought it might have been some time in March 1972, when in fact it was late in April.

c. It is obvious that the counsels have some conflicting testimony concerning the discovery of Martinez' car in the Miami airport following the arrests in June 1972.

6. Martin Lukoskie:

During Mr. Lukoskie's testimony, which commenced at 1300 hours, I moved to go off the record a number of times on the following points:

a. Thompson wanted to know who we dealt with in General Foods to lay on cover arrangements. I told him we were getting into unchartered waters because I didn't know where his questioning was going to end up. He said his interest was to find out the names of the individuals and companies with which CIA had a relationship in Mexico over the last ten years. I requested that he rephrase his question so that we could respond only with respect to the particular companies or individuals in which he was interested. As a concession, he cut down the period from the last ten years to "since 1971" and I said we would note his request.

b. Thompson asked about CIA relationships with the Mormon church, the Summa Corporation, or the Hughes Tool Company. (Thompson said he had specific information that we had something with the Mormon church.) I suggested that if he is interested in whether the Agency had any relationship with these three institutions in connection with CIA's relationship with the Mullen Company, he rephrase the question. Thompson refused to do this and I said we would note his request.

c. Thompson wanted a full explanation of the "WH flap." I told Thompson this involved a sensitive and active situation which had been explained to Senator Baker and that Lukoskie was not an Agency witness in this respect, but we would note his interest and see what could be provided. (I believe Thompson has already been fully exposed to the "WH flap" in an executive hearing with Bennett during which Baker asked if Bennett knew what the WH flap was all about. Baker later told me that Bennett did know, and explained it to Baker. I assumed that Bennett may have gotten this information from Jim Everett.) Thompson observed the parallel which exists between the position of CIA with respect to the "WH flap" and the White House with respect to issues it did not wish to be explored by the Attorney General in connection with the activities of the Plumbers (an observation I have been expecting for some time, but this is the first time it has been presented directly.)

Mr. Lukoskie's testimony was excellent with no surprises and generally paralleled that given to Senator Baker in the Senator's office on 11 December 1973:

a. Concerning any general logs that CCS maintains on contacts with cover firms, Lukoskie explained that internal procedures had changed some time in December 1972 on the information to be maintained in the logs. To assure his responsiveness to a specific question, I refreshed Lukoskie's memory on an entry in a CCS log on a call in June 1972 between the Agency and the Mullen Company in which it was not clear either who initiated the call or who was contacted in the Mullen Company.

Follow up: Provide any extant memorandum reflecting the change in information to be covered in the CCS log.

b. In response to counsel's questions, Lukoskie said he had no knowledge of (1) a Greenspun memorandum, (2) a Mr. Waite (sp?) of General Foods, and (3) Mr. Hemlick (sp?) of ANA (Association of National Advertisers).

c. The counsels focused in on the meetings between Mr. Hunt and Messrs. Cord Meyer and Tom Karamessines.

d. In characterizing Mr. Bennett as an individual in whom he did not have a great deal of trust, as contrasted with Mr. Mullen, Lukoskie mentioned Bennett's suggestion that Lukoskie would be well taken care of if he could assist in getting unfavorable information on Mr. Maheu.

7. Following the hearings, I stayed on with the counsel and we reviewed late into the evening the voluminous material previously provided by the Agency to assure that they could make more effective use of the time of all involved and hopefully to get to the bottom of whatever is troubling them.

During the session I made it clear that I was puzzled by their questioning during the day since it was apparent that they had not yet absorbed the information we had already provided and which we think satisfactorily answers the questions they had raised. Restating a point that I had made previously, I said that while I did not personally believe so, their investigation had the appearance of a fishing expedition and that if they continued it would be unavoidable that we would have to disclose more and more sensitive information which had no bearing on the case and which I assumed they had no desire to obtain. I said that I felt that serious consideration should be given to either advising Mr. Colby about the particulars, or if that was not satisfactory, to at least advise our oversight Committee chairmen and ask them to investigate whatever serious leads had been developed in the secure environment structured for the oversight of sensitive CIA matters. Mr. Thompson admitted this suggestion had some merit.

SIGNED

LYLE L. MILLER
Deputy Legislative Counsel

Att.

Distribution:
Original - Subject
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - OGC
✓1 - IG
1 - DDO
1 - OS
1 - Chrono

HMYA - 1975 thru
2006 - complete

HMYA 2006 repeated

NO HMYA 2007

HMYA - 2008 -
2022 complete

NO HMYA 2023

Incoming Monterey →

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO:

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:

HMYA - 2024 -
2025

FROM:

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

S-E-C-R-E-T 16/06/77

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	ROUTING
HMYA-01935	050-004-131	06/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
LETTER BY CAMILO CHAVEZ						
HMYA-01936	201-0177684	06/09/63			AO	IP
LIDATE OPERATIONAL FILE						
HMYA-01937	050-124-003	12/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
LIGAFF-1/TRANSMITTAL OF A CRAC ADVERTISEMENT						
HMYA-01938	050-126-004	10/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 121 DATED 29 JUL 63						
HMYA-01939	050-124-003	12/09/63			IN	C/WH/3
LIGAFF-1/TRANSMITTAL OF AN ANTI-CRAC ARTICLE						
HMYA-01940	050-004-121	12/09/63			IN	IP
LUIS LAURO ESCAMILLA MARTINEZ						
HMYA-01941	050-004-131	12/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
MHBORIC/FORWARDING OF DISSIDENT CORRESPONDENCE						
HMYA-01942	201-0025485	23/09/63			AC	WH3/ME
REDCAP/TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS CLIPPING						
HMYA-01943	050-009-005	23/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
TRANSMITTAL OF PRI YOUTH LEAFLET						
HMYA-01944	050-006-027/03	23/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
PROJECT LIRULE/PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JUN-10 SEP 63						
HMYA-01945	201-0319623	23/09/63			AO	WH/REG
KAPOK RECD 26 SEP 63						
HMYA-01946	050-126-004	23/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 112 DATED 12 AUG 63						
HMYA-01947	050-004-122	26/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
INTERVIEW WITH AURELIA CAMPOS MORALES						
HMYA-01948	050-004-122	26/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
TRANSMITTAL OF PHOTOGRAPH-MARTA MALDONADO						
HMYA-01949	050-500	26/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
PHOTO IDENTIFICATION						
HMYA-01950	201-0065845	26/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
ACTS OF EDELMIRO MALDONADO LEAL DURING PERIOD 10-13 SEP 63						
HMYA-01951	201-0181033)06	26/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
ATTEMPT TO RECURIT (FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA OTONES)06						
HMYA-01952	201-0733542	02/10/63			AO	C/WH/2
SUBJ OF REFERENCE A						
HMYA-01953	201-0181033	02/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
PRETEXT INVESTIGATION AT HOME OF SUBJ OF HMYA-1951						
HMYA-01954	050-004-131	02/10/63			IN	IP
MHBORIC/FORWARDING OF DISSIDENT CORRESPON-DENCE						
HMYA-01955	201-0065845	03/10/63			AC	C/WH/3
ACTS OF EDELMIRO MALDONADO LEAL						
HMYA-01956	201-0181033)06	03/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
(FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA OTONES)06						
HMYA-01957	DEFERRED	03/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 123 DATED 26 AUG 63						
HMYA-01958	050-500	04/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
COL. SALVADOR BRAVO DE LA TORRE						
HMYA-01959	050-009-005	04/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
LIGAFF/POLITICAL ACTION IN SABINAS HIDALGO, N.L.						
HMYA-01960	201-0283602	04/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
LIPAIL/REQUEST FOR CONTRACT AMENDMENT-KENNETH Q. FRISHMUTH						
HMYA-01961	201-0319623	04/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
LIPAIL-10/MEMO OF ORAL COMMITMENTS						
HMYA-01962	201-0054922	04/10/63			IN	C/WH/3
LIVACATE/1 OPERATIONS						
HMYA-01963	DEFERRED	04/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
LIGAFF/ANTI-COMMIE PROP						

S-E-C-R-E-T 16/06/77

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	ROUTING
HMYA-01964	050-004-104	03/10/63			AC	IP
PCM ACTIVITIES IN MAZATLAN, SINALOA						
HMYA-01965	050-006-110/03	07/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
LIVACATE/1 OPERATIONS						
HMYA-01966	050-004-102	08/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
FORWARDING OF LETTERS OF STATE COMMITTEES OF THE PCM						
HMYA-01967	050-004-102	08/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
BIO DATA/NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE PCM						
HMYA-01968	DEFERRED	09/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
ZREAGER PROSPECTS						
HMYA-01969	050-004-117	09/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
LIBIGHT/LIHUD-IDEN CARD OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL						

14-00000

```
                                                             S-E-C-R-E-T                    16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN              DATE          FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF       CODE ROUTING
HMYA-01964               050-004-104      03/10/63                                               AC   IP
                 PCM ACTIVITIES IN MAZATLAN, SINALOA
HMYA-01965               050-006-110/03   07/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 LIVACATE/1 OPERATIONS
HMYA-01966               050-004-102      08/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 FORWARDING OF LETTERS OF STATE COMMITTEES OF THE PCM
HMYA-01967               050-004-102      08/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 BIO DATA/NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE PCM
HMYA-01968               DEFERRED         09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 ZREAGER PROSPECTS
HMYA-01969               050-004-117      09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 LIBIGHT/LIMUD-IDEN CARD OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL
HMYA-01970               050-009-012      09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 LIBIGHT/LIMUD-CARLOS FERNANDEZ B.
HMYA-01971               050-006-088/03   09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 RECONTACT INSTRUCTIONS/LIVAGUE/1
HMYA-01972               201-0733542      09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 DOLORES SOTELO VASQUEZ
HMYA-01973               201-0063504      09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 PROJECT LIRABBIT/MEMO OF ORAL COMMITMENTS FOR LITANG
HMYA-01974               201-0057721      11/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 GREGORIO RODRIGUEZ RETA
HMYA-01975               050-006-026/03   24/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 LIRABBIT PROJECT/PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 01 JUL THROUGH 30 SEP 63
HMYA-01976               050-500          15/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 IDEN OF PHOTOS
HMYA-01977               050-004-102      16/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                 BIO DATA ON CERTAIN PCM LEADERS
HMYA-01978               201-0054922      16/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
              02 DIZTAG/LIVACATE-1 OPERATIONS
HMYA-01979               201-0319623      18/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 LIPAIL/10-TRANSMITTAL OF PRQ PART II
HMYA-01980               050-006-004      18/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 OPERATIONAL SECURITY/LCFLUTTER
HMYA-01981               050-006-013      25/10/63                                               IN   WH/REG
                 RECD 04 NOV 63
HMYA-01982               050-009-013      24/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                 EDUARDO L. SUAREZ GALINDO
HMYA-01983               050-009-006      24/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 JMPIPER/DYVOUR NAME CHECK ON LUIS G. OLLOUI GUERRA
HMYA-01984               050-124-022/03   25/10/63                                               AC   WH3/ME
                 KAPOK RECD 04 NOV 63
HMYA-01985               050-009-013      24/10/63                                               AC   C/WH/3
                 KURIOT/CCI AND MLN MBRSHIP CARDS
HMYA-01986               050-126-006      25/10/63                                               AC   WH/REG
                 KAPOK RECD 04 NOV 63
HMYA-01987               201-0080638      24/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                 ADDRESSES IN MEXICO CITY
HMYA-01988               037-500          25/10/63                                               IN   IP
                 LIGAFF/LETTER FROM HONDURAS
HMYA-01989               201-0065845      25/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 SUBJ. OF 201-65845
HMYA-01990               201-0355219      25/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 LIGAFF-2/TRANSMITTAL OF PRQ-PART 11
HMYA-01991               050-126-003      25/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                 LIGAFF/POLITICAL ACTION IN SABINAS HIDALGO, N. L.
HMYA-01992               DEFERRED         25/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 KUHOLF/BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 124 DATED 9 SEP 63
PAGE   18021                                         S-E-C-R-E-T                 E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
```

```
                                                             S-E-C-R-E-T                    16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN              DATE          FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF       CODE ROUTING
HMYA-01993               050-004-110      30/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                 FORWARDING OF PHOTO
HMYA-01994               DEFERRED         01/11/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                 KUWOLF/ZRBUILD-LIGAFF-3 TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS ARTICLES
HMYA-01995               050-004-033      31/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CCI IN MATAMOROS DE LA LAGUNA, COAHUILA
HMYA-01996               050-004-131      01/11/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                 MHBORIC/FORWARDING OF DISSIDENT CORRESPONDENCE
HMYA-01997               201-0068545      01/11/63                                               AO   IP
                 LIGAFF-1/ANTI-COMMIE PROPAGANDA
```

14-00000

```
                                                                                   IN   C/WH/3
                   LIGAFF/POLITICAL ACTION IN SABINAS HIDALGO, N. L.
HMYA-01992                  DEFERRED          25/10/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   KUWOLF/BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 124 DATED 9 SEP 63
```

```
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)       FCN             DATE      FSN         SECONDARY/DOC REF   CODE ROUTING
HMYA-01993                  050-004-110       30/10/63                             IN   C/WH/3
                   FORWARDING OF PHOTO
HMYA-01994                  DEFERRED          01/11/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   KUWOLF/ZRBUILD-LIGAFF-3 TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS ARTICLES
HMYA-01995                  050-004-033       31/10/63                             IN   C/WH/3
                   EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CCI IN MATAMOROS DE LA LAGUNA, COAHUILA
HMYA-01996                  050-004-131       01/11/63                             IN   C/WH/3
                   MHBORIC/FORWARDING OF DISSIDENT CORRESPONDENCE
HMYA-01997                  201-0068545       01/11/63                             AO   IP
                   LIGAFF-1/ANTI-COMMIE PROPAGANDA
HMYA-01998                  201-0054922       01/11/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   DIZTAG/LIVAGATE-1 OPERATIONS
HMYA-01999                  201-0293411       01/11/63                             AO   WH3/ME
                   LIVALVE/1 TRAVEL TO MEXICO CITY F-201-0274028
HMYA-02000                  DEFERRED          01/10/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   LIVACATE-1-FORWARDING OF REPORT RE LEADERS OF THE MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY
HMYA-02001                  201-0733542       01/11/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   LETTER CONCERNING SUBJ OF REF
HMYA-02002                  201-0058638       05/11/63                             IN   C/WH/3
                   FERNANDO GARZA YOBA AND JOSE ANGEL SANCHEZ PEREZ
HMYA-02003                  050-006-083/03    06/11/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   LIPAIL/PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JUL-30 SEP 63
HMYA-02004                  050-006-070/03    06/11/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   LIP/PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 AUG-31 OCT 63
HMYA-02005                  050-124-022/03    06/11/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   PROGRESS RPT 1 JUL TO 30 SEP 63
HMYA-02006                  200-006-055       06/11/63                             AO   DESTROY
                   COMMUNICATIONS WATCH LIST
HMYA-02007                  AQUATIC           19/11/63                             AO   TSD
                   SENT TO TSD
HMYA-02008                  201-0322364       07/11/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   LITRAMP/TRAVEL OF LITRAMP/6 TO SAN SALVADOR
HMYA-02009                  050-004-134       08/11/63                             IN   C/WH/3
                   PHOTO IDEN
HMYA-02010                  050-006-110/03    08/11/63                             AO   IP/FI
                   KUTUBE/LIVACATE PROJECT OUTLINE WAS RYBAT
HMYA-02011                  050-004-109       08/11/63                             IN   C/WH/3
                   COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA/RAILROAD WORKERS
HMYA-02012                  050-006-013       08/11/63                             IN   C/WH/3
                   ANASTASIO DE LA GARZA AKA RANDEL E. FITZPATRICK
HMYA-02013                  050-126-003       08/11/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   KUWOLF/TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS CLIPPING
HMYA-02014                  201-0725286       08/11/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   LIGAFF-3/OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES
HMYA-02015                  201-0293411       13/11/63                             IN   C/WH/3
                   LIVALVE/1-PRQ PART 1
HMYA-02016                  050-006-042/05    14/11/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   LIMUD/LIBIGHT-REVIEW OF OPERATIONS IN MONTERREY
HMYA-02017                  AQUATIC           21/11/63                             AO   TSD
                   SENT TO TSD
HMYA-02018                  050-006-042/05    14/11/63                             IN   C/WH/3
                   LIMUD/TRANSMITTAL OF INTERCEPTED LETTER
HMYA-02019                  050-006-042/05    14/11/63                             IN   C/WH/3
                   LIBIGHT/LIMUD-TRANSMITTAL OF INTERCEPTED LETTER
HMYA-02020                  050-126-003       18/11/63                             AO   C/WH/3
                   KUWOLF/TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS CLIPPINGS
HMYA-02021                  200-006-055       18/11/63                             AO   DESTROY
                   COMMUNICATIONS WATCH LIST
```

14-00000

```
                        KUWOLF/TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS CLIPPINGS
HMYA-02021                      200-006-055    18/11/63                                                          AO   DESTROY
                        COMMUNICATIONS WA     LIST

PAGE  18020                                                      S-E-C-R-E-T                        E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981



                                                                 S-E-C-R-E-T                       16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)            FCN            DATE        FSN                SECONDARY/DOC REF             CODE ROUTING
HMYA-02022                      050-009-005    18/11/63                                                      IN   C/WH/3
                        POLITICAL ACTS IN SABINAS HIDALGO, N.L.
HMYA-02023                      050-006-110/03 19/11/63                                                      AO   WH/REG
                        RECD 26 NOV 63 LIVACATE
HMYA-02024                      050-004-104    20/11/63                                                      IN   C/WH/3
                        PEDRO SAENZ FLORES
HMYA-02025                      050-124-000    20/11/63                                                      IN   C/WH/3
                        LIGAFF/1 POLITICAL ACTION
HMYA-02026                      050-004-104    20/11/63                                                      IN   C/WH/3
                        REDCAP/LIVACATE-1 OPERATIONAL
HMYA-02027                      201-0181033)06 20/11/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                    06(FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA OTONES)
HMYA-02028                      050-009-005    20/11/63                                                      IN   C/WH/3
                        LIGAFF/1-MOVIMIENTO CIVICO SOCIAL MEXI
HMYA-02029                      050-006-042/05 22/11/63                                                      IN   C/WH/3
                        LIBIGHT/LIMUD-LETTER TO RODOLFO DE LEON GARZA
HMYA-02030                      050-126-003    02/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        KUWOLF/TRANSMITTAL OF MAGAZINE ARTICLE
HMYA-02031                      050-126-004    05/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        KUWOLF/LIGAFF-3 TRANSMITTAL OF NEWSPAPER CLIPPING
HMYA-02032                      050-004-029    05/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        KUWOLF/LIGAFF-1 TRANSMITTAL OF NEWSPAPER CLIPPING
HMYA-02033                      050-006-013    05/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        ANASTASIO DE LA GARZA AKA RANDEL E. FITZPATRICK
HMYA-02034                      050-006-083/03   /12/63                                                      AC   C/WH/3
                        LIPAIL-57 STUDENT ELECTIONS AT THE MED. SCHOOL AT THE UNIV OF NUEVO LEON
HMYA-02035                      201-0328380      /12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        EDUARDO ROGELIO BLACKALLER VILLARREAL
HMYA-02036                      050-006-042/05 06/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        LIBIGHT/LIMUD-TRANSMITTAL OF LETTER WRITTEN BY LUIS MACIAS
HMYA-02037                      201-0325046      /12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        KUWOLF/LIGAFF STUDENT ELECTIONS AT THE UNIV OF NUEVO LEON
HMYA-02038                      201-0065845    06/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        EDELMIRO MALDONADO LEAL
HMYA-02039                      050-008-008    06/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        MNTY-0773
HMYA-02040                      201-0325046    06/12/63                                                      AO   WH/REG
                        KAPOK RECD 10 DEC 63 LIGAFF-3
HMYA-02041                      050-004-131    06/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        MHBORIC/DISSIDENT ACT-LETTER FROM TERESO GONZALEZ
HMYA-02042                      050-006-042    11/12/63                                                      AO   IP
                        LIBIGHT/LIMUD-VICTOR CANAVATI SAMUR
HMYA-02043                      050-004-029    11/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        LIBIGHT/LIMUD-PROPAGANDA OFFER TO THE IICMR
HMYA-02044                      050-004-124    11/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        LIBIGHT/LIMUD TRAVEL OF DAVID MARTELL MENDEZ TO CZECH
HMYA-02045                      050-009-001    13/12/63                                                      AC   C/WH/3
                        /DR./ JULIAN GASCON MERCADO, GOVERNOR-ELECT OF NAYARIT
HMYA-02046                      200-009-037    13/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        CARLOS AMADOR
HMYA-02047                      201-0733542    13/12/63                                                      AC   WH3/ME
                        KAPOK RECD 23 DEC 63
HMYA-02048                      050-002-004    13/12/63                                                      AO   IP
                        ENRIQUE PINTO GARCIA WAS KAPOK
HMYA-02049                      201-0062864    13/12/63                                                      AO   IP/FI
                        CAMILO CHAVEZ MELGOZA WAS KAPOK
HMYA-02050                      201-0092501    18/12/63                                                      AO   C/WH/3
                        LUIS G. OLLOQUI GUERRA

PAGE  18019                                                      S-E-C-R-E-T                        E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
```

2/m/

S-E-C-R-E-T 16/06/77

14-00000

(T)

```
                          REDTOP (BEDOX ADMIN OFFICIAL POLISH PRESENCE, MEXICO
HMMS-08523                02 201-0231000    09/06/75                                        AO   IP/CRU
                          CKTOP - PHOTO OF S  .ET OFFICIAL
HMMS-08778                   201-(0729530)06 22/09/76                                       AO   LA/COG
                          (SLCAPRICE/1)
                            01
HMMT-00003                               08  04/02/58                                       IN
HMMT-00253                   201-(0012846)   06/06/58                                       AO   IP
                          WALLACE C. RIKON
HMMT-00407                   201-(0012846) 08 03/09/58                                      AO   IP
                          WALLACE C. RIKON
HMMT-01729                   050-500         07/12/60                                       IN
HMMT-01965                   019-005-001     19/04/61                    6*50-5-16          IN
HMMT-02116                   201-0229407     21/07/61                                       AO   IP
                          SIMON D. CLACKETT-CONTRACT AND PAYROLL DATA
HMMT-02156                06 201-(0290116) 08 08/08/61                                      AO   DESTROY
                          (YOLANDA D. GARCIA)
HMMT-02914                   201-0117968     17/07/62                                       AO   IP/FI
                          SALARY INCREASE CAROL K. ZINSMEISTER WAS RYBAT
HMMT-02946                   201-0314933     31/07/62                                       AO   IP
                          LIBELT-1-TRANSFER OF FIELD SALARY PAYMENTS TO HQRS
HMMT-03035                   050-006-037/03  07/09/62                                       AO   IP
                          MONIES RECEIVED FROM RIS OPERATIONS LIJENNET-T
HMMT-03106                   050-004-134     28/09/62                                       IN   WH/3
                          LIHUFF/2, LIST OF MEXICAN COMMUNISTS AND LEFTISTS
HMMT-03126                02 050-008-016     05/10/62                                       AC   IP
                          (DIARIO OFICIAL, DIPLOMATIC LIST
HMMT-03128                   050-500         05/10/62                                       IN   WH3/ME
                          RYBAT RECD 10 OCT 62
HMMT-03981                   201-(0765711) 08 16/08/63                                      AO   IP
                       06 (JOSEPH B. GARCIA)
✓HMMT-04085                  201-0314933     10/10/63                                       AO   IP
                          LIBELT/1-62 COVERT TAXES
✓HMMT-04368                  201-(0765711) 08 13/02/64                                      AO   IP
                       06 (JOSEPH B. GARCIA)
✓HMMT-04676                  201-0204876     29/06/64                                       IN   IP
                          EMILIO LUIS RIERA
HMMT-04763                   RYBAT           28/07/64                                       AO   C/SR
                          RECD 05 AUG 64 08
✓HMMT-04809                  201-(0765711)   17/08/64                                       AO   IP
                          MR. (JOSEPH B. GARCIA) 06
HMMT-04949                   DEFERRED        08/10/64                                       AO   WH/REG
                          KAPOK RECD 19 OCT 64
✓HMMT-04982                  201-(0765711) 08 27/11/64                                      AO   IP
                          MR. (JOSEPH B. GARCIA) 06
HMMT-05143                   RYBAT           /01/65                                         AO   C/SR
                          RECD 19 JAN 65
HMMT-05564                   200-009-051     01/07/65                                       AO   WH/C/E
                          TRANSMITTAL OF PASSENGER MANIFESTS WAS 200-008-064
HMMT-05897                   200-002-061     26/10/65                                       AO   INT/IE
                          PBBAND BRIEFS
HMMT-06092                   201-0292287     29/12/65                                       AO   C/WH/1
                          JUAN BARBARA 201-292287
HMMT-06277                   201-0351547     10/02/66                                       AO   WH/C/E
                          TYPIC/LICOMET/TRANSMITTAL OF PERSONALITY DATA
HMMT-06310                   019-124-032/03  23/02/66                                       AO   WH/C/C
                          AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMT-06311                   019-124-032/03  23/02/66                                       AO   WH/C/C
                          AMROD WAS 201-020481
PAGE   116796                                             S-E-C-R-E-T                  E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
```

6/12

```
                                                          S-E-C-R-E-T                     22/06/78
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)         FCN             DATE         FSN             SECONDARY/DOC REF         CODE ROUTING
HMMT-06312                   019-124-032/03  23/02/66                                       AO   WH/C/C
                          AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMT-06347                   050-002-004     03/03/66                                       AO   C/WH/1
                          NAME TRACE REQUEST-FRANK KENNEDY, ETC
HMMT-06470                   050-009-006     07/04/66                                       AO   IP
                          TRANSCRIPTION OF PCM/PPS MEETING ON 20 MARCH 1966 MARKING THE CLOSING OF WEEK OF SOLIDARITY
                          WITH VIETNAM
HMMT-06479                   201-0792623     12/04/66                                       AO   WH/REG
                          KAPOK RECD 18 APR 66 LIRAVINE-3
HMMT-06591                   050-004-110     04/05/66                                       AO   WH/REG
                          NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DEMOCRATIC STUDENTS 26-29 APRIL 1966
HMMT-06710                   050-006-075/04  26/05/66                                       AO   C/WH/1
                          TYPIC/LIRING/LIENVOY/TRANSMITTAL OF TRAFFIC
HMMT-06736                   050-005-008     26/05/66                                       IN   IP
                          TRANSMITTAL OF REPORT-REORGANIZATION OF SECURITY OF DFS SECURITY SQUAD
HMMT-06763                   050-006-075/04  02/06/66                                       AO   C/WH/1
                          TRANSMITTAL OF TRAFFIC
[illegible]
```

14-00000

```
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)   FCN               DATE        FSN          SECONDARY/DOC REF       CODE ROUTING
  HMMA-47499           200-008-095       26/04/78                                          AC   CH/E/B
                  VISIT OF PRC WOM 08 BASKETBALL TEAM TO MEXICO
  HMMA-47509           201-(09351)       15/05/78                                          AO   MGSB/M
                  MOC AMENDMENT - KDGLUE-28 /201-(0935184) 08
  HMMA-48461           050-005-098 01     /  /                                             AO
  HMMS-02409           201-0054506       31/05/62                                          AO   IP
                  KUCAGE/TRANSMITTAL OF LETTER FROM CHARLES F. GUYMERS TO FIDEL VELAZQUEZ SANCHEZ
  HMMS-02588           201-0320783       25/09/62                                          AO   EE/G
                  MARGITTA GERTRUDE MC CANNEL
  HMMS-02593                              /  /                                             AO
  HMMS-02846           019-124-032/03    14/03/63                                          AO   WH/C/C
                  AMROD WAS 201-020481
  HMMS-02919           201-(0005373) 08  17/05/63                                          AO   IP/FI
               02 (DIZTAG/ADMIN TIMOTHY W HOLLEBERT-1962 TAXES WAS 201-(005313) 08
  HMMS-03034           200-009-042       31/07/63                                          AO   IP
                  PBRUMEN/JMGIN/MACHINE RUN LISTINGS
  HMMS-03109           201-0303452       19/09/63                                          AO   WH3/ME
                  LEO C. REDLICH  08
? ✓HMMS-03380          201-(0765711)     02/03/64                                          AO   IP
               06 (JOSEPH B. GARCIA)
 ✓ HMMS-03467          200-124-118/02    29/04/64                                          AO   CA/B4
                  DTDORIC/SUPPORT-ZRFANON
 ✓ HMMS-03682          050-006-003       24/08/64                                          IN   IP
                  ANTONIO ANTENCIA PUADO
  HMMS-03733           RYBAT              /09/64                                           AO   WH/1
                  RECD 29 SEP 64
 ✓ HMMS-03734 LHO      201-0289248       25/09/64                                          AO   IP/CRU
                  TRANSMITTAL OF PHOTOGRARHS
 ✓ HMMS-03789          201-0102716       29/10/64                                          AO   IP
                  LIONHEART
 ✓ HMMS-03790          201-0736813       29/10/64                                          AO   WH/1
                  LIFTER/9
  HMMS-03791           201-(0007132) 08  29/10/64                                          AO   IP
                  DAVIS ALFARO SIQUEIROS
 ✓ HMMS-03819          201-0351546       09/11/64                                          AO   IP
                  UNDELIVERED LETTER TO ADOLPH BERNARD HORN
 ✓ HMMS-03843          201-0139367       25/11/64                                          AO   IP/FI
                  BERNARDO REYES WAS 201-139637
 ✓ HMMS-03848 LHO      201-0289248       02/12/64                                          AO   IP/CRU
                  WARREN COMMISSION REPORT FORWARDS ONE SET OF THE HEARING TRANSCRIPTS AND EXHIBITS OF
                  COMISSION RPT
  HMMS-03898           DEFERRED          07/01/65                                          AO   IP
                  LCHARVESTODENVY CORRESPONDENCE ON CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO
  HMMS-04066           050-006-018       01/04/65                                          AO   IP
                  AQUATIC/(DIZTAG INTERFERENCE WITH LIHABIT COVER-AGE OF THE (DIZTAG EMBASSY 02
  HMMS-04268        02 050-006-018       12/08/65                                          AO   IP
                  AQUATIC/REQUEST FOR SUPPLIES
  HMMS-04348           019-124-032/03    05/10/65                                          AO   WH/C/C
                  AMROD WAS 201-020481
  HMMS-05639           050-120-019       06/11/67                                          AO.  C/WH/1
                  JOURNALIST /IDENTITY/ OF POSSIBLE INTEREST
  HMMS-05786           201-0289248       23/01/68                                          AO   IP/CRU
                  NO SUBSTANCE TO NORTONS STATEMENTS THAT HE CIA AGENT WHO KNEW OSWALD
  HMMS-05964           050-500           06/05/68                                          AO   IP
                  RYBAT LETTER FOR COS
  HMMS-06064           050-009-012       29/07/68                                          AO   IP
                  REPORTING OF CUBAN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO
  HMMS-06632           050-002-010       25/11/69                                          AO   IP
                  NEW FILE NUMBER
  PAGE  116795                                        S-E-C-R-E-T              E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
```

25/R

```
                                                      S-E-C-R-E-T                   22/06/78
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)   FCN               DATE        FSN          SECONDARY/DOC REF       CODE ROUTING
22 (HMMS)-06743     02 050-008-003       10/03/70                                          AO   IP
                  REDTOP (BEDOX ADMIN OFFICIAL POLISH PRESENCE, MEXICO
22 (HMMS)-08523        201-0231000       09/06/75                                          AO   IP/CRU
                  OKTOP - PHOTO OF SOVIET OFFICIAL
22 (HMMS)-08778        201-(0729530) 08  22/09/76                                          AO   LA/COG
                  (SLCAPRICE/1)
22 (HMMT)-00003      01            08    04/02/58                                          IN
22 (HMMT)-00253        201-(0012846)     06/06/58                                          AO   IP
                  WALLACE C. RIKON
22 (HMMT)-00407        201-(0012846) 08  03/09/58                                          AO   IP
                  WALLACE C. RIKON
22 (HMMT)-01729        050-500           07/12/60                                          IN
  HMMT-01985           019-005-001 08    19/04/61                 6*50-5-16                IN
  HMMT-02116           201-(0229407)     21/07/61                                          AO   IP
                  SIMON D. CLACKETT-CONTRACT AND PAYROLL DATA
  HMMT-02156
```

SECRET
(When Filled In)

08 SEP 178

IP CONTROL NO. (Filled in by IP/CFS)

DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST

FROM: SODERQUIST BARBARA
C/CI
EXT. 1839
KC-660
2D39
TUBE CU6

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981

DATE OF REQUEST

BRANCH | ROOM NO. | PHONE NO.

TO:		DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	IP/CFS DT-6			SKB
2	REQUESTER			
3	IP/CFS DT-6			
4				
5				

SUBJECT (must be furnished)
DISPATCHES REQUESTED BY HSCA RE MEXICO STATION ACTIVITIES

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/CFS. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

☒ *Temporary* ☐ *Permanent*

4. Indicate source of reference:

☒ *Document reference from IP/MI.*
☐ *Document reference from source other than IP/MI.*

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE	DISPOSITION OF REQUEST (To be completed by IP/CFS)
DEFERRED ?	HMMA-22511	19 NOV 63	CONTACT AREA DESK
19-124-32/3	HMMA-22515	21 NOV 63	~~FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO~~ Div PAC/COB Ext 1591 Rm 3D02 Date 15/4/75
6023 6-5 THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD	HMMA-22517	21 NOV 63	
201-735188	RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY HMMA-22518	26 NOV 63	
201-760850	RECORD COPY ATTACHED HMMA-22304 PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY	18 OCT 63	
50-4-110	HMMA-22293	15 OCT 63	RECORD COPY DESTROYED
AQUATIC = ?	HMMA-22303	23 OCT 63	TSD MATERIAL
CA 201-328029	HMMA-22442	07 NOV 63	SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED
50-6-55/4	HMMA-22444	04 NOV 63	THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD
AQUATIC = ?	HMMA-22451	14 NOV 63	TSD MATERIAL
RYBAT ?	HMMA-22469	08 NOV 63	CONTACT AREA DESK
AQUATIC = ?	HMMA-22512	27 NOV 63	TSD MATERIAL
TSD ?	HMMA-22434		RECORD COPY DESTROYED

FORM 1870 USE PREVIOUS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 062147

(38)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

07 SEP 178

IP CONTROL NO. (Filled in by IP/CFS)

DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST

FROM: SODERQUIST BARBARA KC-660
C/CI 2D39
EXT. 1839 TUBE CU6

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981

DATE OF REQUEST

BRANCH	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.

TO:		DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	IP/CFS DT-6			ABS
2	REQUESTER			
3	IP/CFS DT-6			
4				
5				

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/CFS. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

☒ *Temporary* ☐ *Permanent*

4. Indicate source of reference:

☒ *Document reference from IP/MI.*

☐ *Document reference from source other than IP/MI.*

SUBJECT (must be furnished) DISPATCHES REQUESTED BY HSCA RE MEXICO STATION ACTIVITIES

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE	DISPOSITION OF REQUEST (To be completed by IP/CFS)
201-302219	HMMW-12020	18 31OCT63	RECORD COPY ATTACHED ✓ PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
201-68248	HMMW-12029	31OCT63	RECORD COPY ATTACHED ✓ PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
201-352469	HMMW-12032	05NOV63	SEE REVERSE SIDE ✓
ACA 50-6-42/4	HMMW-12035	31OCT63	SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED
100-5-1	HMMW-12046	31OCT63	CHARGED TO YOU 30/8/78 SUBJ: ASSINATIONS
201-85613	HMMW-12080	12NOV63	RECORD COPY ATTACHED ✓ PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
201-726479	HMMW-12084	07NOV63	[illegible] /CRU If Further Search Desired
201-285441	HMMW-12087	12NOV63	[illegible]
19-124-27/3	HMMW-12100	12NOV63	LACO/CI 1325
201-270072	HMMW-12121	18NOV63	3E19 28/3/[illegible] [illegible] IP/CRS Bay 3
ACA 201-329667	HMMW-12134	29NOV63	SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED
ACA (74) 23 120-150	HMMW-12139	03APR64	SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED
19-124-27/3	HMMW-12142	21NOV63	
			LACO/CI 1325
ATTENTION REQUESTER: This form and [illegible] returned to [illegible] for index correction.			3E/19 28/3/78

VPN

SECRET

```
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN               DATE        FSN                                       CODE ROUT
HMMW-11958                050-009-011/02    04/10/63                                              AC   WH3/ME
                 LILINK/CONTRACT WITH LILINK-2
HMMW-11959                050-00[illegible]3/03    03/10/63                                              AO   WH3 ME
                 OPERATIONAL/PROJECT LIBELER/RENEWAL
HMMW-11960                201-0250458       03/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 TRANSMITTAL OF MEMO RE RAFAEL SOMARRIBAGUE AKA /20[illegible]
HMMW-11961                201-0052514       03/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 BENJAMIN, ROBERT SPEARS, SUBJ OF HMMW-117[illegible]
HMMW-11962                050-006-084/01    18/10/63                                              AC   WH3 ME
                 LITABBY/PROJECT RENEWAL
HMMW-11963          23 (028)-006-033/03     09/10/63                                              AO   WH3 ME
                 TRANSMITTAL OF CONTACT REPORT
HMMW-11964                201-0730509       27/09/63                                              AO   EE
                 TRACE REPLY-FRANTISEK HETZL /201-730509/
HMMW-11966                050-500           09/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 PAN AMERICAN CONGRESS OF PHARMACY AND BIOCHEMISTR[illegible]
HMMW-11968                201-0734817       03/10/63                                              AO   EE A
                 DALET/OPERATIONAL-JAMES BOLIN SETTLE /20[illegible]
HMMW-11969        02    02 201-0728291 02   16/10/63                                              A    EE
                 (B)DOX/(B)EVISION/(B)ECOMPLEX
HMMW-11970                074-006-519/03    10/10/63 02                                           AO   SP
                 OPERATIONAL/REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/(A)EMESQUITE
HMMW-11971                019-120-011       10/10/63                                              AO   SAS/E
                 OPERATIONAL/TYPIC-RECRUITMENT PITCH LETTERS TO PBRUMEN OF TARGETS
HMMW-11972                019-124-032/03    02/10/63                                              AO   WH/C
                 AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMW-11973                200-006-099       10/10/63                                              AO   CA/B4
                 TRANSMITTAL OF PUBLICATIONS
HMMW-11974                201-0350663       09/10/63                                              AO   WH3/M
                 LISICLE-1-REQUEST FOR PRQ, PART II
HMMW-11976                201-0264860       04/10/63                                              AO   WH3/M
                 AMPALP-1
HMMW-11977                201-0735860       03/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 LCIMPROVE/ODEARL INTERVIEW REPORT
HMMW-11978                201-0324376       04/10/63                                              AO   WH3 M
                 LIMOTOR-22
HMMW-11979                201-0218343       04/10/63                                              AO   WH3/M
                 LIEBONY-1
HMMW-11980                201-0292287       10/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 JUAN CARLOS BARBARA
HMMW-11981                201-0356072       10/10/63                                              AO   WH3/M
                 LICAMEO-2
HMMW-11983                201-0051203       09/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 LCIMPROVE/LINILE
HMMW-11985                201-0733588       10/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 TRACE REPLY-FRANTISEK VECL /201-733588/
HMMW-11986                019-124-032/03    08/10/63                                              AO   WH/C
                 AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMW-11987                201-0000107       11/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 ALEJO PELYPENKO, AKA FATHER ALEKSEI PELYPENKOCOLONEL NIKOLAI ORLOV /ORLOFF-COLONEL
                 MIGUEL ORLOV-VICTORC VORONOVICH-OSIP KUZNIR
HMMW-11988                201-0329609 00    17/10/63                                              AO   WH3/
                 PBRUMEN/OA FOR LITAMIL-9
HMMW-11990                050-006-004 01    10/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 INTERCEPTED LETTER/ ZARATE, MANUEL /AQUINO/
HMMW-11991                201-0734811       10/10/63                                              AO   C/WH
                 SUBJ OF REF:
HMMW-11992                050-004-020       11/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 AMERICANS IN CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY
PAGE   18370                                          S-E-C-R-E-T                     E2 IMPDET CL BY 01198
```

```
                                                      S-E-C-R-E-T                16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN               DATE        FSN             SECONDARY/DOC REF         CODE ROUT
HMMW-11993                050-004-117       10/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
HMMW-11994                050-006-003       18/10/63                                              AO   WH3
                 SUBJECT OF HMMA-21998
HMMW-11995                201-0349952       16/10/63                                              AO   WH3
                 AMTRAIL-2
HMMW-11996        02    02 201-0728291      17/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 (B)EDOX/(B)EVISION/OPERATIONAL/HARRY ATTIAS
HMMW-11998                201-0353896       10/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 MANUEL PEREZ HERNANDEZ
HMMW-11999             02 020-126-020/03    10/10/63                                              AO   EE/
                 (D)IGLAD MAILING LIST
0/11/ HMMW-12000          050-126-005       10/10/63                                              AO   IP
                 KU[illegible]/FORWARDING GUIDANCE MATERIAL
```

14-00000

return to LA/MOSB/M

```
                                                            S-E-C-R-E-T                          [illegible]
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)        FCN              DATE        FSN                     SECONDARY/DOC REF         CODE
HMMW-11993                  050-004-117      10/10/63                                                   AO
                     LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
HMMW-11994                  050-006-003      18/10/63                                                   AO
                     SUBJECT OF HMMA-21998
HMMW-11995                  201-0349952      16/10/63                                                   AO
                     AMTRAIL-2
HMMW-11996               02 201-0728291      17/10/63                                                   AO
                     BEDOX/REVISION/OPERATIONAL/HARRY ATTIAS
HMMW-11998               02 201-0353896      10/10/63                                                   AO
                     MANUEL PEREZ HERNANDEZ
HMMW-11999               02 020-126-020/03   10/10/63                                                   AO
                     DJGLAD MAILING LIST
HMMW-12000                  050-126-005      10/10/63                                                   AO
                     KUWOLF/FORWARDING GUIDANCE MATERIAL
HMMW-12001                  050-004-124      ~~16/10/63~~                                               A
                     FOREIGN ADDRESS LIST OF THE PCV
HMMW-12003                  050-126-005      17/10/63                                                   AO
                     KUWOLF/FORWARDING HONG KONG PAPER ARTICLE CHINESE REFUSE MEXICANS EXIT
HMMW-12004                  201-0737652      17/10/63                                                   AO
                     DTDORIC/ZRSIGN/SUBJ OF ATTACHMENT
HMMW-12005                  050-500          17/10/63                                                   AO
                     PHOTO OF REFERENCE
HMMW-12006                  201-0229407      17/10/63                                                   AO
                     SIMON D. CLACKETT
✓HMMW-12007                 201-0062864      17/10/63                                                   AO
                     TARGET STUDY ON CAMILO CHAVEZ Y MELGOZA
✓HMMW-12008                 050-006-095/01   24/10/63                                                   AO
                     LIRICE/PROJECT RENEWAL
✓HMMW-12009                 201-0322753      31/10/63                                                   AO
✓" -12010            TRANSMITTAL OF BACKGROUND INFO RE DR. RENE VALLEJO ORTIZ
✓HMMW-12011                 201-0726477      17/10/63                                                   AO
                     SUBJ OF REF.
✓HMMW-12012                 201-0277475      24/10/63                                                   AO
                     DMLET/OPERATIONAL-TRACE REPLY-NIKOLA ZIC /201-277475/
✓HMMW-12013          02   23 060-120-019      24/10/63                                                   AO
                     BEDOX/OPERATIONS-TRANSMITTAL OF PHOTO ALBUMS
✓HMMW-12014                 050-126-036/03   16/10/63                                                   AO
                     DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL QKOPERA/MEXICAN PROGRAM-MING
✓HMMW-12015          WAS 200-124-087/02
✓HMMW-12016               23 060-120-019      24/10/63                                                   AO
                     BEDOX/OPERATIONAL-TRANSMITTAL OF THE 62 AND 63 WARSAW PHONE DIRECTORY
✓HMMW-12017                 201-0734817 06   24/10/63                                                   AO
                     DMLET/OPERATIONAL-NOTIFICATION OF POA
✓HMMW-12018                 201-0735943      24/10/63                                                   AO
                     02 DIZTAG/OPERATIONAL-TRACES-BOHUMIL, OFFICIAL CZECH EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY
✓HMMW-12019                 201-0735104      31/10/63                                                   AC
                     LCHARVEST-PERSONAL INFO DATA SHEETS
✓HMMW-12020                 201-0302219      31/10/63                                                   AO
                     REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE-GEORGIY IVANOVICH ZUBKOV /201-302219/
✓HMMW-12021                 019-126-015      25/10/63                                                   AO
                     PBRUMEN-KUCAGE/REQUEST FOR COPIES OF VISITE CUBA
✓HMMW-12022                 201-0087222      24/10/63                                                   AO
                     REDCAP/LCIMPROVE
✓HMMW-12023                 201-0150616   02 31/10/63                                                   AO
                     01 OCT 63 MEETING WITH STSNAB-1
✓HMMW-12024                 201-0187772      31/10/63                                                   AO
                     61 COVERT INCOME TAX RETURN-HOWARD O. MOSCHIANO
✓HMMW-12025                 201-0737639      12/11/63                                                   AO
                     IDENTITY A
PAGE   18369                                                S-E-C-R-E-T                       E2 IMPDET CL BY 01
```

```
                                                            S-E-C-R-E-T                        16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)        FCN              DATE        FSN                     SECONDARY/DOC REF         CODE R
HMMW-12026                  050-006-042/01   31/10/63                                                   AO
                     LIBIGHT/PROJECT EXTENSION
HMMW-12027                                   31/10/63                                                   AO
                     LIENVOY-8
HMMW-12028                  201-0280295      05/11/63                                                   AO
                     PRIMO MIRAGLIA SANMARTIN
HMMW-12029                  201-0068248      31/10/63                                                   AO
                     VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ GARVIN
HMMW-12030                  201-0352654      31/10/63                                                   AO
                     SUBJ OF HMMA-20824
HMMW-12032                  201-0352469      05/11/63
```

9/HN

14-00000

```
                         61 COVERT INCOME TAX RETURN-HOWARD O. MOSCHIANO
 HMMW-12025                     201-0[illegible]639   12/11/63                                          AO   WH3 M
                         IDENTITY A
 PAGE    18369                                                   S-E-C-R-E-T                    E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
```

```
                                                                 S-E-C-R-E-T                   16/06/77
 DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)           FCN              DATE       FSN                SECONDARY/DOC REF            CODE ROUTI
 HMMW-12026                     050-006-042/01   31/10/63                                                  AO   WH3 M
                         LIBIGHT/PROJECT EXTENSION
 HMMW-12027                                      31/10/63                                                  AO   WH3 M
                         LIENVOY-8
 HMMW-12028                     201-0280295      05/11/63                                                  AO   WH3 M
                         PRIMO MIRAGLIA SANMARTIN
 HMMW-12029                     201-0068248      31/10/63                                                  AO   IP
                         VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ GARVIN
 HMMW-12030                     201-0352654      31/10/63                                                  AO   WH3/M
 Hmmw-12031              SUBJ OF HMMA-20824
 HMMW-12032                     201-0352469      05/11/63                                                  AO   SP/CI
                         REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE-LIFEAT COVERAGE OF AEGENERATE/2
 HMMW-12033                     200-124-093/03   31/10/63                                                  AO   IP
 Hmmw-12034              DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL WSFLUFFER/NAME TRACE
 HMMW-12035                     050-006-042/04   31/10/63                                                  AO   C/WH/
                         TYPIC/CLARA PORSET DE GUERRERO
 HMMW-12036                     201-0355341      31/10/63                                                  AO   WH3/M
                         LISIREN-4, PRQ 11
 HMMW-12037                     201-0028795      05/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/M
                         LCIMPROVE
 HMMW-12038                     201-0732662      05/11/63                                                  AO   IP
                         VICTOR MANUEL GARCIA RODRUGUEZ
 HMMW-12039                     050-126-004      05/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/M
                         KUWOLF-FORWARDING GUIDANCE MATERIAL
 HMMW-12041                     201-0084438      07/11/63                                                  AO   IP
                         MIGUEL PENALOZA
 HMMW-12042                     201-0733542      05/11/63                                                  AO   IP
                         ANALYSIS ON MARIA DOLORES SOTELO
 HMMW-12043                     201-0327270      07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/M
                         PBRUMEN-TRANSMITTAL OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION RPT ON AMSUPER-1
 HMMW-12044                     050-126-023/01   07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/
                         LILISP-M PROJ RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12045                     050-124-021/01   07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/M
                         LITEAR PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12046                  02 100-005-001      31/10/63                                                  AO   DC/CI
                         (ZR)TAFFY/UNKNOWN SUBJ IN MEXICO WAS TS-187398-A
 HMMW-12049                     201-0733764      07/11/63                                                  AO   IP
                      02 (DI)ZTAG/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL-TRACE REPLY VLADIMIR PLESINGER /201-733764/
 HMMW-12050                     050-126-036/03   22/11/63                                                  AO   WH/1
                         DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL QKOPERA/DTGODOWNY MEXICAN PROGRAM
                         WAS 200-124-087/03
 HMMW-12051                     019-120-032      07/11/63                                                  AO   SAS/
                         TRAVEL CONTROLS ON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE FROM PBRUMEN
 HMMW-12052                     019-124-027/02   31/10/63                                                  AO   SAS/
                         RYBAT RECD 01 NOV 63
 HMMW-12053                     050-126-032/01   07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/M
                         LIFIZZ PROJ RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12054                     050-126-030/01   07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/
                         LIERECT PROJECT EXTENSION
 HMMW-12055                     050-126-028/01   07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/
                         LIMIX PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12056                     050-124-024/01   07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/
                         LICHEW PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12057                     050-124-020/01   07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/
                         LULISP-C PROJ RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12058                     050-126-027/01   07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/
                         LIETHIC PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12059                     050-126-025/01   07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/
                         LILISP-X PROJ RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 PAGE    18368                                                   S-E-C-R-E-T                    E2 IMPDET CL BY 01198
```

```
                                                                 S-E-C-R-E-T                   16/06/77
 DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)           FCN              DATE       FSN                SECONDARY/DOC REF            CODE ROUT
 HMMW-12060                     050-126-022/01   07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3
```

			AO	WH3/ME
	LIETHIC PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64			
HMMW-12059	050-126-025/01	07/11/63	AO	WH3/ME
	LILISP-X PROJ REN L FOR FY 64			

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	ROUTING
✓ HMMW-12060	050-126-022/01	07/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LILISP-E PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64					
✓ HMMW-12061	050-124-023/01	07/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LICOAX PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64					
✓ HMMW-12062	201-0121192	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 04 NOV 63					
✓ HMMW-12063	201-0209362	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 04 NOV 63					
✓ HMMW-12064	201-0288248	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 04 NOV 63					
✓ HMMW-12065	201-0119523	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 04 NOV 63					
✓ HMMW-12066	201-0243573	07/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LIMOTOR-14					
✓ HMMW-12067	201-0215763	07/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LIMOTOR-10					
✓ HMMW-12068	201-0079171	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 07 NOV 63					
✓ HMMW-12069	201-0287020	06/11/63			AO	IP
	WAS RYBAT LIMOTOR-19 WAS 201-243573					
✓ HMMW-12070	201-0119964	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 07 NOV 63					
✓ HMMW-12071	201-0080156	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 07 NOV 63					
✓ HMMW-12072 02	201-0150616	07/11/63			AO	IP
✓ Hmmw-12073	(S)SNAB-1 MEETING ON 17 OCT 63					
✓ HMMW-12074	201-0262509	06/11/63			AO	IP
	LIEMBRACE-9 WAS RYBAT					
✓ HMMW-12075	201-0184105	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 07 NOV 63					
✓ HMMW-12076	201-0734728	20/09/63			AO	IP
02	(D)ZTAG/BELARMINO CASTELLANOS RUISECO					
✓ HMMW-12077	201-0239820	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 14 NOV 63					
✓ HMMW-12078	201-0293411	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 08 NOV 63					
✓ HMMW-12079	201-0243573	06/11/63			AO	IP
	LIMOTOR-14					
✓ HMMW-12080	201-0085613	12/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LIEMPTY-LOUISE J. MACRINO /PS/					
✓ HMMW-12081	201-0017895	12/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	KUWOLF/ OPERATIONAL STATUS OF PROJECTS ON PRINCIPAL AGENTS					
✓ HMMW-12082	050-006-031/01	12/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	PROJ LIONHEART					
✓ HMMW-12083 02	201-0150616	12/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	(S)SNAB-1					
HMMW-12084	201-0726479	07/11/63			AO	EE/C
	ZDENEK VOREL					
✓ HMMW-12085	050-008-008	21/11/63			AO	IP
	FILE CHECK RESULTS					
✓ HMMW-12086 02	200-124-090/07	08/11/63			AO	CA/B3
	(JB)LACEPOD/VISIT OF MEXICAN EDUCATORS TO U.S.					
HMMW-12087	201-0285441	12/11/63			AO	EE/C
02	(D)ZTAG/OPERATIONAL-JIRI SVESTKA /201-385441/					
✓ HMMW-12088	050-008-038/02	12/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	TERMINATION OF LIFTER-4 AND LIFTER-7 RAISE FOR LIFTER-1					
✓ HMMW-12089	201-0735945	12/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LIEMBRACE-11					

5/RW

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2) FCN DATE FSN SECONDARY/DOC REF CODE ROUTING

14-00000

```
                                              S-E-C-R-E-T                                   16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN             DATE       FSN                SECONDARY/DOC REF     CODE ROUTING
HMMW-12090                201-0736860     12/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LICUFF-1
HMMW-12091                019-126-015     12/11/63                                           AO   SAS/ES
                 PBRUMEN/AMBASE/USE OF CRYPTONYMS
HMMW-12092                201-0735061     12/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 AMSAIL-4
HMMW-12093                201-0136898     12/11/63                                           AO   IP
                 ARTEMUS J. STEIZER
HMMW-12094                201-0278577     14/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LCIMPROVE/LITARDY
HMMW-12097                201-01105       07/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 RYBAT RECD 15 NOV 63
HMMW-12098                201-0725181     14/11/63                                           AO   IP
                 LETTER TO AMTAX-1 TO BE MAILED FROM MEXICO CITY
HMMW-12099                201-0042557     04/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 SUBJ OF REFERENCE
HMMW-12100                019-124-027/03, 12/11/63                                           AO   SAS/SO
                 RYBAT RECD 14 NOV 63
HMMW-12101                201-0298685     14/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LCIMPROVE/LISTEED
HMMW-12102                201-0739020     14/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 PBRUMEN/LICULT-1
HMMW-12103                201-0051203     14/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LCIMPROVE/AEPETRSL/LINILE
HMMW-12104                201-0263192     21/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LITENCH-1
HMMW-12105                201-0351546     21/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LICADRE-1
HMMW-12106                201-0347429     19/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LISIREN-3
HMMW-12107                050-006-075/01  19/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LIENVOY PROJECT EXPIRATION
HMMW-12108                201-0183946     14/11/63                                           AO   DESTROY
                 JIM WILKE WORKING WITH LAZARO GARDENAS IN MEXICO ON HIS PHD, THESIS
HMMW-12110                201-0108887     21/11/63                                           AO   IP
                 FRANCISCO AMADO GRANADOS /%PACO%/
HMMW-12111                201-0076231     21/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LIMULUS /FORMERLY LIBETHENITE-1/
HMMW-12112                201-0288949     14/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 RYBAT RECD 18 NOV 63
HMMW-12113                201-0397138     19/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LCIMPROVE/LICANNY-1
HMMW-12114                201-0347429     19/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LISIREN-3
HMMW-12115                201-0117742     21/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LIFEUD-29
HMMW-12116                201-0064252     26/11/63                                           AO   IP
                 ALEJO MENDEZ GARCIA
HMMW-12117                201-0355258     21/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LCIMPROVE
HMMW-12118                201-0740227     13/12/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LCIMPROVE/ASSIGNMENT OF CRYPTONYM
HMMW-12119                201-0737472     19/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 PBRUMEN/LICRICK-1
HMMW-12121                201-0270072     18/11/63                                           AO   EE/C
                 KAPOK RECD 18 NOV 63
HMMW-12123                201-0735598     21/11/63                                           AO   IP
                 TRACE REPLY-KAREL SCHOLZ

PAGE   18366                                  S-E-C-R-E-T                        E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
```

12095 & 12096 not available

```
                                              S-E-C-R-E-T                                   16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN             DATE       FSN                SECONDARY/DOC REF     CODE ROUTING
HMMW-12124                050-002-006     03/12/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 SMOTH ACTS. IN ME.I.
HMMW-12125                050-006-099/01  03/12/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LILINK PROJECT
HMMW-12126                050-004-122     22/11/63                                           IN   IP
                 MEXICANS IN THE SOVIET UNION FOR TRAINING
HMMW-12127                201-0736202     22/11/63                                           AO   WH3/ME
                 LICWAVE-1
[illegible]
```

```
                                                    S-E-C-R-E-T                    16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)   FCN              DATE      FSN               SECONDARY/DOC REF        CODE ROUTING
HMMW-12124             050-002-006      03/12/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
                 SMOTH ACTS. IN MEXI.
HMMW-12125             050-006-099/01   03/12/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
                 LILINK PROJECT
HMMW-12126             050-004-122      22/11/63                                             IN   IP
                 MEXICANS IN THE SOVIET UNION FOR TRAINING
HMMW-12127             201-0736282      22/11/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
                 LICRAVE-1
HMMW-12128             201-0077790      21/11/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
                 LCHARVEST/AMCHEETAH 201-77790
HMMW-12129             201-0269885      21/11/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
HMMW-12130             201-0257216      22/11/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
                 KUWOLF/AMPACA-1
HMMW-12131             050-006-055/01   29/11/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
HMMW-12132       LIMOTOR PROJECT RENEWAL
HMMW-12134             201-0329667      29/11/63                                             IN   IP
                 VLADIMIR DAFCIK ET AL
HMMW-12135             201-0728291      21/11/63                                             AO   IP
                 TRACE RESPONSE
HMMW-12136             200-120-033/03   03/12/63                                             AO   EE/EXT
                 OPERATIONAL/NYXIS/OKROW-ZODIAC PROCESSING OF ODACID TRAVEL INFO
HMMW-12137             200-124-073/03   21/11/63                                             AO   CA/B5
                 DTDORIC/HBEPITOME/WSACROBAT/ZRAFRAID LITERACY SEMINAR
HMMW-12138             021-120-012      03/12/63                                             AO   IP
                 PBRUMEN-POSS OPERATIONAL LEAD
HMMW-12139             074-120-150      03/04/64                                             IN   SR/CI
                 KGB RECRUITMENT OPERATIONS AGAINST FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN MOSCOW
HMMW-12140             201-0269885      29/11/63                                             AO   C/WH/5
               # CONTACT WITH ALAGORA-2           HMMW-12141?
HMMW-12142             019-124-027/03   21/11/63                                             AO   SAS/SO
                 RYBAT RECD 29 NOV 63
HMMW-12143             201-0739082      03/12/63                                             AO   IP
                 BEDOX/OPERATIONAL-ALEXANDER MAKOWSKI /201-739082/
HMMW-12144             019-120-011      27/11/63                                             AC   SAS/CI
                 MAILING OF RECRUITMENT PITCH LETTERS TO CUBAN CP TARGETS
HMMW-12145             050-500          03/12/63                                             AO   IP
                 INTERCEPTED LETTERS
HMMW-12146             201-0138898      03/12/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
                 ROBERT SPIERS BENJAMIN
HMMW-12147             201-0285165      03/12/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
                 PBRUMEN/AMSAIL-1
HMMW-12148             201-0737472      03/12/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
                 PBRUMEN/LICRICK-1
HMMW-12149             201-0729524      06/12/63                                             AO   IP
                 LCIMPROVE/LAROB/VALENTIN V. BAKULIN
HMMW-12150             201-0732662      06/12/63                                             AO   IP
                 VICTOR MANUEL GARCIA RODRIGUEZ
HMMW-12151             050-126-004      03/12/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
                 KUWOLF/LCHARVEST PROPAGANDA MATERIAL ON CHICOM TRADE
HMMW-12152             201-0059151      06/12/63                                             AO   IP
                 ILLEGAL MOVEMENT OF ARMS FOR LAZARO CARDENAS
HMMW-12153             201-0736813      06/12/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
                 LICHARO-1
HMMW-12154             050-124-026/01   10/12/63                                             AO   WH3/ME
                 LITAINT PROJECT
HMMW-12155             019-124-027/02   27/11/63                                             AO   SAS/SO
                 RYBAT RECD 27 NOV 63
HMMW-12156             201-0000229      20/12/63                                             AC   SR/CI/
                 OPERATIONAL/REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEPETREL VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO
```

```
                                                    S-E-C-R-E-T                    16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)   FCN              DATE      FSN               SECONDARY/DOC REF        CODE ROUTING
HMMW-12159             201-0234286      06/12/63                                             AO   WH3/
                 ACCOUNT OF [illegible] MEETING WITH [illegible]
```

S-E-C-R-E-T 16/06/77

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	ROUTING
HMMW-12159	201-0234286 ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONAL MEETING WITH LIESCENT IN NYC 11 OCT 63	06/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12160	019-006-086/03 DEGRIP SOURCES	13/12/63			AO	SAS/ES
HMMW-12161	201-0727876 PBRUMEN/LICARD-1	03/01/64			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12162	050-006-099/01 LILINK PROJECT APPROVAL	06/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12163	050-006-093/01 LIHALO PROJECT	06/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12164	050-006-089/01 LITALUS PROJECT	06/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12165	201-0226902 LILINK-2	06/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12166	201-0278577 LCIMPROVE/LITARDY-1 /OVERLAND/	06/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12167	050-300-004 COVERAGE OF BOSCH SUITE AT MARIA ISABEL HOTEL, MEXICO CITY WAS RYBAT WAS 035-124-021/03	06/12/63			AC	IP
HMMW-12168	050-124-025/01 KUWOLF/LINOODLE PROJECT RENEWAL	06/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12169	050-006-004 CONSOLIDATION AND ANALYSIS OF 201 FILES AT HDQTRS.	17/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12170	050-006-099/01 LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING WITH LILINK-7	13/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12171	201-0278577 LCIMPROVE/LITARDY-1	27/12/63			IN	WH3/ME
HMMW-12172	201-0104794 CARLOS ENRIQUE POLANCO	13/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12173	201-0329618 PBRUMEN/OPERATIONAL/LITAMIL-13	10/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12174	201-0238870 MEXICAN GOVT OFFICIALSX ASSOC. WITH ILLICIT TRAFFICKING	13/12/63			AC	IP
HMMW-12175	201-0739020 PBRUMEN/LICULT-1	10/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12176	050-008-000 REDSKIN/BOLSHOI BALLET	10/12/63			AO	IP
HMMW-12177	201-0233955 ANTONIO MORIN RODRIGUEZ	13/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12178	050-004-122 INTERCEPTED LETTER	27/12/63			AO	IP
HMMW-12180	050-006-111/01 LCIMPROVE/DOUBLE AGENT PROJECT	31/12/63			AO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12181	201-0725845 ECHAWK-1	27/12/63			AO	WH7TE
HMMW-12182	050-004-122 MEXICANS ATTENDING THE MOSCOW UNIV.	20/12/63			AO	IP
HMMW-12183	020-126-021/03 MAILING OF LEAFLETS	13/12/63			AO	EE/C
HMMW-12184	200-124-072/03 DTDORIC HBEPITOME/REPORT ON ZRAFRAID CONGRESS	17/12/63			AO	CA/B5
HMMW-12185	060-120-019 W.RSAW TELEPHONE DIRECTORY /VOLS I II AND III/. WAS 063-120-019	13/12/63			AO	SB/P
HMMW-12186	201-0084438 MIGUEL PENALOZA	17/12/63			AO	IP
HMMW-12187	050-004-122 INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE	13/12/63			AO	IP
HMMW-12188	201-0143076 REDCAP/VLADIMIR I. ANDREYEV	17/12/63			AO	IP

S-E-C-R-E-T 16/06/77

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	ROUTING
[illegible]	201-0242728 REDCAP/GEORGIY A. SHCHUCHKIN	17/12/63			AO	IP
[illegible]	[illegible]-005	[illegible]			IN	IP

13-27 Oct 1963 22289 — 22390

```
                                                       S-E-C-R-E-T                                  16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN             DATE         FSN                  SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22285                050-006-101/03  11/10/63                                                   IN   C/WH/1
                    ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS, 17 SEP-11 OCT 63 WAS 201-275992
HMMA-22286                200-009-042     11/10/63                                                   AO   SAS/ES
                    CUBAN TRAVEL/CUBANA PASSENGER MANIFESTS
HMMA-22287                050-004-117     11/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT
HMMA-22288                050-006-105/03  11/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    CONTACT REPORTS--MEETINGS WITH (LITAMIL-9)01
HMMA-22289                050-006-099/02  18/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    LILINK/CONTRACT WITH LILINK-2
HMMA-22290                201-0736781     15/10/63                                                   AC   FE/CH
                    LCHARVEST/OPERATIONAL--SUBJ OF REF A%S REPORT OF CONTACT WITH LIANG SSU-CH%ENG
HMMA-22291                050-126-023/03  14/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    KUWOLF-LILISP M
HMMA-22292                050-124-021/03  14/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    LITEAR STATUS REPORT FOR AUG-SEP 63
HMMA-22293                050-004-110     15/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    BOOK ON PENETRATION OF MEXICAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM BY COMMIES
HMMA-22294                201-0178122       /  /                                                     AO
HMMA-22295             02 201-0294839     18/10/63                                                   AO   EE/C
                    (DI)ZTAG/OPERATIONAL--PCS DEPARTURE OF ZBYNEK SAMONIL /201-294839/
HMMA-22296                201-0152528       /  /                                                     AO
HMMA-22297                076-005-027     18/10/63                                                   AO   IP
                    DMLET/OPERATIONAL-PASSPORTS OF YUGO NATIONALS C-050-008-016
HMMA-22298                201-0277475     18/10/63                                                   AO   EE/YA/
                    DMLET/OPERATIONAL--PASSPORT OF NIKOLA ZIC
HMMA-22299                050-009-012     15/10/63                                                   AO   IP
                    CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC WAS RYBAT
HMMA-22300                201-0218126     15/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    PLANS OF JUANA CASTRO RUZ TO LEAVE CUBA BECAUSE OF THREATS AGAINST HER LIFE BY FIDEL CASTRO
HMMA-22301                200-009-037     15/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    FOREIGN TECHNICIANS WORKING IN CUBA
HMMA-22302                050-124-028/04    /  /                                                     AO
HMMA-22303                AQUATIC         23/10/63                                                   AO   TSD
                    SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22304                201-0760850     18/10/63                                                   AO   IP
                    FORWARDING OF LETTERS REGARDING TRAVEL OF NICARAGUAN COMMUNISTS TO THE BLOC AREA
                    WAS (053)-004-121
HMMA-22305             23 FID             23/10/63                                                   AO   FI/D
                    SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22306             23 (074)-006-319   17/10/63                                                   AO   SR/CI/
                    RYBAT RECD 22 OCT 63
HMMA-22307                050-006-018     18/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    OPERATIONAL MONTHLY REPORT-1-30 SEP 63
HMMA-22308             23 (053)-004-121   18/10/63                                                   AC   C/WH/3
                    LICENTO-1/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON TRAVEL OF NICARAGUANS AND COSTA RICANS TO THE BLOC AREA
HMMA-22309                019-124-032/03  18/10/63                                                   AO   WH/C/C
                    AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMA-22310                050-126-026/03  17/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    PRI YOUTH GROUP CHARGE
HMMA-22311                050-124-025/02  17/10/63                                                   AO   IP
                    KUWOLF/LIGAFF
HMMA-22312                201-0069101     18/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    REQUEST FOR PHOTOS OF PANAMANIAN COMMIE IN MEXICO CITY
HMMA-22313                050-126-026/03  17/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                    LIEVICT STATUS REPORT FOR MAY AND JUN 63
HMMA-22314                201-0150616     17/10/63                                                   AC   C/WH/3
                    (ST)SNAB-1 VISIT TO MEXI CITY 5-13 OCT 63
                     02

PAGE   19355                                           S-E-C-R-E-T                          E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
```

71PJ

```
                                                       S-E-C-R-E-T                                  16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN             DATE         FSN                  SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTIN
HMMA-22315                AQUATIC         23/10/63                                                   AO   TSD
                    SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22316                RYBAT        01 18/10/63                                                   AO   C/WE
                    RECD 22 OCT 63 KEYWAY/SMOTH WH/REG
HMMA-22317                201-0350663     18/10/63                                                   AO   WH/REG
                    KAPOK RECD 28 OCT 63 LISIBLE-1
                                                                                                     AO   FE/C
```

Return to LA/MGS

```
                                                  S-E-C-R-E-T
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN          DATE       FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22315               AQUATIC      23/10/63                                               AO   TSD
                  SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22316               RYBAT     01 18/10/63                                               AO   C/WE
                  RECD 22 OCT 63 KEYWAY/SMOTH WH/REG
HMMA-22317               201-0350663  18/10/63                                               AO   WH/REG
                  KAPOK RECD 28 OCT 63 LISICLE-1
HMMA-22318               200-008-005  22/10/63                                               AO   EE/C
               02 DI[illegible]TAG/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--TRAVEL OF CZECH NATLS
HMMA-22319               201-0204656  22/10/63                                               AO   EE/C
               02 DI[illegible]TAG/ZPDOAC/OPERATIONAL--RETURN OF EMIL HRADECKY /201-204656/
HMMA-22320               201-0294839  22/10/63                                               AO   EE/C
                  PCS DEPARTURE OF ZBYNEK SAMONIL /201-294839/
HMMA-22321               201-0283512  22/10/63                                               AO   EE/C
               02 DI[illegible]TAG/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--RETURNAOF LUDVIK HUBENY /201-283512/
HMMA-22322               201-0730509  22/10/63                                               AO   EE/C
               02 DI[illegible]TAG/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--FRANTISEK HETZL /201-730509/
HMMA-22323               050-008-003  22/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
               02 BEDOX/OPERATIONAL--FNU SZAPINSKI AKA CZAPINSKI
HMMA-22324               201-0059400  22/10/63                                               AO   EE/P
               02 BEDOX/OPERATIONAL--ADAM SCHAFF /201-59400/
HMMA-22325               024-008-015  22/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                  LCHARVEST/OPERATIONAL-THE SMUGGLING OF CHINESE COMMIE MONEY INTO ECUADOR
HMMA-22326               201-0735346 02 22/10/63                                             AO   FE/CH
                  LCHARVEST/THE S[illegible]GOAL-1 OPERATION
HMMA-22327               201-0285165  18/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                  PBRUMEN-ATTEMPTED RECRUITMENT OF DR. ARSENIO MINSAL MARROQUIN
HMMA-22328               201-0737472  18/10/63                                               IN   IP
                  PBRUMEN-DEBRIEFING OF JUAN ANTINIO CANCELA GOMEZ
                  C-201-0327270
HMMA-22329               050-126-026/03 02 21/10/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                  LIQUIFIER LETTER TO KM ASKING
HMMA-22330               050-126-026/03 21/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                  LIEVICT-STATUS RPT FOR JUL AND AUG 63
HMMA-22331               201-0264860  21/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                  AMPALP-1
HMMA-22332               200-009-037  21/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                  JMGIN-CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACT-CENTRAL AMERICA
HMMA-22333               050-124-025/03 21/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                  LINOODLE PROGRESS RPT, SEP 63
HMMA-22334               050-126-028/03 21/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                  PROGRESS RPT FOR PROJ LIMIX FOR SEP 63
HMMA-22335               035-004-121  21/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                  POSSIBLE TRAVEL OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS ABROAD
HMMA-22336               201-0042557  21/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                  JUDITH FERRETO SEGURA
HMMA-22337               DEFERRED     21/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                  TRANSMITTAL OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF MEXICAN COMMUNISTS
HMMA-22338               FID          29/10/63                                               AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22339               FID          29/10/63                                               AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22340               DEFERRED     22/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                  OVERTAXING OF STATION TRAVEL CONTROL FACILITIES
HMMA-22341               201-0736282  22/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                  OPERATIONAL/LCIMPROVE/ASSESSMENT OF AUGUSTIN GUTIERREZ FERNANDEZ
HMMA-22342               019-124-032/03 25/10/63                                             AO   WH/C/C
                  AMMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMA-22343               019-124-032/03 23/10/63                                             AO   WH/C/C
                  AMROD WAS 201-020481
PAGE   19354                                      S-E-C-R-E-T                     E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
```

9/17W

```
                                                  S-E-C-R-E-T                 16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN          DATE       FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22344               FID          29/10/63                                               AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22345               201-0136898  22/10/63                                               AO   IP
                  ARTEMUS J. STEIZER
HMMA-22346               050-124-028/04 22/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                  LIHUFF/XESPEJO MAGAZINEX
HMMA-22347               201-0737472  22/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                  [illegible]-JUAN ANTONIO CANDELA GOMEZ
                                                                                             IN   C/WH/3
                                                  S-E-C-R-E-T                16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN             DATE         FSN           SECONDARY/DOC REF        CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22344               FID             29/10/63                                            AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22345               201-0136898     22/10/63                                            AO   IP
                  ARTEMUS J. STEIZER
HMMA-22346               050-124-028/04  22/10/63                                            AO   C/WH/3
                  LIHUFF/%ESPEJO MAGAZINE%
HMMA-22347               201-0737472     22/10/63                                            IN   C/WH/3
                  PBRUMEN-JUAN ANTONIO CANDELA GOMEZ
HMMA-22348               201-0732862     22/10/63                                            IN   C/WH/3
                  PBRUMEN-MANUEL ARIAS BANA
HMMA-22349               050-124-025/03  22/10/63                                            AO   WH3/ME
                  REPORT ON CUBA BY VISITING FRENCH PRIEST
HMMA-22350               FID             29/10/63                                            AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22351               FID             29/10/63                                            AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22352               DEFERRED        22/10/63                                            AO   C/WH/3
                  LA VOZ DE MEXICO, OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE MEXICAN COMMIE PARTY
HMMA-22353               DEFERRED        22/10/63                                            AO   C/WH/3
                  SOURCE OF HMM-7666
HMMA-22354               201-0293411     22/10/63                                            AO   WH3/ME
                  LIVALVE-1 PLANNED PITCHES TO COMMUNISTS IN MEX CITY
HMMA-22355               201-0240270  02 22/10/63                                            AO   C/WH/3
                  PROPOSED TRANSFER OF (CI)SCO-26 TO MEXICO
HMMA-22356               201-0282533     22/10/63                                            AC   C/WH/3
                  LIPIETY PROJ-TERMINATION OF LIEPIETY-1
HMMA-22357               201-0282533     22/10/63                                            AO   C/WH/3
                  LIPIETY PROJECT-AGENT SERVICE RECORD ON LIPIETY-1
HMMA-22358               201-0729530     22/10/63                                            AO   C/WH/3
                  OSCAR CONCEPCION MENDOZA
HMMA-22359               050-009-012     22/10/63                                            AO   C/WH/3
                  CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC
HMMA-22360               056-300-001     22/10/63                                            AO   C/WH/3
                  ABEL BERNAL AYARZA
HMMA-22361               201-0290894     22/10/63                                            AO   C/WH/3
                  LITAMIL-3
HMMA-22362               201-0252871     22/10/63                                            IN   C/WH/3
                  ALFONSO LOPEZ MICHELSEN
HMMA-22363               FID             30/10/63                                            AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22364               201-0185345     23/10/63                                            IN   C/WH/3
                  JOSE RAMON GRULLON MARTINEZ
HMMA-22365               050-006-091/03  25/10/63                                            AO   IP/FI
                  LITEMPO/PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING MEXICAN TRAN-SIT VISAS FOR CUBANS
                  WAS KAPOK
HMMA-22366               050-006-091/03  24/10/63                                            AO   C/WH/3
                  LITEMPO/OPERATINAL REPORT 01 AUG-30 SEP 63
HMMA-22367            23 (076-005-027    25/10/63                                            IN   IP
                  DMLET/OPERATIONS-PASSPORTS OF YUGOSLAV NATIONALS
                  C-050-008-016
HMMA-22368               200-009-042     24/10/63                                            AO   SAS/ES
                  CUBAN TRAVEL/CUBANA PASSENGER MANIFESTS
HMMA-22369               [AQUATIC]       29/10/63                                            AO   TSD
                  SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22370               050-006-055/01  23/09/63 ✓                                          AO   C/WH/3
                  FURTHER LIFE OF THE LIMOTOR PROJECT
HMMA-22371               201-0256202     24/10/63                                            IN   C/WH/3
                  SONS OF VINCENT HALLINAN, AMERICAN COMMUNIST
```

4IPV

```
                                                  S-E-C-R-E-T                16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN             DATE         FSN           SECONDARY/DOC REF        CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22372               [AQUATIC]       30/10/63                                            AO   TSD
                  SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22373         02    050-008-003     25/10/63                                            IN   EE/P
                  [BE]DOX/OPERATIONAL-PASSPORTS OF POLISH NATLS
HMMA-22374            23 (037)-500       24/10/63                                            AO   C/WH/3
                  JORGE ANIBAL REGAZZOLI
HMMA-22375               050-004-134     24/10/63                                            IN   C/WH/3
                  TRANSMITTAL OF INTERCEPTED LETTER
                         201-0329618     25/10/63                                            IN   C/WH/3
```

14-00000

```
                                                    S-E-C-R-E-T                          16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)    FCN              DATE        FSN          SECONDARY/DOC REF         CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22372              AQUATIC          30/10/63                                           AO   TSD
                  SENT TO TSD
~~HMMA-22373              050-008-003      25/10/63                                           IN~~
            02 [BE]DOX/OPERATIONAL-PASSPORTS OF POLISH NATLS
HMMA-22374              23(037)-500      24/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
                  JORGE ANIBAL REGAZZOLI
HMMA-22375              050-004-134      24/10/63                                           IN   C/WH/3
                  TRANSMITTAL OF INTERCEPTED LETTER
HMMA-22376              201-0329618      25/10/63                                           IN   C/WH/3
                  TRANSMITTAL OF PRQ PART I-CELESTIN PAUL CHEREL
HMMA-22377              201-0329618      25/10/63                                           AO   WH/REG
                  KAPOK RECD 30 OCT 63 LITAMIL-13
HMMA-22378              050-009-012      25/10/63                                           AO   IF
                  CUBAN EMB. TRAFFIC WAS 019-120-032
HMMA-22379              201-0729530      25/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
                  OSCAR CONCEPCION MENDOZA
HMMA-22380              200-009-042      25/10/63                                           AO   SAS/ES
                  TRANSMITTAL OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC TRAVEL REPORTS
HMMA-22381              DEFERRED         25/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
                  SOVIET AND CHINESE FOODSTUFFS IN CUBA
HMMA-22382              201-0052514      25/10/63                                           IN   IP
                  ROBERT SPIERS BENJAMIN
HMMA-22383              050-126-022704   25/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
                  MATERIAL FOR PRESS COMMENTS
HMMA-22384              201-0029486      25/10/63                                           IN   C/WH/3
                  ZRNICK/COMMIESX CORRESPONDENCE
HMMA-22385              050-006-091/03   25/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
                  OPERATIONAL/LITEMPO-2 REQUEST FOR DATA ON TERRORISTS TRANSITING MEXICO
HMMA-22386              201-0217272      25/10/63                                           IN   WH3/ME
                  TRANSMITTAL PRQ PART 1-TULIO PRIETO RUIZ C-201-0738618.
HMMA-22387              050-006-074/01   25/10/63                                           AO   WH/REG
                  KAPOK RECD 30 OCT 63 LIEMPTY
HMMA-22388              201-0031548      25/10/63                                           AO   EE/EXT
                  RYBAT RECD 05 NOV 63 OKROW/OKASSAY
HMMA-22389              201-0349577      25/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/5
                  MANUEL DE NEGRI-YBERRI
HMMA-22390              RYBAT            25/10/63                                           AO   WH/REG
                  RECD 29 OCT 63 ZRTAFFY
HMMA-22391              201-0069296      31/10/63                                           AO   EE/C
            02 [DI]TAG/OPERATIONAL JAROSLAV KUCHVALEK
HMMA-22392              200-120-033/03   31/10/63                                           AO   EE/EXT
                  ZODIAC PROCESSING OF TRAVEL INFO
HMMA-22393              050-126-036/03   28/10/63                                           AO   WH/1
                  DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL QKOPERA/DTGODOWN/MEXICAN PROGRAM
                  WAS 200-124-087/03
HMMA-22394              FID              05/11/63                                           AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22395              050-124-023/03   28/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
                  LICOAX PROGRESS REPORT, SEP 63
HMMA-22396              AQUATIC          05/11/63                                           AO   TSD
                  SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22397              050-500          29/10/63                                           IN   C/WH/3
                  ROBERT KAFFKE
HMMA-22398              050-009-005      29/10/63                                           IN   C/WH/3
                  NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT /MLN/ REQUEST FOR HQS INDEX CARDS
HMMA-22399              050-126-023/03   30/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
                  LILISP M STATUS REPORT FOR SEP 63
HMMA-22400              076-005-027      31/10/63                                           AO   IF
                  DMLET/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--PASSPORTS OF YUGOSLAV NATIONALS
PAGE   19352                                        S-E-C-R-E-T                          E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
```

4IPV

```
                                                    S-E-C-R-E-T                          16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)    FCN              DATE        FSN          SECONDARY/DOC REF         CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22401              201-0739082      31/10/63                                           IN   C/WH/3
                  ARRIVAL OF ALEXANDER MAKOWSKI /201-739082/
HMMA-22402              200-008-005      31/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
            02 [DI]ZTAG/OPERATIONAL-PASSPORT OF CZECH NATIONAL
HMMA-22403              050-006-058/03   30/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
                  LIMOTOR PROGRESS REPORT JAN-JUL 63
HMMA-22404              050-124-021/03   30/10/63                                           IN   C/WH/3
                  LITEAR-POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT PITCH TO LITEAR-1 BY POLISH IS
HMMA-22405              050-006-004      31/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
                  OPERATIONAL--CONSOLIDATION AND ANALYSIS OF 201 FILES
HMMA-22406              201-0155748      30/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
                  ALBERTO GROUX
                                         05/11/63                                           AO   TSD
```

14-00000

LICISR M STATUS REPORT FOR SEP 63

HMMA-22400	076-005-027	31/10/63			AO	IP
	DHLET/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--PASSPORTS OF YUGOSLAV NATIONALS					

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	ROUTING
HMMA-22401	201-0739082	31/10/63			IN	C/WH/3
	ARRIVAL OF ALEXANDER MAKOWSKI /201-739082/					
HMMA-22402	200-008-005	31/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
02	DIZTAG/OPERATIONAL-PASSPORT OF CZECH NATIONAL					
HMMA-22403	050-006-055/03	30/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	LIMOTOR PROGRESS REPORT JAN-JUL 63					
HMMA-22404	050-124-021/03	30/10/63			IN	C/WH/3
	LITEAR-POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT PITCH TO LITEAR-1 BY POLISH IS					
HMMA-22405	050-006-004	31/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	OPERATIONAL--CONSOLIDATION AND ANALYSIS OF 201 FILES					
HMMA-22406	201-0155748	30/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	ALBERTO GROUX					
HMMA-22407	AQUATIC	05/11/63			AO	TSD
	SENT TO TSD					
HMMA-22408	019-124-032/03	31/10/63			AO	WH/C/C
	AMROD WAS 201-020481					
HMMA-22409	019-124-032/03	31/10/63			AO	WH/C/C
	AMROD WAS 201-020481					
HMMA-22410	019-124-032/03	31/10/63			AO	WH/C/C
	AMROD WAS 201-020481					
HMMA-22411	200-006-033/03	31/10/63			AO	EE/EXT
	NYXIS REPORT-JUL-OCT 63					
HMMA-22412	AQUATIC	06/11/63			AO	TSD
	SENT TO TSD					
HMMA-22413	201-0329404	31/10/63			IN	C/WH/3
	JOAQUIN BLANCO PEREZ AND AMSTY-3					
HMMA-22414	201-0327270	31/10/63			IN	C/WH/3
	RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ ALFONSO					
HMMA-22415	050-126-022/04	31/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	ARTICLE FOR PRESS COMMENTS					
HMMA-22416	201-0285165	31/10/63			IN	C/WH/3
	PBRUMEN-CARLOS ALBERTO FERNANDEZ TRUJILLO					
HMMA-22417	201-0735285	31/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	FRANCISCO REFUGIO PEREZ MORON					
HMMA-22418	FID	06/11/63			AO	FI/D
	SENT TO FI/D					
HMMA-22419	050-009-012	01/11/63			AO	SAS/ES
	CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC					
HMMA-22420	201-0729530	01/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	OSCAR CONCEPCION MENDOZA					
HMMA-22421	201-0269885 ol	01/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	OPERATIONAL/ALAGORA-2/PRQ PART 11					
HMMA-22422	050-005-021	07/11/63			IN	IP
	ZDENKO DZERMANOVIC					
HMMA-22423	050-006-035/03	07/11/63			IN	C/WH/3
	MONTHLY REPORT ON CZECH EMBASSY AND TRADE MISSION IN MEX					
HMMA-22424	FID	06/11/63			AO	FI/D
	SENT TO FI/D					
HMMA-22425	AQUATIC	19/11/63			AO	TSD
	SENT TO TSD					
HMMA-22426	036-004-001	04/11/63			IN	C/WH/3
	MAIL INTERCEPTS ON HAITIAN COMMIES					
HMMA-22427	200-008-005	04/11/63			IN	SR/O/W
	REDCAP/LCIMPROVE DMITRIY TRYZNA					
HMMA-22428	050-004-124	04/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	PRENSA LATINA AS A LETTER DROP FOR COMMUNICATIONS FROM HAVANA					
HMMA-22429	201-0736813	04/11/63			IN	C/WH/3
	LICHARD-1/RECRUITMENT AND DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE					

2/17

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2) FCN DATE FSN SECONDARY/DOC REF CODE ROUTIN

AO C/WH/3

```
HMMA-22428           050-004-124     04/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 PRENSA LATINA AS A LETTER DROP FOR COMMUNICATIONS FROM HAVANA
HMMA-22429           201-0736817     04/11/63                                                IN   C/WH/3
                 LICHARD-1/RECRUIT.ENT AND DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE
```

```
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN             DATE        FSN          SECONDARY/DOC REF         CODE ROUTIN
HMMA-22430           200-009-042     07/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 TRAVELLERS FROM CUBA
HMMA-22431           200-008-005     07/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 TRANSMITTAL OF COPIES OF SOVIET PASSPORTS
HMMA-22432           065-002-011/05  04/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 JOSE JIMENEZ ALCORTA
HMMA-22433           AQUATIC         14/11/63                                                AO   TSD
AMMA-22434       SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22435           201-0736336     05/11/63                                                AO   IP
                 DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL-WSFLUFFE/NAME TRACE
HMMA-22436           050-006-113/01  09/12/63                                                AO   WH3/ME
                 FORWARDING OF PROJECT OUTLINE WAS KAPOK
HMMA-22437           050-006-091/03  07/11/63                                                AO   IP/FI
                 RYBAT RECD 12 NOV 63 LITEMPO WAS RYBAT
HMMA-22438           DEFERRED        05/11/63                                                AO   C/WA/3
                 OPERATIONAL/LIHACK EXPLANATION OF EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION
HMMA-22439           201-0352654     05/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 WILLIAM SANFORD MILLER
HMMA-22440           201-0324376     05/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 OPERATIONAL/LIMOTOR/FJDUST/LCFLUTTER OF LIMOTOR-22
HMMA-22441           050-006-072/03  07/11/63                                                IN   WH3/ME
                 RYBAT RECD 12 NOV 63 LIEMBRACE
HMMA-22442           201-0328029     07/11/63                                                AC   C/WH/3
                 OPERATIONAL/LCIMPROVE/LIPLUG 2 AND 1
HMMA-22443           FID             13/11/63                                                AO   FI/D
                 SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22444           050-006-055/04  04/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 OPERATIONAL/LIMOTOR-TRANSMITTAL OF ANTIBETANCOURT LEAFLET
HMMA-22445           201-0132327     05/11/63                                                AC   C/WH/3
                 REQUEST FOR ASSESSMENTS OF LITALUSES 1 AND 2
HMMA-22446           201-0062864     05/11/63                                                IN   C/WH/3
                 TARGET ANALYSIS ON CAMILO CHAVEZ MELGOZA
HMMA-22447           200-009-042     07/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 CUBAN TRAVEL/CUBANA PASSENGER MANIFESTS
HMMA-22448           050-126-022/04  06/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 MATERIAL FOR PRESS COMMENTS
HMMA-22449           201-0118406     07/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 LIENVOY-8 C-78604 OA 17 OCT 59
HMMA-22450           010-120-023/01  06/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 MR. T. /TED/ H. MCLENDON
HMMA-22451           AQUATIC         14/11/63                                                AO   TSD
                 SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22452           050-006-075/04  07/11/63                                                AO   WH3/ME
                 RYBAT RECD 12 NOV 63 LIENVOY
HMMA-22453           019-124-032/03  07/11/63                                                AO   WH/C/C
                 AMROD WAS 201-020681
HMMA-22454           AQUATIC         14/11/63                                                AO   TSD
                 SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22455           050-006-075/04  06/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 OPERATIONAL/TRANSMITTAL OF LIENVOY TRANSCRIPT
HMMA-22456           050-126-022/03  06/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 LILISP E.-PROGRESS REPORT FOR SEP-OCT 63
HMMA-22457           050-006-105/03  06/11/63                                                AO   WH/1
                 CUBAN IDENTIFICATION OF KUBARK AGENT WAS 201-329609
HMMA-22458           050-006-004     07/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                 H. W. TOTTEN
HMMA-22459           050-008-016     08/11/63                                                IN   EE/YA
                 DMLET/LIENVOY/OPERATIONAL--ROUND-UP REPORT ON TITO VISIT TO MEXICO
```

2/p/

14-00000

```
HMMA-22459                    050-008-016       08/11/63                                                IN    EE/IA
                     DMLET/LIENVOY/OPERATIONAL--ROUND-UP REPORT ON TITO VISIT TO MEXICO

 PAGE   19350                                               S-E-C-R-E-T                     E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
```

```
                                                          S-E-C-R-E-T                              16/06/77
 DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)       FCN             DATE         FSN                  SECONDARY/DOC REF        CODE ROUTIN
 HMMA-22460             02  201-0285162     08/11/63                                                 IN   C/WH/3
                    BEDOX/OPERTNL-EUGENIUSZ SPYRA
 HMMA-22461                 FID             15/11/63                                                 AO   FI/D
                    SENT TO FI/D
 HMMA-22462                 050-009-012     06/11/63                                                 AO   IP
                    TRANSMITTAL OF CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC WAS RYBAT
 HMMA-22463                 201-0785205     08/11/63                                                 AO   IP
                    JMGIN/ENRIQUE PERALTA, DOMINICAN WAS 200-009-042
 HMMA-22464                 200-009-042     08/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                    PBRUMEN-TRAVEL OF DOMINICANS TO CUBA -
 HMMA-22465                 019-124-032/03  07/11/63                                                 AO   WH/C/C
                    AMROD WAS 201-020481
 HMMA-22466                 FID             15/11/63                                                 AO   FI/D
                    SENT TO FI/D
 HMMA-22467                 DEFERRED        07/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                    REQUEST FOR HDQS INDEX CARDS-ODENVY REPORTS
 HMMA-22468                 200-006-055     08/11/63                                                 AO   DESTRO
                    COMMUNICATIONS WATCH LIST
 HMMA-22469                 RYBAT           08/11/63                                                 AO   OS/FS
                    RECD 18 NOV 63
 HMMA-22470                 AQUATIC         15/11/63                                                 AO   TSD
                    SENT TO TSD
 HMMA-22471                 050-006-061/03  08/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                    OPERATIONAL/LIHACK-TRANSMITTAL OF ACTIVATOR
 HMMA-22472         02      201-0123353     14/11/63                                                 IN   C/WH/3
                    DIZTAG/LIENVOY/OPERATIONAL--PARVAN TCHERNEV
 HMMA-22473                 050-126-022/04  12/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                    MATERIAL FOR PRESS COMMENTS
 HMMA-22474                 201-0811688     14/11/63                                                 AO   EE/P
                 02 BEDOX/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--BOLESLAW JELEN
 HMMA-22475                 200-008-005     14/11/63                                                 AO   EE/YA
                    TRAVEL OF YUGO NATLS
 HMMA-22476              02 200-008-005     14/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                    ZODIAC/BEDOX/OPERATIONAL-TRAVEL OF POLISH NATIONALS
 HMMA-22477                 201-0273735     12/11/63                                                 IN   SAS/ES
                    CONTACT WITH ROBERTO SALAS, CUBAN PHOTOGRAPHER
 HMMA-22478                 201-0740220     13/11/63                                                 AO   IP
                    DR. JULIAN GASCON MERCADO, GOVERNOR-ELECT OF NAYARIT
 HMMA-22479                 201-0728291     14/11/63                                                 IN   C/WH/3
                    STATUS RPT ON INVESTIGATION OF RYSZARD LICHOCKI
 HMMA-22480                 AQUATIC         19/11/63                                                 AO   TSD
                    SENT TO TSD
 HMMA-22481                 106-009-008     14/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                    MOVIMIENTO PRO INDEPENDENCIA DE PUERTO RICO
 HMMA-22482                 050-006-018     14/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                    OPERATIONAL MONTHLY REPORT-1-31 OCT 63
 HMMA-22483                 050-004-020     14/11/63                                                 IN   IP
                    GEORGE NATHANSON/
 HMMA-22484                 200-009-037     14/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                    H.W. TOTTEN /201-
 HMMA-22485                 019-126-015     13/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                    RESPONSE TO REF.
 HMMA-22486                 050-004-104     13/11/63                                                 AC   C/WH/3
                    COLORADO RIVER SALINITY ISSUE
 HMMA-22487         , 02  02 060-006-056/03 21/11/63                                                 AC   IP/FI
                    BEDOX/OKROW-WOODROW D. GABBOTT-REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE
                    WAS 200-120-033/03
 HMMA-22488                 201-0739850     13/11/63                                                 AO   WH/REG
                    KAPOK RECD 19 NOV 63
 PAGE   19349                                             S-E-C-R-E-T                      E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
```

6|rV

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	ROU
HMMA-22489	050-006-088/03	14/11/63			IN	C/
	REPORT ON VISIT OF LIVAGUE/1 TO MEXICO CITY 30 OCT-9 NOV 63					
HMMA-22490	050-124-028/04	14/11/63			AO	C/
	REVIEW OF BOOK ENTITLED %EL CAPITAL MONOPOLISTA Y LA ECONOMIA DE MEXICO%					
HMMA-22491	050-002-004	14/11/63			AO	C/
	USAGE OF TERMS BY EMB. RELATING TO COMMIE AND SOCIALIST GROUPS IN MEX.					
HMMA-22492	FID	21/11/63			AO	FI/
	SENT TO FI/D					
HMMA-22493	AQUATIC	21/11/63			AO	TSD
	SENT TO TSD					
HMMA-22494	FID	21/11/63			AO	FI/
	SENT TO FI/D					
HMMA-22495	201-0150616	15/11/63			AO	C/
	(ST)SNAB-1/COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE TERMINATION BY STATION SAN FRANCISCO					
HMMA-22496	02 201-0042557	15/11/63			IN	C/
	JUDITH FERRETO SEGURA/ FORWARDING OF COPIES OF DOCUMENTS FROM GOVT FILE					
HMMA-22497	201-0739953	14/11/63			IN	C/
	CARLOS MATIAS SAENZ FERRETO/FORWARDING OF DOCS FROM DEPT OF IMMIGRATION FILE					
HMMA-22498	200-005-038	14/11/63			AO	C/
	ZRKNICK/PERSONS REGISTERED AT THE HOTEL CONGRESO, MEXICO CITY DURING PERIOD 16-25 OCT 63					
HMMA-22499	AQUATIC	21/11/63			AO	TS
	SENT TO TSD					
HMMA-22500	DEFERRED	15/11/63			AO	C/
	STATION REPORTING-LANGUAGE OF REPORTS					
HMMA-22501	FID	21/11/63			AO	FI
	SENT TO FI/D					
HMMA-22503	019-006-086/03	15/11/63			IN	SAS
	CONTACT REPORTS-MEETINGS WITH DEGRIP					
HMMA-22504	050-006-091/04	06/12/63			AO	C/
	TRANSMITTAL OF STATEMENTS SIGNED BY GENARO DEL BUSTO HERNANDEZ AND AUGUSTO PINEDA GONZ					
HMMA-22505	201-0727876	15/11/63			IN	C/
	PBRUMEN-JUAN FRANCISCO GONZALEZ RODRIGUEZ					
HMMA-22506	050-006-105/03	15/11/63			AO	C/
	CONTACT REPORT-MEETINGS WITH (LITAMIL-9) 01					
HMMA-22507	050-009-012	15/11/63			AO	WHS
	RYBAT RECD 19 NOV 63					
HMMA-22508	201-0729530	15/11/63			AO	C/
	OSCAR CONCEPCION MENDOZA					
HMMA-22509	036-004-001	18/11/63			IN	C/
	MAIL INTERCEPTS ON HAITIAN COMMIES					
HMMA-22511	DEFERRED	19/11/63			AO	C/
	GRACIELA PEREZ DEL VALLE DE AVILA, VISA APPLICANT					
HMMA-22512	AQUATIC	27/11/63			AO	TS
	SENT TO TSD					
HMMA-22513	AQUATIC	02/12/63			AO	C/T
	SENT TO C/TSD					
HMMA-22514	DEFERRED	21/11/63			AO	WH/
	KAPOK RECD 27 NOV 63					
HMMA-22515	019-124-032/03	21/11/63			AO	WH/
	AMROD WAS 201-020481					
HMMA-22516	050-006-084/03	25/11/63			AO	C/
	LITABBY PROGRESS RPT-AUG-OCT 63					
HMMA-22517	060-006-056/01 02	21/11/63			AO	WH
	KAPOK RECD 26 NOV 63 (BE)SMOOTH					
HMMA-22518	201-0735188	26/11/63			AO	EE/
	02 (DI)ZTAG/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--ARRIVAL OF JOSEF PLUHAR					
HMMA-22519	201-0304989	26/11/63			AC	IP
	BEDOX/OPERATIONAL--ODACID CABLE MISSENT TO POLISH EMBASSY 02					

5/12

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	RO
HMMA-22520	201-0103968	29/11/63			AO	EE

14-00000

```
                                                       S-E-C-R-E-T                  16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN            DATE        FSN           SECONDARY/DOC REF                 CODE ROUTI
HMMA-22520               201-[illegible]3948      29/11/63                                          AO   EE/P
                    CZESLAW SLO[illegible]IEWICZ /201-103948/
HMMA-22521               201-0291531    21/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN U.S. RESIDENTS AND CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL
HMMA-22522               201-0290885    21/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    AMELBOW/1
HMMA-22523               201-0356959    21/11/63                                                    IN   C/WH
                    PBRUMEN/JORGE ANTONIO ABASOLO GARCIA
HMMA-22524               DEFERRED       22/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MEXI
HMMA-22525               FID            02/12/63                                                    AO   FI/D
                    SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22526               FID            02/12/63                                                    AO   FI/D
                    SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22527               AQUATIC        02/12/63                                                    AO   C/TS
                    SENT TO C/TSD
HMMA-22528               050-009-012    22/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC
HMMA-22529               201-0067016    22/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    DRA. ESTHER CHAPA TIJERINA
HMMA-22530               201-0029486    22/11/63                                                    IN   IP
                    COMMUNIST PARTY PENETRATION PROGRAM ADDITIONAL INFO ON ANTONIO MORIN RODRIGUEZ AND ALEJO
                    MENDEZ GARCIA
HMMA-22531               AQUATIC        02/12/63                                                    AO   C/TS
                    SENT TO C/TSD
HMMA-22532               201-0042557    22/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    JUDITH FERRETO SEGURA
HMMA-22533               201-0289248    22/11/63                                                    AO   CI/R
                    RYBAT OSWALD WAS 201-287248
HMMA-22534               DEFERRED       26/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    COLOR PLATES REQUESTED IN REF
HMMA-22535               AQUATIC        03/12/63                                                    AO   C/TS
                    SENT TO C/TSD
HMMA-22536               201-0282533    22/10/63                                                    AC   C/WH
                    LIPIETY PROJ-TERMINATION OF LIEPIETY-1 WAS RYBAT
HMMA-22537               050-004-124    26/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    OPERATIONAL/LIMUD INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE
HMMA-22538               200-009-042    27/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    CUBAN TRAVEL
HMMA-22539               201-0279366    29/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    ENRIQUE LUMEN-RODRIGUEZ
HMMA-22540               201-0263152    29/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    LITENCH-1
HMMA-22541               AQUATIC        04/12/63                                                    AO   C/TS
                    SENT TO C/TSD
HMMA-22542               050-009-012    29/11/63                                                    AO   IP
                    CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC WAS RYBAT
HMMA-22543               200-009-042    29/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    TRANSMITTAL OF CUBAN DIPL TRAVEL RPTS
HMMA-22544               201-0729530    29/11/63                                                    AO   IP
                    OSCAR CONCEPCION MENDOZA
HMMA-22545               201-0289248    29/11/63                                                    AO   CI/R
                    TRANSMITTAL OF TAPES
HMMA-22546               050-126-022/04 29/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    MATERIAL FOR PRESS COMMENTS
HMMA-22547               035-500        29/11/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    TRAVEL OF FERNANDO MORENO TO PARIS
HMMA-22548               200-004-208    29/11/63                                                    IN   C/WH
                    VISIT OF WORLD PEACE COUNCIL DELEGATES TO MEXI
PAGE    19347                                          S-E-C-R-E-T                E2 IMPDET CL BY 01198
```

```
                                                       S-E-C-R-E-T                  16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN            DATE        FSN           SECONDARY/DOC REF                 CODE ROUT
HMMA-22549               FID            04/12/63                                                    AO   FI/D
                    SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22550               050-124-028/01 02/12/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    OPERATIONAL/KUWOLF/LIHUFF
HMMA-22551               201-0269885    02/12/63                                                    IN   C/WH
                    MANOEL PIO CORREIA JUNIOR
HMMA-22552          23   053-126-023/03 05/12/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    FLN GUERRILLAS
HMMA-22553               019-124-032/03 05/12/63                                                    AO   WH/C
                    AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMA-22554               201-0033012    05/12/63                                            02      AO   C/WH
                    AGENT SERVICE RECORDS FOR LEFTERS 4 AND 7. MEMO OF ORAL COMMITMENTS FOR LEFTER
HMMA-22554/01            201-0275186    05/12/63                                                    AO   C/WH
                    LIFTER-7
```

3 pV

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/PCS 2E0314 Hqs.	EXTENSION 5044	NO. DATE 23 Feb 78

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI/PA	24 Feb 78			These are the notes from the DDO Staff Meeting of 22 February 1978.
2.				
3. CI/RMO	24 FEB 1978			
4.				
5. CI Registry	27/2/78		ZA	
6.	27/2/78			
7. Russ Holmes			h ELAINE	
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

DDO STAFF MEETING BRIEF #32 22 February 1978

1. DDCI

The DDCI attended this week's staff meeting. He spoke of his appreciation of being able to work directly with the Operations Directorate, an organization which he has known from the field. He said that when he was first offered the nomination of the post of Deputy Director, he thought of the Agency primarily in terms of his perceptions of this Directorate. He knew that its officers worked long hours, developed excellent contacts and produced top-flight reports working always with a strong sense of dedication. He is planning to have a series of briefings which will further acquaint him with the activities of the Directorate. Meanwhile he reaffirmed that he had an open door to persons who had problems or issues that they wished to bring directly to his attention.

On his first day on duty, Mr. Carlucci was thrown in direct confrontation with the Department over the State/CIA Treaty. While the Department has expressed very strong emotion concerning this Treaty, the Deputy Director stands by the position that he expressed during his confirmation hearings. When asked by one Senator about the State/CIA relations, he said that he felt this relationship had been codified to the extent that this was possible and that it was now a matter for Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station to work out their own individual arrangements. He hopes that we will be able to find some way of diffusing this issue so that we may proceed to other more substantive issues such as internal reporting responsibilities, communications, and cover.

Specific cover problems were briefly discussed. The DDO promised to deliver to the DDCI a new inventory of those issues and situations where the Divisions are

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

04025

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 008284

[redacted]

encountering problems that they or the DDO had been unable to resolve with the Department. The DDCI agreed to take a look at this catalog of cover problems and asked that a special paper on cover problems in Africa be forwarded to him.

Mr. Carlucci spoke of the interest Congress has in imposing Hughes/Ryan type procedures on sensitive intelligence operations as well as covert action. He had pointed out two problem areas to the Senate Committee, i.e., the difficulty of defining what is a sensitive operation and the problems involved in providing sufficient background and detail to permit the SSCI to make informed judgments on individual operations.

2. Responses to Dr. Brzezinski's Letter

While Dr. Brzezinski has not replied to the letter sent earlier to him this month proposing the 32 key countries on which we would prepare new political reporting plans, we are working on the presumption that this list is acceptable to him. It is planned that we will include sensitive operational details in a separate annex. The plan will be coordinated with NFAC and the Department and then forwarded with the annex to Dr. Brzezinski.

3. Memoranda Addressed to DCI and DDCI

Memoranda addressed to the DCI and DDCI concerning their appointments with Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station should be in their offices at least three days prior to the scheduled appointment.

4. Reorganization of the Operations Directorate

The DDO presented his tentative plan for the reorganization of the Operations Directorate which he will discuss with the Director within a week.

[redacted]

21 FEB 1978

PERSONNEL ANNOUNCEMENTS

Kenney, John H.	(EUR) DCOS/Ankara	February 1978
Hughes, Ralph C., Jr.	(NE) DCOS/Amman	May 1978

EXTENSION		EXTEND TO
Ogino, Jack	(NE) COS/Colombo	August 1979
Twetten, Thomas A.	(NE) DCOS/New Delhi	H/L and new tour o/a 8/78
Panitt, Jeffrey	(AF) COS/Lome	June 1979

SECRET

FROM:
SODERQUIST BARBARA KC-660
C/CI 2D39
EXT. 1839 TUBE CU6
SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981

NDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

BRANCH

ATE

IP/FI CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	2 Oct	DSW
REQUESTER				
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52		
REQUESTER				
IP/RMS	DW-6	GA-20		

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO *(Doc. Ref.)*

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(TO IP/IN)*

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME: VANDERBILT

GIVEN NAMES: (COMM.)

SPELLING VARI~~ATIONS TO BE SE~~ARCHED

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 201-

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*

SEX

DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP

RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

	NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT
	SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES
✓	INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED
	THERE ARE ______ RECORDS OF WHICH ______ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME

020093

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 3-74 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

1978 OCT -2 PM 10:27

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-8-38)

```
                              S-E-C-R-E-T

                        MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE                                   020092      03.
                                                                                     ***IMMEDIATE***
           ***  PRIMARY SEARCH FOR VANDERBILT
REQ NO: 020092A02   REQUESTER: KC660  SODERQUIST B  C/CI     2039     1839  C06

NAME: VANDERBILT                                   YOB:        SEX:   CIT:
ORIGIN:A  DOR:     PURPOSE:FOS  PRTY:I  OTPT:0999  FNU:   SPELL:   MASK:   MAT:

CONTROL CODE 032-DSM-781002-104725-00004    104720
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------


0001 VANDERBILT, WILLIAM                                            ARDP-00022
     OSS REFS ARE AVAILABLE TO THIS NAME IN THE MAIN                01JAN46
     INDEX CAT. III FILE. THESE REFS MUST BE MANUA LLY
     SEARCHED AND APPLICABLE CARDS REPRODUCED AN D ATTACHED
     TO THE NAME TRACE REQUEST.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     ARDP-00022                           01 JAN 46  01748386


0002 VANDERBILT, NEIL                                               ARDP-00022
     OSS REFS ARE AVAILABLE TO THIS NAME IN THE MAIN                01JAN46
     INDEX CAT. III FILE. THESE REFS MUST BE MANUA LLY
     SEARCHED AND APPLICABLE CARDS REPRODUCED AN D ATTACHED
     TO THE NAME TRACE REQUEST.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     ARDP-00022                           01 JAN 46  01748387
```

14-00000

```
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T



0003 VANDERBILT, GLADYS                                               ARDP-00022
     OSS REFS ARE AVAILABLE TO THIS NAME IN THE MAIN                  01JAN46
     INDEX CAT. III FILE. THESE REFS MUST BE MANUA LLY
     SEARCHED AND APPLICABLE CARDS REPRODUCED AN D ATTACHED
     TO THE NAME TRACE REQUEST.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     ARDP-00022                          01 JAN 46  01748388



0004 VANDERBILT, CORNELIUS                                            ARDP-00022
     OSS REFS ARE AVAILABLE TO THIS NAME IN THE MAIN                  01JAN46
     INDEX CAT. III FILE. THESE REFS MUST BE MANUA LLY
     SEARCHED AND APPLICABLE CARDS REPRODUCED AN D ATTACHED
     TO THE NAME TRACE REQUEST.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     ARDP-00022                          01 JAN 46  01748389



0005 VANDERBILT, EMMERSON /MRS./                                      201-0053904
                                    FROM SUBJ                         ATTACH A 3 TO
                                                                      MEMO
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     201-0053904                         07 OCT 51  06304238
```

```
---CONTINUED---         KC660                                                          PAGE 000
                                                                              020092         03
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 015866
```

14-00000

```
                                   S-E-C-R-E-T

0006 VANDERBILT, WILLIAM H.                                  201-0009461
     SEX M                                                   DFB-15112A02
                                                             16JAN52
                                                             P7
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS -- GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DFB-15112                            16 JAN 73  01375647


0007 VANDERBILT, NEIL                                        201-0000395
                                                             06DEC52
                                                             SER-25
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     201-0000395-25                       06 DEC 52  06319220


0008 VANDERBILT, FELIZA PABLOS                               201-0009609
     EX-WIFE OF CORNELIUS VANDERBILT JR. RUMORED TO HAVE     WPLA-02019
     BEEN A COMMUNIST OR FELLOW TRAVELER IN MEXICO           24APR52
                                                             SER-5
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     WPLA-02019                           24 APR 52  06528206


0009 VANDERBILT, FELIZA PABLOS                               201-0009609
                                                             SUDS-53302
                                                             06JUN52
                                                             SER-7
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     SUDS-53302                           06 JUN 52  06590778


                                                                              PAGE 000
---CONTINUED---     KC660                                                 020092    03
                                   S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 015866
```

14-00000

```
                                   S-E-C-R-E-T

0010 VANDERBILT, CORNELUIS /JR./                                   201-0009809
                                                                22 WPLA-02019
                                                                   24APR52
                                                                   SER-5

     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     WPLA-02019                           24 APR 52  06528205
        22


0011 VANDERBILT, FELIZA PABLUS                                     201-0009809
                                                                   DFB-19153
                                                                   25JUN52
                                                                   SER-8

     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     DFB-19153                            25 JUN 52  07062776


0012 VANDERBILT, CORNELIUS                                         201-0009809
                                                                   SODB-53302
                                                                   06JUN52
                                                                   SER-7

     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     SODB-53302                           06 JUN 52  06590777


0013 VANDERBILT, GEORGE                                            201-0009711
                                                                   DFB-32920A02
                                                                   17FEB54
                                                                   ENCL. 2

     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DFB-32920                            17 FEB 54  01711597

                      2/pd

---CONTINUED---       KC660                                                     PAGE 000
                                                                          020092      03
                                   S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 015866
```

14-00000

```
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T


0014 VANDERBILT, CORNELIUS /COMM./                              201-0001042
                                                                DFB-36207
                                                                08JUL54
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS  -  GC-52
                              APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DFB-36207                                 08 JUL 54  07035805


0015 VANDERBILT, FNU                                            201-0009930
                                                                XX-11885
                                                                45
                                                                P. 59
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS  -  GC-52
     XX-11885                                  01 JAN 45  06513836


0016 VANDERBILT, ALFRED GWYNN                                   200-124-003
                                                                DIR-42649
                                                                56
                                                                SER-8718
                                                                OUT59634
                                                                ENCL
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS  -  GC-52
     DIR-42649C  56                            01 JAN 56  06987653
```

14-00000

```
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T

0017 VANDERBILT, CONSUELO                                    201-0123544
                                                             DFB-67868
                                                             15AUG56

     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DFB-67868                          15 AUG 56  07007171


0018 VANDERBILT, ARTHUR                                      100-004-117
                                                             DFB-67575
                                                             08AUG56
                                                             SER-119
                                                             PAGE 4
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     DFB-67575                          21 JUN 78  01706454


0019 VANDERBILT, FNU                                         058-008-020
     CIT CHIL                                         21-30  LIMA 37095
     LOC PERU, CALLAO. SUSPECTED OF SABOTAGE OF ONE IF       13OCT77
     NOT BOTH OF CUBAN FISHING BOATS IN CALLAO HARBOR.       HPL-07893
     THERE WERE EXPLOSIONS ON BOTH BOATS.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     LIMA 37095C1077                    25 OCT 77  09552194
     21-30

0020 VANDERBILT, ALFRED GWYNNE                               200-124-008/02
     OF WORLD VETERANS FEDERATION                            10/3
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     200-124-008/02                     09 SEP 57  06321372

                2/PV

                                                                                PAGE 000
---CONTINUED---      KC663                                                020092      03
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 015866
```

14-00000

```
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T


0021 VANDERBILT, ALFRED GWYNNE /MRS./                                   200-124-008/02
                                                                        10/3
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     200-124-008/02                         09 SEP 57  06321373


0022 VANDERBILT, JANE /MRS./                                            201-0000706
     AUSTRIA JUNE 45 REFERENCE OF MATHA MARIA BRUSSET                   SER-1
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     201-0000706-1                          01 JAN 58  06317367


                              END OF REPLY - 0022 RECORDS LISTED






                                                                                         PAGE 000
                    KC660                                                 END OF 020092        03
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 015866
```

1. RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGES [illegible]T BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL [illegible]AL CENTER.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

QMHT
QMKG
EIVC
QMBE

ORIG: FR:JH:js
UNIT: CI/SO
EXT:: 1758
DATE: 04 September 1970

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ____ of ______

S E C R E T

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET

CITE HEADQUARTERS 056

TO 855 ATHENS (EYES ONLY PLOTKA)
358 AMMAN (EYES ONLY GODWICK [redacted])
672 CAIRO (EYES ONLY RINAKER) 05 15 02Z SEP 70
305 INFO: BEIRUT (EYES ONLY CROWEN)

RYBAT MHCHAOS

1. FYI LNERGO SOURCE REPORTED THAT ORGANIZATION OF ARAB STUDENTS IN U.S. REQUESTED ISHMAEL FLORY (201-327809) CPUSA OFFICIAL IN ILLINOIS, TO SELECT 5 YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS TO GO ON TOUR OF MIDDLE EAST ESPECIALLY JORDAN AND UAR. PURPOSE OF TRIP TO PROPAGANDIZE ARAB POSITION AMONG BLACKS IN U.S.

2. GROUP WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS ON 24 AUGUST 1970 VIA OLYMPIC AIRLINES FLT 420 WHICH STOPPED MONTREAL, CANADA BEFORE PROCEEDING ATHENS, GREECE WHERE FLIGHT TERMINATED. NO FURTHER TRAVEL INFO AVAILABLE PRESENT TIME. TICKETS FOR GROUP HAD BEEN SENT PRE-PAID FROM AMMAN BUT ARRANGEMENTS BEING HANDLED IN CHICAGO.

3. GROUP IDENTIFIED AS:

A: THOMAS CURTIS

ACTION

FILING
1 - Chrono
2 - (FR) BP/ARAB RelATIONS
3 - C/Area Div
4 - Station File
Indexed: KEYPUNCHED

9 SEP 1970

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER 7091

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 3205

CTED HANDLING MESSAGES T BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL AL CENTER.
NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN HARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT::
DATE:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ____ of ________

S E C R E T

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

CITE HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

TO PAGE 2

B: JAMES DILLARD

C: CHRISTINE JOHNSON (COMMENT: FYI PROBABLY IDEN WITH MARY CHRISTINE CLAYBOURNE JOHNSON, 201-328044, BORN 15 JAN 09, VERSAILLES, KENTUCKY WHO IN 1969 WAS PRESIDENT AFRICAN-AMERICAN HERITAGE ASSOCIATION WHICH WAS FOUNDED BY FLORY.)

D: JOE HOWARD

E: JOE WALKER (COMMENT: FYI POSSIBLY IDEN WITH JOSEPH DANFORTH WALKER, 201-856173, BORN 11 MAR 34, BUFFALO, NEW YORK WHO IN 1969 WAS WRITER FOR "MUHAMMED SPEAKS" OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF NATION OF ISLAM AND FRIEND OF HENRY WINSTON (201-006887) NATIONAL CHAIRMAN CPUSA.)

4. REQUEST ANY INFO RE TRAVEL ABOVE INDIVIDUALS, THEIR CONTACTS AND ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY COME STATIONS ATTENTION.

5. ATHENS: SUGGEST QUERY LIAISON RE TRAVELERS WITHOUT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

GROUP 1

FORM 3205

D HANDLING MESSAGES T BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL AL CENTER.
EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy____ of ________

TE:

SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

CITE HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

TO

PAGE 3

GIVING PARA 1 BACKGROUND.

END OF MESSAGE

C/NE/ARN

C/NE D H Blee

AC/CI/SO
Jason Horn

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 4-70 3205

OCT 2 10 52 '72

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

S E C R E T 021510Z OCT 72 RESTRICTED HANDLING

CITE ALGIERS 1341 17-27

PRIORITY HEADQUARTERS.

MHCURB RYBAT MHCHAOS

REFS: A. HEADQUARTERS ~~1653~~ 1663 30 Sep 72

B. ALGIERS 1340 17-27 28 Sep 72

1. MELVIN MCNAIR (DPOB 30 OCT 48, GREENSBORO, N.C.), ONE OF THE HIJACKERS OF A DELTA AIRLINES PLANE ON 30 JULY, APPEARED LNFALL 2 OCT 72 TO OBTAIN US PASSPORTS FOR HIS TWO CHILDREN AND FOR THE CHILD OF GEORGE EDWARD WRIGHT (DPOB 3/29/43, HALIFAX COUNTY, VA.), AND JOYCE TILLERSON (DPOB 6/6/51, SPARTANBURG, S.C.). DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH FLANIK, MCNAIR MADE FOLLOWING REMARKS WHICH GENERALLY CONFIRM GLDUEL/1'S INFO REPORTED REF B: 02

2. WILLIAM HOLDER, A WESTERN AIRLINES HIJACKER, DEFINITELY NAMED BY BLACK PANTHERS (BP) INTERNATIONAL SECTION, AS ITS ALGIERS HEAD. HOLDER WAS PICKED BECAUSE BP INTERNATIONAL SECTION STILL UNDER CONTROL OF ELDRIDGE CLEAVER (201-817097) AND NONE OF THE OTHER BP ASSOCIATES IN ALGIERS

DUP OF 7112

E2 IMPDET WN-SISM
CL BY 059876

3/rw

1

17-27

PAGE 2 ALGIERS 1341 S E C R E T

WANTED TO WORK WITH CLEAVERS. PETER O' NEAL (201-856553), FOR EXAMPLE, RECENTLY LEFT THE COUNTRY AND DONALD COX (201-851941) CLAIMS THAT HE WANTS TO MINIMIZE FURTHER ASSOCIATION WITH CLEAVER SINCE CLEAVER HAS SUCCEEDED IN "ONLY IRRITATING THE ALGERIANS." (MCNAIR HAS NOT SEEN COX FOR ABOUT TWO WEEKS.)

3. MCNAIR, HOLDER AND OTHER HIJACKERS LIVE AT THE BP POINTE PESCADE VILLA AND RARELY SEE CLEAVER WHO IS LIVING IN HIS VILLA IN EL BIAR. MCNAIR SAID ALGERIANS KEEP A "CLOSE EYE" ON CLEAVER AND HIS WIFE, ALSO NOW IN ALGIERS.

4. THE HIJACKERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED NO DOCUMENTATION BY THE ALGERIANS. THERE ARE NO RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR MOVEMENTS EXCEPT THEY HAVE BEEN ADVISED NOT TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE OF ALGIERS.

5. MCNAIR SAID HE HAD NOT REALLY BELIEVED THAT THE ALGERIANS WOULD RETURN TO THE US THE ONE MILLION DOLLARS INVOLVED IN THE DELTA HIJACKING. HE SAID HE WAS AWARE BEFORE THE HIJACKING WAS PLANNED THAT THERE WERE REPORTS THAT THE 500 THOUSAND DOLLARS FROM THE WESTERN AIRLINES HIJACKING HAD BEEN RETURNED, BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE REPORT SINCE HE

UPW

17-27

ALSO AWARE THAT THE HIJACKERS IN THAT CASE WERE FREE IN ALGIERS. ALSO, MCNAIR REASONED THAT SUCH A LARGE SUM WOULD OVERRIDE ALGERIAN POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THEIR DECISION ON THE MONEY'S DISPOSAL.

6. THE RECENT RAID ON THE BPP HEADQUARTERS BY ALGERIAN AUTHORITIES WAS TRIGGERED BY CLEAVER'S OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE DEMANDING RETURN OF THE HIJACK MONEY. CLEAVER'S LETTER WAS WRITTEN WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE REST OF THE BPP MEMBERS IN ALGERIA AND CAUSED A MAJOR SPLIT IN THE PARTY.

7. MCNAIR APPEARED AT EASE IN FLANIK'S OFFICE AND QUITE TALKATIVE, ALTHOUGH MUCH OF THE CONVERSATION CENTERED ON HIS TRIP TO ALGIERS. HE APPARENTLY SURPRISED TO FIND ALGERIA SUCH AN ADVANCED COUNTRY. HE HAS NO DOCUMENTATION EXCEPT AN AMERICAN DRIVER'S LICENSE AND WHEN ASIED IF HE WISHED TO APPLY FOR A US PPT, HE REPLIED THAT "WE HAVE NO WHERE TO GO, SO I GUESS NOT." MCNAIR EXPECTED TO RETURN LNFALL NEXT FEW DAYS TO SEE WHAT PROGRESS FLANIK HAS MADE ON PPT APPLICATIONS.

8. SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF ABOVE INTERVIEW BEING SENT

'/pd

1

17-27

PAGE 4 ALGIERS 1341 S E C R E T

LNGOLD VIA LNFALL CHANNEL. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

I/NJ

V1

S E C R E T 310633Z JAN 73 RESTRICTED HANDLING

17-34

CITE (DAR ES SALAAAM) 1144

12-35

TO: HEADQUARTERS INFO (NAIROBI) (EYES ONLY MASTROME).

MHCURB RYBAT MHCHAOS

REFS: A. 17-34 (DAR ES SALAAM) 1142 19 Jan 73

B. HEADQUARTERS 9343 6 June 72

C. 17-35 (NAIROBI) 1268 9 Jan 73

D. HEADQUARTERS 8175 7 Apr 72

E. 17-35 (NAIROBI) 1233 18 May 72

F. 22 (AJDA) 03452 (NOT SENT 12-35 (NAIROBI) 23 Mar 72

L. HEADQUARTERS 3001 (NOT SENT 12-35 (NAIROBI)) 2 Jan 73

H. HEADQUARTERS 3250 19 Jan 73

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. 02 (OPOWL/1 DEPARTED DAR FOR NAIROBI 30 JANUARY. IN THREE MEETINGS DURING 9-DAY TDY 02 (OPOWL/1 PROVIDED FOLLOWING NEW DATA:

2. PETE O'NEAL, BPP LEADER, CONTINUES VERY LOW PROFILE. HAS BEEN VISITED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BY FRED JOHNSON, ONCE EXCHANGED VISITS WITH SHOO-BE-DOO. FROM JOHN MANNING 02 (OPOWL/1 LEARNED O'NEAL NOW RESIDING IN FIRST FLOOR REAR FLAT OF BLDG G IN NEW APARTMENT COMPLEX IN SOUTH DAR ES SALAAM. (APPROX LOCATION COORDINATES 30/43 ON SERIES Y941 EDITION 3 AMS MAP "DAR ES

E2 IMPDET WN-SISM
CL BY 012682

DUP OF 7115

NPJ

1

17-34

PAGE 2 DAR ES SALAAM 1144 S E C R E T

SALAAM-SOUTH"). LIVES WITH WIFE CHARLOTTE AND TWO UNIDENTIFIED BPP MEMBERS IN APARTMENTS ALLOCATED MAINLY TO UNIDENTIFIED CHINESE ADVISORS. MANNING STATED THAT O'NEAL ORIGINALLY OBTAINED FLAT #7 IN BLDG F ADJACENT TO PRESENT RESIDENCE, FROM SUBJ. REF B., LEONARD DILLON. DILLON RECENTLY DEPARTED, WITH ONLY $20 IN HIS POSSESSION, FOR ZAMBIA.

3. JOHN MANNING WAS UNABLE TO CARRY OUT REF C TRIP TO UGANDA. APPARENTLY WAS STOPPED AT UGANDAN BORDER BY MILITARY GUARDS AND ADVISED HE WOULD NEED LNFALL DOCUMENT REQUESTING ENTRY (THE ULTIMATE HUMILIATION--ACCORDING TO MANNING). MANNINGS INTENTION WAS TO SEE IDI AMIN AND SUGGEST ECONOMIC LIAISON WITH BLACK MUSLIMS IN U.S. HIS MOST RECENT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT UGANDAN LEADER WAS LETTER WRITTEN DURING WEEK OF 22 JANUARY TO AMIN RECOMMENDING THE CHARACTER OF HIS FRIEND JOSEPH "FATMAN" BROWN IN SUPPORT OF BROWN'S FORTHCOMING RESIDENCE REQUEST. (IT ISN'T CLEAR WHETHER THIS IS DIRECT RESULT OF NOTIFICATION OF TANZANIAN AUTHORITIES AND BROWN OF REVOCATION OF BROWN'S U.S. PASSPORT SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER OR SOME OTHER REASON. HOWEVER, IN ALL OPOWL/1 ELICITATION OF INFO ON UGANDAN CONTACTS OF DAR MHCHAOS COMMUNITY THERE NO INDICATION ANY CONNECTION WITH PLO

02

2/17

1

17-34

PAGE 3 (DAR ES SALAAM) 1144 S E C R E T 22

INTENTIONS TO CONTACT BGACK AMERICAN RADICALS REPORTED IN (AUK) 2393, (17-36) (KAMPALA) 19308.

4. (OZ) (OPOWL/1 CONTACTED ROOSEVELT BROWN SUBJECT REF D. TN 24 JANUARY FOR SHORT CONVERSATION IN WHICH BROWN STATED HE HAD JUST COME DOWN FROM NAIROBI. ACCORDING TO (OZ) (IRHEARTY/1 ROOSEVELT BROWN ATTSMPTED RENEW OUTDATED EXCURSION AIR TICKET THAT SAME DAY BUT WHEN RENEWAL WAS APPROVED WAS INFORMED BROWN HAD RETURNED NAIROBI 26 JAN.

5. ON WAY TO RALLY PROTESTING PAIGC LEADER CABRAL'S ASSISINATION (OZ) (OPOWL SPOTTED LYNN (PRINCE HENRY) EVANS AKA FREDRIK ROLLINS, SUBJECT REF E. (EVANS CURRENTLY SUBJECT OF NVIDEA REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER INVESTIGATION DURING DAR TDY)

6. ON VISIT TO PAN AFRICAN SKILLS (PAS) OFFICE, (OZ) (OPOWL/1 MET FRED BROOKS, AND MALIK CHAKA, SUBJECT REF F, LATTER WAS IN MIDST FRENETIC ACTIVITY PRODUCING "STATEMENT" FROM PAS FOR DEMONSTRATION AT TANU HQS DENOUNCING BEALS CA[redacted] ASSASSINATION.

7. DURING VISITS TO PAS OFFICE, (OZ) (OPOWL/1 PERFORMED INITIAL TECHNICAL SURVEY. (FLOOR PLAN AND NOTES BEING FORWARDED BY DISPATCH). EXEMPLAR ELECTRIC OUTLETS NO LONGER OBTAINABLE LOCALLY, HOWEVER (OZ) (OPOWL/1 BELIEVES HE CAN GET THEM IN NAIROBI FOR

9/pd

1

PAGE 4 17-34 DAR ES SALAAM 1144 SECRET

FORWARDING WOLOCK.

8. 02 OPOWL/1 DETERMINED THAT GEORGE RICE AKA GEORGE MATHEWS, SUBJECT REF G. WAS RELEASED BY TANZANIAN AUTHORITIES SEVERAL WEEKS AGO (DESPITE LNFALL IMPRESSION GOVT. STILL PURSUING INITIAL EXTRADITION OFFER). EXPLANATION GIVEN TO 02 OPOWL/1 BY MANNING AND BROOKS FOR ORIGINAL DETENTION OF RICE WAS THAT TANZANIANS HAD MISTAKEN RICE FOR HIJACKER GEORGE EDWARD WRIGHT. MFA HAD INDICATED TO LNFALL WHEN SUGGESTING EXTRADITION THAT THEY BELIEVED RICE TO BE HIJACKER WRIGHT BASED ON NEWSPAPER PHOTOS OF DELTA HIJACKERS. IRONY OF WHOLE SITUATION IS THAT WRIGHT, AKA LARRY DARNELL BURGESS, WAS IN DAR ES SALAAM AT TIME OF RICE DETENTION, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL 02 OPOWL/1 SOURCES.

9. CURTIS POWELL, SUBJECT REF H, CURRENTLY RESIDES IN SAME AREA BUT NOT SAME BUILDING AS PETE O'NEAL. 02 OPOWL/1 AND MANNING DROVE POWELL TO AIRPORT ON WEEKEND 27 JANUARY FOR TRIP TO NAIROBI. BOTH 02 OPOWL/1 AND MANNING HAD TO LEND POWELL FUNDS (PORTION GARBLED) TO PAY AIRPORT TAX.

10. NO FILE E2, IMPDET WN-SISM.

SECRET

6/N

2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

JJ

ORIG: JLong;PG;JH;jah
UNIT: CI/SO
EXT: 9015
DATE: 1 FEB 73

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy - of

S E C R E T

OTT QSN 1

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

S E C R E T

DONE 366 12-34 179

CITE HEADQUARTERS 3407

TO DAR ES SALAAM (EYES ONLY KINTNER)

12-35

INFO: NAIROBI (EYES ONLY MASTROME)

MHCURB RYBAT MHCHAOS

17-34

REFS: A. DAR ES SALAAM 1144 31 Jan 73 01 23 08 FEB 73

17-34

B. DAR ES SALAAM 1146 31 Jan 73

1. APPRECIATE REF A. IT FIRST INDICATION THAT WRIGHT HAS TRAVELED OUTSIDE ALGIERS AND ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS WOULD BE APPRECIATED. HQS CHECKING FURTHER AND WILL ADVISE.

2. RE REF B, HQS TRACES REFLECT SUBJECT ARRIVED ORLY, FRANCE ON 15 AUGUST 1970 FROM ALGIERS. NO ADDITIONAL INFO. CHECKING FURTHER AND WILL ADVISE.

17-34

3. INFO IN REFS AND COMMENTS IN DAR ES SALAAM 1142 ARE ONLY REPORTING, INCLUDING NVIDEA, WE HAVE SEEN ON SUBJECT OF "STOLEN PASSPORTS." AGREE WITH STATION, PER PARA 3 REF B, AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO/ DETAILS STATION CAN OBTAIN. EQUALLY INTERESTED FOLLOW-UP ON REPORT UNIDENTIFIED BPP MEMBERS LIVING IN APARTMENT AREA ALSO ALLOCATED TO UNIDENTIFIED CHINESE ADVISORS.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

E2 IMPDET WN-SISM
CL BY 012682

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY:

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

FORM 10-72 3205 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-44)

DUP OF 7116

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

5/N

14-00000

... DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL SIGNAL CENTER.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ____ of ________

SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET

CITE HEADQUARTERS

PAGE TWO

TO

4. RE PARA 7, REF A: PLS CABLE DISPATCH NUMBER AND DATE POUCHED OF SURVEY. E2 IMPDET WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE

05

C/AF/2 D.M. Wilson

D C/AF 03

AC/CI/SO Jason Horn
Jason Horn

E2 IMPDET WN-SISM
CL BY 012682

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: ________

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

FORM
10-72 3205 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20-44)

2/pv

SIGNAL CENTER.

2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG: JLong;PG;JH;jah
UNIT: CI/SO
EXT: 9015
DATE: 1 FEB 73

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ___ of ___

S E C R E T

OTT GSN 1

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

S E C R E T

DONE 366 12-34 179

TO DAR ES SALAAM (EYES ONLY KINTNER) 12-35

CITE HEADQUARTERS 3407

INFO: NAIROBI (EYES ONLY MASTROME)

MHCURB RYBAT MHCHAOS

01 23 08 FEB 73

REFS: A. DAR ES SALAAM 1144 31 Jan 73

B. DAR ES SALAAM 1146 31 Jan 73

1. APPRECIATE REF A. IT FIRST INDICATION THAT WRIGHT HAS TRAVELED OUTSIDE ALGIERS AND ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS WOULD BE APPRECIATED. HQS CHECKING FURTHER AND WILL ADVISE.

2. RE REF B, HQS TRACES REFLECT SUBJECT ARRIVED ORLY, FRANCE ON 15 AUGUST 1970 FROM ALGIERS. NO ADDITIONAL INFO. CHECKING FURTHER AND WILL ADVISE.

(7-34

3. INFO IN REFS AND COMMENTS IN DAR ES SALAAM 1142 ARE ONLY REPORTING, INCLUDING NVIDEA, WE HAVE SEEN ON SUBJECT OF "STOLEN PASSPORTS." AGREE WITH STATION, PER PARA 3 REF B, AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO/ DETAILS STATION CAN OBTAIN. EQUALLY INTERESTED FOLLOW-UP ON REPORT UNIDENTIFIED BPP MEMBERS LIVING IN APARTMENT AREA ALSO ALLOCATED TO UNIDENTIFIED CHINESE ADVISORS.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

COORDINATING OFFICERS

E2 IMPDET.WN-SISM
CL BY 012682

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: ___

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

FORM 0-72 3205 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

7116

(20-44)

3|pd

14-00000

HANDLING MESSAGES MAY BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL SIGNAL CENTER.

2. DO NOT EXCEED 59 TYPEWRITTEN ARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ___ of ______

SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET

CITE HEADQUARTERS

PAGE TWO

TO

4. RE PARA 7, REF A: PLS CABLE DISPATCH NUMBER AND DATE POUCHED OF SURVEY. E2 IMPDET WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE 03

C/AF/2 D.M. Wilson

DC/AF 03

AC/CI/SO Jason Horn
Jason Horn

E2 IMPDET WN-SISM
CL BY 012682

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: ______

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

FORM 3-72 3205 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20-44)

2/N

2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG: JLong;PG;JH;jah
UNIT: CI/SO
EXT: 9015
DATE: 6 FEB 73

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ____ of _______

SECRET

ott

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 16 22 53 FEB 73

CITE HEADQUARTERS 3475

TO 863 ALGIERS (EYES ONLY BURCHENAL) (2-27
-MHCURB RYBAT MHCHAOS

REFS: A. (7-27 ALGIERS 1362 26 Jan 73
B. HQS-2823 15 Dec 72

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. FYI AND BACKGROUND ONLY:

A. GEORGE LORENZO MATTHEWS ALSO KNOWN AS GEORGE RICE WAS ARRESTED LATE DEC 72 BY TANZANIAN AUTHORITIES WHO HAD MISTAKEN HIM FOR HIJACKER GEORGE EDWARD WRIGHT. WHEN AUTHORITIES DETERMINED HE NOT HIJACKER, MATTHEWS WAS RELEASED. (ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTS WRIGHT ACTUALLY WAS IN DAR ES SALAAM AT TIME OF MATTHEWS ARREST.)

B. PER RECENT INBREED REPORT, BPP MEMBERS FELIX LINDSAY O'NEAL AND WILLIAM HOLDER RECENTLY VISITED GENEVA (DATES NOT GIVEN). BELIEVE VISIT WAS PRIOR TO 15 NOV 72, PROVIDING THAT THEY TRAVELED UNDER TRUE NAME DOCUMENTATION, AS INBREED REPORTEDLY HAD INSTITUTED TRAVEL CONTROL MEASURES FOR O'NEAL AND HOLDER ON THAT DATE. (CHECKING AND WILL ADVISE). [redacted]

E2 IMPDET WN-SISM
CL BY 012682

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E-2, IMPDET CL BY: ________

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

FORM 10-72 3205 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

DUP OF 7117

(20-44)

4/pl

1. RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGES MUST BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL SIGNAL CENTER.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT::
DATE:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy____ of ________

SECRET

2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET

CITE HEADQUARTERS 3475

TO

PAGE TWO

②

C. PER LNERGO CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE REPORT DATED 13 DEC 72, JAMES JOSEPH PATTERSON WAS IN FRANCE IN COMPANY OF ONE NATHAN BURNS ALSO KNOWN AS "SAKU". PER LNERGO BURNS IS MOST PROBABLY IDENTICAL NATHANIEL JEROME BURNS.

D. PER SENSITIVE BKHERALD ASSET, AS OF 31 JAN 73 PETE O'NEAL AND WIFE WERE LIVING IN DAR WITH TWO OTHER UNIDENTIFIED BPP MEMBERS. CONJECTURE THESE TWO MAY BE BURNS AND LARRY NEIL MACK WHO LEFT WITH O'NEAL 23 SEPT 72, BUT HAVE NO POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION.

E. COMMENT: SOME OF ABOVE MAY POSSIBLY BE RESULT OF ALLEGED EFFORTS O'NEAL TO SPREAD CONFUSION, PER PARA 1 REF B, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO PRESENT INDICATIONS CONFIRMING THIS SUSPICION.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: ________

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

... MESSAGES MUST BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL SIGNAL CENTER.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ___ of ___

SECRET

3

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET

CITE HEADQUARTERS 3475

TO ~~PAGE THREE~~

2. WOULD APPRECIATE STATION CONFIRMATION THAT WRIGHT AND HOLDER HAVE TRAVELED OUTSIDE ALGIERS AND ANY OTHER COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS RE ABOVE ALLEGED TRAVELS, ETC. E2 IMPDET WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE

03
C/AF/1 C J Baker
~~C/AF~~ R Hale 03

DC/CI/SO Jason Horn
Jason Horn

E2 IMPDET WN-SISM
CL BY 012682

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E-2, IMPDET CL BY: ___

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

FORM 10-72 3205 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20-44)

2/pJ

1. RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE MUST BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITER CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACE

ORIG: JLong:PG:JR:ms
UNIT: CI/SO
EXT:: 1045
DATE: 14 March 1973

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy____ of ______

S E C R E T

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ESPS ESXB

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

S E C R E T
239 15-4

CITE HEADQUARTERS 3925

TO (PARIS) (EYES ONLY DEMOLAT) 15 20 01 MAR 73
638
(BERN) (EYES ONLY BACHMAN)
15-10 960 OTT 12-27
* INFO: (ALGIERS) (EYES ONLY BURCHENAL)
→ MHCURB MHCHAOS 01

1. FROM (NICERTAIN/5) AT 10 MAR 73 PARIS MTG CURIEL APPARATUS DIRECTION COMMITTEE HENRI CURIEL ANNOUNCED THAT:

A. APPARATUS PARTICIPATING IN SUPPORT OF SIX AMERICAN BLACK MILITANTS/HIJACKERS WHO RECENTLY LIVING ALGERIA.

B. CURIEL SAID THREE OF THEM (TWO MEN AND ONE WOMAN) NOW FRANCE; THREE (TWO WOMEN AND ONE MAN) NOW SWITZERLAND. THOSE IN SWITZERLAND LIVING IN "VERY PRECARIOUS" CLANDESTINE STATUS AND SHOULD BE REMOVED ASAP.

C. CURIEL SAID ENTIRE GROUP DETERMINED RETURN CLANDESTINELY TO U.S. AND CONTINUE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY. GROUP CONVINCED THAT BEFORE LEAVING EUROPE THEY SHOULD ACCEPT POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING.

E2 IMPDET WN-SISM
CL BY 012682

* ADDED BY SIG CEN!

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E-2, IMPDET CL BY:

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

FORM 6-72 3205 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-44)

DUP OF 7118

4/pw

1. RESTRICTED HANDLING MESS MUST BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL CENTER.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRIT CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACE

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT::
DATE:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ____ of ________

SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET

CITE HEADQUARTERS 3925

PAGE TWO

TO

2. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER SENSITIVE SOURCE, HIJACKERS IN ALGIERS REQUESTED IN MID-FEBRUARY EIGHT TITRE DE VOYAGE DOCUMENTS FOR PERSONS LISTED BELOW AND ELDRIDGE CLEAVER (ALTHOUGH HE REPORTED TO HAVE LEFT ALGIERS EARLY FEB). SOURCE BELIEVED ALGERIAN GOVT WOULD PROVIDE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS. NO INFO AVAILABLE THEIR DESTINATION OR ACTUAL DEPARTURE.

3. FOLLOWING ARE HIJACKERS WHO WERE BELIEVED IN ALGIERS AS OF MID-FEBRUARY. ABOVE SIX MAY BE FROM THIS GROUP.

A. WILLIAM HOLDER (201-902920) AKA LINTON CHARLES WHITE.

B. CATHERINE MARIE KERKOW, COMMON-LAW WIFE OF HOLDER.

C. GEORGE BROWN (201-906614) AKA HAROLD SINGLETON.

D. GEORGE EDWARD WRIGHT (201-906612) AKA LARRY DARNELL BURGESS.

E. JOYCE TILLERSON BURGESS (201-906616) WIFE OF GEORGE EDWARD WRIGHT.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: ________

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

1. RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGES MUST BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL SIGNAL CENTER.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITER CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ___ of ______

SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET CITE HEADQUARTERS 3225

TO PAGE THREE

F. MELVIN MC NAIR (201-906613).

G. JEAN CAROL ALLEN MC NAIR (201-906426)

3 WIFE OF MELVIN.

4. SPECULATE HIJACKERS LEFT ALGIERS WITH TRUE NAME TITRE DE VOYAGE DOCUMENTS, BUT MAY BE USING OTHER DOCUMENTATION FOR RESIDENCE PURPOSES. POSSIBILITY THAT HOLDER, WHO SPOKESMAN FOR GROUP AND HEAD OF INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF BPP IN ALGIERS, MAY HAVE REMAINED ALGIERS.

5. NO OBJECTION INFORMING LIAISON THAT ALL OR SOME PARA 3 ABOVE MAY HAVE LEFT ALGIERS AND THAT THERE RUMORS THAT THEY MAY BE IN FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND. PLEASE INFORM LNERGO REP OF SUBSTANCE PARAS ONE AND TWO ABOVE AND COORDINATE WITH HIM TO AVOID DUPLICATION WITH LIAISON.

6. IN RESPONSE LNERGO REQUIREMENT, REQUEST ANY INFO RE WHEREABOUTS HIJACKERS INCLUDING ACTIVITIES/LOCATION/

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: ______

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

[illegible] HANDLING [illegible] -- MUST BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL SIGNAL CENTER.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRIT CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACE.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT::
DATE:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ___ of ___

SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET

CITE HEADQUARTERS 3925

TO PAGE FOUR

15-10

TRAVEL. PLEASE SEE HQS-3383 (BERN ONLY) AND HQS-3323 (PARIS ONLY) FOR RELATED INFO. E2 IMPDET WN-SISM.

15-4

END OF MESSAGE

C/E/AS

C/E/F F. A. Allner

C/EUR John Caswell

03

DC/CI/SO
Jason Horn

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: ___

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

FORM 10-72 3205 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-44)

31PN

S E C R E T

RESTRICTED HANDLING

AGENCY MESSAGE

T 366119 PAGE 01-01 W 17275

TOR:061248Z JUL 73 PARI 3566

S E C R E T 061154Z JUL 73 RESTRICTED HANDLING

20-9

CITE (PARIS) 3566

TO: PRIORITY HEADQUARTERS.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RYBAT MHCURB MHCHAOS

20-4

REFS: A. (PARIS) 3451, 7 May 73

B. HEADQUARTERS 4525, 2 May 73

01 24

1. (UNBOUND) PASSED FOLLOWING REPORT 5 JULY FROM SOURCE ("BABOUCHE"): "BLACK PANTHER MEMBERS GEORGE EDWARD WRIGHT, GEORGE BROWN, MELVIN MC NAIR, HIS WIFE JEAN CAROL MC NAIR, AND JOYCE RILLERSON (WIFE OF GEORGE WRIGHT) ARRIVED IN PARIS FROM ALGIERS IN LATE MARCH. HENRI CURIEL'S CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION HAS PROVIDED THEM LODGING AND TRAINING DURING THEIR STAY IN FRANCE. THE GROUP IS NOW TRYING TO ARRANGE PLASTIC SURGERY AND FALSE DOCUMENTATION TO PERMIT THEIR CLANDESTINE RE-ENTRY INTO U.S."

01

2. (UNBOUND) REQUESTS ON URGENT BASIS ANY AVAILABLE PHOTOS OF ABOVE INDIVIDUALS TO AID THEM IN IDENTIFYING THEM BEFORE SURGERY TAKES PLACE. PLS ADVISE. (UNBOUND) HAS NOT PASSED THIS INFO TO LEGAL ATTACHE.

3. E-2 IMPDET.

7123

S E C R E T

E2 IMPDET WN-SISM
CL BY 059876

6lpd

SECRET

RESTRICTED HANDLING

AGENCY MESSAGE

T 366119 PAGE 01-01 W 17275

TOR:061248Z JUL 73 PARI 3566

SECRET 061154Z JUL 73 RESTRICTED HANDLING

CITE (PARIS) 3566 201

TO: PRIORITY HEADQUARTERS.

RYBAT MHCURS MHCHAOS

REFS: A. PARIS 3451, 7 May 73 201

B. HEADQUARTERS 4505, 2 May 73

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. (UNBOUND) PASSED FOLLOWING REPORT 5 JULY FROM SOURCE ("BABOUCHE"). "BLACK PANTHER MEMBERS GEORGE EDWARD WRIGHT, GEORGE BROWN, MELVIN MC NAIR, HIS WIFE JEAN CAROL MC NAIR, AND JOYCE RILLERSON (WIFE OF GEORGE WRIGHT) ARRIVED IN PARIS FROM ALGIERS IN LATE MARCH. HENRI CURIEL'S CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION HAS PROVIDED THEM LODGING AND TRAINING DURING THEIR STAY IN FRANCE. THE GROUP IS NOW TRYING TO ARRANGE PLASTIC SURGERY AND FALSE DOCUMENTATION TO PERMIT THEIR CLANDESTINE RE-ENTRY INTO U.S."

2. (UNBOUND) REQUESTS ON URGENT BASIS ANY AVAILABLE PHOTOS OF ABOVE INDIVIDUALS TO AID THEM IN IDENTIFYING THEM BEFORE SURGERY TAKES PLACE. PLS ADVISE. (UNBOUND) HAS NOT PASSED THIS INFO TO LEGAL ATTACHE.

3. E-2 IMPDET.

DUP.

SECRET

E2 IMPDET WN-SISM
CL BY 059876

6|PN

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

B-3786
6 MAR 1973

SUBJECT: Travel from Algiers

1. A sensitive and reliable source reported on 26 February 1973 that the travel documents (Titres de Voyage) requested from the Algerian Government by William HOLDER (Subject of your New York Field Office File 164-694) are intended for HOLDER himself, Melvin MCNAIR (Bureau File Number 157-26560), Jean MCNAIR (Bureau File Number 157-26561), Larry BURGESS, also known as George Edward WRIGHT (Bureau File Number 157-26562), Joyce BURGESS (Bureau File Number 157-26563), George BROWN (Bureau File Number 157-26564), Jean Catherine KERKOW (Subject of your New York Field Office File 164-694), and Eldridge CLEAVER.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2. Source speculates that CLEAVER's name was included with the others desiring travel documents in order to convince certain Algerian authorities that CLEAVER, who departed in early February 1973, was still in Algiers. Although Source does not know when the documents will be issued, he believes that the Government will do so.

3. Both Melvin MCNAIR and George BROWN were arrested by the Algerian police on separate charges of possession of handguns. BROWN was found to be carrying a loaded revolver, and MCNAIR had given an Algerian youth two pistols for safekeeping. One of the pistols was of Chinese manufacture. Neither BROWN nor MCNAIR were kept under arrest for any length of time.

4. Source has been unable to provide any additional information regarding the destination of above mentioned individuals. We are checking

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Date Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

SECRET

7/31

further abroad and will provide your Bureau with any additional pertinent information obtained. The above information is being made available to your Bureau in response to your request for information on the activities of the CLEAVER Faction located in foreign countries as transmitted in your teletype 004, dated 17 March 1971, Subject: Black Panther Party-CLEAVER Faction, Racial Matters.

5. The information in this report is being provided to your Bureau with the understanding that it will receive no further dissemination, other than to your appropriate field offices, without the prior approval of this office; and that any reference to it in internal Bureau documents will state only that it was obtained from a confidential source, with no mention of the office originating this report.

Please transmit reply via CACTUS channel

Originated by: CI/SO: MMullen: jb: 6 Mar 73
Based on: Algiers 1368, 2 Mar 73
Source: 02 GDDUEL/1
Distribution:
Original - FBI (via CI courier)
✓1 - CI/SO B-Memo Chrono
1 - PROD Algiers
1 - PROD GDDUEL 02
1 - BPP/Algiers
1 - Eldridge CLEAVER
1 - PG Chrono

2/N

C/DO/I

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL ~~RYBAT/SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
x NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, DO/I

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Base, Washington

SUBJECT: WOMUSE
"Peace" Demonstrations

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: DIRECTOR 39871

1. Enclosed for Headquarters information are copies of literature mailed by the Catholic Association for International Peace (CAIP) to its members (attachments 1, 2 and 3) concerning "Negotiation Now!"

2. Also enclosed as of possible interest are copies of CAIP materials (attachments 3, 4 and 5) concerning its 40th Annual Conference, scheduled for October 27 - 29, the theme of which is "Selective Conscientious Objection in an Age of Conflict." The conference is to be held at Dunbarton College of Holy Cross, 2935 Upton Street N.W., Washington, D. C.

3. The above items were received by Oliver H. CORBUSTON who had joined the CAIP for cover purposes in the course of a previous assignment. Attachments 1, 2 and 3 are forwarded in response to reference.

Oliver H. Corbuston
Oliver H. CORBUSTON

Attachments: As stated.

Distribution:
3 - Chief, DO/I w/atts
1 - Chief, DO w/o att

7147

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 060595
date 13/8/76

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 13/8/76
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 060595

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UWCA-3510

CS COPY

DATE: 11 October 1967
11 OCT 1967

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

HQS FILE NUMBER

1. RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGES ST DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL SIGNA ENTER.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

10

ORIG: BWells:PG:JH:jm
UNIT: CI/SO
EXT:: 1758
DATE: 7 July 1972

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

JUL 7 22 50 Z 72

Copy ____ of ________

S E C R E T

ESPS - MJFS

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

S E C R E T

CITE HEADQUARTERS 9888

906
TO VIENTIANE (EYES ONLY SLAGHT)
676
INFO PARIS (EYES ONLY DEMOLAT)
MHCURB RYBAT MHCHAOS
REF: PARIS 2592 (NOT NEEDED VIENTIANE) 5 July 72

1. FYI ONLY: HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTS THAT TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVES JAMES HOFFA, HAROLD GIBBONS AND WILLIAM TAUB HAVE BEEN INVITED TO VISIT DRV FOR ONE WEEK, LEAVING U.S. EITHER 1 OR 4 JULY AND INTEND PICK UP VISAS IN VIENTIANE OR PARIS. PER HQS-7356 (NOT SENT PARIS), GIBBONS INTERNATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT TEAMSTERS UNION, AND TRAVELED DRV MARCH 72. NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO TAUB; HOFFA WELL KNOWN.

2. DESIRE NO SPECIAL COVERAGE TRADE UNION GROUP AND NO

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY 44-072

CI 247

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)] (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
APPROVAL OF DCI
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

10334

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 3205

14-0000

ICTED HANDLING MESSAGES MUS   DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL SIGN   NTER.
DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT::
DATE:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ____ of ______

SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION)   (DATE AND TIME FILED)

CITE HEADQUARTERS 9885

TO

SECRET

PAGE TWO

REQUEST TO LIAISON, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE ANY PERTINENT MHCHAOS-RELATED INFO WHICH COMES STATION'S ATTENTION. EX-2 APDIR WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE

D C/E/F

C/EUR

C/FE/TBL

C/FE

Based on: Paris 2592, 5 Jul 72
Sens, 30 June 72

Action: RW
File: 100-8-88/MISC
Indexed:

cc: (1)
Station file (4)
C/EUR Div (3)
C/JE DIV (5)

Reply:
HQS-OF
19 July
FOVW-
24 July

C/CI/SO
Richard Ober

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

GROUP 1

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. D. Lavery, OGG

Via : A. Addona, DDO/PICG

Subject : Classification of EX 3600

Re your request for "a couple sentences of factual data as to why this document is classified", here they are:

1. Ex post facto, since I was not associated with Operation MHCHAOS during its existence, I can only offer the following reasonable surmise. As we now know, during its tenure MHCHAOS was one of the most sensitive operations conducted under DDP aegis, repeatedly sanctioned (in writing) by the DCI. The activity was deemed so sensitive that it was controlled by/through extremely restricted handling channels. I think it follows logically, at least in my view, that any document produced by MHCHAOS, whether a formal or informal one, would have been classified at least SECRET.

2. Does the information in this document warrant classification today. I think it does, and I believe the current classification of CONFIDENTIAL is proper. Reading

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

8885

MEMORANDUM FOR: 2.

Pgs. 2 through 12 carefully, it is readily apparent that some of the information on some of these pages was seemingly acquired from/through sensitive sources/methods. Also these pages contain frequent mention of FBI information concerning many of the Peace Movement groups/organizations xxx cited; FBI reports received by MHCHAOS were invariably classified, for the most part CONFIDENTIAL.

3. What should be the proper FOIA exemption for EX 3600; in my view, (b)(3).

P. Haefner H

C/SCB/IP

7 Apr. 77

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. D. Lavery, OGG
Via : A. Addona, DDO/PICG
Subject : Classification of EX 3600

Re your request for "a couple sentences of factual
data as to why this document is classified", here they are:
1. Ex post facto, since I was not associated
with Operation MHCHAOS during its existence, I can only
offer the following reasonable surmise. As we now know,
during its tenure MHCHAOS was one of the most sensitive
operations conducted under DDP aegis, repeatedly sanctioned
(in writing) by the DCI. The activity was deemed so sensi-
tive that it was controlled by/through extremely restricted
handling channels. I think it follows logically, at least
in my view, that any document produced by MHCHAOS, whether
a formal or informal one, would have been classified at
least SECRET.
2. Does the information in this document warrant
classification today. I think it does, and I believe the
current classification of CONFIDENTIAL is proper. Reading

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

8611

MEMORANDUM FOR: 2.

Pgs. 2 through 12 carefully, it is readily apparent that some of the information on some of these pages was seemingly acquired from/through sensitive sources/methods. Also these pages contain frequent mention of FBI information concerning many of the Peace Movement groups/organizations cited; FBI reports received by MHCHAOS were invariably classified, for the most part CONFIDENTIAL.

3. What should be the proper FOIA exemption for EX 3600; in my view, (b)(3).

P. Haefner H

C/SCB/IP

7 Apr. 77

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
CI/SO Summary on: Contact Report with MPTROIKA-7

FROM: C/CI/SO ROber
EXTENSION: 5847
NO. EX-9816
DATE: 1 March 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from wh to whom. Draw a line across column after each comme

CI/SO Internal Use Only

This information is not to disseminated outside CI/SO without prior approval of Chief, Special Operations Group, CI Staff.

Originated by: W. E. Gavaghe
TYPED by : FE/OPS

Based on:
Doc:
Date:
Filed:

SOURCE:
Cryptonym: MPTROIKA-7
Field Station:
ACTION:

DISTRIBUTION:
☒ EX NUMERICAL FILE (recorc
☐ Subject file MPTROIKA-7/
☐ Other:

8614

INDEXING:
KP by pme date 15/3/2

14-00000

SECRET

C/I/SO

EX-9816
1 March 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact Report of Meetings with MPTROIKA-7 in New York City on 14 February and in Virginia on 17-18 February 1972

1. This memorandum covers recent meetings with MPTROIKA-7 in New York City and in the Northern Virginia area. The meetings were held under secure conditions and there were no security incidents noted.

2. Operational:

a. United States - China Friendship Association (USCFA) Study Group: M-7's persistent efforts to locate and join a pro-Mao study group finally paid off. The manager of the China Bookstore finally broke down under M-7's campaign and put her in touch with a local USCFA study group under the leadership of Mrs. Susan Warren, aka Frank. M-7 has attended one session and, based on her initial observation, provided the assessment of Mrs. Warren attached hereto at the undersigned's request. M-7 believes she has hit it off with Mrs. Warren because of her understanding of dialectics (thanks to Andy Ness's tutoring) and, consequently, she was instructed to attempt to develop a social-business relationship with her. With respect to the other members of the study group, M-7 claims that the situation, to date, has not been conducive to ferreting out the identities of these individuals, but that she hopes that as the group continues to meet, some rapport will be established with her classmates.

b. New School and language instruction: M-7 has formally enrolled at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research in a course entitled "Comparative Legal Systems," which studies the theories, institutions, concepts, customs and which purports to analyze and compare the law and the administration of law in selected countries, included China, Japan, Vietnam, Germany, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. M-7 will also enroll in a French language instruction course in the near future.

#8614

SECRET

[illegible] automatic
[illegible]

c. Ramparts' Tours - New York Media Workshop's Womens' Tour: Acting on a suggestion proposed by Mr. Jason Horn, CI/SO, the undersigned raised the subject of the Women's Tour which is scheduled to visit London, Paris (where they will meet the DRV peace delegation) and Rome from 27 May - 25 June 1972 with M-7 and instructed her to attempt to determine the interest in, and likely composition of, the New York group and explore the possibility of joining such a group and explore the possibility of joining such a group. M-7's first reaction to the tour was that the cost ($699, which price includes airfare, trains, hotels, etc.) was too high. It was explained to her that the cost factor should not deter her from following through. It was then that M-7 voiced some concern that the timing of the tour may interfere with her own PCS departure (we had been talking in terms of mid-May or June 1972 up to this point). It was made clear to her that no fixed date has been established as yet for her PCS departure and that the aforementioned tour may well prove to be of operational interest, e.g. meeting the DRV delegation and continuing the staging process prior to her actual departure. M-7 said that she understood and would look into the matter. She did not believe she would have any difficulty in covering for funds should she find herself included on the tour.

d. South East Asia Reports (SEAR): M-7 produced a copy of the first issue of SEAR, a bi-weekly newsletter put out by the New York University Students Mobilization Committee, Box 59, Loeb Student Center, 566 LaGuardia Place, N.Y.C. 10003. M-7 is listed as one of five contributing staff members on the back page of this mimeographed new left publication. A copy of this first issue is attached hereto. One of M-7's articles will appear in a subsequent issue of SEAR.

e. JBMINIMUM Testing and Training: As part of M-7's covert training and assessment in anticipation of her foreign assignment, the undersigned arranged for two members of the Psychological Assessment Branch, TSD (Messrs. DeMarco and Saunders) to administer a JBMINIMUM test to her and to brief her in the use and value of the JBMINIMUM test in a field situation. This training and briefing took place on 18 February in a safehouse in N. Arlington, Va. (A copy of the JBMINIMUM assessment on M-7 will be made a matter of record in her official dossier). M-7 was introduced as "Miss Julie" to members of the PAB/TSD for purpose of this test and briefing. (Mr. Andy Ness devoted the afternoon of 18 February with M-7 for the purpose of continuing her training in dialectics, which she has found to be particularly useful in understanding the study group discussion and to permit her participation.)

2. Administrative:

a. Salary and Operational Advances. The undersigned paid M-7 her January salary on a $500 advance on 17 February 1972. She also received a $300 advance on 14 February 1972. These advances were necessary because of the expenses M-7 had incurred in enrolling at the New School and to pay for her French lessons. (One of the reasons M-7 was brought down to the Washington area was to straighten out a problem she was having with her accounting. Hopefully, she is now convinced that she had been receiving all that was due her.)

b. Tax Administration and Notification of Personnel Action. M-7 was notified of the change in the tax assessment and of the adjustments in her salary due to the legislative pay increase and the withholding of premiums for hospitalization.

3. Actions to be taken.

a. M-7's assignment abroad. Per the undersigned's discussions with Messrs. Flitcroft and Cornish, a telepouch dispatch will be sent to Bangkok Station proposing M-7's assignment to Bangkok, primarily for housekeeping purposes, but with a regional mission to perform. (The undersigned is presently working on this message.)

b. Concealment device. M-7 requested a concealment device for her microdot viewer which the undersigned will attempt to obtain from TSD. Additionally, the undersigned will request TSD to provide concealment devices for M-7's general use as a storage for papers and funds.

William E. Gavaghen
FE/OPS

Attachments
As stated

17 February 1972

SUBJECT: Mrs. Susan Warren aka Susan Frank

Susan is a tough cookie. One of her most outstanding features is a complete lack of interest - in anyone but herself. When leading a China study class this is her method: first she asks a question, from her notes, such as "What do you think Mao meant when he said this..." Then she clamly listens to what the class thinks Mao menat. When everyone finishes Susan begins to tell exactly what he meant to say. Through the evening her attitude remains the same "I've been here before and said this before." There is no enthusiasm in her that I could see.

Susan is an expert on China. I know because she told me. She told everyone else too within the first eight minutes of class. "Well, I spoke to those soldiers in Yunan who fired on those peasants..." But she really didn't have to advertize her knowledge because it is very apparent. She has a solid understanding of Chinese political line and can smoothly defend Chinese history.

As far as the woman herself is concerned she has not as much money as she would like. I believe she wants to dress in 'style.' Now, although dressing conservatively she still developes an eye for color and she would clearly be receptive to intelligent male attention. She has a nice figure and is aware of it.

Perhaps the clue which best typifies Susan's personality is her voice. It is deep, slow, even and artificially cultured. For example, "r's" become "d" in "veddy" or "Amedica".

Her hand movements when she speaks are measured and deliberate. While listening she fidgits a little but not much.

Two noticible features are her thumbnails. Both are filed almost to points, are very thick and yellowish-moreso than other nails.

While she is concerned with herself I believe she would follow someone who either interested her or gently led her. There is a part of her normally conservative character that would like to break away and try new things (altho' not new ideas in politics.)

One last remark, she is a straightforward person; will look you in the eye, will tell someone not to speak too long if she wants to move on to something else.

These observations were made after one meeting in a study class and for a few minutes before class.

104-10064-10006

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

C/Womuse

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/RYBAT	**PROCESSING ACTION**	
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WOMUSE		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, European Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Copenhagen		MICROFILM

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT RYBAT MHCHAOS
Transmittal of Timothy LEARY Documents

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: A. COPENHAGEN 1123 ✓ 14 May 71 (BS Leary Sens)
B. HEADQUARTERS 3244 18 May 71 BS

Transmitted herewith are the photocopies of Timothy LEARY's documents discussed in the references.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Timothy F. Noggle
Timothy F. NOGGLE

Attachment:
as stated above h/w

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 060595
date 8-11-76

Distribution:
2-C/WOMUSE w/att h/w
3-C/EUR w/o att

[illegible]
[illegible] 8-11-76
[illegible] 060595

Group I - Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

7393

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	ODCA-16808	19 May 1971
	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL S E C R E T/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

NAMES AND ADDRESSES	TELEPHONE

NAMES AND ADDRESSES	TELEPHONE
Good Times (Larry Abens)	415
2322 Bush [illegible]	922-9981
[illegible] Cal. 94115	
Alan Eisterg	212
Box 512 Stuyvesant Falls 12	772-6226
(Rd 2 Cherry Valley NY 13320	607-264-6811
Lew Gottlieb - Pens	247
	874 9974
~~Ralph Gleason~~	~~415~~
~~Dr Bernard Gordon~~	~~415~~
~~2300 Sutter St 202~~	~~346-5017~~
~~S.F. [illegible]~~	
~~Robert Gold~~	~~213~~
	~~451-7966~~
~~Bill Graham (Fillmore)~~	~~415~~
	621-0487
~~[illegible] (Fillmore)~~	~~[illegible]~~
	~~[illegible]~~
	~~[illegible]~~
Grateful Dead	~~415~~
	~~457-1830~~
~~[illegible]~~	
~~[illegible] (Rolling Stone)~~	~~415~~
	~~845-[illegible]~~

NAMES AND ADDRESSES	TELEPHONE
~~[illegible]~~	~~213~~
~~c/o Capitol [illegible]~~	~~386-1117~~
~~[illegible]~~	
~~5.3.3.S. [illegible]~~	
~~L.A. Cal. 900~~	
~~[illegible]~~	~~387-3826~~
[illegible]	
[illegible] College	
[illegible] Bakehouse	
Ralph [illegible]	
1020 Howe Street	
Vancouver B.C.	
Irene [illegible]	60-47-23
[illegible]	35-72-98
[illegible]	
Paul Freer	914
Box 231	597-5310
Hopewell Junction NY	

NAMES AND ADDRESSES	TELEPHONE
~~Robert Sutton~~	~~212~~
	~~345-[illegible]~~
Felipe	
66-33-32	
10-07-35	
Charles M. [illegible]	415
9230 Alcosta Blvd	828-6300
San Ramon Cal.	
Fly [illegible]	

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Sov Bloc Div; Chief, Far East Division

INFO.
Chief, WOMUSE/ICG

FROM
Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT
RYBAT MHPASHA REDTOP - Beheiren and the Four U.S. Navy Deserters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
TOKYO 7263

As noted in reference, forwarded herewith is a copy of the subject memorandum. Please note that the information in the memorandum Paragraph B. 4. b) is particularly sensitive and should only be given properly restricted dissemination.

Mark J. LIDGERWOOL

ATTACHMENT
Memo dtd 27 Nov 67

Distribution
~~2~~ - C/SB Div w/1 cy attach
1 - C/FE w/1 cy attach
1 - C/WOMUSE/ICG w/1 attach

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
Conducted On 6-10-76
E2 IMPDET CL BY 060595

CS COPY

8603

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	FJTA-53626	DEC 6 1967

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
UNKNOWN

27 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: BEHEIREN and the Four U.S. Navy Deserters

A. Origin and Development of BEHEIREN.

1. Founding: BEHEIREN (Japan "Peace for Vietnam" Committee) was organized in April 1965, nominally as a politically independent group of intellectuals and cultured persons whose purpose was "to help restore peace in Vietnam." Actually, it is a loosely organized group of ex-JCP members, progressive intellectuals, leftist cultured persons, and leftwing students - banded together in the name of opposition to the Vietnam war by two common denominators, dedicated anti-Americanism and refusal to be dominated or controlled by the orthodox Japan Communist Party.

2. Hard-Core Secretariat: The real force behind the organization of BEHEIREN, right from the beginning to the present, has been a brilliant Communist named YOSHIKAWA Yuichi, whose conspiratorial organizational skills have been perhaps the most indispensible ingredients in BEHEIREN's development. YOSHIKAWA was expelled from Tokyo University for his role as a ZENGAKUREN leader in the 1960 U.S./Japan Security Treaty riots. He then went into fulltime JCP mass movement professional work, becoming the Secretariat official in charge of international relations for the Japan Peace Committee. YOSHIKAWA broke with the JCP in late 1964, following the rupture in relations between the JCP and CPSU in May that year. The inspiration for BEHEIREN springs in large measure from YOSHIKAWA's personal desire to use his organizational talents in countering the JCP and its Japan Peace Committee. YOSHIKAWA, in addition to being a well qualified English linguist himself, years ago surrounded himself with a small following of similarly qualified lieutenants, whom he brought along into BEHEIREN to give him the necessary depth and experience to run this new organization. YOSHIKAWA functions as BEHEIREN's Secretary General.

3. Respectable Intellectual Front: Following fundamental Communist principles for mass movement work (better than the JCP itself follows these tenets), the ex-JCP organizers of BEHEIREN kept themselves in the background and lined up a number of prominent Japanese progressive intellectuals and leftist cultured persons to front for BEHEIREN. The choice of ODA Makoto, ex-Fulbrighter and popular young novelist, to be the chief front man - Chairman - was an extremely lucky stroke for BEHEIREN. ODA has taken to this grand-standing, front work like a duck to water. It has given him a chance to give unbridled vent to his own latent anti-American feelings, puffed him up to the extent that he has been dubbed "the emperor" by other BEHEIREN activists, and given him at long last an ideological mission to pursue. YOSHIKAWA has performed magnificently in feeding ODA's ego needs and in infusing and indoctrinating ODA so that his words and actions take on sufficiently virulent anti-American overtones. ODA has served another vital function for BEHEIREN by recruiting a sizeable number of fellow intellectuals to join the ranks of BEHEIREN activists. (Attachment 1 is a listing of a number of those Japanese who have been identified as active BEHEIREN supporters or sympathizers.)

4. Organizational Development: In its 2 1/2 year history, BEHEIREN has not appreciably changed its organizational format, although it has moved its office three times and modified its name even oftener. BEHEIREN is not a "mass organization", because it has had no sizeable popular backing to the present time. Its hard core, secretariat organization is run by YOSHIKAWA and his lieutenants. Its public image, intellectual front is led by ODA, and given body by a score of like-minded intellectual friends of ODA and YOSHIKAWA, who form the loose body of BEHEIREN's activist leadership. Under this BEHEIREN leadership superstructure lies a paltry base of only several hundred BEHEIREN "rank-and-file" supporters, mostly young Japanese students. Organizationally, BEHEIREN has no formal membership system, so its base of supporters is fluid and not precisely measurable. However, the base support for BEHEIREN has definitely been on the upswing during 1967, and made such notable strides during the past summer that JCP Headquarters officials finally felt constrained to note with concern that BEHEIREN was beginning to drain off a growing number of progressive youth who otherwise would have been absorbed into the JCP's own youth movement. BEHEIREN leaders have tried to help this growth along by setting up a youth section, calling it "Young BEHEIREN." BEHEIREN's imaginative actions and publicity-conscious programs have been responsible for its recent growth, and this period of growth seems to be now on

the verge of really picking up speed and momentum. As a result of its role in the case of the four deserting sailors, BEHEIREN has reaped bountiful publicity, has succeeded in touching a delicate Japanese public nerve of sympathy and pacifism, opening a floodgate of support for BEHEIREN from all over Japan. When this case fades from the limelight, it is still most likely that a fair percentage of current wave of popular support for BEHEIREN will solidify into permanent mass backing, giving BEHEIREN, for the first time, a meaningful base to support its future activities.

5. Activities and Accomplishments: BEHEIREN has engaged in a number of propaganda actions, and participated in international anti-Vietnam War activities. It has tried to cooperate with certain front activities in Japan controlled by the JCP, most notably the Japan Committee to Investigate War Crimes in Vietnam activities, which culminated in the Tokyo Court of last August, but has been soundly and rudely rebuffed by the JCP. In spite of this, BEHEIREN has churned along at its own pace, with a continuing series of anti-Vietnam war actions, most of them related in some way to the American pacifist movement. In this regard, BEHEIREN has succeeded in cornering a virtual monopoly on Japanese contacts with the U.S. pacifist movements, and has effectually capitalized on this to promote its own action program. The case of the four deserting sailors, while an apparent lucky windfall for BEHEIREN, only points up the fact that BEHEIREN, through past organizational work and promotional activities, was "johnny-on-the-spot", ready and capable (unique in Japan in this regard) to take the ball and run with it. BEHEIREN ran all the way in this case and scored its most notable success since it was organized. (Attachment 2 is a listing of BEHEIREN's more notable activities since its founding. Attachment 3 is a partial listing of American and other foreign persons known to have been in contact with or cooperated with BEHEIREN.)

B. The Case of the Four Sailor Deserters and BEHEIREN.

1. How It Started: The consensus of all available overt media material, with no recorded dissent, indicates that the four sailors voluntarily left their ship, went AWOL, and ended up wallowing around Tokyo's hippie-land. Precisely what personal grievances prompted the four to embark on this mis-adventure is not yet known. But, up to this point, the four could fairly be categorized as misguided youngsters, gone astray in a foreign land, and due to get slapped back in line with traditional Navy justice when they finally decided to stop the fun and go back to the ship. So far, this made their cases far from unique.

2. How It Became an Incident: But instead of returning to their ship of their own volition or being apprehended by the Shore Patrol, the four made contact with BEHEIREN leaders. Again, press reports indicate that this was just a coincidence, that there was no pre-planning by the four to contact BEHEIREN. There are no available overt nor covert reports that indicate otherwise. But, once the BEHEIREN people made contact, they recognized the potential immediately and moved fast for the kill. (Attachment 4 is a Yomiuri Newspaper clipping, 22 November 1967, that is both a representative and comprehensive account of this phase of the case. Even if this article should contain some minor inaccuracies, the basic line seems factual and has not been challenged elsewhere.)

3. BEHEIREN Takes Over: When the four made contact with BEHEIREN, it suddenly became an entirely different ballgame. BEHEIREN had everything needed to capitalize on this: veteran activist leaders who are experienced enough to recognize the windfall that had come their way; an apparatus that could provide hiding places for the four; long standing liaison contacts with Soviet Embassy officials for use in planning exit from Japan; solid contacts with reliable American pacifists with whom the bona fides of the four sailors could be checked; money and organization to capitalize on the propaganda potential (such as preparing a movie film for the initial BEHEIREN press conference announcing the desertion, prepared more likely than not by BEHEIREN stalwart KUBO Keinosuke, an independent film producer); and English speaking activists capable of sympathizing, encouraging, soothing, or agitating the four young sailors, so that there would be no turning back.

4. The BEHEIREN Apparatus At Work: While many of the small pieces of this puzzle, which would put the whole case in proper detailed chronological order and eliminate speculation on minor points, are still missing, enough is known now, through overt and covert sources, that the picture of BEHEIREN's adept handling of this case shines through clearly. The following elements, all part of the BEHEIREN apparatus, make up the bulk of the picture:

a) Hide-out: When BEHEIREN got hold of the four on about 26 October, they had to be hiden out for the approximate two week period until their exit from Japan could be arranged. This presented BEHEIREN no great logistical problem. A number of the BEHEIREN activist leaders have homes well suited to harboring fugitives. For example, BEHEIREN activist leader FUKASAKU Mitsusada has a villa hidden away in Chigasaki, which was used on the night of 12 September for a meeting of about 20 top BEHEIREN leaders, and which would be highly suitable for hiding the four deserters. Other private dwellings, belonging to BEHEIREN leaders and loyal supporters, are scattered throughout both the Kanto and Kansai areas.

b) BEHEIREN/Soviet Liaison: BEHEIREN Secretary General YOSHIKAWA has maintained periodic contact with Soviet Embassy officials for years. BEHEIREN Chairman ODA has met Soviet Peace Committee officials in Moscow. The exact means of how this liaison was accomplished in this case is precisely known from a covert phone tap on the Soviet Embassy's line. A full transcript is available of two phone calls made on 30 October, first by Brian Victoria to Chief Press Attache Nikolay V. Vasilyevich, and second by YOSHIKAWA to First Secretary Sergey D. Anisimov, urgently requesting a private meeting later that day to discuss "an extremely important, extremely delicate matter", without doubt the case of the four sailors.

c) BEHEIREN/U.S. Pacifist Liaison: BEHEIREN contacted Dartmouth University professor Ernest P. Young, who flew to Japan on 8 November, apparently helped BEHEIREN leaders check out the bona fides of the deserters, and returned to the U.S. on 11 November. (Attachment 5 is the translation of a *Sankei Shimbun* article, dated 21 November, reporting an interview with Young, giving his version of his role in this case.)

5. Escape to Moscow: The four deserters turned up in moscow on 20 November. The press has speculated widely and unanimously that the four left Japan on the Soviet passenger ship Baikal on 11 November. Again, there is no dissenting opinion, overt nor covert. The only mystery concerning this final phase of the Japanese portion of this case concerns the mechanics of how the four boarded the Baikal and who assisted in this maneauver. But with the sailing of the Baikal from Yokohama, BEHEIREN completed its most highly successful and beautifully executed activity in its 2 1/2 year history. Not only did BEHEIREN smear the American Government's image in Japan, not only did BEHEIREN gain a vast amount of priceless publicity that will swell the ranks of its supporters and be invaluable in future activities, but BEHEIREN doubtlessly even made a profit, financially, on this low budget operation - donations are still pouring into BEHEIREN Headquarters from all over Japan to "help and protect U.S. deserters".

Attachment No. 1

Japanese Who Have Been Identified as Active BEHEIREN Supporters or Sympathizers

1. YOSHIKAWA Yuichi (BEHEIREN Secretary General) - former JCP member.
2. ODA Makoto (BEHEIREN Chairman) - popular novelist.
3. KAIKO Ken - Akutagawa prize winning novelist.
4. KUBO Keinosuke - film producer and director.
5. TSURUMI Shunsuke - Doshisha University professor.
6. TSURUMI Kazuko - sister of Shunsuke (their father is the late philosopher, Yusuke).
7. FURUYAMA Yozo - high school teacher.
8. MUTO Ichiyo - ex-JCP (tried to travel to U.S. to represent BEHEIREN at October 21 demonstrations this year, but was denied a visa to enter the U.S.)
9. YAMADA Atsushi - ex-JCP.
10. FUKUDA Yoshiyuki - playwriter.
11. TOMINAGA Ichiro - cartoonist.
12. FUKASAKU Mitsusada - professor.
13. AWAZU Kiyoshi - graphic designer.
14. TAKADO Kaname - Christian leader.
15. YOSHIDA Kiju - film director.
16. UMIHARA Shun - writer.
17. HASHIMOTO Mineo - Buddhist priest.
18. HOTTA Yoshie - novelist.
19. GOTO Hiroyuki - scientist.
20. KUWABARA Takeo - professor at Kyoto University.

SECRET

21. SAKAMOTO Yoshikazu - Assistant professor at Tokyo University.

22. HIDAKA Rokuro - professor at Tokyo University.

23. IIDA Momo - writer.

24. TSURUMI Yoshiyuki - employed at International House in Tokyo.

25. TERAI Minako

26. ANAI Fumihiko

27. NASU Masanao

28. MATSUMOTO Ichiju

29. FUKUTOMI Setsuo

30. KURIHARA Yukio

31. etc: ANDO Jimbei, CHIBA Hido, EGAWA Taku, FUJII Nittatsu, HANIYU Ichiro, HOSHINO Yasusaburo, ICHII Saburo, IKEYAMA Juro, ISHIDA Takeshi, KANAI Yoshiko, KASAI Seiichi, KATAGIRI Yuzuru, KATO Shuichi, KAZAMA Michitaro, MATSUURA Sozo, KIDOKORO Masao, KITAKOJI Satoshi, KOBAYASHI Shoichiro, KOMATSU Sakyo, KOBAYASHI Tomi, KUNO Osamu (Shu), KURODA Hidetoshi, MARUYAMA Masao, MIDORIKAWA Toru, MIZUSAWA Yana, MORITAKI Ichiro, MUCHAKU Seikyo, MURAMATSU Hiro, NISHIO Noboru, NOMURA Koichi, OGOSHI Teruo, OTSUKOTSU Yoshiko, SERIZAWA Tae, SHIRAI Shimpei, SHINMURA Takeshi, SHISHIDO Hiroshi, SUGIURA Mitsuo, SUGIYAMA Tatsumaru, SUZUKI Masahira, TAKEUCHI Yoshitomo, WADA Nagahisa, YAMADA Munemitsu, YAMADA Toshio, YAMAGUCHI Kosaku, YAMANISHI Eiichi, YASUDA Takeshi, YOSHINO Genzaburo, YOSHIWARA Koichiro, OKAMOTO Taro, MATSUMOTO Seicho, EI Rokusuke, IZUMI Taku, AWAYA Noriko, KATO Yoshiro, SHIROYAMA Saburo, TAKAHASHI Taketomo, ODAGIRI Hideo, OKUMA Minoru, SANO Kenji, SUZUKI Michihiko, KUBATA Manya, SHINOHARA Seiei, MARUYAMA Kunio,

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TSURUSHIMA Sotsurei, MURO Kenji, KONAKA Yotaro, SAKAMOTO Yoshikazu, SAITO Masahiko, etc.

COMMENT: Although not recorded here, many of the above persons are ex-JCP members.

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment No. 2

Some BEHEIREN Activities and Accomplishments

1. Regular once-per-month demonstrations at a public park in Tokyo, consisting of anti-American speeches and followed by street marches.

2. An all night TV "teach-in" with BEHEIREN activist leaders, along with special guest, U. S. pacifist Carl Oglesby (Chairman of the Students for a Democratic Society.)

3. A full page advertisement in the New York Times (16 November 1965), followed by another full page ad in the Washington Post (3 April 1967), appealing to Americans to stop the war in Vietnam.

4. A "Meet in Conference of Two Nations for Peace in Vietnam," held in Tokyo in August 1966, and attended by BEHEIREN activists and seven U.S. pacifist leaders (including Dave Dellinger), and observers from France, England, Canada, the USSR, Pakistan, and Mongolia.

5. A mass meeting in Tokyo in October 1966, guest speakers of which were French pacifists, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir.

6. Nationwide tours of Japan for lectures and peace rallies for such anti-Vietnam war pacifists as Professor Howard Zinn and the late A. J. Muste of the United States, Claude Bourdet of France, and Thich Nhat Hanh of South Vietnam.

7. A mass meeting in Tokyo in January 1967, sponsored by BEHEIREN and featuring U.S. folk singer and pacifist Joan Baez.

8. A continuing program of direct distribution of pamphlets to U.S. troops stationed in Japan, and those coming to Japan on warships, and for rest or hospitalization from Vietnam.

9. Participation by two BEHEIREN activist leaders (Kyoto University professor KUWABARA Takeo and International House staffer TSURUMI Yoshikyuki, taking advantage of a trip to the U.S. to attend a non-political Japan-America Congress on Cultural Problems) in anti-Vietnam war speech rallies and demonstrations at Dartmouth University in early May 1967, followed by an unsuccessful attempt to invite Cassius Clay to visit Japan on behalf of BEHEIREN.

10. Continuing efforts to bring to Japan for a nationwide

SECRET

speech tour on behalf of BEHEIREN, Soviet poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko, an effort that has not yet reached fruition but is still pending.

11. Participation in the Stockholm July 1967 "World Conference on Vietnam," by sending two BEHEIREN activist leaders as delegates.

12. Cooperation with the U.S. Quakers, pacifists, and Earle Reynolds in sending the yacht "Phoenix" with medical aid, first to Haiphong, then on a second trip in the Fall of 1967, seeking but failing to find landfall to deliver medical aid to either North or South Vietnam.

13. Attempted, but failed due to inability to obtain U.S. visa, to send a BEHEIREN activist leader (MUTO Ichiyo) to the U.S. to participate in the 21 October 1967 anti-Vietnam War demonstrations.

14. Currently carrying out a fund raising campaign to send an aid ship to North Vietnam. In this, and other activities, BEHEIREN leaders are maintaining ever closer liaison contact with their counterparts abroad, such as the French "Comite' Vietnam National." In an effort to generate public support for this aid ship fund raising campaign, BEHEIREN succeeded in issuing a public appeal, under the endorsing signatures of Tokyo Governor MINOBE Ryokichi and Yokohama Mayor ASUKATA Ichio, as well as the usual intellectuals supporting BEHEIREN.

15. In October 1967, BEHEIREN solicited approval to hold anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, expecting to be denied and then intending to make this denial a court test case. Instead, BEHEIREN was given this permission, and conducted two orderly and well-publicized demonstrations in front of the American Embassy, garnering a larger public turn out of participants than in any previous BEHEIREN-sponsored demonstration.

16. Assisted and abetted the defection to the USSR of four American sailors from the U.S. Navy carrier Intrepid. Following this success, BEHEIREN's most effective activity to date, BEHEIREN leaders are organizing a permanent "underground railway" of Japanese intellectuals who will volunteer their homes as possible "way stops" for hiding future U.S. military deserters that BEHEIREN now hopes to induce.

Comment: For other details, see Tokyo intelligence reporting:
FJT-11547, 31 May 1966
FJT-12046, 14 October 1966
FJT-12690, 10 May 1967
FJT-12851, 5 July 1967
FJT-13081, 8 September 1967
FJT-13154, 27 September 1967
FJT-13303, 22 November 1967
Also, CSS-6790, 11 July 1967

ATTACHMENT 3

Partial Listing of American and Other Foreign Persons Known to Have Been in Contact with or Cooperated with BEHEIREN

A. Americans.

1. Staughton Lynd (ex-Yale professor)
2. Norman Mailer (novelist)
3. Dave Dellinger (Editor of Liberation)
4. Howard Zinn (Boston U. professor)
5. Donald Keyes (National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy)
6. David McReynolds (Chairman, War Resisters' League)
7. A. J. Muste (now deceased)
8. Karl Meyer
9. William Davidson
10. Bradford Lyttle
11. Charlotte Thurber
12. (Miss) Quentin Bassett (Students for a Democratic Society)
13. Murray Levin (Boston U. professor)
14. Robert Ockene (Veterans and Reservists to End the War in Vietnam)
15. Carl Oglesby (Chairman, Students for a Democratic Society)
16. Barbara Deming (Associate editor of Liberation)
17. Joan Baez (folk singer)

18. Ira Morris (Paris expatriate)

19. Otto Naisan (phonetic, New York City peace activist)

20. Barbara and Earle Reynolds (divorced but separately active long-time residents in Japan)

21. William R. Christensen (an American pacifist drifter, who gave BEHEIREN its first experience in the summer of 1966 in exploiting for propaganda in Japan, and then in arranging the onward journey of an American who wanted to defect to the USSR)

22. Brian Victoria (head-shaved pacifist and "converted" Buddhist priest, known to be in regular contact with the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo)

23. Mr. Willowby (fnu, phonetic, "chief of the Quaker Peace Action movement in the U.S")

24. An unidentified American of Japanese descent, from Hawaii, who is currently a student at Waseda University.

25. Kosaku Yamaguchi (reportedly born in U.S., present citizenship status unclear) (formerly was a professor at Momoyama University in Osaka, but has been teaching at the University of California in Berkeley for some time)

B. Other Foreigners.

1. Mikhail Kotov, USSR (Soviet Peace Committee)

2. Claude Bourdet, France (French Committee to Support the Vietnamese People)

3. Peggy Duff, Great Britain (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament)

4. James Endicott, Canada (World Peace Council)

5. Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Pakistan

6. Gabita Muslepov, USSR

7. Mrs. Erdenebat Ojon, Mongolia

8. Konstantin Shugnov, USSR

9. Francis Marcel Kahn, France (Comite' Vietnam National)

10. Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, France

11. Thich Nhat Hanh, South Vietnam

COMMENT: This is not, by any means, a complete listing, nor does it necessarily list BEHEIREN's most important activist contacts abroad. But this list is representative in showing the breadth of BEHEIREN liaison abroad, particularly with the American "new left".

14-00000

ATTACHMENT 4

THE YOMIURI 22 Nov 67 Wednesda

4 US Deserters Possibly Left Japan Aboard Baikal

YUICHI YOSHIKAWA, secretary-general of the Japan Peace-For-Vietnam Committee (Beheiren), tells a press conference Tuesday that the four deserters of the US warship Intrepid hoped to stay in Japan but the Beheiren could not help them to do so.

The four deserters from the US aircraft carrier Intrepid who made a dramatic television appearance Monday in Moscow are believed to have left Japan irregularly by the Soviet liner Baikal which left Yokohama on November 11 for the Far East Soviet port of Nakhodka.

Sources in the Metropolitan Police Department said Tuesday that the four Americans could have boarded the ship by a special gangway for Soviet Government officials.

Japanese watchmen were on guard at another gangway for ordinary passengers when 222 listed passengers, including eight Americans, boarded the liner before it departed Yokohama at 11.50 am, November 11.

The watchmen told police that they did not see any person who was not on the passenger list board the ship through the ordinary gangway.

It was learned that 17 officials of the Soviet Embassy and trade mission in Tokyo and scores of visitors boarded the Baikal through the special gangway.

The police sources said that it was "quite possible" that the Soviet authorities in Tokyo arranged the deserters' exit.

Beheiren Pledge

Yuichi Yoshikawa, secretary-general of the Japan Peace-For-Vietnam Committee (Beheiren), told a press conference Tuesday that the committee could not disclose how the four Americans left because it had promised not to do so.

He neither affirmed nor denied the report that the Americans left Japan by the Baikal on November 11.

It was the Beheiren which announced for the first time the desertion of the four crew members of the Intrepid to protest against the Vietnam war, at a press conference held November 13 in Tokyo.

Yoshikawa said that the deserters first wanted to live peacefully in Japan and asked the Beheiren to find them jobs in which they could utilize their English proficiency.

The Beheiren told them that they could not live in Japan without being found by the Japanese police or US military authorities sooner or later, Yoshikawa said.

Lived Like Hippies

Hiromi Naito, 20, a painter of Tokyo, told The Yomiuri Shimbun that he and his friend, Sansei Yamao, a hippie poet and member of the Beheiren, acted as go-betweens for the deserters and the Beheiren.

Naito said he met two of the four deserters—Airman Dick D. Bailey, 19, and Airman Mike A. Lindner, 19—at a hippie hangout in Shinjuku around October 20.

He said both Americans wore leather jackets and other informal clothing which they said they borrowed from their Japanese hippie friends hanging around the Shinjuku area.

Bailey and Lindner and the other two—Airman John M. Barilla, 20, and Airman Apprentice Craig W. Anderson, 20—went around in pairs, Naito said.

Naito said he let Bailey and Lindner stay overnight at his house in Hayamiyacho, Nerima-ku, from October 24 to 25.

Not Worried

When he first met the deserters, they were practically penniless but appeared quite unconcerned, Naito said.

He said the deserters apparently enjoyed hippie life, living on cheap Japanese food and drink such as udon (noodles) and shochu.

He said the four Americans wanted to live in Japan, and if possible in Tokyo.

Naito and his friend Yamao decided to ask the help of the Beheiren and delivered the four men to the Beheiren around November 26.

Naito said he believed that all the four Americans were not communists and that they had no interest in communist ideology.

He said the four must have decided to go to some neutral country via the Soviet Union after they learned that they could not live in Japan.

A spokesman for the Justice Ministry said Tuesday that there was nothing legally wrong in the four Americans leaving Japan because the administrative agreement in the Japan-US Security Treaty guarantees US military personnel the right to come, to stay in or leave Japan.

He said he understood that the four Americans were technically still enlisted US military personnel.

Furthermore, if their exit took place on November 11, it was before the US authorities made an official request to the Japanese police to search for them, he added.

He also said there were no Japanese laws allowing charges to be preferred against the Beheiren officials and other Japanese people who "protected" the Americans in Japan and helped their departure to the Soviet Union.

SANKEI (Full) November 21, 1967

Prof. YOUNG Says Four American Deserter Seamen Not in Japan Any More

Went to Tokyo and Tried to Dissuade Them;
Probably Escaped from Japan on the 12th or the 13th

(New York, November 20, Correspondent Tadashi ONODERA) Professor Ernest P. YOUNG of Dartmouth College in the U.S., consented to an interview with this reporter on the question of the four American seamen who deserted from the U.S. aircraft carrier Intrepid. At the interview held on the 19th, Professor YOUNG clarified that the Peace for Vietnam Association (Beheiren, with Makoto ODA acting as its representative) contacted an anti-war organization in the U.S., and at this, Professor YOUNG hurriedly visited Tokyo, and meeting the four seamen in a room in an apartment house in Tokyo on the 9th and 10th, tried to persuade them to return. In regard to the present whereabouts of these four seamen, he made the noteworthy statement that "those four were still in Japan, up until the night of the 11th, when I left Japan, but they are probably no longer in Japan now."

Families Perplexed

The questions and answers exchanged with Professor YOUNG are as follows:

-- Why did you go to Japan?

LL

Professor: Beheiren contacted David DERKINGER, a pacifist activist in the U.S., asking him to "send someone to Japan to hear the stories of the four seamen and announce them in the U.S." I have been in Japan twice, and I also once served as special assistant to Ambassador REISCHAUER. During that time, I became friends with Beheiren representative ODA and other intellectuals in Japan. It was for these reasons that I was given this assignment. I personally have never participated actively in the anti-Vietnam war movement so far.

-- When did you arrive in Japan, and where did you meet the four seamen?

Professor: I arrived in Haneda on November 8, and met the four seamen on the 9th and the 10th. The place of interview was in an apartment house in Tokyo, but I cannot say at this time where that apartment house was and who owned it. However, on both days, I talked fully with these four seamen, for more than three hours on each occasion (according to an investigation made by the public security authorities, Professor YOUNG arrived in Japan toward the evening of the 8th, and stayed at Hotel Tanakanwa in Shiba, Minato-ku, until the morning of the 11th).

-- What were the motives for these four seamen's desertion?

Professor: The desertion was completely the decision of these four persons. It seems that the four seamen decided not to return to the ship, when the Intrepid entered Yokosuka Port on October 17, and they were permitted to go ashore for rest for one week. My impression on meeting these four seamen was that they were definitely not deserting for the purpose of self-advertisement or that they were giving false reasons. I am convinced that they deserted really out of doubt about the Vietnam war.

-- What were the movements of the four after they deserted?

Professor: On the night of the 23rd, two days before the Intrepid was due to sail, the four went to Shinjuku, and told the people whom they met at a bar they happened to visit, that "we are fed up with war." The Japanese who heard them sympathized with them, and at one time, the four lived with some hippies (according to this paper's investigations, they include Mr. K., a student of Tokyo University's Liberal Arts Department, and vanguard artist A., who gather at Fugetsudo in Shinjuku.) Finally, they were taken to Beheiren by a student who spoke English (according to this paper's investigation, this was Mr. S., a Waseda University student). After that, they were hidden by Beheiren. I cannot say where they were hidden.

-- Were the four firmly determined to desert?

Professor: My purpose in visiting Japan was to dissuade the four. I explained to them what the results of their desertion would be. I even told them that they would never again be permitted to stand on American soil, their fatherland. At the time I met them, it was still at a stage where they would only receive light punishment, if they reported back immediately, saying that they "had missed their ship." However, their determination was firm, and my persuasion had no effects.

-- The four seamen's desertion was announced in the form of a press interview given by Beheiren. Were there no facts of their having been forced to desert, during that period?

Professor: I ascertained that point, too. However, they firmly denied any fact of their having been forced, saying that they had voluntarily consulted Beheiren as to whether they should publicly announce their intention to desert, and if so, in what form this should be made.

-- Where are the four seamen now, and where are they planning to go?

Professor: I am certain that the four of them were still in Japan, up until the 11th, the day I left for home. However, they already knew fully well that it was not possible for them to obtain asylum in Japan. They even said that "we will probably have to go to some third nation, which is neutral." (The public security authorities judge that the four seamen left Japan immediately after Mr. YOUNG's persuasion, and consider that they probably were smuggled out of Japan after the 10th, and before the evening of the 13th, when Beheiren announced their desertion at a press conference. However, Mr. YOUNG says that the four seamen were in Japan up until the night of the 11th. Therefore, the possibility is strong that they were smuggled out of Japan by ship, between the night of the 11th and the evening of the 13th.)

-- The films showing the four seamen were shown publicly in the U.S., too. What were the reactions in the U.S.?

Professor: When the films were publicly shown, there was big excitement, with rows and rows of television and press cameramen. I thought I would be exposed to persistent questioning by the FBI and the CIA, after I returned home, but so far, I have only been questioned once by the Navy's Intelligence Section, about the circumstances. It seems that American authorities concerned do not want to make too big a fuss over the matter.

-- What do the parents think of this action taken by their sons?

Professor: A certain television station asked the mother of one of the four men about her son's life. This mother was completely perplexed, saying: "My son is a most average American youth. His school records were quite ordinary, and he liked sports, just like any other student. I cannot understand why he acted in such a way."

KH

R. WAGNER
E/TF
1872
22 SEPT 70

TOTAL COPIES: 29

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 15 PER FDG # 15-70

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

EUR 15 | INFO | FILE, VR, FI, CI, CI/OPS 3, R/AN, SEC/R4, CI/SO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

IMMEDIATE [illegible] CITE DIRECTOR 470597

[redacted] VIENNA BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LONDON HELSINKI PARIS BONN BERL
FRANKFURT HAMBURG MUNICH ROME MILAN LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE OSLO LISBO
MADRID STOCKHOLM BERN GENEVA ZURICH

TOELK

1. FOLLOWING NAMES ON LNBEET WATCH LIST. PLS REPORT ANY INFORMATIC
RE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING TRAVEL, OF THE INDIVIDUALS LISTED BELOW, WH
IN YOUR JUDGMENT MAY EFFECT THE SECURITY OF THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS
EUROPEAN TRIP. THIS LIST MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON FOR TRACES AND BO
WATCH LISTING. PLS ATTEMPT TO CONFIRM THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE INDIVI
IF THEY ARE LISTED AS LAST BEING IN YOUR AREA. FORWARD ALL INFORMAT
BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE CABLE TO HQS AND TO ROME, MADRID AND LONDON.

A. ALBEROLA-SURINACH, OCTAVIO; WHITE MALE, BORN 3/4/28 AT
ALAYO, SPAIN. WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN (REPORTED 3/18/70) ALIASES: ELLAR
JUAN AND SURINACH-ALBEROLA, OCTAVIO. CITIZEN OF SPAIN.

B. ALI-KHAN, TARIQ; ASIAN MALE, BORN 10/21/42 AT LAHORE W.
PAKISTAN. LAST KNOWN LOCATION (REPORTED 7/28/69) LONDON, ENGLAND
ALIAS: KHAN-ALI, TARIQ. CIT: PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN PP AC 063065.

C. ANTIMUCCI, ITALO DEMENIC; WHITE MALE, 5'3" 135 LBS BROWN
HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 11/30/26 AT TIRANO, ITALY. LAST KNOWN LOCATI
(REPORTED 4/21/69) PIAN DORTA, ITALY. CITIZEN OF ITALY.

8605

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES

S-E-C-R-ET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE, VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 070597

D. BLACK, ANTHONY JOSEPH; WHITE MALE, 5'10", BLACK HAIR, BROWN

DUBLIN

ES, BORN 11/1/27 [redacted], IRELAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION IRELAND (REPORTE

8/64. ALIAS: BLACK, PATTY. CIT OF AUSTRALIA; AUSTRALIAN PP E382929.

E. CITRYNELL, HAROLD, WHITE MALE, 6'0" 150 LBS, BLACK HAIR

OWN EYES, BORN 3/10/23 AT NEW YORK, N.Y., LAST KNOWN LOCATION STOCKHOLM,

EDEN (REPORTED 1/24/70). U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP D757574.

F. COHN-BENDIT, DANIEL; WHITE MALE, BLUE EYES, RED HAIR, BORN

4/45 AT MONTAUBAN, FRANCE, LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRANKFURT, GERMANY

EPORTED 1/24/70). ALIASES: BENDIT-COHN, DANNY; RADATZ, DANIEL; COHN-

NDIT, DANNY; KURON-MODZELEWSKI, DANIEL. CITIZEN OF GERMANY.

G. CONN, RONALD C.; WHITE MALE, BLUE EYES, BROWN HAIR, BORN

/1/35 AT CINCINNATI, OHIO. LAST KNOWN LOCATION, RATTS PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC

OCKHOLM, SWEDEN (REPORTED 2/17/70). ALIASES: COHEN, DONALD R.; CONN,

CHRIST CLIFFORD. U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP J1322044.

H. CONWAY, JOHN EARL; WHITE MALE, BORN 12/13/24 AT TANTA, EGYPT

WN EYES, BLACK HAIR, 5'5" 165 LBS. LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRIEDRICHSHEFEN,

GERMANY (REPORTED 11/28/69). ALIASES: HARIRY, JACOB; HARIRY, JOHN H.;

HARIRY, YACOUB. NO CITIZENSHIP.

I. CORCORAN, THOMAS JOSEPH; WHITE MALE, 5'10" 123 LBS BROWN

IR, HAZEL EYES, BORN 4/23/46 AT BROOKLYN, N.Y. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LUND,

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

AUTHENTICATING

14-00000

2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE. VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

CRET

CITE DIRECTOR C70597

DEN (REPORTED 2/27/69). U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP G944949.

J. DAVIDSON, CRAIG; MALE, LAST KNOWN LOCATION STUTTGART, MANY (REPORTED 6/1/70) (28 HEINRICH-BAUMANN STRASSE, STUTTGART, MANY). U.S. CITIZEN.

K. DAVIS, PAUL L.; WHITE MALE, 5'10", 155 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BLUE S, BORN 10/29/26 AT NEW YORK, N.Y. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON W. LAND (REPORTED 2/24/69). ALIASES: SOLOMON, SAUL; KING, MILES A.; NBER, CLIFF. CITIZEN OF U.S. LIVING IN EUROPE.

L. DAVOREN, EDWARD MICHAEL; WHITE MALE, 5'10", BROWN HAIR, BLUE S, BORN 8/4/40 AT IRELAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON ENGLAND PORTED 6/5/69). ALIAS: DEVOREN, EDWARD MICHAEL. CITIZENSHIP UNKNOWN.

M. DUTSCHKE, RUDOLPH ALFRED WILLIE; WHITE MALE, 5'7", 140 LBS, K HAIR, BROWN EYES, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON NW ENGLAND (REPORTED 0/69). ALIAS: DUTSCHKE, RUDI. CIT OF GERMANY. W. GERMAN ~~XXXXXXXX~~ 1582611.

N. FALLET, VERNON ROGER DONALD; WHITE MALE, 5'9", 165 LBS, N HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 3/29/34 AT DOMBRESSON, SWITZERLAND. LAST N LOCATION NEUCHATEL, SWITZERLAND (REPORTED 11/7/68). SWISS CITIZEN.

O. GETZ, KARL IGOR; WHITE MALE, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 46 AT PARIS, FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION MUNICH GERMANY (REPORTED

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and AUTHENTICATING

SECRET

2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

AT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 070597

11/21/67). ALIAS: GOETZ, KARL. U.S. CITIZEN.

P. GODDARD, MICHAEL ANTHONY VICTOR; WHITE MALE, 5'7", BROWN HAIR, HAZEL EYES, BORN 11/29/29 AT HASTINGS SUSSEX ENGLAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION PORT TALBOT, WALES GB (REPORTED 4/4/68). ALIAS: GODDARD, MA. CITIZEN OF ENGLAND.

Q. GONZALEZ-FLECHA, ROSARIO; WHITE FEMALE, BORN 10/28/36 AT SPAIN, LAST KNOWN LOCATION BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 5/14/68).

R. GRANSAC-SADORI, ARIANE HENRIETTE; WHITE FEMALE, BORN 1/6/42 AT TOULOUSE, FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE, (REPORTED 5/14/68). CITIZEN OF FRANCE.

S. GVOJICH, MILE; WHITE MALE, 5'7", 160 LBS, BORN 5/14/28 AT BRNJAVAC, YUGOSLAVIA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION SUBOTICA, YUGOSLAVIA PRISON (REPORTED 2/19/69). CITIZEN OF YUGOSLAVIA.

T. HERRANZ-FERNANDEZ, MARIO; WHITE MALE, BORN 12/28/36 AT SPAIN CITIZEN OF SPAIN. LAST KNOWN LOCATION BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 5/14/68). /

U. HILTUNEN, VILO ALARIK; WHITE MALE, 5'10", BORN 2/5/09, AT HELSINKI, FINLAND, LAST KNOWN LOCATION HELSINKI, FINLAND (REPORTED 4/22/67). CITIZEN OF FINLAND.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____________

INFO FILE, VR,

(elite) (pica)

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

ECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 070597

CITIZEN OF FRANCE; FRENCH PP 231-65.

V. HUMMER, GISELE MARTHE;/WHITE FEMALE, 5'0" 90 LBS, BORN 7/13, AT TOURS, FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION REPORTED 4/15/69, KNOWN. ALIASES: RICHE, GISELE MARTHE; DEHASBOURG, ANNE-MARIE.

W. JONSSON, HORDUR; WHITE MALE, 5'8" 187 LBS, BLACK HAIR, GRAY ES, BORN 3/2/37 AT AKRANES, ICELAND; LAST KNOWN LOCATION AKRANES, ELAND (REPORTED 12/15/66). CITIZEN OF ICELAND.

X. JULLIEN, JEAN; WHITE MALE, BORN 2/18/35 AT DELLE, FRANCE, ST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE (REPORTED 1/22/70. ALIAS: LIEN, JEAN. CITIZEN OF FRANCE.

Y. KING, THELMA ESTELLA; LATIN FEMALE, 5'9" 165 LBS, BORN 31/21 AT PANAMA CITY, PANAMA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE EPORTED 8/3/70). ALIAS: XNLXKXX HARRISON, THELMA ESTELLA KING. TIZEN OF PANAMA.

Z. KUHN, ROBERT; WHITE MALE, 6'4", 180 LBS, BROWN HAIR AND ES, BORN 7/4/18 AT SIEGEN W. GERMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION MUNICH, RMANY (REPORTED 2/27/69). CIT OF GERMANY. GERMAN PP B7443204.

AA. LOCK, WERNER E.; WHITE MALE, BORN 12/3/34 AT BERLIN RMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION PFLUGERSTRASSE 3, AFG 1, WEST BERLIN,

14-00000

3		7	
4		8	

DISSEMINATION PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 070597

GERMANY (REPORTED 4/8/69). ALIAS: BOECK, WERNER. CIT OF GERMANY.

BB. LUNDGREN, ASA MONICA; WHITE FEMALE, BORN 11/25/30 AT SWEDEN, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LUDVIGBERGATAN 39, STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN (REPORTED 5/11/66). CITIZEN OF SWEDEN.

CC. LUNDGREN, TORD ALVAR, WHITE MALE, BORN 7/10/34 AT SWEDEN, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LUDVIGSBERGSATAN 39, STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN (REPORTED 1/27/67). CITIZEN OF SWEDEN.

DD. MAHLER, HORST; WHITE MALE, BORN 1/23/36 AT HAYNAU SILESIA, B BROWN HAIR AND EYES. LAST KNOWN LOCATION BERLIN, GERMANY (REPORTED 6/10/69). CITIZEN OF GERMANY.

EE. MANCHANDA, ABHIMANYA; WHITE MALE, 5'7", BORN 9/4/19, AT INDIA. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON ENGLAND (REPORTED 2/18/69). ALIAS: MANCHANDA, MANU. CITIZEN OF BRITAIN OF INDIAN DESCENT.

FF. MARTIN, EDDIE LEE; WHITE MALE, 6'1", 175 LBS, BLOND HAIR, HAZEL EYES, LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRANKFURT, GERMANY (REPORTED 6/11/70). U.S. CITIZEN.

5
4
3
2
1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

SECRET

3		7	
4		8	

...RIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

______ PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 870597

GG. MIHAJI, JOSEPH; WHITE MALE, 5'5" 140 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, AT CEGLED, HUNGARY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON, ENGLAND (REPORTED 10/8/69). CITIZEN OF ENGLAND.

HH. PFISTER, RUDOLPH JOHN; WHITE MALE, 5'10", 200 LBS, BROWN HAIR AND EYES, BORN 7/28/27 AT SEATTLE WASHINGTON, LAST KNOWN LOCATION BERLIN, GERMANY (REPORTED 7/29/68). ALIASES: PFISTER, RALPH; SOMERS, WALTER J; SOMERS, ROBERT WALTER; COUNTS, LYLE D. & COUNTS, KYLE. SWISS CITIZEN. U.S. PP 286011, SWISS PP 1197934.

II. RAINBOLT, CLYDE DUANE; WHITE MALE, 5'9" 142 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 10/19/42 AT LAFAYETTE, INDIANA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON ENGLAND (REPORTED 8/22/69). U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP / J1306124.

JJ. ~~RIVERSXBARBARAX~~ RIVERS, BARBARA JOYCE; FEMALE, LAST KNOWN LOCATION 20 TOWER RD. STRAWBERRY HILL, TWICKENHAM MIDDLESEX, ENGLAND (REPORTED 3/26/70). ALIAS: HABEOUS, CORPUS. CITIZENSHIP UNKNOWN.

KK. ROMBOUTS, RAYMOND PIERRE LEON; WHITE MALE, 6'0", BROWN HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 1/31/29 AT ANDER LECHT BRUSSELS, LAST KNOWN LOCATION BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 2/26/69). CIT OF BELGIUM. BELGIUM PP 491147.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIAT DISSEMINATION ______ ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE. VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET Page 5 CITE DIRECTOR 050597

LL. SALVATORE, MARCEL ALBERT; WHITE MALE, 5'5" 140 LBS, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 5/23/29 AT AVIGNON VAUCLUSE FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRANCE (REPORTED 2/20/70) CITIZEN OF FRANCE. FRENCH PP 211.

MM. SCHWARTZ, MOLLY THIA; WHITE FEMALE, 5'2" HAZEL EYES, BORN 2/3/54 AT NEWARK, N.J. LAST KNOWN LOCATION EUROPE (REPORTED 7/24/70). U.S. CITIZEN.

NN. SIMPSON, ALFRED WINSTON; NEGRO MALE, 5'11" 150 LBS, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 1/23/30 AT NEW YORK, N.Y. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON W. ENGLAND (REPORTED 2/14/69). LNGOLD REPORTS SUBJECT LAST HIS U.S. CITIZENSHIP. SUBJECT CARRIES A BRITISH PP AND CLAIMS BRITISH CITIZENSHIP.

OO. SLOVACEK, LAWRENCE EVERETT; WHITE MALE, 5'10" 245 LBS, BROWN EYES, BORN 4/3/31 AT PONCA CITY, OKLAHOMA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE (REPORTED 5/17/70). ALIAS: EISLOVACK, LAWRENCE E. U.S. CITIZEN.

PP. SUMNER, FREDERICO O. BURNLEY; WHITE MALE, 5'10" BROWN HAIR AND EYES, BORN 2/25/24 AT BOSTON, MASS. LAST KNOWN LOCATION REPORTED 2/24/69 UNKNOWN. U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP 2549709.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and

AUTHENTICATING

SEEN BY

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE. VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET PAGE

CITE DIRECTOR 070597

QQ. TOBES, NORBERT JACQUES; WHITE MALE, 5'4" 180 LBS, BALD BROWN EYES, BORN 2/7/16 AT LUXEMBOURG. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LUXEMBOURG (REPORTED 6/9/66). LUXEMBOURG CITIZEN AND PP 11521.

RR. TOMIATTI, WOLFGANG; WHITE MALE, 5'8" BLOND HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 3/11/46 AT GERMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION - UNKNOWN 2/27/69. CITIZEN OF GERMANY.

TONE,
SS. [illegible], THOMAS JACK; WHITE MALE, 6'0" 200 LBS, BLOND HAIR BROWN EYES, BORN AT CLEVELAND OHIO, 10/5/17, LAST KNOWN LOCATION BAD WURZACH BAVARIA, GERMANY (REPORTED 2/27/69). ALIAS: BAKARICH, THOMAS JACK. STATELESS; GERMAN PP 0046223, RENOUNCED U.S. CITIZENSHI IN 1964; U.S. PASSPORT D 672328.

TT. VANPREUSS, RITA; WHITE FEMALE, 5'8" 125 LBS, BLOND HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 10/15/24 AT HERTE GERMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION - UNKNOWN (REPORTED 7/24/70) ALIAS: KLEIN, RITA. GERMAN CITIZEN; GERMAN PP B0197011.

UU. VATER, JOHN JOSEPH (III); MALE, BORN 7/2/48 AT ENID, OKLA. LAST KNOWN LOCATION U.S. ARMY, STUTTGART, GERMANY (REPORTED 6/1/70). U.S. CITIZEN.

VV. WALTER, WOLFGANG; WHITE MALE, BLOND HAIR, BROWN EYES, 5'8" BORN 8/27/23 AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA. LAST KNOWN LOCATION-UNKNOWN (REPORTED 2/27/69). GERMAN CITIZEN.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ________ # ________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 070597

WW. WILCZYNSKI, ZBIGMEN MAREK; WHITE MALE, BROWN HAIR AND EYES, 5'10" 160 LBS, BORN 1/9/41 AT WARSAW, POLAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 7/10/70). ALIAS: WILCZYNSKI, ZBIGNIEW. CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL REFUGEE FROM POLAND HAVING ENTERED U.S. AT NEW YORK, N.Y. 09/13/68; LNYUMA STATES HE IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN.

XX. WOLLNICK, KARI (MRS); WHITE FEMALE, BROWN HAIR, 5'6" BORN 7/25/36 AT NORWAY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION OSLO, NORWAY (REPORTED 1/6/69). CITIZEN OF NORWAY.

YY. WOLLNICK, PETER; WHITE MALE, 6'4" BLACK HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 4/21/27 AT NORWAY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION OSLO, NORWAY (REPORTED 1/6/69). CITIZEN OF NORWAY.

2. NO FILE.

END OF MESSAGE

E/AS ________ E/BC ________
E/F ________ E/G ________
E/IB ________ E/I ________
E/BNL ________ E/SC ________

CI/OPS ________

E/TF ________

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

Ramon Joseph ALVAREZ Durant

Recruited: March 1955 as member Station unilateral surveillance team.
OA - 28 Feb 1955.

1 Oct 55: Converted to Contract status w/annual salary $3600.

Late:1956: P/A in charge of surveillance team & also was in charge of photo surveillance of the Soviet Mission, including processing the film. LIEMPTY was crypt for the ~~xxx~~ support team targetted against the Soviet Embassy. Under LIEMPTY, the 3 basehouse were encrypted:

LIMITED - basehouse across street from Soviet Embassy.
LILYRIC - basehouse across the street from Soviet Embassy.
LICALLA - basehouse ~~xx~~ from which pictures taken from garden area of Soviet Embassy.

See next page

Note: photo of man alleged to be OSWALD was taken from the LIMITED basehouse.

12 Dec 58: ALVAREZ married LIEMPTY-19 (Hester ROOS, who assisted him during the next 10 years as a part-time support asset ~~in~~ as P/A for the LIEMPTY activity, surveillance & photo coverage of the Soviet target (1958-1968.

In Oct 1962: In order provide maximum compartmentation between the various basehouses, Oliver G. SCANTLING was inserted as the cutout to the LIMITED basehouse and its basehouse keepers (LIEMPTY-6 & 8), replacing ALVAREZ. ALVAREZ continued as cutout for the LIENTRAP (roving van), LICALLA and LILYRIC. This gave ALVAREZ more time to process raw photo take.

This continued from October 1962 until 1 Sept 1964 when ALVAREZ assumed cutout responsibility for LIMITED basehouse - again.

In 1969: ALVAREZ separated from LIEMPTY-19 and a ~~xxxxxxx~~ messy divorce suit followed. In Dec 1969, he was put on half pay & had his ops duties suspended due his full-time involvement in legal matters re the divorce. On 26 June 7 he & LI-19 signed quit claims & secrecy agreements. ALVAREZ paid $10,000 as termination bonus
Last Station contact with ALVAREZ was ~~in April 1972~~ May 71 when ALVAREZ received the last of his termination bonuses.

In 1963 when OSWALD allegedly ~~walked into~~ visited the Soviet Embassy, SCANTLING was ~~the~~ the P/A for the LIMITED basehouse and LIEMPTY-6 (Jorge Barcello VILLAGRAn Alvarez) was the photo tech who took the pictures.

05941

SECRET

SECRET

LIEMPTY-6 was recruited in June 1954 as member of physical surveillance team. In Dec. 1955, he and his wife occupied the LIMITED basehouse. He took pictures for 13 years & was terminated 31 May 1968, signed quit claim & secrecy agreement which was witnessed by ~~SER~~ ALVAREZ.

ALVAREZ ~~was~~ presumably was the individual who developed the photos which LIEMPTY-6 took, as well as the photo tech coverage of the other 2 basehouses.

SCANTLING's true name is Juan N. FRAIS-RAMIRRZ. (Contract agent)

Soviet Embassy Coverage:

Project LIEMPTY concerned primarily with photo coverage of the Soviet installation. Active from mid-1955 through 30 June 1972. at termination in 1972 It supported 2 of the original 3 basehouses which were:

LIMITED had been terminated.

LICALLA (activated in 1957 to provide photo coverage the rear (garden, parking lot area) of the Sov. Embassy.

LILYRIC (activated 1956 to provide photo coverage of the front entrance of the Soviet Emb. Terminat 30 June 1972.

LIMITED (activiated in 1955 to provide photo coverage of the front entrance of the Sov. Emb. Terminate 31 May 1968.

SECRET

104-10065-10050 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

/44/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/EA-8 INFO: FILE, VR, C/OG/DMS, C/PCS, C/PCS/CAC, ODPD-D,
~~SA/DO/O,~~ (14/P)

---

78 0776768 PAGE 001
TOT: 311326Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 231428

SECRET
STAFF 311326Z DIRECTOR 231428
TO: PRIORITY HONG KONG.

WNINTEL RYBAT

REFS: A. HONG KONG 59696 0768840
B. DIRECTOR 230113

BELIEVE STATION IN REF A IS CONFUSED ABOUT PASSAGE OF REF B TO FBIS. REF B IS FOR STATION AND NOT FOR PASSAGE TO FBIS. HOPE THIS CLARIFIES REF A QUERY. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: EA/HK (W.HAGER/KQ, 1968); COORD: PCS/CAC (GARRISON, TELECOORD); SA/DO/O (GREGG); REL: ACEA/HK (HAGER).

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

05944

03/25/ SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

PRECEDENCE 23 STAFF

ACTION: C/EA-8 (933) INFO: FILE, VR, AGC/DDO, C/CA-3, C/CCS, C/CI-4, C/CMS, C/EPS/COMP, C/EPS/EG-2, C/OED/NOC-2, C/OG/DMS, C/PCS, C/PCS/LSN, C/PM, C/SIA/FL, D/OLC, ODPD-D, OGC-2, SA/DO/O, (34/W)

78 0768840 PAGE 001 IN 0768840
TOR: 292350Z MAY 78 HONG 59696

S E C R E T 270553Z MAY 78 STAFF

CITE HONG KONG 59696

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 230113 - att'd

REF RECEIVED HONG KONG FOR PASSAGE TO FBIS RELATES TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA) INTEREST IN NONOFFICIAL COVER OFFICERS AND AGENT ASSETS. SUBJECT DOES NOT APPEAR TO CONCERN FBIS FIELD UNITS. PLS CLARIFY. E2, IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

#05951

104-10065-10075 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

02/37/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/PCS INFO: FILE, VR, D/DCI, DDO-5, CSRF, AGC/DDO, C/AF-9, C/CA-3, C/CA/SOG-3, C/CCS, C/CI-4, C/CMS, C/CMS/MS, C/CMS/PEB, C/DCD-3, C/DEF/AA, C/EA-8, C/EPS/COMP, C/EPS/EG-2, C/EUR-6, C/FR-4, C/IID, C/IMS, C/INT/ST, C/LA-8, C/LSN/MIL, C/NE-6, C/OG/DMS, C/PCS/CAC, C/PCS/DEF, C/PCS/INT, C/PCS/ITC-4, C/PCS/LSN, C/PCS/NAR-2, C/PCS/TC, C/PM, C/SE-5, C/SIA, C/SIA/EE, C/SIA/FL, C/SIA/IA, C/SIA/IC, D/OLC, DDO/DO, ODPD-D, OGC-2, ~~SA/DO/O~~, (105/P)

---

78 0763280 PAGE 001
TOT: 270110Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 230113

S E C R E T
STAFF 270057Z DIRECTOR 230113
TO: PRIORITY WWSB, LUXEMBOURG.

BOOK CABLE

File 8 HSCA

WNINTEL RYBAT

1. THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), CHAIRED BY REPRESENTATIVE LOUIS STOKES, HAS BEEN INTERVIEWING A NUMBER OF RETIREES AND EX-EMPLOYEES AND HAS BEEN GOING THROUGH MATERIAL FURNISHED TO THEM BY THE AGENCY. THROUGH THIS PROCESS COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBERS HAVE OBTAINED A NUMBER OF NAMES OF NONOFFICIAL COVER OFFICERS AND AGENT CRYPTONYMS. IT IS NOW THE INTENTION OF THE COMMITTEE TO SEND STAFF MEMBERS TO A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES TO INTERVIEW INDIVIDUALS IN THE FIELD. WE ARE, OF COURSE, MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROTECTION OF OUR SOURCES AND THE IDENTITIES OF OUR NONOFFICIAL OFFICERS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST THE WORK OF THE HSCA. WE SHALL THEREFORE EXAMINE EACH REQUEST ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

2. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH CHAIRMAN STOKES TO DEVELOP MUTUALLY ACCEPTED GUIDELINES FOR HANDLING HSCA REQUESTS. THESE ARE:

A. CONTACTS WITH FORMER AGENCY EMPLOYEES LIVING ABROAD:
IF WE KNOW WHERE SUCH EMPLOYEES ARE, WE WILL INFORM THE COMMITTEE. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, UNDERTAKE TO FIND THEM IF WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE THEY ARE.

B. INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT AND HAVE NOT BEEN AGENTS, BUT WHO MIGHT HAVE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE INVESTIGATION:
THE NAMES OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS WILL BE FURNISHED US BY THE HSCA AND WE WILL CHECK TO ENSURE THAT SUCH AN INDIVIDUAL

SECRET

05952

WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO REVEAL PREVIOUS OR CURRENT AGENCY ASSETS OR OPERATIONS.

C. NONOFFICIAL COVER OFFICERS:

STAFF MEMBERS MAY INTERVIEW NOCS BUT NOT REPEAT NOT IN COUNTRY. NOCS WILL BE FLOWN TO OTHER AREAS FOR INTERVIEWS. ADDITIONALLY, NOCS WILL USE ALIASES AS APPROPRIATE.

D. AGENTS, PAST OR PRESENT:

HSCA STAFF MEMBERS MAY NOT REPEAT NOT CONTACT OR INTERVIEW AGENTS.

3. IF YOU ARE APPROACHED IN THE FIELD WITH A REQUEST FROM AN HSCA STAFF MEMBER TO BE PUT IN TOUCH WITH NOCS OR AGENTS AND YOU HAVE NOT HAD PRIOR HEADQUARTERS NOTIFICATION OF SUCH A REQUEST, YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONSULT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO MAKING ANY COMMITMENT. E2 IMPDET.>

ORIG: C/PCS (PAGE)X1052; COORD: SA/DO/O (GREGG)X1398; OGC ( ) X9212; OLC (BRECKINRIDGE)X1133; AUTH: JOHN N. MCMAHON, DDO, 1414; REL: FRANK C. CARLUCCI, DDCI, X1155.<

END OF MESSAGE

/07/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/LA-8 INFO: FILE, VR, C/OG/DMS, ODPD-D, OLC, SA/DO/O,
(13/P)

78 0749284 PAGE 001
TOT: 242059Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 228470

JHSCA

S E C R E T
STAFF 242058Z DIRECTOR 228470
TO: GUAYAQUIL INFO QUITO, CARACAS.

WNINTEL RYBAT

REF: GUAYAQUIL 22196 0741704

1. HQS WORKING AGREEMENT WITH HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA) PROVIDES FOR NOTICE TO HQS BY HSCA INVESTIGATORS OF ALL PLANNED CONTACTS WITH CURRENT OR FORMER STAFF PERSONNEL. IN ABSENCE OF SUCH NOTICE IN THIS CASE IT OUR ASSUMPTION THAT NO CONTACT WITH STATION/BASE STAFFERS, AS SUCH, IS PLANNED.

2. IN EVENT YOU ARE CONTACTED PLS RESTRICT YOUR COMMENTS TO WORK PERFORMED IN YOUR COVER CAPACITY.

3. NO FILE. E2,IMPDET.>
ORIG: C/LA/STB (STURBITTS), COORD: C/LA/VCE/E (TURBERVILLE) SA/DO/O (SHEPANEK), OLC (BRECKINRIDGE), C/LA/VCE/V (AMORI), AUTH: ADC/LA/S (BEARDSLEY), REL: C/LAD (WARREN). CLBY: 12180.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

#05955

10/25/ SECRET FRP: , , , , ., , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (292) INFO: FILE, VR, D/DCI, DDO-4, CS/~~RF~~, C/PCS, EPS/COMP, EPS/EG-2, ICS, ODPD-D, OG/DMS, PCS/LSN, SA/DO/O, (24/W)

78 0741704 PAGE 001 IN 0741704
TOR: 231632Z MAY 78 GAYA 22196

S E C R E T 231556Z MAY 78 STAFF

HSCA

CITE GUAYAQUIL 22196

TO: DIRECTOR INFO QUITO, CARACAS.

REF: STATE 129679

1. BASE HAS JUST RECEIVED COPY OF REF WHICH ADVISES OF VISIT TO GUAYAQUIL ON 29 MAY OF MESSRS GAETON FONZI AND ALBERT GONZALES, STAFF MEMBERS OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS.

2. NATURE OF PURPOSE OF VISIT NOT EXPLAINED, BUT WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF HQS AWARE OF ABOVE AND SHOULD BASE EXPECT CONTACT FROM SUBJECTS.

3. SUBJECTS SCHEDULED FOR CARACAS 1 JUNE.

4. NO FILE. E2. IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

05957

/04/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION: IP/DP-9 (127) INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/W)

78 0723553 PAGE 001

TOR: 191126Z MAY 78 BRUS 51185

S E C R E T 191115Z MAY 78 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE BRUSSELS 51185 (GOERLICH ACTING)

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: EUR/BNL INFO DC/EUR/NW, EUR/AS/A, SA/DO/O

SUBJECT: VLAAMSE MILITANTENORDE

REF: BRUSSELS 51113 0705837

1. FOLLOWING NOTE RECEIVED FROM NIGALE; ONLY FIRST SENTENCE DIFFERS FROM NITRUST'S ORAL STIFFARM OF REF, IN TELLING US WHAT WE ALREADY SURMISED ABOUT LACK OF KNOWN VMO-AMCIT CONTACT IN 1968-70.

"WE HAVE NO INFORMATION CONCERNING CONTACTS BETWEEN VMO MEMBERS AND AMERICAN CITIZENS BETWEEN 1968 AND 1970. IT APPEARS TO US INOPPORTUNE TO PREPARE A REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF THE VMO FOR PASSING TO MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATTIVES COMMITTEE. WE ARE ALSO OPPOSED TO THE PASSAGE OF ARTICLES FROM OUR QUARTERLY OR SEMI-ANNUAL REPORTS TO SAID COMMITTEE."

2. FILE: 008-002-009/3. E2 IMPDET.

S File HSCA

Shep

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

#05961

SECRET

This notice expires 28 September 1977.

DON 1-1462

DDO NOTICE
NO. 1-1462

ORGANIZATION
29 September 1976

REORGANIZATION OF THE STAFF STRUCTURE OF THE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

1. PURPOSE

This notice announces the reorganization of the Operations Directorate staff structure, effective 1 October 1976, and outlines the functions of the new and the redesignated staff components. The new staff organization supersedes that established by the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) on 28 June 1973 and as modified in the interim period. It is the first step of a three-phase, long range reorganization program designed to enable the Directorate to conform to the perceptions of the Executive and the Congress as to the Directorate's role, to adjust flexibly to changing strategies and priorities, and to make most efficient use of personnel and material resources allocated to accomplish the Directorate's mission.

2. GENERAL

The Headquarters organization of the Operations Directorate is comprised of the Office of the DDO and its special staffs, the Senior Staffs, and the Area and Functional operating Divisions. (See Figure 1, attached.)

3. OFFICE OF THE DDO

The following staff elements are attached to the Office of the DDO, and report directly to him and/or the Associate Deputy Director for Operations (ADDO).

a. Assistant Deputy Director for Operations for Development (ADDO/D) (When approved by DDCI)

The ADDO/D will direct and supervise the establishment of a Clandestine Corps responsible for the recruitment, training and dispatch of nonofficial cover officers to foreign areas, and for efforts to develop new techniques, methods and equipment for nonofficial cover operations.

E-2 IMPDET

05990

SECRET

b. Associate General Counsel to the DDO (AGC/DDO)

The AGC/DDO is detailed by the Agency's General Counsel to provide advice and assistance to the Operations Directorate. He will work directly with the ADDO.

c. Evaluation and Program Design Staff (EPDS)

The EPDS will

(1) Design and maintain continuous data on funds, positions, personnel on duty and other such management information as is required by the DDO and the Comptroller of the Agency.

(2) Maintain continuous knowledge of the state or condition of operational activities and achievements, and support activities planned and in progress, including resources used, efforts undertaken, and results.

(3) Prepare periodic evaluations of component programs against objectives including the need for requested resources, evaluations of past results, and projections of future results.

(4) Monitor all data collection for purposes of identifying statistical evidence of problems, identifying areas requiring management attention by the DDO, and providing data to be used for internal and external presentations.

(5) Review all Operational Activity (OP ACT) approvals to ensure compliance with Agency and Directorate regulations, and prepare staff recommendations on Operational Activities which require DDO approval or attention.

(6) Provide staff assistance to the DDO on Directorate, Agency, Community and Government data requirements, techniques and regulations pertaining thereto.

DDO NOTICE
NO. 1-1462

ORGANIZATION
29 September 1976

(7) Undertake special studies as directed of management issues which affect the efficiency or effectiveness of Directorate activities.

(8) Provide staff assistance to the DDO on Directorate, Agency, Community and Government evaluation requirements, techniques, and regulations pertinent thereto.

(9) Continue to develop production and evaluation techniques and values.

d. Policy and Coordination Staff (PCS)

The mission of the Policy and Coordination Staff is to serve as the focal point through which the DDO directs and controls certain activities of the Directorate crossing geographic divisional boundaries. It also will assist in formulating and recommending to the DDO policy and doctrine on matters with overall applicability to the Directorate. The Chief of this Staff will act for the DDO and the ADDO if these officers are unavailable. The responsibilities of this staff will include all intelligence-related matters including staff guidance on scientific and technical matters and such activities as crisis management, international terrorism, narcotics, technical operations, and defector operations. Additionally, the Staff is the focal point for Directorate coordination with the Intelligence Community Staff, the National Intelligence Officers, other components of the Agency, as well as with other agencies of the Government. The Staff will also be responsible for conducting and monitoring liaison with the principal elements of the Intelligence Community. It will be responsible for ensuring that the operations and activities of the Directorate are in compliance with existing regulations and procedures, and for formulation or revision of regulations and procedures as may be required. In short, this Staff will coordinate the paper flow of the Deputy Director for Operations and in so doing serve as a central clearing house for the movement of paper from the Staffs and Divisions to the Office of the DDO. This Staff also will provide policy focus to issues of common concern affecting Directorate-wide activities. It will also provide the support facilities for the DDO's special and Senior Staffs.

e. Senior Review Officers (SRO)

The responsibilities of the Senior Review Officers are described in DOI 5-14.

f. Special Assistant for External Oversight (SA/DO/O)

The responsibilities of the SA/DO/O are described in DON 1-1429.

g. DDO Duty Office (DDODO) (Not shown on Figure 1)

The responsibilities of the DDODO are described in DOI 5-3.

4. SENIOR STAFFS

a. Career Management Staff (CMS)

The Career Management Staff will be responsible for staff advice and support to the DDO on all matters related to organization, manpower planning, personnel management and administration, and training. It will provide staff direction and supervision to personnel management and administration throughout the Directorate, and is responsible for ensuring compliance with related Agency and DDO directives and procedures as well as applicable Government rules and regulations.

b. Central Cover Staff (CCS)

The mission and functions of the Central Cover Staff remain as prescribed in DOI 1-21 for the former Cover and Commercial Staff.

c. Covert Action Staff (CAS)

(1) The Covert Action Staff will provide policy coordination, guidance and support for Directorate covert action operations. It will be the office of record and clearing house for all external policy clearance of covert action operations and programs. Its specialized services and operations support responsibilities will include

(a) issuance of propaganda guidances and related background;

(b) production of tailored, non-attributable media and other background materials in support of authorized covert action operations;

(c) advice, guidance and operational support in the fields of black propaganda and deception operations; and

(d) support to and participation in Agency covert action training programs.

(2) The special operations mission and functions of the CAS are as prescribed in DOI 1-17 for the Special Operations Group, with the addition of a Special Operations Intelligence Center, which will provide crisis management support to the O/DDO and area divisions, particularly Order of Battle and briefing aid support; U.S. mission evacuation planning and support (including CIA representation in the Washington Liaison Group); and all-source intelligence, special operations research and graphics support to SOG.

d. Counterintelligence Staff (CIS)

The responsibilities of the Counterintelligence Staff remain as set forth in DON 1-1339, with the exception of paragraphs 2.f.(3) and 3.d. of that notice as they relate to conduct of deception operations. (See also 4.c.(1)(c), above.)

e. Information Services Staff (ISS)

(1) Manage the Operations Directorate's records and information control system.

(2) Maintain the foreign counterintelligence index for the United States Government.

(3) Oversee Directorate compliance with laws, orders, and regulations regarding recordkeeping.

(4) Provide career development services and training for records management, computer and micrographics specialists assigned to the Directorate.

(5) Serve as the Directorate focal point for Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act matters, and other litigation involving Directorate information, and handle and coordinate all Privacy Act and FOIA requests addressed to the Operations Directorate.

f. International Activities Staff (IAS)

The International Activities Staff will be responsible for

(1) Monitoring the activities of and developing operations into the permanent staffs of world-wide organizations, including

  (a) the United Nations and its specialized agencies;

  (b) the international staff of Communist parties;

  (c) foreign labor organizations that are international in scope;

  (d) Treaty organizations, such as NATO and the EC;

  (e) foreign multilateral trade organizations and foreign-owned companies; and

  (f) commercial organizations with truly international status, such as foreign-owned banks, tourism and sports.

(2) Coordination of CIA relationships with the Israeli liaison services, including provision of headquarters guidance and support to the Tel Aviv Station.

(3) Provision of staff guidance for and coordination of Directorate operational efforts in the fields of international economics and energy.

(4) Developing specific scientific and technical operations;

(5) Provision of staff guidance for and coordination of Directorate efforts against international Communism and the development of specific operations in this field.

(6) Monitoring the activities of certain foreign intelligence organizations outside their national boundaries, in close coordination with the Covert Action and Counterintelligence Staffs.

5. OPERATING DIVISIONS

The Area and Functional Divisions will continue as depicted in Figure 1, attached.

William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SECRET


DDO
ADDO
AGC/DDO
Evaluation & Program Design Staff
ADDO/Development-Clandestine Corps
Oversight
Senior Review
STAFFS
DIVISIONS
Policy & Coordination Staff
AREA
FUNCTIONAL
Career Management
Central Cover
Covert Action
Counterintelligence
Information Services
International Activities
East Asia
Near East & South Asia
Europe
Africa
Latin America
Soviet/East European
Foreign Resources
Domestic Collection Division
Division D

DON 1-1462
Figure 1
29 September 1976

SECRET

/09/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION: IP/DP-9 (791) INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/W)

78 0705837 PAGE 001
TOR: 161246Z MAY 78 BRUS 51113

HSCA

S E C R E T 161212Z MAY 78 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE BRUSSELS 51113 (GOERLICH ACTING)

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: EUR/BNL INFO EUR/A, SA/DO/O, DC/EUR/NW.

SUB: WNINTEL NIFLAIR NIGALE - FLEMISH ORDER OF MILITANTS

REFS: A. WASHINGTON 213077
B. BRUSSELS 51014 0661601

1. NITRUST HAS RESPONDED ORALLY TO OUR NOTE CONCERNING PASSAGE OF NIGALE INFORMATION ON THE VLAAMSE MILITANTENORDE (VMO) TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS. GIST OF HIS COMMENT: HE WILL NOT PASS US INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE VMO-AMCIT CONTACTS, BECAUSE THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT WILL PLACE SUCH INFORMATION AT RISK; AND IN GENERAL HE WILL NOT APPROVE PASSAGE OF NIGALE INFORMATION ON THE VMO TO CONGRESS BECAUSE HE HAS INSUFFICIENT ASSURANCE THAT THE MATERIAL WILL NOT LEAK, DESPITE OUR ASSURANCES THAT THE SUBJECT WOULD BE HANDLED AS CLASSIFIED AND SENSITIVE.

2. WE ARE AWAITING WRITTEN REPLY TO LEARN WHETHER THERE ANY GIVE IN NITRUST ATTITUDE. RE AMCIT ASPECT, WE SUSPECT THERE IS MEASURE OF POSTURING ON NITRUST'S SIDE. IN REF B ACOS/NIGALE-75 DISCUSSION, LATTER REMARKED THAT TO BEST HIS KNOWLEDGE THE ONLY KNOWN VMO CONNECTION WITH AMERICAN WAS INCIDENT IN ABOUT EARLY 1977 WHEN ORGANIZATION MET BRIEFLY WITH AN AMERICAN NAZI PARTY MEMBER WHO HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM UK AND PASSED THROUGH BELGIUM. HE DISCUSSED THE CASE WITH US AT THE TIME (NAME OF TRAVELLER NOT RECALLED BY N-75 OR ACOS).

3. THERE IS NO WAY WE CAN DISLODGE NITRUST'S OBVIOUS MIND SET ON THE CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION. QUESTION OF CONGRESS ASIDE, IF HEADQUARTERS CAN PROVIDE SPECIFICS ON FOIA MECHANICS WHICH WE CAN USE TO COUNTER NITRUST'S ASSERTION THAT RTACTION CANNOT PROTECT LIAISON SOURCES PROVIDING INFORMATION ON AMERICANS, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO MAKE SUCH POINTS WITH NITRUST.

SECRET

#05970

14-00000

SECRET

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

---

78 0705837 PAGE 002
TOR: 161246Z MAY 78 BRUS 51113

HE IS OF COURSE AWARE OF OUR "SOURCES AND METHODS" POSITION, BUT IT'S CLEAR THAT HE'S NOT PERSUADED THAT WE ARE HOLDING THE LINE.

4. FILE: 008-002-009/3. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET 23 FRP: , , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION: IP/DP-9 (622) INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/W)

78 0661601 PAGE 001
TOR: 051805Z MAY 78 BRUS 51014

S E C R E T 051740Z MAY 78 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH HSCA - File

CITE BRUSSELS 51014 (GOERLICH ACTING) m

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: EUR/BNL INFO EUR/A, SA/DO/O, DC/EUR/NW

SUBJECT: WNINTEL NIFLAIR NIGALE - FLEMISH ORDER OF MILITANTS

REF: WASHINGTON 213077

1. SURFACED REF REQUEST WITH NIGALE/75 IN EFFORT AVOID DECISION BY IRASCIBLE NITRUST, BUT N/75 ASKED FOR FORMAL NOTE BECAUSE HE WILL REQUIRE DATA FROM THIRD DIRECTORATE, WHICH HE WOULD NOT RELY ON TO KEEP MATTER BETWEEN HIM AND THEM. WE THEREFORE CONSTRAINED TO SUBMIT MATTER TO NITRUST IN WRITING (HE IS NOT AVAILABLE PERSONALLY AT MOMENT). WILL PRESS FOR EARLY REPLY.

2. FILE: 008-002-009/3. E2, IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET #06270

/25/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

APR 28 12 06 PM '78

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-9 INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/40)

78 0624404 PAGE 001
TOT: 271847Z APR 78 WASHINGT 213077

S E C R E T
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 271846Z WASHINGTON 213077
TO: BRUSSELS.

file
HSCA

FROM: E/BNL INFO EUR/A, SA/DO/O, DC/E/NW

SUBJECT: WNINTEL NIFLAIR NIGALE - FLEMISH ORDER OF MILITANTS

1. THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, IN CONNECTION WITH ITS INVESTIGATIONINTO DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., HAS ASKED FOR INFORMATION IN RTACTION FILES ON A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING FLEMISH ORDER OF MILITANTS (VLAAMSE MILITANTENORDE - VMO). COMMITTEE REQUEST IS NOT LIMITED TO IMMEDIATE PERIOD SURROUNDING ASSASSINATION, BUT PRESUME ITS INTEREST FOCUSES ON ASSASSIN'S ESCAPE ROUTE AND SUPPORT HE OBTAINED WHILE IN EUROPE. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON HOW THE VMO CAME TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION.

2. WE NOTE THAT THE ONLY INFORMATION WE HAVE SO FAR DISCOVERED EVEN MENTIONING THE VMO IS THAT CONTAINED IN POSITIVE INTEL (NIGALE SEMI-ANNUAL REVIEWS OF EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES). WE HAVE NOT YET DREDGED THESE UP FROM LIBRARY IN VIEW NIGALE PROVISION OF THE MATERIAL.

3. WOULD LIKE TO BOTH HONOR COMMITTEE REQUEST AND PRESERVE RELATIONSHIP WITH NIGALE, IF POSSIBLE. THEREFORE, REQUEST YOU DISCUSS COMMITTEE REQUEST WITH NIGALE MANAGEMENT. DOES NIGALE HAVE ANY INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES A CONTACT BETWEEN THE VMO AND AMERICANS DURING PERIOD MARCH 1968 TO 1970? WOULD THEY BE WILLING PROVIDE IT? ALSO WOULD NIGALE PREPARE REPORT ON VMO FOR PASSAGE TO COMMITTEE? PLEASE ALSO ASK NIGALE FOR PERMISSION TO PASS TO COMMITTEE VMO EXCERPTS FROM THE SEMI-ANNUAL REVIEWS, EITHER SOURCED TO NIGALE OR UNSOURCED IF NIGALE WOULD PREFER. PLEASE STRESS THAT ANY INFORMATION PROVIDED WILL BE CLASSIFIED AND HANDLED AS SENSITIVE.

4. FILE: 8-2-9/3. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: AC/E/BNL (KRUMVIEDE, 9384)/E/BNL/R (ALTHEA GUY, 9175);
COORD: SA/DO/O (MR. GREGG - IN SUBSTANCE), E/BNL/B (HARRIS),
EUR/A (LACLAIR); REL: DC/E/NW (THOMPSON). CL BY 034537.

DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

#06321

30-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	161827Z	DIRECTOR	125981

CONF: SA/DDO INFO: FILE EUR8, IP/DMS, LA8, OLC, DDO4, DDO/DO, DDO/SRO,

☐ INDEX DISSEM BY:
☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO PER
☐ IP FILES #

15-15 15-1

TO: [LISBON], INFO [LONDON], MEXICO CITY. Y

RYBAT WNINTEL RNVIEW Y

1. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS WHO CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ASSASSINATIONS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING HAS TOLD STATE THAT THEY INTEND TO PURSUE LEADS IN PORTUGAL, UK AND MEXICO RELATING TO JAMES EARL RAY, CURRENTLY SERVING TIME FOR KING MURDER. THEY BASING THIS INTEREST ON INFORMATION THAT RAY WAS IN LISBON BRIEFLY IN MAY 1968, SHORTLY BEFORE HIS APPREHENSION IN LONDON IN JUNE 1968. Y

2. MR. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR OF COMMITTEE SAYS SELECT COMMITTEE TOLD STATE THAT HE WANTS TO ESTABLISH "CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH APPROPRIATE PORTUGUESE NATIONAL POLICE AND HOPES TO ENLIST THEIR ASSISTANCE INCLUDING ACCESS TO THEIR FILES AND IN LOCATING AND INTERVIEWING POTENTIAL WITNESSES. Y

3. DEPARTMENT HAS SOLICITED EMBASSY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW BLAKEY SHOULD PROCEED. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 06494

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		2

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP:

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF:

INFO: FILE

12598l

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

4. WISH TO CALL ABOVE TO ADDRESSEES' ATTENTION IN EVENT 28 STATIONS ARE SOLICITED FOR ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE. RTACTION IS COOPERATING FULLY WITH BLAKEY AND COMMITTEE INCLUDING ALLOWING THEM ACCESS TO DIRECTORATE RECORDS, AFTER SUITABLE SANITIZATION FOR SOURCES AND METHODS. HOWEVER, BELIEVE COMMITTEE'S EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW POLICE AND WITNESSES AND RESULTING USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED, IF ANY, IS LARGELY OVERT FUNCTION WHICH CAN BEST BE HANDLED BY LEGATTS OR OTHERS WHO WOULD ALSO BE IN A POSITION TO BE PUBLICLY QUOTED OR IDENTIFIED IF NECESSARY. Y

5. 28 STATIONS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE EMBASSY BEST ADVICE IF SOLICITED BUT REQUESTED TO AVOID INVOLVING 27 STATION OFFICERS IN NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IN THEIR COVER CAPACITIES. IF CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH THAT THIS UNAVOIDABLE, PLEASE ADVISE HQS BY CABLE SO THAT THE MATTER CAN BE APPROPRIATELY HANDLED WITH BLAKEY AND DEPARTMENT. ■ H

ORIG: O/SA/DO/O {SOVERN}; COORD: OLC {CUMMINS}, DC/LA {LAUDER}, C/LA/~~MEX~~ MGSB {~~[illegible]~~} {HAWKINS}, DC/EUR/BC {~~[illegible]~~} JAMES, C/EUR/IB 03 {BERGER}; AUTH: SA/DO/O 03 {KATROSH}; REL: DC/EUR {ESTES}.J

DATE: 14 NOVEMBER 1977
ORIG: MASOVERN
UNIT: O/SA/DO/O
EXT: 1542

C/LA/STAFF B-106 [illegible]

OLC-

DC/EUR/BC

DC/LA/N

DC/EUR — RELEASING OFFICER

C/EUR/IB

C/LA/~~ME~~ GSB — COORDINATING OFFICERS

for SA/DO/O — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER TOTAL COPIES 37-2 RU

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT c/LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. c/cplans c/CA3 DDO4
c/SES, c/EUR6, c/SIA/IC c/SIA/FL
c/SIA, c/CI4 c/EPS/EG2 SA/DDO

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 325447 EIA549 PAGE 01 IN 459495

TOR:091001Z NOV 77 HAGU 33077

S E C R E T 090945Z NOV 77 STAFF

CITE ~~THE HAGUE~~ 33077

DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

Mo

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT REAM SYMPATHIZER MHCOLOR

REF: ONHA-40410, 4 MAY 1977

1. SENSITIVE SYMPATHIZER SOURCE INDICATES THAT ON 3 OCTOBER WILLEM OLTMANS MADE APPOINTMENT MEET WITH CUBAN AMBASSADOR, THE HAGUE. OLTMANS STATED HE GOING "TO AMERICA ON 18TH" AND THAT HE " IS INDEED PREPARED TO GO AT THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER AS ARRANGED".

2. DURING DISCUSSION, OLTMANS SAID HE ALSO HAD VISIT SCHEDULED WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ROMANOV FOR 3 OCTOBER AND WANTED COMBINE TWO VISITS FOR SAME DAY. OLTMANS WAS TOLD AN ATTEMPT BY CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO SCHEUDLE MEET WITH HIM DURING SEEK 25 SEPTEMBER HAD BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OLTMANS COULD NOT BE REACHED. OLTMANS STATED HE HAD BEEN IN SOVIET UNION THEN..

3. ABOVE EVIDENCE OF OLTMAN'S CONTINUING CLOSE CONTACT WITH CUBAN AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS AND HIS RECENT TRAVEL TO THE USSR AND APPARENT CURRENT TRAVEL TO CUBA

S E C R E T

06774

14-00000

7-71 MFG. 7/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

TOTAL COPIES

RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 325447 EIA549 PAGE 02-02 IN 459495

TOR:091001Z NOV 77 HAGU 33077

IS OF INTEREST IN VIEW HIS NOTORIOUS ROLE AT THE TIME OF THE DEATH OF GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILD. LATTER WAS OF INTEREST BOTH TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGNECE AND HOUSE ASSASSINATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE. IF HQS DEEMS IT APPROPRIATE, NO STATION OBJECTION TO CONVEYING ABOVE, WITH ADEQUATE SOURCE PROTECTION, TO PROPER CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITIES.

4. FILE: 201-155221. E2, IMPDET.

* c/s SUGGESTS ADDL DISSEM TO: OLC

and resultant limited time available for Committee matters plus other factors, it might be possible to handcarry selected KCIA documents to the SSCI for reading by Mr. Kramer. This office objected on the grounds of the sensitivity of the material, the ground rules established for the Congressional (and DOJ) review of this material by staffers and the problems which could be caused by exceptional treatment being afforded to one Committee or staffer. Mr. George Cary provided the compromise solution which is acceptable to all parties, to wit, that Mr. Garbler invite Mr. Kramer to the Agency for lunch after which time he would review the requested material in the Headquarters building. (ESVidal)

4. MEETING OF SSCI STAFFER AND DDO: At Mr. Hal Ford's request a luncheon meeting with Mr. William Wells has been scheduled for 26 October. Mr. Ford is researching material for a study on China reporting and wishes to discuss this subject with Mr. Wells due to his extensive background and experience in East Asian affairs. (ESVidal)

5. ASSASSINATIONS COMMITTEE: Counsel G. Robert Blakey met with DO, DDA/Security and OLC representatives to determine how he might frame his requirements to best meet our capabilities. His efforts appear to be aimed at the possible CIA role with the Mafia, and a double Mafia role with Castro. He has information which implies that Trafficante was playing both sides. The IG, particularly Scott Breckenridge, has responsibility for the Bill Harvey association and the analysis of the Schweiker report. Blakey has agreed that DO will concentrate initially on the Bayo-Pawley affair and the "Soviet Defector" cover operation. Non identified informants have told him that Col. "Rep" Robertson was involved. His queries are logical, manageable, and, if we can keep his requests to specific people or events, we should be able to respond to his requirements. (It would be, in our opinion, an excellent idea for the ADDO to meet informally with Blakey over a luncheon. This would be useful in giving Blakey a picture of JMWAVE, but also it would perhaps give Blakey a perspective on his own terms of reference. (JDWalker)

6. LITIGATION/HORMAN v SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL, (JAMES E. ANDERSON, COS, COSTA RICA): We prepared a reply to Anderson and suggested he indicate to the Department that he would accept the routine officer of Department of Justice legal representation as a government official in the Horman family suit.

I-C

3 July '74

MEMO FOR FILE

SUBJECT C : OTS (late TSD) and Jim McCord's Cuban Activities

1. Ben Colling phoned to say that one of the fellows in jail is still around, and after he got out he inquired around and got no indication that McCord was ever involved. None of the other OTS people have any recollection of McCord's involvement.

2. I said that I was sure that the man who was rolled up might not have any idea of McCord's involvement, if indeed he was involved. If McCord's involvelement was merely headquarters planning and no releasing operation was ever undertaken his role might never surface. However, we had been told that planning did involve TSD people at the time, along with Security. For instance, I knew that the Security man with TSD at the time had a job of hand-holding with the families of the three men; there may be some TSD record of that which would lead to someone who would know.

3. Colling was pulled out of a staff meeting to talk to me and said he would call back later.

SDB

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

6574

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

20 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : Summary of 02 [STESCALADE - Audio Operation Against the New China News Agency in Havana

1. In May 1959, the New China News Agency (NCNA) opened an office in Havana in the El Medico Building which is occupied partly by business concerns and partly used for residential apartments. Shortly thereafter, the Havana Station obtained the concurrence of Ambassador Bonsal and Miss Carolyn O. Stacey, an Embassy employee, to mount an audio operation against NCNA through the wall of the adjacent apartment in which Miss Stacey lived. In November 1959, the FE Division sent one case officer and one TSD technician to Havana, and the installation of a microphone and tape recorder was completed in Miss Stacey's apartment on 29 November 1959.

2. By June 1960, it had become evident that two other rooms occupied by NCNA possibly housed communication equipment and were used for conferences. At that time 03 [Bryan Mills] FE Division case officer, went to Havana and explored the possibility of improving the operation. He managed to lease an apartment directly over the NCNA office and arranged for a stay-behind agent to occupy this space.

3. In August 1960, a team of three TSD technicians who were in Havana on a separate SR Division operation agreed to install the additional equipment required for the NCNA operation. A second FE Division case officer, Robert Neet, came down to Havana; and he, together with the technicians, installed a probe microphone and tape recorder in the apartment obtained by 03 [Mills] over the NCNA office. About this time the equipment was removed from Miss Stacey's apartment, with the exception of the plastic probe which was left in the wall and plastered over.

6592

3/90

4. As an additional security precaution to provide a safe haven, and after consultation with the Acting Chief of Station, a key to an apartment in the same building leased by Mrs. Marjorie Lennox, an Embassy secretary, was obtained. Mrs. Lennox was told that access to her apartment was needed for photographic surveillance purposes.

5. The Station was then faced with the probability that time and security would work against holding indefinitely the lease to the apartment over NCNA since the owners of the building were cancelling sub-lessors' contracts and recalling leases. It was, therefore, decided to install transmitters and switches in order to permit continued monitoring of the target from a distant listening post. Another three-man team of TSD technicians consisting of David L. Christ (alias Carswell), Walter E. Szuminski (alias Taransky) and Thornton J. Anderson (alias Danbrunt) documented as tourists had been sent to Havana to install audio equipment in the Chinese Nationalist Embassy before it was due to be turned over to the Chinese Communits. This operation aborted. This team was then sent to work on the installation of the transmitters in the apartment over the NCNA office.

6. At 2400 hours on 14 September, Christ, who with the other technicians was working in the target apartment, failed to keep a scheduled appointment with Neet. At 0100 hours on the 15th of September, the apartment of Mrs. Lennox was entered into and searched by Cuban authorities, and she was taken into custody. At 1540 hours on 15 September, Neet, the stay-behind agent and his wife were picked up by the Cuban authorities and detained.

7. As of today the agent remains in the custody of the Cuban authorities. His wife has been released and is still in Havana. Neet was released 1715 hours 16 September and has subsequently returned to Washington where he is being debriefed. Mrs. Lennox was subsequently released and has also returned to Washington where she is being debriefed. The three TSD technicians remain in confinement. They have been seen in confinement but not contacted by an Embassy officer when he first attempted to secure the release of Mrs. Lennox. Christ was last seen by Neet when they were jointly interrogated the morning of 15 September. At that time Christ did not appear

to have been maltreated.

8. According to articles in the Cuban papers the three technicians were arrested while in the apartment over the NCNA office and completing the installation of the equipment. The press article adds that the key to Mrs. Lennox's apartment was found on one of the technicians who identified the apartment to which it belonged. All Cuban press releases have referred to the men by alias and have not identified them as Government or Agency employees. It is unclear at present what story had been agreed upon by the technicians and station personnel to be used in the event they were caught. (While being interrogated with Neet, Christ indicated that Neet was his boss, and Neet consistently denied any knowledge as to why he was being held.) The sub-lease for the apartment in which the men were caught is in the name of the stay-behind agent with the original lease being in the name of [Mills], the FE Division Case Officer.

9. Initial information indicated that the three technicians would be charged with espionage "against the people of China". Subsequent press releases have been unclear on this point. An attempt by Consul Hugh Kessler to contact the three men at 1730 hours on 17 September was unsuccessful. He was not permitted to see them but was told they were in custody.

10. The three technicians travelled to Cuba as tourists under very light commercial cover, two of them working for a company in New York and the third, one in Baltimore. In each case the cover company consists of a telephone answering service and a name on the door. Telephone messages and mail are picked up periodically by an Agency contract employee. The men were provided with this cover as well as unbackstopped home addresses for use when entering or leaving Cuba as tourists since the filling out of the landing card requires this information. Subsequent to their detention the home addresses have been partially backstopped so that inquiries will indicate that someone with this alias name had lived in the apartment house in question. Insofar as the cover companies are concerned, efforts are being made to provide a backstop to withstand inquiries from the press should the Cubans reveal this information. In view

1/20

of the thinness of the cover, it is uncertain whether this will succeed.

11. A cleared and witting law firm in New York has been briefed by Mr. L. Houston on the situation with the thought that inquiries received by the cover company could be referred to the firm of lawyers from whom no comment would be obtained by the press or other inquirers. The law firm has been briefed on the entire situation so that they may be in a position to act if any action by them appears desirable or feasible. It would not appear that much support of any kind can be obtained from the law firm or the law firms in Cuba which are associated with them.

12. Insofar as the families are concerned, one of the technicians is a bachelor presently on home leave between two tours in 13-3 Japan. His father, a cook in a diner in the Boston area, has been contacted by the Office of Security, and he will get in touch with Security if he receives any inquiries on this matter. Security, by the same token, will keep in touch with him as the Cubans reveal their intentions and course of action.

13. The wives of the other two technicians have been told what has happened and are being contacted at least once daily by TSD staffers and their wives who have been briefed on the situation. A conference with the two wives was held in TSD on 19 September to go over the whole situation and determine if there were any personal problems on which the Agency could be of help. For the time being the wives are telling their neighbors that their husbands are on a trip. This story will be adjusted depending on what course of action the Cuban Government takes, whether the aliases remain unbroken and whether recognizable photographs of the individuals are released to the press. The two wives so far have taken the bad news exceedingly well.

RUDOLPH E. GOMEZ
Acting Chief, WH

Distribution:
- DCI - 2
- DDCI - 1
- DD/P - 1
- COPS - 1
- WH - 3
- ~~FE~~ - 1
- OS - 1
- CI - 1

1/90

20 September 1966

02

MEMORANDUM RE STESCALADE

There is a folder of sensitive non-CS/record material pertaining to this operation, retired under Black Tape wrapping, Job #67-86/78, restricted to Offices of DCI, DDCI, DDP, C/WH, C/WH/PL, C/WH/C, C/CI, C/TSD, Director of Security and General Counsel. China Operations is not cited as an originator, addressee, or info recipient of any of this sensitive material.

WH/RMO

Vivian
7384

SECRET

06593

1/20

14-00000

Att C

RELEASE CONTINGENCY OPLAN 62-2

CHART OR MAP REFERENCE:

Sectional aeronautical charts as required.

TASK ORGANIZATION:

Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Major Billy B. Campbell, Commander.

1. SITUATION:

Daniel L. Carswell (Alias), Eustace H. Danbrunt (Alias) and Edmund R. Taransky (Alias) are TSD Staff Employees who were apprehended by Cuban authorities in September 1960 and who are now serving ten year sentences. Efforts are being made to secure their release. Since their release may occur without advance notice and at a variety of places, ie. Havana, Miami, Mexico City, Switzerland, Brazil, etc., it is imperative that a contingency plan be formulated to assure the secure reception of these employees.

The controlling factor in all phases of the release procedure is that these employees were in Cuba under alias and that during the entire period since their capture their aliases and cover stories apparently have been maintained. Therefore it is essential that these aliases be maintained until such time as the employees have returned to Agency control and then have these alias identities disappear as quickly as possible.

For planning purposes the release points will be Havana, Mexico City or "other areas".

2. MISSION:

Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group provide black air transportation from port of entry CONUS to the designated safe area.

3. EXECUTION:

A. Black air transport will be provided under this plan at the request of TSD, COS Mexico, or Operational Support Division/OS/DDS depending on the release point and port of entry.

6594

B. Request for black transport should include:

1. Request that RELEASE CONTINGENCY PLAN 62-2 be implemented.

2. Port of entry.

3. Date, local time, and airfield desired for pick up.

4. Desired destination.

5. Other requirements, ie., stretchers or bunks in the event subjects are hospital cases.

6. Name, organization and telephone number of requesting party.

7. Name and telephone number of KUBARK contacts at loading and off-loading points.

C. The following personnel are knowledgeable and charged with the responsibility of activating this plan:

1. Major Richard I. Skinner, AC/ASD/DD/P
Organization: Air Support Division, DD/P
Home Phone: JE 3-1409
Office Phone: Sterile Numbers ME 8-6285, EX 3-8515
Extensions 6862, 7664, 7367
Red Line 1958

2. Mr. Robert Marrero
Organization: Air Support Division, DD/P
Home Phone: JA 4-3599
Office Phone: Same as 1.

3. Major Billy B. Campbell, Commander, Det. 1.
Organization: Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
Home Phone: 662737
Office Phone: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 631590

4. Major Kenneth R. Burton, Ops Officer, Det. 1.
Organization: Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
Home Phone: 662464
Office Phone: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 631213

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

D. Det. 1 furnish 1 C-54 and crew in standby capacity until further notice. Standby capacity is herein defined as capability to position the aircraft at any port of entry in east, south or southwest U. S. from Boston to Los Angeles within 15 hours.

E. Assuming the subjects will be released in Havana or Mexico City, Det. 1 will prepare mission folders for flights from most probable ports of entry to Isolation and Andrews Air Force Base.

03
[RICHARD I. SKINNER]

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - CI Staff
3 - OS
3 - OP
3 - MS
3 - C/FE
3 - C/TSD
3 - CCG
3 - TFW
3 - C/WH
3 - DPD/DDR

1/20

03/30/ SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

ADV C/LA 1606Z STAFF

NOV 29 1 09 PM '78

PRECEDENCE

File CI

ACTION: C/LA-8 (755) INFO: ODRD-D, VR, FILE, C/[illegible]-4, C/EPS/EG-2,
C/OG/DMS, (7/3)

78 1631411 PAGE 001 IN 1631411
TOR: 291533Z NOV 78 LMIM 29191

S E C R E T 291523Z NOV 78 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 29191

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT SLANK

REF: LA/MIAMI 29190 1631398

IDEN: 1400 SW 16TH STREET
MIAMI, FLA. 33145
TEL (305) 858-4406. E2 IMPDET

AMMUG-1

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

05645

/04/ SECRET FRP: , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEF

ACTION: IP/DP-9 (127) INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/W)

78 0723553 PAGE 001

TOR: 191126Z MAY 78 BRUS 51185

S E C R E T 191115Z MAY 78 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE BRUSSELS 51185 (GOERLICH ACTING)

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: EUR/BNL INFO DC/EUR/NW, EUR/AS/A, SA/DO/O

SUBJECT: VLAAMSE MILITANTENORDE

REF: BRUSSELS 51113 0705837

CHRONO

1542 x

A

1. FOLLOWING NOTE RECEIVED FROM NIGALE; ONLY FIRST SENTENCE DIFFERS FROM NITRUST'S ORAL STIFFARM OF REF, IN TELLING US WHAT WE ALREADY SURMISED ABOUT LACK OF KNOWN VMO-AMCIT CONTACT IN 1968-70.

"WE HAVE NO INFORMATION CONCERNING CONTACTS BETWEEN VMO MEMBERS AND AMERICAN CITIZENS BETWEEN 1968 AND 1970. IT APPEARS TO US INOPPORTUNE TO PREPARE A REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF THE VMO FOR PASSING TO MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATTIVES COMMITTEE. WE ARE ALSO OPPOSED TO THE PASSAGE OF ARTICLES FROM OUR QUARTERLY OR SEMI-ANNUAL REPORTS TO SAID COMMITTEE."

2. FILE: 008-002-009/3. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

6821

/04/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION: IP/DP-9 (127) INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/W)

78 0723553 PAGE 001
TOR: 191126Z MAY 78 BRUS 51185

S E C R E T 191115Z MAY 78 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE BRUSSELS 51185 (GOERLICH ACTING)

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: EUR/BNL INFO DC/EUR/NW, EUR/AS/A, SA/DO/O

SUBJECT: VLAAMSE MILITANTENORDE

REF: BRUSSELS 51113 0705837

1. FOLLOWING NOTE RECEIVED FROM NIGALE: ONLY FIRST SENTENCE DIFFERS FROM NITRUST'S ORAL STIFFARM OF REF, IN TELLING US WHAT WE ALREADY SURMISED ABOUT LACK OF KNOWN VMO-AMCIT CONTACT IN 1968-70.

"WE HAVE NO INFORMATION CONCERNING CONTACTS BETWEEN VMO MEMBERS AND AMERICAN CITIZENS BETWEEN 1968 AND 1970. IT APPEARS TO US INOPPORTUNE TO PREPARE A REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF THE VMO FOR PASSING TO MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATTIVES COMMITTEE. WE ARE ALSO OPPOSED TO THE PASSAGE OF ARTICLES FROM OUR QUARTERLY OR SEMI-ANNUAL REPORTS TO SAID COMMITTEE."

2. FILE: 008-002-009/3. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

Dup
682

2

/09/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUC

ACTION: IP/DP-9 (791) INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/W)

ACTION COPY

78 0705837 PAGE 001
TOR: 161246Z MAY 78 BRUS 51113

S E C R E T 161212Z MAY 78 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE BRUSSELS 51113 (GOERLICH ACTING)

CHRONO

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: EUR/BNL INFO EUR/A, SA/DO/O, DC/EUR/NW.

SUB: WNINTEL NIFLAIR NIGALE - FLEMISH ORDER OF MILITANTS

REFS: A. WASHINGTON 213077
B. BRUSSELS 51014 0661601

1. NITRUST HAS RESPONDED ORALLY TO OUR NOTE CONCERNING PASSAGE OF NIGALE INFORMATION ON THE VLAAMSE MILITANTENORDE (VMO) TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS. GIST OF HIS COMMENT: HE WILL NOT PASS US INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE VMO-AMCIT CONTACTS, BECAUSE THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT WILL PLACE SUCH INFORMATION AT RISK; AND IN GENERAL HE WILL NOT APPROVE PASSAGE OF NIGALE INFORMATION ON THE VMO TO CONGRESS BECAUSE HE HAS INSUFFICIENT ASSURANCE THAT THE MATERIAL WILL NOT LEAK, DESPITE OUR ASSURANCES THAT THE SUBJECT WOULD BE HANDLED AS CLASSIFIED AND SENSITIVE.

2. WE ARE AWAITING WRITTEN REPLY TO LEARN WHETHER THERE ANY GIVE IN NITRUST ATTITUDE. RE AMCIT ASPECT, WE SUSPECT THERE IS MEASURE OF POSTURING ON NITRUST'S SIDE. IN REF B ACOS/NIGALE-75 DISCUSSION, LATTER REMARKED THAT TO BEST HIS KNOWLEDGE THE ONLY KNOWN VMO CONNECTION WITH AMERICAN WAS INCIDENT IN ABOUT EARLY 1977 WHEN ORGANIZATION MET BRIEFLY WITH AN AMERICAN NAZI PARTY MEMBER WHO HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM UK AND PASSED THROUGH BELGIUM. HE DISCUSSED THE CASE WITH US AT THE TIME (NAME OF TRAVELLER NOT RECALLED BY N-75 OR ACOS).

3. THERE IS NO WAY WE CAN DISLODGE NITRUST'S OBVIOUS MIND SET ON THE CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION. QUESTION OF CONGRESS ASIDE, IF HEADQUARTERS CAN PROVIDE SPECIFICS ON FOIA MECHANICS WHICH WE CAN USE TO COUNTER NITRUST'S ASSERTION THAT RTACTION CANNOT PROTECT LIAISON SOURCES PROVIDING INFORMATION ON AMERICANS, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO MAKE SUCH POINTS WITH NITRUST.

SECRET

6822

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

78 0705837 PAGE 002
TOR: 161246Z MAY 78 BRUS 51113

HE IS OF COURSE AWARE OF OUR "SOURCES AND METHODS" POSITION, BUT IT'S CLEAR THAT HE'S NOT PERSUADED THAT WE ARE HOLDING THE LINE.

4. FILE: 008-002-009/3. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

50/42/ SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , ,

PRECEDENCE STAFF

ACTION: C/EA-8 (004) INFO: FILE, VR, C/OG/DMS, C/PCS, C/PCS/CAC, ODPD-D, SA/DO/O, (14/W)

78 0782088 PAGE 001 IN 0782088
TOR: 010944Z JUN 78 HONG 59794

S E C R E T 010929Z JUN 78 STAFF

CITE HONG KONG 59794

SW

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 231428
B. HONG KONG 59696 0768840
C. DIRECTOR 230113

1. REF C WAS PASSED FBIS UPON RECEIPT BY COMMO/HONG KONG. DISTRIBUTION INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONG KONG AND OTHER ADDEES CLEARLY INSTRUCTED PASSAGE FBIS.

2. ASSUME OTHER STATIONS ALSO DISTRIBUTED FBIS WHICH MEANS REF C IS PRESENTLY HELD BY FBIS UNITS AND IN VIEW OF ITS SENSITIVITY, RECOMMEND HEADQUARTERS RECALL ACTION. E2, IMPDET.

Told Hong Kong & discuss the issue.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

6829

/25/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

APR 28 12 06 PM '78

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-9 INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/

78 0624404 PAGE 001
TOT: 271847Z APR 78 WASHINGT 213077

S E C R E T
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 271846Z WASHINGTON 213077
TO: BRUSSELS.

FROM: E/BNL INFO EUR/A, SA/DO/O, DC/E/NW

file
HSCA

SUBJECT: WNINTEL NIFLAIR NIGALE - FLEMISH ORDER OF MILITANTS

1. THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, IN CONNECTION WITH ITS INVESTIGATIONINTO DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., HAS ASKED FOR INFORMATION IN RTACTION FILES ON A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING FLEMISH ORDER OF MILITANTS (VLAAMSE MILITANTENORDE - VMO). COMMITTEE REQUEST IS NOT LIMITED TO IMMEDIATE PERIOD SURROUNDING ASSASSINATION, BUT PRESUME ITS INTEREST FOCUSES ON ASSASSIN'S ESCAPE ROUTE AND SUPPORT HE OBTAINED WHILE IN EUROPE. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON HOW THE VMO CAME TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION.

2. WE NOTE THAT THE ONLY INFORMATION WE HAVE SO FAR DISCOVERED EVEN MENTIONING THE VMO IS THAT CONTAINED IN POSITIVE INTEL (NIGALE SEMI-ANNUAL REVIEWS OF EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES). WE HAVE NOT YET DREDGED THESE UP FROM LIBRARY IN VIEW NIGALE PROVISION OF THE MATERIAL.

3. WOULD LIKE TO BOTH HONOR COMMITTEE REQUEST AND PRESERVE RELATIONSHIP WITH NIGALE, IF POSSIBLE. THEREFORE, REQUEST YOU DISCUSS COMMITTEE REQUEST WITH NIGALE MANAGEMENT. DOES NIGALE HAVE ANY INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES A CONTACT BETWEEN THE VMO AND AMERICANS DURING PERIOD MARCH 1968 TO 1970? WOULD THEY BE WILLING PROVIDE IT? ALSO WOULD NIGALE PREPARE REPORT ON VMO FOR PASSAGE TO COMMITTEE? PLEASE ALSO ASK NIGALE FOR PERMISSION TO PASS TO COMMITTEE VMO EXCERPTS FROM THE SEMI-ANNUAL REVIEWS, EITHER SOURCED TO NIGALE OR UNSOURCED IF NIGALE WOULD PREFER. PLEASE STRESS THAT ANY INFORMATION PROVIDED WILL BE CLASSIFIED AND HANDLED AS SENSITIVE.

4. FILE: 8-2-9/3. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: AC/E/BNL (KRUMVIEDE, 9384)/E/BNL/R (ALTHEA GUY, 9175);
COORD: SA/DO/O (MR. GREGG - IN SUBSTANCE), E/BNL/B (HARRIS),
EUR/A (LACLAIR); REL: DC/E/NW (THOMPSON). CL BY 034537.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET #06321

02/37/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/PCS INFO: FILE, VR, D/DCI, DDO-5, CSRF, AGC/DDO, C/AF-9, C/CA-3, C/CA/SOG-3, C/CCS, C/CI-4, C/CMS, C/CMS/MS, C/CMS/PEB, C/DCD-3, C/DEF/AA, C/EA-8, C/EPS/COMP, C/EPS/EG-2, C/EUR-6, C/FR-4, C/IID, C/IMS, C/INT/ST, C/LA-8, C/LSN/MIL, C/NE-6, C/OG/DMS, C/PCS/CAC, C/PCS/DEF, C/PCS/INT, C/PCS/ITC-4, C/PCS/LSN, C/PCS/NAR-2, C/PCS/TC, C/PM, C/SE-5, C/SIA, C/SIA/EE, C/SIA/FL, C/SIA/IA, C/SIA/IC, D/OLC, DDC/DO, ODPD-D, OGC-2, ~~SA/DO/O~~, (105/P)

---

78 0763280 PAGE 001
TOT: 270110Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 230113

S E C R E T
STAFF 270057Z DIRECTOR 230113
TO: PRIORITY WWSB, LUXEMBOURG.

AW

File HSCA

BOOK CABLE

WNINTEL RYBAT

1. THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), CHAIRED BY REPRESENTATIVE LOUIS STOKES, HAS BEEN INTERVIEWING A NUMBER OF RETIREES AND EX-EMPLOYEES AND HAS BEEN GOING THROUGH MATERIAL FURNISHED TO THEM BY THE AGENCY. THROUGH THIS PROCESS COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBERS HAVE OBTAINED A NUMBER OF NAMES OF NONOFFICIAL COVER OFFICERS AND AGENT CRYPTONYMS. IT IS NOW THE INTENTION OF THE COMMITTEE TO SEND STAFF MEMBERS TO A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES TO INTERVIEW INDIVIDUALS IN THE FIELD. WE ARE, OF COURSE, MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROTECTION OF OUR SOURCES AND THE IDENTITIES OF OUR NONOFFICIAL OFFICERS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST THE WORK OF THE HSCA. WE SHALL THEREFORE EXAMINE EACH REQUEST ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

2. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH CHAIRMAN STOKES TO DEVELOP MUTUALLY ACCEPTED GUIDELINES FOR HANDLING HSCA REQUESTS. THESE ARE:

A. CONTACTS WITH FORMER AGENCY EMPLOYEES LIVING ABROAD:
IF WE KNOW WHERE SUCH EMPLOYEES ARE, WE WILL INFORM THE COMMITTEE. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, UNDERTAKE TO FIND THEM IF WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE THEY ARE.

B. INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT AND HAVE NOT BEEN AGENTS, BUT WHO MIGHT HAVE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE INVESTIGATION:
THE NAMES OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS WILL BE FURNISHED US BY THE HSCA AND WE WILL CHECK TO ENSURE THAT SUCH AN INDIVIDUAL

SECRET

05822

SECRET

STAFF

---

78 0763280 PAGE 002
TOT: 270110Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 230113

WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO REVEAL PREVIOUS OR CURRENT AGENCY ASSETS OR OPERATIONS.

C. NONOFFICIAL COVER OFFICERS:

[illegible] STAFF MEMBERS MAY INTERVIEW NOCS BUT NOT REPEAT NOT IN COUNTRY. NOCS WILL BE FLOWN TO OTHER AREAS FOR INTERVIEWS. ADDITIONALLY, NOCS WILL USE ALIASES AS APPROPRIATE.

D. AGENTS, PAST OR PRESENT:

HSCA STAFF MEMBERS MAY NOT REPEAT NOT CONTACT OR INTERVIEW AGENTS.

3. IF YOU ARE APPROACHED IN THE FIELD WITH A REQUEST FROM AN HSCA STAFF MEMBER TO BE PUT IN TOUCH WITH NOCS OR AGENTS AND YOU HAVE NOT HAD PRIOR HEADQUARTERS NOTIFICATION OF SUCH A REQUEST, YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONSULT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO MAKING ANY COMMITMENT. E2 IMPDET.>

ORIG: C/PCS (PAGE)X1052; COORD: SA/DO/O (GREGG)X1398; OGC (   ) X9212; OLC (BRECKINRIDGE)X1133; AUTH: JOHN N. MCMAHON, DDO, 1414; REL: FRANK C. CARLUCCI, DDCI, X1155.<

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/07/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/LA-8 INFO: FILE, VR, C/OG/DMS, ODPD-D, OLC, SA/DO/O,
(13/P)

---

78 0749284 PAGE 001
TOT: 242059Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 228470

J/HSCA

SECRET
STAFF 242058Z DIRECTOR 228470
TO: GUAYAQUIL INFO QUITO, CARACAS.

WNINTEL RYBAT

REF: GUAYAQUIL 22196 0741704

1. HQS WORKING AGREEMENT WITH HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA) PROVIDES FOR NOTICE TO HQS BY HSCA INVESTIGATORS OF ALL PLANNED CONTACTS WITH CURRENT OR FORMER STAFF PERSONNEL. IN ABSENCE OF SUCH NOTICE IN THIS CASE IT OUR ASSUMPTION THAT NO CONTACT WITH STATION/BASE STAFFERS, AS SUCH, IS PLANNED.

2. IN EVENT YOU ARE CONTACTED PLS RESTRICT YOUR COMMENTS TO WORK PERFORMED IN YOUR COVER CAPACITY.

3. NO FILE. E2,IMPDET.>
ORIG: C/LA/STB (STURBITTS), COORD: C/LA/VCE/E (TURBERVILLE)
SA/DO/O (SHEPANEK), OLC (BRECKINRIDGE), C/LA/VCE/V (AMORI),
AUTH: ADC/LA/S (BEARDSLEY), REL: C/LAD (WARREN). CLBY: 12180.

05823

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

10/25/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (292) INFO: FILE, VR, D/DCI, DDO-4, CS/RF, C/PCS, EPS/COMP, EPS/EG-2, ICS, ODPD-D, OG/DMS, PCS/LSN, SA/DO/O, (24/W)

78 0741704 PAGE 001 IN 0741704
TOR: 231632Z MAY 78 GAYA 22196

S E C R E T 231556Z MAY 78 STAFF

CITE GUAYAQUIL 22196

TO: DIRECTOR INFO QUITO, CARACAS.

REF: STATE 129679

1. BASE HAS JUST RECEIVED COPY OF REF WHICH ADVISES OF VISIT TO GUAYAQUIL ON 29 MAY OF MESSRS GAETON FONZI AND ALBERT GONZALES, STAFF MEMBERS OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS.

2. NATURE OF PURPOSE OF VISIT NOT EXPLAINED, BUT WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF HQS AWARE OF ABOVE AND SHOULD BASE EXPECT CONTACT FROM SUBJECTS.

3. SUBJECTS SCHEDULED FOR CARACAS 1 JUNE.

4. NO FILE. E2. IMPDET.

RX-9379

Bernie: Pls see who is Keenan LAD officer responsible ~~for~~ for ~~Cong~~ Condel visits. B.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

05825

02/ 7   SECRET   FRP: , , ,

ADV LA/1900Z   STAFF

ACTION: C/LA-8   INFO: FILE, VR, C/CCS, C/CI-4, D/COMMO-5, CWO-
DDA, C/IP/DMS, ODPD-D, OGC-2, OLC, D/SECUR-3, DCI/PA, DDO-4, CS/RF,

---

78 0443808   PAGE 001   IN 0443808
TOR: 211827Z MAR 78   MEXI 44345

S E C R E T 211706Z MAR 78 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 44345

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT MHSPLASH

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 190792
B. MEXICO CITY 44308 0429877
C. DIRECTOR 184902

1. REF A CABLE ANSWERS SOME OF THE QUESTIONS OF PRIMARY CONCERN TO THIS STATION, BUT AT SAME TIME, IT CONFIRMS THE WORST FEARS EXPRESSED IN REF B CONCERNING REVELATIONS ABOUT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET TARGET IN MEXICO CITY.

2. IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, THE NBC PROGRAM CANNOT HELP BUT BE DAMAGING TO U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS AND THIS AGENCY IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

A. REVELATION OF SOURCES. THE STATEMENT BY BACH IN REF C THAT HE "HAD NOT IDENTIFIED ANY SOURCES BY NAME OR DESCRIPTION THROUGHOUT THE TAPING..." IS REFUTED BY THE STATEMENT THAT A SOVIET WAS RECRUITED BY FORMER COS (ROGER T. KINGMAN) DURING HIS TOUR. APART FROM THE DESCRIPTION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE RECRUITMENT WAS MADE, THE SIMPLE STATEMENT THAT A SOVIET OFFICIAL WAS RECRUITED IS SUFFICIENT TO SET OFF A FULL SCALE INVESTIGATION BY THE KGB INTO EVERY SOVIET OFFICIAL WHO SERVED IN MEXICO CITY DURING THAT TIME FRAME. THE SOVIETS HAVE THE RESOURCES AND DETERMINATION TO EVENTUALLY IDENTIFY THE SPY.

B. FUTURE RECRUITMENTS. HOW WILL IT BE POSSIBLE FOR THIS AGENCY TO RECRUIT SOVIETS, OR ANYONE FOR THAT MATTER, IF THE AGENCY CANNOT OFFER GUARANTEES THAT THE IDENTITY OF SOURCES WILL NOT BE EXPOSED BY SOME EMPLOYEE, REGARDLESS OF MOTIVATION? WHILE THIS PROGRAM WILL HAVE IMMEDIATE IMPACT IN MEXICO CITY, LA PAZ, AND MONTEVIDEO, THE FALLOUT AFFECTING FUTURE RECRUITMENTS WILL BE WORLD WIDE.

SECRET

07042

C. REVELATION OF METHODS. THE OPERATIONAL TRADECRAFT AND METHODS (TELTAPS) REVEALED BY BACH ARE STILL IN PRACTICE AT THIS STATION. WHILE IT MAY BE ARGUED THAT THE METHODS HAVE BEEN EXPOSED BY OTHERS SUCH AS AGEE, THE BACH REVELATIONS WILL HAVE FAR GREATER IMPACT BECAUSE THEY CARRY THE IMPRIMATUR OF A REPUTABLE U.S. NEWS AGENCY AND ORIGINATE WITH A PERSON WHO IS NOT IN LEAGUE WITH ANY HOSTILE COUNTRY (AS FAR AS WE KNOW).

D. DAMAGE TO LIAISON. A CONSIDERABLE SEGMENT OF THIS STATION'S OPERATIONS ARE BASED ON LIAISON CO-OPERATION. THE RELATIONSHIP THIS STATION ENJOYS WITH HIGH LEVELS OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT ALSO PROVIDES A HUNTING LICENSE FOR UNILATERAL ENDEAVORS. THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPOSURE OF INSTANCES OF CO-OPERATION. THE POLITICAL RISK WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS WILLING TO UNDERGO FOR THIS AGENCY IS NOT UNLIMITED. EXISTING OR POTENTIAL OPERATIONS COULD BE CURTAILED.

E. DAMAGE TO EXISTING SOURCES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW MANY CURRENT SOURCES WILL CONTINUE COLLABORATING WITH THE AGENCY IN MEXICO CITY (OR OTHER STATIONS) AFTER THIS PROGRAM IS RELEASED.

F. EMBARRASSMENT TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO. AS NOTED IN REF B, THE MEXICAN PRESIDENT WILL TRAVEL TO MOSCOW ON A STATE VISIT IN ABOUT SIX WEEKS TIME. AS A MEANS TO DAMAGE CIA, IT WOULD NOT BE UNLIKE THE SOVIETS TO POINT OUT THAT UNBRIDLED CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST A LEGITIMATE SOVIET PRESENCE IN MEXICO ARE A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE SOVIET UNION AND A POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENT TO CONTINUING FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE PRESIDENT MAY CHOOSE TO FINESSE SUCH A STATEMENT, BUT THE POINT WILL HAVE BEEN MADE.

G. STATION SECURITY. DURING PAST MONTHS, HARDLY A DAY HAS PASSED WHEN THE LOCAL PRESS HAS NOT CARRIED SOME ATTACK AGAINST ALLEGED CIA ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO. WITHIN RECENT WEEKS, THE AGENCY HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF EVERY CRIME FROM THE MURDER OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO THE ABDUCTION OF ALDO MORO. THE NBC PROGRAM WILL PROVIDE NEW GRIST FOR THE LOCAL PROPAGANDA MACHINE AND FURTHER HIGHLIGHT CIA PRESENCE IN MEXICO WITH CONCOMITANT EROSION OF STATION SECURITY.

H. FUTURE BACH REVELATIONS. THERE PROBABLY IS NO WAY TO ESTIMATE THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION THAT BACH HAS REVEALED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS. BACH ADMITS THAT HE HAS UNBURDENED HIS SOUL TO HIS FRIENDS, AND UNDOUBTEDLY HAS PROVIDED MATERIAL TO NBC

WHICH WAS NOT USED ON THE PROGRAM. FURTHER, AFTER THE PROGRAM IS BROADCAST, BACH WILL BECOME AN INSTANT CELEBRITY AND A SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO OTHER NEWSMEN OF VARIOUS STRIPES. WHEN WILL HIS REVELATIONS END?

3. STATION WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING MORE PRECISE IDENTIFICATION OF SITES MENTIONED PARA 5 REF A, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF RESIDENCES AND LANDMARKS. WERE THESE THE RESIDENCES OF FORMER OR CURRENT STATION PERSONNEL? WOULD ANY OF THE LANDMARKS BE OF CONCERN TO THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT? RECOGNIZE THAT IN ABSENCE OF SOUND TRACK, THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE EXCEPT A PERSON FAMILIAR WITH MEXICO CITY AND STATION OPS ACTIVITIES TO IDENTIFY THESE LOCATIONS AND JUDGE THEIR SIGNIFICANCE. NEVERTHELESS, SUCH INFO ESSENTIAL IF STATION TO COMPLETE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PRIOR BROADCAST OF THIS PROGRAM. PLS ADVISE SOONEST.

4. FILE: 200-120-150. E2, IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : William Johnson
UNIT : CI/OPS/FE
EXT : 6918
DATE : 26 Nov 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET - RYBAT

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Nov 25 21 41 z 63

DEFERRED ~~SECT.~~

ROUTINE

[illegible] OPIM

TO : SYDNEY INFO CANBERRA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/CI

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/FE 6, VR

TO SYDNEY INFO CANBERRA CITE DIR 85059

RYBAT KUDESK [illegible] OPIM

1. REFERENCE ALUSNA CANBERRA CABLE CHQ-015* OF 24 NOVEMBER WHICH DOWNGRADED TO SECRET.

2. CABLE DETAILS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION INCLUDING VERBATIM TEXT REMARKS POSSIBLE CONNECTION SOVIET GOVERNMENT WITH ASSASSINATION.

3. CABLE DETAILS TELEPHONE CALL OF 15 OCTOBER 1962.

4. CABLE PLANS ANY ODYOKE[1] OR LIAISON CONTACT WITH POLISH DRIVER AND RESULTS SUCH CONTACT. NOTE NSCID-5 ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITY THIS ACTIVITY TO KUBARK.[2]

5. ALL ASPECTS ASSASSINATION HAVE HIGHEST INVESTIGATIVE AND OPERATIONAL PRIORITY.

C/S COMMENT: *Asst. ALUSNA received telephone call on 23 November from person claiming to be Polish driver of Russian vehicle. Information touched on several areas including possible Soviet connection supplying money to individual in U.S. to assassinate President, possible Soviet implication in U.S.S. Thresher incident, etc.

08953

CI/Lia. - J. Roman

ADDP
RELEASING OFFICER

Chief FE
COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/CI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

3
[R. [illegible] COLEMAN] / C
TSD/AID
[illegible]
[illegible] 1963

13-17 13-9
[[illegible]] [[illegible]]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

13-6-18-3

1 [illegible] 29z

DISSEM [illegible]

R ROUTING

[illegible], FI, RI/AN, FE 6, RF 2

22
TO [OKIB]

INFO [[illegible]] 22

CITE DIR **61320**

2
AQUATIC [LE]GROUP

13-7
REF [RFOO] 6707 (IN 97957)*

2
PERMISSION GRANTED TRAIN [LE]GROUP-1 AND ISSUE SYSTEM AS REQUESTED REF.

END OF MESSAGE

2
TSD COMMENT: *Request permission train [LE]GROUP-1 SW Match #23289 and Developer #22689. He to train [LE]GROUP-6 to use match.
2

Coordinated by phone with:

FE/JKO: R. Chin, x5357
FE/TRLB: Mr. John Kennedy, x5934

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SEYMOUR RUSSELL
CHIEF, TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

CHARLES J. RYAN
AC/TSD/DA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

6961

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : PANAMA CITY
ACTION: CA/O 4
INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 122222Z

WAVE INFO DIR MEXI CITE PACY 1245 13 Nov 63 IN 59319

DIDURIC TPRANSACK

1. THE FEDERACION INTERAMERICANA DE ORGANIZACIONES DE PERIODISTAS PROFESIONALES (FIOPP) IS HOLDING ITS SECOND REGIONAL SEMINAR IN MEXICO CITY 18-29 NOV. FIOPP IS A KUBARK INFLUENCED ORGANIZATION. CONTACT IS MAINTAINED WITH ITS INTERAMERICAN REP IN PANAMA AND ITS COCHAIRMAN IN WASHINGTON, BOTH OF WHOM ARE COVERT ASSOCIATES.

2. ATTENDING THE MEXI SEMINAR FROM THE COLEGIO NACIONAL DE PERIODISTAS DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (IN EXILE) ARE:

A. GUILLERMO GENER RODRIGUEZ
VICE DECANO DEL CNP
SOUTH BAY SHORE DRIVE, MIAMI, FLA

B. SALVADOR DIAZ VERSON
VICE DECANO DEL CNP
8773 S.W. 21 ST, MIAMI, FLA

C. FRANCISCO GOMEZ HECTOR
DIPUTADO DE LA JUNTA DE GOBIERNO

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

6968

14-00000

3302 COLLINS AVE, MIAMI BEACH, FLA

D. MARIO BARRERA

DECANO DEL CNP

967 S.W. 5 ST, MIAMI, FLA.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON ABOVE. OF SPECIFIC INTEREST IS INFO BEARING ON PARTICIPANTS POSSIBLE ACTIONS AT SEMINAR.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

00 1(S)3,244,087

MLA 30372

27 November 1962

Subject: Reported Use of Yacht Potomac by Alpha 66

1. On 20 Nov 62 LAFO received an unsolicited telephone call on the listed telephone number. The caller wanted to advise that there was reportedly in the harbor at Long Beach a vessel, formerly used by the late Theodore Roosevelt, called the Potomac. This vessel, according to the informant, was being used by the Alpha 66 organization. She was believed taking on a cargo of weapons crated as Argentine beef, and destined to leave soon for Seattle. He added that a Wes Davis had just signed on as an engineer, and there was another character named Cliff Roberts on board. Both were described as bearded adventurers.

2. The caller refused to identify himself, claiming that he did not know whether contact with the Agency would be approved by his employer, and further did not know whether or not the information was valid or of interest.

LCDR L. Lessing - Long Beach, C

3. In response to a call to the Intelligence Officer, USCG, it was learned that ther is a vessel, the Potomac, formerly one of the 155' USCG cutters. For some time it had been used by the late F. D. Roosevelt as the presidential yacht. Later it had been disposed of to the Maryland (State) Fish and Game Commission, and more recently it had been acquired by the Hydra-Capital, Inc., 410 West Coast Highway, Newport Beach, California (OR 5-1549).

4. USCG advised further that an investigator for the Los Angeles County Prosecutor, D. L. Wheeler, had accepted an assignment (taking leave of absence to do so) to bring the Potomac from the Barbados to California. The plan, supposedly, was to make her a floating museum of some sort. On his arrival in Barbados, Wheeler is reported to have found the craft in foul shape, with only a single engine operative. He refused the job and returned to Los Angeles. The craft later, however, did turn up in San Diego in October and was later observed tied up in Cerritos Channel; Los Angeles harbor area; and subsequently, she was moved back to San Diego, where it is presently in a shipyard. She has since been painted, and appears to be undergoing some modifications to her hull.

US Dept of Justice - Fed. Bldg - L.A. Cal

05

5. The unidentified informant (paragraphs 1 and 2), subsequently identified as Asst. US Attorney Bill Spivak, was re-contacted by telephone. It was suggested to him that in the event any more information concerning the Potomac and the likelihood of her use in any foreign activity came his way, we would appreciate another call. On this occasion, Spivak volunteered the statement that it was his understanding that the Cliff Roberts he had referred to previously had come from Barbados with the vessel. 05 This was Spivak's first reference to Barbados. 05

6. The above is for your information only. The sketchiness of the material presented LAFO as well as the circumstances of its origin militate against its credibility. As a consequence, no follow-up is anticipated unless requested.

- end -

TFW - 30 Nov 62

MLS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

WH-765

006920

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

201(S) 323554/9
BNY 45002

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division DATE: 31 August 1962
ATTN : Support Branch

FROM : Chief, New York Office

06
SUBJECT: [Robert Pratchett] Cuban Counterrevolutionary Group, Alpha-66

1. We came in contact with a new source who will be a continuing one, known as [Robert A. Pratchett,] a US citizen with 27 years experience in Cuba who is currently in direct contact with a Cuban counterrevolutionary group in the US known as Alpha-66, and who is also in contact with anti-Castro Cubans working in Havana. He will give us more detailed information during the coming weeks, and represent to us the ambitions, operations and proposed sabotage activities of Alpha-66 so that they can either be controlled, encouraged or discouraged, as the case may be from the viewpoint of those interested in Cuban action groups.

2. Bio data on Prachett, for any prior clearance or interest in him, based on what he may present to us for consideration, is as follows:

Date & Place of Birth - [31 Oct 1918,] Havana, Cuba (US citizen by birth)

Education - [University of Pennsylvania, 1940]

Employment - 1961 - Present H. H. Pike Co., New York and Havana
1958 - 1960 Brando and Co., Havana
1946 - 1958 Paramount Pictures International, Havana
1941 - 1945 US Army (Rank of Major)

Present Address - [35 Walton Ave., New Providence, New Jersey]

3. Prachett, who appears to be a mature and loyal US citizen, is interested in being of the best possible service to the US Government in a non-pay status, in assisting where he can in terms of his detailed knowledge of Cubans, Cuba, and the Spanish language, which he speaks perfectly. Other than observing the plans of the Alpha-66 group as a potentially successful sabotage group, he is not affiliated with any counterrevolutionary group, but is now in business for himself as a private investor in a firm he owns and operates, called [PREFIXT Business Forms Inc., 60 East 42nd St.,] New York. He indicated that Alpha-66 plans were to blow all the power plants in Cuba.

J.
IFW 10 Sept 62

JAY B. L. REEVES

FLDaniels:ad

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WH 265

07427

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

SECRET SENSITIVE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN: Support Branch (Crowley)
FROM : Chief, Minneapolis Office

DATE: 31 August 1962

SUBJECT: Cuban Refugee Group

06 03

1. Enclosed are three names provided by [George Hauer] of Cleveland, Ohio. These apparently are the leaders of the Cuban group which you and I have discussed in some detail. For the record, [Hauer] 06 got in touch with me because we had some rather extensive debriefing sessions in 1959, and apparently he prefers to continue that relationship for the present. Headquarters' records will show, however, that he was interviewed by Gene Rittenburg in September 1960.

2. The Cubans listed on the enclosure are the leaders of a small group which is shuttling back and forth to Cuba for the purpose of establishing reception groups, taking in medical supplies, ammunition and weapons, and to bring out other Cubans who wish to leave the country. As you know from our discussions, they are seeking help in the form of supplies, etc. 06 [Hauer] understands that no help will be given without some measure of control by our Agency, and he agreed to provide the names for Agency consideration. The third man on the list is in Cuba at the present time. [Hauer] 06 specifically requested that we treat any on-the-street investigation with great care.

3. Please expedite any checking you might do and give me your expression of interest as soon as possible. [Hauer] 06 is not an exceptionally patient man, and I certainly expect to receive an inquiry from him in the near future. I believe he is genuinely motivated and quite capable, and in his present position of recruiting executive personnel for [Ernst & Ernst] he could be quite useful to the Agency.
06

Vernon R. Sando
VERNON R. SANDO

t-TFW
10/19/62

VRSando/jr

Enclosure

WH 828

SECRET SENSITIVE

05896

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

1. Ernesto Rodriguez y Moreno
   Cities Service Station
   Marathon Shores, Florida

   Age 35, married, three children, owner of gas station.

2. Laureano Batista
   157 S. E. 12th Street
   Miami, Florida

   Son of prominent and reputable Havana banker, Augustin Batista

3. Victor Paneque

   Age 42. Former July 20th Commander.
   Presently in Cuba.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~ WH 829

104-10069-10132

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET 4/P

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

21 Jul 56

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS

NO. FUSA-3202

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. FE	10 Jul		
2. VH/PE/[redacted]			
3. VH/FI			
4. CF6/4/VH			
5. [redacted]			
6. FE/4/C 84			
7. Mr. Douglas			
8.			
9. FE/4/VH	OCT 27 1956		
10. "FOR USE OF RI ONLY" Do not write below this line.			
11.			
12. RI/AN		11/8	
13.			
14. RI/FI			
15. RI/FI - 1409 L			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

AXELRAD, EDOUARD

VH/FE [illegible]

Swiss [illegible]

Cousin [illegible]

English [illegible] cable (?)

Bob: This is the thing I gave you on Michael this a.m. & it somehow landed in Larry's box —

Suggest you discuss with Larry & do check on him to send info. re [illegible] to [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

	201	136215	
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX	X

DATE

JUL 1956

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

07483

... IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD ...

VIA AIR

SECRET

FEB 4 1962

To: Chief of Station, Phnom Penh
Info: Chief, FE
From: Chief of Station, Viet Nam
Subject:
General: Operational/FE [illegible]
Specific: Information concerning Idem A

ACTION REQUIRED: None

In answer to request of Gregory O. SAGEMAN, the following is a composite of information from RUSSELL P. ELLIS (TUSPUN) (IDEM B) and VIRGIL H. [illegible] (IDEM C) concerning Idem A.

1. Description of subject: between 35 and 40 years old, about 6 feet tall, rather bald, small moustache, very strong and vigorous, fine white teeth, Jewish. Speaks quite good English. He is married and has one 9 or 10-year old daughter. He has a sister in New York who is a naturalized American citizen. [redacted] says subject speaks well, loves fine music, has an impressive library, reads continuously and paints very well.

2. Early during the war he was deported as a Jew to a German concentration camp (tatooed prisoner's identification number on right fore-arm—9774), where he spent several horrible years and survived only by luck. Since 1945 he has spent most of his time in Indochina and was apparently in intelligence or related fields most of the time. TUSPUN reports that the first [illegible] rep in Hanoi 1950-51 was sucked in by an offer from subject to mount combined operations and was shortly afterwards declared persona non grata by the French.

3. Subject took part as a civilian in the Atlante Operation, and, according to one report, went in with vast sums of money to make propaganda, buy off the opposition, etc. [illegible]-1 (Idem D) and [illegible] (Idem E) considered Idem A's accomplishment in Central Viet Nam among the few notable achievements in that area, particularly in respect to his contribution to the Vietnamese pacification program which he coordinated throughout the course of Operation Atlante.

4. Subject is an old friend of Col. Jean [illegible], former chief of [illegible]. He was for a time (June-August 1955) in the National Security Division, during which time he proposed to VILLIERS joint operations—pool resources and experience—(similar to Hanoi proposal, above) but VILLIERS refused, considered proposal provocation manoeuver.

5. March-April 1954 subject approached Station and [illegible] for military support for program to support nucleus of a people's militia (garde civile) in the Nha Trang area. Information and correspondence on this proposal will be sent upon request.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM ARCHIVE CARD SUBMITTED

14-00000

SECRET

6. In February-March 1955, subject was sent by the French on a special mission to Poland and East Germany to attend a conference.

7. Subject claims that while working for [illegible] he organized an operation for [illegible], who later asked that he be removed from Saigon. Subject stated that [illegible] wanted to get rid of him for "political" reasons—approximately 15 December 1954.

8. At present Subject is Administrator Adjoint to French High Commissioner at Phnom Penh, as of 24 December 1954. He frequently travels to Saigon, was seen here last 17 May.

[illegible] L. [illegible]

Enclosures
[illegible], [illegible]

20 June 1955

Distribution
Orig & 2: Addressee
1: Chief, FE
4: Station files

SECRET

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

201-136765

SECRET [illegible]

Identities

Item A - [illegible]

Item B - [illegible] R. [illegible]

Item C - [illegible]

Item D - [illegible]

Item E - [illegible]

SECRET

201-126765

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MIM-096-72

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service DATE: 5 July 1972
ATTN : OSS (LGrant)

FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

SUBJECT: Gordon Cooper and Associates

REF : OOA(S) 322/16265-72

1. On 22 June 1972 we met at some length with Leroy Gordon Cooper, President, Gordon Cooper and Associates, Hangar One, Opa-Locka Airport, Opa-Locka, Florida. A peripheral benefit of this meeting was the acquisition of additional information concerning Gordon Cooper and Associates (GCA) which may have a bearing on the referenced OOA(S) and possibly on future clandestine interest in the organization.

2. GCA was formed roughly two years ago as an aerospace and airline management consultant firm. Cooper stated that the organization may be disbanded shortly because of disagreements between Cooper and one of his partners, Mel Adler. Adler supposedly is a stock manipulator who, Cooper feels, comes close to operating outside the law and therefore not the type of person with whom Cooper desires to associate. Adler has refused to sell his stock in GCA and to disassociate himself with GCA so the firm will probably be allowed to simply run out of business. GCA will be replaced with Gordon Cooper Consultants Corporation which will be incorporated either in Nevada or the Republic of Panama. The activities will remain the same and a Miami office will be maintained.

3. In addition to activities within his own firm, Cooper is a member of the Board of Directors of Casino Management International (CMI), Grand Cayman Island. CMI is controlled and operated by Edward (nmu) Cellini, Robert (nmu) Cellini, and Dino (nmu) Cellini and its activities center around the establishment and operation of gambling casinos throughout the world. Cooper claims that he has assured himself that CMI operates within the limits of US laws even though they are headquartered in Grand Cayman and that the Cellini brothers, all US citizens, are law abiding businessmen operating a legitimate business. He claims that there is full disclosure of all personnel connected with the organization, an "open books" policy is maintained with the US Internal Revenue Service and they cooperate completely with the FBI. Cooper frankly stated that [illegible] for the use of his name and his ability to capitalize on [illegible] made during his astronaut days to introduce CMI to individuals [illegible] of government in countries throughout the world.

06772

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

23953

MIM-096-72

4. Cooper has recently been instrumental in the establishment of a casino in Istanbul, Turkey, and he is currently assisting in the negotiations for the establishment of additional casinos in Ankara and Izmir. CMI now operates a casino in Yugoslavia and is bidding on the establishment of an additional one in a Yugoslav location which Cooper cannot recall. In conjunction with CMI, Cooper is working on the establishment of a travel club which would, in addition to offering tour packages to various parts of the world, offer junkets to gambling casinos. CMI would fund the travel expenses of those individuals who could be counted upon to gamble heavily at CMI casinos. As an aside, Cooper mentioned that CMI has "fantastic" files on individuals in all parts of the world who are known to be habitual gamblers. These files include their spending habits, income and outgo and general financial situation.

5. The Haitian airline possibility as reported in referent has no connection with CMI. Cooper is very interested in the project, is pursuing it personally and expects to have some definite word from the Government of Haiti after a trip to Haiti within the next week or two. If the deal reaches fruition, Cooper will be closely associated in Haiti with one Norman Dupree, a Canadian citizen who allegedly is the former president of the telephone company in Haiti and who has extremely close ties with the Haitian government.

6. Cooper reiterated and emphasized his willingness to cooperate with the Agency in whatever manner would be most appropriate. He said that he felt very strongly about such cooperation and that we should feel at complete liberty to approach him personally at any time on any matter of interest to CIA. Bio data is being forwarded.

Bruce E. Mainwaring
BRUCE E. MAINWARING

DHWaldone:jck

23953

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] [illegible] and [illegible]

DOMESTIC [illegible] SERVICE
Operational Support Staff, 900 Key
George S. [illegible] - Ext. 2286

Attn: [illegible]/DCAL

DB 2,993

21 July 1978

cc [illegible] for [illegible]
[illegible]
Case 58801

[illegible]. Attached for your information and retention is copy of [illegible]-65-72.

CI/[illegible]
2 D 3323
Headquarters

[illegible]

SB/CI/[illegible]
1 D 15
Headquarters

06772

CONFIDENTIAL

23958

5P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/GYROSE
Agreed Activities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: DIR-14742

1. INTRODUCTION. As a follow up to reference, Maj. Watlington arrived in Miami on 6 June 1962. After Maj. Watlington had an opportunity to discuss the local situation with Lt. Col. Carlos Causes, the local ACSI representative, arrangements were made for a lengthy session on the subject of Agreed Activities. It was agreed that this discussion would take place at 1000 hours on 7 June 1962 at a JMWAVE safehouse facility. This meeting subsequently took place as scheduled and was participated in by Lt. Col. Causes, Maj. Watlington, Dudley R. JENTONS, Charles B. WIESINGER and Andrew K. REUTEMAN. The specific points which were outlined in this discussion are covered in the following paragraph.

2. DISCUSSIONS. In the course of the 7 June 1962 conversations with ACSI representatives the following topics worthy of recording were discussed.

a. Opa Locka Refugee Referral Procedures. Maj. Watlington made the point that in accordance with the agreements which had been reached between ACSI and KUBARK, local procedures were to be agreed upon in order that ACSI might obtain refugee referrals from Opa Locka which could be used as a basis upon which to mount OB collection operations. Maj. Watlington underscored the point that ACSI had no interest or charter to run other than OB collection operations. At the same time if any of their operations produced intelligence on subject matter other than OB, this intelligence would be reported via existing ACSI reports channels. REUTEMAN indicated that JMWAVE acknowledged the validity of ACSI's mission in the OB field, and we were therefore willing to cooperate fully in this regard. On the other hand, we believed that it was essential that certain

CS [illegible] 19-2-12
JOB # 6-8-87/14
Box: 1 Fold: 2

19-2-12

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - Chief, TFW

INDEX X

CROSS REFERENCE TO
19 19-2-4

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
3 JULY 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-4322

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-2-4

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

098255

safeguards be built into any Opa Locka referral in order that we could minimize the possibilities for duplication of effort and/or wire crossing. This concept was readily accepted by Maj. Watlington. It did not, however, strike a totally responsive chord in Lt. Col. Causes. This was noted but in order to proceed with preliminary arrangements, REUTEMAN put forth the proposal that ACSI register a list of agent requirements with Opa Locka and that this list could then be used as a basis upon which refugee screenings could be conducted. It was suggested that Col. Kail would be the logical point of reference in Opa Locka through which the referral system could be managed. In this connection it was pointed out that once Col. Kail identified an individual whom he considered to be primarily of ACSI interest, he could arrange for this individual to be referred to Lt. Col. Causes' covert unit. At the same time Col. Kail would make arrangements to pass to KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and to Station JMWAVE a copy of the Opa Locka debriefing of the individual who had been referred to ACSI. Upon receipt of this information KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and at Station JMWAVE would review the referral. If this review revealed that the individual was not of operational interest to JMWAVE and his primary access was not in fields other than OB, no objections would be expressed relative to ACSI retention and full exploitation of the body. Maj. Watlington expressed satisfaction with this proposal and stated that he would be prepared to discuss it further once he had an opportunity to personally review the functioning of the Opa Locka center.

✓ 13 201-281313 FR RE USE by ANOTHER U.S. AGENCY JUNE 61

b. Antonio *CUESTA Valle. Born 13 June 1926. Lt.Col. Causes asked if we could clarify the current status of our relationship with Cuesta. As this name did not ring a bell with any of the JMWAVE representatives, Lt. Col. Causes was asked for further details. This produced the statement that ACSI was interested in Cuesta and wanted to use him in an infiltration operation. ACSI had allegedly previously traced Cuesta with Station JMWAVE and had received the reply that KUBARK had been in touch with the individual but had terminated him because he was unreliable. In view of this response Lt. Col. Causes wanted to know whether we would recommend the reuse of Cuesta by ACSI. We responded to this by stating that we would review our files and would forward a written reply to Lt. Col. Causes within the next few days.

✓ 201-268277 FR RE. use by another U.S. Agency June 61

c. Laureano *BATISTA Falla. Born 1 May 1935. Lt. Col. Causes asked if we still retained an operational interest in Batista. If we did not ACSI was interested in using this individual in an infiltration operation and as a result wanted JMWAVE's opinion as to Batista's capability and reliability. We advised Lt. Col. Causes that we would check our files and would forward a written reply relative to Batista within a matter of a few days.

✓ 201-523924 FR RE USE by ANOTHER U.S. AGENCY JUNE 61

d. Antonio *ORDONEZ Hernandez. Born 24 August 1918. Lt. Col. Causes asked if we were currently in touch with Ordonez. As this name rang a bell with REUTEMAN we responded by stating that subject was of interest to us. 24 In this connection we indicated we were willing to reexamine our relationship with Ordonez 24 in order to determine his full potential or capability, and if his capability was greater in the OB field than in fields which were of interest to us, we would certainly consider relinquishing our interest. 24

Lt. Col. Causes stated that he felt that he had established his equity in Ordonez through the name trace procedure. Despite this, he had found that Ordonez had disappeared from circulation; and, therefore, he assumed that we were debriefing this man.

e. Third Country Diplomats. REUTEMAN asked the ACSI representatives whether they were currently in touch with any third country diplomats. Maj. Watlington stated that ACSI had previously tried to harness the 24 capabilities of the Spanish, Uruguayan and Canadian diplomatic pouches. Coordination of these activities with KUBARK had resulted in ACSI's being denied the use of these facilities. As a result Maj. Watlington stated that at the present time ACSI was not in touch with any third country diplomats. On the other hand, ACSI was interested in pursuing the third country diplomatic channel as a means of establishing communications with inside assets. At this point Lt. Col. Causes stated that he was very disappointed at KUBARK's refusal to allow him to use the facilities of the Spanish, Uruguayan 24 or Canadian pouches. It was indicated that KUBARK understood Lt. Col. Causes' reaction; however, the KUBARK position was based on sound security principles and could not be altered. The additional explanations which were made relative to the security implications which were inherent in the use of third country diplomats and how misuse could affect long standing government to government or service to service agreements between ODYOKE and free world countries did not make any impact on Lt. Col. Causes. This gentleman was predisposed to interpret KUBARK's refusal to allow him to use certain 24 diplomatic pouch channels as a clear indication that one of KUBARK's primary responsibilities in the Miami area was to restrict and inhibit ACSI operational activity. Once this attitude was identified no further attempts were made to persuade Lt. Col. Causes that our actions had been taken in the best interests of the intelligence community.

f. Maritime Infiltration of ACSI Agents. A discussion of those support services which KUBARK might render to ACSI operations revealed that Lt. Col. Causes was still interested in having JMWAVE infiltrate two of his agents into PBRUMEN. In this connection the point was made by ACSI that under optimum circumstances they would prefer that JMWAVE assume responsibility for the agents in the Miami area and then deliver them through a secure mechanism to Havana. If this were not possible ACSI would reluctantly accept infiltration of their agents into any point in PBRUMEN. Lt. Col. Causes was told in very precise terms that JMWAVE would not undertake to infiltrate any of his agents into Havana. On the other hand, we would consider any proposal for the infiltration of selected agents to a beach area in PBRUMEN. The point was made that in this connection Lt. Col. Causes had to understand that our maritime capabilities were limited and we were currently committed to the full exploitation of these assets for at least six weeks in advance. As a result any operational plan which he might submit to us should be keyed to the assumption that approximately six to eight weeks would pass before we could realistically consider the servicing of his request. Lt. Col. Causes agreed to project his operational plans within this frame of reference.

g. Documentation. A discussion of the documentation problem relative to agent infiltrations revealed that at the moment ACSI did not have any documentation problems which they felt warranted discussion at this session.

h. Coordination Forms. The discussion of operational coordination revealed that ACSI was willing for JMWAVE to coordinate locally those operational proposals which might be received from Lt. Col. Causes. Once this coordination was effected and if there were disagreement, then the operation could be referred to the Washington headquarters of both ACSI and JMWAVE. Maj. Watlington stated that the forms for effecting coordination in accordance with procedures which had been agreed upon at Washington would be sent to both JMWAVE and the ACSI unit in Miami in the near future. In view of this Maj. Watlington suggested that we not initiate the coordination mechanism until these forms were on hand circa 1 July 1962.

i. W/T Assets. The discussion of the use of W/T facilities in terms of PBRUMEN operations revealed that the Miami ACSI unit did not have any W/T assets in PBRUMEN at this time. On the other hand, Lt. Col. Causes was interested in establishing W/T assets in PBRUMEN. In view of this he asked if JMWAVE would continue to assess, polygraph and train those individuals that ACSI thought were suitable W/T candidates. It was indicated that we were certainly prepared to review all appropriate cases and would render whatever support was required. This then resulted in a discussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing to monitor ACSI W/T transmissions from PBRUMEN in those instances where the W/T operator had not been assessed, polygraphed or trained by KUBARK. We indicated that we would be glad to monitor such transmissions if we were told in advance of the date, time and frequencies on which the broadcasts were to be made. This then led to a discussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing to transmit C/W messages for ACSI agents. Here again, we stated that we would favorably consider any requests for C/W transmissions providing that we knew the content of the message, the identity of the agent who was to receive it, and the agent's location and equipment which he might be using. Lt. Col. Causes stated that in view of this discussion we could anticipate that he would be levying requirements on us in the near future for support in the W/T field.

j. Secret Writing. A discussion of S/W techniques revealed that if a request for the issuance of S/W were received from their Miami representative it would be reviewed, and if ACSI approved the operation KUBARK would be asked to issue a system. If JMWAVE agreed via local coordination that the operation in question required the use of S/W, then this recommendation would be cabled to our Washington Headquarters where coordination would be effected with ACSI. Once this was accomplished, KUBARK Washington would cable to JMWAVE the number of the system which was to be issued. JMWAVE would then issue the system to the ACSI representative in Miami.

3. COMMENT. At the conclusion of the above discussion arrangements were made for lunch, but Lt. Col. Causes chose not to participate in the luncheon session. During the luncheon conversation Maj. Watlington indicated that he did not believe that Lt. Col. Causes would cooperate within the spirit of the DCID's. As a result he asked that JMWAVE be extremely patient with ACSI until such time as Lt. Col. Causes retired and could be replaced. Maj. Watlington

indicated that the retirement was scheduled to take place at the end of September 1962. At the end of the luncheon session arrangements were made for JENTONS to take Maj. Watlington on a tour of Opa Locka. Based on this tour additional discussions were to be held with Maj. Watlington particularly in regard to the development of procedures for referral of agents to ACSI from the Opa Locka flow.

4. OPA LOCKA. Maj. Watlington and JENTONS subsequently went out to the interrogation center at Opa Locka. Here they had an interview with Col. Kail, the tenor of which was, on the part of Maj. Watlington, to assure himself that the ACSI representative, Francasi, was having adequate access to operational leads. Col. Kail said that operational leads were shared according to their abilities between the KUBARK representative and the ACSI man. However, there were occasional difficulties in assuring that the men best qualified received the body in question. In addition, he said KUBARK occasionally pulled a man out of the Center without his completing the full treatment which precluded the ACSI representative's getting his hands on someone who might be well qualified for their operations. Maj. Watlington believed that assurance that the ACSI representative got a fair deal might be achieved through a more complete briefing of Col. Trudencio Ulibarri, who is in charge of the preliminary screening so that he would more fully understand what was needed. JENTONS said that this would be a very good idea, but that it would be better if it were a dual briefing with a KUBARK representative being present as well. Maj. Watlington said that he would ask his headquarters for permission to have such a briefing given. Col. Kail expressed his opinion that the assignment of JENTONS to formal liaison with the ACSI representatives would do much to eliminate present difficulties and all present echoed this pious thought.

5. AGREEMENT. When JENTONS turned Maj. Watlington over to Lt. Col. Causes after the meeting at Opa Locka, the two ACSI representatives said that they believed that, for the time being, it would be better to continue the system as at present, pending JENTONS' permanent arrival at the beginning of July 1962. As Lt. Col. Causes is obviously skeptical about the outcome, this was agreed to as a stopgap measure.

END OF DISPATCH

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

19-2-12

104-10069-10260 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

4-4-C

NO-173-65

Chief, Contact Division
Att'n : NonSov Bloc Area

5 May 1965

Chief, New Orleans Office

The Information Council of the Americas, 620 Gravier Street,
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

Ref. : NO-152-65, Support Branch (Richardson) memo of 20 April 1965, NO-161-65

~~S-5093~~ A-135263

1. The Information Council of the Americas (INCA) of 620 Gravier Street, New Orleans, ~~Louisiana~~, was recently opened as a source of foreign intelligence information on the radio broadcasting industry in Latin America. The current program of INCA is primarily concerned with the dissemination of taped recordings of anti-Communist material, called Truth Tapes, to certain radio broadcasting stations in Latin America and North America for use as a weapon against Communist penetration in the Americas. Its headquarters are located at 620 Gravier Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70130. You will find the names of its officers, directors, and consultants given on the enclosed letterhead of the organization.

A 121440

2. We have been in recent contact with Edward Scannell Butler, Executive Vice President and Staff Director, and have received his assurances of wholehearted cooperation in our agency's mission. [Yesterday we examined all of the files of correspondence between Mr. Butler and personnel of various radio stations in 16 Latin American countries.] In order to build up a market for the Truth Tapes program in Latin America, Mr. Butler first obtained from the appropriate consul in New Orleans a list of the radio stations in operation in his country. He next wrote the administrative personnel of these stations about the anti-Communist purpose of INCA and offered to supply each station with Truth Tapes. Those stations requesting them were then provided with a series of the tapes. One or two years later, Mr. Butler sent the participating station a questionnaire designed to elicit information about audience response to the Truth Tapes program. Copies of the first questionnaire and of a revised one are attached for your information. Judging by the responses we read, the INCA correspondence files will provide a limited amount of information, dated 1964 and 1965, on the identification of radio stations in Latin America which are broadcasting Truth Tapes, their addresses, the names of key personnel, the identification of stations not responding to the INCA offer, sizes of audiences, and their responses. In the case of Uruguay, the exchange of correspondence between Mr. Butler and [Dr. Martin Miqueo-Narancio] 85 contained information about the political orientation of key radio personnel in Montevideo /NO-10671/. This example, however, is an exception, since the files contain virtually no detailed political information of significance.

COPY F/ # 5093

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

08743

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

3. Mr. Butler mentioned yesterday that, inasmuch as he was again revising the questionnaire, he would welcome our suggestions about additional topics. We suggested questions designed to elicit technical information about the station and its equipment, such as descriptions (manufacturer, type, model) of transmitter, receiver, antenna type and power, frequencies and frequency range, reliability of equipment, normal and emergency power sources, remote pick-up arrangements, etc. We stressed of course that none of these topics should be introduced into the questionnaire unless Mr. Butler was convinced of their suitability for his immediate purpose as well as for the long-term propaganda aim of his organization. He stated that our suggestions were entirely proper and, in his opinion, were reasonable requests that would not arouse the station manager's curiosity. We pointed out to Mr. Butler that, while information about key personnel and their political orientation, about the station's administrative policies, etc., was of prime importance to us, these subjects obviously could not be introduced into the questionnaire. He agreed that it would be better to elicit such information in another manner, as he had done with OS Dr. Miqueo-Narancio, but because of his very heavy responsibilities, he did not have time to develop similar sources of information in each of the other 15 countries.

4. It occurs to us that you or a possible consumer could assist us by suggesting other appropriate topics for Mr. Butler's consideration in the revision of the questionnaire. We shall appreciate whatever help you can give us in this regard.

5. In the meantime, as soon as all of Mr. Butler's current correspondence has been properly filed, we expect to extract the appropriate information from the folders and to present the material in a series of 00-B reports.

LLOYD A. RAY

DABrandao/gn

Enclosures

cc: Services Branch

SE ONLY SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Current Address of Maurice Halperin

FROM:

Chief, Contact Division (Support) Stuntz

EXTENSION 2268

NO. WH 729

DATE 31 DEC 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. TFW/Registry Mrs. Krages GB 2702			
2. Sam Halpern, ExOff-TFW GB 2708	4 Jan	4	
3. TFW/CI/Harm			
4.			
5. C/Contact Division (Support) Stuntz			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

I am sending this to the following:

1) TFW
2) SR/CI
3) CI/LN
4) Security

Mayo Stuntz

file this cover sheet file in WH 729.
Stuntz

WH-729

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

#09254

14-00000

SECRET

00A(S)3,246,933

WSYRO- 8060

27 December 1962

Preston E. James
342 Huntington B Crouse Hall
Syracuse University,
Syracuse, N.Y.

Subject: Current Address of Maurice Halperin

1. A source of this office has just advised us that he received a Christmas card (1962) from Maurice Halperin on which the return address was given as: "Apt C-2, Calle 12, no 103, Miramar, Habana, Cuba." The only message on the card was one of Christmas greetings. Halperin and our source have known each other for a number of years and they always exchange Christmas cards. This is the first one Halperin has sent with a Cuban address on it. The last time that our source saw Halperin was in Moscow when he (the former) was visiting in the USSR during August-September 1961 as part of an official US delegation.

2. In view of Halperin's past activities and associations, we are making this information known to you. Our source comments that Halperin always seems to show up wherever there is some sort of activity going on.

-end-

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible] and [illegible]

WH-729

MICROFILMED
APR 3 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

3P

9 March 1968

CI: Mexico
4: Mexico

re: report on PRI activities

TO : COS/Mexico City

FROM : Douglas J. FREAPANE

SUBJECT: Status Report, Project LIOGLE/LIMIX Covering Period
1 February thru 29 February 1968

I. ACTIONS TAKEN: (1) LIMIX-1 prepared and published 5,000 copies of the monthly LIMIX political newspaper for distribution in offices of the PRI in Mexico City and to selected officials in the provinces. Copies are included as Attachment A to this report. This issue contains good photographic coverage of the national convention of the PRI; an article on page 3 which is based on previous speeches by the new President of the PRI, Alfonso MARTINEZ Domínguez; a series of interviews with political and intellectual figures regarding MARTINEZ Domínguez on page 4; an article boosting the future leader of the federal workers union, Prof. Edgar ROBLEDO Santiago, on page 13; and, a "plug" for the Olympics on the back page, in addition to other serious and light features of general interest. (2) LIMIX-1 also prepared the monthly ideological magazine-supplement (see Attachment B) which contains the inaugural speech of the new President of the PRI and the new PRI "oficial mayor", Fluvio VISTA Altamirano, and which is included as an insert with the Attachment A newspaper. (3) LIMIX-1 provided the Station with information from very reliable sources on the reasons for the dismissal of Lic. Francisco GALINDO Ochoa from his post in the Presidency and on what the government expects of MARTINEZ Domínguez in the PRI. (4) IDENTITY A and LIMIX-1 continued a close relationship with ex-Deputy Salvador PADILLA Flores who is supposed to be a good friend of the new President of the PRI. (5) The representative of the Municipal Government of Mexico City in Atzcapozalco, Ing. Raúl GARZA Montemayor, provided the IDENTITY A group with a second office, also located in a building owned by the Municipality. (6) The IDEN A group continued, now with official support, to organize athletic events, show motion pictures provided by QKFLOWAGE and the West German embassy and activities related to organization of PRI youth activities in this zone of Mexico City (Atzcapozalco). (7) The LIMIX "Ateneo", headed by IDENTITY B suffered a "temporary loss" of its TV programs and IDEN B was busy trying to find governmental contacts with sufficient power to force Channel 11 to return the TV time to the "Ateneo". (LIMIX-1 believes the loss was caused by the dismissal of GALINDO Ochoa from the Presidency. GALINDO had given IDEN B un-official support in his relationship with the TV Station management.) It is believed that "Ateneo" time can be recovered; however, IDEN B is also investigating the possibility of obtaining time on a commercial TV channel and a radio station. (8) IDEN B and LIMIX-1 continued cultivation of Lic. Esteban RUIZ Ponce who is employed as a "secretario adjunto" to Lic. Joaquín CISNEROS, the Private Secretary of the President of Mexico. LIMIX-1 also had several

201-766871

NO 201

CS COPY

MMA-34311

50-126-28/3

meetings with the Private Secretary of CISNEROS, Lic. Rafael MINOR. (9) LIMIX-1 prepared, published and distributed 3,000 copies of the Attachment C monthly IPN student publication which included an interview with the new President of the Federación Nacional de Estudiantes Técnicos (FNET), José CEBREROS, on page 6, several articles provided by QKFLOWAGE and the West German embassy as well as other material of interest to IPN students. The CEBREROS interview was an "exclusive".)10) LIMIX-1 was able to obtain one of the 2,000 "tickets" available for the national convention of the PRI, and attended both day's meetings. (11) LIMIX-1 provided the Station with a report on the FNET Congress and his participation therein. As a result, a close friend of LIMIX-1, Ramiro AGUIRRE Garín, was named Private Secretary of the President of the FNET, and LIMIX-1 was named one of the advisors of the FNET President. (12) LIMIX-1 continued contact with a variety of political personalities with the objective of being able to penetrate the new PRI headquarters.

N7201

N0201

II. ACTIONS PENDING: The major pending action is the establishment of a penetration and/or friendships within the PRI once the situation in PRI headquarters has solidified to some degree. For example, Lic. Juan MALDONADO sits in a sort of "limbo" at this date, neither out of his job, nor confirmed in a job. However, it would appear that the LIMIX mechanism has at least five channels into the new PRI national executive staff which are being developed for appropriate utilization. A separate report will be prepared on these channels into the PRI national. Other channels exist to provide contacts within the PRI Regional headquarters for Mexico City, but nothing can be done until current officers are retired and the new men appointed.

III. INDICATIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS: As reported in paragraph I, #3, 5, 10 and 11.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES: Nothing new to report.

V. SECURITY SITUATION: No security problems were encountered.

VI. AGENT MEETINGS: Meetings between FREAPANE and LIMIX-1 were held on a weekly basis in a restaurant.

VII. REMARKS: While student operations are no longer the priority operations of this project, FREAPANE continues to encourage LIMIX-1 contact with the IPN student politicians because of the continuing, and even increasing political problems caused by far left student agitation, thus providing WOFIRM with a continuing possibility for intelligence gathering and political action in this field.

Prepared on 9 March 1968 by: Douglas J. Freapane

DOUGLAS J. FREAPANE

144

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PROCESSING		
PRO. POSED	ACTION	ACCOM. PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

akr

SUBJECT Operational/GYROSE
Review and Analysis of AMFAUNA Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FILMED
JAN 1 0 1966

Action Required:

1. Traces on AMFAUNAs 2 through 23, identified in Attachment E. POAs on AMFAUNAs 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19.

2. Ascertain whether AMFAUNA-3 is of operational interest to ODIBEX (see paragraph 15b).

3. Forward evaluations of documentary intelligence provided by AMFAUNA-4 (see paragraph 56).

Summary

4. AMFAUNA-1 is a Cuban national who was recruited and trained in the United States and returned legally to Cuba in March 1961 to serve as resident agent in Havana. Since then he has built a net of over twenty sub-agents and has sent back 140 S/W messages, from which upwards of fifty intelligence disseminations have been made. He is highly motivated for his work and under effective control by JMWAVE. The quality of his production is, for the most part, very good and improving, although he is at times distracted by an understandable interest in para-military operations. Operationally he is very skillful; however, he has been known to take unnecessary risks. There is no reason to think that he is under hostile control nor that the operation is likely in the future to be turned against us. There is, however, the real risk that he may one day fall into a G-2 trap baited with the Escambray guerrillas. If so, this will be due to the fact that contact with the guerrillas was his first assignment and, although he has been re-directed to intelligence collection, he sometimes seems to feel that he has failed in his primary mission. This, plus the fact that he evidently believes that the end is now very close, is apt to make him vulnerable to an appeal from the "heroes of the Escambray".

24
24

INDEX -X

Present Status of the Operation - Modus Operandi:

5. There is considerable evidence that AMFAUNA-1 is extraordinarily

Attachments: A-D, Incl NSM
Charts A,B,C,D h/w N.S.M. attached
Attch. E - Identities ~~USC~~ (AMFAUNAs 2-23)
Attch. F - Identities ~~USC~~
Att. 1, 2 + 3 NA
att. 4 NSM
att 5 + 6 h/w

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
attached

Distribution:
3-Headquarters
[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
11 July 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
JUL 23 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-4703

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-50/3
201-291230

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

8904

skillful in the practice of security. He has built a false identity which he uses wherever possible in his operational contacts, he is usually selective and cautious in his choice of collaborators, he takes pains to check on the security of his sub-agents, and he uses a system of cutouts for much of his work.

6. Some of AMFAUNA-1's older collaborators know him by ~~true~~ name, but wherever possible he introduces himself to new contacts by the name of ("Julio "ROJO") 07 Evidently he is now living the part of (Julio ROJO) 07 to such an extent that he has in effect a double identity. In one of his S/W messages he asked that the widow of AMCUSP-1 be warned not to reveal that ("Julio") is in Cuba. Since AMFAUNA-1 is in Cuba legally, and all his family 07 and friends know it, this can only mean that she should not reveal that AMFAUNA-1 and ("Julio ROJO") are 07 identical.

201-291230 pseudonymn used by Sub. of 201

7. In recruiting sub-agents, AMFAUNA-1 relies primarily on his own judgment and intuition. If he approves of a person, he will recruit him. However, he has shown himself to be very cautious in granting his approval. He has reported two persons whom he does not completely trust because, while otherwise well qualified, they drink too much and are indiscreet. For two other examples, AMBOA-1 and LITAU-5 approached him separately and revealed their relationship with KUBARK, hoping to collaborate with him; AMFAUNA-1 treated them both with reserve while he checked them out with JMWAVE. He has submitted the names of other contacts for checking. In the case of AMFAUNA-4, 04 ((Gonzalez)) whom he recruited without prior checking because time did not permit it, he put his misgivings in writing: "Right away AMFAUNA-1 arranged for a personal interview, taking utmost precautions, since we have had sad previous experiences with members of CASTRO's armed forces."

8. Once he has recruited a sub-agent, AMFAUNA-1 manages to keep an independent eye on the former's security. On more than one occasion he has reported that one of his sub-agents is under G-2 surveillance, and that for the time being he is staying away from him.

9. In general AMFAUNA-1 seems to trust in the efficiency of his security precautions. On 25 February 1962 he reported that Identity 11 had been caught, but that he was in no danger because he had been compartmented from her. 04 This compartmentation is achieved by the use of (five) 04 cutouts: AMFAUNA-2, AMFAUNA-3, AMFAUNA-4, 04 AMBOA-1, and AMFAUNA-5, who maintain contact for AMFAUNA-1 with most if not all of his sub-agents. Chart A, which shows AMFAUNA-1 in direct contact with AMFAUNAs 7 through 13, may be in error on this point. It would be more in keeping with AMFAUNA-1's known modus operandi for him to have cutouts between himself and these sub-agents. If there is a cutout or cutouts here, their identity is not yet known. There may also be an unreported cutout between AMFAUNA-1 and AMFAUNA-4.

10. Except for AMFAUNA-4, all the above-mentioned cutouts are women. Two of his support agents, including his mail drop, are also women. AMFAUNA-1 has not been explicit on this point, but it is believed that he shares his favors between them. If so, he has the best of cover for his relations with them. It also clarifies the otherwise puzzling picture of a legal resident of Cuba sleeping in a different bed each night. This practice must certainly reduce the possibility that the G-2 will pick him up for routine questioning.

Communications:

11. The bulk of AMFAUNA-1's communications come via S/W. His messages to JMWAVE are sent to accommodation addresses serviced by AMPAN-2 and AMCUTLER-1. JMWAVE's messages to him are addressed to AMFAUNA-14. AMFAUNA-1 can also use (diplomatic couriers) 24 for sending documents and other material unsuitable for S/W. He has a personal contact with two of the officers (of the Spanish Embassy), 24 who either bring it to the JMWAVE area and mail it to AMCUTLER-1, or carry it 15-2

15-2

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

second via AMFAUNA-14.

12. The courier system can also work in the other direction. AMFAUNA-1 has been supplied with S/W materials for his own use by way of the (Spanish Embassy,) and for the use of AMRIPE-1 and AMRAVEL-1 by way of the (Argentine Embassy) 24

13. A third communications 01 channel 08 exists in the weekly telephone conversations (between) AMCUTLER-1 (and his wife AMFAUNA-2) 01 It is useful for passing signals already prearranged by S/W, and for confirming that AMFAUNA-1 is still at liberty. If he is ever arrested, the news will probably come first by this means.

Finances:

14. Expenses of the operation are $300 per month. The money is given monthly to Identity-3 or Identity-4 in the JMWAVE area. Identity-3, upon receipt of the dollars, notifies Identity-1 in Havana who in turn pays Cuban pesos to AMFAUNA-1. Identity-4 follows the same procedure with Identity-2. AMFAUNA-1 confirms receipt of this money by S/W.

Sub-agents:

15. Following is a description of the sub-agents in the AMFAUNA net, including AMCOG-2 and AMBOA-1 who, although they have their own independent connections to JMWAVE, have to some extent joined forces with AMFAUNA-1. For the identities of AMFAUNAs 2 through 23, see Attachment E, forwarded under separate cover.

01

a. AMFAUNA-2: AMFAUNA-1's sister-in-law, she formerly served as his contact to members of his net (in asylum in the various embassies) 08 and now serves as his cutout to at least the following:

(1) AMCOG-2: She first appears in AMFAUNA-1's correspondence in his S/W message No. 14 dated 19 May 1961, where he mentions that she was his link to a radio station operated by the (Rescate) 29 organization. Nothing ever came of this proposed communications channel, but AMCOG-2 remained in contact with AMFAUNA-1, helping him arrange asylum for burned agents and passing some of his communications (to diplomatic couriers) 24 AMFAUNA-1 reported on 9 July 1961, in his S/W message No. 21, that AMCOG-2 knew him only by his alias (Julio ROJO) 07 In his message No. 118, dated June 1962, he reported that AMFAUNA-15 had accidentally blown his true name to AMCOG-2. For a further discussion of AMCOG-2, and her relation to the security of AMFAUNA-1 see paragraph 56 below.

01 01

(2) AMFAUNA-14: She is the secretary of (AMCOG-2) with whom she has done clandestine work. She now serves AMFAUNA-1 as an accommodation address and as a source of information. Message No. 112 dated 18 April 1962 included the name of a Communist nurse who has allegedly come to the United States with the mission of infiltrating a counter-revolutionary group. AMFAUNA-14 obtained this information from a doctor (in a Havana clinic) 08 She also is AMFAUNA-1's (link to the Dutch diplomatic pouch) 24

01

(3) AMFAUNA-15: She is a relative of (AMFAUNA-14) and a friend of AMCOG-2. She is also the wife of AMFAUNA-17 and a friend of AMFAUNA-16 who is now 08 (imprisoned on the Isle of Pines) and sends her

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

b. AMFAUNA-3: AMFAUNA-1's first mention of her is in his S/W message No. 127 dated 4 May 1962. She has provided information on military hospitals, 06 and has a trusted contact (Identity 7) in the G-2. 24 She also was AMFAUNA-1's cutout to Identity-12, who was a Havana 08 contact of the guerrilla leader Oswaldo RAMIREZ. 24 In early June 1962 she was approached by Identity-8 who claimed to be the new contact to the RAMIREZ organization. (See also paragraph 58 below.) On 15 March 1962 AMFAUNA-3 was traced by ODIBEX who proposed to use her in their Operation CASINO. A negative trace reply was given at that time. Headquarters is requested to ascertain whether ODIBEX has a valid prior claim on this agent.

c. AMFAUNA-4: 01 He is a high-ranking Cuban Army officer who has provided AMFAUNA-1 with documentary information which ought to be of some value, although JMWAVE has not yet seen it, it having gone to Headquarters via Madrid through the channel described in paragraph 11 above. 52 He also claims to be receiving information from Identity-9 and Identity-10. AMFAUNA-1 was introduced to AMFAUNA-4 by AMCOG-2 who in turn was introduced to him by Identity-13. 01 For a further discussion of this matter, see paragraph 56 below.

d. AMBOA-1: The origin of AMFAUNA-1's contact with this agent, who has also been recruited independently by JMWAVE, is uncertain. He first mentioned her in October 1961 as his cutout to Identity-14, a Cubana Airlines pilot 06 who had formerly been a contact of AMCUSP-1 and who subsequently defected. AMFAUNA-1's last mention of her was on 15 November when he reported that she had given him a map showing artillery installations on the south coast of Las Villas. It is possible that AMFAUNA-1 has broken contact with her, but since he has not reported having done so it is considered more likely that she remains his cutout to two Cubana Airlines pilots 08 who are known to be still reporting:

(1) AMFAUNA-18: He was recruited in March 1962, and has provided AMFAUNA-1 with passenger lists 24 and the location of artillery emplacements which he has spotted from his aircraft. 24 It is not known how AMFAUNA-1 first met AMFAUNA-18, and it is possible that AMFAUNA-1 meets directly with him. It is only surmised that AMBOA-1 is his cutout to him.

(2) AMFAUNA-19: He was recruited at the same time as AMFAUNA-18. Although AMFAUNA-1 did not explicitly say so, it can be inferred that he and AMFAUNA-18 are witting of each other's recruitment.

e. AMFAUNA-5: AMFAUNA-1 first reported her as an agent in September 1961. 06 She is the sister-in-law of AMFAUNA-23, 01 a former naval officer who had been an agent of AMFAUNA-1 as early as July 1961 but had been caught and imprisoned for trying to leave Cuba illegally. 24 She has been the source of information on Cuban airfields, and is the cutout to a group of people employed at Rancho Boyeros Airport. 24 It is believed that the identities of all these people have not yet been reported, but they seem to be effective. On 29 May 1962 AMFAUNA-1 reported the arrival of an undocumented Soviet plane 24 at Rancho Boyeros, and forwarded the passenger list which he said one of his agents had obtained clandestinely. Following are the persons with whom AMFAUNA-5 is known to be in contact.

(1) AMFAUNA-20, 01 her husband. AMFAUNA-1 has written that he has broken personal contact with this man.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

(2) AMPAN 12: A former chief engineer of the 08
Office of Airports he was recruited by Havana Station in 1960, and has been corresponding with JMWAVE by S/W.

(3) AMFAUNA-21: A chief inspector of mechanics 08
for Cubana Airlines. He has stated his willingness to sabotage air traffic, 24 but his precise contribution to AMFAUNA-1's operations is not known.

(4) AMFAUNA-22: A chief of electrical instruments 08
for Cubana Airlines. Nothing more is known about this man.

01
(5) AMFAUNA-23: Brother-in-law of AMFAUNA-5.

f. AMFAUNA-6: A support agent. AMFAUNA-1 has written that she has no access to information of interest, but is an intelligent and brave female whom he uses for cover and to secure overt information.

g. AMFAUNA-7: An old friend of AMFAUNA-1 and his brother AMCUTLER-1.01 He works closely with AMFAUNA-8 and 24
formerly was AMFAUNA-1's cutout to the Uruguayan Embassy.

h. AMFAUNA-8: An old friend of AMFAUNA-1 and his 08
brother AMCUTLER-1.01 He has a contact in the Interior Ministry and works closely with AMFAUNA-7.

08 08
i. AMFAUNA-9: A former sales manager for a coffee firm, he secures information of general interest from coffee buyers travelling throughout Cuba.
08

j. AMFAUNA-10:10 A widow of a bank employee, she has contacts in Santiago de Cuba and in the Cuban Navy and G-2. 24
She is also related to the son of Fidel CASTRO 08 and has provided information on the son's 24 whereabouts and indoctrination.

k. AMFAUNA-11: An employee of the Ministry of Foreign 08
Trade, and the wife of a Communist member of the Central 08
Planning Board (JUCEPLAN), she has reported political intelligence. In March 1962 AMFAUNA-1 reported that she was under surveillance and that he was therefore avoiding her.

l. AMFAUNA-12: He obtains information from contacts within the Cuban Petroleum Institute (ICP). 08

08
m. AMFAUNA-13: An insurance company employee with contacts in the Cuban Government, he has reported information on G-2 activities in Cuba and the United States.

Background and Motivation:

08
16. AMFAUNA-1 is a 39-year-old Cuban male, born in Cuba of Spanish parents. He has tried his hand at various kinds of work, 08
including the import business, journalism (he was once editor of Diario de la Marina) and insurance. He has also ventured into politics, having been a candidate of the Autentico Party in 1958. 08 During the Spanish Civil War he was a member of the Falanje Espanola, 24 and during World War II, until the entry of the United States, he was an agent 24
of the German Intelligence Service. The JMWAVE case officer who trained AMFAUNA-1 in tradecraft in March 1961 (see UFGA-1247 of 10 April 1961) observed that he already had a grounding in clandestine techniques. The case officer also characterized AMFAUNA-1 as " a pleasant, intelligent fellow" and "the most astute member of the team" comprising himself, AMCUS-1 and AMCUTLER-1. 01
01

APPLIQUE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

children, all still in Cuba (as of March 1961). 09 However, it is noted that the two children have different matronymics, that neither of them is his wife's last name, and that all three dependents have different addresses. It is assumed that this is his third wife. Since AMFAUNA-1 has never mentioned her in any of his S/W correspondence, it is also assumed that she has gone the way of her two predecessors.

18. AMCUTLER-1, 01 who was questioned on this point, said that his brother is living in Guanabacoa with his present wife, that he has been married only once before, 10 and has only one child from the first marriage. This information is not considered definitive, because the last point is directly contradicted by AMFAUNA-1's PRQ Part I which he wrote himself, but it is included here for what it may be worth. AMCUTLER-1 01 added that his brother has no sexual relations with his sub-agents except what is considered normal and acceptable by Cuban standards.

19. The elements of AMFAUNA-1's motivation, then, include an adventurous spirit and a taste for clandestine work. Although "anti-Communism" may be an overworked expression, it would seem to apply in the case of AMFAUNA-1, 20 if his former membership in the Falange and the German Intelligence Service can be taken as indicators. Also included should be the loss of a freight forwarding business which started out promisingly in 1959 but folded up after a year 06 of CASTRO's revolutionary government. Finally, although these factors did not yet exist in January 1961 when he was recruited, AMFAUNA-1 is certainly affected now by the death of AMCUSP-1 01 and the imprisonment of his father. 06

Control

20. It is evident from his S/W messages that AMFAUNA-1 derives great personal satisfaction from his work against the CASTRO regime. His connection with KUBARK provides him with the means to do this work. This is believed to be a strong element of control. There have been many opportunities to test this control, by ordering AMFAUNA-1 to do something or to desist from doing something else, and the control is believed to be effective.

Previous History of the Operation - January to May 1961:

21. AMFAUNA-1 was engaged in some form of clandestine work against the CASTRO regime as early as December 1960. 09 As with so much else in this operation, details are lacking, but it is known that he already had an understanding with Identity-29 whom he had known for twenty years. 06 In December 1960, Identity-29 introduced AMFAUNA-1 to Identity-27, an MAR coordinator from Matanzas, who had been introduced to Identity-29 by one of the members of her group, Identity-28. Identity-27 in turn brought in Identity-26, a fellow MAR coordinator. 06

22. In January 01 1961, AMFAUNA-1 01 came legally to the United States together with AMCUSP-1 and AMCUTLER-1 and looked up their old friend AMJAG-4, who at that time was heavily engaged in work with the resistance groups. AMJAG-4 introduced them to a JMWAVE case officer who instructed them to return to Cuba, to form contacts with as many resistance groups as possible, and to report their progress through AMRUNG-1 who was JMWAVE's principal agent in the paramilitary field. Also in the JMWAVE area at this time were Identity-19 and Identity-23 whom they met and with whom they were later to work.

09 23. AMFAUNA-1, AMCUTLER-1, 01 and AMCUSP-1 01 returned to 10 Cuba in January 1961. They dispatched Identity-16 to the Escambray, Identity-17 to Sancti Spiritus, 10 Identity-18 to Trinidad, 11 and Identity-37 to Manzanillo, Bayamo, and Santiago de Cuba. 10 An unidentified courier was put into touch with the guerrilla leader Identity-15, and AMCUSP-1 01 and AMCUTLER-1 01 went to Cienfuegos with Identity-19 to make contacts with insurgent groups there.

time, as did AMRUNG-1. 01

25. 01 To support the activities of AMFAUNA-1, AMCUTLER-1, 01 and AMCUSP-1, it was agreed that JMWAVE would deposit $1,000 monthly into the local bank account of AMCUSP-1 and the latter would provide the equivalent in Cuban pesos from his 01 own resources inside Cuba.

26. AMCUSP-1 01 and AMCUTLER-1 01 continued to busy themselves with preparations for supporting the April invasion. They contacted Identity-21 who, at their request, provided cover as travelling drug 08 salesmen for Identity-19 and also for Identity-20 who was intended to be a radio operator for Identity-23. Although AMFAUNA-1 knew all these people, he was compartmented from these 01 operations to some extent, so that after the arrest of AMCUSP-1 and the escape of AMCUTLER-1 he had some difficulty in reestablishing contact with them.

27. 01 AMCUTLER-1 01 and AMFAUNA-1, working together, held meetings with Identity-33, a Cuban Army officer stationed at the San Antonio de 10 los Banos base, and discussed plans for supporting the invasion. AMFAUNA-1 also contacted Identity-35, the commanding officer of the 08 San Julian base, and arranged for its surrender, using Identity-34, head of the OA in Pinar del Rio, 08 as a cutout. He had another agent on the base, Identity 36, and had already recruited AMFAUNA-11, an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 08

28. On 18 March 09 1961, AMCUSP-1 01 and AMRUNG-1 01 were arrested by the G-2 while holding a clandestine meeting. At first this was not regarded as too serious a matter. The G-2 had broken into the meeting only after having been alerted by the suspicious behavior of a woman 01 lookout, and it was believed that they had no real evidence. AMCUTLER-1 came to the JMWAVE area on 09 3 April 1961 and returned 01 again to Cuba on 10 April, 09 still optimistic that AMCUSP-1 and AMRUNG-1 would either be released or could be helped to escape. 01 However, one 01 of the other prisoners apparently 09 confessed and implicated AMCUSP-1 and AMRUNG-1, 01 who were executed on 20 April. With the wave of arrests accompanying the April 17 invasion, AMCUTLER-1 took asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy and AMFAUNA-1 went temporarily 01 into hiding. 11

29. On 27 April 1961 AMFAUNA-1 resumed operations by sending Identities 24, 25, 26 and 27 to collect order of battle information in Matanzas. Identities 26 and 27 returned to Havana to report. Identity-25 remained in Matanzas, and Identity-24 was caught by the G-2.

30. In May 1961, Identity-30 informed AMFAUNA-1 that some kind of conspiratorial activity was going on in the home of AMCOG-2. He arranged to meet her through Identity-30 whom he thereafter used ~~as~~ a cutout to her.

31. This phase of the AMFAUNA operation is diagrammed in Chart B. The following people participating in this phase were separated from the operation by known causes:

a. By arrest and execution:

(1) AMCUSP-1 01
(2) AMRUNG-1 01

b. By arrest and detention:

(1) Identity-24
(2) Identity-28

c. By asylum or escape to the U.S.:

(1) AMCUTLER-1 01
(2) Identity-23

Previous History of the Operation - June to November 1961:

32. In the period beginning June 1961, AMFAUNA-1 first began making regular use of AMFAUNA-2. 01 He needed contact with his collaborators 01 who were in asylum in various Western 01 embassies, and with AMFAUNA-2 openly visiting her husband AMCUTLER-1 01 she 06 was a natural choice for the job. 06 With the departure of Identities 29 and 30, AMFAUNA-1 began using AMFAUNA-2 as cutout to AMCOG-2 who was useful to him for her ability to obtain 01 the help of diplomatic 24 couriers. In August 1961 he used this channel to send out some order of battle information obtained by Identity-21.

33. Identity-21 continued to help Identities 19 and 20 until they took asylum in the Argentine Embassy. 08 He also served as AMFAUNA-1's cutout to Identity-50 who was a close friend of the insurgent leader 08, 06 Oswaldo RAMIREZ. For cutouts to Identity-21, AMFAUNA-1 first used Identity-51 and then AMFAUNA-8. AMFAUNA-8 also served as cutout to Identity-45 about whom nothing more is known than his name. 06

34. AMFAUNA-1 developed another contact to Oswaldo RAMIREZ during 06 this period in 08 the person of Identity-52, a close relative of RAMIREZ 08 and a former lieutenant in the Rebel Army. Identity-52 met AMFAUNA-1 and Identity-21 on 27 October 1961, and then remained in touch through Identity-51. A few weeks later Identity-52 was arrested.

35. At some time during the period June to November 1961, AMFAUNA-1 began collaborating with AMBOA-1. The origin of this collaboration is not known, but it appears that the initiative was taken by AMBOA-1. AMFAUNA-1 reported that she had revealed to him the fact that she has a channel of S/W communication to KUBARK, and that she had claimed to be a friend of the widow of AMCUSP-1. 01 AMFAUNA-1 asked JMWAVE to confirm her bona fides, and this was done. AMBOA-1 06 then began working as AMFAUNA-1's cutout to Identity-14, a Cubana Airlines pilot who in 08 turn was receiving information from Identity 40, an employee of Cubana. At some time prior to November 1961, Identity-40 was fired from her job and held for interrogation by the G-2.

36. During the same period AMFAUNA-1 added the following new agents:

a. AMFAUNA-23 (for description see paragraph 15e5 above).

b. AMFAUNA-5 (for description see paragraph 15e above).

c. Identity-41, a person who allegedly was collaborating with several other clandestine groups. He had two sub-agents in the Ministry of Public Works, 06 Identities 42 and 43. No production has been attributable to these people.

08

d. Identity-46, a clerk in the Ministry of Communications who allegedly was able to obtain the text of cables between Cuba 11 and Czechoslovakia. Nothing ever came 24 of this contact.

e. Identity-47, a secretary to the Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. 08 AMFAUNA-1 obtained some order of battle information from her, apparently on an unwitting basis. In August 1961 he reported that he was dropping her because she was a strong Communist and had given him information which he considered of doubtful reliability.

08

f. Identity-48, a foreman on the Havana docks who provided some order of battle information.

g. Identity-49, Chief of Maritime Police in Cienfuegos. 08 Although his recruitment was reported, AMFAUNA-1 never mentioned him again.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CHANGE ROLL
CHANGE ROLL

and AMFAUNA-1 hid him in Havana until he was able to get asylum for him in the Ecuadorian Embassy. 06

38. This phase of the AMFAUNA operation is diagrammed in Chart C. The following people participating in this phase were separated from the operation by known causes:

a. By arrest and detention:

(1) Identity 19 (subsequently escaped and took asylum in the Argentine Embassy) 06

(2) Identity 20 (subsequently escaped and took asylum in the Argentine Embassy) 06

(3) Identity 40 (interrogated by G-2, but the duration of her detention is not known).

(4) Identity 52.

b. By asylum:

(1) Identity 21

(2) Identity 37.

Previous History of the Operation - December 1961 to April 1962:

39. During the period 01 from December 1961 to April 1962, AMFAUNA-1 continued to use AMFAUNA-2 as a cutout to AMCOG-2. The latter was 24 given a lead in March 1962 from Identity-13, one of her diplomatic contacts, to a disaffected Cuban Army officer, AMFAUNA-4. 01 She turned this lead over to AMFAUNA-1, and the latter held his first meeting with AMFAUNA-4 01 in AMFAUNA-2's automobile.

40. AMFAUNA-2 01 was also used as alternate cutout to Identity-11, a woman with contacts in the Cuban Navy. 08 The other alternate cutout was AMFAUNA-8. Identity-11 was arrested in February 1962. 09 According to AMFAUNA-1's account of the incident in his message No. 89 of 25 February 1962, Identity-11 had been meeting a member of Fidel 24 CASTRO's bodyguard. AMFAUNA-1 had warned her not to trust the man, but she met him again on the following day and was caught with him. AMFAUNA-1 commented that some of his other agents were not compartmented from her, and he had ordered them to go into hiding. He did not identify these other agents. Presumably they included AMFAUNA-2 01 and AMFAUNA-8.

41. AMFAUNA-3 was recruited during 08 this period and used as a cutout to Identity-12, 06 the Havana representative of the insurgent leader Oswaldo RAMIREZ. According to an official announcement by the Cuban Government, RAMIREZ was killed in action on 09 16 April 1962. Other sources have contradicted this report, 06 and the matter still remains in some doubt. However, according to information obtained by AMFAUNA-1, Identity-12 was arrested in his home in Havana in late April. For a further discussion of the possible security implications of this connection, see paragraph 59 below.

42. Identity-51, who during the period June 24 to November 1961, had been serving as a link to the Oswaldo RAMIREZ group, now established a contact with Identity-54, a resident of Cienfuegos who claimed to be a disillusioned counter-revolutionary. As a 10 cutout to Identity-54, she used Identity-53. As far as the records show, no results were ever obtained from this connection.

06 43. Identity-14 defected during this period, as did Identity-57, another Cubana Airlines pilot whom AMFAUNA-1 had recruited and was

paragraph 15e above, AMFAUNA-1 seems to have an excellent network within Cuban (aviation) 08 but how it works remains a matter for conjecture. It is supposed that AMBOA-1 is handling the two (new pilots.) 08

44. AMFAUNA-21 and AMFAUNA-22, both employees at (Rancho Boyeros 08 Airport), first made their appearance during this period, and AMPAN-12 (who has and continues to use his own S/W communications to JMWAVE) found his way into the AMFAUNA operation. All three are known to AMFAUNA-5, and it is believed that she is probably the cutout to them.

45. Identity-55 and Identity-56 were mentioned briefly as active during the period from December 1961 to April 1962. The former had been a contact of AM(RUNG-1) 01 and seems to have gone into hiding; in any case, nothing more has been reported on him. The latter was an agent of AMFAUNA-1 in (Santiago de Cuba); 10 in January 1962 he was in hiding and awaiting a chance to go into asylum.

46. AMFAUNA-11 remained active during this period, and AMFAUNA-9, 10, and 12 were added to the operation. For descriptions of these agents, see paragraph 15 above.

47. This phase of the AMFAUNA operation is diagrammed in Chart D. The following people participating in this phase were separated from the operation by known causes:

a. By arrest and detention:

(1) Identity-11

(2) Identity-12.

b. By asylum or defection:

(1) Identity-14

(2) Identity-55

(3) Identity-56

(4) Identity-57.

Production:

48. JMWAVE records do not show the total number of AMFAUNA reports disseminated since January 1961. The figure is at least fifty, and is believed to be nearer one hundred, if the present frequency of dissemination can be a criterion. In content they have leaned heavily toward the activities of insurgent groups, militia movements, location of artillery, and aviation matters. There has been a more recent tendency toward political and economic information, which is being encouraged by JMWAVE. Evaluations of his production are lacking.

Security Analysis:

49. The possibility that AMFAUNA-1 is a double agent is considered remote. His successful LCFLUTTER, the fact (or what is believed to be the fact) that his close friend and fellow agent AM(CUSP-1) was executed, and AMFAUNA-1's own character and background, all 10 argue against the proposition that he was originally dispatched by the G-2. However, it must be admitted that the LCFLUTTER can (be beaten.) Also that there is no proof, other than the fact that AM(CUSP-1's) wife is in the JMWAVE area and behaving like a widow, that AM(CUSP-1) was really executed. There is documentary evidence, in the form of a letter written by a fellow prisoner to AM(CUSP-1's) widow, that he was held in prison in March and April 1961. However, the person who identified and buried the body was AMFAUNA-1's father, who was subsequently 08

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

50. Similarly, all that is known about AMFAUNA-1's background comes from AMFAUNA-1's own statements embodied in his PRQ Part I. No confirmation of this information has ever been obtained. From this point of view there is no guarantee that AMFAUNA-1 is what he claims to be. For all the proof to the contrary available to JMWAVE, he could as easily have been a (Spanish) Communist as a member of the (Spanish Falange). 29

51. These points are listed for the sake of completeness, but 01 little importance is attached to them. The known fact that (QUANTUM-51) and (QUANTUM-52) consider AMFAUNA-1 reliable suggests that he at least was not a (Spanish) Communist. And an unusually extensive independent view has been obtained of AMFAUNA-1's operations through the reports and debriefings of eight of his agents who have either escaped to or are in communication with the United States. The defection of Identity-14, and the escape and debriefings of Identity-19, Identity-23, Identity-26, and Identity-29, have all confirmed parts of AMFAUNA-1's story. Finally, AMCOG-3 has reported by S/W that AMCOG-2 is in contact with AMFAUNA-1, and AMFAUNA-2's telephone conversations with AM(CUTLER-1) provide a continuing check on the safety and whereabouts of AMFAUNA-1. 01

52. For the same reasons, the possibility is heavily discounted that AMFAUNA-1 has been caught and doubled by the G-2 since his arrival in Cuba. Additional indications that all is still well are the fact that he never omits the safety signal that was given him for use in his S/W, that his operational activities are consistent with his character and background, and that the reporting of his agents is consistent with their access to information.

53. Whether AMFAUNA-1 is now in danger of being detected, and whether the G-2 could double him if they do catch him, are two questions remaining to be considered. Taking the second question first, it is believed that the chances of the G-2 running a successful CI operation against KUBARK through AMFAUNA-1 are extremely slim. To be sure, the G-2 has certain weapons that 06 they could use against AMFAUNA-1. His father is already (in prison, serving a fifteen-year sentence,) and his mother and two children (are still in Cuba as potential hostages.) 06 It is also conceivable that the G-2 could use AMFAUNA-1's own interest in paramilitary operations as a lever by persuading him that KUBARK, by neglecting to support the insurgent leader Oswaldo RAMIREZ, was responsible for the latter's death and has demonstrated its indifference to the fate of the Cuban people. This would all take time, however, because AMFAUNA-1's reaction to arrest, at least initially, would 01 probably be an attempt to emulate his two heroes, AM(USP-1) and AM(RUNG-1). In the time that it would take the G-2 to break down this resistance, AM(CUTLER-1) would almost certainly have learned, either through his phone conversations with AMFAUNA-2 or by the interruption of the same, that something is wrong with AMFAUNA-1.

54. The risks that AMFAUNA-1 is now running are believed to be considerable. For one thing, at least ten persons with varying degrees of knowledge of his clandestine operations, have been held temporarily or permanently by the G-2, which is believed to be increasing in competence as a security force. For another, AMFAUNA-1 takes unnecessary chances, as by interrogating a new and untested agent (AMFAUNA-4) in the personal automobile of his sister-in-law, or by personally trying to penetrate a restricted area. And for a third, he has some contacts which can be dangerous to him.

55. AMCOG-2 knows too much about AMFAUNA-1 for the latter's good. It is believed that AMFAUNA-1 himself is aware that this is a potentially serious security weakness, because he took the trouble to report it (see paragraph 15a1 above). The AMCOG operation is itself a fairly complex one, and will be analyzed in a separate dispatch. The aspects of it which bear on the AMFAUNA operation are that AMCOG-2 and (her 06 brother) AMCOG-3 are (close relatives of a very prominent anti-Communist 08 Cuban politician,) and that they are widely known, both in Cuba and in

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

prosecution for acts against it, is a matter for wonder. It has been rumored that the old 10 politician has a blackmail hold over Fidel CASTRO by virtue of his possession of very damaging information about CASTRO. There may be some substance to this rumor. As a young student, CASTRO is believed to have committed criminal acts, and the old politician 08 would have been in the best possible position at the time to obtain proof of them. This might well explain why the family enjoys immunity today.

56. It would seem, though, that an alert and competent security service, which the G-2 shows signs of becoming, if it is enjoined from arresting and prosecuting an espionage suspect, would at least try to control and monitor his operations by penetrating them. It is therefore a cause for speculation that, in February 1962, an important officer of the Cuban Army (AMFAUNA-4) 08 allegedly desirous of defecting, was introduced by Identity-13 to AMCOG-2, and a matter for deep concern that AMCOG-2 passed the lead along to AMFAUNA-1 who accepted it without any prior checking and actually held his first meeting with the would-be defector in an automobile traceable to AMFAUNA-2. Since then, it has been observed that reports and sub-sources offered by AMFAUNA-4 are absorbing an increasing amount of AMFAUNA-1's time. The military manuals and documents turned over by AMFAUNA-4, and sent to Headquarters via the 01 QUANTUMs and the Madrid Station, have not yet been seen by JMWAVE, so it is not yet known whether 157 AMFAUNA-4's production can be given a sufficiently high evaluation to allay the doubts raised by the manner of his recruitment. Headquarters is asked to advise on this as soon as possible, and to provide traces on AMFAUNA-4.

57. The other potentially dangerous contacts are, as might be expected, in the field of para-military activities. In November 1961, 08 AMFAUNA-1 was in touch with Identity-52, a nephew of Oswaldo RAMIREZ, through Identity-51, a resident of Cienfuegos. 10 Identity-52 was arrested late in the year. 24 AMFAUNA-1 then developed another contact to the Oswaldo RAMIREZ group through Identity-12, RAMIREZ's Havana 08 representative, whose cutout to AMFAUNA-1 was AMFAUNA-3, a woman from 10 Sancti Spiritus now resident in Havana. Identity-12 was arrested in 08 April, presumably as an aftermath of the 16 April battle in which RAMIREZ was reportedly killed.

58. In late May or early June 1962, Identity-8, a person from Sancti Spiritus known to AMFAUNA-3, called on her in the company of a certain Ricardo *IZQUIERDO 06 who claimed to 06 have had a meeting on 28 May near Trinidad with one Comandante Fidel *HERNANDEZ Perez who gave 06 IZQUIERDO a letter for delivery to Identity-12. Unable to find Identity-12 because of the latter's arrest, 06 IZQUIERDO approached Identity-8 who introduced him to AMFAUNA-3 to whom he handed over the letter. The letter reads as follows:

> "Dear Brother-in-Arms:
>
> "I greet you and officially report to you, as our representative to the Military Junta of the FND, the sad news of the death of our commander-in-chief, Oswaldo RAMIREZ, on 16 April last at 9 a.m. He fell in battle together with other brothers. The certificate to this effect, containing the testimony of Captain BORGE, chief of the personal guard, and of other members of his escort, is in my possession, and I will hand it over to you or to anyone designated by the Military Junta of the FND.
>
> "The disorganization caused by the above-mentioned events prevented our reporting this news to you right away, and only now have we been able to make contact with the bearer, a man who has been working for some time as messenger and enjoying the complete confidence of Oswaldo RAMIREZ and of ourselves in particular.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

who will occupy the position of supreme commander of our liberation army. Whether it be one supreme chief or a joint command must be decided by you.

"Although the National Liberation Army has continued working and acting according to the norms laid down by you and by our late chief, you will understand the urgency of this interview which the bearer will tell you how to arrange. In anticipation of your decisions I sign myself respectfully,

06

Capt. Julio E. "CARRETERO"

59. As mentioned in paragraph 15b above, ODIBEX has some kind of interest in AMFAUNA-3, and it may be that their files contain intelligible answers to some of the questions raised by this development. For instance:

a. Why did the RAMIREZ organization not know of the arrest of Identity-12, one of its own members, which had occurred at least a month previously?

b. If the RAMIREZ organization was so poorly informed about Identity-12, how did they know about AMFAUNA-3, and why did they think she would be the appropriate person to give the letter to?

c. Given the disorganization complained of by the writer of the letter, and the fact that all meetings must have been arranged and held under clandestine conditions, how to account for the fact that in the maximum of six days between 28 May and 3 June when AMFAUNA-1 reported the developments by S/W, something like the following sequence of events must have taken place:

06 06

(1) IZQUIERDO meets HERNANDEZ near Trinidad in Las Villas Province, and receives the letter.

06

(2) IZQUIERDO travels to Havana and tries to locate Identity-12.

06

(3) IZQUIERDO is informed that Identity-12 has been arrested.

06

(4) IZQUIERDO returns to Las Villas, reports that the letter cannot be delivered to Identity-12, and is told that AMFAUNA-3 should be given the letter.

06

(5) IZQUIERDO goes to Sancti Spiritus and locates Identity-8 who is a personal friend of AMFAUNA-3 and can introduce him to her, and who providentially is able to vouch for the authenticity of CARRETERO's signature on the letter.

06 06

(6) IZQUIERDO and Identity-8 go to Havana and give the letter to AMFAUNA-3.

Future Plans

60. It is difficult if not impossible to give an operation of this complexity the support and direction it needs, when the only communication with the principal agent is by secret writing. There is never enough room in an S/W message for both the positive intelligence reporting and the supporting operational details, and it is the latter that suffer. S/W communication also inevitably involves a time lag which, in the case of this operation, has sometimes run as high as three weeks because of the frequent absences from town of AMCUTLER-1

61. As a first step toward speeding up communications, it is planned to find another accommodation address in the JMWAVE area for AMFAUNA-1's use which can be expected to function without the delays that have been experienced recently. Because of the importance and urgency of some of AMFAUNA-1's intelligence reports, consideration is also being given to assigning a radio operator to him, probably AMGLEN-9 who is awaiting only his signal plan to become active and who will probably not be needed in the AMWPEN net as originally planned.

62. AMFAUNA-1 will be instructed to break off contact with AMCOG-2, and to cease interesting himself in the affairs of the Escambray. As for AMFAUNA-4, it is feared that AMFAUNA-1 is already so deeply involved with him that, if he was not a bona fide defector, the damage has already been done. Nevertheless, AMFAUNA-1 will be warned of the potentialities of this situation so that he can be prepared to go into hiding if it should develop badly. Specific military requirements will be sent to AMFAUNA-1 for AMFAUNA-4 to help in establishing his value as a source. Also for the improvement of the security of the operation, AMFAUNA-1 will be told to stop taking personal and unnecessary risks such as his penetration of a restricted beach.

63. For the continued improvement of production, political and economic requirements will be sent to him. AMFAUNA-1 is very responsive to requirements, and has already developed sources and informants in the political and economic areas in response to instructions from JMWAVE. It is believed that an increased output of higher-priority intelligence can be expected from this operation.

END OF DISPATCH

CONTACT Sheet 9

06.08

2. Maria del Carmen *TRUEBA y de la Campa SEX: F
DOB born 8 August 1929, Guanabacoa, Havana
Resides Calle 24 #105, Apt. 2, Miramar, Havana, [redacted]

3. Hortensia *ORIZONDO Meneses
DOB born 11 April 1924, Sancti Spiritus, Cuba SEX: F
Resides Avenida 26 #1108, Apt. 2, Nuevo Vedado, Havana, Cuba

4. Gabino *GONZALEZ Agudin aka "Felipe"
DOB born 27 January 1931, Chambas, Camaguey, Cuba
Resides 354 Chorruca St., Cerro, Havana, Cuba

5. Ofelia *PEREZ Arce SEX: F

[redacted]

6 Esperanza *MANRESA Duarte
DOB born 27 February 1939
Resides 155 Encarnacion St., Apt. 1, Santo Suarez, [redacted]

7. Raul *GRANADOS

8. Conrado *SALMO del Castillo aka "Nene"

9. Pepe *EMBAS
Former sales manager for Regil Coffee

10. Yolanda *PRADA Gutierrez
DOB born 2 September 1935, Santiago, Cuba
Resides 951 41st St., Apt. 1, Alturas del Vedado, Havana, Cuba

11. Zoraida *MARTINEZ Cabal
DOB born 24 January 1938, Havana, Cuba
Resides 145 Entrada St., Apt. 4, Casino Deportivo, Havana, Cuba

12. Secundino *CARRERA Sanchez
DOB born 21 May 1925
Resides 611 Colcuria, Santos Suarez, Havana, Cuba

13. Jose Diego *TATO Rey aka "Juanito"
DOB born 12 April 1923, Havana, Cuba

14. Beatriz *PEREZ aka "Betty" SEX: F
Resides Calle 8 #120, Apt. 8, Vedado, Havana

15. Elvira *BIOSCA SEX: F

16. Miguel *ORTOLL

17. Mauricio *MARTINEZ Lopez aka "Gustavo"
DOB born 4 September 1933

18. Camilo *MARTINEZ Bazuero aka "Anselmo"
DOB born 28 April 1928, Havana

19. Jorge *MARTINEZ Cabo aka "Eduardo"
DOB born 16 April 1939
Resides 533 10th St., Apt. 7, Vedado, Havana

20. Francisco *PEREZ Arce

21. Jesus *DIAZ

22. Jose Antonio *DIAZ

23. (Capt.) Manuel *PEREZ Arce

24. Jose AGUIRRECHO Pedro ~~[illegible]~~
Mariel, 24 May 32, resides
[illegible] 303, Apt 1, Ayes[illegible]
[illegible] Havana

25. Aurelio VASQUEZ Castro
25 June 1939 Havana

SECRET

CS COPY

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

[redacted]

1 ✓ 06,08

all cards → CIT: CUBA
CONTACT Sub. of 201-291230

Separate Cover
Attachment E to UFGA-4703
to Chief, TFW

[redacted]

2. Maria del Carmen *TRUEBA y de la Campa
DOB born 8 August 1929, Guanabacoa, Havana SEX F
Resides Calle 24 #105, Apt. 2, Miramar, Havana

3. Hortensia *ORIZONDO Meneses
DOB born 11 April 1924, Sancti Spiritus, Cuba SEX F
Resides Avenida 26 #1108, Apt. 2, Nuevo Vedado, Havana, Cuba

4. Gabino *GONZALEZ Agudin aka *"Felipe"
DOB born 27 January 1931, Chambas, Camaguey, Cuba
Resides 364 Chorruca St., Cerro, Havana, Cuba

5. Ofelia *PEREZ Arce SEX F

[redacted]

6 Esperanza *MANRESA Duarte
DOB born 27 February 1939
Resides 155 Encarnacion St., Apt. 1, Santo Suarez, [redacted]

7. Raul *GRANADOS

8. Conrado *SALMO del Castillo aka "Nene"

9. Pepe *EMBAS
Former sales manager for Regil Coffee

10. Yolanda *PRADA Gutierrez
DOB born 2 September 1935, Santiago, Cuba
Resides 951 41st St., Apt. 1, Alturas del Vedado, Havana, Cuba

11. Zoraida *MARTINEZ Cabal
DOB born 24 January 1938, Havana, Cuba
Resides 145 Entrada St., Apt. 4, Casino Deportivo, Havana, Cuba

12. Secundino *CARRERA Sanchez
DOB born 21 May 1925
Resides 611 Colcuria, Santos Suarez, Havana, Cuba

13. Jose Diego *TATO Rey aka *"Juanito"
DOB born 12 April 1923, Havana, Cuba

14. Beatriz *PEREZ aka *"Betty" SEX: F
Resides Calle 8 #120, Apt. 8, Vedado, Havana

15. Elvira *BIOSCA SEX: F

16. Miguel *ORTOLL

17. Mauricio *MARTINEZ Lopez aka *"Gustavo"
DOB born 4 September 1933

18. Camilo *MARTINEZ Bazuero aka *"Anselmo"

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

Identity 2 Father of Berta SAMPEDRO, Havana [redacted]

Identity 3 Ramon LAVIN 4283 E. Flagl

Identity 4 Berta SAMPEDRO, 4284 NE 5th St., Apt. 204, Miami

Identity 5 Frank PAEZ (born 4 October 1910, Havana)
Resides 1742 SW 1st Ave., Miami, Fla.

Identity 6 Margarita de ARMAS (born 7 December 1908, Havana)
Resides 735 Calatrava Ave., Coral Gables, Fla. (201-324124)

Identity 7 "Pancho" VILLA

06,08

Identity 8 Ruben DIAZ, Sancti Spiritus, Cuba

Identity 9 Tomas OROPESA, employee of Ministry of Education, Havana

Identity 10 (Lt.) Rolando P. DOBOUE Vidaud (born 30 September 1929, Oriente, Cuba)

Identity 11 Maria Luisa VAIMERENA Lastre (born 21 June 1931, Bahia Honda, Pinar del Rio Cuba) Resides 501 27th Ave., Apt. 8, Vedado, Havana, Cuba.

Identity 12 Luis RODRIGUEZ Rodriguez aka Andres FUENTE

Identity 13 (Dr.) Tomas QUESADA, Liberian Consul, Havana

Identity 14 Electo REYES de Leon (born 14 May 1932, Santiago de Cuba) Former Flight Captain of Cubana Airlines who defected in Nassau, 8 March 1962.

Identity 15 (Comandante) Evelio DUQUE

Identity 16 Sergio MILIAN

Identity 17 Antonio GARCIA

Identity 18 Adalio PEREZ

Identity 19 Miguel PENTON Alfonso aka "Ramon"

Identity 20 (fnu) REYES

Identity 21 Miguel Angel RIVAS Para (born 13 December 1922, Las Villas, Cuba)

Identity 22 Fernando DEBENE, [illegible] of Cienfuegos, Cuba

Identity 23 Manolo [illegible]

Identity 24 "Hugo"

Identity 25 "Anibal"

Identity 26 Jose AGUIRRECHU Pacheco aka "Gustavo"

Identity 27 Candida MURGA Cristo (201-30[illegible]) aka "[illegible]"

Identity 28 Camilo NAVAS, Havana merchant

Identity 29 Alfredo FORMOSO Prieto (born 19 May 192[illegible], Coruna, Cuba)

all card → C.I. CUBA

SECRET

CS COPY

contact sub of

201-291230

10-6-50/5

SECRET

Page [illegible] of Separate Cover
Attachment F to UFGA-4703
to Chief, TFW

Identity 30	Elsa de FORMOSO Sex: F
Identity 31	Luis de ARMAS (DOB born 11 July 1910)
Identity 32	Sex: F "Cecilia" (sister-in-law of Luis de ARMAS), resides Calle 24 #705, Miramar, Havana, Cuba.
Identity 33	Capt. Oscar LEON Delgado aka "Lopez"
Identity 34	Raul GARCIA
Identity 35	Capt. Roger [illegible]
Identity 36	Mariano MAYTT
Identity 37	Cesar [illegible] Cesar [illegible]
Identity 38	Lucas [illegible]LOP, Havana.
Identity 39	John BENNETT (DOB born [illegible]) [illegible] S.E. 8th St., Miami, Fla.
Identity 40	Sex: F alias "Sara". True name similar to AMLOBE-3 (201-306475) and probably identical
Identity 41	Pablo "MORESO" [illegible]
Identity 42	[illegible] [illegible], employee [illegible] Ministry of Public Works, Havana
Identity 43	Quintin [illegible], employee [illegible] Public Works, Havana
Identity 44	[illegible]
Identity 45	Jose Daniel [illegible]
Identity 46	Josefina [illegible]
Identity 47	Gladys [illegible]
Identity 48	Jorge [illegible]
Identity 49	[illegible]
Identity 50	Rigoberto [illegible] Trinidad, Cuba
Identity 51	Sex: F Josefina ROSQUETE [illegible] (DOB born 13 January 193[illegible], Cienfuegos, Cuba, resident [illegible] Cienfuegos [illegible]
Identity 52	Eloy MOREL [illegible] "Francisco"
Identity 53	"Hilda"
Identity 54	Domingo [illegible] Cienfuegos [illegible]
Identity 55	Aurelio VIGIL [illegible]
Identity 56	Alonso GOMEZ Castillo
Identity 57	Jesus MILLARES Nunez, Chief Pilot for Cubana Airlines, now defected.

06,108

104-10070-10272 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JX-24657
23

24

SOURCE: Israeli Liaison

~~6th August, 1961~~ ~~SECRET~~

REPORT No. 6-1053

Subject: International Institute for Peace.

On, 7

24

In a circular letter dated VIENNA, 15th February, 1961, addressed to MAKI leaders in ISRAEL, the following Latin American public figures were listed as signatories of the appeal to convene the Latin-American Conference for National Sovereignty Economic Emancipation and Peace in MEXICO in March 1961:

ARGENTINA:

Prof. ALFREDO L. PALACIOS, MP, former Federal Senator, former Rector of La Plata National University, former diplomat, member of the Executive of the Argentine Socialist Party.
Dr. ALEJANDRO GOMEZ, former Vice-President of ARGENTINA.
Dr. SANTIAGO H. DEL CASTILLO, former Governor of CORDOBA, Former Vice-Presidential candidate from the People's Radical Civic Union.
Prof. CARLOS SANCHEZ VIAMONTE, professor for international law, former MP.
Dr. JULIO E. ACOSTA, MP.
Miss NELIDA BAIGORRIA, MP.
Dr. CARLOS ALBERTO BECERRA, MP.
Dr. JUAN CARLOS ESPINA MP.
Mr. HORACIO LUELMO, MP.
Mr. ATILIO MARCHINI, MP.
Dr. AUGUSTIN RODRIGUEZ ARAYA, MP., President of the Civic Union Party.
Dr. EDUARDO ROSENKRANTZ, MP.
Dr. RAMON A. MUNIZ, General Secretary of the Argentine Socialist Party.
Mr. RODOLFO GHIOLDI, member of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party.
Prof. BERNARDO CANAL FEIJOO, writer, former Dean of the La Plata Faculty of Letters.
Mr. EZEQUIEL MARTINEZ ESTRADA, writer.
Dr. MOISES POLACK, Honorary Professor at the La Plata National University, member of the Executive Committee of the Buenos Aires Medical Faculty.

CI/ICG
+ WH

06767

Mr. GUILLERMO ESTEVEZ BOERO, President of the Argentine University Federation.
Mr. AUGUSTIN CUEVAS, MP.
Mr. C. DE SIMONE, Secretary of the Central Committee of Socialist youth.
Mr. MIGUEL ANGEL ASTURIAS, writer.
Dr. EDUARDO ALEMAN, lawyer, President of the Argentine Peace Council.
Mr. BERNARDO KLEINER, member of the High Council of the Buenos Aires National University.

BRAZIL.

MPs: SERGIO MAGALHAES, President of the Chamber Deputies. BARBOSA LIMA SOBRINHO, GABRIEL PASSOS, JOSUE DE CASTRO, SALVADOR LOSACCO, LICIO HAUER, JOSE JOFFILY, ARTUR VIRBILIO, BOCAIUVA CONHA, FERNANDO SANT ANA, VASCOCELOS TORRES, ELOI DUTRA, JACOB FRANTZ, CLIDENOR FREITAS, ALMINO ALFONSO, CELSO BRANT, FRANCISCO JULIAO, SINVAL GUAZZELI and CANDIDO NORBERTO.

SENATORS: FREITAS CAVALCANTE, HERNAI MAIU (Minas Serais), PAULO VIANA (Pernambuca).

JORGE AMADO, writer.
OLIVEIRAS GUANAIS, President of the National Union of Students.
TAXSAN DE CASTRO, Vice-President of the Brazilian Union of Secondary School Students.
AMILTON GOMES, President of the Paraiba Union of Students.
BENEDITO CORQUEIRA, President of the Metalwokers' Union(Ric
CANEDO LOPES, President of the National Air Transport Unior
BAYARD BOITEUX, President of the National Teachers' Union.

CHILE

SALVADOR ALLENDE, former candidate for the President of the Republic and Socialsit Party Senator
HERMES AHUMADA, Radical Party MP.
ALFREDO DE AMESTI, retired colonel, former President of the Peace Movement.
Prof. ALBERTO BALTRA, former Minister for the Interior, lawyer and Professor at the University of Chile.
ELENA CAFFARENA, lawyer, member of the Council for the Defence of Children.
ARMANDO CARVAJAL, Director and founder of the Symphony Orchestra.

CRISTIAN CADEMAARTORI, businessman.
GUILLERMO DEL PEDREGAL, former Minister of the Interior.
JOSE FONDEA, National Democratic Party MP.
EDUARDO HAMUY, Director of the Institute for Sociology of the Chilean University.
GUILLERMO IZQUIERDO ARAYA, National Democratic Party Senator.
ANIBAL JARA, journalist, former Ambassador to the United States
PABLO NERUDA, poet.
SERGIO RECABARREN, lawyer, former Minister of the Interior

COLOMBIA

Dr. JORGE PERIGU CARDENAS
JUAN DE LA CRUZ VARELA, MP.
ALFONSO BARBERENA, MP.
JORGE ZALAMEA, writer.
GILBERTO VIEIRA, Secretary of the Colombian Communist Part
HERNANDO CARAVITO NUNOZ, lawyer, Member of the Cundinamarc Assembly.
ANIANO INGLESIAS, Director of the Barranquilla Extra
NAZARETH CRUZ, leader of a women's organisation.
VENTURA PUENTE VANEGAS, from the Colombian trade union movement.
TANCREDO HERRAN, leader of the Bogota industrial zone.
HENRY PATINO, member of Tolima Assembly
EDUARDO ELINAS M., leader of a student organisation.
MARIO ALCALA, of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement.
YIRA CASTRO DE CEPEDA, leader of a student organisation.
ALICIA GUERRERO, Union of Democratic Women.
JOSE MARIA VARVAS, Committee for Oil Nationalisation
RICARDO SAMPER, journalist.
ARMANDO SUESCUN, Secretary of the Colombian Socialist Party.

CUBA

Cap. EMILIO ARAGONES, national coordinator of the 26 July Movement.
Dr. MARTHA FRAYDE, Movement for Peace and Sovereignty of the Peoples.
Dr. CLEMENTE INCLAN, Rector of Havana University.
Dr. ENRIQUE GIMENEZ, President of the Board of Governors of Havana University.
Mr. ENRIQUE GONZALEZ MANTICI, Director of the National Symphony Orchestra.

./.

Dr. VICENTINA ANTUNA, General Director of Culture.
Dr. JOSE SANTIAGO CUBAS, Procurator of the Supreme Court of Justice.
DR. JUAN MARINELLO, President of the Popular Socialist Party.
Dr. EDUARDO CORONA, lawyer, diplomat.
Dr. ISABEL MONAL, Director of the Cuban National Theatre.
Commander OSCAR FERNANDEZ MEL, President of the National Doctor's Association.
Mr. BALDOMERO ALVAREZ RIOS, Dean of the National Journalists' School.
Commander Dr. HUMBERTO CASTELLO, General Secretary of the "Directorio Revolucionario 13 de marzo".
Mr. NICOLAS GUILLEN, poet.
Commander ROLANDO BUBELA, President of the Students' Federation.
Mr. GIRALDO MAZOLA, director of the Cuban Institute for Friendship between the Peoples.
Commander GULLERMO JIMENEZ, director of the newspaper "Combate".
Dr. CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ, University Professor, director of the journal "Hoy"
Mr. MARIO KUCHILAN, director of the journal "Prensa Libre".
Mr. CARLOS FANQUI, director of the journal "Revolucion"
Mr. ALFREDO CUEVARA, director of the Cuban Institute of Art and the Film Industry.
Dr. ELIAS ENTRALGO, President of the Cuban UNESCO Commissi
Mr. ENRIQUE DE LA OSA, director of the journal "Bohemia".
Mr. ERNESTO VERA, director of the journal "La Calle".
Mrs. VILMA ESPIN, Federation of Cuban Women.
Dr. OFELIA DOMINGUEZ, Cuban United Nations Association.

HONDURAS

JULIO C. RIVERA, workers' leader.
OSCAR F. ALFARENGO, Member of the University Reform Front.
MIGUEL YANES RIOS, student leader.
SANTIAGO FERNANDEZ TOFFE, theatre director.
JUDITH SALGADO, Committee for Solidarity with Cuba.
ALFREDO HOFFMAN, leader of the Radio Workers' Union.
LETICIA RAUDALES, member of the Liberal Youth Association.
HECTOR I. GUTTIERREZ, general secretary of the Organisatio
Committee of the Honduran Democratic Youth.
LISANDRO GALVEZ, former rector of the National Autonomous University.
ANIBAL DELGADO FIALLO, General Secretary of the University Reform Front.

./.

MEXICO

IGNACIO ACOSTA, University graduate.
FRANCISCO ARGUELLO, Member of the Federal Parliament.
ALONSO AGUILAR, Professor of the National School of Economics.
ANABELA AGUIRRE, anthropologist.
BERTHA ARENAL, Professor at the National School of Odontology.
SOL ARGUEDAS, journalist.
RAMON BARBOSA C., Member of the Federal Parliament.
ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, Magistrate at the District Federal High Court of Justice.
ANGEL BALTAZAR BARAJAS, President of the Michoacan University Professors' Federation.
RAFAEL BANALES, General Secretary of the Kleinenmar Rolling Mill Workers' Union.
RAMIRO BERMUDES ALEGRIA, member of theboard of Governors of Lower California University.
CLEMENTINA BATALLA DE BASSOLS, University graduate.
NARCISO BASSOLS BATALLA, Chemical engineer.
ALFONSO BARRAZA, SANTOS BARCENAS engineer.
ROGELIO BLANCO DESDER, FERNANDO BENITEZ, writer and journalist.
CELERINO CANO, teacher, FERNANDO CARMONA, University graduate, EMILIO CARBALLIDO, dramtist,
CUAUHTEMOC CARDENAS, engineer, AURELIANO GABALLERO C and LEANDRO CASTILLO V., members of the Federal Parliament

PERU

OSCAR AGUIRRE, MP.,
ABUNDIO ARAUZO, MP.,
FELIZ ARIAS SHEREIBER, university leader.
JACINTE CACERES PILARES, MP.,
SXITE COELLO JARA, Senator, specialist for penl law.
LUIS CERENADO VIGIL, MP.
CARLOS MALPICA, MP.,
FERNANDO MANRIQUE, MP, President of the Jose Carlos Mariategui Institute.
ERNESTO MORE, writer, MP., President of the Peruvian Peace Movement.
EFRAIN RUIZ CARO, MP., journalist.
TAMAYO PEZUA, MP.,
WILBERT SALAS, MP.

./.

PUERTO RICO

L. O'NILL, President of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party.
J. SANTOS RIVERA, President of the Puerto Rican Communist Party F.U.P.I. (the University Federation for Independence
R. MEDINA RAMIREZ, United Patriotic Association.
EVARISTO RIBERA CHEVREMONT, poet.
OSVALDO AGUERO, director of the "Godazos" radio programme and coordinator of the Cuban 26 July Movement in PUERTO RICO.
JULIO DE SANTIAGO, former President, Puerto Rican Nationalist Party.
LORENZO PINEIRO RIVERA, lawyer, President of the Society of Friends of Cuba in Puerto Ric~~g~~o.
GABRIEL VINCENTRE MAURA, Secretary for foreign relations of the Puerto Rican Independence Movement.
WILLIAM CORDOVA CHIRINO, director of the radio programme "Native Industries" and of the "El Informador" radio journal.
NORMAN PIETRI, former President, University Indppendence Federation.

SALVADOR

ROBERTO CARIAS DELGADO, General Secretary of the April and May Revolutionary Party.
MARIO SALAZAR VALIENTE, Secretary of the Relations Committee of the April and May Revolutionary Party.
GENERAL ASSOCIATION of University Students of Salvador.

18 January 1952 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York

SENSITIVE
Secret-Security Information

TO LEA FROM ASHCRAFT BY SPECIAL SERVICES(TRAVIS)WA 8622
THIS IS SENSITIVE
THIS IS NEW CASE 9145. REFERENCE MADE TO ~~XXXX~~ LEA'S CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH TRAVIS AND ROSE REGARDING THE OPC REQUEST FOR CONTACT WITH THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA. AS ROSE INDICATED, HE WILL BE IN NEW YORK ON WEDNESDAY, 23 JANUARY, ~~XXX~~ WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET WITH THE APPROPRIATE PERSON OR PERSONS IN RIA TO DISCUSS A COVER CASE. ROSE HAS ADVISED THAT BOTH LEO CHERNE AND CARL HOVGARD HAVE BEEN GIVEN COVERT OPERATIONAL CLEARANCES. FOLLOWING IS THE BACKGROUND OF THIS CASE. THERE IS A MAN BY THE NAME OF WILLIAM J. ACON, PRESENTLY WORKING FOR ECA IN WASHINGTON WHO IS GOING TO RESIGN FROM ECA AND COME WITH CIA, AND WILL GO OVERSEAS FOR OPC. HE IS GOING TO LEAVE ECA SOMETIME AROUND THE END OF THIS MONTH, AND MUST HAVE SOME EXPLANATION AS TO THE REASON FOR HIS RESIGNATION. THEREFORE, OPC WISHES TO ~~XXXXX~~ LOCATE SOME FIRM WHICH WILL BE WILLING TO BACKSTOP ~~XXX~~ ACON'S RESIGNATION, IN THE FORM OF SUPPOSEDLY HIRING ACON. ACON HAS BEEN A RESEARCH ANALYST ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS IN ITALY, AND IT IS FELT THAT, PERHAPS, EMPLOYMENT WITH RIA WOULD BE A LOGICAL ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~REASON TO GIVE FOR RESIONING FROM ECA. THE RIA COVER WILL NOT BE UTILIZED FOR ACON'S COVER OVERSEAS. ABOUT ALL THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED OF RIA WOULD BE TO ACKNOWLEDGE,

SENSITIVE*SECRET*SECURITY INFORMATION

07433

SECRET

SENSITIVE

JAN 18 4 22 PM '52

VSECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR TRAVIS FROM LEA -- SECURITY INFORMATION -- CITE NY 0392

CASE 9145.

THIS IS SENSITIVE. RE W-8622 RPT W-8622. LEO CHERNE RPT LEO CHERNE IS THE MAN. WE HAVE SET UP AN APPOINTMENT FOR NEXT WEDNESDAY AT 3:30 RPT 3:30 PM SO ROSE RPR ROSE BETTER BE HERE IN THIS OFFICE BY 2:30 RPT 2:30 PM.

PLEASE CONFIRM.

CR-62

Rose advised. He will be there at 2:30 on 23 Jan.

07434

21 January 1952 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York Secret-Security Information-Sensitive

TO LEA FROM ASHCRAFT BY SPECIAL SERVICES (TRAVIS) WA 8651

THIS IS SENSITIVE. RE CASE 9145 AND UR NY 0392. ROSE ADVISES T. J. HE WILL BE IN YOUR OFFICE BY 2:30 PM on WEDNESDAY, 22xx 23 JANUARY. THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION-SENSITIVE

07435

14-00000

WILLIAM JACOB ACOH

Background Information:

Born April 6, 1921 in Amsterdam, Netherlands
Single
American citizen

Education: Amsterdam High School - Amsterdam, Netherlands
St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri - ASTP 6/43-2/44
Georgetown Foreign Service School - 2 yrs. 6/47-8/48
University of Chicago - M.A. in International Economic Relations in 1951

Languages: German, Dutch, French and Italian

M.A. Thesis: "Post-war Economic Recovery in the Netherlands and The Marshall Plan". (received honors)

Employment Record:

June 1950 - present International Economist, GS-7, in European Program Division of ECA. Mainly concerned with Italian and Trieste economic affairs. Analyzed economic and financial position of Italy in light of ECA aid program, and handled administration of the aid program itself. Also prepared two, three and four year forecasts designed to show expected economic trends and developments in Italy. These were included in the ECA congressional presentations.

Oct. 47 - June '48 Research analyst in Historical Division of Department of the Army. Engaged in selection of and formulation of reports on German documents which shed light on the West Europe campaign.

Oct. 46 - Feb. 47 Archivist in Office of Military Government for Germany, Department of the Army. Served as chief of the Documents Library, collected reports, dispatches, cables, etc and developed an index system.

Jan. 45 - Aug 45 Assistant to Food and Agriculture Officer with Military Gov't Section of Hq. Twelfth Army Group. Duties consisted mainly of availability and requirements studies connected with food needs of the German population

Address:
3000 Porter St., NW
Washington, D.C.
Woodley 9730

07436

SECRET

SENSITIVE

SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR TRAVIS FROM LEA -- SECURITY INFORMATION -- CITE NY 0470

THIS IS SENSITIVE.

CASE 9145.

THE MEETING TODAY WITH CHERNE RPT CHERNE WAS COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL.

WHEN HE GETS BACK TO WASHINGTON, ROSE IS GOING TO SUBMIT TO US THROUGH YOU ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON ACON RPT ACON WHICH WE WILL TURN OVER TO CHERNE.

WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT WHEN ACON MAKES HIS PITCH AT ECA RPT ECA AND TELLS THEM THAT HE IS BEING OFFERED A JOB WITH THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA THAT HE STRESS THE NAME OF LEO CHERNE WHO ACTUALLY WILL BE THE ONLY PERSON WHO WILL BE ABLE TO BACK UP THIS STORY.

Discussed with Rose. He will furnish data to us.

Copy sent to Rose

07437

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

25 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Backstopping of Cover by the Research Institute of America

1. Pursuant to conversations between Mr. Rose and Mr. Engels of CIA/opc and Mr. Travis of OO/Contacts, an appointment was made for Mr. Rose to see Mr. Leo Cherne, Executive Secretary of the Research Institute of America, 292 Madison Avenue, New York City, to explore the willingness of Mr. Cherne to backstop the cover story of a proposed agent in training. The appointment was made, and kept, for Wednesday morning, 23 January 1952 in New York City in the presence of Mr. Clark of the New York branch of the Contacts Division.

2. The proposed story of the agent in question, who had been employed on the economic research side of ECA specializing in Italy, was that he wished to resign from ECA and take up an offer to be extended to him in civilian employment. Since the Research Institute of America seemed to fit in naturally with his background and activities in ECA, Mr. Cherne was asked:

   a. If he would backstop the agent's story that he was quitting ECA to take employment with the Research Institute of America during his three months period of training with CIA, and

   b. Whether he would in fact employ the agent and send him as a representative of the Institute to Italy at the conclusion of his period of training.

Mr. Cherne replied that unfortunately the latter was impossible inasmuch as his company did not send personnel overseas in any capacity. As regards the immediate backstopping of the agent's story, however, Mr. Cherne said that he would be happy to oblige for a period of training only, to wit, three months, after which other cover would have to be sought. Mr. Cherne requested that he be furnished at an early date with more complete information as to what was to be expected of him in his role as a backstop and further stated that he would like to meet the agent personally as soon as could be arranged. This has been communicated to Mr. Engels, the case officer, who will oblige at the earliest opportunity.

3. This case

SECRET

07438

3. This case may be referred to for further discussion and/or information as Case Number C/101.

EDWARD A. ROSE
OD/OP

OD/OP/EAR/rs
25 Jan 52

Distribution:
OD/OP (Rose): orig
Contacts
Division/OO : 1
WE-4 (Engels): 1
OD/OP : 2
SD/RE : 2

SECRET
Security Information

7 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Edward A. Rose

SUBJECT: Cover Story for Research Institute of America

Query

1. Mr. Acon, who has his MA in International Economic Relations from the University of Chicago, has been working for ECA. He has been hired by the Research Institute of America to do economic research and writing for their weekly newsletter on economic subjects having to do with Western Europe. (Mr. Acon knows Dutch, German, French and Italian.) It could be admitted that he would like eventually to do such writing abroad, but has not yet found a way.

2. His hiring may be delayed for some time. Mr. Leo Cherne will be informed when the story is to be used. By that time, Mr. Acon will have called on Mr. Cherne.

DANIEL J. WHEALTON
WE-4

DJW/atp

✓

07439

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET
Security Information

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: WE-4
X3863

NO.

DATE 7 Feb 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. OD/OP Mr. Rose	1704 L	Feb 7 1952	Feb 8 1952		Bob — Would you please see that the New York Office gets this to pass on to LC as verbally arranged.
2. 00/CO Mr Travis.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					C/10
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					Case 9145
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. ✓					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

10—01155-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

07440

SENSITIVE

Chief, New York Office 13 February 1952

Chief, Contact Division

Case 9145

1. When Rose of OPC was in New York on 23 January 1952 to discuss cover with Mr. Leo Cherne, Executive Secy. of the Research Institute of America, Mr. Cherne requested additional information as to what was to be expected of him in his role as a backstop to the cover being established for the OPC man. The following information has been forwarded by OPC, and is quoted below. Mr. Rose requests that you pass this information on to Mr. Cherne.

a. "Mr. Acon, who has his MA in International Economic Relations from the University of Chicago, has been working for ECA. He has been hired by the Research Institute of America to do economic research and writing for their weekly newsletter on economic subjects having to do with Western Europe. (Mr. Acon knows Dutch, German, French and Italian.) It could be admitted that he would like eventually to do such writing abroad, but has not yet found a way.

b. "His hiring may be delayed for some time. Mr. Leo Cherne will be informed when the story is to be used. By that time, Mr. Acon will have called on Mr. Cherne."

2. We are closing this case. Should further action be required, we will reopen.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

RSTravis/lmp

SENSITIVE

✓

07440

SECRET

SECRET OO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR SPECIAL SERVICES (TRAVIS) FROM LEA -- SECURITY INFORMATION -- CITE NY 2315

JUN 2 12 51 PM '52

CASE 9145.

1. WILL YOU TELL ROSE RPT ROSE THAT THE APPOINTMENT WITH LEO CHERNE RPT LEO CHERNE HAS BEEN SET UP FOR WEDNESDAY, 4 RPT 4 JUNE AT 11:30 RPT 11.30 A.M.

2. PLEASE CONFIRM.✓

GR-58

3 June
Rose advised - he will make appointment
KB

SECRET

07441

3 June 1952 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York Secret-Security Information

TO LEA FROM ASHCRAFT BY SPECIAL SERVICES (TRAVIS) W 1301

CASE 9145 AND UR NY 2315. ROSE ADVISES THAT HE WILL KEEP APPOINTMENT WITH CHERNE AS SET-UP IN YOUR XXXXXXX MESSAGE.

SECRET

07442

SECRET
Security Information

Chief, Contact Division, OO — 19 May 1952

Chief, Cover Division, PLANS/OSO

Appointment with William A. BARRON, John E. TOULMIN and Leo CHERNE

Reference: CS-1512 and CS-1337

1. This will confirm Mr. Rose's verbal request that the Contact Division/OO ask its Boston field office to arrange appointments for Mr. Edward Rose of Cover Division, PLANS/OSO, to see Mr. William A. Barron, Chairman of the Board, Gillette Safety Razor Company, and Mr. John E. Toulmin, Senior Vice President of the First National Bank of Boston, at their convenience on Wednesday May 21, 1952. The purpose of the visit is to explore the willingness of these gentlemen to act as ostensible donors of funds to support a current operation.

[illegible] 1145

2. This will also confirm Mr. Rose's request that the New York City field office of the Contact Division/OO arrange an appointment for Mr. Rose to see Mr. Leo Cherne, President of the Research Institute of America at Mr. Cherne's convenience on Thursday May 22, 1952. Mr. Cherne, who has for some time been backstopping the activities of an agent in this country, has apparently expressed willingness to provide cover for this agent abroad. The purpose of the interview is to discuss more fully Mr. Cherne's proposal. Cover Division would be happy to have an OO field office representative present to insure continuity.

3. As a result of the above requests, Mr. Barron found to his regret that he was unable to cooperate with the Agency at the present time. Mr. Toulmin, on the other hand, was most cooperative. Mr. Cherne, unfortunately, was out of town. The New York field office has been asked to try to arrange a meeting with Mr. Cherne, as outlined above, for Wednesday afternoon, June 4, 1952.

✓

SECRET
Security Information

07443

✓

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET
Security Information

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CS-1337 (Rose)

TO : Chief, Contact Division, OO DATE: 6 June 1952

FROM : Chief, Cover Division, PLANS/OSO

SUBJECT: Field Trip to Interview Leo CHERNE

Reference: CS-1337

Case 9145

1. On Wednesday, June 4, 1952, an interview was arranged by the Contact Division, OO, for Mr. Rose of the Cover Division, PLANS/OSO with Mr. Leo Cherne, President of the Research Institute of America. The meeting was held at 11:30 a.m. in Mr. Cherne's office at 292 Madison Avenue, New York City, and Mr. Rose was accompanied by Mr. Clark of the New York field office of Contact Division, OO.

2. Mr. Cherne, who is currently backstopping an operation within the United States, had expressed the wish to be provided with some form of letter indicating that the Agency was requesting his cooperation, and the purpose of the interview was to inform Mr. Cherne that this was against Agency policy.

3. This information was accordingly conveyed by Mr. Clark and Mr. Rose to Mr. Cherne who accepted it with good grace. In reply to a question by Mr. Rose he indicated that this refusal would in no way mitigate his desire to be of service to the Agency.

SECRET
Security Information

07444

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Files

DATE: 4 MARCH 1954

FROM : Coleman

SUBJECT: Case 9145

On 3 March Ormond requested that a meeting be set up for him with Leo Cherne, President of the Research Institute of America. Ormond said that he would not need more than a half an hour. Called Connor who had Bob McCann set up meeting with Cherne for Monday(8th March) at 3:00 p.m. Ormond will go to the New York Office at 2:15 on Monday to meet McCann and take off for the meeting. This meeting was requested as a Cat III, and McCann will have to bow out after introduction. Ormond is happy, New York is happy.

07445

14-00000

COLEMAN
SUPPORT
2268
6 MARCH 1954

SECRET

NEW YORK

W

ROUTINE

TO LEA FOR CONNOR FROM ASHCRAFT BY SUPPORT (COLEMAN)

do

CASE [illegible] 9145. RE CONNOR/COLEMAN TELECONS OF 3 MARCH. ORMOND WILL BE IN YOUR OFFICE AT 2:15, MONDAY THE 8TH OF MARCH PRIOR TO THE CAT [illegible] APPOINTMENT YOU HAVE ARRANGED FOR HIM WITH LEO CHERNE. THANKS.

SECRET

07446

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNM

CS-1337 (Ormond)

DATE: 4 March 1954

TO : Chief, Contact Division, OO

FROM : Chief, FI/Plans/Cover Division

SUBJECT: Requested meeting with Leo Cherne
OO/C Case 9145

1. On 3 March 1954, Mr. Coleman of your office was requested by Mr. Ormond to arrange a Category III meeting for him with Leo Cherne of Research Institute of America, 292 Madison Avenue, New York City. The identity of an agent and the area in which he will be stationed will be discussed. On the same date Mr. Coleman informed that the appointment had been made for 3:00 PM on 8 March 1954. Ormond was requested to arrive at the New York OO/C office between 2:00 - 2:15 PM to meet Bob McCann who will accompany him to Cherne's office and make the introduction.

2. Cover Division appreciates the assistance rendered by your office. Mr. Ormond will follow the above instructions.

07447

SECRET

17 March 1954 06
CS-1337 (Ormond)

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Contact Division, OO

FROM : Chief, FI/Plans/Cover Division

SUBJECT : OO/C case 9145

1. On 8 March 1954, pursuant to arrangements that had been made by your office, Bob McCann of your New York office introduced Mr. 06 Ormond to Mr. Leo Cherne of the Research Institute of America, 292 Madison Avenue, New York City. As a Category III interview had been requested, Mr. McCann departed soon after the introduction was made.

2. We would like to inform you that Mr. Cherne was cordial and agreed to cooperate with the Agency as requested.

3. On 15 March 1954, Mr. Ormond 06 again met with Mr. Cherne in his office at New York City to discuss further the operational matter. You were previously informed of Ormond 06's appointment on 15 March 1954 and while in New York on that day, he visited your New York office.

4. Your assistance in this matter is indeed appreciated by Cover Division.

file

✓

07448

✓

COLEMAN
SUPPORT
2268
23 March 1954

SECRET

NEW YORK

W

ROUTINE

FOR CONNOR
TO LEA/FROM ASHCRAFT BY SUPPORT(COLEMAN) 2499

CASE 9145. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, OLIVER ORMOND 06 WILL BE IN NEW YORK ON 23 MARCH FOR A 10:30 A.M. MEETING WITH LEO CHERNE. HE WILL COME TO THE NEW YORK OFFICE ABOUT 1 P.M. FOR THE PURPOSE OF DELIVERING A CHECK 24 TO AMOS BELDEN 06 INRE CASE 8417.

✓

SECRET

SECRET

07449

✓

17 Jan 56

Washington

New York

x

R. S. Travis 2268

SECRET

CONNOR FROM SUPPORT(TRAVIS)WA 8244

CASE 9145 REOPENED. RAY MILLARD HAS REQUESTED THAT YOU TRY TO [illegible] SET UP APPOINTMENT FOR HIM WITH LEO CHERNE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CASE[illegible] FOR SOMETIME NEXT WEEK. PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WILL BE TO SEE CHERNE ABOUT ~~XXX~~ EXTENDING COVER ARRANGEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL PERIOD OF TIME. REQUEST THAT THIS APPOINTMENT BE COORDINATED WITH ONE REQUESTED FOR MILLARD UNDER CASE 18945(COLEMAN). THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET

✓

07450

SEC SECRET

WA CITE NYOR 1191

SUPPORT (TRAVIS) FROM MCCANN

CASE 9145 X 9145

RAY MILLARD X RAY MILLARD HAS APPOINTMENT WITH LEO CHERNE X LEO CHERNE ON THURSDAY, 26 X 26 JANUARY AT 2 PM X 2 PM. CHERNE'S ADDRESS IS 292 X 292 MADISON AVE.

APPOINTMENT UNDER CASE 18945 X 18945 IS FOR SAME DAY AT 3 PM X 3 PM.

SUGGEST RAY MILLARD DROP BY THIS OFFICE AT 1:30 PM ON 26 X 26 JANUARY X AT 1:30 PM ON 26 JANUARY, BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH CHERNE.

PLEASE CONFIRM.

✓

20 Jan
Millard advised
and will make appt
& contact office

07451

14-00000

20 January 56 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

SECRET

New York

MCCANN FROM SUPPORT (TRAVIS) WA 8456

CASES 9145 AND 18945. REUR ED NYCR 1191. MILLARD WILL MAKE APPOINTMENTS AS SET UP BY YOU. HE WILL CHECK INTO THE OFFICE BY 1:00 PM ON THE 26TH. THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET

07452

SEC

SECRET

WA CITE NYOR 1351

SUPPORT (TRAVIS) FROM MCCANN

CASE 9145 X 9145

MILLARD HAD SUCCESSFUL MEETING WITH LEO CHERNE WHO AGREED TO PROPOSITION

MILLARD WILL DRAFT A LETTER FOR CHERNE WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED TO [illegible].

JAN 28 3 45 PM '58

07453

SECRET

CS-1337 (Millard) 9145-RST
2 February 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contact Division, 00

SUBJECT : Research Institute of America

1. On 26 January 1956, Mr. Millard of this office, together with Mr. Robert McCann, New York 00/C Office, interviewed Mr. Leo Cherne of the above captioned organization.

2. The results of this meeting were extremely satisfactory for our purposes and we are deeply appreciative of Mr. McCann's assistance in this matter.

3. Your cooperation is appreciated.

Fred R. Youngblood
for John S. Southard
Chief, CCB/NC

07454

DRAFT

Dear ______________:

I am happy to know that you are agreeable to assisting on a continuing basis as set out in your recent communication. However, this letter is being prepared to formalize our understanding and to make it a matter of record.

Effective April 1, 1956, you are appointed a Research Consultant for a period of two years with an annual salary of $5,000.00.

07455

SECRET

CS-1337 (Millard)
2 February 1956

NUGGET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert McCann
New York OO/C Office

SUBJECT : Research Institute of America

1. Attached is a suggested draft of the proposed Letter of Understanding between Mr. Cherne and his special employee.

2. In addition to the two paragraphs set out in the draft, it is suggested that Mr. Cherne also include either: (a) a brief general statement of the duties and responsibilities or (b) a statement indicating that the employee will continue the agreed-upon functions.

3. Another paragraph might be inserted with reference to the employee's past satisfactory performance.

4. For Mr. Cherne's information, the employee has had another article published in the New Leader which was issued on 23 January 1956, under the title "Poujadists".

5. We appreciate your and Mr. Cherne's courtesy and cooperation in this matter.

Raymond E. Millard
Central Cover Branch
Non-Official Cover

Attachment
As stated above

REM:dmw
cc: CS-1337

✓

SECRET

07456

SECRET

CS-1337 (Millard)
2 February 1956 9145-RST

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contact Division, OO

SUBJECT : Research Institute of America

This is confirm the verbal concurrence given to Mr. Millard on 2 February 1956 by Mr. Travis for the hand-carry of the original of the attached memorandum to Mr. Robert McCann, New York OO/C Office.

Fred R. Youngblood
for John G. Southard
Chief, SCB/NC

Attachment
As stated above

07457

14-00000

15 Feb 56 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York SECRET

MCCANN FROM SUPPORT(TRAVIS)W 9709

CASE 9145. MILLARD WONDERS IF YOU HAVE HAD ANY SUCCESS IN OBTAIN CHERNE'S SIGNATURE ON THE LETTER FORWARDED TO YOU IN DRAFT FORM ON 2 FEB? WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS. THANKS.

SECRET

07458

SECRET

SEC

UA CITE NYOR 1685

SUPPORT (TRAVIS) FROM MCCANN

CASE 9145 X 9145.

CHERNE HAS WRITTEN AND DISPATCHED THE LETTER.

WE HAVE COPY OF THE LETTER HERE, WHICH APPROXIMATES PROPOSED DRAFT BY MILLARD.

FEB 16 3 54 PM '56

✓

17 Feb 56
Millard advised
pw

07459

14-00000

2 March 56

Washington

New York

MCCANN FROM SUPPORT (TRAVIS) WA 0350

CASE 9145. MILLARE ADVISES THAT COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY CHERNE WAS SENT TO HEADQUARTERS ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO. LETTER WAS NOT RECEIVED. YOUR NYOR 1685 INDICATED THAT YOU HAD COPY, BUT NO RECORD HERE OF A COPY EVER COMING TO HEADQUARTERS. WILL YOU PLEASE FORWARD COPY. THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET

07460

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : Support (Travis)

DATE: 5 March 1956

FROM : Chief, New York Office

SUBJECT: Case 9145 RST
WA 0350

1. We mistakenly advised Mr. Raymond Millard, last week, that we had forwarded to your division a copy of the letter which Leo Cherne had dispatched to Mr. [redacted]. As you pointed out in your WA 0350 we merely advised you that we had a copy and did not forward it to Headquarters.

2. Attached you will find a replica of the letter written by Mr. Cherne.

MAR 7 10 05 AM '56
CONTACT DIVISION

Charles A. Lea

RWMc
R.W.McCann:cr
Attachment

7 Mar 56
letter fwd to Millard.

✓

07461

14-00000

R I of America
Research Institute

CS-1337. Case 9145

— Mc Cann

Cherne is aware that our boy is writing for a magazine named ______. Sam Reporter of New Leader However the editor of this magazine is going to the area where our man is located, but is not witting.

✓ Leo may know editor and ~~[illegible]~~ boy is going to tell Editor that he does some works

✓

for Leo and other.

In the event that the Editor knows Leo, and should see Leo and mentions ~~the~~ agent and the writing relationship, Cherne is not to identify the agent with CIA. 24

Boy will send in report of his conversation with Editor so ~~that~~ if necessary, Leo Cherne can be advised of it

✓

✓

14 Sept XX 4XX 56 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York Secret

MCCANN FROM SUPPORT (TRAVIS) WA 8598

CASE 9145. RAY MILLARD HAS REQUESTED THAT YOU XXX PASS SOME INFORMATION ON TO LEO CHERNE. XXXXXXX YOU KNOW, AS DOES CHERNE, THAT XXXX OUR MAN WHO IS DOING WORK FOR LEO, HAS ALSO BEEN WRITING FOR THE "NEW LEADER" 08, AS WELL AS XXXXX DOING OTHER JOBS. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE EDITOR OF THE "NEW LEADER" 08, S. LEVITAS 06, IS GOING TO TAKE A TRIP TO THE AREA WHERE OUR BOY IS LOCATED, AND WILL SEE HIM. WHEN OUR BOY SEES LEVITAS 06, HE IS GOING TO TELL HIM THAT HE DOES SOME WORK FOR LEO CHERNE, AND OTHERS, BESIDES SUBMITTING ARTICLES FOR THE "NEW LEADER" 08. HE WILL NOT OF COURSE, IDENTIFY HIMSELF WITH THE AGENCY. LEVITAS 06 IS UNWITTING OF ANY AGENCY RELATIONSHIP, AND IT IS DESIRED THAT IT BE KEPT THIS WAY. ON THE OFF CHANCE THAT CHERNE MAY KNOW LEVITAS 06, AND X ON THE FURTHER CHANCE THAT UPON HIS RETURN TO THE US, LEVITAS 06 MAY SEE CHERNE AND TELL HIM THAT HE RAN INTO OUR BOYXX WHO INDICATED THAT HE WAS DOING SOME WORK FOR CHERNE, WILL YOU TELL CHERNE ~~THAT~~ as soon as possible, that LEVITAS 06 IS NOT WITTING OF THE FACT THAT THE XXXX BOY IS CONNECTED WITH THE AGENCY 24, AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT INDICATE TO LEVITAS 06, XXXX OR ASSUME THAT LEVITAS 06 KNOWS, XX THE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP 24. THANKS VERY MUCH.

5/14/56

✓ SECRET

07462

✓

SECRET

SEC

WA CITE NYOR 4854

SUPPORT FROM MCCANN

CASE 9145 X 9145

SEP 20 1 36 PM '56

1. ON 19 X 19 SEPTEMBER WE ADVISED LEO CHERNE X LEO CHERNE OF THE CONTENTS OF YOUR WA-8598 X 8598. CHERNE, AS IT TURNED OUT, KNOWS S. LEVITAS X S. LEVITAS AND CONSIDERS HIM TO BE A VERY HIGH-TYPE, PATRIOTIC INDIVIDUAL.

2. WE EXPLAINED TO CHERNE THAT LEVITAS WOULD NO X NO DOUBT SEE OUR MAN ABROAD AND CAUTIONED CHERNE THAT HE SHOULD NOT X NOT ASSUME THAT LEVITAS KEW OF ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MAN INVOLVED AND THE AGENCY. CHERNE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD IN NO X NO WAY INDICATE THAT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP EXISTED.

3. RAY MILLARD X RAY MILLARD WAS INFORMED DURING HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK THAT CHERNE HAD BEEN SO ADVISED.

SECRET

20/1724?

✓

07463

✓

PRIORITY SECRET SENSITIVE

PP ESE

DE ESG 81

P 151341Z

GR180

BT

TVAVN

46473/23

46473/23

PRIORITY

SEC

WA CITE NYOR 6845

FEB 15 8 56 AM '57

THIS IS SENSITIVE

CASE 9145 X 9145

THIS IS IN REFERENCE TO A REQUEST MILLARD X MILLARD OF COVER DIV. MADE TO LEA X LEA IN WRITING CONCERNING THE FEAR OF OUR AGENT IN PARIS THAT HIS COVER MAY HAVE BEEN BLOWN BY HIS 24 SISTER, MEETING MR. 06 JOSEPH ARDLEIGH X JOSEPH 06 ARDLEIGH OF THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE AND TELLING HIM THAT HER 04 BROTHER WAS IN PARIS WORKING FOR SAID INSTITUTE.

CHERNE X CHERNE WAS APPRAISED OF THE SITUATION ON 14 X 14 FEBRUARY AND HE REQUESTS THE FOLLOWING:

07464

1. PLEASE ADVISE HIM OF THE NAME OF THE 08 SISTER WHO MET MR. 06 ARDLEIGH. (WE ASSUME FROM THE GIST OF HIS QUESTION THAT HE WANTS TO BE ABSOLUTELY SURE 0824 WHICH AGENT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT)

2. HE REQUESTS THAT 06 JOSEPH ARDLEIGH BE MADE WITTING OF THE OPERATION FOR OBVIOUS REASONS.

WE WILL SEND BIO X BIO DATA ON 06 ARDLEIGH AS SOON AS CHERNE MAKES IT AVAILABLE TO US.

PLEASE SEND US THE NAME OF THE 08 SISTER SO THAT WE CAN MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO CHERNE.

15/13477 ✓

15 Feb
Copy fwd to
Mulland

Mulland advised and will get sister's name. He also wants biog data on Ardleigh 06

RITY

SECRET

SENSITIVE

Case 9415

SECRET

SEC

WA CITE NYOR 6870

SUPPORT FROM MAJOR

REF. NYOR 6845 X 6845

FEB 18 11 18 AM '57

THE FOLLOWING IS THE BIO. X BIO INFORMATION ON 06 JOSEPH D. ARDLEIGH X 06 JOSEPH D. ARDLEIGH, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, 08 RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, INC., 08 589 X 539 FIFTH AVE., NEW YORK, NEW YORK.

HE WAS BORN 08 24 MAY 1914 X 08 24 MAY 1914 AT 08 SCRANTON, PENN.
HIS PRESENT HOME ADDRESS IS 08 ALDEN ROAD, GREENWICH, CONN.
HE WAS PREVIOUSLY CONNECTED WITH THE LAW FIRM OF 08 MILBANK, TWEED, HOPE AND WEBB OF NEW YORK, THE 08 HOOVER COMPANY OF 08 NORTH CANTON, OHIO, HAD HIS OWN BUSINESS WHICH WAS KNOWN AS 08 SALES METHODS INC., ROCKEFELLER PLAZA, NEW YORK.
HE JOINED 08 THE RESEARCH INST. 1939 X 1939.

PLEASE ASSIGN CASE NUMBER TO THESE EFFORTS.

✓

07465

✓

20 Feb 57

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York **14330** Secret

FROM SUPPORT(TRAVIS)WA

CASE 9145. REUR NYOR 6845. MILLARD ADVISES THAT THE NAME OF THE 06 SISTER WHO MET MR. 06 ARDLEIGH IS MRS. HELEN B. 06 BLODGETT(MRS. 06 EMMONS). BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON 06 ARDLEIGH RECEIVED AND MILLARD IS INITIATING SECURITY CLEARANCE ON HIM. WE WILL ADVISE YOU AS SOON AS IT IS RECEIVED.

FEB 20 3 55 PM '57

SECRET

07466

14-00000

7 August 1957 x

Washington

R. S. Travis 2268

New York

Secret

CONDOR FROM SUPPORT(TRAVIS)WA 21187

RE CLOSED CASE 9145. MILLARD OF COVER HAS REQUESTED THAT WE TRY TO DETERMINE WHEN LEO CHERNE WILL RETURN TO NYC. IT APPEARS THAT OUR BOY, [redacted] FOR WHOM CHERNE IS PROVIDING COVER, IS BACK IN THE STATES ON LEAVE, AND WHEN HE TRIED TO CONTACT CHERNE, FOUND THAT HE WAS OUT OF TOWN. WILL YOU PLEASE SEE IF YOU CAN FIND OUT DESIRED INFORMATION. THANKS.

24

AUG 8 9 59 AM '57

SECRET

07467

SEC

SECRET

WA CITE NYOR 9236

SUPPORT (TRAVIS) FROM DAME

AUG 13 10 29 AM '57

CLOSED CASE 9145 X 9145
REUR WA 21187 X 21187

1. MISS KREUGER X KREUGER, LEO CHERNE'S X LEO CHERNE'S SECRETARY, ADVISES HE IS EXPECTED BACK IN NYC 19 X 19 AUGUST, EXACT HOUR UNKNOWN X UNKNOWN.

2. ANYTHING FURTHER?

13 Aug 57
Millard advised. He will advise if action

✓

SECRET

07468

19 August 1957

Washington

R. S. Travis 2268

New York

Secret

DAME FROM SUPPORT(TRAVIS)WA 21593

CASE 9145(CLOSED). REUR NYOR 9236 AND LEO CHERNE. ~~XXXXXX~~ AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS NOTHING FURTHER TO BE DONE. THANKS FOR YOUR ANSWER.

AUG 19 [illegible] PM '57

SECRET

07469

14-00000

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

3263

INDIVIDUAL	DATE	ACTION
Fred Engel	26 Dec.	~~Fred~~ Engel came up at Rose's suggestion to discuss a need for cover. Engel has a man, now working for ECA who is coming with OPC at the end of January. Engel desires an interim back-stop which the ECA man can give to ECA as a reason for his leaving ECA. Engel desires some organization which will be used as the new employer of the ECA man, and which will be willing to acknowledge, if necessary, that they have hired the man. OPC is working on a permanent cover to send the man to Italy on a research program, but must await clearance on the outfit. The latter is believed to be the National Planning Association. Engel is submitting biographic data on the ECA man so that the organization who will backstop the man will have full knowledge of the man. Rose has assigned case # C101 to this case
Rose	10 Jan	Rose brought biographic on Engel's man. Rose indicated he may want to go to NY. to contact a firm re the cover. Travis raised the question as to whether or not the NY field office could make preliminary inquiry. Rose will advise. He wants to see Research Inst. of Amer. AW
	11 Feb	Close case
Holly	17 Mar	Holly requests that we make an appointment for Acon with Cherne for 18 or 19 March. ~~Capt~~ Acon will approach Cherne without CIA representative
Clarke (NY)	17 Mar ✓	Clarke advises that Acon should call direct to Cherne as the latter is expecting the call to come through that way. Acon can use Clarke's name if necessary. Holly notified but she doesn't like it. She will call back. Clarke will tell Cherne and [illegible] to expect call. Clarke advises [illegible] 7188. Oz advised.

07470 ✓

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET
Security Inforr

Office Memorandum • UNI

TO : Chief, Contact Division, OO

FROM : Chief, Cover Division, PLANS/OSO

SUBJECT: Appointment with William A. BARRON, and Leo CHERNE

Case 10336

Reference: CS-1512 and CS-1337.

Case 4145

1. This will confirm Mr. Rose's verbal request that Contact Division/OO ask its Boston field office to arrange appointments for Mr. Edward Rose of Cover Division, PLANS to see Mr. William A. Barron, Chairman of the Board, Gillette Safety Razor Company, and Mr. John [illegible]. Toulmin, Senior Vice President of the First National Bank of Boston, at their convenience on Wednesday May 21, 1952. The purpose of the visit is to explore the willingness of these gentlemen to act as ostensible donors of funds to support a current operation.

2. This will also confirm Mr. Rose's request that the New York City field office of the Contact Division/OO arrange an appointment for Mr. Rose to see Mr. Leo Cherne, President of the Research Institute of America at Mr. Cherne's convenience on Thursday May 22, 1952. Mr. Cherne, who has for some time been backstopping the activities of an agent in this country, has apparently expressed willingness to provide cover for this agent abroad. The purpose of the interview is to discuss more fully Mr. Cherne's proposal. Cover Division would be happy to have an OO field office representative present to insure continuity.

Case 4145

3. As a result of the above requests, Mr. Barron found to his regret that he was unable to cooperate with the Agency at the present time. Mr. Toulmin, on the other hand, was most cooperative. Mr. Cherne, unfortunately, was out of town. The New York field office has been asked to try to arrange a meeting with Mr. Cherne, as outlined above, for Wednesday afternoon, June 4, 1952.

SECRET
Security Information

07471

1. MESSAGES ARE CONSIDERED ROUTINE UNLESS A HIGHER PRECEDENCE IS INDICATED IN ADDRESS LINE.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: GK:RO:sh
UNIT: CI/Special Operations
EXT:: 5847
DATE: 18 April 1970

SECRET

Copy___ of ___

DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET

CITE HEADQUARTERS 984

TO DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ATTN: MR. FRED J. CASSIDY 13 Z APR 70

FROM: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CACTUS

SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN VIETNAM MORATORIUM CAMPAIGN

24

1. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICE THAT WILLIAM RICHARD LESLIE, AUSTRALIAN DELEGATE TO THE FIFTH STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE FOLLOWING FOREIGNERS HAVE BEEN INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE AUSTRALIAN VIETNAM MORATORIUM CAMPAIGN AND HAVE EITHER ACCEPTED OR ARE CONSIDERING ACCEPTANCE:

A. PASTOR MARTIN NIEMOLLER (COMMENT: WEST GERMAN VICE PRESIDENT OF WAR RESISTERS INTERNATIONAL.)

B. MRS. NANCY RUBIN, WIFE OF JERRY RUBIN.

C. MRS. CORETTA KING

D. MR. DICK GREGORY.

2. INCIDENTAL TO THIS, LESLIE NOTED THAT THE STRONG THEME OF AMERICAN DELEGATES TO THE FIFTH STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER b/1373

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER Kpdcw 13 May

07497 [redacted]

2

1. MESSAGES ARE CONSIDERED ROUTINE UNLESS A HIGHER PRECEDENCE IS INDICATED IN ADDRESS LINE.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Copy ___ of ___

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT::
DATE:

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET CITE HEADQUARTERS

TO PAGE TWO

WAS THE IDEA OF "CORPORATE COMPLICITY," AND DAYS OF ACTION PLANNED IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN 21 AND 30 APRIL AGAINST COMPANIES WITH MILITARY CONTRACTS. LESLIE URGED SIMILAR ACTION AGAINST AUSTRALIAN SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES SUCH AS HONEYWELL COMPUTERS AND QANTAS.

3. (THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICE) 24 HAS ASKED FOR VERIFICATION CONCERNING THE INTENTION OF THESE AMERICANS OR OTHERS TO VISIT AUSTRALIA FOR THE MORATORIUM.

4. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY PERTINENT INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ABOVE FOR PASSAGE TO (THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICE.) 24

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION

FILING
1 – Chrono ||
2 – (AUST) OPS (EK)
3 – [illegible]
4 – [illegible]
Indexed: ___

C/CI/SO Richard Ober
Richard Ober

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10071-10021
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CI/OBER
TO : FBI
TITLE : SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF DALE SMITH
DATE : 09/20/1968
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS : ACTIVITY
BLACK POWER
DENMARK
SMITH, DALE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/29/93
COMMENTS : JFK15 : F3 : 1993.07.29.17:33:26:710058

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10071-10021

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/Ober

EXTENSION: 5847

NO. B-177

DATE: 20 Sep 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

EYES ONLY

Originated by: E/SC/CE:
Maria Walsh:ed
6 August 1968

Based on: ODCA-15052, 26 Jul 68

Disseminated to: FBI on
20 Sep 1968

Action

B-700
17 Oct 69

7522

File: B-Memos (record copy)

cc: Dale SMITH (201)

cc: PROD COPENHAGEN
PROD

EYES ONLY B-177

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

SECRET

20 SEP 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Activities of Dale SMITH

1. Attached is a newspaper interview with American Black Power advocate Dale SMITH, which was published in Søndags Aktuelt, 7 July 1968, and which gives a fair description of SMITH's views as they have been expressed on other occasions.

2. SMITH mentions a television program which had been filmed but not shown by Danish TV. The program was, in fact, shown on the week the interview appeared; the title was "The Negro in Denmark" and a group of five American Negroes had a fine time sitting around a table in a dark, smoke-filled set meant to appear as a cafe, damning white America , capitalism, Russian communism, and - most emphatically - Denmark, all with a fine disdain for logic or sequence of thought.

PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON, MR. S. J. PAPICH

Attachment:
Newspaper article

E/SC/CE: Maria C. Walsh:ed 6 August 1968

Distribution:

1-E/SC/CE
~~1-CI/R&A~~
~~1-CI/LSN~~
~~1-RID~~

Based on: ODCA-15052, 26 July 1968

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

104-10071-10041

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/CI/SO Richard Ober	EXTENSION 5847	NO. B-2628	DATE 21 MAY 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

CI/SO Internal Use Only

This memo is not to be disseminated outside CI/SO without prior permission from Chief, CI/SO.

Originated by: CI/SO:GMK:jm

Based on: Budapest 016, 18 May 71 (WPC/Sens/BW) and Budapest 017, 19 May 71 (WPC/Sens/BW)

Source: JKLANCE/Hungarian Press

Dissem to FBI (Mr. Wannall) via CI/SO courier on: 21 MAY 1971

ACTION:

B-2660 B-2809
16 Jun 71 31 Aug 71

B-2670
18 Jun 71

File:
WPC/Sens/BW
FAULKNER/Sens/GMK (201-354414/GK)
KUSHNER/Sens/BW (201-878516/BW)
GILMAN/Sens/BW (new)
DICKERSON/Sens/BW (201-854982/BW)
GARZA/Sens/BW (new)
COLBY/Sens/GMK (201-053968/GK)
KAHN/Sens/EC
KENT, Mrs./Sens/GK (201-221724/GK)
PECK/Sens/BW (201-830466/BW)
KING/Sens/JD (201-760966/JD)
ABERNATHY/Sens/JD (201-853022/JD)
WALKER/Sens/JD
DOUTHARD/Sens/BW (201-857634/BW)
WYATT/Sens/BW
APTHEKER/Sens/BW (201-757176/BW)
GOODLETT/Sens/BW (201-742726/BW)
Production Budapest
Production JKLANCE

7527

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

B- 2628
21 MAY 1971

SUBJECT: Americans Attending the World Peace Council (WPC) Conference in Budapest, Hungary, 13-16 May 1971

1. A reliable source has reported that the following Americans spoke at the indicated committee meetings of the WPC Conference:

A. Stanley FAULKNER, Committee on European Peace and Security;

B. Sylvia KUSHNER, Committee on Indochina Aggression;

C. John GILMAN, Committee on the Near East;

D. Mary Angie DICKERSON, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination;

E. Luis GARZA, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination; and

F. Ruth GAGE-COLBY, Committee on Disarmament.

All of the above-named persons were identified specifically as members of the U.S. delegation.

2. According to the same source, S. FAULKNER, "Vice President of the American National Lawyers' Association," functioned as President in a meeting of lawyer delegates to the Congress and the American delegate Albert KAHN translated a message from the widow of artist Rockwell KENT to the Conference.

3. In its final coverage on 18 May of the WPC Conference, which ended 16 May, the Hungarian Press made the following additional observations regarding United States participants:

A. Sidney PECK, identified as "USA Professor," spoke on the war in Vietnam;

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

B. The WPC awarded the JOLIOT-CURIE GOLD MEDAL posthumously to the Reverend Martin Luther KING. The medal was accepted by the Reverend Ralph ABERNATHY and the Reverend Wyatt T. WALKER, "an American peace fighter." A photograph of the presentation ceremony also included William DOUTHARD and Mrs. Addie WYATT as U.S. delegates to the Conference;

C. U.S. delegates Ruth GAGE-COLBY and Sylvia KUSHNER spoke at a meeting of Indochinese and American delegates; and

D. Americans Herbert APTHEKER and Carlton GOODLETT were re-elected to the Presidential Board of the WPC.

4. For previous information on Subject, please refer to our teletype 3216, dated 14 May 1971, Subject: Ralph David ABERNATHY and Dr. Carlton GOODLETT. ✓

Please transmit reply via CACTUS channel

Originated by: CI/SO:GMKline:jm
Based on: BUDAPEST 016, 18 May 71 (WPC/Sens/BW) and BUDAPEST 017, 19 May 71 (WPC/Sens/BW)
Source: JKLANCE/Hungarian Press
Distribution:
Original - FBI (Mr. Wannall) via CI/SO courier
1 - B memo chrono
1 - extra copy
1 - WPC/Sens/BW
1 - FAULKNER/Sens/GMK (201-354414/GK)
1 - KUSHNER/Sens/BW (201-878516/BW)
1 - GILMAN/Sens/BW (new)
1 - DICKERSON/Sens/BW (201-854982/BW)
1 - GARZA/Sens/BW (new)
1 - COLBY/Sens/GMK (201-053968/GK)
1 - KAHN/Sens/EC
1 - KENT, Mrs./Sens/GK (201-221724/GK)
1 - PECK/Sens/BW (201-830466/BW)
1 - KING/Sens/JD (201-760966/JD)
1 - ABERNATHY/Sens/JD (201-853022/JD)
1 - WALKER/Sens/JD
1 - DOUTHARD/Sens/BW (201-857634/BW)
1 - WYATT/Sens/BW
1 - APTHEKER/Sens/BW (201-757176/BW)
1 - GOODLETT/Sens/BW (201-742726/BW)
1 - Production Budapest
1 - Production JKLANCE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
CI/Special Operations
Richard Ober

EXTENSION: 5847

NO. B-2316

DATE: 2 9 DEC 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

CI/SO Internal Use Only

THIS MEMO IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE CI/SO WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF CHIEF, CI/SO.

Originated By: CI/SO:GMKline
Based On: 13-10 (MELBOURNE) 140, 15 Dec 70 & (MELBOURNE) 143, 21 Dec 70 13-10
Source: 01 (SQUASH)

DISSEM TO FBI(MR. WANNALL)VIA CI/SO COURIER ON: 2 9 DEC 1970

rec'd 14 Jan 71
~~[illegible]~~
DBD - 02466
rec'd 2 Feb 71
DBD-04734
Nat'l Antiwar Conf.
rec'd 3 Feb 71
DBD-04217
anti war Conf.
rec'd 18 Feb 71
DBD-
rec'd 22 Nov 71
DBD-07770
24

FILE: Australia/SQUASH/JOINT OPS/1971 Conferences/
sens/gmk

Prod 13-10 (Melbourne)
Prod 01 (SQUASH)
07508

DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Controlled Dissem/For Background Use Only

B-2316
29 DEC 1970

SUBJECT: Plans for a National Anti-War Conference to be Held in Sydney, Australia 17-21 February 1971 and a Third National Moratorium on 30 April 1971.

1. We have been advised by the (Australian Service) 24 that there are plans for a National Anti-War Conference to be held in Sydney, Australia on 17-21 February 1971 and a Third National Moratorium to be held on 30 April 1971. In August 1970, one Arthur John LLOYD (not further identified) circulated a proposed listing of foreign invitees to the Anti-War Conference. Following is a listing under sub-paragraph A of those invited; under sub-paragraph B of those who have already refused; and under sub-paragraph C those who have accepted:

A. Invited:

(1) Rev. Ralph D. ABERNATHY, President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (see your memorandum from Atlanta, Georgia, dated 4 November 1970, entitled Ralph D. ABERNATHY - Racial Matter);

(2) Father Eugene BOYLE, Sacred Heart Church, San Francisco, California (see your memorandum from Boston, Massachusetts, dated 6 August 1969, entitled Black Panther Party, Page 3);

(3) Noam CHOMSKY, Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (see our memorandum to you dated 18 May 1970, Subject: Travel of U.S. Nationals to North Vietnam);

(4) William Sloan COFFIN, Chaplain, Yale University;

(5) Rev. Earle CUMMINGHAM, Cleveland (not further identified);

(6) David Tyre DELLINGER (Bureau File No. 100-384411);

(7) Donald DUNCAN, former member of the Green Berets (see your memorandum from San Diego, California, dated 17 February 1970, entitled Mark LANE);

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Controlled Dissem/For Background Use Only
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Controlled Dissem/For Background Use Only

(8) Ossie EDWARDS, Federation of Social Service Employees (not further identified);

(9) Betty FRIEDAN, National Union of Women;

(10) A. GINSBURG (not further identified);

(11) Fred HALSTEAD, Socialist Workers' Party (Bureau File No. 100-371709);

(12) David HILLIARD, Black Panther Party Chief of Staff, Berkeley, California (see your memorandum from San Francisco, California, dated 24 August 1970, entitled David HILLIARD, Racial Matter, Black Panther Party, Threat Against the President);

(13) Philip J. HIRSCHKOP, Attorney (see your memorandum, Washington, D.C., dated 22 April 1970, entitled Demonstration by the Jews for Urban Justice, Washington, D.C., April 25-26 1970, Internal Security - R);

(14) Coretta KING (see Bureau File No. 109-12-24);

(15) Prof. S. E. LURIA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (not further identified);

(16) Norman MAILER, author (see your memorandum, New York, New York, dated 10 April 1970, entitled Cuban Mission to the United Nations);

(17) George Mason MURRAY (see Bureau File No. 100-443769);

(18) Fr. Don NOLAN, Detroit (not further identified);

(19) Nancy RUBIN, (see Bureau File No. 100-446949);

(20) Gus SCHOLLE (not further identified);

(21) Dr. Benjamin SPOCK (Bureau File No. 445115);

(22) Prof. G. WALD (not further identified);

(23) John T. WILLIAMS, Teamster' Union (not further identified).

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad

B. Refused:

(1) Harry BRIDGES, Longshoremen's Union;

(2) Mrs. Katherine CAMP, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom;

(3) Sam POLLOCK, Amalgamated Meat Packers.

C. Accepted:

(1) Michael MYERSON (see Bureau File No. 100-435008);

(2) Cynthia FREDERICK, Member of Concerned Asian Scholars (see our memorandum B-2226, 17 November 1970, Subject Cynthia Kay FREDERICK);

(3) David GUREWITZ, National Secretary, Student Mobilization Committee, Chicago.

2. In October 1970, the following persons were also invited:

A. Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT;

B. Senator G. S. MCGOVERN;

C. Averill HARRIMAN;

D. Barbara Ward JACKSON (not further identified);

E. Don Helda CAMARA (not further identified);

F. Carol LIPMAN, Exeuctive Secretary of the Students Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

3. The following persons have accepted invitations to participate in the Conference as speakers:

A. Michael UHL, former U.S. Army Lieutenant who has served in Vietnam (see Bureau File No. NY 100-171248);

B. Peter WILEY, Staff Member of LEVIATHAN magazine (see Bureau File No. 100-441164).

24

4. The (Australian Service) has requested verification concerning the intention of these Americans or others to visit Australia to participate in either the Conference or the Moratorium.

Please transmit reply via CACTUS channel

Originated By: CI/SO:GMKline
Based On : 16-10 (MELBOURNE) 140, 15 December 1970 and
16-10 (MELBOURNE) 143, 21 December 1970
Source : (SQUASH) 201
Distribution :
Original - FBI (Mr. Wannall) via CI/SO courier on: 29 DEC 1970
1 - B-Memo Chrono
1 - Extra Copy File
1 - (Australia/SQUASH/Joint Ops)/1971 Conferences/sens/gk

24

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOMUSE

INFO.

FROM
27, 12-35
Chief of Station, Nairobi

SUBJECT
01
RYBAT/MHCURB/MHCHAOS - Vida Mae GAYNOR (201-867508)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

DO NOT REPRODUCE

RETURN TO CIA

ACTION: File in Subject's 201.

1. The following information on the Subject of 201-867508 was obtained by 02 OPOWL/1 who hosted her at his home in mid-April 1971. Subject has been in Tanzania for 20 months. She expects to remain there permanently. She is employed by the GOT as an assistant to the Deputy Chief Accountant for the National Development Corporation. She expects to be promoted to the post of Deputy Chief Accountant on the first of May when her present boss is himself advanced. She claims to receive a "good" salary plus a TS 2500/month house for which she has to pay only 10% with the GOT picking up the rest.

2. Subject grew up in Queens, New York, where she was very active in the African-Methodist-Episcopal Church where she met her husband 25 years ago. She didn't finish high school but was a good typist and easily found employment "with the New York Jews who realized they could hire a good black secretary for 2/3 what they'd have to pay a white." She was always active in social causes, anti-war demonstrations, civil rights movements, and was active in CORE in 1966. She was a staunch admirer of Malcom X and attended his funeral with Mrs. Martin Luther King.

3. Subject was a member of the Jamaica Rifle Club, an organization created to teach Afro-Americans to shoot rifles. She claims to have "fingered" two "infiltrators" who had been recruited by the authorities to penetrate the organization. She claims that her instructor was another infiltrator who eventually testified in court, causing the organization to be "busted."

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/WOMUSE

07511

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	22 AKNA-6275	30 April 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

4. Subject has two sons. One, named Dennis (age 20), has joined her in Dar es Salaam after she set up a mechanism to help him evade the draft and depart the country illegally. She has another son who is 26 years of age who spent two years in the Army. He had been promised educational opportunities by the recruiter. When denied these he studied abnormal psych extensively and tried to feign mental illness, but was instead put up for Court Martial for malingering. A friend of Subject, the founder of the "Serviceman's Union" helped spring the son.

5. Subject provides a home in Dar es Salaam for Daniel Finley, a 26-year-old son of a prominent electrical contractor in Dayton, Ohio. After avoiding his draft call--when his father couldn't buy it off--he was jailed, but released on bail. He jumped bail and was put on a plane for Dar with a note to President Nyerere to "...take care of my son." He's been in Dar for two years. He has had three audiences with the President at which he has presented Nyerere with prototype lathes and guns which he has himself produced in the technical school where he teaches. He has promised to have a prototype of an M-16 ready for display at an upcoming trade and industrial fair.

6. Subject provides housing and contacts for Afro-Americans coming to Dar es Salaam. OPOWL/1 describes her political attitudes as "...similar to a religious convert--more radical than the radicals." She claims to be frustrated with the slowness of the revolution in Tanzania suggesting that experts from China and North Korea are needed, not those from the West.

Burton L Korade
Burton L. KORADE

(WHEN FILLED IN) 4-63

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/DO/I B-1			17 Oct	
2.				
3. ~~FT~~				
4. MR. OBER - CI OP/DO				
5. MR. TOTH - DO/I/B1 - 1H9				
6.				
7. Shirley				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				

1 thru 4. Of possible interest to you

— file [illegible] dispatch

1528

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 11 Oct 67

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UWCA 03510

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

C/DO/I

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION RYBAT/SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, DO/I	x	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Base, Washington SRC		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
WOMUSE
"Peace" Demonstrations

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
DIRECTOR 39871

1. Enclosed for Headquarters information are copies of literature mailed by the Catholic Association for International Peace (CAIP) to its members (attachments 1, 2 and 3) concerning "Negotiation Now!"

2. Also enclosed as of possible interest are copies of CAIP materials (attachments 3, 4 and 5) concerning its 40th Annual Conference, scheduled for October 27 - 29, the theme of which is "Selective Conscientious Objection in an Age of Conflict." The conference is to be held at Dunbarton College of Holy Cross, 2935 Upton Street N.W., Washington, D. C.

3. The above items were received by Oliver H. CORBUSTON who had joined the CAIP for cover purposes in the course of a previous assignment. Attachments 1, 2 and 3 are forwarded in response to reference.

Oliver H. Corbuston
Oliver H. CORBUSTON

Attachments: As stated.

Distribution:
- 3 - Chief, DO/I w/atts
- 1 - Chief, DO w/o att

1528

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UWCA-3510 CS COPY	DATE [illegible] OCT 1967 11 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT/SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOMUSE

INFO
Chief, European Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Oslo

SUBJECT
RYBAT/MHCHAOS Transmittal of Clippings

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Transmitted herewith are three untranslated clippings from Norwegian newspapers which may be of interest to WOMUSE.

Raymond N. Mansour
Raymond N. MANSOUR

Attachment:
Clippings - h/w

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WOMUSE w/attachment h/w
2 - Chief, European Division w/o attachment

7540

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OWOT-2911	19 March 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-006-387/3

ATTACHMENT TO OWOT-2911

Aftenposten 17.3.69

„Sorte Pantere" for en sosial revolusjon

«Panteren» Bobby Seale kom til Oslo idag

— Vi vil bevise at det sosialistiske samfunn er bedre enn det kapitalistiske: vi vil innføre dette i USA og vi vil samarbeide med revolusjonære i alle land, sa lederen for det amerikanske «Black Panther»-partiet da han i morges kom til Oslo. Seale er på besøk i Skandinavia for å fortelle om sitt syn på kampen mellom rasene i USA. Som arrangør for besøket i Norge står den norske «Black Panther»-komité og Rød Front.

Lederen for det amerikanske «Black Panther»-parti, Bobby Seale, ved ankomsten til Fornebu.

(Foto: Brynjulv Aarthun)

— Intet har bedret forholdene for det sorte Amerika under tidligere president Johnson, og president Nixons forslag om å innføre «sort kapitalisme» i ghettoene vil bare øke følelsen av sort rasehat, hevdet Seale, som understreket at de «sorte pantere» ikke ønsker sitt eget, adskilte samfunn. Rasene har levet adskilt i 200 år, og nu er det på tide å gå fremover, sa den meget veltalende Bobby Seale. Hans uttrykksmåte var overveiet og polert, bortsett fra i gjentatte henvisninger til politiet i USA som han kaller «griser» (pigs).

Første gang «Black Panther»-partiet gjorde seg kjent var da Bobby Seale og en annen av partiets ledere, Huey P. Newton, i oktober 1966 organiserte væpnede patruljer som skulle overvåke politiets behandling av negrene. Newton sitter nu fengslet for å ha skutt en politimann, og et av partiets mål er å få ham frigitt.

— USA er en politistat, fortsatte Seale og hevdet at det sorte samfunn må læres opp til selvforsvar. Han tror ikke på flere såkalte «hete sommere», fordi han mener at det sorte samfunn har innsett utilstrekkeligheten av spontane opprør. Men effektivt arbeidende organisasjoner har man respekt for, la han til.

Et av de første tiltak partiet har satt i verk er å organisere felles frokost for fattige barn, for det meste negre. Dernest håper partiet på å organisere sosialistiske bysamfunn for de som måtte være interessert. Partiet arbeider nemlig ikke bare for negre, men for alle undertrykte minoriteter. Dessuten søker partiet å samarbeide med hva Seale kaller «progressive hvite» elementer i samfunnet.

— Vi godtar ikke betegnelsen «krigersk» (militant). Vi hevder nødvendigheten av selvforsvar, det har vist seg å være nødvendig. Selv Marthin Luther King var ikke fremmed for tanken om alt annet hadde sviktet. Stokely Carmichael er statsminister i vår «skyggeregjering», men har kommet med enkelte uttalelser om agressivitet og separatisme som vi ikke helt kan godta, sa Bobby Seale, som møtte Norge med Mao-profil i luen, og en beklagelse over at ikke fjernsynets kameramenn var møtt frem for å dekke begivenheten.

14-00000

"Black Panthers" for a Social Revolution

"Panther" BOBBY SEALE came to Oslo today

We will show that Socialist society is better than Capitalist society; we will introduce it in the United States and we will cooperate with revolutionaries in all countries, said the leader of the American "Black Panther" Party when he came to Oslo this morning. SEALE is on a visit to Scandanavia to express his views about the struggle between the races in the United States. The Norwegian "Black Panther" Committee and Red Front arranged the visit.

Nothing has improved conditions for Black America under former President Johnson, and President Nixon's proposal to introduce "Black Capitalism" in the ghettoes will only increase feelings of black racial hate, asserted SEALE, who emphasized that the "Black Panthers" are not seeking their own separate society. The races have lived separately for 200 years and now it is time to go forward, said the very eloquent BOBBY SEALE. His manner of expression was judicious and polished, aside from repeated references to the "Police Force" in the US, which he calls "pigs".

The "Black Panther" Party became known for the first time when BOBBY SEALE and one of the Party leaders, HUEY P. NEWTON, organized armed patrols in October, 1966, which were to watch police treatment of Negroes. NEWTON is now in prison for shooting a policeman and one of the Party's goals is his release.

The USA is a police state, SEALE continued, and he maintains that black society must learn to defend itself. He does not believe in many so-called "hot summers" because he believes that black society has realized the inadequacy of spontaneous riots. However, he asserted effectively working organizations are respected.

One of the Party's first efforts was the organization of breakfasts for poor children, for most negroes. The Party next hopes to organize a Socialist municipality for those who must be interested. The Party works not only for Negroes, but for all oppressed minorities. In addition, the Party is seeking to cooperate with what SEALE calls "progressive white" elements in society.

We do not approve the term militant. We assert the need of self defense, which has turned out to be urgent. Even Martin Luther King was not averse to the idea that everything else had failed. STOKELY CARMICHAEL is Prime Minister in our " shadow Government", but he makes statements about aggressiveness and separatism which we can not completely approve, said BOBBY SEALE, who came to Norway with a Mao badge in his cap and a complaint that no television cameramen appeared to cover the events.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

31

[redacted]

DISPATCH NO. (HBDA)-186
22

VIA Air

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 14 May 1955

TO Chief, NEA
12-22

FROM Senior Representative, (New Delhi)

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/INTEL
SPECIFIC (PA)FLIPPER - Transmittal of Reports
02

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of THERIAULT reports and notes as listed below. Not included are carbon copies of the initial report (plans updated) and the report covering the period 28 December - 14 January as the third copy was not made.

2. THERIAULT requested that, if possible, a set of his report be made available to him on his return to facilitate preparation of a master report on overall findings and impressions.

Thomas V. LUND

Enclosures Under separate cover
(Pouched 7 May 1955)

14 Jan - 23 Jan	4 - 7 Mar
25 Jan - 30 Jan	8 Mar - 16 Mar
30 Jan - 8 Feb	18 Mar - 30 Mar
9 Feb - 17Feb	Interview with U.S. EMBAR
18 Feb (1 pp)	8 Apr - 12 Apr
20 Feb - 4 Mar	Notebook

02

Removed from Project (PA)FLIPPER
CS Classification: NE
JOB # 65/59
Box: 5 Fold: # 3

Distribution:
Orig & 4 - Hqs
2 - Files
9 May 55

[redacted]

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

8915

SECRET

14 May 1955

02

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: (PA)FLIPPER

SUBJECT: Preliminary Debriefing of Anita THERIAULT

TIME: 13 May 1955, 2030-2130.

1. Prior to my departure for New York to handle the preliminary debriefing of THERIAULT, I discussed the following subjects with CNEA-5:

1) In view of the fact that THERIAULT's expenses on her recent trip to India have been greater than was anticipated, $1,000 additional funds have or are to be shortly deposited to her bank. This will be done by sterile check. It is to be accounted for under the terms of the original contract.

2) CNEA-5 suggested that I take her reports up with me for possible annotation and expansion. /Upon examination on 14 May, this appears unfeasible in view of the fact that there are CIA commo indicators and RI symbols attached directly to the reports./

3) CNEA-5 suggested that I pursue with THERIAULT the possibility of developing an interest in Krishna Menon, utilizing a cleared publisher who could request Menon to write a book. This approach to be based on Menon's acute susceptability to flattery.

4) CNEA-5 suggested that THERIAULT be asked to review the areas of her influence in order to lay the groundwork for an official invitation to visit this country being extended to the Prime Minister in the future. He suggested Sen. George and Chester Bowles as possible points of departure.

5) THERIAULT is to be informed that her reports have been of immeasurable assistance to the Ambassador and to the U.S. Government vis-a-vis policy planning for India.

6) THERIAULT is to be asked to come to Washington for a day or so in the very near future for further debriefing. This is to be arranged at her convenience.

7) In view of the fact that THERIAULT has been unwitting of the Agency's role in sponsoring her trip, I suggested that I now make her witting in terms of the security involved. It seemed advisable to me since it is likely that there will be future contacts with THERIAULT. CNEA-5 agreed to this.

8) THERIAULT is to be advised that she is at liberty to discuss any and all aspects of her trip with anybody with the exception of the Agency's role in sponsoring it.

02

Removed from Project (PA)FLIPPER
CS Classification: NONE
JOB #66-668/59
Box: 5 Fold: #2

SECRET

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

9) In view of the vast amount of work that must be done, I suggested that I plan to spend two days - 16 and 17 May - if it becomes necessary. On previous trips to discuss TRESIAULT's mission with her, I found that she frequently had other commitments which made it difficult to cover adequately the material which I had amassed. If this is the case on this trip, I should prefer not to press her. One day's latitude seems the better part of wisdom. CHEA-5 agreed. We shall see, however.

10) In the event that it becomes necessary to reach me, I suggest that my wife be asked to get in touch with me, 08 (JAckson 7-7018) and that I be asked simply to call my office. I will then call on the sterile phone. For the record, my telephone number in New York is TELHAM 8-2530. 08

Bertram Cooper

03

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

22

7.

~~ALL NOT FILE~~
NO [redacted]

General Comments.

4P duplicate

1. I have now talked with many Ford Foundation people and many TCM people. Am impressed by their quality. They are working hard and are doing it in a self-effacing manner. I have not heard one criticism of them from anybody. There are a few duds, of cour I have not yet met them. They are here "to help India carry out her projects and her ideas" as one put it. And they seem to do it not only democratically but with a very real warmth and sympathy -- yet they stay quietly in the background and take none of the credit. But I feel more strongly each week I am here that the work is solid and is having tremendously good effect in relieving tension and hostility between the two countries. The results of the actual work are apparent now and hope has recently increased among Indians; also their self-confidence. When confidence increases, sensitiveness decreases, of course.

2. From all I have picked up, the feeling is widespread that Ambassador Allen did a good job out here. As one put it, "he was exactly right for the period he was here; just as Bowles was right for the special problems of his two years." Both Indian and Americans highly praise both men.

3. We have a prize in Evelyn Hersey and somebody should thank God every night that she is here. She and Dr. and Mrs. Wiser are the most-loved Americans in north India, certainly. Evelyn Hersey is known throughout India. She was Social Welfare attache at the Embassy beginning I think in 1943. The only one attached to any embassy anywhere, I understand. Her work was to interpret the social changes taking place in India; to become aware of the needs and problems and how these needs and problems were being met; and to offer her services and her experience whenever or wherever it was asked for. When the administration changed, she was dismissed by Republicans on the grounds that this was a new idea; nobody else had ever done such a thing, that is no other foreign service and so why should the U.S.A. At Mr. Allen's urgent insistence, she was sent back, this time under the aegis of TCM. She is, however, doing the same job. Her influence is very wide; she is admired and loved by literally thousands of Indians from the high echelons down to the sweepers and other harijans. She is called on for advice in numerous fields and by very high officials. She works behind the scenes and feels that her work would be ruined were she given credit for what she has actually done. She is vivid and full of life and one would hardly call her self effacing; and yet her work is done almost anonymously. I have been around her enough to see how wide her circle of Indian friends is; and how constantly and continuously they stream through her house. She goes all ove India. Has travelled much more than 100 thousand miles. She say in recent months she has felt absolutely no antagonism toward her as an American. She is shrewd, has sharp eyes and ears; is knowledgeable politically; is nobody's fool; is strongly anti-communist; is warmhearted and intellectually flexible. One of the best minds I have run into since coming out.

4. I wish we had five times the people in TCM. They carefully avoid politics. I think it is wise. And they are doing a [illegible]

Removed from Project CI FLIPPER
Classification: NONE
JOB # 66-669/59
Box: 5 Fold # 3

PA

AD #1
(-BDA-1805)

AND REPRODUCTIONS

AH (NBDF) 1865
22

General Comments. (continued.)

5. A very good project has recently been launched. It is called The Delhi Training and Orientation Centre for Foreign Technicians in India. This is the second time it has been held, I think. It begins today, Jan. 24. Continues for two weeks. (The first one worked out a fine short bibliography on India; and a little brochure on "Foods available in North India.") This second course covers the Indian village, with visits out to villages; Indian art, architecture, dance; Indian history; religion; Islam in India; other religions and philosophies; Indian family life and customs; Health problems and resources; educational problems; urban problems; rural unemployment and aid; the role of foreign aid in India; discussion of the Five Year Plan.

It is the kind of briefing that every foreigner who are in U.S. [illegible] coming to India should have. It is open to all of them. We were invited simply as guests and shall attend many of the meetings. Films are shown; trips to art galleries and museums, etc. Miss Hersey has had much to do with this; also Dr. Douglas Esminger. And probably others, too. Indians will do most of the briefing.

6. I shall write later about the Five Year Plan. Am still studying it. Shall have a number of interviews with the planners, or with a few of them. Shall also go out on several of the projects. This seems important to me for social changes and how they are made, broad politics. The political picture can certainly not be understood if the cultural and social pictures are not studied and analysed carefully.

We are enclosing a few excerpts of speeches made by Mr. Nehru, Mr. Menon, and Mr. Dhebar this past week at the Congress Party big gathering.

AH(NBDA) 1865
22

Odds and Ends of Information:
(OSO)

1. My Fish, told me that the Communists are organising the domestic workers of New Delhi . Last week there was a meeting of ayahs at India Gate called together for this purpose. The week before the bearers (or the sweepers) were called together. The Communists are going about it in a shrewd way; making very reasonable demands, such as a half day off each week, a rise of perhaps 4 or 5 rupees a month in wages. A Communist in every home will really be something.

He says there is little activity of Congress party or Socialist party among labor groups. The work is being done by Communists. They, somehow,? have the money to do the organisational work while there is little money among regular workers due to weakness of industry, small number and low wages of the workers. He is troubled over lack of activity among the democratic groups in labor circles. Says he has been here only 3 months and cannot as yet see the picture clearly.

2. The State Dept.'s coldness about permitting families to visit the airmen in China gave the U. S. a very bad press out here. It was very clever strategy on the part of China; it was bad strategy on our part to appear callous to the feelings of the families. Family affection runs deep out here. It is another one of our many small blunders which somehow loom so large when viewed by the hundreds of millions out here. If, somehow, everybody could count up to ten before speaking, and think not how China is going to take it but how the entire area of Asia will react. Those families could have been told quietly and personally that if they wanted to go they would not be protected by an American passport; they could even have been secretly urged not to go; but the blatant press release. . . . Forgive my editorialising, I am sure I am not supposed to do it; but one is very close here to the mind and heart of Asia and cannot help being aware of these reactions of the people. Anyone who loves the U. S. cannot help but wish that our spokesmen would speak more softly and more tactfully. A braggart or bully is disliked by all human beings. To have strength is fine; to brandish that strength offends.

3. The Times of India (Jan. 25) has excellent editorial on the new socialistic society goal as outlined by Nehru and Congress Party leaders. "Does Avadi mark a revolutionary shift in Congress policy . . . . All that it meant was an acknowledgment of the increasingly important role of the public sector in the national economy -- a role that was already defined with greater precision in the industrial policy resolution. There was nothing to indicate that there would be any new encroachment on the sphere reserved to private enterprise, and the fears expressed outside the Congress on that score were, therefore, unjustified. Neither was there any justification for the apprehension that the new objective meant a radical departure from the Sarvodaya ideal. . . . What mattered really was not the label that was given the new creed -- but the extent to which in actual practice it would help in the production of greater wealth and in its more equitable distribution. . . . What was significant . . . was that it should [illegible]

Odds and ends of informat on (cont.)

Att (NCDA) 1865
22

have been compelled at this stage to seek a more popular label for its economic and social policies. . . . If this commitment is to be more than a design to steal the opponents' electoral thunder, the Congress Governments at the Centre and in he States have immediately to set about the task of translating the new principles into policies. . . . The only way to make the policy of Congress Governments accord with Congress principles is self criticism and yet there were responsible Congressmen at Avadi who saw danger even in the condemnation of malpractices by Congressmen. . . . . The road to full employment -- for which the Congress has for the first time laid down a time-limit -- is by no means easy. It demands a complete renovation of life in the countryside on the one hand and speedy industrialisation making the country as self-sufficient as possible on the other. (etc.)

Digest of
[illegible] Mr. Deshmukh's speech on Jan. 24th.

He spoke of the unsuitability of totalitarianism in the democratic Republic of India and the inadequacy of capitalism, stating that there was left only a Socialistic approach open to the country.

He states that the acceptance of the Socialistic society as ideal meant the nationalisation of institutions that could be immediately nationalised with advantage. The presumption in so doing, said Mr. Deshmukh, was that Socialised production would be more profitable. He, however, cautioned that if experience belied that view, the step might have to be retraced.

He stated that a Socialistic ideal which received the support of the people could achieve the two objectives of increasing national income and enhancing individual dividend.

He stated that India had established economic stability though at a rather low level of prosperity during the first Plan period. He said the credit for the achievement went not merely to economic management and planning but included other factors, among them, assistance from friendly nations. The United States, he said, had contributed the largest share of foreign aid.

Removed from Project (PA) FLIPPER 02
CS Classification: NONE
JOB #66-668/14
Box# 5 Fold# 3

Aperitif.

Miss Sindi and Mr. Madan (private secretary of Mrs. Gandhi's and reception clerk at Prime Minister's House) over a cosy cup of tea in their quarters told [illegible] the following story:

While in China, at first big banquet given them, Mr. Nehru and his daughter (and others) were served tiny baby live mice dipped in honey. Mrs. Gandhi (his daughter) was so shocked that she shuddered at the sight and turned away. None of them could eat the delicacy. It was not ever served again to them while they were in China.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: — V

ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CICP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 18 Apr 68

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY [illegible] PER ORIGINATOR

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/CI ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, CS/RF, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/EUR, C/WH, C/FE, C/NE

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 19 01 32 Z CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION
Book

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, HELSINKI, HONG KONG, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE, RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH

RYBAT WOMUSE

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY LNERGO CONCERNING SUSPECTED ASSASSIN OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. NAME ERIC STARVO GALT, ALIAS HARVEY LOWMYER, ALIAS JOHN WILLARD, BORN 20 JULY 1931, HEIGHT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TO

1560

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________ #________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF:

☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO

FIVE FEET ELEVEN INCHES, WEIGHT 160-175 POUNDS, MEDIUM BUILD, BROWN HAIR, PROBABLY CUT SHORT, BLUE OR HAZEL EYES, MEDIUM COMPLEXION, RACE WHITE. OCCUPATION: HAS CLAIMED EMPLOYMENT AS SEAMAN. REMARKS: NOTICEABLY PROTRUDING LEFT EAR; REPORTEDLY IS A LONE WOLF; ALLEGEDLY ATTENDED DANCE INSTRUCTION SCHOOL; HAS REPORTEDLY COMPLETED COURSE IN BARTENDING; CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

2. WILL POUCH PHOTO OF GALT TO ANY ADDRESSEE DESIRING IT. ADVISE.

3. GALTS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHILE HAVE NO REASON BELIEVE GALT HEADED FOR YOUR AREA, DESIRE COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES MAKE EVERY EFFORT DETERMINE IF GALT IS OR HAS BEEN IN YOUR AREA. INFORMATION PARA ONE SHOULD BE PASSED TO LIAISON AND ANY OTHER LIKELY SOURCES.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO

LNERGO REQUESTS THAT ANY INFORMATION REPORTED BE EVALUATED AS TO RELIABILITY AND THAT AS ~~EX~~ MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE BE PROVIDED. CABLE ANY POSITIVE REPLY PRIORITY TO HQS AND PASS TO LEGAL ATTACHE IF ANY ~~AT~~ IN YOUR COUNTRY.

DC/CI (in draft)
(Mr. Hunt)
E/COPS
WH/FI (by phone)
(Mr. Smyth)
DC/FE (by phone)
(Mr. Smith)

DDP Richard Ober by direction/SH

for C/NE Ober

ECI/OP/DC

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

DISSEM
UNIT NOTIFIED

[illegible] (C.C.)

NCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT: [illegible] Z

M BY 15 PER CI # 3(EC)

ON c/CI 3

☒ RID COPY

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR, DDP, C/FI, C/EUR 2

1	RID	6	
2	ci staff	7	
3	Clusons	8	
4	NOT CCI	9	
5	Zanders 20	10	

"EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 071450Z JUN 68 CITE STOCKHOLM 9024 (GOEN ACTING)

PRIORITY COPENHAGEN INFO DIRECTOR

7 JUN 68 IN 26770

RYBAT MHPASHA

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 06082

B. COPENHAGEN 7485 (IN 25866)

1. NO STATION TRACE ZANDERS.

2. LOCAL CONSUL STATE SUBJ HAD NOT REGISTERED AND SAID FURTHER HE FORWARDING COPENHAGEN CONSULATE, AT REQUEST LATTER, BACKGROUND INFO TAKEN FROM 8 MAY 68 SVENSKA DAGBLADET. PER SVENSKA DAGBLADET, SUBJ A 25 YEAR OLD ENGINEER FROM ILLINOIS WITH BS DEGREE FROM CALIFORNIA. HAS TWO CHILDREN (ONE OF TWO YEARS AND THE OTHER OF THREE), IS CHAIRMAN AMERICAN COUNCIL HUMAN RIGHTS, MEMBER BOARD NAACP, MEMBER ASSOCIATED UNIFIED BLACK EMPLOYEES, FORMER CO-WORKER MARTIN LUTHER KING.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE DETAILS SUBJECT CONTACTS STOCKHOLM.

S E C R E T

BT

1563

SECRET

19 14 13z MAY 71

SECRET 191340Z MAY 71 CITE BUDAPEST 017

HEADQUARTERS

RYBAT MHCURB MHCHAOS

REF: HEADQUARTERS 2789

1. IN FINAL COVERAGE ON 18 MAY OF WPC, WHICH ENDED 16 MAY, LOCAL PRESS HAS MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RE U.S. PARTICIPANTS:

A. SIDNEY PECK, IDENTIFIED AS "USA PROFESSOR," SPOKE AT CONGRESS ON VIET NAM WAR.

B. WPC HAS AWARDED JOLIOT CURIE GOLD MED~~ILEK~~AL POSTHUMOUSLY TO REV MARTIN LUTHER KING. MEDAL ACCEPTED BY REV RALPH ABERNATHY AND REV W. WALKER "AN AMERICAN PEACE FIGHTER." PHOTOGRAPH (POUCHED) OF PRESENTATION ALSO PICTURES U.S. DELEGATES WILLIAM DOURTHARD ~~ANG~~ AND MRS. ADDIE WYATT.

C. U.S. DELEGATES RUTH GAGE-COLBY AND SYLVIA KUSCHER (SIC) SPOKE AT MEETING OF INDOCHINESE AND AMERICAN ~~.548.~~, DELEGATES.

D. AMERICANS HERBERT APTHEKER AND CARLTON GOODLETT REELECTED TO PRESIDENTIAL BOARD.

2. STATION POUCHING MOST SIGNIFICANT PRESS COVERAGE OF COUNCIL SESSIONS. GP-1

S E C R ~~NKJE~~ ET

ACTION

EHBT-821
1 June 71
[illegible] filed

FILING
1 -- Chrono ✓
2 -- PG ✓
3 -- C/Area Div
4 -- Station File

8629

18 13 22Z AUG 71

S E C R E T 180930Z AUG 71 CITE ADDIS ABABA 1027
HEADQUARTERS
MHCURB RYBAT MHCHAOS

1. JEPYX/1, WHO ENTERTAINED HOSEA WILLIAMS, SCLC LEADER, IN HIS HOME DURING LATTER'S RECENT VISIT ETHIOPIA AND ALSO ATTENDED LECTURE-QUESTION SESSION AT HOME OF (201-879961) AT WHICH WILLIAMS TALKED TO GROUP APPROX 50 ETHIOPIANS AND OTHER NATIONALITIES, HAS REPORTED FOLLOWING INTERESTING FACTS AND OBSERVATIONS WHICH STATION BELIEVES MAY BE WORTH REGISTERING IN HQS MHCHAOS FILES.

2. AT LECTURE AT HOME OF 201-879961, WILLIAMS STATED THAT HE KNEW JKLANCE HAD ARRANGED ASSASSINATION MARTIN LUTHER KING. STATED THAT HE ALSO SUSPECTED JKLANCE INVOLVEMENT IN ASSASSINATION MALCOLM X BUT HE NOT AS SURE ABOUT THIS AS ABOUT ASSASSINATION KING.

3. WILLIAMS HAS HAD NO LUCK IN GETTING VISA FROM CHICOMS FOR PEKING VISIT. HE TOLD JEPYX/1 HE WANTED TO GO TO PEKING TO GET CHICOM COMMITMENT TO PLAN FOR UNIFIED EFFORT AMONG ALL COLORED PEOPLES TO FIGHT RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WORLDWIDE. HE NOW SENSES THAT HE GETTING SOMEWHAT OF RUNAROUND FROM CHICOMS

8630

ACTION
Dissem to FBI ?

FILING
1 -- Chrono
2 -- SCLC
3 -- Africa Div
4 -- Station File

AND THAT PEKING APPARENTLY NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT VISIT THOUGH STILL HAS HOPES OF BEING ABLE GO CHINA FROM NEW DELHI WHERE HE PROCEEDED FROM ETHIOPIA.

4. IN PRIVATE TALKS WILLIAMS DISPLAYED CURIOUSLY AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARD MARTIN LUTHER KING - HE CLEARLY HARBORS RESENTMENTS OF KING'S RELATIVELY AFFLUENT BACKGROUND AS COMPARED WITH HIS OWN.

5. WILLIAMS HAD SOME CONTACT WITH ETHIOPIAN STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS CRITICAL OF REGIME AS WELL AS WITH SOME SOUTHERN SUDANESE AND THIS HAS OPENED UP HIS EYES TO PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM IN AFRICA. JEPYX/1 ASKED HIM HOW HE LOOKED AT PROBLEM OF FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOR INDIVIDUAL IN AFRICA AS COMPARED WITH FREEDOMS OF INDIVIDUAL BLACK AMERICANS AND HE ADMITTED THAT PROSPECTS FOR EXPANSION INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM IN AFRICA DID NOT SEEM GOOD AND THAT BOTH BLACK AMERICAN'S PRESENT STATUS AND PROSPECTS APPEARED SUPERIOR TO CONDITION AFRICANS ON THIS SCORE.

6. OVERALL JEPYX/1 EVALUATION WILLIAMS: "HE HAS A LOT TO LEARN AND THIS TRIP IS OPENING HIS EYES AND CONFRONTING HIM WITH FACTS AND IDEAS HE OTHERWISE COMPLETELY UNAWARE OF. HE IS LIKELY TO PROFIT FROM IT BECAUSE HE IS BASICALLY INTELLIGENT AND CAPABLE AND NOT JUST A NUT LIKE JOMO LOGAN." GP-1.

SECRET

f.C. [redacted]

[illegible]

Attached hereto is a copy of a rundown of the [A] case prepared in SR/3/FI on 18 April 1960 for discussions with the [24 British.] [redacted] will use this paper as a basis for his discussions and will attempt to obtain [24 British] consent to joint further development of [redacted]. His discussions should begin sometime after 19 April.

[redacted] did not bring the A. case up with the [24 British] as he felt the climate was not right at the time.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

08826

12. The second incident involved a rather unstable American woman correspondent Subject had met in Brussels. He had become friendly with her there and had revealed to her his anti-Soviet sympathies. Her association with Subject in Brussels was well known to some other Americans, including the person who had introduced Subject to us. Sometime after Subject's return home we learned that this woman was also to be stationed in Moscow. Knowing that she would want to get in touch with Subject, we wrote him that she was coming and advised him to avoid her. Before he had received our letter she had arrived in Moscow and had already visited him. She told him that her friend, the man who had introduced us to Subject, had told her under no circumstances to phone or visit Subject. (The man who had warned her had feared that she would cause Subject to become suspect to the Soviet security authorities.) This incident upset [redacted] equilibrium, as he wrote to us, and although he said that he had taken notice of our questions to him, he did not reply to our second letter.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
X ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division
COS, Mexico City

INFO: COS, Guatemala City 16-2

FROM: COS, San Jose 16-15

SUBJECT: Possible Contact Between Cuban Embassy, Mexico City and FAR.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

01 1. During a recent training period on interrogation with a HUGLIB Case Officer, the point of getting information from suspects on their international contacts or information that might help other services was stressed. Apparently, as a result, the HUGLIB Case Officer dug into his notes on the interrogation of Ricardo Ismael VALLECILLO Perez, Guatemalan FAR member, and came up with the following information which he thought WOFIRM might want to pass to the Mexican Service 24

2. VALLECILLOS stated (the interrogation took place in December, 1967) that FAR was awaiting the arrival of new type machine-pistol called the Red Star (Estrella Roja) from Cuba. He stated that it was a 28 shot weapon and would be issued to commanders of Guerrilla Groups to replace the present Browning semi-autos. He then added that the individuals in charge of shipping weapons and money to the FAR were two officials of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Their names are Alfredo MIRAMBAL Diaz and Adelo (or Abeldo) CALOME Ibarra. The HUGLIB officer stated that VALLECILLOS blurted this information out in reply to a sarcastic remark made by the Case Officer about the efficacy of the FAR gun-running mechanism.

3. 01 HUGLIB-10 has given his permission to pass this information to the Mexican Service if it is considered of any value by WOFIRM. 24

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - Mexico City
2 - Guatemala City 16-2
2 - Files

Giles E. CORRIGAN

GARDALPHE/gOk
10 May 68

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HRSA-9022	10 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	18-9-10

GP

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Attention: Chief, WH/1
Chief, WH/MHSPAWN

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/LIANCHOR
Progress Report for December 1967 - May 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None; FYI

References : A. HMMA-33670, 13 December 1968
B. Mexico City-5688, 25 May 1968

SUMMARY

1. During the reporting period the LIANCHOR leftist writer press service produced 35 individual articles and serialized political feature articles which were distributed to 20 newspapers throughout Latin America and are known to have been published regularly by at least 12 newspapers. Despite this acceptable production rate, the project has not achieved the objectives set for it by the Mexico Station and in the Project Outline.

2. Prior to submission of a project renewal request in late June, 1968, the Mexico Station will attempt to convert the LIANCHOR operation into a more effective and politically more leftist operation. Four of six LIANCHOR press service writers will be dropped and P/A LINLUCK will be replaced, hopefully by Identity-1, a respected independent leftist Mexican editorialist for the prestige center-left daily "EXCELSIOR". If by the end of June, 1968, the operational

Continued....

Attachments:
A. Identities (u.s.c.)
B. Translation & Articles (u.s.c.)
C. Handbill, Brochure, Open Letter (u.s.c.)

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD wo/atts
1 - C/WH/1 w/atts A, B and C (u.s.c.)
1 - C/WH/MHSPAWN w/atts A, B and C (u.s.c.)

CS COPY

9271

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34792	3 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	50-126-38/3

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

mechanism of LIANCHOR (a cooperative and self-supporting press service not subsidized by WOFIRM) does not seem operationally viable, the LIANCHOR project renewal request will be submitted as an administrative and financial roof project for the individual handling and exploitation of singleton leftist writer assets.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

3. One information report was disseminated in May, 1968, based on information acquired by LINLUCK. 01

OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

4. Formal Organization of LIANCHOR Press Service:

a. The Reference "A" project proposal reports all significant incidents in the development of the LIANCHOR press service by 01 LINLUCK and the Mexico Station through the first week of December, 1967, when 01 LINLUCK set about bringing together the candidates for membership in the cooperative press service. As Headquarters will recall the project involved paying a salary of U.S. $700 per month to 01 LINLUCK in return for which he was to persuade a number of leftist and center-left writers to join together as contributors to the LIANCHOR (Identity-2) press service. The contributing writers or members of the press service were to agree to waive fees for a trial period during which the press service was to develop paying clients among Latin American newspapers and periodicals.

b. 01 LINLUCK held three meetings of candidate members of the press service during December in the home of Identity-3. The meetings were unruly but everyone at the meetings agreed to contribute material to the press service and submit to editing and control of the material by LINLUCK. 01 However, what with the 20 day Christmas festivities which paralyze all Mexicans from 15 December to 5 January of each year, none of the LIANCHOR members other than Identity-4 submitted a manuscript to LINLUCK 01 until late January.

c. 01 LINLUCK dusted off the best and most timeless of his fall 1967 articles and mailed them out with a prospectus to newspapers suggested by third country stations throughout Latin America. At the end of December LINLUCK 01 became seriously ill and the project was dormant until mid-January. In the latter part of January LINLUCK held a sober business meeting of the LIANCHOR press 01 group at his home and by the end of January the members began to submit manuscripts.

5. The Search for a Replacement for P/A 01 LINLUCK:

a. 01 LINLUCK was formally terminated in the summer of 1966. He spent much of his termination bonus on sending his family back to France (the wife is French) and setting the family up there in an apartment and placing his sons in school. Following the termination, 01 LINLUCK was again placed on salary while WOFIRM subsized the publication of a book which he had written in support of

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

in South America accepted the book but would not send 01 LINLUCK his share of the sales, which was to be used to repay WOFIRM the cost of publishing the book. In the late fall of 1967, 01 LINLUCK spent six weeks in Guatemala where he reached agreements with the Guatemalan Defense Minister, Rafael ARRIAGA Bosque, whereby the Defense Ministry was to pay LINLUCK U.S. $4,000 for the right to publish 10,000 01 copies of his first book. The U.S. $4,000 was to be paid by 01 LINLUCK to WOFIRM as partial reimbursement of the costs of publishing the JMROD book. During the visit to Guatemala, 01 LINLUCK was told by ARRIAGA and other Guatemalan government officials that he could expect a consular appointment by the summer of 1968.

b. Headquarters and the Mexico Station were agreed that as soon as he could organize LIANCHOR and find a suitable replacement, 01 LINLUCK should be terminated and leave Mexico. Following the receipt of the LIANCHOR project approval in early 1968, the LIANCHOR case officer told 01 LINLUCK that he was expected to find a replacement meeting WOFIRM approval and be ready to turn the operation over to his replacement by the end of March, 1968. 01 LINLUCK proposed Identity-4, who had shown the most interest in the LIANCHOR press service and had been the first to submit articles. By accident the case officer was forced to listen to an hour's conversation between Identity-4 and 01 LINLUCK after Identity-4 came to 01 LINLUCK's home, interrupted a meeting between the case officer and 01 LINLUCK and the case officer sat trapped in a separate room unbeknownst to Identity-4. From the conversation the case officer observed that Identity-4 was actually a political rightist, believed 01 LINLUCK to be an LNHARP agent, had grandiose plans for using LNHARP funds to mushroom LIANCHOR into a continent-wide anti-Communist movement and was married to a neurotic woman who had hired a private detective agency to check on her husband's activities. 01 LINLUCK was instructed to quietly ease Identity-4 out of LIANCHOR, to cease holding group meetings of LIANCHOR writers and to try to prevent further contact between Identity-4 and other members of LIANCHOR.

c. 01 Identity-5 was selected as the next candidate to replace LINLUCK as P/A. Identity-5 was technically, linguistically, intellectually and professionally well qualified to head LIANCHOR. During the period of development and assessment of Identity-4 by LINLUCK, 01 Identity-5 wrote an excellent article on Soviet intellectual piracy. However, Identity-5 proved difficult to contact and control and turned out to be leading a personal life which would have detracted seriously from his ability to administer LIANCHOR. 01 LINLUCK was told to keep in touch with Identity-5, but to look for still another candidate.

d. In early April ARRIAGA Bosque 01 was exiled to Miami. With the Station's concurrence LINLUCK went to Guatemala during Easter to confer with Guatemalan President, Julio MENDEZ Montenegro, and the new Defense Minister concerning his own future. 01 The President said he had not forgotten LINLUCK but would not be able to give him a consular post until the outset of 1969. The President also said he would not be opposed to LINLUCK's returning to Guatemala and entering politics. 01

e. Upon LINLUCK's 01 return to Mexico he asked whether there was any possibility that he could be kept on after 30 June 1968 for an indeterminate period as LIANCHOR P/A until some outside job showed up. The case officer said he would discuss the matter with Headquarters, but felt that in the interests of LINLUCK's family and his own career it was high time 01 that LINLUCK 01 strike out on his own. Replacements were again reviewed and it was decided that the best candidate would be Identity-1, who had turned down membership in LIANCHOR because he wanted immediate fees for anything he wrote. Identity-6 of the LIANCHOR group, a friend of Identity-1, was queried as to Identity-1's personal life and, as far as can be discovered, Identity-1 lives a quiet life with his wife and family and is highly respected in Mexican intellectual circles both as an author/editorialist and as an independent leftist. Reference "B" and "PLANS" below report the Station's plans for possible recruitment and subsequent utilization of Identity-1 as P/A of LIANCHOR.

6. Production of Articles and Features by LIANCHOR: 01 Separate cover attachment "B" contains a translation of a LINLUCK report written 1 May 1968 on articles and feature articles produced and distributed during the period 15 December 1968 to 30 April 1968. Case officer comments are included along with information about articles prepared and distributed in May.

7. 01 LINLUCK Involvement in Covert Action Operations Targetted Against Soviet Poet Yevgenyi YEVTUSHENKO (March-April 1968):

a. In March 01 LINLUCK drafted an open letter to Soviet poet Yevgenyi YEVTUSHENKO asking the Russian to use his influence to persuade the Soviet government to end the persecution of Soviet intellectuals, artists, writers and poets. 01 LINLUCK managed to obtain the signatures of students, professors, actors, dancers, writers and intellectuals for his open letter and then persuaded the publisher of his books to print thousands of copies, which were distributed by other assets of the Mexico Station. A copy of the open letter was published in "EXCELSIOR" on the day of YEVTUSHENKO's arrival in Mexico for what was originally billed as a personal trip. Because of the open letter and critical press coverage of YEVTUSHENKO's rude behavior towards the press on arriving at Mexico City airport, the Russian Embassy called a special press conference the evening of the day of the poet's arrival. At the press conference YEVTUSHENKO spoke with outrage of the open letter, carefully dodging a number of questions asked by the letter, and chided the signers of the letter for claiming there was absolute literary freedom in Mexico, asking how there can be freedom anywhere in the world as long as there is no freedom in Vietnam. YEVTUSHENKO's remarks about the open letter left no doubt that he had come to Mexico as a Soviet propagandist and not as a rebel poet.

b. 01 LINLUCK also produced a handbill quoting the telegram by Soviet intellectuals to the "Consultative Conference of Communist Parties" at Budapest, asking for an end to Soviet persecution of intellectuals in the USSR. The handbill featured two pen and ink drawings of imprisoned Soviet poets Sinyavsky and Daniel. He also arranged for the printing in Spanish of an authoritative study of incidents surrounding the Galanskov-Dobrovolsky trial in brochure form. Thousands of copies of the handbill and brochure were also distributed by Station assets during

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

and the open letter are submitted as Separate Cover Attachment "C" to this dispatch. Costs of the printing and distribution were charged to LILISP-X.

c. Via Identity-4 01 LINLUCK passed guidance material to Mexico's top female poet, Margarita MICHELENA, concerning YEVTUSHENKO. MICHELENA published a series of professional criticisms of YEVTUSHENKO as a poor poet and opportunist in the Mexican press. In April, immediately following YEVTUSHENKO's departure, a condensation of the MICHELENA critiques of YEVTUSHENKO were published in the leftist political illustrated magazine "IMPACTO" by LILISP-E.

d. Identities 3 and 6 of the LIANCHOR group also published articles against YEVTUSHENKO in the rightist daily "EL SOL", but the Station felt the articles were too vitriolic and unobjective to be a credit to LIANCHOR. In fact, because of these articles the Station plans to remove both Identities 3 and 7 from LIANCHOR; for it is obvious that both persons have long since lost all traces of their former leftism and are extreme rightists.

EFFECTIVENESS

8. Views on LIANCHOR Effectiveness by Owner/Director of Guatemala Daily "EL IMPARCIAL":

a. During 01 LINLUCK's Easter visit to Guatemala City he was told by the owner of "EL IMPARCIAL" that the newspaper was only interested in publishing 01 LINLUCK's articles. The newspaper owner stated that LINLUCK was a well-known personality in Guatemala and also wrote 01 interestingly. The owner also said that he had published one series by Identity-4 because Identity-4 was a Guatemalan who at one time had been important. However, the owner pointed out that the other LIANCHOR writers were unknowns and did not write well. He singled out Identity-3 as being a "menace to journalism" because much of what she wrote amounted to libel or slander.

b. The "EL IMPARCIAL" owner said that he received the newspapers "EL DIA" of Honduras, "LA PRENSA GRAFICA" of El Salvador, "LA PRENSA" of Nicaragua, "LA REPUBLICA" of Costa Rica, "LA ESTRELLA" of Panama and "ULTIMAS NOTICIAS" of Caracas and had noted that these newspapers all published LINLUCK's articles but had not, to his knowledge, published articles by any of the other LIANCHOR writers.

c. When 01 LINLUCK explained the cooperative 01 nature of LIANCHOR, the "EL IMPARCIAL" man told LINLUCK that he could never hope to collect fees for his news service until the service became both famous and sought after. The "EL IMPARCIAL" owner advised LINLUCK to find writers better known in Latin America. 01 He suggested that if 01 LINLUCK could not afford to pay his writers fees, he should persuade first class writers to contribute to LIANCHOR purely for the prestige of having their material published around Latin America.

9. Effectiveness of LIANCHOR Writer Group and 01 LINLUCK as a Covert Action Production Unit:

a. 01 LINLUCK learned quickly that it was best not to allow meetings of members of the LIANCHOR cooperative

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

press group. Of nine persons who belonged to the group as of 15 January, three subsequently dropped out because of differences of opinion which developed at group meetings. In addition, 01 (LINLUCK) learned that persons he had selected partly because of their leftist records (Identities 3, 4, 7 and 8) had long since ceased being leftists and were prone to submit manuscripts with texts politically harmful to the image of LIANCHOR. Confused political thinking and poor writing resulted in rejection of over 20 manuscripts during February-April by (LINLUCK) and the case officer. Rejection of manuscripts 01 in turn angered and insulted some of the writers.

b. The personalities and character 01 of some of the writers have presented problems to (LINLUCK in directing and developing the LIANCHOR group into a productive unit. Identities 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 had to be goaded continually by (LINLUCK) to turn in manuscripts on assigned themes. Both 01 Identity-3 and Identity-7 turned out to be emotional extremists, suffering at times from deep melancholy and at other times from inexplainable rages which were reflected in their writings. As of this writing the Station feels that the only reliable members of the group are Identities 6 and 9, who should be kept as members of the group as long as LIANCHOR is run as a group cooperative press service. The unreliable but brilliant and versatile poet/writer/lexicographer Identity-5 should be continued as a contact of LIANCHOR for occasional emergency use provided (LINLUCK's replacement can obtain any cooperation from Identity-5. 01 In summary the LIANCHOR group composed of Identities 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 has proved ineffective and not too productive and the ineffective members should be replaced.

01

10. Effectiveness of P/A (LINLUCK):

01

a. The list of articles and features by (LINLUCK) under Separate Cover Attachment "B" is by no means the measure of the agent's writing and production capability. After the agent dusted off and mailed out several of his old article series in December 1968 the case officer instructed 01 (LINLUCK) to reduce his production in ratio to the manuscripts of other LIANCHOR writers which were mailed out. The case officer was concerned that LIANCHOR would appear 01 to potential client newspapers to be primarily a vehicle for (LINLUCK's) lengthy political essays in contrast to the statement in the LIANCHOR prospectus that LIANCHOR was a press service combining articles on cultural, educational, economic and social as well as political topics by many writers. During the agent's two final months of service he has been given authorization to write as much as he can on the Vietnam issue and other topics for the purpose of building up his name in Guatemala before he returns there to enter politics.

01

b. While production of articles was not (LINLUCK's) weak point, his selection and handling of the LIANCHOR press service writers appears to have been weak. He has been too long on the fringes of the foreign exile group in Mexico and his contacts among leftists in Mexico are no longer significant. In addition, the agent appears to have gone the way of many former Latin American Communists in that his theoretical solution to some of the political, economic and social problems of Latin America can no longer be termed leftist.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

c. As a penetration of a Communist Party 01 LINLUCK was a singleton. Although as a former Communist leader he has had experience in handling people, he has not had experience in handling sub-agents for WOFIRM. There was evidence during the reporting period that LINLUCK 01 was having real trouble managing his co-workers in LIANCHOR. However, handicapped by the fact that he was not paying his co-workers fees or salaries, LINLUCK 01 probably did as well as he could in controlling his co-workers. The real fault lay in his poor selection of co-workers.

11. Effectiveness of LIANCHOR Articles 01 and Features: In the Station's opinion those articles which LINLUCK wrote were forceful and effective, but too long. The articles written by 01 LINLUCK's co-workers apparently were ineffective to the point that they were not considered worth publishing. The Capriles newspaper chain of Venezuela apparently felt that LINLUCK's 01 articles were well worth running, despite the fact that they had to be published in installments. The leading newspapers in each of the Central American republics appeared to believe 01 that LINLUCK's articles merited automatic publication. It is assumed that LINLUCK's articles were published regularly in Bolivia due 01 to La Paz Station assistance. However, because no 01 newspaper felt like paying fees to LIANCHOR or answering LINLUCK's correspondence, it has not been possible to ascertain whether LIANCHOR articles have been published with any regularity in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia or Ecuador. It is too much to ask third country stations to scan the press daily for articles by seven different people. The Mexico Station has appreciated the assistance received from the 16-17 Caracas, 16-15 San Jose and Guatemala 16-2 City Stations which have been the principal source of the clippings of LINLUCK's 01 LIANCHOR articles submitted as Separate Cover Attachment "B" to this dispatch.

SECURITY

12. There have been no incidents of security nature hazardous to the LIANCHOR project during the reporting period.

FINANCE AND SUPPORT

13. Finance: During 1 October - 30 May the LIANCHOR project expenses 01 have consisted of U.S. $5,600 in salary payments to LINLUCK at U.S. $700 per month and U.S. $119 in cost of mailing out LIANCHOR articles.

14. Support: Reproduction of the LIANCHOR articles for mass distribution to Latin American newspapers was done by the Station using a Xerox machine.

PLANS

15. Replacement of 01 LINLUCK:

a. Provided Headquarters grants POA and Identity-1 accepts recruitment by a Station case officer, LINLUCK will be directed to approach Identity-1 some two weeks after the recruitment. 01 LINLUCK will tell Identity-1 that he has come to Identity-1 on the advice of Identity-6, LIANCHOR member and friend of Identity-1. 01 LINLUCK will explain that he is returning to Guatemala to seek a political career and must give up the direction of LIANCHOR

16-2

because LIANCHOR cannot properly be run from Guatemala. 01 LINLUCK will describe to Identity-1 the problems which he has had in developing LIANCHOR and, in asking Identity-1 to take over control of LIANCHOR, will suggest that Identity-1 use the LIANCHOR name and established publication outlets to broaden his prestige in Latin America without any thought of trying to earn fees. 01 LINLUCK will also suggest that Identity-1 retain Identities 6 and 9 to help fill out the service, but that he gradually try to draw in personal writer friends of definite leftist fame and persuade them to contribute to LIANCHOR purely for the reward of increased prestige. Finally 01 LINLUCK will offer to continue to contribute material from time to time from Guatemala which Identity-1, through his good standing in the Mexican press, perhaps can publish in Mexico.

b. If Identity-1 rejects recruitment, the next candidate for LIANCHOR chief is Identity-10, who has already told LINLUCK that he is prepared to take over LIANCHOR on a pro01ionary basis to see whether it will enhance his reputation. The Station feels that Identity-10 would be easier to recruit than Identity-1. However, Identity-10 is not too well known in Mexico and is totally unknown abroad. One of Identity-10's virtues is the fact that he never formally quit the Communist Party and has done nothing to irritate the Party. As economic and general reporter for "EXCELSIOR" he offers placement potential. If Identity-1 does accept recruitment, the Station still intends to try to recruit Identity-10 as a singleton under Project LIANCHOR, possibly steering Identity-10 to Identity-1 and the LIANCHOR press service after due consideration. The Station is also interested in the possibility of recruiting Identity-10 in order to send him to the World Youth Festival at Sofia, since it is believed by 01 LINLUCK that Identity-1 still has access to some worthwhile contacts in Central American young Communist circles.

16. Testing for Indications of Effectiveness to Determine Future Direction of LIANCHOR Project:

a. It is estimated that it will not cost over U.S. $200 to hire clipping services in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago and Bogota for a three month trial period to test whether newspapers which receive LIANCHOR material in those cities are publishing the LIANCHOR material. The clipping services will be asked to watch for articles with the LIANCHOR by-line, the by-lines of LIANCHOR writers and the headlines or titles which are assigned by LIANCHOR to the articles mailed to the newspapers.

b. If the clipping service tests show that newspapers or periodicals in two of the above cited countries are publishing LIANCHOR material, Station will continue to pursue the development of a small and responsive leftist writer group as one phase of the LIANCHOR operation. The rationale behind this decision is that there is little justification in operating a press service, even a cheap one, with a readership limited to Mexico, Central America, Venezuela and Bolivia. However, if the press service can acquire, or has acquired, readership in any two of the countries in 16-a above then it is felt that the total area coverage is significant and worth maintaining.

17. Conversion of LIANCHOR to Temporary Roof Project for Singleton Leftist Writer Assets: If as a result of clipping

service tests the decision is reached not to continue development of a leftist writer group press service, LIANCHOR will be converted to a roof project for the administration and funding of singleton writer agents. Identity-1, if recruited, will be told to use the LIANCHOR stationery and list of publishing newspapers to develop his own prestige and readership abroad, but he will not be asked to find additional writers for the press service. At the end of FY 1969 the LIANCHOR project will be terminated as such and its funds and such agents as have been developed under LIANCHOR will be documented under Project LILISP-E for FY 1970.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

1P

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

to HMMA-34792

06,08

IDENTITIES: 1 - Ricardo *GARIBAY Ortega, independent Mexican socialist, political editorialist in "EXCELSIOR" and prize-winning author of political books.

2 - "PRENSA SELECTA INTERNACIONAL" 29

3 - Eunice ODIO Infante, a naturalized Guatemalan of Costa Rican origin who resides in Mexico City and writes for "EL SOL" and "EL DIA". 06,08

4 - Alfonso *MARTINEZ Estevez, former personal secretary to deposed Guatemalan Communist president Jacobo ARBENZ.

5 - Ernesto de la *PENA y Munoz, lexicographer and linguist employed by Encyclopedia Britannica's Spanish language edition. He has a reputation as a fair poet in Mexico and writes for the leftist "EL DIA" and the center-left "EXCELSIOR". 06,08

6 - Manuel CALVILLO, Mexican author and editorialist in the Sunday literary sections of Mexican newspapers.

7 - Alicia REYES, writer for the newspapers "EL SOL" and "EL UNIVERSAL". Once a member of the Mexican CP and resident of Moscow. 06,08

8 - Francisco *ZENDEJAS, book critic for "EXCELSIOR", Mexico City TV channel #4 and Radio Station XEW. He was once personal secretary to Leon TROTSKY. Chronic alcoholic.

9 - Rodrigo GARCIA Trevino, Mexican political author, historian and literary critic. 06,08

10 - Rene *ARTEAGA, former head of the Young Communists of El Salvador. Exiled to Guatemala and later to Mexico. Economic reporter for "EXCELSIOR" and formerly for "EL DIA". No longer active in CP. 06,08

CS COPY

SECRET

HMMA

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

Richard Ober
CIOP/DC
6537
19 April 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6
2		7
3		
4		
5		

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 3 PER ORIGINATOR #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO __________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

c/CI 3 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR DCI, D/DCI; DDP, ADDP, CS/RF c/EUR, c/WH, c/FE, c/NE,

(classification) 20 01 41 Z (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 93162

PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, HELSINKI, HONG KONG, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE, RAWALPINDI, RIO DE ~~XX~~ JANERIO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH

99

RYBAT WOMUSE

REF: DIR 92664

1. LNERGO HAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED ACCUSED ASSASSIN AS JAMES EARL RAY, BORN 10 MARCH 1928 IN ILLINOIS; HEIGHT ~~XXXXXX~~ FIVE FEET TEN INCHES; WEIGHT 163-174 POUNDS; BLUE EYES;

09331

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification F.G.: Ray Richards Assassin AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

IG:
IT:
T:
TE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
_______ PER _______ # _______
NF:
☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO _______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 93162

BROWN HAIR. SMALL SCAR ON CENTER OF FOREHEAD AND SCAR ON PALM OF RIGHT HAND. IN ADDITION TO ALIASES CITED REF HAS ALSO USED NAMES JAMES McBRIDE, JAMES WALTON, W. C. HERRON, AND JAMES O'CONNER. SERVED IN U.S. ARMY FROM FEBRUARY 1946 TO DECEMBER 1948; DISCHARGED AS INEPT AND UNABLE TO ADJUST. ONCE CONFINED TO MENTAL HOSPITAL. HAS BEEN EMPLOYED AS BAKER, LABORER, AND "COLOR MATCHER". A DRIFTER WITH LONG CRIMINAL RECORD FOR BURGLARY, ARMED ROBBERY, AND FORGERY. HAS BEEN MISSING FROM MISSOURI STATE PENITENTIARY SINCE 23 APRIL 1967. CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

2. PHOTOS OF RAY (LABELED GALT PRIOR TO IDENTIFICATION) 24 BEING POUCHED FOR LIAISON.

END OF MESSAGE

DDP Richard Ober by direction

CI/OP/DO Richard Ober

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

Richard Ober
CIOP/DO
6537
20 April 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	DC/CI	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 29 PER ORIGINATOR #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

C/CI 3 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR DCI, DDCI, DDP, A/DDP, C/EUR, C/NE, C/WH, C/FE

SECRET
(classification)

(date and time filed)

(elite) (pica)
(reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 93260

PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, THE HAGUE, HONG KONG, LA PAZ, LONDON, MADRID, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, MANILA, MUNICH, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH

RYBAT WOMUSE

REF: DIR 93162

1. REQUEST ADDRESSES CONSTRUCT IDENTIKIT COMPOSITE OF JAMES EARL RAY FOR USE PRIOR RECEIPT PHOTOS NOW EN ROUTE.

2. CODE: H 50 C 32 X 2 E 31 D 82 N 35 X 2 L 28 X 2.

3. NOTE: SCAR ON FOREHEAD MENTIONED REF OMITTED FROM COMPOSITE AS EXACT LOCATION NOT KNOWN. LEFT EAR PROTRUDES MORE THAN RIGHT.

END OF MESSAGE

DDP Richard Ober
by direction.

CI/OP/DO Richard Ober

Assassin
cc RAY
cc CSPO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

09332
COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

SECRET

ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CI/OP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 22 April 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 32 PER OSIK

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/CI 3 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF, C/EUR, C/WH, C/FE, C/NE, CSDO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 22 23 47 Z CITE DIRECTOR 93538

TO BOOK CABLE

PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION

ASUNCION, BANGKOK. BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, HELSINKI, HONG KONG, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE, RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH

99

KYBAT WOMUSE

REF: DIRECTOR 93162 *

DESENSITIZED
per DOI 70-17

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS *

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/BR

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 93538

TO

1. LNERGO FINGERPRINT FORMULA FOR JAMES EARL RAY: 16, M OVER M, 9 OVER 4, U OVER W, O OVER I, O OVER O, O OVER I, 12 RPT 16, M OVER M, 9 OVER 4, U OVER W, O OVER I, O OVER O, O OVER I, 12.

2. PLEASE PASS TO LIAISON.

*LNERGO (1) has positively identified accused assassin as James Earl Ray.

DC/CI

C/WH

C/EUR

C/FE 03

DDP for C/NE CI/OP/DO Richard Ober

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

UBR

SECRET

10

OPERATIONAL AND SOURCE COVER SHEET 22

3P

FROM: (San Jose,) Costa Rica
REPORT NO. (HRS)-906

REPORT MADE BY: Stefan R. Lebenow/stl
NO. PAGES: 2

REPORT APPROVED BY: Stefan R. Lebenow
NO. ENCLOSURES: See below

DATE OF REPORT: 1 February 1956
REFERENCES:

DISTRIBUTION:

By copy to:
2 - Washington, w/att.
2 - files

Orally to:
Embassy

16-2 1 -(Guatemala,) w/att.
16-3 1 -(Mexico,) w/att.
16-26 1 -(San Salvador), w/att.
16-23 1 -(Santiago), w/o att.
16-7 1 -(Panama), w/o att.

SOURCE CRYPTONYM: 01 (HUSSY)

ID NO.
IG NO.
KRYPTON: ☐ YES ☐ NO

SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA, AND COMMENTS

16-2 16-3 16-26

Attachments: 1 copy each of attachment to (Guatemala,) (Mexico) and (San Salvador.)
2 copies to Washington.

INDEX

SECRET

RI COPY

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

22

COUNTRY: [illegible]-906

SUBJECT: Guatemalan Exile Activities 14 January 1956

17 January 1956

(10

PLACE ACQUIRED: Costa Rican, (San Jose) 1 February 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT
High level Central American exile (F). Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

07

On 14 January 1956 (Col. Carlos PAZ Tejada, under the alias (R. Palmares) wrote to (Col. Francisco COSENZA Galvez in Costa Rica from San Salvador. The letter was addressed to the accommodation address ("Justo GARCIA, Apartado 2692, San Jose," which is used by COSENZA, and is ~~[illegible]~~ translated as follows: 08

"Although I have wanted very much to answer your letter of 7 December 1955 ~~very much~~, many things have obstructed it and so time has slipped by against my wish, so that I have been able to write you only today.

"In spite of the latest news with which you must be familiar ~~with~~, I think that what happened is nothing but an incident, natural to the trade. I really believe that the ~~crazy one~~ with whom we were dealing was trying to negotiate and participate in the winnings which there would be without much risk on his part.1/ If the business failed for one reason or another, it does not signify anything more than a loss of time and some short-range hopes, but not in an important manner.2/ Far from that. Something positive is being accomplished within a general line of forcing María Dolores to act in a manner which is good for us.3/ I hope to continue in the activity and I have exactly the patience of a spider repairing its net ~~in~~ wait for a fly to fall into it.

"With relation to what you transcribed from Dona Ticha,4/ that is due to the fact that the fat one5/ who was formerly so close to me, has ~~balked~~ from me and has dedicated himself to the task of defaming me because he was unable to get something he wanted from me. Since he has nothing else to say, he says that I have very strange relations or that I belong to the comrades.6/ As you will understand, this is nothing more than a disloyal ~~means~~ in which he is an expert. The friend7/ who recently arrived from El Indiote8/ can increase your information concerning this. I have already written to the good friend of 'mi morena'9/ so that he may explain if there is an opportunity. Although she is already ~~really suffering a strong reduction in~~ her actions and I do not think she will recuperate. change

"I have strengthened the connections with Roque10/ and other friends of the

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-58
1 NOV 53 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

200-4-173 212

22
(HRB)-906

'finca mi morena'. I think that, depending on how things appear, we should activate our requests and also contemplate new solutions to the large problem. I am writing today to the farm[11] to maintain a continuity of action and to see if the prevailing circumstances can be taken advantage of and given a purpose.

"I consider it extremely important that we maintain ourselves in closer correspondence than up to now. I understand that it is I who have failed to answer you, but I hope that the explanation of the events are sufficient. Failing to do so would be to fail to show interest and would even result in everything becoming cold and paralyzed for who knows how long.

"The big car[12] wrote me very affectionately. I think that the problems that they cause each other are completely negative and that they cause us to deviate from the only road which should be followed."

SOURCE COMMENTS: NIEDERHEITMANN

1. (Col.) Ernesto [redacted]

2. A reference to the planned revolt which was discovered and destroyed by the Guatemalan Government in December 1955.

3. A code name for Guatemalan President Carlos CASTILLO Armas.

4. Augusto CHARNAUD MacDonald.

5. (Major) Marco Antonio FRANCO Chacon. According to Humberto GONZALEZ Juarez, there was a disagreement between FRANCO and PAZ Tejada, which resulted in FRANCO' ~~advising~~ telling CHARNAUD of PAZ' dealings with [redacted] NIEDERHEITMANN

6. The Communists.

7. Humberto GONZALEZ Juarez.

8. El Salvador.

9. Mexico.

10. (Col.) Adolfo GARCIA Montenegro.

11. Guatemala.

12. Juan Jose AREVALO.

200-4-173 212

SECRET ... REPRODUCTION

Sn. Salvador, 13 de Ene

~~NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM~~ 3R HRS

Mi querido Pedrito:

Aunque ha sido mucho mi deseo dirigirte
la para dar respuesta a la tuya del 7 de dic. ppdo.,
me ha (ido) ido dificultando y poco a poco pasando el
tiempo, lo que hace que contra mi voluntad, hasta hoy pueda
dirigirte estas líneas.

A pesar de las ultimas noticias que habrás [illegible]
do, yo creo que lo sucedido no pasa de ser un incidente na
tural en el oficio. En realidad yo creo que el loco con quien
tratamos, estaba tratando de regresar y participar en las ganancias
que hubieran sin mucho arriesgar de su parte. Así lo estima
ba desde el principio y por eso traté de obtener el máximo
posible de compromiso de su parte. Si el negocio falló por
eso por b. razones no es una perdida mas que de tiempo y de al
gunas esperanzas a corto plazo pero en forma alguna algo trascen
dental. Lejos de eso algo positivo se está obteniendo dentro de
lineamiento general de [illegible] hace a Maria Dolores actuar en la forma
menos esperanzas de continuar en la act
que nos conviene. [illegible] la paciencia de la araña, re
vidad y estoy precisamente con la paciencia de la araña, re
mendando la red en espera de que la mosca caiga pronto en
ella.

Con relación a lo que me transcribes de doña Ticha, te
diré que eso se debe a que el gordito aquel que antes estaba
junto a mi, por no obtener de mi algo, se volvió furioso y se ha
dedicado a la noble tarea de difamarme, especialmente ya que
no puede decir otra cosa, que tengo muy estrechas relaciones o
pertenezco a los camaradas. Como tu comprenderás, esto no es más
[illegible] medio desleal aunque él en esto es experto. Es [illegible]
que hace poco llegó de por el Salvador, te podrá

200-4-173 212

OBTAINABLE



Elvira Pacheco

Elvira Pacheco

Sr. Don
Justo García
Apartado Postal 2692,
San José,
Costa Rica, A. C.

VIA AIR MAIL

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

[illegible] y [illegible] y [illegible]

[illegible] acciones y no creo que [illegible]

He fortalecido los contactos de [illegible]

[illegible]. Creo que, según [illegible]

[illegible] gestiones e incluso contemplar nuevas [illegible]

[illegible] grande. Hoy mismo estoy comunicando [illegible]

[illegible] la continuidad de acción y [illegible]

[illegible] y alcanzar las circunstancias [illegible]

Considero sinceramente [illegible]

[illegible] en correspondencia más [illegible]

[illegible] que yo [illegible]

[illegible] que la explicación y [illegible]

[illegible], seré [illegible]

[illegible] se confíe y se [illegible]

[illegible] tiempos.

El Cerro grande [illegible]

[illegible]

BEST OBTAINABLE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

COUNTRY USSR

SUBJECT Oleg E Pirogov, Soviet Exchange Student/ Unexpected Return to the USSR/His Possible Susceptibility to [illegible]/ Incident with Academician [illegible] Semenov

REPORT NO. 00-A-3,203,015

DATE DISTR. 4 December 1961

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES [illegible]

(NY-52511)

C/S Mogan 5

DATE OF INFO. 20 Nov 61 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [illegible]/27 Sep - [illegible]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

Source: Prof. Charles Gilbert Overberger Polytechnic Inst. of Brooklyn

SOURCE: US citizen, head of the chemistry department of a large US technical institute.

During the period 27 Sep to 23 Oct 61, Oleg E Pirogov, Soviet Exchange Student under [illegible] Agreement, was under the supervision of himself and members of his staff.

1. Oleg [illegible] Pirogov came to do post-doctorate research work in the Department of Chemistry under the supervision of myself and my associates* on 27 Sep 61. He came pursuant to the [illegible] exchange agreement and it was intended that he would remain here for a period of three or four months. He had been here less than a month when his sudden and unexplained departure occurred on 23 Oct 61. Prior to coming here, he had been a Scientific Associate of the Institute of Chemical Physics, of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

2. We were very much disturbed by Pirogov's sudden departure because we feared that the whole exchange program might have been jeopardized. So, on 27 Oct 61, we sent a cable, to Professor Nikolay Nikolayevich Semenov, a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, who is the head of the Institute of Chemical Physics, Moscow, where Pirogov had worked. Semenov replied to this cable with a cable which we received 11 Nov 61. It was very conciliatory. It stressed that Pirogov came back for family reasons. "We are extremely sorry," it said, "and will write a letter with details later." However, no such letter has arrived to date, 20 Nov 61.

3. Another cable was sent by the National Academy of Sciences, 6 Nov 61 to Mr Mstislav Vsevolodovich Keldysh, President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, about this subject, but no reply has been received, as far as I know.

4. As far as I am concerned, I am sure that [illegible] that Pirogov's wife and family made him return to the USSR is not the reason for his departure.

5. I think his departure [illegible], there is a [illegible] to being [illegible]. Or it may have been a combination of two or three little things which brought about his recall.

6. Pirogov fitted in very well here. He is a very personable fellow. We gave him the title of Visiting Scientist. He seemed to work with particular

* [Prof. Herman Mark + Murray Goodman]

12/4 Copy to FI/SIG and SR/6.

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC		

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NO DISSEM ABROAD

NOFORN LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echelons with their immediate supporting staffs. [illegible]

1066c

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

graduate about four or five years after receiving their Ph D. When he arrived, he spoke very little English but was learning fast. He had a room in a dormitory over at the Long Island College, where we assigned our fellows. He made many friends. He is married and has a wife and two children who remained in Moscow. One of his parents came from the Ukraine, I believe. The F B I has all the details. "They are paying the freight."

7. He was favorably impressed with Pirogov's ability and regard him as a capable research worker. He is well informed in the limited area in which he has been working. He mixed well with the other students. He was not pretentious. He did not seem to hide anything. On the subject of learning, for example, he did not pretend that the USSR's is up to ours in the US. He was not proselyting for the Soviet system. It seemed to me that he was the sort of man who might have been converted to the US way of doing things, if he was not careful. It may be that the people to whom he reported in the Council of the Soviet Delegation to the UN at Park Avenue and 68th Street, New York City, may have reached the same conclusion. Or his departure may have been brought about for other reasons, for example, by his brush with Leonid Ivanovich SEDOV academician and president of the International Astronautical Society and Chairman of the Soviet Interplanetary Commission.

8. *Dr Sedov was visiting our institution and one of us thought it would be a good idea for Pirogov to meet Sedov. This was brought about at a reception where he was introduced as "Pirogov of Moscow." They shook hands and Pirogov said something in English like, "pleased to meet you." Sedov said something to him in a very sharp tone in Russian and later, in the elevator, drew him aside and lectured him in a very stern voice. I was present and observed that Pirogov grew pale. Later, he became very nervous and went to the UN Delegation Headquarters on Park Avenue and 68th Street. I understand that they laughed at his apprehensions and told him not to worry. However, from then on he became more nervous. Somebody, he said, had indicated that he was talking too much. He was afraid he had given away some important information.

9. This was a lot of baloney because we already know what they are doing. He certainly had no reason to feel he was disclosing more than he should. He only disclosed what was necessary to do the work planned for him in the problem assigned under the exchange agreement. It would have been impossible for him to carry out his assignment without making the disclosures that he made. You just cannot work on such a project without being communicative. Just the same Pirogov became very apprehensive and said he might be recalled. "They will reprimand me anyway. They think I have talked too much about what we are doing in the Institute of Chemical Physics." Pirogov had taken the position that it was not wrong for him to talk about his work at this Institute in the USSR, which is the one headed by Semenov, incidentally. Pirogov maintained that an exchange project cannot be all take and no give. There is supposed to be an exchange of information.

10. Another thing that contributed to Pirogov's apprehensions was the fact that he had not heard from his wife or family for several weeks. He was greatly concerned about this. However, I believe he did have a letter from his wife just before he left.

11. My own feeling is that his popularity worked against him. The suspicious people in the UN Delegation office did not like the idea of his becoming a part of the community here. The students liked him and he went to dinners with them. When some of my students were celebrating receiving their degrees, Pirogov joined the party and after dinner he came along with the rest of them to have a beer at my house. He obviously acted like a human being.

12. In my opinion, Pirogov's superiors made a serious mistake in not appreciating what a good propaganda agent he was for their system, even though he was not afraid to admit that the Soviet system is not perfect and that there

8090

in a housing shortage, for example. They thought he talked too much and was too friendly. He did not keep his mouth shut and he did not act like a boor. I am sure they concluded (that) he was susceptible to contamination. I thought so myself.

13. So I suspect that Pirogov dug his own hole. He had to report to the Council of the US Delegation every week and, in the process, his general attitude got across to them. He talked too much. His conversation with Sadov was an example.

14. Again, what he was working on here was very close to what he had been working on under Semenov and the Council may have jumped to the conclusion that he was telling us all that he knew.

15. The problem on which he worked here was the copolymerization of dienes and alpha-olefins using a transition metal catalyst system. For example, one of the copolymerizations on which he worked involved the diene, butadiene, and the alpha olefin, propylene.

16. He was known to many of the staff and was intimate with ten or fifteen students here but was probably most intimate with the man with whom he shared a laboratory. This was an Italian, named Dr Basilio [illegible]. They appeared to be good friends.

17. I do not think that Pirogov was the victim of an informer. I have wondered about this a lot but I do not think this is what happened. I think, as I said before, that he dug his own hole. Incidentally, we were most anxious to keep this incident out of the papers and there was no leak. Had there been an informer, this might not have been the case.

-end-

8090

104-10072-10034 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CIOP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 18 Apr 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY JK PER ORIGINATOR

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/C ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR CS/RF, DCI, D/DCI, DDP ADDP, C/EUR, C/WH, C/FE, C/NE

(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) 19 01 32 Z
(elite)
(reference number) CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION
Book
ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, ~~CARACAS~~ CARACAS, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, [illegible] HELSINKI, HONG KONG, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE, RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH

RYBAT WOMUSE

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY LNERGO CONCERNING SUSPECTED ASSASSIN OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. NAME ERIC STARVO GALT, ALIAS HARVEY LOWMYER, ALIAS JOHN WILLARD, BORN 20 JULY 1931, HEIGHT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TO

RAY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 10

SECRET

ROM: James P. Burke
NIT: NESA/COPS
XT: 6411
ATE: 19 April 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y 28 PER SOP # 109

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ONF: C/NES ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/CI

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 19 21 20 Z

(elite) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 92897

TO NEW DELHI

RYBAT WOMUSE

REF: DIRECTOR 92664 PARA 2

TWO COPIES REF PHOTO SENT APO 19 APRIL ADDRESSED TO POSSON.

END OF MESSAGE

James P Burke
DCNE/SA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

09346

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

4/4/62

POA CANCELLED

SECRET

6

C Number	Name	Green List Number	201 Number
	FERNANDEZy Coto, Milagros	99952	275509
82596	DE LAS CASAS Alfonso, Gretchen Leonor	100311	275511
82561	NUNEZ Gonzalez, Jorge Jose	100308	275513
83073	RUIZ Rojas, Hiram	100346	275516
90451	MARRERO Piedra, Alberto	111049	275545
82773	FERNANDEZ Uriarte, Eduardo	100318	275554
	NICOLAS, Frances Jane	100320	275555
82351	VALDES Cardenas, Jesus A.	99799	275603
82375	RODRIGUEZy Gonzales, Arnesto Napoleon	100152	275643
82386	LAGOMASINO Camacho, Alberto	100154	275645
82387	LAZA, Hermano	100156	275646
82385	MAZA Paez, Manuel	100155	275647
	CHARDIETy Fernandez, Armando		275907
82425	HOPKINS, John Abel	99777	275908
82509	SOTO, Collado Orlando	100307	275943
82508	SUAREZ Real, Sandalio	100306	275944
	CID Colon, Dimas		275954
83246	COTO Coronado, Rafael Angel	100994	276050
83779	GONZALEZ Rincones Gsuik, Carlos Miguel	102159	276063
82612	ARGUELLES Usategui, Donato Gregorio	100313	276120
82611	TELLECHEA Tellechea, Belisario	100312	276241
82898	EXPOSITO Lorenzo, Jesus	100332	276242
	VELIS, Florencio		276243
	LACEDONIA, Julio		276246
82461	TETZELI, Ludvik	100303	276401
82597	CUBILL Mesa, Diego Jose	100310	276402
82946	TAQUECHEL Mendulay, Enrique Jose	100339	276406
82880	FUENTESy Sanchez, Jacinto Luis	100330	276407
83061	MARTINEZy Leon, Pedro	100345	276410
82815	RODRIGUEZ Gonzalez, Manuel	100322	276420
82894	WILKINSON, Robert J.	100331	276774
	MITCHELL, Leroy		276776
	SALCEDO, Camilo		276777
	WILLIS, Frederick Thompson		276778
	ABELA, Andrew William	100326	276841
	CONTRERAS Criado, Tomas Emilio		276843
82856	JULIENy [illegible], Carlos Pedro Damiano	100329	276847
83060	ACOSTA, Robert	100344	276853
	ARCHIBOLD, David		276854
	CHRISTIE Randle		276855
91656	GUTIERREZ Valle, Laureano	112666	275856
	ROMERO, Cherris Francisco		276859
	CHRISTENSON, Vernon J.		277084
	[illegible], George G.		277085
82953	OLIVEROy Riopa II, Miguel Angel	100337	277088
82947	TRUJOL Gimeno, Miguel Guillermo	100333	277092

/S/ A. J. Amori

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
XX ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH/Cuba

INFO COS, JMWAVE Chief, DOD

FROM Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMCLOCK/1
Transmittal of Contact Reports for First Two Meetings with AMCLOCK/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3346, et seq.

1. Transmitted herewith are one copy for each addressee of the contact reports prepared by Peter J. DI GERVENO concerning his first two meetings with AMCLOCK/1. Report #1, New York Memorandum (NYM)-2233, deals with a meeting held 26 September 1967; Report #2, NYM-2234, deals with a meeting held 27 September.

2. IDENTITY Sheets for each of the two reports follow under separate cover enclosure to this dispatch.

3. Contact reports of later meetings will follow by dispatch.

Howard G. FIGALAN

ATTACHMENTS:
1-Contact Reports as stated para 1, h/w
2-IDENTITY Sheets as stated para 2, USC

DISTRIBUTION:
2-C/WH/Cuba, w/atts. #1 & 2 as stated
2-COS, JMWAVE, w/atts. #1 & 2 as stated
1-DOD, w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UNDA-3263

CS COPY

DATE
13 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-009239

9318

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

H

S E C R E T

DESENSITIZED

CONTACT REPORT NO. 1

8 October 1967

NYM-2233

TO: AMCLOCK/1 File

FROM: Peter DI GERVENO/JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMCLOCK/1, 26 September 1967

REFERENCES: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3346 and 3352

Distribution:
1-Unit A Chrono DUMMY
1-Unit B Chrono DUMMY
4-AMCLOCK/1 File
(Original via ELMARD)

Introduction

445-5547 [redacted]

1. AMCLOCK/1 arrived in New York on 19 September 1967. He had been given instructions to call a JMWAVE operational number (Iden A) next time he was out in a friendly country in order to receive contact instructions. When he failed to call soon after his arrival it was decided to try to establish visual contact with him at HTBASTE, ([illegible] HOTEL [illegible]) same as was done successfully in 1966, to move him to call for contact instructions. For that purpose DI GERVENO was taken to HTBASTE on 21 September carrying a match folder from (Iden B) with his alias, (Iden C, → DAVID CORVIN) and room number. The plan was to make sure AMCLOCK/1 recognized DI GERVENO, who also met him in 1966, and to pass the match folder to AMCLOCK/1 only if this could be done securely. DI GERVENO was able to make definite visual contact on four different occasions: once at (Iden D) (GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS) twice at (Iden E) (DELEGATES LOUNGE, UNITED NATIONS) and a fourth time on the corridor between (Iden D) and (Iden F) (SECRETARIAT BUILDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS). AMCLOCK/1 quickly recognized DI GERVENO and tried to keep himself available for a possible contact. However this was not possible and the contacts on 21 September were limited to visual recognition only.

2. During this time the operational number of the Beekman site (Iden G) (8-4655) was also manned in case AMCLOCK/1 had retained this number and attempted to call DI GERVENO there instead of JMWAVE, but he failed to call either place for contact instructions. It was then decided to attempt to contact the agent again on 26 September at HTBASTE. While attempts were being made to locate AMCLOCK/1 the case officer surveilled the building where AMCLOCK/1 is staying (Iden H) (EMBASSY HOUSE, 310 EAST 47TH STREET) and saw him go in by himself at 1310 hours to leave his briefcase. At 1330 hours, AMCLOCK/1 left the building alone to go for lunch and DI GERVENO followed him. AMCLOCK/1 recognized the case officer and after exchanging safety signals DI GERVENO passed the match folder to the agent while both were waiting on a crowded street corner for the red light to change, at which time AMCLOCK/1 told DI GERVENO that he had no way to contact him and would see him after lunch.

S E C R E T

DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED

Operational Chronology

3. On 26 September AMCLOCK/1 met DI GERVENO from 1500 to 1830 at Iden B. AMCLOCK/1 appeared to be in good health and rested and in high spirits. He was very glad to see DI GERVENO again and to be able to discuss things openly. He criticized bitterly the living conditions in PBRUMEN but does not seem to be affected by it or by the fact that he had to live under a regime he obviously hates. In fact, he seemed quite sure of himself and plans to return to PBRUMEN at the end of the HTBASTE session. He is scheduled to remain in New York until December 1967 but may return to PBRUMEN before then for a short visit to look after his ailing mother and his wife, who had a baby girl two weeks prior to his departure. This may have influenced AMCLOCK/1 not to think about a possible defection at this time, which came as a surprise to the case officer who expected the agent to have second thoughts about return to PBRUMEN where he is not happy.

4. AMCLOCK/1 explained that he could not make contact as instructed because he had destroyed the phone number and both accommodation addresses we had given him for him to report from inside PBRUMEN. He destroyed them in the toilet at the airport upon his arrival in PBRUMEN in late December 1966 after observing a number of uniformed individuals at the airport which he considered to be suspicious, although they had nothing to do with AMCLOCK/1. This may have been a convenient excuse for his failure to make contact as instructed but DI GERVENO did not press the issue. Instead he was given the operational numbers of the Beekman site and of the Base in New York (Iden I) and told he could always call there if he could not locate DI GERVENO at Iden B. He was also given the JMWAVE number for emergency contact. AMCLOCK/1 said he tried to make contact by calling Iden J to inquire about MIDDAUGH in true name, ~~but after much probing~~ he was told that MIDDAUGH was in Washington and was given a phone number for him to call direct. AMCLOCK/1 was planning to call Washington at a later day if he had not been contacted.

986
2948

5. Mission of the United Nations

5. AMCLOCK/1 reported that he has had no security problems and has not been molested inside of PBRUMEN. He was treated "royally" by the AMTHUG regime in early 1967 and everybody seemed pleased to see him back. Apparently his return surprised some individuals who privately thought he would defect rather than return to PBRUMEN to live. During this time he enjoyed special privileges and received frequent invitations to official functions with foreign diplomats. However, by mid 1967 the special privileges and invitations were gradually suspended for no apparent reason. (For example, he was no longer allowed to take his private car to a government garage for repairs and he had to arrange for the maintenance of his house, which was given to him and kept up by the government at first). AMCLOCK/1 believes that this was due to his being under "observation" while going through a reorientation period after his long stay abroad. There is nothing to indicate that AMCLOCK/1 is not trusted or accepted by other government officials. The fact that he was sent out again is a strong

DESENSITIZED

indication that he enjoys a favorable position in the AMTHUG regime. He hopes that in 1968 he will be assigned to another permanent post abroad.

6. In reference to his wife AMCLOCK/1 stated that he is now convinced that she is totally against the AMTHUG regime. After their marriage in late 1966 he was not sure of her true political ideology but during the past year he has been able to confirm her disagreement on a number of occasions. He feels confident that she would follow him in any movement against the regime, such as defection, but has not told her about his work for WOFACT. GONZALO DIAZ DIAZ

ALBERTO BOZA HIDALGO-GATO

ROBE
RODRIGUE
LUE

7. Regarding the trip to New York, AMCLOCK/1 reported that with them came Iden K, a known intelligence type, and four other individuals not known to him but believed to be intelligence types. Later AMCLOCK/1 identified these individuals as Idens L, M, N and O. In answer to specific questions AMCLOCK/1 said that the crate they brought contained only a vase for Iden P. AMCLOCK/1 is not aware if any weapons or special instructions have been sent to Iden P in connection with racial disturbances in WOLADY. The routine instructions given to Iden P were to oppose LNHARP actions in HTBASTE whenever possible and to try to bring all debatable matters to HTBASTE, where they have better support. CUBAN MISS
TO THE UNITE
NATIO

JOAQUIN
CAMILO
GARCIA
ALONSO

CUBAN
MISSION TO
THE UNITED
NATIONS

8. AMCLOCK/1 was not seen going in or out of the room and the meeting was conducted without interruption under most secure conditions. DI GERVENO established immediate rapport with AMCLOCK/1 and their relations remained most cordial throughout the meeting. Only DI GERVENO and AMCLOCK/1 were present.

Finances

9. DI GERVENO was careful not to mention salary payments to AMCLOCK/1 who is not aware of his salary increase to $1,000 a month effective 1 January 1966. However, he requested $500 to buy books and baby items for his daughter. DI GERVENO told him that he would bring him the money in their next meeting. All payments to AMCLOCK/1 will be T/A'd to JMWAVE together with the agent's signed receipts.

Intelligence Production

10. Although most of the meeting was used to discuss operational matters, AMCLOCK/1 reported disseminable information on the following requirements given in DIRECTOR 37960.

a. Present attitude of the PBRUMEN government towards the United States; expectation of a military attack on PBRUMEN supported by the United States; formal military training being given to all PBRUMEN army officials (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3382)

DESENSITIZED

CAPTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET DESENSITIZED

-4-

AFRO-ASIAN-LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION - AALAPSO

LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (LASO)

b. PBRUMEN views regarding Idens Q and R (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3390)

c. Replacement of PBRUMEN Ambassador to the USSR and PBRUMEN views regarding the Soviet Ambassador to PBRUMEN (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3392).

d. Main objectives of the Foreign Policy of the AMTHUG regime (being disseminated).

Future Plans

11. The next meeting was scheduled for the following day, 27 September, for lunch at the Beekman site.

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

Identities to NYM-2233

Iden A - 445-5547

Iden B - Commodore Hotel, Room 1263

Iden C - David Cordova

Iden D - General Assembly of the United Nations

Iden E - Delegates Lounge, United Nations

Iden F - Secretariat building of the United Nations

Iden G - 688-4683

Iden H - Embassy House, 310 East 47th Street)

Iden I - 986-2948

Iden J - U.S. Mission to the United Nations

Iden K - Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato

Iden L - Joaquin Camilo GARCIA Alonso

Iden M - Gonzalo DIAZ Diaz

Iden N - Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

Iden O - "Papo", a courier to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations

Iden P - Cuban Mission to the United Nations

Iden Q - Afro-Asian- Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization - AALAPSO

Iden R - Latin American Solidarity Organization - LASO

OCT 18 1967

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

CS COPY

14-00000

SECRET

Identities to UNDA 2234

Iden A - United Nations, Committee II

Iden B - Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar (201-749244)

Iden C - Raul ROA

Iden D - José FERNANDEZ Cossio, Director of International Organisms in the Foreign Ministry

Iden E - Americo CRUZ, Cuban Ambassador to Canada

Iden F - Bank of Foreign Commerce

Iden G - Fernando ALVAREZ Tabio

Iden H - Foreign Relations Committee of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party

Iden I - Isidro ROSALES (201-335336)

Iden J - Antonio CARRILLO (201-349956)

Iden K - Gabriel MOLINA (201-817838)

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET
DESENSITIZED

CONTACT REPORT NO. 2

9 October 1967

NYM-2234

TO: AMCLOCK/1 File

FROM: Peter J. DI GERVENO/JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMCLOCK/1,
27 September 1967

REFS: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3362 and 3359;
DIRECTOR 37254 and 37960

Distribution:
1-Unit A Chrono DUMMY
1-Unit B Chrono DUMMY
4-AMCLOCK/1 File
(Original via ELMARD)

Operational Chronology

1. On 27 September 1967 AMCLOCK/1 met DI GERVENO from 1130 to 1530 for lunch at the Beekman site. The agent was not seen entering or leaving the site and he stayed out of sight when food was brought up from the restaurant downstairs. The meeting was conducted under secure conditions and without interruptions. Only AMCLOCK/1 and DI GERVENO were present at the meeting.

Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar (201-749244)

United Nations, Committee II

Raul Roa

2. AMCLOCK/1 reported that he had been assigned to work in Iden A with Iden B same as last year. A few days before his departure from PBRUMEN, Iden C told AMCLOCK/1 to watch out for Iden B who is a member of the intelligence service and will be reporting on AMCLOCK/1. The implication was that AMCLOCK/1 was still under observation by the AMTHUG regime and Iden C actually told him to bend backwards in every way possible to prove himself while in New York. AMCLOCK/1 explained that this meant to live a model life while abroad and to perform extra work whenever required, without complaining. AMCLOCK/1 believes that Iden B is being trained to take over AMCLOCK/1's position as an expert in economics for the AMTHUG regime. If this is the case, this may be the last time AMCLOCK/1 is sent to Iden A. Still, under much probing, AMCLOCK/1 could not come out with any clear indication that he was suspected or was falling out of grace with the AMTHUG regime. Although the agent has a tendency to emphasize his "delicate" position, the case officer believes that he is not mistrusted and still enjoys a favorable position in the government, although probably considered too bourgeois to be completely integrated with their communist philosophy.

3. Regarding the recent changes made in PBRUMEN diplomatic personnel abroad, AMCLOCK/1 was not aware of any security shake up taking place in the Foreign Ministry. He regarded these changes as a routine matter in accordance with their policy to bring back to PBRUMEN for a reorientation tour all those diplomats stationed abroad for three consecutive years or more. AMCLOCK/1 actually

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED

appeared not to be aware of any major purge and not to be concerned about it. However, if this is true the chances for AMCLOCK/1 to be reassigned abroad in the near future appear doubtful at this time.

4. When DI GERVENO asked AMCLOCK/1 about his work and how the recent changes may affect him, the agent then reported the following information about his position in the Foreign Ministry. After his return in late December 1966 he was given four months vacation, during which time he went by the ministry from time to time but had no job assigned to him. He used most of this time for a honeymoon and to relocate in his new home furnished by the PBRUMEN government. In the spring of 1967 Iden C considered him actively as a substitute for Iden D whom Iden C does not like. However, the job did not materialize because Iden C's plans to send Iden D as Ambassador to Canada were not accepted by Iden E whom Iden C was going to send as Ambassador to Switzerland. At that time AMCLOCK/1 was also considered for a position in Iden F which was the position the PBRUMEN President wanted him to take, but AMCLOCK/1 avoided the position although it implied frequent travels abroad. The reason AMCLOCK/1 gave for not taking the position at Iden F was that he did not want to break away from his diplomatic career and felt he would be better protected among his friends in the Foreign Ministry. Consequently, after his vacation AMCLOCK/1 want back to work in the Foreign Ministry but without any specific duties. He is actually doing odd jobs for Iden C, like economic studies. In mid 1967 AMCLOCK/1 and Iden G were proposed by Iden C and accepted by Iden H as members of a four-man committee (the other two members have not been selected yet) which is to be created in the Foreign Ministry to make specific area studies and recommendations to Iden H. Since both AMCLOCK/1 and Iden G have been assigned to the HTBASTE session, it is concluded that the creation of said "Advisory Committee" is not contemplated until early 1968. According to AMCLOCK /1 the creation of this "Advisory Committee" has been discussed at the highest levels only and it may have some influence in the policy making decisions of Iden H, which is the main body that dictates present PBRUMEN foreign policy.

JOSE FERNANDEZ COSSIO, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISMS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

BANK OF FOREIGN COMMERCE

FERNANDEZ ALVAREZ TABIO

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY

5. It may be well to record here that we should take with a grain of salt the selection of AMCLOCK/1 to such a sensitive source of information as an "Advisory Committee" to Iden H would be. The agent may be trying to build up his importance to us. It is of interest to note that in the past year that AMCLOCK/1 has been residing inside of PBRUMEN he has made no clear effort to obtain and develop new sources of information and to bring out with him intelligence of particular interest to us. For example, he has no information on the specific requirements we gave him in 1966 prior to his return to PBRUMEN and when asked to identify his main sources of information he said they were his contacts in the Foreign Ministry and Idens I, J, and K who

DESENSITIZED

ISIDORO ROSALES (201-335336)

ANTONIO CARRILLO (201-344956)

GABRIEL MILD (201-817335)

SECRET

DESENSI

are old friends of AMCLOCK/1. Iden K is also a cousin of AMCLOCK/1's wife. (AMCLOCK/1 is a difficult individual to debrief on hard intelligence.)

6. Regarding internal security in the PBRUMEN mission in New York, AMCLOCK/1 reported that the entire third floor of the mission is used only by members of the intelligence service. Not even the Ambassador is allowed in that area. Besides Iden B, AMCLOCK/1 correctly identified the known members of the intelligence service permanently assigned to the PBRUMEN mission.

Finances

7. AMCLOCK/1 was given $500 he requested from his escrow account and signed a receipt for this amount, which will be T/A'd to JMWAVE.

8. During the meeting AMCLOCK/1 was debriefed on the following information which was disseminated as indicated:

a. Changes of PBRUMEN diplomats abroad; expected internal reorganization in the PBRUMEN Foreign Ministry (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3373)

b. Advisory Committee on PBRUMEN Foreign Policy (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3376)

c. Informal message sent to PBRUMEN Prime Minister by Mexican President (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3375)

d. Appointment of PBRUMEN Ambassador to the Congo (Brazzaville) (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3374)

Future Plans

9. Next meeting is tentatively scheduled for 29 September between 1300 and 1400 hours. With the assignment of AMCLOCK/1 to Iden A his free time will be more restricted from now on for future meetings. However, the agent agreed to contact DI GERVENO as often as possible.

NSITIZED

SECRET

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

RID/

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/COG/REG.		18 OCT 1967	30 OCT 1967	
2. WH/C/FI				
3.		1 Nov 1967	2 Nov 1967	
4.				
5. WH/C/RR		6 Nov		
WH/COG/CICS E. ~~Scoggin~~	1B1			
7. [redacted]				
8. [redacted]				
9. RID/AN.		18 OCT 1968		
10.				
11. RID/				
12. RID/FS				12
13.				

RYBAT/SECRET

18

U/S be alleded

Ple inde

AN	,
AB	X
IT	
PG	12
BX	4
~~DES~~	EPD
FI	

RYBAT/SECRET

The foll [illegible] auth [illegible]

Si [illegible]

D. Vitale

14-00000

FROM:

RID/

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/COG/REG.		18 OCT 1967	30 OCT 1967	
2. WH/C/FI				
3.		11 Dec 1967	12 Dec 1967	
4.				
5. WH/C/RR			6 Nov	
6. WH/COG/CICS E. ~~Scoggin~~	FI			
7. [redacted]				
8. [redacted]				
9. CI/D/AN.		OCT 1967		
10.				
11. [illegible]				
12. [illegible]				13
13.				
14.				
15.				
16. [illegible]				
17. RID/AN				

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | INDEX

DATE MICROFILMED

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

~~RYBAT~~/SECRET

1 & 2

U/S/c allotted

Plz index

14

AN	✓
AB	✓
IP	✓
PS	12
BX	4
~~DES~~	MFD
FI	

~~RYBAT~~/SECRET

The [illegible]

[illegible] coordinate

FILE TITLE

[illegible] 9229

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

UNDA 03263

FORM 1-61 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SE CRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SAS

INFO.
Chief of Base, Merida
Chief of Station, WAVE; Chief, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Contact Report/(LITAMIL-9)01

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

PERUMEN

Attached, for addresses, are copies of Subject contact reports dated 11 May, 14 May, and 15 May 1963.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C CURTIS

Attachement:
As stated above

Distribution:
✓2 - C/SAS, w/att
2 - C/WHD, w/att
2 C/WH/3
2 - COS, WAVE, w/att
2 - COB, Merida, w/att HMC
3 - Files

INDEX

X 56-6-105/3

CS COPY

DATE TYPED
21 May 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21403

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
P - 6079

CLASSIFICATION
SE CRET

[illegible] CARD REPRODUCTIONS

[illegible] the Record SECRET [illegible]

Subject: LITAMIL-9

10 P

On the night of 10 May 63, I met LITAMIL-9 at the usual rendezvous point and we droe to outlying district of city where debriefing took place. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS NOTED.

Time: 2130-2245.

LITAMIL-9 reported as follows:

1. Manuel VEGA Perez, Cuban G-2 Mexico, told L-9 that he had been with Dolores DE LA MORA Canedo and that DE LA MORA asked for L-9. L-9, of course, will take advantage of VEGA remark to make con- with DE LA MORA. L-9 commented that fact VEGA was with DE LA MORA is interesting. It will be recalled that "Conchita" FERNANDEZ told L-9 to be careful with DE LA MORA Because she is a contact of CLERGE Fabra, Cuban G-2 type.

2. L-9 reported that on 9 May 63, while near the Cine Diana at ~~XXXX~~ 10:30, he saw Ramon SINOBAS Casado waiting for someone. SINOBAS saw L-9 and waved at him. (This was KUBARK meeting) L-9 commented that SINOBAS was definitely waiting to make a contact with someone.

201-934249

3. Francisco MAIZ Alberdi, Spanish/Cuban, who formerly tended the gate at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, returned to Mexico on 10 May 63, this time assigned to the Embassy as "Auxiliar de Segunda Clase". (LIFIRE Airlists show MAIZ and his wife returned via Cubana on 10 May 63). L-9 said that MAIZ' wife is suffering from cancer, that she was operated on in Habana but there is no hope.

7752 201-934249

4. L-9 reported that on 9 May 63, Ramon SINOBAS Casado, Cuban Charge, met with students (about 6) from Chapingo. The meeting took place at 1700 at the Embassy.

7422 201-306051

5. Fco. MAIZ told L-9 that ~~XXXX~~ Hector GALLO Portieles, Cuban Charge in Bolivia, went back to Habana recently for what he thought was short stay , i.e. two weeks but he is still there. GALLO was assigned to study "instruccion politica y revolucionaria"

201-332665

6. MAIZ also told L-9 that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, formerly in Mexico reportedly received a scholarship. It is not known what kind for where.

7. MAIZ told L-9 that Heberto JORRIN was expected to return to Mexico on 13 May 63. MAIZ said that Antonio GARCIA Lara was expected to return to Mexico shortly.

SECRET

P-6079

1

8/N

8. (L-5) said that he had the duty (security) all day Saturday, 11 May 63. (L-9) said that Jose LLAGOSTERA is taking the day off and will not return until about 2200 this evening. I told (L-9) to report any similar info particularly re Armando SARDINAS and others who live at the Embassy.

9. MAIZ told (L-9) that Eusebio AZCUE was expected back in a week or so. MAIZ said that his wife would return after him. He added that Sra de AZCUE is anxious to return to Mexico.

10. (L-9) finally identified Jose FERNANDEZ Roa as the person who is working with Buenaventura REYES Acosta and Ramon SIMORES. (L-7) reported this previously) (L-9) said he asked FERNANDEZ if he was related to the Foreign Minister and FERNANDEZ didn't say yes or no. (L-9) believes that he might be because he doesn't seem very sharp and yet he's hanging around with SINOBAS and BUENAVENTURA. FERNANDEZ told (L-7) who asked him about his relationship with ROA, that if he was related to ROA it was a distant relationship.

11. Coty SOLORZANO, sister in law of Gral. Lazaro CARDENAS is scheduled to leave for Habana on 13 May 63.

12. L-9 said he attend a meeting at the Academia Mexicana de Derecho Internacional on 8 May 63 and the Mexican Amb to Israel spoke re non- intervention and autodeterminacion. (L-9) said the speech was typical of Mexican govt policy re Cuba.

13. (L-9) said that he saw Rafael PEDROSA Perez and Antonio ARRUZA Mon at the Embassy on 9 May 63. ~~XXXXXXXX~~ They were in session with Ramon SINORAS. PEDROSA, the mulatto type, told L-9 at the inaugural session of the Micwoonda Seminar that "it was necessary for him to make a lot of contacts in Mexico". It was he who also told (L-9) that he was in contact with Raul ROA, i.e. "Estoy en contact con ROA". (L-9) said that on 9 May at the Embassy, PEDROZA was sick, i.e. pale green, bad breath etc. I told (L-9) to make contact with PEDROZA and ARRUZA if possible and size them up. He said it would be difficult because he has no reason to see them. He merely attended the inaugural session of the Seminar. (L-9), however, did identify both men from LIERODE "take" which I showed him on this date.

(5/N

FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

(L-9) said that [illegible] [illegible] on 8 [illegible] 63, through [illegible] visa [illegible] Embassy on 9 May 63. MORIN, according to (L-9) [illegible] in Habana until recently. She is living at (L-9)'s brother's [illegible]. (L-9) suggested that a ltr be written to her asking her to come [illegible] Embassy at which time the CO could interview her. He said that MORIN was told at the Embassy that it would take about a month to get clearance etc, that she had to be investigated. (L-9) pointed out that Embassy request she report for interview would appear to her as past this investigation.

15. (L-9) brought a contract to the meeting re his brother's company and (Nestlé.) 24 He pointed out that the contact was signed on 7 Mar 63 and he left for Habana on 4 March. Because he was not present his name did not appear in the XXXXXXX contract and he was unhappy that this had to be. L-9, however, diplomatically and politely pointed out that he want to bring this to my attention to show that this had been a sacrifice on his part, i.e. his travel to Habana on our behalf. I asked L-9 whether this meant anything to him in dollars and xcents and he said it did not. He said the only thing was that if his name appeared as the Administratorof the Company when the contract was signed with (Nestle) 029 it would give him a feeling of accomplishment and security re his future relationship with the company.

16. (L-9) identified the following from LIEROLE photos [illegible]:

Emigdio VEGA mo 201
Antonio ARRUZA Mon mo 201
Rafael PEDROZA Perez mo 201

17. (L-7) reported that the Gabino FERNANDEZ who was invited to and attended the Cuban Embassy coctail on 19 Apr 63, is XXX married to a Cuban woman and has been to Cuba several times. L-9 said that XXXXXXXXX FERNANDEZ has a home near Acapulco, where Eusebio ASCUE has stayed on occasions.

SECRET FILE: LIEMBIL-9

10/17

Sábado de guardia todo el
día. El Domingo con Sinobas
[illegible] a las 13 p.m. "Los Vive-
ros" Coyoacan.

Jorrín probablemente
llega lunes 13

Ascue

Embajador

Ros-Embajada

Caty Solórzano lunes 13
a La Habana.

Llegan Miércoles familia
Gomez Abascal etc.

Miercoles 8 Academia Mex.
de Derecho Internacional

→

...UCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

Embajada americana Jueves 9
Srta. Morin, solicitó visa.

M. Dolores de la Mora-Vega

Sinobas, Jueves a las 10.30 a.m. junto cine Diana

Llegó Maíz hoy Viernes 10, adscripto a la Emb. Mex. auxiliar de segunda clase.

Sinobas, Jueves a las 5 p.m recibió estudiantes Chapingo.

Gallo, estudiando en Habana "instrucción política y revolucionaria". creyó que estaría en Cuba solo 15 día

Rogelio, becado 8

FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

Subject: (LITAMIL-9)

On 13 May 63, I met (LITAMIL-9) at the usual rendezvous point and we drove to outlying district of the town where we held meeting. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS NOTED. Time: 2230-2330.

(LITAMIL-9) provided the following information:

Comments on Emma Farias removal

1. Francisco MAIZ A. told (L-9) that Emma FARIAS, former upstairs maid at the Cuban Embassy, and now employed by the PORTUONDOS in Oriente (Amb Jose PORTUONDO) is being returned to Mexico as a security risk. She is expected to arrive from one day to the next. According to MAIZ, FARIAS was "sacking in" with anybody who came along, and has even become friendly with counter-revs. In view of the above, FARIAS is being "bounced". MAIZ said the Cubans plan to conduct a full body search of FARIAS when she leaves Cuba, i.e. XXXXXXXX "en cueros". (L-9) pointed out that FARIAS is a Mexican and if it true what MAIZ reporting about body search et al it would be good for PP play in Mexico.

Carmona Ramos, Andres Nicolas 201-333036

2. (L-9) reported that Andres CARMONA is in Jamaica.

3. Jose FERNANDEZ Roa, newly arrived Cuban dip, told (L-9) that he came to Mexico in 1959 with a group of young people as an "official". FERNANDEZ said that Amb MASSIP was in Mexico at that time. (L-7) reported that this is FERNANDEZ first overseas post.

4. Roberto JORRIN is expected to return on 14 May 63.

5. (L-9) reported that Ovidio SAMA Espinoza, the Vice Consul in Veracruz, is quite sick with "turistas", i.e. amoebas. He apparently has had this problem in Cuba.

201-334148

6. Ramon SINOBAS, Cuban Charge, told (L-9) that his baby would be about a week old when the new Ambassador arrived and that this would be fine because he wanted to return to Cuba and see his father who has returned to Habana from Paris (Ramon SINOBAS del Olmo). SINOBAS' wife gave birth to baby boy.

7. Manuel VEGA Perez told (L-9) that the new Amb Joaquin HERNANDEZ de Armas "llegara a mas tardar en diez dias".

SECRET

4

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET 201-[illegible]

8. On 13 May 63, Serafim DUNIN, Soviet Counselor, drove L-9 to the Cuban Embassy from Coyoacan. DUNIN, who in L-9's opinion is extremely "sharp", "realistic" and "talented" told L-9 the following:

a. The Cuban Rev is now consolidated as the recent trip of Fidel CASTRO to Moscow proves. DUNIN said that CASTRO's absence f[illegible]m Cuba did not affect the regime; that things went on the same in his absence etc. DUNIN, however, said that this does not mean that Cuba does not need CASTRO. He said that Cuba is not like the Soviet Union where the loss of KRUSCHEV would not affect the regime. Cubaneeds CASTRO and he must be protected to avoid an assassination attempt etc.

b. L-9 asked ~~XXXXXXX~~ DUNIN about the "tapado" and DUNIN answered that at this time, in his opinion, not even the President LOPEZ M., knows who is going to be the candidate.

c. DUNIN stated that a revolution in Mexico similar to that in Cuba would be very difficult. He attributed this to the fact that the masses in Mexico ~~are~~ do not ~~XXX~~ have the "debida preparacion politica" required for such a revolution. He said that it will take one or two generations before Mexico is ready for such a revolution.

HM 731

HM 731

201-334089 201-334089

9. L-9 said that Eusebio AZCUE Lopez, Cuban Consul, is expected back on 17 May 63.

10. L-9 said that while he was in Habana he asked that 5 copies of Bohemia be sent to the Embassy. He said that 10 copies are arriving each week since his return to Mexico. He said very little propaganda is coming.

11. L-9 said that he saw Rafael PEDROSA and Antonio ARRUZA at the Embassy but he did not have a chance to talk with them. He said they quickly slipped into SINORAS' office.

CKS

SECRET

of 5

FILE: L(TAMIL-9)

5/IV

[illegible] FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED



Emma, ciudadana mexicana.
(doméstica de Portuondo)

Armona, en Tampico

Roa, vino como Oficial en
época de Massip

mañana Martes 14 llega
Jorrín

probablemente en un mes
Sinobas coincidirá en Habana con su padre procedente de Paris

Vega, "De Armas llegará a
más tardar en dies días"

...UCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

Dunin. "La Revolución está tan consolidada, que la momentanea ausencia de Fidel, no ha trastornado la buena marcha de las cosas en Cuba" Esto no quiere decir que Fidel no séa indispensable.--------

Dunin." Yo creo que en este momento ni el mismo Presidente sabe quien va a ser el candidato"
(elecciones en México)

Dunin. "Difícil en México una revolución estilo Cuba, no existe para ello en la masa la debida preparación política"~~[illegible]~~ requiere por lo menos una o dos generaciones,...

CARD SUBMITTED

14-00000

Subject: (LITAMIL-9)

On 14 May 63, I met (LITAMIL-9) at usual rendezvous point and we drove to outlying area to hold meeting. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS NOTED. Time: 2200-2300

(LITAMIL-9) provided the following info:

1. L-9 had dinner at the Embassy on 14 May and he identified Emigdio VEGA Calero as a TDYer.

re info on SARSAMENDI May 63

2. L-9 said that Emmanuel CARBALLO told him that "Chiquis" SARSAMENDI (sic) employed by the Casa de las Americas is coming to Mexico soon for a couple of weeks. 2 May 63 SARSAMENDI, fnu, Subject's father lives in Mexico and according to CARBALLO, was disappointed that his daughter was not going to stay in Mexico. Subject's mother is living in Miami.

201-354433

to Cuba

3. (L-9) reported that Seydou DIALLO, Guinean Amb arrived on Cubana on 14 May 63 and he saw to it that DIALLO had no problems at the airport. DIALLO is the Guinean Amb to the U.N. also. DIALLO told (L-9) that Carlos LECHUGA Hevia, Cuban Amb to the U.N. was highly respected by all members of the U.N., including the U.S. He said that LECHUGA knew how to handle himself in the very complicated U.N. maneuvers. DIALLO said that Raul ROA and LECHUGA make a good team. (L-9) said that DIALLO is very much pro-CASTRO and undoubtedly a member of the pro-CASTRO U.N. clique. DIALLO told (L-9) that he has known Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano for many years.

201-262166

(COMMENT BY SEYDOU DIALLO, GUINEAN AMB to UN, CUBA MAY 63)

201-329

4. (L-9) identified the following LIERODE photos:

identified by photo May 63

Marcial MARTINEZ (COLORED) - L-9 said he saw MARTINEZ in Havana recently.

Rafael PEDROSA Arandia - TDYer for conference on microwaves.

identified

L-9 also identified Jose FERNANDEZ Ros in LIFIRE photo at Sov Embassy press "fiesta" recently. May 63

5. (L-9) said that Manuel VEGA Perez told Rafael PEDROSA Arandia and Antonio ARRUZA Mon that he should not leave any docs or papers at their hotel room. In fact, both men left immediately to get papers from their ~~XXXX~~ room. (L-9) believes they are staying at the Hotel Agnes.

SECRET

FILE: (LITAMIL-9) 6

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM ASSEMBLED CARD SUBMITTED

13/R

SECRET

24 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting With [WUSLAB/1] on 22 April 1970

1. Arrangements and Security: The meeting took place in the [office 24 safehouse] at 1400 on the above date and ended at 1500. There were no incidents of a security nature.

paras 2-3 extracted for WH/3/B.

2. Production: Bolivian Ambassador Julio Sanjines Goytia talked on the phone to president Ovando on 20 April. Ovando said that there was pressure from the civilian members of the cabinet on the Debray case. They related their request that Debray should be released to a letter Ovando wrote the Italian novelist Alberto Moravia which they claimed stated he would release Debray. Ovando commented to Sanjines that he had not committed himself to release Debray. The civilians think that the release of Debray and Bustos would take the pressure off the government. Ovando admitted that the government could not control the students. The Minister of Education had been destroyed when the USIS installation was damaged. Ovando commented that he would reconsider the Debray situation and commented that there were no legal precedents for Debray's release. The military will go along with it if Ovando and the cabinet will put down the union members if needed. Marcelo Quiroga still claims to be able to influence a segment of the mineworkers. Ovando does not want to suppress by force the student demonstrations. Ovando indicated that there is a wave of uneasiness in the country. He is thinking about taking a stronger hand in certain issues and compromise on other issues.

3. Minister of Planning Jose Ortiz Mercado is coming to Washington on 2 May for a four day visit before he goes, to San Jose for the inauguration of Pepe Figueres. [WUSLAB/1] believes that Ortiz will be [frank 08 with him], and tell him what the situation is like back in La Paz. He will attend the [CIAP 8 review] of the Bolivian program.

4. Sanjines described the Rogelio Miranda Baldivia problem (Miranda is the Army Chief of Staff in Bolivia) as a personal matter which has now become ideological. He does not get along with General Juan Jose Torres, the Commander of the Armed Forces. Miranda is now trying to change some commanders in field commands.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

[illegible]UCH SECURITY [illegible]
FIELD DISTRIBUTION

5
BR

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

CS COPY

5. I asked some clarifying questions on the OAS report of a possible demonstration against the OAS Assembly in Santo Domingo in June 1970. He said that Rolz-Bennett normally maintains contact with the OAS Deputy Secretary General Urquia, who is a close personal friend and is also a Central-American. The head of the UNDP office in Santo Domingo is Hugo Navegas. He has been asked to get the information on the possibility of such a disruption.

6. Victor Paz Estenssoro, is one of three experts picked up under an OAS contract with the University of Engineering in Lima. In actuality, Paz will receive a P-4 salary from the OAS. The project is up for board approval and will last at least a year.

7. [WUSLAB/1] went on at length on the difficulties between Miss Alexander, the former Bolivian ambassador to the OAS whose parents were murdered in La Paz, and Sanjines. In brief, Miss Alexander was accompanied to Washington by a catholic priest Father Eduardo. Sanjines offered to find him lodging in a Washington monastery, but he demurred. Whenever Sanjines called Miss Alexander during crises in Bolivia at early morning hours the father would answer the phone. He also helped with Miss Alexander's work at the OAS and was around the Embassy office. Sanjines once found them doing some research in his files. Colonel Banzer, when assigned to Washington, said that there was an intelligence report that Father Eduardo had been involved with the guerrillas. The military finally forced the father to leave the Embassy. Miss Alexander sent him $100 on which to live. When her parents were killed he reappeared. When Miss Alexander returned to La Paz she read a written report submitted by Sanjines on her affair with the priest, and when she came back to Washington she called up Sanjines and told him off.

8. Sanjines said that his relations with the State Department have cooled off. He thinks that the nationalization of Gulf Oil has weakened the government. There is a vacuum in Bolivia and this has caused the present Bolivian government to be much more subservient to the United States than was the government of Rene Barrientos. He believes, however, that his own position with the Bolivian government had been strengthened. Sanjines is going to San Jose for the presidential inauguration. He heard from Colonel Ayoroa that Victor Paz Estenssoro as a personal friend of Figueres, had also been invited to the inauguration. Sanjines said that it would be interesting to talk to Paz.

9. I asked [WUSLAB/1] if there were any recent developments between [his assistant] and the Soviet Embassy. During

3/mc

8, 6

[his absence Mr. Peary, his assistant], received a telephone call from KUTAKOV, the Soviet Under-Secretary, who asked that [Peary] send directly to him Congressional reports on Chemical Warfare, USSR-US cultural exchanges, hearings on the United Nations. These documents are being sent to KUTAKOV. [WUSLAB/1] remarked that the Soviets are always interested in the [information assistants in his office] and never the [office director]. They were interested in [Manton, Thompson and Peary].

10. Plans: The next meeting will be on 28 April at 1400. [WUSLAB/1] goes to [Baltimore] on 29 April to have his eyes checked.

F.B.M.

FLOYD B. MCCULLY

[WUSLAB] OPS

SECRET

TOUCH ... VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

9
13R

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

2 21 PM '64

FROM:

RID/

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SAS/ESC		10 April 64		DRC
2. WH/SA/OPS Maloney		10 APR 1964		
3. SA/MOB/FI			8 April 64	
4. WH/SA/MOB/PRD				
5.			20	EV
6.				
7. SA/ SAS/SO/HH			20 April 64	
8. WH/SA/Security			22 April	
9.			23 April	
10. SAS/MOB/KCP PA	APR 1964		3 SEP 1964	
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Copy Detached of Alvin V. Burt

← For DDP approval—how cleared? ? ?

[illegible] of 201 # orig

UFGA 3413, 17/3/64

MICROFILMED
APR 9 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

7-8: Being both AMCARBON-1 and AMCARBON-2 are U.S. citizens & newspaper reporters. Believe they are social contacts of KEENMAN but some type of clearance would seem appropriate here. As they are U.S. citizens believe that a CSA is called for. Note moreover, 106 Burt has not been similarly cleared. I've asked WAVE for biographic data in order to initiate a clearance request.

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-746416

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

2 Apr 1964

DOCUMENT NUMBER

UFGA 14781

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

ISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MICROFILMED
APR 9 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

TYPIC/OPERATIONAL

201-746416

Special Activities Report on JMWAVE's Relationship with AMCARBON-1

QUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 10

REFERENCES :
A. WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962
B. WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962
C. WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962
D. DIR 40975, dated 6 October 1962
E. UFGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964

1. INTRODUCTION. In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review of the nature of its relationship with AMCARBON-2. This review indicates that the relationship with AMCARBON-2 evolved from that action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the establishment of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT South Campus as a result of security restrictions which were in some way related to JMDUSK. While the relationship with AMCARBON-2 stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the Identity 3 was an objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain. As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made that JMWAVE be given approval to contact the major South Florida news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these news media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity spotlight on those KUBARK activities in South Florida which might come to their attention. Thus, when a relationship was established with AMCARBON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3, which would simultaneously insure the security of JMWAVE's operations, and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for surfacing certain select propaganda items. In the period October to

(CONTINUED)

Attachments: USC att'd in RID/AN
A - Five Newspaper Clippings
B - Identities

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SAS, w/atts.

INDEX X

201-746416

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
19 March 64	APR 2 1964

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-14781

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

201-

during

3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER. AMCARBON-1 originally started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk, and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment which entailed covering major political developments in Florida. At a later date, AMCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the Identity 3. Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant

9933

64
-116

ecember 1962, all of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3 as handled via AMCARBON-2. In mid-December 1962, AMCARBON-2 ade the suggestion that he introduce REUTEMAN to AMCARBON-1 n order that there be a backup contact, in the event that MCARBON-2 were out of town or unavailable at such times as EUTEMAN might require assistance from the Identity 3. REUTEMAN greed to AMCARBON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, AMCARBON-2 osted a luncheon on 12 December 1962 at the Miami Club in the otel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which AMCARBON-2 introduced MCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN. As a result of this initial meeting on 2 December 1962, an operational relationship has developed with MCARBON-1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes to the fulfillment of the over-all JMWAVE mission. In view of this, a special activities report is being submitted to cover the ature of JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the eriod December 1962 to March 1964.

2. FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR JMWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMCARBON-1. When AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN, AMCARBON-2 reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating with REUTEMAN. This review was conducted for AMCARBON-1's benefit, in order that he might clearly understand the frame of reference which should prevail in his relationships with REUTEMAN. In this review, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that it was the policy of the Identity 3 that it would take no action which would purposely embarrass KUBARK or its South Florida operations. As a result, if any embarrassing items relative to KUBARK's operations in South Florida did come to the attention of the Identity 3, this material would be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate attention. AMCARBON-2 made it clear to AMCARBON-1 that such items should be discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner. In addition, AMCARBON-2 made the point that, after an item was discussed, AMCARBON-1 should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative to how any particularly embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, so that it would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the same time, would not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of the Identity 3. In addition, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that, if AMCARBON-1 brought a potentially embarrassing item to REUTEMAN's attention and remedial action on the matter was not taken by REUTEMAN within a reasonable period of time, then the Identity 3 would feel free to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's part. AMCARBON-2 pointed out that in return for this cooperation from the Identity 3, REUTEMAN had agreed that he would be available for contact by telephone or periodic personal meetings at which AMCARBON-1 and AMCARBON-2 could discuss broad trends and developments in Latin American affairs. AMCARBON-2 advised AMCARBON-1 that this arrangement did not mean that AMCARBON-1 could expect to obtain any classified information from REUTEMAN. The point was also made that AMCARBON-1 should not press for the obtaining of classified information, but he should be alert to steering tips which REUTEMAN might furnish him on fast-breaking news stories. AMCARBON-1 indicated that he understood the frame of reference which had been outlined by AMCARBON-2. This frame of reference has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER. AMCARBON-1 originally started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk, and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment which entailed covering major political developments in Florida. At a later date, AMCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the Identity 3. Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant

promotion for AMCARBON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by the Identity 3 management. AMCARBON-1 is by no means an expert on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a long-term Latin American specialist. QDELF has been questioned about AMCARBON-1, and he has indicated that AMCARBON-1 is regarded in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has a keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American affairs. It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse of time, AMCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles. AMCARBON-1 has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting to improve his language fluency. It is REUTEMAN's opinion that AMCARBON-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist, and he will continue to grow in this field. Thus, he is a contact who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing in mind that he does have long-term potential.

4. AMCARBON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES. In keeping with the traditional pattern of source protection which is common to newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers, AMCARBON-1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his sources. On the other hand, when pressed, AMCARBON-1 has identified some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations could be made of that information which AMCARBON-1 had passed to KUBARK. As a result of these occasional witting identifications of his sources, and, as a result of general conversations with AMCARBON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that AMCARBON-1's sources include the following persons:

a. Luis *FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766), secretary general of the DRE.

b. Manolo *RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE.

c. Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct Havana Times.

d. AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437)

e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-019245), leader of the AAA.

f. Edmund *LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau. AMCARBON-1 regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.

g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and adventurer.

h. Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR.

i. Luis *MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico.

j. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201-103272), former president of the Dominican Republic.

k. Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.

l. Jorge *VOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252), an employee of USIA in Miami. AMCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY is a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this does not deter AMCARBON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a source of information.

5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, AMCARBON-1 is used to carry out certain operational support tasks. In such instances, AMCARBON-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The use of AMCARBON-1 for operational support tasks enables JMWAVE to harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3. Several examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been used in operational support tasks are outlined below:

201-356702

a. Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO Camps, DPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived in Miami and was given routine CAC processing. The details of this processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963. After being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and a sensational story was developed. In view of this story, JMWAVE tried to locate ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productive, thus AMCARBON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO. AMCARBON-1 did locate ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for details.

b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group. In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201-309611) of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims relative to his faction invading Cuba. Headquarters' interest in discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-1. As a result of Headquarters' interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had a luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which AMCARBON-1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was less than accurate in its claims relative to its activities in Cuba. In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction might release. AMCARBON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN's comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would ignore the BANDIN faction in the future. Once BANDIN was discredited with AMCARBON-1, the word was soon leaked by AMCARBON-1 to other newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source. As a result of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage in South Florida since September 1963.

6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. In the period February 1963 to February 1964, AMCARBON-1 has furnished JMWAVE with operational intelligence as outlined below:

a. In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that AMBEND-1 was back in Miami and was the object of a great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from a Havana prison. AMCARBON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements. Subsequent developments revealed that AMCARBON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1, and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the publicity stir that was initially anticipated.

b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical situation. In this connection, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was

thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. CARLSON, residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the Bay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON-1 stated that, if CARLSON were of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would soft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of the opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt of this operational intelligence enabled JMWAVE to brief CARLSON on the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn, enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting with AMCARBON-1. While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish his research.

c. In WAVE 8904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that Mr. Trevor ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.

d. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1 gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with AMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963. This information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1 was telling the press.

e. In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 with AMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligence was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's representatives were telling the outside world about their operational activities.

f. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK vessels which were located in South Florida waters. This information alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny was going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warning, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicity repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5.

g. In WAVE 7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE, Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was no real operational potential in this lead. This incident did underscore the fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant operational leads to JMWAVE's attention.

h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calls indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected from a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previously been seen in Miami during November or December 1963. At the same time, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who was being used as a means of creating an incident which would embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating

United States territorial waters. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that KUBARK had played no rôle in mounting a provocation operation against the GOC. At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result of this conversation, arrangements were made for JMWAVE to check out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time, AMCARBON-1 was prevailed upon not to write a story which might lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC.

7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET. AMCARBON-1 has been used successfully, during the period covered by this report, as a propaganda outlet through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in the free world press. Examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been harnessed in this field are outlined below:

a. AMCRAB-1. The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally surfaced in the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo. The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-1's information relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers in the Miami area. As a result, it was decided to do a series of feature stories on AMCRAB-1, pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1 was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions of obscurity once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. AMCARBON-1 was briefed in detail on the AMCRAB-1 story, and he was given an opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a JMWAVE safehouse. After completing his debriefing, AMCARBON-1 wrote a series of feature articles on AMCRAB-1. The first article in the series received front page headline play. The series of articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an excellent peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other propaganda assets. AMCARBON-1's story on AMCRAB-1 was picked up by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America. The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated 14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174, dated 21 October 1963.

b. Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story. On 26 February 1964, JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN's sons went to Cuba to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over to them. It was believed that this information would make a good human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items from the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States territorial waters. In view of this opinion, a steering tip was given to AMCARBON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in Key West interview Mr. GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out, and an article outlining the points which were of interest to JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

c. LAYC Story. The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santiago, Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted AMCARBON-1 on 5 March 1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the Identity 3 should pursue. AMCARBON-1 was grateful for this steering tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

(COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through c above are attached for Headquarters information.)

8. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. Attempts have been made to obtain disseminable positive intelligence from AMCARBON-1 during the period covered by this report. This attempt has been generally unsuccessful, in that AMCARBON-1 does not have a great number of contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile intelligence appreciably in advance of the information appearing in the overt press. As a result, AMCARBON-1 is usually not aware of inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently, he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence. As a matter of fact, AMCARBON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive intelligence than most journalists. This is attributable solely to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American political scene. It is believed that AMCARBON-1 will ultimately overcome this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him for the collection of positive intelligence.

9. COMMENT. In the period covered by this report, AMCARBON-1 has been found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest, cooperative and who understands the need for security. Our relationship also indicates that AMCARBON-1 is an accurate reporter of that information which he passes to KUBARK. In view of this, JMWAVE plans to continue to harness AMCARBON-1 in the same manner that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our relationship with AMCARBON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our operational mission in a secure manner. In addition, this relationship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have difficulties with the media outlets in the South Florida area. As a result of our continuing relationship with AMCARBON-1, a special activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.

10. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARBON-1 and that JMWAVE be advised of the number.

END OF DISPATCH

201-746416

Latin Youth Group in Chile Organized by a Cuban Red

By DON BOHNING
Of Our Latin America Staff

A small, but significant Communist-dominated, Cuban-inspired Latin youth group convenes Monday in Santiago, Chile.

About 400 representatives of Latin American youth organizations, for the most part Communist oriented, are expected to attend the second Latin American Youth Congress.

It has an interesting anatomy. And whether by design or accident, both its timing and locale have political significance.

Chile is one of five Latin countries which still maintains diplomatic relations with Cuba. It also is considered the one most likely to vote itself Communist.

Presidential elections will be held in September, a leading contender is Salvador Allende, candidate of the Communist controlled Popular Action Front (FRAP). Allende lost by 35,000 votes in 1958 to outgoing president Jorge Alessandri.

A provincial election to name a national deputy will be held next week, a day after the Youth Congress closes. Outcome of the election may provide an indication of which way the country will go in September.

Principal organizer of the Youth Congress is a 35-to-40 year old Cuban Communist named Joaquin Mas Martinez. A U.S. official describes him as "one of the brainiest" of the Castro followers.

Mas stepped in last fall when the Congress, originally scheduled for July of 1963, faltered. Cuban exile groups claim he gets his instructions for the Congress directly from Moscow.

Mas, a former president of the School of Social Science at the University of Havana and now vice president of the University Student Federation, arrived in Chile in September.

He quickly organized the International Preparation Committee for the Congress. National preparation groups began to sprout up in other Latin countries at the same time.

Chilean authorities ordered him expelled several times as a "foreign agent." Each time Communist and Socialist party officials intervened in his behalf.

Mas left Chile Nov. 20 for Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela where he conferred with other Communist leaders, then went on to Prague and Moscow.

He returned to Santiago Dec. 26. He was met at the

country. This time Chilean interior minister Dr. Sotero del Rio intervened and Mas came back.

But for Mas, the Congress may not have come off.

It is an outgrowth of the first Lation American Youth Congress held in Cuba in 1960. It was there the "Cuba Si, Yankee no" theme was

News Analysis

A January, 1963, preparatory meeting for the Second Congress nearly fizzled when the Cuban delegation was detained in Mexico on its way to Santiago. The Panamanian representative flew from Santiago to Mexico to confer with the Cubans, then returned to Chile and the meeting resumed. The July date was set, an agenda agreed on and the theme "Fight of the Young for Peace" was adopted.

In March, however, another "international" preparation meeting was held in Cuba, attended only by Cuban youth representatives. Theme for the Congress was changed to read "For the Liberation of Latin America" and it took on a more "anti-imperialist" tone.

Nothing more was heard until mid-summer with little interest apparently being generated among Latin youth groups. The Congress was rescheduled for August and again didn't take place.

To salvage lost prestige, it was announced in late August the Congress would be held in Santiago "in consideration of numerous petitions."

Since its inception, Cuban exile organizations in Miami have waged a heated propaganda campaign against the Congress.

A letter from a top Soviet youth official to Aldo Alvarez, leader of the Cuban National Preparation Committee for the Congress, was reproduced and circulated by the exiles. In it, specific instructions for organizing the Congress are outlined.

Exile groups have promised to send representatives to Santiago when the Congress convenes to "denounce the Communist effort to brainwash the youth of Latin America."

MIAMI HERALD
6 March 1964

201-746

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER Separate Cover Attac B to UFGA-14781

1P

Identities - 1 - The Miami News 29

2 - Sunland Training Center for Retarded Children 29

3 - The Miami Herald

4 - Latin American Editor 08

5 - The LEDA 24

IP/EDI		TRAVEL PROGRAM
		ABSTRACT
		INDEX

DOC. MICRO. SER.

MICROFILMED

02 April

SCA 2 to UFGA 14781
Enclosed

201-74641

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE N

CS COPY

4/RJ

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/R Y B A T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
Chief of Station, London; Chief, WOMUSE;
Chief, EUR Division

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT
MHALPHA/MHPROBE/RODIGAST

kp'd 9 December 68

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OEPA-984, dated 18 March 1968

4C 2)

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to raise what we believe to be an operational prospect worth careful study. The proposal is necessarily somewhat tentative at this point, but we believe it is desirable to share it with Headquarters now in order that its early consideration may be facilitated.

Pol.te

2. As you are aware, RODIGAST has developed excellent contacts with individuals active in the Paris SNCC group. Identity A, who is one of these, has recently become increasingly active in the affairs of the SNCC group (which largely centers around several young girls recently arrived from the US) and has come to play a rather important role since she brings to it a sophistication and ~~articulateness which the "natural" leader of the group lacks.~~ Identity A would not normally have become active in the SNCC group. She is older and holds "moderate" views of the sort held by the late Dr. Martin Luther King. However, she recently took a rather militant position at a public discussion of civil rights (primarily to avoid confrontation with and criticism by the SNCC girls) after which she was admiringly besieged by the girls who were anxious to have her assistance in preparation of speeches, etc. In this regard please see Reference. Partly because she has the time and partly because she was flattered, Identity A accepted and has grown daily more involved in SNCC matters. At the moment she is devoting virtually full time to this.

Pol.te

Attachment: u/s/c (2)
1- Identity Sheet
2-Biographical data

/Continued.../

Distribution:
1 - C/WOLIME w/atts
1 - C/EUR w/atts
2 - C/WOMUSE w/atts
1 - COS/London w/atts

sent to Paris
under # 07PW 42736
18 Sep 68

OEPA-1097
29 Apr 68

7533
Ⓐ
cc CB/Rodigast

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-1058

DATE
17 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/R Y B A T

HQS FILE NUMBER
100-6-148/3

3. RODIGAST reports that Identity A is charming, highly female, definitely intelligent and something of an "actress" in that she is often willing to tell people what they want to hear; indeed, this is what she did at the public discussion mentioned above. At the same time she is committed to the civil rights movement. You will note from the biographical data which we are forwarding under separate cover, that she has worked in civil rights activities before and at one point assisted in the organization of a march led by Dr. King. RODIGAST, who is a personal friend of the family (she is divorced and has a teen-aged girl) in addition to being the representative of her publisher, has gotten to know her very well over the past years. He reports that she is basically a loyal, moderate and anti-Communist person who comes from a middle class family in Detroit where her parents were active in the anti-Communist activities of the United Auto Workers. At one point RODIGAST had proposed her for possible use since she might be able to gain access to North Vietnam. This was rejected, however, because she was thought to be too moderate, respectable and pro-American to be of interest to the North Vietnamese.

4. All this has been altered by her recent involvement in the SNCC activities, and it is now RODIGAST's opinion that she offers what may be a unique opportunity to obtain the collaboration of someone in a position to report on the attempts by Communist, Castroist, and radical forces to influence and use the civil rights movement. Through her involvement in SNCC she has developed contacts with various groups which are flirting with SNCC such as the French Vietnam National Committee, Vietnamese student groups and the Che Guevara Circle—all targets of WOFIRM.

5. At the moment she is Emily Moore the most glamorous figure the SNCC [redacted] returns to the US this Spring, Identity A could easily develop into a leading public representative of SNCC. Another candidate for a leading role in SNCC following the departure of Identity B is the Marxist oriented Identity C—although she is somewhat shy and prefers to operate behind the scene. Thus we can envision a situation where Identity A might become most influential, if only by default.

6. RODIGAST is convinced that Identity A would be willing to collaborate with her government but stresses that the approach to her would require great skill and must be done by an individual with whom she could feel rapport. He reiterates that she is sincerely anti-Communist, and that she does not share the beliefs of the militant black racists, although she certainly is a convinced advocate of the civil rights struggle. RODIGAST suggests that any approach to her must stress respect for her commitment to the civil rights movement. This approach should emphasize that Communist exploitation of the movement is in the interest of neither the movement nor the nation and should request her collaboration in reporting on foreign (and only foreign) attempts to exploit the situation. As an alternative to this direct approach, we believe that consideration should be given to the desirability of merely stating that because of her activity in the civil rights movement she has been thrown into contact with Vietnamese, Cubans, etc. of interest to WOFIRM and on whom we would welcome reports. This line has the virtue of having less blow-back potential should our approach be declined and we would hope that once a relationship with her had been established she would volunteer information on SNCC and its foreign involvement. Reinforcing the approach RODIGAST suggests that she be offered a small payment of, say, $200 per month to assist her in meeting the obligations of living abroad. This payment will

be attractive to her since she is somewhat lazy. She is now living on a grant from Identity D which is designed to give her the financial independence to write another book. However, she has done no writing yet and is beginning to be concerned regarding her source of income when the grant expires at the end of the year.

7. Time is of great importance in any approach to Identity A, in RODIGAST's view. He stresses that she is becoming concerned regarding future income and may soon begin withdrawing from SNCC activities in order to begin writing. More importantly, her normal instincts may soon lead to a falling out with Identity C and other radicals who are active in SNCC. If this happens it can be expected to severely reduce her access. Were she in contact with WOFIRM, however, such arguments with target personalities could be avoided through careful WOFIRM guidance.

8. Thus we are presented with what appears to be an opportunity to gain a collaborator who might be able to provide information of the highest interest regarding Communist efforts to use SNCC, and who might be able to gain access to various other radical groups ~~(Cubans, Vietnamese). The personalities making up the SNCC group,~~ at least abroad, seem to be virtually unapproachable and thus this opportunity may be almost unique. At the same time, there appears to be a rather critical time factor operative here.

9. In addition, rather fundamental questions are raised by this possibility, which will certainly require careful consideration prior to any approach to Identity A. We are impressed with the thoroughness of RODIGAST's assessment of this operational possibility, and believe it warrants serious consideration by Headquarters. We have no reports regarding the impact of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King on Identity A and the other members of the SNCC group—although our guess is that it will only accelerate forces now in operation and render more important, even critical, the consideration of this proposal.

10. We request that an appropriate clearance of Identity A be expedited and that we be advised as soon as possible whether or not Headquarters wishes to pursue further the exploration of this proposal.

Adrian B. MASLOTT

14-00000

SECRET RYBAT

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO:
OEPA-1058

IDENTITIES

A - Carlene Hatcher Polite

B - Emily Moore

C - Julia Herve´

D - The National Council on the Arts (USA)

✓

SECRET RYBAT

RESUME

CARLENE POLITE
26 rue des Lyonnais
Paris 5e
PORt Royal: 66-52

BIRTH DATE: August 28, 1932
Detroit, Michigan
U.S.A.

EDUCATION: Detroit Public Schools - 1937 - 1949 (Diploma)

Resident/Student/Employee - New York City
1949 - 1959

DETROIT, MICHIGAN:

Detroit Council for Human Rights
8014 Grand River Avenue
Detroit 4, Michigan
Reverend C.L. FRANKLIN, CHAIRMAN

May, 1963 - November, 1963

Coordinator/Special Assistant to the Chairman

Duties/Responsibilities included:

Coordination of state-wide organizations for June 23rd WALK TO FREEDOM WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING - Cobo Hall Arena (with cooperation of all related City and Governmental Departments)

Coordination and complete organization of the November 8th through 10th, 1963 NORTHERN NEGRO LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

Michigan State Democratic State Central Committee
847 Book Building
Washington Boulevard
Detroit 26, Michigan

August, 1962 - May, 1963

Assistant Office Manager

Spring Electoral Campaign (1963) Coordinator

Citizens for Sound Government
1601 Washington Boulevard Building
Detroit 26, Michigan

December, 1962 - February, 1963 (Executive Secretary)

January, 1963 - Elected by the Voters of the 13th Congressional District (State of Michigan) to the Michigan Democratic State Central Committee

NEW YORK CITY:

1949 - 1959

Student/Dancer - Martha Graham School of Contemporary Dance

Company Member - Edith Stephen Dance Group

YM/YWHA - 92nd Street - Young Dancers Concert Series

Dancer - Amato Opera - Metrpolitan Opera

Dancer/Actress: The Boyfriend

Dark of the Moon

The Disenchanted

Children's Theatre

The King and I

Office Manager - Vanguard Playhouse - Equity Theatre - Detroit

September, 1960 - June, 1961

ADDENDA:

Guest Artist - Wayne State University - Detroit
Conversations in the Arts - 1960

Guest Instructor (Dance) Wayne State University
Dancer's Workshop

Dancer/Teacher - YWCA - Cranbrook Academy of the Arts
Detroit Department of Parks and Recreation

Dancer/Model for Nation-wide Television - National Auto Show

Representing General Motors (Chevrolet Division)

November, 1963 - August, 1964 - Detroit PLAYBOY Club

(the Bunny Viva...)

# # #

de Verona

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	El Salvador	REPORT NO.	00-A-3228565
SUBJECT	Report on Conditions of the Country Submitted by a Special Representative of the Cuban National Revolutionary Council	DATE DISTR.	28 June 1962
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	(MIMI-4417) C/S Rodriguez 05
DATE OF INFO.	7 Jun 62		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	San Salvador - 2 May 62		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION Source: [Dr. Jose Julio FERNANDEZ Gutierrez] 08

SOURCE: Cuban national exiled in the US.

Source is [a lawyer who returned recently from a trip to the Central American countries as special [illegible] Cuban Revolutionary Council.]

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

[~~On File in the CIA Library~~ Attached is a copy of a report in Spanish by Jose Julio Fernandez Gutierrez to Antonio de Varona. This report, written on 2 May 62, is a full report to the Revolutionary Council of Cuba regarding general conditions in El Salvador and specifically dealing with Cubans in that country. The author of the report was sent to El Salvador for this particular purpose and spent 45 days in El Salvador and other Central American countries. Classified: CONFIDENTIAL.]

-end-

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

6/28 [illegible] Manus
Routed to TFW
with suggestion
they forward
to area
SS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

#09583

2/IV

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE AKC

SUBJECT: Operational/CYROSE/AMCUTLER
AMCUTLER-1 Progress Report for November and December 1962.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information.

Reference: UFGA-6637, dated 23 November 1962.

Developments:

1. AMCUTLER-1's efforts during the reporting period were directed toward: (a) supporting the AMFAUNA operation; and (b) developing new KUTUBE operations.

2. In support of the AMFAUNA operation, he has been investigating AMFAUNA-4, for which purpose he has interviewed seven Masons in Miami who presumably should have known AMFAUNA-4 but did not, and two individuals in New York who did know him. (See UFGA-7118.)

3. AMCUTLER-1 has also reported a potential courier channel to AMFAUNA-1, using:

Gonzalo ABELEM Martin
Brazilian citizen
Born ca. 1915
Residence: 3 N.E. Biscayne Blvd, Miami, Fla.
Occupation: Employee of Brazilian Consulate

and his brother

Manuel ABELEM Martin
Brazilian citizen
Born ca. 1909
Residence: Havana, Cuba
Occupation: Officer of Brazilian Embassy, Havana

Once a month a pouch passes between the Brazilian Consulate in Miami and the Embassy in Havana, and AMCUTLER-1 has made use of it to send letters for posting in Havana to AMCUTLER-2. The two ABELEM brothers are personal friends of AMCUTLER-1 and AMCUTLER-2, but AMCUTLER-1 does not

(Continued)

Distribution:
~~3~~ - Headquarters

27 X

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 Jan. 63	JAN 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-7171

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-6-74/3

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

09593

believe that they would yet be willing to carry or send any obvious espionage material. He does believe that they would be willing to carry canned good to AMCUTLER-2, and this is being explored, with the idea of concealing money, maps, etc. in the tin cans.

4. For the purpose of trying to develop new KUTUBE operations, AMCUTLER-1 has been following up leads given him by his case officer. He has interviewed

CONTACT Sub. of 201-293865

Carlos Manuel *CACERES-Blay
Former manager Motel Las Cuevas, Trinidad
Residence 1122 S.W. 16th Ave., Miami, Fla.

from whom he obtained two intelligence reports; and

Evelio *CRUZ
Born Candelaria, Cuba
Residence 1545 S.W. 6th St., Apt. 4, Miami, Fla.

from whom he obtained operational information on the Esquivel Caves, Soroa Zone, termino municipal of Candelaria, Pinar del Rio. CRUZ passed AMCUTLER-1 to

Luis *HERNANDEZ aka "El Terrible"
Residence 665 N.E. 24th St., Apt. 8, Miami, Fla.

who gave additional information on the caves which, he said, are the property of his brother-in-law

CIT: CUBA

RE. INFO. ON SUB'S PROPERTY IN CUBA.

Dionisio *UGARTE
Sixto *UGARTE

and

Anita *ERRASTE Betancourt — Δ CANDELARIA, PINAR del Rio, Cuba

who still lives in the area.

5. AMCUTLER-1 reported that his friend "Pepe" GONZALEZ, whose brother-in-law now resident in Spain is a son of

Dr. Carlos *PEDEMONTE
Head of Cartographic Office of INRA
SUB'S SCN. IS CONTACT OF Sub. of 201-293865

has received word that PEDEMONTE is looking for a way to leave Cuba. AMCUTLER-1 is trying to develop additional information on PEDEMONTE's situation from GONZALEZ. Other than press clippings, the only JMWAVE trace on PEDEMONTE is contained in HKH-02664 of 15 April 1960.

6. On 22 December 1962 AMCUTLER-1 reported that he had been invited by one

"Chique" *MONTES CIT: Cuba
Cuban citizen
Resident Puerto Rico

CONTACT Sub. of 201-293865
1 JAN 63

to join a maritime expedition aimed against tanker traffic on the south coast of Cuba, with the further objective of seizing a Cuban frigate with the cooperation of its captain. Details were sent to Headquarters in WAVE-2749 of 22 December, in the hope that it might be possible to make a tentative identification of the naval officer involved.

7. On 25 December 1962 AMCUTLER-1 reported that he had been informed the day before by

Pedro Luis *DIAZ Lanz CIT: Cuba
CONTACT Sub. of 201-293865

that two individuals named

23
RS

ARCHIVES CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-7171

201-342588 (?) 6 FR CIT. Cuba Reinaldo *LOPEZ Lima 201-342588

and

~~Not 288950~~ (?) 6 FR CIT. Cuba Enrique *CEIJAS 201-288950

had just approached him with the offer to sell him some weapons allegedly belonging to KUBARK which were stored on an unidentified key and valued at several thousand dollars. LOPEZ and CEIJAS told 6 DIAZ that an armed raid on the key would have to be simulated so that suspicion would not fall on them, and that the raid would have to be pulled off on either the night of 25 December or 31 December, when one or the other of the men would be on guard duty at the key. 6 DIAZ had turned down the offer. JMWAVE file checks showed that the two men were indeed of interest to KUBARK, and that AMTABBY Underwater Demolition Team was possibly involved. Appropriate defensive measures were immediately taken.

Sub. of 201-293665 with offer to sell him weapons belonging to U.S. Gov. Agency.

Production:

8. The following reports were disseminated during the period:

UFG-1955	"Reaction to Current Crisis within Cuba"
UFG-2098	"Possible Military Use of Caves near Trinidad, Las Villas"
UFG-2143	"Identification of Two Caves near Trinidad, Las Villas Which Could be Used for Military Purposes"
UFGT-2823	"Passenger Manifests for Flights to & From Cuba".

Costs:

9. The following expenses were incurred during the period on behalf of the operation:

Two months' salary	$500.00
Use of POV	80.00
Meeting expenses	16.22
	$546.22

Future Plans

10. No change.

END OF DISPATCH

4/mc

CLASSIFICATION PAGE NO

Hqs 19F

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE QER

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMFAUNA
Debriefing of AMFAUNA-14

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

1. Following are the results of the debriefing of AMFAUNA-14 in the JMWAVE area from 22 November to 2 December 1963.

2. AMFAUNA-14 did not leave her apartment all day Sunday, 6 Oct. On Monday, 7 October, she went to work as usual. When she arrived, she found a letter waiting for her which had been forwarded to her office from her accommodation address; it was in AMFAUNA-1's handwriting and contained nothing of any interest, so she was sure there was a secret writing message on it.

3. At 1255 hours two men arrived at the office, one about 45 years old and short, who from his appearance might have been a bus driver, and the other a very young dark-skinned man. They walked into the office vestibule and told the guard that they wanted to see AMFAUNA-14. The guard came into the office to give AMFAUNA-14 the message, and the two men followed right behind. They told AMFAUNA-14 that she had to come with them to identify an arrested person. AMFAUNA-14 said that she would have to ask her supervisor for permission to leave, because it was not yet closing time. She turned to go back into the office, and the two men followed her in. The supervisor told her that it would be all right for her to go, but said that she should check in by phone if there were any difficulty. AMFAUNA-14's father and uncle, both of whom work in the same office, asked whether they could come with her. The men said no, because she would be coming right back; they said they were taking her to "G-2" headquarters in La Vibora.

Continued.............

POUCH [illegible] VIOLATION
NO FIELD [illegible]

Distribution:

Orig & 2 - Chief, SAS

INDEX-X

CS COPY

19-6-50/3

DATE TYPED
9 Dec 1963

DATE DISPATCHED
DEC 11

CROSS REFERENCE TO
019-5-1

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-12894

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-50/3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RETURN TO CIA

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

09748

4. AMFAUNA-14 tried to dispose of the letter she had just received from AMFAUNA-1 by leaving it on the desk of a fellow employee together with some potatoes and a carrot for cover, but the men would not let her. She did, however, manage to destroy a page from her notebook containing telephone numbers.

5. At the DSE headquarters in Villa Maristas, AMFAUNA-14 was turned over to a militiawoman who had her strip and performed a body search on her. She was fingerprinted and photographed and her biographic data were taken down, after which she was locked in a cell which had an adjoining private bath. Nothing else of importance happened for the rest of the day.

6. During her four-day detention period, AMFAUNA-14 was handled by the following DSE officers: C.I.T. CUBA DOB c. 1918 ECC I.S. AGENT HAVANA, CUBA SUBJ INTERROGATED

20-201-314?

(a) Francisco *ABAD: AMFAUNA-14 believes that this is his real name. He did not introduce himself, but she saw the name on her release papers which he signed. He was born about 1918 and is about 5'4" tall, weighs about 160 pounds, and has a fat build, aquiline nose, greenish eyes, dark skin, grey-brown wavy hair, rough laborer's hands, and two teeth missing from the lower jaw. He smokes both cigars and cigarettes, his manner was soft and kindly, and AMFAUNA-14 believes he is probably poorly educated. He is married, but AMFAUNA-14 did not learn whether he has children or what his address is. He wears civilian clothes and drives a black 1956 Pontiac with a grey roof. Discussing this man later in the AMCOG household, AMFAUNA-14 was told by Pedro *CARRILLO (who is a brother of Justo CARRILLO) that Pedro knows ABAD. According to Pedro, ABAD is part Jewish and an old Communist who worked in the Havana underground on behalf of Fidel CASTRO during the Batista period. Pedro CARRILLO thinks that ABAD may now have some regrets about the course he has taken.

(b) "Carlos" aka "Samuel": AMFAUNA-14 does not know his true name. He was born about 1942 or perhaps a little earlier. He is about 5'6" tall, weighs about 150 pounds, and has a muscular build, drooping eyelids, light olive skin, wavy chestnut hair with a widows peak. He is a nervous pacer, and walks with his head bent forward and tilted slightly to one side. An expression which he frequently used was "O.K." pronounced "OKAH" with the accent on the first syllable. He told AMFAUNA-14 that he had been a student in the Commercial School of Havana, that he had worked clandestinely under the Batista regime, had been arrested by Col. Esteban VENTURA Novo, had been released due to the influence of his father, and had gotten out of the country with the aid of the Mexican Ambassador to Cuba, coming then to the United States. He drives a 1959 black and white Chevrolet Corvair, wears civilian clothes, and carries a pistol, sometimes a .45 and sometimes a .38. AMFAUNA-14 believes him to be a 100% Communist. She thinks he may have been somewhat better trained than Francisco ABAD and may have been somewhat superior in rank, although this was never clearly evident. There seemed to be a little professional jealousy between the two men. If she told one man something which she had been unable to remember for the other, the second would show signs of jealousy or resentment. "Carlos" subsequently told AMFAUNA-14 to phone 61-4319 and ask for "Samuel" when she wanted to reach him. She phoned him at this number about ten times in all. The phone was always answered by the same woman, except for once when a boy answered and then called for his mother to come and take the phone. AMFAUNA-14 would ask for "Samuel" and the woman would invariably reply that he was not there. AMFAUNA-14 would then ask the woman to take a message for him to please call "Dolores." The woman would always reply "Yes, Comrade." Discussing this person later within the AMCOG household, AMFAUNA-14 was told by Israel *PADILLA that he thought "Carlos" was Samuel *RODILES. CIT: CUBA 200 201

06 RE INFO PROVIDED BY [illegible] BY SUBJ.

Comment: The physical description of "Carlos" does not match that of Samuel RODILES Plana. Telephone number 61-4319 is listed in the 1962 Havana telephone directory to one Maria Antonia *CARCANO Araujo, Artes 47, Casablanca, Havana. WAVE traces on this

SEX-F CIT: CUBA SUBJ IS A POSSIBLE PHONE CONTACT FOR

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

name include HCSA-09896 of 23 April 1963 showing that one Maria CARCANO Arujo (born 7 December 1935) travelled to Chile in March and April 1963 on a diplomatic passport. An AMOT report of 27 September 1962 mentions one Antonia CARCANO Araujo as a communist in charge of vigilance, and living at 47 Artes St., Casablanca. There also appears to be a Maria ARAUJO (born about 1902) who is an old-time Communist living at Artes 47. AMFAUNA-1 has been given the names of several former residents of this neighborhood in hopes of finding a relative of the CARCANO or ARAUJO families whose physical description matches that of "Carlos." AMFAUNA-1 has also interviewed Col. VENTURA in the WAVE area. VENTURA remembers case similar to that of "Carlos" but does not remember the boy's name. He says that he seems to remember that the boy's father was connected with one Jose LOPEZ Villaboy (on whom WAVE has numerous traces) and that he was assisted in getting to Mexico by a Mexican diplomat named "Benjamin." CIT: CUBA OCC: F.S. AGENT DOB. c.1939 WAS SEEN AT DSE HEADQUARTERS

Ind

(c) Fnu lnu: This man appeared a few times during AMFAUNA-14's interrogation. She never heard his name at this time, but later saw him on television interrogating AMSIGH-2 and he was identified then as Jose Antonio *FERNANDEZ Menert. She does not believe that this is his true name, because it is her understanding that DSE officers use aliases in their public appearances. He is about 5'11" tall, slender, with darkish skin and black hair combed straight back. He has very large green cold eyes. He was born about 1939 and appears to be uneducated, with a cynical and vulgar manner. He wears civilian clothes. IN HAVANA

7. At about 1600 or 1700 hours on Tuesday, 8 October, AMFAUNA-14 was brought into ABAD's office for her first interview. ABAD began by asking if she knew why she was there. AMFAUNA-14 replied that she had no idea. ABAD observed that that was strange, because he had judged her to be an able and intelligent woman. CIT: CUBA LOVER OF 201-332675

201

8. Honestly believing that she might have been denounced by the jealous wife of her lover, Manuel *COMPANIONI, AMFAUNA-14 suggested that it might be a personal matter. X (A) EL NEGRO DOB: C1927 CIT: CUBA AKA LUIS NEGRET AKA LUIS NEGRE CO. GINEBRA DEL RIO CUBA

No 201

9. ABAD said that it was not. He then asked her if she knew one Luis Braulio *VILLAR Negret. AMFAUNA-14 said that she did not. ABAD said that this was strange, because VILLAR Negret knew her. He asked if she knew one Angel *BRINGAS. AMFAUNA-14 said that she did. ABAD asked why, if she knew BRINGAS, she would deny knowing his cousin NEGRET. A textile factory near Cave 100 in Marianao RE. INFO ON SUBJ PROVIDED BY 201-332675

10. AMFAUNA-14 said that she knew the man as Luis *NEGRET and had not recognized the name VILLAR Negret. (SUBJ. INFORMED ON ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN E.S.

11. ABAD told AMFAUNA-14 that NEGRET was then under detention and had implicated AMFAUNA-14 in his confession. ABAD wanted to know what AMFAUNA-14's connection with NEGRET had been. AMFAUNA-14 said that NEGRET had been in her house once, and once in her mother's.

12. At this point in the interrogation, ABAD was called away and AMFAUNA-14 was returned to her cell. Two hours later the interrogation was resumed.

13. ABAD picked up where he had left off, and asked AMFAUNA-14 what connection she had had with Angel BRINGAS. AMFAUNA-14 said that she had known BRINGAS no better than she had known NEGRET. ABAD said that she was lying and urged that she cooperate. AMFAUNA-14 promised that she would cooperate. ABAD said that NEGRET had told the DSE that AMFAUNA-14 had had sexual relations with BRINGAS, and AMFAUNA-14 denied the allegation.

14. The interrogation was again interrupted, and AMFAUNA-14 was returned to her cell. When she returned to the interrogation room, she saw that ABAD had an envelope containing what she recognized to be papers taken from her apartment, including airline passenger manifests, deciphering material, instructions for using the deciphering material, and insurance policies and personal papers belonging to AMFAUNA-1. AMFAUNA-14 now realized that it was time for her to pretend to

cooperate with the DSE, as AMFAUNA-1 had briefed her to do in such a situation.

15. ABAD began by telling her that she was in a very serious situation, because he knew that she had had very close connections with a KUBARK agent. ABAD asked whether AMFAUNA-1 was identical with "Julio." AMFAUNA-14 said that AMFAUNA-1 had been known as "Julio." ABAD then wanted to know whether NEGRET had been working with "Julio." AMFAUNA-14 denied this. ABAD asked whether NEGRET had known "Julio." AMFAUNA-14 denied this too, but volunteered the information that "Julio" had provided NEGRET with mail facilities, and that AMFAUNA-14 had been the cutout between them. Did NEGRET know of "Julio's" existence, ABAD wanted to know. AMFAUNA-14 said that he did not, that she had brought NEGRET mail and money which she had gotten from "Julio," and had picked mail up from him and delivered it to "Julio," but that NEGRET had never known "Julio's" identity.

16. The truth about AMFAUNA-14's relations with NEGRET and BRINGAS, according to her statements to her KUBARK case officer in November 1963 in the JMWAVE area, is as follows:

(a) In about mid-1962, AMCOG-2 asked AMFAUNA-14 to serve as cutout between herself and an unidentified agent, and AMFAUNA-14 agreed. AMFAUNA-14 was driven to the meeting site, which was on the sidewalk in front of a textile factory near Calle 100 in Marianao, by AMCOG-2's chauffeur, a Spaniard named "Segundo." This agent introduced himself to AMFAUNA-14 only as "El *NEGRO", and AMFAUNA-14 described herself to him as an employee of an unidentified embassy. For contact purposes, "El Negro" gave her the telephone number 29-4900 or 20-4900.

(b) Later, when AMFAUNA-14 began to trust "El Negro" more, she gave him the telephone number of her mother. She learned that "El Negro's" true name was Luis Braulio VILLAR Negret, and that he lived in a small room in the rear of the textile factory. The telephone number which he had given her was always answered by a woman whose name she learned to be "Maximina."

(c) VILLAR Negret was born about 1928, and was about 5'11" tall with broad shoulders and a strong build. He had black wavy hair, brown eyes, an olive skin, and a face marked by acne. AMFAUNA-14 never learned anything about his family directly from him, but DSE officers told her that he was married with one child, and that his parents lived on a farm in Pinar del Rio Province. SUBJ. IS INVOLVED IN RECEIVING INFO. FROM 201-297645

(d) VILLAR Negret was a member of the Accion Revolucionaria Democratica, which AMFAUNA-14 understands to be a successor organization to the AAA of Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango. He had formerly belonged to an action component of this organization, but more recently had devoted himself to intelligence collection. AMFAUNA-14 brought him instructions and money from AMCOG-2, and picked up his intelligence reports which she delivered to AMCOG-2. She understands that AMCOG-2 sent these reports via diplomatic channels to Frank *PAEZ in Miami, FLA, USA who in turn delivered them to an individual identified only as "El ~~Guajiro Bermudez~~." The last contact which AMFAUNA-14 had had with "El Negro" was in mid September 1963 when he passed her a report which he said concerned a missile base, and a book on Communist infiltration in Colombia. HAVANA, CUBA

RECEIPT INFO. FROM CIT: CUBA 201-324340

(e) Once when "El Negro" was sick, he sent his cousin to meet with AMFAUNA-14. This cousin was Angel *BRINGAS, an employee of an X-ray equipment company at 23rd and O, La Rampa, Vedado, ~~telephone 70-5570~~. On various other subsequent occasions, BRINGAS filled in for "El Negro." RE. INFO. ON SUBJ. PROVIDED BY 201-332675

(f) According to what the DSE officers told her, "El Negro" was arrested about 1 October and was to be shot. AMFAUNA-14 asked her DSE interrogators whether it would not be possible to reindoctrinate "El Negro" instead of shoot him, but they told her that it was not worth the trouble because "El Negro" was a person of low morals who

201-324340

201

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

be shown to Angel BRINGAS when and if he is caught.

(g) On 12 or 13 October 1963, after AMFAUNA-14 had been released, she was telephoned at her place of employment by Angel BRINGAS who told her guardedly that "El Negro" had been arrested and said that he would like to send a female cousin of his to talk to AMFAUNA-14. A meeting was arranged in the home of AMFAUNA-14's mother. The female cousin, whose name was "Gladys", told AMFAUNA-14 that BRINGAS had gone into hiding and wondered whether "the family with which she worked" (the AMCOGS) could help him get into asylum. AMFAUNA-14 said that she doubted this. "Gladys" told AMFAUNA-14 that, in case it were possible to do anything for BRINGAS, she should telephone "Gladys" with an innocent message. It was understood that a meeting would take place at 1800 hours on the same day of the telephone call at the Ten Cent Store 23rd between 10th and 12th in Vedado. AMFAUNA-14 does not remember Gladys' telephone number which was left with her mother.

(h) In spite of what AMFAUNA-14 told the DSE, AMFAUNA-1 had had nothing to do with NEGRET. AMFAUNA-14 had told this story to protect AMCOG-2. NEGRET had known that AMCOG-2 was involved, and had once had a meeting with her in her home. Nevertheless, AMFAUNA-14 briefed AMCOG-2 on the cover story which she had told the DSE and told her that, in case she were ever arrested and questioned, she should admit having talked to NEGRET in her home, but deny having been involved in the communications channel or knowing anything about it.

Station Comment: Luis Braulio VILLAR Negret appears to be identical with Luis *NEGRE Villar (born 4 November 1930 in Consolacion del Sur, Pinar del Rio), who is carded as ACSI source No. 492 and appears in AMBUD correspondence as National Coordinator of the Accion Revolucionaria Democratica. "El Guajiro Bermudez" appears to be identical with Gerardo Jose *QUESADA Vasquez (201-292022) (born 9 May 1919, Pinar del Rio), President and founder of Accion Revolucionaria Democratica and ACSI source No. 128. There are no Station traces on Angel BRINGAS. The 1962 Havana telephone directory has no listing under 20-4900. 20-4900 is listed to Rafael *LABATUT, Ave. 39 #4117, Marianao; JMWAVE has no traces on him. There is no listing under 70-5570. However, under 70-5579 there is the Cubana de Rayos X y Foto, S.A., Calle 23 #72, La Rampa.)

CIT: CUBA RE. INFO. PROVIDED BY 201-332675

17. ABAD appeared to be particularly interested in how NEGRET and "Julio" obtained their funds, and kept returning to this subject during the interrogation.

18. ABAD then addressed himself to the contents of the envelope and a suitcase found in AMFAUNA-14's apartment. He commented that all these things appeared to belong to AMFAUNA-1 and his son, and asked how they happened to be there. AMFAUNA-14 replied that AMFAUNA-1 and his son, together with AMFAUNA-3, had been hiding for a few days in her apartment because their usual hiding place had become unavailable.

19. ABAD wanted to know how and when AMFAUNA-14 had first met AMFAUNA-1. AMFAUNA-14 replied that she had met AMFAUNA-1 in about February 1962, that AMFAUNA-1 had regularly parked his car in a lot near her office and that they had seen each other on the street frequently, that AMFAUNA-1 had finally spoken to her, and that a friendship had developed which finally turned into a love affair. (Comment: This was a lie told to conceal the fact that it had been AMCUTLER-2 who had introduced them.) She said that AMFAUNA-1 had been her lover until about July 1962 when she broke up with him because he was too busy with clandestine work to pay the proper amount of attention to her.

20. ABAD asked what part AMFAUNA-14 had played in AMFAUNA-1's clandestine activities. AMFAUNA-14 replied that AMFAUNA-1 would sometimes telephone her late at night to invite her to go out for a ride, and she would then find that AMFAUNA-1 was going out to have agent meetings and wanted her along for cover. ABAD asked whom AMFAUNA-1 had been meeting. AMFAUNA-14 mentioned a person known as "Gustavo" and

gave the physical description of AMFAUNA-24, whom she knew to be safely out of Cuba. (She never knew AMFAUNA-24's true name.) She also mentioned Manolo *VILLAMANAN, the true name of AMFAUNA-13 (whom she had known only as AMFAUNA-1's business partner but when she thought she could safely mention now that he was out of Cuba.) For good measure she added a notional name and physical description.

21. Referring back to AMFAUNA-1's automobile, ABAD asked what kind of a car he had driven. AMFAUNA-14 replied that it was a gray Chevrolet Impala. She repeated that AMFAUNA-1 had formerly parked it near her office, but said that she had not seen it recently. ABAD asked where AMFAUNA-1's red car was, and she said she did not know. He asked what the license number on this car was, and she said she did not know. He never asked anything about the third car which AMFAUNA-1 had obtained.

22. ABAD commented that the DSE had observed AMFAUNA-1 in his automobile in the Havana dock area on 1 January 1963, having a meeting with another person. (AMFAUNA-14 recalls that this other person was AMFAUNA-24, and that he and AMFUANA-1 had rendezvoused in the dock area after an attempt to pick up AMFAUNA-1's radio.

23. With reference to the KUBARK agent known as "Julio", whom they had recently identified with AMFAUNA-1, ABAD said that he knew that "Julio" had left Cuba in October 1962 and believed that he had gone to Europe, but he said he did not know whether "Julio" had gone clandestinely or legally.

24. AMFAUNA-14 was asked about AMFAUNA-1's subsources in other provinces, but she said she knew nothing about them. ABAD said he was sure that AMFAUNA-1 had a good source on the Isle of Pines. Whose war name might be "Raul". ABAD also mentioned the name of a person who had been shot about two weeks previously and who he believed had been working with AMFAUNA-1. (AMFAUNA-14 does not remember the name of this person.)

25. ABAD asked if AMFAUNA-1's son had helped him in this clandestine work. AMFAUNA-14 replied that the son had been with AMFAUNA-1 frequently, but that she thought it was only because he was helping AMFAUNA-1 with his business and that the son probably had had nothing to do with clandestine work.

26. ABAD again turned to the envelope of papers found in AMFAUNA-14's apartment, and said he could see she was not cooperating with him. She was not volunteering information, he said, but waiting to be asked questions. ABAD said he was sure that there was much that AMFAUNA-14 could tell him spontaneously, and he intimated that there might be a chance for her to rehabilitate herself.

27. ABAD asked her where the passenger lists came from. AMFAUNA-14 replied that they had been left in her apartment by AMFAUNA-1, who intended to instruct her later by SW what to do with them. She said that AMFAUNA-1 had trained her in this system, and had left her his materials, so that he could use her as a stop-gap communications link while he was trying to reorganize his net.

CIT: CUBA AC-CUBA
RE. CONTACT W/201-32664

28. ABAD told her that this was plainly not true, because some of the lists were dated later than AMFAUNA-1's departure date. He said he supposed they had been brought to AMFAUNA-14's apartment by AMCUTLER-2, who had been observed coming there on 5 October with Lolin *CORREOSO. (This was true, according to AMFAUNA-14. AMCUTLER-2 and Lolin CORREOSO had brought the passenger manifests to AMFAUNA-14's house at about 1630 or 1700 hours on 5 October, and had stayed about fifteen minutes. AT 1400 hours that same day, AMFAUNA-14 had had a meeting with AMFAUNA-39, the first in two weeks, initiated by AMFAUNA-39 by means of a telephone call to AMFAUNA-1's mother who was serving as cutout between them. AMFAUNA-39 had called the meeting to ask whether she had received any instructions from AMFAUNA-1 as to how to act in case of an internal uprising, which a number of people in Cuba seemed to be expecting about that time as a result of the destruction caused by Hurricane Flora.

ABSTRACT CARD REPRODUCTIONS

(The DSE interrogators never at any time mentioned AMFAUNA-39, or asked her about this earlier meeting, so AMFAUNA-14 concludes that she had not been under intensive surveillance that day; either AMCUTLER-2 had been under surveillance on 5 October, or she herself had been under some kind of periodic spot check.)

29. ABAD asked AMFAUNA-14 how she had become acquainted with AMCUTLER-2, and AMFAUNA-14 replied that she had met AMCUTLER-2 through AMFAUNA-15, the wife of a cousin of AMFAUNA-14 who is a prisoner on the Isle of Pines.

30. ABAD then asked AMFAUNA-14 where her SW materials were, which surprised AMFAUNA-14 because she had thought they had been found during her house search and were part of the incriminating envelope which ABAD was holding. AMFAUNA-14 told ABAD where to look for the materials, and he sent somebody to get them.

31. ABAD wanted to know how AMFAUNA-1 and AMFAUNA-3 had gotten out of Cuba. AMFAUNA-14 said she did not know. She said she understood they were to get their instruction on the street once they had left her apartment.

32. ABAD abruptly asked AMFAUNA-14 whether she knew anybody in Luyano. AMFAUNA-14 said she did not. ABAD then produced a photograph of AMFAUNA-14 together with AMFAUNA-1 and AMWEE-2 and told her that she had been in AMWEE-2's home in Luyano with AMFAUNA-1 on Saturday, 7 September. He asked AMFAUNA-14 whether AMWEE-2 were employed in an embassy. AMFAUNA-14 said she did not know but that she thought so. She said she knew AMWEE-2 to be a personal friend of AMFAUNA-1, and thought that he might occasionally have helped AMFAUNA-1 with his mail. (It was true that AMFAUNA-14 had gone to AMWEE-2's house on 7 September with AMFAUNA-1. Later the same day AMFAUNA-1 took her to Miramar to introduce her to AMFAUNA-39. Because the DSE never expressed any interest in AMFAUNA-39, AMFAUNA-14 concluded that they had not observed this meeting, and that therefore it had been AMWEE-2 who had been under surveillance on 7 September and not herself or AMFAUNA-1. She also concluded that the DSE had been inefficient in not transferring their surveillance to herself and AMFAUNA-1.)

33. ABAD again changed the subject suddenly. "Where is the radio?" he asked. "Could AMWEE-2 have it?" AMFAUNA-14 said she did not know anything about a radio. "Where is the camera?" asked ABAD. AMFAUNA-14 admitted having seen AMFAUNA-1 with a Minox camera, but said she did not know what AMFAUNA-1 had done with it. She said she had hoped that AMFAUNA-1 would leave it with her, and pretended to be hurt that he had not done so. ABAD asked her whether she had ever seen one like it in the AMCOG house, and AMFAUNA-14 said that she had. Throughout the interrogation, ABAD kept reverting to the subject of the camera and the radio.

34. ABAD asked AMFAUNA-14 what her connection was with the AMCOG family. She replied that her grandmother was the cousin of AMCOG-3's mother. ABAD said that the whole family had been under observation for a long time, and mentioned an organization (name not remembered by AMFAUNA-14) which AMCOG-2 had worked with during the Batista era. What, he wanted to know, was AMCOG-3 doing. AMFAUNA-14 said that she did not think he was doing anything clandestine. ABAD replied that the DSE was positive that AMCOG-3 was doing secret work. AMFAUNA-14 said that the DSE should not delude itself, that the entire family was too selfish to engage in anything of the kind.

35. ABAD asked what the diplomatic visitors to the AMCOG household talk about. AMFAUNA-14 said that they never talk politics. ABAD asked about the attitude of "the Doctor" (AMCOG-3's uncle), and AMFAUNA-14 said that he was waiting for the situation to settle.

36. "What about AMFAUNA-3?" asked ABAD. "Did she work with AMFAUNA-1?" AMFAUNA-14 said that she did not, but that she sometimes gave him information. ABAD wanted to know whether AMFAUNA-3 had been working with some one in Florida. AMFAUNA-14 answered that AMFAUNA-3

7/P

had been involved somehow with her sister who lives in Florida. ABAD asked whether AMFAUNA-14 had been a good friend of AMFAUNA-3, and she said that she had been. ABAD asked whether AMFAUNA-14 had ever heard AMFAUNA-3 speak about the Escambray insurgents. AMFAUNA-14 said that she had not. ABAD asked whether AMFAUNA-3 had had contacts with any embassy people, for example the Spanish Embassy. AMFAUNA-14 said that she did not know of any such contacts.

37. "How about AMCUTLER-2?" asked ABAD. "We know that she spends a lot of time there." AMFAUNA-14 said she did not know.

38. ABAD asked AMFAUNA-14 if she were a revolutionary. AMFAUNA-14 said that she was not, but that neither was she against the revolution. She said that she had joined the militia early in the revolution, but had soon dropped out because there were some things about the revolution which she did not understand. For instance, she could not understand why there should be so many shortages and rationing, whereas before the revolution there had been plenty. ABAD explained that the shortages were the result of the imperialist blockade of Cuba. AMFAUNA-14 said that she could understand this, but that it did not explain why there should be a shortage of coffee when Cuba grew its own. ABAD said that coffee was in short supply because Cuba was sending coffee to the Soviet Union in gratitude for Soviet assistance in overcoming shortages caused by the imperialist blockade. AMFAUNA-14 replied that this was very logical now that it had been explained to her, and said she wondered why the revolutionary government did not publicly say so in order to put an end to public grumbling on the subject.

39. Early in the morning of 9 October, ABAD produced the letter which AMFAUNA-14 received from AMFAUNA-1 on 7 October and held up the letter to the light, examining it carefully for traces of SW. AMFAUNA-14's developer pills were brought, and she was told to develop the letter, which she did in the presence of ABAD, "Carlos," and a third man whom she was unable to get a good look at. All were very surprised and disappointed when no secret writing appeared. They kept asking her if she were sure she was doing it right, and began intimating that she was deceiving them. (Station Comment: It is indeed surprising that no secret writing appeared, because this letter was almost undoubtedly the one containing SW message no. 1 to AMFAUNA-14.)

40. AMFAUNA-14 also explained the use of her carbons. The only accommodation address she gave away was AMFAUNA-1's JMWAVE area post office box. She deliberately protected the Rosa JUSTIZ address (the home of AMPAN-2), not knowing whether this was a real or a fictitious person.

AA 24

41. "Carlos" and ABAD now invited AMFAUNA-14 to work with them. She replied that she might be willing to do so, but first wanted to know what work would be expected of her. For instance, she said, she would not inform on people in her office. They told her that this would not be asked of her, because that sort of work is done by the Defense Committees. Her work, they said, would be much more important, namely maintaining a link between themselves and KUBARK. She said that would be all right, but she was afraid that it would not last long because KUBARK would probably put her on ice as soon as they learned that she had been arrested. They told her not to worry about that.

42. "Carlos" and ABAD suggested to her that AMFAUNA-1 had briefed her to agree to cooperate with them. She denied this, claiming that she had not really wanted to work with AMFAUNA-1 at all, but had merely let herself be imposed on for old times sake. They asked whether they could trust her. She said she thought so, and asked whether she could trust them to keep their promises. They assured her that she could, and said she would be released the following day.

43. In the morning of 10 October, after being told that she was to be released, AMFAUNA-14 was moved to a smaller cell without a bath. She sent for ABAD and complained that he had double-crossed her. He told

TURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

1/PV

her that he was going to keep his word and release her, but that her original cell was needed for some new prisoners who were expected. He said that the DSE had received advance word that a boatload of refugees were going to try to leave Cuba that night. Many of them were women, and one of these was pregnant, so he wanted the larger cell with bath for them.

44. ABAD always treated AMFAUNA-14 kindly and considerately. When she had a headache, he ordered aspirin for her. He saw to it that she received soft drinks when she wanted them, and he seemed to be honestly distressed whenever she wept. AMFAUNA-14 believes that it had been the DSE's intention from the very beginning to recruit her, because she doubts that all DSE prisoners are treated as well.

45. The first SW message which AMFAUNA-14 wrote while under DSE control was dated 10 October, the day of her release. The DSE officers asked her what her control signal was, and she replied that it was a rubric, but also included her true control signal. She deliberately numbered her first controlled SW message no. 2, to conceal the fact that she had already written several messages containing intelligence reports.

46. In all she wrote three SW messages under control. She was obliged to write each one in duplicate, one of which was mailed and the other given to the DSE for study. One day "Carlos" came to her very angrily, said he doubted that her carbons were anything more than ordinary paper because he had been unable to develop anything that she had written, and threatened her with rearrest. AMFAUNA-14 told him that she did not know anything about it, but that if by chance he had tried to develop the letters she had written with the pills he had taken from her, it would not work. This surprised "Carlos," and AMFAUNA-14 explained that there were two different SW systems, one for outgoing mail and the other for incoming. "Carlos" then asked her if there were any significance to the size of envelope used, or to the way the letter paper was folded. AMFAUNA-14 said she did not think so. AMFAUNA-14 feels that "Carlos" and ABAD never completely believed that she had an SW system, because none of the letters which she received disclosed SW when developed, and none of the letters which she wrote showed any traces of SW when held up to glancing light.

47. "Carlos" was the DSE officer who maintained contact with AMFAUNA-14 after her release. For two or three weeks he saw her every day at her apartment, sometimes for only twenty minutes, and sometimes staying for several hours, frequently late at night. Occasionally he called her at her office. Finally AMFAUNA-14 told him that she had to get up early in the morning to go to work, and asked him to visit her early in the evening, which he agreed to do. At the time of the intercepted AMGLOSSY landing in Pinar del Rio, "Carlos" did not visit AMFAUNA-14 for five days. When he finally returned, he was dirty, sweaty and tired. He dictated an SW letter he wanted AMFAUNA-14 to send to KUBARK, and while she was writing it he fell asleep.

48. AMFAUNA-14 had to prepare written reports for him, which she signed with the pseudonym "Dolores." He told her never to call him at DSE headquarters, because he was never there. Once he brought her a book on Marxism to read, and promised to take her someday to visit a collective farm in Pinar del Rio Province.

49. Despite his occasional efforts to get her to pick up the threads of the AMFAUNA net, AMFAUNA-14 believes that the primary target she was intended to work against was the AMCOG household. From remarks made by both ABAD and "Carlos", she deduced that they already had an informer in the house, but that they were not satisfied with his production. Toward the end of her period of DSE-controlled activity, she felt that the DSE was becoming relatively less interested in AMFAUNA-1 and his net, and more in the AMCOG household.

50. They asked her about one Vicente LAGO, who is a regular guest at the AMCOG house and who seems to be particularly interesting to them.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

Re: visit to [illegible]

201-297537

They also wanted to know what diplomats visit the AMCOGs. When she mentioned the Liberian Consul (Tomas *QUESADA), they exclaimed and said they were very interested in him, and asked whether she could arrange invitations to his house. Other diplomatic personnel AMFAUNA-14 mentioned as visitors to the AMCOG house who were Wanda *FOSCHINI (the wife of an Italian diplomat), Marie *BOISSEVAIN (the wife of the Dutch Ambassador), Brazilian Ambassador Luis *BASTIAN Pinto, a female secretary of the United Arab Republic Embassy, the wife of a former Japanese Ambassador. Fortunately, during the four weeks following AMFAUNA-14's release from DSE custody, no diplomats visited the AMCOG house. Card for all RE visits to 201-294718 household

Sex F
Citizen
A Cuba

MS

51. With the knowledge and encouragement of the DSE, AMFAUNA-14 visited the AMCOG house nearly every day. Her first visit took place at noon on 11 October and she stayed until about 1800 hours, during which time she told AMCOG-3 the entire story. He listened and took a few notes, but kept most of the story in his memory. He encouraged and calmed AMFAUNA-14, told her to follow DSE instructions to the letter, and assured her that KUBARK would send her instructions.

01 52. AMFAUNA-14's immediate preoccupations were AMCUTLER-2 and AMWEE-2 (whom she knew to be blown to the DSE as KUBARK agents), AMFAUNA-39 (who was not yet identified but had her telephone number and might call her at any moment with damaging results to himself), and the possible arrival of SW messages from KUBARK naming other agent personnel.

53. On 11 October, the day after her release, AMFAUNA-14 sent a message to AMCUTLER-2 via AMFAUNA-15 and the mother of Manolo VILLAMANAN warning her that she had been arrested. She also asked AMCOG-2 to send a warning to AMWEE-2. Sex F A Cuba 01 Re: Contact w/ 201-297045 pertaining to 201-331164 being identified by DSE

54. On 13 or 14 October, AMCOG-2 went to the home of Albertina O'FARRILL where she met Wanda *FOSCHINI whom she asked merely to warn 01 AMWEE-2 that the DSE had AMWEE-2 identified. 01 Two or three days later, Wanda FOSCHINI reported back 01 to AMCOG-2 that AMWEE-2 evidently was not taking the warning seriously. By this time, however, AMFAUNA-14 was sure that 01 AMWEE-2 knew that something was wrong, because he had telephoned AMFAUNA-1's mother asking for "Soledad" and had been told that "Soledad" was unknown. (Regarding Albertina *O'FARRILL'S knowledge of these developments, AMFAUNA-14 believes that she probably knew nothing more than that AMFAUNA-14 had been arrested and then released.) Re: knowledge of 01 201-352675

Citizen? Sex F A Cuba

55. On 13 October AMFAUNA-14 sent a warning telephone call to AMFAUNA-39. She dialled 20-6192 and told the woman who answered "Please tell Manolo that Soledad called 08 and that he should not telephone me because I am going to be out of Havana and will call him when I return." AMFAUNA-14 is not sure now whether AMCOG-3, whom she consulted on the best way to do this, had noted the telephone number.

Cit: Cuba A Cuba Close acquaintance of 201-352675

06 56. Another person to whom AMFAUNA-14 sent a warning was her lover Manuel *COMPANIONI whose warname is "Alejandro." 08 Unbeknownst to AMCOG-3, she sent a message to COMPANIONI via AMCOG-3's chauffeur telling him to stay away from her 06 but asking him to telephone her occasionally. Re: 201-352675 being arrested and released

57. On 20 October when she arrived home from work, AMFAUNA-14 found "Carlos" waiting downstairs for her. Trying to divert his attention from the mail box, she invited him to come right in, but he asked her why she did not open her mail box first. She did so and found two letters from AMFAUNA-1, dated 19 and 25 September. They both contained veiled references to names like "Carmina" (AMCUTLER-2), "Edgardo," (AMFAUNA-27), "El Grande" (AMFAUNA-25), and 08 "Igor" (AMWEE-2). 01 One of them instructed AMFAUNA-14 to have "Carmina" introduce her to "Edgardo" and the other intimated that "Igor" had something for her. 08

58. "Carlos" ordered her to develop these letters, and she did so. No secret writing appeared, which did not surprise AMFAUNA-14 because the letters themselves contained instructions for her, but it did

13/W

ABERDEEN GARD REPRODUCTION

surprise "Carlos" who again began to accuse AMFAUNA-14 of double-crossing him. AMFAUNA-14 explained the absence of SW by saying that KUBARK was probably testing its communications channels and waiting for things to quiet down before sending messages.

59. "Carlos" then told AMFAUNA-14 to get in touch with AMWEE-2 and get the package which he was holding for her. She telephoned AMWEE-2 from her office and said she wanted to see him. AMWEE-2 agreed to a meeting, but stipulated that it be after 1700 hours and in his office. AMFAUNA-14 reported this conversation to "Carlos" who told her to proceed with the meeting.

60. AMWEE-2 took AMFAUNA-14 into a small room, where she quickly explained the situation (she felt she should not spend much time in AMWEE-2's office because she was afraid the DSE had her under surveillance; this was confirmed later when "Carlos" asked her casually how much time she had spent in AMWEE-2's office, apparently trying to catch her out in a lie). AMWEE-2 seemed surprised and worried, and told her to take care of herself. She told AMWEE-2 that the reason the DSE had wanted her to meet with him was to pick up a package which they believed he was holding for her. AMWEE-2 replied that he was no longer in a position to receive or send packages, because the diplomat with whom he had been cooperating had been declared persona non grata.

61. "Carlos" also told AMFAUNA-14 to contact AMCUTLER-2 to arrange the introduction to "Edgardo." AMFAUNA-14 telephoned AMCUTLER-2's number, expecting to be told that AMCUTLER-2 was not there, and was very surprised when AMCUTLER-2 herself came to the telephone. AMFAUNA-14 told AMCUTLER-2 that she wanted to see her, but AMCUTLER-2 said she had a bad case of asthma and could not see anybody. AMFAUNA-14 reported this conversation to "Carlos."

Re: contact(s) 201-330675

~~62. AMFAUNA-14 decided that AMCUTLER-2 had either not received or~~ had not understood the warning message sent to her, so she sent AMCUTLER-2 two more oral messages via AMFAUNA-15 and one via Lolita FORMOSO explicitly advising her to hide or take asylum.

63. "Carlos" continued to press AMFAUNA-14 to see AMCUTLER-2, and AMCUTLER-2 showed no signs of heeding AMFAUNA-14's warnings. AMFAUNA-14 therefore sent one more message, this time a written one, via Lolita FORMOSO saying that she really must see AMCUTLER-2 in the latter's home for the purpose of coordinating cover stories. AMCUTLER-2 then paid a visit to the home of Lolita FORMOSO to pass the message that she agreed to the meeting.

64. On 3 November, with the knowledge of "Carlos," AMFAUNA-14 went to AMCUTLER-2's house. "Carlos" briefed her to obtain an introduction to "Edgardo", to find out where AMCUTLER-2's coffee shops were located, and to find out whether AMCUTLER-1 was a close friend of Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo.

at cafe a Cuba

Subject(s) conversation between

65. AMCUTLER-2 told AMFAUNA-14 to tell the DSE that AMCUTLER-1 was not a close friend of GUTIERREZ Menoyo. She said to add that she was very angry with AMCUTLER-1 and thinking of divorcing him.

201-332664 and 201-332615

66. AMFAUNA-14 and AMCUTLER-2 devised the following cover stories for the protection of the source of the airline passenger manifests (AMFAUNA-18, whom AMFAUNA-14 does not know) and of "Edgardo" (AMFAUNA-27, whom AMFAUNA-14 does not know):

(a) Before leaving Cuba, AMFAUNA-1 had asked AMCUTLER-2 to look out for his mother, and to pass on to AMFAUNA-14 anything that might come addressed to "Betty." One day a colored woman called at AMCUTLER-2's coffee shop on Calle San Rafael with a package addressed to "Betty". The coffee shop employees had thought that the package was intended for an employee whose name is "Ketti" and had given it to her, but she said it was not hers, and there matters rested until one day when AMCUTLER-2 visited the coffee shop and was told about the incident. She told her employees that she knew who the package was intended for, and took it away with her.

(b) AMCUTLER-2 had received a letter from AMFAUNA-1 dated 18 October saying that she would receive a visit from a person known to her who would introduce himself as "Edgardo", and asking her to introduce "Edgardo" to AMFAUNA-14. This person has not yet arrived, and AMCUTLER-2 does not know who he is.

67. AMCUTLER-2 agreed to stick to these stories in case she is interrogated, and to brief "Ketti" to support the coffee shop story. She also told AMFAUNA-14 she had decided to go into hiding immediately. AMFAUNA-14 asked her not to do it so soon after her visit, but AMCUTLER-2 said that AMFAUNA-14 should provide her with cover by telling the DSE that AMCUTLER-2 had spoken of taking a holiday at Varadero.

68. Making her report to "Carlos" after this meeting, AMFAUNA-14 told these cover stories as though they had just been revealed to her by AMCUTLER-2.

69. A fourth letter arrived from AMFAUNA-1, consisting of two pages of overt text. AMFAUNA-14 was sure that it contained SW because of the banalities in the cover letter. Before turning it over to "Carlos" she took it to AMCOG-3 who had somebody make a literal copy of it and then destroyed the original. AMFAUNA-14 turned the copy over to "Carlos" who had her develop it, and was again disappointed and angry when no SW showed up. (Station comment: this letter had contained SW number groups for OWVL reception.)

70. On or about 10 November 1963, AMFAUNA-14 prepared a written report for the DSE on the visitors to the AMCOG household. This report was actually dictated by AMCOG-3 to AMFAUNA-14 who took it down on the typewriter. She then made a handwritten copy of the report to turn in to the DSE, keeping the typewritten copy for self-briefing. She brought the typewritten copy out with her. Following is a literal translation:

201

a. Dr. Ernesto *MARTI and his wife Lolita: I do not know them very well. All I can say about them is what I have heard, that they are old friends of the family, and that the doctor took a trip to Mexico with AMCOG-3's uncle after the latter's election.

201-215650

b. Sr. Pedro *CARRILLO and his wife Margot: He is a brother of Justo *CARRILLO and has been a friend of the family for a long time. They sympathize with the Revolution in some aspects, but their daughter (who I think is engaged to the son of AMCOG-2) left Cuba for exile, and this caused them to change. I do not know why their daughter had to take asylum.

c. Dr. Oscar *PINA and his wife Margarita: Within the family she has the nickname "Petite." He is a judge. Until very recently he was neutral, but now it seems that they have loaded him with work and he is in a very bad mood because I believe he has the work of eight cases. She does not sympathize much with the Revolution. They have no children, but almost all of her family is abroad which I think is her principal reason for being discontented.

201-291255

201

d. Sra. Nenita de *CARAMES: She is the wife of fnu CARAMES, the former Chief of Police of Havana. She has a daughter by him whom she brings to lunch every Sunday, and she is also caring for a son of CARAMES who is insane and in an asylum. I do not believe that at the moment she is on good terms with her husband who is abroad, and therefore she is neither against nor in favor. Actually I believe she is afraid that the situation will change and her husband will return.

201

e. Sr. Fernando *STEFFANI: An elderly gentleman who is the father of an intimate friend of AMCOG-2, who out of pity has given him a standing invitation for every Sunday. To be sure, the poor fellow is rather tiresome.

f. **Elsa *DIAZ Biart**: Her family has been friendly with the AMCOG family for many years. They were school friends. She has a sister abroad and a brother who is in prison. Her father and mother seldom come to the house. A sister of hers is a doctor of some farm. All she does is obtain medicines for the prisoners, thereby causing a lot of trouble for AMCOG-2, AMCOG-3 and the old man.

g. **Joaquin *SANCHEZ and his wife Sara**: According to what I have heard, he is a travelling salesman for some laboratory. His wife is the sister of the wife of the old man's two nephews, Pancho and AMCOG-3 (sic). I have also heard that she is always trying to get medicine for her son who, from what I have heard, is abnormal.

h. **Dr. Maria Dolores *SANCHEZ Pessino**: She lost both her father and mother when she was thirteen years old, and the AMCOG family took her in as an adopted daughter. The old man paid for her education. She is like a daughter to him, and like a sister to the nephew and niece. She works in the emergency hospital. She is not openly opposed to the regime, but nevertheless the separation from her brother and her relatives has greatly affected her.

i. **Dr. Vicente *LAGO and his wife Maria Julia**: His brother Roberto LAGO, who died some years ago, was Pola's first husband. They have two sons abroad. From what I have heard, he devotes himself exclusively to his profession, and it is she who is most upset by the separation from her children.

j. **Mercedes *VALDES Chacon**: A case very similar to that of STEFFANI, except that she is a woman who is a very good friend of AMCOG-2's husband, and is in the same situation with her relatives abroad. She is just one more of the many refugees in search of warmth and friendship, with no friends left in Cuba.

k. **Julio *BRAVO**: A long-time friend of Pancho, all his family is abroad. He is another case of warmth and friendship, he uses the swimming pool a lot, he is alone, I have even seen him cutting trees with AMCOG-3, a typical case of an unhappy man, in the afternoons he plays chess with the old man, and I have never heard him say anything bad about anybody, not even about the situation, the only thing - as is natural - he misses his daughters and his wife.

l. **Raquel *CASAGRAN**: The widow of the Director of Culture in the Grau Government, Jesus CASAGRAN, and sister of Raul LAZARO who was military aide to both Grau and Prio. She is very highly regarded by the family. I have never heard her express herself in any way against the Government; I would call her neutral.

m. **Olga *CRECENTE**: Former wife of Jose Maria de la Aguilera, she comes to the house with her two daughters and hermother who is a cousin of Sra. Paulina. AMCOG-2 helped her a lot in hiding her husband during the Batista tyranny. I have also heard that AMCOG-3 helped her with her divorce. Apparently she does not sympathize with the Revolution, although I believe that it is out of spite against her husband. Her mother's name is Leopoldina SANCHEZ Vda. de Crecente, and her nickname is Nonga.

201-337203

n. **Hilda *FEO**: Cousin of Armando *FEO who is a close friend of Frank *PAEZ and of Jose CASUERO the husband of Polita. She is another case of family warmth, because after all her family had left she came to the house in search of friendship. She has wanted to leave Cuba many times, but was never able to. This is her principal obsession and that of her mother as well. She has been coming to the house a lot for the past three years, and has become a very good friend of the family. Although in reality it was her cousin who was a better friend

14-00000

AMCOG family for many years. They were school friends. sister abroad and a brother who is in prison. Her father and mother seldom come to the house. A sister of hers is a doctor of some farm. All she does is obtain medicines for the prisoners, thereby causing a lot of trouble for AMCOG-2, AMCOG-3 and the old man. 201-294714

g. Joaquin *SANCHEZ and his wife Sara: According to what I have heard, he is a travelling salesman for some laboratory. His wife is the sister of the wife of the old man's two nephews, Pancho and AMCOG-3 (sic). I have also heard that she is always trying to get medicine for her son who, from what I have heard, is abnormal.

h. Dr. Maria Dolores *SANCHEZ Pessino: She lost both her father and mother when she was thirteen years old, and the AMCOG family took her in as an adopted daughter. The old man paid for her education. She is like a daughter to him, and like a sister to the nephew and niece. She works in the emergency hospital. She is not openly opposed to the regime, but nevertheless the separation from her brother and her relatives has greatly affected her. 201-294714

i. Dr. Vicente *LAGO and his wife Maria Julia: His brother Roberto LAGO, who died some years ago, was Pola's first husband. They have two sons abroad. From what I have heard, he devotes himself exclusively to his profession, and it is she who is most upset by the separation from her children.

j. Mercedes *VALDES Chacon: A case very similar to that of STEFFANI, except that she is a woman who is a very good friend of AMCOG-2's husband, and is in the same situation with her relatives abroad. She is just one more of the many refugees in search of warmth and friendship, with no friends left in Cuba.

k. Julio *BRAVO: A long-time friend of Pancho, all his family is abroad. He is another case of warmth and friendship, he uses the swimming pool a lot, he is alone, I have even seen him cutting trees with AMCOG-3, a typical case of an unhappy man, in the afternoons he plays chess with the old man, and I have never heard him say anything bad about anybody, not even about the situation, the only thing - as is natural - he misses his daughters and his wife. 201-294714

l. Raquel *CASAGRAN: The widow of the Director of Culture in the Grau Government, Jesus CASAGRAN, and sister of Raul LAZARO who was military aide to both Grau and Prio. She is very highly regarded by the family. I have never heard her express herself in any way against the Government; I would call her neutral.

201-294714

m. Olga *CRECENTE: Former wife of Jose Maria de la Aguilera, she comes to the house with her two daughters and hermother who is a cousin of Sra. Paulina. AMCOG-2 helped her a lot in hiding her husband during the Batista tyranny. I have also heard that AMCOG-3 helped her with her divorce. Apparently she does not sympathize with the Revolution, although I believe that it is out of spite against her husband. Her mother's name is Leopoldina SANCHEZ Vda. de Crecente, and her nickname is Nonga.

201-337203

n. Hilda *FEO: Cousin of Armando *FEO who is a close friend of Frank *PAEZ and of Jose *AGUERO the husband of Polita. She is another case of family warmth, because after all her family had left she came to the house in search of friendship. She has wanted to leave Cuba many times, but was never able to. This is her principal obsession and that of her mother as well. She has been coming to the house a lot for the past three years, and has become a very good friend of the family, although in reality it was her cousin who was a better friend of the house. 201-337203

o. Rosendo *CACIO and Sra. Leopoldina *NUNEZ: This couple has two children who are really hers from her first marriage, Manolito and Lourdes. He has a cleaning shop in Havana, and I know that she has known Pola well for many years because she was her guitar teacher.

FORM 8-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 13

ABERDEEN CARD REPRODUCTIONS

before she married J. AGUERO. Politically speaking, she follows the Grau line. She is more or less neutral, and devotes herself to her teaching work. He devotes himself exclusively to his work.

p. Manuel *COMPANIONI and his wife Alicia: They have been acquaintances of AMCOG-2 and AMCOG-3 for many years, although it was not a close friendship, rather a friendship of Montmartre, Tropicana, etc. A daughter of theirs is abroad. He too was a very good friend of Armando FEO who used to be a friend of the family, and now in the course of time they have become closer friends of the family. In other words it is another case of friendship caused by being abandoned by others. He has a small deodorant factory in the same house where they live. They both have their mothers here.

q. Jack *CONNILL and his wife Marina: His mother has been a very good friend of the family for many years, and she was a school friend of the two nieces of the old man. This couple have always been friends of the family, the more so now that so many of their friends have left Cuba.

71. AMFAUNA-14 turned this report over to "Carlos" on 11 or 12 November. At this meeting he asked her to try to make contact with AMFAUNA-3's brother who he said had been transferred to a hospital in Las Villas. AMFAUNA-14 said she would try, but thought it would be difficult. This was the last time she saw "Carlos." He telephoned her again on 16 November to ask what was new, and this was their last telephone contact.

72. When AMFAUNA-14 arrived at AMCOG-3's house at about 2000 hours on 15 November 1963 for the regular Friday night supper, he took her aside and said he wanted to speak to her privately later. At about 2330 hours she went to his room. There he told her that he had received orders that she was to leave Cuba the following week. He said that precise instructions were to come on 16 and 17 November, so he made a lunch date with her for Sunday noon at his house.

73. AMFAUNA-14 was frightened by this. She did not sleep well Friday or Saturday nights, and spent Saturday in her home.

74. Sunday afternoon in AMCOG-3's house, AMCOG-3 told her that she was to leave the following day. She said that she did not want to. AMCOG-3 responded that this was an order. He said that the DSE would probably arrest her again soon, and for her own safety and that of others she must leave. He added that there were others who were to leave too, whose departure had been made conditional upon her own.

75. AMFAUNA-14 asked whether AMCUTLER-2 were one of these other people who were to leave too, and AMCOG-3 replied that she was. AMFAUNA-14 told him that she thought AMCUTLER-2 would not agree to leave. AMCOG-3 said that he thought she would because the orders had been couched in very strong terms.

76. He then showed her the instructions, both for herself and for AMCUTLER-2. He had her type her instructions on a piece of paper, and then memorize them.

77. Then AMCOG-3 gave AMFAUNA-14 the following verbal messages to deliver when she reached JMWAVE:

(a) A colonel fnu LANDEIRA, a tank expert who had been in the Cuban Army under GRAU and PRIO, is a prisoner on a farm in Havana Province. He is given three days off per week to go home. His wife knows in advance when he will be coming out. AMCOG-3 does not know the wife, but has indirect contact to her. AMCOG-3 says the man is honest and intelligent and a real soldier, and if we want him out AMCOG-3 can arrange it.

(b) As of about 1800 hours on 17 November, a young man who had infiltrated into Cuba and had been hiding at the home of Israel PADILLA,

6

had been moved to a new hiding place. AMCOG-3 was considering trying to help the young man into asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy through a certain "Pepin" whose identity is not known to AMFAUNA-14 but who she thinks is an Uruguayan attache.

06

(c) AMCOG-3 is out of one-time pads and needs a resupply.

(d) It is very possible that AMCOG-3 may be able to obtain and forward a copy of AMFAUNA-14 DSE dossier.

78. On Monday morning, 18 November, AMFAUNA-14 dressed as she had been instructed, and stuffed a pair of slacks and sneakers into the straw handbag which she had been told to carry. At 1300 hours she left her office and proceeded on foot to the corner of Atares and Arango in Reparto Luyano, arriving there at 1400 hours. Here she exceeded her instructions, waiting for AMCUTLER-2 not five minutes but fifteen. She then walked very slowly toward Calzada Luyano, hoping that AMCUTLER-2 might overtake her. This consumed another ten minutes, and by the time she reached the Calzada Luyano it was too late for her to walk the remainder of the distance, so she took a taxi.

79. AMFAUNA-14 discharged the taxi one block before theParque de la Virgen del Camino and walked the rest of the way. She went to the shrine where she prayed for a few minutes, and then sat on a bench from which she could see the whole park.

80. At 1510 hours a 1954 Buick taxi arrived at the park. The driver stayed in the car, and two men - a colored man and a fair-haired man - got out and walked around for about ten minutes. Finally they approached her and gave the challenge, to which she gave the correct response. One of the men then said simply "Follow me". They took her back to the taxi and put her in the back seat with one of the men, the other two riding in front.

81. They headed out of the city. When the reached the Carretera de Varadero, one of the men asked her politely if she would mind keeping her eyes directed down toward the floor and not look out the window. She rode this way for about two hours. By then it was dark, and she was told she could look up again. She took advantage of the opportunity to change into her slacks and sneakers.

82. Finally the car stopped, and she and her two escorts got out. They walked a long time. At one point, whistle signals were exchanged with someone in the darkness, and two other men appeared, one of whom was AMWEE-2. AMFAUNA-14 and AMWEE-2 greeted each other politely, but pretended not to know each other. 01

83. They did a lot more walking and joined up with another man, who turned out to be the radio man. He had a lot of equipment with him, and AMFAUNA-14 and AMWEE-2 helped to carry it.

01

84. They now reached the mangrove and began to walk through water. At one point their guide became briefly lost, but found his way again almost immediately. When they came to the open water, one of the guides went forward and signalled. The boat came in in response to the signal. AMFAUNA-14, AMWEE-2, and the radio man walked out into knee-deep water and climbed into the boat, which already had a crew of two.

85. The boat proceeded out to an unidentified key. The crew concealed it in the mangrove, cleverly lacing and tying branches together over it to form a camouflage cover. There they went to sleep.

86. The following day, 19 November, was spent at this spot. A radio message was received during the day. At night the boat put out for Cayo Megano. The waves were enormous, and AMFAUNA-14 was terribly seasick. The boat remained at the rendezvous point until 1045 hours, with AMFAUNA-14 pleading for the crew to return to land, saying she would rather be shot than remain so seasick. Finally the crew did put back, saying that the ship probably would not come because the sea was

5/PU

87. Wednesday, 20 November, was spent on the same key. A very long radio message was received during the day. AMFAUNA-14 and AMWEE-2 both helped the radio man to decipher it, and their combined efforts took about three hours. Then they put out again for the Cayo Megano rendezvous point. By this time their drinking water was all gone. The boat was overloaded, so much of the food and equipment was left behind on the key. Again no ship appeared. This time, instead of returning to their original hiding place, the crew took the boat to Cayo Mosquito.

88. Here they spent the remainder of the night, and all of Thursday, 21 November. Their water was gone, there was very little food left, and there was only enough gasoline left for one more one-way trip out to the rendezvous point. At 1400 hours on 21 November another radio message was received. With the combined efforts of the radio man, AMFAUNA-14 and AMWEE-2, it took between two and three hours to decipher it. Everybody was very optimistic; they were all sure that they would be picked up that night.

89. Promptly at 2300 hours the ship was seen approaching. The boat put out immediately, and its passengers were taken aboard the ship. AMFAUNA-14 was taken into the sick bay where she was given a pill, a little water, and somewhat later some warm broth.

90. From the moment she stepped into the boat on 18 November, until she was hauled out by the armpits on 21 November, AMFAUNA-14 never left the boat. Her side and legs were bruised from the pounding of the waves against the boat. A little blood vessel in her right eye was broken by a twig snapping in her face as she walked through the mangrove. This was treated by the ship's doctor.

91. AMFAUNA-14 says that the AMHICK team performed very well. The pickup in the park was done excellently. The slight delay while they looked her over, she says, was due to the fact that the men had expected another woman to be with her, and they were waiting a few minutes in case the other woman should show up. The AMHICK team said that they had also been briefed that she would be wearing her hair in a bun. She had not been briefed accordingly, and she was wearing her hair down her back in a pony tail. This discrepancy did not cause any confusion, because every other item of the visual recognition signals tallied perfectly, and the AMHICK team were well briefed on all of them.

92. AMFAUNA-14 was impressed by the precise timing of the team's movements, by the fact that everybody was where he was supposed to be at the time indicated. She expressed admiration for their seamanship, and their ability to pick out one spot of mangrove from another in the pitch darkness.

93. She says that, during these trying days, the team members were always in calm control of the situation, and never failing in their courtesy to her.

94. Regarding AMCUTLER-2, AMFAUNA-14 is sure that the exfiltration instructions reached her. They were taken, she said, by Lolita FORMOSO who had been standing by for them from Friday to Sunday. What Lolita did with them, AMFAUNA-14 does not know. She knows that we had suggested that Lolita take them to AMFAUNA-1's mother, but she also knows that we had indicated to AMCOG-3 that AMFAUNA-1's mother might be under surveillance, so she thinks Lolita might have taken them directly to AMCUTLER-2. In any case, she knows that messages sent previously by AMCOG-3 to AMCUTLER-2 reached the latter, and she sees no reason to assume that these instructions did not.

95. It does not surprise AMFAUNA-14 that AMCUTLER-2 did not follow the orders. AMCUTLER-2, she says, plays her own game with little consideration for others. Between the time that AMFAUNA-1 left Cuba on 11 September, and the time that AMFAUNA-14 was arrested on 7 October, AMCUTLER-2 had visited AMFAUNA-14's apartment twice. On both occasions,

AMFAUNA-14 had asked her to remove the suitcase that AMFAUNA-1 had left behind, but on both occasions AMCUTLER-2 had found some excuse not to do so. When AMFAUNA-14 visited AMCUTLER-2 in her home in Guanabacoa on 3 November for the purpose of coordinating their cover stories, AMCUTLER-2 did not seem very interested in coordinating stories or anything else. AMFAUNA-14 believes that AMCUTLER-2 may be working for ~~the Second Front of~~ the Second Front of the Escambray, because her very close friend Lolin *CORREOSO is the fiancee of Hipolito *LARRAURI who was a collector for this organization. Among other reasons possibly keeping AMCUTLER-2 in Cuba, AMFAUNA-14 says that AMCUTLER-2's mother is sick with cancer, and there may be something wrong between AMCUTLER-1 and AMCUTLER-2. [illegible] Front of the Escambray

06

96. AMFAUNA-14 also had her reasons for not wanting to leave Cuba. Besides the dangers of the trip, she would be leaving her mother and father in a dangerous position, because the DSE had forced her to sign a confession implicating them. While she appears to be trying not to be overly critical of AMCUTLER-2, she has commented that AMCUTLER-2 knows far more members of the AMFAUNA net than she herself does, so that the reasons requiring the exfiltration of AMFAUNA-14 should be even more compelling for AMCUTLER-2.

End of Dispatch

1. RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGES MUST BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL SIGNAL CENTER.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

10

ORIG: BWells:PG:JH.jm
UNIT: CI/SO
EXT: 1758
DATE: 7 July 1972

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

JUL 7 22 58Z 72

Copy____ of ______

SECRET

ESPS - MJFS

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET

CITE HEADQUARTERS 9888

906

TO VIENTIANE (EYES ONLY SLAGHT)

676

INFO PARIS (EYES ONLY DEMOLAT)

154

MHCURB RYBAT MHCHAOS

REF: PARIS 2592 (NOT NEEDED VIENTIANE) 5 July 72

1. FYI ONLY: HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTS THAT TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVES JAMES HOFFA, HAROLD GIBBONS AND WILLIAM TAUB HAVE BEEN INVITED TO VISIT DRV FOR ONE WEEK, LEAVING U.S. EITHER 1 OR 4 JULY AND INTEND PICK UP VISAS IN VIENTIANE OR PARIS. PER HQS-7356 (NOT SENT PARIS), GIBBONS INTERNATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT TEAMSTERS UNION, AND TRAVELED DRV MARCH 72. NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO TAUB; HOFFA WELL KNOWN.

2. DESIRE NO SPECIAL COVERAGE TRADE UNION GROUP AND NO

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY 44-072

CI 247

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)] (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
APPROVAL OF DCI
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

09505

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 3205

3/PV

14-00000

…ICTED HANDLING MESSAGES MUST … DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL SIGNA… …ENTER.
DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ____ of ________

SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

CITE HEADQUARTERS 9888

TO

SECRET

PAGE TWO

24

REQUEST TO (LIAISON) BUT WOULD APPRECIATE ANY PERTINENT MHCHAOS-RELATED INFO WHICH COMES STATION'S ATTENTION. EX-2 APDIR WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE

93

D C/E/F

C/EUR

C/FE/TBL

C/FE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Based on: Paris 2592 5 Jul 72
Sens, 30 June 72

Action: RW
File: 200-8-88/MISC
Indexed:

cc: ~~Chrono~~ (1)
~~Station file~~ (2)
C/EUR Div (3)
C/FE DIV (5)

~~Dissem:~~

Reply:
AGS-CIF
19 July
FOVW-76
24 July

C/CI/SO
Richard Ober

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

FORM 2005

4/RV

SECRET

CSCI - 3/764141

2 MARCH 61

TO: Director of Special Investigations
Inspector General
USAF
Attention: Mr. Gilbert R. Levy

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECTS: LING Lindsey
WEINER Heinz Theodor

1. Reference is made to the telephone request dated 24 February 1961, of Major Malone for information concerning Lindsey LING and Heinz Theodor WEINER. The files contain the following information concerning the subjects of your request.

2. According to information from an official Portuguese service LING was contacted in late August 1960 in Santa Maria, the Azores, by Eloy GUTIERREZ Manoyo, a Cuban National, and Rafal /probably Rafael/ HERNANDEZ, a Cuban diplomat. In 1958 and 1959, GUTIERREZ was reliably reported, by other sources, to have been a military supporter of Fidel CASTRO's revolution and to be employed by CASTRO possibly as a G-2 agent. In August 1959 he had infiltrated the ranks of certain anti-CASTRO conspirators and delivered the leaders up to the Cuban Government.

3. The Portuguese service further reported in September 1960 that Lindsey LING, aka LING Lind Sey, was the manager of a Chinese restaurant located at rua Valaverde 9, Madrid, Spain, and that the restaurant was owned by a second (unidentified) Chinese, who was also supplying clothing to the United States personnel at the Lajes Base in the Azores. Theodor Heinz WIENER, who had represented the clothing firm in the Azores, was reportedly arrested there in December 1958 on a suspicion of espionage, and was, as of September 1960, reportedly in Bermuda, where LING was planning to go to investigate setting up another restaurant.

4. The files contain no further information concerning Subjects than that which is already believed to be contained in your files.

CSCI-3/764,141

SECRET

RID/CE: JWE/BQ/jrg (29-2-7/2) 23
Based on: OFPW-29605, 13 Jan. 61
LISB-1827 (IN 12873), 15 Sept. 60
15-15

#0975

5 RS

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

14 Jul 61

DATE OF INFO: June 1961 and Earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ: --; June 1961

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, residing in the US.

Source is a personal and political friend of former President Carlos Prio Socarras and held positions of Cabinet rank during Prio's administration. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I have been informed by contacts within pro-Fidel Castro groups that Castro agents in the US are attempting to determine whether there are any military training camps [illegible] exact location and [illegible] operatio[illegible] determine of th[illegible]

2. [illegible] suspect[illegible] being [illegible] [illegible]mberto Nunez, former aide to the late [illegible]ilo Cie[illegible] Banos, former employee of the Jose Marti [illegible]rnational Air[illegible] of Rebel Army Captain Angel Banos, who arrived in the US with [illegible] Gutierrez Menoyo, Jesus Dieguez and Eva Gutierrez, not fur[illegible]fied.

-end-

wed
WH/4/Cuba
LA Branch
CI/Liaison
IS
AR-14 Jul 61

-C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L-

WH-304

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN NO DISSEM ABROAD LIMITED

LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echlons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA.

#0980

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1
RS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Sov Bloc Div; Chief, Far East Division

INFO.
Chief, WOMUSE/ICG

FROM
Chief of Station, Tokyo 6-3

SUBJECT 02
RYBAT MHPASHA REDTOP - Beheiren and the Four U.S. Navy Deserters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
TOKYO 7263

(8-3

As noted in reference, forwarded herewith is a copy of the subject memorandum. Please note that the information in the memorandum Paragraph B. 4. b) is particularly sensitive and should only be given properly restricted dissemination.

Mark J. Lidgerwool 03

Mark J. LIDGERWOOL

ATTACHMENT
Memo dtd 27 Nov 67

Distribution
2 - C/SB Div w/1 cy attach
1 - C/FE w/1 cy attach
1 - C/WOMUSE/ICG w/1 attach

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
Conducted On 6-10-76
E2 IMPDET CL BY 060595

09884

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
FJTA-53626

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE
DEC 6 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
UNKNOWN

4/N

3. Respectable Intellectual Front: Following fundamental Communist principles for mass movement work (better than the JCP itself follows these tenets), the ex-JCP organizers of BEHEIREN kept themselves in the background and lined up a number of prominent Japanese progressive intellectuals and leftist cultured persons to front for BEHEIREN. The choice of ODA Makoto, ex-Fulbrighter and popular young novelist, to be the chief front man - Chairman - was an extremely lucky stroke for BEHEIREN. ODA has taken to this grand-standing, front work like a duck to water. It has given him a chance to give unbridled vent to his own latent anti-American feelings, puffed him up to the extent that he has been dubbed "the emperor" by other BEHEIREN activists, and given him at long last an ideological mission to pursue. YOSHIKAWA has performed magnificently in feeding ODA's ego needs and in infusing and indoctrinating ODA so that his words and actions take on sufficiently virulent anti-American overtones. ODA has served another vital function for BEHEIREN by recruiting a sizeable number of fellow intellectuals to join the ranks of BEHEIREN activists. (Attachment 1 is a listing of a number of those Japanese who have been identified as active BEHEIREN supporters or sympathizers.)

4. Organizational Development: In its 2 1/2 year history, BEHEIREN has not appreciably changed its organizational format, although it has moved its office three times and modified its name even oftener. BEHEIREN is not a "mass organization", because it has had no sizeable popular backing to the present time. Its hard core, secretariat organization is run by YOSHIKAWA and his lieutenants. Its public image, intellectual front is led by ODA, and given body by a score of like-minded intellectual friends of ODA and YOSHIKAWA, who form the loose body of BEHEIREN's activist leadership. Under this BEHEIREN leadership superstructure lies a paltry base of only several hundred BEHEIREN "rank-and-file" supporters, mostly young Japanese students. Organizationally, BEHEIREN has no formal membership system, so its base of supporters is fluid and not precisely measurable. However, the base support for BEHEIREN has definitely been on the upswing during 1967, and made such notable strides during the past summer that JCP Headquarters officials finally felt constrained to note with concern that BEHEIREN was beginning to drain off a growing number of progressive youth who otherwise would have been absorbed into the JCP's own youth movement. BEHEIREN leaders have tried to help this growth along by setting up a youth section, calling it "Young BEHEIREN." BEHEIREN's imaginative actions and publicity-conscious programs have been responsible for its recent growth, and this period of growth seems to be now on

the verge of really picking up speed and momentum. As a result of its role in the case of the four deserting sailors, BEHEIREN has reaped bountiful publicity, has succeeded in touching a delicate Japanese public nerve of sympathy and pacifism, opening a floodgate of support for BEHEIREN from all over Japan. When this case fades from the limelight, it is still most likely that a fair percentage of current wave of popular support for BEHEIREN will solidify into permanent mass backing, giving BEHEIREN, for the first time, a meaningful base to support its future activities.

5. Activities and Accomplishments: BEHEIREN has engaged in a number of propaganda actions, and participated in international anti-Vietnam War activities. It has tried to cooperate with certain front activities in Japan controlled by the JCP, most notably the Japan Committee to Investigate War Crimes in Vietnam activities, which culminated in the Tokyo Court of last August, but has been soundly and rudely rebuffed by the JCP. In spite of this, BEHEIREN has churned along at its own pace, with a continuing series of anti-Vietnam war actions, most of them related in some way to the American pacifist movement. In this regard, BEHEIREN has succeeded in cornering a virtual monopoly on Japanese contacts with the U.S. pacifist movements, and has effectually capitalized on this to promote its own action program. The case of the four deserting sailors, while an apparent lucky windfall for BEHEIREN, only points up the fact that BEHEIREN, through past organizational work and promotional activities, was "johnny-on-the-spot", ready and capable (unique in Japan in this regard) to take the ball and run with it. BEHEIREN ran all the way in this case and scored its most notable success since it was organized. (Attachment 2 is a listing of BEHEIREN's more notable activities since its founding. Attachment 3 is a partial listing of American and other foreign persons known to have been in contact with or cooperated with BEHEIREN.)

B. The Case of the Four Sailor Deserters and BEHEIREN.

1. How It Started: The consensus of all available overt media material, with no recorded dissent, indicates that the four sailors voluntarily left their ship, went AWOL, and ended up wallowing around Tokyo's hippie-land. Precisely what personal grievances prompted the four to embark on this mis-adventure is not yet known. But, up to this point, the four could fairly be categorized as misguided youngsters, gone astray in a foreign land, and due to get slapped back in line with traditional Navy justice when they finally decided to stop the fun and go back to the ship. So far, this made their cases far from unique.

2. How It Became an Incident: But instead of returning to their ship of their own volition or being apprehended by the Shore Patrol, the four made contact with BEHEIREN leaders. Again, press reports indicate that this was just a coincidence, that there was no pre-planning by the four to contact BEHEIREN. There are no available overt nor covert reports that indicate otherwise. But, once the BEHEIREN people made contact, they recognized the potential immediately and moved fast for the kill. (Attachment 4 is a Yomiuri Newspaper clipping, 22 November 1967, that is both a representative and comprehensive account of this phase of the case. Even if this article should contain some minor inaccuracies, the basic line seems factual and has not been challenged elsewhere.)

3. BEHEIREN Takes Over: When the four made contact with BEHEIREN, it suddenly became an entirely different ballgame. BEHEIREN had everything needed to capitalize on this: veteran activist leaders who are experienced enough to recognize the windfall that had come their way; an apparatus that could provide hiding places for the four; long standing liaison contacts with Soviet Embassy officials for use in planning exit from Japan; solid contacts with reliable American pacifists with whom the bona fides of the four sailors could be checked; money and organization to capitalize on the propaganda potential (such as preparing a movie film for the initial BEHEIREN press conference announcing the desertion, prepared more likely than not by BEHEIREN stalwart KUBO Keinosuke, an independent film producer); and English speaking activists capable of sympathizing, encouraging, soothing, or agitating the four young sailors, so that there would be no turning back.

4. The BEHEIREN Apparatus At Work: While many of the small pieces of this puzzle, which would put the whole case in proper detailed chronological order and eliminate speculation on minor points, are still missing, enough is known now, through overt and covert sources, that the picture of BEHEIREN's adept handling of this case shines through clearly. The following elements, all part of the BEHEIREN apparatus, make up the bulk of the picture:

a) Hide-out: When BEHEIREN got hold of the four on about 26 October, they had to be hiden out for the approximate two week period until their exit from Japan could be arranged. This presented BEHEIREN no great logistical problem. A number of the BEHEIREN activist leaders have homes well suited to harboring fugitives. For example, BEHEIREN activist leader FUKASAKU Mitsusada has a villa hidden away in Chigasaki, which was used on the night of 12 September for a meeting of about 20 top BEHEIREN leaders, and which would be highly suitable for hiding the four deserters. Other private-dwellings, belonging to BEHEIREN leaders and loyal supporters, are scattered throughout both the Kanto and Kansai areas.

b) BEHEIREN/Soviet Liaison: BEHEIREN Secretary General YOSHIKAWA has maintained periodic contact with Soviet Embassy officials for years. BEHEIREN Chairman ODA has met Soviet Peace Committee officials in Moscow. The exact means of how this liaison was accomplished in this case is precisely known

24 from a covert phone tap on the Soviet Embassy's line. A full transcript is available of two phone calls made on 30 October,

first by Brian Victoria to Chief Press Attache Nikolay V. Vasilyevich, and second by YOSHIKAWA to First Secretary Sergey D. Anisimov, urgently requesting a private meeting later that day to discuss "an extremely important, extremely delicate matter", without doubt the case of the four sailors.

c) BEHEIREN/U.S. Pacifist Liaison: BEHEIREN contacted Dartmouth University professor Ernest P. Young, who flew to Japan on 8 November, apparently helped BEHEIREN leaders check out the bona fides of the deserters, and returned to the U.S. on 11 November. (Attachment 5 is the translation of a Sankei Shimbun article, dated 21 November, reporting an interview with Young, giving his version of his role in this case.)

5. Escape to Moscow: The four deserters turned up in moscow on 20 November. The press has speculated widely and unanimously that the four left Japan on the Soviet passenger ship Baikal on 11 November. Again, there is no dissenting opinion, overt nor covert. The only mystery concerning this final phase of the Japanese portion of this case concerns the mechanics of how the four boarded the Baikal and who assisted in this maneauver. But with the sailing of the Baikal from Yokohama, BEHEIREN completed its most highly successful and beautifully executed activity in its 2 1/2 year history. Not only did BEHEIREN smear the American Government's image in Japan, not only did BEHEIREN gain a vast amount of priceless publicity that will swell the ranks of its supporters and be invaluable in future activities, but BEHEIREN doubtlessly even made a profit, financially, on this low budget operation - donations are still pouring into BEHEIREN Headquarters from all over Japan to "help and protect U.S. deserters".

SECRET

Attachment No. 1

Japanese Who Have Been Identified as Active BEHEIREN Supporters or Sympathizers

1. YOSHIKAWA Yuichi (BEHEIREN Secretary General) - former JCP member.
2. ODA Makoto (BEHEIREN Chairman) - popular novelist.
3. KAIKO Ken - Akutagawa prize winning novelist.
4. KUBO Keinosuke - film producer and director.
5. TSURUMI Shunsuke - Doshisha University professor.
6. TSURUMI Kazuko - sister of Shunsuke (their father is the late philosopher, Yusuke).
7. FURUYAMA Yozo - high school teacher.
8. MUTO Ichiyo - ex-JCP (tried to travel to U.S. to represent BEHEIREN at October 21 demonstrations this year, but was denied a visa to enter the U.S.)
9. YAMADA Atsushi - ex-JCP.
10. FUKUDA Yoshiyuki - playwriter.
11. TOMINAGA Ichiro - cartoonist.
12. FUKASAKU Mitsusada - professor.
13. AWAZU Kiyoshi - graphic designer.
14. TAKADO Kaname - Christian leader.
15. YOSHIDA Kiju - film director.
16. UMIHARA Shun - writer.
17. HASHIMOTO Mineo - Buddhist priest.
18. HOTTA Yoshie - novelist.
19. GOTO Hiroyuki - scientist.
20. KUWABARA Takeo - professor at Kyoto University.

SECRET

21. SAKAMOTO Yoshikazu - Assistant professor at Tokyo University.

22. HIDAKA Rokuro - professor at Tokyo University.

23. IIDA Momo - writer.

24. TSURUMI Yoshiyuki - employed at International House in Tokyo.

25. TERAI Minako

26. ANAI Fumihiko

27. NASU Masanao

28. MATSUMOTO Ichiju

29. FUKUTOMI Setsuo

30. KURIHARA Yukio

31. etc: ANDO Jimbei, CHIBA Hido, EGAWA Taku, FUJII Nittatsu, HARIYU Ichiro, HOSHINO Yasusaburo, ICHII Saburo, IKEYAMA Juro, ISHIDA Takeshi, KANAI Yoshiko, KASAI Seiichi, KATAGIRI Yuzuru, KATO Shuichi, KAZAMA Michitaro, MATSUURA Sozo, KIDOKORO Masao, KITAKOJI Satoshi, KOBAYASHI Shoichiro, KOMATSU Sakyo, KOBAYASHI Tomi, KUNO Osamu (Shu), KURODA Hidetoshi, MARUYAMA Masao, MIDORIKAWA Toru, MIZUSAWA Yana, MORITAKI Ichiro, MUCHAKU Seikyo, MURAMATSU Hiro, NISHIO Noboru, NOMURA Koichi, OGOSHI Teruo, OTSUKOTSU Yoshiko, SERIZAWA Tae, SHIRAI Shimpei, SHINMURA Takeshi, SHISHIDO Hiroshi, SUGIURA Mitsuo, SUGIYAMA Tatsumaru, SUZUKI Masahira, TAKEUCHI Yoshitomo, WADA Nagahisa, YAMADA Munemitsu, YAMADA Toshio, YAMAGUCHI Kosaku, YAMANISHI Kiichi, YASUDA Takeshi, YOSHINO Genzaburo, YOSHIWARA Koichiro, OKAMOTO Taro, MATSUMOTO Seicho, EI Rokusuke, IZUMI Taku, AWAYA Noriko, KATO Yoshiro, SHIROYAMA Saburo, TAKAHASHI Taketomo, ODAGIRI Hideo, OKUMA Minoru, SANO Kenji, SUZUKI Michihiko, KUBATA Hanya, SHINOHARA Seiei, MARUYAMA Kunio,

TSURUSHIMA Sotsurei, MURO Kenji, KONAKA Yotaro, SAKAMOTO Yoshikazu, SAITO Masahiko, etc.

COMMENT: Although not recorded here, many of the above persons are ex-JCP members.

SECRET

Attachment No. 2

Some BEHEIREN Activities and Accomplishments

1. Regular once-per-month demonstrations at a public park in Tokyo, consisting of anti-American speeches and followed by street marches.

2. An all night TV "teach-in" with BEHEIREN activist leaders, along with special guest, U. S. pacifist Carl Oglesby (Chairman of the Students for a Democratic Society.)

3. A full page advertisement in the New York Times (16 November 1965), followed by another full page ad in the Washington Post (3 April 1967), appealing to Americans to stop the war in Vietnam.

4. A "Meet in Conference of Two Nations for Peace in Vietnam," held in Tokyo in August 1966, and attended by BEHEIREN activists and seven U.S. pacifist leaders (including Dave Dellinger), and observers from France, England, Canada, the USSR, Pakistan, and Mongolia.

5. A mass meeting in Tokyo in October 1966, guest speakers of which were French pacifists, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir.

6. Nationwide tours of Japan for lectures and peace rallies for such anti-Vietnam war pacifists as Professor Howard Zinn and the late A. J. Muste of the United States, Claude Bourdet of France, and Thich Nhat Hanh of South Vietnam.

7. A mass meeting in Tokyo in January 1967, sponsored by BEHEIREN and featuring U.S. folk singer and pacifist Joan Baez.

8. A continuing program of direct distribution of pamphlets to U.S. troops stationed in Japan, and those coming to Japan on warships, and for rest or hospitalization from Vietnam.

9. Participation by two BEHEIREN activist leaders (Kyoto University professor KUWABARA Takeo and International House staffer TSURUMI Yoshikyuki, taking advantage of a trip to the U.S. to attend a non-political Japan-America Congress on Cultural Problems) in anti-Vietnam war speech rallies and demonstrations at Dartmouth University in early May 1967, followed by an unsuccessful attempt to invite Cassius Clay to visit Japan on behalf of BEHEIREN.

10. Continuing efforts to bring to Japan for a nationwide

SECRET

SECRET

ch tour on behalf of BEHEIREN, Soviet poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko, fort that has not yet reached fruition but is still pending.

11. Participation in the Stockholm July 1967 "World Conference Vietnam," by sending two BEHEIREN activist leaders as delegates.

12. Cooperation with the U.S. Quakers, pacifists, and Earle Reynolds in sending the yacht "Phoenix" with medical aid, first to Haiphong, then on a second trip in the Fall of 1967, seeking but failing to find landfall to deliver medical aid to either North or South Vietnam.

13. Attempted, but failed due to inability to obtain U.S. visa, to send a BEHEIREN activist leader (MUTO Ichiyo) to the U.S. to participate in the 21 October 1967 anti-Vietnam War demonstrations.

14. Currently carrying out a fund raising campaign to send an aid ship to North Vietnam. In this, and other activities, BEHEIREN leaders are maintaining ever closer liaison contact with their counterparts abroad, such as the French "Comite' Vietnam National." In an effort to generate public support for this aid ship fund raising campaign, BEHEIREN succeeded in issuing a public appeal, under the endorsing signatures of Tokyo Governor MINOBE Ryokichi and Yokohama Mayor ASUKATA Ichio, as well as the usual intellectuals supporting BEHEIREN.

15. In October 1967, BEHEIREN solicited approval to hold anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, expecting to be denied and then intending to make this denial a court test case. Instead, BEHEIREN was given this permission, and conducted two orderly and well-publicized demonstrations in front of the American Embassy, garnering a larger public turn out of participants than in any previous BEHEIREN-sponsored demonstration.

16. Assisted and abetted the defection to the USSR of four American sailors from the U.S. Navy carrier Intrepid. Following this success, BEHEIREN's most effective activity to date, BEHEIREN leaders are organizing a permanent "underground railway" of Japanese intellectuals who will volunteer their homes as possible "way stops" for hiding future U.S. military deserters that BEHEIREN now hopes to induce.

Comment: For other details, see Tokyo intelligence reporting:
22 FJT-11547, 31 May 1966
22 FJT-12046, 14 October 1966
22 FJT-12690, 10 May 1967
22 FJT-12851, 5 July 1967
22 FJT-13081, 8 September 1967
22 FJT-13154, 27 September 1967
22 FJT-13303, 22 November 1967
Also, OSS-6790, 11 July 1967
22

SECRET

SECRET

ATTACHMENT 3

Partial Listing of American and Other Foreign Persons Known to Have Been in Contact with or Cooperated with BEHEIREN

A. Americans.

1. Staughton Lynd (ex-Yale professor)
2. Norman Mailer (novelist)
3. Dave Dellinger (Editor of Liberation)
4. Howard Zinn (Boston U. professor)
5. Donald Keyes (National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy)
6. David McReynolds (Chairman, War Resisters' League)
7. A. J. Muste (now deceased)
8. Karl Meyer
9. William Davidson
10. Bradford Lyttle
11. Charlotte Thurber
12. (Miss) Quentin Bassett (Students for a Democratic Society)
13. Murray Levin (Boston U. professor)
14. Robert Ockene (Veterans and Reservists to End the War in Vietnam)
15. Carl Oglesby (Chairman, Students for a Democratic Society)
16. Barbara Deming (Associate editor of Liberation)
17. Joan Baez (folk singer)

SECRET

18. Ira Morris (Paris expatriate)

19. Otto Naisan (phonetic, New York City peace activist)

20. Barbara and Earle Reynolds (divorced but separately active long-time residents in Japan)

21. William R. Christensen (an American pacifist drifter, who gave BEHEIREN its first experience in the summer of 1966 in exploiting for propaganda in Japan, and then in arranging the onward journey of an American who wanted to defect to the USSR)

22. Brian Victoria (head-shaved pacifist and "converted" Buddhist priest, known to be in regular contact with the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo)

23. Mr. Willowby (fnu, phonetic, "chief of the Quaker Peace Action movement in the U.S.")

24. An unidentified American of Japanese descent, from Hawaii, who is currently a student at Waseda University.

25. Kosaku Yamaguchi (reportedly born in U.S., present citizenship status unclear) (formerly was a professor at Momoyama University in Osaka, but has been teaching at the University of California in Berkeley for some time)

B. Other Foreigners.

1. Mikhail Kotov, USSR (Soviet Peace Committee)
2. Claude Bourdet, France (French Committee to Support the Vietnamese People)
3. Peggy Duff, Great Britain (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament)
4. James Endicott, Canada (World Peace Council)
5. Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Pakistan
6. Gabita Muslepov, USSR

7. Mrs. Erdenebat Ojon, Mongolia
8. Konstantin Shugnov, USSR
9. Francis Marcel Kahn, France (Comite' Vietnam National)
10. Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, France
11. Thich Nhat Hanh, South Vietnam

COMMENT: This is not, by any means, a complete listing, nor does it necessarily list BEHEIREN's most important activist contacts abroad. But this list is representative in showing the breadth of BEHEIREN liaison abroad, particularly with the American "new left".

14-00000

ATTACHMENT 4

THE YOMIURI 22 Nov 67 Wednesc

4 US Deserters Possibly Left Japan Aboard Baikal

YUICHI YOSHIKAWA, secretary-general of the Japan Peace-For-Vietnam Committee (Beheiren), tells a press conference Tuesday that the four deserters of the US warship Intrepid hoped to stay in Japan but the Beheiren could not help them to do so.

The four deserters from the US aircraft carrier Intrepid who made a dramatic television appearance Monday in Moscow are believed to have left Japan irregularly by the Soviet liner Baikal which left Yokohama on November 11 for the Far East Soviet port of Nakhodka.

Sources in the Metropolitan Police Department said Tuesday that the four Americans could have boarded the ship by a special gangway for Soviet Government officials.

Japanese watchmen were on guard at another gangway for ordinary passengers when 222 listed passengers, including eight Americans, boarded the liner before it departed Yokohama at 11.50 am, November 11.

The watchmen told police that they did not see any person who was not on the passenger list board the ship through the ordinary gangway.

It was learned that 17 officials of the Soviet Embassy and trade mission in Tokyo and scores of visitors boarded the Baikal through the special gangway.

The police sources said that it was "quite possible" that the Soviet authorities in Tokyo arranged the deserters' exit.

Beheiren Pledge

Yuichi Yoshikawa, secretary-general of the Japan Peace-For-Vietnam Committee (Beheiren), told a press conference Tuesday that the committee could not disclose how the four Americans left because it had promised not to do so.

He neither affirmed nor denied the report that the Americans left Japan by the Baikal on November 11.

It was the Beheiren which announced for the first time the desertion of the four crew members of the Intrepid to protest against the Vietnam war, at a press conference held November 13 in Tokyo.

Yoshikawa said that the deserters first wanted to live peacefully in Japan and asked the Beheiren to find them jobs in which they could utilize their English proficiency.

The Beheiren told them that they could not live in Japan without being found by the Japanese police or US military authorities sooner or later, Yoshikawa said.

Lived Like Hippies

Hiromi Naito, 20, a painter of Tokyo, told The Yomiuri Shimbun that he and his friend, Sansei Yamao, a hippie poet and member of the Beheiren, acted as go-betweens for the deserters and the Beheiren.

Naito said he met two of the four deserters—Airman Dick D. Bailey, 19, and Airman Mike A. Lindner, 19—at a hippie hangout in Shinjuku around October 20.

He said both Americans wore leather jackets and other informal clothing which they said they borrowed from their Japanese hippie friends hanging around the Shinjuku area.

Bailey and Lindner and the other two—Airman John M. Barilla, 20, and Airman Apprentice Craig W. Anderson, 20—went around in pairs, Naito said.

Naito said he let Bailey and Lindner stay overnight at his house in Hayamiyacho, Nerima-ku, from October 24 to 25.

Not Worric

When he first met the deserters, they were practicall penniless but appeared quit unconcerned, Naito said.

He said the deserters apparently enjoyed hippie life, living on cheap Japanese food and drink such as udon (noodles) and shochu.

He said the four Americans wanted to live in Japan, and if possible in Tokyo.

Naito and his friend Yamao decided to ask the help of the Beheiren and delivered the four men to the Beheiren around November 26.

Naito said he believed that all the four Americans were not communists and that they had no interest in communist ideology.

He said the four must have decided to go to some neutral country via the Soviet Union after they learned that they could not live in Japan.

A spokesman for the Justice Ministry said Tuesday that there was nothing legally wrong in the four Americans leaving Japan because the administrative agreement in the Japan-US Security Treaty guarantees US military personnel the right to come, to stay in or leave Japan.

He said he understood that the four Americans were technically still enlisted US military personnel.

Furthermore, if their exit took place on November 11, it was before the US authorities made an official request to the Japanese police to search for them, he added.

He also said there were no Japanese laws allowing charges to be preferred against the Beheiren officials and other Japanese people who "protected" the Americans in Japan and helped their departure to the Soviet Union.

SANKEI (Full) November 21, 1967

Prof. YOUNG Says Four American Deserter Seamen Not in Japan Any More

Went to Tokyo and Tried to Dissuade Them;
Probably Escaped from Japan on the 12th or the 13th

(New York, November 20, Correspondent Tadashi ONODERA) Professor Ernest P. YOUNG of Dartmouth College in the U.S., consented to an interview with this reporter on the question of the four American seamen who deserted from the U.S. aircraft carrier Intrepid. At the interview held on the 19th, Professor YOUNG clarified that the Peace for Vietnam Association (Beheiren, with Makoto ODA acting as its representative) contacted an anti-war organization in the U.S., and at this, Professor YOUNG hurriedly visited Tokyo, and meeting the four seamen in a room in an apartment house in Tokyo on the 9th and 10th, tried to persuade them to return. In regard to the present whereabouts of these four seamen, he made the noteworthy statement that "those four were still in Japan, up until the night of the 11th, when I left Japan, but they are probably no longer in Japan now."

Families Perplexed

The questions and answers exchanged with Professor YOUNG are as follows:

-- Why did you go to Japan?

LL

Professor: Beheiren contacted David DERRINGER, a pacifist activist in the U.S., asking him to "send someone to Japan to hear the stories of the four seamen and announce them in the U.S." I have been in Japan twice, and I also once served as special assistant to Ambassador REISCHAUER. During that time, I became friends with Beheiren representative ODA and other intellectuals in Japan. It was for these reasons that I was given this assignment. I personally have never participated actively in the anti-Vietnam war movement so far.

-- When did you arrive in Japan, and where did you meet the four seamen?

Professor: I arrived in Haneda on November 8, and met the four seamen on the 9th and the 10th. The place of interview was in an apartment house in Tokyo, but I cannot say at this time where that apartment house was and who owned it. However, on both days, I talked fully with these four seamen, for more than three hours on each occasion (according to an investigation made by the public security authorities, Professor YOUNG arrived in Japan toward the evening of the 8th, and stayed at Hotel Tanakanwa in Shiba, Minato-ku, until the morning of the 11th).

-- What were the motives for these four seamen's desertion?

Professor: The desertion was completely the decision of these four persons. It seems that the four seamen decided not to return to the ship, when the Intrepid entered Yokosuka Port on October 17, and they were permitted to go ashore for rest for one week. My impression on meeting these four seamen was that they were definitely not deserting for the purpose of self-advertisement or that they were giving false reasons. I am convinced that they deserted really out of doubt about the Vietnam war.

-- What were the movements of the four after they deserted?

Professor: On the night of the 23rd, two days before the Intrepid was due to sail, the four went to Shinjuku, and told the people whom they met at a bar they happened to visit, that "we are fed up with war." The Japanese who heard them sympathized with them, and at one time, the four lived with some hippies (according to this paper's investigations, they include Mr. K., a student of Tokyo University's Liberal Arts Department, and vanguard artist A., who gather at Fugetsudo in Shinjuku.) Finally, they were taken to Beheiren by a student who spoke English (according to this paper's investigation, this was Mr. S., a Waseda University student). After that, they were hidden by Beheiren. I cannot say where they were hidden.

-- Were the four firmly determined to desert?

Professor: My purpose in visiting Japan was to dissuade the four. I explained to them what the results of their desertion would be. I even told them that they would never again be permitted to stand on American soil, their fatherland. At the time I met them, it was still at a stage where they would only receive light punishment, if they reported back immediately, saying that they "had missed their ship." However, their determination was firm, and my persuasion had no effects.

-- The four seamen's desertion was announced in the form of a press interview given by Beheiren. Were there no facts of their having been forced to desert, during that period?

Professor: I ascertained that point, too. However, they firmly denied any fact of their having been forced, saying that they had voluntarily consulted Beheiren as to whether they should publicly announce their intention to desert, and if so, in what form this should be made.

-- Where are the four seamen now, and where are they planning to go?

Professor: I am certain that the four of them were still in Japan, up until the 11th, the day I left for home. However, they already knew fully well that it was not possible for them to obtain asylum in Japan. They even said that "we will probably have to go to some third nation, which is neutral." (The public security authorities judge that the four seamen left Japan immediately after Mr. YOUNG's persuasion, and consider that they probably were smuggled out of Japan after the 10th, and before the evening of the 13th, when Beheiren announced their desertion at a press conference. However, Mr. YOUNG says that the four seamen were in Japan up until the night of the 11th. Therefore, the possibility is strong that they were smuggled out of Japan by ship, between the night of the 11th and the evening of the 13th.)

-- The films showing the four seamen were shown publicly in the U.S., too. What were the reactions in the U.S.?

Professor: When the films were publicly shown, there was big excitement, with rows and rows of television and press cameramen. I thought I would be exposed to persistent questioning by the FBI and the CIA, after I returned home, but so far, I have only been questioned once by the Navy's Intelligence Section, about the circumstances. It seems that American authorities concerned do not want to make too big a fuss over the matter.

-- What do the parents think of this action taken by their sons?

Professor: A certain television station asked the mother of one of the four men about her son's life. This mother was completely perplexed, saying: "My son is a most average American youth. His school records were quite ordinary, and he liked sports, just like any other student. I cannot understand why he acted in such a way."

KH

28 6/11F

DISPATCH

RYBAT
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Africa Division
Chief, MKVIVID, Athens 15-16
Chief of Base, Benghazi 12-28

FROM
Chief of Station, Tripoli 12-29

SUBJECT GSFEW 02
List of GSFEW/1's Personnel in Libya and Related Technical Matters 02

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: FYI and as stated

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

References: A. DIRECTOR 068233
B. TRIPOLI 4658 12-29 12-28
C. TRIPOLI 4692 (Not sent Benghazi) 12-29

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a list of GSFEW/1's personnel 02 in Libya (Idens A through M) and the areas to which they are assigned. Also forwarded under separate cover, but to Headquarters only, are biographic sketches on ten of the thirteen men employed by GSFEW/1 as 02 well as a profile of himself. It is hoped that basic biographic data on the other three men, Idens F, G and J, can be obtained from LNCUFF Tripoli and Benghazi Consular files. It will be noted that Iden C was born in West Germany.

2. In recent weeks GSFEW/1 02 has employed Iden N as his secretary and she and her husband (Iden O) live in the apartment above that of 02 GSFEW/1. Iden N's main duties are to handle GSFEW/1's correspondence 02 and greet any visitors that appear at his apartment door. As previously 02 stated, GSFEW/1's office is located in his apartment and, since he has no telephone, anyone must call on him personally.

3. GSFEW/1 02 gives high technical capability marks to Idens A, D and H and that Iden E is also a highly qualified man. However, Iden E has 02 caused GSFEW/1 a few headaches with Libyan Customs since Iden E has been the recipient of considerable pornographic literature sent to him through the international mail from Copenhagen. Libyan customs officials have opened the mail, and although possibly secretly interested in the highly graphic material, have told GSFEW/1 that he must take action to guarantee 02

Attachments: 1. Idens u/s/c
2. Bio data u/s/c
3. Sketch u/s/c

CS COPY

Distribution: Orig & 1 - C/AF w/att 1,2,3 u/s/c
1 - C/MKVIVID, Athens w/att 1 u/s/c 15-16
1 - COB, Benghazi w/att 1 u/s/c 12-28

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	22 ADTA-4481	26 September 1970
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-872560

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

08975

201BR

that no further literature of this nature will come to Libya and to Iden E.

02

4. Again for Headquarters only is a sketch GSFEW/1 gave the Station on 23 September 1970 which shows the proposed UHF radio system expansion which was the subject of Reference C. Portions circled with red pencil are the planned expansions.

02

5. Regarding a SRAC system for GSFEW/1's use in Tripoli. Per Station's request that approval be given to lease another apartment in his building would certainly enable him to transmit from his own to the safe apartment. He could be provided with an appropriate radio (he already possesses two tape recorders) for this purpose. GSFEW/1 does not 02 have a radio in his car but could have one installed and arrangements made for him to transmit to NEUWIRTH's residence. The latter is located a half block from a main thoroughfare that GSFEW/1 could frequently and 02 naturally use to get him to various locations in Tripoli. NEUWIRTH's residence is also about a block and a half from Iden P where GSFEW/1 02 makes a habit of stopping each Friday evening during the "happy hour." He drives to the Iden P, as do other WOCORKERs, and after parking his car 02 could transmit before entering the Iden P. GSFEW/1 also has a TV set, 02 in the event this could be modified as a SRAC device, but it must be taken into consideration that the Libyan programs are only presented during evening hours. The Station also has another safehouse apartment in the Iden Q building which is also located on a busy thoroughfare and a street 02 GSFEW/1 would also have need to take in handling business and shopping affairs. NEUWIRTH has been planning to have a radio placed in this apartment for use during meetings with Station assets.

02

6. Although GSFEW/1 would often use SRAC only for transmitting purposes and it would not be necessary to query him on the information he reported, two-way voice communications would probably be essential in those instances where he had technical and other fairly complicated data to relay which would necessitate his case officer being able to make certain it is understood and does not require clarification and/or amplification.

02

7. Other information concerning the GSFEW/1 activity will follow by separate dispatch.

Arthur E. Neuwirth
Arthur E. NEUWIRTH

REPRODUCTIONS

111BR

08975

14-00000

SECRET
RYBAT

2P

22

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO ADTA-4481

10

Assigned to Tripoli

Idens A. Wallen U. *KLANN, Field Engineer, and married.

B. Quintin V. *PROCHASKA, Field Engineer, and married. Will shortly be transferred to Benghazi to replace L. Wayne Rogers. 10

C. Franz-Josef *STEFFENS, TTY Repairman, and married.

FR 201-868452

D. Charles W. *SPENCE, Field Engineer, and married.

E. Richard L. *KING, Technical Controller, and single.

F. Ray *EDWARDS, Draftsman, and married.

G. Vince *KENNY, Field Engineer, and single.

Assigned to Benghazi 10

FR [illegible]

H. L. Wayne *ROGERS, Field Engineer, and single. Will shortly be transferred to Tripoli to replace Quintin V. Prochaska. 10

I. Donald C. *BEASLEY, Technical Controller, and single.

[illegible]

J. Charles *BUTERA, Field Engineer, and married.

Assigned to Tobruk 10

K. Raymond E. *LEARY, Field Engineer, and single.

L. Robert T. *SONNENBERG, Technical Controller, and single.

M. Clyde Long *COMBS, Jr., Field Engineer, and married.

***

SECRET
RYBAT

[illegible]

08975

61BR

N. Rita *BRANDT, DOB 10 July 1940. She is German and although her POB is not known she attended high school at Friedberg, Germany. She is married to James Brandt.

O. James *BRANDT, U.S. citizen, and employed as a Mechanical Engineer for OASIS Oil Company in Tripoli.

P. U.S. Marine House

Q. Alitalia

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

08975

SECRET

Albanian Cryptographic Material

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Operations Services Group/OSB
03
910 Key (JFrench)mw -2263

HH-28312

20 September 1976

LA/COG
3D5317
ATTN: Chris Hopkins

Attached for your information

cc: Copy sent to SE/BB/A

to: Ruth Elliff

from: Jim Harrison

The following OSG records are attached:

HH 28312

They contain information on:

Sturgis

SECRET

28312

10379

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Albanian Cryptographic Material

03
[Jon French]

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Opera[illegible] [illegible]/OSB
SEC[illegible]

HH-28312

25 August 1976

LA/COG
Chris Hopkins-3 D 53 17 Hq.

cc: SE/BB/A

Attached for your information is a copy of Miami TWX 13477.

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 006875

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

28312

01
ML

R. WAGNER
E/TF
1872
22 SEPT 70

TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

29

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 15 PER IDG # 15-70

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

EUR 15 INFO FILE, VR. FI, CI, CI/OPS 3, RI/AN, SEC R4, C/SO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T

IMMEDIATE

CITE DIRECTOR 470597

[redacted] VIENNA BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LONDON HELSINKI PARIS BONN BERLIN FRANKFURT HAMBURG MUNICH ROME MILAN LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE OSLO LISBON MADRID STOCKHOLM BERN GENEVA ZURICH

99

TOELK

02

1. FOLLOWING NAMES ON LNBEET WATCH LIST. PLS REPORT ANY INFORMATION RE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING TRAVEL, OF THE INDIVIDUALS LISTED BELOW, WHICH IN YOUR JUDGMENT MAY EFFECT THE SECURITY OF THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS EUROPEAN TRIP. 24 THIS LIST MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON FOR TRACES AND BORDER WATCH LISTING. PLS ATTEMPT TO CONFIRM THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE INDIVIDUALS IF THEY ARE LISTED AS LAST BEING IN YOUR AREA. FORWARD ALL INFORMATION BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE CABLE TO HQS AND TO ROME, MADRID AND LONDON. 15-9, 15-2, 15-1

A. ALBEROLA-SURINACH, OCTAVIO; WHITE MALE, BORN 3/4/28 AT ALAYO, SPAIN. WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN (REPORTED 3/18/70) ALIASES: ELLARGO, JUAN AND SURINACH-ALBEROLA, OCTAVIO. CITIZEN OF SPAIN.

B. ALI-KHAN, TARIQ; ASIAN MALE, BORN 10/21/42 AT LAHORE W. PAKISTAN. LAST KNOWN LOCATION (REPORTED 7/28/69) LONDON, ENGLAND ALIAS: KHAN-ALI, TARIQ. CIT: PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN PP AC 063065.

C. ANTIMUCCI, ITALO DEMENIC; WHITE MALE, 5'3" 135 LBS BROWN HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 11/30/26 AT TIRANO, ITALY. LAST KNOWN LOCATION (REPORTED 4/21/69) PIAN DORTA, ITALY. CITIZEN OF ITALY.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S-E-C-RET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 070597

D. BLACK, ANTHONY JOSEPH; WHITE MALE, 5'10", BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 11/1/27 DUBLIN [redacted], IRELAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION IRELAND REPORTED 7/8/64. ALIAS: BLACK, PATTY. CIT OF AUSTRALIA; AUSTRALIAN PP E382929.

E. CITRYNELL, HAROLD, WHITE MALE, 6'0" 150 LBS, BLACK HAIR BROWN EYES, BORN 3/10/23 AT NEW YORK, N.Y., LAST KNOWN LOCATION STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN (REPORTED 1/24/70). U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP D757574.

F. COHN-BENDIT, DANIEL; WHITE MALE, BLUE EYES, RED HAIR, BORN 4/4/45 AT MONTAUBAN, FRANCE, LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRANKFURT, GERMANY (REPORTED 1/24/70). ALIASES: BENDIT-COHN, DANNY; RADATZ, DANIEL; COHN-BENDIT, DANNY; KURON-MODZELEWSKI, DANIEL. CITIZEN OF GERMANY.

G. CONN, RONALD C.; WHITE MALE, BLUE EYES, BROWN HAIR, BORN 10/4/35 AT CINCINNATI, OHIO. LAST KNOWN LOCATION, RATTS PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN (REPORTED 2/17/70). ALIASES: COHEN, DONALD R.; CONN, R. CHRIST CLIFFORD. U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP - J1322044.

H. CONWAY, JOHN EARL; WHITE MALE, BORN 12/13/24 AT TANTA, EGYPT BROWN EYES, BLACK HAIR, 5'5" 165 LBS. LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRIEDRICHSHEFEN, W. GERMANY (REPORTED 11/28/69). ALIASES: HARIRY, JACOB; HARIRY, JOHN H.; ELHARIRY, YACOUB. NO CITIZENSHIP.

I. CORÇORAN, THOMAS JOSEPH; WHITE MALE, 5'10" 123 LBS BROWN HAIR, HAZEL EYES, BORN 4/23/46 AT BROOKLYN, N.Y. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LUND,

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING

TOTAL COPIES:

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 070597

SWEDEN (REPORTED 2/27/69). U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP G944949.

J. DAVIDSON, CRAIG; MALE, LAST KNOWN LOCATION STUTTGART, GERMANY (REPORTED 6/1/70) (28 HEINRICH-BAUMANN STRASSE, STUTTGART, GERMANY). U.S. CITIZEN.

K. DAVIS, PAUL L.; WHITE MALE, 5'10" 155 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 10/29/26 AT NEW YORK, N.Y. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON W. ENGLAND (REPORTED 2/24/69). ALIASES: SOLOMON, SAUL; KING, MILES A.; HEINBER, CLIFF. CITIZEN OF U.S. LIVING IN EUROPE.

L. DAVOREN, EDWARD MICHAEL; WHITE MALE, 5'10" BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 8/4/40 AT IRELAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON ENGLAND (REPORTED 6/5/69). ALIAS: DEVOREN, EDWARD MICHAEL. CITIZENSHIP UNKNOWN.

M. DUTSCHKE, RUDOLPH ALFRED WILLIE; WHITE MALE, 5'7" 140 LBS, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON NW. ENGLAND (REPORTED 10/20/69). ALIAS: DUTSCHKE, RUDI. CIT OF GERMANY. W. GERMAN ~~EEXB13826X~~ PP B4582611.

N. FALLET, VERNON ROGER DONALD, WHITE MALE, 5'9", 165 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 3/29/34 AT DOMBRESSON, SWITZERLAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION NEUCHATEL, SWITZERLAND (REPORTED 11/7/68). SWISS CITIZEN.

O. GETZ, KARL IGOR; WHITE MALE, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 5/9/46 AT PARIS, FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION MUNICH GERMANY (REPORTED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

________ PER ________ # ________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) PAGE 4 (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 070597

11/21/67). ALIAS: GOETZ, KARL. U.S. CITIZEN.

P. GODDARD, MICHAEL ANTHONY VICTOR; WHITE MALE, 5'7", BROWN HAIR, HAZEL EYES, BORN 11/29/29 AT HASTINGS SUSSEX ENGLAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION PORT TALBOT, WALES GB (REPORTED 4/4/68). ALIAS: GODDARD, MA. CITIZEN OF ENGLAND.

Q. GONZALEZ-FLECHA, ROSARIO; WHITE FEMALE, BORN 10/28/36 AT SPAIN, LAST KNOWN LOCATION BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 5/14/68).

R. GRANSAC-SADORI, ARIANE HENRIETTE; WHITE FEMALE, BORN 1/6/42 AT TOULOUSE, FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE, (REPORTED 5/14/68). CITIZEN OF FRANCE.

S. GVOJICH, MILE; WHITE MALE, 5'7", 160 LBS, BORN 5/14/28 AT BRNJAVAC, YUGOSLAVIA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION SUBOTICA, YUGOSLAVIA PRISON (REPORTED 2/19/69). CITIZEN OF YUGOSLAVIA.

T. HERRANZ-FERNANDEZ, MARIO; WHITE MALE, BORN 12/28/36 AT SPAIN LAST KNOWN LOCATION BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 5/14/68). / CITIZEN OF SPAIN.

U. HILTUNEN, VILO ALARIK; WHITE MALE, 5'10", BORN 2/5/09, AT HELSINKI, FINLAND, LAST KNOWN LOCATION HELSINKI, FINLAND (REPORTED 4/22/67). CITIZEN OF FINLAND.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 070597

CITIZEN OF FRANCE; FRENCH PP 231-65.

V. HUMMER, GISELE MARTHE;/WHITE FEMALE, 5'0" 90 LBS, BORN 2/7/13, AT TOURS, FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION, REPORTED 4/15/69, UNKNOWN. ALIASES: RICHE, GISELE MARTHE; DEHASBOURG, ANNE-MARIE.

W. JONSSON, HORDUR; WHITE MALE, 5'8" 187 LBS, BLACK HAIR, GRAY EYES, BORN 3/2/37 AT AKRANES, ICELAND; LAST KNOWN LOCATION AKRANES, ICELAND (REPORTED 12/15/66). CITIZEN OF ICELAND.

X. JULLIEN, JEAN; WHITE MALE, BORN 2/18/35 AT DELLE, FRANCE, LAST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE (REPORTED 1/22/70. ALIAS: JULIEN, JEAN. CITIZEN OF FRANCE.

Y. KING, THELMA ESTELLA; LATIN FEMALE, 5'9" 165 LBS, BORN 1/31/21 AT PANAMA CITY, PANAMA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE (REPORTED 8/3/70). ALIAS: XXXXXX HARRISON, THELMA ESTELLA KING. CITIZEN OF PANAMA.

Z. KUHN, ROBERT; WHITE MALE, 6'4", 180 LBS, BROWN HAIR AND EYES, BORN 7/4/18 AT SIEGEN W. GERMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION MUNICH, GERMANY (REPORTED 2/27/69). CIT OF GERMANY. GERMAN PP B7443204.

AA. LOCK, WERNER E.; WHITE MALE, BORN 12/3/34 AT BERLIN GERMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION PFLUGERSTRASSE 3, AFG 1, WEST BERLIN,

SECRET

2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

________ PER ________ # ________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 070597

GERMANY (REPORTED 4/8/69). ALIAS: BOECK, WERNER. CIT OF GERMANY.

BB. LUNDGREN, ASA MONICA; WHITE FEMALE, BORN 11/25/30 AT SWEDEN, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LUDVIGBERGATAN 39, STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN (REPORTED 5/11/66). CITIZEN OF SWEDEN.

CC. LUNDGREN, TORD ALVAR, WHITE MALE, BORN 7/10/34 AT SWEDEN, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LUDVIGSBERGSATAN 39, STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN (REPORTED 1/27/67). CITIZEN OF SWEDEN.

DD. MAHLER, HORST; WHITE MALE, BORN 1/23/36 AT HAYNAU SILESIA, B BROWN HAIR AND EYES. LAST KNOWN LOCATION BERLIN, GERMANY (REPORTED 6/10/69). CITIZEN OF GERMANY.

EE. MANCHANDA, ABHIMANYA; WHITE MALE, 5'7", BORN 9/4/19, AT INDIA. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON ENGLAND (REPORTED 2/18/69). ALIAS: MANCHANDA, MANU. CITIZEN OF BRITAIN OF INDIAN DESCENT.

FF. MARTIN, EDDIE LEE; WHITE MALE, 6'1", 175 LBS, BLOND HAIR, HAZEL EYES, LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRANKFURT, GERMANY (REPORTED 6/11/70). U.S. CITIZEN.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING

B:
T:
:
TE:

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

________ PER ________ # ________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

F: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR C70597

GG. MIHAJI, JOSEPH; WHITE MALE, 5'5" 140 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, AT CEGLED, HUNGARY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON, ENGLAND (REPORTED 10/8/69). CITIZEN OF ENGLAND.

HH. PFISTER, RUDOLPH JOHN; WHITE MALE, 5'10", 200 LBS, BROWN HAIR AND EYES, BORN 7/28/27 AT SEATTLE WASHINGTON, LAST KNOWN LOCATIO BERLIN, GERMANY (REPORTED 7/29/68). ALIASES: PFISTER, RALPH; SOMERS, WALTER J; SOMERS, ROBERT WALTER; COUNTS, LYLE D. & COUNTS, KYLE. SWISS CITIZEN. U.S. PP 286011, SWISS PP 1197934.

II. RAINBOLT, CLYDE DUANE; WHITE MALE, 5'9" 142 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 10/19/42 AT LAFAYETTE, INDIANA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON ENGLAND (REPORTED 8/22/69). U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP / J1306124

JJ. RIVERS, BARBARA ~~RXVERSXBARBARAX~~ JOYCE; FEMALE, LAST KNOWN LOCATION 20 TOWER RD. STRAWBERRY HILL, TWICKENHAM MIDDLESEX, ENGLAND (REPORTED 3/26/70). ALIAS: HABEOUS, CORPUS. CITIZENSHIP UNKNOWN.

KK. ROMBOUTS, RAYMOND PIERRE LEON; WHITE MALE, 6'0", BROWN HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 1/31/29 AT ANDER LECHT BRUSSELS, LAST KNOWN LOCATION BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 2/26/69). CIT OF BELGIUM. BELGIUM PP 491147.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IT:

TE:

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

________ PER ________ # ________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

NF: INFO FILE. VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET PAGE 5 CITE DIRECTOR 050597

LL. SALVATORE, MARCEL ALBERT; WHITE MALE, 5'5" 140 LBS, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 5/23/29 AT AVIGNON VAUCLUSE FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRANCE (REPORTED 2/20/70) CITIZEN OF FRANCE. FRENCH PP 211.

MM. SCHWARTZ, MOLLY THIA; WHITE FEMALE, 5'2" HAZEL EYES, BORN 2/3/54 AT NEWARK, N.J. LAST KNOWN LOCATION EUROPE (REPORTED 7/24/70) U.S. CITIZEN.

NN. SIMPSON, ALFRED WINSTON; NEGRO MALE, 5'11" 150 LBS, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 1/23/30 AT NEW YORK, N.Y. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON W. ENGLAND (REPORTED 2/14/69). LNGOLD REPORTS SUBJECT LAST HI U.S. CITIZENSHIP. SUBJECT CARRIES A BRITISH PP AND CLAIMS BRITISH CITIZENSHIP.

OO. SLOVACEK, LAWRENCE EVERETT; WHITE MALE, 5'10" 245 LBS, BROWN EYES, BORN 4/3/31 AT PONCA CITY, OKLAHOMA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE (REPORTED 5/17/70). ALIAS: EISLOVACK, LAWRENCE E. U.S. CITIZEN.

PP. SUMNER, FREDERICO O. BURNLEY; WHITE MALE, 5'10" BROWN HAIR AND EYES, BORN 2/25/24 AT BOSTON, MASS. LAST KNOWN LOCATION REPORTED 2/24/69 UNKNOWN. U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP 2549709.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and AUTHENTICATING

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

E SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ____ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE 9 CITE DIRECTOR C70597

QQ. TOBES, NORBERT JACQUES; WHITE MALE, 5'4" 180 LBS, BALD BROWN EYES, BORN 2/7/16 AT LUXEMBOURG. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LUXEMBOURG (REPORTED 6/9/66). LUXEMBOURG CITIZEN AND PP 11521.

RR. TOMIATTI, WOLFGANG; WHITE MALE, 5'8" BLOND HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 3/11/46 AT GERMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION - UNKNOWN 2/27/69. CITIZEN OF GERMANY.

SS. ~~[illegible]~~ TONE, THOMAS JACK; WHITE MALE, 6'0" 200 LBS, BLOND HAIR BROWN EYES, BORN AT CLEVELAND OHIO, 10/5/17, LAST KNOWN LOCATION BAD WURZACH BAVARIA, GERMANY (REPORTED 2/27/69). ALIAS: BAKARICH, THOMAS JACK. STATELESS; GERMAN PP 0046223; RENOUNCED U.S. CITIZENSHIP IN 1964; U.S. PASSPORT D 672328.

TT. VANPREUSS, RITA; WHITE FEMALE, 5'8" 125 LBS, BLOND HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 10/15/24 AT HERTE GERMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION - UNKNOWN (REPORTED 7/24/70) ALIAS: KLEIN, RITA. GERMAN CITIZEN; GERMAN PP B0197011.

UU. VATER, JOHN JOSEPH (III); MALE, BORN 7/2/48 AT ENID, OKLA. LAST KNOWN LOCATION U.S. ARMY, STUTTGART, GERMANY (REPORTED 6/1/70). U.S. CITIZEN.

VV. WALTER, WOLFGANG; WHITE MALE, BLOND HAIR, BROWN EYES, 5'8" BORN 8/27/23 AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA. LAST KNOWN LOCATION-UNKNOWN (REPORTED 2/27/69). GERMAN CITIZEN.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PAGE [illegible] 10

~~S E C R E T~~ CITE DIRECTOR 070597

WW. WILCZYNSKI, ZBIGMEN MAREK; WHITE MALE, BROWN HAIR AND EYES, 5'10" 160 LBS, BORN 1/9/41 AT WARSAW, POLAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 7/10/70). ALIAS: WILCZYNSKI, ZBIGNIEW. CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL REFUGEE FROM POLAND HAVING ENTERED U.S. AT NEW YORK, N.Y. 09/13/68; LNYUMA STATES HE IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN.

XX. WOLLNICK, KARI (MRS); WHITE FEMALE, BROWN HAIR, 5'6" BORN 7/26/36 AT NORWAY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION OSLO, NORWAY (REPORTED 1/6/69). CITIZEN OF NORWAY.

YY. WOLLNICK, PETER; WHITE MALE, 6'4" BLACK HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 4/21/27 AT NORWAY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION OSLO, NORWAY (REPORTED 1/6/69). CITIZEN OF NORWAY.

2. NO FILE.

END OF MESSAGE

E/AS ________ E/BC ________
E/F ________ E/G ________
E/IB ________ E/I ________
E/BNL ________ E/SC ________

EUR

CI/OPS ________

E/TF ________

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

1 Aug 47

- 2 -

source: adso

FBI

The attention of our Paris station has been directed to the [illegible] conversations that took place [illegible] and there remains a possibility that [illegible] Such additional information [illegible] will be transmitted to you immediately upon its receipt.

Foster William Zebulon

Sincerely,

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

With reference to your letter of 11 June 1947 requesting information on policy matters discussed by Foster and certain members of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party in Paris, I should like to summarize the action taken by this organization on Foster's trip. All stations on Foster's itinerary were alerted during the British Empire Conference with emphasis placed upon Foster's contacts and the content of his conversations with foreign Communist officials at Paris, Belgrade, and Prague.

The first reaction from Paris reported Foster's meeting with Thorez and Duclos on 7 March and a planned meeting for the next day with other members of the Central Committee (this information was distributed to you in DB-3658 on 4 April 1947). No adequate follow-up on this original report was subsequently produced — a fact to be accounted for primarily by the hesitation of the Surete Nationale, for political reasons, to give Foster's visit adequate investigative attention (as reported to you in DB-4777 of 1 July 1947).

Information on the policy matters discussed at this meeting, however, was included in a report from M.I.6, Section V, in May (copy enclosed herewith). Although the source of this report did not know precisely what happened at this meeting "because great secrecy was observed," he mentioned several specific topics allegedly under discussion. This report was not forwarded to you since it was assumed the report was handed directly to your London representative by the British. 24

24

16

MICROFILMED
ABSTRACT INDEX ☒
MAY 6 - 1955
DATE 8 DEC 1952

X REF FORM FILED
IN: 201-3141
201-53438

by hand
to Director
1 Aug. 47

1 ENCL.

RI COPY

10446

Pittman

2/pv

15-4

24 The attention of our Paris station has been directed to the actual conversations that took place in this Paris meeting, and there remains a possibility that a verification or expansion of the M I.6 report will be obtained. Such additional information will, of course, be transmitted to you immediately upon its receipt.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

2/17

SECRET

COUNTRY : Italy/Yugoslavia/France/Gt.Britain/USA

SUBJECT : William Zebulon FOSTER

ORIGIN : London 15-1

DATE OF INFO : As stated

DATE : May 15, 1947

15-9

"On 15.3.47, our representative in Rome reported that FOSTER had arrived there on 14.3.47. for a stay of a few days.

15-24

"On 1.4.47., we heard from Belgrade that according to local press reports of 25.3.47., FOSTER had left Jugoslavia on 24.3.47. No details were given regarding his destination, but the press report mentioned that he had been accompanied by Tim BUCK, Leader of the Labour Progressive Party of Canada.

15-4

"A report dated 1.4.47 from Paris, stated that after the British Communist Party Congress in London, several important delegates had arrived in Paris among whom were William Z. FOSTER, Tim BUCK, LAHAUT, Chief of the Belgian Communist Party, who had not been in London, and who arrived direct from Brussels, and Harry POLLITT. At the same time several Communist delegates who had been present at the W.I.D.F. Congress in Prague, had also arrived in Paris, including Nina POPOVA, the U.S.S.R. delegate, as well as delegates from Greece, Brazil, Cuba, and the Viet-Nam. Our source, however, does not know names of any except those mentioned.

"Several meetings were held at the Headquarters of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party at 44, rue Le Peletier. At one of these meetings the following were known to have been present:- William FOSTER, Tim BUCK, Dolores IBARRURI, Nina POPOVA, Maurice THOREZ, Andre MARTY, Jacques DUCLOS, MAUVAIS, CACHIN, BERLIOZ, FRACHON, MONMOUSSEAU, FAJON, Robert PETIT, and also George WILLIAMS @ MICHAILOV, Comintern Delegate.

* "John PITTMAN, Paris correspondent of the American 'Daily Worker' had acted as interpreter. Although our source does not know much of what happened at this meeting because great secrecy was observed, he states that the meeting was concerned with uniting of world democratic forces against international reaction. In this connection, the French Communist leaders are said to have very much regretted the difficulty of bringing about the union between the American Federation of Labour, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations in the U.S.A.

ENCL. 1

SECRET

"Jacques DUCLOS made a special report emphasizing that this was one of the most important tasks to be carried out by the Communists within the C.I.O.

"Besides the above, the question of Greece and Turkey was discussed, notably the question of boycotting of war materials sent to those countries.

"Finally, the different speakers spoke of the necessity of defending the U.S.S.R. by all possible means.

"Andre MARTY is said to have specially dealt with the question of labour in the colonies, emphasising the necessity of bringing about unity of action among the blacks, throughout the African Continent, e. g., in French, British and Belgian possessions.

"The above, according to our source, were the principal points which had been studied during the various meetings of Communist chiefs in Paris.

"We understand that all other details about FOSTER's arrival and departure from this country have already been passed to you by M. I. 5."

24

CONFIDENTIAL

5 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

FROM : Frederick C. Randall
Chief, DDO/Privacy and Information Coordinator

SUBJECT : Edwin Anderson Walker

REFERENCE : Request No. P-76-1140

This Directorate does not maintain a file on Subject. A search of the records of this Directorate revealed one FBI report as follows, which mentions Subject:

ORIGIN: Boston, Massachusetts
DATE: 6 December 1972
SUBJECT: Boston Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action (SESPA) Internal Security-REVACT.
BUREAU FILE: 100-459865
FIELD FILE: BS-100-42304

3
A. F. Addonal

Frederick C. Randall

cc: OPS/ITG

JS

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

10597

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 012120

CONFIDENTIAL

1
RS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER TOTAL COPIES 22 1 RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT
EUR 8
ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IP/AN, DCD 2, OS G/IC, OPS/INT, SS/SOG 6

T 510240 EIA127 PAGE 01-01 IN 393903
20-5
TOR:221526Z OCT 74 (BRUS) 32587

S E C R E T 221427Z OCT 74 STAFF
20-5
CITE (BRUSSELS) 32587 (MCINTURFF ACTING)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

TO: DIRECTOR.
01
(NIGALE)

1. REQUEST ANY AVAILABLE DEROGATORY INFO. FOR PASSAGE TO (LIAISON) ON MILITARY ARMAMENT CORPORATION (MAC), MARIETTA, GEORGIA. ACCORDING TO (LIAISON) MAC RECENTLY SHIPPED MACHINE GUN AND PISTOL AMMO TO A LOCAL FIRM NAMED U.S. ARMY SURPLUS GUNS AND AMMUNITION.
24 24

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

HH 026607

10614

5/PW

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Stephen Van Cleave
REFERENCE: Telecon Ames/Pangburn, 8 April 1974

FROM: William D. Pangburn, Atlanta RO Washington Field Office	EXTENSION	NO. ATL-53-74	DATE 9 April 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Support Branch, DCD Attn: OSS(EAmes)				Attached is the subject tape to use as you see fit. Bill
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				file - 25695
7.				
8.				
9.				RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				11078
14.				26404
15.				~~25695~~ E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

OSS-495-74
13 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Stephen Van Cleave

1. On 27 and 28 February calls 03 were received from Bill Cantrell, OPS/ITG, and Dave Dewhurst WH/4/AR, concerning 00-A(S)-322/03435-74. 03 Cantrell wanted to be sure FBI had information and Dewhurst wanted to advise DCD that there was a file on subject and DCD should be aware of some of his background. Evan Ames stopped in to see Dewhurst on his next visit to headquarters and received a fill-in on subject's background. 03

2. Subsequently a call was received from Charlotte in C/WH Division office (x-7350). It was imperative to determine the exact date of contact with Van Cleave as C/WH, thru Legislative Counsel, had advised Congress on 7 January 1974 that the Agency had no contact with Van Cleave. Atlanta and Miami were contacted and date of first contact was set at 25 January 1974. Both offices were requested to provide a record of contact with Van Cleave. Atlanta had several hours of tape (from first and second meeting) which Pangburn would have transcribed and forwarded for the record. Called John Peterson later and advised that WH has asked that tapes also be forwarded to headquarters for retention.

3. We were advised that the Congressional inquiry on Van Cleave resulted from a remark overheard at a cocktail party - that Van Cleave had commented that he was working with CIA under cover. Van Cleave was scheduled as potential witness of House Internal Security Committee so House had inquired as to whether his appearance would embarrass the Agency. As noted, response on 7 January was that Agency had no contact with Van Cleave.

L Grant

LILLIAN GRANT

File HH 25695
cc: Services Branch (Control)

E-2 IMPDET CL BY ~~010550~~

11078

26404

25695

CONFIDENTIAL

3/pv

OUTGOING MESSAGE

19-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO
0	0	0	0	0	0

OMF

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF X
DATE-TIME GROUP: 262307Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 518052

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, C/CPS/IT6 5, C/OPS, C/CI/OP2

16-A ADD: C/DCD, CR, Li1 Chrono

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 35

TO: BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT MHSPIKE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 511359*

B. DIRECTOR 507298**

*CABLE SEC SUGGESTS DISSEM TO C/DCD

1. FYI ONLY. IT HAS JUST COME TO OUR ATTENTION THAT DOMESTIC CONTACT DIVISION (DCD) IN JANUARY 1974 INTERVIEWED STEPHEN VAN CLEAVE, PRESIDENT OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, LTD, A PRIVATE FIRM, ON HIS PREVIOUS TRIPS TO ARGENTINA. THE MEETING RESULTED FROM VAN CLEAVE'S REPEATED REQUESTS TO MEET WITH DCD REPRESENTATIVES. VAN CLEAVE'S INTERVIEW DESCRIBED MAINLY HIS ACTIVITIES IN ARGENTINA TO ORGANIZE A SECURITY FORCE FOR COCA COLA. POUCHING STATION COPY OF REPORT.

16-29

2. DCD HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON POTENTIAL PROBLEMS FOR BUENOS AIRES STATION INHERENT IN VAN CLEAVE AND COUNCIL FOR THE AMERICAS INVOLVEMENT WITH ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE ON MATTERS RELATED TO TERRORIST KIDNAPPINGS, AND IS ADVISING THEIR FIELD OFFICES TO AVOID CONTACT WITH VAN CLEAVE IN FUTURE.

3. FILE: 4-4-36; 200-6-484/3. E2 IMPDET.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

11079

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

2/PV

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0

CLASSIFICATION

1	4	7
2	5	8
3	6	9

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR · DATE-TIME GROUP · CITE · MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

J18053

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

UH COMMENT: * REPORTED TRIP TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AND MIAMI BY VAN D CLEAVE AND TWO ARGENTINE POLICE OFFICERS.

**ADVISED THERE NO HQS TRACES ON VAN-CLEAVE [WHO HAD STATED THAT HE WORKED FOR C.I.A. IN LATIN AMERICA UNDER COCACOLA COMPANY COVER], AND THAT HQS HAD NO INTENTION ANY USE OF VAN CLEAVE.

DCD/OSS: LILLIAN I. GRANT {TELECOORD}

DC/OPS/ITG: BILL CANTRELL {IN DRAFT}

DATE: 26 FEBRUARY 74/1625 HRS.
ORIG: DAVID H. DEWHURST/KM
UNIT: WH/4/AR 03
EXT: 1926

D.

2640

Jim E. Flannery
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

C/PV

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. D. Lavery, OGG

Via : A. Addona, DDO/PICG

Subject : Classification of EX 3600

Re your request for "a couple sentences of factual data as to why this document is classified", here they are:

1. Ex post facto, since I was not associated with Operation MHCHAOS during its existence, I can only offer the following reasonable surmise. As we now know, during its tenure MHCHAOS was one of the most sensitive operations conducted under DDP aegis, repeatedly sanctioned (in writing) by the DCI. The activity was deemed so sensitive that it was controlled by/through extremely restricted handling channels. I think it follows logically, at least in my view, that any document produced by MHCHAOS, whether a formal or informal one, would have been classified at least SECRET.

2. Does the information in this document warrant classification today. I think it does, and I believe the current classification of CONFIDENTIAL is proper. Reading

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

#09377

VPV

MEMORANDUM FOR:

2. Pgs. 2 through 12 carefully, it is readily apparent that some of the information on some of these pages was seemingly acquired from/through sensitive sources/methods. Also these pages contain frequent mention of FBI information concerning many of the Peace Movement groups/organizations cited; FBI reports received by MHCHAOS were invariably classified, for the most part CONFIDENTIAL.

3. What should be the proper FOIA exemption for EX 3600; in my view, (b)(3).

P. Haefner H

C/SCB/IP

7 Apr. 77

Date

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. D. Lavery, OGG
Via : A. Addona, DDO/PICG
03
Subject : Classification of EX 3600

Re your request for "a couple sentences of factual data as to why this document is classified", here they are:

1. Ex post facto, since I was not associated with Operation MHCHAOS during its existence, I can only offer the following reasonable surmise. As we now know, during its tenure MHCHAOS was one of the most sensitive operations conducted under DDP aegis, repeatedly sanctioned (in writing) by the DCI. The activity was deemed so sensitive that it was controlled by/through extremely restricted handling channels. I think it follows logically, at least in my view, that any document produced by MHCHAOS, whether a formal or informal one, would have been classified at least SECRET.

2. Does the information in this document warrant classification today. I think it does, and I believe the current classification of CONFIDENTIAL is proper. Reading

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

IPV

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible] 2. [illegible]

Pgs. 2 through 12 carefully, it is readily apparent that some of the information on some of these pages was seemingly acquired from/through sensitive sources/methods. Also these pages contain frequent mention of FBI information concerning many of the Peace Movement groups/organizations [illegible] cited; FBI reports received by MHCHAOS were invariably classified, for the most part CONFIDENTIAL.

3. What should be the proper FOIA exemption for EX 3600; in my view, (b)(3).

P. Haefner H

C/SCB/IP

7 Apr. 77

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
CI/SO Summary on: Contact Report with (MP)TROIKA-7 02

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
C/CI/SO ROber	5847	EX-9816
		DATE 1 March 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12. 08687			
13.			
14.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from who to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment

CI/SO Internal Use Only

This information is not to b disseminated outside CI/SO without prior approval of Chief, Special Operations Group, CI Staff.

Originated by: W. E. Gavaghe
TYPED by : FE/OPS

Based on:
Doc:
Date:
Filed:

SOURCE:
Cryptonym: (MP)TROIKA-7 02
Field Station:
ACTION:

DISTRIBUTION:
☒ EX NUMERICAL FILE (recor
☐ Subject file (MP)TROIKA-7 02
☐ Other:

INDEXING:
KP by pme date 15/3/72

SECRET

C/SO

EX-9816
1 March 1972

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact Report of Meetings with 02 MPTROIKA-7 in New York City on 14 February and in Virginia on 17-18 February 1972

02 1. This memorandum covers recent meetings with MPTROIKA-7 in New York City and in the Northern Virginia area. The meetings were held under secure conditions and there were no security incidents noted.

2. Operational:

a. United States - China Friendship Association (USCFA) Study Group: 02 M-7's persistent efforts to locate and join a pro-Mao study group finally paid off. 02 The manager of the China Bookstore finally broke down under M-7's campaign and put her in touch with a local USCFA study group under the leadership of Mrs. Susan Warren, aka Frank. 02 M-7 has attended one session and, based on her initial observation, provided the assessment of Mrs. Warren attached hereto at the undersigned's request. 02 M-7 believes she has hit it off with Mrs. Warren because of her understanding of dialectics (thanks to Andy Ness's tutoring) and, consequently, she was instructed to attempt to develop a social-business relationship with her. 02 With respect to the other members of the study group, M-7 claims that the situation, to date, has not been conducive to ferreting out the identities of these individuals, but that she hopes that as the group continues to meet, some rapport will be established with her classmates.

b. New School and language instruction: 02 M-7 has formally enrolled at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research in a course entitled "Comparative Legal Systems," which studies the theories, institutions, concepts, customs and which purports to analyze and compare the law and the administration of law in selected countries, included China, Japan, Vietnam, Germany, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 02 M-7 will also enroll in a French language instruction course in the near future.

08687

SECRET

[illegible]

9/N

c. Ramparts' Tours - New York Media Workshop's Womens' Tour: Acting on a suggestion proposed by Mr. Jason Horn, CI/SO, the undersigned raised the subject of the Women's Tour which is scheduled to visit London, Paris (where they will meet the DRV peace delegation) and Rome from 27 May - 25 June 1972 with (M)7 and instructed her to attempt to determine the interest in, 02 and likely composition of, the New York group and explore ~~the~~ possibility of joining such a group and explore the possibility of joining such a group. 02 (M)7's first reaction to the tour was that the cost ($699, which price includes airfare, trains, hotels, etc.) was too high. It was explained to her that the cost factor should not deter her from following through. It was then that (M)7 voiced some concern that the timing of the tour may 02 interfere with her own PCS departure (we had been talking in terms of mid-May or June 1972 up to this point). It was made clear to her that no fixed date has been established as yet for her PCS departure and that the aforementioned tour may well prove to be of operational interest, e.g. meeting the DRV delegation and continuing the staging process prior to her actual departure. 02 (M)7 said that she understood and would look into the matter. She did not believe she would have any difficulty in covering for funds should she find herself included on the tour.

d. South East Asia Reports (SEAR): 02 (M)7 produced a copy of the first issue of SEAR, a bi-weekly newsletter put out by the New York University Students Mobilization Committee, Box 59, Loeb Student Center, 566 LaGuardia Place, N.Y.C. 10003. 02 (M)7 is listed as one of (five contributing 08 staff members on the back page) of this mimeographed new left publication. A copy of this first issue is attached hereto. One of (M)7's articles will appear in a subsequent issue of SEAR. 02

02 e. JBMINIMUM Testing and Training: As part of (M)7's covert training and assessment in anticipation of her foreign assignment, the undersigned arranged for two members of the Psychological Assessment Branch, TSD (Messrs. DeMarco and Saunders) to administer a JBMINIMUM test to her and to brief her in the use and value of the JBMINIMUM test in a field situation. This training and briefing took place on 18 February in a safehouse in N. Arlington, Va. (A copy of the JBMINIMUM assessment on 02 (M)7 will be made a matter of record in her official dossier) 02 (M)7 was introduced as "Miss Julie" to members of the PAB/TSD for purpose of this test and briefing. (Mr. Andy Ness devoted the afternoon of 18 February with (M)7 for the purpose of continuing her training 02

12/PJ

SECRET

in dialectics, which she has found to be particularly useful in understanding the study group discussion and to permit her participation.)

2. Administrative:

02 a. Salary and Operational Advances. The undersigned paid M-7 her January salary on a $500 advance on 17 February 1972. She also received a $300 advance on 14 February 1972. These advances were necessary because of the expenses M-7 02 had incurred in enrolling at the New School and to pay for her French lessons. (One of the reasons M-7 02 was brought down to the Washington area was to straighten out a problem she was having with her accounting. Hopefully, she is now convinced that she had been receiving all that was due her.)

02 b. Tax Administration and Notification of Personnel Action. M-7 was notified of the change in the tax assessment and of the adjustments in her salary due to the legislative pay increase and the withholding of premiums for hospitalization.

3. Actions to be taken.

a. M-7 02 's assignment abroad. 06 Per the undersigned's discussions with Messrs. Flitcroft and Cornish, a telepouch dispatch will be sent to 135 Bangkok Station proposing 02 M-7's assignment to 135 Bangkok, primarily for housekeeping purposes, but with a regional mission to perform. (The undersigned is presently working on this message.)

b. Concealment device. 02 M-7 requested a concealment device for her microdot viewer which the undersigned will attempt to obtain from TSD. Additionally, the undersigned will request TSD to provide concealment devices for M-7's general use as a storage for papers and funds. 02

William E. Gavaghen
FE/OPS

Attachments
As stated

08687

11/PJ

1. RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGES T BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL IAL CENTER.
2. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG: FR:JH:js
UNIT: CI/SO
EXT:: 1758
DATE: 04 September 1970

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

QMAT
QMKG
EIVC
QMBE

Copy____ of _______

S E C R E T

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

SECRET

CITE HEADQUARTERS 056

855 15-16
TO ATHENS (EYES ONLY PLOTKA)

12-19
358 AMMAN (EYES ONLY [redacted]) CODWICK

12-1
622 CAIRO (EYES ONLY RINAKER) 05 15 02Z SEP 70

12-18
305 INFO: BEIRUT (EYES ONLY CROWEN)

RYBAT MHCHAOS

1. FYI LNERGO SOURCE REPORTED THAT ORGANIZATION OF ARAB STUDENTS IN U.S. REQUESTED ISHMAEL FLORY (201-327809) CPUSA OFFICIAL IN ILLINOIS, TO SELECT 5 YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS TO GO ON TOUR OF MIDDLE EAST ESPECIALLY JORDAN AND UAR. PURPOSE OF TRIP TO PROPAGANDIZE ARAB POSITION AMONG BLACKS IN U.S.

2. GROUP WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS ON 24 AUGUST 1970 VIA OLYMPIC AIRLINES FLT 420 WHICH STOPPED MONTREAL, CANADA BEFORE PROCEEDING ATHENS, GREECE WHERE FLIGHT TERMINATED. NO FURTHER TRAVEL INFO AVAILABLE PRESENT TIME. TICKETS FOR GROUP HAD BEEN SENT PRE-PAID FROM AMMAN BUT ARRANGEMENTS BEING HANDLED IN CHICAGO.

3. GROUP IDENTIFIED AS:

A: THOMAS CURTIS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

ACTION

FILING
1 - Chrono
2 - (FR) BP/ARAB Relations
3 - C/Area Div 9 SEP 1970
4 - Station File
Indexed: KEYPUNCHED

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

10625

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

FORM 3205

CTED HANDLING MESSAGES [illegible]T BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL [illegible]AL CENTER.
NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT::
DATE:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ____ of ________

S E C R E T

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

TO

SECRET

CITE HEADQUARTERS

PAGE 2

B: JAMES DILLARD

C: CHRISTINE JOHNSON (COMMENT: FYI PROBABLY IDEN WITH MARY CHRISTINE CLAYBOURNE JOHNSON, 201-328044, BORN 15 JAN 09, VERSAILLES, KENTUCKY WHO IN 1969 WAS PRESIDENT AFRICAN-AMERICAN HERITAGE ASSOCIATION WHICH WAS FOUNDED BY FLORY.)

D: JOE HOWARD

E: JOE WALKER (COMMENT: FYI POSSIBLY IDEN WITH JOSEPH DANFORTH WALKER, 201-856173, BORN 11 MAR 34, BUFFALO, NEW YORK WHO IN 1969 WAS WRITER FOR "MUHAMMED SPEAKS" OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF NATION OF ISLAM AND FRIEND OF HENRY WINSTON (201-006887) NATIONAL CHAIRMAN CPUSA.)

4. REQUEST ANY INFO RE TRAVEL ABOVE INDIVIDUALS, THEIR CONTACTS AND ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY COME STATIONS ATTENTION.

5. ATHENS: SUGGEST QUERY LIAISON RE TRAVELERS WITHOUT

15-16 24

COORDINATING OFFICERS

2/PV

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

FORM 3205

...D HANDLING MESSAGES ...T BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SPECIAL ...AL CENTER.
...EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

RESTRICTED HANDLING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy____ of ________

S E C R E T

...:
...TE:

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

CITE HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

TO

PAGE 3

GIVING PARA 1 BACKGROUND.

END OF MESSAGE

C/NE/ARN

C/NE D H Blee

AC/CI/SO ____________
Jason Horn

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUT
DOWNGRADING A
DECLASSIFICATIO

FORM 4-70 3205

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

28

OPERATIONAL AND SOURCE COVER SHEET

FROM: Mexico City

REPORT NO HMM-5348

REPORT MADE BY: Dolores R. CASSAVETIS:gso

NO. PAGES: 1

REPORT APPROVED BY: Willard C. CURTIS

NO. ENCLOSURES:

DATE OF REPORT: 1[illegible] December 1960

REFERENCES: HMM-5321

DISTRIBUTION:

By copy to: 4-Headquarters
1-EMB, PAO, MA, NA, AA, I&NS
1-LA
3-Files

Orally to:
JMPUCK

Headquarters File No.
201-

Field File No.
P-7035

SOURCE CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT

ID NO.

IG NO.

KRYPTON: ☐ YES ☐ NO

SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA, AND COMMENTS:

SUBJECT : Jose Xavier CORTES Hernandez

COMMENTS: Father Manuel PEREZ Alonso, Jesuit and contact of COS, was the source of field comment no. 2. According to Father PEREZ Alonso, CORTES was never a priest but had been a seminarian. Father PEREZ Alonso has been conferring with Archbishop Miguel Dario Miranda, Primate of Mexico, regarding CORTES Hernandez and possible actions against him.

③ 8

16 Dec 60

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

CS-3/460,758

FORM 6-60 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

50-500 [redacted] 09081

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

SUBJECT Jose Xavier CORTES Hernandez

REPORT NO. HMM-5348

DATE OF REPORT 16 December 1960

NO. OF PAGES 1

REFERENCES HMM-5321

DATE OF INFO. 8 December 1960

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (8 December 1960)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Person with good connections in the Cuban Embassy (B). Appraisal of Content: 2

in MEXICO?
do B

1. On 8 December 1960 Jose Xavier CORTES Hernandez, who represents himself as a priest,[1] told Jose Antonio PORTUONDO Valdor, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, that he had information that "the thing they were working on" had gotten underway and had produced a tremendous reaction in Cuba.[2] He said that a friend, who is Roman Catholic but very liberal, had returned from a visit to Cuba, where he said the Knights of Columbus were pretty well entrenched. For this reason, CORTES said he felt it would be necessary to "take the bull by the horns" and begin things or the Knights of Columbus would gain the advantage.

involved in pro Cuba activities

2. PORTUONDO said that the bombing of the church of Father BOZA in Cuba had definitely been an act of "auto-agression" and was clumsily done. He said a red flag with hammer and sickle was found in the debris. PORTUONDO told CORTES that Carlos OLIVARES, Under-secretary of Foreign Affairs, had not said anything, but, since he, PORTUONDO, was going to Cuba at the end of December, he believed that OLIVARES would wait until his visit.[3]

3. CORTES said that he would like to go to Cuba and see for himself how things were going.

Field Comments

1. According to an untested source in the Roman Catholic Church, CORTES Hernandez was never a priest. It was previously reported that Atisbos, Mexico City newspaper, had reported that CORTES was a Catholic priest and a member of the Jesuit order until 1950 when he left the order because of his "rebellious and anarchic spirit".

2. It is believed that CORTES Hernandez, who belongs to a schismatic Catholic church, called the Mexican Apostolic Catholic Church, is interested in establishing a schismatic church in Cuba.

3. Source Comment. PORTUONDO's remark about OLIVARES came after he and CORTES had been discussing German Lence, Castrista priest who has been stopped by episcopal sanction from his ministry in Oriente province.

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

(3)

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

14-00000

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. [illegible] false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	Mexico/Cuba	REPORT NO.	IDM-5348
SUBJECT	Jose Xavier CORTES Hernandez	DATE OF REPORT	16 December 1960
		NO. OF PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	IDM-5321

DATE OF INFO. 8 December 1960
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (8 December 1960)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Person with good connections in the Cuban Embassy (B). Appraisal of Content: 2

or MEXICO?

DOB

1. On 8 December 1960 Jose Xavier CORTES Hernandez, who represents himself as a priest,[1] told Jose Antonio PORTUONDO Valdor, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, that he had information that "the thing they were working on" had gotten underway and had produced a tremendous reaction in Cuba.[2] He said that a friend, who is Roman Catholic but very liberal, had returned from a visit to Cuba, where he said the Knights of Columbus were pretty well entrenched. For this reason, CORTES said he felt it would be necessary to "take the bull by the horns" and begin things or the Knights of Columbus would gain the advantage.

[illegible] in pro Cuba activities

2. PORTUONDO said that the bombing of the church of Father BOZA in Cuba had definitely been an act of "auto-agression" and was clumsily done. He said a red flag with hammer and sickle was found in the debris. PORTUONDO told CORTES that Carlos OLIVARES, Under-secretary of Foreign Affairs, had not said anything, but, since he, PORTUONDO, was going to Cuba at the end of December, he believed that OLIVARES would wait until his visit.[3]

3. CORTES said that he would like to go to Cuba and see for himself how things were going.

Field Comments

1. According to an untested source in the Roman Catholic Church, CORTES Hernandez was never a priest. It was previously reported that Atisbos, Mexico City newspaper, had reported that CORTES was a Catholic priest and a member of the Jesuit order until 1950 when he left the order because of his "rebellious and anarchic spirit".

2. It is believed that CORTES Hernandez, who belongs to a schismatic Catholic church, called the Mexican Apostolic Catholic Church, is interested in establishing a schismatic church in Cuba.

3. Source Comment. PORTUONDO's remark about OLIVARES came after he and CORTES had been discussing German Lence, Castrista priest who has been stopped by episcopal sanction from his ministry in Oriente province.

3

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

DISTRIBUTION

16 Dec 60

Bf SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, VR

S E C R E T 241733Z

24 Nov 63 IN 67374

DIR CITE WAVE 8124

TYPIC AMTRUNK AMTRUNK

REF WAVE 8123

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

IDEN A [LUIS 04 (GOICOCHEA)]

IDEB B [ISRAEL 04 (GARCIA)]

IDEN C [CARLOS 04 (DIAGO)]

IDEN D [MANUEL 04 (GARCIA) SUAREZ RPT SUAREZ]

IDEN E [JUAN 04 (NUIRY) SANCHEZ]

S E C R E T

10726

SECRET

34 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: DIRECTOR 4

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: IW

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, DDOS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, SAS 12, DD/I, WH 8, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR.

TDCSDB-3/658,079

SECRET 262309Z NOV 27 02172 63 IN 68504

DIR INFO LANT PACY BARR CITE WAVE 8188

INTEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMKHAN-2 RECEIVED 251245 LOCAL. REF BARR 1391 (IN). PREVIOUS MENTION OF TANKS WITH TWIN CANNON "NOT PREVIOUSLY SEEN" UFG-3950 A-2 FROM EDUARDO PEREZ REPEAT PEREZ DUANEY (PROTECT). RID NO INDEX. FILED 262309Z. REPORT CLASS: SECRET CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY: CUBA

SUBJ: SIGHTING OF TANKS WITH TWIN CANNONS IN THE AREA OF HABANA.

DOI: 23 NOV 63. PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (26 NOV 63) UFG 4130

SOURCE: AN EDUCATED CUBAN OF WESTERN EUROPEAN EXTRACTION WHO LIVES IN HABANA, SOURCE HAS REPORTED MILITARY INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY PERSONEL OBSERVATION. SOURCE'S RELIABILITY HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A MANAGER OF AN AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISE IN HABANA.

IN COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

10957

SAS	12	
[illegible]	8	

TDCS PRECEDENCE

x ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING:

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 27 NOV 1963 0726Z

BASED ON: UFG-4130 MP/AMKHAN-2

LIAISON:

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce

1/m

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/658,079

SUBJECT TANKS WITH TWIN CANNON IN THE AREA OF HABANA

DATE DISTR. 27 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 23 NOVEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 68504

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (26 NOVEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN EDUCATED CUBAN OF WESTERN EUROPEAN EXTRACTION WHO LIVES IN HAVANA, SOURCE HAS REPORTED MILITARY INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY PERSONAL OBSERVATION. SOURCE'S RELIABILITY HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A MANAGER OF AN AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISE IN HABANA.

1. ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963, ABOUT 200 TANKS WERE OBSERVED, APPARENTLY PARTICIPATING IN MANEUVERS, IN AN AREA AT THE INTERSECTION OF VIA MONUMENTAL AND CARRETERA CENTRAL. MANY OF THE TANKS HAD TWIN CANNON MOUNTED AND WERE A TYPE PREVIOUSLY NOT OBSERVED BY THE EYEWITNESS. (FIELD COMMENT: A CUBAN WHO HAS PROFESSIONAL CONTACT WITH RELATIVES OF OFFICIALS IN CUBAN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES AND A VARIETY OF CONTACTS IN WESTERN CUBA, REPORTED THAT ON 23 OCTOBER THE GRENBURG BROUGHT A NUMBER OF ARMORED VEHICLES WHICH WERE CALLED LANZA LLAMAS (FLAME THROWERS) AND WERE A TYPE NOT PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED IN CUBA. THESE TANKS CARRIED TWO CANNON WHICH APPEARED SIMILAR TO THE 152 MM

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	[redacted]	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[redacted]	FB

STATE/INR 1C5 TREASURY

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

ARTILLERY PIECE.)

2. AS OF THAT SAME DATE THERE WAS A LARGE MILITARY CAMP TO THE WEST OF VIA MONUMENTAL JUST BEFORE REACHING THE CARRETERA CENTRAL. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS IS PROBABLY THE LOMA DE TIERRA MILITARY AREA WHICH HAS RECENTLY SEEN A LARGE INFLUX OF VEHICLES AND MATERIEL).

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, COMNAVKEYWEST.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS COPY SLOTTED AT: 1735 23 NOV WD)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

23 Nov 63 IN 67195

S E C R E T 231917Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8097

RYBAT TYPIC AMKHAN-2 COMMO TARROT

1. FOLL WILL BE SENT. BEGIN AVENT MSG: "ONE SEVEN X GOOD INTEL THIS WEEK XX KEEP TRYING WITH RIG X KEEP SENDING NAMES FROM DIAZ LIST XX TITO X NEED FULL BIO DATA X ALSO ALL MOVEMENTS PABLO SANDOVAL CRANE AND ESPECIALLY ANY X ANY ARMS SHIPMENTS LATIN AMERRICA XX LUCY X SHE WAS LATE REPORTING CHARTERED FLIGHTS TO ALGERIANX NEED THIS INFO FASTER X FLIGHTS SHOULD CONTINUE THRU DEC SIX THREE X TRY HAVE HER FEED YOU LIST ALL CUBANA PERSONNEL WHO FLY X ALSO NEED HER PROVIDE NEXT FOUR WEEKS ONLY CMA LIST CUBANA CREWS FLYING MEXI X LIST PUBLISHED TWICE MONTHLY AND HAS ABOUT TWO ZERO NAMES XX MIKE X GOOD INTEL X HOPE HE EVENTUALLY AGREES WORK X DO NOT PUSH HIM TOO HARD XX MARIA CHRISTINA X WHAT YOUR EVALUATION HER NOW XX DATA UNDERMINING FRANCO GOVT IMPORTANT HERE X GET MORE DETAILS XX NO INFO HERE IZQUIERDO X WHAT TYPE INFO HE HAVE XX OTHER THAN WHAT APPEARED TWO NOV REVOLUCION ON NEW TELEX INSTALLED CMA CAN YOU PROVIDE ADDITIONAL UNPUBLISHED DATA XX WANT TRANSMIT TO YOU TWICE WEEKLY X ADVISE CONVENIENT TIMES ON TUES OR WED XX IMPORTANT X CHECK CAFETERIA

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

11319

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM :
ACTION :
INFO :

IN 67195 PAGE 2

DEADDROP AND SEND ME WHATEVER MSG YOU FIND X ALSO LEAVE BLACK BOX THERE X CHECK THIS DROP END EVERY WEEK FOR ANY MSGSNX GRIESSE X ENRIQUE" END AGENT MSG.

6. FOR DIR ONLY: DIAZ IS 05 OSVALDO DIAZ. CENSOR FOR DSE IN AMKHAN-2 OFFICE. TITO IS 05 RESTITUTO ROBAINA HABANA DOCKS STEVEDORE. LUCY IS 05 ESTER ARANGO. MIKE IS 05 MIGUEL MAYOR. MARIA CHRISTINA IS POSTAL CLERK MIN COMMO, IZQUIERDO IS DANIEL IZQUIERDO CABLES AND WIRELESS EMPLOYEE WHO WORKS AND RESIDE BEJUCAL.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (TEMPO FOR SAS SLOTTED AT 2150-26 NOV 63)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 270258Z

27 Nov 63 IN 68499

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8201

RYBAT TYPIC COMMO PETCOS AMATHENA

1. FOLL WILL BE SENT: BEGIN AGENT MESSAGE. "TRES SIETE X RECIBIDOS MENSAJES HASTA OCHO CERO X RECLUTE ALFA ORESTE RPT ORESTE TAMAYO RPT TAMAYO CMA ROLANDO RPT ROLANDO REYES RPT REYES CMA MEDARA RPT MEDARA SILVA RPT SILVA YANKEE ROBERTO RPT ROBERTO LEGON RPT LEGON X ESTAMOS INVESTIGANDO ALFA LOS OTROS X RECUERDE SER EXTREMAMENTE CAUTELOSO AL HACER CONTACTO CON CUALQUIER PERSONAL QUE RECOMENDO PARA RECLUTAMIENTO YANKEE QUE HEMOS INVESTIGADO X PORQUE LOS HEMOS INVESTIGADOS NO QUIERE NECESARIAMENTE DECIR QUE ESTEN BIEN POR UTILIZARLOS EN SU RED X CADA RPT CADA AGENTE QUE UTILIZA DEBERIA SER COMPLETAMENTE ENTRENADO ANTES DE DARLE UN ENCARGO OPERACIONAL X CON TODOS LOS AGENTES QUE ESTA RECOMENDAN PARA USO PARECE VAYA ALFA TENER UN MAYOR TRABAJO DE ENTRENAMIENTO X DIGANOS EXACTAMENTE RPT EXACTAMENTE COMO SERA REALIZADO ESTE ENTRENAMIENTO CMA NO SOLMENTE QUIEN IMPARTIRA EL ENTRENAMIENTO PERO TAMBIEN COMO CMA DONDE CMA CUANDO ETC X NO ESTAMOS SEGUROS DEL RENE CON QUIEN ESTA HACIENDO CONTACTO EN VICTORIA X FAVOR MANDE NOMBRE OTRA VEZ X CUALES FUERON SUS RELACIONES ANTERIORES CON RENE X MANDENOS MAS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No. 09913

DETALLES SOBRE EL X INCLUSIVE OCUPACION ANTERIOR CMA ESCUELAS ASISTIDAS ETC X NO RPT NO EXTENDA MAS SUS REDES HASTA QUE NO TENGA TIEMPO PARA CONSOLIDAR X"

2. ENGLISH TRANSLATION. 37. RECEIVED MESSAGES THROUGH 80. PROCEED TO RECRUIT ORESTE RPT ORESTE TAMAYO RPT TAMAYO CMA ROLANDO RPT ROLANDO REYES RPT REYES AND MEDARA RPT MEDARA SILVA RPT SILVA AND ROBERTO RPT ROBERTO LEGON RPT LEGON. WE ARE INVESTIGATING THE OTHERS. REMEMBER TO BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS IN MAKING CONTACT WITH ANYONE YOU HAVE RECOMMENDED FOR RECRUITMENT AND WE HAVE INVESTIGATED. BECAUSE WE HAVE CHECKED THEM DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THEY ARE ALL RIGHT TO USE IN YOUR NETS. EACH RPT EACH AGENT YOU USE SHOULD BE FULLY TRAINED BEFORE YOU GIVE HIM AN OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT. WITH ALL THE AGENTS YOU ARE RECOMMENDING FOR USE YOU APPEAR TO HAVE A MAJOR TRAINING JOB AHEAD OF YOU. TELL US EXACTLY RPT EXACTLY HOW THIS TRAINING WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED CMA NOT ONLY WHO WILL TRAIN THEM BUT ALSO HOW, WHERE, WHEN, ETC. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN OF THE RENE YOU ARE CONTACTING IN VICTORIA. PLEASE SEND THE NAME AGAIN. WHAT WAS YOUR PAST CONNECTION WITH RENE. SEND US MORE DETAILS ON HIM INCLUDING FORMER OCCUPATION, SCHOOLS ATTENDED, ETC. DO NOT RPT NOT EXPAND YOUR NETS ANY FURTHER UNTIL YOU HAVE TIME TO CONSOLIDATE.

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

) : DIRECTOR

OM : C/SAS 5

TION: DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

FO :

SECRET 272240Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8225

IN 69411

RYBAT TYPIC AMPANTY FEDGUP COMMO

REFS: A. WAVE 8064 (IN 66850)

B. WAVE 8071 (IN 66867)

C. WAVE 8072 (IN 66868)

D. WAVE 8074 (IN 66883)

E. WAVE 8105 (IN 67242)

F. WAVE 8106 (IN 67216)

G. WAVE 8126 (IN 67381)

1. FOLL IS TRANSLATION OF REFS A THRU G.

A. 43. ENTERING DIRECTLY THE PLACE. TEODORO IS IN CHARGE OF THE VIGILANCE OF KARAT ONE. ARLE, WHO IS ANIBAL'S MAN, IS IN CHARGE OF KARAT TWO. DOCTOR JIMENES IS IN CHARGE OF THE INTELLIGENCE FOR KARAT ONE. THIS MAN DR. JIMENEZ WORKED WITH PANCHO VILLA IN HERE BEFORE. AGUILES.

B. 44. OTTO. THESE ARE DATA ON DAVID'S MEN AND THEIR FUNCTIONS. DATA ON EL BULLDOZER. MIGUEL SUAREZ HERNANDEZ. 30 YEARS OLD. BORN IN 1933. WE DO NOT HAVE THE DAY AND MONTH. SON OF MATEO AND JOSEFA. WORKS IN THE WATER SUPPLY LINE OF BOCA DEL CALAFRE. IS MARRIED AND HAS 4 CHILDREN. LIVES ON THE BEACH OF BOCA DEL CALAFRE. WILL WORK

11044

IN RECEPTIONS. DATA ON EL PIRATA. JOSE TEMPRANA CARMONA. ALIAS EL NINO. IS OWNER OF THE 14 FOOT BOAT WITH A 6 HORSE POWER MOTOR WHO WILL WORK IN RECEPTIONS. 53 YEARS OLD. BORN IN BOCA GALAFRE ON 19 MARCH 1909. MARRIED AND HAS 4 CHILDREN. FISHERMAN. CONTINUES.

C. 45. SON OF ANDRES AND ALTA GRACIA. LIVES IN BOCA DE GALAFRE. THE NAME OF HIS BOAT IS "LA CIVIOTA". DATA ON EL VIGILANTE. THIS MAN GIVES HIS HOUSE TO LOCATE THE RADIO OPERATOR. ROBERTO ROTTADO (also used TORRADO) CACERES. 37 YEARS OLD. BORN ON 19 SEPTEMBER 1926. SON OF HERMINIO AND MARIETA. LIVES ON THE SANTA ROSA FARM ON THE HIGHWAY OF SAN JUAN DEL GALAFRE KILOMETER 9. I WILL LATER SEND THE COORDINATES. IS A TAXI DRIVER. DATA ON EL PATRICIA. HIS SAFE HOUSE. ESTEBAN SUAREZ ROJAS. 56 YEARS OLD. BORN ON 25 DECEMBER 1907. SON OF PABLO AND ISABELA. MARRIED AND HAS 4 CHILDREN. LIVES IN LA PALMA FARM. CONTINUES.

D. 46. FARMER. I WILL LATER SEND YOU THE EXACT LOCATION BY COORDINATES. SEND SET OF MAPS ON COLIBRI. RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE 82. AQUILES.

E. 47. OTTO. YOU SHOULD WARN SAULO THE GREAT DANGER ARTACAN IS IN IF HE REVEALS ANYTHING ON THE TYPE OF WORK THAT WAS ENTRUSTED TO HIM IN CUBA. WE WILL NOT USE POSITION COTORRA AGAIN. WE ARE AWAITING FOR NEWS FROM PANCHO VILLA IF HE HAS RETRIEVED CACHE NORTE THREE. PLACIDO NAMED NORTE FOUR THE CACHE YOU TOLD HIM WAS LOCATED IN FRONT OF SITIO MORALES. THIS HAS BEEN FOUND BY A MINER WHO DELIVERED ALL THE CARGO TO THE MILITIA. I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OK. I HOPE THERE IS NOTHING SERIOUS IN MY GIRL FRIENDS'S LETTER. [illegible]

F. 48. OTTO. THIS INFORMATION IS DATED 11 NOVEMBER. LAST YEAR THEY [illegible] TO CUBA TRAINED DOGS [illegible] A LATIN [illegible] [illegible]. WE [illegible] [illegible]

FACTORY. THERE A PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION WAS GIVEN IN FOLLOWING THE TRAIL AND FINDING A MAN THROUGH OBSTACLES, SUCH AS SUGAR CANE, WEEDS, AND SO ON. THESE ANIMALS ARE NOW IN SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS. SOURCE OF INFORMATION, OWNER OF FARM ADJACENT TO THE TOLEDO SUGAR FACTORY. TEODORO INFORMED. REPORTED BY ANTONIO ON 15 NOVEMBER. AQUILES.

C. 50. OTTO. RECEIVED MESSAGE NUMBER 87. AQUILES.

2. WAVE COMMENTS: RE REF. A. KARAT ONE AND TWO REFER TO OPERATION CORAL. NO WAVE TRACES SUBJS REF B. AND REF C. REF E. SAULO REFUGEE IN MEXICO, COTORRA IS COBRA 13 DRP. (also rcvd 73 DRI)

S E C R E T

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : C/SAS 5 (TEMPO FOR SAS SLOTTED AT 2145-27 NOV 63)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 282315Z

28 Nov 63 IN 69428

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8232

RYBAT TYPIC AMKHAN-2 COMMO TARROT

1. FULL WILL BE SENT. BEGIN AGENT MSG "ONE EIGHT X WEEKEND INTEL SENT OUTSTANDING X NEED ANY ADDITIONAL ADDRESSES MEXICO BUT ESPECIALLY MIAMI AND US X US XX ROGER WEDNESDAY CONTACTS X STILL WANT SEND TWICE WEEK TO YOU SO ADVISE SECOND DAY AND HOURS STARTING MID-DECEMBER X WE WOULD PREFER SATURDAY OR SUNDAY SKEDS XX ANY ADVANTAGE LUCY BEING REASSIGNED RESERVATION OFFICE X IF NOT HAVE HER TRY STAY SOYERUS XX HAVE ALL NET MEMBERS REPORT MILITARY PREPARATIONS MADE NORTH COAST LAST FIVE DAYS AND POSS LANDING CHINESE TROOPS NORTH COAST PORTS XX REQUEST YOU HAVE GENDRA REPORT ON POSSIBILITIES AND LIKELIHOOD ANYONE PUTTING TAP ON YOUR CIRCUIT TO KEY WEST X ENRIQUE" END AGENT MSG.

05 06

2. FOR DIR ONLY: LUCY IS (ESTER ARANGO) AND GENDRA IS (JUAN GENDRA) WESTERN UNION CABLE FOREMENT.

S E C R E T

2/PV

SECRET

(ao **SECRET**

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION : C/SAS 5
INFO : DOP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR

28 Nov 63 IN 69479

SECRET 280108Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8250

PRIORITY TYPIC AMSHATTER

1. IN S/W MESSAGE WRITTEN 4 NOV POSTMARKED 22 NOV MEXICO AND RECEIVED JMWAVE 27 NOV, AMSTASH-1 SAID HE WAITING OUR EXFILTRATION INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE CAN RECEIVE BY AT-3 ON CYPHER PAD FPSAM. A-1 RECOMMENDED (06) JUAN BAUTISTA (GONZALEZ) FRANCISCO AKA EL GALLEGO LONG TIME MEMBER A-1 NET TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS AND MONEY. A-1 ASKED THAT PORTION SALARY BEING HELD ESCROW ACCOUNT BE CONVERTED 11,400 PESOS AND SENT CUBA COVER COST FATHER EYE OPERATION AND FAMILY NEEDS BY 15 DEC. A-1 CONCLUDED MESSAGE STATING PREVIOUS INTELL REPORTS SENT PER HIS INSTRUCTIONS THROUGH EMBASSY DURING HIS ABSENCE ON TRIP CAIBARIEN ON OCTOBER EXFIL ATTEMPT.

2. (06) JUAN BAUTISTA (GONZALEZ) FRANCISCO NOT SAME JUAN BAUTISTA WHO IMPLICATED AMADDER TEAM.

3. NOTE THIS SW LETTER MAILED IN MEXICO. ALSO RECEIVED AT WAVE 27 NOV WERE THREE PLAIN TEXT INFO REPORTS FROM AMSTASH-1 APPARENTLY SENT THROUGH SAME EMBASSY CHANNEL. ALTHOUGH DETAILS THIS CHANNEL NOT REVEALED BY A-1 PRIOR HIS ARREST, RICARDO AND ANGEL BELIEVED CUTOUTS TO ONE VINCENTE IN FRENCH EMBASSY. VINCENTE SENDS MATERIALS TO MEXICO WHERE MAILED.

4. STATION DOES NOT INTEND SEND A-1'S PERSONAL FUNDS TO HIM. 2/[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: C/SAS 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/WE 2, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

S E C R E T 010042Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8370

1 DEC 63 IN 70957

RYBAT TYPIC AMFAUNA-25

REF DIR 83559

C/S COMMENT: *RE EXFILTRATION OF AMFAUNA-25 FROM CUBA.

1. BELIEVE IT CURRENTLY APPROPRIATE REVIEW AMFAUNA-25 SITUATION WITHIN FRAMEWORK THOSE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE REF FORWARDED. SUGGEST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS ARE:

A. WAVE ACTION RESULTED EXFILTRATION AMFAUNA-14 AND THUS DIRECT THREAT SECURITY AMFAUNA-35, AMFAUNA-39, BERNARDO (ALVAREZ) MON AND EDUARDO VEGA HAS BEEN ELIMINATED AS INITIAL DEBRIEFING AMFAUNA-14 REVEALS THESE AGENTS NOT KNOWN DSE. WILL ATTEMPT CONFIRM THIS INITIAL DEBRIEFING CONCLUSION VIA FLUTTER EXAM. IT APPEARS HOWEVER THAT OUR REMEDIAL ACTION HAS NOT ONLY AVERTED POSSIBLE FLAP BUT HAS KEPT VIABLE ASSETS IN PLACE.

B. WAVE ATTEMPTS EXFIL AMCUTLER-2 WERE NOT PRODUCTIVE BECAUSE AMCUTLER-2 REFUSED LEAVE CUBA WHEN WE OFFERED HER THIS OPPORTUNITY. THIS DUE FACT HER MOTHER SERIOUSLY ILL. REMOVAL AMCUTLER-2 FROM CUBA STILL REMAINS PRIORITY TASK AS AMFAUNA-14 DEBRIEFING CONFIRMS WAVE'S PREVIOUS ANALYSIS THAT AMCUTLER-2 IS PRIME CANDIDATE FOR IMMEDIATE ARREST. HER ARREST WOULD LEAD TO ARREST AMFAUNA'S 4, 10, 15, 18, 19, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37 AND 38. WAVE INTENDS MAKE MAXIMUM

11503

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

EFFORT AVOID THIS TYPE FLAP IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. THIS EFFORT HOWEVER CAN ONLY BE SUCCESSFUL IF WE ACT IN TIMELY AND IMAGINATIVE MANNER. IT WAVE OPINION THIS IS NOT TIME AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS WITH STOICISM BUT IT IS TIME INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENTS VIA SOUND ACTION. THUS DESPITE AMCUTLER-2 INITIAL REFUSAL LEAVE CUBA PROPOSE CONTINUE ATTEMPTS EXFIL HER ALTHOUGH THIS PROBLEM CURRENTLY COMPLICATED BY FACT WE HAVE NO DIRECT CONTACT WITH AMCUTLER-2 AND DO NOT KNOW WHERE SHE LOCATED AS SHE HAS GONE INTO HIDING AND HAS CUT TIES WITH NORMAL COMMO CHANNELS. WAVE TRYING IDENTIFY A-2 HIDING PLACE IN ORDER MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT EXFIL HER BUT THIS TIME CONSUMING FRUSTRATING EFFORT WHICH HOLDS NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS. SUGGEST THEREFORE FATE OTHER AMFAUNA ASSETS CANNOT BE ALLOWED DEPEND SOLELY ON THIS SINGLE EFFORT. HAVE THEREFORE REVIEWED EACH AMFAUNA ASSET WHO WOULD BE COMPROMISED BY ARREST AMCUTLER-2 AND HAVE CONSIDERED HOW WE COULD ATTEMPT SAVE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED.

2. WITHIN CONTEXT OVER-ALL REVIEW BELIEVE FOLLOWING FACTORS ARE GERMANE TO AMFAUNA-25 SITUATION.

A. THERE NO DIRECT SECURE COMMO BETWEEN WAVE AND AMFAUNA-25 AT THIS TIME. COMMO LINK WAS AMCUTLER-2 TO AMFAUNA-27 TO AMFAUNA-25. ~~SINCE AMCUTLER-2~~ OUT OF TOUCH THERE NO REPEAT NO WAY SECURELY FIND OUT DETAILS A-25 CURRENT SITUATION OR FOR A-25 TO COMMUNICATE WITH WAVE.

B. CUBA HAS STATE-CONTROLLED ECONOMY AND A-25 EMPLOYED INSURANCE CONTROL OFFICE CUBAN FINANCE MINISTRY THUS HE CAN

14-00000

TRAVEL ABROAD ONLY ON GOVERNMENT BUSINESS. VIEW GOC HARD CURRENCY SHORTAGE GOC NOT LIKELY LET A-25 TRAVEL ABROAD UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH REQUIRE EXPENDITURE GOC FUNDS. A-25 HAS NO KNOWN RELATIVES OR FRIENDS OUTSIDE CUBA WHO COULD FUND HIS TRAVEL ABROAD THUS IT UNREALISTIC ASSUME A-25 COULD HIMSELF ARRANGE LEGAL DEPARTURE CUBA. A-25 MUST BE HELPED IN ARRANGING LEGAL DEPARTURE AND THIS HELP CAN ONLY COME FROM KUBARK. DO NOT KNOW IF THIS HELP WILL BE EFFECTIVE BUT BELIEVE IT MUST BE OFFERED I.E. WE MUST ATTEMPT ARRANGE EXPENSE PAID INVITATION FOR A-25 VISIT LONDONG DISCUSS CUBAN INSURANCE PROBLEMS WITH MINET CO LONDON. LEAD THIME INVOLVED ARRANGING SUCH TRAVEL QUITE LENGTHY AND IF THIS APPROACH IS TO HAVE ANY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS IT MUST BE INITIATED WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. BELIEVE THIS TRAVEL CAN ONLY BE LAID ON WITH SMOTH KNOWLEDGE AND CONCURRENCE. SEE NO HARM PER SE IN DISCUSSING A-25 EXFIL OP WITH SMOTH. THEY WILL SAY YES OR NO. IF ANSWER IS NO WE HAVE HONESTLY AND IN GOOD CONSCIENCE EXHAUSTED ALL LEGAL MEANS ARRANGE A-25 EXFIL. IF ANSWER IS YES SMOTH WILL HAVE WITTINGLY AGREED ASSIST IN OP AND WILL BE AWARE PITFALLS IF ANY WHICH COULD CREATE EMBARRASSMENT. RE THIS POINT WAVE SEES NO FLAP POTENTIAL IN LEGAL EXFIL.

C. ONCE A-25 ARRIVES LOND HE WOULD BE DEBRIEFED IN DETAIL IN ATTEMPT CLARIFY ISSUES OF HIS BONA FIDES AND INTEL KNOWLEDGEABILITY. THIS EFFORT SHOULD PRODUCE INTERESTING INTEL AS A-25 OBVIOUSLY KNOWLEDGEABLE RE CUBAN FINANCE MINISTRY.

3/PJ

IN MILITIA OFFICER AND CIS COLLABORATOR WHO FURNISHES COVER FOR ONE OR MORE CIS STAFF EMPLOYEES HAVANA AND IS ALSO TARGETTED BY CIS AGAINST BRITISH CANADIAN EMBASSIES HAVANA. THESE FACTORS PLUS A-25 CLOSE ASSOCIATION CHE GUEVARA SHOULD PRODUCE INFO FROM LOND DEBRIEFING WHICH WOULD GIVE KUBARK CURRENT INSIGHT INTO SEVERAL AREAS WHERE TOP LEVEL INTEL LACKING. RECOGNIZING FACT THAT A-25 IS OPPORTUNIST SEE NO REASON BELIEVES HE WOULD NOT FURNISH THIS INFO ONCE HE MADE AWARE OF REALITIES WHICH COULD AFFECT HIS SECURITY IF AMCUTLER-2 ARRESTED.

D. IF A-25 COMES LOND AND AMCUTLER-2 EXFIL ARRANGED PRIOR EXPIRATION A-25'S TRAVEL TIME THEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO KEEPING A-25 IN PLACE IN CUBA IF HE BONA FIDE. BELIEVE THERE NO QUESTION BUT THAT A-25, IF HE KUBARK CONTROLLED AGENT WITH ACCESS COMMO CHANNEL, COULD BE SIGNIFICANT REPORTING ASSET DUE HIS POSITION AND IMPLIED INTEL ACCESS AS OUTLINED PARA 2-C. IN THIS SITUATION TIME EFFORT EXPENDED BRING A-25 LOND WOULD BE SOUND INVESTMENT AS IT SHOULD CLARIFY A-25 BONA FIDES AND IF HE BONA FIDE WOULD ENABLE US SEND TRAINED AGENT BACK TO TARGET AREA WITH COMMO. THERE CURRENTLY NO KNOWN SECURITY FACTORS MITIGATING AGAINST THIS ONCE AMCUTLER-2 OUT OF CUBA.

3. VIEW ABOVE RECOMMEND HQS EXPEDITE POA FOR PETER MINET 06 AND HAVE LOND DISCUSS A-25 TRAVEL TO BRITAIN WITH SMOTH 01 SOONEST. IF THIS DISCUSSION FAVORABLE THEN LOND SHOULD PROCEED RECRUIT 06 MINET AND HAVE HIM ATTEMPT ARRANGE A-25 TRAVEL. WISH REPEAT THAT SPEED IN HANDLING THIS PROPOSAL NOT ONLY ESSENTIAL BUT IS CRITICAL FACTOR ON WHICH SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THIS MANEUVER DEPENDS. PLS ADVISE.

2 SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : C/SAS 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, RI/AN DUMMY, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 022012Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8385

TYPIC ATHENA PETCOS COMMO

REF: A. WAVE 7580 (IN 61661)

B. WAVE 7581 (IN 61650)

C. WAVE 7793 (IN 64066)

D. WAVE 7860 (IN 64001)

E. WAVE 7861 (IN 64951)

F. WAVE 7964 (IN 65904)

G. WAVE 8116 (IN 67250)

H. WAVE 8117 (IN 67249)

I. WAVE 8118 (IN 67281)

J. WAVE 8134 (IN 67356)

K. WAVE 8140 (IN 67664)

L. WAVE 8262 (IN 69684)

IN 71764

1. FOLL IS TRANSLATION OF REFS:

11511

A. 70. RECEIVED MESSAGE 34. RUBEN RECOMMENDS JOSE GONZALEZ CANTO BECAUSE HE WAS A SERGEANT IN THE OLD ARMY AND KNOWS HOW TO HANDLE DIFFERENT WEAPONS AND SOME EXPLOSIVES. RAMON AND MARIO ARE COUSINS. TELL US WHAT PICTURES OF MARIO YOU WANT. THE ONE THAT DOI[illegible]ADIOS RECOMMENDS FOR INTELLIGENCE IS ORESTE TAMAYO MUNOS,

SECRET

PROFESSOR AT THE SCHOOL OF COMMERCE. I WILL CONTACT RENE THROUGH [illegible]IANO. DOIMEADIOS SAYS THAT CAMAY RECOMENDS FOR INTELLIGENCE. CONTINUES.

C. 71. CONTINUATION. MEDARDO SILVA MARRERO, BORN IN HOLGUIN. [illegible] OF OCTOBER 1927. LIVES LOS MOSCONES NEIHBORHOOD. SON OF SANTIAGO AND ALTA GRACIA. WORKS IN THE ASPHALT PLANT LOCATED IN THE AREA OF THE HOLGUIN MILITIA AIRPORT.

D. 72. RECEIVED MESSAGE 35. WILL SEND BIO DATA ON RENE BEFORE [illegible] CONTACT WITH HIM. ROBERTO ZAYAS WILL WORK IN THE ACTION CELL. BASED ON THE LOCATION OF THE HOUSE NEAREST THE POINT, IT IS MORE THAN [illegible] THREE KILOMETERS AWAY. THE POINT CAN BE REACHED BY A SECONDARY ROAD. THERE ARE NO PATROLS NOR OBSERVATION POSTS NEAR, THE NEAREST ONE IS 10 [illegible] 10 KILOMETERS. TELL US WHEN YOU CAN HAVE A RE-SUPPLY OPERATION. WE HAVE A FEW SABOTAGE OBJECTIVES, DATA SENT BY MAIL. ON NEXT TRANSMISSION WILL SEND SOME DETAILS OF OBJECTIVES CHOSEN.

E. 73. BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON RENE CRUZ RAMON, BORN IN VICTORIA DE LAS TUNAS ON 23 MAY 1929. LIVES IN JULIAN SANTANA 102 WHERE HE HAS HIS OFFICE. IS A PAPERMAKER. SON OF ROBERTO AND MANUELA, MARRIED TO MERCEDES CRUZ VELAZQUEZ. HAS ONE DAUGHTER NAMED ANAUELA RPT [illegible] ([illegible]). DOIMEADIOS TELLS ME THAT RUBEN RECOMMEND ROBERTO LEGON PINO FOR ACTION. HE WAS BORN IN HOLGUIN. CONTINUES.

F. 74. CONTINUTION. BORN ON 22 APRIL 1932. LIVES ON [illegible] 12. WORKS IN THE ELECTRIC PLANT OF HOLGUIN. RAPID INVESTIGATION OF THESE PEOPLE IS NECESSARY.

G. 75. AGUILAR HAS RECOMMENDED TO ME FOR ACTION AGENT IN PUERTO

PADRE RAMON DANIEL VALDES LEON NATIVE OF HAVANA. BORN 21 RPT 21 JUNE 195 RPT 1915. SON OF HERIBERTO AND TERESA. MARRIED TO LINA PACHECO RONDON. LIVES IN BATEY, CHAPARRA REPARTO MIRAMAR, PUERTO PADRE. WORKS AS MALE NURSE THIS MAN CONTROLS LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE ZONE.

G. 76. RECEIVED MESSAGE 36. DOIMEADIOS TELLS ME THAT RUBEN RECOMMENDS FOR ACTION ALFREDO DIAZ GONZALEZ BORN IN MANZANILLO. BORN (ALIAS [illegible]) ON 17 OCTOBER 1916. SON OF MANUEL AND TOMASA. WORKS AS CHIEF OF THE [illegible] EQUIPMENT WORKSHOPS OF THE OBRAS PUBLICAS (PUBLIC WORKS). LIVES IN [illegible] FERIA, 193. CONTINUES.

H. 77. CONTINUATION. RUBEN ALSO RECOMMENDS LEONARDO PUPO ROMERO BORN IN HOLGUIN. SON OF FRANCISCO AND MARIA. BORN ON 23 AUGUST 1938. LIVES IN THE EXTENSION OF PERALTA 36, HARLEM SECTION. WORKS ON CARGO SHIPS OF HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION (SIC). I NEED PESOS, TELL US IF YOU CAN MAKE ANOTHER CACHE. WE ARE RECRUITING ACTION PERSONNEL IN HIDDEN PLACES. SENT REPORTS ON TARGETS ON 17 NOVEMBER. CONTINUATION.

I. 78. CONTINUATION. TELL ME WHAT OTHER TYPE OF INFORMATION YOU NEED ON THE TANK PARK I REPORTED. I WILL ORDER AGUILAR TO INVESTIGATE WHO LIVES AT PUNTO TOMATE. THE EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL I WILL USE AS SELECTED TARGETS. THE OTHER MATERIAL WILL BE BURIED. THE SUPPLIES WILL BE CARRIED IN THE TRUCK OF MARIO TORANZO. THE EXPLOSIVES WERE DEPOSITED (SIC) IN THE FARM OF MULET. COORDINATES 584282, MAP SHEET 4975 IV.

J. 79. DOIMEADIOS TELLS ME THAT THE TANK PARK REPORTED IN POINT

7A MAP SHEET 4978 IV IS SURROUNDED BY BARBED WIRE FENCE. ONLY GUARD ARMED WITH A SOVIET PPSH WEAPON. IT IS IN A SENTRY BOX WITH PHONE LOCATED IN FRONT OF THE AGUAS CLARAS AND UNAS HIGHWAYS JUNCTION.

RE ARE SEVERAL ANTI-AIRCRAFT INSTALLED ON A HILL AT NORTH, NOT BEING A[illegible]

DETERMINE WHAT TYPE. THE AREA OF ALL THE CAMP IS APPROXIMATELY 1 SQUARE KILOMETER, THE AREA OCCUPIED BY THE TANKS IS ABOUT 1200 METERS. TANKS SEEM TO BE T-54S.

K. 80. RECEIVED MESSAGE 36. DOIMEADIOS TELLS ME THAT CAMAY RECOMMENDS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE CELL IBRAHIN ROBERTO MAURINO MIRANDA. BORN IN MATANZAS, SON OF ROBERTO AND TERESA. BORN ON 16 SEPT 1918. MARRIED TO INES FERIA. HAS TWO CHILDREN, ROBERTO AND INES. THIS MAN WAS CHIEF OF THE RURAL CORPS DURING THE PRIO GOVERNMENT. HE WAS THEN PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR FOR SEARS AND OTHER COMMERCIAL AND BANKING FIRMS. RAPID INVESTIGATION ONE THESE PEOPLE IS NECESSARY.

L. 81. RECEIVED MESSAGE 37. CONTACT IN VICTORIA WOULD BE RENE CRUZ RAMO. RENE HAS BEEN KNOWN TO ME FOR SOME YEARS THROUGH HIS LATE UNCLE FELIPE CRUZ COLON, DELICIA FARM. ALSO RENE WAS INSPECTOR [illegible] MARTIN COMPANY IN PUERTO PADRE. IN VICTORIA RENE WORKS WITH DR. [illegible] LAWYER IN VICTORIA. TRYING TO INVESTIGATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED. [illegible]

YOU CAN PROVIDE SOME MONEY EXPENSES ARE VERY HIGH HERE.

2. STATION COMMENT: FLS INDEX FOR WAVE FILES WITH LEGEND INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM GOC CONTROLLED AGENT, VALIDITY OF INFORMATION CANNOT BE DETERMINED.".

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

#7 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS COPY SLOTTED AT 2210, 3 DEC DD)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 040012Z

3 Dec 63 IN 72878

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8452

RYBAT TYPIC AMCLEW-3 COMMO FATBIU

1. FULL WILL BE SENT. BEGIN AGENT MSG: "ONE SIX THREE X POUCH ARRIVED NEXT TWO DEC X WILL RETRIEVE SOONEST XX ADVISE IF YOU THINK EMILIO IS WILLING BE EXFILTRATED X HE ONLY LINK IN CHAIN THAT WE KNOW OF BETWEEN YOU AND TONY XX JOSE X WILL PICK UP THINGS FROM MANOLO (DIEGO) NEXT TRIP NEXT X GORDA". END AGENT MSG.

06

2. FOR DIR ONLY: EMILIO IS (EMILIO CARBO), TONY IS AMCANOE-3, JOSE IS AMRIPE-2 AND MANOLO (DIEGO) IS A RELATIVE OF AMRIPE-1.

06

06

S E C R E T

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

3|PJ

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TO : DIRECTOR

61

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: WE 6

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 051553Z

5 DEC 63 IN 7424

MADR INFO DIR MEXI CITE WAVE 8525

01

KEYWAY PBRUMEN (QUOTA)

REF WAVE 8524 IN 74317

IDEN A - ODON (ALVAREZ) DE LA CAMPA

IDEN B - (GILBERTO (LIWAY) RODRIGUEZ) 06

IDEN C - (ALDO (VERA) SERAFIN) 06

IDEN D - (MANOLO (UZIEL)) 06

S E C R E T

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

30 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, SAS 8, OL 4, VR

SECRET 262027Z

PRIORITY MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 8671 IN 75337

DYVOUR PERUMEN AMTASE

REF MEXI 7268 (IN 74567) X

PLS SHIP REF ENVELOPES DIRECTLY TO WAVE COMMERCIALLY TO FULL ADDRESS: MISS GRACE HOLMES, P. O. BOX 1767, CORAL GABLES, FLA.

06

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *UNABLE SHIP ENVELOPES THRU CLASSIFIED POUCH UNTIL 13 DEC.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

l/pv

SECRET

1	4
2	5
3	6

DIRECTOR

JMWAVE

WH 8

DOP, CI, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 070030Z

7 Dec 63 IN 75579

[illegible] INFO DIR CITE WAVE 8642

[illegible] PERUMEN AMSTONE

REF WAVE 8641 (IN 75584)

06

1. IDEN A MR THEMISTOCLES APOSPOROS

B. MERIDA (GARCIA) ROSELL 06

S E C R E T

2/IN

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : C/SAS 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

S E C R E T 092016Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8724

RYBAT TYPIC AMTURVY SAGTEL

9 DEC 63 IN 76726

REF WAVE 8694 (IN 76046)

FOLLOWING TRANSLATION REF. 15. RECD MSG NR. 5. START SENDING THINGS VIA ENRIQUE (VICENTE SOCORRAS) AND THE (JAPANESE) EMBASSY. WE EXPECT YOU TO ADVISE WHEN YOU START POUCHING THINGS SO WE CAN WAIT FOR THEM. TODAY RECD THE MAGNUM PISTOLS BUT NO BULLETS. ALSO RECD THE RADIOS. ADVISE THE DISTANCE OVER WHICH YOU CAN HEAR THEM. SEND THE FILTERS FOR PISTOLS SOON. AMTURVY-1.

S E C R E T

2/PN

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and [illegible]

1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 2045, 9 DEC 63)BP

INFO : DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 092307Z

10 DEC 63 IN 76858

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8740

RYBAT TYPIC AMTURVY-1 COMMO SAGTEL

1. FOLL WILL BE SENT. BEGIN AGENT MSG: "SIETE X RECIBI INCLUSIVE UNO SEIS X BUEN TRABAJO XX TAMBIEN RECIBI SW NUMERO SIES X INFO MAGNIFICO XX TE MANDARE REPUESTOS ATRAVES JUSTO ESTA SEMANA X NO NESECITAS USAR JORGE 06 (GUTIERREZ) AHORA X SW LLAMA 06 (GUTIERREZ MORALES) PREG X QUIZAS PODAMOS USARLO MAS TARDE X TRATARE DE MANDARLE DINERO DE TODOS MODOS PARA EL FUTURO XX BALAS LLEGARAN PRONTO X FILTROS TAMBIEN XX AVISAME SI HAS RECIBIDO MI VALIJA NUMERO UNO CERO ATRAVES HALCON XX BARCO RUSSO KRASNOYE ZNAMYA X KRASNOYE ZNAMYA LLEGARA PRONTO HABANA X MANDA DOTOS DE CARGA CHA DISTINACION YANKEE DESCRIPCIONES DE RUSOS ABORDO QUE DESEMBARCARAN XX AVISA SI CONOCES ALQUIEN QUE TIENE LANCHA CERCA DE BAHIA HONDA XX FRITZ" END AGENT MSG.

2. FOR DIR ONLY: SEVEN. RECEIVED ALL THROUGH ONE SIX. GOOD WORK. ALSO RECEIVED SW NR. INFO WAS GOOD. WILL SEND SPARE PARTS THROUGH ENRIQUE VINCENTE SOCORRAS THIS WEEK. NO NECESSARY USE JORGE 06 (GUTIERREZ) NOW. IS HE NAMED 06 (GUTIERREZ MORALES) PERHAPS WE CAN USE HIM LATER. WILL TRY TO SEND HIM MONEY ANYWAY FOR THE FUTURE. BULLETS WILL ARRIVE SOON. FILTERS TOO. ADVISE IF YOU RECEIVED POUCH NR. ONE ZERO

C/PV

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

THROUGH ANGLEN-9. RUSSIAN SHIP KRASNOYE ZNAMYA WILL ARRIVE SOON HABANA. SEND INFO ON CARGO AND DESTINATION AND DESCRIPTIONS OF RUSSIAN ON BOARD WHO DISEMBARK. ADVISE IF YOU KNOW SOMEONE WHO OWNS A BOAT NEAR BAHIA HONDA.

SECRET

24 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4
2		5
3		6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: C/SAS 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, RI/AN DUMMY, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 102123Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8803 10[illegible] 7770[illegible]
08

RYBAT TYPIC AMBANTY FEDGUR COMMO

REF A. WAVE 8699 (IN 76062)

B. WAVE 8700 (IN 76064)

1. FOLL IS TRANSLATION REFS A AND B:

A. 90. OTTO. RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE NUMBER 89. SEND US ON LIBERTAD 12, 6 BOTTLES OF TRINRICON INTRINSIC. THESE ARE CAPSULES OF THE LILLY LABORATORIES TO FIGHT AGAINST PERNICIOUS ANEMIA. AQUILES.

B. 91. OTTO. DOCTOR JIMENES' NAME IS AURELIO MARTINEZ. 06 HE IS A PHYSICIST-MATHEMATICIAN. WAS RECRUITED BY IRENE AND WORKS WITH HER. THE DATA ON ADA'S NEPHEW WHO WILL COME OUT ON LIBERTAD 12 IS: JOSE CAMPOS PEREZ. 06 SON OF RICARDO AND CELINA. BORN IN HAVANA ON 18 AUGUST 1945. 18 YEARS OF AGE. SINGLE. STUDENT. THE NEW POSITION OF AGUILA IN CAYO LEVISA IS SAFE. WE WAIT FOR YOU. THE BOAT, WHICH IS BIG AND WITH MOTOR, WILL BE HIDDEN IN THE MANGROVES. ALL THE SIGNALS AND HOURS WILL BE THE SAME. AQUILES.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

2/IN

2. WAVE COMMENTS: REF B AURELIO (MARTINEZ) FERRO 201-280293 IS
06
OLD CONTACT OF AMCLATTER-5. A-5 WILL BE QUERIED ON SUBJ BUT NOT TOLD
FOR WHAT REASON. TOMAS RENE (INGUANZO) ORTIZ 201-349154 MENTIONS
06 9C
MARTINEZ IN HIS PRQ PART I, UFGA 7327, 8 FEB 63. REQUEST HQS
06
FORWARD 201-280293 TO JMWAVE. NO WAVE TRACES JOSE (CAMPOS) PEREZ.
REQUEST HQS TRACING AND INDEXING.

SECRET

SECRET

49 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, OC 8, VR

S E C R E T 102340Z

11 DEC 63 IN 77647

DIR CITE WAVE 8825

TYPIC AMTAUP YOACRE COMMO

06

1. REQUEST FOLL PRIORITY POAS. IDEN A CARLOS (EVANS) ROMAN DPOB 18 OCT 26 GUANTANAMO, CUBA. RESIDES CALLE ALFREDO DE ZAYAS 08 54 CAIMANERA WITH FATHER 06 EDUARDO (EVANS) SUBJ SINGLE AND HAS WORKED YOACRE AS OFFICE ASSISTANT FOR PAST 17 YEARS. IDEN B MARIANO 06 VIRGILIO DE LA CARIDAD (RAMIREZ) ALARCON DPOB 26 SEPT 12 CAMAGUEY, CUBA. RESIDES 08 SAN LUIS BELTRAN 66 CAMAGUEY. MARRIED DELFIA (MOLINA) 06 GONZALEZ WITH FOUR CHILDREN. SON MARIANO 06 (RAMIREZ) HERNANDEZ LIVES 347 N.E. 36TH ST, MIAMI. SUBJ FORMER ARMY OFFICER PRIOR 59 AND PRESENTLY WORKS AS CAMAGUEY PUBLIC PROCTOR.

2. NO LOCAL ODENVY TRACES SUBJS. ONLY WAVE TRACES INFO PROVIDED BY AMTAUP-10 WHICH SUMMARIZED PARA 1 ABOVE.

S E C R E T

7/rv

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

43 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, SR 7, WH 7, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, AD/RR 3, VR.

TDCS

SECRET 120028Z 12 DEC 0420Z 63 IN 78723

DIR INFO LANT PACY BARR CITE WAVE 8923

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

INTEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMLISP-1 IN SW MSG 317 DTD 10 NOV RECD FROM TRANSLATION 30 NOV 63. INFORMANTS ARE AUDILIO HERRERA 06 SURGIDERO DE BATABANO RESIDENT AND FORMER WHOLESALE FRUIT VENDOR, AND EDILIO GOMEZ 06 RESIDENT OF FINCA ALGOBIN, BATABANO. BOTH WERE RECRUITED BY (FNU) DE LA TORRE FULL IDEN NOT ESTABLISHED. FIELD COMMENTS ARE FROM AMSUM-4 MONITORING OF CLT. RID. NO INDEX. FILED 12/0028Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: CUBA

SUBJ: 1. TRAVEL OF SOVIETS FROM BATABANO TO ISLA DE PINOS.

2. CARGO TRAFFIC BETWEEN ISLA DE PINOS AND BATABANAO

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS
PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING HQ:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
[illegible]

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY

REPORT NO. TDCS

SUBJECT

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCES IN 78723

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. ON 6 NOVEMBER 1963, AT ABOUT 6:00 P.M., TWO TRUCKS, NOT OF U.S. MANUFACTURE, TRANSPORTING A TOTAL OF 24 MEN, WHO APPEARED TO BE SOVIETS, ARRIVED IN BATABANO, HABANA PROVINCE. THE MEN WERE WELL-GROOMED, WORE CLEAN CLOTHES AND WERE CARRYING SUITCASES AND BUNDLES. AT MIDNIGHT THESE INDIVIDUALS BOARDED THE FERRY SAILING FOR ISLA DE PINOS. (FIELD COMMENT: A USALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE ISLA DE TESORO, THE REGULAR FERRY TO ISLA DE PINOS, DEPARTED FROM BATABANO FOR GERONA, ISLA DE PINOS, ON THE NIGHT OF 6 NOVEMBER.)

2. ON 31 OCTOBER AT ABOUT 10:00 P.M., TWO OLIVE GREEN TRAILER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR | DIA | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | AID | USIA | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | OBI | OO

STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

TRUCKS HAULING BOXES ARRIVED AT THE PORT OF BATABANO FROM ISLA DE PINOS.

3. ON 28 OCTOBER AT ABOUT 3:00 P.M., TWO OLIVE GREEN TEN-WHEELED TRUCKS DRIVEN BY MILITIAMEN ARRIVED IN BATABANO AND WERE SHIPPED ABOARD THE ISLA DE PINOS FERRY WHICH LEFT THE SLIP AT 4:00 P.M. THE TRUCKS HAD AN ENCLOSED METAL BODY WITH SMALL SIDE WINDOWS AND EACH TRUCK PULLED A FOUR-WHEELED TRAILER. (FIELD COMMENT: A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT ON 28 OCTOBER ZIL TRUCKS WERE ON BOARD THE ISLA DE TESORO FERRY WHICH SAILED FOR GERONA.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMNAVKEYWEST.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

43 S E C R E T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, ~~IW~~, RI/AN, WH 7, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, AD/RR 3, VR.

TDCS

S E C R E T 120028Z 12 DEC 04527 63 IN 78734

DIR CITE WAVE 8924

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

INTEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMLISP-1 IN SW MSG 315 DTD 7 NOV 63 RECD FROM TRANSLATION 30 NOV 63. SUBSOURCE IS REBECA (ALBERT) 06 WHOSE FIANCE'S UNCLE, JUAN (FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ) 06 (PER SW 328 DATED 28 NOV), IS A NOTARY WHO RESIDES NEAR TORRENS AND WHO REPORTED OBSERVATIONS OF TRAFFIC. FIELD COMMENT SHOE. RID: INDEX. FILED 120028Z.

REPORT CLASS: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM CUBA

SUBJ: TRUCK TRAFFIC AND TUBE-LIKE OBJECTS SEEN ENTERING TORRENS BASE

DOI: 9 OCT - 7 NOV 63 PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (30 NOV 63)

UFG-4246

SOURCE: A FORMER CUBAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE

IN COMMENT:

NO DISSEM[illegible] THE ATTACHED
NO PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS [illegible]
[illegible] OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING
[illegible] BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS
PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING TDO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2/PV

S E C R E T

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

REPORT NO. TDCS

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

REFERENCES IN 8134

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. AS OF 7 NOVEMBER 1963, AFTER 10:00 P.M. ALMOST EVERY NIGHT TRUCKS AND TRAILER TRUCKS COVERED WITH CANVAS WERE OBSERVED TRAVELING TOWARD TORRENS, THE FORMER REFORMATORY ON THE WAJAY HIGHWAY SOUTHWEST OF HABANA.

2. ON 11 OCTOBER SIX LARGE TRAILER TRUCKS ENTERED TORRENS AND ON 9 OCTOBER, TEN MORE OF THESE LARGE TRAILER TRUCKS ENTERED THE BASE. AN UNIDENTIFIED DRIVER OF A VEHCILE TRAVELLING BEHIND ONE OF THE TRUCKS REPORTEDLY OBSERVED TUBE-LIKE OBJECTS WHICH PROTRUDED AT LEAST ONE METER BEYOND THE TRUCK BED OF ONE OF THE TRAILERS, WHEN BY CHANCE THE WIND BLEW TO ONE SIDE THE TARPAULIN COVERING THE TRAILER'S CARGO.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[illegible]	OO	[illegible]

STATE/INR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

3. FIELD COMMENT: THE TORRENS SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE ASSEMBLY AREA WAS ACTIVE DURING THIS PERIOD, ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

END OF MESSAGE

14/ SECRET

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION : C/SAS 3
INFO : DDP, VR

SECRET 122029Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8926

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

78730
[illegible]

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF UFGA 12673

d

AMYUM/19 TOLD GUERTLER THAT (CUANTUM/51) WILL BE ASKED CONTACT FULL AMYUMS IN CUBA AND PASS INSTRUCTIONS FOR RECEIVING SW MSG.

06

1. MARIA TERESA (SACRE) ABIRAFHED - WAVE TRACES IN REF.

06

2. CARLOS (URANGA) GARCIA - WAVE TRACES IN REF.

06

3. DR FRANCISCO RENE (DE LA HUERTA) AGUIAR AGE APPROX 48 YRS BORN HAVA. ACCORDING UFG 256 SUBJ HEADED AMYUM INTEL IN HAVA. NO OTHER WAVE TRACES.

06 06

4. DE LA HUERTA WILL ACT AS CUTOUT FOR DR MARIO ENRIQUE (MARTINEZ) DELGADO BORN 28 SANTO DOMINGO, LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. SUBJ WORKS HOSPITAL DE DEMENTES DE MAZORRA. ONLY WAVE TRACES AMHINT/27 CONTACT REPORT 8 AUG 62 SUGGESTING SUBJ BE USED AS CUTOUT IN A/27 OPS.

SECRET

6/PV

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

42 SECRET

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, ~~FI~~, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, WH 7, AD/CI 2, DD/I, AD/NE, VR.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

TDC:

S E C R E T 12ØØ29Z DEC 12 Ø835Z 63 IN 78746

DIR INFO LANT PACY BARR CITE WAVE 8927

INTEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMICE-14, FROM AMTRUNK-7 WITH PARA 1 FROM HUMBERTO 06 (BERGARA), MEMBER OF A DRE-SPONSORED INFILTRATION TEAM, WHO OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM UNIDENTIFIED LOCAL FISHERMEN AND PARA 2 FROM IRENE 06 (MILIAN) THE WIDOW OF JUAN 06 MANUEL (MILIAN), WHO RECEIVED THE INFORMATION IN A CALL FROM MAGDALENA 06 ((MONTESINO)), THE MOTHER OF LAZARO 06 ORALIO (ALEJANDRO) MONTESINO). PLEASE PROTECT SUBSOURCES.

RID: NO INDEX. FILED 12ØØ29Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: CUBA

SUBJ: ARRESTS AND MILITIA VIGILANCE IN THE NORTHERN COASTAL AREA OF

IW COMMENT:

[illegible] [illegible]NATION OF THE ATTACHED
[illegible] PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS [illegible]
[illegible] OUTSIDE THE AGENCY [illegible]
[illegible] BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IRO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

5/IR

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY
REPORT NO. TDCS
SUBJECT
DATE DISTR.
PRECEDENCE
DATE OF INFO.
REFERENCES IN 78746
PLACE & DATE ACQ.
APPRAISAL
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. AS OF 5 DECEMBER 1963, THE NORTHERN COASTAL AREA OF MATANZAS PROVINCE, PARTICULARLY THAT IN THE VICINITY OF RIO PALMA (N 23-04, W 80-54), WAS UNDER MILITIA SURVEILLANCE.

2. AS OF 9 DECEMBER, MANY PERSONS HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN MARTI, ITABO, AND MAXIMO GOMEZ, MATANZAS PROVINCE, AND MILITIA WERE ALL ALONG THE COASTLINE IN THIS AREA.

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, COMNAVKEYWEST, USCG (MIAMI).

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[illegible]	DO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

24 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : C/SAS 5 (SAS COPY SLOTTED AT: 2000, 12 DEC BP)

INFO : DOP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 122240Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8966

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

12 Dec 63 IN 79555

RYBAT TYPIC AMTURVY-1 COMMO SAGTEL

1. FOLL WILL BE SENT: BEGIN AGENT MSG: "NUEVE X FRANCISCO X DENTRO POCOS DIAS AVISA SI LANCHAS CLASE KOMAR LLEVAN AHORA COHETES VIVOS X TAMBIEN SI LLEVAN AHORA CLASE PAPA SEIS CARGAS DE PROGUNDIDAD VIVAS YANKEE TORPEDOS VIVOS X QUE TIPO COMBUSTIBLE USAN PAPA SIES PREG X SE ANADA ALGO AL COMBUSTIBLE COMO ADITIVO PARA DARLE MAS POTENCIA PREG X HAZ DIBUJO POR SW DE PERFIL VISTA LATERAL YANKEE VISTA ARRIBA DANDO LOCALIDADES DE TANQUES DE COMBUSTIBLE YANKEE MOTORES XSI PUEDE CMA PIDELE PRESTADO ALFA FRANCISCO MANUEL DE MANTENAMIENTO PARA FOTOGRAFEARLO PEPE X LANCHAS CUBANAS DE PESCAR SAN IGNACIO CMA MARIA ELENA YANKEE LOS ANGELES LLEVABAN ARMAS ALFA LATINA AMERICA X FAVOR DE AVERIGUAR SI ESTOS BARCOS TIENEN RADIO DOMMUNICACIONES XX HOY MANDE DOS CIENTOS DOLLARES ALFA JORGE CUTIERREZ EN CANADA XX FAVOR DE MANDAR ANTECEDENTES DE PEPE YANKEE JUSTO PARA CHEQUIAR ARCHIVOS AQUI X ABRAZOS X FRITZ" END AGENT MSG.

2. FOR DIR ONLY: NINE. AMTURVY-9. WITHIN A FEW DAYS ADVISE IF KOMAR CLASS BOATS NOW CARRY LIVE ROCKETS. ALSO IF P-6 CLASS BOATS CARRY LIVE DEPTH CHARGES AND LIVE TORPEDOES. WHAT TYPE FUEL DO THEY USE. IS ANYTHING ADDED TO THE FUEL FOR MORE POWER. MADE A SKETCH IN

8/12

SECRET

EW OF SIDE AND TOP VIEWS SHOWING THE LOCATIONS OF FUEL TANKS AND MOTORS. IF HE ABLE, HAVE AMTURVY-9 LOAN YOU A MAINTENANCE MANUAL FOR PHOTOGRAPHING. LUIS (GONZALEZ.) 06 THE CUBAN FISHING BOATS SAN IGNACIO, MARIA ELENA AND THE LOS ANGELES HAVE BEEN CARRYING ARMS TO LATIN AMERICA. PLS DETERMINE IF THESE BOATS HAVE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS. TODAY WE SENT 200 DOLLARS TO JORGE (GUTIERREZ) 06 IN CANADA. PLS FORWARD FULL BIO DATA ON LUIS (GONZALEZ) 06 AND ENRIQUE (VICENTE SOCORRAS) 06 SO WE CAN CHECK THE FILES HERE.

SECRET

4/1W

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, OS 2, VR

S E C R E T 130018Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8985

TYPIC SECUR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

13 Dec 63 IN 79825

REFS: A. DIR 78641 *

B. UFGT 6718

1. SUBJ WAS GRANTED PCSA PER REF A UNDER NAME (EMMA HARRIS) 06 NEE (DORA BROWN) 06 REF B ADVISED SUBJ NOW KNOWN AS (EMMA HARRIS 06 JOHNSON) PLS ADVISE IF ORIGINAL PCSA STILL VALID.

2. WAVE TRACES ON NEW NAME NEG.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * PCSA GRANTED SUBJS EFFECTIVE 25 OCT.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

3/nv

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO : DOP, CI/OA, RI/AN, VR

S E C R E T 132032Z

DIR CITE WAVE 9018

13Dec63 IN 80386

TYPIC AMCOG

1. REQUEST POAS FOLL:

A. DR. FIDENCIO (SANCHEZ) ESCOTO BORN CA 15 CUBA. VETERINARIAN. MARRIED TO LOLINA FEBLES. RESIDES HABANA CALLE 30 NR 304 BETWEEN 25 Y 27 VEDADO. MENTIONED UFG 2873, 3002, 3172, 3332, 3459 AND UFGA 10978.

B. DR. OSCAR (PINA) HERNANDEZ BORN CA 13 CUBA. COURT JUDGE. MARRIED TO PETITE ESNARD. RESIDES HABANA LOPEZ SIERRA BLDG APT 94, VEDADO. MENTIONED UFG 3285 AND UFGA 4989 AND 12039.

C. DR. CARLOS (RUBI) BORN 24 HABANA. DR MEDICINE. U OF HABANA GRAD. MARRIED TO ALICIA CUSCO FORMER TEACHER SACRED HEART. NO CHILDREN. RESIDES CALLE 60 NO 1114 BETWEEN 11 Y 13, MARIANAO. MENTIONED UFG 2817.

12654

D. RAMON IVAN (LEDO) GARVALLO 38 HABANA. SINGLE. FORMER MANAGER MUEBLICENTRO. RESIDES WITH PARENTS JOSE RAMON (LEDO) GONZALEZ AND ADA HILDA GARVALLO 5TH AVE NO 4417 BETWEEN 46 AND 60, MARIANAO.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES.

E. DR. RENE (ZAMORA) CARBONELL BORN CA 28 CUBA L~~O~~AWYER. MARRIED, RESIDES HABANA AQUIAR NO 363. MENTIONED UFG 2671.

F. MANUEL (CAMPANIONI) SOUZA BORN HABANA DATE UNK. PERFUME MFG. FORMERLY EMPLOYED CAPRI, HILTON AND COMMODORE HOTELS, RACE TRACK CASINO AND MONTMARTE NIGHTCLUB. MARRIED TO ALICIA WITH ONE DAUGHTER LIVING MIAMI BEACH. RESIDES CALLE 6 NO 909. NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES.

G. SECUNDINO (FERNANDEZ) GONZALEZ BORN CA 08 CUBA. FORMER POLICE OFFICER FIRED 10 MAR 52. FARM OWNER. MARRIED TO TERESA (HEVIA) CACHERO. ONE SON BERNARDO (FERNANDEZ) HEVIA BORN 40 HABANA. RESIDE CALLE SEGUNDA NO 269 BETWEEN ALBEAR Y SANTA CATALINA, REPARTO PALATINO, HABANA. MENTIONED UFG 2817 AND 2883.

H. CAPT EDUARDO (RODRIGUEZ) CAMPBELL, BORN CA 15, NEGRO. GENERAL STAFF OFFICER CUBAN ARMY. MARRIED WITH FOUR CHILDREN. FORMER CARPENTRY SHIP OWNER WHO JOINED FIDEL CASTRO IN SIERRA MAESTRE AND REMIANED IN ARMY. RESIDES PAN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN ZABORRA AND RANCHO BOYEROS. AMLINT-1 REPORT DEC 62 LISTS SUBJ IN G-1 GENERAL STAFF. AMOT TRACES REFLECT SUBJ BORN PALMA SORIANO, FOUGHT SIERRA MAESTRE IN COLUMN NO. 3 UNDER ALMEIDA.

2. REQUEST TRACES DSE LT. SEGUNDO (FERRERO) CUEVAS. BORN CUBA DATE NOT GIVEN. FORMERLY MARRIED TO ANA LEDEA. RE-MARRIED JAN 63. NO

CHILDREN. RESIDES CALLE 9 NO 8007 BETWEEN 80 Y 82 MIRAMAR. MARIANAO, HABANA. IDENTIFIED UFG 980. AMCONCERT-1 REPORTS SUBJ COLSE FIDEL AND RAUL CASTRO. ALSO SPELLED FERRER.

3. NO LOCAL ODENVY TRACES.

4. INDEX.

SECRET

DATE : 21 NOVEMBER 63

TO : JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : FD 3, DDP, CCS 3, OP 2, VR

22 NOV 63 14 35z

SIG CEN

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 84474

TYPIC/PERS

REF: A. UFGT-4905 (para 4)
B. UFGT-4735
C. DIR 31166

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

04

MR. (FRANK A JOHNSON) CONTRACT EXPIRED 28 OCT 63. ADVISE VIA CABLE ASAP IF [redacted] TO BE RENEWED. ORIGINAL CONTRACT NEGOTIATED AT JMWAVE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS COMMENT: Request Headquarters payroll Subject starting with April 63 salary.

C/SAS/Finance

Richard Cummings
FB/CEAS (telecon 21 Nov. 63)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

22-4

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ORVILLE C. DAWS
C/SAS/PERSONN
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

11.5.72

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : C. A. Heine
UNIT : EE/Logistics
EXT : 6913
DATE : 21 Nov 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1
2
3

TO : FRANKFURT INFO WAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : EE 6

INFO : ODP, SAS 8, OP 2, OL 4, VR

22 Nov 63 19 05z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

XX ROUTINE

TO FRAN INFO WAVE CITE DIR 84538

REF WAVE 7824 (NOT SENT FRAN)

03

1. REF ADVISES HHE MISS JOAN GRASSIE PACKED FRAN 28 AUGUST FOR SHIPMENT WAVE VIA WASHINGTON NOT RECEIVED. GBL NUMBER UNKNOWN BUT ALPHA TRANSPORT FRAN RECEIPT 30890 CITED

2. NO INFO HQ. PLEASE TRACE ADVISE DIR INFO WAVE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *(IN 64295).

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

03

Austin J. Thomas
Austin J. Thomas
C/EE/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

C/TD/PMB Mr. Brown (Telecoord)
SAS/Log Mr. Tingby (Telecoord)
EE/S

03

COORDINATING OFFICERS

03

Charles A. Heine
Charles A. Heine
C/EE/Log
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

4/PV

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

S-E-C-R-E-T

WE/5
6689
22 NOV 63 X 65-120-12

WAVE MADRID

22 Nov 63 21 17z

SIG CEN

WE 6

DDP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

X

WAVE MADR

84653

REF A. MADR 9692 (IN 64546)*

B. OSMA-7109, 1 AUG 1957 **

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

HQS REQUEST WELDRAKE'S COMMENTS ON SUBJ OF REF A. PLS INFO MADR. NO TRACES HQS OTHER THAN REF B. RE PARA 4 INTERESTED MADR STATION THINKING RE POSSIBLE UTILIZATION.

END OF MESSAGE

06

* REQUESTED URGENT TRACES (ALFONSO [illegible] CONDES) FORMER LANGUAGE INSTRUCTOR OF WELDRAKE, WHO IN CONTACT WITH OAS SPAIN AND WHO HAS OFFERED SERVICES TO KUBARK.

** ONLY RECORD OF SUBJ AT HQS AND MADR

C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FRED E. HUBBARD
C/WE/S
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

104-10077-10112 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: R.E. Scott:rg
UNIT: WH/3/Mexico
EXT: 5940
DATE: 22 Nov 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-500

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

23 Nov 63 16 33z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

WAVE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 84879

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

PERUMEN

REF: WAVE 7856 (IN 64817)*

1. NO ADDITIONAL TRACES GARCIA. NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES VALDES.

2. LEAD SHOULD BE HANDLED BY MEXI PRINCIPAL AGENT ASSET OR MEXI PERUMEN OPS OFFICER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Ref requested traces AMCONCERT one leads. Suggested WAVE CO make contact in Mexi with (Martha Valdes,) 06 studying in Mexi on World Health Org. scholarship.

SAS/EOB Bonis (by phone)

26

D. FITZGERALD
C/SAS

W Hood

~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
RELEASING OFFICER

J.E. Whitten
(J. E. WHITTEN)
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JC King
J. C. KING
C/WHD

~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

2/12

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 11847

5909
☒ NO INDEX

26 NOVEMBER 1963

TO: JMWAVE

FROM:

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, WH 7, VR

WAVE INFO MEXI 35141

TYPIC WHANCHOR

REF: WAVE 8103 (IN 67254)

ODACID SENT OMV-99 TO HEFINCH MEXI ON 3 SEPT 63 AUTHORIZING VISAS.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS COMMENT: Ref requested coordination with State regarding expediting U S Visas for wife and daughter of Alejandro RIOSECO Arencibia, WAVE FM asset.

04

WH/3 Reichardt *Telecon*

SAS/MOB Hicks In draft

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

26-11

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

G.A. Ladner, Jr.
GEORGE A. LADNER, JR
C/SAS/SECURITY
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

1/R/

MULTI - ADDRESSEE CABLE SEE BELOW

27 NOV 63 21 50Z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 6

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE 4, WE 4, NE 4, FE 6, WH 7, VR, (POUCH FRAN 9, BONN 5, BRLN 5, MUNI 5, ATHE 6, ALL OTHER STA'S 3)

DEFERRED S/C GEN

X ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE

PBRUMEN ZRPRIMA

99

LOND PARI BRUS HAGU COPE STOC OSLO MADR
ROME

CABLE SEC: (PLS POUCH CABLE TO FOLLOWING:) (WRENCH POUCH)

99

FRAN FROB BONN HAMB BRLN MUNI VIEN ATHE
BERN GNVA CAIR BEIR TEHE TELA RIOD SAOP
MEXI MRID SAGO MONT BUEN CARA LAPA LIMA 99
QUIT GUAT SNTO MELB TOKY HONG WAVE BARC
HELS LISB MILA OTTA TRIE

99

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

4/IV

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ORIG : PAT E. PATTY 03
UNIT : NE/6/INDIA
EXT : 6207
DATE : 29 NOV 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

24 **SECRET**

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

29 Nov 63 22 21z

SIG CEN

ROUTING

85387

TO : CABLE SECRETARIAT

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, NE 4, VR

TO INFO CITE DIR

12-22

PLEASE RELAY DIR 85387 TO NEW DELHI FOR INFORMATION.

END OF MESSAGE

NE/OPS/RA
RELEASING OFFICER

SAS/EOB/Mr. [illegible]
(by [illegible])
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DC/NE/6 03
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

4/PI

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

S E C R E T

63 FILE NO. 200-120-47

22 NOV 63 17 03z

CERTAIN STATIONS AND BASES

DIRECTOR

[redacted]

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE INFO CITE DIR [illegible]

DEBRUMEN ZRPRIMA

REF: DIR 22218

1. RECENTLY CONCLUDED HQS REVIEW OF ZRPRIMA 1 PROGRAM SHOWS THAT KUBARK 2 EFFORTS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ANY SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND CONTINUATION OF PROGRAM AS SUCH NO LONGER WARRANTED. MAIN REASON FOR KUBARK 2 FAILURE IS THAT CUBAN TECHNICIAN RECRUITING PROGRAM HAS BEEN MISERABLE FAILURE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST FIDEL'S ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF 2000 TECHS FROM WESTERN EUROPE ALONE. THOUGH OUR FIGURES NOT COMPLETE, WE ESTIMATE PROBABLY LESS THAN FIFTY CANDIDATES HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL AND WE ABLE CONFIRM ABOUT TEN WHO HAVE ACTUALLY MADE IT TO THE ISLAND. KUBARK 2 SUCCEEDED IN INSERTING ABOUT THIRTY RECRUITED TECHS INTO THE VARIOUS HIRING CHANNELS, BUT SO FAR ONLY TWO HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL FROM HAVA.

2. CUBAN FAILURE TO RECRUIT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS APPEARS DUE LARGELY TO RELUCTANCE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS PURSUE TECH RECRUITING MISSION AGGRESSIVELY, BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE IN HAVANA, FEAR OF INFILTRATION OF HOSTILE AGENTS

CONT...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

AND PROBABLE LOSS OF INTEREST IN THE PROGRAM ON PART OF CASTRO HIMSELF. THESE FACTORS WHICH EMERGE FROM OUR STUDY OF THE CUBAN PERFORMANCE ACCOUNT FOR LACK OF RESPONSE FROM EMBASSIES TO APPLICATIONS, LONG DELAY IN GETTING WORD BACK FROM HAVANA AND SMALL NUMBER OF TECHS ULTIMATELY HIRED. LONG TIME LAG BETWEEN INITIAL APPLICATION AND ULTIMATE APPROVAL FROM HAVA, WHICH RUNS SIX TO NINE MONTHS, HAS COST CUBANS NUMBER OF TECHS WHO WERE INITIALLY EAGER BUT SUBSEQUENTLY LOST INTEREST OR TOOK OTHER JOBS.

3. IN FACE OF FOREGOING WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE TO CONTINUE INTENSIVE SEARCH FOR ZRPRIMA CANDIDATES FOR INSERTION INTO CUBAN HIRING CHANNEL. WISH STRESS STATIONS WITH ACTIVE LEADS SHOULD STAY WITH THEM IN THE HOPE THEY MAY STILL BE HIRED, BUT CEASE EFFORTS TO GENERATE LEADS FROM SCRATCH. ON OTHER HAND, THERE ARE FAIR NUMBER NON BLOC TECHS IN CUBA AND IT LIKELY CUBANS WILL CONTINUE TO HIRE NEEDED TECHS ON LIMITED SELECTIVE BASIS AS THEY DID PRIOR TO ZRPRIMA PROGRAM. STATIONS THEREFORE ARE URGED TO CONTINUE BE ALERT FOR SUCH OPPORTUNITIES AND TO EXPLOIT THEM IN SAME MANNER AS ALL OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO PLACE RESIDENT AGENTS IN CUBA.

CONT...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

INFO CITE DIR 85387

IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT MOST PERUMEN[3] OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECRUITING TECHS TEND TO RELY HEAVILY ON LOCAL CP STAMP OF APPROVAL OR OTHER STRONG INDICATION THAT CANDIDATE IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. LACKING THIS THEY MAY EITHER IGNORE THE APPLICATION OR REJECT IT.

4. RESPONSE OF MOST STATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING ZEPRIMA[1] HAS BEEN MOST GRATIFYING. WE PROVIDED CUBANS WITH GOOD NUMBER HIGHLY QUALIFIED ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS WHICH THEY FOR REASONS CITED UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ACCEPT. KUBARK[2] HAS MADE A RESPECTABLE EFFORT TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY AND FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS IS MERELY REFLECTION CUBAN CONFUSION AND INEPTITUDE WITH RESULTANT FAILURE ACHIEVE THEIR OWN GOALS.

5. DISCONTINUE USE ZEPRIMA[1] SLUG AND FILE 200-120-67.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Cable pre-dates CS files. Copy may be seen in CIA reference file.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. /

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12 62

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE FOUR

TO   INFO   CITE DIR 85387

SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB ______ 03
WE/5 ______ 03
C/WE
AC/EE ______ 03
C/NE ______ 03
C/WH
C/FE

WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
C/WE

~~THOMAS KARAMESSINES~~
~~ADDP~~

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER
4/DV

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

:ROY W. FORSLUND/jwl
:SAS/PERSONNEL
:6376
:4 DECEMBER 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

4 DEC 63 23 48z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

:JMWAVE
M: DIRECTOR
F: SAS 8
: DDP, OP 2, OS 2, VR

WAVE INFO CITE DIR 86868

TYPIC PERS

REF: WAVE-8461

03

MR. JOSEPH F. PEARSON CLEARED FOR TYPE A CONTRACT EMPLOYMENT 4 DEC 63.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/COMMENT: Pls advise re clearance subject ref b

COORD (telecon)

Philip Warner/Office of Security

03

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER

4-18

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Orville C Dawson

ORVILLE C. [illegible]
C/SAS/[illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

2/IN

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ROY W. FORSLUND/531
SAS/PERSONNEL
6576
5 DECEMBER 63

SECRET

4
5
6

5 DEC 63 22 42z

JMWAVE

DIRECTOR

SAS 8

DDP, OP 2, OS 2, VR

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

X ROUTINE

C

WAVE INFO CITE DIR 87136

TYPIC PERS

REF: WAVE-7893

06

MR. GREER P. HANVEY CLEARED PER REF REQUEST.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *(IN 65155)

SAS/COMMENT: Req priority amendment permit use of subj WAVE area as Maritime c/o.

Orville C Dawson

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
AC/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER

5-2

1/RV

COORDINATING OFFICERS

ORVILLE C. DAWSON
C/SAS/PERSONNEL

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 1082 Copy No.

(K. C. DE KIRK) jmp
WH/2/UP 03
6097
5 DEC 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

6 Dec 63 15 50 z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

JMWAVE (MONTEVIDEO) 16-24

DIRECTOR

WH 8

DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

WAVE INFO (MONT) 16-24 CITE DIR

87291

REFS A. DIR 78231*

B. WAVE 8204 (IN 68510)**

C. WAVE 8439 (IN 72764)**

[illegible] DYVOUR

24

IN VIEW CONTINUED OPS INTEREST (URUG DIPS) EXPRESSED REFS B AND C, REQUEST WAVE REPLY REF A. YOUR ANSWER DEEMED NECESSARY FOR PROCESSING POA REQUEST REF C.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Requested WAVE review entire scope and purpose recruiting (Urug dips) assigned Wave in light of past and anticipated future developments. 24

**WAVE requested POA on wife of (one dip) and on another (dip) who both represent ops potential. 24 24

WH/2/UP

C/WH/2

03

SAS/MOB/Mr. (Bryant) by Phone

SAS/MOB/Mr. (Monahan), by Phone

03

C/SAS

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

10835

9/PU

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIG: P.A.MAGGIO:cmf
UNIT: C/SAS/MOB/FI
EXT: 6957
DATE: 10 DECEMBER 63

TO: JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/SAS 5
INFO: [illegible]

IMMEDIATE WAVE

88119

RYBAT TYPIC AMWEEK AMFAUNA

REFS A) WAVE 8316 (IN 70529)

B) WAVE 8346 (IN 70905)

C) DIR 87628

D) DIR 87290

E) DIR 87508

F) WAVE 8762 (IN 76933) *

FOR HEUTEMAN

PLEASE BRIEF DAINOLD ON WAVE'S VIEWS RE ~~AMWEEK-1~~ CACHING AND MAKING DEAD DROPS AT THIS TIME IN LIGHT ~~REF~~ F. IS IT REASONABLE TO ~~[illegible]~~ ASSUME A AMWEEK-1 UNDER DSE SURVEILLANCE, PARTICULARLY SINCE EXFILTRATION AMWEEK-2 AND AMFAUNA-14? KEYWAY DEEPLY CONCERNED CONTINUED USE AMWEEK-1 FOR CACHING AND MAKING DEAD DROPS UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

01 01 01 01

END OF MESSAGE

12168

WE/4 (S. Munger by phone) 03

WE/5 (T. Bussetti by phone) 03

WE/INT

DESMOND FITZGERALD
AC/SAS

W. A. MALONEY
C/SAS/MOB

6/RJ

10-7

SECRET

03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

12-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ORIG: (LABUZZETTI)pk
UNIT: WE/5
EXT: 8303
DATE: 10 DEC 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO: MADRID JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WE 6
INFO: C, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

10 DEC 63 22 54z

☐ DEFERRED NAGEN
☒ ROUTINE

INFO WAVE CITE DIR **88252**

AV PBRUMEN (QUOTA) 01

REF 88251 *

IDENTITIES: 06

A. (ODON ALVAREZ DELALA CAMPA)

B. (JOSE LUIS GONZALEZ GALLARRETTA) 06

C. (GILBERTO LIWAY RODRIGUES) (201-328941) 06

D. (ROGELIO IGLESIAS PATINO) 06

END OF MESSAGE

*CABLE SECRETARIAT: PLEASE REF ATTACHED CABLE TO THIS CABLE.

12180

SAS/EOB Mr. Armstrong (TELECOORD)

SAS/MOB Mr. Maggio (TELECOORD)

C/WE/INT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1

for C/WE/5 (RC Lock)

03

AUTHENTICATING

7/PJ

S E C R E T

EXT : 5254
DATE 10 DEC. 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

11 DEC 63 20 46z

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WE 6
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/[illegible], FI, [illegible] SAS 8, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 88425

01
KEYWAY NIGALE

01
FOR JENTONS: PER YOUR DISCUSSION HQS, PLANNING HAVE NIGALE/2 VISIT YOU 16 TO 19 FEB 1964 PRIOR HIS RETURN BRUS. HQS OFFICER WILL ESCORT. ADVISE IF NOT CONVENIENT.

END OF MESSAGE

01, 08 01
WE COMMENT: NIGALE/2, CHIEF NIGALE SERVICE, VISITING HQS FEB 1964. NIGALE/2 PERSONAL FRIEND JENTONS AND PLAN PERSONAL VISIT JENTONS FOLLOWING HQS TALKS.

12193

C/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

R C Hawes
C/WE/1

03
C/WE/2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

11-12

SECRET

5/N

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10078-10014
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : JMWAVE
TITLE : DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.
DATE : 12/14/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS : TRAINING
BRIEFING
TRAVEL PLANS
WITHHELD
DIRECTOR CABLE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/27/95
COMMENTS : JFK17 : F21 : 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10078-10014

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jg
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 SECRET

12-62
ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO : SAO PAULO RIO DE JANEIRO JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

7 27z

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO SAOP INFO RIOD WAVE CITE DIR 80299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN BETIDE

REF: SAOP 4538 (IN 80402)*

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING LIGHT STATE. [redacted] WILL CONTACT STATION ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF BETIDE.

J. C. KING
C/WH

C/SAS/EOB

[redacted]

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

11206

Date of Report: 04/02/2001

Print One Document with Issues - All Input Fields
Sorted by Issue

Record ID no (104/180): 104-10078-10014 **104 No:** 104-10078-10014 **jfk id no:** 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028 **box number** JFK17

vol folder: F21 **status:** SAN **record number** **meeting date:** 8/25/98

status validation SAN **postpone count:** 9 **first postpone date:**

fed registry notice no: **fed registry date:** **new postpone date:**

Next Doc Issue Date: 12/01/2005

General Comments: SAO PAULO AND RIO de JANEIRO, SAOP; PROTECT (BE) RELEASE (TIDE); OPS DETAIL: LIGHT STATE

ISSUES Subform:

issue: BE DIGRAPH **occur count:** 2 **action** **doc issue date** 12/01/2005
action date: **issue comment:** SEE 104-10017-10041. OTHER DOCS W/LATER DATES.

issue: CABLE PREFIX **occur count:** 1 **action** **doc issue date** 10/01/2017
action date: **issue comment:** NOTE EXCEPTIONS TO 2017 RELEASE IN DOC COMMENTS

issue: CIA INSTALLATION **occur count:** 5 **action** **doc issue date** 10/01/2017
action date: **issue comment:** NOTE EXCEPTIONS TO 10/2017 IN GENERAL COMMENTS

issue: OPERATIONAL DETAILS **occur count:** 1 **action** **doc issue date** 10/01/2017
action date: **issue comment:** NOTE EXCEPTIONS TO 2017 IN GENERAL COMMENTS

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10078-10014
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : JMWAVE
TITLE : DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.
DATE : 12/14/63
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : DIRECTOR CABLE
TRAVEL PLANS
BRIEFING
TRAINING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/27/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK17:F21 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028:

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

B4 ~~SECRET~~

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

TO : [16-27] [16-20] ~~JMWAVE~~

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

TO [16-27] INFO [16-20] WAVE

CITE DIR 80299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN [02] TIDE

REF: [21-27] 4538 (IN 80402) *

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING [24] [redacted]

WILL CONTACT [16-27] ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF [02] TIDE.

J. C. KING for
C/WH

C/SAS/EOB

~~WH/5~~

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Technical Corrections By NaraID

05-Oct-99

NARA ID	Date Of Change	Meeting Date	Page	Change of Postpnement	Comments
104-10077-10371	11-Dec-98	06-Aug-98	2	12 vice 7	ARRB missed reviewing page 2. One name and 2 digraphs are protected on page 1; 2 names of CIA employees need to be protected and are on the list for protection . See pages 48-49, para 2.a. of ARRB final report for justification.
104-10078-10014	15-Dec-98	25-Aug-98		9 vice 8	Additional postponement conforms to previous ARRB determination. Substitute missed words with "official cover" per page 56, para 3.k. of ARRB Final Report. Also, see 180-10145-10233.
104-10093-10032	05-Oct-99	23-Sep-98		9 vice 11	Document partly illegible; only redactions needed are protection 9 digraphs--root words can be released. Slug line/pseudos are releasable. See 104-10093-10033.
104-10093-10033	14-Dec-98	23-Sep-98		9 vice 8	The document sent to ARRB was partly illegible; the only redactions needed are 9 digraphs. ARRB protected 4 crypts, the root word is now released. 5 more digraphs of this crypt were missed; 4 other authorized postponements are released.
104-10103-10333	02-Dec-98	25-Aug-98		27 vice 25	Additional postponements conform to previous ARRB determinations. Protection of two missed digraphs approved by ARRB elsewhere in this document.
104-10106-10383	08-Dec-98	25-Aug-98	1	7 vice 6	Additional postponement conforms to previous ARRB determination - missed name on cover sheet was protected by ARRB elsewhere on this page.
104-10106-10421	10-Dec-98	25-Aug-98	1	14 vice 13	Additional postponement conforms to previous ARRB determination. Missed dispatch prefix was protected by ARRB elsewhere in this document.

HRG Record Print Printed on: 10/5/1999

ID: 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028
File Title: JFK
Job Num: 80T01357A
Location: HRG
Box Num: JFK17
Vol/Folder: F21

Title: DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.

Title Res: N
Date of Document: 12/14/1963
Status: SAN
From: DIRECTOR
From Res: N
To: JMWAVE
To Res: N
Pages: 1
Orig. Classification: S
Originator: CIA

Last Reviewer:
Review Date:

Exemptions:	1A	1B	1C	2	3	4	5
		X					

Medium: PAPER
Last Inputter: coller
NARA Comments:

Agency Comments: ORIGINALLY UNIT INDEXED

Release: ARRB
Release Date: 25-Aug-1998

Doc Num:	DIR 89299	Res: N
	11206	N

Keywords:	DIRECTOR CABLE	Res: N
	TRAVEL PLANS	N
	BRIEFING	N
	TRAINING	N
	BETIDE	Y

Duplicate Document Of:

Component Review Info

COMPONENT DATE TASKED	DATE REVIEWED	RESPONSE	APPEAL DATE	DECISION

Sent to NARA: Y
Agency Name: CIA

HRG Record Print

Printed on: 10/5/1999

Agency Number:	104
Disk Number:	10078
Control Number	10014

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

84 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

TO : [16-27] [16-20] JMWAVE

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

TO [16-27] INFO [16-20] WAVE

CITE DIR 80299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN [02] TIDE

REF: [21-27] 4538 (IN 80402) *

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING [redacted] 24 [redacted]

WILL CONTACT [16-27] ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF [02] TIDE.

J. C. KING for
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

C/SAS/EOB

~~WH/5~~

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

8/17
8/17/98

Date: 07/22/98
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10078-10014
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : JMWAVE
TITLE : DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.
DATE : 12/14/63
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : DIRECTOR CABLE
TRAVEL PLANS
BRIEFING
TRAINING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/27/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK17:F21 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028:

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62
ROUTING
1
2
3

TO : SAO PAULO 16-27 RIO DE JANEIRO 16-20 JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

7 27 Z

☒ ROUTINE

TO SAOP 16-27 INFO RIOD 16-20 WAVE CITE DIR 80299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN BETIDE 02

REF: SAOP 21-27 4538 (IN 80402)*

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING LIGHT STATE. [redacted] WILL CONTACT STATION 16-27 ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF BETIDE. 02

J. C. KING for
C/WE

C/SAS/EOB

~~WH/5~~

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION 14-4

104-10078-10020 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : G. A. LADNER, JR.:clh
UNIT : SAS/SECURITY
EXT : 5909
DATE : 16 DECEMBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: SAS 8
INFO : DDP, OS 2, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR **89360**

TYPIC SECUR

REF: WAVE 8344 (IN 70903)

PCSA GRANTED EFFECTIVE 13 DEC.

END OF MESSAGE

06

SAS COMMENT: Requested PCSA/CSA for Frank M. WARREN, Jr., Sea Dade Industries, Miami to backstop WAVE cover corp.

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

16-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

George
GEORGE A. LADNE
C/SAS/SECURIT
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ICE IS PROHIBITED.

11216

HSCA Chrono

17 Sep 76	Downing Report, Congressional Record, re establishment of HSCA.
5 Oct 76	Breckinridge memo re Downing Committee; Procedures for dealing with Congressional Investigators.
14 Oct 76	Breckinridge Plans for Working with HSCA.
19 Oct 76	Meeting with Richard Sprague.
22 Oct 76	FOIA Package Delivered to Downing on 4 October. REQUEST to assemble photos of Unidentified Man.
27 Oct 76	Relationship with HSCA: Plans and Proposals.
10 Nov 76	Sprague's Plans for HSCA research.
24 Nov 76	CIA Briefing of Sprague.
24 Nov 76	Sprague Questions & Comments re Transcripts/Photos/ Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD.
23 Nov 76	DCI (Bush) Letter to Downing re CIA Records Moratorium.
26 Nov 76	Post article: "CIA Withheld Details on Oswald Call".
1 Dec 76	Meeting with Sprague, 1 December.
8 Dec 76	Meeting with Sprague, 8 December.
31 Dec 76	Congressional Record--Report, Together With Additional and Supplemental Views of the Select Committee On Assassinations.
10 Jan 77	CI memo refuting article charging "CIA Withheld Data..."
26 Jan 77	IG Memo re HSCA comments in 31 December 1976 Report.
15 Feb 77	CRS Proposed Procedures for....between HSCA and CIA.
29 Mar 77	HSCA Report, Providing for the Continuation of HSCA.
29 Apr 77	News article, $2.5 Million Voted for JFK-King Panel.
5 Jul 77	News items charge Warren Commission Error; Sturgis Interview.
12 Aug 77	Memorandum of Understanding Between DCI and HSCA, with Nondisclosure Agreement.
6 Sep 77	HOLMES memo re 1 Sept 77 Meeting with House Committee. REQUEST (oral) from HSCA for information on: Loran HALL Guy BANNISTER Alexei DAVISON Richard HATHCOCK Gerald HEMMING Lawrence HOWARD John MARTINO Ruben MIRO-CARDONA Eduardo PAULEY Eduardo PEREZ William SEYMOUR Clay SHAW and Frank STURGIS.

HSCA Chrono, page 2

12 Sep 77 Blakey REQUEST (confirming 1 September oral request)

re Howard DAVIS
Richard HATHCOCK
Ruben Miro CARDONA
William SEYMOUR
Gerald Patrick HEMMING
Lawrence HOWARD
William D. PAWLEY
Frank Sturgis (FIORINI)
Edwardo PEREZ, aka Eddie BAYO
Operations MONGOOSE and COBRA

28 Sep 77 Blakey Memo re 1 Sept 77 meeting at CIA Hqs re surfacing of additional documents; request for review of methods for servicing requests.

29 Sep 77 HOLMES Memo re Meeting with HSCA members 20 Sep 77 (includes responses to 6 Sep & 12 Sep requests.)

30 Sep 77 USGPO: "Committee Rules of the HSCA"

5 Oct 77 OLC to Blakey re CIA relationship with Mr. Loran HALL.

13 Oct 77 CI Name Trace: Gerald Patrick HEMMING.

19 Oct 77 O/Security to OLC re name traces (12 names/operations).

21 Oct 77 Blakey REQUEST re Santos TRAFFICANTE.

1 Nov 77 O/SECURITY RESPONSE RE TRAFFICANTE.

1 Nov 77 CI Response to 19 October O/Security name trace.

2 Nov 77 Memo re Blakey review of the 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassination attempts against Fidel Castro.

2 Nov 77 Visit of Blakey, 2 Nov 77; Leavenworth inmate report.

3 Nov 77 Blakey REQUEST for:

1) CIA Letter to Rockefeller Commn, 5/7/75.
2) 6/20/63 Memo re Liaison between FBI & CIA.
3) 4/1/75 Memo for Record by CIA Analyst.
4) C/SAS/CI to C/WHD Cuba (undated)
5) CIA Item 298 (re Warren Commn 2/12/64 request)
6) File on Captain Jean Souetre/Michel Roux/Hertz.
7) All info re CIA's analysis/use of Zapruder film.
8) Uncropped photos of "Mexico City Oswald"
9) File on William George Gaudet.

3 Nov 77 Sovern Memo to C/LA re Manuscript of Leavenworth inmate Mr. Antulio Ortiz Ramierz, Sr. (copy of report attached).

4 Nov 77 Memo re Blakey call concerning Mr. W. David Slawson.

9 Nov 77 Blakey REUQEST for information on:

1) Jack RUBY aka Jack RUBENSTEIN
2) Earl RUBY
3) Eva GRANT
4) Robert McKeown
5) Nancy PERRIN
6) Tom HOWARD
7) Alex GRUBER
8) Mickey RYAN
9) Andrew ARMSTRONG
10) Bruce CARLIN
11) Karen Bennett CARLIN
12) Curtis Laverne CRAFORD
13) Ralph PAUL
14) George SENATOR
15) Lawrence MEYERS
16) Edward MEYERS
17) Lewis J. McWILLIE

HSCA Chrono, page 3

11 Nov Blakey Req for Info on KING + RAY (OLC 77-4938)

11 Nov 77 Blakey REQUEST for documents:
1) Book on anti-Castro Cuban Organizations...
2) Memo from Osborn to FBI, 5/27/66 re John ROSELLI.
3) Memo for Record from Osborn, 12/11/67 re ROSELLI.
4) CIA File on John ROSELLI.

16 Nov 77 C/CI Memo, Comments on Statements by ORTIZ-Ramirez Sr.

25 Nov 77 Sovern Memo to C/LA re Blakey request of 11 November.
Provides July 1964 "Cuban Counter-revolutionary Handbook"

~~25 Nov SOVERN MEMO TO BARTEAUX RE KING + RAY~~

25 Nov 77 Sovern Memo to OLC re ORTIZ-Ramirez Manuscript.

28 Nov 77 C/CI Memo to OLC forwarding William Douglas Pawley file.

29 Nov 77 C/CI Memo to OLC forwarding materials requested.

1 Dec 77 Blakey Request for 6 (3 WC + 3 FOIA items) Warren Commission documents (prev.w'held)

6 Dec 77 Gabrielson Memo for SA/DO/O requesting responses in 5 days.

6 Dec 77 CI Memo to OLC responding to 9 November request.

6 Dec 77 CI Memo to OLC responding to 29 November request.

6 Dec 77 CI Memo to OLC responding to 3 November request.

9 Dec 77 CI Memo to OLC responding to O/Security Memo 1 Nov.

9 Dec 77 CI Memo to OLC responding to HSCA Request 9 Nov 77.

12 Dec 77
13 Dec 77 ADDO Memo for the Record re Discussions with HSCA members 13 December (Blakey, Cornwall, Fonzi & Cummins) re CIA operations which focused on Cuba in 1962-1965.

16 Dec 77 SOVERN MEMO TO GABRIELSON/OLC re 1 + 12 Dec HSCA requests for WC Material

22 Dec 77 HSCA Req: A) 11 Names

B) CIA Document List

~~25 Dec 77~~

5 JAN Barteaux Memo to OLC re King + Ray

6 Jan 78 Blakey Request: 38 items

1) Lee Harvey OSWALD et al
2) Marina OSWALD et al
3) Rima Shirakova
4) Louis Hopkins
5) George DeMohrenschildt
6) Marilyn Dorothy Murret
7) Harold Isaacs
8) John A. McVickar
9) Leo Cherne
10) Gregory Yev. Golub
11) Eusebio Azcue
12) Silvia Duran
13) Horatio Duran
14) Ivan Obyedkov
15) Alvarado Gilb...Ugarte
16) Spas T. Raikin
17) William Harvey & MONGOOSE
18) E. Howard Hunt
19) Jim Garrison
20) John E. Donovan
21) Dr. Rex J. Howard
22) Dr. Rex Z. Howard
23) QJWIN
24) Bernardo DeTorres
25) Mrs. Hal Davison
26) 1958-63 travelers to USSR
27) Intnl Rescue Committee (IRC
anti-Castro groups,A.Rorke
28) Garrison 1967 investigatio
29) Helms,Angleton & Rocca docs
30) Helms etc. docs to Warren (
31) Dulles-CIA corresp...
32) Mexico Cable traffic
33) Tapes/Transcripts re LHO
34) Helms corresp re LHO Mex.
35) DCI Appearance before WC
36) Southern Research Corp.,
aka Wackenhut Corp.
37) CIA Chronology on LHO
38) 1977 CIA Staff Study

12 Jan 78 Blakey, reference to 9 January 1978 meeting, addendum to above request. With Gabrielson covering memo.

17 Jan 78 Routing sheet: Goldsmith request for translation of Spanish.

18 Jan 78 Blakey request; 21 items & 3 names appearing in documents

1) Edward Ivan Arthur
2) Manuel Artime
3) Col. Bradley E. Ayers
4) Luis Balbuena
5) Dominick E. Bartone
6) Dino Cellini
7) Sam Benton
8) James Braden/Brading
9) Edward Browder, Jr.
10) David Ferrie
11) Michael McLaney/McClainey
12) John Martino
13) Capt. William Morgan
14) Edward K. Moss
15) Joseph Raymond Merola
16) William Robert Plumlee
17) Norman Rothman/"Roughhouse'
18) Sergio Arcacha Smith
19) Manuel Antonio DeVarona
20) Eduardo Whitehouse
21) E. Howard Hunt
&Do not delete names of
John Roselli, Frank Sturgis/
Frank Fiorini, Santo Trafficant

19 Jan 78 Blakey request: 1966-68 information following persons (re KING

1) Col. Jonas C. Sporl
2) F. Lee Crisman
3) Laverne "Larry" Crafard
4) Charles Joseph Stein
5) Lemar Wilson
6) Louis P. Davis
7) Charles Siragusa
8) James Earl Ray
aka Eric Stavro Galt
aka Harvey Lowmeyer
9) Arthur Hanes

25 Jan 78 C/LA Memo for O/SA/DO/O re Evaluation of Information in Antulio RAMIREZ-Ortiz Manuscript.

27 Jan 78 MEXICO CITY 43699 (IN 0258730) Review of FBI Documents

27 Jan 78 Stokes Letter to DCI re procedures for HSCA staff personnel investigating on "full access" basis.

30 Jan 78 DCI Letter to Stokes: Amended Secrecy Agreement.

31 Jan 78 O/Security Memo to OLC re HSCA Request for Denied FOI Material

8 Feb 78 Blakey Request: 22 names (KING Investigation)

1) National States Rights Party
2) Jessie B. Stoner
3) Edward Fields
4) Robert DePugh
5) National Front/Liberty Party
6) George Wright
7) Front Nationale
8) National Democratic Party & Hitler Welle
9) VMO or Flemish VMO
10) Roger Stinnewijn
11) Alistair Wicks
12) Randolph Erwin Rosenson w/@
13) Charles Stein
14) Gus Porsch
15) Jerry William Ray
16) John Larry Ray
17) Southern Christian Leadership Conference
18) James Earl Raynes et al
19) Frank Lee Legis
20) Lee Leland
21) Martin Bishop
22) H. Hunt

21 Feb 78 Blakey Request: Statement of reasons for which 201 file opened; criteria presented

23 Feb 78 Barteaux Memo to SA/DO/O re OLC req. 22 Dec 77

23 Feb 78 Congressional Record: "Providing For Funds for the SCA" Report/Plans/Budget/Security etc.

28 Feb 78 Congressional Record: Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations; Stokes remarks

27 Feb 78 Blakey Request: 29 names (request access to 201 files)

1) Davis, Bruce Frederick
2) Dutkaniez, Joseph
3) Sloboda, Vladimir
4) Lawson, John Howard
5) Amron, Irving
6) Block, Mollie
7) Block, Morris
8) Citrynell, Harold
9) Dubinsky, Shirley
10) Greendlinger, Martin
11) Mitchell, Bernon F.
12) Parker, James Dudley
13) Petrulli, Nicholas
14) Webster, Robert Edward
15) Winston, Henry
16) Meyer, Karl Henry
17) Frank, Susan Heligman
18) Martinkus, Anthony V.
19) Pittman, John Orion
20) Frank, Richard Cyril
21) Gold, Robert
22) Jones, Louis Henry
23) Ricciardelli, Libero
24) Halperin, Maurice H.
25) Martin, William H.
26) DuBois, David aka McCanns
27) Jones, Sgt. (fnu)
28) Fletcher, Sgt. Ernie
29) Coe, Virginius Frank

& CI Defector files re Robt. WEBST

27 Feb 78 Blakey Request: 14 names (all files & index references to)

1) Barney Baker
2) Bunny Breen etc.
3) James Eckford Breen
4) Thomas E. Davis III
5) Dewey F. Groom
6) Peter Guarisco
7) Milton Jaffe
8) James Herbert Martin
9) Mrs. James Herbert Martin
10) Nofio Pecora
11) Helen Afance Roan/Cooley
12) Joseph E. Slatin
13) Irwin S. Weiner
14) Edward P. Morgan

6 Mar 78 Blakey Request: any and all reports/documents/member lists
1) Am. Civil Liberties Union
2) The Militant
3) The Worker
4) De Golyer-McNaughton firm
5) Socony-Mobil in Dallas
6) Loma Industries
7) Pollock-Ray Col.
8) Sellers Co.
9) Mullen & Powell Cons. Engrs
10) High Plains Natural Gas Cc
11) N.Orleans Amateur Astronon
12) N.Orleans Council of Peaceful Alternatives
13) N.Orleans Civil Air Patrol
14) John Birch Society in Dallas-Ft.Worth area

7 Mar 78 LONDON 92099, re BBC Broadcast 50-minute program

7 Mar 78 OLC Memo to SA/DO/O re Problems Raisec by HSCA Staff (outstanding requests)

8 Mar 78 Blakey Request:
1) James Wilcott
2) David C. Murphy
3) Boris Tarasoff
4) Ann Tarasoff

8 Mar 78 Blakey Request:
1) Carlos Quiroga
2) Pedro Diaz Lanz
3) Rolando Masferrer Rojas
4) Manolo Rey
5) Antonio Cuesta Valle
6) Antonio Veciana Blanch
7) Edward L. Freers
8) Mrs. G. Stanley Brown
9) David E. Murphy
10) Aline Mosby
11) Abraham Isaac Goldberg
12) Robert J. Korengold
13) Marita Lorenz
14) Evelio Alpizar Perez
15) Antonio Soto Vazque
16) Justin McCarthy
17) Grayson Lynch
18) Robert Moore
19) Bill Logay
& addresses of #16-19
& Briefing papers re Bay of Pigs given to Johnson/Nixon/Ford/Cart

8 Mar 78 Blakey Request: 65 names
1) John P. Adamcik
2) Danny Garcia Arce
3) Mary Bledsoe
4) W.Eugene Barnett
5) Elmer L. Boyd
6) Howard L.Brennan
7) E.D. Brewer
8) V.J. Brian
9) Mrs. Earle Cabell
10) Warren Caster
11) Malcolm V. Couch
12) James N. Crawford
13) J.C. Day
14) C.N. Dhority
15) Jack E.Dougherty
16) Capt. George "
17) Robert E. Edwards
18) Amos Lee Euins
19) Jack W.Faulkner
20) Ronald B. Fischer
21) Buell Wesley Frazier
22) J.W. Fritz
23)Charles Givens
24)Clyde Haygood
25)John Hicks
26)Gerald Hill
27)Harry Holmes
28)James E.Jarman
29) Marvin Johnson
30) Frankie Kaiser
31) Billy Lovelady
32) A.D.Mccurley
33) Cecil McWatters
34) Joe R. Moline
35) Leslie Montgmry
36) Luke Mooney
37) Henry Moore
38) Harold Norman
39) J.L. Oxford
40) Eddie Piper
41) Walter Potts
42) Linnie Randle
43)Mrs.Robt Reid
44) Earlene Roberts
45) James Romack
46) Guy F. Rose
47) Arnold Rowland
48) Mitc. Scibor
49) William Shelle
50) Richard M. Sims
51) L. C. Smith
52) Richard Stoval
53) Robt. Studebake
54) Allan Sweatt
55) Roy S. Truly
56) F. M. Turner
57) Wm. J. Waldman
58) Eddie Raymond "Buddy" Walthe
59) Ralph Walters
60) H.Weatherford
61) Seymour Weitzma
62) Wm. W. Whaley
63)Bonnie R. Willia
64) John Wiseman

9 Mar 78 Blakey Request: List of Documents prior to opening LHO 201
Statement, CIA Criteria on relationships
Dispatches To/From Mexico Oct-Nov 1963
3 201 files preceeding LHO & 3 following

13 Mar 78 Blakey Request: (re KING) 1) Earl Anglin James
2) Robert J. Reynolds
3) K. C. McMillian
4) Mrs. Sun Loo

15 Mar 78 Gabrielson Memo re HSCA Follow-up Request
Hardway request for WUTARDY, WURABBIT, WUBONBON, WUHUSTLER.

21 Mar 78 MEXICO CITY 44345 re NBC program/Bach Revelations

22 Mar 78 Blakey Request: William Krulewitz aka William Kroll

22 Mar 78 Blakey Request: 75 names

1) Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez
2) Santiago Alvarez Fernandez
3) Laureano Batista Falla
4) Orlando Bosch Avila
5) Carlos Jose Bringuier
6) Rogelio Cisneros Diaz
7) Luis Conte Aguero
8) Marcos Diaz Lanz
9) Victor Paneque
10) Evelio Duque Miyar
11) Tom Dunkin
12) William Dalzell(Littlehorse)
13) Ross Crozier
14) John Koch Gene
15) Miguel Mariano Cruz
16) Hignio Diaz aka Nino
17) Frank de la Barre
18) Eugene Davis
19) Ramon Font Samuell
20) Joaquin Godoy y Solis
21) Max Gorman Gonzales
22) Manuel Gil
23) Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo
24) Carlos Grimander
25) Augustine Guitart
26) Alberto Hernandez Hechevarria
27) Celso Macario Hernandez
28) William Johnson
29) Claire Booth Luce
30) Max Lesnick
31) Jose Antonio Lanusa
32) Carlos John Wilson-Hudson
33) George Nobregas
34) Joseph Newbrough
35) Rolando Otero
36) Amador Odio
37) Joseph A. Oster
38) Reinaldo Pico
39) Duney Perez Alamo
40) Orest Pena
41) Rolando Peleaz (Pelaez)
42) Acelo Pedroso Amores
43) Luis Rabel aka Luis Ravel
44) Carlos Rodriguez Quesada
45) Manolo Ray Rivero
46) Francisco Rodriguez Tamayo
47) Jose Ignacio Rasco Bermuda
48) Delphine Points Roberts
49) Arnesto Rodriguez, Sr.
50) Arnesto Rodriguez, Jr.
51) Juan Manuel Salvat Roque
52) Paulino Sierra Martinez
53) Jorge Soto Martinez aka MartinezSo
54) Clay Shaw
55) Kerry Wendall Thronley
56) Juan Antonio Varona
57) Joaquin Vollodas
58) Carlos Zarraga Martinez
59) Alpha 66
60) Commandos L
61) Segundo Frente Nacionale deEscambra
62) Cuban Revolutionary Council
63) Anti-Communist Intnl Brigade
64) Interpen
65) JURE
66) Movimento Democratico Christian
67) Drectorio Revolucionario Estudiant
68) Mvmto Insurreccionale...
69) Mvmto de Recuperacion...
70) Ejercito Libertador de Cuba
71) Agrupacion Montecristi
72) Cuba Libre
73) JGCE
74) Comandos Autenticos

23 Mar 78	CIA Letter to Stokes; re Secrecy Agreements
23 Mar 78	Blakey Requests: 1) re Cubana Airlines flight 11/22/63 2) Travel of unidentified Cuban-American 3) Fair Play for Cuba Committee, 1959-64
25 Mar 78	News Article re secrecy atmosphere of HSCA investigation.
27 Mar 78	News article, "Oswald Link to CIA Suggested at Inquiry"
28 Mar 78	Congressional Record, REPORT of the Select Committee
28 Mar 78	Gabrielson Memo to SA/DO/O summing up HSCA Activity: to date received 22 letters requesting 445 separate items of which 368 are individuals.
28 Mar 78	Blakey request: 1) Herman Milton Greenspun 2) Gordon McLendon
29 Mar 78	Blakey Request for review of DDO Files on Nosenko etc.
29 Mar 78	Blakey Request: 1) Frederick Stephen Patrick O'Sullivan 2) Permindex Corporation
5 Apr 78	OLC to O/SA/DO/O, re Goldsmith's call re interviews of Tokyo Station personnel.
5 Apr 78	Blakey Request: 1) Edward Jap Epstein 2) Marvin Kantor 3) Charlotte Bustos 4) Annie Goodpasture 5) E.Howard Hunt reports (on JFK assassinatic 6) CIA file on Hunt's Watergate activities. & follow ups: 7) Criteria for opening 201 file prior 1964. 8) Documents (37) in LHO 201... 9) pls ensure all files are available... 10) SR Div officers in Tokyo 1963-64
5 Apr 78	Blakey Request: 1) Monica Kramer 2) Loring Marie Loretta Hyde 3) Abram Chayes 4) Rita Naman
5 Apr 78	C/CI Memo to OLC re Documents on LHO Released under FOIA

6 Apr 78 Blakey Request for detailed written statements on whether
1) LHO was ever contacted by CIA;
2) CIA interviewed or debriefed former American defectors;
3) LHO received CIA training.

7 Apr 78 Meeting with HSCA Staffers, 7 April: re Nosenko documents, OP & Security files on Bagley, Wigren, Miler etc.

14 Apr 78 C/SE/ORP Memo for the Record re 7 April meeting

14 Apr 78 Blakey request (re KING) for info on Ronald Ivy and Calvin Taylor.

17 April Blakey Memo re King, + Req for info on Jules Rocco Kimble

19 Apr 78 C/CI Memo to FBI concerning sensitive nature of information.

19 Apr 78 Blakey Request:
1) Nestor R. Castellanos
2) Carl Mather
3) John David Hurt
4) Collins Radio Electronics Co.
5) Minuteman Organization, 1960-64

24 Apr 78 CIA (Turner) to Stokes: Addendum to Memorandum of Understanding between CIA and HSCA.

20 Apr 78 Blakey Request:
1) Archer, Evelyn Eleanor
2) Colosacco, Anthony
3) Dolan, James Henry
4) Geizzaffi, John M.
5) Lerner, Maurice
6) Meadows, Albert
7) Miller, Isadore
8) Peasner, Thomas R.
9) Periera, Victor
10) Pope, Harry Raymond
11) Smith, Helen Kay
12) Stone, John Eli
13) Tourine, Charles
14) Turns, John Benton

26 Apr 78 Blakey request for Interviews with:
1) Moscow Station COS & DCOSs 1959-63
2) Atsugi Japan 1956-60
3) SR Division 1956-64

26 Apr 78 Gabrielson Memo for the Record - A Projection

27 Apr 78 OLC Memo re HSCA Meeting with Mr. Peter Deryabin

28 Apr 78 Blakey Request: Thomas Arthur VALLEE
John Thomas MASEN

28 Apr 78 Blakey Request:
1) Richard Cain/Scalzetti
2) Jorge Alonso Pujol
3) Henry Savaadra
4) I. Irving Davidson
11) Joseph Shimon
5) James Plumeri
6) Salvadore Granello/Sally Burn
7) John LaRocca
8) Angelo Bruno
9) Sam Mannarino
10) Gabriel Mannarino aka "Kelly"

28 Apr 78 Blakey Request: 41 names

1) Lev Aronson
2) Gali Clark
3) Max Clark
4) Alexander Gibson
5) Samuel Ballen
6) George Bouhe
7) Lydia Dymitruk
8) Declan Ford
9) Katherine Ford
10) Everett Glover
11) Elizabeth Gregory
12) Paul Roderick Gregory
13) Peter Paul Gregory
14) Elena Alkhazoff Hall
15) Anita Hudgins
16) Alexander Kleinlerer
17) Raymond F. Krystinik
18) William M. McKenzie
19) Anna Nicolaevna Meller
20) Teofil Meller
21) Marguerite Claverie Oswald
22) Robert Lee Oswald
23) John Edward Pic, Jr.
24) Valentine Anna Ray
25) Frank Henry Ray
26) Natalie Ray
27) Thomas M. Ray
28) Gary E. Taylor
29) Igor Vladimir Voshinin
30) Mrs. Igor Voshinin
31) Adrian Thomas Alba
32) Emmett Charles Barbe, Jr.
33) Arthur Bero
34) Jesse James Garner
35) Jose Lanusa
36) Palmer McBride
37) Charles Joseph Le Blanc
38) Charles Dutz Murret
39) Lillian Claverie Murret
40) John Martial Murret
41) Richard Gibson

1 May 78 Meeting with HSCA & FBI representatives. Blakey called meeting to discuss Bernardo de Torres.

1 May 78 Blakey Request:
1) Silvia Duran
2) Maria Theresa Proenza
3) Elena Garro de Paz
4) Elinita Garro de Paz
5) Oscar Contreras Velazquez

2 May 78 OLC Request to Forward CIA Documents to HSCA Under New Procedures: Hardway needs material to prepare for depositions--
1) Hardway summaries of file reviews
2) Mexico City file, volumes I-IV
3) File WX-7241

2 May 78 Memo, Shepanek to Gabrielson, re HSCA Staffer Wolf"s "Outside Contact Report" dated 26 April 78

3 May 78 Blakey Request:
1) James Riddle Hoffa
2) Edward Grady Partin
3) Meyer Lansky
4) Winnifred Barnes
5) Robert Royce Augg
6) Pauline Virginia Bates
7) Jack Bowen/Jack Corossi
8) Leonard Calverly
9) Richard Dennis Call
10) Nelson Delgado
11) John Lester Quigley
12) Newton S. Miler
13) Lt. Francis Martello
14) Carson A. Roberts
15) Zack Stout

& files on Tennent Bagley & William Colby which pertain to Yuri Nosenko, LHOswald, the assassination of Kennedy, and KGB procedures pertaining to American tourists & defectors.

3 May 78 C/CI Memo to DCI re Continued Agency Responsibility for Welfare and Protection of PL 110 Cases.

4 May 78 Blakey Request: Winifred Barnes

4 May 78 OLC Memo For the Record re HSCA Task Force Meeting
--Providing CIA Documents
--Documents Requested
--Hearings (Nosenko)
--CIA Review of Committee's Final Report
--Final Disposition of Notes, Transcripts etc.

4 May 78 Blakey Request:
1) Ramon San Martin
2) Ernesto Betancourt
3) Manolo Ray Rivero
4) Julio Lanier Hevia
5) Alexander Rorke
6) Enrique Molina
7) Joe Molina
8) Bill Medina
9) Nestor Castellano
10) Kerry Wendell Thronley
11) John Masen
12) Horation Duran
13) William Lowrey
14) Geoffrey Sullivan
15) Bernardo De Torres

5 May 78 Blakey Request for access to 1962 Report by Lyman Kirkpatrick prepared for CIA Director Dulles, concerning organization of the intelligence community and the work of CIA.

8 May 78 Blakey Request: 6 items re Atsugi and U-2

9 May 78 Blakey Request: Hart Report and Evaluation of Nosenko

10 May 78 Blakey Request: Sam Accosta
Cesario Diosdado
Richard Watley

12 May 78 Blakey Request: Martin Isaacs
Marion S. Wyeth, Jr.
John Leggett
Burton Beals
& Reminder re -info on Agency's contact with repatriated
(6 April) American defectors to the Soviet Union
& -Organizational chart of DDP in 1963 & DDO 1978
(27 Feb.) & -Extend request for info to cover DCD files.

12 May 78 OLC Memo re HSCA (with 27 April "Projection" Attached)

12 May 78 Sturbitts' Memo for the Record on Bernardo Gonzalez de Torres

13 May 78 DIRECTOR 222189 re HSCA Visiting Mexico City early June.

16 May 78 OLC Memo for DCI re HSCA Visit to Mexco City, 30 May 1978.

16 May 78 Breckenridge Memo re HSCA Review of Hart Report.

16 May 78 CIA (Turner) Letter to Stokes enclosing Addendum to Original Memorandum of Understanding

17 May 78	MEXICO CITY 45093 re planned contacts of HSCA visitors
17 May 78	DIRECTOR 224314 re HSCA Schedule, 30 May - 4 June 78
17 May 78	C/SE/ORP Memo re CIA/FBI Briefing of HSCA (on defectors)
17 May 78	OLC Memo re meeting with Gary Cornwell (& Mexico City visit)
18 May 78	MEXICO CITY 45116 re impending visit
19 May 78	Gregg Memo of conversation with Blakey re 1) the Hart Report 2) The Nosenko polygraph tapes 3) Shevchenko 4) Approach to the Soviets
19 May 78	OLC Memo re meeting with Mr. Cornwell (on Mexico aspects)
23 MAY	BLAKEY REQUEST: 67 ITEMS -- NAMES + GROUPS
23 May 78	GUAYAQUIL 22196: Base advised HSCA staffers will visit.
23 May 78	Breckenridge Memo re Conversation with Eliz. Egeter
24 May 78	DIRECTOR 228470 to GUAYAQUIL re HSCA travel.
27 May 78	DIRECTOR 230113, Book Cable re HSCA travel.
24 May 78	Blakey Request: Coby V. Smith
17 May 78	Blakey Request: Identity of individuals in photographs

1 Jun 78	MEXCO CITY 45297 re HSCA travel/Cornwell plans
2 Jun 78	CARACAS 36376 re HSCA visit.
2 Jun 78	Shepanek Memo re HSCA query to Belgian service.
2 Jun 78	Shepanek Memo re HSCA Request for Gibson 201
5 JUNE	Meeting Between DDCI CARLUCCI + Blakey
6 Jun 78	Blakey Request: Hugh Chisolm McDonald (auth, Appt in Dallas) Herman Kimsey AMMUG/1.
6 June (2)	Blakey Requests 10 names + 3 SUBJECTS
8 Jun 78	Blakey Request: Luisa CALDERON Carralero Manuel VEGA Perez Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz (fnu) Prisbeck
8 Jun 78	Blakey Request re visitors to home of Ms. Silvia Odio, Da includes methods of steps taken in search for info.
13 June	STOKES Letter to Adm. Turner re MEXICO
20 June	Meeting w/Blakey
20 JUNE	JOSE LUIS ROMERO

#115

14-00000

HSCA CCS CHRON
REQUESTS RECEIVED

REPLIES, MEMOS TO EIS

	HSCA REQ DATE	OLC #	ITEMS		POS.	NEG	(NAMES, NOT DOCS) INFO AVAIL.
1978:	6/20	2460	8	7/10	No Record on items listed		
	14	2185	2 ~~3~~ (2+1)	6/27	+1	-1	24 - COBB
	8	2039	5	6/15	+1	-4	60 - PRISBECK
	6	2098	3	6/22	+3		25 - AMMUX/1 9 - MCDONALD 10 - KIMSEY
	6	2093/1	10	6/21	+1	-9	3 - BAKER
	5/23	2099	9 + ?	6/21	+1		20 - NEWTON
	/12	1580/1	4+A,B	5/19	NO INFO		
	/14	1566	1	5/9	NO INFO		
	/13	1565	15+	5/15	+1	-14	50 - MILER
	/12	1554	5	5/5	NO INFO		
	/19	1790*		6/7	ADDL INFO TO OLC 78-1790 DTD 28 APR/9 MAY		400-Docs GIBSON
	4/28(2)	1789	11	5/9	+1	-10	1 - DAVIDSON
	4/28	1784	2	5/9		- 2	
	4/28(3)	*1790	41	5/9	+1	-40	IDEN GIBSON ?
	20	1534	14	5/9	+1 ?		CHAS. WHITE (13 REF IDEN ?
	19	1500	5	5/3	+1	-4	150 COLLINS RADIO
	17	1524	2	4/26	NO INFO		
	14	1523	1	4/28	NO INFO		
	5	1455	~~6~~ ~~9~~ 10	4/18	+1	-9	(WATERGATE) 75 - E.How. HUNT
	5	0966	4	4/13	NO INFO		
	3/29	1409	2	4/13	+1	-1	2 - PERMINDEX
	28	1410	2	4/13	+1		2. McLENDON
	23	1129	3	4/4	NO INFO		
	22	1128	1	4/4	NO INFO		
	13	1070	1	3/23	NO INFO 1		
	13		4	3/23	NO INFO 4		
	8	1035	19	3/24	+5	-14	BROWN (4) MURPHY (100) LYNCH (60) MOORE (50) LOGAY (2
	8	1037	65	3/23	NO RECORD 65		
	6	0448	4	3/24	+3	-1	WILCOTT (25) TARASOFF, B (75) A.VN (6)
	2	0443	2 +	3/17	?+1		IDEN BISHOP ?
	1	0070/30	14				

14-00000

CCS CHRON

1978:	2/27	0070/29	29	4/28	+1	-28	4-AMRON
	27	0070/22	14	3/3	?+1		3-MORGAN
	14	0588/1	25+7	2/23	?+1		9-CAMPISI
	8	0674/1	22				
	1/26	0070/4	10	2/8	+1	-9	1-LABORDE
	1/19		9	2/2		-9	
	1/23	0070/3	7	1/30			2-NOSENKO
	1/18	0351/1	21+3	1/24	+1	-23	100-HUNT
	1/~~2~~6	0070/1	38	1/27	+8	-30	*
		0130	7				
	12/$\overset{22}{28}$	5685/4	11 ~~3~~	1/20	+5	-6	30-CARSWELL 58-POSADA 25-DIOSDADO 150-PHILLIPS 125-CONEIN

	Docs
*5) DEMOHRENSCHILDT	-5
9) CHERNE	-21
17) HARVEY	-50
27) INTNL RESCUE COM.	-12
29) HELMS	-25
ANGLETON	-25
ROCCA	-25
36) WACKENHUT	100-150

14-00000 ARMSTRONG, Andrew

1. **HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894)**

for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on......

2. C/CI Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77, Holmes)

re 9 November request......See Document dated 24 February 1964 in RUBY's file which is attached to this memorandum.

anti-CASTRO / WH or LA Division

HSCA Request, 11 November 77 (OLC #77-4963) for documents:

1. Book on anti-Castro Cuban organizations and anti-Castro Cuban activity in the U.S. during the approximate period 1959-1965.

SOVERN Memo to C/LA Division, 25 November 77

Requests response as to whether or not book (Cuban Counter-revolutionary Handbook dated 31 July 1964) may be shown to Blakey.

~~SOVERN Memo to OLC, 25 November 77~~

BANNISTER, Guy

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

page 3: ....following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran Hall: BANNISTER, Guy (plus 12 others).

BUTLER, Ed

1. **HSCA Request, 22 December 1977 (OLC #77-5685/4) for access to files or documents on or referring to:**

    8. Ed Butler. Participant in Oswald-Bringuier WDSU-Radio debate in August 1963.

2. DCD 112/78, 31 Jan 78 - copies of all DCD material

3 IPG . 23 Feb 78 - Info to be fwd'd

CARLIN, Bruce

1. HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894)

   for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on......

2. C/CI Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77, Holmes)

   re 9 November request.....See document dated 24 February 1964 in RUBY's file which is attached to this memorandum.

CARLIN, Karen Bennett

1. HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894)

   for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on......

2. C/CI Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77, Holmes)

   re 9 November request.....See document dated 24 February 1964 in RUBY's file which is attached to this memorandum.

CARSWELL, Dan

1. HSCA Request, 22 December 1977 (OLC #77-5685/4) for access to files or documents on or referring to:

    1. Dan Carswell. Reported to have been in Dallas on November 22, 1963.

2. CCS (Latta) Memo to SA/DO/O, 20 Jan 78: CCS Files contain information on 5 of the 11 individuals, as follows: CARSWELL, POSADA, DIOSDADO, PHILLIPS & CONEIN (see memo for details). CCS files ....contain forms, memoranda (etc) concerning administration of cover exclusively. In the opinion of CCS, identification of specific documents that could be of interest to the HSCA cannot be made until such time as the HSCA Staff narrows the focus of its inquiry.

3. DCD-112/78, 31 JAN 78 - 1 memo

4 Barteaux, 23 Feb 78 - File forwarded SA/DO/O

14-00000 COBRA (Operation)

1. Blakey Request, 12 Sept 77 (OLC #77-3890)

...this will also confirm the oral request for all Agency files on thefollowing....Operations "MONGOOSE" and "COBRA"...

2. O/Security Memo to OLC (GAMBINO) 19 Oct 77
TABS Missing -- info provided ?

14-00000

CONEIN, Lucien

1. **HSCA Request, 22 December 1977 (OLC #77-5635/4) for access to files or documents on or referring to:**

   6. Lucien CONEIN. Former CIA employee, currently in Special Operations at DEA.

2. **CCS (Latta) Memo to SA/DO/O, 20 Jan 78: CCS Files contain information on 5 of the 11 individuals, as follows: CARSWELL, POSADA, DIOSDADO, PHILLIPS & CONEIN (see memo for details). CCS files ...contain forms, memoranda (etc) concerning administration of cover exclusively. In the opinion of CCS, identificati of specific documents that could be of interest to the HSCA cannot be made until such time as the HSCA Staff narrows the focus of its inquiry.**

3. DCD 112/78, 31 Jan 78 - 1 document (also furnished in response to CONEIN's request P 77-0805 under Privacy Act

4. IPG, 23 Feb 78 - Info fwd'd SA/DO/O

14-00000 CRAFORD, Curtis Laverne

1. HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894)

   for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on......

2. C/CI Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77, Holmes)

   re 9 November request.....See document dated 24 February 1964 in RUBY's file which is attached to this memorandum.

DAVIS, Howard

1. BLAKEY Req7est Sept 12, 1977 (OLC #77-3890)

...this will also confirmthe oral request for all Agency files on the following......Howard DAVIS. (Note: unable locate "oral" request.)

2. O/Security Memo to OLC (GAMBINO, 19 Oct 77)
TABS missing -- info provided ?

DAVISON, Alexis

1. HSCA Request, 22 December 1977 (OLC #77-5685/4) for access to files or documents on or referring to:

11. Alexis DAVISON. Served as doctor at U.S. Embassy in Moscow, where he had occasion to examine Marina Oswald.

2. IPG no info

14-00000 DAVISON, Alexei

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

page 3: ...following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran HALL.

DE MOHRENSCHILDT, George and Jeanne

1. **HSCA Request, 1 December 1977 (OLC #77-5333) for 16 Warren Commission Documents, by number (these documents in possession of National Archives and withheld from release by CIA).**

    14. CD #1222, 7/6/64; Memo from Helms, DD/P entitled, Statements Reportedly Made by George and Jeanne DeM Concerning LHO and the Assassination of President Kennedy.

DIOSDADO, Cesario

1. HSCA Request, 22 December 1977 (OLC #77-5685/4) for access to files or documents on or referring to:

   3. Cesario DIOSDADO. Former Customs Agent, Currently employed by DEA in California.

2. CCS (Latta) Memo to SA/DO/O, 20 Jan 78: CCS Files contain information on 5 of the 11 individuals, as follows: CARSWELL, POSADA, DIOSDADO, PHILLIPS & CONEIN (see memo for details). CCS files ...contain forms, memoranda (etc) concerning administration of cover exclusively. In the opinion of CCS, identificati of specific documents that could be of interest to the HSCA cannot be made until such time as the HSCA Staff narrows the focus of its inquiry.

3. DCD 112/78, 31 Jan 78 - copies of all DCD Material

4 BarTeaux - ~~file~~ Inf. forwarded SA/DO/O

DURAN, Sylvia

1. **HSCA Request, 1 December 1977 (OLC #77-5333) for 16 Warren Commission Documents, by number (these documents in possession of National Archives and withheld from release by CIA).**

CD# 426, 2/21/64

4. Letter from Helms with attached translations.... results of interrogations of Sylvia DURAN and her husband in Mexico City, 23-28 November 1963.

ERDINGER, Anton

1. **HSCA Request, 1 December 1977 (OLC #77-5333) for 16 Warren Commission Documents, by number (these documents in possession of National Archives and withheld from release by CIA).**

   7. CD #817, 4/20/64; Memorandum from Richard Helms, DD/P, re: BND Report pertaining to Allegations Concerning Anton Erdinger.

14-00000 GAUDET, William George

1. HSCA Request, 3 November 1977: (No OLC #)
   9. File on William George GAUDET. Mr. GAUDET is currently retired. He was formerly a correspondent for the "Latin American Traveler". Mr. Gaudet was reportedly a contract employee of the CIA.

2. C/CI Memo to OlC , 6 DEC 77 (CI 634-77, Holmes)
   ref a Blakey letter dated 3 Nov 77
   b O/Security 18 Nov 77 -(OLC 77-5058)

   1. Tab B of ref B contains DO material...forwarded to CI for review before releasing to HSCA.
   2. ...enclosed (is) a sanitized version of the above mentioned memorandum........staff considers this material to be primarily operational and should be withheld from HSCA review.

GIBSON, Richard Thomas

1. **HSCA Request, 1 December 1977 (OLC #77-5333) for 16 Warren Commission Documents, by number (these documents in possession of National Archives and withheld from release by CIA).**

    6. CD #710, 4/3/64
    Memorandum from Richard Helms, DD/P re Richard Thomas GIBSON

1. **HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894)**
   for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on....

2. C/CI Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77, Holmes)

   re 9 November request.....See document dated 24 February 1964 in RUBY's file which is attached to this memorandum.

14-00000 ØRUBER, Alex

1. HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894)

for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on.....

2. **C/CI Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77, Holmes)**

re 9 November request.....See document dated 24 February 1964 in RUBY's file which is attached to this memorandum.

		OLC#
HALL, LORAN AKA LORENZO HALL, SKIP HALL AKA LORENZO PASCILLO	12 SEP 77 -	3890
HATHCOCK, RICHARD	12 SEP 77	3890
HEMMING, GERALD PATRICK	12 SEP 77	3890
HOWARD, LAWRENCE (LARRY)		

HALL, Loran Eugene (aka Lorenzo HALL, Skip HALL, Lorenzo PASCILLO)

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

page 3: ...following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran HALL.

2. BLAKEY Request, 12 Sept 77 (OLC #77-3890) confirms oral request for all the Agency's files on Loran Eugene Hall. This request was made orally to you on ~~Th~~ Tuesday, August 30, and Mr. Holmes made available what he stated were all the Agency's files on Mr. HALL on Thursday, September 1.

3. BLAKEY Letter, 28 Sept 77 re discrepancy on what Holmes provided ..."at that time, the two staff members were provided with one CIA-generated document on Loren Eugene Hall that had not been located previously....

4. Holmes Memo, 29 Sept 77

The Agency's file on Hall contained one Agency document--HAVA 2037 (IN 46987), 21 April 1959. Other documents included in Hall's file were 9 FBI reports and 1 Army Report......

5. OLC 77-4405/a, 5 Oct 77 (George L. Cary to Blakey)
ref: Blakey letter of October 3, 1977 asking to be informed as to wh whether any relationship existed between Mr. Loran HALL and the CIA. A diligent search of our files fails to disclose any record of any relationship whatsoever between the CIA and Mr. Hall either as an employee or an independent contractor.

...fails to disclose any record of any secrecy agreement....so far as this Agency is concerned we see no reason at this time why Mr. Hall should not feel free to fully respond to any inquiry from the HSCA.

6. O/SECURITY (GAMBINO, 19 OCT 77) Memo to OLC
Info provided

HATHCOCK, Richard

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

   page 3: ...following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran HALL.

2. BLAKEY Request, 12 Sept 77 (OLC #77-3890) confirms oral request for all Agency files on...

3. HOLMES Memo for the Record, 29 Sept 77 re meeting with HSCA reps.

   ...The Agency has no information on Richard HATHCOCK.

4. O/Security (GAMBINO, 15 Oct 77) Memo to OLC:
   Info provided?

HEMMING, Gerald Patrick (aka Jerry HEMMING, Jerry PATRICK)

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

   page 3: ...following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran HALL.

2. BLAKEY Request, 12 Sept 77 (OLC #77-3890) confirms oral request for all Agency files on...

3. Holmes Memo For The Record, 29 Sept 77, re Meeting w/HSCA reps.

   I indicated the Agency has some information on this man, almost all contained in FBI reports which I was in the process of identifying. I explained that although we might have a 201 file on a given person, information might appear in other files which had not been incorporated into the person's 201. It was therefore necessary to call these documents in order to identify them properly.

4. CI 552-77 (Holmes, 13 October 1977) to OLC
   Subject: Name Trace: Gerald Patrick HEMMING
   Attached..18 documents for inclusion in HEMMING file for HSCA review.
   Attached...2 documents which the Staff considers sensitive...

5. O/Security (Gambino, 19 October 77) to OLC; ref HSCA Request 12 Sept
   Subj: Individuals of Interest to HSCA
   The Gerald Patrick HEMMING portion of the package (tab D) contains information dated January-August 1977 and 15 Feb 65...

HOWARD, Lawrence ("Mexican" Larry HOWARD, Larry HOWARD)

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

   page 3: ...following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran HALL.

2. BLAKEY Request, 12 Sept 77 (OLC #77-3890) confirms aral request for all ~~xxfx~~ Agency files on Lawrence HOWARD.

3. HOLMES Memo for the Record, 29 Sept 77 re meeting with HSCA reps.

   I identified one Army report which I had already described in the list of third agency documents pertaining to Hall.

4. O/Security Memo (GAMBINO, 19 Oct 77) to OLC
   Info provided? —

14-00000 HOWARD, Tom

1. **HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894) for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on....**

2. C/CI (Holmes) Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77)

   re: HOWARD, Tom
   No records identifiable with Subject.

1967 Inspector General's Report on Assassination Attempts Against CASTRO

1. OLC 77-4778, 2 Nov 77 Memo for the Record:
BLAKEY...visit 2 Nov 77 was arranted...for him to read the sanitized, but classified, version of the 1967 IG report.....
BLAKEY added he would like to see the ......1977 report. ....he would be informed.

2. BLAKEY to OLC, 3 Nov 77.
Written confirmation of oral request 21 Oct 77 for an unexpurgated copy of the 1967 IG report.

3. HSCA/Blakey Letter/Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77 4894)

....ref letter of November 3.... In light of a more careful review of the Church Committee Interim Report, it is not necessary for you to make this report available.

14-00000 KOSTIKOV, Valery Vladimirovich

1. HSCA Request, 1 December 1977 (OLC #77-5333) for 16 Warren Commission Documents, by number (these documents in possession of National Archives and withheld from release by CIA).

   1. CD #347, 1/31/64 re Information developed by CIA on the activity of LHO in Mexico City, 28 Sept-3 Oct 63 with attached photograph of KOSTIKOV.

MARTINO, John

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

page 3: ...following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran HALL.

14-00000 MEYERS, Edward

1. HSCA REQUEST, 9 NOV 77 (OLC #77-4894)
   for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on.....

2. C/CI (Holmes) Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77)
   re: MEYERS, Edward
   No records identifiable with Subject.

MEYERS, Lawrence

1. HSCA REQUEST, 9 NOV 77 (OLC #77-4894)

   for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on.....

2. C/CI (Holmes) Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77)

   re: MEYERS, ~~Lawxx~~ Lawrence
   No records identifiable with Subject.

MIRO-CARDONA, Ruben

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

page 3: ...following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran HALL.

2. BLAKEY Request, 12 Sept 77 (OLC 77-3890) confirms oral request for all agency files on Ruben MIRO (Cardona).

3. HOLMES Memo for the Record, 29 Sept 77 re meeting with HSCA reps.

I said I had some reference to MIRO but would need more specific biographic information, Triplett could only tell me that Miro-Cardona had been in prison in Cuba in 1959.

4. O/SECURITY Memo (GAMBINO, 19 OCT 77) TO OLC
NO. RECORD.

MONGOOSE (Operation)

1. BLAKEY Request, 12 Sept 77 (OLC #77-3890)

...this will also confirm the oral request for all Agency files on the following.....Operations "MONGOOSE" and "COBRA"...

2. O/Security Memo (Gambino, 19 Oct 77) to OLC
No Record

re MEXICO

HSCA Request 3 Nov 77:

8. Uncropped copies of photographs of the "Mexico City Oswald" These include CIA photographs......

C/CI Memo to OLC (CI 622-77, 29 Nov 77:

c. (attached) A black notebook containing copies of 12 photographs of the "unidentified individual" who was seen entering or leaving the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City.

Eleven of the twelve photographs were released under the FOIA. A copy of each of these photographs is included in the attached notebook.

McKEOWN, Robert Ray

1. **HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894) for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on....**

2. C/CI Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77 by Holmes) re: McKeown, Robert Ray - numerous references to McKeown in FBI documents. The identification of FBI documents will be forwarded by separate memorandum.

McMILLAN, Priscilla Johnson

1. HSCA Request, 22 December 1977 (OLC #77-5685/4) for access to files or documents on or referring to:

   9. Priscilla Johnson McMillan. Author of "Marina and Lee", interviewed Oswald in Soviet Union.

2. DCD 112-78, 31 Jan 78: DCD response to her request (P 76-1861) under the Privacy Act. Full text and sanitized copies of all this material should be available from IPS. Also attached are four intelligence information reports which were not furnished in response to the PA request.

4. IPG, 23 Feb - info to be furn'd SA/DO/O

14-00000 MC WILLIE, Lewis J

~~1. HSCA REQUEST, 9 NOV 77 (OLC #77-4894)~~

~~for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on.....~~

2. C/CI Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77 by Holmes)

re: Lewis J. McWILLIE - see document dated 24 February 1964 (xxxxxx). in RUBY's file which is attached to this memorandum.

ODIO, Silvia

MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)
re meeting with HSCA reps 1 September

"The following topics, given...response and comments follow each topic.

"Agency's file on Loran Hall

Blakey had called the Agency on 30 August 77 asking to see the agency's information on Loran Hall.

Comment: According to testimony given before the Warren Commission by Silvia ODIO of Dallas, Texas, three men, identifying themselves as Leopoldo, Angelo, and Leon Oswald, came to her apartment on 26 Sept 63. Leopoldo claimed he and Angelo were members of JURE (Cuban Revolutionary Junta) and wanted Silvia to meet "Leon Oswald". They introduced him as an American who was very much interested in the Cuban cause. Next day, Leopoldo called Silvia and said (still according to Silvia) '...our idea is to introduce him (Oswald) to the underground in Cuba, because he is great, he is kind of nuts.'

In response to a request dated 28 August 1964 from J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of the President's Commission, the FBI initiated an investigation to identify the two men who accompanied "Leon Oswald" to Silvia's apartment. On 21 September 1964, the FBI informed Rankin that the Bureau had identified the men as Loran Eugene Hall and Lawrence Howa
"Leon Oswald" was identified as William Seymour.

Response: The Agency has little information on Hall beyond what is already available in overt material........"

ORTIZ RAMIREZ, Antulio

1. OLC 77-4777, 2 Nov 77 re visit of Blakey, 2 Nov 77

   BLAKEY...provided handwritten version of an autobiographical work prepared by an inmate at Levenworth....claims to be a former Cuban intelligence officer....included allegation that the author while serving with Cuban intelligence in Havana, sawa file on LHO which indicated that Oswald was a Soviet intelligence agent...

2. Sovern memo to C/LA Division, 3 Nov 77: Attached above & forwarded for action. requests preliminary findings before extensive efforts undertaken.

3. Memo from C/CI to Sovern, CI 600-77, 16 Nov 77 re Manuscript Hopkins of Cuba Desk is reviewing Orgiz-Ramierz' file and will forward to the Staff a copy of her memorandum. 6 pages written.

4. SOVERN Memo to OLC, 25 Nov 77: Preliminary response that CI (Holmes) has drawn material together....may be reviewed by Blakey....

5. C/LA Division Memo for SOVERN, 25 Jan 78: Evaluation of Information in manuscript of Mr. Antulio RAMIREZ Ortiz, with 4 attachments. cc sent C/CI.

OSWALD, Lee Harvey

1. **HSCA Request, 22 December 1977 (OLC #77-5685/4) for access to files or documents on or referring to:**

This letter also serves as confirmation of the December 5 oral request for access to the 57-volume collection of files known as the Oswald file. The collection of files encompasses the following subjects.....

2. HSCA REQUEST 6 JAN 78 (OLC 78-0070)
    1. LHO ETC[redacted]
    2. MARINA ETC

PAUL, Ralph

1. HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894)

for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on......

2. C/CI Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77, Holmes)

re 9 November request.....See document dated 24 February 1964 in RUBY's file which is attached to this memorandum.

PAULEY, Eduardo / PAWLEY, William D.

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

page 3: ...following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran HALL.

2. BLAKEY Request, 12 Sept 77 ((OLC 77-3890) confirms oral request for all agency files.

3. Holmes Memo For the Record, 29 Sept 77 re meeting with HSCA reps.

I had only one FBI report on this name; however, it turns out that Triplett meant WILLIAM PAWLEY, a former ambassador and organizer of the "Flying Tigers". I said I would run another trace.

4. O/SECURITY (GAMBINO, 19 OCT 77) Memo to OLC
Info provided (sanitized).

5. C/CI Memo to OLC (CI 572-77, 28 November 77)

Attached is a file on William Douglas PAWLEY....

PEREZ, Eduardo

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

   page 3: ...following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran HALL.

2. BLAKEY Reuqest, 12 Sept 77 (OLC #77-3890) confirms oral request for all agency files on Edwardo PEREZ, aka Eddie Bayo.

3. Holmes Memo For the Record, 29 Sept 77 re meeting with HSCA reps.

   I said I had many reference to Perez and would need some ~~spx~~ specific biographic information to determine which Perez was of interest to the Committee. Triplett was unable to be more specific.

4. O/SECURITY (GAMBINO, 19 OCT 77) Memo to OLC
   NO RECORD

14-00000 PERRIN, Nancy

1. **HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894)**
   for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on....

2. **C/CI (Holmes) Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77)**

   re: PERRIN, Nancy Rich
   No records identifiable with Subject.

PHILLIPS, David Atlee

1. HSCA Request, 22 December 1977 (OLC #77-5685/4) for access to files or documents on or referring to:

5. David Atlee Phillips. Former CIA employee who was in charge of the Cuban desk in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City in 1963.

2. CCS (Latta) Memo to SA/DO/O, 20 Jan 78: CCS Files contain information on 5 of the 11 individuals, as follows: CARSWELL, POSADA, DIOSDADO, PHILLIPS & CONEIN (see memo for details). CCS files ...contain forms, memoranda (etc) concerning administration of cover exclusively. In the opinion of CCS, identificati of specific documents that could be of interest to the HSCA cannot be made until such time as the HSCA Staff narrows the focus of its inquiry.

3. DCD 112/78, 31 Jan 78 Negative

4 BaiTeany - Info fwd'd SA/DO/O

14-00000 POSADA, Louis

1. HSCA Request, 22 December 1977 (OLC #77-5685/4) for access to files or documents on or referring to:

   2. Louis POSADA. Jailed in 1976 Cubana Airlines bombing with Orlando Bosch.

2. **CCS (Latta) Memo to SA/DO/O, 20 Jan 78: CCS Files contain information on 5 of the 11 individuals, as follows: CARSWELL, POSADA, DIOSDADO, PHILLIPS & CONEIN (see memo for details). CCS files ...contain forms, memoranda (etc) concerning administration of cover exclusively. In the opinion of CCS, identification of specific documents that could be of interest to the HSCA cannot be made until such time as the HSCA Staff narrows the focus of its inquiry.**

3 DCD 112/78, 31 Jan 78 Negative.

~~4. [illegible]~~

4 Boiteaux - No record

ROSELLI, John

1. HSCA Request, 11 November 77 (OLC #77-4963) for documents:
    1. anti-castro organizations....
    2. ~~Memo from Osborn to FBI, 5/27/66 (footnoted in Senate report)~~
    3. Memo for the Record by Osborn, 12/11/67 (same)

   & access to CIA file on John ROSELLI.

2. O/SECURITY (GAMBINO) TO OLC 23 NOV 77:
    1. O/S DEFERS TO DDO re Item 1.
    2. Att'd Memo from OSBORN TO FBI (corr. date is 18 May 66).
    3. Att'd Item 3 for HSCA, sanitized

RUBY, Earl

1. **HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894)**
   for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on....

2. C/CI Memo to OLC, 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77 by Holmes)
   See document dated 24 February 1964 in RUBY's file which is attached to this memorandum.

RUBY, Jack aka Jack RUBENSTEIN

1. HSCA Request, 9 November 1977 (OLC #77-4894) for any and all information generated by or in the possession of CIA on....

2. C/CI Memo to OLC 6 December 1977 (CI 632-77 by Holmes)

   j. See attached sanitized file on Jack RUBY. Included in this file is a list of 28 identified FBI documents and a list of 4 identified Department of State cablegrams.

   3. The santized file on Jack Ruby may be shown to members of the HSC and a copy of the lists passed.... The Staff asks, however, that the Ruby file be returned to Mr. Holmes.... The Staff has no objection to your office making a copy of the sanitized file.

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION / Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with respect to Intelligence Activities, Senate
(following documents are footnoted ir
Final Report)

Blakey request to OLC, 3 Nov 77:
1. Letter from DCI to Rockefeller Commission dated 5/7/75.
2. Memo dated 6/20/63 concerning liaison between the FBI and the CIA
3. Memo for the Record from CIA analyst dated 4/1/75
4. Memoranda (2) fm C/SAS/CI to C/WHD/Cuba undated
& CIA Item 298 (Warren Commission's 2/12/64 request), reportedly an internal memo from Staff Officer to Staff Officer dated 3/5/64.

C/CI Memo to OLC (CI 622-77) 29 Nov 77:

2. The Staff has been unsuccessful in locating copies of those documents described in paragraphs 1,2,3 and 4 ... the search continues. In addition....re CIA Item 298... would appreciate any additional details relating....

14-00000

	HSCA REQ.	OLC #
SENATOR, GEORGE	9 SEP 77	77-4894
SEYMOUR, WILLIAM HOUSTON	12 SEP 77	77.3890
SHAW, CLAY	6 SEP 77	
SHIRAKOVA, RIMA	6 JAN 78	78.0070
SLAWSON, W. DAVID	4 NOV 77	77.4780
SNYDER, RICHARD	22 DEC 77	77.5685/4
SOUETRE, JEAN (CAPT)	3 NOV 77	
AKA MICHEL ROUX, MICHEL HERTZ	3 NOV 77	
STUCKEY, WILLIAM	22 DEC 77	77.5685/4
STURGIS, FRANK AKA FIORINI, FRANK	12 SEP 77	77.3890

SHAW, Clay

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

page 3: ...following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran HALL.

2. HOLMES Memo for the Record, 29 Sept 77 re meeting with HSCA Reps.

I indicated that the Agency has a 201 file on SHAW which I shall sanitize for the Committee and identify other agency documents contained in the file.

STURGIS, Frank (Frank Fiorini)

1. MEMO FOR THE RECORD (6 Sept 77, Russ Holmes)

   page 3:....following names, some of whom may have been in contact with Loran HALL.

2. BLAKEY Request, 12 Sept 77 (OLC #77-3890)

   This will also confirm the oral request for all Agency files on the following individuals and operations: Frank Sturgis (Fior~~n~~ini)

3. HOLMES Memo for the Record, 29 Sept 77 re Meeting with HSCA reps:

   I explained that Sturgis' file was in four volumes which will take time to sanitize. Triplett asked if I could do this file next. I said I would.

4. O/SECURITY (GAMBINO, 19 OCT 77) Memo to OLC
   Info provided:

TRAFFICANTE, Santos

1. Blakey to Adm. Turner, 21 Oct 77 (IG 77-2252; EX REG #77-6724/2
   The HSCA has subpoenaed Santos TRAFFICANTE....
   if you could determine whether or not TRAFFICANTE, in any manner, had any relationship or was ever affiliated with the CIA and inform me ....prior to November 2....

WERBELL, Mitdell Livingston

1. **HSCA Request, 22 December 1977 (OLC #77-5685/4) for access to files or documents on or referring to:**

   4. Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III. Chairman of the Board, Military Armament Corporation.

2. DCD 112/78, 31 Jan 78: file A-12-79-00, containing all DCD material. This file is on loan and should be returned.....please hand carry.

3. IPG, 23 Feb 78 - Inf. to be fwd'd SA/DO/O

WARREN COMMISSION Documents (withheld from release by CIA)

HSCA Request, 1 December 1977 (OLC #77-5333): for

1. CD #347, 1/31/64
2. CD #361, pp 1-95, 1/31/64
3. CD 384, 2/19/64
4. CD 426, 2/21/64
5. CD 698, 3/31/64
6. CD 710, 4/3/64
7. CD 817, 4/20/64
8. CD 871, 4/29/64
9. CD 902, 5/6/64
10. CD 935, 5/15/64
11. CD 944, 5/19/64
12. CD 990, 5/27/64
13. CD 1012, 6/3/64
14. CD 1222, 7/6/64
15. CD 1479, 9/11/64
16. CD 1551, 5/22/64

ZAPRUDER film

1. HSCA Request, 3 Nov 77:

    7. Any and all information concerning the CIA's analysis and/or use of the Zapruder film.

2. C/CI MEmo to OLC (CI 622-77, 29 Nov 77)

b. (attached) a xerox copy of an NPIC analysis of the Zapruder film. This material was contained in a file from the OGC and should be coordinated with that office and with NPIC.

in addition, there are some remarks concerning the Zapruder film in the Agency's response to Paul L. Hock's copyrighted memorandum dated 24 March 1975.....

INVENTORY OF 201-289248

VOL. 1 PART 1

RECORD CY	CY OR X-REF	NON-DOC	DATE	DOCUMENT	SUBJECT	NAMES FOR 'INDEXING'	FOIA CD #
✓			9 DEC 60	831a	201 FILE OPENING	EGETER, ANN	1-18
		✓	5 OCT 61		— NOTE RE STATE TELEGRAMS ON ORDER A-173, 4/61 D 806, 5/61 MOSC 234, 11/59	LYNCH, D. SIMENSON	
	X		22 NOV 63	XAAZ 22595	VOL. 27 BULKY 201 PRIOR NOV 22, 1963	SEE ATT'D B	-692
	X			TX 1855	— MISC. FROM GPFLOOR	SEE ATT'D B	
	X			WX 7241	CHRON. O. VISIT TO MEXICO	SEE ATT'D B	
	X			XAAZ 35909	MINSK MAPS	SEE ATT'D B	
✓				XAAZ 35612	3 INDEX CARDS ON LHO		2-524
	X		19 FEB 64	TS 187908	= XAAZs 22594 + 36365	CALDERON, MARIA HENSEN, ELDON	
	C		20 JUL 63	MEXI 5448	AMCIT PHONED CUBANEMB 19 JULY TRYING EST. CONTACT OFFERING HELP. ~~[illegible]~~ LEAVING 20th SPOKE IN ENGLISH	ATHENS, TEX. phone OR-54787 "LAREDO" KEY WORD ~~[illegible]~~. AMSAIL/1 POSED AS CUBAN EMB OFF	
✓				TX 1940 M	NOTE RE SYLVIA DURAN ARREST		3-526
✓				TX 1941	DRAFT CABLE TO STATE REFS #7072 "YESTERDAY" re DEVELOPMENTS	HERNANDEZ-ARMAS CUBAN AMB MEX DORTICOS CONVERSATION UGARTE, GILBERTO DURAN, SYLVIA	4-527
✓			9 OCT 63	MEXI 6453	LIENVOY 1 OCT 63 CONVERSATION RE VISA FROM WASH	LEE OSWALD KOSTIKOV	5-1a
✓			10 OCT 63	DIR 74673	RE LHO CALL TO SOV EMB TO STATE, FBI, NAVY		6-3
✓			10 OCT 63	DIR 74830	TO MEXI - PHYS DESCRIP OF LHO, BACKGROUND IN USSR		7-2
✓			15 OCT 63	MEXI 6534	PLS POUCH PHOTO OSWALD		8-4
✓			16 OCT	TX 1913 M DUPE OF	COS MEMO TO AMB. DISSEM OF LIENVOY INFO RE LHO CALL 1 OCT 63		—
			16 OCT	TX 1919			9-5
✓			24 OCT	DIR 77978	TO NAVY - REQ. PHOTOS LHO		10-6
✓				TX 1916 M	PHOTOS TO LEGATT FOR USE w/MEXICAN POLICE	Source ? Date ?	11-6a
✓			5 OCT 64	TX 1928 M	MEXICAN COMMUNISTS CONTACTS WITH OSWALD SEP/OCT 1963 HORACIO DURAN IS HUSBAND	GARRO DE PAZ PAZ DURAN, RUBEN " HORACIO	12-528

14-00000

VOL. 1 PART 1
page 2

RECORD COPY	CY OR X-REF	NON-DOC	DATE	DOCUMENT	SUBJECT	NAMES	FOIA
✓			11/63	XAAZ 35813	"HISTORIC DIARY" IN USSR OCT 1959 - DEC 1960	SHERIKOVA, RIMMA DIMITROVA, LUDMILLA ABAFONOVA, ROSA SNYDER, RICHARD Mc VICKARS, GOLDSTENE MOSBY ROSA STELLINA ZEGER, ALEXANDER DETHOF, ROMAN GOLOVACHA, PAVEL ALFERD (HUNGARIAN) ZEGER, ANITA ZEGER, LEONARA LEBIZEN ELLA GERMAIN NELL KOROBKA TOMKA TOMIS ALLA ERICH TITOV MARINA N. PROSAKOVA AUNT VALIA ENNA TAKHAGOBAYA	13-1
✓			11/63	XAAZ 35865	1-page MEMO RE LHO; Brief Account of MEXICO SOJOURN.		14-1c
✓			MAY 64	5X 25607	SOVS IN HELSINKI, 1959 GOLUB, GRIGORIY		15-523
✓			24/4/64	XAAZ 35902	WC Request for info ON HOURS SOVIET + CUBAN EMB/MEX OPEN + MEXI REGS ON AMCITS TRAV. TO CUBA.		16-6B (Same a Documen 667-282
✓			17/12/63	5X 25450	Sole REPORT OF SPY SCHOOL IN MINSK DOI: 1947 (WELA 4060, 2 JUNE '50)		17-525
✓			3 JUN 64	XAE-810	Geo. + JEAN DE MOHRENSCHILDT BACKGROUND OF CIA INTEREST		18-522
	C		3 JULY 61	DBF-82181	FBI, Dallas report on LHO		CD 692
	C		2 Nov 59	DST 11807	AMEMB Moscow 234 LHO WISHES TO RENOUNCE CITIZENSHIP		
✓			25 MAY 60	DBF 49478	FBI, DALLAS report on LHO + FUNDS TRANSMITTED TO RESIDENTS OF RUSSIA		
✓			3 JUN 60	DBD 86527	FBI MEMO TO STATE RE LHO re POSSIBLE USE OF HIS PAPERS BY ANOTHER PERSON		
✓			3 JUL 61	DBF 82181	FBI REPORT ON LHO BACKGROUND -		
✓			26 MAY 61	XAAZ 9644	AMEMB MOSCOW 806 - Letters from LHO to Embassy		
✓			3 JULY 61	DBA 63718	FBI report on LHO. Same as DBF 82181?		
✓			30 Oct 61	XAAZ 9645	AMEMB Moscow #317		
✓			26 Apr 62	DNA 1624	NAVY MEMO TO FBI FWDING LHO LETTER RE UNDESIRABLE DISCHARGE MAR '62 FM MINSK		
	C		17 May 62	DST 8863	STATE TO FBI re Status of AMERICAN DEFECTORS		

✓ 10 July 62 DBA 63719
✓ 30 Aug 62 DBA 64405
✓ 30 Aug 62 DBA 20883
✓ 31 Oct 63 DBA 64406
10 Sep 63 DBA 51407
24 Sep 63 DBA 52355
25 Oct 63 DBA 55777
31 Oct 63 DBA 55715

14-00000

CS COPIES

VOL. 1 PART 1
BULKIES

VOL. 27 Bulky

✓	6 MAR 64	XAAZ 22595	- PRE ASSASSINATION FILE CD 692 MEMO TO RANKIN FM HELMS LISTING 30 DOCUMENTS ON LHO AT CIA PRIOR TO 22 Nov. 63. FORWARDED EXACT REPRO. OF 201 DOSSIER.	590.252
C	31 Oct 59	31	1. STATE AIRGRAM 1304 FM MOSCOW	—
C	1 Nov "		2. POST ARTICLE	591.252A
C	2 Nov		3. CI/LSN NOTE RE ORAL FBI REQ.	592.252B
	2 Nov		4. STATE DESPATCH 234 FM AMEMB MOSCOW	—
	9 Nov		5 " TELEGRAM 1358 FM MOSCOW	—
	9 Nov		6. " " 1448 FM TOKYO	—
	16 Nov		7. POST ARTICLE	593.252C
	26 Nov		8. STAR "	594.252D
	25 MAY 60	DBF 49478	9. DBF 49478 (FUNDS TRANSMITTED..)	—
	MAY 60		10. BIO PROFILE	595.252E
✓	25 Oct 60		11. Letter to CIA FM STATE (DD/P 0.5679)	—
	21 Nov 60	XAAZ 36362	12 " " STATE FM CIA (DD/P 0.6003)	596-252F
	9 DEC 60		13 201 OPENINK SHEET	597.252G
	26 Jan 61		14 STATE MEMCON RE LHO	—
	13 Apr		15 STATE AIRGRAM 273	—
	26 May		16 " DESPATCH 806	—
	11 July		17. " " 29	—
	03 July 61	DBF 82181	18. ~~DFB~~ 82181	—
	28 SEP		19. CIA MEMO FOR RECORD	598.252H
	12 Oct		20 STATE DESP. 317	—
	5 DEC		21 INS Name check request	—
	3 Mar 62		22 NAVY MESSAGE 20199/RB/3	MISSING
	26 Apr 62	DNA 1624	23 EX.PFC LHO, USMCR	—
	9 June		24 Post article	599.252I
	7 SEP 62	DBA 20888	25 LHO (FAIN, DALLAS) 30 Aug	—
	10 SEP 63	DBA 51407	26 " (HOSTY, DALLAS) 10 SEP	—
	24 SEP	DBA 52355	27 " (NEW ORLEANS) 24 SEP	—
	7 Nov	DBA 55715	28 " (KAACK, " " 31 Oct	—
	8 Nov 63	DBA 55777	29 FPCC (DE BRUEYS " ") 25 Oct	—
	31 Jan 64		30 CIA SUMMARY OF LHO ACTIVITIES MEX	CY OF 509-803

ALL COPIES

NOTE: COPIES IN THIS FILE PROVIDED BY NATIONAL ARCHIVES AS 'PACKAGE' THUS INTERNAL NUMBERS NOT APPEARING ON STATE MESSAGES.

NOTE: BOTH SANITIZED + UNSANITIZED COPIES OF EACH DOC.

CS COPY OF XAAZ 36362 INCLUDED

11 = LIST OF AMERICAN DEFECTORS

12 "

14-00000

COPY OR X-REF

CS COPY

FOIA	DATE	DOCUMENT	SUBJECT

201-289248 INVENTORY Vol.__ Part__

14-00000

104-10079-10163 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

35-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 161827Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 125981

CONF: SA/DO/O INFO: FILE EUR8, IP/DMS, LA8, OLC, DDO4, DDO/DO, DDO/SRO,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: P
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

TO: LISBON, INFO LONDON, MEXICO CITY. 4

RYBAT UNINTEL RNVIEW 4

1. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS WHO CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ASSASSINATIONS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING HAS TOLD STATE THAT THEY INTEND TO PURSUE LEADS IN PORTUGAL, UK AND MEXICO RELATING TO JAMES EARL RAY, CURRENTLY SERVING TIME FOR KING MURDER. THEY BASING THIS INTEREST ON INFORMATION THAT RAY WAS IN LISBON BRIEFLY IN MAY 1968, SHORTLY BEFORE HIS APPREHENSION IN LONDON IN JUNE 1968. 4

2. MR. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR OF COMMITTEE SAYS SELECT COMMITTEE TOLD STATE THAT HE WANTS TO ESTABLISH "CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH APPROPRIATE PORTUGUESE NATIONAL POLICE AND HOPES TO ENLIST THEIR ASSISTANCE INCLUDING ACCESS TO THEIR FILES AND IN LOCATING AND INTERVIEWING POTENTIAL WITNESSES. 4

3. DEPARTMENT HAS SOLICITED EMBASSY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW BLAKEY SHOULD PROCEED. 4

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: #11658

OUTGOING MESSAGE

4/DV

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

	AGE	CO1	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0		2		2

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP:

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

125981

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO PER
☐ IP FILES

DISSEM BY:

4. WISH TO CALL ABOVE TO ADDRESSEES' ATTENTION IN EVENT STATIONS ARE SOLICITED FOR ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE. RTACTION IS COOPERATING FULLY WITH BLAKEY AND COMMITTEE INCLUDING ALLOWING THEM ACCESS TO DIRECTORATE RECORDS, AFTER SUITABLE SANITIZATION FOR SOURCES AND METHODS. HOWEVER, BELIEVE COMMITTEE'S EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW POLICE AND WITNESSES AND RESULTING USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED, IF ANY, IS LARGELY OVERT FUNCTION WHICH CAN BEST BE HANDLED BY LEGATTS OR OTHERS WHO WOULD ALSO BE IN A POSITION TO BE PUBLICLY QUOTED OR IDENTIFIED IF NECESSARY. Y

5. STATIONS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE EMBASSY BEST ADVICE IF SOLICITED BUT REQUESTED TO AVOID INVOLVING STATION OFFICERS IN NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IN THEIR COVER CAPACITIES. IF CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH THAT THIS UNAVOIDABLE, PLEASE ADVISE HQS BY CABLE SO THAT THE MATTER CAN BE APPROPRIATELY HANDLED WITH BLAKEY AND DEPARTMENT. H

ORIG: O/SA/DO/O {SOVERN}; COORD: OLC {CUMMINS}, DC/LA {LAUDER}, C/LA/~~MEX~~ MGSB {~~[illegible]~~ HAWKINS}, DC/EUR/BC {~~[illegible]~~ JAMES}, C/EUR/IB {BERGER}; AUTH: SA/DO/O {KATROSH}; REL: DC/EUR {ESTES}.J

DATE: 14 NOVEMBER 1977
ORIG: MASOVERN
UNIT: O/SA/DO/O
EXT: 1542

C/LA/STAFF B-[illegible]

OLC
DC/EUR/BC
DC/LA
C/EUR/IB
C/LA/M~~[illegible]~~ GSB

DC/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for SA/DO/O
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

4/01

Russ: Action

SECRET

I would like to see:

MLK

1) DDO files concerning James Carl Ray and JER under any of his aliases

2) Real names of Crypographic references in 8 June 1968 Ottawa 5446 Telex

SMABOVE/9 — RCMP Liaison Contact

LNERGO REP — MOSS INNES IN [illegible]

FH SMABLE — Canadian INS

3) 3rd Agency

a) INS - Report from San Francisco Field Office of INS dtd 6/17/68 subject: CHANG, Fang Nang (A12-288-758)

[Ray's name given as Eric S Galt]

Rodgers action

b) State Dept Telexes

London	10573	7/3/68
London	10554	7/3/68
State	195240	7/2/68
London	10017	6/18/68
State	183535	6/14/68
Lisbon	1567	6/14/68
State	181198	6/12/68
London	9738	6/11/68
Ottawa	1813	6/8/68

Thanks,
Alan Hausman

SECRET

SECRET

F HOLMES RUSSELL B HM-788
CI/EXO 2D4921
EXT. 1253 TUBE CT5
B
SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 12 SEP 1977

IP/FI CONTROL NO.: 02 SEP 6 77

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	2/9	
REQUESTER				
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52		
REQUESTER				
IP/RMS	DW-6	GA-20		

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO *(Doc. Ref.)*

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(TO IP/IN)*

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME: BANNISTER

GIVEN NAMES: Guy

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 201-

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

☐ NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT

☐ SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES

☒ INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED

☐ THERE ARE ____________ RECORDS OF WHICH ____________ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS

B / 1 Ren listed

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME

1977 SEP -2 AM 10:28 020367

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 3-74 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-8-38)

```
                                    S-E-C-R-E-T

                           MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE                               020378

   REQ NO: 020378A12    REQUESTER: HM768  HOLMES R B     CI/EXO    284921  1253  CTS

   NAME: BANNISTER,GUY                                    YOB:        SEX:    CIT:
    ORIGIN:A  DOR:     PURPOSE:FOS  PRTY:R   OTPT:D999  FNU:   SPELL:   MASK:   MAT:

   CONTROL CODE 010-MTM-770902-112400-00036      112354
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

   0001 BANISTER, W. GUY                                          019-005-003
        SEX M                                                     CSCI-3764414
        FORMER MEMBER FBI. HAS DETECTIVE AGENCY AT 531            30MAR61
        LAFAYETTE ST., NEW ORLEANS. MBR FRIENDS OF DEMOCRATIC
        CUBA, INC., NEW ORLEANS, LA. ANSWER TO NAME TRACE REQ.
        FROM FBI BASED ON UFGA-929, 23 FEB 61.
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/GFS  -- GC-52
                         APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
        CSCI-3764414                        20 APR 61  06199236


   0002 BANNISTER, /MR./                                          200-009-009
        AKA BRUNAUER, ALEXANDER                                   DFB-81736
                                                                  SEP 49
                                                                  PAGE 4
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/GFS  -- GC-52
                         APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
        DFB-81736                           01 JAN 58  08920616


                       END OF REPLY - 0002 RECORDS LISTED

                                                                                   PAGE
           HM798                                                      END OF   02057
                            S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

SECRET

FROM: NAME *(Use gummed labels)* R.B. Holmes	BADGE NO. HM788	INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

BRANCH CI/EXO	ROOM 2D4921	EXTENSION 1253	DATE 22/9/77	IP/FI CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
~~IP/INDEX~~	~~DT-5~~	~~1B4003~~			
~~REQUESTER~~					
IP/FILES AR	~~DT-6~~	~~GC52~~	23/9		MG
REQUESTER					
IP/RMS	DW-6	GA-20			

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED 1	THIS REQUEST REFERS TO *(Doc. Ref.)* 316/3764414

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(TO IP/IN)*

REQUESTED FROM DDP RECORDS CENTER
"Will follow"

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME Bannister	GIVEN NAMES
SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED	201 NO. IF KNOWN 201-
AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

☐	NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT
☐	SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES
☐	INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED
☐	THERE ARE ________ RECORDS OF WHICH ________ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 3-74 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-8-38)

SECRET

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM: NAME *(Use gummed labels)*: Holmes, R. B.

BADGE NO.: Hu1788

BRANCH: CI

ROOM: 2D4921

EXTENSION: 5083

DATE:

IP/CFS CONTROL NO.:

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
IP/MI	DT-5	1B4003	2/24	
SEND IMPERSONAL INDEX SEARCHES DIRECTLY TO IP/AR				
IP/AR	GT-7	GA50		
REQUESTER				
IP/CFS	DT-6	GC52		
REQUESTER				
IP/DMS	DW-6	GA20		

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED:

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO *(Doc. Ref.)*:

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(IP/MI)*:

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME: ESPINOSA-Hernandez

GIVEN NAMES: Victor Dominado

SPELLING VARIA~~TIONS TO~~ BE SEARCHED: N

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 201-

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*:

SEX:

DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP:

RESIDENCE:

RESULTS OF IP/MI SEARCH

- ☐ NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT
- ☑ STAR RECORDS ATTACHED
- ☐ MICROFICHE RECORDS ATTACHED DUE TO TEMPORARY STAR FAILURE. PLEASE CONTACT IP/MI REGARDING RESUBMISSION OF THIS TRACE REQUEST.
- ☐ SURNAME NOT FOUND; VARIANTS CHECKED NOTED ABOVE
- ☐ THERE ARE ________ RECORDS OF WHICH ________ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/MI, 1B4003.

COMMENTS:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. **Review Index Records.**
2. **Draw green diagonal line across items you do not want.**
3. **Forward to IP/CFS.**

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/DMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME:

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 9-77 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 062147

(4-8-38)

14-00000

```
                              S-E-C-R-E-T

                        MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE                        228282
                                                                         ***IMMEDIATE
  REQ NO: 228282A01   REQUESTER: HMZ88  HOLMES R B    CI/EXO   2D4921  1253  CT5

   NAME: ESPINOSA HERNANDEZ,VICTOR DOMINADO             YOB:       SEX:   CIT:
    ORIGIN:S   DOR:      PURPOSE:FDS  PRTY:I  OTPT:D999  FNU:    SPELL:   MASK:    MAT:

   CONTROL CODE 016-RJ -780224-131817-00020    131756


   0001 ESPINOSA HERNANDEZ, VICTOR DOMINADOR                         201-0285147*
        SEX M DOB 26AUG37              POB CUBA, MATANZAS             TYPE NAME T
        CIT CUBA                       OCC CODE STU                   RCD DATE 60
        REF DBA -47207, 02 AUG 63
        RES CUBA AKA ESPINOSA, VICTOR STUDENT CORR. CARD WAS
        ESPINOSA-HERNANDEZ, VICTOR
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                   31 DEC 65  00672790


                    END OF REPLY   0001 RECORDS LISTED

                                                                              PAGE 0
                HM788                                             END OF  228282
                              S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

14-00000

CT 5

SECRET

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM: NAME *(Use gummed labels)*: R Holmes

BADGE NO.: HM 788

BRANCH: CI/EYO

ROOM:

EXTENSION:

DATE:

IP/CFS CONTROL NO.:

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
IP/MI	DT-5	1B4003	15-2-78		MW
SEND IMPERSONAL INDEX SEARCHES DIRECTLY TO IP/AR					
IP/AR	GT-7	GA50			
REQUESTER					
IP/CFS	DT-6	GC52			
REQUESTER					
IP/DMS	DW-6	GA20			

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED:

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO *(Doc. Ref.)*:

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(IP/MI)*

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME: Butler

GIVEN NAMES: Ed

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED:

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 201-

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*

FEB 15 10 15 AM '78

SEX:

DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP:

RESIDENCE:

RESULTS OF IP/MI SEARCH

☐ NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT

☐ STAR RECORDS ATTACHED

☐ MICROFICHE RECORDS ATTACHED DUE TO TEMPORARY STAR FAILURE. PLEASE CONTACT IP/MI REGARDING RESUBMISSION OF THIS TRACE REQUEST.

☐ SURNAME NOT FOUND; VARIANTS CHECKED NOTED ABOVE

☐ THERE ARE ________ RECORDS OF WHICH ________ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/MI, 1B4003.

COMMENTS: 35 FNUs listed

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. **Review Index Records.**
2. **Draw green diagonal line across items you do not want.**
3. **Forward to IP/CFS.**

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/DMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME:

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 9-77 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 062147

(4-8-38)

```
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T

                                  MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE                           777888
                                                                                        ***PRIORIT
   REQ NO: 777888A03    REQUESTER: HM788  HOLMES R B   CI/EXO   204921  1253  CT5

   NAME: BUTLER, ED                                          YOB:       SEX:   CIT:
    ORIGIN:A  DOR:    PURPOSE:FDS  PRTY:P  OTPT:D999  FNU:   SPELL:   MASK:   MAT:

   CONTROL CODE 003-GW -780215-094243-00005    094237
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

   0001 BUTLER, E.                                                 32W-120-034
        SEX M                                                      EGNA-40152A01
        CIT EGER                                                   20FEB70
        ^ 1136 VOLKRAT 88 < EGER, BERLIN ACCOMODATION              P4
        ADDRESS
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                         APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
        EGNA-40152                               20 MAR 70  03380891


   0002 BUTLER, E. E. /LCDR SSA/                                   014-005-001
        SEX M                                                      SER-2Y4
                                                                   NA-343-53
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
        014-005-001-2Y4                          27 JUL 72  02097815










                                                                                          PAGE
   ---CONTINUED---      HM788                                                          777888
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

```
0003 BUTLER, E. G.                                                       201-0044980
     NAME RPRTD AS BUTLER, EDW. G.                                       PHS-3/19/51
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     201-0044980                           10 NOV 75  08391833


0004 BUTLER, R. E. /LCDR/                                                014-005-001
     R.C.N. SSA                                                          03JUL53
                                                                         SER-2Y
                                                                         NA-12853
                                                                         NA-R-128-53
                                                                         PAGE 6
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     014-005-001-2Y                        01 JAN 58  08535286


0005 BUTLER, H. E.                                                       006-006-089
     PARTICIPANT AT THE 8TH INTERNATIONAL ASTROPHYSICAL                  EAVA-16494A01
     SYMPOSIUM, LIEGE, JUL 57                                            30APR57
                                                                         SER-1
                                                                         ENCL. 1
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     EAVA-16494                            25 FEB 76  08897648
```

S-E-C-R-E-T

```
0006 BUTLER, EDWARD G. /COL/                                   042-006-004
                                                               NQBW-00976
                                                               SER-1595
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                        APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     NQBW-00976                       01 JAN 58  08750803


0007 BUTLER, E. C.                                             ARDP-00002
     OSS REFS ARE AVAILABLE TO THIS NAME IN THE MAIN           01JAN46
     INDEX CAT. III FILE. THESE REFS MUST BE MANUA LLY
     SEARCHED AND APPLICABLE CARDS REPRODUCED AN D ATTACHED
     TO THE NAME TRACE REQUEST.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     ARDP-00002                       01 JAN 46  01953320


0008 BUTLER, EDMOND BORGIA                                     100-500
     SEX M                                                     XAAZ-32178
                                                               01JUL71
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     XAAZ-32178                       12 JUL 73  01187540
```

see attached

```
---CONTINUED---     HM788                                                  PAGE
                                                                         777888
```

S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

```
0009 BUTLER, EDMOND BORGIA                                          200-006-043
     FORMERLY: DD NO DATE,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO CCS/REG, GH44    , 9362, 09/03/70
     200-006-043                          30 DEC 60  08427141


0010 BUTLER, EDMOND BORGIA                                          200-006-043
     FORMERLY: DD NO DATE,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO CCS/REG, GH44    , 9362, 09/03/70
     200-006-043                          30 DEC 60  08427142


0011 BUTLER, E. WALTER /JR/                                         200-006-043
     FORMERLY: DD NO DATE,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO CCS/REG, GH44    , 9362, 09/03/70
     200-006-043                          31 JAN 74  03823705


0012 BUTLER, JESSE E.                                              KX-03300
     SEX M
     EMPLOYEE ALIAS-SEE RID/SD.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     KX-03300                             13 FEB 68  02653115
```

S-E-C-R-E-T

```
0013 BUTLER, FRANCIS E. /MRS./                                         SHAN-01634
     CHINA-4 JULY 48 ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MAXIM EGOROFF.                IN46985
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     SHAN-01634C                             01 JAN 58  08655032


0014 BUTLER, VINCENT EDWARD                                            100-006-160/05
     SEX M                                                             XAB-03927
     RES USA, OKLA, TULSA, 6676 SO. EVANSTON CIRCLE.                   15MAR77
     EMPLOYMENT, BUTLER ASSOCIATES, PRESIDENT/OWNER, 4815
     SO. HARVARD, TULAS, OKLAHOMA.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     XAB-03927                               15 APR 77  09494135


0015 BUTLER, E. WALTER /JR/                                            201-0229441*
     SEX M                      POB USA                                TYPE NAME T
                                                                       RCD DATE 58
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                             28 MAR 66  00228687
```

---CONTINUED---   HM788

S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

```
0016 BUTLER, H. E. /LCDR/                                        014-005-001
     SEX M                                                       SER-2Y5
                                                                 ONI-128-53
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     014-005-001-2Y5                         27 JUL 72  02097803


0017 (VON) BUTTLAR, EDGAR /GEN/                                  200-005-009
     HUNGARY GERMAN SIGNAL CORPS OFFICER NOS.540X.               GER-1
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     200-005-009                             06 FEB 74  03824169


0018 (VON) BUTTLAR, EDGAR                                        ARDP-00002
     OSS REFS ARE AVAILABLE TO THIS NAME IN THE MAIN             01JAN46
     INDEX CAT. III FILE. THESE REFS MUST BE MANUA LLY
     SEARCHED AND APPLICABLE CARDS REPRODUCED AN D ATTACHED
     TO THE NAME TRACE REQUEST.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     ARDP-00002                              01 JAN 46  01989732
```

(see attached)

---CONTINUED---   HM788

```
                              S-E-C-R-E-T

0019 BUTLER                                                         200-006-008
     THE IRON CURTAIN-IGOR GUZENKO, INTERROGATION OF                SER-1
     GUZENKO, & THE REPORTOF THE ROYAL COMMISSION
     CANADA-1946 KULAKOV,FNU/LT.
     FORMERLY: DD NO DATE,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO SE/OP/S, 4D30    , 9078, 13/01/78
     200-006-008-1                       01 JAN 46  08428033


0020 BUTLER, FNU                                                    200-006-008
     THE IRON CURIAIN-IGOR GUZENKO, INTERROGATION OF                SER-1
     GUZENKO,& THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION
     CANDA-1946 KULAKOV,FNU LT.
     FORMERLY: DD NO DATE,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO SE/OP/S, 4D30    , 9078, 13/01/78
     200-006-008-1                       01 JAN 46  08428032
```

```
0022 BUTLER, FNU                                                   060-008-003
                                                                   WELA-00207
                                                                   JUL47
                                                                   SER-10Y
                                                                   PAGE 2
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     WELA-00207                            01 JUL 47  08619787


0023 BUTLER, FNU                                                   200-004-106
     REAL NAME-KULAKOV,FNU                                         A-00328
                                                                   20JUN48
                                                                   26-7-0-27
     FORMERLY: DD NO DATE,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO SE/BIO , 5C32    , 1551, 07/12/66
     A-00328                               14 JUN 77  08434590


0024 BUTLER /SAW/                                                  013-006-002
     DEPUTY SECT. TO MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION AND                ZBRA-00044
     COMMUNICATI ONS                                               02JUN50
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     ZBRA-00044                            01 JAN 58  08597163
```

```
0025 BUTLER, /FNJ/                                                    029-008-003
     SEX M                                                            PX-01541
     CIT RUMA?                                                        SER 207
     SUBJ SUSPECTED OF SERVING AS RUMANIAN COMMUNIST                  P1
     AGENT IN FRANCE. CORR CARD WAS TS
     FORMERLY: SER NO FSN,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     PX-01541                               24 OCT 50  05721135


0026 BUTLER, /COUNT/                                                  006-006-002
     SEX M                                                            MAVA-08277
     < CSR, PRAGUE HAS ESTATES IN PRAGUE RELATIVE OF                  12APR51
     ZDENEK SMID                                                      SER-3580
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     MAVA-08277                             07 APR 71  02631229


0027 BUTLER, /MR/                                                     068-006-002
     SEX M                                                            MSBW-02912
                                                                      21MAY51
                                                                      SER-1761
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     MSBW-02912                             07 APR 71  02610262
```

---CONTINUED---

```
0028 BUTLER, /CHIEF ENGINEER/                                             201-0000708
     OF THE SS MADAKET                                                    TZP-01664A03
                                                                          26SEP51
                                                                          SER-16
                                                                          ENCL.3
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     TZP-01664                                 26 SEP 51  08628070


0029 BUTLER /MR/                                                          043-007-028
                                                                          PIRA-07571
                                                                          20MAR51
                                                                          SER-00079
     FORMERLY: DD NO DATE,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     PIRA-07571                                20 MAR 51  08685557


0030 BUTLER /DR/                                                          031-120-013
                                                                          RIRA-00767
                                                                          22JAN52
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     RIRA-00767                                01 JAN 58  08672331
```

```
0031 BUTLER, FNU                                              200-126-003
                                                              LOND-06959
                                                              53
                                                              SER-169
                                                              IN-46150
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     LOND-06959C   53                    01 JAN 53  08791310


0032 BUTLER, /CAPT./                                          025-006-004
     TWA PEOLT                                                NECA-00225
                                                              25JAN53
                                                              SER-1044
                                                              PAGE 11
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     NECA-00225                          01 JAN 58  08763952


0033 BUTLER, /MRS./                                           201-0024443
                                                              DFB-29224A01
                                                              27AUG53
                                                              SER-10
                                                              ENCL 1
                                                              PAGE 4
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DFB-29224                           27 AUG 53  08962829
```

---CONTINUED---

```
0034 BUTLER /FNU/                                                        SGAA-11912A01
                                                                         01OCT54
                                                                         ATT. 1
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     SGAA-11912                                  01 OCT 54  08658655


0035 BUTLER, FNU                                                         32E-005-008/01
     SEX M DOB C12                      OCC INTEL OFFICER                GIS-12957
     CIT GERM                                                            04FEB54
     < E GERMANY MFS STAFF MBR IN NEUBRANDENBURG,
     TEMPLIN.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     GIS-12957                                   01 APR 64  05964742


0036 BUTLER, /CAPT/                                                      060-006-003
     SEX M                                                               EGEA-00965
     < GERM, LUEBECK HEAD OF TRAVEL LIAISON OFFICE MAKING                SER-211
     DIFFICULTIES FOR REFUGEES                                           P5
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                         APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     EGEA-00965                                  07 APR 71  03436396
```

S-E-C-R-E-T

```
0037 BUTLER, FNU                                                   200-008-039
     SEX M                                                         DST-14967A01
     CIT UK                                                        08JUL55
                                   P2 SAYS HE IS                   SER-Y8
     ENGLISH. SEEN AT VORKUTA 1954. REPORTS OF AMERICANS
     HELD IN SOVIET PRISON CAMPS +STATE-F##08 JUL 55
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DST-14967                        29 NOV 67  03492699


0038 BUTLER, FNU                                                   004-006-009
     POSSIBLE DINIE OFFICER                                        HABA-01935
                                                                   18FEB55
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     HABA-01935                       11 JUL 74  08828085


0039 BUTLER                                                        200-004-076
     ALIAS OF KULAKOV,VASILI VASILYEVICH DIPLOMATIC SOV.           DFB-59703
     COURIER. PHOTO. ATT.                                          SER-1777
                                                                   FBI
                                                                   PG 152
     FORMERLY: DD NO DATE, SS NO SOUR
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     DFB-59703                        13 FEB 76  01707460
```

---CONTINUED---   HM788

S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

```
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T

0040 BUTLER, FNU                                                      041-002-008/03
                                                                      NITA-04996A01
                                                                      20SEP55
                                                                      ATT. 1
     FORMERLY: FCN NO FCN,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     NITA-04996                                20 SEP 55  08760386


0041 BUTLER /HOUSE OF COMMONS LEADER/                                 200-007-330
                                                                      DIR-29253
                                                                      56
                                                                      SER-134
                                                                      OUT80857
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     DIR-29253C  56                            01 JAN 56  08921695


0042 BUTLER, FNU                                                      201-0092940
                                                                      EGMA-21446
                                                                      26JUN56
                                                                      ATT.
     FORMERLY: FCN NO FCN,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     EGMA-21446                                01 JUL 56  08874679
```

---CONTINUED---   HM788

```
0043 BUTLER, FNU                                            32W-006-018/03
                                                             EGFA-12916
                                                             OCT56
                                                             SER-Y23
                                                             ATT.
     FORMERLY: FCN NO FCN, SER NO FSN,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
             APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     EGFA-12916                         01 OCT 56  08884979

0044 BUTLER, /LT.CMDR/                                      040-008-005
                                                             NBDA-04257
                                                             SER-9
                                                             ENCL
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     NBDA-04257                         01 JAN 58  08765922

0045 BUTLER, FNU /AMBASSADOR/                               019-004-002
     CUBA-JULY 48 CUBA                                       SER-222
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     019-004-002-222                    01 JAN 58  08528343
```

---CONTINUED--- HM788

```
0046 BUTLER, /MAJ./                                                    025-006-004
                                                                       NECA-04171
                                                                       SER-2800
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     NECA-04171                            01 JAN 58  08763346


0047 BUTLER, FNU                                                       032-006-001
           DOB 18MAY'15                                                MGHA-11267
     INFORMANTS DROPPED BY US INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN                 SER-4670
     GERMANY AND AUSTRIA CZECH ALIAS OF BACA,JAN                       ANNEX B-11
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     MGHA-11267                            01 JAN 58  08781421


0048 BUTLER                                                            201-0000318
     CANADA JUL 48 LT. KULKOV                                          SER-1
                                                                       PG.9
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     201-0000318-1                         01 JAN 58  08400923
```

---CONTINUED---

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

0049 BUTLER, /MR./ 004-006-004
OF THE MANUFACTURE TRUST COMPANY SER-393
HAB-A-276 ok

***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
004-006-004-393 01 JAN 58 08559699

0050 BUTLER, /AMBASSADOR/ 200-007-038
CUBA JUNE 50 SER-429
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
200-007-038-429 01 JAN 58 08422175

14-00000

```
                                   S-E-C-R-E-T

0052 BUTLER, FNU                                                      32E-006-203/03
     SEX M                                                            EGNA-21331
     MFS MBR CONTACTED EDITH NEE EHEMANN SCHULZE                      02JUN61
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     EGNA-21331                              16 JUN 61  06052905


0053 BUTLER, FNU                                                      060-006-172/03
     SEX F                           POB USA                          SX-20700
     CIT USA                         OCC TEACHER                      07JAN74
     RES POLD, KRAKOW. SEE DOC FOR ADDITIONAL INFO.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO SE/PCH , 4D46    , 1092, 26/01/73
     SX-20700                                11 MAR 74  09075608


                         END OF REPLY - 0053 RECORDS LISTED
```

```
                                                                                  PAGE
                HM788                                              END OF   777888
                                   S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

14-00000

BUTLER, E. C. (Mr.)

London-Commo-Op-8
Folder # 17

Accident Report

3

[illegible]12

BUTTLAR, General Edgar Von See Boston Series 540

Wash-SI-Pts-1

630170

CT 5

SECRET

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

M: NAME (*Use gummed labels*) Holmes		BADGE NO. HM788
BRANCH CI/EXO	ROOM	EXTENSION

DATE	IP/CFS CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
IP/MI	DT-5	1B4003	15/2/78		DW
SEND IMPERSONAL INDEX SEARCHES DIRECTLY TO IP/AR					
IP/AR	GT-7	GA50			
REQUESTER					
IP/CFS	DT-6	GC52			
REQUESTER					
IP/DMS	DW-6	GA20			

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED	THIS REQUEST REFERS TO (*Doc. Ref.*)

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS (*IP/MI*)

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME Murret	GIVEN NAMES Marilyn Dorothy

SPELLING ~~VARIATIONS TO~~ BE SEARCHED.

201 NO. IF KNOWN
201- X

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (*Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.*)

FEB 15 10 15 AM '78

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/MI SEARCH

NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT

STAR RECORDS ATTACHED

MICROFICHE RECORDS ATTACHED DUE TO TEMPORARY STAR FAILURE. PLEASE CONTACT IP/MI REGARDING RESUBMISSION OF THIS TRACE REQUEST.

SURNAME NOT FOUND; VARIANTS CHECKED NOTED ABOVE

THERE ARE ________ RECORDS OF WHICH ________ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/MI, 1B4003.

COMMENTS

NO FNUS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. **Review Index Records.**
2. **Draw green diagonal line across items you do not want.**
3. **Forward to IP/CFS.**

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/DMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 9-77 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 062147

(4-8-38)

SECRET

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS (See DOI 70-20)

1. IF SUBJECT HAS A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM WITH THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RECLASSIFIED OR CROSS-REFERENCED ALONG WITH THE INDEX RECORDS MARKED IN GREEN, TO REFLECT ACTION TAKEN, TO IP/DMS.

2. WHEN SUBJECT HAS NO 201 FILE, BUT MEETS THE REQUIREMENT FOR OPENING A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/DMS WITH:

   A. A COMPLETED FORM 831.

   B. ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS, EXTRACTS, AND PROPERLY EDITED RECORDS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF THE FILE BY IP/DMS.

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER	DATE

CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES: REQUESTER SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER TRACING THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WHICH ARE NOT SEARCHED BY IP/MI *(SEE NAME TRACE HANDBOOK)*.

SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED	SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED
DO AREA DESKS			CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE		
IP/ARCHIVES*			CIA LIBRARY		
COMINT NAME CHECK			OFFICE OF SECURITY		
SE BIOGRAPHIC BRANCH			OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES		
TRAVEL PROGRAMS			DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION		
NAME OF BEARER FILE/OTS					
CIA APPLICANTS FILE/OFFICE OF PERSONNEL			DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE		
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP-SS/IL *(WFTU)*			DEFENSE CENTRAL INDEX		
COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF			CENTRAL REGISTRY - EUROPE		
POLICY & COORDINATION STAFF: RESERVE OFFICERS FILE			FBI		
POLICY & COORDINATION STAFF: INTERAGENCY SOURCE REG.			I & NS		
CI OPERATIONS: CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
EUR/G PROGRAM			SECRET SERVICE		
SUBVERSIVES PROGRAM			DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY		
LA					

*OSS REFERENCES NEED NOT BE SEARCHED ON SUBJECTS BORN AFTER 1931.

REMARKS

SECRET

```
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T

                                  MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE                      777888
                                                                                   ***PRIORIT
REQ NO: 777888A02    REQUESTER: HM788  HOLMES R B    CI/EXO   204921  1253  CT5

NAME: MURRET, MARILYN DOROTHY                           YOB:        SEX:   CIT:
 ORIGIN:A  DOR:    PURPOSE:FDS  PRTY:P  OTPT:D999  FNU:   SPELL:   MASK:   MAT:

CONTROL CODE 003-GW -780215-093923-00021    093902
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

0001 MURRET, MARILYN DOROTHEA                                     201-0761577*
     SEX F DOB 14JUL28              POB USA, LA, NEW ORLEANS      TYPE NAME T
     CIT USA                        OCC TEACHER                   RCD DATE 64
                                    OCC CODE PROF
     RES PAKISTAN DOI MAY 64. U.S. ADDRESS 757 FRENCH ST,
     NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA. LISTED AS ONE OF /MOST WANTED/
     DEFECTORS IN /ALLEN-SCOTT REPORT/ OF MAR 26, 64. SOME
     REF TO CONNECTION BETW SUBJ AND LEE HARVEY OSWALD ALSO
     WITH PROF HAROLD ISAACS OF MIT AND COMMUNIST
     /APPARATUS/
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                           27 JAN 75  00153086


                             END OF REPLY - 0001 RECORDS LISTED
```

```
---CONTINUED---     HM788
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

ASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:		EXTENSION	NO.
IP/CFS	1 B 4003	6740	DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. HM 788 HOLMES RUSSELL			
2. CI/EXO			
3. 2D4921			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. Tube DT-6 IP/CFS			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Our records indicate that the attached document is classified into a file currently charged to you/your office.

Permanent ☐ Temporary ☒

Please file this document in the 201 ☒ Subject ☐ Project ☐ file since it may be of immediate value. Destroy this coversheet after material is filed.

If the file is no longer held by your office, please indicate its present location so we may correct the charge.

If you do not know the location of the file, please return this coversheet together with the attached material and fill in the following:

Check if unable to locate ☐

Suggest possible location: ____________

Signature: ____________

Office designation: ____________

12027

CL BY: 062147

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OP-136

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

26-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACF	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	030015Z	DIRECTOR	937078

CONF: AF9 INFO: FILE RIAN EUR8 C14 PS/E63 OPS/INT

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

IP/MB

TO: BRUSSELS INFO PRETORIA, DAR ES SALAAM.Y

WNINTEL SESCYTHE TOPHONE Y

REFS: A. OBBA-35455 DATED 19 AUGUST 1976 (BEING POUCHED PRETORIA)

B. DIRECTOR 936226 Y

S

1. HQS READ WITH INTEREST REF A REPORT BY TOPHONE/1 ON HIS CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICAN ANC AND PAC REPRESENTATIVES IN DAR ES SALAAM. IN CONNECTION WITH REF B PROGRAM, HQS WOULD APPRECIATE TOPHONE/1 MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH SUBJECTS REF A (P.K. LEBALLOS, DAVID SIBEKO AND VUZ MAKE OF PAC AND MZIMKULU AMBROSE MAKIWANE OF ANC) BY CORRESPONDENCE, TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON PLANS AND ACTIVITIES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS, AND LEADS AND INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN BASED REPRESENTATIVES.

2. HQS WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE TOPHONE/1 EXPLOITING ANY EXISTING CONTACTS OR ACCESS TO EUROPEAN BASED REPS OF ANC, PAC, SASM OR SASO WITH VIEW TOWARD OBTAINING INTELLIGENCE AND ASSESSMENT DATA ON PERSONALITIES FOR POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT.Y

3. FILE: 201-306052; 72-300-001; 72-300-004. E2 IMPDET.H

EB

DATE: 26 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: L. SANDS:RG
UNIT: AF/ES/S
EXT: 1949

S

C/AF/ES/S
C/AF/ES
EUR/BNL
C/AF/OPS
DC/AF

RECORD COPY

03 NOV 76
201-306052

C/EUR/NW
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 12027

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10079-10391
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : HANDWRITTEN LIST ENTITLED "ASSETS KNOWN".
DATE : 01/01/1900
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS : HANDWRITTEN
LIST
ASSETS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/01/97
COMMENTS : JFK18 : F23 : 1997.12.01.17:12:45:216031

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10079-10391

Alvarez 201-119523

June 10
by J Barry
WH-1

Assets known

(1.) LIEMPTY
LICALLA- 1 (All agents)
LILYRIC- 4
LIEMPTY- 4 (Bro in law Gerende)
LIMOUSINE

(2.) LIMESA FI Sweep Op
6 Agents

(3.) LIEMBRACE unilateral Sur team
LIEMBRACE 1, 2, 4 & others
LIEMBRACE-8 → Raymond L. BARCENAS
LIEMPTY- 10 & 12

(4) LIFEAT - knows about op.
A. wife LIEMPTY-19 substitute transcriber.
B. LIFEUD-19 former basehouse keeper in op is Gerendes brother.
c. David M. Wilsted - outside c/o & P/A for project.
d. Sister Gerende ?

(5) Case Officers on NOC
Matthew H. Dingley
Vincent P. RIZZUTO
Bruce H. FERNALD aka "Victor Bellini"
Andrew E. PELLEMENT alias
David M. WILSTED
Raymond L. BARCENAS
~~[illegible]~~

"Bill Wells"
- Mike Farmer (T)

Andrew R. DOSCHER -

11815

6. LISTERINE (George Wadsworth (T)) who has supplied cover, ghost payrolling, to Gerende over the years to evade social security payments & income tax payments to GOM.

7. LIRAZOR-1 (Oliver Scantling)

8. LIANVIL-1

9. LIBAND-1 husband of Gerende sister who working against Soviets & quite active (bro in law)
10. Gerende received 5 wks of Hqs Covert trngs 1957
11. Supported JMROD operations. - dealt directly with URQUHART.

General Comments

Gerende has worked in almost every phase of the Station support activity, and even tho in recent years he has been pretty much restricted to LIEMPTY, his knowledge of activities and assets which are still current is considerable.

104-10087-10054 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                              201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26         POB GERM, BERLIN          TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                    OCC PHARMACIST            OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53   OCC CODE CHEM             RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                       30 NOV 70           00833555
```

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISG Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) #____ of ____ volume(s) of 201-__________. ☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier) ☐ Non-Restricted Dossier For Split Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to ______ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ______ (date) retained at ________ desk.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CL BY: 007622

FORM 5-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ____ BADGE ____ COMPONENT ____ EXT. ____

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REG. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

15 November 1974

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A

RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______
(NAME)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B

REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: CG7622 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOI A CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/		17JUL14	CHIN,KHANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0230059			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CNAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CNAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	HALT	
CH'EN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CNAT	0812855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CH'EN, SHOU-YEI /7115/1109/495		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091803			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040288			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KHANGTUNG PROV		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2895/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KHANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CNAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,HUAN TANG TS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CH'EN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2885/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CNAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2885/2797	A	CIRC22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0988577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3105/		08JUL14	CHIN,KHANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0044759			CHIN		
CH'EN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2985/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KHANGTUNG		CCOM?	0073195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2885/8133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179622			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CH'EN, SHU-I /7115/2885/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CNAT	0239156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0647/009		CIRC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CH'EN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0858440			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CNAT	0096947			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/		15APR30	CHIN,CHENGHAI	CHMO	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KHANGTUNG PROV.		CNAT?	0052630			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2895/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN, KHANGTUNG		CHIN?	0085119			CHIN	TAIW	
CH'EN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103289			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2895/1795/		21DEC[illegible]	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763816			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TEH /M7S/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013991			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639		CIRC[illegible]	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2895/2737/		18MAR[illegible]	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0767462			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0037/	A	02FEB0[illegible]				0151329			CHIN		
CH'EN, SHU-YAO /7115/2895/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, [illegible]		CCOM?	0093196			CHIN		
CH'EN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2895/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN,[illegible] CHEN KW		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		09OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CNAT	0345528			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB39	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0313610			CHIN	DENK	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0044010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

PAGE 150

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP/SS).

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

SECRET

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

CSHB ~~43-1-1~~ 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Rscd by
Annex B to Chpt III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dat
1 Oct 62

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or ~~branches~~ often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PAGE 20 of 20
COPY NO.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

CSI NO. 10-5
SECURITY
Revised 17 July 1958

COVERT APPROVALS AND RELATED MATTERS

Reference: CSI-F No. 10-5, 17 July 1958

Rescission: CSI No. 10-5, 31 January 1955

CONTENTS

	Page
PURPOSE	1
GENERAL	1
INVESTIGATIONS	2
OPERATIONAL APPROVALS	2
COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS AND PROPRIETARY APPROVALS	3
COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS FOR LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS	5
SERVANTS OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES	5
EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN SERVICES	5
NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OR DISCONTINUANCE OF COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS OR PROPRIETARY APPROVALS	5
SPECIAL SERVICES	6
DOUBLE AGENTS	6
DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT IN PLACE	6

1. PURPOSE

This instruction describes the functions of headquarters components with regard to covert approvals and related matters which are the subject of CSI-F No. 10-5.

2. GENERAL

a. The Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, is delegated authority to act for the Deputy Director (Plans) in the exercise of all functions which are the latter's responsibility with regard to the granting of Operational Approvals and Provisional Operational Approvals.

b. The Director of Security has designated the Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support, Office of Security, to represent him in discharging the functions which are reserved to him with regard to the granting of Covert Security Approvals, Provisional Covert Security Approvals, Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. It is the basic intent of both components that sensitive operational data shall remain within the custody and knowledge of the Clandestine Services, and that sensitive security investigative data shall remain in the custody and knowledge of the Office of Security. It is recognized, however, that such data may be necessary for proper performance by either component and, consequently, where necessary, it shall be made available or shall be discussed to the extent necessary.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3. INVESTIGATIONS

The function of performing all investigations in the United States in connection with approval matters, except for the check of certain Agency records, is reserved to the Office of Security.

4. OPERATIONAL APPROVALS

a. The assembly and analysis of all file material (including the files of the Records Integration Division) in the Clandestine Services will be accomplished by professional personnel of the interested operating divisions under the technical supervision of the Counter Intelligence Staff and subject to spot check by the Counter Intelligence Staff. Certification will be made in each case by a responsible official of the requesting division that the material furnished is complete and accurate.

b. The requesting division will assemble any biographical data; information of investigative or security significance (such as additional names the subject may have used); information relating to character, reputation, politics, or other activities, favorable and unfavorable information or comments; background information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. Any information previously furnished by the subject concerning himself (such as a personal history statement, records of activities or employments, memberships in organizations, etc.) will be furnished verbatim. All pertinent information thus produced--including that resulting from technical interrogations, personal observation, field investigations, etc.--will be furnished to the Counter Intelligence Staff for necessary transmission to the Office of Security. It is also necessary to forward PRQ Part II to the Counter Intelligence Staff before an Operational Approval will be issued. The Counter Intelligence Staff will not forward PRQ Part II to the Office of Security. In rare, complicated, or sensitive cases the Office of Security, in coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff, may wish actually to review the material of the Records Integration Division. A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of the proposed usage of the subject will be furnished to the Office of Security along with the other data.

c. The requester should also furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff for transmission to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

d. Following appropriate investigation and analysis of a case, the Office of Security will forward its recommendation to the Counter Intelligence Staff, with the investigative data enclosed. Upon receipt of this material

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or his designee, will, if the Office of Security does not recommend against the use of the individual, determine whether an Operational Approval should be granted and will notify the Office of Security of its decision. However, in the event the Office of Security recommends against the use of an individual and the Clandestine Services still desires, on a calculated risk basis, to use the individual, the Counter Intelligence Staff will inform the Office of Security of this fact. In this event, the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Security Support Division will endeavor to arrive at an agreed position and, to this end, the former will hold the granting of the Operational Approval in abeyance until five days have elapsed after the Office of Security has been advised of this intention. The Counter Intelligence Staff will notify the Office of Security whenever it has:

(1) Granted an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval.

(2) Cancelled an Operational Approval.

e. In Operational Approval cases the Office of Security will forward investigative reports, name check results, etc., to the Counter Intelligence Staff. In extremely sensitive cases, however, particularly those in which the security or good of the Agency as a whole is involved, the Office of Security will not be obliged to furnish all investigative material. In such cases the Office of Security will inform the Counter Intelligence Staff that such material has been withheld and will, upon request, discuss the matter with the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or other appropriate official of the Clandestine Services.

f. A Provisional Operational Approval may also be requested where circumstances warrant. A search of the indices of the Agency, including those of the Office of Security, is a minimum requirement for issuance of a Provisional Operational Approval.

g. Whenever interest in an individual under consideration for either an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval is terminated for any reason, the requester, in order to prevent needless processing, will notify the Counter Intelligence Staff promptly so that the latter may in turn advise the Office of Security.

5. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS AND PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

a. All background material will be assembled by the interested divisions and will include any biographic data; information of an investigative or security significance; information relating to character, reputation, politics, past employment, residences, and other activities; favorable and unfavorable information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. This material is forwarded directly to the Office of Security in its original form. (Traces need not be obtained from the Records Integration Division; see paragraph 5.b., below.) A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of use of the subject will also

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be furnished to the Office of Security. The requester should also furnish to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as, special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

b. In Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases, the files of the ✓ Records Integration Division will be searched by representatives of the Office of Security. All files of the Records Integration Division, except those portions containing specific sensitive operational data, will be made available to the representatives of the Office of Security. In those instances where a document of interest contains sensitive operational data, designated professional personnel within the operating division will review that portion of the information and furnish therefrom to the representatives of the Office of Security all information of the nature described in paragraph 5.a., above. The Office of Security will conduct appropriate investigation in each case and will issue or deny Covert Security Approvals and Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Covert Security Approvals and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. The Office of Security will retain the investigative files in Covert Security Approval cases or Proprietary Approval cases, but will:

(1) Make available to the Counter Intelligence Staff any significant information in cases where Covert Security Approvals or Proprietary Approvals are granted.

(2) Immediately call to the attention of the Counter Intelligence Staff any new evidence in Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases that reflects the subject's connection with a foreign government, the Communist Party, or any front organization of the Communist Party.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

d. Where the Office of Security issues or denies a Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval, formal notification will be directed to the requester. In the case of disapproval one copy of the security disapproval will be forwarded to the Counter Intelligence Staff. Where a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval is denied and the Clandestine Services still desires to use the subject on a calculated risk basis, the Office of Security will, upon request, furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff a summary of the investigative data. Thereafter, the Counter Intelligence Staff, the requester, and the Security Support Division will attempt to reach an agreed position.

e. A Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval may be preceded by a Provisional Covert Security Approval or a Provisional Proprietary Approval.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CSI NO. 10-5

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

SECURITY
19 September 1963

f. Unless otherwise designated by the Office of Security, investigative data in either Operational Approval or Covert Security Approval cases involving aliens may be shown to proper offices of the division and may, if deemed necessary by the division, be forwarded to the field. The dispatch or cable in such cases will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Office of Security. No investigative data will be transmitted or disclosed to other than Agency staff officials without the specific prior approval of the Office of Security. The need-to-know principle will be applied strictly in such cases. No investigative data regarding United States citizens will be transmitted to the field without the specific prior approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Director of Security and subsequent to such approval without coordination with the Office of Security on the dispatch or cable involved.

6. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS FOR LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

Requests for Covert Security Approvals for Liaison with U. S. officials, whether such officials are in the United States or abroad, will be transmitted directly to the Office of Security. Each request shall be specifically indicated as a request for a Covert Security Approval for Liaison. The request shall be accompanied by all available biographic information, to include wherever possible in cases of civilian employees of United States Government agencies the name, date and place of birth, the employing agency, and the position and assignment of the person involved. In cases involving military personnel the minimum biographic information required shall consist of the name, date and place of birth, rank and serial number, and the parent service. In each case the details of the liaison with the individual must be set forth.

7. SERVANTS OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES

Requests to headquarters for appropriate checks on domestic personnel employed in the homes of Agency employees overseas shall be forwarded by the requester to the Office of Security accompanied by all available biographical information and the results of overseas investigations.

8. EMPLOYEES OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Proper clearance of staff or contract employees (including indigenous employees) of other U.S. Government agencies for operational use includes notification to and approval by the employee's parent agency in Washington. Requests for clearance will be forwarded to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, Attention: CI/Liaison. Clearance will not be given until the approval of the parent agency has been obtained. If, after such approval is obtained, it is decided that the employee will not be used as requested, or upon termination of use, CI/Liaison will be notified so that the employee's parent agency may be advised.

9. EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN SERVICES

Requests for searches of the indices of other United States agencies or the Office of Security, or investigation of employees or officials of foreign

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intelligence services with whom Agency employees maintain liaison, shall be forwarded by the requester to the Counter Intelligence Staff for processing to the Office of Security. Such requests shall be transmitted with complete results of field traces, all available biographical information, and a statement as to the service which the subject represents.

10. NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OR DISCONTINUANCE OF COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS OR PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

The Office of Security shall be promptly advised by the requester of the discontinuance of interest in or termination of employment or use of a person on whom a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval has been requested or granted.

11. SPECIAL SERVICES

a. Requests for Covert Name Checks and Special Inquiries will be transmitted to the Office of Security through the Counter Intelligence Staff. Each request shall indicate the reason for the inquiry, shall specify the exact action required, and shall contain all available background and/or biographical information concerning the subject.

b. In the case of Special Inquiries, the request should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed during the inquiry and any other information which would provide guidance as to the conduct of the investigation.

12. DOUBLE AGENTS

The operational decision authorizing the doubling of an agent of a foreign power will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff even though no Operational Approval or Provisional Operational Approval is required.

13. DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT IN PLACE

No attempt to defect or recruit in place (a) a member of the Communist Party or (b) a government official of a denied area country shall be made in the United States without prior coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff which will immediately inform the Director of Security and such other United States agencies as may be appropriate.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DOI 50-10

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970

1. GENERAL

a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In general, it is DDO policy to select agent assets with primary regard to the agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following:

(1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to restrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of individuals.

(2) The Agency has entered into a special restrictive agreement with an organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a category of individuals.

(3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently pertain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where appropriate, reference has been made to another publication which provides more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI and DOI-F 10-5.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION

3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*

Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*

Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*

Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):

(a) Members and trainees of ACTION; 99

(b) Fulbright grantees; 99

REPRODUCTION

SECRET

DOI 50-10

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

- (c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom; ? ?
- (d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations; ? ?
- (e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies. ? ?

(2) *Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence* (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.

- (a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
- (b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
- (c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;
- (d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand; ? ?
- (e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
- (f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) *Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO* (see paragraph 7):

- (a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;
- (b) CARE employees;
- (c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
- (d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;
- (e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned; ? ?
- (f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
- (g) Officials of the Vatican State;
- (h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
- (i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
- (j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
- (k) Volunteers to America.

(4) *Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division* (see paragraph 8):

- (a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
- (b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.; ? ?
- (c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

SECRET

6
Rs

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DOI 50-10

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

99

a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION* 99

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.) 99 99 99

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following: 99

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION. 99

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of 99 ACTION but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION. 99 99

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose 99 ACTION service included duty or training 99 overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former 99 members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees 99 who did not serve at any time as members 99 of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty 99 or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained. 99

(4) A former member or trainee 99 of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION. 99 99

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former 99 ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former 99 ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of 99 ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

23/RS

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

REPRODUCTION

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. *Fulbright Grantees*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students including student artists and student musicians who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

REPRODUCTION

24
RS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DOI 50-10

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

99

e. *Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations. 99 99

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies* 99
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5. 99 99

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*. 99 99
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff. 99

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions. 99 99 99 99

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI. 99

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI. 99

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be 99

C
SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

16/25

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*

The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

24/KS

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

99 For Germans only / Seamen only

e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

29/Rs

REPRODUCTION

Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.).

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.

b. *CARE Employees*

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.

17/RS

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United ~~States~~* NATIONS
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

REPRODUCTION

18/25

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exchange programs 99 (except certain Fulbright grantees 99—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government 99 requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee 99 is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor. 99

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations* 99

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. 99 This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. 99 In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. 99 The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations 99 and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations. 99

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute* 99

Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute 99 requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America* 99

Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America 99 while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America 99 are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

14/Rs

99

counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. 99
The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

99

a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)

99

The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.* 99

The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place. 99

99

c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community. 99 99

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is 99

99

1/R5

REPRODUCTION

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below: 99

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning; 99 99

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad. 99 99 DDO

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. Approval The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval. 99 99

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community but such contacts are subject to the following requirements: 99

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained. 99

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

8/Rc

99

academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

??

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

REPRODUCTION

2/RS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HQ. INSTRUCTION SHEET 733

REMOVE			INSERT			EXPLANATION
REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	
HR 20	iii 125-127	2/6/73 3/9/64	HR 20	iii 125-127	2/23/73 2/23/73	Paragraph 53 is revised to redefine categories of contract personnel. Minor revisions are made to update the paragraph.
	128	6/16/70		128-131	2/23/73	Former paragraph 54, Procurement Contracts for the Services of Individuals, is renumbered 55 with no change in text. New paragraph 54, Agents, is added to establish authorities and responsibilities for the management of agents and to clearly distinguish between agents and contract personnel.
HN 20-129		3/9/64				Rescinded.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arrows in the page margin show the locations of the changes described above.

DISTRIBUTION: AB

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

E2 IMPDET
~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ CL BY: 002230

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS—Continued

Paragraph Title Page

j. VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT 118.10
k. DISCONTINUED SERVICE BENEFITS 118.10
l. Not used.
m. INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT 118.10
n. MANDATORY RETIREMENT FOR AGE 118.11
o. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FUND 118.11
p. PERIOD OF SERVICE FOR ANNUITIES 118.13
q. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES 118.16
r. RECALL OF RETIRED PARTICIPANT 118.19
s. REEMPLOYMENT OF RETIRED PARTICIPANT 118.19
t. MONIES 118.19
u. LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF RETIREMENTS 118.20

SECTION VIII: MANAGEMENT OF NONSTAFF PERSONNEL

51. PERSONNEL DETAILED TO OR FROM THE AGENCY 119
52. CONSULTANTS 123
53. CONTRACT PERSONNEL 125
54. AGENTS 128
55. PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS FOR THE SERVICES OF INDIVIDUALS 130
56–59. Reserved.

SECTION IX: RECORDS AND REPORTS

60. PERSONNEL RECORDS AND REPORTS 155

Figure Title Page

1. DISTINGUISHED INTELLIGENCE CROSS 94.1
2. DISTINGUISHED INTELLIGENCE MEDAL 94.1
3. INTELLIGENCE STAR 94.1
4. INTELLIGENCE MEDAL OF MERIT 94.1
4a. CAREER INTELLIGENCE MEDAL 94.1
5. EXCEPTIONAL SERVICE MEDALLION 94.1
6. RETIREMENT MEDALLION 94.1
7. FORM 600, RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD 95
8. Reserved
9. OFFICIAL SEAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 100.2
10. AGENCY FLAG 100.2
11. AGENCY PLAQUE 100.2
12. TABLE OF PERMISSIBLE CHANGES IN ENROLLMENT OF EMPLOYEES 106

Attachment Title Page

1. BIOGRAPHIC DATA TO BE SUBMITTED BY AN EMPLOYEE UNDER COVER ON AN INTENDED SPOUSE 29
2. FORM 3154, SERVICE ABROAD AGREEMENT 52.1

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 002230

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

53. CONTRACT PERSONNEL. This paragraph sets forth policy, authorities, and responsibilities concerning the management of contract personnel. It does not apply to consultants (see HR 20-52), to personal services acquired through industrial or procurement contracts (see HR 20-55), to personnel employed by proprietary projects (see HR 230-8), or to agents (see HR 20-54).

a. **GENERAL.** There are two categories of contract personnel: contract employees and independent contractors.

(1) CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. Although they are not appointed employees, contract employees are employees of the U.S. Government. They have all the rights and privileges granted by law to U.S. Government employees in accordance with their citizenship status as well as those rights and privileges specified in their contracts. They work under supervised conditions and are compensated on a salary basis. Contract employees are grouped into three categories:

(a) **Career Associate (Type C) Contract Employees:** Contract employees who perform duties, usually of a clandestine and operational nature, on a career basis. They are normally required to demonstrate their operational value to the Agency for not less than three years, in the case of U.S. citizens, or not less than five years, in the case of foreign nationals, to qualify for career associate status. When it is necessary for a career associate to have the staff-type access to an Agency installation or classified information, he must meet the same security approval criteria as a staff employee.

(b) **Internal (Type I) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work inside Agency installations. They are required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees, but are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(c) **External (Type E) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work outside Agency installations. They are not required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees and are not permitted the same access to Agency installations as staff employees or internal contract employees. They are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(2) INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals who are engaged under contract to provide specific services. They receive only the compensation and benefits considered necessary to retain their services. In the Operations Directorate, their duties are normally limited to historical research and analysis and to the direction, utilization, spotting, or support of agents. They normally do not carry out espionage or covert action tasks. (Care must be taken to distinguish between independent contractors, defined herein, and agents, defined in HR 20-54.)

b. **POLICY**

(1) Contract personnel may be engaged when

(a) it is necessary to provide for operational or support needs which cannot be met through the use of available staff personnel;

(b) services are required of particularly well-qualified individuals who cannot meet all requirements for staff employment;

~~SECRET~~

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: C02230

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(c) there is a requirement to meet operational needs without obligating the Agency to long-term employment;

(d) the nature of the mission for which the individual is being engaged precludes his being subject to administrative control or working specifically defined hours;

(e) the individual's primary employer or interest is not the Agency and the services the Agency desires from him are supplementary to his primary interest or vocation; or

(f) there is a long term requirement for personal services which, for operational or security reasons, cannot be performed by Agency staff personnel.

(2) The engaging of contract personnel is subject to the following restrictions:

(a) New contracts, contract renewals, and contract amendments for individuals under current or anticipated nonofficial cover, must have prior approval of the appropriate component of the Operations Directorate.

(b) Contract personnel may be engaged only for approved activities for which funds have been made available. Funds for these activities will be budgeted annually and will not exceed limitations imposed by the head of the component concerned.

(c) Contract employees are subject to directorate manpower controls and ceilings established by the Director of Central Intelligence during the annual budgetary review cycle. Independent contractors are excluded from ceiling controls.

(d) Contracts will, whenever possible, be written and signed. However, when special security or operational factors prevent the execution of a formal written contract, a memorandum in lieu of such a contract may be prepared to document the commitments and obligations of the Agency and the individual.

(d) Appropriate security or operational approvals will be obtained before any contractual commitments are made to individuals and before any disclosure to them of classified information.

(f) No commitments relating to the use of the services of an employee of another Government agency will be made without prior approval of the Operating Official or Head of Independent Office concerned and the Director of Personnel.

(g) No commitments will be made to contract personnel that appointed employment status will be offered at the conclusion of or during any period of their contract service, without prior approval of the Director of Personnel and the Director of Security.

(h) Contract employees must meet Agency medical standards prior to the approval and authentication of their contracts. A psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation of those contract employees in whom the Agency may have more than a short-term interest will be carried out whenever feasible.

(i) Independent contractors are normally not required to meet Agency medical standards; however, if their contract contains any provision which obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits, a satisfactory medical examination is required, to include a psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation, if necessary.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(j) Contract personnel candidates whose employment with the Agency cannot be acknowledged must be provided adequate cover and an appropriate cover legend. This requires that legal entitlements and other contractual benefits be provided and tax liabilities satisfied in a manner consistent with the character of the cover and cover legend.

(k) Although staff employees are expected to sever active connections with the Agency upon retirement, there may be instances in which continuation in service under contract after retirement is necessary or clearly in the best interests of the Agency. The use of retired annuitants under contract is governed by policies specified in HR 20-13.

(l) Not used.

(m) Contracts providing for basic compensation at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum annual rate for a GS-15, will not be executed without the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence. All such requests will be forwarded through the Director of Personnel for his recommendation.

c. RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL will

(a) formulate contract personnel management policies and procedures and provide guidance in improving the effectiveness and flexibility of the program within the Agency;

(b) monitor contract personnel management to assure consistency among the directorates while giving due regard to their differing needs;

(c) provide a repository for sensitive suitability information using the guidelines for special files set forth in HR 20-60b(4);

(d) approve and authenticate contracts;

(e) monitor contract employee ceiling authorizations established by the Director of Central Intelligence;

(f) maintain computer-based records on contract personnel and ensure currency and accuracy of input and output data.

(2) THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY will

(a) establish standards and procedures for granting security approvals which meet the Agency's contract personnel requirements;

(b) grant security approvals for the use of contract personnel including their access to classified information and Agency installations;

(c) ensure currency and adequacy of security approvals by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;

(d) provide a repository for all security information pertaining to contract personnel.

(3) THE CHIEF, CENTRAL COVER STAFF will

(a) provide cover and cover legends for contract personnel whose employment by the Agency cannot be publicly acknowledged;

(b) ensure currency of such cover and cover legends by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;

(c) ensure that the methods of providing legal entitlements and contractual benefits and satisfying tax liabilities are consistent with assigned cover and cover legends.

(4) THE DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL SERVICES will

(a) establish standards and procedures for medical and psychiatric evaluations and for psychological assessment of contract personnel;

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(b) make periodic reviews and medical reevaluations of contract personnel when requested to do so.

(5) DEPUTY DIRECTORS AND HEADS OF INDEPENDENT OFFICES will ensure directorate uniformity of contract administration in matters such as qualifications determination, compensation, allowances and other benefits, personnel record keeping, systematic cost accounting, performance evaluations, cover determination and training, terminations, and security and medical approval processing requirements.

(6) THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING will provide appropriate training courses and facilities for contract personnel.

(7) THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE will

(a) administer pay, leave, and allowance entitlements of contract personnel consistent with contract provisions and cover requirements;

(b) in coordination with the Covert Tax Board, administer a secure system for the settlement of Federal income tax and social security tax obligations.

d. **AUTHORITIES**

(1) The Director of Personnel, his Deputy, and the Special Contracting Officer (Chief, Contract Personnel Division) are, upon request of a Deputy Director, an Operating Official, Head of Independent Office, or a duly appointed contract approving officer, authorized to execute, amend, renew, and terminate contracts with contract personnel.

(2) Deputy Directors and Heads of Independent Offices may designate Contract Approving Officers to approve contracts when payment is to be charged against funds under their control.

(3) Authority delegated to Chiefs of Station and Base under the provisions of FR 20-31 is subject to the following limitations:

(a) All contracts executed in the field will be subject to review by the Director of Personnel.

(b) Deputy Directors may limit the exercise of the authority granted to chiefs of field installations to any extent they deem desirable.

(c) Contracts prepared by headquarters will be amended only by, or with the prior approval of, headquarters. Contracts executed in the field may be amended in the field, but all such amendments must be forwarded to headquarters.

(4) All contracts written under the authority of this regulation will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

e. **PROCEDURES.** Requirements and procedures concerning personnel records, personnel actions, security approvals, cover, cover salary, medical evaluations, compensation, qualifications determination, training, and processing of contracts, are set forth in HHB 20-12.

54. AGENTS. This paragraph sets forth policy, responsibilities, and authorities concerning the engagement and the management of agents.

a. GENERAL. Agents are witting manpower assets, unique to the Operations Directorate, who carry out espionage and covert action tasks on behalf of the Agency. Agents are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals whose services may be acquired or terminated at any time. Care must be taken to distinguish between agents, defined herein, and independent contractors, defined in HR 20-53a(2).

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

---

b. **POLICY**

(1) Agents cannot
Government em
with normal pe

(a) Initial appr
commitmen
an agent.

(b) Agents will
and a man
and control

(*1*) No com
pensati
at a rat
maxim
This lin
does no

(*2*) No com
fits, wit
benefit
normal
expens

(*3*) No com
will be
mitme
Operat
Securit

(c) Engageme
controls.

(d) In general
ards. How
to provide
be carried

(e) Agents wh
the United
their asso
tax liabili
20-35.)

(f) The use of
will be go

(2) All commitme
Formal Agree

(a) A Formal
an author
tiated wh

(b) A Memora
ment, sig
agent. Us
those cas
agent's si

(c) An agent
randum o

0004159

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

b. POLICY

(1) Agents cannot claim rights and privileges normally granted to U.S. Government employees; therefore, they will not be managed in accordance with normal personnel and administrative standards.

(a) Initial approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff is required before any commitments are made or any classified information is disclosed to an agent.

(b) Agents will receive compensation, benefits, and emoluments in amounts and a manner deemed best by the Operations Directorate to motivate and control them, subject to the following limitations:

(1) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide gross compensation (basic compensation, additional compensation, fees, etc.) at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum rate for a GS-15, without prior approval of the Director. This limitation applies only to payments made by the Agency. It does not apply to bona fide cover income.

(2) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide special benefits, without the prior approval of the Director of Personnel. Special benefits are Agency obligations other than basic compensation, normal overseas cost of living payments, and travel or operational expenses.

(3) No commitment may be made to an agent that appointed status will be offered at the conclusion of his service unless such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security, and has been approved by the Director of Personnel.

(c) Engagement of agents will not be subject to Agency personnel ceiling controls.

(d) In general, agents will not be required to meet Agency medical standards. However, if an agreement with an agent obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits, a medical examination will be carried out, unless precluded by security considerations.

(e) Agents who are U.S. citizens, resident aliens, or foreign nationals in the United States, must pay Federal tax on all income derived from their association with the Agency. Procedures for satisfying Federal tax liability will be determined by the Covert Tax Board. (See HR 20-35.)

(f) The use of retired civilian annuitants of the U.S. Government as agents will be governed by policy set forth in HR 20-13.

(2) All commitments made or implied to agents will be recorded in either a Formal Agreement or a Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

(a) A Formal Agreement is a written agreement, signed by the agent and an authorized Agency representative. Formal Agreements will be negotiated whenever operationally feasible.

(b) A Memorandum of Oral Commitment is a written record of an agreement, signed by an authorized Agency representative but not by the agent. Use of Memorandums of Oral Commitment will be limited to those cases when it is in the Agency's best interest not to solicit an agent's signature on a Formal Agreement.

(c) An agent will never be given a copy of the Formal Agreement or Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

E2 IMPDET
CL By: 002230

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

c. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES

(1) The Deputy Director for Operations is authorized to

(a) formulate procedures for the engagement and management of agents and to issue operating directives and special instructions, as necessary, to control the use of agents by headquarters and field units;

(b) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment with agents; and to review Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment executed in the field;

(c) suspend procedures implied in this regulation upon his personal determination that operational and security aspects of an agent's management are so sensitive as to require processing through special channels.

(2) The Director of Personnel is authorized to

(a) approve, after coordinating with affected Agency components, the commitment to an agent that he will receive special benefits;

(b) approve the commitment to an agent that he will be offered appointed status at the conclusion of his service, when such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security;

(c) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment when requested to do so by the appropriate Operations Directorate approving officer. This authority may also be exercised by the Deputy Director of Personnel and the Special Contracting Officer, Office of Personnel.

(3) All Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment written under the authority of this paragraph will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

55. PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS FOR THE SERVICES OF INDIVIDUALS

a. **POLICY.** Procurement contracts whose basic purpose is to obtain the services of one or more individuals, negotiated with profit and nonprofit institutions, associations, partnerships, proprietorships, and other organizations, are permitted only when the particular services sought cannot be obtained in any other practicable way.

b. PROCEDURES

(1) Except as provided in subparagraph b(3) below, all proposals for such procurement contracts and their renewal must be justified in writing by the component seeking the services and be submitted to the Director of Personnel for his approval before commitments are made or negotiations started. These proposals will describe in some detail the services to be rendered, the qualifications required, the proposed duration of the task, and the reason or reasons why a procurement contract is judged to be the best method of acquiring the needed services.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

---

(2) The Direct
personnel s
examine th
sonnel. If t
rector of P
Office of L
tract reque
are written
HR 45-2.

(3) The approv
(a) for pro
dental
reports,
task pe
time (p
(b) for pro
require
testing.
follow-
tion—r
above.

c. RESTRICTION

(1) Operating
through th
erly briefed
Agency infc
Operating
the relation
affects the
curity clear

(2) Technical
procuremen
employer-e
organizatio
istrative au
the Agency
cies, private

56–59. Reserved.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(2) The Director of Personnel will ascertain whether any staff or nonstaff personnel are available to perform the needed services. If not, he will examine the feasibility of satisfying the requirement by hiring new personnel. If this latter course of action also proves impracticable, the Director of Personnel will approve the proposal and return it either to the Office of Logistics or to the originator for subsequent submission of a contract request to the appropriate procurement unit. Procurement contracts are written under the authority of the Director of Logistics as stated in HR 45-2.

(3) The approval of the Director of Personnel is not required

(a) for procurement contracts involving the services of individuals incidental to research and development or the preparation of studies or reports, where the fee reflects an end product (a report written, a task performed, etc.) rather than a computation based mainly on time (per hour, per man year);

(b) for procurement contracts involving the purchase of equipment which requires the services of experts or technicians in delivery, installation, testing, initial operation or maintenance, training, etc. However, any follow-on contract for services only—such as maintenance or operation—requires the Director of Personnel's prior approval as set forth above.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

c. RESTRICTIONS

(1) Operating Officials are responsible for monitoring all personnel acquired through these procedures. They will ensure that such personnel are properly briefed and thoroughly understand any limitations on their access to Agency information and buildings and other pertinent security restrictions. Operating Officials are required to advise appropriate offices at any time the relationship or use of such individuals is subject to a change which affects the terms of their contractual arrangements, their status, or security clearances.

(2) Technical representatives and other types of personnel engaged under procurement contracts or other agreements which do not create a direct employer-employee relationship are prohibited by law from holding formal organizational positions or positions requiring the exercise of any administrative authority. They are also prohibited from formally representing the Agency in meetings with representatives of other Government agencies, private industry, or foreign governments or industries.

56-59. Reserved.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 002230

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lists of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION

7 Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-____________.
4.				
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ______ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ______ (date)
14.				retained at ________ desk.
15.				

CL. BY: 007622

FORM 5-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM. OR TEMP	REQ. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6		
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE ET-4		

FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A

RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______ (NAME)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B

REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: CO7522 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

FOI A CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY. CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/50307/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0230859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178655			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU-MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, FORT ARTH		CNAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CNAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CNAT	0832655			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1108/435		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091803			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040288			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-SAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2885/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CNAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,KUAN TANG IS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2885/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CNAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2885/2797	A	C18C22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0988577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3105/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0044759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2885/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0073195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2833/8133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179622			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2885/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CNAT	0839156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0547/009		C18C21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2373/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MICA	CCOM	0858460			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CNAT	0096967			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/		15APR30	CHIN,CHENGHAI	CMMO	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2885/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0085119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103289			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2885/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763816			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TEH /M75/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013921			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TING /7115/0547/6639		C19C75	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2885/2737/		18MAR17	CHIN	BIN	CCOM	0767442			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0037/	A	02FEB06				0181329			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAO /7115/2595/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093176			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	HK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2885/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN,FANG CHEN KH		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		07OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN,HUN	ARMY	CNAT	0339624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB33	CHIN, CHEKIANG	LIB	CCOM	0313810			CHIN	FRAN	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0144010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3942/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

PAGE [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

11

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches. 29

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   11
   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.) 27

11

2. *British Commonwealth*

   29 29 11
   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   29
   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS). 29

   11 11
   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given. 29

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

11

4. *Israel*

   11 27
   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

16/PV

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

SECRET

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Rsc by
Annex B to Chp III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dated
1 Oct 62

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                             201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26            POB GERM, BERLIN      TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                       OCC PHARMACIST        OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53      OCC CODE CHEM         RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                          30 NOV 70           00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) o2 MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field-master 201 record.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

2
3

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : SAS 8*

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, WH 7, RF, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

S E C R E T 011753Z

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6338

1 OCT 63 IN 3033

REF WAVE 5182 (IN 30172) **

MEXI REQUESTING VISA FOR [SILVIA ANNA] ONE OCT. PRIORITY VISA PROCESSING REQUIRES MINIMUM SEVENTY TWO HOURS BEFORE TELEGRAM SENT. IT UNLIKELY THAT CABLE WILL REACH HAVANA BEFORE 4 OCT.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR TYPIC USED.

**RYBAT REF.

RS

12960

17 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : CA/O 4 (CA/O COPY SLOTTED AT 1405, 3 OCT, LMG)

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, WE 4, WH 7, RF, VR

~~S E C R E T~~ 031610Z

3 Oct 63 IN 32419

PRIORITY DIR INFO PALP CITE MEXI 6385

DTDORIC HBEPITOME

REF MEXI 6384 (in 32461)

IDENS OF REF: A, ALFONSO DIBILDOX, B, CNE, C, FUSA.

06

~~S E C R E T~~

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/BR

1 132

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, SR 7, RF, VR

S E C R E T 082315Z

8 OCT 63 IN 35550

DIR CITE MEXI 6445

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

LCIMPROVE

24, 06

1. REQUEST TRACES [AND INITIATION POA ON HECTOR RAFAEL LARA VAZQUEZ] DOB 6 AUG 19[08 MEXICO CITY. SUBJ RESIDED CHICAGO AREA 1927-4[illegible].] FIRST WIFE (NU) U.S. [NATIONAL, HAS FOLL U.S. NATIONAL DAUGHTERS:] 08 MRS. GRADELLE PONZIO [RESIDING 235 FREDERICK LANE, ROSSELLE, INDIANA. 08, PRICILLA LAWOCKI, ALSO IN ROSSELLE. MEXI HAS NO TRACES ANY ABOVE.]

2. [LARA] 06 ADVISED EMB SECURITY OFFICER 24 SEPT THAT WAS AT PARTY WEEK EARLIER WITH [SOV FIRST 06 SEC SERGEY SERGEYEVICH KONSTANTINOV (SUSPECT KGB RESIDENT)], [TASS CORRESPONDENT 06 PIOTR FEDOTOV] AND THIRD SOV (NU). PARTY AT HOME OF [VIRGINIA GOMEZ 06 NIETO,] OTHER PERSON IN ATTENDANCE WAS [GOMEZ BOYFRIEND RICARDO POERY CERVANTES. 06] (INTERRELATIONSHIP OF ABOVE IS THAT [GOMEZ IS 06 SUBJ 08'S WIFE'S HAIR DRESSER, GOMEZ] INTRODUCED SUBJ TO [POERY] 06 ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO. [POERY] 06 IS PROMINENT MEXICAN JOURNALIST OF EXTREME LEFTIST ORIENTATION AND [PRESIDENT 08 OF MEXICAN ACCOSIATION OF JOURNALISTS.] COMMON GROUND BETWEEN [PEORY] 06 AND [SUBJ] 06 IS THAT LATTER IS SUCCESSFUL [ADVERTISING 08] SALESMAN AND PUBLICIST FOR [GARCIA] 08 CHAIN NEWSPAPERS WHICH CONSERVATIVE. IS ALSO MEMBER [illegible] ASSOCIATION [illegible] STS.)

ASSOCIATION

3. [illegible] TOLD EMB SECURITY OFFICER, AND LATER [illegible], THAT HE

15417

17/pj

REPORTING SOV CONTACT SINCE HE PRO AMERICAN AND DOES NOT WANT JEOPARDIZE HIS PRIVILEGE TRAVEL US., NOR JEOPARDIZE POSITION HIS 08 [DAUGHTERS.] ASKED WHETHER SHOULD CONTINUE SEE SOVS WHO TENTATIVELY INVITED HIM PARTY NEAR FUTURE.

4. NEXT TOLD SUBJ TAKE NO INITIATIVE WITH SOVS BUT FOR PRESENT ACCEPT INVITES, EVINCE INTEREST UR CURIOSITY SOV REALITIES, NOT CHANGE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL STANCE WHICH SUBJ SAYS KNOWN 06 [POERY.]

5. 8 OCT SUBJ REPORTED MET 06 [FEDOTOV] AT JOURNALIST ASSOCIATION MEETING 7 OCT, LATER ENTERTAINED 06 [FEDOTOV], 06 [POERY] AND 06 [[illegible]] AT DINNER. 06 [FEDOTOV] AGAIN TENDERED TENTATIVE FUTURE INVITE.

6. TOO EARLY SPECIFICALLY DETAIL OBJECTIVE SUBJ UTILIZATION BUT IF POSSIBLE WISH DIRECT [illegible] 24 [ACCESS] [illegible] 06 [FEDOTOV] OF 06 [KONSTANTINOV.] BASIS DESCRIPTION, THIRD MAN AT FIRST PARTY COULD BE 06 [SOV INFO BULLETIN REP SERGEY SEMENOVICH KUKHARENKO.] (ACCORDING LIENVOY INFO, LATTER HAS PECULIAR INDEPENDENT PERSONALITY, FREQUENTLY TALKS DISPARAGINGLY OF SOVAMB, GETS DRUNK OFTEN, IS ON POOR TERMS WITH SEVERAL SOVEMB OFFICERS.) IF OP DEVELOPS, NO FUNDING NECESSARY.

SECRET

15417

WN

17 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, DODS/L, DODS 4, SPOG 2, CI/OPS, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 151758Z

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6536

PBRUMEN HTBASTE

15 Oct 63 IN 40401

1. WHILE IN NEW YORK 7 OCTOBER CONTACTING CUBAN EXILES WITH POSSIBLE LINKS MEXI, L[ITAMIL-3] HAD CHANCE ENCOUNTER AND CHATTED BRIEFLY WITH [ANTONIO DE SOUZA CARBAJAL] MEMBER CUBAN UN DELEGATION. ON OWN INITIATIVE, L-[3] SUGGESTED DEFECTION TO WHICH [DE SOUZA] REPLIED HE MERELY PERFORMING HIS DUTY AND VERY FRIGHTENED. [DE SOUZA] DID STATE HE WOULD TALK WITH L-[3] AGAIN IN FUTURE UNDER SECURE CIRCUMSTANCES. L-[3] DESCRIBES [DE SOUZA] AS "A KEY MAN."

04 05 01 05 05 01 01 05 01

2. REQUEST TRACES, COMMENTS, ADVICE ON ANOTHER TRIP BY L-[3] TO N.Y. FOR PURPOSE TALKING [DE SOUZA.]

05

S E C R E T

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

00053

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

SECRET 191817Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 6587

RYBAT PBRUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA 06 BENITO RUIZ GUARDIOLA. DOB 19 JAN 09 1898, LOS ARABOS, MATANZAS. WIFE 06 OTILIA LOMINCHIR RUIZ, BORN SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR, HAVANA PROVINCE. 08 MANAGER NATIONAL TRAVEL SERVICE, HOTEL NACIONAL, HAVANA. 08 FOUNDER AMERICAN SOCIETY TRAVEL AGENTS (ASTA). ACQUIRED AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP EARLY YOUTH; RELINQUISHED CERCA 1930. NO LIVING CHILDREN. GRANDDAUGHTER 06 MILDRED SIMON LIVES NEAR SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS. GRANDDAUGHTER 06 JENNY LAVIN AND GRANDSON 06 JOHN P. RUIZ LIVE MIAMI. THIRTY-THIRD DEGREE MASON.

2. SUBJECT IS SOLE 08 CUBAN DELEGATE ASTA CONVENTION MEXI CITY 21 THRU 28 OCTOBER. ALLOWED TRAVEL DUE PRESTIGE AS FOUNDER ASTA, PRESIDENT CARIBBEAN AREA, AND DEAN ALL HAVA TRAVEL AGENTS. STATES HAS ACCESS TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRAVEL INFO, INCL PRIOR NOTICE MUCH OF LATTER. CLAIMS VALUABLE INFORMATION CONTACTS IN NATIONAL POST OFFICE, ESPACIALLY CENSORSHIP SECTION. SAYS HAS ASSISTED ANTI-CASTRO PERSONS BY FORGING VISAS. KNOWLEDGEABLE BLOC TECHS LIVING HOTEL NACIONAL.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

9/9

SECRET

12882

3. APPROACH TO SUBJECT FACILITATED DUE CASUAL ACQUAINTANCE [illegible] WITH [illegible] IN HAVANA 1959. SUBJECT AGREES COOPERATE AND COMMUNICATE VIA SW. PRQ PART I BEING FORWARDED. NO [illegible] TRACES.

S E C R E T

12882

1		4
2		5
3		6

: DIRECTOR

OM : MEXICO CITY

TION: WH 8

FO : DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 222330Z

23 OCT 63 IN 45573

DIR INFO WAVE MNTY CITE MEXI 6620

PBRUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA JORGE ANTONIO ABASOLO GARCIA, CUBAN, DOB 1927, INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER, GRADUATE GEORGIA TECH, ADDRESS CALLE 96 OXABER 308 TELEPHONE 2-6301, MIRAMAR, HAVANA. SUBJ DIVORCED FROM MARIE PAZ SOMEILLAN WHO NOW REPORTED LIVING WITH TWO CHILDREN AGES 5 AND 7 IN MNTY. SUBJ CHIEF OF DIVISION IN MINISTRY INDUSTRIES, WORKS CLOSELY WITH ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA. CONTROLS WOOD FURNITURE INDUSTRY, PORTION OF PAPER INDUSTRY INCLUDING PAPER SACKS, TOY INDUSTRY, ONE OTHER UNSPECIFIED INDUSTRY. HAS HAD SOME CONTACT WITH SOVIETS IN CONNECTION WITH CEMENT PROCUREMENT RECENTLY REPORTED BELIEF SOVS CONSTRUCTING SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA. CAME TO MEXICO ON SPECIAL PASSPORT 2 AUG 63 TO SEE CHILDREN BUT FORMER WIFE MANAGED PREVENT CONTACT. RETURNED CUBA 21 AUG.

2. BROTHER OF SUBJ IS GUSTAVO ABASOLO, CUBAN, ABOUT 42, LEFT CUBA ABOUT 1959 OR 1960 GOING FIRST TO BERMUDA, LATER TO MEXICO. EMPLOYED CONTINUOUSLY 22 YEARS COMPANIA INTERAMERICANA DE SEGUROS, NOW ASSISTANT MANAGER SALES FOR MEXICO. STRONGLY ANTI-CASTRO, FRIEND OF AMSEVER-2. CORRESPONDS WITH SUBJ THROUGH NETHERLANDS EMBASSY DIPLOMATIC POUCH. AT STATION REQUEST THROUGH A-2 GUSTAVO

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14/70

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

12716 Copy No.

RECENTLY ASKED SUBJ IF WOULD BE WILLING FURNISH "CERTAIN INFORMATION" FOR A-2 WHOM SUBJ KNOWS AS ANTI-CASTRO. SUBJ GAVE TENTATIVE AGREEMENT BUT ASKED HOW FAR DO YOU WANT ME TO GO?

3. SUBJ PLANNING TO LEAVE CUBA AT END OF YEAR, DISILLUSIONED WITH REGIME. BELIEVE STATION MIGHT BE ABLE PERSUADE HIM STAY IN PLACE.

06

4. DIVORCED MOTHER OF EX-WIFE HAS RE-MARRIED TO JOAQUIN MIRABAL, COMMUNIST; FORMER "CHIEF OF SECURITY SERVICE" HAVANA, RECENTLY PROMOTED TO MORE IMPORTANT POSITION.

06

5. ABOVE INFO FROM GUSTAVO ABASOLO, FLESHED OUT BY A-2 WHO MET SUBJ DURING AUGUST SOJOURN MEXI. NO STATION TRACES ANY PERSONS MENTIONED HEREIN EXCEPT FOR CONFIRMATION SUBJ TRAVEL. LIFIRE LISTS SHOW HE CARRIED SPECIAL PASSPORT 63/442, SHOW HIS ADDRESS AS CALLE 34 NUMBER 1712, MARIANAO.

08

SECRET

3/PY

12716

2735

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 012356Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 6761

PERUMEN

REF: A. MEXI 6620 (IN 45873)
B. DIR 79070

1. FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS AS RESULT MEETING WITH AMSEVER-2 OCT 30 AND 1 NOV.

2. SUBJ IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA.

3. ADDITIONAL MOTIVATION BEHIND SUBJ PLAN LEAVE CUBA IS DESIRE BE ABLE HELP SUPPORT CHILDREN.

4. POUCH COMMO SYSTEM NOW IN EFFECT WORKS AS FOLLOWS. BROTHER GIVES LETTERS TO MISS (FNU) 06 FRESIAINE AT 11 NETHERLANDS EMBASSY, MEXI. OUTER ENVELOPE MARKED FOR 06 CORNELIS BJIPOST 11 NETHEMBASSY, HAVA. INNER ENVELOPE MARKED FOR SUBJ CARE OF 06 E. CABANES. 06 CABANES DELIVERS LETTERS TO SUBJ FOR WHOM HE WORKS. SYSTEM WORKS BOTH WAYS.

5. A-2 KNOWS 06 CABANES, FORMER OWNER 08 NUEVA PAPELERA DE PUENTES GRANDES. IS OLD MAN, SICK, GOING BLIND. BROTHER OF SUBJ SENDS MEDICINES TO 06 CABANES THROUGH POUCH. 06 CABANES ARRANGED COMMO CHANNEL AS RESULT HIS FORMER DIPLOMATIC CONNECTIONS. A-2 BELIEVES 06 CABANES MAY HAVE WORKED FOR 11 SPANISH FOREIGN SERVICE IN PAST, WAS ORIGINALLY 11 SPANISH CITIZEN.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

13-JD

6. A-2 HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED GET WORD TO SUBJ ASAP THAT HE CAN SERVE SELF, CHILDREN, AND DEMOCRATIC CAUSE BEST BY STAYING IN PLACE. LETTER TO INDICATE THAT FINANCIAL AID FOR CHILDREN CAN BE ARRANGED IN MEXICO. THIS FIRST LETTER, OSTENSIBLY FROM BROTHER, BUT ACTUALLY DRAFTED BY A-2, WILL NOT HOLD OUT SPECIFIC AMOUNT AS BAIT BUT WILL SOUND SUBJ OUT ON WILLINGNESS STAY IN PLACE IN RETURN FOR SOLUTION CHILD SUPPORT PROBLEMS AND GOOD CHANCE OF HAVING NAME CLEARED AFTER FALL OF CASTRO REGIME.

7. BELIEVE APPROX TWO THOUSAND PESOS MONTHLY PAYABLE IN MEXICO MIGHT DO THE TRICK. WILL KEEP HQS INFORMED ALL DEVELOPMENTS.

8. PLS POUCH SOONEST COMPLETE PERSONALITY PROFILE ON SUBJ FROM CLOSE FRIEND 06 [MARIO DE LA GUARDIA] OF REF B.

9. INDEX 23 [221-356959.]

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *SUBJ IS 06 [JORGE ANTONIO ABASOLO GARCIA.]

3/JD

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

2/ SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 1630, 2 NOV 63)BP

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

~~SECRET~~

2 Nov 63 IN 53108

DIR CITE MEXI 6772

KUWOLF LICOAX

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF MEXI 6771 (IN [illegible]) 05,29

IDEN IS: [CARLOS CRUZ MORALES, PRESIDENTE FEDERACION UNIVERSITARIO DE SOCIADADES ESTUDIANTILES. (FUSA)]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/BR

NO.	DATE		CATEGORY		DATE		T/TIME YRMODA	COU
063074	530401	1	XX	450	580701	POSTANY FLOYD	050301	MEXICO
061280	530501	1	VV	450	551115	KENNER RODHAM W	020615	MEXICO
055304	530901	1	VV	450	600226	OHARA PAULINE C	060526	MEXICO
010778	530901	1	SE	450	551101	STRATTON EUGENE A	020201	MEXICO
061591	530911	1	VV	450	560121	KRAVCOV FRED	020411	MEXICO
011047	540303	1	VV	450	590421	MAHONEY HARRY T	050119	MEXICO
012161	540701	1	32	450	560801	NEELY JOHN C	020101	MEXICO
011331	541201	1	XX	450	580701	HILL WILLARD R	030701	MEXICO
006475	541201	1	62	450	561101	SCHNITMAN EDWARD P	011101	MEXICO
057661	550816	1	VV	450	581023	FLORSTEDT ROBERT F	030208	MEXICO
009029	550911	1	VV	450	570322	MACPHEE KEITH L	010612	MEXICO
010694	551101	1	64	450	580801	JETT CHARLES K	020901	MEXICO
059299	560506	1	46	450	581114	BRONDER IRMA	020609	MEXICO
017558	560601	1	64	450	580801	GORDON MORRIS H	020201	MEXICO
039366	560701	1	XX	450	581101	HUTCHISON AUDREY	020401	MEXICO
005578	560801	1	64	450	580701	SCOTT WINSTON M	011101	MEXICO
056304	560901	1	62	450	580701	VAN BIESBROECK M	011001	MEXICO
055966	561101	1	64	450	580701	WEITZEL ISABELLE	010801	MEXICO
009368	561201	1	XX	450	590701	DICKOW DANIEL R	020701	MEXICO
055866	561220	1	CC	450	610930	SHORT STANNARD K	040911	MEXICO
055744	570101	1	38	450	590718	LATHAM ROBERT F	020618	MEXICO
015780	570301	1	64	450	580301	JOHNSON KATHERINE	010001	MEXICO
057303	570506	1	CF	450	681022	GOODPASTURE ANN L	110517	MEXICO
057110	570618	1	VV	450	591002	LYON LOUISE ANNE	020315	MEXICO
057550	570901	1	64	450	580801	BODDEN ROBERT C	001101	MEXICO
057820	570901	1	RR	450	571001	SLOAN LIN S	000101	MEXICO
013355	571001	1	18	450	580601	NORWAT STUART G	000801	MEXICO
025129	571014	1	CC	450	610121	CANTY KATHRYN	030308	MEXICO
061599	571201	1	VV	450	590517	CLARK PHILIP H	010517	MEXICO
063159	571201	1	XX	450	581201	BROMUND DANIEL	010001	MEXICO
006191	571215	1	48	450	580910	CLINTON JOHN A	000826	MEXICO
025120	580201	1	CC	450	580501	RAWLS WILLIAM E	000301	MEXICO
057135	580201	1	VV	450	600215	BOWERS BETTY A	020015	MEXICO
061894	580403	1	VV	450	631204	WHIDDEN GLENN H	050802	MEXICO
063186	580502	1	XX	450	580601	NORWAT STUART G	000030	MEXICO
027409	580601	1	64	450	580701	GUINAND ALICE B	000101	MEXICO
057999	580625	1	FF	450	630628	PUCKETT LOUIS D	050004	MEXICO
027607	580915	1	64	450	601028	WILSON RONALD J	020114	MEXICO
055921	581004	1	VV	450	621202	DEAN WARREN L	040129	MEXICO
060393	581029	1	46	450	610723	SCHERL FRANK	020825	MEXICO

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SERIAL NO.	DATE	TOUR	C/S CATEGORY	AREA	RETURN DATE		T/TIME YRMODA	
007547	590320	1	VV	450	630608	ANDERSON EDWARD L	040219	MEXICO
CC7143	590510	1	VV	450	641202	OFFENBACHER ROSE R	050623	MEXICO
C22592	590630	1	41	450	640405	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	040906	MEXICO
C63565	590713	1	VV	450	620610	SPATHAR RICHARD Z	021028	MEXICO
C574C8	590915	1	CC	450	620705	CARLSCN WILLIAM T	020921	MEXICO
C63038	590916	1	53	450	600217	NONNEMACKER HAROLD	000502	MEXICO
C194C8	591029	1	CC	450	620927	STRUBE MURIEL D	021029	MEXICO
027643	591117	1	64	450	611215	MOONEY MARY P	020029	MEXICO
055544	600204	1	CC	450	620401	STEWART JACK	020128	MEXICO
C546C3	600206	1	51	450	611031	BRADY JOHN B	010826	MEXICO
C31735	600308	1	50	450	621114	OSTROM GAIL A	020807	MEXICO
C29622	600821	1	51	450	630926	TRINNICH SEYMOUR D	030106	MEXICO
C13368	601009	1	VV	450	630601	SUPERFISKY AMELIA	020723	MEXICO
C19399	601011	1	CC	450	621217	LINTON JEAN L	020207	MEXICO
C16245	601016	1	39	450	620105	HARMAN THELMA G	010220	MEXICO
C29629	601113	1	45	450	630309	STINEBISER H C	020327	MEXICO
000322	610408	1	CF	450	630804	KLEIN OSCAR B	020327	MEXICO
C61877	610702	1	CC	450	630716	BRIDGE JOSEPH F	020015	MEXICO
C12796	610924	1	CC	450	631009	BEMBRY A G	020016	MEXICO
024349	610925	1	RR	450	640915	PHILLIPS DAVID A	020521	MEXICO
185016	611001	1	FF	450	660825	RESCIGNO JOSEPH M	041025	MEXICO
C17690	620102	1	51	450	630401	ROBERTS GRACE W	010230	MEXICO
C16188	620205	1	51	450	640717	GUDNEY CAROLE T	020913	MEXICO
055544	620401	1	CC	450	650801	STEWART JACK	030401	MEXICO
C12741	620623	1	CC	450	670131	MARHEINE PRENTICE R	040709	MEXICO
C0C390	620719	1	CC	450	640727	DAIUTO DANIEL J	020009	MEXICO
C25654	620818	1	CC	450	640925	BECKMAN GUNNAR W	020108	MEXICO
C18687	630303	1	CC	450	630703	GORE LAURA T	000401	MEXICO
C19477	630605	1	RR	450	670928	FEINGLASS DOUGLAS J	040324	MEXICO
C55664	630618	1	FC	450	650908	WHITE ALAN P	020221	MEXICO
C57746	630619	1	FF	450	650703	HARRIS HUGH F JR	020015	MEXICO
C13079	630722	1	51	450	650915	CHANDLER HARRY A	020124	MEXICO
C09274	630806	1	VV	450	641122	KARTY FLORYAN R	010317	MEXICO
C37815	630901	1	CC	450	660109	WALSH GERTRUDE A	020409	MEXICO
C33314	631130	1	CC	450	660119	STEEVES CAROL C	020120	MEXICO
019704	631213	1	CC	450	660507	ETSINGER HOWARD T	020425	MEXICO
C36069	631226	1	CC	450	641115	FULLER VENNETTE K	001020	MEXICO
C61062	640202	1	VV	450	650630	FLANNERY JAMES E	010429	MEXICO
CC8165	640617	1	CC	450	680417	PAXTON PAUL P	031001	MEXICO
C24345	640824	1	CC	450	650606	PHILLIPS DAVID A	000913	MEXICO

029790	520701	1	CC	450	5610[illegible]1	DICKENS CHAR[illegible]		040401	MEXICO
058051	520903	1	CC	450	551115	KING MARY E		030213	MEXICO
060736	521104	1	VV	450	570221	MORGAN JOHN S		040318	MEXICO
014561	541006	1	CC	450	570406	GIAMMARINO J P		020601	MEXICO
056629	550401	1	CC	450	600401	MAGGARD PEGGY M		050001	MEXICO
009409	560109	1	VV	450	580215	BEARDSLEY BASIL A		020107	MEXICO
010947	560130	1	CC	450	580221	EDMUNDS BARBARA J		020022	MEXICO
061922	560501	1	CC	450	581101	HUTCHISON TERRELL		020601	MEXICO
055495	560601	1	CC	450	590704	SHAW ROBERT T	nogales	030104	MEXICO
056282	560701	1	CC	450	580701	RODRIGUEZ ALFONSO		020001	MEXICO
059820	560810	1	VV	450	620131	ESTANCONA FRANK R		050522	MEXICO
063380	561206	1	CC	450	580615	SANCHO JOSEPH G		010610	MEXICO
063429	570211	1	VV	450	630630	MCALPINE RICHARD D		060420	MEXICO
022489	570301	1	CC	450	610901	PALMER SYLVIA		040601	MEXICO
063114	570324	1	CC	450	630630	TORVESTAD GROVER E		060307	MEXICO
005956	570407	1	FF	450	620707	SANCHEZ LORENZO B		050301	MEXICO
014267	571001	1	CC	450	591024	SHAW MEREDITH L		020024	MEXICO
044512	571101	1	CF	450	600108	ROLFE GERALD S JR		020208	MEXICO
025658	571201	1	CF	450	600115	PICCOLO JOSEPH S		020115	MEXICO
010116	580201	1	VV	450	600320	SPERA ALFONSO G		020120	MEXICO
059127	580206	1	VV	450	600322	SILEO ANTHONY L		020117	MEXICO
013175	580616	1	CC	450	630619	MISKO GEORGE W		050004	MEXICO
027608	580818	1	FF	450	601029	PRINCE ALBERT E		020212	MEXICO
029057	580822	1	CC	450	600915	HAMPTON NELLIE T		020024	MEXICO
060740	580924	1	VV	450	620206	OUDERKIRK RICHARD H		030413	MEXICO
026063	581101	1	CC	450	610122	WEEKLEY ROBERT D		020222	MEXICO
005221	590522	1	64	450	610712	CAREY GILBERT W		020121	MEXICO
009052	590917	1	VV	450	650815	MANELL HERBERT		051029	MEXICO
018090	590921	1	FF	450	610921	CHAMES NICKLES		020001	MEXICO
063811	591004	1	CC	450	620719	RYDZEWSKI BERNARD		020916	MEXICO
010625	591218	1	VV	450	611216	FINNEY RICHARD A		011129	MEXICO
032013	600125	1	CC	450	620401	MARINE PAUL ALLEN		020207	MEXICO
012270	600129	1	CC	450	620221	SALMON JOAN A		020023	MEXICO
026090	600203	1	51	450	641005	KEENAN THOMAS J	mistery	040803	MEXICO
029163	600306	1	CC	450	620601	HAWKINS M C III		020226	MEXICO
006098	620110	1	CC	450	640705	MURRAY WILLIAM JR	monterey	020526	MEXICO
011340	620112	1	CF	450	670630	PEPPER B FRANKLIN		050519	MEXICO
032013	620501	1	CC	450	640615	MARINE PAUL ALLEN		020115	MEXICO
032703	620514	1	FC	450	650221	ANDERSON JAMES E	monterrey	020908	MEXICO
064518	620708	1	CC	450	650715	DUNCAN ROBERT D		030006	MEXICO

SERIAL NO.	ARRIVAL DATE	TOUR	C/S CATEGORY	AREA	RETURN DATE		T/TIME YRMODA	
035324	621106	1	CC	450	631214	MAWHINNEY ELLEN F	010109	MEXICO
019143	621205	1	FC	450	681027	HENNICK DOROTHY J	051023	MEXICO
035641	621207	1	CC	450	650615	HAMMEL RUTH I	020609	MEXICO
054841	621209	1	RR	450	670930	FELDMANN ROBERT H	040922	MEXICO
019782	630121	1	FR	450	671119	MUSGRAVE MARY G	040920	MEXICO
098924	630216	1	51	450	680401	JOHNSEN PATRICIA L	020116	MEXICO
059495	630421	1	CC	450	651201	SHAW ROBERT T	020700	MEXICO
037507	630430	1	CC	450	650527	JOHNSEN MARTIN I	020028	MEXICO
060942	630615	1	CC	450	680708	THOMAS WADE E	050024	MEXICO
037004	630629	1	CC	450	650629	SILVERLTEB JOAN G	020001	MEXICO
062241	630717	1	FF	450	661016	DINAGEN JAMES F	030230	MEXICO
038031	630819	1	51	450	651107	SANCHEZ DOLORES	020219	MEXICO
027739	630823	1	CC	450	651001	ASHLEY JOSEPH P	020109	MEXICO
025015	630911	1	FF	450	650715	SWIDER RAYMOND J	011005	MEXICO
012037	631031	1	49	450	650531	MACKAY LORNA J	010701	MEXICO
037954	631207	1	CC	450	651220	RODRIGUEZ NEIDA	020014	MEXICO
027747	640219	1	CC	450	660810	HUMPHREY L D JR	020522	MEXICO
038306	640429	1	CC	450	660513	PURKEY EARL K	020015	MEXICO
037171	640511	1	RR	450	661108	LADENBURG ARTHUR T	020528	MEXICO
025644	640521	1	CC	450	660730	BRIGHT WILLIAM C	020210	MEXICO
014680	640715	1	CC	450	670726	BOJARSKI TED S	030012	MEXICO
032616	640910	1	CC	450	671203	FARMER MICHAEL J	030224	MEXICO
033697	640912	1	CC	450	661001	BERNARD JOAN	020020	MEXICO
018055	640914	1	RR	450	661114	DAHLGREN HAROLD E	020201	MEXICO
027605	641012	1	FF	450	670123	MCDONNELL H ANN	020312	MEXICO
019765	641118	1	FC	450	670930	DURKIN SHIRLEY L	021013	MEXICO
019816	650407	1	CC	450	671107	HAUSMANN CYNTHIA	020701	MEXICO
060953	650501	1	CC	450	670601	SIMONS HOMER D JR	020101	MEXICO
027646	650605	1	CC	450	670701	PITTENGER ALICE H	020027	MEXICO
013733	650616	1	RF	450	700626	HARRIS JOANNE LEE	050011	MEXICO
063982	650708	1	CC	450	680601	COVINGTON ROBERT A	021024	MEXICO
056440	650729	1	RR	450	690421	DILLON PAUL L	030823	MEXICO
064769	650911	1	FR	450	670911	BURLEIGH CHARLES H	020001	MEXICO
037764	650913	1	RF	450	700630	PELAYO ROSA M	040918	MEXICO
025658	650929	1	FF	450	680120	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	020322	MEXICO
056625	651012	1	CC	450	671212	MAGGARD PEGGY M	020201	MEXICO
371738	651128	1	RR	450	670901	HOOPES JUDITH A	010904	MEXICO
029958	660109	1	VV	450	680113	SERVILLA ARTHUR D	020005	MEXICO
039032	660405	1	RR	450	680405	BAKKE ALFRED C	020001	MEXICO
021352	660504	1	FF	450	670928	HINKLEY CLYDE I	010425	MEXICO

S-E-C-R-E-T

SUPPORT ASSETS

Unilateral phono taps

1949 - 1961 Charles Anderson III Chief
4/55 - 4/60 **Peggy Maggard** Asst
4/56 - 1/62 Frank Estancona Chief
2/60 - 10/64 Thomas Keenan
9/64 - 12/67 Michael Farmer

49-71 : Outside CO
David WILSTED (ps)
retired in Mexico

Unilateral photo Cubans

6/59 - 4/64 **Robert Zambernardi** (resigned Mexico)
7/59 - 6/62 **Richard Spathar TSD** (retired)

Unilateral photo Soviets

3/54 - 4/59 Harry T. Mahoney
(retired Chicago)
5/57 - 8/64 A. Goodpasture (alternate CO
and internal routing)
6/58 - 6/63 Louis D. Puckett (retired)
6/63 - 10/64 Thomas Keenan
65 - 66 William Bright

56 - 68 Outside Agent
Ramon Alvarez (resigned in Mexico)

~~[illegible]~~

Liaison phone taps

1959 - 1969 Winston Scott (deceased)
1959 - 1960 Alfonso Spera (retired)
1959 - 1960 **Turner Smith** (outside, now retired)
1959 - 1960 John (Training rept resigned)
1960- 1961 John Brady (retired)
1962 - 1968 A. Goodpasture
1961 - 1971 **Charles Flick** (outside TSD Staff Agent - retired)

Liaison - surveillance

Prior 1954 **Robert** Melberg (retired)
3/54 - 4/59 Harry Mahoney (retired)
4/59 - 1961 Thomas Hazlitt
12/62 - 9/67 **Robert Feldmann**

TSD Outside unit

4/58 - 12/63 Glen Widden (retired)
6/59 -4/64 Joseph H. Resigno (ps) Unit blown and closed down

8/56-6/69 COS Winston M. Scott (deceased)

DCOS
7/56 - 7/58 Alfonso Rodriguez (retired)
10/58 - 12/62 Warren Dean (retired)
6/63 - 9/65 Alan White (retired)
10/65 - 1969 Stanley Watson (retired in Mexico)

COVERT ACTION

Prior to 1954 Howard Hunt (retired)
12/54 - 7/58 Williard Hill (resigned)
12/56 - 9/61 Stannard Short (retired)
Chief
9/61 - 3/64 David Phillips C/(retired)
8/62 - 9/64 Gunnar Beckman Asst
2/64 - 6/65 James Flannery C/(retired)
9/64 - 11/66 Harold Dalghren Asst
10/65 - 1967 Stanley Watson C/(retired)
66 - 68 Don Heath
68 - 71 Joseph SmithC(retired in Mexico)

CUBA OPERATIONS

56 - 4/62 Thomas Hazlitt Chief
2/60 - 4/62 Jack Stewart (retired Costa Rica)
4/63 - 4/65 Bob Shaw Chief
9/63 - 7/65 Ray Swider (retired)
10/63 - 5/65 Lorna Mackay
8/64 - 6/65 David Phillips Chief (retired)
9/65 - 10/68 Joseph Piccolo
10/65 - 12/67 Peggy Maggard

SOVIET TARGET

6/57 - 10/59 Louise Lyon (retired)
9/59- 8/65 Herbert Manell Chief
9/59 - 8/65 Barbara Manell
5/64 - 7/66 William Bright
4/65 - 11/67 Cynthia Hausmann
6/65 - 7/67 Alice Pittinger
7/65 - 4/69 Paul Dillon Chief

6/62 - 1/67 Prentice Marheine (ps)
(retired ?)
Outside CO

SOVIET TRANSCRIBERS

6/56 - 8/58 Morris Gordon (resigned)
6/58 - 6/63 George Misko
6/63 - 70 Boris Tarasoff (retired in Mexico)

C25790	520701	1 mexi	CC	450	561001	DICKENS CHARLES B	040301	MEXICO
C55091	520903	1 mexi	CC Reports	450	551115	KING MARY E	030213	MEXICO
C60736	521104	1 "	VV CA	450	570221	MORGAN JOHN S	040318	MEXICO
C14561	541006	1 "	CC COS Sec	450	570406	GIAMMARINO J P	020601	MEXICO
C56625	550401	1 "	CC Sec CE	450 Lifeat	600401	MAGGARD PEGGY M	050001	MEXICO
C09409	560109	1 mnty	VV Co	450	580215	BEARDSLEY BASIL A	020107	MEXICO
C10947	560130	1 mexi	CC Reports	450	580221	EDMUNDS BARBARA J	020022	MEXICO
C61922	560501	1 mexi	CC finance	450	581101	HUTCHISON TERRELL	020601	MEXICO
C55495	560601	1 Nogales	CC COS	450	590704	SHAW ROBERT T nogales	030104	MEXICO
C56292	560701	1 mexi	CC DOOS	450	580701	RODRIGUEZ ALFONSO	020001	MEXICO
C59820	560810	1 mexi	VV Co Lifeat	450	620131	ESTANCONA FRANK R	050522	MEXICO
063380	561206	1 mexi	CC Support	450 outside	580615	SANCHO JOSEPH G	010610	MEXICO
C63429	570211	1	VV	450	630630	MCALPINE RICHARD D	060420	MEXICO
022489	570301	1 mexi	CC finance Clk	450	610901	PALMER SYLVIA	040601	MEXICO
63114	570324	1	CC	450	630630	TORVESTAD GROVER E	060307	MEXICO
C09556	570407	1 mexi	FF C/files	450	620707	SANCHEZ LORENZO B	050301	MEXICO
C14247	571001	1 "	CC Commo	450	591024	SHAW MEREDITH L	020024	MEXICO
C64572	571101	1 "	CF "	450	600108	ROLFE GERALD S JR	020208	MEXICO
C25658	571201	1 "	CF files	450	600115	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	020115	MEXICO
C10116	580201	1 "	VV o/LIENVOY	450	600320	SPERA ALFONSO G	020120	MEXICO
C59127	580206	1 mnty	VV COS	450	600322	SILEO ANTHONY L	020117	MEXICO
C13175	580616	1 mexi	CC translator	450 Sov	630619	MISKO GEORGE W	050004	MEXICO
C27608	580818	1 mexi	FF files	450	601029	PRINCE ALBERT L	020212	MEXICO
C25097	580822	1 mexi	CC files	450	600915	HAMPTON NELLIE T	020024	MEXICO
C60740	580924	1 mexi	VV CP	450	620206	DUDERKIRK RICHARD H	030413	MEXICO
C26063	581101	1 "	CC files	450	610122	WEEKLEY ROBERT D	020222	MEXICO
C05221	590522	1 "	64 finance	450	610712	CAREY GILBERT W	020121	MEXICO
C09092	590917	1 mexi	VV Sov Co	450	650815	MANELL HERBERT	051029	MEXICO
C18090	590921	1 "	FF Commo	450	610921	CHAMES NICKLES	020001	MEXICO
C63811	591004	1 "	CC "	450	620719	RYDZEWSKI BERNARD	020916	MEXICO
C10625	591218	1 "	VV Sat Co	450	611216	FINNEY RICHARD A	011129	MEXICO
C32013	600125	1 "	CC files	450	620401	MARINE PAUL ALLEN	020207	MEXICO
C12270	600129	1 "	CC Reports	450	620221	SALMON JOAN A	020023	MEXICO
C26090	600203	1 "	51 Co Lifeat	450 Photos	641005	KEENAN THOMAS J	040803	MEXICO
C29163	600306	1 mnty	CC COS	450	620601	HAWKINS W C III mnty	020226	MEXICO
C06098	620110	1 "	CC COS	450	640705	MURRAY WILLIAM JR monterry	020526	MEXICO
C11340	620112	1 mexi	CF Sat Co	450	670630	PEPPER B FRANKLIN	050519	MEXICO
C32013	620501	1 "	CC files	450	640615	MARINE PAUL ALLEN	020115	MEXICO
C32703	620514	1 mnty	FC Co/	450	650221	ANDERSON JAMES E monterry	020908	MEXICO
C64518	620708	1 mexi	CC Commo	450	650715	DUNCAN ROBERT D	030008	MEXICO

NO.	DATE		CATEGORY		DATE		YRMODA	
C35324	621106	1 Mex	CC Finance Sec	450	631214	MAWHIKNEY ELLEN F	010109	MEXICO
C19143	621205	1 Mex C.	FC COS/Sec	450	681027	HENNICK DOROTHY J	051023	MEXICO
C35641	621207	1	CC	450	650615	HAMMEL RUTH I Evening? Sov	020609 clk.	MEXICO
C54841	621209	1 Mex	RR CO/TSD Support	450	670930	FELDMANN ROBERT H	040922	MEXICO
C15782	630121	1 Mex	FR CP	450	671119	MUSGRAVE MARY G	040929	MEXICO
C58524	630216	1	51 SOV/SAT	450	650401	JOHNSEN PATRICIA L	020116	MEXICO
C55495	630423	1 Mex	CC CUBA	450	651201	SHAW ROBERT T	020709	MEXICO
C37507	630430	1	CC	450	650527	JOHNSEN MARTIN I	020028	MEXICO
C60942	630615	1 Mex	CC CP op.	450	680708	THOMAS WADE E	050024	MEXICO
C37004	630629	1 merida	CC Sec Mnty	450 merida	650629	SILVERLIEB JOAN G mnty	020001	MEXICO
062241	630717	1 Mex	FF COMMO	450	661016	DINAGEN JAMES F	030230	MEXICO
C38031	630819	1 Mexi	51 files	450	651107	SANCHEZ DOLORES	020219	MEXICO
C27739	630823	1 mexi	CC Commo	450	651001	ASHLEY JOSEPH P	020109	MEXICO
C25015	630911	1 mexi	FF Cuba	450	650715	SWIDER RAYMOND J	011005	MEXICO
C12037	631031	1 mexi	49 Cuba	450	650531	MACKAY LORNA J	010701	MEXICO
C37954	631207	1 mexi	CC Sec Supt	450	651220	RODRIGUEZ NEIDA	020014	MEXICO
C27747	640219	1 mexi	CC photo TSD	450 inside	660810	HUMPHREY L D JR	020522	MEXICO
C38306	640429	1 mexi	CC files	450	660513	BURKEY EARL K	020015	MEXICO
037171	640511	1 mexi	RR LILINK	450 outside	661108	LADENBURG ARTHUR T	020528	MEXICO
C25644	640521	1 mex	CC sov sat	450	660730	BRIGHT WILLIAM C	020210	MEXICO
C14680	640715	1 mexi	CC files chief	450	670726	BOJARSKI TED S	030012	MEXICO
032616	640910	1 Mexi	CC Support	450	671203	FARMER MICHAEL J	030224	MEXICO
C33697	640912	1 mexi	CC CA Clk	450	661001	BERNARD JOAN	020020	MEXICO
C18095	640914	1 mexi	RR CA CO	450	661114	DAHLGREN HAROLD E	020201	MEXICO
C27605	641012	1 mexi	FF Reports	450	670123	MCDONNELL H ANN	020312	MEXICO
C19765	641118	1 Mexi	FC [illegible]	450	670930	DURKIN SHIRLEY L	021013	MEXICO
C19816	650407	1 mexi	CC Sov CO	450	671107	HAUSMANN CYNTHIA	020701	MEXICO
C60993	650501	1 mexi	CC admin	450 finance	670601	SIMONS HOMER D JR	020101	MEXICO
C27646	650605	1 mexi	CC Sov clk	450	670701	RITTENGER ALICE H	020027	MEXICO
C13733	650616	1 mexi	RF file clk	450	700626	HARRIS JOANNE LEE	050011	MEXICO
C63982	650708	1 "	CC Commo	450	680601	COVINGTON ROBERT A	021024	MEXICO
C56440	650729	1 "	RR Sov CO	450	690421	DILLON PAUL L	030823	MEXICO
C64769	650911	1 "	FR Commo	450	670911	BURLEIGH CHARLES H	020001	MEXICO
C37764	650913	1 "	RF file clk	450	700630	PELAYO ROSA M	040918	MEXICO
C25658	650929	1 "	FF Cuba ops	450	680120	RICCOLO JOSEPH S	020322	MEXICO
C56625	651012	1 "	CC " "	450	671212	MAGGARD PEGGY M	020201	MEXICO
371738	651128	1 "	RR Cable clk	450	670901	HOOPES JUDITH A	010904	MEXICO
C29958	660109	1 Mexi	VV CA outside	450?	680113	SERVILLA ARTHUR D	020005	MEXICO
C39032	660405	1 "	RR Commo	450	680405	BAKKE ALFRED C	020001	MEXICO
C21352	660504	1 "	FF files	450	670928	HINKLEY CLYDE [illegible]	010425	MEXICO

NO.	DATE	CATEGORY					DATE		YRMODA	
063074	530401	1	Mexi	XX	CA ops	450	580701	POSTANY FLOYD	050301	MEXICO
061280	530501	1	"	VV	Sov ops	450	551115	KENNER RODHAM W	020615	MEXICO
055304	530901	1		VV	Reports	450	600226	OHARA PAULINE C	060526	MEXICO
010778	530901	1	Mnty	SE	a/a	450	551101	STRATTON EUGENE A	020201	MEXICO
061591	530911	1	Mexi	VV	Sat ops	450	560121	KRAVCOV FRED	020411	MEXICO
011047	540303	1	Mexi	VV	Support	450 Co	590421	MAHONEY HARRY T	050119	MEXICO
012161	540701	1	Mnty	32	CoS	450	560801	NEELY JOHN C	020101	MEXICO
011331	541201	1	Mexi	XX	CA ops	450	580701	HILL WILLARD R	030701	MEXICO
006475	541201	1		62		450	561101	SCHNITMAN EDWARD P	011101	MEXICO
057661	550816	1	Mexi	VV	CP ops	450	581023	FLORSTEDT ROBERT F	030208	MEXICO
009029	550911	1		VV		450	570322	MACPHEE KEITH L	010612	MEXICO
010694	551101	1	mexi	64	Sat ops	450	580801	JETT CHARLES K	020901	MEXICO
9299	560506	1	Mexi	46	Reports	450	581114	BRONDER IRMA	020609	MEXICO
017558	560601	1	Mexi	64	Sov translator	450	580801	GORDON MORRIS H	020201	MEXICO
039366	560701	1	"	XX	finance	450	581101	~~HUTCHISON AUDREY~~	020401	MEXICO
005578	560801	1	mexi	64	DCoS	450	580701	SCOTT WINSTON M	011101	MEXICO
056304	560901	1	"	62	Sec CoS	450	580701	VAN BIESBROECK M	011001	MEXICO
055966	561101	1		64		450	580701	WEITZEL ISABELLE	010801	MEXICO
009368	561201	1		XX		450	590701	DICKOW DANIEL R	020701	MEXICO
055866	561220	1	Mexi	CC	CA ops	450	610930	SHORT STANNARD K	040911	MEXICO
055744	570101	1	"	38	finance	450	590718	LATHAM ROBERT F	020618	MEXICO
015780	570301	1	mexi	64	files	450	580301	JOHNSON KATHERINE	010001	MEXICO
057303	570506	1	Mexi	CF	Support	450 liaison photos	681022	GOODPASTURE ANN L	110517	MEXICO
057110	570618	1	"	VV	Sov Co	450	591002	LYON LOUISE ANNE	020315	MEXICO
057550	570901	1	Mnty	64	CoS	450	580801	BODDEN ROBERT C	001101	MEXICO
057820	570901	1	Mexi	RR	CP	450	571001	SLOAN LIN S	000101	MEXICO
013355	571001	1		18		450	580601	NORWAT STUART G	000801	MEXICO
025139	571014	1	Mexi	CC	Reports clk	450	610121	CANTY KATHRYN	030308	MEXICO
1599	571201	1	Mexi	VV	Sat ops	450	590517	CLARK PHILIP H	010517	MEXICO
063159	571201	1	Mex	XX	Sov outside	450	581201	BROMUND DANIEL	010001	MEXICO
006191	571215	1	mexi	48	Sov outs	450	580910	CLINTON JOHN A	000826	MEXICO
025120	580201	1	"	CC	files	450	580501	RAWLS WILLIAM E	000301	MEXICO
057135	580201	1	"	VV	Reports	450	600215	BOWERS BETTY A	020015	MEXICO
061894	580403	1	Mexi	VV	TSD outside	450	631204	WHIDDEN GLENN H	050802	MEXICO
063186	580502	1		XX		450	580601	NORWAT STUART G	000030	MEXICO
027409	580601	1	Mexi	64	Cz clk	450	580701	GUINAND ALICE B	000101	MEXICO
057999	580625	1	Mexi	FF	Support	450 Co	630628	PUCKETT LOUIS D	050004	MEXICO
027607	580915	1	Mnty	64	Admin C	450	601028	WILSON RONALD J	020114	MEXICO
055931	581004	1	Mexi	VV	DCOS	450	621202	DEAN WARREN L	040129	MEXICO
060393	581029	1	Mexi	46	finance	450	610723	SCHERL FRANK	020825	MEXICO

1950 = 1963 Mexi LIFEAT

[illegible]

14-00000

NO.	DATE		CATEGORY		DATE		YRMODA	
007547	590320	1 Mexi	VV CP ops	450	630608	ANDERSON EDWARD L	040219	MEXICO
007143	590510	1 Mexi	VV Reports	450	641202	OFFENBACHER ROSE R	050623	MEXICO
022592	590630	1 Mexi	41 TSD inside	450	640405	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	040906	MEXICO
063565	590713	1 "	VV Sov outside	450	620610	SPATHAR RICHARD Z	021028	MEXICO
057408	590915	1	CC CA ops	450	620705	CARLSON WILLIAM T	020921	MEXICO
063038	590916	1	53	450	600217	NONNEMACKER HAROLD	000502	MEXICO
019408	591029	1 Mexi	CC outside	450	620927	STRUBE MURIEL D w/Spathar	021029	MEXICO
027643	591117	1 Mexi	64 Sec D/COS	450	611215	MOONEY MARY P	020029	MEXICO
055544	600204	1 Mexi	CC Cuba ops	450	620401	STEWART JACK	020128	MEXICO
054603	600206	1 Mexi	51 Lienvoy	450	611031	BRADY JOHN B	010826	MEXICO
031735	600308	1	50	450	621114	OSTROM GAIL A	020807	MEXICO
029622	600821	1 Mexi	51 Sov outside	450 Student	630926	TRINNICH SEYMOUR D	030106	MEXICO
013368	601009	1 "	VV files	450	630601	SUPERFISKY AMELIA	020723	MEXICO
019399	601011	1 "	CC "	450	621217	LINTON JEAN L	020207	MEXICO
016245	601016	1 "	39 "	450	620105	HARMAN THELMA G	010220	MEXICO
029629	601113	1 "	45 "	450	630309	STINEBISER H C	020327	MEXICO
000322	610408	1 "	CF finance	450	630804	KLEIN OSCAR B	020327	MEXICO
061877	610702	1 "	CC finance	450	630716	BRIDGE JOSEPH F	020015	MEXICO
012796	610924	1 "	CC Commo	450	631009	BEMBRY A G	020016	MEXICO
024345	610925	1 Mex	RR CA + Cuba	450 ops	640315	PHILLIPS DAVID A	020521	MEXICO
185016	611001	1 "	FF TSD outside	450	660825	RESCIGNO JOSEPH M	041025	MEXICO
017690	620102	1 "	51 Cuba clk	450	630401	ROBERTS GRACE W	010230	MEXICO
016158	620205	1 Mexi	51 Reports	450	640717	CUDNEY CAROLE T	020513	MEXICO
055544	620401	1 Merida	CC Cuba ops	450	650801	STEWART JACK	030401	MEXICO
012741	620623	1 Mexi	CC Sov outside	450	670131	MARHEINE PRENTICE R	040709	MEXICO
000390	620719	1 Mexi	CC C/files	450	640727	DAIUTO DANIEL J	020009	MEXICO
025654	620818	1 "	CC CA ops	450	640925	BECKMAN GUNNAR W	020108	MEXICO
018687	630303	1 "	CC Sec Supp	450	630703	GORE LAURA T	000401	MEXICO
019477	630605	1 Mexi	RR Sov translator	450	670928	FEINGLASS DOUGLAS J	040324	MEXICO
055664	630618	1 "	FC DCOS	450	650908	WHITE ALAN P	020221	MEXICO
057746	630619	1 "	FF finance	450	650703	HARRIS HUGH F JR	020015	MEXICO
013079	630722	1 "	51 "	450	650915	CHANDLER HARRY A	020124	MEXICO
009274	630806	1 "	VV transcriber	450 Sov	641122	KARTY FLORYAN R	010317	MEXICO
037815	630901	1 "	CC Cuba/clk	450	660109	WALSH GERTRUDE A	020409	MEXICO
033314	631130	1	CC	450	660119	STEEVES CAROL C	020120	MEXICO
019704	631213	1 Mexi	CC LILINK	450 outside	660507	ETSINGER HOWARD T	020425	MEXICO
036069	631226	1 Mexi	CC finance	450	641115	FULLER VENNETTE K	001020	MEXICO
061062	640202	1 Mexi	VV C/CA ops	450	650630	FLANNERY JAMES E	010429	MEXICO
008165	640617	1 Mnty	CC COS	450	680417	PAXTON PAUL P	031001	MEXICO
024345	640824	1 Mexi	CC Cuba ops	450	650606	~~PHILLIPS DAVID A~~	000913	MEXICO

Poss. yes

This is possibly Dave's integration date for State cover.

SECRET

W gate file

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

6 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Media Inquiry to Cuban Exile Journalist in Miami re Cuban Involvement in Watergate Case and Attitudes in Miami Area

1. This memorandum is for your information only.

2. On 7 May 1973 we were advised by Station WH/Miami that two employees of a Station WH/Miami proprietary had told the Station that one Rene VIERA Gonzalez, a Cuban exile journalist who writes for Diario Las Americas and owns the Westchester Mall Bookstore in Miami received a call in early May from one FNU GOTTLIEB who said he worked for the Times in Washington. (GOTTLIEB is believed to be Sanford GOTTLIEB, 11102 Brandywine St., Kensington, Md. who was formerly an employee of the National Committee on Sane Nuclear Policy". A pretext call to the Washington bureau of the New York Times verified that one "Sandy" Gottlieb was employed there.) GOTTLIEB asked VIERA what people in Miami were saying about the Watergate case and what participation the Cubans had in it. He specifically asked about the activities of Reinaldo PICO (former 2506 Brigade member), Orlando PIEDRA (former Chief of Cuban Bureau of Investigation in Batista Government), and Rolando MASFERRER (former Cuban Senator and self-admitted former Communist). He also asked if ITT had an office in Miami, whether Joaquin SANJENIS Perdomo (former Chief of a WH/Miami proprietary who was amicably terminated in 1972) and Juan A. PAULA (former WH/Miami proprietary employee and former Controller of Revolutionary Democratic Front-FRD-and currently employed by an OGC proprietary) were still in the Miami area. He was also interested in Edgardo BUTTARI, a Cuban born in West Tampa, Florida, a former Cuban Congressman and Minister of Commerce who is reportedly associated with Mr. Charles "Bebe" REBOZO. According to GOTTLIEB, BUTTARI was appointed as "political chief in the Republican Party".

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

3. GOTTLIEB apparently has current information on the activities of the persons he mentioned; for example, he knew that Juan A. PAULA was involved in the jewelry business (PAULA and Antonio Felix GENOVA Corzo, a WH/Miami proprietary employee recently purchased a jewelry business) and he knew that Reinaldo PICO had resided in Venezuela and had recently returned to the United States. The phone conversation lasted about 45 minutes and GOTTLIEB told VIERA that if he came to Miami they would have lunch together.

05

4. VIERA does not know GOTTLIEB but talked to him because GOTTLIEB said he was recommended by Ernesto BETANCOURT who has resided in the Washington area for more than ten years. 05 BETANCOURT was a former Agency asset and is currently Chief of 08 Economic Planning and Budget, OAS. The conversation was initially in English but continued in Spanish. VIERA said he provided no information to GOTTLIEB on the basis that he is a Cuban exile and did not want to get involved in internal U.S. affairs. We do not know why GOTTLIEB was interested in Joaquin SANJENIS or Juan A. PAULA. (Attached are summary biographies of persons of interest to GOTTLIEB.)

06 01

5. On 7 May 1973 Marvin L. EVANS, Chief, MHMUTUAL, was briefed on the substance of the report from WH/Miami pertaining to Juan A. PAULA, who works for the MHMUTUAL proprietary, 24 McKERCHER and AVANT which utilizes NORTHWEST MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 24 INC. as office space cover. Among other duties performed by the proprietary are the monthly checks sent to the dependents of imprisoned assets which are signed in true name by PAULA. 06 EVANS was unaware that PAULA had purchased a new jewelry business in association with Antonio GENOVA; however, he feels that MHMUTUAL is protected and compartmented from the WH/Miami proprietary and he has the utmost confidence in the proprietary being able to field any questions. 01 MHMUTUAL communication with the proprietary is by unlisted phone and a post office box. 06 EVANS said that 06 McKERCHER and AVANT 06 could possibly be linked to NORTHWEST MANAGEMENT 24 but the trail would end there. He feels that either proprietary could only be linked to the Agency 01 by innuendo. (He did say that Howard HUNT was aware of MHMUTUAL when he served as C/CA/EUR.) EVANS 06 feels secure as far as NORTHWEST MANAGEMENT and McKERCHER and AVANT are concerned.

24 24

SECRET

18|PV

6. 06 EVANS mentioned that the 01 bona fide law firm occupying the other portion of the MHMUTUAL offices are the attorneys for John DEAN 06 (These lawyers 06 are cleared and witting.) One of the lawyers told EVANS 0 that DEAN 06 will be the "biggest canary singer of the year". The common receptionist area is manned by 01 MHMUTUAL employees who also monitor all telephone calls, incoming and outgoing for the other law firm. EVANS 06 mentioned that there have been numerous calls from the media and outgoing overseas calls to such places as Japan and Europe.

7. 06 EVANS will be traveling to Nassau and returning via Miami on 10 May 1973. He intends 01 to talk with his proprietary people at that time on other MHMUTUAL business and will also contact COS, WH/Miami. (The COS has been alerted to expect a call from EVANS on 10 May 1973.)

James E. Flannery

James E. Flannery
Acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: Director of Security

Attachments: A-F Biographic Summaries

TTACHMENT A

Rene VIERA Gonzalez

Reporter for Diario Las Americas; was speaker for Journalism in Exile at meeting held Flagler Theater, Miami June 1957.

Had also been head of Public Relations for Cuban National Bank. Date not given.

SECRET

[illegible]

ACHMENT B

Reinaldo PICO Ramon - formerly AMICE-31 (201-284658)

POA granted 14 October 1960 as PM asset. Member 2506 Brigade, captured Bay of Pigs. Member of Prisoners Commission sent by Castro to Miami to negotiate release of prisoners in exchange for mechanical equipment and other supplies needed by Cuba. Defected and refused to accompany other members of Prisoners Commission on their return to Cuba in July 1961. POA granted 15 June 1964 for use as CA/Prop asset. SGSWIRLED 3 October 1964 -- OA 4 February 1966. Amicably terminated 30 June 1968. As of July 1969 in Caracas, Venezuela. In December 1969 he was described by a source as "one does not know where the bluff begins and ends, what is true and what is lie".

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT C

Orlando PIEDRA

Orlando Eleno PIEDRA-NEGUERLA (201-247879)

aka - Orlando Eleno NEGUERLA-PIEDRA
aka - Orlando PIEDRA
aka - O. ROCA

Born 18 December 1917, Havana, Cuba
Believed to be Cuban citizen currently

Was Chief of Cuban Bureau of Investigation in Batista Government. Told FBI June 1959 he was forced to leave Cuba upon fall of Batista. Reportedly head of anti-Castro group in Miami in June 1959. In Sept 59 reported to be friendly with Rolando MASFERRER Rojas, ex-Cuban senator and publisher. PIEDRA reportedly furnished with money by Batista.

During Batista regime was included with others as responsible officials considered directly involved in torture and killing of Cuban citizens. Resided in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. in February 1960. During Batista regime PIEDRA was in charge of all matters pertaining to gambling, rackets and contraband. In 1953 in Cuba PIEDRA was also involved in business of Chinese contraband.

No indication he ever used by Agency.

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT D

Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER Rojas (201-42669)

Former Cuban senator and self-admitted former Communist. Quite active during early 60's in various anti-Castro activities in U.S. Recently served four and one-half year prison sentence received U.S. District Court for violation of U.S. neutrality laws.

No indication Headquarters has been in touch with subject at any time.

Born 1918 in Cuba; typifies worst elements in former regime of Batista. Name connotes ruthlessness, assassination, torture and extortion.

Still considers himself to be a Marxian Socialist; has been virulent critic of U.S. in past.

ACHMENT E

Edgar Anthony BUTTARI Puig (D.V.M.)

aka - Edgar A. BUTTARI (Doctor)
aka - Edgardo BUTTARI y Puig (201-276771)
Photo available

While information in his file does not indicate any past or present CIA contact, there is unsourced information in the WH/COG card file which shows that BUTTARI was in touch with Frank Bender (Gerard Droller) in Miami in the Spring of 1960, apparently in relation to BUTTARI's involvement with the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FRD). Currently BUTTARI is involved in many business ventures in South Florida and is reportedly associated with Charles "Bebe" Rebozo socially and in business.

Edgardo BUTTARI was born 14 August 1909 (also given 1914) at West Tampa, Florida, the son of a Cuban who fought in the Cuban Independence War. Appointed Cuban Inspector General Instructor of the Ministry of State in 1933. He later became Under Secretary of Labor. In 1938 he returned to Cuba and served as Secretary of Commerce until 1940. He later was appointed Minister of the Cuban Foreign Service. Appointed Minister of Commerce by Batista in 1942, he held that post until 1944 when he resigned to run for the House of Representatives, Habana. He remained in the House of Representatives until 1952.

BUTTARI arrived in the U.S. in March 1960 to reside in Miami, Florida. He became involved with the Revolutionary Democratic Front.

During his first term as Minister of Commerce in 1938 he was responsible for the arrest of several American representatives of large lard exporters in the U.S. (Swift, Armour, etc.) for increasing prices. At the same time he endeavored to put forward legislation of nationalistic tendencies, warning to "Yankee Imperialism", and seemed somewhat unfriendly to the U.S. He later changed and in 1938 became more anxious to cooperate with the U.S., apparently having gotten over his openly anti-American feelings. However, he did not appear to be dependable according to Embassy reports. He has been described as astute, clever, intelligent but slippery. He

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ACTION LIST

Control Number	Date of Request	Oral/ Written	Date Received	Subject Matter	Action Responsibility	Status
	1 Oct 76	O-Bill Miller	1 Oct 76	Comments on article in Philadelphia Bulletin, CIA Faked Vietnam Data General Says.		done-GLC called 1 Oct
	1 Oct 76	O-Inderfurth	1 Oct 76	Inderfurth agreed to meet with Fendig 5 Oct to discuss outstanding items		done
	1 Oct 76	O-Miller	1 Oct 76	Agreed to provide Miller with material for Committee retention on Oswald		done
	1 Oct 76	O-Miller	1 Oct 76	GLC met with Miller on "Smith Book" and agreed to provide info including copy of manuscript and damage assessment (GLC memo - OLC 76-2851)		Statistic sheet provided 8 Oct
OLC 76-2832	23 Sept 76	W-Connaughton	4 Oct 76	Constituent of Sen. Bayh wants to make presentation to Agency in order to sell patented device (Elmer Hoehn).	ORD to contact Hoehn for info	DDS&T handling - no action
	4 Oct 76	O-Inderfurth	4 Oct 76	Asked to look through Merhige files		done-5 Oct
	6 Oct 76	O-Miller	6 Oct 76	During mtg with Miller, Inderfurth and Madigan on Dade County and Roselli, agreed we would draft ltr from DCI to Attorney General		done - 14 Oct 76 OLC 76-2904
	5 Oct 76	O-Inderfurth	5 Oct 76	Received from Inderfurth list of subjects Hart would like covered during prebrief on 22 Oct.		done - 22 Oct 76
	6 Oct 76	O-Inderfurth	6 Oct 76	Inderfurth felt response re Telli was inadequate		done - DFM oral
	7 Oct 76 MMM			Re West Coast trip with Inouye and DCI	To be rescheduled	

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ACTION LIST

Control Number	Date of Request	Oral/ Written	Date Received	Subject Matter	Action Responsibility	Status
	24 Sept 76	O-Marshall	24 Sept 76	Destruction of classified waste at Hqs.		done
	27 Sept 76	O-McDonald	27 Sept 76	Requested security briefing for Stan Taylor		done
OLC 76-2781 R#4630	27 Sept 76	W-Inouye	30 Sept 76	Briefing on CIA covert involvement in Jamaica and Argentina	DDO - Bfg to be scheduled Miller alerted and will set date and time	
	28 Sept 76	O-Budget Subcommittee		Breakfast/Briefing follow-up items (See John McMahon's MFR)	DDO, DDI, IC	(one item outstanding)
	29 Sept 76	O-Inderfurth	29 Sept 76	Schedule session with Compt for Sens Hathaway and Goldwater		done
	29 Sept 76	O-Inderfurth	29 Sept 76	During visit to STC, like to sit in on COS seminar		done
OLC 76-2816 R#4645	29 Sept 76	W-Inouye	1 Oct 76	Information on assassination of former Chilean Ambassador Letelier	DDO	DDO bf'd Miller and Inderfurth

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ACTION LIST

Control Number	Date of Request	Oral/ Written	Date Received	Subject Matter	Action Responsibility	Status
OLC 76-2456 R#4413	27 Aug 76	W-Inouye	31 Aug 76	Relations of CIA with National Strategic Information Center; Institute for Study of Conflict; and New Era, Inc.	Discussed with Miller 15 Oct DDO	Awaiting approval of guidelines on liaison
	27 Aug 76	O-Inderfurth	27 Aug 76	(1) Inderfurth and Sen Hart want to visit Farm (2) List of Agency installations for Sen Hart to visit (3) List of DDO Division Chiefs		done - 21 Oct 76 done done - 22 Sept 76
	30 Aug 76	O-Sen Bayh	30 Aug 76	Raised a question during briefing re Iran		done - 30 Aug 76
See OLC 76-2435	30 Aug 76	O-Pickett	30 Aug 76	CFI Directive No. 1, "Program and Budget Review Process"		done - 30 Aug 76
	31 Aug 76	O-Inderfurth	31 Aug 76	Assessment on Washington Post article, "Iran's Police Seek Killers of Americans"		done
See OLC 76-2514	undtd	O-Miller		Current DCID's		done
OLC 76-2478 R#4412	31 Aug 76	W-Hathaway Goldwater	1 Sept 76	Request for meeting in Sept to get views on long-range direction of IC Staff		done - 28 Sept 76 Breakfast/Briefing

S-E-C-R-E-T

20 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : Summary of STESCALADE - Audio Operation Against the New China News Agency in Havana

1. In May 1959, the New China News Agency (NCNA) opened an office in Havana in the El Medico Building which is occupied partly by business concerns and partly used for residential apartments. Shortly thereafter, the Havana Station obtained the concurrence of Ambassador Bonsal and Miss Carolyn O. Stacey, an Embassy employee, to mount an audio operation against NCNA through the wall of the adjacent apartment in which Miss Stacey lived. In November 1959, the FE Division sent one case officer and one TSD technician to Havana, and the installation of a microphone and tape recorder was completed in Miss Stacey's apartment on 29 November 1959.

2. By June 1960, it had become evident that two other rooms occupied by NCNA possibly housed communication equipment and were used for conferences. At that time Bryan Mills, FE Division case officer, went to Havana and explored the possibility of improving the operation. He managed to lease an apartment directly over the NCNA office and arranged for a stay-behind agent to occupy this space.

3. In August 1960, a team of three TSD technicians who were in Havana on a separate SR Division operation agreed to install the additional equipment required for the NCNA operation. A second FE Division case officer, Robert Neet, came down to Havana; and he, together with the technicians, installed a probe microphone and tape recorder in the apartment obtained by Mills over the NCNA office. About this time the equipment was removed from Miss Stacey's apartment, with the exception of the plastic probe which was left in the wall and plastered over.

4. As an additional security precaution to provide a safe haven, and after consultation with the Acting Chief of Station, a key to an apartment in the same building leased by Mrs. Marjorie Lennox, an Embassy secretary, was obtained. Mrs. Lennox was told that access to her apartment was needed for photographic surveillance purposes.

5. The Station was then faced with the probability that time and security would work against holding indefinitely the lease to the apartment over NCNA since the owners of the building were cancelling sub-lessors' contracts and recalling leases. It was, therefore, decided to install transmitters and switches in order to permit continued monitoring of the target from a distant listening post. Another three-man team of TSD technicians consisting of David L. Christ (alias Carswell), Walter E. Szuminski (alias Taransky) and Thornton J. Anderson (alias Danbrunt) documented as tourists had been sent to Havana to install audio equipment in the Chinese Nationalist Embassy before it was due to be turned over to the Chinese Communits. This operation aborted. This team was then sent to work on the installation of the transmitters in the apartment over the NCNA office.

6. At 2400 hours on 14 September, Christ, who with the other technicians was working in the target apartment, failed to keep a scheduled appointment with Neet. At 0100 hours on the 15th of September, the apartment of Mrs. Lennox was entered into and searched by Cuban authorities, and she was taken into custody. At 1540 hours on 15 September, Neet, the stay-behind agent and his wife were picked up by the Cuban authorities and detained.

7. As of today the agent remains in the custody of the Cuban authorities. His wife has been released and is still in Havana. Neet was released 1715 hours 16 September and has subsequently returned to Washington where he is being debriefed. Mrs. Lennox was subsequently released and has also returned to Washington where she is being debriefed. The three TSD technicians remain in confinement. They have been seen in confinement but not contacted by an Embassy officer when he first attempted to secure the release of Mrs. Lennox. Christ was last seen by Neet when they were jointly interrogated the morning of 16 September. At that time Christ did not appear

to have been maltreated.

8. According to articles in the Cuban papers the three technicians were arrested while in the apartment over the NCNA office and completing the installation of the equipment. The press article adds that the key to Mrs. Lennox's apartment was found on one of the technicians who identified the apartment to which it belonged. All Cuban press releases have referred to the men by alias and have not identified them as Government or Agency employees. It is unclear at present what story had been agreed upon by the technicians and station personnel to be used in the event they were caught. (While being interrogated with Neet, Christ indicated that Neet was his boss, and Neet consistently denied any knowledge as to why he was being held.) The sub-lease for the apartment in which the men were caught is in the name of the stay-behind agent with the original lease being in the name of Mills, the FE Division Case Officer.

9. Initial information indicated that the three technicians would be charged with espionage "against the people of China". Subsequent press releases have been unclear on this point. An attempt by Consul Hugh Kessler to contact the three men at 1730 hours on 17 September was unsuccessful. He was not permitted to see them but was told they were in custody.

10. The three technicians travelled to Cuba as tourists under very light commercial cover, two of them working for a company in New York and the third, one in Baltimore. In each case the cover company consists of a telephone answering service and a name on the door. Telephone messages and mail are picked up periodically by an Agency contract employee. The men were provided with this cover as well as unbackstopped home addresses for use when entering or leaving Cuba as tourists since the filling out of the landing card requires this information. Subsequent to their detention the home addresses have been partially backstopped so that inquiries will indicate that someone with this alias name had lived in the apartment house in question. Insofar as the cover companies are concerned, efforts are being made to provide a backstop to withstand inquiries from the press should the Cubans reveal this information. In view

of the thinness of the cover, it is uncertain whether this will succeed.

11. A cleared and witting law firm in New York has been briefed by Mr. L. Houston on the situation with the thought that inquiries received by the cover company could be referred to the firm of lawyers from whom no comment would be obtained by the press or other inquirers. The law firm has been briefed on the entire situation so that they may be in a position to act if any action by them appears desirable or feasible. It would not appear that much support of any kind can be obtained from the law firm or the law firms in Cuba which are associated with them.

12. Insofar as the families are concerned, one of the technicians is a bachelor presently on home leave between two tours in Japan. His father, a cook in a diner in the Boston area, has been contacted by the Office of Security, and he will get in touch with Security if he receives any inquiries on this matter. Security, by the same token, will keep in touch with him as the Cubans reveal their intentions and course of action.

13. The wives of the other two technicians have been told what has happened and are being contacted at least once daily by TSD staffers and their wives who have been briefed on the situation. A conference with the two wives was held in TSD on 19 September to go over the whole situation and determine if there were any personal problems on which the Agency could be of help. For the time being the wives are telling their neighbors that their husbands are on a trip. This story will be adjusted depending on what course of action the Cuban Government takes, whether the aliases remain unbroken and whether recognizable photographs of the individuals are released to the press. The two wives so far have taken the bad news exceedingly well.

RUDOLPH E. GOMEZ
Acting Chief, WH

Distribution:
DCI - 2
DDCI - 1
DD/P - 1
COPS - 1
WH - 3
~~FE~~ - 1
OS - 1
CI - 1

[illegible], DD/P

att

RELEASE CONTINGENCY OPLAN 62-2

CHART OR MAP REFERENCE:

Sectional aeronautical charts As required.

TASK ORGANIZATION:

Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group. Major Billy B. Campbell, Commander.

1. SITUATION:

Daniel L. Carswell (Alias), Eustace H. Danbrunt (Alias) and Edmund R. Taransky (Alias) are TSD Staff Employees who were apprehended by Cuban authorities in September 1960 and who are now serving ten year sentences. Efforts are being made to secure their release. Since their release may occur without advance notice and at a variety of places, ie. Havana, Miami, Mexico City, Switzerland, Brazil, etc., it is imperative that a contingency plan be formulated to ensure the secure reception of these employees.

The controlling factor in all phases of the release procedure is that these employees were in Cuba under alias and that during the entire period since their capture their aliases and cover stories apparently have been maintained. Therefore it is essential that these aliases be maintained until such time as the employees have returned to Agency control and then have these alias identities disappear as quickly as possible.

For planning purposes the release points will be Havana, Mexico City or "other areas".

2. MISSION:

Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group provide black air transportation from port of entry CONUS to the designated safe area.

3. EXECUTION:

A. Black air transport will be provided under this plan at the request of TSD, COS Mexico, or Operational Support Division/OS/DDS depending on the release point and port of entry.

S-E-C-R-E-T

B. Request for black transport should include:

1. Request that RELEASE CONTINGENCY OPLAN 62-2 be implemented.

2. Port of entry.

3. Date, Local time, and airfield desired for pick up.

4. Desired destination.

5. Other requirements, ie., stretchers or bunks in the event subjects are hospital cases.

6. Name, organization and telephone number of requesting party.

7. Name and telephone number of KUBARK contacts at loading and off-loading points.

C. The following personnel are knowledgeable and charged with the responsibility of activating this plan:

1. Major Richard I. Skinner, AC/ASD/DD/P
Organization: Air Support Division, DD/P
Home Phone: JE 3-1409
Office Phone: Sterile Numbers ME 8-6285, EX 3-8515
Extensions 6862, 7564, 7367
Red Line 1058

2. Mr. Robert Marrero
Organization: Air Support Division, DD/P
Home Phone: JA 4-3598
Office Phone: Same as 1.

3. Major Billy B. Campbell, Commander, Det. 1.
Organization: Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
Home Phone: 662737
Office Phone: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 631590

4. Major Kenneth R. Burton, Ops Officer, Det. 1.
Organization: Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
Home Phone: 662464
Office Phone: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 631213

D. Det. 1 furnish 1 C-54 and crew in standby capacity until further notice. Standby capacity is herein defined as capability to position the aircraft at any port of entry in east, south or southwest U. S. from Boston to Los Angeles within 15 hours.

E. Assuming the subjects will be released in Havana or Mexico City, Det. 1 will prepare mission folders for flights from most probable ports of entry to Isolation and Andrews Air Force Base.

RICHARD I. SKINNER

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - CI Staff
3 - OS
3 - OP
3 - MS
3 - C/FE
3 - C/TSD
3 - CCG
3 - TFW
3 - C/WH
3 - DPD/DDR

SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

24 April 1974

RYBAT/JMSPUR/PLVWCADET TRAFFIC REMOVED FROM C/WHD PERSONAL FILES DURING WATERGATE FILE SEARCH. TRAFFIC CAN BE FOUND IN SEALED SENSITIVE ENVELOPE IN SAFE NO. 1322 LOCATED IN WH/COG, ROOM 3D46.

21-4

1. WH/MIAMI 18188 (IN 887783) APR 73 RE: AMANCHOR-1/ARTIME/AMNAIL & Screen for Pumping Mo

2. DIR 395973 APR 73 " ARTIME/Cuban exiles, Mon for Watergate prisoners

27 16-4 02 02

③ UFAA-5041 MAY 73 (COS MIAMI) " SLIGO-31/SLIGO-5 & Conti Blips on Radar Screen; VIERA, GOTLIEB, PICO, SLESTATE-MHSAVVY.

02 02

21-4 02 31

4. WH/MIAMI 18502 (IN 918694) MAY 73 RE: TALLAHASSEE, ALIAS FLORID LICENSES, GERSTEIN/DE DIEGO.

5. DIR 408997 MAY 73 RE: ABOVE CABLE & LICENSES

21-4

6. WH/MIAMI 18553 MAY 73 " ALIAS DOCUMENTATION; FLAT IMPROTA/MALEKIAN

7. DIR 414155 MAY 73 " AGENCY INVOLVEMENT IN WATERG.

21-21 02

⑧ GEORGETOWN 18639 MAY 73 " FADANE/HUNT, official contact the two

28 01

9. FR/WASH 15169 (IN 935851) JUN 73 " WUAIRDALE -- Rumors of cland financial manipulation in Me

21-3

⑩ MEXICO 23918 (IN 935954) " Financial transactions Mexic (re above cable)

21-28

⑪ BUENOS AIRES 25585 JUN 73 (IN 938971) RE: PENTAGON/ELLSBERG CASE; MAYLOTT/HUNT, MEMCONS

22 16-4

⑫ UFAT-3855, 21 JUN 73 (WH/MIAMI) RE: PAUL HELLIWELL/MARY JANE JOHN KIMBALL--business in

⑬ DIR 440158 AUG 73 RE: L.PATRICK GRAY identifies George MUNRO (LIMEW)

06

⑭ DIR 440586 AUG 73 RE: GRAY, excerpts of testimo MUNRO

06

SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

20JPV

15 Oct 76
DATE

WALLER

~~BRECKINRIDGE~~ →

Leader (keep copy for our Task Force file)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RETURN TO: Hannah for file
SSCI

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ ERNAL ONLY ☐ CON ENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Maurice A. Sovern
O/SA/DO/O
2 D 0109

EXTENSION 1542

NO.

DATE 12 October 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. SA/DO/O		12/10/76	V	
2.				
3. IG	13 Oct 76			
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INSPECTOR GENERAL
76-3127

12 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM : Philip F. Fendig
SA/DO/O

SUBJECT : Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Request for Office of Security File Material

1. We appreciate the opportunity to review certain OS file material containing DDO information prior to its being sterilized for passing to the SSCI in response to their request.

2. We have reviewed the material listed in the annex, and our recommendations for passing are included thereon.

3. To confirm our understanding resulting from the meeting in the Legislative Counsel's office on 29 September 1976, with the IG, D/IG, D/SEC, SA/DO/O, LC and A/LC present, hereafter no DDO material held in OS files will be made available for review by House or Senate Committee staff members prior to clearance from this Directorate.

(signed)
Philip F. Fendig
Philip F. Fendig

att

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ANNEX to SA/DO/O Memorandum, 12 October 1976

SUBJECT: SSCI Request for OS File Material

1. From the STURGIS file:

   a. C/SAS memo, 18 February 1964, to D/SEC
      Subject: Interviews by OO/C with West Point
      Cadet, Douglas K. Gentzkow

   b. OOA(S) 3,289,019, 22 January 1964
      Subject: Douglas K. Gentzkow

   c. OOA(S) 3,287,344, 7 January 1964
      Subject: Douglas K. Gentzkow

      21-2

   d. Cable: (Guatemala City) 19536 (IN 944357),
      25 June 1976

None of the above or any part may be passed on the grounds of protection of sensitive sources and methods. We also wish to observe for the record that per page 252 of the Rockefeller Commission Report (June 1975), Sturgis testified that he "was not an employee or agent of the CIA either in 1963 or at any other time."

2. From Alexander RORKE file:

   a. Identical to item 1.b. above.

   b. Identical to item 1.c. above.

   c. Unreadable card apparently listing extracts from DBF 44345 and DBF 45113, 11 March 1960 and 23 March 1960.

   d. Letter from Alexander Rorke to Senator Thomas J. Dodd, August 24, (year undecipherable).

Items a and b or any part thereof should not be passed (see para 1 above). Item c appears to be FBI information (third agency rule prohibition). Item d is not DDO material. Defer to OS.

3. From MOSS file:

   Memorandum from FIOB/SRS to DC/SRS, 14 May 1973
   Subject: MOSS, Edward K.

1/PU

This memorandum appears to contain mostly FBI material (third agency rule prohibition). If clearance is obtained, please delete the first paragraph under sources and methods protection.

4. From ROTHMAN file:

Memorandum for the Record, 25 April 1975
Subject: ROTHMAN, Norman

No objection to passing.

5. From SOCARRAS file:

Memo from C/SSO to D/OS, undated
Subject: DOCARRAS, Carlos Prio

We concur with the OS position not to make this memo available and we cite sensitive sources and methods protection.

06

6. From (MACEO (MACKLE), Antonio Jaime, Dr.) file:

a. Director OS memo to FBI, 23 February 1961
Subject: (Antonio Jaime Maceo Mackle,) 06
Project Zenith

b. Memorandum for the File from C/AAS/OS
Subject (multiple): (MACEO, Mackle, 06
Antonio Jaime) i.a.

06

c. Memorandum for the File, (Massett) OS/AAS
Subject (multiple): as b above (i.a.)

d. Letter to Commissioner, I&NS from D/OS, 28 February 1961
Subject: (see list attached - listing more or less 60 agents)

e. Memorandum For: C/WH from DDOS (I&OS), 3 March 1961 06
Subject: (S-11386)

f. Bio Data Sheet, #220775, 15 November 1960 06
Subject: (Maceo (Mackle), Antonio Jaime, Dr.)

None of the memoranda should be made available as they contain operational information on sensitive sources and methods.

6/DJ

7. File on Artime - Buesa

   a. Memorandum for the Record, 21 February 1975
      Subject: Artime-Buesa, Manuel F.

   b. Identity List, undated, Case #210838,
      Artime-Buesa

   c. Memorandum from C/SAS, SAS 63-369, undated
      Subject: Request for Technical Support

   d. Memorandum For: C/PSD/OS from C/OSD/OS,
      28 May 1965
      Subject: Artime-Buesa, Manuel F.

   e. Memorandum For: C/WH from DDOS/IOS, 28 May 1965
      Subject: Use of Sterile Answering Service,
      #210838

   f. Memorandum For: D/OS from C/SAS, 3 February 1964
      Subject: (Nicaraguan) Passports Issued to
      Manuel Artime and Rafael Ovintero

   g. Letter from D/OS to Commissioner I&NS,
      14 October 1963
      Subject: Manuel F. Artime-Buesa (multiple
      subject, i.a.)

   h. PRQ I, signed by Manuel I. Artime, undated

   i. Memorandum from C/WH to D/OS (AAB), 19 January 1960
      Subject: Request for Assistance in the Cases
      of Manuel Francis Artime-Buesa
      (multiple subject, i.a.)

We concur with the OS position not to make items a through g and item i available under the requirement for protection of sources and methods. Regarding item h, under the protection of sources and methods, please delete paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40. The remainder of the item may be made available to the SSCI.

YPN

8. From VARONA file:

a. Memorandum For: OS/AAS from WH/4/Political Action, 14 June 1960
Subject: Planned Travel Outside United States of JMARC Members in Miami

b. Memorandum for the File, from C/AAS/OS, 27 March 1961
Subject: Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona Loredo (multiple subject, i.a.)

c. Memorandum for the File, from AAS Officer/OS, 14 February 1961
Subject: Varona Loredo, Antonio - SP 504 (multiple subject, i.a.)

We concur with the OS position to delete the names circled both in red and blue. This will confirm oral notification to Mr. Hunt of your office on 5 October 1976.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

96 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8
INFO : CCS 3, VR

S E C R E T 071812Z

PRIORITY BOGO INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7292 7 Dec 63 IN 75863

1. MISS NORMA VALVERDE VARIG FLT CANCELLED AT MEXICO CITY.

2. ONWARD TRAVEL VIA AEROLINEAS PANAMA FLT 203 ARRIVING BOGO 0820 ON 8 DEC.

S E C R E T

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

15045 IM/i

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

5 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: SAS 8 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1450 9 DEC/LMS)

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, RI/AN, WH 7, CC 6, VR

6537

S E C R E T 091850Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7330 9 Dec 63 IN 76536

TYPIC COMMO

1. REQUEST PRITY POA TO INCLUDE COMMO TRAINING FOR 04 MARTA (VALDES) HERNANDEZ, SINGLE, D/O 06, 08 LUCAS AND JULIA, DPOB 22 JULY 29, MATANZAS, RESIDING 10 MAZON NUMBER 163 HAVANA,

2. 04 (VALDES) EMPLOYED AS 08 STATISTICIAN MINISTRY 08 HEALTH AND 09 WELFARE HAVANA. SHE SCHEDULED RETURN CUBA CA 20 DEC FROM MEXI WHERE RECENTLY COMPLETED LENGTHY STUDIES PROGRAM UNDER ASUSPICES 08 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.

3. NO MEXI TRACES. INDEX.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WE 6

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, O/OA, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 140035Z

DIR INFO STOC CITE MEXI 7384

14 Dec 63 IN 80448

KEYWAY PBRUMEN T1CRYSTAL

REF DIR 84498 *

LETTERS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO: ANGEL GUADALUPE RIVERA, HAMBURGO 73, DEPT. 302, MEXICO, D.F.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED MEXI PROVIDE LETTER DROP FOR T1CRYSTAL-1.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : DODS 4

INFO : DODS/L, CI/OPS, EE 4, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 140013Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7383

80439

@SOLOC VU[illegible]IN BEDOX OKROW

REF MEXI 7218 (IN 77[illegible])

1. JERZY PLEBANSKI GOING DALLAS 15 DEC ATTEND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON GRAVITATIONAL COLLAPSE AND OTHER TOPICS IN RELATIVI~~STIC~~TY ASTROPHYSICS. SYMPOSIUM UNDER AUSPICES OF SOUTHWEST CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDIES OF DALLAS AND MEETINGS TO BE HELD AT STATLER-HILTON. PLEBANSKI PLANS RETURN MEXI 18 DEC. SOURCE: PBSWING.

2. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REVIEW GOBERNACION FILE JERZY PLEBANSKI REVEALS SUBJ GRANTED PERMISSION LEAVE MEXI TO ATTEND CONFERENCES U. S.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

46 SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, RI/AN DUMMY, C/TSD 3, C/SAS 5, VR

S E C R E T 221000Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7006

22 NOV 63 IN 66059

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REF A DIR 82999 *

B MEXI 6967 (IN 64313)

1. PRQ DATA ON LICRAFT-1 AS FURNISHED BY BROTHER 20 NOV BEING POUCHED.

2. BROTHER FEELS SUBJ WILLING REMAIN INSIDE FORSEEABLE FUTURE. IS SENDING SUBJ ANOTHER LETTER FOR DEFINITE DECISION AND WILL INDICATE INTERESTED PARTY BEHIND AMSEVER-2 WILLING ESTABLISH TWO HUNDRED DOLLAR MONTHLY ESCROW ACCOUNT.

3. CONTACT WILL BE MAINTAINED USING PRESENT CHANNEL THROUGH 11 NETHEMBASSY DIPLOMATIC POUCH. STATION FEELS SUBJ SHOULD BE TRAINED THROUGH THIS CHANNEL ASAP IN SW SYSTEM TO ENHANCE COMMO SECURITY.

08 4. SUBJ HAS ACCESS TO ALL SIGNIFICANT PLANS ACTIVITIES MINISTRY INDUSTRIES, IS FREQUENTLY CONSULTED BY ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA AND SITS IN ON ALL HIGH LEVEL PLANNING SESSIONS AT MINISTRY. WHILE KNOWN AS NOT FAVORING REGIME, IS CONSIDERED BY GUEVARA AND ASSOCIATES AS HIGHLY QUALIFIED AND CAPABLE ENGINEER WHO WILL NOT HESITATE EVALUATE SOVBLOC MACHINERY AS SUPERIOR TO AVAILABLE WESTERN ITEMS IF THUS CONVINCED.

SECRET

13532 21BR

5. KUBARK CONTROL WILL BE COMBINATION FINANCIAL AND ABILITY "CLEAR" SUBJ OF INVOLVEMENT WITH REGIME AFTER CASTRO DOWNFALL. BROTHER SAYS SUBJ STRONGLY PRO-PBPRIME AND FORESAW ADVENT COMMUNIST REGIME AS EARLY AS 1959 WHEN BROTHER HIMSELF WAS NOT YET CONVINCED CASTRO COMMUNIST.

6. SUBJ LOOKS LIKE EXCELLENT DIRECT LINE INTO "CHE" GUEVARA AND SHOULD BE USED ONLY FOR INFO TO WHICH HAS NORMAL ACCESS. BROTHER EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT SUBJ SHOULD NEVER BE USED FOR CONTACT WITH OTHERS INSIDE NO MATTER HOW WELL SUCH PERSONS TRUSTED BY ODYOKE.

123

7. INDEX 201-356[illegible].

SECRET

C/S COMMENTS: [illegible] WHETHER SUBJECT WILL REMAIN [illegible], HOW CONTACT WILL BE MAINTAINED, EXTENT OF KUBARK CONTROL, AND [illegible] OF INTENDED USE.

13532 (p2)

VBR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LIENVOY-8

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As a result of the recent review done of the LIFEAT and LIENVOY Project, it came to Headquarters attention that LIENVOY-8, who was believed to have been terminated, was still covered by the LIENVOY Project.

2. According to HMMA-14676, LIENVOY-8 was the cause of a security problem for LIENVOY in February 1960 when he requested release from LIENVOY and a transfer to his parent organization, the 24 2A [General Staff of the Presidency.] LIENVOY-8 was described as a "sour" nationalist who disapproved of ODYOKE's (sharing 24 of the LIENVOY take.

3. Headquarters now notes that LIENVOY-8's clearance has never been cancelled and there is no Agent Service Record or termination report in his file. LIENVOY-8 was included in the LIENVOY Project renewal request for the 1961/62 project year, but not for the 1962/63 year. The field project renewal request for the 1963/64 year included him again.

4. It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters of the present status of LIENVOY-8 (201-118406). If he has been terminated, please forward an Agent Service Record. If he is still being used, please provide a current analysis of his reliability and comments on any security probelms present in light of his actions and reputation in 1960.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
0&1 - COS, Mexico City

#15469

31 Oct 63

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-12027	DATE 23 October 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-118406

ORIGINATING

SECRET/KAP

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PRQ Part I - (Alfonso Dibildox Torres) 1006

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith is PRQ Part I on Subject. Provisional Operational Approval is requested, along with 201 number. Subject's cryptonym, assigned 15 October 1963 by the Station, follows under separate cover.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att. h/w and u/s/c
2 - Files

15694

SECRET/

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-22488	13 November 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3/ SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DIRECTOR

M : MEXICO CITY

ION : WH 8

O : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, VR

S C R E T 171636Z

IORITY TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7416 17Dec63 in 82479

F DIR 88728

1. AT 16 DEC MTG SULUCK/1 SAID WIFE WROTE SHE ARRIVING MERIDA 23 C BY AIR AND WILL COME ON MEXI CITY SPEND XMAS WITH HIM. HE LIEVES SHE BRINGING CHILDREN AND WANTS GO MERIDA MEET HER.

. S/1 REQUESTED 150 DOLLARS IN VIEW WIFE'S VISIT AND TO PURCHASE NTA CLAUS FOR CHILDREN. ALSO MENTIONED XMAS BONUS BUT DID NOT ESS POINT.

3. REQUEST TEGU DECISION ON AMOUNT BE GIVEN S/1. ALL PAYMENTS RE WILL BE MADE IN PESOS.

4. S/1 ASSIGNED BY PARTY LEADERS HERE LIVE ALONE IN HOME OF LIODORINA GARCIA, PCM MEMBER, CALLE NO. 17, COLONIA MONTEZUMA. RCIA IS DIRECTOR OF NEARBY SCHOOL WHERE FIVE PCM MEMBERS TEMPORARIL ARTERED. S/1'S WIFE AND CHILDREN WILL LIVE WITH HIM AT ABOVE DRESS WHILE MEXI.

. NEXT OP MTG WITH S/1 SCHEDULED 20 DEC.

E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: DESIRED INFO ON PRESENT STATUS SULUCK 1 IN MEXICO AND OUTLOOK FOR NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No

14659

7/PV

17 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : C/SR 2 (SR NOTIFIED AND COPY ISSUED AT:1125, 20 DEC 63 OJ)
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D, CDC, VR

S E C R E T 201548Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7468 20DEC63 IN 84770

REDWOOD REDSKIN

REF DIR 90368*

WELCOME** HQS C/O. PLS PROVIDE IDEN AND ETA SO CAN MEET AIRPORT.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO CSSOP 210-5[illegible] CABLES.

**STAFFER IDENTIFIED SELF AS RICHAIDSON PHONED MANUILA WHO WAS AWAITING CALL AND WHO CONFIRMED CALL FROM MEXI.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14311

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 6

INFO: CI/CA, CCS 3, WH 7, VR

SECRET 202255Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7479

TYPIC CKASSAY LPSHRINK

REF: MEXI 7480 (IN 85185)
6

IDEN IS MR. GEORGE STEERS.

SECRET

20Dec63 IN 85191

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

TR

14722

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

22 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, DDDS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW, LE 4, WE 4, WH, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, AD/RR 3, VR.

TDCS

SECRET 210030Z DEC 21 0147Z 63 IN 85247

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7489

02

INTEL TYPIC [DE]SIGNET

REF DIR 70123

02 08 08

SUPDATA SOURCE [DE]SIGNET FROM [ITALINA] AND [FRENCH] AMBASSADORS TO CUBA, CUBAN MERCHANTS AND SUGAR EXPERTS

FILED 21/0035Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM-8185 SUBJECT EFFORTS OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO INITIATE COMMERCIAL BARTER WITH WEST EUROPEAN CONTRIES DOI DEC 63 PADA MEXICO MEXICO CITY 20 DEC 63 APR 3 SOURCE WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESSMAN WHO TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO CUBA WHERE HIS COMPANY MAINTAINS COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED
TO PORTION OF [illegible] HAS BEEN
MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING
RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

								TDCS PRECEDENCE
								ROUTINE
								PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14732 4/80

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

TO
FROM.
ACTION.
INFO.

COUNTRY

REPORT NO. TDCS

SUBJECT

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCES IN 85247

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS RESULTING FROM EXPROPRIATIONS MADE FROM CERTAIN WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESS INTERESTS. THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE IS TRYING TO INTEREST WEST GERMANY, ITALY AND FRANCE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES SO THAT A FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE WILL PREVAIL AT THE TIME OF THE COMPLETION OF THE SUGAR CROP HARVEST IN MARCH 1964, WHEN THE COMMODITY IS NORMALLY MARKETED. NEGOTIATIONS FOR REPARATIONS ARE TAKING FORM IN CUBAN OFFERS TO SELL TOBACCO AT DISCOUNT PRICES.

2. IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO OBTAIN

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	CO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

RELEASING

14732

FERTILIZER, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS IN EXCHANGE FOR SUGAR ON A STRAIGHT BARTER DEAL. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTS A BUMPER CROP IN 1964 WHICH, IF SOLD AT THE AVERAGE WORLD PRICE OF 8 CENT A POUND (US CURRENCY), SHOULD PRODUCE ABOUT 800 MILLION DOLLARS (US) IN CREDITS.

3. FIELD COMMENT. SOURCE SAID THAT EXAMINATION OF THE CROP CONFIRMS THAT IT IS ONE OF THE BEST CUBA HAS HAD IN YEARS.

4. FIELD DISSEM STATE ECON CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 3

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI 4, [illegible], C/FE 6, C/SAS 5, [illegible], C/SAS 5, VR

S E C R E T 210103Z 7492

21 DEC 63 IN 85274

INFO WAVE ROME CITE MEXI [illegible]

REF A. DIR 70123

B. DIR 69575 02

TYPIC KEYWAY PBRUMEN [DE] [illegible]

WHILE AWAITING RECEIPT [illegible] 02 [DE]SIGNET ALONG LINES

2. FOLL KEYED TO REF B:

PART A:

1. DAY BEFORE HURRICANE CYNTHIA HIT CUBA, BETWEEN 500 AND [illegible] SOVIET TECHS LEFT BY SHIP FROM SANTIAGO DE CUBA. ON 10 NOV APPROX 200 SOVS WERE SEEN WALKING STREETS HABANA WITH SUITCASES PRIOR DEBARCATION. (SOURCE 05 [REMIGIO [illegible]O] DOI: 9 DEC).

2. ALL SOVS APPEAR TO BE TECHS, ALTHO YOUNG. MOST OBSERVED BY 02 [DE]SIGNET HAD NO MILITARY BEARING, IN SLOPPY PHYSICAL SHAPE, [illegible] HIS ASSUMPTION THEY CIVILIANS. FRIEND 05 [ERIC BONSIGNEUR] 08 [[illegible]MAN] LIVES ON ROAD TO PINAR DEL RIO, TOLD 02 [D/A] "SIX MONTHS [illegible] THE SOVS DID NOT PERMIT ANYONE TO [illegible] THEIR CAMP NEAR EL [illegible] FOR THE LAST THREE MONTHS CUBAN OFFICIALS ENTER IN LARGE [illegible] AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SOVS HAS BEEN REDUCED BY TWO [illegible]". (SIC). [illegible] CAMP IN SOROA CLOSED DOWN ABOUT SIX MONTHS [illegible] IT THOUGHT THEY HAVE RETURNED. (SOURCE NENITA ROCA.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

CLASSIFIED [illegible]

[illegible]). ORIGINAL CONTINGENT OF [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] ARRIVING WITH FAMILIES. (SOURCE: [ANGEL [illegible]] 06

[illegible] NEVER SEEN IN UNIFORM, ALL WEAR SPORT SHIRTS OF VARIOUS [illegible], APPARENTLY CUBAN MADE. NO [illegible]RAS, OF COURSE, SINCE [illegible] SYMBOLIC OF PLAYBOYS. IN A CAFETERIA [illegible] 02 SAT NEXT TO TABLE [illegible] CHINESE, ONE IN PALE BLUE TUNIC AND OTHER THREE IN [illegible] SUITS. [illegible] 02 SAW AND HEARD [illegible] OF NO OTHER ASIATICS, [illegible]LLITE TYPES.

[illegible]. [illegible] 02 SAW ON 13 DEC TEN [illegible] [illegible]IZED AS SOVIET TYPE ON [illegible] FROM MATANZAS TO VERADERO. EACH SIDE THEY HAD 5 LARGE [illegible] AND ONE SMALLER WHEEL RAISED OFF GROUND. DOUBLE TURRETS, [illegible] LARGE CANNON. ON 15 DEC SIX [illegible] SEEN GOING SAME DIRECTION. [illegible] HE SAW 5 LARGE TRUCKS DRIVEN BY SOVS AND CARRYING FIVE [illegible]. LATER SAME DAY SAW TEN MORE. ALL GOING FROM RANCHO [illegible] AREA TOWARDS THE INTERIOR. IN ALL SAW [illegible] 250 DURING [illegible] VISIT. ALL SOVS IN 22-28 AGE GROUP.

4. SEE TWO, ABOVE.

5. FLOW OF SOVS IS CONSISTENT WITH NEEDS CASTRO GOVT. MANY [illegible] MANY MORE WILL COME AS NEED ARISES. TYPICAL ATTITUDE OF MAN [illegible] STREET IS "SOVS HERE TO STAY".

6. NO INFO SOVS IN CUBAN MILITIA UNIFORMS.

[illegible] NO GUARANTEE FROM [illegible] AGRESSION, ALSO CASTRO SENSITIVE TO CHARGE [illegible] SOVIET [illegible] PROVE [illegible] INDEPENDENT, CAN VOTE AGAINST USSR [illegible] NEEDS OF CUBA. [illegible] THIS [illegible] UNDERSTANDING REALITIES CUBAN

4/2

047735

LIFE: NO GOC OFFICIAL OPPOSES FOR FEAR OF OWN LIFE. IN ANY EVENT, OPPOSITION WOULD HAVE NO VALUE OR MEANING. COMMON QUOTE: "FIDEL HACE Y FIDEL DESHACE".

3. SEE ONE, ABOVE.

4. NOT KNOWN, BUT CUBAN POSITION IN DISPUTE VERY INDEPENDANT, UNAFFECTED.

PART C

1. MOST OF THE MILITIA PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO ARMY REGULARS PAST SIX MONTHS.

2. UNKNOWN

02

3. [D]W IMPRESSION IS THAT CUBAN ARMY NOW WELL TRAINED AND ORGANIZED.

4. ON TEN DEC. NEAR SOROA, ALL CARS HALTED ON ROAD WHILE CONTINGENT CUBAN TROOPS SURROUNDED A CANE FIELD AND SPRAYED IT WITH GUNFIRE, SEARCHED IT, BUT FOUND NO ONE. TROOPS WELL FED AND SUPPLIED. (SOURCE: 05 [BENITA ROCA], 9 DEC). SOROA APPROX 80 KMS FROM HABANA TOWARDS PINAR DEL RIO.

S E C R E T

02

C/S ~~COMMENT: *WAS HIGHLY INTERESTED [D] DESIRES RETURN CUBA AS OBSERVER SINGLETON.~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 6153
DATE : 21 NOV. 63

TO : MULTI - ADDRESSEE CABLE SEE BELOW
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF. SAS 6
INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE 4, WE 4, NE 4, FE 6, WH 7, VR, (POUCH FRAN 9, BONN 5, BRLN 5, MUNI 5, ATHE 6, ALL OTHER STA'S 3)

21 Nov 63 21 58z

☐ PRIORITY
☒ ROUTINE

INFO 15-20 15-13 15-8 15-21 CITE DIR 85387

MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE

PERUMEN (ZR)PRIMA 02

LOND PARI BRUS HAGU COPE STOC OSLO MADR
ROME

99

CABLE SEC: (PLS POUCH CABLE TO FOLLOWING:) (WRENCH POUCH) 99

FRAN FROB BONN HAMB BRLN MUNI VIEN ATHE
BERN GNVA CAIR BEIR TEHE TELA RIOD SAOP
MEXI MRID SAGO MONT BUEN CARA LAPA LIMA
QUIT GUAT SNTO MELB TOKY HONG WAVE BARC
HELS LISB MILA OTTA TRIE

99

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

8/PN

11/71

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : D. KONIS:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 21 NOV. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-47

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

22 Nov 63 17 33z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO : CERTAIN STATIONS AND BASES

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

TO MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE INFO CITE DIR 85087

02
PBRUMEN ZRPRIMA

REF: DIR 22218 *

1. RECENTLY CONCLUDED HQS REVIEW OF ZRPRIMA 02 1 PROGRAM SHOWS THAT KUBARK 2 EFFORTS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ANY SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND CONTINUATION OF PROGRAM AS SUCH NO LONGER WARRANTED. MAIN REASON FOR KUBARK 2 FAILURE IS THAT CUBAN TECHNICIAN RECRUITING PROGRAM HAS BEEN MISERABLE FAILURE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST FIDEL'S ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF 2000 TECHS FROM WESTERN EUROPE ALONE. THOUGH OUR FIGURES NOT COMPLETE, WE ESTIMATE PROBABLY LESS THAN FIFTY CANDIDATES HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL AND WE ABLE CONFIRM ABOUT TEN WHO HAVE ACTUALLY MADE IT TO THE ISLAND. KUBARK 2 SUCCEEDED IN INSERTING ABOUT THIRTY RECRUITED TECHS INTO THE VARIOUS HIRING CHANNELS, BUT SO FAR ONLY TWO HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL FROM HAVA.

2. CUBAN FAILURE TO RECRUIT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS APPEARS DUE LARGELY TO RELUCTANCE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS PURSUE TECH RECRUITING MISSION AGGRESSIVELY, BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE IN HAVANA, FEAR OF INFILTRATION OF HOSTILE AGENTS

CONT...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

2/RV

16318

14-00000

UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

AND PROBABLE LOSS OF INTEREST IN THE PROGRAM ON PART OF CASTRO HIMSELF. THESE FACTORS WHICH EMERGE FROM OUR STUDY OF THE CUBAN PERFORMANCE ACCOUNT FOR LACK OF RESPONSE FROM EMBASSIES TO APPLICATIONS, LONG DELAY IN GETTING WORD BACK FROM HAVANA AND SMALL NUMBER OF TECHS ULTIMATELY HIRED. LONG TIME LAG BETWEEN INITIAL APPLICATION AND ULTIMATE APPROVAL FROM HAVA, WHICH RUNS SIX TO NINE MONTHS, HAS COST CUBANS NUMBER OF TECHS WHO WERE INITIALLY EAGER BUT SUBSEQUENTLY LOST INTEREST OR TOOK OTHER JOBS.

3. IN FACE OF FOREGOING WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE TO CONTINUE INTENSIVE SEARCH FOR 02 / 1 ZRPRIMA CANDIDATES FOR INSERTION INTO CUBAN HIRING CHANNEL. WISH STRESS STATIONS WITH ACTIVE LEADS SHOULD STAY WITH THEM IN THE HOPE THEY MAY STILL BE HIRED, BUT CEASE EFFORTS TO GENERATE LEADS FROM SCRATCH. ON OTHER HAND, THERE ARE FAIR NUMBER NON BLOC TECHS IN CUBA AND IT LIKELY CUBANS WILL CONTINUE TO HIRE NEEDED TECHS ON LIMITED SELECTIVE BASIS AS THEY DID PRIOR TO 02 / 1 ZRPRIMA PROGRAM. STATIONS THEREFORE ARE URGED TO CONTINUE ON ALERT FOR SUCH OPPORTUNITIES AND TO EXPLOIT THEM IN SAME MANNER AS ALL OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO PLACE RESIDENT AGENTS IN CUBA.

RELEASING

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONT...

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

2/RV

16318

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 85387

IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT MOST PERUMEN 3 OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECRUITING TECHS TEND TO RELY HEAVILY ON LOCAL CP STAMP OF APPROVAL OR OTHER STRONG INDICATION THAT CANDIDATE IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. LACKING THIS THEY MAY EITHER IGNORE THE APPLICATION OR REJECT IT.

4. RESPONSE OF MOST STATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING ZRPRIMA 1 04 HAS BEEN MOST GRATIFYING. WE PROVIDED CUBANS WITH GOOD NUMBER HIGHLY QUALIFIED ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS WHICH THEY FOR REASONS CITED UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ACCEPT. KUBARK 2 HAS MADE A RESPECTABLE EFFORT TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY AND FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS IS MERELY REFLECTION CUBAN CONFUSION AND INEPTITUDE WITH RESULTANT FAILURE ACHIEVE THEIR OWN GOALS.

5. DISCONTINUE USE ZRPRIMA 1 02 SLUG AND FILE 200-120-47.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Cable pre-dates CS files. Copy may be seen in CIA reference file.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

16318

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

P A G E   F O U R

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO   INFO   CITE 85387

SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
WE/5 R C Locke
C/WE Thomas F. Thiele
C/EE
C/EE/
C/
C/FE

WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
C/WE

[illegible]

[illegible] FITZGERALD
C/SAS

S E C R E T

16318

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 23 Nov 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible]

INFO: [illegible], RI/AN DUMMY, C/WH 2, D/OS 2, /VR

☐ PRIORITY
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

KUDESK ZROCEAN

85974

RE DIR-

06, 08

IDEN A RUREK DUDIN 201-83827.

06 08

IDEN B ARLETTE FRANCOISE HEZARIFEND ALIAS CARTIER BORN 2 MARCH 36 PARIS FRANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

(Please cross-ref to attached outgoing)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZROCEAN CABLES.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

W. Wood
C/WH

C/WH/3

DC/CI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

16349

DM/2

SECRET

UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 30 SEPT 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
4
5
6

1 OCT 63 [illegible] 53z

TO : MEXICO-ROME WAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WE 2
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE CITE DIR

KAPOK KEYWAY PBRUMEN 72346

REF: ROME C534 (IN 28856)* (NOT SENT MEXI)

1. 07 DESIGHET (IDEN A), FORMER LONG TERM RESIDENT PBRUMEN, WILL RETURN PBRUMEN ON BUSINESS TRIP FOR IDEN B. LATTER IS FIRM HE REPRESENTED ALONG WITH OTHERS. PLANS DEPART ITALY 6 OCT TO VISIT FRIENDS SUISSE THEN PROCEEDING MADRID TO TAKE IBERIA FLIGHT DIRECT PBRUMEN 11 OCT HAS 11 ITAL SERVICE PASSPORT. WILL ATTEMPT EXIT PBRUMEN APPROX TWO WEEKS AFTER ARRIVAL FOR BRIEF TRIP MEXI FOR DEBRIEFING BRIEFING BY KUBARKER. HOPES RETURN PBRUMEN FOR TWO OR THREE MONTHS MORE.

2. REQ MEXI CABLE ROME CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PASSAGE 07 DESIGHET PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. HQS FORWARDING MEXI FULL DETAILS THIS OP.

END OF MESSAGE

* 07 DESIGHET will travel PBRUMEN; requests contact Mexico City for brief exit.

WE/5
SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
C/WE/3
C/WE/4

15344

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

03

ORIG : [STEPHEN I. MUNGER]/AVH
UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 30 SEPT 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO : MEXICO ROME WAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WE 2
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

6

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE CITE DIR

72347

KAPOK KEYWAY PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 72346

6
IDEN A [GIULIO MONDELLO], BORN 26 FEB 1917
10 8
IN [ITALY], [ITAL] CITIZEN, FORMERLY
8
AGENT IN CUBA FOR [FIAT] AND OWNER TV
TUBE FACTORY.
6
IDEN B [NEBIOLO] (LINOTYPE) FIRM, TURIN

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4/80

WE/5
SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
C/WH/3

15345

SIWH W Wood

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : W. ULLERY/bld
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 7646
DATE : 30 SEPT 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-733547
201-338838

SECRET

TO : JMWAVE MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/SAS 5
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, RI/AN DUMMY, C/WH 5, RF, VR

1 Oct 63

TO WAVE INFO MEXI CITE DIR 72383

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: WAVE 4369 (IN 20073)*

04 08
[JOSE LUIS (ZALA)] SUBJ PARA 4 REF, RESIDENCE [ULTIMAS NOVEDADES S.A.] [redacted] [illegible] 37-219 MEXI IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH [JOSE LUIS (ZALA)], 201-338838, SAME ADDRESS WHO CURRENTLY REGISTERED ANOTHER SERVICE. 201 FILE CONTAINS NO OTHER INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/COMMENT: *Ref is RYBAT.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SAS/EOB O. Kin
SAS/MOB
SAS/CI Austin Horn (in draft)
26
WH/3/MEXI [Whitten] (by phone)

031 5348

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

1-1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for J. K. KING
C/SAS/INTEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S/ML

03
[Manuel Aragon]
CA/35
5352
8 October 1963

SECRET

PARIS/LCPIPIT INFO MEXICO CITY

PALP [illegible]

02
DEDORIC [LICPIPIT]

REF DIR 74662

74043

IDENTITY

06 08
IDEN A [ALFONSO DIBILDOX] [PRESIDENT CEB]

END OF MESSAGE

C/CA ____________

WH/3/MEXI ____________

CABLE [illegible] PLEASE [illegible] ATTACHED CABLE.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

See Base for release

C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible] G. CABLE
C/CA/B5
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

15538

IN14

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

12-62

ORIG : D. RONIS : tw
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6172
DATE : 8 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-6-78

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

8 OCT 63 [illegible] 15z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, RF, VR

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 74184

TYPIC AMLONG

IDENTITY:A [ALFREDO 06 DAVINS]

[illegible] [[illegible] 06 RONIS]

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

C/WH/3 [26]

J. C. KING
C/WHD

[illegible] A. [illegible]
C/SAS/EOB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible]

15543

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DW/3

Q.1

ORIG: R. [illegible]/KH
UNIT: SAS/FE
EXT: 4556
DATE: 10 Oct 63

SECRET
201-
354405

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SAS 8
INFO: DDP, CI/OA, WH 7, RF, VR

11 OCT 63 5 07z

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 74976

TYPIC AMSOUR

1. LETTER TO AMSOUR-2 BEING POUCHED MEXI BY NON ACCOUNTABLE MANIFEST NO. 577054 FOR MAILING TO SR. (JUAN GOMEZ ~~BLANCO~~ 06) IN PERUMEN.

2. REQUEST MEXI MAIL O/A 1 NOVEMBER AND ADVISE HQS ACCORDINGLY.

END OF MESSAGE

for C/SAS/EOB
for WH/3 MEXI
C/WH/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

10-10

E. A. MAHEL
C/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

15871

4/pv

106/14 OCT 63/CS

03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T/RYBAT

ORIG: JA[illegible] [illegible] -[V. [illegible]
UNIT: SAS/[illegible]
EXT: 1[illegible] - [illegible]3
DATE: 11 OCT. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: BRUSSELS HAMBURG FRANKFURT HAGUE MADRID PARIS LONDON
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/SAS 5
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, RF, VR
ADDED: C/AF 3, C/WH 5, RF, VR

11 Oct 63 22 11z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO BRUS INFO HAMB FRAN HAGU MADR (ROUTINE) PARI LOND

DIR 75124

RYBAT KEYWAY PBRUMEN ZRWAGON

REF: BRUS 3460 (IN 38151)* (NOT SENT PARIS AND LOND)

1. HURRICANE FLORA DAMAGE TO CUBA WILL PROBABLY RESULT HEAVY CONCENTRATION FOOD AND MEDICINE IN MARITIME CARGOES TO CUBA, THUS ALTERING PERCENTAGES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ANY SABOTAGE OPS AGAINST CUBAN SHIPPING. WISH EFFECT MORATORIUM SABOTAGE OPS UNTIL THIS FACTOR DISAPPEARS AND USE INTERVAL TO MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES IN APPROACH.

2. FURTHER GUIDANCE FORTHCOMING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/Comments: * Plans for sabotaging Rio Cronso.

SAS/EXO [illegible] 03
TSD/CAB [Wally Jones] by phone
03
WE/2 [Jack Delaney] by phone
03
WE/5 [Vaughn Allman] in draft
03
WE/3 [Roger Pierce] By phone
WE/BC [illegible] 03 Young (Ph)
EE/G [West Parker] by phone

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

03
[Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS THIELE
C/WE/INT]

11-22

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWARD A. MARELIUS
C/SAS/[illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T/RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Onl
Do Not Reproduce

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

15828

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : BECKY FRANK
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5662
DATE : 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-736761

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

12 Oct 63 [illegible]

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/FE 6

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

TO INFO CITE DIR 75338

IMMEDIATE MEXI

~~[illegible]~~
KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF MEXI 6483 (IN 38148)*

1. LIANG SSU CHENG 2733 1835 2052, 201-736761 BORN 1901, TOKYO.

LANGUAGE ENGLISH. MEMBER CCP.

BACKGROUND:

1923 BA TSINGHUA UNIV

28 BA, MA UNIV PENN

28 MA HARVARD

28-31 PROF AT NATIONAL NORTHEASTERN UNIV, CHINA

RESEARCH (RESEARCH)
31-41 ~~[illegible]~~ FELLOW, INSTITUTE/ CHINESE ARCHITECURE.

32-33 PROF NATIONAL PEKING UNIV; PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING

RESEARCH
41-43 ~~[illegible]~~ FELLOW, ACADEMIA SINICA

46 PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING

47 HONORARY PHD YALE: VISITING PROF YALE

[illegible]-61 MEMBER OF TSINGHUA UNIV

53-61 HEAD OF DEPT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE, TSINGHUA; VICE PRESIDENT ARCHITECTURE SOCIETY

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

15912

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : BENCY FRANK
UNIT : FE/CIOB
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 October 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	17
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

56	ASSOC, INSTITUTE CIVIL AND ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEERING, ACADEMY OF SCIENCE CPR, PEKING
DEC 58	MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, THIRD CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHINA DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE
SEP 58	MEMBER NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHINA SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ASSOC
APR 59	DEPUTY SECOND NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS FROM PEKING; MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, THIRD NATIONAL COMMITTEE CPPCC
OCT 62	VICE CHAIRMAN CHINA ARCHITECTURAL SOCIETY
SEP 63	DEPUTY LEADER OF CPR DELEGATION TO SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ARCHITECTS, HAVANA

2. RE SELF CRITICISM FOLLOWING EXTRACTS FROM LIANG'S SPEECH TO THE NPC, JULY 13 1957 ENTITLED "WHY I LOVE OUR PARTY". DEPUTY LIANG, AFTER DESCRIBING "THE BRILLIANT INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUR NATION," TOLD OF HIS PAST ANXIETY AND PERPLEXITY IN HIS OWN WORK. HE SAID THAT AT THE TIME HE HAD USED OUT-DATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES TO TEACH THE YOUNG INSTRUCTORS AND STUDENTS OF THE TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY BECAUSE HE WAS BOTHERED

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : [redacted]
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

BY THE STATEMENT THAT EVERYTHING OF THE PARTY WAS GOOD. HE SAID THAT AFTER HE HAD WRITTEN ARTICLES, MADE REPORTS, AND DELIVERED LECTURES ON HIS ANTIQUATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES, HE SUDDENLY DISCOVERED THAT HE WAS A NATIONAL TARGET FOR REFUTATION. HE SAID "I WAS DOWNHEARTED. I HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE PARTY. I WAS SURE I WAS BEING SUBJECTED TO CRITICISM BECAUSE MY ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES DID NOT FIT INTO THE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. MY PAIN WAS AS DEEP AS THAT OF A CHILD BEING PUNISHED BY HIS MOTHER. WHY? BECAUSE I TRUSTED OUR PARTY AS MUCH AS I HAD TRUSTED MY MOTHER. THE PARTY, HOWEVER, WAS VERY PATIENT WITH ME. AFTER I HAD STRAIGHTENED OUT MY THOUGHTS, I ADMITTED MY MISTAKES." HE SAID: "I WAS A PRODIGAL SON. AFTER THIS EDUCATION, I WILL NEVER LEAVE OUR PARTY --- NOT EVEN A STEP AWAY FROM IT."

[redacted]

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : VICKY FRANK
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE FOUR

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

3. STPLATE 1 (IDEN) WHO STUDIED UNDER LIANG AT UNIV YALE OF OPINION THAT LIANG WOULD NOT ACCEPT RECRUITMENT IN PLACE BUT THERE IS CHANCE HE WOULD DEFECT IF OFFERED CHANCE LIVE OUTSIDE CHINA. HQS CONSIDERS LIANG AS CANDIDATE FOR DEBRIEFING OR DEFECTION. DOUBTFUL HIS AGE AND BACKGROUND THAT WOULD MAKE GOOD IN PLACE AGENT.

4. SENDING STPLATE 1 TO WORK UNDER STATION DIRECTION AS A POSSIBLE BRIDGE TO LIANG. STPLATE 1 LONG TIME KUBARK CONTACT BUT IS NOT TRAINED CASE OFFICER. HAS BEEN USED PRINCIPALLY IN RESEARCH WORK IN PAST. SANSEED ~~CAN~~ MAY BE FILL IN FURTHER BACKGROUND.

5. STPLATE 1 WILL USE TOURIST COVER AND WILL REMAIN ONLY TWO DAYS DUE HEAVY PERSONAL COMMITMENTS. HIS FUNCTION WILL BE TO USE PAST FRIENDSHIP TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CONTACT LIANG AND DETERMINE WHETHER LIANG INTERESTED DEFECTION. IF SO STATION SHOULD BE PREPARED SAFEHOUSE UNTIL FURTHER STEPS CAN BE TAKEN.

6. STPLATE 1 ARRIVING MEXI 12 OCTOBER 2145 HOURS VIA EASTERN AIR LINES FLITE 305. HAVE BRIEFED HIM WILL BE MET BY SANSEED. STPLATE 1

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

[illegible] KI FRANK
FE/CIOP
EXT 5661
12 OCTOBER 1963

INDEX
IN CS FILE NO

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE FIVE

INFO CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

WILL WEAR RED WHITE BLUE TIE. IF CONTACT MISSED STPLATE 1 TO PROCEED CITY AND CONTACT MARINE GUARD AT EMBASSY ASKING FOR SANSEED. AUTHORIZE STATION ADVANCE OPERATIONAL FUNDS AND PER DIEM AS NECESSARY TO STPLATE 1 SINCE NO OPPORTUNITY DO SO HERE. CHARGE LCHARVEST OOA.

END OF MESSAGE

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)
DC/PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)
CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)
DCFE(C) ✓
C/WH/3 J. Whitten (by phone)

RAFORD ... HERBERT
DC/WHD

William C...
CFE

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

[illegible]
FI/CIOP
6738
OCTOBER

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ RETURN TO ... FILE NO. 201-730711

1		4
2		5
3		6

TO: MEXICO CITY

CONF: C/FE 6

INFO: DDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR **75339**

IMMEDIATE MEXI

KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 75338

LIER:

Chairman, DEPARTMENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
RICHARD WALKER, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)

DC PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)

CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)

CFE(C)

C WH/3 [illegible] (by phone)

C/WH

William [illegible]
C, FI

SECRET

15913

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : FRANK/MICKUM:bjl
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5661
DATE : 16 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO. 10-120-11

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

16 OCT 63 22 2

TO : RIO DE JANEIRO, MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/FE 6

INFO : DDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, CDC, C/WH 5, RF, VR

DEFERRED SIG CEN
ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY RIOD INFO PRIORITY MEXI CITE DIR 76166

REF: MEXI 6550 (IN 40823)* (NOT SENT RIO)

LCHARVEST KAPOK

1. FOR RIO: SOME MEMBERS OF CHICOM DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ARCHITECTS (UIA) HELD HAVANA 29 SEPT - 3 OCT AFTERWARDS WENT MEXI TO ATTEND UIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ARCHITECTURE. MEXI GROUP NOW SCHEDULED LEAVE MEXI 0100 HOURS 19 OCT FOR RIO. FOLLOWING BIO DATA ON THREE MEMBERS OF GROUP KNOWN TO BE MEXI:

A. YANG TING-PAO 2799 1694 1405, 201-735346; B. 20 AUG 1901, HONAN; U.S. EDUCATED; MBR NPC; MBR ACADEMIA SINICA; VP, UIA.

B. LIANG SZU-CHENG 2733 1835 2052, 201-736781; B. 1901, TOKYO; U.S. EDUCATED; MBR CCP; DEPUTY NPC AND CPPCC; VICE CHAIRMAN CHINA ARCHITECTURAL SOCIETY.

C. WU CHING-HSIANG 0702 2529 4382, 201-736317; B. CIRCA 1919, MANCHURIA; FRENCH EDUCATED; CHAIRMAN ARCHITECTURE DEPT TUNG CHI UNIV, SHANGHAI.

2. DURING STAY GROUP MEXI UNILATERAL APPROACHES MADE TO YANG TING-PAO AND LIANG SZU-CHENG FOR PURPOSES OF ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE DEBRIEFING, DEFECTION OR RECRUITMENT IN PLACE. FOLLOWING CONTACTS WITH YANG BY FORMER PARTNER IN ARCHITECTURAL FIRM CHINA AND BY MBR U.S. FIRM YANG PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH, YANG ACCEPTED INTERVIEW WITH KUBARK STAFFER WHO USED COVER

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

16074

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 23

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 76166

RESEARCH SCHOLAR CHINA. CONVERSATION FRIENDLY AND INCLUDED DISCUSSION MAINLAND SITUATION. LIANG APPROACHED BY KUBARK CONTROLLED U.S. SINOLOGIST WHO WAS STUDENT LIANG AT YALE 1947. CONTACT WITH LIANG KNOWN TO OTHER CHICOMS IN DELEGATION, ALTHO LIANG LEFT ALONE WITH OUR MAN FOR HALF HOUR. LIANG ATTITUDE FRIENDLY BUT SEEMED TO FOLLOW PREARRANGED LINE AND LIANG PROFESSED COMPLETE BELIEF CHINESE COMMUNISM. LIANG CLAIMED CONTACT BETWEEN CHINESE AND AMERICAN "FRIENDS" CONSIDERED HIGHLY DESIRABLE BY CHINESE. CONTACTS WITH BOTH LIANG AND YANG LIMITED TO FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS SINCE OPERATIONAL DISCUSSION DID NOT SEEM APPROPRIATE IN EITHER CASE.

3. WU'S BROTHER, U.S, CITIZEN, ARRIVING MEXICO 16 OCTOBER TO TALK WITH WU AND ASK HIM IF WISHES REMAIN IN FREE WORLD.

4. REQUEST RIOD MONITOR ACTIVITIES GROUP BRAZIL AS FEASIBLE AND ATTEMPT DEVELOP FURTHER BIO AND ASSESSMENT DATA IF NATURAL ACCESS TO GROUP CAN BE FOUND. DO NOT RECOMMEND FORCED APPROACH TO ANY OF GROUP, SINCE OUR COVER FOR THIS ACTIVITY WEARING THIN AND THERE IS LONG RANGE GOAL OF FUTURE FOLLOW UP THESE CONTACTS WHEN APPROPRIATE ACCESS CAN BE ARRANGED.

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : FRANK/MICKUM:bjl
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR 76166

5. FOR MEX 3: PLS IDENTIFY OTHER MBRS OF MEXI GROUP ENROUTE RIOD AND FORWARD TO RIOD ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON PURPOSE TRIP TO RIOD. ALSO INFORM RIOD OF RESULTS WU MEETING WITH BROTHER.

END OF MESSAGE

A/DCFE(C) ✓
WH/3
WH/5

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WH
RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM E. COLBY
C/FE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

03
Polly Pike
WH/LOG
7282
16 October 1963

Mexico City

DIRECTOR

WH 8

OL 4, RF, VR

18 OCT 63 15 27z

SIG CEN

X ROUTINE

MEXI INFO 10 [MIDW] CITE DIR 76566

REF: MEXI 6547 (IN 40710)*

10
[MIDW] 3207 (NOT SENT MEXI)

10
[MIDW] ADVISES CARTRIDGES DELIVERED CORPUS CHRISTI 1 OCTOBER ONE BOX FIFTY POUNDS CARGO 64-M51104 MDIF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: *Requests Hdqs advise action taken on Reqn 559-5-64.

C/WH/3 26

Telecoord: OL/TD/CB, Mr. Daly

WILLIAM E. BROOKS
CHIEF, WH SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

03
Charles F. Reiner
CHARLES F. REINER
ACTING CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

16/02

-03

~~S E C R E T~~

ORIG : [R. HANSEN]
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6172
DATE : 18 OCT 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-77541

18 Oct 63 ... 22z

TO : MEXICO JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : [illegible]

INFO : [illegible], CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, WH 7, RF, VR

SIG CEN

X

TO MEXI INFO WAVE 76695

TYPIC

REF DIR 76694

05

IDEN IS [MICHEL CHIDIAC, LEBANESE] CHARGE IN HAVANA. SEE MEXI 5954 AND 6008 FOR RECENT TRAVEL.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

[redacted]

SAS/MOB Sue Darling (in draft)

WH/3/MEXI Reichhardt

[illegible]

C/[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

EDWARD A. MAREL
C/SAS/EOB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

#15408

03
L.G. NORRIS:jpm
WH/3/Mexico
5840
21 Oct 1963

~~S E C R E T~~

MEXICO CITY

21 Oct 63 [illegible] Z

SIG CEN

77180

PRIORITY MEXI

LILINK

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

REF DIR 77179

1. IDEN A: ASH & COMPANY, NEW 420 LEXINGTON AVE NEW YORK, N.Y.

29 08

2. IDEN B: OVERSEAS REALTY SURVEY ASSOCIATES SEATTLE WASHINGTON (KUVEST NOTIONAL)

29

END OF MESSAGE

J.C. [redacted]
[redacted]
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

26
J.M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

# 15494

03

[JANET NIXON]id
SAS/EOB
3152
22 OCT 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S E C R E T/RYB~~

200-120-50

TO: MADRID JMWAVE ROME CASABLANCA RABAT FRANKFURT HAMBURG BRUSSELS HAGUE LONDON MILAN OTTAWA PARIS MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/SAS 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/AF 3, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, C/WH 5, RF, VR

22 Oct 63 21 47z

SIG CEN

TO IMMEDIATE MADR INFO HAMB BRUS HAGU LOND CASB (ROUTINE) RABA OTTA PARI MEXI
WAVE ROME ~~XXXXXXXX~~
FRAN MILA

RYBAT ZRWAGON TECH

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

77347

1. FOLLOWING IS FBIS TICKER ITEM FROM CASTRO'S 21 OCTOBER SPEECH: "CASTRO REVEALS THAT HIS SECURITY FORCES HAVE JUST DISCOVERED AN ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE OF THE CUBAN MERCHANT SHIP LAS VILLAS. CASTRO CLAIMS THAT THE CIA PLACED A BOMB ABOARD THE VESSEL IN GENOA, ITALY, BUT THAT IT WAS DEFECTIVE AND FAILED TO GO OFF. THE BOMB WAS FOUND, HE SAYS, WHEN THE SHIP WAS BEING UNLOADED."

2. KUBARK ~~XXX~~ POLICY IS NO COMMENT AND COMPLETE DENIAL IF SPECIFICALLY ASKED.

03 END OF MESSAGE

Desmond FitzGerald
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

EE/G [West Parker] by phone
WE/2 Jack Delaney by phone
WE/4 [Steve 03 Bunger] by phone
WE/5 [Vaughn 03 Sherman] by phone
WE/BC [Joe 03 Lynch] by phone
SAS/EOB [Arthur 03 Maloney] by phone
[illegible] Austin Jones by phone
AF/1 [Mr. Charles Baker] by phone

WE/BC/C [R. Joyner] 03 by phone
WE/3 Mr. [Pierre] 03 phone
WE/3 Mr. [Murphy] 03 phone

Thomas P. Hedge
RICHARD P. HELMS
C/WE/X

Edward A. Welliu
EDWARD A. WELLIUS
C/SAS/EOB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T / RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

11

#15498

B. L. Reichhardt
ACWH/3
5512
30 Oct 63

~~SECRET~~

MEXICO CITY

30 OCT 19z

79355

MEXI

RYBAT

1. HDQS HAS INFO TO EFFECT [HILTON 24 HOTELS] INTERNATIONAL SEEKING QUALIFIED PERSON AS PERSONNEL DIRECTOR FOR MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA. ONE GOOD POSSIBILITY WE BE ABLE PLACE [illegible] THAT POSITION

2. REQUEST STATION COMMENTS RE UTILITY THIS COVER IN TERMS TARGET ACCESS AND QUALIFICATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SUITABLE OFFICER TO FILL COVER POSITION.

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CCG/SC - Mr. Strange (phone)

CWH/Pers - Mr. Cashman (phone)

R. HERBERT
[redacted]
DC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

B. E. REICHHARDT
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

#15826

MEXICO CITY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

81033

MEXI

RYBAT TYPIC AMQUAR MHAPRON

REFS: A. DIR 78270 *

B. DIR 78271

C/S COMMENT: *STATED AMQUAR-1 [illegible] FAMILY RESIDENT USA ISSUED [illegible] MEANS [illegible] TRANSFERRING THE FILES FROM [illegible] WHERE [illegible] ORIGINALLY APPLIED.

PLS PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMQUAR 1 AT REF ADDRESS AND PROVIDE HIM SECURE COMMO CHANNEL FOR ANY MESSAGE HE DESIRES SEND TO HIS HQS CONTACT MATTHEW H. ONTRICH KNOWN TO AMQUAR 1 AS "DAVID SALAS".

"1. BE ASSURED NOTHING WILL BE DONE IN REGARD CONTACTING DAVIDS UNTIL CLEARED WITH YOU. REQUEST YOU ALSO DO NOTHING UNTIL COORDINATED WITH US. BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR YOU TRY ARRANGE THREE TO SIX MONTHS LEAVE OF ABSENCE WHICH YOU CAN EXTEND IF NECESSARY.

4

2. HAVE ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH [LUIS CASAS CAMPA] WHO SAILING ON CUBAN SHIP. NEXT TIME 4 [LUIS] AVAILABLE FOR CONTACT IN PORT OUTSIDE CUBA DESIRE YOU BE PREPARED TRAVEL TO THAT LOCATION FOR PERSONAL CONTACT WITH HIM.

3. PERSON WHO DELIVERS THIS MESSAGE WILL ALSO PROVIDE A SECURE COMMO CHANNEL TO MR. DAVID."

END OF MESSAGE 3

C/WH/3 Reichhardt

WH/3/MEXI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

5-B

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[EDWARD A. HARELL]
C/SAS/EOB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

3/80

16114

R. S. SCOTT
WH/3/MEXICO
5940
6 NOVEMBER 1963

SECRET

TO : MEXO MERIDA MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS 5, VR

SIG CEN

TO MRID INFO MEXI CITE DIR 81481

KAPOK PERUMEN

REF: MRID 0312 (IN 53124)

1. ODCOIL MEXI SHOULD BE GIVEN LEAD ON MILTON LYNN, AVOIDING KUBARK INVOLVEMENT THIS CASE.

2. NO TRACES ERNESTO ABREU GOMEZ. AGREE HE IS TARGET FOR DEVELOPMENT FOR PERUMEN OPERATIONS. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ABREU GOMEZ ON LYNN CASE AND POSSIBLY LATER INTRODUCTION TO ODCOIL AGENT MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPING RAPPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref reported U.S. citizen LYNN told Merida police chief of drugs case. Chief suggested U.S. agent be inserted in net. Merida wishes develop Chief ABREU for PERUMEN ops.

SAS/EOB Roneis (In Draft)

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

Reichhardt
B. REICHHARDT
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

03

ORIG: L. [illegible]
UNIT: WH/3
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] NOV 196[illegible]

SECRET

TO: MEXICO CITY PANAMA CITY RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO MEXI FOR [illegible] INFO PACY RIOD (ROUTINE) CITE DIR 81525

(IMMEDIATE)

1. 02 ENGINEERING TOLD 06 BOIZELLE HE PROVIDING CR$ 5,000,000 TO 04 ARI CAMPISTA, 08 PRESIDENT GUANABARA CHEMICAL WORKERS FEDERATION THRU 16-20 RIO 02 TPHOODCAP OFFICE FOR USE IN DECEMBER 08 CNTI ELECTIONS. 04 CAMPISTA USING FUNDS GAIN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC SLATE, HOWEVER DEMOCRATIC GROUP NOT ABLE AGREE ON SLATE NOR WHO TO HEAD IT.

2. REQUEST OP DETAILS FROM 02 ENGINEERING AS RIOD DEVELOPING PARALLEL ELECTION OP AND ANXIOUS AVOID CONFLICT OR COMPETITION AMONG DEMOCRATS. BELIEVE 02 ENGINEERING OP NOT NECESSARILY COUNTERING RIOD PLAN BUT NEED CLARIFICATION.

3. FYI RIOD PREPARING PROVIDE FUNDS TO 06 HUGO GOMES DA COSTA, 08 OF ALCOHOL AND SUGAR WORKERS, WHO NAMED AS MEMBER OF 04 CAMPISTA'S DEMOCRATIC GROUP.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/4 Mr. 03 Onga (in draft)
WH/3/Mexico Reichhardt
WH/CA

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~S E C R E T~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

15/90

J. B. NOLAND
C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

15247

S. [illegible]
SAS/CI
4922
[illegible] 1964

S E C R E T

201-160161

MEXICO CITY

MAR 23 17 Z

☐ SIG CEN
☒

MEXI

PBRUMEN

CITE 81778

REFS: A. HMMA-22285*
B. DIR 69900**

1. RE PARA THREE B REF A [RAQUEL PEDROSA ^06 DE LEYVA] WHO NOW RESIDING MEXI AND FRIEND OF LI[TAMIL ^01 2] FAMILY, VERY PROBABLY WIFE OF [ENIO LEYVA ^06 FUENTES] WHO CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY LI[TAMILS ^01] AND IMPORTANT RECRUITMENT/DEFECTION TARGET. AMDIP 1 WHO FORMER CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER MENTIONED PARA ONE REF B, FORMER CLOSE FRIEND OF [LEYVA ^01] DESCRIBES HIM AS NON COMMUNIST AND PROBABLY WILLING COOPERATE WITH ANTI GOC ELEMENTS.

2. REQUEST MEXI EXPLORE POSSIBILITY UTILIZING [PEDROSA ^06] AS LEAD TO [LEYVA ^06]

3. HQS TRACES [PEDROSA ^06] NEGATIVE.

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SAS Comment: *LI[TAMIL-2 ^01] Report
**Re: KYBAT

AC/SAS/CI
SAS/EOB Mr. Bonie (in draft)
WH/3/Mexi

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
AC/SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~S E C R E T~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

15253

201-9

[illegible]
OC-AD
[illegible]
24 DECEMBER [illegible]

(SEE BELOW)

S E C R E T

PRIORITY

PRITY ASUN BOGO BRIL BUEN YOGU PACY
GORG GUAT GAYA LAPA LIMA
MANA MEXI MVID PRIN QUIT
RECI SAGO SALV SAOP SJOS
SDOM TEGU

CITE DIR 91024

OOLONG

BOOK MESSAGE AMCA NET

WITH CHIEF MISSION AND COS CONCURRENCE, ADDEES MAY OBSERVE SAME OFFICE HOURS AS COVER MISSION. SET SELCAL PLUS MONITOR YOGU CQ/QRA AT 2300Z. STATIONS WITHOUT SELCAL MONITOR 2300Z CQ. ALL STATIONS WITH RESIDENCE RECEIVERS MONITOR WITHIN CAPABILITY DURING CLOSURE PERIOD.

END OF MESSAGE

DC/CO

WED - W. Wheeler by phone

S E C R E T

#15729

Samuel Halpern
SAS/EOB
7856
24 Dec. 1963

SECRET

26 DEC 63 16 26z

TO: MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/SAS 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/WE 2, C/WH 5, (R) 6

TO MEXI INFO WAVE CITE DIR **91222**

RYBAT TYPIC

FYI: JOURNALIST NAMED FRANK PILGRIM REPRESENTING [redacted] OBSERVER AND [redacted] MANCHESTER GUARDIAN PLANNING ATTEND CUBAN ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS 1 JANUARY. PLANS LEAVE CUBA FIRST WEEK OF JAN PROBABLY CUBANA TO MEXICO. SMOTH HAS REQUESTED KUBARK NOT ATTEMPT CONTACT. KUBARK WILL RECEIVE DEBRIEFING RESULTS, IF ANY, FROM SMOTH.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
WH/3/MEXI C

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

#15734

[illegible]
WH/3/CAS
[illegible]
[illegible] Sep 1962

SECRET

ROME PRIORITY

15 Sep 62 22 45z

SIG CEN

INFO [illegible]

TO PRIORITY ROME MEXI, SALV CITE DIR **83692**

REF: SALV 4839 (IN 63096)

IF PCI DOES NOT GIVE 02 DEVISTA-1 CONTACTS IN SALV, STATION SHOULD PASS TO 02 DEVISTA-1 ONLY FIRST FOUR NAMES OF ABOVE REF.

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

WH/COMMENT: Suggested Communists as possible contacts 02 DEVISTA-1

C/WH/3 [illegible]
WE/Italy S. Hunger 03
WH/3/MEXI BeR
WH/3/CAN [illegible]

03 Thomas [illegible] Thiele
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

15772

DW5

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
7 DEC. 63

19-132-5

MEXICO CITY

DCI, ADCP, [illegible]

SIG CEN

MEXI

RYBAT TYPIC

86284

REF: DIR 86283

IDEN A: FERNANDO PALENZUELA VAQUET SON OF MATEO AND JOSEFA DPOB 9 NOV 1903 ARTEMISA, PINAR DEL RIO, CUBA, 5'7" BROWN EYES, GRAY HAIR, PASSPORT No. 45809, RESIDENT OF AVENIDA 35 No. 9809, MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN B: MARIA FRANCISCA CRESPO FALCON DAUGHTER OF ARTURO AND JOSEFINA DPOB 28 NOV 1914 GUIRA DE MELENA, HABANA, CUBA 5'0" BROWN EYES/HAIR PASSPORT No. 28149, RESIDENT OF AVENIDA 35 No. 9809 MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN C: HOWARD ANDERSON

SAS/SEC MKH for G.L.

WH/3/MEXI ✓

C/WH/3 ✓

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

15935

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: J. [illegible]
UNIT: SAS/[illegible]/PA/PROP
EXT: 6055
DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 18 32z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO: MEXICO CITY BOGOTA LIMA JMWAVE
GUATEMALA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, WH 7, VR

TO MEXI BOGO LIMA GUAT INFO WAVE CITE DIR

86694

REF: DIR 86693

IDEN: GRACE HOLMES, P.O.BOX 1767, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SAS/[illegible]/PROP
[illegible]
WH/3/[illegible]
CA/[illegible]

A. A. MALONEY
C/SAS/MOB

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

15951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : [illegible]

INDEX
NO INDEX
RETURN TO CS FILE NO.

TO : MEXICO CITY TOKYO

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : FE 6

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

[illegible] 22/32

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO TOKY CITE DIR 86803

[illegible]

REF DIR 86802

1. IDEN A MR. KENICHI WATANABE.

2. IDEN B MR. KENNETH K. SUZUKI, TRANS PACIFIC COMMERCE CONSULTANTS, SUITE 315, 450 SUTTER STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. TELEPHONE DOUGLAS 2-6534.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/3/MEXI

FE/JKO

WILLIAM E. COLBY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

15958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : Manuel Aragon
UNIT : CA/B5
EXT : 5852
DATE : 5 December 1963

SECRET

200-124-73/3

50 [illegible] 49Z

TO : PARIS/LCPIPIT INFO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA [illegible], [illegible] 2, [illegible] 2, [illegible]

TO PALP INFO MEXI 87038

DYDORIC HBEPITOME

REF: MONT 8437 (IN 72721) RELATED MEXI

1. FOR MEXI: HQS ANS TO REF SAID: A) AGREE MONT THAT CASTRISTA CONTROLLED FEUU UNACCEPTABLE AS HOST FOR COSEC EVENT B) INTENT OF OCT 11 COSEC LETTER WAS TO OPEN POSSIBILITY MOVING EVENT TO NEW BUT NOT YET DETERMINED SITE, C) COSEC LETTER WAS AUTHORIZED BY SEPT SUPERVISION COMMITTEE (SUP COM) MEETING WHICH BLAMED FEUU FOR FAILURE HOLD EVENT AND TOLD COSEC TO SEEK ANOTHER SITE.

2. FOR PALP: FOLL SUMMARIZES HQS UNDERSTANDING LATIN AMERICAN STUDY SEMINAR (LASS) TACTICS DISCUSSED WITH KORONELOS (IDEN A). FIRST STEP REGARDLESS WHETHER LASS ULTIMATELY HELD IS SEIZING INITIATIVE ON SITE IN ORDER HONOR SUP COM DECISION AND OFFSET POSSIBLE INVITATION FROM UNFRIENDLY SITE. THIS NOW ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN VIEW REF. CTM [illegible] MOST DESIRABLE HOST FROM [illegible] CONTROL AND FLEXIBILITY. IN THIS RESPECT KORONELOS AND AVILA (IDEN B) SHOULD CONTACT [illegible] BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE EUR. BRIEF HIM ON LASS STRATEGY AND GAIN HIS SUPPORT PERSUADE CTM OFFER INVITATION ACT AS HOST

3. ASSUMING MEXI INVITE LASS CAN BE HELD IF FOLL CONDITIONS SATISFIED:

A) PARTICIPATION MINIMUM 7 DEMOCRATIC UNIONS WITH CLEAR EVIDENCE ALL CASTROIST UNIONS WILL BOYCOTT SEMINAR

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

15963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 87036

B) ENOUGH COORDINATION WITH UFUCH TO AVOID THEIR ACTIVE HOSTILITY LASS AND COSEC AND PREVENT FORCING THEM INTO CLOSER ALLIANCE WITH EXTREMISTS ON OTHER WH ISSUES.

C) LIKELIHOOD THAT LASS CAN BE USEFUL FORUM EXPRESSION DEMOCRATIC VIEWS ON SOCIAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT GROUNDWORK NECESSARY FOR IBC TACTICS.

D) EVENT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH MEXI STATION OPERATIONS.

4. LASS SHOULD NOT BE HELD IF ALL OR ANY PARA 3 CONDITIONS FAIL PERTAIN AND ALSO IF:

A) EARLY EVIDENCE WELL ORGANIZED EXTREMIST COUNTERACTION (POSSIBILITY OF WHICH RAISED BY VEHEMENCE FEOU RESPONSE COSEC LETTER REPORTED IN REF.)

B) PALP HQS JUDGEMENT THAT TIME EFFORT NEEDED SUSTAIN HOLDING EVENT BECOMES COUNTERPRODUCTIVE DIVERSION RESOURCES FROM OTHER ELEMENTS KEEPITOME PROGRAM, DEVELOPMENT OF IBC TACTICS, OR HARMFUL KUBARK LAYC COUNTERACTION.

5. IF PARA 4 SITUATION UNFOLDS CNE COULD WITHDRAW INVITATION ON GROUNDS INADEQUATE PARTICIPATION (ASSUMING BOYCOTT) OR CONTINUE AS HOST BUT CITE SUNDRY TECHNICAL REASONS REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT LASS.

6. FOR PALP: PARA ONE BRIEFING CORDERO WHICH CONTINGENT PALP RECEIPT MEXI COMMENTS, SHOULD INCLUDE CANDID OUTLINE PARA 2-5 THINKING SO THAT CNE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

PAGE THREE

TO

F7836

AGREEMENT ISSUE INVITATION ACT AS HOST INCLUDE AWARENESS OF AND COMMITMENT TO ALL CONTINGENCIES. MOREOVER, CORDERO SHOULD BE ASSURED CONTINUING COSEC SUPPORT LITERACY SEMINAR AND DESIRE HOLDING THAT EVENT AT EARLIEST DATE CONVENIENT TO [illegible].

7. FOR MEXI: HQS BELIEVES IT UNLIKELY THAT PARA 3 CONDITIONS CAN BE MET ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE THAT THIS EVENT COULD BE USEFUL. HQS DISPATCH WILL INCLUDE BACKGROUND AND DETAILS LASS STRATEGY. SINCE CORDERO MAY LEAVE EUR SHORTLY REQUEST COMMENTS TO PALP ASAP.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CA Scott Holloway (

WH/3/MEX BER (in draft)

C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

EDWARD C. SABLE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG: Manuel Ara...
UNIT: CA/25
EXT: 5552
DATE: 5 December 1963

SECRET

200-124-73/3

TO: PARIS/LCPIPIT INFO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4

INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, WE 4, WH 7, VR

5 DEC 1849Z 63

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO PALP INFO MEXI CITE DIR 87037

DTDORIC HEEPITONE

REF: DIR 87036 *

IDENTITIES

A. DONALD EMMERSON - NORTH AMERICAN SECRETARY COSEC

B. RAUL AVILA - LATIN AMERICAN SECRETARY COSEC

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CA Scott Holloway (in draft)

WH/3/MEX [illegible] (in dr.)

*[illegible] PLEASE REFERENCE ATTACHED CABLE.

C/CA

Manuel Ara...

[redacted]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

15964

TO PRIORITY BOOK CABLE CITE DIR 88205

CARA MANA WAVE LODS
MEXI LIMA PACY GUAT
BUEN MONT BOGO QUIT
GAYA RIOD SAOP SAGO
LAPA SANJ SDOM

REFS: A. DIR 8?577
B. DIR 83638

1. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT EXCELLENT EXPLOITATION MOST AREAS HAVING BENEFICIAL EFFECT IN THAT HIGH INTEREST CREATED AMONG PEOPLE IS ENCOURAGING AND/OR CAUSING SOME GOVERNMENTS ADOPT STRON [illegible] PRO VENEZUELA POSITION IN OAS. VIEW THIS, SUGGEST ADDEE ACTIVITIES CONCENTRATE PRIMARILY (BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY) THIS ASPECT, I.E. EFFORTS DEMONSTRATE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THAT PUBLIC OPINION IS IN FAVOR VENEZUELAN POSITION OF TAKING FIRM STAND AGAINST CASTRO. EMPHASIZE THAT CURRENT ISSUE BEFORE OAS RAISED BY SISTER REPUBLIC, VICTIM OF SOVIET AND CHICOM SUPPORTED AGGRESSOR; IMPLICATION BEING THAT ODYOKE PLAYING NO MORE THAN SUPPORTING ROLE.

2. CONTINUE USE " NO COEXISTENCE WITH CASTRO" THEME. CONSIDER HAVING LABOR, STUDENT, OTHER ORGS SEND TELEGRAMS TO LOCAL GOVTS AND OAS IN SUPPORT VENEZ POSITION: FOLLOW [illegible] UP BY PUBLICIZING TELEGRAMS IN PRESS. VIA MEDIA SPECULATE WHAT STEPS LOCAL GOVT MIGHT FAVOR IN SUPPORT VENEZ, INCLUDING

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

16006

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 88285

A. BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA BY ALL LA COUNTRIES

B. CURTAILMENT ECONOMIC RELATIONS,

C. ALL POSSIBLE COMMUNICATIONS BREAK,

D. COOPERATIVE SURVEILLANCE OF OUTBOUND CUBAN CARRIERS.

3. WHERE THERE RELUCTANCE ATTACK CASTRO ON POLITICAL GROUNDS SUGGEST USE PEG THAT CASTRO'S EXPORTING OF REVOLUTION OVERTAKEN BY NEWER EXPORT COMMODITY, NAMELY CRIME. THIS EXEMPLIFIED BY ACTS OF ARSON, DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, MURDER, KIDNAPING, ETC., AND THAT CUBA TRAINING OF SO-CALLED REVOLUTIONARIES FROM THROUGHOUT HEMISPHERE NOTHING MORE THAN SCHOOL FOR CRIME.

4. FOR MONT GUAT BOGO SDOM: ADVISE WHAT ACTION TAKEN PER REFS

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/1
C/WH/2
C/WH/3
C/WH/5
C/WH/6
C/WH/7
C/CA/[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]SAS/CA

[illegible]

SECRET

MEXICO CITY

MEXI 9 0 0 1 2

RYBAT TYPIC AMROD

REF A. MEXI 7317 (IN 76917)
B: MEXI 7298 (IN 75880)
C HMMW 22410, Para 2

1. PER REF A IT LIKELY A MEET WILL BE HELD WITH CUBAN [illegible] IN NEXT WEEKS.

2. HENCE DESIRE LIFEAT COVERAGE ON IDEN B AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE SINCE HE BELIEVED LOCAL CASE OFFICER.

3. IF NECESSARY TO EFFECT COVERAGE ON IDEN, STATION MAY SUSPEND COVERAGE AMSESS/1 BUT PREFER MAINTAIN BOTH.

4. REQUEST STATION TRACES ONLY ON SUBJECTS REF B AND C. NO HEADQUARTERS RECORD ON EITHER.

5. PLEASE RENEW THE TWO POST BOXES SERVICED BY LIKAYAK/2 IN LOMAS AND MIGUEL SHULTZ.

6. PLEASE HAVE GERENDE OR SCANTLING TRANSLATE AND SEND FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO MANUEL VEGA Y SOCIO, FRANCISCO [illegible] 160, COLONIA CONDESA D F "RECEIVED YOUR KIND LETTER BUT NO MONEY. SALUDOS. JULIO RODRIGUEZ." RETURN ADDRESSEE TO BE JULIO RODRIGUEZ AT LOMAS BOX.

MARQUEZ

6

(cont.)

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

16033

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☒ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

TO [illegible]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible]

INFO: [illegible]

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 8

7. PLEASE HAVE THIS TELEGRAM SENT 14 OR 16 DEC, EVEN IF MONEY HAS BEEN RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/EOB

WH/3/MEXI

J. C. KING
C/WH

[illegible] FITZGERALD
C/SAS

S E C R E T

MESSAGE 12-48

IG : SCARPOVICH:mg
NIT : SR/CI/K
T : [illegible]
TE : [illegible] DECEMBER 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

O : BOOK CABLE (SEE BELOW)
ROM : DIRECTOR
ONF :
FO :

X

O ALL COS, &COB INFO CITE DIR

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

1. 20 DECEMBER IS FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF SOVIET STATE SECURITY ORGANIZATION. THIS "CHEKIST BIRTHDAY" IS TRADITIONALLY CELEBRATED BY KGB RESIDENCIES AROUND THE WORLD BY DISCREET GATHERING IN EMBASSY OR OTHER OFFICIAL INSTALLATION, OR IN HOME OF REZIDENT OR OTHER REZIDENTURA MEMBER.

2. ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS SOME STATIONS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE NEW IDENTIFICATIONS OR TO CONFIRM PREVIOUS TENTATIVE IDENTIFICATIONS ON BASIS OF ATTENDANCE THIS PARTY. SUGGEST ADDRESSEES MOUNT UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE AND/OR ALERT LIAISON SERVICES TO THIS DATE AS APPROPRIATE.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

6051

3

SECRET

ORIG: SKAMPOVICH: mg
UNIT: SR/CI/K
EXT: 6091
DATE: 16 DECEMBER 63

TO: SEE BELOW

[illegible] CI/INT [illegible]

89383

AF

ALGI
ORAN
UMBU
YAOU
ADDI
ACCR
CNRY
ABID
NOBI
MNRV
TPLI
WHEL
GAZI
TNAR
SABA
CASA
LABQ
LAGS
BRAZ
LEOP
ELIZ
STEY
BAKO
PRET
CAPT
DURB
LOME
DKAR
KIGA
[illegible]
MOGA
SLBY
KHAR
[illegible]
[illegible]
KAMP

EE

VIEN
SBUR
MECA
FRAN
BRLN
BONN
DORF
FROB
HAMB
HEID
MUNI
STUT
ATHE
KAVA
SLON
BERN
GNVA
ZURI

FE

MELB
CNBR
RNGO
PENH
HONG
TAMI
HULA
DJAK
SURA
TOKY
SEOU
KSAN
[illegible]
KUAL
WELL
OKIE
[illegible]
MANI
SING
BANG
SAIG
UDOR

NE

KABU
COLO
NEWD
BOMB
CALC
MDRS
TEHR
[redacted]
[redacted]
vd. [redacted]
BAGH
[redacted]
KUWA
BEIR
[redacted]
KANI
[redacted]
LAHO
RAWL
[redacted]
DAMA
ALPO
ANKA
ISTA
CAIR
ALEX
wh. [redacted]
TAIZ
wh [redacted]

WE

BRUS
OTTA
COPE
LOND
HELS
PARI
[redacted]
REYK
ROME
[redacted]
LUXE
HAGU
OSLO
[redacted]
STOC
[redacted]
COBA
LAPA
RIOD
BLEM
BELO
BRIL
CURI
LGRE
RECI
SALV
SAOP

WH

GORG
SAGO
BOGA
SJOS
SDOM
QUIT
GAYA
GUAT
PRIN
TEGU
KING
MEXI
MRID
MNTY
MANA
PACY
ASUN
LIMA
SJAN
SALV
PIBO
PRIN
MONT
CARA

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR

I certify that this cable must go to all stations and bases.

C/SR

C/SR/CI
SR/O/AF
SR/O/EE D.W. Schroeder
SR/O/FE
SR/O/WH
SR/O/WH
SR/O/NE

C/AF
C/EE
for C/FE
C/NE
C/WH
C/WE

C/SR/CI

C/SR ← (C/SR)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

104-10101-10227 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : WH/[illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : 17 DEC 63

TO : SEE BELOW
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : DDP, DDOS/L, DDOS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, SAS 8, VR

17 Dec 63 23 07z

PRIORITY
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY BOOK CABLE INFO CITE DIR 89778

CARA MANA WAVE [illegible]
MEXI LIMA PACY GUAT
MONT BOGO QUIT GAYA
RIOD [illegible] SAGO LAPA
SANJ SDOM BUEN

REF: DIR [illegible] *

FYI. ACTION INTENDED PARA 2 REF WAS UNATTRIBUTABLE SURFACING VIA MEDIA. DO NOT DESIRE AT THIS TIME ADDEES MAKE DIRECT OR INDIRECT OVERTURES TO LOCAL OFFICIALS OR GOVTS IN THIS CONNECTION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADDEES TO CONSIDER SURFACING ANY EVIDENCE CASTRO FINANCING TERRORIST AND PRO CUBAN ACTS, ETC.

K [illegible]
J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

[illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

16160

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Mary Parrish
7861
CA/PROP/G
19 Dec 63

INDEX

FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

SEE BELOW

DIRECTOR

19 DEC 63 15 28z

DEFERRED CEN
ROUTINE

CA/ 4, ... 2, AF 4, EE 4, WE 4,
NE 5, ... SR

CITE DIR 90168

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] LAGO ABLJ DKAR [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] KHAR MOGA PRET [illegible] LEOP [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] GAYA CARA [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] KBAL SIEG [illegible]

[redacted]

16172

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible]

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

INFO

CITE DIR 90168

1. REUTERS, UPI, AP REPORT FROM MOSCOW EIGHTEEN DECEMBER THAT APPROX FIVE HUNDRED AFRICAN STUDENTS GATHERED AT GHANA EMBASSY, FOUGHT THEIR WAY PAST POLICE BARRICADES AND MARCHED TO KREMLIN TO PROTEST ALLEGED KILLING GHANA STUDENT ASARO ADDEO. STUDENTS CARRIED PLACARDS "STOP KILLING AFRICANS", SKULL AND CROSSBONES LABELLED "RUSSIAN FRIENDSHIP", "FRIENDS TODAY, THE DEVIL TOMORROW" "MOSCOW IS SECOND ALABAMA". STUDENT DELEGATION PRESENTED MEMO TO MINISTRY HIGHER EDUCATION CHARGING "OUR FREEDOM BEING THREATENED HERE BECAUSE STUDENTS ARE BEING BEATEN IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF SOVIET UNION AND ONE WAS KILLED RECENTLY IN KALININ. WE WANT THE POLICE TO TAKE STRONGER ACTION". SOVIET OFFICIALS CLAIM ADDEO DIED OF EXPOSURE WHILE INTOXICATED. STUDENTS BELIEVE HE KILLED BY RUSSIAN BECAUSE HE WANTED MARRY RUSSIAN GIRL.

MP

2. USING WIRE SERVICE, FBIS SOURCES PLAY STUDENT ACTION ALONG LINES:

A. ~~[illegible]~~ INCIDENT IS EVIDENCE OF RACIST ATTITUDES DESPITE SOVIET PROPAGANDA ~~EFFORT~~ ~~[illegible]~~

MP

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

[redacted]

[illegible] COMMUNISM MEANS BROTHERHOOD ALL PEOPLES

B [illegible] DEATH PROBABLY ONLY SPARK SETTING OFF LONG SMOULDERING STUDENT RESENTMENT OF POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION, SEGREGATION, EXPLOITATION FOR PROP PURPOSES

C TIE INCIDENT TO RECENT CONGO EXPULSION OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS AS ANOTHER FACET SOVIET LONG RANGE PLAN TO DUPE, EVEN TAKEOVER, NAIVE AFRICAN STATES BY MEANS OF SUBVERSION, STUDENT INDOCTRINATION AND CONTROL, ECONOMIC AID WITH POLITICAL STRINGS

3. SEE BIWEEKLY GUIDANCE SEVEN HUNDRED NINETEEN FOR FURTHER ACTION AND BACKGROUND. WATCH STUDENT GROUPS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS, ARTICLES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS FOR REPLAY. INTERVIEW COMMUNIST TRAINED STUDENTS. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, EDUCATORS FOR REACTION.

4. SEND CLIPS HQS

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

03 15 28Z

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

ROUTINE

INFO :

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 90168

Coordinating Officers:

AF/CA Wayne Murphy (in draft)

WE/INT - - - - - - - - -

EE/OPS/CA- - -

NE/OP/PA Walter Harris (phone)

WH/PO/B William Kent (phone)

FE/PO/P John Ishii (phone)

SR/CA Jerry Seit (phone)

C/CA

SECRET

R.D. [illegible]
SAS/[illegible]
4215
19 Dec 63

SECRET
19-134-27/3

19 [illegible] 23 11z

☐ [illegible]
☒ ROUTINE

MEXICO CITY

MEXI

CITE DIR 90383

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

1. PLEASE ADVISE IF SAMBORA LEGEND COMPLETED AND ALL PERTINENT PAPERS POUCHED TO HQS.

2. SUBJECT HMMW 12212* DIRECTED TO APPLY FOR MEXI VISITORS VISA.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: Please add C/WH to distribution.

* Antonio de Jesus (Pineda) Cabrera
201-297754

J. C. KING
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

19-13

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible] FITZGERALD
C/SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

16180

Copy No.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] COMMUNICATIONS

[illegible] 50598

LOND DODO ASUN BOGO
BUEN CARA GUAT LIMA
MANA MONT PRIN QUIT
RIOD SAGO SJOS SDOM
TEGU MEXI LAPA SALV
PACY GAYA GORG RECI
WAVE KOLA OTTA

BRIL SAOP

RADNOTE

BOOK MESSAGE

1. MIRV NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AXAKEP AND AUTHORIZED HANDLE ODYOKE CLASSIFIED CLEAR TEXT. ROUTING INDICATOR RUQSWM ASSIGNED.

2. OTTA NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AXAKEP. ROUTING INDICATOR RUKIOW ASSIGNED. ONLY KUBARK TRAFFIC HANDLED BY OTTAWA.

END OF MESSAGE

OC-S -
OC-T -
COORDINATING OFFICERS

OC-AD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

OC-AD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

16191 Copy No.

SECRET

20 April 1977

SUBJECT: Identification of Sensitive Source

The sensitive source cited in paragraph 4, page 29, of Book V - Final Report of SSC to Study Governmental 24 Operations was an audio operation against the Cuban Embassy in Paris, France encrypted UNSIERRA. It is 10 defunct and the files are retained in Archives in Warrenton. The French Desk will order for us if needed.

A copy of the referenced communication, PARI 1664 (IN 69266) dated 27 November 1963, is attached. It was located in Volume 4 of Rolando CUBELA's official file, 201-252234. 06 UNSNAFU-12, cited in paragraph 3 of that cable, is Marta FRAYDE, 03 a Cuban alternate delegate to UNESCO and an unwitting FI source at that time. 29

Please note that a copy of this cable was provided to Mr. Breckinridge to carry to a meeting on 11 June 1976 with Senators Hart and Schweiker.

Chris Hopkins
Chris Hopkins
LAD/Task Force (JFK)

Attachment: a/s

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

6/90

12952

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

This is not a controlled item

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

913

[redacted] SECRET
SENSITIVE

Draft: new
30 Nov, 1962

OPERATIONAL PLAN - CUBA

I. SITUATION:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during FY-63 and for such longer period as may be directed.

B. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. National objectives with respect to Cuba are essentially as follows:

   a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.

   b. further Discredit the Castro/ Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.

   c. Maintain moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.

   d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.

   e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban leadership, or split

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE REFERENCE
IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. ______
—DO NOT DESTROY—

[redacted] SECRET
SENSITIVE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

on Cuban-Bloc relationships.

II. MISSION:

Covertly support the above-cited U. S. national objectives with respect to Cuba.

III. TASKS:

A. Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:
   - a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
   - b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
   - c. Soviet activities in Cuba.
   - d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
   - e. Military and militia order of battle.
   - f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.
   - g. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cuban relationships.
   - h. Economic

B. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and Latin-American country support for the containment or overthrow of Castro.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

C. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.
2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching Cuba.
3. Harass Free World Trade with Cuba.

D. Psychological:

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.
2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.
3. Develop and exploit tensions between Cuba and Soviet bloc members.

E. Resistance:

1. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnel an[redacted]s support for any significant internal

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
SENSITIVE

resistance group or uprising.

3. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military

against Cuba.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION:

To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be re

to develop the following programs:

A. Intelligence (~~FI~~)/ Counter-Intelligence

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. The following types of acti will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally establi Cubans in Cuba ~~[illegible]~~ Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secu communications will become more critical as poli state controls increase.

2 Spotting/recruiting/training Cubans in Government posts

~~2~~3. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.

~~3~~4. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant informati or who can provide significant operational support.

~~4~~5. Expansion of communications intelligence particula ly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

SECRET
SENSITIVE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[redacted] SEC
SENSIT

34 Maintain refugee

7. Maximize utilization

B. Psychological Warfar

The program must pri

reach the Cuban populati

warfare activities are

1. A propaganda bal

appropriate pol

balloon launchi

2. Continue and ex

operations infi

the open mails,

3. Continue propag

progessional, c

which have p

to their c t

C. Paramilitary:

The program will b

maintaining a minimum

event of a significant

implementation of . $

The following prog

1. Maintain the c

limited number

[redacted] S
SENS

amounts of equipment.

2. Maintain sufficient covert assets to meet requirements levied on CIA in approved U. S. Military contingency plans. Where internal assets are not available, assets may be held externally.

V. **SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:**

None

VI. **ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:**

A. Personnel

B. **Estimated Budget**

FY - 63
FY - 64

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[[redacted] SECRET - SENSITIVE]

DRAFT

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

[[redacted] SECRET - SENSITIVE]

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE [illegible]
IN CS [illegible]
PAPER NO. ______
—DO NOT DESTROY

B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakenod.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two" course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelligence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.

II. OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.
2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.
3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.
4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.
5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.
6. The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.
7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.
8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

B. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. **24 [Liaison] Operations:** We will continue to press the 24 [liaison services] who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The 24 [services] most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the 24 [British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean, and Israeli.] Direct approaches to several of these 24 [services] either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the 24 [services] underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other 24 [liaison services] with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the 24 [liaison] problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the 24 [liaison services] to make greater use of their 24 [national] assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the 24 [Vatican.]

5. **Maritime Operations:** In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through 24 [liaison services,] we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

13/M

particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6. __Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad__: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can gain access and concerning whom we have any reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through 24 [unilateral] operations and where appropriate in conjunction with 24 [liaison services.]

7. __Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad__: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in 24 [Chile, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, England, Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Canada.] No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and wherever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such installation worthwhile.

3/m

8. __Communications Intelligence:__ We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in 10 [Miami] at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban communications.

9. __Communist Party Operations:__ A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable/prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 23 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of 65 are bein individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.

11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further expldtation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

D. **Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations:** Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. **Economic Warfare:** It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. **Counterintelligence:** The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. **Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare:** In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementationof related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendation will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM

01

SUBJECT: Tadeusz (Tad) Witold SZULC (AMCAPE-1) (201-50539)

1. SZULC was born on 25 July 1926 in Warsaw, Poland. He arrived in Brazil from Lisbon on 3 August 1940, and came to the U.S. in October 1947 under sponsorship of U.S. Ambassador John C. WILEY, the husband of his mother's sister. He became a correspondent for the New York Times (NYT) in 1953, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special Congressional bill.

2. SZULC has been under suspicion as a hostile foreign agent since 1948 when the FBI reported (apparently from a \\ British source) that he was a Communist. He brought himself to the attention of CIA in August 1959 in Santiago, Chile by claiming (falsely) to be "cleared" and requesting contact with an Agency representative. This was the first of many such incidents in Latin America, and resulted in a warning to all Latin American Stations to beware of SZULC and his efforts to interview Agency personnel. It also resulted in continuing watch of his movements and activities because they represented a threat to the cover of Agency personnel. By 1960 his reputation was so widespread that several different CIA officers called for an investigation that would clear up "once and for all" his suspected connections with a hostile intelligence service. He was in frequent contact with Communist Party leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America, constantly sought out and elicited information from U.S. Embassy officers,

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

frequently mentioning the name of other CIA officers with whom he was acquainted.

3. Although the suspicions have increased, and SZULC's anti-Agency activities have become much more serious and blatant in the 1970's, it has not been possible to clear up any of the suspicions about his motives or his possible connections with a foreign intelligence service. There have been numerous reviews of his files and the interest in his activities has extended from the case officer level to the DCI. In fact, it is not possible to come to any clear conclusion about this man, and the notes below are simply illustrative of the kinds of things that keep the suspicions alive. It is important to note that SZULC's activities can be explained by the combination of his personality, ambition, and the demands on an investigative reporter for the NYT. He is an aggressive, insensitive, and persistent journalist with the family connections (Ambassador Wiley) and ability to develop the kinds of contacts appropriate to a successful correspondent for a paper like the NYT.

4. Nevertheless, there are elements throughout his entire career that are almost designed to arouse suspicion. For example, a [British] source in Rio de Janeiro (see Attachment A) reported that SZULC was "directed" by the Polish regime in Warsaw to seek employment in U.S. journalistic circles. This report runs like a thread throughout his file and is repeated and garbled in several versions over the years. The report

has never been adequately explained and was apparently never reported in full to 15-1 London by the 11 British representative in Rio. This report and other questions that arose early in his career (his contacts with a cousin who was a Press Attache in the Polish Embassy in Rio) were, however, just the earliest elements that aroused suspicion.

5. Because he became so well-known to so many Agency officers, his name and reputation have become subject of discussion on many occasions. One senior operations officer stated in 1975 that a Soviet agent could not be more beneficial to the Soviets and the Communist cause than SZULC has been. Although he presented a generally anti-Communist view prior to quitting the NYT in 1972, it is noteworthy that he arranged extensive, favorable TV coverage of the Communist-dominated Ligas Campesinas in Northeast Brazil and that one of the most important anti-Castro operations, AMTRUNK, in which he was involved from the beginning, was disastrous for all participants. More indicative of his true beliefs, however, are the articles he has written since Watergate. They have become increasingly critical of the CIA and of the USG generally and have damaged U.S. image and prestige.

6. The notes below are somewhat random examples of elements in SZULC's file that bring him under suspicion. As mentioned above, they in no way point to a firm conclusion. For further information on SZULC during the period 1963 - 1964, see the CI review prepared at Miami Station on Jorge VOLSKY in 1964.

a. The 1948 FBI report that SZULC was involved in supplying the Polish Legation in Rio with information from his personal contacts and from Ambassador John C. Wiley has been repeated in various versions throughout SZULC's file. The FBI has found similar allegations made by other sources who knew SZULC at that time. In addition, several sources have mentioned SZULC's relations with his cousin, Ignacy SACHS, who was the Press Attache in the Polish Embassy in 1947 and 1948, although there is no indication that SACHS had intelligence connections.

b. SZULC's marriage to the daughter of the American manager of the English language newspaper in Rio de Janeiro, the Herald, lasted only until SZULC had permanent residence in the U.S. and appears to have been carried through for that purpose.

c. By 1949 (SZULC was only 23) he had come to the attention of the 16-20 [Rio Station] because of his dealings with the Polish Legation and because investigation revealed his father had some (apparently innocent) business dealings with Russians visiting Brazil from Mexico.

d. In 1954, about a year after he was hired by the NYT, SZULC obtained a sensational story, by telephone, from a Communist leader in Guatemala. This launched his career with the NYT.

e. In 1956 SZULC was investigating Brazilian nuclear policy for the NYT. Although a legitimate topic, it was somewhat unusual for him and the timing seems unusual for NYT interest.

VBR

f. In 1959, on a trip to Santiago, Chile, SZULC claimed to be "cleared" and requested an interview with an Agency representative. This was the first of numerous such requests. In addition, it was in about 1959 that he also began making a point of telling Agency personnel the names of other Agency officers he had identified.

g. An article SZULC wrote on Cuba for the NYT in December 1959 was hailed as an antidote to the excessively favorable reports of his colleague, Herbert MATTHEWS, but in fact his article was largely favorable to Fidel CASTRO and to CASTRO's plans for Cuba. It is only in comparison with MATTHEWS blatantly pro-CASTRO articles that SZULC's piece/can be considered balanced.

h. By September 1960, SZULC was in the forefront of those advocating action against CASTRO. (It was he who finally brought the Leonardo Plan to Washington in 1963. See AMTRUNK Operational paper).

i. In April 1961, shortly after John F. KENNEDY was innaugurated, SZULC was transferred to Washington by the NYT. Although a reasonable transfer, it is noteworthy that in a very short time SZULC claimed that he had a standing invitation to go directly to the President, the Vice President, the Attorney General, McGeorge BUNDY and Robert HURWITCH on Cuban matters.

j. SZULC persistently sought a continuing contact with an Agency representative in Washington shortly after he arrived until it was granted in December 1962. The first contact was with Albert C. DAVIES (Lt. Col. on military detail to CIA - Cuba), and was arranged at the behest of Colonel GROGAN, the Assistant to the Director, on SZULC's request.

k. In early 1963, at President KENNEDY's urging, contact with SZULC was made into a formal relationship and was continued until October 1964. The meetings were used by SZULC to cross check his information from other sources, including various Cuban exiles and the Department of State. He became, by virtue of his contacts with the exile community and throughout Washington, one of the most knowledgeable people in the area of Cuban affairs, anti-CASTRO activities, and U.S. Government policy. (See CI study on Jorge VOLSKY for more information on this period.)

l. The Agency officer, Alfonso RODRIGUEZ, who maintained official contact with SZULC in 1963 and 1964 said in July 1964:

> "The special friendship and mutual admiration society that has existed between Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY, and Manuel RAY and the JURE is not something that is transparent or easily explained. This alliance may be something unholy and Machiavellian; I just do not know, but I can find no evidence to prove it."

m. Another officer, Seymour Young, wrote in 1965:

"After reading and re-reading this man's various files, I began to feel that this man in his position would be an ideal 'agent of influence'. It was noted that he is always in a crisis area and usually in advance of the crisis and writes articles which are more concerned with the Communist successes."

n. In about August 1965, SZULC was sent to Madrid as the NYT representative for Spain and Portugal. He stayed overseas until December 1968. He was present in Prague during the Soviet invasion of August 1968 and in December he was expelled, apparently for being too inquisitive. However, the West German Service has remained suspicious of the circumstances of SZULC's expulsion and the details have never been clarified. (It is interesting that SZULC wrote articles reflecting the official CZECH line concerning the defection of General Jan SEJNA who was in the Czech Intelligence service.)

o. SZULC was reported by an FBI source to have gone horseback riding with Boris V. YAROCHEVSKIY, a suspect KGB officer, in Washington in June or July 1971. SZULC's file reflects no regular contact with Bloc diplomats.

p. In 1972 and 1973 SZULC covered Watergate extensively and demonstrated an extreme bias against the CIA. By July 1972, SZULC's inquiries of the Department of State and his articles had taken on a distinctly anti-US Government tone. His coverage of guerrilla and terrorist groups

1/8R

was less sure than in earlier days and was frequently sensationalist and full of inaccuracies. (See, especially, article in NYT for 14 July 1972 on a terrorist Headquarters in Zurich and other wild statements.)

q. Since 1974 SZULC's articles have been highly critical of the Agency and he has used the background information he gathered in the 1960's to attack the Agency and to criticize its operations.

r. In May 1975 SZULC accused the Agency of rifling the files of U.S. Senators. This was only one of many irresponsible and false articles he wrote trying to discredit the Agency. One of the more spectacular efforts was a series in Esquire magazine, in which, among other things, he charged that the U.S. intelligence community had a hidden budget of $25 billion dollars and a network of 200,000 spies.

s. In, Inside the Company: A CIA Diary, Philip AGEE credits SZULC's daughter, Nicole, for having "obtained vital research materials in New York and Washington, D.C." There is reason to believe, particularly in view of the extreme views Tad SZULC has manifested in the past two years, that he may have aided his daughter in her "research."

SUMMATION

The case against Tad SZULC as a foreign agent is weak. However, his most recent activities are entirely consonant with the view that he has already served the Soviets well and can end his career as an overt propagandist taking advantage of the current furor over the CIA to do the greatest possible damage. The current paralysis of all anti-Communist action by the Agency attests to the effectiveness of AGEE, SZULC, the Soviets, et al.

NOTE: (See attachment B from a highly sensitive source. Any use of the SECRET/SENSITIVE attachment requires C/CI approval.) The source reported that Nicole, while working with the DGI in Cuba to expose the Agency, said that except for her father, her whole family were "fascists." She said that her father quit the NYT because of the restrictive editorial policy and he wished to write according to his beliefs.

03

LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/Marty Miller:rp
2 Attachments, a/s
Copy filed: 201-50539

1/82

SECRET

14 January 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez (AMLEO-3) (201-249386)

1. Born 7 April 1922 in Havana, Cuba, the son of a native-born American citizen, RABEL was brought up in comfortable circumstances. He attended high school in Cuba, completed the last year in New Orleans, Louisiana, and entered Tulane University in September 1938. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in December 1940 and eventually saw combat in France, Belgium, Germany and Austria. After discharge in December 1945, RABEL returned to Cuba to attend the University of Havana and this began a life of job changes, moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba, and, in general, rootless living.

2. RABEL's background reads like that of a man with no allegiances or loyalties and no particular goals. Viewed in retrospect, his career presents a picture of unreliability. It is probable that RABEL's rootlessness and apparent unreliability applied both to his relations with CASTRO and to those with the Agency. It is quite possible, therefore, that he not only served the Agency in a superficial way but that he did the same for CASTRO at various times when it suited his purposes. Without postulating this sort of dual role (one which fits very well with his previous life) it is almost impossible to explain some of the reasonably good things he did for the Agency and the quite certain allegations that he was a CASTRO agent. This explanation is not fully satisfactory, but it does explain his career better than the charge

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

#12923

that he was a CASTRO agent from the beginning. The question that must remain unanswered is whether he betrayed the AMTRUNK Operation. He was not arrested until September 1965 (when AMTRUNK had already run its course) but it appears quite certain that he cooperated with the DSE after his arrest and while he was in prison.

3. RABEL joined in the clandestine activities against BATISTA in March 1952, first ~~amongst~~ among the exiles in the U.S. and then after late 1952 from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban armed forces to further his plotting and was assigned to the Cuban General Staff. He was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mission in Cuba from November 1954 until April 1956. During his entire period in the Cuban army, RABEL was involved with dissident Army elements; when they attempted a coup in April 1956, RABEL was arrested. He was released shortly thereafter, worked in the chicken business for a year and then returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers (Luis RABEL Nunez). In October 1957 he returned to Cuba and became involved with the 26th of July Movement but had to leave a year later when he was brought to the attention of the BATISTA forces because of a bomb explosion. He smuggled weapons to Camilo Cienfuegos for about a year and then in October 1958 he joined the Cienfuegos group. Shortly after the CASTRO victory, CASTRO called upon RABEL to set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until February 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief of Viviendas Campesinas.

He held this job until he defected to the U.S. in December 1962. It is worth noting that he rarely pursued one activity in one place for more than a year at a time from 1945 to 1962.

4. RABEL gave Alfonso RODRIGUEZ the following reasons for his defection:

a. Communist pressure, hounding, and the basic enmity of the Communist Party toward him. (This appears very reasonable in view of his service in the U.S. Army and training in some aspects of intelligence, such as prisoner interrogation. In addition, his schooling in the U.S. and the reasonable economic circumstances would not have been recommendations from the Communist point of view.)

b. Strong backing by Fidel which protected him from more serious attacks from the Party. (This, too, seems entirely reasonable. His family farm was near the farm Fidel's father managed and RABEL and Fidel had known each other as children. In addition, RABEL's long involvement in the anti-BATISTA movement and with Camilo Cienfuegos were probably in his favor in CASTRO's view.)

c. An obligation to protect the non-Communists in his department, which prevented his earlier defection, and uncertainty of his reception in the U.S. (In view of the number of defections from RABEL's department, there were, in fact, people to protect. Since RABEL had served in the U.S. Army, and probably felt the U.S. was his second country, he could well have had questions about his reception after serving in the CASTRO government.)

d. His resentment against the confining nature of a Communist State. (Since he never stayed in one place more than a short time in his entire life, to have been restricted to Cuba must have seemed a punishment.)

04

5. RABEL was used to pitch [Dr. Marta FRAYDE Barraue] in 08 [Paris] in 08 [July] 1963, and to check out leads for the AMTRUNK Operation. One of his leads led to the recruitment of AMTRUNK-10. Later, in early 1964, RABEL was leader of the Rebel Army Group supported by the American Legion in Miami and was involved in the Rebel Army Radio program.

6. There is no specific evidence (except the accusations below) that RABEL was involved in a suspicious way with the CASTRO regime during this period, but his desire to exfiltrate his wife and children was a constant source of difficulty between him and the Station. This problem led to his eventual termination in July 1964 and to a great deal of resentment on his part. He conspired constantly, from mid-1963 until his capture in Cuba in September 1965, to get into Cuba to exfiltrate his wife and children.

7. RABEL was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was set free in July or August 1967, which is a strong indication that the charges that he worked for the DSE while in prison were true. Moreover, there is some indication that he may have attempted a provocation at Cuban behest immediately after his capture. There are two firm accusations that RABEL was a

3/ML

Cuban agent as early as July 1963 (which would have been when he was screening names for the AMTRUNK Operation), one from 01 LITAMIL-9, and the other from Fernando REY reported by 02 VASLOUCH-1. As mentioned above, these charges could well be true; yet RABEL could have fulfilled his duties for CASTRO superficially, for his own purposes, and not necessarily have compromised his work with the Agency until he was captured. The difficulties he had in exfiltrating his wife could have been, partially, punishment by CASTRO for not fulfilling his duties as an agent; otherwise, had his work in the U.S. been valuable, CASTRO could have facilitated the exfiltration of RABEL's wife so that RABEL could continue his work as an agent undisturbed.

LAD/JFK Task Force 1977/03 Marty Miller:rp
Copy filed: 201-249386

Attachments: 4

A- 10 Feb 1964 Memo for the Record
B- 6 Mar 1963 dispatch UFGA-7998 with Att.
C- 20 Feb 1963 cable WAVE 4730 (IN 71127)
D- 30 Sep 1963 dispatch UFGA-11375

3/M

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Nestor Antonio MORENO Lopez (AMICE-27) (201-312091)

1. MORENO was born on 25 August 1921 in Havana, Cuba. His father was a Cuban Senator (1940-44) and the Cuban Minister of Public Works (1944). MORENO became a lawyer and continued to live in comfortable circumstances. He became involved in the anti-BATISTA movement, apparently in the late 1950's, and ultimately in the 26th of July Movement. After the revolution, one of his clients was Camilo CIENFUEGOS. In Miami after defection, he was associated with the JURE.

2. MORENO's specific activities in the anti-BATISTA movement were not reported and apparently were unexceptional. A point worth noting about his activities before defection is his acquaintance with Tad SZULC, at least by 1959, and with Jorge VOLSKY. MORENO's background as a lawyer did not prepare him for active revolutionary involvement. When he defected in April 1961, therefore, he associated with anti-CASTRO exiles, particularly VOLSKY, but did not become actively involved. He was assessed in 1963 as being unfriendly to CIA.

3. About February 1963 MORENO and Enrique CAYADO Ribera reportedly collaborated in the formulation of an operational plan to overthrow the Castro government. They discussed it with Jorge VOLSKY, who then passed it to Tad SZULC. VOLSKY and SZULC apparently conspired to have the plan presented to the "political authorities" (Robert HURWITCH and the KENNEDY Administration) in Washington in order to by-pass the dis-

SECRET

00993

trusted "operational authorities" (the CIA). (VOLSKY originally took full credit for the plan, called "Leonardo Plan," which eventually became known as the AMTRUNK Operation.)

4. The Leonardo Plan was well thought-out and caught the fancy of the KENNEDY Administration. HURWITCH bought it to the CIA with the blessings of the Department of State. Thus, from the very beginning, SZULC, VOLSKY, and MORENO, each of whom had outside interests to some degree in conflict with AMTRUNK, were involved in AMTRUNK policy and planning meetings. Moreover, all three were to some degree antipathetic to the Agency for various reasons and were difficult or impossible to control.

5. MORENO's indiscretions were a serious problem that limited his effectiveness as a direct participant in the AMTRUNK Operation by arousing the concern of other participants. While the Station attempted to cut out VOLSKY and SZULC after the initial policy discussions in Washington, VOLSKY always remained involved to some degree and kept SZULC fully informed. Under the circumstances, the censure of MORENO for talking to SZULC was just an attempt to plug one of many leaks. The fact is that MORENO, SZULC, and VOLSKY believed they had an inside track in Washington because of their contacts there and all three disliked following Agency instructions that conflicted with their own diverse interests. However, because JMWAVE Station and AMICE-14 (Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue) objected to MORENO's continued involvement in the AMTRUNK Operation after learning of his free talk with SZULC and others, the Station

terminated MORENO's involvement in the sensitive aspects of AMTRUNK in November 1963.

6. Since MORENO was one of the original authors of AMTRUNK and already disliked the Agency, one can imagine his feelings at that juncture. He sulked, refused at first to take a position on the Rebel Army Radio Program, and caused problems in general. By January 1964 MORENO was actually interferring in the AMTRUNK Operation (by giving demoralizing, conflicting information to AMTRUNK-9, for example) and attempting to debrief returnees on behalf of VOLSKY and SZULC. MORENO was fired, therefore, by RABEL on Station instructions, from the Rebel Army Radio Program in February 1964 and terminated by the Station as of 5 March.

7. Shortly after his termination, MORENO, using VOLSKY as an intermediary, approached Mr. G. Harvey SUMM with a proposal similar to the Leonardo Plan. The COS met with SUMM on 1 April 1964 and advised him how to put off MORENO.

8. In August or September 1964, MORENO left Miami and took a position as a Spanish-language professor in South Carolina.

CONCLUSION:

MORENO apparently was a sincere anti-CASTRO revolutionary, but his dislike for and distrust of the Agency, which was undoubtedly stimulated by SZULC and VOLKSY, made his involvement in AMTRUNK a liability to the security of the operation. It appears that MORENO, like many Cubans of the upper middle class, had little sense of security. It is obvious that he trusted SZULC and VOLSKY far beyond what normal prudence would dictate. He probably was not a CASTRO agent, but he did help leak operational details and general plans to people who helped to spread the information more widely and who, themselves, were not trustworthy.

03

LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/Marty Miller:rp

Copy filed: 201-312091

Att. A - To

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HBRA 9438

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-050539

TO: Chief, WHD
INFO: Chief, EE

FROM: Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

DATE: 20 June 1962

SUBJECT: ~~BEDOX/Operational~~
SMEDIFY Information Concerning
Tad SZULC (201-050539)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☑ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE(S)

1. Attached is a SMEDIFY report concerning Tadeusz SZULC which includes SMEDIFY's traces on SZULC.

2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy SACHS, who is mentioned in the attachment.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 4 May 1961 (ultimate source: Henryk HRANKROWSKI, former member of the Polish Commercial Mission, in Brazil)

> Ignacy SACHS, upon his return from India, will not work in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but will be reassigned to the Latin American section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade. He recently wrote a report on Latin America based upon material contained in the South and Central American press. He reportedly had a falling out with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence the transfer.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 30 May 1961 (ultimate source: Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ, Polish diplomat)

> Ignacy SACHS, after a period of disgrace, has a new job, economic assistant for underdeveloped countries in Department III of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Frederick E. Rouzky
FREDERICK E. ROUZKY

Distribution
~~4~~ - WHD w/attachment
1 - EE w/attachment REC'D RID/AN 22 Jun 62
1 - Sao Paulo
2 - Files
200 w/att WH

19 June 1962/bcj

The attached info was not sent to the FBI because according to RIO/CE 5 Feb '63 & after discussion with Jane Roman & Office of Mr. R. Helms, we are not to send any info out of the Agency on subject. Any inquiries — domestic — should be referred to the FBI.

(CI/CC)

C. Hopkins
CI/LI

Att. A

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1

[illegible] COPY

2nd June, 1961.

Tadeusz SZULC

(b)3(A)

The Station copies of the original reports on SZULC have been destroyed. I attach, however, a memorandum consisting of selected entries from his card.

2. All the information is from the same source, a Polish emigre who knew SZULC personally and also had informants in the Polish Embassy.

3. There is little doubt that SZULC was pro-communist at the time, and that he co-operated with Ignacy SACHS, a cousin who was employed by the Press Section of the Polish Embassy, and provided him with "information". It would, however, be unwise to jump to the conclusion that this collaboration took the form of espionage, since SZULCs does not seem to have made any secret of the relationship.

4. I can find no evidence that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956, stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute for International Affairs.

Att. to HBRA 9438

NOFORN / Cont'd [illegible]

Att to HBRA 9438

CS COPY

[illegible]

201-50539

[illegible]

(6)(3)(c),

Tadeusz SZULC

Born: c. 1926.
Nationality: Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen 1955.
Occupation: Journalist.

June 1947: Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE PRESSE. Is on good terms with the Polish Legation whom he supplies with information on Brazil. One of the party who accompanied Raul FERNANDEZ on his mission to Montevideo. He is the son of Seweryn SZULC.

Dec. 1947: sub-source: Harold HORAN of New York: Re subject's efforts to find employment in American press circles. Mr. HORAN tried to help him, due to a letter of introduction from SZULC's uncle, John WILEY, American Ambassador in Lisbon, but desisted on finding that SZULC had been connected with the Rio de Janeiro communist paper "Diretrizes".

Feb. 1948: Further details of subject's efforts to find a job in the United States. He is to work on the Palestine Commission of the U.N.O. as from middle of February.

March 1948: Subject still in New York and writing regular reports on U.S. political affairs and personalities to the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Trying to get a job with U.S. Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY.

Sept. 1949: Subject at present in New York, married to an American girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies. Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press Attache, the late Wikinski. Told by Warsaw Poles in Washington that to be useful he cannot have a job with the Press Dept. of the Washington Polish Embassy or the Polish Press Bureau in New York. Using his "Uncle" introduction letters (the U.S. Ambassador John Wiley married to Polish born, Irene BARUCH, who is the sister of the first Mrs. SZULC), he obtained a job with Americans on orders from the Poles. Subject is helped financially by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to introduction letters from the WILEYs, SZULC penetrated several circles in New York. He is writing reports to Rio de Janeiro and working with people in New York and is considered useful for future tasks.

June 1951: Nephew of newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in PANAMA, he is now trying to get a job in Panama as American correspondent. He has a job with U.P. in New York. In Rio de Janeiro in 1947/48, was fellow traveller and informer of communist nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes". Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the Polish colony in Rio de Janeiro.

June 1951: Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he returned to New York. Whilst in Rio, he was in touch with Ignacy SACHS to whom he brought information from the USA. The two are relatives and boyhood friends and subject writes personal letters to SACHS containing matters of interest to the Polish Legation. Subject also has useful contacts in New York in political and artistic circles, obtained through his Aunt. Is believed to be trying to obtain American citizenship through having married an American woman.

/ - 2 - ....

Sept. 1951: Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject.

March 1952: Source met subject in America recently. Subject volunteered that he obtained much information on the differences of policy between the British and American Governments on the Persian problem through his aunt, the wife of John WILEY, and that he kept the Polish Government informed through Ignacy SACHS. He boasted acquaintance with Drew PEARSON and the Shah of Persia.

- - - - - - - - -

5

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE AKR

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.

1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.

2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weaknesses:

MDREND

A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.

3ZULC

[redacted] AMTRUNK 19-6-84
[redacted] 19-6-8/3 ~~19-6-84~~ STATE
[redacted] 68-496/16
[redacted] 7 [redacted]: 1 VOLSKY
WASH DC

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/attchs.

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
5 April 1963	APR 9 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-8381

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]
S E C R E T

12922

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION [redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA - 8381

AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed. There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1.

B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper. The latter could prove to be most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro's hands.

NEW YORK TIMES

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents, AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27 is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK contacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop.

E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea.

RABEL Nunez

F. This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 operations aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they expect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4. Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level, it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision. In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Headquarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time, operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated.

END OF MESSAGE

See DIR 3:748

[redacted]

[redacted]

31 March 1963

PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW

I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, working out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE

The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and

Removed from Project AMTRUNK
CS Classification: 19-6-84/3
JOB # 68-496/16
Box: 7 Fold: 1

DESENSITIZED
per CSN-43-43

[redacted]

4-9-6

the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.

III. PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel

1. AMTRUNK/2 is a 21 year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended Catholic Social University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasion a great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

2. AMTRUNK/3, a [redacted] year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in [redacted] 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.

B. TASKS

1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at [redacted] in the [redacted] section [redacted]

2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.

3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his [redacted] and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be exfiltrated at Punta Jijira.

4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.

5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.

6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration.

7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to [redacted] farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.

2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.

3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.

4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts.

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by [redacted], located [redacted] from the point of infiltration. They will make contact with the manager of the farm named [redacted]. [redacted] is [redacted] years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon [redacted] to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:

a. [redacted], who lives a few kilometers away in [redacted]. [redacted] owns a small farm and a [redacted] in the area and also owns a truck. He is [redacted] years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.

b. If [redacted] is unsuccessful in getting [redacted] truck he will contact [redacted] who operates a farm next to [redacted] farm. He is [redacted] years old, married, no children, wife's name is [redacted]. He was the [redacted] in 1954. He owns a jeep.

19 - 6 -

c. Another contact of A/3 is [redacted], age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is [redacted] Havana. He owns a [redacted] shop in the [redacted] section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

a. [redacted] years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

b. [redacted], born in Havana. He is a [redacted] who lives and practices [redacted] in Havana. [redacted] has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of [redacted] at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. [redacted] is also a close friend of [redacted]

c. [redacted], age about [redacted], born in Cienfuegos, a former [redacted] as well as the former head of the [redacted] Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. [redacted] has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The husband of this daughter, however, works for [redacted] A/2 has maintained correspondence with [redacted]

d. [redacted], age about [redacted], born in Havana, single. Subject is an [redacted] teacher who runs a small private [redacted] school in [redacted] in Havana. She was A/2's [redacted] and offered support to the underground. [redacted] lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.

[redacted]
SECRET

e. Gloria BAMCIALLA age 23-24, born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. She has no record of underground work. She lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at Guanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessar

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

a. Jorge VALS, age late 30s early 40s, married. Subject holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims VALS has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. VALS primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels VALS is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of VALS and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to VALS in 1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.

b. Jose DUARTE Oropesa, age early 40s, served in the U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, DUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District by Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos, DUARTE was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said DUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the military secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 DUARTE was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention DUARTE as an opportunist.

SECRET
[redacted]

c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.

Lester RODRIGUEZ, age late 30s early 40s, married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as head of one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working in INRA in Oriente Province. He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his father to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3

to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his business. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to undertake a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his business competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his [redacted] with maritime reception capabilities.

2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana However, he has not seen [redacted] and [redacted] for over a year. In addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on [redacted] conflict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that [redacted] is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims [redacted] is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that [redacted] has assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of [redacted] which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly security conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impression. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his [redacted] and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named [redacted] would be one of their contacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candidate for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.

3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and recruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.

IV. PHASE II

A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

1. AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense. He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply resents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he presents a difficult handling problem.

2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been involved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME. He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made [redacted]filtration/exfiltration trips to and from Cuba [redacted], and has an excellent knowledge of the north[redacted] area. He is easy to work

19-6-8-1

with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27.

3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a [redacted] year old fisherman from the [redacted] area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.

B. TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.

2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.

3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.

4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.

5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.

6. Establish internal and external communications.

7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ IN NAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFI TIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Director of Finance
1212 Key Building

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 27 February 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Inspector General 2 E 24 HQS.	27 Feb '74		D	
2. Breckinridge				
3. Richards			R	
4. ~~Wyatt~~				
5. Sandy-Arsdel - W/file				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

27 FEB 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Howard Hunt

1. At the recent request of the Deputy Director for Management and Services, the Office of Finance has searched its records to determine if we could find any payment to Mr. Hunt in an amount of approximately $30,000 that required no accounting.

2. We have searched the following records:

a. The expense runs for the period July 1964 to June 1973 for the immediate Office of the DCI, the immediate Office of the DD/P, FI Staff, CI Staff, CA Staff and the Office of Security. We have checked various items that were reflected in these expense records but have identified nothing relating to Mr. Hunt.

15-2

b. The Madrid Station, JMWAVE and FR/Washington Office accountings to determine if there were funds passed by the Stations to Mr. Hunt during the year he served under non-official cover in Madrid. We could find no payment to Mr. Hunt either in his true name or his two identified pseudonyms.

c. Mr. Hunt's travel claims for the period 1960-1972 and have found nothing in these travel claims that were not consistent with normal travel expenses, i.e., transportation, per diem.

d. We made a specific analysis of Mr. Hunt's advance account for the period he was under non-official cover (July '65-Sept '66) and have

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 006567

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

RS

determined that $33,500 was advanced to him for travel and transportation of household goods to and from Madrid with one trip to Paris for he and his family to renew their Spanish visas. All of this advance was fully accounted for. However, in his accounting, one item appeared unusual. It was an expenditure of $1,600 for a sensitive operation which was approved for write-off by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald on 1 June 1966 without further accounting.

3. Also, we confirmed that no other Agency advance accounts were established for Mr. Hunt during this period.

4. At the beginning of his non-official cover tour, it was necessary to establish a bank account in his name. The EUR Division accordingly requested we open an account at the Chase Manhattan Bank in Mr. Hunt's name to receive all non-salary payments. (Mr. Hunt had an account at Riggs National Bank to receive his salary and allowance payments). The following deposits were made to the account during 1965 and 1966:

Account opened: 13 July 1965

13 July 1965	$10,000
22 July 1965	5,000
15 September 1965	5,000
6 October 1965	5,000
19 July 1966	5,000
	$30,000

All of the above have been accounted for by submission of travel and transportation accountings.

5. We feel at this time without specific guidelines that further searching would be somewhat fruitless. One strange aspect of the non-official cover assignment in Madrid is that all the costs were charged to the support allotment of the EUR Division which is not normal as non-official cover people are usually assigned to a project. It is unusual to have a case officer abroad for one year on an operational assignment without him incurring operational expenditures.

SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

6. The Office of Finance has not found operational expenditures except for the $1,600 mentioned above. Therefore, it is suggested that Mr. Karamessines be questioned as to a project or projects to which Mr. Hunt's operational expenditures if incurred would have been charged.

7. Another possible course of action is to request the Director to approve my asking a cleared contact at Chase Manhattan Bank to provide a transcript of all entries into Mr. Hunt's Chase Manhattan Bank account.

8. We are currently reviewing records of all cashier's checks prepared and issued by Monetary to determine if any were payable to Mr. Hunt. Hopefully this effort will be finished by the end of the week.

Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

This is not a controlled item

DRAFT

[redacted] SECRET - SENSITIVE

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

[redacted] SECRET - SENSITIVE

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE [illegible]
IN CS [illegible]
PAPER NO. ______
—DO NOT DESTROY

B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two" course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelligence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.

II. OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.
2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.
3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.
4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.
5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.
6. The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.
7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.
8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean, and Israeli. Direct approaches to several of these services either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the services underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make greater use of their national assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the Vatican.

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can gain access and concerning whom we have any reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral operations and where appropriate in conjunction with liaison services.

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in Chile, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, England, Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Canada. No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and wherever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such installation worthwhile.

8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban communications.

9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 23 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of 65 are bein individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.

11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further expldtation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrille Type Operations: Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementationof related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Drafting
23 Nov, 1962

OPERATIONAL PLAN - CUBA

I. **SITUATION:**

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during FY-63 and for such longer period as may be directed.

B. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. National objectives with respect to Cuba are essentially as follows:
    - a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.
    - b. further Discredit the Castro/ Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.
    - c. Maintain moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.
    - d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.
    - e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban leadership, or split

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE REFERENCE
IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. ______
—DO NOT DESTROY—

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

on Cuban-Bloc relationships.

II. **MISSION:**

Covertly support the above-cited U. S. national objectives with respect to Cuba.

III. **TASKS:**

A. **Intelligence**/Counter-Intelligence

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:
    - a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
    - b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
    - c. Soviet activities in Cuba.
    - d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
    - e. Military and militia order of battle.
    - f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.
    - g. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cuban relationships.
    - h. Economic

B. **Political:**

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and Latin-American country support for the containment or overthrow of Castro.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted] SECRET
SENSITIVE

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.

4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

C. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.

2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching Cuba.

3. Harass Free World Trade with Cuba.

D. Psychological:

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.

2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.

3. Develop and exploit tensions between Cuba and Soviet bloc members.

E. Resistance:

1. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnel and logistics support for any significant internal

[redacted] SECRET
SENSITIVE

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

resistance group or uprising.

2. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military plans against Cuba.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION:

To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop the following program:

A. Intelligence (CI)/ Counter-Intelligence

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. The following types of actions will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba ~~even in Cuban government posts abroad~~. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.

2 Spotting/recruiting/training Cubans in Government posts abroad

3 Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.

4 Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information or who can provide significant operational support.

5 Expansion of communications intelligence particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. Maintain refugee debriefing programs.

7. Maximize utilization of liaison services for above programs.

B. Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:

1. A propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.
2. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.
3. Continue propaganda activities utilizing political professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

The program will be basically for developing and maintaining a minimum stand-by capability for use in the event of a significant up-rising or in the event of implementation of U. S. Military plans.

The following program is considered essential:

1. Maintain the capability to infiltrate/exfiltrate limited numbers of personnel and/or limited

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

amounts of equipment.

2. Maintain sufficient covert assets to meet requirements levied on CIA in approved U. S. Military contingency plans. Where internal assets are not available, assets may be held externally.

V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

None

VI. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. Personnel

B. Estimated Budget

FY - 63
FY - 64

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

14-00000
104-10103-10097
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

AMTRUNK Operation - Interim Working Draft,
Dated 14 February 1977,
with Attachments

AMTRUNK Operation

INTERIM WORKING DRAFT 14 February 1977

1. It is possible that the AMTRUNK Operation might have been a political action operation run against the U.S.G./CIA. (See the separate memorandum on "Operations to Split the Castro Regime.")

2. In late 1962 or early 1963, pressure was exerted on CIA by Higher Authority (State Department and the White House) to consider a proposal for an on-island operation to split the CASTRO regime. The proposal was presented to Mr. HURWITCH, the State Department Cuban Coordinator, by Tad SZULC[1] (AMCAPE-1) of the New York Times. On 6 February 1963, Albert C. DAVIES, (Lt. Col. on military detail to WH/4 - Cuba) met with SZULC at SZULC's residence, to discuss the plan.[2] SZULC referred to it as the "Leonardo Plan." While at first hesitant, SZULC finally revealed that Dr. Nestor MORENO (AMICE-27)[3] was one of its prime originators. SZULC said that he first thought of bringing the plan to the attention of President KENNEDY, as he had had a standing invitation, since November 1961, for direct contact with President KENNEDY, Attorney General KENNEDY, or Mr. McGeorge BUNDY, on matters concerning Cuba. He decided against that approach, however, and instead determined to use the Cuban Coordinating Group. SZULC later said that George VOLSKY[4] (AMTRUNK-1) masterminded the plan, assisted by MORENO. It was agreed that CIA representatives would meet with SZULC and the two Leonardo planners, MORENO and VOLSKY, in Washington.

The follow-up meeting on 9 February (in a safehouse) was attended by HURWITCH, Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY, Dr. Nestor MORENO, and David MORALES, Col. A. DAVIES and Alfonso RODRIGUEZ of the CIA.

3. A 11 February 1963 memorandum from RODRIGUEZ to the Chief, SAS, expressed definite interest in the operation with certain recommendations which included having JMWAVE Station put its operational mechanism into gear to have the Cuban personnel of the operation (now called AMTRUNK) ready for infiltration by mid-March 1963. Following a review of the AMTRUNK Project, JMWAVE forwarded a lengthy dispatch to Headquarters[5], dated 8 April 1963, which recommended that the operation be terminated soonest. Since it was a Headquarters originated operation, JMWAVE also requested Headquarters decision as to continuance or termination. A Headquarters cable to JMWAVE on 10 April 1963 concurred that the AMTRUNK operation should be terminated for a number of reasons, including the fact that CIA could not at that time be certain that hostile elements were unaware of the plan. A 17 April 1963 cable from Headquarters to JMWAVE Station advised that SZULC had informed HURWITCH that JMWAVE had given VOLSKY responsibility to decide whether or not the operation was to continue. It seems that Headquarters had intended to use VOLSKY, with his concurrence, only as a funding channel for the AMTRUNK operation if the AMTRUNK principals were willing to proceed with the operation independently. In any case, for some reason, CIA continued to

support the operation. The two principals, MORENO (AMICE-27) and Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue (AMICE-14) claimed to have contact with high-level GOC officials. They completed four infiltration missions to Cuba and were terminated in March 1964.

4. Early phases of the operation resulted in the on-island recruitment of Ramon Tomas GUIN Diaz (AMTRUNK-10), Modesto Orlando OROZCO Basulto (AMTRUNK-9), and Carlos PEDRAZA Aguilar (AMTRUNK-11). GUIN was arrested in February 1966. (CUBELA was arrested at the same time, separately.) OROZCO, after reportedly running scared, was exfiltrated and terminated in March 1964. He returned to Cuba in December 1964 on an independent exfiltration mission and apparently remained in Cuba. There is some speculation that he might have been G-2. His knowledge of the identity of internal AMTRUNK agents, caused a planned infiltration mission to be scrapped. PEDRAZA was arrested in December 1965, tried for alleged CIA activities and given a 30 year prison sentence. JMWAVE Station advised in March 1966 that four former AMTRUNK internal assets were arrested for counterrevolutionary activities during early 1966, in addition to CUBELA and GUIN, and that all of the principals of the AMTRUNK network active during 1963 and 1964 had been rolled up. The Cuban press reportedly identified DIAZ (AMICE-14) as the clandestine infiltree who recruited GUIN.

COMMENT: It appears that the opposition might have succeeded in obtaining CIA financial and material support for an operation which was controlled by the planners. They succeeded, it seems, in identifying, neutralizing, and exposing on-island anti-Castro forces, and tying up CIA time, money, and manpower for an operation of their own creation. Following are some reasons which might have contributed to its failure:

a. The controversial nature of the principal initiators, Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY and MORENO. The AMTRUNK operatives made it known that they were anti-U.S.G. and anti-CIA and accepted assistance only to accomplish their own purposes. They were not under CIA control.

b. SZULC, although reportedly not directly involved in the operation, was kept fully informed of its activities by MORENO and perhaps others.

c. SZULC's direct contact with the White House, if true, placed him in a position to pass U.S. policy information on Cuba to the opposition. (There is a note by Richard Helms on a 23 September 1963 cover sheet requesting Alfonso RODRIGUEZ to maintain periodic contact with SZULC on Cuban matters at Presidential request going back many months.)

6

d. RABEL (AMLEO-3), who "defected" to the U.S. in 1962, was knowledgeable of on-island AMTRUNK targets. RABEL, following termination, returned to Cuba allegedly to bring out his family, and never returned. There is a possibility that he was a CASTRO agent.

e. CUBELA was knowledgeable of at least some of the AMTRUNK agents. GUIN (AMTRUNK-10) was a codefendant in the CUBELA trial. (Believe GUIN may have been given a stiffer sentence than CUBELA and may still be in prison.)

30 YEARS!

CUBELA was given a relatively light sentence, considering the magnitude of the crime. Immediately following sentencing he functioned as a prison physician, and reportedly was driving a jeep unescorted, which is unusual treatment unless one is trusted by the regime. He reportedly is now practicing medicine as a private physician in Havana.

f. The questionable activities and current whereabouts of AMTRUNK-9. We have learned of the other AMTRUNK agents who were wrapped up but we have been unable to determine precisely where AMTRUNK-9 is. There is some indication that he might have been G-2.

g. There was overlap with other operations: the AMLILAC's, placing CUBELA cache, etc.

NOTE: Cables cited in this paper, and other selected papers from the AMTRUNK Project, are readily available in the LAD/JFK Task Force office for review if needed.

LAD/JFK Task Force/Chris Hopkins:rp

14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Tadeusz (Tad) Witold SZULC (AMCAPE-1) (201-50539)

1. SZULC was born on 25 July 1926 in Warsaw, Poland. He arrived in Brazil from Lisbon on 3 August 1940, and came to the U.S. in October 1947 under sponsorship of U.S. Ambassador John C. WILEY, the husband of his mother's sister. He became a correspondent for the New York Times (NYT) in 1953, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special Congressional bill.

2. SZULC has been under suspicion as a hostile foreign agent since 1948 when the FBI reported (apparently from a [redacted] source) that he was a Communist. He brought himself to the attention of CIA in August 1959 in Santiago, Chile by claiming (falsely) to be "cleared" and requesting contact with an Agency representative. This was the first of many such incidents in Latin America, and resulted in a warning to all Latin American Stations to beware of SZULC and his efforts to interview Agency personnel. It also resulted in continuing watch of his movements and activities because they represented a threat to the cover of Agency personnel. By 1960 his reputation was so widespread that several different CIA officers called for an investigation that would clear up "once and for all" his suspected connections with a hostile intelligence service. He was in frequent contact with Communist Party leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America, constantly sought out and elicited information from U.S. Embassy officers,

frequently mentioning the name of other CIA officers with whom he was acquainted.

3. Although the suspicions have increased, and SZULC's anti-Agency activities have become much more serious and blatant in the 1970's, it has not been possible to clear up any of the suspicions about his motives or his possible connections with a foreign intelligence service. There have been numerous reviews of his files and the interest in his activities has extended from the case officer level to the DCI. In fact, it is not possible to come to any clear conclusion about this man, and the notes below are simply illustrative of the kinds of things that keep the suspicions alive. It is important to note that SZULC's activities can be explained by the combination of his personality, ambition, and the demands on an investigative reporter for the NYT. He is an aggressive, insensitive, and persistent journalist with the family connections (Ambassador Wiley) and ability to develop the kinds of contacts appropriate to a successful correspondent for a paper like the NYT.

4. Nevertheless, there are elements throughout his entire career that are almost designed to arouse suspicion. For example, a British source in Rio de Janeiro (see Attachment A) reported that SZULC was "directed" by the Polish regime in Warsaw to seek employment in U.S. journalistic circles. This report runs like a thread throughout his file and is repeated and garbled in several versions over the years. The report

has never been adequately explained and was apparently never reported in full to London by the British representative in Rio. This report and other questions that arose early in his career (his contacts with a cousin who was a Press Attache in the Polish Embassy in Rio) were, however, just the earliest elements that aroused suspicion.

5. Because he became so well-known to so many Agency officers, his name and reputation have become subject of discussion on many occasions. One senior operations officer stated in 1975 that a Soviet agent could not be more beneficial to the Soviets and the Communist cause than SZULC has been. Although he presented a generally anti-Communist view prior to quitting the NYT in 1972, it is noteworthy that he arranged extensive, favorable TV coverage of the Communist-dominated Ligas Campesinas in Northeast Brazil and that one of the most important anti-Castro operations, AMTRUNK, in which he was involved from the beginning, was disastrous for all participants. More indicative of his true beliefs, however, are the articles he has written since Watergate. They have become increasingly critical of the CIA and of the USG generally and have damaged U.S. image and prestige.

6. The notes below are somewhat random examples of elements in SZULC's file that bring him under suspicion. As mentioned above, they in no way point to a firm conclusion. For further information on SZULC during the period 1963 - 1964, see the CI review prepared at Miami Station on Jorge VOLSKY in 1964.

a. The 1948 FBI report that SZULC was involved in supplying the Polish Legation in Rio with information from his personal contacts and from Ambassador John C. Wiley has been repeated in various versions throughout SZULC's file. The FBI has found similar allegations made by other sources who knew SZULC at that time. In addition, several sources have mentioned SZULC's relations with his cousin, Ignacy SACHS, who was the Press Attache in the Polish Embassy in 1947 and 1948, although there is no indication that SACHS had intelligence connections.

b. SZULC's marriage to the daughter of the American manager of the English language newspaper in Rio de Janeiro, the Herald, lasted only until SZULC had permanent residence in the U.S. and appears to have been carried through for that purpose.

c. By 1949 (SZULC was only 23) he had come to the attention of the Rio Station because of his dealings with the Polish Legation and because investigation revealed his father had some (apparently innocent) business dealings with Russians visiting Brazil from Mexico.

d. In 1954, about a year after he was hired by the NYT, SZULC obtained a sensational story, by telephone, from a Communist leader in Guatemala. This launched his career with the NYT.

e. In 1956 SZULC was investigating Brazilian nuclear policy for the NYT. Although a legitimate topic, it was somewhat unusual for him and the timing seems unusual for NYT interest.

f. In 1959, on a trip to Santiago, Chile, SZULC claimed to be "cleared" and requested an interview with an Agency representative. This was the first of numerous such requests. In addition, it was in about 1959 that he also began making a point of telling Agency personnel the names of other Agency officers he had identified.

g. An article SZULC wrote on Cuba for the NYT in December 1959 was hailed as an antidote to the excessively favorable reports of his colleague, Herbert MATTHEWS, but in fact his article was largely favorable to Fidel CASTRO and to CASTRO's plans for Cuba. It is only in comparison with MATTHEWS blatantly pro-CASTRO articles that SZULC's piece can be considered balanced.

h. By September 1960, SZULC was in the forefront of those advocating action against CASTRO. (It was he who finally brought the Leonardo Plan to Washington in 1963. See AMTRUNK Operational paper).

i. In April 1961, shortly after John F. KENNEDY was innaugurated, SZULC was transferred to Washington by the NYT. Although a reasonable transfer, it is noteworthy that in a very short time SZULC claimed that he had a standing invitation to go directly to the President, the Vice President, the Attorney General, McGeorge BUNDY and Robert HURWITCH on Cuban matters.

j. SZULC persistently sought a continuing contact with an Agency representative in Washington shortly after he arrived until it was granted in December 1962. The first contact was with Albert C. DAVIES (Lt. Col. on military detail to CIA - Cuba), and was arranged at the behest of Colonel GROGAN, the Assistant to the Director, on SZULC's request.

k. In early 1963, at President KENNEDY's urging, contact with SZULC was made into a formal relationship and was continued until October 1964. The meetings were used by SZULC to cross check his information from other sources, including various Cuban exiles and the Department of State. He became, by virtue of his contacts with the exile community and throughout Washington, one of the most knowledgeable people in the area of Cuban affairs, anti-CASTRO activities, and U.S. Government policy. (See CI study on Jorge VOLSKY for more information on this period.)

l. The Agency officer, Alfonso RODRIGUEZ, who maintained official contact with SZULC in 1963 and 1964 said in July 1964:

> "The special friendship and mutual admiration society that has existed between Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY, and Manuel RAY and the JURE is not something that is transparent or easily explained. This alliance may be something unholy and Machiavellian; I just do not know, but I can find no evidence to prove it."

m. Another officer, Seymour Young, wrote in 1965:

> "After reading and re-reading this man's various files, I began to feel that this man in his position would be an ideal 'agent of influence'. It was noted that he is always in a crisis area and usually in advance of the crisis and writes articles which are more concerned with the Communist successes."

n. In about August 1965, SZULC was sent to Madrid as the NYT representative for Spain and Portugal. He stayed overseas until December 1968. He was present in Prague during the Soviet invasion of August 1968 and in December he was expelled, apparently for being too inquisitive. However, the West German Service has remained suspicious of the circumstances of SZULC's expulsion and the details have never been clarified. (It is interesting that SZULC wrote articles reflecting the official CZECH line concerning the defection of General Jan SEJNA who was in the Czech Intelligence service.)

o. SZULC was reported by an FBI source to have gone horseback riding with Boris V. YAROCHEVSKIY, a suspect KGB officer, in Washington in June or July 1971. SZULC's file reflects no regular contact with Bloc diplomats.

p. In 1972 and 1973 SZULC covered Watergate extensively and demonstrated an extreme bias against the CIA. By July 1972, SZULC's inquiries of the Department of State and his articles had taken on a distinctly anti-US Government tone. His coverage of guerrilla and terrorist groups was less sure than in earlier days and was frequently sensationalist and full of inaccuracies. (See, especially, article in NYT for 14 July 1972 on a terrorist Headquarters in Zurich and other wild statements.)

q. Since 1974 SZULC's articles have been highly critical of the Agency and he has used the background information he gathered in the 1960's to attack the Agency and to criticize its operations.

r. In May 1975 SZULC accused the Agency of rifling the files of U.S. Senators. This was only one of many irresponsible and false articles he wrote trying to discredit the Agency. One of the more spectacular efforts was a series in Esquire magazine, in which, among other things, he charged that the U.S. intelligence community had a hidden budget of $25 billion dollars and a network of 200,000 spies.

s. In, Inside the Company: A CIA Diary, Philip AGEE credits SZULC's daughter, Nicole, for having "obtained vital research materials in New York and Washington, D.C." There is reason to believe, particularly in view of the extreme views Tad SZULC has manifested in the past two years, that he may have aided his daughter in her "research."

SUMMATION

The case against Tad SZULC as a foreign agent is weak. However, his most recent activities are entirely consonant with the view that he has already served the Soviets well and can end his career as an overt propagandist taking advantage of the current furor over the CIA to do the greatest possible damage. The current paralysis of all anti-Communist action by the Agency attests to the effectiveness of AGEE, SZULC, the Soviets, et al.

NOTE: (See attachment B from a highly sensitive source. Any use of the SECRET/SENSITIVE attachment requires C/CI approval.) The source reported that Nicole, while working with the DGI in Cuba to expose the Agency, said that except for her father, her whole family were "fascists." She said that her father quit the NYT because of the restrictive editorial policy and he wished to write according to his beliefs.

LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/[redacted]:rp
2 Attachments, a/s
Copy filed: 201-50539

ATT. A - To

DISPATCH

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HBRA 9438
TO Chief, WHD INFO Chief, EE		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-050539
FROM Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro		DATE 20 June 1962
SUBJECT BEDOX/Operational [redacted] Information Concerning Tad SZULC (201-050539)		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED FYI		
REFERENCE(S)		

1. Attached is a [redacted] report concerning Tadeusz SZULC which includes [redacted]'s traces on SZULC.

2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy SACHS, who is mentioned in the attachment.

[redacted]BICUSPID from [redacted]BICUSPID-5, 4 May 1961 (ultimate source: Henryk HRANKROWSKI, former member of the Polish Commercial Mission, in Brazil)

Ignacy SACHS, upon his return from India, will not work in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but will be reassigned to the Latin American section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade. He recently wrote a report on Latin America based upon material contained in the South and Central American press. He reportedly had a falling out with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence the transfer.

[redacted]BICUSPID from [redacted]BICUSPID-5, 30 May 1961 (ultimate source: Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ, Polish diplomat)

Ignacy SACHS, after a period of disgrace, has a new job, economic assistant for underdeveloped countries in Department III of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

FREDERICK L. ROUZKY

Distribution
4 - WHD w/attachment
1 - EE w/attachment
1 - Sao Paulo
2 - Files

REC'D RID/AN

2CC w/atts WH

19 June 1962/bcj

The attached info was not sent to the FBI. According to RIO/CE 5 Feb '63 talk (RIO/CE) discussion with Jose Romero + Office of Mr. R. Helms, we are not to send any info on this agency or subject. Any inquiries — domestic — should be referred to the FBI.

C. Hopkins

ATT. "A"

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1

COPY

2nd June, 1961.

Tadeusz SZULC

(b)3(a)

The Station copies of the original reports on SZULC have been destroyed. I attach, however, a memorandum consisting of selected entries from his card.

2. All the information is from the same source, a Polish emigre who knew SZULC personally and also had informants in the Polish Embassy.

3. There is little doubt that SZULC was pro-communist at the time, and that he co-operated with Ignacy SACHS, a cousin who was employed by the Press Section of the Polish Embassy, and provided him with "information". It would, however, be unwise to jump to the conclusion that this collaboration took the form of espionage, since SZULCs does not seem to have made any secret of the relationship.

4. I can find no evidence that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956, stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute for International Affairs.

att. to
HBRA 9438

NOFORN / [illegible]

att. to HBRA 9438

CS COPY

20 JUN 62
201-50539

Source of all this info
a Polish [illegible]
[illegible]

Tadeusz SZULC

(6)(3)(c),

Born: c. 1926.
Nationality: Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen 1955.
Occupation: Journalist.

June 1947: Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE PRESSE. Is on good terms with the Polish Legation whom he supplies with information on Brazil. One of the party who accompanied Raul FERNANDEZ on his mission to Montevideo. He is the son of Seweryn SZULC.

Dec. 1947: sub-source: Harold HORAN of New York: Re subject's efforts to find employment in American press circles. Mr. HORAN tried to help him, due to a letter of introduction from SZULC's uncle, John WILEY, American Ambassador in Lisbon, but desisted on finding that SZULC had been connected with the Rio de Janeiro communist paper "Diretrizes".

Feb. 1948: Further details of subject's efforts to find a job in the United States. He is to work on the Palestine Commission of the U.N.O. as from middle of February.

March 1948: Subject still in New York and writing regular reports on U.S. political affairs and personalities to the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Trying to get a job with U.S. Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY.

Sept. 1949: Subject at present in New York, married to an American girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies. Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press Attache, the late Wikinski. Told by Warsaw Poles in Washington that to be useful he cannot have a job with the Press Dept. of the Washington Polish Embassy or the Polish Press Bureau in New York. Using his "Uncle" introduction letters (the U.S. Ambassador John Wiley married to Polish born, Irene BARUCH, who is the sister of the first Mrs. SZULC), he obtained a job with Americans on orders from the Poles. Subject is helped financially by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to introduction letters from the WILEYs, SZULC penetrated several circles in New York. He is writing reports to Rio de Janeiro and working with people in New York and is considered useful for future tasks.

June 1951: Nephew of newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in PANAMA, he is now trying to get a job in Panama as American correspondent. He has a job with U.P. in New York. In Rio de Janeiro in 1947/48, was fellow traveller and informer of communist nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes". Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the Polish colony in Rio de Janeiro.

June 1951: Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he returned to New York. Whilst in Rio, he was in touch with Ignacy SACHS to whom he brought information from the USA. The two are relatives and boyhood friends and subject writes personal letters to SACHS containing matters of interest to the Polish Legation. Subject also has useful contacts in New York in political and artistic circles, obtained through his Aunt. Is believed to be trying to obtain American citizenship through having married an American woman.

/ - 2 - ....

Sept. 1951: Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject.

March 1952: Source met subject in America recently. Subject volunteered that he obtained much information on the differences of policy between the British and American Governments on the Persian problem through his aunt, the wife of John WILEY, and that he kept the Polish Government informed through Ignacy SACHS. He boasted acquaintance with Drew PEARSON and the Shah of Persia.

- - - - - - - -

SECRET

14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Nestor Antonio MORENO Lopez (AMICE-27) (201-312091)

1. MORENO was born on 25 August 1921 in Havana, Cuba. His father was a Cuban Senator (1940-44) and the Cuban Minister of Public Works (1944). MORENO became a lawyer and continued to live in comfortable circumstances. He became involved in the anti-BATISTA movement, apparently in the late 1950's, and ultimately in the 26th of July Movement. After the revolution, one of his clients was Camilo CIENFUEGOS. In Miami after defection, he was associated with the JURE.

2. MORENO's specific activities in the anti-BATISTA movement were not reported and apparently were unexceptional. A point worth noting about his activities before defection is his acquaintance with Tad SZULC, at least by 1959, and with Jorge VOLSKY. MORENO's background as a lawyer did not prepare him for active revolutionary involvement. When he defected in April 1961, therefore, he associated with anti-CASTRO exiles, particularly VOLSKY, but did not become actively involved. He was assessed in 1963 as being unfriendly to CIA.

3. About February 1963 MORENO and Enrique CAYADO Ribera reportedly collaborated in the formulation of an operational plan to overthrow the Castro government. They discussed it with Jorge VOLSKY, who then passed it to Tad SZULC. VOLSKY and SZULC apparently conspired to have the plan presented to the "political authorities" (Robert HURWITCH and the KENNEDY Administration) in Washington in order to by-pass the dis-

SECRET

trusted "operational authorities" (the CIA). (VOLSKY originally took full credit for the plan, called "Leonardo Plan," which eventually became known as the AMTRUNK Operation.)

4. The Leonardo Plan was well thought-out and caught the fancy of the KENNEDY Administration. HURWITCH bought it to the CIA with the blessings of the Department of State. Thus, from the very beginning, SZULC, VOLSKY, and MORENO, each of whom had outside interests to some degree in conflict with AMTRUNK, were involved in AMTRUNK policy and planning meetings. Moreover, all three were to some degree antipathetic to the Agency for various reasons and were difficult or impossible to control.

5. MORENO's indiscretions were a serious problem that limited his effectiveness as a direct participant in the AMTRUNK Operation by arousing the concern of other participants. While the Station attempted to cut out VOLSKY and SZULC after the initial policy discussions in Washington, VOLSKY always remained involved to some degree and kept SZULC fully informed. Under the circumstances, the censure of MORENO for talking to SZULC was just an attempt to plug one of many leaks. The fact is that MORENO, SZULC, and VOLSKY believed they had an inside track in Washington because of their contacts there and all three disliked following Agency instructions that conflicted with their own diverse interests. However, because JMWAVE Station and AMICE-14 (Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue) objected to MORENO's continued involvement in the AMTRUNK Operation after learning of his free talk with SZULC and others, the Station

terminated MORENO's involvement in the sensitive aspects of AMTRUNK in November 1963.

6. Since MORENO was one of the original authors of AMTRUNK and already disliked the Agency, one can imagine his feelings at that juncture. He sulked, refused at first to take a position on the Rebel Army Radio Program, and caused problems in general. By January 1964 MORENO was actually interferring in the AMTRUNK Operation (by giving demoralizing, conflicting information to AMTRUNK-9, for example) and attempting to debrief returnees on behalf of VOLSKY and SZULC. MORENO was fired, therefore, by RABEL on Station instructions, from the Rebel Army Radio Program in February 1964 and terminated by the Station as of 5 March.

7. Shortly after his termination, MORENO, using VOLSKY as an intermediary, approached Mr. G. Harvey SUMM with a proposal similar to the Leonardo Plan. The COS met with SUMM on 1 April 1964 and advised him how to put off MORENO.

8. In August or September 1964, MORENO left Miami and took a position as a Spanish-language professor in South Carolina.

CONCLUSION:

MORENO apparently was a sincere anti-CASTRO revolutionary, but his dislike for and distrust of the Agency, which was undoubtedly stimulated by SZULC and VOLKSY, made his involvement in AMTRUNK a liability to the security of the operation. It appears that MORENO, like many Cubans of the upper middle class, had little sense of security. It is obvious that he trusted SZULC and VOLSKY far beyond what normal prudence would dictate. He probably was not a CASTRO agent, but he did help leak operational details and general plans to people who helped to spread the information more widely and who, themselves, were not trustworthy.

LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/Marty Miller:rp

Copy filed: 201-312091

DISPATCH

SECRET

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE AKR

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.

1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.

2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weaknesses:

MORENO

A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.

SZULC

[redacted] from [redacted] AMTRUNK 19-6-84/3
[redacted]: 19-6-84/3 ~~14-6-84~~, STATE
[redacted] 68-496/16
[redacted] 7 [redacted]: 1 VOLSKY
WASH, DC

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/attchs.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

CROSS REFERENCE TO

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
5 April 1963	APR 8 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-8381

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed. There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1.

B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper. The latter could prove to be most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro's hands.

NEW YORK TIMES

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents, AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27 is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK contacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop.

E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea.

RABEL Nunez

F. This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 operations aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they expect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4. Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level, it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision. In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Headquarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time, operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated.

END OF MESSAGE

See DIR 31748

[redacted]

[redacted]

31 March 1963

PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW

I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE

The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and

Removed from Project AMTRUNK
CS Classification: 19-6-84/3
JOB # 68-496/16
Box: 7 Fold: 1

DESENSITIZED
per CSH-43-43

[redacted]

19-6-

the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.

III. PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel 08

1. AMTRUNK/2 is a 21 year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended Catholic Social 08 University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasion a great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in 09 January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

3/PV

[redacted]

08

2. AMTRUNK/3, a 22 year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.

B. **TASKS**

1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at A/3's father's farm in the Galera section (AMS 3885 III, Coords 993614). 08 08

2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.

3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be exfiltrated at Punta Jijira. 08

4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.

5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.

6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration.

7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).

[redacted]

6/PV

[redacted]

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for 24 the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to A/3's father's farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.

2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.

3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.

4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts.

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the 24 two men will work their way to a 24 farm owned jointly by A/3's father and Santos SUAREZ located 1 kilometer from the point of infiltration. 06 They will 06 make contact with 08 the manager of the farm named Pedro CRUZ. CRUZ is 35 to 40 years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon 06 CRUZ to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:

06

a. Roman HERNANDEZ, who lives a 06 few kilometers away in 08 Sierra del Arzobispo. HERNANDEZ owns a small farm and a 08 butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is 08 37 to 40 years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.

06 06 06

b. If CRUZ is unsuccessful in getting HERNANDEZ' truck he will contact Augusto MACHIN who operates a farm next 08 to A/3's father's farm. He is 45-50 08 years old, married, no children, wife's name is Alicia. 06 He was the mayor of Santa Cruz del Norte in 1954. He owns a jeep.

08

SECRET

[redacted]

19-6-81

19/PJ

06

c. Another contact of A/3 is Ramon CALZADILLE age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is Corojo #1, Cotorro, 08 Havana. He owns 08 a butcher shop in the Cotorro section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if 08 he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

06, 08.

a. Elsa Maria NEGRIN, 25 years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

06, 08

b. Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55 born in 08 Havana. He is 08 a physician who lives and practices medicine in Havana. 06 IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicine 08 at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. IGLESIAS 06 is also a close friend of Elsa NEGRIN 06

c. Sergio MENDEZ 06 age about 08 50, 08 born in Cienfuegos, a former senator (1954) as well as the former head of the 08 Railroad system in Cuba. Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. 06 MENDEZ has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The 08 husband of this daughter, however, works for Che Guevara. A/2 has maintained correspondence with MENDEZ.

06 08 08 06

d. Isabel MENOCOL, age about 35, born in Havana, single. Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private 08 tutoring school in English 08 in Havana. She was A/2's 08 English teacher and offered support to the underground. 06 MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.

26/PV

06 08

e. Gloria BAMCIALLA age 23-24 born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. 08 She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. 08 She has no record of underground work. She lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at 08 Guanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary.

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

06 08

a. Jorge VALS, age late 30s early 40s, married. Subject holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. 08 He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims 06 VALS has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. 06 VALS' primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels 06 VALS is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of 06 VALS and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to 06 VALS in 09 1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee. 08

06 08

b. Jose DUARTE Oropesa age early 40s, served in the 08 U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, 08 06 DUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District by Camilio Cienfuegos. 06 Following the disappearance of 06 Cienfuegos DUARTE was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said 06 DUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the military 08 secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. 06 A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually 06 DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 DUARTE 06 was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention 06 DUARTE as an opportunist.

28/pd

c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.

06 08

Lester RODRIGUEZ age late 30s early 40s, married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as head of 08 one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working in INRA in Oriente Province. 06 06 He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his 24 father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his 24 father to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3

7/17

to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his business. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to undertake a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his business competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his father's farm with maritime reception capabilities. 24

2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient number of supporting assets to provide for his 06 safety while in Havana. However, he has not seen 26 VALS and DUARTE for over a year. In addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on 26 DUARTE conflict with A/2's evaluation of 06 this man. While there is no evidence to verify that DUARTE is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUARTE is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. 06 A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that 26 DUARTE has assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. 06 This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of DUARTE which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly security conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impression. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then 24 to Cuba. Once there they would go to his father's farm and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named DUARTE 06 would be one of their contacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candidate for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.

10/17

3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and recruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.

IV. PHASE II

A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

1. AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense. He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply resents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he presents a difficult handling problem.

2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been involved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME.He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made [redacted]filtration/exfiltration trips to and from Cuba[redacted], and has an excellent knowledge of the north[redacted] area. He is easy to work

19-6-84/1

with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27.

08

08 3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a 49 year old fisherman from the Cardenas area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.

B. TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.

2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.

3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.

4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.

5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.

6. Establish internal and external communications.

7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).

2/17V

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Cayo Cinco Leguas. This key is used for production of charcoal and salt. Residents are reported solidly anti-Communist. A/14 has two contacts here that he used previously for infils and exfils. One is "Tango" Garcia Lezcano. 06 Tango is a brother of Eustiquiano Garcia Lezcano (201-307338) 06, 08 whom A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation, but who was already being utilized elsewhere. The other contact is the owner of the Salina (salt drying beds). A/14 has not yet been able to recall this individual's name. 08

2. Finca Casualidad. This area is directly south of Cinco Leguas, on the mainland. Key contacts here are Antonio 06 Garcia (not related to Tango, above) and Pablo Lopez, both of whom have small farms in the area. 06

3. Town of Marti. Contact here is "Perico" LNU. Subject is about 50 years old, is employed by INRA 08 and has a jeep which was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes.

06

4. City of Cardenas. Contact is Pedro Barbi, owner of the 08 Bate Marino restaurant. Subject is a close friend of A/14 who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime receptions. 06 Barbi would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to Havana. Owns a car.

5. City of Matanzas. A-14 has a friend here named Carlos 06 Pedraza who also assisted A/14 in underground activities in 1961. Subject is 60 06 years old, married, and is a forman 08 of public works in the city. Subject has a son Carlos 06 now in New York City. 06 Pedraza will be contacted for transportation to Havana. Owns a car.

6. Varadero. "Fifo" Pineiro 06 owns a car and was formerly a close friend of A/14. Subject was formerly active in the underground 06 and might be used by A/14 in the event he could not use Barbi or Pedraza 06 for obtaining transportation. 06, 08 06 Pineiro is the brother of the communist Manolo Pineiro, aka "Barba Roja", but is reported to be anti-communist himself.

7. Havana

06

a. Adolfina (Suarez) More. Subject is single and lives with her mother. Is friend of AMICE/27 (possibly mistress) and can be 06 used as safehouse keeper. Subject is 08 sister of Rafael (Suarez) More, a Commandante in the Navy who, according to A/27, was at one time chief of naval 08 operations. His present assignment or location is unknown.

23/pv

06

b. Manuel (Garcia) Sanchez 06 Is a close friend of A/14 and is uncle of A/14's wife 06 Can be used for operational support, a car, and safehousekeeping. Was formerly a Lt. in Oriente under Calixto Garcia 06 but no longer in army. A/14 believes he is now an adminstrator of some type of industry in Havana.

06

c. Maria Josefa (Isalgue) Subject is aunt of A/14 and can be used as safehouse keeper. She is single, lives alone except for ten cats. Does not have a car. Was formerly a teacher but now has a pension and does not work.

06

d. Gonzalo (Lopez) de la Torre Subject is a relative of A/27 and can be called on for ops support or safehousing. Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his sixties.

06

e. Bebo (Orozco) To be recruited by A/14 as his principal agent in Havana. Subject and A/14 previously worked together in the underground. 06 Orozco was in the Sierra with Castro and also fought in Camaguey. He resigned from the army in February 1959, although he has maintained many contacts within the army. Was one time active in the 06 Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was a friend of Capt. Bernardo Corrales who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio. Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain arms and remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into Cuba without his absence having been known to the authorities. Was responsible for safehousekeeping Vargas Gomez 06 for nearly one month when authorities were searching for him. Will be used for intel collection and spotting on defectable army officers. He is also known to A/27, but not well. A/14 was last in touch with Orozco by letter about two months ago. 06

f. Ramon (Guin) Diaz. Subject to be recruited by A/27 as principal agent. Would be used for operational intelligence and spotting among disaffected army officers. Would be kept entirely compartmented from Orozco 06 Guin is an army Comandante, now managing a large INRA farm complex outside of Havana. He is known to A/27 and A/14, both of whom believe he can be contacted safely. He is anti-Communist and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos officers contacted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an overthrow of the government.

Co-defendant in CUBELA trial - in prison

(1/PV

g. Target personalities who are suspected of being disaffected and on whom A/27 and A/14 will attempt to gather information in Havana are as follows:

1. Comandante "Macho" Parra
2. Cdte. Oscar Guerra
3. " Jose Pinares
4. Capt. FNU Lawton
5. " Manuel Avila
6. Cmdte. Rene de los Santos
7. " Pedro Miret
8. Capt. Juan Nuiry
9. Cmdte. Rafael Suarez More
10. Capt. Fernando Fernandez Superville
11. Capt. FNU Guerra Matos
12. Capt. Sandy Olivares
13. " Jose Fernandez Alvarez

These names have all been checked through JMWAVE RI and in most cases also with AMLEO/3. In a majority of cases there appears to be some evidence to indicate the subjects may be disaffected. In the case of Jose Pinares however, it would appear that he is completely loyal to the regime. This information was passed on to A/27 and A/14. RI files were negative on Avila and Lawton.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will live black during their entire stay in Cuba. They will be equipped with alias documentation and with disguises. Both of them have previously lived in the Havana area and know the city well. They will be trained in Secret Writing (SW) and will plan to train at least two and possible three agents in Havana in SW, prior to their own exfiltration. In addition, it is planned to train A/27 and A/14 in OWVL. At the time of infiltration, exfiltration plans will have been laid on with the agents. In the event that a change in time or location of exfiltration becomes necessary, an OWVL message could be sent to the agents. Any urgent and immediate message which might have to be sent by the agents during their short stay in Havana would be on a prearranged open code system by commercial telegram. Such a system will be worked out to cover several possible contingencies. Internal communications of whatever net is organized by A/27 and A/14 will be arranged by courier, cut-out, live and dead drops.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The LCFLUTTER examinations on both AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 were inconclusive. Although it is the opinion of both the case officers and the training personnel who have been in close contact with these individuals that both agents are

highly motivated and strongly anti-communist, this point will remain basically unresolved since it is almost certain that A/27 would refuse a second LCFLUTTER examination if asked. It is believed that A/27 was withholding information during the LCFLUTTER and subsequently. The nature, seriousness, and possible consequences of this are as yet not clear.

2. A/27 has told at least two people something about this operation. Although he says that he did not give any details of the operation, he does admit to having discussed it in very general terms with two individuals whom he named at the time of the LCFLUTTER test. One of these is a friend of Gutierrez Menoyo and one a friend of Vargas Gomez.

THERE SOME suspicion he was G-2 agent.

3. AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the army for the past two years. Although it is difficult to assess how well he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks, it is the case officer's opinion that few of these contacts might be considered really close. AMICE/14 has been out of direct touch with his operational contacts since July 1961.

4. The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent upon having a good guide in the boat. At this time, Phase II is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/4 as guide.

5. Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is basically lacking. Some control can be exerted through the implied threat of withholding support to the operation. Control however will remain tenuous at best and A/27 will continue to be a difficult handling problem.

6. On the positive side of the ledger is the calibre of the agents, both of whom are well educated, astute, and highly motivated. Both agents have experience in clandestine operations, particularly A/14 who has made a number of previous clandestine entries and exits and has many operational contacts. To date both have performed in a superior manner in training.

V. FUTURE PLANS

During the week of 1 through 6 April, the team will receive maritime instruction. During the week 8 through 13 April, they will receive SW training, possibly OWVL training, disguise training, and further operational planning sessions.

VI. COMMITMENTS

1. According to AMICE/27, the following principle, which he feels is a commitment from ODYOKE, was enunciated during his initial trip to ZRMETAL: "ODYOKE will recognize a new Cuban

government which is anti-Communist and which operates on democratic principles; ODYOKE does not desire to impose a government of its own choice upon Cuba". A/27 has made a big point of discussing this "commitment". It is apparent that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his followers. It is also apparent that in his mind he links Batista and KUBARK, and fears that KUBARK would back Batistianos in a post-Castro government.

2. All AMTRUNK group members think that they received a commitment while in ZRMETAL that ODYOKE would support their operational plan, with funds, training, logistical support, and technical assistance, but would leave control of the operation entirely in their hands. In other words, they are not working for ODYOKE or KUBARK in any sense. On this point they are very sensitive.

3. Another commitment which AMICE/27 claims to have discussed in ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE should give "official recognition" to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful coup d'etat, following the coup, in order that these individuals will not be treated as political criminals by a future regime. This means recognition of an individual's participation in the conspiracy, not a promise of recognition of a specific government formed by the conspirators themselves.

4. Discussion of the above "commitments" has been pressed several times by A/27. PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these commitments with A/27. However, A/27 feels that the commitments have already been made by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL. PEGGINS has told A/27 that he will report these "commitments" back to ODYOKE to determine if, in fact, ODYOKE considers them as commitments.

Rol

5. The only commitment made by JMWAVE through PEGGINS has been that if any of the AMTRUNK group were killed or captured while on the mission, their families in PBPRIME would be assisted for a "reasonable amount of time" financially. PEGGINS declined to state what that time would be or how much financial assistance would be involved.

Why!

6. One further negative commitment has been discussed between PEGGINS and A/27. PEGGINS has stated to A/27 that no commitment will be made at this time to support any internal group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives and that this extends specifically to no promise to support active sabotage with demolitions.

N.B

19-6-51/1

SECRET

20 April 1977

SUBJECT: Identification of Sensitive Source

The sensitive source cited in paragraph 4, page 29, of Book V - Final Report of SSC to Study Governmental Operations - was an audio operation against the Cuban Embassy in Paris, France encrypted UNSIERRA. It is defunct and the files are retained in Archives in Warrenton. The French Desk will order for us if needed.

A copy of the referenced communication, PARI 1664 (IN 69266) dated 27 November 1963, is attached. It was located in Volume 4 of Rolando CUBELA's official file, 201-252234. UNSNAFU-12, cited in paragraph 3 of that cable, is Marta FRAYDE, a Cuban alternate delegate to UNESCO and an unwitting FI source at that time.

Please note that a copy of this cable was provided to Mr. Breckinridge to carry to a meeting on 11 June 1976 with Senators Hart and Schweiker.

Chris Hopkins
LAD/Task Force (JFK)

Attachment: a/s

14 January 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez (AMLEO-3) (201-249386)

1. Born 7 April 1922 in Havana, Cuba, the son of a native-born American citizen, RABEL was brought up in comfortable circumstances. He attended high school in Cuba, completed the last year in New Orleans, Louisiana, and entered Tulane University in September 1938. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in December 1940 and eventually saw combat in France, Belgium, Germany and Austria. After discharge in December 1945, RABEL returned to Cuba to attend the University of Havana and this began a life of job changes, moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba, and, in general, rootless living.

2. RABEL's background reads like that of a man with no allegiances or loyalties and no particular goals. Viewed in retrospect, his career presents a picture of unreliability. It is probable that RABEL's rootlessness and apparent unreliability applied both to his relations with CASTRO and to those with the Agency. It is quite possible, therefore, that he not only served the Agency in a superficial way but that he did the same for CASTRO at various times when it suited his purposes. Without postulating this sort of dual role (one which fits very well with his previous life) it is almost impossible to explain some of the reasonably good things he did for the Agency and the quite certain allegations that he was a CASTRO agent. This explanation is not fully satisfactory, but it does explain his career better than the charge

that he was a CASTRO agent from the beginning. The question that must remain unanswered is whether he betrayed the AMTRUNK Operation. He was not arrested until September 1965 (when AMTRUNK had already run its course) but it appears quite certain that he cooperated with the DSE after his arrest and while he was in prison.

3. RABEL joined in the clandestine activities against BATISTA in March 1952, first among~~st~~ the exiles in the U.S. and then after late 1952 from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban armed forces to further his plotting and was assigned to the Cuban General Staff. He was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mission in Cuba from November 1954 until April 1956. During his entire period in the Cuban army, RABEL was involved with dissident Army elements; when they attempted a coup in April 1956, RABEL was arrested. He was released shortly thereafter, worked in the chicken business for a year and then returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers (Luis RABEL Nunez). In October 1957 he returned to Cuba and became involved with the 26th of July Movement but had to leave a year later when he was brought to the attention of the BATISTA forces because of a bomb explosion. He smuggled weapons to Camilo Cienfuegos for about a year and then in October 1958 he joined the Cienfuegos group. Shortly after the CASTRO victory, CASTRO called upon RABEL to set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until February 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief of Viviendas Campesinas.

He held this job until he defected to the U.S. in December 1962. It is worth noting that he rarely pursued one activity in one place for more than a year at a time from 1945 to 1962.

4. RABEL gave Alfonso RODRIGUEZ the following reasons for his defection:

a. Communist pressure, hounding, and the basic enmity of the Communist Party toward him. (This appears very reasonable in view of his service in the U.S. Army and training in some aspects of intelligence, such as prisoner interrogation. In addition, his schooling in the U.S. and the reasonable economic circumstances would not have been recommendations from the Communist point of view.)

b. Strong backing by Fidel which protected him from more serious attacks from the Party. (This, too, seems entirely reasonable. His family farm was near the farm Fidel's father managed and RABEL and Fidel had known each other as children. In addition, RABEL's long involvement in the anti-BATISTA movement and with Camilo Cienfuegos were probably in his favor in CASTRO's view.)

c. An obligation to protect the non-Communists in his department, which prevented his earlier defection, and uncertainty of his reception in the U.S. (In view of the number of defections from RABEL's department, there were, in fact, people to protect. Since RABEL had served in the U.S. Army, and probably felt the U.S. was his second country, he could well have had questions about his reception after serving in the CASTRO government.)

d. His resentment against the confining nature of a Communist State. (Since he never stayed in one place more than a short time in his entire life, to have been restricted to Cuba must have seemed a punishment.)

5. RABEL was used to pitch Dr. Marta FRAYDE Barraque in Paris in July 1963, and to check out leads for the AMTRUNK Operation. One of his leads led to the recruitment of AMTRUNK-10. Later,in early 1964, RABEL was leader of the Rebel Army Group supported by the American Legion in Miami and was involved in the Rebel Army Radio program.

6. There is no specific evidence (except the accusations below) that RABEL was involved in a suspicious way with the CASTRO regime during this period, but his desire to exfiltrate his wife and children was a constant source of difficulty between him and the Station. This problem led to his eventual termination in July 1964 and to a great deal of resentment on his part. He conspired constantly, from mid-1963 until his capture in Cuba in September 1965, to get into Cuba to exfiltrate his wife and children.

7. RABEL was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was set free in July or August 1967, which is a strong indication that the charges that he worked for the DSE while in prison were true. Moreover, there is some indication that he may have attempted a provocation at Cuban behest immediately after his capture. There are two firm accusations that RABEL was a

Cuban agent as early as July 1963 (which would have been when he was screening names for the AMTRUNK Operation), one from LITAMIL-9, and the other from Fernando REY reported by VASLOUCH-1. As mentioned above, these charges could well be true; yet RABEL could have fulfilled his duties for CASTRO superficially, for his own purposes, and not necessarily have compromised his work with the Agency until he was captured. The difficulties he had in exfiltrating his wife could have been, partially, punishment by CASTRO for not fulfilling his duties as an agent; otherwise, had his work in the U.S. been valuable, CASTRO could have facilitated the exfiltration of RABEL's wife so that RABEL could continue his work as an agent undisturbed.

LAD/JFK Task Force 1977/[redacted]:rp
Copy filed: 201-249386

Attachments: 4

A- 10 Feb 1964 Memo for the Record
B- 6 Mar 1963 dispatch UFGA-7998 with Att.
C- 20 Feb 1963 cable WAVE 4730 (IN 71127)
D- 30 Sep 1963 dispatch UFGA-11375

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 27 PER CI 2 (EO) TOTAL COPIES 10-1 RUN BY Z

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT * C/CI 3

ACTION #

INFO: ~~RF~~. FILE. VR. 000, OGC, C/EUR 3

"Eyes Only"

STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

T 693164 EIA770 PAGE 01 IN 830376

TOR:181831Z FEB 76 15-2 [MADR] 30177

S E C R E T 181900Z FEB 76 STAFF

4 cent LA

*CABLE SEC SUGGESTS DISSEM TO: C/LA IF DESIRED, SEND FORM 1601 TO CABLE SEC

CITE 15-2 [MADRID] 30177

TO: DIRECTOR INFO 15-1 [LONDON], 15-15 [LISBON].

RYBAT PHMHHLANKET KMSTONE

1. NICKY SZULC STILL IN MADRID AS OF 17 FEB. SHE TOLD 01 [QUCOMUMN/1] SHE HAS BEEN IN CUBA THREE TIME, LAST TIME DURING INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S CONFERENCE. WHILE THERE SHE CLAIMED BE WORKING AS ADVISOR FOR MINREX COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SECTION. SHE SAID CUBANS GAVE HER ACCESS TO ALL INFO THEY HAD ON CIA ACTIVITIES AROUND WORLD. SAID SHE WAS PAID SALARY AND HAD CAR AND CHAUFFEUR AT HER DISPOSAL.

2. SZULC ALSO TOLD 01 [Q/1] SHE HAD WORKED VERY CLOSELY WITH AGEE ON PREPARATION HIS BOOK. SAID SHE AND WEISSMAN AND AGEE VERY ANGRY WITH JOHN MARKS FOR PUBLISHING HIS BOOK "HOW TO SPOT A SPOOK". THEY TOLD HIM THIS WOULD ONLY ALERT CIA TO CHANGE ITS TACTICS, BUT MARKS PUBLISHED BOOK ANYWAY AND THEY NOW CONSIDER HIM TRAINTOR.

3. FILE: 23 [73]-6-46/3. E2 IMPDET

Rich

(*)

SECRET SENSITIVE

CI Staff Action

S E C R E T

19 FEB 1976

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

7/PR

N.B.

(att. B. to 14 Feb. 77 Szulc memo)

Att. B.

OGC 67-0040

24 February 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Estimate of Damage Which Could Accrue to CIA Miami Through Prosecution of the Rolando Masferrer Haitian Invasion Group

1. The decision by the Justice Department to seek a Grand Jury indictment against Rolando Masferrer and certain of his associates is a potentially explosive matter which could result in extensive damage to CIA activities in Miami. Recent adverse publicity on the national scene and in the Miami area have added substantially to the already sizeable embarrassment potential. Some of the main sectors of danger to CIA equities are described below.

2. Basic national publicity regarding student and foundation topics have already attracted attention of the local press to the CIA in general. Usually any reference to CIA covert activities leads the press to check files for references to any such activities locally. However, before this action could be taken, the story regarding the Pan American Foundation and the University of Miami broke, and the press immediately concentrated on this topic. The CIA Chief of Station learned through personal press contacts that this was partly a matter of luck and partly because of the friendly and cooperative attitude of these press contacts. Although several editorials highly critical of CIA have been published and the replay of wire service stories has been given much space, as yet there has been no local follow-up aimed at putting CIA or the CIA Station on the spot. However, the situation remains delicate, since, even with much good will, local newsmen cannot afford to let themselves be scooped by outsiders concerning stories in their own back yard.

3. Any new story, such as the 22 February story in World Journal Tribune on suspected CIA connection with recruitment of Cuban pilots for the Congo, the possible results of inquiry made on 21 February by three students connected with the University of Miami newspaper The Hurricane, or further revelations concerning the Pan American Foundation, could easily trigger publicity with an inevitable focus on the South Campus of the University of Miami and on the Miami Station cover firm.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

KK3

06,08 4. As has been the case for the past six years, Dr. Henry King Stanford, President and Dr. Eugene Cohen, Vice President and Treasurer of the University of Miami, 29 06,08 have extended their fullest cooperation concerning the Miami Station and overall CIA interests and it is anticipated they will continue to do so. However, we believe there is a practical limit to the amount of pressure they could stand from 24 their trustees and from certain public quarters if there is a flood of publicity regarding CIA activities allegedly centered in or controlled from the Zenith Technical Enterprises Inc., 20 or its accused successor, the Melmar Corporation. 29 If such a situation arises, it is conceivable that Dr. Stanford 06 would feel impelled to take some action aimed at disassociating the University of Miami 29 from any contact with the Melmar Corporation. 29 Since the Melmar Corporation 29 is ostensibly the tenant of the University of Miami 29 although on Federal property, the resulting action might involve a request for the termination of the tenancy agreement.

5. Even if the above circumstances did not exist, we would remain concerned regarding the possible effects of the prosecution of the Masferrer group. Although no Station agents or persons with whom the Miami Station has contractual arrangements are among the persons arrested or those who will be prosecuted, it will be very easy for the defense to drag CIA Miami into the case. The defense has only to obtain testimony (true or perjured) from one of the defendants, or to summon as defense witness one or more disaffected former agents of the CIA Station, in order to begin a chain reaction surfacing much detail and rumor concerning CIA operations against the Cuban target. Given the sizeable reduction of infiltration and Covert Action agents during the past year, a general feeling of frustration and lack of support for Cuban freedom attributed to passive U.S. policy and reduction in CIA support in all sectors, the long standing animosity of certain exile circles against U.S. Government, notably CIA, and the evaluation that CIA now is the most vulnerable of Federal Agencies confronting them, exiles will be tempted to see an attack against CIA as accomplishing several purposes, that is, gaining acquittal, blackening CIA, and exerting pressure on the U.S. Government for a policy change.

KK4

11/RV

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING attachment	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC
Contact Report - IDEN *A

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: See Para 4

1. IDEN A, a wealthy and prominent New Orleans businessman, was recommended to JMWAVE and made available by Headquarters. He had been cleared by Headquarters for JMWAVE use under date of 15 December 1962 in DIR-05291.

2. IDEN A was initially contacted for JMWAVE by Eli A. SACHTSCHALE, who was introduced to him by the New Orleans KUJUMP office on 27 December 1962. The JMWAVE cover situation was discussed with IDEN A by SACHTSCHALE and IDEN A's assistance was requested. IDEN A was first enlisted as the President of YOCOUGH, a JMWAVE cover company. Also cleared and used as officers of YOCOUGH are IDEN D and IDEN E. Although cleared and witting, these individuals are contacted only when their signatures on YOCOUGH documents are required, all contact normally being with IDEN A. IDEN A also permits use of his own company as a funding mechanism for YOCOUGH. He has acted as a spotter for JMWAVE and has recommended several other businessmen who are being used by JMWAVE. He has also made available several oil companies in which he owns interests for use in backstopping cover of JMWAVE operational vessels. It is known that he is used by Headquarters for several JBECHO activities. IDEN A is contacted several times each month by JMWAVE.

ACE Marine Surveys
Ceres Enterprises Inc

3. IDEN A has met Rufus E. MANGROLL and Colin R. HOWGRIND as well as Eli A. SACHTSCHALE. He knows YOCOUGH, YOAFT and the JMWAVE operational vessel IDEN B. He knows that Miami attorney IDEN C participates in JMWAVE activities. So far as is known, he knows no other JMWAVE personnel or assets.

4. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned IDEN A and that it be made known to JMWAVE.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

ATTACHMENT;
Identities u/s/c

DISTRIBUTION:
✓3 - C/WH/C w/att
u/s/c

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
12 May 65

DATE DISPATCHED
MAY 19 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-21422

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER

TO: UFGA-21422

IDENTITIES

IDEN A: Alfred J. *Moran

DPOB: Not available

Res: 8422 South Claybourne Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana

Bus: 909 South Broad Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

IDEN B: M/V BARB

IDEN C: James Costello

IDEN D: Glean E. Magnuson

IDEN E: Robert T. Nieset

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL SECRET ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File: Kennedy assassination - Garrison

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: E/BC	EXTENSION	NO.	
		DATE 2 0 DEC 1967	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/EURBC	20 Dec 67			OGC 67-2367
2.				
3. Office of General Counsel John Greaney			JG	1-3: Per our conversation — incidentally, I'm still under [State] cover with my [daughter!] [illegible]
4.				
5.				SECRET
6.				
7.				Passed oral info to Mr Kossack that FBI was given report in London sr [MI-5] & Govt Garrison to Russell Foundation, on 2 Jan 1968 J.K.Z.
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				file
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

4 RS

3/

14-00000

SECRET

OGC 67-2367 ✓
Indep

20 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : Mr. John Greaney

SUBJECT : James Garrison

1. Per our conversation in the environs of the 15-1 DD/P's office on 19 December, we have just received from [London] Station a 24 scrap of information on Subject's activities. [MI-5, the [British] Security Service,] 24 has provided the following in a report on Americans who are in correspondence with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation:

> "Jim Garrison, District Attorney, Orleans, Louisiana
>
> A secret and reliable source has reported that the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has been in touch with Jim Garrison. Our source states that the initiative in this contact appears to have come from the Foundation and the purpose of it seems to be to persuade Garrison to write an article about the late President Kennedy's assassination which presumably the Foundation could use in some way."

2. 24 [MI-5] has also passed this 15-1 information to the Legal 24 Attache (FBI representative) in [London.] I would stress that [MI-5's] source is very sensitive and request that this office be advised in advance if any executive action is to be taken on the basis of the above information.

03

[Philip F. Fendig
AC/EURBC]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

7/ML

JMWAVE COVER FACILITY

A. NAME : Ace Marine Survey, Inc.

OFFICE ADDRESS : Room 214, 2525 S.W. 3rd Street, Miami, Florida

MAILING ADDRESS : P. O. Box 1337, Main Post Office, Miami, Florida

LOCATION : Office of Attorney Norman S. Pallot

B. TYPE OF FACILITY: This is a Florida Corporation established by and under the control of JMWAVE and certified to do business in Florida. Ace Marine Survey, Inc. was formerly known as Ace Cartography Company, a corporation which had been certified to do business in Florida on 11 July 1962. This Corporation was amended on 4 November 1966 to its new name, Ace Marine Survey, Inc.

The President of the Corporation is Alfred J. Moran of New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Moran is a very prominent businessman in the New Orleans area. He is head of Kalvar and has investments in a variety of businesses which include many oil interests. He is known to Headquarters representatives particularly in Logistics.

C. OSTENSIBLE BUSINESS: Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is engaged primarily in marine research including the study of marine life and testing of marine equipment. However, its general provisions permit it to perform almost any corporate function.

D. USE : JMWAVE use of the Corporation is to provide cover for a maritime vessel, the M/V SONORA. The Corporation provides status cover and payrolling of the agents assigned to the M/V SONORA and the safe area or berthing site from which the vessel operates in the performance of its ostensible business.

24

E. FUNDING : Method - This account is funded through the [Bank and Hall covert account at the First National Bank of Miami] by the following method: A check in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips for the various corporations is then turned over to a teller, where it is combined with all other transactions which are processed by that particular teller on the given business day. Since the number of transactions handled by a given teller may go as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of the deposits being attributed to the particular credit ticket which accompanied these deposits.

24

Overt Attribution or Source -[Offshore Navigation Company, 3503 Fern Street, New Orleans, Louisiana]

SECRET

F. TAX STATUS : This is a profit-making corporation and has met Federal and State requirements as follows:

1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Returns.

2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes.

3) Florida State Unemployment Tax.

4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return.

5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return.

G. AGENT IDENTIFICATION: The Corporation was providing status cover and payrolling for 10 Cubans as of 31 January 1967.

H. ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY:

1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967: This cover company should be affected little by a flap. However, because of the berthing location within largely tourist or recreation areas, its commercial activity has been noted.

2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967: A successor to Ace Cartography Company, Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is currently used in connection with the leasing of a waterfront berthing site for the berthing of M/V SONORA, which is registered under this firm. The firm also provides cover and serves as well as the vehicle for payrolling the agent crew.

Ace Marine Survey, Inc.,is engaged in the field of marine research, including the study of marine life as well as the testing of marine equipment.

In view of the current limited use of this cover, the likelihood of exposure is considerably reduced. However, if such an exposure did occur, it is felt that the damage to either WOFACT or the officers of Ace Marine Survey, Inc., would be of no great import. The major likely "injury" that would be sustained would be the denial of further use of the berthing site and the need for re-naming/re-registering the M/V SONORA.

In order to add depth and lend further substance to the cover story, the officers of a legitimate firm, Offshore Navigation Company, New Orleans, Louisiana, which is engaged in marine research and off-shore oil exploration activities, have agreed to backstop the activities of Ace Marine Survey, Inc. and to recognize the latter firm as a client. 24

14-00000

20

SECRET

JMWAVE COVER FACILITY

: Ceres Enterprises, Inc.

DRESS : Suite 1409 Biscayne Building, 19 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33101

ADDRESS : P. O. Box 5045, Main Post Office, Miami, Fla. 33101

: Office of Attorneys George E. Brown and Thomas B. Duff

ACILITY: This corporation was established in Florida and certified to do business on 10 March 1964. It was established by and is under the control of JMWAVE.

The President of this corporation is Mr. Richard W. Freeman, who is the retired Chairman of the Board of Delta Airlines. He is also the principal owner of the Coca-Cola Bottling Company in New Orleans. In addition he has many other varied interests including investments in oil ventures. He is extremely prominent in the New Orleans civic and social structure.

E BUSINESS: This corporation was established ostensibly to maintain and operate boats for all types of marine research.

: This corporation provided cover for maritime vessels, the M/V BARB and the M/V JADE, and served as the status and payroll mechanism for the agents employed by this corporation.

: Method - This account is funded through the [Bank and Hall covert account at The First National Bank of Miami] by the following method: A check in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips for the various corporations is then turned over to a teller, where it is combined with all other transactions which are processed by that particular teller on the given business day. Since the number of transactions handled by a given teller may go as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of the deposits being attributed to the particular credit ticket which accompanied these deposits. 24

Overt Attribution or Source -[Peterman & Peterman Associates, P. O. Box 8103, Main Post Office, Chicago, Illinois] 24

2/m

INCORD

SECRET

TAX STATUS : This is a corporation for profit. It has met federal and state tax requirements as follows:

1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Return
2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes
3) Florida State Unemployment Taxes
4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return
5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return

AGENT IDENTIFICATION: None at this time.

ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY:

1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - The cover mechanism established by the Ceres Enterprises, Inc. was very secure during the period of its operation and remained so until the loss of one of its agents who was captured in Cuba. This made it necessary to terminate the activities of this corporation and transfer its activities to another entity. This was accomplished without any unusual events or actual public exposure. If any should occur at this late date, the damage would be minimal.

2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - This corporation is currently inactive and will become legally dormant after three years. It was placed in this status due to an operational flap which could have exposed the corporation. The last active tax return was filed at the tax year ending March 31, 1966. An additional tax return will be filed for the past tax year which will indicate no financial transactions.

   Its assets and activities were transferred to other JMWAVE entities. This corporation was established to provide cover for a Maritime Branch vessel and status and payroll cover for the agents assigned to it. The corporation is inactive and will be allowed to remain so. It was placed in this status due to a flap wherein an agent was captured in Cuba who had knowledge of this vessel and its ownership. There was no public exposure in the Miami area. However, because of the past incident the corporation should not be used in the future under its current name. While in use the corporation served very satisfactorily for the purpose for which it was established.

104-10105-10102 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Returned to CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

03

FROM : Sherwood R. Bosworth
External Activities Branch

SUBJECT : Manuscript by David Phillips

1. Attached herewith is a proposed letter to Mr. David A. Phillips outlining deletions which the Agency would like made from his book. The general tone of the responses from Agency components was that, if possible, this book should not be published. In the view of most, it dangerously reveals sources and methods, internal organization, missions, and functions. It also provides public confirmation of covert Agency activities and the disruption and reduced morale created by Agee and others.

2. However, on the assumption that publication could not or would not be blocked, the operating components catalogued their most serious concerns. The attached letter to Mr. Phillips includes many of these reservations. The chapter by chapter review, which appears later in this memorandum, contains those recommendations for deletion which, for various explained reasons, should not be forwarded to Mr. Phillips.

3. Before proceeding with the manuscript review, we would like to advise that Mr. John Greaney of OGC has volunteered his services to accompany you or Mr. Stembridge when our proposals are placed before Mr. Phillips. Due to time limitations, he has not had a chance to review this memorandum or the proposed letter to Mr. Phillips as of this date.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4. The following is a compilation of items of concern to Agency components which were not included in the letter to Mr. Phillips. This does not include chapters one and six which have been previously reviewed and returned to Mr. Phillips.

5. Chapter two: Guatemala

a. Several offices expressed concern that this book, for the first time, confirms the CIA's role with Col. Armas and the coup. However, since it would be difficult to defend a classification on this, it was not included in the letter to Mr. Phillips. The same was true of the reference to the coup in Iran (p. 43).

b. Another area of concern was our relationship with the FBI in connection with his arrest and our use of false identity papers in the U. S. Of particular concern was mention of a capability to alter FBI criminal records. Again, we don't believe we can prove classification.

c. The one item which could have been deleted was a footnote on page 35 which inferred that the CIA had indemnified Lloyd's of London for a sunken ship. LA Division was able only to ascertain that no payment had been made as of August 1960. Since the footnote begins "press reports claimed that . . ." without further specifying the source, we felt it best to make no comment to Mr. Phillips on this point.

6. Chapter three: Havana and Beirut

a. Some concern was expressed regarding the paragraph on page 13 explaining salary off-set for deep cover officers. Although this may be truely classified, it might be best to let it remain as is, to dissuade readers that the Agency or its officers are making extra money on the side.

b. Other comments related to the details of Mr. Wisner's death (p. 5); connecting Ernest Hemmingway with the Havana COS (p. 21); and confirming that an

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

American executed by the Cubans was a CIA NOC (p. 48). The latter point, while clearly sensitive, was not raised to Mr. Phillips as LA Division posed no specific objection.

7. Chapter four: Bay of Pigs

a. Some objection was raised to Mr. Phillips citing the Gulf Steamship Company as a cover for the broadcasting aspect of the Bay of Pigs operation. However, in checking this out, it was learned that the cover was the Gibralter Steamship Company so no objection is made to the use of Gulf.

b. SSU also raised questions regarding the confirmation of assassination planning against Castro (p. 12) and the use of the Alban Towers Hotel as a temporary lodging facility for Agency personnel (p. 17). Since no one else raised an objection on these points, they were not relayed to Mr. Phillips.

8. Chapter five: Mexico City

a. In addition to all the comments directed to Mr. Phillips (see attached letter), the SSU objected to discussion of the purchase of scotch (p. 15), the specifics associated with the Cuban missile crisis (pp. 25-27), and the handling of "walk-ins" (pp. 33-35). LA Division also objected to the Agency's role in name tracing (p. 8).

b. In view of the considerable deletions requested of Mr. Phillips, the above were not included as their sensitivity and justification for classification appears to be marginal.

9. Chapter seven: Washington, D. C.

a. Several offices took exception to some items in this chapter which were not passed on to Mr. Phillips.

b. The SSU objected to the mention of liquor in the Director's dining room and the footnote confirming

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

a CIA role in the Glomar Explorer (p. 26). In view of the fact that GSA is now trying to rent or sell the ship, we don't feel we can justify a classification on these items.

c. The DDO objected to the general discussion of cover starting on page 29, but we could not pin the objection down to specifics. SSU commented that Mr. Phillips reveals the location of many stations around the world (including Brazzaville on page 31), but deletions of the names would be difficult to justify legally.

12-32

d. Both the SSU and LA Division objected to Mr. Phillips mention of assassination attempts on Castro (pp. 42-44), but, again, we would have trouble defending the classification of the information presented.

10. Chapter eight: Rio de Janeiro and Caracas

a. The most sensitive objections to this chapter involved the information on pages 15 to 20 of our role in Chile - Track II. These included the allegation of back-channel correspondence and the fact that the information could distort the public's view of the whole affair. Unfortunately, no one could tie it to the sources and methods or classification questions and therefore it was not included in the Phillips letter.

b. Other items of concern were the discussion of cover in Brazil (pp. 2-3); the operational use of women (p. 23); the employment of blacks (p. 26), especially the revelation that two black officers in Brazil were CIA officers, jeopardizing their cover, and that Army commo went through the Agency during the Dominican crisis (p. 31). While all of these could cast us in a questionable light or make operational life more difficult, it would be difficult to justify their deletion on legal grounds.

11. Chapter nine: LA Division

a. Although the requested deletions from this chapter are rather lengthy, they do no include all reservations raised by our offices.

1/PN

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

b. Several offices objected to references to the assassination of President Kennedy and the Watergate affair (pp. 5, 16, 30). These were rather innocuous and could probably not be justified on legal grounds.

c. The second objection was the author's general verification of the information in the Agee book and the impact of this book on the Agency. Again, deletion would be difficult to justify, but you may wish to discuss the damage potential with Mr. Phillips directly.

12. Chapter ten: Retirement

The DDO raised the question that Mr. Phillips statement on page 12 that he knew Agee has been to Cuba five times betrays knowledge he gained either from travel programs or liaison services. This would be a difficult point to argue in any confrontation with Mr. Phillips.

13. Epilogue

a. The SSU questioned whether this manuscript is the proper vehicle to surface the fact that two cables sent to Santiago in May 1973 established our non-involvement in the overthrow of Allende (p. 6). We could see no justification to strike this.

b. The SSU further believes that revelation of friction between Mr. Colby and Dr. Kissinger (p. 13) is also improper. Perhaps so, but difficult for us to press for deletion.

c. And last, the SSU objected to comments on pp. 14-18 which are suggestive of Agency judgements and evaluation regarding the conduct and success of the investigative efforts as well as other personalities critical of the Agency.

03

Sherwood R. Bosworth
Sherwood R. Bosworth

Att

Distribution:
  Orig - Adse
    1 - OS Registry
    1 - EAB
    1 - Chrono 03
OS/SSD/EAB/SRBosworth:sw (1 Jul 76)

4PN

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Chapter 3

Page 13 - Refers to deep cover personnel income offset against CIA salary and to CIA officers under light cover protected by diplomatic or official passports.

Page 14 - Refers to laundering of CIA salary before deposit to personal bank account.

Chapter 5

Contains detailed references throughout to Winston Scott, identified as chief of station, Mexico City. Central Cover Staff points out that Mr. Scott, who was never officially acknowledged as a CIA employee, retired under State Department cover in Mexico, where he subsequently died and where his widow and children still reside.

Chapter 7

Page 29 et. seq. - Discussion of cover

Pages 44-49 - Identifies "Camp 99 Perry" as a CIA training establishment, discusses training cover and Department of Defense cover. Central Cover Staff asserts 99 that while the CIA auspices of Camp Peary has been often alleged in the press, the Agency has never confirmed it as a fact.

2|7N

Chapter 8

Pages 2, 3 - Discussion of cover.

Page 4 - Reference to CIA/State ground rule that ambassadors are not necessarily informed about deep cover officers.

Chapter 9

Page 37 - As written, passage in first full paragraph could endanger a particular source, according to NE Division, which suggests the following modification:

> ...unexpected development. From surveilling the group's movements it was established that the intention was to travel to an adjoining area, where a major energy installation, we assumed, might be their target. CIA, through liaison, warned the authorities of that country and appropriate defense measures were taken. I instructed the CIA Station in Costa Brava to advise the president that the 16-42 terrorists might be using his country as ...

Pages 38-41:

LA Division recommends that the passage on the terrorist kidnapping in the Dominican Republic be deleted for the following reasons:

1) This incident is still fresh in the minds of most Dominicans and it is unrealistic to assume that it will not be picked up and published in the local press. Barbara Hutchison, USIA, one of the people kidnapped, is still in the Dominican Republic and, according to two recent reports, is again being considered as a target for kidnapping. The potential for terrorist acts against US citizens continues; three leaders of terrorist-oriented groups are in prison and publication of this item could propel the terrorists into action.

2) The close link between the ambassador and the station, as portrayed in the book could be prejudicial to his public image and might even provoke the terrorists to target against him.

3) The station has renewed a (liaison) 24 relationship and much effort is being directed toward developing 24 mutual confidence. Revelation of details of a (joint 24 operation) by a former division 24 chief might lead the increasingly friendly (liaison 24 contacts) to wonder whether we can maintain confidence on future operations and thereby throw the new relationship into jeopardy.

4) Although the bugging of the thermos was discovered and appeared in the press, the use of the Coca Cola case was not exposed and therefore continues to be an operational possibility, at least as far as the Dominican Republic is concerned. Revelation of the technique by Agee should not be a criterion for further disclosure.

3/RV

DD/O 76-3962

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

23 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

ATTENTION: Mr. Julian Fox

FROM: Clifton R. Strathern
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT: General Comments on Mr. David Phillips' Manuscript

REFERENCE: C/LAD Memorandum dated 22 June 1976, Citing Specific Objections to Mr. David Phillips' Manuscript

1. The general tenor of the manuscript leaves much to be desired from both an operational and security viewpoint. The author in numerous instances specifically discloses sources, methods, cover arrangements and liaison relationships. Various LA Division officer who have reviewed portions of the manuscript pertinent to their areas have commented negatively on the revelations of tradecraft and identification of numerous overseas Stations and operations.

2. Other objectionable items in the manuscript concern the confirmation of Agee's effectiveness in neutralizing Agency efforts abroad by publishing lists of CIA personnel in specific 24 Stations; revelation 28 of (Office of Communications) personnel in (every Embassy abroad;) the Agency role in countering terrorism, narcotics trafficking and training provided other services to counteract these activities; and, the specific identity of liaison relationships, particularly, (the Israeli 24 service.)

3. The overall concensus of this Division is that publication of this manuscript in its present form would be detrimental to the Agency and this Division in particular.

Clifton R. Strathern

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009560

3/PV

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

FROM: Robert R. Kierce Chief Special Security Unit, DDO	EXTENSION 1015	NO.	DATE 14 June 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/EAB/SSD				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

PRIORITY
Form No. 160 1 Dec 56 Use Previous Editions (13)

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14 JUN 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, External Activities Branch, SSD

SUBJECT : Manuscript by David Phillips

1. The following passages are a compilation of observations made by the SSU regarding Mr. Phillips' manuscript. The comments are by no means a total list of reservations concerning the submitted chapters but those noted from the perspective of the SSU.

2. In general the undersigned felt somewhat enlightened but rather uncomfortable in reading the submitted manuscript. This uneasy feeling appears to be based upon two impressions. Throughout the text, there is an obvious effort on the part of Mr. Phillips to "set the record straight" with regard to events, techniques and activities involving the CIA. Regrettably, as is often the case when one attempts to clarify and present the real facts, there is a possibility of further compounding a confused and ambiguous circumstance. Because of the various ramifications of the activities of the Agency, the SSU gained the feeling that more was lost rather than won in Mr. Phillips' efforts. The second disarming impression is that because an individual has proved to be an effective and successful CIA operations officer, there is no clear-cut assurance that he can achieve the same success as an author. The SSU was continually pained by Mr. Phillips' efforts to employ certain techniques often seen in spy fictions. The problem with author Phillips is that he is not writing fiction and has been identified as a former CIA employee with over 25 years in intelligence service. Although Mr. Phillips labored to introduce some humor into his manuscript, some of his anecdotes appear to be in bad taste.

3. The following comments are codified to complement those parts of the manuscript reviewed in this reading.

Epilogue

Page 6: Although Mr. Phillips makes a considerable effort to conceal the true identity of "Abe", there is a question as to whether the fact that two cables were sent from Headquarters to Chile in May 1973, and if this manuscript is the proper vehicle to surface such information.

16-23

VPV

E 2 IMPDET CL BY Ck1146

Page 13: Mr. Colby is quoted by the author indicating certain information revealing complications between Mr. Colby and Dr. Kissinger. In addition to breaching personal confidences, the author contradicts what he had indicated earlier to be an intent to permit Mr. Colby to speak for himself.

Page 14-18: Mr. Phillips again refers to "Abe" and his evaluations of the various congressional select committees investigating the CIA. In effect these comments are suggestive of Agency judgments and evaluation regarding the conduct and success of the investigative efforts as well as other personalities critical of the Agency.

Chapter 3

Page 5: Have the circumstances regarding Mr. Wisner's death ever been surfaced with such particulars as provided in this text?

Page 14: The information regarding the "laundering of money" as set forth in the first paragraphs of this page serves as a confirmation of official involvement in such activities. This should be deleted.

Page 21: There is a serious question raised regarding the author connecting Ernest Hemmingway and the Havana Chief of Station implying the prospect of a professional as well as personal affiliation.

Page 48: If it is in fact correct, has it ever been officially acknowledged that a U.S. citizen, a businessman in Havana, implied by the author as being a CIA agent was executed? Note: This chapter is replete with a profusion of illustrations of tradecraft and operational activities too numerous to set forth.

Chapter 5

Page 1: Mr. Phillips in his writing provides a historical chronology of senior assignments within the Agency with particular reference to the LA or WH Division. This is illustrated on this page in his reference to Colonel King "regaining leadership of the WH Division". Anyone interested in noting the organizational hierarchy and key personalities in the WH or LA Division during the period of Mr. Phillips' tenure with the Agency, would be aided considerably on page 2 and further as the author proceeds to identify Mr. Winston Scott as the Chief of Station Mexico.

Page 3: Although it has been publicly surfaced that Mr. William F. Buckley had worked for CIA in the past, the author on this page now ties him in with Howard Hunt and Mexico City and further as an American contract agent. The best interests of the Agency are not served nor for that matter the interests of Mr. Buckley and Mr. Hunt are not served by such revelations.

Page 4-6: The SSU believes it is totally unwise to have the mission and organization of the Mexico City Station outlined as explicitly as contained in these pages.

Page 5-6: The above observation is further complicated by the author's remarks regarding operations levied against the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

Page 8: The SSU further challenges the information set forth on this page regarding the biographic details of Mr. Winston Scott's assignments in Cuba, London, Eur Division and Mexico City. 15-1

Page 15: The undersigned does not believe the content of the information set forth regarding the Agency's procedures associated with the purchasing of scotch liquor. He is implying things which may perhaps have been unique to that station but certainly has not been a worldwide practice. Mr. Phillips' anecdote about the prospects of the Agency printing counterfeit tax stamps and the details involved in such planning, even though perhaps presented in jest would not be viewed as such in the eyes of many individuals in the United States today.

Page 16: Because Philip Agee has revealed the secret of the camera operation in his book,is it necessary for Mr. Phillips to repeat and in effect collaborate what a diseffected employee of the Agency is purporting? From a friendly alumnus of the Agency, this serves as a verification of Agee's statements and provides a violation of sources and methods of this organization.

Page 18-19: Pursuing the aspect of sources and methods, the SSU questions the author's anecdote regarding the identification and employment techniques of the material "why me". It would seem that in so far as any chemical or technical devices of this nature used by the Organization should not be surfaced in a book such as this.

Page 25-27: The specifics associated with the Cuban Missle Crisis of 1962 involving former Director John McCone and others are subject to strong question as to whether they should be included in this text. Again, what is provided by Mr. Phillips in this manuscript is drawn from such personal experiences realized in his Agency duties.

Page 33-35: The SSU takes exception to the information presented regarding "walk-ins" based upon the same rationale as contained above. It also flirts with the concerns of sources and methods of this Agency.

Page 46-48: All remarks concerning technical operations such as hidden microphones, quick plants, etc, are out of order particularly with reference to the development of a microphone in the armchair. This again violates the Agency's concern regarding sources and methods.

Page 55-61: Considerable inside information is provided regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his activities in Mexico. The SSU defers to LA Division, SE Division and OS regarding the advisability of inclusions of this material in this manuscript.

Chapter 7

Page 26: Although there is a legal basis for the serving of alcoholic beverages in the DCI dining room, is it appropriate to include such "tidbits" providing the news media with grist to conjure up stories of senior CIA executives making critical decisions following an alcoholic luncheon. This implication is synonymous with the problem of beer being available to the Secret Service when they are on assignment with the President.

Page 31: Throughout the manuscript the author in his narration confirms the fact that CIA has stations located around the world and in his writing procedes to verify the location of these stations. The comments relating to where he was assigned and where others in the Agency have been or are assigned, not only relates to the South America area but on this page the author confirms the fact that there was a CIA station in 12-32 (Brazzaville.) Other than in the change in name there is no effort made to dispel the prospect that the station continues.

Page 42-44: Although it is a most timely subject, information regarding any U.S. Government effort to assassinate Castro is highly explosive. Mr. Phillips is reporting information which he has privy to as a direct result of his Agency experiences. These should not be contained in this book.

99

Page 44: Although (Camp Peary) has unfortunately been identified as a CIA facility, is it necessary for the author to reinforce media articles regarding this establishment by spelling out the cover background and other "chapter and verse" items regarding this facility. I believe comments regarding firearms training, counterterrorism training should be avoided.

Chapter 8

Page 7: The author's remarks concerning CIA support to the Elbrick kidnapping again is a violation of sources and methods, and should be deleted.

Pages 13-21: It is understandable but regrettable that the author continues to single out sensitive issues; i.e., assassination and in this instance CIA involvement in Chile. The information contained in these pages are volatile and should not be included in such a commercial venture. Any such information is liable for quotations out of context warping or reinforcing the involvement that the Agency did have in the political activities of Chile.

Page 25: For the first time the SSU was made aware of the daughter of a CIA officer who was stripped naked and held with a knife at her throat by political assassins. If this is in fact a true statement, I question the value of such an inclusion in this text particularly in light of the terrorism problems that this Agency and other elements of the U.S. Government are experiencing around the world.

Page 27: The statement the author makes with regard to promotion to GS-17 is not correct.

Page 31: I believe that Office of Communications should be consulted on the entire section relating to communications, communications personnel and the Office of Communications, however, the SSU raises the question concerning the inclusion of teletype decoding speeds on this particular page.

Chapter 10

Note: Chapter 10 continues in the same vein as all of the other chapters. It further reinforces the earlier remarks that the more one tries to explain and clarify a point the more confusing it becomes. The remarks contained in pages 23 and 24 regarding Chile are illustrative of this.

4. In summary, the SSU joins those who feel that this book would better have been left unwritten. It is a text replete with names, details, operational information and close personal privileged information based upon the author's assignments which has been rendered into a commercial version of Mr. Phillips' affiliation with this agency for over 25 years. This manuscript reinforces the difficulty of a retired operations officer to develop a non-fiction text which is attractive to the public but does not contain information regarding intelligence personalities, organization and sources and methods.

Robert R. Kierce

Robert R. Kierce
Chief
Special Security Unit, DDO

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

3 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, External Activities Branch
Office of Security

FROM : John H. Stein
Deputy Chief, Soviet/East European Division.

SUBJECT : Manuscript by David Phillips.

1. At the risk of tilting continually at windmills, it is the undersigned's view, and that of innumerable colleagues, that Mr. Phillips' book should not be published. In the first instance, those portions we have read are superficial and give the reader the impression that the profession which Mr. Phillips practiced so well is one of derring-do, frivolity and foolishness. More seriously, the entire book is based on knowledge acquired by Mr. Phillips during his career in the Agency. Whether a given sentence is in the public domain or not, Mr. Phillips should not put his stamp of authenticity on that sentence. If publish Mr. Phillips must, and if the Agency cannot legally stop him, then so be it. Hopefully, while there is still time, someone will push for appropriate legislation to stop this foolishness.

2. While it is perhaps fruitless, we have attempted to identify some of the more damaging items in the text as drafted. These are cited below:

a. Page 15: Discussion of back channel communications used to circumvent the Secretary of State seems to be ill-advised and not designed to enhance Agency relations with State.

b. Page 23: There begins here a discussion of the use of women by the DDO. While I understand Mr. Phillips' desire to indicate that the DDO does in fact hire women and minorities, this section causes some anguish. At the present time, certainly in the Near East, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, the

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018307

use of women provides us an operational flexibility which we would not otherwise have. It is quite evident, furthermore, that the local security services have not focused on the extent to which we do use women. We would like to keep it that way as long as we possibly can, and it is the undersigned's firm belief that statements from Mr. Phillips, obviously authentic, will rather quickly bring the women we do use under increased scrutiny of hostile intelligence services. Further, in opening the Pandora's box of the use of women and minorities in the DDO, Mr. Phillips may be opening both himself and the DDO to unjustified criticism that we are either exploiting women or not hiring enough of them; similarly the minorities.

c. Page 25: I have known personally for 17 years the girl who, although stripped naked by burglars, managed to save her mother and father from harm. There are others elsewhere in the government and probably outside who are knowledgeable about the incident. The girl, now a lovely lady, is about to be dispatched under very sensitive cover abroad. Mr. Phillips would do well to delete reference to her as being an Agency employee.

d. Page 26: I think it is unwise for Mr. Phillips to conjecture on the reason why there are few blacks employed in the DDO. His reasoning may be correct, but I would venture that not everyone who reads his book will believe so, and the Agency may come under unfortunate pressure because of it. The specific black cited on page 27 as having removed a flag from the hands of demonstrators is a personal friend of mine. He is under cover. By citing the incident, Mr. Phillips removes that cover, for the black retrieved the flag as an American citizen, not as a CIA officer. In sum, I would suggest the deletion of the section involving women and minorities because it opens a Pandora's box and because, as written, the cover of two highly effective officers is placed in jeopardy.

e. Page 36: The anecdote on page 36 should at least be modified. The person referred to is the undersigned. I am the only Agency and State officer who owns a Chow dog. All my acquaintances abroad

32

YPJ

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

know I own the Chow dog. To avoid damaging further what cover I have left, I would appreciate Mr. Phillips simply citing "dog" or calling it a "poodle."

John H. Stein

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SUBJECT: (Optional) Manuscript by David Phillips

FROM: John M. Reeves, Jr JMR
C/EAB

EXTENSION: 7770

NO.

DATE: 24 May 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DDO/SS/Sec 3D00(H. Keough)		6/2/76	
2. ** see comments			
3. John M. Reeves Jr. C/EAB			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			**
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached are Chapters 3, 5, 7, 8, 10 and the Epilogue to David Phillips' book "The Night Watch." Previous chapter numbers are changed as follows: 5 (Bay of Pigs) is now 4; 8 (Dominican Crisis) is now 6; and 11 (Washington 1973-74) is now 9.

Please review these chapters for material that: (1) is classified, (2) was learned while the author was a CIA employee, and (3) has not been placed in the public domain by the Agency.

Concurrent review is being conducted by LA Div., CI Staff, CCS, DDO/SS/SOG, OGC DDO/SU, O/Commo (Chapter 10) and SE Div (Chapter 8).

The author must meet a publishing deadline within the next few weeks. In order to negotiate deletions before the deadline, your review and comments should be returned no later than 11 June 1976.

Only comment by C/SOG re Chapter 7, p 44 re Camp Peary being CIA installation.¶To our understanding, this base has never been officially acknowledged as a CIA installation. C/SOG also suggest NE Div and CAG may wish review. This package given to C/CAG and returned with no comments.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☒ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Manuscript Submitted by David A. Phillips

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

FROM: C/SS/SC	EXTENSION	NO.	DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, EAB, Office of Security				Attached are the comments of Acting Chief, SOG, regarding subject manuscript. All three comments fall within caveats 2) and 3) cited in your Routing and Record Sheet. H.R. Keough
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DRAFT
7 Jan 76

Chapter XI

Page 10: Though 99 Camp Perry (sic) has received much publicity, there appears no good reason to confirm the use of this facility by the Agency. Unless we plan on officially opening 99 Camp Perry (sic) as a CIA training facility, it should not be mentioned. (Check OTR)

Page 15: The "Phoenix Program" originated before William Colby became DEPCORDS, COMUSMACV. Ambassador Komer started the program and asked that Colby replace him as DEPCORDS so that there would be some continuity in the effort to deal with criminal elements of the Viet Cong infrastructure. It is unfair to subjectively state that the "Operation Phoenix" was Colby's own albatross. Certainly Colby doesn't believe this though he is receiving considerable flack from those who would like others to believe that the whole program was one of assassination of which Colby, as head of the CIA, was in charge.

Page 39: We're still putting audio devices in coke bottles -- all these techniques and methods should not be discussed since we may very well want to use them again in the future.

2/PN

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Review for Approval - Manuscript Submitted by Mr. David A. Phillips

FROM: J. F. Meehan
C/EAB, 4E33 Hq.

EXTENSION: 7770

NO.:

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE: 5 Jan 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/CCS GH-44, Att: Mr. H. Schor		8 JAN	
2.			
3.			
4. [redacted]	[redacted]		
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. J. F. MEEHAN C/EAB 4E33			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Subject, a retired Agency staff employee and former C/LA Div., has submitted the attached manuscript containing three (3) chapters of a book he has in preparation. Coordination for review and comment is requested to determine if the material: (1) is classified, (2) was learned while the writer was employed by the Agency, or (3) has not been placed in the public domain by the Agency.

Please note author's query for information contained in paragraph 3 of his letter FYI. The author had previously submitted Chapters I and VIII which were security approved with deletions.

Coordination for review is being conducted with LA Div., CI Staff, CCS, DDO/SS/SOG, and DDO/SSU.

It would be appreciated if this office could have your comments before COB 16 Jan 1976.

CCS
7 JAN 1976

1 TO 9

SEE CCS COMMENTS ON REVERSE SIDE

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1 to 9:

CCS recommends deletion of that part of the last sentence, following the semi-colon, 99 of the first paragraph on page 10 of Chapter XI, which 99 identifies Camp Perry as the site of Agency training courses. Camp Perry is an Agency training installation under DOD cover, and while its CIA affiliation has been alleged numerous times in the press, no confirmation of this affiliation has been made by the Agency. Mr. Phillips' comments as a former senior Agency officer can be interpreted as constituting official acknowledgement of the CIA/CAMP PERRY relationship.

99

HCS

4IPV

[illegible]
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	OGC		
2	Mr Greaney		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: John - the attached is all we can contribute.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/SOG	

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

(40)

FORM NO. 237 1-67 Use previous editions ☆ GPO : 1974 O - 535-857

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

Terms of Privacy Act
FR - 57 Systems

Gene Wilson: All records systems which could logically be conceived of were checked

8/27

Fred Randall

356-8204

X

Everyplace -

① STAR System
Computer Trace DDO

Main file

② Central Cover Staff

③ CI/STAFF
- a. HT Lingual
- b. Watch Lists
- c. etc

④ DCD

⑤ ~~FR~~ For Resources Div

⑥ OPS/ ~~ITG~~
International Terrorists C/S
(Chaos)

⑦ ~~OSG/DC~~ OPS CI files

⑧ Area Div's (LA/

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

U.S.

Kane Atkinson
Sam Stevens

DEA

~~[illegible]~~

[illegible]

572

Accounting Section
Mrs Foucci
21607

Robert Bayard
John Muldoon
Maria D. Mangum — Secretary for IGO
~~[illegible]~~ Eileen

Central Investigative Agency, Inc
Security Consultants International, Inc
Defense Systems International, Inc
Defense Service Company
Research ~~Company~~ Corporation of America
Mills & Raymond Research Projects —

No Records — of I.

Liaison app. Contact
Exp DOT. 1970
SI Cl. Official 1974.

Muldoon — Leave w/o pay 19NOV71 . 19NOV72
GS-12 19NOV72 — Disability Pension

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CKS

8/27

Werbell - CI/Staff.

7 FBI reports

+ 4 docs.

CI Staff

Cable to Athens

① Dir 375530 (17 July 74) 6 Mar
74.

② Ath IN 304568
11 July 74.

---

③ Teleponed to Borcuk
23 Jun '69

Subj' Simonis To file

---

④ To FBI 27 Jun 74.

CIRA -- 0371-74.

WH/7.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

C I Agcy, Inc

Dec '73

CIA

10 Dec '73

14-00000

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4th — 474

521

12th
E9F

8/19

Muellenberg, Kurt

Kench - Briefed.

Mort Sitver



5th Circuit. Kench Conf planned

alerted we have another problem re

Def. ~~cc~~ Citation

- Opinion of Ct ?
- Marger, Atty Δ

Co man has been Subpoenaed

Charles Jaffee * Govt. Coun

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CRIMINAL DIVISION

Assistant Attorney General, Richard L. Thornburgh, Rm. 2107	2601
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John C. Keeney, Rm. 2107	2621
Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Robert L. Keuch, Rm. 2113	2333
Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jay C. Waldman, Rm. 2113	2636
Special Assistant, James M. Seif, Rm. 2208	4676
Special Assistant, William Brady, Rm. 2209	2825
Executive Assistant, James W. Muskett, Rm. 2119	2641
Appellate Section, Chief, George Gilinsky, Rm. 2216	2657
Fraud Section, Acting Chief, Mark Richard, Rm. 764, SAFE Bldg.	2648
General Crimes Section, Acting Chief, Alfred Hantman, Rm. 504, FTRI Bldg.	2624
Government Regulations and Labor Section, Acting Chief, Philip Wilens, Rm. 808 SAFE Bldg.	3761
Internal Security Section, Chief, John H. Davitt, Rm. 200 FTRI Bldg.	2307
Legislation and Special Projects Section, Acting Chief, Philip White, Rm. 2714	2613
Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, Acting Chief, Kurt Muellenberg, Rm. 408, SAFE Bldg.	3971
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Chief, William Lynch, Rm. 2521	3516
Public Integrity Section, Acting Chief, Thomas Henderson, Rm. 868 SAFE Bldg.	2676
Special Litigation Section, Acting Chief, George Calhoun, Rm. 216, FTRI Bldg.	3885

LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION

Assistant Attorney General, Peter R. Taft, Rm. 2143	2701
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Walter Kiechel, Jr., Rm. 2143	2718
Legislative Assistant, Martin Green, Rm. 2607	2736
Administrative Section, James F. Hickey, Rm. 2610	2721
Appellate Section, Edmund B. Clark, Rm. 2339	2748
Appraisal Section, Norman E. Lauer, Rm. 500, SAFE Bldg.	5054
General Litigation Section, Floyd L. France, Rm. 2133	2704
Indian Claims Section, A. Donald Mileur, Rm. 604, SAFE Bldg.	5069
Land Acquisition Section, Anthony C. Liotta, Rm. 504, SAFE Bldg.	5092
Marine Resources Section, Bruce Rashkow, Rm. 2646	2750
Pollution Control Section, Alfred T. Ghiorzi, Rm. 2625	2707
Indian Resources Section, Myles E. Flint, Rm. 4710	4241

14-00000

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Def. William Bell
Def. Jerald Cunningham
Wayne

Martin
William ~~B~~ Bell
Gerald Wayne Cunningham

6/27/28

5/24/41

8/18

CIA -

Mud.

DEA & Customs



Work, DEA
Job - Sp Enforcement
Div Director

- Reporting of pertinent data

- Did you send



Custodian
Sealed

magazine
Pilot Cos

Sam Shores DOJ Atty

Stan a-dams

Conf w/ John M on line

14-00000

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Church 3971

187

8/19.

Morton, Sitver - DoJ.

~~[illegible]~~ Robert Richardson

P Charles Jeffer

Mort on Van Cleve incident

Crom Crueer - Pertu form

#

WR

Conf @ DEA/DoJ

Mat also attended.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Aug 56 – going back to USA for 20 yrs Ser Aug 56

Dec 48.

Married Carmen Adkisson on 25 Dec 48

Divorce – Sept ~~3d~~ 56

Detailed to Dep of State 8/11/65

State Corr. Not DAC

– Prob. Turkey Mar 67. Throwing plates
– Second Prob July 67 Returned home

Terminated Contract 24 May 1968

Back to Army to complete 20 yrs

Army + all

73-75
moves pd.

14-00000

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Church Staffer Conf.

Confirmation of Bundy Material:

① . What Moneys paid ?

5 def.
3 others
6 Cos.

Werbell 27 Jun 28
Wm Morton Bell 24 Jul 16
John NARDI 1 NOV 26
Morton Fruhle ~~11~~
Gerald. Wayne Campbell 24 May 5

② John
Conein. - Muldoon.
③ Robert BAYARD. Col.
Maura,
D. Mangum.

Central Investigation Agency, Inc.
Security Consultants International
Company
Defense Services
Defense Systems International Inc.
Research Coll of America.
Miller & Raymond Research Projects.

② . What Contracts with these resulting in purchase of Info. ?

③ . Colby Meeting for Lg.

④ formal release of Secrecy Agt.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Wm ~~[illegible]~~ Kunn -
Westinghouse -

Pre Trial
file is open!
9000!

2:00

Rpts
- Take Names out
- Run Names thru RI

USV.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Sheres

8/18

~~[illegible]~~ - C/ Narcotics Sect, DOJ.

Mr. Muellenberg
~~Mullenberg~~

739-3928

Pros This & Next

Def (?)

- good 5th circuit

Judge - Foy Motion to

Nixon
~~Kaye~~ . King
Colby
Colson
Conein .

Reed Kennedy.

Talk in fun of IP.

Grot Case

Sam Sheres.

Eglemens & Iglesias

Refute

Watterman

Private investigator

Party . <

Bell Morgan Case

Bell M

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Mark - Mort [redacted] Sitver
739-3971
8/17.

Robert Richardson - 128-6175

Chief Counsel, DEA.

AG willing to testify.

- certain areas.

w/ Werbell

Whether working with him.

Not anything. —

Q - DEA assassination Texas

Justice Crim Div

Jack Cross

350-4136

14-00000

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Death of Col Robert E. Bayard. '56. July 75
Atlanta Ga.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

8/23

Jack

Sam Stees .
Wm. Warner . §

Bernstein . dead !! (FBI)

* Emp records of Conein –

* Release from Security Cl. –
Copy

---

* CIA letterhead

Roland Brugeewell , NC
Atty Bell

* Witness ? ident ?
The L.P. w/ Fox & devices

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Southern Air Transport - <

8 dates of Sale ?

Juror !!

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

8/24.

Conein, Lucien Emile.

June 1943 invest. - Subj' born Paris. (Parents french)

~~divorced wife~~ - Owen Axsom girlfriend -

divorced wife. Rose Marnin - Sept 21, 41
div. 3/31/42

brought to US. as child - Naturalized 1942

DOB. Nov 29, 1919. Paris.
ASN - 0 1322768.

lived france 1919-1925

enter US. 9/~~[illegible]~~ 1925 - Naturalized 8/11/42.
Divorced - ?.

Aunt raised

HS - Kansas city. 1935-36.
French Army. 1940-41.

Type Setter
1936-39.

2 Rtn US. Apr 41.

overseas. entangled w/ french girl - entered USA.
Sept 41.

App for duty OSS. June 43

(~~47~~. recorded he stayed in USA Status not Agency)
July 48

Monique Veber
on Apr 23, 46

Richard Helms requested waiver of 10-2 (for relatives)
Subj wife french - and then divorced

Feb 48 ? Dec 23, 1947

EOD w/ CIA on Mar 51

5th from back

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

"Communist China Intel Study" ~ 1945-1972

23 Sep 73

Lucien E Conein + Richard L. Kobakoff

75 docs. all Sensitive w/ another typing type. Richard L. Kobakoff

~~OM N~~ Omaha Neb.

13 Dec '37

Macken, Walter Joseph.

Reed. College grad.

Wife of Stanley Karnow B. R. Fox Co. of Alex. Va.

Michael John Morrissey - in C Information.

Parents German - Pro German

Subject uses the prefix Von Macken

5 NOV 69 given SI data (Commo)

Served in VN under (AID Cover) 32

* 3 Feb '72 made available to Bur of Narcotics + Dangerous Drugs for 2 yrs

TK Briefing. 20 Mar '72

UPI

31 Aug 61 → 13 Mar 62 FBIS (Calif.)
Apr 62 - Dec 63 Hq. "
Dec 63 Aug 64 HQ DAC.
Aug 64 Feb 67 VN - DAC
Aug 67 - Feb 72. Hq. DAC.
1 Feb 72 - detailed to BNDD for CIA (Covert)
Transfer BNDD - Terminated 31 Oct 73

Declined Extension to CIA.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Interviews – Soil.. Thai desk must have sent, the
i.e. Joan (LNU).

~~for~~ DEA c/CIA interview.

30 more docs. in Pers paper

TK. debrief ~ Rifford.
5 Oct '73

~~[illegible]~~ SI/Comm. 5/10/73

? Contact of ________ - Case officer in WH.

Also ________ (former CIA) w/DEA

Reported on Macken in FOA & paramilitary TA.

Lots of Studies on NOT

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Werbell Dob. ~~[illegible]~~ 18 Mar 1918.

Secrecy Agt. 7 July 59.

(Tom J. Flores) 03

Phoned Gen ~~Cabel~~ Cabell on 5 July '59.

Tr. Dominican Republic. Gen Pedraza.

OSS July 45 - Dec 45 ✓

Enlisted 20 Apr 43. 2nd Lt. 21 Jun 44. ✓

Burma & China--

Soldiers Medal. presented. BG. John Magruder 18 Dec '45 ✓

POA - 4 Aug 59.

Oct '59 - decision to drop:

(a). motivation to use A for source of funds to fin his personal plans

(b). His access to data of value limited always 2 or 3rd hand.

Tx advised on 2 Oct 59 - Suggested he report data to FBI

Feb '63 [Guatemala, Nicaragua & El Salvador.]

Art Smith "United Organization for the Liberation of Cuba"

YPV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Andrew St. George –

Haitian invasion of Government of Duvalier –
July 8 1966

Haitian Council. Maximilien.
Arms to Rolando Masferrer Rojas
Cuban senator in Batista Govt,

Connections in Dominican republic –

May 69 Ops proposal to Thailand –
Sionics, Inc.
Atlanta Ga.
Fred N. Brown pres.
Export license to Thailand

Jan '70 – rpt of Ops against Duvalier from Canada
To FBI & Treas

Feb '71 DOD CI Problems

Mar. 71 Longdistance Call from Sully re CI problems

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

27 Apr 73 State. "Bahamas effort."

Edwin Marger, Atty.
"Council for a free Abaco"

¢ Subject

Military Armament Corp - Abaco prob

Jan '74 . DCD review Take into - Stay away from him.

TO FBI May '74.

Van Cleave to FBI from our Agt. July 74.

Aug '74 - deal with Arms to Greek Govt
to a Contact of Agency - see if "friend agree"

Jan '75 . DEA Conein - B.R. Fox Co.
& Michael Morrisey

w. Wm Bell

Jan '75 - DEA. Narcotics & overthrow Gov. of GRenada
(July 75)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Friends of Ar

FDA Muldoon, Russos & Hackim (out as wears oct 73 — 8/13 (detailed to DEA Feb; oct 7)

Lucien E Conein,

Muldoon, John Patrick.

3 Feb' 58 DOB. 25 Aug.' 37

Cove - USA. Staff Emp;

Cove back Stp fictional - interrogation expert

Feb 58 – Apr 59 –	Hqts.
Apr 59 Aug 61 –	Frankfurt Ger
Aug 61. Feb. 64 –	Seoul Korea
Feb 64 – Oct 64	– Hqts
Oct 64 – Sept 66	Saigon
~~Oc~~ Sept 66 – Dec 68.	Bang Kok
Dec 68 – ?	Hqts

Malaysia Bangkok & Indonesia

24 (4305 Kent Ave) Bethesda, Md.

SI Cl 12 Feb 68

24 (Security Consultants Intl.)

Gun permit. Apr 70 (FBI) (NYC Dept [illegible])

~~Return~~ – Policythemia (Blood disease) Aug 70

✓ Secrecy oath on termination. 19 Aug '71

Comm SI – (18 USC 798) (See this)

✓ Retired medical 19 Nov '72

Involved w/ Werbell – Friend of Abaco.

2/PV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	OGC FU-2 Attn: Walter Lloyd	8/9	
2			
3	file Werbell		
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
03 A.F. Addona C/DDO/PIC/AL	6 Aug

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

(40)

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Richardson — Counsel to Chief 8/12

Robert ?
or Craig ?

128-5295

128-6175

Minor Prob — John Muldoon

P

Krogh

St George

O'Neil

WerBell

Lou Conein

Sup.

Kennedy

Stuart — Asst AG.

RETU... ...e Only
Backgrou...
Do Not Reproduce

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Coneen – 19th → 25th
or week

To DEA < Sent by WH,

Bud Krogh – Purpose

CIA Testimony
on Drug Traffic

Show Coneen – used Werbell

< We arrested

7 3/74.

History WWII – OSS
1969 – CIA
Central Am & FE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED YES NO	DATE 6 August 1976 LETTER NO.

TO : Office of General Counsel
ATTN: Walter Lloyd

FROM: DDO/PIC 03
(A. F. Addona)

SUBJECT: Privacy Act Case [illegible]-828--Werbell

I understand you requested the status and date of completion of the above Privacy Act case. DDO/PIC estimates that the case will be completed by 20 August 1976. If there are further questions, would you please call either Hal Matter, DDO/PIC, or myself.

(A. F. Addona)
03

cc: Ernie Mayerfeld, OGC
Hal Matter, DDO/PIC

SIGNATURE

REPLY DATE

SIGNATURE

2/PJ

RESPONDER'S FILE

SENDER WILL CHECK CL[illegible]CATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	OGC FU-2 Attn: Ernie Mayerfeld		
2			
3	Walt Lloyd		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
03 (A.F. Addona), C/DDO/PIC/AL	6 Aug

	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 (40)

4PJ

FBI Docs incl in WERBELL FILE 1974-

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

ORIGIN: Atlanta, Geogia
DATE : 8 July 1975
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Atlanta, Georgia
DATE: 9 August 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: San Diego, California
DATE: 7 August 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Director, FBI
DATE: 6 August 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Internal Security - ABACO
Neutrality Matters - ABACO
BUREAU FILE: 62-108665
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Atlanta, Georgia
DATE: 22 July 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: New York, New York
DATE: 19 July 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Internal Security - Abaco
Neutrality Matter - Abaco
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ORIGIN: Las Vegas, Nevada
DATE: 24 July 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Director, FBI (Cable)
DATE: 25 June 1975
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell III William Martin Bell Neutrality Matters - Grenada
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Director, FBI (Cable)
DATE: 24 January 1975
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Director, FBI (Cable)
DATE: 16 January 1975
SUBJECT: Aladdin N, Al-Tayyar Internal Security - Iraq
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

14-00000

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

PS

X9271

Wilson

Gene

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

APPR OR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PRO

Karen Atkinson.

8/4.

~~[illegible]~~

- Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs.

Trial. - Miami

" Conspiracy to import & distribute Marijuana "

①. Aff'd not one of people.

②. Notes - Pete KINSEY. witness

Chuck Colson

Lucien Con~~[illegible]~~E/ CONEIN

from CIA - VN.

White H. - DEA.

CIA/DEA.

Chin - introduction

Pro N.

RETURN TO CI
Background Use
Do Not Reprodu

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRA

Produce by. Narcotics

AH. –

Conversations –
74 – 75

"Working for"

✓ Judge. Search 74 → July 75

* (Pete Fay.

Narcotics info.

USDC.
Southern Dist
Fla.

* Nothing on FOIA.

Motion for discovery.

Formal written request.

LA – FE.

Call

✓ 350 - 4443 – Tox ~~HH~~

~~[illegible]~~ Dudley LIVELY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

7

Central Invest Agency (CIA)

FBI - Jerry Brown - OS

1968
4400 Bk.

Karen - in Miami
591-4870

DEA

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

Hole Matter - DDO/FOIA Coord
working - Deceived 8/4.
1313

REPRODUCED ... Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce

Lee Bixler [illegible]

5:30

Notes WTN

8/10

RELEASED FROM ... CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROG

Military Ser 1943, 2nd Lt. in Signal Corps June 44 assigned to China Burma Theater.

to OSS from Apr thru Dec 45.

Returned to US & discharged as 1st Lt.

8/11

Tx Conf w/ Atkinson

~~[illegible]~~ Colneen Moldune

- Colson
- Krogh
- Nixon

Δ counsel there

↑ may be called to Testify

305-591-4910

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Mitchell Livingston WER BELL III

FROM: Nestor D. Sanchez Acting Chief Latin America Division	EXTENSION 1884	NO. DATE 3 MAR 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. ADDO 7E26				RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce
2.				
3. DDO 3 MAR 1976			✓	
4.				
5. Associate General Counsel, OGC 7D01				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DD/76-1261

OGC 76-1072
3/5/76

3 MAR 1976

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate General Counsel, OGC

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WER BELL III

REFERENCE : Your memorandum of 24 February 1976, Subject as above

1. Per reference request, we are forwarding information in our files concerning contacts that have taken place between this Agency and WER BELL.

2. The following is a summary of all DDO contact directly with WER BELL which took place in 1959:

a. A 6 July 1959 03 Memorandum to C/WH Division signed by (Thomas J. Flores) stated that General Cabell called (Flores) to report that WER BELL had called him. 03 WER BELL discussed with General Cabell a trip WER BELL had taken to the Dominican Republic and offered to come to Washington at his own expense to discuss the trip. No commitments were made to WER BELL by General Cabell.

b. A 7 July 03 1959 Memorandum of Conversation signed by (T. J. Flores) stated that WER BELL was met in Washington, D.C., by (Flores) who discussed with WER BELL information 03 concerning the Dominican Republic, Fidel Castro, Fulgencio Batista and General Pedraza.

c. A 8 July 03 1959 Memorandum of Conversation signed by (T. J. Flores) stated that on 8 July 1959 03 (Flores) called WER BELL to set up an appointment. During the meeting, WER BELL was told that the United States would not support any revolutionary activities by General Pedraza. He was also told that the U.S. will observe its international obligations concerning Cuba and Pedraza, and that

C/PN

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 012913

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

the U.S. would not overlook any violations by Pedraza or his followers of the neutrality laws. 03 (Flores) said that the Agency had some interest in the possibility of his (WER BELL's) working for us as an intelligence gatherer under terms to be negotiated after we obtained a security clearance on him. 03 (Flores) pointed out that the Agency was not attempting to limit his actions in connection with the Dominican Republic, nor was it assuming any responsibility for those matters he carried out in his own behalf. 03 (Flores) dictated a Secrecy Agreement to him and had him sign it.

d. A 9 July 03 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) reported that Subject called him on 9 July 1959 from New York. WER BELL gave (Flores) further information on Loos, fnu, the 03 representative of a Colonel Frei, fnu, of the Swiss army who had 1,000 men available for duty as soldiers.

e. A 20 July 03 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) reported that WER BELL called (Flores) from Miami on 20 July to ask about the Agency 03 picking up the tab for his forthcoming trip to the Dominican Republic. They discussed his clearance which had not come through.

f. A 3 August 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by Martha R. Tharpe reported that on 24 July 1959 03 WER BELL called for Mr. (Thomas J. Flores). 03 Since (Flores) was on leave, Tharpe took the call. WER BELL gave Tharpe further information concerning Pedraza and Batista. Tharpe called WER BELL back that evening to tell him that if he obtained further information to report it to Mr. Justin Gleichauf, OO Contacts Representative in Miami, until Mr. (Flores) returned to Washington. 03

g. A 5 03 August 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) stated that WER BELL phoned him on 5 August 1959 to ask if there was any news on his clearance. WER BELL said he wanted to go to the Dominican Republic soon, and would like CIA to pick up his expenses. He was told there was no

11/pd

news. 03 (Flores) and WER BELL discussed the Dominican Republic and Cuba. On 3 August 03 (Flores) phoned WER BELL and told him that his clearance had not been granted and that he should not predicate his activities on the expectation of the clearance at any given time. WER BELL said that the Pedraza group was air lifting and dropping material into Cuba.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

h. A 9 September 03 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) reported that WER BELL called (Flores) on 9 September 1959 to provide information 03 on Cuba. He was told by 03 (Flores) that his clearance had not yet been processed.

i. According to a 23 September 1959 03 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) WER BELL called (Flores) on 9 September 1959 to ask if his clearance had come 03 through since he wanted the Agency to finance his trip to the Dominican Republic. 03 He was told it had not. WER BELL told (Flores) about some people who had been discussing the counterfeiting of U. S. dollars and Cuban pesos for use in connection with 03 Cuban revolutionary activities. He was told by (Flores) to contact the FBI. 03 On 13 September WER BELL had phoned (Flores) at home to say that the FBI had referred him to the Secret Service on the counterfeiting aspect, and that no one seemed particularly interested in the gun running. The Secret Service asked him to go to Miami at his own expense to obtain further information on the matter and WER BELL asked (Flores') advice. 03 (Flores) said that he could not 03 influence him one way or the other since he was not in a position to direct his activities, but felt he might be better off to take no action. He was told that (Flores) would be in touch with him as soon as he had 03 any further information concerning our possible use of him.

j. A 13 October 03 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (Thomas J. Flores) states that WER BELL phoned him on 25 September 1959 to report on Cuba. On 2 October 1959 03 (Flores) talked with WER BELL by phone and terminated the relationship.

3. The following undated memorandums are also contained in WER BELL's file:

5/pN

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

03 a. A Memorandum for the Record signed by 03 (T. Flores) reports that WER BELL called (Flores) on 13 August 1959 to discuss Cuban activities in Miami. This memorandum also records that WER BELL phoned 03 (Flores) again on 26 August 1959 at which time activities in the Dominican Republic and Cuban activities in Miami were discussed. WER BELL also asked about the status of his clearance, and was told it had not yet come through.

03

b. A letter signed "W" addressed to ("Tom") gave "W's" location and some information concerning Batista and Castro. (This letter is probably in the 1959 time frame.)

03 c. A Memorandum of Conversation signed 03 by (T. Flores) reports that WER BELL called (Flores) and gave his location. The status of WER BELL's clearance was discussed and (Flores) told him it had not yet come through. 03 WER BELL gave (Flores) 03 some information concerning Batista. (This memorandum probably is in the 1959 time frame.)

d. An unsigned report, apparently from WER BELL, gave a summary of his contacts and activities during a trip to the Dominican Republic. (This report is probably in the 1959 time frame.)

4. A 17 December 1963 dispatch from Station Santo Domingo reported that Station (NOC Officer Joseph Luna) recently met WER BELL in Santo Domingo. 24, 03 No further details of the meeting were reported.

5. According to the CS file on WER BELL, three former Agency employees were contacted in 1974 by WER BELL and other representatives of a group called "Friends of Abaco (FOA), a group allegedly advocating the secession of the island of Abaco from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. The three former employees contacted are:

a. John Patrick Muldoon, retired from CIA on 20 March 1972.

03

b. (Theodore John Roussos), retired from CIA 09 (on 31 July 1970.) He was rehired on a contract in February 1971. His contract was terminated in September 1973.

1/PN

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

c. Walter Joseph Mackem, separated from CIA on 31 October 1973.

6. Mr. Muldoon contacted Agency employee (E. James McTighe) 03 on 22 May 1974. Mr. Muldoon told Mr. McTighe that he was nominal Vice President of a Washington-based firm called "Security Consultants International." He presented Mr. McTighe with a report containing the essential data he possessed concerning WER BELL and other members of FOA whom he had met on 17 and 20 May 1974 in Washington, D.C. According to Mr. Muldoon, WER BELL had hopes of establishing gaming casinos, hotel and other tourist facilities in Abaco catering to the U. S. tourist crowd. As a consequence of some run-in with Prime Minister Pindling of the Bahamas, however, WER BELL is apparently persona non grata in the Bahamas; hence his ambitions appeared to be contingent on Abacan independence. Mr. Muldoon reported that at least on two occasions WER BELL made a concerted effort to involve persons formerly affiliated with the Agency in the activities of the FOA in support of its independence. On several occasions, WER BELL introduced Mr. Muldoon and Mr. 03 (Roussos) as active Agency officials, implying that either the Agency or the United States Government supported the aims of the FOA. WER BELL also proposed to Messrs. Muldoon and (Roussos) 03 in separate conversations that they conduct a study, involving a visit to Abaco, to determine the feasibility of Abaco's independence in political and economic terms. The study was to include interviews with citizens of Abaco prior to an alleged "plebiscite" on independence to take place in Abaco on 28 June 1974. 03 In default of the collaboration of either Muldoon or (Roussos) WER BELL hired Mr. Walter Joseph Mackem, a former Agency friend of both Muldoon and (Roussos.) 03 According to WER BELL's file, Mackem later in 1974 contacted the Agency in an attempt to get an official policy on the activities of the FOA. Mackem was informed that the case comes under FBI jurisdiction, that this Agency has no official involvement, and that all information we had on the matter had been made available to the FBI. He was advised at that time to report his contacts and any information he had to the FBI.

7. On 24 March 1975, Mr. (Joseph P. Hayes) 03 assigned to SE/PCH, reported that during the week of 9 March 1975, he talked with Mr. Wesley Dyckman. Mr. Dyckman is a former Agency employee employed by the Drug Enforcement Agency. According to Dyckman, former Agency employee Walter Mackem was employed in the Washington area as a private investigator. He is also involved with a paramilitary activity funded by some unnamed British source. The activity, which Dyckman referred to as

6/pn

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

"the new land project" sought to establish a tax shelter on one of the out-islands of the Caribbean by forcefully taking over the island and establishing a government there. Mackem is supposedly involved in the paramilitary training of forces who would participate in this adventure. According to Dyckman, the paramilitary training supposedly was to take place in Georgia, where WER BELL is based.

8. On 31 August 1974, Mr. Roussos 03 met with Mr. K. Michael Absher, who at that time was AC/E/GC, and told him that WER BELL was leaving for Athens on 31 August 03 to sell arms to the Greek Government. WER BELL wanted Roussos 03 to be his advisor in this venture and to go to Athens. 03 Roussos told WER BELL that he would check with CIA before giving him an answer. WER BELL asked Roussos 03 to see if the Agency was in favor of such an arms deal or not. Mr. Absher strongly advised against 03 Roussos' getting involved in this deal. 03 Roussos told Mr. Absher that he understood and agreed not to get involved. Roussos 03 said that WER BELL would probably call him from Athens and he would give WER BELL a final negative reply.

9. On 22 July 1974, the FBI reported that WER BELL may be in possession of a one-line note from former CIA Director William Colby stemming from a chance meeting with the Director at an OSS alumni dinner, reading something like "Good to see you again." This note was apparently used by WER BELL to suggest that he and Mr. Colby were good friends. This information was passed on to Mr. Colby on 9 August 1974.

10. According to reporting from several Stations, WER BELL and Arthur L. Smith (a cohort of WER BELL's) were in several Central American countries during August and early September 1962. Their principal activity appeared to be contacting officials of the governments of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador for the purpose of obtaining recognition of a de facto Cuban Government in exile called the "United Organization for the Liberation of Cuba." In discussions with Nicaraguan Government representatives, WER BELL claimed the proposed Cuban Government in exile had the support of 90 separate Cuban exile organizations and 186,000 Cuban exiles. WER BELL offered a representative of the Nicaraguan Government $100,000 to obtain that government's recognition of the Cuban Government in exile. The group claimed to have its headquarters at 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, in Washington, D.C. While in Guatemala, Smith claimed that the group had a man in the Department of State in Washington, D.C., whom they pay $6,000 per year "to keep them advised."

7/PJ

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

11. In December 1965 WER BELL contacted a Miami DCD asset and told him that he and six Cuban exiles in the U. S. had organized a group, including approximately 20 Cubans inside Cuba, to perform a commando operation in Cuba during early January 1966., Their primary mission was the assassination of Fidel Castro, with the secondary mission of blowing up the generators that supply electricity to Havana, Cuba. WER BELL, at the time, stated that he was trying to get a "green light" from CIA to proceed with the mission, and inferred that the mission would be called off if such approval was not obtained.

12. On 7 February 1966 the Miami office of the FBI reported that WER BELL had been in contact with various news agencies concerning an alleged plan to assassinate Fidel Castro, and reportedly also had discussed the plan with Mr. Richard Phillips, Public Affairs Officer, Department of State, Washington, D.C. WER BELL claimed to have a group of some 500 men infiltrated into Cuba and said that they were ready for action to overthrow the regime immediately following the assassination of Castro. According to the FBI, WER BELL gave the impression that he is acquainted with many high government officials, both in the U. S. and other countries, and implied that his assassination plan had been approved by CIA.

13. According to a memorandum in WER BELL's file, on 7 February 1968, one Bruce Arman Baker telephoned an employee of this Agency and said he had been in contact with WER BELL. Mr. Baker said that WER BELL was in the weapons manufacturing business and delivered them by air throughout the world. Mr. Baker said that he understood that WER BELL does this for CIA. Mr. Baker said that he understood from WER BELL that he would have to get a CIA security clearance to fly for WER BELL. Baker said that he was afraid that his past smuggling record might keep him from getting a CIA clearance. 13-5

14. WER BELL came to the attention of the (Bangkok Station) in early 1969 when he went to Thailand representing himself as Vice President of Sionics, Atlanta, Georgia. He described himself as a counterinsurgency expert, had a variety of weapons to display, claimed to be a retired colonel, and introduced himself at a local nightclub as Chief of CIA in Thailand. WER BELL attempted to sell arms to the Thais and also to a variety of U. S. military elements. 13-5 (Station Bangkok) passed the gist of his reputation to key personalities in the U. S. mission and the Thai Government stressing that he was not sponsored in any way by the U. S. Government.

2/PV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

15. WER BELL was also the subject of two memorandum signed by Lawrence R. Houston. Mr. Houston, answering a request from Joseph J. Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, on 23 February 1971, denied WER BELL's alleged affiliation with the CIA. On 28 October 1971, Mr. Houston wrote Mr. David H. Henretta, Jr., of the Industrial Security Clearance Review Division, to return notarized Interrogatories previously sent by Mr. Henretta.

16. We have no information on Colonel Bayard except news articles reporting his death which were forwarded by the FBI.

17. Per your request, we have sent instructions to the LA/Miami Station that there should be no contact with WER BELL.

Nestor D. Sanchez
Acting Chief
Latin America Division

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012913

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Seymour R. Bolten 2 E 14	EXTENSION 7520	NO. DATE 19 September 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. John Morrison OGC 7 D 01	9/19/74			1. Attached is an advanced informal copy of our proposed security deletions and revisions of the Hunt galley proof. Please note that this list has not yet been reviewed by Mr. Blee and is, therefore, still subject to change.
2. JSM				2. The DDO panel that reviewed the Hunt manuscript has designated items, numbered 12, 14, 19, 21, 24 and 25, as "hard core," by which we mean that the Agency should insist on their deletion or revision and be prepared to obtain an injunction and engage in litigation should Hunt refuse to cooperate.
3.				Seymour Seymour R. Bolten SAB/DDO
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				C/O

FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Manuscript and Galley Proof of Undercover: Memoirs of an American Agent by E. Howard Hunt

NOTES: A. Pages and lines underlined and appearing at the beginning of the items below refer to the galley proof.

B. Corresponding page and line listings as they appear in the manuscript are provided in brackets at the end of each item.

other members

3

1. Page 57, line 6 from bottom of page; the name "Henry Pleasants". Mr. Pleasants retired under cover and his past relationship should not be exposed. It is also recommended that efforts be made to have the name "John Richardson" also removed from the same sentence containing Mr. Pleasants' name. (Page 96, line 17.)

2. Page 59, line 38 beginning with "However" and ending on page 60, line 2 with "milieu". Rutherford T. "Pinky" Walsh retired under cover and his CIA relationship should not be exposed. His assignment in Paris under 24 student cover is similarly classified. The description of this activity just a couple of pages before the author gratuitously mentions the lack of an agreement between the Agency and the French barring 24 unilateral operations in France (Item 4 below) is potentially an additionally damaging blow to liaison relationships. (Page 100, lines 10-14.)

[illegible] (D.A)

C11

5/mc

3. Page 63, line 21; the name "Frank Holcomb" Mr. Holcomb retired under cover and his past relationship with the CIA should not be exposed. It is additionally recommended that the entire paragraph wherein Mr. Holcomb's name appears (lines 21-24) should be deleted because it acknowledges CIA operations in support of anti-communist political operations in Italy. (page 105, lines 18-21.)

V.A.

4. Page 63, line 30 beginning with "By" and ending with "arrangement" on line 33, page 63. It is recommended that this passage be deleted since its inclusion not only is not pertinent to the narrative but it unnecessarily jars 24 liaison with the 24 British and is an implied insult to the French liaison services. (page 106, lines 4-7.)

5. Page 66 beginning with "Finis" on line 24 and ending with "world" on line 27. This passage describes a specific CIA operation which resulted in the production and distribution of an animated cartoon based on George Orwell's Animal Farm. (Page 111, lines 6-9.)

6. Page 68, the pseudonym "John F. Rittenhouse" on line 34. The author's original CIA pseudonym was classified, and even though compromised, never appeared in the press and still exists on various currently classified documents. (page 114, line 23.)

7. Page 71, beginning with "Spanish" on line 28 and ending with "America" on line 20, page 72, and including the footnotes on pages 71 and 72. This passage should be deleted because it describes the Agency's role in subsidizing, producing and distributing 24 "El Campesino's" book, Life and Death in the USSR. (pages 120 [lines 4-20, including footnote] - 121 [lines 1-16, including footnote.])

8. Page 72 beginning with "Eudocia" on line 21 and ending with "Scribner's" on line 32. This should be deleted because 24 it describes the Agency's role in the translation, publishing and distribution of Eudocio Ravines' book, The Yenan Way. It also describes William Buckley's role in that operation as a CIA officer. (Page 121, lines 17-23 and page 122, lines 1-6.)

9. Page 73 beginning with "Mexican" on line 5 through "Rivera" on line 8. This should be deleted because it not only describes sources and methods but also identifies a specific CIA operation. (Page 122, lines 19-21 and page 123, line 1.)

C12

4/mc

N.A.

10. Page 73 beginning with "Communism" on line 14 and ending with "reputation" on line 15. This passage could serve to identify a former asset in Mexico who is still living. (Page 123, lines 7-8.)

NA

11. Page 73 beginning with "cover" on line 17 through "legend" on line 19. This should be deleted because it identifies a CIA-sponsored cover arrangement in Bangkok. Furthermore, this particular type of cover, the movie industry, has figured in earlier unfavorable publicity to CIA in other Southeast Asian countries and thus serves to further render suspect the use of such cover in still other areas. (Page 123, lines 10-12.)

✓

12. Page 73 beginning with "planned" on line 22 through "authentic" on line 5 of page 74 and including the footnote on page 74. This should be deleted because it describes 24 a specific operation involving the forgery of a page of the [Shanghai Post], and also includes descriptions of sources and methods. (Page 123, lines 15-23 and all of page 124 including footnote.)

13. Page 77 beginning with "technical" on line 19 through "station" on line 21. This should be deleted because it describes and authenticates a CIA operation. (Page 131, lines 2-4.)

✓ [illegible]

14. Page 80 beginning with "surreptitious-entry" on line 9 through "Embassy" on line 12, page 82. This should be deleted because it describes a specific, sensitive operation as well as 24 sensitive sources and methods including the [acquisition of code materials]. (Page 136, line 3 through page 139, line 20.)

15. Page 86 beginning with "Greek" on line 18 through "countries" on line 20. This should be deleted because it identifies a specific operation and the foreign assets involved in its support. (Page 147, lines 6-8.)

16. Page 95 beginning with "quasi-military" on line 11 through "East" on line 16. This should be deleted because it describes various cover and support facilities used in Far East Asian countries. (Page 163, lines 6-11.)

NA

17. Page 95 beginning with "Hong Kong" on line 16 through "Branch" on line 19. This should be deleted because it describes an operation conducted [jointly with a liaison 24 service in Hong Kong targetted] against mainland China and as such is not only damaging to current American detente efforts but is particularly menacing to Hong Kong authorities in view of their proximity and susceptibility to potential Chinese retaliatory pressures. (Page 163, lines 11-14.)

substitute "In HK we run no independent operation

C/3

3/mc

18. Page 99 beginning with "disrupting" on line 5 through "display" on line 27 and including the footnote on page 99. This passage describes specific CIA operations [in Tokyo targetted against China and as such are not only damaging to current detente efforts but are also disruptive to liaison relationships with the Japanese.] (Page 169 line 23 through page 170, line 22, including footnote.) 24

19. Page 102 beginning with "Despite" on line 6 through "returned" on line 10. This should be deleted because it describes a specific and sensitive CIA operation including [code materials]. (Page 175, lines 10-15.) 24

20. Page 105 beginning with "wiretap" on line 6 through "surreptitious-entry" on line 7. Ought to be deleted since it refers to sensitive Agency sources and methods. (Page 181, lines 2-3.)

21. Page 108 beginning with "tap" on line 17 through "Embassy" on line 7, page 109. This passage deals intermittently with various operational proposals, activities including a recruitment of an identifiable individual, as well as with sensitive methods of operation, e.g., surveillance teams. (Page 187, lines 6-24 through page 188, lines 1-15.)

22. Page 109 beginning with "FBI" on line 21 through "station" on line 26. The "Ramirez" operation. Describes an operation which began with the FBI's spotting of a possible Soviet intelligence agent. Since this information was then turned over to the Agency, a question arises concerning the need to seek the FBI's prior comments. (Page 189, lines 6-11.)

23. Page 111 beginning with "The" on line 22 through "triumvirate" on line 23. It would seem that an effort ought to be made to have this passage deleted or changed since its damage potential to [liaison relationships with the Uruguayan services] is considerable, and it does jeopardize the current careers and livelihoods of the Agency's contacts who are referred to by date and position and thus, are identifiable. (Page 192, lines 21-22.) 24 1958

24. Page 115 beginning with "I" on line 23 through "department" on line 35. This passage should be deleted because it describes Agency methods of operation --- acquisition and passage of information to and from a liaison service --- as well as an overall Agency program of operational activities within Uruguay involving the '[monitoring of forty-two telephone lines]'. Page 200, lines 6-18.) 24

CONFIDENTIAL

C14

4/mc

NOT IN PASSAGE

✓25. Page 116 beginning with "technical" on line 10 through "secrets" on line 29. This passage should be deleted because it describes a sensitive operation conducted [jointly) with a liaison (Uruguayan) service (which involved code materials]) (Page 201, lines 12-23 and page 202, lines 1-9.) 24

26. Page 122 beginning with "The" on line 8 through "Djilas" on line 9. This passage should be deleted because it attests to the Agency's subsidization of publication of Djilas' book. In addition an effort ought to be made to have the author remove or appropriately alter the rest of the paragraph wherein he refers to an Agency news service located in "Washington's National Press Building". (Page 211, line 4.)

27. Page 122 beginning with "from" through "Gaines" on line 31. It is recommended that OGC's attention be called to this passage in order that they be made aware of its possible interpretations. (Page 212, lines 4-5.)

Ref OGC concerned 1964 campaign [illegible]

28. Page 123 beginning with "Soon" on line 12 through "Madrid" on line 35. This passage deals with the author's work on several "Peter Ward" books and, later, his assignment to Madrid. It is recommended that OGC's attention be called to this passage. (Page 212, last line through page 213, lines 1-23.)

29. Page 126 beginning with "Chief" on last line through "officers" on page 127, line 5. This passage should be deleted because it specifies the classified activities of a CIA officer, [Roger Goiran. 03,04 His assignments in Tehran and Brussels], as well as his involvement in the compilation of a classified "encyclopedic study" are unwarranted disclosures of Agency methods. (Page 219, lines 8-13.)

30. Page 130 beginning with "Free" on line 20 through "CIA" on line 21. This phrase should be deleted because it could serve to affect the life of one of the principals of the Free Cuba Committee, [Mrs. Marieda Bourgin] 05, a former witting contact, who is now employed by the State Department. (Page 225, lines 10-11.)

31. Page 150, all of lines 14 through 16. It would appear that this description of the author's contact with Dr. Barney Malloy of CIA is very unfair to the latter. It implies that Hunt had a special relationship with Dr. Malloy and an effort ought to be made by OGC to have the author rewrite this version in order to reflect Dr. Malloy's true role in this affair. Page 260, lines 22-23 through page 261, lines 1-2.)

3 BR

C/S

32. Page 220, lines 5 through 10. This passage concerning the use of CIA alias documentation by Hunt and others includes loose language which implies that still another set of documents was prepared by the CIA for Hunt's use --- i.e., a set of documents which was not mentioned during the recent Congressional "Watergate hearings". As such this is misleading and could serve to create additional difficulties for the Agency. It is recommended that the OGC make an effort to have the author rewrite this paragraph in order that this potentially damaging language be removed from his manuscript. (Page 387, lines 4-9.)

add "old" + "new" to description of documents.

C16

OGC 74-1755

SECRET

30 September 1974

RETURN TO [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with E. Howard Hunt Re His Memoirs, "Undercover"

1. On 28 September 1974 Ray Rocca, Deputy Chief/CI Staff, and I met in the DCD Washington Field Office with E. Howard Hunt, his attorney William A. Snyder, Jr., and Snyder's associate Thomas W. Coons. As the meeting began, Hunt asked if it was being tape-recorded; I assured him that it was not. He said he did not care; but that, if it were to be recorded, he would like to know. We then embarked upon the review according to the plan under which we would demand the deletion of three items as classified and then proceed to the remaining 29 items, only if Hunt was cooperative on the first three. He and his lawyers appeared very cooperative, and accordingly, the meeting continued to cover all 32 items.

2. Changes were agreed to in the items set forth in paragraphs 12, 14, and 25 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September 1974. These appear at pages 73, 80-83, and 115 of the galley proof and concern the fabrication of the Shanghai post for a Mexican operation, the entry into the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City, and the joint CIA-Uruguayan telephone monitoring operation. The wording of the agreed changes is as shown on the attached copies of the pertinent pages of the galley proof. Essentially, these changes disguise the identity of the fabricated newspaper and remove a reference to journalists as agents; delete the word "Guatemalan" to make the entered embassy non-specific; and delete the reference to listening posts and telephone monitoring to make that paragraph refer in more general terms to our ability to cover targets without referring to the use of electronic surveillance.

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 058473

SECRET

C1

3. We then proceeded to the 29 items which we would like to see modified but which we could not consider classified. We made this clear to Hunt and went through them one by one, discussing our concern with each. Hunt contended that most of these items should not be considered sensitive since they had been publicized extensively; in some cases confirmed in testimony; and, in the case of other items, the principals involved were dead. However, he agreed to changes in the items referred to in paragraphs 1, 3, 17, and 32 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September. These involve the deletions of the names of Henry Pleasants and Frank Holcomb, both now retired under cover; a direct reference to joint operations with the British in Hong Kong against China; and the wording of his reference to CIA alias documentation used by the Watergate burglars. The language of this last item will be changed so that it no longer leaves the impression that the documentation was prepared by the Agency for this operation.

4. When we had finished, Hunt and his lawyers emphasized as they had mentioned earlier in the meeting that it might be very difficult to get the publisher to agree to changes in the unclassified items. Mr. Snyder offered to present all of the items to the publisher for change without distinguishing between the classified and unclassified items. He said he would do this without implying they were all classified. I felt it necessary to turn down his offer because of the risk of the publisher being unwilling to accept that many changes with the result that we would have to go back to him on the three classified items, thus presenting a situation similar to our retraction of previously demanded deletions in the Marchetti book. I think there would be some danger of the publisher using this in his advertising and through reviewers for publicity purposes.

5. As we were leaving, Hunt showed me what was described as a "comfort letter." This was a letter written by him to the publishers on 17 May 1974 at the publisher's request which said that in his opinion nothing in the manuscript violated any agreement between himself and the CIA, nor would subject him to prosecution under the espionage laws. As the meeting was ending, Hunt expressed his hope that no publicity would be given to it and that the Agency would not issue any kind of a press release. In view of the Director's decision that we shall issue a press release, I took pains to persuade Hunt that public acknowledgment of the fact that we had reviewed his

C3

manuscript would be in his interest as well as ours. He had referred more than once during the meeting to the need to avoid the appearance of "a bear hug"; in other words, collusion or cooperation between him and the Agency, leaving an inference that the book was designed to be a whitewash of CIA. In view of this, it was easy to convince Hunt that an Agency press release would be in his interest. I would note here, however, that both Mr. Rocca and I felt that Hunt and his lawyers were genuinely cooperative and that a press release which is too harsh or denigrates the book or Hunt's motives might be unfair and considered by him to be in bad faith. Hunt appears to retain admiration and respect for the Agency and seems convinced that nothing in his book will harm our operations or personnel.

John D. Morrison Jr
JOHN D. MORRISON, JR.
Acting General Counsel

Attachments

cc: Acting DDO
SAB/DDO
DC/CI Staff
O/Security
Asst. to DCI
Mr. Walter Pforzheimer
C/CCS

OGC:JDM:sin
Original - OGC Subj: PUBLICATIONS
1 - Chrono

SECRET

DD/O '75-0223

14 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ed Pechous 03
SA/ADDO

SUBJECT : Name Trace - Henry L. BRETTON and PRAEGER Publishing Corporation

REFERENCE : OGC 75-0088, 10 January 1975

1. In response to the referent request, we have checked IP, OSG/OC, FR, DCD, ITG, and CI files with the following results:

a. IP -- 201-153109
b. OSG/OC -- no record
c. FR -- no record
d. DCD -- see attachment
e. ITG -- no record
f. CI -- no record
g. CCS -- see below

A. The IP 201 file indicated Subject was a former OSS man who had used the name Henry BISMARK. He was met by Contact Division in 1964, apparently on several occasions, due to his plans to accept a position with the University of Accra, Ghana. At that time he indicated he did not want to get involved with the Agency. There is no paper in the file after 1964.

B. CCS reported various agency contacts with PRAEGER but CCS itself has had no such contacts. (Mr. Arthur Y. Cox (retired 1962) used PRAEGER as cover while on project ZREVADE.) 03, 24

E2 IMPDET CL BY 010154

SECRET

2llW

SECRET

Subject: Name Trace - Henry L. BRETTON and PRAEGER Publishing
Corporation (Con't)

2. The results of this check are forwarded in this format to allow you to respond as you may wish to OCC who had requested an answer by 13 January. This confirms my phone conversation of this date.

03

Lee E. Patton
Chief, OSC/OC

11/PJ

SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10105-10290
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CHIEF, COVER & COMMERCIAL STAFF
TO : ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL
TITLE : MR. E. HOWARD HUNT - ALIAS BIRTH CERITIFICATE
DATE : 11/02/1973
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS : TOURIST CARD
JFK ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/21/04
COMMENTS : JFK37 : F10 : 20040112-1033571

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10105-10290

OGC 73-2074

2 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting General Counsel

SUBJECT: Mr. E. Howard Hunt - Alias Birth Certificate

1. On 30 October 1973 I saw Mr. John S. Warner, Acting General Counsel, to discuss two outstanding requests from the Special Prosecutor's office in regard to U.S. passports which had been issued to E. Howard Hunt and a MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD on Mr. Robert Bennett's session with the U.S. Prosecutor Silbert in July 1972. I handed Mr. Warner a memorandum listing the type, number and dates of the 2 passports which Mr. Hunt was issued between 1950 and 1970. In reviewing the information in this memorandum, I mentioned Mr. Hunt's tour in Spain in the middle 1960's and the fact that I had been instructed not to include Mr. Hunt and his activities in my inspection of the Madrid Station in 1965. I also mentioned to Mr. Warner that I remembered two discussions with Mr. Skip Dunn late in 1972 during which he inquired of me whether CIA had ever issued an alias passport to Mr. Hunt. I said that as I recalled, CIA did not initiate the issuance of a U.S. alias passport, but that Mr. Hunt did have in his possession an alias travel document. This came as a surprise to Mr. Warner. He had not been previously aware that Mr. Hunt possessed a U.S. international travel document in alias. As a result he called Mr. John Richards, Office of the IG, and asked whether Mr. Richards was aware of this and whether Mr. Dunn's reports provided this information. After an interval, Mr. Richards called back and told Mr. Warner that I had provided information to Mr. Dunn that Mr. Hunt had a tourist card in alias. According to Mr. Richards, Mr. Dunn's memorandum quoted me as saying that my information came from an " A-1 source." At that moment, I could not recall having made such a statement.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY
059770

2. Upon my return from Mr. Warner's office, I consulted with Mr. James W. Franklin, Chief, Official Cover Branch, CCS, with whom I had discussed Mr. Dunn's inquiry in late 1972. I asked Mr. Franklin whether he could refresh my memory. This he did immediately. He reminded me that a newspaper article (Tab A) had appeared claiming that one of the Watergate 5 had carried a U.S. passport in the name of Edward Hamilton. This newspaper article had been seen by Mr. Robert Johnson, Deputy Director of the U.S. Passport Office, who had had the U.S. Passport Office files examined with negative results. Mr. Johnson then determined from the FBI that the document involved was not a U.S. passport in the name of Edward Hamilton but a tourist card in that name. I then remembered that because the information came from the FBI via Mr. Johnson, I had not identified the source of my information. I immediately called Mr. Warner and advised him of the foregoing.

3. Later in the afternoon of 30 October 1973 Mr. Franklin came to my office with a number of documents. They consisted of a form memorandum signed by me which was addressed to Mr. Hunt dated 29 June 1970 (Tab B), a list of names numbering from 1 through 154, representing true names (Tab C), and a second listing similarly numbered, representing aliases (Tab D). Number 63 on the true name list reads E. Howard Hunt and on the alias list, Edward Joseph Hamilton. Mr. Franklin explained -- which I had forgotten -- that we had obtained from TSD this list of outstanding alias birth certificates issued by TSD in an attempt to recall--if possible-- as many of these documents, or to determine what had happened to them. (Most of these alias birth certificates were issued in connection with the Bay of Pigs Operation.) The memorandum was never forwarded to Mr. Hunt because by June 1970, he had been retired for 3 months. This memorandum had not been included in Mr. Hunt's cover file but had been kept with the working papers pertaining to the action trying to recall as many of the outstanding alias birth certificates as possible. As a result, the repeated reviews of Mr. Hunt's cover file had not yielded the information that an alias birth certificate had been issued to him. 97 of the 154 aliases were not previously recorded in the CCS central index and the indexing after the acquisition of the list had been overlooked. The surfacing of these documents at this time occurred because in re-discussing Mr. Hunt's possession of an international travel document in alias reminded Mr. Franklin of the 1970 CCS exercise of recouping outstanding alias birth certificates. Discussions on the same subject in December 1972 simply did not result in the same memory association.

4. In the late afternoon of 30 October 1973 Mr. Franklin and I saw Mr. Warner, reported the foregoing facts to him, showed him the documents, and agreed that we would ask Mr. Johnson to check the Passport Office files once more to confirm that no U.S. passport in the name of Edward Joseph Hamilton had ever been issued to Mr. Hunt. The result of Mr. Johnson's check is still outstanding at the time of this writing.

Erich W. Isenstead

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
Chief, Cover & Commercial Staff

4 Atts:
A: News Article
B: 29 June 70 Form Memo to Hunt
C: True Name Listing
D: Alias Name Listing

cc: IG via DDO

TRUE

1. ASARIS, Gundaris [illegible] C-7
2. AASAL, Glen 6175
3. SHERWOOD, John 11007
4. ADKINS, Matt 48-336
5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay [illegible]
6. RAGONA, Ferruggia NR
7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algis NR
8. BROWN, James W. 474[illegible]
9. SPEED, Horace III 8435
10. Amthrill-I (Crypt) NR Julio Kauri Barreto
11. ROSENBAUER, William A. 13915
12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr. NR
13. BEALE, W. H. 48-336
14. BENAS, Alis NR
15. BECERT, Jerome F. NR — 12871
16. ERICKSON, Paul 14317
17. KINAMER, James F. NR
18. BARQUIN, Casimiro 7737
19. BECKER, Alexander NR
20. BYZEK, Stephen Joe [illegible] R-3097
21. BURKE, Paul J. 8497
22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward 48-338
23. SHERWOOD, John [illegible]
24. MELBERG, Robert L. 2219
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore 6777
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert NR
27. BURKE, Paul J. 8497
28. BLAIR, William 9181
29. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr. 5[illegible] ✓
30. CHAS, Peter [illegible]

[redacted]

32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton 48-336
33. CAREY, William David 4874
34. CARTER, William R. [illegible] ✓
35. CROCE, Andrew 4447
36. FLORES, Thomas J. [illegible] ✓
37. DAIGA, Janis NR T-421
38. DALEY, V. J. NR
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
40. DILLON, John E. 9540
41. DE GARDER, Constantine NR
42. DEMMONS, William H. [illegible] ✓
43. DALY, Vincent S. 11537
44. DUBOIS, Rene E. [illegible]
45. EGAN, Frank J. [illegible]
46. ENDERS, Rudolf A. 10012 ✓
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr. [illegible]
48. None ✓
49. HEATH, Donald R. [illegible] ✓
50. FUCHS, Robert H. [illegible]
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr. [illegible]
52. FLICK, Charles E. 17765 ✓

TRUE

53. [illegible], John Norman [illegible] ✓
54. [illegible], Frank 7422 ✓
55. [illegible], Robert Peter 48-33
56. [illegible], Charles [illegible] 3657
57. CRI[illegible] ✓ Greano, Aubrey
58. BRICOLAT, Pedro Gonzalez NR
59. GOUDIE, Cecil Mario 14162 ✓
60. TISLER, Frantisek 16183 ✓ S-1567
61. GREENE, Bill NR
62. GRAHAM, Barbara 9808
63. HUNT, E. Howard ~~NR~~ 9 1088
64. None
65. HAWKINS, Jack NR
66. HORN, Rufus A. Jr. 11749
67. HILDALGO, Barney
68. HEWITT, Thomas M. 9922

[redacted]

70. HECHT, Elmer Edward [illegible] R-2156
71. IWASKIW, Andrij NR
72. JENCSOK, Stephen NR
73. JANCHUK, Nicholas NR
74. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E. NR
75. JAUNZEMIS, Ulgis NR
76. JOANSON, Ivar NR 7428
77. JASUKOW, Nikolai NR
78. KYKER, Benjamin Franklin 3111- 48-336
79. KAPUSTA, Peter 10378
80. KARKLINS, Zigurds NR
81. KRYZANIWSKY, Myron NR
82. KOCELA, Paul NR
83. KAPPES, G. 13180 George M.
84. KURTZ, Walter NR
85. KIDA, Jack 10130
86. KENNEDY, John W. [illegible]
87. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter NR
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph NR 25-103

[redacted]

90. LAMBERGS, John NR

[redacted]

92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen 10580
93. MAYERFELD, Ernest 5824
94. KLEIN, Theodore 5570
95. LOPUSZAUSKY, Myroslaw 47-5
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae NR
97. Unknown ✓
98. MAHONEY, Philip J. 48-336
99. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
100. MASLOVSKY, Serge T-835
101. MARTINEZ, Ruben [illegible]
102. SMITH, Haviland Jr. 4593
103. MOORE, Andrew F. NR 25-5
104. MARSAK, Frank 8-2994
105. KRIESFELD, George NR
106. MULANE, Corrald J. NR 25

Denil Shea Joe Latorre TSD. 6 8

TRUE

107. BARQUIN, Casimiro 1797
108. MORALES David S. 3643
[redacted]
110. NEWMASTER, Harry Richard NR
111. NASARENKO, Michael NR
112. PIEPER, Harry C. 3-1[illegible] - 633
113. PHILLIPS, William D. 2610
114. GREENE, Harris
115. PASLAWSKY, Nicholas NR
116. PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw NR
117. FRANK, Maryado 4021
118. MOORE, Robert Butler 4271
119. PRIBANYEC, Janos NR
120. None ✓

121. RASTENIS, Jonas NR
122. REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene 10227
123. RAUS, Juri [illegible]
124. RIKAND, Enno NR
125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt) N.R.
126. RATCLIFF, Richard [illegible]
127. REEVES, John M. Jr. 10691
[redacted]
129. REYNOLDS, Robert E. NR —
[redacted]
131. RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr. 10764
[redacted]
133. SULLIVAN, Dennis B. 25-3591
[redacted]
136. STAROSTENKO, Henry NR
137. IMLER, Norman C. 8055
138. SLEEPER, Gordon 11235
139. None ✓
140. None ✓
141. GONZALO, QUESADA Jr. NR
142. SAGER, John 4192 — N-122

K.C. K-5971
143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrill - 48-338
144. SLENYS, Lindas K. NR
145. SOLNZEFF, Henry [illegible]
146. SOLER, Eva Diana NR
147. SATINSKAS, Henry NR
148. STEVENS, George A. 18-371
149. WALLIN, Jack [illegible]
150. TASHEFF, Mary 11184

TRUE

151. AIMAN, James Henry NR 49-
152. STOIAKEN, Nicholas P. 11524
153. TALLEY, Ulo NR
154. TURK, Leo L. 48 338
[redacted]
156. THOMAS, Edward [illegible]
157. None ✓
158. TRIANOSKY, Harry 349
159. VINING, James L. 25-557 -N
160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald NR
161. HARVEY, William K. K.C. 2375
162. BULIK, Joseph 3714
163. WILL, Kenneth John 48-331
164. SHORTALL, John W. Jr. 14854
165. WATTS, Roy Furniss 25-3011
166. MERTZ, Richard 2201
167. None ✓
168. ZANKIN, Myroslaw NR
169. ALAGAZE-1 (Crypt)

LODYGENSKI [illegible]
NR-1

CASE FILES WITH MISSING BIRTH CERTIFICATES

ALIAS

R.C. 7427 1. / ACKER, Gerald 6815
48-338 2. / ADLAND, Glennon Edward (210-660)
1166 3. / AHORN, Paul Rodger
48-338 4. AIVNEY, Matt (210-660)
K-703/48-338 5. ASHBORNE, Howard Clay (210-660)
NR 6. AUDISIO, Mario
NR 7. BARKER, Algis
48-338 8. BARNAUD, James Winston (210-660)
8435-NR 9. BARKER, Andrew Frank
NR 10. BARRETO, John Raymond
13915-NR 11. BAUER, William John
NR 12. BAUGH, William James
48-338 13. BELT, William Henry (210-660)
NR 14. BENTON, Alan
NR 15. BENUCK, Karl Donald
14317 NR 16. BERGETHON, David Bjorn
P-168 17. BERGSON, William Kinander
7717 / RC 715 18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo
NR 19. BEST, Alexander
(RC) K-3077 20. (T) BINSWANGER, Stanley Joe
C-1734/(N-87) 21. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
8711 48-338 ~~NR~~ 22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
11667 23. BREITHEIM, John Albert
2219 ~~NR~~ 24. BRICK, Robert Leo
5877 ~~K-2149~~ 25. BRICKHAM, Tad S.
NR 26. BRIGGS, Herb
C-1734/P-120 27. BROOKE, Paul Gregory
8417 NR 28. BRUTON, William Emmott
9181 5385 NR 29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.
NR 30. CARNEY, Peter
NR [redacted]
48-338 32. BOWTECK, Cletus Winton (210-660)
[illegible] 33. CLINE, William David
14337 NR 34. CONRAD, WILLIAM Robert
5-16560 35. CROWE, Andrew Paul 4447
3037 NR 36. CURBELO, Eduardo
T-421 37. (T) DAILEY, James
NR 38. DEKANSKI, Vincent Joseph
7168 39. DELAIRE, William Alan
9540 NR 40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
NR 41. DE LONG, Constantine
48-338 42. DONAIRE, William Henry 12465
[illegible] 43. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
9564 44. DUBOIS, Rene E. ARMY
RC-11655 NR 45. EMELSON, Frank Joseph
10016 NR 46. ELFMONT, Rudolf Albert
K-[illegible] NR 47. ELIEGOR, William Monroe
NR 48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
NR 49. FARON, Charles Andrew
RC-2535 NR 50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
5561 48-338 51. FITSAMES, Lucian Charles
15765/C-307 52. (T) FLICK, Charles E.

ALIAS

NR 53. FORDASCH, John Norman 4925
74264 54. FROST, Frank 7426
48-338 55. FRYLTEN, Robert Peter 45-338
48-338 56. GENGARO, Charles Henry 5557
~~[illegible]~~ 57. GENISMAN, Aubrey Lyle 7424
7714 NR 58. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
25-211 59. CUDINO-MARGAIN, Carlos 14162
K ~~9666~~ 60. HABER, Frantisek 16183
5-1567 61. HALE, William Mark
NR 62. HALLY, Roberta Shirley 98
NR 63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph 10
NR 64. HARRISON, Louise
NR 65. HASKINS, John Martin
11747 66. HEBERDEN, Roger Andrew ARMY
9927 67. HILLARY, Bernard Norman
NR 68. HODONICKI, Thomas Mark 99
NR [redacted]
48-338 70. HURLEY, Edward Elmer K-2156
NR 71. IRVING, Andrew
NR 72. JACOBS, Stephan
NR 73. JAMES, Nicholas
NR 74. JARECKI, Stanley
NR 75. JEFFRIES, Uldis
7428 76. (T) JENKINS, Ivar
NR 77. JUDD, Nicholas
(C-2771)(3101) 78. KACKMAN, Benjamin Franklin 48-338
~~[illegible]~~ 79. KARLQUIST, Paul 1007
NR 80. KASABIAN, Zigurds
NR 81. KELLY, Myron
NR 82. KENDALL, Paul
NR 83. KERCHNER, George Michael 101
NR 84. KERKSICK, Walter
NR 85. KIMSEY, Jack Anthony 1010
8017 86. KINSLOW, John William 8097
NR 87. KOLA, Walter
NR 88. KOSTIK, Joseph RC-25-1
NR [redacted]
NR 90. LANSING, John
NR [redacted]
10556 92. (T) LEE, Watson Hwa Shen ARMY
NR 93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest 5
~~[illegible]~~ 94. LENART, Charles Edward
6570 NR 95. LOWE, Myron 47-567
NR 96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae
10333 97. (T) LYONS, George H. ARMY
NR 98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph 48-
NR 99. MALABRE, Howland Edward 7168
NR 100. MALOKOFF, Serge. T-83
NR 101. MARKSCHATT, Ruben 16764
4593 102. MARSAL, Karl
25-557 103. MASCHGAN, Andrew Frank
C-2994 104. MASON, Frank
NR 105. MCADAN, George Thomas
NR 106. MCGAVIN, Gerrald, Joseph 253

ALIAS

NR 107. MENICUCCI, Andrew Robert 7797

3647 108. MIRANDA, Diego S.

NR [redacted]

NR 110. NACHBRUNN, Harry Richard

NR 111. NASH, Mike

NR 112. PANOCK, Harry Charles 3-134-633

NR 113. PAPPS, William David 8610

NR 114. PARKER, Carl Frank

NR 115. PASTOR, Nick

NR 116. PAULSON, Marty

NR 117. PEVER, Laura Jean 4021

NR 118. POLACEK, Henry Franklin 4271

NR 119. POLING, Janos

NR 120. RAHILL, Richard Kent

NR XXXXXXXRAHXLLXXXRXXXXXXXXXXX

NR 121. RANALLO, Jonas

122. RATCLIFF, Matthew Edward K 739

25-154 123. REED, Juri

NR 124. REESE, Eno

NR 125. REEse, Joseph Anthony

NR 126. RESTELLER, Richard Lawrence 13315

~~[illegible]~~ 127. ROBERTS, John Martin Jr.

061 NR [redacted]

NR 129. ROGERS, Robert E.

NR [redacted]

NR 131. RCTTUM, Lowell Owen Jr.

NR 133. SAKIN, Edmond Abel 25-3541

NR [redacted]

NR 136. SEALE, Henry

NR 137. SEALY, Robert Ruben 8852

11635 138. SELFE, Gordon Dale ARMY

NR 139. SHALER, Floyd A

NR 140. SHIPLEY, Charles Joseph

NR 141. SHOWCROFT, Richard E.

N-122 142. SIMPSON, John DEF. 4192

N XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

48-338 143 SIROTA, Edward G. (RC) K-5371

NR 144. SLATER, Lawrence

NR 145. SNYDER, Gene 13713

NR 146. None

NR 147. SORENSON, Henry

48-338 148. STANDARD, George Adam

NR 149. STATEN, Samuel Addison

150. XXXXXXX, STEPHENS, Marina T. 11184

ALIAS

48-338 151. STEVENS, James Henry

NR 152. None

NR 153. None

NR 154. TANIER, Lester Lewis

NR [redacted]

3-134-633 48-338 156. TOGGITT, Edward J.

NR 157. TORREY, Erasmus

349 158. TRABAN, Gregorio R.

N-117 159. VALCHIN, James Louis

NR 160. VAN CHADDE, Donald

(RC) K-2395 161. WALKER, William

N-122 162. WELK, Joseph Reinhold

48-338 163. WIDEGREN, Keith J.

~~[illegible]~~ 14856 164. WILLEMS, Brenton Wall

NR 165. WISHFORD, Roy Furniss

NR 166. WOLF, Frederick Morri

NR 167. WONG, Lam

NR 168. ZEAMAN, Myron

NR 169. ZIMMER, Paul R.

NR 97 and [illegible]

1. ASANIS, Gundaris
2. AASAL, Glen 6175 03
3. SHERWOOD, John 11997
4. ADKINS, Matt 48-336
5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay
6. RAGONA, Ferruggia NR
7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algis NK
8. BROWN, James W. 4747
9. 03 SPEED, Horace III 8435
10. Antarill-1 (Crypt) NK Julio Kauri Barreto
11. ROSENBAUER, William A. 13915
12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr. NK
13. BEALE, W. H. 48-336
14. 03 BENAS, Alis NK
15. BECERT, Jerome F. NK — 12871
16. ERICKSON, Paul 14317
17. KINANDER, James F. NK
18. BARQUIN, Casimiro 7797
19. BECKER, Alexander NK
20. BYZEK, Stephen Joe K-3097
21. 03 BURKE, Paul J. 7497
22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward 48-336
23. SHERWOOD, John
24. MELBERG, Robert L. 2219
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore 6777
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert NK
27. BURKE, Paul J. 8497
28. 03 BLAIR, William 9181
29. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr.
30. CHAS, Peter
[redacted]
32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton 48-336
33. CAREY, William David 4894
34. CARTER, William R.
35. CROCE, Andrew 4497
36. FLORES, Thomas J.
37. 03 DAIGA, Janis NK T-421
38. DALEY, V. J. NK
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
40. DILLON, John E. 9540
41. DE GARDER, Constantine NK
42. DEMMONS, William H.
43. DALY, Vincent S. 11597
44. DUBOIS, Rono E.
45. EGAN, Frank J.
46. ENDERS, Rudolf A. 10012
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr.
48. None
49. HEATH, Donald R.
50. FUCHS, Robert H.
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr.
52. FLICK, Charles E. 765

03

53. [illegible], John [illegible]
54. [illegible], Frank 7422
55. [illegible], [illegible] Peter 48-3
56. [illegible], Charles [illegible] 03
57. CROOK Graano, Aubrey
58. ENCOLAT, Pedro Gonzalez NK
59. GOUDIE, Cecil Mario 14162
60. 03 TISLER, Frantisek 16183 S-1567
61. GREENE, Bill NK
62. GRAHAM, Barbara 9908
63. HUNT, E. Howard 9 1088
64. None
65. 03 HAWKINS, Jack NK
66. HORN, Rufus A. Jr. 11749
67. HIDALGO, Barney 03
68. HEWITT, Thomas M. 9922
[redacted]
70. HECHT, Elmer Edward K-215
71. IWASKIW, Andrij NK 03
72. JENCSOK, Stephen NK
73. JANCHUK, Nicholas NK
74. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E. NK
75. JAUNZEMIS, Ulris NK
76. JOANSON, Ivar NK 7420
77. JASUKOW, Nikolai NK
78. 48-336 KYKER, Benjamin Franklin
79. KAPUSTA, Peter 10978
80. KARKLINS, Zigurds NK
81. KRYZANIWSKY, Myron NK
82. KOCELA, Paul NK
83. KAPPES, 03 G. (George H)
84. KURTZ, Walter NK
85. KIDA, Jack
86. KENNEDY, John W.
87. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter NK
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph 9325-1
[redacted]
90. LAMBERGS, John NK 03
[redacted]
92. 03 LEE, Watson Hwa Shen 10566
93. MAYERFELD, Ernest 5824
94. KLEIN, Theodore 5570
95. 03 LOPUSZAUSKY, Myroslaw 47-
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae NK
97. Unknown
98. MAHONEY, Philip J. 48-336
99. 03 CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
100. MASLOVSKY, Serge T-825
101. MARTINEZ, Ruben
102. SMITH, Haviland Jr. 4593
103. MOORE, Andrew F. NK 25-
104. 03 MARSAK, Frank 2974
105. KRIESFELD, George NK
106. MULANE, Gerald J. NK 2

(Joe Latorre) TSD. 6

03

22/N

TRUE

107. BARQUIN, Casimiro 1171
108. MORALES David S. 3643
[redacted]
03
110. NEWMASTER, Harry Richard NR
111. NASARENKO, Michael NR
112. PIEPER, Harry C. 3-125-633
113. PHILLIPS, William D. 2610
114. GREENE, Harris
115. PASLAWSKY, Nicholas NR
116. PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw NR
117. FRANK, Maryado 4251
118. MOORE, Robert Butler 4271
119. PRIBANYEC, Janos [illegible]
120. None ✓ 03

03
121. RASTENIS, Jonas NR
122. REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene 10227
123. RAUS, Juri [illegible]
124. RIKAND, Enno NR
125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt) NR
126. 03 RATCLIFF, Richard [illegible]
127. REEVES, John M. Jr. 10691
[redacted]
129. 03 REYNOLDS, Robert E. NR
[redacted]
131. 03 RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr 10764
[redacted]
133. 03 SULLIVAN, Dennis B 25-3591
[redacted]
136. STAROSTENKO, Henry NR
137. 03 IMLER, Norman C. 4052
138. SLEEPER, Gordon [illegible]
139. None ✓
140. None ✓
141. 03 GONZALO, QUESADA Jr NR
142. SAGER, John 4192 — N-122

K.C. K-5571
143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrill — 48-338
144. SLENYS, Lindas K. NR
145. 03 SOLNZEFF, Henry [illegible]
146. SOLER, Eva Diana NR
147. SATINSKAS, Henry NR
148. STEVENS, George A. 18-326
149. WALLIN, Jack [illegible]
150. TASHEFF, Mary 11184
03

TRUE

151. 03 AIMAN, James Henry NR 49
152. STOIAKEN, Nicholas P. 11[illegible]
153. 03 TALLEY, Ulo NR
154. TURK, Leo L. NR [illegible]
[redacted]
156. 03 THOMAS, Edward [illegible]
157. None ✓
158. TRIANOSKY, Harry 349
159. 03 VINING, James L. 25-557
160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald NR
161. HARVEY, William K. K.C. 237
162. BULIK, Joseph 3714
163. 03 WILL, Kenneth John 48-331
164. SHORTALL, John W. Jr 1486
165. WATTS, Roy Furniss 25-301
166. MERTZ, Richard 2201
167. None ✓ 03
168. ZANKIN, Myroslaw NR
169. ALAGAZE-1 (Crypt)
02

06
(LODYSEVSKI, [illegible] NR-1)

91N

14-00000

ALIAS

R.C. 7427 1. ACKER, Gerald 6815
48-338 2. ADLAND, Glennon Edward (210c60)
1166 3. AHORN, Paul Rodger
48-338 4. AIVNEY, Matt (210c-60)
K-7103/48-3385. ASHBORNE, Howard Clark (210c-60)
NR 6. AUDISTO, Mario
NR 7. BARKER, Algis 07
48-338 8. BARNAUD, James Winston (210c-60)
8435-NR 9. BARKER, Andrew Frank
NR 10. BARRETO, John Raymond
13915-NR 11. BAUER, William John
NR 12. BAUGH, William James
48-338 13. BELT, William Henry (210c60)
NR 14. BENTON, Alan
NR 15. BERUCK, Karl Donald
14317 NR 16. BERGETHON, David Bjorn
P-168 17. BERGSON, William Kinander
~~[illegible]~~/RC 7717 17115 18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo 07
NR 19. BEST, Alexander
(RC) K-30772 20. (T) BINSWANGER, Stanley Joo
C-1737/N-89 21. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
8711 48-338 ~~22~~ 22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
11667 23. BREITHEIM, John Albert
2219 ~~24~~ 24. BRICK, Robert Leo
58711K ~~2149~~ 25. BRICKHAM, Tad S. 07
NR 26. BRIGGS, Herb
C-1734/P-120 27. BROOKE, Paul Gregory
8447 NR 28. BRUTON, William Emmott
9181 5305 NR 29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.
NR 30. CARNEY, Peter
NR [redacted]
48-338 32. BOWTECK, Cletus Winton (210c60)
[illegible] NR 33. CLINE, William David
14337 NR 34. CONRAD, WILLIAM Robert
5-1650 35. CROWE, Andrew Paul 4447
30378 NR 36. CURBELO, Eduardo
T-421 37 (T) DAILEY, James
NR 38. DEKANSKI, Vincent Joseph
7168 39. DELAINE, William Alan
9540 NR 40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
NR 41. DE LONG, Constantino
48-338 42. DONAIRE, William Henry 12465
[illegible] 43. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
9564 44 03 DUBOIS, Rene E. ARMY
RC-11655-NR 45. ENGLSCH, Frank Joseph
.0016 NR 46. ELFMONT, Rudolf Albert
K-13[illegible] NR 47. ELLEGOR, William Monroe
NR 48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
NR 49. FARON, Charles Andrew
RC. 2535 NR 50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
5561 48-3385 51. FITSAMES, Lucian Charles
15765/C-3071 52. (T) FLICK, Charles E.
03

NR 53. FORDASCH, John Norman 4-25
742654. FROST, Frank 1426
48-338 55. FRYLINK, Robert Peter 48-33
48-338 56. GENGARO, Charles Henry 5557
~~[illegible]~~ 57. GENISMAN, Aubrey Lyle 9424
7714 NR 58. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
25-2411 59. GUDINO-MARGAIN, Carlos 1416
K ~~9676~~ 60. HABER, Frantisek 16183
5-15467 61. HALE, William Mark
NR 62. HALLY, Roberta Shirley 07 4
NR 63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph 1
NR 64. HARRISON, Louise
NR 65. HASKINS, John Martin 07
117476 66. HEBERTEN, Roger Andrew ARMY
992767. HILLARY, Bernard Norman
NR 68. HODONICKI, Thomas Mark 96
NR [redacted]
48-338 70. HURLEY, Edward Elmer K-2156
NR 71. IRVING, Andrew
NR 72. JACOBS, Stephan
NR 73. JAMES, Nicholas
NR 74. JARECKI, Stanley
NR 75. JEFFRIES, Uldis
74258 76. (T) JENKINS, Ivar
NR 77. JUDD, Nicholas
(C-2771)(3161) 78. KACKMAN, Benjamin Franklin 48-33
~~[illegible]~~ 79. KARLQUIST, Paul 07 1067
NR 80. KASARIAN, Zigurds
NR 81. KELLY, Myron
NR 82. KENDALL, Paul
NR 83. KERCHNER, George Michael 16
NR 84. KERKSICK, Walter
NR 85. KINNEY, Jack Anthony 1616
8077 86. KINSLOW, John William 07 8C9
NR 87. KOLA, Walter
NR 88. KOSTIK, Joseph R.C.-25
NR [redacted]
NR 90. LANSING, John
NR [redacted]
10550 92 (T) LEE, Watson Hwa Shen 03 ARMY
NR 93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest 07 5
~~[illegible]~~ 6570 94. LENART, Charles Edward
NR 95. LOWE, Myron 47-4567
NR 96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae
10333 97 (T) LYONS, George H. ARMY
NR 98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph 48-
NR 99. MALABRE, Howland Edward 716
NR 100. MALOKOFF, Serge. T-8
NR 101. MARKSCHATT, Ruben 16760
4593 102. MARSAL, Karl
25-557 103. MASCHGAN, Andrew Frank
C-2994 104. MASON, Frank
NR 105. MCADAM, George Thomas
NR 106. MCGAVIN, Gerrald, Joseph 25
07

BDN

ALIAS 07 7797

NR 107. MENICUCCI, Andrew Robert
3647 108. MIRANDA, Diego S.
[redacted]
NR 110. NACHBRUNN, Harry Richard
NR 111. NASH, Mike
NR 112. PANOCK, Harry Charles 07 3-134-633
NR 113. PAPPS, William David 561C
NR 114. PARKER, Carl Frank
NR 115. PASTOR, Nick
NR 116. PAULSON, Marty
NR 117. PEVER, Laura Jean 4021
NR 118. POLACEK, Henry Franklin 4271
NR 119. POLING, Janos
NR 120. RAHILL, Richard Kent
NR XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
NR 121. RANALLO, Jonas
122. RATCLIFF, Matthew Edward 1C 739
25-157 123. REED, Juri
NR 124. REESE, Eno
NR 125. REEse, Joseph Anthony
NR 126. RESTELLER, Richard Lawrence 13315
~~[illegible]~~ 127. ROBERTS, John Martin Jr. 061 NR
[redacted]
NR 129. ROGERS, Robert E. 07
[redacted]
NR 131. ROTTUM, Lowell Owen Jr. 11
NR 133. SAKIN, Edmond Abel 25-3541
[redacted]
NR 136. SEALE, Henry
NR 137. SEALY, Robert Ruben 8652
11633 138. SELFE, Gordon Dale ARMY
NR 139. SHALER, Floyd A.
NR 140. SHIPLEY, Charles Joseph
NR 141. SHOWCROFT, Richard E.
N-122 142. SIMPSON, John 07 DEF. 4192
NR XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
45-338 143 SIROTA, Edward G. PC K-5371
NR 144. SLATER, Lawrence
NR 145. SNYDER, Gene 13713
NR 146. None
NR 147. SORENSON, Henry
45-338 148. STANDARD, George Adam
NR 149. STATEN, Samuel Addison 07
~~[illegible]~~ 150. XXSHEKK, STEPHENS, Marina T. 11184

ALIAS

48-335 151. STEVENS, James Henry
NR 152. None
NR 153. None
NR 154. TANIER, Lester Lewis
[redacted]
48-338 156. TOGGITT, Edward J.
NR 157. TORREY, Erasmus
349 158. TRABAN, Gregorio R.
N-113 159. VALCHIN, James Louis
NR 160. VAN CHADDE, Donald
(PC) K-2395 161. WALKER, William 07
N-122 162. WELK, Joseph Reinhol
48-338 163. WIDEGREN, Keith J.
~~[illegible]~~ 14856 164. WILLEMS, Brenton Wal
NR 165. WISHFORD, Roy Furniss
NR 166. WOLF, Frederick Morri
NR 167. WONG, Lam
NR 168. ZEAMAN, Myron
NR 169. ZIMMER, Paul R. 07

NR 97 and [illegible]

71pJ

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

R.C. 7427 1. / ACKER, Gerald 6815 (21 Dec 60)
48-558 2. / ADLAND, Glennon Edward (21 Dec 60)
1166 3. / AHORN, Paul Rodger
48-335 4. AIVVEY, Matt (21 Dec 60)
K-7103/48-3385 5. ASHBORNE, Howard Clark (21 Dec 60)
NR 6. AUDISIO, Mario
NR 7. BARKER, Algis
48-338 8. BARNAUD, James Winston (21 Dec 60)
8435-NR 9. BARKER, Andrew Frank
NR 10. BARRETO, John Raymond
13915-NR 11. BAUER, William John
NR 12. BAUGH, William James
48-338 13. BELT, William Henry (21 Dec 60)
NR 14. BENTON, Alan
NR 15. BENUCK, Karl Donald
14317 NR 16. BERGETHON, David Bjorn
P-168 17. BERGSON, William Kinander
~~[illegible]~~ / 17115 18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo
7717 RC NR 19. BEST, Alexander
(RC) K-3917 20. (T) BINSWANGER, Stanley Joo
C-1737 / N-89 21. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
48-338 5741 ~~[illegible]~~ 22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
11667 23. BREITHEIM, John Albert
2219 ~~[illegible]~~ 24. BRICK, Robert Leo
6877 ~~K-2117~~ 25. BRICKHAM, Tad S.
NR 26. BRIGGS, Herb
C-1734 / P-120 27. BROOKE, Paul Gregory
8447 NR 28. BRUTON, William Emmott
9181 5305 NR 29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.
NR 30. CARNEY, Peter
NR [redacted]
48-338 32. BOWTECK, Cletus Winton (21 Dec 60)
[illegible] NR 33. CLINE, William David
14337 NR 34. CONRAD, WILLIAM Robert
5-16563 35. CROWE, Andrew Paul 4447
3037 NR 36. CURBELO, Eduardo
T-421 37. (T) DAILEY, James
NR 38. DEKANSKI, Vincent Joseph
7168 39. DELAIRE, William Alan
9540 NR 40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
NR 41. DE LONG, Constantine
48-338 42. DONAIRE, William Henry 12465
[illegible] 43. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
9564 44. [DUBOIS, Rene E.] ARMY
RC-11655 NR 45. EBELSON, Frank Joseph
10016 NR 46. ELFMONT, Rudolf Albert
K-[illegible] NR 47. ELLEGOR, William Monroe
NR 48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
NR 49. FARON, Charles Andrew
RC-2535 NR 50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
5561 48-338 51. FITSAMES, Lucian Charles
15765 / C-3071 52. [(T) FLICK, Charles E.]

NR 53. FORDASCH, John Norman - 4125
7426 54. FROST, Frank - 7426
48-338 55. FRYLINK, Robert Peter - 45-33
48-338 56. GENGARO, Charles Henry - 3557
~~[illegible]~~ 7714 57. GENISMAN, Aubrey Lyle - 7424
NR 58. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
25-211 59. GUDINO-MARGAIN, Carlos - 1416
K ~~[illegible]~~ 60. HABER, Frantisek 16183
5-1567 61. HALE, William Mark
NR 62. HALLY, Roberta Shirley - 9
NR 63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph - 1
NR 64. HARRISON, Louise
NR 65. HASKINS, John Martin
11747 66. HEBERDEN, Roger Andrew ARMY
9927 67. HILLARY, Bernard Norman
NR 68. HODONICKI, Thomas Mark - 9
NR [redacted]
48-338 70. HURLEY, Edward Elmer K-2156
NR 71. IRVING, Andrew
NR 72. JACOBS, Stephan
NR 73. JAMES, Nicholas
NR 74. JARECKI, Stanley
NR 75. JEFFRIES, Uldis
7428 76. (T) JENKINS, Ivar
NR 77. JUDD, Nicholas
(C-2771) (3101) 78. KACKMAN, Benjamin Franklin 48-3
~~[illegible]~~ 79. KARLQUIST, Paul - 10
NR 80. KASARIAN, Zigurds
NR 81. KELLY, Myron
NR 82. KENDALL, Paul
NR 83. KERCHNER, George Michael - 1
NR 84. KERKSICK, Walter
NR 85. KINNEY, Jack Anthony - 1016
8017 86. KINSLOW, John William - 569
NR 87. KOLA, Walter
NR 88. KOSTIK, Joseph RC-25-
NR [redacted]
NR 90. LANSING, John
NR [redacted]
10550 92. (T) [LEE, Watson Hwa Shen] ARMY
NR 93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest - 5
~~[illegible]~~ 94. LENART, Charles Edward
6570 NR 95. LOWE, Myron 47-567
NR 96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae
10333 97. (T) LYONS, George H. ARMY
NR 98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph 48-
NR 99. MALABRE, Howland Edward - 716
NR 100. MALOKOFF, Serge. T-8
NR 101. MARKSCHATT, Ruben - 16704
4593 102. MARSAL, Karl
25-557 103. MASCHGAN, Andrew Frank
C-2994 104. MASON, Frank
NR 105. MCADAM, George Thomas
NR 106. MCGAVIN, Gerrald, Joseph - 25

3/mc

14-00000

[illegible]

1. ASARIS, Gundaris [illegible]
2. AASAL, Glen 6175
3. SHERWOOD, John 11037
4. ADKINS, Matt 48-336
5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay [illegible]
6. RAGONA, Ferruggia NR
7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algio NR
8. BROWN, James W. 4742 [illegible]
9. SPEED, Horace III 8435
10. Amthrill-1 (Crypt) NR Julio Kauri Barreto
11. ROSENBAUER, William A. 13915
12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr. NR
13. BEALE, W. H. 48-336
14. BENAS, Alis NR
15. BECERT, Jerome F. NR — 12871
16. ERICKSON, Paul 14317
17. KINANDER, James F. NR
18. BARQUIN, Casimiro 7791
19. BECKER, Alexander NR
20. BYZEK, Stephen Joe [illegible] K-3097
21. BURKE, Paul J. 7497
22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward 48-336
23. SHERWOOD, John 11037
24. MELBERG, Robert L. 2219
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore 6777
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert NR
27. BURKE, Paul J. 8497
28. BLAIR, William 9181
29. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr. 5366 ✓
30. CHAS, Peter [illegible]

[redacted]

32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton 48-336
33. CAREY, William David 4874
34. CARTER, William R. [illegible] ✓
35. CROCE, Andrew 4447 ✓
36. FLORES, Thomas J. [illegible] ✓
37. DAIGA, Janis NR T-421
38. DALEY, V. J. NR
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
40. DILLON, John E. 9540
41. DE GARDER, Constantine NR
42. DEMMONS, William H. [illegible] ✓
43. DALY, Vincent S. 11307
44. DUBOIS, Rene E. [illegible]
45. EGAN, Frank J. [illegible]
46. ENDERS, Rudolf A. 10012 ✓
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr. [illegible]
48. None ✓
49. HEATH, Donald R. [illegible] ✓
50. FUCHS, Robert H. [illegible]
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr. [illegible]
52. FLICK, Charles E. [illegible] 765 ✓

[illegible]

53. [illegible], John [illegible] ✓
54. [illegible], Frank 7422 ✓
55. [illegible], Robert Peter 48-3
56. [illegible], Charles E. 3257
57. CRILK ✓ Greano, Aubrey
58. BRICOLAT, Pedro Gonzalez NR
59. GOUDIE, Cecil Mario 14162 ✓
60. TISLER, Frantisek 16183 ✓ S-1567
61. GREENE, Bill NR
62. GRAHAM, Barbara 9808
63. HUNT, E. Howard [illegible] 9 1088
64. None ✓
65. HAWKINS, Jack NR
66. HORN, Rufus A. Jr. 11749
67. HILDALGO, Barney
68. HEWITT, Thomas M. 9922

[redacted]

70. HECHT, Elmer Edward [illegible] K-215
71. IWASKIW, Andrij NR
72. JENCSOK, Stephen NR
73. JANCHUK, Nicholas NR
74. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E. NR
75. JAUNZEMIS, Ulris NR
76. JOANSON, Ivar NR 7428
77. JASUKOW, Nikolai NR
48-336 78. KYKER, Benjamin Franklin 3111
79. KAPUSTA, Peter 10378
80. KARKLINS, Zigurds NR
81. KRYZANIWSKY, Myron NR
82. KOCELA, Paul NR
83. KAPPES, G. 12180 George M
84. KURTZ, Walter NR
85. KIDA, Jack 10135
86. KENNEDY, John W. [illegible]
87. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter NR
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph NR, 25-10

[redacted]

90. LAMBERGS, John NR

[redacted]

92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen 10580
93. MAYERFELD, Ernest 5824
94. KLEIN, Theodore 5570
95. LOPUSZAUSKY, Myroslaw 47-5
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae NR
97. Unknown ✓
98. MAHONEY, Philip J. 48-336
99. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
100. MASLOVSKY, Serge T-835
101. MARTINEZ, Ruben 10787
102. SMITH, Haviland Jr. 4593
103. MOORE, Andrew F. NR 25-
104. MARSAK, Frank 8-2974
105. KRIESFELD, George NR
106. MULANE, Corrald J. NR 2

[illegible] Joe Latorre TSD. 60

TRUE

107. BARQUIN, Casimiro 1771
108. MORALES David S. 3643
[redacted]
110. NEWMASTER, Harry Richard NR
111. NASARENKO, Michael NR
112. PIEPER, Harry C. 3-125-633
113. PHILLIPS, William D. 2610
114. GREENE, Harris
115. PASLAWSKY, Nicholas NR
116. PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw NR
117. FRANK, Maryado 4221
118. MOORE, Robert Butler 4271
119. PRIBANYEC, Janos NR
120. None ✓

121. RASTENIS, Jonas NR
122. REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene 10227
123. RAUS, Juri [illegible]
124. RIKAND, Enno NR
125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt) NR
126. RATCLIFF, Richard [illegible]
127. REEVES, John M. Jr. 10691
[redacted]
129. REYNOLDS, Robert E. NR
[redacted]
131. RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr. 10764
[redacted]
133. SULLIVAN, Dennis B. 25-3591
[redacted]
136. STAROSTENKO, Henry NR
137. IMLER, Norman C. 8055
138. SLEEPER, Gordon [illegible]
139. None ✓
140. None ✓
141. GONZALO, QUESADA Jr. NR
142. SAGER, John 4192 — N-122
R.C. K-5511
143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrill — 48-338
144. SLENYS, Lindas K. NR
145. SOLNZEFF, Henry [illegible]
146. SOLER, Eva Diana NR
147. SATINSKAS, Henry NR
148. STEVENS, George A. 18-321
149. WALLIN, Jack NR
150. TASHEFF, Mary 11184

TRUE

151. AIMAN, James Henry NR 48
152. STOIAKEN, Nicholas P. 11[illegible]
153. TALLEY, Ulo NR
154. TURK, Leo L. 48-[illegible]
[redacted]
156. THOMAS, Edward 48-[illegible]
157. None ✓
158. TRIANOSKY, Harry 349
159. VINING, James L. 25-557
160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald NR
161. HARVEY, William K. R.C. 2[illegible]
162. BULIK, Joseph 3714
163. WILL, Kenneth John 48-331
164. SHORTALL, John W. Jr 2485
165. WATTS, Roy Furniss 25-3011
166. MERTZ, Richard 2201
167. None ✓
168. ZANKIN, Myroslaw NR
169. ALAGAZE-1 (Crypt)

LODYGENSKI [illegible]
NR.

OGC 74-1755

SECRET

30 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with E. Howard Hunt Re His Memoirs, "Undercover"

1. On 28 September 1974 Ray Rocca, Deputy Chief/CI Staff, and I met in the DCD Washington Field Office with E. Howard Hunt, his attorney William A. Snyder, Jr., and Snyder's associate Thomas W. Coons. As the meeting began, Hunt asked if it was being tape-recorded; I assured him that it was not. He said he did not care; but that, if it were to be recorded, he would like to know. We then embarked upon the review according to the plan under which we would demand the deletion of three items as classified and then proceed to the remaining 29 items, only if Hunt was cooperative on the first three. He and his lawyers appeared very cooperative, and accordingly, the meeting continued to cover all 32 items.

2. Changes were agreed to in the items set forth in paragraphs 12, 14, and 25 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September 1974. These appear at pages 73, 80-83, and 115 of the galley proof and concern the fabrication of the Shanghai post for a Mexican operation, the entry into the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City, and the joint CIA-Uruguayan telephone monitoring operation. The wording of the agreed changes is as shown on the attached copies of the pertinent pages of the galley proof. Essentially, these changes disguise the identity of the fabricated newspaper and remove a reference to journalists as agents; delete the word "Guatemalan" to make the entered embassy non-specific; and delete the reference to listening posts and telephone monitoring to make that paragraph refer in more general terms to our ability to cover targets without referring to the use of electronic surveillance.

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 058473

SECRET

C1

3. We then proceeded to the 29 items which we would like to see modified but which we could not consider classified. We made this clear to Hunt and went through them one by one, discussing our concern with each. Hunt contended that most of these items should not be considered sensitive since they had been publicized extensively; in some cases confirmed in testimony; and, in the case of other items, the principals involved were dead. However, he agreed to changes in the items referred to in paragraphs 1, 3, 17, and 32 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September. These involve the deletions of the names of Henry Pleasants and Frank Holcomb, both now retired under cover; a direct reference to joint operations with the British in Hong Kong against China; and the wording of his reference to CIA alias documentation used by the Watergate burglars. The language of this last item will be changed so that it no longer leaves the impression that the documentation was prepared by the Agency for this operation.

4. When we had finished, Hunt and his lawyers emphasized as they had mentioned earlier in the meeting that it might be very difficult to get the publisher to agree to changes in the unclassified items. Mr. Snyder offered to present all of the items to the publisher for change without distinguishing between the classified and unclassified items. He said he would do this without implying they were all classified. I felt it necessary to turn down his offer because of the risk of the publisher being unwilling to accept that many changes with the result that we would have to go back to him on the three classified items, thus presenting a situation similar to our retraction of previously demanded deletions in the Marchetti book. I think there would be some danger of the publisher using this in his advertising and through reviewers for publicity purposes.

5. As we were leaving, Hunt showed me what was described as a "comfort letter." This was a letter written by him to the publishers on 17 May 1974 at the publisher's request which said that in his opinion nothing in the manuscript violated any agreement between himself and the CIA, nor would subject him to prosecution under the espionage laws. As the meeting was ending, Hunt expressed his hope that no publicity would be given to it and that the Agency would not issue any kind of a press release. In view of the Director's decision that we shall issue a press release, I took pains to persuade Hunt that public acknowledgment of the fact that we had reviewed his

C3

14-00000

manuscript would be in his interest as well as ours. He had referred more than once during the meeting to the need to avoid the appearance of "a bear hug"; in other words, collusion or cooperation between him and the Agency, leaving an inference that the book was designed to be a whitewash of CIA. In view of this, it was easy to convince Hunt that an Agency press release would be in his interest. I would note here, however, that both Mr. Rocca and I felt that Hunt and his lawyers were genuinely cooperative and that a press release which is too harsh or denigrates the book or Hunt's motives might be unfair and considered by him to be in bad faith. Hunt appears to retain admiration and respect for the Agency and seems convinced that nothing in his book will harm our operations or personnel.

John D. Morrison Jr.
JOHN D. MORRISON, JR.
Acting General Counsel

Attachments

cc: Acting DDO
SAB/DDO
DC/CI Staff
O/Security
Asst. to DCI
Mr. Walter Pforzheimer
C/CCS

OGC:JDM:sin
Original - OGC Subj: PUBLICATIONS
1 - Chrono

c2

SECRET

20 October 1976

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

06
Mr. Emmett M. Steele, President
International Art Associates, Ltd.
08

06
Dear Mr. Steele,

08

This document is intended to confirm discussions held between yourself, representing International Art Associates, Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Mr. John J. Murray, Jr., representing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). If it conforms to your understanding of the agreement reached, kindly so acknowledge by signing below.

1. You have agreed on behalf of the Company to assist CIA by placing on retainer Mr. Richard T. Gibson at an annual fee of $9,000 per annum. This fee will be paid to Mr. Gibson by the Company in monthly increments of $750 each. The Company will overtly negotiate a retainer contract with Mr. Gibson, which will make eminently clear that both are negotiating and concluding the contract as independent parties; that the Company will have no obligation to withhold Federal, state or Social Security income taxes.

2. In consideration of the support rendered, CIA will pay the Company a fee of $10,000 per annum. Provision is made in this amount to offset any nominal expenses the firm incurs in its overt associations or support of Mr. Gibson.

3. CIA will reimburse the Company in quarterly increments via a contrived contractual arrangement between the Company and a notional facility of CIA. Cancelled checks will serve as adequate accounting for monies paid the Company.

4. Because of CIA's interest in Mr. Gibson, it is requested that the Company neither offer Mr. Gibson bona fide employment nor accept any proposal of employment from him without prior consent of CIA for a period of two (2) years following termination of this agreement.

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

SECRET

5. All information relating to this Agreement is classified secret. Both CIA and the Company agree that the most stringent safeguards will be taken to protect this information, including the existence of the agreement. Any information in any form that must be given to a third party by either CIA or the Company will be done in strict conformance with the laws safeguarding national security information, and only with full consultation between CIA and the Company.

6. This agreement is effective 1 October 1976 and shall remain in full effect for an indefinite period, subject to cancellation at any time upon sixty (60) days' notice by either party thereto.

The CIA wishes to express its appreciation for the manner in which you have received this request to perform a service related to the national security of the United States and for your personal attention thereto.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY ______________________
Special Contracting Officer

08

International Art Associates, Ltd.

06

Emmett M. Steele, President ______________________ Date

2/P

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HSCA Request Ltr 8 May 1978 OLC 78-1573

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

INCLUSIVE DATES: Directorate of S & T Memo 22 June 1978

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICI
7-7-78	7-7-78	G. ROBERT BLAKEY	G. Robert Blakey
7-10-78	7-10-78	Kenneth Klein	Kenneth Kl.
9-26-78		Johanna Smith	Johanna Smith

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Scott Breckenridge, OLC		
2	6D15, Hqs.		
3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
AEO/DDS&T, 6E60, Hqs., x6561	

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. SC-01836-78
Copy 1

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

E2 IMPDET

SC-01836-78
Copy 1

22 JUN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Counsel

ATTENTION : Scott Breckenridge

SUBJECT : HSCA Request

REFERENCE : HSCA Letter Dated 8 May 78, OLC 78-1573

1. (U) Reference requests access to information in six areas pertaining to the U-2 Project. As you know the U-2 Project files include about 150 boxes and over 650 reels of microfilm, all located at the Records Center. We have reviewed the shelf listing titles to identify pertinent files that might be responsive to the areas of request. The information requested covers an era and an organization which was not a part of this Directorate. As a result much of the corporate memory is no longer available and research of the files by current personnel is time consuming and requires almost a learning process. We have depended a great deal on the written History of the U-2 Project for leads to files and for information contained in this memorandum.

2. (U) The primary interest of reference refers to the U-2 Project, Detachment C, while stationed in Atsugi, Japan. Attached are replies keyed to the six areas in the HSCA letter.

3. (U) We realize that the information supplied by this memorandum does not fully respond to all the areas requested. Because of the broad and encompassing nature of some of the requests in the HSCA letter and the fact that our files are not organized to readily respond to such broad requests we request that the HSCA staff review the material and determine if their requests could be limited or narrowed in some way.

Thomas G. Ward, Jr.
Thomas G. Ward
Acting Executive Officer
Directorate of
Science and Technology

Attachments:
As stated

May be downgraded to
Unclassified when
removed from attachment.
CL BY: 469804

Attachment To:
SC-01836-78

SUBJECT: DDS&T Interim Reply to HSCA Request, 8 May 78,
OLC 78-1573

General Background: Detachment C advance party of security and communication personnel departed the U.S. for Atsugi, Japan, on 20 February 1957, the second echelon of administrative personnel departed 4 March, and the main body of the detachment with two U-2 aircraft and equipment began deployment on 15 March. On 29 March Headquarters was notified that all personnel and equipment were on base. Operational readiness was forecast for the week of 8 April. Operating procedures and liaison had been accomplished with the following major U.S. components:

Far East Air Force 13-3
Far East Command and Theater Commander
Agency's Tokyo Station and local support unit
54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron
Atsugi Naval Air Station

Details or specific operating agreements or procedures with the above components have not been located.

By mid-May 1957 the Detachment had flown 30 sorties. All of these operations were preparations for the primary mission of the Detachment. The first primary mission of the Detachment, a flight over part of the USSR, occurred on 20 June 1957, however, this mission did not originate or recover at Atsugi.

The first overflight of the USSR from Atsugi occurred on 1 March 1958 and this flight was the only and last flight. This flight, as other previous flights by other Detachments, was tracked by Russian radar, even though the U-2 aircraft had anti-radar applications, and a Soviet protest was made on 5 March 1958 by the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Mikhail Menshikov. Attached are copies of the Soviet Aide Memoires of 5 March and 21 April 1958 (Tab A).

The Detachment continued to perform non-USSR missions in the Far East area until the Powers flight of 1 May 1960. Redeployment of the Detachment began in early July, the last U-2 aircraft departed Japan on 9 July and all personnel and other equipment cleared the base and turned the facilities back to the Navy on 19 August 1960.

4PJ

During the deployment of Detachment C it performed approximately 86 operational missions, of these only 43 originated and recovered at Atsugi.

1. Any and all information pertaining to the take-offs and landings of the U-2 at Atsugi, Japan, limited to the years 1959 through 1962.

We have been unable to locate files which would contain logs of all take-offs and landings of the U-2 aircraft assigned to Detachment C. In addition to the mission flights stated above we must assume that there were a large number of take-offs and landings which would include flights for pilot familiarization, training, equipment testing, transitional and flights (purely for cover purposes.) 32

2. Any and all information concerning the radar procedures, facilities, and staff involved with the U-2 flights at Atsugi, Japan, limited to the years 1959 through 1962.

As stated in the General Background above we have not located details or specific operating procedures or agreements with the local Navy base at Atsugi.

3. Any and all information pertaining to contact between Marine Air Control Squadron #1, Air Group II, 1st Marine Wing, and U-2 personnel at Atsugi, Japan, including but not limited to housing, recreational, and eating facilities - limited to the years 1959 through 1962.

We have not identified any relationship between Detachment C and Marine Air Control Squadron #1. On the subject of housing, we have noted that late in 1957 families were permitted at Detachment C and as a result housing was provided in the compound assigned to the Agency Support Unit and ten houses were rented on the local market.

4. Any and all information pertaining to defectors with knowledge of the U-2 program.

The DDS&T has not located any information pertaining to defectors. We defer this request to the DDO.

5. Any and all information within the U-2 program file pertaining to defectors with knowledge of the U-2 program.

   See above.

6. Any and all information concerning Soviet knowledge of the U-2 program previous to May 1, 1960.

Attached is an extract from a report dated 3 March 1958 concerning Soviet Air Defense which gives a summary of Soviet knowledge of the U-2 overflights between 20 June and 10 July 1956 (Tab B).

Also attached is a copy of the Soviet protest note of 10 July 1956 concerning Mission 2013 on 4 July 1956 which was the first penetration of the Soviet borders (Tab C).

5 March 1958

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

AIDE MEMOIRE

According to precisely established data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 hours Moscow time, an American military jet aircraft, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement of Velikaya Kema and penetrated into the airspace of the Soviet Union, remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time. Thereafter, the aircraft left in the direction of the Sea of Japan in the area south of the Olga Bay.

The information on this violation has been carefully checked and there is no doubt as to its authenticity. The military representatives of the United States, who in this case acted possibly without the knowledge of the Government of the United States, will perhaps deny the said violation, as has happened in the past. However, such a denial cannot eliminate the fact of violation itself. In any case, the Soviet side would have no interest in commenting on this incident if it had not actually taken place.

A the present time, when negotiations are being conducted on the holding of a summit meeting which could contribute to an improvement of relations and to strengthening trust between states, the violation of the Soviet border by an American military aircraft may be evaluated as an attempt to undermine the efforts aimed at convening such a meeting and to aggravate the international situation.

From the messages of the President of the USA and his conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, as well as from statements by other government officials of the USA, it is known to the Soviet Government that the Government of the USA desires a rapprochement between our governments and improvement in the relations between them. There can hardly be any doubt that such facts of violation of the borders of the USSR can have only one result--that of hindering this cause and upsetting Soviet-American relations.

The attention of the Government of the USA is invited to the fact that in the present situation the violation of the airspace of the USSR by an American military aircraft takes on a particularly dangerous character since, as has been repeatedly reported, American military planes make flights around the clock over many countries of the world carrying thermonuclear bombs. The Government of the USA cannot fail to be aware of what genuinely catastrophic consequences for the cause of peace will ensue when an American plane with such a load will find itself shot down.

The attention of the Government of the USA has already been previously directed to cases of violation of the state boundaries of the Soviet Union by American military aircraft. However, as proven by the case cited, the authorities of the USA have not taken the necessary measures to prevent such violations.

It is absolutely obvious that it is the duty of the governments of the USSR and the USA to do everything possible to prevent any acts capable of complicating the situation and the relations between the Soviet Union and the USA.

The Soviet Government cannot but protest against the violations of Soviet frontiers by an American military aircraft and it expects that the Government of the United States will punish severely those guilty of the violation of the airspace of the USSR which has taken place and that it will take steps to prevent such violations in the future.

Taking into account the present situation, where a summit conference is being prepared, and also the spirit and purpose of the negotiations being conducted between our governments, the Soviet Government would not like to make this matter public or subject it to discussion in the UN.

The hope is expressed that this matter will be settled satisfactorily between the governments of the USSR and the USA and that there will be no need for the Soviet Government to resort to other means for its settlement.

(Initialled by M. Menshikov)

Washington, March 5, 1958

21 April 1958

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Note No. 9

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, referring to the Aide-Memoire of the Department of State dated March 31, 1958 and containing a reply of the Government of the United States of America to the Aide-Memoire of the Soviet Government dated March 5 concerning a violation of the Soviet state border in the Far East by an American military jet aircraft, has the honor to communicate the following:

In the reply Aide-Memoire of the Department of State an attempt is made to deny the fact of an American military aircraft having violated the Soviet border.

As has already been communicated, the Soviet Government has at its disposal carefully verified data on this violation, the reliability of which leaves no room for doubt. According to these data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 a.m. Moscow time, an American military reconnaissance aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement Velikaya Kema, 32 kilometers south of that settlement. Then the violating aircraft deeply penetrated the airspace of the USSR and, after remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time, passed beyond the limits of the Soviet territory 45 kilometers south of the Olga Bay at 8:11 a.m.

In the light of the established facts the reply of the Government of the United States of America can in no way be recognized as satisfactory. Naturally, the question arises as to how to explain such a reply of the American Government: whether it was misled deliberately by its military representatives in the Far East or whether it considered it possible to protect such persons subordinate to it, who, without regard to the possible consequences, sanction violation of Soviet borders, thus creating a threat of international complications.

Such a reply of the Government of the United States of America to the communication of the Soviet Government cannot fail to cause serious concern, the more so since the new case of violation of Soviet airspace took place after warnings on the part of the Government of the USSR to the effect that American authorities should take the necessary steps to prevent such violations.

In connection with the foregoing the Soviet Government expects that the Government of the United States of America will undertake further investigation of this act of violation of the airspace of the USSR by an American military aircraft and will punish severely those guilty of this violation.

The Soviet Government also expects that the Government of the United States of America will take the necessary steps to prevent violations of Soviet airspace by American aircraft in the future and states that in the event of new violations full responsibility for their consequences will rest with the Government of the United States.

Washington, D. C.. April 1958

TAB
B

Summary of Initial Missions

In the period from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense system was subjected to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven occurring within a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that 24 (COMINT) provides the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet system. This is important because it is clear from REGAL material that 24 considerable air defense business is conducted over landlines and thus not observed by COMINT. However, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from these initial flights and these are indicated as follows:

1. In spite of the fact that these missions come as a surprise, none of them went undetected. This is clear evidence that their radar coverage extends above (72,000) 24 feet.

2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action. One positive action was the standdown of civil flights while the mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second action which is believed related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraft into East Germany and Poland on 7 July 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved into Hungary at about this time.

3. The performance of the Soviet system on the 5 July mission, 2014, was indeed curious. While the action evident from COMINT 24 is not clear an explanation which appears to fit the known facts is offered as follows: As a result of the previous missions, the Soviets had concluded the essential facts concerning the missions, 24 i.e., that they were for reconnaissance, that they flew above 65,000 feet, and that a penetration as deep as Moscow was possible. They probably surmised that the 5 July mission was headed for Moscow when the track appeared on a northeasterly heading. The loss of the target when it entered Soviet territory was probably deliberate and the "red herring" track returning to the west was either a dodge or a convenience to avoid broadcasting a track for all the system to see that a "hostile or intruder" was coming over Moscow with no means available to stop it. This idea is supported by the use of a raid number assigned in the region just beyond the point where the track had been "lost". In addition, the track was not labeled "hostile or intruder" when it was broadcast after it had passed beyond Moscow. The reporting of the track when it did appear was only by Moscow and it has been suggested that other stations had been instructed not to broadcast the track. Further, it may or may not be a coincidence that the height broadcast was almost exactly half of the true altitude of the mission aircraft, but on the next missions, four days later, the altitude reporting was consistently above 50,000 feet. 99

4. By 9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recognition of the great height of the mission flights, tracking was better and in general the performance of the warning system was much improved.

5. The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air defense warning system closed a 3000 mile track with only two short periods of confusion or track loss. Altitude reporting was over 60,000 feet with one plot passed 68,800 which was only 100 feet off target. 99

6. The first eight missions proved that the air defense warning system is deployed in depth. This was evident from both the continuity of track and most forcefully from the ELINT data collected. Some 1461 intercepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 3000 mc/s band were obtained by project ELINT as follows: TOKEN-1331, WHIFF-37, GAGE-26, PATTY CAKE-37, Other 30. These numbers cannot be equated to individual radar sets since the same radar may be intercepted more than once. 618 TOKEN sites were located, including 213 new sites. Some 343 additional TOKEN signals were identified but available information does not permit determination of location so that it must be concluded that these signals include both known and new sites. Because of the limitation of ELINT to the 3000 mc/s band and the Soviet practice of collocating radars on different frequencies the total number of radars may be expected to be at least double the number of sites. 99

5/N

7. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related to the presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturation point has not been determined because of insufficient data.

99

8. The question of radars for height finding, the capabilities of TOKEN in this role, the introduction of ROCK CAKEs and later developments are discussed in another section. It is believed, however, that these missions were a catalyst in the introduction of ROCK CAKEs.

99

e/RV

TAB
4

(Text of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)

Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
10 July 1956

Note No. 23

The Embassy of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, acting on instructions from the Soviet Government, has the honor to state the following:

According to precisely verified data, on July 4 of this year, at 8:18 a.m. Moscow Time, a twin-engined medium bomber of the United States Air Force appeared from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany and flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, entering the air space of the Soviet Union from the direction of the Polish People's Republic at 9:35 in the area of Grodno. The aircraft which violated the air space of the Soviet Union flew on the route Minsk, Vilnyus, Kaunas and Kaliningrad, penetrating territory of the Soviet Union to the depth of 320 kilometers and remaining over such territory for one hour and 32 minutes.

On July 5 of this year, at 7:41 Moscow Time, a twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force, coming from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany, flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, and at 8:54 penetrated the air space of the Soviet Union in the area of Brest, coming from the direction of the Polish People's Republic. The aircraft violating the air frontier of the Soviet Union flew along the route Brest, Pinsk Baranovichi, Kaunas, and Kaliningrad, having penetrated Soviet territory to a depth of 150 kilometers and having remained one hour and 20 minutes over such territory. The same day another twin-engine bomber of the United States Air Force

Department of State of the
United States of America
Washington, D. C.

invaded the air space of the Soviet Union and penetrated to a significant depth over Soviet territory.

On July 9 there took place new flights of United States aircraft into the Soviet air space.

The above-mentioned violation of the air frontiers of the Soviet Union by American aircraft cannot be interpreted as other than intentional and conducted for purposes of reconnaissance.

It must be underscored that these gross violations of the air space of the Soviet Union took place at a time when, as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving governments, a definite lessening of international tensions has been achieved, when relations between governments are improving, and when mutual confidence between them is growing. Such a development of international relations is fully supported by the peoples of all countries who are vitally interested in strengthening peace.

One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary circles hostile to the cause of peace in a number of countries are worried by the relaxation of international tension which has taken place. These circles do everything possible to interfere with further improvement of relations between countries and the creation of mutual trust among them. Among such attempts is the said gross violation by the American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union, which consistently carries out a policy of strengthening peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all countries, including the United States of America.

In this connection, the fact attracts attention that the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General Twining, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet Government energetically protests to the Government of the United States against such gross violation of the air space of the Soviet Union by American military aircraft and considers this violation as an intentional act of certain circles in the United States, planned to aggravate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Calling the attention of the Government of the United States to the inadmissibility of such violations of the air space of the Soviet Union by American aircraft, the Soviet Government states that all responsibility for possible consequences of such violations rests with the Government of the United States.

The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken by the Government of the United States to punish those guilty for the said violations and to prevent such violations in the future.

Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1956

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Robert D. Clark
Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT: PDLADLE: Outside Lawyer to Draw Up
Deed of Trust

1. PDLADLE is a high-level defector residing in New York who has had advanced to him a number of large "loans" over the years, in addition to his "salary." Some of these monies have gone into the purchase of some real estate in the State of New York. The Agency now wants a Deed of Trust executed in favor of one of its nominees on the New York real property.

2. Possible lawyers to handle drafting the Deed of Trust are:

06

a. Natalie Koether, a cleared N.Y. lawyer, on whom FR Division has an operational approval. They have an active interest in using her and her husband. If Ms. Koether is used on the Deed of Trust, FR would lose an asset. Were it not for our rule of no operational use of cleared attorneys, FR apparently (accordingly to Eric Sowers) has no objection to Ms. Koether's drawing up the Deed of Trust;

06

b. another cleared lawyer. The clearance on any such lawyer would have to be updated by Security. The best candidate Bill Ashbaugh and I were able to locate off the Cleared Attorneys Panel was Richard C. Kullen, Jr., OS #651 162, last cleared 21 March 1975; 06, 08

c. the case officer for PDLADLE, MONCURE, who is apparently a practicing N.Y. lawyer who at one time worked for the Agency. This idea was suggested by Vasia Gmirkin of CI Staff, the client component on the Deed of Trust. The idea would be that since MONCURE already knows that PDLADLE and MONCURE would be used only on this PDLADLE job, the security and cover problems normally associated with allowing cleared attorneys to become involved in operations would not be as pronounced as

9/PN

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 035774

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

usual. On the other hand, his prior association with the Agency could jeopardize PDLADLE if drafting the Deed of Trust exposes MONCURE to more scrutiny than his present association with PDLADLE already does; and

d. an attorney from OGC. N.Y. mortgage law would have to be researched to try to make the Deed of Trust freely assignable from one CIA nominee to another. N.Y. form books should be easily locatable in the D.C. law libraries. If the Deed of Trust follows N.Y. form, would the fact that the OGC lawyer is not licensed in N.Y. in any way throw doubt on the document? When might the name of the lawyer who drafted the document come to light?

Robert D. Clark

RDC: kas
Distribution:
Original - DEFECTORS
1 - RDC Signer
1 - Chrono

DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

SUBJECT: Sam Jaffe

1. Sam Jaffe's relationship with the Agency predates his assignment to Moscow as an ABC correspondent. During the period 1958-60 while in New York Jaffe was a confidential informant of the FBI on his Soviet contacts in New York. In addition, he had several meetings with the New York office of CIA's Domestic Contact Division. While in Moscow with ABC Jaffe felt he was the subject of a recruitment attempt by the KGB in 1962. He recounted his story to the Regional Security Officer at the American Embassy in Moscow, copies of which went to both CIA and FBI. Jaffe covered the Gary Powers' trial for ABC and flew on the same plane from New York to Moscow with the Barbara Powers' party. Prior to that trip he was briefed by a CIA psychologist on ways to observe Powers's behavior and demeanor. Jaffe was never "ordered" to cover the Powers' trial, but simply acted as an enterprising newspaperman befriending Barbara Powers while her party was enroute and in the Soviet Union.

2. During the latter part of his time in Moscow Jaffe was in contact with a KGB officer, Kuvkov, and this relationship is a matter of record with the FBI. There is some evidence that Jaffe was given preferential treatment by the Soviet authorities. Some western pressmen felt that Jaffe, as an aggressive newspaperman, was giving a little to get a story. Jaffe has given his version of his dealings with the KGB in a lengthy 1969 interview with the FBI.

3. The defector Nosenko provided information on Jaffe's relationship to the KGB in 1964. However as time went on, further debriefings of Nosenko indicated that Nosenko was not as sure about Jaffe's relationship as he had been originally. By 1968 Nosenko was positive only that Kuvkov had been in touch with Jaffe, but Nosenko was not certain that Jaffe was a paid and witting agent of the KGB.

4. During Jaffe's tour in Hong Kong, and subsequently in Washington, he was in touch with CIA officers. He provided good information on a [Chinese 24 news official] and he was helpful to the Agency in reporting on a [Canadian] 11 organization, [The Committee of New China Policy]. All [official] contact with Jaffe ended in 1971. 08 28

5. Central to Jaffe's charges about CIA, which he has made public many times, is Jaffe's belief that the CIA passed derogatory information about him to his employers. Attached is a 24 November 1975 letter from Mr. Colby to Jaffe which states categorically that no information in the CIA files had ever been passed outside of official channels. In addition to this letter Jaffe has been reassured on this point verbally on at least four other occasions. The CIA is positive that Jaffe's recall from Hong Kong in 1968

4/BR

and subsequent dismissal by ABC, are not related to any action taken by the CIA.

6. In discussions with Jaffe he frequently recounts a conversation he had with Mr. Ted Cowen, a British intelligence official in Hong Kong. 06/08 According to Jaffe, Cowen told him that he had a "security problem" but 06 this problem would clear up in due course. A close check of our files can not ellucidate what Cowen was talking about. It is possible, of course, 06 that Cowen was alluding to the Nosenko allegations as the British were 06 given much of the Nosenko debriefings. The record is unclear on this point. However, based on information available to this Agency, we feel we have tried to pacify Jaffe with the statement contained in the Colby letter that we have no evidence he has ever been an agent of any foreign intelligence service.

7. Jaffe has submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to CIA which has resulted in the release of a large number of documents to him. Jaffe can, of course, appeal our withholding of certain documents through appropriate administrative and judicial procedures under the FOIA.

5/BR

10 March 1978

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Robert D. Clark
Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT: Meeting in New York: PDLADLE

On 2 March 1978, the undersigned and Vasia Gmerkin of CI Staff met in New York City with the defector [redacted] and his wife [redacted] at the apartment of Bernard MONCURE. There [redacted] put a first mortgage on a New York City property of theirs located at 163 East 71st Street, New York, New York, in favor of a devised facility nominee of the Agency, (Roush-Walker Company, 24 48 Alabama Street, S.W.), Atlanta, Georgia, for a recited indebtedness of $167,429.88. They signed a classified document acknowledging that the devised facility is an instrumentality of the United States Government. This document was witnessed in alias by Mr. Gmerkin and the undersigned. [redacted] registered strenuous objections to the "mortgage."

RDC

Robert D. Clark

RDC: kas
Distribution:
Original - DEFECTORS
1 - RDC Signer
1 - Chrono

2 IMPDET CL BY 035774

1/P/

STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF NEW YORK ss:

On the 2nd day of MARCH 1978, before me personally came [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] husband and wife,

to me known to be the individuals described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that they executed the same.

STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF ss:

On the day of 19 , before me personally came

to me known to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that executed the same.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF ss:

On the day of 19 , before me personally came to me known, who, being by me duly sworn, did depose and say that he resides at No. ; that he is the of , the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument; that he knows the seal of said corporation; that the seal affixed to said instrument is such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by order of the board of directors of said corporation, and that he signed h name thereto by like order.

STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF ss:

On the day of 19 , before me personally came the subscribing witness to the foregoing instrument, with whom I am personally acquainted, who, being by me duly sworn, did depose and say that he resides at No. ; that he knows to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument; that he, said subscribing witness, was present and saw execute the same; and that he, said witness, at the same time subscribed h name as witness thereto.

Mortgage Note

TITLE NO.

[redacted]

WITH 24

(ROUSH-WALKER COMPANY)

STANDARD FORM OF NEW YORK BOARD OF TITLE UNDERWRITERS

Distributed by

CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY

SECTION 5
BLOCK 1406
LOT 26 - Tax Map
COUNTY ~~XXXXXXX~~ NEW YORK

Recorded at Request of
CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY

Return by Mail to

Morton E. Blood, Esq.,
116 Sullivan Street
NY NY 10012
Zip No.

VR

Standard N.Y.B.T.U. Form ·-10M Mortgage Note, Individual or Corporation. (Straight or Instalment.)

CONSUlT YOUR LAWYER BEFORE SIGNING THIS INSTRUMENT — THIS INSTRUMENT SHOULD BE USED BY LAWYERS ONLY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MORTGAGE NOTE

$ 167,429.88 New York, MARCH 2,1978 19

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, We, [redacted] husband and wife, residing in the City, County and State of New York,

24

promise to pay to (ROUSH-WALKER COMPANY, 48 Alabama Street, S.W.) ATLANTA, GEORGIA (30303)

24

or order, at the offices of (Roush-Walker Company, 48 Alabama Street, S.W.) Atlanta, Georgia,
or at such other place as may be designated in writing by the holder of this note, the principal sum of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY NINE 88/100 ($167,429.88) on demand. ~~Dollars~~

~~with interest thereon to be computed from the date hereof, at the rate of per centum per annum and to be paid on the day of 19 next ensuing and~~

IT IS HEREBY EXPRESSLY AGREED, that the said principal sum secured by this note shall become due at the option of the holder thereof on the happening of any default or event by which, under the terms of the mortgage securing this note, said principal sum may or shall become due and payable; also, that all of the covenants, conditions and agreements contained in said mortgage are hereby made part of this instrument.

Presentment for payment, notice of dishonor, protest and notice of protest are hereby waived.

This note is secured by a mortgage made by the maker to the payee of even date herewith, on property situate in the Borough of Manhattan, City, County and State of New York, and commonly known as and by Street Number (163 East 71st, Street, New York, N.Y. (10021)

2/PV

This note may not be changed or terminated orally.

In the presence of:

[redacted]

[redacted]

14-00000

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

STATE OF NEW YORK,
COUNTY OF NEW YORK } ss.:

On this 2nd day of MARCH, in the year nineteen hundred and seventy-eight, before me personally came [redacted] and [redacted] to me known to be the the individuals described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and they acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

STATE OF NEW YORK,
COUNTY OF } ss.:

On this day of, in the year nineteen hundred and, before me personally came

to me known, who, being by me duly sworn, did depose and say that he resides at

that he is the of

the corporation described in, and which executed the above instrument; that he knows the seal of said corporation; that the seal affixed to said instrument is such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by order of the Board of Directors of said corporation, and that he signed name thereto by like order.

Title No.

[redacted]
(Husband and Wife)
TO
ROUSH-WALKER COMPANY 24
48 Alabama Street, S.W.,
Atlanta, Georgia.
(30303)

MORTGAGE

Dated March 2, 1978
$ 167,429.88

The land affected by the within instrument lies in Section 5 in Block 1406 on the Map of the County of New York
Lot 26. RECORDED AT REQUEST OF
AND RETURN BY MAIL TO:

Mario E. Brod, Esq
116 Sullivan Street
NY NY. 10012

1/PV

STATE OF NEW YORK,
COUNTY OF } ss.:

On this day of, in the year nineteen hundred and, before me personally came

to me known to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

THIS MORTGAGE, made the 2nd day of MARCH

nineteen hundred and seventy-eight , between [redacted] and [redacted] husband and wife, both residents of the State of New York

Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

24 ¢

the mortgagor, and ROUSH-WALKER COMPANY, 48 Alabama Street, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia

, the mortgagee

WITNESSETH, that to secure the payment of an indebtedness in the sum of ($167,429.88) ONE HUNDRED SIXTYSEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTYNINE $\frac{88}{100}$ Dollars, lawful money of the United States, to be paid on demand,

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

according to a certain bond or obligation bearing even date herewith, the mortgagor hereby mortgages to the mortgagee ALL that certain plot, piece or parcel of land, with the buildings and improvements thereon erected, situate lying and being in the Borough of Manhattan, City, County and State of New York, bounded and described as follows:

BEGINNING at a point on the northerly side of 71st Street, distant 285 feet westerly from the corner formed by the intersection of the sa northerly side of 71st Street and the westerly side of Third Avenue; RUNNING THENCE northerly, parallel with Third Avenue and part of the w through a party wall, 102 feet 2 inches to the center line of the bloc THENCE westerly, along said center line of the block, 15 feet; THENCE southerly, parallel with Third Avenue and part of the way through anot party wall, 102 feet 2 inches to the northerly side of 71st Street; ar THENCE easterly, along the northerly side of 71st Street, 15 feet to the point or place of beginning.

Said premises now being known as and by Street Number 163 East 71st Street, New York, New York.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ORIGINAL

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

lpN

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case

1. Mr Helms, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.

2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what we at least considered to be two problems on which we would like the advice of the Department of Justice. First, we would seeon feel compelled to begin hostile interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered what the legal position would be in circumstances in which we detained Nosenko against his will for this purpose. Second, we would have to be ready after determining that we could obtain no additional information from Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to Germany and transferring him to Soviet custody in Berlin where this has been done a number of times in the past.

3. There was some discussion of whether deportation to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms explained we would probably face publicity problems in deporting to a third country of the kind we would encounter if he were free in the U. S. Mr. Helms noted there were many items of information which we and the FBI realize are of no significance because of the file holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best place.

4. The question of the basis for detention was again raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "exclusion and parole case" which means he has not been admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is responsible for him while he is in this country. This

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further. In this event, we would be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest and deportation was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston. Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA Office of Security officials to get the background of their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helms thanked Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall" in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

C/SB

~~SECRET~~

OGC 64-0903

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states: "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status." This means that the responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word "minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.

3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed departure.

para 1 declassified by AAL on 19 Sept 78

Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

cc: DD/P
C/SR

~~SECRET~~

January 1975

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media.

2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet officials/ in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in the United States.

~~SECRET~~

3 OCT 1969 ER 69-5003/1

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrell:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance of subject into the United States for permanent residence since his entry is in the interest of the national security ~~and essential to the furtherance of the~~ national intelligence mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject has provided valuable information to this Agency and he will continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a period of five years and has submitted to a technical interrogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and should any information be developed definitely disproving his bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the Attorney General.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

There are enclosed Forms I-125 and background data, in duplicate, concerning the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/

Richard Helms
Director

Enclosures.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/ H. J. Osborn 8 October 1969

Howard J. Osborn Date
Director of Security

Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Signer's copy
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - SB Div.
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP
1 - OGC
2 - OS Files

SECRET

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)

30 October 1927 Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

Male Divorced Brown Blue/Gray 5ft. 11 inches

Soviet Caucasian --

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

AKA: Yuri NOSENKO

DPOB: 30 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

MARITAL STATUS: 1946 – Married and divorced Flavia NOSENKO (Nee SHILKOV).
1948 – Married Augustina K. NOSENKO (Nee TELEGINA), 1949 – separated and 1951 – divorced.
23 June 1953 – Married Ludmila Yulianovna NOSENKO (Nee KOZHEVNIKOVA), January 1964 – separated and 1969 – divorced.

CHILDREN: Daughters – Oksana NOSENKO, born 21 August 1954, Moscow; Tamara NOSENKO, born 13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USSR)

EDUCATION: 1942-1945 – Attended various USSR Naval Schools.
1945-1950 – Attended Institute of International Relations, Moscow.

EMPLOYMENT: March 1951-March 1953 – Soviet Naval RU (Naval Intelligence).
March 1953-February 1964 – Officer in KGB (The Committee for State Security).

MILITARY: Lieutenant in USSR Navy while in school and during RU service.

NATIONALITY: Soviet

PRESENT AND PAST POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS:
1943-1954 – Member Komsomol, USSR
1954 – Candidate Communist Party
1957-1964 – Member Communist Party, USSR

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

SP-1687

18 JUL 1969

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO

Reference is made to previous correspondence in this case.

~~Subject continues to be of operational~~ interest ~~to this Agency.~~ Therefore, it is requested subject's parole to this Agency be extended for an additional period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of his stay of 16 August 1969.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, SR Division	EXTENSION 5777	NO.	DATE 13 February 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from to whom. Draw a line across column after each comm
1. DD/OS				TOP SECRET — EYES ONLY BY HAND
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

11 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans

CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:
- Orig - Adse
- 2 cc - SR/CI/K-Dowey
- 1 cc - C/CI
- 1 cc - CSR
- 1 cc - DD/OS

EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

Defection Preceded Report to Swiss Police, Apparently Ruling Out Negligence

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17—Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place in Washington at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public. The department said that a Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Soviet Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 5.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressures.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities. Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.

196

file

U.S. Lets Swiss And Red Envoys Talk to Defector

Nosenko Again Voices Desire For Asylum

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Soviet secret police defector Yuri I. Nosenko is in the United States where he was interviewed yesterday by officials of both the Russian and Swiss Embassies.

The State Department said each interview lasted less than an hour and that a Department official was present each time. Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier request for aslyum in the United States and it will be granted.

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips, in giving out this information, declined to say where the interviews took place or to give any details. Earlier he had said it was possible that newsmen here will be allowed to talk with Nosenko.

Soviet Kicks up Fuss

These developments came as the Soviet Union kicked up a diplomatic fuss over the disappearance of Nosenko on Feb. 4, from Geneva, where he had been assigned as an "expert" in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. Phillpps said he was "on temporary duty from KGB (secret police) headquarters in Moscow."

Up to yesterday Moscow had been directing its public diplomatic wrath at the Swiss, charging them with loose security. The provision for a Swiss diplomat to interview Nosenko was to assure the Swiss that the United States had taken part in no illegal act on their soil.

The Swiss already had strongly rejected the Soviet charges.

On Wednesday, Phillips re-

See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1

Wash Post
2/15/64

Swiss, Soviets See Defector

folio

ported yesterday, a Soviet Embassy messenger brought a message to the State Department asking for information "as to the manner in which Mr. Nosenko presented himself to the U.S. authorities and requested an opportunity to interview him." The Department agreed to the interview with American officials present, and said Nosenko also was "agreeable." A reply about the defection also was given to the Soviet Embassy.

Also on Wednesday in Geneva, Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin gave newsmen an angry statement aimed at the Swiss and charging "provocative activity" by unspecified Western agents. Up to then Tsarapkin had been saying both privately and publicly that the Nosenko defection would not affect the disarmament talks.

Yesterday the Soviets stepped up their protest in two places, Moscow and Geneva.

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called in American Ambassador Foy Kohler and charged the United States with impermissable acts in the case. He stopped short of a kidnaping charge, however. Kohler replied that on behalf of the United States he rejected any implication of American wrongdoing.

Serious Effects Hinted

In Geneva, Soviet officials, including Tsarapkin himself, privately spread to the press hints of serious consequences. Soon there were rumors that Moscow would pull out its delegation, but up to last night no such threat had actually been made, according to word reaching Washington.

In public Tsarapkin said only "I have nothing to say. I am not in the position to tell you anything."

At some so far unspecified date, Nosenko, who had apparently crossed from Switzerland to France, was flown to the United States. It is assumed he is in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency, the normal course for defectors.

Officials here yesterday were knocking down the idea that he was a particularly big fish, that he knew any atomic secrets or that he knew anything about Soviet disarmament strategy. Rather, they said, he was a KGB staff officer, a security man operating, as is the Soviet practice, in a tight compartment. That would mean he would have useful and perhaps important knowledge of part of the KGB but probably not much more.

Believed Genuine

It is assumed here that the 36-year-old Nosenko is a genuine defector though the possibility of his being a double agent has not been overlooked. It also is felt here that the Soviet protest was no stronger than could be expected. The request for an interview, rare but not unprecedented, was granted in hopes of reciprocal treatment should the occasion arise.

Moscow dispatches said there had been no word up to last night of the defection on the Soviet radio or in the press though word of mouth reports had spread through the capital.

It was felt here that Moscow might have stepped up its protest after Tsarapkin had publicly downgraded the case in Geneva. At any rate U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster and Tsarapkin held another business session in Geneva yesterday at which they said the case was not discussed.

It also was noted here that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has been meeting in Moscow all this week. But whether the Nosenko case was discussed was not known.

Wash Post
2/15/

~~[illegible]~~

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch

FROM : Chief, Operational Support Division

SUBJECT : AEFOXTROT
#262 622

1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May 1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane, Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs. Bagley, Karpovich ~~([illegible])~~, McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the Subject:

(1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings," but may have the necessary silverware with which to eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be exercised with regard to controlling the silverware, and it was suggested that at least two of the guards be required to count the silverware in and out; that the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)

(2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is understood that there is quite a bit of equipment available through Logistics channels.)

(3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear; change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/[illegible]D
	C/[illegible]D
	C/[illegible]B
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]B
1	C/SB
2	Cuya
	[illegible]
	FILES

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.

(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.

(NOTE—These changes with regard to the bath, haircut, cigarette are not to be considered as something to be done on a regular schedule. We will await specific instructions from SR Division as to when these items are to be accomplished in the future.)

(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the Subject only on Tuesday each week.

(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely the same, and our security procedures, including searches, will continue to be at maximum control.

3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed as to their responsibilities in this matter.

Jack M. Bauman

Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)

SECRET

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

SECRET

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES	:	Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Lit Crim - US v. Leon

FROM: William H. Godson CI/R&A/O 03	EXTENSION 1592	NO.	DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/CI/R&A/O	02 NOV 1977		NF	
2.				
3. AC/CI/R&A	2 NOV 1977	2 Nov		
4.				
5. C/CI Staff	2 NOV 1977	3 NOV 1977		5-6: This note is pursuant to our discussion of the black notebook several weeks ago. You may wish to talk directly with (Bill Godson 03) who has reviewed the file.
6. OGC - Mr. John Greaney				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

2/pw

14-00000

SECRET

SRC 77-6719
11-4-77

1 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM : William H. Godson 03
CI/R&A/O

SUBJECT : Herbert Itkin File

1. I have reviewed the material in the Herbert Itkin file which is divided into two main divisions. The first concerns the details of Itkin's use as an unpaid witting informant on matters concerning an attempt by Haitian exiles in 1963 to unseat then President Duvalier. This involved a large number of contacts with Haitian exiles in New York, Washington, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Itkin became a legal advisor for a Haitian Government-In-Exile and put up $15,000 of his "own funds" for this Haitian enterprise. Bernard E. MONCURE (P) a CI Staff staff agent in New York, rode piggy-back on Itkin's contacts with the Haitians to make his own operational contacts within the group. He also provided a small amount of money to them ($4,300) from CIA funds. It would seem from information in the file that there was high-level governmental interest in removing Duvalier from office in 1963. This information is contained in handwritten notes which are paraphrased and indicate high-level interest in the activities of the Haitian exile group. (I suggest that this material be kept in case there are Freedom of Information Act requests on CIA activities involving Haiti in 1962-1963.)

2. The second and bulkier section of material concerns Itkin's efforts to involve MONCURE and CIA in his attempts to secure custody of his wife's children from her second marriage. Itkin had been heavily involved as a lawyer and confidant with Mafia syndicates and labor unions, particularly the teamsters. While doing this he had gained a large amount of information on the Mafia. In March 1963, MONCURE had recruited Itkin for the FBI for domestic issues while maintaining for CIA the use of Itkin for foreign intelligence matters. The FBI and the federal prosecutors in New York starting in 1968 found Itkin to be a very important witness in a series of criminal indictments starting with New York City Water Commissioner Marcus.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 019816

VPN

SECRET

Itkin and his wife had for a long time been struggling to maintain custody over her children from her second marriage. Claiming that she had violated the custody stipulations of a New York court by moving them more than 50 miles from New York without his permission, Frederick Hersh, Mrs. Itkin's former husband, gained custody of the children by means of a ruling from the British court in 1966. Mrs. Itkin began legal procedures in New York to regain the children. As part of their effort they swore affadavits that Mrs. Itkin had taken the children to England at the request of the CIA. Itkin embellished on his CIA record by stating that he had worked for CIA for many years prior to 1963, and insisted that his original contact had been set up between Harold Stassen and Allen Dulles in Philadelphia in the summer of 1954. Most of these assertions were fabrications. MONCURE's CIA relationship was exposed in various legal circles in New York. The Agency wanted to avoid MONCURE's having to contradict Mr. and Mrs. Itkins' affadavits in court. The FBI seemed to have been more interested in protecting Itkin's reputation as a witness than in protecting MONCURE's reputation for honesty.

3. MONCURE did not appear in court. The Federal authorities eventually placed protection around Itkin and his wife, keeping them on a military reservation, while he appeared as a star witness in numerous Mafia cases which led to covictions.

03

4. One small side issue 08 is worth noting: Thomas L. Roberts, who was a law partner of Itkin until mid-1961, became a CIA staff agent under cover in Africa. 24 The many fraudulent activities of Itkin spread a scintilla of suspicion around
03 Roberts. The latter was given a polygraph examination in Frankfurt. He answered questions on his relationship with Itkin including financial and his few contacts with Marcus to the satisfaction of his interrogators.

5. Comments: The thrust of the file is mainly defensive. CIA was reacting to Itkin's tactics to help his wife gain custody over her children. Itkin's numerous trips to England and Europe were made on behalf of the FBI, and they were part of an FBI attempt to gain information on the Mafia. Before the recruitment of Itkin and his utilization by the FBI, CIA did pass to the Attorney General in 1963 information on a Department of Labor official's alleged criminal involvement with the Mafia, which MONCURE had elicited from Itkin. The file also refers to MONCURE's continued contact with one Mafia figure Lenzieri, who was a legal client, as a means of self-protection as Lenzieri represented a channel back to the Mafia

4/PV

for MONCURE, who was apprehensive of Mafia retaliation because of his involvement with Itkin.

6. I have talked to Will Kerbe who is presently the case officer in contact for MONCURE. He says that MONCURE is in limited law practice and is drawing a pension from the Agency as well as a contract for services connected with Golitsyn. There is probably nothing in the file which could damage MONCURE's security as much of the information regarding his association with Itkin has already been exposed. The most recent information in the file is a January 1975 memorandum for the record from Acting Chief, CI, which states that John K. Greaney, Assistant General Counsel had learned that Seymour Hersh had learned details of the Itkin-MONCURE relationship. It would appear that Mr. Greaney is the most knowledgeable person in the agency on the legal aspects of the Itkin case and probably maintains his own files.

03

William H. Godson

William H. Godson

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO

TEL 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: TELEPOUCH
DATE - TIME GROUP:
DISPATCH NUMBER: FAMW-4125

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO:
0 IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 034405

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

13-10 13-4
TO: (MELBOURNE), (CANBERRA)

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH

22
DISP NO: (FAMW)-4125

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1973

13-10
TO: CHIEF OF BASE, (MELBOURNE)

13-4
CHIEF OF STATION, (CANBERRA)

FROM: CHIEF, EAST ASIA DIVISION

SUBJECT: MR. HERBERT ITKIN

FYI ONLY:

03 24
1. ON 6 NOVEMBER 1973 MR. (LESLIE V. JARVIS), (ASIO REP) IN WASHINGTON, HAND CARRIED TO HQS A LETTER FROM AUSTRALIAN JUSTICE A. R. MOFFITT REQUESTING INFORMATION ON THE RELIABILITY OF MR. HERBERT ITKIN WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A FORMER CIA AND FBI EMPLOYEE. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE THE GIST OF MR. MOFFITT'S LETTER, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED TO "MR. WILLIAM CROSBY", (SIC) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. MOFFITT HOLDS A COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO THE INFILTRATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME INTO NEW SOUTH WALES. IT IS OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE TO HIS INQUIRY THAT HE CONSIDER EVIDENCE GIVEN DURING A

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:	COORDINATING OFFICERS	IP USE ONLY
RELEASING OFFICER		
CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		
CROSS REFERENCE	FILE NUMBER (5)-8-5/3 23	

8/PJ

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

OUTGOING TELEPOUCH

ROUTING			
1		4	73 2163
2		5	
3		6	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	PAGE	OF	PAGES
TEL ■	0	0	0	0	0		2		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
TELEPOUCH

DATE - TIME GROUP

DISPATCH NUMBER
FAMW-4125
22

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO:
0 IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 034405

COURT CASE IN ENGLAND IN JULY 1971 BY ITKIN.

B. IN HIS TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND MR. ITKIN CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN RECRUITED BY CIA IN AN "UNDERCOVER CAPACITY" IN ABOUT 1954. HE CLAIMED HE WAS WITH THE C.I.A. UNTIL MARCH 1963 AT WHICH TIME BY SOME ARRANGEMENT HE WORKED FOR BOTH THE FBI AND CIA, UNTIL JANUARY 1968.

C. MOFFITT ASKS FOR INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF MR. ITKIN DURING THE YEARS 1964 TO 1969 AND FOR COPIES OF "ANY RELEVANT AFFIDAVITS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY IN THE FBI OR CIA USED IN PROCEEDINGS IN USA."

D. MOFFITT NOTED THAT IN THE INTERESTS OF PRIVACY HE ROUTED HIS LETTER VIA THE AUSTRALIAN-DIPLOMATIC POUCH, AND ASKED THAT THE REPLY BE RETURNED TO HIM BY THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

2. MR. MOFFITT'S REQUEST WAS HANDLEED BY THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNCIL (OGC) WHO MADE AVAILABLE FOR MR. MOFFITT COPIES OF THREE AFFIDAVITS (ALL OF WHICH IN PUBLIC DOMAIN) RELEVANT TO HERBERT ITKIN AND HIS AFFILIATION WITH THE CIA. OGC CONCLUDED THEIR REPLY BY SAYING THAT HERBERT ITKIN FURNISHED INFORMATION TO THE CIA OVER A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS, BUT THAT HE WAS NOT SENT TO ENGLAND TO COLLECT ANY

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:	COORDINATING OFFICERS	IP USE ONLY
RELEASING OFFICER		
CLASSIFICATION SECRET		
CROSS REFERENCE	FILE NUMBER (S) [illegible] 023	

2/PD

OUTGOING TELEPOUCH

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ROUTING
1		4	73 [illegible]
2		5	
3		6	

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO
TEL	■	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
TELEPOUCH

DATE - TIME GROUP

DISPATCH NUMBER
FAMW-4125
22

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO:
0 IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 034405

INFORMATION FOR CIA AND HE DID NOT FURNISH THE CIA WITH ANY INFORMATION WHILE HE WAS IN ENGLAND.

3. OGC'S REPLY WAS SENT TO MR. MOFFITT IN THE SAME CHANNELS HIS REQUEST CAME IN. HQS POUCHING COPIES AFFADAVITS, BOTH LETTERS.

U/S/C2 VIA POUCH

E2 IMPDET.H

03

DATE: 21 NOVEMBER 1973
ORIG: LA[illegible]ER:BAK
UNIT: EA/PMI/ANH
EXT: 5681/9033

COORDINATING OFFICERS
OGC MR. GREANY {IN DRAFT}
CI MR. ROCCA {IN DRAFT}

IP USE ONLY

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA
RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

CROSS REFERENCE

FILE NUMBER 52-5/3
23

3|pd

CONFIDENTIAL

32814

10 April 1963

Security Division
Federal Aviation Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Charles F. Niles

Subject: **HARVEY, WILLIAM K.**

Dear Sir:

In accordance with existing arrangements made with the Federal Aviation Agency and to confirm our oral notification, it is requested that your files reflect the above-named individual, an employee of this Agency, as having been issued Federal Aviation Agency Credential Number 4883, on 2 January 1963.

In the event of an inquiry, this information may be released to verify the authenticity of this credential.

Nicholas R. Zubon
Chief, Building Security Branch
Office of Security

FORM 10-62 1995 CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-40)

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

12 December 1967

SUBJECT: SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION
(See Houma Munitions Bunker - Leased by Subject firm)

ALLEGATION:

GARRISON has charged that the burglary of the Houma munitions bunker was "CIA-inspired." He issued arrest warrants for Gordon NOVEL and Sergio ARCACHA SMITH charging them with the Houma burglary.

SOURCE:

Enclosure 24 of CI/R&A memorandum of 7 August 1967.

CIA CONNECTION:

CIA had no connection with the alleged burglary of the Houma Munitions Bunker or any connection with the bunker itself.

However, Pierre SCHLUMBERGER, president of the SCHLUMBERGER CORPORATION, was of contact interest in 1950 for routine exploitation as a foreign intelligence source. The FBI advised they had no objection to the Agency's interrogating Pierre SCHLUMBERGER who was an alien. In 1962 DAYSTROM, INC. was acquired by SCHLUMBERGER, INC. The Agency had a contract with DAYSTROM for an unclassified item [($49,000 contract for the production of Mark II limpet mines);] Agency interest was classified Secret. SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. is a Dutch firm controlled by French nationals. After the merger, it was determined that future relationship with DAYSTROM must be governed by Agency policy not to place classified contracts with a foreign firm. In 1963 the same decision was reached concerning Agency contracts with Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc., a subsidiary of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. EMR dealt in all phases of telemetry. Contact clearances for other personnel of SCHLUMBERGER are set out below.

24

OS INDICES RESULTS:

The SCHLUMBERGER COMPANY was the subject of a name check in 1947 because of a contact request, and it was determined that there are a number of SCHLUMBERGER corporations in Latin America which are dominated by French nationals. SCHLUMBERGER has a patented operation for an oil well "shooting" service which is subscribed to by various oil companies. The SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION in Houston was controlled by Henri Georges DOLL, a French national. He was of contact interest in 1956 and 1957. His wife is the daughter of Conrad SCHLUMBERGER.

139

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

08

[In August 1951 the Agency was interested in contacting Professor Edouard POLDINI, a geophysicist and professor at the University of Geneva and formerly an employee of the SCHLUMBERGER CORPORATION in Paris, for operational use. He was to be used as a channel to a Janus KANTAS who could give information about the fate of the previous employees of the Jersey Company in Hungary, the production figures and extent of exploitation of existing oil fields and exploration of new oil fields together with the names of the officials of the Russian Hungarian Company who took over the Jersey Company.]

In March 1953 the SCHLUMBERGER file reflects that an FBI source furnished information that one Maurice Henri MARTIN, employed as an engineer by the SCHLUMBERGER Company, Paris, France, received a letter dated 27 July 1951 at Moscow from one Siegfied Stefanovitch MOROSOFF, asking MARTIN for specialized information concerning geophysics. The letter requested that MARTIN's reply be forwarded to Moscow through an intermediary. From January 1932 until April 1937 MARTIN represented the SCHLUMBERGER Company in Russia as an engineer, and it was thought that the correspondence from MOROSOFF may represent a Soviet attempt to resume contact with MARTIN and develop clandestine relations with him. The FBI conducted an investigation dated June 1953 and determined that Maurice Henri MARTIN resided at Nod Hill, Wilton, Connecticut and was employed by the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Co., Ridgefield, Connecticut. Informants advised that although MARTIN was strongly nationalistic toward France, he have every indication of being anti-Russian and there was no evidence of CP activities.

When DAYSTROM, INC. merged with SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., research was done on the directors and officers of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. The results are as follows:

OS indices reflect a record on Dillon ANDERSON, a trustee of Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc. (a subsidiary of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD.) who was also a proposed trustee of "NEW DAYSTROM" when it merged with SCHLUMBERGER. ANDERSON is an attorney from Houston, Texas who was appointed by President EISENHOWER as an advisor to the National Security Council from 1953 until 1956. He was considered for a special clearance in August 1955 but the briefing was not given. He was granted a covert clearance in December 1953 and April 1954 [for use as a covert associate on Project LPFUNNEL.] 08

Pierre SCHLUMBERGER, President and Chief Executive Officer, SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., Houston, Texas, French citizen, was of contact interest in 1950.

Charles C. PARLIN, Director of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., and a member of the law firm of SHEARMEN, STERLING and WRIGHT, Englewood, New Jersey, U. S. citizen, was of contact interest in 1962 but was security disapproved. PARLIN was allegedly the boy friend of Johanna BEKER who was in contact with known Soviet Agents, ROBERT and JACK SOBLE. BEKER advised the FBI in 1957 that she received, paid for and transmitted to Robert SOBLE, OSS information which was given her by two former OSS employees. She also advised the FBI in 1957 that she

21

had given a very general outline of her activities to PARLIN and it is reliably reported that PARLIN and HEBER shared a hotel room in Holland in 1957. PARLIN recommended a William Hoart LANCASTER for OSS employment. LANCASTER was a member of the same law firm as PARLIN and had a long record of Communist front affiliations. PARLIN in 1956 traveled to Russia as a member of a delegation under the sponsorship of the National Council of Churches. He was also the lawyer for a Swiss armament industrialist who sold arms to the Nazis and the Communist countries since that time.

Clark Drouillard GOODMAN, Vice-President of SCHLUMBERGER, Ltd., Houston, Texas, U. S. citizen, was security disapproved for use by TSD in 1952 and for contact use in 1955 based on his support of Professor Dirk STRUIK, a colleague at MIT, who was indicted on a charge of having been a Communist conspirator and identified as a Communist Party member. In March 1959 the same derogatory information was furnished the Contact Office to be considered in determining any use of GOODMAN. Also, a book written by GOODMAN's wife, May Ellen GOODMAN, was favorably reviewed by the "DAILY WORKER" in 1956.

Jean C. LEGRAND, Vice-President of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION, Ridgefield, Connecticut (U. S. citizen, naturalized Houston, Texas 1941) was approved for contact use in May 1957. His file is clear. There is a notation that one Mrs. J. C. LEGRAND, 5319 Mandell Street, Houston, Texas, in November 1944 was President of the Houston Chapter, France Forever, The Fighting French Committee in America.

Everett STRATTON, Sales Manager, Houston Area, SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING Corporation, Houston, Texas, U. S. citizen, was security approved (CAUTION) for contact use in October 1950. His file is clear.

10

Daniel SCHLUMBERGER, French citizen, archeologist and teacher at the University of Strasbourg, France in 1955, was granted an operational approval for use as a contract agent in Kabul in April 1956 but the clearance was cancelled 20 September 1956. His file is clear. However, in a file on Nicholas KAGAN, French financier, and suspected Soviet agent, which contains a detailed study of the interrelationships and family connections existing in French firms, information on Daniel SCHLUMBERGER is contained therin. Daniel SCHLUMBERGER, a member of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING Corporation, was head of the French Archeological Delegation in Afghanistan (1948-1954). An associate of Daniel SCHLUMBERGER was Raoul CURIEL of a wealthy Jewish banking family in Cairo, Egypt. Raoul and his brother, Henri CURIEL had Communist backgrounds and their mother was aunt to George BLAKE English Soviet spy who defected to Russia. BLAKE had lived with the CURIEL's in Cairo. Also Gilbert PONTECORVO, known Communist, was in contact with Eugenio CURIEL, a relative of the CURIEL family involved in the George BLAKE case. Bruno PONTECORVO, Gilbert's brother, and the atomic scientist who defected to Russia in 1950, worked for the Well Surveying Corporation, Tulsa, Oklahoma, from 1940 to 1942 but it was not known if the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation is in any way connected with the Well Surveying Corporation in Tulsa.

SCHLUMBERGER and Company and another SCHLUMBERGER subsidiary firm, Machine Bull (Competitor of IBM), are connected with Schneider and Company, 42 rue d'Anjou, Paris. Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL, manager of Compagnie Internationale de Commerce, represents SCHNEIDER for the USSR and is a Soviet agent. In September 1961, an investigation conducted in France disclosed that "everything that takes place in the Elysee is known in Moscow within 48 hours and the originator of such intelligence is Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL." Machines Bull is controlled by General Electric Company of the U. S. and SCHNEIDER and Company is affiliated with U. S. Westinghouse Corporation under the name SCHNEIDER-Westinghouse.

The Study in KAGAN's file contains the following additional information concerning SCHLUMBERGER and Company:

Maurice and Remi SCHLUMBERGER are affiliated with Lazard Freres and the Worms Bank. Lazard Freres controls SCHNEIDER-Westinghouse and has a New Orleans Branch Office. Closely associated with the SCHLUMBERGER's is Charles DOH. DOH was born at Odessa in 1911 and arrived in the United States in 1937 to join the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation at Houston, Texas. He became a U. S. citizen on 6 September 1950. Charles has a brother, Jean, who was closely associated with Leonard HOUNAU, a suspected Soviet agent. HOUNAU was closely associated with Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL, previously mentioned Soviet agent connected with SCHLUMBERGER and Company. Charles DOH was approved for Agency contact use in September 1955 as a member of the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation. His file is clear.

Roger Robert Henri HENQUET, Executive Vice-President, SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation, Houston, Texas, was approved for contact use on a limited basis in October 1950. He had been an employee of OSS from 1943 to 1945; was given American citizenship and the Congressional Medal of Honor for his deeds during World War II.

Arthur Henry FRENTROP, an employee of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION, Ridgefield, Connecticut, was of contact interest in June 1956. Information concerning his spouse's critical attitude towards American customs and institutions and the dominant position she exercised over her husband was furnished the contact office.

SECRET

29 August 1968

SUBJECT: SEITZ, Charles

Charles SEITZ is identified as a pilot who was employed by the FLOURNOY Flying Service at the same time as Leslie Norman BRADLEY. It is reported that SEITZ stated that when BRADLEY learned of the assassination (President KENNEDY), he decided he had to go to Miami immediately.

A check of OS records revealed the following information on one Charles J. SEITZ who is currently being considered for a Proprietary Approval by DOD for Project WUBETON. He is to be used as a flight instructor on an unwitting basis for an Agency proprietary entity in Newton, Kansas. The results of investigation are not complete and clearance has not yet been granted. 24

Charles J. SEITZ was born 31 January 1943 at Steele City, Nebraska and resides at 844 San Pablo, Wichita, Kansas. He is currently a test pilot with Cessna Aircraft Company, Wichita, Kansas. From 1963 to June 1966 Subject was in the U. S. Army. He was a flight mechanic and had tours in Vietnam and Thailand.

Charles's father, Charles William SEITZ, was born 21 December 1917 at Hollenberg, Kansas and currently resides at 2111 South Terrace, Wichita, Kansas 67218.

Inquiry was made of DOD if either Charles J. or his father Charles William SEITZ, had ever been employed by the Jack R. FLOURNOY Flying Service and it was determined that both Charles J. SEITZ and his father were employed by FLOURNOY in 1962-1963. The Jack R. FLOURNOY Flying Service went out of business in 1964 and the owner, Jack R. FLOURNOY, is currently employed as a salesman.

DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

144

SECRET

I/PV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CG - 77-0286
1-11-77

11 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SE Division

ATTENTION : Division Security Officer

FROM : Thomas L. Briggs 03
SE/X/LA

SUBJECT : Appearance As Witness In Behalf of the United States Government

REFERENCE : USA V. Gerald P. Hemming, Et Al. (76-371-CR-CA)

1. During the period of my employment as a Special Agent at the Drug Enforcement Administration (May 1971 - Jan 1977), I conducted an interview of Gerald Patrick Hemming (DPOB 1 March 1937, at Los Angeles, California) on 23 May 1975 at DEA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. My report concerning that interview has become part of the case file in USA v. Gerald P. Hemming, Et Al., Case Number 76-371-CR-CA, Southern District of Florida, Miami, Florida.

2. Upon my entrance on duty in SE Division on 5 January 1977, I orally informed the Division Security Officer, Billy Hix, about the information in paragraph 1 above. Mr. Hix asked me to submit the information in writing as soon as I was settled in the Division. On 7 January 1977, however, Special Agent Robert Fredericks telephonically contacted 03 Hope Mason, DC/SE/X/LA, and told her that the United States Attorney, Southern District of Florida, had requested that I appear at the U.S. Courthouse, Miami, Florida on 10 January 1977 to confer with the Assistant United States Attorney, Karen L. Atkinson, regarding my appearance as a witness in behalf of the U.S. Government in the trial of Gerald P. Hemming.

3. During the afternoon of 7 January 1977 I conferred with Mr. Hix who advised me to contact the Office of the General Counsel. I talked to Mr. Edmund Cohen who advised me to get in touch with the Office of Security, External Activities Branch (OS/EAB). I completed an Outside Activity Approval Request (Form 879), obtained the concurrence of DC/SE, Mr. John Stein, and submitted the Form 879 to OS/EAB. OS/EAB sent me to Central Cover Staff (Mr. Blandford) and then to the Office of the General Counsel. After discussions with Mr. Cohen, I called

2|PV

S/A Fredericks in Miami at Mr. Cohen's suggestion. S/A Fredericks was not available. Mr. Cohen then advised me to return to my office and he would contact me with further instructions. Mr. Cohen retained the Form 879. Subsequently, Mr. Cohen advised me that I should travel to Miami as requested and that CIA would reimburse me for expenses connected with my activities in behalf of the U.S. Government. He further advised me that being in an overt cover status I should state, if asked under oath, that I am currently a CIA employee.

4. On 10 January 1977 I traveled to Miami where I met and conferred with AUSA Karen Atkinson and DEA S/A Robert Fredericks. They informed me that Gerald P. Hemming's case had been severed and his trial would not begin on 11 January. AUSA Atkinson told me she wanted me as a rebuttal witness if Gerald P. Hemming presented the defense that he had been working at the direction of DEA. She said they would not call me until and unless that defense was presented. She also said that she felt that any attempt to question me concerning my current place of employment was irrelevent and she would object to any such line of questioning. She said she would only ask me where I was employed at the time I interviewed Hemming. I returned to Washington D.C. the same day.

03

(Thomas L. Briggs)

Distribution:

1 - CCS
1 - OS
1 - OGC

4/pJ

SECRET

16 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Edmund Cohen
Assistant General Counsel

SUBJECT: U.S. v. Hemming

1. On 22 November 1977 the undersigned accompanied by Messrs. 03 Thomas Briggs, Gary Mattocks and Robert Barteaux, travelled to Miami to confer with Judge Hoeveler, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas M. Sherouse, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, about subject case. Messrs. 03 Briggs and Mattocks had dealt with Mr. Hemming while they were employed by the Drug Enforcement Administration and Mr. Sherouse wanted them available as rebuttal witnesses. Mr. Barteaux also was sought as a possible rebuttal witness to describe the Agency's relationship with Mr. Hemming in the event that Hemming raised a CIA defense.

2. On 23 November Mr. 03 Briggs, Mr. Barteaux and the undersigned met in chambers with Judge Hoeveler, Mr. Sherouse, Mr. Roger Howard, law clerk to Judge Hoeveler, and Mr. Ted Sakowitz, Public Defender for the Southern District of Florida. Mr. Sherouse decided that Mr. Mattocks would not be required to testify and he did not attend the meeting. The Judge initially expressed some reluctance to have an *ex parte* conference because Mr. Hemming had assumed primary responsibility for his own defense with only limited assistance from the Public Defender. The Judge insisted that a transcript of the meeting be made but he promised that the transcript would be sealed and, in fact, would not be transcribed.

3. The undersigned indicated that the Agency had no interest in the outcome of the case and interposed no objection to the introduction of any relevant information. Our sole concern was to protect Mr. 03 Briggs and his relationship with CIA both before and after his DEA employment. The Judge was informed that Mr. 03 Briggs sole connection with Hemming was on 23 May 1975 and that he had no contact with Hemming during any period of Agency employment. The national security consequences of exposure of Mr. 03 Briggs as well as the career consequences were outlined. In addition, the Judge was informed that Mr. Barteaux was prepared to testify as an overt Agency employee about any relationship between Hemming and CIA.

6|PN

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 035714

4. Judge Hoeveler asked Mr. Sakowitz to cross-examine Mr. Briggs 03 to determine whether he had any information which might be relevant to Hemming's defense. Mr. Sakowitz stated that although he was aware that Mr. Hemming wished to call Mr. Briggs 03 as a witness, he was not fully informed of all aspects of the case and, therefore, reluctant to question Mr. Briggs. 03 Thereupon, Judge Hoeveler, swore in Mr. 03 Briggs and proceeded to ask him a series of questions to determine whether Mr. Briggs' interaction with Mr. Hemming had been in any way connected with his CIA employment. 03 At the conclusion of this examination the Judge gave Mr. Sakowitz a second opportunity to question Mr. 03 Briggs and when Mr. Sakowitz again declined, he stated that in light of the national security consequences which had been brought to his attention he was not inclined to permit questions relating to Mr. Briggs' 03 CIA employment.

5. At the conclusion of the conference in chambers, but before the jury was admitted into the courtroom, Mr. Sherouse informed Mr. Hemming that Mr. Briggs 03 was available as a witness. When the trial proceeded Mr. Hemming concluded his defense without calling Mr. 03 Briggs. Mr. Sherouse, however, did call Mr. 03 Briggs as a rebuttal witness. On cross-examination Mr. Hemming asked Mr. 03 Briggs whether he was with CIA. Mr. Sherouse promptly objected to the question, the Judge sustained the objection and Mr. Hemming went on to the next question. The trial concluded soon afterwards without Mr. Barteaux being called as a witness. It was subsequently learned that Mr. Hemming was found guilty as charged.

Edmund Cohen

EC:jz
Distribution:
Original - LITIGATION-CRIMINAL, Hemming Gerald P.
1 - EC Signer
1 - Chrono

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OUTSIDE ACTIVITY APPROVAL REQUEST

COMPLETE AND FORWARD ORIGINAL AND 2 COPIES TO EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH

TO :	DIRECTOR OF SECURITY; ATTN: EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH	DATE 7 Jan 77
THRU:	*(Staff, division or office head and security officer, where assigned)* SE Division Security Officer	

FROM:	NAME AND GRADE OF EMPLOYEE *(Print or type)* 03 ([illegible], Thomas). [illegible]	COMPONENT [illegible]	ROOM NO. AND BLDG. [illegible] 5229	PHONE [illegible]

1. FULL DESCRIPTION OF OUTSIDE ACTIVITY FOR WHICH APPROVAL IS REQUESTED INCLUDING NAMES OF ORGANIZATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED. DATES. LOCALE. ETC. *(Refer to HR 10-7 before completing)*

03

On 7 January 1977 at approx. 1130 hrs. I was informed by my supervisor, (Hope) [illegible] that she had been telephonically contacted by a Mr. Fredericks of DOJ in Miami, Florida (Ofc 305-[illegible], Res [illegible]) and told that DOJ wants me to travel to Miami to attend a pre-trial conference on Tuesday 10 January in order to prepare for possible appearance as a witness for the DOJ against Gerald Patrick [illegible].

I consulted with the SE Division Security Officer who advised me to contact the OGC. At approx. 1[illegible] hrs this date I talked to the OGC who advised me to contact the Office of Security, External Activities Branch.

2. REMARKS BY REQUESTOR

IN ENGAGING IN THE REQUESTED ACTIVITY, I WILL MAKE NO REFERENCE TO OR DISCUSS MY CIA ASSIGNMENTS OR DUTIES. I (WILL, WILL NOT) BE IDENTIFIED AS EMPLOYED BY CIA FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

I was a CIA employee from Jan 69 to [illegible] prior to transferring to DIA. I was under cover at that time. I have not yet been put under cover since my [illegible] (3Jan77).

SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING EMPLOYEE

3. COMMENTS AND CONCURRENCE OF STAFF, DIVISION OR OFFICE HEAD

CONCUR: ____________________ ______________________________

DATE SIGNATURE OF OPERATING OFFICIAL

FOR COMPLETION BY EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH AND RETURN OF ORIGINAL TO EMPLOYEE

DATE:

SECURITY APPROVAL HAS BEEN (GRANTED, DENIED)
FOR THE ACTIVITY CONTEMPLATED BY THIS REQUEST.

2/R (FOR) CHIEF, SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION

FORM 870 USE PREVIOUS

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

9/7 Mo Sovereign – discuss Sherouse call re Q Doc
& re DCD contacts of on Drugs – he to do
Bob Bourteaux to be ready to testify.
Info Processing ~~section~~.
MFR on Q Doc

9/6 Spoke w/ Tom Sherouse 305 350 5449
Trial 25 Oct.

10/3 Ck'ed w/ Sherouse still is scheduled for
25 Oct – but calendar call set for
20 Oct Thur Cal^endar^ Call Will call bk on 21 Oct
to see where stand

10/25 Spoke w/ ~~Sherouse~~ Hemming case is
#8 on Judges calendar
now on case # 1
earliest is late Next wk at earliest
Hemming – will be OWN lawyer

11/15 Spoke w/ Sherouse sch for 16 Nov & needs us
Bourteaux, (Briggs)^{03}, Maddox & Q for rebuttal case Thurs Fri late AM
but to call on 16th to check.

11/15 Meet w/ Mo S. (Briggs)^{03} Maddox, Bourteaux review Sherouse
statement, ck on why left agency & why returned, what doing.
Later meet w/ Mo & Bourteaux – get DDO (official) view
re impact of public exposure on (Briggs)^{03} & Maddox & brief &
review w/ Bourteaux all records on Hemming.
reserve for Fri EA 195 Nat'l Airport 9⁰⁰ → arrive 11²⁰

11/17 – Called off – for now

3/PV

08
9318 (119 Evans St)
Rockville Md 20850
03
[~~Tom~~ Briggs] r ~~TM9~~ (340 8186) 08

1. empl & cover
a Jan 69 — May 74 CIA — Army & Air Amer — Army "overseas ops" clandestine Laos
b 4 May 74 — ~~1~~ Jan 77 DEA

c ~~2~~ 3 Jan 77 — no cover, State cover

2. only contact w/ Hemming —
23 May 75

3. Hemmy — to DC — to see Conein — VP & Snow told see Tom —

4 Now Sov — target recruitments
Why w/ 2 Sov KGM mety in true name

From 50 — resigned — law enforcement
& CIA cont — no contact, recruits

3/17

S.D of fla.

(Gerald P. Hemming)
US vs Hemming   Case No 76-71-Cr-CA   Judge Hoeveler

P.O. Bldg & Ct House 300 N.E. First Ave. Miami Florida
1st Ave 3 St
Mezzanine Floor 350-4136

Thomas M. Sherouse Ast US Attorney (305) 350 5449 or 4471
Sec Mary Jones   300 Ainsley Bldg.   hm 856 2285

1819

521 Florida Ave apt 104
Herndon Va 22070

Barry Maddox — 437 8958

1, empl - cover
✓ CIA — 69 – 73 — Army Cover Vietnam
— DEA (Sept) Aug, 73 ——— 26 Feb 77 (comm cover)
✓ CIA 27 Feb 77 — open 5-6 wks then
State cover now Cuban gp – certain people [illegible]

2. no later than Dec 76 contact w/ Maddox
none since back w/ CIA –
no contact before DEA
never personal contact only through DEA contact

3. rel w/ Hemmy met undercover re purchase of narcotics
in Miami and, [illegible] airport re [illegible]
a) informal exchange sold gun of silenced rifle 2) [illegible] re Cuban envelope

4 [illegible] – – Cuba gp –

ck Mc — [illegible] LA office in DC?

Henry   Oct 25   2 wk trial

— Jan 62 submitted applic for empl —

1) on 21 June 62 informed No positions aval for him in Agcy

2) Recds do not reflect he ever employed in any capacity or used as agent.

but records do show Henry has falsely claimed assoc with agency on several occasions since 1960

3. In Oct 60   3 [illegible] in [illegible] 1961, 1 in 1967, 3 in 1970 [illegible] after 23 Aug 70

on these occasions Henry came forward to volunteer info which he thought might be of value & info [illegible] by or Don Scott people who openly need info any U.S and who has info to volunteer.

ck

Drugs → ?

3. re that Doc not be able help — people that could — cover & [illegible] why not withhold enable people to —



Demy was found guilty

SECRET

OGC 76-57?
10-20-76

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CS-3640
#18383

7 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Rod Brooks

FROM : Joel E. Keys, Chief
Corporate Cover Branch
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : Request for Letter of Agreement

02 1. Please prepare a Letter of Agreement between the Agency and LPBLUE, which through the President of the firm, Mr. Emmett M. Steele 06 has agreed to place on retainer a Contract Agent of Europe Division, 02 TOPHONE/1. John J. Murray, Jr. represented the Agency in these negotiations. Identities will be forwarded under separate cover.

2. Effective 1 October 1976, 02 LPBLUE will place on retainer 02 TOPHONE/1 at an annual retainer of 02 $9,000, which will be paid to him in monthly increments of $750 by LPBLUE. The Company will overtly negotiate a retainer contract with 02 TOPHONE, which will make eminently clear that both are negotiating and concluding the contract as independent parties; that the Company, 02 LPBLUE, will have no obligation to withhold Federal, or state income taxes, or Social Security taxes.

02 3. In consideration of the support rendered, the Agency will pay LPBLUE $10,000 annually. Provision is made in this amount to offset any nominal expenses the firm incurs in its overt associations or support of 02 TOPHONE/1. It also serves, in part, to minimize the chances that auditing personnel will identify a wash transfer between the notional facility and payments to 02 TOPHONE/1.

4. The Agency will reimburse 02 LPBLUE in quarterly increments via a contrived contractual arrangement between 02 LPBLUE and a notional facility of the Agency. Cancelled checks will serve as adequate accountings for monies paid LPBLUE. 02

5. Please include the usual paragraphs of appreciation, secrecy, and prohibition of bona fide employment.

6. All information relating to this agreement is classified secret. Both the Agency and the Company agree that the most stringent safeguards will be taken to protect this information, including the

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 055087

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

existence of the agreement. Any information in any form that must be given to a third party by either the Agency or the Company will be done in strict conformance to the laws safeguarding national security information, and only with full consultation between the Agency and the Company.

JOEL E. KEYS

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CJC 69-C237

FYI

5 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the General Counsel

VIA : Chief, Central Cover Staff

INFO : Mr. Rocca, CI Staff

SUBJECT : 03 Thomas Lee Roberts: The Itkin Case

1. At our meeting on 30 January 1969, certain additional questions were raised relative to the relationship between Roberts 03 and Itkin.

29 First, when did 02 LPGLOBE become aware that Itkin and the Conestoga Group had approached 03 Roberts with a proposal to represent them in Africa? 10 We were advised in 1966 through case officer meetings with Roberts that he had been developing some potential 03 cover company business with interests from the United States and England. We were given the name of the Conestoga Group no later than 27 October 1966. We cannot say that we then knew the 29 individual names of those involved. It was not uncommon for 03 Roberts to have discussions with a number of potential clients; when it became apparent that no real business was forthcoming from this group, our interest ceased.

At the 30 January meeting, we were also asked certain 08 questions about Roberts financial involvement with the law firm he and Itkin has been 03 with prior to Robert's association with the Agency. 03

2. We can add nothing to 03 Roberts' account of January 1968 reflecting that he entered into an agreement with the firm on 31 May 1961 wherein he was authorized leave of absence from 1 June 1961 to 31 May 1963 drawing $100.00 per week for that period.

03

Eugene Milligan
EUGENE MILLIGAN
Chief, CCS/LPGLOBE
02

5/pw

OGC 69-0402

4 March 1969

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. I showed Mr. George Carey his memorandum of 1955 to the Director referring to T. and H., and said we thought that H. referred to a General Hardin. After considerable speculation Mr. Carey finally placed T. as being Juan Trippe and Hardin as an Air Force General who was being placed with 24 (Pan Am) for operational reasons, primarily technical information collection. Independently Mrs. Lovejoy had checked with Mr. Larocque, and he also recalled General Hardin was a man Mr. Carey was interested in placing with (Pan Am) for operational reasons. 24

2. The Air Force Register lists a General Thomas O. Hardin, Air Force Major General, who retired in 1955, which would seem to fit in as he is listed as an airline executive. Mr. Carey had no knowledge whatsoever of the Itkin case, and we felt it was out of the question that General Hardin is synonymous with Philip Harbin.

LRH.

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

OGC:LRH:bt
1-C/CI/R&A
1-DCS
2-General Counsel chrono
✓subject HERBERT ITKIN

2|pd

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

MDE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	PAGE	OF	PAGES
TEL 0	0	0	0	0	0	1		

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: TELEPOUCH
DATE - TIME GROUP:
DISPATCH NUMBER: FAMW-4125 22

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO:
0 IP FILES

13-10 13-4

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 034405

FYI

TO: MELBOURNE, CANBERRA.

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH

DISP NO: FAMW-4125 22

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1973 13-10

TO: CHIEF OF BASE, MELBOURNE
CHIEF OF STATION, CANBERRA 13-4

FROM: CHIEF, EAST ASIA DIVISION

SUBJECT: MR. HERBERT ITKIN

FYI ONLY:

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

03 24

1. ON 6 NOVEMBER 1973 MR. LESLIE V. JARVIS, ASIO REP IN WASHINGTON, HAND CARRIED TO HQS A LETTER FROM AUSTRALIAN JUSTICE A. R. MOFFITT REQUESTING INFORMATION ON THE RELIABILITY OF MR. HERBERT ITKIN WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A FORMER CIA AND FBI EMPLOYEE. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE THE GIST OF MR. MOFFITT'S LETTER, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED TO "MR. WILLIAM CROSBY", (SIC) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. MOFFITT HOLDS A COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO THE INFILTRATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME INTO NEW SOUTH WALES. IT IS OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE TO HIS INQUIRY THAT HE CONSIDER EVIDENCE GIVEN DURING A

	COORDINATING OFFICERS	IP USE ONLY
DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:		
RELEASING OFFICER		
CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		
CROSS REFERENCE	FILE NUMBER 5-2-5/3	

6pN

14-00000

OGC 13-2465

OUTGOING TELEPOUCH

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	PAGE	OF	PAGES
TEL	0	0	0	0	0	2		

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE - TIME GROUP	DISPATCH NUMBER
TELEPOUCH		FAMW-4125 22

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO:

0 IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 034405

COURT CASE IN ENGLAND IN JULY 1971 BY ITKIN.

B. IN HIS TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND MR. ITKIN CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN RECRUITED BY CIA IN AN "UNDERCOVER CAPACITY" IN ABOUT 1954. HE CLAIMED HE WAS WITH THE C.I.A. UNTIL MARCH 1963 AT WHICH TIME BY SOME ARRANGEMENT HE WORKED FOR BOTH THE FBI AND CIA, UNTIL JANUARY 1968.

C. MOFFITT ASKS FOR INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF MR. ITKIN DURING THE YEARS 1964 TO 1969 AND FOR COPIES OF "ANY RELEVANT AFFIDAVITS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY IN THE FBI OR CIA USED IN PROCEEDINGS IN USA."

D. MOFFITT NOTED THAT IN THE INTERESTS OF PRIVACY HE ROUTED HIS LETTER VIA THE AUSTRALIAN-DIPLOMATIC POUCH, AND ASKED THAT THE REPLY BE RETURNED TO HIM BY THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

2. MR. MOFFITT'S REQUEST WAS HANDLED BY THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNCIL (OGC) WHO MADE AVAILABLE FOR MR. MOFFITT COPIES OF THREE AFFIDAVITS (ALL OF WHICH IN PUBLIC DOMAIN) RELEVANT TO HERBERT ITKIN AND HIS AFFILIATION WITH THE CIA. OGC CONCLUDED THEIR REPLY BY SAYING THAT HERBERT ITKIN FURNISHED INFORMATION TO THE CIA OVER A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS, BUT THAT HE WAS NOT SENT TO ENGLAND TO COLLECT ANY

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: RELEASING OFFICER	COORDINATING OFFICERS	IP USE ONLY
CLASSIFICATION SECRET		
CROSS REFERENCE	FILE NUMBER 5-82-5/3	

4/IN

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO

TEL ▮ 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
TELEPOUCH

DATE - TIME GROUP

DISPATCH NUMBER
FAMW-4125

OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

22

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO:
0 IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 034405

INFORMATION FOR CIA AND HE DID NOT FURNISH THE CIA WITH ANY INFORMATION WHILE HE WAS IN ENGLAND.

3. OGC'S REPLY WAS SENT TO MR. MOFFITT IN THE SAME CHANNELS HIS REQUEST CAME IN. HQS POUCHING COPIES AFFADAVITS, BOTH LETTERS.

U/S/C▮ VIA POUCH

E2 IMPDET.H

[redacted]

4.

03

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1973
ORIG: LAFISHER:BAK
UNIT: EA/P[redacted]
EXT: 5621/9033

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA
RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CROSS REFERENCE

COORDINATING OFFICERS
OGC MR. GREANY (IN DRAFT)
CI MR. ROCCA (IN DRAFT)

FILE NUMBER 5-2-5/3

IP USE ONLY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

12/12

OGC 69-0181

31 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Herbert Itkin

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. A meeting was held on 27 January 1969 with Messrs. Rocca, Houston, Warner and myself to discuss the ramifications of the confrontation with the New York FBI office on 17 January. It was concluded that additional information was required on 03 Thomas L. Roberts and Robert Delson. 03 I contacted the Director of Security and requested the security files on these two individuals and was advised that we could not have the security files but that Mr. Ward Greene would bring the files to the office and discuss their contents openly.

03 2. On 29 03 January, Mr. Greene brought the security files on Roberts and Delson and was most cooperative in explaining their contents. Attached is a chronological rundown on the pertinent information on Thomas L. Roberts' affiliation with the FBI, CIA and Itkin. 03

3. On 30 January a 03 meeting was held 02 with Messrs. Houston, Warner, Rocca, and Eugene Milligan, CCS/LPGLOBE, to discuss the operational use of Mr. Roberts. 03 Mr. 03 Roberts has been a Staff Agent of CIA since 28 August 1961. From March 1964 to November 1964 he spent time in West Africa writing a monograph 24 on West African legal problems. 10 It should be noted that this task was performed under a grant from a foundation which was blown in the MHDOWEL exposures. In November 1964 Roberts 03 was assigned for Cover to the Radio Corporation of America 24 legal staff where he remained until March 1965 and then went to Dakar.

12-10

(4/PN

4. The facts in the attached chronology 03 are subject to question since they are the result of (Roberts) own explanation of his affiliation with Itkin rather than having been determined from independent sources. The most critical aspect would appear to be the knowledge or suspicion that Itkin may have known of 03 (Roberts) affiliation with CIA. This knowledge is borne out by the strange way in which Itkin repeatedly brings 03 (Roberts)' name into the story which Itkin develops about his CIA affiliations. One of the questions to be answered by 02 (LP)GLOBE personnel is whether or not 03 (Roberts) reported his activities with Itkin in Geneva, Switzerland, in March 1966. There appears to be no record of 03 (Roberts') having explained why he never pursued the Itkin debt or what his financial contribution was to the (law firm of Itkin, Roberts 08 and Greenbaum.)

5. Mr. Rocca was advised by Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI that the New York District Attorney may be considering prosecution against 03 (Roberts) for having absconded with funds received from negligence cases. We do not have sufficient information to evaluate the likelihood of criminal prosecution. It may be necessary to discuss this problem with representatives of Mr. Hogan's office.

6. With regard to 03 (Robert Delson) there appear to have been two operational considerations, one having been a request to use him with Project DTPILLAR from November 1953 to February 1955, and then a request in 1963 by the Domestic Operations Division for his use on Project WUBRINY. In March 1964 DO Division advised Security that (Delson) 03 was not going to be used on WUBRINY. Mr. Rocca commented that there are some rather ominous allegations against members of the firm of (Delson, Levin 08 and Gordon,) indicating that one member of the firm was a card-carrying member of the Communist Party. At the present time Mr. Rocca is investigating the DTPILLAR use of Mr. (Delson) 03

John K Greaney
JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

Attachment

cc: C/CI/R&A

12/PJ

7 March 1966 03 (Roberts) received letter from Itkin but his secretary advised that 03 (Roberts) was on vacation in Austria. Itkin contacted 03 (Roberts) in (Austria) 10 and set up meeting in (Geneva, Switzerland.) 10

15 March 1966 Meeting at 08 (Hotel Beau Rivage) in (Geneva.) 10 Present were Itkin and (wife) (Jim Marcus), 06 06 (Littman) and (wife) 08 Meeting 08 lasted three days. No projects get off the ground.

Nov 1966 03 (Roberts) in New York City, met at 06 (Marcus's) apartment with Itkin and 06 (Marcus's) father. Then met Itkin again at a dinner given by (Mario Brod.) 06

Nov 1967 03 (Roberts) again in New York and contacted Itkin. Had lunch with Itkin and 06 (Brod.) Last time 03 (Roberts) saw or heard of Itkin until he read in the press about the (Marcus) 06 scandal.

19/N

SECRET

THOMAS L. ROBERTS 03

Nov 1949	Roberts 03 volunteered his services to Boston FBI; 08 not accepted.
Jan 1950	Roberts 03 left United States to study in Paris. 10
Nov 1950	From Nov. 1950 until Nov. 1955 reported on security matters to the Boston FBI Office, Labor Youth League. 24
Aug 1955	Itkin hired Roberts 08, 03 to work for Delson, Levin & Gordon. 08 Roberts 03 says he was hired to handle maritime matters in litigation. 08
Nov 1955	Roberts 03 moved to New York City.
June 1956	Resumed services of reporting to FBI. 24 Was a paid informant of New York FBI office reporting on the National Lawyers Guild. 24
Fall 1956	Roberts 03 and others submitted profit-sharing plan to Delson, Levin & Gordon 08 not accepted.
Apr 1957	Roberts 03 resigned from Delson, Levin & Gordon 08 to form a new firm, Roberts, Greenbaum & Itkin. 08 (No mention of financial arrangement of setting up new firm.)
6 Apr 1961	Roberts 03 came to Washington and talked with Robert Amory about employment with CIA since Amory had been a former professor of Roberts. 08 Roberts 03 was sent to overt CIA personnel recruiter and filled out an application for employment with CIA.
1 June 1961	Roberts 03 took a leave of absence from the firm of Roberts, Greenbaum & Itkin 08 which was to last from 1 June 1961 through 31 May 1963. 08 Roberts 03

24/RV

SECRET

	was to receive 08 $100 per week from the firm while on the leave of absence. Roberts 03 did receive the following payments: 08 09 Sept 1961 - 08 $200; 09 4 Dec 1961 - $100; 09 10 Jan 1962 - 08 $100; 09 1 June 1962 - $100; 08 09 18 June 1962 - 08 $500. NOTE: Roberts 03 received only $1,000 when he should have received $10,400. 08
12 July 1961	29 FBI advised that 08 Roberts 03 was still reporting to them in New York.
25 July 1961	03 Roberts was given CIA polygraph interview.
Aug 1961	03 Roberts approved by Office of Security for CIA employment as a Staff Agent.
Sept 1961	29 FBI advised they had broken off all contact with Roberts. 03
24 May 1963	03 Roberts wrote letter to 08 firm withdrawing his membership effective 09 31 May 1963.
May 1965	03 Roberts received a check from Itkin for $2,500 but with the stipulation that 03 Roberts send $1,250 to England in order to get the money out of reach of Itkin's first wife.
26 May 1965	03 Roberts arrived in 12-10 Dakar.
16 June 1965	03 Roberts sent $500 to Itkin in England after asking Itkin about a desk and chair to be sent to 03 Roberts in 12-10 Dakar.
10 Nov 1965	03 Roberts forwarded money to Aida Itkin in England.
Jan 1966	Itkin advised 03 Roberts about the formation of 08 Conestoga, Ltd.
Feb 1966	Itkin wrote to 03 Roberts about Senator Lodge.

35/PN

SECRET

OGC 69-0181

31 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SUBJECT: Herbert Itkin

1. A meeting was held on 27 January 1969 with Messrs. Rocca, Houston, Warner and myself to discuss the ramifications of the confrontation with the New York FBI office on 17 January. It was concluded that additional information was required on 03 (Thomas L. Roberts) and 06 (Robert Delson) 07 I contacted the Director of Security and requested the security files on these two individuals and was advised that we could not have the security files but that Mr. Ward Greene would bring the files to the office and discuss their contents openly.

03 2. On 29 January, Mr. Greene brought the security files on (Roberts) and 06 (Delson) and was most cooperative in explaining their contents. Attached is a chronological rundown on the pertinent information on (Thomas L. Roberts) affiliation with the FBI, CIA and Itkin. 03

3. On 30 January, 03 a meeting was held, 02 with Messrs. Houston, Warner, Rocca, and (Eugene Milligan), CCS/(LP)GLOBE, to discuss the operational use of Mr. (Roberts). 03 Mr. 03 (Roberts) has been a Staff Agent of CIA since 28 August 1961. 10 From March 1964 to November 24 1964 he spent time in (West Africa) writing a monograph on (West African legal) problems. It should be noted that this task was performed under a grant from a foundation which was blown in the MHDOWEL exposures. In November 1964 (Roberts) 03 was assigned for Cover to the (Radio Corporation of America 24 legal) staff where he remained until March 1965 and then went to (Dakar).

12-10

SECRET

14/PN

14-00000

SECRET

4. The facts in the attached chronology are subject to question since they are the result of 03 (Roberts) own explanation of his affiliation with Itkin rather than having been determined from independent sources. The most critical aspect would appear to be the knowledge or suspicion that Itkin may have known of 03 (Roberts) affiliation with CIA. This knowledge is borne out by the strange way in which Itkin repeatedly brings 03 (Roberts') name into the story which Itkin develops about his CIA affiliations. One of the questions to be answered by 02 (LP)GLOBE personnel is whether or not 03 (Roberts) reported his activities with Itkin in Geneva, Switzerland, in March 1966. There appears to be no record of 03 (Roberts') having explained why he never pursued the Itkin debt or what his financial contribution was to the (law firm of Itkin, Roberts and Greenbaum.) 08

5. Mr. Rocca was advised by Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI that the New York District Attorney may be considering prosecution against 03 (Roberts) for having absconded with funds received from negligence cases. We do not have sufficient information to evaluate the likelihood of criminal prosecution. It may be necessary to discuss this problem with representatives of Mr. Hogan's office.

6. With regard to 06 (Robert Delson) there appear to have been two operational considerations, one having been a request to use him with Project DTPILLAR from November 1953 to February 1955, and then a request in 1963 by the Domestic Operations Division for his use on Project WUBRINY. In March 1964 DO Division advised Security that 06 (Delson) was not going to be used on WUBRINY. Mr. Rocca commented that there are some rather ominous allegations against members of the firm of 08 (Delson, Levin and Gordon) indicating that one member of the firm was a card-carrying member of the Communist Party. At the present time Mr. Rocca is investigating the DTPILLAR use of Mr. (Delson.) 06

JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

Attachment

cc: C/CI/R&A

SECRET

12/pv

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
LETTER OF INDEMNITY FOR (COLLINS RADIO) 29

FROM: William F. Donnelly Acting Chief, Division D	EXTENSION 9427	NO. DIV/D-511/76 DATE 17 November 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OGC				BY HAND
2.				X6967
OGC SUBJ: LIAISON-NON-GOVERNMENTAL				
3.				
4.				
5.				RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce
6. AC/DIVD				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				BY HAND

YPN

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible]

DIV/D-511/76

17 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel

FROM : William F. Donnelly
Acting Chief, Division D

29

SUBJECT : Letter of Indemnity for Collins Radio

1. We would appreciate your signing the attached letters.

06, 08

2. Mr. Yockey, Vice President and General Manager of Collins Government Telecommunications Division, has agreed to conduct certain research and development work on behalf of an Agency proprietary provided this Agency guarantees all agreements entered into by 20 Collins and the proprietary. The attached letters will serve this 06 purpose. The unclassified letter will be shown for Mr. Yockey's retention. The classified letter will be shown for his information and written acknowledgment and then returned to Agency files.

W F Donnelly
William F. Donnelly

Attachments:
As Stated

4/PN

[illegible]

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014246

TOP SECRET

29 November 1976

06

Dear Mr. Yockey,

≥4

This letter acknowledges that the Liechtenstein Anstalt Electronic Products International Etablissement is an instrumentality of the United States Government. This Agency, as the true party in interest, stands behind all official agreements of the Anstalt and ≥4 guarantees its credit.

This classified letter will be retained in the files of this Agency for safekeeping, but will be available to you or your authorized representatives at any reasonable time. The United States Government appreciates your cooperation in this matter relative to the national security.

Sincerely,

Anthony A. Lapham

Anthony A. Lapham
General Counsel

Acknowledged

06

Donald J. Yockey

4|N

(2)

TOP SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

29 November 1976

06

Dear Mr. Yockey,

Your company may enter into contractual agreements involving this Agency. A classified letter of even date herewith describes arrangements relating to these agreements and is held in the files of this Agency for safekeeping and has been acknowledged by you. This classified letter is available for your inspection or the inspection of a representative of your company at any reasonable time.

This Agency appreciates your cooperation in this matter relative to the national security.

Sincerely,

Anthony A. Lapham

Anthony A. Lapham
General Counsel

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

C/R

(3)

OC-111-67-091
Communications
1 FEB 1967

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Logistics

SUBJECT : Request for Services of Collins Modem Field Service Engineer

1. The Office of Communications recently purchased two Collins Radio Company Model TE-216D-16D High Frequency Data Modems at a cost of $20,000 each. These Modems are specially designed equipment and will be used to test the feasibility of transmitting Secure (encrypted) Voice over a narrow band, high frequency, radio circuit. We also intend to determine their suitability for use in high speed data transmission, and tests by our Engineering Staff are scheduled to commence in mid-February.

2. Owing to the fact Modems are very complex in operation requiring special set-up techniques and adjustment, it would be advantageous to have a specialist available to assist our personnel and to assure timely completion of the tests. Accordingly, it is requested that a contract be let with the Collins Radio Company for the services of a Field Service Engineer. It is presently estimated that the services of this Engineer will be required at 24 (Station "D", WTC) for approximately six to eight weeks depending on test results. The exact date on which the Engineer is needed will be determined as preliminary installation of the equipment is completed. For planning purposes, however, we estimate he will be required on or about 6 March 1967.

3. It is understood from discussions with Collins representatives at Newport Beach, California, that engineering services of this type cost approximately $3,000 per month in addition to travel expenses. We recommend that the services of Modem Field Service Engineer, Mr. (Donald Warren Waycott,) 06 be secured, as he has an Agency TOP SECRET clearance effective 19 May 1965.

4. For any additional information, please contact Mr. (Jack W. Andrews) 03 on Extension 2045.

JOHN W. COFFEY
Director of Communications

Attachment:
Request for Procurement Services

3/17/N

SUBJECT: Request for Services of Collins Modem Field Service Engineer

CONCURRENCE:

(Signed) RICHARD H. LANSDALE
Office of General Counsel

[illegible] 1967
Date

for Harlan A. Westrell
Director of Security

3 FEB 1967
Date

APPROVAL:

for /s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Director of Personnel

8 FEB 1967
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att.
1 - Director of Security w/o att.
1 - Director of Personnel w/o att.
1 - General Counsel w/o att.

SC-02164-58

Extract from Archive file of COMIREX obtained thru Divo/NPIC

Summary of Initial Missions

In the period from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense system was subjected to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven occurring within a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that COMINT provides the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet system. This is important because it is clear from REGAL material that considerable air defense business is conducted over landlines and thus not observed by COMINT. However, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from these initial flights and these are indicated as follows:

1. In spite of the fact that these missions came as a surprise, none of them went undetected. This is clear evidence that their radar coverage extends above 72,000 feet.

2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action. One positive action was the standdown of civil flights while the mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second action which is believed related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraft into East Germany and Poland on 7 July 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved into Hungary at about this time.

3. The performance of the Soviet system on the 5 July mission, 2014, was indeed curious. While the action evident from COMINT is not clear an explanation which appears to fit the known facts is offered as follows: As a result of the previous missions, the Soviets had concluded the essential facts concerning the missions, i.e., that they were for reconnaissance, that they flew above 65,000 feet, and that a penetration as deep as Moscow was possible. They probably surmised that the 5 July mission was headed for Moscow when the track appeared on a northeasterly heading. The loss of the target when it entered Soviet territory was probably deliberate and the "red herring" track returning to the west was either a dodge or a convenience to avoid broadcasting a track for all the system to see that a "hostile or intruder" was coming over Moscow with no means available to stop it. This idea is supported by the use of a raid number assigned in the region just beyond the point where the track had been "lost". In addition, the track was not labeled "hostile or intruder" when it was broadcast after it had passed beyond Moscow. The reporting of the track when it did appear was only by Moscow and it has been suggested that other stations had been instructed not to broadcast the track. Further, it may or may not be a coincidence that the height broadcast was almost exactly half of the true altitude of the mission aircraft, but on the next missions, four days later, the altitude reporting was consistently above 50,000 feet.

4. By 9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recognition of the great height of the mission flights, tracking was better and in general the performance of the warning system was much improved.

5. The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air defense warning system closed a 3000 mile track with only two short periods of confusion or track loss. Altitude reporting was over 60,000 feet with one plot passed 68,800 which was only 100 feet off target.

6. The first eight missions proved that the air defense warning system is deployed in depth. This was evident from both the continuity of track and most forcefully from the ELINT data collected. Some 1461 intercepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 3000 mc/s band were obtained by project ELINT as follows: TOKEN-1331, WHIFF-37, GAGE-26, PATTY CAKE-37, Other 30. These numbers cannot be equated to individual radar sets since the same radar may be intercepted more than once. 618 TOKEN sites were located, including 213 new sites. Some 343 additional TOKEN signals were identified but available information does not permit determination of location so that it must be concluded that these signals include both known and new sites. Because of the limitation of ELINT to the 3000 mc/s band and the Soviet practice of collocating radars on different frequencies the total number of radars may be expected to be at least double the number of sites.

7. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related to the presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturation point has not been determined because of insufficient data.

8. The question of radars for height finding, the capabilities of TOKEN in this role, the introduction of ROCK CAKEs and later developments are discussed in another section. It is believed, however, that these missions were a catalyst in the introduction of ROCK CAKEs.

DANIEL FLORES

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 75-4191
13 November 1975

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable Barnard F. Jennings
Senior Judge, Circuit Court for
Fairfax County
4000 Chain Bridge Road
Fairfax, Virginia 22030

Dear Judge Jennings:

An employee of this Agency who falls within that special category of employees that members of my office have previously discussed with you has been summoned for jury duty at Circuit Courtroom #6, Fairfax County Courthouse, commencing 17 November 1975. It is my understanding that you believe such employees should not serve on a jury.

The employee is identified by a copy of his jury summons returned under separate cover and, as previously agreed, we ask that this letter and the name of the employee not be joined together. Mr. Edmund Cohen of my office will be pleased to explain the circumstances further if you desire. He can be reached at the following number: 351-5648.

We appreciate your efforts on our behalf.

Sincerely,

John S. Warner

John S. Warner
General Counsel

OGC:ECohen:aam
Distribution:
Original - Addressee (delivered by courier 11/13/75)
1 - JURY DUTY
1 - EC signature file
1 - Chrono

NOTE: Per GMBreneman's call to Mrs. Chesly, Judge Jenning's secretary, Mr. Daniel Flores has been excused from jury duty. Sandy called Mr. Flores with this message.

Alyce 11/14/75

III

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ [illegible]ERNAL [illegible] ONLY ☐ CON[illegible]ENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Daniel Flores - Jury Summons

FROM:
Frank Stewart
OS/EAB

EXTENSION: 7720

NO. OGC 75-4073

DATE: ~~7 NOV 75~~ 11/7/75

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OGC ~~7D07~~	11/7/75			To 1. Request OGC action Re attached.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11. OS/EAB 4E 33				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

112

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OUTSIDE ACTIVITY APPROVAL REQUEST

COMPLETE AND FORWARD ORIGINAL AND 2 COPIES TO EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH

DATE: 7 November 1975

TO: DIRECTOR OF SECURITY; ATTN: EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH

THRU: *(Staff, division or office head and security officer, where assigned)*

Chief LA/COG
Chief L[redacted] Security King

FROM:

NAME AND GRADE OF EMPLOYEE *(Print or type)*	COMPONENT	ROOM NO. AND BLDG.	PHONE
Daniel Flores GS-12	LA/COG	3D5325	7144

1. FULL DESCRIPTION OF OUTSIDE ACTIVITY FOR WHICH APPROVAL IS REQUESTED INCLUDING NAMES OF ORGANIZATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED, DATES, LOCALE, ETC. *(Refer to HR 10-7 before completing)*

On 29 October 1975 I received a summons from the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia to serve on jury duty beginning 17 November 1975 for two months.

I am presently (under Department of State cover (nominal).) Request Guidance.

32

2. REMARKS BY REQUESTOR

IN ENGAGING IN THE REQUESTED ACTIVITY, I WILL MAKE NO REFERENCE TO OR DISCUSS MY CIA ASSIGNMENTS OR DUTIES. I (WILL, WILL NOT) BE IDENTIFIED AS EMPLOYED BY CIA FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING EMPLOYEE

3. COMMENTS AND CONCURRENCE OF STAFF, DIVISION OR OFFICE HEAD

CONCUR: 11/7/75
DATE

SIGNATURE OF OPERATING OFFICIAL

FOR COMPLETION BY EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH AND RETURN OF ORIGINAL TO EMPLOYEE

DATE:

SECURITY APPROVAL HAS BEEN (GRANTED, DENIED) FOR THE ACTIVITY CONTEMPLATED BY THIS REQUEST.

II3

(FOR) CHIEF, SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

FORM 3-75 879 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

TO: Flores
Larkin Lane

Pursuant to an order of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, received on October 20 1975, YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED TO APPEAR for jury service for the term beginning at 8:30 AM on the 17th day of November 1975, in Circuit Courtroom , 2nd floor, Fairfax County Courthouse, 4000 Chain Bridge Road, Fairfax, Va 22030.

Questions you may have will be answered when you report on that date. If any emergency precludes you from reporting as directed above, please call the Clerk of Court's office at 691-2227 or 691-2228. Any correspondence relating to this summons should be directed to the Chief Circuit Court Judge of Fairfax County and not to the Sheriff. Please clock your mileage from your home to the courthouse and be prepared to provide to the Clerk of Court your roundtrip mileage for reimbursement purposes.

James D. Swinson, SHERIFF
Fairfax County, Cities of
Fairfax and Falls Church

10 o'clock DCI's deadline.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Talked to Jim Collis, Deputy Chief Ground Photo Services Branch, in the absence of Harry Van Tuyl. There is no photo of the "3 bums in police custody at the scene of the assasination". Without a credit at the bottom of the photo it cannot be obtained from the wire service direct.

Mr Collis called Herb Simmons CRS, Document Services Group could arrange for our man in New York (who has State cover) to put in a request to Newsweek. Mr 99 Simmons said he could not make a request for a domestic photo without the authorization of Dr Proctor but even w/ authorization he does not reccommend this route [as there is no plausible reason for a "State" person to be requesting this photo]. 24

2/BR

PRIORITY

22 APR 71

MS 149

TO HDQS

FROM SAC MFO

SUBJ SUPPORT TO PROJECT SEAL - LINDERMAN KEY
(LIAR'S LAIR) 219 000 F SD/R

ATTENTION: MR. [illegible]

c/e to [illegible] on 22 April 71. [illegible]

1. ABOUT [illegible] HRS ON 22 APR 71, MR. WILLIAM LOSNER, SENIOR VP BANK OF PERRINE AND A CLEARED AND WITTING CONTACT OF THIS AGENCY FOR MANY YRS, RPTD A LONG DISTANCE PHONE CALL FROM LES WHITAKER, ASSOCIATE OF JACK ANDERSON. WHITAKER INQUIRED AS TO LOSNER'S ASSOCIATION WITH THIS AGENCY AND RECENT ALLEGED ACTIVITIES OF AGENCY AT LIAR'S LAIR ON LINDERMAN KEY, LOCATED ABOUT EIGHT MILES SE OF HOMESTEAD AFB ACROSS BISCAYNE BAY.

2. LOSNER DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF AND ASSOCIATION WITH THIS AGENCY. HE RPTD HE IS OFFICER IN CORP WHICH LEASED LIAR'S LAIR FROM UNIV OF MIAMI SEVERAL YRS AGO. (THIS IS TRUTH AND NEITHER SITE NOR CORP HAS PRESENT ASSOCIATION WITH THIS AGENCY). HE ALSO RPTD THAT ONLY ACTIVITY THERE WAS CORP WORK FORCE REBUILDING AN OLD PIER DURING LAST WEEKEND.

3. LOSNER SPECULATES THAT WHITAKER MAY HAVE OBTAINED HIS NAME FROM STATE CORP RECS. ALSO, SOMEONE WITH PAST KNOWLEDGE OF AGENCY

(CONTINUED)

ACTIVITIES AT LIAR'S LAIR MAY HAVE OBSERVED THE WORK FORCE OVER THE PAST WEEKEND AND FALSELY ASSOCIATED ACTIVITY WITH THIS AGENCY. INFO FEELS ANDERSON AWARE OF AGENCY'S PAST INTEREST IN KEY THROUGH DISCLOSURES OF CAPT BRAD AYRES.

4. THIS INFO PASSED TO VENOM. SUGGEST HDQS PASS TO WH.

PRIORITY

END MAL THANKS

END JES YW

10:15 18 June 1974

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

FILE

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

TRAVEL BRIEFING DATA

NAME BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte		FILE NUMBER 56840
OFFICE WH	PHONE x7811	RANK OR GRADE GS-14 99
DEPARTURE DATE 30 June 1974	STATUS PCS	COVER STATE INTEGREE
DESTINATION(s) Trinidad		DEPENDENTS BRIEFED ☐ YES ☐ NO

PREVIOUS TRAVEL yes

AREA	COVER	YEARS
AREA	COVER	YEARS
AREA	COVER	YEARS

EXPERIENCED TRAVEL - Formal briefing waived ☐ YES ☐ NO

RISK OF CAPTURE TRAVEL BRIEFING

CATEGORY -	A X	B	C	D

SPECIAL BRIEFING PROBLEM

TYPE		YES	NO
	CIA VON A-Z		
	WHO'S WHO IN CIA		
	HIJACKING NOTICE		
	OTHER		

SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL VERIFIED IN SUBJECT FILE ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL BASED ON FILE REVIEW BY BRIEFING OFFICER ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECURITY FILE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BEFORE BRIEFING ☐ YES ☐ NO

- ☐ EMERGENCY CONTACTS *(met on arrival, phone no., alternate action to make contact)*
- ☐ SECURITY REGULATIONS *(operational talk, documents, indigenous employee hazards)*
- ☐ TRAVEL PRECAUTIONS *(recognition overseas, camera, black market, currency exchange)*
- ☐ PERSONAL AFFAIRS *(charge accounts, traffic tickets, litigation, neighbors)*
- ☐ PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE *(limitations, home address, shop talk)*
- ☐ PERSONAL CONDUCT *(morals, drinking, representative americans)*
- ☐ ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGNERS *(overseas briefing, phase out on return)*
- ☐ HOSTILE AUDIO SURVEILLANCE *(microphones, shop talk at home-hotels, report to security)*
- ☐ COVER PROBLEMS *(adequacy, request for briefing on arrival, family knowledge)*
- ☐ RESPONSIBILITY ABROAD *(local customs, traditions, religion, responsibility for dependents)*
- ✓ OTHER
  TRAVELING W/SPOUSE

REFERRED BACK TO CENTRAL COVER ☐ YES ☐ NO

EMER C. DES. – SPOUSE – IF NOT POSSIBLE THEN PARENTS.

DATE BRIEFED 6/18/74 BY ______ SECURITY OFFICER

FORM 11-72 1987 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

(4-11-48)

SECRET

18 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch

FROM : Mr. Ramon R. Hart

SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
#210 838

1. The first phase of the audio surveillance of the Subject at the SAS safehouse in Bethesda has been completed. The Subject left Washington, D. C., on 13 July 1963. The owner of the listening post, Mr. [redacted], moved out of his house, bag, baggage, and furniture, on 12 July 1963 enroute to an overseas PCS assignment.

2. Mr. Charles MATT, the case officer in this case, has advised that the Subject, along with a Cuban companion, Mr. Rafael Aurelio QUINTERO Ibarbia (#252 529), will return to Washington, D. C., to be billeted in the Bethesda safehouse on Monday, 29 July 1963. Mr. MATT has fervently requested audio coverage of the downstairs bar and telephone and the main floor living room at this house in order to monitor the Subject's conversations with QUINTERO during the absence of SAS case officers.

3. The case was assigned to the District Field Office, and Special Agent [redacted] was designated as responsible agent. It is Agent [redacted] plan to place microphones in the downstairs bar and the main floor living room and a tap on the telephone and string all the wires to a crawl space over the garage. In that latter space, which will be kept locked, he will set up two regular AC-operated tape recorders to be actuated by the two VOR's obtained from Franconia and paid for by SAS. Unbeknown to the Subject and his companion, a case officer will have to service this equipment whenever an opportunity presents itself.

DDS/IOS
2 ADDS/IOS
ASST/IOS
C/ID
2 C/CED
C/SSB
[illegible]
[illegible]
C/LAB
C/S B
[illegible]

A&TS
FILES

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Page Two
#210 838

4. The cover story to be used by Agent [redacted] during the installation is that he is working on the house at the request of the leasor, Washington real estate agent, Mr. [redacted]. Mr. [redacted] supposedly maintains the house for a New York lawyer in order to billet the latter's transient clients. Case Officer MATT has engaged a maid to clean up the house Mondays and Thursdays; however, she can be told to stay away if Agent [redacted] needs to do work there on those days. It was also discreetly requested by the undersigned of Case Officer MATT not to kibbitz too much while the technicians are making the installation.

5. It is expected that the audio results of this type of coverage will be superior to the results of the previous "radio" phase. The only complication will be in servicing the recorders on a timely basis.

Ramon R. Hart

Ramon R. Hart

cc: #252 529

llg

SECRET

18 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch

FROM : Mr. Ramon R. Hart

SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
#210 838

1. The first phase of the audio surveillance of the Subject at the SAS safehouse in Bethesda has been completed. The Subject left Washington, D. C., on 13 July 1963. The owner of the listening post, Mr. Fred C. THOMAS, Jr., 03 was moved out of his house, bag, baggage, and furniture, on 12 July 1963 enroute to an overseas PCS assignment.

2. Mr. Charles MATT, the case officer in this case, has advised that the Subject, along with a Cuban companion, Mr. Rafael Aurelio QUINTERO Ibarbia (#252 529), will return to Washington, D. C., to be billeted in the Bethesda safehouse on Monday, 29 July 1963. Mr. MATT has fervently requested audio coverage of the downstairs bar and telephone and the main floor living room at this house in order to monitor the Subject's conversations with QUINTERO during the absence of SAS case officers.

3. The case was assigned to the 03 District Field Office, and Special Agent Harold G. TITTSLER was designated as responsible agent. It is Agent TITTSLER's 03 plan to place microphones in the downstairs bar and the main floor living room and a tap on the telephone and string all the wires to a crawl space over the garage. In that latter space, which will be kept locked, he will set up two regular AC-operated tape recorders to be actuated by the two VOR's obtained from Franconia and paid for by SAS. Unbeknown to the Subject and his companion, a case officer will have to service this equipment whenever an opportunity presents itself.

DDS/IOS
ADDS/IOS
ASST/ICS
C/SAS
1 C/S Bu
A&TS
2 FILES

252529

3/JD

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

03

4. The cover story to be used by Agent TITTSLER during the installation is that he is working on the house at the request of the leasor, Washington real estate agent, Mr. R. V. Cortlandt HERBST (DI 7-8865). Mr. HERBST supposedly maintains the house for a New York lawyer in order to billet the latter's transient clients. Case Officer MATT has engaged a maid to clean up the house Mondays and Thursdays; however, she can be told to stay away if Agent TITTSLER needs to do work there on those days. It was also discreetly requested by the undersigned of Case Officer MATT not to kibbitz too much while the technicians are making the installation. 04

5. It is expected that the audio results of this type of coverage will be superior to the results of the previous "radio" phase. The only complication will be in servicing the recorders on a timely basis.

Ramon R. Hart

cc: #252 529

llg

5/JD

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch DATE: 1 July 1963

FROM : Mr. Ramon R. Hart

SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
#210 838

1. On 24 June 1963, Mr. Charles Matt, SAS/MOB/PM, extension 6488, was referred to me by the SAS Security Officer, Mr. George Ladner, and visited me in Room 4 E 21 to request some operational support beginning 1 July 1963. Mr. Matt advised that two leaders of the Cuban Exile Group were coming to Washington, D. C., on that latter date to confer with CIA and other Government officials, including probably Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General, concerning the "new program" for the exiles.

2. Mr. Matt explained that a covert site (#302 922) located at 9218 Aldershot Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, had recently been procured to billet these exiles and to serve as the meeting place for these sensitive discussions to take place. Mr. Matt said that SAS is vitally interested in what these two exiles say to each other when the U. S. Government officials have departed after a day's discussions. He, therefore, requested that microphones be concealed in the house to monitor their comments.

3. Mr. Matt said that the two men would arrive on 1 July and would be in Washington at the house for about a week or ten days. The audio coverage was requested for this entire time. Mr. Matt also said that the house would be retained for several more months and that the two exiles would return to Washington several more times in that period and that an audio surveillance would probably be requested for these latter visits also.

4. Mr. George Ladner supplied the true name of the leader of the two men, the captioned Subject. Having been informed by Mr. Matt that the covert site was a private dwelling place in an expensive neighborhood, I assumed that there would be only two methods of making an audio penetration of the premises:

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	[illegible]
2	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	C/SAB
1	C/S B WJR
4	Hart
3	C/SB WJR
	A&TS
	FILES

1/JD

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

Page Two
#210 838

(a.) Concealing a tape recorder in the attic, basement, or garage, and using a voice-operated relay to actuate the recorder.

(b.) With the use of directories, search the environs of the safehouse for the purpose of locating a potential listening post where radio transmissions could be monitored.

5. After checking with Mr. Joseph Langan, Acting Chief, Operational Support Division, I assigned the case to the District Field Office and directed some agents to case the house and the neighborhood to determine which method of penetration should be used. Mr. John Cryer was designated responsible agent at the District Field Office, and after a quick survey, he reported that the concealment and servicing of a tape recorder on the premises would be impossible and that the only method would be the use of a transmitter and a nearby listening post.

6. Using the directories in SRS, I ran the names of all the residents of the houses within a quarter-mile of the covert site 08 through SRD Indices and found one Fred C. Thomas 03, Jr. (#57 328), of 9127 McDonald Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, to be a Staff employee. Through telephone information, I located Mr. Thomas 03 at the Langley Headquarters Building and personally contacted him the first thing in the morning of 25 June 1963. I indicated to Mr. Thomas 03 the fact that there was a safehouse in his neighborhood which we wanted to "bug" and that he was the only Staff employee who lived within range of our covert transmitters. I asked him if it would be too much of an imposition on him for us to set up a listening post in his house. Mr. Thomas 03 explained that he was scheduled to depart for Karachi, 10 Pakistan, on a PCS assignment in approximately a month but that he would be glad to make his home available as a listening post. He confided that his primary mission in Karachi was to be the audio 10 penetration of the Communist Chinese Embassy and so he would look forward to the next week's operations in his home as valuable to 24 training. The next step I took was to set up a meeting among George Ladner, Charles Matt, Sam Halpern, Executive Officer of SAS, and myself in Mr. Halpern's Office. I advised Mr. Halpern that the

SECRET

8/JD

audio surveillance appeared to be technically feasible since I had located a possible listening post. However, I admitted to him that, even though the Office of Security has the "charter" to conduct the surveillance, TSD controls the necessary expensive equipment; Mr. Halpern must arrange for TSD to transfer this equipment to the Office of Security. Mr. Halpern declared that the procurement of the necessary equipment should pose no problem after he would make a few telephone calls. I then returned to my office and made out a list of the equipment which I felt would be necessary, and awaited advice from him as to whom to contact in TSD to obtain it.

03

7. After checking with Mr. H. T. Bent of the Audio Operations Branch of TSD as to appropriate equipment and after checking through the specifications in the "Audio Manual" of TSD, I selected the following:

Two voice-operated relays, QSC-2, $1,100 each	$2,200.00
Two Transmitter Radios, FM, 130 - 140 MCS, SRT-6H, @ $275 each	550.00
Two Battery Packs, 130 hrs. ops., UWB-7, $25 each	50.00
Two Battery "A", 1.5 volts, Burgess 2 F $. 54 each	1.08
One Battery "B", 45 volts, Burgess A-30 $1.87 each	1.87
TOTAL	$2,802.95

8. About Noon on 25 June, I received a telephone call from Mr. John W. McBee, extension 2481, of TSD, who told me that everything had been laid on by SAS for me to obtain from TSD any

1/JD

equipment necessary for this operation. Mr. McBee directed that I fill out a Form #88 and have the technicians hand carry it to the Franconia Depot in order to obtain the equipment. The use of the Form #88 disturbed me in this matter because I had assumed from Mr. Halpern that he would arrange it so that TSD would turn over the equipment to us without charge to anyone. The use of the Form #88 implies that a division is allocating funds for the purchase of equipment. However, I filled out the Form #88, listing the above equipment, and walked it down to SAS, where I gave it to Charles Matt to have signed. The form, bearing the SAS Cost Center #3132-5455-3400, was completed and returned to me within an hour, whereupon I gave it to DFO Agent Stan Lach, who drove with it immediately to the Franconia Depot. I called ahead to Bob Woods and Charlie Beall of the T & I Shop at Franconia and requested that they give a little briefing concerning the operation of this equipment to Mr. Lach and Mr. Cryer, who was to meet Mr. Lach there. Neither Cryer nor Lach had ever had any experience with any of the pieces of equipment on the list. Mr. Woods and Mr. Beall were quite cooperative in this request.

9. Several problems kept appearing and disappearing while the DFO technicians were transporting, installing, and testing the equipment. One problem was the payment of the equipment. I received a telephone call from Mr. Dayton S. ("Doc") Barrows of TSD, informing me that SAS had reneged on paying the $2,802.95 for the equipment, but that if I would tell him what equipment we wanted, he might be able to arrange to lend it to us. I told Mr. Barrows that as far as I knew, we had indeed obtained the equipment with the Form #88, but that if we needed anything else, I would contact him. Another problem which appeared was the rumor that it was not two Cuban exiles who would be residing in the safehouse, but only the captioned Subject and a Spanish speaking Staff employee. If the rumor were actually true, it would seem that an audio surveillance of the safehouse would not be necessary. I called Charles Matt for an explanation, and he informed me that Senor Artime was going to be the only person living in the house after each day's discussions were completed - no Staff employee would be living with him. I asked Mr. Matt to whom Senor Artime would be

holding the conversations which we were to record. He replied that he was interested in any visitors which the Subject might receive and any telephone calls which he might make. I suggested that possibly a telephone tap might be sufficient under these circumstances. Mr. Matt disagreed and still requested a microphone installation to cover the whole house if possible.

10. In addition to the equipment obtained from TSD, the DFO agents took their own SRR-4 tuneable receiver and the SRR-4 charged to the WFO. These receivers would be used in the listening post to pick up the radiations from the two SRT-6H transmitters. It was suggested to the DFO agents to borrow the two WFO transceivers to be used to communicate during the installation between the listening post and the safehouse; however, the agents chose not to use them and relied solely on telephonic communications. The "A" and "B" batteries picked up at Franconia were to be used in the SRR-4 receiver so that checks could be made from an automobile to see just how far the radiations extended around the transmitters. A report on the area covered by the transmitters was requested of the DFO agents.

11. The first test of the SRT-6H from the safehouse to the listening post was a failure. Its 50 milliwatt output, ordinarily good for a quarter mile, wasn't sufficient to reach the receiver, 2/10th's of a mile away. Its failure was blamed partly on the distance, partly on the brick construction of the listening post, and partly on the hilly contours of the housing development, which deflected the 135 megacycle, line-of-sight radiations.

12. When this disheartening news arrived, I immediately telephoned Mr. Barrows of TSD and requested a pair of the more powerful 150 milliwatt SRT-7 transmitters. I telephoned Mr. Barrows rather than filling out another Form #88 to avoid a possible furor within SAS. Mr. Barrows consented to loan two of these transmitters with their proper receivers on a hand receipt to us, and Stan Lach was dispatched to Franconia to pick them up. An opportunity to test it on 28 June 1963 was thwarted because Mr. [Thomas] was having foreign visitors in for cocktails [redacted] that afternoon. But the equipment was installed and tested the next day, Saturday, 29 June, and appeared to work satisfactorily.

1/JD

SECRET

13. At 1330 hours on 1 July 1963, Mr. Cryer telephoned Headquarters to announce that one SRT-7 transmitter had been installed in the ceiling over the bar and telephone in the basement of the safehouse and that the SRR-1 receiver was picking up the transmissions satisfactorily in Mr. Thomas's (82) basement. The QSC-2 voice-operated relay was also satisfactorily actuating the Ampex tape recorder when conversations began to take place in the safehouse. The AC-powered FM transmitter is crystal controlled to operate at a frequency of 157.4 megacycles in the VHF Band. Its operating range is supposed to be approximately one mile.

14. The DFO agents also fitted the transmitter with a hidden switch which would enable the case officers to turn the transmitter off when they are present at the house holding the sensitive discussions and to turn it on when they leave.

15. Mr. Thomas (03) and his wife have consented to do most of the operating of the tape recorder themselves in their own basement. With the use of the voice-operated relay, the monitoring will be almost 100% automatic anyway. No more than one visit a day by a field office agent should be necessary to pick up the day's take and to make minor adjustments, repairs, or corrections to the receiver, actuator, and recorder. Mr. Thomas (03) is well-known to his friends as a "hi-fi bug", and the presence of the new equipment in his basement would not raise the eyebrows on any of his visitors, some of whom are expected to be foreign dignitaries - Mr. Thomas (03) will be going to Karachi (28) under Department of State cover.

Ramon R. Hart
Ramon R. Hart

llg

cc: #57 328

6/JD

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 28 DECEMBER 1977
FILE NO. 3190

TO: (Check)
X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
X CHIEF, (OPERATING COMPONENT FOR ACTION)
ATTN: LA

SS NUMBER 069-26-3138
EMPLOYEE NUMBER 007667
ID CARD NUMBER

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

REF. RETIREMENT

STATUS X STAFF ☐ CONTRACT

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☐ CANCELLED X CONTINUED

SUBJECT: BUSTOS-VIDELA, CHARLOTTE Z.

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER (BLOCK RECORDS)

☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EOD
EFFECTIVE DATE

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED
FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)

X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 5 (HHB 20-7)

X FORM 3254 State W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11) 94

X SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)

X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)

EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AGP HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER (UNBLOCK RECORDS)

EFFECTIVE DATE:

FORM 3254 ____ W-2 TO BE ISSUED (HHB 20-7)

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ (HHB 20-7)

EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK -

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

SUBJECT WILL BE DENIED FOR ENTIRE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT EXCEPT FOR US GOVERNMENT APPLICATIONS.

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD/TRB OR CPD CONTROL
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SRD
COPY 4 - OC/DO/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

VS/TW
rp

Alvan M. Selsby
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 4-77 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET WN-SISM

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 021964

(13-20-43)

716K

INISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONL

56840

INTERVIEW REPORT

NAME OF SUBJECT: BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte

FILE NO.: ~~007 667~~

REASON FOR INTERVIEW: Retirement:CIA 30 Dec 1977

PERMANENT ADDRESS:
PO Box 3030
FALLS CHURCH, VA 22043

TEMPORARY ADDRESS: Home Tel Phone 281-2258

PRESENT TITLE, GRADE AND DIVISION: LA GS-14

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DETAILS OF CONTEMPLATED FOREIGN TRAVEL: Europe (dates not firm)

BADGES, PASSES, KEYS AND CREDENTIALS:

CLEARANCES: Commo - S1 99

COVER: 99 STATE (Retirement under Cover in State)

1. ALL PHASES OF SECURITY WITH RESPECT TO SUBJECT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ORGANIZATION WERE FULLY AND COMPLETELY DISCUSSED.

2. SUBJECT WAS ADVISED THAT ALL INFORMATION RECEIVED AND COMPILED BY THE AGENCY IS OFFICIAL DATA, AND IS THE PROPERTY OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AND THAT NO OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE HAS ANY PROPERTY RIGHT IN SUCH INFORMATION.

3. SUBJECT WAS INFORMED THAT THE SECURITY REGULATIONS AND THE SECRECY AGREEMENT APPLY, NOT ONLY TO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION; BUT, ALSO TO ANY STATISTICAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION OF WHICH HE IS COGNIZANT.

4. SUBJECT WAS INSTRUCTED THAT INFORMATION PERTAINING TO INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, SOURCES AND METHODS PECULIAR TO THE AGENCY MAY NOT BE DIVULGED TO PERSONS IN OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, EVEN THOUGH SUCH PERSONS ARE FULLY SECURITY CLEARED WITHIN THEIR OWN DEPARTMENTS.

5. SUBJECT WAS INFORMED THAT SHOULD ANY QUESTION ARISE ON SECURITY MATTERS HE MAY COMMUNICATE WITH THE AGENCY FOR ADVICE AND GUIDANCE.

6. GENERAL: *(Comments, criticisms or suggestions and knowledge of any incidents or activities of persons which seemed to have a security significance.)*

C3

/s/ Thomas A. Gaines

DATE: 30 December 1977

SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER: Charlotte J Bustos Videla

FORM 4-73 1099 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY (11-36)

3/BR

740

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 25 FEB 77
FILE NO.: 3190

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
	X	CHIEF, LA (OPERATING COMPONENT FOR ACTION) ATTN:

SS NUMBER: 069-24-3136
EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 007667
ID CARD NUMBER:

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

REF. Form 2458 dated 1 Dec 76

OFFICIAL COVER: ☒ ESTABLISHED ☐ CANCELLED

STATUS: ☒ STAFF ☐ CONTRACT

UNIT: 99

SUBJECT: BUSTOS-VIDELA, CHARLOTTE Z.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER (BLOCK RECORDS)

☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EOD
EFFECTIVE DATE

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED
FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)

X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 3 (HHB 20-7)

X SUBMIT FORM 3254 State W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11) 99

X SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)

X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)

X EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☒

X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AGP HOSPITALIZATION CARD

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

27 Aug 51-Aug 62-Hqs-Overt
Aug 62-Jul 67-Hqs-DAC 99
Jul 67-10 Aug 72-Mexico-State-Nominal 99
1 Sep 72-27 Jun 74-Hqs-DAC 99
28 Jun 74-10 Nov 76-Trinidad-State-Int. 1631
11 Nov 76-26 Feb 77-Hqs-State-Int. 99
27 Feb 77- -Hqs-State-Nominal 99

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER (UNBLOCK RECORDS)

EFFECTIVE DATE:

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ____ W-2 TO BE ISSUED (HHB 20-7)

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ (HHB 20-7)

EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

03

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD OR CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SRD
COPY 4 - OC-O/D/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

RP/SW

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF

FORM 6-75 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 006687

(13-20-43)

9/BR

SECRET

REQUEST FOR OFFICIAL COVER ACTION

DATE: 18 NOV 76

1. WHEN REQUESTING INITIAL COVER OR ON RETURN FROM OVERSEAS ROUTING SHOULD BE: *(COMPLETE SECTION 1)*	2. WHEN CHANGE OR REMOVAL IS REQUESTED ROUTING SHOULD BE: *(COMPLETE SECTION 2)*	FILE NO.
TO: CCS/OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH *(Use Form 610 Routing & Record Sheet)* FROM: LA Security THRU: OS/SSD	TO: CCS/OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH *(Use Form 610 Routing & Record Sheet)* FROM:	EMPLOYEE TELEPHONE NO. EOD WITH AGENCY
SUBJECT'S TRUE NAME *(last, first, middle)* Bustos-Videla, Charlotte		EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 007667

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECTION 1

☐ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER FOR SUBJECT IS REQUESTED.

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 069-24-3138

COVER REQUESTED:		MILITARY	XX	STATE		OTHER GOVT. AGENCY *(specify)*			
USE OF COVER:		DOMESTIC ALL PURPOSE		DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL		INTEGRATED	XX	NOMINAL	

SUBJECT'S CIA AFFILIATION ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN VOLUNTARILY DECLARED OR INVOLUNTARILY EXPOSED TO ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THERE ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN ANY OTHER EXPOSURE OR COMPROMISE WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THIS REQUEST. *(If an affirmative answer is given, provide details on separate attachment.)*

JUSTIFICATION FOR REQUESTED ACTION:

Ms. Bustos-Videla is currently assigned to the Trinidad Station under Integrated State cover. It is requested that she be placed under Nominal State cover for her future Headquarters assignment.

SECTION 2

☐ CHANGE OR REMOVAL OF OFFICIAL COVER STATUS FOR SUBJECT IS REQUESTED.

JUSTIFICATION FOR REQUESTED ACTION:

SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF REQUESTING OFFICER Jonathan G. Hanke Jonathan G. Hanke, C/LA/PEMS	DATE:

FOR OFFICE OF SECURITY

DO YOUR RECORDS REFLECT ANY EXPOSURE, COMPROMISE, SECURITY OR OTHER FACTORS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN MAKING A COVER DETERMINATION IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE REQUEST? *(If the answer is affirmative, provide details on separate attachment.)*

OFFICE OF SECURITY	☐	NO PERTINENT INFORMATION	☒	SEE ATTACHED	SIGNATURE	DATE 24 November 76

APPROVAL

COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF	SIGNATURE	DATE

FORM 5-75 1322 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 006687 SECRET OS COPY (02-04-38)

3/BK

56 840

NAME : BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte Z.

DATE OF BIRTH : 12 January 1929

REF NUMBER : #56840

POSITION : Operations Officer

LOCATION AND PHONE : Room 3-E-04, Extension 6954

DATE OF INTERVIEW : 10 January 1973

INTERVIEWED BY : James E. Peters/William A. O'Donnell

PERIOD(S) OF ACQUAINTANCE WITH AGEE:

Various--see memorandum of 31 May 1972.

AGEE'S OTHER ACQUAINTANCES OR CONTACTS:

Nothing additional.

ADDITIONAL DATA:

Mrs. Bustos-Videla could offer no additional information regarding Agee. However, she suggested that Dorothy Hennick, Europe Division/[Bern,] 15-18 be contacted to ascertain whether or not Agee had contacted Jim Noland [of Mexico Station.] 16-3

[illegible] INVOLVED

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2 IMPDET CL BY 010249

21/90

31 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

16-3

SUBJECT: Agee Effort Against Cuban Operations [at the Mexico City Station]

06 [Francis Sherry]

1. Elsie I. SCALETTI recalls that Raymond A. FRADYER, Chief of the Cuban Section, tried to get Agee to discuss the development of contacts with access to the Cuban target in the Olympics. In these discussions it may well be that Agee was told about LIARM-1, [a member of the 08 Mexican rifle team,] who was a contact [of the Station] and we were trying to get invited to Cuba. 08 (LIARM-1 is no longer a contact [of the 16-3 Station] even though he is still with [the rifle team.)]

2. SCALETTI recalls the Cuban Section feeling very frustrated that Agee could provide no leads or assistance to this section in its effort to target against the Cuban teams. She recalls no memoranda prepared by Agee for the Section, no leads given the Section, and he came to discuss the olympics with C/Cuba not more than half a dozen times.

3. As SCALETTI recalls, it is unlikely that Agee knew any thing about the operations being run against the Cuban target than that which he might have picked up at Headquarters or known about [the 16-3 Station] operations in general -- such as audio, surveillance, photo surveillance, etc.

4. SCALETTI had Agee over to her home once for dinner; there were no other guests. Agee had SCALETTI, her husband, and Laura J. UTSTINE 06 [Jane Zeffren] (on TDY) to his apartment once for dinner. The conversation was always light. The only significant thing about Agee's plans which arose was his discussion about buying used drycleaning equipment in the United States, bringing it to Mexico and setting up a drycleaning plant. This was brought up as something for the future and just an idea Phil was toying with.

[Jim 06 Noland]

5. SCALETTI ran into Agee by chance on the side street by the Embassy one day after the arrival of John A. PROBERT. Agee said he understood PROBERT had arrived [as COS.] and he would like to say hello. I suggested he call PROBERT. I immediately informed PROBERT of my chance encounter with Agee, and informed PROBERT that Agee had resigned under somewhat of a cloud and suggested he get briefed ~~himself~~ on Agee's assignment in Mexico.

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

10/9A

24

6. Agee knew that SCALETTI was in Mexico [under tourist cover,] even though SCALETTI was working regular hours in the [10 Embassy.] He probably also knew that there were other [Station employees 31 also utilizing tourist cover.]

Elsie I Scaletti
Elsie I. SCALETTI

SECRET

OUTLINE*

Subject: Philip Burnett Franklin Agee Busto - Villa

1. NAME OF OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE Elsie I. Scaletti

2. PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT #56840

Were you ever personally acquainted with him? Yes or No yes. If you were never personally acquainted with him have you acquired any information of a personal nature concerning him through other persons? Yes or No ____. Give details including dates, by months and years as best you can recall, circumstances, purpose and nature of any relationship you may have had with him and provide all data relating to his character or personality, illustrating briefly with any stories or other information acquired as a result of your own relationship with him or which might have been acquired from others.

See attached memo

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

3. SUBJECT'S KNOWLEDGE OF YOU, PROJECTS, OR OPERATIONS IN WHICH YOU PARTICIPATED

On the basis of your personal association with Subject, either official or social, or, on the basis of what you know or believe him to be knowledgeable of, outline the nature and extent of information you believe he could provide an opposition intelligence service as to (a) your identity as an intelligence officer or employee, (b) your personal background and experience including places of assignments, and (c) operations in which you participated in some way. (Cryptonyms should be employed when known. The nature of the operations in any event should be briefly but sufficiently described to lead to their identification, with the dates or periods involved and any comments or observations as to their success or failure.)

See memo attached

SECRET/SENSITIVE

4. OTHER AGENCY PERSONNEL

List other Agency personnel or former personnel, who on the basis of your own personal knowledge or belief, had official or social contact with Subject. Give brief information as to the period and nature of such relationship for each.

See memo attached.

5. OTHER U. S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL

List all other U. S. Government personnel who, on the basis of your own personal knowledge or belief, had particularly close official or social contact with Subject. Identify the Bureau, Department, Agency or Office with which each such person was employed at the time of the relationship and give brief information concerning the period and nature of such relationship for each.

See memo attached

6. OTHER PERSONS

List all other persons who irrespective of nationality, sex, or employment are known or believed to have had intimate or particularly close association with him and brief information concerning the identity and occupation of such persons, your knowledge of such persons, and the period and nature of the relationship of such person with Subject. Include also the names of all American and foreign newspaper people with whom he is known or believed to have had personal contact irrespective of the extent or closeness of their relationship. Give names with brief information as to the period and nature of such relationship for each.

I know of none.

7. HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS

Can you provide any information of any kind tending to establish that Subject may have been sympathetic to hostile ideologies or had contact with and was cooperating with a hostile intelligence service. Yes or No no. If yes, give full details.

Signed:

Dated : 10 July 1972

*This is an Outline only of information desired. If you either knew the Subject or have any information from other sources on any of the points contained in the outline, a separate memorandum is needed with each paragraph thereof keyed to those in this outline. If you neither knew the Subject nor have any information of the kind requested in any section of the outline (and only in such instance) negative entries may be entered under all sections, and the outlined returned after signing and dating. The signed and dated outline will thus serve as a memorandum for the files.

SUBJECT: Philip Burnett Franklin Agee

1. NAME OF OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE: Elsie I. Scaletti

2. PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT:

I knew Phil during the entire time he was in Branch I at Headquarters, and during his tour in Mexico. We came to Mexico PCS at the same time. This means I knew him from 1966 until he resigned. In Headquarters our relationship was limited to business in the office, and that was not very frequent. We sat in different rooms. He handled SB matters. I did the routing of all Branch correspondence which meant I decided what he was to see--this was anything affecting Soviet/Satellite/Chinese matters. My main areas of responsibility were in the support field. Even though we were both processing out at the same time, we did not exchange stories much. However, since I traveled as a "Tourist" and was not therefore allowed to bring anything into Mexico, Phil offered to have some of my things packed with his household effects since he said he owned hardly anything. One day my husband and I took some boxes of things over to his apartment before work. I do not remember the name of the apartment development in Virginia, but it was the garden type. His apartment was nice--fairly new but sparsely furnished. He helped us unload the things and take them upstairs. Then we parted. I seem to recal he had some trouble with his car that morning and we dropped him off at a repair shop on the way to the office.

At this time, in Washington, Phil was very pleasant, was nice to work with. He did not appear to be pushy, even though he did everything he could to get the Mexican assignment. At this time, despite his family problems, he did not appear to let these affect his work. At least from my position he seemed to get his work done, not to procrastinate, not to take a lot of time off. From the gossip I heard, he was separated, and was anxious to get any assignment overseas. When the possibility of this Olympic job opened up in Mexico he grabbed it. As I recall, C/WH/1 was sympathetic toward him also, and was happy to be able to help Phil at this particular time.

In Mexico when Phil's household effects arrived he let me know; and as I recall, he brought them over to my house and we unloaded them into our apartment. We did not go and pick them up. In thanks, we invited him over to supper one evening. (Willard C. CURTIS had given permission for individual officers to have Phil over to dinner if no outsiders were present and prior permission was obtained.) I think I got permission from the DCOS at that time. There were only the three of us (Phil, my husband, and myself--no maid, no other invited guests) There was no discussion of office. My husband knew Phil was with BKTRUST and was working on the Olympics in Mexico. Conversation was light. During dinner, as I recall, we talked about business in Mexico, and he mentioned his father was in the dry cleaning business, and he thought he might be interested in bringing into Mexico some used dry cleaning equipment which is worth nothing in the United States, and set up some dry cleaning establishments in Mexico. The discussion was merely in generalities--nothing specific as to timetable or even if Phil were serious about this.

About a week later Phil brought his car over and my husband helped him work on his car--adjusting it to the altitude. This must have been around September 1967.

Shortly thereafter, when Laura B. UTSTINE was in Mexico TDY (she worked in WH/1 and also knew Phil at Headquarters), Phil had my husband, me, and UTSTINE over to his apartment (on Insurgentes Sur just off the Viaducto) for dinner. It was a huge apartment, sparsely furnished. We had an enjoyable evening, very light conversation. Talked mostly about Mexico. At this time he showed us he had several bedrooms (forget how many) and hopefully his sons would be able to visit him.

During his tour in Mexico I only saw Phil in the Station occasionally--and then just in passingin the halls. Once after I heard about Phil's having kidnaped his boys, I thought I saw them (can't remember why I thought they were his) in front of the Embassy with a maid. I never saw Phil in the Embassy proper nor at any Embassy functions (I was tourist and did not circulate in the Embassy).

During his tour in Mexico, Phil remained pleasant but was certainly hard to find to talk to. After Phil resigned I saw him once. After John PROBERT arrived as COS, I saw Phil along the side of the Embassy.

We just greeted each other. he said he heard PROBERT was coming to Mexico and asked if he were here. He wanted to call and say hello. I said yes. I immediately informed PROBERT, and suggested the latter, read Phil's file at the Station as it was my understanding there was some problem about his resignation, but did not know all the details. (This was true as personnel matters in the Station were kept very close by the front office.) I do not know if, when, or how many times PROBERT might have met with Phil. At this time Phil looked neat and well kept, as I recall.

3. SUBJECT'S KNOWLEDGE OF SCALETTI, PROJECTS, OR OPERATIONS IN WHICH SCALETTI PARTICIPATED

a). Phil could definitely identify me as a long-time BKTRUST employee

b). Phil probably knew that Mexico was my first overseas assignment, and possibly that I had a medical hold before. He knew I had spent "many years" in Branch I, and was privy to almost everything going on at the Mexico City Station. He knew I was assigned to Mexico under tourist cover but worked inside the Embassy. He knew my husband was here as a professor at the Universit of the Americas, and that he did not work for BKTRUS

c). In Headquarters Phil knew I handled mostly the support projects plus such extras as LILINK and 02 LPGLOBE (both NOC). LILINK had closed down either just as Phil came to the Branch, or just before. However, Gary H. REYMANDER, formerly with LILINK was assigned to the Branch then, and talked with Phil about Mexico, and possibly about LILINK. I remember keeping the LPGLOBE material very close, in my own safe, and I do not think Phil knew of 02 LPGLOBE (LIREALM was then in Mexico under LPGLOBE), but may have learned of LPGLOBE program and LIREALM through Ex-LIADLIB (see paragraph 4).

In Mexico City Phil knew I was in the Cuban section, and privy to all operations being run against the Cuban target. He did not know of operations in particular except possibly LIARM-1 (now terminated) who we hoped to use against the Cuban olympic target. The Cuban Section tried to talk with Phil many times about the Cuban delegations to the Olympics, but as I recall, C/Cuba only succeeded in

GETTING Phil to come to our end of the hall a couple of times. I was not in on the discussions between C/Cuba (Raymond F. FRADYER) and Phil, but I believe they were mainly held to see who Phil had met who might be useful against the Cuban target. I know we thought at the time Phil was spending almost full time on his overt activities and the SB target, and he gave the Cuban target little attention./

4. OTHER AGENCY PERSONNEL

At Headquarters in WH/1 Phil shared his cubicle with LIADLIB-1 who was pressing to get overseas as much as Phil, for different reasons. Ex-LIADLIB-1 was a much more pushy individual, less experienced operationally (right out of the JOT program) and out to benefit himself entirely--much more so than Phil.24 LIADLIB-1 went out of channe constantly, talking of NOC cover ideas (for himself), and going right to the head of Training or JOT (can't remember which) and WOMACE on ideas and suggestions, without necessarily going through the Branch or Division. He had many business deals on the side (one was as a landscaper in Virginia) and had great prospects for business deals in Mexico.01 He wangled a 21 NOC job in Mexico (replacing LILINK) and was inserted in the LAGLOBE program while he knew Phil (I think this was the 02 timing.) He was also quite open in his bragging he had been hired as a GS-13 (I think it was) and did not have to go up thru ranks. This might have irritated Phil who was still a 12. Ex-LIADLIB came to Mexico PCS about the same time Phil and I came. Although I remember no close friendship between Ex-LIADLIB and Phil on the desk, the fact they sat together, were both processing out for Mexico, would have meant they had something in common. Also, LIADLIB was then handling all the projects for CP and leftist penetration operations for the Station and Base (Monterrey). Phil would have more than casual interest in some of these as some were being handled in the field by Howard R. BENJAYA, an old friend of Phil's from Ecuador. I do not know that Phil and

5/DE

Ex-LIADLIB ever met socially in Mexico or not. I am quite certain their work paths never crossed. LIADLIB is still in Mexico. He has had a difficult time since his "resignation" getting a job, keeping a job, and making ends meet. It probably would be to BKTRUST's disadvantage now for the two to meet. For this reason, and to assess ex-LIADLIB-s present state of mind, Headquarters sent someone to talk with LIADLIB-1 in the spring of 1972. At that time he still seemed bitter against BKTRUST.

Other than wishing to make special mention of EX-LIADLIB-1, I know of no Agency personnel other than those in WH/1 and the Mexico City Statio whom he knew.

5. OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL

I know of none except the Olympic Attache in Mexico under whom Agee worked from July 1967 until the end of the Olympics.

Elsie Scaletti
10 July 1972

14-00000

104-10110-10307 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 10 JULY 1974

NO.: 3190

SS NUMBER: 069-24-3138

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 007667

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: FORM 2458, DATED 19 JUNE 1974

SUBJECT: CHARLOTTE BUSTOS-VIDELA

OFFICIAL COVER: X ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

UNIT: 99 [DEPARTMENT OF STATE]

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS
X	☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EOD EFFECTIVE DATE
	☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER *(Specify)*
X	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 0 *(HHB 20-7)*
X	SUBMIT FORM 3254 [STATE] W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)* 99
X	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR 240-2e)*
X	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR 240-2e)*
X	EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II X
X	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD

	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE: -
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ____ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*
	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ *(HHB 20-7)*
	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK -

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

27 AUG 51--AUG 62-[redacted] 99
AUG 62-JULY 67-[redacted]-[DAC] 99
JULY 67-10 AUG 72-[redacted]-[STATE-[redacted]]
1 SEPT 72-27 JUNE 74-[redacted]-[DAC] 99
28 JUNE 74-[TRINIDAD-[redacted]] 1631

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD OR CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SR&CD
COPY 4 - OC-DO/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

EP:mlr

James L. Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF

FORM 1-74 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622

(13-20)

61BR

SECRET

T.S. 3 April 1969
B.I. 3 April 1969

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE: 7 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OS/Clearance Division

SUBJECT : Certification of Security Clearance for CHARLOTTE Z. BUSTOS-VIDELA
Zehrung

1. It is requested that the appropriate security certification be prepared on Subject whose date of birth is 12 JANUARY 1929.
Dayton, Ohio

2. Your memorandum of certification should be addressed to Chief, CCS/OCB/State 99

3. Subject will depart Washington, D.C. for: ☒ PCS ☐ TDY assignment to PORT OF SPAIN 16-28 on or about ________.

James L. Franklin
Chief, Official Cover Branch
Cover and Commercial Staff

104-10110-10328 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

FILE

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 7 August 1962

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT - WH

ESTABLISHED FOR: (NCL: [illegible]) BUSTOSVIDELA, Charlotte [illegible]

ATTN: WH/SS Mr. [illegible]

FILE NO.: 5190

REF: Verbal Request for Cover, Form 1322 Dated 31 Jul 62

ID CARD NO.: B165617

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: U.S. Army Element, Joint Operations Group (8739) 32

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR _____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________

x x b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE 7 August 1962.

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

13628

James H Franklin
[illegible] CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CLG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION	DATE 7 August 1962
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, WH	ESTABLISHED FOR (HEE: ZENPUNG) USTOSVIDELA, Charlotte Z.
ATTN: [illegible] Mr. Sullivan [illegible]			FILE NO. [illegible]
REF: [illegible] for Cover, Form 1322 Dated [illegible]			ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED U.S. Army Element, Joint Operations Group (8730)			

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE 7 August 1962.

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

43688

James H. Franklin
/s/ CHIEF, MILITARY COVER [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (13-20-48)

FILE NO. [illegible] 067 DATE [illegible] May 1961

SYNOPSIS

Live address established at 5611 Jason Street, 10 Cheverly, Maryland, on 17 May 1961. Householder and all adult members of his family were briefed. Householder notified local Post Office (Cheverly) that SUBJECT was residing with him and also requested local Post Office to notify Hyattsville Post Office. Western Union telegram forwarded on 18 May 1961 for Gladys G. DAHLBRUFF.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

REPORT NO.

[illegible] 125c

3/PV

#62 067 23 May 1961

GENERAL

At Cheverly, Maryland:

On 17 May 1961, a live address was established for Gladys G. DANBRUNT at 5611 Jason Street, 10 Cheverly, Maryland, through the cooperation of Dr. Edward A. 06 and Anne B. SALLOCH, 06 householder at that address.

On the same date, Mrs. 06 SALLOCH, her daughter, 06 Patricia and son, George, were briefed to the effect that they should accept any cables, letters, telegrams or telephone calls for Mrs. DANBRUNT. In the event any inquiries were received concerning Mrs. DANBRUNT, they were to advise that Mrs. DANBRUNT was residing with them but that she was not available at the moment. They were to determine who was calling and the purpose of the call. If the call was from the cable or telegraph office, Mrs. 06 SALLOCH or 06 Patricia was to call back later as Mrs. DANBRUNT and receive the message and request delivery of the written cable or telegram. In the event the inquiry was from any other source, they were to contact the Reporting Agent immediately.

The same individuals were further briefed, in general, as to why Mrs. DANBRUNT was supposedly residing with them and why she was expecting some form of communication. They were informed that Mrs. DANBRUNT was the mother of Eustace H. DANBRUNT, who was being held a prisoner by a foreign government. The mother has sent a cable to her son asking how he is, whether he needs anything, inquiring if there is anything she can do for him, and asking him to please communicate with her. She is now awaiting and expecting some form of reply from him.

On the following day, 18 May 1961, Dr. 06 SALLOCH was 06 contacted. The above information had been related to him by Mrs. SALLOCH at the request of 10 the Reporting Agent. 10 Dr. 06 SALLOCH was requested to notify the Cheverly and the Hyattsville Post Offices that Mrs. DANBRUNT was residing at his home and any mail received for her should be delivered to his address.

On 22 May 1961, Dr. 06 SALLOCH was again contacted and 11 he advised that he had personally called the Postmistress at the Cheverly Post Office regarding delivery of Mrs. DANBRUNT'S mail and had requested

14/70

#62 067

her, in turn, to notify the 10 Hyattsville Post Office.

Dr. 06 SALLOOM is a well-known 08 Washington dentist. He maintained an office at 810 "K" Street, N.E. 08 for a number of years until he was drafted into military service. He served in the Army as a 08 dentist and upon his release, as a Lieutenant Colonel, he re-opened 08 his private practice with an office at 1835 "I" Street, N.W. 08 For a number of years he was on the Staff of Georgetown University as 08 an instructor of 08 dentistry in the Georgetown Dental School. 08 He has resided in Cheverly, 10 Maryland 08 for at least the past twenty years, previously at 2816 Laurel Avenue and currently at 5611 08 Jason Street. His daughter, Patricia, 06 is attending Maryland University. His son, George, is attending St. John's College High School. 06 08

Daily contact was maintained with Dr. 06 SALLOOM on 22, 23 and 24 May 1961. As of the latter date, no communication had as yet been received for Mrs. DANBRUNT.

On 18 May 1961, a Western Union Telegram was sent to Eustace DANBRUNT, Reclusorio Nacional, Nueva Gerona, Isla de Pinos, Cuba. A copy of this telegram is attached as Exhibit #1.

Attachment:
Exhibit #1 (Western Union Telegram dated 18 May 1961)

JDS:mhm

2 June 61

17/RV

SECRET

13 December 1967

SUBJECT: BATISTA, Laureano
(See also DAVIS, Rudolph Richard)

ALLEGATION:

Rudolph Richard DAVIS, Cuban exile questioned by GARRISON's staff in connection with a training camp for Cubans at Lacombe, Louisiana, told the FBI in May 1964 that Laureano BATISTA, sent him 19 men from Miami in response to a request from DAVIS in 1963. The men stayed at a home near Lacombe, Louisiana.

CIA CONNECTION:

Laureano BATISTA, Secretary of Military Affairs, Executive Committee, Movimiento Democratica Cristiano (MDC), Miami, was granted a Provisional Operational Approval on 30 December 1959 and an Operational Approval on 20 February 1960 for use as a PP Agent, Havana, Cuba.

SOURCE:

Memorandum No. 5, Enclosures 3 and 7.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

OS INDICES RESULTS:

Subject, a 32 year old Cuban exile, was from a wealthy Cuban family and in Cuba he was a banker. He was granted a POA in December 1959 and an OA in February 1960 for use as a PP agent in Havana, Cuba.

A copy of a letter in Subject's file dated 22 November 1963 signed by Subject as Secretary for Military Affairs, Executive Committee, Movimiento Democrata Cristiano is addressed to Major General Bela K. KIRALY, President, Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation, Inc., and offered the services of the MDC in arranging meetings and discussions with other anti-CASTRO organizations and the Hungarian Freedom Fighters. The Hungarian Freedom Fighters were Agency sponsored and Covert Action 24 Staff was interested in information on the MDC before granting approval for contact between the two organizations.

DETAILS:

During an interview with the FBI in October 1963 in New York Rudolph Richard DAVIS advised that in January 1961 he was in New York where he served as coordinator between the MDC and the New York Police Department. DAVIS also said that some nineteen men had been sent from

SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic

Miami to New Orleans by Laureano BATISTA in response to a request by DAVIS for men to work in a lumber business with which he was connected in Guatemala. The men stayed at a home near Lacombe, Louisiana. When the FBI seized dynamite and other explosives nearby, the men became disgruntled and were unwilling to proceed to Guatemala. So the lumber company paid their fare back to Miami.

Some of the names of these men were as follows: Victor PANEQUE, Leodorino INTERIAN, Fernando FERNANDEZ, and fnu FORNES.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE FILES

03

FROM : (George Weademan)

SUBJECT : MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATICA CRISTIANO
#353 012

with original of this mem

1. Subject Organization is of interest to 27 (CA/1) because it forwarded the attached letter (prepared by Laureano BATESTI falls---212-635) to Bela Kiraly of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Inc.---a 24 (CA sponsored activity). James Conlon, 27 (CA1) asked for any available Office of Security data concerning Subject Organization or the writer of the letter. 24 If there was nothing unfavorable available concerning either of them, (CA was going to permit) Kiraly to meet with the representative of Subject Organization in order to determine whether Kiraly could be of help to Subject group.

2. A review of Office of Security records revealed that Subject Organization is an Anti-Castro group and that the writer of the letter was of interest to the Agency under an Operational Approval in 1960.

03
(George Weademan)

cc: 212 635 ✓

6/72

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

92692

SECRET

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch

23 Dec 1963

CHI-63-1314

Chief, Chicago Field Office

Hargrave Secret Service

[redacted]

1. Al Thompson recently asked me for my opinion of Hargrave Secret Service, 6 West Randolph Street, Chicago, insofar ~~as~~ 24 cover potential is concerned.

2. Chicago Field Office files contain no information on the company. The Chicago telephone directory reflects the company was formed in 1888 and has offices and/or representatives in the principal cities of the world. (See attached Redbook ad). [redacted]

3. Local FBI contacts had no information concerning the company. Albert Johnson, an ex-FBI man who has operated a private detective agency in Chicago for years told me that George E. Hargrave is sole owner and is the son of the founder. Mr. Johnson described Hargrave as a big, 250 pound man who has been married five times. In business, he is the type to put on a big show and is not averse to putting more men than necessary on a job in order to charge his client a higher price and profit accordingly. Mr. Johnson said that, although Hargrave advertises offices throughout the world he doubts that these are any more than investigative correspondents.

use 5-
81732
IN
(97)

A-92692

4. A casual inquiry put to Richard Cain, Chief Investigator, Cook County Sheriff's Office, brought forth the comment that Cain distrusts Hargrave. He said he knows him personally and does not regard him as a discreet person.

5. In view of the above, 24 Cover may want to reconsider using Hargrave.

2 copies filed In [redacted]

R.F.B. Lohmann

RFBL/jak

Attachment

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

2/17N

DAVID L. CHRIST

Chief of TSD/Audio Operations Branch witting of the following:

All audio operations world-wide since December 1957 to present date.

Complete knowledge of all R&D aspects of audio equipment research.

Had knowledge of certain Staff D and FI equipment and operations.

Complete knowledge of all audio assets in production and stocked for use overseas.

Clearances through Top Secret, Special Intelligence clearance, and "Q" clearance.

World-wide knowledge of the location of all our audio technicians.

Having previously been with the Applied Physics Branch of TSD, he was also aware of many of our other R&D activities.

As Branch Chief in TSD, he has full information on all personnel in TSD and general knowledge of the overall activities, including the research programs.

He has been to Isolation many times.

ORD-8271-70

10 December 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PSD/OS

ATTENTION : Mr. Joseph Hossick

SUBJECT : CHRIST, David Lamar #43872

1. During the last week in November 1970, Mr. David L. Christ, Chief of the Applied Physics Division, Office of Research and Development retired from the Agency. He is currently employed by Devenco of New York City.

24

2. ORD has a contractual relationship with Devenco and it is desired that the TOP SECRET clearance of Mr. Christ be activated so that he may be involved in this Agency-sponsored work.

3. While he was in ORD, the subject held several special clearances and it has been learned that he will require SI & TK in his present status as a contractor's employee. When his TOP SECRET clearance has been activated, we will file a separate request to cover the special clearances.

4. It is therefore requested that the subject be processed for an Industrial Security Approval at the TOP SECRET level. If any further information is needed, please contact the undersigned on extension 3233.

03

Richard P. O'Brien

Richard P. O'Brien
Security Officer
ORD/DD/S&T

2/pw

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE 9 Mar 64
TO: ODTR	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING
REMARKS: Per our Conversation re Cover Memorandum 2c 43	
FROM: Cos/ISO	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING / EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

S-E-C-R-E-T

OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION COURSE #24

SEMINAR ROOM ROSTER

[KALISH]03 RAN THIS GROUP

BADGE NO.	ROOM D
2411	AFFINITO, Thomas J.
2401	[BANICK, John A.]03
2402	[BUTENHOFF, Robert L.]03
2403	[CANTWELL, Robert B.]03
2404	[CARLSTROM, Tacy A.]03
2405	[COWEY, Ross E.]03
2406	[GREENE, Mary S.]03
2407	[ISENBERG, Don L.]03
2416	[LINSENMAYER, Neil R.]03
2417	[LUTZ, Thomas M.]03
2408	[MASON, Harry E.]03
2418	[McELFRESH, Elizabeth J.]03
2409	[NEWELL, Richard D.]03
2420	[WEIMER, Edwin Q.]03
2410	[ZROWKA, Peter]03

BADGE NO.	ROOM F
2412	[BOSTON, M. David]03
2421	[CHAMBERS, Austin G.]03
2413	[CHASE, Pamela W.]03
2422	[DONALDSON, Mary A.]03
2423	[GEPHART, Cleo L.]03
2414	[GOERTZ, Margaret G.]03
2424	[KOLARIK, George T.]03
2415	[LAYTON, Bobby E.]03
2425	[KIDWELL, Donald M.]03
2426	[MARLING, George L.]03
2427	[MOORE, Davis W.]03
2428	[MOW, Richard K.]03
2429	[PLASAN, Charlotte L.]03
2419	[ROGERS, Lawrence E.]03
2430	SHINN, Jerry L.
2431	[WEBB, Daniel D.]03

Reported [Stoccalade]02 referred to in class as a poor covert practice.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION COURSE #24

ROSTER (For Staff Use Only)

Student Name	Grade	Age	Component	Experience
AFFINITO, Thomas J.	GS-7	26	OTR/JOTP	
BANICK, John A.	GS-11	41	DDP/TSD/TSL	
BUTENHOFF, Robert L.	GS-15	41	DDP/TSD/R&D/CB	
CANTWELL, Robert B.	GS-13	33	DDI/OSI/LSD	
CARLSTROM, Tacy A.	GS-7	28	OTR/JOTP	
COWEY, Ross E.	GS-7	28	OTR/JOTP	
GREENE, Mary S.	GS-7	27	OTR/JOTP	
ISENBERG, Don L.	GS-12	28	DDP/TSD/BB	
LINSENMAYER, Neil R.	GS-7	24	OTR/JOTP	
LUTZ, Thomas M.	GS-9	28	DDP/CA Staff	
MASON, Harry E.	GS-7	23	OTR/JOTP	
McELFRESH, Elizabeth J.	GS-7	32	OTR/JOTP	*
NEWELL, Richard D.	GS-12	31	OTR/SIC	
WEIMER, Edwin Q.	GS-10	32	DDP/TSD/TA/SAB	
ZROWKA, Peter	GS-9	43	DDP/FE/VCL	* #
BOSTON, M. David	GS-13	38	DDP/TSD/BB	
CHAMBERS, Austin G.	GS-7	29	OTR/JOTP	
CHASE, Pamela W.	GS-7	26	OTR/JOTP	
DONALDSON, Mary A.	GS-7	26	OTR/JOTP	
GEPHART, Cleo L.	GS-12	35	DDP/TSD/TSL	
GOERTZ, Margaret G.	GS-5	26	OTR/JOTP	
KOLARIK, George T.	GS-14	44	DDS/OL/PD	
LAYTON, Bobby E.	GS-7	25	OTR/JOTP	
KIDWELL, Donald M.	GS-7	27	NE/AA/Jordan	
MARLING, George L.	GS-11	31	DDP/IO/B6	
MOORE, Davis W.	GS-8	25	OTR/JOTP	
MOW, Richard K.	Capt.	32	DDP/FE/Korea	
PLASAN, Charlotte L.	GS-7	35	DDS/OD/MS	
ROGERS, Lawrence E.	GS-12	37	DDI/OSI/SD	*
SHINN, Jerry L.	GS-10	29	DDP/TSD/R&D/CB	
WEBB, Daniel D.	GS-8	30	DDP/WH/1	

Legend:
Scheduled for overseas assignment
* Previous overseas assignment

S-E-C-R-E-T

3/DV

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A PERSONAL DATA

1. EMP.SER.NO. 059090	2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED *(Last,First,Middle)* Christ David Lamar	3. POSITION TITLE C/AP/ORD/DD/S&T	4. GRADE 16	5. SD R

6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT ORD	7. OFFICE EXT. *(If hqs)* 3486	8. STATION ☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD *(Specify location)*

9. HOME ADDRESS *(No.,St.,City,State,ZIP Code)* 6212 Maiden Lane, Bethesda, Md., 20034	10. HOME PHONE 656-2127	11. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED USA, Birth

12. RECOMMENDED AWARD Intelligence Medal of Merit	13. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT 30 November 1970	14. POSTHUMOUS ☐ YES ☒ NO

15. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN Wilma M. Christ	16. RELATIONSHIP Wife	17. HOME ADDRESS *(No.,St.,City,State,ZIP Code)* 6212 Maiden Lane, Bethesda,Md.	18. HOME PHO 656-212

SECTION B RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF HAZARD

19. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

20. FULL NAME	21. ORGN. TITLE	22. GRADE	23. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

24. FULL NAME	25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

26. LOCATION	27. INCLUSIVE DATES	28. TIME OF DAY

29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED	31. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO	32. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION C RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT, SERVICE, OR PERFORMANCE

33. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☐ YES ☐ NO

34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE
Chief, Applied Physics Division

35. COMPONENT OR STATION *(Designation and location)*
Office of Research and Development

36. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSIGNED POSITION

Direct efforts of 10 professional research and development scientists.

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED Nov. 1950 - Nov. 1970	38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☒ YES ☐ NO	39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL WHO ASSISTED OR CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE

40. FULL NAME	41. ORGN. TITLE	42. GRADE	43. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE PERFORMANCE

44. FULL NAME	45. TYPE OF AWARD

FORM 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
9-68

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECTION D **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION**

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act. Enclose unclassified citation.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. *(Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.)* What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation. Enclose unclassified citation.

Mr. David L. Christ is recommended for the Intelligence Medal of Merit in recognition of his career of especially meritorious service which has contributed significantly to the missions of CIA.

Mr. Christ joined CIA in November of 1950 as the first research and development electronics engineer in what has evolved as TSD. He created an Applied Physics Branch setting high standards for himself and the R&D engineers he recruited. His accomplishments included the anti-disturbance mine and the time pencil, both of which are still Agency stock items, and an IR beacon. As a pioneer in audio surveillance devices, he recognized very early that the use of systems concept would be most productive in meeting Agency needs. As part of his development program, his efforts led to the establishment of specialized contract facilities such as Baird Atomic which in 1953 was the first Agency source of transistorized equipment. 24

In early 1957, Mr. Christ was made Chief of what is now the Audio Operations Branch of TSD and, realizing that a drastic upgrading of the caliber of field technicians was required, began aggressively recruiting and training graduate engineers. His high standards and efforts in this area are reflected in the fact that the majority of TSD Audio mid-management personnel were recruited by him. In September 1960, he and two associates were apprehended while on an operation in

☒ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES *(List individually)* IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR PERFORMANCE. ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESS OR INDIVIDUALS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY Robert M. Chapman Robert M. Chapman	48. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION Robert M. Chapman Director of Research and Development	49. DATE 2 NOV 1970

SECTION E **RECOMMENDATION FORWARDED THROUGH OFFICIALS CONCERNED FOR THEIR INFORMATION**

50. HEAD OF R CAREER SERVICE *(Career service of nominee)*	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Carl E. Duckett, Deputy Director for Science and Technology	DATE
51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Carl E. Duckett, Deputy Director for Science and Technology	DATE
52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Carl E. Duckett, Deputy Director for Science and Technology	DATE

SECRET

Section D (Cont'd)

a denied area. His exemplary conduct and personal courage during the resulting two and one-half years incarceration permitted the maintenance of a very difficult cover situation and successful extraction of all three men.

Upon his return, Mr. Christ joined the Office of Research and Development soon after its inception, assisting in the definition and establishment of the various divisions. Under his early guidance, the over-the-horizon radar program developed finally into an operational system. His sensitivity to the needs of Agency operational elements based upon his experience, his technical expertise and his dedicated desire to broaden the technological capabilities of the Agency precipitated his development of a major coordinated program of accelerated R&D to provide the clandestine services with a number of new audio surveillance techniques of which the laser probe is an example, and his conception and direction of the Microtechnology R&D program. Within this program, the success of the micropower transistor led to the award of Medals of Merit to two scientists under his supervision. Other progeny of the microtechnology concept are three novel intelligence gathering systems to function in the air, in space, and in the sea environments, one of which is approaching operational status. Mr. Christ has also been responsible for pioneering efforts in the area of Audio Surveillance Countermeasures, first proposing the application of computers to the problem.

Mr. Christ's imaginative leadership and inspiration to those working with him, his broad scope of interest, his resourcefulness, and philosophical devotion to the cause of the Agency and the United States have provided this Agency with an individual whose unique efforts and accomplishments over his 20 years service are worthy of this recognition.

43872

DAVID CHRIST

14 August 1961

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Mrs. Christ's Knowledge of the Cuban Operation

The day after her husband's arrest, 16 September 1960, Mrs. Christ and her brother-in-law, Lawrence Christ, were briefed as to the reasons why Mr. Christ was sent to Cuba and provided with an outline of the operation.

Mrs. Christ had very little knowledge of the functions or activities performed by her husband and was not aware of his experience in the audio surveillance field. Therefore, terms such as cover, security and audio surveillance were relatively new to her.

Mrs. Christ was advised that her husband was Chief of the Audio Operations Branch and that this branch services all requests within the organization for the surreptitious installation of microphones and other listening devices. She was told that members of this branch, including her husband, are required to perform dangerous missions on a world wide basis. Mrs. Christ was astonished to learn that her husband's mission in Havana was clandestine and dangerous. She knew that the technicians were requested to place audio surveillance equipment in offices which were scheduled for occupancy by the New Chinese News Agency. Mrs. Christ was told that her husband, two other employees of the organization, a State Department employee and an agent were apprehended by the Cuban G-2. She was told that the State Department employee, (Robert Neet) 06 who was released by the Cuban Government, was actually the (case officer under State Department cover). 24 Although the name of the agent (Nordio) 04 was not mentioned at this time, Mrs. Christ read about him in various newspaper accounts at the time of the trial. Mrs. Christ was also told that the operational knowledge that her husband possesses, if disclosed to the Cubans, would not only cause considerable damage to the United States Government, but would also lead to intensive and probably brutal interrogation of her husband by the Cubans and probably the Russians as well. She was not advised of other operations involving her husband.

Mrs. Christ was given as much information as possible about Mr. Christ's cover story. He was employed by a cover organization, Vachata Associates, located in New York City and had been provided with alias documentation, such as a driver's license and a social security card. Mrs. Christ understood the reasons for this cover and why it was easier for her husband to pose as a bachelor than to admit the existence of a family. At no time have the movements or activities of the imprisoned technicians, prior to their arrest, been discussed with Mrs. Christ. Mrs. Christ was informed

3/PV

that in the event of danger the technicians planned to escape to an apartment which was occupied by an unwitting State Department secretary.

Since the initial briefing, Mrs. Christ has gradually picked up additional information, mostly from newspaper articles, about the operation and subsequent trial. It is believed that Mrs. Christ has not obtained any substantiative information about the operation other than what is mentioned in this memorandum. At the present time, she does not seem too interested in the operational aspect of the case, nor the reasons for her husband's capture. At the time of the trial, what little publicity appeared in the newspapers had been previously discussed with Mrs. Christ. She knows that the agent (Kendle) returned to Washington, D.C., but she was instructed not to ask any questions about his release nor his present whereabouts.

Mrs. Christ was informed that Mr. Kessler, who was the Department of State Welfare Officer in Havana at the time of the technicians arrest, had contacted the prisoners shortly after their arrest. She was told that Mr. Kessler was witting of the technicians true identity and was able to verbally transmit brief messages to them from their families. Mrs. Christ sent one message through Kessler to her husband, prior to the severance of diplomatic relations. She was also aware of Kessler's activities in behalf of the technicians and knows that he supplied them with spending money, vitamins, cigars, candy and other items as requested. She was told that Kessler hired Dr. Colomar, a Cuban National, to serve as the technicians attorney. In May 1961, Kessler visited Washington, D.C. on official business and met Mrs. Christ on two occasions in the presence of other Government employees.

Mrs. Christ also knows that Dr. Colomar left Havana with his wife in June 1961 and has been brought to Washington, D.C. for consultation with Government personnel. She has been told that another Cuban attorney was hired by Dr. Colomar to represent the technicians and handle the case when the appeal is heard. It was not intended that Mrs. Christ should know about the Washington attorney, Mr. Murphy, but she appears to be acquainted with the name.

Mrs. Christ has learned from newspaper articles that there are about 20 American prisoners at the Isle of Pines and that conditions at the prison are extremely poor. She also knows that food is brought to the technicians by a Cuban woman whose son occupies a cell with the technicians. She was advised that Dr. Colomar saw the technicians a few days prior to his departure, that they were in good spirits and that Mr. Christ occasionally worked in the prison.

Insofar as knowledge of specific operations originated by the organization to obtain her husband's release, Mrs. Christ now knows of only one direct approach. She was told that the American attorney offered to exchange medical supplies for the freedom of the three technicians and that the offer was never acted upon by the Cubans. She also knows that we have tried several other unsuccessful operations, but she is unaware of any details of these attempts. Mrs. Christ is not aware of the operation now in progress, which contemplates utilizing personnel in Mexico. On several occasions when the organization seriously considered a given operation, Mrs. Christ, by coincidence, has had similar ideas. For example, when Castro proposed exchanging tractors for prisoners, Mrs. Christ continually questioned us as to what action was under way to include the technicians in any exchange. She also had numerous ideas as to how this should be carried out. Yet, she could only be told that the negotiations were being closely monitored and that there would be no interference in behalf of her husband, unless the political climate was favorable.

As the Cuban-American political atmosphere changes and specific acts occur, such as the hi-jacking of U. S. airplanes, Mrs. Christ gets new ideas or approaches regarding the means we might use to obtain the release of her husband. Of course, about the same time, we are usually considering a similar possibility.

Mrs. Christ has been verbally advised of the contents of the messages we have exchanged with the technicians and knows that the Swiss have been unable to visit them. She knows that over 1000 pesos was left by Mr. Coleman with the Swiss and that this amount is being supplemented through Bern. She also knows that we recently cabled the Swiss Embassy in Havana regarding the receipt of packages and that the packages which we sent to the technicians were not received by the Swiss, and therefore, no further packages will be sent.

The operational details which have been discussed with Gen. Taylor but not with Mrs. Christ are of such a nature that little damage would be done if they were inadvertently revealed to Mrs. Christ. The main points which should not be discussed with her are:

1. The name of the Washington attorney handling the case.

2. Details of present or future operations designed to effect the release of the men.

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 27 January 1964

ESTABLISHED FOR: CHRIST, David L.

FILE NO.: K-2077

ID CARD NO.: 1452

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, OHD, DD/S&T

ATTN: Admin Staff

REF: Form 1322 Requesting Cover, 27 Sept 1963

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element, Joint Operations Group

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: OPERATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)
a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____
Xb. X CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD

☒ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
[illegible], CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CC

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from auto
downgrading an
declassificatio

SECRET

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

employment as a Type A part time employee. In August 1958 Subject advised that she was divorcing her husband and wished to be reinstated as a regular staff employee. Her reinstatement was approved and in November 1959 she was transferred back to Washington, D.C., PCS. During her employment in Panama she was under DAC cover. Back in Washington she was assigned to DDP/WH, Support Staff, Logistics Section.

6. In April 1960 Subject legally resumed her maiden name.

7. In May 1960 Subject was certified to the State Department in connection with ninety day proposed TDY in Havana, Cuba with JMARC; and in October 1960 she was transferred from Havana to Guatemala.

8. In November 1960 Security was advised that according to information from "the Project" (presumably JMARC) Subject had, while in Cuba, allegedly been having affairs "with the three people who were "incarcerated in the Cuban jail". This allegation very possibly was exaggerated and from information in the file may have been untrue. However, a Security officer on the Project seemed definitely under the impression that she had been having an affair with one of them, i.e.: Dave CHRIST and was of the opinion that her "immoral" behavior was "a probable contributing factor" to then recent arrests of Agency personnel in Cuba. According to another version, apparently hers, she went out one evening with CHRIST and on other occasions had group social contact with him and with two other TSD technicians who arrived in Havana three days before she left to go to the United States on leave. On the Saturday night prior to her departure on Sunday, she and her two roommates, she said, entertained these three men in their apartment.

9. In Guatemala, Subject met and dated a Ronald Stanley DAVIS, an American who was "wanted" by the FBI for car theft and mail fraud. According to Subject she found this out by checking "the files" and reported it to her superiors. Also according to Subject, "It was decided" that there was "no real harm" in continuing her relationship with this individual "as long as I kept on guard"; and she continued to date him until the day he suddenly disappeared from Guatemala City on 24 January 1961. She had, in fact, expected him for dinner the evening of the day he disappeared.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Addicott, Kenneth K.		11/20/47
Akins, Richard T.		6/23/49
Albertsen, Cecil V.	03	5/5/52
Amrine, Horace		6/2/52
Armsworthy, Frank J.		6/6/53
Arneson, Paul E.		6/2/48
Augustine, Reginald C.	03	8/31/49
Aurell, George E.		8/19/47
Baker, John E.		10/21/48
Balaze, William E.	03	5/22/51
Baranowski, Peter		12/14/50
Bennett, Edward		1/5/5
[illegible], Dudley E.(Lt.Col)		[illegible]
Brown, Ralph William		5/22/52
Birdsall, Paul		2/20/51
Blackburn, Bruce B.	03	4/1/48
Boswell, Clarence		6/7/51
Bromell, William		12/17/54
Bross, John		3/15/51
Burkett, Harold G.	03	2/23/54
Butz, Newton S.		12/22/47
Childers, Joe E.(Lt.Col)		12/19/52
Christ, David		11/24/50
Coolidge, Francis L.	03	12/11/50
Cunningham, Hugh		7/18/50
Driscoll, Robert P.	03	2/12/47
Driscoll, Walter (Dr.)		4/20/51
Erhardt, Walter L.	03	6/7/50
Evans, Bryan (Col.)		11/18/54
Ferris, Edwin H.(Lt.Col)		2/13/50
Fox, Ernest F.	03	2/26/51
Fox, William H.		7/30/53
Funderburk, Thomas		10/29/52
Garrison, James A.		9/27/51
Gibbons, Willis (Dr.		9/23/52
Goiran, Roger	03	3/2/48
Greenway, Gilbert C.		10/13/49
Hall, Virginia		10/10/51
Hazell, Hardley	03	11/7/52
Hensel, Karl C.(Capt.)		10/8/53
Hileman, Elmer F.	03	6/6/52
Hull, Harris B. (Col)		7/18/52
Hull, Kenneth D. Jr.	03	2/25/52
Johnson, William R.		5/19/49
Jones, George A. A.(Col)		8/27/52
JORGENSON, Gordon L.		4/7/51
Karamessines, Thomas H.		4/19/48
Kehm, Harold D. (Col)		10/19/54
King, J. C.		2/26/51
Knutson, Henry		6/16/53
Koppes, Lawrence W.(Capt)		2/2/51
Learned, [illegible]		5/6/51
Litchfield, Edward	03	9/29/52
McCafferty, George C.		4/4/52
McClelland, H. M.(Maj.Gen)		5/21/52
Matt, Charles W.		10/8/51
Maury, John M.		4/14/48

Northrop, Johnston K.	03	6/14/
O'Brien, John T.		4/21/5
Piburn, Edwin A.(Brig.Gen)		11/11/5
PRESTON, Howard J.		6/3/48
Rady, George A.		11/22
Reidy, Joseph	03	6/12/52
Richardson, John Hammond		10/10/4
Rider, Donald L.		7/25/5
Rogers, Luke P.		1/9/5
Rowland, William F.		4/24/5
Roosevelt, Archibald		2/15/5
Robertson, William A.		12/24
Rucker, Lucius O	03	5/20/
Scotti, Elio		12/23
Shannon, L. T.		1/15/4
Stevens, Lewis E.	03	7/1/4
Stewart, Gordon M.		2/1/4
Stein, Sidney	03	10/25/50
Sutphen, Preston L., Sr.		8/26/52
Tansey, Patrick H.(Maj.Gen)		10/18/54
Torbert, Ralph	03	8/20/5
Tower, Harry N.(Lt.Col)		4/14/52
Trimble, Carl F.	03	10/11/51
Triplet, William S.(Col)		9/24/5
Vincent, Chester	03	4/15/
Walker, Fred L. (Col)		1/26/
Whitney, Burke		2/13/5
Williams, Ogden	03	2/14/

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

23/R

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Personnel Security Division

CONEIN, LUCIEN

SUBJECT: [redacted], Reassignment

1. It is requested that clearance be granted for the reassignment of [redacted] [redacted], ZRJEWEL Career Agent, to Caracas, Venezuela under AID cover.

16-17 32

2. [redacted]'s security clearance number is 5025.

3. It is planned that [redacted] will depart Headquarters during June, 1965.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Date: 7/12/65

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request

D. O. Osborne
Chief, Personnel Security Division

SECRET

2/12/

2/12/65

1C 5025

SECRET

REQUEST FOR DOMESTIC COVER LIST ENTRY OR CHANGE

SUBMIT THIS FORM IN DUPLICATE, ENCLOSED IN SEALED ENVELOPE

TO : Central Cover Staff THROUGH: Office of Security SUBJECT: (True Name) CONEIN, Lucien E.	DATE 4 Jan 1965

23 H9 02 A 5 MAL

☐ ENTRY Inclusion of Subject on the Domestic Cover list is requested as noted below. When notified that cover has been established, Subject will be specifically authorized and instructed to conceal his Agency affiliation.

☒ CHANGE Subject is currently included on the Domestic list. For the reason noted below, it is requested that:

☒ This employee be removed from the Domestic Cover list.

☐ The following change be made

Mr. Conein is a recent returnee from Saigon where he was stationed under military cover. He was temporarily scheduled for duty at ISOLATION under [illegible], and is now to be located in the Headquarters area for an indefinite period of time. It is requested that he be placed on a Domestic Cover list pending further overseas [illegible]ation.

TYPE COVER		MILITARY		STATE		OTHER GOVT. AGENCY		NONOFFICIAL
USE OF COVER		ALL PURPOSE		OPERATIONAL ONLY				

REQUESTING OFFICE

STAFF OR DIVISION FE Division	SIGNATURE AND TITLE Chester R. [illegible], FE Security Officer	DATE 4 January 1965

CENTRAL COVER STAFF APPROVAL	OFFICE OF SECURITY APPROVAL
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE R. H. Meade
DATE	DATE 5 Jan 65

OFFICE OF SECURITY COPY

FORM 3.63 1322 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

TC 5025

SECRET

REQUEST FOR DOMESTIC COVER LIST ENTRY OR CHANGE

SUBMIT THIS FORM IN DUPLICATE, ENCLOSED IN SEALED ENVELOPE

TO : Central Cover Staff
THROUGH: Office of Security
SUBJECT: *(True Name)* CONEIN, Lucien E.

23 11 05 A 5 JAN

DATE 4 Jan 1965

☐ ENTRY Inclusion of Subject on the Domestic Cover list is requested as noted below. When notified that cover has been established, Subject will be specifically authorized and instructed to conceal his Agency affiliation.

☐ CHANGE Subject is currently included on the Domestic list. For the reason noted below, it is requested that:

☐ This employee be removed from the Domestic Cover list

☐ The following change be made

Mr. Conein is a recent returnee from Saigon where he was stationed under military cover. He was temporarily scheduled for duty at ISOLATION under [illegible], and is now to be located in the Headquarters area for an indefinite period of time. It is requested that he be placed on a Domestic Cover list pending further overseas utilization.

TYPE COVER		MILITARY		STATE		OTHER GOVT. AGENCY		NONOFFICIAL
USE OF COVER		ALL PURPOSE		OPERATIONAL ONLY				

REQUESTING OFFICE

STAFF OR DIVISION	SIGNATURE AND TITLE	DATE
FE Division	Chester R. Houston Chester R. Houston, FE Security Officer	4 January 1965

CENTRAL COVER STAFF APPROVAL	OFFICE OF SECURITY APPROVAL
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
DATE	DATE 5 January 65

OFFICE OF SECURITY COPY

FORM 3-58 1322 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE
2 October 1963

TO: (Check)
CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT [illegible]

ATTN: [illegible]

REF: [illegible] Briefing

ESTABLISHED FOR
CROZIER, [redacted] L.

FILE NO.
[illegible] [redacted]

ID CARD NO.

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: RESIGNATION DATE: 28 November 1963
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____.

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ____.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

32

☐ REMARKS: [illegible]

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, C[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

FIL

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE [illegible]

TO: (Check)	☒	CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
	☐	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT

ATTN:

REF:

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED

ESTABLISHED FOR

FILE NO.

ID CARD NO.

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ____________.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-[illegible])

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CO

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADED/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check) ☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT [illegible]	DATE [illegible]
ATTN: [illegible]	ESTABLISHED FOR: [illegible]
REF: [illegible]	FILE NO. [illegible]
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED [illegible]	ID CARD NO. [illegible]

☒ BLOCK RECORDS: [illegible]
(OPMEMO 20-300-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ____

☒ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3
(HB 20-800-3)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ NA SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☒ REMARKS: Cover History: [illegible] - Jul 54 - [illegible] [illegible] Aug 54 - Feb 57 - [illegible], overseas; May 57 - Sept 60 - [illegible] CONUS; Sept 60 - Apr 61 - [illegible], CONUS; Sept 61 - Jan 62 - [illegible], CONUS; Jan 62 - Jul 62 - DAC, [illegible].

[illegible] backstop will [illegible] depending [illegible] use for [illegible] only. Should he ever have need to apply for a governmental position he will contact this office and will [illegible] above information [illegible].

[illegible] address not known.

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

FILE

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE
8 October 1963

ESTABLISHED FOR
CROZIER, Ross L.

FILE NO.
E-7810

ID CARD NO.
[redacted]

TO: (Check)
X CONTRACT PERSONNEL
CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT WAS (Prov.)

ATTN:
Mr. Dawson

REF:
Resignee Backstop Briefing

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
See remarks.

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: RESIGNATION DATE: 28 November 1963
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

NA ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

NA SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

NA SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

32

X REMARKS: Cover History: 1953 - Jul 54 - NOC, overseas; Aug 54 - Feb 57 - NOC, overseas; May 57 - Sept 60 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 60 - Aug 61 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 61 - Jan 63 - NOC, CONUS; Jan 63 - Jul 63 - DAC, [illegible].

[illegible] Should he ever have need to apply for a governmental position, he will contact this office and will [illegible] [illegible] information and use CIA from [illegible] [illegible].

Fwdg address not known.

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

1/PV

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, C[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

FIL

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 5 October 1963

ESTABLISHED FOR: [redacted]

TO: (Check)
X CONTRACT PERSONNEL, CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT FAS (Prov.)

ATTN: Mr. Dawson

FILE NO. [redacted]

REF: Resignee Backstop Briefing

ID CARD NO. [redacted]

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: See Remarks.

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: RESIGNATION DATE: 26 [redacted]
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

NA ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

NA SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

NA SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

X REMARKS: Cover History: 1952 - Jul 54 - NOC, overseas; Aug 54 - Feb 57 - NOC, overseas; May 57 - Sept 60 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 60 - Aug 61 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 61 - Jan 63 - NOC, CONUS; Jan 63 - Jul 63 - NOC, Hdqs.

Subject will use above information for backstopping and for commercial use only. Should he ever have need to apply for a governmental position, he will contact this office and will ignore above information and use CIA from Aug 1952 on.

Fwdg address not known.

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, C

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

FILE

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

		DATE
TO: (Check)	☐ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT	ESTABLISHED FOR
ATTN:		FILE NO.
REF:		ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED		

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR _____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ______________________________.

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ________________________.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CO

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, ~~1-PSD/OS,~~ 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible] (13-20-4

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

27 June 1963

ESTABLISHED FOR: C[illegible]ZIER, [illegible]

FILE NO: K-[illegible]

ID CARD NO:

TO: (Check)
X CHIEF, ~~CONTRACT PERSONNEL~~ RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, WH

ATTN: WH/SA - Mr. Wallace

REF: Form 1322 Requesting Cover, 14 May 1963

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element, Joint Operations Group

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD.

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

21 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. F. I. G. Coleman
C/OPS/LSN

SUBJECT : FBI Investigation of Allegations
Regarding CIA Activities

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 30 July 1974 and captioned as above, requesting that the names of certain individuals and organizations be searched in Office of Security records and the results of such checks which may be passed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. The records of this Office contained no prior information identifiable with Security Defense System; Intelligence Services, Ltd.; or Advance Security Corporation. Our records reflect no prior information identifiable with Howard Gibson of Powder Springs, Georgia.

3. Mitchell Livingston Werbell III, born 8 March 1918 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, served in the Office of Strategic Services briefly from July to December 1945 during World War II, and has repeatedly come to the attention of CIA through the intervening years through his activities, primarily in connection with the Far East and Caribbean areas. He has a reputation as a "wheeler dealer, con-man, arms peddler, and soldier of fortune."

4. The foregoing information may be passed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

5. The following information from Office of Security records was recently passed to Mr. Frank Schwartz, Federal Bureau of Investigation Liaison representative:

> "John Patrick Muldoon - Subject was born 25 August 1937 at Washington, D. C. He entered on duty with the Agency on 7 January 1958 as a GS-03 Courier. During his Agency career he became an Operations Officer primarily in the Far East area. His overseas assignments included Malaysia, Bangkok, and areas of Indonesia. He went on a

13 - 24

1/PV

2 [illegible] 668217

Leave Without Pay status on 19 November 1971, pending 24 disability retirement. His retirement became effective on 19 November 1972, as a GS-12. At the time of retirement he resided at 4305 Kentbury Drive, Bethesda, Maryland. The latest notation in his file indicated he may be employed as the Washington representative of the firm, Security Consultants International."

6. Office of Security records reflect that an individual, probably identical to Steve Van Cleave of Atlanta, Georgia, had falsely claimed to the State Department in January 1974 that he worked for CIA in Latin America under cover of Coca Cola Company. He also apparently indicated that he is known to FBI representatives in Buenos Aires. This information is contained in Agency cables DIR-507298, 30 January 1974, and DIR-490860, 12 December 1973.

Charles S. Phalen
Chief
Security Support Division

24 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IB/3

FROM : A/Chief, SB/2

SUBJECT : CROZIER, R. L.
#112569

This will confirm verbal advice of 23 December 1959 that the writer advised Joseph KING, SO/OTR, that the Office of Security would not favorably entertain a request for the Subject's utilization in a staff capacity at (Isolation) in view of his current non-staff status and cover and security considerations involved in connection with his current assignment in (Mexico) as a Career Agent. It is understood that OTR will advise WH Division that OTR cannot assign the Subject to (Isolation) for security and cover reasons. 01

Ervan E. Kuhnke, Jr.

KUHNKE/ewd(12-24-59)
CLOSED

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

6/8
(Date)

TO: Mr Swedeman

BUILDING	ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Subject was scheduled to travel 7 June to (Saigon). 13-2 If he goes Travel arrangements will be made by Major Fullam.

Subject's file reflects that French Intelligence sources in Indo-China sought his services twice in 1945 when he was stationed there.

FROM: Vince

BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

OVERSEAS PROCESSING SHEET

SUBJECT Conein, Lucien Emile No. 5025

Title and Grade Area Ops Off, Major USA Office & Division FE

Estimated date of travel TDY ☐ PCS ☒

Destination (Saigon) 13-2 Cover for one year

Itinerary True Military

SECURITY FACTORS

Item		Action Initiated	Completed
1. Date of polygraph	14 Sept 53		
2. Clearances:			
☐ CRYPTO			
☐ SI			
☐ Q			
☐ Certification			
☐ Concurrence	– ?	file fwd to RCS	

3. Flags:

4. Other: Subject was scheduled for 7 June checkout. Price indicates that MPD will handle travel and they state there is a strong possibility he will not travel.

Information regarding travel obtained from File

Processing Sheet completed by Luddy Date

4PJ /

5025

[redacted] **TRAVEL ORDER** [redacted]

26 May 1954

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.	[illegible]
ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL	[illegible]

Lucien E. Conein

NAME Lucien E CONEIN	OFFICE PHONE [illegible]	GRADE AND SALARY [illegible]
TITLE Area Ops' Officer	OFFICIAL STATION (Saigon Indochina) 13-2	

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY

Travel authorized from Washington D. C. to (Saigon, Indochina)

13-2

PURPOSE

For PCS (Subject will be under MAAG cover which only allows subject to remain in (Indochina) one year. His PCS tour will therefore be one year.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

13-2

Authorized 150 lbs. operational excess baggage

[redacted]

Subject will be (under MAAG cover.)

32

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. Advance of funds is authorized.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL

$ [illegible]

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT 7 June 1954	TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY arrival at PCS
MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY) Air rail sea	

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.

03

SIGNATURE

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER.

☐ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

☒ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

Military orders required by [illegible] 28 May 54

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

FR D [illegible], CAPT., AGC

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE) [illegible] FE/CPI Gordon M. Stewart CPI	(DATE)	SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27
OCT 1951

SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 33-27, 33-28, 34-4, 34-4A, 34-5, 36-207 AND 37-60 WHICH MAY NOT BE USED.

(28-4

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951 - 97630

5|PJ

14-00000

SECRET 5025

TRAVEL ORDER

30 April 1954 CANCELLATION

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.: [illegible]

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL: [illegible]

NAME: Lucien E. CONEIN Conein

OFFICE PHONE: 371

GRADE AND SALARY: Major - [illegible]

TITLE: Intelligence Officer

OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY

15-20

Washington, D. C. to Athens, Greece to (Frankfurt, Germany) and return to Washington, D. C.

PURPOSE

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

This cancels the original order and Amendment # 1 in their entirety.

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. Advance of funds is authorized.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: $

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY)

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER.

☐ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.

03 MBFrederick

SIGNATURE

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

Noted by MPD: 13 May 54

FRED M. S[illegible]OWELL, CAPT., AGC

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE)

03

(Frank G. Chapin,) SE/[illegible]

(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27 [illegible], CPI
OCT 1951

SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 33-27, 33-28, 34-4, 34-4A, 34-5, 36-207 AND 37-60 WHICH MAY NOT BE USED.

(28-48)

SECRET

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 230611

3/PJ

6.

SECRET

5025

TRAVEL ORDER

6 April 1954

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. CE-166/54, Amend #1

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL CDOPSB (4-3215-51-012)

NAME Lucien E. CONEIN

OFFICE PHONE 612

GRADE AND SALARY Major - USA

TITLE Intelligence Officer

OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY

15-20

Washington, D. C. to Athens, Greece to (Frankfurt, Germany) and return to Washington, D. C.

I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE:

OBLIGATION REFERENCE No. __________

PURPOSE

CHARGE TO ALLOTMENT No. __________

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

AUTHORIZING OFFICER

Inasmuch as only tourist flight accommodations are available to the traveler, excess baggage is authorized up to a total weight allowance for the traveler of 66 lbs.

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. Advance of funds is authorized.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL $ 53.33 additional

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY)

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER.

☐ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.

03

DMuddiman

SIGNATURE

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

Noted by MPD: 11 May 1954
FRED P. STOWELL, CAPT., AGC

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE)

63

(Frank M. Chapin,) SE ADMIN

(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27
OCT 1951

SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 33-27, 33-28, 34-4, 34-4A, 34-5, 36-207 AND 37-60 WHICH MAY NOT BE USED. (26-46)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 - 257127

SECRET

3/PN

14-00000

FILE-8

OVERSEAS PROCESSING SHEET

SUBJECT Conein, Lucien E. No. 5025

Title and Grade Major U.S.A. Office & Division DDP/SE

Estimated date of travel 3 May 64 TDY ☑ PCS ☐

Destination A-G and F-G Cover

Itinerary

SECURITY FACTORS

Item	Action Initiated	Completed
1. Date of polygraph 14 Sept 53	Cancelled	
2. Clearances:		
☐ CRYPTO		
☐ SI		
☐ Q		
☐ Certification		
☐ Concurrence		

3. Flags:

None

4. Other:

Information regarding travel obtained from File and Price

Processing Sheet completed by V B Guddy Date 4/28/64

14-00000

SECRET

5025

TRAVEL ORDER

13 April 1954

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. SE-166/54

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL [illegible] ([illegible])

NAME Lucien E. CONEIN	OFFICE PHONE 671	GRADE AND SALARY Major - USA
TITLE Intelligence Officer	OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.	

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY

15-20

Washington, D. C. to Athens, Greece to Frankfurt, Germany and return to Washington, D. C.

PURPOSE

To confer on operational matters in connection with [illegible].

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

$250.00 advance authorized.

Military cover orders authorized.

32

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. Advance of funds is authorized.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL $ [illegible]

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT [illegible]

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY [illegible] May 1954

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY) [illegible]

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER.

☐ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.

SIGNATURE

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

Military orders required by MPD: 15 Apr 54

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE)

03

Frank M. Chapin, CE/ADMIN

FRED M. STOWELL, CAPT., AGC

(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27
OCT. 1951

SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 33-[illegible], 33-20, 34-4, 34-4A, 34-5, 36-207 AND 37-60 WHICH MAY NOT BE USED. (28-46)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 - 257127

SECRET

31PD

14-00000

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

VOUCHERED

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.* If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Lucien E. CONEIN

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 Nov 1919

3. REQUEST NO.: 281-53

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 20 Oct 195

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Reassignment (Key Personnel)
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED
B. APPROVED

RECORDED
CONTROL DESK

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Operations Officer (F) 45-1	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intell. Officer BD-49
Major USA	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	Major USA
DDP/SE 11 German Mission Nurnberg Ops. Base Nurnberg, Germany 15-29	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SE SE/1 - "Albanian Branch Office of the Chief Washington, D. C.
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM Unvouchered Funds.

Concurrence: ______________________
EE Division

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): 03 JOSEPH BURK SE/ADMIN

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): 03 ROBERT BURNS X-3965

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: ______________________
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.	
				CD - FI

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 3130 - 55 - 017
TO: 4 - 3200 - 20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): NO

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVE
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Security Approval has been granted for
[illegible] this request
[illegible] Security Branch
NOV 9 1953

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		
F. APPROVED BY		

REMARKS:

S

51N

SECRET

16—57329

CPD August 5, 1947

Chief, Security Branch, OSO

MARCHAND, [illegible] L.
CORRIN, Lucien E.
QUINN, Myrtle V. 06
BEST, David E. 06
HESS, Rudolph W. 06
SIMKOFF, Helena V. 06
MACAULEY, Hugh O.

A review of the subjects' files reflects that they do not meet with the requirements set forth in recent instructions from the Assistant Director for Special Operations.

We request that this office be furnished with two copies of current Personal History Statements of each of the subjects at the earliest date possible in order that appropriate security checks may be initiated.

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM
Chief, Security Branch, OSO

CI/DV

SECRET

AAC-1622

18 APR 1968

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Miguel Angel DIAZ Isalgue (A 11 264 049)
DPOB: 14 February 1937, Matanzas, Cuba

Subject is a contract employee of this Agency engaged in activities in the furtherance of the national intelligence mission. He is scheduled to travel in the immediate future to Argentina and several other South American countries.

For operational reasons subject will be documented with a "Republic" of Nicaragua Passport Number 86781 and I-94, Arrival/Departure Record Card, in the name of Juan Hidalgo ELIZONDO Romano. The Form I-94 will be surrendered at the time of his departure from the United States.

It is requested subject be issued Form I-512, Reentry Document, under the name of Juan Hidalgo ELIZONDO Romano to permit his return to the United States. In this connection, there are enclosed two (2) photographs of subject.

Travel information will be submitted prior to subject's departure from the United States to permit control of Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record Card. Your Service will be advised in advance of subject's return to the United States.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED
Edmund X. Klipa

for Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Enclosure.

JM

OS/A[illegible]S/LW:es 15 April 1968

AB Memo No. 9362
12 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/6/Argentina

ATTENTION : Mr. Robert Fambrini 03

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Nicaraguan 11 Ordinary Passport in Alias for Use by AMSTALK-1 - AB Case No. 6937

REFERENCE : WH Memorandum dated 5 April 1963, same subject

1. Transmitted herewith for use 31 as outlined in Reference are the following two documents issued in alias for AMSTALK-1: Nicaraguan 11 Ordinary Passport No. 66701 and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Form I-94 (stapled in the passport, page 9). Also furnished herewith is a travel itinerary on which AMSTALK-1 should be briefed before he applies for the Argentine visa in New York.

2. In keeping with arrangements made by TSD/AB, the Medical Office is preparing, for direct delivery to WH/4, the International Vaccination Certificate in alias to be used with the above documents. This certificate should be checked for accuracy as to name, place and date of issue. It is also understood that AMSTALK-1 will have received a bona fide smallpox vaccination prior to departing from the U.S.

3. TSD/AB prepared 0 the above Nicaraguan 11 passport on the strength of information that BIOGENESIS would instruct an Argentine Consular post in the U.S. to place a visa in the passport. The document was prepared in one week from date of request because of operational urgency. The requirement specified use of a 10 Central American passport. To avoid placing a long, time-consuming simulated itinerary in the passport, it was given a recent issuance date, which necessitated issuance on the basis of exemplars issued nearly one year earlier (the most recent ones available). This short itinerary also would seem to make application at this time in the U.S. for an Argentine visa somewhat unusual. Since we are now informed that AMSTALK-1 is to obtain his Argentine visa without 0 BIOGENESIS assistance we wish to make the limitations of the documentation provided for this operation, and agreed to by Mr. Fambrini, 03 a matter of record. This confirms discussion with Mr. 03 Fambrini. A telephone check with the Argentine Embassy by WH indicated that a Nicaraguan transient in the U.S. can obtain an Argentine visa in this country. 11

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4. It is understood that the passport will be needed for about six months, following which it is to be returned to TSD/AB. Should further operational need exist for this document beyond that time, it must be borne in mind that the expiration date is 7 March 1959 and that annual revalidations are needed from that time forward. Any such revalidations would have to be entered by TSD/AB. Also, use of this passport for travel other than that originally intended (direct from U.S. to Argentina and back within six months) will require careful scrutiny by TSD/AB of the situation at the time of the intended future travel.

03 5. In accordance with verbal arrangements between Messrs. ([illegible] 03 and Phelan) please pass on to TSD/AB details of [illegible]-1's procurement of the Argentine visa and any other travel control events of significance in the use of this passport so that TSD/AB may gain from the experience of this agent in the use of this alias document.

6. Any further questions concerning this case should be referred to the undersigned or to Miss ([illegible]) on extension [illegible].

03

03
(Patrick J. Phelan)
TSD/AB

Attachment: 1 Envelope (h/w)
" (Nicaraguan) Passport,
Travel Itinerary

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - C/[illegible]/AAB (Info)

FEB 12 1 50 PM '58

5/N

SECRET

5 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD/AB

VIA : Office of Security/Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT : Request for Alias Documentation for AMOTIN-117

1. In accordance with preliminary conversations 03 between Mr. 03 Robert Fambrini, WH/4/A, and Miss Tina Japiks and Mr. 03 Patrick Phelan, TSD/AB, it is requested that an ordinary Nicaraguan passport be issued in the name of Juan Hidalgo ELIZONDO Romano for AMOTIN-117's use to travel from the United States to Argentina and return. In addition, it is requested that an Arrival-Departure Record (I&NS Form I-94) be prepared for Subject.

31

2. The requested passport should contain a forged United States multiple entry tourist visa and a cachet showing entry into the United States via Miami, Florida, in early April 1968. Inclusion of the forged United States visa in Subject's passport will 31 not afford him any privileges he does not already legally hold in his true identity. The passport should be valid through the end of 1968.

3. The following information should be included on the Form I-94 to be prepared for Subject:

10

a. Permanent address in Managua, Nicaragua: Calle 15 de Septiembre No. 403.

08

File

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

b. Anticipated address in the United States: Airport International Hotel, Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida.

4. The above requirements are being coordinated with the Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, Office of Security, who will be kept informed every time the passport is being used for travel from or to the United States prior to exit and reentry to the United States. The information will include flight number, date and place of departure and reentry. The Alien Affairs Staff has been requested to provide Form-612 in alias.

Thomas

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum SECRET

TO : File DATE: 5 April 1968

FROM : Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT: Miguel Angel DIAZ Isalgue
DPOB: 14 February 1937, Matanzas, Cuba
#253233(C)

03

1. (Robert Fambrini,) WH/4A, R.L. 1069, reported subject is scheduled for TDY travel to Argentine. He is a paroled Cuban and will be traveling in alias.

03

2. (Fambrini) is submitting a request to TSD for an (Argentine) Passport with B-2 visa imprinted. This document will be used for travel in South America.

3. An I-512, Reentry Document, will be requested from the Service to permit his reentry as parolee.

Louis Wienckowski

OS/AAS/LW:es 5 April 1968

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

FI/STC/SPB

15 OCT 1954

Chief, Special Security Division

C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your request dated 21 July 1954 for a recommendation as to whether an Operational Clearance should be granted to permit the Subject's use as an Agent in Costa Rica under unindicated cover.

16-15, 24

2. The attached information is furnished as an aid in determining whether or not the Subject should be used in the requested capacity.

3. In view of the fact that Subject has resided outside the United States since, at least, 1945 no field investigation was scheduled in this case.

4. This memorandum pertains only to this proposed assignment. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision in this case. The attached material should be returned to the writer in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only" when it has served its purpose.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

Attachment:
MZD dtd 28 September 1954

HASTY:mjd 14 Oct 1954

CC: FILE
CLOSED

SSD - CHIEF

OCT 12 11 53 AM '54

Chief
Chief
A/Chief
A. Dep.
Ad. & Trng.
Chie SRB
Cover
Chief
Contact Desk
Desk
Desk
CC Desk
Desk
Desk
Files

19 OCT 1954

SECRET

March 18,1961

~~APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM~~

To: Mr. Jack Kennedy
WH/4/Security

On March 18,1961 I spent hours with Court Wood and we discussed at great length his plans for the future and his participation in the activities of the FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE. Court seems to be extremely naive concerning my position with the Agency, and he is very open and frank with me in all areas. I am certain that if given enough time I can obtain a great deal of information on the backgrounds and activities of many of his associates.

While visiting his apartment I observed that both Court and his father are interested in a large number of Communist Publications. These included "U.S.S.R.", "The Worker", and many Prop. pamphlets that were obviously published in England. Court is an extreme Leftist in his political views and he believes fanatically in Castro's Cuba.

Mr. Wood mentioned to me that he and several of his friends are making plans to enter Cuba in June; illegally if necessary. He apparently wants to become a teacher for the Castro government and to make his permanent home there. Members of the "26th of July Movement" are in close contact with Court and they are envolved in this proposed move to Cuba. Court does have some money and he seems to be very serious this thing. Within the next few days I hope to be able to get some names and specific facts concerning their plans.

Please include this in my permanent record.

Michael Stratton
WH/4/Security
Ex. 2929

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1
SR

3/8/61

To: Mr. Jack Kennedy
WH/4/Security

Mr. Kennedy,

Several months ago I wrote you a letter concerning the Pro-Castro sentiments of Court Wood, son of Foster Wood, a local attorney. Since that time I've seen Court only once, on March 3,1961, and he appears to be actively engaged in the organization of a local chapter of the FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE. Complete with beard, Court has been meeting with"interested groups"and lecturing to students in severl eastern cities. He specifically mentioned Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. Apparently there are a number of students envolved in this activity; I met David Lacterman from George Mason High School in Falls Church, Va.and Walt.MacDonwald, a fellow student of Courts, and both are obviously active. NR NR.

What action, if any, should I take in regard to my relationship with Court and his father?

Please include this statement in my permanent record.

THANK YOU

[Michael Stratton]
WH/4/Reg.
Ex. 2929

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

80

1 Feb 1961

TO: C/EAB/OS
ATTN: Mr. Belt
VIA: WH/4/Security
ATTN: Mr. Kennedy

SUBJ: FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

1. At the request of Mr. Dave Phillips, C/WH/4/Propoganda, I spent the evening of January 6 with Court Wood, a student who has recently returned from a three week stay in Cuba under the sponsorship of the FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE.

2. Court and his father both have voiced very strong Pro-Castro sentiments and are extremely critical of our foreign policy in general.

3. I've been advised by Mr. Phillips to continue my relationship with Mr. Wood and I will keep your office informed of each subsequent visit.

4. This is forwarded to you as a matter of information and to become a permanent part of my security file.

Michael Stratton
WH/4/Registry
Extension 2929

2/1/61
M/R Subject stated this is operational with no specific goal in mind. [Stratton] and Wood went to high school together & although they travel in different circles they on occasion see each other. Wood [illegible] [Stratton] is a CIA employee beginning with the time [Stratton] filed application

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

5
38

RETYPED FROM UNREADABLE
COPY.

7 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION: Mr. Sam J. Papich

SUBJECT: COURT FOSTER WOOD
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Reference is made to a 25 March 1961 and a 6 July 1961 investigative report on captioned Subject which have previously been furnished to this Agency.

3, 8

[Michael Weimer Stratton, born 21 January 1941, Austin, Texas], who is a current Agency employee, has recently been interviewed concerning his knowledge of Court Foster Wood whom [Stratton] had 3 known since mutual attendance in high school. Attached is a detailed report of the information furnished by [Stratton] concerning his knowledge of Wood. 3

Since [Stratton] 3 personally has sufficient reason to question the activities of Wood and the activities of the associates of Wood, [Stratton] has been advised to discontinue any further contact with Wood. 3

It would be appreciated if your Bureau would furnish this Agency any additional information brought to your attention concerning Court Foster Wood and of particular interest would be any information received by your Bureau concerning past association of Court Foster Wood with [Michael Weimer Stratton]. 3

The above information is for your use only and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

R. L. Bannerman
Acting Director of Security

6
BR

Attachment:
As noted

OS/SRS/BLSolie:ect - 16 October 1961

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

17 OCT 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Mr. Sam J. Papich

SUBJECT : COURT FOSTER WOOD
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

1. Reference is made to a 23 March 1961 and a [illegible] 1961 [illegible] report on the above subject [illegible] previously [illegible] to this Agency.

3 2. [illegible] born [illegible] January 19[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

3. [illegible] personally [illegible] activities of Wood and the activities of [illegible] has been advised to discontinue any further contact with Wood.

4. It would be appreciated if your Bureau would furnish this Agency any additional information brought to your attention concerning Court Foster Wood and of particular interest would be any information received by your Bureau concerning past association of Court Foster Wood with [illegible] Stratton.

5. The above information is for your use only and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

R. L. Bannerman
Acting Director of Security

Attachment:
As noted

OS/SRS/RLSolie:ect - 16 October 1961

REF Reference Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RETYPED FROM UNREADABLE COPY.

SUBJECT: Court Foster Wood

Michael Weimer Stratton has recently advised that Court Foster Wood was a relatively close high school friend of Stratton during mutual attendance at George Mason High School, Falls Church, Virginia, during 1957 to 1959. Stratton described Wood as an average high school student who had no particular problems with the exception that there were domestic difficulties between the father and mother of Wood.

Stratton became acquainted with the parents of Wood and made occasional visits to their home during the above period of time. The father of Wood, Foster Wood, is an attorney who was then living in Falls Church. Some time ago the father and mother of Court Wood split up and Court Wood and father moved into an apartment on Columbia Road, Washington, D.C.

Stratton advised that after graduation from high school in June 1959 he lost any close contact with Wood who then started to attend George Mason College, where he seemed to have an interest in philosophy. Stratton started to attend a military school and Wood expressed extreme opposition to military schools.

Stratton married in 1960, which also helped to move Stratton somewhat out of the social circle of Wood. Stratton believed that for approximately a year, during 1959 to 1960, he did not actually see Wood but advised that after this period in which he did not see Wood he has had a number of contacts with Wood, many of which occurred during mutual attendance at the University of Virginia Extension School (night school) in early 1961. On one occasion Stratton attended a party at the apartment occupied by Wood and father at the invitation of Wood, and on this occasion came into contact with the "new set of friends" of Court Wood, whom Stratton described as being "beatnik types." Girls in attendance at the party, according to Stratton, appeared to be of the "street pickup" type.

After the above party Wood occasionally telephoned Stratton and about Christmas 1960 Wood called and stated that he was going to Cuba under the auspices of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Stratton called on Wood after the return of Wood from Cuba and at that time Wood lauded Castro very highly. The father of Wood was also present and Stratton obtained the impression that the father was also in sympathy with Castro. Stratton recalled that he again, at a later date, had visited the Wood apartment, this being an occasion when Wood had been visiting somewhere in Falls Church and contacted Stratton to ask Stratton to take Wood home. On this

18
BR

SECRET

[illegible] Court Foster Wood

[illegible] recently [illegible] Falls Church, Virginia [illegible]

3 [illegible]

3 [illegible] Wood [illegible] father [illegible] Court Wood [illegible] Washington, D. C.

[illegible] school [illegible]

[illegible] Wood [illegible] (night school) in early 1960 [illegible] the University of Virginia Extension School [illegible] party at the apartment occupied by [illegible] on one occasion [illegible] on this occasion [illegible] Court Wood [illegible] "beatnik" types. Girls in attendance at the party, according to [Stratton], appeared to be of the street-pickup type.

After the above party Wood occasionally telephoned [Stratton] and about [illegible] late 1960 Wood called and stated that he was going to Cuba under the auspices of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. 3 [Stratton] called on Wood after the return of Wood from Cuba and at this time Wood lauded Castro very highly. The father of Wood was also present and [Stratton] obtained the impression that the father was also in sympathy with Castro. [Stratton] recalled that he again, at a later date, had visited the Wood apartment, this being an occasion when Wood had been visiting somewhere in Falls Church and contacted [Stratton] to ask [Stratton] to this Wood home. On this

3 3

SECRET

18

BR

3

occasion Stratton stayed at the Wood apartment for approximately an hour, and advised that on this occasion he observed some Soviet propaganda pamphlets in the apartment and that these pamphlets had been printed in England. Stratton also observed a number of copies of the "USSR" [illegible] in the apartment.

3

Stratton also advised that, as previously indicated, he would meet Wood at the University of Virginia Extension School which was conducting night classes at the Washington and Lee High School. Both Wood and 3 Stratton were attending the night classes but were not attending mutual classes. Stratton recalled that on one of the occasions when he had met Wood while attending night classes Wood talked about going to Cuba or Mexico for permanent residence, and made some statement to the effect that he would be willing to renounce his United States citizenship.

[illegible] also [illegible] that Americans were afraid of the word "Communist" and were being misled by the newspapers. Wood had complained that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was unable to obtain proper publicity in the United States.

In June 1961 the [illegible] night classes were [illegible] and Stratton did not recall [illegible] with Wood [illegible] until late August or early September 1961. Wood [illegible] in regard to the purchase of a bicycle [illegible] through some mutual friends Stratton learned that Wood had married, [illegible] interested in meeting the wife of Wood, and Wood invited Stratton and wife to the Wood apartment for a party [illegible] he could meet his wife. Stratton 3 and wife, together with Gail and Thomas Varney, [illegible] Washington Boulevard, Arlington, who had also attended high school with Stratton, the wife of 3 Stratton, and Wood, accompanied Stratton 3 and wife to the above party. The other individuals at the party were of the "beatnik crowd" with several of the men wearing beards, and the girls appearing to be of the "street pick-up" type. In view of this Stratton 3 and wife only remained at the party for a very short time but did meet the wife of Wood. The wife of Wood had been attending Bryn Mawr College and was [illegible] to attend Bryn Mawr during the school year of 1960-1961. Stratton 3 learned that the [illegible] of the wife of Wood is still [illegible] but that they were [illegible] Wood.

03

[illegible] party, [illegible] attended at the apartment [illegible] Wood and [illegible]

03

[illegible] D. C. [illegible] Baker, who lives in Washington, D. C. and who [illegible]

11
BR

21

3

George Mason College with Wood. Stratton also recalled that at the first party which he attended and which was at the apartment of Wood and [illegible], David Eastman was also present. [illegible], according to Stratton, attended the George Mason/High School, or graduated from George Mason High School in June 1951.

3

Stratton recalled that the first name of the wife of Wood is [illegible] but did not know her maiden name. At the above party Wood indicated that he was moving to Philadelphia so that his wife could continue her college education, but Stratton at the time of the interview did not know whether Wood has actually moved to Philadelphia.

3 3

Wood, during conversation with Stratton, made the remark to Stratton that he, Wood, did not know if his wife was a Communist but she might be. Wood, however, did not [illegible] this [illegible] remark.

3 3

At the time of the above party Stratton understood that Wood was employed as [illegible]. Stratton could not recall [illegible] the [illegible] party [illegible] [illegible] Washington, D.C.

6
BR

occasions he visited [illegible] at the Wood apartment for [illegible] and [illegible] this occasion he [illegible] [illegible] that these [illegible]

[illegible] also advised that [illegible] previously indicated he would [illegible] to the University of Virginia [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] that he would [illegible]

During 1961 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 2 [illegible] George [illegible] [illegible] the party [illegible] individuals of the party were of the [illegible] [illegible] the girls appearing to be [illegible] type. In view of this Stratton had wife only [illegible] the party for a very short time but did meet the wife of Wood. The wife had [illegible] attending Bryn Mawr College [illegible] during the school year 1960-1961. Stratton believes that the [illegible] of the wife of Wood is still financing the education of the daughter but that they were strongly opposed to the marriage of the daughter to Wood.

In regard to specific associates of Wood, Stratton advised that at the party which he attended at the apartment occupied by Wood and wife 2 there were approximately thirty individuals present, a number of whom he casually met but whose names he did not recall. Stratton did recall that the following individuals were present: "Walt" McDonald, now believed living in Washington, D. C. but who had attended George Mason College with Wood; and "Charlie" [illegible], who lives in Washington, D. C. and who attended [illegible] College [illegible] according to [illegible]

[illegible] the first [illegible] of the life of [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

6
68

14-00000
104-10114-10163
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

1. Appraisal memo dtd 2/15/61 concerning [Michael Stratton
Limited info in memo concerning Fair Play for Cuba Committee and is
[redacted]
derived from polygraph and FBI
Sum and substance of poly info duplicated elsewhere and
retrieved — copies of pertinent memos appear above (2/1/61;
3/8/61; 3/18/61 and 10/17/61)

2. memo dtd 10/15/61 — Info re FPCC is duplicated in memo of 10/17/61 above

SECRET

13 December 1967

SUBJECT: BATISTA, Laureano
(See also DAVIS, Rudolph Richard)

ALLEGATION:

Rudolph Richard DAVIS, Cuban exile questioned by GARRISON's staff in connection with a training camp for Cubans at Lacombe, Louisiana told the FBI in May 1964 that Laureano BATISTA, sent him 19 men from Miami in response to a request from DAVIS in 1963. The men stayed at a home near Lacombe, Louisiana.

CIA CONNECTION:

Laureano BATISTA, Secretary of Military Affairs, Executive Committee, Movimiento Democratica Cristiano (MDC), Miami, was granted a Provisional Operational Approval on 30 December 1959 and an [Operational Approval on 20 February 1960 for use as a PP Agent, Havana, Cuba.]

SOURCE:

Memorandum No. 5, Enclosures 3 and 7.

OS INDICES RESULTS:

Subject, a 32 year old Cuban exile, was from a wealthy Cuban family and in Cuba he was a banker. He was granted a POA in December 1959 [and an OA in February 1960 for use as a PP agent in Havana, Cuba.] 24

A copy of a letter in Subject's file dated 22 November 1963 signed by Subject as Secretary for Military Affairs, Executive Committee, Movimiento Democrata Cristiano is addressed to Major General Bela K. KIRALY, President, Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation, Inc., and offered the services of the MDC in arranging meetings and discussions with other anti-CASTRO organizations and the Hungarian Freedom Fighters. 24 [The Hungarian Freedom Fighters were Agency sponsored] and Covert Action Staff was interested in information on the MDC before granting approval for contact between the two organizations.

DETAILS:

During an interview with the FBI in October 1963 in New York Rudolph Richard DAVIS advised that in January 1961 he was in New York where he served as coordinator between the MDC and the New York Police Department. DAVIS also said that some nineteen men had been sent from

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

3/ML

8.

Miami to New Orleans by Laureano BATISTA in response to a request by DAVIS for men to work in a lumber business with which he was connected in Guatemala. The men stayed at a home near Lacombe, Louisiana. When the FBI seized dynamite and other explosives nearby, the men became disgruntled and were unwilling to proceed to Guatemala. So the lumber company paid their fare back to Miami.

Some of the names of these men were as follows: Victor PANEQUE, Leodorino INTERIAN, Fernando FERNANDEZ, and fnu FORNES.

20 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LEOB/SRS

SUBJECT: December 1967 RAMPARTS Article Entitled "The CIA's 'Brown and Root Dimensions'"

BROWN and ROOT, Inc. - #405552

The following employees of BROWN and ROOT, Inc. were approved for contact use on the dates indicated:

WHITE, Ross - #405552-A	13 March 1950
TOWNE, Isaac Newton, Vice-President in Charge of Foreign Operations -#405552-B	11 December 1952 and 16 February 1953
WARNER, Merritt Allen, Chief Project Accountant - #405552-C	31 January 1957 and 11 April 1957
MONTGOMERY, Thomas Kenneth - #405552-D	15 February 1957 and 8 May 1957
BRADBERRY, Louis Dell - #405552-E	4 October 1957
WILLIAMS, Bobby Joe #C462165	14 July 1965
WAGNER, Richard Andrew, Civil Engineer - #453188 (A PSCA was issued for contact and assessment but he was not used - had a poor credit reputation)	3 August 1965
REMKES, Elmer Ray - #R464127	6 August 1965
MACKIN, John Gilman, Jr. - #449780	19 July 1966

BROWN FOUNDATION

There is no OS subject file on the BROWN Foundation but a reference file contains a memorandum dated 30 January 1967 to the Deputy Director, Plans

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

from Chief, Central Cover Group concerning the threat of exposure of Agency operations and concludes that the BROWN Foundation of Houston, Texas was one of the most vulnerable to exposure because public records reflect direct ties from Agency funding instruments identified by Congressman PATMAN in 1964 to legitimate foundations and Agency projects they have sponsored.

VERNON FUND - #69000-573

The VERNON Fund (HEMUDWEED) was created by the Agency in June 1958 as an ostensibly private philanthropic foundation legally incorporated under the laws of and with an office in the District of Columbia. It is used as a cover and funding mechanism for Porject DTLAMPREY. The objective of this project is the development of organizational and individual assets capable of strengthening the unity of non-Communist teachers and their organizations throughout the world. These objectives are carried out through the active support by the Agency of the international programs of the National Education Association (FBLINTERN) and the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession (JBLACEPOD) with which NEA is affiliated. In March 1967 because of exposure of the Vernon Fund in news media, the Board members were contacted advised as follows:

> Each Vernon Fund board member is being advised that he will receive a copy of the NEA and WCOTP letters regarding press allegations; he will acknowledge his membership on the Vernon Fund board if confronted with the fact; he will acknowledge that the Vernon Fund has supported WCOTP and that it made a few small grants to NEA; he will decline any further comment on the origin or operation of the Vernon Fund, on sources of Vernon Fund money, on whether the Vernon Fund received money from the Agency, or any other aspect of the Fund; he will be informed that the Vernon Fund records are not available to the public, short of subpoena; he will be asked to return any files or papers relating to the Vernon Fund; he will be told that Dr. CARR (William George CARR) has not yet had to identify any board members but will probably have to; he will not comment on the creation of the Vernon Fund and how initial contacts were made.

DICK, Albert Blake, III - #C178333 (Vernon Fund Board Member)

Albert Blake DICK, III, President, A. B. DICK Company, Chicago, Illinois, was granted a Covert Security Approval for his witting use in connection with the funding of Project TPFOUMART.

CARR, William George - #410038-B and #116332

William G. CARR was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 22 April 1955 for unwitting use under Project DTPILLAR and on 21 November 1967 he received a Covert Security Approval to permit his use under Project DTLAMPREY in his position as Secretary-General of the World Confederation of Organizations in the Teaching Profession.

REA, Bryce, Jr. - #149438

Bryce REA, Jr., attorney for the Vernon Fund, was granted a Covert Security Clearance for his use on a cleared attorneys' panel on

SECRET

15 November 1956 and on 19 September 1958 he received another covert security Clearance to permit his use as a Lessee Cut-Out in the procurement of domestic safehouses.

World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Professions
(Funded by the Vernon Fund)

I In April 1967 a discussion was held between an Agency representative and John THOMPSON and Ray SMYKE of the WCOTP (World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession) concerning future funding for WCOTP. Because of publicity concerning the funding of WCOTP by the Vernon Fund WCOTP leadership promised its membership that no further Vernon Fund money would be accepted until the status of the Vernon Fund was clarified. John THOMPSON felt that the best solution would be a one-time only infusion of money by sterile check into the WCOTP bank account to be backstopped by a letter from the attorney for the Vernon Fund, Bryce REA, who would attribute the money to members of the Vernon Fund Board who anonymously wished to provide WCOTP with sufficient funds to cover expenses until other sources could be found.

In May 1967 John THOMPSON of the WCOTP described to an Agency representative an interview he had with Mike MacMANUS of TIME magazine on 1 May 1967 who wanted to discuss the effects of newspaper publicity on WCOTP operations. MacMANUS was especially interested in any economies forced on WCOTP and a request for proof of the value of WCOTP operations to individual teachers. THOMPSON felt that MacMANUS did not succeed in gaining sufficient additional information from the interview to warrant writing his projected article.

SMYKE, Raymond Joseph - #160031

Raymond Joseph SMYKE was granted a Covert Security Approval on 18 July 1957 for use as a witting employee of Project HTFILACER and on 19 May 1962 he received a Covert Security Approval for his use by Project JELACKFOD as Coordinator for African Activities in Washington, D. C. SMYKE is administrative officer of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

THOMPSON, John

I It was not possible to identify a subject file on John THOMPSON employed by the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

CABOT FOUNDATION

OS indices were negative on the CABOT Foundation. (SEE Thomas D. CABOT)

American Friends of the Middle East O #340377 and #65300

American Friends of the Middle East (Project ZNTENDER) was created in May 1951 with the purpose of employing aggressive propaganda to promote

SECRET

the friendship of peoples of the Near and Middle East toward the United States and to combat Communism. It was incorporated as a voluntary, non-profit membership corporation under the laws of New York State. Dorothy THOMPSON, columnist, was selected as Chairman. In early 1967 AFME received a good deal of newspaper publicity concerning its Agency affiliation including articles in the Soviet press, TASS and USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Syria was the only country in which AFME is active that raised the question of the organization's continued existence in the light of allegations of Agency financial support; although, there were rumblings in Iraq.

San Jacinto Fund

There is no OS subject file on the San Jacinto Fund. The attached memorandum dated 30 January 1967 from Chief, Central Cover Group to Deputy Director, Plans - "Threat of Exposure of Agency Operations" - stated that RAMPARTS has expressed intense interest in the San Jacinto Fund, and its sources of income in particular, because it funds 5 HBEPITOME activities (youth affairs).

M. D. ANDERSON Foundation

There is no OS subject file on the M. D. ANDERSON Foundation but OS indices reflect a file on the M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute.

A study program to determine the effects in diverse Biological Systems resulting from exposure to high intensity coherent radiation was contracted with the M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute, University of Texas, Houston, Texas in October 1963 but as of 16 April 1964 there was a hold order against going ahead with the contract because of a question as to why the Agency should bear the whole cost of the contract which was to be for inter-departmental use. In May 1967 a note in the file indicated that M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute will be engaged in classified work for the Agency. There was no record of a clearance issued.

MARSHALL FOUNDATION

See attached memorandum dated 30 January 1967 from Chief, Central Cover Group to Deputy Director, Plans - "Threat of Exposure of Agency Operations". The MARSHALL Foundation of Houston, Texas is considered one of the most vulnerable to exposure.

A "New York Times" article for 26 February 1967 disclosed that the MARSHALL Foundation of Houston, Texas channeled funds from the Agency to the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University from 1961 to 1963.

(See Douglas B. MARSHALL)

BROWN, George Rufus - #94214

George Rufus BROWN, Executive Vice President of BROWN and ROOT, Inc., Houston, Texas, was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 23 October 1953 for use as a covert associate in the United States on Project LPCOIN. On 22 April 1965 he was granted a Provisional Covert Security Approval to permit contact and assessment of BROWN in connection with his possible use in serving on the Board of Directors for a proprietary being set up to support staff employees working in Udorn, Thailand, Laos and a Covert Security Approval for this use was issued on 18 June 1965. These clearances were cancelled 2 June 1967 as BROWN was not used.

BROWN, Herman - #95239

Herman BROWN, President and Director of BROWN and ROOT, Inc., Houston, Texas and President and Trustee of the BROWN Foundation, Houston, Texas, was granted a Covert Security Approval on 3 December 1953 for use as a Covert Associate in the U. S. under Project LPCOIN. This clearance was cancelled 15 February 1966.

CLARK, Ed

Negative

SHIVERS, Allan - #373051

Governor Allan SHIVERS of Texas was on the Advisory Board of FACTS FORUM NEWS in September 1955. He was listed as a trustee of the American Good Government Society in April 1965.

Allan SHIVERS, Governor of Texas, was a signer of a statement appearing in the NEW YORK TIMES for 20 October 1949 sponsored by the Iron Curtain Refugee Campaign of the International Rescue Committee. The IRC was described as basically good, humanitarian organization but many individuals of questionable loyalty have been associated with it.

A NEW YORK TIMES clipping for 12 February 1954 stated that Allan SHIVERS, Governor of Texas, said he planned to ask his Legislature to make membership in the Communist Party a death penalty offense. He was quoted as saying "In politics we often speak of bipartisan issues. I can think of nothing that should be more bipartisan than catching a Communist. There can be no valid issue between Americans over Communists. Americans are either pro-Communist or anti-Communist."

No clearance was requested or issued for SHIVERS. His file contains reference cards only.

MOODY, Dan

Negative

CABOT, Thomas D., Jr. - #430900

Thomas D. CABOT, Jr. was approved for contact use on 17 August 1961. At the time he was Vice President and Director of International Relations Texas Butadiene and Chemical Corporation. He was residing in Lausanne, Switzerland. Contact interest was for briefing him on Agency interests in economic and political developments in various European countries; chemical industrial development, etc. He was the subject of a favorable background investigation in 1952.

CABOT, Thomas Dudley - #87904

Thomas Dudley CABOT was granted a Covert Security Approval for use under Project LPCOIN. On 26 June 1959 he was issued a Covert Security Approval for use with Project UNGLANT. He was to serve as the President or Chairman of an American Committee whose objective was to foster Franco-American relations at the management level. CABOT had been approved for contact use in 1950 and received a clearance for use on the Executive Committee of M.I.T. in April 1954. A continuation of this clearance was granted on 29 October 1958.

SMITH, William A. - #76555

William A. SMITH was granted an Operational Clearance on 22 August 1952 for use as an agent in Latin America under commercial cover. On 14 January 1955 a Covert Security Clearance was issued to SMITH to permit his use as a Covert Associate in the United States under Project LPFUNNEL. At the time he had a number of business interests in Houston, Texas, i. e., William A. SMITH Construction Company, Houston, Texas; Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Citizens State Bank of Houston, etc.

WORTHAM, Gus

Negative

JAWORSKI, Leon - #168199

Leon JAWORSKI was granted a Covert Security Approval on 31 March 1958 in order that he could be made witting of Agency interest in the M. D. ANDERSON Foundation. His file contains a newspaper clipping from the WASHINGTON STAR for 3 December 1963 which concerns his appointment as special counsel for a Texas State Court of Inquiry into the assassination of President KENNEDY. He had achieved prominence when he was prosecutor at the Nuremburg War Trials. The article also stated that in 1960 JAWORSKI successfully represented Lyndon B. JOHNSON in a court challenge of Mr. JOHNSON's right to have his name appear on the general election ballot in Texas both as a candidate for Vice-President and for reelection to the U. S. Senate. Another item in U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT for 7 July 1964 reported that Houston lawyer, Leon JAWORSKI, who is close to Lyndon JOHNSON was being considered for the job of Attorney General.

SECRET

FREEMAN, John Henry - #157181

John Henry FREEMAN was granted a Covert Security Approval on 28 June 1957 to permit the utilization of his services under Project LPCOIN. At the time he was a partner in the large and leading law firm of FULBRIGHT, CROOKER, FREEMAN, BATES and JAWORSKI at Houston, Texas and was a trustee of the M. D. ANDERSON Medical Foundation.

COCKRELL, Ernest Dashiell, Jr. - #91571 and #E403051-A

Ernest Dashiell COCKRELL, Jr. was approved for contact use (CAUTION) on 10 June 1953 and was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 4 August 1953 for use in the U. S. under Project QKENCHANT. At the time he was President of two oil companies in Houston, Texas; Oil Production Maintenance, Inc. and Production Maintenance Company.

MARSHALL, Douglas B. - #173597

Douglas B. MARSHALL was granted a Covert Security Approval on 28 November 1958 in order that he could be made witting of Agency interest in the CULLEN Foundation. MARSHALL was Vice President of the Quintana Petroleum Corporation of Houston, Texas which is the holding company owned by the Hugh Roy CULLEN family. MARSHALL's wife, Margaret Cullen MARSHALL, is a daughter of Hugh Roy CULLEN.

HOBBY, Oveta Culp - #344001 and #241189

Oveta Culp HOBBY was granted a continuing liaison clearance on 7 April 1953 when she was Director of the Federal Security Agency. A Covert Security Approval was issued 18 July 1961 to permit her use under Project LPCORSET to aid in funding arrangements through the HOBBY Foundation of Houston, Texas of which she is President. On 26 October 1965 a Provisional Security Approval was granted to permit contact, assessment and briefing of Mrs. HOBBY as President of the HOBBY Foundation in connection with her possible utilization on an advisory committee of a broadcasting activity, University of the Air, directed at the students and intellectuals of Cuba. A Covert Security Approval was issued 31 March 1966 primarily to use the prestige of her name and position as cover for WH/Cuba activities and it was not expected that Mrs. HOBBY would take an active day by day role in the activities.

BUTLER, George A.

Negative

HOBBY, William Pettus, Jr. - #425337 and #275074

Oveta Culp HOBBY's son, William Pettus HOBBY, Jr., born 19 January 1932 at Houston, Texas, was security approved for contact use on 23 May 1960. At the time he was Associate Editor of the HOUSTON POST, Houston, Texas. On 29 June 1962 he was granted a Covert Security Approval to permit his witting use under Project CAWAGTAIL which was to be supported by the

SECRET

HOBBY Foundation. On 22 October 1965 a PCSA was issued to HOBBY for the same use in WH/Cuba activities as that outlined for his mother. This Provisional clearance was firmed into a Covert Security Approval on 4 February 1966 for the same use.

Sarah K. Hall

Atts:
Dec 67 RAMPARTS
Memo dtd 24 Nov 67 (SF-633-67
Memo dtd 30 Jan 67 to DD/P
NYT 2/26/67
NYT 2/19/67

SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

SECTION I. INSTRUCTIONS

Submit in duplicate. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "NA." Write "UNKNOWN" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates.

1. FULL NAME (last-first-middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	4. SOC SEC NO.
Flores, Daniel	09 4 Aug 1935	San Marcos Texas	460-48-6230 30

5. PRESENT STATUS (Single, widowed, divorced, or annulled) SPECIFY: Married 10

6. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
"NA"

SECTION II. SPOUSE

1. NAME OF SPOUSE (last-first-middle-maiden)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH (spouse)
Flores, Dorothy Arnett 06	09 31 Jan 1935	Portland, Oregon

4. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE	5. CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE (If naturalized, indicate date & place of naturalization & certificate no.)
18 November 1960 Lima, Peru 10	USA

6. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
"NA"

7. OCCUPATION	8. PRESENT EMPLOYER
Legal Secretary	Arnold and Porter 08

9. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State & Zip Code - Country if not U.S.)
08 1229 19th Street NW, Washington, D.C.

SECTION III. RESIDENCE (Since date of last PHS, if overseas residence indicate only city and country)

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST (number, street, city, state, country) Incl. Apt. #	INCLUSIVE DATES (month & year) FROM-	TO-
Guayaquil, Ecuador 10	May 1969	May 1971
Lima, Peru 10	Sept. 1971	Feb. 1974
X Vienna, Va 08 8151 Larkin La. ✓	Feb. 1974	

SECTION IV. CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS (Provide information for all children and dependents)

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	08 ADDRESS
06 Kendra Flores	Daughter	3 March 1971 Washington, D.c.	USA	8151 Larking La Vienna, Va.
06 Zola Marie Flores	Daughter	15 March 1974 Washington, D.c.	USA	"

(4)

FORM 12-70 444e OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(4/N

SECTION V. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

(1)

1. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* GUERRERO, Richard 06	2. RELATIONSHIP Nephew	3. DATE OF BIRTH UK	4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)* New Orleans, La
5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)* USA	6. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES Ansbach, Germany		
7. EMPLOYED BY U.S. Army	8. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT Periodic	9. DATE OF LAST CONTACT March 1974	

(2)

1. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*
5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
7. EMPLOYED BY	8. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	9. DATE OF LAST CONTACT	

(3)

1. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*
5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
7. EMPLOYED BY	8. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	9. DATE OF LAST CONTACT	

SECTION VI. PERSONAL DECLARATIONS

1. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW *(Other than for minor traffic violation)* SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS		YES *(explain below)*	X	NO
2. SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS, HAVE THERE BEEN ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION.		YES *(explain below)*	X	NO

3. NAME OF YOUR PRESENT IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR *(include Room Number and Extension)* Mr. Nestor Sanchez ✓ X-7451 RM 3D30

Hu

SECTION VII. PERSONS TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* Same as previous PHS.	2. RELATIONSHIP
3. HOME ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, ZIP Code)*	4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, ZIP Code)*- INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER & EXT.

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(spouse, mother, father ...)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE IDENTIFY THE PERSONS NOT TO BE NOTIFIED AND THE REASON.

SECTION VIII. ADDITIONAL REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

Vn✓

SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

1. NAME *(First-middle-last)* Daniel (nmn) Flores	2. MARITAL STATUS ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ OTHER
3. IF MARRIED 06 NAME OF SPOUSE *(First-middle(maiden)-last)* Dorothy A. Moran Flores	
PLACE OF MARRIAGE Lima, Peru 10	DATE OF MARRIAGE 18 November 1960

4. RESIDENCE *(Since date of last PHS, if overseas residence indicate only city & country)*

	SINCE *(Date)*	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY AND STATE
PRESENT	August 1961	2828 Connecticut Ave., N.W. 08	Washington, D.C. 20008
FROM	DATE TO DATE	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY AND STATE
FROM	DATE TO DATE	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY AND STATE

5. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW *(Other than for minor traffic violation)* SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS	☐ YES *(Explain below)*	☒ NO
6. SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS, HAVE THERE BEEN ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION	☐ YES *(Explain below)*	☒ NO

7. NAME OF YOUR PRESENT IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Harry T. Mahoney EXT. 7176 RM. # 3D54

8. ADDITIONAL REMARKS *(Use reverse if necessary)*

DATE 29 March 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Daniel Flores

FORM 4-61 444e

(4)

3/pv

14-00000

SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

1. NAME *(First-middle-last)* Daniel (nmn) Flores	2. MARITAL STATUS ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED	OTHER

3. IF MARRIED

NAME OF SPOUSE *(First-middle(maiden)-last)*
06 Dorothy A. Moran Flores

PLACE OF MARRIAGE Lima, Peru 10	DATE OF MARRIAGE 18 November 1960

4. RESIDENCE *(Since date of last PHS, if overseas residence indicate only city & country)*

PRESENT	SINCE *(Date)* August 1961	NUMBER AND STREET 08 2828 Connecticut Ave., N.W.	CITY AND STATE Washington, D.C. 20008
FROM	DATE TO DATE	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY AND STATE
FROM	DATE TO DATE	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY AND STATE

5. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW *(Other than for minor traffic violation)* SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS	☐ YES *(Explain below)*	☒ NO
6. SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS, HAVE THERE BEEN ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION	☐ YES *(Explain below)*	☒ NO

7. NAME OF YOUR PRESENT IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Harry T. Mahoney EXT. 7176 RM. # 3D54

8. ADDITIONAL REMARKS *(Use reverse if necessary)*

RETURN PHS AND ATTACHMENTS TO HEADQUARTERS

DATE 29 March 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Daniel Flores

FORM 4-61 444e (4)

3/PV

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT — (Appendix I)

Listed below are names of organizations identified by the Attorney General, under his responsibility pursuant to Executive Order 10450, dated 27 April 1953, to list the names of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which he designates as Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or as having adopted or having shown a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Each applicant or employee and spouse (if any) must review the following list of organizations for certification purposes, and sign on the last page.

- Abraham Lincoln Brigade
- Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
- Action Committee to Free Spain Now
- Alabama People's Educational Association (see Communist Political Association)
- American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
- American Branch of the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions
- American Christian Nationalist Party
- American Committee for European Workers' Relief (see Socialist Workers Party)
- American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born
- American Committee for Spanish Freedom
- American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidjan, Inc.
- American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
- American Committee to Survey Labor Conditions in Europe
- American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee for National Unity
- American Council on Soviet Relations
- American Croatian Congress
- American Jewish Labor Council
- American League Against War and Fascism
- American League for Peace and Democracy
- American National Labor Party
- American National Socialist League
- American National Socialist Party
- American Nationalist Party
- American Patriots, Inc.
- American Peace Crusade
- American Peace Mobilization
- American Poles for Peace
- American Polish Labor Council
- American Polish League
- American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the United American Spanish Aid Committee)
- American-Russian Fraternal Society
- American Russian Institute, New York, also known as the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union
- American Russian Institute, Philadelphia
- American Russian Institute of San Francisco
- American Russian Institute of Southern California, Los Angeles
- American Slav Congress
- American Women for Peace
- American Youth Congress
- American Youth for Democracy
- Armenian Progressive League of America
- Associated Klans of America
- Association of Georgia Klans
- Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
- Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party

- Baltimore Forum
- Benjamin Davis Freedom Committee
- Black Dragon Society
- Boston School for Marxist Studies, Boston, Massachusetts
- Bridges-Robertson-Schmidt Defense Committee
- Bulgarian American People's League of the United States of America

- California Emergency Defense Committee
- California Labor School, Inc., 321 Divisadero Street, San Francisco, California
- Carpatho-Russian People's Society
- Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent, also known as Central Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian Women
- Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai)
- Central Japanese Association of Southern California
- Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance (Deutsche-Amerikanische Einheitsfront)
- Cervantes Fraternal Society
- China Welfare Appeal, Inc.
- Chopin Cultural Center
- Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges
- Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)
- Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder
- Citizens Emergency Defense Conference
- Citizens Protective League
- Civil Liberties Sponsoring Committee of Pittsburgh
- Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations, including:
  - Civil Rights Congress for Texas
  - Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York
- Civil Rights Congress for Texas (see Civil Rights Congress)
- Columbians
- Comite Coordinador Pro Republica Espanola
- Comite Pro Derechos Civiles (See Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles)
- Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
- Committee for Constitutional and Political Freedom
- Committee for Nationalist Action
- Committee for Peace and Brotherhood Festival in Philadelphia
- Committee for the Defense of the Pittsburgh Six
- Committee for the Negro in the Arts
- Committee for the Protection of the Bill of Rights
- Committee for World Youth Friendship and Cultural Exchange
- Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland (See Congress Against Discrimination; Maryland Congress Against Discrimination; Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland)
- Committee to Aid the Fighting South
- Committee to Defend Marie Richardson
- Committee to Defend the Rights and Freedom of Pittsburgh's Political Prisoners
- Committee to Uphold the Bill of Rights
- Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas
- Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates

Communist Political Association, its subdivisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates, including:
  Alabama People's Educational Association
  Florida Press and Educational League
  Oklahoma League for Political Education
  People's Educational and Press Association of Texas
  Virginia League for People's Education
Congress Against Discrimination
  (See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Congress of American Revolutionary Writers
Congress of American Women
Congress of the Unemployed
Connecticut Committee to Aid Victims of the Smith Act
Connecticut State Youth Conference
Council for Jobs, Relief and Housing
Council for Pan-American Democracy
Council of Greek Americans
Council on African Affairs
Croatian Benevolent Fraternity

Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of Japan or Military Art Society of Japan)
Daily Worker Press Club
Daniels Defense Committee
Dante Alighieri Society (between 1935 and 1940)
Dennis Defense Committee
Detroit Youth Assembly

East Bay Peace Committee
Elsinore Progressive League
Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees (founding body of the North American Spanish Aid Committee)
Everybody's Committee to Outlaw War

Families of the Baltimore Smith Act Victims
Families of the Smith Act Victims
Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U. S. A., Inc. (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani, Federazione degli Stati Uniti d'America)
Finnish-American Mutual Aid Society
Florida Press and Educational League (see Communist Political Association)
Frederick Douglass Educational Center
Freedom Stage, Inc.
Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)
Friends of the Soviet Union

Garibaldi American Fraternal Society
George Washington Carver School, New York City
German-American Bund (Amerikadeutscher Volksbund)
German-American Republican League
German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische Berufsgemeinschaft)
Guardian Club

Harlem Trade Union Council
Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee
Heimusha Kai, also known as Nokubei Heieki Gimusha Kai, Zaibei Nihonjin, Heiyaku Gimusha Kai, and Zaibei Heimusha Kai (Japanese Residing in America Military Conscripts Association)
Hellenic-American Brotherhood
Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)
Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society — a group of Japanese War Veterans)
Hokubei Zaigo Shoke Dan (North American Reserve Officers Association)
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy
Hungarian Brotherhood

Idaho Pension Union
Independent Party (Seattle, Washington)
  (See Independent People's Party)
Independent People's Party
  (See Independent Party)
Industrial Workers of the World
International Labor Defense
International Workers Order, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates
Japanese Association of America
Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)
Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940
Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City
Jewish Culture Society
Jewish People's Committee
Jewish People's Fraternal Order
Jikyoku Iinkai (The Committee for the Crisis)
Johnson-Forest Group
  (See Johnsonites)
Johnsonites
  (See Johnson-Forest Group)
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
Joint Council of Progressive Italian-Americans, Inc.
Joseph Wedemeyer School of Social Science, St. Louis, Missouri

Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of Japanese Ancestry who have returned to America after studying in Japan)
Knights of the White Camellia
Ku Klux Klan
Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League (Kyffhaeuser Bund), Kyffhaeuser Fellowship (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)
Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)

Labor Council for Negro Rights
Labor Research Association, Inc.
Labor Youth League
League for Common Sense
League of American Writers
Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts)

Macedonian-American People's League
Mario Morgantini Circle
Maritime Labor Committee to Defend Al Lannon
Maryland Congress Against Discrimination
  (See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Massachusetts Committee for the Bill of Rights
Massachusetts Minute Women for Peace (not connected with the Minute Women of the U. S. A., Inc.)
Maurice Braverman Defense Committee
Michigan Civil Rights Federation
Michigan Council for Peace
Michigan School of Social Science

Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military Friends Group or Southern California War Veterans)
National Association of Mexican Americans (also known as Asociacion Nacional Mexico-Americana)
National Blue Star Mothers of America (not to be confused with the Blue Star Mothers of America organized in February 1942)
National Committee for Freedom of the Press
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners
National Committee to Win Amnesty for Smith Act Victims
National Committee to Win the Peace
National Conference on American Policy in China and the Far East (a Conference called by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy)
National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
National Labor Conference for Peace
National Negro Congress
National Negro Labor Council
Nationalist Action League

Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
Nature Friends of America (since 1935)
Negro Labor Victory Committee
New Committee for Publications
Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre)
North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy
North American Spanish Aid Committee
North Philadelphia Forum
Northwest Japanese Association

Ohio School of Social Sciences
Oklahoma Committee to Defend Political Prisoners
Oklahoma League for Political Education (see Communist Political Association)
Original Southern Klans, Incorporated

Pacific Northwest Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Palo Alto Peace Club
Partido del Pueblo of Panama (operating in the Canal Zone)
Peace Information Center
Peace Movement of Ethiopia
People's Drama, Inc.
People's Educational and Press Association of Texas (see Communist Political Association)
People's Educational Association (incorporated under name Los Angeles Educational Association, Inc.), also known as People's Educational Center, People's University, People's School
People's Institute of Applied Religion
Peoples Programs (Seattle, Washington)
People's Radio Foundation, Inc.
People's Rights Party
Philadelphia Labor Committee for Negro Rights
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art
Photo League (New York City)
Pittsburgh Arts Club
Political Prisoners' Welfare Committee
Polonia Society of the IWO
Progressive German-Americans, also known as Progressive German-Americans of Chicago
Proletarian Party of America
Protestant War Veterans of the United States, Inc.
Provisional Committee of Citizens for Peace, Southwest Area
Provisional Committee on Latin American Affairs
Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland
(See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles (CLC)
(See Comite Pro Derechos Civiles)
Puertorriquenos Unidos (Puerto Ricans United)

Quad City Committee for Peace
Queensbridge Tenants League

Revolutionary Workers League
Romanian-American Fraternal Society
Russian American Society, Inc.

Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association — composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War)
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts
Santa Barbara Peace Forum
Schappes Defense Committee
Schneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee
School of Jewish Studies, New York City
Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Serbian-American Fraternal Society
Serbian Vidovdan Council
Shinto Temples (limited to State Shinto abolished in 1945)
Silver Shirt Legion of America
Slavic Council of Southern California
Slovak Workers Society
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee for European Workers' Relief
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
Southern Negro Youth Congress
Suiko Sha (Reserve Officers Association, Los Angeles)
Syracuse Women for Peace

Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York
Trade Union Committee for Peace
(See Trade Unionists for Peace)
Trade Unionists for Peace
(See Trade Unionists for Peace)
Tri-State Negro Trade Union Council

Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union
Union of American Croatians
Union of New York Veterans
United American Spanish Aid Committee
United Committee of Jewish Societies and Landsmanschaft Federations, also known as Coordination Committee of Jewish Landsmanschaften and Fraternal Organizations
United Committee of South Slavic Americans
United Defense Council of Southern California
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization
United May Day Committee
United Negro and Allied Veterans of America

Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York (see Civil Rights Congress)
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Virginia League for People's Education (see Communist Political Association)
Voice of Freedom Committee

Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey
Washington Bookshop Association
Washington Committee for Democratic Action
Washington Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights
Washington Commonwealth Federation
Washington Pension Union
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation
Workers Alliance (since April 1936)

Yiddisher Kultur Farband
Young Communist League
Yugoslav-American Cooperative Home, Inc.
Yugoslav Seamen's Club, Inc.

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE ISSUED BY	**PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT**	THIS DATE *(Fill In)* September 6, 1961

INSTRUCTIONS

0PSEK/C OB

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* FLORES, Daniel	2. AGE 26	3. SEX ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

4. HEIGHT 5' 8"	5. WEIGHT 165 pds.	6. COLOR OF EYES Brown	7. COLOR OF HAIR Black	8. TYPE COMPLEXION Dark	9. TYPE BUILD Medium

10. SCARS *(Type and Location)* Right cheek, one-half inch scar; left upper lip, one-quarter inch scar; both received playing football

11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES
None

12. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)* 2828 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., #203 Washington 8, D. C. 08	13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)* AND PHONE NO. 08 2828 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. #203 - Washington 8, D.C.

14. CURRENT PHONE NO. 265-8322 08	15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT. None	16. LEGAL RESIDENCE *(State, Territory or Country)* Washington, District of Columbia

17. NICKNAMES Dan	18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED None

19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including Length of Time)* UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.
Personal acquaintances - twelve years

20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by What Authority)*.
NA

SECTION II POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING
Any phase of communications; administration; or personnel work.

2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT *(You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary)*. $ 4,250.00	3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT Immediately

4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL

☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS *(Check (X) each item applicable)*

☒ WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY *(Specify)*:

☒ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

I would be willing to travel within the United States provided said travel would not involve a permanent move whereby my legal residence would be changed. However, it is my wish to live overseas on a permanent basis.

FORM 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
11-58

(4)

JOY COONEY

49 ✓

3/RV

14-00000

SECTION III — CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH: August 4, 1935 09
2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): 10 San Marcos, Texas
3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): United States of America
4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):
5. DATE NATURALIZED: NA
6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.: NA
7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: NA
8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country): NA
9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☐ YES ☒ NO
10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY: NA
11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

NA

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☒ NO
13. GIVE PARTICULARS: NA
14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)? NA
15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.: NA
16. PORT OF ENTRY: NA
17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY: NA
18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue): NA
19. DATE VISA ISSUED: NA

SECTION IV — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☒ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: 08 San Marcos Elementary School
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): 10 San Marcos, Texas, U.S.A.
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): Sept., 1942 - May, 1951
4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: 08 San Marcos High School
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): San Marcos, Texas, U.S.A. 10
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): Sept., 1951 - May, 1955
4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: NA
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To):
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

6/2U

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

NA

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
NA				

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
Marine Security Guard School - Henderson Hall Hq. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D.C.	Security Guard Training	9/28/58	10/31/58	(5 wks)

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

Weapons Training in Marine Corps.

Acted as partisan during cold weather training at Bridgeport, California (Pickle Meadows - USMC).

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak: EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			HOW ACQUIRED: NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Spanish	X		X		X													X	

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

NA

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

NA

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

Could act as literal interpreter at almost any level.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION VI — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Bolivia	General knowledge	11/13/58 to 1/14/60		X			
Peru	General knowledge	1/14/60 to 11/20/60		X			
Chile		6/16/59 to 6/21/59			X		
Argentina		6/21/59 to 6/30/59			X		
Uruguay		6/30/59 to 7/2/59			X		

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

Marine Security Guard - American Embassy - Bolivia and Peru
Vacation - Chile; Argentina; Uruguay; Panama

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.

No. 174850 08 (SP-85575) Passport has been cancelled.

SECTION VII — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
45 wpm	None	☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING *(Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.)*.

Thermofax, mimeograph, switchboard

SECTION VIII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Football - good
Basketball - fair
Swimming - good
Reading - average
Contract Bridge - very good

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.

None to my knowledge

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO *(Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving)*, OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

None

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

UPW

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE *(Provide License Registry Number, if known).*

NA

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)* NA

7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)* NA

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(Do NOT submit copies unless requested).* INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).*

None

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

None

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

Have spoken in my father's church and other churches approximately 150 times. Met and assisted public in Embassies during my tour of duty with the Marine Security Guard.

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

None

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)* From 1949 to 1953

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Hillburn's Drug Store

08

3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* 10 San Marcos, Texas

4. KIND OF BUSINESS Drug Store

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR 06 Mr. William Hillburn

6. TITLE OF JOB Fountain attendant

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $100.00 PER month

8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Employee at soda counter

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

To participate in school events (football).

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

3/RN

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
July 1954-June 1955

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
(Diamond) Grocery Store 08

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
(South Guadalupe St. San Marcos,) Texas 08

4. KIND OF BUSINESS
Grocery Store

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Mr. (Ignacio Gonzales) 06

6. TITLE OF JOB
Butcher

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$30.00 PER Week

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Slaughtering and preparing meat for sale as well as actual selling.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING
To attend college ?

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
May, 1955 - September, 1956

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
(San Marcos) Baptist Academy 08

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
(San Marcos) 10 Texas

4. KIND OF BUSINESS
Private School

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Mr. (John Sparkman) 06

6. TITLE OF JOB
Painter's Assistant

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ 35.00 PER week

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Painted dormitories in the Academy

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING
To attend school

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
September, 1956 - July, 1957

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
(Economy) Department Stores 08

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
(San Marcos) 10 Texas

4. KIND OF BUSINESS
Clothing Store

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Mr. (Max Mendlovitz) 06

6. TITLE OF JOB
Sales Clerk

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ 30.00 PER week

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Assisted customers in selecting and buying goods.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING
To join the Marine Corps.

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
July 26, 1957 - July 25, 1961

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
United States Marine Corps

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia

4. KIND OF BUSINESS
Military

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Col. John Magruder

6. TITLE OF JOB
Marine Corps Museum Attendant

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ 180.00 PER month

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
Cpl. (E-4)

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

54

9/[illegible]

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

5

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Acted as guide to all visitors entering Museum, explaining Marine Corps history, etc. Also on several occasions acted as interpreter for visiting military personnel from Latin America.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING
Discharged

6

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
July 28, 1961 - August 30, 1961

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
08 Ohio Valley Engineering Company

3. ADDRESS (No., Street. City, State, Country)
S. Capitol and I Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS
Construction 08

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Mr. L. G. Bruce 06

6. TITLE OF JOB
Laborer

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ 2.17 PER hour

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Handyman for Company

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING
Temporary work while seeking permanent employment.

7

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3 ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

8. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN. 7 1/2 years

9. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☒ YES ☐ NO
HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

Honorably discharged from United States Marine Corps.

55

3/12

SECTION X **MILITARY SERVICE**

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 *(As amended)*	X	YES	2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION IV-A	3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. 41-65-35-187 08
		NO		
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON NA			5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS #65 - 101 1/2 E. San Antonio St., 08 10 Lockhart, Texas	

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE *(Specify):*
HAVE SERVED→			X						
NOW SERVING →									None

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S)
Personnel Administration

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY *(Past service)* 25 July, 1961			4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES *(Past and current service)* 4 years
5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY →	PAST SERVICE 26 July, 1957	CURRENT SERVICE	6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION
7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE →	PAST SERVICE Cpl. (E-4)	CURRENT SERVICE	8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER *(If now serving, provide current number)*
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	PAST SERVICE 0141 - Chief Clerk		CURRENT SERVICE
10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	PAST SERVICE None		CURRENT SERVICE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES *(Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)*

Past Service: Clerk - Maintained personnel service records.
2 years as Security Guard in the American Embassies in La Paz, Bolivia and Lima, Peru.

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

X	HONORABLE DISCHARGE		RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE		UNDUE HARDSHIPS
X	RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY		RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY		OTHER:
	RETIREMENT FOR AGE		RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY		

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

X	REGULAR	X	RESERVE *(Including the National and Air National Guard)*		OTHER *(Including AUS)*

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS?	X	YES	2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.?		YES	3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC?		YES
		NO		X	NO		X	NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

	ARMY	X	MARINE CORPS		NATIONAL GUARD		COAST GUARD		NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
	NAVY		AIR FORCE		AIR NAT'L. GUARD		ARMY ROTC		AIR FORCE ROTC	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE Cpl. (E-4)	6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK May, 1959	7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION January 20, 1962

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY		READY RESERVE		STANDBY *(Active)*	X	STANDBY *(Inactive)*		RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE 0141	10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE None

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

None

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT		YES	13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
	X	NO	
14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT?		YES	15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
	X	NO	

16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY	YEARS 7	MONTHS 7	17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT? Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington 25, D.C.

56

3/R/

SECTION XI - FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

Wife's income

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
The Bank of California, N.A.	330 S.W. 6th Avenue, Portland, Oregon
Union Trust Company	15 and H Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY. ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
General Motors Acceptance Corp.	1310 S.W. Yamhill Street, Portland 5, Oregon
Gulf Oil Corporation	P.O. Box 7245, Atlanta 9, Georgia
Ninde Furniture Company	917 Caroline Steet, Fredericksburg Virginia

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☒ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled)* SPECIFY: Married

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME (First) Dorothy (Middle) Anne 06 (Maiden) Arnett (Last) Flores

4. STATE ANY OTHER NAMES EVER USED 06

Dorothy A. Moran

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH ANY OF THESE NAMES WERE USED. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

5. DATE OF MARRIAGE November 14, 1960

6. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)* Lima, Peru 10

7. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*

American Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia 10

8. LIVING X YES ☐ NO

9. DATE OF DEATH

10. CAUSE OF DEATH

11. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address, if deceased)* 08

2828 Connecticut Ave., N.W., #203, Washington 8, D.C.

12. DATE OF BIRTH January 31, 1935

13. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)* Portland, Oregon

14. CITIZENSHIP United States of An.

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

5

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA
15. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA
16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)]: NA
17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA
19. OCCUPATION: Legal Secretary
20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers): Boykin and De Francis 08
Former: Department of State
21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 1000 16th St., N.W., 08 Suite 603, Washington 6, D.C.
22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.): None
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE:
24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED:
25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: Foreign Service - Jan., 1958 - Oct., 1960; Civil Service - April 1961 - June 1961

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
None				

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨
3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, step-parents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information, for Stepfather and/or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Jose S. Flores
2. LIVING: X YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH:
4. CAUSE OF DEATH:
5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: 06 None

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country): 501 S. Guadalupe Street, 08 San Marcos, Texas
7. DATE OF BIRTH: December 20, 1898
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Mier y Noriega, Nuevo Leon, Mexico
9. CITIZENSHIP: USA
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: May 24, 1918
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: Unknown
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)]: Mexican
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: 1957
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): Austin, Texas
15. OCCUPATION: Baptist Minister
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed): Mexican Baptist Church
17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED: 501 S. Guadalupe Street, 08 San Marcos, Texas
18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To): To my knowledge never served in any military service
19. BRANCH OF SERVICE:
20. COUNTRY:
21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN:

58

5/12

SECTION XV **MOTHER** (Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Flores, Agustina 06
2. LIVING: ☐ YES ☒ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: June 1939
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Unknown
5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: None to my knowledge

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED (No., Street, City, State, Country): S. Austin and Lee Streets, 08 San Marcos, Texas
7. DATE OF BIRTH: September 20, 1903
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Mier y Noriega, Nuevo Leon, Mexico
9. CITIZENSHIP: Mexican
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.- DATE OF ENTRY: Unknown
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: Unknown
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA
15. OCCUPATION: Housewife
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed): NA
17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED: NA
18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To): NA
19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: NA
20. COUNTRY: NA
21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: NA

SECTION XVI **BROTHERS AND SISTERS** (Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)

	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	5. LIVING	6. AGE
1	Patlan, Frances 06	Sister	U.S. of America	631 S. River St., 08 Seguin, Texas	☒ YES ☐ NO	41
2	Renteria, Rachel 06	Sister	U.S. of America	311 Lambert St., 08 San Antonio, Texas	☒ YES ☐ NO	39
3	Black, Rebecca Mary 06	Sister	U.S. of America	501 S. Guadalupe St., 08 San Marcos, Texas	☒ YES ☐ NO	34
4	Flores, Samuel 06	Brother	U.S. of America	Rosemary and Chapman Streets, 08 Seguin, Texas	☒ YES ☐ NO	32
5	Flores, Joe 06	Brother	U.S. of America	Route 2, Box 320, San Marcos, 08 Texas	☒ YES ☐ NO	29
6	Bruce, 06 Esther	Sister	U.S. of America	7252 Exmore St., 08 Springfield, Virginia	☒ YES ☐ NO	27
7	Flores, Eleazar 06	Brother	U.S. of America	Deceased	☐ YES ☒ NO	7
8	Flores, Juan 06	Brother	U.S. of America	Deceased	☐ YES ☒ NO	NA

16/RV

SECTION XVII FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* Arnett, Carl Raymond 06	2. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO	3. DATE OF DEATH	4. CAUSE OF DEATH

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: Ray

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* 08: 4505 Washington St., Milwaukie, 22, Oregon

7. DATE OF BIRTH January 2, 1909	8. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)* Minot, North Dakota	9. CITIZENSHIP U.S. of America
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY NA	11. PLACE OF ENTRY NA	
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *[Country(ies)]* NA	13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED NA	14. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)* NA
15. OCCUPATION Warehouse Foreman	16. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed)* Rudy Wilhelm Inc., Portland, Oregon	

SECTION XVIII MOTHER-IN-LAW

08

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* Tompkins, Alma Dean 06	2. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO	3. DATE OF DEATH	4. CAUSE OF DEATH

5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: 06 Alma Dean Arnett

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* 08: 13920 S.E. Portland View Place, Portland 36, Oregon

7. DATE OF BIRTH May 4, 1910	8. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)* Portland, Oregon	9. CITIZENSHIP U.S. of America
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY NA	11. PLACE OF ENTRY NA	
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *[Country(ies)]* NA	13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED NA	14. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)* NA
15. OCCUPATION Homemaker	16. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed)*	

SECTION XIX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

2	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* None to my knowledge	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES	5. EMPLOYED BY	
	6. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES	5. EMPLOYED BY	
	6. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES	5. EMPLOYED BY	
	6. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
5	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES	5. EMPLOYED BY	
	6. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

SECTION XIX CONTINUED TO PAGE 13

6IPN

SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE

NA

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Arnett, Raymond Wesley 06	2. RELATIONSHIP Bro-in-law	3. AGE 24	4. CITIZENSHIP U.S. of America
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) U.S. Army Depot, Pueblo, Colorado	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
2	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Miller, Claude 06	2. RELATIONSHIP 2nd Cousin	3. AGE Unk	4. CITIZENSHIP U.S. of America
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Air Station, Quantico, Virginia	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known) Aviation - 1st Sgt., USMC		
3	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S., WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State) 08	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Mr. and Mrs. Jose Espinosa 06	S. Guadalupe St., San Marcos, Texas 08	San Marcos, Texas 08
Rev. Carlos Paredes 06	First Baptist Church Austin, Texas	Austin, Texas
Mr. Thaxter L. Goodell 06	2430 E. St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 08	3742 Jason Avenue, 08 Alexandria, Virginia
Mr. Alfred Beaty 06	Dept. of Agriculture	1711 Massachutes Ave. 08 Washington, D.C.
Cpl. Michael Hennessy 06	The American Embassy, Lima, Peru	172 Bartolome Herrera 08 Miraflores, Lima, Peru

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS, IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY - NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Mr. Howard Wickland Jr. 06	Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.	Hilltop House 08 Euclid St., Wash., D.C.
Mr. Max Pine 06		3571 Section Road, 08 Cincinnati 36, Ohio
Miss Mary Ann Newman 06	Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.	Allen Lee Hotel, 23rd & 08 E Sts., N.W., Wash., D.C.
Miss Ruth F. Stewart 06		601 Cascade, 08 Boulder, Colorado
Mrs. Bea Lux 06		173 Bartolome Herrera, 08 Miraflores, Lima, Peru

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Miss Nancy Payne 06		402 Hanover St., 08 Fredericksburg, Virginia
Lt. and Mrs. William Faulman 06		c/o Lee Pelts, 08 Route 1, Kennett, Mo.

28/W

SECTION XXII CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind *(Include membership in, or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country)* to which you belong or have belonged.

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
Spanish Club 10	08 San Marcos High School, San Marcos Texas	Sept., 1954	May 1955
Distributive Education Club	08 San Marcos High School, San Marcos, 10 Texas	Sept., 1954	May 1955
Baptist Youth Organization	First Mexican Baptist 08 Church, San Marcos, Tex. 10	Jan., 1957	May 1957

SECTION XXIII RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	INCLUSIVE DATES	
	FROM	TO
08 4736 Kenmore Ave., #201 Alexandria, Virginia	March, 1961	Aug., 1961
08 402 Hanover St. Fredericksburg, Virginia	Dec., 1960	Mar., 1961
08 172 Bartolome Herrera, Miraflores Lima, Peru	Jan., 1960	Nov., 1960
USIS Building, 3rd & 4th Floors, Calle Potosi, La Paz, Bolivia	Nov., 1958	Jan., 1960
"F" Company, Headquarters Marine Corps, Henderson Hall, Washington 25, D.C.	Sept., 1958	Nov., 1958
Cold Weather Training Battalion, Pickle Meadows, Bridgeport, California	Jan., 1958	Aug., 1958
Marine Corps Base, 29 Palms, California	Dec., 1957	Jan., 1958
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California	July., 1957	Nov., 1957
Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California	Nov., 1957	Dec., 1957
08 501 S. Guadalupe St., San Marcos Texas	May 1956	July, 1957
08 Howard Payne College, Brownwood, Texas	Sept., 1955	May, 1956
08 501 S. Guadalupe St., San Marcos, Texas	1946	Sept., 1955

62

12/PJ

SECTION XXIV ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF; OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, EXPLAIN

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940

I served 4 years in the United States Marine Corps.

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

An investigation (I do not know by whom) was conducted prior to my departure for Bolivia where I was attached to the American Embassy. This investigation took place during August and September of 1958.

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS **If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.**

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A *MINOR* TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XXV PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(First-Middle-Last)*: Mrs. Daniel Flores

2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*: 2828 Conn. Ave., #203, Washington 8, D.C. 08

4. HOME PHONE NO.: 265-8322 08

5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:
Boykin and De Francis 08
1000 16th St., Suite 603, Washington 6, D.C.

6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT.: 08 DI 7-5444

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE. 06

In all cases wife: Relative, Mrs. Vicente Patlan, 631 S. River St. 08
10 Seguin, Texas Telephone Fr 9-1087 08

8/m

SECTION XXVI CERTIFICATION

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES September 8, 1961	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Daniel Flores
3. SIGNED AT (City and State) Washington, District of Columbia	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Nancylee Cooley

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates, sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

MARITAL STATUS: Item #4, Section XII 06
September 1, 1956 to October 6, 1956. Married to Lt. Col. Joseph G. Moran in Portland, Oregon, by Circuit Court Judge. Used name of Moran until November 14, 1960, when changed to Flores. 06

FATHER-IN-LAW: Item #5, Section XVII
Short name for Raymond

GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL: Item #1, Section VI

Argentina	2 July 1959 to 3 July 1959	Travel
Panama	10 November 1958 to 13 November 1958	Travel

SEE ATTACHED SHEET FOR PERTINENT INFORMATION RELATIVE TO STEP-MOTHER.

Signed at Washington, D. C., this 8th day of September, 1961.

Daniel Flores
Daniel Flores

44

2/FV

ATTACHMENT TO FORM NO. 444 - PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Section XV - STEPMOTHER

06

Full name: Concepcion R. Flores
Living: Yes
Other Names She Has Used: None to my knowledge
Current Address: 501 S. Guadalupe Street, San Marcos, Texas
Date of Birth: December 8, 1914 08
Place of Birth: Mexico
Citizenship: Mexican
If Born Outside U.S. - Date of Entry: December 8, 1922
Place of Entry: Unknown
Former Citizenships: None
Occupation: Homemaker and Missionary 08
Present Employer: Mexican Baptist Church, SanMarcos, Texas
Never served in Military or other Government service to my knowledge.

This paper is attached to and hereby made a part of Form No. 444.

Daniel Flores
Daniel Flores

65

3/pd

20 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LEOD/SRS

SUBJECT: December 1967 RAMPARTS Article Entitled "The CIA's 'Brown and Root Dimensions'"

BROWN and ROOT, Inc. - #405552

The following employees of BROWN and ROOT, Inc. were approved for contact use on the dates indicated:

WHITE, Ross - #405552-A	13 March 1950
TOWNE, Isaac Newton, Vice-President in Charge of Foreign Operations -#405552-B	11 December 1952 and 16 February 1953
WARNER, Merritt Allen, Chief Project Accountant - #405552-C	31 January 1957 and 11 April 1957
MONTGOMERY, Thomas Kenneth - #405552-D	15 February 1957 and 8 May 1957
BRADBERRY, Louis Bell - #405552-E	4 October 1957
WILLIAMS, Bobby Joe #C462165	14 July 1965
WAGNER, Richard Andrew, Civil Engineer - #453188 (A PSCA was issued for contact and assessment but he was not used - had a poor credit reputation)	3 August 1965
REMKES, Elmer Ray - #E464127	6 August 1965
MACKIN, John Gilman, Jr. - #449780	19 July 1966

BROWN FOUNDATION

There is no OS subject file on the BROWN Foundation but a reference file contains a memorandum dated 30 January 1967 to the Deputy Director, Plans

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

from Chief, Central Cover Group concerning the threat of exposure of Agency operations and concludes that the BROWN Foundation of Houston, Texas was one of the most vulnerable to exposure because public records reflect direct ties from Agency funding instruments identified by Congressman PATMAN in 1964 to legitimate foundations and Agency projects they have sponsored.

VERNON FUND - #69000-573

The VERNON Fund (HBMUDWEED) was created by the Agency in June 1958 as an ostensibly private philanthropic foundation legally incorporated under the laws of and with an office in the District of Columbia. It is used as a cover and funding mechanism for Porject DTLAMPREY. The objective of this project is the development of organizational and individual assets capable of strengthening the unity of non-Communist teachers and their organizations throughout the world. These objectives are carried out through the active support by the Agency of the international programs of the National Education Association (FBLINTERN) and the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession (JBLACEPOD) with which NEA is affiliated. In March 1967 because of exposure of the Vernon Fund in news media, the Board members were contacted advised as follows:

> Each Vernon Fund board member is being advised that he will receive a copy of the NEA and WCOTP letters regarding press allegations; he will acknowledge his membership on the Vernon Fund board if confronted with the fact; he will acknowledge that the Vernon Fund has supported WCOTP and that it made a few small grants to NEA; he will decline any further comment on the origin or operation of the Vernon Fund, on sources of Vernon Fund money, on whether the Vernon Fund received money from the Agency, or any other aspect of the Fund; he will be informed that the Vernon Fund records are not available to the public, short of subpoena; he will be asked to return any files or papers relating to the Vernon Fund; he will be told that Dr. CARR (William George CARR) has not yet had to identify any board members but will probably have to; he will not comment on the creation of the Vernon Fund and how initial contacts were made.

DICK, Albert Blake, III - #C178333 (Vernon Fund Board Member)

Albert Blake DICK, III, President, A. B. DICK Company, Chicago, Illinois, was granted a Covert Security Approval for his witting use in connection with the funding of Project TPFOUMART.

CARR, William George - #410038-B and #116332

William G. CARR was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 22 April 1955 for unwitting use under Project DTPILLAR and on 21 November 1967 he received a Covert Security Approval to permit his use under Project DTLAMPREY in his position as Secretary-General of the World Confederation of Organizations in the Teaching Profession.

NEA, Bryce, Jr. - #149438

Bryce NEA, Jr., attorney for the Vernon Fund, was granted a Covert Security Clearance for his use on a cleared attorneys' panel on

SECRET

15 November 1956 and on 19 September 1958 he received another covert security Clearance to permit his use as a Lessee Cut-Out in the procurement of domestic safehouses.

World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Professions
(Funded by the Vernon Fund)

I In April 1967 a discussion was held between an Agency representative and John THOMPSON and Ray SMYKE of the WCOTP (World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession) concerning future funding for WCOTP. Because of publicity concerning the funding of WCOTP by the Vernon Fund, WCOTP leadership promised its membership that no further Vernon Fund money would be accepted until the status of the Vernon Fund was clarified. John THOMPSON felt that the best solution would be a one-time only infusion of money by sterile check into the WCOTP bank account to be backstopped by a letter from the attorney for the Vernon Fund, Bryce REA, who would attribute the money to members of the Vernon Fund Board who anonymously wished to provide WCOTP with sufficient funds to cover expenses until other sources could be found.

In May 1967 John THOMPSON of the WCOTP described to an Agency representative an interview he had with Mike MacMANUS of TIME magazine on 1 May 1967 who wanted to discuss the effects of newspaper publicity on WCOTP operations. MacMANUS was especially interested in any economies forced on WCOTP and a request for proof of the value of WCOTP operations to individual teachers. THOMPSON felt that MacMANUS did not succeed in gaining sufficient additional information from the interview to warrant writing his projected article.

SMYKE, Raymond Joseph - #150031

Raymond Joseph SMYKE was granted a Covert Security Approval on 10 July 1957 for use as a witting employee of Project HTVILACER and on 19 May 1962 he received a Covert Security Approval for his use by Project JBLACKPOD as Coordinator for African Activities in Washington, D. C. SMYKE is administrative officer of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

THOMPSON, John

I It was not possible to identify a subject file on John THOMPSON employed by the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

CABOT FOUNDATION

OS indices were negative on the CABOT Foundation. (SEE Thomas D. CABOT)

American Friends of the Middle East O #340377 and #65300

American Friends of the Middle East (Project EXTINDER) was created in May 1951 with the purpose of employing aggressive propaganda to promote

SECRET

the friendship of peoples of the Near and Middle East toward the United States and to combat Communism. It was incorporated as a voluntary, non-profit membership corporation under the laws of New York State. Dotothy THOMPSON, columnist, was selected as Chairman. In early 1967 AFME received a good deal of newspaper publicity concerning its Agency affiliation including articles in the Soviet press, TASS and USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Syria was the only country in which AFME is active that raised the question of the organization's continue d existence in the light of allegations of Agency financial support; although, there were rumblings in Iraq.

San Jacinto Fund

There is no OS subject file on the San Jacinto Fund. The attached memorandum dated 30 January 1967 from Chief, Central Cover Group to Deputy Director, Plans - "Threat of Exposure of Agency Operations" - stated that RAMPARTS has expressed intense interest in the San Jacinto Fund, and its sources of income in particular, because it funds 5 HBEPITOME activities (youth affairs).

M. D. ANDERSON Foundation

There is no OS subject file on the M. D. ANDERSON Foundation but OS indices reflect a file on the M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute.

A study program to determine the effects in diverse Biological Systems resulting from exposure to high intensity coherent radiation was contracted with the M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute, University of Texas, Houston, Texas in October 1963 but as of 16 April 1964 there was a hold order against going ahead with the contract because of a question as to why the Agency should bear the whole cost of the contract which was to be for inter-departmental use. In May 1967 a note in the file indicated that M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute will be engaged in classified work for the Agency. There was no record of a clearance issued.

MARSHALL FOUNDATION

See attached memorandum dated 30 January 1967 from Chief, Central Cover Group to Deputy Director, Plans - "Threat of Exposure of Agency Operations". The MARSHALL Foundation of Houston, Texas is considered one of the most vulnerable to exposure.

A "New York Times" article for 25 February 1967 disclosed that the MARSHALL Foundation of Houston, Texas channeled funds from the Agency to the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University from 1961 to 1963.

(See Douglas B. MARSHALL)

SECRET

BROWN, George Rufus - #94214

George Rufus BROWN, Executive Vice President of BROWN and ROOT, Inc., Houston, Texas, was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 23 October 1953 for use as a covert associate in the United States on Project LPCOIN. On 22 April 1965 he was granted a Provisional Covert Security Approval to permit contact and assessment of BROWN in connection with his possible use in serving on the Board of Directors for a proprietary being set up to support staff employees working in Udorn, Thailand, Laos and a Covert Security Approval for this use was issued on 18 June 1965. These clearances were cancelled 2 June 1967 as BROWN was not used.

BROWN, Herman - #95239

Herman BROWN, President and Director of BROWN and ROOT, Inc., Houston, Texas and President and Trustee of the BROWN Foundation, Houston, Texas, was granted a Covert Security Approval on 3 December 1953 for use as a Covert Associate in the U. S. under Project LPCOIN. This clearance was cancelled 15 February 1966.

CLARK, Ed

Negative

SHIVERS, Allan - #373051

Governor Allan SHIVERS of Texas was on the Advisory Board of FACTS FORUM NEWS in September 1955. He was listed as a trustee of the American Good Government Society in April 1965.

Allan SHIVERS, Governor of Texas, was a signer of a statement appearing in the NEW YORK TIMES for 20 October 1949 sponsored by the Iron Curtain Refugee Campaign of the International Rescue Committee. The IRC was described as basically good, humanitarian organization but many individuals of questionable loyalty have been associated with it.

A NEW YORK TIMES clipping for 12 February 1954 stated that Allan SHIVERS, Governor of Texas, said he planned to ask his Legislature to make membership in the Communist Party a death penalty offense. He was quoted as saying "In politics we often speak of bipartisan issues. I can think of nothing that should be more bipartisan than catching a Communist. There can be no valid issue between Americans over Communists. Americans are either pro-Communist or anti-Communist."

No clearance was requested or issued for SHIVERS. His file contains reference cards only.

MOODY, Dan

Negative

SECRET

CABOT, Thomas D., Jr. - #430906

Thomas D. CABOT, Jr. was approved for contact use on 17 August 1961. At the time he was Vice President and Director of International Relations Texas Butadiene and Chemical Corporation. He was residing in Lausanne, Switzerland. Contact interest was for briefing him on Agency interests in economic and political developments in various European countries; chemical industrial development, etc. He was the subject of a favorable background investigation in 1952.

CABOT, Thomas Dudley - #87904

Thomas Dudley CABOT was granted a Covert Security Approval for use under Project LPCOIN. On 26 June 1959 he was issued a Covert Security Approval for use with Project UUGLANT. He was to serve as the President or Chairman of an American Committee whose objective was to foster Franco-American relations at the management level. CABOT had been approved for contact use in 1950 and received a clearance for use on the Executive Committee of M.I.T. in April 1954. A continuation of this clearance was granted on 29 October 1958.

SMITH, William A. - #76555

William A. SMITH was granted an Operational Clearance on 22 August 1952 for use as an agent in Latin America under commercial cover. On 14 January 1955 a Covert Security Clearance was issued to SMITH to permit his use as a Covert Associate in the United States under Project LPFUNNEL. At the time he had a number of business interests in Houston, Texas, i. e., William A. SMITH Construction Company, Houston, Texas; Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Citizens State Bank of Houston, etc.

NORTHAM, Gus

Negative

JAWORSKI, Leon - #168199

Leon JAWORSKI was granted a Covert Security Approval on 31 March 1958 in order that he could be made witting of Agency interest in the M. D. ANDERSON Foundation. His file contains a newspaper clipping from the WASHINGTON STAR for 3 December 1963 which concerns his appointment as special counsel for a Texas State Court of Inquiry into the assassination of President KENNEDY. He had achieved prominence when he was prosecutor at the Nuremburg War Trials. The article also stated that in 1960 JAWORSKI successfully represented Lyndon B. JOHNSON in a court challenge of Mr. JOHNSON's right to have his name appear on the general election ballot in Texas both as a candidate for Vice-President and for reelection to the U. S. Senate. Another item in U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT for 7 July 1964 reported that Houston lawyer, Leon JAWORSKI, who is close to Lyndon JOHNSON was being considered for the job of Attorney General.

SECRET

FREEMAN, John Henry - #157181

John Henry FREEMAN was granted a Covert Security Approval on 28 June 1957 to permit the utilization of his services under Project LPCOIN. At the time he was a partner in the large and leading law firm of FULBRIGHT, CROOKER, FREEMAN, BATES and JAWORSKI at Houston, Texas and was a trustee of the M. D. ANDERSON Medical Foundation.

COCKRELL, Ernest Dashiell, Jr. - #91571 and #E409051-A

Ernest Dashiell COCKRELL, Jr. was approved for contact use(CAUTION) on 10 June 1953 and was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 4 August 1953 for use in the U. S. under Project QKENCHANT. At the time he was President of two oil companies in Houston, Texas; Oil Production Maintenance, Inc. and Production Maintenance Company.

MARSHALL, Douglas B. - #173597

Douglas B. MARSHALL was granted a Covert Security Approval on 28 November 1958 in order that he could be made witting of Agency interest in the CULLEN Foundation. MARSHALL was Vice President of the Quintana Petroleum Corporation of Houston, Texas which is the holding company owned by the Hugh Roy CULLEN family. MARSHALL's wife, Margaret Cullen MARSHALL, is a daughter of Hugh Roy CULLEN.

HOBBY, Oveta Culp - #344001 and #241189

Oveta Culp HOBBY was granted a continuing liaison clearance on 7 April 1953 when she was Director of the Federal Security Agency. A Covert Security Approval was issued 18 July 1961 to permit her use under Project LPCORSET to aid in funding arrangements through the HOBBY Foundation of Houston, Texas of which she is President. On 26 October 1965 a Provisional Security Approval was granted to permit contact, assessment and briefing of Mrs. HOBBY as President of the HOBBY Foundation in connection with her possible utilization on an advisory committee of a broadcasting activity, University of the Air, directed at the students and intellectuals of Cuba. A Covert Security Approval was issued 31 March 1966 primarily to use the prestige of her name and position as cover for WH/Cuba activities and it was not expected that Mrs. HOBBY would take an active day by day role in the activities.

BUTLER, George A.

Negative

HOBBY, William Pettus, Jr. - #425337 and #275074

Oveta Culp HOBBY's son, William Pettus HOBBY, Jr., born 19 January 1932 at Houston, Texas, was security approved for contact use on 23 May 1960. At the time he was Associate Editor of the HOUSTON POST, Houston, Texas. On 29 June 1962 he was granted a Covert Security Approval to permit his witting use under Project CAWAGTAIL which was to be supported by the

SECRET

HOBBY Foundation. On 22 October 1965 a PCSA was issued to HOBBY for the same use in WH/Cuba activities as that outlined for his mother. This Provisional clearance was firmed into a Covert Security Approval on 4 February 1966 for the same use.

Sarah K. Hall

Atts:
- Dec 67 RAMPARTS
- Memo dtd 24 Nov 67 (SF-633-67
- Memo dtd 30 Jan 67 to DD/P
- NYT 2/26/67
- NYT 2/19/67

SECRET

SECRET

```
CTL NC 3019    REQUESTOR HALL         OFFICE SRS                       06AUG69

N3019 REDMONT,BERNARD

  REDMONT,BERNARD                                          OR   68   C481654
  /Y M   /D LST 30JAN68 P2 RAMPARTS  /W CHG TO SRS
  /Z 2165410
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  REDMONT,BERNARD                                          OR   66   M350808
  /D BOOK 07MAR66 P462 KAGAN,NICHOLAS
  /Z 2013209
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  REDMONT,BERNARD SIDNEY                                   OS        M351010
  /A REDMOND,BERNARD SIDNEY
  /A ROTHENBERG,BERNARD SIDNEY
  /A ROTHBERG,B
  /Z 9077954
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  REDMONT,BERNARD SIDNEY                                   OR        M351010
  /A REDMONT,JOAN  /Y F  /D SPO REDMONT,BERNARD SIDNEY  /T MRS
  /Z 1080442
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------

N3019 BUCHANAN,THOMAS

  BUCHANAN,T G                                             OR   48   U364060
  /D DW  01NOV48 P5  /L DC ,WAS  /W CHG TO MIC
  /Z 0169631
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  BUCHANAN,THOMAS                                          CR   54   R017239
  /D FBI 01APR54 P7 BARTON,HUGH C JR
  /Z 0169637
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  BUCHANAN,THOMAS                                          CR   54   R145275
  /D FBI 07SEP54 P4 BEIDLER,MARGARET G
  /Z 0169636
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  BUCHANAN,THOMAS B                                        OR   64   C408647
  /B 06AUG21 CLARKVILLE VIR  /C MEM 18JUN64 P1 ATT(WTC)CONTRACTORS
  /Z 0169638                                                 24
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  BUCHANAN,THOMAS C                                        OR   49   R038399
  /A BUCHANNON,TOM  /D F   14JUN49 P4+DW  27JUN48 P2 MARSHALL,MARION D
  /L DC ,WAS
  /Z 0169639
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  BUCHANAN,THOMAS E                                        OS        R112748
  /B 31AUG99 LAFAYETTE LA
  /Z 0169640
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  BUCHANAN,THOMAS ELIE                                     CS        R112748
  /B 08AUG99 LAFAYETTE LA
  /Z 0169641
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
```

VPJ

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

```
CTL NO 3019     REQUESTOR HALL          OFFICE SRS                    06AUG69

N3019 BUCHANAN,THOMAS

  BUCHANAN,THOMAS G                                       OS   64   M351118
  /T  JR
  /Z 0169644
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  BUCHANAN,THOMAS G                                       OR   64   R351164
  /D NYT 12JUN64 VOL5 OSWALD,LEE H
  /Z 0169642
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  BUCHANAN,THOMAS G                                       OR   64   R266988
  /D WEEKLY PAMPHLET 05DEC64 P1 TOCSIN
  /Z 9002806
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  BUCHANAN,THOMAS G                                       OR   64   M266988
  /D PAMPLET 05SEP64 P2 TOCSIN
  /Z 0169643
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
```

~~SECRET~~

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

#13914

SECRET

7 July 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security, Clearance Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Joe Murphy

FROM : OP/Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Notification of Contract Terminations

Listed below are contract terminations received during the month of June 1977.

03, 08

Name	SSN	SFN	TE	ORG	Termination Date
Annis, Carole Ann	005428507	672196	CE	EA	25 March 1977
Barga, Judy K.	519501284	654601	CE	OSIG	26 May 1977
Brown, Thomas J.	081160726	087840	IC	OGCR	30 May 1977
Bull, Katherine S.	493440700	182961	CE	EUR	29 April 1977
Day, Walter L.	507076762	683575	IC	ICS	22 May 1977
Fishow, Evelyn M.	291180012	546928	CE	ISS	3 June 1977
Frey, Frederick W.	108221041	676214	IC	OSI	15 June 1977
Gleason, Robert D.	210409564	676971	CE	FBIS	23 May 1977
Goodpasture, Ann L.	446149768	013914	IC	IG	20 May 1977
Greenstein, Fred I. 03,08	331261868	663902	IC	OSI	15 June 1977
Hargrove, Erwin C., Jr.	497325244	671272	IC	OSI	15 June 1977
Harnage, William A.	223804686	619339	CE	OSIG	15 June 1977
Holsti, Ole R.	548404442	677885	IC	OSI	15 June 1977
Jensen, Beverly	564569690	391891	CE	NE	4 June 1977
Keegan, Patricia A.	231584387	237031	CE	NE	12 May 1977
Kiev, Ari	083267818	609830	IC	OSI	15 June 1977
Loecher, Karl F.	051428566	789641	IC	OPR	30 April 1977
Martinez, Barbara Jean	525828737	672329	CE	LOG	3 June 1977

SECRET

E2IMPDET
CLBY063837

2|98

SECRET

03,08

NAME	SSN	SFN	TE	ORG	Termination Date
McFarlane, Sharon K.	520447069	565910	CE	AF	8 April 1977
Minekime, Norman E.	128422843	600765	CE	NPIC	25 February 1977
Montgomery, Jeanette N.	525501118	581225	CE	NE	31 May 1977
Morris, Carol Lee	567866614	622763	CE	OMS	5 June 1977
Phillips, Judy B.	230544853	678205	CE	Commo	4 June 1977
Ruth, Roberta Ann	174309494	665671	CE	OMS	18 June 1977
Singleton, Walter F.	225245972	039688	CA	FRD	3 June 1977
Trager, Diane M.	046445459	684186	CE	Fin	27 May 1977
Aldridge, Beverly A.	183347384	465450	IC	Sec	17 June 1977
Anderson, Barbara V.	350306996	582195	CE	NE	30 June 1977
Bancroft, Roger W.	064384161	615892	CE	ODE	24 June 1977
Blackman, Edson E. III	577561373	?	IC	NPIC	30 June 1977
Brunow, Steven E.	587802323	648746	CE	NPIC	21 January 1977
Carroll, Hugh M.	215687793	641523	CE	Sec	24 June 1977
Chedid, Patricia A.	578564033	660921	CE	NE	27 May 1977
Cunningham, Hugh T.	083361810	024802	IC	OTR	23 June 1977
Dudley, George M. 0308	239283246	104102	IC	Pers	30 June 1977
Firment, Lynda R.	256628421	486785	CE	EUR	31 May 1977
Frye, Christine	004685976	679551	CE	Commo	24 June 1977
Goodlett-Bowen, Norma	054369777	?	IC	NPIC	30 June 1977
Gray, Barbara H.	280446526	670101	CE	SE	10 June 1977
Habari, Terpsithea	No SSN	681418	FN	FBIS	28 May 1977
Harms, Werner O.	201120242	126364	CA	FRD	30 June 1977
Henning, Julia M.	233627239	138364	CE	AF	27 May 1977
Heumann, Gertraude	No SSN	683899	FN	FBIS	4 June 1977
Howard, Irene O.	022308200	182429	CE	EUR	23 May 1977
Howell, Gwendolyn W.	241907795	662197	CE	OSI	31 January 1975
Johnson, Dana C.	223969825	679677	CE	OTR	3 June 1977
Kenney, Ellen Jane	579523274	212436	CE	OTR	3 June 1977
LeFevre, Jane	032308979	532453	CE	EA	13 May 1977
Little, Jeffrey K.	225785758	642239	CE	OTS	11 June 1977
Lofgren, Joan M.	296324215	681917	CE	EUR	27 May 1977
Mather, Peggy Ann	485200235	646270	CE	Fin	15 June 1977
McCutcheon, Katherine	360340786	233452	CE	AF	29 December 1976
Morden, Karren F.	540408060	184344	CE	EUR	18 June 1977
Nobert, Marilyn Jean	120347691	588784	CE	NE	13 May 1977
Phillips, Kenneth R.	453068932	675394	CE	NPIC	3 June 1977
Ransom, Alison G.	394505004	634937	CE	AF	14 June 1977

SECRET

2/90

SECRET

Name	SSN	SFN	TE	ORG	Termination Date
MUNTZ, DONALD W. 03,08 [redacted]	485105490	055849	CE	AF	27 May 1977
Vagnina, Daniele S.	231640291	641680	CE	OTR	30 June 1977
Weaver, Carol M.	380361880	586457	CE	AF	10 May 1977
West, Bill C.	113332128	015790	IC	OSR	13 May 1977
Williams, James H.	578701385	662217	CE	LOG	30 June 1977
Wolfe, Elizabeth L.	412667301	663774	CE	OSIG	18 June 1977
Woodyear, Frances A.	579501526	133351	CE	EA	6 May 1977
Meybaum, Heino W.	565464787	051918	CA	EUR	10 June 1977
Edger, Ruth C.	447461282	679606	CE	LA	10 June 1977
Kelley, Joseph B.	579388251	016617	Consl.	OGC	31 May 1977

Type Employee Codes

CE - Contract Employee
CA - Career Associate
IC - Independent Contractor
Conslt - Consultant
FN - FBIS Foreign National

03

Sara Tarchie

Sara Tarchie
OP/CPD

2/90

SECRET

A

HEADQUARTERS

Photocopy of Unclear Original

FILE WHEN INITIALLED

OS DATE
L.A. DATE 16 Sept 65

TO : Special Agent in Charge, DFO Office of Origin

SUBJECT: Gregory, Peter Paul POS.:
468 572 6U ID/3/b 32

1. ☐ Use DODD credentials, if feasible; however TTOD may be used.
32

☐ Of covert interest, conduct investigation according to standard regulations except as noted below.

2. DFO will conduct the following NAC's:

	FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PASSPORT	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I&N	CSIF	MIL			
SUBJECT	X								X					

3. FIELD

FLD.OFFICE	AREA	BIR	EDUC	EMPL	REF	NEIGH	CRED	POL	OTHER

NONE

FILE COPY

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DISTRIBUTION								ATTACHMENTS		
BFO	CFO	DFO	LAFO	MFO	NYFO	SFFO	WFO	X BIO. DATA	X CONTROL CARDS	PHS

FORM 11-63 1742c USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (9-43)

Organization and Activities of the Deputy Director (Research)

Development Projects Division - Special Projects Branch

As recommended, the Special Projects Branch of DPD plus the necessary supporting units have been transferred to DD/R.

Technical Services Division

Further study did not commend implementation of the Working Group's recommendation that all TSD research and development be placed under DD/R. The DD/P made a substantial argument in favor of leaving all of TSD under his control in order to insure close and intimate relations with the operating units. Further, an argument of almost overwhelming proportions indicated that the DD/R already had some very major responsibilities without taking on the diverse and generally unrelated responsibilities of TSD.

Other Research and Development

After considerable additional study it was decided to transfer all ELINT to DD/R, except for the direct command of certain field units which under all circumstances should be left under the station chiefs. Research and development in support of NPIC would fall under DD/R for those very advanced items, but not for current production requirements.

Part II

Coordination

The staff of the Assistant for Coordination has continued to work on the same basis as formerly and continues to be constituted of assignees from other agencies. There appears to be progress in achieving closer inter-agency coordination, but whether this is due to the work of the Coordination Staff or to the DCI's personal interest in this subject would be hard to determine.

Princeton Consultants to ONE

This group has been continued.

National Photographic Interpretation Center

The Executive Director has personally kept under review the workload of NPIC. NPIC is recruiting in anticipation of an increased workload.

Caliber of Personnel

The new DD/I is cognizant of this problem and is taking steps to improve the caliber of the personnel.

Merger of ONE and OCI

It has been decided not to merge these offices.

Preparation and Dissemination of Memoranda

Too many uncoordinated memoranda are still being circulated. The practice of asking other departments to prepare memoranda has not been adopted.

White House Relations

(This matter was handled orally by the Working Group and consequently the comments will be handled similarly.)

Research on International Communism

The DD/I has established a special staff under an experienced intelligence officer for this purpose, and this staff is getting gradually organized.

Office of Scientific Intelligence

OSI is remaining under DD/I, but DD/R will eventually open his career service to those who wish to join it.

DD/R's Operational Responsibilities

It has been firmly established that DD/R will operate those projects which he develops. We believe that DD/R has implemented some of the principles in the special annex of the Working Group report.

Organization and Activities of the Intelligence Community

National Indications Center - Watch Committee

General Carter, the new Chairman of the Watch Committee, has made a thorough review of its activities and NIC operations. Steps have been taken to see that NIC is properly manned with the right personnel, and the Department of State is being constantly reminded of its obligations in this regard. We also believe that the methods of operations of the Watch Committee have now been aligned in accordance with the objectives of the Working Group.

CIA Relations with the Department of State

Since the issuance of the Working Group report, a special team composed of a senior representative from the Agency and from the Department of State have studied the entire problem of "cover." They have reached an agreed formula for this cover and for correcting some of the problems that attracted the attention of the Working Group. This includes the Foreign Service designation. A new agreement has been reached on the handling of State communications. Since the production of the Working Group report the level on which COMINT policy is handled in CIA has been raised to that of Assistant Deputy Director.

State's Counter Communism Office

The proposal for the creation of such an office in the Department of State appears to have come to naught.

State's Operational Center

The State Operational Center also appears to have come to naught.

State at White House Briefings

The Department of State does not attend the White House briefings.

Receipt of Top Classification Messages

The DCI has taken up with the White House the necessity for being included in the dissemination of all top classification messages.

1. The organization of the DCI/DDCI's office is currently under study.

2. The Audit Staff is removed from the DD/S area and placed under the Inspector General.

3. The Comptroller is removed from the DD/S area, given greatly expanded responsibilities, and will report directly to the DCI/DDCI's office.

4. The General Counsel's office is removed from under the DD/S, will resume responsibility for Congressional relations, and will report directly to the DCI/DDCI's office.

5. The Office of Operations is disbanded. Contact Division to DD/P as nucleus for Domestic Division. Foreign Documents Division to be combined with OCR Library. Foreign Broadcast Information Division to be independent unit reporting directly to DD/I.

6. Position of Assistant DD/P for Covert Action abolished.

7. Assistant DD/P for Paramilitary and Air Support Operations created.

8. Central Support Staff under DD/P created. This will draw together such support as personnel, logistics and budget and will also take over technical support from those operating units of TSD which remain in the DD/P, e.g., secret writing, audio operations, etc. The Central Support Staff will also absorb the present Operational Services Staff and certain other activities.

9. A Special Task Force is created for such operations of a magnitude that transcends the capabilities of one division.

10. The International Organizations Division and Covert Action Staff are combined, putting together our largest activities in this field.

11. A Domestic Division is created. This will absorb as its nucleus Contact Division of CO from the DD/I, the Commercial Staff, the Air Proprietary Branch from DPD, ultimately the management of CAT from the DD/S, and those aspects of cover which involve contacts with the U.S. business community.

12. A Deputy Director for Research is created. This organization will take over the Office of Scientific Intelligence from the DD/I, Special Projects from DPD, all research and development from TSD, and other research and development activities currently located in various units of the Agency such as the Office of Communications, NPIC, etc.

March 29, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on discussions between myself, Carter, Kirkpatrick Coyne and Schuyler in review of report of the Kirkpatrick Committee

Following recommendations call for further consideration and possible modification.

I. Office of the DCI

1. Page 11 - Comptroller

Terms of Reference of the Financial Policy and Budget Committee under the Comptroller and the Executive Committee as provided hereafter must be clarified to provide continuing program review by a senior committee as part of an orderly program and budget process.

2. Office of Coordination.

Differences between Kirkpatrick and Schuyler position as outlined in the report and Coyne's position should be considered and reconciled. Page 3, Item C. Responsibility for SIGINT policies and resulting international arrangements as a responsibility of this office should be further considered.

3. Public relations directive should be issued on policy of speech making and public appearances by Agency employees, including DCI and the Deputies.

4. Page 6. Reduction of force consideration should be given with continuing 3-man management review committee (such as the Kirkpatrick Committee) exploring for the DCI and the DDCI ways and means of eliminating duplication and consolidating functions, eliminating unnecessary activities, with the objective of developing better organization at lesser cost and with fewer personnel.

5. 6. B. Terms of Reference for the Executive Director and the selection of this man should be discussed between McCone and Carter at an early date.

II. Office of DD/P

1. Page 9: Important to move on an Assistant DD/P for Paramilitary operations and air support. There is continuing criticism of the Agency for lack of professionalism in these activities, most particularly airborne.

2. Domestic Division.

Care must be exercised and the merger of Contact Division with the balance of the Domestic Division and also care must be exercised to be sure that the Domestic Division "gathers up" all fragments of CIA's activities dispersed throughout the United States with the exception of Security Division.

3. Deputy Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth

Definition of this office must be worked out to avoid confusion with respect to small British areas such as Hong Kong, Singapore, British Guiana, etc. The purpose of this office probably to handle Commonwealth versus Colonial Office affairs.

4. CIA/State Relations.

Review of salary allowances, expense accounts, living conditions, etc., of CIA agents under State cover versus Foreign Service Officers comparable conditions should be made and if criticism legitimate, corrective measures should be taken without impairing ability Chiefs of Station to handle special costly situations which might be done by specific authorization. Also audit and control of personal expenses of COS must be developed immediately.

III. Office of DD/I

1. Carter and McCone should agree on selection of a DD/I, Deputy DD/I and Chief of OCI as initial step in improving personnel within this office.

2. Merger of O/NE and OCI should be delayed until new DD/I is installed and makes his recommendations.

3. National Board of Estimates should be reviewed and improved where necessary and consideration given to formation of a special group within O/NE to analyze on a continuing basis objectives of Soviet/Sino Bloc, international communism and their pursuit of their cold war activities and in their efforts to establish world domination. Note: This office previously existed directly under DD/I but was abandoned a few months ago.

4. Proper liaison with finance, State Department, and agreed methods for DCI to brief NSC as provided by law should be worked out.

5. National Photographic Interpretation Center, Page 19.

Note this requires immediate study, possibly by USIB. Fear that the work load on the NPIC will overwhelm it and as a result it will be unable to process vast amount of information during months of May through September should be quickly studied and arrangements made through USIB to disperse read-out to SAC and Army St. Louis Center if doing so necessary to keep our processing and read-out on a current basis. This matter considered of greatest importance.

IV. Elements of DD/R

1. It should be recognized that Deputy Director for Research is a cover and this office not necessarily confined to research but should be tasked with operationed responsibilities. Also most important project under DD/R is OXCART, therefore DD/R must be restrained from taking on collateral activities so fast that OXCART will suffer. The DD/R responsibilities will cover all phases of Agency responsibility and activity in NRO which may or may not include the actual operation of OXCART. It will include intelligence input into OXCART and CORONA and SAMOS planning, irrespective of where operations rest.

2. Location of OSI should be resolved.

3. Interrelationship between DD/R and DD/P to provide staff support and particularly the CI production should be established by directive of Deputy DCI.

4. With respect to page 23, certain operational responsibilities should pass from DD/R to DD/P upon completion of research and development; however a study should be made to determine whether the many fully integrated operational activities such as OXCART and some fully integrated ELINT operations should not be permanently under DD/R who is to have both operational and research and development responsibilities.

Considerations of OXCART

1. Responsibility for all phases of OXCART are to follow the direct supervision of Sec/Def and DCI by agreement with the OD, Charyk as AR/Sec.Def., will be executive head of NRO, DD/R will be his Deputy and by assignment will be responsible for all phases of OXCART.

2. Details of operations, as contrasted to R&D, will be worked out at a later date.

3. NSC directive agreed OXCART tasks are responsibility of Special Group and question of augmentation is a matter for Special Group, not CIA, to decide.

4. DD/R should be charged with the responsibility of mobilizing and utilizing all necessary resources of DD/I, DD/P and DD/S and General Counsel in performance of DD/R's assigned responsibility as Deputy Director NRO and manager of OXCART project.

5. Question of use of Air Force officers versus civilians must be decided by higher authority, likewise the question of operational responsibility between that of CIA or DD/R or personnel seconded from the Air Force versus direct Air Force operation must be decided by DCI and Sec/Def. and the President after careful consideration of all issues and problems relating to this matter.

6. Because of imminence of commencement of test flights immediate careful attention should be given to all aspects of the cover story as certain information concerning the plane will become known when it is observed in FAA (that other) radar

V. National Indications Center Watch Committee

1. Appointment should be made next week for General Carter and myself to visit the NIC and the DIA Centers and observe the Watch Committee operations and make a judgment as to whether this organization is properly set up and efficiently operating, and to resolve differences between Mr. Coyne and USIB.

2. White House briefings should continue; a substitute for Mr. Amory should be arranged until a more adequate arrangement is provided: Daily briefings of Bundy, Clifton and Taylor and an occasional briefing of the President by DCI should suffice.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

mfb

6 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Final Report of Working Group on Organization and Activities

1. I have the honor to present herewith the final report of the working group which you established in January to consult with you and advise on the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of its relationship with other agencies in the intelligence community. This report reflects the views of the working group and is divided into two parts. The first part deals primarily with the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency and reflects the unanimous views of the working group. The second part contains comments and recommendations on areas dealing with the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and activities of the intelligence community in which the working group was either unable to agree or felt that considerably more study was needed before action was taken.

2. For the record I would note that the working group held its first session on January 3 and met on 35 different days between that date and its final session with you on March 28. During its work the group had approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its relations with CIA; approximately one-half day spent in the Pentagon in addition to other briefings by the Defense Intelligence Agency; and a full week spent visiting SAC, NORAD and other activities in the United States. We were briefed by the head of every major component in the CIA with the exception of three DD/P area divisions whose briefings had to be excluded because of the pressure of time. However, we feel that having heard from four other area divisions the working group had a knowledge of the activities and problems of these units. In addition to the 100 briefings, the working group had more than ten executive sessions in which it discussed and debated at great length its findings and conclusions. Finally, there were

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

17684

some 20 meetings with yourself, and with senior Agency officials to discuss our findings and conclusions. These included at least two sessions with each of the Deputy Directors and with the Assistant Director for National Estimates and the Assistant Director for Current Intelligence.

3. The attached report does not purport to be complete or exhaustive in any respect, but rather it is an aide memoir to recall to mind our oral discussions and to record some of the reasons and philosophy behind our recommendations.

/s/

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

cc: DDCI

Attachment

Report was read by:
DD\R
DD\S
DD\I (and also Knight McMahan)
AD\SI
DD\P

cy 7 - destroyed

~~SECRET~~

PART I

This section deals primarily with the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency and represents the view of the entire Working Group.

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DCI

Organization of DCI's Office

We recommend that the organization of the DCI's office be changed in order to provide more effective support to the DCI, a systematized control of messages both oral and written, and a clear delineation of the responsibilities of the assistants to the DCI. In this connection we would urge that a secretariat be created, that the head of this secretariat assign individual responsibilities to each of the personal assistants to the DCI, that daily staff meetings be held for a full exchange on the activities of the staff, and that all personnel in the Agency be advised as to how to keep the DCI's staff informed properly of the activities of the Agency.

ExD

Comptroller

We recommend that the Comptroller's office be brought out from under the DD/S, report directly to the DCI's office and receive full authority for total fiscal control of the Agency.

We recommend that the Comptroller be designated Chairman of a Financial Policy and Budget Committee composed of the appropriate senior officers of the Agency. We believe that such a committee should be kept fully and currently informed of all Agency activities, and in order to be effective should meet regularly and submit its reports to the DDCI and DCI. ✓

Inspector General

We recommend that the Audit Staff be combined with the staff of the Inspector General and that the merged staff report to the DCI's office. ✓

We believe that the size of the Inspector General Staff should be increased with qualified professional personnel assigned from their respective components in order to perform more frequent inspections of Agency units. We urge inspections at least annually of major operations and of field stations.

Up to new IG + review recomm.

General Counsel

We recommend that the General Counsel's staff be removed from the organization of the Deputy Director (Support) and report directly to the office of the DCI. ✓ In such a position the General Counsel should resume the responsibility for the direction and guidance of the work of the Legislative Counsel, which is currently the responsibility of the Inspector General. ✓

Cable Secretariat

We have examined the Cable Secretariat which is currently located in the office of the DCI and reports to the Executive Officer. ✓ We believe it should continue to be in the office of the Director under the careful supervision of the Executive Director. We are concerned that as it now operates requirements for cables have not been adequately coordinated, and cables have been disseminated too often on the judgment of junior officers. We believe this needs careful study.

Ex D

Contracts

We believe that the Agency is vulnerable on sole-source contracts for such activities as TSD and DPD, and that those contracts currently in existence should be reviewed and that all such future contracts should be passed on by the DCI's office prior to approval.

DDCI should review.

Personnel Assignments

We believe that the DDCI and DCI should be the final approving authority for all assignments to positions of Chief or Deputy Chief of Offices (DD/P Divisions and Staffs) or of field stations and bases, both foreign and domestic. ✓

We believe the DCI's office should also review all assignments in the middle management echelon with particular reference to insuring the proper language qualifications, operational training and suitability.

[illegible]

?

Public Relations

We recommend that the present system of public relations by the Agency be changed. While we see the necessity for the DCI to have an assistant in his office handling relations with the public media, we believe that every effort should be made to minimize the amount of publicity that CIA receives.

under ExD

We strongly recommend that the present practice of giving background briefings to newspapermen cease and that CIA give information to the press only where CIA has something which for operational reasons should be released on an unattributable basis. We urge that no public speeches be given by Agency officials.

agree

Reduction in Force

We recommend that the DCI and DDCI insure that the present reduction in force in the Agency include senior officers, particularly supergrades who are no longer as effective as they should be in their assignments.

✓

Handling of Communications Other Than Cables

We note that under present arrangements communications other than cables are handled by the Records Integration Division of DD/P, which is not always fully cognizant of the interests of non-DD/P parts of the Agency. We recommend that the entire system of handling incoming and outgoing communications be subjected to further study with a view to insuring adequate dissemination of all communications, particularly in DD/I, DD/R and DD/S, which may have need for prompt receipt of such material.

Ex I to DD

Executive Director

We have not tried to spell out the responsibilities of the Executive Director, inasmuch as we believe this to be primarily a matter that should be tailored to the personal preferences of the DCI and DDCI and how they wish to operate their office and the Agency. We urge, however, that special attention be directed to the avoidance of a straight vertical line of command; i.e., all problems should not have to pass through each of the three officers.

agree

Executive Committee

We recommend the creation of an Executive Committee to be chaired by the DDCI and consist of the four Deputies, the

~~SECRET~~

Comptroller, and the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance. This Committee, from a policy standpoint, would review proposed major projects and maintain a continuous review of all major activities and make appropriate recommendations thereon to the DCI. This Committee would replace the present Project Review Committee.

Include

ExD ?

IG ?

GC ?

Delete Asst for Coord ?

Ger [illegible] Dep [illegible] to [illegible]

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

Office of the DD/P

We commend the decision of the DD/P to abolish the position of the A/DDP/A, and believe that the restoration of the previous organization with just the DD/P and COP in the line of command in the front office will result in a clear delineation of responsibilities and more efficient operations.

The Staffs

We studied at some length the staffs in the DD/P. We considered a possible merger of the FI, CI and CA staffs. We also studied proposals for divesting the staffs of all operational responsibilities. We believe that while both are desirable objectives, neither are practicable under present circumstances. We therefore urge that the FI, CI and CA staff functions be drawn closer together under the Chief of Operations and that these organizations insofar as practical act in the classical sense as staffs for the DD/P. We further believe that the Operational Services Staff, the Central Staff, and the residual of the Cover and Commercial Staff, after the changes recommended below are completed, be transferred to the Central Support Staff which is proposed.

/

Merger of Covert Action Staff and International Organizations Division

The DD/P has advised us of his desire to merge the Covert Action Staff with the International Organizations Division. While this is contrary to the trend of divesting staffs of operational duties, we nevertheless do not observe any major reasons against such a merger and believe that it should be tried out in accordance with the DD/P's wishes.

Central Support Staff

We recommend that the DD/P draw together into a Central Support Staff control of personnel and other support matters currently decentralized to the divisions and staffs in order to locate these functions directly under him.

Special Task Force Operations

We recommend the creation of an organizational entity to be known as "Special Task Force Operations" reporting directly to the DD/P, which shall be activated and deactivated upon need, and which shall be the command mechanism for handling such projects as the Cuban operation which demands the creation of an organization from Agency-wide assets.

Assistant to DD/P for Paramilitary and Air Support Operations

We recommend the creation of an office in the DD/P to be known as Paramilitary and Air Support Operations, under the direction of an Assistant DD/P, to develop the capability for covert paramilitary and air support operations. We suggest that the bulk of this new organization be located at [10] where it will have facilities for organization and training. Such a move will also relieve the burden on the headquarters building. We recommend that the individual to head this organization be drawn from military service and be a senior Colonel or a Brigadier General with wartime paramilitary experience. Having in mind the total disestablishment of the DPD in its present form, we recommend that the Air Support Branch of DPD be transferred to the new Paramilitary Office of DD/P.

Domestic Division

We endorse the proposal to create a Domestic Division. We strongly urge that the new Domestic Division utilize the Contact Division of OO, which is to be transferred from the DD/I to the DD/P, as the nucleus for field work in the United States. We also believe that this Domestic Division should take over those functions of the Cover and Commercial Staff presently carried out by the Commercial Group, plus all those activities of the Cover Division which involve contacts with domestic organizations in the United States such as business and foundations. This would involve the transfer to this Domestic Division of the Air Proprietaries Branch of DPD, and of the responsibility for the management of CAT from the DD/S, and of managing Fairways Corporation. In consolidating CAT and Fairways into the Air Proprietaries Branch we wish to draw attention to the necessity of having the right man to head this branch.

We would also urge that a complete review be made of the Agency's present and future requirements for air proprietaries and that a statement of the requirements be provided the Air Proprietaries Branch indicating exactly what may be needed in all parts of the world. With the creation of the Domestic Division we urge that the DD/P examine the requirements levied by DD/P components on the Office of Security for operational support and if possible reassign these requirements to the Domestic Division in order to relieve the Office of Security for its more important responsibilities in regard to the security of CIA.

Operational Aids Unit

The DD/P should have a new unit charged with the following functions:

a. Residual TSD activities not transferred to DD/R.

b. Preparation of "operational characteristics" for new or improved equipment desired to be developed by DD/R.

c. Close contact with DD/R activities involving development of items for DD/P.

d. The conduct of rigorous field tests of these items before they are released to divisions for operational use.

We recommend that all of the research and development responsibilities currently in TSD be transferred to DD/R. Remaining units in TSD should be transferred to the new DD/P division recommended above; e.g., Audio Support less Research and Development, Photographic Support less R & D, Special Assistance, Intelligence, Personnel, Authentication, and Graphic Arts Reproduction. We note, however, that DD/P himself would prefer to retain under his own responsibility the R & D function as it pertains to specific items to be used by individual agents (audio devices, incendiary items, etc.).

Deputy Chief for British Commonwealth Affairs, Western European Division

We recommend the creation in the Western European Division of a second Deputy Chief for British Commonwealth Affairs. We suggest that this Deputy Chief have as his line responsibilities all matters involving [

24

]. Further, this officer should have full control authority over [

24

]. and all other components of the Agency, including the DD/I, should keep this officer advised on a daily basis [24

].

War Plans

Because of the vital importance of war plans to the Agency's relations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we recommend that the War Plans Group receive direct support from the DDCI, even though it should remain organizationally as a part of the Central Support Staff of the DD/P.

Police Programs

We are convinced that United States Government support to the police in friendly nations can provide great benefits to the United States and that some of these benefits will assist CIA in its work. The President has recently indicated to AID that he wishes this program to receive strong support. We believe that CIA should give it greater support than it has previously received. We recommend that the police group in the CI Staff receive such augmentation as is necessary, and that Project [24] be transferred from the NE Division to the CI Staff.

Liaison with Department of State

We urge that the DD/P centralize liaison with the Department of State and maintain careful records of all discussions between the Agency and State Department officials. We note that nearly every area division chief has a weekly meeting with his counterpart in the Department but that under the present system there is no organized method for keeping the central management of the DD/P informed of what takes place at these meetings.

Advice to State on Black Propaganda

We recommend that the DD/P develop procedures which will insure that other appropriate agencies of the government (Department of State, Defense, White House and USIA) are kept appropriately informed of black propaganda activities which otherwise might be misunderstood and believed to be legitimately the views of a foreign power. We have in mind our discussions with the Department which heard expressed concern that the Department was unaware of certain black propaganda activities relating to Communist China and consequently was led astray.

CIA Personnel Under State Cover

We recommend that CIA personnel under the Department of State cover make greater efforts to truly live their cover. We believe in this connection that the DCI should receive assurances from the DD/P, after proper study, that CIA allowances for rents, servants and entertainment are in line with comparable State Department allowances.

"Legitimate" [08] Cover

We recommend that the Agency more and more place people under [08] cover by the "legitimate" method of recruiting individuals, having them [08] and be [08] ; and follow through a normal [08] career. CIA should obviously keep [08] advised concerning these individuals, work with [08] on their assignments which will be mutually beneficial, and covertly train them. By this method such individuals will be under true [08] cover and will not only be unknown to other intelligence services, but also to their colleagues in [08].

~~SECRET~~

Latin American Operations

We urge that the Agency give high priority to supporting the expansion of activities of Latin America, and insure that the proper level of competence is assigned to these important posts.

American Friends of the Middle East

We recommend that the project for support of the organization known as the American Friends of the Middle East, which is currently being run by the NE Division, be transferred to the IO Division inasmuch as it now transcends NE Division area responsibilities and has activities in Africa, or, if it is determined that AFME activities are not worth the Agency's support, that the project be abolished.

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)

DD/I ?
views

Office of the DD/I

We have carefully reviewed the organization and activities of the DD/I's immediate office and believe that with the addition of a full time deputy he will be able to assert the degree of influence on the management of the units under him required for sound operations. At present his three office assistants provide good staff work in this review, but we did observe that a considerable amount of the intelligence produced in the DD/I area is reviewed at no higher a level than office chief, if that.

We recommend that the DD/I establish in his office a focal point through which all intelligence, processed or unevaluated, going to the White House must flow. If for reasons of urgency a report is sent to the White House prior to evaluation, we recommend that a special notice to the effect that it is unevaluated be attached to the report and that an evaluation follow the report at the earliest possible moment.

Board of National Estimates

The Office of National Estimates should be strengthened by the addition of one top-level foreign affairs expert to the Board of Estimates, and if obtainable a top-level scientist and a top-level economist. We also believe that the Board would benefit by the addition of an individual experienced in business in the international field, provided one of sufficient caliber could be found who would be willing to spend two or three years on the Board of Estimates.

Control of Estimates

We urge that the DCI utilize the USIB to control the scheduling and to limit the number of National Estimates.

✓

Office of Operations

We recommend that the Office of Operations be abolished, that the Contact Division be transferred to DD/P to be the nucleus of the Domestic Division.

The DD/I has advised us that with the transfer of Contact Division, Office of Operations, to the DD/P, he is considering closer integration of the Foreign Documents Division and the Foreign Broadcast Information Division. These units have a lot in common: both process unclassified information, both have considerable language capability. We believe such an integration should be considered. On the other hand, the Assistant Director for Central Reference believes very strongly that the Foreign Documents Division should be assigned to OCR. He advances as reasons: that the procurement of foreign documents are arranged by OCR; that the dissemination of the FDD product is handled by OCR; that OCR through its relations with the Library of Congress and other agencies is in a good position to assist in coordinating the exploitation of foreign documents. We urge that the DD/I integrate FDD and FBID into the most compatible area of the DD/I organization.

Support of Cenis

Tell me more ?

Support for the Center for International Studies (CENIS) at MIT is currently being handled by the DD/P. If such support is worth continuing, and we question this, we recommend that it be transferred to the DD/I's office.

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)

Security Office

We recommend that the burden on the Security Office for support of the DD/P be reviewed (see DD/P section). In the meantime, we believe that a careful look at the Security Office is necessary to insure that the volume of work it is carrying is not in any way jeopardizing its primary responsibility of insuring that every possible measure is taken to keep the Agency secure.

We recommend that all security clearances be centralized under the Office of Security; e.g., clearances that are issued by DPD, OCI, NPIC, and other Agency components. While we would leave the policy of granting clearances with the appropriate officials, we believe that the Office of Security should maintain a centralized index for special clearances and do all of the processing of these clearances.

Audit Staff

We recommend that the Inspection and Audit Staff check regularly on activities in the Lockheed plant which are of vital concern to the Agency.

DPD Support

We recommend that the DD/S be given the responsibility for support to all projects under the control of DD/R, providing of course the necessary security safeguards, and that in the future no parallel support mechanism be developed in the Agency.

Automatic Data Processing

We believe the Automatic Data Processing Staff can properly remain under the DD/S inasmuch as this is a support mechanism, although we strongly recommend that the DD/S in consultation with other deputies concerned direct this staff to aggressively pursue the objective of automation in the Agency in such a way as to insure the ultimate compatability of automatic data processing systems throughout the intelligence community.

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)

The Office of the Deputy Director (Research) having already been created, we now make the following recommendations as to those units which should be included under this Deputy.

Development Projects Division - Special Projects Branch

We recommend that the Special Projects Branch of DPD plus the necessary supporting elements, including those projects supporting the Department of Defense in advance reconnaissance programs, be placed under DD/R.

Technical Services Division

We recommend that all TSD research and development be placed under DD/R.

Other Research and Development

We recommend that the extent to which research and development for SIGINT collection equipment, including agents' SIGINT equipment, air-borne collection, etc., should be transferred to DD/R, be left as a matter for negotiation and agreement between DD/I and the Director of Communications.

We recommend all research and development in support of NPIC be transferred to DD/R.

PART II

This section contains comments and recommendations on areas of the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and activities of the intelligence community in which the working group was either unable to agree, or felt that considerably more study was needed before action is taken. These views are presented herewith so that they may assist and guide those who may be asked to pursue these matters further.

Coordination

We note your intention to abolish the present office of the Assistant for Coordination and to create in its stead an Assistant to DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance. With the exception of Mr. Coyne, we are fully in accord. We set forth below our concept of the principal functions of this Assistant.

a. He should be the DCI's principal advisor on coordination matters within the community and his personal representative in dealing on such matters with top officials of the community.

b. When so directed he should represent the DCI in negotiations and discussions on intelligence matters with appropriate officials of foreign governments.

c. He should be responsible for development of Comint and Elint policy insofar as this is an Agency function.

d. He should keep continually under review the general extent and direction of the intelligence efforts of the community to insure that such efforts fully and effectively support national policy, submitting reports and recommendations to DCI as appropriate.

e. He should correspondingly maintain a continuing review of activities and efforts of the Agency to insure that they remain fully and effectively coordinated with the activities and efforts of other members of the community.

We do not consider it practicable at this time to suggest the number or qualifications of supporting staff officers for this Assistant. We feel, however, that he will need a group of such officers and that they should be of particularly high caliber and broad experience. The functions we visualize for this office are highly important for the community and for CIA. They have not been adequately handled in the past. The Assistant should be given whatever staff the full development of his role may later require.

Mr. Coyne does not concur in this recommendation. He disagrees with (a) the proposed organizational placement and title of the recommended office, because this would perpetuate the present ineffective arrangement of the Coordination Office now in existence and would not provide the recommended office with the stature required to assist the DCI in fulfilling his heavy responsibilities throughout the Intelligence Community; (b) the limitations in the functional concepts of the office, as outlined above. Further, he does not concur in this recommendation because it does not distinguish sufficiently the internal CIA operating functions of the DDCI from the community-wide functions which the recommended office must perform if the DCI is to execute effectively his principal mission as assigned in the President's Directive of January 16, 1962. Mr. Coyne believes that if the office is established along the lines recommended above, it will be incapable of effectively assisting the DCI in performing his principal Presidentially-assigned responsibilities of (a) coordinating and effectively guiding the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort; (b) establishing necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all levels; (c) maintaining a continuing review, with the heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned, of the programs and activities of all U. S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities; and (d) assuring efficiency and effectiveness, and avoiding undesirable duplication in the total foreign intelligence effort. Mr. Coyne will submit his recommendations on this subject at a later date.

Princeton Consultants to ONE

Mr. Coyne recommends that this group be disbanded based on advice from principal concerned officers of the Agency that the group makes no contribution to the intelligence estimating effort. The other members feel that on balance the group should be continued.

National Photographic Interpretation Center

We are concerned about the capability of NPIC to handle what may be a greatly increased volume of work in coming months. We recommend that as a matter of priority the USIB have this matter reviewed and insure that any increased flow of raw material does not result in slowing down the prompt and complete processing so urgently required.

Caliber of Personnel

We believe that the DD/I should devote some considerable effort to improving the caliber of personnel in his offices. Although we did not make a study in depth, we believe that there is a serious problem in this regard in OCI and that steps should be taken under the new management of OCI to improve the caliber of supervisory personnel and thus improve the morale of that office.

Merger of ONE and OCI

We studied at some length the feasibility of merging the Office of National Estimates with the Office of Current Intelligence. We found the Office of Current Intelligence eager for a merger, the Office of National Estimates strongly opposed. The DD/I was inclined to favor it, but foresees certain personnel difficulties. We do not believe that such a merger would be wise unless it was well established that the result would be the creation of better national estimates and current intelligence dailies and weeklies. The DD/I feels that he should be given at least sixty days to explore this proposal and to prepare his recommendations. We concur.

Mr. Coyne does not agree with the above paragraph and in lieu thereof recommends that the ONE and OCI be merged now. He believes that such merger will result in improved intelligence products to support the national policy makers.

Preparation and Dissemination of Memoranda

We have noted considerable unhappiness in the Department of State because ONE and OCI have established the practice of distributing throughout the community, and to the White House, uncoordinated memoranda on intelligence matters. These memoranda are prepared as "think pieces", but the Department of State feels that they often seem to influence policy at high levels. We think the Department of State has a point, and we urge that such memoranda be carefully restricted to circulation within the Agency unless or until they have been coordinated across-the-board.

We also urge that the DCI adopt the practice of asking other agencies to prepare such memoranda if the subjects fall within the purview of their responsibilities; e.g., the Department of State on strictly political matters. We believe that, at a minimum, when CIA is asked for a memorandum that inquiries should be made of other departments to determine whether such a memorandum hasn't already been prepared or might be in the process of preparation.

White House Relations

We are concerned about Agency relationships with the White House insofar as handling of intelligence matters is concerned. We would like the opportunity to discuss this with you orally before framing recommendations.

Research on International Communism

We are concerned about the reported inadequacy of research done on International Communism. At the present time some is done in the DD/I area in both OCI and ONE, some is done in the DD/P area in the International Communism Division of the Counter Intelligence Staff, and some is done in the State Department in the Special Studies Group of INR. The DD/I expressed himself as believing this was sufficiently covered. The Chief, CI Staff believes it is insufficiently covered. Representatives of the Department of State urged that greater expertise be brought to bear on the subject. Inasmuch as it will fall squarely on the shoulders of the DCI if not enough is being done, we urge that the matter be reviewed by the DCI at an early date to satisfy himself that all necessary research in this field is being accomplished.

Office of Scientific Intelligence

On the new chart we have shown OSI as a division under DD/R since we understand this to be your desire. We feel, however, that OSI in its major activities is more closely linked to DD/I than to DD/R and therefore more properly belongs under DD/I. DD/I himself strongly supports this view and urges that he retain OSI. We believe that if this is approved, scientists in OSI should be members of DD/R's career service, subject to transfer between OSI and units of DD/R as might be agreed between the deputy directors concerned.

DD/R's Operational Responsibilities

We have some concern relative to your intention to have DD/R carry into the operational phase his responsibility for certain major projects involving complex and coordinated operations which are highly sensitive and where a mis-step could have serious national or international repercussions. DD/R's key people will be mostly scientists, technological experts or leaders in specialized development fields. Such individuals on the average have no professional intelligence operating experience and little background or interest in detailed operational problems requiring thorough inter-agency coordination, painstaking and tedious follow-up actions and careful attention to security details. DD/P, on the other hand, has a number of top-flight people who for some years have dealt almost exclusively with just such problems.

We recognize all the difficulty, in the course of a project of this type, of shifting responsibility from one deputy to the other; and we realize that development must also lap over into the operational phase. We suggest having as a general rule (but granting that exceptions will arise) that when operation begins the responsibility for the operations should be the DD/P's, but that DD/R should retain his responsibility for seeing that the equipment he has developed continues to function properly. There is here attached a specially classified annex.

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

National Indications Center - Watch Committee

We have examined quite carefully the National Indications Center, its organization, its capacity to support fully the Watch Committee, and its relations with other departments and agencies. We note that opinions within the community concerning NIC and its functions vary widely -- from the feeling that it should be abolished, or combined with DIA indications center -- to the belief that it is entirely satisfactory in its present situation. We do not fully subscribe to either of these views.

The functions of the Watch Committee, and NIC, with their terms of reference, were developed prior to the time when DIA was created. Now DIA has developed a strong capability to provide both early warning and indications of approaching crises to the community. Its capacity in this regard will develop even further in the months ahead.

We are aware that USIB is now considering the Fitch Committee Report. But we doubt that few if any members of that Committee were intimately aware of the full capacity of DIA and of its future plans. We note that General Carroll was reluctant to be drawn into the Committee's deliberations.

We recommend, therefore, that except as noted below, NIC operations be allowed to continue as they are for the next three or four months. At that time we recommend a thorough review of the Watch Committee and NIC operations, particularly in the light of DIA's capabilities and activities, with a view to redefining the responsibilities and functions of NIC as may then appear desirable.

Mr. Coyne disagrees and recommends that the NIC be abolished now, and that the DIA be assigned the national strategic warning function and that its personnel complement be enlarged to include representation from appropriate members of USIB. Mr. Coyne points to reasons outlined in his memorandum to the DCI dated February 5, 1962.

We do believe that the National Indications Center should be properly manned and should receive both the high caliber of personnel at the proper grade and the number of personnel to perform its function promptly and efficiently. In this connection the Department of State has no representatives at NIC at present and the DCI should ask the Secretary to remedy this situation immediately.

We would suggest a change in the present method of preparing the Watch Committee report. If NIC is adequately manned, we see no reason why it should not draft, 24 hours in advance, the weekly

Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for consideration prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated.

Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an important aspect of all coordinated intelligence community reports -- we believe that substantive disagreements should be encouraged and even spelled out in Watch Committee reports; that NIEs and SNIEs rather than being suppressed or covered by watered down language as is sometimes the case today, in all cases should reflect the consensus of views of the intelligence community. If there are differing minority views on the part of one or more agencies, including CIA, these should be spelled out in appropriate footnotes.

CIA Relations with the Department of State

We examined the relations of CIA with the Department of State. Several matters of concern in this area are mentioned in the section on the DD/P. We would note that "covering" for the Agency poses certain problems for the Department in its relations with the Congress. These include such items that attract Congressional interest as: the number of officers in each Embassy, particularly the political section; the designation of CIA officers as [24]; the CIA role in handling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommend close liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters and that whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appropriate Congressional committees on these matters.

We are particularly concerned that the [24] designations of CIA personnel [24], particularly [ ], are so revealing. We recommend that the Agency arrange with State to [24] designations.

The Department of State indicated concern about the level in CIA on which Comint policy matters are handled, and also noted that on occasions there appears to be lack of coordination within CIA on Comint policy matters. This factor is one of the reasons why we recommend raising the level of Sigint policy matters to the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance.

State's Counter Communism Office

We reviewed with some interest the proposed creation in the office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs of the Department of State of a strategy group for combatting communism. While the full scope of its function is as yet unclear, we believe that CIA should follow the developments in this office closely as its activities will have considerable bearing on the work of the Agency.

State's Operational Center

We reviewed with some interest the embryonic operational center which the Department of State is developing. We found that this is an interesting development and would obviously have bearing on the intelligence community.

State at White House Briefings

We recommend that in accordance with the present practice of a representative of the Defense Intelligence Agency attending the briefings of the White House staff by CIA, that a representative of the Department of State also be invited to attend these meetings.

Receipt of Top Classification Messages

We recommend that the DCI take up directly with the President the problem of receiving all pertinent messages dealing with foreign affairs which might have any bearing on intelligence estimates or reports, or on covert operations. We have particularly in mind such communications as between the President and Khrushchev, etc. We believe that it is important for the DCI to see such messages in order to give proper guidance to the intelligence and operational activities of the Agency.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency

In the course of our discussions as members of Mr. McCone's Working Group on Intelligence and in our March 28 meeting with Messrs. McCone and Carter, I indicated that I did not concur in the "Coordination" section of the draft report which we discussed with the DCI and the DDCI.

In line with the foregoing, it would be appreciated if you would:

1) Amend the second sentence of the section to read: "With the exception of Mr. Coyne, we are fully in accord."

2) Add at the end of the section a new paragraph reading as follows:

"Mr. Coyne does not concur in this recommendation. He disagrees with (a) the proposed organizational placement and title of the recommended Office, because this would perpetuate the present ineffective arrangement of the Coordination Office now in existence and would not provide the recommended Office with the stature required to assist the DCI in fulfilling his heavy responsibilities throughout the Intelligence Community; (b) the limitations in the functional concepts of the Office, as outlined above. Further, he does not concur in this recommendation because it does not distinguish sufficiently the internal CIA operating functions of the DDCI from the community-wide functions which the recommended Office must perform if the DCI is to execute effectively his principal mission as assigned in the President's Directive of January 16, 1962. Mr. Coyne believes that if the Office is established along the lines recommended above, it will be incapable of effectively assisting the DCI in performing his principal Presidentially-assigned responsibilities of (a) coordinating and effectively guiding the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort; (b) establishing necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all levels; (c) maintaining a continuing review,

> "with the heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned, of the programs and activities of all U. S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities; and (d) assuring efficiency and effectiveness, and avoiding undesirable duplication in the total foreign intelligence effort. Mr. Coyne will submit his recommendations on this subject at a later date."

I would appreciate receiving a copy of the revised report of the Working Group at your earliest convenience.

J. Patrick Coyne

J. Patrick Coyne

14-00000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

23 October 1962

Good
10/25/62

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: After Action Report on the Findings of the Working Group

This is with reference to the memorandum of 6 April 1962 which presented you with the final report of the Working Group which you established in January to consult and advise on the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. This report indicates the action which has been taken on the findings of the Working Group, and if no action has been taken the reasons therefor. The comments here are in the same order as they appeared in the report of the Working Group.

(signed) Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

Attachment

CC: DDCI

LBK:jrc: Retyped gmk (23 Oct. 62)

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/att
1 - DDCI w/att
1 - Exec. Dir. w/att
~~4 - Extra~~

~~SECRET~~

Operational Aids Unit

This recommendation was rendered inapplicable in view of the decision not to transfer TSD to DD/R.

Deputy Chief for British Commonwealth Affairs, Western European Division

As recommended, this position has been created and is now occupied by Mr. John Caswell. A review will shortly be made to determine the degree of control that this unit has over liaison.

War Plans

As recommended, the DDCI is giving full support to the War Plans Group, and is assisted in this effort by the Executive Director.

Police Programs

As recommended, CIA is giving the police program greater support. An Agency Officer heads the police program in AID, and he has been provided an Executive Officer by the Agency. Project ENDOMORPH will be transferred to the CI Staff.

Liaison with the Department of State

The DD/P has centralized the control of liaison with the Department of State and careful records are now maintained of all discussions.

Advice to State on Black Propaganda

The Chief, CA Staff, is now charged with advising State, and other departments where appropriate, of any black propaganda activities that might be misinterpreted by the U.S. Government if they were presumed to be legitimately the statement of another government.

CIA Personnel Under State Cover

The DD/P is making a thorough review of State cover directed toward insuring that CIA personnel are not out of line in their various allowances with their State Department colleagues.

Assistant to DD/P for Paramilitary and Air Support Operations

We recommend the creation of an office in the DD/P to be known as Paramilitary and Air Support Operations, under the direction of an Assistant DD/P, to develop the capability for covert paramilitary and air support operations. We suggest that the bulk of this new organization be located at Isolation where it will have facilities for organization and training. Such a move will also relieve the burden on the headquarters building. We recommend that the individual to head this organization be drawn from military service and be a senior Colonel or a Brigadier General with wartime paramilitary experience. Having in mind the total disestablishment of the DPD in its present form, we recommend that the Air Support Branch of DPD be transferred to the new Paramilitary Office of DD/P.

Domestic Division

We endorse the proposal to create a Domestic Division. We strongly urge that the new Domestic Division utilize the Contact Division of OO, which is to be transferred from the DD/I to the DD/P, as the nucleus for field work in the United States. We also believe that this Domestic Division should take over those functions of the Cover and Commercial Staff presently carried out by the Commercial Group, plus all those activities of the Cover Division which involve all matters involving liaison with the British or with Canadian, Australian and New Zealand intelligence services except matters concerned with Sigint and Comsec. Further, this officer should have full control authority over liaison exchange of information with the British and the above mentioned Commonwealth services, and all other components of the Agency, including the DD/I, should keep this officer advised on a daily basis of liaison relations with the British services.

War Plans

Because of the vital importance of war plans to the Agency's relations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we recommend that the War Plans Group receive direct support from the DDCI, even though it should remain organizationally as a part of the Central Support Staff of the DD/P.

Police Programs

We are convinced that United States Government support to the police in friendly nations can provide great benefits to the United States and that some of these benefits will assist CIA in its work. The President has recently indicated to AID that he wishes this program to receive strong support. We believe that CIA should give it greater support than it has previously received. We recommend that the police group in the CI Staff receive such augmentation as is necessary, and that Project ENDOMORPH (police training school) be transferred from the NE Division to the CI Staff.

Liaison with Department of State

We urge that the DD/P centralize liaison with the Department of State and maintain careful records of all discussions between the Agency and State Department officials. We note that nearly every area division chief has a weekly meeting with his counterpart in the Department but that under the present system there is no organized method for keeping the central management of the DD/P informed of what takes place at these meetings.

Advice to State on Black Propaganda

We recommend that the DD/P develop procedures which will insure that other appropriate agencies of the government (Department of State, Defense, White House and USIA) are kept appropriately informed of black propaganda activities which otherwise might be misunderstood and believed to be legitimately the views of a foreign power. We have in mind our discussions with the Department which heard expressed concern that the Department was unaware of certain black propaganda activities relating to Communist China and consequently was led astray.

CIA Personnel Under State Cover

We recommend that CIA personnel under the Department of State cover make greater efforts to truly live their cover. We believe in this connection that the DCI should receive assurances from the DD/P, after proper study, that CIA allowances for rents, servants and entertainment are in line with comparable State Department allowances.

"Legitimate" Foreign Service Cover

We recommend that the Agency more and more place people under Foreign Service cover by the "legitimate" method of recruiting individuals, having them take and pass the Foreign Service exams and be commissioned in the Foreign Service and follow through a normal Foreign Service career. CIA should obviously keep the Department advised concerning these individuals, work with the Department on their assignments which will be mutually beneficial, and covertly train them. By this method such individuals will be under true Foreign Service cover and will not only be unknown to other intelligence services, but also to their colleagues in the Foreign Service.

Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for consideration prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated.

Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an important aspect of all coordinated intelligence community reports -- we believe that substantive disagreements should be encouraged and even spelled out in Watch Committee reports; that NIEs and SNIEs rather than being suppressed or covered by watered down language as is sometimes the case today, in all cases should reflect the consensus of views of the intelligence community. If there are differing minority views on the part of one or more agencies, including CIA, these should be spelled out in appropriate footnotes.

CIA Relations with the Department of State

We examined the relations of CIA with the Department of State. Several matters of concern in this area are mentioned in the section on the DD/P. We would note that "covering" for the Agency poses certain problems for the Department in its relations with the Congress. These include such items that attract Congressional interest as: the number of officers in each Embassy, particularly the political section; the designation of CIA officers as FSRs; the CIA role in handling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommend close liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters and that whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appropriate Congressional committees on these matters.

We are particularly concerned that the Foreign Service designations of CIA personnel under State cover, particularly FSR, are so revealing. We recommend that the Agency arrange with State to cover CIA personnel equally with FSS and FSO designations.

The Department of State indicated concern about the level in CIA on which Comint policy matters are handled, and also noted that on occasions there appears to be lack of coordination within CIA on Comint policy matters. This factor is one of the reasons why we recommend raising the level of Sigint policy matters to the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance.

State's Counter Communism Office

We reviewed with some interest the proposed creation in the office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs of the Department of State of a strategy group for combatting communism. While the full scope of its function is as yet unclear, we believe that CIA should follow the developments in this office closely as its activities will have considerable bearing on the work of the Agency.

22 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Herbert Itkin/Mario Brod et. al.

1. Reference is made to your instructions concerning this case and my attached memorandum concerning research on whether or not Itkin was ever, in fact, utilized by this Agency prior to his contacts with Brod.

2. All available sources in the Agency reflect no record of Itkin or of Philip Harbin, who was allegedly his case officer. Harbin has been checked both as a true name and as an alias. Although the name is not registered in the Agency, this of course does not mean that some Agency representative did not make this up and use it without telling anyone.

3. My visceral reaction is that Itkin is lying about his contacts with Mr. Dulles and Philip Harbin. However, since there appears to be a possibility of an extreme "flap" if Itkin gives the same story to the newspapers that he gave to Mr. Houston, I would recommend that, with the concurrence of Mr. Helms, Mr. Dulles be interviewed and asked if he remembers anything about this case.

4. I also spoke with Harry Mason, x5231, in Finance who handles OS budgetary matters and is a personal acquaintance. Without giving him any names I asked him if it would be possible to track down the receipt that Itkin claims he gave Harbin for the $5000.00. Harry says if the case was handled properly and the account is still outstanding it will be fairly easy to find the receipt. I have done nothing further on this, pending your instructions.

Ward K. Greene
SA/EPD

Attachment

SECRET
EYES ONLY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

22 November 1968

ITKIN, Herbert

Subject States: When he was first admitted to the bar in 1953 he was employed by the firm of Delson, Levin & Gordon in New York City. (Now Delson and Gordon.) Itkin alleges that one partner, Levin, had close ties with Alger Hiss, Cyrus Eaton and other of similar persuasion. Because of the viewpoint of the law firm, Subject states that he began passing information to Senator Joseph McCarthy. However, in the Spring of 1954, Senator McCarthy told Itkin that he was getting into trouble and allegedly reported that he had passed Itkin's reports to CIA. Itkin then states that a meeting was set up for him either in June/July/or August of 1954 with Mr. Allen Dulles. This meeting was at the Bellevue Stratford in Philadelphia. His contact was reportedly a man known as Philip Harbin.

At this time, Itkin says he was able to report on matters affecting U Nu, then the Premier of Burma, the Indonesian Foreign Minister; and the owner or editor of the New Delhi Times. Itkin also claims to have had personal contacts with Luis Gutierrez, Consul General of El Salvador, and with a number of other people who had Guatemalan contacts. Itkin says the only money he received from Harbin was $5,000.00, which was supposed to be repayable and for which he gave a receipt, he believes sometime in 1957. He said the money was not repaid.

Itkin states that he met Mario Brod in 1961 and that Brod was represented to him as a former Colonel in the OSS who had intelligence connections. From then on his contact was Brod and apparently Harbin dropped out of the picture.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

Agency Files reflect:

No record of Herbert Itkin in Office of Security records, other than newspaper clippings.

No record of Herbert Itkin in RI files.

No record of Philip Harbin in Office of Security.

No record of Philip Harbin as a DCS alias.

No record of Philip Harbin in OS pseudo files.

No record of Philip Harbin as either a pseudo or a registered alias in RI/CRYPTO.

No record of Philip Harbin in RI files.

The file of Mario Brod reflects no information concerning his contacts with Herbert Itkin and reflects no information concerning a Philip Harbin.

During Itkin's meeting with Mr. Houston he mentioned that the law firm had a negro lawyer named Thomas L. Roberts, #193026, who had very useful contacts with the United Nations. Itkin stated that Roberts was a very presentable and intelligent negro who left the firm and now had a law practice in Dakar.

The Office of Security file concerning Roberts reflects that:

> Mr. Roberts [is a current employee of this Agency under deep cover in Dakar] In January of 1968 Roberts furnished this Office with an extensive summary of his past association with Herbert Itkin. He also mentioned that he and Itken had associated with Mario Brod at a dinner party in 1965 and had had lunch with Brod in 1967. There is no indication, however, that Roberts is aware of any use of Itken as a CIA informant during the 1950's.

08

SECRET
EYES ONLY

1/N

16 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Security

SUBJECT : Comments on Manuscript Give Us This Day; CIA and the Bay of Pigs Invasion by Edward J. Hamilton

1. This manuscript has evidently been kicking around in publishing circles since at least mid-1968, presumably without CIA clearance. William Buckley of the National Review seems to have been "shopping" it at one point. One publisher rejected it as too "controversial", and noted its "confidential" nature as well as its potential for libel suits.

2. In the foreword to this manuscript, the author (whom I shall refer to under his assumed name of Hamilton), describes the book as a "personal account" of CIA's role in the Bay of Pigs affair in which he was a senior CIA participant for 19 months. He notes in the foreword his hope that someone would have written this book so that he would not have to do it; now convinced that, if he does not write it, it will never be written, he has taken up his pen "reluctantly and in a mood of nostalgic bitterness." Hamilton states that he has used no official files or documents and has consulted no one in preparing this work. Where true names are used in the manuscript for CIA personnel, he writes that they have been publicly identified before, and in this contention I believe that he is correct, with the possible exception of [Jim Noel] The author's claim that this book would provide no information not known to Castro's intelligence service, or that details this late are of no value to the opposition, is, in my view, seriously open to question.

3. The book is, in general, favorable to CIA actions in the Bay of Pigs. The villains of the piece are certain liberal figures in the Kennedy Administration (Schlesinger, Goodwin, Stevenson) and to some extent, the President himself. In his concluding chapter, the author's bitterness is undisguised against those in the Administration and the press who took the opportunity of the Bay of Pigs incident to attack and denigrate CIA.

4. Messrs. Bissell and Barnes and the author's other CIA co-workers in the Cuban Project, by and large, are given quite favorable treatment. One exception is General Cabell, whom the author excoriates, and it is apparent that Hamilton's opinion of Jerry Droller is far from

EYES ONLY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/JD

03

favorable, both on political and professional grounds. [Jim Noel] also comes out poorly.

5. It is apparent that Hamilton feels very deeply about the Bay of Pigs and its aftermath, to the extent that he is willing to put his career on the line by circulating this manuscript to several publishers without apparent clearance or authorization. He has utilized as his nom de plume the special name assigned to him in the project for dealing with the Cuban Frente, and it would not take anyone who was involved in the Cuban Project more than a few pages of reading to identify the author, as one potential publisher pointed out. The manuscript itself is the most comprehensive story of a CIA operation that has ever been written for publication to my knowledge. Meetings, conversations, and internal and external CIA actions are here reported extensively and with all the authority of an "insider" who was there. It far exceeds in detail anything that has been written on the Bay of Pigs, including Charles Murphy's article in Fortune of September 1961 or the "insider" books that were published following the death of President Kennedy.

6. Attached herewith is a chapter-by-chapter description of the manuscript particularly as it affects CIA security. This analysis states what the author states, whether right or wrong. Where I have occasionally added comments of my own, they are in brackets [].

Walter Pforzheimer
Curator
Historical Intelligence Collection

Attachment
As noted above

Distribution w/att.
Orig& 2 - D/Security w/att.
2 - HIC

SECRET

1-70

Chapter I

1. The chapter opens in 1956 in Ambassador Gardner's office in Havana, where a courtesy call was being paid on the Ambassador by the CIA Central American and Caribbean Chiefs of Station who are holding their annual regional meeting. It is noted that one of the reasons for selecting the place of meeting was the "absence of Communist embassies" (p. 6). The presence of Col. J. C. King, Division Chief, is mentioned. Col. King remarks that Castro was "heavily involved" in the Bogotazo, setting the stage for Hamilton's subsequent comment. [Actually Castro played a junior role in the Bogotazo, and it was after the Bay of Pigs that Mr. Dulles assigned Hamilton the task of determining Castro's role in the Bogotazo.] (p. 7). Hamilton states that in the subsequent three years, while funds were being collected in South America for Castro's 26th of July Movement, there were no orders from CIA Headquarters to penetrate pro-Castro groups abroad (p. 10). He then states that in March 1960 he was "having coffee with the newly-elected president of the country to which I was assigned." (p.10) [This could reveal the author's relationship with [President Nardone of Uruguay] who became President in early [March 1960.]]

2. Mr. Richard Bissell and Mr. Tracy Barnes are mentioned and the author adds that he had worked with Barnes as a member of the team that ousted President Arbenz from Guatemala (p. 11). At this point Hamilton is recalled to Headquarters to become Chief of Political Action in an Eisenhower-approved project to assist Cuban exiles in overthrowing Castro. His duties would include organizing Cuban leaders into a government-in-exile which would form a provisional government in Cuba when Castro was forced out. Hamilton's base was to be in Costa Rica, provided ex-President Pepe Figueres could obtain Costa Rican agreement (p. 11). [This link could be quite embarrassing in view of Figueres' recent re-election as President of Costa Rica.]

3. At this point the manuscript introduces the Project Chief as Jake [presumably Mr. Esterline], who is referred to as Jake throughout (p. 12). We also meet Droller about whom there is some "diversity in attitudes" among CIA officers. Droller's operational name of Frank Bender is noted (p. 13), and he is referred to as Bender throughout the rest of the manuscript. [This is not the first time Droller has been identified as Bender; his name was blown by Arthur Schlesinger in his book A Thousand Days in 1965.] Bender's cover telephone arrangements in Miami and New York, which allowed him to answer local calls there at his Washington desk, are disclosed (p. 14). Hamilton states that Bender told him that as far as he knew "Richard Helms, Chief of Operations for the Clandestine Services, had not been cut in" (p. 14).

2-071

4. Hamilton calls on the Project's Propaganda Chief [presumably Dave Phillips], whom he calls Knight throughout, noting that Knight had worked for him on the Guatemala project. He notes that Knight "had spent most of his CIA career on the outside, i.e., under cover", and that he had spent the three preceding years under cover in Havana. At this point Knight was also establishing a clandestine radio on Swan Island (p. 15). The Paramilitary Chief is also introduced and is called Ned throughout. (p. 15). Ned tells Hamilton that Cuban refugees are being recruited and polygraphed at Useppa Island off Fort Myer, Florida (p. 16). Hamilton is also advised of the role of Roberto Alejos and of the Retalulehu base in Guatemala; that all this had the consent of Guatemalan President Ydigoras. [This has all been previously published.] (p. 16). Hamilton lists certain Cuban leaders, most of whom were helped by CIA to escape from Cuba. This Hamilton considered ironic, because the Chief of Station, Havana, Jim Noel, and his deputy, Earl Williamson, "had been enthusiastic over Castro while he was in the Sierra Maestra, and had treated with certain rebel groups . . . " (p. 17). Hamilton also charges that Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom and William Wieland "exercised considerable influence" over Col. J. C. King (p. 18).

5. Hamilton returned to his station, closed out his affairs and then came back to Washington. Resigning from the Foreign Service, "my cover at the time", he then flew to Spain to try to defect the Cuban military attache there (p. 20).

3-JN

Chapter II

1. In this chapter Hamilton states that Barnes and others recommended that he visit Havana, and that the CIA Cover Staff provided him with the documentation for his operational alias of Edward J. Hamilton which he kept for the duration of the Project (p. 23). Upon returning from Havana, Hamilton prepared a report and recommendations. The first recommendation was that Castro be assassinated before or coincident with the invasion. Hamilton considered this his principal recommendation, but Barnes would only tell him subsequently that it was in the hands of a "special group." So far as Hamilton was able to determine, no plan was ever developed within CIA to assassinate Castro (pp. 30-31). [These comments would be unfortunate if published, in view of current charges in the press of various CIA "assassinations".]

2. Hamilton describes a luncheon that he and Jake had with Brig. General Robert Cushman, then Assistant for National Security Affairs to Vice President Nixon. Hamilton had known Cushman when the latter had had an earlier tour in CIA, and Jake said that Cushman followed the Cuban Project for the Vice President. Hamilton states that Cushman advised him that Nixon "as Chairman [sic] of the National Security Council, was the real spark plug behind the project" and the Administration's focal point and troubleshooter regarding it. The General gave Hamilton his private telephone number in the event that he had something for the Vice President's urgent attention (pp. 31A-32).

Chapter III (commencing at page 34)

1. As in Chapter II, here again Hamilton's distaste for Bender comes through. The difference is particularly one of their political philosophies -- Hamilton being quite conservative and Bender being a liberal, i.e., Hamilton was pro-Nixon, Bender apparently anti-Nixon. Hamilton gets the impression (in both Chapters II and III) that conservative Cuban elements, such as the business and professional communities, would not be much utilised in the Project's plans. In Hamilton's view, the emphasis was on utilising Cubans who had originally supported Castro but who had fled Cuba when they became aware of the direction in which the Castro Revolution was moving.

2. In this chapter, Hamilton discusses the main leaders of the Frente with whom he was to work, and their budget (pp. 35-39).

3. Hamilton tells of visiting the Cuban Project headquarters in Coral Gables, noting the building's disguise as an electronics firm for cover purposes (p. 39), as well as CIA subsidies to Cuban exile groups and newspapers. In an intra-office squabble with the paramilitary elements of the Project, Hamilton loses control of military hardware, a decision he considers basically wrong in that it placed the paramilitary people in charge of what the Cubans wanted most and thus undercut Hamilton's political action role (pp. 42-43). The bulk of the chapter describes the various members of the Frente including their idiosyncrasies, as well as some account of those who would not join.

Chapter III (commencing at page 45. This is a second Chapter III and apparently was misnumbered.)

1. The attempt to locate the Frente in Costa Rica having failed, it was determined to set them up in Mexico City, to which Hamilton and his family now repaired. Hamilton's office was to be independent [of the Station] and his cover was to be that of a fiction writer. Hamilton's use of an American businessman in Mexico named Sam as his principal manager of Frente activities, safehouses and the like are described. Here the name of Manolo Ray is first introduced (pp. 50-52). 16

2. Harassment by the Mexican police and other authorities, including some attempted surveillance, caused Hamilton to recommend withdrawal from Mexico. This caused some problem because President Eisenhower wanted the Project to appear as Cuban as possible, which presented difficulties on American soil. However, things proved so difficult in Mexico that the Frente was moved back to Miami in October 1960. This caused some personal difficulty to Hamilton because it was impossible to explain to his young children why he should be living under an assumed name in Miami. As a result, his wife and children were forced to come back to Washington, while Hamilton stayed in Miami.

Chapter IV

1. Mention is made of the training of an exile parachute battalion in Guatemala. The training was being handled by Colonel Lake [presumably Lou Rucker], "one of the world's most experienced parachutists" (p. 57). Mention is also made of Hamilton's assistant, Bernie, who had originally joined the Havana police force at CIA request, which ultimately lost him his U. S. citizenship (p. 59). CIA funding of the Frente through foreign banks is noted (p. 60). Some problems with Bender including a security breach, which came to the attention of the FBI, are mentioned (p. 61). Another security flap is noted (pp. 63-64), when it was discovered that Hamilton's assistant in Mexico City had his briefcase stolen with compromising documents. Hamilton was required by Col. King to return to Washington to make a recorded statement on his relations with Sam and also possibly to submit to a polygraph. The resultant interview was such that Hamilton became "convinced of Col. King's ill-will, and never spoke to him after that" (p. 65). Hamilton states that a Marine Colonel named Haskins had been placed in charge of the Project's paramilitary operations, seconded from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He garnered Hamilton's ill-will by refusing to accede to the Frente's request that they be permitted to visit the training site in Guatemala.

2. There is some mention of relations with the Coast Guard in Florida in alerting them to those boats which CIA desired to allow to go through to Cuba without being stopped. This chapter also includes the usual problems of squabbling within the Frente.

Chapter V

1. Hamilton writes in this chapter (p. 77), and in several subsequent chapters, of the general failure of infiltration efforts into Cuba, the roll-up of those that got there, and the poor record for delivering supplies to those anti-Castro guerrillas who might have gotten into Cuba. Maritime operations also were not very effective.

2. Hamilton underscores the fact that at no meeting of which he was aware was it asserted that the Cuban underground or population was scheduled to play a significant role in the invasion. He notes the many statements to the contrary that appeared in the press and elsewhere from uninformed commentators (p. 79). The remainder of the chapter describes Hamilton's views on various members of the Frente, his conversations with them during the period between the election of 1960 and President Kennedy's inauguration, during which time a lot of the activity ground to a halt. Hamilton here also again airs one of his major gripes, namely that the Cuban political objectives were being continually downgraded in favor of the paramilitary operations (pp. 92-93).

Chapter VI

1. In this chapter Hamilton levels some criticism at Ambassador Bonsal, whom he describes as ineffectual and whom he calls "fumbling Phil" (pp. 94-95)

03

2. Hamilton describes Jim Noel's arrival at the Miami Base, following the severing of diplomatic relations with Cuba, as "unwelcome", because he felt him to be "basically either soft on Communism or at least terribly confused about the issues" (p. 96). Hamilton offers his criticism of Manuel (Manolo) Ray because the latter had stayed with Castro too long and was now sounding a theme of "the revolution betrayed" which was finding favor at the White House, State and CIA.

1-JD

Chapter VII

1. This chapter relates Hamilton's touchy visit, with some members of the Frente, to the Guatemala training bases. Their breakfast conversations with President Ydigoras are described. This breakfast gives the author a chance to reflect back on the CIA role in the overthrow of Guatemalan President Arbenz. He recalls the three exiled leaders of Guatemala, his own support for Dr. Cordova to head the new government, and State's veto of Col. Ydigoras as "vaguely authoritarian." At a crucial moment, however, Dr. Cordova had to undergo cancer surgery and therefore could not be selected; the choice fell on Castillo Armas. Now Ydigoras was President but was subsequently overthrown because he had done so much for the U.S. and Cuba (pp. 119-122).

27, 41

2. Bob Davis, the CIA Chief in Guatemala, is mentioned as a participant in the breakfast with Ydigoras. [Davis' name has been published previously.]

3. At the Guatemalan training site, Hamilton refers to being greeted there by an American Army Lt. Colonel whose name was "Frank." In a footnote, Hamilton adds that this officer had been detailed to CIA for the Project, and that "Credible allegations of his actions during the invasion strongly suggest that he was to some extent mentally unbalanced" (p. 124). Hostile conversations between Hamilton and "Frank", as well as the initial unfortunate polemics of Frente chief Tony Varona, are described.

4. The presence of Green Berets to help in the training of the Brigade is noted. Colonel Lake's presence and parachute training is again mentioned (pp. 135-136).

Chapter VIII

1. This chapter describes more conversations regarding internal problems within the Frente, one of whose members is trying to bring in Manolo Ray (p. 140-145).

2. Hamilton then tells of a meeting with Bissell who said that he was under White House pressure to broaden the political base of the Frente. Evidently former Venezuelan President Betancourt, former Costa Rican President Figueres and Puerto Rican Governor Muñoz Marin were insisting on the inclusion of Manolo Ray (p. 146). Schlesinger and Goodwin were also backing Ray. Hamilton mentioned that the Cubans did not like Ray because of the lateness with which he broke from Castro (p. 147). Bissell noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to send an evaluation team to the training camps to appraise the state of readiness (p. 148).

3. Tracy Barnes takes Hamilton to see Schlesinger at the White House where the latter is working on his famous White Paper on Cuba (p. 151). It was there that Hamilton learned that Secretary of State Rusk had veto'd the original point of invasion as too "noisy." Ambassador Stevenson joins the meeting and asks Barnes if everything was going well. Hamilton interprets this remark as indicating that the Ambassador knew about the invasion plans, which the latter had subsequently denied. Hamilton also mentions the fact that Barnes had kept a memorandum of his briefing of Stevenson before the invasion (pp. 152-153).

Chapter IX

1. Hamilton states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessment team visited the Guatemalan camps and issued an enthusiastic appraisal as to the Brigade's training and battle readiness (p. 160). The author notes that this was important in the light of post-invasion attempts by the Pentagon to play down their role.

2. In a footnote, Hamilton writes that after the invasion Bender "was galled" by the fact that the exiles referred to him freely, and usually in unflattering terms (p. 162). Hamilton also adds that he learned that [Jim Noel] and [Will Carr,] "Col. King's crony", were becoming increasingly active among non-Frente Cubans in Washington and New York (p. 163). [This presumably cut across Hamilton's political action lines.]

3. The remainder of the chapter is largely taken up with discussions of intra-Frente problems, with a note of the fact that American infiltration operations into Cuba had virtually ceased because of their lack of success.

2 KTD

Chapter X

1. This chapter opens with an unsuccessful internal revolt against President Ydigoras in Guatemala and indicates the desire of the Cuban Frente and some of the Cuban Brigade in Guatemala to come to his assistance. Hamilton relayed this request to Washington, where it was considered by Bender, Barnes and Bissell, and presumably higher levels, and turned down (p. 180). Ydigoras succeeded in putting down this revolt. Hamilton notes that he subsequently learned that several companies of the Brigade had disobeyed orders, made a show of force at a rebel stronghold and helped stifle the uprising (p. 182).

2. In mid-March 1961, Hamilton was summoned back to Washington to a meeting with Bissell, Barnes, Jake, Bender and 03 [James Noel]. Barnes pointed out that the White House wanted a broader base in the Frente, and how important it was to the White House to bring Manolo Ray into the picture. Hamilton pointed out that the Cubans disliked Ray and that a large percentage of the Cubans accepted the Frente. 03 [Noel] indicated that Ray was not as bad as painted, while Hamilton listed the Cuban objections to Ray's program of Castroism without Fidel and the length of time it took Ray to become disillusioned with Castro. Furthermore, Ray's program did not include returning to the Cuban Constitution of 1940 which the others all supported (pp. 185-189). As a result of the desire to force Ray into the Frente, Hamilton resigned his position in Miami and was reassigned (p. 189). 03 [Jim Noel] and 03 [Carr] replaced him (p. 190).

4-JD

Chapter XI

1. Hamilton moved to Washington to assist Knight [presumably Dave Phillips] in the propaganda work. An attempt to secure Mexican cooperation to obtain a re-fueling stop for the Guatemalan-based aircraft scheduled to bomb Cuba failed because of the venality of a Mexican air force officer whose price CIA would not meet. In Hamilton's view, this was an error.

2. As the Frente leaders were clamoring for invasion information, it was determined to bring them to New York and to tell them if they wanted to learn the assault plans and go to the beachhead, they would have to agree to remain in isolation from that date forward. Hamilton stresses the "voluntary" basis for this agreement, to counter later charges that CIA had kidnapped the Frente and imprisoned them by force (p. 200).

3. With regard to the selection of the Bay of Pigs landing site, Hamilton states that assault plans were almost entirely in the hands of the Pentagon (p. 203). Relations with Lem Jones' public relations firm in New York are noted (p. 204).

4. A CIA project officer is flown to the Carrier Boxer, flagship of a naval task force that was assembled in Puerto Rican waters. This officer was to serve as liaison between the naval task force commander, CIA Headquarters and the Cuban Brigade (p. 205).

Chapter XII

1. This chapter tells of the initial air raid on Cuba. Ambassador Stevenson's doubt at the UN as to the origins of the planes are surfaced, and Barnes and Hamilton draft a message to Stevenson. When Stevenson received it and was advised of the true nature of the planes, Hamilton heard that Stevenson had called the White House to express his resentment (p. 211).

2. U-2 photography showed that the initial air raid on Cuba had not been as successful as claimed, and a second strike was being prepared when General Cabell entered the Headquarters War Room (p. 214). Cabell stated that he thought only one air strike had been authorised, but the Project Officers gave as their opinion that there had been no limitation other than to knock out the Cuban air force. General Cabell sent for Bissell and stated that the matter would have to be checked out with Secretary Rusk. In the meantime, the second strike was held up (p. 215). Cabell and Bissell went to meet Rusk at State. Adverse comments in the War Room about General Cabell are quoted (p. 216).

EYES ONLY

Chapter XIII (commencing at p. 218)

1. The tenor of remarks in this chapter and in the conclusion of the previous chapter is that the meeting with Rusk included the President, Rostow, and Stevenson. [Other authoritative accounts have included only Rusk, Cabell and Bissell; Tracy Barnes has said he also was present. It is believed that the President was not at the meeting but was contacted by Rusk on the telephone at his Virginia home. There is no other indication, other than Hamilton's allegation, that Walt Rostow was present]. (p. 219)

2. Hamilton's and other anti-Cabell views are expressed, with an indication that the call-off of the second air strike would not have happened had Dulles been in Washington (pp. 222-223).

SECRET

EYES ONLY

Chapter XIII (commencing at page 225. This chapter is apparently misnumbered.)

1. This chapter describes some of the battle problems at the beachhead. Three jets from the Boxer were allowed a reconnaissance run over the beach (p. 227). Finally the President authorized an hour's air cover from the Boxer, but the time was fouled up and the Brigade's B-26's were shot down before the air cover arrived (p. 230).

Chapter XIV

1. In this chapter, Hamilton is highly critical of the post-invasion attacks on CIA by Administration officials and the press. Hamilton notes the President's establishment of the Taylor Committee to look into the causes of the failure and states his conclusion that the Committee was to "whitewash the New Frontier by heaping guilt on CIA" (p. 234).

2. The only exception to these attacks was Charles Murphy's favorable article in the September 1961 Fortune. Hamilton believes the article to have been authored by a high Administration official who had for months defended the invasion and urged the President to commit air strikes. Hamilton does not reveal the source's name (p. 238). [Presumably Admiral Burke]. Hamilton charges that one subsequent CIA Chief of Cuban Operations was removed because of incompatibility with Robert Kennedy (p. 242).

JAMES " NOEL - 12951
Resigned July 68 - GS-16 N.B.
to Calif

(1)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

written April 1967 pg 1

TRACY BARNES pg 10, 11, etc

PROTECT chief - Jake (Esterline) pg 12

DROLLER (aka FRANK Bender) says Hunt pg 12

ops techniques of Bender pg 13, 14

Helms not cut in although he was COPS pg 14

KNIGHT - propaganda chief, tall (ED HOBBING) pg 15

fluent Spanish, owned Spanish paper

Ned - (Ernest SPARKS) pg 15
(per CANNGAN)

PM chief, retired Marine officer

gone to see says Hunt

cowboy boots, sloppy

[Jim 03 Noel], [Earl 03 Williamson] COS & DCOS of Havana Station pg 17

Rubottom & Wieland exercised influence pg 18
over J.C. KING

99

plays [State cover] pg 20

mentions U-2 project 21, 22

discusses also documentation ET Hamilton etc 23

3SR

②

mentions proposal to assassinate Castro — pg 31

met Gen Cushman with Jake E. discuss — 31A
Nixon and his clothing

Bender held Nixon in low esteem — pg 33

"Jimmy" responsible for procuring infiltration — pg 38
equipment

describes office in Coral Gables — pg 39

Douglas GUPTON, bilingual — pg 39
young propaganda officer

critical of "Jimmy's" performance — pg 42
confrontation with him.

critical of Bender and his view of — pg 44
Cubans

secretary - "vague, dreamy eyed spinster" — pg 45

Jack, Station contact confirmed clearance — pg 46
met with cables, etc. - no details — 47

pg. 3

~~S E C R E T~~

27 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/OA

SUBJECT: LOPEZ, Henry P. (201-253203)

REFERENCE: CI/OA Memorandum of 6 June 1968

In response to the referenced memorandum, the following information is provided:

1. Field and Headquarters traces, other than operational material contained in subject's 201 files, are negative. Green List trace request No. 189405 was submitted 26 June 1968.

2. From 1961 until August 1966, subject lived in Mexico City with his wife and two children. While in Mexico City, subject [was ~~an asset of Station~~ Mexico City and] travelled extensively throughout Central and Latin America [~~on WOFIRM sponsored operational activity~~]. In August 1966, subject was obliged to leave Mexico City due to his wife's increasing medical problem in adjusting to the high altitude encountered there. In October 1966, subject established residence in New York City [where his cover employment has been that of legal consultant to WUSALINE, a WOPLAY proprietary company. He has been employed in this capacity up to the present time.] Since 1965, there have been no changes in subject's family status. 08 24 08

03

[Richard F. Long]
E/IB/S

File.
201-253203
LS 25 June 1968

~~S E C R E T~~

4/98

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE 29 Jan. 1965 ew

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - 2[illegible]3203
[illegible]; [illegible]: LOPEZ, Henry P.

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
01
(LI[illegible])
[illegible]-63
WH/1 (Mexico)

TYPE OF REQUEST ☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CNC ☐ SI	OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date) 5 Feb. 19[illegible]	FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date) [illegible] 1965

USE OF SUBJECT
PA 2 Agent

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

Please up-date indices and [illegible] investigation.

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA DATE 27 APR 1965

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results: See attached - 4 Feb 65

☑ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☐	☒	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐

☐ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached [illegible] CSC
25D H[illegible]

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, // reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS (a) FO [illegible] - Rest [illegible] carried to Mr Kelly - 16 Nov 65 03
27
FBI - [illegible] carried to Mr Kelly - 16 Nov 65 03
FEB 8 08 51 '65
26 Apr 65
CLOSED

DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY, IOS

FORM 3-64 693 SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (9) 2

7/PN

Memo 16 Dec 1962 regarding informations furnished by George Winters, #55769

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Subject advised that Aline MOSBY was a newspaperman in SCHAPIRO's office. MOSBY, during the past year, had been in the hospital on several occasions, and one didn't see too much of her. Subject also advised that MOSBY stuck mostly to the foreign circuit rather than the Embassy circuit. Subject stated that one of the reasons MOSBY was in the hospital, on one occasion, was the fact that she had an abortion, according to gossip.

✓ Subject stated that another newspaperwomen in Moscow was Priscilla JOHNSON. Subject advised that JOHNSON had the reputation of being a fairly good reporter and one whom the Soviets kept on a month to month visa basis. Subject indicated that it was highly possible the Soviets had attempted to recruit JOHNSON, as she spent a lot of time with Soviet nationals.

Subject was queried as to whether he had ever made an unauthorized disclosure of classified information in the Soviet Union, to which he replied that he had not disclosed classified information as such. He stated that his cover, which he had used for the period in between State Department assignments, was that he was a consultant of the AEC, particularly to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee; composed of AEC, CIA, State, NSA, Joint Chiefs, and the Armed Services. Subject stated that he had indicated to individuals, when questioned, that he had done economic research and analysis in the Soviet field and that he had done this ever since he had first become a State Department employee. Subject stated that, among others, he had discussed this with Ray HUTCHINS, his counterpart in the British Embassy.

99
24
06108

Subject was asked for his itinerary on his return trip to the United States and who authorized the trip. Subject stated that he had long planned to come home via the Far East, and it was a well publicized plan. He stated that when he left Moscow, he stayed over in Delhi for a week to see if there were any objections from Headquarters as to his itinerary. He stated that when he received no instructions to the contrary, he returned to the United States via his previously announced plans and the differences in fares being borne by him.

Subject departed Moscow 1 September 1960 (1:00 A.M.); went to Tashkent and then to Delhi where he spent one week; Bangkok, 4 days; Saigon, 6 days; Hong Kong, [illegible] days; Tokyo, 5 days; Hawaii, 5 days; San Francisco, 5 days; Los Angeles, 2 days; Las Vegas, 2 days; Denver, 10 days; arrived Washington 24 October 1960.

4
6R

Chief, Overseas Branch, Employees Division, SSS
Attention: J. S. Reff
Chief, Special Security Branch

DEC 7 1950

RITTENHOUSE, John F. (Pseudo - OPC)
#23500

RECORDED
CONTROL D

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 November 1950 requesting security concurrence in the conversion of the Subject's status from that of OPC Staff Employee to that of OPC Staff Agent. It is contemplated that the Subject will be assigned to Mexico City, Mexico, as GS-13, Intelligence Officer, under deep State cover.

This is to advise that from a security standpoint this office offers no objection to the proposed conversion and assignment of the Subject.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

GEORGE P. LOKER, JR.

JFR:mp
cc: file

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Special Security Branch
Attn: Mr. George P. Loker, Jr.

DATE: 28 November 1950

FROM : Chief, Overseas Branch

SUBJECT: John F. Rittenhouse (Pseudo - OPC)
#23500

Concurrence is requested in the conversion of the subject's status from that of OPC Staff Employee to that of OPC Staff Agent. The subject is to be assigned to Mexico Cit [illegible] as a GS-13, Intelligence Officer under Department of State Deep Cover.

It is further requested that the appropriate certification be sent to Mr. Emshey's office in the Department of State.

Joseph S. Reff
JOSEPH S. REFF

No indices [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] 1 Nov [illegible]

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

IG:
:F:
F:
TE:

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

NF:

☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE , VR

SECRET (classification)

PAGE 3 (date and time filed)

(elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 165476

KNOW THEM AND BELIEVE THEM TO BE RELIABLE, WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR BEING RESPONSIVE WITHOUT GIVING AWAY ANY SENSITIVE OPERATIONAL DETAILS.

2. DO NOT COMMENT ON ACTIVITIES OF ANY OTHER AGENCY. DO NOTDISCUSS JKLANCE OR ANY OTHER AGENCY FUNDING, PERSONNEL FIGURES OR INADEQUACIES. DO NOT DISCUSS INTELLIGENCE RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, OR COVERT ACTION OR OTHER OPERATIONS.

3. YOU MAY INDICATE PRINCIPAL JKLANCE FUNCTION ABROAD IS TO DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION NEEDED BY NATIONAL POLICY LEVELS PARTICULARLY THAT NEEDED ON SUCH CLOSED COUNTRIES AS SOVIET UNION, CHINA AND OTHER DENIED AREAS. THIS IS ALSO AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUINITY TO THROW DOWN DEFINITELY AND POSITIVELY FALSE ALLEGATIONS SUCH AS JKLANCE INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTICS TRAFFIC, IN MURDER OF MALCOM X AND OTHER OUTRIGHT FALSEHOODS RE JKLANCE WHICH ARE IN CIRCULATION.

4. BEFORE ANY CONVERSATION WITH ANY NEWSWEEK

5
4
3
2
1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

~~SECRET~~

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:

FILE , VR ,

SECRET
(classification)

PAGE 4
(date and time filed)

(elite)
(reference number)
(pica

CITE DIRECTOR 165476

to

CORRESPONDENT, PLEASE INSURE THAT THERE WILL BE NO MENTION BY HIM OF NAMES OF JKLANCE PERSONNEL AND THAT ANYTHING SAID BY YOU WILL BE FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY, NOT FOR QUOTATION AND NOT FOR ATTRIBUTED PUBLICATION. THERE IS A VERY REAL CONCERN FOR PERSONNEL IDENTIFIED AS JKLANCE BECOMING TARGETS FOR PHYSICAL [redacted] HARM BY EXTREMISTS, A PROBLEM WHICH HAS ACTUALLY ARISEN IN SOME AREAS. PLEASE ADVISE ANY CONVERSATIONS YOU HAVE WITH NEWSWEEK CORRESPONDENTS GIVING DETAILS OF QUESTIONS ASKED AND REPLIES GIVEN.

END OF MESSAGE

TH Karamessines

Thomas H. Karamessines
DDP

RELEASING OFFICER

J. Goodwin
in draft

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

8
4
3
2
1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 66-4

G: W. Nelson/SHalpern
: C/FE; EA/DDP
: 1428/9203
TE: 30 July ~~196~~ 1971

6

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2	SMS	7	
3		8	C/FD
4	OSD	9	
5		10	

ILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

6 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

NF: C/FE 4 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CSRF, C/RI/AN, C/AF5, C/DO4, C/EUR5, C/CA3, C/FE/CO4, C/FE/LOC2, C/FE/VNO4, C/NE5, C/WH8, EX/DIR, DCI (GOODWIN), DDS2, D/SECUR4, C/FI2, C/CI,

SECRET (classification) 30 JUL 71 16 23z (date and time filed) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 165476

BOOK MESSAGE PRIORITY TO ALL 99

ALGIERS, [redacted], KINSHASA, ADDIS ABABA, ASMARA, [redacted], NAIROBI, MONROVIA, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, TANANARIVE, [redacted], RABAT, CASABLANCA, LAGOS, [redacted], PRETORIA, DAKAR, [redacted], KHARTOUM, [redacted], TUNIS, [redacted], DO/BASE/WASHINGTON, DO BASE/LOS ANGLES, DO BASE/SAN FRANCISCO, DO BASE/CHICAGO, DO BASE/BOSTON, DO BASE/NEW YORK, VIENNA, [redacted], BRUSSELS, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, LONDON, LCPIPIT, HELSINKI, PARIS, BONN, BERLIN, FRANKFURT, HAMBURG, MUNICH, [redacted], ROME, [redacted], THE HAGUE, OSLO, LISBON, MADRID, STOCKHOLM, BERN, GENEVA, ZURICH, CANBERRA, [redacted], ~~RANGOON~~ RANGOON, PHNOM PENH, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, HONOLULU, DJAKARTA, [redacted], TOKYO, [redacted], SEOUL, VIENTIANE, [redacted], KUALA LUMPUR, WELLINGTON, OKINAWA, MANILA, SINGAPORE, BANGKOK, [redacted], SAIGON, [redacted], COLOMBO, NICOSIA,

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

2/90

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

RIG:
NIT:
XT:
ATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

Y________ PER________ #________

ONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RI

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR ,

(classification) PAGE 2 (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pi

SECRET

99

CITE DIRECTOR 165476

ATHENS, NEW DELHI, [redacted] CALCUTTA, [redacted] TEHRAN, AMMAN, JERUSALEM, KUWAIT, BEIRUT, [redacted] ISLAMABAD, DACCA, KARACHI, [redacted] JIDDA, [redacted] ANKARA, ISTANBUL, CAIRO, [redacted] BUENOS AIRES, LA PAZ, RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, [redacted] SANTIAGO, [redacted] BOGOTA, [redacted] SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, [redacted] WH/MIAMI, [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, [redacted] PANAMA CITY, [redacted] LIMA, [redacted] [redacted] MONTEVIDEO, CARACAS,

RYBAT NEWSMEN

1. NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE IS IN PROCESS OF PREPARING MAJOR STORY ON U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INCLUDING JKLANCE. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT STORY WILL DEAL WITH MAJOR AGENCIES IN COMMUNITY, PERSONNEL FIGURES, FUNDING, ADEQUACIES AND INADEQUACIES AND REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS. WE DO NOT WISH YOU TO SEEK OUT NEWSWEEK CORRESPONDENTS IN CONNECTION THIS STORY BUT SHOULD YOU BE APPROACHED BY THEM AND YOU

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
uded from automatic downgrading and

20 February 1970

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: VAN HET REVE, Karel - #839052

REFS: Attached Clippings from the NEW YORK TIMES dtd 11 Jan 1970 and NEWSWEEK dtd 12 Jan 1970

1. References reported that Subject, founder of the Alexander Herzen Foundation in Amsterdam, is publishing the writings of Soviet dissenters; notably Andrei AMALRIK, Andrei SAKHAROV, Pavel LITVINOV and Anatoly T. MARCHENKO.

2. [Subject was granted a POA 24 in June 1969 for use as an informant by SB/PO/M, W. Europe, under Project AEEGGHEAD].

Sarah K. Hall
SRS/OS

Atts. Refs.

[illegible] NEWSWEEK
[illegible]

1
BR

14-00000

NEW YORK TIMES
11 January 1970

New Dutch Group Is Publishing Writings of Soviet Dissenters

By HENRY RAYMONT

A group of West European scholars have set up a non-profit organization, the Alexander Herzen Foundation in Amsterdam, to disseminate works by dissident Soviet writers.

The purpose is to protect the author's name against piracy, political exploitation, careless translations and other complications that have often marked the publication in the West of manuscripts smuggled out of the Soviet Union.

With the increasing interest in Soviet dissent, scores of Western publishers in recent months have turned to the foundation for book rights to such works as Andrei Amalrik's "Will the U.S.S.R. Survive Until 1984?", Anatoly T. Marchenko's "My Testimony," and essays by Pavel Litvinov, grandson of Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Foreign Minister under Stalin.

Though the translations received wide notice in the Western press, little was known about the foundation until one of its representatives came here last week to explain its role to United States publishers.

"We received our inspiration from the enlightened efforts of Alexander Herzen to defy totalitarian methods against Russian authors by publishing them in the West and sending their books back through a literary underground, the representative, who asked not to be identified, said in an interview.

Herzen Had a Journal

Herzen, an aristocratic litterateur and father of Russian socialism, in 1857 started a periodical, Kolokol (The Bell), in London to publicize his ideas and those of other dissidents banned by Tsarist autocracy. The journal established a long tradition of Russian publishing in exile that over the years has included such authors as Lenin, Gorky, Trotsky and Pasternak.

"The new generation of Soviet writers has none of the obsessive fear that characterized the Stalin era," the representative said. "They contend that there is nothing in Soviet law to prevent them from publishing abroad and they insist on exercising their rights."

What differentiates the Herzen Foundation from some of the émigré presses that publish manuscripts smuggled out of the Soviet Union, he maintained, is that it has the approval of the authors to act as their agent abroad.

Established in 1968

The foundation was established in 1968 by Dr. Karel van het Reve became friendly with literature at the University of Leyden, with support from a group of Dutch businessmen.

While he was Moscow correspondent for a Dutch newspaper in 1967 and 1968, Dr. van het Reve became friendly with several writers who asked to be helped in getting their books published in the West.

After he returned to Amsterdam in 1968, Dr. van het Reve was joined by Dr. Jan Besemer, another Russian literature professor, who was also a newspaper correspondent in Moscow, and Peter Reddaway, a lecturer at the London School of Economics. One of the institute's principal advisers is Max Hayward, a translator of Russian literature.

The foundation's procedure is to publish a manuscript in its original Russian text, thereby insuring copyright, before offering it to publishers in Western Europe and the United States.

Since it placed its first book in the West, Mr. Litvinov's "Dear Comrade" (published here by Pitman), the organization has supervised translations and collected royalties for the authors. It is now preparing several test cases to determine whether the authors can be paid through official accounts in the Soviet State Bank.

NEWSWEEK
12 January 1970

Underground Press

By normal city-desk standards, Karel van het Reve wasn't much of a newsman in his days as Moscow correspondent for the Dutch daily Het Parool. "I kept forgetting to ask names and ages," he recalls. But then, van het Reve was really a scholar of Russian literature who had only signed on with the newspaper as a way of spending a year or so in the Soviet Union. And now, back at his lectern at Leyden University, the mild-mannered, [illegible]-year-old ex-reporter is scooping the world by breaking the story of the vocal liberal opposition movement in Russia. Through a foundation named for Aleksandr Herzen, the nineteenth-century Russian writer who printed banned Russian manuscripts abroad, van het Reve has begun releasing a flood of underground political documents and memoirs for publication in the West.

Acting only as agent and translator, van het Reve made headlines with the bitter, apocalyptic pamphlet "Will the U.S.S.R. Survive Until 1984?" by youthful historian Andrei Amalrik, which appeared in the fall issue of the British quarterly Survey. And last week, van het Reve gave Newsweek's Robert J. Korengold an exclusive look at his latest triumph over Soviet censorship: a 400-page dossier on the closed-door trial of four Russian dissidents—Yuri Galanskov, Aleksandr Ginzburg, Aleksei Dobrovolsky and Vera Lashkova—that took place in Moscow's grim Kolomchovka Street courthouse in early 1968.

Van het Reve, as it happens, "covered" that trial himself, shivering with the rest of Moscow's foreign press corps in subzero cold on the street outside the court. The charges were, in essence, complicity in the production of a "white book" of allegedly anti-Soviet documents concerning the 1966 trial of writers Yuli Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky plus alleged collusion with NTS, a counter-revolutionary Russian émigré group in Frankfurt, Germany. Friends of the accused smuggled out thumbnail accounts of each day's proceedings, and when the trial ended, van het Reve, through his friendship with one of the self-appointed court recorders, came into possession of the 120 different manuscripts which make up the book that Longmans Green will publish in Britain later this year.

Time: Though much of the material is technical, courageous voices like that of Ginzburg bring the combative atmosphere of the trial to life. "I thought and I continue to think now," he declared to the judge, "that if I don't agree with something I should express my disagreement openly . . . I know that you will convict me because not one person charged under Article 70 [anti-Soviet activity] has ever been acquitted. I will go off to the camp calmly to serve my time."

Van het Reve naturally isn't eager to reveal how he smuggled out this mass of documentation. "Let's just say I managed," he smiles. Probably through the time-honored methods of the plain brown envelope and the luggage of departing foreigners, he and the Herzen Foundation, which ironically occupies the former headquarters of the Dutch Communist Party in Amsterdam, have "managed" to receive not only the Amalrik pamphlet and the Ginzburg trial records, but a steady flow of other anti-regime works including a sharp attack on Soviet politics by Andrei Sakharov, the noted nuclear physicist, and a factual account of life in the U.S.S.R.'s labor camps by Anatoly Marchenko, who is still serving time for "agitation."

A lapsed Stalinist turned democrat, van het Reve insists that the Herzen Foundation is apolitical. "Our only aim is to give these people a chance to publish and that's all," he says. And if he can keep his foundation clear of damaging outside support and free of any profit motive, as it now appears to be, then he will have gone [illegible] eliminating the credibility gap that has previously beclouded the reception of Russian social critics abroad.

OGC 7 83
30 Sep Oct 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

FROM: Andrew J. Percival
Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT: Agency Connections with the Grand Bahama Development Company

REFERENCE: A. Memo fm C/CCS for Dep. Gen. Counsel, dtd 15 Sept. 76, Same Subj., OGC 76-5044

B. Memo fm D/OS, for OGC, dtd 3 Sept. 76, Subj: Grand Bahama Development Corp. and Wallace Groves OGC 76-4861

1. Referent B forwards an analysis of possible Agency involvement with suspected criminal elements in the Bahamas. Referent A is a commentary on this analysis that details CCS relationships with individuals associated with a company that is reputed to be an employer of organized crime figures. No specific fact is presented that would legally raise the suspicion of the commission of a violation of law, morality or ethics by the U.S. citizen businessmen now cooperating with this Agency: Major General William P. Fisher (USAF-Ret.); Mr. John P. Roulett (USN-Ret.); and Mr. Albert Whisnant.

2. In the sensitivity of this time, it would be imprudent not to recognize that mere proximity to unsavory elements is sufficient for some to suggest guilt by association. This Agency recognizing that unfortunate fact of life has an obligation to protect the rights of those upon whom we have prevailed to cooperate. The only direct method immediately apparent is to sever our relationship with voiced gratitude for past services in the national interest. The timing proposed by C/CCS in referent A appears appropriate.

3. It should be noted that General Fisher's son is a [DDO case officer.] 08 That fact dictates that every effort be made to contain the substance of this and referent memoranda to the narrowest possible audience to preclude unwarranted acrimony and suspicion until proof positive of evil or criminal activity is certain, which event is extremely doubtful.

Andrew J. Percival

cc: Mr. Morrison
Mr. Isenstead
Mr. Koehler
Mr. Gambino ✓

SECRET

2 IMPDET CL BY 02577

OS 64327 1/90

SECRET

REQUEST FOR DOMESTIC COVER LIST ENTRY OR CHANGE

SUBMIT THIS FORM IN TRIPLICATE, ENCLOSED IN SEALED ENVELOPE

TO : **DCB/CCG**
THROUGH: **SSD/OS**
SUBJECT: **Calvin W. Hicks** (true name)

DATE: **21 September 1960**

ENTRY	CHANGE
Inclusion of subject on the Domestic Cover List is requested for the reason noted below. When notified that cover has been established, subject will be specifically authorized and instructed to conceal his Agency affiliation.	Subject is currently included on the Domestic Cover List. For the reason noted below, it is requested that ☐ this employee be removed from the Domestic Cover List. ☐ the following change be made:

REASON

To provide Subject with an organizational affiliation other than CIA.

HHA

COVER *(Complete only for new entries)* 32,12-33

None 1956-58 (Military Staff agent in Cherat)
1958-60 (DAC in Cherat)
32, 12-33

TYPE SUGGESTED *(Specify whether official or non-official)*	Official - (DAC) 32
JUSTIFICATION, IF NON-OFFICIAL COVER SUGGESTED	

Note: Security granted 9/21/60

APPROVED BY CENTRAL COVER DIVISION	REQUESTING OFFICIAL
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE John F. Gardiner Jr. **John F. Gardiner, Jr.**
DATE	TITLE **NE Security Officer**

DC/[illegible]E VER E
DC/[illegible]S
[illegible] SSD
[illegible] Chief
to Chief
IF
[illegible]N OVER E
[illegible] SSD
[illegible] Br.
[illegible] Br.

#43133

FORM 7-58 1323 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET (38)

3/12V

18 MAY 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Calvin W. Hicks, WH/4
Room 2828 B
Quarters Eye

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : HITCH, Cal William (A)
#4313

1. This memorandum confirms receipt of Mr. Hicks' verbal request on 17 May 1961 for security approval for the issuance of documentation in the captioned alias.

2. This memorandum also 03 confirms the verbal security approval furnished to Mr. Richard Major, TSD/IB, on 17 May 1961 for the issuance of the requested documentation.

3. It is understood that the documentation to be issued will include a D. C. driver's license, a Social Security Card 31 and a AAA Insurance Card. It is also understood that the requested documentation will not be backstopped and will be used only for flash purposes in connection with an operational assignment in Florida. According to Mr. Hicks the alias has been registered with RID/OR.

4. Upon termination of Mr. Hicks assignment the documentation should be returned to TSD/IB.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

CC: TSD/IB

SG SIKAS/csm (5-18-61)
CLOSED

MAY 18

DDS/I&S
ADDS/I&S
Chief/SSD
Dep Chief
A to Chief
Files PSD

SECRET

2/12

REQUE FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

43133

FILE

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) RICKS, CALVIN [illegible]	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code [illegible]	5. Sex [illegible]	6. CS - EOD Mo. Da. Yr. 07 10 55
7. EOD Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code [illegible]	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority [illegible] USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible] 55
13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code					

RECORDED
CONTROL DESK

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations [illegible] [illegible] BASE, PAKISTAN	Code [illegible]	15. Location Of Official Station [illegible], PAKISTAN	Station Code [illegible]

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code [illegible]	17. Position Title [illegible] WAR OFF	18. Position No. [illegible]	19. Serv. [illegible]	20. Occup. Series [illegible]

21. Grade & Step [illegible]	22. Salary Or Rate $ [illegible]	23. SD [illegible]	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]	26. Appropriation Number [illegible]

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations [illegible]	Code	32. Location Of Official Station [illegible]	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title [illegible]	35. Position No. [illegible]	36. Serv. [illegible]	37. Occup. Series [illegible]

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

29 SEP 1960

DOB
Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request.
Chief, Personnel Security Division

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET

29 September 1960
File No. K-749

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, NE

ATTENTION : Mr. Gardner

SUBJECT : Calvin W. HICKS
Establishment of Official Cover Backstop

REFERENCE : Form 1322, dated 21 September 1960

1. In compliance with above reference, official cover backstopping which utilizes the U. S. Army Staff Group 32 has been established for the above-named individual. All information concerning this cover arrangement is available in the Official Cover and Liaison Section, CCD.

2. It is requested that OCL/CCD be notified when this cover arrangement is no longer required. Any changes in the Subject's Headquarters status should be coordinated with this office for the determination of need for continued documentation and cover.

3. Subject has been issued Unit ID Card No. 363 for domestic use only. In accordance with arrangements made with Offices of Security and Personnel, the above documentation will be picked up by a CPB representative for any individual making a PCS move from Headquarters or an overseas TDY trip. In the case of the PCS traveler, CPB will return this documentation to OCL/CCD for disposition. For the TDY traveler, this documentation will be retained by CPB and returned to the TDY traveler upon completion of the trip. In the event of a resignation from the Agency, OCL/CCD will obtain the documentation from the employee at the time of the employee's debriefing conference.

/S/ PAUL P. STEWART

JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover ~~& Liaison, CCD~~ Branch, CCG

cc: Personnel Security Division,
Office of Security

V/RJ

FORM 5-60 1554

SECRET

12637 (9-11)

Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

8 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Mr. (Clay Kallander) 03

THRU : Office of Security/OSD
Attn: Mr. Gikas

Central Cover Staff
Attn: Mr. James Franklin

No security objection
9 May 63

SUBJECT : Request for Official Documentation

REFERENCE : WAVE 8138 (IN 32980)

31

1. It is requested that a (U. S. Army Investigator Credential) and Civilian Identification Card be issued in alias to the SAS employee identified hereunder.

2. The credential should identify the employee (with the U. S. Army, Joint Operations Group, and the title designation should be INVESTIGATOR.) 32

3. The credential will be utilized generally in the Southeastern part of the United States and possibly in Latin American in pursuit of the mission of SAS. Further the utilization of the credential will be on a controlled basis as directed by the Chief of Station, JMWAVE.

4. The alias set forth in the attached identity sheet has been registered with RI. Pertinent biographic data has been set forth on the Identity sheet.

5. Photographs for the individual were forwarded to TSD on 6 May 1963. Subject's social security number is (055-18-4137) according to the above reference. 08

6. After the credential has been signed it should be forwarded to P. Lawrence, SAS/Security Officer, Room GH-56.

7. Any questions regarding the foregoing matter should be directed to Mr. Lawrence, ext. 5909.

for VINCENT J. HEYMAN
Chief, SAS/Support

Attachment:
a/s
cc: OS/OSD, CCS

0-#65077

DDS/IOS
ADDS/IOS
ASST/IOS
C/ID
C/OSD
C/SRD
C/AB
C/PB
C/SAB
C/SB
L&TS
FILES

4/01

IDENTITY SHEET

TRUE	**ALIAS**
Balmes N. HIDALGO, Jr.	~~Bernard Norman HILLARY~~ 07

DOB: 27 May 1919

HEIGHT: 5'9"

WEIGHT: 165 lbs.

EYES : Brown

HAIR : Black

SOCIAL SEC NO.: 055-18-4137

63

0-65077
C-65077

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP			DATE 9 April 1964
TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION	ESTABLISHED FOR
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, SAS	HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.
ATTN: Mr. Dawson			FILE NO. K-7412
REF: Request for Cover, 9 April 1964			ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED 32 US Army Element, (Joint Operations Group)			NA

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ________.

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

UPV

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CD/ELL CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

15 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD

ATTENTION : Mr. Clay Kallender

THROUGH : Mr. Ervan Kuhnke — No security objection Cff 16 Aug 62

SUBJECT : HILLARY, Bernard N.

#65077

1. Reference is made to my memorandum dated 19 June 1962 requesting issuance of alias documentation for the captioned Subject.

2. Returned herewith is the New York State drivers license, the National Rifle Association of America card, and the USF&G card issued by you in consequence of the referenced request. The Social Security card, also issued at that time, is retained.

3. It is requested that the same type documentation, including a Virginia drivers license, be prepared for Subject by you with the ostensible residence of the Subject changed to an Arlington, Virginia address.

JEREMIAH J. MULLANE JR
Chief, WH Security

DDS/IOS
ADDS/IOS
ASST/IOS
C/ID
C/[illegible]D
C/[illegible]D
C/AB
C/PB
C/SAB
C/SB
SOh CH
A&TS
FILES

PSD #65077

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

6/P

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DC/PSD

DATE: 2 DEC 1960

FROM : (C'Shea)03

SUBJECT: Hidalgo, Balmes H. Jr.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. A request for security approval for State certification of Subject has been received from OCL, in connection w/30 days' TDY to San Salvador, effective immediately.

2. Subject's file is non-derog; however, as a former FBI informant State Dept appears to have been reluctant to consider him for (integration) in 1957. (See Col. E's Memo of 21 Feb 1957, in file.)

3. Do you wish to check with State prior to OK'ing a certification for this TDY?

(C'Shea)03

3/PV

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Special Security Branch

DATE: 14 December 1950

FROM : Chief, Overseas Branch

SUBJECT: John F. RITTENHOUSE (Pseudo - OPC)
#23500

Re : Clearance dated 7 December 1950

Please cancel your security clearance dated 7 December 1950. The decision has been made that the subject is to be considered a semi-covert employee integrated into the [redacted] He will not be considered deep cover. Subject was integrated into the [redacted] as of 13 December 1950.

Joseph S. Reff
JOSEPH S. REFF

Case closed by memo 12/7/50

SECRET

DWAYNE ORVILLE ANDREAS

1. According to press reports of 25 August 1972, Mr. Andreas is Chairman of the First Oceanic Corporation, Minneapolis, Minnesota. It was his $25,000 check which was given to Mr. Kenneth Dahlberg, Midwest Regional Chairman of the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President, and which eventually made its way into the Miami, Florida, bank account of Watergate participant Bernard L. Barker.

2. Mr. Dwayne Andreas was born on 4 March 1918 at Worthington, Minnesota. He is a recognized agricultural expert, and from April 1952 to the present has responded to intelligence requirements levied by the Central Intelligence Agency through his relationship with its Domestic Contact Service.

3. Beginning in 1962, Mr. Andreas served as Principal 24 Officer of the Andreas Foundation, (a funding mechanism of this Agency.) The latter activity was terminated in 1967.

4. Mr. Andreas' firm, the Archer Daniels Midland Company, Decatur, Illinois, provided cover for five operational assets of this Agency between 1964 and 1969. In arranging for this activity, a total of 11 of the firm's employees were briefed over the years. The Agency's principal contact with the firm was Mr. Andreas' brother, Lowell W. Andreas. Mr. Dwayne Andreas was not made witting of these cover arrangements.

24

2/IN

28 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Chief, SB/2 Desk 24

SUBJECT: COVER, NONOFFICIAL - GENERAL
(Proposal for A&E Assessment of Potential
REDSKIN Agent Candidates)
#90682

1. Reference is made to my previous memorandum pertaining to the subject as captioned, ending with the Memorandum for the Record dated 21 February 1961.

2. As indicated in the 29 referenced memorandum, CCG feels that the PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ASSOCIATES (see copy of SR memorandum dated 3 February 1961 and my memorandum dated 21 February 1961) should not be utilized. This decision was made as a result of a conversation between Mr. Howard OSBORNE, Deputy Chief, SR Division, and Mr. Jack SOUTHARD, Chief, CCG/NC.

3. A meeting was called on 27 February 1961 to determine the type of cover organization that should be substituted for this purpose. After considering the matter at length, it was ascertained that the Agency has a cleared employment service in 10 Pittsburgh which could possibly be utilized as an initial A&E assessment. This firm, the EMPLOYMENT SERVICE COMPANY, 29 is located in the Union Trust Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 10 and is managed by Margaret A. KEARNEY (see SSD File 95018). It was agreed that if the EMPLOYERS SERVICE COMPANY could provide the needed cover, two OTR psychologists would be documented in true name with that firm in Pittsburgh. 10 CCG (Frank O'MALLEY) will make a trip to Pittsburgh in the next few days to determine whether Miss KEARNEY is amenable to the proposed arrangement. The two psychologists selected were Doctors BRADT and McKEE, on whom credit checks were recently completed with negative results as to Agency employment.

4. It was further ascertained at this time that Mr. Howard OSBORNE desired that all training and assessment of REDSKIN Agents who pass the initial screening be conducted

3/1/61

SECRET

outside the Washington, D. C. area. Most of the training will be conducted in an SR safe house in New York. The SR representative will probably request a safe house in Baltimore for the final assessment and processing of those REDSKIN Agents that are cleared in the initial screening by either BRADT or McKEE. 06 It should be noted at this point that SR Division plans to process thirty or thirty-five REDSKIN Agents this year. Time is, of course, of the essence, in view of the fact that these people will have to be assessed, security-cleared, briefed, and trained, and arrangements for grants made before the summer season.

Ervan E Kuhnke Jr.
Ervan E. Kuhnke, Jr.

KUHNKE/ewd(2-28-61)
PENDING

cc: SSD #95018

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

20 February 1961

21 FEB 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Chief, SB/2 Desk

24

SUBJECT: COVER, (NONOFFICIAL) - GENERAL
(Proposal for A&E Assessment of Potential
REDSKIN Agent Candidates)
#90682

1. Reference is made to my previous memorandum pertaining to the proposal to initiate a change of policy with respect to the processing of potential REDSKIN Agents.

2. As will be noted, it was initially recommended that potential REDSKIN Agent candidates be provided with an A&E assessment by OTR prior to disclosure of Agency interest in them and prior to the disclosure of any classified information. This assessment will be conducted utilizing a (nonofficial cover) 24 It was initially suggested that TSD's Psychological Assessment Associates firm now used by Dr. GITTINGER be used for this purpose. If the A&E assessment were favorable, Security would be requested to conduct a full investigation of the Subject and he would be subsequently contacted under alias CIA credentials. At that point, he would be requested to perform a mission for us and would be given requirements for same if he agreed to accept such assignment.

3. Attention is invited to the attached memorandum dated 8 February 1961. A copy of this memorandum was furnished to the writer with the verbal request that credit checks be conducted on all the staff A&E members mentioned. Prior to the initiation of credit checks, it was verbally agreed between the undersigned and Mr. Thomas STRANGE, CCG/NC, that no credit check would be conducted on Jacob GOLDER, in view of the fact that it was known the latter was recently surfaced as an Agency employee. The requested credit checks were completed on or about 16 February 1961 and the results verbally transmitted to Mr. Thomas STRANGE.

Documents results are in individual files

4. As of this date, CCG feels that they may have to establish another notional cover for this program. It is understood that this cover will be utilized in addition to utilizing the (Psychological 24 Assessment Associates.) Pending a further request in this matter from CCG, no further action is contemplated.

Attachment:
A&E Memo dated 8 Feb. 1961

KUHNKE/ewd(2-20-61)

CLOSED

Ervan E. Kuhnke, Jr.

3/21

[illegible]

ATTACHMENT

BRADY, Roger O.	EOD: 12 September 1951 GS-13 Overt employee of the Agency except for 1957-1959, (Saipan - Navy) Cover * WH/4 Project 13-23 32.
COLDER, Jacob V.	EOD: 3 January 1955 GS-15 Overt employee of the Agency - DAC Cover (overseas use) * WH/4 Project
GOODRICH, David C.	EOD: 9 April 1956 GS-13 Overt employee of the Agency * WH/4 Project
KOEMERL, Alice F.	EOD: 20 October 195[illegible] GS-13 Overt employee of the Agency, 1958 - DAC Cover for three months
03 (LAU, James B.)	EOD: 21 September 1951 GS-15 Covert employee of the Agency 1951-1954 Overt Status with CIA 1954-1955 Army Status Overseas 1955-1957 U.S. (Foreign Service) 32 1957-Present Army Civilian Cover
McKEE, Michael G.	EOD: 25 January 1960 GS-12 Overt employee of the Agency

* Participated in TDYs within the U. S. for WH/4 during 1960. Cover for these trips was provided by the operating division.

4/N

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

NAME	PROJECT	FUNCTION
Charles P. DEXTER 03	AEROOT 01 or CAMBARO 01	Case Officer
Bernard EDGECOMB 03	AEROOT 01	Audio Surveillance
John FEILY 03	CAMBARO 01	Photo Instructor
John FIBLE 03	CAMBARO 01	Photo Instructor
George FILL	AEROOT 01	Assessment
Donald GREER 03	AEROOT 01	Commo Officer
John GREGOR 03	AEROOT 01 CAMBARO 01	Log Officer Log Officer
Fred HENDERSON 03	CAMBARO 01	Project Officer
Richard HOLT 03	AEROOT 01	Medical Officer
03 Clarence E. HOWARD	AEROOT 01	Case Officer
Hampton HOWARD 03	AEROOT 01	Firearms Instructor
Herman KIMSEY	AEROOT 01 CAMBARO 01	Documents Instructor Documents Instructor
Aleksi KURGVEL 03 (Contract)	AEROOT 01	Native Consultant
Gulver LADD 03	AEROOT 01 CAMBARO 01	SW Instructor SW Instructor
Demitri LEVITSKY 03 (Contract)	CAMBARO 01	Native Consultant
Arthur LUNDAHL	AEROOT 01	Photography
Edward MALCOMB 03	AEROOT 01	Medical Officer
Edward MASLOWSKY 03	AEROOT 01	Judo Instructor
George MATECKO 03	CAMBARO 01	Airborne Training

7/26/72

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Chief, LEOB	8/28	
2	Deputy Chief, SRS	8-29	
3	C/SRS	8-29-72	
4			
5		8/29/72	
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

#587455

(5) Check Robert KORNGOLD to see if iden with this one, please.
(5) Do you have copy for LOERS file. (apl)
Thanks
BL

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Sarah Hall	8/28/72

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 (40)

28 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, SRS

THROUGH : Chief, LEOB/SRS

SUBJECT : KORENGOLD, Robert J. #495685

REFERENCE : CIA Cable No. 689548 dated 22 August 1972 from [London]
15-1

1. Information contained in Subject's file is of a miscellaneous nature. He has had no Agency affiliation or use.

2. An FBI reply dated 19 October 1966 to an inquiry from this Agency stated that FBI files contained references to Subject's assignment in Moscow as a correspondent for Newsweek but did not contain any information of a derogatory nature concerning KORENGOLD.

3. Extract of Foreign Service Dispatch No. 392 from Amembassy Moscow to the Department of State, Washington, D. C. dated 12 December 1960 listed Robert KORENGOLD as UPI correspondent in Moscow. No remarks were made concerning KORENGOLD.

4. An Overseas Press Bulletin dated 24 April 1965 reported that Newsweek's bureau chief, Robert KORENGOLD, gave a cocktail party for visiting Newsweek's foreign editor, Robert CHRISTOPHER.

5. On page 4 of a Department of State report of investigation dated 14 December 1965 regarding the activities of a Department of State employee in Moscow, William Henry LUERS, LUERS said that Robert KORENGOLD, Newsweek correspondent, was interested in interviewing a Soviet painter whose work had been shown in Paris. The report further stated "At KORENGOLD's request, LUERS

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

1
8R

attempted to arrange for such a meeting through Andre AMALRIK. After calling from the Embassy to arrange the appointment, LUERS and KORENGOLD went to AMALRIK's apartment. The painter was not there, and shortly after their arrival two militia men and KGB officers came to AMALRIK's apartment. AMALRIK was arrested, tried, and sentenced for being a 'parasite'. LUERS said that his superior at the Embassy, Malcolm TOON, was unhappy about this activity and was critical of LUERS in his efficiency rating because of it. LUERS said he did not previously mention it to the interviewing agent because he did not wish to further complicate matters." (LUERS was security approved as a GS-7 JOT in June 1957, subject to technical interview, but his case was cancelled when he accepted another position. He was subsequently granted liaison clearances in February and March 1962.)

6. A New York Times article for 11 January 1970 reported that Karel VAN HET REVE had given an exclusive interview to Newsweek's Robert J. KORENGOLD concerning the trial of four Russian dissidents. (Karel VAN HET REVE - #839052 was granted a POA in June 1969 24 for use as an informant by SB/PO/M, West Europe, under Project AEEGGHEAD.)

7. Subject's file contains a copy of his business card identifying him as UPI correspondent in Moscow. A notation by E. MENDOZA/SRS dated August 1960 states "KORENGOLD's card was picked up by Barbara POWERS in Moscow during trial of Francis POWERS."

15-1

8. CIA Cable 389853 dated 29 July 1971 from London advised that Mr. Robert James "Bud" KORENGOLD, London correspondent, Newsweek, had told Mr. Eugene ROSENFELD, Press Attache, American Embassy, London, that Newsweek was planning to do a cover story on the Agency and KORENGOLD was looking for anecdotes favorable to the Agency. Headquarters guidance was requested in cable. A CIA Book Message dated 30 July 1971 was sent priority advising that Newsweek magazine was in process of doing a major story on U.S. intelligence community, including CIA, and while cable recipients were not to seek out Newsweek correspondents, they were to be responsive under certain limitations which were specified in detail in the book message.

Sarah K. Hall
SRS/OS

SKH:jmn

2
BR

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 25 May 1962

TO:
☐ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: CA SECURITY

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Priscilla Mary Post JOHNSON

PROJECT: 02 [QKOPERA

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO. 70300 ~~70100 01-52373~~

RI 201 FILE NO. 102 798

SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	XX	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

London, U.K. A.S.A.P.

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

oz Clearance to employ SUBJECT as news editor - writer for magazines subsidized by [DTLEAFAGE (China Quarterly and Encounter]. and [Soviet Survey]

Subject has been of previous interest to the Agency though she has not been hired by either a proprietary operation or used in any FI project.

Subject subsequent to clearance and hire will be considered by the Project for possible re-assignment into more responsible work. Appropriate security clearance up-grading will be then requested.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	YES	NO NO
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	YES	NO NO
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	YES	NO NO
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	YES	NO NO

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. Commercial

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED on file OS	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER:

EXTENSION: 5996

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: John J. Murray Jr.
John J. Murray Jr.

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 61

SECRET

7516

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF SUBJECT	FILE NO.

KEY TO ANALYSIS SYMBOLS*

NI = NOT IDENTICAL
I-ND = IDENTICAL - NOT DEROGATORY
U-ND=UNABLE TO IDENTIFY-NOT DEROGATORY
SA = SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(To be completed by requester)*

☐	SEARCH NAMES AS WRITTEN	☐	SEARCH OVERT CARDS ONLY
☐	SEARCH NAME VARIATIONS *(Record known to exist)*	☐	SEARCH COVERT CARDS ONLY
☐	SRD/CAB ANALYSIS OF FILES	☐	SEARCH SUBJECT CARDS ONLY
☐	INDICES CHECK ONLY *(Do not pull files)*	☐	SEARCH ALL CARDS

NO.	NAME - LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE *(Type or print)*	SOURCE DOCUMENT	PAGE	RESULTS OVERT	RESULTS COVERT
1	KING MARTIN LUTHER			353062	
2	NOEL-BAKER PHILIP JOHN			356217	
3	PIRE, DOMINIQUE GEORGE				477800
4	PIRE, (REVEREND)				
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					

NAMES CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

NO.	FILE NO.	TYPE	REFERENCE DOCUMENT	PAGE	ANALYSIS* OR CHARGEOUT
			SRD MAIL ROOM DEC 7 4 50 PM '67		

RESULTS CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

REQUESTER *(Name - Component - Extension)*	DATE COMPLETED	APPROVE FOR FILING *(Initials)*

FORM 1-63 745 REPLACES FORMS 745, 1734, AND 1735 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

INDICES SEARCH REQUEST

SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (38-43)

SECRET

(When Filled In)

NO.	FILE NO.	TYPE	REFERENCE DOCUMENT	PAGE	ANALYSIS* OR CHARGEOUT

SECRET

14-00000
104-10120-10652
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET Do Not Reproduce
(When Filled In)

M342000-L

I understand that no change in my employment status or relationship with the United States Government will relieve me of my obligation under this Agreement.

I have been advised of the procedures to follow in order to determine the identity of individuals who have been approved for access to this Project, the current estimate of hazard involved in travel to a foreign area or to resolve any other question which may arise under this Agreement.

PROJECTS* 24 JENNIFER (AZORIAN, URALITE, LYRICAL, TAMBOURINE, CROFTON)	
NAME OF WITNESS (Type or Print)	NAME (Type or Print) Clare Boothe Luce Clare Boothe Luce
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Robert E Leidenheimer	SIGNATURE
REMARKS PHASE ________ SOCIAL SECURITY# ________ DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________	NAME & ADDRESS OF AFFILIATION PFIAB DATE 1 August 1973

*The signator should place his initials after each Project name.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CROSS REFERENCE FOR PERS. SD FILES

DURING PROCESSING OR REVIEW, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT A POSSIBLE OR ACTUAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTS, OR MAY BE FOUND TO EXIST, BETWEEN OR AMONG THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW:

03 (GERTRUDE L. CULLY DUFFEY)	#187570	subject
03 (JAMES L. DUFFEY)	#34771	subject's spouse
(TIMOTHY JOSEPH BURKE) 06	SD #19130 S.D #19130	subject's ref.
(STEWART L. BURTON) 06	#49893	subject's ref.
(FRANCIS LEO CARROLL) 06	#58032	subject's mbr.
EDWARD C. FENIMORE	#37774	subject's ref.
(JAMES L. MC LAU) 06	#56172	subject's mbr.
(THOMAS F. MC COY) 06	#6236	subject's ref.
CLARE BOOTH LUCE	#HS-2001-L	subject's ref.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

7/PJ

DATE	SIGNATURE
8/2/60	PB/

FORM NO. 1151
1 JAN 57

CONFIDENTIAL

(4-35)

06

(DUFFEY, JAMES DONALD, JR.) 0-535 313

03

(DUFFEY, JAMES D.) - 0-34171 - FATHER

03 (DUFFEY) IS A CURRENT GS-14 STAFF EMPLOYEE WHO EOD IN 1948. N.D.

(DUFFEY, GERTRUDE E.) - 0-187757 - MOTHER

03

SUBJECT'S MOTHER IS A CURRENT GS-9 STAFF EMPLOYEE WHO EOD IN 1960. N.D.

03

(SHEA, JOHN J.) - 0-109907 - CNR

(SHEA) IS A CURRENT GS-15 STAFF EMPLOYEE WHO EOD IN 1956. N.D.

03

LUCE, CLARE BOOTHE - C-169102 - SR

SUBJECT'S SR WAS OF C INTEREST IN MAY 1958; THIS INTEREST WAS CANCELLED IN SEPTEMBER 1958. SHE WAS GRANTED A CSA FOR CONTACT ON 8 AUGUST 1963. N.D.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

18 JAN. 1968

6/RW

RCM:LLH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

16 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Physical Security

FILE

SUBJECT: Renewals of CIA Building Passes

It is requested that CIA Building Passes be renewed for the following individuals who are Members or Alternate Members of the Inter-agency Defector Committee:

Army - Mrs. Dorothe K. Matlack, Pass No. 6120

Major Earnest E. Livaditis, Pass No. 6434

NOTE: Please add 1717 H Street Building to above two passes. Also, please add Administration and East Buildings to Pass No. 6434.

Air Force - Major Warren E. Reid, Pass No. 6507

Colonel Jas T. Bull, Pass No. Unknown

03

JOHN E. BOYLE
Deputy/CDC

On 12/27/57 Subject's SO advised that Subject was cleared for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Date 18 DEC 1958

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request.

Chief, Personnel Security Division

OS: MS 4001 OK

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

[illegible]

FILE-d

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL BRIEFING DATA

NAME [illegible] S.		FILE NUMBER 39418
OFFICE WH	PHONE	RANK OR GRADE GS-15
DEPARTURE DATE 29 Jun 65	STATUS PCS	COVER 32 ~~[illegible]~~ AID
DESTINATION(S) France		DEPENDENTS BRIEFED ☐ YES ☐ NO

PREVIOUS TRAVEL

AREA Cuba	COVER	YEARS 61
AREA Venezuela	COVER	YEARS 55 - 58
AREA	COVER	YEARS

EXPERIENCED TRAVEL - Formal briefing waived ☐ YES ☐ NO

RISK OF CAPTURE TRAVEL BRIEFING

CATEGORY -	A	B	C	D

SPECIAL BRIEFING PROBLEM

TYPE - Must Clear

SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL VERIFIED IN SUBJECT FILE	☐	YES	☐	NO
SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL BASED ON FILE REVIEW BY BRIEFING OFFICER	☐	YES	☐	NO
SECURITY FILE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BEFORE BRIEFING	☐	YES	☐	NO

- ☐ **EMERGENCY CONTACTS** *(met on arrival, phone no., alternate action to make contact)*
- ☐ **SECURITY REGULATIONS** *(operational talk, documents, indigenous employee hazards)*
- ☐ **TRAVEL PRECAUTIONS** *(recognition overseas, camera, black market, currency exchange)*
- ☐ **PERSONAL AFFAIRS** *(charge accounts, traffic tickets, litigation, neighbors)*
- ☐ **PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE** *(limitations, home address, shop talk)*
- ☐ **PERSONAL CONDUCT** *(morals, drinking, representative americans)*
- ☐ **ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGNERS** *(overseas briefing, phase out on return)*
- ☐ **HOSTILE AUDIO SURVEILLANCE** *(microphones, shop talk at home-hotels, report to security)*
- ☐ **COVER PROBLEMS** *(adequacy, request for briefing on arrival, family knowledge)*
- ☐ **RESPONSIBILITY ABROAD** *(local customs, traditions, religion, responsibility for dependents)*
- ☐ **OTHER**

REFERRED BACK TO CENTRAL COVER ☐ YES ☐ NO

DATE BRIEFED 6/25/65

BY ____________________
SECURITY OFFICER

FORM 10-62 1987 SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification VBR (4-11-48)

FILE-3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL BRIEFING DATA

NAME [illegible]		FILE NUMBER [illegible]
OFFICE WH	PHONE	RANK OR GRADE GS-15
DEPARTURE DATE [illegible]	STATUS [illegible]	COVER [illegible]
NATION(S) [illegible]		DEPENDENTS BRIEFED YES

PREVIOUS TRAVEL

Cuba	COVER	YEARS 61
Venezuela	COVER	YEARS 53 - 57
AREA	COVER	YEARS

PREVIOUS TRAVEL - Formal briefing waived		YES		NO

RISK OF CAPTURE TRAVEL BRIEFING

CATEGORY	A	B	C	D

SPECIAL BRIEFING PROBLEM

TYPE

Must Read

SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL VERIFIED IN SUBJECT FILE		YES		NO
SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL BASED ON FILE REVIEW BY BRIEFING OFFICER		YES		NO
SECURITY FILE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BEFORE BRIEFING		YES		NO

- EMERGENCY CONTACTS (met on arrival, phone no., alternate action to make contact)
- SECURITY REGULATIONS (operational talk, documents, indigenous employee hazards)
- TRAVEL PRECAUTIONS (recognition overseas, camera, black market, currency exchange)
- PERSONAL AFFAIRS (charge accounts, traffic tickets, litigation, neighbors)
- PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE (limitations, home address, shop talk)
- PERSONAL CONDUCT (morals, drinking, representative americans)
- ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGNERS (overseas briefing, phase out on return)
- HOSTILE AUDIO SURVEILLANCE (microphones, shop talk at home hotels, report to security)
- COVER PROBLEMS (adequacy, request for briefing on arrival, family knowledge)
- RESPONSIBILITY ABROAD (local customs, traditions, religion, responsibility for dependents)
- OTHER

REFERRED BACK TO CENTRAL COVER		YES		NO

DATE BRIEFED [illegible]

BY

SECURITY OFFICER

JBR

SECRET

3 9,418

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 18 Sep 75

FILE NO.: 3043

TO: (Check)	☐	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
	☐	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
	☒	CHIEF, LA (OPERATING COMPONENT FOR ACTION) ATTN: SUPPORT STAFF

SS NUMBER: 525-20-4565

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 063385

ID CARD NUMBER:

REF. [illegible]

STATUS	☐	STAFF	☐	CONTRACT

SUBJECT: MORALES, DAVID S.

OFFICIAL COVER	X	~~ESTABLISHED~~ CONTINUED
	☐	CANCELLED

UNIT: U.S. ARMY STAFF GROUP 32

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER (BLOCK RECORDS) CONTINUATION

☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE EOD

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)

NA	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)
X	SUBMIT FORM 3254 Army W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
NA	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)
	EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

SUBJECT WILL BE DENIED FOR ENTIRE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT EXCEPT FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT APPLICATIONS.

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER (UNBLOCK RECORDS)

	EFFECTIVE DATE:
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED (HHB 20-7)
	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)
	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - 1

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD OR CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS SRD
COPY 4 - OC-O/D/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

Jr.

VBR

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL. BY: 006687

16 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR : CCS/PRG

SUBJECT : Return of Alias Documents

Returned herewith are alias 07 documents which have been issued 07 to identity in the aliases of Miguel P. COSSIO; Diego S. MARDONES; 07 Daniel Suarez MORENO; Simon S. 07 MARTINEZ. These documents have been utilized by identity for operational purposes. However, as he is due to retire on 31 July 1975, they are being returned to you for final disposition. The documents returned are as follows:

Miguel P. COSSIO 07 (A)
- CIA Credential #1716 FORWARDED SEPARATELY
- Social Security Card 31
- Continental Insurance Companies Card 31
- 10 Washington Theater Club Card
- 29 RCA Record Club Card

Diego S. MARDONES 07 (A)
- 10 Dade Country Library Card
- 29 AAA Card
- 31 Social Security Card
- 29 Humble Travel Club, Inc. Card
- 29 Pan American Bank Card
- 29 ABC Card

Daniel SUAREZ Moreno 07 (A)
- Panimanian Passport 11, 31

f6/rd

SECRET/RYBAT

E2 IMPDET CL BY 022052

07
Simon S. MARTINEZ (A)
31 Health Cert. #41716
29 Nat. Science Book Club
29 AM Bowling Congress Card
31 SS Card
31 GEFOO Card
10 Ft. Wash. Yacht & Tennis Club
29 DC Nat'l Bk
29 Best Products Co., Inc.
Special Rep Credential #389
Calling Cards

2. It is noted that identity also has a 11 Mexican Passport in the alias of Diego S. MARDONES MARTINEZ. This document is currently maintained by identity who 07 is on TDY in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The document will be retrieved from identity upon his arrival at Headquarters and will be returned separately to CCS. 16-29

3. Records available 10 in L.A. Division also reflect that 07 identity was issued a Maryland Driver License in the alias of Miguel P. COSSIO and a Florida Driver License in the alias of 07 Diego S. MARDONES. These two 10 documents were reportedly returned to the Office of Technical Services in April 1974.

4. Should any further questions arise relative to this matter, please direct your inquiries to undersigned on extention X6300 or R1546.

Joseph F. King
Joseph F. King
Chief, LA Security

Attachment:
As Stated

Identity:
David Morales

O/C 39418

6|pd

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 023117

SECRET

20 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: OTS/AB/DOCS

SUBJECT : Request for Special Representative ID Card and Supporting Pocket Litter - Simon S. MARTINEZ (A)

26 JUN 1974

1. Simon S. MARTINEZ is a new registered alias for identity. He requires the Special Representative ID Card and supporting pocket litter in this alias. The documentation will be used for a Cuban diplomat recruitment. Subject can not use his other registered aliases (for which he has supporting pocket litter) since one is a registered name for BKHERALD identification, another is used in conjunction with his Mexican passport and the third was extensively used during his JMWAVE tour and may be compromised. Attached is an ID photograph to be used on the Special Representative document. Request expedite handling for this request which is being hand carried.

2. Thank you for your cooperation.

/s/ David A. Phillips

David A. Phillips
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment:
Identity

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY C24345

1. Mr. David S. Morales is hereby recommended for the Intelligence Medal of Merit for his twenty-five years of dedicated service with the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. Prior to his entrance on duty with the Central Intelligence Agency in March 1951, Mr. Morales served from April 1946 to March 1951 in the United States Army.

3. Mr. Morales spent more than twenty years in the field in several different installations in the areas of Europe, Latin America and East Asia. He held senior level positions engaged in FI, CI, CA and PM operations. His record includes such items as participation in key roles in both of Latin America Division's two major PM/political action operations plus tours as Base Chief in Pakse Laos (supervised 45 employees); and, Regional Officer in Charge, Nha Trang, Vietnam (supervised 60 employees). These assignments were carried out in war zones requiring considerable personal courage.

4. Mr. Morales was commended twice by Chiefs of Station while assigned to the Cuban operation; by the Director of Central Intelligence for service in the Dominican Republic during the crisis; by the King of Laos during his assignment in Laos and by the Government of Vietnam for his service in that country.

5. Upon his return from Vietnam in 1971 Mr. Morales was assigned to FR Division, Washington Base, where he was targeted on Latin American military officers assigned to the Inter-American Defense Board and attending the Inter-American Defense College. This assignment was initiated by Latin America Division in an effort to get at the rich operational potential afforded by the presence in the Washington area of numerous Latin American officials. Mr. Morales, with his long years of experience in Latin America, and his native fluency in Spanish, proved ideal for this assignment. He developed numerous assets who were later pursued successfully and recruited in the field and he made several significant recruitments of his own.

6. Following the FR assignment Mr. Morales returned to the Latin America Division where he completed his final year with CIA. He served TDY as Acting Chief of Station, Paraguay for some months. During this period "there was more activity and accomplishment flowing out of the Asuncion Station than had been seen in years". This is typical of Mr. Morales' resourcefulness, imagination and push to get the job done. The remainder of his Agency time was spent on a TDY to Panama and in the Cuban Operations Group, where his contribution was also very large.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059115

9/PV

7. During his Agency career Mr. Morales was constantly engaged in an exceptionally wide variety of activity in hazardous areas (Guatamala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Laos and Vietnam). He recruited countless assets and sources directed against a wide range of targets. In addition, he managed large installations and sizeable groups. He always shouldered heavy responsibilities and consistently demonstrated that he had the capacity, determination and necessary judgment to take on such jobs.

8. After nearly thirty years of dedicated and productive service with the US Government, Mr. Morales retired on 31 July 1975. Throughout his long career he was a dedicated, skillful and professional clandestine operator and unfailing in the pursuit of Agency objectives. His performance was of the highest caliber and unquestionably contributed significantly to the Agency's mission.

CITATION

Mr. David S. Morales

is hereby awarded the

Intelligence Medal of Merit

for his accomplishments during his career with the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Morales, during his entire Agency career, displayed exceptional talent, considerable imagination and initiative, and intense devotion to duty. With determination, resourcefulness and adaptability he performed all assignments in an extremely competent manner. His many achievements, often under hazardous conditions, reflect great credit on him and the Central Intelligence Agency.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING A
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

Chief, Far East Division

Chief, WOBONE

13-7
Chief of Station, [Vientiane]

02
RYBAT FJDUST - [C]FRAIL/1 - Damage Report

REFERENCES 13-7
A. [Vientiane] 0347
B. 13-7 [Vientiane] 1363
C. 13-7 [Vientiane] 1363
D. 13-7 [Vientiane] 0392

[Pritchard, Thomas R.] 03 — [Martinez, Armand] 03

1. 03 Station has been advised by [redacted] that [redacted] did marry [CYFRAIL/1] (201-845063) and they are currently residing in [Pottstown], Pennsylvania. [redacted] also advised that [redacted] hopes to get employment with R.C.A. and be assigned to a classified project in the Caribbean area. [Martinez] 03 [Pritchard]

2. It is difficult to ascertain how much, if any, sensitive information [redacted] may have conveyed to [CY]FRAIL/1. However, it has been determined that during the ten and one-half months [redacted] saw [CY]FRAIL/1, he introduced her to the following WOFIRM personnel: 03 (2.) 03

1 [redacted] [illegible], Arthur
2 [redacted] Diane Tenley
3 [redacted] [illegible] J.
4 [redacted]
5 [redacted] [illegible]
6 [redacted] [illegible] P. W.
7 [redacted] [illegible] Ruttkowski
8 [redacted] Richard Rizzo
Frank Nagy

9 [redacted] Orcads Koch[illegible]
9 Lawrence [illegible]
10 [redacted] David G. [illegible]
11 [redacted] Terrance [illegible]
12 [redacted] Bruce Wilk[illegible]
13 [redacted] [illegible] J.
14 [redacted] John R. Mil[illegible]
15 [redacted] Frank J. Ki[illegible]

3. The following were identified to her by [redacted] [Pritchard] 03 as having worked upcountry in Laos with him: 03

16 [redacted] [illegible], Anthony A.
17 [redacted] Michael Shel[illegible]
18 [redacted] [illegible] H. Stephens

19 [redacted] [Wilbur Murray Jr.] 03
20 [redacted] 20. David S. Mor[illegible]

Attachment:
1 - IDEN, USC/THP

Distribution:
2 - C/FE, w IDEN USC/THP
1 - C/WOBONE, w IDEN USC/THP

-continued-

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER 22 [FOVT]-7774
DATE
CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T
HQS FILE NUMBER

26/820

02
4. It should be noted that [ ]FRGAL/1 was surveilled by a Station surveillance team on several occasions and was reported to have visited IDEN A. This organization's [Vientiane] office is currently under investigation by this Station. 13-7 (See 13-7 [Vientiane] [illegible]413, 74[illegible] and 22 [FO[illegible]] [illegible].)

Leon W. Alburdas

DYBAT

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO 22 [FOVT]-7774

IDENTITIES

29
IDEN A - [Investment Overseas Service]

7/920

SECRET

17 NOV 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION : J. J. MULLANE
Room 2919 Quarters Eye

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : ACCOMMODATION ADDRESSES

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 10 October 1961 requesting the cancellation of the following facilities:

48 807 03 Andrew L. JACKOLOW, 1 Twin Oaks Drive, Staten Island, N. Y. 08
39 418 David S. MORALES, 227 Laverne Avenue, Long Beach, California 08
57 368 03 Charles A. BERTELLI, 1734 Arlington Blvd., Falls Church, Va. 08
190 584 03 Jacob SACKLOVE, 6843 Matilija Avenue, Van Nuys, California 08
219 512 03 Harold HAMILTON, 1171 Eddy Street, Providence, Rhode Island 08
226 414 03 Bernard Alvin PARKS, 91-45 115th Street, Queens, New York 08
229 643 03 Maria Fernandezy SANCHEZ, 27 Stebbins Avenue, Staten Island, N.Y. 08
229 646 03 Carmen Rodriguizy MENDOZA, 157 Sheridan Terrace, Ridgewood, N.J. 08
243 855 03 Norman R. HARTHERODT, 331 First Street, N. E., Washington, D. C. 08

2. This is to advise that these facilities have been cancelled.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Edward [illegible]
for VICTOR R. WHITE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

17/90

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

07, 07

MIGUEL P. COSSIO & DIEGO S. MARDONES

FROM:
C/WH/Security
E. A. Cahill
3 D 3102

EXTENSION 1546

NO.

DATE 15 August 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OS/OSD/C&D 4 E 44				* For your information.
2. ATTN: Jerry Gabriel				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

25 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/SECURITY

SUBJECT: Transfer of Alias Documents - David Morales

Foreign Resources Division is transferring the following alias documents to WH Division:

07
Miguel P. COSSIO Ⓢ
CIA Credential #1716
10 Maryland Driver License
31 Social Security Card
31 Continental Insurance Companies Card
10 Washington Theater Club Card
29 RCA Record Club Card

07
Diego S. MARDONES Ⓢ
10 Florida Driver License
10 Dade County Library Card
29 AAA Card
31 Social Security Card
29 HTC Card
29 Pan American Bank Card
29 ABC Card
MEXICAN PASSPORT
11, 31

This is being held by [illegible], WH Div. off. and will not be given to anybody unless Mr. Cahill is sure that it will be used properly.
9/7/73

Robert J. Baker
Robert J. Baker
Chief, FR/Plans

Hold for Mr Morales:
Leave to 5 Sept
15 Sept →
Senior Seminar to end of November

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 005734

5/7

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FR SEC 72-125
13 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/OS/SD/3

SUBJECT: P. O. Box (Washington, D. C.)

1. Reference is made to my telephonic request that a P. O. Box be established ~~in~~ Washington, D. C., in the alias Diego S. Mardones 07 (A). The true name of the Officer receiving material through this facility is Mr. Gilbert 03 Richmond.

2. This memo confirms receipt of:

08
P. O. Box 4433
Brookland Station
Washington, D. C.

3. Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.

John T. Daly
John T. Daly
Chief, FR Security

SECRET

3|PJ

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET OS 39418

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE 1 SEP 71

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) FE

FILE NUMBER 3643

EMPLOYEE NUMBER 063365

ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: SUPPORT STAFF, CHIEF

REF: FORM 1322 dtd 1 JUL 71

OFFICIAL COVER: ☒ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT ~~MAX~~ MORALES, David S.

UNIT US ARMY [STAFF GROUP] 32

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)		CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
	A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF EOD		DATE
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)		SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X	ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)		RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
X	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
X	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)		
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

DEC 54 - NOV 55 - HQS - DAC
[illegible] - MAY [illegible] - [illegible] - [illegible] 32
MAY 56 - OCT 60 - CUBA - [STATE INT] 32
OCT 60 - MAY 65 - FLORIDA - [NOC] 32
JUN 65 - FEB 67 - PERU - AID INT
FEB 67 - JUL 69 - LAOS - AID INT 32
OCT 69 - JUL 71 - VIETNAM - DAC
AUG 71 - HQS - DAC

[illegible]/mh

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - OF
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

James A. Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

5/8R

SECRET

15 NOV 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Advisor/HMAB

SUBJECT : Foreign Awards and Decorations

The individuals listed on the attached roster have been presented with foreign awards and decorations. In accordance with a new public law, PL 89-673, dated 15 October 1966, the individuals may retain their awards upon the approval of the Head of the Agency (delegated in CIA to the Director of Personnel) and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Central Cover Staff is arranging for appropriate liaison channels to obtain the State Department concurrence. However, prior to forwarding the list to Central Cover for action, we would like to have you review the listing as a basis for the Director of Personnel's approval. Memorandums are not required for any of these awards. Your approval is for our records only.

Ellin B. Glenn

Ellin B. Glenn
Executive Secretary
Honor and Merit Awards Board

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

NAME	AWARD	COUNTRY	DATE
03 [BARB, James C.] ✓	MDEM Medal Award (Certificate)	South Vietnam	25 Sept 1968
03 [DANIELS, Gerard] ✓	Knight of the Order of the Million Elephants with White Parasol	Laos	Oct 1968
03 [DIMMIT, Kirk] ✓	Knight of the Order of the Million Elephants with White Parasol	Laos	Oct 1968
DRALLE, Anthony F.J.	Order of Cloud and Banner	GRC ?	?
03 [ELLIOT, Richard W.] ✓	Vietnamese Citation and Certificate	South Vietnam	1967
03 [ENKOJI, John] ✓	Citation for Vietnamese Medal of Honor	South Vietnam	April 1968
03 [FORD, Harold P.] ✓	GRC Psywar Medal	Taipei	May 1968
FOSMIRE, Thomas	Companion (4th Class) of the Most Noble Order of the Crown of Thailand	Thailand	26 June 1968
03 [FREDERICK, Christian, Jr.] ✓	Police Honor Medal (Third Class)	South Vietnam	1 Aug 1968
03 [FREEMAN, Howard] ✓	Knight of the Order of the Million Elephants with White Parasol	Laos	Oct 1968
03 [GMIRKIN, Leonard G.] ✓	Order of the King	Laos	Oct 1968
03 [HEYEL, Norman J.] ✓	MDEM Medal Award (Certificate)	South Vietnam	25 Sept 1968
03 [HORGAN, John P.] ✓	Medal of Honor of First Class	South Vietnam	13 April 1968
HORNE, Richard L.	GRC Psywar Medal	Taipei	May 1968
03 [JOHNSON, Ralph E.] ✓	MDEM Medal Award (Certificate)	South Vietnam	25 Sept 1968
03 [LAIR, James W.] ✓	Commander (3rd Class) of the Most Exalted Order of the Crown of Thailand	Thailand	26 June 1968
	Officer of the Order of the Million Elephants with White Parasol	Laos	Oct 1968

13/020

NAME	AWARD	COUNTRY	DATE
7. [LANDRY, Lloyd P.] ✓ 03	Companion (4th Class) of the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant	Thailand	26 June 1968
	Officer of the Order of the Million Elephants with White Parasol	Laos	Oct 1968
8 MORALES, David S. 39418 03	Order of the King	Laos	Oct 1968
9. [POSHEPNY, Anthony] ✓ 03	Companion (4th Class) of the Most Noble of the Crown of Thailand	Thailand	26 June 1968
	Knight of the Order of the Million Elephants with White Parasol	Laos	Oct 1968
0. [RANDALL, Jonathan] ✓ 03	Knight of the Order of the Million Elephants with White Parasol	Laos	Oct 1968
1. SECORD, Richard, Major (Military Detail)	Member (5th Class) of the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant	Thailand	26 June 1968
2. [SEVERT, Roger W.] ✓ 03	GRC Psywar Medal	Taipei	May 1968
3. SHACKLEY, Theodore	Commander (3rd Class) of Most Exalted Order of White Elephant	Thailand	26 June 1968
	Officer of the Order of the Million Elephants with White Parasol	Laos	Oct 1968
4. [SHELDON, James D.] ✓ 03	Order of the King	Laos	Oct 1968
5. [THOMPSON, Colin R.] ✓ 03	Commendation (Tribal Development)	South Vietnam	22 March 1968
5. Von der MUHLL	Medal of Honor (First Category)	South Vietnam	19 May 1968
7. [WAITES, Melvin Dale] ✓ 03	Vietnamese Medal of Honor	South Vietnam	4 Dec 1967
3. [WEBER, Joseph W., Sgt. (Military Detail)] ✓ 03 08	Member (5th Class of the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant	Thailand	26 June 1968

9/20

SECRET

03
GRAY, Sara Sioux (Barnes) 0-892 217

~~06~~ 03
GRAY, John Franklin - 0-105943 - Spouse

Subject's spouse is a current GS-9 staff employee who EOD in March 1956. N.D.

06
[illegible], Claude Griffith, Jr. - 0-487150 - SR's son

Subject's SR's son was a summer contract employee at a C Agency facility for 1966. N.D.

~~06~~ 03
[illegible], Claude G. - 0-48247 - SR

Subject's SR is a current GS-10 staff employee who EOD in July 1951. N.D.

MORALES, David Sanchez - O/C - 39418 - supervisor

Subject's supervisor is a current GS-15 staff employee who EOD in 1951. N.D.

~~06~~ 03
[illegible], Charles Hunter - O/C - 44771 - SR

Subject's SR is a current GS-12 staff employee who EOD in April 1951. His file contains an SRS flag sheet dated 6 March 1956. No pertinent derogatory information.

~~06~~ 03
SHIVERS, Forrest - 0-38798 - supervisor

Subject's supervisor is a current GS-15 staff employee who EOD in September 1949. N.D.

~~06~~ 03
VORHIS, Donald George - 0-38713 - supervisor

Subject's supervisor is a current GS-14 staff employee who EOD in September 1949. N.D.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

[illegible] September 1966 SKH:lls SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 1

7/?

SECRET

24 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security

ATTENTION : Support Branch

SUBJECT : MORALES, David S.

1. This will confirm the verbal request to Mr. John Lavery from Mr. J. J. Mullane, Jr. on 13 October 1960 that two backstopped residence addresses be provided for Subject, one in the Washington, D.C. area and one in the Los Angeles area.

2. Mr. Lavery was also requested to backstop the Washington address to the extent that Subject's residence at the address from 5 October 1960 on would be acknowledged. He was to be identified as a recently returned State Department employee who had secured a new position with the Department of the Army, since returning from overseas and resigning from State Department. It was to be indicated that pending determination of the location of his assignment, Subject's family had not joined him in the Washington, D.C. area but were understood to be at the home of his wife's family somewhere in New England. Subject's employer is the U.S. Army Staff Group whose telephone number, left by Subject with the management of his residence for emergency contact, is OX 6-2255. It was explained to Mr. Lavery that this residence and cover was necessary to backstop Subject in the event of inquiry arising out of some private business ventures in which he is currently engaged in the Phoenix, Arizona area.

change

3. Mr. Lavery was requested to provide a second residence address in the Los Angeles area where Subject's residence from approximately 1 August 1958 to 14 October 1960 could be acknowledged. He was to be identified at this residence as a local representative for a New York City concern, (Bartlett and Rogers) and to have done economic research for them concerned with Latin American trade. Subject was understood to have been moved by his company to the Miami area, leaving Los Angeles on 14 October 1960.

DDS/I&S
ADDS/I&S
Chief/SSD
Dep Chief
A to Chief
Ch. CCR
Ch. SSD
C... [illegible] Br.
✓ Ch. Sup. Br.
D... IS-
✓ Desk SB-3
Ad & Trng
Control Desk
Files

SECRET

4. Mr. Lavery was advised that for purposes of answering inquiries in Los Angeles, Subject was to be identified as a single individual approximately 35 years old, 6 feet tall, 200 lbs., swarthy complexion, with dark hair and eyes. He is understood to have a good position with his employer, and earning, it is estimated over $10,000 per year.

JOSEPH F. LANGAN
Chief, WH/4/SO

104-10121-10304 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduc

INTERVIEW PROCESSING SHEET ROUTING

Subject: Morales David S. # 39418

Advice received reveals thatthe subject person is scheduled for overseas travel as indicated below -

Departure Date 28 Nov 53 Title & Grade GS-12 C/Admin Sect.

Destination 16-17 [Caracas Venez.] Office & Division WH

Cover 99 [State Integree] Passport Type & No.

Return Date

PRELIMINARY PROCESSING - A reviewof this file and the above information reveals:

☐ No special briefing topics or ☐ See below

☐ No special cover problems or ☐ See below

☐ No special debriefing by other or ☐ Requires debriefings on (as circled) SI Q CRYPT

☐ No special badges or credentials or ☐ See remarks

REMARKS cert 11/53

Date of Polygraph 10/53 C 10/53

INTERVIEW - On the indicated date subject was interviewed on the following points:

1. ✓ Security regulations in general.
2. ✓ Travel Precautions (to carry nothing identifying him with CIA).
3. ✓ Cover Story (nature of cover; adequacyor prior briefing; possibility of inconsistencies; briefing of spouse).
4. ✓ Personal Affairs (proper handling of bank account, credit accounts, forwarding of mail).
5. ✓ Personal Correspondence (no mention of CIA in letters to and from subject).
6. ✓ Personal Conduct (a. general good behavior, b. no black market or currency transactions, c. no undue duriosity in natives in his area, d. no attempts to identify or approach otherCIA personnel in area except for official business and through official channels). ✓
7. ___ Other Travel (only official travel in or through Soviet controlled areas).
8. ___ Other:

ACTION -

☐ Security debriefing by the undersigned completes action necessary in this case.

or

☐ Subject was referred to the following for the indicated additional briefing:

☐ The following were obtained from subject and forwarded appropriately for disposition.

☐ Subject waspermitted to retain the following for turn in at a later date.

X David S. Morales

By: R. [illegible] White

Date: 28 Nov 53

SECRET
EYES ONLY

4 OCT 1973

SUBJECT: Robert A. Maheu

1. Robert A. Maheu was born on 30 October 1917 in Waterville, Maine. He graduated from Holy Cross College, Worcester, Massachusetts in 1940. He is married and has four children.

2. He was employed as a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1940 to 1947. Upon resigning from the Bureau a venture into private enterprise culminated in bankruptcy in 1952. Subsequent to his bankruptcy, he was employed as Special Assistant to the Administrator, Small Business Administration with the specific duty of Director of Security. In February 1954, he was forced to resign for political reasons from this position. He then established his own investigative organization known as Robert A. Maheu Associates, and rented desk space in a suite occupied by Carmine S. Bellino, a former Bureau Agent, Certified Public Accountant, and currently employed on Capitol Hill with one of the Congressional Committees.

3. Mr. Maheu's organization successfully handled a number of prestige accounts, including Niarchos, Schenley Distillers, New York Central Railroad, United Steel Workers Union, and ultimately Howard Hughes. Although he has maintained offices in Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, most recently he resided in Las Vegas, Nevada.

4. He was initially recruited by the Office of Security in 1954 and granted a Covert Security Approval on 30 August 1954. He performed many sensitive assignments for the Office of Security, and also accepted assignments from elements of the predecessor of the Deputy Director for Operations.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061142

EYES ONLY
SECRET

5. Some of these assignments included the following:

A. King Hussein

The procurement of feminine companionship to the King during an official State visit to this country during the period 16 March 1959 through 18 April 1959. (See attached Tab 1--taken from "Family Jewels" memorandum dated 16 May 1973)

B. Johnny Roselli

The use of a member of the Mafia in an attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro, initiated in August 1960. (See attached Tab 2--taken from "Family Jewels" memorandum dated 16 May 1973)

C. Cover

Various officers of the Clandestine Service met with Mr. Maheu over the years from 1954 to 1970 to determine the feasibility of using his firm for non-official cover purposes. Actual cover uses were provided for one officer in Mr. Maheu's Washington Office from September 1964 to June 1966, and another officer used the cover of Maheu Associates representatives in Quito, Ecuador from 1 August 1968 through 31 December 1970. (See attached Tab 3--Director of Security Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 20 January 1971)

6. No contact has been made with Mr. Maheu since the termination of the above cover arrangement.

3 Atts

SECRET
EYES ONLY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
4 OCT 1973

SUBJECT: Robert A. Maheu

1. Robert A. Maheu was born on 30 October 1917 in Waterville, Maine. He graduated from Holy Cross College, Worcester, Massachusetts in 1940. He is married and has four children.

2. He was employed as a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1940 to 1947. Upon resigning from the Bureau a venture into private enterprise culminated in bankruptcy in 1952. Subsequent to his bankruptcy, he was employed as Special Assistant to the Administrator, Small Business Administration with the specific duty of Director of Security. In February 1954, he was forced to resign for political reasons from this position. He then established his own investigative organization known as Robert A. Maheu Associates, and rented desk space in a suite occupied by Carmine S. Bellino, a former Bureau Agent, Certified Public Accountant, and currently employed on Capitol Hill with one of the Congressional Committees.

3. Mr. Maheu's organization successfully handled a number of prestige accounts, including Niarchos, Schenley Distillers, New York Central Railroad, United Steel Workers Union, and ultimately Howard Hughes. Although he has maintained offices in Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, most recently he resided in Las Vegas, Nevada.

4. He was initially recruited by the Office of Security in 1954 and granted a Covert Security Approval on 30 August 1954. He performed many sensitive assignments for the Office of Security, and also accepted assignments from elements of the predecessor of the Deputy Director for Operations.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061142

EYES ONLY
SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

5. Some of those assignments included the following:

06

A. **King Hussein**

The procurement of feminine companionship 08 to the King during an official State visit to this country during the period 16 March 09 1959 through 18 April 1959 09 (See attached Tab 1--taken from "Family Jewels" memorandum dated 16 May 1973)

B. **Johnny Roselli**

The use of a member of the Mafia in an attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro, initiated in August 1960. (See attached Tab 2--taken from "Family Jewels" memorandum dated 16 May 1973)

C. **Cover**

Various officers of the Clandestine Service met with Mr. Maheu over the years from 1954 to 1970 to determine the feasibility of using his firm for non-official cover purposes. Actual cover uses were provided for one officer in Mr. Maheu's Washington Office from September 1964 to June 1966, and another officer used the cover of Maheu Associates representatives in 10 Quito, Ecuador from 1 August 1968 through 31 December 1970. (See attached Tab 3--Director of Security Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 20 January 1971)

6. No contact has been made with Mr. Maheu since the termination of the above cover arrangement.

3 Atts

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 7 October 1959

TO:
☐ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
☒ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: NE/2/Jordan
1205 I x3203

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Robert A. Maheu

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☒	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: U.S. and Jordan

FULL DETAILS OF USE: May be employed by the King of Jordan to handle Jordanian public relations in the U. S.

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION:
Per discussion with Mr. J. O'Connell, sufficient Security Office investigation has already taken place.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS Available at OS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED. NO:

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☒	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)* has not been in area
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
James E. Burkart James E. Burkart 03	3203	William R. Freeman Fred Satrasth / OC 03

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

2/71 (8)

80 342991

SECRET

4/4/62

96

C Number	Name	Green List Number	201 Number
90330	JIMENEZ Raveiro, Raul Guillermo	111108	297731
90224	[illegible], Rafael Sotero	111045	297732
90223	LICETI Cruz, Rene	111046	297733
90503	LOPEZ Fernandez, Julio Antonio	111071	297734
90519	MACEO Masque, Antonio	111085	297736
90237	MARTICORENA Castillo, Reynaldo	111030	297737
90518	MINGUEZ Nunez, Orestes	111086	297739
90456	MUJICA Bonis, Arturo	112053	297743
90377	NIETO Planes, Darsicio	111136	297744
90449	OLIVA Cantu, Oscar	111052	297745
90399	OSA Amat, Jorge de la	111112	297746
90515	PEDROSO Amores, Acelo	111089	297748
	PENA Esteriza, Pedro Otoniel	111138	297749
90375	PERDIGON Figarola, Pedro	111140	297750
90396	RICARDO Baras, Jose Manuel	111115	297756
90395	RODRIGUEZ Carreno, Fabio M.	111116	297757
90393	ROMNEY Alvarez, Leslie	111118	297760
90440	CORA Johnson, Ricardo	111064	297762
90523	FIGUEIRAS Leon, Delio	111080	297763
90236	MUNOZ de Juan, Mario	111031	297766
90398	PADRON Gonzalez, Rodolfo Armon	111113	297767
90650	RODRIGUEZ Gonzalez, Ismael	112086	297768
91263	ROSELLy Layva, Florentino Orelia	111036	297769
90392	ROUSSEAU Bueno, Santiago	111119	297770
90390	SANCHEZ Rivas, Enriques Reimundo	111121	297771
90455	SUAREZ Hernandez, Roberto Guillermo	112054	297774
90528	TORRES Pacheco, Hector de	111075	297775
90511	VALDES Andino, Pedro Julio	110093	297776
90387	VALDEZ Martnnez, Sergio	111124	297777
90510	VALLE Gutierrez, Jesus del	111094	297778
90608	VARONA Cortinas, Julio Pascual	111146	297779
90509	VEGA Clark, Manuel de la	111095	297780
90831	ACOSTA Suarez, Orlando	112278	297784
91111	ALOMA Sabas, Ernesto Ignacio	112204	297785
90796	ARTECONA, Jose Jr.	112276	298788
91137	BARNET Gil, Enrique Raimundo	112246	297789
90249	BARROSO Palacio, Jorge	111016	297790
91159	BENITEZ Pineda, Andres	112201	297792
91140	CABRERA Rodriguez, Timoteo Amando	112239	297793
91132	CALATAYUD Rivera, Antonio	112229	297795
91117	CARMENDIA Socarras, Rodolfo	112212	297796
91114	CORONA Villar, Ramon	112206	297797
91142	DIAZ Reyes, Mario Rolando	112241	297801
91123	ESPINOSA Navarrete, Ramon	112220	297802
91112	FAJARDO Rojas, Juan	112203	297804
91144	FEIJO Fabregat, Jose Vicent	112243	297805
91110	FERNANDEZ Quirch, Sergio Raul	22[illegible]	2978[illegible]

Thomas Carroll Jr.

04 JUN 1963

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

SECRET

SUBJECT: Robert A. Maheu

Mr. Robert A. Maheu was born on 30 October 1917 in Waterville, Maine. He graduated from Holy Cross College in 1940 and is married with four children. He was employed as a Special Agent with the FBI from 1940 to 1947, and upon resigning from the Bureau, formed a private enterprise doing business as "Dairy Dream Products." This venture culminated in bankruptcy in 1952. He then re-entered Government service with the Small Business Administration in Washington, D. C., and was appointed Special Assistant to the Administrator with the specific duty of Director of Security. In February of 1954, he was forced to resign from SBA because of political reasons, determined to be the result of backing the wrong political party in the election. He then set up his own investigative organization known as Robert A. Maheu Associates.

Mr. Maheu was recruited by the Office of Security in March of 1954. He was previously known to Mr. Robert H. Cunningham (deceased) who was, at that time, Chief, Special Security Division, through their mutual employment by the FBI. Cunningham saw in Maheu a covert asset who could be utilized by the Office in extremely sensitive cases. With the approval of the Director of Security, Subject was offered a proposition wherein he was to receive $500.00 per month, with the stipulation that he move into his own office and that he be on call for any assignments by the Office of Security. He agreed to this and immediately took steps to move out of his area, where he rented desk space in a suite occupied by Carmine S. Bellino, a former FBI agent and CPA.

In July of 1954, Maheu was engaged by "British shipping interests" to check on Aristotle Onassis' activities while in the United States. This included technical coverage of Onassis' New York office. It was later learned that the principal "British interest" was Stavros Niarchus and that the ultimate goal of this task was to scrap the Onassis/Saudi oil deal. Maheu took the job but conditioned his acceptance with the fact that he would do nothing inimical to the U. S. Government. Any information developed of interest to the United States was to be passed by Maheu to the appropriate Government agency.

During this operation Maheu had his staff prepare a paper citing dangers to U. S. economy and trade resulting from the Onassis deal. Through contacts in FOA, Maheu had Harold Stassen read this paper in the National Security Council on 22 June 1954. During this same period Maheu briefed Scott McLeod, Assistant Secretary of State for Security and Consular Affairs on the project. McLeod agreed to furnish State commo and pouch facilities subject to John Foster Dulles' approval. Additionally, Maheu briefed J. Edgar Hoover and Vice President Nixon.

In August of 1954, Maheu advised this Office of his relationship with Niarchus. NEA Division was contacted and expressed interest in this matter. They were put in touch with Maheu and furnished him a commo channel, a pouch system and operational guidance. International litigation erupted as a result of the Onassis/Niarchus matter, and as a result of Niarchus claiming Government privilege in the case, the Agency was subsequently identified as being the Government agency involved. Files of this Office reflect extensive correspondence furnished us by the Office of General Counsel in 1956 regarding the Onassis matter.

On 16 August 1954 Subject was granted a covert security clearance for utilization as an agent under Project TWIXT in the Near East. On 30 August 1954 he was granted a similar clearance to permit his use in the United States as a covert associate under Project LPHIDDEN. In November of 1957, a cable from Ciudad Trujillo indicated that Mr. Maheu had allegedly been involved in a violation of the Mann Act in procuring and transporting prostitutes for President Sukarno during Sukarno's state visit to the United States in 1956. Mr. Maheu contacted this Office to advise that the allegations were without foundation and stated that he would take steps immediately to have his attorney see that appropriate Dominican officials would retract the charges. This was subsequently done. Edward Bennett Williams acted as Maheu's lawyer in this matter.

In 1957 information was received indicating that during President Sukarno's visit to Moscow in the fall of 1956, he was introduced to a Soviet woman within the Kremlin. He had an affair with her against the admonitions of his advisers. It was reported that the Soviets took detailed films of the affair and that a copy was sent to the PKI. In June of 1957 Al Ulmer and Samuel Halpern, FE Division, contacted the

Director of Security and outlined a project wherein they envisioned a film being made simulating this affair. It was planned that clips from this film would be inserted in a leaflet for distribution throughout Southeast Asia suggesting that Sukarno was compromised by the Soviets. In July of 1957, Robert Maheu was given this assignment. He utilized a trusted male employee of this organization (since deceased) and his fiance. Maheu after an intensive make-up course, administered the make-up to the participants himself, utilizing available pictures and descriptions of the subjects as a guide. He hired a studio where he was given detailed instruction on the use of the lights and camera. When the film was taken, only Maheu and the two participants were in the studio. The project known as "Happy Days," was never completed and the film was not distributed.

Files of this Office reflect that during the 1958-1959 period, FE Division was put in touch with Maheu by this Office for assistance in another operation relating to President Sukarno. This project was originated in May 1958 when FE Division initially contacted the Director of Security and briefed him on the project known as HARPSTAR. Basically, the project capitalized on President Sukarno's known weakness for Caucasion women. Robert Maheu was given the assignment to locate a female-candidate. He advised that a prominent [redacted] attorney and "man about town," [redacted] could come up with a qualified woman. [redacted] was investigated with favorable results and given a CSA on 2 July 1958 but was not made witting of CIA interest. The female candidate was [redacted], a well-to-do widow, approximately 35 years of age, resident of [redacted], considered to be highly intelligent and extremely attractive. In August of 1958, the Project HARPSTAR plan was concurred in by the COPS and the DCI.

In September of 1958, Maheu and James O'Connell, of this Office, met with [redacted] in New York City. [redacted] was briefed on Agency interest in the matter. Later in September Maheu met with [redacted] in New York City under his true name and told her of governmental interest. [redacted] knew Maheu's true identity having been introduced to him socially by [redacted]. On the same day (23 September 1958), [redacted] was introduced to Joseph Smith, FE Division (known to both [redacted] and Maheu as Joseph Sims). [redacted] was briefed on the assignment, indicated that she understood exactly what was expected of her and stated that she could leave the country in 45 days. On 24 September 1958 "Sims" again met with [redacted] at which time she was told she would be accompanied by a female traveling companion, Elizabeth Hogarth (actually Elizabeth Harter, FE Division). [redacted] was told that "Hogarth" would ostensibly be her secretary but would be, in fact, the person she would look to for direction.

Records of this Office do not reflect any of the activities of [redacted] during the course of her mission. It is known that she did meet Sukarno, but due to unfortunate timing that had him leaving his country on official business, she had little time to cultivate him. Consequently, the purpose of the mission was not fulfilled. The last known contact [redacted] had with the Agency was in the form of a telephone call on 12 April 1961 when she called on a sterile line and talked to Mr. Hugh Tovar, who she knew as George Henry. She advised that one [redacted] had asked her to give a party for President Sukarno who would be in Los Angeles on 21 April 1961. [redacted] wanted to know whether the Agency was interested in sponsoring this party. A negative response was given.

In June of 1959, a covert security approval was issued for the use of Maheu by IO Division in order for him to be approached and advised of Agency interest in International Labor. Files of this Office do not reflect whether or not this was done. On 7 October 1959 a covert security approval was granted for Mr. Maheu's use in the United States. The request for approval indicated that Subject might be employed by the King of Jordan to handle Jordanian public relations in the United States. Mr. Maheu's later involvement in the procurement of feminine companionship for King Hussein during the latter's state visit to the United States is set forth in Attachment A.

In August of 1960, Richard M. Bissell, the then DD/P contacted the Director of Security regarding the Roselli matter. Details concerning this are set forth in Attachment B.

In 1966 information was received by the Agency indicating that the Senate Administrative Practices Subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Senator Edward V. Long, had advised Maheu that his testimony was desired concerning his relationship with Onassis, Savros Niarchos, Sam Giancana and [redacted]. The Subcommittee interest was invasion of privacy and particularly the use of audio devices by private investigators. In July of 1966, Senator Long was alerted to the fact that the Agency had had sensitive operational contacts with Maheu. Senator Long was told that the Agency had used Maheu over the years on a number of occasions but that he had never been asked to engage in any wiretapping and had never engaged in any such activities on our behalf. Office of Security files do not indicate whether or not Maheu did appear before this Subcommittee, although it appears that he did not.

In January of 1971, in light of the involvement of Maheu in a suit between executives of the Hughes Company and Maheu, the Director of Security recommended to the DCI that all existing clearances with Maheu and Associates be terminated. The DCI concurred in this recommendation.

Files of this Office reflect that Subject's company, Maheu and Associates, cooperated with the Agency in supporting the activities of an LPGLOBE agent, Michael G. Merhige, in Ecuador.

A memorandum from the Chief, Central Cover Staff to the Inspector General dated 10 October 1973, delineates the relationship between CCS and Robert Maheu and Associates.

Information regarding the possibility that Subject was involved in a leak of information concerning a sensitive DD/S&T Special Projects Staff project is set forth in Attachment C.

Subject's son Peter Robert Maheu was a staff employee of the Agency and of this Office from 1963 to 1964. He was a clerical employee. In February of 1969, Peter Maheu was granted a covert security approval as an employee of Maheu and Associates for use on Project QKENCHANT.

SUBJECT: Robert Maheu - King Hussein Incident

1. In connection with the official State visit of King Hussein from 16 March through 18 April 1959, the Office of Security was requested to render special support during the Los Angeles and New York phases of the tour. According to NEA personnel Messrs. Norman Paul, Fred LaTrash and William Arms, King Hussein was especially desirous of female companionship during his Los Angeles visit and it was requested that appropriate arrangements be made through a controlled source of the Office in order to assure a satisfied visit.

2. On 3 April 1959 Mr. Robert Maheu, a cleared Office of Security contact, was asked to arrange a party for King Hussein at Los Angeles, California. This was done by Mr. Maheu through Mr. [redacted]. Mr. [redacted] is a prominent [redacted] attorney and [redacted] figure previously granted a covert security approval for use by FE Division. By pre-arrangement, during the course of this party King Hussein was introduced to [redacted], a part-time screen and stage actress. For the duration of King Hussein's stay in Los Angeles, 3 through 7 April 1959, he and Miss [redacted] became intimate friends. It was indicated by Mr. LaTrash, who was integrated into the State party, that King Hussein desired to continue his friendship with Miss [redacted] and that he wished to meet with her during his stay in New York City from 14 through 18 April 1959.

3. On 13 April 1959 arrangements were made to rent the home of [redacted], an Office of Security source, at Long Beach, Long Island, for the period 14 through 18 April 1959. The home was to be used as a confidential meeting place for Miss [redacted] and King Hussein. At the same time Miss [redacted] was registered at the Hotel Barclay, 111 East 48th Street, New York City, under the name of Mrs. [redacted] of El Paso, Texas. The publicity touching on the relationship had become more pointed since some publicity mention had been made of the [redacted] background of Miss [redacted]. On 14 April 1959 Mr. LaTrash and Miss [redacted] were transported to the [redacted] home on Long Island which was taken over as

the meeting place for King Hussein and Miss [redacted]. Later the same day, by pre-arrangement, two Department of State Security Agents, a New York City police lieutenant and a hired chauffeur arrived with King Hussein. Miss [redacted] remained at the site through 18 April 1959, and King Hussein and his party visited each evening and remained for about four to five hours.

4. During the stay at the Long Beach site, Miss [redacted] discussed the publicity in the case at some length with the Security representatives. She speculated about the possible sources of certain personal information that she felt had been leaked to the press. Additionally she spoke of her deep feeling for King Hussein and commented on how [redacted] initially sought her out to serve as a party companion for the King. At the time she said she was unclear as to just what part Mr. [redacted] wanted her to play. In attempting to clarify his case Mr. [redacted] said, "I am employed by the CIA. We want you to go to bed with him." Miss [redacted] said she rejected the proposal but finally went to the party. She became quite taken with King Hussein and found him to be most charming.

5. All personal contacts by Security representatives in this case were under alias and implied State Department affiliation. There is no record or indication in any of the files in this case that involves Robert Maheu by name or reference. It is believed that Mr. Maheu was never introduced to Miss [redacted], and as far as can be determined [redacted] "fronted" for all arrangements. Office of Security investigation conducted variously from 25 May through 17 September 1959 of [redacted] reflected no substantive derogatory information regarding her.

SUBJECT: The Johnny Roselli Matter

1. In August of 1960 Mr. Richard Bissell approached the then Director of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, to determine if the Office of Security had any assets that might assist in a sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro. Because of its extreme sensitivity, only a small group was knowledgeable of the project. The DCI was briefed and gave his approval. Colonel J. C. King, Chief, WH Division, was briefed, but all details were concealed from any of the JMWAVE officials. Certain TSD and Communications personnel participated in the initial planning stages but were not witting of the purpose of the mission.

2. Robert Maheu was contacted, briefed generally on the project, and requested to ascertain if he could develop an entree into gangster elements. Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one Johnny Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. Maheu knew Roselli only casually through clients but had been given to understand that Roselli was a high ranking member of the "Syndicate" and controlled all of the ice making machines on the Strip. Maheu was asked to approach Roselli, who knew Maheu as a personal relations executive handling domestic and foreign accounts. Maheu was to tell Roselli that he had recently been obtained by a client who represented several international business firms which were suffering heavy financial losses in Cuba as a result of Castro's action. These firms were convinced that Castro's removal was the answer to the problem and were willing to pay a price of $150,000 for its successful accomplishment. It was to be made clear to Roselli that the United States Government was not and should not become aware of this operation.

3. The pitch was made to Roselli on 14 September 1960 at the Hilton Plaza Hotel, New York City. Mr. James O'Connell, Office of Security, was present during this meeting and was identified to Roselli as an employee of Maheu. O'Connell actively served as Roselli's contact until May 1962 at which time he phased out due to an overseas assignment. Roselli's

initial reaction was to avoid getting involved, but through Maheu's persuasion he agreed to introduce him to a friend, Sam Gold. Roselli made it clear that he would not want any money for his part, and he believed that Gold would feel the same way. Neither of these individuals were ever paid out of Agency funds.

4. During the week of 25 September 1960, Maheu was introduced to Gold at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach. During this meeting Maheu also met an individual identified as "Joe" who was supposedly a courier operating between Havana and Miami. Several weeks later Maheu saw photographs of both of these individuals in the Sunday Supplemental Parade. They were identified as Momo Salvatore Giancana and Santos Trafficant. Both were on the list of the Attorney General's ten most wanted men. Giancana was described as the Chicago Chieftan of the Cosa Nostra and successor to Al Capone. Trafficant was identified as the Cosa Nostra boss of Cuban operations. Maheu called this Office immediately upon ascertaining this information.

5. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing the mission, Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but that he be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink. Gold indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving kickback payments for a gambling interest and who still had access to Castro and was still in a financial bind.

6. TSD was requested to produce six pills of high lethal content which were then delivered to Orta by "Joe." After several weeks of reported attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet and asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success. "Joe" then indicated that Dr. Anthony Verona, one of the principal officers in the Cuban exile junta, had become disaffected with the apparent ineffectual progress of the junta and was willing to handle the mission through his own resources. Verona asked that he be given $10,000 for organization expenses and requested $1,000 worth of communications equipment. Dr. Verona's potential was never fully exploited as the mission was cancelled shortly after the Bay of Pigs episode. Verona was advised the offer was withdrawn, and the pills were retrieved. At the height of

the project negotiations, Gold expressed concern about [redacted], [redacted] who he learned was [redacted]. Gold asked Maheu to put a bug in [redacted] room to determine the extent of [redacted] with [redacted]. The technician involved in the assignment was discovered in the process, arrested, and taken to the sheriff's office for questioning. He called Maheu in the presence of sheriff's personnel and informed him that he had been detained. Subsequently, the Department of Justice announced its intention to prosecute Maheu along with the technician. On 7 February 1962 the Director of Security briefed the then Attorney General Robert Kennedy on the circumstances leading up to Maheu's involvement in the wiretap. At our request, prosecution was dropped.

7. In May 1962 Mr. William Harvey took over as Roselli's case officer and it is not known if he was used officially from that point on. It was subsequently learned from the FBI that Roselli had been convicted on six counts involving illegal entry into the United States some time during November 1967. On 2 December 1968 Roselli along with four other individuals was convicted of conspiracy to cheat members of the Friar's Club of $400,000 in a rigged gin rummy game. Mr. Harvey reported his contacts with Roselli to this office during November and December of 1967 and January of 1968. Roselli was facing deportation at that time but felt that he would win an appeal.

8. On 17 November 1970 Mr. Maheu called James O'Connell, Roselli's first case officer, to advise that Maheu's attorney, Ed Morgan had received a call from Thomas Waddin, Roselli's attorney, who stated that all avenues of appeal had been exhausted and Roselli faced deportation. Waddin indicated that if someone did not intercede on Roselli's behalf, he would make a complete expose of his activity with the Agency. On 13 November 1970 Mr. Helms was briefed on this latest development and it was decided that the Agency would not in any way assist Roselli. Maheu was advised of the Agency's position and was in complete agreement. He stated that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally should Roselli decide to tell all. Subsequently Roselli or someone on his behalf furnished Jack Anderson details of the operation. Anderson wrote two columns regarding this operation

on 13 January 1971 and 23 February 1971. Roselli was last known to be in the Federal Penitentiary in Seattle, Washington.

SUBJECT: Special Projects Staff Matter

1. On 25 June 1974 Mr. Paul Evans, Security Officer, Special Projects Staff, DD/S&T, requested that Office of Security records be checked regarding a Mr. James R. Phelan and Mr. Wallace Turner who were both of interest in connection with a sensitive SPS activity.

2. A check of FBI and Office of Security records indicated that Mr. Phelan had written an unfavorable article about the FBI in 1965 which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post. Additionally Mr. Phelan testified as a defense witness in the Clay Shaw conspiracy trial on 26 February 1969. A review of Agency library sources reflected that Mr. Phelan had published a number of articles. Mr. Carl Duckett, DD/S&T, has speculated that Mr. Robert Maheu might have been the source of Mr. Phelan's information. Several DD/S&T officers recalled that in approximately December of 1970 Mr. James O'Connell received a telephone call from Mr. Maheu in which Mr. Maheu complained that the Agency had embarked on a new project with the Howard Hughes organization and had not gone through him. A review of various articles by Mr. Phelan indicated that he had written several stories concerning Maheu's defamation suit against Howard Hughes. In these articles Phelan reported variously that: Howard Hughes might have paid Robert Maheu $520,000 a year because of Maheu's Central Intelligence Agency expertise; Maheu reportedly claimed that one of his assignments for Hughes was to get the CIA to serve as a cover for the billionaire's activities, a request which Maheu says he refused to carry out; and Maheu claimed that Howard Hughes suggested that Maheu work out an arrangement whereby he or his organization could become a front for the CIA, another suggestion which Maheu claims he did not undertake.

File 24 November 1964

Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

Santiago ARGUELLES Izquierdo (AAC-1130) - #244420(C)
Angel Manuel BENITEZ Benitez (AAC-1131) - #744305(C)
Alicio CALAS Roque (AAC-1132) - #737175(C)
Alfredo FERNANDEZ Martinez (AAC-1133) - #737177(C)
Conrado FERNANDEZ Morales (AAC-1134) - #272300(C)
Felix FUENTES Games (AAC-1135) - #284891(C)
Orlando GARCIA Duarte (AAC-1136) - #218729(C)
Jose Angel GONZALEZ Castro (AAC-1137) - #223976(C)
Guillermo GONZALEZ Lazo (AAC-1138) - #733496(C)
Jose Severino HERNANDEZ Martinez (AAC-1139) - #283744(C)
Pedro LOPEZ Cristo (AAC-1140) - #284375(C)
Raimundo MARTINEZ Gonzalez (AAC-1141) - #284148(C)
Ricardo Anibal MORALES Navarrete (AAC-1142) - #380858(C)
Alberto PEREZ Martinez (AAC-1143) - #223124(C)
Manuel A. RIVERO Colona (AAC-1144) - #228117(C)
Jorge Delio RODRIGUEZ Triana (AAC-1145) - #744303(C)
Mario Andres ROMERO Arias (AAC-1146) - #277933(C)
Jorge Luis SILVA Del Monte (AAC-1147) - #218751(C)
Juan Cornelio TAMAYO Cordovi (AAC-1148) - #218752(C)

1. On 24 November 1964 Bob Gambino, SOD/SO, called and said that subjects will probably be returning to the U.S. around 30 November 1964.

2. On 25 November 1964 Jack Scanlan 03, SOD/SO, advised that the arrival would be in the first week of December 1964.

3. On 30 November 1964 Jack Scanlan 03 advised that all but AAC-1142 and AAC-1143 would be returning on about 5 December 1964 at midnight on an Agency C-118.

4. On 1 December 1964 Scanlan 03 advised that subjects (except 1142 and 1143) would probably arrive at Andrews Air Force Base, Md., at about midnight on 5 December 1964 on an Air Force C-118 06 with tail number 3820. He said that Bob Gambino, Arthur Garza 03, William Robertson 06 and Dr. James Fearon 06, M.D., would also be

	Dir. Sec.
	Dep. Dir. Sec.
	Executive
	DDS/I&S
	DDS/P&PS
	Ch I Staff
	Ch P Staff
	Ch [illegible] S
	Ch S&S
	Ch A&S
	Ch SSD
	Ch PSD
✓	SSD File

6/PN See # 380858 (C)

aboard. He said that the plane would also have loose cargo as follows: outboard motors, radio beacons, silence weapons, other weapons, commo gear, medical equipment and parachute drop equipment. He also said Gambino may be carrying some TSD material. He stated that James Fitchett, under Air Force 32 cover, would be there to transfer subjects to a C-54 for further travel to Camp Pickett and that Fitchett would meet the Customs and I&NS men at Base Operations.

5. On 2 December 1964 I advised Lawrence Fleishmann, Deputy Commissioner of Customs of the arrival and told him of the type of gear aboard. He said he would have his man meet Fitchett at Base Operations.

6. On 3 December 1964, I advised Frank Braden, I&NS, of the arrival of subjects and the other passengers and that Customs and his man should meet James Fitchett at Base Ops.

/S/

W. M. Knott

OS/AAS/WMK: es 4 Dec 64

File SECRET 24 September 1964

Alien Affairs Officer

Santiago J. ARGUELLES Izquierdo (AAC-1130)
#244429
Angel Leonel BENITEZ Benitez (AAC-1131)
#746373
Alcido CALAS Roque (AAC-1132)
#737475
Alfredo FERNANDEZ Martinez (AAC-1133)
#737173
Conrado FERNANDEZ Gonzalez (AAC-1134)
#[illegible]
Felix FUENTES Gomez (AAC-1135)
#[illegible]
Orlando GARCIA Rosado (AAC-1136)
#221729
Jose Angel GONZALEZ Castro (AAC-1137)
#[illegible]
Guillermo GONZALEZ Lara (AAC-1138)
#[illegible]
Juan Severino HERNANDEZ Martinez (AAC-1139)
#[illegible]
Pedro LOPEZ Calzio (AAC-1140)
#[illegible]
Raimundo MARTINEZ Gonzalez (AAC-1141)
#[illegible]
Ricardo Anibal MORALES Navarrete (AAC-1142)
#[illegible]
Alberto PEREZ Martinez (AAC-1143)
#[illegible]
Manuel A. RIVERO Colon (AAC-1144)
#[illegible]
Jorge Delio RODRIGUEZ Ybarra (AAC-1145)
#744329
Mario Andres ROMERO Arias (AAC-1146)
#277939
Jorge Luis SILVA Del Monte (AAC-1147)
#615758
Juan Cornelio TAMAYO Cordova (AAC-1148)
#218712

REFERENCE: Our letter to I&NS of 25 September 1964 regarding 19 Cubans being sent to the Congo by [illegible].

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

1. Bob Gambino, [illegible], and Mr. Braden, I&NS, will fly to Camp Pickett, Va., this morning where Mr. Braden will issue Forms I-512's for the subjects. Braden will also take two Applications, Forms I-131, for two (2) of the nineteen (19) who are permanent residents. The other seventeen (17) are 212(d)(5) refugees.

2. Afterwards Gambino will have TSD put [illegible] on the I-512's.

3. The I-512's and Reentry Permits will be issued as valid for twelve (12) months.

Jerry L. [illegible]

CS/AAS/[illegible] 26 Sept 64

SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4 OCT 1973

SUBJECT: Robert A. Maheu

1. Robert A. Maheu was born on 30 October 1917 in Waterville, Maine. He graduated from Holy Cross College, Worcester, Massachusetts in 1940. He is married and has four children.

2. He was employed as a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1940 to 1947. Upon resigning from the Bureau a venture into private enterprise culminated in bankruptcy in 1952. Subsequent to his bankruptcy, he was employed as Special Assistant to the Administrator, Small Business Administration with the specific duty of Director of Security. In February 1954, he was forced to resign for political reasons from this position. He then established his own investigative organization known as Robert A. Maheu Associates, and rented desk space in a suite occupied by Carmine S. Bellino, a former Bureau Agent, Certified Public Accountant, and currently employed on Capitol Hill with one of the Congressional Committees.

3. Mr. Maheu's organization successfully handled a number of prestige accounts, including Niarchos, Schenley Distillers, New York Central Railroad, United Steel Workers Union, and ultimately Howard Hughes. Although he has maintained offices in Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, most recently he resided in Las Vegas, Nevada.

4. He was initially recruited by the Office of Security in 1954 and granted a Covert Security Approval on 30 August 1954. He performed many sensitive assignments for the Office of Security, and also accepted assignments from elements of the predecessor of the Deputy Director for Operations.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061142

EYES ONLY
SECRET

5. Some of those assignments included the following:

06

A. **King Hussein**

08 The procurement of feminine companionship to the King during an official State visit to this country during the period 16 March 09 1959 through 18 April 1959 09 (See attached Tab 1--taken from "Family Jewels" memorandum dated 16 May 1973)

B. **Johnny Roselli**

The use of a member of the Mafia in an attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro, initiated in August 1960. (See attached Tab 2--taken from "Family Jewels" memorandum dated 16 May 1973)

C. **Cover**

Various officers of the Clandestine Service met with Mr. Maheu over the years from 1954 to 1970 to determine the feasibility of using his firm for non-official cover purposes. Actual cover uses were provided for one officer in Mr. Maheu's Washington Office from September 1964 to June 1966, and another officer used the cover of Maheu Associates representatives in 10 Quito, Ecuador from 1 August 1968 through 31 December 1970. (See attached Tab 3--Director of Security Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 20 January 1971)

6. No contact has been made with Mr. Maheu since the termination of the above cover arrangement.

3 Atts

5/RV

20 May 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Robert D. Peloquin, President
International Intelligence, Inc. (INTERTEL)
839 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Telephone: (202) 638-2179

The undersigned, seeking an employment opportunity in the District of Columbia area or in California, was introduced to Mr. Peloquin on May 10, 1971 by former Agency employee, Alfred A. Pease who is currently employed by INTERTEL.
03

This unique corporation, probably created in 1970, first came to the attention of the undersigned when it was publicized in The Wall Street Journal on May 4, 1970. There had been an earlier article on April 26, 1970 in the financial section of The Sunday New York Times. The new concern has its headquarters in Washington, D. C. at the above address which also serves as the location of Mr. Peloquin's law firm. The Executive Vice President, John D. O'Connell, a former FBI agent and friend of the undersigned, maintains his office at 375 Park Avenue, New York City.

At the time of the first publicity, Mr. Peloquin said "His organization will seek to provide the necessary guidance and information to help legitimate companies from blundering into mergers, joint ventures or acquisitions with concerns secretly controlled by the Mafia and other mobsters." For the past several years, Mr. Peloquin, as Vice President of the corporation which controls INTERTEL, Resorts International, Inc., had been in charge of security for Resorts' owned gambling casino on Paradise Island in the Bahamas. He further said that the executives of INTERTEL did not "serve as detectives," they will be consultants only.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

The original publicity disclosed that in addition to Washington and New York INTERTEL would open offices in Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Canada. Just how many of these offices are presently opened and active is not known, but it is understood from (Al 03 Pease) that the Philadelphia office will not be opened because of the fact that Mr. J. Shane Creamer is the Pennsylvania Attorney General under a Democratic administration. Creamer was former head of the Pennsylvania Crime Commission. Just why INTERTEL made this change is not known but it would appear that they want no part of Mr. Creamer.

In spite of the initial publicity that INTERTEL executives were not would be "detectives," it would appear that since December of 1970 much of their active staff working out of the D. C. office have in fact become just exactly that. INTERTEL was engaged by the Hughes Tool Company to conduct a sweeping and exhaustive investigation into the affairs and past activities of Robert A. Maheu. Four or five years ago the Hughes Tool Company (Howard Hughes himself) allegedly entered into an oil contract with Robert A. Maheu Associates to perform a variety of services apparently undefined for the amount of $525,000 per year. Before the end of 1970 Maheu's contract was rescinded and attorneys for the Hughes Tool Company moved quickly to remove him from authority in the Nevada Operations. According to the newspapers this was done at the express request of Mr. Hughes himself. Preliminary litigation appalled this removal but shortly after the first of the year Maheu filed a suit against the Hughes Tool Company for $50 million to which he said he was entitled as damages for the cancellation of his "lifetime contract."

It is doubtful that there was any connection between INTERTEL and the Hughes Tool Company prior to early 1971. They were engaged as an investigative unit under a temporary contract to protect the assets of the Hughes Tool Company and to determine just exactly what Robert A. Maheu was up to. The first contract was temporary and indefinite but currently they are operating under a recently executed five year contract. Howard Hughes reportedly is living in one of the Bahaman hotels owned or operated by Resorts International.

There are those in Las Vegas who do not look on INTERTEL as the "good guys" on the local scene. The suave, popular Mr. Maheu, even though he was discharged and removed by the Hughes Tool Company, remains a popular figure winning considerable

SECRET

(/PN

political influence in the county as opposed to the city of Las Vegas itself. Maheu is being vociferously defeated by the leading local newspaper, The Las Vegas Sun. President and Publisher Herman M. Greenspun has just concluded a series in The Sun in which he alleges that INTERTEL is in fact a front and instrumentally of organized crime--shocking if true, but not wholly impossible. The working staff for INTERTEL in Vegas is made up predominantly of ex-FBI agents and recently retired employees of the Internal Revenue Service. Peloquin himself is the former Chief of the Justice Department's Crime Strike Force, but little if anything has been publicized regarding the principles for controlling elements of Resorts International and its other subsidiaries. In January 1969 Resorts International made a bold yet futile move to seise control of Pan American World Airways by purchasing a 9.7 per cent stock interest. Pan Am naturally screamed and rushed to CAB for advice and support. The intercession of CAB was effective but it is believed that Resorts International did acquire perhaps half the stock that it had originally intended to purchase. The index for The Wall Street Journal for 1969 lists many references to Resorts International including one in October of that year regarding some bad publicity Resorts had received as a result of their management of the gambling casino on Paradise Island. There should be an abundance of other public information available about Resorts, its officers and principle investors with CAB, SEC and even the American Stock Exchange since it is a public corporation.

Snagging the Hughes Tool Company contract to investigate Robert A. Maheu Associates was certainly opportune and the contract is reported to run upward to a million dollars but the company's current role investigating Maheu seems inconsistent with its declared purpose unless Maheu himself is suspected of having been in touch with or ensnared by the Mafia.

Local allegations and publicity by The Las Vegas Sun could be ignored as irrelevent and as having no bearing on the Maheu-CIA relationship. Whether the allegations are evidence, it probably would be advisable to read this series of articles carefully.

There is a current rumor similar in nature to Greenspun's allegations that recently was indirectly brought to the undersigned's attention during the week of May 10th. A D. C. attorney, Bernard Fensterwald, 927 15th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. commented to a friend, "It looks like may be the good guys (INTERTEL) are in fact the bad guys with the Mafia connections." Fensterwald did not mention The Las Vegas Sun series but claimed that The Miami Herald and The Washington Post were both about to break stories linking INTERTEL with organized crime.

When Maheu hurriedly relinquished his palatial offices which occupied one whole wing of the Frontier Hotel in Las Vegas, according to Al Pease, 03 he took ten or twelve packing crates of records with him. In his haste, however, he appeared to overlook a box of 3 x 5 cards that were cross references to some of these records. The INTERTEL investigation, under the guidance of Pease 03 and the Hughes Tool Company attorneys, will undertake to establish as nearly as possible exactly what Maheu was doing with his time and with the Hughes fortune. The Hughes attorneys are proceeding on the basis that if Maheu in fact did have a "contract for life," as he contends, then the Hughes Tool Company was entitled to 100 per cent of his time and "true and faithful service." At the outset and without the records the INTERTEL staff hardly knew where to look or to begin since they suspected kickbacks, siphoning of money into foreign numbered bank accounts and the purchase of false mining claims, just to name a few. Such investigation is costly and tedious but INTERTEL hopes to develop and reconstruct Maheu's pattern of activity from the date he gave up all of his other clients to work for the Hughes Tool Company (Howard Hughes) exclusively. Therefore they will thoroughly scrutinize any and all private deals, foreign or domestic, looking for concealed assets, evidence of kickbacks or foreign numbered bank accounts, etc. Preliminary court action, except to accomplish Maheu's removal, has been slow. Mr. Pease 03 said that the Hughes Tool Company lawyers were in court in Las Vegas on April 18-20, 1971 but additional action or proceedings have been set down for June 25, 1971 and so it will probably ad infinitum. With Hughes resources he can hold out forever but the general consensus is that Maheu is already beginning to feel the financial pinch. Pease 03 reported that a recent new business, a consulting service opened by Maheu in Las Vegas, had flopped. It would appear that Maheu first became indirectly associated with Howard Hughes in the early 1950's at a time when Hughes was entangled in extended Senate hearings with the then Senator Brewster of Maine. Maheu did some subcontract investigative work developing material which Mr. Hughes used during these hearings. If it has any significance or bearing to any current problems, Mr. Robert 03 J. Flynn, a former Agency employee, could supply all details

5/20

regarding this part of Maheu's life. It was 03 Flynn who informed the undersigned some months ago that when Maheu secured employment with the former public administration in the 1950's his sponsor was Senator Margaret Chase Smith.

Some time in the early 1960's Maheu closed his D. C. office, picked up Hughes as a sole client and moved to Los Angeles. The undersigned is aware of this because he was in touch with him during the period 1962-1964. Simultaneously the undersigned was working out the details of a 20 nonofficial cover arrangement with the Aircraft Division of the Hughes Tool Company in Culver City, California. Mr. Rhea Hopper, Vice President in Charge of the Aircraft Division was the principle cleared witting official. It is doubtful that details of this arrangement ever reached Mr. Hughes himself but because of Maheu's significant role he was cut in as a pickup for insurance. The undersigned did this himself. The investigative staff of INTERTEL will not be in this Maheu investigation alone. Already they have turned certain significant information over to the Internal Revenue Service. Mr. William A. Kolar, retired Director of the IRS Intelligence Division, is part of the INTERTEL staff on the scene in Vegas.

The name of Edward P. Morgan, a former FBI agent and prominent D. C. attorney, was mentioned by Mr. Pease. 03 It seems that at some undisclosed date Morgan was engaged by the Hughes Tool Company. This would have no particular significance except for two things. (1) Morgan is one of Maheu's closest friends and business associates. (They had their heads together in 1963 in a deal under which they and other investors were trying to gain control of a large Los Angeles radio station that had its license rescinded by FCC). (2) 03 Pease said that Morgan is still in the wings making noises to certain unnamed Hughes Tool Company officials to the effect that they had better take it easy on Maheu because of the past involvement with CIA in covert operations. Mr. 03 Pease did not say exactly where he got his information and of course being uninformed was unable to appreciate its significant. It is not known whether Morgan still represents the Hughes Tool Company in any capacity but 03 Al Pease disclosed privately to the undersigned that for past services Morgan had been paid almost a million dollars. INTERTEL has studied several approaches to Morgan through ex-FBI channels to discuss this veiled threat but he has not been approached. Certainly this is a strange arrangement if it has been allowed to continue. The Hughes Tool Company would do well to drop Morgan completely. As INTERTEL attempted to interview him it's doubtful that it would be productive. Just what Morgan might have to do if served with a subpoena is beyond the undersigned's comprehension. It seems reasonable to assume that Morgan picked up the Hughes Tool Company account through his good friend Maheu or his intercession. Naturally the INTERTEL investigators did not find a folder bearing the name Edward P. Morgan but they did find a 3 x 5 card indicating that there had been such a file. This prompting of Morgan and his approach to the Hughes Tool Company could only have come from one source, Maheu himself. Because he is attorney for the Hughes Tool Company, Morgan could not have been involved. It may never be known just how much Maheu has already told Morgan about his CIA relationship.

On May 10, 1971 Mr. 03 Pease said that Robert A. Maheu and Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist, are known to be involved together in some oil mix deals. INTERTEL is looking into this and all such other similar matters to trace the source and disposition of funds. The recent expose by Jack Anderson regarding Maheu's role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert A. Maheu using his son Peter as an intermediary. 03 Pease's theory was that Maheu probably thought such publicity would "scare them off." The INTERTEL staff is aware of a series of recent contacts and meetings between Peter Maheu and Jack Anderson or a member of his staff.

Mr. 03 Pease is prepared to be reasonable in his investigation insofar as CIA interests are concerned but he cannot be intimidated, cannot ignore logical leads, and will not allow Maheu to use the Agency as a shield. He is prepared to discuss any reasonable approach.

In conclusion the undersigned respectfully requests that his name not be connected with any of the information reported herein. Much of it was volunteered by an old friend, Al Pease 03 in confidence and this confidence must be respected. Whether an employment offer is forthcoming is inconsequential.

John G. Southard

EYES ONLY

SECRET

9 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : TYLER, Lyon L.

1. On 5 January you queried the Undersigned as to his knowledge of Mr. Tyler. For your information I have known Mr. Tyler, who is known as "Slug", for about fifteen years. He is an attorney and a former FBI agent, and my association with him stems from the Society of Former Agents of the FBI. Most of the information set forth below was derived from personal contact with Slug over these years.

2. Mr. Tyler entered the Bureau in 1939 and remained in the Bureau until 1948. He served as a Special Agent and worked in Bureau Headquarters at the time of his departure. Upon resigning from the Bureau he went to work on Capitol Hill and according to Slug he worked for Lyndon B. Johnson, then Senator Johnson. As I recall, he indicated that he was in charge of Senator Johnson's files and records. He also knows a great number of Congressmen and Senators on the Hill and his present office contains autographed pictures of President Johnson, Vice President Humphrey and many prominent Senators and Representatives.

3. Some time later Slug left his employment on the Hill and started into the private practice of law. He at first shared an office with the firm of Welch, Mott and Morgan. His contact with this firm came about through his association with Edward P. Morgan who is also a former Bureau agent who served during the years 1940-1947. Apparently, Mr. Tyler felt that he could not work with Morgan and subsequently he started his own law practice in the Investment Building. The name of the firm is Tyler and Stetter. This is a loose arrangement since Stetter, also a former Bureau agent, is mixed up in real estate and investigative activities as well as law practice.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY
SECRET

24

4. One source of Tyler's income has been the Agency. He has been utilized by Central Cover Staff, the Office of Security and the Office of General Counsel to my knowledge. I do not think he has been heavily involved in operations, but rather has furnished backstopping and safehouse support. On at least one occasion I raised the question as to whether we were not using Tyler too much. In view of your interest I have asked for a summary of our association with Tyler.

5. Tyler has been married twice and his current spouse is named Peggy. At one time she was personal secretary to the Secretary of Commerce and has always held a position of executive secretary to highly placed people in government. Slug himself is very affable and is extremely well known. He has been active in the Ex-Agents Society and may have had some minor involvements in politics.

6. Edward Morgan, who is mentioned above, is a well known attorney dealing primarily with cases coming before the FCC. He is reportedly very wealthy and Tyler told me at one time that Morgan obtained his funds through Oklahoma oil men. It seems that he represented a number of southwest oil men in obtaining a franchise for TV stations in that area. He was given part of his fee in oil leases which proved to be of great value. On one occasion in about 1954 I talked with Ed Morgan regarding the possibility of a national ex-FBI agents convention in Washington, D. C. At that time Morgan indicated that he would be willing to put up $250,000 to back a convention in Washington. He made this offer to indicate that he was certain such a convention would be a success and no financial loss would occur from such a convention.

7. In about 1951 Ed Morgan left his law practice to take over as Chief of Enforcement of the Office of Price Stabilization. At that time he hired a number of former FBI agents and reportedly was accused of proselyting agents from the Bureau. It is common gossip among ex-agents that the Director of the FBI was extremely miffed at Morgan's action and would have nothing to do with him. There was also talk among ex-agents that the FBI had thwarted his attempts to become president of the national ex-agents organization. (He ran for the presidency and was defeated in 1957.)

8. The above is set forth for your information.

Charles W. Kane

Charles W. Kane
Deputy Director of Security

SECRET
EYES ONLY

'JRV

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security 4 May 1967

SUBJECT : MORGAN, Edward P.

1. I first met Ed Morgan in about 1952 or 1953 through our association with the Society of Former Agents of the FBI. Both Ed and I served on the Executive Committee of the Washington Chapter of that Society in 1953-54 and both Ed and I were interested in having the Ex-Agents National Convention in Washington, D. C. At that time Jim McInerny was President of the Washington Chapter.

2. I went overseas in 1955 and I have seen Ed possibly four or five times since my return in 1957. While I have been active in the Society, Ed Morgan has not been. The last time I saw Morgan was in January 1967 at an Ex-Agents dinner. All of my association with Morgan has been through the Ex-Agents, and I have never been in contact with him socially other than through the Society.

3. The following information is hearsay concerning Ed Morgan. I have reason to believe that all the information is true, but I do not know it on a first hand basis. Ed Morgan served in the Bureau from 1940 to 1947. He is a tall, personable, nice looking individual and in the Bureau he ended up in the Training Division. He used to give lectures to the new Agents classes and the National Academy classes, and through his speaking ability he came to the attention of Director, J. Edgar Hoover. At the end of the war Morgan left the Bureau to enter private law practice.

4. According to rumor, Morgan entered the field of Federal Communications practice. His firm became well known in this field and the firm name is Welch, Mott & Morgan. Rumor is that he obtained TV franchises for a number of oil men in the Middle West, and took his pay in oil leases. He made a great deal of money in a short period of time and is reportedly worth at least a million dollars.

5. At the time of the Korean War, Morgan accepted an appointed position in the Office of Price Stabilization. He headed the investigative and compliance unit of OPS and in this position he hired a number of Ex-Agents. It was in this job that he reportedly ran afoul of the Bureau. Morgan apparently proselyted a great number of Bureau Agents at higher salaries than the Bureau made and this made Director Hoover furious. A few years later a rumor was started that Morgan hoped to replace Hoover; the Director was even more furious. I do not know this for a fact, but it has been speculated that Morgan is persona non grata with the Bureau.

6. Morgan continued active work in the Society of Former Agents between 1955 and 1957. In 1957 he ran for the office of National President of the Society. He was defeated in his bid for this office and was very bitter about his defeat. For the past ten years he has not attended more than two or three local meetings, and he does not participate in Society activities. It was rumored that Morgan blamed his defeat on the Bureau, stating that he was defeated because the Bureau had black-listed him.

7. According to rumor Morgan moves in fairly high circles in the District of Columbia. I believe he belongs to the Touchdown Club and I also believe he belongs to one of the more exclusive country clubs in the area. He drinks, but I have never seen him intoxicated. Other than the items mentioned above, I have never heard anything unfavorable concerning him. There are a number of people in the Agency who knew him and worked with him at the Bureau. I feel certain that (Frank Holmes) 03 would know him fairly well, as well as Bill Harvey, Ron MacMillan, Herman Horton and Glenn Fields. Lyon L. (Slug) Tyler, who has been 24 (utilized by Central Cover) for a number of years, formerly worked for Morgan in his law firm, but broke away from the firm because of some disagreement. Tyler would probably know a great deal concerning Morgan's personal habits. It should be remembered, however, that because Morgan's law practice is primarily an administrative practice before the FCC, most of his business associates would be in the broadcasting and news business.

Charles W. Kane

SECRET

[illegible] COPY

2/M

SECRET
EYES ONLY

7 June 1966

SUBJECT: MAHEU, Robert A.

1. Robert A. Maheu, a personnel relations executive and former F.B.I. Agent, has been utilized by the Office of Security on many sensitive assignments since the early fifties. He has also on several occasions been cleared for use by the DD/P in various capacities. He does business as Robert A. Maheu, Associates, and maintains offices in Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, California, where he is now residing.

2. It has come to our attention that the Senate Subcommittee investigating wiretapping activities (Long Committee) has expressed considerable interest in Maheu. He has never been asked to perform any technical surveillance on our behalf.

3. The first inkling we had that the Long Committee was interested in Maheu came to our attention through the OGC. Mr. Lawrence Houston advised that Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, had casually mentioned to him that he had been advised by Raymond A. Taggart, an AID employee, that he may be called upon to testify before the Long Committee regarding his activities while employed by Maheu (1954-55).

4. The only significant association the Agency had with Maheu during that period involved the struggle between two Greek industrial giants, Stavros Niarchus and Aristottle Onassis. Maheu had been retained as a trouble shooter for Niarchus. Onassis had just concluded a pact with King Saud which would allow him to control approximately 90 percent of the oil shipments out of Saudi Arabia. In consumating the deal, he allegedly employed every trick in the book. His achievement caused much consternation among the British, German, and American interests. Niarchus also realized as a result of this the balance of power and influence weighed heavily in

EYES ONLY
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

favor of Onassis in their own private battle. It was this mutual concern of the United States and Niarchus that set the stage for a joint venture. Niarchus supplied the money, personnel, and documents; the Agency furnished the communications, courier facilities, and direction in the form of our Commo channel, pouch system, and the NEA Division's expertise and guidance.

5. Spyridon Catapodis, a Greek Broker, who had an ax to grind against Onassis as a result of being manipulated out of a handsome commission he believed due him for his intercession with certain Saudi officials to secure oil rights for Onassis, spearheaded a campaign to publicize Onassis' high-handed methods of operation. This triggered off all sorts of international litigations which erupted into suits and countersuits by all parties concerned. Of particular note was the case of Catapodis vs. Onassis, which suit was filed in New York State. While Niarchus was being examined before trial by Onassis' attorney, he claimed Government privilege in answering certain questions. This tact was challenged by the attorney and pursued to the point that eventually it was recorded in the briefs filed by both the plaintiff and the defendent that CIA was, in fact, the Government agency of interest. Close coordination was maintained during this period with Justice and State. At our request a representative of the U. S. Attorney's Office in New York monitored all of the Hearings. Mr. Houston is intimately familiar with the actions in this case, and copies of his memoranda pertinent to it are contained in his files.

6. The Security file on Subject contains a Covert Security Clearance issued 16 August 1954 at the request of NE/2, Att: William Miller, for Maheu's use on Project TWIXT. Other interested DD/P personnel were identified as William F. Rowland, Acting Chief, NEA Division; George Prussing; Walter Snowden; and Charles Williamson.

63

7. Mr. Maheu was contacted to determine whether the Committee had been in touch with him. He stated he was not aware of their interest in him. When the Taggart conversation was mentioned, he promptly replied that it must be the Onassis operation they are looking into. He recalled that he had Onassis' New York office "covered" sometime during the period. John Frank, a

former staff employee, and then a private investigator, was engaged to arrange for the coverage. Maheu could only identify the technician by the name of Leon. Presumably, this coverage was done as a routine technique to keep the Niarchus interests informed on Onassis' movements. This was not initiated at the request of any Agency component so far as our records indicate.

8. Subsequently, Maheu advised he had received a message from one of the Committee's attorneys named Homme who wanted to fly out to talk with him. Maheu fended him off by saying he was tied up for the next several days. He then contacted his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, of Washington, D. C., and it was decided that Morgan would meet him in St. Louis on 24 May for a conference.

9. On Thursday morning, 26 May, Maheu called to advise that he was at the Madison Hotel, Washington, D. C., and was anxious to talk with us. At his request it was arranged to have Colonel Edwards accompany a member of this office to meet with him.

10. Maheu opened the conversation by announcing that he had been selected to be the star performer on a planned TV hearing which is scheduled to open within the next few weeks. He went on to give the basis for this statement in the following detail.

> When he first talked to Ed Morgan of the possibility of his being subpoenaed, Morgan assured him that he had nothing to be concerned about inasmuch as he was a very close friend of Senator Long's personal attorney who had considerable influence upon the Senator. The lawyer resides in St. Louis, and he suggested that they both go out and solicit his assistance. After the presentation of the facts, all three flew to Washington where the lawyer secured an appointment with the Senator. Mr. Bernard Fensterwald was in attendance at the meeting. He identified himself as the Chief Attorney for the Committee. According to Maheu, Fensterwald made it clear that Maheu was their ace in the hole and without him the Hearings would have no appeal. He implied that Maheu's clients and their opposition added

up to a very attractive package. Such headliners as Niarchus, Onassis, Dave McDonald, and Howard Hughes are hard to come by. Fensterwald further referred to Maheu as the type who employed the technique of cutting the Government in just enough on his touchy operations to permit him to hide behind their skirts if he were caught. It is the opinion of the lawyer that, unless the Senator can be convinced to the contrary, he will proceed with plans on schedule.

11. Maheu's most active account and, at this time, almost exclusive client is Howard Hughes. In the past he did considerable work for Dave McDonald, former president of the United Steel Workers. So far as this office knows, the Agency never had any interest in either of these clients. However, it should be noted that the IO Division was granted a Covert Security Approval on 4 June 1959 to approach Maheu and advise him of the Agency's interest in international labor. Maheu claims he never became involved in any "bugging" operation for either of these accounts.

12. It is not believed that Maheu wants or expects us to front for him in the Onassis tap matter. As mentioned previously, to our knowledge this was not Agency sponsored. However, if exploited, it would probably eventually lead to exposing our part in the Onassis/Niarchus feud. As it is a matter of court record, it could not be denied nor buried. Even though the details might be protected by a declaration that it involved classified operational information, it would set up a field day for the press and critics of the Agency.

13. Mr. Maheu is presently furnishing cover for a DODS staff agent in his Washington, D. C., office. In this connection, two of Maheu's employees have been cleared and witting. Other clearance actions noted were: CSA granted FI/Plans, Cover Division on 30 August 1954 for use under LPHIDDEN; CSA issued to NE Division on 7 October 1959 for Maheu's use in the United States and (Jordan) 11 inasmuch as he may be employed by (the King of Jordan) to handle (Jordanian) public relations in the United States. 24

11

4/PV

14. In 1958-59, Maheu was used by the FE Division in two sensitive operations targeted against Sukarno. Mr. Allen Dulles was aware and approved of these operations. Mr. Joseph Smith who was then Chief/PMI, is knowledgeable of the actions.

15. While none of our interests in Maheu relate to wiretapping, it is evident that the extensive and diversified use of him makes us vulnerable to exploitation should he be interrogated in depth regarding his activities.

16. Mr. Maheu is maintaining a cooperative attitude and has promised to do all in his power to protect the Agency from embarrassment or compromise.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DDS		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached are copies of summaries of our operational involvement with Maheu. In addition to giving Mr. Helms the originals, I have also given copies to Mr. Houston.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Director of Security	6/20/66

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Project HARPSTAR

1. May 1958 - FE Division initially contacted Director of Security and briefed him on Project. Basically, Project capitalized on President Sukarno's weakness for women, especially Caucasian. Because of our inability to get controlled asset close to him to determine his thinking and plans, and the recent apparent success of Soviets use of a woman, believed he may let down guard and become expansive in discussion of plans with a female and accept advice that he would not ordinarily accept from a man.

2. Object - Locate intelligent, attractive, emotionally stable, and trustworthy female who would accept assignment which would involve eventual intimate relationship with Sukarno.

3. January 1958 - Gave Robert Maheu assignment to locate candidate. He advised that a prominent [redacted] attorney and "man about town," [redacted], could come up with a qualified woman. Maheu told [redacted] he had a "client" whose business was not prospering in an unidentified country. Felt could improve situation if an attractive and intelligent female could get to him and, through feminine charm, persuade his thinking in a more favorable direction.

4. [redacted] was investigated with favorable results and given CSA on 2 July 1958, but not made witting of CIA interest.

5. Candidate - [redacted], a well-to-do widow, approximately 35 years old, resident of [redacted], considered highly intelligent and extremely attractive.

6. August 1958 - Project HARPSTAR plan concurred in by COPS and DCI.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
EYES ONLY

7. August 27 - Joseph Smith, FE Division, introduced to Maheu as Joseph Sims.

8. Smith emphasized need for a solid cover story and back-stopping. Maheu suggests, in view of [redacted] close relationship with movie colony, may induce [redacted] who represents several movie interests, to set up an arrangement that would also include necessary funding mechanisms.

9. September 23 - Maheu and O'Connell, Security, met with [redacted] in New York City (Hampshire House). Agreed, if he co-operative, would brief him re Agency interest and objective of Project to get maximum effort from him. He responded enthusiastically and offered his complete service and facilities to set up a secure cover mechanism. He suggested that [redacted] be told of general Government interest (not CIA) at the outset due to her sharp perceptiveness which may cause her to speculate at a later date.

10. Cover Story - [redacted] would commission her to perform an "on location survey" in certain FE areas for the proposed filming of "Journey to the Center of the Earth." This could be done very naturally because [redacted] has the reights to the film and is contemplating shooting it in near future.

11. September 23 - [redacted] arrived New York City (St. Regis). Maheu met her alone for first time and told her of Government interest. She seemed to be relieved about certain misgivings she had of assignment. (She knew true identity of Maheu, having been introduced to him socially by [redacted]. She also knew that he had a personal relations organization.)

12. September 23 (afternoon) - Maheu introduced "Sims" to [redacted]. Was given a gradual briefing on assignment, determining at various points whether she was still interested. She indicated she understood exactly what was expected of her and could leave country in 15 days.

13. September 24 - "Sims" again met with [redacted] at which time she was told she would be accompanied by a female traveling companion, [redacted] ([redacted] GS-12). Would ostensibly be her secretary, but would be, in fact, the person she would look to for direction.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

14. [redacted] subsequently given several briefings by FE personnel, both in New York City and California. All under aliases. P. O. boxes and sterile phones were set up for communications.

15. Cover arrangements were completed by [redacted]. He arranged for [redacted] to carry a letter of introduction from [redacted] to a [redacted], his representative in Indonesia. [redacted] known to Sukarno. Also arranged to have funds placed in the Indonesian branch of Twentieth Century Fox in DJARKARTA.

16. Records of this Office do not reflect any of the activities of [redacted] during the course of her mission. It is believed she left for Indonesia sometime in January 1959. It is known that she did meet Sukarno, but due to unfortunate timing that had him leaving his country on official business, she had little time to cultivate him; consequently, the purpose of the mission was not fulfilled. It should be noted that Sukarno took sufficient notice of her that during an unofficial visit to the United States in June 1959, he expressed a strong desire to see her and did.

17. The last known contact [redacted] had with the Agency was in the form of a telephone call on 12 April 1961 when she called on the sterile line and talked to Hugh Tovar, who she knew as George Henry. She advised that [redacted] asked her to give a party for President Sukarno who would be in Los Angeles on 21 April 1961. She wanted to know whether Henry's people were interested in sponsoring this party. A negative response was given.

18. It is not known where she is or what her activities are at the present time, but presumably she is still in the Los Angeles area.

14-00000

EYES ONLY

PROJECT NORFOLK

06

1. In connection with the official State visit of King Hussein from 16 March 09 1959 thru 18 April 09 1959, the Office of Security was requested to render special support during the Los Angeles and New York phases of the tour.

28 03

03 2. According to NEA personnel, Messrs. Norman Paul, 03 Fred LaTrash and William Arms, the Subject was particularly desirous of female companionship during his Los Angeles visit, and it was requested that appropriate arrangements be made through a controlled source of the Office of Security, in order to insure a satisfied visit. In addition, other supportive service, such as car rentals, living accommodations, etc. were required and authorized under NEA Division Project NORFOLK.
28

09

3. 06 On 3 April 1959 Mr. Robert Maheu was asked to arrange a party for King Hussein at Los Angeles, California. He did this through Mr. [redacted], a prominent [redacted] attorney and [redacted] figure previously granted a CSA for use by FE Division. By prearrangement, during the course of this party, King Hussein 06 was introduced to [redacted], a part-time [redacted] and [redacted]. For the duration of 06 King Hussein's stay in Los Angeles, 3 April thru 7 April 09 1959 he and [redacted] became [redacted] friends. Accordingly, it was indicated by Mr. Fred LaTrash, who was integrated into the State party, that King Hussein desired to continue his friendship with [redacted] 06 and that he wished to meet with her during his stay in New York City from 14 April thru 18 April 1959 09

4. Because of the publicity 06 that had attended the relationship between [redacted] and King Hussein in Los Angeles, the Office of Security was requested by NEA Division 29 to facilitate the arrangements for the visit in New York City.

09

5. On 13 April 1959 arrangements were made to rent the home of [redacted], a Security Office source, at Long Beach, Long Island, for the period 14 April thru 18 April 1959 09 as a confidential meeting place for [redacted] and King Hussein. 06 At the same time, [redacted] was registered at the Hotel Barclay, 111 East 48th Street, New York City, under the name of Mrs. [redacted] of El Paso, Texas. The publicity touching

EYES ONLY

21/pv

EYES ONLY

on the relationship became more pointed, some public mention had been made of the [redacted] background of [redacted] and thus it became increasingly important that the New York meeting be carefully arranged.

6. On 14 April 1959, 09 Mr. Fred LaTrash 03 and [redacted], after appropriate security arrangements, were transported to Long Beach, Long Island, where the residence of [redacted] was taken over as the meeting place between King Hussein 06 and [redacted] Later the same day, by prearrangement, two Department of State Security Agents, a New York City Police Lieutenant and a hired chauffeur arrived with King Hussein. 06 [redacted] remained at the site thru 18 April 1959 09 and King Hussein 06 and party visited each evening, remaining for about four to five hours.

7. During the stay at the Long Beach site, [redacted] discussed the publicity in the case at some length with the Security representative. She speculated about the possible sources of certain personal information that she felt had been leaked to the press. She spoke of her depth of feeling for King 06 Hussein and commented on how Mr. [redacted] had initially sought her out to serve as a party companion for the 06 King. At the time, she said she was unclear as to just what part Mr. [redacted] wanted her to play and in attempting to clarify his request, [redacted] said, "I am employed by the CIA. We want you to go to bed with him." [redacted] continued to say that she rejected the proposal, but finally went to the party 06 and that it developed that the relationship between her and King Hussein transcended what had been suggested.

8. Following the departure of King Hussein 06 for Jordan 11 at the request of NEA Division, 29 the Office of Security assisted in arranging means of communication between [redacted] and the 08 King. From May 09 1959 thru October 1960, the Security Office assisted the NEA 29 Division in the handling and examination of personal correspondence between [redacted] and the 08 King. The last-recorded action by the Security Office in this case was 10 October 1960. 09

9. All personal contacts by Security representatives in the case were under alias and implied State Department affiliation.

10. There is no record or indication in any of the files in this case that involves Robert Maheu by name or reference. Maheu, as we understand it, never was introduced to [redacted] and, as far as

EYES ONLY

181N

can be determined, [redacted] "fronted" for all arrangements.

11. Security Office investigation conducted variously from 25 May through 17 September 8 1959 of [redacted] reflected no substantive derogatory information germane to the case.

C/TW

Third party, personal information deletions from attached memo's re "Project HARPSTAR" and "Project NORFOLK".

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 21 PER #

ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

26

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE. VR. RI/AN, WH/COG-8, ~~DDP~~, AddP, OGC-2, CI, CI/OPS, SOD-6, CS/DO, Secur-4, CS/SGo, CI/PS

ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

#081

24 JUL 68 IN 56811

M

S E C R E T 241549Z JUL 68 CITE JMCOBRA 0382

DIRECTOR, (SANTO DOMINGO) INFO (PORT AU PRINCE)
16-10 16-8

REFS: A. (SANTO DOMINGO) 5907 IN 54327 N

21-10

B. (SANTO DOMINGO) 5912 IN 55244 N

21-10

C. DIRECTOR 18614 N

1. (SECEN) (WHO ALSO FORMERLY (EMSHAM-1) IS PARTNER OF PARA 7 REF A COMPANY WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IS LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISE TO EXPLOIT HIS EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN DOMINICAN MILITARY FOR BUSINESS PURPOSES. (SECEN) HAD SOME CONTACT WITH FATHER GEORGES AT LEAST IN PERIOD BEFORE HIS TERMINATION BY JMWAVE IN AUGUST 66. NO (SECEN) CONTACT WITH FATHER BAJEUX KNOWN BUT JMCOBRA NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE HIS RECENT ACTIVITIES.

06 02 06 06

2. JMCOBRA HAS NO INFO (SECEN) CURRENTLY IN CONTACT WITH MASFERRER OR THAT MASFERRER PROPOSED TRIP NEW YORK CONNECTED WITH (SECEN) TRIP SANTO DOMINGO. [redacted] (ONE OF FORMER JMWAVE CASE OFFICERS OF (SECEN) COMMENTS IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY (SECEN) CURRENTLY DEALING WITH MASFERRER. [redacted] ALSO COMMENTS (SECEN) IMPRESSED HIM AND OTHERS AS HIGHLY COMPETENT TOUGH PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER AND IF INVOLVED

06 06 06 06 06 03

True

[illegible], O'MALLEY

True

8/13/68

14/jw

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION • CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY:______ AT:______ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.______

X-REF TO FILE NO.______

DISSEM BY______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 JMCOBRA 0382 SECRET

IN OR LEADING TROOPS IN INVASION ATTEMPT HAITI COULD BE EXPECTED MAKE MUCH STRONGER SHOWING THAN PREVIOUS COMIC-OPERA ATTEMPTS.

3. SY MANDEL PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH SEYMOUR MANDEL FORMER OWNER CRAZY AMERICAN BAR HAVANA WHO NOW SHIP CAPTAIN REPUTED BE ENGAGED SMUGGLING AND OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN CARIBBEAN. NO LOCAL WOBONE TRACES MAC DONALD AND CARTUS.

SECRET

BT

8/3/68

SECRET

23 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Analysis Group

SUBJECT : Manuel L. DE ARMAS
SF#591 865

1. Reference is made to the attached cable traffic which sets forth the "defection" of the Subject to Cuba circa April 1976. In substance, DE ARMAS apparently gave a press conference in Havana on 21 April 1976 in which he claimed to be an ex-CIA agent who had been recruited by a fnu BLACKENHOUSE (no Office of Security traces) in 1969. DE ARMAS also claimed to have been stationed in New York City in 1971 where he maintained contact with BLACKENHOUSE and Richard TOMLEY (probably identifiable with Peter L. B. TOMLEY, Washington Area Recruiting Office).

2. In the cited press conference, DE ARMAS made many allegations concerning purported CIA operations, such as assassination plots and a plan to rupture relations between Venezuela and Cuba. Details of these allegations are set forth in the attached cable traffic and are not treated in instant memorandum. However, interest in DE ARMAS' allegations concerning alleged CIA operations concerns the identities of individuals that he claimed to have been Agency operatives and assets; details regarding these individuals are covered in the latter portion of instant memorandum.

3. Agency interest in DE ARMAS was originally predicated upon the receipt of a letter written by DE ARMAS on 12 September 1972 in which he related details concerning his anti-CASTRO activities through his membership in a group called ABDALA. The letter also contained a request for employment with the Agency. As a result of DE ARMAS' letter, WH Division requested a Special Inquiry by the Office of Security for the purpose of establishing DE ARMAS' identity, which was completed in October 1972. In May 1973 Office of Personnel opened a file on DE ARMAS and apparently went through the normal routine of shopping his file. Interest in DE ARMAS terminated when TOMLEY sent DE ARMAS a letter advising him that the Agency had nothing currently available. Then on 22 January 1973 DE ARMAS wrote TOMLEY thanking the latter for interest following a telephone call

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 007472

DE ARMAS made to TOMLEY in which DE ARMAS wanted to know once and forever if there were any openings for him. DE ARMAS' security file reflected no subsequent activity except for the attached cable traffic following his "defection."

4. Regarding the personalities mentioned by DE ARMAS in his Havana press conference, it appears that several individuals may be identical to former WH Division assets, as shown below. It should be noted that DE ARMAS did not identify any bona fide Agency staff employees or agents nor does it appear that he identified any past or current operations. It seems likely that DE ARMAS was provided a list of known or suspected Agency assets by the DGI as part of Cuba's ongoing anti-CIA, anti-U. S. Government campaign designed to offset adverse criticism to Cuba's military assistance to Angola. Set forth below are those individuals alleged to have been connected with Agency operations by DE ARMAS; results of Office of Security indices searches and file reviews follow each name where a possible identification could be made.

NAME GIVEN BY DE ARMAS	OS FILE, IF ANY, AND COMMENTS
Bob DYNES (aka: DINUS, DAYNES)	No Office of Security traces regarding all variations.
Robert Bud MILES (alleged to have been the supplier of explosives used in the * murder of Rolando MASFERRER)	No Office of Security traces.
Lazaro ALVAREZ	Possibly identifiable with Lazaro Gustavo ARECES ALVAREZ, SF#753 905, on whom a POA was requested by WH Division (JMATE) in June 1964 for use as a PM/Maritime asset; files canceled in October 1964.
Fred DUNCAN	No Office of Security traces; believed to be a DEA officer stationed in Caracas.
Doug PHILLIPS	No Office of Security traces; believed to be a DEA officer stationed in Caracas.

* MASFERRER Died in 1975 when his car was blown apart by a bomb in Florida.

NAME GIVEN BY DE ARMAS	OS FILE, IF ANY, AND COMMENTS
John VALDAVIAN (aka: BLADABIAN)	No Office of Security traces regarding all variations.
A. NASS	Probably identifiable with Donald L. NESS, State Department RSO in Santo Domingo.
Anselmo ALLIEGRO (HIJO)	No Office of Security traces.
Justo ALFONSO (aka: "El Gallego")	No Office of Security traces.
Ricardo MORALES NAVARRETE	No Office of Security traces.
Armando RUIZ	Possibly identifiable with Armando VALENZUELA RUIZ, SF#752 358. OA request by WH/3/[Columbia for use as a 24 PA in Columbia or PRC;] not used due to significant derogatory information developed.
Antonio de LEON	Possibly identifiable with Sergio Antonio LOPEZ DE LEON, SF#740 227, who was apparently [used by WH/1/Mexico as a LP operator from December 1964 to May 1973 in Mexico.] 24
Mario MEJIA RICARD (aka: RICART)	Probably identifiable with Marcio MEJIA RICART, CR to SF#244 148 (Manuel Moises LAMARCHE SALAS). In June 1960 latter advised FBI that RICART was a Venezuelan active in anti-TRUJILLO activities and had visited Miami in April to buy B-26's and weapons for an attack on the Dominican Republic; also advised that RICART was an instructor at Caracas University, was associated with Director of Economic

SECRET

417V

NAME GIVEN BY DE ARMAS	OS FILE, IF ANY, AND COMMENTS
	Development in Venezuela and believed RICART may be a Communist.
Luis DESA SOTO	No Office of Security traces.
Felix MARTINEZ SUAREZ	Possibly identifiable with Felix Antonio MARTINEZ SUAREZ, SF#242 302, who was Director of El Mundo when a POA was granted in April 1961 and updated in July 1973 for his use by WH/3/V as a Propaganda Placement Asset. 24
Salavador ROMANI	Possibly identifiable with Salvador Garcia ROMANI-ORUE, SF#223 776; on whom an OA was granted in September 1960 for use by WH/4/Cuba as a PP Agent in Caracas; files canceled in January 1967. On PRQ listed one Manuel ARTIME, not further identified, as a relative/friend/correspondent in U. S. 24

5. The possible identification (by either DE ARMAS or the DGI) of those WH Division assets reflected above suggests that their names were either known or suspected as CIA assets and were thrown in with those individuals not identified above in an effort to legitimatize DE ARMAS' claims to have worked for the CIA. It should be noted that of those individuals listed above on whom a security file exists, none appear to have any current association with this Agency and, as far as can be determined, no actual Agency operations were either exposed or threatened.

6. The above is provided for your information; no further action in this case appears necessary.

Michael E. Schneeberger
Security Analysis Group

Att

2/RV

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 53 PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION EUR 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, CI/RA, SECUR 4, CA/PROP, CA 5

#079

S E C R E T 151047Z MAR 69 CITE ZURICH 1629 15-8

DIRECTOR INFO BERN 15-11

Mrs Hall

17 MAR 69 IN 15450

3/17/69

REF DIRECTOR 83209

1. NAGELL LAST APPEARED AT ZURICH CONSULATE MORNING 7 MARCH AND STATED THAT IF HE RECEIVED NO SATISFACTION BY FIVE O'CLOCK THAT AFTERNOON HE WOULD CARRY OUT HIS THREATS AND EXPOSE US GOVERNMENT ON RADIO, TELEVISION AND IN THE PRESS.

2. HE THEN DISAPPEARED, NOTHING FURTHER HEARD FROM HIM AND, NO PUBLICITY GIVEN. MORNING MONDAY 10 MARCH CONSULATE ZURICH ADVISED BY TELEPHONE FROM US CONSULATE BARCELONA THAT NAGELL HAD APPROACHED THEM AND MADE SIMILAR THREATS.

3. FILE: 201-746537.

S E C R E T

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

2/BR

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 76

SECRET 27

RIG: MARY KOUREMBIS MK
NIT: E/AS/S
T: 7963/9108
ATE: 12 MARCH 1969

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	SRS	5	
2		6	
3		7	1D/1
4	OSD	8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 24 PER Sop #102

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-746537

Tighe

ONF: EUR-6 INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, CI, CA-S, CI/IC-2, CI/RA, SECUR-4, CI, RI/AN, CS/DO, CA/PROP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 23 17 MAR 69 3

CITE DIRECTOR 83209

15-10 15-18
O ~~BERN~~ ZURICH INFO BERN 15-10

Mrs Hall

INK MHORDER WOMUSE

REFS: A. 15-10 BERN 4908 (IN 07192)
B. DIRECTOR 80955

Richard Case

1. FOR RECORD ON NAGELL PLEASE ADVISE US IF ~~[illegible]~~ HE AIRED GRIEVANCES ON RADIO/TV AS THREATENED. (RW)

~~2. BERN: PLEASE PASS ZURICH~~ 15-10

~~3~~ 2. FILE: 201-746537.

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

C/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/E/AS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

5 4 3 2 1

5/BR

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

36 SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2	OSD	6	
3		7	1D/1
4	SRS	8	

ORIG: 03 JERRY SEIGEL
UNIT: E/AS/S
EXT: 7963/9108
DATE: 5 MARCH 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 33 PER SOP # 102

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-746537

Tighe

CONF: EUR 6 INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CAS, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/RA, FI2, SECUR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 06 00 03 MAR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 80955

PRIORITY 15-18
TO BERN 15-10 ~~INFO ZURICH~~

INK MHORDER WOMUSE

REFS: A. ZURICH 15-18 1610 (IN 03310)
B. BERN 15-10 4908 (IN 07192)

1. INFO REF A PASSED LNERGO 28 FEBRUARY 1969. NO INFO SUBJECT'S FILE SUBSEQUENT DIRECTOR 06625 ~~DATED~~ JUNE 1968 EXCEPT FOR PARA 3 BELOW.

2. SUBJECT HAS NEVER HAD ANY WOFIRM CONNECTIONS. NO EVIDENCE ANY CURRENT LNHARP RELATIONSHIPS (ISR HAS NO RECORD). PAST HISTORY INDICATES HE FABRICATOR AND MENTALLY DISTURBED INDIVIDUAL.

3. NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED WAS FACT SUBJECT SERVED JAPAN EARLY 1958 WITH 441ST CIC DETACHMENT. WAS RELIEVED CIC DUTIES IN APRIL 1958 DUE MENTAL INSTABILITY AND CLEARANCES REVOKED. JUNE 1968 LNGOLD REQUESTED WOFIRM TRACES ON SUBJECT AND REFERRED TO LNERGO. PRESUME THIS REQUEST STEMS FROM HIS APPROACH AMCONGEN ZURICH JUNE 1968 AND DETAILED INFO ALREADY KNOWN CONSULATE.

4. BERN PASS ZURICH WHEN COB RETURNS.

5 ~~6~~. 15-10 FILE: 201-746537. 15-18

END OF MESSAGE

13

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

NAGELL, RICHARD CASE

CI/OPS/EUR G. R. Young
CI/CSAT
CI/SO

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

John Berg
C/E/AS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO. 71BR

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Sarah Hall	3/5/69	
2	SRS		
3	4E-13		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☒	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: Sarah,

You may have rec'd copy attch twx, if not, you're welcome to this copy F.Y. files.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
DHarush 03 10-1/C	4-3-69

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/BR

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2	DRS	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	OSD	10	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
CSDO
BY: T AT: 1215 Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PRECEDENCE

DISSEM BY 46 PER #

ACTION
EUR 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE. VR. , RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CI, CI/OPS, CI/ICZ, C/RA, CA5, CA/PE

#054

SECUR 4, CCS 2

SECRET 280751Z CITE 15-18 ZURICH 1610 28 FEB 69 IN 03310

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, 15-10 BERN T

INK MHORDER WOMUSE

REFS A. DIRECTOR 06625 JUNE 1968

B. 15-18 ZURICH 1331 (IN 25955) N/R

1. CONSULATE WILL BE REPORTING ON VIA STATE CHANNELS ON VISIT TO CONSULATE 27 FEB OF RICHARD CASE NAGELL, AKA JOE CRAMER, JOE CRANE, ROBERT C. NOLAN 201-746537. HE WARNED INTERVIEWING CONSUL THAT UNLESS PROMISES MADE TO HIM BY US OFFICIALS WERE HONORED HE WOULD REVEAL TO THE PRESS ENTIRE STORY OF HIS ALLEGED CONTACTS WITH WOFIRM AND WOULD EXPOSE INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM HE HAD DEALT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

2. UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY 15-18 BASE WILL, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, LEAVE THIS MATTER STRICTLY TO CONSULATE. 15-10 BERN PLEASE ADVISE LNERGO.

3. MOST RECENT STATE MESSAGE WAS US MISSION BERLIN 2567 OF 26 OCTOBER 68.

SECRET

~~Sheila~~ with Cdl

264170

SECRET

5/BR

SECRET (When Filled In)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3	JK	8	
4		9	
5	CI SD	10	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED EUR

BY: dl AT: 1810 Z

DISSEM BY 5 PER #

ACTION EUR6 ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

P[illegible]CE

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE. VR. RI/AN DDP ADDP CI CA5 CI/IC2 CI/RA SECUR 4 CA/PEG CA/PROP CCS2, FI2

420

S E C R E T 051726Z MAR 69 CITE [BERN] 4908 15-18

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO [ZURICH] 15-18

5 MAR 69 IN 07192

INK MHORDER WOMUSE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 06625, 10 JUNE 68

B. [ZURICH] 1610 (IN 03310) 15-18

1. ON 5 MARCH SUBJ AGAIN CONTACTED ZURICH CG AND IN EVEN MORE THREATENING FASHION CLAIMED HE HAS RADIO/TV TIME EVENING 6 MARCH AND WILL TELL ALL ABOUT HIS ALLEGED WOFIRM CONTACTS UNLESS HE RECEIVES ASSURANCE THAT PROMISES MADE BY US OFFICIALS WILL BE HONORED. CONSIDER THIS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE BUT REQUEST HQS CONFIRM PRIORITY THAT SUBJ HAS HAD NO WOFIRM OR OTHER LNHARP TIES.

2. FILE DEFER.

S E C R E T

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

3/BR

SECRET

66483

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Clayton Kallander
226 Westout

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
#66483

1. Returned herewith find alias documentation which was issued by your office to the Subject in accordance with our request on 6 April 1962.

2. The documentation in question is no longer needed and may be destroyed.

3. Please convey my appreciation to those responsible for the expeditious handling of this matter.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

/IOS
/IOS
/IOS

3

Attachments:
[California] Driver's License
Social Security Card
Reserve Officer's Association Membership Card
[Traveler's] Auto Insurance ID Card

UHNKE/mjl
29 June 1962
CLOSED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

66483

SECRET

O'Connell, James P.

9 APR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Mr. [John Swedberg] 03
226 Westout Building

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : OLDS, James Paul (A)
#66483

1. This will confirm our verbal request of 5 April 1962 that you prepare alias documentation in the alias indicated which will include but not necessarily be limited to the following documents: [California] 10 Driver's License, Social Security card, Reserve Officers Association identity card with the rank of Commander, and an appropriate insurance identity card.

2. You were provided with the Subject's true name, a photograph, and a sample of his signature and you were requested to have such documentation ready for the Subject no later than 1600 hours, 6 April 1962. You were provided with the following physical desctiption: Eyes - Blue; Hair - Brown; Height - 6'3"; Weight - 200 lbs; Complexion - Ruddy; Birth - 19 February 1917, Elmhurst, New York; and you were requested to utilize a non-backstopped, multiple unit address in San Francisco.

3. The documentation in question will be returned to your office when the Subject has no further use for same.

4. Your prompt attention to this matter is sincerely appreciated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

[illegible]/IOS
[illegible]/IOS
[illegible]/IOS

wjl

1 Stehle

3

KUHNKE/mjl
6 April 1962
CLOSED

Ftoz: Documentation was rec'd by JOC on 4/6/62

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2/BR

19 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Support Desk

FROM : Robert J. Leonard

SUBJECT : COVERT SITE
Apartment 423
Warwick Apartments
3051 Idaho Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
#156229 A-SB/2

24

GIST:

SB/1 has requested security approval to use the above site to house a contract Agent. Approval recommended.

DETAILS:

1. Mr. Marx Holder requires a place for the use of [illegible] (172341) an Agent of Security Research Staff. He has obtained permission of SAC/WFO and requests SB/2 to grant security approval.

2. Since this site is to be terminated on 1 March 1961 and since SAC/WFO has advised that it is leased in alias no security objection can be ascertained.

ACTION:

Recommend that SB/1 be advised that there is no security objection to the contemplated use of this site.

Cancel

Robert J. Leonard

Robert J. Leonard

[illegible]/csm (10 Jan. 1961)

172341

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

FILE: O'CONNELL, JAMES P., Jr.

Eyes Only

Director of Security
Deputy Director of Security
[illegible] R. WHITE
R. [illegible] E.

VL/[illegible]
15-0[illegible]
[illegible] 1965

SECRET

DD/S 65-0896

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

23 FEB 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Key Assignments
Office of Security

1. This memorandum submits proposed key assignments in the Office of Security for your information and approval; such assignments are contained in paragraph 2.

2. The following key assignments for the Office of Security are proposed for the summer of 1965:

a. Mr. Arthur C. Sheridan, GS-15, Chief, Technical Division, will replace Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr. in 13-17 Okinawa as Chief, Far East Regional Security Staff during July 1965.

b. Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., GS-15, who is presently attending the Air War College, will replace Mr. Sheridan as Chief, Technical Division during June 1965.

file

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

c. Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr., GS-15, will be assigned to a GS-16 position as Chief, Investigations Division upon his return to Headquarters in August 1965. After Mr. O'Connell has had a brief period of orientation in this assignment, I plan to recommend that he be promoted to GS-16.

(SIGNED)
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

The assignments contained in paragraph 2 are approved 26 Feb 65
Date

/s/
L. K. White
Deputy Director for Support

Distribution:
Original - Return to OS
2 - DDS
2 - PersBr.

OS/A&TS/ELHardt/ph (x6200 - 19 Feb 65)

43

7245

SECURITY INDOCTRINATION AND SECRECY AGREEMENT
BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM, BYECOM APPROVAL

A special system of security and control, known as the BYEMAN Security and Control System, has been established by the Director of Central Intelligence for the purpose of providing maximum security protection to a number of extremely sensitive intelligence collection projects. Each of these projects requires a separate, special security approval for access. In your official capacity in connection with U. S. Government communication systems you have been granted a BYECOM approval which permits you to perform your official duties as regards BYEMAN projects in general, without regard to the necessary separate special security approvals. Strict adherence to the BYEMAN Control Manual and all supplemental directives must be adhered to in the handling of BYEMAN materials or information. You are requested to read and sign the Secrecy Agreement and Oath.

1. In connection with my indoctrination into the BYEMAN Control System, I acknowledge my full understanding of an agreement with the following provisions:

a. Security restrictions and penalties for violations of the BYEMAN Control System, to which I am subject, are covered under Title 18, Sections 792, 793, 794, 795 and 797, U. S. Code and Section 19 of Public Law 831, Internal Security Act of 1950.

b. It is my responsibility to ascertain that persons with whom I may have reason to discuss materials or sources of BYEMAN activities to any degree have also been properly cleared and designated to receive and discuss BYEMAN information.

c. By reason of my BYEMAN clearance alone I do not have access to all BYEMAN information or materials but only those required on a "MUST KNOW" basis.

d. I will report to the BYEMAN Security Officer immediately any violations of BYEMAN regulations of which I become aware.

e. I will advise the BYEMAN Security Officer of any personal changes in my status or assignment.

f. No change in my assignment will relieve me of my obligation under oath and that the provisions of this oath remain binding at all times.

2. I do solemnly swear or affirm that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means any classified information, intelligence, or knowledge relative to BYEMAN sources except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the requirements set forth in the BYEMAN Control System Manual or supplemental directives.

WITNESS: James C. O'Connell

SIGNED : Ernest M. Kropff
DATE : 19 June 1963
Ernest M. Kropff

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 2 3

46 SECRET

ACTION: OS 2

INFO : FE 6, OC 8, S/C 2

fr: Jam O'Connell file

S E C R E T 250227Z

13-27

(SEAC) INFO DIR (SING) CITE (OKIE) 8358

13-28 18-17

(FJDUST) 01

18-27

REF (SEAC) 0613 *

CS INTERNAL COMMUNICATION 25 APR 1963 IN 24859

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RA

1. CLEANCE STATUS MR. O'CONNELL FORWARDED THRU SPECIAL CLEARANCE CHANNELS TO APPROPRIATE STATIONS.

13-14 13-28 13-13 13-5 13-2 13-25

2. HE VISITING (HONG), (SING), (KUAL), (BANG) (SAIG) (PENH) AND

13-1

(MANI).

28 APRIL

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 0205, 25 APRIL 63.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

12/PN

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

4 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Advisor, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT : Honor Recommendation for JAMES W. McCORD, JR.

The attached recommendation for an Honor and Merit Award is forwarded for your information and recommendations concerning any security measures that should be taken in the processing of this award.

ELLIN L. BEATTY
Executive Secretary/HMAB

Attachment

Distribution:
  Orig - Addressee
    1 - HMAB Case File

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/S 66.4/052

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD
(Submit in duplicate)

DATE

TO: Secretariat, Honor and Merit Awards Board

FROM: (Operating official) Director of Security

Section A — Personal Data

1. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle) McCORD, James W., Jr.	2. POSITION TITLE Elec. Engr-Audio Supt.	3. GRADE 15	4. SD SS

5. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Technical Division

6. STATION: ☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD (Specify location)

7. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, Zone, State): 6801 Floyd Ave., Springfield, Va.

8. OFFICE EXT. (If hqs.): 4192

9. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED: U. S. - Birth

10. RECOMMENDED AWARD: Certificate of Distinction

11. POSTHUMOUS: ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: Sarah Ruth McCord

13. RELATIONSHIP: Wife

14. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, Zone, State): Same as 7

15. HOME PHONE: 451-5279

Section B — Recommendation for Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard

16. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

Personnel in immediate vicinity or who assisted in act or shared in same hazard:

17. FULL NAME	18. ORGN. TITLE	19. GRADE	20. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

List any of the above persons given an award or recommended for award for participating in act:

21. FULL NAME	22. TYPE OF AWARD

Conditions under which act was performed:

23. LOCATION

24. INCLUSIVE DATES

25. TIME OF DAY

26. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

Section C — Recommendation for Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance

27. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☒ YES ☐ NO

28. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: Chief, Technical Division, OS

29. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location): Headquarters

30. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: Supervises the activities of the Technical Division, OS

Personnel who assisted or contributed substantially to the service or performance

31. FULL NAME	32. ORGN. TITLE	33. GRADE	34. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT
MARCY, William M.	Elec. Engr.	10	OS/Technical Division
PETIT, Alan F.	Elec. Engr.	13	OS/Technical Division

List any of the above persons given an award or recommended for award for participating in the performance

35. FULL NAME	36. TYPE OF AWARD
MARCY, William M. PETIT, Alan F.	Certificate of Distinction

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED

38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO

39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

FORM 11-63 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Section D — Narrative Description

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. *(Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.)* What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation.

40.

From early December 1965 through May 1966, Messrs. James W. McCord, Jr., Alan F. Petit, and William M. Marcy, of the Technical Division, Office of Security, spent many off-duty hours in experimentation with various items of equipment in an effort to improve and strengthen the Agency's Audio-Countermeasures Program. 24 They conceived and developed a unique technique in fluoroscopic scanning which is considered to be a major breakthrough in the detection of clandestine microphones and other devices targeted against the Agency. It gives the Agency for 24 the first time the capability to detect hidden technical listening devices, a capability for which the intelligence community has expended large sums of money to develop in a variety of approaches. This technique will not only benefit the security of all Agency installations at home and abroad, but will be of utmost benefit to other agencies in the community. This technique was met with wide acclaim by the intelligence community and the Technical Security Countermeasures Committee.

24

In experimenting with the X-ray in combination with a fluoroscopic screen, these men showed this combination had distinct advantages in terms of time and effort over the considerably more expensive X-ray 24 film and processor. In further refinement of this technique, they designed an innovation in the form of 24 a fluoroscopic cloth which has the distinct advantage of flexibility over the fluorescent screens 24 currently available on the commercial market.

☒ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

41. ENCLOSURES *(List individually)* If orginator is not an eyewitness or does not have personal knowledge of the act or performance, attach affidavits of eyewitness or individuals having personal knowledge of the facts.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

42. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY	43. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL MAKING RECOMMENDATION	44. DATE
Ermal P. Geiss	Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)	7/28/66

Section E — Recommendation Forwarded Through Officials Concerned For Their Information

	TITLE AND SIGNATURE	DATE
45. Head of SS Career Service (Career service of nominee)	Acting Director of Security	7/29/66
46. Deputy Director of Operating Component		
47. Deputy Director of Career Service	SIGNED R. L. Bannerman Deputy Director for Support	3 AUG 1966

SECRET

6/h

Section D Continued - James W. McCord, Jr.

To further enhance the use of this equipment, these men developed an inconspicuous, easily transportable package, consisting of two attache cases which hold the X-ray fluoroscopic equipment, wall racks, and motor units. This makes it possible for an audio-countermeasures team to enter offices, residences, and safehouses without undue attention. 24

These men have shown great ingenuity and resourcefulness in the application and development of this audio-countermeasure technique. Through their further efforts in package design they contributed significantly to the future clandestine use of this technique on a world-wide basis. This technique provides the Agency for the first time a procedure through which large interior wall surfaces, room furnishings, and objects can be rapidly scanned in "real time" in the search for hostile technical penetrations. This capability will significantly enhance the security of all Agency installations.

McCORD, James W., Jr.
Civ, CIA
"Jim"
DOB: 26 Jan 24

WIFE: Ruth
CHILDREN: Mike,12; Anne,10;Nancy,8.

ASSIGNMENTS:
64: CIA, Security Off, Washington
62-63: Dept of Army Civilian,Germany 32, 15-13
53-62: CIA, Security Off, Washington
51-53: Dept of Def, Security Off, San Francisco 32, 16-35
48-51: FBI Agent, California

EDUCATION:
Univ/Texas,46-48,BBA, Bachelor Bus Adm
Lincoln Law Sch, Oakland,Calif,51
ICAF, Assoc Prog,60-62

HOBBIES: Golfing, Scouting Advisory Wkr

PERMANENT ADDRESS:
5701 Floyd Ave
Springfield, Virginia

2/pd

REPORT OF HONOR AWARDS BOARD

(CONVENED PURSUANT TO REGULATIONS R 20-635 AND AFR 20-635)

DATE 2 March 1959

The Honor Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

NAME: (Last) [illegible]	(First) James	(Middle) Walter	POSITION TITLE Actg.Dep. Chief/[illegible]/OS
PRESENT GRADE GS-14	OFFICE ASSIGNED TO Security		STATION Headquarters

BE AWARDED:

Certificate of Merit with Distinction

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION, ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE DURING THE PERIOD
1 July - 15 August 1958

☐ APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION ☒ DISAPPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION

☐ APPROVES, BUT IN LIEU THEREOF, RECOMMENDS THE AWARD OF:

CITATION

REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF RECOMMENDED AWARD

The Honor and Merit Awards Board concludes from the information available to it that the service performed, while of unquestionable value, is not sufficiently outstanding to merit an honor award.

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE

SIGNATURE [illegible] APR 1959

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AWARDS BOARD
Gordon M. Stewart

SIGNATURE /s/ ([illegible] Boulton) 03 05 MAR 1959

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
([illegible] Boulton) 03

FORM NO. 382 REPLACES FORM 37-176
DEC 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(4)

2/pd

File

SECRET

SO 9-527
21 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Staff, Office of Logistics

FROM : Chief, TSD/Security

SUBJECT : Identi-kit

EE-10772

1. Attached to this memorandum is a copy of an article appearing in the February 1960, issue of "Science and Mechanics" magazine. Page 2 reflects a comment to the effect that the U. S. Intelligence under wrote the development of the Identi-kit to the amount of $87,000.

24

2. TSD/EB under RD—177 and under the EARWORT Program has invested $82,531 into the Identi-kit. Chief Hugh C. McDONALD, who is mentioned in the article, is a cleared TSD consultant. He was initially briefed by Mr. ANDERSON, TSD/EB. The Agency sponsored Mr. McDONALD's visit to Washington and arranged his trip to Honolulu, Hawaii, all in connection with the development of the Identi-kit. The Townsend Corporation, working with McDONALD, has built a number of these kits and will advise the Agency of those sold to foreign powers, etc. Mr. Courtney OWENS, Sales manager of Townsend Engineering Corporation, is a TSD/EB cleared source 24 and understands the Agency's interest in the Kit. Townsend has also opened a school for Identi-kit users. Three persons from TSD have attended this school.

3. The TSD project engineers are very dubious that McDONALD disclosed classified information to unauthorized persons and speak highly of him. They have especially noted his eagerness to assist us on various crash-type projects of an unclassified nature.

4. Therefore, we have no desire to alienate his feelings. Nevertheless, I would suggest that Mr. JONES, during his forthcoming visit to the West Coast, interview Mr. McDONALD to determine, if possible, the reason for inclusion of U. S. Intelligence interest in the attached article, whether or not CIA was mentioned during his interview with the author and to further brief McDONALD if necessary. Furthermore, the Identi-kit is expected to receive considerable publicity as the sales program is stepped up.

5. A copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to PSD (Attn: Robert SWENDIMAN) to determine whether or not any other components of the Agency are or have used McDONALD (possibly contacts or SRD).

James P. O'CONNOR
Chief, TSD/Security

2pl

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att
1 - Phys. Sec. Div. (Survey Br.)
1 - Pers. Sec. Div. (Mr. SWENDIMAN)

3/31/60 - SO/TSD
[illegible] was advised
a OO contact in 1954

SECRET

HSC on ff

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

J-15

HSCA
77-0029

FOIA

15. (Unclassified - DTC) LIAISON I was called by Mr. James Fiesta, in the office of Representative Clarence D. Long (D., Md.), regarding a constituent's request for information on the Kennedy assassination. This constituent, Ernest F. Rethschulte, is a graduate student and is preparing a thesis on the assassination. He had seen a newspaper article reporting an FOIA release from the Agency of about 850 pages of material on the assassination to the Associated Press. Mr. Fiesta is sending me a copy of the newspaper article so that we can more clearly identify the material with IPS, and if it has been released it will be provided to the constituent through Mr. Fiesta. (Note: There have been prior OLC contacts with Mr. Fiesta on this FOIA request.)

16. (Unclassified - RJK) LIAISON Spoke with Anne Karalekas, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, to confirm that she would be speaking to the Intelligence Process Course on 18 April, for which I would be assisting her with transportation. She will also speak to an annual records management conference at Warrenton Training Center on 4 May, for which George Frates, Records Administration Branch, is making the travel arrangements. She indicated that she would call Frates and they would work out the arrangements together.

17. (Unclassified - CM) LIAISON I asked Linda, secretary to Pauline Baker, of the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, if the Subcommittee hearings of September 1976 had been published. She said that had just occurred, and promised to send us two copies. I advised Molly Kreimer, CPS, the requester.

18. (Unclassified - ALM) LIAISON Winslow Wheeler, from the office of Senator Jacob K. Javits, called requesting a copy of "A Study of Climatological Research as it Pertains to Intelligence Problems." A copy was forwarded to him.

20040

[illegible] USE ONLY

SECRET

Testimony HSCA

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel RETURN TO CIA Page 3
Wednesday - 28 June 1978 Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

7. (Secret - MMP) LIAISON Julie Wetzel, NSA, called to advise us that a letter was coming over from NSA to Lyle Miller, Acting Legislative Counsel, on the subject of the leak of NSA's ability to read Korean diplomatic traffic. She said that the letter states that NSA has no objection to the Director's provision of NSA's damage assessment to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The letter goes on to state that NSA does not feel that it would be appropriate to reveal the names of Congressmen and staff who are aware of NSA's capability to read Korean diplomatic traffic inasmuch as the Attorney General is investigating the leak.

8. (Confidential - MMP) LIAISON Called Loch Johnson, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staff, to advise him (based on information provided by Suzanne Black, Office of Public Affairs), that the Agency has no past or present substantive involvement with WETA. This was in response to a previous request from Johnson. I also asked Johnson how much information he wished us to provide him on the Agency's relationship with public television. He indicated that he is only interested in a brief sketch of what kinds of relationships the Agency may have had with public television and I passed this requirement on to Ms. Black.

9. (Confidential - DFM) LIAISON Received a call from Ed Greissing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, regarding the House Select Committee on Assassinations request for access to Church Committee transcripts of testimony by Agency employees. I asked him to send Ted Shackley's testimony to me so he could review it before giving approval. I reminded him that Mr. Sanchez had asked that his testimony not be shown and that that should be considered the final Agency response.

10. (Secret - DFM) LIAISON Called Earl Eisenhower, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, who mentioned he would like the briefing on counterintelligence to be presented to the Committee during the first week of August. I later picked up a letter from Eisenhower on this subject. We confirmed tomorrow's briefing of four Committee staff members to cover the Martha Peterson case, specifically the allegations of poison pills; the discovery of the antenna in the chimney of the Moscow Embassy; and the Shevchenko case. Eisenhower repeated his earlier request to Lyle Miller, Acting Legislative Counsel, for a trip to NPIC to view Wrangel Island which is part of the USSR but which some U.S. citizens claim really belongs to the U.S. Eisenhower had viewed maps of the Island but wants to see photographs as none of the maps are more recent that ten years old. I agreed to try to set this meeting up for Friday, 30 June.

20437

SECRET

[illegible] USE ONLY

2/RJ

/04/ SECRET FRP: , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/LA-8 INFO: ODPD-D, VR, FILE, C/EUR-6, C/OG/DMS, C/PCS, C/PCS/LOC, OLC, (20/P)

---

78 1054630 PAGE 001
TOT: 290107Z JUL 78 DIRECTOR 265443

S E C R E T
STAFF 290107Z DIRECTOR 265443
TO: PRIORITY MADRID INFO MEXICO CITY.
15-2
WNINTEL RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 265425

1. IDENTITIES TO REFERENCE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

04

IDENTITY A - ALBERTO CESAR RODRIGUEZ GALLEGO
DPOB: 6 NOVEMBER 1926, HAVANA CUBA
CIT: CUBAN (AT BIRTH) 08 04
IDENTITY B - VICTORIA GALLEGO HERNANDEZ
DPOB: 22 MARCH 1900, MATANZAS, CUBA
CIT: CUBAN (AT BIRTH) 08

04

2. THE CURRENT MADRID TELEPHONE DIRECTORY HAS THREE 08 INDIVIDUALS LISTED UNDER A. RODRIGUEZ GALLEGO; FIRST IS ATL. 08 GONZALEZ 33, TEL 252-4078; SECOND IS AT AVENIDA MANZANARES 194, TEL 269-6191; AND THIRD IS AT OCANA 1, TEL 718-3365. VICTORIA GALLEGO HERNANDEZ IS NOT LISTED. 08 04

3. NO FILE. 03 E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: LA/MGSB/M (BASHAW 1034, GRAY 3-8263); COORD: OLC (BRECKENRIDGE); PCS/LOC (SHEPANEK); C/E/IB (BERGER); C/LA/STB (AMES) C/LA/MGSB (HAWKINS) DC/LA/N (DESMOND) 03 AUTH C/LA (WARREN); REL: DC/EUR/NW (THOMPSON); CL BY 029163.
03

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

19834

PHILLIPS, Maria Louise 0-626272

06, 08

[HUFF, Kay Lowe - C-850404] - SOR

06

[Kay Lowe Huff] was granted Operational approvals in August 1969, August 1970 and August 1971.

06

Note: As a member of the news media field [Huff] has been involved in journalistic activity resulting in Agency publicity. Specifically, [Huff] 06 filed a story in which he endeavored to explain why some Brazilians have thought that the United States Government and this Agency have been involved in Brazilian police torture tactics.

PHILLIPS, Virginia Louise Simmons - 0-542601 - Step-mother

Virginia Louise Simmons Phillips (formerly Ahern) was approved for Contract Type A employment in June 1968. Approval was ultimately cancelled in September 1968. N.D.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4/pd

SECRET

FOR THE RECORD 1 Feb. 1961

FROM: Kammer

SUBJECT: [STRATTON, Michael Weimer] 03
#188074

1. On this date Subject's case was coordinated with Mr. McCORD of SRS in connection with Subject's operational use within the US by WH/4/Propaganda. The implications of a CI operation with the States by this Agency and the possibility Subject might come to the attention of the FBI through association with Court WOOD were discussed.

2. Mr. McCORD expressed the opinion that it is not necessary to advise the FBI of the operation at this time. However, he wishes to review the case in a month. The file of Subject, along with that of the WH man who is supervising the operation (David Atlee PHILLIPS # 40695) will be pended for the attention of Mr. McCORD on 1 March 1961.

For details on this see
the file of [Stratton]. 03

2·2·72

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE ISSUED BY	# PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT	THIS DATE *(Fill In)* AUGUST 31, 1961

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* RODRIGUEZ, EMILIO AMERICO			2. AGE 33 YEARS 8 MONTHS	3. SEX ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	
4. HEIGHT 5 FT. 10 IN.	5. WEIGHT 150 lbs.	6. COLOR OF EYES BROWN	7. COLOR OF HAIR BLACK	8. TYPE COMPLEXION RUDDY	9. TYPE BUILD MEDIUM

10. SCARS *(Type and Location)*
NONE

11. OTHER DISTINGUSHING PHYSICAL FEATURES
NONE

12. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)* 9361 S.W. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA. U.S.A.	13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)* AND PHONE NO. 9361 S.W. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA. U.S.A. PHONE: CEdar 5-8341

14. CURRENT PHONE NO. CEdar 5-8341	15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT. N.A.	16. LEGAL RESIDENCE *(State, Territory or Country)* FLORIDA, U.S.A.

17. NICKNAMES NONE	18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED EUGENIO GONZALEZ

19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including Length of Time)* UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.
FROM APRIL 1960 TO PRESENT IN HAVANA, CUBA AND MIAMI, FLA. AS UNDERCOVER NAME

20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by What Authority)*.
N.A.

SECTION II POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING
CONTRACT AGENT

2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT *(You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary).* $ 9,600.00	3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT ALREADY SIGNED

4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☒ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS *(Check (X) each item applicable)*
☒ WASHINGTON, D.C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY *(Specify)*:
☒ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.
ADEQUATE PAY AND LIVING CONDITIONS FOR SELF AND FAMILY

R

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH JAN. 27, 1928	2. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)* HAVANA, CUBA	3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP *(Country)* U.S.A.

4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY

☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☒ OTHER *(Specify)*: NATURA.

5. DATE NATURALIZED
DECEMBER 15, 1949

6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.
#6799255

7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN DIST. OF LOUISIANA

8. ISSUED AT *(City, State, Country)*
NEW ORLEANS, LA.

9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY
☒ YES ☐ NO

10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY
CUBA

11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

CUBAN BY BIRTH

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
☐ YES ☒ NO

13. GIVE PARTICULARS
N.A.

14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First Papers, Etc.)*?
N.A.

15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S. JUNE 6, 1961	16. PORT OF ENTRY MIAMI, FLA.	17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY SWISS PROTECTIVE PASSPORT

18. LAST U.S. VISA *(No., Type, Place of Issue)*
RESIDENT, U.S. EMBASSY IN HAVANA, CUBA

19. DATE VISA ISSUED
NOV. 1942

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☒ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
COLEGIO DE LA SALLE

2. ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*
HAVANA, CUBA

3. DATES ATTENDED *(From-and-To)*
Sep. 1934 to Nov. 1942

4. GRADUATE
☒ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL
ALCEE FORTIER HIGH SCHOOL

2. ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*
NEW ORLEANS, LA.

3. DATES ATTENDED *(From-and-To)*
Nov. 1942 to June 1945

4. GRADUATE
☒ YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL

2. ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*

3. DATES ATTENDED *(From-and-To)*

4. GRADUATE
☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HOURS *(Specify)*
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA	Psychology	Biology Chemistry	1945	1948	B.S.	June 1948	Sem hrs.
TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA	Spanish	Portuguese	1949	1952	M.A.	JUNE 1952	Sem hrs.
TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA	Spanish	French	1952	1954	NONE	N.A.	Sem hrs.

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

EL EPITETO EN LAS OBRAS DE BERCEO (DO NOT REMEMBER EXACT TITLE). A DETAILED STUDY OF THE MANY USES OF THE EPITHET IN BERCEO'S WORKS, A 12TH CENTURY WRITER, INCLUDING A CROSS-REFERENCE LISTING OF ALL EPITHETS AS SHOWN IN HIS WRITINGS.

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
	N. A.			

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
	N. A.			

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

N. A.

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Spanish	X	X	X													X			X
Portuguese				X		X		X											X
French													X	X	X				X
Italian													X	X	X				X

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

FROM 1949 to 1954 STUDIED THE ROMANCE LANGUAGES AT THE GRADUATE LEVEL

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

N. A.

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

FAMILIAR WITH SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TERMINOLOGY IN SPANISH.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION VI GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
CUBA	HAVANA + VECINITY. POLITICAL ECONOMIC + SOCIAL STRUCTURE. COMMERCE - IMPORTATIONS.	1954-1961	N.A.	☒			☒

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

To work as Assistant District Manager for Century Electric Co., in charge of their HAVANA Office, in HAVANA, Cuba. Later remained in Cuba from March 1960 to June 1961 as Principal Agent for C.I.A.

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.

Pass. Nº: 1095961 Expired: Sept. 2 1960 (NOT RENEWED)

SECTION VII TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM			
50	N.A.	☐ GREGG	☐ SPEEDWRITING	☐ STENOTYPE	☐ OTHER (Specify):

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE ~~OR TRAINING~~ (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.). MIMEOGRAPH, ADDING MACHINE, CALCULATOR, DICTATING MACHINE.

SECTION VIII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

FISHING, HUNTING, SWIMMING (GOOD UNDERWATER RESISTANCE), PHOTOGRAPHY (BLACK + WHITE AND COLOR), MUSICAL (PLAY SEVERAL INSTRUMENTS BY EAR), FLYING, Bowling, Chess.

Average in ALL OF THE ABOVE.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.

TEACHING AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE SECURED AT THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL AND IN FOREIGN TRADE MANAGEMENT RESPECTIVELY. ALSO CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AT THE GRADUATE LEVEL.

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

FAMILIAR WITH GENERAL SCIENTIFIC APPARATUS AS MAY BE PRESENT IN A MEDICAL RESEARCH LABORATORY. Beckman Spectophotometry. (DID ONE half YEAR RESEARCH AT TULANE MEDICAL SCHOOL)

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☒ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE *(Provide License Registry Number, if known).*

Student Pilot Certificate Nº S-293957

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)* 2-18-54

7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)* N.A.

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(Do NOT submit copies unless requested).* INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).*

N.A.

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

N.A.

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

IN COLLEGE AND AS A JUNIOR EXECUTIVE IN FOREIGN TRADE

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

Phi Sigma Iota, National Honor Society of Romance Languages.

American Association of Teachers of Spanish and Portuguese.

Graduate Scholarships offered by the State of Louisiana and Tulane University.
(UNDER WHICH I DID FIVE YEARS OF GRADUATE WORK)

HONORARY MENTIONS AND MEDALS.

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: **(LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.)** ***Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.***

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)* APRIL/1954 - Oct. 1960

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY CENTURY ELECTRIC COMPANY

3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* 1806 PINE ST., ST. LOUIS, MO., USA.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS MANUFACTURER OF MOTORS. GENERATORS, ETC.

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR ARNESTO N. RODRIGUEZ, Dist. Mng
Mr. Charles C. White, Export Manager.

6. TITLE OF JOB Assistant DISTRICT MANAGER

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 1,000 PER MONTH (app)

8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO PROMOTE AND SERVICE THE SALE OF CENTURY MOTORS, GENERATORS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT IN THE TERRITORY OF CUBA, AND TO COOPERATE IN COLLECTIONS WHEN NECESARY. TO MANAGE THE HAVANA DISTRICT SALES OFFICE IN FULL RESPONSABILITY IN THE ABSENCE OF THE DISTRICT MGR. TO LOOK AFTER THE INTEREST OF CENTURY ELEC. CO. IN CUBA.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING PRESENT CONDITIONS IN CUBA AND ACCEPTANCE of ASSIGNMENTS AS PRINCIPAL AGENT IN CUBA FOR C.I.A.

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) FEB. 1950 - MARCH 1954

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY TULANE UNIVERSITY

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) ST. CHARLES ST., NEW ORLEANS, LA., U.S.A.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS COLLEGE

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Dr. John E. Englekirk, Chairman Sp. Dept.

6. TITLE OF JOB Graduate Asst.

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 300 PER MONTH (Aff.)

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TEACHER OF BEGINNER AND INTERMEDIATED SPANISH. IN THE COLLEGE LEVEL. TO ASSIST WITH REGISTRATION AND DEPARTAMENTAL FUNCTIONS.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING TO ACCEPT ABOVE POSITION

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) JUNE 1949 — JUNE 1950

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY BERLITZ SCHOOL OF LANGUAGES

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) INTERNATIONAL TRADEMART, NEW ORLEANS, LA, U.S.A.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS LANGUAGE SCHOOL

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR MR. HALL, DIRECTOR

6. TITLE OF JOB PROFESSOR

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 3.00 PER HR. (Aff.)

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO TEACH THE SPANISH LANGUAGE BY THE BERLITZ METHOD.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING TO ACCEPT ABOVE POSITION AND PURSUE AN ADVANCED DEGREE

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) JAN. 1949 — JUNE 1949

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY TULANE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL SCHOOL

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) TULANE AVE., NEW ORLEANS, LA. U.S.A.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS MEDICAL SCHOOL

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Dr. Woo

6. TITLE OF JOB Medical Research Technician

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 200.00 PER MONTH

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES IN CHARGE OF SPECTROPHOTOMETRIC ANALYSIS IN THE CARDIO-VASCULAR RESEARCH LABORATORY.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING CONCLUSION OF RESEARCH

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

5	9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES			
	10. REASONS FOR LEAVING			
6	1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY		
	3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*			
	4. KIND OF BUSINESS	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR		
	6. TITLE OF JOB	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*
	9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES			
	10. REASONS FOR LEAVING			
7	1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY		
	3 ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*			
	4. KIND OF BUSINESS	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR		
	6. TITLE OF JOB	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*
	9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES			
	10. REASONS FOR LEAVING			

8. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN.

9. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

SECTION X — MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 (*As amended*)	☒ YES ☐ NO	2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION 4-F	3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. 16-45-28-53

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON: DIABETES MELLITUS

5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS: No 45, Orlean Parish, New Orleans, La.

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE (*Specify*):
HAVE SERVED →									
NOW SERVING →									

NA

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S)

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (*Past service*)

4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES (*Past and current service*)

5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY → PAST SERVICE / CURRENT SERVICE

6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE → PAST SERVICE / CURRENT SERVICE

8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER (*If now serving, provide current number*)

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (*Mos or Designator*) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE / CURRENT SERVICE

10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (*Mos or Designator*) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE / CURRENT SERVICE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (*Indicate whether applicable to past or current service*)

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	OTHER:
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY	

NA

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

☐ REGULAR ☐ RESERVE (*Including the National and Air National Guard*) ☐ OTHER (*Including AUS*)

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO	2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.? ☐ YES ☒ NO	3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☐ ARMY	☐ MARINE CORPS	☐ NATIONAL GUARD	☐ COAST GUARD	☐ NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
☐ NAVY	☐ AIR FORCE	☐ AIR NAT'L. GUARD	☐ ARMY ROTC	☐ AIR FORCE ROTC	

NA

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*Active*) ☐ STANDBY (*Inactive*) ☐ RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (*Mos or Designator*) AND TITLE

10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (*Mos or Designator*) AND TITLE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT ☐ YES ☒ NO

13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

NA

16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY — YEARS: NA — MONTHS: NA.

17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT?

SECTION XI FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

N.A.

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans	New Orleans, LA., U.S.A.
The Airport Bank of Miami	Miami, FLA., U.S.A.
The Royal Bank of CANADA	HAVANA, CUBA.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY, ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

N.A.

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans	New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.
D.H. HOLMES Ltd. (Department Store)	New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.
MAISON Blanche (Department Store)	New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

N.A.

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☒ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled)* SPECIFY: MARRIED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

N.A.

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME

(First)	(Middle)	(Maiden)	(Last)
PAULINE	JUANITA	ROSS	RODRIGUEZ

4. STATE ANY OTHER NAMES EVER USED

PAULA (NICKNAME SINCE CHILDHOOD)

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH ANY OF THESE NAMES WERE USED. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

5. DATE OF MARRIAGE: JUNE 10, 1948

6. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)*: New Orleans, LA., U.S.A.

7. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*

300 OAKUM ST. EDENTON, N.C., U.S.A.

8. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. DATE OF DEATH: N.A.

10. CAUSE OF DEATH: N.A.

11. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address, if deceased)*

9361 S.W. 178 St, PERRINE 57, FLA. U.S.A.

12. DATE OF BIRTH: JAN. 2, 1923

13. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*: BOGALUSA, LA. U.S.A.

14. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DATE OF ENTRY N.A.

15. PLACE OF ENTRY N.A.

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)] N.A.

17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED N.A.

18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) N.A.

19. OCCUPATION HOUSE WIFE

20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers) N.A.

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) N.A.

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.) N.A.

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE N.A.

24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED N.A.

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN N.A.

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
EMILIO AMERICO RODRIGUEZ J.R.	SON	SEPT. 18, 1951, New Orleans, La.	U.S.A.	9361 SW. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA.
JOSEPH ROSS RODRIGUEZ	SON	MARCH 1, 1953, New Orleans, La.	U.S.A.	9361 SW. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA.
PATTI MICHELLE RODRIGUEZ	DAUGTHER	OCT. 23, 1954, HAVANA, Cuba	U.S.A.	9361 SW. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA.
PAUL MARSHALL RODRIGUEZ	SON	NOV. 1, 1957, HAVANA, Cuba	U.S.A.	9361 SW. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA.

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING ⇨ 4

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, step-parents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING ⇨ 1

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information, for Stepfather and/or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) RODRIGUEZ, ARNESTO NAPOLEON

2. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH N.A.

4. CAUSE OF DEATH N.A.

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED N.A.

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country) The Orleanian Apt. Hotel ST. CHARLES Ave. New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.

7. DATE OF BIRTH August 5 18[illegible] ~~Havana, Cuba~~

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) HAVANA, Cuba.

9. CITIZENSHIP Cuban

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY Nov. 1962

11. PLACE OF ENTRY New Orleans, La.

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)] N.A.

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED N.A

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) N.A.

15. OCCUPATION RETIRED

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed) ~~SELF EMPLOYED~~ Century Elect. Co.

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED 1806 PINE ST. ST LOUIS, MO. U.S.A.

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To) N.A.

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE N.A.

20. COUNTRY N.A.

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN INTELLIGECE AGENT FOR U.S. EMBASSY IN HAVANA CUBA DURING WORLD WAR I, WORLD WAR II, AND RECENT CASTRO REVOLUTION

SECTION XV MOTHER (*Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet*)

1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*): CASANOVA, EMILIA

2. LIVING: YES ☐ NO ☒

3. DATE OF DEATH: ~~August~~ July 6, 1961

4. CAUSE OF DEATH: ARTERIOSCLEROSIS

5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: N.A.

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (*Including length of time*) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (*Where and by what authority*). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED (*No., Street, City, State, Country*): the Pontchartrain Apt. Hotel, ST. Charles Ave. New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.

7. DATE OF BIRTH: JUNE 5, 1901

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (*City, State, Country*): HAVANA, Cuba

9. CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.- DATE OF ENTRY: Oct. 1, 1950

11. PLACE OF ENTRY: New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [*Country(ies)*]: N.A.

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N.A.

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (*City, State, Country*): N.A.

15. OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (*Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed*): N.A.

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED: N.A.

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (*From-and-To*): N.A.

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: N.A.

20. COUNTRY: N.A.

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: U.S. (Sp. MAIL) CENSOR IN NEW ORLEANS CENSORSHIP OFFICE DURING WORLD WAR II.

SECTION XVI BROTHERS AND SISTERS (*Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters*)

1
1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*): RODRIGUEZ, ARNESTO JOSE
2. RELATIONSHIP: BROTHER
3. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*): U.S.
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*): 212 MAPLE Rd., METAIRE, LA. U.S.A.
5. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE: 38

2
1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*)
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

3
1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*)
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

4
1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*)
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

5
1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*)
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

6
1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*)
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

7
1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*)
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

8
1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*)
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

SECTION XVII

FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) ROSS, SAMUEL SANFORD

2. LIVING YES ☒ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH JUNE 30, 1958

4. CAUSE OF DEATH HEART ATTACK

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED SAM (NIKNAME SINCE CHILDHOOD)

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Route 2, Box 500, EDENTON, N.C., U.S.A.

7. DATE OF BIRTH JULY 2, 1890

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) MOBILE, ALABAMA, U.S.A.

9. CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY N.A.

11. PLACE OF ENTRY N.A.

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)] N.A.

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED N.A.

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) N.A.

15. OCCUPATION SAWYER

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed) R.P. BAER AND Co., EDENTON, N.C., U.S.A.

SECTION XVIII

MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) BONTA, PATTI JUANITA

2. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH N.A.

4. CAUSE OF DEATH N.A.

5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED N.A.

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Route 2, Box 500, EDENTON, N.C. U.S.A.

7. DATE OF BIRTH Dec. 21, 1899

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) LAUREL, Miss. U.S.A.

9. CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY N.A.

11. PLACE OF ENTRY N.A.

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)] N.A.

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED N.A.

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) N.A.

15. OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed) N.A.

SECTION XIX

RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) LOPEZ, ELENA

2. RELATIONSHIP SISTER IN LAW

3. AGE 33

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES 212 MAPLE Rd., METAIRE, LA. U.S.A.

5. EMPLOYED BY BERLITZ SCHOOL OF LANGUAGEZ

6. CITIZENSHIP (Country) MEXICAN

7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT ONCE YEARLY (4)

8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT JUNE 1961

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. AGE

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES

5. EMPLOYED BY

6. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT

8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. AGE

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES

5. EMPLOYED BY

6. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT

8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. AGE

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES

5. EMPLOYED BY

6. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT

8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

SECTION XIX CONTINUED TO PAGE 13

SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE

Above relative has been a continuous resident in the U.S.A. since 1945 in New Orleans, La.

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) ROSS, JOSEPH ALBERT	2. RELATIONSHIP BROTHER IN LAW	3. AGE 40	4. CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Route 2, Box 595H, Pensacola, FLA, USA.	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known) MARINE PILOT AND PHOTOGRAPHER INSTRUCTOR PENSACOLA NAVAL AIR STATION		
2	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
3	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S., WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
A.C. White	N.S.A. WASHINGTON, D.C.	10125 MARKHAM ST. SILVER SPRING, Md.
J.S. McNEELY	U.S.N. USS SARATOGA FPO N.Y. NY. (CVA-60)	1601 ARDEN WAY JACKSONVILLE, FLA.
P.M. ARTHUR	INTELLIGENCE UNK.	DRAWER K FT. AMADOR CANAL ZONE
DOROTHY MANESS JONES	HOUSEWIFE UNK.	210 W. President, Apt. 4 GREENWOOD, Miss.
C. A. ZEHNDER	EBASCO SERVICES N.Y. UNK.	P.O. BOX 285 PINE BLUFF, ARKANSAS

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS, IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY - NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
J. W. BARNES	MANUFACTURER REPRESENTATIVE UNK.	6938 Colbert St. New Orleans, LA.
L.T. WOLF	EBASCO SERVICES, N.Y. UNK.	420 PARK Ave. SWARTHMORE, PA.
J. BRUNO	CIVIL SERVICE UNK.	3310 CASTIGLIONE New Orleans, LA.
DOROTHY BOETTCHER	HOUSEWIFE UNK.	839 PALERMO Ave. CORAL Gables, Miami, Fla
A. TAWATER	UNK.	1211 W. ARKANSAS LANE Rt 2, Box 16, ARLINGTON, Texas

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Dr. C. Peebles	TULANE MEDICAL SCHOOL New Orleans, LA.	2207 BROAWAY Ave. New Orleans 18, LA.
D. White	RETIRED CIVIL SERVICE	512 WALNUT St. New Orleans, LA.
C. MACE	TULANE UNIVERSITY SPANISH DEPARMENT	UNK.

SECTION XXII **CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind *(Include membership in, or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country)* to which you belong or have belonged.

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
Phi Sigma Iota	TULANE UNIVERSITY unk.	1951 unk.	Present.
American Ass. of Teachers of Spanish & Portuguese	DE PAUW UNIVERSITY unk.	1952 unk.	Present

SECTION XXIII **RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS**

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	INCLUSIVE DATES	
	FROM	TO
FOCSA BLDG. APT. 28L, 17 & M St., Vedado, HAVANA Cuba	Oct. 1956	June 1961
FINCA Emilita , Klm 12 Central Highway, SAN FRANCISCO de Paula, Havana Cuba.	April	1954 - Oct. 1956
2D Newcomb Campus, New Orleans, LA, U.S.A.	Augt. 1951	April 1954
510 Walnut St., New Orleans, LA., U.S.A.	Jan. 1950	Aug. 1951
2305 1/2 Almonester Ave., New Orleans, LA., U.S.A.	Oct. 1949	Jan. 1950
510 Walnut St., New Orleans, LA., U.S.A.	Nov. 1942	Oct. 1949

SECTION XXIV ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF; OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, EXPLAIN

N.A.

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? N-A

5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? N-A.

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

N.A.

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940 C.I.A., STATE DEPARTMENT, PAN AMERICAN UNION, CIVIL SERVICE, USIA.

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

UNK.

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS **If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.**

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A *MINOR* TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD?
IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XXV PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(First-Middle-Last)* PAULINE JUANITA RODRIGUEZ

2. RELATIONSHIP WIFE

3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* 9361 SW. 178 St. PERRINE 57, FLA.

4. HOME PHONE NO. CEdar-5-8341

5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE N.A.

6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT. N.A.

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

N.A.

SECTION XXVI

CERTIFICATION

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES Sept. 5, 1961	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Emilio A. Rodriguez
3. SIGNED AT (City and State) MIAMI, FLA.	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Paula R. Rodriguez

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates, sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

☆U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1959 O - 492175

SECRET

1. NAME (*Last, First, Middle*) Piccolo, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 1935	3. GRADE GS-12
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (*or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment*) Managua, Nicaragua - State	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Off - #0396	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 6576
7. PROPOSED STATION 16-22 32 JMCOBRA	8. PROPOSED POSITION (*Title, Number, Grade*) Ops Off. #1770, GS-12	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION Military	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE O/A 11 Oct 68	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY

12. COMMENTS

Subject was medically approved for overseas assignment in December 1967. Is returning short of tour for assignment JMCOBRA.

03

13. DATE OF REQUEST 27 Sept 68	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Roy W. Forslund Roy W. Forslund	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3D5319 Hqs.	16. EXTENSION 6576

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

Date 18 OCT 1968

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request.

Chief, Personnel Security Division

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

3/7/ FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

, First, Middle) ccolo, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH December 1935	3. GRADE GS-11
ICE. DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/WH/1 - (Mexico City) 16-3	5. PRESENT POSITION Operations Officer	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION
7. PROPOSED STATION (Managua, Nicaragua) 16-22	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) 0396 Ops.Officer GS-13	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION (State Integree) 32	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 27 Jan 1968	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY one

12. COMMENTS

Lateral transfer. Subject will be in Headquarters area o/a 23 January 1968.

Subject will be language trained [illegible]

13. DATE OF REQUEST 20 December 1967	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL John F. Conroy John F. Conroy	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3 D 5309 HQS	16. EXTENSION 4516

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

03

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

Date 27 Dec 1967

Security Approval has been granted to the use contemplated by this request

Personnel Security Division

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

28 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Clay [illegible]
Room 226, [illegible]

VIA : Office of Security/[illegible]
Attn: Mr. [illegible]
Room [illegible]

Central Cover Group
Attn: James Franklin
Room [illegible]

SUBJECT : Request for U. S. Army Credentials

REFERENCE : [illegible] dated 22 May 1962

1. The Technical Services Division is requested to prepare back-stopped credentials in alias for the seven individuals who are identified in the attached seven identity sheets.

2. The credentials should identify the individuals with the U. S. Army, Joint Operations Group, and the title designation for all seven individuals should be INVESTIGATOR.

3. The credentials will be utilized generally in the South-Eastern part of the United States and possibly in Latin America in pursuit of the mission of Task Force W. Further, the utilization of the credentials will be on a controlled basis as directed by the Chief of Station, JMWAVE.

4. The aliases set forth in the attached identity sheets have been registered with RI. Pertinent biographic data for each individual is also set forth on the identity sheets.

5. Photographs for all seven individuals are being obtained and will be furnished to you as soon as possible.

DDS/IOS
ADDS/IOS
ASST/IOS
/ID
/OSD
/SRD
/AB
/PB
/SAB
/SB
0/2 Cf

PSD # 214442

SECRET

4/PV

SECRET

-2-

6. When the credentials are prepared and are ready for issuance, they should be sent to Mr. Ed FITZGERALD, Central Cover Group, Room [illegible], so that he may sign the name of the commanding officer of the Joint Operations Group [illegible] on all seven credentials. After Mr. (FITZGERALD) signs all the credentials, he should forward them to Mr. [illegible] LAUNER, Security Officer/TFW, Room [illegible] 5602.

7. Any questions regarding the foregoing matter should be directed to Mr. LAUNER on ext. 5907.

JOHN F. [illegible]
Chief of Support
Task Force W

Attachments
7 [illegible] Sheets

[illegible]

SECRET

3|rw

SECRET
EYES ONLY

8 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Analysis Group

FROM : Michael E. Schneeberger

SUBJECT : Philip B. F. AGEE
Exposure of CIA Personnel

(5-1 1. Reference is made to the attached P&L RYBAT cable from London (IN 058476) dated 4 October 1976 which indicated, according to a very sensitive source, that one Ron CASPER (ph) of The Washington Post recently was in contact with AGEE. During that contact CASPER asked AGEE questions regarding the Kennedy assassination with specific interest relating to the involvement of OSWALD and Cubans. CASPER also queried AGEE regarding personalities assigned to the Mexico City Station in 1963, and AGEE provided CASPER with details regarding the Station's surveillance capabilities and the functions of specific individuals of interest to CASPER.

2. Regarding the individuals of interest to CASPER, the following is a brief summary of pertinent information relating to those individuals identified by AGEE to CASPER:

NAME LISTED IN CABLE	OS FILE NO. AND SUMMARY
BUSTOS, Charlotte	BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte B., SF#56 840; appears to be Chief of Station at 16-28 Trinidad since June 1974, integrated State cover. Well known to AGEE through assignment to Mexico City, July 1967-August 1972.
FREDERICK, William	FREDERICK, William Fulton, SF#60 785; former GS-12 LA Division Ops Officer who was dismissed due to improper handling of Agency funds in September 1966; may have

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 007472

SECRET
EYES ONLY

2/pd

	assisted AGEE in his Inside the Company. Exposures include "close" relationship with AGEE and CIA Von A-Z. As of June 1972 Subject was employed by U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
03 STEWART Joe (or 03 Jack)	03 STEWART, Jack NMN, SF#32 953; former LA Division Case Officer who retired 30 January 1970. Assigned to Mexico, 1960-1965. Exposed in Who's Who in CIA and CIA von A-Z.
SCOTT, Winston	Former Chief of Station at Mexico City Station, 1959-1969; retired July 1969, died circa 1973. Exposed in Who's Who in CIA, CIA Von A-Z, and mentioned numerous times in AGEE's book.
WHITE, Allan	WHITE, Alan Perine, SF#28 700; former DDO/OPS/ITG employee who retired 31 July 1975; assigned to Mexico City, 1963-1967 as Deputy Chief of Station; exposed in CIA Von A-Z and Who's Who in CIA.
03 WATSON, A. S. (Stanley)	03 WATSON, Daniel Stanley, SF#57 626; former Chief/Training Resources Group/DTS who retired 30 June 1973; was assigned to Mexico 1965-69. Former security interest due to friendship with BOOTS. 036 CIA Von A-Z.
DILLON, Paul	DILLON, Paul Leo, SF#43 334; 12-22 currently a Case Officer at New Delhi assigned to Mexico City as Chief of Soviet Ops, 1965-1969. Exposed in CIA Von A-Z, listed in AGEE book, identified in October 1974 Bridgeport, Connecticut, Post, and known to Indian Communist Party, May 1976. 11

8/PV

VOGLE, Don	VOGEL, Donald Frederic, SF#55 277; currently Deputy Chief of Station at Islamabad, 12-14 Pakistan, was assigned to Mexico City, 1967-70 as DC/SB/CIG. Exposed in Winter 1975 CounterSpy, listed in AGEE book, identified in October 1974 Bridgeport, Connecticut, Post, and Who's Who in CIA.
HAUSMAN, Cynthia	HAUSMANN, Cynthia Joy, SF#61 423; currently assigned to CI Staff/R&A; assigned to Mexico City, 1965-67. Exposed in CIA Von A-Z, October 1974 Bridgeport, Connecticut, Post, and listed in AGEE book.
STEELE, Robert	STEELE, Robert Hampton, SF#230 069; former SB Case Officer who resigned July 1968 to run for U.S. Congress from Connecticut (successful); was assigned to Mexico City, 1966-68. Listed in AGEE book and October 1974 Bridgeport, Connecticut, Post; numerous publicity since election to Congress.
07 RAMIDES, Dan	03 RAMIREZ, Benjamin Adrian, SF#188 141; former WH Case Officer who resigned February 1969; was assigned to Mexico City, 1966-69. Exposed in CIA Von A-Z and listed in AGEE book.
07 RAMIDES, Zeek	03 RAMIREZ, Ezekiel Stanley, SF#100 937; former OTR instructor who retired June 1972. Listed numerous times in AGEE book.
03 HUGHES, Frank	03 HUGHES, Frank Wallace, SF#57 626; former CI Staff Branch Chief who retired in June 1973. Exposed in Quicksilver Times, August-September 1969 article.

7/80

3. Office of Security indices reflected no traces in the name of Ron CASPER, The Washington Post correspondent who was in contact with AGEE. However, it is believed that CASPER may be identifiable with Ronald KESSLER, who was mentioned in the Press Credibility security file (#610 955) as a Washington Post journalist who won the George Polk Memorial Aware in February 1973.

4. The foregoing is provided for your information. No further action appears necessary at this time except for dissemination of this memorandum to interested Agency officials.

Michael E. Schneeberger
Security Analysis Group

Att

22 JAN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : 201-274330
#214 485

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 15 January 1965 requesting an appropriate investigation in connection with your Provisional Operational Approval interest only for Subject's use as a PA-PROP Asset in Miami by WH/SA/IOS under Project JMATE.
24

2. A search of our indices was made in the name of the Subject and reflected the attached information.

3. This case is being closed in our office pending further notification from you.

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(IOS)

Attachment:
As stated

CLOSED
DALY/vsf
21 January 1965

FILE-d

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL BRIEFING DATA

NAME PICCOLO, Joseph Jr.		FILE NUMBER 109709
OFFICE DDP/WH	PHONE	RANK OR GRADE GS-9
DEPARTURE DATE 3/7/1965	STATUS PCS	COVER State 32
DESTINATION(s) Mexico City,Mexico		DEPENDENTS BRIEFED ☐ YES ☐ NO

PREVIOUS TRAVEL

AREA Belgium-Brussels	COVER 32 DAC-TDY	YEARS 1964
AREA Mexico City,Mexico	COVER 32 Light State-PCS	YEARS 1959
AREA	COVER	YEARS

EXPERIENCED TRAVEL - Formal briefing waived ☒ YES ☐ NO

RISK OF CAPTURE TRAVEL BRIEFING

CATEGORY -	A	B	C	D

SPECIAL BRIEFING PROBLEM

TYPE

SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL VERIFIED IN SUBJECT FILE	☒ YES	☐ NO
SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL BASED ON FILE REVIEW BY BRIEFING OFFICER	☒ YES	☐ NO
SECURITY FILE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BEFORE BRIEFING	☐ YES	☐ NO

- ☐ EMERGENCY CONTACTS *(met on arrival, phone no., alternate action to make contact)*
- ☐ SECURITY REGULATIONS *(operational talk, documents, indigenous employee hazards)*
- ☐ TRAVEL PRECAUTIONS *(recognition overseas, camera, black market, currency exchange)*
- ☐ PERSONAL AFFAIRS *(charge accounts, traffic tickets, litigation, neighbors)*
- ☐ PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE *(limitations, home address, shop talk)*
- ☐ PERSONAL CONDUCT *(morals, drinking, representative americans)*
- ☐ ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGNERS *(overseas briefing, phase out on return)*
- ☐ HOSTILE AUDIO SURVEILLANCE *(microphones, shop talk at home-hotels, report to security)*
- ☐ COVER PROBLEMS *(adequacy, request for briefing on arrival, family knowledge)*
- ☐ RESPONSIBILITY ABROAD *(local customs, traditions, religion, responsibility for dependents)*
- ☐ OTHER

REFERRED BACK TO CENTRAL COVER ☐ YES ☐ NO

DATE BRIEFED 9/1/65

BY ______________
SECURITY OFFICER

3/12

FORM 10-62 1987

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-11-48)

10439

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REASSIGNMENT PROCESSING

1. THIS IS TO RECORD RECEIPT OF, AND WHERE INDICATED, ACTION ON A DOCUMENT WHICH PLACES THIS EMPLOYEE IN THE ASSIGNMENT SPECIFIED

ROUTING

(Kittelle +)

03

SUBJECT: PICCOLO, Joseph (NMN) Jr.

FILE NO.: 109709

ASSIGNMENT: Mexico City, Mexico

DOCUMENT

	FORM 1152		TRAVEL ORDER
XX	CERTIFICATION REQUEST		RETURNEE LIST
			OVERSEAS PANEL LIST

2. THE FILE HAS BEEN REVIEWED FOR INFORMATION, FLAGS, OR OTHER INDICATORS HAVING A BEARING ON THE PROPOSED ACTION. THE VARIOUS ASPECTS CONSIDERED AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE, IF ANY, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

	NONE	NOT PERTINENT	OTHER OR COMMENTS
SRS FLAG			
OTHER FLAG			
SUITABILITY INFO		✓	
MEDICAL INFO			
PRIOR PANEL ACTION			
COVER PROBLEMS			
INTEGRATION PROBLEM			

DATE OF LAST POLYGRAPH	NEEDS REPOLYGRAPH		YES		NO

3. ACTION TAKEN

32 7 [illegible] Cert

✓	REASSIGNMENT ACTION APPROVED
	ACTION WILL BE RECORDED IN ANOTHER DOCUMENT

COMMENTS

4. CASE IS FORWARDED HEREWITH FOR THE FOLLOWING ACTION

DATE: 9 AUG 1965

SIGNATURE AND TITLE

FORM 10-62 1948 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

2/P/

SECRET

NOTE:
I requested Bob Leonard to give me a copy of this memo.
M.K. Holbik
RO/PSD
10/20/60

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Support Desk

FROM : Mr. Robert J. Leonard

SUBJECT : TARASOFF, Anna
#131751 B-SB/2

GIST:

A special meeting was convened to consider the problem of the prospective visit of Subject's father to the Russian Embassy to obtain a visa. It was determined that he should not be briefed in advance and that an army cover be provided for Subject.

DETAILS:

1. On 13 October 1960 the undersigned as representative of the Office of Security met with Mr. Birch O'Neal, CI Staff; T.K. Chalmers, CI/Projects; Henry C. Woodward, CCG/DC; 03 Thornton W. Means, OCG/OCB and the Subject to discuss the problem of a prospective trip to the Russian Embassy by the Subject's father for a trip to Russia.

2. Mr. O'Neal had Mrs. TARASOFF recount the details of the situation. She said that several months ago her father ANTHONY ADAMOVIEZ had indicated an interest in attempting to locate his brother and sisters in Russia. He sent correspondence to his home town and received a reply from his sister MARIYA KALNAK, c/o KALINOTSKIY, VZDEN SKIY RAYON, MINSKAYA, U.S.S.R.. She stated that his brother IVANU YULYANOVICHU ADOMOVICHU was also living. This correspondence inspired ADAMOVIEZ with the desire to visit his brother and sister in Russia upon his retirement. ADOMOVICHU, age 66, in good health, recently retired from his job as a laborer with American Steel and Wire Company and is now determined to visit Russia. Subject's mother has no intention of returning to Russia.

3. Mrs. TARASOFF, on her return from a short vacation visit to her husband BORIS D. TARASOFF, an Agency employee on TDY in Mexico, visited her parents in Ohio and was informed

	DDS/I&S
	ADDS/I&S
	Chief/SSD
	Dep Chief
	A to Chief
	Ch. CSR
	Ch. SRD
	Ch. [illegible] Br.
	Ch. Sup. Br.
	Desk IB-
1	Desk SB-
	Ad & Trg
	Control Desk
1	
7	Files PSO

SECRET

of her father's intention to come to Washington to make inquiry at the Russian Embassy in regard to his visit to Russia. Subject's father wished Subject to accompany him but she indicated that as a government employee she did not want to go there.

06 4. Mrs. TARASOFF says that her oldest sister, Mrs. Sherry COMELLA knows of her CIA employment and the necessity not to divulge this information. Subject stated that her father and mother know only that she is a government employee. They are not interested in the Agency or Department where she or her husband is employed. Subject also advised that although her landlady and Sears Roebuck Department Store know her as CIA she is not aware that anyone else knows.

5. Mr. O'Neal asked what could be done about this situation. Mr. Means said that Subject's husband is in
Mexico under light state cover but had previously been 32
backstopped firmly as a contract employee of the Department 32
of State, Escort Branch, Division of Language Services. He said he would firm up this backstop so that in the event of
inquiry at that Division of State it would be confirmed that 32
he is in Mexico on an assignment. Mr. Woodward stated that 03
he would provide a U.S. Army Translation Unit cover for 32
Mrs. TARASOFF retroactive to her entrance on duty. The undersigned stated that he would conduct expedite credit checks on the Subject and her husband to ascertain whether or not they had been recorded as Agency employees.

6. It was agreed among the conferees that since the father of Subject was unwitting of Subject's CIA employment he would not be specially briefed on what to answer in the event that the question was asked in connection with his VISA application. It was agreed that not knowing the specific Department of Government he would have to consult his daughter and then she could give the cover which had been prepared for her. The undersigned pointed out the possibility that Subject's father might know of Subjects employment but it was agreed that in view of his age and background it was very improbable and that it would be better not to brief him specifically on Subjects employment but to let the question be handled naturally.

6/BR

7. Subsequent to the meeting expedite credit checks on the Subject and her husband revealed no record at either the Credit Bureau or Stone's. It has subsequently been learned that Subject's father had visited the Embassy and had been asked to give a short history and the names of his children. Subject was listed by her father in her maiden name. Consequently no further difficulty is expected in this matter. The Office of Security is to be kept advised of further developments in this case by T. K. Chalmers, Subject's supervisor.

ACTION:

None. Information only.

Robert J. Leonard
Robert J. Leonard

Note: The question of Subject and/or her husband's employment did not come up and accordingly was not given to her father or the Russian Embassy -

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REINVESTIGATION ACTION

DATE 9 Sept 1966

SUBJECT TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri

FILE NO. 104 887

1. THE FILE OF THE SUBJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH THE REINVESTIGATION PROGRAM AND NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

- ☐ INVESTIGATION WITHIN LAST FIVE YEARS
- ☑ CURRENT ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS
- ☐ POSSIBLE RETIREMENT OR RESIGNATION
- ☐ ON LWOP STATUS
- ☐ (Other)

2. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, THIS CASE HAS BEEN PENDED TO 1 Sept 1968.

3. THIS CASE IS TO BE FORWARDED TO THE CHIEF, TRANSACTION REVIEW SECTION, CLEARANCE BRANCH, UPON SUBJECT'S RETURN FROM OVERSEAS OR ANY CHANGE IN CURRENT STATUS.

4. REMARKS

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SIGNATURE FOR C/TRS, CLEARANCE BRANCH
[N. M. Haughery] 03

FORM 3-63 1986d

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-8-13)

c/pd

RF

CONFIDENTIAL

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Memorandum for the File 13 February 1962

TARASOFF, Boris

03

About two weeks ago Mr. [Sounitza,] OO/C extension 3026, called and said that they needed an interpreter for a Soviet Delegation for one afternoon and Subject had been selected. Mr. [Sounitza] 03 said that Mr. Kuhn had given his approval recently on the Subject.

03

Mr. [Sounitza] said that a new exchange program is now under negotiation.

99 24

Subject will be under [State Department] cover [as a contractor for the language school.]

No security objection was interposed to Subject's use.

R. C. Swendiman

5/PN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

104887

TRAVEL ORDER

☒ TDY		EOD	OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. [illegible] 34-61
☐ PCS			
☐ INVITATIONAL			

NAME: Boris D. Tarasoff (FDD)

10487

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.

OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

OFFICE PHONE:

GRADE: GS-11

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Washington, D.C. to Mexico City and return.

MODE: Air

PURPOSE: TDY Replacement for Station Employee while on home leave.

Area Classified Category A.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE			AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE	
BEGIN	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN			
15 Aug.'60		$	☒ MAXIMUM	☐ OTHER (See below)	CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

90 days TDY
99
[Light State Cover]

PROCESSING BRANCH
11 58 PM '60

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED		
NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
☐ TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
☒ CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
☐ SHIPMENT ☐ NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
☐ SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED

ACCOMPANIED	UNACCOMPANIED
LBS AND MODE	LBS AND MODE
40 Air	

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: $1400.00 (02)

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.: 34
CHARGE COST CENTER NO.: 1135-5700-3000

☐ ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
☐ FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
☐ ADVANCE RETURN

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
☒ YES
☐ NO
ACCOUNTING DUE DATE: Dec. 1960

DATE: 5 July '60
SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER: Charles A. Moore

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
	CCI	7/1/60

REQUESTING OFFICIAL
TYPED NAME AND TITLE: J. C. KING, Chief, WHD
COMPONENT
SIGNATURE
DATE: 5 July 1960

CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL
TYPED NAME AND TITLE: RICHARD HELMS, Chief, Ops.
COMPONENT
SIGNATURE
DATE: 5 July 1960

JUL 11 1:58 PM '60

FORM 3-59 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
MFG 5-59

SECRET

(28-48)

TRAVEL BRIEFING SHE

NAME: TARASOFF, Boris D		FILE: 104887
OFFICE: FDD/OO	PHONE:	TITLE AND GRADE: GS-11
DEPARTURE DATE: 13 AUG 60	STATUS: (90 DAYS) TDY	COVER: [LT/STATE] 99
DESTINATION: MEXICO CITY	DEPENDENTS BRIEFING:	

PREVIOUS TRAVEL: Area____ Cover____ Years____

Area____ Cover____ Years____

Area____ Cover____ Years____

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Risk of Capture Travel Briefing Category A X B ____ C ____ D ____

CERTIFICATION:

CONCURRENCE:

SPECIAL BRIEFING

SPECIAL CLEARANCES

TYPE:____ COORDINATED____

TYPE:____ COORDINATED____

TYPE:____ COORDINATED____

TYPE:____ COORDINATED____

1. Emergency Contacts
2. Knowledge of Security Regulations
3. Travel Precautions
4. Personal Affairs
5. Personal Correspondence
6. Personal Conduct
7. Association with Foreign Nationals
8. Defensive Audio Surveillance
9. Cover
10. Responsibility as American Abroad

OTHER____

Date Briefed: 7-20-60

SECRET

BY [Thomas L Cuff 03]
SECURITY OFFICER

2/pv

File

Tarasoff, Boris Dimitri
104667

Mr. Jerome WE, Div. inquired whether SO has any objection to Subject's assignment to [Oslo, Norway] PCS.
14-4

Mr. Jerome was advised that a preliminary review of subject's file indicated no reason why subject should not be processed but because of Subject's background the final decision would be made Tops side.

Meyers

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

V/PN

SECRET

28 Ma 1963

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT: Mr. Boris D. TARASOFF, PCS Security Clearance

1. I have been advised by a representative of the Office of Security that Mr. TARASOFF will be granted security clearance for PCS to Mexico City with the following proviso:

That WHD is aware of and recognizes in conjunction with his overseas function: Mr. TARASOFF and his family are known to be CIA; and, further, are known by USSR representatives whom he served as interpreter/translator in the U.S. (NOTE: I believe that during the periods of the interp./transl. duties he was given cover [of Dept. of State or 99 U.S. Govt. Contract Employee].

2. I advised that the WHD was aware of the above, ~~acc~~ accepted same, and that the proviso would be brought to attention of C/WH/3.

W. S. RENEHAN
WH/Pers

SECRET

28 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Wackenhut Corporation
SF#493 364

1. The files on George R. Wackenhut (SF#254 530) and his company, Wackenhut Corporation, were opened in May of 1960. Agency interest in Mr. Wackenhut and his company was for the purpose of obtaining cover support for Western Hemisphere Agency employees assigned to Florida. 24

2. Mr. Wackenhut, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, was investigated by this Agency with favorable results, and a Covert Security Approval for his use was granted on 21 November 1961. Subsequently, his company provided cover backstopping to Western Hemisphere employees stationed in the Miami, Florida, area. 24

3. In April of 1967 due to the notoriety that Mr. Wackenhut had received in connection with his activities in Florida, Mr. Wackenhut's Covert Security Approval was rescinded and this Agency severed our relations with him. 24 However, in November of 1974 it was learned that Wackenhut Corporation was providing guard coverage to Global Marine Development, Incorporated (GMDI), Los Angeles, California, a firm that the Agency office of DDS&T was dealing with. This Agency made no attempt to persuade GMDI to terminate their contract with Wackenhut Corporation, and it is assumed that GMDI is still receiving guard coverage from them.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 063994

3/Rs

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Central Cover Staff
Nonofficial Cover Branch
1-A-20

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 26 MAR 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Office of Security (Attn: Mr. Bannerman) G-E-31	2 Apr.		RBB	For your information
2. Bob. Edwards		2 Apr	SE	
3. Mr. White		2 Apr.	J.R.W.	See mc. 1/84 #49364
4. Mr. Hanigan				Place in Wackenhut file. J.R.W.
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				Wackenhut
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

[illegible]

25 MAR 1963

CS-2793

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: The Wackenhut Corporation
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

1. Mr. Bannerman, Security Office, arranged through Chief, CCS for the writer to meet Mr. George Wackenhut, President of subject, to explore its potential for cover support. At 10:30 a.m., on 14 March 1963, Mr. Wackenhut, Mr. Wes Reynolds, and I met at Mr. Reynold's home, 3809 37th Street, North, Arlington. Mr. Reynolds apparently represents Wackenhut in the Washington area, although I did not gather that the firm is actually operating here at present. Mr. Wackenhut and Mr. Reynolds, both, are ex-FBI agents.

2. Wackenhut started his firm in 1954. In 1961 it was reported to have 1100 employees and anticipated 1961 sales in excess of $5 million. At present it has offices in Miami, Coral Gables, Tampa, Jacksonville, Philadelphia, New York City, Boston, Buffalo, Denver, Los Angeles, San Jose (Calif.), Honolulu, San Juan and Ponce, Puerto Rico. Wackenhut freely states that he trades on the reputation of the FBI by publicizing widely the 21 ex-FBI agents, including two former Assistant Directors of the FBI, in his management.

3. The Operating Divisions of the company and their services are described in a Wackenhut brochure as follows:

Investigative Division

Performs all types of investigations for attorneys, insurance companies, banks and other businesses; sets up internal audit systems to prevent embezzlements, and investigates personal backgrounds of prospective executives, business partners and associates.

Scientific Services Division

Conducts pre and post-employment, pre-promotional and specific lie detector examinations for business and industry; specializes in technical security and investigative techniques, scientific detection devices, and electronic and mechanical security methods and equipment, and performs electronic "sweeps" to counter business espionage through the detection of electronic intrusion attempts.

4/RS

Internal Intelligence Division
Specializes in exposing and controlling inside thefts that may range from employee pilferage, through embezzlement of thousands of dollars, to highly valuable industrial secrets.

Central Clearing Division
Assists personnel and security directors to screen quickly the backgrounds of present and potential employees through the massive files of The Wackenhut Corporation.

Retail Store Protection Division
Increases net profits by reducing inventory shortages through the control of internal and external losses with security programs designed to meet the client's specific needs.

Training Services Division
Provides specialized training programs for security, fire fighting, investigative and other personnel of business organizations and professional groups.

Industrial Security Division
Provides the essential security services that are required by all companies seeking or handling government classified contracts; assists management in disaster and emergency planning.

Fire and Safety Division
Supplies ambulance services, first aid crews, Wackenhut firemen fully trained in the technical field of industrial and municipal fire fighting and equipment, and safety surveys, systems, and educational programs.

Guard Forces Division
Selects, investigates, trains and supervises the uniformed and plain-clothes guards who protect your operations; also provides uniformed receptionists and guardettes; makes physical property surveys to determine security requirements and establishes security systems and controls.

4. Mr. Wackenhut wants to expand abroad, in view of his
successful venture into Puerto Rico. However, he has no definite
plans as of the present and seemed to be seeking [from CIA covert 24
sponsorship] for entry into areas of interest to us. He is pre-
pared to furnish personnel himself [or to permit integration of 24
Agency nominees.]

5. It is not apparent to me that there is any significant market for Wackenhut's services in foreign countries, except possibly among American businesses with physical plants overseas. The nature of these services, I would presume, would make rather difficult acquisition of the necessary occupational permits in many countries. The potential for clandestine intelligence activities would be too obvious to host governments, and the emphases

2/RS

on former FBI personnel probably would enhance such suspicions, particularly in Latin America where "FBI" means "intelligence" since its WW II activities there.

6. CCS/NC on occasion receives requests for advice to business organizations as to setting up security systems at overseas installations. We recently referred a request of this type, involving a major oil company, to the Physical Security element of the Security Office. Conceivably, the Agency might make some arrangement to advise Wackenhut of such requests, providing our own Security Office is satisfied as to Wackenhut's competence. We 24 could then place an Agency representative, if desired, in the team 24 dispatched overseas by Wackenhut should his company successfully secure the contract.

7. Wackenhut said he would be willing to dispatch teams to set up personal security systems for foreign chiefs of state whom the Agency wants protected. He is amenable, in fact, to any reasonable application of his capabilities to Agency problems. He would be willing to negotiate financing in equitable proportions in the event an overt operation, set up at Agency behest, were not financially self-sustaining.

8. Wackenhut impressed me as a clean-cut, energetic, ambitious young business man who is obviously proud of what appears to be a superior organization of its type. He is interested in profits, but it is my impression he is sincerely eager to do what he can to assist the government and feels that CIA offers one possible opportunity. Incidentally, he appears somewhat younger in person than in the pictures appearing in the promotional material given the writer.

9. Copies of this memorandum are being furnished those Agency components which might have an interest in utilizing subject company. Inquiries may be directed to the writer.

FRED R. YOUNGBLOOD
Chief, CCS/NC

4R8

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO	DATE 26 February 1969 LETTER NO.

TO : Chief, Central Cover Staff ATTN: James W. Franklin	FROM: Christos S. Gikas Acting Chief, Employee Activity Branch

Please check your records for any cover considerations in connection with the release of a retirement medallion to VITALE, Guy, DDP/WH.

SIGNATURE

REPLY	DATE

No cover objections.

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 5-67 1831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

INFORMATION FOR THE SECURITY FILE

TO : Chief, Personnel Security Division
Date: 1 July 1965

FROM : Chief, Interrogation Research Division
IRD#: 21642

SUBJECT: SWENSON, Harold Francis
SF #: 73086

CATEGORY A:
1. Foreign relatives residing in foreign countries.
2. Foreign relatives (non-US citizens) residing in the United States.
3. Relatives residing in foreign countries other than U. S. Government connected.

CATEGORY B:
1. Any relatives employed by foreign governments foreign owned firms or foreign intelligence organizations.

CATEGORY C:
1. Foreign social acquaintances residing in foreign countries.
2. Foreign social acquaintances (non-US citizens) residing in the United States.
3. Social acquaintances other than U. S. citizens or Government connected residing in foreign countries.

CATEGORY D:
1. Any acquaintance employed by a foreign government, foreign owned firm or foreign intelligence organization.

CATEGORY E:
1. Close Agency acquaintances.

CATEGORY F:
1. Current roommates.

CATEGORY G:
1. By whom recommended.

CATEGORY	NAME(citizenship)	ADDRESS	EMPLOYMENT	RELATIONSHIP TYPE ASSOCIATION TYPE CONTACT
A	None			
B	None			
C	None			
D	None			
E	Bob Dahlgren	Arlington	CIA/I&R	Friend many years + former supervisor
	Jack Flynn	Bethesda	CIA/WH/C	Friend & current supervisor
	Al Rodriguez	Bethesda	CIA/OTR	Friend & colleague
F	None			

WH/C #65-200
10 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/FI/INT/IE

SUBJECT : Foreign Intelligence Officers (in Liaison with CIA) in the United States 24

REFERENCES : A. Your Memo dated 14 April 1965, Subject as above.
B. SAS Memo #64-96 dated 5 February 1964

1. The following information is submitted per your reference A which has been reported previously in reference B to the Director of Security.

Name: Colonel Carlos LUNA
Position: Argentine representative to the Security Committee of the OAS, Washington, D. C.
Nationality: Argentine
Background: Age, 49. Born Argentina. Wife is Argentine. Senior Colonel in the Argentine Army. Career Army Intelligence officer. Formerly an officer assigned to the Secretaria de Informaciones del Estado (SIDE), the senior Argentine Intelligence Service (with which we maintain official liaison.) 24 The Argentine service has assigned officers to the OAS Security Committee (at Washington, D. C. (at our official request) 24 He replaced Lt. Col. Francisco RAMIREZ and has almost finished his tour here. Estimated time of departure from Washington, D. C. in July 65. He was assigned to the OAS Security Committee by the Argentine Army and the Argentine Intelligence Service (SIDE).
CIA Contacts: Harold F. Swenson, WH/C/SP
Raford W. Herbert, DC/WHD #30061
John Wilson, DC/WH/2 # 104057

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

6/3/

31/21

Frequency of Meetings: Occasional. No more often than once per month as a rule.

Place of Meetings: At homes of above listed officers or at restaurants.

2. The above contact stems from a past association, is only semi-official and in each instance covered by a Memorandum of Record to WH Division.

Harold F. Swenson
WH/C/SP

cc. Deputy Director for Plans

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDP
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - Chrono

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION : Mrs. Dorothy Turner
Room 5E03

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : (SAFLEY, Harold F.)(A)
#73086 07

1. This is to advise that a CIA Identification Card will be issued in the above captioned alias to an employee of TFW. You are requested to establish an indices card in the above alias in order that the Office of Personnel will be in a position to acknowledge any inquiries that might be received concerning the Subject.

2. Upon receipt of any inquiry, you are further requested to promptly acknowledge Agency employment for such individual and then to advise the Chief, Cover Support Section of the Office of Security, extension 6280 or 7380 or in the latters absence, Mr. George Ladner, TFW/Security, extension 6055.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

cc: OO/C

KUHNKE/efb
6 November 1962
PENDING M/R: See TFW memorandum dated 5 November 1962 which was concurred in by Moorhouse of CCS with the understanding that I would advise Mr. Bannerman of the action taken and obtain his approval upon the latters return on or about 9 November 1962. An exception was made in this case to the general rule that CIA identification in alias will not be issued to (State Department) integrees. The exception was granted because of the Subject's position and long experience in matters of this nature and due to the fact that it will be strictly controlled and limited to assignment which will be directly by Mr. Harvey.

Ervan E. Kuhnke, Jr.

SECRET

14-00000

FILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

73086

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 October 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER 016229	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) SWENSON, Harold F.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH / DAY / YEAR
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3132-1000-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP Task Force W Office of the Chief	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE ATTACHE, POL OFF OPS OFF (D BR CH) (D)	12. POSITION NUMBER 0663
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS (15)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP 04 0 15 (2)	17. SALARY OR RATE 12,445 $ 15,045

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/WH, Br. 2, BuenosAires, Argentina, #0084

Date 29 OCT 1962

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request

Chief, Personnel Security Division

CONCURRENCE: Chief, WH/Personnel

1 cy Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/Pers.	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HDQTRS. CODE
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46. O.P. APPROVAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic [illegible]

DATE APPROVED

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Clayton Kallander
226 Westout Building

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : SWENSON, Harold F.
#73086

1. There is attached hereto TFW/Support memorandum dated 5 November 1962 requesting alias documentation for the Subject in his registered alias.

2. Please note that a backstopped driver's license has been requested for the Subject. The Office of Security will, therefore, initiate action to procure a backstopped alias New York State Driver's License. Please issue the remaining requested documentation directly to TFW/Support.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

Attachment:
As Indicated

cc: TFW/Security

KUHNKE/efb
6 November 1962
PENDING

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/OSD
	C/SSD
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	B
	3
	AAFS
	FILES

SECRET

SECRET

5 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Technical Services Division
(Authentication Branch)

THRU : OS/SD/2, Mr. Kuhnke

SUBJECT : Request for Alias Documentation
Harold F. SWENSON (T)

1. Attached for your information is a completed form D-104 requesting alias documentation for Subject in his registered alias, Harold Francis SAFLEY.

2. Please handle this request on an expeditious basis since it will be necessary for Mr. SWENSON to make some contacts in the near future.

3. Refer any inquiries to George A. LADNER, Jr., ext. 6055.

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief, TFW/Support

Attachment:
Form D-104

cc: OS/SD/2

8/6/62

SECRET

DOCUMENT REQUEST FORM

Case No.: Requestor: Date Due:

True Name: Harold F. Swenson Extension:

Alias (including middle name): Harold Francis SAFLEY

Address to be used: Washington, D. C.

Height: 6'0" Weight: 185 Hair: Black-Gray Eyes: Hazel

BLOOD TYPE A+

Wears glasses? No Married? Yes Occupation: Legend: Industrial Relations

Birth date: 28 April 1915 Place: New York, N.Y.

Countries where documentation will be used: U. S. and possibly Latin America

DATA FOR BIRTH CERTIFICATE, AS OF TIME OF BIRTH

Father's name: Mother's maiden name:

POB: POB:

Age: Age:

Occupation: Occupation:

Residence: Doctor's name:

Number of children born to parents prior to this birth:

Documentation requested: Backstopped D. C. driver's license or backstopped *New York State license—whichever is more quickly obtained.

Social security card

Pocket litter to support legend of an Industrial Relations man

*Can use 251 E. 51st St. New York City as address. This is present home of Subject's uncle.

Security clearance: 1. Has New Jersey Driver's license #59586-31566-04155
Expiration Date - October 1965
2. Former D. C. Permit #941947 - now expired

Signature sample in alias:

D-10

Erv:

5 Nov 62

Geo Lodner called & requested alias CIA credentials

SWENSON

Swenson is a ~~[illegible]~~ said Swenson is a smooth guy who [illegible] himself O.K.

Talked to Harold [illegible] contacted: no

More [illegible] Knagge

return [illegible] and

Waits [illegible] w/ RFK [illegible] on Thursday

FILE

[illegible] 131175

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check) ☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For Action) [illegible]	DATE [illegible]
ATTN: [illegible]	SUBJECT [illegible] [illegible]
REF: [illegible]	FILE NO. [illegible]
MILITARY COVER DISCONTINUED [illegible] Support Group, [illegible]	ID CARD NO. [illegible]

☒ Unblock Records: (OP Memo 20-800-11) [illegible] effective [illegible] September [illegible]

Effective [illegible]

☒ Submit Form 642 To Change Limitation Category. (HB 20-800-2 to be redesignated HHB 20-7) N/A

☒ Return All Military Documentation To CCS. N

☒ Remarks: Subject to [illegible] CIA as place of employment for the entire period.

☐ COPY TO CPD/DP

James H. Franklin
[illegible] CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-CSD/OS; 1-PSD/OS

FORM 2-61 1551a

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-43)

Headquarters
12 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Agent in Charge
Washington Field Office

SUBJECT : Removal of Credit Blocks
B2 SD/2 JFM

1. The Credit Blocks at the Washington, D.C. Credit Bureau for the following listed individuals may be removed:

a. Mr. [Louis Edward MARCHI] 03
OS #62224
SS# Unknown 06
DOB: [5 June 1908]
POB: Lucca, Italy 06
[3709 West Augusta Ave.
Phoenix, Arizona]

b. Mr. [Anthony C. PONTARI] 03
OS #58149 06
SS [#164-14-4336] 06
DOB: [22 August 1920]
POB: Philadelphia, Pa.
[1156 Wimbledon Dr.] 06
McLean, Va.

c. Mr. [Cecil C. PURVIS] 03
OS #42693 06
SS# [258-01-3285] 06
DOB: [8 December 1917]
POB: Ellabelle, Georgia
[6519 Cavalier Drive] 06
Alexandria, Virginia

d. Mr. Walter S. SNOWDON
OS #43481 06
SS# [227-12-9052]
DOB: [3 April 1918] 06
POB: Plainfield, N.J.
[11321 Myrtle Lane] 06
Reston, Virginia

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

e. Mr. Boris D. TARASOFF
OS #104 887 08
SS# 079-05-9624
DOB: 2 November 1908
POB: Ekaterinosav, Russia
Rancho Contento, S.A.
Apartado Postal 2707 08
Guadalajara, Jal., Mexico

2. A written report regarding your handling of this matter is not necessary.

2/PV

Headquarters
[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Agent in Charge
Washington Field Office

64

SUBJECT : WICHTRICH, Alfonso Rudolph
#85 002 OA/ID/3

23

1. Your office is Office of Origin.

2. Subject is of covert interest. Conduct investigation according to standard regulations except as hereinafter noted.

3. Assignments are as follows:

a. DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE will conduct the following National Agency checks:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PASSPORT	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I&N	MILITARY
	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X

DO NOT CONTACT FBI.

b. WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE:

At Columbus, Georgia

Informants (if possible)
Employment
Police and Credit

At Washington, D. C.

Police and Credit

4. Special Instructions:

a. Subject has apparently been located as follows:

10
1916-1943: Wilcox, Arizona
1943-1945: U. S. Army
1945-1947: Washington, D. C. (details unknown)

DISTRIBUTION			
	SFO		MFO
	CFO		NYFO
X	DFO		SFFO
		X	WFO
	LAFO		

ATTACHMENTS	
X	BIOG. DATA
X	CONTROL CARDS
	OTHER

FORM 7-60 1073a

(9-38-43)

3/Rs

05

1947-1949: Columbus, Georgia and/or Panama - with NEHI
1949-Pres: Mexico

b. Subject gives the following character references:

06 10

William C. FRANKLIN, 428 E. Preston Street, Baltimore, Md.
T. H. STANLEY, Chairman of the Board, NEHI Corp., Columbus, Ga.

06 08

PAUL T. AUDEN

PENDING
BYRNE/rpe
29 Mar. 1962

4/RS

SECRET

109301

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 19 April 1965

TO: (Check)
☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

ESTABLISHED FOR: [illegible], Jr.

ATTN: Mr. [illegible]

FILE NO.: [illegible]

REF: [illegible] stopping cover

ID CARD NO.: [illegible]

EMPLOYEE NO.: [illegible]

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: 32
US Army Element, (Com[illegible] Operations Group)

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ **Block Records:** *(OPMEMO 20-800-11)*

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______

b. Continuing, effective ______

☒ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category. *(HHB 20-7)*

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued. *(HB 20-661-1)*

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover. *(R 240-250)*

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility. *(R 240-250)*

☒ Remarks: [illegible]

☐ Cover History

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

James H. Franklin
[illegible] Chief, Military Cover [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-OL/TELSVC, Copy 5-PSD/OS, Copy 6-File.

FORM 6-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-43)

14-00000

0 109301-0

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check)		CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION	DATE 10 September 64
	x	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)	ESTABLISHED FOR [illegible]
ATTN: [illegible]			FILE NO. [illegible]
REF: [illegible] 1322 [illegible] September 64 [illegible]			ID CARD NO. [illegible]
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED 32 [illegible]			EMPLOYEE NO. [illegible]

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ **Block Records:** *(OPMEMO 20-800-11)*

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______

b. Continuing, effective [illegible]

☒ **Submit Form 642 to change limitation category.** *(HHB 20-7)*

☒ **Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued.** *(HB 20-661-1)*

☒ **Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover.** *(R 240-250)*

☒ **Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility.** *(R 240-250)*

☐ **Remarks:**

☒ **Cover History**

13-3

Mar 57-May 60 Hdqs/overt
May 60-Jul 64 DAC & DAFC/Japan

James H. Franklin
[illegible] CHIEF, MILITARY COVER [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-OL/TELSVC, Copy 5-PSD/OS, Copy 6-File.

FORM 6-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

2/RV

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(19-20-43)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Document Number 1271-1029
for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. /The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.7

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens
M. D. Stevens

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENT

Date: 09/20/98
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10133-10207
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : WITHHELD
DATE : 00/00/
PAGES : 152
SUBJECTS : JFK DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/03/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK48:F0 1993.08.03.16:05:34:120027:

RETURN TO CIA

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 13 Mar 78

TO: Jack Sullivan / SEC

ROOM NO. 4E13 BUILDING Hqs

REMARKS:

Jack - Per your request, TOKYO Position Control Register pages for 1960-64. The runs for Sept. 63 and Dec. 63 are missing from our records and must not have been filmed 15-years ago (?). If the missing months are critical, we can research other sources.

FROM: C/Statistical Rptg Br/OP

ROOM NO. 1022 BUILDING Ames EXTENSION 3717

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

12/31/64 1137 FE

SECRETARY STENO

SECRETARY-STENO

JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY SECTION

BORNSTEIN DAVID

ALLIN DONALD F

INTELLIGENCE ASST

BETTY DIANA

LIAISON BRANCH

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 [illegible] 12/31

[illegible]	05-0301-02	09	1 3124	00										
[illegible]	05 0301-30	08	3124	D	018948	C	19	F	10	011098		37587		45380041000
SECRETARY-STENO	05-0310.01	07	1 3033	00										
[illegible]	05 0310.01	07	3033	D	039835	C	38	F	10	041204		37587		45380042000
[illegible]	05-0322.01	05	1 4454	00										
[illegible]	05 0322.01	05	4454	D	030854	C	41	F	10	041204	0463	37587		45380043000
12	12	12												
[illegible] BRANCH														45380046000
OPS OFFICER	05-0136.01	14	1 2447	10										45380047000
[illegible] JOHN [illegible]	05 0136.01	14	2447	D	004704	C	19	M	10	072103		37587		
OPS OFFICER	05-0136.01	13	1 2448	00										
[illegible]	05 0136.01	13	2448	D	004130	C	38	M	10	111063		37587		45380048000
OPS OFFICER	05-0136.01	12	1 2594	00										45380049000
[illegible]	05-0320.01	06	1 4169	00										
[illegible] PATRICIA [illegible]	05 0320.01	06	4169	D	003651	C	42	F	10	122360	0464	37587		45380050000
3	3	3												
[illegible] BRANCH														45380051000
[illegible]	05-0136.01	14	1 1911	10										
[illegible] RICHARD G	05 0136.01	15	1911	D	009406	C	17	M	10	102564		37587	01	45380052000
[illegible]	05-0136.01	13	2 1914	00										45380053000
[illegible] DANIEL	05 0136.01	13	1914	D	030113	C	26	M	10	082203	0501	37587		
[illegible]	05 0136.01	13	1914	D	012240	C	25	M	10	111757		37587		
[illegible] JAMES	05 0136.01	13	1914	D	037849	C	30	M	10	032404	[illegible]	37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]		4 2753	00										45380054000
[illegible]	[illegible]		2753	D	003557	C	26	M	10	111363		37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]		2753	D	027875	C	31	M	10	041264	[illegible]	37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]		2753	D	032729	C	38	M	10	031564	[illegible]	37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]		2753	D	009402	C	17	M	10	040959		37587		
			1993	00										45380055000
			1993	D	[illegible]	C	21	M	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	37587		

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 [illegible]/21/64 1157 78

NAMES UNDERLINED

POSITION OR AND INCUMBENT NAME

DEVEL. COMPONENT

INTELLIGENCE ASST 03-0301.20 07 1 1929 40 [illegible] 37587 40340084600
KEEFE PATRICIA M 03 0301.20 06 1929 0 [illegible] 0 40 F 10 [illegible] 8003 37587
MCCLINTOCK TAUSCA L 03 0301.20 06 1929 0 [illegible] 40340087500

CLERK TYPIST 03-0322.01 05 1 1927 40

10 11 12 13 4

40340087102

40340087300

SOVIET BRANCH

OPS OFFICER-PS GH 03-0136.01 13 1 4213 40 [illegible] 10 [illegible] 8000 37587 40340087400
HILL GEORGE A 03 0136.01 13 4213 0

02

OPS OFFICER 03-0136.01 13 [illegible] 40 [illegible] 37587
[illegible] ROBERT R 03 0136.01 13 [illegible] 37587
[illegible] PETER [illegible] 03 0136.01 13 [illegible] 37587 40340087400
[illegible] GEORGE 03 0136.01 13 [illegible]

OPS OFFICER 03-0136.01 12 1 4216 40 [illegible] 10 [illegible] 37587 40340087500
CARTER THOMAS [illegible] 03 0136.01 12 4216 0

INTELLIGENCE ASST 03-0301.20 07 1 4497 40 [illegible] F 10 [illegible] 37587 40340087700
[illegible] JOCELYN [illegible] 03 0301.20 07 4497 0

SECRETARY STENO 03-0318.01 07 1 4221 40 [illegible] F 10 [illegible] 37587 40340087800
[illegible] CARMELINA [illegible] 03 0318.01 06 4221 0

SECRETARY STENO 03-0318.01 06 1 4228 40 [illegible] F 10 [illegible] 37587
[illegible] JOAN [illegible] 03 0318.01 06 4228 0

4 4

40340087810

40340087820

[illegible] 12 1 4436 40 [illegible] 10 [illegible] 37587
[illegible] 12 [illegible] 0

4

40340087910

[illegible] REPORTS STAFF

SECRET

CONTROL REGISTER

													45340001000
													45340002000
[illegible] STATION													45340003000
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF													45340004000
CHIEF OF STATION	GS-0136.01	00	1 3808	10									45340005000
BROE WILLIAM V	GS 0136.01	17	3808	D	256735	C	13	M	10	072361		37587	
OPS OFFICER-DCOS	GS-0136.01	15	1 3803	10									45340004000
FELDMAN HORACE Z	GS 0136.01	15	3803	D	029895	C	23	M	10	122401		37587	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	09	1 3809	10									45340004000
ODONNELL SARA E	GS 0318.01	09	3809	D	052297	C	17	F	10	080764		37587	
SECRETARY STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1 4492	10									45340006000
[illegible] BETTE JANE	GS 0318.01	07	4492	D	041039	C	39	F	10	102002		37587	
4 4 4	4												
INTERNAL OPERATIONS BRANCH													45340024000
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	15	1 3874	10									45340027000
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	14	3874	D	000654	C	26	M	10	170763		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible].01	14	1 3875	10									4534002[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	13	3875	D	001015	C	28	M	[illegible]	[illegible]		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3879	10									45340028000
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3879	D	000791	C	24	M	10	062202	[illegible]	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]		3879	D	024059	C	31	M	10	120664		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	10									453[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	027952	C	27	M	10	061052	[illegible]	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]				010593	C	36	M	10	062393		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]				029621	C	33	M	10	041264		37587	
					031906	C	33	M	10	[illegible]		37587	

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

```
                                  GRADE  PERM    Position                          N  Birth
                                         INCUM   Number                            D
                                         BENCH
                                                                                                                            45380057840
[illegible] OFFICER-CH        GS-0136.01  14   1 3056  1D                                 072180 0760 37587
  HULL WILLIAM P              GS 0136.01  14     3896   D     009717 C 21 M 10
                                                                                                                            45380057850
[illegible]PORTS OFFICER      GS-0132.58  13   1 3846  4D
  NAUDLE JO ANN B             GS 0132.58  12     3840   D     001460 C 22 F 10    101402        37587
  YOUNG AMELIA BELLE          GS 0132.58  12     3840   D     001209 C 19 F 10    041760        37587
                                                                                                                            45380057860
[illegible]PORTS OFFICER      GS-0132.58  12   1 4499  4D
  [illegible]LAND WINNIFRED   GS 0132.58  12     4499   D     007180 C 16 F 10    121355 0563 37587
                                                                                                                            45380057871
[illegible]RETARY-STENO       GS-0318.01  07   1 3848  1D

                                                                                                                            45380057880
[illegible]RCH TRANSLATION SECTION                                                                                          45380057890
[illegible] OFFICER-CH        GS-0136.01  13   1 4460  2D
  [illegible] OTTO L          GS 0136.01  13     4460  1D     011124 C 19 M 10    110836        37587
                                                                                                                            45380057900
[illegible] OFFICER           GS-0136.01  12   1 4461  4D
  [illegible] KEN R           GS 0136.01  11     4461   D     009429   20 M 10    100954 0107 37587
                                                                                                                            45380057910
INTERPRETER                   GS-1047.01  11   2 4462  4D
  SUGIMOTO SAM [illegible]    GS 1047.01  11     4462  1D     050445 C 19 M 10    122152 0731 37587
  TAMAKI PAUL [illegible]     GS 1047.01  10     4462  1D     002340 C 17 M 10    102692 0359 37587
                                                                                                                            45380057920
[illegible]SLATOR             GS-1045.01  09   1 4463  4D

                                                                                                                            45380057925
[illegible] SUPPORT STAFF                                                                                                   45380057930
[illegible]FICER              GS-0136.01  14   1 4464  1D
  [illegible]                 GS 0136.01  13     4464   D     012178 C 20 M 10    090780 0961 37587
                                                                                                                            45380057935
[illegible] ASST              GS-0301.20  09   1 4465  1D
  [illegible]                 GS 0301.20  09     4465   D     020492 C 22 M 10    092908 0459 37587

                                                                                                                            45380057940
```

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

	OCCUP. SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C.A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	U N D	Birth							
[illegible] ANALYST-CR	GS-0132.35	09	1	4466		1D										[illegible]
[illegible] JAMES [illegible]	GS 0132.35	09		4466		D	018032	C	28	M	10	111650		37587		
[illegible] CONTROL CLK	GS-0305.13	07/08	1	4467		eD										45380087980
[illegible] JEAN LEROY	GS 0305.13	07		4467		D	004989	C	32	M	10	092963	0364	37587		
[illegible] CONTROL CLK	GS-0305.13	06	1	4468		eD										[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-0302.05	05	3	4469		eD										[illegible]
[illegible]KINSON ELLIS L	N4 0302.05	04		4469		D	309388	C	39	M	30	010101		37587	AF	
[illegible]NNER JACKIE R	N4 0302.05	05		4469		D	378963	C	36	M	30	010101		37587	AF	
[illegible] WALTER H	N4 0302.05	06		4469		D	039204	C	27	M	30	010101		37587	AF	
	2	2	3	5												
SUPPORT STAFF																45380054000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0341.03	13	1	3147		1D										[illegible]
[illegible] A J JR	GS 0341.03	13		3147		D	[illegible]	C	15	M	10	[illegible]		37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3149		1D										[illegible]
[illegible] WINONA J	GS 0318.01	07		3149		D	[illegible]	C	29	F	10	[illegible]	0763	37587		
PERSONNEL OFFICER	GS-0201.01	13	1	3154		1DF										[illegible]
[illegible] JOHN	GS 0201.01	13		3154		DF	[illegible]	C	21	M	10	[illegible]	0954	37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	06	1	3093		eD										45380062000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0510.14	13	1	3164		1DF										45380063000
[illegible] JACK T	GS 0510.14	13		3164		DF	[illegible]	C	20	M	10	021097	0603	37587		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0510.14	12	1	3165		1DF										[illegible]
[illegible] W	GS 0510.14	12		3165		DF	[illegible]	C	15	M	10	[illegible]		37587		
[illegible]	GS-0501.03	09	1	3166		eDF										[illegible]
[illegible] W	GS 0501.03	09		3166		DF	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	37587		
[illegible]	GS-0501.03	07	2	3167		eDF										[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0501.03	07		3167		DF	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
	GS-0341.02	07	1	3094		eD										[illegible]
	GS-1010.01	13	1	[illegible]		1DF										[illegible]
	GS 1010.01	13		[illegible]		DF	[illegible]	C	16	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		
	[illegible]	09	1	[illegible]		eD										[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 12/31/64 11:28

```
                                                                    45340072000
   PENDING REASSIGNMENT TO CURRENT S/C
                                                                    45340072100
  PENDING REASSIGNMENT



                                                                    45340073000
  TOTAL FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION

  PLAN. VOU. UV. TOTAL  MIL  GRAND  PRA  NON-STRENGTH  PKGS.
  EMP.  CIV. CIV. VOUV       TOTAL          SO  LNGR  30 DTN
    JX          73    75    3    76    3
```

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	Schedule	OCCUP. SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER								
FAR EAST DIVISION																[illegible]
FOREIGN FIELD																[illegible]
FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION																[illegible]
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF																[illegible]
CHIEF OF STATION		GS-0136.01	00	1	3092		10									[illegible]
BROE WILLIAM V		GS 0136.01	17		3092		D	056735	C	13	M	10	072361		37587	
OPS OFFICER-DDOS		GS-0136.01	15	1	3093		10									[illegible]
FELDMAN HORACE Z		GS 0136.01	15		3093		D	099995	C	35	M	10	123461		37587	
WHEELER ROBERT F		GS 0136.02	16		3093		D	050447	C	18	M	10	053964		37301	
SECRETARY-STENO		GS-0318.01	09	1	3097		10									[illegible]
OCONNELL SARA E		GS 0318.02	09		3097		D	058897	C	17	F	10	065764		37587	
SECRETARY STENO		GS-0318.01	07	1	4452		10									[illegible]
HANCOCK BETTE JANE		GS 0318.01	07		4452		D	051839	C	30	F	10	102662		37587	
4	5	5		3												
INTERNAL OPERATIONS BRANCH																45380024000
OPS OFFICER		GS-0136.01	15	1	3074		10									45380027000
THOMPSON ROBERT F		GS 0136.01	14		3074		D	090634	C	26	M	10	122263		37587	
OPS OFFICER		GS-0136.01	14	1	3075		10									45380028000
ENTER WILLIAM N		GS 0136.01	14		3075		D	007362	C	29	M	10	082660	0260	37587	
OFFICER		GS-0136.01	13	[illegible]	3077		10									45380029000
AYS ROBERT A		GS 0136.01	13		3077		D	001955	C	28	M	10	091362		37587	
CHESTER H		GS 0136.01	13		3077		D	000702	C	27	M	10	062360	1097	37587	
WILLIAM T		GS 0136.01	13		3077		D	000761	C	30	M	10	062363	1259	37587	
[illegible]		GS-0136.01	12		3089		10									45380030000
D A		GS 0136.01	12		3089		D	027992	C	27	M	10	061262	0599	37587	
LIAM G		GS 0136.01	11		3089		D	018909	C	30	M	10	082363		37587	
VON D		GS 0136.01	12		3089		D	087287	C	32	M	10	122263	0599	37587	
[illegible]		GS 0136.01	12		3089		D	089432	C	33	M	[illegible]	042264		37587	

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 09/28/64 1127 FE

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	PAY PL	SERIES	GRADE	MAX. INCUM-BENCY	POSITION NUMBER	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	[illegible]	Birth	S E X	Type Emp Code	[illegible]	DATE OF GRADE	[illegible] DATE	STATION CODE	[illegible]
TILGHMAN AUSTIN S	GS	0136.03	12		3980		D	026232	C	31	M	10	013460		37587	
HILL ROBERT J JR	GS	0136.03	12		3980		D	016539	C	37	M	10	122161	0958	37587	
																45380031000
OPS OFFICER	GS	0136.01	11	4	3076		4D									
GRAHAM THOMAS G	GS	0136.01	11		3076		D	015598	C	32	M	10	031564		37587	
PROBST HOLLY ANNE	GS	0136.01	08		3076		D	025915	C	32	F	10	062461	0963	37587	
																45380032000
OPS OFFICER	GS	0136.01	09	1	4852		4D									
																45380033000
SECRETARY STENO	GS	0318.01	07	1	3105		4D									
ASHBY BETTY JUNE	GS	0318.01	07		3105		D	030091	C	30	F	10	041264		37587	
BROWN QUEEN ESTHER	GS	0318.01	07		3105		D	022478	C	34	F	10	082661		37587	
EVERETT BRENDA K	GS	0318.01	06		3105		D	032657	C	42	F	10	082164		37587	
FLICKINGER JUDY M	GS	0318.01	05		3105		D	036132	C	41	F	10	071364	1062	37587	
GUEST HELEN S	GS	0318.01	05		3105		D	014273	C	22	F	10	092460		37587	
																45380034000
SECRETARY-STENO	GS	0318.01	05	1	3052		4D									

19 18 10 18 5

JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY BRANCH

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	PAY PL	SERIES	GRADE	MAX. INCUM-BENCY	POSITION NUMBER	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	[illegible]	Birth	S E X	Type Emp Code	DATE OF GRADE	[illegible] DATE	STATION CODE	[illegible]
															45380034200
OPS OFFICER	GS	0136.01	14	1	4493	3D									45380034110
BERNSTEIN DAVID P	GS	0136.01	14		4493	D	001386	C	30	M	10	053163		37587	
															45380034120
OPS OFFICER	GS	0136.01	12	1	4494	4D									
ELLIS DONALD F	GS	0136.01	11		4494	D	005024	C	31	M	10	045362		37587	
															45380034130
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS	0301.20	07	1	4495	4D									
[illegible] BETTY DIANA	GS	0301.20	06		4495	D	023807	C	34	F	10	042962		37587	

[illegible] LIAISON BRANCH

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	PAY PL	SERIES	GRADE	MAX. INCUM-BENCY	POSITION NUMBER	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	[illegible]	Birth	S E X	Type Emp Code	DATE OF GRADE	[illegible] DATE	STATION CODE	[illegible]
															45380035000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	0136.01	15	1	[illegible]	1D									45380035010
[illegible]	GS	0136.01	15		[illegible]	D	[illegible]	[illegible]	32	M	10	091160	0154	37587	
															45380035020
[illegible]	GS	0136.[illegible]			[illegible]										
[illegible]	GS	[illegible]					[illegible]	[illegible]	20	[illegible]	[illegible]	011063		37587	
															45380036000
							[illegible]	[illegible]	28	M	10	111063		37587	
							[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		37587	
							[illegible]					[illegible]		37587	

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

146

Position Title / Name	Group Series	Grade			Date of Grade	PCS Date	Station Code
[illegible] OFFICER	[illegible]	[illegible]					
[illegible] SATOSHI	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		37587
[illegible] GEORGE	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37587
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		37587
[illegible] ALLAN [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		37587
INTELLIGENCE ASST	[illegible]	[illegible]					
[illegible] MATILDA M	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		37587
SECRETARY-STENO	[illegible]	[illegible]					
VAUGHN ROXANNA J	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37587
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]					
[illegible] BRANCH							
[illegible] OFFICER	[illegible]	[illegible]					
[illegible] JOHN [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		37587
[illegible] OFFICER	[illegible]	[illegible]					
WATANABE [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		37587
OPS OFFICER	[illegible]	[illegible]					
SECRETARY-STENO	[illegible]	[illegible]					
JOYCE PATRICIA J	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37587
[illegible] BRANCH							
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]					
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		37587
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]					
[illegible] DANIEL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37587
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible]

REPORTS OFFICER [illegible]

INTELLIGENCE ASST [illegible]

[illegible]

SOVIET BRANCH

[illegible]

OFFICER [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 [illegible]

	Sal. Rate	OCCUP. SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C. A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr. Birth	SEX	Type Emp. Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo. Da. Yr.	PCS O/S DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE	
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS STAFF																	[illegible]
OPS OFFICER-CH		GS-0136.01	14	1	3856		1D										[illegible]
HULL WILLIAM P		GS 0136.01	14		3856		D	004717	C	21	M	10		072163	0763	37587	
REPORTS OFFICER		GS-0132.58	13	1	3046		4D										[illegible]
YOUNG AMELIA BELLE		GS 0132.58	12		3046		D	001209	C	15	F	10		041760		37587	
REPORTS OFFICER		GS-0132.58	12	1	4459		4D										[illegible]
[illegible]LAND WINNIFRED		GS 0132.58	12		4459		D	[illegible]	C	10	F	10		[illegible]	[illegible]	37587	
SECRETARY-STENO		GS-0318.01	07	1	3045		1D										[illegible]
4	3	3	3														
RESEARCH TRANSLATION SECTION																	[illegible]
OPS OFFICER-CH		GS-0136.01	13	1	[illegible]		1D										[illegible]
GEORGE OTTO L		GS 0136.01	13		[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	18	M	10		[illegible]		37587	
OPS OFFICER		GS-0136.01	12	1	[illegible]		4D										[illegible]
INTERPRETER		GS-1047.01	11	3	4462		4D										[illegible]
[illegible]		GS 1047.01	11		4462			[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10		[illegible]	0557	37587	
SUGIMOTO SAM [illegible]		GS 1047.01	11		4462		1D	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10		[illegible]	0761	37587	
[illegible] PAUL I		GS 1047.01	10		4462		1D	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10		[illegible]	[illegible]	37587	
TRANSLATOR		GS-1049.01	09	1	4463		4D										[illegible]
5	4	4	4														
OPERATIONS SUPPORT STAFF																	[illegible]
[illegible] OFFICER		GS-0136.01	14	1	4464		1D										[illegible]
[illegible]ANDALL FREDERICK		GS 0136.01	13		4464		D	018170	C	26	M	10		090758	0961	37587	
[illegible]LIGENCE ASST		GS-0301.28	09	1	[illegible]		1D										[illegible]
[illegible] GEORGE A		GS 0301.28	09		[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	10	M	10		[illegible]	[illegible]	37587	
[illegible] EDWIN L		GS 0301.28	09		[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	22	M	10		[illegible]	[illegible]	37587	
3	-	[illegible]	3	2													

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

	Series	Grade	Plan Pos. No.	Employee Number	Date of Grade	Stat. Code	
CENTRAL ASSISTANT/RECORDS							[illegible]
INTEL ANALYST-GN	GS-0132-35	09	[illegible]				[illegible]
WOODS JAMES S	GS 0132-35	09	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	
INFO CONTROL CLK	GS-0303-13	07	[illegible]				[illegible]
ROWE JEAN LEROY	GS 0303-13	07	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	
INFO CONTROL CLK	GS-0303-13	05	[illegible]				[illegible]
COURIER	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]				[illegible]
ATKINSON ELLIS L	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	AF
DONNER JACKIE R	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	AF
LYONS WALTER H	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	AF
SUPPORT STAFF							[illegible]
ADM OFFICER	GS-0341-03	13	[illegible]				[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0341-03	13	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	
PIERCE DOUGLAS S	GS 0341-03	13	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318-03	07	[illegible]				[illegible]
PERSONNEL OFFICER	GS-0201-01	12	[illegible]				[illegible]
[illegible] JOHN	GS 0201-01	12	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318-01	06	[illegible]				[illegible]
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510-14	13	[illegible]				[illegible]
RANDALL JACK F	GS 0510-14	13	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510-14	12	[illegible]				[illegible]
[illegible] FRANK W	GS 0510-14	12	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS-0501-03	09	[illegible]				[illegible]
JOHNSON RICHARD [illegible]	GS 0501-03	09	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS-0501-03	07	[illegible]				[illegible]
[illegible] GERALD D	GS 0501-03	06	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	
[illegible] JAMES B JR	GS 0501-03	07	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	
[illegible]	[illegible]	07	[illegible]				[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	07	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	37987	

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

```
                          GRADE  PLAN   POSITION  C.A  SD  EMPLOYEE
                                 INCUM- NUMBER             NUMBER
                                 BENCY

SECURITY OFFICER  GS-1016.01  13  1 [illegible] [illegible]                                                    [illegible]
  [illegible]     GS 1016.01  13    [illegible] [illegible]  000137 C 30 N 10  [illegible]   37007

[illegible]       GS-2040.00  09  1 [illegible] [illegible]                                                    [illegible]

   17          12      10              10


   PENDING REASSIGNMENT TO CURRENT OHD                                                                         [illegible]

PENDING REASSIGNMENT                                                                                           [illegible]
   [illegible]            GS 0156.01  12    4310   0   000612 C 30 N 10  [illegible] [illegible] 37007

               1      1             1

TOTAL FE/UNB = TOKYO STATION                                                                                   [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] TOTAL  MIL  GRAND  PRA  [illegible]  [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]  TOTAL         [illegible]
   05         04      0     1      07     4
```

DocId:32399957 Page 18

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible] EAST DIVISION

[illegible] FIELD

[illegible] - TOKYO STATION

[illegible] OF THE CHIEF

TITLE	SERIES	GRADE	INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Birth				
CHIEF OF STATION	GS-0136.01	00	1	3002		10							
[illegible] WILLIAM W	GS 0136.01	17		3002		0	050135	C	13	M 10	072301		37587
[illegible] OFFICER-DOCS	GS-0136.01	15	1	3003		10							
WHEELER ROBERT P	GS 0136.01	15		3003		0	000047	C	13	M 10	121297		37587
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	09	1	3009		10							
ODONNELL JANE E	GS 0318.01	09		3009		0	[illegible]	C	17	F 11	[illegible]		37587
SECRETARY STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	4092		10							
4	3	3	3										

[illegible] OPERATIONS BRANCH

TITLE	SERIES	GRADE	INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Birth				
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	15	1	3074		10							
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	14	1	3075		10							
[illegible] WILLIAM A	GS 0136.01	14		3075		0	[illegible]	C	30	M 10	[illegible]	0360	37587
[illegible] JOHN C	GS 0136.01	14		3075		0	[illegible]	C	32	M 10	070802		37587
[illegible] KEITH M	GS 0136.01	14		3075		0	062308	C	25	M 10	072103		37587
[illegible] ROBERT V	GS 0136.01	14		3075		0	000094	C	26	M 10	122563		37587
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	13	1	3077		10							
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3077		0	004520	C	30	M 10	081302		37587
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3077		0	000791	C	24	M 10	062303	1057	37587
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	12	1	3084		10	057592	C	27	M 10	081092	0590	37587
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3084		0	010063	C	30	M 10	062303		37587
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	11		3087		0	029087	C	31	M 10	122203	0259	37587
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	10		1087		0	000761	C	30	M 10	060353	1200	37587
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3089		0	029481	C	32	M 10	091264	0460	37587
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		[illegible]		[illegible]							

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

Title / Name	Serv ID	Series	Grade	Position Number	C.A.	Employee Number					Date of Grade	PCI	Station Code	
[illegible] AUSTIN S	GS	0136.01	12	3089	0	[illegible]	C	41	M	10	012460		37587	
HILL ROBERT J JR	GS	0136.01	12	3089	0	014509	C	37	M	10	102461	0968	37587	
IPS OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	11	3 3098	00									45380031000
ELLIS DONALD F	GS	0136.01	11	3098	0	012824	C	41	M	10	061563		37587	
GRAHAM THOMAS D	GS	0136.01	11	3098	0	033990	C	33	M	10	061564		37587	
PROBST POLLY ANNE	GS	0136.01	09	3098	0	019410	C	32	F	10	060562		37587	
WILLIS ALLAN C	GS	0136.01	11	3098	0	033390	C	35	M	10	061264		37587	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-	0318.01	07	1 3104	00									45380034000
ADNEY BETTY JUNE	GS	0318.01	07	3104	0	030853	C	33	F	10	061364		37587	
BROWN [illegible] ESTHER	GS	0318.01	07	3104	0	032470	C	33	F	10	062563		37587	
HANCOCK BETTE JANE	GS	0318.01	07	3104	0	031087	C	33	F	10	102563	0562	37587	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-	0318.01	07	1 3808	00									45380034000
FLICKINGER JUDY K	GS	0318.01	07	3088	0	044122	C	41	F	10	061263		37587	
11	41	21	11	1										

[illegible] COMMUNIST PARTY [illegible]

Title / Name	Serv ID	Series	Grade	Position Number	C.A.	
						45380034000
IPS OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	14	1 3450	00	45380034000
IPS OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	12	1 3459	00	45380034000
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-	0301.28	07	1 3455	00	45380034000

JAPANESE [illegible]

Title / Name	Serv ID	Series	Grade	Position Number	C.A.	Employee Number					Date of Grade	PCI	Station Code	
														45380037000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	14	1 3601	00									45380037000
[illegible]	GS	0136.01	14	3601	0	013096	C	41	M	10	091362	0354	37587	
[illegible]				[illegible]										45380037000
[illegible]						[illegible]					033457	0958	37587	
[illegible]						[illegible]					012063		37587	
[illegible]														45380038000
[illegible]				[illegible]		[illegible]					061362	0987	37587	
[illegible]		[illegible]	12	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	C	[illegible]			[illegible]		37587	
[illegible]		[illegible]	12	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10	[illegible]		37587	
		[illegible]	12	[illegible]	00									45380039000
		[illegible]	12	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	C	40	M	10	[illegible]		37587	

SECRET

DocId:32399957 Page 20

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

NAKAMURA GEORGE	03 0136.01	12		3113	1	049327 C 19 M 10	122094	0392	37587
TAGAMI NAN	03 0136.01	12		3113	1	021048 C 18 M 10	042141		37587
INTELLIGENCE ASST	00*0301.28	09	1	3184	40				
DRESSLING MATILDA M	03 0301.28	09		3184	0	013048 C 19 F 10	021060		37587
SECRETARY-STENO	03*0318.01	07	1	3083	40				
VAUGHN ROXANNE	03 0302.01	05		3083	0	030294 C 41 F 10	041204		37587
CLERK TYPIST	00*0322.01	09	1	3480	40				
19 11 11	32								

KOREA BRANCH

[illegible]	[illegible]	14	1	3447	40				
[illegible]	03 0136.01	14		3447	0	[illegible] C 19 M 10	122403		37587
[illegible] OFFICER	[illegible]	13	1	3448	40				
[illegible]	[illegible]	13		3448	0	[illegible] C 24 M 10	[illegible]		37587
[illegible]	[illegible]	13		3448	0	[illegible] C 23 M 10	121093		37587
[illegible] OFFICER	[illegible]	12	1	3454	40				
[illegible]	[illegible]	06	1	4100	40				
[illegible]	[illegible]	06		4100	0	[illegible] C 42 F 10	102303		37587

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	14	1	1911	40				
[illegible]	03 0136.01	14		1911	0	[illegible] C 17 M 10	110297		37587
[illegible]	[illegible]	13	1	1914	40				
[illegible]	[illegible]	13		1914	0	[illegible] C 26 M 10	[illegible]	[illegible]	37587
[illegible]	[illegible]	13		1914	0	[illegible] C 30 M 10	[illegible]	[illegible]	37587
[illegible]	[illegible]	13		1914	0	[illegible] C 35 M 10	[illegible]		37587
[illegible]	[illegible]	12	1	[illegible]	40				
[illegible]	[illegible]	12		[illegible]	0	[illegible] C [illegible] M 10	[illegible]	[illegible]	37587
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3783	0	[illegible] C [illegible] M 10	[illegible]		37587
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3783	0	[illegible] C [illegible] M 10	[illegible]		37587

SECRET

DocId:32399957 Page 21

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

340 05/30/64 1104 36

Title / Name	Series	Grade	Man Incumbency	Position Number	C A SD	Employee Number	C N D	Birth	Sex	Type Emp Code	Date of Grade	PI Date	Security Code		
REPORTS OFFICER	GS*0132.38	12	1	1923	*D										45380055000
NISHIDA MALCOLM M	GS 0132.38	12		1923	D	004220	C	21	M	10	090956		37587		
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS*0301.28	07	1	1925	*D										45380056000
KEEFE PATRICIA M	GS 0301.28	06		1929	D	034031	C	39	F	10	032964		37587		
MCCLINTOCK TAUSCA L	GS 0301.28	06		1925	D	036609	C	40	F	10	032964		37587		
CLERK TYPIST	GS*0322.01	05	1	1927	*D										45380057000
10 10 10	10														
SOVIET BRANCH															45380057100
															45380057200
OPS OFFICER*BR CH	GS*0136.01	15	1	4316	1D										
FILL GEORGE A	GS 0136.01	14		4316	D	001709	C	21	M	10	010861	0960	37587		
OPS OFFICER	GS*0136.01	13	2	4317	*D										45380057300
[illegible]WIN ROBERT K	GS 0136.01	14		4317	D	00[illegible]820	C	24	M	10	121061		37587	02	
[illegible]NENBAUM LEO	GS 0136.01	12		4317	D	006674	C	23	M	10	100959	0960	37587		
SATO HAYAMI	GS 0136.01	13		4317	D	059527	C	20	M	10	062363	0952	37587		
BLORCRIN PETER M	GS 0136.01	13		4317	D	000771	C	20	M	10	102156	0961	37587		
VONBRETZEL GEORGE	GS 0136.01	13		4317	D	006373	C	21	M	10	081959		37587		
OPS OFFICER	GS*0136.01	12	1	4318	*D										45380057400
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS*0301.28	07	1	4497	*D										45380057600
[illegible]	GS*0318.01	07	1	4321	*D										45380057700
HAIRE JOAN [illegible]	GS 0318.02	05		4321	D	038305	C	40	F	10	111063		37587		
[illegible]	GS*0318.01	06	1	4322	*D										45380057800
CASTANO [illegible]	GS 0318.01	06		4322	D	034097	C	20	F	10	010964		37587		
															45380057810
SCIENTIFIC STAFF															45380057820
OPS OFFICER ADV	GS*[illegible]	13	1	4495	*D										
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS STAFF															45380057830

SECRET

2

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 08/30/64 1105 16

	Occup Series	Grade	Plan Incumbency	Position Number	C A	Employee Number		Yr Born	Sex	Type Emp Code	Date of Grade	PCS Date	Station Code	
OPS OFFICER-CH	GS-0136.01	14	1	3856	1D									45380057840
HULL WILLIAM P	GS 0136.01	14		3856	D	004717	C	21	M	10	072163	0760	37587	
REPORTS OFFICER	GS-0132.53	13	1	3046	#D									45380057850
HAUGLAND WINNIFRED	GS 0132.58	12		3046	D	007109	C	16	F	10	031359		37587	
YOUNG AMELIA BELLE	GS 0132.58	12		3046	D	061209	C	15	F	10	041760		37587	
REPORTS OFFICER	GS-0132.58	12	1	4459	#D									45380057860
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3045	1D									45380057870
BROWN ELEANOR K	GS 0318.01	07		3045	D	033921	C	21	F	10	011964		37587	
4	4			4										
RESEARCH TRANSLATION SECTION														45380057880
OPS OFFICER-CH	GS-0136.01	13	1	4460	1D									45380057890
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	1	4461	#D									45380057900
INTERPRETER	GS-1047.01	11	2	4462	#D									45380057910
TRANSLATOR	GS-1045.01	09	1	4463	#D									45380057920
4														
OPERATIONS SUPPORT STAFF														45380057925
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	4464	1D									45380057930
[illegible]	[illegible]	07	1	4465	#D									45380057935
[illegible]														45380057940
	[illegible]	07	1	[illegible]	1D									45380057950
	[illegible]		1	4467	#D									45380057960
	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	4468	#D									[illegible]

```
                                        POSITION CONTROL REGISTER                 PAGE
                                                                                  140        06/30/64 1100 F6

COUNTER   [illegible]              GS-0302.05  05   1 4469   4D                                                                    45380057000

   4

   SUPPORT STAFF                                                                                                                   45380058000

[illegible] OFFICER                GS-0341.03  15   1 3147  15A                                                                    45380059000
   [illegible] A A JR              GS 0341.03  15     3147   5A  013100 C 15 M 10   090857          37587
   [illegible] DOUGLAS S           GS 0341.03  15     3147   5A  010795 C 20 M 10   012603          37587

[illegible] SECRETARY-STENO        GS-0318.02  07   1 4149  1D                                                                     45380060000

PERSONNEL OFFICER                  GS-0201.01  13   1 3104  13P                                                                    45380061000
   WASH[illegible] JOHN            GS 0201.01  12     3104   5P  001150 C 21 M 10   060963          37587

SECRETARY-STENO                    GS-0318.02  06   1 4295  4D                                                                     45380062000

[illegible] OFFICER                GS-0510.14  11   1 3164  10P                                                                    45380063000
   [illegible] JACK [illegible]    GS 0510.14  11     3164   0P  012702 C 25 M 10   121057          37587

FINANCE OFFICER                    GS-0510.14  12   1 4265  16P                                                                    45380064000
   [illegible] FRANK [illegible]   GS 0510.14  12     3165   5P  034470 C 15 M 10   022457          37587

FISCAL ACCT ASST                   GS-0501.03  09   1 3166  4SP                                                                    45380065000
   [illegible]                     GS 0501.03  09     3166   5P  009347 C 30 M 10   032358          37587

FISCAL ACCT ASST                   GS-0501.03  07   2 3167  4SP                                                                    45380066000
   [illegible] D                   GS 0501.03  06     3167   5P  035092 C 38 M 10   030363          37587
   [illegible] JAMES [illegible] JR GS 0501.03 07     3167   5P  029790 C 31 M 10   081563          37587

[illegible] ASSISTANT              GS-0341.02  07   1 3694  4D                                                                     45380067000
   [illegible]                     GS 0341.02  07     3694   D   014790 C 29 F 10   121201          37587
   [illegible] C                   GS 0341.02  07     3694   5CA 020317 C 37 F 10   031061          37587

[illegible] OFFICER                GS-0110.01  13   1 5183  130                                                                    45380068000
   [illegible]                     GS 0110.01  13     5183   50  050137 C 15 M 10   102057          37587

[illegible] ASST                   GS-0340.06  10   1 7549  4DL                                                                    45380071000

          13                                 11

   [illegible] REASSIGNMENT TO CURRENT O/C                                                                                         45380072000

   [illegible]                                                                                                                      45380072100
   [illegible]                      GS 0340.0[illegible] 14     3014   6   004300 C 39 M 50   010101          [illegible]

                                                SECRET
```

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 03/31/64 1174 FE

Organization / Title / Name	Sched Occup Series	Grade	Plan Incumbency	Position Number	C. A.	SD	Employee Number	Fund	Yr. Birth	Sex	Type Emp. Code	LWOP	Date of Grade Mo Da Yr	PCS O/S Date Mo Yr	Station Code	Devel. Complement	Control Number
[illegible] EAST DIVISION																	453A0001000
[illegible] FIELD																	453A0002000
[illegible] - TOKYO STATION																	453A0003000
[illegible]																	[illegible]
CHIEF OF STATION	GS-0136.01	00	1	3002	10												[illegible]
[illegible] WILLIAM V	GS 0136.01	17		3002		D	090735	C	13	M	10		072361		37587		
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	15	1	3003	10												[illegible]
[illegible] ROBERT [illegible]	GS 0136.01	15		3003		D	008947	C	15	M	10		121557		37587		
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	14	1	3005	10												[illegible]
[illegible] RICHARD [illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3005		D	000008	C	25	M	10		111063		37587		
[illegible] FREDERICK	GS 0136.01	13		3005		D	012170	C	26	M	10		090756	0361	37587		
[illegible]	GS-0316.01	09	1	3005	10												[illegible]
[illegible] SARA [illegible]	GS 0316.01	06		3005		D	035277	C	17	F	10		111261		37587		
[illegible] ANNA [illegible]	GS 0316.01	07		3005		D	017885	C	24	F	10		041760		37587		
[illegible]																	[illegible]
[illegible]-GEN	GS-0132.56	09	1	3001	10												[illegible]
JAMES [illegible]	GS 0132.56	09		3001		D	010032	C	[illegible]	M	10		111658		37587		
[illegible]	GS-0305.1907/06		1	3009	10												[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] 0305.19	09		3009		D	054609	C	10	M	10		061256	0561	37587	92	
[illegible]	[illegible] 0305.19	09		3009		D	025692	C	22	M	10		092963	0459	37587	82	
[illegible]	[illegible] 0305.19	07		3009		D	064988	C	32	M	10		092963		37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]-0305.08	07	1	3064	40												[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]-0485.13	06	1	[illegible]	10												[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible].13	06		[illegible]		[illegible]	010847	C	14	M	10		052960		37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]	09		[illegible]	40												[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		D	037531	C	[illegible]	F	10		010101		37587	AF	
[illegible]	[illegible].56	[illegible]		[illegible]		D	039094	C	27	M	[illegible]		010101		37587	AF	

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

14 3/31/64 1129 76

Title and Incumbent Name	Pay Sys	Occup Series	Grade	Auth Incumbency	Position Number	C. A.	SD	Employee Number	Fund	Yr Birth	Sex	Type Emp Code	VOP	Date of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	PCS O/S Date Mo. Yr.	Station Code	Ceiling Complement	Orig	Spec Reference	Control Number
INTELLIGENCE STAFF																				453400016000
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01		14	1	3056		1D													453400017000
HULL WILLIAM P	GS 0136.01		14		3056		D	004717	C	21	M	10		072163	0760	37587				
REPORTS OFFICER	GS-0132.50		13	1	3046		*D													453400018000
HOURLAND WINNIFRED	GS 0132.50		12		3046		D	007109	C	16	F	10		031355		37587				
YOUNG AMELIA BELLE	GS 0132.50		12		3046		D	061209	C	19	F	10		041760		37587				
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01		07	1	3043		1D													453400019000
BREEN ELEANOR K	GS 0318.01		07		3043		D	039031	C	21	F	10		011964		37587				
RESEARCH TRANSLATION SECTION																				453400020000
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01		13	1	3030		1D													453400021000
ICHIKAWA TAKAO	GS 0136.01		13		3030		C	000344	C	14	M	10		113058	1059	37587				
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01		12	1	3055		*D													453400022000
YAMADA SHIZUO	GS 0136.01		12		3055		C	000447	C	11	M	10		061959		37587				
INTERPRETER	GS-1047.01		11	4	3050		*D													453400023000
ISERI KEN M	GS 1047.01		11		3050		D	000425	C	20	M	10		100958	0157	37587				
SUGIMOTO SAM Y	GS 1047.01		11		3050		C	000449	C	16	M	10		122158	0761	37587				
TANAKI PAUL [illegible]	GS 1047.01		10		3050		C	000346	C	17	M	10		102808	0359	37587				
TRANSLATOR	GS-1045.01		09	1	3058		*D													453400024000
CLERK [illegible]	GS-0322.01		05	1	3060		*D													453400025000
[illegible] 9	9																			
EXTERNAL OPERATIONS BRANCH																				453400026000
OFFICER	GS-0136.01		15	1	3074		1D													453400027000
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01		14	3	3075		*D													453400028000
[illegible] WILLIAM H	GS 0136.01		14		3075		D	052902	C	26	M	10		062660	0260	37587				
[illegible] JOHN P	GS 0136.01		14		3075		D	035990	C	20	M	10		070862		37587				
[illegible]LLIN DAVID B	GS 0136.01		14		3075		D	001300	C	26	M	10		070161		37587				
[illegible] ROBERT	GS 0136.01		14		3075		D	060434	C	26	M	10		122263		37587				
[illegible]	[illegible].09		11	1	[illegible]		*D													[illegible]
[illegible] JACK [illegible]	[illegible]		11		[illegible]		D	027900	C	12	M	10		061161		37587				
[illegible]	[illegible].01		13	1	3079		*D													[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		13		3079		D	001915	C	20	M	10		061362		37587				

SECRET

SECRET
WHEN FILLED IN

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 06/30/64 1107 FE

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	Pay Plan	OCCUP SERIES	GRADE	PLAN. INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C.A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp. Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O/S DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE	DEVEL. COMPLEMENT Date in Mo Da Yr	Origin	Special Remarks	P C R CONTROL NUMBER
GREEN GEORGE A	GS	0309.19	09		3092		D	094609	C	18	M	10		081256	0361	37587			82	
CHILLEMI RICHARD L	GS	0136.01	13		[illegible]		D	060008	C	25	M	10		111063		37587				
CONNER JACKIE R	H4	0302.09	05		[illegible]		D	370563	C	36	M	36		010101		37587			AF	
GEORGE OTTO L	GS	0132.02	13		302		C	013124	C	15	M	10		123058		37587				
HENDRICK RONALD K	H4	0302.05	04		301		D	037231	C	40	M	30		010101		37587			AF	
HOBBS JACK C	GS	0855.02	13		4200		R	027900	C	12	M	10		081161		37587				
ICHIKAWA TARAO	GS	0136.01	13		3030		C	000344	C	14	M	10		113058	1059	37587				
ISERI KEN M	GS	1047.01	11		3050		D	000429	C	20	M	10		100558	0157	37587				
LUCK EDWIN L	GS	0309.19	09		3009		D	025602	C	22	M	10		093003	0459	37587			82	
LYONS WALTER H	H4	0302.09	05		3014		D	030294	C	27	M	30		010101		37587			AF	
RANDALL FREDERICK	GS	0136.01	13		3000		D	012370	C	26	M	10		090758	0961	37587				
ROWE JEAN LEROY	GS	0309.19	07		3009		D	004008	C	32	M	10		102963		37587				
SUGIMOTO SAM S	GS	1047.01	11		3056		C	000445	C	16	M	10		122152	0761	37587				
TAKAKI PAUL I	GS	1047.01	10		3056		C	000340	C	17	M	10		102052	0359	37587				
TYLER ROYALL	GS	0136.01	11		4319		D	029619	C	36	M	10		031504	0362	37587				
WAGGONER JOCELYN G	GS	0132.35	06		4320		D	036022	C	39	F	10		031162		37587				
WAGNER BETTY DIANA	GS	0301.20	09		3103		D	023587	C	34	F	10		041562		37587				
WOODS JAMES S	GS	0136.00	09		3061		D	010032	C	36	M	10		111099		37587				
YAMADA SHIZUO	GS	0136.01	12		3059		C	000447	C	11	M	10		061059		37587				

14 10 4 20 2

TOTAL PEAJKO - TOKYO STATION

4518007?000

PLAN. INC.	VOU. CIV.	UV. CIV.	TOTAL VSUV	MIL	GRAND TOTAL	PRA	NON-STRENGTH SO	PERS. LWOP	DO	OTH
84		08	88	4	92	4				

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 03/31/64 1176 F8

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	Schedule	OCCUP SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C. A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr. Birth	SEX	Type Emp. Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo. Da. Yr.	PCS O/S DATE Mo. Yr.	STATION CODE	DEVEL. COMPLEMENT Date In Mo. Da. Yr.		Orgn	Special Reference	P C R CONTROL NUMBER
[illegible] CHESTER H	GS	0136.01	13		3079		D	060791	C	24	M	10		062363	1057	37587					
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	12	5	3089		*D														45340036890
SCOTT DURAND W	GS	0136.01	12		3089		D	057992	C	27	M	10		061062	0559	37587					
LAVANOUX OLIVER D	GS	0136.01	12		3089		D	027207	C	31	M	10		122263	0559	37587					
MAKINO WILLIAM T	GS	0136.01	13		3089		D	053701	C	20	M	10		062363	1259	37587				84	
TILBERRY AUSTIN S	GS	0136.01	12		3089		D	024239	C	31	M	10		012460		37587					
WILL ROBERT J JR	GS	0136.01	12		3089		D	014539	C	27	M	10		102961	0958	37587					
OPS OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	11	6	3096		*D														4534003[illegible]
BOBBY WINTHROP B	GS	0136.01	11		3096		D	063179	C	32	M	10		031763	1059	37587					
ELLIS DONALD F	GS	0136.01	11		3096		D	029624	C	31	M	10		041562		37587					
GRAHAM THOMAS B	GS	0136.01	11		3096		D	031598	C	33	M	10		031564		37587					
[illegible] JERARD MAX	GS	0136.01	11		3096		D	029621	C	33	M	10		042962	0960	37587					
[illegible] POLLY ANNE	GS	0136.01	08		3096		D	019028	C	32	F	10		062462		37587					
[illegible] ALLAN C	GS	0136.01	10		3096		D	032300	C	35	M	10		041463		37587					
[illegible] ASST	GS-	0301.28	07	1	3103		*D														[illegible]
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-	0318.01	07	2	3100		*D														453[illegible]
BROWN QUEEN ESTHER	GS	0318.01	07		3100		D	022470	C	30	F	10		062061		37587					
HANCOCK BETTIE JANE	GS	0318.01	07		3100		D	031039	C	39	F	10		102862	0761	37587					
[illegible] SECRETARY-STENO	GS-	0318.01	05	1	3088		*D														45300034000
[illegible] JUDY M	GS	0318.01	05		3088		D	030122	C	41	F	10		031162		37587					
[illegible] 21 21			21	1																	
[illegible] LIAISON STAFF																					[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-	0136.01	15	1	3031		1D														[illegible]
[illegible] HERBERT [illegible]	GS	0136.01	15		3031		D	011990	C	21	M	10		091562	0154	37587					
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	14	1	3032		*D														[illegible]
[illegible] GLENN [illegible]	GS	0136.01	14		3032		D	057092	C	21	M	10		032457	0958	37587					
[illegible] ALBERT P	GS	0136.01	13		3032		[illegible]	013998	C	25	M	10		012063		37587					
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	13	3	3111		*D														[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0136.01	13		3111		D	064946	C	19	M	10		091362	0857	37587					
[illegible]	GS	0136.01	12		3111		D	063361	C	13	M	10		032358		37587					
[illegible]	GS	0136.01	12		3111		D	024062	C	29	M	10		121063		37587					
	GS-	0136.01	12	4	[illegible]		*D														[illegible]
	GS	0136.01	12		[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]			M	10		[illegible]		37587					
	GS	0136.01	12		[illegible]			[illegible]						[illegible]	[illegible]	37587					
		[illegible]	12		[illegible]			[illegible]						[illegible]		37587					

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

14[illegible]3/31/64 1127

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	Schedule OCCUP SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C. A. SO	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O/S DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE	LEVEL COMPLEMENT	
[illegible]ELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	09	1	3124	*D											453*0041000
GOESLING MATILDA M	GS 0301.28	08		3124	D	013948	C	19	F	10		011060		37587		
[illegible]RETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3033	*D											453*0042000
VAUGHN ROXANNA J	GS 0318.01	04		3033	D	036254	C	41	F	10		040562		37587		
11 11 11				11												
[illegible] BRANCH																453*0046000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	2447	*D											453*0047000
[illegible] JOHN [illegible]	GS 0136.01	14		2447	D	003704	C	15	M	10		072163		37587		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	13	1	2449	*D											[illegible]
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	1	3554	*D											[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3554	D	006227	C	24	M	10		[illegible]		37587		
[illegible]RETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	06	1	4165	*D											[illegible]
[illegible] PATRICIA J	GS 0318.01	06		4165	D	034601	C	42	F	10		122263		37587		
4 1 3				3												
[illegible] BRANCH																453*0051000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	1911	*D											453*0052000
[illegible] RICHARD [illegible]	GS 0136.01	14		1911	D	000406	C	17	M	10		110357		37587		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	13	2	1914	*D											[illegible]
[illegible] ALLAN	GS 0136.01	13		1914	D	005441	C	29	M	10		090758		37587		
[illegible] JOHN	GS 0136.01	14		1914	D	000395	C	25	M	10		110357		37587	92	
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	12	4	2753	*D											453*0054000
[illegible] JAMES [illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		2753	D	057845	C	30	M	10		022259	0859	37587		
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	11		2753	D	037679	C	31	M	10		041463	1061	37587		
[illegible] CHARLES [illegible]	GS 0136.01	11		2753	D	[illegible]	C	35	M	10		031564		37587		
[illegible] FRANK [illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		2753	D	[illegible]	C	17	M	10		040559		37587		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0132.30	12	1	1923	*D											[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0132.30	12		1923	D	004220	C	21	M	10		090956		37587		
[illegible]	GS-0301.[illegible]	07	1	1929	*D											[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0301.[illegible]	06		1929	D	034831	C	39	F	[illegible]		[illegible]		37587		
[illegible]	GS [illegible]	04		[illegible]	D	036609	C	[illegible]	F	[illegible]		[illegible]		37587		

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 03/31/64 1198

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	Sched Code	GROUP SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C. A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr. Birth	SEX	Type Emp Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O/S DATE Mo. Yr.	STATION CODE	DEVEL. COMPLEMENT Date In Mo Da Yr	Orgn	Special Reference	POSITION CONTROL NUMBER
CLERK TYPIST	GS	-0322.01	05	1	1927		*D													45300057000
10		10	10	10	1															
SOVIET BRANCH																				45300057100
[illegible] OFFICER-BR CH	GS	-0136.01	15	1	4316		1D													45300057200
[illegible] GEORGE A	GS	0136.01	14		4316		D	061709	C	21	M	10		010661	0660	37587				
OPS OFFICER	GS	-0136.01	13	4	4317		*D													45300057300
ROSENBAUM LEO	GS	0136.01	13		4317		D	060678	C	23	M	10		100558	0960	37587				
SATO [illegible]	GS	0136.01	13		4317		D	059317	C	20	M	10		082363	0762	37587				
SLOBODIN PETER M	GS	0136.01	13		4317		D	000771	C	20	M	10		102156	0561	37587				
[illegible] GEORGE	GS	0136.01	13		4317		D	030373	C	21	M	10		081955		37587				
OPS OFFICER	GS	-0136.01	12	1	4318		*D													45300057400
[illegible] RUDOLPH W	GS	0136.01	11		4318		D	029992	C	33	M	10		041562		37587				
OPS OFFICER	GS	-0136.01	11	1	4319		*D													45300057500
TYLER ROYALL	GS	0136.01	11		4319		D	029615	C	36	M	10		031564	0362	37587				
INTEL ANALYST	GS	-0132.39	09	1	4320		*D													45300057600
[illegible] JOCELYN O	GS	0132.39	06		4320		D	036022	C	39	F	10		021162		37587				
SECRETARY STENO	GS	-0318.01	07	1	4321		1D													45300057700
[illegible] JOAN S	GS	0318.02	05		4321		D	038389	C	40	F	10		111063		37587				
ROSE VIRGINIA	GS	0318.01	06		4321		D	031626	C	39	F	10		010762		37587				
SECRETARY STENO	GS	-0318.01	06	1	4322		*D													45300057800
[illegible] M	GS	0318.01	06		4322		D	034097	C	28	F	10		010564		37587				
11		11		11																
[illegible] STAFF																				45300058010
[illegible]	GS	-0341.03	15	1	3147		15A													[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0341.03	15		3147		8A	010799	C	20	M	10		012063		37587				
[illegible]	GS	-0318.01	07	1	3149		1D													[illegible]
	GS	-0301.01	13	1	3194		1SP													[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0301.01	13		3194		SP	012319	C	19	M	10		050456	0761	37587				
	GS	0301.01	13		3194		SP	001106	C	21	M	10		040963		37587				

SECRET

SEC[redacted]NT

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

14[redacted]3/31/64 1129

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	Schedule OCCUP SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C. A. SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp. Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo. Da. Yr.	PCS O/S DATE Mo. Yr.	STATION CODE	DEVEL COMPLEMENT	Special Reference	CONTROL NUMBER
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	06	1	3093	*D												45380062000
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14	14	1	3164	13F												45380063000
RANDALL JACK Y	GS 0510.14	13		3164	5F	012708	C	20	M	10		021057		37587			
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14	12	1	3165	*0F												4538006[illegible]
WELLS FRANK A	GS 0510.14	12		3165	5F	050678	C	15	M	10		022457		37587			
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS-0501.05	09	1	3166	*5F												4538006[illegible]
JOHNSON RICHARD W	GS 0501.0[illegible]	09		3166	5F	009347	C	30	M	10		032259		37587			
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS-0501.03	07	2	3167	*0F												4538006[illegible]
BURNS DONALD D	GS 0501.03	06		3167	5F	035092	C	38	M	10		030563		37587			
[illegible]ILCOTT JAMES E JR	GS 0501.03	07		3167	5F	025793	C	31	M	10		091563		37587			
ASSISTANT	GS-0341.02	07	1	3094	*D												4538006[illegible]
[illegible]ORAL WINONA J	GS 0341.02	07		3094	D	014786	C	29	F	10		111261		37587			
[illegible]CZAK THERESA C	GS 0341.02	07		3094	DCA	010817	C	37	F	10		031862		37587			
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-1810.01	13	1	3168	13S												4538[illegible]
[illegible]OOD DRIN W	GS 1810.01	13		3168	3S	050357	[illegible]	18	M	10		102057		37587			
CLERK TYPIST	GS-0322.01	05	1	7699	0D												4538006[illegible]
[illegible] AND UNIV ASST	GS-2040.06	07	1	4649	*SL												45380071000

11 11

PENDING REASSIGNMENT TO CURRENT S/O 45380072000

[illegible] TRAINING [illegible] 45380072100

[illegible] STATION 45380073000

TOTAL CIV	MIL	GRAND TOTAL	DNA	NON-STRENGTH SO	LWOP	PERS. DD	OTH
47	2	49	4				

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

TITLE AND EMPLOYEE NAME	OCCUP. CODE	GRADE	PLAN	Position Number	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	F U N D	Yr. Birth	S E X	Type Emp. Code	DATE OF GRADE	PCS O/S DATE	STATION CODE	Remarks	CONTROL NUMBER
[illegible] DIVISION															56380001000
[illegible] FIELD															56380002000
[illegible] - TOKYO STATION															56380003000
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF															56380004000
CHIEF OF STATION	GS-0136.01	00	1	3002	10										56380005000
[illegible] WILLIAM V	GS 0136.01	17		3002	D	066739	C	13	M	10	072361		37587		
DEP OFFICER-[illegible]	GS-0136.01	15	1	3003	10										56380006000
[illegible] ROBERT P	GS 0136.01	15		3003	D	000947	C	15	M	10	121557		37587		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	3005	10										5638[illegible]
[illegible] RICHARD L	GS 0136.01	14		3005	D	006998	C	29	M	10	090756		37587		
[illegible] FREDERICK	GS 0136.01	13		3005	D	012270	C	26	M	10	090758	0966	37587		
[illegible]-STENO	GS-0318.04	06	1	3009	10										5638[illegible]
[illegible] MARA B	GS 0318.04	06		3009	D	088897	D	17	F	10	111261	1160	37587		
[illegible] ANNA [illegible]	GS 0318.04	07		3009	D	017850	D	24	F	10	041760		37587		
REGISTRY															5638[illegible]0000
[illegible]ANALYST-GEN	GS-0132.[illegible]	09	1	3001	10										56380011000
[illegible] JAMES E	GS 0132.[illegible]	09		3001	D	010032	C	26	M	10	121658		37587		
[illegible]	GS-0305.19	07/06	1	3009	10										56380012000
[illegible]	GS 0305.19	[illegible]		3009	D	054[illegible]	D	19	M	10	062256	0661	37587	80	
[illegible]	GS 0305.19	[illegible]		3009	D	025692	C	22	M	10	093761	0499	37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]	7	1	3004	[illegible]										56380013000
[illegible]	[illegible]	16	1	3015	10										56380014000
[illegible]	[illegible]	15		3015	D	032547	C	14	M	10	052560		37587		
	[illegible]	05	1	3014	[illegible]										5638[illegible]15000
	[illegible]	04		3014	D	037231	C	40	M	30	010101		37587	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	05		3014	D	039894	C	27	M	30	010101		37587	[illegible]	

DocId:32399

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

POSITION TITLE / INCUMBENT NAME	PAY PLAN	SERIES	GRADE	[illegible] AGENCY	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O/S DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE	POSITION CONTROL NUMBER
[illegible] INTELLIGENCE STAFF																	56380016000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0130.01	14	1	3050		SD										56380017000
HULL WILLIAM [illegible]	GS	0130.01	13		3050		D	004727	C	21	M	10		110655	0760	37587	
REPORTS OFFICER	GS-	0132.58	13	1	3046		SD										56380018000
HAUGLAND WINNIFRED	GS	0132.58	12		3046		D	007169	C	16	F	10		031355	0459	37587	
[illegible]KAGA GEORGE K	GS	0132.58	12		3046		D	000411	C	21	M	10		090652	0556	37587	
YOUNG AMELIA BELLE	GS	0132.58	12		3046		D	061209	C	15	F	10		041760		37587	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-	0318.01	07	1	3048		SD										56380019000
[illegible] ELEANOR K	GS	0318.01	06		3048		D	023023	C	21	F	10		072869		37587	
RESEARCH TRANSLATION SECTION																	56380020000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0130.01	13	1	3030		SD										56380021000
ICHIKAWA TAKAO	GS	0130.01	13		3030		DD	000364	C	14	M	10		110658	1059	37587	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0130.01	12	1	3055		SD										56380022000
[illegible]KAI AKIRA	GS	0130.01	10		3055		DD	000305	C	16	M	10		010663	0357	37587	
[illegible] SHIZUO	GS	0130.01	10		3055		DD	000407	C	11	M	10		061959	0304	37587	
INTERPRETER	GS-	1047.01	11	3	3056		SD										56380023000
[illegible]	GS	1047.01	11		3056		D	000420	C	20	M	10		100955	0157	37587	
[illegible]	GS	1047.01	11		3056		DD	000445	C	13	M	10		122158	0761	37587	
[illegible]	GS	1047.01	10		3056		DD	000340	C	17	M	10		102662	0359	37587	
TRANSLATOR	GS-	1045.01	09	1	3058		SD										56380024000
[illegible]	GS-	0322.01	05	1	3060		SD										56380025000
	11	11	11														
[illegible] BRANCH																	56380026000
[illegible]	GS-	0136.01	15	1	3074		SD										56380027000
[illegible]	GS-	0136.01	14	3	3075		SD										56380028000
[illegible]		[illegible]	14		3075		D	037062	C	20	M	10		[illegible]	[illegible]	37587	
[illegible]		[illegible]	14		3075		D	035990	[illegible]	28	M	10		[illegible]	0359	37587	
[illegible]			13		[illegible]												[illegible]
[illegible]								[illegible]		12	M	10		[illegible]		37587	
[illegible]																	[illegible]
[illegible]								[illegible]		24	M	10		[illegible]		37587	

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

Title and Incumbent's Name	Series	Grade	Position Number	C. A.	SD	Employee Number	U N O	Yr. Birth	Sex	Type Emp. Code	Date of Grade	PCS GS Date	Station Code		C & E Number
[illegible] DIRECTOR [illegible]	GS 0136.01	13	5079		D	050791	C	24	M	10	062363	1257	37567		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS*0136.03	12	6 3087	40											56360030000
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	13	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10	102961	0559	37567		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	13	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	26	M	10	062363	1255	37567		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	12	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	26	M	10	090257		37567		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	13	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	31	M	10	012460		37567		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	13	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	27	M	10	102961	0958	37567		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS*0136.01	11	5 3096	40											56360031000
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	12	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	27	M	10	081062	0959	37567	60	
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	11	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	32	M	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	37567		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	11	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10	[illegible]		37567		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	10	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10	[illegible]		37567		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	11	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	31	M	10	[illegible]		37567		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	11	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10	[illegible]	0960	37567		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	11	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10	[illegible]		37567		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	10	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10	[illegible]		37567		
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	11	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	31	M	10	[illegible]	0558	37567		
[illegible]	[illegible]	07	[illegible]	40											56360032000
[illegible]	GS*0318.[illegible]	07	[illegible]	40											56360033000
[illegible]	GS 0318.[illegible]	06	[illegible]		D	036235	C	30	F	10	111062		37567		
[illegible]	GS 0318.[illegible]	07	[illegible]		D	023870	C	38	F	10	[illegible]	0560	37567		
[illegible]	GS*0318.[illegible]	05	1 3085	40											56360034000
[illegible]	GS 0318.[illegible]	05	3312		D	036122	C	41	F	10	051362		37567		
[illegible]	33	30													
[illegible]															56360035000
[illegible]	GS*0136.02	15	1 3082	40											56360036000
[illegible]	GS 0136.02	15	[illegible]		D	011093	C	21	M	10	091562	0154	37567		
[illegible]	GS*0136.02	14	1 3089	40											56360037000
[illegible]	[illegible]	14	[illegible]		D	057882	C	21	M	10	[illegible]	0956	37567		
	[illegible]	13	[illegible]	40											56360038000
	[illegible]	13	[illegible]		D	044544	C	17	M	10	[illegible]	0557	37567		
	[illegible]	13	[illegible]		D	003301	C	13	M	10	[illegible]		37567		
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		D	014862	C	22	M	10	[illegible]		37567		
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	40											[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		D	003613	C	18	M	10	[illegible]		37567		
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	18	F	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	37567		

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	OCCUP SERIES	GRADE	AUTH INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C. A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Serv	SEX	Type Emp Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O/S DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE	LEVEL COMPLEMENT		POSITION CONTROL NUMBER
TAGAWI KAN	GS 0136.01	12		3113		D	081868	C	10	M	10		040161		37587			
...ELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	09	1	3124		*D												56380041000
...RETTS	GS 0301.28	08		3124		D	000370	C	19	F	10		041760	0658	37587			
...ECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3833		*D												56380042000
...ALOHN ROXANNA J	GS 0318.01	04		3833		D	036254	C	41	F	10		040862		37587			
11 10 10	10																	
KOREA BRANCH																		56380046000
...S OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14		3447		1D												56380047000
...RRAY JOHN L	GS 0136.01	13		3447		D	063704	C	15	M	10		090756		37587			
...S OFFICER	GS-0136.01	13	1	344[illegible]		*D												56380048000
...S OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	1	3354		D												56380049000
...L L J	GS 0136.01	10		3354			060207	C	24	M	10		[illegible]		37587			
...-TYPING	GS-0318.01	06	1	4145		*D												56380050000
4 2	1																	
... BRANCH																		56380051000
...OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	1911		1D												56380052000
...RICHARD J	GS 0136.01	14		1911		D	060406	C	17	M	10		110357		37587			
...OFFICER	GS-0136.01	13	2	1914		*D												56380053000
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		1914		D	056135	C	25	M	10		090759	1259	37587			
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		1914		D	060395	C	25	M	10		110357		37587		80	
	GS-0136.01	12	4	2753		*D												56380054000
	GS 0136.01	12		2753		D	057945	C	30	M	10		022259	0859	37587			
	GS 0136.01	12		2753		D	061357	C	27	M	10		061062	0959	37587			
	GS 0136.01	11		2753		D	027075	C	31	M	10		041463	1061	37587			
	GS 0136.01	12		2753		D	064002	C	17	M	10		040559		37587			
	GS-0132.38	[illegible]	1	1923		*D												56380055000
	GS 0132.38	[illegible]		1923		D	004220	C	21	M	10		090956		37587			
	GS-0318.24	07	1	1925		*D												56380056000
	[illegible]	05		1925		D	036605	C	40	F	10		[illegible]		37587			
	[illegible]			1925			005431	C	34	F	10		[illegible]		37587			

SECRET

DocId:323

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	Pay Plan & Series	GRADE	MAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C. A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	Sex	Type Emp Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O/S DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE	CIVIL COMPLEMENT Date In Mo Da Yr	Orgn	Reference	CONTROL NUMBER
[illegible] TYPIST	GS*0322.01	05	1	1027		*D													56380057000
1? 26 1?		10	1																
SUPPORT STAFF																			56380058000
[illegible]	GS*0341.05	15	1	3147		18A													56380059000
[illegible]	GS 0341.05	15		3147		SA	010795	C	20	M	10		012963		37587				
[illegible]	GS*0318.01	07	1	3149		1D													56380060000
[illegible]EL OFFICER	GS*0201.02	13	1	3154		18P													56380061000
[illegible] EDWARD [illegible]	GS 0201.01	12		3154		SP	011316	C	19	M	10		050498	0761	37587				
[illegible]	GS*0318.01	06	1	3693		*D													56380062000
OFFICER	GS*0510.14	14	1	3164		18F													56380063000
[illegible] CLARENCE [illegible]	GS 0510.14	14		3164		SF	012909	C	20	M	10		012961	0659	37587				
[illegible] OFFICER	GS*0510.14	12	1	3165		*SF													56380064000
[illegible] FRANK [illegible]	GS 0510.14	12		3165		SF	036670	C	15	M	10		022457	0661	37587				
[illegible] ASST	GS*0501.05	09	1	3166		*SF													56380065000
[illegible] WILLIS [illegible]	GS 0501.05	10		3166		SF	017675	C	24	M	10		070862		37587			90	
[illegible] RICHARD [illegible]	GS 0501.03	09		3166		SF	009347	C	30	M	10		032358	0659	37587				
[illegible] ACCT ASST	GS*0501.05	07	2	3167		*SF													56380066000
[illegible] WILLIAM [illegible]	GS 0501.05	07		3167		SF	025174	C	30	M	10		021961	1059	37587				
[illegible]	GS 0501.03	06		3167		SF	025798	C	31	M	10		111261		37587				
[illegible]	GS*0341.02	[illegible]	1	3694		*D													56380067000
[illegible]	GS 0341.02	[illegible]		3694		SCA	016317	C	37	F	10		031862		37587				
	GS*[illegible].01	13	1	3168		18S													56380068000
[illegible]	GS [illegible].01	13		3168		SS	[illegible]	C	28	M	10		102657		37587				
	[illegible].05	09	1	3695		*D													56380069000
	[illegible].04	[illegible]	1	[illegible]		*DL													56380071000
	[illegible]																		[illegible]

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible]	GRADE	[illegible]	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	[illegible]	DATE OF GRADE	PCS O/S DATE	STATION CODE	[illegible]	CONTRACT NUMBER
					Mo Da Yr	Mo Yr		Mo Da Yr	
[illegible]									[illegible]
[illegible] STATION									[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]						
[illegible] TOTAL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]						

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

14A 03/31/[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	GRADE		[illegible]		EMPLOYEE NUMBER		Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp Code	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O-S DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE		POSITION NUMBER
[illegible] EAST DIVISIO[illegible]															56380001000
[illegible] FIELD															56380002000
FE/JAC - TOKYO STATION															56380003000
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF															56380004000
CHIEF OF STATION	GS-0136.01	00	1	3002	1D										56380005000
[illegible] WILLIAM V	GS 0136.01	17		3002	D	056738	C	13	M	10	072361		37587		
OPS OFFICER-DCOS	GS-0136.01	15	1	3003	1D										56380006000
[illegible] ROBERT P	GS 0136.01	15		3003	D	060947	C	15	M	10	121557		37587		
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	3005	1D										56380007000
[illegible] RICHARD [illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3005	D	000908	C	25	M	10	090758		37587		
[illegible] FREDERICK	GS 0136.01	13		3005	D	012178	C	26	M	10	090758	0961	37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.03	09	1	3008	1D										56380009000
[illegible] SARA E	GS 0318.03	08		3008	D	0[illegible]297	C	17	F	10	112261	1160	37587		
[illegible] ANNA A	GS 0318.05	07		3008	D	017885	C	24	F	10	041760		37587		
REGISTRY															56380010000
[illegible] ANALYST-OPS	GS-0132.36	09	1	3061	1D										56380011000
[illegible] JAMES S	GS 0132.36	09		3061	D	010032	C	28	M	10	111658		37587		
[illegible] SUP	GS-0305.17D7/06		1	3009	1D										56380012000
[illegible]	GS 0305.17	09		3009	3	054539	C	18	M	10	[illegible]1256	0961	37587	80	
[illegible]	GS 0305.17	08		3009	D	025692	C	22	M	10	091751	0459	37587		
[illegible]	GS-0301.28	07	1	3064	4D										56380013000
[illegible]	[illegible]305.17	06	1	3010	1D										56380014000
[illegible]	[illegible]305.17	04		3010	D	010847	C	14	M	10	052960		37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]2.03	09	1	3014	4D										56380015000
[illegible]	[illegible]02.03	08		3014	D	037232	C	40	M	30	010101		37587	AF	
[illegible]	[illegible].03	09		3014	D	038294	F	27	M	30	010101		37587	AF	
		12	1												

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

1 03/31/63 1110 FB

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	SCHED. OCCUP. SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C. A.	SO	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr. Birth	SEX	Type Emp. Code	WOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo. Da. Yr.	PCS O/S DATE Mo. Yr.	STATION CODE	P. C. # CONTROL NUMBER
INTELLIGENCE STAFF																56380016000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.03	14	1	3050		1D										56380017000
[illegible]ELL WILLIAM P	GS 0136.01	13		3050		D	004717	C	21	M	10		110655	0760	37587	
REPORTS OFFICER	GS-0132.58	15	1	3040		1D										56380018000
[illegible] GEORGE K	GS 0132.58	12		3040		D	000411	C	21	M	10		060552	0954	37587	
YOUNG AMELIA BELLE	GS 0132.58	12		3040		D	061200	C	19	F	10		041760		37587	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3049		1D										56380019000
[illegible] ELEANOR K	GS 0318.01	06		3049		D	033921	C	21	F	10		072262		37587	
RESEARCH TRANSLATION SECTION																56380020000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.03	13	1	3030		1D										56380021000
[illegible] TARAO	GS 0136.01	13		3030		OD	000344	C	14	M	10		110858	1059	37587	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	1	3055		4D										56380022000
[illegible] AKIRA	GS 0136.01	11		3055		OD	000305	C	16	M	10		010063	0357	37587	
[illegible] SHIZUO	GS 0136.01	12		3055		OD	000447	C	11	M	10		021059	0354	37587	
TRANSLATOR	GS-0033.01	11	3	3056		4D										56380023000
[illegible] KEN K	GS 0033.01	11		3056		D	000425	C	20	M	10		100558	0157	37587	
[illegible]	GS 0033.01	11		3056		OD	000445	C	16	M	10		102152	0761	37587	
[illegible] PAUL	GS 0033.01	10		3056		OD	000340	C	17	M	10		102362	0359	37587	
[illegible]	GS-0033.01	09	1	3058		4D										56380024000
[illegible]	GS-0320.01	09	1	3060		4D										56380025000
[illegible] 17		18														
[illegible]																56380026000
[illegible]	[illegible]	15	1	3074		D										56380027000
[illegible]	[illegible]	14	3	3075		4D										56380028000
[illegible]	[illegible]	14		[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	36	M	10		[illegible]0482	0260	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	4		[illegible]		D	[illegible]	C	36	M	10		0[illegible]062	0350	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]		1	3081		4D										56380029000
[illegible]	[illegible]	4		3080		1S	0[illegible]		[illegible]	M	10		[illegible]0141		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]		4D										563[illegible]0000
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]		D	000791	C	34	M	10		[illegible]0157	1057	37587	

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

03/31/63 1119 FE

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	Type of GS	OCCUP SERIES	GRADE	MAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C A SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr. Birth	SEX	Type Emp. Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo. Da. Yr.	PCS O/S DATE Mo. Yr.	STATION CODE	Special Reference	P C # CONTROL NUMBER
[illegible]	GS	0136.01	12		3113	D	021888	C	18	M	10		040161		37587		
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-	0301.20	09	1	3124	4D											56380041000
YUKASA BETTE [illegible]	GS	0301.20	09		3124	0D	000370	C	19	F	10		041760	0698	37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-	0318.04	07	1	7033	4D											56380042000
[illegible]																	56380046000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	14	1	2447	4D											56380047000
[illegible] JOHN L	GS	0136.01	15		2447	D	062754	C	15	M	10		060760		37587		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	13	1	2448	4D											56380048000
[illegible]	GS-	0136.01	12	1	2336	4D											56380049000
[illegible]	GS	0136.01	12		2336	D	060287	C	24	M	10		040959		37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-	0318.04	06	1	4163	4D											56380050000
[illegible]																	56380051000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	14	1	1911	4D											56380052000
[illegible]	GS	0136.01	14		1911	D	000000	C	17	M	10		110307		37587		
[illegible]	GS-	0136.01	13	2	1914	4D											56380053000
[illegible]		0136.01	13		1914	D	052139	C	25	M	10		090760	1259	37587		
[illegible]		0136.01	14		1914	D	065705	C	28	M	10		120357		37587	8D	
[illegible]	GS-	0136.01	12	4	2753	4D											56380054000
[illegible]		0136.01	12		2753	D	057045	C	30	M	10		022459	0859	37587		
[illegible]		0136.01	12		2753	D	053228	C	27	M	10		061062	0559	37587		
[illegible]		0136.01	12		2753	D	087078	C	31	M	10		111261	1061	37587		
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]		2753	D	084008	C	17	M	10		040460		37587		
[illegible]					[illegible]	4D											56380055000
[illegible]					[illegible]	4D											[illegible]
[illegible]					[illegible]	D	[illegible]	C	34	F	10		[illegible]		37587		
[illegible]					[illegible]	[illegible]											[illegible]

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	OCCUP. SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUM-BENCY	Position Number	C. A. SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr. Birth	SEX	Type Emp. Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo. Da. Yr.	PCS O/S DATE Mo. Yr.	STATION CODE	DEVEL. COMMITMENT	POSITION CONTROL NUMBER
SUPPORT STAFF																56380058000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0301.08	15	1	3147	15A											56380059000
TRABUE DOUGLAS S	GS 0301.08	15		3147	SA	010799	C	28	M	10		012063		37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3149	SD											56380060000
PERSONNEL OFFICER	GS-0201.01	13	1	3154	15P											56380061000
SHELLEY EDWARD K	GS 0201.01	12		3154	SP	011318	C	19	M	10		052458	0761	37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	06	1	3383	SD											56380062000
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14	14	1	3164	15P											56380063000
[illegible] CLARENCE F	GS 0510.14	14		3164	SP	012039	C	23	M	10		012261	0460	37587		
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14	12	1	3165	-SP											56380064000
WOLLE FRANK W	GS 0510.14	12		3165	SP	030578	C	15	M	10		022457	0661	37587		
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS-0501.03	09	1	3166	-SP											56380065000
DURHAM WILLIS F	GS 0501.03	10		3166	SP	017075	C	24	M	10		070662		37587	80	
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS-0501.03	07	2	3167	-SP											56380066000
DOHERTY WILLIAM E	GS 0501.03	07		3167	SP	055174	C	30	M	10		021961	1059	37587		
WILCOTT JAMES [illegible] JR	GS 0501.03	06		3167	SP	023793	C	31	M	10		111261		37587		
[illegible] ASSISTANT	GS-0301.02	07	1	3594	-D											56380067000
SECURITY OFFICER	GS-1810.01	13	1	3183	1SS											56380068000
[illegible]	GS 1810.01	13		3183	SS	050137	C	18	M	10		100857		37587		
[illegible]	GS-0322.01	05	1	3849	-D											56380069000
[illegible]	[illegible]	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	-SL											56380071000
[illegible] SUPPORT S/M																56380072000
				3030		[illegible]	C	[illegible]	[illegible]	10		082061	0560	37587		56380072100

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible] 1 [illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	DATE OF GRADE Mo. Day Yr.	POS'N DATE Mo. Yr.	STATION CODE	[illegible]	Remarks	CONTROL NUMBER
TOTAL HEADQUARTERS STATION															[illegible]
[illegible]						[illegible]									

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

14 12/31/62

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number		EMPLOYEE NUMBER					DATE OF GRADE	POSITION DATE	STATION CODE		
FAR EAST DIVISION															56380001000
[illegible] FIELD															56380002000
[illegible] - TOKYO STATION															56380003000
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF															56380004000
CHIEF OF STATION	GS-0136.01	00	1	3002	10										56380005000
DROE WILLIAM V	GS 0136.01	17		3002	D	056735	C	13	M	10	072361		37587		
OPS OFFICER-DCOS	GS-0136.01	15	1	3003	10										56380006000
WHEELER ROBERT P	GS 0136.01	15		3003	D	060947	C	15	M	10	121557		37587		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	3085	10										56380007000
[illegible] RICHARD L	GS 0136.01	12		3085	D	060965	C	22	M	10	090756		37587		
[illegible] FREDERICK	GS 0136.01	13		3085	D	[illegible]	C	26	M	10	090758	0961	37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	09	1	3069	10										56380008000
[illegible] ANNA	GS 0318.01	07		3069	D	017869	C	24	F	10	041760		37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3073	10										56380009000
[illegible]	GS 0318.01	07		3073	D	022475	C	30	F	10	062061	0560	37587		
REGISTRY															56380010000
[illegible]	GS-0132.36	09	1	3061	10										56380011000
[illegible]	GS 0132.36	09		3061	D	010032	C	28	M	10	111656		37587		
[illegible] FILE SUP	[illegible]305.17	07/08	1	3009	10										56380012000
[illegible]	[illegible]305.17	09		3009	D	[illegible]	C	16	M	10	081256	0661	37587	80	
[illegible]	[illegible]305.17	08		3009	D	025602	C	22	M	10	091761	0459	37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]301.26	07	1	3064	40										56380013000
[illegible]	[illegible].17	06	1	[illegible]	[illegible]										56380014000
[illegible]	[illegible]	06		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]847					052960		37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]	09	1	[illegible]	40										5638[illegible]015000
[illegible]	[illegible]	14		[illegible]	D	037231	C	[illegible]	M	30	010101		37587	AF	
[illegible]	[illegible]	09		[illegible]	D	038294	C	27	M	30	010101		37587	AF	

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

12/31/62

[illegible] STAFF														56350016000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	3056	1D									56350017000
[illegible] WILLIAM [illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3056	D	004717	C	21	M	10	110635	0760	37587	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0132.56	12	1	3046	*D									56350018000
[illegible] GEORGE M	GS 0132.56	12		3046	QD	000411	C	21	M	10	060652	0558	37587	
[illegible] AMELIA [illegible]	GS 0132.59	12		3046	D	061250	C	19	F	10	041760		37587	
[illegible]-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3046	1D									56350019000
[illegible] ELEANOR [illegible]	GS 0318.01	06		3046	D	035021	C	21	F	10	072062		37587	
[illegible] TRANSLATION SECTION														56350020000
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	13	1	3050	1D									56350021000
[illegible] TARAC	GS 0136.01	13		3050	QD	000344	C	14	M	10	113058	1050	37587	
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	12	1	3050	*D									56350022000
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3050	QD	[illegible]	C	16	M	10	081752	0387	37587	
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3050	QD	050447	C	21	M	10	101055	0354	37587	
[illegible]	GS-0033.03	11	4	3050	*D									56350023000
[illegible]	GS 0033.01	11		3050		002419	C	20	M	10	100758	0137	37587	
[illegible]	GS 0033.01	11		3050	QD	026449	C	16	M	10	102152	0705	37587	
[illegible]	GS 0033.01	11		3050	QD	[illegible]		17	M	10	102562	0359	37587	
[illegible]	GS-0031.01	09	2	3050	*D									56350024000
[illegible]	GS-0371.01	09	1	3050	*D									56350025000
[illegible]														56350026000
[illegible]		09		3174										56350027000
[illegible]														56350028000
[illegible]						[illegible]					02060	0260	37587	
[illegible]						[illegible]					10642	0352	37587	
[illegible]														[illegible]
[illegible]						[illegible]					041561		37587	
[illegible]														[illegible]
[illegible]						102651		20			100198	0490	37587	
[illegible]						161791	C	24			81557	1057	37587	

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

12/31/62

					Position Number			NUMBER							STATION CODE		NUMBER
[illegible] RAYMOND F	GS	0136.01	13		3079		D	063235	C	25	M	10	062462	0759	37587		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	12	10	3089		*D										56380030000
[illegible]HURST GORDON R	GS	0136.01	12		3089		D	063268	C	30	M	10	022160		37587		
KOYAMA SPADY AYATO	M1	0136.01	04		3089		D	030048	C	17	M	30	010101		37587	AR	
[illegible]VANCOUX OLIVER [illegible]	GS	0136.01	11		3089		D	033649	C	31	M	10	102961	0559	37587		
[illegible]KING WILLIAM T	GS	0136.01	12		3089		D	063761	C	26	M	10	090956	1255	37587		
SMITH HAROLD P	GS	0136.01	12		3089		D	058279	C	26	M	10	090857		37587		
[illegible]LBERRY AUSTIN S	GS	0136.01	12		3089		D	062429	C	31	M	10	012460		37587		
[illegible]LL ROBERT L JR	GS	0136.01	12		3089		D	014539	C	27	M	10	102961	0958	37587		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-	0136.01	11	8	3096		*D										56380031000
[illegible]OTT DURAND R	GS	0136.01	12		3096		D	063228	C	27	M	10	061062	0559	37587	RQ	
[illegible]BERY WINTHROP [illegible]	GS	0136.01	10		3096		D	063179	C	32	M	10	091761	1059	37587		
[illegible]ENNER GEORGE W	GS	0136.01	11		3096		D	029585	C	33	M	10	042962		37587		
[illegible] THOMAS B	GS	0136.01	10		3096		D	031598	C	33	M	10	090262		37587		
[illegible]DERWOOD MARK W	GS	0136.01	11		3096		D	033243	C	31	M	10	041562		37587		
[illegible]DEN JERARD MAX	GS	0136.01	11		3096		D	029621	C	33	M	10	042962	0960	37587		
[illegible]COMB RUDOLPH [illegible]	GS	0136.01	11		3096		D	033039	C	33	M	10	041562		37587		
[illegible]LLIS ALLAN [illegible]	GS	0136.01	09		3096		D	032308	C	33	M	10	112661		37587		
[illegible]LAN HUGH [illegible]	GS	0136.01	11		3096		D	026776	C	31	M	10	042962	0359	37587		
[illegible]	GS-	[illegible]	07	2	[illegible]		*D										56380032000
SECRETARY(STENO)	GS-	0318.01	07	2	3106		*D										56380033000
[illegible] MARGARET [illegible]	GS	0318.01	07		3106		D	015942	C	25	F	10	060257	1058	37587		
[illegible]	GS-	0318.01	05	2	3688		*D										56380034000
[illegible]	GS	0318.01	05		3688		D	036122	C	41	F	10	031162		37587		
	13	19	1	24	1												
[illegible]																	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3631		*D										[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3631		D	[illegible]	C	21	M	10	[illegible]	0154	37587		
					3632		*D										[illegible]
			[illegible]		3632		D	[illegible]	C	26	M	10	[illegible]	0958	37587		
					3111		*D										[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3111		D	065546	C	19	M	10	[illegible]	0457	37587		
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3111		D	063381	C	21	M	10	[illegible]		37587		
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3111		D	014862	C	20	M	10	[illegible]		37587		
			[illegible]		[illegible]		*D										[illegible]
			[illegible]		[illegible]		D	003613	[illegible]						[illegible]		

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 12/31/62 1315 FE

	Occup Series	GRADE		Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER		Yr Born		Type Emp Code	DATE OF GRADE		STATION CODE	
[illegible]AMURA GEORGE	GS 0136.01	12		3113	3	080327	C	17	M	10	123056	0552	37587		
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3113	3	021808	C	18	M	10	040161		37587		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	11	1	3118	*0									56380040000	
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	09	1	3124	*0									563[illegible]041000	
[illegible] BETTY N	GS 0301.28	08		3124	08	000379	C	19	F	10	041760	0658	37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3433	*0									56380042000	
[illegible] BRANCH														56380043000	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	3126	10									56380044000	
[illegible] ASST	[illegible].28	07	1	4444	*0									5638[illegible]045000	
[illegible] BRANCH														56380046000	
[illegible]ICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	2447	10									563[illegible]047000	
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		2447	3	083794	C	15	M	10	090758		37587		
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	13	1	2446	*0									563[illegible]048000	
[illegible]	[illegible]	12	1	3394	*0									563[illegible]049000	
[illegible]	[illegible]	12		3394	3	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10	[illegible]59		37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]	16	1	4168	*0									563[illegible]050000	
[illegible]														56[illegible]	
[illegible]														56[illegible]	
[illegible]													37587		

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

14 12/31/62 [illegible]

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	TITLE SERIES	GRADE	NUM	POSITION NUMBER		EMPLOYEE NUMBER		BIRTH	SEX	VET	DATE OF GRADE	PCS DATE	STATION CODE		CONTROL NUMBER
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	4	2753	*D										56380054000
[illegible]LANEY JAMES E	GS 0136.01	12		2753	D	037845	C	30	M	10	022259	0859	37587		
[illegible] ROGER G	GS 0136.01	12		2753	D	063215	C	27	M	10	061062	0559	37587		
[illegible] KENT [illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		2753	D	027073	C	31	M	10	111261	1061	37587		
[illegible] FRANK K	GS 0136.51	12		2753	D	084002	C	17	M	10	040959		37587		
REPORTS OFFICER	GS-0132.58	12	1	1923	*D										56380055000
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	07	1	1928	*D										56380056000
[illegible] BETTY LOU	GS 0301.28	07		1925	D	008431	C	34	F	10	051362		37587		
CLERK TYPIST	GS-0322.01	05	1	1927	*D										56380057000
10 4 6		5	1												
SUPPORT STAFF															56380058000
ADM OFFICER	GS-0301.03	15	1	3147	1SA										56380059000
[illegible]	GS 0301.03	14		3147	SA	010755	C	20	M	10	051053		37587		
[illegible]GRAPHER	GS-0318.01	07	1	3144	1D										56380060000
PERSONNEL OFFICER	GS-0201.01	13	1	3154	1SP										56380061000
[illegible] STUART [illegible]	GS 0201.01	12		3154	SP	011328	C	17	M	10	050458	0761	37587		
[illegible]	GS-[illegible]	06	1	3693	*D										56380062000
[illegible]	GS-0510.24	14	1	3166	1SF										56380063000
[illegible]	GS 0510.24	14		3166	SF	012939	C	23	M	10	012261	0659	37587		
[illegible]	GS-0510.28	12	1	3168	*SF										56380064000
[illegible]	GS 0510.24	12		3168	SF	[illegible]	[illegible]	19	M	10	022457	0661	37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]	10	1	3166	*SF										56380065000
[illegible]	[illegible]			3166	SF	[illegible]	C	24	M	10	070862		37587	80	
[illegible]	[illegible]			3167	*SF										56380066000
[illegible]	[illegible]			3167	SF	025174	C	30	[illegible]	[illegible]	021961	1059	37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]			3167	SF	025944	C	31	[illegible]	[illegible]	111261		37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	*D										563[illegible]067000
[illegible]	[illegible]			3183	1SS										563[illegible]068000
[illegible]	[illegible]			3183	SS	056137	C	19	M	10	122057		37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]			1888	*D										[illegible]069000

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 12/31/62

```
                        SERV  OCCUP     GRADE PLAN    POSITION C A    EMPLOYEE F  YR.  S TYPE W DATE OF    PCS O/S STATION          CONTROL
                         GS   SERIES          INCUM   NUMBER          NUMBER   U  BORN E EMP  O GRADE      DATE    CODE             NUMBER
                                              BENEF                            N       X CODE P MO DY YR   MO YR
                                                                               D

[illegible] PROPERTY OF  GS-1170.01   12       1       3995    15L                                                                  56380070000

[illegible] AND SPLY ASST GS-2040.00  09       1       4049    48L                                                                  56380071000

            8        8                8        1


   PENDING REASSIGNMENT TO CURRENT S/O                                                                                              56380072000

PENDING REASSIGNMENT                                                                                                                56380072100
  [illegible]RENCE P     GS 0301.02   06               3006    D      029206   C  38   F 10     102961          37567
  [illegible] ANNETTA    GS 0301.02   08               3006    D      095800   C  18   F 10     100260     759  37567        55

            2        2                2        1

[illegible] STATION                                                                                                                 56380073000

PLAN. NON. UN. TOTAL  MIL  GRAND  PRE  NON-STRENGTH PERS.
      CIV. CIV. VOUV       TOTAL            OS  LWOP ED.OTH
            72    72    3    75     5
```

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

1-6 [illegible]

POSITION TITLE AND EMPLOYEE NAME	SERIES	GRADE	PLAN	Position Number	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type	DATE OF GRADE	PCS DATE	STATION CODE		ORG CODE
[illegible] DIVISION															56380001000
[illegible] FIELD															56380002000
[illegible] - TOKYO STATION															56380003000
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF															56380004000
CHIEF OF STATION	GS-0136.01	00	1	3002	10										[illegible]
[illegible] WILLIAM [illegible]	GS 0136.01	17		3002	D	[illegible]36759	C	13	M	10	072361		37587		
DEP OFFICER-OCOS	GS-0136.01	15	1	3003	1D										[illegible]
[illegible] ROBERT [illegible]	GS 0136.01	15		3003	D	060047	C	15	M	10	121557		375 7		
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	3885	1[illegible]										[illegible]
[illegible] RICHARD L	GS 0136.01	12		3885	D	[illegible]60936	C	25	M	10	090758		37587		
[illegible]DALL FREDERICK	GS 0136.01	13		3885	D	[illegible]12175	C	26	M	10	090758	0961	37587		
[illegible] STENO	GS-0318.01	9	1	3005	10										[illegible]
[illegible]ER ANNA A	GS 0318.01	07		3005	D	017865	C	24	F	10	041760		37587		
[illegible] STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3073	1D										[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0318.01	06		3073	D	031626	C	39	F	10	010762	0760	37587		
[illegible]															[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-0132.36	09	1	3061	10										[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0132.36	09		3061	D	010042	C	28	M	1	111658		37587		
[illegible] SUP	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	3009	1D										[illegible]
[illegible] GEORGE A	[illegible].17	07		3009	D	054609	C	18	M	10	081256	0861	37587		
[illegible] L	[illegible].17	08		3009	D	025692	C	22	M	10	091761	459	37587		
[illegible]	GS-0301.28	07	1	[illegible]	40										[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-0105.17	06	1	[illegible]											[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible].17	06		[illegible]		010847	[illegible]	14	[illegible]	10	[illegible]		37587		
[illegible]	[illegible]	05	[illegible]	[illegible]											[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	03		[illegible]		[illegible]7231	C	40	M	30	010161		37587	AS	

SECRET
WHEN FILLED IN

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 09/30/64 1162

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	[illegible]	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C. A. SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp Code	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O S DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE	[illegible]
INTELLIGENCE STAFF														56380016000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	3856	1D									56380017000
HULL WILLIAM P	GS 0136.01	13		3856	D	004717	C	21	M	10	110655	0760	37587	
REPORTS OFFICER	GS-0132.58	13	1	3046	*D									56380018000
[illegible]SA GEORGE M	GS 0132.58	12		3046	OD	000411	C	21	M	10	060852	0558	37587	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3045	1D									56380019000
GREEN ELEANOR K	GS 0318.01	06		3045	D	033921	C	21	F	10	072262		37587	
RESEARCH TRANSLATION SECTION														56380020000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	13	1	3830	1D									56380021000
ICHIKAWA TARAO	GS 0136.01	13		3830	OD	000344	C	14	M	10	113058	1059	37587	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	1	3055	*D									56380022000
SAKAI AKIRA	GS 0136.01	09		3055	OD	000365	C	16	M	10	021752	0357	37587	
YAMADA SHIZUO	GS 0136.01	12		3055	OD	000447	C	11	M	10	061955	0354	37587	
INTERPRETER	GS-0033.01	11	4	3056	*D									56380023000
ISEKI KEN M	GS 0033.01	11		3056	D	00042[illegible]	C	20	M	10	100558	0157	37587	
SUGIMOTO SAM S	GS 0033.01	11		3056	OD	000445	C	16	M	10	122152	0761	37587	
TAKAKI PAUL I	GS 0033.01	09		3056	OD	060340	C	17	M	10	100955	0359	37587	
TRANSLATOR	GS-0031.01	09	2	3058	*D									56380024000
CLERK-TYPIST	GS-0322.01	05	1	3060	*D									56380025000
[illegible] OPERATIONS BRANCH														56380026000
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	15	1	3074	1D									56380027000
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	14	[illegible]	3075	*D									56380028000
[illegible] WILLIAM [illegible]	GS 0136.01	14		3075	D	057562	C	26	M	10	062660	0260	37587	
[illegible] JOHN P	GS 0136.01	14		3075	D	085996	C	28	M	10	070862	0352	37587	
[illegible] ROBERT JR	GS 0136.01	13		3075	D	009100	C	24	M	10	111261		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	13	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]									[illegible]
	GS-0136.01	13	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]									[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3075	D	[illegible]62651	C	26	M	10	090753	0859	37587	
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3075	D	[illegible]19492	C	22	M	10	110357	0859	37587	
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3075	[illegible]	[illegible]27589	C	12	M	10	061161		37587	

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

Position Title and Incumbent Name	Series	Grade	Plan Incum	Position Number	SD	Employee Number	Fund	Birth	Sex	Type Emp Code	Date of Grade Mo Da Yr	PCS O S Date Mo Yr	Station Code	Control Number
NAKAMURA GEORGE	GS 0136.01	12		3113	D	060327	C	19	M	10	123056	0552	37587	
[illegible] KAN	GS 0136.01	12		3113	D	021888	C	18	M	10	040161		37587	
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	11	1	3116	*D									56380040000
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	09	1	3124	*D									56380041000
[illegible]SA BETTE N	GS 0301.28	08		3124	OD	000370	C	19	F	10	041760	0658	37587	
[illegible]-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3833	*D									56380042000
[illegible] BRANCH														56380043000
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	[illegible]	1D									56380044000
[illegible]DS CHARLES A	GS 0136.01	13		3126	D	055501	C	22	M	10	090758	1256	37567	
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	07	1	4084	*D									56380045[illegible]00
[illegible] BRANCH														56380046[illegible]00
OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	2447	1D									56380047000
[illegible] JOHN L	GS 0136.01	13		2447	D	063704	C	15	M	10	090758		37587	
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	13	1	2448	*D									56380048000
[illegible]	[illegible]	12	1	3354	*D									56380049000
[illegible]	[illegible]	12		3354	D	[illegible]63799	C	26	M	10	[illegible]57		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	12		3354	D	[illegible]227	C	24	M	10	[illegible]559		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	4165	*D									5638005[illegible]00
														[illegible]51[illegible]00
[illegible]	[illegible]	14	1	1911	1D									[illegible]52[illegible]00
[illegible]	[illegible]	14		1911	D	060406	C	17	M	10	[illegible]		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	14		1911	D	055660	C	[illegible]	[illegible]	10	[illegible]2259	1960	37587	

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible]

[illegible]	Series	Grade	Plan Incum Bency	Position Number	C A	SD	Employee Number	Fund	Yr Birth	Sex	Type Emp Code	W G P	Date of Grade	PCS O S Date	Station Code	Dept Complement	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	13	2	1914		*D												5638005300 0
[illegible]LY JAMES R	GS 0136.01	13		1914		D	056135	C	25	M	10		090758	1255	37587			
[illegible]RY JOHN	GS 0136.01	14		1914		D	060395	C	25	M	10		110357		37587			
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	4	2753		*L												56360054000
[illegible]BY JAMES E	GS 0136.01	12		2753		D	057845	C	30	M	10		022259	0859	37587			
[illegible]BURN ROGER C	GS 0136.01	12		2753		D	063215	C	27	M	10		051062	0539	37587			
[illegible] KENT W	GS 0136.01	10		2753		D	027075	C	31	M	10		111261	1061	37587			
[illegible]INA FRANK K	GS 0136.51	12		2753		D	064002	C	17	M	10		04[illegible]55[illegible]		37587			
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0132.58	12	1	1923		*D												[illegible]
[illegible] ROBERT [illegible]	GS 0132.58	11		1923		D	009740	C	26	M	10		040757	1160	37587			
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	07	1	1925		*D												[illegible]
[illegible]TOR JEANNE R	GS 0301.28	07		1925		D	01306[illegible]	C	24	F	10		051362		37587			
[illegible]TON BETTY LOU	GS 0301.28	07		1925		D	008431	C	34	F	10		051362		37587			
[illegible] TYPIST	GS-0322.01	05	1	1927		*D												[illegible]
11 11		11	1															
[illegible]PORT STAFF																		[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-0301.03	15	1	3147		1SA												[illegible]
[illegible] DOUGLAS [illegible]	GS 0301.03	14		3147		SA	010795	C	20	M	10		071C5[illegible]		37587			
[illegible]	GS-0318.01	07	1	3149		1D												[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0318.01	06		3149		D	029447	C	39	F	10		010762		37587			
[illegible]	GS-0201.01	13	1	3154		1SP												[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0201.01	12		3154		SP	011316	C	19	M	10		050458	761	37587			
[illegible]	[illegible]	06	1	3893		*D												[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible].14	14	1	3164		1SP												[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible].14	14		3164		SP	[illegible]1293	C	23	M	[illegible]		012261	[illegible]	375[illegible]7			
[illegible]	[illegible].14	12	1	3165		[illegible]												[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible].14	[illegible]		3165		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		37587			
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]						[illegible]	[illegible]	37587			
[illegible]				[illegible]		1SP												[illegible]
[illegible]				[illegible]		SP	[illegible]						[illegible]		37587			
[illegible]			1	3167		*SP												[illegible]
[illegible]				3167		SP	[illegible]						[illegible]	1059	37587			

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 09/30/62 11A

Title / Name	Sched Series	Grade		Position Number	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp Code	DATE OF GRADE	PCS DATE	STATION CODE	CONTROL NUMBER
[illegible] JAMES J JR	GS 0501.03	06		3167	SP	025798	C	31	M	10	111261		37587	
[illegible] ASSISTANT	GS-0301.02	07	1	3894	*D									56380067000
SECURITY OFFICER	GS-1810.01	13	1	3183	1SS									56380068000
[illegible] ORIN [illegible]	GS 1810.01	13		3183	SS	058137	C	18	M	10	102057		37587	
[illegible] TYPIST	GS-0322.01	05	1	3895	*D									56380069000
[illegible] PROPERTY OF	GS-1170.01	12	1	3995	1SL									5638007.000
[illegible] AND SPLY ASST	GS-2040.06	09	1	4049	*SL									56380071000
[illegible]INER ROBERT [illegible]	GS 2040.06	07		4049	SL	022588	C	33	M	10	121160	0760	37587	
4	11	11		11	1									

PENDING REASSIGNMENT TO CURRENT S/C 56380072000

Title / Name	Sched Series	Grade		Position Number	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp Code	DATE OF GRADE	PCS DATE	STATION CODE		CONTROL NUMBER
PENDING REASSIGNMENT															56380072100
[illegible]HUMCH JOHN I	GS 1810.01	12		3184	SS	027507	C	19	M	10	040559	0360	37587		
[illegible]ICE M J	GS 0301.02	06		3006	D	029206	C	38	F	10	102961		37587		
[illegible]OYAMA SPADY AYATO	GS 0136.01	04		3099	D	030048	C	17	M	30	010101		37587	A	
[illegible]LOR ANNETTA [illegible]	GS 0301.02	08		3006	D	055800	C	18	F	10	100260	758	37587		
	1	1		4	1										

[illegible] TOKYO STATION 56380073000

[illegible] TOTAL [illegible] GRAND PRA NON_STRENGTH PERS,
[illegible] TOTAL 30 GRUP 30 OTH
94

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

06/30/62 1184 FE

Position Title / Employee Name	Sched. Series	Grade	Incumbency	Position Number	C. A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	U N D	Yr. Birth	Sex	Type Emp Code	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O.S. DATE Mo. Yr.	STATION CODE	Origin	CONTROL NUMBER
FAR EAST DIVISION																56380001000
FOREIGN FIELD																56380002000
FE/JAO - TOKYO STATION																56380003000
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF																56380004000
CHIEF OF STATION	GS-0136.01	00	1	3002		10										56380005000
BROE WILLIAM V	GS 0136.01	17		3002		D	056795	C	13	M	10	72361		37587		
OPS OFFICER-OCOS	GS-0136.01	15	1	3003		10										56380006000
WHEELER ROBERT P	GS 0136.01	15		3003		D	060947	C	15	M	10	121557		37587		
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	3005		10										56380007000
CHILLEMI RICHARD L	GS 0136.01	12		3005		D	060956	C	23	M	10	90758		37587		
RANDALL FREDERICK	GS 0136.01	13		3005		D	[illegible]	C	26	M	10	90758	6109	37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	09	1	3069		10										56380008000
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3073		10										56380009000
[illegible] VIRGINIA	GS 0318.01	06		3073		D	[illegible]	C	39	F	10	10762	6007	37587		
REGISTRY																56380010000
[illegible] ANALYST-GEN	GS-0132.36	09	1	3061		10										56380011000
[illegible] JAMES S	GS 0132.36	09		3061		D	010032	C	28	M	10	111658		37587		
[illegible] AND FILE SUP	GS-0305.1707/08		1	3009		10										56380012000
[illegible] GEORGE	GS 0305.17	09		3009		D	054609	C	18	M	10	[illegible]	6108	37587	80	
[illegible] ASST	GS-0301.28	07	1	3064		*D										56380013000
[illegible]	GS 0301.28	07		3064		D	013147	C	25	M	10	121357		37587		
[illegible]	GS-0305.17	06	1	3010		10										56380014000
[illegible]	GS 0305.17	06		3010		D	010847	C	14	M	10	052960		37587		
	GS-0302.05	05	2	3014		*D										56380015000
[illegible]	WA 0302.05	05		3014		D	021933	C	24	M	30	[illegible]		37587	AF	

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

1-0 06/30/62 1185 RE

[illegible]	[illegible] SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C.A. SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	U N D	Birth		Code	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE	NUMBER
INTELLIGENCE STAFF														56380016000
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	3036	1D									56380017000
HULL WILLIAM P	GS 0136.01	13		3036	D	004717	C	21	M	10	110655	6007	37587	
REPORTS OFFICER	GS-0132.56	13	1	3046	*D									56380018000
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3049	1D									56380019000
WERNER MARGARET D	GS 0318.01	07		3049	D	013845	C	31	F	10	082458	6110	37587	
RESEARCH TRANSLATION SECTION														56380020000
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	13	1	3050	1D									56380021000
ICHIKAWA YASAO	GS 0136.01	13		3050	OD	000344	C	19	M	10	113056	5910	37587	
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	13	1	3053	*D									56380022000
SAKAI AKIRA	GS 0136.01	09		3053	OD	000365	C	19	M	10	121752	5703	37587	
INTERPRETER	GS-0033.01	11	4	3056	*D									56380023000
[illegible] SAM S	GS 0033.01	11		3056	OD	000445	C	16	M	10	122152	6107	37587	
[illegible] PAUL I	GS 0033.01	09		3056	OD	000340	C	17	M	10	100955	5909	37587	
TRANSLATOR	GS-0031.01	09	2	3058	*D									56380024000
SEC TYPIST	GS-0322.01	05	1	3060	*D									56380025000
[illegible] OPERATIONS BRANCH														56380026000
OFFICER	GS-0136.01	15	1	3074	1D									56380027000
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	15		3074	D	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	M	10	082555	5907	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	14	3	3075	*D									56380028000
[illegible]	[illegible]	14		3075	D	[illegible]	C	20	M	10	062060	6002	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	13		3075	D	055996	C	[illegible]	M	10	061557	5203	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	13	6	3079	*D									56380029000
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3079	D	061916	C	21	M	10	100356		37587	
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3079	D	062651	C	20	M	10	050758	5908	37587	
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3079	1D	019802	C	22	M	10	110257	5905	37587	
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3079	D	060791	C	24	M	10	081157	5710	37587	
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3079	D	063235	C	23	M	10	062462	5907	37587	
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3079	D	061268	C	26	M	10	111558		37587	

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

06/30/62 1186 FE

Position Title / Incumbent Name	Sched. / Occ. Series	Grade	Plan. Incumbency	Position Number	C. A.	SD	Employee Number	FUND	Yr. Birth	Sex	Type Emp. Code	LWOP	Date of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	PCS O/S Date Mo. Yr.	Station Code	Devel. Complement Date In Mo. Da. Yr.	Orig.	Special Reference	Control Number
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	10	3089		*D													56380030000
HAWSHURST GORDON R	GS 0136.01	12		3089		D	063268	C	30	M	10		022160		37587				
LAVANOUX OLIVER D	GS 0136.01	11		3089		D	033649	C	31	M	10		102961		37587				
MAKINO WILLIAM T	GS 0136.01	12		3089		D	063761	C	20	M	10		090956	5512	37587				
RICHMOND GILBERT	GS 0136.01	12		3089		D	059854	C	28	M	10		111658		37587				
SMITH HAROLD P	GS 0136.01	12		3089		D	058279	C	26	M	10		090857		37587				
TILBERRY AUSTIN S	GS 0136.01	12		3089		D	062429	C	31	M	10		012460		37587				
WILL ROBERT J JR	GS 0136.01	12		3089		D	014539	C	27	M	10		102961	5809	37587				
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	11	8	3096		*D													56380031000
ACOTT DURAND R	GS 0136.01	12		3096		D	063228	C	27	M	10		061062	5905	37587			80	
ROBRY WINTHROP G	GS 0136.01	10		3096		D	063179	C	32	M	10		091761	5910	37587				
GERNER GEORGE W	GS 0136.01	11		3096		D	029585	C	33	M	10		042962		37587				
LIDGERWOOD MARK J	GS 0136.01	11		3096		D	033243	C	31	M	10		041562		37587				
PADEN JERARD MAX	GS 0136.01	11		3096		D	029621	C	33	M	10		042962	6009	37587				
WATANABE KAZUO	GS 0136.01	11		3096		D	063689	C	23	M	10		100358	5406	37587				
YOUNG HUGH W	GS 0136.01	11		3096		D	026776	C	31	M	10		042962	5903	37587				
[illegible]LLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	07	2	3103		*D													56380032000
[illegible]RETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	2	3106		*D													56380033000
MARTINO MARGA[illegible]	GS 0318.01	07		3106		D	018742	C	25	F	10		060257	5810	37587				
PEDERSEN C A	GS 0318.01	06		3106		D	031349	C	37	F	10		010762	6003	37587				
[illegible]TARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	05	2	3088		*D													56380034000
7 35 40		25	1																
JAPANESE LIAISON STAFF																			56380035000
OFFICER	GS-0136.01	13	1	3091		1D													56380036000
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3091		D	011990	C	21	M	10		051362	5401	37587				
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	14	1	3092		*D													563800370[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	14		3092		D	057892	C	21	M	10		32407	5809	37587				
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	13	3	3111		*D													56380038000
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		3111		D	064546	C	19	M	10		051362	5708	37587				
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3111		D	063361	C	13	M	10		032358		37587				
[illegible]	GS 0136	11		3111		D	014862	C	29	M	10		012559		37587				
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	12	4	3113		*D													56380039000
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3113		D	063613	C	16	M	10		22259		37587				
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3113		D	060327	C	19	M	10		033056	5205	37587				
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	12		3113		D	021868	C	18	M	10		[illegible]0151		37587				

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 06/30/62 1187 FF

		GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C.A. SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O/S DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE	DEVEL COMPLEMENT	CONTROL NUMBER
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	11	1	3116	*D											56380040000
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	09	1	3124	*D											56380041000
MUKASA BETTE N	GS 0301.28	06		3124	OD	000370	C	19	F	10		041760	5806	37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3833	*D											56380042000
12	9	9		9												
KOBE BRANCH																56380043000
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	3126	1D											56380044000
SHIELDS CHARLES A	GS 0136.01	13		3126	D	055301	C	22	M	10		090758	5612	37567		
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	07	1	4044	*D											56380045000
2	1	1		1												
KOREA BRANCH																56380046000
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	1	2447	1D											56380047000
MURRAY JOHN L	GS 0136.01	13		2447	D	063704	C	15	M	10		090758		37587		
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	13	1	2448	*D											56380048000
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	2	3354	*D											56380049000
[illegible]OF DAVID Y C	GS 0136.51	12		3354	D	063799	C	26	M	10		090857		37587		
[illegible]DONNELL L J	GS 0136.01	12		3354	D	060227	C	24	M	10		040559		37587		
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	06	1	4165	*D											56380050000
																56380051000
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	14	1	1911	1D											56380052000
[illegible]	[illegible].01	14		1911	D	055060	C	24	M	10		052255	6009	37587		
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	13	2	1914	*D											56380053000
[illegible]	GS 0136.51	13		1914	D	062145	C	24	M	10		020659	5902	37587		
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	13		1914	D	056135	C	25	M	10		090758	5512	37587		
[illegible]	GS 0136.01	14		1914	D	060395	C	25	M	10		110357		37587	80	

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

1 06/30/62 1188 EE

		GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C.A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER					DATE OF GRADE	PCS DATE	STATION CODE	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	4	2753		*D									56380054000
EASTBURN ROGER O	GS 0136.01	12		2753		D	003215	C	27	M	10	061062	5905	37587	
LONG KENT W	GS 0136.01	10		2753		D	027075	C	31	M	10	111261	6110	37587	
TASHIMA FRANK K	GS 0136.51	12		2753		D	064002	C	17	M	10	040559		37587	
[illegible]ORTS OFFICER	GS-0132.58	12	1	1923		*D									56380055000
WILLIAMS ROBERT W	GS 0132.58	11		1923		D	009740	C	26	M	10	040757	6011	37587	
[illegible]ELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	07	1	1925		*D									56380056000
PRAYTOR JEANNE N	GS 0301.28	07		1925		D	013069	C	24	F	10	051362		37587	
WHARTON BETTY LOU	GS 0301.28	07		1925		D	008431	C	34	F	10	051362		37587	
[illegible]	GS-0322.01	05	1	1927		*D									56380057000
10 10 10	10	1													
[illegible] STAFF															56380058000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0301.03	15	1	3147		*SA									56380059000
[illegible] REX S	GS 0301.03	15		3147		SA	009838	C	11	M	10	032492		37587	
[illegible]TARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3149		*D									56380060000
HENRY PATRICIA E	GS 0318.01	06		3149		D	029447	C	39	F	10	010762		37587	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0201.01	13	1	3154		*SP									56380061000
[illegible] EDWARD K	GS 0201.01	12		3154		SP	011318	C	19	M	10	050458	6107	37587	
[illegible]-STENO	GS-0318.01	06		3893		*D									56380062000
[illegible]	GS 0318.01	05		3893		D	[illegible]	C	35	F	10	031460	6010	37587	
[illegible] OFFICER	[illegible]	14	1	[illegible]		*SP									56380063000
[illegible]	[illegible]	14		[illegible]		SP	[illegible]	C	33	M	10	122261	5906	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	12	1	[illegible]		[illegible]									56380064000
[illegible]	[illegible]	12		[illegible]		SP	[illegible]	C	45	M	10	020958		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	12		[illegible]		SP	[illegible]	C	19	M	10	022457	6106	37587	
	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	[illegible]		[illegible]									56380065000
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		SP	[illegible]	C	24	M	10	[illegible]		37587	
	[illegible]	[illegible]				[illegible]									56380066000
	[illegible]	[illegible]				SP	[illegible]	C	30	M	10	021961	5910	37587	
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		SP	[illegible]	C	31	M	10	111261		37587	
	[illegible]			[illegible]		*D									56380067000
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		D	019609	C	22	F	10	012162	5706	37587	

```
                              POSITION CONTROL REGISTER                               140  06/30/62  1189  AE

  [illegible] BERNADETTE M   GS 0301.02  06      3894   D   014643 C 36 F 10   111757        37567

  SECURITY OFFICER           GS-1810.01  13    1 3183  1SS                                                          56380068000
    FAULKNER THOMAS M        GS 1810.01  13      3183   SS  002185 C 13 M 10   120754 5907  37587
    TODD [illegible] H       GS 1810.01  13      3183   SS  058137 C 18 M 10   102057        37587

  CLERK TYPIST               GS-0322.01  05    1 3895  #D                                                           56380069000

  REAL PROPERTY OF           GS-1170.01  12    1 3993  1SL                                                          56380070000

  PROP AND SPLY ASST         GS-2040.06  09    1 4049  #SL                                                          56380071000
    [illegible] ROBERT [illegible]  GS 2040.06  07   4049   SL  022988 C 33 M 10   121160 6007  37587

    15        15     15            15

     [illegible] REASSIGNMENT TO CURRENT S/C                                                                        56380072000

  [illegible] REASSIGNMENT                                                                                          56380072100
    [illegible] BORIS [illegible]   GS 1810.01  14    3170   SS  006635 C 13 M 10   050160        37557
    CHURCH JOHN [illegible]  GS 1810.01  12      3184   SS  027507 C 17 M 10   040559 6003  37587
    [illegible] P J          GS 0301.02  06      3006   D   039206 C 56 F 10   102961        37587
    GREGORY GORDON T         GS 1810.01  13      3172   SS  063473 C 23 M 10   012162 6106  37587
    [illegible] PAUL J       GS 1670.02  12      3906   SS  017861 C 26 M 10   082160 6107  75513
    [illegible] KEN [illegible]  GS 0083.01  11      1920   D   000429 C 20 M 10   100558 5701  37587
    [illegible]              GS 1810.23  12      3179   SS  007657 C 23 M 10   052255 6101  37593
    [illegible] WILLIAM M    GS 1810.01  15      3169   SS  003980 C 10 M 10   101054        37557
    [illegible] BRADY AKATO  WI 0136.01  04      3099   U   030048 C 17 M 30   010101        37587       AP
    [illegible] ROBIN L      GS 0132.36  08      3069   D   025692 C 22 M 10   091761 5904  37587
    [illegible] GEORGE M     GS 0132.58  12      3047   DD  006411 C 21 M 10   060652 5805  37587
    [illegible] CHARLES [illegible]  GS 0301.01  12  4065   SP  [illegible] C 29 M 10   61756 5906  37587
    [illegible]              GS 0132.36  11      3069   D   003143 C 08 F 10   102553        37587
    [illegible]              GS 0301.02  06      3006   D   055500 C 18 M 10   100260 58 7  37587      85
    [illegible]              GS 1810.21  13      3176   SS  006649 C 27 M 10   61756         37587

                                                                                                                    56380073000

                        [illegible] MONASTERY [illegible] CORP,
                                     [illegible] 30 OTH
```

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible]												56380001000
[illegible]												56380002000
[illegible]												56380003000
[illegible]												56380004000
[illegible]	S-0136.01	[illegible]	1	3002	1							56380005000
[illegible] WILLIAM	S 0136.01	17		3002	0	056735	C	13	10	072361	37597	
[illegible]	S-0136.01	13	1	3003	10							56380006000
[illegible]	S 0136.01	13		3003	0	060 47	C	15	1	131557	375 7	
[illegible]	S-0136.01	14	1	3885	1							56380007000
[illegible] RICHARD L	S 0136.01	12		3885	0	0609 8	C	25	10	090758	37597	
[illegible]	S 0136.01	11		3885	0	12170	C	26	10	090758	375 7	
[illegible]-STENO	[illegible]	09	1	3005	1							56380008000
[illegible] BETTY [illegible]	[illegible]	06		3005	0	08431	C	34	10	060559	37597	
[illegible]	S-0138.01	07	1	3073	10							56380009000
[illegible] VIRGINIA	[illegible]	06		3073	0	31626	C	3	[illegible]	010762	375 7	
[illegible]												56380010000
[illegible]	S-0132.36	09	1	3061	1							56380011000
[illegible]	S 0132.36	09		3061	0	10032	C	28	1	111556	37597	
[illegible]	S-0109.1707	09	1	3009	10							56380012000
[illegible]	[illegible].37	[illegible]		3009	0	546	C	18	10	091756	37597	
		[illegible]	1	3064	[illegible]							56380013000
		[illegible]		3064	0	[illegible]	[illegible]	29	1	101157	37597	
	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	3010	[illegible]							56380014000
	[illegible]	[illegible]		3010	0	10847		14	10	092156	37597	
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]								56380015000
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		21933	C	34	36	010151	37597	

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

	Series	Grade		Position Number	SD	Employee Number		Yr Birth	Sex	Type Emp Code	Date of Grade	PCS Date	Station Code	Serial Number
[illegible]														56380016000
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	14	1	3856	10									56380017000
[illegible] WILLIAM [illegible]	GS-0136.01	14		3856	D	004717	C	21	M	10	110655		37587	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0132.58	13	1	3046	*D									56380018000
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3045	10									56380019000
[illegible]	GS-0318.01	07		3045	D	013895		31	F	10	042458		37587	
[illegible] TRANSLATION SECTION														56380020000
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	13	1	3830	1									56380021000
[illegible] A TARAI	GS-0136.01	13		3830	D	000394	C	14	M	10	113058		37587	
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	12	1	3055	*D									56380022000
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	12		3055	D	000365	C	16	M	10	110258		37587	
[illegible]	GS-0033.01	11	4	3056	*D									56380023000
[illegible] CHITO	GS-0033.01	09		3056	D	063392	C	15	F	10	111056		37587	
[illegible] SAM [illegible]	GS-0033.01	11		3056	D	000445	C	16	M	11	122152		37587	
[illegible]	GS-0033.01	09		3056	D	060340	C	17	M	10	100755		37587	
[illegible]	GS-0031.01	09	2	3058	*D									56380024000
[illegible]	GS-0322.01	05	1	3060	*D									56380025000
	7	7												
[illegible]														56380026000
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	13	1	3074	10									56380027000
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	13		3074	D	[illegible]	C	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]		37587	
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	13	1	3075	*D									56380028000
[illegible]	[illegible]	13		3075	D	57962	C	26	M	[illegible]	[illegible]		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	13		3075	D	055926	C	25	M	[illegible]	[illegible]		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	11	[illegible]	3079	*D									[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	11		3079	D	061616	C	21	M	10	[illegible]		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	11		3079	[illegible]	[illegible]	C	26	M	10	[illegible]		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	11		3079	[illegible]	[illegible]	C	22	M	10	[illegible]		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	11		3079	[illegible]	062028	C	27	M	10	050160		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3079	[illegible]	061721	C	19	M	10	[illegible]		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3079	[illegible]	060791	C	24	M	10	081157		37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	C	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]		37587	

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible]	[illegible]136.01	12		3079	0	61288	C	26	M	10	111658	37587	
[illegible]	S-0136.01	12	16	3089	40								[illegible]380030000
[illegible]	S 0136.01	12		3089	0	063268	C	30	M	10	022160	37587	
[illegible] OLIVER D	S 0136.01	11		3089	0	033649	C	31	M	10	102961	375 7	
[illegible] WILLIAM T	S 0136.01	12		3089	0	063761	C	20	M	10	090956	37587	
[illegible] AKIRA ALEX	S 01 6.01	12		3089	0	064848	C	24	M	10	040261	37587	
[illegible] RAY [illegible]	S 0136.01	12		3089	0	063235	C	25	M	10	072758	37587	
[illegible] GILBERT	S 0136.01	12		3089	0	059854	C	28	M	1	111658	37587	
[illegible] HAROLD P	S 0136.01	12		3089	0	058275	C	26	M	10	010857	37587	
[illegible]	0136.01	12		3089	0	062429	C	31	M	10	012460	37587	
[illegible]	0136.01	12		3089	0	014539	C	2	M	10	1 2961	37587	
[illegible]	S-0136.01	11	6	3096	40								[illegible]380031000
[illegible] DURAND [illegible]	S 0136.01	11		3096	0	063228	C	27	M	10	042156	37587	
[illegible] WINTHROP [illegible]	S 0136.01	10		3096	0	063176	C	32	M	10	091761	375 7	
[illegible]	S 0136.01	10		3096	0	029585	C	33	M	10	071060	37587	
[illegible]	S 013 .01	11		3096	0	332 3	C	31	M	10	041260	37587	
[illegible]	S 0136.01	11		3096	0	63659	C	23	M	10	100958	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]			3096	0	26776	C	31	M	10	032160	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]		3	3104	40								[illegible]380032000
[illegible]	S-0 1 .01	7	3	3106	40								[illegible]380033000
[illegible]	S 0 1 .01	7		3106	0	18942	C	25	F	10	060357	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible] 1 .01	6		3106	0	31 49	C	37	F	10	010762	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	5		3 0	40								[illegible]380034000
													[illegible]380035000
	[illegible]	13	1	3 31	40								[illegible]380036000
	[illegible]	13		3 31	0	11	C	21		1	1 59	37587	
	[illegible]	14	1	3 33	40								[illegible]380037000
	[illegible]	14		3 33	0	57 42	C	21		1	032 57	375 7	
	[illegible]	13	1	3111	40								[illegible]380038000
	[illegible]			3111	0	64946	C	19	M	10	020157	37587	
	[illegible]			3111	0	61351	C	12	M	10	032159	375 7	
				3111	0	14892	C	29	M	1	12 59	37587	
			3	3113	40								[illegible]380039000
				3113	0	63413	C	16	M	10	102059	375 7	
				3113	0	40107	C	19	M	10	1 1 57	37587	

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

```
[illegible]            [illegible]  12    3113   [illegible]  21[illegible] C 18 [illegible] 10  040161   37547
[illegible]            -0136,41     11  1 3116   [illegible]                                                  [illegible]0040000
[illegible]            [illegible]0301,28 09 1 3124 [illegible]                                              [illegible]0041000
[illegible]            [illegible]0301,28 08  3124   00    00370 C 1 [illegible] 10  041364   37547
[illegible]            [illegible]  17  1 3033   [illegible]                                                  [illegible]0042000

[illegible]                                                                                                  [illegible]0043000
[illegible]            [illegible]0136,01 14 1 3126 [illegible]                                              [illegible]0044000
[illegible] CHARL[illegible] [illegible] 0136,01 14 3126 [illegible]  [illegible] 1 C 22 [illegible] 10  [illegible]0758  37547
[illegible]            [illegible]  17  1 3149   [illegible]                                                  [illegible]0045000

[illegible]                                                                                                  [illegible]0046000
[illegible]            [illegible]  14    2447   [illegible]                                                  [illegible]0047000
[illegible]            [illegible]  13    2447   [illegible]  637 4 C 15 [illegible] 10  [illegible]          37547
[illegible]            [illegible]  11  1 2448   [illegible]                                                  [illegible]0048000
[illegible]            [illegible]0136,01 12 [illegible] 3754 [illegible]                                    [illegible]0049000
[illegible]            [illegible]  12    3754       63 [illegible] C 26 [illegible]  040457   37547
[illegible]            [illegible]  12    3754       [illegible] C 24 [illegible]  040459   37597
                                                                                                             [illegible]0050000

                                                                                                             [illegible]
                                                                                                             [illegible]
                                                     [illegible] C 24 [illegible]  [illegible]  37547
                                                                                                             [illegible]
                                                     [illegible] C 24 [illegible] 10  [illegible]  37547
                                                     [illegible] C 29 [illegible]  [illegible]  37547
```

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible]	Series	Grade	Incumbency	Position Number	C.A.	SD	Employee Number					Date of Grade Mo Da Yr	Station Code	
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	4	2753	*D									56380054000
[illegible] ROGER G	GS-0136.01	11		2753	D	063219	C	27	M	10		030958	37587	
[illegible]	0136.01	10		2753	D	027075	C	31	M	10		111261	37587	
[illegible] JOHN A	GS-0136.01	12		2753	D	025[illegible]62	C	26	M	10		090957	37587	
[illegible]	GS-0136.01	12		2753	D	084002	C	17	M	10		040559	37587	
OPS OFFICER	GS-0132.58	12	1	1923	*D									56380055000
WILLIAMS ROBERT [illegible]	GS-0132.58	11		1923	D	0097[illegible]0	C	26	M	10		0[illegible]0757	37587	
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.18	07	1	1925	*D									56380056000
[illegible] JEANNE [illegible]	GS-0301.38	06		1925	D	013049	C	24	F	10		110959	37587	
CLERK TYPIST	GS-0322.01	05	1	1927	*D									56380057000
SUPPORT STAFF														56380058000
OPS OFFICER	GS-0301.08	13	1	3147	*SA									56380059000
[illegible]	GS-0301.03	13		3147	SA	009838	C	11	M	10		[illegible]2452	37587	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3149	*D									56380060000
[illegible] PATRICE	GS-0318.01	05		3149	D	29447		39	F	10		010762	37587	
[illegible]	GS-0301.01	11	1	3154	[illegible]									56380061000
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	05	1	3893	*D									56380062000
[illegible]	0318.01	05		3893	D	32287	C	36	F	10		03146[illegible]	37587	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0[illegible].14	15	1	3164	*SP									56380063000
[illegible]	GS-0[illegible].14	15		3164	SP	[illegible]12949	C	23	M	10		012361	375[illegible]7	
[illegible]	[illegible].14	12	1	3165	SP									[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible].14	12		3165	SP	[illegible]578[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	3166	*SP									[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3166	SP	17875	C	24	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	2	3167	[illegible]									[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3167	[illegible]	25174	C	3[illegible]	[illegible]	10		[illegible]	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3167	[illegible]	297[illegible]	C	31	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	37587	
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]										[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]9	C	22	F	10		[illegible]2162	37587	

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	OCCUP SERIES	GRADE	MAN EQUIV.	Position Number	C.A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp Code	DATE OF GRADE	STATION CODE		CONTROL NUMBER
[illegible] EAST DIVISION															56380001000
[illegible] FIELD															56380002000
[illegible]JAO - TOKYO STATION															56380003000
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF															56380004000
CHIEF OF STATION	GS-0136.01	00	1	3002	1	D									56380005000
[illegible] WILLIAM V	GS 0136.01	17		3002		D	056735	C	13	M	10	072361	37587		
OPS OFFICER-DCOS	GS-0136.01	15	1	3003	1	D									56380006000
[illegible] ROBERT P	GS 0136.01	15		3003		D	060[illegible]47	C	15	M	10	121[illegible]57	375[illegible]7		
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01	15	1	3936	1	D									56380007000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	14	2	3883	2	D									56380008000
[illegible] RICHARD L	GS 0136.01	12		3883		D	060908	C	25	M	10	090758	37587		
[illegible]ANDALL FREDERICK	GS 0136.01	13		3883		D	012170	C	26	M	10	090758	37587		
[illegible] ASSISTANT	GS-0301.02	09	1	3004	1	D									56380009000
[illegible] STENOGRAPHER	GS-0318.01	09	1	3005	1	D									56380010000
[illegible]	GS 0318.01	06		3005		D	008431	C	34	F	10	060559	37587		
[illegible] ASSISTANT	GS-0301.02	07	2	3006	*	D									56380011000
[illegible]	GS 0301.02	06		3006		D	02[illegible]206	C	38	F	10	102[illegible]61	37587		
[illegible]	GS 0301.02	08		3006		D	035800	C	18	F	10	100260	37587	85	
[illegible]	GS-0318.01	07	1	3073	1	D									56380012000
	GS-0301.26	05	1	3887	*	D									56380013000
[illegible] RECORDS SECTION															56380014000
	GS-0132.16	12	1	3061	1	D									56380015000
	GS 0132.16	09		3061		D	010032	C	28	M	10	111558	[illegible]7587		
	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	*	D									56380016000
	[illegible]		1	3063	*	D									56380017000
				3063		D	[illegible]23492	C	22	[illegible]		[illegible]	37587		

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible] 12/31/7[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	PLAN	Position Number	C.A. SO	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr. Birth	SEX	Type Emp. Code	WOP	DATE OF GRADE	PCS DATE	STATION CODE	COMPLEMENT	[illegible]
[illegible] AND FILE SUP	GS-0305.17	09	1	3009	1D											56180018000
[illegible] GEORGE A	GS 0305.17	06		3009	D	054609	C	18	M	10		081256		37557		
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	07	2	3064	*D											56180019000
THOMPSON JOSEPH [illegible]	GS 0301.28	07		3064	D	013147	C	25	M	10		121557		37587		
[illegible] AND FILE SUP	GS-0305.17	07	1	3010	1D											56180020000
[illegible] AARON	GS 0305.17	06		3010	D	010847	C	14	M	10		052960		37547		
[illegible] AND FILE CLERK	GS-0305.03	05	1	3011	*D											56180021000
[illegible]	GS-0302.03	05	2	3014	*D											56180022000
[illegible] JAMES [illegible]	GS 0302.03	05		3014	D	021938	C	34	M	10		010101		37587	AF	
[illegible]	12	2	1	3	1											
[illegible] MILITARY [illegible] OPERATIONS COORDINATION STAFF																56180023000
[illegible] OFFICER	[illegible]-0136.[illegible]	14	1	3020	1D											56180024000
[illegible]	[illegible]	06	1	3819	*D											56180025000
																56180026000
	GS-0136.[illegible]	13	1	3823	1D											56180027000
	GS 0136.[illegible]	12		3823	D	006980	C	20	M	10		090356		37587		
	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	3827	*D											56180028000
																56180029000
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	1D											56180030000
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	D	055640	C	34	M	10		052235		37587		
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	*D											56180031000
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	D	042149	C	24	M	10		020859		37587		
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	D	056134	C	[illegible]	M	10		090759		37547		

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

T[illegible] 12/31/[illegible]

[illegible] NAME	SERIES	GRADE	[illegible]	POSITION Number	C A SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	U N D	[illegible]	[illegible]	Type Emp Code	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	STATION CODE	[illegible]
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	12	5	2753	*D								56380032000
[illegible] ROGER G	GS 0136.01	11		2753	D	083213	C	27	W	10	030958	37587	
[illegible] KENT W	GS 0136.01	10		2753	D	027075	C	31	W	10	111261	37587	
[illegible] JOHN G	GS 0136.01	12		2753	D	029362	C	26	W	10	090857	37587	
[illegible] FRANK K	GS 0136.01	12		2753	D	064002	C	7	W	10	040559	375[illegible]7	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01	11	2	1913	*D								56380033000
[illegible]PRETER	GS-0033.01	11	1	1920	*D								56380034000
[illegible] KEN W	GS 0033.01	11		1920	D	000429	C	20	W	10	100558	37587	
[illegible]ORTS OFFICER	GS-0132.58	12	1	1923	*D								56380035000
[illegible] ROBERT W	GS 0132.58	11		1923	D	[illegible]740	C	26	W	0	040757	37587	
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28	07	1	1925	*D								56380036000
[illegible] JEANNE M	GS 0301.28	06		1925	D	013069	C	24	F	10	110959	37587	
INTELLIGENCE C[illegible]	GS-0301.27	06	1	2081	*D								56380037000
[illegible] TYPIST	GS-0322.01	05	1	1927	*D								56380038000
[illegible] KATHRYN	GS 0322.01	05		1927	D	[illegible]2699	C	21	F	10	090557	37587	
[illegible]		[illegible]											
[illegible] SPARE													56380039000
[illegible]	[illegible]-0136.01	10	1	2447	*D								56380040000
[illegible]	[illegible]0136.01	13		2447	D	063704	C	13	W	10	090758	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]-0136.01	13	1	2449	*D								563[illegible]41000
[illegible]	[illegible]136.01	12	4	3354	*D								56380042000
[illegible]	[illegible]136.01	0[illegible]		3354	D	031886	C	30	W	10	020[illegible]53	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]136.01	12		3354	D	063797	C	26	W	10	090457	37587	
	[illegible]136.01	12		3354	D	040527	C	4	W	10	040554	37587	
	[illegible]	11	1	3716	*D								56[illegible]3000
	[illegible]	[illegible]	2	2432	*								56[illegible]4000
	[illegible]	[illegible]		3[illegible]	*[illegible]								56[illegible]5000
		[illegible]		3[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]				[illegible]	072756	37587	
	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	3780	*D								56[illegible]6000

40

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 12/31/61 1167 BF

Position Title and Incumbent Name	Series	Grade	Plan Incum	Position Number	C A SD	Employee Number	Fund	Yr Birth	Sex	Type Emp Code	Date of Grade	Station Code	Control Number
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136,01	14	1	3856	1D								56380072000
[illegible] WILLIAM P	GS 0136,01	13		3856	D	004717	C	21	M	10	110655	37587	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318,01	07	1	3045	1D								56380073000
[illegible] MARGARET C	GS 0318,01	07		3045	D	013845	C	31	F	10	082458	37587	
REPORTS AND REQUIREMENTS SECTION													56380074000
REPORTS OFFICER	GS-0132,58	13	1	3046	1D								56380075000
REPORTS OFFICER	GS-0132,58	12	2	3047	*D								56380076000
[illegible] GEORGE M	GS 0132,58	12		3047	DD	000411	C	21	M	10	050852	37587	
REPORTS OFFICER	GS-0132,58	11	2	3049	*D								56380077000
[illegible] EMILY I	GS 0132,58	11		3049	D	002143	C	08	F	10	102553	37587	
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301,28	07	1	3891	*D								56380078000
[illegible] CLERK-TYP	GS-0301,30	05	1	3892	*D								56380079000
[illegible]	GS 0301,30	[illegible]		3892	D	029909	C	37	F	10	091860	37587	
TRANSLATION SECTION													56380080000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136,01	13	1	3830	1D								56380081000
[illegible]	GS 0136,01	13		3830	DD	000344	C	19	M	10	113058	37587	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136,01	12	1	3055	*D								56380082000
[illegible]	GS 0136,01	12		3055	D	000369	C	16	M	10	110258	37587	
[illegible]	GS-0033,01	11	2	3056	*D								56380083000
[illegible]	GS 0033,01	09		3056	D	053592	C	15	F	10	011556	37587	
	GS 0033,01	11		3056	DD	000445	C	6	M	10	122152	37587	
	GS 0033,01	[illegible]		3056	DD	000340	C	7	M	10	100955	37587	
	GS-0033,01	09	2	3058	*D								56380084000
	GS-0136,01	09	1	3059	*D								56380085000
	GS-0132,01	05	1	3060	*D								56380086000
													56380087000
													56380088000

DocId:32399

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible] 12/31/[illegible]

ATTORNEY ADVISOR	GS-0970.01	14	1	3080	1SA2							56380089000
[illegible] OBERGROBEN ROBERT	GS 0970.01	14		3080	SA2	011459	C	19	* 10	031057	37587	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3140	10							56380090000
[illegible] PATRICIA F	GS 0318.01	05		3140	0	024447	C	39	F 10	110159	37587	
PERSONNEL OFFICER	GS-0201.01	14	1	3154	1SP							56380091000
PERSONNEL OFFICER	GS-0201.01	12	1	4065	*SP							56380092000
DECROWO CHARLES W	GS 0201.01	12		4065	SP	006031	C	29	* 10	061756	37587	
PERSONNEL OFFICER	GS-0201.01	11	1	3195	*SP							56380093000
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.07	06	1	3893	*0							56380094000
SARCAVAGE A G	GS 0318.01	05		3893	0	032367	C	36	F 10	031460	37587	
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14	14	1	3164	1SP							56380095000
LOMBARDY CLARENCE R	GS 0510.14	14		3164	SP	012034	C	23	* 10	012261	37587	
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14	12	1	3165	*SP							56380096000
MARTIN ELWOOD D	GS 0510.14	12		3165	SP	037008	C	26	* 10	020459	37587	
[illegible]CIAL ACCT ASST	GS-0501.03	09	1	3166	*SP							56380097000
[illegible] WILL[illegible]	GS 0501.03	09		3166	SP	017875	C	24	* 10	020958	37587	
[illegible]AL ACCT ASST	GS-0501.03	07	2	3167	*SP							56380098000
[illegible] WILLIAM R	GS 0501.03	07		3167	SP	025174	C	30	* 10	021961	37587	
[illegible]	GS 0501.03	06		3167	SP	025746	C	1	* 10	111261	37587	
ASSISTANT	GS-0301.02	07	1	3684	*0							56380099000
[illegible]	GS 0301.02	06		3684	0	015629	C	22	F 10	030[illegible]58	37587	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-1810.01	13	1	3183	1SS							56380100000
[illegible]	GS [illegible]	13		3183	SS	002139	C	13	* 10	120594	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	13	1	3184	*SS							56380101000
[illegible]	[illegible]	13		3184	SS	027907	[illegible]	19	* 10	040559	37587	
[illegible]	[illegible]	09	1	3699	*0							56380102000
[illegible]	[illegible]	12	1	3369	1S[illegible]							56380103000
[illegible]				3314	*S[illegible]							56380104000
				[illegible]	*0							56380105000
				[illegible]	*S[illegible]							56380106000

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible]						56380107000
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF						56380108000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0301.03	15	1	3188	[illegible]	56380109000
ADM ASSISTANT	GS-0301.02	07	1	3191	*D	56380110000
CLERK STENOGRAPHER	GS-0312.01	05	1	4046	*D	56380111000
REGISTRY						56380112000
MAIL AND FILE SUP	GS-0305.17	07	1	3193	1D	56380113000
COURIER	GS-0302.05	05	2	3194	*D	56380114000
MESS AND CLUB UNIT						56380115000
STEWARD	GS-0067.01	11	1	3229	1D	56380116000
FINANCE SECTION						56380117000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0510.14	12	1	3197	1SF	56380118000
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14	11	1	3195	*SF	56380119000
[illegible] ACCT [illegible]	GS-0501.03	09	1	3199	*SF	56380120000
[illegible] ACCT [illegible]	GS-0501.03	07	2	3200	*SF	56380121000
[illegible] SECTION						56380122000
[illegible]	[illegible]	12	1	[illegible]	*S	56380124000
						56380125000
	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	4047	1S	56380126000
	[illegible]	5	1	4048	*D	56380127000
						56380128000
	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	3205	*S	56380129000
	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	3206	*S	56380130000
	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	3912	*D	[illegible]

DocId:32

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

12/31/[illegible]

Position title and incumbent name	Occup series	Grade	Plan incumbency	Position number	SD	Employee number		Yr birth		Type emp code	Date of grade	Station code	Special reference	Position number
STOCK CONTROL UNIT														56380132000
PROC AND SUPPLY OF	GS-2040.01	11	1	3209	*SL									56380133000
PROC AND SPLY ASST	GS-2040.06	09	1	4049	*SL									56380134000
CENTNER ROBERT G	GS 2040.06	07		4049	SL	022388	C	35	x	10	121160	37557		
PROC AND SUPPLY ASST	GS-2040.06	07	1	3212	*SL									56380135000
CLERK TYPIST	GS-0322.01	05	2	3901	*D									56380136000
REAL ESTATE AND HOUSING SECTION														56380137000
REAL PROPERTY OF	GS-1170.01	11	1	3220	*SL									56380138000
CLERK TYPIST	GS-0322.01	05	1	3902	*D									56380139000
TRANSPORTATION SECTION														56380140000
TRANSPORT OF	GS-2101.01	11	1	3234	*SL									56380141000
JACOBSON RAYMOND F	GS 2101.01	12		3234	SL	010093	C	26	x	10	012261	37557	A1	
TRANSPORT ASST	GS-2101.04	09	1	3235	*SL									56380142000
[illegible] TRANS ASST	GS-2130.06	09	1	3239	*SL									56380143000
CLERK STENOGRAPHER	GS-0312.01	05	1	3903	*D									56380144000
[illegible] SECTION														56380145000
[illegible]	GS-0002.02	14	1	3150	*SL									56380146000
[illegible]	GS-[illegible].04	11	1	[illegible]	[illegible]									56380147000
[illegible]	GS-[illegible]	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	[illegible]									56380148000
[illegible]														56380149000
[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]										56380150000
[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	x	10	[illegible]	37557		
[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]									56380151000
[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	SL	000638		17	x	10	050160	37557		
				[illegible]	[illegible]									56380152000

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

12/31/[illegible]

[illegible]		GRADE		Position Number		SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER						STATION CODE	
[illegible] DATOR	GS-1310.22	12	2	3176		*SS								56380153000
INTERROGATION SPEC	GS-1810.23	13	1	3178		*SS								56380154000
TAYLOR ROBERT A	GS 1810.23	13		3178		SS	006063	C	27	M	10	061756	37587	
INTERROGATION SPEC	GS-1810.23	12	3	3179		*SS								56380155000
KING GEORGE Y	GS 1810.23	12		3179		SS	007657	C	23	M	10	052259	37543	
PHYSICAL SEC OF	GS-1810.07	13	1	3172		*SS								56380156000
GREGORY GORDON Y	GS 1810.07	12		3172		SS	063473	C	23	M	10	020958	37557	
AUDIO SUPPORT SPEC	GS-1670.02	12	1	3906		*SS								56380157000
[illegible] PAUL J	GS 1670.02	12		3906		SS	017841	C	26	M	10	082160	75513	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	07	1	3171		*SS								56380158000
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	06	1	3407		*SS								56380159000
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01	05	1	4050		*SS								56380160000
13	6	5		5										

PENDING REASSIGNMENT TO [illegible] S/C 56380161000

PENDING REASSIGNMENT 56380162000

[illegible] SECTION 56380163000

[illegible] ON-STRENGTH [illegible]

50 [illegible]

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible]									[illegible]638000100[illegible]
[illegible]									5638[illegible]
[illegible] TOKYO STATION									56[illegible]
[illegible]									56[illegible]
[illegible] STATION	[illegible] 0136.0100	1	3002	1	D				56380[illegible]
[illegible] WILLIAM V	GS 0136.0117		3002		D	C 13	10		
[illegible]-GCOS	GS 0136.0115	1	3003	1	D				56380[illegible]
[illegible] ROBERT P	GS 0136.0115		3003		D	C 15	10		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS 0136.[illegible]	1	3[illegible]36	1	D				563800[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]		[illegible]36		D	C 22	10		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]	2	3885	2	D				5638[illegible]
[illegible] RICHARD [illegible]	GS 0136.0112		3885		D	C 25	10		
[illegible]	GS 0136.[illegible]		3885		D	C 26	10		
[illegible]	GS 0301.0209	1	3004	1	D				5638000[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0301.0208		3004		D	C 17	10		
[illegible]	GS 0318.0109	1	3005	1	D				563800[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0318.[illegible]		[illegible]		D	C [illegible]	10		
[illegible]	GS 0318.[illegible]		[illegible]		D	C 10	10		
[illegible]	[illegible]	2	[illegible]6	[illegible]	D				5638[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]6		D	C [illegible]	10	B5	
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]6		D	C [illegible]	10		
[illegible]	[illegible]	1	[illegible]73	1	D				563800[illegible]
	[illegible]	1	30[illegible]						5638001[illegible]
	[illegible]								563800[illegible]
			3051	1	D				5638[illegible]
	[illegible]		[illegible]		D	C 26			

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

160 02/[illegible]/61

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	SERV	OCC OR SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	F U N D	Basic	Cap	DATE OF GRADE	PCS DATE	STATION CODE	CIVIL COMPLEMENT	Status	P R CONTROL NUMBER
LUCK EDWIN	GS	0132.3608			3063		D		C	22	10						
MAIL AND FILE SUP	GS	0305.1709		1	3009	1	D										5638001800
GREEN GEORGE A	GS	0305.1709			3009		D		C	18	10						
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS	0301.2807		2	3064	*	D										5638001900
THOMPSON JOSEPH M	GS	0301.2807			3064		D		C	25	10						
MAIL AND FILE SUP	GS	0305.1707		1	3010	1	D										5638002000
[illegible] AARON	GS	0305.1706			3010		D		C	14	10						
MAIL AND FILE CLERK	GS	0305.[illegible]		1	3011	*	D										5638002100
COURIER	GS	0302.0505		2	3014	*	D										5638002200
WEST JAMES H	M4	0302.05E5			3014		D		C	24	10						
21		15							1								

MILITARY OPERATIONS COORDINATION STAFF

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	SERV	OCC OR SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	F U N D	Basic	Cap	P R CONTROL NUMBER
												5638002300
OPS OFFICER	GS	0136.0114		1	3020	1	D					5638002400
SECRETARY-STENO	GS	0318.0106		1	3819	*	D					5638002500
2												
[illegible]												5638002600
[illegible]	GS	0136.0113		1	3828	1	D					5638002700
[illegible]	GS	0136.0112			3828		D		C	20	10	
[illegible] ASST	[illegible]	0301.2809		1	3827	*	D					5638002800
[illegible] MARI[illegible]	[illegible]	0301.2807			3827		D		C	30	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	0301.2809			3827		D		C	15	10	
		5										
												[illegible]
		[illegible]136.0114		1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]					563[illegible]

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	SCHED	SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER			STATION CODE	SERIAL NUMBER
[illegible] DAVID [illegible]	[illegible]	136.0114			1911		D		C	24 10		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	0136.0113		2	1914	*	D					563800031000
KELLY JAMES H	GS	0136.0113			1914		D		C	25 10		
HICKCOX EDWARD L	GS	0136.5113			1914		D		C	25 10		
HOLDNER IRVING F	GS	0136.5113			1914		D		C	24 10		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	0136.0112		5	2753	*	D					563800032000
LONG KENT W	GS	0136.0109			2753		D		C	31 10		
EASTBURN ROGER G	GS	0136.0111			2753		D		C	27 10		
PICKARD JOHN G	GS	0136.0112			2753		D		C	26 10		
TASHIMA FRANK K	GS	0136.5112			2753		D		C	17 10		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	0136.0111		2	1915	*	D					563800033000
INTERPRETER	GS	0033.0111		1	1920	*	D					563800034000
[illegible] KEN M	GS	0033.0111			1920		D		C	20 10		
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	0132.5812		1	1923	*	D					[illegible]
[illegible] ROBERT [illegible]	[illegible]	132.5811			1923		D		C	26 10		
[illegible] ASST	GS	0301.2807		1	1925	*	D					563800036000
[illegible] JEANNE N	GS	0301.2806			1925		D		C	24 10		
[illegible] CLERK	GS	0301.2706		1	2881	*	D					563800037[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0322.0105		1	1927	*	D					563800038000
[illegible]	GS	0322.0105			1927		D		C	21 10		
												563800039000
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	2447	1	D					563800040000
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			2447		D		C	15 10		
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	2440	*	D					563800041000
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	3394	*	D					563800042000
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			3394		D		C	26 10		
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			3394		D		C	24 10		
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]		D		C	20 10		
	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	*	D					[illegible]

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 [illegible]

		PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER			
OPS OFFICER	GS 0136.0109	2	2452	*	D				[illegible]
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS 0301.2807	1	3718	*	D				[illegible]
[illegible] ROD FRANCES M	GS 0301.2807		3718		D		C 22	10	
[illegible] STENOGRAPHER	GS 0312.0106	1	3380	*	D				[illegible]638004700[illegible]
II	4						1		
INTERNAL OPERATIONS BRANCH									563800470[illegible]
OPS OFFICER	GS 0136.0115	[illegible]	3074	1	D				5638000800[illegible]
[illegible]EDHAM WILLIAM C	GS 0136.0115		3074		D		C 11	10	
OPS OFFICER	GS 0136.0114	4	3075	*	D				[illegible]
THOMPSON ROBERT F	GS 0136.0113		3075		D		C 26	10	
CENTER WILL[illegible]	GS 0136.0114		3075		D		C 26	10	
[illegible] JOHN D	GS 0136.0114		3075		D		C 21	10	
OPS OFFICER	GS 0136.0113	6	3079	*	D				[illegible]
[illegible]RAGUT DAVID [illegible]	GS 0136.0113		3079		D		C 26	10	
[illegible]GGR DONALD [illegible]	GS 0136.0113		3079		D		C 27	10	
WATERS [illegible]	GS 0136.0112		3079		D		C 26	10	
[illegible] GEORGE [illegible]	GS 0136.0113		3079		D		C 20	10	
[illegible] CHESTER M	GS 0136.0112		3079		D		C 24	10	
[illegible] CHARLES [illegible]	GS 0136.0113		3079		D		C 21	10	
[illegible] GRANT [illegible]	GS 0136.5112		3079		D		C 19	10	
[illegible] RICHARD [illegible]	GS 0136.0113		3079		[illegible]		C 27	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]136.0112	6	3089	*	D				[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]36.0110		3089		D		C 31	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]36.0112		3089		D		C 20	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]136.0112		3089		D		C 30	10	
[illegible]	[illegible].0112		3089		D		C 26	10	
[illegible]	[illegible].0112		3089		D		C 24	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]		3089		D		C 28	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	6	3096	*	D				[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		3096		D		C 33	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]		3096		D		C 23	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]		3096		D		C 31	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]		3096		[illegible]		C 31	[illegible]	

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 [illegible]

ORGANIZATION AND INCUMBENT NAME		SERIES	INCUMBENCY	Position Number	SD	F U N D	Yr Birth	Type Emp Code	CONTROL NUMBER
NELSON GLENN W	GS	0136.0114		3832	D	C	21	10	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	0136.0113	2	3111 *	D				5638006600
KUBOTA KINJI	GS	0136.0112		3111	D	C	13	10	
DOWNS JAMES A	GS	0136.0112		3111	D	C	19	10	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	0136.0112	2	3113 *	D				5638006700
[illegible] KAN	GS	0136.0112		3113	D	C	18	10	
NAKAMURA GEORGE	GS	0136.0112		3113	D	C	19	10	
NAGASE SATOSHI	GS	0136.0112		3113	D	C	16	10	
OPS OFFICER	GS	0136.0111	2	3116 *	D				5638006500
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS	0301.2809	1	3124 *	D				5638006900
[illegible] BETTY [illegible]	GS	0301.2808		3124	OD	C	19	10	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS	0318.0107	1	3033 *	D				5638007000
[illegible] STAFF									[illegible]
OFFICER	GS	0136.0114	1	3856 I	D				[illegible]
[illegible] WILLIAM [illegible]	GS	0136.0113		3856	D	C	21	10	
[illegible]	GS	0318.0107	1	3045 I	D				[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0318.0107		3045	D	C	13	10	
[illegible] REQUIREMENTS SECTION									[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]	1	3046 I	D				[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]	2	3047 *	D				[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]		3047	OD	C	21	10	
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	3049 *	D				[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]		3049	D	C	08	10	
[illegible]		[illegible]	2	3891 *	D				[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]		3891	D	C	[illegible]	10	
[illegible]		[illegible]		3892 *	D				
[illegible]		[illegible]		3892	D	C	37	10	

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

ADM ASSISTANT	GS 0301.0207	1	3191	*	D			56380110000
SCHWEGMANN BETTY K	GS 0301.0307		3191		D	C 24	10	
CLERK STENOGRAPHER	GS 0312.0105	1	4046	*	D			56380111000
REGISTRY								56380112000
[illegible] AND FILE SUP	GS 0305.1707	1	3193	1	D			56380113000
COURIER	GS 0302.0505	2	3194	*	D			56380114000
ALLISON JAMES H	GS 0302.0504		3194		D	C 33	10	
CHADWICK J M III	GS 0302.0504		3194		D	C 39	10	
MESS AND CLUB UNIT								56380115000
STEWARD	GS 0067.0111	1	3225	1	D			56380116000
FINANCE SECTION								56380117000
FINANCE OFFICER	GS 0510.1612	1	3197	1	SF			56380118000
FINANCE OFFICER	GS 0510.1411	1	3198	*	SF			56380119000
[illegible] ACCT ASST	GS 0501.0309	1	3199	*	SF			56380120000
[illegible]	GS 0501.0308		3199		SF	C 27	10	
[illegible] ASST	GS 0501.0407	2	3200	*	SF			56380121000
[illegible] SECTION								56380122000
[illegible]	[illegible].113	1	3228	1	SL			[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible].114		3228		SL	C 01	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]112	1	3229	*	SL			5638 [illegible]
[illegible]								[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	1	[illegible]47	1	[illegible]			56380126000
[illegible]			[illegible]48	*	[illegible]			[illegible]
[illegible]								[illegible]
[illegible]			[illegible]	*	SL			[illegible]

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 [illegible]

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME				C A	SD				CONTROL NUMBER
STOREKEEPER-GEN	GS 2091.1107	1	3206	*	SL				56380130000
CLERK TYPIST	GS 0322.0105	1	3912	*	D				56380131000
STOCK CONTROL UNIT									56380132000
STOCK AND SUPPLY OF	GS 2040.0111	1	3209	1	SL				56380133000
STOCK AND SPLY ASST	GS 2040.0609	1	4049	*	SL				56380134000
[illegible] ROBERT G	GS 2040.0607		4049		SL	C 33	10		
STOCK AND SUPPLY ASST	GS 2040.0607	1	3212	*	SL				56380135000
CLERK TYPIST	GS 0322.0105	2	3901	*	D				56380136000
REAL ESTATE AND HOUSING SECTION									56380137000
REAL PROPERTY OF	GS 1170.0111	1	3220	1	SL				56380138000
[illegible] RAYMOND W	GS 1170.0111		3220		SL	C 28	10		
CLERK TYPIST	GS 0322.0105	1	3902	*	D				56380139000
TRANSPORTATION SECTION									56380140000
TRANSPORT OF	GS 2131.0111	1	3234	1	SL				56380141000
[illegible] RAYMOND [illegible]	GS 2131.0112		3234		SL	C 26	10	81	
[illegible]	GS 2131.0409	1	3235	*	SL				56380142000
[illegible]	GS [illegible].0409	1	3239	*	SL				56380143000
[illegible]	GS 0312.0106	1	3913	*	D				56380144000
[illegible]									56380145000
[illegible]	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	1	SM				56380146000
				*	SM				[illegible]
			[illegible]		SM	C 20	10		
			[illegible]	*	SM				[illegible]

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME											
SECURITY OFFICER	GS	1810.0115	1	3169	1	SS					56380150000
KNOTT WILLIAM R	GS	1810.0115		3169		SS		C	10	10	
SECURITY OFFICER	GS	1810.0114	1	3170	1	SS					56380151000
SAGRANOFF BORIS T	GS	1810.0114		3170		SS		C	13	10	
INVESTIGATOR	GS	1810.2213	1	3174	1	SS					56380152000
COLLINS WALLACE JR	GS	1810.2213		3174		SS		C	20	10	
INVESTIGATOR	GS	1810.2212	2	3174	*	SS					56380153000
INTERROGATION SPEC	GS	1810.2313	1	3178	1	SS					56380154000
TAYLOR [illegible]	GS	1810.2313		3178		SS		C	27	10	
INTERROGATION SPEC	GS	1810.2312	[illegible]	3179	*	SS					5638015500
KING GEORGE W	GS	1810.2312		3179		SS		C	23	10	
PHYSICAL SEC OF	GS	1810.0713	1	3172	1	SS					56380156000
GREGORY GORDON [illegible]	GS	1810.0712		3172		SS		C	23	10	
[illegible] SUPPORT SPEC	GS	1670.0212	1	3906	*	SS					5638-157000
RUSSELL PAUL J	GS	1670.0212		3906		SS		C	26	10	
[illegible]	GS	0318.0107	1	3171	1	SS					56380158000
CLERK-STENO	GS	0318.0106	1	3907	*	SS					56380159000
[illegible]	GS	0318.0105		3907		SS		V	39	10	
[illegible]	GS	0318.0105	1	4050	*	SS					56380160000
[illegible] REPORT [illegible]											56380161000
[illegible]		[illegible]		3907		SS			[illegible]	10	5638016[illegible]
[illegible]											5638016[illegible]

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME		SERIES	GRADE	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER				
FAR EAST DIVISION											56380001000
FOREIGN FIELD											56380002000
FE/JAO - TOKYO STATION											56380003000
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF											56380004000
CHIEF OF STATION	GS	0136.0100	1	3002	1	D					56380005000
ABOE*WILLIAM*V******	GS	0136.0116****		3002		D		C	13	10	
OPS OFFICER-DCOS	GS	0136.0115	1	3003	1	D					56380006000
[illegible] ROBERT P	GS	0136.0115		3003		D		C	15	10	
OPS OFFICER	GS	0136.0115	1	3936	1	D					56380007000
HALPERN SAMUEL	[illegible]	0136.0115		3936		D		C	22	10	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	0136.0114	2	3885	2	D					5638000[illegible]
MILLEMI RICHARD L	GS	0136.0112		3885		D		C	25	10	
LEICHLITER VYRL F	GS	0136.0114		3885		D		C	19	10	
OPS ASSISTANT	GS	0301.0209	1	3004	1	D					5638000[illegible]
[illegible] MARION [illegible]	GS	0301.0208		3004		D		C	17	10	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS	0318.0109	1	3005	1	D					5638001[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0318.0108		3005		D		C	10	10	
[illegible] ASSISTANT	GS	0301.0207	2	3006	*	D					56380011000
[illegible] P J	GS	0301.0205		3006		D		C	38	10	
[illegible]	GS	0301.0206		3006		D		C	18	10	85
[illegible]-STENO	GS	0318.0107	1	3073	1	D					5638001[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]301.2605	1	3087	*	D					5638001[illegible]
[illegible] SECTION											56380014[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3061	1	D					5638001[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3061		D		C	14	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3061		D		C	28	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]					56380016000
[illegible]				[illegible]	*	D					[illegible]

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

TRANSLATION SECTION							[illegible]
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	136.0113	1 3830 1	D			[illegible]
[illegible]MIKAWA TARAO	GS	136.0113	3830	OD	C 14	10	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	136.0112	1 3055 *	D			563800[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	136.5112	3055	D	C 16	10	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	[illegible]033.0111	2 3056 *	D			563800[illegible]
[illegible] PAUL T	GS	[illegible]033.0109	3056	OD	C 17	10	
SUGIMOTO SAM S	GS	[illegible]033.0111	3056	OD	C 18	10	
[illegible]	GS	[illegible]033.0109	3056	D	C 19	10	
[illegible]ANSLATOR	GS	[illegible]037.0109	2 3058 *	D			[illegible]
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	136.0109	1 3054 *	D			[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	2 3060 *	D			[illegible]
[illegible]							[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	[illegible].0315	1 3147 1	SA			[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	[illegible].0315	3147	SA	C 11	10	
[illegible]	GS	971.0114	1 3040 1	SA			[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	[illegible].0114	3040	SA2	C 19	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1 3149 1	D			5638000[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3149	D	C 3[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	GS	[illegible]	1 3104 1	SP			[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	[illegible]	3104	SP	C 13	[illegible]	
[illegible]	GS	[illegible]	1 [illegible]	SP			[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	[illegible]	[illegible]	SP	C 2[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SP			563800[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SP	[illegible]		

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 [illegible]

			Position Number	C.A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER			Type Emp Code		CONTROL NUMBER
[illegible]ARCAVAGE A G	GS [illegible]318.[illegible]105		3893		D		C	36	10		
[illegible]NANCE OFFICER	GS [illegible]51[illegible].1414	1	3164	1	SF						563[illegible]
[illegible]ORMENT CLARENCE [illegible]	GS 051[illegible].1414		3164		SF		C	23	10		
[illegible]ANCE OFFICER	GS [illegible]510.1412	1	3165	*	SF						563800960[illegible]
[illegible]RTIN ELWOOD D	GS 051[illegible].1412		3165		SF		C	26	10	82	
[illegible]CAL ACCT ASST	GS [illegible]501.[illegible]309	[illegible]	[illegible]66	*	SF						56380097[illegible]
[illegible]UNHAM WILLIS F	GS 0501.[illegible]309		[illegible]66		SF		C	24	10		
[illegible]ISCAL ACCT ASST	GS 0501.0307	2	3167	*	SF						563R0098000
DOHERTY WILLIAM F	GS 0501.0307		3167		SF		C	30	10		
[illegible]ILCOTT JAMES M JR	GS [illegible]501.[illegible]305		3167		SF		C	31	10		
[illegible] ASSISTANT	GS [illegible]301.0207	1	3894	*	D						56380099000
[illegible]RPIEN MARGUERITE	GS [illegible]301.0206		3894		D		C	22	10		
[illegible]URITY OFFICER	GS 1810.0113	1	3183	1	SS						563801[illegible]
[illegible]AULKNER THOMAS [illegible]	GS 1810.[illegible]113		3183		SS		C	13	10		
[illegible]URITY OFFICER	GS 1810.0112	1	3184	*	SS						56380101[illegible]
[illegible]URCH JOHN [illegible]	GS 1810.[illegible]112		3184		SS		C	19	10		
[illegible]YPIST	GS [illegible]322.[illegible]106	1	3895	*	D						56380102000
[illegible]	GS 117[illegible].[illegible]112	1	3995	1	SL						56380103000
[illegible]	GS 1170.0112		3995		SL		C	15	10		
[illegible]	GS [illegible].[illegible]11[illegible]	1	3216	*	SL						56380104000
[illegible]	GS [illegible]		3216		SL		C	10	10	82	
[illegible]	GS [illegible]	1	3896	*	D						56380105000
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	*	SM						56380106000
											563801070[illegible]
											563801[illegible]
			[illegible]		SA						563801[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 06/30/61 [illegible]

Position Title and Incumbent Name	Sched	Occup Series	Grade	Plan Incumbency	Position Number	C. A.	SD	Employee Number	Fund	Yr Birth	Sex	Type Emp Code	W O P	Date of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	PCS O S Date Mo	Yr	Station Code	Level Complement Date in Mo.	Da.	Yr	Orgn	Special Reference	Control Number
MAIL AND FILE SUP	GS	0305.1709		1	3009	1	D																		56380018000
NOLAN JAMES P	GS	0305.1708			3009		D		C	27		10													
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS	0301.2807		2	3064	*	D																		56380019000
LUCK EDWIN L	GS	0301.2807			3064		D		C	22		10													
THOMPSON JOSEPH M	GS	0301.2807			3064		D		C	25		10													
MAIL AND FILE SUP	GS	0305.1707		1	3010	1	D																		5638002000
HITER AARON	GS	0305.1706			3010		D		C	14		10													
MAIL AND FILE CLERK	GS	0305.0505		1	3011	*	D																		56380021000
COURIER	GS	0302.0505		2	3014	*	D																		56380022000
WEST JAMES H	M4	0302.05E5			3014		D		C	34		30													
21		15							1																
MILITARY OPERATIONS COORDINATION STAFF																									56380023000
FS OFFICER	GS	0136.0114		1	3020	1	D																		56380024000
SECRETARY-STENO	GS	0318.0106		1	3819	*	D																		56380025000
2																									
[illegible]																									56380026000
[illegible]		136.0113		1	3823	1	D																		56380027000
[illegible]		136.0112			3823		D		C	2[illegible]		10													
[illegible]		[illegible].2809		1	3827	*	D																		5638002[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible].2807			3827		D		C	30		10													
[illegible]		[illegible].2809			3827		D		C	15		10													
		[illegible].0114		1	3911	1	D																		[illegible]

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

WEST DAVID C	GS 0136.0114		1911		D	C 24	10	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS 0136.0113	2	1914	*	D			5636003100
[illegible]MER IRVING F	GS 0136.5113		1914		D	C 24	10	
HICKCOX EDWARD L	GS 0136.5113		1914		D	C 25	10	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS 0136.0112	6	2753	*	D			5638003200
[illegible] ROGER L	GS 0136.0111		2753		D	C 27	10	
BEAL ALAN GORDON	GS 0136.5112		2753		D	C 26	10	
[illegible]ASHIMA FRANK A	GS 0136.5112		2753		D	C 17	10	
PICKARD JOHN G	GS 0136.0112		2793		D	C 26	10	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS 0136.0111	2	1919	*	D			563600[illegible]
INTERPRETER	GS 0033.0111	1	1920	*	D			563600340[illegible]
[illegible] KEN M	GS 0033.0111		1920		D	C 20	10	
[illegible] OFFICER	[illegible] 0132.5812	1	1923	*	D			[illegible]
[illegible]ILLIAMS [illegible]	[illegible] 0132.5811		1923		D	C 26	10	
TELEPHONE [illegible]	[illegible] 0391.2807	1	1925	*	D			[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] 0391.2806		1925		D	C 24	10	
[illegible]	[illegible] 0391.2706	1	2881	*	D			5636003700
[illegible] TYPIST	GS 0322.0105	1	1927	*	D			5636003800
[illegible]	[illegible] 0322.0105		1927		D	C 21	10	
[illegible]	11							
[illegible]								5636003900
[illegible]	[illegible].0116	1	2447	1	D			563600[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible].0116		2447		D	C 18	10	
[illegible]	[illegible].0111		2447		D	C 15	10	
	[illegible].0115	1	2448	*	D			[illegible]
	[illegible].0112	[illegible]	3394	*	D			[illegible]
	[illegible].0113		3394		D	C 24	[illegible]	
	[illegible].0112		3394		D	C 26	10	
	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	C 22	10	
	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	C 17	10	

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

2ND 06/30/61

		GRADE	PLAN INCUM BENCY	Position Number	C.A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	N D			W G P	DATE OF GRADE	ACS O S DATE	STATION CODE	
[illegible]BAYASHI TAKEO	M? [illegible]136.0103			3354		D		C	20	30					
[illegible] OFFICER	GS 0136.0111		1	3716	*	D									5638004[illegible]
[illegible] OFFICER	GS 0136.0109		2	2452	*	D									563800440[illegible]
ZIMMERMAN IONE K	GS 0136.5109			2452		D		C	07	10					
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS 0301.2807		1	3718	*	D									5638004500
[illegible] FRANCES [illegible]	GS 0301.2807			3718		D		C	22	10					
CLERK STENOGRAPHER	GS 0312.0106		1	3380	*	D									563800460[illegible]
11	8							1							
INTERNAL OPERATIONS BRANCH															56380047000
OPS OFFICER	GS 0136.0115		1	3074	I	D									563800480[illegible]
[illegible] WILLIAM [illegible]	GS 0136.0115			3074		D		C	11	10					
[illegible] OFFICER	GS 0136.0114		4	3075	*	D									563800490[illegible]
THOMPSON ROBERT F	GS 0136.0113			3075		D		C	26	10					
[illegible] WILLIAM H	GS 0136.0114			3075		D		C	26	10					
[illegible] JOHN	GS 0136.0114			3075		D		C	21	10					
[illegible] OFFICER	GS 0136.0113		6	3079	*	D									563800500[illegible]
[illegible] DONALD [illegible]	GS 0136.0113			3079		D		C	27	10					
[illegible] GRANT [illegible]	GS 0136.0112			3079		D		C	19	10					
[illegible]	GS 0136.0112			3079		D		C	24	10					
[illegible]	GS 0136.0113			3079		D		C	20	10					
[illegible]	GS 0136.0113			3079		15		C	22	10					
[illegible]	GS 0136.0112			3079		D		C	26	10					
[illegible] OFFICER	[illegible] 0136.0112		6	3089	*	D									563800510[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] 0136.0111			3089		D		[illegible]	31	10					
[illegible]	[illegible] 0136.0112			3089		D		C	20	10					
[illegible]	[illegible] 0136.0112			[illegible]		D		C	30	10					
[illegible]	[illegible] 0136.0112			[illegible]		D		C	26	10					
[illegible]	[illegible] 0136.0112			[illegible]		D		C	24	10					
[illegible]	[illegible] 0136.0112			3089		D		C	28	10					
				3096	*	D									[illegible]
				3096		D		C	33	10					
				[illegible]96		D		C	23	10					

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

1[illegible] 06/30/61

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME		OCCUP SERIES		POSITION NUMBER			SD				TYPE EMP CODE			ACCOUNT NUMBER
YOUNG HUGH W	GS	0136.0110		3096		D		C	31		10			
LIDGERWOOD MARK J	GS	0136.0110		3096		D		C	31		10			
WILL ROBERT J JR	GS	0136.0111		3096		D		C	27		10			
OPS OFFICER	GS	0136.0109	2	3099	*	D								56380053000
PADEN JERARD MAX	GS	0136.0110		3099		D		C	33		10		02	
KOYAMA SPADY AYATO	H1	0136.0104		3099		D		C	17		30			
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS	0301.2809	2	3103	*	D								56380054000
ADM ASSISTANT	GS	0301.0209	1	3105	*	D								56380055000
SECRETARY-STENO	GS	0318.0107	3	3106	*	D								56380056000
LEICHLITER E H	GS	0318.0107		3106		D		C	22		10			
MARTINO MARGARET C	GS	0318.0107		3106		D		C	25		10			
PEDERSEN C A	GS	0318.0105		3106		D		C	37		10			
SECRETARY-STENO	GS	0318.0105	2	3888	*	D								56380057000
PITTENGER ALICE H	GS	0318.0105		3888		D		C	31		10			
ROSE VIRGINIA	GS	0318.0105		3888		D		C	39		10			
33		27						1						
KOBE BRANCH														56380058000
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	0136.0114	1	3126	*	D								56380059000
[illegible] CHARLES A	GS	0136.0113		3126		D		C	22		10			
[illegible] OFFICER	GS	0136.0113	1	3127	*	D								5638006[illegible]
[illegible] GEORGE W	GS	0136.0113		3127		D		C	27		10			
[illegible]LLIGENCE ASST	GS	0301.2809	1	3128	*	D								5638006[illegible]
[illegible] ROBERTA J	GS	0301.2810		3128		D		C	24		10		01	
[illegible]	GS	0301.2807		3128		D		C	31		10			
[illegible]LIGENCE ASST	GS	0301.2807	1	4044	*	D								5638006[illegible]
[illegible]														5638006[illegible]
[illegible]														563806[illegible]

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

240 [illegible]

TITLE / NAME	GROUP SERIES	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Race	SEX	Type Emp Code	REMARKS
[illegible]RROWS HERBERT [illegible]	GS 0136.0114		3831		D		C	21		10	
OPS OFFICER	GS 0136.0114	2	3832	*	D						56380006500.
NELSON GLENN W	GS 0136.0114		3832		D		C	21		10	
OPS OFFICER	GS 0136.0113	2	3111	*	D						5638006600.
KUROTA KINJI	GS 0136.0112		3111		D		C	13		10	
DOWNS JAMES A	GS 0136.0112		3111		D		C	19		10	
OPS OFFICER	GS 0136.0112	2	3113	*	D						5638006700.
NAKAMURA GEORGE	GS 0136.0112		3113		D		C	19		10	
SAGAMI KAN	GS 0136.0112		3113		D		C	18		10	
NAGASE SATOSHI	GS 0136.0112		3113		D		C	16		10	
OPS OFFICER	GS 0136.0111	2	3116	*	D						5638006800.
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS 0301.2809	1	3124	*	D						5638006900.
HIRAGA BETTY N	GS 0301.2808		3124		DD		C	19		10	
SECRETARY-STENO	GS 0318.0107	1	3833	*	D						5638007000.
11	4										
INTELLIGENCE STAFF											5638007100.
OFFICER	GS 0136.0114	1	3856	1	D						5638007200.
[illegible] WILLIAM A	GS 0135.0113		3856		D		C	21		10	
[illegible]	GS 0318.0107	1	3045	1	D						5638007300.
[illegible]	GS 0318.0107		3045		D		C	13		10	
[illegible] REQUIREMENTS SECTION											5638007400.
[illegible]	[illegible].9811	1	3046	1	D						5638007500
[illegible]	[illegible].9812	2	3047	*	D						5638007600.
[illegible]	[illegible].9812		3047		DD			21		1	
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	*	D						5638007700
			[illegible]		D					1	
				*	D						56380078[illegible]

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

		GRADE	ENCUM-BENCY	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER			STATION CODE
[illegible] CLERK-TYP	GS 0301.3009		1	3892	*	D				5638007900[illegible]
TAMBILL W A	GS 0301.3005			3892		D		C 37	10	
TRANSLATION SECTION										5638000800[illegible]
[illegible] OFFICER	GS 0136.0113		1	3830	1	D				5638000810[illegible]
[illegible]IKAWA TARAO	GS 0136.0113			3830		OD		C 14	10	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS 0136.0112		1	3055	*	D				5638000820[illegible]
SAKAI AKIRA	GS 0136.0112			3055		D		C 16	10	
INTERPRETER	GS 0033.0111		2	3056	*	D				56[illegible]
[illegible]AMAKI PAUL I	GS 0033.0109			3056		OD		C 17	10	
[illegible]ONAGA [illegible]	GS 0033.0109			3056		D		C 15	10	
TRANSLATOR	GS 0031.0109		2	3058	*	D				5638000840[illegible]
[illegible] OFFICER	GS 0136.0109		1	3054	*	D				563800085[illegible]
TYPIST	GS 0322.0105		1	3060	*	D				563800086[illegible]
17	10									
[illegible] STAFF-TOKYO										5638000870[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0301.0315		1	3147	1	SA				5638000880[illegible]
[illegible]	GS [illegible].0315			3147		SA		C 11	10	
[illegible]	GS 0970.0114		1	3040	1	SA				5638000890[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0970.0114			3A0		SA2		C 15	10	
[illegible]	GS 0318.0107		1	3169	1	D				5638000900[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]			3169		D		C 39	10	
	[illegible].0114		1	3154	1	SP				563800091[illegible]
	[illegible].0114			3154		SP		C 11	10	
[illegible]	[illegible].0112		1	4045	*	SP				563800092[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible].0112			4045		SP		C 29	10	
	[illegible]		1	3155	*	SP				563800093[illegible]
				3155		SP		C 29	10	

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 06/30/61 926 F1

Position Title and Employee Name	Pay Plan	Occup Series Grade	Plan Incumbency	Position Number	C.A.	SD	Employee Number	U N D	Yr Birth	Type Emp Code	[illegible]	Control Number
SECRETARY-STENO	GS	0318.0706	1	3893	*	D						5638009400
[illegible]ARCAVAGE A [illegible]	GS	0318.0105		3893		D		C	36	10		
FINANCE OFFICER	GS	0510.1414	1	3164	1	SF						5638009500
[illegible] CLARENCE F	GS	0510.1414		3164		SF		C	23	10		
FINANCE OFFICER	GS	0510.1411	1	3165	*	SF						5638009600
MARTIN [illegible] D	GS	0510.1412		3165		SF		C	26	10	02	
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS	0501.0309	1	3166	*	SF						[illegible]
[illegible] WILLIS F	GS	0501.0309		3166		SF		C	24	10		
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS	0501.0307	2	3167	*	SF						[illegible]
[illegible] WILLIAM E	GS	0501.0307		3167		SF		C	30	10		
[illegible] JAMES B JR	GS	0501.0305		3167		SF		C	31	10		
[illegible] ASSISTANT	GS	0301.0207	1	3894	*	D						[illegible]
[illegible] MARGUERITE	GS	0301.0206		3894		D		C	22	10		
[illegible]ITY OFFICER	GS	1810.0113	1	3183	1	SS						[illegible]
[illegible]ULKNER THOMAS W	GS	1810.0113		3183		SS		C	13	10		
[illegible]ITY OFFICER	GS	1810.0112	1	3184	*	SS						[illegible]
[illegible]RCN JOHN [illegible]	GS	1810.0112		3184		SS		C	19	10		
[illegible] TYPIST	GS	0322.0105	1	3895	*	D						56380102[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0322.0105		3895		SS		C	37	10		
[illegible]	GS	[illegible].0112	1	3995	1	SL						563801[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	[illegible].0112		3995		SL		C	15	10		
[illegible]		[illegible].0111	1	3216	*	SL						563801[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible].0112		3216		SL		C	1	10	02	
		[illegible]	1	3896	*	D						563801050[illegible]
		[illegible]	1	3918	*	SN						5638010[illegible]

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

Title / Name	Plan Series Grade	Incumbency	Position Number	C.A	SO	C N D		Type Emp Code	Code
[illegible]	GS 0301.0315	1	3188	1	SA				5638010900[illegible]
[illegible] ASSISTANT	GS 0301.0207	1	3191	*	D				5638011000[illegible]
[illegible]MANN [illegible] K	GS 0301.0307		3191		D	C	24	10	
[illegible] STENOGRAPHER	GS 0312.0105	1	4046	*	D				5638011100[illegible]
REGISTRY									56380112000
[illegible] AND FILE [illegible]	GS 0305.1707	1	3193	1	D				56380113000
[illegible]	GS 0302.0505	2	3194	*	D				5638011400[illegible]
CHADWICK J M III	GS 0302.0504		3194		D	C	39	10	
ALLISON JAMES [illegible]	GS 0302.0504		3194		D	C	33	10	
MESS AND CLUB UNIT									56380[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]0347.0111	1	3225	[illegible]	D				[illegible]
[illegible]									5638011[illegible]
[illegible] OFFICER	[illegible] 0510.1412	1	3197	1	SF				563801[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] 0510.1412		3197		SF	C	24	10	
[illegible]	[illegible] 0510.1411	1	3198	*	SF				563801[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]0501.0[illegible]	2	3199	*	SF				563[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]0501.0[illegible]6		3199		SF	C	27	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]05[illegible].[illegible]07	2	3200	*	SF				563801[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		3200		SF	C	15	10	
[illegible]									563801[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3228	1	SL				563801[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		3228		SL	C	01	10	65
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3229	*	[illegible]				5638012[illegible]
									563801[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]				563[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]				56[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

	Series	GRADE	PLAN INCUM-BENCY	Position Number	C.A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER		
WAREHOUSING UNIT									56380128[illegible]
STOREKEEPER-GEN	GS 2030.1109		1	3205	*	SL			56380129[illegible]
STOREKEEPER-GEN	GS 2030.1107		1	3206	*	SL			56380130000
CLERK TYPIST	GS 0322.0109		1	3912	*	D			56380131000
STOCK CONTROL UNIT									56380132000
PROP AND SUPPLY OF	GS 2040.0111		1	3209	1	SL			563801330[illegible]
PROP AND SPLY ASST	GS 2040.0609		1	4049	*	SL			56380134000
GENTNER ROBERT G.	GS 2040.0607			4049		SL	C 33	10	
PROP AND SUPPLY ASST	GS 2040.0607		1	3212	*	SL			563801350[illegible]
[illegible] TYPIST	GS 0322.0105		2	3901	*	D			56380136000
[illegible] AND HOUSING SECTION									56380137000
PROPERTY OF	GS 1170.0111		1	3220	1	SL			56380138000
[illegible] RAYMOND [illegible]	GS 1170.0111			3220		SL	C 28	10	
[illegible]	GS 0322.0105		1	3902	*	D			56380139000
[illegible] STATION SECTION									56380140000
[illegible]	GS 2101.0111		1	3234	1	SL			56380141000
[illegible]	GS 2101.0112			3234		SL	C 26	10	
[illegible] ASST	GS 2101.0609		1	3243	*	SL			563801420[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		1	3239	*	SL			56380143000
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	*	[illegible]			563801440[illegible]
[illegible]									563801450[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	1	SM			56380146000
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]		SM	[illegible]	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	*	SM			563801470[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]		SM	[illegible]	[illegible]	

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible] TECH	GS 1645.0109	1 3151 * SM			563801480000
14	12				
[illegible] AREA SECURITY BRANCH - ATSUGI					563801490000
SECURITY OFFICER	GS 1810.0115	1 3169 1 SS			563801500000
[illegible] WILLIAM [illegible]	GS 1810.0115	3169 SS	C 15	10	
SECURITY OFFICER	GS 1810.0114	1 3170 1 SS			563801510000
[illegible]SANDOFF BORIS [illegible]	GS 1810.0114	3170 SS	C 13	10	
INVESTIGATOR	GS 1810.2213	1 3174 1 SS			563801520000
[illegible]OLLINS WALLACE JR	GS 1810.2213	3174 SS	C 20	10	
INVESTIGATOR	GS 1810.2212	2 3176 * SS			563801530000
[illegible]OLLINGER JOHN [illegible]	GS 1810.2212	3176 SS	C 22	10	
[illegible]RRY EDWARD J	GS 1810.2212	3176 SS	C 23	10	
[illegible]ATION SPEC	GS 1810.2313	1 3178 1 SS			56380154000
[illegible] ROBERT A	GS 1810.2313	3178 SS	C 27	10	
INTERROGATION SPEC	GS 1810.2312	3 3179 * SS			563801550000
[illegible]ANNIN NOEL [illegible]	GS 1810.2312	3179 SS	C 29	10	
[illegible] GEORGE [illegible]	GS 1810.2312	3179 SS	C 23	10	
[illegible]	GS 1810.0713	1 3172 1 SS			563801560000
[illegible]	1810.0712	3172 SS	C 23	10	
	[illegible].0212	1 3906 * SS			563801570000
	[illegible].0212	3906 SS	C 26	10	
	[illegible].0211	3906 SS	C 26	10	
	[illegible]	1 317[illegible] SS			[illegible]
	[illegible].0156	317[illegible] SS	C 37	10	
	[illegible]	1 3907 * SS			[illegible]
	[illegible]	3907 SS	[illegible]	[illegible]	
		1 [illegible] * SS			563801600000

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 06/30/61 [illegible] FE

ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEE NAME	SAL. SC	OCCUP. SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C A SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	F U N D	[illegible]	S TYPE Code	W O P	DATE OF GRADE Mo. Da. Yr.	PCS Q/S DATE Mo. Yr.	STATION CODE	Date In Mo. Da. Yr.	COMPLEMENT Cnt. Cnt.	[illegible]	POSITION CONTROL NUMBER
PENDING REASSIGNMENT TO CURRENT S/C																		5638016100
PENDING REASSIGNMENT [illegible] ROBERT A	GS	0136.0??		3457	6F		C 30	10										5638016200
TOTAL PRJ/ADO - TOKYO STATION																		5638016300
TL INC 184	2001	1	184				MIL 8				ADP							

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

	[illegible]		1916		0	C 2[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]		[illegible]		0	C 2[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	136-0112	6	2753	@	D		
[illegible]	136-3111		2753		D	C 27	10
[illegible]	136-9112		2753		D	C 26	10
	136-9112		2753		D	C 17	10
	[illegible]		2753		D	C [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	2	1919	@	D		
	[illegible]		[illegible]	@	[illegible]		
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	C 20	10
[illegible]	0132-5012		1928	@	D		
	[illegible]		1928		D	C [illegible]	10
	[illegible]		1925	@	D		
	[illegible]		1925		D	C [illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	1	2541	@	D		
	[illegible]	1	1927	@	D		
	[illegible]		1927		D	C 21	10
	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		
	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	C [illegible]	
			[illegible]		[illegible]		
			[illegible]		[illegible]		
	[illegible]		[illegible]	@	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		[illegible]			C 26	10
	[illegible]		1954		0	C 21	10
			[illegible]			C [illegible]	10
			[illegible]			C [illegible]	[illegible]
			[illegible]			[illegible]	10

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

Position Title and Incumbent Name	Pay Plan	Occup Series	Plan Incumbency	Position Number	C. A.	SD	Fund	Yr Birth	Type Emp Code	Number
OFFICER	GS	0136.0109	2	2452	*	D				56 [illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0136.5109		2452		D	C	07	10	
INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	GS	0301.2807	1	3718	*	D				56 [illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0301.2807		3718		D	C	22	10	
[illegible]	GS	0312.0106	1	3380	*	D				56 [illegible]
[illegible] OPERATIONS BRANCH										56 [illegible]
OFFICER	GS	0136.0115	1	3074	1	D				56 [illegible]
[illegible] WILLIAM [illegible]	GS	0136.0115		3074		D	C	11	10	
OFFICER	[illegible]	0136.0114	4	3075	*	D				[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	0136.0113		3075		D	C	26	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	0136.0114		3075		D	C	26	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	0136.0114		3075		D	C	21	10	
[illegible]	GS	0136.0113	6	3079	*	D				56 [illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0136.0113		3079		D	C	20	10	
[illegible]	GS	0136.5112		3079		D	C	19	10	
[illegible] CHESTER [illegible]	[illegible]	0136.0112		3079		D	C	24	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	0136.0113		3079		D	C	27	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	0136.0112		3079		D	C	26	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	136.0113		3079		IS	C	22	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	0136.0112	[illegible]	[illegible]	*	D				56 [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3089		[illegible]	C	[illegible]	10	
[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	C	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	C	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		D	C	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		D	C	[illegible]	10	
[illegible]		[illegible]		3089		D	C	26	10	
[illegible]				[illegible]		[illegible]	C	26	[illegible]	
				[illegible]	*	D				56 [illegible]
				[illegible]		[illegible]	C	[illegible]	10	
				[illegible]		[illegible]	C	31	10	
				[illegible]		[illegible]	C	24	10	
				[illegible]		[illegible]	C	27	10	

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

	Pay Plan / Series	Plan Incumbency	Position Number	C A	SD	Employee Number	Fund	Yr Birth	Type Appt Code		Code
[illegible]	GS 0136.011[illegible]		3096		D		C	31	10		
OFFICER	GS 0136.0109	2	3099	*	D						5638[illegible]
AUER GERARD MAX	GS 0136.0110		3099		D		C	35	10	82	
YAMA SPUDY AYATO	M1 0136.0104		3099		D		C	17	30		
LIGENCE ASST	GS 0301.2809	2	3103	*	D						5638[illegible]
ASSISTANT	GS 0301.0209	1	3105	*	D						56380[illegible]
RETARY-STENO	GS 0318.0107	3	3106	*	D						56380[illegible]
MARTINO MARGARET	GS 0318.0107		3106		D		C	25	10		
LICHLITER L H	GS 0318.0107		3106		D		C	22	10		
WOERSEN C J	GS 0318.0105		3106		D		C	37	10		
TARY-STENO	GS 0318.0105	2	3888	*	D						5638[illegible]
LINGER ALICE M	GS 0318.0105		3888		D		C	31	10		
VIRGINIA	GS 0318.0105		3888		D		C	39	10		
23	28						1				
BRANCH											5638[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0136.0114	1	3126	1	D						5638[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0136.0113		3126		D		C	22	10		
ICER	GS 0136.0113	1	3127	*	D						5638[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0136.0113		3127		D		C	27	10		
[illegible] ASST	GS 0301.2809	1	3128	*	D						5638[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0301.2810		3128		D		C	24	10	81	
[illegible]	GS 0301.2807		3128		D		C	31	10		
[illegible]	[illegible]	1	4344	*	D						5638[illegible]
[illegible]											56[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	D						56[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		3831		D		C	21	10		

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

[illegible]	[illegible]	OCCUP SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUM BENE	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O/S DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE	DEFERRED COMPLEMENT	[illegible]
OFFICER	GS	0136.0114		2	3832	*	D											5638[illegible]
NELSON GLE[illegible] W	GS	0136.0114			3832		D		C	21		10						
OFFICER	GS	0136.0113		2	3111	*	D											5638[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0136.0112			3111		D		C	13		10						
[illegible]	GS	0136.0112			3111		D		C	19		10						
OFFICER	GS	0136.0112		2	3113	*	D											5638[illegible]
NAKAMURA GEORGE	GS	0136.0112			3113		D		C	19		10						
NAGASE SATOSHI	GS	0136.0112			3113		D		C	16		10						
[illegible] KAN	GS	0136.0112			3113					18							APP	
OFFICER	GS	0136.0111		2	3116	*	D											5638[illegible]
[illegible]IGENCE ASST	GS	0301.2809		1	3124	*	D											5638[illegible]
[illegible]ASA BETTE N	GS	0301.2808			3124		OD		C	19		10						
[illegible]TARY-STENO	GS	0318.0107		1	3833	*	D											5638[illegible]
11		7																
[illegible]																		563[illegible]
[illegible]ICER	GS	0136.0114		1	3856	1	D											5638[illegible]
WILLIA[illegible]	GS	0136.0113			3856		D		C	21		10						
[illegible]	GS	0318.0107		1	3045	1	D											5638[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	0318.0107			3045		D		C	13		10						
[illegible]	GS	0318.0107			3045		D		C	31		10						
[illegible] SECTION																		563[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	3046	1	D											563[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	0132.5817			3046		D		[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]						
[illegible]	[illegible]	0132.5812		2	3047	*	[illegible]											563[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			3047		[illegible]											
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]											563[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]		D		[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]						
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	[illegible]	*	D											563[illegible]

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

Position Title and Employee Name	Pay Plan	Occupation Series	Grade	Plan Incumbency	Position Number	C.A.	SD	Employee Number	CND	Yr Birth	Type Emp Code	Remarks
[illegible]	G[illegible]	0301.2806			3891		D		C	36	10	
[illegible]	GS	0301.3805		1	3892	*	D					563800[illegible]
[illegible]	G[illegible]	0301.3009			3892		D		C	36	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	0301.3055			3892		D		C	37	10	
[illegible] SECTION												5638[illegible]
[illegible]ICER	GS	0136.0113		1	3830	1	D					563800[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	0136.0114			3830		DD		C	14	10	
[illegible]OFFICER	GS	0136.0112		1	3055	*	D					563900[illegible]
[illegible]AKAI AR[illegible]	GS	0136.5112			3055		D		C	16	10	
[illegible]WRITER	GS	0133.0111		2	3056	*	D					563800[illegible]
[illegible]SOGAGA CH[illegible]	[illegible]	0133.0109			3056		D		C	35	10	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible].0119			3056		DD		C	17	10	
[illegible]	GS	[illegible]		1	3058	*	D					563800[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	136.[illegible]		1	3054	*	D					563[illegible]
		322.[illegible]		1	3060	*	D					[illegible]
		[illegible].315			[illegible]							563[illegible]
		[illegible].315			[illegible]				C	[illegible]	10	
		[illegible]			[illegible]		[illegible]					[illegible]
		[illegible]			[illegible]		[illegible]				10	
		[illegible]			[illegible]							563[illegible]
		[illegible]			314[illegible]				C	37	10	
		[illegible]1.0[illegible]			[illegible]		DD					563807[illegible]
		[illegible]			[illegible]		D		C	1[illegible]	10	
		[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	*	D					563800[illegible]

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

140 05/11/[illegible]

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	OCCUP SERIES	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C. A.	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	N D	Yr Born	Type Emp Code		
[illegible]CKLEY JUSTIN J	GS 0201.0111		3155		SP		C	23	10		
[illegible]ETARY-STENO	GS 0318.0706	1	3893	*	D						563800.4000
MARCAVAGE A G	GS 0318.0105		3893		D		C	36	10		
FINANCE OFFICER	GS 0510.1414	1	3164	1	SF						563800.5000
[illegible] CLARENCE F	GS 0510.1414		3164		SF		C	23	10		
FINANCE OFFICER	GS 0510.1411	1	3165	*	SF						56380[illegible]
MARTIN ELWOOD [illegible]	GS 0510.1412		3165		SF		C	26	10	82	
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS 0501.0309	1	3166	*	SF						563800.7000
[illegible] WILLIS [illegible]	GS 0501.0309		3166		SF		C	24	10		
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS 0501.0307	2	3167	*	SF						563800.8000
DOHERTY WILLIAM E	GS 0501.0307		3167		SF		C	30	10		
[illegible] JAMES B JR	GS 0501.0305		3167		SF		C	31	10		
[illegible] ASSISTANT	GS 0301.0207	1	3894	*	D						56380[illegible]
[illegible] MARGUERITE	GS 0301.02[illegible]		[illegible]		D		C	22	10		
SECURITY OFFICER	GS 1810.0113	1	3163	1	SS						56380[illegible]
FAULKNER THOMAS [illegible]	GS 1810.0113		3163		SS		C	13	10		
SECURITY OFFICER	GS 1810.0112	1	3184	*	SS						56380[illegible]
[illegible] JOHN [illegible]	GS 1810.0112		3184		SS		C	19	10		
[illegible] TYPIST	GS 0322.0105	1	3895	*	D						56380[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 0322.0105		3895		SS		C	37	10		
PROPERTY [illegible]	GS 1170.0112	1	3955	1	SL						56380[illegible]
[illegible]	GS 1170.0112		[illegible]		SL		C	15	10		
SUPPLY [illegible]	GS [illegible].0111	1	3216	*	SL						56380[illegible]
[illegible]	GS [illegible].0112		3216		SL		C	10	10	82	
[illegible]	GS [illegible].0112		3216		SL		C	19	10	81	
	GS 03[illegible]	1	[illegible]896	*	D						[illegible]
	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	*	SM						[illegible]
	[illegible]		[illegible]		SM		C	24	[illegible]		

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
[illegible]

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

TA[illegible] 03/3[illegible] F4

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	Type	OCCUP SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yr Birth	SEX	Type Emp Code	WCP	DATE OF GRADE			PCS O/S DATE		STATION CODE	DEVEL COMPLEMENT Date In			CTOY	Origin	Special Reference	CONTROL NUMBER
														Mo	Da	Yr	Mo	Yr		Mo	Da	Yr				
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF																										56380108000
OFFICER	GS	0301.0315		1	3188	1	SA																			56380109000
ASSISTANT	GS	0301.0207		1	3191	*	D																			56380110000
SCHLEGMANN BETTY K	GS	0301.0307			3191		D		C	24		10														
STENOGRAPHER	GS	0312.0105		1	4046	*	D																			563801110[illegible]
REGISTRY																										56380112000
[illegible] AND FILE SUP	GS	0305.1707		1	3190	1	D																			56380113000
[illegible]	GS	0312.0505		2	3194	*	D																			56[illegible]
[illegible]ADWICK J H III	GS	0312.0504			3194		D		C	39		10														
[illegible]LLISON JAMES H	GS	0312.0504			3194		D		C	33		10														
MESS AND CLUB UNIT																										56380115000
[illegible]O	GS	0067.0111		1	3225	1	D																			56380116000
[illegible]NANCE SECTION																										56380117000
[illegible]FICER	GS	0510.1412		1	3157	1	SF																			56380118000
[illegible]	GS	0510.1412			3157		SF		C	24		10														
[illegible]FICER	GS	0510.1411		1	3198	*	SF																			5638011[illegible]000
[illegible]	GS	0501.0309		2	3199	*	SF																			56380120000
[illegible]	GS	0501.0308			3199		SF		C	27		10														
[illegible]	GS	0501.0307		2	3200	*	SF																			56380121000
[illegible]	GS	0501.0307			3200		SF		C	19		10														
[illegible] SECTION																										56380122000
[illegible]	GS	2120.0113		1	3228	1	SL																			56380123000
[illegible]	GS	2120.0114			3228		SL		C	01		10													65	
[illegible]	GS	2120.0112		1	3229	*	SL																			56380124000
[illegible]	GS	2120.0106			3229		SL		C	32		10														
[illegible] SECTION																										56380125[illegible]
[illegible]	GS	2140.0112		[illegible]	[illegible]		SL																			56[illegible]

SECRET

DocId

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	Pay Plan / Occup Series / GRADE	Plan Incumbency / Position Number / C A SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND	Yrs	Type Code	DATE OF GRADE Mo. Da. Yr.	PCS DATE Mo. Yr.	STATION CODE	DEVEL COMPLEMENT Mo. Da. Yr.		
[illegible] TYPIST	GS 0322.0105	1 4040 * D										5638[illegible]
WAREHOUSING UNIT												563801[illegible]
[illegible]KEEPER-GEN	GS 2030.1109	1 3205 * SL										5638[illegible]
[illegible] RICHARD I	GS 2030.1109	3205 SL		C	22	10						
[illegible]KEEPER-GEN	GS 2030.1107	1 3206 * SL										56380130000
[illegible] TYPIST	GS 0322.0105	1 3912 * D										5638[illegible]1000
STOCK CONTROL UNIT												5638012[illegible]
[illegible] AND SUPPLY OF	GS 2040.0111	1 3209 1 SL										563801[illegible]
[illegible] AND SPLY ASST	GS 2040.0609	1 4049 * SL										56380134000
[illegible]TNER ROBERT J	GS 2040.0607	4049 SL		C	33	10						
[illegible]D SUPPLY ASST	GS 2040.[illegible]7	1 3212 * SL										5638[illegible]
[illegible] TYPIST	GS 0322.0105	2 3901 * D										56380136000
REAL ESTATE AND HOUSING SECTION												56380137000
[illegible] PROPERTY OF	GS 1170.0111	1 3220 1 SL										56380138000
[illegible]	GS 1170.0111	3220 SL		C	28	10						
[illegible]	GS [illegible]322.01[illegible]5	1 3902 * D										5638013[illegible]
[illegible]SPORTATION SECTION												5638[illegible]40000
[illegible]	GS 21[illegible].0111	1 32[illegible] 1 SL										56380141000
[illegible]	[illegible] 21[illegible].0112	[illegible]		C	[illegible]6	[illegible]					81	
[illegible]	[illegible] 21[illegible]	1 3235 * SL										56380142000
[illegible]	[illegible] 2150.[illegible]	1 3239 * SL										56380143000
[illegible]	[illegible]	1 3903 * D										5638[illegible]
[illegible]												56380145000
[illegible]	[illegible].14	1 [illegible] 1 SM										5638014[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]0213	3190 SM		C	25	10						

SECRET

POSITION CONTROL REGISTER

POSITION TITLE AND INCUMBENT NAME	SCHED	OCCUP SERIES	GRADE	PLAN INCUMBENCY	Position Number	C.A	SD	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	FUND		SEX	Type Emp Code	LWOP	DATE OF GRADE Mo Da Yr	PCS O S DATE Mo Yr	STATION CODE	DEVEL COMPLEMENT	Number
PENDING REASSIGNMENT TO CURRENT S/C																		[illegible]
[illegible] REASSIGNMENT																		[illegible]
[illegible] C	[illegible]	1309.1711			3008		SA		C	14		10						
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			3097		SF		C	30		10						
2																		
[illegible] STATION																		[illegible]
[illegible]	UV. 133							WIL 3						APP 1				

SECRET

[illegible]

	PARTICIPANT	[illegible] GRADE	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

```
[illegible] TITLE        OCC.CODE  GRADE    POS. #    SD     INCUMBENT          OCC.CODE GRADE   POS. #

FAR EAST DIVISION                                                                                         592[illegible]

[illegible] FIELD                                                                                          592[illegible]

  [illegible] - TOKYO STATION                                                                              59[illegible]

    OFFICE OF THE CHIEF                                                                                    59[illegible]

 [illegible] STATION    GS-0136.01-00     1-3002. 1 D  5 BAKER JOHN F       GS-0136.01-18      3002    D    592[illegible]

 [illegible]            GS-0136.01-15     1-3003. 1 D  5 WHEELER ROBERT P   GS-0136.01-15      3003    D    592[illegible]

 [illegible] OFFICER    GS-0136.01-14     1-3001. * D  5 LEICHLITER VYRL E  GS-0136.01-14      3001    D    592[illegible]

 [illegible] ASSISTANT  GS-0301.02-09     1-3004. 1 D  5 AILOR MARION G     GS-0301.02-07      3004    D    592[illegible]

 [illegible]ARY-STENO   GS-0318.01-09     1-3005. 1 D  5 COPELAND ANGELINE  GS-0318.01-07      3005    D    592[illegible]

 [illegible] ASSISTANT  GS-0301.02-07     2-3006. * D  5 SUMMERS HELEN F    GS-0301.02-06      3006    D    59[illegible]
                                                       5 STOSE VIVIAN H     GS-0301.02-06      3006    D
                                                       5 FORANCE P J        GS-0301.02-05      3006    D

                                                 7          6       8


   [illegible] AND [illegible]TIONS                                                                       592771[illegible]

     OFFICE OF THE CHIEF                                                                                  5927760

     CHIEF              GS-0136.01-15     1-3936. 1 D  5 HALPERN SAMUEL     GS-0136.01-15      3936    D    592[illegible]

     [illegible]        GS-0136.01-13     2-3886. * D                                                        592[illegible]

       [illegible]      GS-0318.01-07     [illegible] 1 D                                                    592[illegible]

                        GS-0301.26-09     1-3307. * D                                                        59[illegible]

                                                 5          4       1


        [illegible] COORDINATION STAFF                                                                     59[illegible]
```

SECRET

AS OF [illegible] SEPT [illegible]

POSITION TITLE	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	
[illegible]	GS-0136.01-14	1-3020.	* D					[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-0318.01-06	1-3819.	* D	5 KELLER EMMA J	GS-0318.01-06	3819	D	[illegible]
				2 2 1				
[illegible]								[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-0136.01-13	1-3823.	* D	5 HODGE H M	GS-0136.01-12	3823	D	[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-0301.28-09	1-3827.	* D	5 AMBROSE MARIE A 5 MCELLIGOTT M C	GS-0301.28-07 GS-0301.28-09	3827 3827	D D	[illegible]
				2 2 3				
[illegible]								[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-0136.01-14	1-1911.	* D	5 WEST DAVID F	GS-0136.01-14	1911	D	[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-0136.01-13	2-1914.	* D	5 HICKCOX EDWARD L 5 HOLDBER IRVING F	GS-0136.51-13 GS-0136.51-13	1914 1914	D D	[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-0136.01-12	4-2753.	* D	5 BEAL ALAN GORDON 5 RICKARD JOHN E 5 TASHIMA FRANK K 5 EASTBURN ROGER G	GS-0136.51-12 GS-0136.01-12 GS-0136.51-12 GS-0136.01-11	2753 2753 2753 2753	D D D D	[illegible]
	GS-0136.01-12	2-1919.	* D					[illegible]
	GS-0033.01-11	1-1920.	* D	5 IZUMI KEN M	GS-0033.01-11	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	GS-0132.58-12	1-1923.	* D	5 MATTHEWS LOIS [illegible]	GS-0132.58-11	1923	[illegible]	[illegible]
	GS-0301.[illegible]	1-[illegible]	* D	5 DRAYTON JEANNE M	GS-0301.28-0[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	GS-0301.27-0[illegible]	1-2831.	* D	5 [illegible]	GS-0301.27-0[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

POSITION TITLE	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	
CLERK TYPIST	GS-0322.01-05	1-1927.	* D	S MCCUTCHEON KATHRYN	GS-0322.01-05	1927	D	5928360
				16 9 12				
KOREA BRANCH								5928400
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01-14	1-2447.	* D	S ESCHBACH ROBERT L	GS-0136.01-14	2447	D	592844[illegible]
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01-13	1-2448.	* D	S RUCKER JERRY C	GS-0136.01-12	2448	D	592848[illegible]
				S YAKARD DAWSON L	GS-0136.01-12	2448	D	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01-12	4-3354.	* D	S ANNIS WILLIAM D	GS-0136.51-11	3354	D	592852[illegible]
				S FLYNN PAUL C	GS-0136.01-11	3354	D	
				S HUBS MARK C	GS-0136.01-12	3334	D	
				S LEE DAVID Y C	GS-0136.51-12	3354	D	
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01-11	1-3716.	* D					592856
[illegible] OFFICER	GS-0136.01-09	2-2452.	* D	S ROBINSON OWEN E	GS-0136.01-08	2452	D	59286[illegible]
				S ZIMMERMAN JOHE K	GS-0136.51-09	2452	D	
[illegible] ASST	GS-0301.28-07	1-3718.	* D	S ELROD FRANCES M	GS-0301.28-07	3718	D	5928640
[illegible] STENOGRAPHER	GS-0312.01-06	1-3380.	* D					5928680
				11 7 10				
[illegible]								5928720
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-3074.	* D	S [illegible] WILLIAM [illegible]	GS-0136.01-15	3074	D	592876[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	* D	S [illegible] JOHN D	GS-0136.01-14	3075	D	59288[illegible]
				[illegible] WILLIAM [illegible]	GS-0136.01-14	3075	D	
				S THOMPSON ROBERT F	GS-0136.01-13	3075	D	
[illegible]	GS-0136.01-1[illegible]	1-3079.	* D	S GRAIN RICHARD J	GS-0136.01-13	3079	D	[illegible]

DocId:32399957 Page 120

SECRET

AS OF [illegible] SEPT 1961

POSITION TITLE	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD		
				5 LINEBACK WEBSTER K	GS-0136.01-13	3079	D		
				5 ITO CHESTER H	GS-0136.01-12	3079	D		
				5 WATERS HARRY C JR	GS-0136.01-12	3079	D		
				5 ISHIKAWA GRANT H	GS-0136.01-12	3079	D		
				5 GREGG DONALD P	GS-0136.01-13	3079	D		
				5 SHECKS GEORGE H	GS-0136.01-12	3079	D		
[illegible]	[illegible]-0136.01-12	7-3089.	* D	5 CAMLY ROSAMOND	GS-0136.01-12	3089	D		992608
				5 LOWE GABRIEL L JR	GS-0136.01-11	3089	D		
				5 SULLIVAN JOSEPH F	GS-0136.01-12	3089	D		
				5 MORIUCHI LUCIUS H	GS-0136.01-11	3089	D		
				5 SMITH HAROLD P	GS-0136.01-12	3089	D		
				5 RICHMOND GILBERT	GS-0136.01-12	3089	D		
				5 MAKINO WILLIAM T	GS-0136.01-12	3089	D		
				5 HAWSHURST GORDON R	GS-0136.01-12	3089	D		
[illegible]	[illegible]-0136.01-11	5-3096.	* D	5 HILL ROBERT J JR	GS-0136.01-11	3096	D		992092
				5 YOUNG HUGH W	GS-0136.01-10	3096	D		
				5 ROBINSON JOSEPH J	GS-0136.01-10	3096	D		
				5 WATANABE KAZUO	GS-0136.01-11	3096	D		
				5 MAYEDA AKIRA ALEX	GS-0136.01-11	3096	D		
[illegible]	GS-0136.01-09	4-3099.	* D	5 PADEN JERARD MAX	GS-0136.01-10	3099	D	02	99.595
				5 KOYAMA BRADY AYATO	MIL0916.6 -03	3099	D	1-MIL	
[illegible] ASST	GS-0301.20-09	2-3103.	* D						992940
[illegible]	GS-0301.02-09	1-3105.	* D	5 NUKASA BETTE H	GS-0301.02-08	3105	OD		992904
[illegible]	[illegible]-0318.01-07	3-3106.	3 D	5 MARTINO MARGARET C	GS-0318.01-07	3106	SA		99291.89
				5 PEDERSEN C A	GS-0318.01-05	3106	D		
				5 LEICHLITER F H	GS-0110.01-07	3106	D		
[illegible]	[illegible]-0318.01-05	3-3888.	* D	5 SYLVESTER DOLORES	GS-0318.01-05	3888	D		99.912
				5 PITTENGER ALICE H	GS-0318.01-05	3888	D		
				5 ROSE VIRGINIA	GS-0318.01-05	3888	D		

33 10 [illegible] 1

99.916

825

SECRET

SECRET

AS OF 30 SEPT 196[illegible]

POSITION TITLE	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SO	INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD		
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01-14	1-3126. * D		S SHIELDS CHARLES A	GS-0136.01-13	3126	D		592925.0
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01-13	1-3127. * D		S STEITZ GEORGE *	GS-0136.01-13	3127	D		592924..
INTELLIGENCE ASST	GS-0301.28-09	1-3128. * D		S KEIRSTEAD ROSEMARY	GS-0301.28-07	3128	D		592925.
				S MEYER ROBERTA J	GS-0301.28-10	3128	D	01	
				3	3	4			

JAPANESE LIAISON STAFF 592932.

POSITION TITLE	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SO	INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD		
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01-15	1-3031. 1 D		S BURROWS HERBERT E	GS-0136.01-14	3031	D		592934.0
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01-14	2-3032. * D		S REDICK JOSEPH P	GS-0136.01-14	3032	D		592934.0
				S NELSON GLENN W	GS-0136.01-14	3032	D		
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01-13	2-3111. * D		S KUBOTA KINJI	GS-0136.01-12	3111	D		592944..
				S DOHNS JAMES A	GS-0136.01-12	3111	D		
OPS OFFICER	GS-0136.01-12	2-3113. * D		S NAKAMURA GEORGE	GS-0136.01-12	3113	D		592948.
				S NAGASE SATOSHI	GS-0136.01-12	3113	D		
[illegible]	GS-0136.01-11	2-3116. * D		S TAGAMI KAN	MIL0093 -04	3116	D	1-AIL	5929420
[illegible]	GS-0301.28-09	1-3124. * D		S LYONS MARY L	GS-0301.28-07	3124	D		592925.0
[illegible]	GS-0318.11-07	1-3033. 1 D		S LANDON BEVERLY ANN	GS-0322.01-05	3033	D		592936..
				11	7	9		1	

[illegible] STAFF 592944..

POSITION TITLE	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SO	INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD		
	GS-0136.01-14	1-3056. * D		S MULL WILLIAM [illegible]	GS-0136.01-13	3056	D		592944..
[illegible]	GS-0318.01-07	1-3048. 1 D		S HENRICK DOROTHY J	GS-0318.01-07	3048	D		[illegible]

```
                                    SECRET                                        [illegible] SEPT 196[illegible]

[illegible] TITLE      OCC.CODE GRADE    POS. #    SD     INCUMBENT            OCC.CODE GRADE    POS. #    SD

REPORTS AND REQUIREMENTS SECTION                                                                       592976.

REPORTS OFFICER      GS-0132.58-13     1-3046. * D  5 HORIUCHI MAYNARD C    GS-0132.58-12     3046      D          592980.

REPORTS OFFICER      GS-0132.58-12     2-3047. * D  5 FUKASA GEORGE M       GS-0132.58-12     3047      DD         592984.
                                                    5 COLE BETTINA          GS-0132.58-12     3047      D

REPORTS OFFICER      GS-0132.58-11     2-3049. * D  5 SHEK EMILY L          GS-0132.58-11     3049      D          592988
                                                    5 GAMMELL HELENA H      GS-0132.58-11     3049      D

[illegible] ASST     GS-0301.28-06     1-3091. * D  5 MCLAREN SALLY         GS-0301.28-06     3091      D          592992.

[illegible]          GS-0301.30-05     1-3092. * D  5 LEDBETTER P [illegible] GS-0301.30-05   3092      D          592996.
                                                    5 YANOYLL M A           GS-0301.30-05     3092      D

[illegible] SECTION                                                                                    593000.

[illegible]          GS-0136.01-13     1-3050. * D  5 ICHIKADA TARAO        GS-0136.01-13     3050      DD         593004.

[illegible]          GS-0136.01-12     1-3055. * D  5 SAKAI AKIRA           GS-0136.31-12     3055      D          593008.

[illegible]          GS-0033.01-11     2-3056. * D  5 TAMAKI PAUL I         GS-0033.01-09     3056      DD         593012
                                                    5 IENAGA CHITO          GS-0033.01-09     3056      D

[illegible]          GS-0031.01-09     2-3058. * D                                                                 593016.

[illegible]          GS-0136.01-09     1-3054. * D  5 HIRABAYASHI TAKEO     MIL0136.01-09     3054      D   1-MIL  593020.

[illegible]          GS-0322.01-04     1-3060. * D                                                                 593024.

[illegible] SECTION                                                                                    593028.

[illegible]          [illegible]       1-3061. * D  5 RICHARDSON RICHARD    GS-0132.56-11     3061      D          593032.

[illegible]          [illegible]       1-3062. * D                                                                 593036.

[illegible]          [illegible]       1-3064. * D  5 THOMPSON JOHN [illegible] GS-0301.28-07 3064      D          593040.
                                                    5 LUCY [illegible]      GS-0301.28-07     3064      D

                                           52          14                                 1

                                                                                                       593044.
```

POSITION TITLE	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	
ADM OFFICER	GS-0301.03-15	1-3147. 1	SA	5 GREAVES REX C	GS-0301.03-15	3147	SA	993 [illegible]
ATTORNEY ADVISOR	GS-0970.01-15	1-3040. 1	SA	3 BLADERGROEN ROBERT	GS-0970.01-14	3040	SA	993[illegible]
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.01-07	1-3149. 1	D	5 PUCKETT KATHRYN L	GS-0318.03-07	3149	D	993[illegible]
				5 CHERRY PATRICIA F	GS-0318.01-05	3149	D	
PERSONNEL OFFICER	GS-0201.01-14	1-3154. 1	SP	3 SHORE N L	GS-0201.01-14	3154	SP	993[illegible]
PERSONNEL OFFICER	GS-0201.01-11	2-3155. *	SP	3 BUCKLEY JUSTIN J	GS-0201.01-11	3155	SP	9930[illegible]
SECRETARY-STENO	GS-0318.07-05	1-3891. *	D					99306[illegible]
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14-15	1-3163. 1	D					993[illegible]
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14-13	1-3164. 1	SF	5 NORMENT CLARENCE F	GS-0510.14-13	3164	SF	993[illegible]
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14-11	1-3165. *	SF	5 STILLMAN GEORGE A	GS-0510.14-11	3165	SF	993[illegible]
[illegible] ACCT ASST	GS-0501.03-09	1-3166. *	SF	3 DUNHAM WILLIS F	GS-0501.03-09	3166	SF	993[illegible]
[illegible] ACCT ASST	GS-0501.03-07	2-3167. *	SF	5 DOHERTY WILLIAM E	GS-0501.03-06	3167	SF	99308[illegible]
				5 WILCOTT JAMES R JR	GS-0501.03-05	3167	SF	
[illegible]	GS-0301.02-07	1-3896. *	D					993[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-1810.01-13	1-3183. 1	SS	5 FAULKNER THOMAS M	GS-1810.01-13	3183	SS	993[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-1810.01-12	1-3184. *	SS	5 CHURCH JOHN I	GS-1810.01-12	3184	SS	993[illegible]
				5 WILFONG EDWARD [illegible]	GS-1810.01-11	3184	SS	
[illegible]	[illegible]-0322.01-0[illegible]	1-3895. *	[illegible]	3 PUTTI GINA	GS-0322.01-04	3895	SS	993[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-3893. [illegible]	[illegible]					993[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-3216. *	[illegible]	[illegible] JARDON RICHARD [illegible]	GS-2040.01-1[illegible]	3216	SL	993[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-3896. *	[illegible]					993118[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SM	5 COUMPRY FRANCIS G	GS-0[illegible]	3910	SM	993[illegible]

21 19 17

```
                                        SECRET                                   A[illegible] SEPT 196[illegible]

[illegible]ITION TITLE  OCC.CODE  GRADE    POS. #    SD     INCUMBENT          OCC.CODE GRADE    POS. #    SD

  REGISTRY                                                                                                  593128[illegible]

MAIL AND FILE SUP     GS-0305.17-11        1-3008. 1 D  5 WILSON NOEL C        GS-0305.17-11    3008      SA          5931286

MAIL AND FILE SUP     GS-0305.17-09        1-3009. * D  5 NOLAN JAMES P        GS-0305.17-08    3009      D           5931326

MAIL AND FILE SUP     GS-0305.17-07        1-3010. * D                                                                5931369

MAIL AND FILE CLERK   GS-0305.03-05        1-3011. * D                                                                5931406

[illegible]           GS-0302.03-05        2-3014. * D  5 WILLIS CARLTON L     MIL7025    -E5   3014      D   4-MIL   593144[illegible]
                                                        5 LEDBETTER CURTIS D   MIL        -E5   3014      D   1-MIL
                                                        5 WEST JAMES H         MIL7025    -E4   3014      D   4-MIL

                                                    4          5       2                               1


  [illegible]                                                                                                 [illegible]

   [illegible]FICE OF THE CHIEF                                                                               593154[illegible]

  [illegible]         GS-0301.03-15        1-3188. 1 SA 1 CALL THOMAS O        GS-0301.03-15    3188      SA          593156[illegible]

[illegible]           GS-0301.0[illegible] 1-3189. * SA                                                               59316[illegible]

[illegible]           GS-0301.03-07        1-3191. * D  5 SCHWECHMANN BETTY K  GS-0301.03-07    3191      D           5931640

      [illegible] - ATSUGI                                                                                    5931660

    [illegible]        [illegible]0305.17-07  1-3193. * D  5 WATERS LAWRENCE A  GS-0305.17-07    3193      D           593172[illegible]

                      [illegible]-0302.05-0[illegible]  1-3196. * D  5 ALLISON JAMES P  [illegible]-0302.05-04  3196  D  593176[illegible]

                       [illegible]         1-3097. * D                                                                59318[illegible]

                         [illegible]                                                                                  [illegible]

                        [illegible]        [illegible]. * D  5 [illegible] WALTER A  [illegible]-0302.[illegible]  [illegible]  [illegible]  [illegible]
```

POSITION TITLE	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	
				5 CHADWICK J M III	GS-0302.05-04	3244	D	
MESS AND CLUB UNIT								593192
STEWARD	GS-0067.01-11	1-3225. 1	D					593196C
STEWARD	GS-0067.01-07	1-3226. *	D					593200
PERSONNEL SECTION								593204
PERSONNEL OFFICER	GS-0201.01-12	1-3195. 1	SP	5 REDMOND CHARLES JR	GS-0201.01-12	3195	SP	593208
CLERK STENOGRAPHER	GS-0312.01-05	1-3898. *	D					593212
FINANCE SECTION - ATSUGI								593216
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14-12	1-3197. 1	SF	5 MOTHERSOLE WILLIAM	GS-0510.14-12	3197	SF	593220
				5 MARTIN ELWOOD D	GS-0510.14-12	3197	SF	
FINANCE OFFICER	GS-0510.14-11	1-3198. *	SF	5 COOK JOHN D	GS-0510.14-11	3198	SF	593224
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS-0501.03-09	1-3199. *	SF	5 BERTOLINI ERNEST [illegible]	GS-0501.03-08	3199	SF	593228
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS-0501.03-07	1-3200. *	SF	5 WHEELER JOSEPH F	GS-0501.03-07	3200	SF	593232
CLERK STENOGRAPHER	GS-0312.01-05	1-3899. *	D					593236
CLERK TYPIST	GS-0322.01-05	1-3900. *	D					5932[illegible]
FINANCE SECTION - YOKOSUKA								593244
FISCAL ACCT ASST	GS-0510.03-09	1-3857. *	SF	5 GRASSI ROBERT A	GS-0501.03-09	3857	SF	593248
LOGISTICS SECTION								593252
[illegible]	GS-2020.01-15	1-3228. 1	SL	5 SCHROEDER HANS H	GS-2020.01-14	3228	SL 65	5932[illegible]
[illegible]	GS-2020.01-12	1-3229. *	SL	5 DOUGHERTY JOHN C	GS-2020.01-12	3229	SL	5932[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]0.01-12	1-3230. *	SL					[illegible]

SECRET

AS OF [illegible] SEPT 196[illegible]

POSITION TITLE	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	
[illegible]UREMENT ASST	GS-2020.06-07	1-3231.	* SL	5 GAUTREAU ROBERT L	GS-2020.01-08	3231	SL	5932680
				5 ROCHETTE ROBERT J	GS-2020.01-09	3231	SL	
WAREHOUSING UNIT								5932720
STOREKEEPER-GEN	GS-2030.11-09	1-3205.	* SL	5 HARRIS RICHARD T	GS-2030.11-09	3205	SL	5932760
STOREKEEPER-GEN	GS-2030.11-07	2-3206.	* SL	5 WILLIAMS C W JR	GS-2030.11-05	3206	SL	5932800
CLERK TYPIST	GS-0322.01-05	1-3912.	* D					5932840
STOCK CONTROL UNIT								5932880
FOOD AND SUPPLY OF	GS-2040.01-12	1-3208.	1 SL	5 NEWLOND [illegible] E SR	GS-2040.01-12	3208	SL	5932920
FOOD AND SUPPLY OF	GS-2040.01-11	1-3209.	* SL	5 WILSON IVAN J	GS-2040.01-11	3209	SL	5932960
FOOD AND SUPPLY ASST	GS-2040.06-07	1-3212.	* SL	5 BENTNER ROBERT [illegible]	GS-2040.06-05	3212	SL	5933000
CLERK TYPIST	GS-0322.01-0[illegible]	1-3901.	* D					5933[illegible]
SUPPLY UNIT - [illegible]								5933080
[illegible] SUPPLY ASST	GS-2040.06-07	1-3213.	* SL	5 BEVINGTON ROBERT W	GS-2040.06-07	3213	SL	5933120
STOREKEEPER-GEN	GS-2030.11-07	1-3214.	* SL					5933160
[illegible] AND HOUSING SECTION								5933200
[illegible] OF	GS-1170.01-11	1-3220.	* SL	5 RYAN JOHN P	GS-1170.01-12	3220	SL 02	5933240
				5 LASH RAYMOND W	GS-1170.01-11	3220	SL	
[illegible]	GS-0322.01-05	1-3902.	* D					5933280
[illegible] SECTION								5933320
[illegible]	[illegible].01-11	1-3536.	1 SL					5933360
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-[illegible]	* SL	5 HARRISON RAY[illegible] W	GS-2101.01-11	3234	SL	59334[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

```
POSITION TITLE        OCC.CODE GRADE    POS. #    SO    INCUMBENT            OCC.CODE GRADE   POS. #   SO

[illegible] ASST      GS-2101.04-09     1-3235. * SL S WHELAN ROBERT D       GS-2101.04-09    3235     SL        593344
MOTOR TRANSPORT OF    GS-2150.04-09     1-3239. * SL S OSBURN HAROLD A       GS-2150.04-09    3239     SL        593348
CLERK STENOGRAPHER    GS-0312.01-05     1-3903. * D                                                              593352
CLERK TYPIST          GS-0322.01-05     2-3904. * D                                                              593356
     MEDICAL SECTION                                                                                             593360
MEDICAL OFFICER       GS-0602.02-14     1-3150. 1 SM S KURTH R L             GS-0602.02-13    3150     SM        593364
MEDICAL SERVICES OF   GS-0645.04-11     1-3152. * SM S MACKIN JOSEPH J       GS-0645.04-11    3152     SM        593368
MEDICAL [illegible]   GS-0645.01-09     1-3151. * SM                                                             593372
                                                   44         42       30

  [illegible] ARMY SECURITY BRANCH - 410301                                                                      593376
SECURITY OFFICER      GS-1810.01-15     1-3169. 1 SS S LYON H H              GS-1810.01-15    3169     SS        593380
                                                     S SCOTT WILLIAM W       GS-1810.01-15    3169     SS
SECURITY OFFICER      GS-1810.01-14     1-3170. 1 SS S BAGRANOFF BORIS T     GS-1810.01-14    3170     SS        593384
                                                     S MULLAN WILLIAM J      GS-1810.01-14    3170     SS
[illegible]           GS-1810.22-13     1-3174. 1 SS S COLLINS WALLACE JR    GS-1810.22-13    3174     SS        593388
[illegible]           GS-1810.22-12     1-3176. * SS S BOLLINGER JOHN J      GS-1810.22-12    3176     SS        593392
                                                     S SHERRY EDWARD J       GS-1810.22-12    3176     SS
[illegible]           GS-1810.23-13     1-3178. 1 SS S TAYLOR ROBERT [illegible]  GS-1810.23-13  3178   SS        593396
[illegible]           GS-1810.23-12     [illegible] * SS S [illegible]       GS-1810.23-12    3179     SS        59[illegible]
                                                     S DAVIS CALVIN [illegible]  GS-1810.23-12  3179   SS
                                                     S MARTIN GILBERT JR     GS-1810.23-11    3179     SS
                      GS-1810.07-13     [illegible]                          GS-1810.07-13    3172     SS        [illegible]
```

SECRET

```
                                          SECRET                                       AS OF [illegible] SEPT 196[illegible]

 POSITION TITLE      OCC.CODE  GRADE    POS. #    SO     INCUMBENT           OCC.CODE GRADE   POS. #    SO

                                                     5 GREGORY GORDON T     GS-1810.07-12    3172      SS

 [illegible] SUPPORT SPEC  GS-1670.02-12  1-3906. # SS 5 SCHWERMANN GEORGE  GS-1670.02-11    3906      SS          5934.8[illegible]

 [illegible]TARY-STENO  GS-0318.01-07   1-3171. 1 SS 5 SAVOIE PATRICIA      GS-0318.01-06    3171      SS          59341[illegible]

 [illegible]TARY-STENO  GS-0318.01-06   1-3907. # SS 5 TOMAO DEANNA         GS-0318.01-06    3907      SS          59341[illegible]
                                                     5 WILLIAMSON GLENDA    GS-0318.01-05    3907      SS

                                                       13          10       17


 PENDING REASSIGNMENT TO CURRENT S/C                                                                           59342[illegible]


 [illegible] - [illegible] STATION                      196         142      162                        6      5934[illegible]
```

SECRET

AS OF 30 JAN 1961

POSITION TITLE	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3075	D	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	3077	D1	[illegible]
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3079	IE	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3079	D1	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3079	D1	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3077	D1	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3079	D	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3079	DP	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	D	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	3089	DP	[illegible]
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3089	D	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3089	DP	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3089	DP	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3089	D	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3089	D1	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3089	D	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	D1	[illegible]
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3094	D	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3094	D	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3094	D	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3094	D1	
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	3099	D	[illegible]
				[illegible]	[illegible]	3099	D	
	[illegible]	[illegible]						[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
				[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
				[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
				[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	D	

SECRET

```
                                   REG. #   SE     ASSIGNMENT          OCCUPANT SHARE     REG. #   SO

                                                 [illegible] WILLIAM P  65-0236.01-17      3058     0

                 05-0318.01-07     1-3044.  ? 0  S KORNICK DOROTHY     65-0318.01-07      3045     05            592036

   [illegible] AND [illegible] SECTION                                                                            592040

                 65-0132.44-12     1-3046.  ? D  S ROBINSON MAYNARD    65-0132.44-12      3046     01            592044
                 65-0132.44-12     2-3047.  ? ?  S MURAKAMI [illegible] M  65-0132.44-12  3047     00            592048
                                                 S COLE BETTY MA       65-0132.44-12      3047     01
                                                 S CAMPBELL [illegible]  65-0131.44-11    3049     01            5920[illegible]
                                                 S [illegible] L       65-0131.44-11      3049     01
                 [illegible]20-07  1-3051.  ? 0  D MCLAREN [illegible]  65-0201.28-05     3051     05            592076
                                   1-3052.  ? 0  S [illegible] P L     65-0201.30-05      3052     05            592080
                                                 S [illegible]         65-0201.30-04      3052     05
                                                 [illegible]           65-0156.01-13      3030     00
                 65-0135.01-12     1-3055.  ? 0  S [illegible]         65-0135.01-12      3055     01
                 65-0039.01-11     3-3056.  ? 0  S TANAKA PAUL I       65-0033.01-09      3056     00
                                                 S [illegible] CHITO   65-0033.01-09      3056     0
                                   3-3058.  ? 0                                                                   5921[illegible]
                                   1-3054.  ? 0  S [illegible]         61-0156.01-03      3054     0    1-MIL    592104
                                                                                                                  592108
```

DocId:32399957 Page 135

[illegible]	POS. #	ST	INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	
			S [illegible] JOHN L	GS-0301.[illegible]	3069	[illegible]	
						1	
							5921180
[illegible]	1-3147.	1 SA	S [illegible]	GS-0301.03-15	3147	[illegible]	5921320
[illegible]	1-3040.	1 SA	S [illegible] ROBERT	GS-0170.01-14	3040	[illegible]	5921360
[illegible]	1-3149.	1 P	S [illegible] KATHRYN L S [illegible] PATRICIA E	GS-[illegible]18.03-07 GS-[illegible]18.01-05	3149 3149	[illegible] P	5921400
[illegible]	1-3154.	1 SA	S [illegible] N C	GS-[illegible]201.01-14	3154	[illegible]	5921440
[illegible]	2-3193.	2 SA	S [illegible]VICH JOSEPH S [illegible] JUSTER [illegible]	GS-[illegible]201.01-11 GS-[illegible]201.01-11	3193 3193	[illegible]	5921520
[illegible]	[illegible]						[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		S [illegible]	GS-0510.14-15	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	1-3166.	1 SF	S [illegible] CLARENCE F	GS-0510.14-13	3166	SF	5921640
[illegible]	1-3165.	2 SF	S [illegible] GEORGE A S [illegible]	GS-0510.14-11 GS-0510.14-11	3165 3165	SF SF	5921680
[illegible]	1-3166.	2 SF	S [illegible] ANNE M S [illegible] WILLIS F	GS-0501.05-0[illegible] GS-0501.05-09	3166 3166	SF SF	5921720
[illegible]	[illegible]	SF	S [illegible] A S [illegible] S [illegible]	GS-0501.[illegible]-07 GS-0501.[illegible] GS-0501.[illegible]	3167 3167 3167	SF SF SF	5921760
	[illegible]						59218[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	SA	S [illegible]	GS-1810.[illegible]-13	3183	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	SA	S [illegible]	[illegible]-1810.[illegible]-12	3184	[illegible]	[illegible]

```
                                    [illegible]                                        JUN 196[illegible]

                      POS. #    SB     INCUMBENT            OCC.CODE GRADE   POS. #    SB

                                   S WILLIAMS EDWARD G    05-1810.01-11     3154      SS

                  [illegible]     1-3695. 4 S  S BUTTI GINA   05-0322.01-09     3695      SL        592193
                  [illegible]-12   1-3693. 1 SL                                                      592194
                  [illegible]-11   1-3216. 4 SL  S REARDON RICHARD C  05-2040.01-11  3216   SL        592196
                  [illegible]      1-3270. 4 S                                                       592204
                  [illegible]-09   1-3918. 4 SM  S CONVERY FRANCIS X  05-0645.01-09  3918   SM        592208

                                      21        19       12

                                                                                                     592212
                  [illegible]      [illegible]  S WILSON [illegible]  05-1035.03-11   3008      SA        592214
                  [illegible]      [illegible]  S [illegible]         05-1035.05-05   3009      DS        592125
                  [illegible]      [illegible]                                                       592224
                  [illegible]      1-3013. 4 D                                                       592228
               [illegible].05-08   1-3014. 4 D   S WILLIS CARLTON L   MIL7023   -52   3014    D  4-MIL  592232
                                                 S WEBSTER CURTIS D   MIL       -55   3014    D  1-MIL

                                      5          5        2                              2

                                                                                                     592236
                                                                                                     592[illegible]
                                   [illegible]                 05-1811.03-1[illegible]   3180     SL        592[illegible]
                                                                                                     59[illegible]
```

		INCUMBENT	OCC.CODE GRADE	POS. #	SD	
[illegible]	1-5191. # P	S [illegible]	GS-0301.03-07	3191	DS	592[illegible]
[illegible]						592[illegible]
[illegible].05-07	1-5193. # D	S [illegible] LAWRENCE A	GS-0305.05-07	3193	D	592[illegible]
[illegible].05-0[illegible]	1-5194. # D	S [illegible] JAMES	GS-0302.05-04	3194	D	592[illegible]
[illegible]	1-[illegible] #					592[illegible]
[illegible]						592[illegible]
[illegible].05-05	1-5344. # D	S [illegible] WALTER C	GS-0302.05-04	3244	DS	592[illegible]
		S CHADWICK J H III	GS-0302.05-04	3244	DS	
[illegible]						592[illegible]
[illegible]	1-[illegible]					592[illegible]
[illegible]	1-[illegible]					592[illegible]
[illegible]						592[illegible]
[illegible]-12	1-3195. 1 SP	S [illegible] CHARLES JR	GS-[illegible].01-12	3195	SP	592[illegible]
[illegible]-04	1-5598. # D					592[illegible]
[illegible]						592[illegible]
[illegible]-12	1-[illegible]	S [illegible] WILLIAM	GS-0318.14-11	3197	SP	592[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	S [illegible]	GS-[illegible]	3198	SP	592[illegible]
		S [illegible] JOHN L	GS-[illegible]	[illegible]	SP	
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SP	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	GS-0301.03-07	3200	SP	592[illegible]
						592[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	POS. #	SB	INCUMBENT	OCC,CODE GRADE	POS. #	SB	
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-9966. #	D					5923320
[illegible]	[illegible]							5923360
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-9007. #	SF	# [illegible] ROBERT A	55-05 1.03-09	3057	SF	5923440
[illegible]								5923480
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-9[illegible]. #	SL	# [illegible] CARL P JR	55-2020.01-12	3228	SL	592352[illegible]
				# [illegible] JUNE M	65-2020.01-14	3228	SL 05	
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-9[illegible]. #	SL	# DOUGHERTY JOHN C	55-2020.01-12	3229	SL	59235[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-3710. #	SL					59236[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-9[illegible]. #	SL	# [illegible] ROBERT J	65-2020.01-09	3231	SL	59236[illegible]
				# [illegible] ROBERT [illegible]	65-2020.01-08	3231	SL	
								[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] #	SL	# [illegible] RICHARD [illegible]	65-2020.11-09	[illegible]	SL	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible] #	SL	# [illegible]	65-2020.11-07	3208	SL	[illegible]
				# [illegible] JR	65-2020.11-09	3208	SL	
	[illegible]	1-9012. #	D					[illegible]
								[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	SL	# [illegible]	65-2020.01-12	3208	SL	[illegible]
				# [illegible]	65-2020.01-12	3208	SL	
		[illegible]	SL	[illegible]	[illegible].01-11	[illegible]	SL	[illegible]
				[illegible]	[illegible].01-0[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
								[illegible]
								[illegible]

			INFORMANT	OCC.CODE NMBR			
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-3211. # SL	$ REVINGTON ROBERT N	62-2040.01-09	3211	SL	[illegible]
[illegible]	66-2098.11-09	1-3214. # SL					[illegible]
[illegible] SECTION							[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]-1170.01-13	1-3220. # SL	$ RYAN JOHN F $ LASH RAYMOND R	65-1170.01-13 65-1170.71-31	3220 3220	SL 87 SL	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	1-3231. # T					[illegible]
[illegible] SECTION							[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	$ [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SL [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] # SL	$ [illegible] RAYMOND [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SL	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] # SL	$ [illegible] ROBERT [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SL	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] # SL	$ [illegible] ARNOLD [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SL	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] # S					[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]					[illegible]
[illegible] SECTION							[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] # SM	$ KURTH W L	[illegible]	[illegible]	SM	5924120
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] # SM	$ FARLEY DONALD W	[illegible]	[illegible]	SM	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] # SM	$ [illegible] AUGUSTINE C	[illegible]	[illegible]	SM	[illegible]
							[illegible]
	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

S COLE BETTINA

DAVIS CALVIN E

SAVOIE PATRICIA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

SECRET

DDC

INTEREST

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 29 January 1964

STATE INFO

FROM : M. D. Stevens

p. 2

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Document Number 1271-1029

for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. /The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department ~~that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who~~ defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, ~~had~~ not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States./

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens

M. D. Stevens

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files BLS

DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Document Number 1271-1029

for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. /The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department [redacted] /DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States./

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens

M. D. Stevens

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

NAME /(LAST KNOWN ADDRESS)	FILE NUMBER	ASSIGNED TO TOKYO STATION	POSITION	SECURITY POSTURE
1. George Andrew Breen (Currently Tokyo)	29 835	July 1953-Sept 1955 (Yokosuka) Aug. 1961-Aug. 1964 (Reassigned Tokyo May 1977)	Intelligence Asst. Mail and file supervisor	CIA Von A to Z; association with James B. Wilcott and Ray Robinson.
2. Eleanor Elizabeth Breen nee: Kasony (Currently Tokyo)	28 817	April 1954-Sept. 1955. (Yokosuka) Aug. 1961-Aug. 1964. Reassigned Tokyo since May 1977.	Clerk Steno/Secretary Steno	Parents born in Czechoslovakia.
3. William Vincent Broe (4317 Saul Road, Kensington, Maryland)	35 706	May 1961-Jun 1965	Chief of Station	Who's Who in CIA, CIA Von A to Z; known to Eugene Weaver, captured by Viet Cong; possibly identified to Chicoms via Downey capture. Known to Japanese press as CIA.
4. James E. Delaney (Currently DCOS/BKK)	56 587	July 1959-July 1965, Aug. 1968-Jun. 1971 (Kobe)	Operations Officer	Known to Weaver, captured by Communists.
5. Jerome Fox (5019 Cockney Court, Annandale, Va.)	102 815	Sept. 1959-Sept. 1962	Identification Officer (Factory Markings/DDI)	May be known to Japanese as CIA; loyalty stepmother and stepbrother questioned.
6. Robert Seido Hashima (Last address: Tokyo-1958)	83 083	1953-1954	Contract Employee	Former Department of Army employee in Japan picked up as contract employee. Poly revealed unresolved issues regarding Communist contacts and/or associations.
7. Chester Hiroshi[redacted] ITO (9327 Boothe St; Alexandria Va.)	62 407	May 1952-Jul.1956 Nov. 1957-Apr.76	Operations Officer	Has been questionable regarding foreign contacts, Japanese Intelligence Services, Black Market activity, mis-use of Ops funds, disobedience of Ops instructions. Known by Japanese Intelligence as CIA. One week suspension in 1957 for mishandling Agency responsibilities.

NAME /)LAST KNOWN ADDRESS)	FILE NUMBER	ASSIGNED TO TOKYO STATION	POSITION	SECURITY POSTURE
8. Elwood Diamond Martin (Rt. 2, Box 100, Falston, Maryland)	34 209	July 1960-Aug.1962	Operations Officer	No Pertinent Information.
9. Robert Tsutomu Ojiri (Currently Tokyo)	94 192	1953-Present	Stock Control Clerk Property Assistant Logistics Officer	Wife is Japanese national--Many Japanese relatives. File clear.
10. Frederick C. Randall (1823 Deer Drive, McLean, Va.)	55 667	Sept. 1961-Jul.65	Operations Officer	No Pertinent Information.
11. Jack Tracy Randall (3508 Frederick Place Kensington, Maryland)	48 937	July 1963-Oct. 67	Finance Officer	CIA Von A to Z; no noteworthy or derogatory information.
12. Kan Tagami (Currenlty C/PMLD/Tokyo)	137 587	1958-Aug.1965 Jun. 1974-Present	Operations Officer	Known to Weaver, captured by Communists; daughter arrested in June 1969 in Honolulu for "Resistance Activities" (Member of SDS); exposed as CIA by Japanese Communist Party, April 1976.
13. Doris Watanabe (Currenlty Tokyo Station)	114 464	April 1954-Jul.62	Fiscal Accountant	No Pertinent Information.
14. Larry Watanabe (Currenlty PMLD, Tokyo)	83 683	1954-1962; Jun.76 to Present.	Translator/ Operations Officer	No Pertinent Information.
15. James Sauvie Woods (304 Meadow Hall Drive, Rockville, Maryland)	61 415	1954,1955 Mar. 1961-Sept.66	Intelligence Analyst	Known to Weaver, captured by Communists.
16. Louise Anne Woods (304 Meadow Hall Drive Rockville, Maryland)	102 307	Mar. 1961-Sept. 66	Clerk/Clerk Typist	No Pertinent Information.

NAME /(LAST KNOWN ADDRESS)	FILE NUMBER	ASSIGNED TO TOKYO STATION	POSITION	SECURITY POSTURE
17. Robert P. Wheeler (6600 Millwood Road, Bethesda, Maryland)	60 164	1946-1956; Jun.59 to Aug. 1964	Liaison Officer/ Ops/DCOS	No Pertinent Information. (Former GS-18, DDO, last assignment, CH/NOC/DDO.)
18. Shizuo Yamada (1131 University Boulevard West, #1109, Silver Spring, Maryland)	31 642	1953-1959; 1962-1964	Translator/ Ops Officer	No Pertinent Information.

03/30/ SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

ADV C/LA 1606Z STAFF

File CI

PRECEDENCE

ACTION: C/LA-8 (755) INFO: ODPD-D, VR, FILE, C/CI-4, C/EPS/EG-2,
C/OG/DMS, (17/W)

---

78 1631411 PAGE 001 IN 1631411
TOR: 291533Z NOV 78 LMIM 29191

S E C R E T 291523Z NOV 78 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 29191

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT SLANK

REF: LA/MIAMI 29190 1631398

IDEN: 1400 SW 16TH STREET
MIAMI, FLA. 33145
TEL (305) 858-4406. E2 IMPDET

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

17029

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OLC #78-2060/1

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 056735

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 5 May 1942

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) BROE, William Vincent
3. SEX M
4. DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug 1913
5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 21 Jun 1948
6. MARITAL STATUS Married
7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee) NO. 3 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1920 1950 1955
8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE NA
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954 OTHER STATUS
10. LAST MED. RPT. Jul 1970
QUAL. FOR TDY Standby
EVAL. FOR Latin Ameri TDY Standb
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS NONE X SERVICE GRADE ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1 RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2 TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3 RETIRED
12. ASSESSMENT DATE
13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE
14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT
1939-41 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, Quincy, Mass - Budget Sales Manager
1941 General Motors Acceptance Corp, Boston, Mass - Field Representative (6 mos)
1942-48 Dept of Justice, FBI, Ohio, Michigan, DC - Special Agent

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION
1935-39 Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me - AB, Biology, Chemistry

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested) None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING
1948 Admin Procedures
1948 Basic Intel
1948 Adv Intel Trng
1950 Secret Writing
1951 Cryptog Briefing
1951 Basic Ops Photo
1951 Invest Tech; Locking Devices
1956 Conceal, Ops Disguise, Furnishings & Equipt

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Jun 1948	I.O.(Ops)	0132.00	P-5		OSO/COPS/FDZ/Act Ch., Phil Br	Hq
Apr 1950	I.O.	0130.00	GS-13		OSO/FDZ/SPA/Chief, Phil Br	"
Feb 1951	" "	0130.00	13		OSO/FDZ/SPA/COS	(3-1 (Manila)
Oct 1951	" "	0132.00	14		OSO/FDZ/Br 4/COS	"
	May - Aug 1953 - TDY - Hq					
Aug 1953	I.O.	0132.00	14		DDP/FE/Dep Ch, FEW/[illegible]	(10 ([illegible])
Aug 1954	Area Ops Of	0134.01	15	DI	DDP/FE/DCOM, China Mls	"
Apr 1955	" " "	0134.01	15	DI	DDP/FE/Chief, China Br	Hq
	Mar - Apr 1956 - TDY - Japan					
	May - Jun 1957 - TDY - FE					
Jan 1958	Area Ops Of	0134.01	15	DI	DDP/Dep Chief, FE Div	Hq
Jul 1959	" " "	0134.01	16	DI	" " " " " 13-3	" (3-3
Jun 1960	Chief of Station	0136.05	16	D	DDP/FE/JAD/(Tokyo Station)/COS	(Tokyo)
Jul 1961	" " "	0136.05	17	D	" " " " " "	"
May 1965	" " "	0136.05	18	D	" " " " " "	"
Jul 1966	Ops Officer	0136.01	18	D	DDP/Chief, WH Division	Hq
Jan 1972	InspectorGen	0000.23	18	D	DCI/Inspector General	"
Feb 1972	" "	0000.23	EP-V	D	" " " "	"

20. DATE REVIEWED 2 Jan 1973
21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY [illegible]/cal
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010026
22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE 24 Jul 1973

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

PROFILE 18958 (4)

e/pw

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.
056735

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle)
BROE, William Vincent

DATE OF BIRTH
24 Aug 1913

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Letter of Appreciation 1953 from the President of the Republic of the Philippines unselfish cooperation and valuable assistance given the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency.

Appointed Member of Panel of Examiners, CIA Selection Board, FY 1956, 1957, 1958.

Appreciation 1959 from Director of Personnel for participation in the Personnel Officer Training Course.

Commendation 1965 from Commander-6499th Spt. Grp. (PACAF) USAF for outstanding suppo and guidance rendered to this organization. Endorsements of appreciation by Dir of I and Asst Ch of Staff Intel of 6499th Spt Grp. Appreciation expressed by DCI for fine performance.

27. DATE REVIEWED
2 Jan 1973

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
rwd/cal
E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 010025

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 67

SECRET

PROFILE

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 1)

EOD: 20 Mar 1948

1. [illegible] NO.: 056491

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEITH, Robert Malcolm)

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Aug 1927

5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE: 1 Aug 1950

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married

7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee): NO. 2 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1931 1957

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA SPOUSE: NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS: MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954 OTHER STATUS

10. LAST MED. RPT.: Nov 1971 QUAL. FOR: TDY Standby / World-Wide TDY Standby

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NONE X SERVICE GRADE ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1 RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2 TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3 RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: Sep 1956

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: Oct 1953; Dec 1964

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1945-46 Military Service, US Navy, S 1/c
1948 Patterson & Dewar (Utility Elect Engrs) - Instrumentman (summer)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1944-45 North Carolina State College, A&E, Raleigh (ASTRP)
1946-47 US Military Academy, West Point - Military Science, Engineering
1947-48 The Citadel, Charleston, SC - Chemistry
1949-50; 1957 Virginia Polytechnic Institute - BS, (1958)/Chemical Engineering, Chemistry
1953 Private Tutoring in Russian

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): Russian - R, Elem; W, Slight; P,S,U Inter (Apr 1958); I, None-Oct 1957

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1950 Intel Orient
1950 Ops
1950 Ops Famil
1951 Survival
1951 German, Berlitz
1953-54 Russian, G'town
1955 Nat'l Intel Orient
1956 Russian (Self-Study)
1957 Operations
1957-58 Japanese
1958 CI Ops
1958 Secret Writ
1958 Sci Tech Ops
1960 Intel Tech Seminar, Tokyo
1964 China Fam
1964 Sci&TechOps
1965 Indonesian/FSI/
1965 SoEastAsia/Reg Sem/FSI/

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details) (Cont.

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Aug 1950	Intel Asst	0301.23	5		OPC	Hq
Mar 1951	Intel Asst (PM)	0301.28	7		OPC/EE/Area III	" 15-21
Aug 1951	I.O. (PM)	0132.00	7		OPC/EE/USSR Gr/JBEDICT	(Munich)
Oct 1952	Trng Instr (PM)	1711.00	9		Ger Mis/MOB/USSR Gr/Trng	"
Oct 1953	Area Ops Off	0136.01	9		DDP/SR-5/A Sec	Hq
	Nov 1953 - Sep 1954 - Russian Lang Trng, Georgetown					
Nov 1954	I.O. (FI)	0136.51	9	FI	DDP/SR-7/AEACRE/Trng Spt	"
Jan 1955	" " "	0136.51	11	DI	" " " " "	"
May 1956	" " "	0136.51	12	DI	DDP/SR-7/DOB/Ops/Trng	"
Nov 1956	" " "	0136.51	12	DI	DDP/SR-5	"
Oct 1958	Area Ops Off	0136.01	12	DI	DDP/SR/Dep Ch Br 5 13-3	" 13-3
Jan 1959	I.O. (CI)	0132.57	12	DI	DDP/SR/FE/(Tokyo Sta)/Sov Br	(Tokyo)
May 1962	Ops Off	0136.01	13	D	" " " " " " "	"
Aug 1963	" "	0136.01	13	D	" " " " " " "	"
Oct 1963	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/SR/4	Hqs
Apr 1964	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/SR/CIG/GRU Sec	
Jun 1964	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/FE/CHIAct/MainlandOpsBr	"
Jan 1965	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/FE/CS/CS Dev Comp	" 13-20
Aug [illegible]		01[illegible].01	13	D	DDP/FE/PLI/([illegible] Sec) 13-20	([illegible])

20. DATE REVIEWED: 7 Oct 1976

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: emw/obs

VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: No

(Cont'd on next page)

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART 1) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible] PROFILE 18067

5/RN

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 056491	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I - Continued)

NAME (Last-First-Middle) KEITH, Robert Malcolm)	DATE OF BIRTH 11 Aug 1927

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING CONTINUED
1974 COS Seminar
1974 Risk of Capture

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details) 13-20

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Jun 1967	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	DDP/FE/PMI/ Indonesia (Sta) 26	(Djakarta)
	Jul'68 departed Indonesia					
Sep 1968	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/FE/Chi/Ch,Mil&Sci Br 60	(HongKong)
	Jun '71 departed Hong Kong					
Aug 1971	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/FE/CHI/Ch,HongKong-TaipeiBr 13-14	Hq
May 1973	Ops Off Ch	0136.01	15	D	DDO/EA/ChiOps/Ch,HongKongTaiwanBr	"
May 1974	Ops Off DCOS	0136.01	15	D	DDO/EA/FE/(TaipeiStat)/DCOS	(Taipei)
Jul 1974	" " "	0136.01	15	DMB	" " " " 13-6 "	" 13-6
Jul 1976	Ops Of Ch	0136.01	15	DMB	DDO/EA/Ch,PersEval&MgtStf	Hq

DATE REVIEWED 7 Oct 1976	PROFILE REVIEWED BY emm/obs

5/21

FORM 7-67 1200-1a

SECRET E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	
056491	**BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)**

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
KEITH, Robert Malcolm)	11 Aug 1927

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

SEE COVER HISTORY ATTACHED.

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1966 from Ch, FE for services rendered during and following the abortive coup attempt in Indonesia in Sep 1965.

Letter of Commendation 1972 from Deputy Director for Plans for Subject's outstanding performance as CS coordinator of the Agency's task force in connection with Richard Fecteau.

Appreciation 1974 from DD/O for Subject's participation as a member of the GS-13 DDO Personnel Evaluation Board.

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
7 Oct 1976	emm/ obs

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 67

SECRET E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 PROFILE

14-00000

104-10136-10329

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET (When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 30 Jul 1952

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: 035619

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): ORR, Howard McCrea

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 22 Jul 1922

5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE: 4 Mar 1955

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married

7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee): NO. 2 — YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 1928 1957

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA — SPOUSE: NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS: MEMBERSHIP Mar 1958 — OTHER STATUS:

10. LAST MED. RPT.: Oct 1975 — QUAL. FOR: TDY Standby — EVAL. FOR: TDY Standby

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NONE X — SERVICE: — GRADE: — ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1 — RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2 — TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3 — RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: May 1961

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1943-45 Military Service, US Army Air Force, S/Sgt
1945-46 Farm Manager of family farm, Circleville, Ohio
1948-49 Univ of Michigan - History Assistant (part time)
1950 Hess Aluminum Window Co, DC - Salesman (3 mos)
1950-51 Liberty Mutual Insurance Co, DC - Salesman (7 mos)
1953-57 Winorr Canning Co, Circleville, Ohio - President and General Manager

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1941-43; 1946-49 Univ of Michigan - BA(1948), MA (1949) History, Political Scien
1944 Scott Field, Ill - Radio Ops
1950 Liberty Mutual Ins Co, Boston, Mass - Sales Training (3 wks)

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French - R, Elem; P,S,U, Slight (Jun 1971); W, Slight; T, None - Mar 1958
Russian - R,P,S,U, Elem; W, Slight (Apr 1965); T, None - Mar 1958

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1951 Nat'l Intel Orient
1951 Operations
1952 Cland Ser Rev
1951 Ops Famil
1958 Cland Ser Rev
1958 Secret Writ
1958 Russian
1959 Sci&Tech Ops
1960 Ops Photo
1961 AAO/Japan
1964-65 Russian
1967 French
1967 Vietnam Sta Orient
1967 Vietnam FM Orient/Ref
1974 Survey of AudioOps
1974 QuestionedDocFund B
1976 SE Ops Crse

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Jan 1951	I.O.	0132.00	7		OCD/BioRegis/RegionalBr/EE-USSR	Hq
May 1951	"	0132.00	7		OPC/EE/USSR Gr	"
Oct 1951	"	0132.00	9		" " " "	"
Jul 1952	I.O.(Ops)	0132.00	11		OSO/SR/Western Br	"
Dec 1952	Resignation for personal reasons					
Feb 1957	I.O.(FI)	0136.51	12	D	DDP/SR/FE Area	"
Dec 1957	" "	0136.51	12	D	DDP/SR-10	"
Apr 1961	Ops Off	0136.01	12	D	DDP/CS Dev Comp/SR (3-3	" (3-3
Aug 1961	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/SR/FE/(Tokyo Sta)/Soviet Br	(Tokyo)
Oct 1963	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/FE/(TokSta)/Soviet Br	"
Nov 1963	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/SR-4 (3-3	Hq
Apr 1964	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/SR/OpsServGrp/FE Sec	"
May 1964	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/SR/OpsServGrp/AreaSptBr/FE	"
Sep 1964	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/SR/OpsDevGrp/Area Ops Br	"
Jan 1966	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/SR/CollGrp/DCh,Mil&IndBr	"
Nov 1966	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/WH/Br-4/Chile (FI)	"
Sep 1967	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/FE/VNO/ID/DCh,DeniedAreaBr	Saigon
Dec 1969	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/WH/DevComp(Other)	Hq
	Jul-Nov 1969 - DDP/SB/ O Tas [illegible]					
Jan 1970	Watch Officer	0132.07	13	D	DDP/FI Stf/IntelGrp/IntelWatch	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: 25 Apr 1977

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: mel/obs

22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: 24 Mar 1960

FORM 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 6-57

SECRET CL BY 307622 PROFILE 18063 (4)

31 PV

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (Continuation Sheet)
005619	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
ORR, Howard McCrea	22 Jul 1922

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT. 1947 (*Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details*) (Cont'd.)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (*If any*)	LOCATION
Nov 1972	Ops Of	0136.01	13	D	DDP/WH-3/Venezuela Sec	Hq
Mar 1973	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDO/WH-3/VenezuelaSec	"
Oct 1973	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDO/WH/FIStaff/DCh,Narcotics	"
Dec 1974	" "	0136.01	13	DQG	DDO/LA/BrazilBr/Ch,HardTargets	"
Aug 1975	" "	0136.01	13	DQG	DDO/LA/ADCh,BrazilBr/Ch,Hard /Targets	"
	Dec 1975-Jul 1976-detailed-DDO-CIStf/FieldSurveyTeams(Caracas Sta/Rabat Sta; Casablanca Base) 12-2 12-5 16-7					

DATE REVIEWED	PROFILE REVIEWED BY
25 Apr 1977	mel/obs

FORM 10-72 1200-1a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

PROFILE (4)

3 PV

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
005619	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
ORR, Howard McCrea	22 Jul 1922

23. PHOTOGRAPH



24. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

SEE COVER HISTORY ATTACHED.

25. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1969 from Ch,Sov Bloc Div for contribution to a fast moving operational situation which existed in the Internal Operations Group of SB Div, caused by a series o Bloc intelligence officer defections, during the months of July and Aug 1969. DDP concu in this commendation.

Award 1969 Certificate of Distinction in recognition of superior performance of duty while serving under conditions of turmoil and hazard during the Tet Offensive of 1968.

Appreciation 1971 from Ch,EUR Div for the Intelligence Watch assistance to the Division.

Letter of Commendation 1976 from Chief, CI Staff for Subject's exemplar performance while on a six months detail to CI Staff as operations survey team member and his substantive review of two DDO Stations.

26. DATE REVIEWED	27. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
25 Apr 1977	mel/obs

FORM 2-68 1200 (PART 2) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 PROFILE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

HSCA

FOIA/Security/Requests

INTE USE ONLY

JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 10 November 1977

1. (Unclassified - MLG) EMPLOYMENT REQUESTS Concerning Debbie's, in the office of Representative Douglas Applegate (D., Ohio), request as to whether we had received an application from their constituent, Robert Sensibaugh, I informed her, per the Office of Personnel, that we had not as of yet. She thanked me for my help.

2. (Unclassified - MLG) LIAISON Per her request I forwarded to Karen, in the office of Representative Mario Biaggi (D., N.Y.), a copy of the press release that went out regarding the CIA tours.

3. (Unclassified - MG) LIAISON Received a call from Ted Winicov, in the office of Representative Richard T. Schulze (R., Pa.), who requested a copy of the Agency publication "Soviet Commercial Operations in the West." I told him a copy would be forwarded to him.

4. (Unclassified - KSN) LIAISON Called Dawn, secretary to Professor G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, House Select Committee on Assassinations, and set up a meeting for tomorrow afternoon for Mr. Sidney Stembridge, DD/OS, and Mr. Cummins to meet with Professor Blakey.

5. (Secret - DTC) LIAISON Called Professor G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, House Select Committee on Assassinations, and informed him that we had received six Privacy Act requests from members of the Select Committee staff asking for any security information on them which is held by the Agency. I did not provide the names of the requesters to Blakey.

6. (Internal Use Only - RJK) LIAISON Keith Raffel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, visited the Badge Office and received his Headquarters badge. He then proceeded to the C&R conference room where he reviewed extracts of NIS's relating to the security services of the United Kingdom, Australia, and France. Evvy Vidal, O/SA/DO/O, assisted with the United Kingdom liaison service aspects. (1,11,11

11,24

19053

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY

INTERNAL USE ONLY

2 JRV

J-22

HSCA
77-0007/16

HSC
Guidelines

19. (Unclassified - LJK) ADMINISTRATIVE DELIVERIES Delivered to Charles Snodgrass, 27,16-3 House Appropriations Committee staff, phone numbers of Chief of Station, Panama and Chief of 27,16-3 Station, Mexico City for passage to Representatives John J. Flynt (D., Ga.) and J. Kenneth Robinson (R., Va.) for their use in an upcoming trip to the above locations.

20. (Confidential - LJK) LIAISON Met with James Fellenbaum, Senate Appropriations Committee staff, to discuss the FY78 budget. Fellenbaum indicated that the Senate Appropriations Committee would have to treat the issue of intelligence-related costs due to the fact that the House Appropriations Committee has shown such interest in this matter. I informed him that the House Appropriations Committee is scheduling a hearing on intelligence-related costs on 8 March 1977.

Fellenbaum also said that it appears Senator William W. Proxmire (D., Wis.) and Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.) will join the Intelligence Subcommittee of Senate Appropriations Committee.

21. (Unclassified - LLM) LIAISON Advised Art Kuhl, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, of the number of Agency employees covered by the upcoming foreign service list to be submitted to the Senate. The information was supplied by Tom Carney, CCS.

22. (Unclassified - LLM) LIAISON Spoke with Paul Daly, FBI, on the present state of affairs with respect to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Daly advised that at the request of Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez (D., Texas) to the Attorney General the Committee staffers will no longer be provided access to the unclassified material they have been reviewing within the Department of Justice.

Daly is hopeful that Chairman Gonzalez will approve the security clearance standards and once this is in motion the first clearances should start coming through in about 30 days. I asked Daly to keep us advised as to the progress on the clearances matter to pave the way for our next coordinated step within the Executive Branch to seek Chairman Gonzalez's and Representative Samuel L. Devine's (R., Ohio) agreement on procedures for access to classified information.

18928

2/PV

HSC on FF

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

J-15

Chrono

HSCA
77-0029

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Wednesday - 30 March 1977

15. (Unclassified - DTC) LIAISON I was called by Mr. James Fiesta, in the office of Representative Clarence D. Long (D., Md.), regarding a constituent's request for information on the Kennedy assassination. This constituent, Ernest F. Rethschulte, is a graduate student and is preparing a thesis on the assassination. He had seen a newspaper article reporting an FOIA release from the Agency of about 850 pages of material on the assassination to the Associated Press. Mr. Fiesta is sending me a copy of the newspaper article so that we can more clearly identify the material with IPS, and if it has been released it will be provided to the constituent through Mr. Fiesta. (Note: There have been prior OLC contacts with Mr. Fiesta on this FOIA request.)

16. (Unclassified - RJK) LIAISON Spoke with Anne Karalekas, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, to confirm that she would be speaking to the Intelligence Process Course on 18 April, for which I would be assisting her with transportation. She will also speak to an annual records management conference at Warrenton Training Center on 4 May, for which George Frates, Records Administration Branch, is making the travel arrangements. She indicated that she would call Frates and they would work out the arrangements together.

17. (Unclassified - CM) LIAISON I asked Linda, secretary to Pauline Baker, of the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, if the Subcommittee hearings of September 1976 had been published. She said that had just occurred, and promised to send us two copies. I advised Molly Kreimer, CPS, the requester.

18. (Unclassified - ALM) LIAISON Winslow Wheeler, from the office of Senator Jacob K. Javits, called requesting a copy of "A Study of Climatological Research as it Pertains to Intelligence Problems." A copy was forwarded to him.

2094

ipd

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

J-22

HSC

77-0007/16

Chrono

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 5
Friday - 11 February 1977

19. (Unclassified - LJK) ADMINISTRATIVE DELIVERIES Delivered to Charles Snodgrass, House Appropriations Committee staff, phone numbers of Chief of Station, (16-7) (Panama) and Chief of Station, (16-3) (Mexico City) for passage to Representatives John J. Flynt (D., Ga.) and J. Kenneth Robinson (R., Va.) for their use in an upcoming trip to the above locations.

20. (Confidential - LJK) LIAISON Met with James Fellenbaum, Senate Appropriations Committee staff, to discuss the FY78 budget. Fellenbaum indicated that the Senate Appropriations Committee would have to treat the issue of intelligence-related costs due to the fact that the House Appropriations Committee has shown such interest in this matter. I informed him that the House Appropriations Committee is scheduling a hearing on intelligence-related costs on 8 March 1977.

Fellenbaum also said that it appears Senator William W. Proxmire (D., Wis.) and Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.) will join the Intelligence Subcommittee of Senate Appropriations Committee.

21. (Unclassified - LLM) LIAISON Advised Art Kuhl, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, of the number of Agency employees covered by the upcoming foreign service list to be submitted to the Senate. The information was supplied by (Tom Carney), CCS. 03

22. (Unclassified - LLM) LIAISON Spoke with Paul Daly, FBI, on the present state of affairs with respect to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Daly advised that at the request of Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez (D., Texas) to the Attorney General the Committee staffers will no longer be provided access to the unclassified material they have been reviewing within the Department of Justice.

Daly is hopeful that Chairman Gonzalez will approve the security clearance standards and once this is in motion the first clearances should start coming through in about 30 days. I asked Daly to keep us advised as to the progress on the clearances matter to pave the way for our next coordinated step within the Executive Branch to seek Chairman Gonzalez's and Representative Samuel L. Devine's (R., Ohio) agreement on procedures for access to classified information.

20117

3/pd CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTERNAL USE ONLY

H S C A

Briefing Chrono

JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 10 November 1977

1. (Unclassified - MLG) EMPLOYMENT REQUESTS Concerning Debbie's, in the office of Representative Douglas Applegate (D., Ohio), request as to whether we had received an application from their constituent, Robert Sensibaugh, I informed her, per the Office of Personnel, that we had not as of yet. She thanked me for my help.

2. (Unclassified - MLG) LIAISON Per her request I forwarded to Karen, in the office of Representative Mario Biaggi (D., N.Y.), a copy of the press release that went out regarding the CIA tours.

3. (Unclassified - MG) LIAISON Received a call from Ted Winicov, in the office of Representative Richard T. Schulze (R., Pa.), who requested a copy of the Agency publication "Soviet Commercial Operations in the West." I told him a copy would be forwarded to him.

4. (Unclassified - KSN) LIAISON Called Dawn, secretary to Professor G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, House Select Committee on Assassinations, and set up a meeting for tomorrow afternoon for Mr. Sidney Stembridge, DD/OS, and Mr. Cummins to meet with Professor Blakey.

5. (Secret - DTC) LIAISON Called Professor G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, House Select Committee on Assassinations, and informed him that we had received six Privacy Act requests from members of the Select Committee staff asking for any security information on them which is held by the Agency. I did not provide the names of the requesters to Blakey.

6. (Internal Use Only - RJK) LIAISON Keith Raffel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, visited the Badge Office and received his Headquarters badge. He then proceeded to the C&R conference room where he reviewed extracts of NIS's relating to the security services of the United Kingdom, Australia, and France. Evvy Vidal, O/SA/DO/O, assisted with the United Kingdom liaison service aspects.

19894

SECRET

2 IMPDET CL BY

INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

INTERNAL USE ONLY

HSCA

Chrono FOIA/Security/Requests

JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 10 November 1977

1. (Unclassified - MLG) EMPLOYMENT REQUESTS Concerning Debbie's, in the office of Representative Douglas Applegate (D., Ohio), request as to whether we had received an application from their constituent, Robert Sensibaugh, I informed her, per the Office of Personnel, that we had not as of yet. She thanked me for my help.

2. (Unclassified - MLG) LIAISON Per her request I forwarded to Karen, in the office of Representative Mario Biaggi (D., N.Y.), a copy of the press release that went out regarding the CIA tours.

3. (Unclassified - MG) LIAISON Received a call from Ted Winicov, in the office of Representative Richard T. Schulze (R., Pa.), who requested a copy of the Agency publication "Soviet Commercial Operations in the West." I told him a copy would be forwarded to him.

4. (Unclassified - KSN) LIAISON Called Dawn, secretary to Professor G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, House Select Committee on Assassinations, and set up a meeting for tomorrow afternoon for Mr. Sidney Stembridge, DD/OS, and Mr. Cummins to meet with Professor Blakey.

5. (Secret - DTC) LIAISON Called Professor G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, House Select Committee on Assassinations, and informed him that we had received six Privacy Act requests from members of the Select Committee staff asking for any security information on them which is held by the Agency. I did not provide the names of the requesters to Blakey.

6. (Internal Use Only - RJK) LIAISON Keith Raffel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, visited the Badge Office and received his Headquarters badge. He then proceeded to the C&R conference room where he reviewed extracts of NIS's relating to the security services of the United Kingdom, Australia, and France. Evvy Vidal, O/SA/DO/O, assisted with the United Kingdom liaison service aspects.

19897

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY

INTERNAL USE ONLY

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                                      201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26           POB GERM, BERLIN                TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                      OCC PHARMACIST                  OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53     OCC CODE CHEM                   RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                         30 NOV 70              00833555
```

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISG Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

?? l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e. exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-____________. ☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier) ☐ Non-Restricted Dossier For Split-Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to ________ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ________ (date) retained at ____________ desk.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

CL BY: 007622

FORM 5-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ____ BADGE ____ COMPONENT ____ EXT. ____

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

○ SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REQ. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A

RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______________________ (NAME)
COMPONENT: ______________ Date: ______________

SECTION B

REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______________ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______________ Date: ______________

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: CC7422 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



```
FOI A CHINA
    201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST              SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
    03 OCT  1973

           NAME                        TYPE   DOB      BIRTHPLACE                 OCC.  CIT.    201      OI-1  OI-2  ACT.  LOC.  INT.
                                       NAME   DA/MO/YR CTRY  CITY                                                   CTRY  CTRY  CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/                17JUL14  CHIN,KWANGTUNG                   CHIN?   0165401             CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/                                                     DIPT          0238859             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/          A     24JAN11                                           0178653             CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6776/1108/0038                90       CHIN,AMOY                  BUSP  CCOM?   0043751             CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU MEI                                04JAN19  CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.              CHIN?   0234629             CHIN  CUBA
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690                21OCT08  CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH       CNAT    0179620             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001          A     12NOV22  CHIN, HUNAN                      CNAT    0069786             CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-TAO                                18MAR45  CHIN                       DIPT  CCOM    0905390             CHIN  MALT
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1                 C41      CHIN, CANTON               ENGR  CNAT    0832855             CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807                02SEP26  CHIN, LIAONING PRO               CHIN?   0130415             CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/499                 12JAN18  CHIN, FUKIEN                     CCOM?   0091803             CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-YI                                 09JUN99  CHIN, CANTON               PROF  CHIN?   0040289             CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU-SAN                           A     19DEC19  CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV             CNAT?   0052638             CHIN  HWAI
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2885/6930                02JUL30  CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.      ARMY  CNAT    0328328             CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU CHUAN /7115/3219/122                19       CHIN,HUAN TANG TS                CHIN?   0124438             CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2885/2                  NOV30    UK                         TSEA  CNAT    0797335             CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2885/2797          A     CIRC22   CHIN,PEILIU                      CHIN?   0200223             CHIN
CHEN, SHU FEN                           R                                                       0988577             CHIN  ETHI
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3185/                08JUL14  CHIN,KWANGTUNG                   CHIN?   0179621             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74                10       CHIN,FUKIEN                      CHIN?   0044759             CHIN
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2885/7                 23FEB07  CHIN, KWANGTUNG                  CCOM?   0093195             CHIN
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2885/8133                05MAY18  CHIN,FOOCHOW                     CHIN?   0179622             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-HUA                                 30MAR26                             DIPT  CCOM.   0223161             CHIN  CEY
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2885/5030/            A     06FEB16  CHIN, HOPEI                DIPT  CNAT    0239156             CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710                27NOV23  CHIN,FANG CHENG            PROF  CHIN?   0179623             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LAN                           R              CHIN                             CCOM    0221972             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0647/009                CIRC21   CHIN                       DIPT  CHIN?   0223162             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/                25NOV20  CHIN,FENGSHUN                    CHIN?   0179624             CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010                 01JUL29  CHIN, KIANGSU              MILA  CCOM    0858440             CHIN  LAOS
CHEN, SHU-MIN                           A     20SEP20  CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU       CNAT    0096947             CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/                15APR30  CHIN,[illegible]           CHMO  CHIN?   0179625             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/                19DEC19  CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.            CNAT?   0052630             CHIN  HWAI
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2885/2773/          A     10DEC26  CHIN,KWANGTUNG                   CHIN?   0085119             CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091                 27JAN25  CHIN, FUKIEN PROV                CHIN?   0103209             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2885/1795/                 21[illegible] CHIN, SHANGHAI        GEOL  CHIN?   0763916             CHIN  BURM
CHEN, SHU TEH /M75/                     V     27MAR20  CHIN, CHANG SHU                          0013991             CHIN
CHEN, SHU TING /7115/0647/6639                CIRC[illegible] CHIN,HANG CH[illegible]   CHIN?   0153929             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2885/2737/                18MAR[illegible] CHIN               FIN   CCOM    0767442             CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0337/          A     02FEB0[illegible]                                 0191329             CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YAO /7115/2885/1031                 11NOV08  CHIN, KWANGTUNG                  CCOM?   0093196             CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YIN                           V     05APR17  CHIN,PEIPING                     CHIN?   0107336             CHIN  CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2885/5391/                15JUN06  CHIN,KANG CHEN KW                CHIN?   0179626             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/                07OCT30  CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN ARMY  CNAT    0340528             CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-YU                                  17FEB39  CHIN, CHEKIANG             INT   CCOM    0313610             CHIN  DENM
CHEN, SHU-YU                                  21APR21  CHIN, SHANGHAI                   CHIN?   0144010             CHIN
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3942/           V     04SEP28  CHIN, SZECHWAN                   CHIN?   0144750             CHIN  TAIW

                                        SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
                                        E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979                                                     PAGE   150
```

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location
(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
(3) Citizenship
(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname
(b) Given name
(c) Date of birth
(d) Country of birth
(e) Citizenship
(f) OI code
(g) Location

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP SS).

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

   All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HSCA

Security/Requests

SECRET

INTERNAL USE ONLY

JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 10 November 1977

1. (Unclassified - MLG) EMPLOYMENT REQUESTS Concerning Debbie's, in the office of Representative Douglas Applegate (D., Ohio), request as to whether we had received an application from their constituent, Robert Sensibaugh, I informed her, per the Office of Personnel, that we had not as of yet. She thanked me for my help.

2. (Unclassified - MLG) LIAISON Per her request I forwarded to Karen, in the office of Representative Mario Biaggi (D., N.Y.), a copy of the press release that went out regarding the CIA tours.

3. (Unclassified - MG) LIAISON Received a call from Ted Winicov, in the office of Representative Richard T. Schulze (R., Pa.), who requested a copy of the Agency publication "Soviet Commercial Operations in the West." I told him a copy would be forwarded to him.

4. (Unclassified - KSN) LIAISON Called Dawn, secretary to Professor G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, House Select Committee on Assassinations, and set up a meeting for tomorrow afternoon for Mr. Sidney Stembridge, DD/OS, and Mr. Cummins to meet with Professor Blakey.

5. (Secret - DTC) LIAISON Called Professor G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, House Select Committee on Assassinations, and informed him that we had received six Privacy Act requests from members of the Select Committee staff asking for any security information on them which is held by the Agency. I did not provide the names of the requesters to Blakey.

6. (Internal Use Only - RJK) LIAISON Keith Raffel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, visited the Badge Office and received his Headquarters badge. He then proceeded to the C&R conference room where he reviewed extracts of NIS's relating to the security services of the United Kingdom, Australia, and France. Evvy Vidal, O/SA/DO/O, assisted with the United Kingdom liaison service aspects. 11,11/11

11,24

21289

SECRET

INTERNAL USE ONLY

2 IMPDET CL BY

2/m

HSCA

INTERNAL USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL

ADDENDUM TO JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 6 July 1978

1. (Confidential - MMP) LIAISON Accompanied Scott Breckinridge, Special Coordinator for the House Select Committee on Assassinations, OLC, and Rodger Gabrielson, OLC, to brief Thomas K. Latimer, Staff Director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, on the state of play as between the House Select Committee on Assassinations and the Agency. Mr. Latimer immediately understood that the crux of the problem lay in the House Select Committee on Assassinations possible exposure of sensitive information (Nosenko and/or Mexico operations) in open fora. He said that he would brief Chairman Edward P. Boland (D., Mass.), House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and that the latter might discuss the matter with Chairman Louis Stokes (D., Ohio), House Select Committee on Assassinations. He suggested that the best approach would be for the DCI to raise the issues we were concerned about with Chairman Stokes and, then, if necessary with the President. The latter in turn could register his concerns with Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill. Mr. Latimer said that the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence charter precluded the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from playing a significant role in this matter.

2. (Confidential - DFM) LIAISON Received a call from Spencer Davis, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, who asked for the phone number of former Agency employee Newton S. Miler, as one of the Committee staff members wanted to interview him. June, O/PCS/LOC/DDO, subsequently called Miler and, in his absence, left a message that he call Davis. I informed Davis this was how we had handled his request and he was satisfied.

I also explained to Davis, 03 the Agency's position regarding retired Agency employee [Raymond Close] who was [Chief of Station] 12-7 [Saudi Arabia] and upon retiring took a position as a consultant to the Saudi Government. Our position is that as [Close] has retired, the Agency has no control over his activities other than through his secrecy agreement which he signed and which remains in effect. Davis also asked me if the same situation was true for a former Chief of Station in [Amman] and I said I would check. 12-15

INTERNAL USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL

2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

21885

5/9 [illegible]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

2. GABRIELSON
3. SDB Chrono

INTERNAL - ADMINISTRATIVE USE ONLY

16 November 1978

MEMO FOR FILE

SUBJECT : Pennent Bagley

1. Yesterday at about noon Mr. Bagley's attorney phoned OGC asking for the following:

a. The originsl copy of a memo said to be in Bagley's handwriting, concerning options for Nosenko's disposal. This was in the Hart testimony at line 4218 and the Helms testimony at line 4610.

b. The original ane excised portion of a Bagkey memo referring to the purposes of a polygraph of Nosenko. This was at line 2981 of the Hart testimony and 2068 of the Helms testimony.

c. The original letter from Bagley re "devastating consequences," in the Hart testimony atlline 3877.

d. Bagley's complete personnel file, including specifically:

(1) reference to Bagley's transfer from Headquarters in the 1966/67 period.

(2) Fitness Reports and comments for the 1962-72 period.

(3) Promotion recommendations for 1962-72 period.

(4) His IMM and the associated citation.

2. We asked the various parties to gather the items requested to see what was involved. The OPF was at Headquarters, having been bgought from WTC for the HSCA inquiry. The Honor and Merits Awards Board had the medal and citation (having been brought up for a file reciew). CI Staff had thr documents cited in the Hart tesimony. We met yesterday afternoon to consider what is involved. Bagley wanted the material an appearance at HSCA this morning.

22422

ADMINISTRATCVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

24,32

3. CCS has a standing position on non-release of citations and awards to persons retired under cover ((Bagley is retired in Belgium under State cover)) so he would have to make a decision on that before he could have the material. He could not be given some of his personnel records, as they are clsssified, although he could be shown them as in a Privacy Act request; he is not now cleared for access to classified material, although his attorney is. CI Staff considers the materials not cited in the Hart testimony as unclassified; those portions authorized for use are unclassified only to the extent used by Hart; the exception is the entire handwritten list of options, which has been provided the Committee at its request, and he can see that when he appears before the Committee.

4. I tried to contact the DDA and DDO, reaching John McMahon. He agrees with this preliminary position. Mike Malanik phoned me back today, indicating that when the cover aspect is straightened out Bagley should be treated as anyone else. Dick Rininger of OGC, meanwhile, had advised Mr. Chabot, Bagley's attorney, that the cover consideration has to be resolved first. Bagley was there and Rininger also spoke to him, with Bagley indicating his intention to have his cover removed.

SDBreckinridge

JPN

CONFIDENTIAL

13 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Operations Support Branch
03
FROM: Joseph P. Mirabile
Operations Support Branch

SUBJECT: SHERMAN, Adrian Fisher, Jr.
#54 621

1. On 25 September 1978, a call was received in the Security Duty Office from James A. Sherman, Subject's brother, advising that Subject suffered a fatal heart attack on 23 September 1978 at his apartment in Monterey, California. Subject was sixty years of age and had a history of previous heart trouble.

2. Mr. Sherman was previously of interest to this Agency as a military detailee, 1952 - 1954, when he was serving at Clark Air Force Base, the Philippines, as a Major in the United States Army. After leaving the Army, he worked for Pan American Airlines for approximately 13 years and then as an investigator for the State Attorney General's Office in Miami, Florida. He has been of interest to DCD and FRD in San Francisco, California, since April 1977. FRD's operational interest was as an access agent to a Saudi Arabian of interest to the San Francisco Base. 24

3. On 23 September 1978, Subject's body was discovered by an FRD case officer who had arrived at the Monterey, California, apartment for an operational meeting. The apartment house resident manager gained access to the apartment. Subsequent access was allowed to an emergency ambulance squad, police officers and the deputy coroner.

4. Assistance has been rendered to FR Base by San Francisco Field Office personnel in this matter. 03 Gordon Gregory, SAC/SFFO, was apprised on the circumstances on 25 September 1978 and subsequently made contact with the Chief, FR Base. Subject's son, who was traveling cross-country by auto at the time of the death, arrived in the area on 27 September with two sisters and was contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Field Office. He is

2,499
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 064537

CONFIDENTIAL

3

reported to be very cooperative, aware of need for discretion and secrecy and proud of his father's relationship with this Agency.

5. The only aspect of this incident, which may be of continuing security concern, is that the son recalls that in May 1978, while assisting his father in moving some personal effects, he remembers seeing a written plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. The son said that it had been prepared by his father in the early 1970's when he was working in Florida but at a time when he had no Agency association. At this time the paper is still missing. It may have been recently destroyed by the Subject or, the possibility exists, it may have been stolen by someone having access to the apartment. According to Subject's son, several other items were missing, including a money clip containing a $100 bill that his father always kept, a Randall knife, a gold pen and pencil set and a microwave oven. After notifying the police of the missing personal items, Subject's son received the knife from the resident manager who claims to have found it in some weeds. Subject's son suspects that the resident manager may have been responsible for the theft of the personal items, but he has now resolved to drop the entire issue.

6. Foreign Resources Division has advised that the DCI has been briefed on this case. It is therefore felt that no further Office of Security action is required at this time other than to monitor the case for 60-90 days to determine if any new developments occur.

03

JPMirabile

Joseph P. Mirabile

Distribution:
Orig. - Subject's file
1 - OSB Chrono

03
OS/PSI/SSD/OSB/(JPMirabile)/csn

Whit Moore Bishop
056446
DOB : 24 September 1915

Office of Communications

10
January 1960 - [Warrenton]
August 1963 - Rhein Main
July 1964 - Frankfurt
January 1966 - Headquarters
June 1972 - Retired (GS-14(7)

1949

5' 11"
170 lbs.
Grey hair
Brown eyes

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/90

James Clarence Bishop
113544
DOB : 11 November 1912

Office of Logistics

Resigned 14 December 1960 (GS-16(5)

1952

5' 10-1/2"
170 lbs.
Brown hair
Green eyes
Medium build

Fred Margeson Bishop
P-684-57 (contract #)
DOB : 28 October 1890

TSD Consultant

Separated 1 July 1961

1955

5' 10"
182 lbs.
blue eyes
light hair

Frank Patrick Bishop
004736
DOB : 25 April 1914

Office of Finance

March 1958 - Headquarters
April 1969 - Inspector

Retired 29 June 1973 GS-17(5)

1949

5' 11-1/2"
145 lbs.
blue yes
brown hair

1973

grey hair

[Eugene ^{3} Edward] Bishop, Jr.
235566
DOB : May 1941

1963 - Clerk Headquarters

Resigned 8 February 1969 GS-7(4)

1963
6'1"
172 lbs.
hazel eyes
black hair

Ymc

Edwin Warren Bishop
037252
DOB : 29 May 1923

July 1962 - Headquarters

Resigned May 1963 GS-13

1962
6'
170 lbs.
grey eyes
red hair

03

Boyd Warrington Bishop
08 390487 09
DOB : 29 April 1940

June 1965 - CT (new employee)
August 1968 - Hamburg 15

Still active
09
1965
5'11"
150 lbs.
blue eyes
brown hair

5/90

03
08 [John Carl] Bishop
[036385]

09
DOB : [18 January] 1938

DDO-Eur.

May 1962 - New employee headquarters
July 1964 - JOT
July 1965 - Headquarters
Jan. 1968 - [Berlin] 15 - 8
Mar. 1969 - [Bonn] 15 - 13

Still active GS-13

1964
6'2"
160 lbs.
grey eyes
brown hair

5/920

03 [Henry Charles] Bishop
08 [017891]

DOB : [25 February] 1932 09

January 1960 - Station E.
October 1962 - Nicosia
October 1964 - Headquarters

Office of Communications GS-13

Still active

09 [1954]
5'9"
170 lbs.
brown eyes
brown hair

4/20

SECRET

INTERNAL USE ONLY

HSCA

5. (Unclassified - JMS) LIAISON House Select Committee on Assassinations staffers visited Headquarters to review files.

6. (Confidential - LLM) LIAISON Advised Tom Latimer, Staff Director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, of the situation developing with the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations having open hearings on FBI/CIA dealings on KCIA in the early 1970's. Latimer said he would alert Chairman Edward Boland (D., Mass.).

7. (Confidential - LLM) LIAISON Talked to Mike Hershman, Deputy Staff Director, House International Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations, and he agreed to set back the planned hearings with former FBI agent McDonnell until 21 March. I made it clear that by this action we were not making any commitment to appear and told Hershman that I hoped the next step would be taken on Monday, 13 March.

8. (Internal Use Only - GC) LIAISON Called Beverly Lumpkin, on the staff of the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations, to tell her that the supplementary paragraph submitted by the Subcommittee was acceptable for public release.

9. (Secret - DFM) LIAISON Called Audrey Hatry, Clerk, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, who gave me a rundown of Committee meetings for next week. Scheduled for the week are FBI and DEA FY-1979 budget briefings on 14 March and a meeting of the Special Investigation Subcommittee on 17 March to discuss the recently completed staff report on CIA activities in (Australia.)

11

10. (Unclassified - DFM) LIAISON Talked with Doug McCullough, Senate Select Committee on Ethics staff, Don Sanders and Ken deGraffenreid, both of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, regarding Senator Adlai Stevenson's (D., Ill.) request of last week for the Agency to provide him examples of leaks that he might use to illustrate seriousness of leaks in a closed Senate session. None of these people were able to give me a date for the planned session although Sanders did provide some help on what kinds of examples would be the most useful.

SECRET

INTERNAL USE ONLY

21363.

[illegible] - Nosenko

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL USE ONLY

ADDENDUM TO JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 6 July 1978

1. (Confidential - MMP) LIAISON Accompanied Scott Breckinridge, Special Coordinator for the House Select Committee on Assassinations, OLC, and Rodger Gabrielson, OLC, to brief Thomas K. Latimer, Staff Director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, on the state of play as between the House Select Committee on Assassinations and the Agency. Mr. Latimer immediately understood that the crux of the problem lay in the House Select Committee on Assassinations possible exposure of sensitive information (Nosenko and/or Mexico operations) in open fora. He said that he would brief Chairman Edward P. Boland (D., Mass.), House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and that the latter might discuss the matter with Chairman Louis Stokes (D., Ohio), House Select Committee on Assassinations. He suggested that the best approach would be for the DCI to raise the issues we were concerned about with Chairman Stokes and, then, if necessary with the President. The latter in turn could register his concerns with Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill. Mr. Latimer said that the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence charter precluded the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from playing a significant role in this matter.

2. (Confidential - DFM) LIAISON Received a call from Spencer Davis, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, who asked for the phone number of former Agency employee Newton S. Miler, as one of the Committee staff members wanted to interview him. June, O/PCS/LOC/DDO, subsequently called Miler and, in his absence, left a message that he call Davis. I informed Davis this was how we had handled his request and he was satisfied.

I also explained to Davis the Agency's position regarding retired Agency employee Raymond Close, who was Chief of Station Saudi Arabia and upon retiring took a position as a consultant to the Saudi Government. Our position is that as Close has retired, the Agency has no control over his activities other than through his secrecy agreement which he signed and which remains in effect. Davis also asked me if the same situation was true for a former Chief of Station in Amman and I said I would check.

INTERNAL USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY

21581

CONFIDENTIAL

OLC-78-3040
22 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Ray Reardon
Office of Security

FROM : S. D. Breckinridge

SUBJECT : Agency Employees with the Surname of Bishop

1. The Office of Personnel is gathering files of present and past employees of the Agency who were on board in the 60's. Attached are brief excerpts from the OPFs of the first group shown to me by Doris Houdesheldt.

2. I am trying to assemble a book of photographs of these different employees to show to the two witnesses who think they knew a man named Morris Bishop in the 60's. The photograph or photographs that you may have concerning the persons listed on the attached pages as near as possible to the first half of the 60's would be helpful.

3. I expect to have more names in the near future and will forward those to you as soon as they are available.

4. It would be appreciated if you could give this some priority attention.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

008 2678

03

Boyd Warrington Bishop
66 390487
DOB : 29 April 1940
09

June 1965 - CT (new employee)
August 1968 - Hamburg

Still active 17-26

1965
5'11"
150 lbs.
blue eyes
brown hair

4/1V

03
Edwin Warren Bishop
06 037252
DOB : 29 May 1923
09

July 1962 - Headquarters

Resigned May 1963 GS-13

1962
6'
170 lbs.
grey eyes
red hair

3/RJ

Frank Patrick Bishop
004736
DOB : 25 April 1914

Office of Finance

March 1958 - Headquarters
April 1969 - Inspector

Retired 29 June 1973 GS-17(5)

1949

5' 11-1/2"
145 lbs.
blue yes
brown hair

1973

grey hair

03
Eugene Edward Bishop, Jr.
08 235566 09
DOB : May 1941

1963 - Clerk Headquarters

Resigned 8 February 1969 GS-7(4)

1963
6'1"
172 lbs.
hazel eyes
black hair

3/PJ

14-00000

03
Henry Charles Bishop
06 (01789)

09
DOB : 25 February 1932

January 1960 - Station E. 24
October 1962 - Nicosia 15-33
October 1964 - Headquarters

Office of Communications GS-13

Still active

1954
5'9"
170 lbs.
brown eyes
brown hair

5/N

03
Fred Margeson Bishop
06 P-684-57 (contract #)
DOB : 28 October 1890
09

TSD Consultant

Separated 1 July 1961

1955

5' 10"
182 lbs.
blue eyes
light hair

3/PJ

03
John Carl Bishop
08 036385

08
DOB : 18 January 1938

DDO-Eur.

May 1962 - New employee headquarters
July 1964 - JOT
July 1965 - Headquarters
Jan. 1968 - Berlin 15-8
Mar. 1969 - Bonn 15-13

Still active GS-13

1964
6'2"
160 lbs.
grey eyes
brown hair

5/12

03
James Clarence Bishop
08 113544
DOB : 11 November 1912
09

Office of Logistics

Resigned 14 December 1960 (GS-16(5)

1952

5' 10-1/2"
170 lbs.
Brown hair
Green eyes
Medium build

3/PJ

Whit Moore Bishop
056446
DOB : 24 September 1915

Office of Communications

January 1960 - Warrenton 99
August 1963 - Rhein Main 15-34
July 1964 - Frankfurt
January 1966 - Headquarters
June 1972 - Retired (GS-14(7)

1949

5' 11"
170 lbs.
Grey hair
Brown eyes

2/PJ

OLC RECORD COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Pkg in HSCA

OLC-78-3040
22 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Ray Reardon
Office of Security

FROM : S. D. Breckinridge

SUBJECT : Agency Employees with the Surname of Bishop

1. The Office of Personnel is gathering files of present and past employees of the Agency who were on board in the 60's. Attached are brief excerpts from the OPFs of the first group shown to me by Doris Houdesheldt.

2. I am trying to assemble a book of photographs of these different employees to show to the two witnesses who think they knew a man named Morris Bishop in the 60's. The photograph or photographs that you may have concerning the persons listed on the attached pages as near as possible to the first half of the 60's would be helpful.

3. I expect to have more names in the near future and will forward those to you as soon as they are available.

4. It would be appreciated if you could give this some priority attention.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment

Distribution:
1 - Adse w/atts
1 - OLC/Subj w/atts
1 - OLC/Chrono w/o atts

CONFIDENTIAL

21476

Whit Moore Bishop
056446
DOB : 24 September 1915

Office of Communications

January 1960 - Warrenton
August 1963 - Rhein Main
July 1964 - Frankfurt
January 1966 - Headquarters
June 1972 - Retired (GS-14(7)

1949

5' 11"
170 lbs.
Grey hair
Brown eyes

James Clarence Bishop
113544
DOB : 11 November 1912

Office of Logistics

Resigned 14 December 1960 (GS-16(5)

1952

5' 10-1/2"
170 lbs.
Brown hair
Green eyes
Medium build

Fred Margeson Bishop
P-684-57 (contract #)
DOB : 28 October 1890

TSD Consultant

Separated 1 July 1961

1955

5' 10"
182 lbs.
blue eyes
light hair

Frank Patrick Bishop
004736
DOB : 25 April 1914

Office of Finance

March 1958 - Headquarters
April 1969 - Inspector

Retired 29 June 1973 GS-17(5)

1949

5' 11-1/2"
145 lbs.
blue yes
brown hair

1973

grey hair

Eugene Edward Bishop, Jr.
235566
DOB : May 1941

1963 - Clerk Headquarters

Resigned 8 February 1969 GS-7(4)

1963
6'1"
172 lbs.
hazel eyes
black hair

Edwin Warren Bishop
037252
DOB : 29 May 1923

July 1962 - Headquarters

Resigned May 1963 GS-13

1962
6'
170 lbs.
grey eyes
red hair

Boyd Warrington Bishop
390487
DOB : 29 April 1940

June 1965 - CT (new employee)
August 1968 - Hamburg

Still active

1965
5'11"
150 lbs.
blue eyes
brown hair

John Carl Bishop
036385

DOB : 18 January 1938

DDO-Eur.

May 1962 - New employee headquarters
July 1964 - JOT
July 1965 - Headquarters
Jan. 1968 - Berlin
Mar. 1969 - Bonn

Still active GS-13

1964
6'2"
160 lbs.
grey eyes
brown hair

Henry Charles Bishop
017891

DOB : 25 February 1932

January 1960 - Station E.
October 1962 - Nicosia
October 1964 - Headquarters

Office of Communications GS-13

Still active

1954
5'9"
170 lbs.
brown eyes
brown hair

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT c/TAS	INFO	6 RF. FILE. VR. c/iPloms c/CA3 DDO4 dSES c/EUR6, dSIA/IC dSIA/FL dSIA, dCI4, c/EPS/EG2 SAlDDO
ACTION #		

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 325447 EIA549 PAGE 01 (OLC) IN 459495

TOR:091001Z NOV 77 HAGU 33077

HSCA

DTC

Mo is putting together a blind memo on this to pass to GRB.
R

HSCA
Media

S E C R E T 090945Z NOV 77 STAFF

CITE THE HAGUE 33277

TO: DIRECTOR,

WNINTEL RYBAT REAM SYMPATHIZER MHCOLOR

REF: ONHA-40410, 4 MAY 1977

1. SENSITIVE SYMPATHIZER SOURCE INDICATES THAT ON 3 OCTOBER WILLEM OLTMANS MADE APPOINTMENT MEET WITH CUBAN AMBASSADOR, THE HAGUE. OLTMANS STATED HE GOING "TO AMERICA ON 18TH" AND THAT HE " IS INDEED PREPARED TO GO AT THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER AS ARRANGED".

2. DURING DISCUSSION, OLTMANS SAID HE ALSO HAD VISIT SCHEDULED WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ROMANOV FOR 3 OCTOBER AND WANTED COMBINE TWO VISITS FOR SAME DAY. OLTMANS WAS TOLD AN ATTEMPT BY CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO SCHEUDLE MEET WITH HIM DURING SEEK 25 SEPTEMBER HAD BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OLTMANS COULD NOT BE REACHED. OLTMANS STATED HE HAD BEEN IN SOVIET UNION THEN.

3. ABOVE EVIDENCE OF OLTMAN'S CONTINUING CLOSE CONTACT WITH CUBAN AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS AND HIS RECENT TRAVEL TO THE USSR AND APPARENT CURRENT TRAVEL TO CUBA

22225

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 325447 EIA549 PAGE 02-02 IN 459495

TOR:091001Z NOV 77 HAGU 33077

IS OF INTEREST IN VIEW HIS NOTORIOUS ROLE AT THE TIME OF THE DEATH OF GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILD. LATTER WAS OF INTEREST BOTH TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGNECE AND HOUSE ASSASSINATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE. IF HQS DEEMS IT APPROPRIATE, NO STATION OBJECTION TO CONVEYING ABOVE, WITH ADEQUATE SOURCE PROTECTION, TO PROPER CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITIES.

4. FILE: 201-155221. E2, IMPDET.

* C/S SUGGESTS ADD'L DISSEM TO: OLC

SECRET

35-2

King assassination

ROUTING 2 3 5 6 8 9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

H S C A

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

Media HSCA

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

161827Z

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

125981

CONF: SA/DDO INFO: FILE EU/38, IP/DMS, LA8, ~~OLC~~, DDO4, DDO/DO, DDO/SRO,

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: /

#

3

TO: LISBON, INFO LONDON, MEXICO CITY. 4

RYBAT WNINTEL RNVIEW 4

① CHR
② file

1. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS WHO CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ASSASSINATIONS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING HAS TOLD STATE THAT THEY INTEND TO PURSUE LEADS IN PORTUGAL, UK AND MEXICO RELATING TO JAMES EARL RAY, CURRENTLY SERVING TIME FOR KING MURDER. THEY BASING THIS INTEREST ON INFORMATION THAT RAY WAS IN LISBON BRIEFLY IN MAY 1968, SHORTLY BEFORE HIS APPREHENSION IN LONDON IN JUNE 1968. 4

2. MR. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR OF COMMITTEE SAYS SELECT COMMITTEE TOLD STATE THAT HE WANTS TO ESTABLISH "CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH APPROPRIATE PORTUGUESE NATIONAL POLICE AND HOPES TO ENLIST THEIR ASSISTANCE INCLUDING ACCESS TO THEIR FILES AND IN LOCATING AND INTERVIEWING POTENTIAL WITNESSES. 4

3. DEPARTMENT HAS SOLICITED EMBASSY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW BLAKEY SHOULD PROCEED. 4

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

22228

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

12598l

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY:

#

4. WISH TO CALL ABOVE TO ADDRESSEES' ATTENTION IN EVENT STATIONS ARE SOLICITED FOR ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE. RTACTION IS COOPERATING FULLY WITH BLAKEY AND COMMITTEE INCLUDING ALLOWING THEM ACCESS TO DIRECTORATE RECORDS, AFTER SUITABLE SANITIZATION FOR SOURCES AND METHODS. HOWEVER, BELIEVE COMMITTEE'S EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW POLICE AND WITNESSES AND RESULTING USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED, IF ANY, IS LARGELY OVERT FUNCTION WHICH CAN BEST BE HANDLED BY LEGATTS OR OTHERS WHO WOULD ALSO BE IN A POSITION TO BE PUBLICLY QUOTED OR IDENTIFIED IF NECESSARY. Y

5. STATIONS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE EMBASSY BEST ADVICE IF SOLICITED BUT REQUESTED TO AVOID INVOLVING STATION OFFICERS IN NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IN THEIR COVER CAPACITIES. IF CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH THAT THIS UNAVOIDABLE, PLEASE ADVISE HQS BY CABLE SO THAT THE MATTER CAN BE APPROPRIATELY HANDLED WITH BLAKEY AND DEPARTMENT. ■ H

ORIG: O/SA/DO/O {SOVERN}; COORD: OLC {CUMMINS}, DC/LA {LAUDER}, C/LA/~~MEX~~ MGSB ~~{[illegible]}~~ {HAWKINS}, DC/EUR/BC ~~{[illegible]}~~ JAMES, C/EUR/IB {BERGER}; AUTH: SA/DO/O {KATROSH}; REL: DC/EUR {ESTES}.

DATE: 14 NOVEMBER 1977
ORIG: MASOVERN
UNIT: O/SA/DO/O
EXT: 1542

C/LA/STAFF B-116 Roberts

OLC -

DC/EUR/BC

DC/LA/N

C/EUR/IB

C/LA/~~MEX~~ MGSB

DC/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for SA/DO/O
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

1 October 1968

CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
IN THE CASE OF
YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

#7

1 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff

SUBJECT : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich

1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclusions concerning the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Subconclusions are contained in the summary concerning several major areas which were given primary consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO.

2. Included in this summary are comments concerning reconclusions in the previous summary and an annex containing remarks on three separate subjects related to the NOSENKO case.

3. In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO is the person he claims to be, that he held his claimed positions in the KGB during 1953 - January 1964, that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB, and that his previous lies and exaggerations are not actually of material significance at this time.

Bruce L. Solie

Attachment:
Summary

BLS:ko

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction

II. Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since 30 October 1967

III. Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

  A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims to be?

  B. Is the Claimed KGB Career of NOSENKO Plausible?

  C, Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation of His Motivation in Contacting CIA in 1962 and For His Defection in 1964?

  D. Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CIA Concerning KGB Operations, Personalities, and Organization Reasonably Commensurate With His Claimed KGB Career?

  E. Can the Information Furnished by NOSENKO be Considered in Toto as Having Resulted in Material Damage to the KGB and/or Has the Information Furnished by NOSENKO Been of Significant Benefit to Western Intelligence?

  F. Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away" in Information Furnished by NOSENKO Which Would Warrant a Conclusion that NOSENKO was Dispatched by the KGB?

SECRET

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

G. Is There Evidence of a Political or Any Other Type Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions?

H. Is There Any Evidence That the Contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 With CIA Were Known to the KGB Prior to His Defection or That NOSENKO Was Ever Briefed by the KGB Relative to His Behavior or KGB Objectives During These Contacts or After His Defection?

IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regard to NOSENKO

A. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval RU in Any of the Capacities or at the Places and Times He Claimed

B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the Time He Claimed

C. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy Section Throughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He Claimed

D. During the Period 1955 - 1960, He Was Neither a Senior Case Officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section

E. NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a Senior Officer or Supervisor in the Section During the Period 1961 - 1962 (sic)

F. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and Was Thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, Are Not Credible

G. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim to Certainty That the KGB Recruited No American Embassy Personnel Between 1953 and His Defection in 1964

Annex

Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text

Annex C - The Cherepanov Papers

I

I. INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organizational, operational, personality and case type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do so would be repetitious and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of primary concern.

This summary will not contain a detailed psychological assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational or policy nature.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily on whether he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide" defector.

There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer. For purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to whether this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate.

The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omissions and unsupported conclusions in the previous summary in regard to specific cases or sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this summary will not include a point-by-point comparison of all areas of agreement or disagreement with information contained in the previous summary.

A positive decision in regard to NOSENKO based on all available information should be made in the immediate future. There are no known sources currently available to provide new positive information concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. It is recognized that there is always a possibility in the future a new source or sources will be able to furnish additional information in regard to NOSENKO. However, this possibility is exceedingly tenuous and it is felt there is sufficient information available on which to base a conclusion in the NOSENKO matter.

II

II. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962.

Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been covered during previous interview or interviews.

NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the first few interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

interviewer would not dispute or disparage his statements without adequate reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the interviewer, totally disappeared.

During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six months, NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for defection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an example of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included remarks concerning approximately (875) KGB officers, (100) KGB agents, 35 GRU officers, and (400) other Soviet nationals. These lists were alphabetically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information furnished by him during current interviews.

Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related memoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the CI Staff. Special Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has interviewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information.

In addition, three professionals from the SB Division have reviewed the current information and assisted in the retrieval of previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current information with previous information. The latter is a tremendous task because of the volume of material; the number of individual cases involved; and the extensive information in regard to KGB personalities, procedures, organizational structure and activities.

The SB Division also provided the services of an expert translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOSENKO by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioned three professionals completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly pertinent previous interviews of NOSENKO have been completed by the Office of Security.

Approximately 7000 pages of transcripts and related material have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Comments concerning the value of the information contained in the above material are contained in another section of this summary. As of the present time, a complete analysis is not possible since a considerable portion of the material has not been fully processed. In the preparation of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined. Because of the voluminous information, all analytical and collation work has not been completed; but it is not considered that, based on all available information, the remaining work will materially affect the conclusions drawn in this summary.

The polygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on 2 August and concluded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixty questions of a pertinent nature were included in the polygraph interview. No problems were encountered during the polygraph interview and no additional testing of NOSENKO is anticipated. Attached is a copy of the self-explanatory report on the results of the polygraph interview.

Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph interview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permit a review of previous information and preparation of this summary. There is no doubt that future interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information of intelligence value, but information developed thus far will permit a decision in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Attachment:
12 Aug 68 Polygraph Rpt

TO : Chief, Security Research Staff 12 August 1968

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO IRD # 67491

IDENTIFYING DATA

Subject is a 40 year old former KGB Staffer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 in Geneva.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been debriefing and interrogating Subject since October 1967 in order to resolve the issue whether Subject was a dispatched agent of the KGB. He has conducted a vast amount of research and checking with sources in an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements.

PURPOSE

The primary purpose of the polygraph test was to determine:

1. Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB;

2. Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie any false information.

PROCEDURE

Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was conducted in the English language. Subject's comprehension and the ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative in all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information on a topic.

The following relevant questions were asked during the first test:

Is your true name Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes.

Were you born in the year 1927? Yes.

Besides the Americans, did you tell anyone else about your intention to defect? No.

SECRET

GROUP
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Did you ever tell anyone in the KGB about your contact with American Intelligence? No.

Were you given instructions by the KGB to get in contact with American Intelligence? No.

Were you told by the KGB to defect in order to carry out an Intelligence mission? No.

The following relevant questions were asked during the second test:

Did the KGB actually send a communication for your recall to the USSR on the day of your defection? No.

Were you acquainted with CHEREPANOV? Yes.

Did you actually travel to Gorkiy in November 1963 to hunt for CHEREPANOV? Yes.

Are you deliberately withholding from us any information about the KGB recruitment of Americans? No.

Does the KGB have METKA and NEPTUNE 80? Yes.

Were you the responsible Case Officer for John Abidian in 1960-61? Yes.

Do you know the true name of ANDREY or SASHA? No.

Did you ever have tuberculosis? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test three:

Did you serve in Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yes.

Was SHUBIN in the USSR during the period 1957 to 1959? Yes.

To the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh Department at this time? Yes.

Did you telephone the GRU about SHUBIN at this time? Yes.

To the best of your knowledge, was POPOV compromised because of the letter Mr. Winters mailed? Yes.

14-00000

To the best of your knowledge, was PENKOVSKIY exposed to the KGB because of the mass surveillance on the British Embassy? Yes.

Was there any misleading information in the notes you brought out from the Soviet Union? No.

Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal association with GRIBANOV? No.

Are you hiding any adverse information about your background? No.

Subject's polygraph test reflected no significant responses indicative
eception regarding the relevant questions asked. No further polygraph
s were administered on this date because the examiner did not want to
he risk of fatigue setting in and thus possibly causing adrenalin
stion.

Polygraph testing was resumed on 6 August 1968. The following
ant questions were asked on test four:

Di[illegible]ou join the KGB in March 1953? Yes.

ere you a KGB officer from 1953 to 1964? Yes.

re you a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department? Yes.

re you only a Captain at this time? Yes.

e you an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section from March
3 to May 1955? Yes.

1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chief of the American-
tish-Canadian Section in the Seventh Department? Yes.

January 1960 to December 1961 were you the Deputy to the
f of the First Section of the First Department? Yes.

January to July 1962 were you the Chief of the First Section
e Seventh Department? Yes.

you an officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD,
e time of the Stalingrad operation against Benson, Mule and
l? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test five:

Since 1953 do you know of any other KGB recruitments in the American Embassy besides ANDREY and HOWARD? No.

Did the KGB know about the notes you brought out? No.

Have you told us the complete truth about your KGB career? Yes.

Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal involvement in cases in 1962 and 1964 in order to mislead us? No.

Did you intentionally give us any false operational information? No.

Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chief of the First Department? Yes.

Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the Chief of the First Department? Yes.

In early 1960 did GRIBANOV tell you that your primary responsibility was to work against American Code Clerks? Yes.

Other than you mentioned, are you hiding any other reasons for your defection? No.

Are you deliberately withholding any information on any foreigners recruited by the KGB? No.

The following relevant questions were asked on test six:

Did you enter the KGB through the influence of General BOGDAN KOBULOV? Yes.

Did you succeed BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.

Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.

Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB knowledge? No.

To your knowledge was there any misleading information in the CHEREPANOV papers? No.

Did you ever personally meet GOLITSYN? No.

Was there a cable sent to Geneva for you to assist ARTEMEV in the BELITSKIY case? Yes.

Did you personally make an approach to KEYSERS at the Moscow Airport? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test seven:

Did you actually review the KGB file on OSWALD? Yes.

Did LEE HARVEY OSWALD receive any KGB training or assignments? No.

Were there any microphones installed in the North Wing of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow? No.

Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in 1960-61? Yes.

Are you withholding any information known to you concerning KGB microphones or electronic activity against the U.S. Embassy? No.

Before your official transfer to the Seventh Department did you read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to PUSHKIN street? Yes.

Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKOV in 1962 in Geneva? Yes.

Was the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document to GORKIY only a mistake by KASHPEROV? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test eight:

While in the U.S. Embassy Section did you obtain a typewriter for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter to Edward Ellis SMITH? Yes.

Did you read the official report of KOSOLAPOV on his contact with JENNER on a train from Helsinki to Moscow? Yes.

Are you intentionally withholding any information concerning KGB knowledge of CIA personnel in Moscow? No.

Is there any possibility that the KGB would dispatch an officer to defect to the Americans? No.

Subject's polygraph test of 6 August likewise reflected no indications of deception.

CONCLUSION

Based solely on the overall analysis of Subject's polygraph tests, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the Subject has been substantially truthful in answering the relevant questions asked.

downgrading and

III

III. ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbitrary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent to the question of whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB.

It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects would also be considered but that his admitted previous lies and exaggerations would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide defector."

The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which are being given specific consideration. Attached is a separate section containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A - H.

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964?

D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB career?

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence?

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?

G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions?

H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection?

A

A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

During interviews NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard to his family, his activities as a youth, the schools he attended, associates of his father and mother, and his own associates. The period under consideration in this section is the period preceding his entry into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953.

Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and mother and his early life, together with other information such as a comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he is Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satisfactorily supported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other associates of his father and mother.

Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

little or no value in assessing the bona fides or non-bona fides of NOSENKO. An expose of his youthful indiscretions, of which he has admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. Obtaining any collateral first-hand information in regard to NOSENKO before 1945 would be of negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from Nikolay ARTAMONOV, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory school in Leningrad.

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had attended the Institute since 1945. He has explained that he should have graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the final examination in Marxism and therefore was required to attend the Institute for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations.

Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co-students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he "completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950." NOSENKO has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950 instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952.

The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has characterized as his "stupid blunders." The latter is a rather apt characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence of a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which he had knowledge but did not personally participate.

The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of time are contained in a separate section of this summary, but it is considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily substantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953.

Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum completed by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement concerning his life and KGB career. No effort has been made to correct grammatical errors or spelling since to do so would be in conflict with the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give NOSENKO an opportunity to recount his life and activities to permit a re-examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time.

Interviews of and memoranda prepared by NOSENKO since 31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the statements of NOSENKO in the attached memorandum. One change that has been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization" (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature. An effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by NOSENKO.

Attachment:
31 Oct 67 Memo

Operational Memo # N-2

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on 30 October 1967:

I, NOSENKO, George, was born 30 October 1927 in the city Nicolaev, Ukraine.

My family: the father - NOSENKO, Ivan, b. 1902, was working at the shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI), b. 1908, a housewife; the brother - NOSENKO, Vladimir, b. 1944, a student.

In September 1934 I began to study in the school (0 class) but studied a short period of time because in October with the mother went in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant, "Sudsmech" from summer 1934. In Nicolaev I was living at the Street Nicolski 7. All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev.

In Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938: at the Street Stachek (1934 - summer 1935), St. Canal of Griboedov, 154 (1935-1938), St. M. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living. In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon I with the mother went to live in Moscow in the end of this year.

In Moscow we were living at the St. Serafimovich, 2. Here I was continuing to study at the school 585 (St. B. Polianka). In 1941 I finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the south (Sochi) but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow.

In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I finished 7th class in spring 1942. In Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, being there I tried to run to the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned home. In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorki and in July-August we returned in Moscow.

In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finished 8th class in summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow. This school must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I did not want to go there. With the help of father I was accepted in the Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku, where I was studying at the second course (9th class). In this school I twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to the front but failed. Soon after that I run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Moscow (January 1944). In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished 9th class and was accepted again in the military-navy preparatory school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in Leningrad.

All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km. from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was put in the navy hospital. When I was in the hospital I decided not to return in the school but to finish 10th class in Leningrad about what I have written a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with such my decision. With the help of the father's friends I quited with the school and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January 1945 and studied there till the end of May. The WWII finished and I decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second course and finished this course (though I was not passing exams). In Leningrad I was living in the hostel of this college (St. Tolmachev).

In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parents (St. Granovski, 3).

In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the international relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institute.

In July my father went in Germany with the group of engineers and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant, documents and a uniform).

In 1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 I acquainted with a girl - Shishkov FLAVIA, student of the medicine institute. I was in close relations with this girl, because of the pregnancy I married her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and we did not live together and we soon divorced. In the end of 1946 I was acquainted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, received a flat in 1947 (St. Mira - former 1st Uecyehckad, 162/174). In November her father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married her. The marriage was not successful. I foundout about her close relations with the brother, and the child-girl was born with pathological changes. I was not the father of this child. After that I broke with her and we were living separately (end of 1948 - beginning 1949).

In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working the commission, which was dealing with future works of the students of my 5th course. I expressed a wish to work in any military organization and soon I was invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry of State Security). But MGB did not accept me. After that with the help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my future work.

Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a group of fails I was passing state exams once more. In October 1950 I finished the institute and received a diploma.

I was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951 and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th Fleet, as an interpreter of the information department). Before going to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife.

At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Moscow. Immediately after returning in Moscow I had a blood cough out. In the middle of May I went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow. In July I finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health I could not return back to the Far East and the personnel department of the navy intelligence sent me to Baltic Sea (as a senior interpreter of the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet - in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district).

When I studied at the institute I as all the students received a rank of junior lieutenant of administrative service after finishing the second course in 1947. In 1951 the ministry of navy had given me also the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence. In September-October 1952 I received a rank of lieutenant.

In Sovietsk the work was not interested and for me it was nothing to do. Besides this the climate was not good for my health and I decided to change the job. With this purpose before new year at the end of 1952 I took a leave and went to Moscow. January 1 I was with my parents at the evening party at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom I did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili - a former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I was thinking about change of the job. KOBULOV was speaking with me on this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nothing more definite was said about my work. This month I reported to the head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN about my decision and that I will be working in MGB.

In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium, where I was in 1952. In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There I have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said that he would settle my question concerning my job. After several days in the middle of March I have received a telephone call from MVD to come to KOBULOV. There I have spent about two hours in the reception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory SHUBNIAKOV, who told me that there was signed an order and I was accepted in the 1 department of 2 chief directory as a case officer. SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1 department GORBATENKO (who was acting as the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department of extraordinarily affairs (investigation)). SHUBNIAKOV and GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the 1 section of the department. Then I with GORBATENKO went to the 1 department, was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV told me that I will be working against the American correspondents, showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were working in this room: KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV. The last officer must give files on the correspondents and agents. I was said to come next day and began to work.

When I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium I acquainted with KOJEVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University, and in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents at St. Gorky, 9, but after marriage was living with the wife at

St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents). In 1955 I received a flat at St. Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family.

In 1954 I contracted a disease (gonorrhea) and on the advice of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctors asked to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an operative passport and showed them the passport. Doctors had given me a treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to come once more, but I did not come. They wanted to see once more and sent a letter to the place of work, which was written in the passport. The plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAKOV, was speaking with me. I had written my explanation, and punished by the chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV - 15 days of arrest. The komsomol's organization also punished me. I received a strict reprimand and was freed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director.

I was a member of komsomol's organization from October 1943. In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of age) the komsomol organization of KGB took off this strict reprimand.

In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that I did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory. In June-July I was appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory as a case officer of 2 section. This section was new created (the work against tourists). The chief of 7 department - PERFILIEV, the chief of the 2 section - GUSKOV.

In 1956 I was accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party, soon received a rank of a senior lieutenant and got a promotion - a senior case officer.

In 1957 I was accepted in the Party as a member.

In August 1956 my father died.

In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section. In 7th department I was working till 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to work as a deputy chief of the 1 section in the 1 department 2 chief directory (chief of the 1 department, KLIPIN, Vlad., chief of the 1 section - KOVSHUK).

My family was consist of the wife and two daughters: Oksana, born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958. Oksana was ill (bronchial asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in hospitals. In 1960 I was thinking about change (temporary) place of living and there was a possibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB in Lvov and Odessa. But there was another question if I go from Moscow I would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the chief of the section of 2 department, PIATROVSKI, proposed to me to go to work in Ethiopia (counter-intelligence work among Soviet specialists in Ethiopia). The chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agree. The reasons were the case of 1954 (illness and use of the passport for "cover) and a checking in the place of my living (some of agents report that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife).

I was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962 I was appointed again in the 7 department as the chief of the 1 section (work against tourists from the USA and Canada).

In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain.

When I began to work in the 7 department I knew that soon I must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free a place - the deputy chief of department BALDIN was preparing to go to work in eastern Germany.

In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department (the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here I was working till January 18, 1964.

During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school, only in 1953-1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD-KGB at St. Kiselni.

Five times I was sent abroad: In 1957 I was in England with a sport delegation; in 1958 was again in England with a sport delegation; in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industry; in 1961 I was sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to 1 department 2 directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzerland - the conference of disarmament.

Working in MVD-KGB every year I had leaves for rest. In 1953 with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium. In 1954 I was with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage. In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia. In 1957 I was in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at the cottage. In 1958 I was resting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife rested in Sochi. In January-February 1960 I rested with the wife in Kislovodsk. In 1961 - August - I rested with the wife and daughters in Nicolaev. In October 1962 I rested with the wife in Sochi. In July 1963 I rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa.

B

B. IS THE CLAIMED KGB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer in the KGB. Information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concerning the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has been so extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer.

It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed positions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 as date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given in 1962). There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature, as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day of transfer from one Department to another and not considered critical or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

his KGB career today is not significantly different from the fragmentary version he gave in June 1962.

Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB career of NOSENKO:

Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, First Section, First Department, SCD

Late May 1955 - December 1959 (1958 - December 1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh Department, SCD

January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of Section, First Section, First Department, SCD

January 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section, Seventh Department, SCD

July 1962 - January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh Department, SCD

(NOTE: The term Deputy Chief is being used throughout this summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief." The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance, including CIA, is not synonymous with the term "Deputy Chief" as used in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example, a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the title of First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief of Department and in general has supervisory functions over all the Department sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider the most important section. Other deputies have supervisory functions only over designated sections or organizational components.)

During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, NOSENKO has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates his claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remarks on these topics are contained in separate sections of this summary.

It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960. It is impossible to correlate this information with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available at this time. On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO would lay claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 - 1961 and of his conferences with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time.

NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD or former officers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN. A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware of certain activities including Vladislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. GUK, Vladimir A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV.

The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950's. The description of GOLITSYN of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it. There is no reason to attach significance to this lapse of memory.

The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 has had the most merit in the controversy over his statements relative to his KGB career. This particular aspect will be covered in detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961 on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the First Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch.

Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment as to whether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis of a comparison of his activities and responsibilities with that inherent in a somewhat similar position in CIA.

One of the most important differences between United States agencies or organizations, including CIA, and the bureaucratic structure of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the salary structure. Pay of a KGB officer is based on military rank and on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity and language qualification. Actual position held is important from a monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increase in military rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a major who holds the position of Chief of Section.

During current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at this time.

C. HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OF HIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CIA IN 1962 AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964?

C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and although motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in 1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision. Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit unfavorable information which they consider of a personal nature.

On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnished a handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct, is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memorandum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at best usually a gradual process in which many factors, some recognized and some not recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying degrees.

NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibly until the death of his father in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The influence of his father and the name of his father undoubtedly was an important if not the most important factor in NOSENKO even being permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENKO is particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was the primary reason.

The above should not be construed as any reflection on the actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His performance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding.

If a certain amount of speculation is permitted, the disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may have actually started soon after the death of his father. That NOSENKO is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time after his defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through influence.

A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money and would sell "two pieces of information." NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he was not emotionally ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could no longer retreat.

NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the Americans stating he was a "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted to give information," he would not have been believed and would have been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally decided to do it through David MARK whom the KGB considered was with American Intelligence.

The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the record. NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces of information," almost immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated, as he first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the Americans.

NOSENKO has stated that the night before his departure from Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but was not emotionally adapted to defect at that time. Following his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a period of time, made his final decision to defect at the first opportunity, realizing that it meant leaving his wife, children, and other members of his family in the USSR.

Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and will probably so remain. It would be preferable if an exact detailed chronology of all the factors involved could be prepared or if even certain obvious factors could be accurately delineated. These are both impossible at this time and probably at any time in the future. What is important at this time is a decision as to whether the motivation of NOSENKO was based on personal reasons with no implications of KGB dispatch. It is considered that the explanation of NOSENKO concerning his motivation is acceptable and that his statement that no one except the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americans in 1962 or his intent to defect in 1964 is supported by other information of a collateral nature. (See Section III, H.)

Attachment:
Typed cpy Memo from NOSENKO

Operational Memo # N-4

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on 31 October 1967:

What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of the methods of the communist regime, the knowledge of the real foreign and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the rightness of the free world.

It was not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing in me. I think that the beginning was in the studentship.

Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent's and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in the Far East and later being in trips in different regions and cities of Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the people of the Soviet Russia.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

When I worked 11 years in MVD-KGB I understood and found out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime, about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings, about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was (and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB.

At the same time when I was several times abroad I have seen personally the so-called "decay" at the West. I have seen in reality how is living people.

Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying at the West and not returning in Russia, but only one thing was keeping me -- my family.

In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the Americans. From my part "the sell of the information" was a real show. I was thinking that they would not believe me otherwise. In that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even when I was returning home in Vienna.

In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done all my best to go as soon as possible abroad.

It was not easy to make this decision, it was very difficult to leave the family for ever.

And now in spite of everything I do not regret.

D

D. IS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO TO CIA CONCERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND ORGANIZATION REASONABLY COMMENSURATE WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the information furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with his claimed career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February 1964.

In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given to his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in each department. Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logically be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, of course, no accurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive determination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events or could be attributed to willful deception.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall specific matters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely from recollection. In addition, there has been no material reluctance on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topics of interest.

NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire KGB career. He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently added certain details which he recalled at a later date.

Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This information is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Consideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held.

It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed positions. Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an applicable description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957. As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four primary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 - 1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagrams and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily prepared the material in such detail. This type of information is peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another defector and could, if not relatively correct, permit a rather positive conclusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information.

NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is less for the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently substantiated even though his actual job performance undoubtedly deserved a low rating.

The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cases, KGB operations, and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of other departments of the SCD from the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is also a further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions during this period of time.

E

E. CAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE CONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence? The conclusion in regard to both of the above questions is affirmative, even though it is realized that ultimate loss to the KGB and ultimate benefit to Western Intelligence are both partly of an intangible nature and not susceptible to accurate measurement.

NOSENKO has, as previously indicated, furnished voluminous information during current and previous interviews. An accurate total of specific cases is not possible at this time and would at best be only an interesting figure, the actual significance of which would be marginal. Practically every interview with NOSENKO, even at present, reveals information of counterintelligence interest and it is expected that this production can continue for a considerable period of time. This should not be construed as an indication that NOSENKO is intentionally withholding information, but rather that stimulation of his memory through normal questions and discussions has been and can continue to be productive.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning perhaps 2,000 KGB officers and 300 KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms agents or operative contacts are used to refer to Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately 250 former or current First Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the number of KGB officers identified by NOSENKO who have been outside the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in the future.

There has been very little attempted exploitation of information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other KGB officers and, therefore, the possible value of this information to United States Intelligence cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be estimated.

Disclosure of information concerning certain KGB officers would be a necessary part of any dispatch of a KGB agent or officer to the West either for purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a limited period of time or for the placing of the individual in a defector status. However, identification of KGB officers or agents to Western Intelligence is necessarily a matter of concern to the KGB and the exposure of the identities of approximately 2,000 KGB officers and several hundred KGB agents could not be considered of negligible importance.

Obtaining specific information in regard to KGB officers or KGB assets is important to United States Intelligence and a considerable amount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even acknowledging that it is much more difficult for CIA to obtain this type of information about the KGB, which operates in a closed society, than it is for the KGB to obtain the identity of CIA employees, it is believed doubtful any reader of this summary would consider that the identification of 2,000 CIA employees and several hundred agent assets to the KGB would be any less than a very serious compromise of valuable information.

Prior to the defection of NOSENKO, little was known of the organization of the SCD or other internal KGB organizations. The information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been detailed and extensive. That this information is of value to the United States Intelligence community is hardly subject to dispute, although analysts can differ as to the weight which should be given to the value of this type of information.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning SCD, KGB, recruitments of United States citizens and foreign nationals covering the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not be interpreted as a statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all SCD recruitments, even of Americans, during this period. His information based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the First Department and Seventh Department. He has furnished information concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some FCD cases, but this information was in general acquired indirectly from social or business conversations with other KGB officers.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of cases which were previously known to United States Intelligence. While the value of such information cannot be considered high, the additional details which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be dismissed as being of no value to Western Intelligence, even if the information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his having provided such information.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of recruitments by the KGB of non-Bloc nationals who were known by Western Intelligence to be pro-Communist or even connected with Communist organizations. The identification as a recruited KGB agent of an individual previously known to be pro-Communist is of considerable value to Western Intelligence and may be considered to have resulted in some damage to the KGB. Admittedly, the potential to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than that of a "politically clean" individual. However, "pro-Communist" or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent."

NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in which there was some previous but limited information. In a number of these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has permitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing of an "Unknown Subject" case. In such instances the information from NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest. This category of cases must be considered as having resulted in damage to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of individuals, both American and non-Bloc foreign, who were recruited by the KGB and concerning whom Western Intelligence had no significant information. It is recognized that certain of these cases mentioned by NOSENKO, particularly in the tourist category, would probably never have actually materialized as productive KGB agents. This could be for various reasons including later refusal to cooperate, later geographical inaccessibility to the KGB, or not being either at the time of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish information of interest to the KGB. In this regard, NOSENKO has stated that at least until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Department to make a "recruitment" as a statistic for the end-of-year report even though it was apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that it was highly unlikely there would be a potential in the future.

NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a number of cases, primarily third nationals but some American, in which he has been unable to furnish sufficient details to permit identification at this time. In certain instances it is believed that an identification will be possible after additional research and investigation. Until an identification is made, the value of any particular lead to Western Intelligence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential value cannot be ignored. As an example of this category, NOSENKO has furnished a lead, still under investigation, to an unidentified agent, probably not an American, who in 1962 was in a position to remove the "NATO Emergency Codes," deliver the codes to the KGB for photographing, and then successfully replace the codes. Because the agent is as yet unidentified, his current access to information affecting the security of the United States cannot be gauged.

In all, the information from NOSENKO in the category of cases where Western Intelligence did not previously have significant information must be considered on balance as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and of significant benefit to Western Intelligence.

Quantity alone of CI or FI information from a KGB defector is not a standard on which to judge bona fides. The question is whether the amount of his information is reasonably commensurate with his claimed positions in the KGB. This question as regards NOSENKO has been examined, with affirmative findings, in another section of this paper.

A few examples from the above cited categories of information furnished by NOSENKO are listed below. These cases are given as illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance.

The case of Robert Lee JOHNSON and the related case of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH have been covered in the previous summary. It can be considered that both were exposed as a result of a lead from NOSENKO which led to suspicions of JOHNSON.

Another American case is that of Herbert HOWARD, a USIA employee who spent considerable time in the USSR in 1962 - 1963. NOSENKO identified Herbert HOWARD as having been recruited by the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1962 and was positive that HOWARD furnished valuable information to the KGB. When interviewed in 1964, HOWARD did not admit he had been recruited, but suspicion of HOWARD was great enough so that his contract with USIA was not renewed.

If indeed HOWARD was recruited by the KGB, it is impossible to determine how much information would have been compromised by HOWARD while in the USSR, he did have certain access to the United States Embassy. There is good reason to believe that if HOWARD was recruited, it was he who was responsible for the compromise of a potentially valuable Soviet walk-in with whom CIA was attempting to establish contact using HOWARD as intermediary.

NOSENKO in 1964 furnished information in regard to a "ZHARI" (apparently a KGB code name, although NOSENKO thought it was a true name). He identified "ZHARI" (phonetic) as an American code clerk who defected to the USSR in 1961. An internal assumption was made based on the original lead information from NOSENKO that "ZHARI" was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Fouzi Mitri HINDALY, a former NSA employee who defected to the USSR in 1962, and the information from NOSENKO was never disseminated or investigated.

Prior to the surfacing of John Discoe SMITH by the Soviets in the fall of 1967, [redacted] information concerning KGB knowledge of American code clerks was being investigated; and John Discoe SMITH was a leading suspect. After the surfacing of SMITH by the Soviets, it became apparent that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, was identical to "ZHARI." Investigation disclosed that no definite information could be established in regard to the actual whereabouts of SMITH after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively stated that appropriate investigation in 1964 of the "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identification of John Discoe SMITH as "ZHARI." However, such identification would have been of considerable interest to the Department of State and CIA, and could very well have permitted certain action which would have at least lessened the propaganda effect of the surprise announcement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967.

NOSENKO, in June 1962, furnished information from which William VASSALL could be quickly identified. GOLITSYN, in late 1960 - early 1961, had furnished information concerning a Soviet penetration of the British Government on the basis of which the British

Services had compiled a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. Even though it may be presumed that investigation of the twenty suspects would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL was the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the information from NOSENKO in June 1962 resulted in the earlier termination by the British Services of a still valuable productive KGB agent.

Although not the case of a KGB agent, the matter of the microphones in the United States Embassy should also be mentioned. GOLITSYN, following his defection in December 1961, furnished certain information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones were connected to central cables, location of one microphone would logically have led to the exposure of the entire set of microphones. However, appropriate action was not taken on this information and the KGB would have been aware that no action was taken prior to June 1962 when NOSENKO first contacted CIA.

If NOSENKO is a dispatched KGB agent, it is not clear why the KGB would attract specific attention to a system of microphones which must have still had some value as of June 1962. A presumption may be made that if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence of such an advanced system is available and it should be noted that it was not until circa April 1964 that any effective action was taken to locate and remove the microphone system to which GOLITSYN had given a lead in late December 1961 - early January 1962.

A few general comments in regard to the CI information furnished by NOSENKO would be appropriate in this particular section. As regards leads furnished by NOSENKO to American cases, most of these leads have been mentioned in the previous summary. Current interviews with NOSENKO have resulted in approximately seventeen new American leads which are being examined by the FBI. The interviews have also resulted in more specific information in regard to a number of cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO, thus permitting additional development of these cases by the FBI.

NOSENKO has provided leads to over 100 third-country KGB agents. Geographically these leads are wide in scope, including nationals of such countries as Indonesia, Austria, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Japan, Mexico, Italy, and a number of other countries.

Included in the more important of these agent or other leads are leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks, to access agents for American targets, to actual or possible illegal support assets. Also included are foreign correspondents, representatives of foreign tourist firms, and foreign tourists.

A summary of the foreign leads arbitrarily defined as of major significance shows nineteen leads highly placed or formerly highly placed in their own government, four code clerks, eight cases involving definite American interest, and four access agents to Americans. It also shows nine instances of clandestine KGB activity against foreign missions in Moscow, including actual KGB clandestine access into certain Western Embassies (but not the British or American Embassies).

NOSENKO has also furnished leads to certain FCD foreign national agents, his information on several being derived during his three months in Geneva in 1962.

It is impossible to give an exact evaluation of the significance of the foreign leads furnished by NOSENKO. That they are of significant value to Western Intelligence and damaging to the KGB is hardly subject to dispute. This evaluation must be given even though there are numerous foreign leads which have not been adequately exploited at this time.

As a final note, the implied conclusion in the previous summary is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive intelligence information is not a significant factor in a determination of his bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intelligence interest.

F

F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGB DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY" IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENKO WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB?

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB. In reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above question has been both a necessary and integral part.

It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration in arriving at a conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have surely been willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be unknown.

An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter-intelligence officer who wanted to give information," he very possibly would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information" and began to talk quite freely on other matters.

If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead. a current review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva.

NOSENKO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which in retrospect were impossible, and the investigation of which could only have raised certain questions concerning NOSENKO. The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO made gross exaggerations or made incorrect or impossible statements.

(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the recruitment pitch to James STORSBERG. (This was a lie and an interview with STORSBERG with display of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO did not participate.)

(b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and LANGELLE was available for interview.)

(c) NOSENKO said he recruited LUNT (Horace LUNT) in Bulgaria. (Actually NOSENKO never met LUNT.)

(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with Edmund STEVENS who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally met STEVENS and only had seen STEVENS once at a distance.)

(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY" in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnished information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to Moscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in Moscow 1952-1954.

(f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he did not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreign typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH operation.)

(g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the first person, saying "We did this," or "We did that," in reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he and the KGB should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.)

In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were quite striking and gave rise to certain suspicions of NOSENKO because he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of NOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of the similarities noted.

(a) Both furnished information in regard to Johan PREISFREUND.

(b) Both furnished information in regard to a military code clerk case (James STORSBERG).

(c) Both furnished information in regard to a trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name, to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in

0001283

Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerly with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the assumed name which KOVSHUK used.)

(d) Both furnished information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.

(e) Both furnished information in regard to Edmund STEVENS and Isaac Henry SHAPIRO.

The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the actual differences in the amount of information furnished on any particular topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in this summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases, or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.

The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during current interviews satisfactorily sourced his information in almost every instance. In a few instances he has said he did not recall how he learned of a particular piece of information but these apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are considered to be in no way suspicious.

The general area in which there was a similarity between information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early 1962 and information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering around or in the First Department, SCD.

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955 and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961. Therefore, the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN knew and was in contact with other officers of the First Section and GOLITSYN has attributed his knowledge of certain cases or activities of the First Department, SCD, primarily to his association with certain officers in the First Department, SCD.

It is recognized that there are certain conflicts in information furnished by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO and at this time it is not possible to satisfactorily correlate certain information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO. Pages 162 - 163 of the previous summary refer to information from GOLITSYN which is characterized as "Information about KGB Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in 1960 - 1961." The references are to information from GOLITSYN based on remarks by Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV and Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Department, SCD, and an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD.

NOSENKO has stated that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1960 - 1961, that his primary responsibility was work against code clerks at the United States Embassy in Moscow, and that both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV were engaged in the same work and under his supervision. The statement by GOLITSYN that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary.

GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he received from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part of NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain instances, more apparent than real.

In certain instances it has now been possible to correlate fragmentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO, making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be construed as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this time, (d):

(a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an

American female employee of the American Embassy in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that the attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return to Moscow so that further work could be undertaken to effect her recruitment. He did not recall the name of the secretary, but did recall that it was a long and "German sounding" name.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a recruitment attempt against Collette SCHWARZENBACH, who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary" referred to by GOLITSYN. However, SCHWARZENBACH was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow. The recruitment attempt against SCHWARZENBACH, according to NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First Section, First Department, SCD.

(b) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNOV had developed an operation against an American Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited. This is believed to undoubtedly be a reference to the case of (James STORSBERG) who was actually the subject of a recruitment approach in 1961.

There is considered to be a good possibility that GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January 1961 from Vladislav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section) that (Johan PREISFREUND) had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American employee of the Embassy. (Johan PREISFREUND) was used in the (STORSBERG) operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about PREISFREUND since GOLITSYN wanted to use PREISFREUND in Helsinki. NOSENKO has stated he was not present during the above conversation. It is very possible that KOVSHUK exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the matter of why GOLITSYN could not use PREISFREUND as an agent.

NOSENKO has furnished extensive information in regard to the James STORSBERG case and with due consideration to the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the reporting by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV concerning what is considered to have been the James STORSBERG case and detailed information furnished by NOSENKO concerning the James STORSBERG case. The exact date of the recruitment attempt against STORSBERG has not been positively established, but it is considered to have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the March-April 1961 period. The statement by James

STORSBERG that it occurred in October 1961 is completely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other statements by STORSBERG himself.

(c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960. The previous summary also states that according to GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN did not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB would hold in reserve.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the homosexual compromise of Robert BARRETT, who was a guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and with whom "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted. Work against the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of the Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departments were participating under the direction of the Ninth Department.

One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in involving BARRETT in homosexual activities which were photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO, although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because of a general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO also stated that the compromising material and information on BARRETT was later given to the First Department and that BARRETT was recruited by the Second Section, First Department when he returned with another Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in the recruitment operation. BARRETT, following his return to the United States in January 1962, confessed to the FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of compromising photographs which had been taken during his 1959 trip to Moscow.

Although it cannot be established at this time, it is possible that the information furnished by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV actually refers to the Robert BARRETT case. It should be noted that Robert BARRETT could not actually be characterized as an "American employee of the Embassy in Moscow."

(d) Page 162 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki. GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had already furnished the KGB with some information, that he was

considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki to accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train to Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow.

The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was undoubtedly John GARLAND and the train manifest lists John GARLAND and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the same train from Helsinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the identity of John GARLAND but claims no knowledge of the above trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip.

NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki. His lack of knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities such as his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it cannot be interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.

A theory which has previously been given consideration and warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence and/or to denigrate the value of information furnished by GOLITSYN. In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during current interviews has not made any remarks which could in any way be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently, when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been broached with NOSENKO, his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD," or "You should ask GOLITSYN about that."

In connection with any consideration of whether the contact of NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing of certain events should be noted. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerland, where he remained until 15 June 1962.

It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN, select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counteract the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for this would have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN aspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.

The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have been dispatched to confuse and divert American Intelligence and thus to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United States Government, particularly CIA. This is a theory which should and has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.

Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts of American counter-intelligence to determine the identity of and take appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United States Government. The only answer to this question seems to be that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelligence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.

The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even considered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow. In this area his statements could be construed as assurance that there were no recruitments of American personnel in the United States Embassy in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD. The basis for this expressed opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the expressed opinion of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any particular knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he does not claim to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. As an example, he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activities against members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students, and individuals in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best mainly of a collateral nature.

NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD, nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code name. These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases.

G

G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH OF NOSENKO BY THE KGB WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION OR MISSIONS?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions? The above possibility has been given consideration even though the ultimate ramifications are practically incalculable. The conclusion is that as regards NOSENKO, with the single exception detailed below, there is no evidence of a political or other type objective which could be considered of sufficient importance by the KGB to warrant the dispatch of a KGB officer with the knowledge of NOSENKO to speak freely with CIA without his being given a specific mission or missions by the KGB.

It is accepted that the Soviet leadership would be entirely capable of instructing the KGB to dispatch a staff officer for permanent defection to United States authorities with no specific intelligence mission and no limitations on the KGB intelligence information he might reveal providing that such act would, in the estimate of the leadership, result in a net political gain for the USSR. For such a possibility to be seriously entertained by the Soviets, however, it would have to involve an issue of major importance to the Soviet leadership and presumably would have to

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

be considered by them as the only or at least the best means of achieving the desired end and of having a very high probability of success.

The only area touched upon in any way by NOSENKO which might meet the above requirements is the assassination of President Kennedy: the involvement of Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination and his association with the Soviet Union. Given (a) speculation obtaining at the time that there was Soviet involvement in the assassination, (b) the premise that in fact there was no Soviet involvement, and (c) a hypothesis that the Soviet leadership was deeply concerned lest erroneous conclusions be drawn which could lead to irreversable actions, it is conceivable that the Soviet leadership might have been prepared to take extreme steps to convince United States authorities of their non-involvement in the assassination. (The passage to the United States Government of the allegedly complete Soviet consular file on OSWALD was, in itself, an unprecedented act.)

The NOSENKO case warrants examination in the above regard in light of the fact that among the information NOSENKO provided was "inside" KGB information on OSWALD: information which purportedly revealed the substance of the content of the KGB files on OSWALD. This information clearly indicated that there was no KGB relationship with OSWALD, that the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD, and that as a matter of fact OSWALD had presented the KGB with a continuing series of problems.

Upon examination, however, NOSENKO does not meet the requirements premised above for serious Soviet consideration of a free KGB defection. The following reasons render this unacceptable:

a. The chronology, in itself, presents virtually impossible problems for such a theses, viz. NOSENKO's initial approach to CIA in June 1962, 17 months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.

b. While the information from NOSENKO on OSWALD is interesting and pertinent, it is not, in nature, scope, and content, sufficiently convincing for United States authorities to reasonably be expected to conclude that it represented unequivocal proof of Soviet non-involvement.

c. It is implausible not to assume that the Soviets would assume that United States authorities, in any examination of the possibility of a Soviet (KGB) hand in the assassination, would presume extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation -- a compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB officer other than very senior persons and an individual or group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of this nature. The KGB career of NOSENKO would not permit even serious consideration that NOSENKO could have logically been fitted into the above very limited category.

It is accordingly concluded that the possibility of a politically motivated free dispatch can in the case of NOSENKO be satisfactorily eliminated.

The possibility has also been considered that the KGB might have theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an officer, with numerous leads to non-valuable or non-current KGB agents or cases, the facilities of the United States Intelligence community would be practically neutralized for an extended period of time. This could only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence community would involve a major portion of its personnel and efforts in the investigation and resolution of cases which had little or no current or potential value to the KGB. The above possibility cannot be arbitrarily eliminated without full consideration. It is not believed that

NOSENKO in the absence of any evidence that he had any KGB mission or missions to fulfill comes within the above category, particularly since an overall assessment of his information leads to the conclusion that full exploitation of his information would be quite damaging to the KGB.

Consideration of the above possibility must also include an evaluation of the deterrent effect on the prospects of future recruitments by the KGB caused by legal action taken against individuals exposed by information from the dispatched agent or officer. The deterrent effect on others of the conviction and sentencing of persons who have committed a crime or crimes has long been a part of the legal theory of why persons who commit a crime should be imprisoned or punished.

The deterrent effect on others of the trials and convictions of William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH should not be underestimated. The KGB also could not have known that information furnished by NOSENKO would not result in the trial and conviction of other KGB agents or recruitments concerning whom NOSENKO had some knowledge.

H

H. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTACTS OF NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1964 WITH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE KGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR OR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFECTION?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection? The conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.

The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in previous sections. It is being treated here as a separate area of interest since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration.

It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO, collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of each item of available information.

The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962 and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB control at that time.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962 contacts with CIA were not known to the KGB, but became known to the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It was concluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitor in KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free to defect.

Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO, during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the

United States Embassy in Moscow concerning his contact with CIA and that he did not wish to be contacted and would not recognize any attempted contact within the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also furnished information as to the reason for his concern that no information regarding his contact with CIA become known in the United States Embassy in Moscow and the dangers to NOSENKO in any contact or attempted contact with NOSENKO in the USSR.

It is recognized that the above indicated concern of NOSENKO about his personal security is not substantial evidence that NOSENKO was not under KGB control; however, it is evidence that NOSENKO was not in any way encouraging clandestine contact of NOSENKO within the USSR, which very likely would have been an aim of the KGB if NOSENKO was under KGB control.

The material which NOSENKO furnished to CIA in 1964 has been carefully reviewed to determine if there is any evidence that the KGB participated in any way in the assembling of this rather unique collection of material. None of the material appears to have been of an accountable type and, on the contrary, it appears that NOSENKO could have furnished all of the material to CIA and returned to the Soviet Union without the KGB ever at a later date becoming aware that the material was actually missing. The latter statement even includes the travel document which authorized the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963.

The trip in December 1963, according to NOSENKO, was to participate in the search for Aleksandr CHEREPANOV. According to NOSENKO, this particular document was not accountable in that it was only necessary to turn it in when requesting reimbursement for travel expenses. NOSENKO stated that he had not claimed the rather small amount of money to which he was entitled and has also admitted that he really brought the document along because it gave him the indicated rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

NOSENKO has completely retracted his claim to having had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, stating that even as a Deputy Chief of Department he was only a Captain although he was entitled to and expected to receive the rank of Major in early 1964. NOSENKO has stated that giving him the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the above document was the error of KASHPEROV, the officer on duty in the SCD on Sunday, and that practically all Deputy Chiefs of Department in the SCD had at least the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

The above explanation by NOSENKO may well be considered by readers with at least a degree of skepticism. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would seem that he could have been provided with something a little more substantial to document his claim of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In addition, it would seem that the KGB could have provided NOSENKO with some type of document which would support at least one of his claimed positions in the SCD, KGB. Even the Cherepanov Papers do not in any way support the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1960 - 1961, nor do they even support the claim of NOSENKO that there was such a position in the First Section in 1960 - 1961 or even in 1958 or 1959.

IV

IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 - 360 of the "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" which contains seven (A - G) primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence) and KGB career of NOSENKO. These conclusions or findings are independently treated in separate attachments.

With the exception of "G," the conclusions in this summary are in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that NOSENKO served in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964, and held his claimed positions in the *KGB during the March 1953 - February 1964 period.

* For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations unless otherwise indicated.

Attachment:
Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"

The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with other sections of this summary.)

"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES"

"NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, 'the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence', paralyzed the work of a [redacted] KGB [redacted] Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assassinate him."

"The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?"

"This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently:

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed.

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed.

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.

D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.

E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic)

F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964.

These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance."

"The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector."

"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made."

"Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB agent."

"The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself."

"Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind."

"It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources."

"Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable."

"In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his information should be assessed accordingly."

A. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NAVAL RU IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES AND TIMES HE CLAIMED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation from the Institute of International Relations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class. However, previous efforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962 statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time.

It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his "stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully acceptable. It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will, for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope.

The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits to Geneva."

Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by NOSENKO regarding approximately 875 KGB officers, 100 KGB agents, 35 GRU officers and 400 other Soviet nationals.

It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENKO relates to the early 1950's period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelligence personnel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period.

Page 52 of the above summary and other related pages question whether NOSENKO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area. The memorandum was completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.

NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled that the former name of the place, an almost deserted fishermen's village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENKO for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was nonexistent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen.

The previous summary also stated that despite his claimed active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures. It should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States Navy.

Attachments:
List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO
Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO

Bekrenev Leonid - till 1952 or 1953 a deputy of chief of navy intelligence (on agents), then a chief of navy intelligence, later he was a deputy of chief of GRU (Serov Ivan and Ivashutin). I heard he was a navy attache in the USA.

~~2. Bobylenko~~

2. Bespalov - a major, code-clerk of the navy intelligence of 7 fleet in Soviet Harbour's region in 1951-1952.

3. Bogdanovskiy - a deputy of chief of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet (on agents) in 1951-1952.

4. Bulakh - an officer of the navy intelligence point of intelligence of the 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.

5. Chikin - in 1950s a colonel, worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

6. Chervil'skiy - a colonel, in 1950s worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

7. Demchenko Petr - an officer of navy intelligence point of intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district.

8. Denisenko - in 1962-1964 a military attache of soviet embassy in Bern.

9. Bol'shakov Yuri - an officer of GRU (colonel), was in the USA, works under cover of press-agency "Novos".

10. Bulganin Lev N. - in 1950s worked in GRU.

11. Ioliyev - an officer of GRU in 1950s. (or Iyevlev).

12. Kaloshin - a colonel, in 1950-1953 a chief of personnel department of the navy intelligence.

13. Kononyuk - in 1950 finished the institute of international relations; in 1957 taken in the navy intelligence and sent to work in Berlin (Germany

14. Kapalkin - a general, in 1940s was a deputy of chief the Military diplomatic academy. He has two sons: Kapalkin Sergey - finished this academy in 1950, works in GRU, worked in Italy and in France, his wife - a daughter of Marshal Timoshenko - Olga (finished the institute of foreign trade); Kapalkin Victor - in 1940s studed as a student in the USA, also works in GRU.

15. Kabalinov Vladimir - a major, a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

16. Khaberov - in 1950-52 a deputy of chief of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

17. Khaytov S. S. - a deputy of chief (on information) of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

18. Kon'kov - a deputy of chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1951-52.

19. Kozlovskiy - in 1950s an officer of department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

20. Molchanov - an officer of GRU (in 1950s)

21. Orekhov Gennadi - in 1951-52 an administrative officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

22. Pogodin Boris - a chief of the secretariate of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-1952, knows a japanese language.

23. Rezantsev - a commander of navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.

24. Shalin - a general, in 1940s was a chief of the Military diplomatic academy, later was a chief of GRU.

000126

25. Shaposhnikov Yuri - a general, works in GRU: his father was a marshal USS

26. Mel'nikov Sergey - a chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

27. Namgaladze - a general, a chief of navy intelligence at Black sea, 1950-52

28. Sergeyev - an engineer - ~~b~~ colonel, a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1951-52 (earlier he worked in Turkey).

29. Suslovich - in 1950-52 a commander of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

30. Grishchunov - an officer of GRU, worked in the USA, last years in India, from where was recalled.

31. Tishkin (o2-cv) - a rear-admiral, in 1950-52 a deputy chief of the navy intelligence of the ministry of military navy.

32. Vasilevskiy Yuri - works in GRU, son of a marshal of USSR.

33. Voronkov Al'bert - an officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1952.

34. Vorontsov Michael - a vice-admiral, a former chief of navy intelligence (1950-52)

~~35. Yazikov Dmitriy F. - a doctor of trade fleet, works in port Leningrad, as archives agent of KGB.~~

35. Yershov - an officer of personnel of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52, knows a chinese language.

SECRET

The 1st of March, 1951 was signed an order about my appointment as an interpretor of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in Soviet harbour, Primorskiy district., where I have gone by a train and arrived in the place of my appointment in the end of March. (I went from Moscow to Khabarovsk, where changed a train to Komsomolsk-on-Amur, then crossed the river and from station Pivan' went to Soviet harbour (station Pyatisotka).



The intelligence of 7 Fleet was located in bay Postovaya, here were also Political directory of 7 Fleet, submarine's and destroyer's bases. The headquarters of 7 Fleet was located in settlement Zhildorbat. The commander-in-chief of 7 Fleet was admiral Baykov Ivan I., chief of staff - vice-admiral Kasatonov.

0001128

The chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet was captain of 1 rank Mel'nikov Sergey K., his deputies - captain of 2 rank Bogdanovskiy (agent's department), captain of 1 rank Khaytrov Semen S. (information department), captain of 1 rank Kovikov (navy intelligence), colonel Burchenko (a commissar).

I was working in the information department. Officers Kabalinov, Efimov were working in this department. Other officers of the intelligence were lieutenant-colonel Sergeyev, lieutenant Voronkov Albert, major Ershov, captains Orekhov, Rodionov, Pogodin, Bespalov and 3-4 more officers. There were also seargents and privates.

In the end of April, 1952 I flew in Moscow (stopping for 1-2 days in Khabarovsk) for a leave.

In June-July 1952 a personnel department of the chief directory navy intelligence (a chief - colonel Kaloshin) was desiding a question about my transference because of illness. And I was appointed in the navy intelligence point of navy intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk (located before a peninsula to Baltiysk - former Pillau), where I arrived in August, 1952. (Kaliningrad's district - former Prussia).

Soviet is a little sity-village, a former german village of fishermen, it seems had a name Fishhausen.



Sovietsk - a demolished little town, here there were a navy intelligence point and 1-2 others military detachments (building battalion).

Baltiysk was a base and headquarters of 4 Fleet.

The commander-in-chief of 4 Fleet was admiral Golovko A. G. The chief of my navy intelligence point was captain of 2 rank Ryazantsev. Here were officers: Vinogradov, Bulakh, Demchenko and others with sergeants and privates.

Before my arrival (2 days) this navy intelligence point was transfered from east Germany in Soviet. If in Germany the work of the point was connected with agent's work, now there was another task - a preparation of agent-observation post in a case of new war (3-4 persons each post). - an absolutly monkey bussness.

In the end of December I took a leave reasoning it with my illness, but having in mind a transference in another place.

In mid of March, 1953 I began to work in 2 chief directory of КГБ (former МВД).

B. NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER THE KGB IN THE MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.

Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary and will not be repeated here. His statements during current interviews that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are considered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in 1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

In 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into the KGB in an effort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the Institute of International Relations in 1949.

The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding, and the influence of General KOBULOV. An analyst can either accept or reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB procedures should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet Intelligence organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official. General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy to BERIYA, the Minister of the then MVD.

The previous summary raises several points concerning the eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67 that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not controvertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO was not sponsored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953 with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy to BERIYA.

The previous summary also states that according to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statement which it is doubtful any defector or series of defectors could fully substantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it is medically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it is accepted that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium -- rest place in Kubinka. It is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGB after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.

The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB (MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that

NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his processing for KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate. This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).

The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also had a dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN era.

The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office. It would seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he completed the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD).

Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While NOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN has stated this reversal of designations occurred in March 1953.

STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June 1953. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less than a year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning the date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and places it as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated that the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of the MVD in April 1953." In the light of our inability to fix the effective date of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it is unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).

There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who was responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD. NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is in conflict with the statements of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for the changes. As for the issue of who was responsible for the reversal of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. However, the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in this issue.

NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased to exist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicates the KI continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but care should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certain position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations were organized or ceased to exist.

The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the brother of General KOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection was discussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.

C. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION THROUGHOUT THE 1953 - 1955 PERIOD AS HE CLAIMED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953 - 1955 period as he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department, SCD.

This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work during this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his personal behavior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether he would be fired from the KGB or transferred to some other component.

The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB.

The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.

NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews that following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was responsible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with newspaper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers. NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer," indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officers and his information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American correspondents was his assignment from mid-March 1953 to mid-1954.

From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Department in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the Military Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members of the Office of the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work undoubtedly left much to be desired.

In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances, NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if not undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of the Military Attache supports the claim of NOSENKO that he was an officer of the First Section with the indicated assignment as related by him.

NOSENKO has stated that the work against the Military Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB would appear to be completely plausible and NOSENKO noted as exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Walter MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches to Soviets in the United States in that period.

NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the details concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time. It is submitted that this may be evidence of his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his assigned functions, but makes no allowance for the uncertain personal status of NOSENKO whose actual future in the KGB was in jeopardy after mid-1954.

NOSENKO has previously indicated and still indicates a definite lack of knowledge concerning his assigned targets during approximately March - May 1955. This, according to NOSENKO, was when an unsatisfactory "characterization" was being prepared on NOSENKO, a decision was being made on his case, and a period of time in which he went on a "big drunk" which culminated in his spending about 40 days under hospital care because of the possibility of recurrence of his previous tuberculosis.

Pages 84 - 87 of the previous summary suggest that NOSENKO had not furnished sufficient details about his alleged agent network for use against the Military Attaches. It is considered that NOSENKO in current interviews has furnished adequate acceptable details, and as an example furnished specific information concerning "VOLODINA and "RAKETA" (page 85). It would appear that there was no intent by NOSENKO to withhold information concerning these individuals, but rather that he was never asked to amplify his previous casual reference to these individuals.

The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an officer in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that information furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.

D. DURING THE PERIOD 1955 - 1960, HE WAS NEITHER A SENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF, THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

D. During the period of 1955 - 1960, NOSENKO was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, American-British Commonwealth Section. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department from 1958 to December 1959.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally involved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959. These activities include among others the recruitment of Richard BURGI in June 1956, contact with Sir Allen LANE and Arthur BIRSE in the summer of 1957, the recruitment of Gisella HARRIS in 1958, the recruitment of George DREW in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

William Stanley WILBY in June 1959, the recruitment of David TAYLOR in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of Gerard MERTENS in July - August 1959, and the recruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959. The foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO claims personal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who was the KGB target.

Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY, and David TAYLOR were British citizens and the other above-named individuals were United States citizens. This would seem to substantiate the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Commonwealth tourists in the USSR.

In addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about an operation against Martin MALIA, an American tourist who was in the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955. MALIA has not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, so at this time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the individual involved.

NOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certain United States Government officials, including Congressional representatives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when considered with the previously mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his claimed service in the Seventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealth tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period.

NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent network was not available for operations against American and British tourists. This seems quite logical since the influx of tourists into the USSR was just in a formative stage.

NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he developed after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB code names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual compromise operations.

The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It is considered that even if the statements were accepted in toto, there would still not be an adequate basis for a conclusion that NOSENKO was not an officer in the claimed positions in the Seventh Department during the period of late May 1955 - December 1959. Nor is it conceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various areas of information were accepted without qualification, there is any evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. However, there are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and which are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.

On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counterintelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruitment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Department, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB officer when considered with the detailed information NOSENKO has provided on Seventh Department personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of a similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact.

Page 145 of the above summary lists eleven operations which were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations were those against Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (fnu) KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William TARASKA. The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cases was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Department in 1962 following his return from the First Department.

The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in another section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently available indicates that his statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approximately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes.

During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific information on certain of the above eleven cases, including William TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUFE. It should also be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR and William TARASKA were cases in which the tourist was visiting relatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactory explanation of how he learned of the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in discussing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended to visit relatives in the USSR, the case automatically was assigned to a group of officers in the Section who reported directly to the Chief of Section and were not under the supervision of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual returned to the USSR.

NOSENKO has also explained how he learned of the Patrick PRESSMAN and Gerald SEVERN cases; and, the listing of the Sofia SHATTAUER case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in complete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.

The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual. An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents were used in two of the four cited cases.

The summary also noted that there was a question concerning whether Gisella HARRIS was necessarily a Seventh Department case.

This question seems quite superfluous since HARRIS was in the USSR on a tourist visa and "real" tourists are the responsibility of the Seventh Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an individual traveling in the USSR is decided on the basis of how the individual is traveling; i. e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member of a delegation, as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a former diplomat stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow, as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors which affect the determination of which Department or organizational component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman. In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the FCD.

On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at least some of the substance of the information furnished by George BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents in the USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information although he did then and still suspects that William VASSALL was the source. The references by NOSENKO to the KGB having such information were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was not until current interviews that it was established that NOSENKO had actually seen excerpts of information passed by George BLAKE. According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could only have come from an agent.

The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his defection in December 1961). It was noted that the summary contained references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counterintelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents during this period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967.

NOSENKO has never claimed to know all activities against American travelers in the Soviet Union during 1958 - 1959. Many of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in the Seventh Department, other than the American-British Commonwealth Section, or another Department in the SCD. NOSENKO was quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 - 1959 were acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view.

NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effort to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not review the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and following advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained additional information not in the document which he was aware had been prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD.

NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the description of NOSENKO concerning the distribution of responsibilities within the SCD for various categories of foreign visitors to the USSR provides a logical explanation for his unfamiliarity. Previous problems in this regard appear to have stemmed from a misconception of the meaning of the term "tourist" as used by the KGB. This general term has a specific meaning in the Second Chief Directorate; namely, a "tourist" is a foreigner travelling to the USSR on a tourist visa. Such a person was the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department. A large number of travelers to the USSR, including businessmen, persons travelling on invitation of a Soviet organization, students attending a university, etc., are not tourists in the KGB concept and would not be the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department.

The only unresolved problem considered of any significance in regard to the 1955 - 1959 period is the account by NOSENKO of the presence of American citizen John SHUBIN in the USSR as a tourist in the late 1950's. The previous summary pointed out that, since John SHUBIN did not have a valid United States passport between 1940 and June 1961, it was impossible for him to have been a tourist under true name in the USSR and, therefore, a target of the Seventh Department, as NOSENKO claims. Although several avenues of possibly fruitful investigation have not yet been fully explored, there is no assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch, or for that matter as indicative that he was not Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959; neither would such an inaccuracy reflect on his claimed service in 1962 - 1963 in the Seventh Department.

E. NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR OFFICER OR SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE PERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period of 1961 - 1962 (sic). (Previous conclusion)

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO held the position of Deputy Chief, First Section (American Embassy Section), SCD, from January 1960 - December 1961.

The claim of NOSENKO that he held the above position in 1960 - 1961 has been the most difficult claimed position of NOSENKO to satisfactorily resolve and accept. Acceptance or nonacceptance of his claim to have held this particular position is a critical factor in a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career is valid. It is believed reasonable to presume that if NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indication that he was demoted, he should have been at least a Deputy Chief of Section during 1960 - 1961.

Position in the SCD, KGB, and throughout the KGB is important from a monetary point of view as well as a prestige point of view. If

NOSENKO was only in the First Section as a Senior Case Officer in 1960 - 1961, this would have been a demotion in position with resultant loss of both money and prestige. For this reason alone, his failure to have held the position of Deputy Chief in 1960 - 1961 would raise considerable doubt as to whether he held his claimed position prior to 1960, as well as whether he held his claimed positions in 1962 - 1963.

It is apparent that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning all aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 is incomplete when judged by what are considered the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA. During current interviews, an effort was made to determine what the responsibilities of NOSENKO actually were in 1960 - 1961 and whether his statements in this area were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section.

According to NOSENKO, in the early 1960's there were only approximately fifteen Deputy Chiefs of Section in the entire SCD and in certain departments none of the sections had a Deputy Chief of Section. In addition, transfer of a Deputy Chief of Section was not always followed by a replacement in kind, according to NOSENKO who stated that he was not replaced by another Deputy Chief when he transferred to the First Section, First Department.

According to NOSENKO, there was not a job description for a Deputy Chief of Section and the duties of the particular Deputy Chief were in actuality what the Chief of Department and Chief of Section decided would be his assigned duties.

The previous summary drew attention to an apparent conflict between early statements of NOSENKO that he replaced no one when he entered on duty in the First Section, First Department, and his subsequent claim that he replaced Mikhail BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief in the First Section. Along with this he had first credited KOVSHUK and various other officers in the Section with previous responsibility for certain matters which were assigned to him upon his arrival there, then later stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsible for these matters. The previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these contradictions.

In the light of the present clearer picture of the nature of a Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not contradictory. There is no reason to question that BAKHVALOV, with whom NOSENKO, incidentally, did not overlap, was a Deputy Chief of Section in the First Section before NOSENKO, and that he was responsible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO. On the other hand, according to NOSENKO, the principal reason for his being assigned to the First Section was to concentrate on a new area of emphasis (code clerks). There could of course have been no specific predecessor for a substantively new area. Therefore, in one sense BAKHVALOV was the predecessor of NOSENKO and in another sense he was not. The interpretation of the various statements of NOSENKO on this issue as being in conflict appears to be the result of confusion on this point by all concerned.

According to NOSENKO, at the time of his transfer to the First Section, First Department, in early 1960, he had not been told and for a short period thereafter was not told what his actual duties would be. KOVSHUK, Chief of the First Section, wanted to assign NOSENKO to supervise the work against Service Attaches at the United States Embassy. NOSENKO felt that the proposed assignment by KOVSHUK was intended to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive work since KGB policy for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of control on trips and not active work towards possible recruitment.

After a short period of time, NOSENKO was informed by GRIBANOV that he, NOSENKO, had been transferred to supervise the work against code clerks (also code machine mechanics) at the United States Embassy. GRIBANOV defined this work as being of the greatest importance, and the recruitment of code clerks as a priority aim of the KGB. KLYPIN, who was Chief of the First Department, later repeated the above and a group consisting of NOSENKO, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV was formed with NOSENKO responsible for supervision of the work. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV were not new KGB officers, but instead were experienced officers although both as Senior Case Officers were of lesser rank than NOSENKO. NOSENKO does not claim that he had to train either officer or to minutely scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO does claim he was responsible for supervision over their work.

According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV emphasized that work against code clerks was to be his primary work in the First Section and that it would take precedence over any other activity. Other than work against code clerks, NOSENKO has generally defined his responsibilities as follows:

(a) Responsibility for file of (work against) John ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States Embassy.

(b) Responsibility for preliminary review of reports from OTU (KGB technical unit) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.

(c) Responsibility for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy.

(d) Acting in place of Vladislav KOVSHUK, Chief, First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent.

As can be seen from the above, the responsibilities of NOSENKO, by his definition, which are borne out by specific information furnished by NOSENKO, would not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CIA. An analyst can either accept or reject the theory that there is necessarily an equation between the responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA and the KGB, but if the analyst accepts the theory, he must offer some supporting evidence on this point.

Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments and conclusions and sub-conclusions in regard to the claimed service of NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy Chief of the First (American Embassy) Section nor a supervisor in that section. The conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks. The matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later. Comments will first be made on the responsibilities listed in (a) - (d) above.

Pages 205 - 222 of the previous summary contain a detailed basis for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the KGB case officer for John ABIDIAN. The current conclusion is that he was the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN. Whether or not his work against ABIDIAN compared favorably with what is considered to be the MO of a responsible CIA case officer is immaterial; what is material is whether NOSENKO reasonably fulfilled the requirements of the KGB for work against the particular target, John ABIDIAN. It is felt that the answer to this is that NOSENKO did.

According to NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the direction of determining if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his description of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered only within that framework.

Admittedly NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the KGB was to see if coverage of ABIDIAN would lead to "another POPOV," it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had little material value for the SCD. The FCD had advised the SCD prior to the arrival of ABIDIAN in the USSR that ABIDIAN was considered to be "American Intelligence," and in addition ABIDIAN assumed the Security Officer position formerly held by Russell A. LANGELLE, who was known by the KGB to be CIA. No investigation by the SCD was necessary to determine if ABIDIAN was "American Intelligence" or not.

The previous summary, pages 213 - 216, contains some quite specific statements relative to ABIDIAN and a Soviet maid, a KGB operational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erroneous. This invalidates one of the bases for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO had previously stated that in circa October 1960 he prepared an operational plan on ABIDIAN which included continuation of the placing of Metka on the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN by his maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH. The statement is made in the summary that this could not be true because FEDOROVICH did not work part time for ABIDIAN until at least July 1961. ABIDIAN has recently been reinterviewed concerning the above and the results invalidate the previous conclusion that FEDOROVICH could not have treated the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN with Metka prior to July 1961.

ABIDIAN has now stated that he arrived in Moscow in March 1960 with the intention that he would not employ a Soviet maid. Approximately three months later his close association began with Myra KEMMER, a Department of State employee; this association continued until she left Moscow in mid-1961. KEMMER had Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid and through mutual agreement with KEMMER, FEDOROVICH became the part-time maid for ABIDIAN beginning sometime in the fall of 1960. From that time on FEDOROVICH, according to ABIDIAN, had uncontrolled access to his living quarters since she had a key to permit entry for cleaning purposes.

ABIDIAN did not mail any operational letters within the Soviet Union until after March 1961 and therefore in view of the above, there is no reason to contradict the statement of NOSENKO that the three operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN all showed evidence of Metka. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO in June 1962 warned CIA about the KGB use of Metka for spotting internal letter mailings by United States Embassy personnel.

When mailed?

ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was the subject of a 24-hour surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance brigade to cover ABIDIAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was the responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the

First Section, First Department. NOSENKO, as the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN, was expected to review these reports and give any appropriate guidance or direction to the Seventh Directorate, but under the KGB organization he would not participate in the surveillance activities of the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO stated that had surveillance or agent information disclosed any personal weaknesses of ABIDIAN, the KGB would have attempted to exploit them. No personal weaknesses were disclosed, according to NOSENKO, and the pattern of coverage to see if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV" remained unchanged.

Pages 210 - 212 of the previous summary notes that NOSENKO was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN during trips outside the USSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the FCD to find out such information. According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that the FCD "would not accept" such a request for "operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow." The surveillance which would have been required on the part of the FCD to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad would certainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKO contends that the results which might reasonably be expected would be of little or no practical value to the SCD.

Pages 216 - 221 of the previous summary contain a summary on the matter of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site which John ABIDIAN visited on 30 December 1961. It should be noted that a current review of the 1964 - 1966 interrogations of NOSENKO on this matter indicates they were unable to clarify the matter and did much to confuse the issue.

Current interviews, as indicated above, have not fully resolved the problems, but have assisted in at least minimizing the areas of conflict or confusion. It is apparent that NOSENKO was not in the First Section, First Department, for any material period of time after 30 December 1961. It is also clear that he either read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or was fully briefed on the details of the visit. NOSENKO insists that he read the surveillance report at the time or shortly after the event. There is no reason to question his assertion that he read the report since his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN and his actions in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relateit to his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually read the report.

NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop area led to the KGB setting up a stationary surveillance post near the site which was maintained for three months and that he was informed on a daily basis of the results of this stake out (always negative). To take this statement literally would raise a further problem since, in addition to his transfer from the First Department to the Seventh Department as of early January 1962, NOSENKO went to Geneva in mid-March 1962.

It is conceivable that, as he himself now maintains, he was kept advised of developments or nondevelopments following the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street building by Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chief of Department in the Seventh Directorate who had been known to NOSENKO since 1953, or Vladislav KOVSHUK or Gennadiy GRYAZNOV, Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Department. Even so, however, his failure to call our attention to this matter in June 1962 would seem to require explanation, especially in view of the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letter mailings by ABIDIAN -- a warning which would appear clearly to have been derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the spring-summer of 1961.

It is to be noted that during the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO was not specifically asked for any additional information regarding any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyond this, NOSENKO himself has stated that it did not occur to him to tell us because the stake out had long since been dropped, it had revealed nothing suspicious on the part of ABIDIAN or anyone else, and therefore he had regarded it as insignificant.

This is not implausible. Another possible explanation, however, derived from the already noted inability of NOSENKO to pin down a date for the visit, is that he learned of the stationary surveillance post if not of the visit itself after his meetings with us in June 1962. It should be noted in this context that with the public exposure of the PENKOVSKIY case in the fall of 1962, the Pushkin Street deaddrop undoubtedly became the subject of widespread interest within the KGB.

That NOSENKO is at a minimum still confused about the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop and its consequences is clear from the record. While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has consciously exaggerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermath, it is also possible that the evident distortions of his accounts of the affair derive from honest confusion.

Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous interviews leave no doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961. These visits by ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operational letter mailing. NOSENKO consistently relates, and has furnished drawings which substantiate, that visits of ABIDIAN to a commission shop, a next-door art shop, and a local post office in the area were known to and considered suspicious by the KGB. The entrance to the art shop, according to NOSENKO, was so situated as to be an ideal place for picking up or placing a deaddrop, and a mobile surveillance was placed on the art shop for a period of time following the visit of ABIDIAN. Official records confirm the visits of ABIDIAN at the time and to the buildings described by NOSENKO.

Pages 216 - 220 of the previous summary contain no reference to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area. It is also clear from a review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations that no differentiation was made concerning his statements relative to KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his knowledge of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site after the visit of ABIDIAN to that site (30 December 1961).

It is impossible at this time to state that a detailed debriefing of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would have permitted the clarification of all issues including the above, but there is no doubt that the hostile interrogation has confused matters to the point where complete clarification appears impossible. In any event, one thing is clear -- since he may well have transferred out of the First Section, First Department, by 31 December 1961 and most certainly had transferred by early January 1962, the fact that NOSENKO has supplied confused information regarding the Pushkin Street affair cannot be used to impugn his claim to having been case officer for ABIDIAN from early 1960 until late 1961. Furthermore, the fact that NOSENKO is not able to properly date the visit of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, is in no way indicative of KGB dispatch. If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have had the date right.

In regard to (b), the responsibility of NOSENKO for preliminary review of reports from OTU (Technical Unit of KGB) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy, the previous conclusion was that his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB monitoring reports was not sustained.

It is not felt that the previous conclusion made sufficient allowance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually entailed. Information from microphones in the United States Embassy, according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially. Telephone intercepts were given to a designated officer for distribution to the appropriate case officer, but microphone reports, to prevent wide dissemination even within the First Section, were brought daily to the Deputy Chief or in his absence to the Chief and then were distributed to the individual responsible case officer. In this way, according to NOSENKO, no one below the rank of Deputy Chief was aware of the total microphone "take" from the United States Embassy as received by the section.

As regards political type information, and according to NOSENKO this was considered the most important by the KGB and OTU, NOSENKO had no responsibility for review or ultimate dissemination of the information to the Chief, SCD, the Chairman, KGB, or the Central Committee since this was the responsibility of a unit in the office of the Chief, SCD.

NOSENKO has also stated that the output from certain of the working microphones was "dying" and that OTU in addition to having reception difficulties was also having difficulty obtaining a sufficient number of qualified monitor-translators. As a result, according to NOSENKO, OTU was not providing complete verbatim transcripts from most microphones, but actually was reporting only those portions which OTU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts of all conversations in areas covered by active microphones would have been of interest to responsible officers of the First Section, OTU, according to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more personnel." According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of the

First Section could listen to a particular tape but he had to go to OTU to do so and as a result this was done very infrequently.

It is believed that any presumption that the KGB recovered or transcribed all conversations even in the thirteen areas listed by NOSENKO as having active microphones is not reasonable or even realistic. It is also unrealistic to presume that any conversation conducted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was not compromised to the KGB. The latter is a factor to be considered in any damage assessment; it is not an appropriate basis for a presumption that NOSENKO had to have been aware of this or this just because someone had a conversation in one of the rooms in which there was an active microphone and NOSENKO has claimed he reviewed the "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.

It is apparent that there are a number of imponderable factors to be considered such as whether the conversation could be picked up by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover sufficient portions of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being said, and even if he did, whether he would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form.

In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy, it is not considered that there is an adequate basis for questioning this claim.

The previous summary contained a conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was custodian of the Embassy security file was an invention. The basis for this conclusion was not then adequate and current interviews with NOSENKO have further indicated that his claim on this point should be accepted.

In regard to (d), the claim of NOSENKO that he acted in place of KOVSHUK, the Chief of First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent, it is considered that this claim is acceptable providing it is not converted into a presumption that therefore NOSENKO knew everything that KOVSHUK knew.

NOSENKO claims that he was not responsible for the direct supervision of approximately two-thirds of the officers in the First Section. These officers normally reported directly to KOVSHUK and would only report to NOSENKO when KOVSHUK was absent. As an example of this, NOSENKO has shown a lack of detailed knowledge of the work against diplomatic personnel in the United States Embassy. He has stated he is sure he would have known of anything "important" such as a recruitment or attempted recruitment, but he does not claim to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First

Section. His recognition of the names of individuals at the United States Embassy in 1960 - 1961 and even their assignments seems adequate.

The previous criticism that NOSENKO knew only the names of most agents or operative contacts who were part of the KGB network among the indigenous employees of the American Embassy, did not recognize their photographs, and did not give sufficient details concerning their specific activities is considered to be an unwarranted criticism. NOSENKO indicates that in general the handling of agents in the First Section was the responsibility of individual case officers.

It is also apparent that the philosophy in the KGB was to maintain a single handler-agent relationship as much as possible, and that responsibility for an agent would not be transferred merely because the agent had access to a target who was the responsibility of a case officer other than the handler of the agent. This apparent philosophy is of particular interest in connection with NOSENKO, who even though he was the case officer responsible for ABIDIAN and together with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agent network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent for reporting on or a specific activity against a particular target was normally not an adequate reason to transfer responsibility for the agent and it appears the KGB considers that the continuation of an established handler-agent relationship has considerable merit.

NOSENKO, as previously indicated, has stated that he had the responsibility for work against code clerks at the United States Embassy during 1960 - 1961. Except for the period of time that he claims responsibility for supervision of work against the Service Attaches in early 1960, he was, according to NOSENKO, responsible for supervision of the work of Vadim A. KOSOLAPOV, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir DEMKIN and Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY.

GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV worked only against code clerks and therefore were supervised solely by NOSENKO, whereas DEMKIN and GROMAKOVSKIY, who handled indigenous agents in American House, came under the supervision of NOSENKO only in those cases where these agents were directed against code clerks.

It is quite clear that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning the code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouch clerks who, according to NOSENKO, were included in his targets in 1960 - 1961, was much greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees at the United States Embassy during this period except for ABIDIAN.

The following comments are concerned with several specific cases in which, according to NOSENKO, there was an approach by the KGB, interesting information was developed, or in which at least a considerable amount of specific work was carried out by NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.

The first case, (James STORSBERG) is covered on pages 166 - 177 of the previous summary. Little additional comment is considered necessary on this case since there does not appear to be any adequate reason to question the general story of NOSENKO in regard to the KGB effort against (STORSBERG).

It is recognized and mentioned elsewhere that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal involvement in the case, particularly in placing himself as present with GRIBANOV when the recruitment pitch was made to (STORSBERG). NOSENKO has retracted this particular claim, but there is no reason to doubt that he was engaged for approximately a year in the planning and activities which preceded the unsuccessful approach to (STORSBERG).

An issue was previously made over the timing of the approach to (STORSBERG) since (STORSBERG) dated this as October 1961, NOSENKO has indicated about June 1961, and information from GOLITSYN, based on remarks by KOVSHUK to him, had been interpreted as indicating the approach occurred at the "end of 1960."

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has given an acceptable account of the STORSBERG case. He has stated that he cannot precisely date the approach to STORSBERG, but that it occurred before the approach at the Moscow airport to James KEYSERS (June 16, 1961) because otherwise no action would have been taken against KEYSERS.

When recently reinterviewed, STORSBERG continued to maintain that the approach occurred in October 1961, but the internal evidence in his description of collateral events makes it clear that the approach had to have taken place considerably earlier.

Joseph MORONE, another code clerk at the United States Embassy, who will be the subject of further discussion below, has been interviewed on the basis of statements by STORSBERG that MORONE was present in American House the night of the approach. Analysis of the statements of MORONE clearly indicates that the events STORSBERG describes could not have taken place later than the period February to early May 1961.

The best estimate possible at this time is that the approach to STORSBERG occurred in March - April 1961, which is quite compatible with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSENKO. In the face of this approximation of the date of the approach to STORSBERG, it is believed reasonable to assume that the remarks of KOVSHUK to GOLITSYN in January 1961, as related by GOLITSYN concerning a successful operation against a military code clerk in Moscow at the end of 1960, referred to STORSBERG, and that KOVSHUK either was referring to a compromise phase of the operation rather than the actual approach, or was prematurely claiming anticipated success.

Pages 178 - 181 of the previous summary contain information in regard to the attempted defection operation against James KEYSERS. As of this time, it is considered that there are no discrepancies between record information and information from NOSENKO which in any way reflect against NOSENKO. KEYSERS did not recognize a photograph of NOSENKO as the Soviet who made a fast approach to him at the airport, but this does not provide a valid reason to disbelieve the statement of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk to KEYSERS.

There are certain statements relative to the KEYSERS case as set forth in the previous summary which require specific comment.

(a) The statement is made that no KGB officer directly connected with the case could regard KEYSERS as the replacement for STORSBERG. In fact, KEYSERS actually was being trained by STORSBERG as a substitute, not a replacement, even though his primary assignment was not that of a code clerk. NOSENKO has during current interviews related how he received the impression from the OTU reports of conversations picked up by the microphone in the Military code room at the United States Embassy that KEYSERS either was not a code clerk or had been away from code work for a considerable period of time. In any event, the impression of NOSENKO was that STORSBERG was having a difficult time explaining the particular work to KEYSERS. The observations of NOSENKO are of interest since KEYSERS actually had not been a code clerk but, as noted, was being trained by STORSBERG so that he could act as a substitute. Under the circumstances, it is considered quite logical that the KGB would assume at the time that KEYSERS was to be the eventual replacement of STORSBERG.

(b) The previous summary stated that, "prior to his departure from Moscow, KEYSERS acknowledged to his supervisors /Colonel URBAN/ his homosexual tendencies and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents, all at the American House" (page 179).

Contrary to this assertion, a review of the official memorandum, dated 16 June 1961, of Colonel URBAN reflects that KEYSERS was not informed by URBAN of the "allegations of homosexuality in order not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him while within the Soviet Union."

(c) On page 236 of the previous summary, the statement is made that, "In the single case in which he /NOSENKO/ asserted that he relied on information procured from microphones (KEYSERS' failure to report receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error."

While the official record shows that KEYSERS did indeed report receipt of the defection letter to Colonel URBAN in the office of Colonel URBAN, it should be noted that this occurred less than one hour before KEYSERS left the Embassy for the airport. NOSENKO has stated that in the absence of information to the contrary from microphone and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded that KEYSERS had not reported receipt of the defection letter and therefore had decided to approach KEYSERS at the airport. In view of the short time between KEYSERS report of receipt of the letter and his departure from Moscow, it would have been remarkable if the KGB had learned this information in time to call off the airport approach. The account of NOSENKO in the KEYSERS matter therefore is considered completely credible.

Pages 181 - 184 of the previous summary contain information in regard to Matthew ZUJUS, who succeeded James STORSBERG, having arrived in Moscow in September 1961. GRYAZNOV was the responsible case officer for ZUJUS, according to NOSENKO.

The previous summary states (page 183) that ZUJUS, during a routine debriefing, confirmed an Embassy report that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN," who visited the American House with someone from the United Arab Republic. "LILLIAN" was interviewed by the American House manager and she claimed to be from Vienna but traveling with her employer, a Czech. Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport had been issued to "LILLIAN," and she was later asked for her passport. "LILLIAN" replied that she had forgotten it, then left, and did not return.

The previous summary stated that the above incident had been described by NOSENKO but in connection with attempts to entrap Joseph MORONE in 1960, not ZUJUS in 1962.

Page 194 of the previous summary relates information from NOSENKO that GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin in early 1960 to obtain two German women who could be used against the residents of American House. During current interviews, this matter has been again covered with NOSENKO. According to NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV arranged for these two women, agents of the Berlin KGB Residentura, to visit Moscow under false documentation, one as a West German and the other as an Austrian. NOSENKO further identified the "West German" agent, "HANNA," as having the cover of a journalist, and stated he believed "HANNA" had met MORONE at American House. In a recent interview, MORONE confirmed that in early 1961 he had met a West German girl at American House who claimed to be a journalist. The statements of MORONE therefore appear to substantiate the report of NOSENKO.

Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO reported that she was queried about her passport at American House and as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further attempts to use her at American House. NOSENKO places this incident in the same time period as the "HANNA" case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He has never suggested any connection with ZUJUS, nor is there reason to assume that he could be referring to the experience of ZUJUS since this took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had left the American Embassy Section.

It was the conclusion of the previous summary that NOSENKO did not know enough about ZUJUS or his background to have exercised any supervision in the development of ZUJUS. Granted that NOSENKO did not know many details regarding ZUJUS, the fact is that NOSENKO left the First Section, First Department, at the end of 1961 at which time any supervisory functions of NOSENKO terminated. ZUJUS who did not arrive in Moscow until September 1961, remained in Moscow until January 1963. NOSENKO could hardly be held responsible for knowing anything about ZUJUS after 1 January 1962.

Pages 185 - 189 of the previous summary contain a synopsis of previous information from NOSENKO in regard to Paul JENNER. Basically, NOSENKO had reported that when the KGB learned that Paul JENNER, who was thought to be a code clerk, was coming to Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki to travel on the same train as JENNER to Moscow. A female agent of GRYAZNOV was to be placed on this train at Vyborg after the train entered the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainted with JENNER as a part of a future operation against JENNER in Moscow, and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with JENNER.

NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successful, that both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acquaintance of JENNER, and that he, NOSENKO, read the report submitted by KOSOLAPOV on the trip from Helsinki to Moscow.

(JENNER), after arriving in Moscow, reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students," who struck up a conversation. According to (JENNER), they both said that they might see (JENNER) in Moscow. About three months later (JENNER) reported being approached again by the same girl, this time at the Moscow airport where he had gone on courier business. There was a short conversation and she gave (JENNER) a phone number, insisting that he call her. The woman also advised (JENNER) not to mention the conversation to anyone. NOSENKO has stated that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance, the KGB had arranged for the female agent to encounter (JENNER) at the Moscow railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet couriers.

Insofar as is known, (JENNER) has never been shown a photograph of KOSOLAPOV. Although KOSOLAPOV was approximately 34 years of age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicate that in appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed as a university student.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has repeated the same general story as regards Paul JENNER. He still insists that KOSOLAPOV was on the same train with JENNER from Helsinki. Collateral information raises difficulties here, however: Finnish train manifests indicate that JENNER was the only Moscow-bound passenger on the 31 March 1960 train from Finland to Moscow, and that one Viktor KOLOSSOV (a name NOSENKO has identified as an alias used by KOSOLAPOV) was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow.

The above obvious discrepancy has not been and cannot be clarified with available information. KOSOLAPOV (KOLOSSOV) was either on the same train as JENNER or he was not. Train manifests indicate that KOSOLAPOV was not. Nevertheless, the "boy and girl, probably university students" who, according to JENNER, struck up a conversation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the operational effort described by NOSENKO, particularly in view of the later approach of this same girl to JENNER at the airport. There is no reason to question that this girl was the female agent of GRYAZNOV. In view of the conflict between the train manifest and statements by NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the "boy student" was: whether this somehow was KOSOLAPOV, or whether it may have been some other person entirely.

It is not accepted that the train manifests are incontrovertible evidence that KOSOLAPOV could not have been on the same train as JENNER. Neither is it accepted that the train manifests are in error. There is just not a satisfactory answer for the indicated discrepancy between the train manifests and the statement of NOSENKO that KOSOLAPOV and JENNER were on the same train. If indeed KOSOLAPOV did not travel with JENNER, this does not establish anything more than that NOSENKO is wrong; it is evidence that he does not know something he, as the supervisor of KOSOLAPOV, should have known according to his own statements.

Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in regard to the John GARLAND case. GARLAND was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk whom the KGB was studying, but on whom no derogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practically no details in regard to GARLAND other than to identify him as a code clerk.

GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered relates to the trip of GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsinki KGB Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that the responsible SCD case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki under alias to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which the SCD hoped to continue in Moscow. GOLITSYN talked to KOSOLAPOV in Helsinki at that time, and the Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in the compartment of the American on the train from Helsinki to Moscow.

The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN had advised that later in Helsinki he inquired of another SCD officer "from the Embassy Section" (First Section, SCD) about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, the officer refused to discuss the case and he, GOLITSYN, concluded from this reaction that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment.

It has been determined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the FBI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD officer from the Embassy Section" as (fnu) ZENKIN of the American Department. GOLITSYN also stated that the officer was in Helsinki under the alias of SERGEEV (SERGEYEV), but was unable to furnish a first name and patronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN referred to (fnu) ZENKIN as being from the American Department, SCD.

It is considered that there is no doubt that the (fnu) ZENKIN referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished information. NOSENKO has identified ZENKIN (whose first name he does not recall but possibly is Yuriy) as an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD. According to NOSENKO, one group of the Second Section both before and after 1960 - 1961 was engaged in "operative games" against American Intelligence and that ZENKIN was a member of this group. NOSENKO has advised that ZENKIN traveled abroad in connection with activities of the Second Section, but that he had no specific knowledge regarding the activities of ZENKIN on these trips. NOSENKO has furnished some fragmentary information which he learned in regard to ZENKIN and when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) together with his photograph is obtained, this fragmentary information from NOSENKO may prove quite useful.

As regards the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND matter and the opinion expressed by GOLITSYN based on the refusal of ZENKIN to discuss the case (GARLAND) that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment, there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presumption. According to NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSENKO on this point, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not the First Section, in 1960 - 1961. He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case

Officer. Since KOSOLAPOV was an officer of the First Section and the work against GARLAND was the responsibility of the First Section, it does not appear that ZENKIN would necessarily have known of any developments in the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND matter.

The Finnish train manifest of 16 November 1960 for the Helsinki to Moscow train lists John GARLAND and Viktor KOLOSSOV (alias of KOSOLAPOV) as passengers. GARLAND, when interviewed in 1962 following the lead from GOLITSYN, denied having met any Soviet with the physical description of KOSOLAPOV on the Helsinki-to-Moscow trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet Intelligence. Later interviews by the FBI and a polygraph interview did not indicate that he had ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had ever knowingly been contacted by any foreign intelligence agent.

It is accepted that KOSOLAPOV went from Moscow to Helsinki in November 1960, that he talked with GOLITSYN there, and that he was on the same train as GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow. It is also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960.

Travel for an SCD officer outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not matter that the individual has previously traveled on a similar mission, each trip must have specific high-level approval. The red tape which thus must inevitably have been involved in preparation for such a trip further supports the assumption that NOSENKO should have known about the KOSOLAPOV-(GARLAND) trip.

The position taken by NOSENKO on this point is that he accepts the statement by the interviewer that KOSOLAPOV made such a trip, but he says that he, NOSENKO, simply does not know anything about it. He adds only that had anything significant developed in the study of (GARLAND), he would have been aware of it.

NOSENKO, as supervisor of the group working against code clerks, should have known of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba from 15 November 1960 to circa 17 December 1960. The possibility exists that this could have accounted for his lack of knowledge of the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki and return to Moscow on 16 November 1960. However, NOSENKO has not attempted to use his Cuban trip as a possible explanation for not knowing of the November KOSOLAPOV trip.

As with the (JENNER)-KOSOLAPOV case, it is not possible at this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the (GARLAND)-KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledge of this operational activity of KOSOLAPOV is another apparent instance, as in the JENNER case, of his not knowing something he, by his own statements, should have known.

Viewed in the context of the total knowledge of NOSENKO of operations against code clerks, however, neither the problems in the JENNER case nor those in the GARLAND case, singly or combined, in any way represent conclusive evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of KOSOLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk operations described by NOSENKO. This statement, however, was not substantiated in the previous summary.

Pages 193 - 199 of the previous summary contain an account of KGB activity against code clerk Joseph MORONE from various sources, including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962.

[redacted]

According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work against MORONE was KOSOLAPOV. When it was learned that MORONE and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the name of BEGGS, were planning a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrangements were made with the UB (the Polish Security Service) for a female Polish agent to come to Moscow and travel from there to Warsaw on the same train as MORONE and BEGGS. The intent was for the agent, either on the train or subsequently in Warsaw, to meet and compromise MORONE sexually. She successfully accomplished this, but due to certain problems in KGB-UB liaison relations, it was not possible for the KGB to exploit this directly.

The previous summary stated that with respect to the female UB agent, there was persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV played the roles in the (MORONE) case described by NOSENKO. That summary cited the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba and of KOSOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the same time as the (MORONE) trip to Warsaw as evidence of the impossibility of NOSENKO and KOSOLAPOV being involved personally in this part of the (MORONE) case.

NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish female agent and made the arrangements to place her on the train to Warsaw. (MORONE) and (BEGGS) departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. It is not known when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the 16 November 1960 train manifest as departing Helsinki for Moscow. NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 for Cuba. The activities described by NOSENKO are therefore possible within the known time frame.

It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role in the (MORONE) case, particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO, placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that

KOSOLAPOV was the only KGB officer in contact with the Polish agent. NOSENKO previously stated that a KGB technician who was on the train from Moscow to Warsaw reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw. Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician after he returned from Cuba.

The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matter are accordingly possible within the known time frame. It is not considered that the retractions NOSENKO has made from his original statements on this operation are of sufficient significance to materially discredit him.

Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that MORONE, when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House. NOSENKO had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw or heard concerning MORONE (page 194). The summary, however, cited a number of reports that MORONE had been intimate with IVANOVA and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware of the sexual involvement of MORONE with "IVANOVA's friends."

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has indicated awareness of at least some involvement of IVANOVA with MORONE. He has furnished information on a developing operation against Marine guard GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCIA) based on the involvement of GARCIA with IVANOVA. He has also stated that the possibility was considered of using IVANOVA against MORONE to obtain compromising photographs. This plan was seriously affected when it was learned from the militiaman/KGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA, her girl friend, MORONE and a Marine guard, possibly GARCIA, had been "in the city," then returned to the "flat" of one of the Marines where the girls spent the night. This apparently placed the reliability of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section.

According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Pietro CECCHI, Italian cook at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOV, reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE. The summary also states that MORONE was said by other American Embassy employees to be a close friend of CECCHI and that MORONE had admitted black market money exchanges with CECCHI.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has stated that CECCHI furnished "pieces" of information concerning MORONE, but he, NOSENKO, knew of no black market involvement of MORONE with CECCHI. NOSENKO has also indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected, and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not fully report everything of interest to the KGB. The KGB of course was aware that CECCHI was involved in the black market. However, whether he reported to the KGB everything he did and with whom is open to question; viz., the Maurice ZWANG case below.

The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENKO was unaware that MORONE met some Soviet females in the spring of 1961 at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, an Egyptian-national KGB agent of the Sixth Department who was also reporting on Americans, and was intimate with one in this apartment.

A review of official records indicates that MORONE did report having met some Soviet girls at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is no indication that he admitted or that anyone else has reported that he was intimate with any of them. The conclusion of the previous summary in this regard was based on a misinterpretation. Accordingly, since there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is considered completely acceptable.

A few comments are appropriate concerning remarks in the previous summary on pages 199 - 204. Comments were made there concerning five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY and Joseph GAFFEY, and although it is not specifically stated, the suggestion is apparent that the reporting of NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of all KGB operations against code clerks. The following observations may assist in placing these cases in their proper perspective:

(a) Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on" during 1960 - 1961. The previous summary suggested that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity against ZWANG was inadequate. First, reporting of NOSENKO on ZWANG contained no reference to the relationship of ZWANG with his maid, whom NOSENKO in another case has identified as a KGB agent. Although ZWANG denied sexual relations with his maid, he did admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment. During polygraph examination ZWANG reacted when he responded in the negative to a question regarding sexual relations with his maid. The failure of NOSENKO to report on this relationship can be ascribed to ignorance, but also can be plausibly explained by faulty memory on his part or failure on the part of the maid to report details of this relationship to the KGB.

Second, NOSENKO had not reported that ZWANG was involved in the currency operations of Pietro CECCHI. (A fact that previous summary implied he should have known from KGB agent CECCHI.) From the record, however, it appears that the dealings of ZWANG were not directly with CECCHI, but rather through other Embassy employees, making it plausible that CECCHI was either unaware of the involvement of ZWANG or, as NOSENKO himself stated he suspected, CECCHI did not report all details of his currency operations to his KGB handler.

(b) John TAYLOR - NOSENKO identified TAYLOR as a State Department code clerk and target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was aware of the involvement of TAYLOR with his Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit TAYLOR before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might endanger the plans for a recruitment approach to James STORSBERG, who had been under development for almost a year and was considered more valuable.

The implication of the previous summary that the explanation given by NOSENKO was subject to question failed to take into account the fact that although STORSBERG was not approached until after the departure of TAYLOR, the operation against STORSBERG was underway before TAYLOR became involved with his maid. Further, it is apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in TAYLOR since he was approached at a later date outside the USSR on the basis of his previous affair with his maid in Moscow.

(c) Frank DAY - NOSENKO identified Frank DAY as a State Department code clerk who was the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO, nothing "interesting" was learned about DAY and no operational measures were taken against DAY. The previous summary noted that in July 1961, DAY traveled to the Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA employee, Agricultural Attache G. Stanley BROWN. It was also stated that the two were under surveillance by five persons at all times on the above trip, that they found a "repairman" in their hotel room when they unexpectedly returned, and that on another occasion an "attractive and available Soviet female" was believed to have been planted in their train compartment.

According to NOSENKO, surveillance and any other local coverage of any employee at the United States Embassy who travels in the USSR is the responsibility of the local KGB organization, not the SCD. It would appear that the local organization was trying to do a thorough job on DAY and BROWN, but it apparently was nonproductive. It does not seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should have recalled a trip which produced no results.

(d) Robert DWELLY - NOSENKO has related in considerable detail the efforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV to involve Robert DWELLY, a code clerk in Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in a homosexual compromise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion DWELLY was a homosexual.

There is no reason to doubt the statement of NOSENKO concerning KGB efforts to determine when and where DWELLY was going "into the city" (Moscow) so that a homosexual compromise situation could be arranged. There were no specific developments from their efforts, according to NOSENKO.

DWELLY has categorically denied being a homosexual; NOSENKO has not said he was, but only that the homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed DWELLY as a homosexual. There does not appear to be any reason to consider the statements of NOSENKO about DWELLY as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO.

(e) Joseph GAFFEY - NOSENKO has identified Joseph GAFFEY as a code clerk. The previous summary noted that NOSENKO had stated the KGB had tried to lure GAFFEY into downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA, an agent of DEMKIN in the American House.

By way of comment, the previous summary stated that GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 1961 and that Fred KADERA had reported that GAFFEY had told him he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the American

House. It was further noted that GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962 because of drunkenness and during interview had admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apartment and that she had claimed pregnancy.

As to whether the above information raises a question concerning NOSENKO, the following factors should be considered:

(1) NOSENKO has stated that during the latter part of December 1961 he was part time in the First Department and part time in the Seventh Department, and that he reported full time to the Seventh Department after New Years Day 1962.

(2) In addition to the information previously mentioned as furnished by GAFFEY during interview, GAFFEY also stated that he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December 1961 and was also intimate with her later on three occasions at her apartment. According to GAFFEY, IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about 1 May

1962, which is approximately four months after NOSENKO has stated he transferred to the Seventh Department.

The matter of review by NOSENKO of OTU reports from microphone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been mentioned in this summary. Pages 226 - 236 of the previous summary contained a detailed account of information from NOSENKO on the matter of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and damage estimates prepared by the Americans. The previous conclusion was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports. Comments have been made in this summary in regard to this previous conclusion.

A few remarks, it is believed, will assist in a fuller understanding of the microphone matter. In the material brought out by NOSENKO in 1964, there was a single sheet of paper containing on one side handwritten notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active microphones (those which were being monitored) in the United States Embassy. This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not be repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was characterized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated that NOSENKO has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.

During current interviews, the matter of the above list has been covered in considerably greater detail with NOSENKO than had been done before. His explanation, both of the circumstances which led to his acquiring the list as well as of his still having it in his possession at the time of his defection, is considered plausible, contrary to the judgment of the previous summary.

NOSENKO has stated that in 1960 - 1961 Vladimir I. PETROV, Chief of the Second Section, First Department, desired some "points" for use against targets of his section. NOSENKO uses the term "point" not as meaning just a microphone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors and translators to cover the microphone and translate the "take." The targets of PETROV were primarily Americans and, therefore, there was a transcription-translation problem.

According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points" were assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the United States Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Vladimir A. KLYPIN, held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section Vladislav KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, and NOSENKO, the purpose of which was to discuss the possibility of temporarily discontinuing certain Embassy "points" controlled by the First Section, and permitting PETROV to use these "points" against targets of his section.

According to NOSENKO, PETROV brought to the meeting a list of names of certain targets to which he wished to give technical coverage. During the meeting, KOVSHUK apparently took a piece of paper which PETROV had and wrote on it a list of active microphones in the United States Embassy and residences. When the meeting ended, NOSENKO had this paper and he took it back to his office.

Contained on the reverse side of the paper were the following names in Russian: LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN, and Sipe BURTIN. The name A. A. MIKHAYLOV was listed next to the name of LUBIN, and the name of Y. E. CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of SMITH. NOSENKO has explained that LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN, and Sipe BURTIN were among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOV and CHERNETSEV were officers of the Second Section.

NOSENKO stated he knew nothing more about the four non-Soviet names except that they were targets of PETROV. NOSENKO stated that he could not be positive of the date of the meeting other than that it occurred while KLYPIN was Chief of the First Department. (According to NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FEDOSEYEV as

Chief of the First Department in circa mid-1961.) Research in regard to the four non-Soviet names leaves no doubt that LUBIN is George LUBIN; and that Will BURTIN and Sipe BURTIN are correct names, with Sipe being the wife of Will BURTIN. All three are American citizens who were in the USSR circa June 1961. SMITH, at this time, has still not been identified.

In view of the above, it has been possible to deduce the date of the meeting called by KLYPIN as circa June 1961.

According to NOSENKO, the piece of paper described above was placed by NOSENKO with other notes he kept between the pages of a bound volume which NOSENKO calls a "working copy." This, according to NOSENKO, was an accountable, registered notebook issued to all officers in which they were supposed to write all their notes, destroying any other notes.

According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers, did not completely follow regulations and the tendency was to frequently put loose notes in the notebook so that the notebook often acted as a file rather than being used in the way required by regulations. NOSENKO has stated that when he left the First Section he took various notes with him to the Seventh Department; these included notes he had drafted concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSEYEV when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLYPIN, and notes he had prepared for lectures to the Seventh Directorate. According to NOSENKO, he did not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones; it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went to the Seventh Department.

In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKO, it should be noted that he also brought with him in 1964 his notes for the briefing of FEDOSEYEV and certain notes he obviously had also prepared while in the First Section; e.g., his notes for a lecture to the Seventh Directorate in regard to a "mass surveillance" on the American Embassy.

By including a section (pages 236 - 239) on the knowledge of NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on United States Embassy communications, the previous summary implies that there is some reason to question his information on this subject.

NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however, he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KGB responsible for communications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading some United States Embassy traffic. While it is open to question to what extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known to anyone in the First Section of the First Department, within the scope plausibly available to NOSENKO in his claimed position, there is no reason to question his statement.

In the previous summary (pages 240 - 248), the failures or successes of NOSENKO in identifying CIA officers are noted. With the exception of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO does not claim to have been the responsible case officer for any of the listed CIA officers. According to his claim, NOSENKO should have been aware that William N. MORELL was CIA, but he has never identified MORELL as CIA. Surely KOVSHUK knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was CIA is not known. It has already been established, however, that NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of all of the activities of KOVSHUK.

As regards some of the other listed individuals, a few remarks are appropriate.

(a) NOSENKO has never indicated any knowledge Paul GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely known to the FCD as a CIA employee before going to Moscow. It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was "American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not arrive in Moscow until November 1961, only a month before NOSENKO left the First Section for the Seventh Department.

(b) The previous summary stated that according to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect that Eugene MAHONEY was a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA officer. It was also stated that MAHONEY reported the presence of intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow from October 1960 to September 1961. The "intensive KGB surveillance" is based on statements of MAHONEY and may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern over surveillance rather than what was actually happening.

(c) Steve WASHENKO was correctly identified by NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA and identified by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CIA officer or cooptee.

(d) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according to NOSENKO, suspected of being a CIA officer.

George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate that the KGB had reasons to consider the activities of BOWDEN with suspicion.

It is not believed that the listed failures of NOSENKO to identify CIA officers are of particular significance in establishing that he was or was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. There are too many unknown factors which would need to be considered. Despite our assumptions as to what the KGB knows, it is possible that (a) the KGB did not know of the CIA affiliation of these people, (b) the information known to the KGB was not available at the First Section, First Department, level, or (c) information available to the Chief of the First Section or to a specific case officer was of no official concern to NOSENKO and was not made available to him. The last of these possibilities is suggested in spite of claims by NOSENKO that he had to have known whatever was known in the Section regarding CIA identifications; a propensity on the part of NOSENKO to exaggerate the area of his own knowledgeability has been seen elsewhere in this case.

Pages 252 - 258 of the previous summary contain a report of the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With regard to the Cuba trip, there is collateral evidence of his travel as described by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason to doubt his account of his activities on this trip. The statement was made in the previous summary that the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba in 1960 damaged his claim that he was supervising operations against Embassy code clerks at the time. To accept the validity of this judgment is to say that no supervisor in the SCD would be permitted to make a trip abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for which there is no supporting evidence.

As regards the trip of NOSENKO to Bulgaria in 1961, for which there is no collateral information, the previous summary concluded that his account of the trip was untrue and argued that such a trip to Bulgaria, if it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operation against STORSBERG was reaching a climax and his subordinates were "apparently planning to exploit KEYSERS' newly-discovered vulnerability," it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dispensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO did not travel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reasoning as to why his account of the purpose of the trip was untrue.

As to the STORSBERG case, while it cannot at present be proved that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria, it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from MORONE, that it had to have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria. Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow at the time this pitch was made, it would appear that NOSENKO was comparatively free to go to Bulgaria because this phase of the STORSBERG operation had been completed.

As to the KEYSERS case, there is no apparent problem since it is clear that the approach to KEYSERS took place after NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably did not become aware that KEYSERS was a homosexual, and therefore potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was made.

In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true, or that if they are true they necessarily reflect on his claim to having been supervisor of code clerk operations.

F. NOSENKO's CLAIMS, THAT IN 1962 HE WAS CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE

F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department thereafter.

NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the position of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position.

According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK, then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section. However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUK as a Deputy.

Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indicates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.

This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section, and July 1962 - January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having detailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January - July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarks in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of Wallace Everett JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst BRAUNS. Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO and information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial evidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. That there were KGB operations against JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and BRAUNS has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four individuals.

A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clarification.

In the Wallace Everett JOHNSON case, it was previously noted that JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary suggested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tendencies of JOHNSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary to the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during current interviews has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of JOHNSON "by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a room at the Metropol Hotel where JOHNSON stayed. They met JOHNSON there and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies.

In regard to the William Carroll JONES case, NOSENKO during current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation against JONES, including the woman Ludmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited as an agent to work against JONES and was used in another case. The other details furnished by NOSENKO concerning the JONES case are compatible with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department.

In regard to the Natalie BIENSTOCK case, NOSENKO did not claim to have been the responsible case officer but was able to provide enough specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when she was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the details concerning the BIENSTOCK case could be explained by his claim to have been Chief of Section and not the case officer directly involved with the case.

In regard to the Horst BRAUNS case, in the previous summary the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNS visited the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, according to the previous summary, was aware that BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives was information available to the KGB through his visa application.

In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from NOSENKO.* Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the responsibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were involved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher authority to another department or component, it was and remained the responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen could very well have made BRAUNS of interest to the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of the SCD. However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher authority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Department since BRAUNS was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The previous summary also indicated that BRAUNS listed on his visa application that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. BRAUNS had a

* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the Seventh Department. The situation was not the same as in 1959.

relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although BRAUNS, when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concerning his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose in visiting the USSR.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary reviews remarks by NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role in the case was not plausible. There are several specific points made in the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of the case. There is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV.

The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and information from the actual CIA record of the case. There are major differences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved, an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case.

NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the

KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary stated that NOSENKO did not know when the BELITSKIY operation started (Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or Geneva.

NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruitment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR. The latter was considered completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.

There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent discrepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO. On the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. There is a distinct possibility the KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium. As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in 1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.

The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the developments in his case prior to 1961:

(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to

George BLAKE. (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence.)

(b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, after he went to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961, BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore would not have told the KGB how he actually made contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962, but very well could have told the KGB he had seen a particular woman whom he had previously known, he was sure she worked for American Intelligence and it was through this woman American Intelligence became aware BELITSKIY was in Geneva.)

(c) BELITSKIY in 1962 in Geneva agreed to meet within the USSR an individual representing CIA. However, his agreement was only under certain stipulated conditions, the most interesting of which was that the individual must be unwitting of the true nature of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. In addition, any message to BELITSKIY or any individual who met BELITSKIY must make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITSKIY with CIA.

The above conditions are quite explainable if BELITSKIY had not been under KGB control between 1958 and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGB only a partial story of the 1961 events in London.

As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrepancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reflection against NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not know the true facts of the BELITSKIY case.

The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA." The previous summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY."

There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA," is a reasonably accurate description of what actually happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva. The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence while previously in Paris, France.

It was determined there was no collateral information which would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behalf of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "forcibly recruited by American Intelligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV. It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of American tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959. The summary noted this was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section, First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approximately 1957.

A closer examination of the cases described in the previous summary as "CIA American tourist agents," reveals there is no conflict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Department. As an example, one of the cases is the case of Edward McGOWAN. NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department.

Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with a CIA officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland, and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. Such an individual would under no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of the Seventh Department, particularly since apparently the individual was even traveling under a diplomatic passport. It is assumed the individual was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely unlikely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance in a case involving an American diplomat.

Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate information. During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964.

An example in support of the statement that the previous conclusion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the written notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964. The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews, an effort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explanation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed information concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960 - 1961.

Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as follows:

(a) Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 - 1963 responsible for supervision over these Sections and that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, who supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives. NOSENKO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also expanded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not excluding previous cases or cases which had already been given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included handwritten reports from the Chief or Acting Chief of each Section on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to agent and even including some human errors.

Many of the above cases had previously been transferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about their inclusion support his statement that he had expanded the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have some "pieces of information to give CIA."

(b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned of during the 1962 - 1963 period. Certain of the notes were made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before his defection.

(c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962 - 1963.

(d) Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1961.

(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report prepared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs, including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh

Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a formal document.

The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination of this material suggests that NOSENKO was using extreme care in collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a considerable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his departure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None of the material was registered and all could have previously been destroyed by NOSENKO.

The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to:

(a) The draft report for the briefing of the Collegium which has been mentioned previously.

(b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of submitting in handwriting as the others did.

(c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one. Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usual information as to number of copies typed.

G. NOSENKO HAS NO VALID CLAIM TO CERTAINTY THAT THE KGB RECRUITED NO AMERICAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL BETWEEN 1953 AND HIS DEFECTION IN 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the opinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD, who actually was a USIA employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy.

The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any way of the recruitment. This should in no way be interpreted as a suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area.

The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should be examined and can be cited as follows.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(a) During March 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKO was a case officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD. NOSENKO does not claim that he would have known the details concerning any recruitments (other than "ANDREY") in this period, but states if there had been he would have heard "something."

(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department, but continued to have contact with certain officers in the First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United States Embassy during this period he would have heard "something" even though he would probably have learned few details.

(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, and he has made the categorical statement that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United States Embassy personnel during this period of time. He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during 1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of the case or cases. There is merit to this contention by

NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Department since 1953, actually working in the First Section except for the periods of time that he was in the United States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First Department.

(d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain contact with certain officers of the First Section, First Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department.

According to NOSENKO his relationship with GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO some information in regard to any successful recruitments of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed out that he learned of the existence of the Herbert HOWARD case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually learned of the name when the First Section, First Department, needed the services of the Seventh Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room in a certain hotel for the Soviet girl friend of HOWARD.

In general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and Herbert HOWARD were the only successful KGB recruitments during 1953 - December 1963. It should be noted that there are no other identified KGB recruitments during this period of time which would specifically refute the opinion of NOSENKO. However, in view of the cited actual basis for the opinion of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being an honest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it is absolute proof that another recruitment could not have occurred. NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, but since NOSENKO was only in the First Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961 his opinion that he would have heard "something" about a recruitment in 1955 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 cannot be accepted as infallible.

V

V. ANNEX

ANNEX

The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex "B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex "A," Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B," Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition, there is an Annex "C" to this summary which is entitled, "The Cherepanov Papers."

Attachments:
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ANNEX B

SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT

Pages 399 - 435 of the previous summary contain summaries on the cases of 49 Americans who, according to information from NOSENKO, were of KGB interest, were approached by the KGB, or were actually recruited by the KGB. It was stated that these cases did not clearly relate to the specific KGB positions held at particular times by NOSENKO and thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The sourcing of these cases has been explored in detail during the current interviews with NOSENKO, and it is now possible to establish a certain relationship between these cases and certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB.

It is the conclusion of this summary that any group of 49 cases, as well as all other cases concerning which NOSENKO has furnished information, must be fully considered, not necessarily for the importance or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENKO claimed to have learned of the case and whether his statements concerning each identified case are supported by collateral information. These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of information from NOSENKO as well as being supporting evidence of his claimed positions in the KGB.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current interviews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO in approximately 40 of the 49 cases. Of even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has logically sourced his information in all except perhaps four cases. The indicated inability of NOSENKO to completely source all 49 of the cases is not considered significant, particularly since his having knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSENKO for not being able to source all of his information would be unreasonable since it makes no allowance for normal lapses of memory or failure to recall something which was insignificant at the time it occurred.

Without citing in detail any of the 49 cases, the ways in which NOSENKO learned of a number of the cases are considered important since there is a direct relationship to his claimed positions in the KGB during 1960 - January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961; Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, January - July 1962; and as Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, July 1962 - January 1964. Certain examples of the above are as follows:

(a) NOSENKO learned of a number of the Seventh Department cases which had occurred in 1960 - 1961, as well as several 1958 - 1959 cases from notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section in 1963. These notes were prepared at the request of NOSENKO who as a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, was responsible for supervision of these three sections; and the request was actually an expansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chief of the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO brought with him in 1964 the notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section and his knowledge of many of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly 1960 - 1961, was limited to information contained in the notes. From these notes, NOSENKO had prepared his report to BOBKOV eliminating those which were not applicable to the request.

(b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 - 1963 cases of the First Section, First Department, from Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department. This information was furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENKO learned of certain of the cases or was furnished additional details as a result of a request from the Seventh Department to the First Section, First Department, for assistance or vice versa.

Certain of the 49 cases listed were cases of the Seventh Department prior to 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 when NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. Certain of the cases were cases in which the First Section, First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or 1960 - 1961. The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these two groups of cases does not materially support his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to the Seventh Department prior to 1960 and in 1962 - 1963, and his claimed assignment to the First Department in 1960 - 1961.

It is difficult to specifically comment concerning these 49 cases since they do not fall into one or two specific categories. Instead, they constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of the detailed sections of the previous summary. Included are First Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approximately five and one-half years. It should be noted, however, that the explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of the 49 cases is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department during 1960 - January 1964.

ANNEX C - THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ANNEX C

THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

Pages 309 - 316 of the previous summary contain a description of the Cherepanov Papers, and how Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV passed a package of documents to an American tourist in Moscow in early November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, in late 1963.

The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored and must be given specific consideration. If CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception information," the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious question.

NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Department,

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

during 1960 - mid-1961 when he was forced into retirement from the KGB. During the above period of time, NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, although he does not claim to have had a direct supervisory responsibility over CHEREPANOV except in the absence of the Chief of Section, Vladislav KOVSHUK. NOSENKO also claims to have participated in the hunt for CHEREPANOV in December 1963.

Consideration has previously been given to the theory that the Cherepanov Papers were passed to Americans by the KGB through CHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. This theory seems to have little credibility since the papers contain no information which would even support the claim of NOSENKO that he was in the First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The papers also contain no information which would indicate there was even a Deputy Chief of the First Section during 1958 - 1960.

Statements by NOSENKO are emphatic that CHEREPANOV was not under KGB control, that he passed the papers which it later developed he had taken from the First Section prior to his retirement because he was disgruntled with his treatment by the KGB, and that the action by CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.

There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any of the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is nothing in either the form or substance of the papers which provides a basis for suspicion as to their authenticity. In addition, the form and substance of the papers are in keeping with the description by NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Section, First Department.

During current interviews, the CHEREPANOV case has been covered in detail with NOSENKO. The Cherepanov Papers, which were originally shown to NOSENKO in 1964 after his defection, have also been covered in detail on a separate item-by-item basis. Although NOSENKO does not claim to have specifically seen any particular item prior to 1964, his statements in regard to the various handwritings, types of notes, and draft memoranda leave no doubt that NOSENKO was very familiar with personnel in the First Section, First Department, and with First Department procedures.

Certain additional research has been conducted in regard to the papers and a detailed analysis will be prepared at a later date. It should be noted that a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary in making an assessment of the Cherepanov Papers since there are no exemplars with which to compare any of the material. However, based on information developed thus far, and there is no reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is not an adequate basis for an opinion that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive information," or that the papers were other than the collection of material by a disgruntled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulated, the removal of which would only have constituted a minimal risk to CHEREPANOV.

The entire Cherepanov Papers have been reviewed to determine if there is any information which could be considered "deceptive information" either by direct statement or implication. Two possible areas have been noted and given full considerati

(a) There is no specific info
were any recruitments by the KGB
sonnel in the United States Embas
nor is there any information sugge
American source or American age
during that period of time.

1253
Coded 08, should
be [redacted]
Protect

Joint OK

(b) Petr S. POPOV, a GRU
an extremely valuable CIA source from 1953 on, was, according to the papers, exposed to the KGB in January 1959 as a result of a letter mailing by George Payne WINTERS, Jr. WINTERS was a CIA employee under [Department of State cover] assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. The letter, which was to POPOV, was obtained by the KGB after mailing by WINTERS and was a direct result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS.

In regard to (a), the papers are only a rather minute part of the total papers prepared in the First Section during 1958 - 1960. The lack of any information in these papers which directly or indirectly indicates that the KGB made a recruitment of an American in the Embassy or had an American source in the Embassy during the 1958 - 1960 period is only a matter for consideration. It is not conclusive proof that a recruitment was not made or that an American source did not exist. The papers do not contain a positive statement on either matter.

In regard to (b), the quite specific information in the papers that Petr S. POPOV was uncovered by the KGB as a result of KGB surveillance on George Payne WINTERS, Jr., who mailed a letter to POPOV in January 1959, this information should be considered as possibly information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalled to Moscow from East Germany in November 1958 ostensibly for TDY. The circumstances under which he was recalled and collateral information have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November 1958 POPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had been cooperating with United States Intelligence.

It may be presumed that any lead to the KGB in regard to POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more specifically

CIA, had a source in the GRU would have come from an agent or source of the FCD, KGB, not the SCD. It can also be presumed that a source or agent of the FCD in a position to furnish a lead to a penetration of the GRU by Western Intelligence would be carefully protected even within the KGB. The possibility of course exists that a lead from George BLAKE, an FCD agent, resulted in the exposure of POPOV to the KGB, but it is not established that it did nor is there any reason to believe the FCD could not or did not have another agent or agents who furnished information to the KGB pertinent to development of the case against POPOV.

The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov Papers is whether, even if it is presumed the KGB obtained information from an FCD source or agent which led to suspicion of POPOV or identification of POPOV, this would be incompatible with information in the papers and could only lead to the conclusion that the papers contain "deceptive information."

The conclusion in regard to the above is that the fact the papers attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained information from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV.

If information was received from an important FCD agent such as George BLAKE or through another valuable FCD agent which led to KGB suspicion of POPOV prior to his return to Moscow in November 1958, it is highly unlikely such information would receive wide distribution within the KGB, either in the FCD or the SCD. It is also possible the limited group within the KGB who would be aware that the KGB had received information leading to suspicion of POPOV from a valuable agent would be very interested in attributing the exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPOV by WINTERS. The possibility should be considered that prior to the retrieval by the KGB of the letter to POPOV there was only a deep suspicion of POPOV but that the letter completely solidified the case against POPOV.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist and that it was done by the KGB with the hope of involving CIA in a KGB-controlled operation within the USSR. In that event, the papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likely be genuine since this would have been the initial step in what the KGB hoped would become a successful operation.

The above theory has been rejected since there are a number of factors which militate against it. These factors include the fact that the latest information in the papers was at least three years old, which would indicate CHEREPANOV had no current access and there was no indication CHEREPANOV was interested in a future contact.

INDEX

INDEX

ABIDIAN, John - IV, E, 5, 7-15, 19, 20, 52

"ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) - IV, G, 1-4

ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - III, A, 2

ARTEMOV, Vladimir Lvovich - IV, F, 6, 12, 13

BAKHVALOV, Mikhail - IV, E, 3, 4

BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich - IV, F, 2

BARRETT, Robert - III, F, 14, 15

BEGGS, Frank - IV, E, 36, 37

BELITSKIY, Boris - IV, F, 6-12

BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich - IV, B, 2, 3, 5-7

BIENSTOCK, Natalie - IV, F, 3, 4

BIRSE, Arthur - IV, D, 1, 2

BLAKE, George - IV, D, 9; IV, F, 9; V, C, 6, 7

BOBKOV, Filip Denisovich - IV, F, 15, 16; V, B, 3

BOHLEN, Ambassador - III, F, 10

[redacted]

BOWDEN, Lewis - IV, E, 53, 54

BRAUNS, Horst - IV, F, 3-6

BROWN, G. Stanley - IV, E, 43

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

BUGAYEVA, Ludmila - IV, F, 4

BURGI, Richard - IV, D, 1

BURTIN, Sipe - IV, E, 49, 50

BURTIN, Will - IV, E, 49, 50

CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E, 39, 40, 42

CHELNOKOV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich - IV, F, 2, 16

CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr N. - III, H, 4; V, C, 1-4, 6-8

CHERNETSEV, Y. E. - IV, E, 49

CHURANOV, Vladimir A. - III, B, 4

DAY, Frank - IV, E, 41, 43

DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, E, 20, 45

DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich - IV, B, 5, 6

DOUGLAS, William O. - IV, D, 3

DREW, George - IV, D, 1

DWELLY, Robert - IV, E, 41, 44, 45

FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. - V, A, 1

FEDOROVICH, Tatyana - IV, E, 8, 9

FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M. - IV, E, 49-51; IV, F, 1

FISK, Norman - IV, D, 5

FRIPPEL, Arsene - IV, D, 2

GAFFEY, Joseph - IV, E, 41, 45, 46

GARBLER, Paul - IV, E, 52

GARCIA, Anthony A. - IV, E, 39

GARLAND, John - III, F, 17; IV, E, 31, 33-36

GINSBURG, Michael - IV, D, 5, 6

GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich - III, B, 3, 4; III, E, 9-11; III, F, 5-13, 15-19; IV, B, 5, 6; IV, D, 9, 10; IV, E, 21, 23, 31-34; V, A, 1

GRIBANOV, Oleg M. - III, F, 3, 4; IV, 6; IV, 6; IV, E, 4, 5, 21; IV, F, 1, 2

"GRIGORIY" - III, F, 13; IV, D, 3, 6; IV, F, 4

GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - III, B, 4; IV, E, 20

GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. - III, B, 4; III, F, 8-13, 15; IV, E, 5, 12, 19-21, 26-28, 30, 43-45; IV, G, 3; V, B, 3, 4

GUK, Yuriy I. - III, B, 4

HAMILTON, Victor Norris - III, E, 9
(aka: HINDAL, Fouzi Mitri)

"HANNA" - IV, E, 27

HARRIS, Gisella - IV, D, 1, 7, 8

HORBALY, William - IV, E, 53

HOWARD, Herbert - III, E, 8; III, F, 20; IV, G, 1, 3, 4

IVANOVA, Svetlana - IV, E, 38, 39, 45, 46

JENNER, Paul - IV, E, 28-31, 35-36

JOHNSON, Robert Lee - III, E, 8; III, G, 5

JOHNSON, Wallace Everett - IV, F, 3, 4

JONES, William Carroll - IV, F, 3, 4

KADERA, Fred - IV, E, 45

KANTOR, Marvin - IV, D, 5, 6

KARLOV, fnu - IV, D, 5

KASHPEROV, Mikhail - III, H, 4

KEMMER, Myra - IV, E, 9

KEYSERS, James - IV, E, 22-26, 55, 56

KLYPIN, Vladimir Alekseyevich - IV, E, 5, 48-51

KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) - IV, B, 1-4, 7

KOLOSSOV, Viktor - IV, E, 30, 34
(Alias used by KOSOLAPOV)

KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V. - III, B, 4; III, F, 8, 16, 17; IV, E, 5, 19-21, 28-32, 34-39, 42-44

KOSYGINA, Madame - III, A, 1

KOVSHUK, Vladislav M. - III, B, 4; III, F, 5, 11, 12; IV, E, 3, 4, 6, 12, 18, 21, 23, 49, 52, 53; IV, F, 1, 2; IV, G, 3; V, C, 2

KOZLOV, Veniamin - IV, E, 12

KRUGLOV, Sergey Nikiforovich - IV, B, 5

LANE, Allen - IV, D, 1, 2

LANGELLE, Russell - III, F, 3; IV, E, 8

"LILLIAN" - IV, E, 26

LUBIN, George - IV, E, 49, 50

LUNT, Horace - III, F, 3

MAHONEY, Eugene - IV, E, 53

MALIA, Martin - IV, D, 2

MARK, David - III, C, 4

MATLAW, Ralph - IV, D, 5

MERTENS, Gerard - IV, D, 2

MIKHAYLOV, A. A. - IV, E, 49

MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen - III, E, 8; III, G, 5

MORELL, William N. - IV, E, 52

MORONE, Joseph - IV, E, 22, 27, 36, 37, 39, 40, 55

MULE, Walter (Capt.) - IV, C, 4

MC GOWAN, Edward - IV, F, 13

PECHTER, Bernard - IV, D, 5, 6

PENKOVSKIY, Oleg Vasilyevich - IV, E, 13

PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich - III, B, 4; IV, E, 48, 49

POPOV, Petr S. - IV, E, 7, 10; V, C/4-7

PREISFREUND, Johan - III, F, 5, 11, 12

PRESSMAN, Patrick - IV, D, 5, 7

"RAKETA" - IV, C, 5

RASTVOROV, Yuriy - IV, B, 5, 6

RHODES, Roy - III, F, 4

RUFE, John - IV, D, 5, 6

SCHWARZENBACH, Collette - III, F, 10

[redacted]

SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FNU - IV, E, 32, 33
(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)

[redacted]

SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry - III, F, 6

SHATTAUER, Sofia - IV, D, 5, 7

SHAZLY, Sarwat el - IV, E, 40

SHELEPIN, Aleksandr Nikolayevich - III, F, 13

"SHMELEV" - III, F, 13; IV, D, 3, 6; IV, F, 4

SHUBIN, John - IV, D, 11

SHULGINA, Nataliya - IV, F, 11, 12

SMITH, Dayle Wallis - III, F, 4, 20; IV, G, 1

SMITH, Edward Ellis - III, F, 4

SMITH, John Discoe - III, E, 9; IV, E, 49, 50

STALIN - IV, B, 5

STEVENS, Edmund - III, F, 4, 6

STORSBERG, James - III, F, 3, 5, 11-13; IV, E, 21-24, 26, 43, 55, 56

TARASKA, William - IV, D, 5, 6

TAYLOR, David - IV, D, 2

TAYLOR, John - IV, E, 42, 43

UMANETS, Ella - IV, E, 38

URBAN, (Colonel) - IV, E, 24, 25

VASSALL, William - III, E, 9; III, G, 5; IV, D, 9

WASHENKO, Steve - IV, E, 53

WILBY, William Stanley - IV, D, 2

WINTERS, George Payne, Jr. - IV, E, 53; V, C, 4-7

ZENKIN, FNU - IV, E, 32-34
(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)

ZUJUS, Matthew - IV, E, 26-28

ZWANG, Maurice - IV, E, 40-42

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Summary of Initial Missions

In the period from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense system was subjected to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven occurring within a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that 24 (COMINT) provides the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet system. This is important because it is clear from REGAL material that 24 considerable air defense business is conducted over landlines and thus not observed by COMINT. However, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from these initial flights and these are indicated as follows:

1. In spite of the fact that these missions came as a surprise, none of them went undetected. This is clear evidence that their radar coverage extends above (72,000) feet.

24

3/m

[redacted]

2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action. One positive action was the standdown of civil flights while the mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second action which is believed related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraft into East Germany and Poland on 7 July 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved into Hungary at about this time.

3. The performance of the Soviet system on the 5 July mission, 2014, was indeed curious. While the action evident from COMINT 24 is not clear an explanation which appears to fit the known facts is offered as follows: As a result of the previous missions, the Soviets had concluded the essential facts concerning the missions, i.e., that they were for reconnaissance, that they flew above 65,000 24 feet, and that a penetration as deep as Moscow was possible. They probably surmised that the 5 July mission was headed for Moscow when the track appeared on a northeasterly heading. The loss of the target when it entered Soviet territory was probably deliberate and the "red herring" track returning to the west was either a dodge or a convenience to avoid broadcasting a track for all the system to see that a "hostile or intruder" was coming over Moscow with no means available to stop it. This idea is supported by the use of a raid number assigned in the region just beyond the point where the track had been "lost". In addition, the track was not labeled "hostile or intruder" when it was broadcast after it had passed beyond Moscow. The reporting of the track when it did appear was only by Moscow and it has been suggested that other stations had been instructed not to broadcast the track. Further, it may or may not be a coincidence that the height broadcast was almost exactly half of the true altitude of the mission aircraft, but on the next missions, four days later, the altitude reporting was consistently above 50,000 feet. 99

4. By 9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recognition of the great height of the mission flights, tracking was better and in general the performance of the warning system was much improved.

5. The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air defense warning system closed a 3000 mile track with only two short periods of confusion or track loss. Altitude reporting was over 60,000 feet with one plot passed 68,800 which was only 100 feet off target. 99

6. The first eight missions proved that the air defense warning system is deployed in depth. This was evident from both the continuity of track and most forcefully from the ELINT data collected. Some 1461 intercepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 3000 mc/s band were obtained by project ELINT as follows: TOKEN-1331, WHIFF-37, GAGE-26, PATTY CAKE-37, Other 30. These numbers cannot be equated to individual radar sets since the same radar may be intercepted more than once. 618 TOKEN sites were located, including 213 new sites. Some 343 additional TOKEN signals were identified but available information does not permit determination of location so that it must be concluded that these signals include both known and new sites. Because of the limitation of ELINT to the 3000 mc/s band and the Soviet practice of collocating radars on different frequencies the total number of radars may be expected to be at least double the number of sites. 99

7. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related to the presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturation point has not been determined because of insufficient data. 99

8. The question of radars for height finding, the capabilities of TOKEN in this role, the introduction of ROCK CAKEs and later developments are discussed in another section. It is believed, however, that these missions were a catalyst in the introduction of ROCK CAKEs. 99

2/RJ

CLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded or declassified when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

TOP SECRET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
SOURCE C T Stoff
DOC. NO. TS 197124
DOC. DATE Feb 68
COPY NO. 02 cy #1 of cy #10
NUMBER OF PAGES 447
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS None

REGISTRY
CIA CONTROL NO. TS197124
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED S 31 May 78
LOGGED BY Susan Kessler

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE	OFFICE/DIV.	DATE

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED *(OUTSIDE CIA)*
TO		BY *(Signature)*		TO
BY *(Signature)*		WITNESSED BY *(Signature)*		BY *(Signature)*
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE

FORM 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
8-73

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

LE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector

CLUSIVE DATES: 1 Document - dated February 1968

STODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI

ROOM:

LETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE ECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3-14-78		Kenneth Klein	Kenneth Klein
-15-78		Kenneth Klein	Kenneth Klein
16 78		Kenneth Klein	Kenneth Klein
17-78		Kenneth Klein	Kenneth Klein
-20-78		Kenneth KLEIN	Kenneth Klein
20-78		Johanna Smith	Johanna Smith
21 APR 78		JOHANNA SMITH	Johanna Smith
4-22-78		G. Robert Blakey	G. ROBERT BLAKEY
27 Apr 78		Johanna Smith	Johanna Smith
May 78		Johanna Smith	Johanna Smith
2 MAY 78		SURELL BRADY	Surell Brady
16 May 78		MARGO E. JACKSON	Margo E. Jackson

22064

14-00000

Top Secret

The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector

OLC Cy #1 of cy #10

TS No. 197124

Top Secret

Copy № 10

TOP SECRET

1. Attached is copy number 10 of the February 1968 CIA study entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. Nosenko."

2. Please note that the CIA finds this study to be inaccurate in many important details and to contain the results of faulty judgements leading to unfounded conclusions.

3. We have deleted certain portions of this study containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

4. We request return of this study when it has served your purposes.

TOP SECRET

The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector

Yuriy I. NOSENKO

February 1968

0001267

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

Top Secret

CONTENTS

PAGE

Introduction 1

Summary of Case 3

I FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS 11

- NOSENKO's Statements About Himself 11
- Soviet Officials' Statements 20
- The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing 21
  - Positive Intelligence Information 21
  - Counterintelligence Information 22
    - Significant KGB Operations Not Directly Related to NOSENKO's Claimed Service 24
      - "The KGB Agent in Paris" (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON) 24
      - "SASHA" (Identity Unknown) 28
      - "The KGB Agent in the British Admiralty" (William VASSALL) 30
      - The KGB Audio Attack on the West German Embassy 31
      - "ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH) 33
      - Edward Ellis SMITH 37

II EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES 41

- Notes for the Reader 41

III PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY 45

- Birth to 1945 45
- Moscow Institute of International Relations (1945-ca. 1950) 48
- Naval RU Service (Ca. 1951-ca. 1953) 49
  - Summary and Conclusion 58

0001268

CONTENTS

PAGE

VI SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960) (Cont.)

Operational Activities (1955-1958) 113
  Entrapment of MALIA 06 114
  Recruitment of BURGI 06 115
  Attempted Recruitment of GEHRCKENS 06 121
  Contact with LANE and BIRSE 06,06 122
  Recruitment of SUNDAR 06 123
Travel to London (1957 and 1958) 124
Operational Activities (1958-1960) 127
  Recruitment of HARRIS 06 128
  Compromise of KRAFT 06 129
  Recruitment of DREW 06 130
  Recruitment of LUKIS 06 131
  Recruitment of WILBY 06 131
  Recruitment of TAYLOR 06 132
  Recruitment of MERTENS 06 133
  Compromise of BARRETT 06 134
  Compromise of WILLERFORD 06 136
  Recruitment of FRIPPEL 06 137
  Lee Harvey OSWALD 143
Summary 144
Knowledge of other Seventh Department American Tourist Operations 145
Seventh Department Counterintelligence Operations (1955-1960) 146
  NOSENKO's Information 146
  Information Furnished KGB by George BLAKE 148
  KGB Tourist Study 149
Summary and Conclusion 150

VII AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (January 1960-January 1962) 151

Deputy Chief of Section 151
  Transfer to Section 152
  Predecessor as Deputy Chief 153
  Responsibilities 154
  Deputy and Occasional Acting Chief 156
  General Supervisory Duties 159

16'8R

CONTENTS

PAGE

VII AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (January 1960-January 1962) (Cont.)

Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications 236
Knowledge of CIA Personnel within Embassy 240
  Suspected CIA Officers 241
  Unsuspected CIA Officers 244
Personal Handler of Agents 248
Temporary Assignments Abroad 251
  Planned Travel to U.S. 251
  Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960) 252
  Travel to Bulgaria (April-May 1961) 254
    Compromise of LUNT 06 256
Promotion and Transfer to Seventh Department (January 1962) 259
Summary and Conclusion 261

VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964) 263

Introductory Comment 263
Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (January 1962-July 1962) 265
  NOSENKO's Agents 265
  Operational Activities 268
    Entrapment of JOHNSON 06 268
    Entrapment of JONES 06 272
    Recruitment of BIENSTOCK 06 273
  Travel to Geneva (March-June 1962) 275
    Purpose of Trip 275
    Investigation of SHAKHOV 276
    Security Escort for Delegation 278
    Visits to KGB Legal Residency 279
    KGB Officers within Soviet Delegation 279
    Association with Other Soviets 280
    Supervising Case Officer for BELITSKIY 282
    Contact with CIA 286
  Operational Activities (continued) 288
    Attempted Recruitment of BRAUNS 06 288
  Summary and Conclusion 290

5/84

CONTENTS

PAGE

VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964) (Cont.)

Deputy Chief of Seventh Department (July 1962-January 1964) 291
  KGB Operations 292
    Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY 06 292
    Investigation of SLESINGER 06 293
    Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN 06 295
    GRU Agent SHUBIN 06 296
    Arrest of BARGHOORN 298
    Investigation of OSWALD 303
      Residence in USSR 303
      Request to Return to USSR 305
      Post-Assassination Review of KGB File 307
    The CHEREPANOV Papers 309
      Contents 314
      NOSENKO's Travel Document 315
  Return to Geneva (January-February 1964) 316
    Purpose of Trip 317
    Visits to KGB Legal Residency 318
    Availability for Meetings with CIA 318
    NOSENKO's Written Notes 319
    NOSENKO's Defection 320
    [redacted] [redacted]
  Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations 325
  Operational Activities (July 1962-January 1964) 326
KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists 326
  Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE 327
  KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations 327
  NOSENKO's Information 330
  Summary 331
Summary and Conclusion 331

Copy

41BR

CONTENTS

PAGE

IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE 335

- Relationship with General GRIBANOV 335
- Communist Party Status 338
- Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures 342
- Awards and Decorations 345
- Sourcing 349
- Ranks 350

X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT 355

XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES 357

[redacted] [redacted]

Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text 399

Index of Personalities 437

0001272

Introduction

The judgment of NOSENKO's bona fides entailed the distillation of the huge volume of counterintelligence information assembled in connection with his case, including the product of his lengthy interrogations, the analysis of KGB operations which he related, the results of file checks of thousands of individuals involved, comparison of his assertions against collateral information from all sources and with counterintelligence records on the KGB and related matters. The examination herein reduces this volume of material to manageable proportions, to essential elements of NOSENKO's claims, in order to permit comparison of his statements with matters of known fact and to permit application of reasonable judgment. Conclusions are drawn from the examination of each major period in his claimed biography. The final conclusions represent the aggregate of conclusions independently drawn from the examination of each major period in his claimed biography.

CONTENTS

PAGE

IV KGB ENTRY (ca. 1953) 61

Date of Entry 62
Role of General KOBULOV 64
Eligibility 67
Processing for Entry 68
Initial Service 70
Other Aspects Relevant to KGB Service 72
Summary and Conclusion 74

V AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (ca. 1953-June 1955) 75

Operations Against American Correspondents 75
  KGB Files 77
  NOSENKO's Agents 78
Operations Against U.S. Army Attache Personnel 81
  Custody of Case Files 83
  NOSENKO's Agents 84
  NOSENKO's Targets 87
    MICKELSON 06 87
    MEARNS 06 88
    RICHARDS 06 89
    FELCHLIN 06 90
    BENSON 06 93
    STROUD 06 93
    MULE 06 94
    BENSON, MULE and STROUD 06,06,06 Expulsion 95
    CARDELLA 06 97
    VAN LAETHEM 06 97
Additional Reporting 99
Summary and Conclusion 99

VI SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960) 101

Introductory Comment 101
NOSENKO's Agents 104
  Soviet Citizen Agents 104
  Homosexual Agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV 110
  Summary 112

10/3R

CONTENTS

PAGE

Introduction 1

Summary of Case 3

I FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS 11

- NOSENKO's Statements About Himself 11
- Soviet Officials' Statements 20
- The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing 21
  - Positive Intelligence Information 21
  - Counterintelligence Information 22
    - Significant KGB Operations Not Directly Related to NOSENKO's Claimed Service 24
      - "The KGB Agent in Paris" (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON) 24
      - "SASHA" (Identity Unknown) 28
      - "The KGB Agent in the British Admiralty" (William VASSALL) 30
      - The KGB Audio Attack on the West German Embassy 31
      - "ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH) 33
      - Edward Ellis SMITH 37

II EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES 41

- Notes for the Reader 41

III PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY 45

- Birth to 1945 45
- Moscow Institute of International Relations (1945-ca. 1950) 48
- Naval RU Service (Ca. 1951-ca. 1953) 49
  - Summary and Conclusion 58

0001268

Summary of Case

The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Disarmament Conference. A Soviet official approached an American diplomat with the suggestion that they get together for a talk the following day. The diplomat advised CIA of the appointment, explaining that he thought the approach so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection. He said he believed the Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation.

Later meeting with the American diplomat, the Soviet official identified himself as NOSENKO and stated he was a KGB counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that the American had previously served in Moscow and erroneously believed that he was the "American *Rezident*" in Geneva. NOSENKO stated that he needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva. He offered for this amount to sell two items of information to American Intelligence. These were the identity of a former American Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washington area, and the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually controlled by the KGB. In reply, the American explained that he was not an intelligence officer, but that he could place NOSENKO in contact with an appropriate U.S. official in Geneva later that same day.

That evening NOSENKO was met by a CIA officer and a three-hour meeting followed at a CIA safehouse in Geneva. Describing himself as a KGB major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA officer of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell

Top Secret



Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

0001274

Top Secret

TS No. 197124
Copy 10

the two items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he also expressed dissatisfaction with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva in June 1962. With the second meeting on 11 June, his earlier expressed reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations. His knowledgeability was almost exclusively limited to the KGB Second Chief Directorate (responsible for counterintelligence and security within the USSR). NOSENKO seemed to be what he claimed to be: a KGB officer in a sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations.

NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to do everything within certain limits to collect information on matters indicated to be of interest to CIA. The only restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be communicated to the American Embassy in Moscow. He promised to notify CIA via an accommodation address when he came to the West again.

NOSENKO again accompanied the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in January 1964. Since last meeting with CIA he had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and had become the Deputy Chief of the largest department in the Second Chief Directorate. At the first of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United States. He cited as reasons his continuing dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would have no further opportunities to travel to the West in the foreseeable future. Although he implied that he wanted to defect as soon as possible, he agreed to remain in place in Geneva while arrangements for his reception were being made in Washington. NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB operational activity which he had collected in the 18 months since his last meeting with CIA.

(Summary of Case)

On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively selected for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that he had received a cable from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate return to Moscow to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to the Soviet Union. That night exfiltration plans were implemented and NOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany where his debriefing was resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The decision was reached on 11 February to bring NOSENKO to the United States, and in the early evening of 12 February he and his CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft, thence to a safehouse in the Washington area.

At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO met on 14 February with representatives of their respective Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected on his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and rights as a citizen of the USSR.

CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 February, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of the FBI for questioning. At about the same time, there was a marked change in NOSENKO's comportment. While outwardly cooperative during most debriefing sessions, it became increasingly difficult to get him to respond to specific questioning. His free time in Washington and nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior, and disputes with his security escort. He explained his behavior by saying that he was under great tension as a result of his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the disgrace that he had brought to his family name, and on this basis CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vacation. On 12 March, NOSENKO left Washington with a CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week visit to Hawaii. There his behavior deteriorated still further. He drank heavily and almost constantly; he consorted with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude in public places; and he spent money extravagantly and conspicuously.

(Summary of Case)

During NOSENKO's absence from Washington, consultations were held with the FBI regarding steps to be taken to restrict his movements and activities. This Agency was concerned that his behavior would attract undesirable attention and publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were becoming known to a widening group in the U.S. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The FBI on 1 April indicated it would "not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement, and the Acting Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House were advised.

On 4 April NOSENKO was driven to a new safehouse in a Washington suburb, and told that this safehouse thenceforward would be his regular place of residence. Since that time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to news media.

Intensive interrogation of NOSENKO, including a polygraphic examination, was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to divulge earlier, and to clarify contradictions in what he had already reported. The polygraph examination results were inconclusive. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964.

Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO asserted that he was willing to answer, or to try to answer all questions put to him. Because more information pertinent to the question of his bona fides was needed, a new series of interrogations was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964.

After further consultations with the FBI, a round of hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. Between then and 5 March, NOSENKO was questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interrogators and interrogation teams, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous assertions. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had been basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States solely for the reasons he had originally given. These interrogations were suspended on 5 March 1965.

Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964 and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from January 1960 to January 1962. Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were the comparatively large amount of collateral information available against which NOSENKO's statements could be checked; the importance of the Embassy and its personnel as critical KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from the standpoint of American security; and the extent of NOSENKO's claimed knowledge of the activities of the Embassy Section, of which he claimed to have been Deputy Chief.

In keeping with a Soviet practice with which NOSENKO was familiar, CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-called "protocols", most of which concerned the period of his claimed service in the American Department. These were written by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to set forth NOSENKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific subjects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession", but rather as distilled and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom to indicate that he understood and agreed with its contents; he was allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any questions and make any changes that he wished. (Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were initialed by NOSENKO.) NOSENKO was asked, after reading each page and after completing the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there and whether there were any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to sign and date the statement, "I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct", at the end of the final page. With one exception, he did so calmly and without objections. In one or two instances he remarked that his statements were presented in such a manner as to make them

(Summary of Case)

look foolish, but he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presentation which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct. Anything I have signed is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing when I am signing any paper. This is an official document, and I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being absolutely correct."

Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 14 August 1965 with the participation of Petr DERYABIN, a former KGB officer. These interrogations, held in Russian, were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's KGB experience to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's claimed personal and professional background.

During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB operations. Questioning was in both Russian and English. Although the interrogations identified topics and time periods in NOSENKO's accounts which contained the greatest number of contradictions and discrepancies, neither the contradictions nor the discrepancies could be resolved.

Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has encountered among would-be defectors, the question of NOSENKO's mental stability was a matter considered early after his defection in Geneva. From his arrival in the United States in 1964 NOSENKO has been under psychiatric observation. A CIA psychiatrist and a CIA psychologist, both with extensive experience with Soviet Bloc defectors, monitored many of NOSENKO's interrogations. In May 1965 the psychologist for three weeks questioned NOSENKO on his life from birth until 1953, when NOSENKO claimed he joined the KGB, in an attempt to identify psychological factors which might underlie NOSENKO's contradictory and inconsistent accounts. The psychiatrist has continued his periodic observations of NOSENKO to the present time. The psychiatrist and the psychologist concluded independently, on the basis of their observations, that NOSENKO was mentally stable.

(Summary of Case)

NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966. The period since has been devoted to the examination and review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts and other materials, and in the preparation of the present paper.

CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS

Evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides is comprised of his own statements, the corroborating statements of Soviet officials, and the counterintelligence information he has provided.

NOSENKO's Statements About Himself

In his meetings in 1962 and 1964 with CIA abroad and in the course of the interrogations since, NOSENKO has made numerous statements about himself. More than any other, however, a statement written in July 1964 (after the initial hostile interrogation was concluded) is a thoughtful and well-expressed exposition of how he wished CIA to regard him. It is quoted here in its entirety.

> My life, my childhood and youth passed in very comfortable circumstances since the position of my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking for anything. And the only difficult periods of my life before the death of my father were at the naval schools attended in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad, and at the beginning of my working life, when I was in the Far East in 1950-1952. The opportunity to be always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the car given me by my family and also my father's car, the opportunity to travel to the South and to vacation in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth; all this unquestionably left its mark on me and became something of a habit. After the death of my father, my successful progress in my work gave me a higher salary, and although I did not have all that which I had while my father was alive, still I did not experience any serious difficulties. But already I wanted to live still better.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Up to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the family--it was always pounded into my head that Stalin was a great genius, that he was good, keen, etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question his words or his deeds because everything that he said, and everything he did, were completely axiomatic. The arrests and trials only involved traitors and it was considered and explained that the betrayor of the people was Yezhov, the head of the NKVD. Not even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of Stalin. Soon after Stalin's death in 1953 I read a certain document given me by my father. This was a secret letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 'case of the doctors;' it was not addressed to all communists but only to members and candidate members of the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this letter which described in detail how these people, important specialists in the field of medicine, were brought to such a condition that they condemned themselves; that is, they confessed to things which had never happened, to things which they had never done. They were simply forced to give the evidence which was needed by the investigators. The secret letters on the cult of Stalin and much that I heard in the KGB about the reign of Stalin, all this left its mark and forced me to think deeply about the real truth and to look at everything more critically. I no longer had faith in all those ideas which for years had been pressed into my head.

The new leaders (Khrushchev and Company) used the same methods but already diluted with the water of democracy, with playing up to the people and attempts to convince them that a new era would arise, a new and better life, and that now the Party was always going to concern itself with the welfare of the people. In fact, it was a struggle for power and the use of all means in this struggle, even microphones (they listened to the conversations of Beriya and his friends; later they listened to the conversations of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and others). Khrushchev's endless blabbing about successes, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures about how the USSR had passed the USA in the production of butter and milk, when in the stores they were available only infrequently. The endless promises of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is taking place. All this similarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the events which were taking place in the country, but already the entire ideology of the Party, its external and internal course.

The events in Novocherkassk where 20,000 to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this popular indignation was suppressed by troops with many casualties. This also made a deep impression on me. When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood well the real relation of the workers both to the leadership and to the Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat, what they have and what they can buy with their wages.

I heard a great deal from my father about the domestic policies of Khrushchev in regard to the development and the course of construction in industry, about his complete illiteracy in engineering technology and industrial economics, about incorrect decisions in regard to many industries, and this was not only the opinion of my father, but also of other important leaders in various fields of industry. But no one dared to open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain decision would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff from Khrushchev that he was profoundly shaken and in the opinion of my mother this brought him to his illness and death in August 1956.

The events in Germany and especially in Hungary showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of communist ideology. What was especially important for me was the fact that in these countries it was a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the entire people who could no longer endure a regime imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to emphasize that the life of the people in these countries was much better than that of the people in the USSR (I saw for myself how people live in Czechoslovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live better than the entire people of the Soviet Union).

The split of the international Communist movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed my opinion that the theory of Communism is a theory built on sand and that it is practiced according to the needs of the leadership of the Party at a given stage of life and that in reality full material welfare would never be enjoyed by the people but only by the leadership and the Party and the government.

Working in the KGB I came to understand much and became conscious of the contradiction between the internal and external course of the USSR. Such questions as disarmament, the ban of atomic weapons, the position of the USSR in the United Nations--all these are used only in the interest of propaganda and as a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by the communist party. (I was myself present at the negotiations in Geneva and saw the 'politics' of the Soviet delegation.)

My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people live, how much they earn, how they can dress and live on their wages, and I paid special attention to the life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists, engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of the West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and the 'unbelievably difficult life' was immediately dispelled. And what I met in my own work, how which Soviet citizens get sent where abroad--this finally debunked this propaganda. Many of my KGB acquaintances think back with great pleasure about life abroad.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

I entered the Komsomol completely without thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and I became a Komsomol member like all the others. It was different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party in 1956 after the death of Stalin and while I was working in the KGB and already at that time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father continually insisted on this, saying that without the Party I would never move ahead and would not have success in life. But I myself understood and saw that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the Party. And if I worked somewhere else, I would truly never move ahead in my career unless I entered the Party. But from the very beginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism and dogmatism. All the Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially when I became the Deputy Chief and then Chief of a section, and then Deputy Chief of a department, because then I had to speak at these meetings. Because this meant to lie, to twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedicated to the Party and its course.

In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became worse. The question of a change of climate was raised. At that time the Second Chief Directorate needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally talk Second Chief Directorate Chief General GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work references had been confirmed, all the questionnaires were already filled out, the photos had been submitted; that is, all the formalities had been accomplished. But at the very last moment the Central Personnel Office of the KGB began to protest against my going with my family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from the house check made at my place of residence they received information that I sometimes came home in a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was necessary because of the health of my daughter (since 1963 the illness has become better) and also it would have been advantageous from the financial point of view. From this time on I understood that Personnel would not let me go abroad with my family.

Knowing many officers in the First (Foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate, I began to understand that being sent abroad is entirely determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and success, but only by the absolute 'cleanliness' of the person's autobiography and complete assurance as to his limitless dedication to the Party and the government. But not only being sent abroad but the assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons indicated by me and also on good relations with the leadership and good connections with workers in Central Personnel.

I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life was not a hell. It is true that there were quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude towards my delays at work and also when I would be delayed with some of my friends and acquaintances after work and would come home with a few drinks under my belt. Of course, I loved and love my children and only the fact that they are taken care of financially until they grow up and have received an education to some extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial security? After the death of my father, the family received a large monetary allowance, plus the money that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc. My mother many times offered to divide all this in three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I suggested that we not do this before her death. And, of course, my mother will not leave my children without attention, and my share of the property and the money will be given to my children.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

If the defections of [former KGB officers] PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also great strength of will. And already I put to myself the question, will I be able to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me?

Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my departure I myself of my own desire entered into contact with you. The reason for this was the loss of money received by me for operational expenses. I would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of money before my departure and there was nobody to borrow from. To tell the truth about the loss of the money would have meant that it would be necessary to explain where and in what circumstances it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they might think that I had appropriated the money, that is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst of all and I would, of course, in such event have told the truth.

To tell the truth, it was only after my return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not immediately, began full to realize all the seriousness of my contact with you and its full meaning. And although I did not give you any promises or assurances about our continued contact in the future, I understood that you sooner or later would set yourself the task of continuing our contact. And here it was that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip abroad.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some sort of 'baggage', that is, with materials which could be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment to the position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in July 1962 gave me a greater opportunity than before. But at the same time this assignment almost excluded the possibility of a trip abroad and it was only with great difficulty that I was able to get away for the trip in January 1964. It was necessary to convince my superior CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince others. In this I advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the money (in foreign currency); that the medicine which I bought for my daughter had proven very successful and that I needed to buy some more medicine to carry out one more series of treatments; that this trip would not be a long one and that since I was already the Deputy Chief of the Department I would not be able to travel abroad any more and so, therefore, this trip would probably be my last. Of course, all this was said at convenient moments and outside of work. Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms with the KGB officer who covered Switzerland, besides which when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him a number of presents.

The publication in 1963 by the foreign press of the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the newspaper Times it said outright that the English learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the leadership of the First Chief Directorate, as I learned from my colleagues, came to the conclusion that here the Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the same time the First Chief Directorate was not completely sure of this. But the publication in the American press of Alsop's articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely. This article in one spot said plainly that as far as is known the KGB does not have any sources in the

CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB.

During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a pass from the Second Department and went, in order to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his appearance and I understood that everything which had been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater confidence in the correctness of the decision taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.

26 July 1964

Signed: Yu. NOSENKO

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.

[redacted]

The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing

Positive Intelligence Information

At his first meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO asserted that he was acquainted with Ministers of the Soviet Government, who were friends of his father, and he heard what was said in their circles. His debriefing and interrogations did not bear out his assertion that he was informed of the attitudes and aims of the Soviet leaders. His responses to questions about the viability of the then Soviet Government, for example, were couched in vague and general terms and did not reflect any specific knowledge. From his debriefing it emerged that NOSENKO had spent his entire adult life either as a student or as a state security official, and he stressed that since the early 1950's he had had few interests and "no real contacts" outside of the KGB itself. Questioned on a wide range of topics, including various aspects of nuclear weaponry, missiles, electronics, communications, unconventional weapons, military industry, military units and equipment, and research and development, NOSENKO repeatedly said that he had no knowledge of such matters and that his responses reflected only personal opinions. Because of his two assignments to Geneva with the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, questions were put to NOSENKO about Soviet underground testing, Soviet efforts in the fields of chemical and biological warfare, Soviet disarmament aims and Soviet views of the corresponding attitudes and intentions of the United States. Because his assignments to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation were for cover purposes only, NOSENKO disclaimed any special knowledge. He explained that he took no part in the substantive work of the Delegation nor did he have any connection in the USSR with officials or organizations concerned with arms control or disarmament policies.

NOSENKO's failure to provide any useful positive intelligence information was not unique, although previous KGB defectors did not have NOSENKO's claimed access, either on the basis of his family ties or on the basis of his KGB counterintelligence position within the Soviet Union. KGB officers who defected earlier to Western services provided no significant military, economic or scientific information on the USSR, and the political information provided by a few (usually relating to the personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the Communist Party) was of marginal value.

Counterintelligence Information

NOSENKO's knowledge of KGB foreign intelligence operations was limited, for his whole career had been spent in the Second Chief (Counterintelligence) Directorate concerned with KGB operations within the Soviet Union. His information on Second Chief Directorate operations, however, was apparently a counterintelligence windfall, because most of his KGB assignments involved operations against American targets, either visitors to the Soviet Union or members of the Embassy staff in Moscow. From this circumstance he represents himself as an authoritative source on KGB success and failure in recruiting Americans in the USSR during the years 1953-1963.

NOSENKO has described scores of KGB operations mounted against American Embassy personnel during that ten year period. Because of lasting relationships he established with KGB colleagues, NOSENKO kept abreast of KGB operations against the Embassy, even while serving elsewhere than in the Embassy Section. NOSENKO has stated that he would know if the facts were otherwise, and he has asserted unequivocally that no American stationed permanently at the Embassy was recruited between the early 1950's and his defection in 1964. NOSENKO named six members of the Embassy staff who rejected KGB recruitment overtures, and all have confirmed his assertions. He provided information on the vulnerability of a significant number of Embassy personnel; in particular, two Foreign Service Officers were consequently withdrawn from Moscow. Physical search has confirmed the information he provided regarding the KGB audio surveillance installations in the Embassy.

Among Americans other than Embassy personnel whom NOSENKO described as KGB targets, he provided information leading to the identification of 51 KGB agents, including seven correspondents in Moscow, the Moscow representative of the
29 American Express Company, the former code clerk "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33), and Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON,

VBR

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Mrs. JOHNSON, and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH. Twenty-five of this number acknowledged KGB recruitment before or after NOSENKO's information was received. In fifteen other instances NOSENKO's information has been corroborated in part by the individuals' admissions of contact with (if not recruitment by) the KGB, or by other sources' reports of their recruitment. Besides these 51, NOSENKO provided leads to four other American KGB agents, including an officer in an American military intelligence organization, none of whom has yet been identified. Lastly, NOSENKO identified 22 Americans whom the KGB knew or suspected to be American Intelligence agents.

From NOSENKO's information 68 non-American KGB agents have been identified. Although investigations are still incomplete, in 39 of these cases the individual's KGB recruitment has been reported by other sources, or the individuals were suspect for other reasons. Among these 68 individuals were a French and a Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, an Austrian and an Indonesian Army Attache, a Director and a Deputy Secretary of the Indian Foreign Ministry, and a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL, see below). In addition, NOSENKO provided leads on 22 other KGB foreign agents, yet to be identified. NOSENKO's information about the KGB electronic attack on the German Embassy in Moscow was confirmed by subsequent technical and physical search.

With respect to the KGB itself, NOSENKO named (if not completely identified) approximately 1,000 Soviet citizens who are or have been affiliated with Soviet intelligence and security organizations. These included over seven hundred active KGB staff officers, of whom 435 were serving in the Second Chief Directorate. Of the 165 KGB officers he named as belonging to the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate, over one hundred had been previously reported to be KGB personnel, as reflected in CIA files. NOSENKO's information permitted updating CIA holdings on previously received reports of the 1959 KGB reorganization, particularly as it affected the Second Chief Directorate. He described further refinement of responsibilities, the Second Chief Directorate's absorption of previously independent directorates, the creation of new units from elements

4/82

formerly belonging to other numbered directorates, and individual officers prominent in each. NOSENKO was not as productive with respect to KGB operational methods and Headquarters procedures, although he furnished numerous examples, particularly regarding operations mounted against Embassy personnel, which provided useful insight on these topics.

Significant KGB Operations Not Directly Related to NOSENKO's Claimed Service

All of the KGB operations which NOSENKO has described are favorable evidence of his *bona fides*, but they break down into two qualitatively different groups. Operations which NOSENKO related to specific KGB positions he held at particular times are described in the following section in connection with an examination of his KGB career. The remaining operations are those which NOSENKO said he learned of informally, or by accident, or even despite (not because of) the KGB position he held at the time. Since these are not material to his claimed positions at various times in the KGB, they are summarized in Annex B. (NOSENKO's leads to most non-American KGB agents belong in this latter group, but for reasons of brevity they are omitted from this paper.)

Among the items of information which NOSENKO provided but which do not relate to specific KGB positions he held at particular times, there are several which merit special note here. These, which are among the most significant of his revelations, are the leads to Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON, "the KGB agent in the British Admiralty" (William VASSALL), "SASHA" (the KGB agent in American Military Intelligence), "ANDREY" (Embassy military code clerk Dayle W. SMITH), Edward SMITH (CIA officer) and the KGB electronic attack on the West German Embassy in Moscow.

US

"The KGB Agent in Paris" (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON)

The first item of information given by NOSENKO upon meeting CIA in Geneva in 1964 was a lead to a KGB agent who was an American serviceman stationed at a sensitive U.S. military installation in the Paris area. The agent had been the source of documentary intelligence which had been

1/BR

shown to Premier Khrushchev personally. Although still active, the agent had lost access to classified documents some months earlier, in 1963. NOSENKO characterized the lead as the most important single counterintelligence item that he acquired during the year and a half he was a CIA collaborator at KGB Headquarters in Moscow.

NOSENKO's Information

Shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO first learned of a KGB agent's successful penetration of a classified documents vault at an "important American military installation" in the Paris area. Because the documents included information on strategic targets in France as well as in the Soviet Union, he assumed that it was a "strategic planning installation". The installation had its own airfield and that there were "procedures for bringing Top Secret documents in and for taking them out".

There had been six successful entries of the vault, four in 1962 and two in 1963. On each occasion Special Section technicians travelled TDY to Paris under diplomatic courier cover to assist the local KGB case officer in the technical details of the operation. Their function was to advise the case officer concerning the entry to the vault and later surreptitiously to unwrap and re-seal the documents. The case officer, on this basis, would give appropriate instructions to his agent, and the technicians probably never met the American.

Although this was a First Chief Directorate operation, officers of the Special Section of the Second Chief Directorate were used. The Special Section was comprised of technicians transferred from the KGB Operational-Technical Directorate, and usually it handled surreptitious entries to Western embassies in Moscow. Among these officers were S.A. IONOV, L.A. LEBEDEV, S.D. ILYIN, V.V. SINITSYN, V.Z. KARETNIKOV, M.I. PREOBRAZHENSKIY and Fedor FOFANOV. IONOV, LEBEDEV and ILYIN took part in this operation, and FOFANOV was later involved.

The specialists were not the ones that carried out the operation. It was carried out by the case officers of the Paris Legal Residency. The specialists just opened and then resealed the packages. LEBEDEV said that they also placed some radioactive substance, with the help of the American agent, in the lock of the vault door; when the substance was removed, they could pick the lock. They did the same thing [used some radioactive substance] to the safe in the vault. Before everything was finally ready, the Special Section technicians had to visit Paris several times. The first time was the beginning of 1962. The Paris Residency couldn't have launched the operation before 1962, because they couldn't do it without the help of Special Section technicians and the latter did not travel to Paris in 1960 or 1961.

Entry into the vault area was first achieved after the agent used some radioactive substance to determine the combination. The agent also photographed the lock for KGB study. Subsequent entries were always made between two and five o'clock in the morning. The agent removed documents from the vault and delivered them to his KGB case officer, who in turn passed them to Special Section technicians. The envelopes were then opened, photographs were made, the documents were repackaged, and the envelopes were given back to the case officer for return to the vault. Thereafter, the Paris Legal Residency pouched the films to Moscow, and the technicians themselves left Paris until the next opportunity for entry.

The KGB officers were able to complete the whole operation during the agent's night duty. During this time, they had to pick up the materials, drive some place ("maybe the Soviet Embassy") open the documents, photograph them, close them again just as they were, and return them to the agent. The KGB could not specify which documents the agent was to bring out; the fact that all the documents had to be opened shows that they were sealed when they were received from the agent.

Since he heard that almost all of the material obtained was of interest to the Ministry of Defense, NOSENKO concluded that it came from a military installation. The agent couldn't bring out a great deal of material, only what he could hide on his person. From what the KGB technicians said, NOSENKO thought the agent was not alone on duty. The technicians said that "the agent explained [to co-workers] that he is going out for coffee or a sandwich", and that "he is gone for only 5 or 10 minutes".

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

The last time the vault was entered was in the fall of 1963. At about that time the agent, a military man, received a promotion and was relieved of his night watch duties. (The agent was scheduled for rotation to the United States but, with his promotion, he had obtained an extension until May 1964.) Although the agent was still active in January 1964 and was still assigned to the same military post, he had lost access to the classified documents. The information obtained from the agent's vault was highly sensitive and so valuable to the KGB that the Paris Legal Rezident as well as several case officers there had been rewarded for their part in the operation.

Before leaving Moscow for Geneva in January 1964, NOSENKO had been told that the technician FOFANOV had been sent to Paris in the KGB hope that the agent would be able to re-enter the vault again before his transfer to the United States in May. When NOSENKO visited the Soviet Embassy in Paris on 19 January 1964 while en route to Geneva, FOFANOV was on duty at the entrance and NOSENKO chatted with him. FOFANOV said he "was not doing good" and he "would probably be sitting there until May", but he had hopes "that something might happen".

The American agent was getting paid by the KGB and he was recruited with the promise of a substantial sum of money. NOSENKO didn't know if he was recruited in Paris or if it was even a formal recruitment, nor what plans the KGB had for him after he left Paris.

NOSENKO learned of the case "in little pieces" at separate times from various members of the Second Chief Directorate Special Section who participated in it, principally LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV in Moscow, and FOFANOV later in Paris. [Under intensive questioning, NOSENKO has also alleged he learned of the case from IONOV, the Chief of the Special Section.] NOSENKO explained that he knew LEBEDEV and KARETNIKOV from their visit to his office to discuss technical installations at new tourist hotels, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Comment: NOSENKO's lead was identified as Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, who served in the period 1962-1963 at a military courier station at Orly Field, Paris. JOHNSON confessed to KGB recruitment of himself and his wife, his recruitment of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH, and the latter's subsequent collaboration with the KGB. Mrs. JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH have corroborated JOHNSON's statements.

NOSENKO is apparently unaware of JOHNSON's earlier (since 1952) involvement with the KGB in Berlin, the United States, and in Orleans, France. With respect to the 1962-1963 surreptitious entires of the courier station vault, however, JOHNSON's admissions coincide with the information provided by NOSENKO, with no significant differences.

"SASHA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown)

When NOSENKO announced in Geneva in 1964 that he was going to defect, he was told that as a consequence additional persons in CIA would be informed of his case and he was asked to search his recollection for any evidence of a KGB penetration of CIA. NOSENKO knew of none in CIA, but he recalled a KGB agent, an American known as "SASHA", who was a member of a U.S. military intelligence organization.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO learned of "SASHA" from M.A. SHALYAPIN, the KGB officer who, while assigned to the First Chief Directorate and working in Berlin, recruited the agent in 1955-1957. "SASHA" who had been recruited by financial inducements, had officer status; he wore civilian clothes to his meetings with his KGB handler and he could have been either a civilian or military intelligence officer. "SASHA" returned to the United States "in the 1960's" or "in 1962". "SASHA" was stationed in the United States at the time of the Cuban missile crisis but had been unable to provide the KGB any relevant intelligence of any significance. NOSENKO thought that "SASHA" served as a department chief in intelligence when he was re-assigned to Germany in November 1962 - early 1963.

NOSENKO met SHALYAPIN for the first time in September or October 1962 [after NOSENKO's first visit to Geneva and initial contact with CIA] through his friend, Yu. I. GUK. GUK had known SHALYAPIN when they had served together in the First Chief Directorate in Moscow. SHALYAPIN had served in the United States, Uruguay, Berlin, and Cuba. In 1962 he had been assigned to the Latin American Department of the First Chief Directorate, as a case officer. He retired from the KGB and through NOSENKO's intervention with Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV, SHALYAPIN obtained a position with Inturist. Presumably out of gratitude to NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN felt free to talk, and over drinks he expressed his bitterness at his treatment by the First Chief Directorate which, without him, would not have had the agent "SASHA" in Germany "at that time" [1963]. NOSENKO heard such details as he knew of "SASHA" in the course of several such talks with SHALYAPIN.

Under intensive questioning on the "SASHA" case NOSENKO retracted his statement that he had first heard of the case from SHALYAPIN, though maintaining that he was sure he had discussed the case with SHALYAPIN "at some time". Pressed to identify his first source, NOSENKO then cited several officers--some First Chief Directorate, some Second-who could have told him about it because they were likely to know of it though none of them was actually involved in the operation. Ultimately NOSENKO refused to commit himself on this point, saying he did not remember from whom he first learned of "SASHA".

Comment: "SASHA" has not been identified.

William VASSALL ("KGB Agent in the British Admiralty")

Asked in the June 1962 meetings with CIA if he was familiar with the case of George BLAKE, the former KGB agent in MI-6, NOSENKO replied that he knew of another, more important, KGB agent who was employed in the British Admiralty.

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB has now (in 1962) an agent in a high government position in London who provides most valuable information, some from NATO intelligence services' conferences. The agent was recruited in Moscow in 1956 or 1957 on the basis of a homosexual compromise. In Moscow he was "a First Secretary" or "chief of protocol" of the British Embassy. After leaving Moscow he became an assistant to the Minister, or "something like that" in the Admiralty. "He may be an assistant, chief of the secretariat, but he's close to the Minister. All papers for the Minister go through him. He's not an intelligence officer. He is meeting with the KGB now." Several KGB officers received the Order of Lenin for their part in the operation, including the London Rezident RODIN. NOSENKO learned of the agent's existence, but not of his identity, from his friend and colleague in the Second Chief Directorate, V.A. CHURANOV, who had made the recruitment while chief of a section in the British Department.

Comment: GOLITSYN had earlier provided a lead to a KGB agent who was the source of Admiralty documents which GOLITSYN had reviewed in KGB Headquarters. On the basis of that lead, British security authorities on 11 June 1962 passed to CIA a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. On 17 June CIA gave the British authorities a preliminary report on NOSENKO's information, on the basis of which the twenty-man list was reduced to VASSALL and one other suspect. Full

Comment: (Continued)
details of NOSENKO's information were passed to British authorities on 20 August, and on 12 September 1962 VASSALL was arrested. He promptly confessed.

VASSALL's confession confirmed what NOSENKO had reported. He had been recruited in Moscow in 1955, after a homosexual entrapment, by two KGB officers, one of whom he identified as CHURANOV. He continued to collaborate with the KGB after returning to London, first in his job in the Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division, as clerical officer assistant to the Civil Lord's private secretary, and finally, as an employee in the secretariat of the Naval staff. In London he was met by KGB officer "KOROVIN" who has been identified as London Rezident RODIN. VASSALL's last meeting with the KGB in London was on 17 August 1962. At the time of his arrest in September he had, in preparation for his next meeting on 30 October, fifteen rolls of film containing 140 photographs of classified Admiralty documents.

11

KGB Audio Attack on the West German Embassy

In 1962 and 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB microphones concealed in several Western embassies in Moscow. Aside from the American Embassy (see p. 225), he furnished the greatest detail on the microphones in the West German Embassy.

11

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB was able to enter surreptitiously every embassy in Moscow, with the exception of the American and British Embassies. It had been particularly successful with respect 11 to the West German Embassy. KGB microphones monitored the 11 West German Ambassador as he dictated his reports or held discussions with diplomatic colleagues, including American Ambassador Thompson. The microphones were operative during the period 1959 through 1961, and the KGB monitored then-Ambassador Kroll's dictation of cables, dispatches and

06

5/BR

conversations as well as passages of a book he was writing on the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO learned of the KGB microphones either from O.S. BUBNOV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's Third (Austria and Germany) Department, or Mikhail SKORIK, Chief of that Third Department's First Section. In 1960-1961 Tatyana GRISHNYAT brought from the Operational Technical Directorate to NOSENKO in the American Embassy Section daily monitoring reports from microphones in the American Embassy. On such occasions she had a much larger volume of material addressed to the Third Department, from which NOSENKO concluded that the KGB was even more successful in monitoring the West German Embassy than it was the American Embassy.

Comment: NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Independent of that information, however, West German authorities learned in 1963 that their technical security officer in Moscow had been recruited by the KGB. They surmised that the recruitment may have taken place as early as 1956. In August 1964 the leader of a technical search team was seriously disabled by mustard gas poisoning, presumably at the hands of the KGB. In 1965, finally, another search team completed a "tear down" of the West German Embassy, in the course of which two separate audio systems with 24 microphones were found, as well as 27 microphones in the residence of the Ambassador. In addition, evidence was found indicating that the Embassy had been the target of a sophisticated electronic attack against its cipher machines and its acoustic room.

NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB microphones were operative in 1959 and his sourcing of his information to the periodic visits of Tatyana GRISHNYAT to the American Section, are contradictory. NOSENKO claims he was not in the American Section until 1960.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

"ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)

When contacting CIA in 1962 NOSENKO offered to sell information about two KGB operations, one of which he knew only under the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY", a KGB agent recruited in Moscow in 1949 or 1950 who in 1962 was working in Washington "near ciphers".

NOSENKO's Information-1962

"ANDREY" was a U.S. Army sergeant who was spotted for the KGB by "QUEBEC" (Roy RHODES). [RHODES served in Moscow from April 1951 to July 1953. He dated his own recruitment by the KGB as January 1952.] RHODES was still in Moscow when "ANDREY" was recruited by the Second Chief Directorate, although RHODES was not aware of "ANDREY's" recruitment. The KGB approach to "ANDREY" was based on "women and money".

"ANDREY" worked satisfactorily in Moscow for the KGB, providing "materials" and information on ciphers. He promised that he would cooperate with the KGB in future assignments abroad, but would not work with them in the United States as he did not want to "sit in the electric chair". He was paid well for his cooperation in Moscow. The KGB wanted to pay him more but he refused; he said he could not plausibly explain the possession of too much money. When the KGB offered him diamonds and other gems for later sale, he did not take them, telling his case officers that possession could arouse the attention of the American police. In 1950 the agent left Moscow for the United States. The KGB waited for him to reappear in some other country, but he did not. Finally, in 1955, the KGB sent V.M. KOVSHUK, the then-Chief of the American Embassy Section of the Second Chief Directorate, and a participant in "ANDREY's" recruitment in Moscow, to the United States to find the agent. KOVSHUK travelled under the alias "KOMAROV", under the cover of either Second or Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

KOVSHUK, with the help of the KGB Legal Residency in Washington, learned where the agent was living, identified his automobile, and contacted him at the end of 1955 or the beginning of 1956. KOVSHUK had looked for him a long time. He found where "ANDREY" parked his car, but "ANDREY" lived in a place where there were many other people and it was difficult to get close to him. At first "ANDREY" was frightened and refused to work, but when at the third contact he was offered $1,000, the agent accepted the money from KOVSHUK because, due to his gambling, he was again in financial straits. From that point on he worked well with the KGB. He again provided good information, information considered important by the KGB. When KOVSHUK found him, "ANDREY" was working in the Pentagon and he was still working there in 1962.

In reference to his modus operandi for meetings with "ANDREY", KOVSHUK knew he was under surveillance by the FBI. His meetings always took place in cars. KOVSHUK would lose his surveillance the day before the meeting and travel outside of Washington where he would wait by the highway; "ANDREY" would drive by and stop, KOVSHUK would sit with him in the car, receive "ANDREY's" information, and given him the money. Then KOVSHUK would get out, and the American would drive on.

The KGB officer who compromised Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL [Reino HAYHANEN, who defected in Paris in May 1957] also provided the information leading to the arrest of Roy RHODES. When RHODES was under investigation, "ANDREY" was called as a witness because he had worked with RHODES in Moscow. "ANDREY" was the only such witness called, and he was called upon several times to tell how RHODES had behaved in Moscow. "ANDREY" could be identified as the only person who testified at the trial. During this investigation of RHODES, "ANDREY" stopped meeting KGB officers, because he was afraid he too would be exposed and arrested. "ANDREY" may have feared that RHODES was involved in his own recruitment, or he may merely have been panicky because he knew he could be accused of the same thing as

RHODES. Little by little, however, "ANDREY" resumed his meetings with the KGB, "having little other choice".

KOVSHUK turned "ANDREY" over to a member of the Washington Legal Residency and returned to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know who succeeded KOVSHUK as the handler, but KOVSHUK's successor eventually turned the case over to N.G. BAGRICHEV, who concluded his tour in Washington in 1961. NOSENKO did not know BAGRICHEV's successor, but asserted that there must have been one since "ANDREY" was still working with the KGB in 1962.

NOSENKO's Information-1964

While continuing to associate "ANDREY's" recruitment with RHODES' presence in Moscow, NOSENKO in different discussions of the case asserted that "ANDREY" was recruited in "1948-1949", "in 1952 or earlier", or "in 1953".

"ANDREY" had been recruited by KOVSHUK and N.M. BORODIN. After returning to the United States, "ANDREY" worked at the Pentagon, "in codes", but by the time KOVSHUK recontacted him in the United States he was nearing the end of his enlistment, and he was working in an Army recruiting office. He was still working in the recruiting office when BAGRICHEV took over the case from KOVSHUK.

It was not RHODES' trial at which "ANDREY" appeared, but he was among persons called during the pre-trial investigation. "ANDREY" was called just once, and he was scared to death. "ANDREY" did not testify at the RHODES trial.

In Moscow, "ANDREY" had explained to the KGB how the code machines in the Embassy worked and may have given the KGB parts of code machines such as "discs" [sic, meaning rotors]. Aleksandr SELEZNEV, a deputy department chief in the Communications Directorate of the KGB, had been involved in the "ANDREY" case: NOSENKO first saw him in 1953 during the period that "ANDREY" was working for the KGB in Moscow. SELEZNEV came to meetings in the American Department to discuss and plan KGB meetings with "ANDREY". The reason for SELEZNEV's presence was that the case officers were not technical specialists, and SELEZNEV would supply them with questions to be asked of "ANDREY". Since SELEZNEV came to these meetings in civilian clothes, whereas NOSENKO later saw him in uniform in his visits to the American Department, NOSENKO speculated that SELEZNEV may have attended some of the meetings with "ANDREY". Although NOSENKO did not know how the KGB exploited him, he repeatedly emphasized "ANDREY's" great importance to the KGB during the time he worked for them in Moscow. "Thanks to his help they were able to read your State Department codes. To date we have never been able to read your military codes..." "ANDREY" brought no military code material to the KGB, only State Department material. Mainly, he described the operation of code machines and what daily or other periodic settings were made.

"ANDREY" supplied valuable material from the time that the first recontact was made in the United States until he ceased meeting the KGB because of the RHODES trial. Again, after the trial, he was able to furnish good material. This was true both while KOVSHUK was handling him and while BAGRICHEV was the case officer. Between June 1962 and January 1964, while NOSENKO was in Moscow, he heard that "something is going wrong with this operation".

Comment: "ANDREY" was identified as former U.S. Army Sergeant Dayle W. SMITH, who served as a code machine mechanic while assigned to the office of the U.S. Military Attache in the Embassy in Moscow from April 1952 to April 1954.

NOSENKO's information has been confirmed as substantially correct by admissions of Roy RHODES and Dayle W. SMITH ("ANDREY"). RHODES informed the FBI in a 1963 interview that among other American enlisted personnel of the Embassy in Moscow, he reported on SMITH to the KGB. After denying involvement with the KGB in interviews with the FBI in 1964 and 1965, SMITH admitted that he had been approached by the KGB in Moscow in late 1953, that he had been offered a large sum of cash and gems in exchange for classified information concerning Embassy cipher systems, and that he had provided

Comment: (Continued)
the KGB with a mock code machine rotor. He further acknowledged that he had been recontacted by the KGB in the United States in 1957, where he met KGB officers regularly until September 1962. He identified by photograph all of the KGB officers described by NOSENKO as having taken part in the operation.

NOSENKO "cannot be certain" that he did not know about "ANDREY" while he served in the Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and when pressed to describe specifically the source of his information, he invariably indicated that he learned of the American agent later, informally from KGB colleagues.

Edward Ellis SMITH

NOSENKO's Information

In the context of a 1962 discussion of KGB operations against the American Embassy in Moscow, NOSENKO was asked whether he knew "about SMITH". He answered: "SMITH? The red-head. Listen, he headed the FBI, he was a colonel and headed counterintelligence." NOSENKO went on to describe the mounting of a blackmail operation, of which he was the case officer, against SMITH (whose KGB cryptonym was "RYZHIY", or "REDHEAD").

SMITH had been sleeping with his Russian housemaid, who was an agent planted on him by the KGB. When the KGB was unable to obtain actual incriminating photographs, she was instructed to take photographs of herself on SMITH's bed. These were then combined with photographs of SMITH to produce photomontages, copies of which were delivered to SMITH together with a letter inviting him to a meeting with the KGB. SMITH came. The KGB was represented at the meeting by GRIBANOV, NOSENKO and one other officer. At this initial meeting SMITH was not interrogated nor asked for classified information. SMITH agreed to come to further meetings.

When SMITH did not come to the next scheduled meeting with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO sought out the maid to find out what had happened. She reported that SMITH was in a state of desperate indecision; he had paced his room all night as if his mood was alternating between despair and defiance. To increase the pressure on him, the KGB sent him threatening letters on each of the succeeding three days. Finally, on the third day, instead of meeting the KGB, SMITH went to Ambassador BOHLEN and reported the blackmail attempt. SMITH was immediately withdrawn from Moscow and (as of 1962) he was "still in intelligence work".

In 1964 and afterwards NOSENKO denied that he had played any personal role in the case. He explained that as a junior officer in the American Embassy Section at the time, working on correspondents, he would not have taken part in so important an operation. He said that he had heard about the operation from V. M. KOVSHUK, SMITH's case officer. (On a later occasion NOSENKO said that his only personal role was being assigned to a phone-watch to receive surveillance reports connected with the initial KGB approach to SMITH.)

GOLITSYN's Information

In February 1962 GOLITSYN reported that in 1957 he had read a two-volume KGB study which gave examples of successful operations against the Embassy in Moscow. One case concerned an American, probably single, who was either the Security Officer or the counterintelligence representative in the Embassy. He had a dog, and lived in an apartment in the city or a country house outside Moscow. His Russian maid or cleaning woman was his mistress. The KGB concluded that the American would not succumb to ordinary blackmail and consequently the maid, a KGB agent, was instructed to confess to him that she had been recruited by the KGB against her will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB tasks. The American agreed to help her, and GOLITSYN believed that he did not report this to his Washington headquarters. GOLITSYN also recalled that the American first supplied only misinformation to the KGB, but when the KGB complained, he provided a mixture of truth and misinformation. GOLITSYN said the case study he read was based on a true incident which took place between 1953 and 1957, but he was not sure that the operation actually resulted in a successful recruitment, as was alleged in the study.

Comment: Edward Ellis SMITH (a redhead), Embassy Security Officer (and CIA employee) from July 1954 to June 1956, reported to the Ambassador on 5 June 1956 that he had received four letters from the KGB. The first, received on 2 June 1956, enclosed incriminating photographs of himself and his Russian maid and requested him to come to a personal meeting with KGB representatives outside the Embassy. When he did not do so, SMITH subsequently had received three threatening letters. In reporting the matter to the Ambassador, SMITH admitted having been intimate with his Russian maid. SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June 1956, and he left CIA employment a year later. When interviewed in March 1962 on the basis of the GOLITSYN information, SMITH admitted that he had maintained his affair with the Russian maid during most of the time of his Moscow assignment, 20 July 1954 to 8 June 1956, and confirmed that to help her he had in fact passed unclassified information through her to the KGB for many months.

NOSENKO clearly ascribed the SMITH operation to the period when NOSENKO was in the American Embassy Section, in 1953-1955. SMITH's statement that he reported the blackmail attempt to the Ambassador in June 1956 is confirmed. If NOSENKO was, as he says, transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955, he could not have played any role in the KGB approach to SMITH. If he played such a role, he was in the Embassy Section in 1956, not in the Seventh Department as he claims. If he played a role in the SMITH case as well as in the Seventh Department recruitment of BURGI (see p. 115), it remains 06 possible that he was neither an officer in the Embassy Section nor Seventh Department and was acting in some other KGB capacity.

CHAPTER II

EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

What NOSENKO has said about himself, the information about the KGB which he has provided, and the apparently corroborative statements which Soviet officials have made since his defection represent *prima facie* evidence that NOSENKO is a former senior KGB officer. To permit a conclusive judgment that he is a *bona fide* defector, the information NOSENKO provides about his life and related persons and events must be coherent, and his accounts of important events must be consistent. Allowing for personal vagaries such as lapses of memory and so forth, as well as for factors of accident and coincidence, the information he relates must conform within reasonable limits with that which is known from independent and reliable sources to the United States Government about Soviet realities and about the events, topics and individuals NOSENKO describes. Lastly, the information NOSENKO provides must plausibly relate primarily to the KGB positions he held, and his account of how he functioned in these positions must be substantiated by verisimilar detail.

The following portions of this paper, organized in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims.

Notes for the Reader

In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following:

The examination tests the validity of the presumptive evidence favoring NOSENKO in terms of coherence, consistency, and compatibility with fact and plausibility.

(EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES)

Notes for the Reader (Continued)

NOSENKO's claims are judged in the light of his own assertions and in comparison with collateral information. It is not the function of the examination to speculate about possibly credible alternative explanations for the paradoxes reflected in NOSENKO's statements, except when such explanations are advanced by NOSENKO himself.

If there is no immediate explanatory note pointing out the relevance or significance of some item in the text, the reader may expect that the item's relevance or significance usually will be developed in the immediately-following text. Otherwise seemingly minor points are included because of their aggregative significance: they will be a matter of comment in the Summary and Conclusions section following each major portion of the examination.

Direct questions and NOSENKO's replies about his contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, retractions, omissions and the like, are reflected in the text. Where, during his interrogations, it was not possible to pose direct questions without furnishing NOSENKO information or insight into the interrogators' purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively, if indirectly, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently was not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn't say", or "didn't comment" or "didn't indicate awareness" and so forth, the reader properly may assume that the matter was covered extensively.

In instances in which NOSENKO contradicts or retracts earlier assertions, no more weight is necessarily given to his final assertion as opposed to earlier contrary claims.

To assist the reader in following what are sometimes lengthy and complex accounts of events, NOSENKO's narrative is broken from time to time by a clearly identified editorial comment which seeks to draw the reader's attention to the relevance or significance of NOSENKO's assertions, or to what conclusion is drawn.

Notes for the Reader (Continued)

At the end of each episode in NOSENKO's biography there appears a conclusion resulting from the examination of NOSENKO's claims with respect to that period of his life. The judgment of whether NOSENKO is a bona fide defector is the sum of these independently drawn conclusions.

CHAPTER III

PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY

NOSENKO's biography from birth to entry into the KGB is relevant to his bona fides insofar as it is material to establishing his true identity, his general veracity, and his eventual eligibility for KGB service. Below are summarized pertinent events in his early life, his study at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and his RU service, as reconstructed from statements he volunteered as well as from the accounts obtained in repeated interrogations.

Birth to 1945 - NOSENKO's Account

NOSENKO was born on 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, in the Ukraine. At the time of his birth, his father, Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, was a shipyard mechanic and an evening student at the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute. Shortly after NOSENKO began kindergarten in Nikolayev, in September 1934, his father graduated from the Shipbuilding Institute and the family moved to Leningrad, where NOSENKO started the First Class of school in September 1935. From 1935 to 1937 NOSENKO lived in Leningrad where his father was director of a shipyard. In 1938 the elder NOSENKO became Deputy People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and the family moved to Moscow, where NOSENKO completed the Sixth Class in June 1941 just as the war broke out.

NOSENKO has given two versions of his whereabouts for the next two years. In one, he said that on the outbreak of hostilities he was enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev where he finished the Seventh Class; thereafter he transferred to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (which had been evacuated to

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

[redacted]

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

[redacted]

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Attendance at the Moscow Institute of International Relations (1945 - ca. 1950)

In all of his accounts, NOSENKO has stated that he entered the Institute's Faculty of International Law and English in September 1945. He completed his first year in spring 1946.

In 1947, on completion of his second year at the Institute, NOSENKO claims he received a commission as a junior lieutenant "in the reserves"; he does not recall in what arm he received a commission, other than being sure that it was not in the Navy.

Comment: Soviet students completing their second year of higher institutions are commissioned, but in an arm (Army, Navy, Air Force) of Soviet defense forces. At that time they receive their voyennyy bilet (military booklet) which reflects their assigned MOS and category (sostav). CIA interrogators were unable to resolve why NOSENKO pleaded ignorance on this matter, and concluded it may relate in some manner to his claims to subsequent commissioned service in the Navy.

In 1947, also, NOSENKO married the daughter of a Soviet Army Lieutenant General, Augustina K. TELEGINA "just after" her father had been arrested in connection with Stalin's campaign against Marshal Zhukov's associates. NOSENKO recalls neither the date of that marriage, in what season of the year it occurred, nor how long after her father's arrest. [The significance of this first marriage lies in NOSENKO's contradictory statements about when and how he obtained his divorce. See below.]

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.

[redacted]

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

[redacted]

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in

Korea. In spring 1952 NOSENKO suddenly fell ill. Returned to Moscow and given a medical examination, he was diagnosed to have "a small spot on a blood vessel under his collarbone" and he was confined to the Hertzen Sanitorium outside Moscow for two months. In summer 1952, again eligible for duty, NOSENKO was offered an assignment to the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but he rejected the opportunity because the curriculum was almost identical to that of the Institute from which he was graduated.

In summer 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Baltic city of Primorsk, "the former German city of Pillau". [Baltiysk, a larger city close by Primorsk, is the former German city of Pillau.] There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of "agent-observation posts", in which candidates from among Soviet seamen were formed into three-man teams and trained as stay-behind agents in the event of war. In early 1953, after less than six months in the Baltic assignment, NOSENKO returned on leave to Moscow where he met at his father's dacha KGB General KOBULOV, First Deputy to then-MGB [KGB] Chairman Beria. KOBULOV, on finding that NOSENKO did not care for his RU assignment, invited him to consider joining the KGB.

NOSENKO's Information-1964

Prior to NOSENKO's graduation he had been tentatively assigned by the Institute's military commission to the RU, and on the instructions of the Institute's "secret unit", he was interviewed by a RU Colonel KALOSHIN at the RU Personnel Department. After passing the state examination on the second try, NOSENKO entered the Navy in September 1950, when he received orders calling him to active duty as a junior lieutenant. He also received orders assigning him to the Intelligence Staff of the Seventh (Far East) Fleet. He left Moscow approximately 1 October 1950, travelling for ten days by train to his unit, which was stationed near Sovetskaya Gavan'. He was there assigned to a Reports Section with duties which included translating American naval publications and making summaries of Order of Battle information of American naval forces in the Far East. A radio signals intercept unit was connected with NOSENKO's unit, but [contrary to what he asserted in 1962 and 1965] he was not personally concerned with that unit's activities.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

In spring 1951 NOSENKO was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. At the end of 1951 NOSENKO was assigned as an "apprentice" in the Agent-Intelligence Section near Sovetskaya Gavan', an assignment which involved subchaser delivery and pickup of agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin.

In early 1952 NOSENKO filed by mail for divorce from TELEGINA in a Moscow court. In April 1952 he returned to Moscow on leave, where he visited the Naval RU Headquarters personnel officer, Col. KALOSHIN, and requested a transfer from the Far East. During May and June 1952 he was on leave accrued during his two years' service in the Far East. Following his leave, in summer 1952, NOSENKO was ordered to proceed to Rostock but he refused and took unauthorized leave. (He could not learn what his actual assignment was to be in Rostock, and he heard that the Naval Intelligence Points in Germany were being closed down.) He subsequently was assigned to the Baltic city of Baltiysk, where he reported for duty with the Intelligence Staff of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. He was assigned to a Naval Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk (sic, see p. 57), a small town "in Primorskiy Kray" near Baltiysk.

Comment: Primorskiy Kray is in the Far East, as NOSENKO's interrogators pointed out to him at the time. NOSENKO subsequently claimed it was his earlier post, Sovetskaya Gavan', which was in Primorskiy Kray, a fact known to him from the way his letters were addressed. This is also an error. See below.

In Sovetsk NOSENKO prepared training materials for agents.

Comment: NOSENKO also said that after refusing to go to Rostock he himself had received training in Moscow and then was sent to Rostock and Sassnitz,

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued) in East Germany, before going to Baltiysk. In retracting that claim, he explained that he knew his CIA interrogators would not believe that he had successfully refused the assignment in Germany.

In August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to Moscow for 7 to 10 days to complete the divorce proceedings which he had initiated in the Far East. This was not regarded as leave, but official business. He afterwards returned to Sovetsk, but he did not like his work there, and in late 1952 he requested leave to return to Moscow to seek a transfer. When his unit commander refused him leave, NOSENKO appealed to Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk, and because of the elder NOSENKO's influence, was able to return to Moscow for a month's leave in January 1953. At the end of January NOSENKO visited the RU Personnel Officer, KALOSHIN, and stated his distaste for his work. KALOSHIN told him to "look around", and NOSENKO spent February 1953 "at the disposal of the Personnel Department", not doing anything. Since he wasn't working, he didn't receive his pay, and he lived with his parents.

Comment: Just before giving this account of his January 1953 leave, NOSENKO claimed that he spent January and a part of February at the Kubinka Sanitorium. He has never reconciled these two statements.

NOSENKO's Information-1965

Prior to his graduation from the Institute, a military commission tentatively assigned NOSENKO to the Navy, after which he visited a special section at the Naval Ministry to file special forms for a security check. Although nothing was said at the time, NOSENKO believed then that he was slated to join Naval Intelligence. After passing all of his examinations, in the fall of 1950 NOSENKO received orders calling him to active duty. Offered a choice of assignments, NOSENKO chose the Far East "to prove that he was now ready to make a man of himself". Arriving in Sovetskaya Gavan' in Primorskiy Kray (sic), NOSENKO was assigned to a Reports Section.

Comment: Questioned in 1965 on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan', NOSENKO insisted that it was located in Primorskiy Kray. Shown contemporary Soviet maps clearly locating it in Khabarovskiy Kray, NOSENKO angrily asserted that the map had been falsified by his interrogators to confuse him. NOSENKO's contention is somewhat analogous to being stationed in Oregon for an extended period and thinking oneself to be in California.

In Sovetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO liked the work and did a good job despite rigorous working and living conditions, and during his service there he was commended as an outstanding officer. NOSENKO and his officer colleagues analyzed the product of some 300 radio intercept operators as well as information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok.

In spring, 1951, after about seven months' service, NOSENKO was promoted to lieutenant, the normally required time in grade of one year having been reduced to six months for Far East service.

In early 1952 NOSENKO published in a local newspaper his intent to divorce his wife, and he forwarded the necessary legal papers to Moscow.

NOSENKO's two-year tour would not end until October or November 1952, nor was he entitled to any leave before that time. An understanding superior, however, arranged for him to take leave in April 1952 so that he could return to Moscow in time for his father's birthday on 1 May. On 2 May he reported to the Naval Ministry and was told to return for reassignment at the end of his leave. NOSENKO was on leave in May and June 1952, and he remained "at the disposal of the Naval Ministry". [According to his 1962 and 1966 versions, he was hospitalized during this period.]

In the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to the RU Military-Diplomatic Academy, to a special Naval espionage school, and to a post in Germany, but he turned them all down. He rejected the opportunity to attend the academy, because he had had almost all of the courses earlier at the Institute of International Relations.

"Sometime after his return to Moscow from Sovetskaya Gavan'," NOSENKO completed the formalities to secure his divorce from TELEGINA. [According to his 1964 account, NOSENKO visited Moscow later, from his Baltic assignment, to complete divorce proceedings.]

In August 1952 NOSENKO received an assignment to Sovetsk, in the Baltic, where he arrived in early September 1952. His assignment there was as a political officer, in which capacity he was involved with sailors being trained for wartime sabotage missions. His main task was to prepare the training plan for the agents, to instruct them in such subjects as "The Foreign Policy of the USSR", and generally to see to their needs. NOSENKO did not care for his assignment in Sovetsk and in December 1952 he obtained leave to spend the holidays with his parents in Moscow. In January 1953 NOSENKO and his parents visited KGB General KOBULOV at the latter's dacha and KOBULOV, learning of NOSENKO's dissatisfaction with the RU, suggested he consider working for the KGB.

After New Years in 1953 NOSENKO went "to rest for several days" at the Hertzen "House of Rest", located 65-70 kilometers from Moscow near Kubinka. There he met his second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA. [In 1964 and 1966 statements NOSENKO claimed he was not "resting" but was hospitalized with tuberculosis for several weeks in January and February.]

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO's Information-1966 (April)

At an interview with the military placement commission at the Institute before graduation, NOSENKO indicated that he wanted to work in "some sort of a military organization". Soon thereafter the chief of the Institute's special section gave him a telephone number to call. NOSENKO recognized the number as one belonging to the MGB [the predecessor of, and hereafter referred to as, the KGB]. NOSENKO was invited to an interview with KGB officials who queried him about his background and his knowledge of English. Later, however, the chief of the Institute's special section informed NOSENKO that his qualifications were unsuitable for assignment to the KGB. During the summer of 1950 "while state examinations were underway" [in earlier versions NOSENKO claimed the examinations were over in June], NOSENKO began to process for entry into the Naval RU, through Colonel KALOSHIN, the Chief of the RU Personnel Department. He filled out questionnaires in duplicate, wrote two autobiographies and, in August or September, submitted copies of his diploma. [Note that this version of events omits any reference to delayed graduation caused by his having to take a state examination a second time.] For the next nine months, until March 1951, NOSENKO awaited being called to RU service. [In earlier versions, NOSENKO claims he entered the RU in 1949 or 1950.]

On 12 March 1951 NOSENKO received two orders from the Naval Ministry, one calling him to active Naval service and the other assigning him as a translator to the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet in the Far East. On 13 March, on KALOSHIN's instruction, NOSENKO reported to the Moscow City Military Commission and was issued his travel documents, and NOSENKO departed Moscow for his post on 16 or 17 March. At the end of March NOSENKO arrived at his post near Sovetskaya Gavan' and began work in the Reports Section of the Seventh Fleet Intelligence Unit.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

At the end of April 1952 NOSENKO left Sovetskaya Gavan' on leave, arriving in Moscow on 28 April. [Note earlier versions in which he was transferred because of illness, and that he was permitted to return to Moscow because of his father's birthday.] While on leave he became ill with tuberculosis and spent almost two months in May and June 1952 in a sanitorium near Moscow.

During the month of July 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Naval Intelligence Point of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet in Sovetsk, in Kaliningradskaya Oblast (at the head of the Bay of Gdansk). Sovetsk was a small village located on the spit of land between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk. [The only Sovetsk in Kaliningradskaya Oblast is located many miles inland from Kaliningrad, in the opposite direction from Baltiysk. When NOSENKO was shown their locations on contemporary Soviet maps, he insisted that he was correct, although Primorsk, where NOSENKO had said in 1962 that he was assigned while in the Baltic, is located on a spit of land between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk.] NOSENKO remained in "Sovetsk" but a short time, and he returned to Moscow at the end of 1952 to seek another assignment. Before his departure he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service. [In previous versions he claimed to have become eligible for promotion and was promoted while in the Far East, after less then a year's service.]

On 1 January 1953 NOSENKO and his parents were guests at the KOBULOV dacha. NOSENKO indicated his dissatisfaction with his RU assignment and KOBULOV promised to find him a place in the KGB.

From the middle of January to the middle of March 1953 NOSENKO was under treatment at the sanitorium near Moscow where he had been hospitalized in 1952, and there he became acquainted with his second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA. [NOSENKO's earlier accounts either omitted reference to this period of hospitalization, or indicated that it was of considerably shorter duration.]

NOSENKO's Information-1966 (October)

In his most recent account, in October 1966, NOSENKO said that before graduation from the Institute the military placement commission sent him to the KGB, but there he was told that he was not qualified as a candidate because of mediocre academic record and drinking habits. NOSENKO said he did not mention this rejection earlier, because his interrogators would not have believed that he ever became a KGB officer after once being rejected.

NOSENKO also volunteered that he had "lied" when he claimed to have entered the Naval RU in 1950. In fact, he said, he entered the RU in March 1951 and was on active duty in the Far East from 1951 until 1953.

Comment: This latest assertion discredits almost all of his earlier claims regarding entry into the RU, including the date of his graduation from the Institute, the timing if not the fact of his promotion, the number, sequence, and purposes of his visits to Moscow, his hospitalization with tuberculosis, and his assignment to the Baltic Fleet.

Naval RU Service: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO's contradictory statements, which are still unresolved after interrogations over a three-year period, he graduated from the Institute of International Relations in either 1949 or 1950. Before graduation, he (a) was selected for Naval assignment, (b) sought a Naval assignment, or (c) was selected for and rejected by the KGB and then he sought an assignment to the RU; or, immediately following graduation, or three months or nine months later (in the following year), he was called to

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

active Naval service and assigned to the RU. With neither training nor indoctrination he was assigned initially to the Far East for nine months or three years; there he participated in agents' operational training, or reports work. In the latter capacity he was or was not involved in RU radio signals intercept operations. He either never served in the Baltic or, if he did, it was for three months or six months, during which he either participated in agent training or was an administrative or political officer. He was promoted to lieutenant in the Far East or in the Baltic, after either seven months' or thirteen months' RU service.

Despite his claimed active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knows nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrine, organization, or procedures. He disclaims knowledge of RU organization other than at the posts where he served, "because of his junior rank". However, even at those posts he describes neither the staff, the functions nor the personnel intelligibly nor does he describe the posts' actual locations.

The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the personnel chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East intelligence staffs. Some thirty GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits to Geneva.

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities at the places and times he claimed.

CHAPTER IV

KGB ENTRY

Comment: Stalin died in March 1953, an event which was accompanied by extraordinary repercussions. The Ministries of Internal Affairs (MVD) and State Security (MGB) merged under the MVD, of which Beriya became Minister. There followed a period of widespread reorganization entailing the transfer or dismissal of many personnel. Beriya's arrest just four months later in June 1953 was followed by another extensive (if bloodless) purge and reorganization, which culminated in the creation of the Committee for State Security (KGB) in March 1954. Vladimir and Evdokia PETROV, Yuri RASTVOROV, and Petr DERYABIN, among others, defected in the wake of these events. From information they provided, as well as from that acquired from other sources, CIA has a substantial amount of information against which NOSENKO's accounts of this period may be weighed.

For the convenience of the reader, the term "KGB" is used hereafter to refer as well to its predecessor organizations in 1953-1954.

In statements volunteered in his early meetings with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO mentioned that he had joined the MVD/KGB in 1953. In a biographic statement written immediately after his defection, however, he asserted his KGB service began in 1952, a date he insisted was correct even after reminded he had earlier said 1953. Repeated interrogations produced a variety of dates of claimed KGB entry, ranging from "the beginning of 1952" to April 1953, all of which were accompanied by modified accounts of the circumstances of his entry (as well as of his earlier period of service in the Naval RU and of his date of graduation from the Institute of International Relations). To the extent to which he has been consistent at all, he has cited March 1953 as the time of his entry to the KGB.

Date of Entry

NOSENKO at his first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962, volunteered how and when he joined the KGB. NOSENKO had just returned from his Naval RU assignment in the Baltic, he said, when he met KGB General KOBULOV and KOBULOV urged him to join the KGB. NOSENKO stated that after completing his processing, he reported for duty in the Embassy Section of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in March 1953, "just after Stalin died". (Stalin died on 5 March 1953.)

Comment: According to KGB defectors, the precise date of entry to the KGB would not likely to be forgotten by a KGB officer. The date is the basis for computing length of service and is a common entry on KGB administrative forms periodically filled out by KGB officers in the course of their service.

According to NOSENKO in January 1964, he transferred to the KGB from the Naval RU "in something like 1952", "just after Yu. I. GUK transferred from the Second Chief Directorate".

Comment: GOLITSYN had reported that GUK was transferred out of the Second Chief Directorate in January 1952.

(KGB ENTRY)

In February 1964 NOSENKO wrote a biographic statement in which he noted that he entered the KGB in 1952, and in which he back-dated by one year his 1962 account of his activities in the period 1945-1955. Although he was then reminded of his 1962 statement and the contradiction was discussed with him, after study he indicated his approval by signing an official biographic statement (for the Intelligence Community) which indicated that he entered on duty with the KGB in about May 1952.

At the first hostile interrogation in April 1964, NOSENKO was confronted with his contradictory claims. In response, NOSENKO stated that he returned to Moscow from the Baltic in August 1952 [by most of his other accounts, NOSENKO returned in January 1953] and entered the KGB on 5-7 September 1952. By March 1953, NOSENKO stated, he had already worked in the Embassy Section for some months against American correspondents, and it was "just after Stalin's death, after the reorganization" that he assumed responsibility for operations against American Army Attache personnel. [NOSENKO ultimately settled on June or July 1954 as the time of this reassignment. See p. 84.]

Challenged in April 1964 to resolve the contradictions of his earlier claims that he joined the KGB variously in January 1952, September 1952, or March 1953, NOSENKO asserted that the truth was that his service dated from March 1953, after Stalin's death. He went on to explain that he finished his Institute studies in 1949 (sic), "defended his diploma" and then failed one of the four required State examinations. All four examinations, he said, he had to take over again, and as a result he didn't receive his diploma until 1950 although he "officially" graduated in 1949. NOSENKO said that to avoid admitting "this unpleasant thing", he claimed he joined the KGB in 1952 and after claiming that to be a fact, "did not want to correct it, to twist it around again". NOSENKO went on to say that the actual date of entry was while Stalin was still alive, on "12 or 15 March 1953" or about 15 March 1953.

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: NOSENKO's explanation takes no account of the fact that he had already said (in 1962) that he joined the KGB in March 1953.
KGB defectors describe the period immediately following Stalin's death in the KGB as one of extensive reorganization and uncertainty in which new candidates were not being accepted. Other evidence of the improbability of NOSENKO's entering the KGB in March 1953 is discussed below.

NOSENKO repeated during 1965 interrogations the date 13-15 March 1953. In 1966, however, in a written statement, he said he entered the KGB on 2 April 1953, but a week later, in another signed statement, he said it was the "middle of March 1953".

In his final interrogation in October 1966 NOSENKO said he entered the KGB in March 1953 and he acknowledged that he had lied, and had known at the time he was lying, when he had said he joined in 1952. Asked by his interrogators why he had lied, NOSENKO said, "There was no sense." He went on to explain that because he was only an average student and a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 1950; he had tried to conceal this by adjusting his account by one year, since his interrogators would not have believed that he was eventually accepted by the KGB after an earlier rejection.

The Role of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV

In all of his accounts NOSENKO has attributed to General KOBULOV's initiative and intervention his entry to the KGB. In the account which he volunteered in Geneva to CIA in 1962, NOSENKO said KOBULOV was a friend of the elder NOSENKO whom he met when the KGB General "dropped by" the NOSENKO dacha outside of Moscow, and KOBULOV at the time ("early 1953") was First Deputy to Beriya, the Minister of the then-MVD. NOSENKO said that when KOBULOV learned of NOSENKO's dissatisfaction with the Naval RU, KOBULOV encouraged him to enter counterintelligence and invited him to visit the General's office. NOSENKO said he did not, but nevertheless received a week later a telephone call from the KGB Personnel Office asking him to appear at the secretariat of General KOBULOV and informing him that General KOBULOV had already arranged for a building pass.

NOSENKO gave a different, somewhat more detailed account in April 1964. In this version, he first met KOBULOV, a friend of the NOSENKO family, in February 1953. NOSENKO said KOBULOV had visited his father in the latter's office, and that evening the elder NOSENKO brought him to the NOSENKO dacha to spend the weekend. [NOSENKO had just before been informed by his interrogators that KOBULOV was at that time posted in Germany, not in Moscow.] According to NOSENKO, KOBULOV was in Moscow on a short visit from Germany. "My father invited him to spend Saturday night and Sunday...On Sunday we were playing billiards and KOBULOV asked me what I was doing, and I told him I was at the disposal of the (Naval RU) Personnel Department and that I didn't want to return to the Baltic." NOSENKO said that KOBULOV offered to call the KGB Personnel Office and have them "look NOSENKO over", and NOSENKO assented, after which he twice visited the Personnel Office where he filed completed forms. NOSENKO asserted that KOBULOV did not forget, because "just as soon as STALIN died, KOBULOV immediately returned from Germany" after being "summoned by Beriya or someone", and on "maybe the 10th of March" NOSENKO received a call from KOBULOV's assistant. NOSENKO claimed he reported to KOBULOV's office, and although he waited two hours to see the General, the latter was busy elsewhere. Instead of seeing KOBULOV, however, NOSENKO said he was finally taken to the office of Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief SHUBNYAKOV, who assigned him forthwith to the Embassy Section of the American Department.

In April 1964 NOSENKO introduced a new variant. He said that he met KOBULOV while accompanying his parents on a visit in January to KOBULOV's dacha [NOSENKO had previously graphically described KOBULOV's weekend visit at the elder NOSENKO's], KOBULOV intervened in his behalf, and he was called to the KGB Personnel Office to be interviewed and to receive necessary forms. NOSENKO stated that he heard nothing further until after Stalin's funeral, when he was summoned to KOBULOV's office and afterwards assigned to the Second Chief Directorate.

During the July 1965 interrogations NOSENKO retracted his earlier claim that KOBULOV and his father had been close personal friends. He stated that his father's relationship with KOBULOV was not personal, and that KOBULOV had never visited the NOSENKOs.

In a biographic statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO said that he had met KOBULOV but twice, once on 1 January 1953 at the latter's dacha, and the second and last time in the elder NOSENKO's office as NOSENKO's father and KOBULOV were departing to attend Stalin's funeral. On that latter occasion, NOSENKO claimed, KOBULOV promised to concern himself with NOSENKO's entry into the KGB and it was several days later that NOSENKO was summoned to KOBULOV's office and told he was appointed to the KGB.

Comment: General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV was a career security official, but from the immediate post-war period until after Stalin's death he was not assigned to KGB Headquarters. As of 1952, he was posted to Germany with the Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad, then directly subordinate not to the MVD but to the Council of Ministers and latterly to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Until he returned from Germany in March 1953 to assume the position of Beriya's deputy, he had no office in KGB Headquarters. KOBULOV was arrested with Beriya in June 1953, and also later executed.

In light of the foregoing, it is improbable that KOBULOV was instrumental in NOSENKO's appointment to the KGB at the times NOSENKO claimed. If KOBULOV ever interceded in NOSENKO's behalf, it is probable that NOSENKO would later have been purged after KOBULOV's

Comment: (Continued)
and Beriya's arrest and execution. NOSENKO's eventual retraction of his assertion that his father and KOBULOV were intimate acquaintances makes it the more unlikely that KOBULOV played any role at any time in NOSENKO's appointment to the KGB.

Eligibility

Throughout the various versions NOSENKO has provided about his entry to the KGB, he has emphasized how influential was his father's prominent position in the Soviet Government.

Comment: In the period 1953-1954, during which NOSENKO claimed he entered the KGB, it was KGB policy to avoid recruiting the children of senior Soviet officials.

NOSENKO asserts that he was rejected for KGB appointment upon graduation from the Institute of International Relations.

Comment: Other than claiming to have completed an undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, NOSENKO acknowledges that he was no more eligible in 1953 for KGB appointment than he was at the time of his rejection.

(KGB ENTRY)

NOSENKO states that in March 1953 he was already twenty-five and a half years old, a member of only the Komsomol, and that he had not been recommended for Party membership. He further claimed that on entry to the KGB he became secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization.

Comment: Eligibility for Party membership, if not membership itself, is a requisite for KGB appointment. By Komsomol statutes of that time, twenty-five was at that time the maximum age. Thus, at the time of NOSENKO's claimed KGB appointment, he was within six months of being dropped by the Komsomol as well as still unqualified for Party membership. He could not have been secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization, as discussed on p. 338.

NOSENKO has referred frequently to having contracted tuberculosis for which he was periodically hospitalized.

Comment: According to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis.

KGB Processing for Entry

NOSENKO has stated (in chronological order) that at his initial interview with a KGB personnel, it was not necessary for him to complete any forms or questionnaires since the KGB had his Naval RU file; that he was told that the KGB would request the Naval RU file and meanwhile he was given three copies of a four to six-page biographic form to complete at home; and (at his last interrogation in 1966) that he never spoke to any KGB personnel officers nor visited the personnel office (and thus completed no forms provided by them).

Comment: The most important document filled out by prospective KGB officers was a detailed 16-page personal history questionnaire, Anketa spetsialngo naznacheniya sotrudnika KGB, which was completed in one copy only. Classified even when blank, the form was not permitted to be taken home. KGB defectors have described completion of the form "as an experience not likely to be forgotten". NOSENKO omits in all accounts reference to other documents which are known to have been required in connection with a KGB officer's processing for duty.

NOSENKO insisted that he took no physical examination in connection with processing for KGB entry.

Comment: A medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of a KGB candidate's processing. Former KGB defectors could think of no instance in which the examination could be waived, particularly for a candidate with a recorded history of tuberculosis.

NOSENKO claims in all of his accounts that he entered the KGB building and, with a pass obtained at the Pass Office, was permitted to proceed without escort. NOSENKO specifically asserted that the name of the interviewer did not appear on the pass.

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: Persons not holding a valid KGB identity document were not permitted entry to or movement in the building without escort. The interviewer's name did appear on the building pass. The interviewer's name was essential to the issuance of the pass: the interviewer had complete responsibility for the visitor's custody while on KGB premises.

Initial Service in KGB (1953)

NOSENKO stated that in the period of Beriya, in March-June 1953, the two existing directorates were the First Chief Directorate, which was the foreign intelligence directorate, and the Second Chief Directorate, the counterintelligence directorate. The designations were later reversed for a few months, he said, by Kruglov, Beriya's successor.

Comment: Beriya reversed the designations of the First and Second Chief Directorates in March 1953, and they were not changed back until March 1954. NOSENKO does not know how his own directorate was designated either at the time he allegedly entered on duty or during his entire first year of KGB service.

NOSENKO described the KGB identity document of the period, but in spite of repeated questioning could not recall anything unusual about it.

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: Twice, following Stalin's death in March 1953 and again following Beriya's arrest in June 1953, all KGB identity documents were temporarily recalled for revalidation. On both occasions new stamps were placed on the document, lacking which the bearer could no longer enter the KGB installation. KGB defectors state that the events were the topic of numerous anecdotes at the time.

NOSENKO claims he received no training in the KGB, but was assigned operations responsibilities immediately upon reporting for duty. He had explained that training was unnecessary because of his Naval RU experience.

Comment: NOSENKO's lack of training is unlike that of any other KGB defector. His Naval RU service, by NOSENKO's own account, provided little if any preparation for his subsequent KGB duties.

NOSENKO stated that his initial KGB basic pay was 1700 rubles as a case officer, plus secrecy, language and longevity pay, plus 500 rubles "rank pay" as a lieutenant. He recalled that there was one year, 1954, when KGB officers did not receive the pay for rank.

Comment: KGB officers' rank pay was abolished in September 1952 and not restored until April 1954, a period which covers NOSENKO's first year of claimed service in the KGB.

(KGB ENTRY)

NOSENKO claimed that he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB.

Comment: All promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time Beriya became Minister in March 1953 until late 1953. NOSENKO's actual sequence of promotions has never been established. He has also claimed this promotion occurred in 1952 and in 1954. See p. 351.

NOSENKO acknowledged that his qualifications for continued KGB service were probably reviewed in connection with the purges following both Stalin's death and Beriya's arrest, during which reviews numerous negative factors in his background would have come to light. He stated, however, that he could only assume that the important and influential position of his own father outweighed the negative factors.

Comment: NOSENKO has never mentioned any influence his father had on his KGB service aside from that exercised through KOBULOV, who was himself arrested and executed.

Other Aspects Relevant to 1953 KGB Service

NOSENKO insisted that the KGB was organized from components of the MVD not earlier than late 1954 or early 1955.

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: The KGB was organized in March 1954, in a final reform of Beriya's organization of Soviet security agencies. Preceded by a series of purges, the inception of the KGB would presumably be memorable to a KGB officer serving in Moscow Headquarters at the time.

NOSENKO stated that the MVD Intelligence Directorate (subsequently to become the KGB First Chief Directorate) was located in 1953 in four buildings, including the Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI (Committee of Information) Building".

Comment: The Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI Building" were one and the same. From his statement, NOSENKO is unaware that the KI (a combined foreign intelligence agency) ceased to exist in 1951, a matter perhaps unfamiliar to a KGB officer serving at a substantially later time, but one which other KGB officers serving in Moscow in 1953 recalled easily.

NOSENKO did not know where the Chief Directorate of the Militia was located in 1953-1954.

Comment: According to KGB defectors, a staff officer in the Counterintelligence Directorate at the time would have had frequent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of the Militia.

KGB Entry: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's assertions regarding the KGB in the 1953-1954 period throw no more light on the actual date of his KGB entry than did his claims of when he transferred from the Naval RU; the contradictions and inconsistencies are interrelated.

It is possible that a former KGB officer, relating the truth as he recalls it about events occurring ten years earlier, could be inconsistent; that he could forget his date of entry, not remember what administrative procedures were, fail to recall the circumstances of the organization he joined were, be inaccurate about what his pay was, and be vague on what his KGB identification document looked like. Recognizing that administrative regulations and procedures are on occasion honored in the breach, it is also possible that NOSENKO was accepted by the KGB despite the fact that he was the son of a senior official, that he had tuberculosis, that he was unqualified for Party membership, that he had been previously rejected and all at a time when the KGB was not accepting new recruits.

The probability of these events being coincident, however, is remote. On examination, NOSENKO's latest admission, that he "actually" entered the KGB in March 1953, is no better substantiated than earlier accounts citing other dates.

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner nor at the time he claimed.

CHAPTER V

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
(ca. 1953-June 1955)

NOSENKO claims to have served in the American Embassy Section of the American Department (Second Chief Directorate) from his entry in the KGB until June 1955. His targets during this period were at first American correspondents residing in Moscow and later Army Attache personnel of the American Embassy in Moscow. His assignment involving American correspondents lasted anywhere from six to eighteen months (depending on the various dates he claimed he entered the KGB). His involvement with the Army Attaches lasted from sometime in 1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Department in June 1955.

NOSENKO has sought to avoid discussion of his own or other KGB activities during this entire period which he characterized on occasion as "not relevant" or "of no consequence". He has repeatedly stated that he "found himself" only after this initial KGB service in the American Embassy Section. Until then, he asserted, he was a wastrel and "did not pay attention to the work". (He has variously dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955 when he transferred to the Seventh Department; in June 1956 in connection with his participation in and award for the BURGI 06 case; and after August 1956 when the death of his father forced him to pull himself together.)

Operations Against American Correspondents

NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-1954 by saying that, as a new, very junior employee he had no access to operational files and did not participate personally in the handling of any of the correspondents.

VRR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Although able to identify correspondents in Moscow who were then recruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in conversations with his superior [V.A.] KOZLOV or at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer was working against these targets. NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsible for the more important correspondents: "KOZLOV himself was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with SHAPIRO 06 with SHAPIRO's 06 wife. I also know that KOZLOV was working with WHITNEY 06 and with (Andrew J.) STEIGER. 06 For each of these persons there was an operational file which I did not see." According to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved with STEIGER and 06 06 Edmund STEVENS, American correspondents who he alleged were recruited agents of the KGB.

Comment: 06 SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by GOLITSYN in 1961, before the lead was received from NOSENKO. 06 SHAPIRO's KGB agent cryptonym, known to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN, appears in the CHEREPANOV papers (see p.309). The KGB defector Nikolay KHOKHLOV in April 1954 06 identified the Polish-born wife of WHITNEY as a KGB agent, an allegation which she denied.

NOSENKO said his early months in the job were spent reading personality (not operational) files on a number of the correspondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's developmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the "agent network" or drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four of the correspondents, SHAPIRO, GILMORE, 06, 06, 06 SALISBURY and WHITNEY. 06 He met with his agents periodically to determine whether they had developed any important information. His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NOSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward whenever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents when there was even a hint that something of interest might develop. NOSENKO has described some of these agents in general terms, but for all but a few he recalled neither their names nor personalia concerning them.

06 06 06 06

KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY

On the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO stated that he was taken directly to the offices of the American Embassy Section. There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO that he would take over the work of the departing case officer, Captain Anatoliy TORMOZOV, in operations against American correspondents in Moscow.

When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, he found a desk in Room 615 and, "There were three other guys sitting there. At first I was running traces, and at the same time I was reading the files on journalists... I think there were seven files in all, and I didn't see any other." NOSENKO listed these files as those on Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy 06, 06 GILMORE (as well as ones 06 on GILMORE's wife SEREBRYANKOVA 06 and her sister CHERNYSHEVA), Harrison SALISBURY and Thomas WHITNEY. 06 06 06

06 NOSENKO identified SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours". He said that 06 WHITNEY "worked for us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he refused to work for us when he left the country". 06 GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did not know the status of SALISBURY as of 1953. 06

NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read during the early period of his KGB service were developmental files (delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents. The developmental files were less sensitive, and from them "you would never be able to figure out whether he (the subject of the file) is an agent or not". NOSENKO explained that, once a person became an agent, another file is set up, and these agent files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO stated that he read the files on the seven persons "slowly and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things as

12/GR

notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remember". He was also given the files on the agents surrounding these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and cooks.

Agents Reporting on Correspondents

NOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents who were reporting on SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, SALISBURY 06 and the 06 GILMORES and met them regularly to learn whether "anything was new, whom did SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting in his behavior, what might be suspicious in his behavior, whom he is contacting, etc". He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare a written report of his conversations with the agents. Asked to describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied:

> 06
>
> "Let us take the same case of SHAPIRO. I would meet drivers about three times a month or even two times. At the meeting I would ask the driver what was new in SHAPIRO's behavior since our last meeting, whether SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with foreigners, about his meetings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was SHAPIRO walking 06 behind the person he met. And then the man [agent] would begin his report. Of course, if he spots anything suspicious he calls immediately, and I would see him the next morning. Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I would see him again in about ten days or in two weeks, but if there was something interesting he should call immediately. It was the same with the maid and the cook. Upon returning to the office I would have to report to KOZLOV about my meetings, either orally or in writing. If, for example, [V.M.] KOVSHUK [also of the American Embassy Section] had a meeting with his agents, he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV. If the meetings were taking place late in the day and lasted until midnight or later and there were no written materials submitted at the meeting, I could go home and then report the next morning."

2/13R

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was teaching me. Then he would go in cases when something interesting would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case officer."

NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their families. Asked to describe them, he said:

> "My first agent 06 was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at GILMORE's place. She also worked at the Associated Press later. Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one." (While reviewing a list of Soviets employed by Americans in Moscow, NOSENKO in the fall of 1965 identified one Yelena S. KOSIENKO as his former agent "AGLODINA". At that time he told CIA that he had taken over KOSIENKO from TORMOZOV upon entering the American Embassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked for and reported on 06 GILMORE's successor, Richard 06 KASISCHKE. NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never provided any interesting information.) "My second agent was a chauffeur whose cryptonym, I think, was 'SERGEY'. I think he was driving for WHITNEY. 06 Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a funny little fellow. In other words, 06 charwomen, chauffeurs, this was my agentura [agent network]."

Although NOSENKO was able to give a breakdown of this network in terms of the number and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he had forgotten their true names and could not provide personality information on any of them. He explained: "I don't remember now. They all passed by like a river because they were turned over often." NOSENKO did recall that it was he who selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's 06 office as a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of Moscow News, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.

6/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling ten to twelve agents in operations against the correspondents. This, he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case officers might have as many as fifteen. NOSENKO described his agentura as follows:

Target	Agents
Eddy GILMORE 06	Two agents, the cook and the driver; one operational contact, a part-time cleaning girl; and a girlfriend of GILMORE's sister-in-law and GILMORE's Russian wife. 06 06,11
06 Thomas WHITNEY	One agent, his driver, "SERGEY".
Henry SHAPIRO 06	Three agents; 06 SHAPIRO's secretary and his chauffeur, plus an old woman who was a relative of 06 SHAPIRO's wife and lived with 06 the SHAPIROS in Moscow. (The secretary and chauffeur later worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and 06 reported on him to NOSENKO; 06 BRODNEY temporarily took SHAPIRO's 06 place in Moscow.)
06 Harrison SALISBURY	06 Two agents; SALISBURY's driver, and a part-time cleaning girl.

NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral", in that they did not have specific targets on whom to report. The first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language training program for foreigners in Moscow. His cryptonym was "RAKETA", but NOSENKO could not recall his true name. The second "VOLODINA", was a female teacher in this same program who instructed some of the correspondents, and Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true name of "VOLODINA". When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his agents to other case officers in the American Embassy Section with the exception of "RAKETA" and "VOLODINA", whom he continued to handle in his work with Army Attaches.

13/18R

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Operations Against U.S. Army Attache Personnel

NOSENKO claimed specific responsibility for work against American Army Attaches during twenty months of 1954-55, a period in which NOSENKO claimed no supervisory responsibility to divert his attention from personal operational duties. (NOSENKO, explaining why he did not know more details about the Embassy Section's targets while he was its deputy chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy overseeing subordinates. Hence, NOSENKO continued, he could not be expected to remember as many such details as would be possible had he been a case officer working daily on only four or five targets. Elsewhere, he contrasted operations against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a few days, with the work against the service attaches and diplomats permanently stationed in Moscow, who could be studied systematically and slowly.)

NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American Department case officer responsible for operations against Army Attaches he received and was responsible for assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned information received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; and the microphones which were emplaced about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department.

Comment: NOSENKO has said variously that the microphones in the Army Attache offices were his most valuable source of information on his targets of 1954-1955; that he knew nothing of these microphones until he re-entered the Embassy Section in 1960; and that he learned of their existence during 1953-1955 but not where any were located.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Information was also received according to NOSENKO from the network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and other agents in the Embassy; permanent and roving surveillance patrols outside the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by the attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military. The point of collecting and assimilating this information, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the military attaches were doing in Moscow and thereby to control their intelligence collection activities. Far less important was the goal of recruiting military attaches; NOSENKO knew of only a few instances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts allegedly failed.

The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the backgrounds and personal lives of his targets--such information, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of control. He has also used this explanation to support his assertion that there were no recruitments of American military personnel during this period.

Comment: NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB's mission was to control rather than to recruit American military attaches is contradicted by the emphasis KGB tradition and doctrine place on conducting operations against the United States, the "main enemy", in the KGB parlance, in this case American officials with access to classified information, who were residing in the Soviet Union.

In the USSR, especially in the early 1950's prior to the U-2 reconnaissance, the Service Attache travel program was the primary means by which the U.S. Armed Forces acquired intelligence information on the Soviet Union's military-industrial complex. The prevention or inhibition of this collection activity fell consequently to KGB components concerned with the security of military-industrial installations,

Comment: (Continued)
with transportation facilities, and with the geographic regions to which the Service Attaches travelled. Approval of Service Attache travel itineraries was not within the competence of a case officer within the Embassy Section; the determination would have to have been made by officials concerned with the USSR's military and industrial security and aware of reciprocal privileges being extended to Soviet Service Attaches in the United States, matters involving the GRU as well as the KGB. An Embassy Section case officer would have as a matter of course monitored reports of Service Attaches' travel, searching for personal vulnerabilities among his targets, and assisted local KGB elements in setting up provocations outside of Moscow. NOSENKO, however, has included neither of these latter functions as having been among his responsibilities.

Custody of Case Files on Army Attache Personnel

"Sometime in the first half of 1954" NOSENKO said, he was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then until his transfer from the American Department he handled KGB Second Chief Directorate operations against the officer personnel of the Army Attache's office. NOSENKO's account of the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of the acceptance of the attache files is presented below.

-8 April 1964: "I took over the Army Attache cases from Nikolay KHRENOV... When I was leaving in 1955, I turned the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

-10 April 1964: "I made a mistake [when] I said I accepted the cases from KHRENOV.... I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954."

-15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned to the USSR from Australia in May 1954). NOSENKO asked when the PETROVs defected in Australia; he explained that he was not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them to another officer. "If KISLITSYN came [back from Australia] in 1953, then it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was someone else."

-18 June 1964: "KISLITSYN came into the Embassy Section in 1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents. BUDYLDIN also joined the section this year and took the files on the Army Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV. BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over to me.... Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files on the Army Attache and his assistants."

NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed responsibilities for the Attaches. As noted above, he said on 10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of 1954. He had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents "only about six months". If the date of March 1953, which he most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is correct, this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he has said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases and began work against the Attaches in January 1954, on still others that this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.

Agents Reporting on Army Attaches

Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network (agentura) at his disposal in operations against Army Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers...about ten persons, plus the agent 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the cryptonym 'DMITRIYEV'.... These additional two agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one exception, this network remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from the American Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the street. The Assistant Army Attaches used a pool of five drivers at random, all of whom were his agents, NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior Attache, none was targetted against specific members of the attache office.

Comment: As noted earlier, NOSENKO named "VOLODINA" and "RAKETA" as agents he used against correspondents and against Army Attache targets, but he never again referred to them and, in describing his own activities, he never indicated how or in what cases they were used.

According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the main source of information on the Army Attaches being the microphones in their offices.

Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache 06 Earl L. MICKELSON and his successor, Fillmore K. MEARNS 06 Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of English in order to overhear conversations or read letters without taking them outside".

Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, cryptonym "SHVEDOVA," and she was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, Ira 06 RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin woman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest. They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.

31BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO named Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various attaches. "He reported where they went, what they said, whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages with them, and so on."

When viewing photographs (see below) in September 1964, NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as his former agent "SERVIZNIY". He had been working in the Embassy since its establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connection with the Army Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in 1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the Embassy, issued monthly.

"DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV; NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but was not sure, that this was his agent. An electrician who worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and elevator, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires and other wires he had observed on the top floors. Like VOROBYEV, "DMITRIYEV" had no direct connection with the Army Attaches.

Comment: Elsewhere NOSENKO described an electrician who provided some technical information on the Embassy, but he related him to his second tour in the American Embassy Section in 1960-1962 and did not then claim that the electrician was his agent.

In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260 biographic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American Embassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the person involved and short biographic notes, including his name and job in the Embassy. The first time he went through these cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photographs; NOSENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV but said that the face of VOROBYEV was familiar, adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV. When shown the Embassy biographic cards on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American Department and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the biographic information, which listed SHNYRYEV as "chauffeur for the military attache," NOSENKO exclaimed: "Oh my God, this is my own agent." He later said it was a good photograph of SHNYRYEV.

NOSENKO's Targets

Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache personnel for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and 1955, NOSENKO orally listed the following names: "MICKELSON, MEARNS, RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."

06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06

Comment: In the order as given by NOSENKO, the list comprises two generations of Army Attaches in Moscow. It is neither in alphabetical order nor chronological according to date or service in Moscow. It is, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKELSON through 06 Captains MULE and STROUD to Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA. 06 06 06

06

MICKELSON

06

NOSENKO correctly identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a 08 colonel and the Army Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955. PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKELSON, 06 and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When asked about agents who might have been working against MICKELSON, 06 NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON's maid, 06 whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA. In addition to these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was 06 his chauffeur, whose name NOSENKO also did not remember.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

06 NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruitment was attempted. There was, in fact, no interesting or derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source. 06

06

Comment: MICKELSON was involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed a bridge. In August 1954 06 MICKELSON was arrested again for illegal photography south of Kharkov; on this occasion he was held for two hours before being released. It is judged that such events, particularly those staged by the KGB, would be known to the KGB case officer responsible for the attache officer concerned.

06

MEARNS

06 NOSENKO accurately identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as MICKELSON's replacement and said that he was the responsible case officer. There were two agents and one operational contact working against MEARNS. 06 Of these, NOSENKO could recall the name only of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on MICKELSON. 06 Besides being told to attempt to overhear 06 MEARNS' conversations, NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find, but she never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects 06 were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the United States, and that all his service records had been discovered and photographed. (NOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON.) NOSENKO described 06 06 MEARNS as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had 06 been and said that information from concealed microphones showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest concerning him was received from these microphones or from telephone taps.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

06
RICHARDS

06
NOSENKO correctly identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a 08 lieutenant colonel who served as an Assistant Army Attache 08 in Moscow. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO 06 could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym "SHVEDOVA", but she had never provided any worthwhile information about RICHARDS. 06 In addition, some Soviet drivers reported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from them. 06

06
Comment: RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 to July 1956. There was a microphone in the office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with MEARNS. 06 06

06 RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart attack during the period she was employed by him, an incident which was not recalled by NOSENKO.

For about four months of his Moscow tour, 06 RICHARDS took Russian-language lessons from Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During 06 these lessons, RICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her record her speech on his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was pregnant and unmarried at the time. In another context, NOSENKO named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent during 1960-1962 but did not relate her to RICHARDS 06 or to the 1953-1955 period.

06 RICHARDS identified one "Volodya" (the diminutive of Vladimir) as his principal driver. About 62 years old in 1954, Volodya's father was a rich jeweler in Moscow at the time of the Revolution. Volodya himself was well educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with

15/RR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment: (Continued)
06 RICHARDS about the Revolution, propaganda, and news media. NOSENKO did not know of Volodya who, as RICHARDS' 06 driver, was NOSENKO's agent by NOSENKO's own account.

06

FELCHLIN

06

08 NOSENKO correctly identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in 08 Moscow. By far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the object of special interest, NOSENKO said FELCHLIN served 08 in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being declared persona non grata. NOSENKO did not recall the names of any agents specifically targetted against 08 FELCHLIN, although he thought FELCHLIN must have had a maid 08 who would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO 08 said, the Assistant Army Attaches shared a pool of cars and drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the 08 precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind. NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel 08 FELCHLIN, but said the action was based on information which had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents. 08 For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photographs and a report had been written; along with other 08 similar indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of 08 agents in contact with FELCHLIN, the report was filed away for possible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on 08 FELCHLIN during the February 1965 interrogations. He said 08 then that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata, and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO explained his having but few details concerning this action by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had transferred from the American Department to the Seventh Department in June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN's background.
08

18/8R

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

08

Comment: FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before arriving in July 1953 as an Assistant Army Attache. 08 He served in the latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was expelled. He had previously served in Austria and West Germany and had been in official contact with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the United States. During his entire tour in Moscow he was the object of intense KGB surveillance.

08 Shortly after his arrival in September 1953 FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant Army Attache 08 08 Martin J. MANHOFF and two Air Force Attaches, 08 took a train trip to Siberia, the first trip permitted such Americans in many years. Six months later, on 25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article falsely 08 alleging that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some "spy documents" on the train. On another occasion, while travelling with a British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to 08 his train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in his berth. NOSENKO recalled neither of these incidents.

In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YEAGER, an Assistant 06, 08, 06 Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned 06 YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was 06 08 the Air Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were 06, 06 taken to a Militia station where they were ordered to sign a confession. They were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the American Ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. 06 FELCHLIN was told on 3 July 1954 to depart the Soviet Union within 48 hours.

06 Major Walter A. McKINNEY, the American Air 06

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment: (Continued) 06
Attache and one of FELCHLIN's travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were allegedly lost, was declared *persona non grata* at the same time. Ambassador Bohlen successfully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the USSR to fly FELCHLIN and McKINNEY out. 06, 06 In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN 06 left. NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch, as he was no longer in the American Department at the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.

06 Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and 06 FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the chauffeurs assigned to the office of the Army Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip 06 outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the Attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either "Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to distinguish him from another chauffeur with the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV 06 drove primarily for the Army Attache himself, but sometimes drove for the Assistant Army Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had continuing chest or lung trouble. Asked whether SHNYRYEV had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of any.

06 FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOROVA was in her 50's. When she spoke with FELCHLIN 06 about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN 06 offered 80. FEDOROVA refused and left. Two days later she returned and accepted. She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back door of FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with 06 her, and suspecting that they were reporting to FEDOROVA, FELCHLIN teased her about it. 06

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment: (Continued)
FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew Pearson with a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the local "boss" of the Embassy network. Pearson printed the allegation. In the summer of 1953 or 1954, according to FELCHLIN, 06 the maid approached FELCHLIN with the article, 06 waved it in his face, and accused him of being Pearson's source. NOSENKO did not recognize FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or reading of this incident.

BENSON 06

08 NOSENKO correctly identified his target John S. BENSON 06 as a major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not 08 recall the names of any agents working against BENSON but 06 said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in 06,06 10,09 Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared persona non grata. The KGB had no other derogatory information on BENSON from any other source.

06 STROUD 06

08 NOSENKO correctly identified William R. STROUD 06 as a captain and an Assistant Army Attache. 08 The only agents working against him were the Army Attache drivers. From concealed microphones, the KGB learned before STROUD's 06 arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of electronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE 06,06 10 in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any source. 06

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

06 06 06

Comment: STROUD, with BENSON and MULE, was the victim of the Soviets' seizure of technical equipment in Stalingrad and was declared persona 10 non grata on 7 May 1955. On 31 January 1955 09 he travelled to Kharkov from Moscow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an American 06 defector living there. According to NOSENKO, 06 SISCOE was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer. The visit of ex-FBI agent SISCOE and 08, 06 a military officer to an American defector is judged to be an event in which the KGB would have taken interest and one which the Attache's KGB case officer would find memorable.

MULE 06

06

NOSENKO correctly identified Walter MULE as an 08 Assistant Army Attache and as such said that he was the case officer responsible for him. NOSENKO described an operational 06 approach to MULE, in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there had been several defection approaches to Soviets in the United States with the promise of money and a new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to try the same measures, MULE was selected. 06 He was only a 08 captain despite his lengthy service in the Army and information from concealed microphones indicated that he was often disparaged by the other Attaches. When MULE received letters 06 from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned these over to the KGB. From this mail it was understood 06 that MULE did not have a house in the United States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two 06 children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Germany for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the KGB appointed N.M. BORODIN, a recruiter of the American Department, to attempt to defect MULE. 06 Together with BORODIN, KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's special technical section), NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE's hotel room,

06

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

06

and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return. When 06 MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK closed the door from the hall and prevented his escape. BORODIN 06 reviewed for MULE the facts the KGB had accumulated about his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his fellow Attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered him a job as a "consultant". BORODIN had either $5,000 or $10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. According 06 to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN to get out. 06

06

Comment: MULE reported this incident. He said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000 for "work" on a long-range basis. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required to 06 procure documents from the Embassy, and 06 according to MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts 06 concerning MULE's personal life that could have been obtained only from listening devices 06 in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about 20 minutes, having warned MULE not 06 to report the incident. MULE identified 06 SIEGAL/BORODIN by photograph, but was unable to identify NOSENKO.

KGB lack of interest in recruitments, which NOSENKO elsewhere cited to explain his ignorance of the personal backgrounds of his Army Attache targets, is belied by the MULE case. 06

06, 06 06

BENSON, MULE and STROUD Expulsion from the Soviet Union

After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets 06, 06 06 of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being declared *persona non grata*. NOSENKO gave the following account of this incident: For some time the Second Chief Directorate had been trying to acquire a small, convenient piece of

17/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

electronic equipment which American Intelligence officers were known to be using during their travels inside the Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the American Department had been given authorization from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to steal this equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of such an operation was assured. Before his transfer to the Seventh Department in 1955, NOSENKO himself had helped to develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an abortive attempt to seize the equipment from an Attache at a railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE and 06, 06 06 STROUD were on one of their trips (after NOSENKO's transfer) it was learned that they had the equipment with them, and the KGB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad. 10 The hotel rooms of BENSON 06 STROUD and MULE were watched constantly from a visual observation post, 06 and it 06 was noted that they never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms. It was also noted that the apparatus was placed under a pillow before they began to eat. While they were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment. In order to partially cover the illegality of this act, it was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, 06 MULE and STROUD from the 06 Soviet Union, and this was done by having 06 the Foreign Ministry declaring each persona non grata.

06 06

Comment: The equipment was seized from BENSON, MULE and 06 STROUD on 5 May 1955, and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May, a month before NOSENKO claimed to have transferred to the Seventh Department. When the 7 May date was given to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he did not directly participate in it, but that he had been involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment. It was pointed out to him that he had always said he was in the Seventh Department at the time of this operation, and that he had consistently said that he transferred from the American to the Seventh Department in June 1955. NOSENKO offered no comment.

13/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

CARDELLA 06

NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was a civilian administrative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA. 06 The KGB had no interesting or unusual information concerning CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO could say nothing more about him. 06

Comment: As a member of the Army Attache's staff, 06 CARDELLA also would have been NOSENKO's target. 06 Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955. In 1964 a microphone was discovered in the Embassy office 06 CARDELLA had occupied. The microphone was believed to have been emplaced in 1952. See p. 227.

VAN LAETHEM 06

06

08 NOSENKO incorrectly identified George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant Air Attache at the Embassy against whom an operation was attempted in 1953 or 1954. He said that during this period a Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquaintance with VAN LAETHEM 06 which could be followed up in Moscow. She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number. Although she was certain that she would hear from him, he never did call her in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he had heard about this from P.F. PANKRATOV, the case officer handling LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOV was the case officer responsible for VAN LAETHEM, along with other 06 members of the Air Attache's office at that time. NOSENKO 08 knew of no other KGB interest in or activity concerning VAN LAETHEM.

06

B/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment: 06 VAN LAETHEM was not an Assistant Air Attache 08 but an Assistant Army Attache 08 serving in Moscow from March 1951 to March 1953. When 06 VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in March 1953 (when NOSENKO said he entered the KGB), he was succeeded by Walter 06 MULE, for whom NOSENKO has claimed responsibility. The fact that he was Assistant Army 08 Attache and MULE's 06 predecessor should be known to the responsible KGB case officer, in this case, NOSENKO. As cryptographic security 08 officer and officer in charge of the Embassy 08/06 code room, VAN LAETHEM had supervisory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics, including Dayle SMITH, and he was on fairly close personal terms with Sergeant Roy RHODES until VAN LAETHEM's departure from 06 Moscow in March 1953. VAN LAETHEM's duties 06 also included responsibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy.

VAN LAETHEM was again in Moscow from 19 March to 19 May 1955, when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for Army Attaches. Although this visit was only a temporary assignment, it was represented to the Soviets as a permanent assignment of an Assistant Army Attache (and thus, presumably NOSENKO's target) because of the sensitive nature of his duties. He was project officer for the entire signals collection program at the Embassy, and he went to Moscow to review the program including the planned use of the new electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE 06, 06 and STROUD 06 in Stalingrad 10 in May 1955 (while 09 06 VAN LAETHEM was still in Moscow). VAN LAETHEM 06 stated that no meeting such as the one NOSENKO described with LARIONOVA ever occurred.

17/BR

Additional Reporting

Knowledge of another KGB operation involving Americans was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the American Embassy Section, against CIA officer and Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see p. 37). NOSENKO claimed to have personally participated in the operations against E.E. SMITH in 1954-1955. The incidents which NOSENKO described, however, occurred in June 1956, by which time NOSENKO, by his own account, had been out of the American Embassy Section for a year and when he was involved in the Seventh Department recruitment of [Richard BURGI]. 06 His involvement in the [BURGI] 06 case has been confirmed.

NOSENKO has also described the KGB recruitment of military cipher machine mechanic "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33), whose true name he claimed not to have known. He dated the recruitment as occurring "in 1949-1950" and "before he joined the KGB", although he said that he knew of the existence of the agent during his first tour in the Embassy Section in 1953-1955. However, NOSENKO also related that "ANDREY" was recruited while Roy RHODES was in Moscow, that RHODES "had spotted 'ANDREY'". "ANDREY" and RHODES overlapped in Moscow from April 1952 to July 1953. "ANDREY" fixes his own recruitment as occurring in December 1953, and until his departure in April 1954 he was responsible for the entire Embassy code room. In that capacity "ANDREY" was a direct subordinate of the Army Attache cryptographic security officer, NOSENKO's target [Army Captain Walter MULE]. 06 If NOSENKO served in the Embassy Section during 1953-1955 as he claimed, it is difficult to perceive how he could have remained unaware of "ANDREY's" identity.

American Embassy Section - ca. 1953-June 1955: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, immediately upon entering on duty with the KGB he was assigned without training to what he describes as the most sensitive and important section of the Second Chief Directorate. There, after first handling agents covering American correspondents resident in Moscow,

3/BR

he was made the case officer solely responsible for operations against the commissioned officers of the Embassy's Army Attache office, until his transfer to the Seventh Department. Alleging complete knowledge of all service attache operations, NOSENKO flatly asserts that there were no KGB recruitments of American military personnel during the period of his assignment to the Embassy Section.

Pertinent to the consideration of NOSENKO's statements is his reluctance to discuss the 1953-1955 period, and his inconsistent accounts of the dating and circumstances of his entry into the Embassy Section, of his assumption of responsibility as sole case officer for Army Attache targets, and of his transfer to the Seventh Department. Although NOSENKO could plausibly claim failing memory to explain some areas of ignorance, he does not do so. Instead, he is positive and insistent that his statements about his targets are a factual and complete account of what was then known to the KGB. His assertion that the KGB was not interested in his targets' vulnerability to recruitment is belied by his own statements as well as by the MULE case, 06 as he himself related it. He is uninformed about both Attache personnel and agent-informants who, by his own account, were his targets and his agents.

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the March 1953-June 1955 period as he claimed. Specifically, he neither entered the Section in March 1953 nor transferred from the Section in June 1955. In whatever period he may have served, he was not the sole case officer responsible for commissioned officers in the office of the Army Attache. Unaware of many aspects of KGB activities involving Army personnel and by his own account not involved with either Air or Naval Attache personnel or diplomats, NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel during this period.

CHAPTER VI

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: NOSENKO's claimed Second Chief Directorate service during 1955-1960, in which he was involved with Seventh Department operations against American and British tourists, coincides with the growth of a substantial American and British Intelligence program \\ aimed at exploiting tourists visiting the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1956, the growth of tourism which followed the post-Stalin thaw in the USSR had grown to the point where it could be usefully exploited by CIA. Initially, returning American tourists were debriefed on their experiences in the Soviet Union and particularly with regard to their acquaintances there with Soviet citizens who might be susceptible to eventual recruitment. Gradually, leads were developed to Americans planning to visit the USSR, and from among these, agents were selected, trained in clandestine operational techniques, briefed on intelligence requirements, and instructed how to identify and develop potential agents from among their Soviet contacts. The American agents performed a variety of clandestine tasks including passive assessment of Soviet candidates for recruitment, propaganda activities, and infiltrating equipment, loading deaddrops, or mailing letters bearing secret writing, all destined for CIA agents in the Soviet Union.

The program reached its height in 1959, by the end of which over one hundred and fifty agents under tourist cover from CIA alone had performed missions in the USSR; by

VBR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: (Continued) then a substantial number of similar missions had also been launched by American military intelligence organizations and by the British and allied services.

It is a matter of fact, not of conjecture, that as early as 1957 a large number of these agents were coming to the attention of the KGB within the Soviet Union. Few were arrested. Instead, all were surveilled, and some provoked or entrapped, as the Second Chief Directorate and its provincial KGB counterintelligence elements sought to identify the Soviet citizens with whom the American agents were in contact, as well as the agents' specific clandestine tasks. By the summer of 1959 the KGB had obtained from its British agent, George BLAKE, complete details of the objectives and methods of CIA and British Intelligence tourist programs, together with a number of case examples.

It is within this context that one must examine NOSENKO's claims to KGB service in and consequent knowledge of Second Chief Directorate counterintelligence operations against American and British tourists in 1955-1960.

NOSENKO claimed he served with the Seventh Department from June 1955 until January 1960. According to him, the Seventh Department exercised counterintelligence functions involving foreigners then visiting the Soviet Union, including businessmen, seamen, foreign delegations and some tourists, as well as the hotels and restaurants utilized by these visitors. He said that by 1958, however, the number of foreign tourists visiting the Soviet Union had grown appreciably, and in June 1958 the Seventh Department Tourist Section was split, and two new sections were created. NOSENKO explained that one of the new sections became

2BR

responsible for counterintelligence operations conducted against American and British Commonwealth nationals, the other section was charged with all other nationalities.

It is convenient to divide the examination of NOSENKO's claims to service in the Seventh Department into two periods. The first of these covers the years from June 1955 until June 1958, during which NOSENKO said he was a case officer handling and recruiting agents of all nationalities and planning and managing other operational activities. The second period covers NOSENKO's service from June 1958, when he claimed to have become Deputy Chief of the newly-created American-British Commonwealth Section, to the beginning of 1960.

NOSENKO described his personal and direct participation in Seventh Department operations during this four and one-half years as including:

-Recruiting and handling Soviet citizen agents and targetting them against American tourists. NOSENKO's agentura varied in number from eight to fourteen agents, most of whom were employees of Inturist.

-Mounting operations against fifteen foreigners, principally Americans, in the Soviet Union.

-Recruiting a pair of Soviet homosexuals as agents to be utilized against foreign homosexual targets. NOSENKO managed the pair from their recruitment in 1957 and 1958 until their retirement in 1962 or 1963.

-Recruiting and handling Arsene FRIPPEL 06, the American Express Company 08 representative in Moscow. (NOSENKO continued 06 to meet FRIPPEL even after the latter was transferred from Moscow to New York and after NOSENKO was transferred from the Seventh Department.)

From personal involvement or otherwise NOSENKO claimed that he learned of all the important operations conducted against American tourists during this period of his Seventh Department service.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

NOSENKO's Soviet Agents

The Seventh Department Tourist Section, just established when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent network for operations against American and British tourists. Consequently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case officers had to "start from the beginning".

As a first step NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist. These were not agents, he explained, but "just persons a KGB man could approach with questions about somebody or something". NOSENKO collected information on these and others with the aim of formalizing their recruitments. By the end of 1955, he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all of them Inturist interpreters. During the following four years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied. Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another, some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing all the time, back and forth". In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had about ten agents, in 1957 there were about twelve, in 1958 about eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return to the American Department) he had approximately twelve. The substance of NOSENKO's description of his agents is as follows:

Larissa SOBOROVA

An Inturist English-language interpreter, SOBOROVA was one of the first agents recruited in 1955 by NOSENKO within Inturist. She reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as an interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO when he served as a guide for British subjects BIRSE and LANE in the summer of 1957. During 1957-1959 she was involved and possibly sexually intimate with American travel writer Horace SUTTON. SOBOROVA was NOSENKO's agent until 1959, when she married and "retired".

06 06

08, 06

318R

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: SOBOROVA was an Inturist guide for a number of American tourists, including CIA agents, between 1957 and 1959. SUTTON has identified 06 her. In 1959 she was the head of all English-language interpreters at Inturist headquarters in the National Hotel, Moscow.

Vladimir MUROMTSEV

MUROMTSEV, KGB cryptonym "LEBEDEV", was recruited by NOSENKO from Inturist in 1955. He was NOSENKO's agent until called into the army in about 1959, when he was sent to a Soviet Air Force Academy in Central Asia to serve as an interpreter with Syrian students there. During that period his file was held by the KGB organization in Central Asia. When he returned to Moscow he was re-employed by the KGB Second Directorate.

Comment: NOSENKO has said elsewhere that MUROMTSEV had been a Second Chief Directorate agent "since 1958", implying that someone else recruited him and that he thus could not have been NOSENKO's agent in 1955. MUROMTSEV was identified in 1957 as an Inturist guide by two CIA sources.

Nikolay ROGOV

ROGOV, KGB cryptonym "OZERO", was recruited in 1955. He had been formerly a "confidential contact" of the KGB. He worked in the central Inturist office which assigned interpreters to British and American citizens visiting the USSR.

1/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: CIA records refer only to one Alexander ROGOV who in 1960 was a senior official at the main Inturist office in the Hotel National in Moscow.

Nataliya SHULGINA

SHULGINA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. NOSENKO knew that double agent Boris BELITSKIY [see p.282] "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA".

Comment: KGB-controlled CIA source BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent: CIA did not warn him. SHULGINA was for two years the secretary-interpreter of NBC correspondent Irving R. LEVINE after his arrival in Moscow in July 1955. She served as a guide for an American musical troupe's visit in the USSR in 1956 and in 1956 and 1957 she served as a guide for American tourists in Moscow. According to BELITSKIY, she was involved in the sexual entrapment and KGB recruitment of British MP Tom DRIBERG. 06 NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of SHULGINA's involvement with LEVINE and other Americans, as well as with DRIBERG, 06 and of her foreign travel, belies his claim that she was his agent during the 1955-1958 period. Shown her photograph in 1964, NOSENKO failed to recognize it. When he was then given her name, he identified her not as his former agent but just as a Second Chief Directorate agent once involved with BELITSKIY.

21BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Tamara KUNGAROVA

KUNGAROVA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a KGB sexual entrapment operation of an American professor 06 John THOMPSON, but there was no attempt to recruit him. Between 1957 or 1958 and 1960 she was targetted against American tourist and suspect CIA agent Philip NIELSEN 03 (see p.420). KUNGAROVA married NIELSEN and emigrated to 08,03 England, and the KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at 03 the time NOSENKO left the Seventh Department.

Comment: Elsewhere NOSENKO has said KUNGAROVA was an agent who came to the Seventh Department from the British Commonwealth Department in 1957 or early 1958. If true, he could not have recruited her or have been her case officer in the 1955-1957 period. In describing the 03 NIELSEN case, NOSENKO indicated he himself was not involved and, although he commented on KUNGAROVA's role, he never mentioned that she was or had been his agent. KUNGAROVA was interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's information and she confirmed that she had been 06 intimate with THOMPSON while serving as an Inturist guide, as well as with other Americans. She denied, however, that she had ever collaborated with the KGB. KUNGAROVA died in 1965.

Aleksandr A. DMITRIYEV

DMITRIYEV, KGB cryptonym "TOMO", when NOSENKO recruited him in 1958, was a candidate member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a specialist on Japan and Thailand. He spoke Japanese and English and worked at the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow. He "was used against British and American nationals". DMITRIYEV was also used against communications

(6/8R)

personnel at the Japanese Exhibit, but while he telephoned NOSENKO, he was meeting with another KGB case officer. DMITRIYEV accompanied a sports delegation to Norway and a Soviet circus to Japan.

Comment: DMITRIYEV's travel to Norway and Japan in 1958 is confirmed. From NOSENKO's own statement he was aware of DMITRIYEV's activities, but he was not his case officer.

(Fnu) IVANOV

Once a recruited agent in the Baltic area, when IVANOV moved to Moscow the provincial KGB suggested he might be of some use in the capital. IVANOV was a lawyer employed by the Institute of Foreign Trade when NOSENKO became his case officer. IVANOV was later turned over to the British Commonwealth Department which "planted him in the British Trade Mission or something like that".

Comment: CIA records contain no reference identifiable with IVANOV.

Marina RYTOVA

RYTOVA, KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA", was turned over to NOSENKO by another Seventh Department case officer, I.A. KONSTANTINOV, in 1956 or 1957. She was educated at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, where she studied military subjects as well as foreign languages. When NOSENKO became her case officer she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow. She continued this job until about 1960, when she became an instructor in the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations. She reported to NOSENKO information which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the Exhibit in Moscow, and on foreign delegates attending meetings at the Ministry of Agriculture, where she served as an interpreter in English and Greek. RYTOVA served several times as an interpreter for Khrushchev and once participated in a conversation he had with the Iowa farmer [Roswell] GARST. In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as an interpreter with a small delegation visiting GARST's farm in the United States, and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington to report observations made enroute and while there. RYTOVA was married to a captain or major who works in a military office in Moscow. She had one daughter, approximately 14 years old.

Comment: RYTOVA served as an interpreter for Roswell GARST in the USSR in 1955, 1959 and 1963 and she visited the U.S. in 1958 and 1962. Her biographic data is consistent with the information related by NOSENKO.

Yevgeniya ("Jane) DANKO

DANKO, KGB cryptonym "OKSANA", worked in the American 29 Express Company office in Moscow for Arsene FRIPPEL 06 (NOSENKO's agent, see p.137) and later for FRIPPEL's 06 successor, Michael JELISAVCIC. 06 NOSENKO took DANKO over from Seventh Department case officer I.A. KONSTANTINOV in 1955-1957. She was used to report on JELISAVCIC. 06

Comment: DANKO was an Inturist guide in 1956, 1958 and 1959, and she was working for the American 29 Express Company office in 1960. 06 FRIPPEL left Moscow in 1961, by which time NOSENKO had transferred from the Seventh Department.

0001379

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Soviet Homosexual Agents

The KGB operations which NOSENKO described commonly involved sexual entrapment. Many of the operations in which he claimed a personal role involved the use of homosexual agents, KGB agents whose homosexuality was exploited against susceptible male targets. While NOSENKO was never their official case officer, in specific recruitment-entrapment operations he worked with "LUCH", "NIKOLAYEV", "SIBIRYAK", "KOSHIKIN" and "STROYEV" (Victor BELANOVSKIY, used in the compromise of Richard BURGI, VASSALL, and the Canadian Ambassador WATKINS). He provided virtually no personality information on them and usually could not recall their true names. Two such homosexuals, however, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO claimed were his own agents. 06

NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former agent (cryptonym "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMOV (cryptonym "GRIGORIY") and to have been their sole case officer from the beginning of their KGB careers in 1957-1958 until they were discharged in 1963 because they had become too well known. He said he met them frequently, and directed them in at least a dozen entrapment operations or other homosexual encounters. NOSENKO claimed he took them with him when he transferred to the American Department in 1960 and back again in early 1962 to the Seventh Department.

YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a public toilet in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some operational value. To verify this possibility in 1957, a homosexual agent of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked VOLKOV into a compromising situation. Then VOLKOV, who had previously been a KGB agent but was at this time inactive, was summoned by the KGB and, after NOSENKO interrogated him, he admitted his homosexuality and agreed to NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB among

VBR

homosexuals. VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to recruit a homosexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not recalled) YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in addition to specific targets, they had the general assignment of associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the purpose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents:

> "Although I am a chief of section there I have all sorts of agents. I have a good agent apparatus. I have beautiful girls, whom I can use as I like. I have homosexuals, in particular, one special pair. I am afraid they are known to both you and the British... I permitted this pair to work [without specific assignments] on their own. I give them money and tell them to go look around, but only Americans. Look for American pederasts. They call me at night: 'Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister so-and-so here.' I say: 'Well, let him [do what he wants]. We'll talk about it tomorrow.' So the next day they go to a special hotel room. We make photographs. Then we think about what he represents. Is he worth it? Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not--depending on his position, what he can give, what he can tell. If he can give something, I say: 'Well, let's have a go [igrat].' After this, I speak to these boys: 'Well, go with him again. Do whatever is wanted.' All this is observed by the KGB. The [hotel] administrator enters. 'What are you doing?' The administrator calls the Militia. An akt is drawn up. 'Well, you are a foreigner. This is not our business. We don't know what to do with you.' Then the Chief arrives and a conversation ensues: 'Listen, what shall we do? Pederasty is punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand, if your friends find out that you are a pederast--and how can they help but find out'..."

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

When NOSENKO moved from the Seventh Department to the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in January 1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him. They were never used against targets in the American Embassy but, NOSENKO said, the Seventh Department "used to call me on homosexual prospects". VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB agents until some time in 1960 or 1961. After they were employed once more [against W.E. JOHNSON in 06 January 1962] it was decided that they were "too well known". NOSENKO claimed that the agents were retired and that he himself sent their files to KGB Archives in 1962 or 1963.

NOSENKO's Soviet Agents: Summary

NOSENKO claims to have been these agents' case officer for two to five years, during which he met each regularly, assigned them operational tasks, and received their reports. With the exception of YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, however, NOSENKO can cite few instances of their operational use, and he has but superficial knowledge of their personal backgrounds. It is unlikely that this is merely the result of failing recollection. He knows no more about the three whom he claimed he took with him to the Embassy Section, where he continued to be their case officer for two more years, than he does about the others. In the two instances where his agents were involved in KGB operational activity, NOSENKO is unaware of SHULGINA's work with LEVINE and DRIBERG, and 06 was not involved when KUNGAROVA was targetted against and 08,03 married CIA agent Philip NIELSEN. NOSENKO's familiarity with the nine agents he named appears to be that which would be acquired second-hand, not through personal contact as he claimed.

With respect to YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, the evidence does not sustain NOSENKO's claim that he was their case officer in every operation from their recruitment in 1957 until their retirement in 1962-1963. He is unfamiliar with either agent's background. He cannot say where either of them lived or, indeed, how he got in touch with them when he required their services. With the exception of the W.E. 06 JOHNSON compromise in 1962 (see p.268), all of VOLKOV's and

4BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

YEFREMOV's known activities with respect to Americans took place in the course of less than twelve months in 1959-1960. It is probable that NOSENKO's claim that he was their sole case officer during even this relatively brief period is also false. In the period April-November 1959, apparently unknown to NOSENKO, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were involved with one Dutch and five American visitors (including three CIA agents) in the Soviet Union. Further, in other contexts NOSENKO has described their involvement with 06 Americans MATLAW (see p.419) and KARLOV in 1959, 06 of which NOSENKO only learned when he retired VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's file in 1962-1963. KARLOV was a Swedish, not an American, citizen.] 06

Operational Activities (1955-1958) Tourist Section Case Officer

According to NOSENKO, he was among the first case officers to arrive in the Seventh Department Tourist Section when it was being formed. He took part with other officers in the acquisition of an agent network from within Inturist, in the establishment of facilities and methods, and generally "getting things going". After several months, he participated in what he says was his first operation against an American tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-the-scenes (and hence unconfirmed) and unsuccessful attempt to compromise American student Martin MALIA. 06 NOSENKO's next case (the first operation in which his participation is confirmed) took place a year later, in June 1956, when he assisted in the homosexual entrapment and recruitment of Professor 06 Richard BURGI. Sometime in 1957, he said, he was personally 06 involved in the attempted recruitment of the German business- 11 GEHRCKENS and in the sexual and blackmarket entrapment of 06 SUNDAR, a Norwegian 11 journalist. [Both GEHRCKENS 06 and SUNDAR 06 admitted to having been the object of KGB recruitment attempts, the former reluctantly in a private interview, and the latter publicly in the press. It has been possible to question neither in detail.] NOSENKO's presence in the third "operation" in 1957 is confirmed: he accompanied the

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

08, 06

British publisher Sir Allen LANE and the latter's interpreter 06 BIRSE on a tour of Soviet publishing houses. According to NOSENKO, it was for the purpose of observing 06 BIRSE, a suspected British intelligence agent. 08

Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955) 06

NOSENKO's Information

06

Martin MALIA, a graduate student, spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was suspected by the KGB of having connections with American Intelligence. Toward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA was observed in 06 contact with a Soviet citizen believed to be a homosexual. The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and NOSENKO eventually obtained a confession that he had had homosexual relations 06 with MALIA. NOSENKO arranged for the Soviet to introduce 06 MALIA to a KGB homosexual agent, and the latter enticed 06 MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow. NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in touch with MALIA) when 06 the introductions were made in a Moscow restaurant, and from an observation point in a neighboring hotel room he watched 06 the KGB agent and MALIA in homosexual practices. MALIA 06 insisted on the lights being turned off, however, and it was impossible to obtain compromising photographs (the KGB did not yet have infrared photographic equipment) and therefore no recruitment approach was made to MALIA. 06 During this and a later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "very cautious", 06 and the KGB never succeeded in exploiting MALIA's homosexuality for a recruitment approach. 06

06

Comment: MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence officer during World War II, visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and twice in 1962. While buying books for the Library of Congress and several universities 06 in 1955, MALIA travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, an event sufficiently unusual at the time to be publicized in the Soviet press. On 1955 and 1962 trips he had contacts with dissident Soviet citizens and he smuggled to the West literature for publishing

NS/BR

Comment: (Continued) abroad. In December 1963 06 MALIA was the object of an attack in the Soviet press which charged that during 1962 he had "spent his time in Mosocw looking for dissension in the ranks of young intellectuals at drunken debauches". 06 MALIA was then in periodic contact with CIA; in the spring of 1963 he denied having had any involvement with blackmarketeers, homosexuals, or females inside the Soviet Union. 06 MALIA has not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's allegations.

06

Recruitment of BURGI (1956)

At the first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO gave a brief account of the recruitment of Richard BURGI, a 06 08 Yale professor. The recruitment was effected on the basis of a homosexual provocation operation which began in Moscow and culminated with an approach in Kiev in June 1956.

This recruitment, which occurred close in time to the death of NOSENKO's father, was by NOSENKO's later accounts a turning point in his personal and professional life. From it, NOSENKO said he acquired a sense of self-confidence and responsibility and began to "grow" from a wastrel into an effective and successful KGB officer. As a result of this operation, the first successful recruitment in the then short history of the Tourist Section, NOSENKO asserted he first came into personal contact with General GRIBANOV. According to all accounts he gave prior to October 1966, when he retracted the claim, NOSENKO received the first of a series of KGB awards for operational performance because 06 of the BURGI case--a letter of commendation. Within a month of this operation, NOSENKO said, he was promoted from the rank of lieutenant to captain.

0001385

7/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO stated that at the time of 06 BURGI's arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application (anketa), "maybe" an excerpt from a cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying that a visa had been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving BURGI's 06 anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary inside the Soviet Union, and the results of file checks of the KGB main Archives and of the First Chief Directorate Archives. NOSENKO himself ran the file checks, which proved to be negative; there was no information on record concerning 06 BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the 06 material available on BURGI, no other checks were made. 06 The KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact 08 that he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefore had contact with students who might eventually work for the U.S. State Department, American Intelligence, and for other target organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested an attempt to recruit him.

06
When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in contact with a number of KGB agents, and their reports were placed in an informal file maintained by NOSENKO. NOSENKO could not recall how many such agents there may have been, their names, or what they might have reported concerning 06 BURGI. 06 (BURGI had an Inturist interpreter but NOSENKO did not know whether he was a KGB agent.) From some source, name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB obtained indications that 06 BURGI was a homosexual, and it was decided to try to obtain grounds for recruitment by homosexual compromise. NOSENKO therefore approached Yu. A. LOPUKHOV, an officer of the British Department who handled the homosexual agent Viktor BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use BELANOVSKIY in setting up the compromise. After permission had been received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV and NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make 06 BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met BURGI, the 06 fact of common homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was 06 invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the adjoining room and directed the compromise, although he did not meet BURGI at this time.
06

14, BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the compromising photographs were ready by the following day. A report of the compromise and a request for permission to attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors. The request came back with the approving signatures of O.M. GRIBANOV and A.S. FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Department of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed interest in using BURGI 06 in the United States. 06 BURGI's itinerary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there to prepare the operation. BURGI arrived the next 06 morning and was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist cover.

In accordance 06 with the operational plan, the local KGB officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels in Kiev were full at the moment because of various conferences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about a day in a private apartment in the center of town; he would be moved to a hotel as soon as possible. When the car arrived at the apartment building in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer, and (fnu) RASTYKAITE, a woman housekeeper, were waiting for them. NOSENKO could not 06 remember how or whether he introduced himself to BURGI. The recruitment conversation, he said, was handled by "KOZLOV-NOSENKO", but NOSENKO had forgotten by 1965 who said what:

> "I don't remember what I talked about and I don't remember what KOZLOV talked about. Many things were discussed. It started with how he liked his stay in the Soviet Union... Then we slowly proceeded to say how unfortunate it was that information had been received about his conduct in Moscow. We told him that his homosexual activities were known, that this was punishable under Soviet law according to article so-and-so of the criminal code, etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court according to the Soviet law... Well, he was scared, confused, upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly proceeded to say that everything could be smoothed

5/BR

> out, and the basis was prepared for the man to say: 'All right, I agree to help'... We showed him the pictures. He was embarrassed of course--he was naked. Then we prepared the basis: 'You have a noble task. You teach; you have students; the students may become future specialists on Russia or may work as diplomats, etc., but many of these students can be used by intelligence. They may be sent somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will tell us who among the students is preparing for government service, how they are distributed, etc.'... During the first conversation everything was made completely clear... He was not at all willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence. He was told that he must understand that in this case 'helping Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term. I remember that I told him: 'Understand, nobody is going to ask you that you help our friends over there, or me, if I should be there, or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subversive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.' After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to
> 11 Italy, to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and 08 11
> here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this school. He told us a bit about
> 08 the Russicum and we asked him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the professors who teach Russian subjects..."

According to NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five 06
hours; at its end BURGI signed a short statement that he agreed "to assist the organs of Soviet Intelligence". (NOSENKO first said that it was he who took this statement
06 from BURGI but later he could not remember whether it was he or KOZLOV.) BURGI was then taken to a hotel.

06 06

This was the first time NOSENKO met BURGI. Following the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor above
06 BURGI, and for the remainder of BURGI's stay in Kiev became 06
his constant companion and guide. An attempt was made "to smooth out all the dirty business that had been brought up during the recruitment talk". NOSENKO took BURGI to an old 06

cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in nearby Kaniv. The subject of homosexuality was not raised again. From 06 Kiev, BURGI left the Soviet Union without returning to Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had visited the American Department of the First Chief Directorate and had arranged with its chief, FEKLISOV, for a recontact plan in New York City should BURGI be recruited. BURGI was 06 06 instructed how to use a recognition signal for a first meeting in the New York Public Library.

About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO turned over all his materials on the BURGI operation to 06 the First Chief Directorate. Somewhat later Sergey GUSKOV, Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, KOZLOV, and NOSENKO visited American Department Chief FEKLISOV in the First Chief Directorate and expressed an interest in further developments in the case. FEKLISOV told them that 06 BURGI had been observed to arrive for the first meeting but the KGB refrained from establishing contact. The first actual meeting in New York City took place the second or third 06 time BURGI appeared, and a KGB officer of the New York Legal Residency continued to meet with him until the revolution in Hungary in late [October] 1956, when BURGI refused to colla- 06 borate further. NOSENKO later heard from someone in the American Department, First Chief Directorate that the case was closed. For their roles in this first recruitment of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO said he and KOZLOV received letters of commendation and bonuses of one month's pay by order of SEROV, Chairman of the KGB; PETRENKO was given a letter of commendation and half a month's salary; and even RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation.

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, had also taken part in this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was the responsible case officer. In August 1965, when asked who had recruited BURGI, NOSENKO replied: 06 "KOZLOV and NOSENKO." Asked who recruited him first, NOSENKO said: "KOZLOV, naturally. He was the Deputy Chief of the Department. The collection of the materials [in preparation for the approach] was in the hands of Case Officer NOSENKO."

(81BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: In a 22 November 1957 interview with the FBI, 06 [BURGI] had recounted how he was compromised and recruited by the KGB while in the USSR in June 1956. His version substantially confirmed that provided eight years later by NOSENKO. 06 [BURGI] asserted (contrary to NOSENKO's account) that the KGB officers knew a good deal more about him than what might have been acquired 06 during [BURGI]'s visit to the USSR, including 06 details of [BURGI]'s close relatives, his work 08 10 with the [Russicum] in [Rome], his earlier travel to Brazil, his military service in Korea, and his acquaintance with Alexander KERENSKY. 06 On 25 May 1964 [BURGI] positively identified NOSENKO (from a photograph) as being the junior of the two KGB officers who recruited him. The other KGB officer (KOZLOV) was "the controlling figure and was in command". 06 The [BURGI] case is the earliest confirmed instance of NOSENKO's participation in a KGB operation. See p.39 for comment on the 06 relevance of the [BURGI] case to the period of NOSENKO's claimed service in the Seventh Department.

06 NOSENKO's claim that [BURGI]'s compromise and recruitment was based only on information routinely acquired from [BURGI]'s visa application 06 and from apparently chance meetings with KGB agents on his arrival in Moscow, is contradicted by [BURGI]'s description of the 06 KGB's familiarity with his personal life. NOSENKO cannot sustain his claim of having personally traced [BURGI] through First Chief 06 [Foreign Intelligence] Directorate files (the probable repository of information on [BURGI] 06 which the KGB recruiting officers used). NOSENKO, as described elsewhere, is unfamiliar with the mechanics of KGB tracing procedures. 06 According to [BURGI]'s statement and NOSENKO's own eventual admission, NOSENKO lied when he

0001390

TS No. 197124

Copy 15/8R

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: (Continued) 06
first claimed to have recruited BURGI unaided. NOSENKO has subsequently retracted all claims regarding the effect of this case on his career: Contrary to his earlier assertions, he now says it won him neither awards nor promotion.

06

Attempted Recruitment of GEHRCKENS (1957)

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO made an unsuccessful recruitment approach in 1957 08, 06 to Hamburg shipping executive Hans GEHRCKENS, on the basis 06 of GEHRCKENS' commercial ventures in the USSR. The responsible case officer originally was A.I. VERENIKIN of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department; this section was then responsible for operations against foreign seamen. Since VERENIKIN spoke 08 no German and GEHRCKENS was known to speak 06 English, NOSENKO was selected to make the approach because he "knew English a little". When asked why a German- 08 speaking KGB case officer was not used, NOSENKO answered: "The higher-ups said 'go work on this case', and that was all." After being rebuffed by GEHRCKENS, NOSENKO saw him 06 several more times during the 1957 visit to Moscow, but when NOSENKO attempted to renew contact upon GEHRCKENS' return 06 to the Soviet Union in 1958, the latter refused to see him.

06

Comment: GEHRCKENS was interviewed by CIA on 19 July 1965, and, while generally uncooperative, described a "mild approach" in Moscow during 1956 or 1957 which may be the one described by NOSENKO. (He was not questioned on the identities of the Soviets involved.) GEHRCKENS 06 continues to have extensive business contacts with Soviet commercial representatives in West 11 Germany and was recently reported to have

0001391

TS No. 197124
Copy 10

12/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: (Continued) 08
negotiated a sizable shipping contract with the Soviet Union shortly after a visit to the USSR. His principal contact at the Soviet Trade Mission in Cologne has been a GRU officer.
10

06 06
Contact with LANE and BIRSE (1957)

NOSENKO's Information

06
The British subject Sir Allen LANE travelled in the summer of 1957 to the Soviet Union to visit various publishing houses and brought with him as an interpreter Arthur BIRSE. 06 The latter was of Russian extraction, having left Petrograd (Leningrad) before the Revolution, and he served in British 29 Intelligence during the Second World War. The case was handled by another section of the Seventh Department, but 06 because of BIRSE's past, "some of our leaders decided that it would be good if one of our workers could approach him, would get in on the case under the cover of the Ministry of Culture, who would take care of this person, who would help him meet with all sorts of people representing our publishing companies. The choice fell to me. I was chosen for this job." Taking along the KGB agent Larissa SOBOROVA as an interpreter and using the alias "NIKOLAYEV", NOSENKO 06 06 accompanied BIRSE and LANE in Moscow and Leningrad during their stay there. The only object was to watch BIRSE 06 because he was suspected of having an intelligence mission, and no approach was made or contemplated. NOSENKO explained that the use of the NIKOLAYEV alias with BIRSE and LANE made 06 06 it necessary for him to use the same name when travelling to Great Britain in 1957 and in 1958.

06
Comment: LANE was interviewed subsequent to NOSENKO's defection, and he was able to identify NOSENKO's photograph as that of a "Russian official he met in Moscow who was introduced to him as "NIKOLAYEV". LANE said that he could remember
06

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: (Continued)
nothing in particular about NIKOLAYEV except that he appeared a "friendly, helpful man who had opened up considerably towards the end of my visit to Moscow in July 1957".

NOSENKO seems unaware of the probable basis for KGB interest in BIRSE. 06 Born of Scottish 08 parents in pre-revolutionary Petrograd, BIRSE 10, 06 served with the British Military Mission in 29 Moscow during World War II and was interpreter 06 for Churchill during the latter's meeting 06 with Stalin. He was the official interpreter 08 for the Royal Commission investigating the revelations of KGB officers Vladimir PETROV and his wife, who defected in 1954 in Australia. NOSENKO apparently does not know that BIRSE 06 returned on similar trips to Moscow in 1958 and 1959 (while NOSENKO was still in the Tourist Section) and that in the latter year two KGB officers attempted to recruit him.

06

Recruitment of Egil SUNDAR (1957)

NOSENKO's Information

08, 06

In 1957 or 1958 a Norwegian journalist, (fnu) SUNDAR, visited the Soviet Union and an attempt was made to recruit him. A Second Chief Directorate officer, N.A. ARKHIPOV, 06 made SUNDAR's acquaintance and handled the entire operation against him, but NOSENKO himself played a rôle. NOSENKO presented himself to SUNDAR, 06 using the name "SMIRNOV" or "SERGEYEV" and posing as a painter, and told SUNDAR that he 06 could find women for him. A party was arranged with a KGB 06 agent as SUNDAR's date and a Second Chief Directorate secretary as NOSENKO's. Late in the evening NOSENKO and his date excused themselves, and SUNDAR had sexual relations with the 06 female agent. Photographs of the scene were taken by the KGB. When NOSENKO and SUNDAR saw one another the next day, 06 06 SUNDAR announced that he had some articles, cameras and the like, that he wanted to sell on the blackmarket. NOSENKO

17188

06
offered to arrange the sale and took SUNDAR to a dingy section of Moscow. As they arrived before a small house, 06 NOSENKO asked SUNDAR to give him the things to be sold. At this moment a KGB officer posing as a militiaman approached and arrested the two for blackmarketeering. At the Militia 06 station, SUNDAR was recruited by K.N. DUBAS, then Chief of the Seventh Department, under threat of imprisonment. There was no further contact with SUNDAR after he left the USSR, 06 however, because on his return to Oslo he published an 10 article in which he described his experiences, "but not all of them".

06, 08, 10

Comment: Egil SUNDAR, a journalist for Aftenposten in Oslo, travelled to the USSR in December 1957 as a member of a press delegation in connection with the opening of a new SAS air route to 29 Moscow. 06 SUNDAR wrote an article on his return in which he described his arrest for blackmarket activities and his subsequent recruitment; he also reported this to Norwegian authorities. 06 According to SUNDAR, he was introduced to Moscow blackmarketeers by an artist, whose name he did not know, and was apprehended immediately afterwards. SUNDAR has not been 06 interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's information.

Travel to London (1957-1958)

NOSENKO reported that his first official travel outside the Soviet Union was in 1957 when he was selected to accompany a group of athletes who had been invited to visit London. As he explained, it was a KGB order that a security officer accompany any such delegation. [NOSENKO elsewhere cited this KGB practice, but later denied any such order was issued]. The Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate (responsible for designating Second Chief Directorate

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

officers for this purpose) telephoned K.N. DUBAS, Chief of the Seventh Department, to request an officer who spoke English. DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether he wanted to make the trip. NOSENKO replied: "Why not? I have never been abroad yet." NOSENKO consequently travelled to London, using the alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as "the deputy chief" of the delegation. He was specifically instructed to observe one member of the delegation, a woman named MYARIMYAYE, whose father had been killed in a Soviet prison and whose political reliability was uncertain. Additionally, he had the general task of watching all members of the delegation for possibly suspicious contacts with foreigners. The delegation consisted of approximately 60 persons and to help him in carrying out these duties, NOSENKO was assigned three or four agents and several operational contacts among the delegation members. He was the only KGB security officer which accompanied the group.

The second trip to London took place a year later, in the fall of 1958, again as a security escort. This time he accompanied a delegation of eleven or twelve boxers, and again he used the alias NIKOLAYEV and the cover position of deputy chief of the delegation. NOSENKO said he was the only security officer with the delegation, and he had two agents and two operational contacts among the boxers. His assignment was general; no one in particular was kept under observation, and the KGB had no derogatory information concerning any member of the delegation.

NOSENKO used the NIKOLAYEV alias for travel to London because it was the alias used earlier with the British subjects BIRSE and LANE. NOSENKO explained this situation as follows:

06 06

> 06 06
>
> "With BIRSE and LANE I used the name NIKOLAYEV, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative of the Ministry of Culture. And then when the question was raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to England, I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEV. Because [of this] I went as the assistant head of the delegation, again representing the Ministry of Culture. I didn't go under my own name because it was decided that when these people BIRSE and LANE
>
> 06 06

0001385

6/8R

went back to England, they would tell who they were with [report their contacts in the USSR]. They would probably question BIRSE especially, as one 06 who used to work in intelligence... BIRSE would 06 say: 'There was this man from the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV. He was with us all the time, even went to Leningrad with us.' So they would say: 'How does he look [what does he look like]?' He would say: 'He looked so-and-so.' I'd go there, and they would look at me and say: 'How come this man--his name is NOSENKO, and yet he is very similar to the one described by BIRSE.' That was 06 why it was decided I have to go again under the name NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable."

Comment: That NOSENKO (as NIKOLAYEV) took the trips is corroborated by British records, according to 11 which, a Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV, born 30 October 1927, arrived at London from Brussels on 20 August 1957. His visa application described him as a member of a group invited by the Light Athletics Association to participate in contests in London. He left on 27 August 1957. With the same name and date of birth, NIKOLAYEV arrived again at London on 12 October 1958 with seventeen others, all described as boxers. His visa application described him as an "office worker", but on his landing card, NIKOLAYEV was listed as a boxer. He left London on 19 October 1958. On neither visit did NIKOLAYEV attract the attention of any British security service. 29

While these trips are corroborated, they are not material to NOSENKO's claims to have served in the KGB positions he alleges he held at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Operational Activities (1958-1960)
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section

According to NOSENKO, the Seventh Department was reorganized in June 1958, and NOSENKO's section, which theretofore had been concerned with operations against foreign tourists from all countries, was split into two new sections, one concerned with tourists from the United States and the British Commonwealth and the other with tourists from Europe, Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO claimed that at that time he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, "the most important section of the Seventh Department".

In September 1958, he claimed to have personally recruited
06 Gisella HARRIS. It was also in 1958, he said, that he supervised the sexual entrapment of Virgil KRAFT, 06 although Seventh Department Chief DUBAS made the actual approach. Beginning in the spring of 1959 he said he directed his agents YEFREMOV
06,06,06,06 and VOLKOV in a series of successful entrapments--DREW, LUKIS, WILBY, TAYLOR, and MERTENS. 06 NOSENKO stated that he also
08,06,06 used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLERFORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, he recruited the Moscow representative of the American Express Company, FRIPPEL. 29,06 NOSENKO claimed that his operational success during 1959 earned him a commendation from the KGB Chairman. [He has since retracted all claims to any awards earned during his KGB service.] It was because of his position as Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO said, that he first became involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

NOSENKO asserted that the recruitment of agents among foreign tourists was secondary to his department's principal mission, the detection of Western intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the Soviet Union. In line with that counterintelligence mission, on General GRIBANOV's order in the fall of 1959, NOSENKO

6/BR

reviewed what the KGB knew through 1958 about the use of tourists and tourist cover by Western intelligence services. It was from this task that NOSENKO claimed he learned of all the important arrests and recruitments among American tourists as recorded by the KGB at the time.

06

Recruitment of [HARRIS] (1958)

NOSENKO's Information

06

29,10 NOSENKO in 1958 recruited [Gisella HARRIS], an employee of the [American Express Company in Salt Lake City]. The recruitment was based on her romantic and sexual involvement with a Soviet citizen, who told [HARRIS] that he was in trouble 06 with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to accompany him to the police. [HARRIS] agreed to meet and cooperate with 06 the KGB in [Salt Lake City]. The case was turned over to the 10 First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any further contact with her.

06, 08

Comment: [HARRIS, a former German citizen], visited the USSR on a tourist visa in 1958. According to statements made to the FBI in 1958, the purpose of her visit was to contact her former lover, a Soviet soldier who had fathered her child in 11 [Germany] in 1953. She hoped to persuade him to divorce his Soviet wife and marry her. She described her recruitment by two men, one of whom resembled NOSENKO. When shown a photograph in 1964, she tentatively identified NOSENKO as one of the men who recruited her and said that, of the two involved, he "was definitely the man in charge" while the other "was merely present and listened". According 06 to [HARRIS], she has had no further contact with Soviet intelligence.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Compromise of KRAFT 06

NOSENKO's Information

06, 08

Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the Chicago area, with his wife visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in 1957 or 1958, and NOSENKO was assigned as the responsible case officer. 06 The KGB learned KRAFT had been intimate with a Soviet woman during an earlier trip to the USSR, and NOSENKO arranged for her to come to Moscow from Leningrad, where she was then living, in order to compromise KRAFT. 06 KRAFT and the Soviet 06 woman were intimate in the latter's room in the Grand Hotel. Photographs were taken, and then militiamen broke into the 06 room, finding KRAFT and the woman unclothed. NOSENKO was in a nearby room, supervising the operation. The recruitment approach was then made by DUBAS, the Chief of the Seventh Department. (NOSENKO had been the case officer and had handled the operation, but he took no part in the confrontation or recruitment approach "because DUBAS wanted it for himself".) Although the recruitment was not firm, KRAFT 06 and DUBAS "had an agreement" that nothing would be done about the compromise if KRAFT did not criticize the Soviet 06 Union in lectures about his trip which he was to give in the United States. DUBAS again contacted KRAFT when he came 06 to Moscow in 1963, and afterwards his file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO recalled that the First Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was not in a good 06 region of the United States. And also it smelled like he had spoken of the approach made to him." Therefore, NOSENKO concluded, he probably had not been contacted in the United States.

Comment: According to the FBI, some time before 1960 06 KRAFT wrote a pamphlet in which he described the KGB approach, omitting reference to his sexual compromise. In a statement given to the FBI on 4 November 1964, KRAFT, who is an 06

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: (Continued) 08,10
Associate Pastor of the Peoples Church in Chicago, stated that he had visited the Soviet Union in 1956, 1958, and 1963. He confirmed NOSENKO's information in detail except that he denied having been intimate with the Soviet woman involved. He related that the "Chief" who interviewed him had "several photographs which portrayed him and the female in intimate compromising positions and which appeared to have been taken in her hotel room". KRAFT said 06 that he had told the "Chief" that they could do him no possible harm as "no one would believe that they were valid photographs". KRAFT denied 06 agreeing to collaborate with the KGB at any time.

06

Recruitment of DREW (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

06

George DREW, an American who visited the Soviet Union in the spring of 1959, was the responsibility of case officer V.V. IVANOV. By chance, however, DREW became involved with 06 NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV and they reported this to NOSENKO, then the Deputy Chief of the section. NOSENKO and IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the Section Chief, and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad to make the approach. (IVANOV was not judged qualified.) NOSENKO arranged for DREW to be 06 compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homosexual agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer PERELETOV. Using the alias "Mr. SERGEYEV", NOSENKO alone 06 recruited DREW in an office of the hotel. The KGB First Chief Directorate was interested in DREW's recruitment 06 because he might be able to spot other homosexuals, possibly some in the U.S. Government.

(9/8R)

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

Comment: DREW reported the approach in 1959, describing a four-hour interrogation by "SERGEYEV' in Leningrad and generally confirming NOSENKO's account of the operation. Re-interviewed by the FBI on 12 May 1964, DREW identified NOSENKO's 06 photograph as that of his interrogator and said that, although NOSENKO was a young man, from the way everyone reacted to him it was clear that he was the man in charge. Another man was present, DREW said.

06

06

Recruitment of LUKIS (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

In June or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited a British subject, (fnu) LUKIS (or LUCAS), in a room of the 06 Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after LUKIS had been compromised 06 by NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. The case was then turned over to Ye. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief of the British Department of the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did not know its current status, but he believed the KGB has not been in contact with LUKIS subsequently.

06

06

Comment: LUKIS has not yet been identified by the British services. 29

06

Recruitment of WILBY (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

06

By himself NOSENKO recruited William Stanley WILBY in a hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after WILBY had been compro- 06 mised by either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, NOSENKO's homosexual agents. WILBY is a British citizen and his case was also 06 (like LUKIS, see above) turned over to TARABRIN.

06

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06 11

Comment: WILBY reported the approach to British authorities in 1959, saying that he was "brought up before SERGEYEV" (an operational alias sometimes used by NOSENKO). He has not been re-interviewed since NOSENKO's information was received.

06

Recruitment of TAYLOR (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO personally and alone recruited the Moscow representative of British European Airways, whose name 29 NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow during the summer of 1959, possibly in August. The approach was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV.

NOSENKO explained that the Seventh Department in 1959 had a section dealing with commercial representatives, which was responsible for the BEA man. That section had asked NOSENKO's section for help. 29

> "They said they didn't have any agents or anything and didn't know what to do. So somebody said, 'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the section? He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange everything for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report to him."

[In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy chief of the section.]

5/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: 06 David TAYLOR confessed homosexual, is described by British services as a neurotic 29 type who had been discharged from the R.A.F. 29 on grounds of mental instability. In 1962 (before the NOSENKO lead was received) TAYLOR admitted his recruitment to British authorities, 11 indicating that it took place in August 1959 on the basis of his homosexuality. He reported in 1962 that the recruitment had been effected by a "Colonel SERGEYEV", and when re-interviewed in 1964, he "unhesitantly identified NOSENKO as 'Colonel SERGEYEV'," adding that the mere sight of NOSENKO's photograph "sent shivers down his back". TAYLOR also identified a photograph of VOLKOV.

Recruitment of 06 MERTENS (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

06 Gerard MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or August 1959. NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, seeking out American homosexuals, accidentally 06 met MERTENS in Moscow and reported their suspicions to NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and requested authority to take compromising photographs in preparation for a recruitment approach, and DUBAS, his chief, then assigned the case to him. (MERTENS had been 06 the responsibility of A.A. VETLITSKIY, another case officer.) 06 Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between VOLKOV and MERTENS on two separate occasions in Moscow. 06 When MERTENS later travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested" by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged in relations with a KGB homosexual agent from Odessa, whom NOSENKO had arranged by phone to bring to Uzhgorod. [He did not recall his name, and could only supply CIA with a physical description.] MERTENS was then brought before 06 NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with

1118R

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

MERTENS when he visited Lvov and Minsk before leaving the USSR. NOSENKO said that he had used the name "George" with 06 MERTENS, but he could not recall what last name he had given him.

When he related the case in 1962, NOSENKO could not recall the American's name. In 1964 he stated the name was MARTIN, or MARTINS.

06 06

Comment: In a signed statement given to the FBI on 5 August 1964, MERTENS, an American professor, 06 generally confirmed NOSENKO's account. He names his recruiter as one "George PETERSON" and stated that NOSENKO's photograph might be that of a person whom he had met while visiting the Soviet Union in 1959. MERTENS 06 reported one KGB attempt to recontact him after he returned to the United States. In September 1959, according to arrangements made at the time of his recruitment, he received a letter signed "George PETERSON" telling him to be at a rendezvous point in New York. By the time he received the letter, however, the date of the meeting had already passed and so he ignored it. MERTENS claimed 06 that there were no further attempts by the Soviets to contact him.

06

Compromise of BARRETT (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

06 08

Robert BARRETT, a guide at the U.S. Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, had become friendly with the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV whom he met at the fairground. Although 08 06 BARRETT was not an active homosexual, VOLKOV succeeded after a long period of development in involving him in homosexual acts, which were photographed by KGB personnel from an adjoining hotel room. As case officer for VOLKOV and YEFREMOV,

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise, was present when the photographs were taken, and he has described the occasion in detail. (There was much complaining among the photographic technicians because of the amount of time they spent waiting for VOLKOV to succeed in his mission, and NOSENKO recalled that he provided them with drinks and treated them well because they were a big help to him in this operation.) The photographs were good, but the KGB was unable to use them in 1959 because of a general ban placed by the Central Committee on the recruitment of U.S. Exhibition guides due to Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union. 08

06

NOSENKO reported that BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 photography when he returned with another exhibition in 1961. The recruitment was carried out by the First (American) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was not involved.

Comment: Immediately on his return to the United States in January 1962, BARRETT confessed to the FBI 06 that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of photographs depicting him in a homosexual act with VOLKOV, which had been taken during his 1959 trip to Moscow. He claimed that the photographs had been taken while he was unconscious, after being drugged. BARRETT was 06 contacted once by the KGB in New York City following his admissions to the FBI. He was contacted by KGB officers, including SKVORTSOV of the First Chief Directorate, during later trips to the Soviet Union in 1963, 1964, and 1965 and arrangements were made for meetings in the United States. No Soviets appeared at such scheduled meetings.

0001405

4/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

Compromise of WILLERFORD (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

06, 11, 08 06

Frederick WILLERFORD, an American Negro, was BARRETT's 08 roommate during the 1959 exhibition in Moscow. Initially he was a target of the Moscow City KGB Directorate which 06 believed WILLERFORD to be an FBI agent and had been collecting information on him. Unaware of the interest of the other KGB element, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had made WILLERFORD's 06 acquaintance, and NOSENKO had arranged for compromising photographs to be taken of WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV in a Moscow 06 hotel room. NOSENKO watched WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV through 06 a two-way mirror and was able to describe the scene in detail. It was only after these compromising photographs had been obtained that NOSENKO learned of the Moscow City KGB Directorate's interest in WILLERFORD. 06 NOSENKO's own department and the Moscow City Directorate then made a joint request for operational approval to recruit WILLERFORD, but 06 permission was refused because of the ban on recruitment attempts at the time. The case file was retained by the Moscow KGB organization, and NOSENKO did not know whether WILLERFORD was approached subsequently.
06

06

Comment: WILLERFORD was interviewed by the FBI in July 1964 and "advised emphatically that he had never been compromised by anyone nor did he feel that he ever could be compromised by anyone except through the use of drugs, since he felt that he was 'too smart' and most Soviets that he has ever met are aware of his pro-American sentiments". BARRETT has reported 06 06 that WILLERFORD had visited VOLKOV in his hotel room and was friendly with him. 06 BARRETT said that he had often wondered if WILLERFORD was a 06 homosexual because of his manner and bearing.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Recruitment of 06 FRIPPEL (1959-1963)

As a member of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO in 1959 personally participated in the recruitment 29 of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, 06 Arsene FRIPPEL. He continued to be one of this agent's two KGB handlers, even after transferring to the American Department in 1960. 06 FRIPPEL left Moscow in 1961 but returned on trips to the USSR in 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO met him. The only recruited American whom NOSENKO ever claimed to handle, FRIPPEL confessed to his recruitment 06 when questioned by the FBI on the basis of the NOSENKO lead. 06 Although the FRIPPEL case only started during NOSENKO's first assignment to the Seventh Department (1955-1960), it is described in its entirety through 1963, for the convenience of the reader.

NOSENKO's Information

At his second meeting with CIA in Geneva on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO described the circumstances in which an unnamed foreigner was compromised by a KGB female agent, Klara Konstantinovna GORBACHEVA. He described the scene in detail including the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion pictures through a two-way mirror, and the confrontation of the foreigner by the militiamen, who broke into the room. NOSENKO identified that foreigner as FRIPPEL by name the 06 following day while discussing KGB successes in Moscow:

> "There was another agent, [KGB cryptonym] 'Artur'. He was not a correspondent. He knew me as George, Yuriy Ivanovich, and my last name as NIKOLAYEV. He was a permanent representative, not in the Embassy, but of the American Express Company in Moscow. 29 06 FRIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPEL. He liked drinking, always drank. He was also strongly attracted to women. I provided him with beautiful women... Well, we decided to have a talk with him. Why? What could he give? He now works in the American Express 29 Company [main office in New York City]. A new

0001407

10/BR

department has now been organized for the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. And he is chief of the department... He is no longer in Moscow, but he was here two and a half or three years. We hope that he will return. We are waiting for him to come back. We know that the company wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian language very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this 06 FRIPPEL. And he also did a good and intelligent job of establishing relations with Inturist. He had very good relationships with ANKUDINOV, the Chairman of Inturist, and with other people, both the chiefs and the low-level workers... But, why was FRIPPEL 06 recruited? I was interested in knowing precisely by whom, by name, and how approaches were being made to our delegations [in the United States]. I was interested in him from the point of view of counter-intelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of approaches are taking place to our people in America and by whom? This is what interested me. But he didn't know anything. He provided only superficial information, nothing more."

06

NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEL would not have been useful for coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union. He replied no, that the KGB had already had great success in this by other means.

In Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made additional statements concerning the FRIPPEL case.
06

06

NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the FRIPPEL recruitment as follows:

"In 1958, after 1958, when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area of activity was narrowed down. I didn't handle all the tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of the section and I had my own little area--for example, the permanent representative of the American Express Company 29 and besides that I began to collect all the material on all American tourist firms which have anything to do with Inturist and which send tourists to the USSR."

6/38R

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he did not do so alone. Col. V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later Chief) of the Seventh Department, was present, and he and NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in early September 1959. NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL's case officer. 06

06

NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL until January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at FRIPPEL's home, where 06 06 they met Mrs. FRIPPEL. 06 Odette FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent, and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with 06 FRIPPEL. Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that he went because he "was invited", and CHELNOKOV went "because he was also involved in the recruitment".

As Deputy Chief of a Tourist section of the Seventh Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels and 06 restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time I 06 met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with CHELNOKOV." Usually NOSENKO would arrange meetings with 06 FRIPPEL at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continued to meet with FRIPPEL, 06 despite his lack of production, because they "kept hoping he would give something". (In a different context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO explained that GRIBANOV insisted that even Department Chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate must each have two or three agents.)

When NOSENKO began to work in the American Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960, he took FRIPPEL 06 06 with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Americans at the Embassy. NOSENKO questioned FRIPPEL about the Embassy and about Embassy officers George WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO anything useful.

06

CCC1409

(1418R)

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06
NOSENKO continued to act as FRIPPEL's case officer after
06 FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union and after NOSENKO had been
transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy Chief
of the Seventh Department. He met twice with FRIPPEL during 06
this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as 06
a guide with groups of foreign visitors. Both of these
meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, without CHELNOKOV.

The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962, after
NOSENKO returned to Moscow from Geneva. FRIPPEL arrived 06
in the Soviet Union as a guide for some American journalists.
(NOSENKO was unable to give the composition of the journalist group or to recall where they stayed in Moscow and
where else they travelled in the Soviet Union.) NOSENKO
contacted him in Moscow to learn what questions the newsmen
intended to ask Khrushchev during a scheduled interview;
[subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice
required visiting journalists to submit their intended
questions for Khrushchev in writing to Soviet authorities
prior to interviews]. After the interview, he recontacted
06 FRIPPEL to learn the reaction of the journalists to their
talk with the Soviet leader. NOSENKO could not recall their
specific reaction to the Khrushchev interview but did
remember that they were "satisfied". Another reason for
06 contacting FRIPPEL, NOSENKO added in a later discussion,
was to learn whether any of the journalists might have
joined the group at the last moment in the United States,
which might suggest intelligence connections on their part.

06
NOSENKO met FRIPPEL alone for the second and last time
during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for tourists 06
aboard the ship "Olympia", which stopped for a day in Yalta
and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Moscow and accosted
06 FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where the tourists were
having dinner. Finally able to get away from his group,
06 FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's hotel room, and
the two drank and talked. NOSENKO had given FRIPPEL a 06
bottle of vodka as a gift, and FRIPPEL said he wanted to 06
give NOSENKO some whisky in return. They drove in NOSENKO's
car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while
06 FRIPPEL went aboard for the whisky. (He had invited NOSENKO
to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.)

141BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

When FRIPPEL returned, he brought another American, so NOSENKO had to invent for himself a suitable cover (Inturist) on the spot. The three returned to the hotel and drank some more, everyone getting drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL 06 reported "nothing of importance", and his most interesting news was that he might again be reassigned to Moscow in December 1963 as the American Express Company representative. 29 (NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been 06 assigned elsewhere, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent would return to Moscow. This report was submitted by V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City, who was a former Second Chief Directorate colleague of NOSENKO.)

06

FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when 06 FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.

On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV papers (see p.309) in Geneva, NOSENKO was asked about the following passage dealing with FRIPPEL which appeared in 06 the KGB operational plan against BOWDEN:

> "He [BOWDEN] showed himself to be an indiscreet person... One day, as though by chance, he [BOWDEN] blurted out to our agent SHVEDOVA [the fact of] 'ARTUR's' affiliation with American intelligence."

Asked who SHVEDOVA was, NOSENKO said she was "probably a cleaning woman". [Elsewhere NOSENKO described SHVEDOVA as his own agent working against American Army Attaches, see p. 85.] Asked what connection 06 FRIPPEL had with American intelligence, NOSENKO replied that he could not say. To the inquiry why not, since he was FRIPPEL's case officer, NOSENKO was silent.

06 06

Spencer ROBERTS [whose KGB recruitment is described on p.424] in August 1962 became friends with a young Soviet male who acknowledged having been a KGB agent used against French-speaking foreigners. Included among the

0001411

06 06

latter, the Soviet told ROBERTS, was FRIPPEL, whom the KGB suspected of being an American intelligence agent. [NOSENKO reported ROBERTS 06 recruitment but has never indicated awareness of other KGB agents being targetted against FRIPPEL. 06

06

FRIPPEL's Information

06 06

FRIPPEL, who uses the nickname "Arthur" was the American 29 Express Company representative in Moscow from 7 April 1958 to 3 January 1961. He was first interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's information on 30 April 1964, and when shown a picture of NOSENKO, FRIPPEL admitted his recruitment by the 06 KGB in 1959. During this and subsequent interviews with 06 the FBI, FRIPPEL has reported in detail on his association 06 with the KGB. FRIPPEL's version coincides with that provided by NOSENKO to a considerable degree, with the following exceptions:

06

- FRIPPEL asserts that at the time of his recruitment the KGB wanted only general information on American Embassy officials and American tourists travelling to the Soviet Union under American Express auspices. 08 According to NOSENKO, FRIPPEL was originally 06 recruited to provide information on American intelligence approaches to Soviets in the United States, and he claimed that FRIPPEL was not needed for 06 coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union, since the KGB had already "great success" by other means. NOSENKO stated that later, when he transferred to the American Embassy Section, he took 06 his agent FRIPPEL with him to report on acquaintances among the Embassy employees. NOSENKO and 06 FRIPPEL agree that, with one exception (when 06 FRIPPEL was queried regarding BOWDEN and WINTERS), 06 FRIPPEL was not so used.

- 06 FRIPPEL, while acknowledging that NOSENKO participated in all meetings and on occasion met FRIPPEL 06 alone, stated that CHELNOKOV "was in charge of the entire operation".

21/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

FRIPPEL claims that he saw NOSENKO on three occasions, twice in Odessa, while visiting the USSR in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO insisted that he met FRIPPEL but once 06 in Odessa and once in Moscow in that period.

06

Comment: NOSENKO volunteered his account of the FRIPPEL case in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. He freely related the details of the summer 1962 and February 1963 meetings with FRIPPEL in the 06 USSR. His account of FRIPPEL's activities is 06 consistent with FRIPPEL's version, except as noted above. 06

Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-1960)

For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement with OSWALD in 1959-1960 and in 1963 are described elsewhere. (See p.303.) According to NOSENKO, he was involved with OSWALD in 1959 because he was then Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. In that capacity he participated in the decision that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB and he should not be allowed to remain in the Soviet Union.

Comment: NOSENKO's information on his involvement with OSWALD in 1959 is insufficient to serve as evidence confirming or refuting his claimed service as Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department in 1959.

6/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Operational Activities - 1955-1960: Summary

According to NOSENKO, after an uneventful assignment in the American Department's Embassy Section, in 1955 he was transferred to the newly-organized Seventh Department Tourist Section as a case officer. Between 1955 and 1957 he assembled a network of agents and was involved in four KGB attempts to recruit foreign tourists. One of these attempts, that against Richard BURGI, was the first recruitment 06 of the Tourist Section; it won NOSENKO a commendation, brought him to the attention of General GRIBANOV, and turned NOSENKO into an effective and successful KGB officer. In 1958 NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. He then recruited the second member of his two-man homosexual team and, in 1958 and 1959, participated in ten KGB attempts to recruit American and British visitors to the USSR and one American resident of Moscow. NOSENKO's success in the Seventh Department prompted GRIBANOV to transfer him back to the American Embassy Section as Deputy Chief with the critical priority task of reviving KGB operations against American Embassy code clerks.

It is worthy of note that of the fifteen cases in which he personally participated, by his own admission, NOSENKO became involved in nine not because they were operations of his section, but because the targets were the victims of homosexual or other entrapment. In addition, three of the fifteen operations were not directed by his section, but by senior Seventh Department officers. According to his own statements, four others were specifically the responsibility of other Seventh Department sections of KGB elements, including the Foreign Seamen Section (GEHRCKENS), Delega- 06
06 06 tions Section (LANE and BIRSE), Commercial Representatives
06 06 Section (TAYLOR), and WILLERFORD (Moscow City KGB). FRIPPEL 06
does not relate clearly to NOSENKO's claimed Seventh Department service. NOSENKO states he was also used as an agent of the First Department Embassy Section. Even the remaining case, that of HARRIS, was not necessarily a

06

8/BR

Seventh Department operation: by NOSENKO's other statements, she was not a "tourist" and she would have been the target of the Moscow Oblast KGB because of her intention to marry a Soviet citizen.

While NOSENKO's participation in the attempted recruitment of the targets he describes, even where not confirmed, is not disputed, the evidence suggest that he was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counterintelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB.

Nothing NOSENKO has said indicates that there was any material change in his duties and responsibilities after he was allegedly promoted to Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. The evidence is that he was more active, but not that he had any administrative and supervisory responsibilities.

Knowledge of other Seventh Department American Tourist Operations

NOSENKO said that upon his return to the Seventh Department in 1962 as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, he reviewed the section's activities during his two-year absence, e.g. January 1960 to January 1962. In the course of that review he made written notes of the section's operational targets during that period notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964. (See p. 319.) NOSENKO could not describe the operations other than to say that he recorded the target's names and such details as he could acquire at the time of his review. Eleven of the operations included in his notes were those against Bernard PECHTER, 06,06,06,06,06,06,
Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, 06,06
fnu KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR,
06 Michael GINSBERG, and William TARASKA: 06 All were from the period 1956-1959 and six of the eleven individuals were identified by the KGB as homosexuals. All of these cases are described in Annex B.

3/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: NOSENKO has never resolved why these cases, which predated the records he claimed he reviewed, were included in his notes. More important, he never could explain why he was unfamiliar with American tourist cases which occurred at a time when he claimed that he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was knowledgeable of all such cases.

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among Foreign Tourists, 1955-1960

Besides those operations in which NOSENKO claimed personal involvement or about which he learned in his capacity of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB knew of the use of tourists in the USSR by foreign intelligence services throughout the 1955-1960 period. Information from other sources serves as a basis for judging the validity of NOSENKO's claim.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO's Tourist Study

Sometime between May and October 1959, during the tourist season, NOSENKO was ordered to gather facts for Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence services during the period 1955 through 1958. NOSENKO said he assembled this material from the Seventh Department's annual reports of the years 1955-1958, supplemented by information he obtained from discussions with knowledgeable Seventh Department case officers. NOSENKO recalled only that the study incorporated statistical data on the growth of foreign tourism; he did not remember the content of the study, any examples included in it, or what the study concluded about American or British Intelligence tourist operations. Nevertheless, based on his research for this study as well as on his general and supervisory responsibilities in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asserted that he could accurately describe KGB counterintelligence operations among tourists during the period 1955-1960.

Extent of KGB Knowledge

According to NOSENKO, operations against foreign tourists were developing slowly during this period and very little was known by the KGB about the American Intelligence use of tourism at the time he wrote the study in 1959. No agents were definitely identified among American tourists, and no tourists were "caught in the act" mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting agents, with one exception. 06 (McGUIRE, sic, see below.) The Seventh Department, NOSENKO said, developed suspicions concerning a number of tourists because of their apparent interest in photography, or because they were disseminating foreign literature. The KGB never established any firm intelligence connection, however, despite various operational measures taken such as vyemka (covert baggage search) and maneuvering KGB agents in contact with the suspect tourists. No American tourists were definitely identified as American Intelligence agents, NOSENKO concluded. On related matters, NOSENKO asserted that during his 1955-1960 service in the Seventh Department the KGB acquired no information regarding American Intelligence use of tourism; specifically, the KGB obtained no documentary information on this topic from any agent source.

American Tourist Agents

The one exception in which an American tourist was observed performing a clandestine task, NOSENKO said, was one whose name he recalled as McGUIRE, and who mailed a 06 letter in Minsk in 1959. NOSENKO said he never knew what KGB operational activity led to the discovery of McGUIRE's clandestine letter mailing.

21BR

0001417

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

Comment: NOSENKO here is apparently referring to Edward McGOWAN, a CIA tourist agent who was in fact detected by the KGB while clandestinely mailing an operational letter in Minsk, but in August 1958. 06

There was a Robert Alan McGUIRE who visited the Soviet Union during NOSENKO's Seventh Department service, but he was not connected with American Intelligence at the time and he mailed no letter. McGUIRE, however, was a 06 former CIA staff employee. He visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in April-May 1959, during which period he was the target of numerous KGB provocations, including black-market, females, and a Soviet citizens' request for assistance in defecting to the Americans. Also, a customs officer confiscated from 06 McGUIRE a Radio Liberation Russian-language 06 script, and McGUIRE was compelled to sign an acknowledgement of the event, although the reasons were left blank. Interrogation has never resolved how NOSENKO knew the name of 06 McGUIRE, but not the background of the case, or the background of McGOWAN's case, but not his name. 06

7/BR

Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE

In 1959 the KGB obtained from its agent in MI-6, [George BLAKE, who was arrested by British authorities in April 1961] the complete details of the CIA-MI-6 program for utilizing tourist agents in the Soviet Union. In early June 1959 a three-day conference was held in London between CIA and MI-6 representatives, at the conclusion of which a nineteen-page document was drawn up which described operational doctrine on tourist operations, including agent spotting, agent selection, agent assessment, agent training, and agent tasks planned for the current (1959) tourist season. The document stressed CIA planned use of tourists for spotting, contacting, and assessing and, eventually, communicating with agents in the Soviet Union. BLAKE confessed to passing the document to the KGB as soon as it came into his possession.

Comment: It is not advanced that NOSENKO should necessarily have known of BLAKE, although his statements on the matter have been ambiguous. Asked in 1962 whether he knew of BLAKE (whose earlier arrest had been publicized), NOSENKO affirmed that he did but indicated that BLAKE was a less important source than the Canadian Ambassador (WATKINS) or the agent in the British Admiralty (VASSALL). When BLAKE was mentioned in 1964, NOSENKO asked "Who's BLAKE?"

The significance of BLAKE is that his confession established that the KGB was fully aware of the status and character of American and British Intelligence tourist operations while NOSENKO alleges he was in the Seventh Department. It is judged, by any measure as well as by NOSENKO's statements about the KGB, that the substance of the information if not the document itself would be brought to the attention of a key KGB counterintelligence officer concerned, the Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, which NOSENKO claims was himself.

KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations

In 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy KGB Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union. The KGB study draws recognizably upon the information supplied by BLAKE and, although concerned primarily with American tourist operations in 1960, it also refers to American agents whom KGB counterintelligence elements identified among tourists in the years 1958 and 1959, while NOSENKO claims he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and during which time he claims the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - 1955-1960: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's description of the activities of the Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department in this period is almost solely restricted to his account of these fifteen KGB operations. Other than to allege that certain KGB officers he named were his subordinates, he provided no information to substantiate his claim that he had any supervisory or administrative responsibilities. The common feature of the operations do not relate to NOSENKO's own description of the function of the Seventh Department's Tourist Section or later, to the American-British Commonwealth Section. Most were sexual or other entrapment operations, and he acknowledges that several were operations conducted by KGB elements other than his own section. In short, NOSENKO need not have been in the Seventh Department sections, as he claims, to have learned of or participated in the activities he describes. Although NOSENKO gives a graphic account of the Second Chief Directorate's (and his own) counterintelligence mission, his knowledge is not of counterintelligence operations among tourists; in the only three such operations he describes, the counterintelligence aspects were incidental. Contrary to his claims, NOSENKO is aware neither of all important KGB operations conducted against American tourists during the period, nor what was known to the KGB about American Intelligence and British tourist operations.

Conclusion

While NOSENKO was associated with a KGB element conducting operations against American and other foreign tourists during the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer nor Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.

CHAPTER VII

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (January 1960-January 1962)

Deputy Chief of the Section

NOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first days of January 1962. This section, in his words, was working against "the most important counter-intelligence target in the Soviet Union", the permanent American representation in Moscow. It regarded every American stationed there a possible spy and, simultaneously, as a target for recruitment.

The functions of the American Embassy Section were described by NOSENKO as being to monitor all contacts by Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens, to collect all information possible on American Embassy employees, and to use this information as a basis for planning and implementing recruitments. The Americans' personalities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines, security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the major and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers employed large numbers of agents and informants among the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with American contacts. The officers also benefitted from the reports of numerous surveillance teams at their disposal, as well as information obtained from telephone taps and microphones in Americans' offices and homes. Each officer had a limited number of American targets with whom he attempted to become thoroughly familiar. Annually, they submitted detailed operational plans for exploiting the knowledge they had gained of their targets. During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, within the section special emphasis was placed on "identifying intelligence officers in the Embassy and actively developing them, acquiring ciphers, and painstakingly studying code clerks, creating the basis on which they can be recruited".

As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO said, he had access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing was hidden" from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB recruited no Americans associated with the Embassy, there were no KGB agents among Americans assigned to the Embassy in this period and, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American Embassy personnel since "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, recruited ca. 1953, see p. 33). From continuing friendships with his fellow-officers of 1960 and 1961, who remained in the section when NOSENKO transferred, NOSENKO has also claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the time he left the section in January 1962 until his January 1964 departure in Geneva.

Transfer to the American Embassy Section

In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO learned from the Department Chief DUBAS of plans to transfer him back to the American Department's American Embassy Section, as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move and wanted to remain in the Seventh Department:

> "I was used to it there and wanted to continue. I wanted to stay in the Seventh Department. This [the transfer] was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief of section and would be the same there. The American Department is, of course, the most important. But here I was working against American tourists. This is also important. Furthermore, I showed [had proven] myself there in '55, '56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to be not a bad case officer. And there, in the American Department, I must prove myself with new people."

NOSENKO therefore asked DUBAS to try to retain him. DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring NOSENKO were issued.

On the day NOSENKO reported to V.A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report to GRIBANOV's office. NOSENKO expressed his misgivings about the change of assignment to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him but that he, GRIBANOV, "had his own plans and that was all". GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that he thought NOSENKO could bring "fresh air" to the American Embassy Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention to operations against American code clerks, the "number one target".

Predecessor as Deputy Chief

Asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting for duty in the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO replied: "No one." He assumed responsibility for the Embassy security file from KOVSHUK. Various case officers earlier had been responsible for Embassy Security Officer Russell LANGELLE, including MALYUGIN, then KUSKOV, KOVSHUK, and KLYPIN; but LANGELLE had been expelled from the Soviet Union in October 1959 and his successor, John ABIDIAN, was not to arrive until March 1960.

On several occasions between January and June 1964 NOSENKO had referred to a KGB officer named Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV--but never in connection with the American Embassy Section. Thus, in January he first identified him as Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV, the Deputy Chief of the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department. In February he identified a V.A. ALEKSEYEV as the alias of a Mikhail Fedorovich, last name not recalled, who was Deputy Chief of the Fifth Department. In June, in listing KGB officers who had received various awards for their service, NOSENKO included the name of Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of "an unremembered department" of the Second Chief Directorate.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

On 18 June 1964 NOSENKO was asked to list the names of all officers who had either joined or departed the American Embassy Section from the time NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955 to his return to the American Embassy Section in 1960. NOSENKO listed fourteen officers as having joined the section, and five who had been transferred out. In neither list did NOSENKO mention BAKHVALOV.

A week later, however, on 24 June 1964 NOSENKO stated that "in 1959 and possibly in 1958 Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section. I replaced him in his position in 1960 and he went to the Fifth Department as Deputy Chief". In September 1964 NOSENKO asserted that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief, [not the others he had identified earlier] had been LANGELLE's case officer. In 1965 NOSENKO first mentioned that BAKHVALOV, not KOVSHUK, had been responsible for maintaining the Embassy security file and stated that BAKHVALOV had shared with KOVSHUK responsibility for supervising code clerk operations.

Comment: Interrogation has never resolved contradictions between NOSENKO's earlier accounts of what functions he assumed from whom when he entered the Section, and his belated assertions that BAKHVALOV was his predecessor as Deputy Chief.

Responsibilities

Shortly after reporting for duty in the American Embassy Section and following his short discussion with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said he met with American Department Chief KLYPIN and Embassy Section Chief KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in the section. Repeating what GRIBANOV had said, KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single responsibility in the section would be supervision of all KGB operational activity against American military and State Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for the other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN suggested a division of labor under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for supervising operations against State Department personnel and NOSENKO would supervise work against the Army, Air Force, and Naval Attaches and their assistants. NOSENKO was also to be custodian of certain sensitive files in the section.

NOSENKO has signed a protocol which listed his principal responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It reads in part:

> "During the entire period in the First [American Embassy] Section, First [American] Department in 1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section. My responsibilities were the following:
>
> -General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of Section in his absence.
>
> -Immediate supervisor for the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity I closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV.
>
> -Case officer for American Embassy Security Officer, John ABIDIAN.
>
> -For about the first six months of 1960, supervisor of the work against the offices of the Army, Naval, and Air attaches.

Comment: Before 1965 NOSENKO never claimed responsibility for supervising operations against service attache targets. In October 1966 NOSENKO for the first time claimed he was personally responsible for (as contrasted to supervising) operational activity against Naval and Marine officers of the office of the Naval Attache.

C0G1425

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

-I maintained the file on American Embassy security.

-I maintained the log books for the reports sent to the First [American Embassy] Section by the Operational Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information obtained from all the microphones installed in the American Embassy. I read all the reports and gave the pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in the section. In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV.

-During this period I was the agent handler for agents 'SHMELEV', 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', 'ARTUR' and 'SARDAR' [VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, PREISFREUND, 06 FRIPPEL and WEISS respectively].
06 06

"Throughout this entire period I sat in Room 618 of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzherzhinskiy Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this office with me throughout most of this period."

Comment: NOSENKO's assertions with respect to each of these claimed functions are examined in some detail in the following pages.

Deputy and Occasional Acting Chief of Section

Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under repeated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSHUK, with the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he had access to and was obliged to keep current on all information relating to the section's activities. On this basis he has assured his questioners that the KGB was completely unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit Americans assigned to the Embassy in these two years. NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to section files and his association with section officers made it certain that there were no such KGB successes even in the periods

1955-1960 and 1962-1964, when he was assigned in the Seventh Department. His statements on this subject during February 1965 were distilled in a protocol which NOSENKO signed on 20 February:

> "As the only Deputy to the Chief of the American Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my functions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In order to perform this function I had the right and the obligation of knowing the details about every important activity of the section against the American Embassy and its personnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from me.
>
> "As Deputy Chief of the Section I know definitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy were agents of the KGB or reporting unofficially in any way to the KGB during my service in the Section. There were no approaches or recruitments made by the Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962 against personnel of the American Embassy, including personnel of the Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department of Agriculture and USIA, including Marine guards, Army sergeants, State Department code clerks except against STORSBERG and KEYSERS, both unsuccessful approaches.
>
> 06 06
>
> "There were no approaches or recruitments made against any employees of the United States Government who were assigned to the American Embassy on temporary duty during this period. I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct."

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

In the two years of NOSENKO's service in the section there were a total of over three months when he said KOVSHUK was ill or on leave. NOSENKO recalled that he was Acting Chief during KOVSHUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and 1961, although he did not remember precisely in which months. He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961, again when KOVSHUK was ill. He recalled that KOVSHUK was also absent for several days in connection with preparations for President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in 1960.

As Acting Chief in KOVSHUK's absence, NOSENKO stated that he was responsible for supervising the administrative work and operational activity of the entire section and, in particular, for assuming KOVSHUK's work in directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to the American Embassy.

NOSENKO could recall no operational decisions that he made as acting chief, nor any specific or unusual occurrences during these times. NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSHUK's which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going out of the Embassy Section. NOSENKO stated he met none of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences, nor could he remember any of them except GLAZUNOV [whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own agent and later said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's"] and the American correspondent STEVENS [about whom NOSENKO had reported in connection with his activities in 1953-55].

06

According to NOSENKO, KOVSHUK had personal contact, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, with "some" American Embassy officers, but the only such Embassy officer he could identify was WINTERS, and he knew of no details about KOVSHUK's relations with him.

1/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

03

Comment: NOSENKO knows neither that William N. MORELL was identified formally by the Embassy to the Soviet Government to be a CIA employee, nor that KOVSHUK (who was aware of this fact), was in personal contact with MORELL.

03

General Supervisory Duties

In interrogations of January 1965 NOSENKO was questioned in considerable detail about his supervisory duties as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. He didn't know what major duties occupied most of his time, nor which were the most important: He stated that "everything" was important. His subordinates were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV (responsible for code clerk operations), [Vladimir] DEMKIN assisted by [Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY (residents of America House), [N.A.] GAVRILENKO (Air Attaches personnel and the aircrews of the Ambassador's aircraft), [I.Ya.] KURILENKO (Army Attache personnel), and [Victor] BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attache personnel). Except for "little questions" which the officers decided for themselves, NOSENKO said he directed their activities, discussed with them various aspects of their work, and responded to their questions as required. If he could not answer their questions, NOSENKO stated, or if the problem was not within his authority, NOSENKO discussed the matter with KOVSHUK. If it was necessary, NOSENKO claimed he thereafter would discuss the matter with American Department Chief KLYPIN or his successor, [S.M.] FEDOSEYEV, and on some occasions, with Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO stated he accompanied his subordinates to some meetings with their agents, not because he didn't trust them, but to hear for himself what the agent was reporting. He cited as hypothetical examples occasions when DEMKIN might relay reports from Ella UMANETS or Inga VARLAMOVA (agents working against America House residents), reports which NOSENKO would want to hear for himself, personally. NOSENKO would not estimate to his interrogators what percentage of Embassy Section agents he met in this fashion.

21BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

In addition to supervising his subordinates's direction of agents, NOSENKO said he personally managed [PREISFREUND] 06 ("PROKHOR") and [WEISS] ("SARDAR").
06

Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations

NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for supervising operations against American code clerks, he found a very "difficult situation". Prior to the assignment of KOSOLAPOV to the American Embassy Section in late 1959, all operations against code clerks had been handled by MALYUGIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort there had been no operational approaches and no successes. When NOSENKO took over there were no active developmental operations against code clerks under way, he stated, and the only agents or operational contacts being used against them were poorly educated maids and waitresses none of whom had accomplished anything of importance. No non-Soviet citizen agents were being used in operations against code-room personnel.

According to NOSENKO, in January or February of 1960 GRYAZNOV was assigned to the American Embassy Section as a second assistant to NOSENKO in his code clerk activities. From this point on, NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV shared the same KGB Headquarters office. There, all KGB files on American code clerks as well as the files on all agents available for work against them, were stored in one large safe accessible to all three officers. NOSENKO supervised all of the section's work along these lines, and no provocations, compromises, recruitment attempts, or recruitments could have been planned or carried out without his prior knowledge and agreement when he was in Moscow. If NOSENKO was absent on a trip, he would have been told about any such activity upon his return.

NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases with them, taking part in operational planning, and approving or disapproving all operational measures.

2/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

When NOSENKO took over responsibility for operations against code clerks, he read files on targets and agents, discussed the situation with MALYUGIN, DEMKIN (the American Embassy Section case officer responsible for the residents of America House), GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV, and reported his findings and recommendations to his superiors, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result, NOSENKO asserted. In introducing a new program for the work of the section, NOSENKO suggested the use of third-country nationals (neither American nor Soviet citizens) for agent work against code clerks; in line with this suggestion, he personally recruited a Syrian military officer, Samih WEISS 08,06 (see p. 181), and directed him against the America House. After his first few visits, WEISS was specifically targetted 06 against military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS. Another such 08,06 agent directly handled by NOSENKO was the Finnish business- 08,06 man Johan PREISFREUND, who figured in the case of the 08,06 military code clerk James STORSBERG (see p. 166). NOSENKO also suggested initiating activity against code clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and specifically proposed that operational measures be undertaken or that operational possibilities be studied in Helsinki, the city through which most of the American code clerks passed on their way to Moscow.

Comment: Questioned later on individual cases, NOSENKO retracted his assertion that he read and studied all the files on individual American code clerks, stating instead that he did not study any although he "may have skimmed some". He insisted, however, that in any event he read all the current incoming information on code clerks received from microphones, agents and the like, and routed the reports to the case officer concerned.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

GOLITSYN's Information About KGB Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in 1960-1961

The most significant collateral information about KGB operations against American code clerks in this period, with which to compare NOSENKO's assertions [on this topic], is that provided by GOLITSYN after his defection in 1961.

GOLITSYN identified KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV by name and from photograph as being two veteran KGB officers, personally known to him, who were in 1960 "working against code clerks in the American Embassy in Moscow." With respect to the priority attached to the recruitment of American code clerks in 1960, GOLITSYN commented in 1961 that: "The task of strengthening of work against Americans had been a standing requirement, both in the past and most particularly [in 1960]. This work was particularly intensified after the appointment of SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the Americans at the Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other countries... This question of intensifying work against the Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB. Thereafter there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensification of work against the American cipher-clerks."

GOLITSYN said that NOSENKO was not assigned to the Embassy Section in 1960-1961, since if he had been GOLITSYN would have known about it.

Preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, GOLITSYN in the spring of 1960 visited the Embassy Section and learned from GRYAZNOV that the latter had as an agent an Embassy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki. The code clerk had already provided the KGB with some information and he was considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent. GOLITSYN was told by GRYAZNOV that, if the code clerk's transfer materialized, GOLITSYN might have him in Helsinki as his agent.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in spring of 1960 that the latter had developed an operation against an Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited.

GRYAZNOV informed GOLITSYN in April or May 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960. The KGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, at the time was stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN said that the homosexual blackmail was in this instance "too dirty", and the KGB should find another basis for recruitment. SHELEPIN did not exclude future use of the photographs, which the KGB would hold in reserve.

While on a temporary assignment to Helsinki in November 1960, V.V. KOSOLAPOV told GOLITSYN that he had come to Helsinki in order to accompany an Embassy code clerk back to Moscow on the train. KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which he could continue to develop in Moscow. In September 1961 a friend of KOSOLAPOV also visited Helsinki on temporary duty. GOLITSYN tried to get him to talk about KOSOLAPOV's November train operation, but KOSOLAPOV's friend would not discuss the case. GOLITSYN reasoned that there would be no reluctance to discuss the case if it had been unsuccessful, and that therefore KOSOLAPOV must have been successful in developing the code clerk on the train or afterwards.

0806 GOLITSYN learned in January 1961 from V.M. KOVSHUK that the Finnish agent Johannes PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American employee of the Embassy.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

X Comment: Two of GOLITSYN's leads may refer to STORSBERG 06 06 and GARLAND (see below). The other leads, more than one of which may refer to the same individual, have not resulted in an identification of any code clerk target of the KGB.

Operations Against Military Code Clerks

Comment: According to official U.S. Government records, Service Attaches of the Embassy in Moscow as of 1960 shared a single cryptographic center and a single military code clerk (except when two code clerks overlapped during periods of turnover). The military code clerk was responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all three military services. In practice, at least one other member of the Service Attaches' offices in Moscow held a cryptographic clearance and was trained to replace the regular military code clerk when the latter was absent.

James STORSBERG was the only military code 06, 08 clerk assigned to the Moscow Embassy from February 1960 to September 1961, when his 06 successor, Matthew ZUJUS, arrived. STORSBERG 06 himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and departed in November 1961.

06 During the period of STORSBERG's tour in Moscow, back-up cryptographic duties were performed by the Military Communications Officer, 08, 06 CWO-2 HURLEY. HURLEY performed these duties 06 on a number of occasions, including the night of the KGB approach to STORSBERG and he could 06 be loosely termed a code clerk. (Although NOSENKO has distinguished between STORSBERG's 06 function as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's 06 duties as "military code machine mechanic", he considered both to be within the general category

11/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: (Continued)

of "military code clerks". NOSENKO reported that there was no KGB operation against 06 HURLEY.) Additionally, HURLEY performed repair 06 work on the cryptographic machines and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy 06 HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly 06 before STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.

The only other person performing official functions in the military code room during the 1960-61 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived 06 in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer. As a concurrent secondary assignment, KEYSERS 06 worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the Air Attache. From February until mid-April 1961, as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in 06 the joint military code room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer. He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of low aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.

The significance of the following cases, particularly that of STORSBERG, is the extent 06 to which collateral information corroborates or contradicts NOSENKO's claims to have been Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, to have supervised all KGB operations against Embassy code clerks, and to have certain knowledge that no Americans in the Embassy were recruited between "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH) in 1953 and NOSENKO's defection in 1964.

8/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Attempted Recruitment of STORSBERG 06

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO first alluded to a KGB attempt to recruit an unnamed American military code clerk during his initial meeting with CIA in 1962. He was describing a new technique (which he later claimed to be his own idea) introduced in the 1960-1961 period to overcome the reluctance of Americans in Moscow to develop friendships with Soviet citizens. Beginning in 1960 the KGB instructed "third-national" agents (Germans, Frenchmen, and Finns, for example) to visit the American Club on Kropotkinskaya Naberezhnaya to cultivate American enlisted men living there. (GOLITSYN learned of one such agent of NOSENKO and the KGB concluded that GOLITSYN had reported the KGB practise to the Americans, because foreigners no longer were permitted to enter the America House billets freely for dances, movies, and the like at the club there.) NOSENKO had recruited the agent known to GOLITSYN in order to develop an American military code clerk. Without identifying either the foreign agent or the American target, NOSENKO provided further details on the case in subsequent meetings.

Recruiting a military code clerk from the Embassy was the American Embassy Section's "number one assignment", and for a year NOSENKO was involved in an operation against such a target almost to the exclusion of all other duties. The case was considered to be the "number one" case, and KGB Chairman SHELEPIN as well as Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV impatiently inquired as to its progress. The target was an American Army sergeant with about 20 years' service 08 who, the KGB learned, wanted to retire and take a position as a code clerk with the State Department. For the purpose 08 of developing the target, NOSENKO recruited a foreigner who visited the USSR frequently. The "third-national" agent was placed in contact with the American, and they had several drinking bouts together. After about two months, NOSENKO instructed his agent to take the American to the agent's hotel room and introduce him there to a KGB female agent.

3/BR

Although the girl and the American were intimate, no photographs were taken, nor were photographs taken the next time the agent provided the American with a girl. On the third such occasion, however, the KGB technicians did obtain incriminating photographs. The foreign agent also involved the American in an illicit currency transaction in which the American contributed $300 as his share to finance the purchase and subsequent sale of some jewels. The American was allowed to believe that he earned a $5,000 profit: the money was actually furnished by the KGB.

After a year's development, GRIBANOV decided that a recruitment should be attempted, through another foreigner. The original foreign agent was withdrawn from the operation, and a KGB officer, Nikolay Semenovich SKVORTSOV, was introduced to the American in the guise of wealthy French businessman "Marcel MICHAUD". SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD met and drank with the American several times, "even at America House". It was SKVORTSOV's estimate that the American was very careful, but that he might be susceptible to recruitment while drunk. After meeting with the American at the club in America House one evening, SKVORTSOV telephoned him and invited him to SKVORTSOV's hotel room to meet "two Dutch girls". When he arrived, SKVORTSOV explained that the girls had refused to come, but that he could call another girl for the American. The girl [identified by NOSENKO in 1964 as Inga VARLAMOVA] was a KGB agent of GRYAZNOV's who was used for such operations, and she and the American were intimate in SKVORTSOV's hotel room. In an adjacent room were GRIBANOV, NOSENKO, KOVSHUK, and another KGB officer. In another adjacent room were technicians of the Operational Technical Directorate, who taped the American's conversations. When the American left SKVORTSOV's room at two o'clock in the morning, he was "very tipsy". NOSENKO and another officer intercepted him in the hallway, escorted him into the adjacent room, and locked the door. NOSENKO himself solicited the American's collaboration with the KGB in exchange for $20,000 in cash (which was offered in two packages of $10 notes) and the promise of additional sums. When the American refused, the KGB officers disclosed their knowledge of his plan to transfer to the State Department. They threatened to inform the Embassy that he had collaborated with the KGB, in which case he would get neither the cash nor the job with the State Department. The American was adamant in his refusal, although he was held in the hotel room all night long. At about six o'clock in the morning the KGB officers received a telephoned report that the Embassy Marine guard had called America House to advise that the American was needed at the Embassy because an enciphered telegram had arrived. The American was then released.

The KGB "knew" that the American did not report the recruitment attempt. Using that circumstance for blackmail rather than the incriminating photographs, the KGB planned another attempt to recruit him if he ever returned abroad.

When the non-Soviet agent used in the first year of developing the American target had come to the attention of GOLITSYN, GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section to see if he could use him in First Chief Directorate operations abroad. NOSENKO was on leave at the time, but GOLITSYN talked with another Embassy Section officer. GOLITSYN was told "Don't touch him, he's ours". [The relevance of this incident is discussed below.]

NOSENKO's Information-1964

At the second meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO identified the American military code clerk as "Jim" 06 STORSBERG. The foreign agent NOSENKO recruited for the case was Johannes PREISFREUND 06 (KGB cryptonym "PROKHOR"), a Finn. 11 In repeating the substance of his 1962 account of the KGB recruitment attempt, NOSENKO emphasized his personal role in directing both PREISFREUND and the KGB officer SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD. 06

GRIBANOV and KOVSHUK, not NOSENKO, actually made the recruitment attempt. NOSENKO was not present; he waited outside the room with GRYAZNOV. Neither did NOSENKO recruit 06 PREISFREUND. The latter was recruited by KOVSHUK "who needed credit for the recruitment" although NOSENKO had initially cultivated the Finn. 11 Under KOVSHUK's orders, NOSENKO served as PREISFREUND's 06 case officer, although KOVSHUK accompanied him to operational meetings with the agent.

7/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06 PREISFREUND was used in no KGB operation other than in the development of STORSBERG. 06 His usefulness declined because he was suspected, particularly by his fellow Finns, 11 of having some relationship with the KGB.

Comment: A report of the 11 Finnish security service advised CIA in December 1960 that PREISFREUND 06 "is a Soviet agent who calls at the America Club in Moscow and develops Americans in an attempt to penetrate Western circles".

After GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] NOSENKO (who had by then transferred back to the Seventh Department) and KOVSHUK concluded that PREISFREUND thereby had been identified as a KGB agent to American Intelligence, 06 and that 06 PREISFREUND should not be used again against American Embassy personnel. NOSENKO was told to use the Finn 11 in Seventh Department operations, but he was unsuitable since he knew only Finnish 11 and Russian.

NOSENKO's Information-1965

In the February-March 1965 interrogations NOSENKO provided some additions as well as further amendments to what he had related earlier about STORSBERG. 06 GRYAZNOV wrote the initial operational plan, which NOSENKO read and approved. The plan called for a detailed study of STORSBERG 06 and the creation of some basis on which to make an operational approach. The case developed slowly in 1960. From 06 a female clerk named YAZHINSKAYA and other employees in the 29 Finnish Embassy, PREISFREUND obtained background information 06 06 on STORSBERG, who sometimes visited the sauna in the Finnish Embassy. 08 PREISFREUND was directed to visit America House 06 in order to strike up an acquaintance with STORSBERG, 06 and when he was successful, he managed to lure STORSBERG to his 06 hotel room, where the KGB obtained incriminating photographs 06 of STORSBERG and the female agent Inga VARLAMOVA. STORSBERG 06 visited PREISFREUND's rooms many times at different hotels 06 in Moscow, but the KGB took incriminating photographs on

221BR

only two occasions. 06 PREISFREUND introduced 06 STORSBERG to SKVORTSOV, and when they had become acquainted, SKVORTSOV 06 invited STORSBERG to his room at the Leningrad Hotel on a number of occasions, but STORSBERG always refused. On one 06 evening in the middle of 1961, however, STORSBERG accepted 06 SKVORTSOV's invitation in the belief that he would meet non-Soviet girls. NOSENKO was in the hotel and he had made arrangements with the KGB Operational Technical Directorate to call at once if audio coverage of the American Embassy indicated anything which might affect the recruitment attempt.

While NOSENKO waited outside the room, GRIBANOV attempted 06 to recruit STORSBERG on ideological grounds; his proposal was translated by KOVSHUK. 06 STORSBERG, however, must have given SKVORTSOV's hotel room telephone number to someone at the American Embassy, because while GRIBANOV was talking to him someone called SKVORTSOV's room looking for the American. When this happened, either GRYAZNOV or NOSENKO knocked on the door and advised KOVSHUK that the Embassy was searching for STORSBERG. 06 The recruitment attempt was thereupon terminated, unsuccessfully.

NOSENKO "could not remember" if he had ever read the KGB file on STORSBERG. 06 [In describing KGB practice, NOSENKO consistently equated custody of a case file with being the responsible case officer.] He had no interest in "earlier reporting", although he had read current materials concerning 06 STORSBERG as they came into the Embassy Section.

Comment: NOSENKO at that time in 1965 was then confronted with the substance of the 1962 meeting transcripts in which he claimed to have run the operation, to have been deeply involved in it, and to have personally spoken to STORSBERG 06 during the recruitment attempt. NOSENKO interrupted the reading of the transcript, calling it "nonsense". He said he was drunk at all the 1962 meetings in Geneva and was nervous in the presence of CIA officers. He

11/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: (Continued)
admitted that he had "painted himself" as being somewhat more active and important than facts justified, but said this reflected only "white lies" which did not affect the otherwise complete accuracy of his story with respect to the position he occupied at the time nor the events which then transpired.

NOSENKO's Information-1966

During the 1964 interrogations NOSENKO had been vague as to the timing and sequence of events in the STORSBERG operation, 06 and in 1965 he refused to specify dates for this or any other operation he described, stating he could no longer be sure when any particular incident occurred. Questioned 06 again about the STORSBERG case in October 1966, NOSENKO insisted that he had directed the entire operation from beginning to end, and that it was his most important case. At his interrogator's insistence, he provided the following chronology:

06

January 1960: STORSBERG arrived in Moscow. (NOSENKO accepted the actual date as supplied by the interrogator.)

06

Early 1960 or mid-1960: PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK. NOSENKO, after retracting his claim he recruited PREISFREUND, said he 06 first met PREISFREUND "a week or so 06 after his recruitment" (which occurred, according to most accounts, in early 1960). In October 1966, however, NOSENKO said that he and PREISFREUND 06 first met "in the middle of 1960, in the summer of 1960".

06

Summer 1960: PREISFREUND first provided a woman to STORSBERG.

06

C001441

91BR

TS No. 197124
Copy 10

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Early 1961:	Compromising photographs of STORSBERG 06 and a Soviet female were first obtained at the Hotel Peking in Moscow.
About May. 1961:	06 PREISFREUND was withdrawn from the operation and SKVORTSOV was introduced about three weeks before the approach to STORSBERG. 06
June 1961:	Unsuccessful KGB approach to STORSBERG 06 in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow. (Earlier in the 1966 interrogations NOSENKO had said that the approach was made "a month or a month and a half 06 before STORSBERG left Moscow". Told 06 that STORSBERG was reassigned in November 1961, NOSENKO said that the approach was in June 1961, five months 06 before STORSBERG's departure.) 06 [STORSBERG reported that the approach was in October 1961. See below.]

06 STORSBERG's Information

06 STORSBERG did not report the KGB recruitment approach until the NOSENKO lead prompted his being interviewed by the FBI on 14 September 1964. His reasons, he said, were that the KGB officers had warned him not do so and he feared that by reporting the approach he would jeopardize his chance for employment with the State Department. He said that he provided no information to the Soviets during or after the approach in October 1961. With the exception of the timing of the recruitment attempt, STORSBERG's 06 account of the operation is fairly close to that provided by NOSENKO, including the roles of PREISFREUND and SKVORTSOV, 06 whom he positively identified by their photographs. He was unable to identify photographs of GRIBANOV, KOVSHUK, or NOSENKO.

06 STORSBERG said that he first became acquainted with 06 PREISFREUND in February or March 1960, he was first intimate with a female procured by PREISFREUND "six months or so" 06

Copy ______

15/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

[e.g., ca. June] after arriving in Moscow, and it was not until more than a year later, in September 1961, that he first met SKVORTSOV, posing as the Frenchman "Marcel MICHAUD". 06 STORSBERG was uncertain how he became acquainted with SKVORTSOV, stating variously that he met him through State Department code clerk Joseph MORONE, 06 through friends at the Finnish Embassy, or that he became acquainted with SKVORTSOV while he, STORSBERG, 06 was serving as bartender in the America Club. During September 1961 STORSBERG was 06 intimate with female friends of SKVORTSOV on two occasions in SKVORTSOV's hotel room.

06

In the middle of October 1961, on the evening of the KGB recruitment attempt, STORSBERG saw SKVORTSOV, MORONE, 06 and an unidentified female sitting together in the America Club.

06 06

Comment: STORSBERG could not have met MORONE with SKVORTSOV in October 1961. 06 MORONE was transferred to Lisbon the previous August after he himself was compromised by the KGB. See p. 198. As far as CIA is aware, MORONE has never been 06 questioned regarding his alleged association with SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD or STORSBERG. 06

06 06

While MORONE was dancing with the unknown female, STORSBERG was invited to visit SKVORTSOV's hotel for drinks. STORSBERG 06 and SKVORTSOV left the America Club, and STORSBERG was again 06 intimate with a Soviet female in SKVORTSOV's hotel room. It was immediately after leaving SKVORTSOV's room on this night when STORSBERG was accosted by the KGB.

06

In a signed statement which he gave a representative of the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations on 29 July 1965, 06 STORSBERG gave somewhat different details. According to this account, three or four months after arriving in the Soviet Union in November 1959 (sic), he met 06 PREISFREUND through friends at the Finnish Embassy. Thereafter PREISFREUND became a frequent visitor to the America Club and a friendship developed between the two. On four

06

211BR

06 06

occasions STORSBERG was intimate with females in PREISFREUND's hotel rooms. 06 STORSBERG last saw PREISFREUND 06 around the end of September or the beginning of October 1961, when PREISFREUND 06 stopped coming to the America Club. At about that time, he first met SKVORTSOV through MORONE 06 at the America Club. 06 MORONE left Moscow the previous August.] STORSBERG 06 was not sure of the exact circumstances of his introduction 06 to SKVORTSOV nor did he know the latter's relationship with MORONE. After meeting STORSBERG, 06 SKVORTSOV frequently visited the America Club and actively cultivated STORSBERG's 06 friendship. This soon led to an invitation to visit SKVORTSOV's apartment, where STORSBERG was intimate with a 06 Soviet female acquaintance of SKVORTSOV. It was after a second visit to the apartment, about a week after the first, that the KGB made its recruitment approach. According to 06 this as well as STORSBERG's earlier account, the approach occurred in the middle or toward the end of October 1961.

In connection with an OSI security interview on 5 August 1965, 06 STORSBERG denied having furnished defense information to any "Communist intelligence agency" or having ever agreed to do so, that he had been contacted by a member of a foreign intelligence agency since his return to the United States, or that he knew of anyone at the American Embassy in Moscow who had been contacted by a member of a "Communist intelligence agency". He also denied having agreed in any way with 06 PREISFREUND to buy diamonds. 06 STORSBERG's denial with respect to the diamonds is in contradiction both with the specific assertions of NOSENKO and with GOLITSYN's more general allegation that the unnamed American was recruited by the KGB after being compromised by PREISFREUND in illicit speculation.]

06 06

PREISFREUND's Information

06 10

CIA interviewed PREISFREUND in July 1965 in Helsinki. [NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND would 06 confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.] 06 While PREISFREUND 06 correctly identified photographs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and 06 STORSBERG, he maintained initially that he had only a business relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO, that he never had anything to do with the KGB, and that he did not even know what the initials "KGB" stood for.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06 PREISFREUND finally admitted, however, that he had been involved in a KGB operation against STORSBERG and he agreed 06 to tell "the entire truth". His version of the case, while containing some internal contradictions, only partially coincided with that provided by NOSENKO. [PREISFREUND 06 claimed to be hazy on the date of all events connected with his contacts with the KGB. The dates, however, could be reconstructed from the known dates of otherwise related events which he said occurred about the time he was recruited or 06 first met STORSBERG or last visited the America House, and so forth.] He described being recruited by KOVSHUK, first dating the event as at the end of 1959 or the beginning of 1960, and later as March-April 1960. According to PREISFREUND, 06 he was "cultivated" neither by NOSENKO or by KOVSHUK. The first time he met either was when he was confronted and recruited by KOVSHUK under threat of prosecution for black-market dealings. [NOSENKO is unaware of that feature of 06 PREISFREUND's recruitment.] On NOSENKO's and KOVSHUK's instructions, about six months after PREISFREUND's recruit- 06 ment, he became acquainted with STORSBERG, 06 and in the summer of 1960 on one occasion he lured STORSBERG into intimacy with 06 a female KGB agent (earlier identified by NOSENKO) in his hotel room. He never saw STORSBERG again, nor did he 06 participate in any other KGB operations.

Referring to the night 06 STORSBERG was intimate with the female KGB agent in PREISFREUND's hotel room, PREISFREUND 06 06 said he slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and the 06 girl shared his bed. At one point during the evening he glimpsed NOSENKO in the hallway, wearing a rubber apron. He deduced from this that NOSENKO had been involved in surreptitious photography of STORSBERG and the girl. 06

Comment: NOSENKO stated that photographs were taken of 06 STORSBERG and a girl in PREISFREUND's hotel 06 room. He has never said anything to suggest, however, that he ever personally was involved in photographing any of the compromises he claims to have arranged, nor has he ever claimed any competence in clandestine photography.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Before his last meeting with CIA, 06 PREISFREUND mentioned that he was planning to visit Leningrad with his family, but that he had learned from business contacts in Moscow that Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in NOSENKO's defection. He was apprehensive and particularly concerned that the KGB might suspect that he had related his role in the STORSBERG case to American Intelligence. 06 During his final meeting with CIA on 13 July 1965 PREISFREUND 06 asked his interviewers for advice as to whether he should or should not travel to the USSR. He was told that if the situation was as he described, it could be quite dangerous for him to return. PREISFREUND stated then that 06 he agreed, that he would not go to the USSR after all.

Comment: 06 PREISFREUND did shortly thereafter visit the Soviet Union as he planned, and according to 11 Finnish official travel records returned to 10 Helsinki on 24 July 1965. From his apparent immunity to KGB pressure, it is concluded that 06 PREISFREUND is to some degree still under KGB control.

GOLITSYN's Information

GOLITSYN, who served as a KGB First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer in Helsinki until his defection in December 1961, reported that he had met in Helsinki on several occasions in 1960 a Finn by the name of PREISFREUND 08, 06 whom he wished to use operationally. In December 1960 [GOLITSYN's passport showed that it took place in January 1961] GOLITSYN visited the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in Moscow to request the permission of KOVSHUK to use PREISFREUND against Americans in Finland. 06 11 KOVSHUK refused the request with the explanation that 06 PREISFREUND "helped in one recruitment now, and it is necessary to be careful for about six months so as not to arouse American suspicions". GOLITSYN learned from KOVSHUK that PREISFREUND 06 had met the target at America Club in

Moscow and had involved him in speculatory activities and lured him into intimacy with various female KGB agents. According to KOVSHUK, the recruitment was accomplished "in 1960, at the end of 1960"; PREISFREUND "had helped to create 06 the circumstances" and had been withdrawn from the operation before the actual approach, which was made by KGB officers. The American target of PREISFREUND, from what KOVSHUK related 06 to GOLITSYN, was either a code clerk or diplomat. (GOLITSYN later expressed his personal belief that the individual probably was unmarried and might have been a "military man".)

06

Comment: If GOLITSYN's lead is not to STORSBERG, but to some other American code clerk against whom 06 PREISFREUND was used, NOSENKO's claim to have supervised all such code clerk operations is refuted.

06

Attempted Recruitment of STORSBERG: Summary and Conclusion

In the absence of contrary evidence, it is judged that GOLITSYN's lead refers to STORSBERG. 06 The role of PREISFREUND 06 is the key to this determination. While the time of the operation remains in dispute, GOLITSYN's timing is judged to be the most plausible because of the circumstances under which he acquired his information. These circumstances-- GOLITSYN's visit to and discussion with KOVSHUK in Moscow, about the use of PREISFREUND are confirmed by NOSENKO and 06 the date, January 1961, is established by passport information. It follows that the operation against STORSBERG thus 06 would have taken place more than six months prior to the time NOSENKO and STORSBERG claimed. Such a significant inaccuracy 06 by NOSENKO, about an event which he said took place less than a year before he described it to CIA (in June 1962), undermines his claim to the role he played in the case and hence to his position as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section and supervisor of code clerk operations.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Attempted Defection of KEYSERS

06

U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS served in Moscow from 20 December 1960 as an assistant to Embassy Medical Officer Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force Captain. 06, 08 06 KEYSERS was the replacement of Staff Sgt. J.G. BRADLEY who 06 had been earlier withdrawn from Moscow because he was a homosexual. Besides his duties with the Medical Officer, 06 KEYSERS was assigned administrative functions in the office of the Air Attache. 06 KEYSERS was trained also to perform back-up cryptographic duties under James STORSBERG in the 06 military code room, but he was relieved of this duty in April 1961. Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies, 06 KEYSERS was removed from Moscow by his American superiors on 16 June 1961.

06 NOSENKO first spoke of what turned out to be the KEYSERS case in Geneva in 1962, but without naming the KGB target or identifying him as STORSBERG's replacement. The 06 KGB and Embassy officials almost simultaneously discovered the American to be a homosexual, he said, and when the KGB found out that the target was to withdraw from the Soviet Union, a letter offering him asylum in the USSR was sent to the American. NOSENKO himself followed up the letter by personally repeating the KGB offer to the American at the airport just before his departure.

06

On 24 January 1964 NOSENKO described the KGB attempt to recruit STORSBERG and then proceeded to repeat his 1962 description of the KGB action taken against STORSBERG's 06 replacement, whom he identified as ZUJUS. 06 Several days later, NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse and requested an urgent meeting with CIA. At the meeting he announced that he had made a mistake, that STORSBERG's replacement was 06 06 not ZUJUS, but KEYSERS. 06 KEYSERS, 06 not ZUJUS, 06 he said was the homosexual code clerk whom he NOSENKO had personally accosted at the airport.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

NOSENKO's Information

KEYSERS 06 was STORSBERG 06's replacement as military code clerk, and the KGB "sensed at once" that he was a homosexual, and the case preoccupied NOSENKO the exclusion of everything else. NOSENKO and other KGB officers, for example, chased KEYSERS 06 all over Moscow, attempting (without success) to confront their target in compromising circumstances. The American ice ballet (Ice Capades troupe) came to Moscow, and KEYSERS 06 became involved at America House with some of its male homosexual members. The Embassy Security Officer learned of KEYSERS' activities at about the same time 06 NOSENKO learned of them through a KGB agent. The KGB would have preferred to attempt to recruit KEYSERS 06, but it learned that he was to be withdrawn from the Soviet Union. The KGB then sent a letter to KEYSERS 06 at his room in America House, pointing out the trouble he was in, and offering him asylum in the USSR. 06 KEYSERS did not respond to the letter. On the 06 day of KEYSERS' departure, KGB surveillants reported that he had left America House for the airport, accompanied by an Assistant Army Attache. NOSENKO sped to the airport and in the terminal building found occasion to approach KEYSERS 06 alone. NOSENKO asked if KEYSERS had thought about the offer 06 in the letter, but KEYSERS did not respond and immediately 06 reported the approach to the officer escorting him.

In the 1965 interrogations NOSENKO added only that at the time NOSENKO approached KEYSERS at the airport, the KGB 06 had concluded that KEYSERS had not reported receipt of the 06 letter inviting him to defect, because no information to this effect was obtained from microphones or telephone taps in the Embassy.

KEYSERS 06' Information

Prior to his departure from Moscow KEYSERS 06 acknowledged to his superiors his homosexual tendencies and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents, all at America House. He was rebuffed by a Marine guard in March 1961, and he twice engaged in homosexual acts with members of the Ice Capades troupe in May. He denied any public display of his homosexuality but said he could not be sure that someone had not entered his room at America House while he and a homosexual partner were asleep.

16/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

In a debriefing in West Germany on 26 June 1961, KEYSERS 06 related the events leading to his withdrawal from Moscow. On 15 June he had been called to the office of Army Attache 06 Colonel URBAN, who advised him that he was being transferred from Moscow the following day for excessive drinking, and cautioned him not to reveal the reasons for his transfer.

Comment: NOSENKO's information generally coincides with that reported by KEYSERS and Embassy officials. 06 However, before the events NOSENKO described, 06 KEYSERS' behavior and reputation had already been discussed between Security Officer John ABIDIAN and Army Attache, Colonel HOFFMAN, a 06 conversation which HOFFMAN concludes was among those sensitive matters compromised by microphones later discovered in the Army Attache offices. Similarly, Colonel URBAN's conversa- 06 06 tion informing KEYSERS of his impending transfer was concluded to have been monitored by the same KGB microphones, from which the KGB would have learned, contrary to NOSENKO's assertion, 06 that KEYSERS did report the receipt of the defection letter to his superiors.

06 KEYSERS described the Russian who approached him at the airport as being 40 to 45 years old, about 5 feet 8 inches tall, approximately 225 pounds, and having a dark complexion and light hair. NOSENKO was then 34 years old, and he is several inches taller and not rotund. When 06 KEYSERS was shown photographs of NOSENKO, he did not recognize him.

According to NOSENKO, the KGB "sensed at 06 once" that KEYSERS was a homosexual. He is unaware of certain information relating to 06 KEYSERS' homosexual activities, drinking, and difficulties with his superiors, although that information was available through KGB agents in America House and had been widely discussed in Embassy offices in which microphones had been emplaced. No KGB officer directly connected

13/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: (Continued)

06 06

with the case could regard KEYSERS as STORSBERG's replacement. 06 KEYSERS arrived in Moscow almost a year before STORSBERG's departure, and was 06 assigned to the Air Attache office. ZUJUS, 06 06 STORSBERG's replacement, arrived in Moscow and 06 worked with STORSBERG about three months before 06 STORSBERG departed Moscow. 06 KEYSERS stated NOSENKO was not the person who approached him at the airport. NOSENKO, in asserting that he was, forgot the name of the single American target whom he ever personally confronted.

Developmental Operation Against ZUJUS 06

In February 1964 NOSENKO reported that he had personally recruited and handled Syrian army officer Samih WEISS, the 11, 06 "main agent" in a KGB developmental operation against U.S. 06 Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS. 06 ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in September 1961 to assume the military code clerk duties 06 of STORSBERG, and he remained there until January 1963. NOSENKO did not recall the ZUJUS case until he was reminded 06 of it by a reference to Samih WEISS which was among his notes which he brought to Geneva. 06

NOSENKO's Information

06 08

NOSENKO recruited WEISS, a Syrian from Damascus, in 1961. 06, 08 WEISS was a captain or major in the Syrian Army who was studying at the Tank Academy. He visited the America Club, and when he identified ZUJUS by photograph as one of the 06 persons he had met there, he was told to develop him, not to pay any attention to anyone else. 06 WEISS and ZUJUS had 06 something in common in that ZUJUS had been stationed in 06 11, 08 Lebanon and the Syrian was from Damascus, only a short distance away. 06 WEISS merely studied and developed ZUJUS. 06 during conversations at the America Club. On one occasion, 06 when ZUJUS agreed that it would be nice to have some Lebanese 11 vodka, the KGB arranged for some to be sent from the KGB Legal Residency in Beirut, and WEISS presented it to ZUJUS as a gift from friends. 10

06 06

311BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

ZUJUS' case officer was GRYAZNOV, and besides handling the 06 "main agent" WEISS, NOSENKO supervised GRYAZNOV's activities with respect to ZUJUS. 06 NOSENKO read the Second Chief Directorate file on the American, as well as all reports as they came into the Embassy Section, and he discussed the case with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible for America House), and his own superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote the operational plan, which called for thorough development 06 by WEISS in order to learn everything about him and eventually 06 to introduce an agent to ZUJUS through the Syrian. 08 Progress 06 was slow because ZUJUS was quiet and reserved and often stayed alone, even in America House. Although WEISS and 06 06 ZUJUS became acquainted, they did not become good friends. 06 On the days WEISS planned to visit America House, NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants, never in safehouses. This occurred every week or two, depending on WEISS' availability. 06 When they met the day following WEISS' 06 meetings with ZUJUS, 06 06 WEISS would report such things as which Americans were drinking heavily and who at America House was involved with which girls from foreign embassies. Although WEISS visited 06 America House once or twice a month, and drank there with 06 ZUJUS, he reported little of interest.

The KGB learned "something" about 06 ZUJUS' family in the United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall: he was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or of interest to the KGB about ZUJUS' family background. There 06 was no information on ZUJUS received from KGB microphones, 06 telephone taps or surveillance, and the KGB was unaware of any vices or vulnerabilities which ZUJUS may have had. 06 NOSENKO did not know of any other KGB agents working against 06 ZUJUS. The KGB did not attempt to recruit ZUJUS while 06 NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section. If there had been a recruitment attempt later, after he left the Section, NOSENKO would certainly learned of it from GRYAZNOV.

"Because no one else knew him", at the American Department's request NOSENKO continued to manage WEISS' contact 06 06 with ZUJUS after NOSENKO transferred to the Seventh Department in January 1962. In March or April 1962 it was planned 06 that WEISS would invite ZUJUS to a restaurant where he 06 would be introduced to "a friend", but the meeting had not

26/RR

06

materialized before NOSENKO turned WEISS over to GRYAZNOV and left for Geneva. When WEISS 06 returned to Syria in April 1962, he was not turned over to the First Chief Directorate: his file was sent to Second Chief Directorate archives.

06 ZUJUS' Information

During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities in 06 1963, ZUJUS confirmed an Embassy Security Office report that in the summer of 1962 ZUJUS had been intimate with an 06 Austrian woman, "Lillian" (last name unknown), who had visited America House with someone from the United Arab Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when she was picked up by ZUJUS. 06 Since ZUJUS was a cryptographer, 06 the America House manager interviewed "Lillian" and learned that she claimed to be from Vienna and to be travelling with her employer, a Czech. When the Embassy Security Officer learned from the Austrian Embassy that no Austrian passport had been issued to "Lillian", he asked her for her passport. She replied that she had forgotten it and then left, saying she was going to her hotel for the passport. She never returned to America House.

Comment: NOSENKO described this incident, but in connection with KGB attempts to entrap Joseph 06 MORONE in 1960, not ZUJUS in 1962. 06 (See p. 194.) NOSENKO was not in the Embassy Section in 1962. Interrogation of NOSENKO never resolved how he knew of this incident.

06 Interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1965, ZUJUS said that as manager of the America Club he had frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS. 06 ZUJUS often used her an an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was able to provide considerable background information about her.

0001453

12/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: NOSENKO has in other contexts identified UMANETS as a long-time KGB agent employed in America House. He never related her to ZUJUS. 06

In that same interview with CIA 06 ZUJUS described having met in Moscow a person from Damascus 10 who had been in Beirut, 10 or a person from Beirut 10 who had been in Damascus, 10 he could not recall which. 06 ZUJUS met him while acting as doorman at America House, but they conversed only for about 15 minutes 06 and ZUJUS could not recall what they had talked about. He may have seen the man on several other occasions, but he did not know his name nor why he was in Moscow, and he could provide no physical description. 06 ZUJUS did not recall that 11 this person gave him Lebanese vodka, but he acknowledged he favored the beverage. 06 ZUJUS confirmed to CIA that his father, Matas, 06 is secretary of the Lithuanian Roman Catholic 29 Alliance of America, an emigre organization concerned with the liberation of Lithuania. 11 06 ZUJUS indicated that his father often travels abroad in connection with his emigre activities.

Comment: Emigre organizations, including the Lithuanian, 11 have been traditional KGB targets and most have been penetrated by KGB agents. The fact of the elder ZUJUS' 06 emigre activities is almost certainly to have been known to the KGB, making 06 ZUJUS a matter of KGB concern for reasons quite separate from his cryptographic duties.

From NOSENKO's unfamilarity with ZUJUS' 06 father's activities, 06 ZUJUS' intimacy with KGB agent "Lillian" and relationship with KGB agent UMANETS, it is concluded that NOSENKO's role in the case, if any, was limited to his relationship with 06 WEISS and that NOSENKO exercised no supervisory function in the development of ZUJUS. 06

221BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Operations Against State Department Code Clerks

KGB operations against code clerks, for which NOSENKO claimed supervisory responsibility, included those directed against State Department cryptographic personnel as well as military cryptographers at the Embassy. In several such cases, NOSENKO's claimed subordinate, KOSOLAPOV, figures prominently.

Development of Paul JENNER 06

06

NOSENKO first mentioned the JENNER case in a 1964 interview with the FBI, when he was asked whether he had ever heard of a case within recent years in which KOSOLAPOV had travelled to Helsinki to intercept and establish contact with an American code clerk. NOSENKO "immediately recalled" such an incident which happened in 1960-1961. He explained that because Embassy code clerks were not sufficiently accessible to the KGB after they arrived in Moscow, it was decided to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki as part of an effort to probe for a new way to get in touch with the code clerks. According to NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV made but one trip to Helsinki in this new effort, and it was not tried again by others. NOSENKO identified KOSOLAPOV's target in this operation as Paul JENNER.

06

NOSENKO's Information

06

A month before JENNER's arrival in Moscow the Embassy Section received a copy of JENNER's anketa (visa application) 06 listing his diplomatic title as Secretary Archivist and indicating when he was to enter the Soviet Union from Finland by train "at the beginning of 1960, in the middle of the month". Believing him to be a code clerk (he was subsequently found to be a pouch clerk) 06 "the group" decided 06 to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki with the mission of accompanying JENNER on the train to Moscow to study JENNER's behavior. 06 06 JENNER and KOSOLAPOV were about the same age. KOSOLAPOV was to be accompanied by a female agent of GRYAZNOV's, "SOLISTKA", a Russian ballerina, who was to board the train after it entered the USSR at Vyborg.

(9BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

A proposal for the operation was prepared for the approval of the KGB Chairman which explained that code clerks were assigned to Moscow usually only for one year [thus limiting their accessibility to the KGB for development] and that it was necessary to attempt to place an agent near them even before they arrived in Moscow. When the Chairman's approval was granted, NOSENKO prepared the kharakteristika (official form) on KOSOLAPOV for the trip and gave it to the Personnel Office. KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable for Helsinki explaining that he was coming for two or three days. NOSENKO didn't sign the cable, but read it, and it was taken to KLYPIN for his signature and thereafter KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second (European) Department of the First Chief Directorate for release. There was no other correspondence with the Helsinki rezidentura concerning the operation before KOSOLAPOV departed Moscow. NOSENKO discussed the plan with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV and "maybe" they discussed it with KOVSHUK the day before KOSOLAPOV left. KOSOLAPOV had JENNER's photograph and his 06 name, and expected that the Helsinki residency could obtain a ticket for KOSOLAPOV on JENNER's train. 06 NOSENKO did not recall precisely when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow or under what name he travelled. KOSOLAPOV was gone for about a week and he travelled both ways by train.

NOSENKO read KOSOLAPOV's otchet (official account) of his trip, and the report of the female agent, "SOLISTKA". According to those reports, KOSOLAPOV became acquainted on 06 the train with JENNER as planned, as did "SOLISTKA", whom GRYAZNOV took to Vyborg and placed in JENNER's car. 06 06 "SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her Moscow telephone number. While in Helsinki KOSOLAPOV had spoken with the Rezident and Deputy Rezident about obtaining their help in Helsinki with the work against code clerks, and about using Helsinki agents against American code clerks en route to Moscow. Nothing came of the discussion, however; although the Rezident and Deputy Rezident said they would see about it, the Embassy Section later learned the Residency had "more important questions".

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Although the KGB later discovered that JENNER 06 was not a 08 code clerk but a pouch clerk, he remained a target for development. Since he did not telephone "SOLISTKA" after one or two months, the KGB arranged for her to encounter him at the railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet the couriers. 06 JENNER saw her but did not approach her, turning away. The KGB took no further steps to cultivate 06 JENNER. The KGB "had nothing on JENNER at all except a 06 suspicion he may have been a homosexual, but there was no proof".

On 26 October 1966 NOSENKO confirmed the identification of other CIA sources by identifying a photograph as that of Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV, [born in Perm, 19 February 1928] his former subordinate of the Embassy Section. The photograph shown NOSENKO was that of one Victor Dmitriyevich KOLOSSOV, employee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927, in Perm, who arrived in Finland by train from the USSR on 31 March 06 1960 [the day JENNER left] and departed on 2 April. NOSENKO acknowledged that that data accurately reflected KOSOLAPOV's alias, cover, and itinerary during his trip to Helsinki to accompany JENNER 06 back to Moscow in 1960.

On 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was confronted with the Finnish train manifest showing that Paul JENNER was the single 06 passenger departing Helsinki for Moscow on 31 March 1960 and that KOSOLAPOV/KOLOSOV travelled on 2 April on a train carrying no Americans. Repeating the substance of the KGB operation and citing his recollection from reading KOSOLAPOV's report of the trip, NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV travelled on the same train with JENNER 06 and that the Finnish manifests must be in error. [See accompanying exhibits.]

06 JENNER's Information

After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960 JENNER 06 reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students". The two Russians struck up a conversation and were soon baiting him on the question of racial discrimination in the United States. They said that they might see JENNER 06 in Moscow. About three months later, on 29 June, JENNER 06 was performing his normal duty of escorting Embassy couriers to Sheremetevo Airport when he was again approached by the Russian girl, "Yuliya", who acted surprised to see him and asked him to go outside to talk. "Yuliya" explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend who was leaving on a flight to Irkutsk (JENNER had seen the Irkutsk flight 06 depart a half hour earlier) and told JENNER that her male 06 companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with "Yuliya's" 06 questions concerning JENNER's impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy. When 06 JENNER said he must leave, she gave him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted that he call her. She advised JENNER 06 that "it would be better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone".

06

Comment: As far as CIA is aware, JENNER has never been asked to identify KOSOLAPOV's photograph.

06 Besides information about his Soviet companions on the Moscow journey, JENNER also told U.S. Department of State security officials about sexual advances made by his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his second maid.

Comment: Although NOSENKO has not identified either of these women as KGB agents, he has said in another context that all maids of American code clerks were KGB agents or informants.

EXHIBIT 1 - Complete Train Manifests, Helsinki-Moscow



Luettelo matkustajista, jotka Junalla saapuivat Suomeen / lähtivät Suomesta } Vainikkalan kautta

06 1	Jenner, Paul Francis	arkist.siht	17.o7.33	U.S.A:n	U.S.A. - Mosk. /F	
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7				Passintarkastaja:		
8				V.t.ylikonst.	E. Saukkonen	
9						
10						
11						
12						
13						
14						
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						

31 March 1960

06

NOTE: JENNER single international passenger on train. (Soviet passengers who may have boarded train in USSR, including at Vyborg, would not be included.)



Luettelo matkustajista, jotka Junalla saapuivat Suomeen / lähtivät Suomesta } Vainikkalan kautta

1	Ferdinand, Klaus Vilhelm	Yliopiston opettaja	10.o4.26	Tanskan	Tanska-Afganistan/F	
2	Hourpiliadi, Sofia	konttoristi	20.o2.22	Kreikan	Tukholma-Mosk./F	Se.asuu
3	Kolossov, Viktor	Sisliin:n virkailija	10.o3.27	N.liiton	Hki. - Mosk.	Copv./Mosk.
4	Suomen kansalaiset:			Kotipaikka:		
5	Korhonen, Jouko Aarre Armas ✓	työmies	16.11.24	Joensuu	Joensuu-Mosk. alue	(9opv.viis.
6	Laukkanen, Kirsti Hellin Irene ✓	konel.apul	24.o7.23	Jyväskylä	Jyväskylä-Gorki	(15pv.viis.)
7	Koskenniemi, Tyyne Kyllikki ✓	rouva	o3.o9.21	"	"	"
8	Kärkäs, Elli Helena ✓ Vouk	"	23.o7.22	Lahti		
9	Tiili, Aako Viljam ✓ Vouk	opettaja	13.o7.28	"	Lahti-Zaporoje	(15pv.viis.)
10	Takala, Toivo Erkki ✓ Vouk	var.hoit.	27.o3.23	"		
11	Utriainen, Erkki Olavi ✓ Vouk	kirv.mies	o3.o8.20	"		
12	Kaspio, Otto Allan ✓	toimittaja	o8.12.19	Helsinki		
13	Mäki-Reinikka, Antti ✓	liitt.siht.	12.o4.28	"		
14	Karukoski, Unto Mattias ✓	nuor.siht.	13.12.10	Sunila	Hki. - Mosk.	(15pv.viis.)
15	Järvinen, Aarne Juhani ✓	varastomies	27.o1.34	Toijala		
16	Sundman, Judith Josefina ✓	toto.apul.	o3.o3.15	Helsinki		
17						
18						
19				Passintarkastaja:		
20				V.t.ylikonst.	E. Saukkonen	
21						
22						

2 April 1960

NOTE: No Americans on train with KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV.

2BR

TS No. 197124
Copy 1

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Information From Other Sources

I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in Helsinki, contacted the chief of the Helsinki police on 31 March 1960 to ask his assistance in locating an American 06 named Paul F. JENNER, who was due to arrive in Helsinki the day before. SERGEYEV explained that he had some "business" with JENNER 06 but he did not specify its nature. Reportedly, this was the first time that SERGEYEV had made such a request of the police chief. GOLITSYN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet intelligence agent from "about 1945 on".

06

Development of JENNER: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's version of the 06 JENNER case in some degree resembles less the facts about JENNER than KGB activities 06 06 directed against John GARLAND (see below), activities which NOSENKO asserts never occurred. 06 GARLAND, not JENNER, 06 travelled on the same train as KOSOLAPOV, and GARLAND not 06 06 JENNER, travelled "in the middle of the month". The Helsinki Residency's query to the Helsinki police chief about JENNER 06 indicates that KOSOLAPOV's cable contained information about 06 JENNER, not just notice that KOSOLAPOV was coming to Helsinki. It was at the airport in Moscow, not on the train, that 06 "SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number, an event which would be presumably memorable to NOSENKO (as supervisor of all code clerk operations) if only because of his futile 06 wait for JENNER to call. Finally, NOSENKO is unaware of the actions of KGB agents who were employed as maids by JENNER. 06 From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO was neither KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, nor in this instance, supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks.

15/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Development of John GARLAND

06

The GARLAND case is of particular significance to judging the validity of NOSENKO's claim to complete knowledge of all KGB operations against American code clerks. NOSENKO is not merely unaware of KGB action taken with respect to GARLAND, he vehemently asserts no such action was taken.

06

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified twenty Americans employed by the American Embassy in Moscow who were of interest for various reasons to the KGB. He gave a short statement concerning each of the twenty, among which was 06 GARLAND, about whom NOSENKO said, "Code clerk, but nothing doing". Later asked to review the list and supply any additional information he might have, NOSENKO stated that 06 the KGB was studying GARLAND like the other code clerks, to gather enough incriminating material to make a recruitment. The case officer was KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not recall any agents working against GARLAND, 06 nor could he recall whether he had read the KGB file on GARLAND, 06 but he thought he must have read reports concerning him as they came into the Embassy Section. There was no operational plan drawn up 06 for GARLAND because the KGB developed no derogatory information concerning him; no recruitment thus was ever planned or attempted. NOSENKO could recall no background information concerning GARLAND, 06 such as his travels and acquaintances while stationed in Moscow.

Confronted in October 1966 with the evidence [see below] of KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki to accompany GARLAND back 06 to Moscow on 16 November 1960, NOSENKO was insistent that there was no such trip, that KOSOLAPOV travelled but once to Helsinki in connection with JENNER in early 1960, and 06 that the KGB had taken no such action with respect to 06 GARLAND. (NOSENKO had earlier reiterated that he was KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January 1960 until January 1962 and he would have had to know and to approve

12'5R

in advance any operational travel performed by his subordinate outside of the USSR.) Reminded that he transitted Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba on 15 November 1960 (the day before KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki with GARLAND), 06 NOSENKO stated that he would have learned of KOSOLAPOV's travel in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow.

06 GARLAND's Information

06 GARLAND was first interviewed on 17 July 1962 by the Regional Security Officer in Moscow as a result of the GOLITSYN lead [see below]. In this interview GARLAND denied 06 having met any Soviet of KOSOLAPOV's physical description during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied having been approached by Soviet Intelligence. On 30 July 06 1963 GARLAND was interviewed by the FBI and on 31 July he was given a polygraph examination. The latter, according to the FBI, "disclosed no information indicating that 06 GARLAND was deceptive in his statements to us denying any association with Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV or denying ever knowingly being contacted by any foreign intelligence agent". 06 GARLAND, by his own statement, took the train on 16 November 1960 from Helsinki to Moscow, to assume the duties as supervisor of the State Department code room in the Embassy. 08

GOLITSYN's Information

GOLITSYN, who was not posted to Helsinki until July 1960, reported that "about the end of 1960, about November or possibly by the beginning of 1961", the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residence advising that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki in transit to Moscow. The telegram stated that the responsible case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki in alias and under Vneshtorg cover for the purpose of striking up an acquaintance to be continued with the American in Moscow. The Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in the American's compartment. GOLITSYN himself went to the train to see off a Soviet delegation returning to Moscow, and he talked with KOSOLAPOV. Later in the summer or fall of 1961, GOLITSYN met in Helsinki another Second Chief Directorate officer from the Embassy Section, and he inquired about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. From the Embassy Section officer's refusal to discuss the case GOLITSYN concluded that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment; otherwise, the Embassy Section officer would have been willing to talk to him about it.

06

Shown GARLAND's photograph by the FBI on 13 March 1962, GOLITSYN failed to identify it "as being that of the unknown individual he had seen in the train compartment in Helsinki with KOSOLAPOV".

Information From Other Sources

KOSOLAPOV arrived by train in Helsinki on 12 November 1960. The Finnish railroad manifest of passengers travelling from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960, lists KOSOLAPOV (as KOLOSSOV) among eight Soviets aboard the train, and John W. GARLAND, the only American. [See accompanying exhibit.] 06

06

As he had with regard to JENNER (see above), SERGEYEV of the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 11 November 1960 asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to GOLITSYN) for help in locating GARLAND an American who would arrive there on 14 November. 06

06

Development of GARLAND: Summary and Conclusion

06 06

Whether or not GARLAND was aware, and contrary to NOSENKO's assertion, GARLAND clearly was the target of a KGB operation entailing KOSOLAPOV's travel to Helsinki. NOSENKO denies (with a vehemence which the foregoing summary cannot accurately reflect) that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Helsinki except in connection with JENNER, 06 and his assertion thus cannot be dismissed as the product of faulty recollection in which he confuses the cases of JENNER and GARLAND. 06

06 06

NOSENKO's denial of the facts of the GARLAND case is fatal to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, and that he supervised all KGB operations against American code clerks. Moreover, the KGB action in the GARLAND case impugns NOSENKO's 06 claim that, as one time Deputy Chief of the Section, he would necessarily know of any operations mounted against Embassy code clerks.

12/18R

14-00000

EXHIBIT 2 - Complete Train Manifest, Helsinki-Moscow



Luettelo matkustajista, jotka Junalla (kulkuneuvo) saapuivat Suomeen / lähtivät Suomesta } Vainikkalan (paikkakunta) kautta / 196

	Suku- ja etunimet	Ammatti tai arvo	Syntymäaika	Kansalaisuus	Määrämaa	Osoite Suomessa
1	Mouravieva, Nonna ✓	sos.min.	dipl.	N:liiton	N:liitto	Lähetystö, Hki.
2	Parve, Ralf	kirjailija	1919	"	Eesti	"
3	Morosov, Alexandre	dipl.kur.	dipl.	"	N:liitto/N-S	F,Kauttakulku
4	Otchagovski, Alexandre	"	"	"	"	"
5	Gavrilova, Maria ✓	rouva	1922	"	N:liitto	-
6	Kolossov, Viktor	virkailija	19.03.27	"	"	-
7	Agadjanov, Garnik ✓	"	1922	"	"	-
8	Akolzine, Potr	sirkustait.	1913	"	"	-
9	Lair, Jean Baptiste	dipl.kur.	17.08.07	Ranskan	"	Kauttakulku.
06 10	Garland, John Jr.	sihteeri	22.03.33	USA:n	"	"
11	Brunberg, Henry Charles	tsto siht.	dipl.	Suomen	"	Ulkoasiainministeriö.
12	Pantalainen, Aatu Ilmari	kirvesmies	14.11.19	"	"	Kulmak. 2.H.65, Hki.
13	Oksanen, Frans Oskar	sähk.asent	25.05.00	"	"	4.Linja,20.B.39, Hki.
14	Immonen, Heikki Juhani Tam ✓	lainop.kand	21.01.20	"	"	Kivelterint.23.C, Hki.
15						
16						
17				Passintarkastaja:		
18				V.t.ylikonst.		
19						E. Saukkonen
20						
21						
22						

16 November 1960

NOTE: GARLAND and KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV travelled on same train.

06

0001464

2BR

TS No. 197124
Copy 1

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

KGB/Polish UB Operations Against MORONE

At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a female Polish UB agent in contact with an unnamed American from the Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw and later brought the agent to Moscow to further compromise the American. On 11 June 1962 NOSENKO was asked whether he had foreign (non-Russian) agents working against the American Embassy, and he replied that he himself introduced the idea of using such agents to develop Americans afraid of becoming involved with Russian girls. He had several such agents, he said, and he sometimes asked the East German and Polish security services to supply him with such agents. As an example, NOSENKO cited the case of a Marine guard and a code clerk from the Embassy who travelled to Warsaw. The code clerk was intimate with a Polish female agent, whom NOSENKO had planted in their train compartment, on the train to Warsaw, and later in Moscow.

In an FBI interview on 24 February 1964 NOSENKO referred to the case again, and when the names of code 06 clerk Joseph MORONE and Embassy Marine guard Frank BEGGS 06 were mentioned, he immediately identified them as the men involved.

NOSENKO's Information

06

MORONE's case officer was NOSENKO's subordinate and specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO read 06 the file on MORONE, and saw his visa photograph, but never saw him in person. NOSENKO discussed the MORONE case with 06 KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occasions. Several KGB agents were employed against MORONE, including foreigners as well as Soviet citizens. 06

7/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid or waitress at America House reported to DEMKIN, her case officer, everything she saw or heard concerning MORONE. 06 KOSOLAPOV visited her several times with DEMKIN to discuss MORONE 06 and NOSENKO himself met her once or twice in one of the two safe apartments that DEMKIN had at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall any specific information from IVANOVA on MORONE which was interesting or useful. 06

SARWAT EL SHAZLY, an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian Embassy and an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, visited America House and met MORONE, but he reported nothing of value that NOSENKO recalled. 06

Pietro CECCHI, an Italian cook at the American Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAPOV, but NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE. 06

In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two German women who could be used against the residents of America House. One of these, Hanna, a blonde, was documented as a West German. NOSENKO never met her but instructed 06 PREISFREUND (see the STORSBERG 06 case) to take her to America House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times to America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that she may have reported on MORONE. 06 The second East German girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENKO never met her but he recalled that she was asked for her documents at America House on her first or second visit there. She replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America House, and never returned. (NOSENKO did not remember the time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he was still in the Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the Embassy security officer at the time.)

From one of these agents, 06 or possibly in some other manner, the KGB learned that MORONE was planning to go on leave in Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to compromise him. KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational plan for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after

9/BR

some editing by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK. KOSOLAPOV next met with a Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Headquarters to discuss the plan. The Pole was told that the target was an American Embassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk; this fact was deliberately kept from the Poles.

As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow by train. Upon her arrival she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her to a Moscow hotel where he gave her instructions concerning her role in the operation. The girl was told to meet MORONE on the 06 train, flirt with him, have him fall in love with her, continue the association, and study him. She was to tell him that she had been in Moscow as a guest of her uncle, a member of the Polish Trade Representation in Moscow, and that she could meet him again on her next visit.

Arrangements were made with the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for a technician to be placed on the train in the compartment next to that of MORONE and his companion, 06 06 BEGGS, for audio and visual (but not photographic) coverage.

NOSENKO did not recall when 06 MORONE and 06 BEGGS left Moscow. The Polish agent did, however, succeed in making MORONE's 06 acquaintance, and the technician from the Operational Directorate reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train reached Warsaw. The technician told NOSENKO the girl had engaged in sexual intercourse with MORONE during the trip. 06 The technician also reported that the tape recordings obtained were of poor quality.

Comment: At this juncture in NOSENKO's interrogation he was reminded that he was en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960 and did not return to Moscow until mid-December, and that State Department records indicated that MORONE and 06 06 BEGGS left Moscow on 13 November and arrived on the following day. NOSENKO responded that instead of having talked to the technician personally, he may have read the technician's

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: (Continued)
report and had seen "the film strips" after his return from Cuba. NOSENKO, it will be noted, had said earlier that there was no photographic coverage of MORONE's train compartment.
06

Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials, KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising photography during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room. The girl called MORONE at America 06 06 House, and MORONE subsequently visited her in the hotel room two or three times, during which photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on MORONE. 06 He did not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she had no further contacts with him.

Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it was felt that there were insufficiently incriminating to attempt to recruit MORONE. 06 The KGB wanted to trap him in the apartment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something that was definitely prohibited. For this purpose, Svetlana IVANOVA (see above) was supposed to lure MORONE out of 06 America House to somewhere in Moscow, but before anything further could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE out of 06 Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore, NOSENKO said, the KGB made no attempt to recruit MORONE. 06

NOSENKO has also explained 06 (to the FBI) that no attempt was made to recruit MORONE because Khrushchev instructed the KGB to refrain from any action which might affect the improvement in relations which the Soviets sought with the United States.

9/8R

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

MORONE's Information

Following receipt of information about his compromise, received from a sensitive Polish source, MORONE was first 06 interviewed about the allegation in May 1961. On 19 August 1961 he was transferred from Moscow. In an October 1962 security interview, MORONE stated that he had travelled with 06 06 Frank BEGGS to Warsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her what languages she spoke. Later she entered his compartment, and when he tried to engage her in sexual relations, she slapped his face. A day or two after they arrived in Warsaw, the girl contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room where they had sexual relations. According to MORONE, he 06 had sexual relations with at least two other women while in 06 Warsaw. He and BEGGS returned to Moscow without incident. On 6 February 1961, after MORONE had returned to Moscow, 06 the Polish girl from the train called him at America House, and the following day he visited her in her room at the Peking Hotel, where they were again intimate. On either this or an earlier occasion the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow. 06 MORONE has denied being approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence.

Information From Other Sources

A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 November 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where she was met by a KGB case officer named "VOLODYA". She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The KGB case officer, apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November 1960 (sic) pointed MORONE 06 out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Polish female met MORONE and was 06 intimate with him on the train to Warsaw. In Warsaw on 12 November 1960 (sic) she was quite friendly with MORONE, 06 but pursuant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a 06 suitably-prepared Polish UB safehouse where incriminating photographs were clandestinely taken of MORONE and herself. 06 The female agent again travelled to Moscow on 5 February 1961

13/BR

and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further compromising photographs were taken of her and MORONE on this trip. 06 The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her and MORONE. 06

06

06 The Marine guard BEGGS has confirmed that the Polish girl and MORONE were intimate on the train to Warsaw, and 06 that MORONE had been recontacted by the Polish girl in Moscow in February 1961.

06

MORONE's fellow code clerks and residents of America House described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and a ladies' man. Various reports indicate that MORONE was 06 involved in a currency-speculation ring operated by SARWAT EL SHAZLY, the KGB agent mentioned by NOSENKO, and MORONE 06 confirmed that on at least one occasion SARWAT arranged the 06 introduction of MORONE and other code clerks to Soviet females. 06 MORONE was intimate with one of them in SARWAT's apartment in the spring of 1961. 06 MORONE was also said to be a close friend of the Embassy cook, and KGB agent Pietro 06 CECCHI, and MORONE had admitted that along with other Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles illegally from CECCHI. One report states that CECCHI asked a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to MORONE in the 06 State Department code room, (a restricted area to which CECCHI had no access). A number of reports indicated that 06 MORONE had been sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO. 06 MORONE denied having been intimate with IVANOVA. He said, however, that he had told his friends that he had, that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued.

06

The Army code clerk STORSBERG has reported that MORONE 06 was acquainted with the KGB officer SKVORTSOV who, as "MICHAUD", was involved in the KGB attempt to recruit 06 STORSBERG. (See p. 173.) 06 STORSBERG recalled meeting MICHAUD at America House; MICHAUD had frequented the bar there. In one version of his recruitment STORSBERG said that MORONE was

06 06

in SKVORTSOV's company the night SKVORTSOV lured STORSBERG 06 to the hotel where the KGB tried to recruit him.

06

Operation Against MORONE: Summary and Conclusion

06

NOSENKO relates but one aspect of the MORONE case, the use of the Polish UB female agent. He is apparently unaware of information known to KGB agents (and hence to the KGB), 06 such as MORONE's sexual involvements with IVANOVA's friends and at SARWAT EL SHAZLY's apartment, his illicit currency dealings with CECCHI, and his relationship with UMANETS. 06 He errs in relating to MORONE the East German female agent sent to America House: the incident occurred, but later, 06 when MORONE was no longer in Moscow nor was NOSENKO himself still in the Embassy Section. (See p. 183.) The KGB did 06 not lack a sufficient basis for attempting to recruit MORONE: if it refrained from the attempt, it was for other reasons. KGB inaction did not relate to Khrushchev's concern for Soviet-United States relations; this was the period between the U-2 incident (May 1960) and the Berlin crisis (August 1961).

Even with respect to the Polish UB agent, there is persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV played the roles NOSENKO described: NOSENKO was travelling to Cuba and KOSOLAPOV was in Finland in connection with the GARLAND case.

06

It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO, in this instance, was not supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks nor would he necessarily have known of recruitments among Embassy personnel.

Other KGB Targets Among State Department Code Clerks

In connection with his responsibility for directing KGB operations against American code clerks in 1960-1961, NOSENKO has commented on five other State Department code clerks who served in Moscow during that period. Their brief treatment in this paper reflects not their unimportance but NOSENKO's limited comments and the lack of collateral information. The significance of these cases is the extent to which information provided by NOSENKO accurately reflects the KGB's knowledge of each target.

Maurice ZWANG 06

06

NOSENKO identified ZWANG as a State Department code clerk who was "actively worked on" during the 1960-1961 period. An Egyptian agent, name not recalled, introduced 06 ZWANG to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain incriminating photographs, but the female did not like ZWANG and 06 refused his sexual advances. In January 1962 (when NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section) the KGB was engaged in no activity against ZWANG. 06 The KGB agents had no agents in contact with him, and had no information indicating ZWANG was vulnerable.

06

Comment: In connection with a State Department security interview conducted after ZWANG returned from 06 Moscow, 06 ZWANG related that in March or April 1961 an Egyptian introduced him to a Soviet female whom he visited in her apartment on several occasions but with whom he was not intimate. Although ZWANG denied it, a polygraph 06 examination indicated that he was intimate with his maid during visits to her apartment.

06 ZWANG's maid has been identified as a KGB agent. Various Americans stationed in Moscow have reported that ZWANG was active in currency 06 speculation and blackmarketeering with the Egyptian and KOSOLAPOV's agent, CECCHI.

1118R.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

John TAYLOR

06

NOSENKO identified TAYLOR as a State Department code clerk and the target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was interested in TAYLOR 06 because of his intimacy with his Russian maid (a KGB agent) and "his sympathy towards the Soviet Union and its people". No attempt was made to recruit 06 TAYLOR because of the lack of compromising photographs of 06 TAYLOR and the maid, and because the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important STORSBERG 06 case by risking a scandal with TAYLOR. 06

06

Comment: TAYLOR has acknowledged that he was intimate with his maid from about September 1960 until his departure in early 1961, on one occasion in a "friend's apartment" in Moscow, and that 06 maid had told TAYLOR she was pregnant and 06 TAYLOR offered her money for an abortion. 06 TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961 and the KGB attempt to recruit STORSBERG did not occur 06 until June 1961, according to NOSENKO, or October 1961, according to STORSBERG. 06

06

Frank DAY

06

NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Department code clerk at the Embassy who was a target either of KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. The KGB knew nothing interesting about him such as who his friends in Moscow were, or his travel in or outside of the Soviet Union. The KGB had no derogatory information about him and was unaware of any vulnerabilities he may have had. No operational measures were taken against him.

15/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Comment: DAY was in Moscow from May 1960 until October 1961. In July 1961 he travelled to the Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA employee, Agricultural Attache BROWN. The two were under surveillance by five persons at all times on this trip. On one occasion they found "repairmen" in their hotel room upon returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and on another an "attractive and available Soviet female" was believed to have been planted in their train compartment. 08, 06

06

Robert DWELLY

Reviewing an American Embassy telephone list in September 1964, NOSENKO said that he "believed" DWELLY was 06 a code clerk during the 1960-1961 period. There was no 06 approach to DWELLY and he knew no details of the operational plan against DWELLY nor the identity of any agent 06 who might have been used against him. DWELLY's case officers were KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV. 06

Under interrogation in February 1965, however, NOSENKO said that the KGB was "100 percent sure" that he was a homosexual on the basis of his "behavior when visiting a public men's room". There was a "big hunt" for DWELLY and 06 on a number of evenings when DWELLY was known to be free 06 from work, NOSENKO himself, GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, and NOSENKO's homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV waited in vain in a KGB surveillance car in the hope that DWELLY would 06 visit downtown Moscow and they could establish contact with him. No photographs of DWELLY were obtained: there was no approach and no recruitment. 06

NOSENKO later added that "perhaps" GRYAZNOV's homosexual agent "VOLODYA" had spoken with DWELLY in a 06 public toilet in a museum or a park and it was on this basis that he concluded DWELLY was a homosexual.

06

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Comment: DWELLY was assigned to Moscow as a code clerk from April 1959 to July 1960. In a Department of State security interview in March 1966 (prompted by NOSENKO's information), he categorically denied being a homosexual. He described two occasions in Moscow when, while walking alone, two men, who by their general appearance and actions made him think they were "queer", were trying to attract his attention. He recalled that, on one of the two occasions, one asked him the way to the toilet.

06

Joseph GAFFEY

06

NOSENKO originally identified GAFFEY as a military enlisted man in Moscow during the 1960-1961 period, and an operational target of DEMKIN. In February 1965, however, he identified him as a State Department code clerk for whom the responsible case officer was KOSOLAPOV, whom NOSENKO supervised. The KGB attempted to lure GAFFEY into downtown 06 Moscow using Svetlana IVANOVA, the maid in America House who was one of DEMKIN's agents, but GAFFEY rejected her 06 repeated invitations. The KGB was unaware of any vices 06 GAFFEY might have had and had no derogatory information regarding him.

06

Comment: GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 1961. A fellow resident of America House, Fred KADERA, reported during a State Department 06 security interview that GAFFEY had told him 06 that he had been intimate with a girl at America House. 06 GAFFEY told KADERA that he did 06 not know she was Russian until he was walking her home and met IVANOVA, who identified her as such. America House manager Peter BINDER 06 reported rumors in America House that GAFFEY 06

B15R

Comment: (Continued)
was having an affair with IVANOVA in America House. He described GAFFEY as the heaviest 06 drinker in America House and said that occasion- 06 ally GAFFEY could not report to work due to his drinking. In describing the KGB approach made to him in early 1963, BINDER (see p.405) 06 quoted his interrogator as saying that GAFFEY 06 took IVANOVA to BINDER's room in America House, 06 implying that he was intimate with her at that time.

06 GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962, before the expiration of his tour, because of drunkenness. During a State Department security interview, GAFFEY admitted 06 being intimate with IVANOVA at America House and at her apartment. 06 GAFFEY reported that IVANOVA had told him she was pregnant and had asked for money for an abortion.

Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, on transfer to the Embassy Section, operations against the American code clerks were the Section's priority task and thus his most important single responsibility as Deputy Chief. He asserts to be complete his awareness of what was known to the KGB on this topic at the time, because of his senior position, his personal review of relevant files and correspondence, his personal direction of KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV, and his personal participation in their operations. Without exception, in every one of the cases NOSENKO describes there are facts substantially at variance with his account, in direct proportion to the amount of collateral information available.

Conclusion

From the foregoing it is concluded that he was neither Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section nor supervisor of all operations against American code clerks. Consequently, he would not necessarily have known of recruitments among other Embassy personnel.

Case Officer for Embassy Security Officer
John ABIDIAN

Comment: John V. ABIDIAN served as the Embassy Security Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately the same period as NOSENKO's claimed service in the Embassy Section of the American Department. The State Department replacement for CIA officer Russell LANGELLE, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a number of operational tasks, including performing clandestine letter mailings to CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing deaddrop emergency communications from CIA source GRU Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY.

ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 and then secured employment with the Department of State as a clerk/typist. He remained in Paris until 1954. After special training at the CIC school at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service school, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Department's Office of Security. A large part of his work in this period was accompanying foreign dignitaries visiting the United States, including Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov in November 1956, Mikoyan in the spring of 1959, and Khrushchev at the end of 1959. These

Comment: (Continued)
duties brought ABIDIAN into contact with KGB officers stationed in New York and Washington as well as among the Soviet delegations. One of the members of the Khrushchev entourage was KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's subordinate in the Embassy Section.

During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN in several instances, identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as "a CIA officer" and describing his letter-mailing activities. His knowledge of ABIDIAN was attributed to his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section.

After recontacting CIA in Geneva in 1964 NOSENKO for the first time explicitly claimed to have been the KGB case officer responsible for ABIDIAN in Moscow and for the first time described ABIDIAN's alleged servicing of a deaddrop in 1960. NOSENKO has described ABIDIAN since 1964 as the sole American for whom NOSENKO was personally accountable during his 1960-1961 Embassy Section service, and one of the most important counterintelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Directorate.

Duties as a Case Officer

When he reported for duty in the Embassy Section NOSENKO was told by KLYPIN and KOVSHUK that one of his duties would be case officer for ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was then expected in the near future. ABIDIAN was to be the only American target for whom NOSENKO personally was officially accountable while he served in this section. KOVSHUK gave NOSENKO such information as the section had on ABIDIAN. Included was ABIDIAN's visa application, the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate. According to that report, which was based on correspondence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN had served as a Department of State Security Officer concerned with the safety of Premier Khrushchev when he visited the United States in 1959; from ABIDIAN's behavior at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer, probably with CIA. That report and the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security Officer, made ABIDIAN one of the most important counterintelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later adopted for him the cryptonym "ARSEN" used earlier by personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate of the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, but that unit had no information not included in its original report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States be asked for further details, but none were ever received. NOSENKO thus never learned of ABIDIAN's education and study abroad, date of entry into the Department of State, promotions, personal rank, previous assignments, military service, or foreign service status.

Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the KGB decided not to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal vulnerability. It was considered better to concentrate on surveillance coverage in the hope that, as LANGELLE's successor, he might lead "to another POPOV". [POPOV, a GRU Lieutenant Colonel and CIA agent, according to KGB sources, was apprehended in 1959.]

Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of his arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveillance by at least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour a team was available to cover him if he left the Embassy. The only time this intensity of coverage might have been reduced, NOSENKO said, was during a period of about one and one-half months in 1961, when surveillance of the Embassy was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage of British targets in connection with the PENKOVSKIY case. As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by information from surveillance reports.

In line with the emphasis on surveillance, the operational plan for ABIDIAN written by NOSENKO in October 1960 called for no direct action but specified that:

-ABIDIAN's maid Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an "operational contact" of the Embassy Section, was to continue to apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and "NEPTUNE-80" to his shoes. (According to NOSENKO, these are surveillance aids. Metka is a "thief powder" applied to clothing pockets, leaving a trace on anything with which it comes into contact. Its primary purpose is to aid in the detection of operational letters mailed by suspected foreign intelligence officers and agents. NEPTUNE-80, applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on the ground which the KGB even long afterwards can follow with a dog.) The only item of information received from FEDOROVICH was that ABIDIAN was having an affair with an Embassy female employee. FEDOROVICH was unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's apartment.

-Pietro CECCHI, Embassy employee and KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever he learned concerning him. CECCHI never obtained any significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life. "ABIDIAN was developing CECCHI as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy", but NOSENKO did not recall any specific report CECCHI gave to ABIDIAN that was of interest to the Embassy Section.

-Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if necessary.

-All other agents and operational contacts of the section were to be instructed to report every detail about ABIDIAN (see below).

-Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters.

-Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be continued.

Apart from those specified by the operational plan, two other KGB agents, Lyudmila GROMAKOVA and "KAMO" (a KGB agent - whose identity NOSENKO did not recall) were involved with ABIDIAN. GROMAKOVA, a language instructor for Embassy personnel, was an agent handled by Embassy Section case officer GAVRILENKO. ABIDIAN took "only several" Russian language lessons from GROMAKOVA and NOSENKO did not know whether these were private or class lessons. He learned nothing of operational significance from GROMAKOVA's contacts with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular reporting from her.

Comment: Although he had earlier identified GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent, NOSENKO never associated her with ABIDIAN until told that ABIDIAN had been one of her students. In actuality ABIDIAN took regular language lessons from GROMAKOVA, normally three one-half hour lessons per week, from shortly after his arrival until his departure from Moscow.

The second KGB agent, "KAMO", was an agent of the Moscow City KGB organization who met ABIDIAN at the Baku Restaurant by accident. When informed that ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that "KAMO" try to develop a relationship with ABIDIAN. After arguing that this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finally agreed, and "KAMO" phoned ABIDIAN twice on KGB instructions. ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet him, and no further action was taken. [See below for ABIDIAN's account of a similar incident, but one which occurred in Armenia.]

NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but he could have checked, if necessary, with a copy of the Embassy telephone list published monthly, since it contained the office room number of each American employee. [The Embassy telephone list contained apartment, but not office room numbers.] ABIDIAN's office was in the "Zone of Security" (i.e., secure office areas). NOSENKO said that a report from an agent (identity not recalled) indicated that there was a sign on ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security Office". [There was no such sign.] NOSENKO was unable to determine if ABIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation was monitored in ABIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone was installed there. [In 1964 a microphone, albeit then inoperative, was found in the room occupied in 1960-1961 by ABIDIAN.] NOSENKO recalled no particularly interesting or important information about ABIDIAN obtained from other microphones in the Embassy.

NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished, since "data of this nature was not operationally significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was under active development".

Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries he went or the time of year when the trips were made. Such information would have been of interest to him as ABIDIAN's case officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier trips abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed to be for operational purposes. However, there was no possibility for the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone; even if the Embassy Section did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First Chief Directorate "would not accept a request for operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow".

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

With reference to whether the KGB could have photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow, NOSENKO said that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union. While this procedure would not be impossible, it was not considered so important as to justify the special effort involved.

Comment: According to ABIDIAN, he openly discussed his travel plans with Embassy language teacher GROMAKOVA (GAVRILENKO's agent), and on at least some occasions used international telephone calls to arrange for accommodations at his destination in Europe. Also, the Foreign Ministry UPDK (which office provides administrative services to foreign diplomats in Moscow), to which ABIDIAN sent his passport for an exit visa for each departure, could have noted from passport entries the whereabouts of his earlier travel.

ABIDIAN took no trips in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow, since if he had, NOSENKO would have known and remembered them, as it was his responsibility as case officer to take certain actions. Among the latter he listed:

-Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel from the UPDK (the Soviet Foreign Ministry unit which provides administrative services to the diplomatic community in Moscow).

-Advising the UPDK of KGB approval for the trip.

-Advising appropriate local KGB offices of ABIDIAN's itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and any other necessary operational activity.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

-Receiving, reading, and filing all reports of surveillance and other operational activity carried out by various KGB units.

NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. Even if he were absent when such a request for travel was made, he would have seen all documents upon his return; he did not recall seeing any such documents in ABIDIAN's file.

Comment: ABIDIAN who is of Armenian origin and speaks the Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency, made a trip to Armenia between 5 and 9 October 1960. While in Armenia ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen, their parishioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece in 1946. ABIDIAN attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and also visited some relatives of his in or near the city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow, an Armenian whom ABIDIAN met on that trip tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but ABIDIAN refused to see him.

After being told ABIDIAN had attended a service celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk, and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said that this was his sole recollection concerning ABIDIAN's trip.

With reference to ABIDIAN's travel to Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO recalled having been on leave at the time. However, NOSENKO's reconstruction of the timing of his alleged leave still placed him in Moscow at the time of ABIDIAN's trip. In 1966, NOSENKO stated that he had lied, that his 1960 leave was taken in January, not October.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Except for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was thought to have been intimate, NOSENKO knew none of ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow nor his close friends and professional contacts among foreigners there.

NOSENKO received and read transcripts of all telephone calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and apartment via the Moscow city telephone system, but he recalled none of their names nor nationalities, because there was nothing of interest in the conversations.

At the end of the January-February 1965 interrogations concerning ABIDIAN NOSENKO acknowledged that he knew little about this important KGB target. He was "working badly" as ABIDIAN's case officer, he said, because he had had to concentrate on supervising the work against code clerks.

ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings

During the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO in Geneva, he reported KGB knowledge of ABIDIAN's mailing of at least three clandestine letters, in each case to KGB-controlled agents. According to NOSENKO, the KGB detected all the letters mailed by ABIDIAN through the use of metka. He cautioned the CIA representatives from further use of Embassy employees for mailing letters to agents in the Soviet Union. He noted that after LANGELLE, no such letters were mailed for a year and a half, until ABIDIAN mailed several. He explained that Embassy employees' servants applied an odorless substance (metka) to clothing pockets, and traces of the substance rubbed off on any thing it contacted, such as a letter. All the letters mailed in Moscow were passed through a machine which identified letters bearing tracing of metka, he said, and this was how letters ABIDIAN mailed were intercepted. [NOSENKO said the machine was a fotoapparat, literally a camera, but presumably he meant some sort of light-sensitive device.] NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had mailed a letter to someone in Odessa, and two to the Baltic area, probably to Riga, and all were detected by metka, not by ABIDIAN's surveillants. According to NOSENKO, no new agents were discovered, however, since all of the agents to whom ABIDIAN mailed letters were already controlled by the KGB.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: NOSENKO's information is substantially correct, that no letters were mailed for one and a half years after LANGELLE's expulsion, and that ABIDIAN mailed two or three letters, including ones to the Baltic area and to Odessa. No letters were mailed from February 1960 until ABIDIAN mailed one on 1 April 1961, and of the three letters ABIDIAN mailed, one was to Odessa and one each to Latvia and Estonia.

CIA has conducted tests to determine whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB control device. Ultra-violet, chemical and microscopic analyses developed one possible use of a metka like substance. Analysis of an article of clothing of a foreign diplomat in Moscow who served as a CIA support agent produced a sharply positive reaction.

NOSENKO later described how metka was applied to ABIDIAN's clothing by his maid and how, in particular, this led to the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed to the agent in Odessa and to his parents in the United States.

> "ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH. She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV. She started to work for ABIDIAN a few months after his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than six months after his arrival. I met her shortly after she began to work for ABIDIAN in order to get acquainted with her, in order to evaluate her and give her general instructions about her work for ABIDIAN. I do not know the exact date of this meeting but it was before the fall of 1960. I wrote the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN. This operational plan stated that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly on ABIDIAN's clothing.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

"FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing during the entire period that she worked for him. She did this every two or three weeks except for a few times when she was sick or on leave. No one else had access to ABIDIAN's apartment and therefore no other person had the possibility of putting metka on his clothing.

"I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational letter to the KGB double agent 'ARKHANGELSKIY' (in Odessa). He mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier. Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to 'ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these letters had metka on them, as I was told by SUMIN (a KGB secret writing specialist). I cannot remember the date that ABIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was sometime in 1961."

Comment: ABIDIAN had no maid in Moscow until sixteen months after his arrival; FEDOROVICH worked for him part-time from July 1961 until he left Moscow. Thus FEDOROVICH could not have applied the metka which as NOSENKO claimed resulted in the interception of the letter ABIDIAN mailed 1 April 1961, and probably was not yet employed by ABIDIAN even at the time the letter to "ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed on 2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, while FEDOROVICH was working for him.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Told that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the time of the "ARKHANGELSKIY" letter mailing, NOSENKO insisted that no one but FEDOROVICH had access to ABIDIAN's apartment, that he himself briefed her on the use of metka, that the letters were intercepted by use of metka, and that FEDOROVICH was responsible.

ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Deaddrop Site

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that in 1960 or in early 1961 the KGB had surveilled ABIDIAN visiting what was believed to be a deaddrop site on Pushkin Street in Moscow. He provided additional details when questioned again in 1965.

NOSENKO's Information

In 1960 or early 1961, while NOSENKO was his responsible case officer, ABIDIAN was surveilled from the Embassy to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A KGB stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally used. ABIDIAN's surveillance team followed the car to a bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone and walked around the corner, where he entered a residential building next to a meat market on Pushkin Street. The surveillance team saw him go in but did not follow him. ABIDIAN emerged after a few seconds. This unusual incident was reported by the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, and the building was inspected that same day by KOZLOV, the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance Directorate, and MATVEYEV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department. Taking into account the character of the building and its inhabitants, the duration and circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the suitability of the hallway - particularly the radiator in it - for use as a deaddrop site, it was decided by the leadership of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance

Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover this location. Because of the short time available, it was not possible to place this post inside the building, so it was set up across the street. In addition, the radiator was checked daily to see if anything, such as a magnetic container, had been concealed behind it. The post was manned around the clock for 30 days, after which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another two months. If a package or magnetic container had been found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning, it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger a signal should someone remove the package. At the same time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of sight from the hallway below. During the three months that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the building. The post was then discontinued, but the address was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Directorate. The true significance of this location became known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.

NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the suspected deaddrop site on the day it occurred. He was sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone call from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief of the Embassy Section, the decision to place the stationary surveillance post at the site was made at a higher level; neither of them was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO himself visited the building on Pushkin Street the following day or the day after, but he remained only a few minutes and did not recall any details of the hallway, except that there was a radiator there.

As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled receiving the surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street building and placing this report in ABIDIAN's file. (This case file NOSENKO turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about 28 December 1961, just before he transferred to the Seventh Department.)

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month of surveillance, and periodically after that. These discussions took place either by telephone, when KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred during the period of the stationary surveillance.

NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section during all the period that the stationary surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections.

NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on the Pushkin Street deaddrop site to his CIA contacts in Geneva in June 1962 because by that time the post had already been discontinued without anything unusual or suspicious having been noted, and he thought that this incident would be of no particular interest to CIA.

When last asked whether he had visited the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied:

> "I don't remember. I do not want to say that I visited the deaddrop. I don't remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say 'yes', and I cannot say 'no'."

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street deaddrop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a full year after the time reported by NOSENKO. As NOSENKO reported, accompanied by an Embassy Economic Officer, ABIDIAN left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet driver and proceeded in a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin Street. Leaving the bookstore, ABIDIAN entered the building where the site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and left one minute later, returning to the Embassy.

The deaddrop was proposed by PENKOVSKIY in August 1960. CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY walked 03 by the site on 12 November and 4 December 1960; on 21 January 1961 MAHONEY briefly entered the 03 building to confirm the site's precise location. If the KGB had surveilled MAHONEY's visits and 03 had put the site under surveillance, NOSENKO might be relating those events by mischance in attributing the visit to ABIDIAN. In such a circumstance, however, NOSENKO, as ABIDIAN's case officer, would have known that his target visited a site which had been previously noted in connection with the suspicious movements of another Embassy official. Further, NOSENKO's description of ABIDIAN's route, companion, and sequence of movements is so precise as to refer clearly to ABIDIAN. Lastly, NOSENKO dislcaims any knowledge of MAHONEY or his activities; he 03 asserts that MAHONEY was neither the object of 03 KGB suspicion or concern. For reasons no combination of circumstances nor NOSENKO himself can plausibly explain, NOSENKO can describe ABIDIAN's deaddrop site visit although it occurred at a time when NOSENKO was no longer ABIDIAN's case officer and when he was assigned to another Second Chief Directorate department.

If he turned over ABIDIAN's file on 28 December 1961 to another Embassy Section officer, as he claimed, NOSENKO could not have received

0001431

5/8R

Comment: (Continued)
nor filed the initial surveillance report of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street site. If he transferred to the Seventh Department two days after ABIDIAN's visit, as he claimed (and NOSENKO's participation in the W.E. JOHNSON case 06 indicates that he was working against tourists by 5 January 1962), he could neither have visited the site as he described nor could he have received thereafter the daily surveillance reports. He could not, of his own knowledge, assert that the surveillance was terminated after three months, since well before the three months' surveillance ended he was abroad in Geneva. Lastly, it cannot be for the reason NOSENKO claimed (that the surveillance was unsuccessful) that NOSENKO did not mention ABIDIAN's activities to CIA in Geneva in 1962.

Case Officer for John ABIDIAN: Summary and Conclusion

If for no other reason than ABIDIAN's security functions with the Khrushchev entourage, files of the First Chief Directorate would record his name: If NOSENKO states to the contrary, that traces were negative, NOSENKO did not run the traces himself nor know the results. According to NOSENKO, ABIDIAN was "one of the most important targets of the Second Chief Directorate"; all KGB resources were employed for two years, including 24-hour surveillance, the exploitation of all agents with access to him, audio surveillance, and technical aids, with almost absolutely negative results. The results could not have been negative: for NOSENKO to so assert can only mean that NOSENKO was not informed of the results. In the two instances NOSENKO cited of Embassy agents' activities against ABIDIAN, he made fundamental errors: ABIDIAN's maid was not employed by ABIDIAN at the time NOSENKO insists she was applying the metka, and GROMAKOVA taught ABIDIAN Russian throughout his stay in Moscow, not just "several times". NOSENKO acknowledges that ABIDIAN's travel in the Soviet Union would have had to been approved by the KGB, and that the responsible case officer would have issued orders for his surveillance outside of Moscow and would have later received reports of the target's activities. NOSENKO acknowledged that he was not so involved, although he belatedly recalled one trip ABIDIAN made. Lastly, although NOSENKO claims to know, from his Embassy Section assignment, details of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop, the event occurred at a time when NOSENKO by his own account could not have been physically present in the Embassy Section.

Conclusion

It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO was not case officer for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN.

Supervisor of Operations Against American Service Attaches

Questioned in detail in 1964 on his responsibilities in the Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed no personal role in operations against American service attaches. He said only that when he arrived in the section, DRANOV was the responsible case officer for the Naval personnel, including the Embassy Marine guards, and when DRANOV was transferred shortly thereafter, his responsibilities were assumed by BELOGLAZOV. Listing the names and functions of American Department personnel, NOSENKO mentioned that Yevgeniy Nikolayevich ALESHIN was Second Deputy to Department Chief KLYPIN: ALESHIN had the special assignment of coordinating Second Chief Directorate activities against all foreign military intelligence personnel, including service attaches.

In January 1965 NOSENKO claimed for the first time that he had among his other responsibilities as Deputy Chief that of supervising operations against American service attaches, and for the first time claimed case officer responsibilities against American targets other than ABIDIAN. He related how, at his meeting with KLYPIN and KOVSHUK on entering the section in January 1960, KOVSHUK suggested that NOSENKO assume supervisory responsibility for the service attaches while KOVSHUK supervised operations against the civilian diplomatic staff of the Embassy. NOSENKO stated "supervising" meant that the case officers for the service attaches referred their questions to him, not to KOVSHUK. These included case officers GAVRILENKO, responsible for Air Attaches, KURILENKO, for Army Attaches, and DEMKIN, for enlisted personnel of all services. "While he was getting acquainted with the section on DRANOV's retirement", NOSENKO himself took case officer responsibility for the Naval Attache personnel. This responsibility was subsequently assumed by DRANOV's former assistant, BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO could not initially recall how long he supervised service attache operations; he later said "several months" and finally "five or six months". Neither could NOSENKO recall what other pressing duty or duties caused him to be relieved of this function. He said this resulted from KOVSHUK's proposal that supervision of the service attaches be assumed by ALESHIN who was Deputy Chief of the Second Directorate's American Department and coordinator for Second Directorate operations against military intelligence officers of all nationalities.

Supervisor of Service Attache Operations: Summary and Conclusion

Because of the tardiness of NOSENKO's claim to have been responsible for operations against service attaches and because he was not able, when challenged, to substantiate his claims by providing any details of KGB activities against these targets, it is concluded that this aspect of his claimed KGB service is a fiction.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Custodian of KGB File on Embassy Security

As former Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed awareness of KGB knowledge of its American Embassy target. Specifically, NOSENKO claimed to have been custodian of the Second Chief Directorate's file on Embassy security.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO's knowledge of the physical layout of the Embassy derived both from his general supervisory functions during 1960-1961 and from his responsibilities as the officially registered custodian of the KGB file on the Embassy security. He received the file from the Section Chief, KOVSHUK, when he arrived in January 1960. As was permissible under KGB procedures, as long as the custodian was still in the same directorate, the file was charged to BAKHVALOV. [See p. 153 for NOSENKO's various assertions with respect to BAKHVALOV.] NOSENKO had custody of the file charged to himself, and from January 1960 until NOSENKO was leaving the section on 25-28 December 1961, only KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV (both of whom shared NOSENKO's office and safe) had access to the file.

The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old building on Mokhovaya Street and the second (about an inch thick) on the new Embassy building occupied in 1953 on Chaykovskiy Street. The file contained detailed floor plans and photographs of both buildings.

No operational analysis or planning by NOSENKO or others was done on the basis of this file during NOSENKO's two years in the Embassy Section. It was used only for reference purposes, since the KGB had concluded that it was impossible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate the secure areas of the Embassy because of the American security precautions in effect.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

All Soviet employees of the Embassy who entered the restricted areas, "the seventh through the tenth floors", were carefully questioned because of the special KGB interest in these offices. [The secure area barred to unescorted local employees is comprised of the eighth through tenth floors.]

NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in the Embassy security file, while he was custodian. None of the information was of interest or important or useful enough for him to remember, and he recalled none of the KGB agent sources. [In another context NOSENKO cited an instance in which an unrecalled KGB agent had reported [erroneously] that ABIDIAN's office had a sign on the door reading "Security Office".]

Nothing could be recovered from the Embassy classified trash, which was always burned at an unrecalled location by a non-commissioned officer or Marine guard accompanied by an officer. [At the Moscow Embassy the Marine guard detailed for the purpose has always burned the classified trash alone. NOSENKO may be unwittingly referring to a U.S. military security procedure requiring a commissioned officer to witness and to certify the destruction of classified documents. If NOSENKO is aware of any such procedure, he has never indicated it in any context.]

In 1960-1961, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief, he either knew the location of all offices and personnel within the Embassy or he could obtain them from the monthly Embassy telephone lists which the KGB received regularly from agents. The lists gave office numbers. [The Embassy telephone lists contain names, apartment numbers and telephone numbers, but omits office room numbers.]

In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret conversations. None of the technical specifications of the room were known, nor was its location. An unrecalled source reported only that meetings were held in the room, which was in the restricted area.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material during 1960-1961. A charwoman who was an agent of BELOGLAZOV stole a bag of papers from the Naval Attache office. The torn and crumpled contents included a draft of a report of Naval Attaches' observation of ships and factories on a trip to Leningrad. The report was only of routine interest to the KGB. The charwoman was granted a cash award.

Custodian of Embassy Security File: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO cannot describe the location (even by floor) of any of his own targets, such as ABIDIAN, the military code room, or the State Department communications center. In fact, he cannot describe the location of the office of any individual or unit in the Embassy, even of the Ambassador. When challenged to substantiate his claim to knowledge of the Embassy security file, NOSENKO asserted that he had never read it nor paid any "special attention" to its content in the two years he was file custodian. It is concluded that NOSENKO's claim that he was custodian of the file is an invention.

Audio Operations Against the American Embassy

NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB microphone system in the Embassy derived from his alleged responsibility as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section for receiving and routing to appropriate KGB personnel the reports of monitored conversations. Also, in his capacity as Deputy Chief and custodian of the monitoring reports logbook NOSENKO claimed to have attended a meeting at the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 at which he learned details of the locations of specific microphones hidden in the Embassy. Lastly, NOSENKO claimed he obtained information on the KGB audio operations against the Embassy, even after he left the Embassy Section, from his former subordinate GRYAZNOV. NOSENKO regarded the information about the KGB microphones, first mentioned in Geneva in 1962, as the most important he provided CIA.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

NOSENKO's Information

Handling of Monitor Reports

According to NOSENKO, only a limited number of KGB personnel, all in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate, had access to the monitor reports. These included Department Chief KLYPIN (but not his deputies), KOVSHUK, NOSENKO himself, and GRIBANOV, to whom important items were shown. The existence of the audio operation and its product were concealed from personnel in other KGB Departments. The reports were produced by the Second Special Department of the Operational Technical Directorate (OTU). The OTU Second Special Department has several sections, one of which was the English Section under Colonel N. Ya. KUZMIN. KUZMIN's monitors, fluent in English, listened to and transcribed the tape recordings. Their reports of the preceding day's product were brought daily by Tatyana GRISHNYAT (of the Second Special Department) to the American Department. (In some accounts NOSENKO has said that he received the reports first, at other times that they went first to KLYPIN.) NOSENKO reviewed the reports, marked significant portions and usually within twenty-four hours returned the reports to the Second Special Department. In NOSENKO's absence either KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV reviewed the reports. The Second Special Department prepared sterile abstracts of the portions NOSENKO had marked, abstracts which disguised the source of the information contained: the abstracts were returned to the American Department for the reference of individual case officers in the Embassy Section and for filing in the delo-formulyar (developmental file) kept on each American employee in the Embassy.

Location of the Microphones

In the 1962 Geneva meetings with CIA, NOSENKO emphasized that the KGB was listening to all conversations of the service attaches and particularly, to conversations held in the office of the Minister Counsellor. In addition, he referred to "points" [microphones] in the office of an unnamed State Department employee, in the Agricultural Attache office shared by BROWN and HORBALY, and in the Embassy code room.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

In 1964, at the second meeting with CIA, NOSENKO produced a handwritten note which he asserted listed all the microphones in the Embassy which were operative in the years 1960-1961. NOSENKO explained that at the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961, he and KOVSHUK met with Department Chief KLYPIN. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of releasing monitors from some of the Embassy microphones so they could be assigned to Vladimir PETROV, Chief of the American Department's Second Section for use against non-Embassy targets. (PETROV had earlier requested English-language monitors from the Second Special Section, but had been told that English linguists were engaged on priority targets.) At the meeting, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the Embassy chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little value, so that the monitors for those microphones could be released to PETROV's Second Section. KOVSHUK used NOSENKO's notebook in which to list Embassy apartments and offices then being covered on a full-time basis and to note those of lesser importance. KOVSHUK decided to relinquish, temporarily, monitoring of Embassy apartments. He continued the monitoring of the code room, despite the limited value of the information obtained. At the end of the meeting KOVSHUK gave or NOSENKO took the list, and NOSENKO retained it in his office safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964.

NOSENKO's list showed that microphones were located in the following offices of the noted occupants:

"Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;
"Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;
"Office of the Army Attache, URBAN;
"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO and SACHANEN;
"Office of the Assistant Army Attaches, MASON, REITZ and WILSON;
"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;
"Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;
"Military Code Room;
"State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;
"Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;
"Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"

06,06,06 06

2/5R

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

NOSENKO said that "many" microphones were installed in the chancery building before the Americans occupied it, but he did not know how many were installed in all, how many were in any particular room on KOVSHUK's list, or where they were located in specific rooms. He did recall that most of the microphones were emplaced in the outside wall, the wall nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced this street and microphones emplaced there were less vulnerable to technical search and discovery.

According to NOSENKO, there were no fixed microphones in America House, the Embassy quarters of enlisted military personnel. In 1960-1961 there had been a discussion of using KGB agents employed there to emplace temporary audio devices for one or two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans, as well as in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, because of the risk of discovery. For the same reason there was no attempt made in this period to emplace a device temporarily in Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence, or in the apartments of Embassy officers. The KGB was afraid that they would be detected and there would be a scandal.

Performance Characteristics of the Microphones

According to NOSENKO in 1962, the audibility of the microphones in 1960-1961 ranged from very clear to zero, but the microphone system was deteriorating. The KGB could do nothing about it because they could not gain access to the inside of the Embassy. Referring to the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office, NOSENKO said that it was becoming increasingly difficult to work with its product. The microphone was fading, and the recording tape sounded as if "somewhere far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaking in a whisper". KUZMIN, the KGB officer responsible for the monitors, said that soon the KGB could recover nothing. Of the microphones then (in 1962) in place, about twenty no longer were operative.

In 1964 NOSENKO referred again to the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office. NOSENKO learned from DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of OTU Second Special Department] how difficult it was to monitor conversations in that office. Only very experienced linguists were used, but even they had to listen "ten, fifteen, even twenty times" in order to understand portions of the recording. After NOSENKO left the Embassy Section, on several occasions in 1962-1963 GRYAZNOV, his former subordinate and his successor, referred to the microphones' decline. GRYAZNOV said the microphones were picking up only snatches of conversation, and that in a year or two they would be completely inoperative. As a result, GRYAZNOV told NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was insisting on the recruitment of code clerks at all costs. Besides the fading quality of the microphone's signal, GRYAZNOV, KOVSHUK and FEDOSEYEV attributed the diminishing value of the audio operation to the Embassy use of the "room-in-a-room". [NOSENKO said that in 1960-1961 the KGB had information that, in preparation for President Eisenhower's visit, a "steel chamber" had been constructed within the Embassy where secure conversations could be held.]

Microphones in the North Wing

According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio devices were ever installed in the north wing (as distinct from the chancery) prior to the Embassy's occupancy of the building in 1962. In his first meetings with CIA in Geneva he described how he knew. When it was decided to permit the Embassy to construct the north wing, NOSENKO wrote a proposal that audio equipment be installed. Approval was held up by KGB Chairman Shelepin, who had reservations because of the political consequences of discovery. By the time Shelepin approved the proposal two or three months later, renovation was far advanced, and Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN was already inspecting the premises. The opportunity was lost and the KGB installed no microphones. Consequently, NOSENKO suggested to CIA that the Minister Counsellor, the service attaches, and others presently occupying rooms in the chancery which had microphones, be moved gradually to the north wing, where the KGB had neither audio equipment nor the capability of installing any.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Amount, Type, and Value of Audio Surveillance Production

In 1962 while citing examples of the kind of information the KGB obtained from monitoring, NOSENKO referred only to the offices of the Minister Counsellor and of the service attaches. According to NOSENKO, Counsellor FREERS dictated Top Secret and Secret cables. If the content justified, GRIBANOV was informed and he notified the KGB Chairman immediately. FREERS also dictated fitness reports on Embassy personnel from which the KGB learned of various American officers' personal weaknesses. With respect to the service attaches, NOSENKO said that the KGB learned from microphones where they intended to travel, and what they wanted to find out.

In 1964 NOSENKO provided some additional details. He said that audio reception was good from the military code room, but that the occupants rarely spoke. When one of them was monitored, the monitor report was sent immediately to the Eighth Directorate which was concerned with ciphers. Nothing was obtained from the State Department code room and teletype room because of the interference from the noise of the teletype machines. The microphones in the apartments produced rarely anything of interest. An exception was advance information obtained of a social affair, for which the English-language Section of the OTU Second Special Department would be asked to pay particular attention. There was a microphone with good reception in GLEYSTEEN's (a political officer) office, but no secret information was obtained. Similarly, the conversations were overheard in the Agricultural Attache office, but nothing significant was obtained except "something" which made the KGB suspect HORBALY was connected with American Intelligence.

In a protocol signed on 26 October 1965 NOSENKO summarized his knowledge of the value of the information obtained by the KGB via microphones in the Embassy:

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

"I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from January 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only information which I can remember as being important, interesting or operationally useful to the KGB:

"From the microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government and advised the State Department on positions for negotiations with the USSR. This information was of such importance that special reports were written to the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, I cannot remember any specific incidents or events which these cables reported nor any specific evaluations or recommendations made in these cables.

"Also from the microphones in the Minister Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve officers in the Embassy. I cannot remember who any of these officers were or any details from the reports. There was nothing in these reports which was of interest or useful to the KGB.

"From the microphone in the Army Attache's office I remember that the service attaches regularly discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the targets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed the results of these trips after their return. However, I cannot remember any information about specific trips planned by specific service attache personnel or any specific targets that they planned to cover or any specific operational activity taken by the organs of the KGB against service attaches on trips within the USSR which was based on information obtained from this microphone. There was no interesting, important, or useful information about the personal or professional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone in the service attache offices (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this microphone.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

"I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally a code clerk would read numbers. These numbers were only of interest to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryptology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations from this microphone. There was no information from this microphone of any of the code clerks which was interesting, important, or useful to the Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB.

"During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed the production from all the microphones in the American Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points noted in the above paragraphs."

Results of Technical and Physical Search

NOSENKO's information [no action had been taken as a result of GOLITSYN's earlier report that there was a microphone in the Embassy office occupied by the Minister Counsellor] was, as far as it went, confirmed by a search of the Embassy chancery in spring 1964. According to the USIB Security Committee damage report which followed, a microphone and associated probe was first discovered in the outside wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the chancery. [In 1960 this room had been the office of the Army Attache, where NOSENKO reported a microphone was emplaced.] The microphone's cable was traced to a major cable which ran horizontally (several inches) under the outside surface of the east face of the chancery, to the roof area of the north annex. A number of vertical cables were found to run to the various microphone installations. Fifty microphones were positively identified [ultimately, fifty-four were found], although the system apparently was devised for a considerably greater number. The microphone system covered all outside rooms on floors six through ten, with certain exceptions. The USIB damage report concluded that the microphones were installed before the Embassy took occupancy of the chancery in 1953.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

The discoveries in the chancery led to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing. Parallel to the audio cable running from the chancery to the north wing roof, there were found three coaxial cables, all terminating in the concrete floor of the north wing attic. The coaxial cables appeared to be of more recent installation, probably prior to the Soviets' evacuation of the north wing in 1962.

Comment: While not definitely established, it is assumed that the Soviets, before the Embassy occupied the north wing, used it as a listening post for monitoring microphones in the chancery. In preparation for American occupancy the main cable from the chancery was concealed and run from the north wing roof to the basement, and presumably from there to a listening post elsewhere. The three coaxial cables may have been either installed at that time or earlier. Their purpose is still unknown, but they may have been a feature of a highly sophisticated electronic attack against the code room, the existence or character of which NOSENKO did not know and need not have known. When NOSENKO was informed in 1965 by CIA that there had been a technical discovery in the north wing, he offered his personal assurances that nothing was installed in the north wing and insisted that whatever was found must be something unrelated to an audio system.

Damage Estimates

With reference to the damage caused by the audio penetration, the previously-cited USIB damage report stated that "it must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetration, the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to the United States. The Soviets have gained considerable

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache collection program. Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority intelligence and probably Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions. The Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable information concerning the personal habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future."

Col. Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961 (a period coinciding with some eighteen months of NOSENKO's claimed two years' service in the Embassy Section), has been more specific. Interviewed by CIA, Col. HOFFMAN recalled instances which the KGB, by monitoring just the conversations held in his office, could have become aware of the vulnerability of service attache personnel. As examples, he cited the two occasions on which military code 06 clerk STORSBERG was reprimanded for absenteeism (unavailable for cipher duties because he was elsewhere with "girl friends"); HOFFMAN's conversations with America House manager 06 Peter BINDER (the personality problems, drinking habits and other incidents relating to America House residents and visitors to the America Club), and the detailed circumstances prompting the decision to remove substitute code clerk KEYSERS 06 from Moscow (homosexuality). [Besides his general duties as Chief of the Embassy Section, NOSENKO claims special responsibilities for each of the persons mentioned. He supervised the KGB officers operating against code clerks and residents of America House, and asserts he was personally involved in the KGB attempts to recruit STORSBERG and KEYSERS. 06 (The KGB attempted later to recruit BINDER, 06 as well.)] In summing up his views, Col. HOFFMAN said: "To be perfectly frank, I would assume that ... some of our modus operandi, some of our targets, some of the results, and all of our personal weaknesses were compromised."

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Audio Operations Against American Embassy: Summary and Conclusion

Given that NOSENKO's information about microphones in the chancery has been confirmed, that information's significance remains the extent to which it substantiates his claims, e.g., that his knowledge derived from his position as Deputy Chief, and that he for two years reviewed the reports of what the KGB monitored from microphones emplaced in the chancery.

NOSENKO's knowledge of the microphones' existence is not proof that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, (or even proof that he served in that unit). KGB sources serving elsewhere than in the Second Chief Directorate earlier reported the microphones' existence; GOLITSYN specificall identified one as being in the Minister Counsellor's office.

NOSENKO's acquisition of the list of microphones in "1960-1961" is singular (the more so since he never hinted of the list's existence while describing the microphones in the chancery to CIA in 1962). He asserts that he had no plan to defect in 1960-1961, when the list was acquired, that for no apparent purpose he risked keeping a highly sensitive document in a safe he shared with two subordinates (GRYAZNOV and KOSOALPOV), and keeping it even after he left the Embassy Section for the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.

According to NOSENKO, he reviewed what must have been literally hundreds of monitor reports in the course of two years, important ones of which were forwarded to Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV, and others of such significance that they were the subjects of special reports sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU. Yet when challenged he cites not a single example, despite the fact that this period included such critical events affecting Soviet-United

States relations (and hence of priority interest to the KGB), as the U-2 and President Eisenhower's visit. Of the microphones which produced useful information, NOSENKO describes those in the Minister Counsellor's office, the office of the Army Attache, and in the code room; when challenged to cite examples of information obtained, he asserts that none produced any information of interest to the Embassy Section. Lastly, although he stresses the value of the chancery microphones as sources of information on which he relied to direct operations against code clerks and other Embassy personnel, he again can describe no actual instance. In the single case in which he asserted that he relied on information procured from microphones. (KEYSERS' failure to 06 report receipt of the defection invitation), he was in error.

Conclusion

From the foregoing it is concluded that, NOSENKO's claims to the contrary, his information on the chancery microphones does not sustain his claim either to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports.

Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications

As former Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section of the American Department NOSENKO claimed to be knowledgeable of the extent of KGB success in its cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. He has consistently asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the service attaches [for which reason he claimed he recruitment of a military code clerk was his priority ask in 1960-1961]. He "knew", however, that the Eighth irectorate was reading at least some State Department mbassy traffic.

NOSENKO's Information

At his second meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO expressed oncern that the American Embassy in Moscow might be informed f him, an event which would be fatal since the KGB was reading all the State Department ciphers". He knew this ecause he saw the clear-text messages every day. In a ubsequent meeting NOSENKO revised his earlier statement to xplain that while no service attache traffic was being ead, certain State Department codes had been broken. He ad only rarely seen the clear-text of deciphered cables, t the most, "ten or twelve times" during 1960 and 1961.

The Russian text of those deciphered State Department essages was sent to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, who sometimes forwarded it to GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief irectorate. GRIBANOV at times forwarded some of the aterial to Vladimir Alekseyevich KLYPIN, Chief of the American epartment, or KLYPIN's successor, S.M. FEDOSEYEV. NOSENKO aw such material on the desk of KLYPIN and later on EDOSEYEV's desk, but was never permitted to read it. ikolay ZEMSKOV, from the Secretariat of the Second Chief irectorate, brought a book containing the broken State epartment messages to KLYPIN or FEDOSEYEV. He would open he book to certain pages which had red paper and permit LYPIN or FEDOSEYEV to see the material. This was Eighth irectorate material, but NOSENKO did not know where or how EMSKOV got it... At times portions of this material were ead aloud to NOSENKO by KLYPIN, but they concerned the osition of the American Ambassador or the U.S. Government n political questions and were of no significance to him. nfrequently there was mention of the expected arrival of mericans who were not permanently assigned to the Embassy, nd NOSENKO remembered that one such item concerned the rrival of a one-or two-man "commission", to check the work f the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of tate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest

---

ary 1962)
est to the KGB
Of the micro-
NKO describes
office of
hallenged to
rts that none
bassy Section
chancery
he relied to
r Embassy
tance. In
elied on
S' failure to
was in error
ENKO's claim
y microphone
Deputy Chief
rsonally
ions
of the
dgeable of
ack on
erted that
d communica
he claimed

in the information as it did not relate to agents or agent activities. NOSENKO noted, however, that the material concerned messages from the Secretary of State to the American Ambassador, Moscow. All of this material was highly sensitive, and few people were permitted to see it or even to know of its existence. NOSENKO stated that it was treated more carefully than Top Secret information.

Unable to describe the techniques of the KGB Eighth Directorate in breaking U.S. Department of State cryptographic systems, NOSENKO nevertheless did indicate methods as known to him. One method, mentioned by NOSENKO on 12 June 1962, stemmed from the habit of certain Embassy officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS and McSWEENEY) dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud. When the texts were picked up on the KGB microphones, the Eighth Directorate compared them against enciphered traffic intercepted by other means.

NOSENKO has referred to the Eighth Directorate's interest in equipment sounds and snatches of technical conversations picked up by the microphones in the State Department and military code rooms.

> "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of interference [equipment noises which drowned out conversations]. In the military code room--that was where [James H.] 06 STORSBERG and later Matthew P.] ZUJUS worked--we 06 didn't get much. We could hear STORSBERG swearing 06 on occasion, and then he would mention a group of numbers. This was, of course, all recorded and we turned it over at once to the Eighth Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding. Of course, all other intercepts were turned over to them also."

With respect to the use of code clerks by the American Department, NOSENKO recalled that in 1948 or 1949 the KGB was helped a great deal by [James H.] McMILLAN [a military code clerk of the Embassy staff who defected in 1948], and by "ANDREY" [Dayle SMITH, see p. 33]. It was thanks to

"ANDREY's" help that the KGB were able to read State Department and ciphers. [At the time of SMITH's tour in Moscow a single code room was shared by State Department and military code clerks. As the only cryptographic machine technician assigned to the Embassy, SMITH had access to both State and military cryptographic equipment.]

NOSENKO also named MARTIN and MICHELL [NSA mathematicians who defected to the USSR in July 1960] and "an American code clerk brought to the USSR from India" [unidentified, but possibly John Discoe SMITH, State Department communications technician who defected to the USSR sometime between 1960-1967, when his presence in the USSR was publicized].

NOSENKO said the Eighth Directorate was submitting regular reports to Khrushchev and the Central Committee on their intercepts until "the end of 1961 or the beginning of 1962". He learned this from GRYAZNOV, his successor in the Embassy Section. At about the same time he learned that various Embassy officers were less often overheard from KGB microphones in their offices discussing significant information. This development GRYAZNOV and American Department Chief FEDOSEYEV attributed to a "room-within-a-room" installed in the Embassy and other Embassy security measures. [The acoustical room was installed in December 1962.] After his own departure from the Embassy Section, NOSENKO also learned of the KGB's loss of its code breaking capability from Second Chief Directorate Chief, GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV told him that the Central Committee was exerting considerable pressure on the KGB Chairman for continuation of the information formerly obtained in this manner; consequently, the KGB Chairman was demanding maximum effort from all KGB officers concerned with the recruitment of code clerks.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications: Summary and Conclusion

From USIB and NSA damage assessments following the discovery of the microphones in the chancery, it has been concluded that it was equally feasible for the Soviets to have recovered plain text (by analysis of cipher machine emissions) from enciphered service attache traffic of the period 1952-1962, and from enciphered State Department traffic during 1952-1959. "ANDREY" (see p. 33), the code machine mechanic the KGB allegedly recruited in 1953, serviced the cipher machines in a common State-service attache code room; his access was not limited, as NOSENKO indicates, to State Department traffic. On the basis of these fundamental errors, it is concluded that NOSENKO was not knowledgeable of the extent of KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy communications, and that such information as he provided can not be related to his claim to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section.

Knowledge of CIA Personnel within Embassy

As Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed that he would "necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer" under diplomatic cover within the Embassy. Within the section, "special emphasis" was placed on the identification and development of American Intelligence personnel, with the objective of an eventual recruitment. The KGB believed that the Ambassador, code clerks, and Marine guards would not be used to perform intelligence missions: any diplomat, however, was noted as "suspect

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

American Intelligence", the notation referring to CIA. Reviewing lists of American personnel assigned to the Embassy during 1960-1961 NOSENKO commented on those who were known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers, and on some officers who were not.

Embassy Personnel Suspected to be CIA Officers

Boris KLOSSON 06

06 KLOSSON was considered to be CIA "Resident" in Moscow, for reasons unknown to NOSENKO except that he replaced 06 David MARK, who had been regarded as "Resident" because of his behavior under surveillance and of his clandestine letter mailing. 06 KLOSSON's case officer was MIKHAYLOV. NOSENKO recalled the names of none of the KGB agents working specifically against KLOSSON. 06 He never read any agent or surveillance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in 06 any clandestine activity. NOSENKO was unaware of KLOSSON's 06 job in the Embassy, whether his family was in Moscow or any other features of his personal life, of his travels inside the Soviet Union, the identities of his close American associates or any of his Soviet contacts. NOSENKO never read KLOSSON's file.
06

Comment: 06 KLOSSON was not a CIA officer and had no connection with CIA in Moscow.

John ABIDIAN

ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer on the basis of his conduct as a Department of State security officer during Premier Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States and because he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE. Surveillance confirmed that he clandestinely mailed operational letters and visited a deaddrop site in Moscow. (See p. 206)

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted by CIA. Although not a CIA staff employee, he was for all intents the CIA "Resident" in Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961.

03

Steve WASHENKO

03

WASHENKO was identified as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing of one or two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area. Additionally, from a KGB microphone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a field trip.

03

Comment: WASHENKO was a CIA employee detached from his Washington overt assignment as an economic 08 analyst to be assigned to Moscow. He was used there for limited operational support activity, including clandestine mailings. He reverted to overt CIA employment after his Moscow assignment.

Lewis BOWDEN

BOWDEN was suspected of being a CIA officer for reasons unknown to NOSENKO. KOVSHUK was in contact with BOWDEN under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover.

Comment: BOWDEN had no affiliation with CIA.

4/18R

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Richard FUNKHAUSER

FUNKHAUSER was suspected of being a CIA officer because he was a specialist on the Soviet Union, particularly on economic matters. NOSENKO remembered the names of no KGB agents working against FUNKHAUSER, nor any information about him which was regarded as derogatory by the KGB.

Comment: FUNKHAUSER had no affiliation with CIA.

William HORBALY

HORBALY was suspected of being a CIA case officer or cooptee because the KGB monitored through a microphone in the Embassy his discussion or dictation of observations made on a field trip. NOSENKO knew the names of no KGB agents working against HORBALY, nor whether the agents ever obtained any derogatory information about him. The KGB did not try to recruit HORBALY.

08

Comment: Like WASHENKO, HORBALY was an overt employee and economic analyst of CIA before being appointed to a State Department position in Moscow, where he openly discussed the fact that he had formerly worked for CIA. In January 1962 he accepted an appointment to the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture. While in Moscow HORBALY had no connection with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities.

VBR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

George WINTERS

WINTERS was known to be a CIA officer and was given special attention because of his operational activity in the POPOV case (see p.207). KOVSHUK was in personal contact with WINTERS under the cover of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition he was overheard from a KGB microphone dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a field trip.

Comment: WINTERS was a CIA officer.

CIA Personnel Not Suspected by the KGB

Stanley BROWN

NOSENKO did not recognize BROWN's name, whose name was on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA in 1964, a list indicating that BROWN shared an office with HORBALY. In that office there was a KGB microphone providing good reception, but insignificant production.

Comment: Like HORBALY and WASHENKO 03, BROWN was an overt employee of CIA who was transferred to the Department of Agriculture prior to being assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. He was engaged in no clandestine activities during his tour. In 1960 he visited Leningrad with WINTERS, whom NOSENKO correctly identified as a CIA officer. BROWN and another member of the Embassy staff were under constant surveillance during a trip within the USSR in 1961. 24

2BR

as given
ctivity in the
al contact
Foreign Af-
microphone
he returned

06
William N. MORELL

MORELL was not suspected of being a CIA officer.
06

06
Comment: MORELL was an overt employee of CIA who was identified as such to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to his assignment to the Embassy as a Minister Counsellor. In attempting to recruit Francis STEVENS (see p.430) 06 a KGB officer allegedly commented to STEVENS 06 06 that MORELL openly acknowledged himself to be a CIA employee. KOVSHUK, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was cultivating MORELL. 06

03
Eugene MAHONEY

hose name was
a list in-
LY. In that
reception,

03
NOSENKO identified MAHONEY's name as that of an employee f the Administrative Section of the Embassy. Nothing was own of MAHONEY such as his previous career, whether he new Russian, when he arrived or departed Moscow, or where e lived while there. The KGB did not suspect that he was CIA officer.

vas an overt
ed to the De-
eing assigne
engaged in
is tour.
WINTERS, who
CIA officer.
bassy staff
during a trip

03
Comment: MAHONEY was a CIA officer who served in Moscow from October 1960 until September 1961 as an 32 assistant General Services Officer. His specific CIA mission was to support communications with PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union. From the start of his tour he was active in attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow and he frequently toured various areas of the city on foot. 03 MAHONEY went to the vicinity of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site on two occasions during November and December 1960,

15/BK

Comment: (Continued)
and examined the site itself on 21 January 1961. See p. 219.) Throughout his tour MAHONEY 03 was subjected to intense KGB surveillance. On 25 October 1960 ABIDIAN commented that "I find this type of coverage (five surveillants on a recent trip to a barber shop) completely out of character with that which is usually given a new arrival of similar rank. My only inference is that the KGB has at least strong 03 suspicions of MAHONEY's primary role as a CIA officer." (ABIDIAN's own surveillance at the time was occasional and extremely discreet.) 03 MAHONEY lived throughout his tour in Moscow in America House, for which NOSENKO's subordinate DEMKIN was case officer and which NOSENKO had described as thoroughly penetrated by KGB agents among the local employees. 03 MAHONEY spoke Russian, and his administrative tasks exposed him more than most Americans to KGB agents and informants among Embassy local employees.

Paul GARBLER

GARBLER was a naval officer in the office of the Naval Attache and the target of BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO knew the names of no agents working against GARBLER. The KGB obtained no interesting information concerning GARBLER from microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance. NOSENKO "did not know" whether or not he had read GARBLER's file. (It will be recalled that in other contexts NOSENKO said that all Service Attaches were considered by the KGB to be intelligence officers.)

4/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: The CIA Chief of Station while in Moscow, GARBLER had been detailed to CIA by the Navy in 1952, and he served CIA [under Naval cover in Berlin] 32,10 from January 1953 until July 1955. He resigned his naval commission in 1955, and in 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to [the American Embassy in Stockholm, under the cover of Second Secretary and Political Officer]. 32,10 He returned to active duty with the Navy in June 1961 and on 31 August 1961 he was formally proposed as a candidate for the position of Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow. In response to a request from the Soviet Naval Attache office in Washington, in September 1961 GARBLER forwarded to the Soviet Embassy an official biographic summary, followed by an official call on the Soviet Naval Attache. GARBLER arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961.

Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER had served in Korea where he was acquainted with George BLAKE. GARBLER was a participant in the joint CIA/MI-6 discussions in Washington in April 1960, minutes of which BLAKE had admitted passing to the Soviets. (See p. .) CIA thus assumed GARBLER to have been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer prior to his arrival in Moscow. This assumption was confirmed by an article appearing in *Izvestiya* in October 1963 in which the author alleged that GARBLER had earlier been involved in subversion and espionage in [Sweden]. 11

3/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Knowledge of CIA Personnel in Embassy: Summary and Conclusion

With the exception of ABIDIAN, there is a paradox connected with each of NOSENKO's identifications, as is most evident in the cases of MORELL and GARBLER. It is a 06 fact that both these individuals were known to the KGB as CIA officers, a fact of which NOSENKO apparently is unaware. His claim is thus false, that he would necessarily know whom the KGB believed was a CIA officer, and to the extent he related it to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, that latter claim is unsubstantiated.

Personal Handler of KGB Agents

NOSENKO has named seven agents which he claimed to have handled while Deputy Chief of the American Section during 1960-1961.

YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

NOSENKO continued to manage these two homosexual agents whom he had recruited and managed during his assignment in the Seventh Department, and brought with him when he transferred to the American Department (see p. 111). They were used in no operations during the period 1960-1961. [NOSENKO described the compromise of Robert BARRETT in 1959 and knew 06 of his later recruitment in 1961. (See p. 134.) NOSENKO does not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOV 06 in 1961, when he claims to have been their case officer.]

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

FRIPPEL

NOSENKO continued to manage the Moscow manager of the 29 American Express Company during the 1960-1961 period, as he had earlier during his assignment to the Seventh Department. (See p. 137.) 06 FRIPPEL was an uncooperative and unproductive source reporting on his acquaintances in the American Embassy.

DMITRIYEV

NOSENKO's English and Japanese-speaking agent during the 1955-1960 Seventh Department period was employed in the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow. (See p. 107.) He was not used operationally during 1960 or 1961.

Marina RYTOVA

NOSENKO's agent from 1956 or 1957 (see p. 108) at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow, RYTOVA was not used operationally during 1960-1961.

Maya LEVINA

LEVINA was a language teacher and librarian at the Embassy used as an informant on her American language students, among whom were a number of code clerks. She provided no worthwhile information on any American nor was she ever used in operations. At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 she was fired by Paul SMITH, and NOSENKO 06 turned her over to another Embassy Section officer. The British Department planned later to use her in either the British or Canadian Embassies. [LEVINA was employed at the Embassy from January 1958 through January 1962. Cultural 08, 06 Affairs Officer SMITH left Moscow in September 1961, and could not have been directly involved in LEVINA's termination. LEVINA thus was employed at the Embassy throughout NOSENKO's tour of duty with the Embassy Section.]

5/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

[PREISFREUND]

06

Recruited by KOVSHUK, [PREISFREUND] was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against [STORSBERG] (see p. 166). He was 06 used in no other operation during 1960-1961.

[WEISS] 06

06

The [Syrian Army captain] studying in Moscow was first targetted against America House occupants, then used in 06 the development of [ZUJUS], [STORSBERG]'s successor. 06 The latter operation had not terminated when NOSENKO left the Embassy Section in January 1962.

Personal Handler of KGB Agents: Summary and Conclusion

Of the five agents NOSENKO claims to have brought with him to the American Embassy Section from his previous Seventh Department assignment, none was used operationally during 1960-1961. If NOSENKO handled LEVINA as he claimed, he would presumably know that his single agent in the Embassy served throughout his Embassy Section assignment and was not fired earlier, as he asserted. 06 [PREISFREUND] and [WEISS] 06 are discussed in considerable detail in connection with the KGB operations against 06 [STORSBERG] and [ZUJUS]. 06 NOSENKO's claims regarding the agents he handled during the 1960-1961 period do not sustain his assertions that he was Deputy Chief of the American Section, responsible for code clerk operations, or provide conclusive evidence that he did or did not serve in the Embassy Section.

11 BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Temporary Assignments Abroad

NOSENKO claims that he was scheduled to travel to the United States in November 1960 (a trip which was cancelled) and that he travelled to Cuba in November-December 1960 and to Bulgaria in April-May 1961, on KGB assignments. The significance of his travel is the extent to which it relates to his claimed position and functions in the Embassy Section, and to operations in Moscow for which he claimed supervisory responsibility.

Planned Travel to the United States

In one of the initial meetings in 1962 NOSENKO stated that he had been in the United States. He later amended this to explain that he had been scheduled to make a trip to the United States, but that the trip had been cancelled. He was to travel under true name, he said, to avoid being connected to the name NIKOLAYEV, under which he travelled to the United Kingdom in 1957 and 1958. In his early account he claimed that the decision to use his true name was his, personally; later he asserted that the decision was made by "the people in charge of such operations". NOSENKO stated that he was to travel under the cover of an employee of the State Scientific-Technical Committee [GNTK], and was to accompany an automotive delegation. The visit, however, was part of the Soviet-U.S. exchange program, and when the visit was postponed in 1961, NOSENKO's travel was cancelled.

Comment: The name of NOSENKO appeared along with 11 others on a 20 October 1960 request to the Embassy in Moscow for visas for members of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled to visit the United States in November 1960. NOSENKO was listed as an engineer employed by the State Scientific-Technical Committee.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960)

When NOSENKO first mentioned his travel to Cuba (in 1962, in Geneva), he claimed that he travelled under the NIKOLAYEV alias, and he provided colorful details of his activities in Havana in surveying the American Embassy there for operational possibilities. In subsequent versions NOSENKO asserted that he travelled in true name, and that his was a routine assignment to accompany a Soviet delegation as a security officer.

NOSENKO's Information

In the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan, the Soviet State Planning Commission, was preparing for departure for Cuba. The delegation was a routine one, consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the Soviet Union. Since there was no one under any sort of suspicion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of the Second Chief Directorate decided it was unnecessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party ordered that a Second Chief Directorate officer accompany the group. Because of the short time remaining before the delegation's scheduled departure, the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suitable officer who could get his necessary travel documents ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department suggested NOSENKO, who had been supposed to go to the United States and who had a valid passport (in true name). The Cubans issued NOSENKO a visa immediately as did The Netherlands a transit visa.

NOSENKO's functions with the delegation were purely of a security nature. He flew with the delegation to Cuba in October or November and spent about a month and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delegation everywhere it went, to different plants, and to meet representatives of the so-called Institute of Agrarian Reform to discuss how to increase production. NOSENKO's cover assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly before departing Moscow he was introduced to the other members as such. He had one agent within the delegation and developed several "confidential contacts" during the trip. NOSENKO would not have accepted the assignment had he known how long and uneventful the trip was to be; he had really wanted to go only to the United States.

On his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB Legal Rezident in Cuba, A.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package with instructions to deliver it to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know the contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route home. There the wrappings became loose (it was bound only by thin string) and NOSENKO took the opportunity to determine that it contained copies of "letters between Mikoyan and Khrushchev concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. On arrival at the airport in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that a message had been received from the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructing that the package was to be delivered "urgently" to Che Guevara, who was touring Eastern Europe and was then in Berlin. While the delegation continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train for East Berlin. When he arrived in Berlin Guevara was found to have left Berlin for Hungary, and NOSENKO delivered the papers to "Guevara's deputy" in Berlin and continued on to Moscow.

Comment: Travel records obtained by CIA, which include photographs taken in both Amsterdam and Caracas of NOSENKO's true name service passport and his passport photograph, confirm that NOSENKO, a "minerals engineer", transited Amsterdam en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960, was in

Comment: (Continued)
Caracas on 17 November, and departed Caracas for Havana on 19 November. According to flight manifests, on 13 December NOSENKO arrived in Amsterdam from Havana en route to Moscow and left Amsterdam via air for Moscow on 15 December.

NOSENKO was travelling on a service passport; he did not enjoy diplomatic immunity. It is thus highly unlikely that he did serve as a courier, bearing documents of the nature he described as he claimed.

NOSENKO's planned trip to the United States and his confirmed travel to Cuba damages his claim that he was supervising operations during this period against Embassy code clerks in Moscow. The trip occurred at the time his alleged target, State Department code clerk 06 MORONE, was to be entrapped on the train en route to Warsaw (15 November) and while his subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16 November) in connection with another code clerk target, John GARLAND.

06

Travel to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case (April-May 1961)

In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO reported that he had been sent to Sofia as a KGB response to a Bulgarian Ministry of Interior (MVR) request that the KGB provide a Second Chief Directorate American Department officer to discuss operations with Bulgarian counterparts. While in Sofia NOSENKO asserted he played a key role in the compromise of American professor Horace G. LUNT.

06

NOSENKO's Information

Consultation with the MVR

NOSENKO first heard of the Bulgarian assignment from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the KGB unit handling liaison with Bloc counterintelligence representatives in Moscow. YEGOROV said that the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior had requested the KGB Chairman to provide an officer from the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for consultation with the MVR American Department in Sofia. American Department Chief KLYPIN subsequently instructed NOSENKO to go. NOSENKO was told that he was going for "consultations" and that KGB advisors would discuss his duties with him. KLYPIN told NOSENKO only that he should see how the MVR worked, and tell them how the KGB managed its operations. NOSENKO had no meetings or discussions with MVR representatives in Moscow before his departure, and knew nothing about the size or responsibilities of the MVR American Department, the names of any MVR officers, or what the MVR's particular problems were.

NOSENKO flew from Moscow to Sofia in early April 1961 and was met at the airport by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second Chief Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow. The following morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian MVR building. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was told that "they want to know about how to work against the American Legation, everything, right from letter 'A'". NOSENKO was introduced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he was assigned an office in the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks he discussed both general matters and particular cases with individual Bulgarian officers working against the American target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers on the principles of operations against foreign military personnel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR surveillance post opposite the American Legation. He discussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists. He also addressed the entire American Department for about five hours to tell them "what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work". At the end of his visit, some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First Deputy Minister of the MVR about what had been accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations against Americans.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: NOSENKO doesn't know why he was selected to consult with the MVR in Bulgaria. As far as is known to CIA, such consultation was a function of the KGB advisors in Sofia whom NOSENKO himself described. The American Legation (after a ten-year absence) reopened in February 1960. By 1961 the MVR had demonstrated that it had lost none of its earlier demonstrated efficiency in controlling the activities of resident foreigners and in establishing the basis for mounting operations against American diplomats. There was no apparent necessity for NOSENKO's Sofia assignment, and therefore his account is judged to be untrue.

06

Compromise of LUNT

06 In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO described the compromise of LUNT in graphic terms, including his own personal confrontation of LUNT. 06 In his subsequent accounts he had stated 06 that while he never saw LUNT personally, he supervised the activities of the MVR officers who dealt with LUNT. 06

About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of April 1961, NOSENKO was reviewing MVR lists of foreigners scheduled to visit Bulgaria, when he came across the name of Horace G. LUNT. 06 NOSENKO recalled that a Slavic linguist of that name had been reported to him in Moscow by VOLKOV or YEFREMOV as a possible homosexual. When MVR officers confirmed that this LUNT was a Slavic specialist, 06 NOSENKO decided to check his recollection against KGB records, for which purpose he telephoned Moscow. An almost immediate reply confirmed that this was the same LUNT who 06 had visited Moscow previously, and that he was a homosexual. (The KGB had never exploited its knowledge of LUNT's homo- 06 sexual activities and the MVR had not known that LUNT was 06 a homosexual.)

101BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

KOZLOV and the Chief of the MVR American Department were very interested in NOSENKO's lead, and KOZLOV appealed to NOSENKO for his help, since "the MVR had never recruited an American". The three discussed the matter with General DUMKOV, the Chief of the MVR Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO suggested that a MVR homosexual agent should be employed, an apartment prepared, and preparations made for clandestine photography. They then advised YEGOROV, the senior KGB advisor to the MVR, and KOZLOV called GRIBANOV in Moscow. GRIBANOV prohibited NOSENKO's personal involvement in the entrapment of LUNT 06 and NOSENKO's role thereafter was merely advising the MVR officers, "who didn't know what to do".

NOSENKO suggested that the MVR officers get two homosexual agents, since "maybe LUNT wouldn't like one of 06 them", and he advised them to weigh the time element in deciding whether to entrap LUNT with a view to attempting 06 to recruit him at once, or merely to obtain evidence for later blackmail. The MVR American Department Chief and his Tourist Section chief were to attempt the recruitment. NOSENKO remained in a MVR office where he could be reached by telephone in the event the MVR officers needed further assistance.

NOSENKO learned from the MVR officers involved that the recruitment had been successful, and that LUNT had 06 agreed to meet them again on the following day. NOSENKO later was told that the MVR did not give LUNT arrangements 06 for a contact in the United States because he was expected to return to Bulgaria for a Slavic Language conference in 1962 or 1963.

06

LUNT's Information

06

LUNT travelled directly from Sofia to Belgrade and there on 9 May 1961 he reported to American Ambassador George Kennan and to CIA that he had been recruited under duress by the MVR in Sofia on 5 May. After being entrapped with a homosexual and accepting recruitment, he was instructed to meet clandestinely with a MVR officer in Paris en route back to the United States. He was given no other tasks.

7lBR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

LUNT stated that while on an earlier trip to Sofia in November 1960 he became involved with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on at least five separate occasions. He had given ALEKSIEV American travellers checks which the Bulgarian planned to sell on the blackmarket. Once, while in LUNT's company, 06 ALEKSIEV had been recognized and questioned by the Bulgarian civil police. 06 LUNT corresponded with ALEKSIEV after departing from Bulgaria in 1960, and he had advised ALEKSIEV of his planned return in April 1961 to Sofia.

06

Comment: LUNT's account refutes NOSENKO's claims that the MVR had no evidence of LUNT's vulnerability 06 prior to receiving NOSENKO's information in May 1961, and that NOSENKO's personal participation in the MVR operation was such that he knew that LUNT was given no MVR contact in the United States. 06

06

NOSENKO's involvement in the LUNT case is unrelated to the assignment he claims at the time. Although NOSENKO cites the LUNT case in 06 connection with his Embassy Section duties, it resembles most of all a Seventh Department operation.

NOSENKO's presence in Sofia in May 1961 (when he claims his operation against STORSBERG 06 was approaching a climax and when his subordinates were apparently planning to exploit 06 KEYSERS' newly-discovered vulnerability) indicates that NOSENKO's presence in Moscow was dispensable. The LUNT case is thus not 06 evidence supporting NOSENKO's claims regarding Embassy Section service in April-May 1961, nor regarding supervisory responsibility for all American code clerk operations.

Promotion and Transfer to the Seventh Department (January 1962)

NOSENKO stated that his return to the Seventh Department resulted from GRIBANOV's wish to promote him from Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section to Deputy Chief of the whole American Department. However, according to NOSENKO, the new American Department Chief, FEDOSEYEV, wanted as his deputy KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's superior. Under the circumstances, NOSENKO said he preferred to be transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any capacity. NOSENKO reported that he spoke to Seventh Department Chief V.D. CHELNOKOV, and the latter proposed that NOSENKO ask GRIBANOV to be returned to the Seventh Department as chief of the American Section, with the understanding that he would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as the incumbent deputy [B.A.] BALDIN retired in July 1962. NOSENKO asserted his proposal was made and approved by GRIBANOV in September or October 1961. GRIBANOV, according to NOSENKO, never indicated his reasons for planning to appoint him Deputy Chief of the American Department or for later promoting him to Section Chief and then Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962.

In view of his impending transfer, starting in December 1961 NOSENKO said he spent several hours each day in the Seventh Department. There he stated he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist Section, and discussed current operations and operational possibilities with the officers assigned to this section. NOSENKO said the formal order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 December 1961, and within the next few days NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file and the Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, GRYAZNOV. As he had when he transferred into the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said he took his active agents with him when he returned to the Seventh Department.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: NOSENKO dates his transfer as occurring "before GOLITSYN's defection", which he insists occurred in mid-January 1962 even after learning from CIA that the correct date is 15 December 1961. Obliged to take the latter date into account, NOSENKO reconstructed the foregoing chronology of his departure from the Embassy Section and his assumption of duties in the Embassy Section and his assumption of duties in the Seventh Department. Repeated interrogation has never resolved the reason NOSENKO attached so much significance to the date on which he believes GOLITSYN defected.

In claiming to have transferred from the Embassy Section just prior to 5 January 1962 (when his participation in the Seventh Department compromise of W.E. JOHNSON is confirmed), 06 NOSENKO's account makes it impossible for him to have played the role he claimed in the events connected with ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop. (See p. 216.)

NOSENKO's assertion that he was GRIBANOV's candidate over KOVSHUK for Deputy Chief of the American Department is implausible. In contrast to NOSENKO's self-admitted undistinguished performance, KOVSHUK was a former Deputy Chief of the American Department who had been personally involved in such American Department operations of the previous decade as recruitments of Roy RHODES and Dayle SMITH, and the development of CIA officers WINTERS and MORELL and the interrogation of CIA officer LANGELLE, and the more recent attempt to recruit STORSBERG. 06

03

3/BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

DEPUTY CHIEF of the AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - 1960-1962: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, between January 1960 and January 1962 he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, in which capacity he was occasional Acting Chief, supervisor of all operations against code clerks and for some months service attaches, case officer for priority KGB target ABIDIAN, custodian of the Embassy security file, and reviewer of all information obtained from microphones emplaced in the Embassy. From a comparison of NOSENKO's assertions, amendments, and retractions with collateral information, he was none of these. Further, while he may have been familiar with the activities of some agents of the Embassy Section, his relationship with them was not in the manner nor circumstances he claimed.

From his position as Deputy Chief NOSENKO claims complete knowledge of KGB recruitments and recruitment attempts among Embassy personnel during the period 1960-1961 and thereafter, of CIA personnel identified by the KGB on the Embassy staff, and of the status of the KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. His apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's relationship with MORELL 03 and KOSOLAPOV's connection with GARLAND 06 refute his contention that he would have known of all KGB recruitment attempts; that he was seemingly unaware of such events while Deputy Chief demolishes his claim that he would necessarily have learned of them later, and while assigned elsewhere. Contrary to his claim, NOSENKO does not know of CIA personnel on the Embassy staff who were identified by the KGB. NOSENKO's information on the KGB cryptologic attack reflects no special knowledge; it is superficial and in error.

Conclusion

NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a supervisor in that section.

2(BR)

TS No. 197124
Copy 10

CHAPTER VIII

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962 to January 1964)

Comment: By late 1959 or early 1960 the KGB had the complete substance of the CIA and MI-6 tourist agent program in the USSR. The information obtained from the KGB agent in MI-6, BLAKE, included accurate details of the objectives and targets of those operations, as well as the practices employed for the selection, recruitment, training and briefing of the agents involved. As a probable consequence of reports received from BLAKE as well as by the independent confirmation of tourist agents identified in the USSR, the KGB by 1961 was mobilizing all of its resources to counter the threat. The KGB's tasks were made no easier by the increase in bona fide tourists to the Soviet Union, the numbers of which were increasing by thousands annually. Evidently uncertain of the success of domestic measures it was taking, the KGB extended responsibility for countermeasures to KGB elements outside of the Second Chief Directorate. To that end, selected First Chief Directorate residencies abroad were instructed to exploit all of its facilities in developing tourist agent countermeasures. In describing the magnitude of its tourist agent problem, KGB Headquarters cited the scores of American tourist agents who had been identified in just one year in the Soviet Union.

In fact, by the time NOSENKO returned to the Seventh Department in January 1962, the threat against which the KGB was deploying had passed. By early 1961 the tourist agent program was suspended when technical collection programs and other agent operations made the use of tourists unnecessary.

The statements of NOSENKO with respect to Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department counterintelligence operations among American

Comment: (Continued)
tourists during this period must be examined in light of the foregoing facts. Since NOSENKO claims to have held key KGB positions from which vantage he asserts he was particularly well informed about KGB operations against American tourists, it is appropriate to hold him closely accountable for his statements.

NOSENKO's claimed assignment to the Seventh Department, first as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and then as a Deputy and then First Deputy Chief of the entire Department, extended from January 1962 until his defection in Geneva in January 1964. By the time NOSENKO returned to the Seventh Department for this assignment, the KGB reorganization of 1959 had been completed, and according to NOSENKO, the Department was divested of all of its former functions unrelated to tourists. A newly-created Service (sluzhba), NOSENKO explained, assumed responsibility for foreign religious figures, emigres visiting the Soviet Union, and persons travelling to the USSR to visit relatives. The Seventh Department's former responsibilities for operations against foreign seamen, commercial delegations, and so forth were similarly transferred elsewhere.

In addition to performing supervisory and administrative duties, NOSENKO asserted that in this period he personally was involved with KGB operations launched against six American tourists and participated in investigations of Lee Harvey OSWALD and of a disaffected KGB colleague from the American Embassy Section, A.N. CHEREPANOV. In this period, also, he travelled on two occasions to Geneva on missions unrelated to his Seventh Department duties.

Because of the senior position NOSENKO said he occupied during his period of service in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed full awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (January - July 1962)

As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section NOSENKO said he was responsible for planning and coordinating all KGB activities against American (and British and Canadian tourists in the USSR as well as for supervising the operational work of fifteen subordinate case officers. He had no deputy, and he did not indicate who assumed his duties in his absence. He required several months at the beginning of 1962 to "get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the initial period on this new job. In mid-February 1962, within a few weeks of his transfer, he began preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation. This involved discussions with the Eleventh (Soviet Delegation) Department of the Second Chief Directorate, as well as with case officers responsible for the investigation of one particular Soviet delegate to Geneva, SHAKHOV. NOSENKO claimed that his preparations for his trip were only part-time and in addition to his other regular duties. He spent his early weeks talking to case officers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the previous two years, and discussing plans for the coming tourist season. He proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist firms in Moscow with an eye to their recruitment by the KGB, a proposal which was accepted. [NOSENKO elsewhere attributed the proposal to his earlier assignment in the Tourist Department in 1958-1960, which he alleged resulted in the recruitment of FRIPPEL.] 06

NOSENKO's Agents

NOSENKO claimed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department he brought with him the agents which he had been handling in the American Department Embassy Section.

Arsene FRIPPEL 06

29,06

American Express manager FRIPPEL departed from Moscow in early 1961, but NOSENKO claimed he continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case officer since FRIPPEL had no 06 contact with the KGB in New York City, and that he met 06 FRIPPEL twice in the USSR in 1963. According to NOSENKO,

5/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

06

FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB 06 nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the 06 FRIPPEL case.)

06

06

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts 06 he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known 06 to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter. [redacted]

06

Johannes PREISFREUND

06

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take 06 PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish 06 and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND 06 on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.

06

Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175, 06 and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.

14/38

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

VOLKOV and YEFREMOV

According to NOSENKO, he used the two homosexual agents in the entrapment of W. E. JOHNSON several days after 06 returning to the Seventh Department. This was their first operational activity since 1959, because they were employed in no operations during the entire period he was their case officer while assigned to the Embassy Section. After the 06 JOHNSON entrapment, these agents were not used again. NOSENKO claimed that in 1962 or 1963 they were retired, and he personally dispatched their files to KGB Archives. (For details of VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's activities see p.110 .)

Comment: There is evidence that VOLKOV was involved in a KGB entrapment operation directed against American tourist William J. ZUBON in July 06 1962 (while NOSENKO claims he was still his case officer), an event of which NOSENKO apparently is uninformed.

06

Samih WEISS

After his transfer to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed he was instructed also to continue directing Syrian 11, 06 military officer WEISS, who was targetted against military 06 code clerk ZUJUS (see p. 161). NOSENKO continued to meet 06 WEISS during the first months of 1962, and in February or March he attempted to have WEISS arrange a social affair 06 with ZUJUS so that another KGB agent could be introduced to the code clerk. Just before leaving for Geneva for the first time, NOSENKO turned WEISS over to GRYAZNOV, NOSENKO's successor as Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy Section. 06 WEISS was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, after which NOSENKO believed he returned to Syria. 11

11

Comment: Because of the political climate in Syria, there has been no opportunity to query WEISS regarding NOSENKO's allegations.
06

0001538

TS No. 197124
Copy 10

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Marina RYTOVA

Until 1960 or 1961 a Greek language instructor at the Institute for International Relations, RYTOVA obtained a job at a CPSU Central Committee school and thereafter ceased all agent work. Nevertheless, NOSENKO asserted that he was officially registered as her case officer until his defection in 1964.

NOSENKO's Agents: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims with respect to these agents do not sustain his claims to service in the Seventh Department in this period, since none were utilized in Seventh Department operations.

Operational Activities (January - June 1962)

As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department during the period January-July 1962, NOSENKO claimed he directed the compromise of W.E. JOHNSON 06 in January, briefed himself on the Section's activities, and prepared himself for his assignment as a security officer with a delegation travelling to Geneva. During March and June he visited Geneva and contacted CIA and, by his assertion, supervised the case officer handling of KGB double agent Boris BELITSKIY. Shortly after his return to Moscow in June he claimed he recruited Horst BRAUNS. 06

Entrapment of W.E. JOHNSON 06

NOSENKO's Information

06

NOSENKO first referred to JOHNSON in Geneva in 1962, when he described how YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in January 1962 had been used in the homosexual entrapment of a tourist, JOHNSON, a 06 08 young Baptist from California. The KGB was angered that the American was writing letters critical of the Soviet Union. Although the American agreed to NOSENKO's demand that he work with the KGB in the United States, the American immediately reported the recruitment attempt to the Embassy.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

In February 1964 NOSENKO produced among other notes which he had brought with him to a meeting with CIA (see p.319) one bearing the name of Everett Wallace [sic] JOHNSON and the 06 date "5 January 1962". Questioned about the note, NOSENKO recalled the significance of neither the name nor the date, and stated that the case was not a recruitment but "some sort of developmental operation".

06

NOSENKO next mentioned JOHNSON on 17 April 1964. Although not immediately recalling JOHNSON's name, he eventually 06 remembered that it was something like JOHNSON or JOHNSTON, and 06 06 that he was a Baptist from the California coast. 08 NOSENKO placed the operation sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered he wore no overcoat at the time. 06 JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist, was discovered to be a homosexual, and on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a recruitment target. 06 The Second Chief Directorate was not interested in JOHNSON as an agent because he had no access to important information and he lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient contact.

06

Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they were found to be "so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical, that the KGB decided something had to be done" to prevent his writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on his return to the United States. 06 "At about the same time" there was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to 06 halt JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR. No recruitment was to be attempted because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorate had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had concluded that he was unlikely to accept recruitment. NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach 06 to JOHNSON, except that "BOBKOV said I should go." (NOSENKO said he had reported on duty in the Seventh Department only the day before. F.D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, supervised the activities of the Seventh Department.) NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to compromise JOHNSON.

06

13/8R

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

06

JOHNSON became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the Metropol Hotel. They told JOHNSON 06 that they had recently arrived in Moscow and invited JOHNSON 06 to visit their hotel room. 06 JOHNSON agreed because "they understood each other right away. They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals)." Under the guise of the hotel administrator and a militiaman, KGB officers burst in on the trio. Photographs of the incident had been taken (but had yet not been developed). A report describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared and JOHNSON 06 was then transferred to another room. By this time NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his office and he went into the room where JOHNSON was being held.

06

06 The "militiaman" described what had happened to NOSENKO, in JOHNSON's presence. Addressing JOHNSON, 06 NOSENKO said: "How come? How could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and...people are given from five to eight years for such relations. It used to be three to five, now it's from five to eight." Frightened, 06 JOHNSON wrote out and signed a promise not to criticize the Soviet Union in the future.

The following day, after the incriminating photographs had been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the 06 Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his promise. When JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO 06 presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photographs and said that they would be released to the foreign 06 press if JOHNSON were to break his promise. The KGB later 06 learned that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a later version) the American Embassy and the KGB thus assumed that he had reported the approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had used during this operation.

In 1965 NOSENKO dated the entrapment operation as having occurred in summer in either 1962 or 1963. Reminded that his notes paired JOHNSON's 06 name with the date of 5 January 1962, NOSENKO insisted that the date had nothing to do with the name, that he recalled the operation as having taken place in summertime. 06 [NOSENKO ultimately accepted 5 January 1962 as the date of JOHNSON's entrapment, since it occurred "immediately after his transfer back to the Seventh Department.]

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

06

JOHNSON's Information

According to a statement given to the FBI, prior to his 06 visit to the USSR JOHNSON had written a church authority in Moscow requesting permission to preach there. He was informed that some official permission was needed. JOHNSON 06 subsequently travelled to Moscow as a tourist, and he did preach on one occasion but he suspended further such activity on the advice of Russian Baptist colleagues. 29 During his ten-day stay in Moscow JOHNSON wrote and posted letters to some twenty persons outside the USSR.

06 06

JOHNSON reported to the Embassy in Moscow on 5 January 1962 that he had experienced an incident with Soviet plainclothesmen at the Hotel Metropol earlier that day. JOHNSON, 06 who had arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, explained that he was dining alone at the Metropol restaurant on the evening of 4 January when he was joined by a Soviet citizen who identified himself as "a doctor from Riga". The "doctor" spoke English poorly, and JOHNSON agreed to visit the doctor's 06 room at the hotel on the following day, when the doctor would have with him a student friend who spoke English well. Soon 06 after JOHNSON arrived in the doctor's room on 5 January, the "student" made homosexual advances. 06 JOHNSON protested and started to leave when two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under arrest. After signing a statement in Russian, JOHNSON was taken to another 06 room where he was confronted with a man who identified himself as Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV, "the Chief of Police". 06 After threatening JOHNSON with imprisonment, "NIKOLOV" offered to dismiss the matter, provided JOHNSON would sign a 06 commitment not to criticize the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States.

06

On 8 January JOHNSON telephoned the Embassy to report that he had been recontacted by the "Police Chief" who reminded him of his pledge and showed him incriminating photographs allegedly taken of JOHNSON and the "student" in the hotel room previously.

06

06

Shown photographs of VOLKOV and NOSENKO, JOHNSON thought VOLKOV to be "familiar", but he could not identify NOSENKO as the "Police Chief".

16/18R

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: From their modus operandi the "doctor from Riga" is undoubtedly VOLKOV and the "student" YEFREMOV. NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and was called Georgiy. 06

Although JOHNSON apparently confirmed NOSENKO's role, NOSENKO's version of the case is incompatible with what must have been the actual time frame. According to NOSENKO's version, within five days of JOHNSON's arrival 06 in Moscow the KGB had discovered that he was a homosexual, concluded from "two or three" censored letters that he was a threat, and arranged his entrapment. The rapid pace of events suggests that JOHNSON's homosexuality 06 was already known to the KGB (if not to NOSENKO) 06 before JOHNSON's arrival in Moscow. NOSENKO's 06 ignorance of JOHNSON's preaching (probably the actual cause of KGB concern) is further evidence that NOSENKO did not know the complete background of the KGB operation, and that his role was merely that of playing the "Police Chief".

NOSENKO's participation in this case contradicts his assertions about the timing of his transfer from the American Department. (See p. 260.)

06

William Carroll JONES

06 08

NOSENKO's Information

JONES, a wealthy Baptist layman, visited the USSR on six 29 or seven occasions, each time meeting with Russian Baptists. He is personally acquainted with President Johnson and knew President Kennedy. He was the target of Seventh Department case officer Vitaliy DERA. While visiting the Soviet Union 06 in 1962 JONES became involved with a Soviet female. Although she was not a KGB agent, the KGB took control of her relationship 06 with JONES and, on JONES' 06 subsequent trips to the Soviet Union, unsuccessfully sought to obtain incriminating photographs.

12/8R

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in June 1964, JONES 06 (the sponsor of the annual Presidential 08 "prayer breakfast" in Washington) confirmed the substance of NOSENKO's information but denied sexual intimacies with any Soviet female. 06 JONES claimed to have made 24 trips to the Soviet Union and to have successfully 08 smuggled Bibles into the USSR on numerous occasions. According to JONES, 06 in 1963 Pravda publicized an incident in which a number of Bibles were confiscated from his luggage. 08

A 1961 KGB document furnished CIA by GOLITSYN cited JONES by name in connection 06 with a description of his Bible-smuggling 08 activities.

NOSENKO reported the 06 JONES case in 1962 in Geneva and stated that the Seventh Department case officer, DERA, was NOSENKO's subordinate in the Section. However, NOSENKO's ignorance of JONES' Bible smuggling 06, 08 (the activity which most likely prompted KGB action) and of the fact that JONES' activities 06 had been publicized in the Soviet press, indicate that NOSENKO had no intimate connection with the case.

Recruitment of Natalie BIENSTOCK 06

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB recruited 06 BIENSTOCK during her 1962 visit to the USSR. The Seventh Department case officers were K.G. KRUPNOV and A.G. KOVALENKO, who were acting in behalf of the Leningrad KGB. The latter had become interested in the American tourist while she was staying with a Soviet boy friend in Leningrad. (NOSENKO himself would have attempted the recruitment, but he was busy preparing to leave for Geneva in April 1962.) During the recruitment, the KGB officers did not disclose their knowledge that she was an American Intelligence agent and that she had been involved

BIBR

in the American Intelligence attempt to deliver a written message to a Soviet ballerina in the United States. The ballerina received the message, but passed it to the KGB, which concluded that BIENSTOCK was an agent either of CIA 06 or of the FBI. After recruitment, BIENSTOCK was turned 06 over to First Chief Directorate officers of Department D (Disinformation). If she returned to the USSR the KGB planned to secure her confession of her relationship with American Intelligence.

Comment: 06 BIENSTOCK was employed as an interpreter with a Bolshoi troupe touring the United States when she was asked by CIA to pass a letter to the ballerina, a letter destined for the ballerina's brother in the USSR. BIENSTOCK re- 06 fused, and the letter was delivered by other means. Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's information, BIENSTOCK acknowledged 06 in July 1964 that she had been recruited by the KGB while visiting Moscow as a tourist in 1962, and that she had been intimidated by the KGB accusation of her involvement with the ballerina. (Note that NOSENKO stated the KGB withheld its knowledge of that involvement.) 06 BIENSTOCK also admitted having contact in the United States through secret writing with KGB officers, until the letters ceased at KGB initiative in late 1962 or early 1963.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Travel to Geneva (March-June 1962)

NOSENKO visited Geneva between 10 March and 15 June 1962 as a security officer accompanying the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. In addition to performing that function, NOSENKO claimed he supervised the activities of another KGB case officer's meetings with a KGB-controlled CIA agent, visited the KGB rezidentura in Geneva and associated with KGB officers in Switzerland during the period. Six days before his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO contacted CIA.

Purpose of Trip to Geneva

NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 10 March 1962 listed officially as an "expert" of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs attached to the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO explained that after GOLITSYN's defection in Finland [in December 1961] an order was issued that no delegation was to be permitted to depart the Soviet Union without an accompanying KGB security officer. [NOSENKO has since stated that he can recall no such order.]

Explaining in 1962 how he came to be designated, as the security escort, NOSENKO said he argued that he was needed to direct the fifteen case officers in his section, but GRIBANOV stated that Foreign Minister Gromyko was leading the delegation and that someone of an appropriate senior rank should accompany the delegation, not just a senior case officer, but a section chief or a deputy chief or a chief of a department. NOSENKO was the most junior section chief. His immediate superior in the Seventh Department approved the trip on the basis that it would last only a month.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

In addition to his general security duties with the delegation, NOSENKO said in 1962 that he was given a special assignment to check on a senior delegation advisor, Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV (see below).

During the 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO provided somewhat varying accounts of the background of his 1962 trip to Geneva. He said that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with his assignment, but that [S.G.] BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Directorate who supervised the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department, made the selection. The latter department was investigating SHAKHOV, and BANNIKOV was concerned with the selection of a security officer because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. Because of the seriousness attached to the case, the Delegations Department wanted a chief of section as case officer, and when a request was made to the Seventh Department Chief, CHELNOKOV, the latter agreed to NOSENKO's assignment. NOSENKO stated that CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, let him go to Geneva as "a treat", even though he had just assumed his duties as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, he had no deputy, and the trip was occurring on the eve of the tourist season.

Investigation of SHAKHOV

According to NOSENKO, M.G. SITNIKOV, representing the Soviet Delegations Department, conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but had been unable to resolve the KGB suspicions about him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send a "senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up". Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with LYALIN, the Soviet Delegations Department case officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case. He also read various materials on the case, including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN.

NOSENKO has said that SHAKHOV was under suspicion in 1962 because he was working with different delegations at different conferences, and there was some evidence that in Geneva earlier he was somehow connected with American diplomat [David MARK],

06

who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961, 06 but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and "not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow, [redacted] KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.

1/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

[redacted]

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Visits to the Geneva KGB Legal Residency

Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for more than a day or two, Legal Rezident S.I. GAVRICHEV would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself. GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962, NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesitation on the part of the Legal Rezident that all of his subordinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO. In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform countersurveillance on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry out other private errands. [NOSENKO was not under CIA surveillance at any time in 1962 in Geneva and his claims as to his activities there, aside from his meetings with CIA, can be neither confirmed nor refuted.]

KGB Officers within the Soviet Delegation

NOSENKO claimed that he would know of any others, and he was the sole KGB officer within the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in 1962. Among delegates he identified only Oleg GRINEVSKIY as having any connection with the KGB. GRINEVSKIY was one of NOSENKO's own agents within the delegation: in Moscow he was handled by KGB officers of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate. Among other delegates NOSENKO described A.K. KISLOV and V.G. FILATOV. According to NOSENKO, KISLOV was head of the American Section of TASS and was "a genuine correspondent"; "definitely not an intelligence officer".

Comment: CIA had tentatively identified all three of the delegates as KGB officers. KISLOV was observed in apparent KGB operational activity in both Washington and Moscow. FILATOV served as an alternate contact with the KGB agent in NATO, Georges PAQUES. [British Intelligence] has reported that GRINEVSKIY was a member of the permanent Soviet delegation in Geneva who handled

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: (Continued)
a [British] double agent. NOSENKO was in Geneva at the time.

Association with Other Soviets

According to NOSENKO, the Soviets he saw most often in Geneva in 1962 were A.K. KISLOV (see above), Yu.I. GUK, and M.S. TSYMBAL. (Both KISLOV and GUK were involved in the "ANDREY" case: see p. 33 .)

A.K. KISLOV

TASS correspondent KISLOV was one of the three other delegates besides NOSENKO staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva. NOSENKO said he arranged for KISLOV's name to be given as a notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy to KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see below). NOSENKO drank and caroused with KISLOV while in Geneva, and KISLOV was NOSENKO's companion in early June, when NOSENKO either squandered or was robbed of KGB operational funds [the loss he asked CIA to make good], and on the night of 10 June, when he squandered the 2000 Swiss francs CIA provided on wine and women. With reference to the threat posed his security by KISLOV's knowledge of his profligacy, NOSENKO said that KISLOV was "too drunk to know what was going on", and in any event constituted no threat.

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while stationed in the United States and that NOSENKO had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to departing for Geneva in 1962, so that he could use KISLOV at the conference. On the basis of NOSENKO's favorable report afterwards, he said, KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on his return.

In 1966 NOSENKO named the Soviets living with him at the Ariane Hotel in 1962, but did not name KISLOV.

1/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Yu.I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. [redacted]

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Headquarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

08

Association with British Female Secretary

08

NOSENKO has described his association with a British secretary whom he met at a diplomatic reception in Geneva as one of an amorous pursuit: he disclaimed any operational interest in the girl. After several dates, NOSENKO could no longer reach her at her apartment, and he concluded that she had told her superiors that he was a Russian and had probably believed him to be an intelligence officer.

11

Comment: According to an official British report, when NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions and the secretary reported the contact to her superiors she was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland and she later resigned from the Foreign Office. 29

This same incident came to the attention of the Swiss service, 11 which later reported it to CIA, without details, as an attempt by NOSENKO to recruit the girl. According to this report, "after a time it became evident that NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but also in information to which she had access in the course of her duties". A Swiss official in 11 Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her.

Supervising Case Officer for KGB-Controlled CIA Agent BELITSKIY

NOSENKO's Information

Among his other activities in Geneva NOSENKO supervised a younger and less experienced KGB case officer's handling of KGB double agent BELITSKIY. He first heard of the BELITSKIY case under the code name "BELKIN", when he was working in the American Embassy Section of the American Department. He learned of the case through his friendship with the chief of the Second ("Active Line") Section of the American Department, V.I. PETROV. BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence had recruited in London: he had never been met by the Americans in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO did not know the date of recruitment but knew the case was already in progress during his second assignment with the Embassy Section (January 1960-January 1962). BELITSKIY had been a KGB agent for a "long, long" time and was a KGB agent when he first went abroad (prior to his recruitment by American Intelligence).

The KGB's purpose in running the BELITSKIY operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting the agent inside the Soviet Union, to learn the channels and means through which American Intelligence communicated with agents inside the Soviet Union. This was the "most important task" of the Second Chief Directorate. Although BELITSKIY, in meeting with his American case officers, continually pleaded fear of contacts with American Intelligence in Moscow, this was a ruse; the real KGB intent was to use BELITSKIY to lure American Intelligence into contacting him in the Soviet Union. After BELITSKIY was recruited in London, CIA "did not go on with him...didn't hold any meetings with him". Nevertheless, he said, the KGB "cherished the hope...to lead him in somewhat deeper". The KGB First Chief Directorate, with its own responsibilities and objectives, was unaware of Second Chief Directorate objectives in the BELITSKIY case. The First Chief Directorate, through Department D, provided dezinformatsiya [disinformation] at the Second Chief Directorate's request, but in this case, as in other "games", it did not know for what ultimate purpose the disinformation would be used. (In such cases I.I. AGAYANTS, Chief of Department D, did not even know in what country the disinformation was to be used, let alone the identity of the agent.)

Comment: According to GOLITSYN, Department D runs its operations alone or in conjunction with (never subordinate to) other KGB departments.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO did not actively participate in the case until he received in Geneva a cable from Moscow directing him to give advice to the young and inexperienced case officer V.L. ARTEMOV. ARTEMOV had not worked on the BELITSKIY case in Moscow either; he also had been sent to Geneva to work on counterintelligence matters and only to direct BELITSKIY if the Americans should contact the agent. BELITSKIY had been "inserted" in a World Health Organization Delegation in the hope that CIA would "find him".

As a result of that KGB instruction, NOSENKO joined with ARTEMOV in directing BELITSKIY's meetings with the latter's American case officers. BELITSKIY was first met in Geneva by the American case officer "Bob", and later by "Henry", who was "called out from the States". BELITSKIY noted that the name on the door of the apartment where he met his American case officers was not the same as that of the person whose apartment it was alleged to be, and that the apartment itself had an "un-lived-in" look.

When the American case officers asked BELITSKIY whether he could establish contact with a Russian on the Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO advised ARTEMOV not to use anyone from the Soviet Foreign Ministry. NOSENKO proposed instead that BELITSKIY claim to get information from the head of the American Department of TASS, A.K. KISLOV. The information, of course, would be (disinformation) furnished by the KGB. In case the Americans would check, NOSENKO and ARTEMOV arranged for BELITSKIY to be introduced to KISLOV.

The KGB believed that CIA had accepted BELITSKIY's bona fides. From the KGB viewpoint, however, while BELITSKIY was not a bad agent, he was apt to go too far sometimes, and "add things on his own". For this reason, the KGB limited BELITSKIY's time spent with CIA, to lessen the chance that the agent might say something which would cause CIA to sense that he was a plant.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: NOSENKO's information about the BELITSKIY-CIA relationship is substantially correct, except for some inaccuracies about the origin of the case. BELITSKIY, a commentator for Radio Moscow, as NOSENKO described, in Geneva did meet CIA officers using the aliases "Bob" and "Henry" in a safe apartment.

NOSENKO's version of his role in the case, however, is implausible. He asserts that BELITSKIY, a prominent Russian with acquaintances among influential officials of the Soviet Government, an agent ostensibly under the control of CIA for several years, was sent by the KGB to Geneva to resume contact with CIA. The KGB, according to NOSENKO, sent neither the responsible case officer nor an officer of the KGB section responsible for the operation. NOSENKO states that the KGB instead detailed a "young and inexperienced" KGB officer who happened to be in Geneva at the time, an officer who had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even knowledge of operating conditions in Geneva. NOSENKO further states that the KGB then instructed NOSENKO, who had learned of the case unofficially, who had no experience or training in double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva for other reasons, to guide the other "inexperienced" KGB officer. NOSENKO can cite no guidance provided by KGB Headquarters, although he claims he exchanged messages with Moscow about the case.

ARTEMOV was not inexperienced. He had had continuous service with the Second Chief Directorate at least since 1958, and had been involved with a series of CIA American tourist agents in the Soviet Union. Although allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV, NOSENKO is unaware of the latter's

Comment: (Continued)
involvement with American tourist agents in 1958 and 1959, during a period when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department's American Section.

Under interrogation NOSENKO did not know how, when, or where the BELITSKIY operation started, did not know the nature of British || involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA, did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or in Geneva, and did not know the alleged objective of the KGB operation, e.g., the substance of the "disinformation" which BELITSKIY was to provide CIA.

From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO did not exercise any supervisory function in the BELITSKIY case.

Contact with CIA

On 5 June 1962 U.S. Foreign Service Officer 06 David MARK reported to CIA in Geneva that he had been approached by a Soviet citizen whom he believed to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO had merely suggested that they get together for a talk on the following day. In late afternoon on 6 June, NOSENKO told 06 MARK privately that he would like to talk to MARK as soon as 06 possible. He was "not going to pump him for information", but "simply wanted to tell him some things". A luncheon meeting was arranged for 9 June, although NOSENO indicated that he preferred an earlier date. 06 MARK advised CIA of the appointment and commented that the approach seemed so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection.

At the 9 June luncheon with 06 MARK, NOSENKO identified himself as a counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that MARK had 06 previously served in Moscow and [erroneously] believed him to be an American intelligence officer. NOSENKO said he needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva, and offered for this amount to sell two items of information to American Intelligence. The first item was the identity of an American, a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow, who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washington area. The second item was the identity of a Soviet citizen in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, had been planted on CIA by the KGB. Although NOSENKO proposed a one-time transaction, he acknowledged to MARK that he might be unable to avoid deeper involvement with American Intelligence.

06 06

MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer the evening of 9 June and NOSENKO was taken to the first of five lengthy meetings held in a CIA safehouse. At the initial meeting NOSENKO described himself as a KGB major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against American tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union. He told of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell the two specified items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he asserted also that he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized that he had no intention of becoming an American agent and that after his proposed transaction, he would have no further contact with CIA. Despite this assertion, after describing the cases of "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33) and the KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see p. 282), NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic information about himself and also discussed in general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had told MARK earlier, that CIA would want more information, and he agreed to meet again two days later.

06

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva. With the second meeting on 11 June, his initially expressed reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most of his information being limited to the Second Chief Directorate. Besides "ANDREY" and BELITSKIY, he provided leads to more than a score of American citizens who had been compromised or recruited by the KGB, and information on the KGB audio surveillance operation against the Embassy in Moscow. Among foreign agents of the KGB NOSENKO identified Canadian Ambassador WATKINS (see p. 23) and described a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL, see p. 30). He talked freely of his activities in Geneva, including his association with KGB officers there, his visits to the KGB residency and his security duties with respect to the Soviet delegation. NOSENKO seemed to CIA to be what he claimed: a KGB officer with personal knowledge of important and sensitive KGB operations. He described his education, his service in the Naval GRU, his entry into the KGB and the general functions and operating techniques of the various components of the Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along with the approximate dates of his service.

Ultimately the only restriction which NOSENKO placed on his cooperation with CIA was his refusal to permit communication with him in the Soviet Union. He was willing to meet with CIA representatives during future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once every other year. He said he would not consider defecting except in circumstances in which his personal security was endangered, citing as reasons his devotion to his wife and children (and fear of KGB reprisal against them if he fled), his widowed mother's dependence on him, and his love of Russia and the Russian people.

NOSENKO promised to contact CIA and arrangements were made for him to do so, when he came to the West again. Meanwhile, he expressed the intention to do everything within limits imposed by concern for his own security to obtain information which he was informed was of interest to CIA.

06

Attempted Recruitment of Horst BRAUNS

Immediately after returning to Moscow from Geneva, NOSENKO claimed he personally was involved in the attempt to recruit American tourist BRAUNS.

06

218R

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

BRAUNS was Russian born, and he lived in Leningrad until the Second World War when he fled when the Germans retreated. 06, 08 He eventually settled in the United States where the First Chief Directorate learned he had become a technician working for an "interesting company making computers, adding machines, and other instruments". When BRAUNS visited the Soviet 06 Union, NOSENKO assigned his subordinate [K.G.] KRUPNOV to handle the case, and KRUPNOV arranged for Inturist to take 06 BRAUNS out of the Inturist hotel and assign him to a room in another hotel where KRUPNOV met him. KRUPNOV "couldn't get 06 anywhere" with BRAUNS, 06 and he called on NOSENKO for help. NOSENKO joined him in BRAUNS' room, and eventually secured 06 BRAUNS' agreement to cooperate with the KGB, under threat of imprisonment for treason (based on BRAUNS' wartime flight from 08 the Soviet Union). 06 BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Leningrad, and because NOSENKO thought the recruitment was "shaky", 06 he sent KRUPNOV to Leningrad to consolidate the recruitment. BRAUNS refused to see KRUPNOV, and NOSENKO went to Leningrad and again talked to BRAUNS. 06 BRAUNS was so frightened, however, that NOSENKO concluded that he would never work for the KGB; NOSENKO decided to terminate the case and BRAUNS was sent on his way.
06

06
NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNS visited the Soviet Union, nor was he able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS met in the USSR.
06

06
In 1964 NOSENKO asserted that he had mentioned the BRAUNS case to CIA in 1962, but could not at that time recall his name.

06 06
Comment: NOSENKO did not mention BRAUNS in 1962. BRAUNS arrived in the Soviet Union on 24 June 1962, after NOSENKO had met with CIA in Geneva. 06 BRAUNS' version is consistent with the events as related by NOSENKO, although he could not identify NOSENKO by photograph. In other contexts NOSENKO has explained that the Seventh

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: (Continued)
Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, both of which were the responsibility of other KGB elements. NOSENKO acknowledges that the KGB knew that BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen. 06 BRAUNS' plan to visit relatives in Leningrad was information also available to the KGB through his visa application. 06 BRAUNS had corresponded for a year before his visit with a former girl friend in Leningrad. She spent the first week with him in Moscow (during which the KGB recruitment attempt occurred). The existence of the girl friend was presumably known to the KGB, if not through mail censorship, then from surveillance connected with KRUPNOV's planned approach to BRAUNS in the hotel. NOSENKO was unaware of these facts. 06, 08

06

Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, he requested transfer to the Seventh Department to avoid being named Deputy Chief of the American Department over his then-superior, the experienced and highly successful KGB officer KOVSHUK. He is adamant that the transfer took place "before [the defection of] GOLITSYN", which he asserts occurred in mid-January 1962. Among his other functions in the Seventh Department, he cites directing five agents whom he brought from the American Department. In his initial capacity as Chief of the American Section, NOSENKO claims involvement only in the W.E. JOHNSON case, his time being spent either in "reading in" on his new job or preparing for his initial trip to Geneva. He alleges that he was directed to accompany the Soviet delegation to Geneva for an extended period, in behalf of another Second Directorate Department, over his objections, when he had no deputy to assume his functions in his absence, and on the eve of the tourist season. 06

5/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

In Geneva he said he supervised the KGB double-agent BELITSKIY's meetings with CIA, before contacting CIA himself to sell information for a relatively small sum. Back in Moscow, immediately after participating in the KGB approach to BRAUNS, 06 he claims he became Deputy Chief of the entire 100-man Seventh Department.

Besides the implausibility of NOSENKO's account of seeking transfer "to avoid becoming Deputy Chief of the American Department", his dating of the transfer impugns his claims. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. If NOSENKO transferred, as he said, in mid-January 1962, his earlier participation in 06 the JOHNSON compromise (see p. 268) is not evidential of his Seventh Department service. If he transferred just in time 06 for the JOHNSON operation, he could not have played the role he claimed in the Embassy Section (re ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street dead drop, see p. 216). In the period with one exception, none of his claimed agentura participated in a Seventh Department operation. No change marked his claimed increased responsibilities and new functions upon being promoted to Section Chief of the largest department in the Second Chief Directorate. Of the five operations NOSENKO described as occurring during this period, all had aspects for which, by NOSENKO's description of the Seventh Department's mission, they could have been in the jurisdiction of another Second Chief Directorate Department. NOSENKO's various explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 prompt scepticism because of tortuous contradictions. In Geneva he neither directed the investigation of SHAKHOV nor supervised the BELITSKIY case, as he claimed.

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department (July 1962 - January 1964)

In July 1962, in line with the personal wish of the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, General GRIBANOV, NOSENKO

0001562

(3/6R)

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief of the entire Seventh Department. A year later, he was made First Deputy Chief, and thus second-in-command to CHELNOKOV and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist operations. The Seventh Department, which had a strength of about 100 KGB officers, was responsible for all operations against tourists in the Soviet Union. From this period NOSENKO claimed to have learned, either by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief or otherwise, of a number of KGB operations against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, and investigations of a suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey OSWALD. NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB position during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO returned to Geneva for the second time, and defected.

06

Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY

NOSENKO's Information

In September 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate, Seventh Department case 06 officer Ye.N. NOSKOV, the management of KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY (cryptonym "ANOD"). 06 SVENCHANSKIY was the president of "Afton Tours", a travel 29,08 agency in New York City, and the owner of a Chicago Russian- 10,08 language bookstore. There was originally some suspicion 06 that SVENCHANSKIY might be an FBI informant, and the KGB was 06 also concerned over SVENCHANSKIY's contacts with AMTORG personnel in New York City. 06 NOSKOV, the case officer at the time, "felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI informant and recruited him in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for blackmarketeering while visiting the Soviet Union. 06 SVENCHANSKIY's cooperation was secured against KGB promises that Inturist would refer business to the agent's New York travel agency.

06 SVENCHANSKIY's task was to screen visa applications of prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who might be connected with American Intelligence. If he suspected such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph on the visa application slightly, or making a small pin-prick or pencilled mark on the application form.

10/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

When NOSENKO took the case from NOSKOV in September 1963, NOSENKO's name as the handling officer was entered in the single-volume case file, although NOSKOV accompanied NOSENKO to both subsequent meetings with 06 SVENCHANSKIY in Moscow (in September 1963 and at the end of 1963).

06

Comment: SVENCHANSKIY, a Russian-born naturalized American citizen, is president of Afton Tours of New York City and the Cross World Books and Periodicals in Chicago. His partner, and the actual operator of Afton 29 Tours, is Sonya SOKOLOW, reportedly a one- 06 time "confidential secretary" of Jacob GOLOS. 08,06 Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist 06 sympathies and probable involvement in Soviet espionage date back to the Second World War. His involvement in espionage has been publicized in the press (notably in a 1953 New York Times account of Harry GOLD's 06 allegations). 06 29,10,29,10

Since SOKOLOW manages the Afton Tours 29 office, while SVENCHANSKIY usually is 06 occupied elsewhere with his other firm, he would be unlikely to review and mark suspect visa applications, as NOSENKO alleged. 06 SVENCHANSKIY's background is such as to have prevented his being interviewed on the basis of the information NOSENKO provided.

06 NOSENKO did not refer to his association with SVENCHANSKIY spontaneously, but described it only after referring to the written notes he brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964. (See p. 319)

06

Suspected FBI Source Alfred SLESINGER

06 On 8 July 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB interest in an American named SLESINGER, a proprietor of a photographic shop in New York City, who was suspected by the KGB of "having connections with the FBI."

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

NOSENKO's Information

06

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that 06 SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. 06 SLESINGER had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned 06 another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. 06 The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, 06 and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly 06 with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. 06 SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit SLESINGER, 06 but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.

06

Comment: [redacted]

NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, 06 reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a 06 Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether SLESINGER had "ever been bothered by the FBI." 06

13/BR

Comment: (Continued) 06
In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in 06 contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case. 06

06
KOTEN's Arrest [redacted]

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, 06 a guide for
29 Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of
06 Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN 06 was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, [redacted]

NOSENKO's Information

06
KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocatio 06 agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.

10/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

06

On the eve of KOTEN's arrival in 1963, the Seventh Department learned from V.B. BARKOVSKIY of the First Chief Directorate's S&T Department that KOTEN was 06 carrying with him the address of relatives of an important S&T agent of the New York residency, and that 06 KOTEN intended to visit the agent's relatives while in the USSR. The S&T agent had asked to be repatriated to the USSR, but when the KGB eventually assented, the agent balked, arousing KGB suspicions. When it was 06 found that KOTEN was acquainted with the agent, the 06 KGB concluded that KOTEN "evidently received from American Intelligence an assignment to visit [the agent's relatives]." After KOTEN visited the relatives 06 in the Crimea, the decision was made to arrest him as a suspect American Intelligence agent. KOTEN was en- 06 trapped with a KGB homosexual agent and arrested, although he was released when the American Communist Party and other organizations strongly protested.

06 NOSENKO did not personally participate in the arrest nor meet KOTEN, although he supervised the arrest from KGB Headquarters.

06

Comment: KOTEN's arrest on charges of homosexual activities were publicized at the time in a report datelined Moscow and quoting Inturist which was carried in the New York Times. In an interview with representatives of the Department of State, KOTEN described how he 06 had been arrested by the KGB in Kiev on 28 August 1963, accused of being an American Intelligence agent and interrogated for three days, and held in jail for a month.

06

GRU Agent ~~John~~ SHUBIN

06

The name of John Andrew SHUBIN and his year of birth were among the notes which NOSENKO brought to the 1964 meetings with CIA in Geneva.

12/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

06 SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. 06 SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN 06 was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was 06 placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance 06 observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent. 06

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name 06 and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according 06 to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN. 06

Comment: [redacted]

06 SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring 06 to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Arrest of BARGHOORN

At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO described the provocation and arrest of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963. NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the following paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964. NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona non grata action taken against three Soviets in New York City in the case of John W. BUTENKO [in November 1963] and to secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet (Igor IVANOV) in the BUTENKO case who was jailed. (NOSENKO had asserted in Geneva, earlier, that the operation against BARGHOORN "was to discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV, not because of any special importance of IVANOV himself.")

NOSENKO's Information

In 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in operational activity in the United States. Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauffeur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity. GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed by KGB Chairman Semichastnyy to take "necessary measures." GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Seventh Department; and G.I. GRYAZNOV and Ye. M. RASHCHEPOV from the American Department. After describing the arrest, GRIBANOV asked what information the Second Chief Directorate Departments had on any American, Embassy employee or tourist, that could serve as the victim of an [retaliatory] arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said that at that very moment there were three or four American Service Attaches in Rostov and that, in the opinion of the American Department, these officers might be carrying electronic apparatus. It was known that they had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and they had been observed taking notes. They could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to Moscow.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

GRIBANOV instructed the two representatives of the American Department to write a report on what other possibilities existed. He also told them to request permission to arrest and search the Service Attaches.

GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held by the Seventh Department. He was told that there were relatively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that time. These included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not recalled). NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no "strong" materials to use against them. They were ordered to make an immediate study of the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon as possible.

Returning to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that BARGHOORN was the only possible American target. All information on BARGHOORN was gathered, and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took it to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV read it and was pleased; he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi and that, in fact, Ye. N. NOSKOV (case officer, American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose of working against BARGHOORN; the doctor had some special substance which had been used to make BARGHOORN so violently ill that he had to be hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful search had been made of his belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN "materials", but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait. At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the 06
29 British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.

2JBR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving "materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow. NOSENKO said that this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made no difference. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO to locate an agent who could be used to pass the compromising material to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materials which are of interest to American Intelligence." This was to be sent in letter form to Semichastnyy over GRIBANOV's signature; the letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive the materials. (That the evidence was to be planted was not to be mentioned.)

GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV concerning the Service Attaches, to Semichastnyy. While the four -- NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV -- were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the Rostov KGB organization informing him that the Service Attaches were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the Service Attaches as well as BARGHOORN. Khrushchev was absent from Moscow at the time, but Semichastnyy had called BREZHNEV and secured his approval.

When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the Service Attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he became furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die." Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department D" (the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate) to provide materials on missiles which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While these were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the arrest.

BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN had gone to the American Embassy, and it was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of the British Embassy at 1900 hours, 06,29 but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN

VBR

had left the American Embassy in the American Ambassador's car. He was alone but for the Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was in the moving car. A check on 06 ORCHARD established that he was in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was therefore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at the hotel.

No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car than the agent approached. "You are an American?" the agent asked. "Yes." "Please take it," the agent said. The agent put the packet containing the materials on missiles in BARGHOORN's inside coat pocket and then ran off.

BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he was seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest. A surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in the United States had received similar treatment) and driven to a Militia station where a room had been prepared.

L.I. YEFREMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and a document was prepared requesting permission to hold him 48 hours. Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the Seventh Department case officers were released with instructions to report for duty at 0930 hours. NOSENKO and the others went home.

KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000 hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian, YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several times during these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained the missile documents.) The first sessions concentrated on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.

After one and one half hours of questioning BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had been placed on his person. He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something," that he did not know what they were. The package was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages of information on missiles. "BARGHOORN was not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.

Following BARGHOORN's admission, another declaration was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first interrogation, and the first and second declarations were reported to MISHUTIN, the First Deputy Chief Prosecutor. GRIBANOV directed that all materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB Archives, be given to the KGB Department of Prosecution so that they could begin legal proceedings against BARGHOORN. After this, all interrogations were conducted by that department; KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, although YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.

Comment: BARGHOORN's version of his entrapment, arrest, and interrogation coincide fairly precisely with the version provided by NOSENKO. He identified NOSENKO from a photograph as a KGB officer present at one stage of the interrogation on the second day of his arrest and said NOSENKO took some part in the proceedings. He recalled NOSENKO as being "clever and quick-witted" and as "giving the impression that he was not a dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive: he seemed not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The OSWALD CASE

NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB's interest in OSWALD stemmed from his claimed Tourist Department assignments. He asserted that while Deputy Chief of the American Section in 1959 he participated in the KGB determination that OSWALD was of no operational interest. In September 1963, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, he was informed of OSWALD's visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to apply to return to the USSR. Immediately following President Kennedy's assassination, NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, reviewed KGB records of OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union including the Second Chief Directorate file on OSWALD.

For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement with the OSWALD case (1959-60 and 1963) are discussed here.

The information NOSENKO provided on the OSWALD case is significant if it substantiates NOSENKO's claimed positions in the KGB and confirms the validity of his claim that he knew the extent of KGB involvement with OSWALD.

NOSENKO's Information

Residence in the USSR

Prior to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR, he was completely unknown to the KGB. Moreover, upon receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief Directorate determined that he was not of sufficient importance to justify any special interest by the Seventh Department. Not until about October 1959, when OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in the USSR did he come to the attention of NOSENKO, who was, at that time, Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department. All available materials on him were thereupon collected and examined - the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check of KGB Archives. NOSENKO's subordinate, KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his wish to stay in the USSR.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT -- January 1962-January 1964)

Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility because "this would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. KRUPNOV sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information which had been received concerning OSWALD. The memorandum cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin, where OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet Union. A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO's section.

From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB, and both agreed that OSWALD appeared somewhat "abnormal." For this reason NOSENKO instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the Inturist interpreter that he would not be permitted to remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry as a permanent resident through normal channels at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO's orders, and either that day or the next NOSENKO learned that OSWALD failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his Inturist guide. This prompted a search, and after several hours, OSWALD was found in his hotel room, bleeding heavily from self-inflicted wounds. After hearing of this incident from KRUPNOV, NOSENKO then reported it to K.N. DUBAS, Chief of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in turn reported it to GRIBANOV, head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV upheld NOSENKO's original decision that the KGB should not become involved with OSWALD and that OSWALD should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.

There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an interesting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO did not know who eventually granted OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permit. The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to live in the Moscow area. Either the Soviet Red Cross or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have made this decision to assign OSWALD to Minsk. The Seventh Department updated his file, and it was sent, along with a cover letter prepared by KRUPNOV, to the local KGB organization in Minsk. KRUPNOV's letter summarized the case and specifically instructed local authorities there to take no action concerning OSWALD except to observe his activities "passively" to make sure that he was not an American Intelligence agent on temporary "sleeper" status. NOSENKO read this letter, and it was signed by DUBAS. On the basis of the instructions contained in the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could be taken in Minsk without KGB Headquarters approval. It was NOSENKO's opinion that the only coverage of OSWALD during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, questioning of his neighbors and associates, and coverage of his mail. After OSWALD's threatened second suicide attempt, the KGB "washed its hands of him" and that even though there was considered to be some possibility that he was a "sleeper agent," KGB Headquarters interest in him while he was in Minsk was "practically nil."

Request to Return to the USSR

The KGB Second Chief Directorate was not concerned with OSWALD's return to the United States in June 1962, by which time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. No further word on him was received at KGB Headquarters until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in September 1963 and requested a visa to return to the Soviet Union. The Mexico Legal Residency reported his visit to KGB Headquarters by cable, requesting information. The KGB First Chief Directorate had no record on OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate's Service Number Two (Counterintelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department to see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD. The Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department, V.K. ALEKSEYEV, received the call and reported the inquiry to Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO.

NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV relayed this information to the First Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere.

Comment: Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Cuban as well as Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 3 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Seventh Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Headquarters from the KGB Legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR and that the cable specified that OSWALD had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Post-Assassination Review of KGB File

NOSENKO next learned of OSWALD's activities as a result of President Kennedy's assassination. About two hours after President Kennedy was shot, NOSENKO was advised of this fact in a telephone call to his home from KGB Headquarters. A short while later he was told, again by telephone, that the President had died. About two hours later, NOSENKO was told that OSWALD had been arrested, and he and the other officers of the American Tourist Section were called in to determine whether the KGB had any information concerning him. After establishing OSWALD's identity from KGB files and learning that his file was still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the KGB office in Minsk on GRIBANOV's orders. The local KGB dictated over the telephone a summary of its file on OSWALD. This summary concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minsk had attempted "to influence OSWALD in the right direction". GRIBANOV had been greatly disturbed about the local KGB's efforts because it had been given specific instructions to carry out nothing other than passive measures against OSWALD there. He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to OSWALD's stay there, as well as an explanation of the meaning of the statement about influencing OSWALD, be flown immediately to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personally read the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of this statement and thoroughly reviewed OSWALD's file when it arrived by plane. He then turned the file over to S.M. FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summary memorandum for GRIBANOV. This memorandum, which NOSENKO read, was forwarded to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, and Semichastnyy in turn reported to the CPSU Central Committee and to Khrushchev concerning it.

OSWALD's file from Minsk contained no information to indicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken any action with respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Headquarters. From the date of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR until his departure, the KGB had no personal contact with him and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

OSWALD never received any KGB training or KGB assignments. If any other department of the KGB or the GRU had wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had to secure permission from the Seventh Department, which originally opened his case file. In view of OSWALD's apparent mental instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particularly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotage) Department, would have considered using him. KGB Headquarters did not maintain a control file on him following his settlement in Minsk, as it would have done had OSWALD been of any operational interest. The only KGB record on OSWALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a file concerning him.

The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OSWALD; all information about her was kept in OSWALD's file. There was no indication in OSWALD's file that the KGB had had any interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she left for the United States.

Comment: NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally.

NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief Directorate first learned of OSWALD when he applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in September 1963 is probably incorrect. The consular file turned over to the U.S. Government by the Soviet Embassy in Washington after the assassination indicated that the KGB First Chief Directorate would have known of OSWALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier. That file contained Marina OSWALD's letter of February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from OSWALD, both of which indicated that OSWALD had

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: (Continued) earlier requested permission to return to the Soviet Union. In the last dated letter of the file, one of 9 November 1963, OSWALD advised the Soviet Embassy in Washington of his travel under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact with an official (whom CIA identifies as a KGB officer) of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, his contact there with the Cuban Consulate and his efforts to reach Havana in order to visit the Soviet Embassy there. Without regard to possible earlier correspondence, OSWALD's request for a Soviet visa addressed to the Embassy in Washington in July 1963 would require the Washington Residency to report the matter to Moscow just as NOSENKO described the Mexico City Residency later did. NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of OSWALD's communications with the Soviet Embassy in Washington discredits his claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of the KGB relationship with OSWALD.

The CHEREPANOV Papers

Comment: On 4 November 1963 in Moscow, a MEZHKNIGA employee claiming to be one CHEREPANOV, passed to an American book-buyer a package which he requested the American to deliver to a trustworthy person at the American Embassy. Embassy officials found the package to contain a bundle of typed or handwritten documents which appeared to have originated in classified KGB files. Fearing a Soviet provocation which could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy for possessing classified Soviet Government documents, Embassy officials had the documents photographed and on the next day, 5 November, returned the originals to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

At his first meeting with CIA in January 1964 NOSENKO related how a disaffected former KGB colleague, A.N. CHEREPANOV, had stolen documents from the American Embassy Section and in November 1963 sent them through an intermediary to the American Embassy. CHEREPANOV's treason was discovered, NOSENKO said, when the Embassy returned the documents to Soviet authorities. CHEREPANOV fled Moscow, and NOSENKO claimed to have taken part in the KGB search for him. NOSENKO brought with him to Geneva the official KGB document which authorized his travel in the search for CHEREPANOV.

The significance of the CHEREPANOV incident is twofold. The KGB documents which CHEREPANOV allegedly sent to the Embassy appear to have originated in the American Department's Embassy Section, and the documents relate to KGB modus operandi, personnel, targets, and technical devices employed in operations during 1958-1960, during part of which time NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. The KGB document, the "temporary duty authorization", is an item of physical evidence NOSENKO has offered to substantiate his claim to personal participation in the CHEREPANOV case and to having held the rank of KGB lieutenant colonel. [The document does not itself refer to CHEREPANOV in any manner.]

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB officer, A.N. CHEREPANOV was born about 1920 or 1921. During World War II he was a KGB officer working with partisan groups behind the lines. Later he was in Yugoslavia for four or five years, and was probably Deputy Chief of the KGB Legal Residency in Belgrade.

Comment: CIA records contain references to an Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a Soviet diplomat and suspected intelligence officer in Belgrade in 1953. CHEREPANOV left Belgrade in 1956. A Yugoslav intelligence officer who defected in 1957 confirmed that CHEREPANOV had been an intelligence officer.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

When CHEREPANOV returned to Moscow, he had some (unspecified) problem getting a job, but finally the KGB Second Chief Directorate took him into the American Embassy Section of the American Department, working against State Department personnel in the Administrative Section of the Embassy. He worked in the same room as V.A. KUSKOV, and was case officer for three KGB targets: Richard SNYDER and John McVICKAR, counsular officers, and Marion ALBAMONTE, secretary to the 06 08 personnel officer. CHEREPANOV's work as a case officer was poor, and as it grew worse, the KGB decided to retire him. Because of his service in World War II, for which he received three years' pension credit for each year of military service, he had enough time to his credit to be eligible for retirement. Also, he was just over the minimum age (40) for retirement from the KGB.

Upon retiring in July or August 1961, CHEREPANOV got a job with MEZHKNIGA. Unhappy about his enforced retirement and angry at the KGB, he became even more dissatisfied when MEZHKNIGA turned down his several attempts to go abroad.

Prior to leaving the KGB, CHEREPANOV had stolen draft copies of documents he had handled in the Embassy Section. In one case, he copied the contents of a report in his own handwriting, evidently having been unable to steal the document itself. All of the documents he had stolen were intended for destruction.

In November 1963 Yu. I. GUK brought NOSENKO news about "a catastrophe" in the KGB. GUK said he had the story from B.D. MAKASHEV, a common friend of GUK and NOSENKO. MAKASHEV had been in Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko's office when the CHEREPANOV papers were brought there, after their delivery by Thomas FAIN of the Embassy. MAKASHEV saw the name of (Second Chief Directorate Chief) GRIBANOV on some of the papers and saw that one of them was a plan for agent operations against an American. He noted that one of the documents was at least an inch thick. Gromyko immediately called KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, who notified GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV's deputy went to Gromyko's office and picked up the papers. The KGB then began an investigation of all the personnel assigned to the American Department during the time period covered by the papers, 1959 to 1960 or 1961.

2/8R

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

When the American Embassy saw the CHEREPANOV documents, they were afraid that the documents were part of a KGB provocation, and they wondered what the Russians were trying to do. The Embassy officials photographed the documents and on the next day returned them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the Americans gave the documents to the Ministry, the KGB wondered why the Americans gave them back.

The whole matter was held very tightly in the KGB during its investigation for 20 or 25 days. When the KGB examined the documents, some were found to be in CHEREPANOV's handwriting, but no documents were found which pertained to CHEREPANOV's own case work, or that of the American Embassy Section. The KGB found no documents dated later than 1961--none for 1962 or 1963--only 1959, 1960 and 1961. Thus there were a number of indications pointing towards CHEREPANOV, who had left the section in 1961. The KGB did not dare alert him by putting full-time surveillance on him, but instead mounted fixed surveillance posts at his home and office. In order to provoke CHEREPANOV into some precipitous action, a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him who, in the course of conversation, mentioned the great disturbance in the KGB caused by someone passing stolen KGB documents to the Americans. CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the news and was quite cool about the matter. The next day the surveillance post observed him leaving his house in the morning at his usual time, apparently on his way to work, but the surveillance post at his office soon reported that he had not arrived at work. He had "simply dropped out of sight".

An intensive search "all over the city of Moscow" ensued, then spread throughout the Soviet Union: Border controls were tightened, photographs of CHEREPANOV were sent out to Republic and local KGB and militia offices, and all means of transport were covered. Reports began coming in from various places that someone who seemed to fit CHEREPANOV's description had been seen acting suspiciously here and there. Reports which came into KGB Headquarters from Gorkiy Oblast strongly indicated the possibility of CHEREPANOV's presence there, so NOSENKO was dispatched to the area to check.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHEREPANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.

Comment: [redacted] NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

0001584

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Contents of the CHEREPANOV Package

The KGB documents in the CHEREPANOV package totalled 103 pages in the original Russian version, divided almost equally between typewritten reports in final form and handwritten draft reports or notes, plus two copies of letters written by Soviet citizens to the American Embassy. The longest single document was a 33-page Top Secret report, dated 18 April 1959, entitled "Operational Conditions in the U.S.A. and the Activities of American Counterintelligence Organs against Soviet Installations and Soviet Citizens in the U.S.A. in 1957-1958". The report was signed by Colonel A. FEKLISOV, [alias FOMIN, the former KGB rezident in Washington] whose title is given as "Chief, First [American] Department, First Chief Directorate". The rest of the documents refer to KGB coverage of various American Embassy and American diplomats in Moscow during the period August 1958 to 15 October 1960. Most of the documents were prepared by or for one senior case officer of the Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, Major V. KUSKOV. (NOSENKO has identified V.A. KUSKOV as an officer of the Second Chief Directorate who shared an office with CHEREPANOV from about 1958 to 1961.) Two reports were on Americans who had left the Soviet Union, Edward L. KILLHAM, Second Secretary from July 1957 to July 1959, and Wallace L. LITTELL, Attache from June 1956 to July 1958. There were operational plans for agent work against four American diplomats once stationed in Moscow, Richard HARMSTONE, Lewis W. BOWDEN, James A. RAMSEY, and George WINTERS. Other documents included were an agent's report of her relationship with WINTERS, a summary of LANGELLE's activities while in the USSR, a list of Soviet citizens whose letters to the Embassy had been intercepted by the KGB, a handwritten summary (signed by CHEREPANOV) of derogatory information on a Soviet youth who had been in touch with American Consul Richard SNYDER, and various handwritten drafts and notes on the foregoing Americans.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The operational plan on WINTERS, as an example, indicated that WINTERS had already been identified as an intelligence officer, and to ascertain the nature of his intelligence activities, the KGB was to employ round-the-clock surveillance, technical aids metka and "NEPTUNE-80", audio surveillance, and investigation of his contacts among Soviet citizens. The plan reflected that while the KGB judgment was that WINTERS "had a hostile attitude toward the USSR" and that there "was no basis for recruitment", care should be taken not to alarm him and cause him to leave the country prematurely, since there still might arise an opportunity to attempt to recruit him.

NOSENKO said that he had never seen the documents CHEREPANOV passed to the Embassy, although he was familiar with their substance.

Comment: The information in the CHEREPANOV Papers was substantially consistent with what NOSENKO had said earlier in 1962 regarding WINTERS, LANGELLE, HARMSTONE and Embassy Section operational techniques such as the use of metka.

NOSENKO's Travel Document

When NOSENKO first related to CIA in Geneva in 1964 his knowledge of the CHEREPANOV case, he produced a document (see accompanying exhibit) which he said was his official KGB "temporary duty authorization" to go to Gorkiy Oblast to search for CHEREPANOV. The document, signed by General GRIBANOV, authorized Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO to travel to Gorkiy during the period immediately before NOSENKO's trip to Geneva, 15-30 December 1963. NOSENKO acknowledged that it was "illegal" to have kept the document and to have brought it with him from the Soviet Union. He did it, he said, to show CIA.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: NOSENKO has never provided a satisfactory explanation for his retention of the document nor for bringing it to Geneva. According to an earlier KGB defector, the bearer of a temporary duty authorization is held strictly accountable for the document which has to be turned in with the financial voucher. Whatever NOSENKO's purpose, the effect of presenting the document to CIA was to corroborate his statements about CHEREPANOV and substantiate his claim that he was a KGB lieutenant colonel. NOSENKO was not a lieutenant colonel (see p.350). When he eventually said in 1966 that he was only a captain, NOSENKO was challenged to explain how he came to possess an official KGB document signed by General GRIBANOV and identifying him as a lieutenant colonel. NOSENKO asserted that it came about "by mistake".

Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)

NOSENKO was detailed a second time to perform security escort duties with the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference, and he returned to Geneva in January 1964 where he resumed contact with CIA and announced his intention to defect. He brought with him a considerable number of handwritten notes to which he referred when describing to CIA officers KGB operations of which he claimed he learned at KGB Headquarters during 1962 and 1963. His delegation security duties were not onerous. He visited the Geneva Legal Residency daily and met with CIA almost as frequently while awaiting approval of his defection and exfiltration from Switzerland, tentatively scheduled for some three weeks later. A little more than a week after his arrival, however, NOSENKO declared that he had to defect at once, because he had received cabled instructions to return to the USSR immediately. On 4 February 1964 NOSENKO was taken from Switzerland to Germany, and on 12 February he was brought to the United States.

Exhibit 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963

FRONT



КОМИТЕТ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

15 декабря 1963 г.

Командировочное удостоверение № 11933

Выдано подполковнику
Носенко
Юрию Ивановичу
Командированному в УКГБ Горьковской
области
Срок командировки 15 дней
по 30 декабря 1963
Основание: распоряжение нач
Главного Управления

Действительно по предъявлении удостоверения личности № НК-2517

Начальник Управления
отдела
Комитета Государственной Безопасности
при Совете Министров СССР

Committee for State Security Under the Council of Ministers, USSR

15 December 1963

Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel
NOSENKO
Yuriy Ivanovich
For duty to: UKGB of Gor'kaya Oblast'
Length of temporary assignment: 15 days
through: 30 December 1963
Authorization: directive of Chief of a Chief Directorate

Effective on presentation of identity document No.: NK-2513

Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorate
of Department

Committee for State Security Under the Council of Ministers, USSR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Purpose of Geneva Trip

NOSENKO explained that it was his personal wish that had brought him to Geneva, that he was allowed to travel as "a treat" when it appeared to be the last occasion he might have to travel to the West. [NOSENKO said in 1962 that when he became Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, as he expected to become, he would travel to the West every two or three years.] He had discussed the possibility of the trip in 1963 with then-Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV, and secured his agreement. He also talked with officers of the Soviet Delegations Department, but after it had been decided that he should go, the Chief of that Department, [N.T.] ZHARIKOV, suggested that it might be unnecessary for a security officer to accompany this particular delegation. [A.G.] KOVALENKO, the new Chief of the Seventh Department, supported NOSENKO's assignment as a personal favor. Although at one time NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV approved the trip, he has later asserted that GRIBANOV was not involved and that if GRIBANOV had learned of NOSENKO's plans, he would not have permitted NOSENKO to go.

NOSENKO's only mission was to concern himself with the general security of the delegation, as he had done in 1962. He had no specific tasks such as on his earlier assignment (e.g., investigating SHAKIDV or supervising the BELITSKIY operation).

Comment: NOSENKO has never satisfactorily explained why a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department would draw an unrelated assignment abroad which would last many weeks if not months. In another context, NOSENKO had described a KGB conference to take place about this time where plans were to be drawn up for KGB operations during the coming tourist season: he acknowledged that he was expected to attend, but nevertheless went to Geneva.

EXHIBIT 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963

REVERSE



1. Командированный не позднее 3-дневного срока по возвращении из командировки обязан представить авансовый отчет об израсходованных в связи с командировкой суммах.
2. При получении проездного билета предъявить в жел.-дор. кассу командировочное удостоверение для наложения компостера.

ОТМЕТКИ О ПРЕБЫВАНИИ В ПУНКТАХ КОМАНДИРОВКИ

(указываются даты прибытия и убытия, заверенные подписью и печатью)

Прибыл в г. Горький 16 декабря 1963
Прибыл в г. Шахунья 17/XII-1963
бесплатной квартирой
не пользовался!
Нач. Шахунского ГОМ
м-р мил

Убыл из г. Шахунья 17/XII-1963 г.
бесплатной квартирой не
пользовался
Нач. Шахунского ГОМ
м-р мил

Убыл из г. Горького 17 декабря 1963 г.
бесплатной квартирой не пользовался

ОТМЕТКИ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ (ОТДЕЛА)
КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Убыл из Москвы „____" ________ 196 г.
Прибыл в Москву „____" ________ 196 г.

Нач. секретариата

Печать

ФИНО ____________
КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Выдано:

Аванс на расходы по командировке в сумме

Руб. ____________

Перевозочные требования №№ 005867, 005870

Талоны на плацкарту №№ ____________

Ст. бухгалтер

NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES OF TEMPORARY DUTY

"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy 16 December 1963"

"Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye 17 XII 1963 Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye
Chief Militia Section,
Militia Major________
(Illegible)

"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63 Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye
Chief Militia Section,
Militia Major________
(Illegible)

"Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963 Did not use free quarters"

s./_____(Illegible)

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Visits to Legal Residency

As in 1962, NOSENKO said he visited the Legal Residency daily. According to strict rules, he explained, an officer in his status [temporary duty assignment which was independent of Residency] should not do so, but his case was exceptional because he was a Deputy Chief of Department and because of the relationship he established in 1962 through the intervention of M.S. TSYMBAL. Illegals Directorate Chief TSYMBAL, NOSENKO related in 1964, was an old friend; they had become acquainted in Moscow before meeting again in Geneva in 1962, when they dined together frequently. TSYMBAL's wife once had taught NOSENKO in school, and TSYMBAL had once offered NOSENKO a job in the Illegals Directorate. NOSENKO asserted that TSYMBAL's introduction of NOSENKO to Rezident GAVRICHEV in 1962 permitted NOSENKO to frequent the Legal Residency in 1964.

Comment: In 1962 NOSENKO attributed his access to the Residency to his "old friend Yuriy GUK", not TSYMBAL. He mentioned TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva but claimed no close acquaintance.

Availability for Meetings with CIA

In 1964 NOSENKO behaved as if he had no official responsibilities or any demands on his time, and he was willing to spend all of his time in meetings with CIA. He said that his absence from the Disarmament Delegation could be explained as "security duties" since everyone on the Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer. From the first meeting on 24 January until 4 February, NSOENKO met CIA officers thirteen times for meetings usually lasting for five or six hours. By mutual agreement, most of the meetings started in the afternoon. On two occasions NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours and several meetings continued until past midnight.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Written Notes

After returning to KGB Headquarters from Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO said, he had availed himself of various opportunities to record what he learned of KGB operations in order to inform CIA, and to pilfer appropriate KGB documents to which he had access, when he could safely do so. He brought to Geneva in 1964 three KGB documents and a large number of handwritten notes. The latter reflected items which he had excerpted from various documents to which he had access, principally the Seventh Department Chief's special file containing periodic summaries of all Seventh Department operations. He last had access to this special file, he stated, in connection with his review of it in December 1963 to confirm that it was intact after the CHEREPANOV affair. While the file contained no true names, he claimed he learned such true identities as were contained in his notes by asking KGB colleagues. For safekeeping, NOSENKO said he kept the notes and documents in a wall safe of the office which he occupied alone, as Deputy Chief of the Department.

Questioned repeatedly about the KGB operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more.

Comment: NOSENKO's sourcing for the notes does not explain how he learned of the cases described in the notes dating from 1957-1959, a period not covered by the documents NOSENKO claimed he reviewed. Neither can NOSENKO explain why he was not knowledgeable, without the notes, of operations which occurred while he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department's American-British Commonwealth Section. NOSENKO acknowledges that his access to a personal safe in

Comment: (Continued)
which to keep the notes was just fortuitous, since neither all offices had such safes, nor even all offices of Deputy Chiefs.

NOSENKO's Defection

On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had decided to defect. He explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, and that because of the stature and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few if any opportunities for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family behind. He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the USSR for the "next twenty years". NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is to part with my family". He had, however, carefully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector, and he felt that, because of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm would come to them.

NOSENKO was told that CIA accepted in principle his decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA would exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States. He wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the CIA officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this request were:

-The desire to obtain further information on the local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference while he still had access;

-The value of having NOSENKO present when GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February, a visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;

-The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's in-place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the Soviet representation in Geneva;

-The necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.

In a three-and-a-half hour meeting on 26 January NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was necessary and useful for him to remain in place until GRIBANOV visited Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as possible thereafter.

On 28 January NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman Semichastnyy was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.

On 30 January NOSENKO said that there appeared to be little likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris. [From 7 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer.] Therefore, he wanted to defect right away. He cited as reasons the emotional strain of any further delay and the fact that he and his case officers were wasting their time working against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or promising targets. He also felt that nothing of value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because "Tsarapkin himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by Moscow the day before". CIA handlers, however, delayed the defection for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for the defection, he suggested Saturday morning, 8 February, because he probably would not be missed until the following

Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a trace". He also asked about exfiltration plans.

On 31 January NOSENKO reported the results of his reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in connection with the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers, (see p.309) which he was told were en route from Washington. He explained that he had been alarmed at the previous meeting because the delegation was supposed to move from its hotel to a Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would be noticed more quickly. This move, as he had now learned has been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer from Moscow.

At NOSENKO's request on 1 February, it was firmly agreed that the defection would take place on the morning of 8 February. NOSENKO assumed that exfiltration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States, and his case officers confirmed his assumption.

On 3 February NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV materials. The defection was still scheduled for Saturday, 8 February.

NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel room in the early afternoon of 4 February and said: "I want to come now and not go back." After arriving at the CIA safehouse he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the Soviet Union. The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties as security officer for the Soviet delegation in Geneva. Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a number of new cities and tourist itineraries in this connection. Semichastnyy had decided that it was time to call a conference to discuss new "tactics and strategies" for handling the increased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the report would be read to the conference either by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO explained that he was the only one who could do this job as Lt. Col. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new man in this line of operations, having been there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the morning of 5 February. He had arranged for a Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the next morning for the move. His absence would be noted at that time, and therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss border before morning". NOSENKO felt, however, that there would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for a time following his disappearance, and that there would be no real concern until the evening. To foster Soviet uncertainty, he had left his clothing lying around his hotel room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safehouse. NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or early on the 6th.

NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immediate interview with NOSENKO dictated that he be brought to Washington as soon as possible. He arrived in the United States on the evening of 12 February 1964.

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY, 06 06 the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations 06 of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, 06 his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held. [redacted]

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists 1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

4/8R

tourist operations, and, specifically, awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists.

Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE

The KGB agent in MI-6, George BLAKE, in 1959 furnished the KGB with a documentary account of the joint CIA-MI-6 meeting in June of that year, (see p.148) and he was to furnish other information by which the KGB could keep current on such hostile operations. Another CIA-MI-6 meeting was held in Washington in April 1960, of which a twenty-one page summary was made. BLAKE also passed this document as soon as it came into his possession to the KGB.

KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations

The lengthy 1961 KGB Top Secret study referred to earlier (see p.149) reflects the detailed and accurate information in possession of the KGB during the period of NOSENKO's alleged service in the Seventh Department in 1962-1963. Pertinent portions are quoted as follows:

> "It has been established that the Intelligence organs of the USA are displaying special activity in the utilization of legal channels, specifically, in tourism, for the purpose of conducting subversive work against the USSR. Numerous facts indicate that American tourists and members of various US delegations, in the USSR strive to visit areas and installations to which employees of the Embassy and military attaches have no access, establish contact with Soviet citizens, and collect intelligence information. In this regard, the channels of tourism to the USSR are used to dispatch experienced intelligence agents to develop individual Soviet citizens with the objective of their eventual recruitment. In line with the preparation and dispatch of such agents, among the tourists the Americans also make extensive use of persons not directly connected with American Intelligence organs. These latter agents are given one-time assignments such as collecting information leading to the ideological development of Soviet citizens.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

"With the objectives of accomplishing subversive activities, a so-called 'Information Center; has been established in the US with the participation of the Department of State. The 'Center' officially advertises that its purpose is to inform intending American tourists to the Soviet Union about the opportunities and restrictions existing there. Actually, however, the 'Center' is involved in the ideological preparation of American tourists, whom it instructs regarding their conduct in the Soviet Union and the methods to be used there for propagandizing the American way of life. The 'Center' collects information about the Soviet Union from returning American tourists, including the political attitudes of certain Soviet citizens, their addresses, etc. The direction of the 'Center' is controlled by experienced intelligence officers of CIA.

"Candidates for missions to the USSR are selected carefully. They ordinarily possess knowledge of the Russian language, know the fundamentals of photography, have specific technical training and must look upon their mission as a responsible assignment and not as a pleasure trip. American Intelligence organs prefer to use persons who have previously visited the USSR and person having relatives there.

"Once selected, the American tourist agent is instructed as to his intelligence assignment and his route, and he is acquainted with the security conditions in the USSR, including passport controls, documentation and customs controls, the hazard of both physical and technical surveillance, as well as the possibility of provocations and compromise making the agent vulnerable to blackmail.

"Among American Intelligence tourist agent tasks there are included visual observation and clandestine photography, the establishment of contact with Soviet citizens, and spotting among such citizens persons who may be developed as sources of information. For American Intelligence, any Soviet citizen, regardless of his social status or his personal access to important information, is of interest, because of his ability to travel to regions of the USSR which are of interest to American Intelligence.

"American Intelligence tourist agents suspect as KGB agents Soviet citizens who too openly express anti-government sentiments, who volunteer information about friends or relatives who work in secret establishments, who accept an invitation for a clandestine meeting but display an awareness of security principles, who quickly request aid or assistance in defecting, or who have a good knowledge of foreign languages."

Citing the increase in foreign tourists in the Soviet Union from 35,000 in 1959 to over 50,000 in 1960, the document instructs a KGB First Chief Directorate Legal Residency abroad

"to utilize all its resources to expose among American tourists persons suspected of belonging to the enemy intelligence or counterintelligence organs."

Promising its assistance, KGB Headquarters instructs the Legal Residency

"to inform KGB Headquarters of foreigners temporarily visiting the USSR who are of operational interest in the work against the main enemy [the U.S.]. With this aim, the Legal Residency should intensify its work against local services which are using tourism to conduct intelligence work in the USSR; determine the role played by anti-Soviet emigre organizations with respect to tourism; exploit tourist firms which organize tours in the USSR, with the aim of obtaining information regarding the firms being exploited by hostile intelligence services; and telegraph timely and necessary information to KGB Headquarters regarding tourists believed to be of operational interest, including the individual's surname, name, patronymic, date of birth, profession, date to arrive in the USSR, means of travel, itinerary, description of group with whom tourist travelling, and any other pertinent information available to the Legal Residency about the tourist. The Legal Residency is further directed to include where possible among tourists groups agents of the Residency, informing KGB Headquarters in advance of their presence and advising how the KGB could contact the agents in the USSR if it should become necessary. Lastly, the Legal Residency is instructed to provide all possible aid, including financial assistance, so that persons favorably disposed to the USSR can visit there, with the objective of their recruitment in the Soviet Union for the purpose of exposing enemy intelligence agents among other tourists."

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO insisted that the operations he described accurately reflected the extent of KGB counterintelligence operations among American tourists during his 1962-1963 service in the Seventh Department. In response to questions during his interrogation, NOSENKO asserted that the Seventh Department, during his absence in 1960-1961, had only noted that "automobile tourism had increased and that American Intelligence had increased its use of multi-national tourist groups." He stated that the Seventh Department received no information during 1960-1961 regarding American Intelligence use of tourism as a cover for espionage. He was aware, he said, from the damage survey conducted in the KGB after GOLITSYN's defection, that American Intelligence had obtained a KGB document on tourist operations, a document which had been written in the Seventh Department.

Comment: NOSENKO does not know the content of the document, which he describes as a statistical survey similar to the study he himself drafted in 1959 (see p. 146).

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists: Summary

BLAKE's confession and evidence obtained from internal KGB documents establish the KGB concern for the threat of American tourist agent operations and the scope of KGB actions to thwart that threat. The effect of NOSENKO's statements is that the KGB did not know of the American tourist agent program. He averred that the operations he described accurately depicted the nature of KGB counterintelligence operations during the period.

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - 1962-1964: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, in January 1962, at the direction of General GRIBANOV, he was appointed Chief of the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section in the expectancy that he soon would be named a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. As a Section Chief, he personally handled agents and supervised all Second Chief Directorate operations against American and British Commonwealth tourists, of which he describes four. In this period NOSENKO also was assigned the unrelated duty of serving as a security escort officer with a Soviet delegation travelling to Geneva in which capacity he investigated a delegate of suspected loyalty, SHAKHOV. While in Geneva he drew also the assignment of supervising another KGB case officer's management of the KGB double agent, BELITSKIY. On that visit to Geneva NOSENKO first contacted CIA. In July 1962, NOSENKO claims that as GRIBANOV promised, he became one of three Deputy Chiefs of the entire Seventh Department; in this position he learned of all KGB operations against American tourists. In this connection he described five operations, as well as his accidental discovery of the identity of an American GRU agent, and the investigation and search for a disaffected former KGB colleague. In July 1963 NOSENKO states he became First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Again assigned to escort a delegation to Geneva in January 1964, NOSENKO met CIA representatives again and delivered notes of KGB operations of which he had learned since his last meeting with CIA in 1962. He also presented at this time a KGB travel document to substantiate his claimed rank of lieutenant colonel. Finally, he announced the receipt of a telegram recalling him to Moscow, an event which prompted CIA to accept his immediate defection.

NOSENKO's claimed date of transfer into the Seventh Department is in dispute because of contradictory claims he made regarding his Embassy Section activities. He provides no information sustaining his claim to have become Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section; his description of his functions does not differ materially from that given in connection with his earlier claimed service in the same section, as a case officer, and he describes no administrative nor supervisory responsibilities. None of his claimed agents, with one exception, was employed in Seventh Department operations he described. Because of contradictions and the conflicts in his varying accounts, neither of the reasons NOSENKO cites for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 or 1964 is credible. In Geneva, it is implausible that he conducted the investigation of SHAKHOV as he claims, and he clearly did not supervise the management of the double agent, BELITSKIY.

NOSENKO offers nine "tourist" cases as evidence that he served in the 1962-1964 period in the Seventh Department, part of the time as Deputy Chief. These cases, which included two religious figures, two American Communists, one emigre, one suspected FBI agent, a First Chief Directorate target who intended to marry a Soviet citizen, a hostage, and a permanent resident or former permanent resident of the Soviet Union, all have aspects for which KGB elements other than the Seventh Department may have been responsible. This fact and the anomalies of NOSENKO's accounts of the cases aside, however, the cases are evidence that NOSENKO did serve during the period in the Seventh Department, although they are not persuasive of his claim to have been Deputy Chief. A judgment of that latter claim must rest primarily on an appraisal of other aspects of his statements, including those relating to his supervisory duties and to the nature of Second Chief Directorate operations against American and other foreign tourists.

NOSENKO has retracted his assertion that he was a lieutenant colonel, a rank appropriate for a Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief of Department, and asserts that he was never promoted beyond the rank of captain.

Most damaging to NOSENKO's claims that he was a supervisor in the Seventh Department is his assertion that he accurately describes KGB counterintelligence operations against foreign, particularly American, tourists. A senior Seventh Department officer would be aware of the Second Chief Directorate's preoccupation with American tourists: If NOSENKO is unaware of the extent of KGB activities in connection with American tourists, he was not a Section Chief of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

CHAPTER IX

OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB SERVICE

Most of NOSENKO's assertions can be examined in a chronological fashion, as has been done in the proceding sections. Some can most easily be examined separately, since they relate not to any particular period of his KGB service nor to any specific position he claimed he occupied, but to his entire KGB career. The principal aspects in this category of claims are those he made about his relationship with Second Chief Directorate General GRIBANOV, his Party status, his knowledge of certain KGB forms and procedures, his sourcing of KGB operations, awards he earned for KGB service, and his KGB rank.

Relationship with General GRIBANOV

From his first meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO maintained that he had a close personal and professional relationship with Major General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO described recruitment approaches in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his promotions, awards and assignments, and their after hours carrousing. According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was wholly responsible, against NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy Section in 1960, and when NOSENKO later rejected GRIBANOV's offer to make him Chief of the entire American Department, it was GRIBANOV who arranged his return to the Seventh Department as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and who shortly thereafter appointed him a Deputy Chief and thereafter First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied

06

VBR

06

GRIBANOV on only one such occasion and learned from "friends" in 1958-1959 about DeJean); GRIBANOV put NOSENKO in Embassy Section in 1960 as Deputy Chief to supervise code clerk operations (Contradicted. NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief and did not supervise code clerk operations); GRIBANOV approved NOSENKO's operational plan for MORONE's recruitment (Retracted. The plan was written by another KGB officer.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to prepare study on foreign intelligence services use of tourism (Contradicted. NOSENKO could recall no details of the study nor whether he ever discussed it with GRIBANOV.); GRIBANOV promised to promote NOSENKO directly to lieutenant colonel from the rank of captain and (subsequently) personally congratulated him on his promotion to lieutenant colonel (Retracted. NOSENKO never was promoted past the rank of captain.); GRIBANOV was instrumental in NOSENKO's receiving personal commendations from the KGB Chairman, the Orders of the Red Banner, the Red Star, and the Order of Lenin (Retracted. NOSENKO received no such awards.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to Geneva in 1962 (Retracted. NOSENKO went at the request of the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to assume charge of the BELITSKIY case (Contradicted. NOSENKO did not supervise the BELITSKIY case.); GRIBANOV allowed NOSENKO to go to Geneva in 1964, "as a personal favor" (Retracted. GRIBANOV was not aware that NOSENKO was to return to Geneva a second time.): and finally, GRIBANOV was NOSENKO's patron (Retracted. Their relationship was no closer than their relative rank and position indicated.)

06

Conclusion

NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to his claimed relationship with GRIBANOV discredit his single and most important unretracted claim, that NOSENKO, on GRIBANOV's appointment was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

218R

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Communist Party Status

In addition to other stringent requirements, candidates for the KGB must normally be Communist Party or Komsomol members. The significance of NOSENKO's statements about his Party status is the extent to which they are consistent with what is known about Party activity in the KGB, and consistent with NOSENKO's account of his KGB career.

NOSENKO said his formal participation in Communist Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory in Baku. The step was a casual one, he said, and he took it without much thought, mainly because all of his friends were joining. He continued his pro forma membership in the Komsomol while in the Naval RU, and when he "transferred" to the KGB in spring 1953, he transferred routinely to the KGB Komsomol organization from his Naval RU Komsomol unit in the Baltic. He was registered with the KGB Komsomol, he said, without referring the matter to his former Baltic Komsomol unit.

Comment: According to knowledgeable KGB defectors, a member's acceptance in another Komsomol unit is contingent upon the endorsement of the individual's former unit; NOSENKO's acceptance by the KGB Komsomol without referring the matter to his Komsomol unit in the Baltic "is impossible".

In the fall of 1953 NOSENKO claims he was elected secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization. He was elected, he said, at a meeting of the Komsomol membership.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: The Komsomol membership elects only the Komsomol Committee. The latter elects the secretary.

NOSENKO cannot describe the duties of a Komsomol secretary in any specific manner. He does not know who was the secretary of the KGB Komsomol organization, nor could he describe his dealings with that official's office.

Comment: The secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization is directly subordinate to the KGB Komsomol secretary and would have occasion to deal with the latter frequently.

NOSENKO stated that he did not know whether there was a Komsomol Congress while he was Komsomol secretary of the Second Chief Directorate, but that the Congresses were ordinarily held yearly.

Comment: The first Komsomol Congress since 1948 was held in March 1954, entailing considerable work by every Komsomol member and especially by the unit secretaries.

As Komsomol secretary, NOSENKO collected the dues of the members of his unit: All members paid in the amount of two percent of their monthly salaries.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding scale in which members earning 500 rubles monthly paid .5 percent, those earning 500 to 1500 rubles paid one percent, and those earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent.

NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-1954 the maximum age for a Komsomol member was 26 years of age, and that he was a member until he became overage in October 1954, and that no special privilege was extended to him.

Comment: According to Komsomol statutes at the time, the maximum age was twenty-five, a fact which would be known by a person who served as a Komsomol secretary at the time. NOSENKO would have thus been excluded from the Komsomol when he became overage in 1953, not in 1954 as he claimed.

The March 1954 Komsomol Congress retained the 25 year age limit, but provided for two-year extensions in certain cases. Because of age at the time, and because of his claimed position as Komsomol secretary, the matter would have been of vital interest to NOSENKO if the facts he related were true.

From the time he was dropped from the Komsomol because of age, until he was accepted as a candidate member of the Communist Party in January 1956, NOSENKO claimed that he was the only officer in the KGB who was a member of neither organization.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: NOSENKO is the only Soviet official known to CIA who claims to have occupied a position of trust and who claims he was not a Party member at the time.

In the period following, "to show his eagerness" and "to improve himself", NOSENKO asked for Party assignments. For more than a year he ran errands and collected newspapers and performed other such tasks. He stated that he applied for Party membership in January 1956, was accepted as a candidate member in 1956, and that he was accepted as a full Party member in 1957.

Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims about his Party activity do not sustain his claims to KGB service, and they suffer from identical discrepancies with respect to chronology, plausibility, and contradiction by independent sources. It is concluded that NOSENKO was never a Komsomol secretary and, if a member at all, was no longer a member after reaching his twenty-sixth birthday in October 1953. The period in which he had no Party status was twenty-eight months, not the fifteen he claimed, and it covers the period of his first tour in the Embassy Section as well as a portion of his initial Seventh Department assignment. An officer unqualified for Party membership is ineligible for KGB service. Consequently, the evidence provided by examination of NOSENKO's Party status indicates that he was not serving in the KGB through at least a portion of the 1953-1956 period.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Knowledge of Certain KGB Forms and Procedures

In the course of his various interrogations, NOSENKO had occasion to comment generally on various KGB forms and procedures. Interrogation on these points, however, developed that while he was generally familiar with various aspects unexpectedly there were some of which he was ignorant. Some of these topics are described on page   in connection with his KGB entry, and others which are described below.

KGB Forms

NOSENKO was familiar with the anketa, the KGB Personal History Statement, including its appearance, the nature of the questions included, and the purpose of the document. However, he maintained that it was required to be completed in two copies, that it could be completed outside of KGB premises, and that it consisted of four to six pages.

Comment: The anketa is a detailed, sixteen page questionnaire. As a sensitive document, it is not taken from KGB premises. Defectors' describe its completion as "an experience not soon to be forgotten". If NOSENKO was a supervisor as he claimed, he would recall the form from reviewing personnel files in which the anketa is a prominent basic document.

NOSENKO maintained that he had never heard of the Communist Party Questionnaire, (Lichny Listok po Uchetu Kadrov). Shown an exemplar, NOSENKO stated that he had seen it in personnel files, but had never himself filled one out. Asked in whose personnel files he had seen the document, NOSENKO first said those of civilians (interpreters, etc), and finally expressed his belief that the KGB did not use the document.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: The form is completed by every KGB officer, and while it is not of critical importance to the KGB itself, a copy is filed in every officer's personnel file, a fact known to any Komsomol secretary or supervisor responsible for reviewing KGB personnel files.

NOSENKO was unfamiliar with the name of the KGB personnel action form, and said he did not know of it. When its purpose was described to him, he gave a superficial description of its content.

Comment: A senior KGB officer would be familiar with the form, which he would see on every occasion in which one of his subordinates was promoted or transferred.

NOSENKO was familiar with the Employment and Service Record (Posluzhnoy Spisok), but he claimed he filled it out only in "1958 or 1957".

Comment: The Employment and Service Record is completed on entry on duty with the KGB. In citing 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO is claiming that he completed it only four or five years after entering the KGB.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Visitor's Pass Procedures

NOSENKO has described procedures entailed in a non-KGB visitor's gaining access to a KGB installation, but he maintained that the interviewer's name did not appear on the visitor's pass. (See p. 70.)

Comment: The interviewer's name does appear on the pass, a fact which a senior officer of more than a decade's KGB Headquarters service would recall, since he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors to KGB buildings.

Name Checks of KGB Central Files

NOSENKO on many occasions claimed that in connection with his direction of an operation he personally performed the check of the target's name against KGB files. Prominent among these cases were BURGI (see p.115) and ABIDIAN (p.205).

06

Comment: NOSENKO could not describe specifically how he performed the name checks he claimed, and his description contained numerous errors of fact. Among these were assertions that the Militia retained court records of all Soviet citizens, and that the First Special Department holds its criminal index separate from political and security card indices. NOSENKO was unfamiliar with the KGB term *spetsproverka*, meaning a clearance check. Despite NOSENKO's claim that he performed name checks of American Embassy personnel, he pleaded ignorance of any aspect of the files held by the First Chief Directorate, where any KGB record on foreigners is kept.

(VBR)

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Conclusion

NOSENKO's ignorance of the foregoing forms and procedures is evidence that he did not occupy the position nor perform the functions he claimed during his alleged KGB service.

Awards and Decorations

Since 1964 NOSENKO has claimed to have received various awards, commendations, and decorations for his KGB service. His assertions are material to any judgment of his general credibility and, as well of the validity of his claims to having occupied various KGB positions.

In January 1964 NOSENKO mentioned that in 1962, shortly after meeting with CIA in Geneva, he received the Order of Lenin for ideas which he developed to "enlarge the experience and improve the quality" of Second Chief Directorate personnel in Moscow.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked about his awards, and he first said he received the Order of the Red Banner, then corrected himself to say he received first the Order of the Red Star. He confirmed that he received the Order of Lenin, in 1963. [Earlier he had said 1962, "just following visiting Geneva".] He claimed he received the Order of Lenin for his performance in his Seventh Department assignment, but when he was asked what recruitments justified his receipt of the award, he said the main task of the Seventh Department was not to make recruitments, but to counter the hostile intelligence service operations. [For his contradictory statements regarding the Seventh Department's mission, see pages 103 and 326 .] The Order of Lenin was the highest decoration for which a KGB officer is eligible, NOSENKO said, and besides himself, the Chief and former Chief of the Seventh Department received it. NOSENKO said he received in 1962 the Order of the Red Star, he "thought" for his service in the Embassy Section in 1960-1961, not for Seventh Department service; no explanation accompanied that decoration.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

The question of NOSENKO's awards, orders and decorations were of some interest to the interrogators since they might reflect the importance the KGB attached to particular operational activities in which NOSENKO engaged. However, before the April 1964 interrogations were suspended, NOSENKO retracted his claim that he received the Order of Lenin, saying that it was just an idle boast. GRIBANOV, NOSENKO explained, had promised in 1963 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and KOVALENKO would receive the Order of Lenin "for creating the Central Operational Communications System of the Second Chief Directorate" within the Seventh Department, but the award had not materialized before NOSENKO left for Geneva in January 1964.

Comment: Earlier NOSENKO claimed he received the Order for ideas he developed "to enlarge the experience and improve the quality of Second Chief Directorate personnel". Questioned, NOSENKO reverted to the earlier claim.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked to list the dates, reasons, and types of awards, decorations, and bonuses he had received in his KGB career. He replied that he received nothing from 1953 until 1956, when he received a commendation and one month's pay for the recruit-
06 ment of BURGI [see p.115] by order of the KGB Chairman Serov. GRIBANOV informed him of the commendation, NOSENKO said, and NOSENKO saw his name on the list of recipients which was circulated. No written certificate accompanied the commendation, according to NOSENKO, but personnel recorded the event in each KGB recipient's personnel file. Almost every year after 1956, NOSENKO stated, he received something, "perhaps on the KGB anniversary, or May Day, or Army Day". In 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO did not recall exactly, he received "something" from GRIBANOV, "maybe on the anniversary of the Soviet Army": GRIBANOV's deputy, PERFILYEV, made the presentation at an assembly of officers in the KGB Headquarters auditorium. NOSENKO said he received in 1959 a second commendation and one month's pay from KGB Chairman Shelepin

118R

06 06

for "several recruitments, including Americans MERTENS, DREW, 06 FRIPPEL," and three British citizens whose names he could not recall. Along with a large group of KGB officers, NOSENKO received a commendation from GRIBANOV in 1960, he said, "for good work in general". He received in 1961 the Order of the Red Star, he stated, with a group of Second Chief Directorate case officers "for general good work"; IVASHUTIN made the presentation, which included a medal and a certificate which the officer may retain.

Comment: A week later, NOSENKO said that he received this award in December 1962. He said he recalled that the presentation was planned for the KGB Anniversary on 20 December, but the presentation was delayed and not made until the end of the month.

In 1962, NOSENKO claimed, he received another commendation from GRIBANOV for "general good work", and he also received the Unblemished Service Award for ten years' service.

Comment: At this juncture his interrogators reminded NOSENKO that his most recently claimed date of entry to the KGB was March 1953, and that in 1962 he would only have had nine years' service. NOSENKO said that he could not understand why, but he was certain he received the service award after his return from Geneva in 1962. (The date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier retracted claim that he entered the KGB in 1952.) The following day NOSENKO announced that he recalled why he received the medal in 1962 rather than in 1963; the medal was awarded to servicemen as well as to KGB officers, and prior military service is taken into account in computing KGB officers' time

Comment: (Continued)
in service. NOSENKO entered the Naval RU in 1950, he said, and should have received the medal in 1960, but did not because of some administrative mixup. (See p.56 for NOSENKO's eventual claim that he entered the RU in 1951.)

In 1963, NOSENKO said, he received another commendation from GRIBANOV for "general good work", and GRIBANOV told him that along with others he would receive the Order of Lenin "for inspiring the Seventh Department" on 20 December 1963, the KGB anniversary. NOSENKO said because he left for Geneva, he did not actually receive the medal. [NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 19 January 1964.]

Interrogated in August 1965 regarding his claim to having received a commendation from KGB Chairman Shelepin for his recruitment of the three Americans and three British citizens in 1959, NOSENKO said that he was nominated for the Order of the Red Banner for these successful recruitments, but he did not receive it, probably because he transferred to the American Embassy Section at that time.

Comment: NOSENKO apparently is referring to the KGB practice of conferring decorations on KGB anniversary, 20 December. NOSENKO claims he transferred to the Embassy Section in January.

When NOSENKO's claims to various KGB awards was reviewed with him during the October 1966 interrogations, he said that during his KGB service he had received only the Red Army anniversary medal and an award for satisfactory completion of ten years' service, and that he had received no KGB award, decoration, or commendation for his operational work.

0001619

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims to having been the recipient of various awards for KGB service are inextricably linked with his claimed operational successes, his rank, and GRIBANOV's patronage, on all of which topics he had made virtually categoric retractions.

NOSENKO's Sourcing

NOSENKO cited four general sources for KGB operations he has related, and in all four there have been inconsistencies, contradictions, and retractions. Three of these categories, each with an example typifying the difficulty of judging the validity of his sourcing, are personal participation (W.E.
06 JOHNSON, p. 268) cases learned in the course of specific
06 official duties (SHUBIN, p. 296), and information obtained informally from KGB colleagues (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON, p. 24). The fourth category of sourcing relates to the notes of KGB operations which he brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964.

Regarding the notes, NOSENKO said he collected them at various opportunities in order to bring them to CIA. He kept them in a wall safe in the office which he occupied as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. [In this connection, NOSENKO admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one of the Seventh Department section chiefs, a similar handwritten report by another Seventh Department officer, and a carbon copy of a KGB document which summarized the recruitment of an Austrian 11 businessman. NOSENKO said he copied the date for the remaining notes from such sources as the "Special File", which was held ordinarily by the Seventh Department Chief. According to NOSENKO, he obtained access to it for various

0001620

3/BR

reasons from time to time. The "Special File" contained no true names, however, and NOSENKO said he obtained such true names as were included in his notes by asking various case officers for them. Questioned on case after case which appeared in his notes, NOSENKO insisted that he had written everything he could learn, and could add nothing more.

Conclusion

NOSENKO's sourcing for many of the events he has related is not credible.

NOSENKO's KGB Rank

When he first met with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO identified himself as a KGB officer holding the rank of major. He said at that time that he had served the requisite time in grade and expected to be promoted shortly to the rank of lieutenant colonel. On defecting in 1964 NOSENKO said that he was a lieutenant colonel. In the course of his career as he initially described it, his military rank promotions had generally parallelled his assumption of successively greater supervisory responsibilities, culminating in his becoming Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Under interrogation, however, questioning about his rank has evoked a series of inconsistent and contradictory statements leading to his eventual assertion that he had never advanced beyond the rank of captain. The matter of NOSENKO's statements about his rank is significant with respect to his general credibility, to the fact that he brought to Geneva in 1964 a KGB document identifying him as a lieutenant colonel, and to the paradox that as a company grade officer he held supervisory positions in which KGB officers of significantly senior rank were his subordinates.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

In June 1962 NOSENKO volunteered that he was then a major, but that he would soon be promoted to lieutenant colonel.

In 1964, in Frankfurt awaiting transportation to the United States, NOSENKO reviewed and approved a biographic statement which included the claim that he had been a senior lieutenant in the American Embassy Section from 1952 (sic) until 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO claimed that at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954 [not in 1952] he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant. When it was pointed out to him that that was less than a year after he entered the KGB, he asserted that his Naval RU service was taken into consideration.

Asked in June 1964 to list his promotions, chronologically, NOSENKO asserted that he became a senior lieutenant in 1953, in 1956 a captain, in 1959 a major and, in October [in Geneva, just afterwards, he said November] 1963, he was advised by Personnel that he had been promoted to lieutenant colonel and afterwards was personally congratulated by General GRIBANOV. NOSENKO did not recall the month of his earlier promotions.

Comment: KGB defectors have commented that it would be unusual for a KGB officer not to recall his date of rank, from which he computes his seniority and time in grade towards his next promotion.

In January 1965, while discussing his role as case officer for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never been a major nor was he promoted to captain in 1956, as he had claimed earlier. He explained that he became eligible for captain in 1956, but his promotion was withheld as punishment because he had obtained treatment for a venereal disease under an alias, with the use of KGB operational documents. He stated that thus he was a senior lieutenant still in 1959, and although GRIBANOV had promised him that he would be promoted directly to major at that time, an administrative error was made in the personnel office, and he was just promoted to captain. Instead of rectifying the mistake, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV persuaded him to remain a captain until (if a major) in 1963 he became eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel. In October 1963, he concluded, he was promoted directly to the rank of lieutenant colonel; he was never a major, and he had served as senior lieutenant from 1953 to 1959, and a captain from 1959 to 1963.

Comment: According to this chronology, NOSENKO was merely a captain when he claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, and still a captain for much of the time that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

In August 1965 interrogations NOSENKO still claimed that he was proposed for advancement to captain in 1956, but he stated that he was not promoted because of shortcomings in his work. [He earlier had claimed he was being punished for misuse of operational documents.] In response to his interrogator's question, NOSENKO replied that he had claimed earlier in 1962 and 1964 to have been a major because he thought the truth would not have been believed.

In a voluntary statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO alleged that he had been promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in 1956 [he earlier claimed 1953], to captain in December 1959 [he could not previously remember the month] and that at the end of 1963 he was recommended for the rank of major. Continuing, NOSENKO said he had never held the rank of lieutenant colonel, and the travel order [which he brought to Geneva in 1964] indicating his rank as lieutenant colonel, was filled out erroneously.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

NOSENKO said in October 1966 interrogations that he had lied when he had claimed in 1964 to be a lieutenant colonel, that actually he had been but a captain. Asked why he had claimed in 1962 that he had been a major, NOSENKO denied that he had ever even mentioned his rank to CIA in 1962.

Conclusion

NOSENKO has stated that he became a senior lieutenant in the KGB in 1952, April 1953, 1954, or 1956. He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1956 or September/October/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963. He brought to Geneva in 1964 an official KGB document dated November 1963 identifying him as a KGB lieutenant colonel. In retracting his claim that he was ever a major or lieutenant colonel, NOSENKO asserts that nevertheless as a captain, he held the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to his KGB rank parallel and are apparently related to his contradicted and retracted claims regarding Naval RU service, date of entry to the KGB, KGB assignments and positions held, and in short, to the totality of his claims regarding KGB service, few of which are credible.

CHAPTER X

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has encountered among many would-be defectors, the question of NOSENKO's mental stability was a matter considered early after his defection in Geneva. From the time of his arrival in the United States he has been under psychiatric observation. In addition, he has undergone psychological examination. The CIA psychiatrist and psychologist, besides being highly-qualified professionals, have both had extensive experience with Soviet Bloc defectors. Their findings were reached independently.

Psychological Examination

In April 1964 NOSENKO was administered a series of psychological tests by the CIA psychologist. After monitoring numerous interrogation sessions, the psychologist interviewed NOSENKO for fourteen days during 3-21 April 1965, in an attempt to develop sufficient insight into NOSENKO's personality to permit the obtaining of a truthful account of his life.

Findings

NOSENKO is a rationalizer, a distorter, and an evasive person clearly capable of dissembling for personal reasons. He is not a compulsive liar. He is inclined to relate what he thinks he is expected to say rather than to tell the truth as he knows it. He lies by design as well as for effect, however, and he does not always embroider just to bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor psychotic, and he suffers from no "delusions". NOSENKO's rationalizations are not the product of derangement.

(PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT)

Psychiatric Examination

Since April 1964 NOSENKO has been under the observation of the CIA psychiatrist. Besides monitoring many of the interrogation sessions, the psychiatrist has visited NOSENKO weekly for the first year, monthly until 1967, and at somewhat less frequent intervals since.

Findings

NOSENKO is neither psychotic nor neurotic. Of above average intelligence, he is shrewd, perceptive, and highly adaptable. His memory is not defective. Besides suffering from ordinary lapses of memory, however, he sometimes falsely claims lack of recall. NOSENKO's thought processes are unimpaired; he is rational and fully capable of distinguishing fact from fiction.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT: Conclusion

The findings of the psychologist and psychiatrist dispel the notion that NOSENKO's behavior and his statements are other than willful.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. [redacted]

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently:

-NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed.

-NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed.

-NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.

-During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.

-NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962.

-NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

-NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964.

These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance.

The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's _bona fides_. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a _bona fide_ defector.

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made.

Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB agent.

The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself.

Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind.

It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources.

Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable.

In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his information should be assessed accordingly.

Annex B

Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text

There follow NOSENKO's descriptions of KGB operations involving Americans which do not clearly relate to specific KGB positions he held at particular times and which thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The cases include, for example, Seventh Department operations of which he said he learned while serving in the American Department, and *vice versa*, as well as operations conducted by KGB elements other than the Second Chief Directorate. Unless otherwise specified, each entry reflects all of the information NOSENKO provided.

06

ACTOR/PROCTOR

NOSENKO's Information

06

An American known as ACTOR or PROCTOR is a valuable First Chief Directorate agent who travelled overtly to Western Europe and there obtained other documents with which to continue clandestinely to the USSR.

06

Comment: The lead may refer to one Vernon W. PROCTOR who visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1963. The investigation is not complete. NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes he brought to Geneva in 1964.

0001631

3/BR

(Annex B)

06

ALBINGER, Donald

NOSENKO's Information

06

ALBINGER, an American citizen born in 1937, visited the USSR in 1963 and there was the target of a KGB investigation in Sochi because he was believed to be an American Intelligence agent. In Sochi ALBINGER 06 was in touch with a KGB agent, "TRAPEZUND".

By NOSENKO's account, the 06 ALBINGER case was directed by a provincial KGB element while NOSENKO was assigned to the Seventh Department in Moscow.

Comment: According to the FBI, 06 Donald ALBINGER visited the Soviet Union in 1963 and while there, in Sochi, was associated with one Gazarian OHANNES (sic, probably Oganes GAZARYAN), a Lebanese national who repatriated to the USSR in the 1920's. OHANNES allegedly offered 06 ALBINGER intelligence-type photos which 06 ALBINGER said he refused to accept.

06

ALLOYAN, Lawrence

NOSENKO's Information

An American of Armenian background, 06 ALLOYAN visited the USSR in November 1963 and contacted the KGB. He stated to KGB officers that he had been asked by an American Army captain and military intelligence officer, to inform the KGB of American Intelligence use of the Monterey Language School. The Army captain's name is possibly Hugo VAN KRAKOV, 06 and the KGB planned to contact him. NOSENKO noted the case 06 when ALLOYAN, a tourist, first contacted the KGB in Moscow through a Seventh Department case officer.

1188

(Annex B)

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in January 1965, 06 ALLOYAN denied having been in the USSR in 1963. He stated that he was acquainted with a Hugo 06 VAN KRAKOW who had a son of the same name, but disclaimed knowledge that the latter was an Army captain. 06 ALLOYAN said he had not seen the son for twenty years. The younger VAN 06 KRAKOW was interviewed by the FBI and said that he was discharged from the Army in 1953 as a staff sergeant, and that he was not in contact with ALLOYAN. 06

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

APISSON, Henry 06

NOSENKO's Information

An American citizen of Armenian origin, 06 Henry EPISON (sic) was recruited by the KGB of the Armenian SSR in April 1963, on ideological grounds. The recruitment was believed not to have been firm, however, and the KGB planned to renew it if EPISON returned to the USSR in 1964. 06 06 EPISON had access to a military installation in the New York suburbs.

Comment: 06 Henry APISSON, a naturalized American and the owner of a hotel and restaurant near West 10 Point, N.Y., visited the USSR in 1963. In 1964 he acknowledged having had contacts with Soviet officials in 1963 in Armenia, where he may have conveyed an impression of willingness to see them if they should later visit West 10 Point. 06 APISSON claimed he did not realize the approach was for intelligence purposes.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

(Annex B)

06

[ARMSTRONG, Robert]

NOSENKO's Information

06, 08

[ARMSTRONG, the American Ambassador's aide], is known by the KGB to be having a homosexual affair with a [code clerk 08, 06 of the Danish Embassy, one Johannes BUHLE]. ARMSTRONG is a close friend of another homosexual officer of the American Embassy, [Stephen HOFFMAN] (see below).
06

Comment: Recalled from Moscow and interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's allegation, [ARMSTRONG] 06 acknowledged the truth of the allegations. Before resigning from the Department of State in August 1964, he asserted that he had had no contact with the KGB while serving in Moscow. NOSENKO provided no source for his information regarding [ARMSTRONG], which was a 06 Embassy Section case at a time when NOSENKO claimed to be serving in the Seventh Department.

06

[BARTHELEMY, Thomas Franklin]

NOSENKO's Information

06

[BARTHELEMY] twice led American tourist groups to the USSR in 1959, during which visits the KGB assessed him to be an American Intelligence agent. He was subsequently in contact with one [V.A. LAINE, a Finn] who was a KGB agent.
06, 11

06

NOSENKO only learned of the [BARTHELEMY] case and of his 06 contact with [LAINE] while visiting the Leningrad KGB in 1963. 06 [BARTHELEMY]'s Seventh Department file indicated that he had been under surveillance in 1959 because the KGB had information he had graduated from an intelligence school.

C001634

(ANNEX B)

06

Comment: BARTHELEMY was a CIA contact whose intelligence connections were assumed to have been compromised during his visits to the USSR. He reported his contacts with LAINE 06 to CIA. BARTHELEMY's name 06 appeared in the KGB document on Western tourist operations which GOLITSYN provided CIA. (See p. 149 .)

06

BERMAN, Harold

NOSENKO's Information

While on one of his frequent visits to the Soviet Union, American lawyer and prominent professor of law BERMAN was 06 surrounded by KGB agents, but the KGB "could do nothing with him".

06 29

Comment: BERMAN is a professor at Harvard University who is a specialist in the Soviet legal system. He has visited the USSR on several occasions for study and research, and he had described several incidents which occurred in Moscow which appear to have been KGB provocations.

06 NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on BERMAN, nor did he provide the date he acquired the information.

06

BINDER, Peter

NOSENKO's Information

08,06

The "top sergeant in charge of America House", BINDER, was involved with a Soviet female employee at America House, with whom at various times he had been intimate in his room. He obtained for her items of clothing from the United States. Since the KGB had been unable to obtain compromising photographs of 06 BINDER and the Soviet girl, it had no means to exert pressure on him, and a recruitment attempt thus failed.

(Annex B)

06
[BINDER, Peter] (Continued)

NOSENKO later identified the Soviet girl as Galya MORELLI, a KGB agent employed at America House as a dishwasher. Vladimir DEMKIN of the Embassy Section was the case officer 06 working against [BINDER], and the Chief of the American Department S.M. FEDOSEYEV participated in the recruitment attempt, in 1962, by which time NOSENKO had transferred to the Seventh Department and thus knew no further details.

06

Comment: [U.S. Army Master Sergeant Peter BINDER] served as [manager of the America House from 16 March 1961 to 22 January 1963]. On 15 January 1963 he reported to Embassy officials that he had been abducted off the street by Soviet plainclothesmen, taken to a Militia station, and interrogated on the substance of a letter alleged to have been written by Galya MORELLI, which his interrogators threatened to send to the Ambassador. The letter alleged that [BINDER] 06 had lived with MORELLI as "man and wife" from 25 November 1961, had warned Soviet employees against Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, that MORELLI had told [BINDER] she was pregnant 06 06 and [BINDER] instructed her to get an abortion, had engaged in blackmarketing, [BINDER] had 06 told ABIDIAN's replacement Hugh MONTGOMERY about his affair with MORELLI and MONTGOMERY had told him not to worry about it, and that 06 [BINDER] had told MORELLI that Embassy Officer Richard C. JACOB was a "well-trained spy" and that she and other Soviets should be wary of him. When [BINDER] denied the allegations and 06 challenged the interrogators to send the letter on to the Ambassador, he was allowed to go free. 06 [BINDER] acknowledges that he was intimate with MORELLI and that he gave her gifts of money and clothing; and that she said she thought she was pregnant in February or March 1962; she never mentioned an abortion and made no other demands of [BINDER]. [BINDER]

08, 09

06 06

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued) states that MORELLI "disappeared" in June or July 1962, while BINDER was on leave. 06

Except for dating the recruitment attempt in 1962 instead of 1963, NOSENKO's fragmentary information coincides with BINDER's account. 06 NOSENKO asserts that the notes brought to Geneva in 1964 contained all information he was able to discover. NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section in 1961, supervising BINDER's and MORELLI's case 06 officers, but he relates his knowledge of the case neither to that period nor to the position he then held.

BROCHES, Adam 06

NOSENKO's Information

06 BROCHES, born in 1896, visited the Soviet Union with a tourist group in 1960. He has relatives in the USSR, and he was recruited in September 1960 by the KGB on ideological grounds.

Comment: 06 BROCHES was born in 1890. His brother, 06 Alexander, was born in 1896. GOLITSYN reported that a Seventh Department officer told him in 06 1960 that Adam BROCHES had been a Soviet agent in the 1920's and 1930's in Paris and that when he visited the USSR as a tourist guide in 1959 or 1960 the KGB suspected that he might be on an American Intelligence mission to contact V.M. ZARUBIN, his one-time Soviet Intelligence superior in Paris. According to GOLITSYN, the KGB placed BROCHES under surveillance 06 and the Chief of the Seventh Department was planning to discuss with ZARUBIN what action the KGB should take.

0001637

9/BR

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued) 06

Interviewed by the FBI, BROCHES said that he escorted tours to the USSR three times in 1960, and that on his last trip, in September 1960, he was approached by Soviet officials for information on members of his tour group. 06 BROCHES claimed he refused to cooperate and denied that he had ever been a Soviet agent. 06 BROCHES said, however, that the allegation might refer to another of his brothers, Ignacy, 06 now dead.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964. NOSENKO claimed to have been in the American Department when the Seventh Department recruited BROCHES. 06

06

BUNDARIN, Eugene Peter

NOSENKO's Information

06

BUNDARIN, born in 1917, the son of a Russian emigre, and an employee of the "Four Winds Travel Agency" in New York 29 City, was recruited by the KGB in 1962 on ideological grounds. He left the Four Winds agency and his case is 29 inactive because the KGB is waiting for him to open his own 08 travel bureau. 06 BUNDARIN was handled by Seventh Department case officer V.G. DERA.

06

Comment: BUNDARIN, born 25 April 1917, the son of an emigre and an employee of the Four Winds 29 agency visited the Soviet Union for eighteen days in 1962. He left the Four Winds agency 29 in 1962 to travel abroad, and he now works for 29 Hermes Travel of California. Interviewed by 06 the FBI, BUNDARIN denied any connection with Soviet Intelligence. FBI reports indicate

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
06 BUNDARIN and parents associate with CPUSA members and participate in CP front organization activities.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964.

06

CHRISTNER, Robert Charles

NOSENKO's Information

While reviewing after his defection in 1964 a list of Americans who had visited the Soviet Union, NOSENKO noted 06 that one CHRISTNER had been arrested while touring the Soviet Union by automobile. He did not indicate the source or date of his acquisition of the information.

Comment: As described in press accounts of the period and stated in a KGB document on American tourists which GOLITSYN provided, CHRISTNER 06 was arrested in the Soviet Union on charges of espionage in the summer of 1961. He had a CIA mission at the time, but he reported that he had managed to maintain his tourist cover throughout his intensive interrogations. In the summer of 1961 NOSENKO claims he was in the Embassy Section of the American Department.

06

FAIN, Thomas

NOSENKO's Information

06

FAIN, an "American consul" stationed in Yugoslavia, 11 visited Moscow in 1959. During that visit he encountered NOSENKO's agent, VOLKOV, who reported his suspicion that

0001639

7/8R

(Annex B)

06
FAIN, Thomas (Continued)

06 FAIN was a homosexual. There was insufficient time during 06 FAIN's visit to arrange his entrapment.

06 FAIN was assigned permanently later in Moscow, and the KGB planned at that time to entrap him with a homosexual.

Comment: In a Department of State security interview 06 FAIN has stated that he recalled no Soviets whom he had met during his five-day visit to Moscow in 1959, except a female Inturist guide and the Hotel Ukraine receptionist. He reported no noteworthy incidents during his later permanent assignment in Moscow.

06
FINK, David

NOSENKO's Information

06
FINK is an American professor from Philadelphia and frequent visitor to the USSR whom the Leningrad KGB hoped to recruit on an ideological basis and through the use of a female agent. Because of his sister's love affair with a Soviet he was refused a visa in 1963, but the KGB has arranged so that he will be admitted to the USSR if he applies again. NOSENKO learned of the case when the Leningrad KGB objected to FINK's being denied a visa: NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time. 08 06

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in September 1964, 06 FINK acknowledged that his sister was trying 08 to marry a Soviet citizen, but that she had been refused a visa to visit the USSR for the purpose. 06 FINK admitted involvement with a female in Leningrad, during his visit to the

12/BR

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
USSR in 1961, but denied recruitment. FINK 06 asserted that he had visited Europe every summer since 1957 (except in 1959, when he went to Mexico), and that he had only visited the USSR once, in 1961.

06

FISK, Norman

NOSENKO's Information

06

FISK visited the USSR as a tourist in 1959, when he was assessed to be a homosexual. The KGB planned to attempt to recruit him if he returned to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO 06 noted FISK's name while reviewing files of YEFREMOV and VOLKOV (see p.145) in 1963.

06

Comment: FISK visited the USSR with his wife and parents in 1959. In an interview with the FBI in December 1964 he claimed that his only Soviet contacts in the USSR were with Inturist personnel and a spinster niece. NOSENKO has never explained why he learned of the case only from the files of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in 1963, since he claims he was their case officer at the time FISK visited the Soviet Union, in 1959.

06

06

GINSBERG, Michael

NOSENKO's Information

06

A professor GINSBERG visited the USSR in 1957 or 1958, when operational contact was established between him and the KGB.

C001641

8/6R

(Annex B)

Comment: One Professor Michael GINSBERG 06 reported to U.S. officials in Helsinki in August 1956 that he had been the target of a Soviet recruitment attempt earlier in Moscow. His contact has been identified by CIA as a KGB officer whom 06 GINSBERG, according to the FBI, has met during subsequent visits to the USSR.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964.

06

GROVER, Preston

NOSENKO's Information

06 GROVER, currently (in 1964) Associated Press correspondent 08 in Moscow, is a recruited KGB agent handled by the Tenth (Intelligensia and Correspondents) Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

Comment: 06 Preston GROVER retired in 1965 and now lives in France with his wife. 06 GROVER's wife was born in Russia and apparently emigrated at about the time of the 1917 Revolution. GROVER 06 met her in Moscow, where she was a correspondent for a French newspaper. According to FBI reports, she associated with known Communists in the United States during an earlier assignment here. NOSENKO indicated no source of his information on GROVER. 06

9/BR

(Annex B)

06

HAMZAVI, Charles P.

NOSENKO's Information

06

An American, one Charles KHAMZAI (sic) was the object of considerable interest to the KGB during his 26 October-1 November 1963 visit to the USSR. A KGB officer under cover was in contact with him in Moscow and the KGB planned to resume this contact in the United States. The Seventh Department action with respect to KHAMZAI was in response 06 to a request from the First Chief Directorate for assistance in developing a contact with him in Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO's lead has been identified as Charles 06 P. HAMZAVI, who has been noted in frequent contact with Soviet officials from 1955, when he immigrated to the United States, until 1963. According to the FBI, he was in Moscow in 1963, when he was in contact with a Foreign Ministry official which CIA identifies as KGB officer I.D. BORISOV.

HARMSTONE, Richard

NOSENKO's Information

In 1958 or 1959 the American Department's Embassy Section attempted to recruit HARMSTONE, a Second or Third Secretary 06, 08 at the Embassy. Both male and female agents were used against him, and photographs were obtained of HARMSTONE's 06 homosexual as well as heterosexual activities. When confronted, 06 however, HARMSTONE refused to collaborate with the KGB. 06 HARMSTONE reported the approach to American officials, but asserted that he was involved just in heterosexual compromise.

NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV documents (see p. 309) in 1964, including the KGB plan of operations against HARMSTONE. 06 NOSENKO confirmed the substance and eventual success of the plan, which was to get HARMSTONE drunk and photograph him

06

11/SR

(Annex B)

06

HARMSTONE, Richard (Continued)

while in intimate relations with a Soviet girl. Because the KGB concluded that HARMSTONE had not reported the homo- 06 sexual compromise, it was planned to attempt to recruit him again later, when he was transferred elsewhere abroad. 06 If HARMSTONE had reported the homosexual compromise, it would have been monitored by the KGB over the microphone in the Minister Counselor's office.

06 In later questioning NOSENKO stated that he learned of the HARMSTONE case from KOVSHUK. He could not recall who the KGB case officer was, but was certain that the latter had left the Embassy Section. If HARMSTONE had reported 06 his compromise, he surmised, he would have been withdrawn immediately from Moscow, and HARMSTONE did not leave the 06 Soviet Union prematurely.

06

Comment: Richard C. HARMSTONE, who served in Moscow from October 1957 to October 1959 as Second 08 09 Secretary, reported to the Embassy Security Officer on 23 May 1959 that a KGB officer had tried to recruit him after threatening exposure through doctored photographs purporting to 06 show HARMSTONE's homosexual activities. HARM- 06 STONE subsequently identified from a visa application photograph the KGB officer as "KOMAROV", an overt contact of Embassy colleague WINTERS. HARMSTONE left the Soviet 06 Union six months later, admitted homosexual activities, and resigned from the Department of State. The relevant portions of the CHEREPANOV Papers confirm HARMSTONE's admissions 06 with respect to KGB agents with whom he was involved. "KOMAROV" has been identified as KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's superior in the Embassy Section and the source of what NOSENKO said he learned of the case.

(Annex B)

HOFFMAN, F. Stephen 06

NOSENKO's Information

08,06 An American Embassy official and a friend of the Ambassador's aide Robert ARMSTRONG (see above), HOFFMAN 06 is known to have engaged in homosexual acts with an Armenian in Yerevan. The KGB currently (in 1964) is planning to attempt to compromise and recruit HOFFMAN. 06

Comment: Interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's allegation, 06 HOFFMAN in a State Department security interview denied homosexual activities. Informed that the results of a polygraph examination indicated he had practiced deception on that question, HOFFMAN resigned from the 06 Department of State on 31 July 1964. HOFFMAN 06 asserted that he had no contact with the KGB while assigned in Moscow, an assertion supported by the polygraph examination.

NOSENKO claims he was assigned to the Seventh Department at the time HOFFMAN was 06 the target of the Embassy Section of the American Department.

06

HOWARD, Herbert

NOSENKO's Information

06,08

HOWARD, a USIA employee, was assigned temporarily for four months to the Embassy in Moscow in spring 1962 as a 08 publications procurement officer. He was recruited by the KGB. G.I. GRYAZNOV, of the American Department Embassy Section, requested NOSENKO's help in obtaining a hotel room adjacent to HOWARD's, for a woman from Leningrad. 06

0001645

12/BR

(Annex B)

Comment: 06 HOWARD denied recruitment in an interview with the FBI, although a polygraph examination indicated he was disturbed on related questions. 06 HOWARD had earlier declared his intention to divorce his American wife and marry a Soviet national. His contract with USIA 29 expired in December 1964 and was not renewed.

NOSENKO claims to have been serving in the Seventh Department at the time HOWARD 06 was a target of the Embassy Section.

06

HUSTON, Hayden Henry

NOSENKO's Information

One 06 HUSTON (fnu) travelled to the USSR on official U.S. Government business from his assignment in Belgrade 10. In Moscow 06 HUSTON was photographed making a blackmarket deal in a taxi, but the KGB did not exploit the incident because 06 HUSTON did not again visit the USSR.

08,06

Comment: USIA employee Hayden Henry HUSTON was interviewed on 30 October 1963 regarding a report that he had been arrested in Yugoslavia 11 in 1954 as a result of his sexual activities. 06 HUSTON served in Yugoslavia 11 for eight years—from 1953 until January 1962. During that interview he stated that during his tour in 10 Belgrade he made two trips to the USSR, and he asserted that there were no other incidents in 11 Yugoslavia or elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc which could be used to compromise him. 29 Currently on a USIA assignment in Taiwan 11, 06 HUSTON has not been interviewed with respect to NOSENKO's allegation.

1818R

(Annex B)

JAFFE, Sam 06

NOSENKO's Information

06 08
JAFFE, an ABC correspondent in Moscow, is an active KGB agent who was cultivated and recruited by V.A. KUSKOV. In 1963, while in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asked American Department Embassy Section officer GRYAZNOV for an agent who could be used against a visiting American delegation, and GRYAZNOV suggested JAFFE. 06

Comment: Before NOSENKO's information was received, 06 JAFFE reported his recruitment by one "Slava KISLOV" in October 1962. In a CIA interview 06 in December 1966 JAFFE did not recognize A.K. KISLOV's photograph but identified a photograph of KUSKOV as being the KGB officer who recruited him in 1962. JAFFE was expelled 06 from the USSR in October 1965. As far as CIA is aware, he has not been interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's information.

KANTOR, Marvin

NOSENKO's Information

Melvin (sic) KANTOR, a Harvard student, was recruited on ideological grounds in 1961. His case was turned over to the First Chief Directorate.

Comment: Marvin KANTOR, a Slavic-language instructor at the University of Michigan, visited the USSR in 1958 or 1959. When interviewed by CIA in 1961 he admitted having had contact with Soviet Intelligence officers in the Soviet Union in 1959, but asserted that he then had flatly refused to collaborate with Soviet Intelligence.

715R

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
When interviewed in 1963, KANTOR said he had not travelled to the USSR since 1959.
NOSENKO's information was limited to written notes brought in 1964 to Geneva. NOSENKO claims he was in the Seventh Department in 1959, at the actual time of KANTOR's recruitment, and does not explain why the KANTOR case was included among cases he noted as having occurred while he was in the Embassy Section in 1960-1961.

[KAZAN-KOMAREK] 06

NOSENKO's Information

06

[KOMAREK], an American of Czech descent and somehow connected with a tourist service in the United States, has been identified by the Czech Secret Police as being in contact with Western Intelligence and they have been trying to locate him. The Czechs have learned that [KOMAREK] might 06 possibly visit the Soviet Union and have requested [the KGB] that he be arrested on arrival and deported to Czechoslovakia. The Soviets have agreed and Inturist is currently attempting to induce [KOMAREK] into visiting the Soviet Union.
06

Comment: The subject of NOSENKO's lead was [Vladimir 06 Joseph KAZAN-KOMAREK], a naturalized American citizen and the operator of the [Harvard Travel 29,10 Tourist Agency in Cambridge, Massachusetts]. He has never had any covert relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. In August 1963 the FBI was advised by another source of the Soviet-Czech plan to lure [KAZAN- 06 KOMAREK] to the Soviet Union and take him to Czechoslovakia where he would be tried for espionage.

0001648

7/18R

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)

NOSENKO's information, which he reported only to the FBI, was substantially accurate. In October 1966, after being warned of the risk by the FBI, KAZAN-KOMAREK visited Moscow 06 for an Inturist travel agents conference and, en route back to Paris, was arrested in Prague when his AEROFLOT flight was diverted.

NOSENKO's sourcing for this lead, which presumably relates to his 1962-64 service in the Seventh Department, had not been established. CIA did not learn of NOSENKO's report on KAZAN- 06 KOMAREK until the latter was arrested in Czechoslovakia in 1966, by which time NOSENKO's interrogation had been suspended.

06

MATLAW, Ralph

NOSENKO's Information

06

One MATLO (sic) visited the USSR in 1959, and the KGB concluded that he was a homosexual and planned to attempt to recruit him if he should return to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO noted the information while reviewing YEFREMOV and VOLKOV's file prior to their retirement.

Comment: The identity of NOSENKO's lead has been confirmed to be one Ralph MATLAW. 06 The case is still under investigation. NOSENKO claims to have been YEFREMOV's and VOLKOV's case officer at the time one of them was in touch 06 with MATLAW in 1959, but learned of the case only later when reviewing those agents' files.

(Annex B)

06

[NIELSEN, Philip]

NOSENKO's Information

06 [NIELSEN] visited the USSR the first time in 1957 or 1958. Because he made the acquaintance of some "teddy boys" in Moscow and tried to acquire from them a copy of the Moscow Telephone Directory, the KGB suspected that he was connected with CIA. 06 [NIELSEN] was kept under surveillance during this and all subsequent trips, but was never observed in other intelligence tasks. On one of his visits to Moscow, [NIELSEN] 06 fell in love with KGB agent [Tamara KUNGAROVA], and the KGB 06 used her in the development of [NIELSEN]. 06 For purposes of assessment, LEONOV, a Seventh Department officer, was 06 introduced to [NIELSEN] in the role of [KUNGAROVA]'s father, but 06 with no positive result. NOSENKO heard later that [NIELSEN] 06 and [KUNGAROVA had married] 06, 08 and were living in London.

NOSENKO was involved in the determination of [NIELSEN]'s 06 possible intelligence status on his first trip. Besides himself and LEONOV, American Department case officer Viktor KOPEYKIN was also involved.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he recruited 06 [KUNGAROVA] in 1955 and that she was his agent until 1960, and that she was already an agent in 1958 when she transferred into the Seventh Department from the British Commonwealth Department.

06 [NIELSEN], a CIA agent at the time, visited the Soviet Union in April 1958. One of his tasks on this trip was to obtain a Soviet telephone book. 06 [NIELSEN] met [KUNGAROVA] 06 on a later trip, in January 1959. Despite CIA warnings that he was involved in what appeared to be a KGB operation, [NIELSEN] returned to see 06 her in Moscow in January 1960, and there met a person representing himself as [KUNGAROVA]'s 06 father. 06 [NIELSEN] returned to Moscow in 1962, 08, 06 [married KUNGAROVA], and they moved to France. [KUNGAROVA] 06 died in France in 1965. In January

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
1960, when NOSENKO claims personal knowledge 06 of [NIELSEN]'s meeting with [KUNGAROVA]'s "father", 06 he was not in the Seventh Department, but in the American Embassy Section.

06

[NIXON, Dmitriy]

NOSENKO's Information

An American tourist, 06 [NIXON] was recruited by Seventh Department case officers in June 1963. NOSENKO was not in Moscow at the time, and knew no further details.

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's 06 information, [NIXON] admitted having been recruited while visiting the Soviet Union. He was not contacted by the KGB in the United States, although such arrangements had been made at the time of his recruitment. On a visit to Moscow in 1964, after NOSENKO's defection, 06 [NIXON] was again contacted by the KGB and he agreed to collaborate for fear of reprisals against relatives in the USSR.

06

[OMELICH, Paul]

NOSENKO's Information

06 [OMELICH] was contacted by KGB officers during the Winter Olympics at Squaw Valley, California. Although he was not recruited, he was to be recontacted by KGB officers later, in Switzerland. 06 When [OMELICH] visited Moscow in August 1963, Seventh Department American Section case officer K.G. KRUPNOV arranged for First Chief Directorate officer (fnu) ZAYTSEV to meet the American.

9/8R

(Annex B)

Comment: In 1963 06 OMELICH reported his earlier contacts with Soviet officials at Squaw Valley. He denied that he had ever met KGB officers later, or that any meeting arrangements were made for Switzerland, although he admitted "he may have given the impression of sympathy toward Soviets".

06

PECHTER, Bernard

NOSENKO's Information

06 PECHTER was recruited by the KGB in Moscow in 1959.

Comment: In December 1959, a month after 06 PECHTER's return from the USSR, the FBI learned that he had revealed his homosexual compromise and recruitment by the KGB to a member of his tour group. NOSENKO cited the PECHTER 06 case not from memory, but from his written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. Although presumably a Seventh Department case, NOSENKO did not relate it to his service there in 1959, nor did he indicate the source of his information.

06

PRESSMAN, Aron

NOSENKO's Information

06 Patrick (sic) PRESSMAN visited the USSR in October 1957 with a delegation of American metallurgists and was recruited at that time by the KGB. The case was afterwards turned over to the First Chief Directorate.

71BR

(Annex B)

Comment: NOSENKO's lead is believed to relate to Aron 06 PRESSMAN, a long-time Communist and a friend 06 of Bernard KOTEN (see p.295), whose sister has resided in the Soviet Union since her 1945 marriage to a Soviet citizen who has been identified as a courier for Soviet Intelligence. 06 PRESSMAN accompanied a delegation of metallurgists from NYU on an exchange visit to the Moscow Mining Institute in 1957; he himself surveyed Soviet language training programs during this visit. He denied any recruitment approach was made to him there or on subsequent trips to the USSR.

06

NOSENKO cited the PRESSMAN case from his written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He did not relate it to his Seventh Department service nor did he indicate the source of his information.

06

PROCTOR, fnu

See ACTOR. 06

RASK, Walter 06

NOSENKO's Information

06, 08

RASK, the president of World Wide Tours, was recruited in the USSR in 1960. He has returned to the USSR several times since. He is used for spotting tourists suspected of having intelligence affiliations. 06 The KGB has received only one open code message from RASK since recruitment. RASK was 06 recruited by Seventh Department case officer Ye. N. NOSKOV while NOSENKO was assigned to the American Department. On subsequent visits to the USSR he was met by Seventh Department case officers of the American-British Commonwealth Section.

(Annex B)

06

Comment: [RASK], a former CIA contact who visited the USSR several times, reported the KGB recruitment approach in 1961.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in written notes he brought to Geneva in 1964. He did not relate the case to his 1962-1964 Seventh Department service.

06

[ROBERTS, Spencer]

NOSENKO's Information

06

[ROBERTS] was recruited at the end of 1962 after being compromised with a homosexual in Sochi, USSR. The case was turned over to the KGB First Chief Directorate, and [ROBERTS] 06 was recontacted by a KGB officer in the United States. 06 [ROBERTS] confessed his recruitment to the FBI, news of which reached the KGB, and his KGB case officer in the United States was hastily recalled to Moscow.

06

[ROBERTS] was handled by the American Department because he was a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow. The case officers were V.M. MIKHAYLOV, V.A. KUSKOV, and V.M. KOVSHUK. NOSENKO learned of the events in the U.S. from B.A. SOLOMATIN, a First Chief Directorate American Department case officer.

06

Comment: [ROBERTS] had been coopted as a CIA representative in Moscow in 1950, while he was a State Department officer assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. He confessed his recruitment by the KGB to the FBI in the fall of 1962. He was contacted by a Soviet official from the UN in New York in mid-1963. That official apparently suddenly departed the United States in December 1963. NOSENKO did not indicate the original source of his information on [ROBERTS].

06

8/BR

(Annex B)

ROSS, Johanna

06

NOSENKO's Information

The former governess to the American Ambassador's family who now (in 1964) teaches at the American school in Moscow 08 was recruited by the KGB on the basis of sexual involvements. The case was handled by the American Department at the time NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department.

Comment: NOSENKO's information was limited to written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He does not indicate the source of his information. 06 ROSS reported to the American Embassy of her arrest in Kiev in 1958 on charges of immoral behavior with a Soviet citizen. In a May 1965 FBI interview she admitted contact in Moscow in September 1963 with the KGB, which stemmed from her continued relationship with the same Soviet citizen, but she denied that the KGB attempted to recruit her or contact her thereafter.

06

RUFE, John

NOSENKO's Information

06

The KGB discovered that RUFE was a homosexual during his visit to the USSR in 1959. When he returned to the USSR in 1962, he was entrapped and recruited. The case was only of marginal value to the KGB, and it was terminated in 1963.

5/BR

(Annex B)

06

Comment: RUFE, a New York City attorney, has admitted that he had been compromised while visiting the USSR in 1962 and that he was in contact with KGB officers in the United States until November 1963.

06

NOSENKO did not relate the RUFE case specifically to his Seventh Department service when he cited it from writen notes brought to Geneva in 1964, nor did he indicate the source of his information. His notes state that RUFE 06 was recruited on homosexual grounds by the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department, jointly with the UKGB of Leningrad Oblast.

06

SCHWARZENBACH, Collette

NOSENKO's Information

06

SCHWARZENBACH, who was working in Moscow at the time, fell in love with a male KGB agent and was the target of an unsuccessful KGB recruitment attempt in 1958 or 1959. The KGB had incriminating photography, but NOSENKO did not believe it was used, the KGB appeal being based solely on her affection for the Soviet people. V.M. MIKHAYLOV of the American Department Embassy Section directed the operation. NOSENKO never read the SCHWARZENBACH file, but he later saw it and the incriminating photographs.

06

06, 08, 09

Comment: SCHWARZENBACH was during 1955 and 1956 secretary to Mrs. BOHLEN, the wife of the American Ambassador, and director of the Anglo-American School in Moscow. In 1956 and 1957 she worked for Henry SHAPIRO, United Press correspondent 06, 08 in Moscow (see p. 76). While employed by 06 SHAPIRO she became acquainted with one Viktor I. SERGEYEV, a Soviet publishing functionary.

Comment: (Continued)
In January 1959 she was approached in Riga by a KGB officer who confronted her with incriminating photographs and solicited her cooperation in providing information on the U.S. Embassy. She immediately reported the event to SHAPIRO, 06 who informed then-Ambassador THOMPSON, and 06 SCHWARZENBACH left the USSR shortly thereafter in early 1959. She provided details of the KGB recruitment attempt to a State Department Regional Security Officer in Geneva on 4 June 1959. 06 10

NOSENKO did not recall from whom he learned of the SCHWARZENBACH case, which was directed by the American Department Embassy Section while he was assigned to the Seventh Department.

06

SEREBRENNIKOV, Eugene Sergey

NOSENKO's Information

06 29

In 1955-1957, SEREBRENNIKOV, an employee of the Library of Congress, visited Moscow with a Congressional delegation. 06 SEREBRENNIKOV had a brother who was a Soviet citizen, a doctor living in Sverdlovsk. Assigned to the Seventh Department at the time, NOSENKO himself arranged for the brother to be brought to Moscow and briefed him for a 06 meeting at which SEREBRENNIKOV would be "felt out" as a prospective collaborator with the KGB. The meeting took place, but the brother told the KGB that he had had no opportunity to discuss with SEREBRENNIKOV the possibility 06 of his helping the Soviet Union. SEREBRENNIKOV was in 06 Moscow only for a few days, and there was no opportunity for another meeting. The KGB concluded that SEREBRENNIKOV's 06 suspicions were aroused by his brother's behavior.

12/BR

(Annex B)

Comment: According to his 1964 interview with the FBI, 06 [SEREBRENNIKOV] visited the Soviet Union in 1956 in the company of Senator Henry H. Jackson. On his last night in Moscow he received in his hotel room a telephone call from a person claiming to be his brother from Sverdlovsk, whom he had not seen since 1918. The "brother" requested a meeting, but [SEREBRENNIKOV] 06 was convinced from the caller's uneducated speech and other signs that he was not in fact 06 [SEREBRENNIKOV]'s brother, and he refused to see him. 06 [SEREBRENNIKOV] immediately advised Senator Jackson of the incident, as well as Embassy officials. After [SEREBRENNIKOV] 06 returned to the United States, the incident was described in an article in Newsweek magazine.

06

[SEVERN, Gerald]

NOSENKO's Information

06 [SEVERN], KGB cryptonym "EDVIN" was recruited in Moscow by the Seventh Department in 1958 or 1959 on ideological grounds. He is a valuable all-purpose agent. His case officer was V.M. IVANOV.

06

Comment: [SEVERN], a naturalized American citizen whose name originally was [Gennadiy SEVASTYANOV], had 06 Russian-born parents. He enjoys special residence arrangements in Moscow, and prior to receipt of the NOSENKO lead he was suspected to be a KGB agent. 06 [SEVERN] has not visited the United States since 1961, and he has not been interviewed by the FBI.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964.

(Annex B)

06

SHATTAUER, Sofia Greta

NOSENKO's Information

06

In September 1962 SHATTAUER visited the Soviet Union and was recruited by Seventh Department case officer D.A. DITYATEV. She had originally been recruited in Poland in 1946-1947 but she was never contacted again because the KGB believed her to be known to American Intelligence.

06

Comment: In 1962 an FBI source reported that SHATTAUER stated she was looking forward to her trip to the USSR and "to being away from the imperialist policies of the United States", and that 06 SHATTAUER "appeared enthusiastic about Russian ideology". In July 1964 SHATTAUER admitted to 06 the FBI that she had had intelligence contact with Soviet officers in Poland in 1947 and that she was recontacted by the KGB in September 1962 in Moscow, after which she periodically met a KGB officer in New York City until May 1964.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He did not indicate the source of his information.

06

SOCHUREK, Howard

NOSENKO's Information

08, 06

The former Time-Life correspondent in Moscow, SOCHUREK, was probably recruited by the KGB and was an agent of Vadim BIRYUKOV. 06 SOCHUREK returned briefly to Moscow in 1962 when Seventh Department surveillance noted his association with BIRYUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth (Intelligensia and Correspondents) Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

8/6R

(Annex B)

Comment: 06 [SOCHUREK] who was assigned to Moscow in 1958-1960, reported to the Embassy a number of instances in which Soviet officials attempted to pressure him or in which he was in touch with identified KGB officers. [SOCHUREK] has 06 named BIRYUKOV as the guide and interpreter who invariably accompanied him while he was stationed in the USSR. NOSENKO has not indicated the source of his information on [SOCHUREK]. 06

06

[STEVENS, Francis]

NOSENKO's Information

06 [STEVENS], an 08 [American correspondent], visited the Soviet Union in 1961 as a tourist. He was the target of American Department officers KOVSHUK and KLYPIN, who entrapped him with a Soviet female, accused him of rape, and blackmailed him into accepting recruitment. His KGB cryptonym was "SERGEY". 06 [STEVENS], however, described the recruitment attempt in a letter to his mother which he deposited at the Embassy. The letter was opened and read by the Minister Counsellor, who immediately dictated a cable summarizing the events described in the letter to the Department of State. The KGB monitored the dictation through the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office. First Chief Directorate officers nevertheless planned to resume contact with [STEVENS] 06 in New York City.

Although a tourist and a 08,06 [correspondent, STEVENS] was the concern of the Embassy Section because he was a [former member of the Embassy staff]. 08

(Annex B)

06

Comment: STEVENS, after his compromise concerned for his safety for the remainder of his 1961 visit to Moscow, did deposit with the Embassy a letter to his mother. However, he also gave Ambassador Thompson a written report of the KGB entrapment, immediately after the incident, and he was interviewed about the matter by the Minister Counsellor the following day. Interviewed periodically by the FBI following his return to the United States in 1961, STEVENS 06 has denied any further contact with the KGB.

According to the notes which NOSENKO brought to Geneva in 1964, on the basis of which he reported the STEVENS 06 case, STEVENS' 06 recruitment was accomplished jointly by the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department and the American Department's Embassy Section.

06

TARASKA, William

NOSENKO's Information

06, 08

TARASKA, a New York City policeman, had been developed by the KGB while visiting the Soviet Union in 1958. Although considered in 1958 a "stupid and unpromising target", the Ukrainian KGB was still interested in attempting to recruit him while he was in the Soviet Union in June 1963.

06

Comment: TARASKA, who had visited the Soviet Union in 1958, was recruited by CIA for a mission in 1960. When he returned to the United States he reported that the KGB had attempted to recruit him on both visits. TARASKA returned 06 to the USSR in 1963 and later reported to the FBI that the KGB had again attempted to recruit him during that visit.

8/Be

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
NOSENKO does not indicate the source of his information on [TARASKA]. 06

[THOMPSON, John] 06

NOSENKO's Information

American professor [THOMPSON] 06, a specialist in Russian literature or Russian History, became involved with Tamara KUNGAROVA, a KGB agent within Inturist. He was intimate with KUNGAROVA and incriminating photographs were taken. The KGB did not attempt to recruit him, however, but planned to continue his assessment and establish additional grounds for his recruitment if he returned to the USSR. When he did not return, NOSENKO reviewed [THOMPSON]'s file 06 and recommended that the case be retired to KGB Archives.

Comment: [Dr. John M. THOMPSON, Associate Professor of History at Indiana University] 06,08, was interviewed by the FBI in April 1965. He identified KUNGAROVA's photograph as that of his Inturist guide during a trip outside Moscow in 1959, and admitted having been intimate with her. When he returned to Moscow in 1960 he had sought out KUNGAROVA, who told him she had been demoted in Inturist because of her [declared intention to marry an American (see Philip NIELSEN)] 08,06. [THOMPSON] also visited the 06 Soviet Union in 1964. 06 [THOMPSON] stated that he was unaware of any photographs the KGB might have and that he was never approached by the KGB on either trip.

8/BR

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
KUNGAROVA was interviewed by the FBI in June 1965. She confirmed that she had been intimate with THOMPSON in 1959 but denied that 06 she had been instructed to compromise him.
NOSENKO has claimed KUNGAROVA was his agent in 1959, although he has not related that claim to his description of her role in the THOMPSON 06 case.

06
TORREY, Carmen

NOSENKO's Information

06
TORREY, who was in love with a Soviet citizen, was recruited by Seventh Department case officers on that basis in 1960 and turned over to the First Chief Directorate, which helped her obtain employment at the UN (also given as NATO). NOSENKO was in the American Department at the time.

06
Comment: In 1960 it was reported that TORREY planned to defect to the USSR because she was in love with a Soviet citizen. In 1961 she married an American. In 1962 GOLITSYN reported KGB attempts to recruit an American identifiable 06 as TORREY during her October or November 1959 visit to Moscow. 06 TORREY worked for the Pan 29 American Union in 1954-1959, but there is no indication that she was ever employed by the UN or by NATO.
NOSENKO has not indicated the source of his information on TORREY. 06 In 1959, when GOLITSYN reported the KGB attempted to recruit TORREY, 06 NOSENKO claims he was in the Seventh Department, not the American Department.

0001663

10/BR

(Annex B)

06

TWAROG, Leon

NOSENKO's Information

An American professor of Russian Literature and a fluent Russian speaker, 06 TWAROG visited the Soviet Union in 1962 or 1963. The target of Seventh Department case officer K.G. KRUPNOV, 06 TWAROG was lured into intimacy with a female KGB agent, of which the KGB took incriminating photographs. At one point Seventh Department case officer Yevgeniy NOSKOV was placed in direct contact with TWAROG, but no recruitment 06 attempt was made because the KGB had concluded that the incriminating photographs were not sufficient to ensure success. The KGB deferred further action pending TWAROG's 06 expected return to the Soviet Union in 1964 or 1965.

Comment: In a 1965 interview with the FBI, 06 TWAROG said he had visited the USSR in 1957, 1960, 1962, and 1964. On his 1962 trip he had met and befriended one Nina S. PETROVA, and on one occasion they attended a party accompanied by friends of hers, a Soviet couple. The man's name was Yevgeniy. 06 TWAROG stated that he was later intimate with PETROVA, but was never confronted by anyone about that fact. In 1964 (after NOSENKO's defection), TWAROG stated, he 06 was approached in the USSR by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian whom he had met in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1962. HAMAN, who had defected in Sweden in 1955, redefected to the USSR in 1962. According to TWAROG, HAMAN offered 06 $50,000 if TWAROG would provide background 06 summaries of members of his tour group and threatened him with the denial of future entry 06 to the USSR if TWAROG did not comply. TWAROG 06 stated that he refused, and no further pressure was applied.

NOSENKO provided the information on TWAROG 06 from notes, in Geneva in 1964.

0001664

13/BR

(Annex B)

06

VOLKOV, Vasiliy Andreyevich

NOSENKO's Information

06

VOLKOV, construction company employee and an American, was recruited by a Seventh Department case officer in the summer of 1962 while visiting the Soviet Union. He was to be used in emigre operations.

06

Comment: VOLKOV has been identified as a carpenter living in California who travelled to the Soviet Union in 1962. He is a religious fanatic with a record of many arrests, and he may be mentally disturbed. In an FBI 06 interview VOLKOV denied that he had been recruited by the KGB.

NOSENKO does not indicate the source of his information, which was contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

06

VOLSKIY, Boris

NOSENKO's Information

08 06

The president of "American Travel Abroad", VOLSKIY was recruited by a Seventh Department case officer in 1962 on ideological grounds. His mission is to advise the KGB by open code of any tourist whom he suspected of having some connection with American Intelligence.

06

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in May 1964, VOLSKIY advised that he travelled annually to the USSR on tourist business and has frequent contacts with Inturist officials in the Soviet Union. He denied having any intelligence contacts, with one possible exception. In about 1962 he was visited in his Moscow hotel room by a

8/6R

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued) 06
person represented to be an Inturist official who solicited VOLSKIY's aid in curtailing foreign tourists' distribution of Bibles and literature in the USSR. VOLSKIY asserted that 06 he was in no position to provide such assistance, and he was not contacted again.
NOSENKO's information is limited to that contained in written notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

06
WALLACE, William

NOSENKO's Information

10 , 06
A student at the University of Vienna, WALLACE was recruited on ideological grounds while visiting the Soviet Union in 1961. The Seventh Department made the recruitment, 06 and turned WALLACE over to the First Chief Directorate, which was still managing the case in 1964.

10
Comment: Interviewed in February 1965 in Vienna, 06 WALLACE admitted having been approached by an unidentified Soviet during a visit to the USSR in 1961. He claimed he refused to "help them", and said there had been no further attempts to contact him.
NOSENKO's information is limited to that contained in written notes brought to Geneva in 1964; he has not indicated the source of his information.

(Annex B)

06,06

YOUNGER, Ralph and Evelyn

NOSENKO's Information

06

The YOUNGER couple were identified as American Intelligence agents and arrested and recruited by the KGB while they visited the USSR in 1961. However, later they failed to meet their KGB case officer as planned, in Denmark. The case was handled by the American Department while NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO's former subordinate, V.V. KOSOLAPOV, was directly involved in the case.

06

Comment: The YOUNGERs were on a mission for the U.S. Army at the time of their arrest, and they reported their recruitment immediately upon leaving the Soviet Union. KGB officer KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen under alias in 1961, at the time when the YOUNGERs were 06 scheduled to meet with the KGB in Denmark.

NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information which he related to CIA in Geneva in 1962.

06

ZIRING, Stanley

NOSENKO's Information

06

ZIRING, a student who visited the USSR in 1960, was recruited by the KGB after being apprehended in blackmarket dealings.

06

Comment: Interviewed in London in 1964, ZIRING admitted blackmarketeering but denied recruitment. British authorities concluded that he may have given the impression of willingness to cooperate without realizing the purpose of the Soviet offer. British authorities report no evidence of subsequent contacts between ZIRING and Soviet officials.

06

NOSENKO claims he was in the American Department at the time ZIRING was recruited by the Seventh Department.

06

9/BR

Index of Personalities

ABEL, Col. Rudolf Ivanovich 34
ABIDIAN, John V. 153, 155, 180, 194, 205-222, 224, 225, 229, 241, 242, 246, 259, 260, 344, 351, 404
ACTOR, fnu (See PROCTOR) 06 399
AGAYANTS, Ivan Ivanovich 283

"AGLODINA" (KGB cryptonym for Yelena S. KOSIENKO) 79
06 ALBAMONTE, Marion 311
06 ALBINGER, Donald 400
ALEKSEYEV, Aleksandr Ivanovich 253
ALEKSEYEV, Vladimir Kuzmich 305, 306
ALEKSIEV, Georgi Velev 258
ALESHKIN, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich 221, 222, 390
ALLOYAN, Lawrence 400, 401 06
"ANDREY" (KGB cryptonym for Dayle Wallace SMITH) 22, 33-37, 99, 152, 165, 238, 239, 287
06 ANDREYEV, Igor Ivanovich 376, 391
ANDRIANOV, Vladimir Nikolayevich 387, 395 06
ANKUDINOV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich 138
"ANOD" (KGB cryptonym for Alexander SVENCHANSKIY) 06 292
06 APISSON, Henry 401
[redacted]
"ARKHANGELSKIY" 215, 216
ARKHIPOV, Nikolay Alekseyevich 123
06 ARKHIPOV, Petr Mikhaylovich 372
06 ARMSTRONG, Robert 402, 413
"ARSEN" (KGB cryptonym for John V. ABIDIAN) 207
ARTAMONOV, Nikolay Fedorovich (Defector) 47, 373
ARTEMOV, Vladimir L'vovich 214, 284, 285
"ARTUR" (KGB cryptonym for Arsene FRIPPEL) 06 137, 156
06 AVDEYEV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich 389, 390
BAGRICHEV, Nikolay Grigoryevich 35, 36
BAKHVALOV, Mikhail Fedorovich 153, 154, 223
BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich 259
BANNIK, Maj. Gen. (See BANNIKOV) 389
BANNIKOV, Sergey Grigoryevich 276, 384, 390
BARGHOORN, Frederick 298-302, 326
BARKOVSKIY, Vladimir Borisovich 296
06 BARRETT, Robert 127, 134-136, 248

0001668

13/BR

06 BARTHELEMY, Thomas Franklin 402, 403
06 BEGGS, Frank 193, 195, 197, 198
BELANOVSKIY, Victor (KGB cryptonym "STROYEV") 110, 116
BELITSKIY, Boris Yefimovich 106, 268, 280, 282-287, 291
317, 331, 332, 337
"BELKIN" (KGB cryptonym for Boris BELITSKIY) 282
BELOGLAZOV, Viktor 159, 221, 222, 225, 246
BELOV, Ivan Andreyevich 391
06 BENSON, John S. 87, 93-96, 98
06 BENYAMINOV, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich 50, 363
06 BERMAN, Harold 403
06 BIENSTOCK, Natalie 273, 274
06 BINDER, Peter 203, 204, 234, 403-405
06 BIRSE, Arthur 104, 114, 122, 123, 125, 126, 144
BIRYUKOV, Vadim Osipovich 427, 428
BLAKE, George 30, 102, 148, 149, 247, 263, 327, 331
BOBKOV, Filip Denisovich 269
06 BOLSHAKOV, Georgiy Nikitovich (GRU) 398
BORODIN, Nikolay Mikhaylovich (aka Norman M. BORODIN)
35, 94, 95
BORISOV, Ivan Dmitriyevich 411
BORISOV, Petr Pavlovich 377
[redacted]
BOWDEN, Lewis W. 139, 141, 142, 242, 314
06 BRADLEY, Jerome G. 178
06 BRAUNS, Horst 268, 288-291
06 BROCHES, Adam 405, 406
06 BROCHES, Alexander 405
06 BROCHES, Ignacy 406
06 BRODNEY, Kenneth 80 08
BROWN, G. Stanley 202, 226, 227, 244
BUBNOV, Oleg Sergeyevich 32
BUDYLDIN, Valeriy 83, 84
06 BUHLE, Johannes 402
06 BUNDARIN, Eugene Peter 406, 407
06 BURGI, Richard 99, 110, 113, 115-120, 144, 344, 346
BUTENKO, John W. 298, 368
06 CARDELLA, James 87, 97
CECCHI, Pietro 194, 198, 199, 200, 208
CHELNOKOV, Col. Vladimir Dmitriyevich 18, 29, 139, 140,
142, 259, 276, 292, 305, 346
CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr Nikolayevich 76, 264, 309-313, 319,
322, 326, 381, 411, 412
06 CHERNYAVSKIY, Viktor Petrovich 387, 390, 395
06 CHERNYSHEVA, fnu (Eddy GILMORE's sister-in-law) 77
06 CHRISTNER, Robert Charles 407
06 CHUCHUKIN, Vladimir Aleksandrovich 370, 372
CHURANOV, Vladimir Aleksandrovich 30-31, 97

0001669

TS No. 197124

Copy

241BR

DANKO, Yevgeniya "Jane" 109
06 DAY, Frank 201, 202
DEMKIN, Vladimir (mnu) 159, 161, 182, 194, 203, 222, 246, 406
DERA, Vitaliy Grigoryevich 272, 273, 406
DEREVENSKOV, Gennadiy Georgiyevich 370
DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich (KGB defector 1954) 17, 61, 277, 380, 381, 396
DITYATEV, Dmitriy Alekseyevich 427
"DMITRIYEV" 84
DMITRIYEV, Aleksandr Anatolyevich 107, 108, 249
DMITRIYEV, Sergey Georgiyevich 228
DRANOV, Vasiliy (mnu) 221, 222
06 DREW, George 127, 130, 131, 347
06 DRIBERG, Tom 106, 112
DUBAS, Konstantin Nikitovich 124, 125, 127, 129, 130, 133, 152, 153, 304-306
DUMKOV, Gen. (Bulg. MVR) 257
DVORKIN, Yuriy Mikhaylovich 294
06 DWELLY, Robert 202, 203
"EDVIN" (KGB cryptonym for 06 Gerald SEVERN) 426
EL SHAZLY, Mohammed Sarwat 194, 198, 199
06 EPISON, Henry (See Henry APISSON)
[redacted]
06 FAIN, Thomas 407, 408
06 FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. 392, 393
FEDOROVA, Dora 92, 93
FEDOROVICH, Tatyana 208, 214, 215, 216
FEDOSEYEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich 159, 229, 237, 239, 259, 307, 313, 406
FEDYANIN, Vladimir Petrovich 158
FEKLISOV, Aleksandr Semenovich 117, 119, 314
06 FELCHLIN, Howard L. 87, 90-93
FILATOV, Vladimir Gerasimovich 279, 294
06 FINK, David 408, 409
06 FISK, Norman 145, 409
FOFANOV, Fedor (mnu) 25, 27
FOMIN (alias of A. FEKLISOV) 314, 368
06 FREERS, Edward L. 227, 230, 231, 238
06 FRIPPEL, Arsene 103, 127, 137-144, 249, 265, 266, 347
06 FRIPPEL, Odette (Mrs. Arsene FRIPPEL) 139
FUNKHAUSER, Richard 243
06 GABELKO, Sergey Stepanovich 376
06 GAFFEY, Joseph 203, 204
GAMKRELIDZE, Revas Valeryanovich 386, 387
GARBLER, Paul 246-248
06 GARLAND, John 189-192, 199, 254
GARST, Roswell 109
GAVRICHEV, Sergey Ivanovich 279, 318

GAVRILENKO, Nikolay Aleksandrovich 159, 211, 222
GAZARYAN, Oganes 400
06 GEHRCKENS, Hans 113, 121, 144
06 GILMORE, Eddy 76, 77, 78, 79, 80
06 GINSBERG, Michael 145, 409, 410
GLAZUNOV, Ilya Sergeyevich 158
06 GLEYSTEEN, Culver 227, 230
06 GOLD, Harry 293
GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich 17-19, 30, 38, 39, 62, 76, 162, 163, 166, 168, 169, 176, 189, 191, 192, 232, 235, 266, 273, 283, 290, 330, 364, 376, 380, 381, 383, 396, 403, 405, 407, 431
06 GOLOS, Jacob 293
GOLOVKO, Admiral Arseniy Grigoryevich 53
GOLUBEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich 277, 384, 385
GORBACHEVA, Klara Konstantinovna 137
"GRAY" 392
GRIBANOV, General Oleg Mikhaylovich 15, 20, 37, 38, 115, 117, 127, 144, 146, 153, 154, 159, 166, 167, 168, 170, 172, 194, 235, 237, 239, 257, 259, 260, 275, 276, 291, 298-302, 304, 307, 311, 315-317, 321, 331, 335-337, 346-349, 352, 360, 367, 368, 384, 385, 387-392, 394
"GRIGORIY" (KGB cryptonym for Aleksey YEFREMOV) 156
GRINEVSKIY, Oleg Alekseyevich 279
GRISHNYAT, Tatyana (mnu) 32, 226
GROMAKOVA, Ludmila 89, 209, 211, 220
GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy (mnu) 159
06 GROVER, Preston 410
GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy Ivanovich 155, 156, 159, 160-163, 168-170, 182, 185, 186, 193, 194, 202, 204, 217, 223, 225, 226, 229, 235, 239, 259, 267, 298, 300, 382, 413, 415
GUK, Yuriy Ivanovich 62, 280, 281, 311, 318, 383, 384, 387
GUSKOV, Sergey Mikhaylovich 119, 130
HAMAN, Arthur 432
06 HAMZAVI, Charles P. 411
"Hanna", lnu 194
HARMSTONE, Richard 314, 315, 411, 412 08
06 HARRIS, Gisella 127, 128, 144
HAYHANEN, Reino (KGB defector 1957) 34
06 HOFFMAN, F. Stephen 402, 413
06 HOFFMAN, Col. Theodore F. 180, 234
HORBALY, William 226, 227, 243, 244
06 HOUGHTON, Captain J. C. 227
06 HOWARD, Herbert 413, 414
06 HURLEY, William S. 164, 165
06 HUSTON, Hayden Henry 414
[redacted]

0001671

TS No. 197124

Copy

16/8R

ILYIN, Sergey Aleksandrovich 25
ISAKOV, Viktor Fedorovich 366
IVANOV, fnu 108
06 IVANOV, Boris Semenovich 46, 50, 324, 362, 363, 366, 369, 370, 374, 386
IVANOV, Igor Aleksandrovich 298
IVANOV, Vladimir Maksimovich 428
IVANOV, Vladimir Vladimirovich 130
IVANOVA, Svetlana N. 194, 196, 198, 199, 203, 204
IVASHUTIN, Petr Ivanovich 347
JACKSON, Henry H. 426
JACOB, Richard C. 404
06 JAFFE, Sam 415
06 JELISAVCIC, Michael 109
06 JENNER, Paul 164, 185-190, 192
JOHNSON, Hedwig (Mrs. Robert Lee JOHNSON) 23, 28
JOHNSON, Robert Lee 22, 24-27, 349, 380
06 JOHNSON, Wallace Everett 112, 220, 260, 267-272, 290, 291, 349
06 JONES, William Carroll, III 272, 273
06 KADERA, Fred 203
KALNINSH, Khariy Yanovich 385
KALOSHIN, Colonel (RU) (fnu) 51-53, 56, 59
06 KALUGIN, Oleg Daniilovich 372, 373
"KAMO" 209
KANTOR, Marvin (or Melvin) 145, 415, 416
KARETNIKOV, Venyamin Zasimovich (or Venedikt Vasilyevich) 25, 27
06 KARLOV, fnu 113, 145
06 KASISCHKE, Richard 79
06 KAZAN-KOMAREK, Vladimir Joseph 416, 417
06 KEYSERS, James G. 157, 165, 178-181, 234, 236, 258
06 KHAMZAI, Charles (See Charles P. HAMZAVI)
KHODAKOVSKIY, fnu 117
KHOKHLOV, Nikolay (KGB defector 1954) 76
KHRENOV, Nikolay (mnu) 83, 84
KILLHAM, Edward A. 314
06 KIPTENKO, Vadim A. 374
KISLITSYN, Filip Vasilyevich 84
KISLOV, Aleksandr Konstantinovich 279, 280, 284, 415
KISLOV, Slava (alias of and see V.A. KUSKOV) 415
06 KLOSSON, Boris 241
KLYPIN, Vladimir Alekseyevich 153, 154, 159, 161, 186, 206, 209, 222, 226, 227, 237, 255, 428
KOBULOV, General Bogdan Zakharovich 49,51, 55, 57, 62, 64-66, 7
06 KOLOBASHKIN, Aleksey Mikhaylovich 380
KOLOSOV, (alias of V.V. KOSOLAPOV)
KOLOSSOV, Viktor Dmitriyevich (alias of V. V. KOSOLAPOV) 187, 192

16/SR

06 KOMAREK (See KAZAN-KOMAREK)
KOMAROV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich (alias of V.M. KOVSHUK) 33, 412
KONSTANTINOV, Ivan Alekseyevich 108, 109
KOPEYKIN, Viktor 418
KOROLEV, Yuriy Dmitriyevich 396, 397
KORNIENKO, Georgiy Markovich 366
"KOSHIKIN" 110
KOSIENKO, Yelena S. (KGB cryptonym "AGLODINA") 79
KOSOLAPOV, Vadim Viktorovich 155, 156, 159, 160-163, 182, 185-196, 199-204, 206, 223, 235, 254, 261, 435
KOSTYRYA, Vladimir Viktorovich 141
06 KOTEN, Bernard 295, 296, 326, 421
[redacted]
KOVALENKO, Anatoliy Grigoryevich 273, 298-300, 302, 305, 317, 323, 346
KOVALEV, Feliks 366
KOVSHUK, Vladislav Mikhaylovich 33-36, 78, 94, 95, 153-159, 161, 163, 167, 168, 172, 174-177, 186, 195, 206, 209, 217, 222, 223, 226-229, 242, 244, 245, 250, 259-261, 290, 412, 422, 428
KOZHEVNIKOVA, Lyudmila Yulianovna 55, 57
KOZLOV, Anatoliy Sergeyevich 117-120, 255, 257
KOZLOV, Veniamin Alekseyevich 76-79, 216, 218
06 KRAFT, Virgil 127, 129, 130
06 KROTKOV, Yuriy Vasilyevich 372
KRUPNOV, Kim Georgiyevich 273, 289, 290, 301, 303-305, 419, 432
"KRYMOVA" (See Marina RYTOVA)
KUKOLEV, Dmitriy 86, 87
06 KULEBYAKIN, Nikolay Panteleymonovich 370, 374, 379, 394, 398
KUNGAROVA, Tamara 107, 112, 418, 419 06 430, 431
KURILENKO, Ivan Yakovlevich 159, 222
06 KUROCHKIN, fnu 372
KUSKOV, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich 153, 311, 314, 415, 422
KUZMIN, Nikolay Yakovlevich 226, 228
KUZNETSOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich 252
06 LAINE, V.A. 402, 403
06 LANE, Sir Allen 104, 114, 122, 125, 144
LANGELLE, Russell 153, 205, 207, 210, 213, 214, 241, 260, 314, 315
LARIONOVA, Alla 97, 98
"LEBEDEV" (See Vladimir MUROMTSEV)
06 LEBEDEV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich 362
LEBEDEV, Lev Aleksandrovich 25, 27, 94
LEONOV, Mikhail A. 418
LEONTIYEV, Yuriy (mnu) 84
LEVINA, Maya (mnu) 249, 250
LEVINE, Irving R. 106, 112

0001673

1015R

"Lillian" 183, 184
LITTELL, Wallace L. 314
LOPUKHOV, Yuriy Aleksandrovich 116
"LUCH" 110
06 LUKAS (See LUKIS)
06 LUKIS, fnu 127, 131
06 LUKYANOV, Pavel Pavlovich 368
06 LUNT, Horace G. 254, 256-258
LYALIN, fnu 276
06 LYSOV, Yuriy Vasilyevich 362, 375
06 MAHONEY, Eugene 219, 245, 246
[redacted]
MAKASHEV, Boris Dmitriyevich 311
06 MALIA, Martin 113-115
MALYUGIN, Aleksandr Stepanovich 153, 160, 161
06 MANHOFF, Martin J. 91
06 MARK, David 241, 276, 286
06 MARTIN, Captain Donald C. 178
MARTIN, William Hamilton 239
06 MASON, Major Anthony 227
06 MATLAW (also MATLO), Ralph 113, 145, 417
06 MATLO (See MATLAW)
MATVEYEV, Mikhail Georgiyevich 216, 217
MAYOROV, Igor Sergeyevich 278
06 McGOWAN, Edward 148
06 McGUIRE, Robert Alan 147, 148
06 McKINNEY, Walter A. 91, 92
McMILLAN, James H. 238
06 McSWEENEY, John M. 238
McVICKAR, John 311
06 MEARNS, Fillmore K. 85, 87, 88, 89
MEDVEDEV, Viktor Sergeyevich 383, 384
06 MERTENS, Gerard 127, 133, 134, 347
MICHAUD, Marcel (alias of N.S. SKVORTSOV) 167, 173, 198
06 MICKELSON, Earl L. 85, 87, 88, 89
MIKHAYLOV, Aleksey Mikhaylovich 241
MIKHAYLOV, Valentin Matveyevich 422, 424, 426
MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen 23, 28
MISHUTIN, fnu 302
MITCHELL, Bernon 239
MONTGOMERY, Hugh 404
06 MORELL, William N., Jr. 159, 245, 248, 260, 261
MORELLI, Galya 404, 405
06 MORONE, Joseph 173, 174, 183, 193-199, 254, 337
06 MULE, Walter 87, 94-96, 98-100
MUROMTSEV, Vladimir (mnu) 105
MYARIMYAYE, fnu 125

[redacted]

NEVEROVA, Marina [illegible]
06 NIELSEN, Melvin
06 NIELSEN, Phi[illegible] [illegible]
NIKOLAYEV (alias [illegible] 252
NIKOLAYEV, Yuriy [illegible] (alias used by NOSENKO) 122, 125, [illegible]
NIKOLOV, Georgiy [illegible] used by NOSENKO) 271
NIXON, Dmitriy, [illegible]
NOSENKO, Ivan [illegible]
NOSKOV, Yevgeniy [illegible] 293, 299, 301, 421, 432
NOVIKOVA, fnu [illegible]
OHANNES, Gazarian [illegible]
"OKSANA" (See [illegible]
06 OMELICH, Paul [illegible]
OSWALD, Lee Harvey [illegible] 303-309, 326
OSWALD, Marina [illegible]
06 ORCHARD, Theodore [illegible]
"OZERO" (See [illegible]
PANKRATOV, Pavel [illegible]
PAQUES, Georges [illegible]
06 PAVLOV, Gleb A[illegible]
06 PECHTER, Bernard [illegible]
PENKOVSKIY, Col. [illegible] 205, 208, 217, 219, 245, 369
PERELETOV, Boris [illegible]
PERFILYEV, Nikolay [illegible]
06 PERFILYEV, Yuriy [illegible], 379
PETERSON, George [illegible]) 134
PETRENKO, Vladimir [illegible], 119
PETROV, Evdokia [illegible] 61
PETROV, Vladimir [illegible]
PETROV, Vladimir [illegible] defector 1954) 17, 61, 84, 123, [illegible]
PETROVA, Nina S. [illegible]
PETUKHOV, Ivan [illegible]
POCHANKIN, Vitaliy [illegible] 383, 384
POPOV, Col. (GRU) [illegible] 207, 244
POPTSOV, Petr [illegible]
06 PREISFREUND, Johann [illegible] cryptonym "PROKHOR") 160, 161, [illegible]
PREOBRAZHENSKIY, [illegible]
06 PRESSMAN, Aron [illegible], 421
06 PROCTOR, Vernon [illegible]
"PROKHOR" (KGB [illegible] PREISFREUND) 156, 160
06
"RAKETA" [illegible]
RAMSEY, James A. [illegible]
KASHCHEPOV, Yevgeniy [illegible], 300

11/BR

06 RASK, Walter 421, 422
RASTVOROV, Yuriy (KGB defector [illegible]) 17, 61, 277, 396
RASTYKAITE, fnu 117, 119
06 REITZ, James T. 227
RESHETNYAK, Nikolay Timofeyevich [illegible], 388
RHODES, Roy 33-37, 98, 94, [illegible]
06 RICHARDS, Ira. B. 85, 87, [illegible]
06 ROBERTS, Spencer 141, 142, [illegible]
ROGOV, Nikolay (mnu) 105, [illegible]
06 ROSS, Johanna 423
06 RUFE, John 145, 380, 423, [illegible]
RYTOVA, Marina L'vovna 108, 109, 249, 268
06 SACHANEN, Felix 277
06 SAGATELYAN, Mikhail Rachyanovich [illegible]
06 SALISBURY, Harrison 76-78, 80
"SARDAR" (KGB cryptonym for Farik WEISS) 06 156, 160
SARWAT EL SHAZLY (See Mohammed Sarwat EL SHAZLY)
06 SCHWARZENBACH, Collette 424, 425
[redacted]

06 SENIO, Walter P. 227
06 SEREBRENNIKOV, Eugene Sergey 425, 426
06 SEREBRYANKOVA, fnu 77
"SERGEY" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown) 79, 80
"SERGEY" (KGB cryptonym for Francis STEVENS) 06
SERGEYEV or Col. SERGEYEV (alias used by NOSENKO) 123, 130-133
SERGEYEV, Ivan Yefimovich 184
SERGEYEV, Victor I. 424

06 "SERVIZNIY" (KGB cryptonym for Vladislav VOROBYEV) 84, 86
SEVASTYANOV, Gennadiy (See Gerald SEVERN)
06 SEVERN, Gerald 145, 426
SHAKHOV, Pavel Fedorovich 265, 276-278, 291, 317, 331, 332, 398
SHALYAPIN, Mikhail Aleksandrovich 28
[redacted]
06 SHAPIRO, Henry 76-80, 396, 424, 425
06 SHATTAUER, Sofia 145, 427
SHCHERBAK, Maj. Gen. Fedor Alekseyevich 389
06 SHUBIN, John Andrew 296, 297, 326, 349
SHUBNYAKOV, Fedor Grigoryevich 65
SHULGINA, Nataliya 106, 112
SHUSTOV, Vladimir Viktorovich 364
"SHMELEV" (KGB cryptonym for A.I. VOLKOV) 156
SHNYRYEV, Nikolay (mnu) 86, 87, 92
"SHVEDOVA" (KGB cryptonym for Mariya NEVEROVA) 85, 89, 141
"SIBIRYAK" 110
SIEGAL, Jack (alias of N.M. BORODIN) 95
SISCOE, Frank 94
06

SITNIKOV, Mikhail G. 276
SKVORTSOV, Nikolay Semenovich 135, 167, 170, 172-174, 198, 199
06 SLESINGER, Alfred Lazarevich 293-295, 326
SMIRNOV (alias used by NOSENKO) 123
SMITH, Dayle W. (See "ANDREY") 33, 36, 98, 99, 238, 239, 260, 287
SMITH, Edward Ellis 37-39, 99, 336
SMITH, John Discoe 239
06 SMITH, Paul 249
SNYDER, Richard 311, 314
SOBOROVA, Larissa 104, 105, 122
06 SOCHUREK, Howard 427, 428
SOKOLOV, Gen. (GRU) Vsevolod Sergeyevich 297
06 SOKOLOW, Sonya 293
"SOLISTKA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown) 185-187, 189
SOLOMATIN, Boris Aleksandrovich 422
06 SPRECHER, George Herman 377, 378
06 STEIGER, Andrew J. 76
06 STEVENS, Edmund 76, 158
06 STEVENS, Francis 245, 428, 429
06 STORSBERG, James 157, 161, 164, 165, 166-179, 194, 198, 199, 201, 234, 238, 250, 260, 266
06 STROUD, William R. 87, 93-96, 98
"STROYEV" (KGB cryptonym for Victor BELANOVSKIY)
SUMIN, Aleksey Konstantinovich 215
06 SUNDAR, Egil 113, 123, 124
06 SUTTON, Horace 104, 105
06 SVENCHANSKIY, Alexander 292, 293, 295, 326
SVIRIN, Vasiliy Grigoryevich 392
SYCHEV, Aleksandr Anfimovich 390
TARABRIN, Yevgeniy Anatolyevich 131, 132, 391, 394
06 TARASKA, William 145, 429, 430
06 TAYLOR, David 127, 132, 133, 144
TELEGINA, Augustina Konstantinova 48, 52, 55
06 TITOV, Col. Viktor Nikolayevich 362, 381
06 THOMPSON, John M. 107, 381, 430, 431
"TOMO" (KGB cryptonym for Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV)
TORMOZOV, Anatoliy 79
06 TORREY, Carmen 431
"TRAPEZUND" (KGB cryptonym for Oganes GAZARYAN) 400
TSYMBAL, Mikhail Stepanovich 278, 280, 281, 318
TULAYEV, Vladimir Yevgenyevich 373
TURALIN, Mikhail Ilich 305
06 TWAROG, Leon 432
UMANETS, Ella 159, 183, 184, 198
06 URBAN, Peter 180, 227
06 VAN KRAKOW, Hugo 400, 401
06 VAN LAETHEM, George 97, 98

0001677

VARLAMOVA, Inga 159, 167, 169
VASSALL, William John C. 18, 23, 24, 30, 31, 110, 149
VERENIKIN, Aleksandr Ivanovich 121
VETLITSKIY, Arseniy Aleksandrovich 133, 297
VLADIMIROV, Vladimir Viktorovich (alias of V.V. KOSTYRYA) 141, 362-364, 369
VLASOV, Gennadiy N. 380
VLASOV, Ivan Pavlovich 372
VOLKOV, Anatoliy Ivanovich 110-113, 127, 130-136, 202, 248, 256, 267-271, 407, 409, 417
06 VOLKOV, Vasiliy Andreyevich 433
"VOLODINA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown) 80, 85
Volodya, lnu 89, 90
"VOLODYA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown) 202
Volodya, lnu (unidentified KGB officer) 197
06 VOLSKIY, Boris 433, 434
VOROBYEV, Vladislav (KGB cryptonym "SERVIZNIY") 86, 87
06 WALLACE, William 434
06 WASHENKO, Steven 242-244
WATKINS, J. B. 110, 149
06 WEISS, Samih (KGB cryptonym "SARDAR") 160, 161, 181-184, 250, 267
06 WHITNEY, Thomas 76-80
06 WILBY, William Stanley 127, 131, 132
06 WILLERFORD, Frederick 127, 136, 144
06 WILSON, Charles 227
06 WINDSOR, David M. 227
WINTERS, George P. 139, 142, 158, 244, 260, 314, 315, 412
06 YAZHINSKAYA, fnu 169
06 YEAGER, F.J. 91
YEFREMOV, Aleksey (mnu) 110-113, 127, 130-136, 202, 248, 256, 267-270, 272, 409, 417
YEFREMOV, Leonid Ivanovich 301, 302
YEGOROV, Mikhail (mnu) 255, 257
YEGOROV, Sergey Ivanovich 254
YEREMEYEVA, Nina Ivanovna 383
06 YERMAK, Yevgeniy Ivanovich 372
06 YOUNGER, Ralph and Evelyn 435
"Yuliya", lnu 188
"Yura", lnu 188
ZARUBIN, Vasiliy Mikhaylovich 405
ZAYTSEV, fnu 419
06 ZAYTSEV, Valentin Aleksandrovich 363, 364
ZEMSKOV, Nikolay 237
ZHARIKOV, Nikolay Timofeyevich 317
06 ZIRING, Stanley 435
06 ZUBON, William J. 267
06 ZUJUS, Matas 184
06 ZUJUS, Matthew P. 161, 164, 178, 181-184, 238, 250, 267
06 ZWANG, Maurice 200

File

CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL USE ONLY

HSCA

25. (Confidential - MMP) LIAISON Called Herb Romerstein, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staff, to set up an appointment (Tuesday, 16 May at 1400 hours) to meet with Dave Millbank and Ed Mickolus, ORPA/International Issues, on the subject of terrorism and the Fourth International. This was set up via Pat Taylor, NFAC/CSS. The meeting will take place in 3F30.

Herb indicated that the Committee would probably hold hearings on terrorism in late May or early June and said that they would like to start off with an open session. I told him that an open session for CIA on the subject of terrorism would probably cause us some difficulty and suggested the possibility of an open statement, followed by a closed session as a middle ground.

26. (Confidential - MMP) LIAISON Called Alan Brown, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staff, to discuss the issue of providing the Committee with codeword cover sheets and the removal of the safe and am waiting for Alan to call me back with regard to whether or not the Committee wishes to be included in the USG number control system which the Office of Security manages.

27. (Unclassified - MMP) LIAISON Called Joyce Early, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staff, to ask what the House recess schedule will be and was told that the House would be in recess from 1-9 July (Independence recess); from 18 August to 5 September (summer recess); and that 6 September would be the end of the session.

✓ 28. (Confidential - MMP) LIAISON Called Loch Johnson, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staff, to respond to his question on what the impediment to CIA's destruction of files (mostly CI files on U.S. citizens) was. I told him that the House Select Committee on Assassinations had strongly urged us not to.

29. (Confidential - MMP) LIAISON Called the office of Joe DiGeorgio, GAO, International Division, to tell him that the six intelligence reports that his people had requested from the Buenos Aires Station would be made available to his regional office in Panama, with one possible exception.

16-29

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL USE ONLY

2/846

V/N

SECRET

AMBIDDY-1

15 June 1964

SYNOPSIS

Per his request, 2nd Lt. Oliverio Antonio TOMEU Vasallo was recontacted on 8 June 64 at his place of residence. He provided additional details on Carlos and Ana Gloria de VARONA, and identified Osiel GONZALEZ and one "COCO" as possible leads to Jose LLANUZA Gobel.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

15 June 1964

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Recontact of Oliverio A. TOMEU Vasallo. (201-283206)

1. At 1730 hours, 8 June 64, the undersigned was advised at his residence that a Mr. TOMEU (Subject) had called the security number given him (351-8161) and left the message that he would like to talk again with Paul Stroud (the undersigned) anytime after 1800 hours, 8 June.

2. Upon arriving at TOMEU's apartment (Apt. 303, 1028 Wahler Place SE, High Point Apartment House, Washington, D. C.), 1830 hours, 8 June, TOMEU indicated to his two daughters he would like to have some privacy and they and his wife, Caridad, left the apartment.

3. TOMEU apologized for not having recalled the name "de VARONA" as that of Ana Gloria de VARONA. He reiterated that, while in hiding to escape capture by the Cuban Government subsequent to his infiltration, he knew only the first names of the persons with whom he came in contact, but then added he knew Ana Gloria de VARONA, in whose house he was hiding, because she was the sister of Carlos de VARONA, one of his infiltration team members. (This Carlos de VARONA may be identical with one Carlos Manuel de VARONA Segura, 201-289985; or one Carlos Arturo VARONA Arjona, 201-283208.)

4. On several occasions, according to TOMEU, he was seated at the table in Ana's house with several other people. One of these individuals, known to TOMEU only as "COCO," was described as the secretary to Jose LLANUZA Gobel. There was not, however, any discussions in which TOMEU recalls LLANUZA or his political sympathies having been discussed. According to TOMEU's recollection it was "COCO" who was associated with LLANUZA, and he was not aware of any relationship between Ana and LLANUZA. Although TOMEU had no information as to what finally happened to Carlos de VARONA, his infiltration team mate, he suggested that if Carlos or Ana were available they may be able to identify "COCO" and provide data on his accessability for contact.

5. One Caiol GONZALES, former Chief of the Havana Fire Department, was identified by TOMEU as another possible lead

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

who would know LLANUZA. TOMEU affirmed Osiel was previously with MENOYO Gutierrez in the Second Front of Escambray. Osiel was under asylum in the Brazilian Embassy (sic, Argentine Embassy?), when TOMEU gained political asylum. When Osiel finally received his safe conduct from the Embassy, he went to Puerto Rico and, TOMEU postulates that Osiel is now again with MENOYO in either the United States or Puerto Rico.

6. Two snap shots (to be returned) were provided by TOMEU of himself and six other individuals who were in asylum at the same time. He identified these, in the photograph in which Monsignor Eduardo BOZA Masvidal is seated, as, from left to right: Manuel VILLAMANAN, Oliverio TOMEU, Nils DIAZ (believed to be in US), Publio RUIZ (US), Jorge Del VALLE (Mex?), and Osiel GONZALEZ (US or Puerto Rico?).

7. Upon completing the debriefing, Stroud and TOMEU "exchanged small talk" for a while until TOMEU finally stated that he still wished there was something more he could do to help free Cuba, and asked "What do you think I should do?" Stroud replied that no person could really make that type of decision for another individual, and countered by asking TOMEU what alternatives he had in mind, other than remaining in the US Army as a career military officer.

8. TOMEU replied that, of course, he was once an agriculturalist, but that there were few job opportunities in which he could apply his past experience. His sister had also asked him if he felt he and his family would want to live with her in Spain or Mexico, but he didn't think too much of this idea. He then stated that he had been asked by Manuel ARTIME to take a job as an instructor. Without indicating any association of even awareness of ARTIME's activities, or of ARTIME's contact with TOMEU (as indicated in TOMEU's 201), TOMEU was asked what he thought of ARTIME's proposition. TOMEU stated that he would no longer follow any man as an individual or as a leader, because a man's ideals, outlook, and objectives change with time. For example, the people of Cuba followed Fidel because of the ideals he advocated. When Fidel took over, his accomplishments gradually became quite different from the ideals he had espoused. TOMEU continued by saying he would "no longer follow a man. One could only trust his ideals or an organization which followed those ideals, since a good organization would be less likely of being controlled by a single man." When asked for an example of the type of organization he had in mind, TOMEU replied he was most favorably inclined towards the ideals and goals of the JURE. (The JURE or JRC is an organization created by Manolo RAY Rivero around a nucleus of former 26 July Movement leaders. See memo and attachment dated 23 July 1963 from John Hugh Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, ARA, Department of State in TOMEU's 201-283206.)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

9. It should, perhaps, be noted here that in an informal exchange with Mrs. Donald WEBSTER, TOMEU's supervisor at the Defense Language Institute, Anacostia Naval Annex, 4 June 64, Mrs. WEBSTER volunteered the information that "all of the other 'Brigade students here' have told me they think very highly of TOMEU, and that he is a very brave man, because he and his family were very wealthy in Cuba and he gave it all up to go into exile and fight the Castro Regime."

WH/SA/SO/HS
C. PAUL PLUMB, JR.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

109709

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: [illegible]

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT

ESTABLISHED FOR: [illegible]

ATTN: Mr. Filer

FILE NO.: [illegible]

REF: Pre-employment Cover Briefing

ID CARD NO.: [illegible]

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army (Research Translation Group) 32

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE 6 January 1964

☒ NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin

JHF/[illegible] CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HHH

7-71 MFG 2/76

Fiche 11,696

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 25 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 46 - 4 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/LA 8

ACTION #

INFO RF . FILE . VR . C/IP/DMS DCI (FALK) CS/RF

DDO 3 C/PCS/INT C/PCS/LSN C/CI 4 C/CCS OGC 2

OLC DPA D/SECUR 3 D/COMMO 5 CWO 2 C/EA 3 C/EPS/EG 2 ADDO/D

1 2 SA 6 5 OSSD 6

T 651930 EIA932 PAGE 01 C/SA/IC C/SA IN 206462

TOR: 041930Z MAR 77 C/PCS/SSU 21-17 [CARA] 32414

S E C R E T 041555Z MAR 77 STAFF

CITE 16-17 [CARACAS] 32414

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT

REF: 16-17 [CARACAS] 32384 (IN 203537)

1. ON 3 MARCH CHARGE (DCM) TALKED "INFORMALLY" TO FOREIGN MINISTER ESCOVAR SALOM, INFORMATION MINISTER DIEGO ARRIA, AND PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT AND UNOFFICIAL PRESS ADVISOR EUGENIO SOLER. TO ALL THREE CHARGE MADE SAME TWO BASIC POINTS WITH THOUGHT THESE WOULD BE RELAYED TO PRESIDENT PEREZ: (1) VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT HAD MISREAD NEW YORK TIMES STORY; HAD ATTRIBUTED TO DAVID PHILLIPS STATEMENTS APPARENTLY MADE BY OTHERS; HAD OVER-REACTED TO WHAT SEEMED TO BE AN EFFORT ON PHILLIPS' PART TO BE HELPFUL; AND (2) THE USG WAS STANDING PAT ON THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. NO ONE ELSE WAS SPEAKING, COULD OR WOULD SPEAK FURTHER FOR THE USG ON THIS SUBJECT. AS FAR AS THE U.S. WAS CONCERNED, ISSUE WAS CLOSED AND WE HOPED GOV WOULD SEE IT THE SAME WAY.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2. DURING 3 AND EARLY 4 MARCH IT APPEARS THAT THE CHARGE'S EFFORTS AND TRADITIONALLY SHORT LATIN AMERICAN ATTENTION SPAN HAVE COMBINED TO GREATLY EASE CRISIS SITUATION OF LAST WEEK, AT

S E C R E T

3/PV

14-00000

7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF . FILE . VR .

ACTION #

T 651930 EIA932 PAGE 02 IN 206462

21-17

TOR:041930Z MAR 77 [CARA] 32414

LEAST AS FAR AS GOV IS CONCERNED. CAP AND GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN HAVE ALL STATED THAT INCIDENT HAS ENDED AND ARE NOW TRYING TO DIVERT ATTENTION TO OTHER SUBJECTS. MEDIA COVERAGE IS RETURNING TO NORMAL WITH STORIES OUT OF HEADLINES AND BACK ON PAGE SIX OR EIGHT, SUPERSEDED BY NIEHOUS CASE, UGANDAN SITUATION, OPEC PRICE HIKE, ETC. UNFORTUNATELY, EVERY VENEZUELAN WEEKLY MAGAZINE HAS LONG ARTICLE (S) ON CIA WHICH ARE, OF COURSE, DEFAMATORY, AND TEND TO WHIP UP PUBLIC ANTIPATHY TOWARDS AGENCY. THEN TOO, THERE IS STILL MATTER OF DEMONSTRATION AGAINST CIA WHICH TWO DAYS AGO CAP SEEMED TO BE INSTIGATING IN TWO MEETINGS WITH JOSE VICENTE RANGEL AND POMPEYO MARQUEZ OF MAS AND JESUS FARIA OF THE PCV. NEVERTHELESS, ON THE WHOLE, THEINTEREST IN THIS ISSUE SEEMS TO BE DROPPING OFF AND DYING OUT RATHER RAPIDLY.

24

3. LIAISONS WITH DIM AND DISIP CONTINUE AS BEFORE- IF ANYTHING, ODDLY WE ARE GETTING A LITTLE MORE OUT OF THESE ASSOCIATIONS THAN BEFORE THE FLAP. AMBASSADOR'S INSTRUCTIONS ON LIAISON BEFORE HE LEFT ON CONSULTATION VISIT WERE "BUSINESS AS USUAL ~~SUAUAL~~ AND LET THEM MAKE FIRST BREAK IF THEY WANT TO". IT WAS AMBASSADOR'S OPINION THAT WHILE CAP WAS BLASTING CIA PUBLICLY HE

2/PV

7-71-MFG 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF . FILE . VR .

ACTION #

T 651930 EIA932 PAGE 03 IN 206462

TOR:041930Z MAR 77 21-17 [CARA] 32414

24
[WOULD NOT WANT TO SEVER ALL TIES]: ALTHOUGH AMBASSADOR, STILL SOMETHING OF A POLLYANNA AT SUCH TIMES, SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATED CAP'S INTENTION TO 24 [PNG TWO OF US] AN ACTION WHICH CAME WITHIN ONE HOUR OF OCCURING. ANYWAY, THROUGOUT ALL OF THIS 24 [BOTH DIM AND DISIP] HAVE CONTINUED THEIR CONTACTS AND HAVE TRIED TO BE AS FRIENDLY AND UNDERSTANDING, PERHAPS EVEN 24 [COVERTLY] HELPFUL, AS SITUATION WOULD ALLOW. TYPICAL OF 24 [LIAISON] ATTITUDE IS [DIM, COLONEL 06 CATALAN'S] CONVERSATION WITH CRYMM DURING PEAK OF CRISIS HAVING DISCUSSED A VARIETY OF TOPICS OF 24 [COMMON OPS] INTEREST, 06 [CATALAN] ASKED CRYMM, "WELL OTHERWISE, HOW ARE THINGS GOING?" CRYMM REPLIED, " YOU WHOULD KNOW THE ANSWER TO THAT", TO WHICH 06 [CATALAN] SAID, SOMEWHAT GLUMLY, " YET, I SUPPOSE SO".

4. WE SHOULD NOT FOOL OURSELVES IN THINKING THAT THE WORLD HERE IS NOT DIFFERENT, HOWEVER. WKSCARLET-9 COVERTLY REPORTED THAT DISIP HAS DEFINITELY TAPPED AT LEAST COS'S HOME PHONE, LIAISON OFFICER'S OFFICE LINE, AND TELEPHONES OF EX-COS LABANOW AND JOE MANN, LOCAL NEW YORK TIMES REPRESENTATIVE. CAP HIMSELF INSTRUCTED DISP DIRECTOR TO GO OUT AND GET CIA AND INDICATED TO AMBASSADOR HE WAS HAVING SECURITY SERVICES LOOK INTO CIA CONTACT IN VENEZUELA, PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH JOURNALISTS. TWICE

SECRET 24

1/PN

14-00000

7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	STAFF			
			1		4	
ACTION #			2		5	
			3		6	

T 651930 EIA932 PAGE 04-04 IN 206462

TOR:041930Z MAR 77

21-17
CARA 32414

24

IN LAST COUPLE OF DAYS STATION CASE OFFICERS HAVE ENCOUNTERED WHAT CERTAINLY APPEARED TO BE SURVEILLANCES. WKIDET-3 REPORTS THAT LAST WEEK CUBAN AMBASSADOR HERNANDEZ VISITED CAP AND PROVIDED HIM A LIST OF ALL CIA PERSONNEL AND AGENTS THE CUBANS KNOW TO BE OPERATING IN VENEZUELA. SO, AS CAN BE SEEN BY ALL OF THIS, THE RELATIVELY EASY OPERATING CONDITIONS OF THE RECENT PAST NO LONGER PERTAIN- PERHAPS THEY NEVER WILL AGAIN- AND WHILE WE ARE NOT BECOMING PARANOID NOR WILL WE BE UNDULY SPOOKED, WE HAVE ADJUSTED TO THE NEW AMBIENTE AND ARE NOW BEING MUCH MORE CONSERVATIVE AND CAUTIOUS IN OUR ACTIVITIES THAN BEFORE.

5. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.

2/PN

104-10161-10096 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

30 - 1 SAG DSB

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 2700162

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 798092

CONF: EUR 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, C/4, ICS 2, SECUR 3, OGC 2, COMMO 5, CWO, DDO, DDO/DO, DDA

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: J

15-2 15-15
TO: PRIORITY [MADRID], [LISBON]. Y

02
[MH]SPLASH Y

15-2
REF: [MADRID] 29824 |IN 805199| Y

1. DAVE PHILLIPS REPORTS HIS SON CHRIS IS TRAVELLING IN EUROPE, USING BONN RESIDENCE OF SISTER AS HIS BASE. DAVE HAD TOLD SON OF HIS CORDIAL LAST MEETING WITH [KALBING]03 INSTRUCTED CHRIS TO LET HIM KNOW WHEN CHRIS GETTING READY TO VISIT SPAIN, AT WHICH TIME DAVE WOULD WRITE TO [KALBING]03 TO INTRODUCE CHRIS AND EXPRESS GRATITUDE FOR ANY MODEST HELP [KALBING]03 MIGHT EXTEND TO HIM. BUT CHRIS NEGLECTED TO ADVISE DAVE OF TRAVEL PLANS. NOTE CHRIS BORN 28 DEC 1956. C

2. BELIEVE THIS EXPLAINS REF INCIDENT. NO INDICATION CHRIS PLANS TRY CONTACT ANYONE IN LISBON. Y

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

Reardon

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE: 26 JAN 76
ORIG: CHRIS MAY/KM
UNIT: DDE/PTF/OPS 03
EXT: 1489

C/E/RE [W. Phelps] 03

C/OG [C. Hogg] (PHONE) 03

DC/E/NW

C/E/IB/S

C/E/PTF

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

b/pd

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 6 PER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY (ISSUED)/SLOTTED EUA BY C AT 1255 Z

ACTION UNIT EUA8

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR IP/AN, C14, CCS2, SECUR3, OGC 2, COMMO5, ODO, DDA

1 DAG
2
3 OSB
4
5
6

T 631054 EIA355 PAGE 01 IN 805199

TOR:261252Z JAN 76 MADR 29824

To Reader [illegible] [KALB] [illegible]

S E C R E T 261330Z JAN 76 STAFF

15-2
CITE [MADRID] 29824

15-15
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, [LISBON.]

02
[MH]SPLASH

03
1. MORNING 25 [JAN KALBING] RECEIVED PHONE CALL AT HOME FROM YOUNG MAN WHO SAID HE CHRIS PHILLIPS, SON OF DAVE PHILLIPS. HE SAID HE ON VACATION AND REQUESTED INFO ON WHAT TO SEE AND DO IN MADRID AREA. ALSO ASKED IF POLITICAL SITUATION IN PORTUGAL SUCH THAT TRAVEL THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. [KAL-BING]⁰³ WAS ON WAY TO MEETING AND ASKED THAT HE CALL BACK LATER. HE DID, AND SAID HE TRAVELING TO LISBON THAT NIGHT AND WOULD RETURN MADRID LATER IN WEEK. HE SAID HE DID NOT HAVE ADDRESS IN MADRID AT MOMENT AND WOULD CALL [KALBING]⁰³ AGAIN UPON RETURN TO MADRID.

2. WE SOMEWHAT SUSPICIOUS THIS CALL SINCE [KALBING]⁰³ DOES NOT KNOW CHRIS PHILLIPS, ALTHOUGH IT POSSIBLE HIS FATHER GAVE HIM [KALBING'S]⁰³ NAME AS SOMEONE TO HELP HIM WITH TOURIST QUESTIONS. ALSO DOUBT THAT PHILLIPS WOULD HAVE CALLED BACK IF HE ONLY PROBING FOR LOCATION OF CIA PERSONNEL, SINCE FIRST CALL WOULD HAVE CONFIRMED WHAT HE WANTED KNOW. CHECK WITH MARINE

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

9/01

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 631054 EIA355 PAGE 02-02 IN 805199

TOR:261252Z JAN 76 15-2 [MADR] 29824

GUARD REVEALED THAT SOMEONE HAD CALLED EMBASSY MORNING 25 JAN ASKING FOR 03 [KALBING'S] HOME PHONE. MARINE GUARD FURNISHED THE NUMBER, ALTHOUGH RECENT EMBASSY INSTRUCTION IS NOT TO GIVE OUT SUCH NUMBERS BUT ASK CALLER FOR HIS NUMBER AND SAY PERSON WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM.

3. CAN HQS CONFIRM THAT CHRIS PHILLIPS TRAVELING IN IBERIA AND THAT DAVE PHILLIPS GAVE HIM NAMES OF PEOPLE TO CALL ON THERE?

4. 15-15 [LISBON:] PHILLIPS MAY ALSO CALL ON PERSONS YOUR STATION WHO KNOWN TO DAVE PHILLIPS.

5. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

3/DV

14-00000
104-10161-10115 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

109709

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE
11 June 1963

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For Action) OS

SUBJECT
PICCOLO, Joseph S.

ATTN: Mr. White

REF: Form 1322 dtd 4 June 63 removing cover

FILE NO. 4455

MILITARY COVER DISCONTINUED
32
US Army Records Analysis Group

ID CARD NO.

☒ Unblock Records:
(OP Memo 20-800-11)

Effective ________________ EOD .

☒ Submit Form 642 To Change Limitation Category.
(HB 20-800-2 to be redesignated HHB 20-7)

☒ Return All Military Documentation To CCS.

☐ Remarks:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CD/DD CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: [illegible]SD/OS 1-PSD/OS

FORM 12-61 1551a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(13-20-43)

RJ

SECRET

/ 0 4 7 0 9

28 September 1961
File No. 4455

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Chief, PSD/OS
Attention: Mr. Robert C. Swendiman

SUBJECT : PICCOLO, Joseph S.
GS-7, WH - Cover Debriefing

1. Mr. Piccolo entered on duty with the Agency on 4 February 1957 and will resign on 4 October 1961. During his period of employment he utilized nominal state 32 cover in Mexico from 1 November 1957 to 14 January 1960, and from 15 January 1961 to resignation used nominal Department of the Army cover in Headquarters.

2. Mr. Piccolo was instructed to indicate his employer for the entire period as CIA, 2430 E Street, N. W., Washington 25, D. C.

3. He was further instructed to indicate, whenever necessary, that he travelled, listing various countries en route to and from Mexico, but not reveal the specific location or details of his cover assignment.

4. Mr. Piccolo's forwarding address will be 1636 N.E. 20th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. His new employment is 121st Tactical Fighter Sq., Andrews AFB.

5. The above information is furnished for your guidance and inclusion in the Subject's personnel and security files.

C. T. DOLLAR
03
ROBERT E. YOUNG
Chief, Military Cover Branch, CCG

MCB/CCG/EF:sl
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - PSD/OS
1 - WH Division
1 - File 4455
1 - MCB
1 - Chrono

SECRET

2/rj

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP	DATE 15 August 1961
TO : Chief, WH	ESTABLISHED FOR
ATTN: Mr. Herbert V. Juul	PICCOLO, Joseph S.
REF : Form 1322, dated 22 June 1961	FILE NO. 1455
OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP UTILIZED U. S. Army Records Analysis	

1. All information concerning this cover arrangement is available in Military Cover, CCG.

2. It is requested that CCG be notified when this cover arrangement is no longer required.

3. Appropriate action must be taken to ascertain that subject employee is issued an Army W-2 Form for tax purposes.

C. T. DOLLAR

ROBERT E. YOUNG
Chief, Military Cover, CCG

FORM 1-61 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (13-20-43)

2/

SECRET

169769

TRAVEL PROCESSING SHEET

SUBJECT Piccolo, Ralph
FILE # 169769
OFFICE WH
TITLE & GRADE Mail Clerk GS-5
DEPARTURE DATE 14 July '59
STATUS PCS
COVER LT Staff ~~[illegible]~~ 32
DESTINATION Mexico City Mexico

A review of SUBJECT'S file reflects: [illegible]

DATE OF POLYGRAPH 5 Feb '57
SPECIAL CLEARANCES None
DATE OF CERTIFICATION
SECURITY FILE REVIEWED BY E/ju
CONCURRENCE
DATE 6/12/59

SPECIAL BRIEFING:

On 6/12, 1959 SUBJECT was interviewed regarding the following;

1. Knowledge of Security regulations in general.
2. Travel precautions (No CIA identification); emergency contact numbers.
3. Cover story (briefing, nature and adequacy).
4. Dependents Briefing.
5. Personal affairs prior to departure.
6. Personal Correspondence while overseas.
7. Personal Conduct: (10-250 & 20-155).
8. Assignments involving Risk of Capture -- 10-800.
9. Defensive Audio-Surveillance matters.
10. Other:

Date Checked out 6/12/59

Interviewed by
Security Officer

SECRET

2/Rs

SECRET

10 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OSD/OS

ATTENTION : Michael Shortley

SUBJECT : Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lahera

742651 F-SD/1

1. The Subject WHD asset is currently residing in Apt. G-32 at the Summit Hills Apartments, 8500 16th St. 60 Silver Spring, Md., a safehouse procured by the Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics. Ostensible lessee of this Apt. is a local Arlington attorney Roger McK. SHEA, Esq., 24,66 who has acquired the place for the ostensible purpose of providing quarters for out of town clients, etc. 24

2. On Friday, 7 August 1964 Subject claims to have made a long distance phone call from the telephone at the Apt., 587-8534 to a cousin, Pablo Rodriguez, 2852 (sic) West 20th St., New York, N. Y., telephone number HI 9-1359.

3. It is requested that your office ascertain if this call was actually made on the 7th, including the time at which the call was made. It would be appreciated if you could ascertain if any long distance phone calls were made on 6 August. It is further requested that you attempt to identify the subscriber to the New York number, HI 9-1359. No Pablo Rodriguez is listed in the New York telephone directory, and the address is obviously an incorrect one as street numbers in Manhattan do not go as high as this number.

4. It would be appreciated if results of this inquiry could be communicated to this office by 12 August 1964.

03

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

8/12 to DFO

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

5/RS

WASHINGTON

LEAN OFFICE
Take Jorge Washington Park Way
to BPR turnoff.

ES BLDG
1820 N. Ft. Meyer Drive
Roslyn, Va.

- John HART Jim Phillips 03 7451 or 351
/Ops - (Tom FLORES) Ext. 3481
Off. Phone 638-5074 (Area Code 202)
Home: (469-8049 (Area Code 301)) 08
- Walter CINI (pronounced Chini)
- (Earl WILLIAMSON) 03 Room 3E04
FI - (John SHERWOOD) 03 Tom Haslet
Eco - (Harry MUSTAKUS) Paul Obert 03

MMO - (Bud STEELY) 03
Ext. 6528 03
(Vincent LAGO) (O/T pads, etc)

- (Alex TEJEDA) 03
Ext. 2922

ncealment - (Lee POOLE) 03
Ext. 2292

WH - William V. BROE
/WH - Jake ESTERLINE (Exec & Personnel)
WH-3 - Larry STERNFIELD
/WH - Dave McLEAN [illegible]
DDP - Desmond FITZGERAL
RECTOR - Dick HELMS

EUR-South - Ed FENNIMORE Room 4B24
R/Cuba - Les RATY (pronounced Reti) X-6393
EUR - Ralph KISLEY 03
Spain - (Steve MONGER) (friend of (Al [illegible]) 03
H - Thomas Polgart C/FI
H - ~~[illegible]~~ Donald Marelius wH Executive Arnold
H - (George Thompson) 03 C/Support Personnel (?) X-7678
H - Martin (Personnel-Medical) X-4460

WASHINGTON

06
(A.C WHITE & Dorthy)
(10125 Markham Ave.) 08
(Four Corners)
Silver Spring, Md.
Home: (593-0368) 08 ~~[illegible]~~
Off. Ext. ~~7141~~ Room ~~[illegible]~~ 5614

06
(Ed LAFFIN & Maj-Lis)
(6314 Tulsa Lane*) 08
Bethesda, Md.
Home: (469-6389) 08
Off Ext. ~~6223~~ 7811
*from Belt exit at Old Georgetown Rd

(Clemente HERNANDEZ) 06
American Institute for Free
Labor Development
1925 K St N.W.
Social Projects
Phone: 965-2100 (Area Code 202
635-3172 (Area Code 703

(Sally SWENSON) 06
(3707 Leland St) 08
Chevy Chase, Md.
Phone: (OL-4-5867) 08
c/o Mrs. Robert Phelps

(Fred HENDERSON) 06 X-6523 Room 5C40
(6629 Beacon Lane) 08
Falls Church, Virginia 22043

(Mathew McCULLOUGH) 06 Room ~~[illegible]~~ 3B2607
(10401 Grosvenor Place) 08 Apt. (1322) 08
Rockville, M.D. 20852
Phone: (493-9534) 08 ~~X-7811~~
(351) - 6223
from out Bldg.

15 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Thomas K. Strange

SUBJECT : Peter J. DiCERVINO
214 442 CCS # 2285

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 12 June 1967 regarding establishment of non-official cover for Subject's assignment to Madrid, Spain. 24
15-2

2. Security files contain no record of declaration or compromise to foreign Governments or intelligence/security services. There is no indication of security factors which would affect the proposed action.

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

REEVES:lst
15 June 1967
Closed

] DDS/IOS
] ADDS/IOS
] SA-DD/IOS
] C/ID
] DC/ID
] C/ID/
] C/OSD
DC/OSD
C/OSD/2 R
] C/SAD
] C/AAS
]
] A&TS
R FILES

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2/JW

SECRET

C-2285
12 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
Investigation and Operational Support

ATTENTION : Mr. Marvin Wehking

SUBJECT : Peter J. DiGervino (p)

24 1. This staff has been requested to establish non-official cover for subject for an assignment to Madrid, Spain 4/5-2 . As an essential factor in considering this proposal, this staff would appreciate being advised whether or not the subject has been voluntarily declared to foreign governments and intelligence/security services or involuntarily exposed to them. Also please advise if any exposure or compromise has been recorded or if there are other security factors present which should be considered in this proposal.

2. Please provide this information by 19 June 1967 .

Thomas K. Strange
THOMAS K. STRANGE
Chief, CCS/NC

SECRET

2/1/N

13 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Operations Support Branch

FROM: Joseph P. Mirabile
Operations Support Branch

SUBJECT: SHERMAN, Adrian Fisher, Jr.
#54 621

1. On 25 September 1978, a call was received in the Security Duty Office from James A. Sherman, Subject's brother, advising that Subject suffered a fatal heart attack on 23 September 1978 at his apartment in Monterey, California. Subject was sixty years of age and had a history of previous heart trouble.

2. Mr. Sherman was previously of interest to this Agency as a military detailee, 1952 - 1954, when he was serving at Clark Air Force Base, the Philippines, as a Major in the United States Army. After leaving the Army, he worked for Pan American Airlines for approximately 13 years and then as an investigator for the State Attorney General's Office in Miami, Florida. He has been of interest to DCD and FRD in San Francisco, California, since April 1977. FRD's operational interest was as an access agent to a Saudi Arabian of interest to the San Francisco Base.

3. On 23 September 1978, Subject's body was discovered by an FRD case officer who had arrived at the Monterey, California, apartment for an operational meeting. The apartment house resident manager gained access to the apartment. Subsequent access was allowed to an emergency ambulance squad, police officers and the deputy coroner.

4. Assistance has been rendered to FR Base by San Francisco Field Office personnel in this matter. Gordon Gregory, SAC/SFFO, was apprised on the circumstances on 25 September 1978 and subsequently made contact with the Chief, FR Base. Subject's son, who was traveling cross-country by auto at the time of the death, arrived in the area on 27 September with two sisters and was contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Field Office. He is

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 064537

reported to be very cooperative, aware of need for discretion and secrecy and proud of his father's relationship with this Agency.

5. The only aspect of this incident, which may be of continuing security concern, is that the son recalls that in May 1978, while assisting his father in moving some personal effects, he remembers seeing a written plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. The son said that it had been prepared by his father in the early 1970's when he was working in Florida but at a time when he had no Agency association. At this time the paper is still missing. It may have been recently destroyed by the Subject or, the possibility exists, it may have been stolen by someone having access to the apartment. According to Subject's son, several other items were missing, including a money clip containing a $100 bill that his father always kept, a Randall knife, a gold pen and pencil set and a microwave oven. After notifying the police of the missing personal items, Subject's son received the knife from the resident manager who claims to have found it in some weeds. Subject's son suspects that the resident manager may have been responsible for the theft of the personal items, but he has now resolved to drop the entire issue.

6. Foreign Resources Division has advised that the DCI has been briefed on this case. It is therefore felt that no further Office of Security action is required at this time other than to monitor the case for 60-90 days to determine if any new developments occur.

Joseph P. Mirabile

Distribution:
Orig. - Subject's file
1 - OSB Chrono

OS/PSI/SSD/OSB/JPMirabile/csn

TO	C/OPS/OSG/OC 2B16	FROM DESK FR/3/SF — DATE 1 Nov 77
	C/OS/PSI/CD3 3E47	REQUESTER 03 Judy Doyle
	C/OPS/OSG/OC 2B16	RED LINE 1097 — ROOM 3C29 — TUBE ET 3

1. SUBJECT'S IDENTIFYING DATA

TRUE NAME Sherman, Adrian F.	AKA'S ALIASES, PSEUDO'S	201 948067 — SO# 54621 EMPLOYER NAME ☐ U.S. FIRM ☐ FOREIGN retired
TRAVEL TO U.S. (IF YES GIVE DATES) ☐ YES	FROM — TO	☐ NO ☐ NO KNOWN — CITIZENSHIP

2. ACTION REQUESTED

POA		OA		CNC		SI		SRD
	X							

3. SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC AREA AND DETAILS OF USE

San Francisco - access agent to Saudi Arabian of interest to Base

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

A. SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION REQUIRED ☐ NO ☒ YES (SPECIFY)

X No neighborhood checks.

No USG interest to be shown.

B. SUBJECT IS OR WILL BE AWARE OF INVESTIGATION ☒ NO ☐ YES

5. PRO STATUS — PRQ 1 (2 COPIES ATTACHED) — BIO (2 COPIES ATTACHED)

6. TRACE STATUS

CATEGORY		NO RECORD	NON-DEROGATORY	WILL FORWARD	DEROG/SIGNIFICANT INFO ATTACHED	NOT APPLICABLE
IP						
DIVISION	DESK					
	COMINT VAULT					
OTHER DIVISION	DESKS					
	COMINT VAULTS					
CRS/ISG						
FIELD ENTER STATION NAME IN APPROPRIATE SPACE						

REMARKS

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER — SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF Judy Doyle

7. OFFICE OF SECURITY ACTION

1. OS INDICES RESULTS Duty interest to DCD Interest [illegible] til April 82 — FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (DATE)

2. CHECKS WERE CONDUCTED AT THE INDICATED AGENCIES WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS

X	FBI		DIS	X	DODCI		CSC		STATE		PP		I&N	X	IDENT *

3. CHECKS WERE CONDUCTED AT THE FOLLOWING AGENCY(IES) WITH POSITIVE RESULTS, REPORTS ATTACHED.

PASSPORT; MPRC

4. DOMESTIC FIELD INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED. 1 (TWX) * REPORTS ATTACHED.

5. DOMESTIC FIELD INVESTIGATION FAVORABLE, REPORTS WILL FOLLOW WITHIN 60 DAYS.

REMARKS

*NR CA Central Bureau of Ident.

01 MAR 1978

D/SECURITY/PSI 2/28/78

APPROVAL ACTION REQUEST

FORM 3-74 772 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS — SECRET — E-2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622

4/12

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

WH/ARGENTINA

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. 03 [Lozupone]		13 Oct		JOX
2. 03 [Barone]		13 Oct		B
3. SR/10/CE		13 OCT 1958	5 OCT 1958	PVF
4. WH/II/Argentina [Lozupone] 03 AC/WH/II		16 Oct. 17 Oct		JOX RS
5. WH/Mail Room		OCT 1958 18		
6. RI/D & P		20/10		mbd
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RI/AN		28 OCT 1958		
18. RI/FI				

COMMENTS

3 to 4: Suggest you indicate to Field that these are full Hq. traces.

16-29

Pls. pouch to [Buenos Aires.]

°ALFEROV, Ivan Gavrilovich

21 OCT 1958

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NAME	OFFICE
[Antonina V. Irvin] 03	SR/10/CE

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

NAME	TITLE
[Richard S. Sampson] 03 RICHARD S. SAMPSON	AC/WH/II

RELEASING OFFICER

NAME	TITLE
R. S. Sampson for J. C. KING	C/WHD

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT		FILE NUMBER
	INDEX		201/236701

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

6/AV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. 22 [HABW] 5097
TO Chief of Station, [Buenos Aires] 16-29 INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-236701
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		DATE 21 OCT 1958
SUBJECT Operational/REDCAP Ivan Gavrilevich ALFEROV		RE: "RI" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED For your retention		
REFERENCE(S) [BUEN] 3365 21-29		

Attached for your retention is a REDCAP sheet on Ivan Gavrilevich ALFEROV mentioned in reference as requesting an Argentine visa for travel to Buenos Aires for TDY at the Soviet Embassy. The information on this sheet is the result of full headquarters traces.

10 October 1958 OLIVER G. GALBOND

Attachment - 1 REDCAP sheet w/traces

Distribution
3 - [Buenos Aires] 16-29
3 - WHD (BA Chrono, Mail Room, Subject File)
~~1~~ - RI
1 - SR/10/CE

03
WH/II/FI/[JLozupone]/msg

CS COPY

14-00000
104-10162-10017
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

563 MM/LR/LR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : [S. VINCENT BARONE] 03
UNIT : WH/II/A 563
EXT : 2359
DATE : 26 SEPTEMBER 1958

TO : [BUENOS AIRES] 16-29
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, SR 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 29 16 21 '58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE				INITIALS
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	

OUT77287
77887

TO [BUEN] 16-29 INFO CITE DIR 43097

21-29
RE [BUEN] 3501 (IN 44771) *

NO PRELIM TRACES STOLIAKOV AND ALFIRIEV. ADDITIONAL HQS TRACES WILL BE RUN AND RESULTS FORWARDED.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *CONCERNED [BIOGENESIS] 01 TRACES ON STOLYAROV AND ALFIROV.

COORDINATED BY PHONE
SR/CE/MCINTOSH
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for J. CALDWELL KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

03
R. S. SAMPSON
AC/WH/II
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

6/A

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

03

FROM: WH/4/Prop/

NO.

DATE 13 January 1961

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
1. C/WH/4/CI	1/1		mea	1 to 2: In your dealings with Subject have you ever had any ~~the~~ doubts about his bonafides — or do you have any info which might tend to substantiate this statement. Bill.
2. WH/4/PA				
3.				
4. M. Thorpe — pls see me				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

Artime

IB MEMO NO. 5269
10 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

ATTENTION : Mr. Lou Napoli

File

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Documentation for use of Manuel Artime y Buesa

REFERENCE : Memo from WH/4, 27 December 1960

1. This is to confirm that the following Cuban documentation was handcarried on 9 January 1961 by Mr. [Stanley Shultz] as requested in reference:

03

a. Passport No. 17130
b. Vigencia (Exit Permit) JL-11041-H
c. International Certificate of Vaccination

24

2. The Cuban Passport contains a U.S. Non-Immigrant Visa, B-2, issued in Santiago de Cuba on 17 May 1960 ~~and~~ is valid until 17 May 1964. [The Miami Admitted Cachet and Arrival-Departure Record I-94 were provided by I&NS and are "backstopped".] You will note that I-94 form shows that subject was admitted to the U.S. on 16 June 1960 and has a valid extension of stay until March 15, 1961.

3. It is our understanding that subject will leave the U.S. "black" but will carry the above listed documentation. The documentation should be returned to TSD/IB when no longer needed for operational purposes.

03

[Charles Yech
CHARLES YECH, JR.
CHIEF, TSD/IB]

Distribution:
Original and 1 - Addressee

SECRET

3/90

SECRET

RECEIPT FOR AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS

TO: TSD/IB DATE 9 January 1961

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS TRANSMITTED WITH MEMO NO. ______ DATED ______ AND PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ______

Javier Alvarez de la Torre

a. Cuban Passport #17130
b. Cuban Vigencia (Exit Permit) JL-11041-H
c. Cuban International Certificate of Vaccination

The Cuban Passport contains a U.S. Non-Immigrant Visa, B-2, issued in Santiago de Cuba on 17 May 1960 and is valid until 17 May 1964. [The Miami admitted cachet and arrival departure record I-94 were provided by I&NS and are "backstopped".] You will note that I-94 form shows that subject was admitted to the U.S. on 16 June 1960 and has a valid extension of stay until March 15, 1961.

24

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

______
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

NOTE: Authentication Materials must be returned to TSD/IB as soon as the intended operational use has been fulfilled; unused documents, whether filled in or blank, must be returned to TSD/IB when no longer needed.

TSD/IB should be notified if any of the Authentication Materials are destroyed, lost, or for any other reason can no longer be returned.

D-861 SECRET

1/90

THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED: SECRET

#3815

RESPONSE TO GREEN LIST REQUEST **Nº 108574**

1. SUBJECT NAME, IN ROMAN LETT. / AND IN NORMAL ORDER

Santiago ALVAREZ Fernandez

88474

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. BIRTH DATE

12 June 1941

4. BIRTH PLACE

Havana, Cuba

5. CITIZENSHIP

Cuban

6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Residing in Miami, Florida

7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

DATE OF REQUEST 30 Jan 61

REQUEST FROM

03 NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER

[Margaret Moca]

OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/4

ROOM, BUILDING 2702 Qtrs E

EXTENSION 8564

14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED? X YES ___ NO

15. TYPE OF REQUEST

X FIRST TIME SUBMITTED

___ ADDITIONAL DATA

___ OTHER

16. INTEREST IN SUBJECT

___ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY

X OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

___ OTHER

17. INFORMATION REQUIRED

Derogatory

8. MILITARY SERVICE

SERVICE ARM, COUNTRY	SPECIALTY	LOCATION	DATES

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
P... A EXPEDITE		FEB 13 4 29 PM '61

10. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND ASSOCIATES

Father-Santiago ALVAREZ
Mother-Lucia FERNANDEZ

13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC) ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

201 - 291419

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI-10-7

FORM 11-59 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (13)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/08

SECRET

#2015

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

TO: ☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division ☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security		DATE 30 Jan 61 03 FROM: Margaret Moss WH/4 2702 Qtrs E 8564
SUBJECT: (True name) Santiago ALVAREZ Fernandez		PROJECT JMATE
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES		CI/OA FILE NO. RI 201 FILE NO. 291413 SO FILE NO.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Cuba

FULL DETAILS OF USE

PM Trainees

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☐	YES	☒	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION

None

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: #108574

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
for Joseph Piccolo	8564	for Jacob D. Esterline

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-291417

(8)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reprodu

Photographs

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-0236701)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
RYBAT/REDTOP/DIOGENESIS/AEBOOR - Surveillance Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HABA-20512, dated 25 April 1969

1. Reference dispatch described our efforts against AEBOOR and stated that the next phase would consist of a 24 hour a day surveillance of Subject for a period of about two weeks. The coverage was initiated at 0600 hours on 19 May, and terminated at 1515 hours on 26 May, the day of AEBOOR's departure for home leave.

2. The overall results of the surveillance effort were interesting, and provided us with a great deal of basic data which should prove valuable in future AEBOOR operational planning. Although the period covered must be viewed as somewhat atypical since it covered a time of preparation for home leave, the basic pattern could not have varied greatly from the norm. There was definite evasive action designed to shake surveillance taken by AEBOOR on several occasions; there were repeat visits to several establishments which could easily serve as letter drops or contact points; and there was an interesting contact on 21 May (reported in BUENOS AIRES 3009) with an individual we failed to identify positively.

3. Although the above makes it appear that we are approaching the AEBOOR operation strictly from the CI/CE angle, this is not the case. We are attempting to gather adequate information to give us a clear insight into AEBOOR's activities in order to help us attempt to introduce an access agent into this operation, or to expand direct development of Subject by Station officers.

4. Forwarded under separate cover for Headquarters study are copies of the surveillance reports along with a copy of the AELANYARD transcript for 21 May.

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

Paul W. Leverone
Paul W. LEVERONE

SD, 26 JUN. 69

COPY ROUTING
wh/pr w/att
6 w/o att

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/o attach

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABA-20657	16 June 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-236701

DISPATCH

~~SECRE~~T

TO: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

FROM: Chief, SB via Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: REDTOP/AEXICK/AEBOOR
Operational Possibilities against AEBOOR

Reference: HCSW 7566, 11 February 1969

1. With the departure of AEBOOR and his wife on home leave, we would like to offer a few comments about him for possible future action by the Station when he returns. The impetus for these thoughts was a recent examination of the files of all those Soviets on the priority target list to determine if, perhaps, one of them offers more of a potential for intensive development than another. The purpose of this review was not to discard the agreed-upon target list, since this list is the rationale behind the entire concept of selective targetting; but rather, to attempt a narrowing of the Station's focus on the one particular Soviet who appears to be the best selection for operational development among the priority group. We have looked at such factors as susceptibilities (known or potential), contacts, accessibility, etc. and, for reasons discussed below, feel that AEBOOR may be the best selection for a determined Station effort aimed at his eventual recruitment. Thus, the Station's focus on the other priority Soviets would continue at its present level but at the same time, AEBOOR would be placed "under the microscope" as the object of a more intensive Station effort aimed at gaining multiple access to him.

2. With the imminent departure of BIBANDIT/12 from Buenos Aires and the resulting elimination of our one good contact with AEVULTURE, the choice of AEBOOR became easier to make. His selection, however, was based on several considerations which, from our vantage point, seem to offer the best potential for Station action when he returns to the country.

a. Accessibility: AEBOOR is one of the very few Soviets with whom direct Staffer contact has been made. The social evening spent with him and his wife in January showed excellent promise because it appeared that foundations for rapport and further contact had been laid. We note, however, that there has been no mention of further meetings since the initial one, four and one-half months ago. Due to the elapsed time, we assume that Subject and his wife are not planning to reciprocate the invitation; on the other hand, enough time will have passed since the initial contact for the Station to take the initiative

201-236701

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HABW 11473

DATE: 6 June 1969

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-236701

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/SB/X/WH	6 June 69	
SB/CI/O	6-6	T Comer
C/WH/4/A	10 JUN	

SB/X/WH
SB/MC
SB/CI/O
C/WH/4/A
RID

AH
AB
~~IN~~
~~FD~~
DY
~~DBS~~ ~~IFO~~
FI

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WH/4
DATE: 10 JUN 1969

(40)

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 11-69

DISPATCH

again and instigate a second meeting soon after Subject returns from home leave. Since there are no other access agents now in touch with Subject, the potential for assessment of our target personality by direct Staffer contact becomes crucial in the selective targotting procedure. Through the advantages of direct assessment, we should be able to make a good judgment concerning the susceptibilities (or lack thereof) of AEBOOR and accordingly, determine the value in pursuing him as a priority target.

b. The impressions of AEBOOR and his wife from the one meeting thusfar seem to offer some possible avenues of approach which the Station may wish to consider in their planning. The wife, in particular, was described as being more relaxed than AEBOOR and through her professed interest in theatre, music, and ballet, it might be possible for Nina T. MARGANDE to exploit this interest and invite her to selected cultural events. If AEBOOR does not share his wife's proclivities for the "arts", then she might appreciate the presence of a female companion who shares her interests. AEBOOR's wife also claimed to like both American songs and dancing. This too, might open the door to some form of imaginative approach built around a future invitation whereby the incipient social relationship of 9 January would be further developed in the depth needed for a thorough assessment of the target. Cultivation of the wife appears to be particularly appropriate because of the apparent conflicts and tensions between her and her husband. The accounts of this relationship from their previous tour in Mexico and also the current transcripts from AELANYARD paint a picture of an irascible and foul-mouthed husband constantly doing battle with a domineering wife. It seems likely that the impression of "sweetness and light" which they generated during their evening with the Station case officers was atypical and manufactured for the benefit of their hosts. This, of course, is natural with most couples who choose not to air their personal differences in public, but from our point of view, this lack of harmony between AEBOOR and his wife offers distinct possibilities for the Station to contact the wife independently and offer her welcome diversions from the regimented and turbulent life with her husband. (We call your attention to the reference since it may provide some useful points in devising an approach to AEBOOR's wife). Their present home leave in the USSR would seem to offer a ready-made situation for renewed contact when they return since natural curiosity about their activities and time spent at home could be sufficient grounds for an invitation either to both or singly to spend an evening together. We offer these thoughts only because they appear to us as good opportunities not only to maintain Staffer contact with a target of priority interest, but to also develop this contact further to the degree of intimacy needed for a recognition and ultimate exploitation of his susceptibilities.

c. Since there are no access agents now in touch with AEBOOR, we suggest, as a supplement to the direct Staffer contact and in order to obtain additional assessments of Subject from other angles, the Station consider "running" a controlled asset into AEBOOR under suitably contrived circumstances. In other words, we would create a relationship where none previously existed. By this device, we are not suggesting a double agent operation in which our agent offers himself for recruitment; on the contrary, the rationale is simply to move a controlled asset into the path of the target and attempt to establish a contact through a common bond of social or business interests. If we agree that AEBOOR can be brought under a more intensive scrutiny than the other Soviets, then this ploy would be a logical step in his development as a recruitment target if additional access to him is non-existent.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABW 11473

d. AVDEPTH: The ability to monitor AEBOOR through this technical operation was a key factor in deciding to bring him under closer focus. It should be able to provide the necessary depth to any human assessment of the target and it gives us the singular opportunity to "observe" AEBOOR when he is relaxed at home and not exhibiting the official mannerisms and personality which he must display in public and around his other Soviet colleagues. If we are able to expand the burgeoning Staffer contact with Subject as well as place access agents in touch with him, then his reactions to these contacts can be monitored and our moves against him tailored accordingly.

3. As part of the total effort to build up a large amount of information on the selected target, we are including as an attachment, a copy of the new Personality Characteristic Questionnaire (PCQ) with instructions for its use. By employing it in conjunction with your direct assessment of AEBOOR, we should be able to slowly build up enough information on him so that the indirect psychological assessment technique can also be applied. The PCQ is a new form and less time-consuming than others but we believe it should be an integral part of the entire assessment process focused on a target Soviet and that it can be an invaluable aid in attempting to evaluate the varied impressions of the target which have been obtained from multiple access to him. An initial review of the PCQ may give the impression that many of the questions are irrelevant and have no bearing on the determination of a persons susceptibility to manipulation. The questionnaire should not be perused piecemeal, however, but taken in its entirety since each portion will be interpreted and weighted by the indirect psychological assessment techniques until a very complete impression of the total personality emerges. We encourage the Station to utilize the PCQ and when sufficiently complete, forward it to Headquarters for evaluation.

4. Once again, we wish to emphasize that Headquarters is in a position to offer guidance and support to your efforts, but the direction of the case rests with the Station. The case officer involved is in the best spot to judge the progress of the case and make decisions accordingly. For this reason, we encourage a continuous and candid dialogue, concerning the various aspects of your operations against the selected Soviet targets in order to insure professional development of each case. If our choice of AEBOOR is at variance with your on-the-spot assessment of the priority Soviets, then we would appreciate your appraisal of him as well as any suggestions about a more logical candidate for closer focus.

Philip D. Eiferman
Philip D. EIFERMAN

Attachment:
As stated H/W

Distribution:
3-COS

201-236701

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY: DCR PER ______

ACTION: SR 8 ☐ RID COPY

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

27

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 10

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR. R/AN. WH8. CI. CI/OPS. CI/IC2 FI2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

187

SECRET 272000Z MAY 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES/3032 (BUEN) 27 MAY 69 IN 67772

DIRECTOR

REDTOP BIOGENESIS

1. BIOGENESIS TRAVEL CONTROLS REPORT 26 MAY DEPARTURE FOR USSR OF IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV (201-236701) AND WIFE ROSA VIA AEROLINEAS ARGENTINAS 140 TO ROME. LYUDMILA IVANOVNA MAKAROCHKINA, WIFE OF 201-802696, ALSO LEFT SAME FLIGHT.

2. PER BILOCULAR ALFERYEVS WILL TRAVEL ROME TO MOSCOW BY TRAIN. BIBAFFLE AND OTHER SOURCES INDICATE WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES AFTER HOME LEAVE.

3. HAVE NO INFO ON MAKAROCHKINA'S ONWARD TRAVEL FROM ROME NOR ON HER HUSBAND'S PLANS TO JOIN HER. DO NOT KNOW WHETHER DEPARTURE PCS OR HOME LEAVE.

4. FILE 201-236701 AND 201-802696.

SECRET

1P

AN RIP
AN X
~~JH~~
DU WA
DX C
DC
FI

MICROFILMED
JUN 27 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

B 201-802696

201-236701
27 May 69

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

~~S E C R E T~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: PATRICIA GRAHAM:DG
UNIT: WH/4/A
EXT: 1926
DATE: 27 MAY 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 15 PER ____ #
☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: WH 8 FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB 8, EUR 6, CI/ICG 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 28 17 20Z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 06410

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO PARIS

REDCOAT BIOGENESIS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3009 (IN 65500)

1. NO TRACES.

2. FILE: 201-236701

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Requested traces Phillipe De Seze, French citizen, who is visiting Argentina and is in contact with Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV, known KGB.

AN KB
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PB~~
~~BR~~
~~DNO~~ NFD
FI

AC/WH/4/A
EUR/F

201-236701
28 May 69

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RAYMOND A. WARREN
C/WH/4

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
S E C R E T
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	WH	6	
2	CI	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY: PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SR5 #022 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 8, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/EUR5, C/FI 2,

S E C R E T 231720Z MAY 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3009

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS

23 MAY 69 IN 65500

RYBAT REDTOP BIOGENESIS

1. REQUEST TRACES INCLUDING LIAISON FRENCH CITIZEN PHILLIPE DE SEZE, DPOB 22 SEPTEMBER 1920, BORDEAUS, PASSPORT 155114. DIRECTOR OF EXPORTACION FRANCAIS VISITING ARGENTINA.

2. BIBAFFLE TEAM SURVEILLING IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV, SECOND SECRETARY AND KNOWN KGB, DURING WEEK PRIOR ALFERYEV HOME LEAVE DEPARTURE. ON 21 MAY SPENT SEVERAL HOURS WITH LIMPING MAN WHO OBVIOUSLY NOT ARGENTINE. TWO MET IN EMBASSY, HAD COFFEE IN LOCAL CAFE, VISITED ALFERYEV APARTMENT THEN RETURNED EMBASSY. CHECK OF HOTEL IN WHICH APPEARED MOST LIKELY VISITOR STAYING REVEALED DE SEZE ONLY GUEST WITH LIMP. HAS STAYED HOTEL VARIOUS TIMES INCLUDING PERIOD 3 TO 10 MAY. CURRENT CHECK IN DATE WAS 21 MAY.

3. NO STATION TRACES.

4. INDEX DE SEZE. FILE: 201-836781.

S E C R E T

SECRET

Source: BUENOS AIRES
HABA-20528
Reel No.: 5
Side(s): 1
Readability: Very poor

Date(s) of Intercept: 16/17 April 69
Rec'd at Prod. Unit: 16 May 69
Processing Completed: 3 June 69
Transcriber/Checker: N.V.M.
Translator/Editor: L.T.
Typist: L.T.

Interesting Tape – deteriorating (apparently) relationship between A & wife. Vasilyev again mediator.

Bill – B
TMo'd

Vmuy – Pls. file AEBOOZ

~~SECRET~~

A. Ivan (ALFERYEV)
B. Rosa (ALFERYEV)
C. Anatoliy Ilich (VASILYEV)

((Readability is very poor. Music is playing very loudly.))

A., B., and C. continue their conversation. ((Reel 4)) They talk about clothing and dinner jackets. C. says he does not own a dinner jacket, and adds, "But according to regulations, I... By official government regulations, a counselor is provided/allowed ((to have a dinner jacket)). I'll tell you, there are some people who think I don't know this. They keep quiet about it... but I'm embarrassed to say..." B. comments, "You should have one made, and that's all." C. says that when he needed a dinner jacket, he talked to the Ambassador about it. He adds, "Concerning the dinner jacket, he ((the Ambassador)) said, 'Drive over; you have... well, get it from ALFERYEV.' That's an Ambassador!" ((Short portion unreadable.)) B. remarks, "Anatoliy Ilich, he ((probably the Ambassador)) is a strange man."

They continue talking about dinner jackets. A. says that some diplomats at other embassies also do not have dinner jackets. He says to C., "Why don't you asks the French Ambassador if he has a tail coat..." C. comments, "What a comparison!" A. continues, "By the way, they rent ((tail coats))... Ask the French counsel if he owns a dinner jacket..." C. states, "And you go ahead and ask how much they pay an ambassador -- $500, $1,000. I know they get (20) ((a high salary))." ((Portion unreadable; all talk at once.)) A. says, "He doesn't have one; they rent ((evening clothes.))" C. disagrees, "No, Ivan; you're wrong. That doesn't bother me." A. says, "I realize that." C. explains, "This is a matter of representation ((diplomacy)). If a man has such a difficult, such a difficult... but I know that (XG)." ((Portion unreadable; all talk simultaneously.))

A. insists, "Everybody rents ((evening clothes)); everybody rents." C. exclaims, "But I'm supposed to have it ((a dinner jacket)) according to the regulations. It's written, it's written. Why should I rent it. If you wish, I'll let you read it ((the regulation))."

A. and C. try to convince each other on the pro and con of renting a dinner jacket.

C. expresses his indignation about the situation and tells of his conversation with the Ambassador about a dinner jacket when they were due to attend a function: "I told him... if I find a dinner jacket... So, you will go ((alone)). You have one. But he asked me, 'But why don't you have one?' I said, 'Yuriy Ivanovich, you yourself know why I don't have one.' He shut up..." Later, B. agrees, "You should have your own ((dinner jacket)). C. continues to be resentful, and says, "But the man ((unclear who, possibly the Ambassador)) is jealous, so that, I don't know... "that some sort of (?crooked - krivoy?) counselor will have a dinner jacket. I... ((B. laughs)) I spit on you..." ((probably referring to a supposed critic)). C. adds that he frequently says that "if a dinner jacket is required, I will not go."

The three have a drink. ((short pause)) They discuss music, and talk about an orchestra which they heard on TV. They comment on tickets which they have received for various concerts. ((Readability is very poor; the TV covers their conversation.)) They talk about theatrical artists, the Bolshoi Theatre, and an orchestra. Mention is made of DUNAYEVSKIY, the composer, and various records. ((Loud music covers their conversation.)) They talk about OYSTRAKH and OSTROPOVICH. B. flirts a bit with A. and C. All laugh frequently.

Farther, B. changes the subject and speaks irritably about her work. She asks A., "Was my work at the Embassy normal, was it normal?" A. states, "It was normal." B. retorts, "Oh... it was normal. Yes, ((sarcastically)) it was normal. I did not (3G) normally when I was sitting in (?Pavlovich's?) ((not otherwise identified)) office. (2G). And I'll tell anyone you please that it ((the work)) was not normal." A.'s brief comment is unreadable. B. insists angrily, "I'll say it myself. And I won't ask (XG). I know whom to tell. I'll definitely say it." A. calls her "a fool!" B. rebukes him, "The word 'fool' is always at the tip of your tongue; 'fool,' 'fool.' All evening, all evening." A. states, "That's the first time I said it." B. rants, "So, you said it for the first time! Really? You only said it once?"

C. attempts to sooth B., "Well, Ivan didn't want to say anything bad. I'm sure of that... It isn't that... It concerns some sort of... ((All talk at once -- unreadable)) A. states, "This is none of your business (4G) and I'm not planning to." B. shouts, "Right, so don't put/seat me where you shouldn't -- in the bathroom!" ((figuratively speaking)). C. interrupts, "Rosa, Rosochka, what are you saying!" B. yells, "Well..." C. continues, "Well, Rosa... Rosa, sometimes..." B. retorts sarcastically, "It's none of my business -- that's the main thing!" C. says, "Ivan is sometimes incorrect/unjust in his attitude toward you ((plural)) but you ((the informal "ty")) understand how difficult it becomes for married (3G) ((possibly meaning "officials")), Rosa. Rozochka, you shouldn't... you should work some more/longer..." A. repeats to B., "It's none of your business." C. adds, "You shouldn't be that way... Later everything will be better." A. remarks, "She's not satisfied..." C. continues, "Because we/you have to maneuvre somehow. Even if we were wrong, even if we were 100% wrong, you still have to wait. For you to see that we are wrong (1-2G). Why is he wrong? Perhaps we are wrong, but there was some sort of precondition/reason for it. It's impossible for us to be wrong. According to his/our character, persuasion, (1G)... desire... Do you understand what happens, Rozochka?" A. states, "Do you understand, when they announce ((unknown what)) to them, they have not deserved that. It's always that way... In order to cast aspersions on someone, it is absolutely necessary (2-3G)..." B. protests, "((Even)) if (?an accusation?) is unjust? All right! ((But if)) something is well done... ((express)) some gratitude, if you please..." C. comments, "Rozochka, don't you see, then the whole thing is that we then (1G)." B. retorts, "At least he could have said that they were (?accusing?) me unjustly. At least he could have said..." C. says, "Rosa! But here (2G), do you understand, (XG) no such attention is given. For him here, you understand, (4G). He is not alone here. A number of people are there, this one and that one ((colloquial: the fifth and the tenth))... And then perhaps someone... especially a wife. That becomes most sensitive/painful. She is sort of the most sincere/frank person. But I wouldn't do it that way. There you are. And she will be correct. However, she did not see the one and the other person ((the fifth and the tenth person))... and immediately did not (2C)... It's good at times. My Lord, Galka does that. At times I feel hurt ((but)) I won't say (2G). I won't begin saying it. Sometimes I feel so hurt that (XG)." B. tells C., "Anatoliy Ilich, when everything will be clean, when everything will be put in order, then I/you/we can talk about gratitude. But now? ... There's chaos all around! And you talk about gratitude... ((She sounds incensed)) Everywhere there is (1G)." C. tries to convince her, "Rosa! You shouldn't talk now. Do you understand? It has to be done gradually. After all, there is some sort of restraint/forbearance; there's a line... you have to (1G). Rosa! How much more/longer will we (1G). After all, we haven't been together merely for one day. Take Ivan. (5G) there are a minimum of 6 to 7 of us men in the Bureau. What I'm saying is that we must respect each other. We think, we discuss. We might make mistakes in something. But, nevertheless, 7 of us men won't be too mistaken as would be someone at (3G). And then, a woman will sometimes not see/understand, Rosochka. (XG). Rosa, you shouldn't insult/hurt us that much. We have nerves and they (XG)." A.'s comment is unreadable. B. tells her husband, "Sit, sit, all right!" C. continues trying to convince B. that she shouldn't insult her husband.

A bit further, B. tells C. irritably, "He piles everything on me. You're blaming me, right?" C. continues telling B. to treat her husband better, and says, "I love my Galka very much, and I see that Ivan loves ((you)). I am firmly convinced of that." B. laughs sarcastically. C. adds, "(XG) that means to indulge ((your husband)). Rosa, how can you do that?" C. continues, "What do you want to do -- do you want to see/think of your husband as a scoundrel?" B. replies, "(2G) in ((his)) attitude toward his wife." C. adds, "Or that I should be a scoundrel? I won't be one. If Galka would throw me out, I wouldn't become a scoundrel any way. I spit on that. No matter what anybody says about me, I won't become a scoundrel any way. And I won't be led by the nose by any Nina MEDVEDEVA." ((Apparently, C. believes that MEDVEDEVA bosses her husband.)) B. remarks, "I'm talking about (this attitude?) toward his wife." C. states, "And I'm saying that they are scoundrels." B. continues, "... personal attitude..."

C. states decisively, "They ((the MEDVEDEVs)) are scoundrels... Ivan, you shouldn't receive ((or, have anything to do with)) them. On the contrary, you should stay farther away from them someplace, as far away as possible." C. continues lecturing B. about changing her attitude toward her husband.

Further, C. tells B. about an incident which occurred where the MEDVEDEVs were involved, saying that the MEDVEDEVs had been given ingredients to make meat pastries (piroshki), and that they had not made the meat pastries but had said that the ingredients had spoiled. He asks B., "How could those people do that? What happened to the ingredients? Roza! You have to answer! Please answer!" B. asks, "I should answer?! Let them answer!" C. says, "Aha... But they don't want to ((answer))." B. asks, "Why should I answer?" C. insists, "Go ahead... answer! What happened to them. How did they..." B. says, "I defend them!" C. continues, "What happened to the ingredients? Please answer. They... someone else, if you please... Why? Did they take them ((drive them)) someplace? They volunteered to make them. What happened ((to the ingredients)). How did they spoil? When did they spoil? What spoiled? And where did they drive to? Answer that question. And (?automatically?) they twisted everything around. Do you know what I'm leading up to? And what happened later?" A.'s comment is unreadable. B. states categorically, "Ivan will twist anything around..." C.'s comment unreadable. B. repeats, "... he'll twist anything..." C. asks, "And then what about (3G)?" A. says, "This is the very best example..." B. asks, "What did you say...?!" A. says something unreadable. B. asks, "Why do you ascribe things to me that I did not say? By the way, your manner has long since been noticed... has long since been noticed..." C. tries to interrupt her, but she continues, "... you can blame a person for something he did not say, and you will keep on insisting that he said that you (3G) me." A.'s remark is unreadable. B. says, "... a good relationship. He ((MEDVEDEV)) has a very fine relationship/attitude toward his wife." Further, C. asks, "What kind of relationship is that? If I did such a thing, Galka would give me such a lecture... if I permitted such a thing, did such a thing, she would not live with me. She would never permit me to do such a thing -- never would she look ((at me)) if I would be able to do anything so vile." Referring to B.'s statement about the good relationship between the MEDVEDEVs, C. says, "How can you say that, how can you give such an example? ((He mimics B. sarcastically)) 'They have such ((a good relationship)); everything is done by them in a friendly manner.' ((C. says maliciously)) Roza, I despise them..." He continues expressing his indignation. He adds, "They have a foursome; the first are the MEDVEDEVs and then, the TEREKHOVs ((the four are good friends))." C. says that "yesterday I spoke with Galya BOLDINOVA ((probably about the MEDVEDEVs and the foul up on the meat pastries))."

The three of them then calm down, converse quietly, and have a drink. The music covers a part of their conversation. Theylisten to the music and make intermittent comments.

Later, A. begins picking on B. and says to C., "She doesn't think. She has been in a huff all evening. Instead of thinking, she..." C. interrupts, "Vanya, don't talk that way. ((He changes the topic)) Where do you want to go ((take a trip, or drive))? Well, Rozochka..." B. yells, "Well, when I get rid of you...! May I state my conclusion/decision, or not? Will that minute ever arrive, or not?" C. tries to calm her, "Rozochka..." B. continues yelling, "It's absolutely impossible..." C. and B. talk simultaneously -- unreadable. B. then says, "Anatoliy Ilich, that's correct. After you've talked with him, you leave. But for me this goes on with him eternally, from morning to evening, and during the night. It's absolutely frightening!" C. again tries to calm her down. B. goes on, "Why should I wait to say what I want to. I say what I please." C. interrupts, "Roza, Rozochka, Roza! But all of this is..." B. adds, "He has a malicious soul..." C. disagrees, "Nothing of the sort; nothing of the sort! He touched upon ((the subject)), he asked..." B. snaps back, "He touched upon it... so now let him listen to what I'm going to say since he touched upon it. If you object to him ((unclear)), then shut up..." C. again tries, "Roza, may I ask one question?" B. says, "You may..." C. begins, "Please tell me..." B. starts up again, "He poisons everything... because even if he says one thing, he poisons everything." C. states, "Oh no... He (20).

I'll tell ((you)) that the nature of women is to exaggerate at times. And I would say not sometimes, but very often, very often. And why do you... don't you think that you (3G), that he is acting badly toward you? Let him make mistakes..."

C. continues soothing and lecturing B, and tries to convince her that her husband isn't so bad. A. remains silent.

C. changes the subject and suggests that Ivan finish his drink. He talks about food and snacks. C. and A. drink up and leave the room. The radio is on. B. is walking around the room, apparently cleaning up. A bit later, she turns off the radio.

End of Recording

((Transcribers note: Contrary to the Log listing, there is no further recorded conversation, possibly due to faulty recording.))

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AETARGET
Telephone Tap Operations Against AEBOOR and 201-025485

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As part of our continuing effort to effectively "zero in" on selected FJSTEALER targets, we requested BIOGENESIS to set up telephone taps on phones located in the apartments of AEBOOR and 201-025485. BIOGENESIS complied, and the tap on AEBOOR's line became effective on 18 April. Coverage of 201-025485's line went into effect on 22 April.

2. Although we do not expect this coverage to provide us with dramatic results or some sort of "break through", we hope that it will contribute significantly to our overall coverage of these two targets.

3. Once these operations have been in existence for a reasonable period of time, we will advise Headquarters of the results.

Paul V. LEVERONE

Distribution:
2 - C/SBD
2 - C/WHD

CS COPY FILED IN 201-025485

file 201-236701

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA-[illegible]

DATE
9 May 1962

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
AEBOOR
201-025485

C/S B

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~S E C R E~~ T/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
RYBAT REDTOP BIOGENESIS AEBOOR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: BUENOS AIRES-2749 dated 11 April 1969

1. Even though we have maintained AELANYARD for a considerable length of time, we have not been able to establish a pattern of activity for AEBOOR. The cause of this lack is quite simple: AELANYARD has been maintained more or less on a working hour schedule, i.e., from roughly 0800 to 2200 hours with occasional additional night monitoring. Realizing this, we decided to carry out a two week operation whereby we used different equipment. We will cease this phase of the operation since we now have, we believe, sufficient coverage to establish the pattern of activity of AEBOOR.

2. The operation has proved very helpful. We now know that on two occasions AEBOOR did not return home until five or six in the morning. Mrs. AEBOOR on one occasion launched into him demanding to know where he had been, etc. His reply was "I have been working" and nothing more. We forward under separate cover a copy of the pertinent transcript involved in this discussion.

3. Our next step against AEBOOR is to mount via BIBAFFLE a 24 hour surveillance of AEBOOR. It is our present thought to continue this for up to two weeks; however, since as many as 12 officers per day will be needed, the BIBAFFLEs will be hard put to carry it out. Other operations will have to suffer since we are convinced that a well conducted and thorough surveillance could produce

Attachment:
Transcript (u/s/c)

Distribution:
~~3~~ - C/SB (w/att u/s/c) / WH 3 PT W/ATT W/O/ATT
2 - C/WHD (w/att u/s/c)

Continued

[illegible] 3D 7 MAY 69

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA-20,312

DATE
25 April 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-236071

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~S E C R E T/RYBAT~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-20,512

extremely interesting results.

4. We will advise you of our progress.

5. File: 201-236071.

Edwin W Shroyer
Edwin W. SHROYER

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/RYBAT	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

CASO: RANCO
SUBCASO: MIGUEL
RLL I2
LA 7
FA I3-4-69
OP I2I

Desde las I2.0I hasta I300

12:AM 98 Puerta de campanillas. Entra Rosa.
1225 I74. Ivan. Y, muchacha, como termino (ID)?
Rosa. Y, a que hora llegaste vos? Por donde te llevaron los diablos por toda la noche?
Ivan. Toda la noche. A lo de (?? MOGILOV ??)
Rosa. A que hora llegaste?
Ivan. Vino, segun me parece a las 5 (?)
Rosa. Y donde estuviste? A lo de Misha?
Ivan. Trabaje.
Rosa. A lo de Misha, si?
Ivan. No.
((Pausa corta))
Ivan. Y no lo adivinaste. No lo adivinaste, (?muchacha?).
Rosa. Y donde? A lo de Iuri Ivanovich?
Ivan. No lo vas a adivinar lo mismo.
Rosa. Aborto monstruoso.
Ivan. No vas a adivinar.
Rosa. Estas parado como un idiota.
Ivan. Lo mismo no adivinaras.
Rosa. Callate la boca. (?Vas a jugar?) conmigo todavia.
((Pausa))
1230 2I3 Persianas bajan.
1240 246. Rosa. Vas a salir ahora, si?
Ivan. (Murmura algo afirmativo.))
Rosa. Y que no me aparezcas hasta las 6. Porque ya no hay nada que hacer. Todo me hiciste al reves. Yo necesito dormir. Que no te lleven los diablos por aqui.
Ivan. Dormi.
Rosa. Esta claro? Y que no me aparezcas.
Ivan. Que?
Rosa. Todo lo hace al reves. La gente va a acostarse, y el se levanta. La gente duerme, y el esta paseando. Y porque haces todo al reves?
Ivan. Que dices (2-3D)
Rosa. "Que decis?" Yo te doy "que decis". Como se indisciplino.
Ivan. Y vos no me vas a persuadir. En esto yo no creo.
Rosa. Ahora se puso histerico.
Ivan. No me persuadiras.
Rosa. A mi me llamaron ayer. Dice; "Uds. no se van de licencia" Yo digo: " Como? Quien le dijo esto? " Ella dice: " MEDVEDEVA no trabaja (ID)lo conoces? Vos viajas, y ella dice que alla hay NASTENKO, y puede ser que SOKOL ((De SOKOLOVSKI ?) y ALFERIEV. Y ella dice:"Como Alferiev? Alferiev no viaja.
([illegible])
Ivan. ((Monosilaba))
Rosa. Y con este aplomo lo dijo: " No, Alferiev no viaja. ((Pausa))
Rosa. Y que me decis?
Ivan. (6D).
Rosa. Correcto. Yo ire. Y a mi me dice. Castigar y listo.
((Siguen hablando de vacaciones, algunos empezaran a

CS COPY

RLL I2
LA 7
FA I3-4-69
OP I2I

PARTE 2

irse de vacaciones en primeros dias de mayo.

271 Salio Ivan
423 Telefono vecinos sin contestar.
800 Portero electrico. Vecinos.
802 Lo mismo.
1605 Se levantan las persianas. Pasos. Puertas internas. Se levanto Rosa.
1930 Puerta campanillas. Entro Ivan.
Conversan corto tiempo. Entre otras cosas Rosa le pregunta si va al cine y si tiene frio. Para primera pregunta no se escucha l respuesta. Para segunda, respuesta negativa. Leen diarios. No hablan.

Hasta 3125 sin cambios.

FINAL DEL ROLLO .

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY 26 PER ______

ACTION
SB 8 ☐ RID COPY
298

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE VR A/AN, WH 8, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 252234Z APR 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 2833

DIRECTOR

25 APR 69 IN 44917

REDTOP

1. BIOGENESIS TRAVEL CONTROLS REPORT THAT GENRIKH BORISOVICH MEDVEDEV DEPARTED FOR MOSCOW ON 23 APRIL WITH WIFE NINA AND DAUGHTER MARINA.

2. PCS DEPARTURE ABRUPT, APPARENTLY UNEXPECTED BY MEDVEDEV, SINCE RETURNED FROM HOME LEAVE ONLY LAST SEPTEMBER. CURRENT TRAVEL CERTAINLY NOT RESULT NORMAL ROTATION. FURTHERMORE, BILOCULAR GAVE NONE OF USUAL INDICATIONS FAMILY PREPARING LEAVE. AT 18 APRIL LUNCH WITH BIBANDIT-11, SUBJECT IMPLIED PLANNED TO REMAIN ARGENTINA FOR SOME TIME. WHEN BIBANDIT-11 CALLED TRADE DELEGATION 24 APRIL, WAS TOLD MEDVEDEV HAD LEFT PERMANENTLY. BIBANDIT-9 REPORTS REQUEST FOR PERMISSION DEPART NOT RECEIVED HIS OFFICE UNTIL 2[illegible] APRIL. NO REQUEST FOR REENTRY OR SHIPMENT OF HHE INCLUDED.

3. INITIAL ANALYSIS CURRENT AELANYARD TAPES INDICATES DEPARTURE POSSIBLY RESULT OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEDVEDEV AND COLLEAGUES, NOTABLY IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV (201-236701) AND ANATOLIY ILICH VASILYEV (201-227440) ON OPS OR POLICY MATTERS.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 RUESBA 2833 SECRET

REVIEWING AVAILABLE MATERIAL FOR MORE CONCRETE DETAILS AND WILL ADVISE.

4. FILE: 201-313586.

SECRET

SECRET

ORIG: PATRICIA FLYNN
UNIT: SB/X/WH
EXT: 0412 1515
DATE: 21 APRIL 1969

TOTAL COPIES: 22

~~SECRE~~T

1	C/H	5	BL
2	CI	6	PE
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 23 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: SB8 INFO: FILE, VR, WH8, RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 21 20 48Z APR 69

CITE DIRECTOR (reference number) 94535

TO BUENOS AIRES

REDTOP AEKICK AEBOOR

REFERENCES A: DIRECTOR 93637*

B: BUENOS AIRES 2784 (IN 39529)**

IDENTITY ENCRYPTED AEBOOR WHOSE CORRECT 201 NUMBER IS 201-236701.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/X/WH L.[illegible]
WH/4/AR
AC/WH/4

*Encrypted known KGB officer, ALFERYEV.

**Requested clarification of subject's 201 number.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

L.[illegible]
SB/XO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1	WH	6	
2	CI	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. APR 19 3 19 PM '69

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ACTION COPY BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 22 PER ______ #

ACTION SB8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS

843

S E C R E T 182150Z APR 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 2784

18 APR 69 IN 39529

DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: DIRECTOR 93637

1. REF INDICATES 201-236701 ENCRYPTED AEBOOR. PRESUME 201-236071 MEANT. IF NOT, PLEASE IDENTIFY FURTHER. ?

2. NO FILE.

S E C R E T

BILL ____

TRB/H ____

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG: PATRICIA FLYNN 20K
UNIT: SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412 1315
DATE: 16 APRIL 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 26 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

DISSEM: SB 8 | FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 17 23 34Z APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 93637

TO BUENOS AIRES

REDTOP AEKICK

SUBJECT OF 201-236701 ENCRYPTED AEBOOR.

END OF MESSAGE

Hqs Comment: Subject is on the Station's Priority Target List and is the target of a residency audio operation.

C/SB/X/WH L. [redacted]
SB/CI/O F Walters
WH/4/AR [illegible]
DC/WH/4 [illegible]

AN MS
AD
JP
FP
JR
SB/X/WH

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

L. [redacted]
SB/XO

17 APR 69
201-236701

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

DATE [illegible]	**REQUEST FOR CODE DESIGNATION** *Fill out in duplicate* *Hand Carry*
SR MC	
RID CR (I D 15)	

1.	REQUEST FOR	☐	PSEUDONYM	☐	ALIAS	☐	CRYPTONYM
	NAME ASSIGNED NEBOOR						

2.	BRANCH [illegible]	CASE OFFICER [illegible]
	BADGE NUMBER [illegible]	HOME PHONE [illegible]

3. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT OR AGENT (what, where, use, etc.)
[illegible]

4.	STATUS	☐	STAFF EMPLOYEE	☐	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	☐	STAFF AGENT
		☐	CONTRACT AGENT	☐	FIELD AGENT	☐	OTHER
5.	TYPE OF ACTIVITY	☐	FI	☐	CI	☐	CA
6.	IS THIS TO BE USED IN CABLE TRAFFIC			☐	YES	☐	NO

7. LIST ANY PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED PSEUDONYM OR CRYPTONYMS

THIS PORTION IS DETACHED AND THE ABOVE IS SENT TO CABLE SECRETARIAT ON CRYPTONYMS ONLY THAT WILL HAVE CABLE TRAFFIC

TRUE NAME [illegible]

FILE NUMBER (201, Project, Subject) [illegible]

FORM 3-66 2611 SECRET (11-39)

A. Ivan (ALFERYEV)

B. Rosa (ALFERYEVA)

C. Anatoliy Ilich (VASILYEV)

C. comes in and asks, "You're angry, aren't you?" A. asks, "Why did you come here so late? You don't deny it; there's no (10)?" C. answers something about old/former guests. A. agrees. B. comes into the room and greets C. very graciously, telling him that they have been waiting for him. Everyone talks at once, joking and laughing. A. calls B. "Rozochka." .

A short portion of the conversation is unreadable because the record player is on as well as a Spanish-language radio program.

AELANYARD - 16 APRIL 1969

SECRET

Americans then become the topic of conversation. A. says, "They work with anyone, with the good and the bad (s khoroshimi i plokhimi.)" B. states, "It is my impression and opinion that, nevertheless, the Americans somehow understand us better, so to speak. I don't know... what to talk about ((or, what someone is talking about))... A. remarks, "I don't understand yet what you are trying to say -- that they simply... they (1G) us very much. How do they understand ((?us?))?" B. explains, "Well among them there are more such progressives that you find here..." C. asks, "Than in Washington?" B. continues, "... Yes, than in Argentina." C. says, " Ah... you ((informal "ty")) understand, I don't know anything about the USA; I only heard a lot about it. I'm not talking about their popularity right now.. (2G) comrades were there ((?in the USA?)). But apparently there actually is (1G) there, nevertheless, and a healthy (??unusual spirit??). That's how I understood it from my comrades/friends who told me about it and who passed on to me (3G), apparently (XG). But the English have something which is not comprehensible to us. (4G) everything, television sets..." B. adds, "That's how I have even ((?noticed it?))... But there, but there they ((the Americans)) are more... in my opinion, they are closer to us." ((Portion unreadable because all talk at once.)) A. says, "I do not agree with you on one thing ((uses the informal "ty"))." C. says, "Ivan, I wasn't there. I'm only saying..." B. says, "But here, in general, the people are such, ((they're)) stupid. Right here in (?Argentina?),((there are)) festivities, restaurants, and everything. They have ([illegible]G). Right?" ((All speak simultaneously - unreadable.))

A bit later, B. says to C. in an exasperated voice, "He shouldn't be so helpless; he shouldn't be so helpless, Anatoliy Ilich, he shouldn't be. If he broke it, he should fix it. 'If you can't ((fix it)), get a specialist.'" A. tries to fix the record player and, obviously hurt, he complains about his wife and says to her, "Don't be rude/crude." ((A. sounds rather high.)) B. complains, "He can't do a thing, Anatoliy Ilich. I simply can't understand. A man in the house is, after all... If something breaks somewhere, it should be fixed. Just say, 'I'll fix it,' that's all. If you can't fix it, you need a specialist." ((She sounds quite annoyed.)) They discuss the cost of fixing the TV and record player.

B. hasn't calmed down and angrily says to her husband, "Everything is falling apart. But you're living in a government-paid apartment. Everything is falling apart. Look, how can it be that way -- the handle. You can see that the handle is falling off; you should screw it in, if you approach it like a man... Should I be the one to screw things in... everywhere. A handle is falling off there, here a handle fell off. How can it be that way?"

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~
~~RYBAT~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Acting Chief f Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
RYBAT REDTOP BIOGENESIS AELANYARD

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

APR 8 1969

Reference: HABA-20357, dated 13 March 1969

1. Transmitted under separate cover for your information are copies of the AELANYARD transcripts from 3 February through 20 March 1969. Since Matthew F. CHETUNG worked exclusively on AEDANGLE-2 during this period, the material being forwarded is comprised entirely of Spanish language transcripts processed by BIOGENESIS transcribers. It is probably representative of the product we shall receive from this operation after CHETUNG's departure.

2. Although we have reviewed this material rather carefully, we have found little hard information therein. From the circumstances and the tenor of the conversations, we conclude that the wife of 201-236701 and the wives of 201-087550, 201-820310 and possibly 201-025485 are friends. From the transcript of 28 February we have extracted the information on 201-236701's T.V. repairman and will suggest that the BIBAFFLE team do at least an initial check. Otherwise, we are confronted with tantalizing fragments which appear to be significant but defy any attempt to read meaning into them. The pages are filled with names of individuals that we have not been able to identify, exceptions being those of officials presently or formerly stationed in Argentina. (From experience with BILOCULAR and other BIOGENESIS transcripts, we feel that some of those names escape recognition simply because they are so garbled.)

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

Transcripts destroyed
January 1970

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/o attach.

27 MAR. 69

CS COPY

COPY ROUTING
1 [illegible] w/ATT.
2 B w/ATT
3
4
5

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-236701

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA-20415

DATE
27 March 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
74-120-221
201-236701

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-20415

3. In the coming months Buenos Aires Station plans to examine and assess the AELANYARD transcripts with care in an effort to decide whether they truly are worth the great amount of time now devoted to their review by Station officers. It is our present feeling that alternative, hopefully more productive operations against 201-236701 should be considered unless we and/or the BIOGENESIS transcribers develop a greater facility for putting the product into a more meaningful context.

4. We should appreciate receiving any comments or ideas Headquarters may have on the separate cover material.

Nina T. Margande
Nina T. MARGANDE

ORIG: C. Thompson:sk
UNIT: TSD/AOB
EXT: 2481
DATE: 10 March 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	PT	6	
2	WH	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ABST SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY Re PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH [ ] FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/TSD 3 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 8, C/SSS, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CI/SD

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 18 [illegible] MAR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 82506

BUENOS AIRES INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT AQUATIC REDCOAT AETARGET AELANYARD

REF BUENOS AIRES 2437 (IN 02909)

1. FAILURE ANALYSIS UNDERWAY. WILL ADVISE MKCHECK CONCLUSIONS.

2. FILE 4-137-100 AND 4-8-100/1.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD Comment: Station request analysis of equipment failure.

WH/4/C Mr. Loftus (by phone X6067)

SB/S/PT Mr. Hunt (by phone X6356)

Benjamin M. Collins
TSD/COP

John H. McBee
Norman S. Jackson
C/TSD/AOB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY: PER

ACTION: C/TSD 3 ☐ RID COPY

#114

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

523

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 8, C/SB 5, C/CI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	FT	6	
2	WH	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 072005Z MAR 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 2483

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

7 MAR 69 IN 09480

RYBAT AQUATIC REDTOP AETARGET AELANYARD

REF: BUENOS AIRES 2437 (IN 00909)

1. ON 5 MARCH OEHRMANN, BISAFFLE 3, BIOGENESIS 14 AND HIS ASSISTAN REPLACED SWA-3A ON REF LINE WITH NEW UNIT, SERIAL G-925, THUS RESTORING AUDIO. DEFECTIVE PREAMP WILL BE POUCHED HQS FOR INSPECTION.

2. FOR PANAMA CITY: PLEASE FORWARD TWO SWA-3A PREAMPS AND ONE UWP-9 POWER SUPPLY FOR STATION STOCK.

3. FILE: 4-137-100 AND 4-8-10/1.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: _____ AT: _____ Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER _____ #

ACTION C/TSD-3 ☐ RID COPY

820

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____

X-REF TO FILE NO. _____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR. C/RI/SD, C/WH-8, C/SB-5, C/FI-2, C/CI,

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	CT	6	
2	WH	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 272123Z FEB 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 2437

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT AQUATIC REDTOP AETARGET AELANYARD

27 FEB 69 IN 02909

REFS: A. BUENOS AIRES 2110 (IN 62639)

B. HABA-20212

1. FOLLOWING HEAVY RAIN, ELECTRICAL STORM ONE AELANYARD LINE NOT OPERATING. CHECK BY GEHRMANN SHOWS PROBLEM IS OUTSIDE LP, PROBABLY ANTOHER FAILURE OF SWA-3A PREAMPLIFIER. BIOGENESIS-14 DUE RETURN FROM VACATION WEEK 3 MARCH AND WE PLAN AGAIN REPLACE DEFECTIVE UNIT.

2. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST FINDINGS ON DEFECTIVE UNITS FORWARDED HQS VIA REF B.

3. FILE 4-137-100 AND 4-8-10/1

S E C R E T

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT: REDTOP AEKICK
ALFERYEV Contact with Lev YASHIN (201-)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded under separate cover for your information is a copy of a BILOCULAR report of 8 January describing a conversation between Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV and Soccer player Lev YASHIN (DPOB; 22 October 1929, Moscow, Passport 331422). YASHIN and the rest of the Moscow Dynamo team had just arrived at Ezeiza Airport on Varig Flight 845 from Rio and were departing for Santiago on SAS Flight 955 after a layover in Argentina of three and one half hours. The team was on a Latin American tour covering Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. (close friend of Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV [illegible] (201-236701)

No 201

2. During the conversation KGB officer ALFERYEV and YASHIN, whom we believe is KGB, show that they are fairly close friends. They also mention mutual friends: Ivan Semenovich ARKHIPENKO (201-731434), a suspect KGB officer formerly stationed in Argentina; and Vitaliy Borisovich SHUBIN, the former Consul/KGB officer in Chile. close friend of Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV [illegible] (201-236701)

Nina T. Margande
Nina T. MARGANDE

amended on abstract.

FEB 17 1969

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

S/C ATT'D AS STATED
Dated 14 Feb 69

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach. u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/o attach.

CS COPY

1 att (usc)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HABA-20258

DATE: 5 February 1969

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: ~~201-236071~~ 201-236701

11
URSS
[illegible] 8 de enero de 1969 LINEA Cs 92
T E 42-8039

CARETE GR 026 Página 3 3P

(SIGUE)-HM - Para cuándo calcula / más o menos ¿
-HD - Para este mes va estar seguro - Después el mes que viene nos vamos de vacaciones -
-HM - Asi que el mes que viene van de vacaciones ¿
-HD - Sí - Mucho entregamos ya - Se entregaron unos cuantos -
-HM - Sí / sí -
-HD - Por 17 hay / después no hay más - Acá está anotado el número suyo - el suyo / puede ser que dentro de una semana este - Llameme a la tarde / asi hablo con el patron -
-HM - Como no - (c)

-HD con la Sra [illegible] -
-HD - Hablo con la embajada ¿
-HM - Sí -
-HD - Le habla [illegible] / desde Moscu - Buenos días -
-HM - Buenos días -
-JA - Por favor me podría llamar a Ivan [illegible] ¿
-HM - Un momento / ahora voy a preguntar ----- (se oye decir a [illegible] "Mijail Konstantinovich ([illegible]) / por favor llame [illegible] a [illegible] / lo llama [illegible] desde MOSCU / rapido / rapido / porque tiempo corre ----- aja) ----- escuche / espere un momento / ahora él va a bajar - Ud tenía que llamar por otro número - Porque él está en otro número - ahora él ya viene -
-JA - Yo tengo acá tres números - Me costó mucho para comunicarse con Ud - Tengo acá 83-5271 -
-HM - No / no / no es ese - Tenía que llamar al 42-1552 -
-JA - No / me dieron solo estos tres números y con el último me pude comunicar -
-HM - Bueno / mientras llega [illegible] / quiero preguntar / qué tal está Moscu ¿
-JA - Hace mucho frío - Bajo 20 -
-HM - Y nosotros ayer teníamos 32 -
-JA - Ah que lindo / con que gusto iríamos allí para calentarnos un poco -
-HM - (Se ríe) - Ud viene a Buenos Aires -
-JA - No / nosotros estamos acá de paso en "aerodromo" - Nosotros vamos a Chile -
-HM - A Chile ¿
-JA - Nosotros vamos a tener un torneo / de "[illegible]" - Asi que viajamos para Chile para jugar -
-HM - Y por qué no vienen acá ¿
-JA - Nosotros con mucho gusto / pero no nos dejan -
-HM - Que sin verguenzas (se ríe) -
-JA - Ahí está el gato encerrado -
-HM - Qué bien que se oye a Ud - Parece que yo estoy en Moscu -
-JA - Tambien yo lo oigo bien -
-HM - Y además qué novedades hay ¿
-JA - Con quién hablo yo ¿
-HM - Con la persona que esta de guardia -
-JA - Mucho gusto - Hace poco yo estuve en Mexico - He visto a muchos muchachos que han trabajado - He visto a Ivan [illegible]
-HM - Ivan [illegible] / trabajo acá en la Argentina -
-JA - Lo sé / con él yo me encontré varias veces - Hace poco me encontre con él en MEXICO -
-HM - Que lastima que Uds no vienen - Nosotros los esperamos el año pasado -
-JA - Y no sale -
-HM - Y este año ya no vienen ¿
-JA - No creo / porque allí en la Argentina el torneo está para terminar - Ahora allí juegan Hungaros - Austriacos / pero nosotros no participamos - Nuestros van a jugar tambien en Uruguay -
-HM - Pero es tan cerca - SIGUE 3/4

201-238701

MICROFILMED
FEB 17 1969
[illegible]

1 1
URSS
PORTERIA . 8 de enero de 1969 LINEA Co 92
TE .42-8039

CARRETE CR 026 Página 4

(SIGUE)-JA- (¿¿ Representantes ¿¿) van a visitar el URUGUAY - A la mejor ellos van hacer una visita a la Argentina - Ahora no le puedo asegurar -
-NA - Bueno / solo ~~para~~ como huespides / ya no vamos hablar del torneo -
-JA - Bueno / es cómo fuera que una hace una visita de "Sokolniki" a "Arbat" ¿
-NA - Asi es (se rie) --- Porque es "tan cerca" - Escucha / nosotros tenemos un calor barbaro - Ayer hacía un calor insuportable - Hoy es un poco mejor -
-JA - Está bien / porque hay brisa del viento / no hace calor - Nosotros recien estuvimos en Brasil - Allí si que hace calor - Nosotros llegamos a las siete de la mañana y hacia 29 grados -
-NA - Un momento / ya llegó ALFERIEV -
-ALFERIEV con JASHIN (IACHINE)
-AL - Lova -
-JA - Salud Vania (Ivan)
-AL - Buenos días / pero allí es ya noche -
-JA - Cómo -
-AL - Primero "Feliz Año Nuevo" -
-JA - Tambien para ti "Feliz Año Nuevo" - Y te saludan todos muchachos -
-AL - Le agradezco que no han alvidado al viejito -
-JA - Yo pensé que si voy a tener oportunidad de llamarte te voy a llamar -
-AL - De dónde llamas tú ¿
-JA - De "aerodrom" -
-AL - Y adónde van Uds ¿
-JA - A Santiago - Allí tenemos torneo -
-AL - Yo no sabía a qué hora Uds van a pasar / porque yo iría a aerodromo - Yo crei que Uds pasen más tarde -
-JA - Nosotros venimos de Italia - Nosotros Hemos jugado en Italia dos ---
-AL - (Lo interrumpe) ---- Yo sabía que Uds se van a pasar por acá en transito / pero no sabía ni qué día ni a qué hora -
-JA - Y bueno -
-AL - Bueno Lova (Leon) te deseo mucha suerte en Chile - Después llamame de Chile - Adónde van Uds después ¿
-JA - Nosotros hacemos Chile / Peru / Colombia / Ecuador -
-AL - Bueno / yo te voy a mandar algo / porque voy a tener ocasion -
-JA - Cuándo ¿
-AL - En proximos días -
-JA - Adónde / a Chile ¿
-AL - Sí -
-JA - Y tú no puedes venir a Chile ¿
-AL - No creo -
-JA - Y tan c[illegible]
-AL - No creo / demasiado complicado -
-JA - Escucha / yo podría hacerte ahora un pequeño presente / pero tengo todo allí -
-AL - Está bien / gracias -
-JA - Y allí en Chile a quién puedo entregar el obsequio ¿
-AL - Al consul / creo yo -
-JA - Y quién reemplaza a CHURIN (CHURINE) ¿
-AL - No sabría decirtelo - Vas a entregar al consul -
-JA - Está bien - Creo que voy a ver a todos - Porque nosotros nos vamos a quedar allí tres semanas -
-AL - Tres semanas se van quedarse en Chile ¿
-JA - Sí -

1 1
URSS
PORTERIA

8 de enero de 1969

LINEA Ca 92
TL 42-[illegible]039

CARRETE GR 026

Página 5

(SIGUE)-AL - Que bien -
-JA - Escucha te mandan saludos los muchachos desde Mexico -
-AL - Gracias -
-JA - Me encontré allí con todos muchachos -
-AL - Creo que este año nos vamos encontrar en MOSCU -
-JA - Vas a venir de licencia ¿
-AL - Sí / en el mes de junio -
-JA - Bueno / y además qué tal ¿
-AL - Todo está bien / solo no me gusta este clima / hace mucho calor / es sofocante -
-JA - Es como baño turco / asi hay que aprovechar / para poder sudar -
-AL - Asi es - No nos queda otra alternativa -
-[illegible] - Cuándo sale el avión ¿
-JA - El avión sale dentro de una hora y media dos horas -
-AL - Dentro de dos horas ¿
-JA - Más o menos / porque es un avión de la compania "SAS" y no se por qué viene con retraso - Todavía no llegó -
-AL - A la mejor voy a ir hasta allí - Si es dentro de una hora y media dos horas salen Uds ¿
-JA - Pero es lejo ¿
-AL - Son 40 min -
-JA - Si son 40 min a la mejor llegan en tiempo - Pero vale la pena ¿ Tu lo sabes mejor -
-AL - Vamos a ver si podemos -
-JA - Bueno / saludos y hasta la vista -
-AL - Gracias por haberme llamado y hasta la vista - (u)

13 00 -Zoia° con Valia NAUMOV -
-ZO - Llego Tamara FIODOROV ¿
-NA - Todavía no -
-ZO - Y dónde está paseando tanto tiempo -
-NA - Bueno / ellas fueron al Centro / creo que dentro de poco van a llegar - Yo anoté así que tu llamaste - Cuando ella viene te va a llamar -
-ZO - Gracias - (u)

80-0592
-Tamara FIODOROV° con Zoia ERMATCHKOV -
-FI - Buenas tardes Zoia -
-ER - Buenas tardes - Escuche yo te llamaba por el asunto de la quinta - Tú tienes allí el turno de 19 a 26 y yo de 26 a 2 - Quería preguntarte / no quieres cambiar conmigo ¿
-FI - Me parece que Galia BOLDIKOV quería cambiar conmigo - Porque no hables antes con ella para ponerse de acuerdo y depues para mi es igual -
-ER - Yo creo que con ella no habrá problema -
-FI - Bueno / después vamos a conversar -
-ER - Como no - (u)

14 00

15 00

-HD° con Valia NAUMOV -
-HD - Hablo con la embajada Rusa ¿
-NA - Sí -
-HD - Le hablo de dirección de noticias (¿¿pro artel ¿¿) canal 13 -
-NA - Espera un momento —— (viene AVIKOVSKI) -
-HD - Le hablo de división noticias del Canal 13 - Nosotros quisieramos hacer una nota / mañana de noticiero - Es sobre

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT REDTOP AEKICK
ALFERYEV Contact with Lev YASHIN (201-)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded under separate cover for your information is a copy of a BILOCULAR report of 8 January describing a conversation between Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV and Soccer player Lev YASHIN (DPOB: 22 October 1929, Moscow, Passport 331422). YASHIN and the rest of the Moscow Dynamo team had just arrived at Ezeiza Airport on Varig Flight 845 from Rio and were departing for Santiago on SAS Flight 955 after a layover in Argentina of three and one half hours. The team was on a Latin American tour covering Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador.

2. During the conversation KGB officer ALFERYEV and YASHIN, whom we believe is KGB, show that they are fairly close friends. They also mention mutual friends: Ivan Semenovich ARKHIPENKO (201-731434), a suspect KGB officer formerly stationed in Argentina; and Vitaliy Borisovich SHUBIN, the former Consul/KGB officer in Chile.

Elma T. MARGAKIS

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach. u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/o attach.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-20258	DATE 8 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-236971

1 1
U R S S
[illegible]

8 de enero de 1969

[illegible] Co 92
[illegible] 42-3039

CARETE GR 026

Página 3

(SIGUE)-HE - Para cuándo calcula / más o menos ¿
-HM - Para este mes va estar seguro - Después el mes que viene nos vamos de vacaciones -
-HE - Así que el mes que viene van de vacaciones ¿
-HM - Sí - Mucho entregamos ya - Se entregaron unos cuantos -
-HE - Sí / sí -
-HM - Por 17 hay / después no hay más - Acá está anotado el número suyo - El suyo / puede ser que dentro de una semana este- Llámeme a la tarde / así hablo con el patron -
-HE - Como no - (c)

-HM° con la Sra MALKOV -
-HM - Hablo con la embajada ¿
-JA - Sí -
-HM - Le habla JASHIN / desde Moscu - Buenos días -
-NA - Buenos días -
-JA - Por favor me podría llamar a Ivan ALFEREV ¿
-NA - Un momento / ahora voy a preguntar ----- (se oye decir a MALKOVA "Mijail Konstantinovich (MALKOV) / por favor llame rapido a ALFEREV / lo llama JASHIN desde MOSCU / rapido / rapido / porque tiempo corre ----- aja) -----escuche / espere un momento / ahora él va a bajar - Ud tenía que llamar por otro número - Porque él está en otro número - ahora él ya viene -
-JA - Yo tengo acá tres números - Me costó mucho para comunicarse con Ud - Tengo acá 33-5271 -
-NA - No / no / no es ese - Tenía que llamar al 42-1552 -
-JA - No / me dieron solo estos tres números y con el último no pude comunicar -
-NA - Bueno / mientras llega ALFEREV / quiero preguntar / qué tal está Moscu ¿
-JA - Hace mucho frio - Bajo 20 -
-NA - Y nosotros ayer tenimos 32 -
-JA - Ah que lindo / con que gusto iríamos allí para calentarnos un poco -
-NA - (Se rie) - Ud viene a Buenos Aires -
-JA - No / nosotros estamos acá de paso en "aerodromo" - Nosotros vamos a Chile -
-NA - A Chile ¿
-JA - Nosotros vamos a tener un torneo / de "DINAMO" - Así que viajamos para Chile para jugar -
-NA - Y por qué no vienen acá ¿
-JA - Nosotros con mucho gusto / pero no nos dejan -
-NA - Que sin verguenzas (se rie) -
-JA - Ahí está el gato encerrado -
-NA - Qué bien que se oye a Ud - Parece que yo estoy en Moscu -
-JA - Tambien yo le oigo bien -
-NA - Y además qué novedades hay ¿
-JA - Con quién hablo yo ¿
-NA - Con la persona que esta de guardia -
-JA - Mucho gusto - Hace poco yo estuve en Mexico - He visto a Ivan [illegible] a muchos muchachos que han trabajado - He visto
-NA - Ivan ARTIMENKO / trabajo acá en la Argentina -
-JA - Lo sé / con él yo me encontré varias veces - Hace poco me encontre con él en MEXICO -
-NA - Que lastima que Uds no vienen- Nosotros los esperamos el año pasado -
-JA - Y no sale -
-NA - Y este año ya no vienen ¿
-JA - No creo / porque allí en la Argentina el torneo está para terminar - Ahora allí juegan Hungaros - Austriacos / pero nosotros no participamos - Nuestros van a jugar tambien en Uruguay -
-NA - Pero es tan cerca -

SIGUE 3/4

1 1
U R S S
PORTERIA . 8 de enero de 1969 LINEA Cn 92
TE 42-8039

CARRETE GR 026 Página 4

(SIGUE)-JA- (¿¿ Representantes ¿¿) van a visitar el URUGUAY - A la mejor ellos van hacer una visita a la Argentina - Ahora no le puedo asegurar -
-NA - Bueno / solo como huespides / ya no vamos hablar del torneo -
-JA - Bueno / es cómo fuera que uno hace una visita de "Sokolnika" a "Arbat" ¿
-NA - Asi es (se rie) ---- Porque es "tan cerca" - Escuche / nosotros tenemos un calor barbaro - Ayer hacei un calor insuportable - Hoy es un poco mejor -
-JA - Está bien / porque hay brisa del viento / no hace calor - Nosotros recien estuvimos en Brasil - Allí si que hace calor - Nosotros llegamos a las siete de la mañana y hacia 29 grados -
-NA - Un momento / ya llegó ALFERIEV -
-ALFERIEV con JASHIN (IACHINE)
-AL - Lova -
-JA - Salud Vania (Ivan)
-AL - Buenos días / pero allí es ya noche -
-JA - Cómo -
-AL - Primero "Feliz Año Nuevo" -
-JA - Tambien para ti "Feliz Alo Nuevo" - Y te saludan todos muchachos -
-AL - Le agradesco que no han alvidando al viejito -
-JA - Yo pensé que si voy a tener oportunidad de llamarte te voy a llamar -
-AL - De dónde llamas tu ¿
-JA - De "aerodrom" -
-AL - Y adónde van Uds ¿
-JA - A Santiago - Allí tenemos torneo -
-AL - Yo no sabía a qué hora Uds van a pasar / porque yo iria a aerodromo - Yo creí que Uds pasan más tarde -
-JA - Nosotros venimos de Italia - Nosotros Hemos jugnéo en Italia dos ----
-AL - (Lo interrumpe) ---- Yo sabía que Uds se van a pasar por acá en tranzito / pero no sabía ni qué día ni a qué hora -
-JA - Y bueno -
-AL - Bueno Lova (Leon) te deseo mucha suerte en Chile - Después llamame de Chile - Adónde van Uds después ¿
-JA - Nosotros hacemos Chile / Peru / Colombia / Ecuador -
-AL - [illegible] yo te voy a mandar algo / porque voy a tener consion -
-JA - Cuándo ¿
-AL - En próximos días -
-JA - Adónde / a Chile ¿
-AL - Sí -
-JA - Y tú no puedes venir a Chile ¿
-AL - No creo -
-JA - Y tan cerca -
-AL - No creo / demaciado complicado -
-JA - Escuche / yo podría hacerte ahora un pequeño presente / pero tengo todo allí -
-AL - Está bien / gracias -
-JA - Y allí en Chile a quién puedo entregar el obsequio ¿
-AL - Al consul / creo yo
-JA - Y quién reemplasa a [illegible] (CHURINE) ¿
-AL - No sabría decirtelo - Vas a entregar al consul -
-JA - Está bien - Creo que voy a ver a todos - Porque nosotr nos vamos a quedar allí tres [illegible] -
-AL - Tres semanas se van quedarse en Chile ¿

1 1
U R S S
PORTERIA

8 de enero de 1969

L I N E A Ca 92
T E 42-8039

CARRETE GR 026

(SIGUE)-AL - Que bien -
-JA - Escucho te mandan saludos los muchachos desde Mexico -
-AL - Gracias -
-JA - Me encontré allí con todos muchachos -
-AL - Creo que este año nos vamos encontrar en MOSCU -
-JA - Vas a venir de licenica ¿
-AL - Sí / en el mes de junio -
-JA - Bueno / y además qué tal ¿
-AL - Todo está bien / solo no me gusta este clima / hace mucho calor / es sofocante -
-JA - Es como baño turco / así hay que aprovechar / para poder sudar -
-AL - Así es - No nos queda otra Alternativa -
-AL - Cuándo sale el avión ¿
-JA - El avión sale dentro de una hora y media dos horas -
-AL - Dentro de dos horas ¿
-JA - Más o menos / porque es un avión de la compañía "SAS" y no se por qué viene con retraso - Todavía no llegó -
-AL - A lo mejor voy a ir hasta allá - Si es dentro de una hora y media dos horas salen Uds ¿
-JA - Pero es lejo ¿
-AL - Son 40 min -
-JA - Si son 40 min a lo mejor llegan en tiempo - Pero vale la pena ¿ Tu lo sabes mejor -
-AL - Vamos a ver si podemos -
-JA - Bueno / saludos y hasta la vista -
-AL - Gracias por haberme llamado y hasta la vista - (u)

13 00 -Zoia° con Valia NAUMOV -
-ZO - Llego Tamara FIODOROV ¿
-NA - Todavía no -
-ZO - ¿ Dónde está pasando tanto tiempo -
-NA - Bueno / ellos fueron al Centro / creo que dentro de poco van a llegar - Yo anoté acá que tu llamaste - Cuando ella viene te va a llamar -
-ZO - Gracias - (u)

80-0392
-Tamara FIODOROV° con Zoia [illegible] -
-FI - Buenas tardes Zoia -
-ZR - Buenas tardes - Escucho yo te llamaba por el asunto de la quinta - Tú tienes allí el turno de 19 a 26 y yo de 26 a 2 - Quería preguntarte / no quieres cambiar conmigo ¿
-FI - Me parece que Galia [illegible] quería cambiar conmigo - Porque no hablas antes con ella para ponerse de acuerdo y depues para mi es igual -
-ZR - Yo creo que con ella no habrá problema -
-FI - Bueno / después vamos a conversar -
-ZR - Como no - (u)

14 00

15 00

-HD° con Valia NAUMOV -
-HD - Hable con la embajada Rusa ¿
-NA - Sí -
-HD - Le hable de dirección de noticias (¿¿pre artel ¿¿) canál 13 -
-NA - Espere un momento ---- (viene AVAKOVSKI) -
-HD - Le hable de división noticias del Canal 13 - Nosotros quisieramos hacer una nota / mañana de noticiero - Es sobre este viaje a VENUS - Entonces necesitaría de Uds toda la

[illegible]
[illegible] 8 de enero de 1969 [illegible] Co 92
[illegible]

CA[illegible] 026 Página 3

(SIGUE)-LE - Para cuándo calcula / más o menos ¿
-HD - Para este mes va estar seguro - después el mes que viene nos vamos de vacaciones -
-LE - Así que el mes que viene van de vacaciones ¿
-HD - Sí - Mucho entregamos ya - Se entregaron unos cuantos -
-LE - Sí / sí -
-HD - Por 17 hay / después no hay más - Acá está anotado el número suyo - el suyo / puede ser que dentro de una semana entonces llámeme a la tarde / así hablo con el patron -
-LE - Como no - (c)

-HD con la Sra [illegible] -
-HD - Hablo con la embajada ¿
-NA - Sí -
-HD - Le habla JA[illegible] / desde Moscu - Buenos días -
-NA - Buenos días -
-JA - Por favor me podría llamar a Ivan A[illegible] ¿
-NA - Un momento / ahora voy a preguntar ----- (se oye decir a [illegible] "Mijail Konstantinovich ([illegible]) / por favor llame rápido a A[illegible] / lo llama JA[illegible] desde [illegible] / rápido / rápido / porque tiempo corre ----- aja) ----- noche / espere un momento / ahora él va a bajar - Ud tenía que llamar por otro número - porque él está en otro número - ahora él ya viene -
-JA - Yo tengo acá tres números - Me costó mucho para comunicarse con Ud - Tengo acá 83-5271 -
-NA - No / no / no es ese - Tenía que llamar al 42-1552 -
-JA - No / me dieron solo estos tres números y con el último se pudo comunicar -
-NA - Bueno / mientras llega A[illegible] / quiero preguntar / qué tal está Moscu ¿
-JA - Hace mucho frio - Bajo 20 -
-NA - Y nosotros ayer tenímos 32 -
-JA - Ah que lindo / con que gusto iríamos allí para calentarnos un poco -
-NA - (Se ríe) - Ud viene a Buenos Aires -
-JA - No / nosotros estamos acá de paso en "aeródromo" - Nosotros vamos a Chile -
-NA - A Chile ¿
-JA - Nosotros vamos a tener un torneo / de "[illegible]" - Así que viajamos para Chile para jugar -
-NA - Y por qué no vienen acá ¿
-JA - Nosotros con mucho gusto / pero no nos dejan -
-NA - Que sin verguenzas (se ríe) -
-JA - Ahí está el gato encerrado -
-NA - Qué bien que se oye a Ud - Parece que yo estoy en Moscu -
-JA - También yo lo oigo bien -
-NA - Y además qué novedades hay ¿
-JA - Con quién hablo yo ¿
-NA - Con la persona que está de guardia -
-JA - Mucho gusto - Hace poco yo estuve en Mexico - He visto a muchos muchachos que han trabajado - He visto a Ivan [illegible]
-JA - Ivan A[illegible] / trabajo acá en la Argentina -
-NA - Lo sé / con él yo me encontré varias veces - Hace poco me encontré con él en MEXICO -
-NA - Que lástima que Uds no vienen - Nosotros los esperamos el año pasado -
-JA - Y no sale -
-NA - Y este año ya no vienen ¿
-JA - No creo / porque allí en la Argentina el torneo está para terminar - Ahora allí juegan Hungaros - Austriacos / pero nosotros no participamos - Nuestros van a jugar también en Uruguay -
-NA - Pero es tan cerca - SIGUE 3/4

i 1
U R S S
PORTERIA . 8 de enero de 1969 LINEA Co 92
TE 42-6039

CARRETE GR 026 Página 4

(SIGUE)-JA- (¿¿ Representantes ¿¿) van a visitar el URUGUAY - A la mejor ellos van hacer una visita a la Argentina - Ahora no le puedo asegurar -
-JA - Bueno / solo ~~para~~ como huespedes / ya no vamos hablar del torneo -
-JA - Bueno / es cómo fuera que uno hace una visita de "Sokolniki" a "Arbat" ¿
-JA - Asi es (se rie) —— Porque es "tan cerca" - Escuche / nosotros tenemos un calor barbaro - Ayer hacai un calor insuportable - Hoy es un poco mejor -
-JA - Está bien / porque hay brisa del viento / no hace calor - Nosotros recien estuvimos en Brasil - Allí si que hace calor - Nosotros llegamos a las siete de la mañana y hacia 29 grados -
-NA - Un momento / ya llegó ALEXEEV -
-ALEXEEV con JASHIN (IACHINE)
-AL - Lova -
-JA - Salud Vania (Ivan)
-AL - Buenos días / pero allí es ya noche -
-JA - Cómo -
-AL - Primero "Feliz Año Nuevo" -
-JA - Tambien para ti "Feliz Año Nuevo" - Y te saludan todos muchachos -
-AL - Le agradezco que no han alvidado al viejito -
-JA - Yo pensé que si voy a tener oportunidad de llamarte te voy a llamar -
-AL - De dónde llamas tú ¿
-JA - De "aerodrom" -
-AL - Y adónde van Uds ¿
-JA - A Santiago - Allí tenemos torneo -
-AL - Yo no sabía a qué hora Uds van a pasar / porque yo iría ~~a aeródromo - Yo creí que Uds pasan más tarde~~ -
-JA - Nosotros venimos de Italia - Nosotros hemos jugado en Italia dos ——
-AL - (Lo interrumpe) —— Yo sabía que Uds se van a pasar por acá en transito / pero no sabía ni qué día ni a qué hora -
-JA - Y bueno -
-AL - Bueno Lova (Leon) te deseo mucha suerte en Chile - Después llamame de Chile - Adónde van Uds después ¿
-JA - Nosotros hacemos Chile / Peru / Colombia / Ecuador -
-AL - Bueno / yo te voy a mandar algo / porque voy a tener ocasion -
-JA - Cuándo ¿
-AL - En proximos días -
-JA - Adónde / a Chile ¿
-AL - Sí -
-JA - Y tú no puedes venir a Chile ¿
-AL - No creo -
-JA - Y tan cerca -
-AL - No creo / demasiado complicado -
-JA - Escucha / yo podría hacerte ahora un pequeño presente / pero tengo todo allí -
-AL - Está bien / gracias -
-JA - Y allí en Chile a quién puedo entregar el obsequio ¿
-AL - Al consul / creo yo
-JA - Y quién reemplaza a CHUBAIN (CHUBAINE) ¿
-AL - No sabría decirtelo - Vas a entregar al consul -
-JA - [illegible] - Creo que voy a ver a todos - Porque nosotros nos vamos a quedar allí tres semanas -
-AL - Tres semanas se van quedarse en Chile ¿

(SIGUE)-AL - Que bien -
-JA - Escuche te mandan saludos los muchachos desde Mexico -
-AL - Gracias -
-JA - Me encontré allá con todos muchachos -
-AL - Creo que este año nos vamos encontrar en MOSCU -
-JA - Vas a venir de licenica ¿
-AL - Sí / en el mes de junio -
-JA - Bueno / y además qué tal ¿
-AL - Todo está bien / solo no me gusta este clima / hace mucho calor / es sofocante -
-JA - Es como baño turco / asi hay que aprovechar / para poder sudar -
-AL - Asi es - No nos queda otra Alternativa -
-AL - Cuándo sale el avión ¿
-JA - El avión sale dentro de una hora y media dos horas -
-AL - Dentro de dos horas ¿
-JA - Más o menos / porque es un avión de la compañía "SAS" y no se por qué viene con retraso - Todavía no llegó -
-AL - A la mejor voy a ir hasta allá - Si es dentro de una hora y media dos horas salen Uds ¿
-JA - Pero es lejo ¿
-AL - Son 40 min -
-JA - Si son 40 min a la mejor llegan en tiempo - Pero vale la pena ¿ Tu lo sabes mejor -
-AL - Vamos a ver si podemos -
-JA - Bueno / saludos y hasta la vista -
-AL - Gracias por haberme llamado y hasta la vista - (u)

13 00 -Zoia° con Valia NAUMOV -
-ZO - Llego Tamara FIODOROV ¿
-NA - Todavía no -
-ZO - Y dónde está paseando tanto tiempo -
-NA - Bueno / ellos fueron al Centro / creo que dentro de pose van a llegar - Yo anoté así que tu llamaste - Cuando ella viene te va a llamar -
-ZO - Gracias - (u)

80-0592
-Tamara FIODOROV° con Zoia ERMATCHKOV -
-FI - Buenas tardes Zoia -
-ER - Buenas tardes - Escucha yo te llamaba por el asunto de la quinta - Tú tienes allí el turno de 19 a 25 y yo de 26 a 2 - Quería preguntarte / no quieres cambiar conmigo ¿
-FI - Me parece que Galia BOLDINOV quería cambiar conmigo - Porque no hables antes con ella para ponerse de acuerdo y depues para mi es igual -
-ER - Yo creo que con ella no habrá problema -
-FI - Bueno / después vamos a conversar -
-ER - Como no - (u)

14 00

15 00 -ID° con Valia NAUMOV -
-ID - Hablo con la embajada Rusa ¿
-NA - Sí -
-ID - Le hablo de dirección de noticias (¿¿pro artel ¿¿) canal 13 -
-NA - Espere un momento ——— (viene AVROVSKI) -
-ID - Le hablo de división noticias del Canal 13 - Nosotros [illegible] hacer una nota / mañana de noticiero - Le sobre

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~S E C R E T~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
O REDTOP/Operational Evening with ~~201-236071~~ 201-236701 and Wife

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. After many months of contact and many promises to "get together" some evening, Paul W. LEVERONE received a firm promise from 201-~~236071~~ 236701 that he and his wife would drop by for a drink and a snack on 9 January 1969. The promise became a reality, and the report of the evening's activities is forwarded under separate cover.

2. Although no firm date for a future meeting was set, every effort will be made to continue social development of Subject.

Paul W. Leverone
Paul W. LEVERONE

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

[illegible]'D BY [illegible]/AN
28 JAN 69

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach. u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/attach. u/s/c

1 Att (usc)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-20210	DATE 16 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ [redacted] 201-236701

~~SECRET~~

1. Subject arrived at 1930 bearing a Russian record as a gift from his wife and a bottle of vodka with a jar of caviar as a gift from himself. He apologized that his wife could not make it that evening because she had to attend a "command performance". Although Subject claims to be under a doctor's care for problems with his stomach and legs (blood pressure problems) and is supposed to avoid use of alcohol for four months, he did accept a drink (Scotch) and then proceeded to chat about various inconsequential topics. At about 2000 MARGANDE dropped in and a general conversation ensued. LEVERONE offered to prepare some Shashlik and Subject stated that it was one of the favorite dishes of his wife. He suggested that perhaps he could pick her up after the "command performance" and bring her to the apartment. This was readily agreed to but since there was an hour and a half remaining before Subject could fetch his wife, we continued with general conversation. The following points concerning Subject's past activity came to light.

a. Subject stated that he had spent some time in Argentina in 1958 and that during this time he had had a chance to travel freely and see something of the country. The people were friendlier, politer and less hurried then. He did not go into detail as to what he was doing in Argentina but it appears to have been an official visit.

b. His "high point" was Mexico and his fondest memories are of his time spent there. He claims that he was able to travel over the entire country and got to know it better than his own. He also had various close friends in the journalistic field including several Americans (sic). In Mexico he was a PRAVDA correspondent.

c. Subject also stated he had been in Ecuador for an unspecified length of time during the month when the annual Indian fiesta is held. He claimed to like the place very much and described at length the Indian practice of selling all their produce at the fair and then spending the money on liquor.

d. When Subject was ready to leave Mexico he applied for a transit visa to the United States. When its issuance was delayed for some time, he asked the American officials concerned if there were

CS COPY

s/c att #1 to HABA-20210 SECRET 201-236701 any specific problems regarding the visa or if it was being withheld simply because he was a Soviet. If the latter were the case, he said he would raise the question with the President of the United States (who was visiting Mexico at the time and was going to hold a press conference). Subject claims that as a result of this threat the visa was issued almost immediately. Due to completely fortuitous circumstances, Subject and three other Soviet correspondents met in New York on the 4th of July. LNERGO allegedly became excited about the presence of four Soviet correspondents in New York at one time and carried on a very tight surveillance which was quite annoying. During this time the notes compiled for books on Latin America were stolen from Subject and as a result his literary ambitions have not been realized.

e. Subject stated that he has a 14-year old son in Moscow and although they miss the boy, there are no adequate schools in Argentina. This is the reason for the separation. In Mexico the Soviet Embassy has provision for the three primary grades. That is where Subject's son started his schooling.

2. At 2130 hours Subject left to pick up his wife saying he would be back in about 40 minutes. This was fine since it gave MARGANDE and LEVERONE time to get everything prepared for the meal. At 2230 hours Subject called to say they were "on the way" and would be over shortly. At 2315 they arrived at LEVERONE's apartment.

3. A general four-way conversation continued during which Subject's and his wife's comments ran as follows:

a. Their son in Moscow is studying English and speaks it rather well. He also keeps fish in a 175-liter fish tank. Subject was unable to recall the sort of fish in question.

b. There was a rather lengthy commentary on the system of sending single people abroad for assignment to embassies. Subject's wife was very surprised that the Americans would send single men and women abroad since this was very "dangerous". She stated that the Soviets occasionally send a single girl to a foreign post but the implication was very strong that she was "well chaperoned".

c. They were both interested in the linguistic abilities of individuals assigned to the American Embassy and stated that the Americans were often sent abroad with virtually no knowledge of the language whereas the Soviets were always well trained. (Subject's wife managed to get this point across in her halting Spanish and with assistance from her husband whom she kept asking for the Spanish equivalent of Russian words.) Subject did state that the Soviet language training system was not the greatest and seemed to give a point to the U.S. system when MARGANDE said that she had learned her Spanish from tapes and instruction.

d. Subject and his wife agreed that Buenos Aires is a large, dirty, indifferent city. They talked with nostalgia about their Moscow apartment which was only a ten-minute drive from lovely forests and streams where "a person could really relax". They mentioned that they had a quinta to which they retired on weekends but that the quinta was noisy and full of mosquitos. (MARGANDE and Subject's wife agreed that Raid and Off were the most important purchases in Buenos Aires in the summertime.)

3. Conversation and listening to music continued until about 0200 hours (with Subject's wife oohing and aahing over American songs and arrangements). The evening was friendly and relaxed and there was no attempt to get into deeper political or ideological discussions since the primary purpose was to establish rapport and pave the way for future meetings.

4. Given below are MARGANDE's and LEVERONE's impressions of Subject and wife:

Subject: Although Subject at times gives the impression of being a rather simple fellow, this effect is created more by his apparent non-aggressive attitude than by actual evaluation of his intelligence. He appears to be au courant of the general situation in Argentina and his assessment of world situations and incidents seems to be quite logical and unbiased. It might even be suggested that Subject is not overly influenced by Soviet official stands concerning certain specific topics. Unlike 201-183943, he does not go about spouting a very obvious party line. Subject presents a pleasant appearance, dresses well (he had on a clean shirt!), and is generally XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX an attractive individual with a fairly good sense of humor. He appears to understand a fair amount of English but it is hard to judge his speaking ability since he seems to be reluctant to talk at length in the language. He also appears to know some Georgian. He claims to know the Soviet Union west of the Urals rather well but gives the impression that he has never traveled in the eastern part of the country. From his comments and from observation it can be assumed that he enjoys Mexican and modern American records and perhaps even prefers them to the new, socially conscious Soviet music. His one detracting mannerism is a heavy and constant blink.

Subject's wife: Subject's wife is also attractive and has a warm personality. She dresses well and is interested in theater, music and ballet. She enjoys going to the Colon but thinks the ballet at the Bolshoy is much better. She claims to enjoy dancing and apparently does not drink very much. Her Spanish is halting but adequate to make herself understood.

Their Relationship: Subject and his wife appear to be a couple who, if not in love, have grown used to each other and each other's ways. Despite reports and direct evidence of their squabbling, it would be dangerous to assume that this constitutes a weakness or domestic problem. They appear to rely upon each other and complement each other in social situations to the point where a deeper understanding between them can be assumed. (An interesting occurence was the wife's flat declaration that the Soviet Union was rapidly becoming a matriarchal society. Subject agreed with a smile.) Although Subject does not take open issue with his wife on topics where he may not be in complete accord, he manages to get his point across with a joke and a smile. All in all, Subject and his wife appear to be two that could take part successfully in any social gathering. MARGANDE thinks they are a "fun couple."

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Montevideo

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AELANYARD/Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236071)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. It has come to our attention through AELANYARD that Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236071), a known KGB officer, may have traveled to Uruguay during the first days of November. This suspicion is based on the fact that Subject informed his wife he had to take a trip to Uruguay and then was not seen in Buenos Aires on the following Saturday and Sunday, the 2nd and 3rd of November. Although we have been unable to find any record of travel or any request for permission to travel on his part, we cannot discount the possibility of his having traveled under false documentation.

2. Forwarded herewith is a photograph of Subject for your files. Buenos Aires Station will continue to monitor Subject's activities. If it appears that he is planning a trip to Uruguay, Montevideo Station will be notified immediately, and some coordinated action can be taken to try and determine his contacts and activities while he is in Uruguay.

Paul W. LEVERONE

Attachment: photos

Distribution:
2 - COS, Montevideo w/a
1 - C, WHD wo/a
1 - C, SBD wo/a

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

201-236701

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA-20,099

DATE
2 December 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
~~201-236071~~
[redacted]

SUMMARY OF AELANYARD TRANSCRIPTS -- OCTOBER 1968

(HADA-20084, 27 November 1968)

Subject appears to be quite hen-pecked. His wife constantly mimics him, tells him what to do and how to do it, finds fault with him for no apparent reason. She is over-bearing -- doesn't give Subject a chance to answer her rhetorical questions before blasting him with accusations of never listening to her good advice.

On 30 October 1968 Subject mentioned that he would have to be going to Uruguay. There is no verification of his having made the trip.

Entire transcripts and covering dispatch filed in 74-120-221.

~~SECRET~~

Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

Chief of Station, Panama City

Chief, SB via Chief, WH
RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET TECHS
Assignment of Cryptonym

Reference: HABA 19735, 8 August 1968

In answer to Paragraph 8 of Reference, the cryptonym AELANYARD has been assigned to this operation.

TEUNIS C. PACHATTE

Distribution:
2 - COS, Buenos Aires
1 - COS, Panama City

200HH

HAPW 11212

19 August 1968

SECRET

74-120-222

SB/O/PT

GLENN HUNT/rho

6587

1 - SB/O/PT
1 - SB/O/WH
1 - TSD/AOB
1 - WH/4AR

C/SB/O/PT

SB/O/WH

TSD/AOB

WH/4/AR

E/ BRENNAN, by phone

[illegible] /4

~~SECRET~~

Chief, SR Division
Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Panama City

Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

REDTOP/BIOGENESIS/AKTARGET/AEKICK/TECHS

References: A. MARA-19,706, 7 March 1968

B. BUENOS AIRES 0679, 24 May 1968

C. BUENOS AIRES 0707, 29 May 1968

INTRODUCTION

1. As pointed out in Reference A we had hoped to mount an audio operation against 201-236071's (an identified AEKICK officer) apartment when his predecessor departed PCS. We failed in our initial attempt and had decided to wait until 201-236071 left the city for a vacation or a business trip. On 21 May 1968 we learned (via BILOCULAR) that 201-236071 was seeking a new apartment. BIBAFFLE promptly identified the real estate agent (IDENTITY A) responsible for the apartment and on 22 May enlisted his cooperation.

2. With the aid of IDENTITY A, BIOGENESIS-14 and other BIBAFFLE agents entered the target apartment and undertook a thorough casing and made photographs. After consultation with the Station, a precise technical plan was worked out.

THE OPERATION

3. The apartment is located at IDENTITY B. It consists of a large living room, dining room, den, two bedrooms, one complete bath, a kitchen, and servants quarters. (We forward under separate cover as Attachment A a scale drawing of the apartment.) The monthly rent is 85,000 pesos with a two-year contract. The owner of the apartment is IDENTITY C.

Attachments: (Continued)
A. Scale drawing, U/S/C
B. Photographs, U/S/C
C. IDENTITIES, U/S/C
Distribution:
③ - C/SR w/atts 2 - C/WH w/att C only 2 - COS, Pacy w/att C only

MARA-19,738 8 August 1968

74-153-231

Having gained assured access, the problem of a suitable LP presented itself. A quick check of the occupants in the same building disclosed that the occupant directly above the target apartment was a military colleague (IDENTITY D) of BIOGENESIS-66 (the BIRAFFLE chief). Contact was established immediately and although IDENTITY D was willing to help, he had already rented the apartment to another and could not renege. He agreed however to hold it one more month and to grant the BIRAFFLE techs access before he turned it over to the new occupant.

4. While still seeking a suitable LP, the BIRAFFLEs went ahead and installed six mikes (two Sennheiser "peter" mikes—5000 OHMs—in each room, thus creating a binaural installation). The holes were drilled from the floor above to the ceiling of the target apartment. Once the installation was completed, the target apartment was entered (201-280071 had not yet moved in) and photographs were taken (we forward them under separate cover as Attachment B).

5. After considerable searching, a suitable LP was located at IDENTITY E which was for rent. After consultation with BIOGENESIS-46, an agreement was reached whereby BIRAFFLE-13 (one of the Station's unilateral assets) would rent the apartment and serve as LP monitor. The apartment was rented by BIRAFFLE-13 on 1 July 1963.

6. The running of the wire from the apartment above the target to the LP was delayed due to BIOGENESIS-14's other priority tasks and by a shortage of suitable cable (we obtained the cable from Headquarters). This final phase of the operation was completed on 7 August 1963. The distance between the target and the LP is 500 feet. The LP will be equipped by three Sony stereo tape recorders provided by Headquarters.

EXPLOITATION

7. We are just now beginning to receive the take from this operation. The tapes come directly to us from the LP and Matthew F. [illegible] processes them. The Spanish language portion, which we assume will be light, will be processed by BIRAFFLE.

HEADQUARTERS ACTION REQUESTED

8. Please assign a cryptonym to this operation.

[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

~~SECRET~~ NO

ORIG: GLENN HUNT/gmh
UNIT: SB/O/PT
EXT: 6587
DATE: 15 August 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: SB8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR WH8, TSD6, RI/AN, FI2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 25z 16 68 CITE DIRECTOR 25510

TO BUENOS AIRES

REDTOP TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 1184 (IN 70606)

FYI REF VEHICLE IS 1968 CHEVELLE SEDAN IN HOLD NUMBER 4 UPPER BETWEEN DECK WING. SERIAL NUMBER 136398B125849. CONSIGNOR LUIGI SERRA CO NEW YORK. COLOR UNKNOWN. ONE OTHER CHEVELLE SEDAN ALSO ON BOARD.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH

WH/4

DC/SB/AO

for C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

523 COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

~~SECRET~~

ORIG: GLENN HUNT/rbo
UNIT: SB/o/PT
EXT: 6587
DATE: 15 AUGUST 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 32 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/SB5 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR C/RF/SD, C/WH6, C/TSD3, C/CI, C/FI2, DDP, ADDP, CSDO,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 15 22 Z 02 Aug 68 CITE DIRECTOR 25032

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO: PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 1184 (IN 70606)

1. WOACRE ADVISES THEY HAVE JUST RECENTLY COMPLETED SERIES TESTS OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE CAR TRACKING BEACON WITH GENERALLY POOR RESULTS. DEVICES SUITABLE MAINLY FOR CAR LOCATING FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES AGAINST ~~[illegible]~~ UNSOPHISTICATED TARGETS. DEVICES NOT EFFECTIVE FOR CAR TRACKING. DEVICES NOT TOTALLY CONCEALABLE AND HENCE DETECTABLE THROUGH CURSORY INSPECTION OF VEHICLE. POUCHING COPY OF ONHS 4084 WHICH ~~[illegible]~~ RECENT WOACRE REPLY TO SIMILAR REQUEST FROM HAGUE.

2. IN VIEW ABOVE CAN NOT CONCUR REF PROPOSAL [redacted].

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH

TSD/SDB W. SZUMINSKI, BY PHONE

WH/4 /sc

C/WH

for DC/SB/AO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	CT	6	
2	[illegible]	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 32 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SB5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/WH6, C/TSD3, DDP, ADDP, CSDO, C/CI, C/FI2,

S E C R E T 142006Z AUG 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 1184

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

14 Aug 68 IN 70606

RYBAT REDTOP TECHS

1. THROUGH BILOCULAR LEARNED VEHICLE DESTINED FOR SUBJECT 201-236[illegible] DUE ARRIVE BUENOS AIRES 18 AUGUST ON MORMACK PRIDE. SHIP DEPARTED NEW YORK 4 AUGUST. REQUEST HQS TRY IDENTIFY MAKE TYPE AND MODEL VEHICLE THROUGH MOORE MCCORMACK. BELIEVE ONLY ONE VEHICLE ABOARD CONSIGNED SUBJECT OR HIS EMBASSY SO POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION POSSIBLE. STATION WILL TRY OBTAIN SAME INFORMATION THIS END AND WILL CABLE HQS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

ALEKSEYEV, IVAN G. 201

2. REQUEST WOACRE COMMENTS RE FEASIBILITY INSTALLING CAR TRACKING BEACON WITH MINIMUM RANGE FOUR CITY BLOCKS. DURING TIME CAR IN CUSTOMS CAN DELAY RELEASE CAR UP TO THREE WEEKS IN ORDER PERMIT WORK. IF FEASIBLE REQUEST WOACRE HQS TECHS TDY FOR INSTALLATION. OPERATION WOULD BE RUN WITH BIOGENESIS.

3. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL THIS PROPOSAL.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

TOTAL COPIES [illegible]

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	RF	6	
2	WH	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28/21 PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SB5 ☒ RID COPY.

INFO: FILE, VR. C/WH6, C/TSD3, DDP
ADDP, CS/DO, C/CI, C/CA/PEG, C/FI2, C/FI/INT

S E C R E T 300015Z CITE BUENOS AIRES 0707 30 May 68 IN 21280

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

KAPOK REDTOP BIOGENESIS TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0679 (IN 18226)

1. ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BY BIBAFFLE HAS ACCOMPLISHED FOLLOWING:

A. ACCESS TO TARGET APARTMENT COMPLETLY ARRANGED AND BIBAFFLE WILL HAVE ACCESS UP UNTIL 15 JUNE.

B. APARTMENT DIRECTLY ABOVE RENTED UNTIL 31 MAY BY BIOGENESIS-66 ACQUAINTANCE WHO ALLOWED BIFAFFLERS ENTER AND SURVEY. ORIGINAL PLAN WAS UTILIZE THIS APT AS SITE FROM WHICH TO DRILL AND TO EVENTUALLY RUN WIRES OUT OF THIS APT TO DIST LP. HOWEVER 29 MAY ON THE SITE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THERE NO PRACTICAL WAY RUN WIRES OUT OF THIS APT SINCE ALL OUTSIDE WALLS NEAT AND BARE.

2. VIEW ABOVE, WE HAVE INSTRUCTED BIBAFFLE ATTEMPT RENT APT ABOVE TARGET. WILL UTILIZE THIS AS LP WITH BIBAFFLE MEMBER AS OCCUPANT AND MONITOR.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-236701

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 28 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/TSD 3, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT, C/CI/RA, CS/DO

S E C R E T 232225Z MAY 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 067

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

25 MAY 68 IN 18226

m

KAPOK REDTOP BIOGENESIS TECHS

REF: HABA-19,206, 7 MARCH 1968

1. VIA BILOCULAR WE LEARNED THAT SUBJECT REF IN CONTACT WITH LOCAL REAL ESTATE AGENT IN ATTEMPT RENT NEW APARTMENT. AFTER QUICK CHECK IN WHICH NO DEROG UNCOVERED, BIBAFFLE CONTACTED REAL ESTATE AGENT WHO VERY COOPERATIVE AND NOT ONLY PIN-POINTED APRTMENT BUT ALSO WILLING ARRANGE BIBAFFLE ACCESS.

2. SUBJECT REF EXPECTED SIGN LEASE 27 MAY. PLANS OCCUPY 1 JUNE. BIBAFFLE NOW PLANNING ENTRY AND INSTALLATION MIKES. BIOGENESIS-14, UTILIZING UVH 2A DRILL FURNISHED PER DIRECTOR 00523, WILL MAKE INSTALLATION. BIBAFFLE ALSO WORKING ON LP WITH TWO ADJOINING APTS AS POSSIBILITIES.

3. WILL DISPATCH FULL DETAILS.

S E C R E T

BT

PRIORITY

Ref. pc.

SECRET

201-236701

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO.

FROM: Chief, SB via Chief, WH

SUBJECT: REDTOP/Transmittal of Soviet Personality Report, Supplement and Characterization on Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REF: BUENOS AIRES 9897, 30 January 68

1. Forwarded herewith is a draft Soviet Personality Report, Supplement, and Characterization on Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701), known KGB officer of the Fifth Department (Latin America), First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence), who served as Pravda correspondent in Mexico City from September 1960 to October 1964. Although the draft is not in polished form it is Headquarters feeling that it represents an accurate summary of Subject's 201 file. Headquarters traces were made on Subject's contacts and included in the attached Supplement. The Characterization, prepared in 1964 by Douglas J. FEINGLASS, provides an excellent personality sketch of Subject and family.

2. Throughout his tour in Mexico Subject and family remained apart from the Soviet colony, associating chiefly with the SHUBINs (201-266547), and the SHENGALEVs (201-328294). Subject's ill temper, coarse language, and unfriendly wife won him few friends among his colleagues. (See Characterization) Neither did he have many known contacts among the foreign correspondents' community. Those with whom he did frequently associate were representatives of Prensa Latina (PL) and Siempre. The majority of his time was spent in CP liaison in Mexico, Ecuador, and Cuba. He was also actively involved with various leaders of the Movimiento Liberacion Nacional (MLN) and Central Campesina Independiente (CCI), particularly in the rural areas of Ensenada, Tijuana, and Mexicali. He took these occasions to contact local Russian emigres and, in one instance, to develop a rural recruiter to assess Mexican youths desiring to study in the USSR.

Harriet J. GUILLERMINA

Attachments:
SPR, Supplement, &
Characterization of Subj.

Distribution:
3 - Buenos Aires w/atts
2 Atts -

CS COPY

RIS INPUT NO.
201-236701

25 MAR 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABW 11041	19 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-236701

Distribution:
1 - SB/O/WH w/o att
1 - SB/CI/K w/o att
1 - WH/4/ARG w/o att
1 - RID w/att

MBH

ANALYST
ABSTRACT
SB/ECC
INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SB/O/WH	Patricia Flynn	cp	6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SB/O/WH	19/3/68	
DC/SB/CI/K	21 Mar 68	
C/WH/4/Arg	21 MAR 1968	Chaumont

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/4	MAR 1968	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

(40)

DISPATCH

2P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
MAR 11 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO: Chief, SB Division
Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT: KAPOK/REDTOP/BIOGENESIS
Prospective Audio Installation Against Apartment of Ivan ALFERYEV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. BUENOS AIRES 9864, 25 January 1968

B. BUENOS AIRES 9879, 26 January 1968

1. The Station has long been interested in the fact that but two Soviets reside outside of the Soviet "compounds." In the fall of 1967 we began a unilateral investigation and casing of the apartment then occupied by Viktor FILIPPOV. Our unilateral investigation revealed that the lock on the door of this apartment was a Trabex--a lock which requires at a minimum several hours of picking. Simultaneous to our unilateral investigation we learned of FILIPPOV's planned PCS departure. We also learned that the Soviets intended to keep his apartment and that it was to be occupied by FILIPPOV's replacement. In mid-January we decided to send BIBAFFLE-3 to the apartment building in order to befriend the portero. We had hoped that the portero would be able to furnish us with a key to the apartment. On 25 January we learned that Ivan ALFERYEV was arriving in Buenos Aires on 27 January. Unfortunately time had run out on us. We therefore decided to turn to BIOGENESIS.

2. There were several reasons for this decision. First of all, we do not doubt the operational value of having an audio installation in the apartment of an identified senior KGB officer. However, a unilateral installation is a difficult and at times risky operation. Considering this and matching it against the potential take of the operation we felt that a joint operation would be more practical. Cost also influenced our decision. At the same time our experience with BIOGENESIS in the "Vista" operation showed that BIOGENESIS was perfectly willing to give us and only us the tapes from the audio installation.

(Continued)

74-120-221

Distribution:
(2) - C/SB
2 - C/WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-236701	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HADA-10,206	DATE 7 March 1968
1-4-5-5/3 [illegible]	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	HQS FILE NUMBER 1-2-8/3 201-236071

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/~~KAPOK~~ | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HABA-19,206

3. As explained in Reference A we briefed BIOGENESIS in the early afternoon of 25 January. BIOGENESIS immediately issued instructions that the portero of the building be approached. This was accomplished successfully in the late afternoon of the same day. Unfortunately the portero did not have a key. The same night a BIOGENESIS team of three (including BIBAFFLE-3 and BIOGENESIS-14) attempted in vain to pick the lock. In the course of this lock-picking exercise BIBAFFLE-3 had to identify BIOGENESIS interest in the apartment to the owner of the neighboring apartment. Fortunately this individual is wealthy and was cooperative.

4. Once we had been forced to temporarily withdraw (ALFERYEV occupied the apartment on 27 January), we obtained through BIOGENESIS the blueprints of the target apartment and the apartments which abutted. A study of those blueprints shows that the apartment belonging to the wealthy cooperative neighbor has a maid's room which shares the wall of the living room of ALFERYEV's apartment. We pointed this out to BIOGENESIS and suggested that they enlist the further cooperation of the owner in order that a microphone could be installed through the common wall. Unfortunately the owner had departed for several weeks leave.

5. The owner should be back in Buenos Aires at this time and we have instructed BIOGENESIS to approach him again and to move on with the operation. We are also presently working on an LP.

6. We shall keep you advised of our progress in this operation.

Edwin W. S

Edwin W. SHROYER

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 21

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

RO[illegible]G AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	SB/C/WN	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER

ACTION SB 8 ☑ NO COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-236077N

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, C/IC 2

BRCN

S E C R E T 011940Z FEB 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 9915 (STOTREST ACTING)

1 FEB 68 IN 42036

DIRECTOR

REDTOP LCIMPROVE

REFERENCE DIRECTOR 56231

AN	~~PI~~	SB/C/WH
~~PS~~		
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

APPRECIATE FULL SPR ALFERYEV 201-236701 (~~201-236077~~) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE INCLUDING ALL POSSIBLE DETAILS HIS MODUS OPERANDE IN PAST KGB ACTIVITY.

S E C R E T

BT

O/C

AN [illegible]
AB X
~~IN~~
~~FI~~
~~PI~~
~~PS~~
~~FI~~
SB/X/WH

201-236701
~~[illegible]~~
1 Feb 68

CS COPY

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-23607
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
C/Chricker

FROM:
25

ACTION
SB 8

☒ RID COPY

INFO
FILE VR WH8, FI, CI, CI/OPS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 22

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	SB/o/WH	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT SB/o/WH TIME BY

~~PS~~ ABSTRACT X INDEX

30 JAN 68 IN 40404

BUEN

S E C R E T 302002Z JAN 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 9897 (STOTREST ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, MONTEVDIEO, RIO DE JANEIRO

REDTOP LCIMPROVE

NR

REF A BUENOS AIRES 9548 (IN 01576) (NOT SENT INFO ADDRESSEES)

B. DIRECTOR 56231

IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV (201-236071) AND WIFE ROZA ARRIVED 27 JANUARY 1968 ABOARD KLM 791. MET AT AIRPORT BY VRAGOV (201-820310) AND YURSHENAS (201-779979). PASSPORT AND PERSONAL PHOTOS OBTAINED.

S E C R E T

SECRET

AN 007
SB/X/WH

201-236701
~~201-236071~~
30 Jan 68

CS COPY

FORWARDED

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED C/SB

TOTAL COPIES 24

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
[illegible]

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	> B/WH	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: D AT: 2135Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-243346 201-236071

X-REF TO FILE NO 201-104216

DISSEM BY 32 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH SB/... ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SB5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/INT2, C/SDO, DDP, ADDP, C/TSD3, C/CI/RA,

PRECEDENCE

26 JAN 68 IN 37522

S E C R E T 252132Z JAN68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 9864 (STOTREST ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

KAPOK REDTOP BIOGENESIS

PRIORITY

REF BUENOS AIRES 9848 (IN 01576)

1. NOTING THAT AFTER VIKTOR FILIPPOV'S (201-243346) 25 DECEMBER 1967 PCS DEPARTURE, SOVS KEPT HIS APARTMENT (WHICH ALONG WITH YURIY CHELPANOV (201-104216) ONLY SOV PRIVATE BILLETS IN BUENOS AIRES) AND THAT FILIPPOV SUSPECT KGB AND REPLACED BY IVAN ALFERYEV (201-236071) WHO KNOWN KGB, WE UNDERTOOK UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION (UTILIZING BIOGENESIS-42 AND BILLABONG-1) OF FILIPPOV APARTMENT AND SURROUNDING AREA WITH INTENTION UNILATERAL PLANT AUDIO DEVICE. INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED APARTMENT TO BE RE-OCCUPIED IN MARCH. WE JUST IN PROCESS OF BRIEFING BIBAFFLE-3 IN ATTEMPT MEET AND INITIATE SLOW DEVELOPMENT OF APARTMENT BLDG PORTERO WHEN WE LEARNED ON 25 JANUARY THAT ALFERYEV DUE ARRIVE BUENOS AIRES 27 JANAURY.

2. ON BASIS OF FOLLOWING WE HAVE OPTED FOR JOINT OP:

A. TIME FACTOR: STATION UNABLE RISK BIBAFFLE-3 OR

C.C. Filed 201-243346
C.C. Filed 201-104216

SECRET

File in 201-236071

14-00000

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

TING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 9854 SECRET

ANY OTHER SUITABLE ASSET IN QUICK, COLD APPROACH TO PORTERO. IN ORDER GAIN ACCES PRIOR 27 JANUARY QUICK APPROACH ESSENTIAL. BIOGENESIS ON OTHER HAND FULLY EQUIPPED, ABLE BACKSTOP, AND CAPABLE UNDERTAKE IMMEDIATE APPROACH.

B. COST: UNILATERAL OP WOULD INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE FUNDS-- RENT OF LP, SALARY TO MONITORS, ETC. BIOGENESIS ON OTHER HAND CAN AND PROBABLY WILL RECRUIT NEIGHBOR FOR LP AND UTILIZE BIBAFFLE TEAM MEMBERS AS MONITORS. (AS AN EXAMPLE RECENT SOV QUINTA OP-- SEE BUENOS AIRES 9845 (IN 36039) -- COST LESS THAN U.S. $100.)

C. OPS POTENTIAL: ON SURFACE DO NOT QUESTION BASIC VALUE OF BUG IN APARTMENT OF KGB STAFFER WHO LONG TIME LATIN AMERICAN HAND. HOWEVER BELIEVE TAKE WILL PRODUCE PRIMARILY ASSESSMENT INFO AND RESULTANT TAPES WILL COME DIRECTLY TO STATION FOR STUDY AND EVENTUAL EXPLOITATION.

3. IN ESSENCE WE WILL RECEIVE TAKE WITH MINIMUM COST, NO RISK, AND NO TIE-UP OF OUR MANPOWER.

4. AFTERNOON 25 JANUARY WE BRIEFED BIOGENESIS-49 WHO

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY PER

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE. VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 3 BUENOS AIRES 9664 SECRET

ENTHUSIASTICALLY ACCEPTED OP. HE IMMEDIATELY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS BIBAFFLE-3 THAT PORTERO TO BE HIT AT ONCE AND IF APARTMENT ACCESSIBLE, CASING (WITH PHOTOS) BY TECHNICIAN BIOGENESIS-14 TO TAKE PLACE NIGHT 25 JANUARY. FOLLOWING DAY DECISION AS TO TYPE EQUIPMENT (WE PUSHING FOR MIKE AND WIRE SINCE WE UNDERSTAND HQS ADVISES AGAINST USE FREE RUNNING TRANSMITTER AGAINST SOV TARGETS) WILL BE DECIDED UPON.

5. WE HAVE ALSO BRIEFED BIOGENESIS-49 THAT IF AS RESULT NIGHT 25 JANUARY CASING, OP NOT FEASIBLE AT THIS TIME, WE WILL PURSUE IT FURTHER ONCE ALFERYEV AND FAMILY OUT OF TOWN OR ON LEAVE.

6. WILL ADVISE PROGRESS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ALFERYEV, IVAN GAVRILOVICH
201-236701
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
KGB, FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE.

074-005-102
SX -05555/07
06 SEP 67
P5

711719
R 6710200217

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 236 701

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

HMMA-31217
27 Jan 1967

Sent to IP/ARD/RCU along with voice tape attachment - document will be returned to this file, + attachment retained in IP/ARD/RCU -

11 June 1993

201-236701

~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-9 INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/P)

78 0355300 PAGE 001
TOT: 241807Z FEB 78 WASHINGT 177201

S E C R E T
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 241807Z WASHINGTON 177201
TO: LIMA.

FROM: SE/X/LA INFO: SE/OR/X, LA/CPB

SUBJECT: WNINTEL CKTOP PDQUICK PDGRAVE

REFS: A. LIMA 37860 0311385

B. LIMA 37858 NO CDS #

C. LIMA 37861 NO CDS #

1. YEMELIN: PARAGRAPHS 1, 2, AND 3 ONLY OF DIRECTOR 0566177 MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON.

2. ALFERYEV: DIRECTOR 0831024 IS PASSABLE TO LIAISON EXCEPT FOR FYI PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5. PDSTORAGE INFO NOT PASSABLE TO LIAISON. ALFERYEV CAN BE CONSIDERED KNOWN KGB PER DERYABIN'S INFO.

3. KHUDENKO: ALL INFO IN DIRECTOR 0877966 MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON.

4. FILE: 201-0822406, 201-0236701, 201-0889402. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: SE/X/LA (BREWER 1604); COORD: C/SE/X/LA (PHIPPS), SE/OR/X ???? LA/CPB/P REL C/LA/CPB REID CL BY 029353.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-236701
DO NOT DESTROY

IP/AN

/37/ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FRP: , , , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION: IP/DP-9 (403) INFO: FILE, PF, ODPD-D, (11/W)

78 0311372 PAGE 001
TOR: 102138Z FEB 78 LIMA 37858

C O N F I D E N T I A L 102121Z FEB 78 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE LIMA 37858 (KINSMAN ACTING)

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: SE/X/LA INFO LA/CPR; SE/X/SI

SUBJECT: WNINTEL RNMUM CKTOP PDQUICK

REF: DIRECTOR 831024

1. PLEASE ADVISE WHAT PORTIONS REF RE IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV MAY BE PASSED LIAISON. LIAISON CARRIES ALFERYEV AS "SUSPECT KGB." WE WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM THAT ALFERYEV KGB AND PASS AS MUCH ADDITIONAL INFO AS POSSIBLE.

2. FILE: 201-0236701. E2 IMPDET.

OTP

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NO. (2, 3)

RECORD COPY

10 FEB 1978
201-236701

END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOG TPG MRO OCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 302246Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 831025

CONF: SE5 INFO: FILE, LA4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 77

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER 60

0 IP FILES # 111

IP/EDI		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	☒	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/CR/T		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/MB		CODE NO. (2, 3)
		EVENT RESI. CODE
		CABLE IDEN (11)
		NID (8)
		FOR FILING
SE/X/LA		

TO: LIMA.Y

OCKTOP PDQUICK TRACES RQPCY

REF: DIRECTORY 831024

1. IDENTITY IS PDBOOR.Y

2. FILE: 201-0236701. E-2 IMPDET.H

RECORD COPY

30 MAR 76

201-236701

DATE: 29 MARCH 1976

ORIG: DOROTHEA DEVRIES/CP

UNIT: SE/BIO

EXT: 9077

SE/CI/X

SE/X/LA (R. SCHARDT IN DRAFT)

C/LA/NU

C/LA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/SE/BIO 29 MAR 1976

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 046968

OUTGOING MESSAGE 11-3

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

~~S E C R E T~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
SBTAFF	302246Z	DIRECTOR	831024

CONF: SE 5 INFO: FILE W/AA 4, LA 4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 27

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO ___ PER

IP/DDI

0

IP/CR/T

IP/MD

TRAVEL PROGRAM 501

~~ABSTRACT~~

INDEX 101

PREPARE FOR FILMING

CODE NO. (2, 3)

SPECIAL RST. CODE

CYCLE GEN (11)

NO. (8)

FOR FILING

SE/X/LA

TO: LIMA.Y

CKTOP PDQUICK TRACEY REPLY

REF: LIMA 032783 |IN 865283| |*|Y

1. ALFERIEV IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV (201-0236701), IDENTITY, WHO WAS BORN ON 20 JAN 28 IN TULA. HE IS MARRIED TO ROZA ALEKSEYEVNA, BORN ON 20 SEP 34 IN MOSCOW. THEY HAVE ONE SON, VADIM, BORN 24 SEP 55 IN MOSCOW. ALFERYEV SPEAKS EXCELLENT SPANISH AND SOME ENGLISH (DOI: MAR 70).Y

2. ALFERYEV REPORTEDLY WAS TDY IN ARGENTINA DURING AUG 58; SERVED AS PRAVDA REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY FROM 13 SEP 60 TO 28 OCT 64 AND WAS SECOND, LATER FIRST SECRETARY, OF THE CULTURAL SECTION OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES FROM 27 JAN 68 TO 17 JUL 72. HE VISITED ARGENTINA FROM 21 JUN TO 4 JUL 75. (FYI: ACCORDING TO A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT, ALFERYEV WAS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE LATIN AMERICA DEPARTMENT WITHIN THE MFA IN DEC 73. END FYI).Y

3. DURING HIS TOURS AND TRAVELEBS ABROAD, ALFERYEV WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECT KGB OFFICIALS. DERYABIN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT: B201-727613

RECORD COPY

30 MAR 76
201-236701
Alferov

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 048968

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOO TPS MRO DCI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES

2

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

831034

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

IDENTIFIED ALFERYEV IN JUN 65 AS HAVING WORKED AT KGB HQS DURING 52-53. THERE WAS ALSO SOME SPECULATION THAT HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE KGB RESIDENT WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES. ALFERYEV WAS MENTIONED IN APPENDIX D OF JOHN BARRON'S BOOK, "THE KGB". ALFERYEV IS KNOWN KGB.Y

4. FYI: WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES, ALFERYEV WAS THE TARGET OF JOINT AUDIO OPERATION FROM AUG 68 TO SEP 69 AND WAS SUBJECTED TO PERIODIC SURVEILLANCE. THIS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FACT THAT HE WAS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH STATION OFFICERS AND THAT HE AND HIS WIFE EXPERIENCED MARITAL DIFFICULTIES MADE HIM A PRIORITY TARGET. END FYI.Y

5. FYI: PER PDSTORAGE (DOI: 64), ALFERYEV IS AN OFFICER OF THE FIFTH DEPARTMENT (LATIN AMERICAN), FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE, KGB, WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO THE RESIDENTURA IN MEXICO CITY IN 61. SOURCE HAD NO INFORMATION ON SUBJECT'S SPECIFIC DUTIES IN MEXICO. ALFERYEV GRADUATED FROM THE INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CIRCA 57. HE ENTERED THE KGB INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL IN 58 AND GRADUATED IN 60. SOURCE DOES NOT KNOW SUBJECT'S KGB ASSIGNMENT FOR PERIOD FROM

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0462962

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE CCI ACP TOG TPS WRO DCI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

831024

HIS GRADUATION IN 60 TO HIS ASSIGNMENT TO MEXICO IN 61. END FYI.

6. BASED ON CURRENT SLOT AND POSITION PLUS CAREER PATTERN INCLUDING REPLACEMENT OF ARSENIY F. ORLOV (201-0727613), HQS WILL CARRY ALFERYEV AS SUSPECT KGB RESIDENT IN PERU.

7. FILE: 201-0236701 AND 201-08727613. E-2 IMPDET.

*REQUESTED TRACES ON PCS SOVIET

PARA 6 BY SE/CI/X.

018375

DATE: 29 MARCH 1976
ORIG: DOROTHEA DEVRIES/CF
UNIT: SE/BIO
EXT: 1079

201-236701

SE/CI/X

SE/X/LA R. SCHARDT (IN DRAFT)

J.F. Matthews
C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/NW
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Jackson
C/SE/BIO 29 MAR 1976
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0482968

14-00000

30 March 1976

SUBJECT: Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV
201-0236701

(PDBOOR)

RIS: KNOWN KGB

Suspect KGB Resident
Lima, Peru (DOI: Mar 76)

DPOB: 20 January 1928

CAREER

Sept 58 : Granted one month Argentine visa in Moscow Sept 58. No indication he ever travelled to Argentina.

13 Sept 60 to 24 October 64 : PCS, Mexico City, Mexico as PRAVDA Correspondent.

27 Jan 68 to 17 July 72 : PCS, Buenos Aires, Argentina as Second Secy, then promoted to First Secy, Soviet Embassy, Cultural Section.

May 1975 : Scheduled TDY Argentina. Was TDY Argentina Jun-July 75.

RIS: Known KGB. Per PDSTORAGE, DOI: Sept 64. FCD, Fifth Dept. (Latin America Dept)

Replacement Pattern:

Mexico: ALFERYEV replaced Vasiliy Mikhaylovich CHICHKOV (201-0207254) and was replaced by Vladimir Agafonovich DOLGOV (201-0763035), both known KGB officers.

Argentina: ALFERYEV replaced Viktor Mikhaylovich FILIPPOV (MD 001706) (201-0243346), carried as Suspect KGB Resident in Bs.As. ALFERYEV was replaced by Vasiliy Mikhaylovich MURAVYEV (201-356530 WHOM Hqs believes was KGB Resident (Suspect() during his tour in Bs.As.

Peru: ALFERYEV to replace Arseniy Fedorovich ORLOV (201- 0727613) as Counselor of Embassy, Lima Peru. ORLOV was carried as Suspect KGB Resident in Lima. ALFERYEV will be carried in same capacity as Suspect KGB Resident.

ALFERYEV arrived Lima PCS early March 1976 or late Feb 1976.

SE/CI/X X1917

7-71 MF...

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER Sq C/11 TOTAL COPIES 12 RUN BY

IP/AN

~~S E C R E T~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT SE5

ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR IP/AN, 4A4

T 776308 EIA847 PAGE 01-01 IN 065283

TOR:220002Z MAR 76 LIMA 32783

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-727613
DO NOT DESTROY

S E C R E T 221943Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE LIMA 32783

TO: DIRECTOR,

CKTOP TRACE

1. REQUEST HQS TRACES IVAN G. ALFERIEV WHO ACCORDING DIPLOMATIC NOTE, ASSUMED DUTIES AS COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY ON 23 FEBRUARY 1976.

2. ASSUME SUBJECT REPLACING ARSENIY FEDOROVICH ORLOV (201-0727613), KGB RESIDENT. ON 11 MARCH JULINDEN-1 REPORTED THAT ORLOV RETURNING TO USSR PERMANENTLY WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

3. FILE: 201- AND 201-0727613. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER SOP/11 TOTAL COPIES 12-1 RUN BY CP

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT SE5

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE, VR, IP/AN, +14

T 778308 EIA847 PAGE 01-01 IN 865283

TOR:220002Z MAR 76 LIMA 32783

IP/EDR		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	☒	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/CR/V		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/MD		[illegible] NO. (2, 3)
		[illegible] ST. CODE
		[illegible] (11)
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
SE/X	LA	

S E C R E T 221943Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE LIMA 32783

TO: DIRECTOR,

CKTOP TRACE

1. REQUEST HQS TRACES IVAN G. ALFERYEV ✓ amended (201-236701) O.K. WHO ACCORDING DIPLOMATIC NOTE, ASSUMED DUTIES AS COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY ON 23 FEBRUARY 1976.

2. ASSUME SUBJECT REPLACING ARSENIY FEDOROVICH ✓ ORLOV O.K. (201-0727613), KGB RESIDENT. ON 11 MARCH DULINDEN-11 REPORTED THAT ORLOV RETURNING TO USSR PERMANENTLY WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

3. FILE: 201- AND 20-0727613. E2 IMPDET

B201-727613

[illegible] COPY

22 MAR 76
201-236701

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 201524Z CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 698800

CONF: SE 5 INFO: FILE 11/AN, LA4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 15
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER 501
0 IP FILES # 111

201-0236701
TO: PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES.Y

CKTOP PDQUICK NTTIGER TRACEY
c Trace Reply

[illegible]

REF: BUENOS AIRES 33333 |IN 587924| |*|Y

1. ALFERYEV {201-0236701} {IDEN} IS MARRIED TO ROZA ALEKSEYEVNA MUTACOVA, BORN 20 SEP 34 IN MOSCOW. THEY HAVE ONE SON, VADIM, BORN 24 SEP 55 IN MOSCOW. ALFERYEV SPEAKS EXCELLENT SPANISH AND SOME ENGLISH {DOI: MAR 70}.Y

2. ALFERYEV REPORTEDLY WAS TDY IN ARGENTINA DURING AUG 58. SERVED AS PRAVDA REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY FROM SEP 60 TO OCT 64. WAS SECOND, LATER FIRST SECRETARY, CULTURAL SECTION SOVIET EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES FROM 27 JAN 68 TO 17 JUL 72. DERYABIN DEFINITELY IDENTIFIED ALFERYEV AS HAVING WORKED AT KGB HEADQUARTERS DURING 52/53. DURING HIS MEXICO TOUR HE WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECT KGB OFFICERS.Y

3. WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES ALFERYEV WAS THE TARGET OF A JOINT AUDIO OPERATION FROM AUG 68 TO SEP 69. HE WAS SUBJECT TO PERIODIC SURVEILLANCE. THIS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FACT THAT HE WAS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH STATION OFFICERS MADE HIM A PRIORITY TARGET OF THE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

23 May 75
201-236701

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:032884

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO	DCI		PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.	2		2

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

698800

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

STATION. THERE WAS ALSO SOME SPECULATION THAT HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE KGB RESIDENT WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES.Y

4. FILE REVIEW FAILS TO REVEAL ANY CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF INTEL ACTIVITIES; HOWEVER, BASED ON THE FOREGOING HE IS CONSIDERED TO BE KGB.Y

5. FYI: PER PDSTORAGE INFO DATED SEP 64 ALFERYEV IS A KNOWN KGB OFFICER OF THE FIFTH DEPARTMENT (LATIN AMERICA), FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE. HE GRADUATED FROM THE INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CIRCA 57, ENTERED THE KGB SCHOOL IN 58 AND GRADUATED IN 60. END FYI.Y

6. PLEASE ADVISE IF ALFERYEV PCS AT WHICH TIME DETAILED TRACES WILL BE SENT. E-2 IMPDET.#

*REQUEST FOR TRACES ON PCS SOVIET

DATE: 23 MAY 1975
ORIG: DEBBY LEISER/DH
UNIT: SE/BIO
EXT: 9077

AA/SB L. Laser

SE/CI/X - MIKE BRINDOCK IN DRAFT

RLConolly

for C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/SE/X/LA - R. FROST IN DRAFT
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DC/SE/BIO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 032684

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG			
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 231524Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 698801

CONF: SE 5 INFO: FILE IP/AN, LA 4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 15
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER 50 P
0 IP FILES # :11

201-0236701
TO: PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES.

CKTOP NTTIGER TRACEY
Identity to
REF: DIRECTOR 698809 |*|

1. IDENTITY IS PDBOOR.

2. FILE: 201-0236701. E-2 IMPDET.

[illegible]	☒	[illegible]
		INDEX
		PREPARE FOR FILMING
		[illegible]

DATE: 23 MAY 1975
ORIG: DEBBY LEISER/DH
UNIT: SE/BIO
EXT: 9077

RECORD COPY

23 May 75
201-236701

LA/SB - L. Kuse
SE/CI/X (in draft)
SE/X/LA (in draft)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for DR Connolly
C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

DC/SE/BIO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 032884

14-00000

?-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER SOC 111 TOTAL COPIES 12-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED SE BY UM AT 1525Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	~~RF~~ FILE VR	STAFF
SES		IP/AN, LA 4	1
ACTION #			2
			3

T 035695 EIA949 PAGE 01-01 IN 587924

TOR:221435Z MAY 75 BUEN 33333

SECRET 221417Z MAY 75 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 33333 (BROWN ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

CKTOP NTTIGER TRACE

1. NTTIGER LIAISON REQUESTS PRIORITY TRACES ON IVAN ALFERYEV, BORN 28 JAN 28, MOSCOW, SON OF GEORGIY ALFERYEV AND DASHA KOZLOVA. MARRIED ROSA KOMAROVA. STATION TRACES INDICATE ONE IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV 201-0236701) APPLIED FOR PCS VISA ARGENTINA 2 OCT 67 (DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT #19667). WAS SCHEDULED TO BE SECOND SECRETARY, SOVIET EMBASSY, PER HABA-18997, 9 JAN 68, REPLACING V.M. FILIPPOV (201-0243346), KNOWN KGB OFFICER.

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

PC

TRAVEL PROGRAM

[illegible]

RECORD COPY

22 May 75

201-236701

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Brasilia

INFO.: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

FROM: Chief, SB via Chief, WH

SUBJECT: REDTOP/PDQUICK/ALACORA/3-
Traces on Ten Soviets Assigned to Argentina

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HBBA-01823, 22 March 1973

Attached are the traces Station requested for passing to ALAGORA/3.

Serena W. LELINSKI

Attachment: As stated, h/w

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - COS, Brasilia, w/att
- 1 - COS, Buenos Aires, w/att

alfuiyer
Arg.

**DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 236701**

CS COPY FILED IN 201-013483

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 012140

CROSS REFERENCE TO:
201-0025060
201-0128117 201-0220494
201-0025485 201-0236701
201-0247389 201-0288550
201-0786652 201-0892214

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HBDW-738

DATE: 9 MAY 1973
24 April 1973

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-0013483

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: SB/BIO
OFFICER: Pearl Chinn
TYPIST: db
EXT. 6651

Distribution:
- 1 - SB/BIO
- 1 - SB/CI/X
- 1 - SB/X/WH
- 1 - SB/MC
- 1 - WH/4/A
- 1 - WH/5
- 10 - IP/FI

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DC/SB/BIO		
SB CI X		
X		
WH/4/A		
WH/5		

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL
DATE
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV

Subject has departed PCS ~~prior to April 19~~73.

178272.

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
REDTOP NTTIGER
Transmittal of Passports and Photos

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 347839

B. BUENOS AIRES 23416

Enclosed are copies of the passports and personal photos of Vasiliy Mikhailovich MURAVYEV (201-256530) and his wife. Subject, his wife and daughter arrived in Buenos Aires on 29 November 1972 to replace Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701). They were met at the airport by Stepan Pavlovich PADAUSIS (201-786652) and Anver Ismaylovich YAKUBOV (201-228494).

Beatrice F. PETRESUK

Beatrice F. PETRESUK

Attachments:
Herewith As Stated

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SB (w/Atts, h/w)
2 - Chief, WH (W/o Atts)

[illegible] FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
[illegible] EXEMPTION [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] DECLASSIFICATION [illegible]

CS COPY FILED IN 201-256530

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201-236701

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABA-23232	Typed: 18 December 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-256530 201-236701

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 13 PER ______

ACTION UNIT SB8

INFO FILE, VR ddp WH8 ci, ci/ops, cs/oo ci/ofs, c/ci-2, FI

ACTION NO 207

SECRET 052015Z DEC 72 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 23416

777857
m

DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO.

REDTOP NTTIGER

REFS A. BUENOS AIRES 21975 (NOT SENT SANTIAGO) (IN 668034)

B. HABA-19090, 31 JAN 68

C. SAGO-5977, 5 FEB 68

1. REQUEST ADDEE TRACES VASILIY MIKHAILOVICH MURAVYEV, DPOB 31 DEC 1915, USSR, COUNSELOR SOVEMB BUENOS AIRES, DIP. PPT 6368. WIFE LYUDMILA NIKOLAYEVNA, DPOB 7 FEB 1935, USSR, OCCU PROFESSOR, DIP. PPT 6369 AND DAUGHTER OLGA, DPOB 25 NOV 1968, MOSCOW. REFS B AND C INDICATE SUBJ STATIONED PCS SANTIAGO AS OF JAN 68. DEPARTED SANTIAGO 28 JAN 68, POSSIBLY PCS. NO FURTHER TRACES.

2. SUBJ AND FAMILY ARRIVED BUENOS AIRES 29 NOV VIA SWISSAIR 204. BILOCULAR DTD 29 NOV INDICATES SUBJ IS REPLACEMENT FOR IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV, WHO HAS NOT REAPPEARED BUENOS AIRES.

3. FILE: 201-356530, 201-236701. E-2, IMPDET.

SECRET

CS COPY FILED IN 201-356530

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 236701

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 22 PER ______

ACTION UNIT

JS8

INFO

FILE, VR [illegible]

ACTION NO.

907

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 251715Z JUL 72 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 21975

DIRECTOR.

668034

REDTOP BIOGENESIS

1. BIBAFFLES REPORT AEBOOR DEPARTED FOR USSR 17 JULY VIA SWISSAIR 201 TO DAKAR. AT RECENT DIPLOMATIC FUNCTION, TOLD STATION OFFICERS HAD HOPED TO BE LEAVING PCS BUT HAS BEEN EXTENDED AND WILL RETURN ARGENTINA WITH WIFE FOLLOWING HOME LEAVE. PASSPORT CONTAINS REENTRY VISA.

2. FILE: 201-236701. EX-2, APDIR, WN-SISM.

S E C R E T

B

AF 00

[redacted]

~~CI/OA~~ ~~WPD~~

FI

25 Jul 72

201-236701

CS COPY

SECRET

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Buenos Aires X

Chief, SB
Via Chief, WH
REDTOP
CC CPSU Representative in Buenos Aires

REFS: A. HD-7782, 19 February 1971
B. HABA 22379, 17 September 1971
C. HABA 21382, 18 May 1970

1. Headquarters can provide no additional guidance on CC CPSU Representatives abroad other than that forwarded in Reference A.

2. According to Reference B, the Station has tentatively identified one of the Soviet diplomats in Buenos Aires as the CC CPSU Representative. Since this individual was not named in Reference B, a Headquarters review of the files of Soviets most likely to hold this position has been made and from the information currently available to us, Viktor Grigoryevich CHEKMAZOV (201-128117) appears to be this individual.

3. Although CHEKMAZOV's present andpast duties do not fit all the criteria set forth in Reference A, there are certain indicators that he is the CC CPSU Representative. Little is known of CHEKMAZOV's tour in Cuba, where he was assigned as Second Secretary and Chief of the Consular Section from 1960 to 1963. Prior to that, however, CHEKMAZOV was a Consular Officer in Uruguay from 1954 to 1956. Among his reported duties there, the following could be considered as background leading to his suspected current position:

a) handled emigre and repatriation matters and was involved in activities requiring Spanish, which he and his wife speak reasonably well.

b) believed to be active in the Colony's MESTKOM, (which in general is social rather than political, although the political element is ever-present. The MESTKOM Secretary is usually a Party activist who is responsible for making certain that no possible deviations from the Party line crops up in any MESTKOM discussions or activities.)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

15 OCT 1971

DISTRIBUTION: HABW-12137 12 October 1971

Orig & 2 -
Buenos Aires S E C R E T

201-128117
201-236701
201-[illegible];201-[illegible]

CS COPY FILED IN 201-138117

SB/CI/X DJ CHATTIN:cmc 6901

1 - SB/CI/X chrono
1 - SB/MC
1 - WH/4
4 - IP/AN
1 - SB/X/WH

SB/X/WH

SB/CI/X

WH/4/AR

C/WH/4

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 236701

ALFERYEV

c) reportedly became angry with a colleague who refused to prepare a speech commemorating GORKIY's birthday.

e) wife supervised production of the Soviet publication, URSS.

4. In his current position as Counselor of Embassy, CHEKMAZOV enjoys apparent freedom of movement and is sufficiently high-ranking to be the CC CPSU Representative. In addition, no firm identification has ever been made of his affiliation with either the KGB or the GRU. Although the Station reported in BUENOS AIRES - 18575, 29 June 1971, that CHEKMAZOV was believed to be a "likely candidate for new KGB Resident", it would seem from information contained in Headquarters files that he is more likely the SC CPSU Representative. An excerpt from Reference C contains the following indicators:

During visits to the Soviet "Quinta" almost every week-end, CHEKMAZOV

a) lunched with the Ambassador,

b) spent long periods reading, seated outdoors under the trees and remained generally aloof from other Soviets,

c) was the only Soviet who addressed other Soviets as "Comrade", and

d) his wife was said to treat wives of lower-ranking personnel in a brusk and authoritarian manner.

While the indicators cited above are not conclusive in themselves in establishing that CHEKMAZOV is the CC CPSU Representative, they do point up the possibility that he might be acting in that capacity.

5. We shall be interested to learn the identity of the Station's tentative CC CPSU Representative selection. In addition, from our review of the files mentioned in Paragraph 2, it seems that the most likely candidate for KGB Resident in Buenos Aires is Ivan Gavrilovich ALFEREYEV (201-236701), with either Steponas Pavlovich PASAUSIS (201-780552) or Boris Ivanovich BOKHIN (201-[illegible]) as Deputy KGB Resident. We should also like to have the Station's thinking as to the identities of the KGB Resident and his Deputy.

Olivia L. HUELLIS

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201-236701

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Acting
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
REDTOP AEKICK BIOGENESIS
Surveillance of AEBOOR (Alferyev)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Since his move to the Residence/Club in mid-1970, AEBOOR has appeared to withdraw from almost all overt activity. Rarely does he appear on BILOCULAR and his daily routine is a complete mystery. In order to determine his present status, the BIBAFFLEs were directed to run a surveillance on AEBOOR from Monday, 6 September through Tuesday, 14 September 1971. During this period his wife was away on home leave, thus giving him the opportunity to pursue a different life if he were so inclined. His overt subordinate in the cultural field, 201-820310, had left PCS without a replacement. Presumably his cover activities would be multiplied. Despite all this, AEBOOR maintained a spartan routine which left no clue about his present interests, activities, or responsibilities.

2. Most mornings (including Saturday and Sunday), he drove or walked to the Embassy, often buying a paper on the way. Once inside he stayed until about 1300 hours when he returned to the Residence/Club. His lunch break was rarely longer than a half hour. He returned to the Embassy and stayed at least until 2000 hours, sometimes until 2300 hours. Upon leaving, he walked or drove directly to the Residence/Club and never came out again during the night.

3. AEBOOR's only deviations from this schedule were an occasional trip to a neighbourhood shop to buy cold-cuts; one excursion to a leather-goods store to look at suitcases;

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SB
2 - Chief, WH

ALFERYEV

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 19 1971
MICROFILMED

GROUP 1
Excluded from Automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABA-22432	4 October 1971
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-236701

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	~~S E C R E T~~	HABA-22432

one attendance at a MEKNIGHT Embassy function; two trips to Ezeiza airport; and, surprisingly enough, a Sunday afternoon tour with 201-873887 and his wife to take pictures along the river front and drink beer in a Costanera cafe. (During this last excursion, the known KGB officer drove the GRU chauffeur and his wife.) The first trip to the airport was made in the company of several other high-ranking Embassy officials to greet an important transiting delegation. (See HABA-22399.) On the second trip AEBOOR was accompanied by 201-128117 (suspect KGB resident) and 201-790164 (chauffeur). On arrival, AEBOOR and his companions went up to the terrace to take photos of the Concorde as it landed for a two-day visit. They were joined by Mr. and Mrs. AELESION and 201-228494. Evidently, the KGB and the GRU groups went separately to photograph the same plane.

4. Twice during the period the BIBAFFLEs felt that AEBOOR might have been checking for surveillance. Otherwise there were no incidents of note. Not once were the BIBAFFLEs approached by local authorities with a request that they identify themselves.

5. In sum, we remain as much in the dark as before about AEBOOR. With every opportunity and reason in the world to lead a hectic pace, he spent the majority of his waking hours within the Embassy. During the days in question he received only one phone call even worth noting, one in connection with the Fischer-Petrosyan chess match scheduled for late September.

Nina T Margande

Nina T. MARGANDE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-236701

Note:
Alferyev is
now 1st Sec. This
info should be
input into machine
runs -

SB/CI/X
4 Oct 71

14-00000

54

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ______

1		5
2		6
3		7
4		

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUL 22 1971
MICROFILMED

ACTION UNIT SB 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN WH 8 CI CI/OPS CI/ICZ FI

ACTION NO. 970

S E C R E T 242050Z JUN 71 CITE BUENOS AIRES 18529 (Buen)

DIRECTOR

24 JUN IN 364928

REDTOP AEGRIP AEKICK BIOGENESIS

REF BUENOS AIRES 18511 (IN 363761)

1. BIBAFFLE TRAVEL CONTROLS REPORT THE HOME LEAVE DEPARTURE OF FIRST SECRETARY IVAN ALFERYEV AND HIS WIFE ROSA ABOARD LUFTHANSA 501 TO DAKAR ON 23 JUNE 1971. ABOARD SAME FLIGHT WAS MILATT SERGEY IVANOVICH SOKOLOVSKIY AND HIS WIFE ALEKSANDRA. ACCORDING TO BIBAFFLE-18 ALL HAVE REENTRY VISAS AND WILL RETURN.

2. FILE: 201-236071 AND 201-025485. GP-1.

SECRET

11

AEBOOK

AN
AB
IN
FB
RX
DES NED
FI

ang

AN
AD

CS COPY

SECRET

B 201-25485

24 Jun 71

201-236701

~~201-236071~~

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Soviet Bloc Division	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Buenos Aires		MICROFILM

SUBJECT REDTOP BIOGENESIS
Forwarding of Assessment Questionnaires

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REFERENCE: BOOK DISPATCH 7509, 7 July 1970

1. Attachment F to Reference was translated and given to BIBAFFLE transcribers for their use some months ago. Transmitted herewith are copies of the resulting assessment questionnaires on six official Soviets and three local Soviet Cultural Representation Employees. A breakdown on the transcribers and their products is as follows:

BIBAFFLE-30:	Assessments on Mikhail Konstantinovich VRAGOV (201-820310); Yelena Fedorovna VRAGOVA; Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701); Roza Alekseyevna ALFERYEVA; and local employees Constantino LOGVINIUK and Luis ORSETTI.
BIBAFFLE-33:	Assessment of local employee Esteban SEMENIUK (201-860420).
BIBAFFLE-45:	Assessment of VRAGOV and wife; of Sergey Iosifovich SOKOLOVSKIY (201-025485) and wife Aleksandra Vasilyevna; and of Constantin LOGVINIUK.

2. The material in the questionnaires simply reflects the transcribers' impressions and is not necessarily correct. BIBAFFLE-30 sees ALFERYEV as short and VRAGOV as greying; but ALFERYEV is tall and VRAGOV's hair is still completely sandy.

Attachments:
Questionnaires h/w

Distribution:
~~3~~ - Chief, SB (w/atts h/w)
2 - Chief, WH (w/o atts)

201-236701

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-820310 201-236701	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HADA-22158	DATE 3 June 1971
201-860420 201-025485	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 74-120-111

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	~~SECRET~~	HABA-22158

BIBAFFLEs-30 and 45 seem to be talking of different people when they describe the VRAGOVs and Constantino LOGVINIUK. One of BIBAFFLE-45's impressions that we are checking is her statement that the SOKOLOVSKIYs have occasional parties at home with singing and dancing. We have no evidence of such gay get-togethers.

3. As Headquarters is aware, the BIBAFFLE transcribers only process material from special operations such as AEVARIETY, AELANYARD, etc. and cannot furnish assessment on all individuals in whom we have interest. However, we have requested BIOGENESIS to have the BILOCULAR transcribers work with the form.

Nina T. MARGANDE

Source [illegible] 30
May 1971

~~SECRET~~

0 ALFERIEV Ivan Gavrilovich.

Apodo: Parece no tener.

Esposa: Rosa Alexeievna.

Hijos: Creo haber escuchado que el matrimonio tiene una hija. Ivan tiene por lo menos un hermano (que tambien puede pertenecer al cuerpo diplomatico).

Puesto que ocupa: agregado cultural.

Lugar donde trabaja: Yo diria-la calle. Oficialmente en la embajada. No tiene horario fijo. Se le escucho estar en casa a las mas diferentes horas. Sus salidas de la casa se produjeron tambien a horas mas diversas de dia (y de noche).

Lugar donde se aloja: actualmente en la embajada.

Telefonos donde mas comunmente se encuentra: actualmente no hago escucha de los Alferiev.

B. PARTICULARES:

a) Como se le imagina:
Bajo la mascara de aparente apatia y lentitud- sorprendente agilidad tanto fisica como mental. No es un lindo tipo de hombre. Tampoco tiene una figura Marmoniosa. Sin embargo un tipo que suele gustar a las mujeres. Entrenado para eludir el siguimiento. Muy cauteloso (hasta con su propia mujer). Lo imagino con la estatura mas bien baja que alta. Suele salir y entrar en la casa sin hacer ruido y sin aviso, tanto que ni su mujer se daba cuenta cuando salia o entraba.

b) Referencias al lugar donde nacio: No tengo.

Algun empleo anterior en su propio pais o en el exterior: Se escuchaba en algunas oportunidades que contaba de su vida de oficial a Rosa. Creo que estuvo con las tropas de ocupación en Europa.

Donde cree o piensa usted que nacio: lo ubico en la Rusia central. Posiblemente Moscu. Tiene (junto con Rosa) un departamento en un suburbio de Moscu que se llama Molodietski Stan. Es una casa de departamentos nueva.

c) Puede Ud. indicar algo sobre la vida hogareña, amistades personales etc. :
Habita, pero no "vive" en casa. La casa no es un hogar para el es solo lugar de estar. Acerca de amistades puedo decir solo de los que tenia en tiempos cuando lo escuchaba. En las reuniones, bastante frecuentes, en su casa figuraban siempre mas o menos las mismas personas. Los del grupo de Representación Comercial em primer lugar: Diakov, Pivovarov, Makaretchkin, Boldinov (con sus respectivas esposas), Sokolov-

SECRET

HABA-22158/02

Basic Doc filed

CS COPY

3 Jun 71

201-236701

ski (y anteriormente antiguo agregado militar), Vasiliev, y el mismo Velski (con quien tenia muy cordiales tratos, como tambien con todo este grupo). Los que no frecuenteaban estas reuniones (y esto llama atencion) son: Vragev, los del grupo consular, Sheitaishvili etc. (justamente, al parecer amigos de Vragev).

d) Datos, impresiones y función que desempeña la señora en la comunidad y puesto de trabajo que realiza: Ver Rosa A.

e) Que idiomas habla: habla bien ruso, español bastante regular pero muy lejos de perfecto. En una oportunidad se intercambiaron algunas frases con Rosa en idioma para mi desconocida, que no era ni ruso ni español con seguridad, ni idioma germanica ni eslava ni latina (hungaro?). En una oportunidad se escucho a Ivan (estando el solo) cantar en iddich (lo que, naturalmente no quiere decir que ni que es un judio ni que sabe hablar esta idioma).

2. FUNCION:

a) Este individuo vive dentro de una comunidad pequeña, singular y muy cerrada. Puede usted decir algo sobre su posición dentro de esta comunidad?
Posición sin duda elevada. Evidente respecto de parte de los colegas. Su opinión es buscada y apreciada. Da impresión que su estadia en la Argentina es una etapa transitoria para ocupar un puesto mas elevado. Posiblemente independiente.

b) Pertenece a la embajada.

c) Cual es su función, con quien esta comunicado abierta o encubiertamente.
Questión muy dificil de contestar. Esta extremamente cauto en hablar hasta con su propia mujer. Oficialmente es agregado cultural y se escucha que por lo menos en una pequeña parte desempeña sus funciones especificas: recibimiento (y parte financiera) de delegaciones deportivas y artisticas que vienen en gira de la URSS (tambien lo hace Vragev). Por otro lado, las verdaderas funciones de agregado cultural las desempeña Vragev al parecer por entero (consultas, cartas, pedidos de literatura, "intercambio cultural" etc.) Sin duda Alferiev tiene contactos velados con diferente gente, tanto con residentes rusos, como tambien argentinos. De una de sus conversaciónes se podria sacar conclusión que tenia sus contactos (puede ser que por intermedio de terceras personas) con general Lopez, o por lo menos que este general se encuentra en la esfera de "intereses" de Alferiev. Tambien un tal John se cuenta entre sus amigos. Con frecuencia Alferiev venia a la casa en altas horas de la noche. Tambien se escucho que sale de la zona permitida (sus viajes hace con Mamuta). Al parecer a ambos les interesa la costa mas alla

de Mar del Plata. Se escucho que tiene plata asignada de hacer regalos (pequeños) para mujeres (que mujeres es un misterio). Les regala medias, perfumes y otras chucherias. Los otros datos acerca de sus actividades (muy escasos por cierto) estaban remetidos oportunamente y nó los tengo en mi memoria.

d) Cual es su titulo oficial (y segun el): Nunca hablo de sus titulos.

e) Coincide el tratamiento de sus collegas y relaciones o contactos con su posición ostensible, o se le trata a el con mas o menos respeto que merece de acuerdo a su posición. Coincide plenamente.

3. **FISICA:**

a) Tiene algun rasgo sobresaliente etc.: No, no tiene. Su mujer a veces rie de sus movimientos y posturas torpes (que le son solo en apariencia). Alferiev tiene exceso de sudor.

b) De comentarios juzga usted que es atractivo, poco o sin atracción.
No es atractivo, pero es simpatico. Gusta a las mujeres. La llegada de el en su casa cuando habia reuniones se festejaba largamente especialmente por las mujeres. Su mujer le quiere y esta celosa de el.

c) Puede dar referencias de sus preferencias para vestirse y cuidado de su persona.
No da mucha importancia ni en vestir ni em cuidado de su persona. Posee escasos trajes y son posiblemente viejos. Se escuchaba que los daban a intervalos mas o menos regulares para limpiar. Utilisaban servicio a domicilio.

4. **EXPRESIVIDAD.**
Se expresa con habilidad. Tambien en castellano por instinto encuentra las expresiones adecuadas. Es persuasivo en alto grado. No tiene visibles modismos o expresiones favoritas. Algunas de sus expresiones estan penetradas de fina ironia, nada de sarcasmo. No se puede hablar de acento propiamente dicho cuando habla castellano. Que es extranjero se nota de lejos. Si, parece tener oido y talento para idiomas.

5. **ATRIBUTOS VOCALES.**
Voz suave, moderada, mas baja que aguda. Es pausada, pero solo ligeramente. Habla con ritmo normal aumentandolo solo cuando esta excitado (que sucede muy raras veces) pero casi sin levantar la voz. Su voz puede estar imperiosa (solo en raras ocasiones.) Nada de tartamudear o balbucear.

~~SECRET~~

6. PSIQUICAS.

No muestra tensión nerviosa de ninguna indole casi nunca. Sabe dominarse muy bien. Es frio y calculador. Nada de tics. Lejos de ser historico. Se enoja en muy raras ocasiones. Demuestra su enojo mas bien con gestos (portazo) que palabras. No trata despoticamente a nadie. Lejos de ser sumiso, pero es muy paciente.

7. SENTIDO DEL HUMOR.

Bromea no muy a menudo, si lo hace, se nota un fino sentido de humor en sus bromas. No cuenta ninguna clase de cuentos obscenos. No creo que le gusta escuchar procacidades y profanidades. Su mujer lo reta a menudo y muchas veces lo insulta. Su reacción aparente es no prestarke ni menor atención. En mas de un año de escucha no note en el referencias al sexo.

8. HABITOS, INTERESES Y HOBBYES.

a) Tiene intereses, habitos o manualidades especiales?
No se noto. Al parecer hace palabras cruzadas. Lee revistas y diarios asiduamente. Ve TV.

b) Le agradan bebidas alcoholicas?
Consumo de alcolol es moderado. Vermuth, coñac "Reserva San Juan" y Fernet Branca son las bebidas preferidas. Al parecer no toma vino con las comidas.

c) Tiene inclinación especial hacia el sexo? (quienes)
No muestra aparente inclinación hacia el sexo. Su mujer de ~~xx~~ vez en cuando le hace escenas de celos. No creo que el sexo lo domina, pero tampoco que no va a correr alguna que otra aventura (nada profundo) si se le presenta oportunidad.
En una oportunidad Rosa le reprocho (haciendo un gran escandalo) porque lo vio besar en la boca a una mujer (tambien de la embajada, no se escucho a quien).

d) Habia referencias a cigarillos en la casa. No tiene tos habitual.

e) Cuales son sus comidas preferidas.
No hay referencias. Mas sobre esto ver Rosa A.

f) Cuales son sus companias preferidas? Se trata con sus colegas y familia? En que grado?
Se menciono ya el grupo de sus amistades dentro de cuerpo diplomatico. Alferiev es un tipo que suele hacer amistades facil. No parece tener amigos intimos. Sus collegas lo quieren y respetan al parecer con sinceridad.

g) Tiene habito de gastar dinero? Se queja (el o su familia) de falta de dinero? Cuales son sus reacciones ante quejas de caracter economico?
No tiene habito de gastar dinero. Todo lo contrario. En esto coincide con Rosa. Es egoista, sin ser mezquino.

SECRET

No va a vacilar en robar, si sabe que saldra impune. En una oportunidad se escucho claramente que en una conversación con Rosa que, aprovechando desconocimiento de cambios monetarios, leyes, idioma y restricción de movimientos, por parte de la delegación deportiva de la lucha grecoromana (Mar del Plata) y aprovechando su posición les robaba algunos miseros 3-4 dolares por cabeza. "Y todo esto es para nosotros"-decia Rosa encantada, batiendose las palmas de las manos como una niña.

9. VIDA PROFESIONAL.

a) Es aparentemente satisfecho con su posición. Por otra parte creo que espera un ascenso (posiblemente un traslado en un pais de habla francesa)

b) Cuales son las actitudes expresadas hacia la gente del pais y con quienes se trata.
Desprecia al argentino, hombre criollo y al pais y a sus gobernantes y habitantes. Considera a la Argentina como a un pais riquisimo, de recursos inagotables. Expresa su genuino asombro por el periodo de poca prosperidad y dificultades economicas por las cuales atravieza el pais. Este desprecio no lo muestra frente a los argentinos. Esto de ninguna manera!

c) Que piensa de sus colegas y ellos de el? Como lo valoran profesionalmente.
Nunca se le escucho opinar sobre los otros (es una caracteristica tambien de Rosa). Se nota su enemistad evidente con Vragov. Si hablan con Rosa de el, lo llaman invariablemente "vrag = enemigo". Acerca de como lo valoran los colegas ya di mi opinion.

II. ACCESO:

a) No se ocupa de compras. Raras veces llega a casa trayendo pan o cualquier otra cosa que le encarga su mujer.

b) Maneja auto?
Si, maneja. Al parecer va (por lo menos en tiempos de mi escucha) sin acompañantes ni chofer.

c) Estudia idiomas?
Aparentemente estudia frances, en parte en casa con Rosa. Lo de castellano, lo estudia practicandolo en cualquiera oportunidad que se le presenta hablando con la gente del pais. No se escucho que toma algun curso. Hace palabras cruzadas en castellano, lo que ayuda.

d) Lugares donde va a divertirse (con quien).
Salen con Rosa al cine (siempre barato) o aprovechando entradas libres, con frequencia y bastante regular. Prefieren peliculas nacionales. Visitan bares y confiterias. En algunas

~~SECRET~~

oportunidades van al Colon (creo que aprovechando invitación). Van solos, acompañados por otros miembros del C.D. y tambien con residentes rusos procomunistas. En este aspecto parece que gozan de entera libertad y se les tiene ilimitada confianza. Entiendo que para el personal sovietico hay un cine en la embajada. Al parecer precisamente alli donde no van.

e) No se escucho nada de medicos.

I2. SALUD.

a) Es enfermo?
En lo patologico es propenso al resfrio y grippe (en forma siempre ligera). Tiene (tenia) furunculosis y al parecer una forma de eczema. Puede ser hipertiroide(por sudor abund.)

b) No se escucharon quejas ni de cansancio ni de fatiga.

I3. CAMBIOS.

No, no se notaron ningunos cambios del animo etc. en ninguna oportunidad. Que los trasladaron del departamento no parecio inmutarlos. Ni hablaron de esto. Todo traslado se produjo en forma sorpresiva.

14-00000

Source. Bibaffle 30
May 1971

~~SECRET~~

A. ALFERIEVA Rosa Alexeievna

Apodo: desconocido.

Hijos: ver Alferiev Ivan.

Puesto que ocupa: Esposa del agregado cultural.

Lugar donde trabaja: Embajada.

Lugar donde se aloja: Embajada.

Telefonos donde mas comunmente se encuentra: Hace mucho tiempo no hago escucha de los Alferiev. No puedo contestar.

B. PARTICULARES:'

I. Personales:

a) Como se la imagina:
La imagino como una trigueña, de estatura mediana, con la figura de pasable a buena. Es una persona perezosa.

b) Referencias al lugar donde nacio. Algun empleo anterior en su propio pais o en exterior. Donde cree o piensa usted que nacio:
No hay referencias en este aspecto. La ubico como nacida en Rusia Central.

c) Puede Ud. indicar algo sobre la vida hogareña, amistades personales etc.
Mala ama de casa y excelente anfitriona. No le gusta cocinar ni mantener el hogar impecablemente limpio. Pocas veces hace comida en casa, generalmente sopas substanciales que sirven a la vez como I y 2 plato. Sus comidas solia hacerse traer de una rotiseria proxima, por lo general pocote al horno. Tambien las provisiones de almacen se hacia mandar ocasionalmente (no siempre). Lo mismo con la tintoreria(venian a retirar prendas.) Pero en esto se terminan sus gastos superfluos. Es egoista y calculadora, busca comprar lo mas barato posible y regatea hasta el ultimo centavo. Ama al dinero.

d) Datos impresiones y funcion que desempeña en la comunidad y puesto de trabajo que realiza.
Despues de mas de un año de escucha queda incognita absoluta. El matrimonio no parece "trabajar" en lo mismo. Tienen funciones muy bien diferentes y no se confian los pormenores de sus respectivas actividades el uno al otro. En la casa simplemente no hablan de asuntos de trabajo.

e) Que idiomas habla:
Ruso-bien. Castellano regular. Para hacerse entender y no mas. Lo estudia en la casa. Parece que habla un idioma desconocido por mi (ver Alferiev Ivan).

2. FUNCION

a) Goza de una posicion elevada a causa de su marido y no por

SECRET

meritos propios. Buena amfitriona, querida por sus colegas de mas o menos el mismo rango, probablemente odiada por los de posición subordinada, por que a estos los trata como a perros.

b) pertenece a la embajada.

c) Cual es su función, con quien esta comunicada abierta o encubiertamente?

Ya se dijo de lo cauto que esta este matrimonio. Carezco de datos al respecto. Puedo comunicar mi opinion personal de que "trabaja" mas bien "dentro" de la colonia que "afuera" en contraste con su marido. Posible que desempeña una especie de vigilancia interna y vela por "buenas costumbres" del grupo.

d) Es la esposa del agregado y nada mas.

e) Si, coincide. La tratan con respeto unos y la estiman y quieren otros.

3. FISICA

a) No se menciona rasgos sobresalientes algunos.

b) Los hombres parecen encontrarla "interesante". Dijo ella en una oportunidad no carente de orgullo que tiene una figura buena.

c) No da mucha importancia a la manera de vestir (no tanto como por ejemplo Elena) pero siendo mujer, siempre mas que su marido. Lo mismo al cuidado de su persona no da excesiva importancia. Usa cremas y polvos, pero no se maquilla. Critica el modo de vestir de mujer argentina con cierta ironia y su modo de maquillaje con franco sarcasmo. Prefiere colores oscuros pero no chillones. Para decir al paso, esta sorpresivamente bien informada acerca de vida de la alta sociedad estadounidense (p.ej. Jackeline Kennedy) y de realeza europea y de moda oriente.

4. EXPRESIVIDAD

Se expresa con mucha facilidad y habilidad. Se siente comoda en cualquier ambiente. Favorito modismo de ella es "ured = monstruo, aborton". Parece tener oido para idiomas.

5. ATRIBUTOS VOCALES

La voz de Rosa es un alto. Es moderada a aguda, imperiosa y clara. Habla rapido. Nada de tartamudeos ni balbuceos.

6. PSIQUICAS

Es al extremo celosa. No solo hacia otras mujeres, sino a la poca atención que le presta su marido y al trabajo de el. No es histerica, pero se enoja facilmente. Su enojo pasa rapido. Es buena amfitriona, siempre domina con tacto cualquiera situación embarazosa durante las reuniones. A cada uno siempre tiene lista una palabra adecuada de elogio. Nunca, repito, nunca participa en alguna discusión de otra persona o personas o hechos (me refiero a los de embajada), pero siempre escucha muy atenta las opiniones de otros. Es muy diplomatica

y muy cauta y tambien muy astuta.
A causa de sus celos parece ser despotica, pero es mas pese siva. Reta muy a menudo a su marido. En asuntos domesticos dirige la batuta. Pero en casos en que se toma decisión de caracter financiero-familiar y sobre todo en casos que conciernen al trabajo, es el marido quien manda. No es sumisa, discute acaloradamente, pero si su marido decide algo, le bastan 2-3 palabras en el tono tajante para pararla en seco. Entonces le obedece sin chistar siquiera. Respeta en el fondo a su marido, aunque a veces muestra todo lo contrario.

7. SENTIDO DE HUMOR.

Es propensa a hacer bromas, es alegre, especialmente en sociedad. Sus bromas no son finas pero en ninguna manera vulgares. En raras ocasiones manda a su marido a la p. que lo parió, pero es en ocasiones cuando sale a la calle vestido, al parecer de ella, inadecuadamente o cuando no cuida de su salud. En querrollas entre los dos (muy frecuentes) raras veces se escuchan obscenidades. Cuando se enoja llama a su marido "aborto menstruoso" o "fascista".

8. HABITOS INTERESES HOBBYES

a) Parece no tener. Ve con regularidad TV.(especialmente las transmisiones de la hora religiosa, esta no la deja pasar).

b) Ya se hablo de esto. Ver Ivan.

c) Tiene inclinación especial hacia el sexo?
No se nota. Es celosa, es todo.

d) Tiene tos. A veces persistente y largo tiempo.

e) No tiene culto al estomago. Una sopa, un asado al horno la satisface.

f) Cuales son sus companias preferidas. Se trata con sus colegas y familia.
Con todos los de Representación Comercial mantiene relaciones cordiales sin entrar en intimidad, especialmente con los Diakov, lo mismo se podria decir con respecto a los Vasiliev, de agregado militar y del mismo embajador. En los tratos con los Vragov hay distanciamiento y franco antagonismo, lo mismo que con los amigos de Vragov (consulado, los Sheitaishvilli etc).

g) No, no tiene habito de gastar plata. Tiene habito de guardarla. Esta enferma cuando le falta plata. Una vez casi lloro hablando con su marido de una combinación financiera que fracaso. Utilizando su posición de diplomatica hace contrabando-hormiga de perfumes ropa y pieles a URSS. Utiliza servicios de oficiales de la flota pesquera o comercial sovietica que la visitan oportunamente.

9. VIDA PROFESIONAL

a) No hay visible desagrado con la posición, mas bien es a su gusto.

b) Al tratarse de criollos su expresión(en conversación con sus connacionales) es "negro y cabecita".

c) Al respecto de sus colegas nunca expresa su opinión. A ella misma la parecen estimar y querer, es popular. Antagonismo con los del grupo Vragov.

II. [illegible].

a) Todo lo que compra Rosa (como tambien muchos otros de la colonia) lo hace exclusivamente en los negocios judios y no porque los quiere, sino por 2 razones. Generalmente hablan ruso y tienen tradicional comida rusa. Generalmente va sola, a veces acompañada. Los almacenes en Junin, Corrientes y Pueyrredon se mencionan a menudo. Para la ropa, hay una tienda que esta en los suburbios de Gran Buenos Aires. No me acuerdo mas donde es. Parece pertenecer a los ucrainianos. Se escucho varias veces mencionar direcciones de depositos (no propiamente negocios) de Guth y Chavez y Harrods. Al parecer tienen una tienda exclusivamente para su personal en la Rep. Comerc. que se abastece con articulos ya pasados de moda de estos negocios.

b) No tengo referencias de que maneja auto.

c) Estudia español mas bien en forma practica (hablando, leyendo), estudia frances en su casa (a veces con su marido).

d) Ver Alferiev Ivan.

e) -"-"-"

I2. SALUD.

a) Anginas, bronquitis con tos persistente con regular frecuencia.

b) No se queja de fatiga ni da impresión de cansancio.

I3. CAMBIOS

No se ha notado ningun cambio.

I4. OTROS DATOS

Al tratarse de matrimonio mi primera y fuerte impresión fué que se llevan mal, impresión que se desvaneció poco a poco. Creo que es un error considerarlo asi. Rosa es excesivamente celosa, esto explica frecuentes escenas que hace a su marido, por otra parte creo que no le desagrada mayormente los celos de su mujer (vanidad del hombre). Habia escenas de conversación muy tiernas entre ellos. Entonces " el aborto monstruoso" se convertia en "mi abertencito". Es evidente tambien que Rosa cuida la salud de su marido. En lo financiero parece reinar la mas perfecta armonia entre ambos: todo para la familia.

14-00000

FORM 3020 10-69 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 25-1

1

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT SB 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC

ACTION NO. 800

FI

Buen

S E C R E T 081810Z FEB 71 CITE BUENOS AIRES 7271 (SHROYER ACTING)

DIRECTOR

8 FEB 71 231321

REDTOP AEKICK BIOGENESIS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 7069 (IN 246580)

1. BIBAFFLES REPORT IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV RETURNED BUENOS AIRES 5 FEBRUARY VIA SWISSAIR 200 FROM DAKAR. STATION HAS NO INFO ON PURPOSE OF TDY BUT BELIEVE IT NOT UNLIKELY HE SUMMONED FOR DISCUSSIONS RE AEPARADISE 64 CASE.

2. FILE: 201-236701. GP-1.

S E C R E T

D

FI

CS COPY

8 Feb 71

201-236701

SECRET

10-69 EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINAT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COP 25-1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER #

ACTION UNIT SB8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC

ACTION NO. 800 FI

S E C R E T 081810Z FEB 71 CITE BUENOS AIRES 7271 (SHROYER ACTING)

DIRECTOR 8 FEB 71 231321

REDTOP AEKICK BIOGENESIS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 7069 (IN 246580)

1. BIBAFFLES REPORT IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV RETURNED BUENOS AIRES 5 FEBRUARY VIA SWISSAIR 200 FROM DAKAR. STATION HAS NO INFO ON PURPOSE OF TDY BUT BELIEVE IT NOT UNLIKELY HE SUMMONED FOR DISCUSSIONS RE AEPARADISE 64 CASE. You Betcha! Damage assessment.

2. FILE: 201-236701. GP-1.

S E C R E T

LEE
CON
CHA I CO
CLY
DIA
KAT
BOB
FIL. Alferyev 201
DES
RET

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 5-7

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION UNIT: SB 8

INFO: FILE, VR WH 8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

ACTION NO. 978

S E C R E T 182102Z JAN 71 CITE BUENOS AIRES 7069 BUEN

DIRECTOR

18 JAN 71 246580

REDTOP BIOGENESIS AEKICK

1. BIBAFFLE TRAVEL CONTROLS REPORT IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV, KNOWN KGB, DEPARTED FOR USSR WITHOUT WIFE 17 JANUARY VIA KLM 792 TO AMSTERDAM. PER BILOCULAR, TRIP IS FOR CONSULTATION.

2. FILE: 201-236701. 3P-1.

SECRET

CS COPY

18 Jan 71

201-236701

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 26

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY DCP PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT: SB 8

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, SI/ICZ, FI 2

ACTION NO. 203

S E C R E T 131725Z OCT 70 CITE BUENOS AIRES 6154 Buen

DIRECTOR

13 Oct 70 183849

REDTOP BIOGENESIS

1. BIOGENESIS REPORTS RETURN FROM HOME LEAVE OF ROZA ALEKSEYEVNA ALFERYEVA, 201-236701, 9 OCT, VIA SWISSAIR 200.

2. FILE: 201-236701. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN
AH
IN
PF
BI
DE
FI

CS COPY

13 Oct 70
201-236701

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 3040 3-70 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 4

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______
X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______
DISSEM BY 35 PER ______ #
☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT SB8
INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI2, WH8
ACTION NO. 808

S E C R E T 082035Z SEP 70 CITE BUENOS AIRES 5793 Buen

DIRECTOR 8 SEP 70 158462

CREDTOP AEKICK BIOGENESIS

1. BIOGENESIS REPORTS TRAVEL FOLLOWING SOVIETS:

A. IVAN ALFERYEV, WHO RETURNED BUENOS AIRES WITHOUT WIFE, 4 SEPT VIA SWISS AIR 200.

B. VADIM CHEKMAZOV, WHO DEPARTED B.A. 5 SEPT VIA AIR FRANCE 082. CHEKMAZOV LEFT, PRESUMABLY ON HOME LEAVE, TO JOIN WIFE WHO PRECEDED HIM WITH SON IN APRIL.

C. YURIY, LYUDMILA, AND ANTON MAMONTOV, WHO DEPARTED B.A. (PRESUMABLY UPON HOME LEAVE) 7 SEPT VIA AIR FRANCE 090.

2. FILE: 201-236701, 201-128117 AND 201-853701. GP-1

SECRET

AN MGC
~~XB~~
~~IN~~
PS
DX
DHM
FI

MICROFILMED
SEP 22 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RID/EDI
RECEIVED

CS COPY

B 201-128117
B 201-853701

201-236701
8 Sept 70

SECRET

SBYWH

1 Sep 70

[illegible], BA.
201-236,701

201-236701
Argentina 01 Sep 70


СССР
ПАСПОРТ
6 7 8
22 23 24 25 2
12


26
12

D 029288/70 mate

Alferev Ivan
gavrilovich
Argentina



Предъявитель сего, гражданин СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

АЛФЕРЬЕВ Иван Гаврилович,

Первый Секретарь Посольства СССР

в Аргентине

отправляется за границу

Именем Союза Советских Социалистических Республик

Министерство Иностранных Дел просит все гражданские и военные власти СССР и Дружественных Государств пропускать беспрепятственно владельца настоящего паспорта и оказывать ему всяческое содействие.

Паспорт действителен на пять лет

25 мая 1970 г.

Айрес

Заведующий Консульским Отделом Посольства СССР

Министерства Иностранных Дел СССР в Аргентине

7

Traduction.

Le titulaire du présent, citoyen...... de L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Ivan ALFERIEV,

Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS

en Argentine

se rend à l'étranger

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Ce passeport est valable pour cinq ans

25 mai 1970

12

Suppléant du Ministre
ires Etrangères de l'URSS

Pour traduction conforme:

JEFE DE LA SECCION CONSULAR DE LA
EMBAJADA DE LA URSS EN LA
REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

26

Отметки о продлении паспорта. Renouvellement.

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен
по „..........“.................................19.......... г.
Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé
jusqu'au „..........“.................................19..........
„..........“.................................19.......... г.
М. П.
le „..........“.................................19..........
Подпись
Signature ....

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен
по „..........“.................................19.......... г.
Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé
jusqu'au „..........“.................................19..........
„..........“.................................19.......... г.
М. П.
le „..........“.................................19..........
Подпись
Signature ....

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен
по „..........“.................................19.......... г.
Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé
jusqu'au „..........“.................................19..........
„..........“.................................19.......... г.
М. П.
le „..........“.................................19..........



Посольство СССР в Аргентине Консульский отдел

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№ 380268

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до [illegible]
[illegible] 1970 г.
через пограничный пункт
[illegible] 12/3



ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№..................

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до «.......» ....

.... 19........ г.

через любой пограничный пункт

м. п. Подпись

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№..................

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до [illegible]

через любой пограничный [illegible]

м. п. Подпись

Визы. Visas

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto

El Titular del presente Pasaporte ingresó al país el día 27 de enero de 1968 Con Pasaporte Diplomático Nº 019467 y Visación Diplomática Nº 182 otorgada por Embajada de la República en U.R.S.S. el 10 de enero de 1968.

Buenos Aires 9 de junio de 1970

[illegible]

12



Emb. Visas.

Buenos Aires, *9 de junio de 1970*
Se prorroga el período de permanencia en la República establecido en la Visa Argentina estampada en la página *10* del presente pasaporte, hasta el *término de la misión del Titular en la República* -

[illegible]
CONSEJERO DE EMBAJADA
JEFE DE DESPACHO GENERAL
DIRECCION NACIONAL DE CEREMONIAL

Emb. Visas.

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
y Culto
UNA (1)
Visa para ~~Varias~~ Entradas
a la Republica Argentina

Válida hasta 9 SET 1970

Buenos Aires 9 JUN 1970

[illegible]
CONSEJERO DE EMBAJADA
JEFE DE DESPACHO GENERAL
DIRECCION NACIONAL DE CEREMONIAL

12



Визы. Visas.

Визы. Visas.

No. 24/HE/70

DIPLOMATIQUE / DIPLOMATIEK / [illegible]

Ivan VIDA Alferiev.

Valable pour / Geldig voor / Valid for : Brussel

Délivré le / Afgegeven op / Issued on ... 11-6-1970.

Ce visa est valable pour / Dit visum is geldig voor / This visa is valid : deux (2) [illegible]

à partir du / vanaf / from : [illegible] | de la date de la [illegible] / the date of first entry

pour [illegible] / voor [illegible] / for a [illegible]

Première entrée avant / Eerste binnenkomst voor / First entry before ... 11-7-1970.

[illegible]

sauf prorogation par le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères / [illegible] / unless extended by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[illegible]

De Ambassadeur [illegible]
voor deze
Ledesqui

II № 029288

— [illegible] —

12


8 9 10 11 12
22 23 24 25 26 27 2
СССР
ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 029298

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ

13

Предъявитель сего, гражданка СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

АЛФЕРЬЕВА Роза Алексеевна,

супруга Первого Секретаря Посольства СССР

в Аргентине

отправляется за границу —

ИМЕНЕМ СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Министерство Иностранных Дел просит все гражданские и военные власти СССР и Дружественных Государств пропускать беспрепятственно владельца настоящего паспорта и оказывать ему всяческое содействие.

Паспорт действителен на ПЯТЬ ЛЕТ

25 мая 1970 г.

Адрес

Заведующий Консульским Отделом Посольства СССР в Аргентине

Заместитель Министра Иностранных Дел СССР

13

2



Traduction.

Le titulaire du présent, citoyen...... de L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Roza ALFERIEVA,

épouse du Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS en Argentine

se rend à l'étranger

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Le passeport est valable pour cinq ans

25 de mai 1970

Adjoint du Ministre
des Affaires Etrangères de l'URSS

13

Pour traduction conforme:

DE LA SECCION CONSULAR DE LA
EMBAJADA DE LA URSS EN LA
REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

12

Отметки о продлении паспорта. Renouvellement.

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

по „.........“.................................19.......... г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „.........“.................................19..........

м. п. „.........“.................................19.......... г.

le „.........“.................................19..........

Подпись
Signature ....

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

по „.........“.................................19.......... г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „.........“.................................19..........

м. п. „.........“.................................19.......... г.

le „.........“.................................19..........

Подпись
Signature ....

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

по „.........“.................................19.......... г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „.........“.................................19..........

м. п. „.........“.................................19.......... г.

le „.........“.................................19..........

Подпись
Signature ....

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ КНИ

№ 380267

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

по „09“ (девятого)

ноября 1970 г.

пограничные пункты

13

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№ ....

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до «.........» ....

.... 19......... г.

через любой пограничный пункт

м. п. Подпись

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№ ....

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до «.........» ....

.... 19......... г.

через любой пограничный пункт

м. п.

Визы. Visas.

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA
Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteriores y Culto

El Titular del presente Pasaporte ingresó al país el día 27 de enero de 1968 Con Pasaporte Diplomático N° [illegible] y Visación Diplomática N° 183 otorgada por Embajada de la República en U.R.S.S. el 12 de enero 1968

Buenos Aires, [illegible]

13



Emam. Visas

Buenos Aires, 9 de junio de 1970.-
Se prorroga el período de permanencia en la República establecido en la Visa Argentina estampada en la página 10 del presente pasaporte, hasta el término de la misión de su esposo en la República

[illegible] JOSE CARDE CEBALLOS
CONSEJERO DE EMBAJADA
JEFE DE DESPACHO GENERAL
DIRECCION NACIONAL DE CEREMONIAL

Emam. Visas,

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto
Visa para ~~Varias~~ una(s) Entradas
a la Republica Argentina
Válida hasta: -9 SET 1970
Buenos Aires, -9 JUN 1970

13



Визы. Visas.

Визы. Visas.

22

No. 25/NE/70

DIPLOMATIQUE / DIPLOMATISK / DIPLOMATIC

Nora VISA Alferieva

Valable pour / Geldig voor / Valid for : Benelux

Délivré le / Afgegeven op / Issued on 11-6-1970.

Ce visa est valable pour / Dit visum is geldig voor / This visa is valid deux (2) mois/heure / maanden/dagen / months/days

à partir du / vanaf / from — de la date de la première entrée / de datum van eerste binnenkomst / the date of first entry

pour une/plusieurs entrée(s) / voor een/meerdere reis(en) / for a single/several journey(s)

Première entrée avant / Eerste binnenkomst voor / First entry before 11-7-1970.

Durée du séjour ininterrompu / Duur onafgebroken verblijf / Duration of uninterrupted stay — mois/jours / maanden/dagen / months/days

sauf prorogation par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères / behoudens verlenging door het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken / unless extended by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Attention : Faire estampiller votre passeport à la frontière
Opgelet : Paspoort aan de grens laten afstempelen
Attention : Passport to be stamped at the frontier.

Signature et sceau / Handtekening en stempel

De Ambassadeur
Voor deze

Д № 029289

— 44 —

13

14-00000

SBXWN

[illegible]

Alfeyev V.A.
201-256701



Срок настоящего паспорта продлен до „ " 19 г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé jusqu'au „ " 19

с „ " 19 г.

по „ " 19

Подпись
Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен до „ " 19 г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé jusqu'au „ " 19

с „ " 19 г.

по „ " 19

Подпись
Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№ 3002ор

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до „09" (девятого) ...ября 19 70 г.

через пограничный пункт



Срок настоящего паспорта продлен до „ " 19 г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé jusqu'au „ " 19

с „ " 19 г.

по „ " 19

Подпись
Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен до „ " 19 г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé jusqu'au „ " 19

с „ " 19 г.

по „ " 19

Подпись
Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен до „ " 19 г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№ 3002ор

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до „09" (девятого) ...ября 19 70

через пограничный пункт



Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

до „ „ 19

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „ „ 19

М. П. „ „ 19

L. S. „ „ 19

Подпись
Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

до „ „ 19

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „ „ 19

М. П. „ „ 19

L. S. „ „ 19

Подпись
Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

до „ „ 19

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „ „ 19

М. П. „ „ 19

L. S. „ „ 19

Подпись
Signature

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ ПАСПОРТ

№ 30420

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЕН до [illegible]

до „ 29 . [illegible] 19 76

[illegible]



[illegible] URSS [illegible]
des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes

Nora ALFERIEVA,

Epouse du Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade

de l'URSS en Argentine

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Le passeport est valable [illegible]



Le titulaire du présent, citoyen de l'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Rosa ALFERIEVA,

épouse du Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS en Argentine

se rend à l'étranger

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Le passeport est valable pour



Le titulaire du présent, citoyen de l'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Rosa ALFERIEVA,

épouse du Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS en Argentine

se rend à l'étranger

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Le passeport est valable pour



[illegible] СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

[illegible] Роза Алексеевна,

[illegible] Первого Секретаря Посольства СССР
в Аргентине

[illegible]

[illegible] СОЮЗА
СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

[illegible] СССР [illegible]

[illegible]



[illegible] СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

[illegible] Роза Алексеевна,

[illegible] Первого Секретаря Посольства СССР
в Аргентине

[illegible]

[illegible] СОЮЗА
СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

[illegible] просит все гражданские и военные власти СССР и дружественных государств пропускать [illegible] настоящего паспорта и оказывать ему всяческое содействие.

[illegible]


UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES
PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE
СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК
ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ
Д №


UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES
PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE
СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК
ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ
Д №



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

No [illegible]

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

№ [illegible]



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

No [illegible]

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

№ [illegible]

14-00000

8

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT SB8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN WHP E2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 EUR6

ACTION NO. 917

SECRET 292111Z JUN 70 CITE BUENOS AIRES 5319 (Buen)

~~DIRECTOR~~ DIRECTOR

29 JUN 70 113219

REDTOP BIOGENESIS AEKICK SOVIET TRAVEL

1. BIOGENESIS REPORTS FOLLOWING TRAVEL.

A. IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV AND WIFE ROZA ALEKSEYEVNA DEPARTED FOR USSR, PROBABLY ON HOME LEAVE, 27 JUNE VIA AIR FRANCE 082 TO PARIS.

B. NIKOLAY ALEKSEYEVICH NAUMOV DEPARTED PCS WITH WIFE VALENTINA IVANOVNA AND DAUGHTERS MARINA AND TATYANA 28 JUNE VIA KLM 792 TO AMSTERDAM.

2. FILE: 201-236701 AND 201-817222. GP-1.

SECRET

1P

MICROFILMED
JUL 30 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN
AB X
~~FN~~
FO N
IN
DPT
FI

CS COPY

SECRET

29 June 70

B 201-817222

201-236701

From HABA-21382, 18 May 1970, Source: BIOGENESIS

c) ALFERIEV IVAN (1º Secretario – Sección Cultural – K.G.B.) Aparenta ser complaciente con el Embajador y a menudo conversa con él fuera de las horas de las comidas. Habla bastante bien el castellano. Fuma bastante, casi siempre cigarrillos americanos. Bebe bastante aunque sin exceso. Es muy suceptible sobre su rango diplomático. En una oportunidad discutió con el Embajador sobre el significado de la frase "Alferiev – 1º Secretario, pertenece a la Embajada de la URSS", argumentando que él no es "una silla o un mueble". VOLSKI le llamó la atención, dándole a entender que buscara bien el significado de las palabras. Es muy ambicioso. Se mantiene siempre muy alejado de su mujer. En una oportunidad se sentaron juntos a la mesa a almorzar y todos les hicieron bromas por este hecho, lo que significa que es "vox populi", las desavenencias del matrimonio ALFERIEV.

14-00000

SECRET

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY SHEET

MAY 1970

A. **TARGET IDENTITY:** (Name, DPOB, 201#, present job and location)

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (AEBOOR), born 20 January 1928 in Tula, 201-236701
Second Secretary/Cultural Officer at Sovemb. Buenos Aires

B. **TARGET BACKGROUND:** (Brief resume of background, family members and where located, whether known or suspect RIS, languages.)

Apparently from peasant background.
1958: TDY Argentina (possible. 1960: TDY Havana
1960-1964: Mexico City, PRAVDA rep.
1968- : Buenos Aires, 2nd Sec./Cultural Officer at Sovemb.

Known KGB. Speaks Spanish, English.
Wife: Rosa Alekseyevna (20 Sept. 34 in Moscow), son: Vadim (24 Sept. 55 in Moscow). Wife with him, son in SU.

C. **OPERATIONAL SUMMARY:** (Short statements on following where applicable: access agents, access informants, residence audio/taps, office audio/taps, physical surveillance, C/O contact, BAB assessment, past recruitment attempts, other. Cite significant documents, starting dates.)

Residence audio: AELANYARD run jointly with BIOGENESIS in August 1968, ALFERYEV moved out unexpectedly into compound for unknown reasons in October 1969. (HABA-20979, 4 Nov 69)
Office ~~xxxxx~~ taps: BINOCULAR is joint liaison teletap.
C/O Direct contact: Paul W. LEMEROME, Nina T. MARGANDE (HABA-20210, 16 January 1969).

D. **List of Susceptibilities/Vulnerabilities:** (List of everything which possibly exploitable by us, and significant steps we have taken to clarify, confirm or refute it. Cite document/source.)

Intense arguments ~~xxxx~~ between ALFERYEV and wife (AELANYARD, BIBAFFLE reports, HABA-20528). Their behaviour in Public is all sweetness and light; she appears almost like a different person. She appears to harbor resentment against him because of his behaviour towards her.
ALFERYEV is very tail-conscious. (HABA-21080, 18 December 1969).
ALFERYEV has on occasion remained out all night, and has claimed to his wife when he comes home that he has been working. (HABA-21080, 18 December 1969). Surveillance on him at night allegedly proved he made clandestine contacts.

~~SECRET~~ X

X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

REDLEG - Bernardo Francisco NORIEGA

1. Headquarters traces are requested on:

NAME	:	Bernardo Francisco NORIEGA
DPOB	:	18 June 1914, Argentina
OCCUPATION	:	Director of Difusora Argentina de Espectáculos y Filmes Artísticos (DAEFA)
PARENTS	:	Bernardo and Agustina nee DEGRADI
WIFE	:	Married, wife's name unknown

2. Station traces show that NORIEGA, apparently a musician by profession, has a long record of association with Communist front groups. He was one of the founding members of the Movimiento de Unidad y Coordinacion Sindical (MUCS) and reportedly a member of the Communist Party of Argentina. He was also formerly the Secretary General of the Argentine Union of Musicians. Specific references include:

a. HAB-03124, 16 October 1961, which describes him as the owner of the building in which the PCA Buenos Aires Central Zone Committee had its Headquarters. (This document also identifies NORIEGA as alias Ken HAMILTON.)

b. HMMA-18041, 27 October 1961, which reports NORIEGA's travel to Cuba at the invitation of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba.

c. BUENOS AIRES-9129, March 1963, which states NORIEGA attended the Rio Congress for Solidarity for Cuba.

File AEBOOK

Distribution
3 - Chief, WHD
~~2~~ - Chief, SBD

HABA-21266 20 March 1970

SECRET 201-

~~SECRET~~ HABA-21266

d. HABA-15153, 20 January 1964, which identifies NORIEGA as a member of the Communist faction of the Argentine Musicians' Union.

3. Despite his background, the Station is taking a close look at NORIEGA as a possible unilateral access agent. As a Director of the firm which is currently sponsoring the visit of the Moscow Circus, he is in constant touch with both AEBOOR and 201-821510. He is, in fact, the only consistent overt contact that AEBOOR has maintained since his arrival in Argentina.

4. Please assign a 201.

Elma T. MARGANDE

16 March 1970

AEBOOR TARGETING EXERCISE - 201-236701

GENERAL BACKGROUND:

INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION: Known KGB, Suspect Deputy Resident

POSITION: Second Secretary/Cultural

DPOB: 20 January 1928, Tula

FAMILY: Wife - in Buenos Aires
Son (born 1955) - in Moscow

LANGUAGES: Spanish, excellent
English, some

TOURS:

1958: TDY (possible), Argentina
1960: TDY, Havana
1960-64: Mexico, PRAVDA Rep.
1968- : Buenos Aires

RESIDENCE: Private apartment of Embassy Club

PERSONALITY: Reportedly likes modern Mexican & American music.

FEINGLASS - 1964: Peasant background. Vulgar/crude speech, high-pitched reedy voice. Foul vocabulary. Choleric temperament. Rudimentary sense of humor. Easily upset by small things. Impatient, demanding.

AELANYARD - November 1962: Henpecked. Wife always arguing with him.

DIRAFFLEs 5 and 22 : Introvert, clever, cautious, distrustful. Excellent self-control, hides his feelings. Socially, joking, good sense of humor.

WIFE'S PERSONALITY:

FEINGLASS - 1964: She is more intelligent than he. Not attractive. Domineering. Unpleasant with husband. Family of liars.

AELANYARD: She finds fault with her husband for no apparent reason.

LEVERGUE and MARGAUDE - 1962: Warm personality, attractive. Interested in theater/music/ballet.

DIRAFFLEs 5 and 22: In private -- total lack of understanding of her husband. Intolerant/impetuous. Unhappy married life known generally to Soviet community. Socially -- docile, cheerful, lovely disposition.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

January 1962 (In Quito): observed casing a State Dept. building with the Cuban Commercial Attache in Quito. Close contact with Cuban diplomats and local CP leaders.

1963: trip to Ensenada. Contacted rural recruiter to assess Mexican youths desiring to study in USSR.

Mexican tour Involved with leaders of Movimiento Liberacion Nacional (MLN) and Central Campesina Independiente (CCI) in Ensenada, Tijuana, and Mexicali.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
0 BIOGENESIS/BIBAFFLE/Information on Various Soviets

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached please find a seven-page report in Spanish composed by members of the BIBAFFLE unit. While the report is not always accurate, it does represent a good effort on the part of the BIBAFFLE team to pull together all available information (telephone taps, surveillance and audio ops) on Soviet personalities.

2. We suggest that you make pertinent extracts from the attachment and include the information in your Headquarters files on individual Soviet personalities.

Edwin W. Shroyer
Edwin W. SHROYER

MICROFILMED
MAR 20 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment
BIBAFFLE Report h/w

Distribution
5 - Chief, SBD w/att h/w
2 - Chief, WHD w/o att

CS COPY

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO
74-120-111

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA-21223

CLASSIFICATION

DATE
10 March 1970

HQS FILE NUMBER

Extracted from attachment

Pasa urgente a la Sec. C.E.

25 JAN 19

Estrictamente Secreto y Confidencial

No. 3459

E: 117/ "Document contains info regarding certain members of Soviet Mission in Argentina"

Personalidades Claves de la Misión Soviética

201-236701

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERIEV, Segundo Secretario Cultural. Oficial del Servicio de Inteligencia.

Aunque nominalmente a cargo de la Sección Cultural en Quito 2031, de la operación telefónica surge que tiene poco contacto con el público.

2. En Enero recibió una llamada del aeropuerto de Leon YASHIN, miembro del equipo de futbal "Moscow Dynamo" en ruta a un encuentro en Santiago de Chile. YASHIN y ALFERIEV eran obviamente buenos amigos puesto que YASHIN le trajo saludos "de los muchachos en México".

3. Las conversaciones telefónicas de ALFERIEV con su esposa son bruscas. En una ocasión en marzo cuando llamó para avisar a medio día que no iba a casa para comer ella le acusó de estar "ya borracho", lo que estaba confirmado por su conversación vacilante. Una noche le pidió que hiciera té para los VRAGOS (era las 21 horas) y ella de mal humor contestó que estaba para irse a la cama, pero finalmente consintió hacerlo.

4. Aparentemente Rosa ALFERIEV posee un caniche

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

201-236701

c. ALFERYEV and Roza. He made a point of complaining - several times in the course of the evening, about not being invited to our 4th of July celebrations. We lamely pointed out that the affair was so big that we only invited men - Ambassadors, Milatts, and Comm'l. Chiefs, and besides, the food was lousy. Nevertheless, we assured him he'd be invited the next time. He was suffering ; his usual case of halitosis, which effectively keeps one at a proper distance. Roza was her charming self, with a sparkle in her flirtatious eyes. She asked us to convey regards to LEVERONE and MARGANDE.

[illegible]

Stephen H. GARSIDE - SOVIET 7 NOVEMBER CELEBRATION
HABA - 21161, 3 FEBRUARY 1970

SECRET 201-236701

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION	
MARKED FOR INDEXING	
NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT BIBAFFLE Assessment of AEBOOR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded as a separate cover attachment is a translation of an assessment of AEBOOR prepared by the BIBAFFLE Soviet Desk Officers, BIBAFFLE-5 and 22. The assessment does not tally completely with our assessment of Subject in some minor points, but it does present another view which should prove of interest to Headquarters analysts.

Paul W. Leverone
Paul W. LEVERONE

MICROFILMED
JAN 16 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/attach u/s/c
[illegible]

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
1 att	HABA-21080	18 December 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-236701

SPECIAL REPORT

6P

I.- SUBJECT

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERIEV was born in Moscow (U.S.S.R.), on the 20th of January 1928, diplomatic passport No. 091.477, married to Rosa Alekseevna ALFERIEVA, born on September 20th, 1934, in Moscow, diplomatic passport No. 019.468. Subject is assigned as 2nd Counsellor of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in Buenos Aires. He arrived in this country on the 27th of January 1968, taking up residence on Uruguay 1176, 5th Floor, Apt. "A" in the Federal Capital, Tel. 41-5405, living at said address until de 7th of October 1969 when he moved to live at the Posadas Club (residence for the officers of the soviet representation).

ALFERIEV had been for a short time in Argentina during the month of September 1958; in Havana in September 1960; in Quito in January and February 1962 and in Tijuana in September 1963. He was representative of PRAVDA in Mexico during 1960 and 1964.

MICROFILMED
JAN 16 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

In view of the fact that subject lived separetely from the rest of the Embassy personnel, his mission based on information was thus made easier.

It should be pointed out, that during his residence on Uruguay, he was kept under surveillance through a technical penetration carried out by this Section.

As a result of the exploitation of these lines, as well as the Case "ASADO" (summer home) and information from the "LORO" case, certain details concerning his personality, private life and contacts have been ascertained.

Through thorough study of above mentioned sources, it is apparent that the ALFERIEVS have certain differences, during which he is the object of vituperation from his wife Rosa, which Ivan thoroughly ignores to the great exasperation of his wife.

II.- PERSONALITY OF IVAN ALFERIEV

He is an introvert, clever, cautious and distrustful. He knows how to hide his feelings and he has an excellent self-control, showing violent feelings on very rare occasions. (See Section IV).

With relation to his cultural level, nothing much is known, as he has never been heard speaking on themes of general culture. When he speaks at social gatherings he is joking, using double meaning phrases (usually funny)

S/c. att 1 to HABA 01080 CS COPY 201-236701 or he tells jokes. It is as though he were afraid to show that he takes things seriously, as though he were ashamed or frightened.

During the various opportunities when his wife is screaming all sort of impropieties at him he maintains absolute silence, seeming to be concentrating on one fixed idea, and letting all that Rosa says just slide off him.

He has been identified and known to belong to the K.G.B. (Soviet Secret Police). According to a confidential source, he is considered a high official in the embassy and of aboslute trustworthiness by Ambassador Iouro VOLSKI; being respected and feared by the rest of the embassy staff. He speaks perfect spanish.

He is present at all receptions with Iouri VOLSKI and Ivan DIAKOV (ambassador and Chief of the Commercial Representation, respectively), not only in his official position, but also in his private life, having a warm friendship between the three which is quite rare in the embassy circle. During his stay at the summer home, ALFERIEV and his wife occupy the quarters reserved for the ambassador.

III.- PERSONALITY OF ROSA ALFERIEVA

A certain duality of personality is apparent in her behavior. In her married life she shows herself to be intolerant andimpetuous, arriving at absolutellack of control on various occasions, bringing forth continual marital quarrels.

On the contrary, in her social life, she shows herself as a very docile, cheerful woman, being the center of attraction in almost all the gatherings for her "lovely disposition" and gayety, not only among the men but also their wives. (See section I).

Rosa Alekseevna ALFERIEVA is a woman brought up in the typical soviet atmosphere, subjected sice childhood to a rigid political indoctrination in some juvenile organisation and in school. She is not sufficiently intelligent to rid herself, even partially, of what she has been taught. She does not separate her affective life from the obligations that she, presumes, every good Communist citizens should have. It seems that she does not realise the importance of her husbands mission. She is not a woman who is attuned to her companion. She is not on the same wave length, she does not understand him. She harbors a concentrated and continuous resentment against him. May be this is due to his ironic,and keen and wounding sense of humour.

With regard to her surroundings, this woman has shown, on various opportunities, to feel antipathy and scorn for Argentina and its people, dueugh probably to its leanings toward democracy, and therefore, contrary to her way of thinking. As she has shown not to possess much imagination,she takes as wonderful that which she has been taught. However, the reason for her poor matrimonial relations remains a mystery. Maybe one of the reason, as stated above is her lack of understanding of her husband, so that one quarrel on top of the other has built a wall which cannot be breached.

In the company of her friends, Rosa has always shown herself to be pleasant, gay and uncomplicated. She has not always masked her marital problems, so that they are not a secret to the rest of the members of the embassy, who nevertheless make believe they know nothig about it, through consideration or whatever other motives they may have. On some occasions VOLSKI has taken the initiative to improve relations between the ALFERIEVS, to no avail.

IV.- MODUS OPERANDI WHICH HAS SHOWN UP FROM SURVEILLANCE

During the shadowing of Ivan ALFERIEV, he has shown himself to be an expert in this matter. He is observant and his movements in the street are carried out carefully and ably- on many opportunities he has shaken off his shadows. He is an excellent driver, and he uses all sorts of ruses to throw off the agents on the job. This is proved below:

Shadowing on 23-5-69:

He drove his car down Cordoba Av., turned on 9 July going towards Cerrito, which was closed off for repairs. In the middle of the street were two signs which read: "DETOUR, USE CENTER LANES". Subject disregarded the signs and continued straight ahead towards Viamonte, where transit was completely cut off, and he had to take 9 July again and comes to the Obelisco.

With this trick, ALFERIEV wanted to learn whether he was being followed.

SHADOWING on 20-5-69:

He went into the Bank of Napoli, approaches the counter, carries on a conversation with an employee, and vanishes without being observed inspite of close vigilance .

- Before going into a building of store, he looks in both directions and searches carefully.

- When he goes in his car, he drives slowly, but every so often, he steps on the gas, and then abruptly reduces speed, doing this various times.

--During all the shadowings carried out, subject always managed to go ahead on the yellow light, leaving his shadow generally facing the red light.

- On various occasions he went up one way streets.

V.- CONTACTS

It was ascertained that ALFERIEV arrived home very late at night and even at dawn, which is quite out of the ordinary with the rest of the diplomatic personnel. (See Annex 2).

This led to the supposition that subject was either leading a licentious life or carrying out clandestine activities. Therefore, a permanent suverveillance was carried out during 24 hours for 20 days on his home, proving that he did in reality come home between 6 and 7 at times.

Fifteen days before his return to the U.S.S.R. for his leave, a surveillance and shadowing service was set up during all 24 hours, proving that subject did make clandestine contacts.

It was under these circumstances that on the 21/5/69, at 1200 hours, a contact was spotted. This occurred once again on the 23/5/69, at which time the "contact" was suspicious of being followed and he pulled quickly out of the area.

On the 18th of August of the present year, when a security agent who was carrying out his duties on the ALFERIEV address (improvement of the P.T.), spotted the above mentioned contact patrolling the zone; with the aid of a Policeman he was detained in order to be identified, his documents are the following:

Names. . . . . Alberto DO EYO
C.I.No. . . . . 5.432.687 Pol. Fed.
Address. . . . . Moldes 742, 7º Fl., Fed. Cap.
Profession. . . . . Newspaperman

After investigation was carried out it was established that subjec did not live at said address and that his I.D. was not his.

Continuing the investigation it was learned that at Moldes 1872, 7th floor, a certain Alberto DO EYO did live there, and that he worked at Editorial "ESTAMPA", address Calle Salta 980, Federal Capital, Tel. 23-4052/8958/6166 and also in the firm "PETERSEN THIELE CRUZ and CIA", Rivarola 178, Federal Capital, Tel. 45-8811, 46-1334/1666 and 40-1785, which was in the construction and sale of apartments.

When Editorial "ESTAMPA" was visited, it was learned that this firm had gone out of business for some time.

Following investigation, ~~it was learned~~ at the administrative offices of the firm "PETERSEN THIELE CRUZ y Cia", Talcahuano 178, 1st Floor, Federal Capital, the agent in charge of the investigation was waited by subject, who turned out to be:

Names	✓Alberto DO EYO [illegible]	SEX: M
C.I. No.	1.024.378 Pol. Fed.	DOB: 15 Oct 13
L.E. No.	0.257.963, D.M. 2	POB: ?
Date of Birth	15-10-1913	CIT: Argentina
Son of	Manuel	OCC: Businessman
and	Rosa PAZ	PA Argentina
Address	Moldes 1872, 7th Floor, Apt. "B"	Buenos Aires
Tel.	78-4665	
Names of Wife	Eugenia MAGLIOCCA	
C.I. No.	2.600.078 Pol. Fed.	P in contact with Ivan J. Alferiev P (201-236701)

Antecedents:

Alberto DO EYO does not have any police nor ideological antecedents. Until the year 1961, he worked at Editorial "ESTAMPA", then at "PETERSEN THIELE CRUZ y Cia".

It should be pointed out that in order to establish his activities and connections with ALFERIEV, starting 22-10-69 a surveillance and shadowing was carried out on subject.

On the other hand, and as a result of the use of the clandestined microphones, it was learned that Ivan ALFERIEV maintained conversations with a person by the name of MOGUILEVSKY, who was a member of the directive Council of the Metropolitan Federation of Chess and the Argentine Chess Federation.

Investigation carried out on subject determined the following:

Names	Marcelino MOGUILEVSKY [illegible]	Sex: M
C.I. No.	1.429.304 Pol. Fed.	DOB: 30 Oct 16
L.E. No.	0.386.446	POB: Argentina,
Son of	David	Macachia, La
And	Natalia GOBERNOSER	Pampa
Date of birth	October 30, 1916	CIT: Argentina
Place of birth	Macachia, La Pampa	OCC: Sec.
Address	Arredondo 2440, 1st Floor, Apt. B	Argentine
Place of Work (address)	San Blas 2638, Fed. Cap.	Chess Fed.

Mr. MOGUILEVSKY occupies the post of Secretary of the Argentine Chess Federation with head quarters in the Sports Confederation Building, address on Viamonte 1360, 6th Floor, Federal Capital.

Beginning October 22nd of this year a surveillance and shadowing service was established to determine his activities and possible contacts with ALFERIEV.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

With reference to the 2nd Councellor of the U.S.S.R., Ivan ALFERIEV, the following conclusions have been reached:

a) He is a diplomatic officer who carries out his professional work efficiently, showing at all times great sagacity when carrying out public contacts and relations, avoiding on various opportunities with ingenuity and ability the shadowing detail assigned to him.

b) With reference to his relations and activities within the Embassy, it is observed that he carries a lot of weight over the rest of the personnel, as he is given deferential attention and respect not only at official but private functions within the circle.

c) He is a person who is always busy, on the go all day and on into the late hours of the night.

d) His married life is not harmonious, due to the character of his wife who is temperamental and impetuous and not tolerant toward subject. It is estimated that these misunderstandings are linked to his activities outsidde of normal working hours, which take him away from home, as well as, the indifference and silence with which her recriminations are received.

e) With reference to his contacts, mentioned in this report, the corresponding investigations are being carried out to determine how far they reach and their importance.

201-236701

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	RYBAT SECRET
TO	Chief, Soviet Bloc Division
INFO.	Chief, WHD; COS, Panama City/MKSPICE
FROM	Chief of Station, Buenos Aires 18
SUBJECT	RYBAT REDTOP AELANYARD BIOGENESIS/AEBOOR

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. BUENOS AIRES-3801, 2 October 1969

B. BUENOS AIRES-3837, 9 October 1969

1. We have kept you up to date on AEBOOR's sudden move and the subsequent termination of AELANYARD. At the present time, we still do not know whether or not the story of a sudden transfer to Mexico City was in reality the basis for the move or if a compromise of the operation was the actual cause. As we pointed out in our original cable, our immediate thought was that perhaps the AVDOLMAN flap had caused all AEKICK types to "pull in" and that perhaps AEBOOR was simply following orders. Subsequent investigation, however, tended to discredit this thought.

2. The AELANYARD transcripts reveal that AEBOOR did indeed contemplate the move several days before we actually had wind of it. His wife did not like the idea and complained to him about the move. AEBOOR also told his landlord in advance of his move. There is also evidence that AEBOOR was in somewhat regular contact with the Mexican Embassy and although we were not certain, it appeared that he was anxious to learn if his visa had been granted. In any case, on 28 September 1969, AEBOOR and wife checked out of their apartment.

3. Shortly thereafter, we made a physical check of the interior of the apartment. Everything seemed to be in order. There was no evidence whatsoever that the technical end of the operation had been tampered with. As we said before, it functioned up until and after AEBOOR vacated.

Continued. . .

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD
2 - C/WHD
2 - COS, Panama City/MKSPICE

COPY ROUTING
WH
VT
6

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-20979	DATE 4 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-236701

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~RYBAT~~ ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-20979

4. We have not been able as yet to establish direct social contact with AEBOOR. Both Nina T. MARGANDE and Paul W. LEVERONE (who have legitimate reason to seek him out) have tried, but to date, to no avail. Our hope has been to have AEBOOR actually tell us of his plans - will he indeed be transferred to Mexico? Our original thought was that the Mexico Station could readily determine if he had indeed applied for a visa to that country. As you know, we struck out here also.

5. The fact is that as of this writing, we do not know whether AEBOOR's move was routine and innocent or if indeed there was something sinister involved. If AEBOOR does indeed pick up and move to Mexico, we shall, of course, be somewhat relieved. However, this will not answer categorically the major question - was the operation compromised? It would appear that regardless of what happens to AEBOOR, we shall never know the actual reason for his move. However, for what it is worth, the evidence here does not point toward a compromise.

Edwin W. Shroyer

Edwin W. SHROYER

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT C/SB5

ACTION NO. 711

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD, C/WH 8, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 091746Z OCT 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1631 MEXI

9 Oct 69 IN 62331

BUENOS AIRES, INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT REDTOP AELANYARD BIOGENESIS

REFS: A. BUENOS AIRES 3214 (458524)

B. BUENOS ARIES 3837 (462151)

AXSO PS ABSTRACT INDEX SB/X/WH

1. MEXICO CITY HAS NO INFO RE AEBOOR TRANSFER.

2. FILE: 201-236701.

S E C R E T

9 Oct 69

CS COPY

201-236701

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT C/SAS

ACTION NO. 686

FILE, VR C/CI/SP, C/WH 8, C/CI, C/CA 2, C/TSD 3, C/CI/IC, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 091420Z OCT 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3837
BUEN

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, PANAMA CITY

9 Oct 69 IN 62151

ANSD

SB/H/10H

RYBAT RECTOP AELANYARD BIOGENESIS TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3814 (IN 58524)

1. AEBOOR TURNED OVER KEY TO LANDLORD 7 OCTOBER. ON 8 OCTOBER LANDLORD ACCOMPANIED KANOUSE AND BIRAFFLE-24 TO APARTMENT THEN DISCREETLY WITHDREW DURING INSPECTION. KANOUSE AND BIBAFFLE-24 FOUND NO EVIDENCE AELANYARD INSTALLATION HAD BEEN DISCOVERED.

2. LANDLORD WILL VISIT MHHARSH 9 OCTOBER FOR FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT AND AT KANOUSE REQUEST WILL OFFER APARTMENT FOR RENTAL BY OTHER MHHARSH OFFICIAL.

3. FOR MEXICO. ANY CONFIRMATION ON AEBOOR STORY RE MEXICAN TRANSFER?

4. FILE: 201-236701

S E C R E T

9 Oct 69

CS COPY

SECRET

201-236701

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 2-0

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1	WH PT	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/SB5

FILE, VR C/RI/SD C/WH8 C/CI C/FI2 C/TSD3 C/CI/TC

ACTION NO. 381

DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 032201Z OCT 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3814 (SHROYER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO PANAMA CITY

3 Oct 69 IN 58524

M

RYBAT REDTOP AELANYARD BIOGENESIS TECH

(1073470)

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3081 (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY)

1. FOR MEXICO. REF DESCRIBES AEBOOR'S (IDEN) ABRUPT MOVE TO PRIVATE APARTMENT OT EMBASSY CLUB.

2. ON 3 OCTOBER BIBAFFLES INTERVIEWED LANDLORD WHO STATED THAT ON 18 AUGUST AEBOOR SAID PLANNED VACATE APARTMENT IN FIRST DAYS SEPTEMBER BECAUSE OF TRANSFER TO MEXICO. APARTMENT CONTRACT RENEWED IN JUNE WAS NOT FOR YEAR AS STATION HITHERTO ASSUMED BECAUSE OF CON~~CID~~DITION LAST YEAR'S CONTRACT, BUT CONTAINED SIMPLE PROVISION FOR THREE MONTH ADVANCE NOTICE FROM EITHER PARTY. LANDLORD ADDED DID NOT PLAN MAKE ISSUE OF RECEIVING ONLY SIX WEEKS NOTICE. FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT PENDING.

3. STORY MAKES SENSE SINCE BILOCULAR SHOWS FREQUENT AEBOOR CALLS TO MEXICAN EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES BEGINNING 18 SEPTEMBER. IN RETROSPECT NOW CLEAR CONVERSATIONS CONCERNED HIS DIFFICULTIES OBTAINING MEXICAN VISA.

4. ABOVE APPEARS INDICATE AELANYARD NOT COMPRIMISED.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | **CLASSIFIED MESSAGE** | **TOTAL COPIES** | **ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 3814 SECRET

5. FILE: 201-236781.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)   GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

BY: ATI: Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 30 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT c/SB5   FILE, VR c/RI/SD c/WH8 c/CI c/FE2 c/TSA3

ACTION NO. 582   c/CI/TC DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 032202Z OCT 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3815 (SHROYER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO PANAMA CITY

30 OCT 69 IN 58520

RTBAT REDTOP AELANYARD BIOGENESIS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3814 (IN 58524)

1. IDEN IS IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV, PRAVADA CORRESPONDENT MEXICO 1960-64 AND SECOND SECRETARY BUENOS AIRES SINCE JANUARY 1968. KNOWN KGB.

2. FILE: 201-236701.

S E C R E T

N

2

AEBDDR

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY dsb PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ~~ACTION COPY~~

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

OCT 2 7 15 PM '69

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1	WH	5	
2	[illegible] PT	6	
3	[illegible]	7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/SB5

INFO FILE, VR c/WH 8, c/RI/SD, DDP, ADDP, s/c/ue/62

ACTION NO. 273

S E C R E T 021845Z OCT 69 CITE BUENOS AIES 3801 (SHROYER ACTING)

DIRECTOR

2 Oct 69 IN 57397

RYBAT REDTOP AELANYARD

1. ON 28 SEPT AEBOOR AND WIFE VACATED AELANYARD APT AFTER HAVING PACKED HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS. THEY MOVED DIRECTLY TO PSOADAS WHERE THEY PRESENTLY RESIDING. CONTRACT NOT DUE EXPIRE UNTIL JUNE 1970.

2. FIRST INDICATION OF PLANNED MOVE IS FROM TRANSCRIPT 28 SEPT WHICH DUE TO BACKLOG AND WEEKEND NOT PROCESSED UNTIL 30 SEPT. IN THIS AEBOOR AND WIFE ARGUE OVER DICISION TO MOVE OUT. UNFORTUNATELY LANDLORD OUT OF TOWN AND WE DO NOT HAVE YET BENEFIT AEBOOR'S FUTURE DISCUSSION WITH HIM RE REASON FOR MOVING.

File: AEBOOR

3. AT THIS MOMENT WE UNABLE DETERMINE REASON FOR SUDDEN MOVE AND WHILE IT APPEARS COMPROMISE OF OPERATION A LIKELY CAUSE, WE UNABLE MAKE CONCLUSIVE STATEMENT. AUDIO EQUIPMENT FUNCIONING NORMALLY. WE PRESENTLY INCLINED BELIVE AEBOOR MAY HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS MOVE DUE AVDOLMAN FLAP. NOTE AEBOOR AND 201-825485 ONLY TWO WITH

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION UNIT FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 3801 S E C R E T

PRIVATE APARTMENTS. ALSO BELIEVE IT SIGNIFICANT THAT AEDOOR DISCUSSED MOVE WITH WIFE. CANNOT RATIONALIZE THIS IF HE INDEED AWARE OF OPERATION.

4. WE CONTINUING INVESTIGATION. WILL FORWARD COMPLETE DETAILS VIA POUCH.

5. FILE: 201-236701.

SECRET

SECRET

5-60 3015 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 30/21 PER RCF RVBAT

ACTION UNIT C/SAS

ACTION NO. 292

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES

OCT 2 11 30 PM '69

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE ACTION COPY

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

#165

FILE, VR, C/WH8, C/BUSD, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2

SERVICE

BUENOS AIRES 3801
STA & NR

02 OCTOBER '69
DATE

57397-A
IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

ADD PANAMA CITY AS INFO ADDEE.

SECRET

14-00000

S E C R E T

Chief, Soviet Bloc Division
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief of Station, Montevideo

Chief of Station, Buenos Aires
AEDTOP BIOGENESIS
Soviet Courier Travel

Reference: MONTEVIDEO 8705

Transmitted herewith for SB Division are copies of the passports of Soviet couriers Viktor Sergeyevich MUNIN and Petr Leontyevich SAMOYLOV (Diplomatic 12303 and 12133 respectively.) These documents were obtained by BIOGENESIS Travel Controls. MUNIN and SAMOYLOV first transited Buenos Aires on 8 September on reference Alitalia flight from Montevideo to Santiago. They did not deplane but delivered four packages to local Soviet Embassy officials who boarded. (BIOGENESIS did not identify the officials.) They retransited Argentina on 15 September via KLM 792 from Santiago to Montevideo and again remained on the plane. Yuriy Yuryevich MOSKWED (201-824296) and Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701) boarded to deliver four packages. (This is perhaps the first time that ALFERYEV, known KGB, has met a courier flight. The explanation for his having done so may rest in the fact that Consul Antanas Ignovich YURSENKNAS (201-779979), the suspect KGB officer who usually has this job, suffered a serious heart attack on 19 July and has been confined to his apartment since.)

Nina T. MARGANOS

Attachment:
H/W as Stated

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach h/w
2 - C/WHD, w/o attach
2 - COS, Montevideo, w/o attach

File in
201-236701

CS COPY FILED IN 200-8-63

HABA-20678

17 September 1969

S E C R E T

HFN: 4-6-40/2; 201-23670;
WPR: 201-824296; 201-779979 and

ORIG: C. Collyer/Beresford:sak
UNIT: TSD/AOB
EXT: 2481
DATE: 9 Sept 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	WH	5	
2	RI	6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: C/TSD 3 INFO: FILE VR. C/RI/SD, C/WH 8, C/SB 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 10 13 54z SEP 69 CITE DIRECTOR

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO PANAMA CITY 36601

RYBAT AQUATIC REDLEG BIOGENESIS AELANYARD

REF BUENOS AIRES 3615 (IN 37031)

1. REGRET WOACRE UNABLE ESTABLISH CAUSE REF FAILURE. EVIDENCE ON ALL PREVIOUS UNITS INDICATE FAILURES DUE ABNORMAL LINE CONDITION AELANYARD.

2. RECOMMEND BIOGENESIS CHECK LINE SIX TO INSURE IT NOT COMING IN CONTACT WITH AC LINE. ALSO CHECK LINE TO DETERMINE IF ABNORMAL VOLTAGES PRESENT.

3. FILE 4-137-102/2 AND 74-120-221.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD Comment: Station requested WOACRE comments re failure SWA-3A.

WH/4 Mr. Loftus (by phone X6067)

Quentin C. Johnson
TSD/COP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

N. Jackson
Norman S. Jackson
C/TSD/AOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 77 PER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	WH	6	
2	PT	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION C/TSD 3 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/RUSD C/WH8 C/SB5 C/CI

313 C/FI 2 DD/P ADDP C/CI/7C

S E C R E T 041401Z SEP 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3515

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT AQUATIC REDTOP BIOGENESIS AELANYARD

4 SEP 69 IN 37021

REFS: A. BUENOS AIRES 3467 (N 19230)

B. BUENOS AIRES 2087

C. BUENOS AIRES 2483

D. BUENOS AIRES 3442 (N 16579)

E. DIRECTOR 90984

1. REF A WORK COMPLETED. INSTALLATION REPORT FOLLOWS VIA POUCH.

2. DURING ROUTINE LP INSPECTION MORNING 3 SEPTEMBER FOUND LINE SIX SWA-3A DEAD AGAIN. SAME PROBLEM REPORTED THREE TIMES PREVIOUSLY VIA REFS B, C AND D. PER REF E FIRST TWO FAILURES DETERMINED BY HEADQUARTERS TO BE PROBABLY RESULT ELECTRICAL STORM.

3. SINCE THIS OCCURS ALWAYS ON LINE SIX WITH ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE ON LINE SEVEN PERHAPS SOME OTHER INFLUENCE PRESENT SUCH AS POSSIBLE LINE SHORT, ETC. CHANGE OF UWTP-9 DID NOT ALTER SITUATION.

4. REQUEST WOACRE COMMENTS.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 3615 SECRET

5. FILE 4-137-102/2 AND 74-120-221.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY dh PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT SB8

INFO FILE, VR WH8 R/AN WHC2 CI/CI2 FI2

ACTION NO. 1421

S E C R E T 252140Z AUG 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3573

25 Aug 69 IN 30527

DIRECTOR

RECTOP BIOGENESIS

1. BIOGENESIS REPORTS ANATOLIY ILICH VASILYEV, HIS WIFE GALINA AND ROZA ALFERYEVA ALL RETURNED BUENOS AIRES FROM HOME LEAVE 22 AUGUST VIA LUFTHANSA 504.

2. SOV PRIEST YEVGENIY STEPANOVICH PARFENYUK DEPARTED FOR USSR 17 AUGUST WITH WIFE ~~MARGARITVPOXXKIDXKD KSUFKYSCUL OXDJIXTKXIHD~~ ~~[illegible]~~ AND SON VLADIMIR. PHOTOS AND PASSPORTS ~~SE~~OBTAINED AND BEING FORWARDED. SINCE CONTAIN NO ARGENTINE REENTRY VISAS DO NOT KNOW WHETHER TRAVEL PCS OR HOME LEAVE.

3. FILE: 201-227440, 201-236701 AND 201-781794.

SECRET BEING SERVICED

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

10

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 35/ PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/TSD 3

FILE, VR C/RI/SD, C/SBS, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 8

ACTION NO. 651

S E C R E T 121554Z AUG 69 CITE PANAMA CITY 0947

12 Aug 69 IN 21989

BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT AQUATIC REDLEG BIOGENESIS AELANYARD

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3467 (IN 19530)

1. MKSPIEC FORWARDING FOUR EACH ADDITIONAL TWO HUNDRED OHM MM-22 POTTED MICROPHONES AND FOUR EACH AGC-2 KEL PREAMP SYSTEMS FOR TEST AND POSSIBLE USE. MKSPICE SUPPLY DOT-3 TRANSFORMERS DEPLETED HOWEVER OUR RECORDS SHOW TWELVE DOT-3'S PREVIOUSLY SHIPPED WHICH SHOULD BE IN BIOGENESIS-14 POSSESSION.

2. FILE 4-137-102/2 AND 74-120-221.

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Soviet Bloc Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Buenos Aires		MICROFILM

SUBJECT RYBAT REDTOP AELANYARD
Transmittal of Tapes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HABA-20415, dated 27 March 1969
B. LABW-11445, dated 21 April 1969

1. Forwarded under separate cover are two AELANYARD tapes covering 26, 27 and 28 July 1969. The recording for the 28th runs through the last half of the first tape and all of the second; it involves a conversation between AEBCOK and 201-268170 regarding the former's experiences during his recent home leave. We should very much appreciate having Headquarters' monitors review this conversation of 28 July and forward to Buenos Aires as complete a transcription as possible. Once the transcription is finished the tapes may be destroyed.

2. In reference B Headquarters suggested that samplings of AELANYARD be forwarded tri-annually. Since we have begun forwarding the most interesting AELANYARD tapes for transcription at Headquarters, we assume there is no longer any need to transmit routine samplings of the initial BIOGENESIS product.

Nina T. Margande
Nina T. MARGANDE

Attachments:
2 Tapes U/S/C

SD 21 Aug 69

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attachs U/S/C
2 - C/WHD, w/o attachs

COPY ROUTING
1 WH/PT
2 B.
3
4
5

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
74-120-221	HABA-20776	11 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-236701 74-120-221

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

ACTION UNIT C/TSD 3

ACTION NO. 534

FILE, VR C/EUS?, C/WH 3, C/SAS [illegible] C/FI 2 [illegible]

DDC, CS/DO, C/CI [illegible]

S E C R E T 072300Z AUG 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3467

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

7 AUG [illegible]

RYBAT AQUATIC REDTOP BIOGENESIS AELANYARD

REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 3442 (IN 16579)

B. PANAMA CITY 0818 (IN 11343)

C. BUENOS AIRES 3396 (IN 10364)

1. APPROX 19 AND 20 AUGUST GEHRMANN, BIOGENESIS-14 AND HIS HELPER PLAN ENTER ACCESS APARTMENT ABOVE TARGET TO REPLACE MIKES PER REF B WITH TWO HUNDRED OHM MM-22'S AND ENLARGE PINHOLES IF POSSIBLE. HAVE APARTMENT OWNER'S PERMISSION AND HE WILL BE OUT OF TOWN. WILL TEST LINES WITH AND WITHOUT SWA-3A PREAMPS USING AMPEX AND SONY RECORDERS IN LP. (DUE EXCESSIVE FAILURE SWA-3A HERE, PREFER MAKE INSTALLATION WITHOUT PREAMPS IF POSSIBLE.) GEHRMANN WILL MOVE TO LP DURING TESTING PERIOD.

2. FOR PANAMA CITY: PLEASE POUCH SOONEST SIX EACH DOT-3 OR EQUIVALENT TRANSFORMERS AND FOUR ADDITIONAL TWO HUNDRED OHM MM-22 MIKES, POTTED FOR ONE INCH DIAMETER IF POSSIBLE.

3. FILE: 4-137-102/2 AND 74-120-221.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

ACTION 588 590

☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH8, FI2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2

S E C R E T 282006Z JUL 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3413

BUEN

DIRECTOR

REDTOP BIOGENESIS

28 Jul 69 IN 11670

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3032 (IN 67772)

1. BIOGENESIS TRAVEL CONTROLS REPORT IVAN GAVRIOLVICH ALFERYEV ARRIVED ARGENTINA ALONE 25 JULY VIA LUFTHANSA 504 FROM DAKAR. DO NOT KNOW WHEN OR IF WIFE ROSA RETURNING.

2. FILE: 201-236701.

SECRET

AN
AR X
IN
FS
IPD
FI

CS COPY

201-236701
28 Jul 69

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES C-1

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________

DISSEM BY 4 PER ____

ACTION C/SB 1 ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR. C/WH 8, [illegible], C/CI
391 C/EUR 5, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 241237Z JUL 69 CITE PARIS 1043 (RILANDER ACTING)

BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR

24 Jul 69 IN 09124

RYBAT REDTOP BIOGENESIS

REF BUENOS AIRES 3009 (IN 65500)

AB
ABSTRACT SB/X/EU

1. UNION ADVISES THAT PHILIPPE DE SEZE BORN 22 SEPTEMBER ~~OOWP~~ 1920 AT BORDEAUX IS KNOWN TO HAVE MADE FREQUENT TRIPS TO EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DURING 1956-61 PERIOD FOR NORMAL COMMERCIAL PURPOSES.

2. THERE ARE NO STATION TRACES.

3. ~~[illegible]~~ FILE 201-236701.

S E C R E T

24 July 69

RS COPY

SECRET 201-236701

14-00000

3P-

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Via Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AEKICK/AEBOOR
Operational Possibilities Against FJSTEAL Priority Targets

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Paragraph 5.
Reference : HABW-11473, dated 5 June 1969

1. The detailed analysis of the Station's operational efforts against some of the priority FJSTEAL targets and the suggestion that perhaps AEBOOR offered the best immediate operational promise and warranted special attention was reviewed and discussed by the interested officers; it should come as no surprise to Headquarters that there is really little divergence of opinion, not only as to the priority target, but also insofar as operational approach and conduct is concerned. We would like to correct the apparent Headquarters impression that the Station was negligent in the follow-up of operational opportunities and was waiting for the FJSTEALers to take the initiative insofar as future contacts were concerned. We believe Station efforts have been as aggressive as possible in the existing operational climate, and if we were remiss, it was in failing to report in detail the various negative results of what we consider normal operational efforts.

2. AEBOOR was selected as one of the priority Station targets for the simple reason that three officers had direct access to him through Identity; once he accepted the invitation to Paul W. LEVERONI's home he was moved up to the top of the priority list since it was hoped that continued and rather frequent contact could be maintained for assessment and operational purposes. Every reasonable effort was made to follow

Attachment
Identity USC

Distribution
3 - Chief, SBD w/att USC
2 - Chief, WHD w/att USC

MICROFILMED
JUL 25 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D 74-120-111	HABA-20693	3 July 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-236701

up the first social contact (experience has shown that the FJSTEALers here will not take the initiative and must be actively pursued) but a number of conversations (both face to face and by phone) ended up in the vague promise on the part of Subject that "we must get together soon". In the interim the Station tightened the coverage of AEBOOR by putting AELANYARD on a 24-hour-a-day basis for a little over two weeks and by conducting full coverage surveillance for about one week. Our reasoning behind this acting was as follows: such intensive coverage would possibly permit us to spot a likely place where we could inject an access agent; it would give us a better "feel" of his daily activity; it might uncover one or more of his clandestine contacts. The results of the effort, while far from solving our problems, did give us a wealth of information which should help us in our operational planning once AEBOOR returns to his station.

3. The distaff side of the target was not ignored, and Nina T. MARGANDE managed to spend some time in conversation with AEBOOR's wife during a get-together of Identity on 21 May 1969. As a result of this meeting the groundwork has been laid for a follow-up by MARGANDE; despite the fact that the wife was at first cool and then lukewarm to the idea of getting together for a shopping excursion, we will do everything possible to bring such a meeting about and try have MARGANDE become the wife's "confidante", if this is possible. (In order to permit MARGANDE to pursue this contact in the most natural manner and to give her a chance to meet and assess other FJSTEALer wives, she has also become a member of Identity.)

4. Until his departure for home leave AEBOOR was the primary FJSTEAL target and will continue in this position after his return until we can reach a decision regarding future action. There is one thing that should be kept in mind, however; and that is the fact that all of the FJSTEALers are reserved in their dealings with members of LNPURE. It seems that it is possible to get some of the FJSTEALers to accept an invitation, even to a private home, but to try to develop such a contact into a continuing social relationship is a much harder proposition. Leland C. KROULD's experience with 201-313506 followed this pattern, and despite KROULD's efforts to continue and follow up what seemed to be the beginning of a good relationship, nothing came of the attempt; Stephen M. GARSIDE twice tried to utilize a natural opportunity to get together with 201-820310, only to be put off, as he was in an approach to 201-025485; Paul W. LEVERONE tried on several occasions to arrange a dinner with 201-183943, only to be put off (and this despite the fact that 201-183943 maintains extensive social contacts with non-WOLADY types). 201-025485 has expressed an interest in social contact, and since he is a senior type who should not have to check out and obtain approval for his social activity, we hope that he will not conform as closely to the pattern. This is not the time or place to examine the possible reasons for the FJSTEALer attitude; it is merely mentioned to demonstrate that we are fighting an uphill (although not a hopeless) battle, a battle that we intend to win by fair means or foul.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HABA-23693

5. The value of the PCQ (a copy was forwarded with Reference) in assessment of target individuals is readily apparent, and it is requested that ten English and Spanish language copies be forwarded to the Station for use in our assessment program.

Paul W. Leverone
Paul W. LEVERONE

201-236701

FORM 5-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO
	SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	3

final

1P

SECRET

USC Attachment to HABA-20693

IDENTITY: Diplomatic Association

MICROFILMED
JUL 25 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

S/E Att 1 to HABA 20693

CS COPY

201-236701

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
CI Suspect

FROM: P Kapusta	EXTENSION	NO.
		DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/SR/CI/I				If your time permits, this is the second of the two cases I discussed with you (spotted through my AEEXPLORE program). I would be interested in your views as to his possible IS involvement (and whether I may be all wet in feeling he is Soviet dispatched). Do you see an Illegal Support aspects to this case? P Kapusta
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8. P Kapusta				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SR/O/AC - 64 - 202
22 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Irving AMRON

1. Subject responded to the AEEXPLORE ad for a position as a Russian language linguist. As was requested of him, he provided the Forms 444, 89, autobiography, and photograph.

2. The undersigned established contact with Subject by phone on 2 September and arrangements were made to interview him on the following day. He was interviewed in the Undersigned's Philadelphia hotel room on 3 September 1964. The undersigned used the Paul Peters alias and DOD cover.

3. The following was obtained from AMRON during the interview:

a. Subject, of Jewish descent, was born in 1917 in the USA. Subject's father, whose original name had been

Philip AMROMIM

came to the USA in 1905/06 at the age of approximately 15. Philip AMROMIM's parents stemmed from the GOMEL area. At the time of his emigration to the USA, he was accompanied by his mother (his father died sometime prior thereto), and by the following brothers and sisters: Lewis, Willy, Abe (who has since died), Moris, Minnie (now married to LAIKEN), Pearl, and Max. All of Subject's father's brothers except for Max, are butchers by occupation, including Subject's father. Max graduated from CCNY and became a structural engineer; he has an office on 43rd Street and his firm is called the Amron Associates.

b. Subject's mother, also of Jewish descent, came to the USA in 1911 (or 1913). Her older sister, Fannie, is married to (fnu) COHEN who is presently retired and living in Florida. Her sister, Ruth, married Max AMRON. Her brother, Hyman HORLIK, who arrived in the USA only in 1922, owns a liquor store in Bayonne, New Jersey. Subject's mother has another sister (nu) who is presently living in Florida. Subject's mother has one brother who is still living in the USSR.

-5

c. At the time of Subject's birth, Subject's father was employed in the Brooklyn shipyards. However, he changed jobs frequently and was subsequently employed on a farm near New Brunswick, then in a shoe factory as a cutter, then as a butcher, and finally became active in a Jewish cooperative organization. As Subject's father became convinced that the future of the Jews was in Russia under Soviet Communism, in 1931 Subject's family left the USA for the USSR for Birobidzhan where Subject's father worked as an agronomist (he had sometime prior thereto graduated from the National Farm School in Bucks County, Pennsylvania).

d. According to Subject, his family returned to the USA in 1933; the motivating reason therefor was the ill health--actually only severe headaches--of Subject's brother, Eugene. Subject alleges that, because they had retained their US citizenship, they experienced no problems either in leaving the USSR or in obtaining permission to return to the USA. Moreover, Subject's father allegedly did not like life in the USSR; however, Subject's mother and sister insisted that they return to the USSR after only a brief stay in the USA.

e. As a result, later in 1933 the entire AMRON family once again returned to the USSR. Again, Subject states that they had no problems in obtaining authorization from the Soviet government for this trip to the USSR. Upon their return to the USSR, they established themselves in Moscow where one Noah LONDON, a friend of the family and a construction engineer, took Subject's father "into his employ". Subject's father worked in this capacity, in the construction industry, from 1933 to 1936. Sometime after the 1936 purges began, Subject's father worked for Komsomolsk, a Moscow "panel board construction" outfit. In 1936 Subject's father also worked for the Paris Commune as a shoemaker. Subject's mother worked during this entire period as chief of a dining establishment in the school of foreign languages in Moscow.

f. Subject began his elementary education at the DeWitt Clinton School in the USA where he studied until 1931; he then studied in the Soviet secondary school in Khabarovsk, Birobidzhan, until 1933. In 1933 he again returned for one semester to the Dewitt Clinton School. Later in 1933 and 1934 he attended the Anglo-American School in Moscow where he completed his 8th grade of school. He then continued his studies from 1933 to 1936 in Public School #327 in the 24th Bauman Rayon. In 1936 he entered the Moscow Avtodorozhniy Institut where he studied on the civil engineering faculty, to be a highway engineer. He graduated in 1941 at which time he was sent to assist in the construction of an airdrome in Minsk, later to the Polish station of Janow.

g. In 1937 Subject's mother was dismissed from her position and both she and Subject's father began to feel the pressure of the purges. Subject's father, allegedly by appealing to the then President KALININ, succeeded in again acquiring exit visas for them to the USA. Subject, who admits that he had become a "good Communist" by then had gotton "thoroughly steeped" in the Communist philosophy, elected to remain behind in the USSR. An important consideration, he states, was his desire to complete his education which he was certain he would not be able to do in the USA for economic reasons.

h. According to Subject, his father never lost his American citizenship. Subject's mother, however, in 1936 applied for and obtained Soviet citizenship. According to Subject, he actually acquired Soviet citizenship "by default" although he never applied for this in person; he alleges that although he was 18 years of age at the time, he was "granted" Soviet citizenship by virtue of his mother's application for her own citizenship.

i. Subject remained in Moscow prior to World War II. In April 1940 he married

Nina MOISEYIVA
a bookkeeper by profession,

who was the step-daughter of the well-known Major SHOGOLEV of the "Soviet Proleteriat Regiment". A son was born to them in June 1941. Although at this time Subject was assigned to the construction of aerodromes to support front line troops, he succeeded in pulling strings and in arranging a "TDY trip" to Moscow, ostensibly to visit the Geodetic Institute. Enroute back from Moscow to the front lines, Subject's train got bombed in Brest Litovsk on 22 June 1941 and as a result he was returned to Moscow on the same train via Baranovichi. According to Subject, he was then assigned to the Moscow Military District, to the Otdel Aerodromnoi Sluzhby, where he was placed in charge of a brigade of engineers, technicians and laborers who were engaged in building dummy air sites for camouflage purposes.

j. In August 1941 Subject states that he was permitted to return to school in order to receive his diploma which was granted him in October 1941. He was then assigned to the 22nd Voyenno-Dorozhniy Otryad which was formed in Dmitrov but which was then assigned to Suzdal'. Subject states that he was not inducted into the Soviet military service allegedly because "engineers were needed" and because, as a member of the MVD, this was considered as equivalent to military service. Nonetheless, in response to my query, Subject admitted that this was unusual as his activities were of a kind which were performed by old women particularly since during this period, from October 1941 to September 1942, all able-bodied Soviet males were drafted into the Soviet army. During this period Subject lived in comparative ease, being assigned to Suzdal and Klin, and other towns. According to Subject, he wore an MVD uniform but wore no insignia. He admitted that "favored treatment" was bestowed upon him and his family when the MVD assisted him in evacuating his first wife and son from Moscow in August 1941 to beyond the Urals. (His son by his first wife reportedly died on 11 October 1943 of diabetes.)

k. In September 1942, Subject received an appointment to the Moscow 2nd Military Infantry Institute from which he graduated in June 1943 and upon which he was given the grade of a Jr Lt in the Soviet Infantry. In response to my query, Subject again admitted that this appointment was highly unusual as his background did not lend itself to this, as appointments were made out of the various military branches, and as this implied that, as a foreigner (American), he was fully and completely trusted by the Soviet punitive organs who had cleared him both for this training and the institute and for promotion to officer status in the Soviet Army.

l. Initially he was sent to Alatev on the Volga, then to Orel where he was assigned to the front lines in August 1943. He was given a platoon of infantry troops in the 415th Infantry Division of the Soviet Central Front. However, in October 1943 he was wounded; he was hit in the left forehead by a German bullet. He was operated on in a field hospital and then transferred to a Moscow hospital after he had recovered sufficiently. He was reclassified after his recovery and found suitable to continue in military service with the limitation that he should not serve on the front lines (goden vtoroi stepeni).

m. Because the wound failed to heal completely (he has a very obvious scar, with approximately a 1" depression, on his forehead), he "asked" to be assigned to a warmer climate. The Soviet authorities, he states, complied and in January 1944 dispatched him to Tbilisi where he was placed in a special officer's camp; he was hospitalized again, had osteomyelitis complications, and ultimately discharged from the Soviet military forces. However, Subject provided several contradictory stories as to the date of discharge which at various times he indicated occurred in May 1944, then in July 1944, and even in August 1944. (NOTE: This aspect of Subject's story bothered him as it was obvious to the undersigned that Subject had somewhere become confused in this aspect of his background.)

n. Upon his discharge, he was returned to the Moscow area where he was placed in a rest home (although Subject admitted that there really existed no need for this as he had recovered already prior to his discharge). In continuing his narration, Subject indicated that the rest of his story "sounds very strange and unbelievable" but then averred that it was true. He states that, strange as it appears and despite the shortage of Soviet men at the time (1944) he could not "find" himself a job. He went to the MVD which did offer him a job in Veliki Luki on the highways with the SoyuzDorog-Proyekt ; however, he was not given the job by the officials responsible for this. As a result, he appealed directly to the Minister of the MVD who "tried to intercede" in Subject's behalf. Allegedly after he was given a full physical examination, he was told that he could not be assigned to the highway units for reasons which were not spelled out to Subject.

o. Subject then "sought out" work with the Nauchniy Sovet with no luck. He ultimately obtained a job with the Moscow Sovet in the Moscow Soviet Senior Library (sic). In November 1944, at a salary of 900 rubles, Subject began working in the field of "information on municipal works--highway construction, architecture, sanitation, etc." His immediate supervisor was (fnu) LEBEDEV, the head of information department of the Hydro-Energy Project. Subject admitted, in reply to the undersigned's query, that his work was "unusual" for several reasons. First, he was paid a salary which was unusually high and out of line with his qualifications. Secondly, though paid a salary for a full-time job and position, he actually worked on a part-time basis and was able to come and go almost as he wished. His work also included working on abstracts and translations from English to Russian, primarily in the field of dams, dam construction, and hydraulics.

p. In June 1949 Subject states that he was dismissed from the foregoing position after he was given the explanation that the flow of literature from the USA, which Subject was translating, had decreased. In actual fact, Subject states, he was being "purged" because he was a Jew. He then found a job as a laboratory assistant in a concrete plant where he worked from July 1949 to 23 February 1950. Because he did not like that job, Subject states he wrote to Stalin personally as a result of which, within less than 4 weeks, he was offered 4-5 different jobs. The positions were offered to him by the Moscow Committee of the CP to whom "Stalin had forwarded the letter". In reply to my query, Subject admitted that he was not concerned that, by writing to Stalin, he would come to the attention of the Soviet punitive organs, MVD/MGB, which would undertake to investigate his case. Accordingly, on 1 April 1950 Subject was given a job as an engineer with the Bauman District Road Department where he worked until February 1955.

q. After he lost his job in 1949 with the Moscow Sovet, he states that his relations with his wife went from bad to worse and ultimately cultinated first in a separation and latter in a divorce in 1950. In the meantime, he was already living with

Eugenia VOLSOVA

an empolyee and a teacher of forsenic medicine of the Moscow Medical Institute where she was studying for her PhD and where she was working in a morgue as a pathologist. Subject married her either in 1950 or 1951. However, within less than one month of their marriage, Subject divorced her as he found out that she was a "bad person" and because he "had fallen blindly in love" with her. (NOTE: This aspect of Subject's story disturbed him very much. He was unsure of himself, was vague on dates, details, specifics, names, etc. It was again obvious that Subject was less than frank and open about this aspect of his background. His narration did not sound convincing to Subject himself when he began talking about "falling blindly in Love", etc.) In 1952 he began living with another woman,

Rose MINKINA,

whom he married only in late 1954 when their son was already well on the way. MINKINA's parents and family were very strongly opposed to the marriage because the parents held responsible party positions and because MINKINA's brother held a sensitive position with the Soviet electronics and aviation industries. A son was born to Subject and MINKINA on 5 April 1955.

r. In ca 1954 (dates vague) Subject entered the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and continued his studies for three or more years. Though he registered for the evening sessions, he devoted a good portion of his days to study. As a result, Subject again admitted to the undersigned that he actually was in a unique position of being able to do almost as he "wished and desired" although ostensibly he was a full-time employee of the Bauman District Road Department. While a student at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Subject and his wife began submitting applications for a visa to visit Subject's parents in the USA. In actual fact, Subject states, his real purpose in applying for the visa was to "defect" upon his arrival in the USA. In February 1955 Subject states that he was "fired" from his job with the Bauman District because of "political unreliability". However, Subject admitted to the undersigned that the real reason for dismissal must have been otherwise as, had he actually been dismissed for "political unreliability", he would not have been able to continue his studies at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

s. Because Subject had communicated to his father, using "hidden phrases" in their letters to each other, about his wish to leave the USSR, Subject's father arrived in the USSR in 1957 in order, Subject states, "to establish at first hand for himself" whether Subject really wished to "defect to the USA". Subject's father remained in the USSR for a total of 10 days. As a result of his father's visit, Subject changed his tactics and began to submit applications for "immigration" to the USA. As earlier, these applications too were rejected; however, Subject states that he continued resubmitting them several times each year.

t. After he left the Bauman District place of employment in February 1955, Subject found work as a "free lance translator for the Moscow Torgovaya Palata. He earned ca 1100 rubles per month translating English language material related to the iron and steel plant which was being designed by the USSR for erection in India. In January 1956 Subject found work as chief of the translations bureau of the Nauchno-Issledovatelniy Institut Ministerstva Mashino-Stroyeniya; his functions consisted primarily of supervising the translation of English language manuals on technical equipment. Again, Subject admitted that his work was "unusual" as, in actual fact, he spent 1-2 days at work, spent the rest of his time at home, and devoted most of his time and energy to the studies at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. His salary continued at 1100 rubles per month.

u. In August 1958 his work came to an end. Generally he provided a contardictory account in this respect. Initially he stated that the position had been eliminated but then changed this story to state that he resigned in August 1958 as he would have had to begin devoting his full time to the work. In any case, his resignation generally coincided with his completion of studies at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Thereafter, and until his immigration to the USA in 1962, Subject held no full time job. Nonetheless, he states that he succeeded in earning no less than about 1100 rubles per month by working as a free lance translator for the Torgovaya Palata of Moscow. He turned over to the undersigned a sample of his translation efforts--see the attached book. In response to my query, Subject admitted that his work again was of such a nature that he was a free agent, came and went as he pleased, and generally was responsible to no one. Apparently in order to forestall any further discussions in this regard, Subject then stated that "if you are thinking that I could have worked for the KGB at this time, then you are right because I had the time to do anything including engaging in intelligence activities". However, Subject then proceeded to deny that he had then or at any time, had any relationship with the KGB (or its predecessor organizations).

v. In July 1962 Subject's mother and father came to Moscow, this specifically for the purpose of getting Subject to return to the USA. They stayed in Moscow for six weeks during which time the father wrote letters to KHRUSHCHEV, to Nina KHRUSHCHEVA, to ADZHUBEI, to the Supreme Soviet, to the KGB, and to other Soviet establishments in order to get Subject and his son permission for emigration to the USA. (Subject's wife, [illegible], had died in 1961.) In August 1962, while vacationing in Sochi Subject was sought out by the local Inturist office and apprised by the local militia office that, "in view of your father's strong appeals", the USSR had granted Subject and his son permission to leave the USSR. Upon his return to Moscow, Subject proceeded to the American Embassy where he was advised that he had not been granted an exit visa by the Soviets. As a result, Subject applied for emigration to the USA twice, once in the capacity of a Soviet citizen using his Soviet passport, and the second time in the capacity of an "American citizen".

w. In September 1962 the application to travel to the USA as an "immigrant" was approved for him and his son. Therefore, without waiting to receive approval to travel under his claim of being an "American citizen", Subject left the USSR and entered the USA on his Soviet passport together with his son on 24 September 1962 via Idlewild. Upon his arrival in the USA, Subject immediately undertook action to have his "American citizenship" restored. This was initially denied as he had admitted that he had voted in the Soviet national elections. However, he then retained an attorney who appealed the case; the original decision was then reversed and both Subject and his son had their US citizenship restored to them in the summer of 1963, the reversal was based on Subject's claim that he had had no choice and was, therefore, compelled to vote in the USSR national elections.

x. Upon his arrival in the USA, Subject immediately applied for a position with the UN, however, he was rejected as he was "stateless"at the time. He then accepted a position with Stelling, Lord-Wood, and Van Suetendals, 36th Street, working on site-planning. His supervisor, one Frank McGovan, then recommended Subject to the

Blauvelt engineering firm for whom he worked from January 1963 through July 1964. In 1964 Subject found work with Harold J. SELDEN, 60 Broad Street, Red Bank, New Jersey, as an engineer working on the planning and designing of sub-divisions, grading, construction developments, etc. His immediate supervisor is the township engineer of Marlboro Township, New Jersey. His present salary is $700.00 per month.

y. In April 1963 Subject married

Bella MINCBERG nee MILSTEIN

a Polish Jew who had come to the USA from Poland in 1949. She has two sons by her previous marriage(s). Subject and his son now live in the home of his present wife.

4. Comments and Assessment:

a. Subject speaks native English and passes for a middle class American. His Russian is likewise native.

b. According to Subject, his objective in life now is to work for the US Government. He states that he has submitted Forms 57 to a number of the US Government agencies (he did not elaborate). In applying for the position under [illegible], Subject asked for $10,000.00 per annum which is his asking price for a position with the US Government.

c. According to Subject, his present position is excellent with great potential for going into partnership as soon as he becomes a licensed engineer. However, he states that he is not interested in making money (despite his request for a $10,000.00 salary) but in "fighting Communism" as an employee of the US Government.

d. Subject admitted that he was a firm and strong believer of Communism which, incidentally, was the reason why he remained behind in the USSR when his parents returned to the USA in 1937. He states that he continued to be a firm believer of Communism until approximately 1958/59 when he became "disenchanted with Communism". Subject denies that he was a member of the Komsomol or that he had to join the Communist Party, this despite the fact that he became an officer of the Soviet Army and despite the fact that he was accepted to study at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Despite his alleged "disenchantment" with Communism, Subject spoke in flattering terms about life in the USSR, about the "democracy", about equal opportunities, about the excellent "educational system", et cetera. Subject admitted that he had led almost a "charming existence" in the USSR and that neither life in the USSR nor the Soviet authorities mistreated him.

e. According to Subject, he was never arrested in the Soviet Union.

f. In reply to my query, Subject indicated that in 1958 the KGB tried to co-opt him into reporting a fellow student at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. However, Subject states that he rejectd the pitch. In reply to various queries which were posed to him about the fellow-student (name allegedly now forgotton), Subject states that he did render an unfavorable report on the person. Despite this, the particular Soviet was ultimately assigned abroad as an interpreter. Subject later heard that the Soviet worked and traveled in both Japan and Italy.

g. In reply to a general query about life in the USSR, Subject indicated that life in the USSR has made him into "an accomplished prevaricator".

h. Subject was less than fluent in relating the story of his life to the undersigned. He made mistakes frequently, he contradicted himself, he altered dates to accommodate other aspects of his activities to correspond with what he had mentioned earlier, etc. Also, Subject repeatedly tried to digress from relating his story into presenting his views of life; it was a chore to keep him on substantive matters relating to his own background.

i. Subject's brother, Eugene, is now employed as an engineer of the Freehall Township, New Jersey. Additionally, he has a private office in Rockland, New Jersey, called the Civil Engineer Associates.

j. Subject's account of how he acquired Soviet citizenship-- see above-- is a very weak item in Subject's story. He will have us believe that he got Soviet citizenship "by default" as a result of his mother's application for Soviet citizenship for herself. He himself admitted to the undersigned that this is illogical as his brother, Eugene, whose status was no different from Subject's, never acquired Soviet citizenship "by default" though Subject did allegedly without any action whatever on his own part. Moreover, Subject admitted that he was legally of age (18) by this time and no longer a dependent as a result of which he would have had to apply for a Soviet passport and for Soviet citizenship of his own free volition rather than through his mother.

k. Subject is aware that the story of his "immigration" to the USA is also weak. He tried to explain this away by stating that he "got out by mistake", that he was permitted to go "to hide the Soviet shame surrounding the Cuban crisis", that "someone had committed an error", etc. He admitted that there exists no other explanation as to why the Soviet government would have permitted him to leave the USSR as, in the eyes of the Soviet government, he was a full fledged and responsible Soviet citizen who had no genuine or legitimate claim to American citizenship. As a result, Subject is unusually sensitive to this topic.

5. CONCLUSION:

a. In the opinion of the undersigned, Subject should not be considered for either AESCREEN or AEEXPLORE despite the fact both his English and Russian are native.

b. On the basis of the interview, the undersigned feels that, Subject is less than frank and that he is prevaricating. Moreover, there exist innumerable items in Subject's tale which are indicative both that he worked as a recruited agent of the KGB (and its predecessor organizations) in the USSR and that he left the USSR only through and with the intercession of the KGB.

6. It should be underscored that because of the unique and sensitive cover used by the undersigned, no attempt was made to resolve the various contradictions, to challenge Subject on any of his statements, or to pursue certain points of their logical conclusion. The foregoing was obtained in the form of an interview and no real attempt could be made, given the cover, to delve more deeply into the suspicious aspects of Subject's background.

Peter P Kapusta

PETER P. KAPUSTA
Chief, SR/O/AC

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

ISSUED BY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE (Fill in) July 5, 1964

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last First Middle): AARON IRVING
2. AGE: 46
3. SEX: X MALE FEMALE
4. HEIGHT: 6'00"
5. WEIGHT: 195#
6. COLOR OF EYES: blue
7. COLOR OF HAIR: brown
8. TYPE COMPLEXION: light
9. TYPE BUILD: heavy
10. SCARS (Type and Location): Deep scar (1"x2") on left part of forehead
11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES: None
12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country): 260 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey
13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO.: 260 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey. Tel:201-222-5592
14. CURRENT PHONE NO.: 201-222-5592
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.: LE2-0700
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country): New Jersey
17. NICKNAMES: None
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED: None
19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES: NA
20. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority): NA

SECTION II — POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING: Russian language linguist
2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary): $10,000 annually
3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT: 2 weeks after
4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: X OCCASIONALLY FREQUENTLY CONSTANTLY OTHER:
5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (C: X WASHINGTON, D.C. X ANYWHERE IN U.S. CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify): OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.
6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGT: Possibility of schooling for children

FORM 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
11-58

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH: Dec.4,1917
2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Brooklyn, New York
3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): U. S. A.
4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):
5. DATE NATURALIZED: NA
6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.: NA
7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: NA
8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country): NA
9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☐ YES ☒ NO
10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY: NA
11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY. While I was living in Moscow, the Russian government considered me as a Russian citizen, even though I had never handed in an application for Soviet citizenship. Due to this, and because I was in a rush to leave the country, I arrived xxxx on a Soviet foreign passport. In the U. S. Embassy in Moscow I filled in simultaneously two applications for entry into the U. S. A. : one as an immigrant and the other as an American citizen. I received a Nonquota K-2(1) visa dated Sptember 10, 1962. After arrival the Board of Appeals of the Dept. of State reinstated my native-born citizenship.
12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☒ NO
13. GIVE PARTICULARS:
14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)*: NA
15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.: Sept. 26, 1962
16. PORT OF ENTRY: N. Y.
17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY: U. S. S. R.
18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue): K-2(1), Moscow, U. S. S. R.
19. DATE VISA ISSUED: Sept. 10, 1962

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

- ☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
- ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
- ☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
- ☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS
- ☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
- ☒ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
- ☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
- ☐ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: P. S. 39
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Bronx, N. Y.
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1928 to 1930
4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: No. 327
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Moscow, U. S. S. R.
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1934 to 1936
4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: NA
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): NA
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): NA
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM. OTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute Moscow, U. S. S. R.	CE		1936	1941	BS	1941	

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

NA

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
Evening University of Marxism-Leninism	Political Sciences	1952	1954	
Moscow, U. S. S. R.				

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
2nd Moscow Infantry School	Infantry officer	1942	1943	10
Moscow, U. S. S. R.				

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

NA

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE *(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).*	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak: EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			HOW ACQUIRED: NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT *(with parents, etc.)*	ACADEMIC STUDY *(all levels)*
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Russian	X	X	X														X		

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

NA

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN. NA

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS. I have deep knowledge in the field of information (technical) embracing CE, ME on the basis of twenty years of experience in Russia.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED? X YES ☐ NO

SECTION VI — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY: RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Moscow, U.S.S.R.	Acquainted with town and suburbs as permanent resident	1934 to 1962		X			

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

Arrived in U.S.S.R. together with parents during crisis and remained to graduate college in 1937. Impossible to leave during WW II and only after seven years of repeated applications was allowed to leave, in 1962.

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE (IF ISSUED)

NA

SECTION VII — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING SPEED (WORDS PER MINUTE)

10-15

2. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED AND SPEED (WORDS PER MINUTE)

GREGG | SPEEDWRITING | STENOTYPE | OTHER (Specify)

3. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.) calculators

SECTION VIII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

chess - average proficiency.
swimming - for pleasure

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

On the basis of my twenty years of experience I could manage, edit and translate information in the field of CE and ME, published in Russian, or vice versa.

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 3, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

NA

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE (*Provide License Registry Number, if known*).

NA

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (*Year of Issue*) NA	7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (*Year of Issue*) NA

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do NOT submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-Fiction, Scientific Articles, General Interest Subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.*). Translated "Precast Concrete in the Soviet Union", published by Foreign Languages Publishing House in 1953 (technical).

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

NA

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

NA

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

None

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From and To - By Mo. and Yr.*) January 1953 to present time	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Blauvelt Engineering Co.	
3. ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, State, Country*) 79 Madison Ave., NYC		
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Consulting engineers	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Francis Fuerst	
6. TITLE OF JOB CE	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 550 PER month	8. CLASS. GRADE (*If Federal Service*) NA

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Highway design. Alignment, drainage, sewers, right-of-way, final estimates.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Improving possibilities of further advancement

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Nov., 1962 to Dec., 1962
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Sterling, Lord-Wood and Van Suetendale
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) 35 E. 26 St. 520
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Site planning
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Frank McGowan
6. TITLE OF JOB Jun. CE
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 130 PER week
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service) NA
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Grading, site planning for high schools
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Improving possibilities of further advancement

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) 1952 to Sept., 1962
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S.S.R. Chaber of Commerce
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Ul. Kuibysheva 6, Moscow, U.S.S.R.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Foreign trade
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Miss Postnova
6. TITLE OF JOB Free-lance translator and editor
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 300 PER month
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Reports for International Congresses, trade publications, manuals, dam projects, road-building and construction machinery manuals, articles on building materials, metallurgy. (Russian to English)
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Repatriation

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) 1956 to Sept., 1962
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Foreign Trade Publishing House
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Moscow, U. S. S. R.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Foreign trade
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Medvedyev
6. TITLE OF JOB Free-lance translator and editor
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 300 PER month
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Trade publications, road-building and construction machinery manuals. (Russian to English)
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Repatriation

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Jan., 1956 to Aug., 1958
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Scientific-Research Institute of Construction & Road-Building Machinery
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Frunze Embankment, house No. unknown, Moscow, U.S.S.R.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Machinery research and foreign trade
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Ratner
6. TITLE OF JOB Senior engineer
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 130 PER month
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

5

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Supervision of five translators. Head of translators Bureau. Management, editing and translating from Russian to English of construction and road-building machinery manuals, trade publications.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Completion of translations into English

6

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Mar., 1950 to Feb., 1955

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Bauman Boro Road Repair Dept.

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Spartakovsky Ul. 9, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS Road & sewer maintenance

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Artamonov

6. TITLE OF JOB Senior engineer

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 100 PER month

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Engineering supervision of repair jobs, surveying, designing of small streets and sewers, planning, contact with factories for paving jobs, estimates.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Reduction of forces

7

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) ~~xxxxxxxx~~July 1949 to Feb.,1950

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Highway Construction Dept.

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Warsaw Highway, house No. unknown, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS Manufacture of concrete

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

6. TITLE OF JOB Laboratory assistant

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 60 PER month

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Laboratory testing of concrete and concrete components.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Reduction of forces

E. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN. NA

8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

SECTION X

MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 (As amended) ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION: NA

3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.: NA

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON: NA

5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS: NA

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE (Specify):
HAVE SERVED									USSR Army 1941-1944
NOW SERVING									

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION: 1941 to Sept., 1942 - Highway Battalion; 1942 to May, 1943 - Military school; May, 1943 to Sept., 1944 - Active service

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (Past service): 1944

4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES (Past and current service): NA

5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY — PAST SERVICE: May, 1943 — CURRENT SERVICE: NA

6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 3 years

7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE — PAST SERVICE: Jr. Lt. — CURRENT SERVICE: NA

8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER (If now serving, provide current number): NA

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Nos or Designator) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: Jr. Lt. — CURRENT SERVICE: NA

10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Nos or Designator) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: Highway repair supt. — CURRENT SERVICE: NA

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)

After graduation was sent to Highway Batallion until Sept., 1942. Then directed to Military Infantry School. Active service until wounded in Oct., 1943. Then in hospitals and reserve until Sept., 1944.

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☒ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	☐ OTHER:
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY	

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

☒ REGULAR ☐ RESERVE (Including the National and Air National Guard) ☐ OTHER (Including AUS)

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS NA

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☐ ARMY	☐ MARINE CORPS	☐ NATIONAL GUARD	☐ COAST GUARD	☐ NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
☐ NAVY	☐ AIR FORCE	☐ AIR NAT'L. GUARD	☐ ARMY ROTC	☐ AIR FORCE ROTC	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE:

6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK:

7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION:

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Nos or Designator) AND TITLE:

10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Nos or Designator) AND TITLE:

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY — YEARS: — MONTHS:

17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT?

Section XII

3. Nina Shchogoleyva Moisejeva
4. None
5. Apr. 12, 1940 6. Moscow, USSR
7. 12 Bolshaya Pionerskaya, Moscow, USSR
8. Unknown 9. NA 10. NA
11. Unknown
12. 1915 13. Moscow, USSR 14. USSR
14 to 25 - NA

3. Eugenie Volsova
4. None
5. 1950 6. Moscow, USSR
7. Dormitories of Medical College
8. Unknown 9. NA 10. NA
11. Unknown
12. 1924 13. Moscow, USSR 14. USSR
14 to 25 - NA
3. Rose Minkina Arron
4. None
5. 1954 6. Moscow, USSR
7. Station Taininskaya, Pogranichnaya Ul. 9, Moscow Province, USSR
8. Deceased 9. Mar. 24, 1961 10. Blood clot in brain
11. 29 Pyatnitskaya Ul., Moscow, USSR
12. 1924 13. Unknown 14. USSR
14 to 25 - NA

SECTION XI FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Monmouth County National Bank	Long Branch, New Jersey

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY. ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
Eugene Amron	22 Community Drive, West Long Branch, N.J.
Hyman Horlik	114 W. 46 St., Bayonne, N. J.
Abraham H. Waldman	235 Albert Pl., Elberon, N. J.

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☒ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled)* SPECIFY: Married

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
June 10, 1950, Moscow, USSR, [illegible] [illegible]seyeva, divorce, incompatibility
Oct.12, 1954, Moscow, USSR, Eugenie Volsova, divorce, no children

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME *(First)* Bella *(Middle)* *(Maiden)* Milstein *(Last)* Amron

4. STATE ANY OTHER NAMES EVER USED: Bella Mincberg

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH ANY OF THESE NAMES WERE USED. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 15 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

5. DATE OF MARRIAGE: April 24, 1963

6. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)*: Long Branch, N. J.

7. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: 260 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey

8. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. DATE OF DEATH: NA

10. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

11. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address, if deceased)*: ~~260 Marshall Court~~ 260 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey

12. DATE OF BIRTH: 1927

13. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*: Tomashuv-Maz, Poland

14. CITIZENSHIP: U. S. A.

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY July 15, 1949

15. PLACE OF ENTRY New York

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)] Displaced person

17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED May 16, 1955

18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) Freehold, New Jersey

19. OCCUPATION Housewife

20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers) NA

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) NA

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.) NA

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED NA

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN NA

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Bella Amron	wife	[illegible], Poland, 1927	U. S. A.	265 Marshall St. Long Branch, N.J
Michael Amron	son	Moscow, USSR, April 4, 1955	U. S. A.	Same
Joe Mincberg	son	Bielefeld, Germany June 26, 1949	U. S. A.	Same
Steven Mincberg	son	Long Branch, N.J. June 20, 1957	U. S. A.	Same

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. 3

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, step-parents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. 1

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information for Stepfather and or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) Philip (Pessha) Amron

2. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH

4. CAUSE OF DEATH

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED ~~None~~ [illegible]

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country) 1412 Ocean Drive, Apt. 11, Miami Beach, Fla.

7. DATE OF BIRTH 1889

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Gomel, Russia

9. CITIZENSHIP U. S. A.

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY 1906

11. PLACE OF ENTRY New York

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)] Russia

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED Unknown

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) Unknown

15. OCCUPATION Retired

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed) Self-employed

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED Holiday Hills, Nolans Drive, Lake Hopatcong, N. J.

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To) NA

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

20. COUNTRY NA

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN None

SECTION XV **MOTHER** (Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
AARON BEATRICE

2. LIVING
X YES | NO

3. DATE OF DEATH
NA

4. CAUSE OF DEATH
NA

5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED
None

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED (No., Street, City, State, Country)
1412 Ocean Drive, Apt. 11, Miami Beach, Fla.

7. DATE OF BIRTH
1893

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
Shchedrin, Minsk Province, Russia

9. CITIZENSHIP
Stateless

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.- DATE OF ENTRY
Unknown

11. PLACE OF ENTRY
Unknown

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies))
Unknown

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED
NA

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
NA

15. OCCUPATION
Housewife

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if mother is deceased or unemployed)
NA

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED
NA

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To)
NA

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE
NA

20. COUNTRY
NA

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
NA

SECTION XVI **BROTHERS AND SISTERS** (Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
AARON EUGENE
2. RELATIONSHIP
brother
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
U. S. A.
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
22 Community Drive, West Long Branch, New Jersey
5. LIVING
X YES | NO
6. AGE
40

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING
YES | NO
6. AGE

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING
YES | NO
6. AGE

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING
YES | NO
6. AGE

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING
YES | NO
6. AGE

6
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING
YES | NO
6. AGE

7
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING
YES | NO
6. AGE

8
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING
YES | NO
6. AGE

SECTION XVII FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): MILSTEIN [illegible]
2. LIVING: YES ☐ NO ☒
3. DATE OF DEATH: 1941
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Heart disease
5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: None

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 14 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Kosciusko Square 12, Tomashuv-Maz, Poland
7. DATE OF BIRTH: ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Unknown
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Tomashuv-Maz., Poland
9. CITIZENSHIP: Polish
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA
15. OCCUPATION: XX Storekeeper
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): Xx Self-employed

SECTION XVIII MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): MILSTEIN MINDL
2. LIVING: YES ☐ NO ☒
3. DATE OF DEATH: Unknown
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Nazi conc. camp
5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: None

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Unknown
7. DATE OF BIRTH: Unknown
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Tomashuv-Maz., Poland
9. CITIZENSHIP: Polish
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA
15. OCCUPATION: NA
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): NA

SECTION XIX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): GORELIK VOLODYA
2. RELATIONSHIP: uncle
3. AGE: 60
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Bobruisk, USSR
5. EMPLOYED BY: Government
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country): USSR
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: Up to 1962 once every 2-3 years
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: September, 1962

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

SECTION XIX CONTINUED TO PAGE 13

SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
2	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
3	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S., WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Mrs. C. M. Arnold		214 Bay View Ave., Belvedere, Calif.
Lawrence Blum	Dept. of City Planning, NYC	2100 Heath Ave., Bronx 63, N. Y.
Volkoff, Andre	Blauvelt Engineering Co. 79 Madison Ave., NYC	84-25 109th St., Richmond Hills 18, N.Y.
Tenzer, Milton	Fort Monmouth	232 Lenox Ave., Long Branch, N. J.
Stamelman, Laurence C.	464 Broadway Long Branch, N. J.	15 Park Ave., Elberon, N. J.

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY - NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Tucker, Jerome	141 Broadway Long Branch, N. J.	241 Lenox Ave., Long Branch, N. J.
Epstein, Stanley	Unknown	23 Maryland Ave., West Long Branch, N. J.
Lawn, Howard	Unknown	274 Lenox Ave., Long Branch, N. J.
Scher, J. P.	EAI Eatontown, N. J.	571 Hoey Ave., Long Branch, N. J.
Dingle, John G.	Blauvelt Engineering Co. 79 Madison Ave., NYC	34-25 150th Place Flushing, N. Y.

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Teitelbaum, Sidney	Fort Monmouth	9 Marshall Court Long Branch, N. J.
Saxon, Alfred	157 Broad St., Red Bank, N. J.	7 Marshall Court, Long Branch, N. J.
Lehrer, M. S.	Unknown	3 Marshall Court, Long Branch, N. J.

SECTION XXII	**CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**		
NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind (Include membership in or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country) to which you belong or have belonged.			
NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

SECTION XXIII **RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS**		
ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	INCLUSIVE DATES	
	FROM	TO
260 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey	April, 1963	present time
31 Cedar Avenue, Long Branch, New Jersey	Sept., 1962	April 1963
47 Novokuznetskaya Ul., Moscow, U. S. S. R.	Nov., 1961	Sept., 1962
29 Pyatnitskaya Ul., Moscow, U. S. S. R.	Apr., 1960	Nov., 1961
12 Bolshaya Pionerskaya Ul., Moscow, U. S. S. R.	June, 1946	Apr., 1960

SECTION XXIV — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF; OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, EXPLAIN

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE '40
NA

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION. NA

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD?
IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XXV — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (First-Middle-Last): Bella Aaron

2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 200 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey

4. HOME PHONE NO.: 201-222-3592

5. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country) - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: NA

6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT.: NA

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

SECTION XXVI **CERTIFICATION**

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES: July 5, 1964
2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT:
3. SIGNED AT (City and State): Long Branch, New Jersey
4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS:

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates. Sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

~~Section IX~~ ~~see p.7~~

From Nov., 1944 to June, 1949 Technical Library of Moscow City Soviet
Ul. Gorky 13, Moscow, U. S. S. R.
Library, technical information Mrs. Makalinskaya
Senior Librarian $90 per month

Publication of monthly bulletin in field of municipal works, road and street construction and maintenance. architecture. city planning and other work connected with the municipality. Supervision of twenty free-lance translators and abstractors (English to Russian). Translation and editorial work from English to Russian.
Left due to reduction of forces.

Section XII - 4 Previous marriage to Sol Mincberg, deceased Dec.12, 195
See additional enclosed sheet to Section XII.

SUPPLEMENT
to
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
of
IRVING AARON

During the years I spent in the Soviet Union I had many friends. Among them were writers, journalists, engineers, doctors and professionals in different fields. It would be very difficult to list all of them. For instance, during the last year I met a new neighbour in the building I moved into. He was a professor in the field of economics. His name was Barsky and he told me many things which I never knew about concerning the economic basis of the Soviet system. He noted that with an industrial labour force exceeding the labour force of the U. S. A. by 100% the productivity of labour and industrial production wasthree times lower.

While studying in high school I became acquainted with a well-known movie producer - Alexander Stolper. He is the brother of one of the students with whom I was freidly in high school. Besides, through a friend in college I met with several writers and journalists such as Dykhovichny, Slobodskoy, and others writing in the field of satire.

People working in classified fields of industry never talk about their work. And even though my relatives through my wife in Russia worked in the fieldof aviation and electronics I did not know anything about their work. I only knew that my wife's brother worked in [illegible], and her brother-in-law worked near Sokol (both in Moscow). Her brother's name is Lev Minkin and her brother-in-law's name is Boris Bershadsky.

During the last years I worked as a translator and met many people who were born in the U. S. A. Among them are Norma Shikman. Paul Shikman, Grace Duetch-Boogay (nee Sgovio) - now in Italy, andmany others.

Section XIX

GORELIK EUGENE cousin 33
Riga, USSR Government
USSR Met him in 1960 and 1961 and 1962, during the summer
Met with him the last time in
1962 (summer)

14-00000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS 201-759831 Irving AMRON

FBI	Unnumbered XXX	July 18, 1963	Newark, New Jersey	[redacted]
FBI	F#105-2862; B#105-100312	2/28/64	Newark, New Jersey	[redacted]
FBI	F#105-2862; B#105-100312	5/25/64	Newark, New Jersey	[redacted]
FBI	Unnumbered	Sept 10, 1965	Newark, New Jersey	[redacted]
FBI	Unnumbered	July 24, 1969	Washington, D.C.	[redacted]
FBI	Unnumbered	Sept. 19, 1969	New York, N.Y.	[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

Irving Arron
260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey

June 21, 1964

Box # 1390
Main P. O.
Washington, D. C.
20013

Gentlemen:

In answer to your advertisement in the New York Times of June 21, 1964 for a Russian linguist capable of translating, analyzing and editing publications, as well as interpreting, I am enclosing my resume.

I lived in Russia for over 25 years and graduated college there after the beginning of the German-Russian war. After 7 years of continuous attempts to leave Russia, I was repatriated in September, 1962. I am a native-born citizen of the United States of America.

In Russia I worked as a translator, editor and head of Translator's Bureaus for twenty years. My experience in translating, abstracting and selection of technical articles for publication is significant. My initial salary requirements are $10,000 per year. I would appreciate the opportunity of a personal interview for discussing possibilities which may exist for me in your organization.

Sincerely yours,

Irving Arron

Resume of
IRVING AARON

260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey
Telephone: (201)-222-5592

Born December 4, 1917, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Married, 2 children

Bachelor of Science, 1941
Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute

1. Blauvelt Engineering Co., 79 Madison Ave., N. Y. C.
   Highway engineer - January, 1963 to present time.
   Earthwork calculations, alignment computations, drainage computations and design, right-of-way.

2. U. S. S. R. Chamber of Commerce, Moscow. Free-lance technical translator and editor - Russian to English 1952 to 1962. Left due to repatriation.
   Reports for International Congresses, trade publications, manuals, dam construction, road-building and construction machinery.

3. Foreign Trade Publishing House. Free-lance technical translator and editor - Russian to English 1956 to 1962.
   Same as in item 2.

4. Scientific Research Institute of Construction and Road-Building Machinery, Moscow. 1956 to 1958.
   Left due to completion of translating jobs.
   Head of Translator's Bureau. Management, editing, translation - Russian to English: construction and road-building machinery manuals, trade publications.

5. Borough Road Repair Department, Moscow.
   Senior engineer 1950 to 1955. Reduction of forces.
   Field work - surveying, estimator.

6. Concrete Plant, Moscow
   Laboratory assistant 1949 to 1950. Reduction of forces.
   Checking quality and composition of concrete.

7. Technical Library of Moscow City Soviet.
   Senior Librarian 1944 to 1949. Reduction of forces.
   Head of Translator's Bureau - English to Russian. Publication of monthly information bulletin.

   Part-time translator - Hydraulic Power Designing Institute (Hydroenergoproject) - English to Russian 1945 to 1952 (abstracting). Russian to English 1952 to 1952 (Reports for International Congresses, dam projects).

   Book translated and published in Moscow in 1958 by Foreign Languages Publishing House: "Precast Concrete in the Soviet Union"

ving Aaron
0 Marshall Court
g Branch, New Jersey

NEW YORK N.Y.
P.M.
2 JUN
1964

U.S. AIR MAIL

Air Mail

Box # 1390
Main P. O.
Washington, D. C.
20013

Resume of
IRVING AARON

260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey
Telephone: (201)-222-3592

Born December 4, 1917, Brooklyn, N. Y.   Bachelor of Science, 1941
Married, 2 children   Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute

I was born December 4, 1917 in Brooklyn, N. Y. My father, Philip Aaron was successively a farmer, a shoemaker, a butcher and worked in a Jewish cooperative organization. In 1931, at the age of 13, I left for Russia with my parents. My father in Russia worked as an agronomist in Biro-Bidjan. I attended school in Khabarovsk. In January, 1933, our family returned to the U. S. A. due to the illness of my younger brother. In September, 1933 we returned to Russia. My father then worked in construction as a manager, and later worked in a shoe factory as a shoemaker. My mother worked as a manager in a public dining room. I graduated high school in Moscow in 1936 and was accepted as a student in the Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute. In 1937 my parents and brother returned to the U. S. A. I remained in Moscow as I wished to finish my courses in college. I graduated in 1941, after the beginning of war with Germany and was sent as a superintendent to a Highway Bat. In September, 1942 I was sent to Military School in Moscow. After finishing as a Jr. Lt. I was in active duty as a platoon officer. I was wounded Oct. 11, 1943. I was operated upon three times, the last time in April, 1945. After being discharged from the Soviet Army due to combat disability I got a job as a senior librarian in the Technical Library of the Moscow City Soviet. In 1949 due to the small number of publications being received from abroad my position in thelibrary was eliminated. I then got a job as a laboratory assistant in a concrete plant and after a reduction of forces I got a job as a senior engineer in the Bauman Boro Road Repair Dept. At this time I was divorced and re-married. My first wife was a bookkeeper. Her step father was a major in the Soviet Army. He was later killed, in 1942, during WW II. Her maiden name, by her stepfather was Shchegolyeva. My second wife (maiden name - Volsova) was a pathologist. She hid the fact that she could not have children and we were divorced one month after my marriage. In 1952 I met Rose Minkina. We were officially married only a few months before our son was born. The cause of this delay in our marriage was the fact that I wasborn in the United States. Her brother is an aviation engineer and her brother-in-law works in the field of electronics. Her mother considered that our marriage would harm my wife's relatives. In 1955, after the birth of our son we began handing in applications for an exit visa from the Soviet Government. At first we tried to get out as visitors to my parents. We received our first refusal at the time of the Ungarian Revolt. Up till 1957, when my father came to visit us we continued to hand in applications for an exit visa as visitors. After 1957 we continued to hand in applications approximately every six months to leave the Soviet Union permanently. And we continued to regularly hear refusals. I consider that the aggravations connected with these refusals contributed to the causes of my wife's death in March, 1961. Andonly in July, 1962 my son and I received exit visas. As I mentioned in Form 444 I filled in two different applications. The first answer to the applications I filled out in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow: as an immigrant and as a native-born citizen was a Nonquota immigrant visa. The Board of Appeals of the Dept. of State, after my arrival, restored my native-born citizenship.

In 1955, due to a reduction of forces I lost my staff job in the Bauman Road Repair Dept. At this time I was working as a free-lance translator in the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and as a part-time translator in Hydroenergoproject. Until January of 1956 I worked for these organizations. In 1956 I began working as the Head of the Translators Dept. of the Scientific-Research Institute of Construction and Road-Building Machinery. After having finished the translation of all manuals in this field I continued working until I left the Soviet Union as a free-lance translator and editor for the Chamber of Commerce, the Foreign Trade Publishing House, the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hydroenergoproject and other organizations requiring translators.

After returning to the U. S. A. I got a job as a civil engineer. At first I worked for Stelling, Lord-Wood and Van Suetendal from Nov., 1962 to Dec., 1962 and then from January, 1963 to July, 1964 I worked for Blauvelt Engineering Co. xxx At present I am working for Harold J. Seldin, 60 Broad St., Red Bank, New Jersey. During the last several months I have been working on a free-lance basis with AMEREACH Corporation (1634 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa.) as an abstractor.

SUPPLEMENT
to
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
of
IRVING AARON

During the years I spent in the Soviet Union I had many friends. Among them were writers, journalists, engineers, doctors and professionals in different fields. It would be very difficult to list all of them. For instance, during the last year I met a new neighbour in the building I moved into. He was a professor in the field of economics. His name was Barsky and he told me many things which I never knew about concerning the economic basis of the Soviet system. He noted that with an industrial labour force exceeding the labour force of the U. S. A. by 100% the productivity of labour and industrial production wasthree times lower.

While studying in high school I became acquainted with a well-known movie producer - Alexander Stolper. He is the brother of one of the students with whom I was freidly in high school. Besides, through a friend in college I met with several writers and journalists such as Dykhovichny, Slobodskoy, and others writing in the field of satire.

People working in classified fields of industry never talk about their work. And even though my relatives through my wife in Russia worked in the fieldof aviation and electronics I did not know anything about their work. I only knew that my wife's brother worked in [illegible], and her brother-in-law worked near Sokol (both in Moscow). Her brother's name is Lev Minkin and her brother-in-law's name is Boris Bershadsky.

During the last years I worked as a translator and met many people who were born in the U. S. A. Among them are Norma Shikman. Paul Shikman, Grace Duetch-Bocgay (nee Sgovio) - now in Italy, andmany others.

Section XIX

GORELIK EUGENE Riga, USSR USSR	cousin Government Met him in 1960 and 1961 and 1962, during the summer Met with him the last time in 1962 (summer)	33

Resume of
IRVING AMRON

260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey
Telephone: (201)-222-3592

Born December 4, 1917, Brooklyn, N. Y. Bachelor of Science, 1941
Married, 3 children Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute

I was born December 4, 1917 in Brooklyn, N. Y. My father, Philip Amron was successively a farmer, a shoemaker, a butcher and worked in a Jewish cooperative organization. In 1931, at the age of 13, I left for Russia with my parents. My father in Russia worked as an agronomist in Biro-Bidjan. I attended school in Khabarovsk. In January, 1933, our family returned to the U. S. A. due to the illness of my younger brother. In September, 1933 we returned to Russia. My father then worked in construction as a manager, and later worked in a shoe factory as a shoemaker. My mother worked as a manager in a public dining room. I graduated high school in Moscow in 1936 and was accepted as a student in the Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute. In 1937 my parents and brother returned to the U. S. A. I remained in Moscow as I wished to finish my courses in college. I graduated in 1941, after the beginning of war with Germany and was sent as a superintendent to a Highway Bat. In September, 1942 I was sent to Military School in Moscow. After finishing as a Jr. Lt. I was in active duty as a platoon officer. I was wounded Oct. 11, 1943. I was operated upon three times, the last time in April, 1945. After being discharged from the Soviet Army due to combat disability I got a job as a senior librarian in the Technical Library of the Moscow City Soviet. In 1949 due to the small number of publications being received from abroad my position in thelibrary was eliminated. I then got a job as a laboratory assistant in a concrete plant and after a reduction of forces I got a job as a senior engineer in the Bauman Boro Road Repair Dept. At this time I was divorced and re-married. My first wife was a bookkeeper. Her step father was a major in the Soviet Army. He was later killed, in 1942, during WW II. Her maiden name, by her stepfather was Shchegolyeva. My second wife (maiden name - Volsova) was a pathologist. She hid the fact that she could not have children and we were divorced one month after my marriage. In 1952 I met Rose Mirkina. We were officially married only a few months before our son was born. The cause of this delay in our marriage was the fact that I wasborn in the United States. Her brother is an aviation engineer and her brother-in-law works in the field of electronics. Her mother considered that our marriage would harm my wife's relatives. In 1955, after the brith of our son we began handing in applications for an exit visa from the Soviet Government. At first we tried to get out as visitors to my parents. We received our first refusal at the time of the Ungarian Revolt. Up till 1957, when my father came to visit us we continued to hand in applications for an exit visa as visitors. After 1957 we continued to hand in applications approximately every six months to leave the Soviet Union permanently. And we continued to regularly hear refusals. I consider that the aggravations connected with these refusals contributed to the causes of my wife's death in March, 1961. Andonly in July, 1962 my son and I received exit visas. As I mentioned in Form 444 I filled in two different applications. The first answer to the applications I filled out in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow: as an immigrant and as a native-born citizen was a Nonquota immigrant visa. The Board of Appeals of the Dept. of State, after my arrival, restored my native-born citizenship.

In 1955, due to a reduction of forces I lost my staff job in the Bauman Road Repair Dept. At this time I was working as a free-lance translator in the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and as a part-time translator in Hydroenergoproject. Until January of 1956 I worked for these organizations. In 1956 I began working as the Head of the Translators Dept. of the Scientific-Research Institute of Construction and Road-Building Machinery. After having finished the translation of all manuals in this field I continued working until I left the Soviet Union as a free-lance translator and editor for the Chamber of Commerce, the Foreign Trade Publishing House, the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hydroenergoproject and other organizations requiring translators.

After returning to the U. S. A. I got a job as a civil engineer. At first I worked for Stelling, Lord-Wood and Van Suetendal from Nov., 1962 to Dec., 1962 and then from January, 1963 to July, 1964 I worked for Blauvelt Engineering Co. At present I am working for Harold J. Seldin, 60 Broad St., Red Bank, New Jersey. During the last several months I have been working on a free-lance basis with AUERBACH Corporation (1634 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa.) as an abstractor.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

Pos [redacted] Armor n 6 Pipeline [illegible] in INS at NYC. Resident alien. [illegible] amended sub of A12 762401 [illegible] 15 [illegible] Bru [illegible] PK 13 July

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Phone [redacted] who will try to get INS file.

phoned Tamaran, CI/S, who will get State + FBI files.

Need much more on him: Party affiliations, contacts with NKVD/KGB, militia, school of Marxism, etc.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

Per J. Hanrett,
Amin is a Permanent
resident alien per INS at NYC.
2nd # A12 762 401
is sponsored
Bru [illegible] PK
13 July

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Phoned Jerry Hanrett who will try to get INS file.

Phoned Marovic, OS, who will get State + FBI files.

Need much more on him: Party affiliations, contacts with KGB, militia, NKVD/school of Marxism, etc.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O—587282

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

Irving Aaron
260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey

September 28, 1964

[ ]
Box 1390
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C.
20013

Dear [ ]

I greatly appreciate the time you spent with me during our interview in Philadelphia. My intentions to work for your organization have not changed. I am very busy at my job at present and cannot, due to this, send you a different copy of my autobiography. I hope that this will not unduly influence the conclusions of your organization relating to my employment.

Yours truly,

Irving Aaron

Irving Aaron

Irving Aaron
260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey

LONG BRANCH
SEP
N.J.

Box 1370
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C.
20013

Irving Amron
260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey

September 28, 1964

Mr. Paul Peters
Box 1390
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C.
20013

Dear Mr. Peters:

I greatly appreciate the time you spent with me during our interview in Philadelphia. My intentions to work for your organization have not changed. I am very busy at my job at present and cannot, due to this, send you a different copy of my autobiography. I hope that this will not unduly influence the conclusions of your organization relating to my employment.

Yours truly,

Irving Amron

Irving Amron

Irving Aaron
260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey

LONG BRANCH
SEP 8
AM
[illegible]
N.J.

U.S. POSTAGE

Mr. Paul Peters
Box 1390
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C.
20013

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

Washington, D.C.
26 August 1964

Dear Mr. Amron:

I am making reference to your reply to my ad for a position with the U.S. Government as a Russian language linguist.

From 1 to 4 September, I will be in Philadelphia to conduct interviews for the position. I will phone you upon my arrival in Philadelphia to arrange a mutually convenient schedule for an interview with you.

Should you still be interested and if you have not already forwarded the material to me, kindly prepare the forms I forwarded to you some time ago. Also, please bring with you the photograph and the autobiography.

Thank you for your interest in our program.

Cordially,

Administrative Officer

Box 1390
Main Post Office
Washington, D.C. 20013

Washington, D.C.
26 August 1964

Dear Mr. Amron:

I am making reference to your reply to my ad for a position with the U.S. Government as a Russian language linguist.

From 1 to 4 September, I will be in Philadelphia to conduct interviews for the position. I will phone you upon my arrival in Philadelphia to arrange a mutually convenient schedule for an interview with you.

Should you still be interested and if you have not already forwarded the material to me, kindly prepare the forms I forwarded to you some time ago. Also, please bring with you the photograph and the autobiography.

Thank you for your interest in our program.

Cordially,

Paul Peters
Administrative Officer

Box 1390
Main Post Office
Washington, D.C. 20013

14-00000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

SECRET

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side of form. Type or print. Guide for use of 201 system is contained in CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.

TO: RID/201 Section

TYPE STATION: [illegible]

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CANCEL ☐

FROM: NAME

BRANCH

ROOM NO.

PHONE

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO.

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

10. NAME VARIATIONS

TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

16. ORGANIZATION OR INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION

CODE

17. OCCUPATION (Clear text)

CODE

18. ACTION DESK

CODE

19. SECONDARY DESK

CODE

20. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE

21. COMMENTS

22. SIGNATURE

23. IDN-

201-

FORM 11-62 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(36)

14-00000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

Standard Form 89
(Rev. Aug. 1954)
Bureau of the Budget
Circular A-32

REPORT OF MEDICAL HISTORY

THIS INFORMATION IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AND WILL NOT BE RELEASED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS

1. LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME Amron, Irving	2. GRADE AND COMPONENT OR POSITION	3. IDENTIFICATION NO.
4. HOME ADDRESS (Number, street or R.F.D., city or town, State and ZIP code) 260 Marshall Ct, Long Branch, New Jersey	5. PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION	6. DATE OF EXAMINATION 7/4/64

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF PHYSICIAN OR EXAMINER	DATE	SIGNATURE	NUMBER OF ATTACHED SHEETS
HAROLD GABEL, M.D.	7/4/64	Harold Gabel	

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

Standard Form 89
(Rev. Aug. 1954)
Bureau of the Budget
Circular A-32

89-103

REPORT OF MEDICAL HISTORY

THIS INFORMATION IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AND WILL NOT BE RELEASED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS

1. LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME Amron, Irving	2. GRADE AND COMPONENT OR POSITION	3. IDENTIFICATION NO.
4. HOME ADDRESS (Number, street or R.F.D., city or town, State and ZIP Code) 260 Marshall Ct, Long Branch, New Jersey	5. PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION	6. DATE OF EXAMINATION 7/4/64
7. SEX Male — 8. RACE White — 9. TOTAL YEARS GOVERNMENT SERVICE: MILITARY 0, CIVILIAN 0	10. AGENCY	11. ORGANIZATION UNIT
12. DATE OF BIRTH Dec 4, 1917 — 13. PLACE OF BIRTH Brooklyn, N.Y.	14. NAME, RELATIONSHIP, AND ADDRESS OF NEXT OF KIN Bella Amron, wife 260 Marshall Ct, Long Branch, N.J.	
15. EXAMINING FACILITY OR EXAMINER, AND ADDRESS 1348 Norwood Ave. Harold Gebel, M.D. Oakhurst, New Jersey	16. OTHER INFORMATION	

17. STATEMENT OF EXAMINEE'S PRESENT HEALTH IN OWN WORDS (Follow by description of past history, if complaint exists)

I am in excellent health

18. FAMILY HISTORY negative

RELATION	AGE	STATE OF HEALTH	IF DEAD, CAUSE OF DEATH	AGE AT DEATH
FATHER	75	good		
MOTHER	66	good		
SPOUSE	37	good		
	40	good		
BROTHERS AND SISTERS				
CHILDREN	7	good		
	9	good		
	16	good		

19. HAS ANY BLOOD RELATION (Parent, brother, sister, other) OR HUSBAND OR WIFE

YES	NO	(Check each item)	RELATION(S)
	✓	HAD TUBERCULOSIS	
	✓	HAD SYPHILIS	
	✓	HAD DIABETES	
	✓	HAD CANCER	
	✓	HAD KIDNEY TROUBLE	
	✓	HAD HEART TROUBLE	
	✓	HAD STOMACH TROUBLE	
	✓	HAD RHEUMATISM (ARTHRITIS)	
	✓	HAD ASTHMA, HAY FEVER, HIVES	
	✓	HAD EPILEPSY (Fits)	
	✓	COMMITTED SUICIDE	
	✓	BEEN INSANE	

20. HAVE YOU EVER HAD OR HAVE YOU NOW (Place check at left of each item)

YES	NO	(Check each item)	YES	NO	(Check each item)	YES	NO	(Check each item)	YES	NO	(Check each item)
	✓	SCARLET FEVER, ERYSIPELAS		✓	GOITER		✓	TUMOR, GROWTH, CYST, CANCER		✓	"TRICK" OR LOCKED KNEE
	✓	DIPHTHERIA		✓	TUBERCULOSIS		✓	RUPTURE		✓	FOOT TROUBLE
	✓	RHEUMATIC FEVER		✓	SOAKING SWEATS (Night sweats)		✓	APPENDICITIS		✓	NEURITIS
	✓	SWOLLEN OR PAINFUL JOINTS		✓	ASTHMA		✓	PILES OR RECTAL DISEASE		✓	PARALYSIS (Inc. infantile)
	✓	MUMPS		✓	SHORTNESS OF BREATH		✓	FREQUENT OR PAINFUL URINATION		✓	EPILEPSY OR FITS
	✓	WHOOPING COUGH		✓	PAIN OR PRESSURE IN CHEST		✓	KIDNEY STONE OR BLOOD IN URINE		✓	CAR, TRAIN, SEA, OR AIR SICKNESS
	✓	FREQUENT OR SEVERE HEADACHE		✓	CHRONIC COUGH		✓	SUGAR OR ALBUMIN IN URINE		✓	FREQUENT TROUBLE SLEEPING
	✓	DIZZINESS OR FAINTING SPELLS		✓	PALPITATION OR POUNDING HEART		✓	BOILS		✓	FREQUENT OR TERRIFYING NIGHTMARES
	✓	EYE TROUBLE		✓	HIGH OR LOW BLOOD PRESSURE		✓	VENEREAL DISEASE		✓	DEPRESSION OR EXCESSIVE WORRY
	✓	EAR, NOSE OR THROAT TROUBLE		✓	CRAMPS IN YOUR LEGS		✓	RECENT GAIN OR LOSS OF WEIGHT		✓	LOSS OF MEMORY OR AMNESIA
	✓	RUNNING EARS		✓	FREQUENT INDIGESTION		✓	ARTHRITIS OR RHEUMATISM		✓	BED WETTING
	✓	CHRONIC OR FREQUENT COLDS		✓	STOMACH, LIVER OR INTESTINAL TROUBLE		✓	BONE, JOINT, OR OTHER DEFORMITY		✓	NERVOUS TROUBLE OF ANY SORT
	✓	SEVERE TOOTH OR GUM TROUBLE		✓	GALL BLADDER TROUBLE OR GALL STONES		✓	LAMENESS		✓	ANY DRUG OR NARCOTIC HABIT
	✓	SINUSITIS		✓	JAUNDICE		✓	LOSS OF ARM, LEG, FINGER, OR TOE		✓	EXCESSIVE DRINKING HABIT
	✓	HAY FEVER		✓	ANY REACTION TO SERUM, DRUG OR MEDICINE		✓	PAINFUL OR "TRICK" SHOULDER OR ELBOW		✓	HOMOSEXUAL TENDENCIES

21. HAVE YOU EVER (Check each item)

YES	NO		YES	NO	
✓		WORN GLASSES		✓	ATTEMPTED SUICIDE
	✓	WORN AN ARTIFICIAL EYE		✓	BEEN A SLEEP WALKER
	✓	WORN HEARING AIDS		✓	LIVED WITH ANYONE WHO HAD TUBERCULOSIS
	✓	STUTTERED OR STAMMERED		✓	COUGHED UP BLOOD
	✓	WORN A BRACE OR BACK SUPPORT		✓	BLED EXCESSIVELY AFTER INJURY OR TOOTH EXTRACTION

22. FEMALES ONLY: A. HAVE YOU EVER—

YES	NO	
		BEEN PREGNANT
		HAD A VAGINAL DISCHARGE
		BEEN TREATED FOR A FEMALE DISORDER
		HAD PAINFUL MENSTRUATION
		HAD IRREGULAR MENSTRUATION

B. COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING

AGE AT ONSET OF MENSTRUATION
INTERVAL BETWEEN PERIODS
DURATION OF PERIODS
DATE OF LAST PERIOD
QUANTITY ☐ NORMAL ☐ EXCESSIVE ☐ SCANTY

23. HOW MANY JOBS HAVE YOU HAD IN THE PAST THREE YEARS? 3	24. WHAT IS THE LONGEST PERIOD YOU HELD ANY OF THESE JOBS? MONTHS 18	25. WHAT IS YOUR USUAL OCCUPATION? Technical translator	26. ARE YOU (Check one) ☑ RIGHT HANDED ☐ LEFT HANDED

YES	NO	CHECK EACH ITEM YES OR NO. EVERY ITEM CHECKED "YES" MUST BE FULLY EXPLAINED IN BLANK SPACE ON RIGHT	
		27. HAVE YOU BEEN UNABLE TO HOLD A JOB BECAUSE OF:	
	✓	a. SENSITIVITY TO CHEMICALS, DUST, SUNLIGHT, ETC.	
	✓	b. INABILITY TO PERFORM CERTAIN MOTIONS	
	✓	c. INABILITY TO ASSUME CERTAIN POSITIONS	
	✓	d. OTHER MEDICAL REASONS (*If yes, give reasons*)	
	✓	28. HAVE YOU EVER WORKED WITH RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCE?	
	✓	29. DID YOU HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH SCHOOL STUDIES OR TEACHERS? (*If yes, give details*)	
	✓	30. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN REFUSED EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE OF YOUR HEALTH? (*If yes, state reason and give details*)	
	✓	31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED LIFE INSURANCE? (*If yes, state reason and give details*)	
✓		32. HAVE YOU HAD, OR HAVE YOU BEEN ADVISED TO HAVE, ANY OPERATIONS? (*If yes, describe and give age at which occurred*)	Had skull injury during war, in 1943. Operated in 1944 and 1945 on [illegible]. Was 25 years old at time of wound and operation (first) in 1943
	✓	33. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PATIENT (*committed or voluntary*) IN A MENTAL HOSPITAL OR SANATORIUM? (*If yes, specify when, where, why, and name of doctor, and complete address of hospital or clinic*)	
	✓	34. HAVE YOU EVER HAD ANY ILLNESS OR INJURY OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY NOTED? (*If yes, specify when, where, and give details*)	
	✓	35. HAVE YOU CONSULTED OR BEEN TREATED BY CLINICS, PHYSICIANS, HEALERS, OR OTHER PRACTITIONERS WITHIN THE PAST 5 YEARS? (*If yes, give complete address of doctor, hospital, clinic, and details*)	
	✓	36. HAVE YOU TREATED YOURSELF FOR ILLNESSES OTHER THAN MINOR COLDS? (*If yes, which illnesses*)	
	✓	37. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN REJECTED FOR MILITARY SERVICE BECAUSE OF PHYSICAL, MENTAL, OR OTHER REASONS? (*If yes, give date and reason for rejection*)	
✓		38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED FROM MILITARY SERVICE BECAUSE OF PHYSICAL, MENTAL, OR OTHER REASONS? (*If yes, give date, reason, and type of discharge; whether honorable, other than honorable, for unfitness or unsuitability*)	Discharged from military service in Soviet Army in 1946 due to combat disability.
	✓	39. HAVE YOU EVER RECEIVED, IS THERE PENDING, HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR, OR DO YOU INTEND TO APPLY FOR PENSION OR COMPENSATION FOR EXISTING DISABILITY? (*If yes, specify what kind, granted by whom, and what amount, when, why*)	

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE REVIEWED THE FOREGOING INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY ME AND THAT IT IS TRUE AND COMPLETE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.
I AUTHORIZE ANY OF THE DOCTORS, HOSPITALS, OR CLINICS MENTIONED ABOVE TO FURNISH THE GOVERNMENT A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF MY MEDICAL RECORD FOR PURPOSES OF PROCESSING MY APPLICATION FOR THIS EMPLOYMENT OR SERVICE.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF EXAMINEE: [illegible], Irving

SIGNATURE: Irving [illegible]

40. PHYSICIAN'S SUMMARY AND ELABORATION OF ALL PERTINENT DATA (*Physician shall comment on all positive answers in items 20 thru 39*)

In excellent health. He has
a past history of skull
injury which is non-disabling.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF PHYSICIAN OR EXAMINER	DATE	SIGNATURE	NUMBER OF ATTACHED SHEETS
HAROLD GABEL, MD	7/4/64	Harold Gabel	

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE ISSUED BY	**PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT**	THIS DATE (Fill In) July 5, 1964

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible] IRVING	2. AGE 46	3. SEX X MALE FEMALE

4. HEIGHT 6'00"	5. WEIGHT 195#	6. COLOR OF EYES blue	7. COLOR OF HAIR brown	8. TYPE COMPLEXION light	9. TYPE BUILD heavy

pages 2-13 all deleted.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ARAUJO-Bernal, Leopoldo
201-771754

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM: 2 D 11

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
20 Jul 7		Clifford A. FENTON	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

ARAUJO-Bernal, Leopoldo
201-771754

STATE DEPT. DOCUMENTS

(1) DESP# 1056, 2 Apr. 1960
Subj: Medical Assoc. Officer Gives Further
Indication of Plans of Gov't for Medical Profession

(2) USINT. Havana, 25 Oct. 1977 NC 86475
SUBJ. NIV Applications

(3) Am. Emb. Santiago ref. dated 12 Dec. 1960

FBI DOCUMENTS

(1) ~~DBA-26368~~, 25 Oct. 1962, Miami, Florida
Subject: Verisimo Francisco Domingo, Sanchez Barrio; Internal Security - Cuba
(2) ~~DBA-78316~~, 19 May 1961, Miami, Florida
Subject. Foreign Political Matters - Cuba
Status of Cuban Medical Profession
File: MM 105-1747.

LIAISON

(1) Document dated 28 Mayo 1966

(2) Cable, Mexico City 18206 dated 13 Apr. 1971

(3) Cable, Mexico City " (Dupe) of above - Destroy

C/A DOCUMENTS

(1) Cable DIRECTOR 205666, dated 24 Apr. 1971
(sanitized copy placed in 201)

(2) WH/Miami cable 13885, 29 Apr. 1971
(sanitized copy placed in 201)

AIR ATTACHE

(1) IR. 457-54 Air Attache Office Rome, Italy, 8 Apr 1971

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 1

CONF ~~C~~ 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

DATE-TIME GROUP 102319Z

CITE CIA/DDO

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER ~~e123413~~

CONF: IP/ES INFO: FILE ISN/10, C/FAY

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 5

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER 505

0 ~~201~~-771754/104

TO: PRIORITY DEPT OF STATE INFO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

SECRET WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

CIR-316/03858-77

DONKEY CHIPMUNK

TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT X
INDEX
CODE NO.

REF: HAVANA 0427 DATED 25 OCTOBER 1977 SUBJECT: NEW APPLICATIONS

1. SUBJECT: ARAUJO BERNAL, LEOPOLDO EDUARDO (U)

DPOB: 9 JUNE 1932, PINAR DEL RIO, CUBA

2. (S) SUBJECT HAD BEEN REPORTED AS A MILITANT COMMUNIST SINCE 1935, AND HE HAD BEEN ACTIVE IN MANY COMMUNIST AND LEFTIST REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS. IN FEBRUARY 1961 HE WAS REPORTED TO BE AN INFORMANT OF THE CUBAN G-2 (SECURITY POLICE). THIS INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM A GROUP OF CUBAN REFUGEES, TRAINED IN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, WHO HAVE PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION SINCE 1961.

3. CLASSIFIED BY AUTHENTICATING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY PARA: 5B(2). AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE.

10 Nov 1977

BASED ON:UFGA 01861 11 JULY 61; UFGA 15378, 5 NOV 64; FILE IN: 201-771754; ORIG: R HARRIS; UNIT: IP/EIS:JE/DM; EXT: 9461; COORD: LA/COG: H SPEED; REL: C/PCS/LSN; AUTH: C/IP/RB.

316-0385877

201-771754

DATE: 10 NOV 1977
ORIG: R HARRIS
UNIT: IP/EIS:JE/DM
EXT: 9461

RECORD COPY

C/PCS/LSN/D
RELEASING OFFICER

COORD IN DRAFT:
LA/COG: WH SPEED
COORDINATING OFFICERS

A Zeff
for C/IP/RB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET 062147

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

MFG 4-63

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no below and forward document to RID AN.

FROM:

RID/

[illegible] JOHN
IP/AN
EXT. 4239

GA-637
GA50
TUBE GT7

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICERS INITIALS
1. C/WH/C				
2. DC/WH/C		6 DEC 1971	6	
3. [redacted]				
4. [illegible]		6 Dec		R
5. [redacted]				
6. VASQUEZ				
7.				
8. DC/WH/1		13 DEC 1971		
9.				
10. Beshmith		14 Dec		JB
11. [redacted]				✓
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-771754

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 29 Nov 71

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFAA 03604

73780

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
AMOT Report on Dr. Leopoldo Araujo Bernal (201-771754)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: WH/MIAMI 13167

Forwarded herewith, as promised in Reference, is a copy of an AMOT report (EE 1970) on Leopoldo Araujo Bernal.

Priscilla J. BRAZLEY

Attachment:
Copy of EE 1970, herewith

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City w/att, herewith — To out Pouch
③ - Chief, WHD without att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA 3604

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE
[illegible]
Typed: 22 November 1971

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-771754

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 1-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ORIG: BETTY VAZQUEZ:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/FI
EXT: 7144 R. 1819
DATE: 6 DEC 1971

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 46 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, I/ad, c/ci, RS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 07 C 02 CITE DIRECTOR 203775

TO WH/MIAMI INFO: MEXICO CITY

TYPIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 13225 (IN 479676)*

1. WHILE ARAUJO MAY HAVE HAD CONTACT WITH JUSTO CARRILLO'S GROUP IN 1958 SUBSEQUENT INFO WOULD TEND TO INDICATE HE NOW IN SOLID WITH THE CURRENT REGIME. THEREFORE, DO NOT FEEL CHANCE ENCOUNTER BASED ON PRE-REVOLUTION ACQUAINTANCE WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE.

2. FILE: 201-771754.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: *Said Araujo had had contact with Justo Carrillo's Montecristis group in December 1958 and suggested Headquarters might want consider sending Carrillo to Mexico City for chance encounter with Araujo to explore depth of his ideological sentiments at this time.

7 Dec 71
201-771754

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12-1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR

IP/AN

ACTION NO. 624

(4)

S E C R E T 221546Z NOV 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 13167

W/MIAM

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

22 Nov IN 475064

REF: MEXICO CITY 18206 (N 468629)

1. TRACES ON LEOPOLDO ARAUJO BERNAL (201-771754) REQUESTED PARA 3 OF REF AS FOLLOWS: DOB 9 JUNE 1912. AS OF MARCH 69 WAS PRESIDENT OF CUBAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PROFESSOR AT HAVANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICAL SCIENCES, AND HELD POSITION AT BRAIN FUNCTIONING RESEARCH INSTITUTE. UFGA 2698, 8 FEB 67, LISTED SUBJECT AS SECRETARY OF PAN AMERICAN MEDICAL CONFEDERATION FOR CARIBBEAN ZONE WHO WAS MANIPULATED BY JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY. MEMBER OF CUBAN DELEGATION TO 4TH WORLD CONGRESS ON PSHCYIATRY IN MADRID SEPT 66. ATTENDED VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CONFERENCES IN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA PRIOR TO CASTRO REGIME. RECENT TRAVEL: CUBA TO SPAIN TO UNITED KINGDOM JULY 69, RETURNING CUBA AUG 69, PASSPORT EF/69/733.

2. POUCHING COPY OF AMOT REPORT ON SUBJECT DATED OCT 64. SOURCE OF REPORT IS MEDICAL DOCTOR WHO WAS RESIDING MIAMI AT THAT TIME.

3. FILE: 201-771754. GP-1

S E C R E T

ZZ

ZZ PROCESSED

11 JAN 1972

22 Nov 71

201-771754

CS COPY

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

DISSEM BY 3B

ACTION UNIT c/wh8 | FILE VR c/ci/ca, c/ci, c/fi 2, c/ca 3,

ACTION NO. 294

S E C R E T 291622Z NOV 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 13225 wmim 29 Nov 71 IN 479876

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR 285656

RYBAT TYPIC

AN / PS / ABSTRACT X

1. FOR WHATEVER IT IS WORTH [redacted] MET WITH ARAUJO AND OTHER LEADERS OF MONTECRISTI GROUP IN ARAUJO'S HOME LATE DEC 58 WHEN MONTECRISTIS ATTEMPTING MOUNT OP TO TOPPLE BATISTA BEFORE FIDEL COULD. LEADER OF MONTECRISTIS AT THAT TIME WAS FORMER ASSET JUSTO CARRILLO WHO NOW WITH BID SAN SALVADOR. HQS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER HAVING CARRILLO TRAVEL MEXICO CITY FOR "CHANCE ENCOUNTER" WITH ARAUJO TO EXPLORE DEPTH OF HIS IDEOLOGICAL SENTIMENTS AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 201-771754. GP-1

S E C R E T

29 NOV 1971

201-771754

CS COPY

SECRET

14-00000

[redacted]

[illegible], FI
[illegible] 1819
[illegible] 1971

2-1

SECRET

48 PER

WH8 IP/AN, CI/ICG, CI/OPS, FI, CAS, CA/PROP

Ⓢ

SECRET [illegible]

MEXICO CITY INFO: WH/MIAMI

CITE DIRECTOR 2[illegible]

TYPIC

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 18206 (IN 468629)*

B. WH/MIAMI 13167 (IN 475984)**

1. FOLLOWING AUGMENTS INFO REF B. ARAUJO IS A LONG-TIME COMMUNIST HAVING BECOME INVOLVED WITH THE PARTY IN HIS SCHOOL DAYS. ON STOPOVER IN SANTIAGO IN JUNE 1963 ARAUJO WAS PERSONALLY RECEIVED BY THE THEN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SALVADOR ALLENDE. ARAUJO IS REPORTEDLY A GOOD PERSONAL FRIEND OF FIDEL CASTRO.

2. ARAUJO HAS BEEN MARRIED AT LEAST TWICE. FIRST WIFE CARMEN CARRUANA REPORTEDLY A COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER. SECOND WIFE IS ELSA PRADERES, WHO AS OF 1967 WAS PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF CUBAN PSYCHOLOGISTS. ARAUJO'S DAUGHTER LOIPA ARAUJO PRADERES IS WITH THE CUBAN NATIONAL BALLET AND MARRIED TO A RUSSIAN-BORN BALLET DANCER. SHE IS ALSO A PARTY MEMBER.

3. FILE: 201-771754.

CS COPY

27 Nov 71
201-771754

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Requested traces on Araujo who to attend conference in Mexico City. **Sent trac[redacted]

C/WH/COG [redacted], C/WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

[illegible] PERAL, Leopoldo DR.

BF

XIX INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY

London
27 Jul-2 Aug 1969

LIST OF MEMBERS AND ASSOCIATES ≠

≠ A supplementary list of late registrants will be available at the Congress.

CANADA (contd)

[illegible] No.

*[illegible], David, Dept. of Psychology, University of Calgary, Calgary.
[illegible], Jocelyne, Dept. of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon.
*[illegible], John W., Dept. of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, 5.
[illegible], S.Gerald, 5345 Cote des Neiges, Suite 575, Montreal 26.
[illegible], Paul D., 400 Walmer Road, Toronto, 10.
[illegible], Denis H., 30 Colborn Street, Guelph, Ontario.
*SUBOSKI, Milton D., Dept. of Psychology, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.
*TAYLOR, Maurice M., DRET, Box 2000, Downsview, Ontario, Canada.
*TULVING, Endel, Dept. of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, 5.
*[illegible], Christopher D., Alcoholism & Drug Addiction Research Foundation, 344 Bloor Street West, Toronto 4, Ontario.
WEYANT, Robert G., Dept. of Psychology, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta.
WIGDOR, Blossom T., 503 Roslyn Avenue, Montreal 217, Quebec.
WINOCUR, Gordon, Dept. of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon.
WONG, Roderick, Dept. of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8.
WRIGHT, Mary J., Dept. of Psychology, University of Western Ontario,
*ZELAZO, Philip R., Dept. of Psychology, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.
1485 ZWEIG, Joseph P., Dept. of Psychology, Sir George Williams University, 1435 Drummond Street, Montreal Quebec.

CEYLON

*JAYASURIYA, J.E. University Bungalows, Sanghamitta Hill, Peradeniya.

COLUMBIA

0010 *ARDILA, Ruben, Box 1212, Lincoln, Nebraska 68508, U.S.A.

CUBA

/3F

ARANGO

1281 BERNAL, Waldes Leopoldo De Arango, Havana University, Havana, Cuba.
1280 GUEVARA, Juan Jose, address as above
1279 PUIG, Ernesto Gonzales, " "

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[illegible], Milos, Jilovska 1165, Praha 4, Branik.
[illegible], Eduard, Praha 1, Mala Strana, Ujezd 26.
[illegible], Vaclav, Praha 1, Hradcanske Nams, Institut Psychology.
*[illegible] Jan, Institute of Physiology, Czech Academy of Sciences, Praha 4-Krc, Budejovicka 1083.
*[illegible]OVA, Olga, Institute of Physiology, Czech Academy of Sciences, Praha 4-Krc, Budejovicka 1083.
[illegible]RIC, Ladislav, Dept. of Educational Psychology, Gondova 2, Bratislava.
[illegible], Jaroslav, Vrane nad Vltavou 314.
*HOLAS, Emil, Ministerstvo skolstvi, Mozartova 10, Olomovc.
[illegible], Josef, Pribram VII, Pod Haldou 452.
[illegible], Ondrej, Bratislava, [illegible] 27.
[illegible]OVA, Jarmila, Psychology Institute CSAV, Purkynova 2, Praha 1.
[illegible]A, [illegible], Psychiatric Research Institute, Bohnice Prague 8.
[illegible], Otakar, Belcicka 2826, Praha 4, Sporilov II.
[illegible], Jaroslav, Psychologicky ustav KU, Hradcanske nam 5, Praha, 1-Hradcany.
[illegible], Zdenek, Praha 10, Nam. Kub. revoluce 24.
[illegible], Oldrich O., Petrinska 10, Prague 5..
[illegible]OVA, Jaroslava, Prague 6, Dostalova 86.
[illegible], Jaroslava, Praha 4, [illegible] 1233.
*[illegible], Ivan, Bratislava, Kocel'ova 17.
*[illegible], D. Institute of Physiology, Academy of Sciences, Sienkiewiczova 1, Bratislava.

*Programme Participant

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARAUJO BERNAL, LEOPOLDO E. /DR/
201-771754 — 019-006-069/03
SEX M DOB ? — UFGA-26930A01
08 FEB 67
CIT ? — P5.
OCC ?
SECRETARY OF THE CMP /PAN AMERICAN MEDICAL CONFEDERATION/ FOR THE CARIBBEAN ZONE AND MANIPULATED BY JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY /201-22396/ AS A PUPPET TO SERVE HIS ENDS.

UFG — R 6705100140

FILE IN 201-771754

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. — SECRET — (7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM 7P

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/C

INFO
Chief, European Division, UFG
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMTOIL-1
Background Information on Medical Colleagues of AMTOIL-1 in Cuba

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: FYI

1. In late December 1966 and early January 1967 QUSHIP-1 debriefed AMTOIL-1 in detail regarding his medical colleagues still in Cuba. AMTOIL-1 said that most of them would like to leave Cuba. The majority of those described below are psychiatrists who are keenly aware of, and depressed by, the effect of the Castro regime. Almost all of the psychiatrists mentioned herein have friends and patients among Cuban Government officials and, in AMTOIL-1's opinion, those defecting would cooperate in extensive debriefings of their considerable knowledge. Most of them frequently travel abroad. AMTOIL-1 is attempting to maintain correspondence with the most promising. The defection of any of the psychiatrists would be especially harmful to the present Cuban Government, since it is faced with a rapid increase of suicides, mental illnesses, and alcoholism, stemming from a general breakdown of morals and mental health as traditional values are uprooted and replaced by repressive, unfamiliar demands.

2. In the descriptions that follow, it should be noted that the Department of Psychiatry of the University of Havana Medical School is composed of professors and instructors from the psychiatric staffs of several hospitals, where the classes actually are given; there is no University Hospital *per se*.

pg 19

cit: Cuba 3. Cuban Physicians Considered as Possible Prospects for Defection/ Operational Utilization

ACOSTA Nodal (fnu). Assistant Director of the Department of Psychiatry of the University of Havana/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Full professor. Acosta, wife, and mother criticize the regime. Has son 13 years of age. Admits correspondence with a brother in the U.S. Takes a courageous stand against the regime but volubly indiscreet. In August 1966 said that he probably was going to be the father of an illegitimate child. Age 40, 5' 5", 140 pounds, almost totally bald. Would defect and cooperate in being debriefed if abroad with family.

DOB: c. 1926

Possible defector

Distribution:
2 - DC/WH/C
2 - C/EUR 2cc ful E/IB/S
1 - COS, JMWAVE

CS COPY

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-805766

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-22,232

DATE
20 January 1967

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-805766

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSVA-22,232

DOB: c. 1925

3. SUAREZ Ramos, Humberto. Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Intelligent and professionally skillful. Admitted he is a candidate for the Cuban Communist Party in order to live more comfortably. Married to a former medical-school student who desires to leave Cuba and who constantly criticizes the political indoctrination in Cuban schools suffered by their four children. Suarez admits corresponding with a brother in Miami. Age 35-40, 5' 7", 170 pounds, black hair. Would probably defect and be debriefed if abroad with family.

Possible defector

DOB. c. 1928

4. YODU Prevez, Rene. Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Follows the dictates of the regime with commentary. Is sole member of Calixto Garcia staff to side with the staff of the Department of Medical Psychology of the University of Havana, headed by Jose Angel Bustamante, which is notoriously servile to the regime. Attended the 1966 international psychiatric congress in Madrid. Married and regularly fights in public with his wife. Mulatto, Age 35-40, 5' 11", 170 pounds, black hair. Vague possibility of defection and subsequent debriefing, if Yodu felt there was absolutely no risk involved.

Possible defector

Sex: F

DOB: c. 1940

5. Cunill, Cristina. Specially appointed Professor of Psychology of the University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Only intimate friends know that she is firmly anti-regime, as she pretends the opposite, in order to support her widowed mother and younger brother Philip, currently majoring in English Literature at the University of Havana and attempting to obtain a scholarship for study abroad (probably England) in order to defect. Cunill may have been born in the U.S., when her father was a Cuban diplomat posted there. She would leave Cuba if it were not for family commitments. She is a courageous, discreet woman, about 26 years old, who might possibly work against the regime while still in Cuba, and most probably would do so if she and her family were outside of Cuba. Would seek a scholarship to study abroad if there were a way to make up for the loss of her monthly income of approximately 500 pesos, which is needed for the support of her family.

Potential defector

DOB: c. 1939

6. Mora (fnu). Instructor of Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Admits he desires to leave Cuba but is too gripped by inertia or fear to try. His wife also wishes to leave. They have one or two children. Age 26-27, 5' 6", 130 pounds, blond hair. If abroad with family he would probably defect and consent to debriefing. He is too timid for any other operational utilization.

Possi defec

DOB: c. 1928

7. PEREZ Villar, Jose. Instructor and head of the Department of Child Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Admitted being so emotionally distressed by his inability to leave Cuba that he requested not to teach university classes. He is attempting to leave through a scholarship, as a delegate to a medical congress, or through the translation/publication of Intelligence and Experience, a medical text by U.S. author James McV. Hunt, with whom he corresponds. He is married and has a 15-year-old son, whom he is resigned to leave behind to perform obligatory military service, in the event he and his wife can leave. Perez formerly attended a U.S. university. Age 39, 5' 7", 160 pounds, black hair. If outside of Cuba, Perez could be used as an access agent to Cuban officials, as his opposition to the regime is known to only a few friends.

Poss def

DOB: c. 1932

8. Lopez, Mirta. Instructor of Child Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Never makes

Possible defector

FORM 8-60 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

Pg 3

political comments but desires to leave Cuba. In process of divorcing her husband, a physician for the Ministry of the Interior. They have two four- or five-year-old children. [illegible] is a mulatto, age 34, 5' 7", 145 pounds, black hair. She would be of little operational use, for she is too lazy to arrange travel outside of Cuba or to work against it.

DOB: c. 1936

H. *Sanchez, Isidoro. Instructor/Intern of Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Has an official post, possibly secretary of the Communist Youth, at the University of Havana, but actually plans to defect through obtaining a scholarship to study abroad, probably in England. The scholarship was authorized by the Cuban Government in September 1966. Sanchez is intelligent, discreet, and anti-Castro. He is a bachelor, 30 years of age, 5' 4", 130 pounds, black hair. It is virtually a certainty that Sanchez will defect while outside of Cuba. There would be an excellent chance of recruitment for use as an access agent.

Probable defector

DOB: C.1932

I. *Acevedo (fnu). Instructor of Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Worked to correct ills of the regime, now disillusioned, depressed, and criticizes the regime in public. Courageous and combative personality. Married, several small children. Brother of Miriam Acevedo, professional singer who represents Cuba at international events. Age 34, 5' 7", 150 pounds, brown hair. If abroad with family would probably defect and could be used as an access agent.

Possible defector

201-756158

J. FR *ABDO Canasi, Jorge. Head of the Psychiatric Department of the National Hospital, Assistant Professor at the University of Havana Medical School. See paragraph 1 of OSWA-22,121, dated 30 December 1966.

201-107524

~~201-107524~~

Sex: F

K. FR *Frayde, Marta. Former director of the National Hospital, former delegate to UNESCO, Paris. Frayde told Cristina Cunill that she is completely anti-regime, that she personally told Fidel Castro that Communism is ... (obscenity) and that Castro just laughed by way of reply. She is rumored to be protected by Castro, who has allowed her to dedicate herself exclusively to private practice. AMCIL-1 has never met Frayde personally but believes that she would probably defect and undergo debriefing.

Possible defector

DOB: C. 1928

Sex: F

L. *GARCIA Mauri, Clotilde. Assistant Professor of Medical Psychology of the National Hospital and of the University of Havana Medical School. She is single, sexually promiscuous, and has never revealed her political affiliation. Age 38, 5' 6", 125 pounds, brown (but changeable) hair.

DOB: c. 1933

M. *Grau, Miguel. Instructor of Psychiatry of the National Hospital/University of Havana Medical School. He is currently attempting to obtain a scholarship to study abroad in order to defect. Married, two children. Wife is sharply critical of the regime and wishes to leave soonest. Grau is the nephew of Pedro GRAU Triana, who reportedly made millions of dollars in construction and real estate before Castro came to power. Pedro Grau now lives abroad. He gave Miguel a European trip upon graduation from medical school. Miguel's wife is also from a wealthy family. Age 33, 5' 8", 140 pounds, brown hair. Once outside Cuba with his family, Grau would defect and possibly could be used as an access agent.

Probable defector

DOB: c. 1933

N. *MUNIZ Leon (fnu). Instructor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana Medical School/Mazorra Hospital of National Psychiatry. Openly anti-regime, Muniz has requested permission

He requested permission to emigrate.

4 P. 7

to emigrate." He is married, has no children. Age 33, 5' 5", 150 pounds, light brown hair. Once allowed to leave, he could be debriefed, but his open request to emigrate would make any use as an access agent impossible in spite of his motivation.

D.O.B: c.1932

√B. F *Esteves, Carlos. Psychiatrist of the Civil Hospital of Cienfuegos. Secretly but [illegible]. Married, two or three children. Age 3[illegible], 5' 7", [illegible] pounds, blond hair. AMTOIL-1 has had no contact with him since 1962.

4. Cuban Physicians Whose Defection is Dubious but not Impossible

DOB: c 1924

A. F *Collado (fnu). Official psychiatrist of the Cuban Air Force and formerly of the National Hospital psychiatric staff. He is constantly poking fun at the Cuban Government in sparkling wit at parties that he regularly gives for friends in the Arts, whom he seems to cultivate. He is a close friend of Cristina Cunill and Marta Frayde, to whom he has admitted feigning approval of the Cuban Government. He is cultured and loves the good life. He was first married to Eva FREJA Ville, a French national formerly a professor at the Alliance Française in Havana, who is now living in France, since their amicable divorce in 1961. He has one child. Collado moves in high government circles. Age 42, 5' 7", 150 pounds, black hair. He might defect, if shown a good offer, in spite of traditionally seeking not to complicate his life. He can be reached through his former wife, with whom he maintains correspondence. AMTOIL-1 is trying to obtain her exact address.

[redacted] ? 1P √ KR DOB: c1927 201-743217

B. *Torroella, Gustavo. Professor of Psychology, University of Havana Medical School, and head of vocational guidance for the University of Havana. His brother-in-law is Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister. Torroella is [illegible] counselor for UNESCO with alternating postings in Paris and Havana. In 1960 he told AMTOIL-1 that he intended to publish books outside of Cuba in order to have income and pretexts to justify travel and residence abroad. In AMTOIL-1's opinion, Torroella studied and failed to justify Marxism, and obtained his current UNESCO posting so as to be out of Cuba. His wife Marta Kouri de Torroella and two daughters are presently in Havana. Age 39, 5' 8", 170 pounds, light brown hair. It is very doubtful that Torroella will openly break with the regime, even though he establishes a semi- or permanent residence abroad, but it might be worth approaching him when he has his family abroad because of his knowledge of, and access to, key Cuban Government officials.

DOB: c.1929

√C. F *Palacios, Claudio. National Coordinator of Psychiatric Care, Ministry of Public Health, and full Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana Medical School/Mazorra Hospital. He is extremely clever, intelligent, materialistic, and ambitious. He maneuvered himself into an important post and a wealthy private practice. He is a candidate for the Cuban Communist Party, which probably will be denied him because of a previous internship in a New York hospital, according to the opinion of Jorge Abdo Canasi, a former partner in medical practice. Palacios was a delegate to an international congress of psychiatry in Madrid in 1966. He has two daughters by a first marriage; no children by the second. Age 35-40, 5' 5", 170 pounds, brown hair. Defection is doubtful, but it is felt that Palacios would give serious consideration to the offer of any post that would enhance his professional career.

7

DOB: c. 1902

√D. F *Cordoba, Armando de. National Coordinator of Psychiatric Teaching, Ministry of Public Health, full professor, head of the Psychiatric Department of the University of Havana Medical School/Fajardo Hospital. An aristocrat whose effortless adaptation to the regime surprised his cohorts, Cordoba is intelligent, ambitious for power and prestige. He is married, no children. His brother

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	CONFIDENTIAL	OCMA-22,232

Ti pg. 5 Ti

is a former ambassador to Great Britain, who fears that the regime's excesses will strike him. Age 64, 5' 6", 140 pounds, brown hair. Because of his age and position, defection is highly doubtful, but he would consider any post that would enhance his international prestige; however, it is more likely that he will continue to prefer being an important man in a little country.

5. Cuban Physicians Whose Defection is Considered Virtually Impossible

DOB [illegible] — A. F *Rodriguez, Luis. Professor and Director of the University of Havana Medical School, he has been a member of the Communist Party in Cuba since a youth. He is intelligent, personable, and dedicated to his career. He is married and has three or four children. Age 36, 5' 7", 180 pounds, black hair.

DOB c.1921 — ✓B. F *IRIZASTEGUI Dupuy, Fidel. Assistant Professor of the University of Havana Medical School. Member of the Cuban Communist Party. He is quite satisfied with the present situation - is well off financially, has prestige, and travels regularly. He was a delegate to the medical congress in India in 1966. He is married to Noemi Valdes, a professor of the School of Psychology, University of Havana. Age 35-40, 5' 6", 150 pounds, mulatto.

DOB: 1932 — ✓C. GX *MIYAR Barrueco, Jose. Rector of the University of Havana since August 1966. He made a rapid rise from Director of Rural Medicine to Vice-Minister of Public Health. He is credited with professional skill as an administrator and public relations type and is said to be a traveling companion of Fidel Castro. He is not believed to be a member of the Communist Party of Cuba. Miyar is married and is a former classmate of AMTOIL-1's. Age 34, 5' 8", 170 pounds, black hair.

DOB: 1919 — ✓D. F *DORTICOS Torrado, Francisco. Dean of the Medical School, University of Havana, and brother of the President of Cuba. AMTOIL-1 worked closely with him for six months in a Cienfuegos hospital and describes him as straightforward, honest, hard working, and one who avoids politics. His present post was forced upon him by his brother. He is married, and one of his sons is active in the Communist Youth. Age 47, height 5' 7", 180 pounds, grey-black hair.

DOB: c.1930 — ✓E. F *ROJAS Ochoa, Francisco. Director of National Statistics and member of the Communist Party of Cuba. He represented Cuba as a delegate to the World Health Scholarship in Mexico in 1965 and to a 1966 conference concerning sanitation in Washington, D.C. He was a university classmate of AMTOIL-1's. Age 35-36, 5' 4", 140 pounds, brown hair, balding.

cit: Brazil
DOB: c.1934 — F. X *Modesto (fnu). Instructor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. A Brazilian citizen resident in Cuba since 1961, Modesto is a fanatically anti-American Marxist who broadcasts to Brazil for Radio Havana. He swears he will participate in the violent overthrow of the Brazilian Government, once he returns from Cuba in 1967 via Mexico. He is married to a Cuban whose wealthy father lives in Mexico but travels frequently to Cuba. Age 30-35, 6', 200 pounds, black hair, mulatto. In AMTOIL-1's opinion, Modesto is a dangerous political fanatic, about whom the Brazilian authorities should be warned.

201-775411

[redacted]
DOB: c.1908
cit: Cuba — ✓G. FR <*Caligarcia, Jose. Director of the Department of Psychiatry of the University of Havana/Calixto Garcia Hospital.> Full professor. Attempts to ignore the realities of Cuban life but has been emotionally depressed by them. Age 58-60. Will stay in Cuba where he is assured of material comfort in return for being integrated with the regime.

DOB: c.1921 — ✓H. F *RODRIGUEZ Rivero, Alipio. Instructor of Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Fully

201-805766

5 6 11

integrated with the regime. His brother Luis is Director of the University of Havana Medical School. Aligio Rodriguez is ill; he underwent spinal fusion in East Germany in 1965. He is married and has one child. Age 35-40, 5' 7", 150 pounds, light mulatto.

B. C. 1934

I. VALDES Mier (fnu). Instructor of Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Valdes, a mulatto, is not a Communist but follows the dictates of the regime. Age 30-35, 5' 9", 150 pounds, black hair.

OB. 1931

J. CORNEJO, Carlos. Psychiatrist at the Matanzas Civil Hospital. Cornejo, a recent graduate, is apolitical and so happy with his 600-peso-a-month salary that he will stay in Cuba. He is a bachelor, age 35, 5' 7", 150 pounds, black hair.

OB: 1917

K. RODRIGUEZ, Anibal. Professor of the School of Psychology of the University of Havana Medical School. He is an opportunist, fully integrated with the regime. His brother is Mariano Rodriguez, the well known Cuban painter. Anibal is married and has several children. Age 49, 5' 6", 140 pounds, black hair.

OB: 1920

L. GONZALEZ Martin, Diego. Instructor in the School of Medical Psychology, University of Havana Medical School. He is married, a former journalist, and member of the Communist Party of Cuba. Age 46, 5' 7", 170 pounds, black hair.

DOB: c1928

M. BARRAL, Fernando. Psychiatrist of the Ministry of the Interior and former Instructor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana Medical School Calixto Garcia Hospital. A convinced Marxist-Leninist (and Castroite), he nevertheless was sharply critical of the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, since he is of Hungarian descent. He is currently the director of psychiatric treatment for personnel of the Ministry of the Interior. His clinic is at the corner of Avenida de los Presidentes and 19th Street, Havana, in the building formerly occupied by the Brazilian Embassy. Barral is a skilled and intelligent psychiatrist who is assisted in his work by Dr. Abilio DIAZ Abascal, a Communist. Barral is divorced from a Hungarian-born physician and is now married to a luxury-loving medical student many years his junior. Age 35-40, 5' 8", 150 pounds, brown hair.

~~[illegible]~~ ? [illegible]
DOB: c1928

201-340662

N. DIAZ Abascal, Abilio. A recently graduated psychiatrist, he is an assistant to Dr. Fernando Barral in the psychiatric department of a clinic in Havana for personnel of the Ministry of the Interior. He is ignorant and illogical, constantly bragging of revolutionary experiences with Castro in the mountains. Age 35-40, 5' 4", 140 pounds, blond hair.

DOB: c. 1918 201-112630

O. VILLA Landa, Florencio. Visiting professor at the Naval Hospital and the University of Oriente in Santiago de Cuba from September 1965 to June 1966. A life-long Communist, Florencio has a brother who is the physician for the Cuban Embassy in Madrid. Both brothers were born in Spain. Age 45-50, 5' 6", 140 pounds, black hair.

D.B. 1916 201-771754

P. ARAUJO, Leopoldo. President of the Cuban Psychiatrists' Association and Professor/Assistant Director of the Department of Medical Psychology, University of Havana Medical School. He is fully integrated with the regime but held important posts, such as head of the Psychiatrists' Association, under Batista as well. Araujo is married to Elsa Praderes, President of the Association of Cuban Psychologists. One of two or three daughters, Loipa ARAUJO Praderes, is with the Cuban National Ballet and married to a Russian-born ballet dancer. Age 50, height 5' 7", 160 pounds, black hair.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEVA-22,232

PJ 9 ff

DOB: 1916 201-022396

[redacted] Q. Bustamante, Jose Angel. Full professor and head of the Department of Medical Psychology of the University of Havana Medical School. He is fully integrated with the regime, but it is believed that he is not a member of the Communist Party of Cuba. Bustamante is materialistic and a political maneuverer who held important posts under Batista as well. He travels regularly. He is married to Maria Luisa Columbie, a professor of Spanish for the Ministry of Education, and they have one son about 25 years old. Age 50, 5' 6", 150 pounds, black hair.

Ernest P. Bybee
Ernest P. Bybee

for Floyd R. Miedema

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 7

CUBA

[illegible] TO, FROM CUBA [illegible] MEXICO -- [illegible] City, [illegible] [illegible] 1966

Following were among the Mexicans who returned to Mexico City from Havana on 4 September: Olga Campos Peon, Manuel [illegible], Yuri Socarras de Romero, Enrique Garza Trevino, Jesus [illegible] Garcia, Marta Lopez Portillo de Tamayo, Luisa Gomez [illegible], [illegible] Sandoval, and Juan M. Marigo [illegible] and his brother [illegible].

Luis Angel Ortiz Monasterio, Sergio Gonzalez Rodriguez, [illegible] Gonzalez Arroyo, [illegible] Bopejo, and Catalina Eibenschutz de [illegible] and his children Julia and Pablo left Mexico City for [illegible] on 4 September.

MEXICAN RESIDENTS UNION ELECTS NEW OFFICERS -- Havana, El Mundo, 30 August 1966

The Union of Mexican Residents in Cuba elected new officers. Chosen president was Humberto Espino-Barros Ramirez; other officers are Eduardo Canudas, Carlos Moyola, Miguel Kiriev and Amira Arubi de Costa.

CUBANS ATTEND CONGRESSES IN WESTERN EUROPE -- Havana, El Mundo, 30 August 1966

Leaving for Madrid were Cuban doctors Claudio Palacios, Angel Lopez Valles, Rafael Larragoiti, Jesus Suarez Ramos and Rene Yodu, who along with Cubans Leopoldo Araujo and Jose Angel Bustamante, who are already in Europe, will participate in the Fourth World Congress of Psychiatry, which will be held from 5 to 11 September.

Doctor Julio Martinez Paez left for France where he will attend the Tenth World Congress on Orthopedics and Traumatolgy from 4 to 9 September. He will join Doctor Rodrigo Alvarez who already is in Paris.

Cuban Doctor Ubaldo Farnot, a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology, will travel to Spain, Great Britain, Sweden, and Norway under a scholarship to widen his knowledge in his fields.

14-00000

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 9 22 38 Z CITE DIRECTOR - 34227

(REFERENCE NUMBER)

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

9 Sept 66

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO JMWAVE, FRANKFURT, GERMANY,

TYPIC MHAPRON

REF MADRID 9088 (IN 92840)

ABSTRACT X INDEX X

3P

1. TYPIC DESK TRACES SUBJS REF:

A. DR. JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMENTE O'LEARY HARD CORE COMMIE AT LEAST TWENTY YEARS AND DO NOT BELIEVE HE VULNERABLE ANY PITCH.

B. DR. LEOPOLDO ARAUJO (201-771754) WAS ONE OF DIRECTORS MEDICAL COLLEGE IN HAVANA AND ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL MEDICAL MEN CUBA. ~~ROSE TO THIS~~ POSITION OUT OF COMPARATIVE OBSCURITY. HE COMMIE OF LONG STANDING AND CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF TOP COMMIE PARTY MEMBERS IN LATIN AMERICA.

C. DR. LUIS YODU PREVEZ: ONLY TRACES SHOW HE TRAVELED CZECHOSLOVAKIA '61 AND '62.

D. DR. RAFAEL J. LARRAGOITI, BORN 9/8/12, MATANZAS, CUBA. GRADUATE UNIVERSITY HAVANA '40. '40 - '43 INTERNED CALIXTO GARCIA HOSPITAL. '43 - '46 RESIDENT IN DEPT NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASES UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL. TOOK POST GRADUATE TRAINING IN ILLINOIS AT

201-022396

9 Sept 66

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) Page 2. (REFERENCE NUMBER) CITE DIRECTOR 34227

TO

PSYCHIATRIC AND NEUROLOGICAL INSITITUTE WHERE ALSO STUDIED ELECTRO-ENCEPHALOGRAM. LICENSED PRACTICE CUBA. PSYCHIATRIST AT CASA DE SALUD, COVEDANGA FROM '48 TO DATE. WAS IN PRIVATE PRACTICE TEACHING UNIVERSITY HAVANA FROM 1943 TO 1946, PROFESSOR EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY AT MAZORRA HOSPITAL DE MENTES DE CUBA FROM 1945 TO AT LEAST 1963. MEMBER CUBAN PSYCHIATRIC SOCIETY. PUBLISHED ARTICLES IN THERAPEUTICAL DIA 1943 AND IN REVIEW MEDICAL CIRCULATION FOR CUBA 1945. ADDRESS CALLE 22 NUMBER 273 ALTO VEDADO, HAVANA.

E. DR JORGE LOPEZ VALDES PSYCHIATRIC SPECIALIST IN DEPENDIENTES DEL COMERCIO HOSPITAL. ONE TRACE LISTS JOSE LOPEZ VALDES SCHEDULED ATTEND SPECIAL TRAINING IN ORGANIC FUNCTIONS IN PSYCHIATRIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN USSR FOR TWO YEARS. INFO DTD OCT '63.

F. DR. GERARDO NOGUEIRA RIVERO BORN HAVANA 27 JAN '18. GRADUATED IN MEDICINE FROM UNIV HAVANA. DIRECTOR SANITARY UNIT MARIANAO '44 TO '47. WORKS IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY. WAS ASSISTANT CLINIC ANGEL ABELLI FOR CHILDREN. PODIATRIST. ALSO INVOLVED IN TROPICAL AND PARASITIC MEDICINE. BROTHER, AMGERM-1, TERMINATED JAN '64 FOR NON PRODUCTIVITY.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

DATE AND TIME FILED *Page 3.*

(REFERENCE NUMBER) CITE DIRECTOR *34227*

TO

G. NO, OR INSIGNIFICANT, TRACES ON REMAINING DRS.

2. UNLESS THERE IS INDICATION THAT ANY SPECIFIC MEMBERS SUSCEPTIBLE, DESIRE THAT APPROACHES BE LIMITED TO ONE MEMBER OF DELEGATION, PREFERABLY LARRAGOITI SINCE HE HAS AT LEAST BEEN EXPOSED TO THE U.S. PURPOSE OF PITCHING ONE DELEGATE, EVEN THOUGH COLD, IS TO HAVE OTHERS BECOME AWARE THAT RECRUITMENT AND/OR DEFECTION POSSIBLE.

SECRET

NOT:

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[redacted]

DISSEM BY 3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	TT	5	[illegible]
2		6	[illegible]
3	FI	7	[illegible]
4	FD	8	[illegible]

ACTION EUR 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/C 8, SB 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

6 Jun 65 IN 31453

S E C R E T 261143Z CITE MADRID 3294

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS JMWAVE

KEYWAY PBRUMEN MHAPRON

QUDOZE 30 MAY REPORTS ARAUJO (FNU) TRAVELING TO PRAGUE AS CUBAN DELEGATE TO CP CONGRESS. TRAVEL LIST SHOWS ONE LEOPOLDO ARAUJO BERNAL, CUBAN DIPLOMAT, LEFT MADRID FOR PARIS 1 JUNE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-771754

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Cuba	REPORT NO.	00-K-323/08240-66
List of Psychiatrists Who Have Attended Medical Congresses and Lectures in the Sino Soviet Bloc	DATE DISTR.	16 May 66
	NO. PAGES	2
	REFERENCES (356)	DCS Case 42491 Responsive to C-SI4-50555 (closed)
Apr 66 and earlier		
Cuba - Apr 66 and earlier		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

Cuban national, A 17 357 520, who arrived in the US on 14 Apr 66. He had been on the staff of the Mazorra Hospital in Havana for more than 25 years. This is one of several reports. Source specializes in psychiatry.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

The following Cuban psychiatrists have attended medical congresses and lectures on psychiatry in Sino Soviet Bloc and/or other countries:

a. Jose Angel Bustamante - USSR, Communist China and Italy. He has been a Communist for at least twenty years.

b. Leopoldo Araujo - USSR, Italy, Communist China. He is the current President of the Medical College in Havana.

c. Jose Galigarcia (nmu) - USSR, Communist China, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. He took an intensive course in psychiatry in East Germany.

d. Jorge Abdo Canasi - USSR, Communist China, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

e. Edmundo Gutierrez Agramonte- USSR, Spain, UK, Czechoslovakia.

f. Armando de Cordova (nmu) - USSR, Communist China, Czechoslovakia.

g. (fnu) Calvizu (nmu) - USSR, Spain, Czechoslovakia, UK.

h. Gerardo Nogueira (nmu) - USSR, Spain, Czechoslovakia, UK.

i. Margarita Prendes Varela - USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Communist China and other SovBloc countries.

54521

S-YES U-YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

[illegible] Bernal, Leopoldo Dr.

SCIENTIFIC

CURRENT DEVELOPMENT IN MEDICINE

[The following is a translation of the titles, authors and summaries of several articles which appeared in the Revista Cubana de Medicina, Vol. IV, No. 2, Havana, 30 April 1965. The pages are indicated before each title.]

13F

129 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY ON ITS LIMITS AND BASIC CONCEPTS(*)

By Dr. Leopoldo E. Araujo Bernal(*)

(*) Professor of Medical Psychology, School of Medical Services of the University of Havana. Director of the Department of Social Psychology of the Institute of Advanced Nervous Activity.

137 ELECTROCARDIOGRAPHICAL ALTERATIONS IN THE TRANSVENTRICULAR MITRAL COMMISSUROTOMY

By Dr. A. Hernandez Canero(*), Dr. M. Amoedo Mon(**) and Dr. J. Castillo Navarro(**)

(*) Professor of Internal Medicine, Head of the Cardiology Department of the Comandante Manuel Fajardo Training Hospital.

(**) Assistant Specialists, Department of Cardiology of the Comandante Manuel Farjardo Training Hospital.

142 CONCLUSIONS

1. The electrocardiograms corresponding to 33 cases of mitral stenosis operated transventricularly were studied.

2. The rhythm variations, as well as the favorable changes in the auricular and ventricular complex are those which, according to other authors, are present in patients operated transauricularly.

JPRS Sub No 33413 ; Date 20 DEC 65 16
Trans. on Cuba No. 341 ; UNCL

3. Many instances of pericardic injury were observed immediately after the operation. This injury is similar to that observed in patients [illegible] through the auricle.

4. We were able to observe a fast deviation of the QRS axis towards the left, accompanied by signs of left ventricular hypertrophy, which shows severe mitral insufficiency.

5. The possibility of myocardial infarction following the transventricular mitral dilatation is mentioned.

185

CHRONIC OBSTRUCTIVE EMPHYSEMA(*)
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

By Dr. Alberto Orlandini N.(**)

(*) Presented before the First Regional Congress on Stomatology of Southern Oriente, on 29 October 1964.

(**) Resident of the Psychiatric Service, Provincial Training Hospital of Santiago de Cuba.

187

SUMMARY

The chronic obstructive emphysema with breathing insufficiency of the fourth degree originates first delirium, and then catatonic stupor. The phychic disturbances following the changes of consciousness are described.

188

CARDIOVASCULAR ASPECTS OF SICKLAEMIA(*)

By Dr. Jose Cabrera Flores(**) and
Dr. Hugo Camargo Gallegos(**)

(*) Presented before the First Regional Congress on Stomatology of Southern Oriente. Santiago de Cuba, October 1964.

(**) Dr. Enrique Cabrera Cosio Cardiovascular Department. Provincial Hospital of Santiago de Cuba.

190

CONCLUSIONS

After studying eight patients with Sicklaemia, the most important observation has been the enlargement of the electric systole shown by the electrocardiograms. This is to be confirmed in subsequent studies. Other observations are the presence of the Heglin syndrome in the two cases presenting the lowest hemoglobin level, the evolution with normal cardiac rhythm in most cases. This phenomenon is present in the evolution of chronic anemic syndromes and has not been fully explained yet.

14-00000

14

[illegible] which will represent Cuba at the conference of peoples consists of [illegible] (2[illegible] January 1962) in Havana as a reply to Punta del Este Conference)

Jo[illegible] [illegible]O	University Rector
[illegible]	Peace Movement
[illegible]	Peace Movement
[illegible]	Union of Writers
Dr. [illegible], [illegible]on Alvarez	CTC Foreign Affairs
[illegible]	FEU
Vilma [illegible]	FMC
Joel [illegible]	AJR
Pedro [illegible]	ANAP
Leopoldo [illegible]	National Medical College
Jose LOPEZ Sanchez	P/Medical Confederation
Ramon CALCINES	ORI Nat. Administration
Emilio ARAGONES	ORI Nat. Administration
Jose MATA	Committees for Defense of the Revolution
Jesus VALDES Garcia	Tourists

SO: FBIS, 22 January 1962, OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational/AMOT
Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 20354

Subject has been assigned 201-771754.

CHESTER D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - JMWAVE

~~CS COPY~~

201-771754

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER **UFGW-5000**	DATE 25 MAR 1965
	CLASSIFICATION **S-E-C-R-E-T**	HQS FILE NUMBER **201-771754**

ORIGINATING

OFFICE			EXT.
WH/C/RR/OSOA	M. Simmons db	24 Mar 65	7646

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/RR/OSOA	24/3/65	J. Moughan
WH/C/MO/FI	24 Mar	S. Darling

1 - WH/C/RR/OSOA
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - 201-771754

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	25 Mar 65	Desmond Fitzgerald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

MAR 15 5 PM '65

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WHSAESC			18 MAR 65	QN
2.				
3. Mel WH/C/RR/OS/CA		24 Mar 65		MH
4.				
5. WH/C/MO/FI		26 MAR 1965	26	29 [illegible] 1965
6.				
7. WH/C/FI/TC				
8.				
9. WH/C/RR/OS/[illegible]			30.III.65 21 [illegible]	
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.		12 H 82	10	34
17. RID/FI			RID/SC	

Copy Detached

See para 6 above re Field [illegible]
UFGW 5000

MICROFILMED
MAR 18 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-771754

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
12 Mar 65

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFGA 20354

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMP-LISHED
Y	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMOT
Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal (201-)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-771754

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 5

REFERENCE: UFGA-18378, 4 November

1. Forwarded herewith are Parts I and II of an AMOT Defection-in-Place Form on Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical Association. Part I contains biographic data on the Source, Alberto Antonio del CASTILLO Guerra (A 12-481-172), a friend of Subject's since 1949; Part II provides background data and an assessment of Subject.

2. Attached to the Defection Form are AMOT traces on Subject covering the period September-December 1964; AMOT traces dating prior to September 1964 were included with the report forwarded in referenced dispatch.

3. No identifiable traces were found in JMWAVE on the Source, Alberto Antonio del CASTILLO Guerra. There is voluminous information in Station files on Subject, all available to Headquarters.

4. In view of Source's assessment of Subject as a Communist sympathizer and a follower of the regime, which is corroborated by other information available on Subject, we plan to take no further action on this case at the present time and are forwarding the attached form for the record only.

5. It is requested that Subject be assigned a 201 number and that the individuals appearing in the attachment be carded as marked to Subject's 201 file.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachment:
Defection Form (Parts I & II), h/w

201-771754

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA, w/2 cys att.

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
10 Mar. 65	MAR 12 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-20354

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-

1 att

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

111 ATT. T. UFGA-20354

SECRET

TO: AMOT-2 HH-2753.

FROM: AMDIAL-2 23 Feb 65.

SUBJECT: Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical Association. Case No. 237.

DEBRIEFERS: AMCHEER-1 & ANTONIO PORTUONDO LARRIEU

Attached herewith is Part I of the Defection Form giving biographic data on Dr. Alberto Antonio del CASTILLO Guerra, who has been Subject's friend since 1949.

(No file traces on this person.)

MICROFILMED
MAR 18 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

att #1 UFGA 20354 [illegible] 201-771754

HB-2753.

No: 237.

Date: 23 Feb 65.

PART I

1. Name: Alberto Antonio del CASTILLO Guerra. Cl Cuba occ medical
(give complete name, including both patronymic and matronymic)

2. Immigration ~~No.:~~ INS # A-12 481 172 (U.S. resident).

3. List any and all nicknames, aliases and war names ever used.
aka "Castillito" (nickname).

Close friend and source of info on
Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Grenal 201-771754
Transmittal of Bio data

4. Date and place of birth: DPOB 20 April 1922, Havana. Cuba
his A for Birth
A 585 SW 13th [illegible] Miami, Fla USA

5. Name of spouse (wife or husband): Carmen Rafaela RUIZ Suárez.
(give both patronymic and matronymic for all names requested)
(Divorced from his 1st wife, Raquel CRUZ Flores.)

6. Date and place of birth of spouse: Cit Cuba?
17 July 1935, Bayamón, Puerto Rico. Sex F

7. Children: (list by name, date and place of birth)
(None by his present wife. The following by his first wife: friend of
a. Alberto del CASTILLO Cruz. Born 17 May 57 in Havana. Dr. Leopoldo
b. Roberto del CASTILLO Cruz. Born 29 Dec 58 in Havana. Araujo Grenal
c. (No others.) 201-771754 00
d.
e.
f.

8. Father: (give name, date and place of birth)
José del CASTILLO Avilés. Born in 1884 in Santiago de Cuba, Oriente province. Died in 1948 when he was 64 years old.

9. Present address of father: (if deceased, write "deceased")
Deceased.

10. Mother: (give name, date and place of birth)
Bárbara María GUERRA Hanson. Born on 4 Dec 1900 in Sagua la Grande, Las Villas province.

11. Present address of mother: (if deceased, write "deceased")
Deceased.

List all brothers and sisters, giving date and place of birth and present address:

a. **(None.)**

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

13. What is the date of your arrival in the United States?

1 January 1962.

14. How did you arrive--via PAA, boat, via another country? Give briefly any pertinent details.

Via Spain. Arrived in the U.S. in New York.

15. What is your present address and how long have you lived at this address?

585 SW 13th Ave., Apt. 4, Miami, Fla., phone FR-1-1058.

16. Where are you employed and what is your job title? **Practices medicine clandestinely among old patients and friends. Receives some money from Spain. Trying to enter the USAF as a medical doctor.**

17. How long have you had this employment?

Since I arrived in the U.S.

18. List your employment in Cuba, giving addresses and dates. (approximate if you are not sure of dates)

Medical doctor in the Cuban Air Force (1956-1959). Doctor in the "Sagrado Corazón de Jesús" Clinic in Vedado section, City of Havana (1954-59), and in the "Hijas de Galicia" Clinic, City of Havana (1954-59). Professor of Medical Clinic Pharmacology in the School of Medicine of Havana University.

19. List your affiliations with any and all Cuban political parties, and indicate whether you were merely a member or whether you were active and/or held some office--give dates.

"Partido Acción Unitaria" (pro-Batista). Formerly affiliated with the "Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico)" as a rank-and-file member.

EE-2753, Case No. 23 - 23 Feb 65 (cont.)

20. If you have or ever have had any citizenship other than Cuban, so indicate, giving dates and other pertinent details.

No.

21. List your travel outside of Cuba, giving dates and purposes of such travel.

To the U.S. on vacation more than 5 times since childhood. In 1961, already an exile, to Spain, France and Italy.

22. List any membership in professional and/or social organizations.

Aerospace Medical Association. Cuban National Medical Association and Havana Medical Association. Cuban Endocrinology Society.

23. List your educational background, giving the names and locations of the schools attended and listing any degrees received.

Grammar school and high school in "Colegio de la Salle," Vedado section, City of Havana. Graduated as a medical doctor in Havana University. Aviation Medicine on 4 Apr 58, Texas, U.S.A.

24. List any languages spoken besides Spanish and estimate your fluency in reading, writing and speaking as poor, fair, good or excellent, as indicated.

Language	Reading	Writing	Speaking
English	**excellent**	**excellent**	**excellent**
French	**good**	**fair**	**fair**
Italian	**good**	**poor**	**poor**
German	**fair**	**poor**	**poor**

SECRET

TO: AMOT-2 EB-2753.

FROM: AMDIAL-2 23 Feb 65.

SUBJECT: Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical Association. Case No. 237.

DEBRIEFERS: AMCHEER-1 + ANTONIO PORTUONDO LARRIEU

Attached herewith is Part II of the Defection Form giving biographic data on Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical Association.

SECRET

SECRET

PART II. EE-2753, 23 Feb 65, Case No. 237.

1. Identify by name your relative (or very close friend) in Cuba who holds an important position in the Communist Party and/or with the Castro regime or in the Cuban Armed Forces.

   Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal.

2. What is the relationship--brother, son, first cousin, etc.; if a close friend, how well do you know him, for how long (give sufficient details)?

   Professional friends and associates (shared the same medical office). 1949-53.

3. List the position he holds with the Castro regime, the Communist Party, and/or the Armed Forces; list his place of employment or assignment. If possible, give the date or approximate date when this individual took this position or office.

   President of the National Medical Association.

4. Date and place of birth: Born circa 1920 (POB unknown).

5. What is his address and phone number (give both official or business and residence listings):

   Unknown.

6. What is the name of his spouse: (give both patronymic & matronymic)

   Unknown.

7. List his children by name, date and place of birth:

   I know he has a son, but I don't remember anything else.

8. Identify his father and mother by name (include patronymic and matronymic), date and place of birth, and present address. If deceased, write "deceased" instead of address.

   I don't know.

9. Identify his brothers and sisters: (give all possible details)

   I don't know.

SECRET

PART II (cont.) (EE-2753, 23 Feb 65, Case No. 237)

10. List any comments or actions taken by the above individual indicative of his loyalty or lack of loyalty to the Communist Party and/or the Castro regime. List any incidents possibly indicative of any disaffection or disillusionment with the Party or the regime.

    In mid-1961, we had a discussion about the Soviet Exhibition in Havana and he praised Soviet medicine, criticized Americans and expressed himself in favor of all the measures of the regime, justifying everything the Castro regime and the USSR did. (Source could not be more specific.)

11. Present political militancy: Sympathizer of the regime & Marxism.

12. Past militancy: Leftist intellectual.

13. Describe this individual—age, height, color of hair, eyes, weight, complexion; list any obvious physical handicaps, scars, peculiarities, distinctive mannerisms, etc.

    White, dark complexion, slender, 5'9" tall, brown eyes, dark brown hair. Usually wore dark glasses.

14. What is his educational background? List the schools he attended and any degrees he has received.

    Doctor in Medicine. Havana University graduate (I don't know when.) No further details known.

15. List any travel this individual has made outside Cuba.

    I don't know.

16. Does he speak any languages other than Spanish? Name and estimate his degree of fluency in each.

    I don't know.

17. Are you in contact with this person by mail, telephone, or any other way? How often do you communicate?

    No.

18. Do you have and may we see some of the letters you have received from him?

Part II (cont.) (EE-2753, 23 Feb 65, Case No. 237)

19. List his close friends in Cuba, particularly those holding high positions in the Government or the Communist Party, and give their positions if you know them.
I don't know.

20. List, with brief background and biographic data, plus your personal assessment, any individual in Cuba who might be willing to act as a go-between to contact this person, such as a relative, a close friend, a mistress, a working associate, etc.

I don't know.

21. If you are not on friendly terms with this individual, list any incidents or individuals in his life or background which might be used to pressure him. (Give all pertinent details.)
I don't know any such incidents.

a. Has he ever been involved in an assassination or assassination attempt?
Not to my knowledge.

b. Has he ever committed any act of violence such as murder?
Not to my knowledge.

c. Has he ever been involved in any embezzlements, misuse of public or private funds, etc.
Not to my knowledge.

d. Does he have a mistress or mistresses? Can you identify?
Not to my knowledge.

SECRET

TO: C-300.

FROM: C-94.

HB-2753.

23 Feb 65.

SUBJECT: Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the National Medical Association. Case No. 237.

DEBRIEFERS: C-90 and P-124.

Attached herewith are file traces on Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical Association.

SECRET

SECRET

Report # EE 2753 FEB 23 1965

TO: AMOT-2

FROM: ARCHIVE

SUBJECT: File traces requested on:

ARAUJO Bernal, Dr. Leopoldo

FILE DATA:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo

Information on this person was submitted in Report # EE-1970, of 15 October 1964 (UFGA-18378, 4 Nov 1964)

REF DATA:

ARAUJO, Leopoldo

President of the National Medical Association and Communist during many years.
SOURCE: Request of file traces AMOT-2, 12 Aug 64.

Medical doctor. President of the National Medical Association. Will take part in a Seminary on the Blood Banks, to be held at Havana in the current month, organized by the Ministry of Public Health. It will be held in the Medical Association Building.
SOURCE: REVOLUCION Newspaper, 5 Sep 64, page 2.

Medical doctor. President of the National Medical Association. Attended a lunch offered in the Restaurant "Rio Cristal" at Havana, by the Ministry of Public Health, as homage to the 247 new Physicians graduated at the University of Havana.
SOURCE: LA TARDE Newspaper, 10 Sep 64, page 5.

President of the National Medical Association. Attended the act of graduation of 250 new doctors in the Theater of the CTC, Havana, to which attended and spoke the Prime Minister.
SOURCE: REVOLUCION Newspaper, 11 Sep 64, page 2.

President of the National Medical Association. In the Presidential stand during the graduation of the 247 new physicians at the CTC Theater, on the 10th of September (Thursday).
SOURCE: BOHEMIA Magazine, 18 Sep 64, page 64.

Member of the National Medical Association. Attended the celebration of the Centennial of the International, held at the Medical Association, Havana.
SOURCE: REVOLUCION Newspaper, 22 Sep 64, page 3.

Report # EE 2753

FEB 23 196

ARAUJO Bernal, Dr. Leopoldo

ARAUJO, Leopoldo (continued)

Medical doctor. President of the National Medical Association. Attended to day the inauguration of the First Seminary on Blood Banks and Transfusions, which will last two days, meeting at the Medical Association of Havana.
SOURCE: LA TARDE Newspaper, 24 Sep 64, page 1.

Medical Doctor. In the Presidential stand of an act as homage of the birth of the Cuban scientist Carlos Finlay, and the Day of the American Medicine, held in the Central Military Hospital.
SOURCE: REVOLUCION, 4 Dec 64, page 2.

President of the National Medical Association.
SOURCE: HOY Newspaper, 4 Dec 64, page 5.

Physician and Surgeon. Attended last night the commemorative acts to celebrate the 67 Anniversary of the foundation of the Hospital "General Calixto Garcia".
SOURCE: EL MUNDO Newspaper, 6 Dec 64, page 8.

President of the National Medical Association. Attended yesterday the act of presentation of Professor André VOISON.
SOURCE: EL MUNDO Newspaper, 9 Dec 64, page 2.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

TO: Chief of Station, [illegible]

INFO: Deputy Chief, [illegible], Chief, [illegible]

FROM: Chief of Station, [illegible]

SUBJECT: Operational/[illegible]
Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical School

ACTION REQUIRED: See para. 5

REFERENCE: [illegible]-17,392, 12 June 1964

201-67991

1. The following information on Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, Subject of Reference, was obtained by [illegible]-1, a member of the AMOT Group, from an interview with Dra. Leonor [illegible] Borja, who said that she knew ARAUJO well. Source is a medical doctor, currently residing in Miami as an exile. Her first husband, Orestes Ignacio [illegible], aka "Ignacio" and "Alcantara," was a member of the Communist Party's central cell in Cuba.

2. Source reports that Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal was born about 1914 in San Diego de los Banos, Pinar del Rio Province, Cuba. He lived at 12 Calle [illegible] in Habana. Source describes him as white, with a pale complexion, slender, about 5'10" tall, straight brown hair cut short with some grey. He is nearsighted and wears glasses. ARAUJO graduated from the University of Habana School of Medicine in 1937 or 1938 and is a specialist in respiratory diseases. He decided to enter this field after he had tuberculosis.

3. Subject's first wife was [illegible] CARCUANA, a rank and file Communist. She was a teacher and had been married before to a Spaniard who was one of the organizers of the Communist Party of Cuba. ARAUJO had two daughters, [illegible] ARAUJO Carcuana, born circa 1945, who is a ballerina in Alicia ALONSO's ballet and also a Communist, and another younger daughter whose name source does not remember. Around 1957 ARAUJO married again. His second wife was a physical education teacher but source could give no further information about her.

Attachments:
AMOT traces on Subj., h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Madrid, w/att. - To out Pouch
2 - DC/WH/SA, w/att.
2 - C/WE, w/att.

CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 29 Oct. 64

DATE DISPATCHED: [illegible] 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-1837[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

INDEX

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-15378

4. ARAUJO grew up with Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE O'Leary, old-guard Cuban Communist, and was active in many Communist, leftist, and revolutionary organizations in Cuba. During his days as a medical student ARAUJO was a member of the left wing student group and belonged to an organization called "Cuban Anti-Imperialist League" (Liga Anti-Imperialista de Cuba), together with Aureliano [illegible] Franco, Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE O'Leary, Juan [illegible] Vicaurreta, Ruben de LEON, Anibal ESCALANTE, Ruben MARTINEZ Villena, Raul ROA, and Julio Antonio MELLA. During the Spanish Civil War Subject collected money to help the Communist faction of the Republican side but he did not go to Spain to fight. Around 1933 he began working in the Ministry of Labor as a labor inspector. About 1935, at the time of the March strike, ARAUJO and Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE O'Leary, with others, organized the "Frente Unico de Empleados Publicos." Source states that about this time ARAUJO became a militant Communist Party member. In 1940 ARAUJO was a member of the Cuban Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular) cell in the National Medical Association which the Party had organized in an attempt to seize control of the leadership of the National Medical Association. In 1951 Subject was closely connected with Dr. Romulo BETANCOURT, then president of Venezuela, and with Juan BOSCH. ARAUJO had maintained contact with BOSCH since 1935.

5. Attached for your information is a copy of [illegible] file trace on Subject.

6. Reference does not indicate whether the source of the information in referenced dispatch was one of the [illegible]s stationed in Habana or a Cuban refugee who recently arrived in Madrid. If the latter, and the refugee is planning to come to the U.S., [illegible] would like to be advised of the date of the refugee's departure in order to debrief him.

7. A sterilized version of the above information on ARAUJO may be passed to the [illegible]s.

ANDREW K. [illegible]

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION [illegible]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

H/

47-1970

Date: October 1', 1964.-

FOR: [redacted] AMAT-2

FROM: ARCHIVE

SUBJECT: Report about all file traces appearing in this Archive in connection with your request on the following:

ARAUJO Leopoldo

FILE TRACES:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo

Promoter of the "Comité Pro-Liberación de Nicaragua" (Committee for the Liberation of the Republic of Nicaragua).-
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - 7/22/59.-

Doctor.- General Secretary of the Pan-American Medical Congress.- He requests from the subsidiary associations their sending cablegram to the President of the United States expressing their protest for the air-raid over the City of Havana.
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - 10/27/59.

In connection with Justo CARRILLO and in the company of José Angel BUSTAMANTE and Jorge QUINTANA he suggests statements supporting the Government.
Ref.: "Bohemia" Magazine, part named "Sección en Cuba" (Cuban Sectio edition of the 10th. of July, 1960, Page 61.-

Doctor.- Office Manager of "Administración de los Departamentos de Orientación y Rehabilitación de Menores" (Management of Departments for the Orientation and Readjustment of Minors). In an article appearing in the Magazine "Bohemia" he explains about the operation of the Readjustment Program for Minor Male Boys at Torrens.-
Ref.: Magazine "Bohemia", edition of the 31st. day of July, 1960, Pa

Vice-President of the Medical College.- Member of the Delegation of Cuban Physicians arriving at Santiago de Chile.
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - edition of 12/10/60.

Doctor.- Director of "Prevención de Bienestar Social" (Prevention of Social Welfare).- Member of "P.S.P". (Popular Socialist Party)
Ref.: José PAZ Novás - January 17, 1961.-

Physician.- Communist.- Informer of the G-2 (Secret Police)
Ref.: [redacted] - February 25, 1961.-
AMC-11

Arrived to Mexico on December 19/61.- Ref.: 001143.- Sheet No. C0102
Ref.: "Amigos" Passenger List.-

Doctor.- Professor of Medical Psychology of the University of Havana
Salary $409.66.-
Ref.: CC-32.-

CS COPY

SUBJECT: Report about all file traces appearing in this Archive in connection with your request on the following:

ARAUJO Leopoldo

FILE TRACES:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo (continued)

Leader of the Medical College. Visits "Granjas del Pueblo" (People's Granges).- Ref.: Newspaper "Revolución" - January 10, 1962, Page 2.-

Doctor.- Head of the "Departamento de Psicología Social del Instituto de Investigaciones de la Actividad Nerviosa Superior" (Department of Social Psychology of the Research Institute engaged in the top level Nervous Activity) which is located at No. 37 Lo[illegible] Street, Alturas del Vodado Residential Section.-
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - December 9, 1962, Page 3.-

In the presidency of the opening event of the X National Medical Congress held in the "Habana Libre" Hotel on the 17th. day of ___, 1963.-
Ref.: S/N - Agent AMDIAL-2 [redacted] - March 12, 1963.-

He was in the presidency of the closing event of the X National Medical Congress held on the 24th. day of the month of February, 1963 in the "Chaplin" Theater, in which event Fidel CASTRO delivered the closing speech.-
Ref.: S/N - Agent AMDIAL-2 [redacted] - March 12, 1963.-

Doctor.- Member of the "Instituto de Investigaciones de la Actividad Nerviosa Superior" (Research Institute for the top level nervous activity) and forming part of the Medical Psychology Department of the University of Havana.- Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - March 17, 1963 - Página 3.-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- He heads a meeting in which it is informed that the goal aimed at in connection with 400 physicians taking part in the events of the 1st. of May, has been surpassed.
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo", edition of the 24th. of April, 1963, Page

Doctor.- Communist Professor of the Medical Psychology Faculty of the University of Havana.- Appointed in accordance to paragraph 20/62.- Monthly Salary $409.66.-
Ref.: Report CC-95 - April 26, 1963 (Agent AMOT-131 [redacted]).-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- He takes part in

OCT 15 1964

ARAUJO Leopoldo

FILE TRACES:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo (continued)

the 1st. of May Parade in the company of the Socialist Physicians.-
Ref.: Newspaper "Revolución", edition of the 2nd. day of May, 1963,
Page 5.-

White Race.- Older than 45 years old. Domiciled in Cuba at No. 1010 Forty First Street, Nuevo Vedado Residential Section.- It is understood that at present he is in the United States. He belongs to the Medical Profession. He belonged to the Staff of the "Centro Benéfico Jurídico de Trabajadores de Cuba" (a Hospital catering to workers) which Hospital belongs to the "Partido Comunista" (Communist Party). He was on record in the "B.R.A.C." (Bureau for Reprisals again Communist Activities).--
Ref.: Report No. CC-124 - Agent (AMOT-14) - May 7, 1963.-

Travels Habana - Mexico on 6/21/63.- Passport 62-631.- Diplomat.-
Ref.: "Amigos" Passenger List.-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College and Professor of the Medical School of the University of Havana.-
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - February 20, 1964.- Page 5.-

President of the National Managing Committee of the National Medical College.-
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 3, 1964 - Page 8.-

Doctor.- He was in the presidency of an event held at the "Instituto de Ciencias Básicas y Pre-Clínicas "Victoria de Girón" ("Victoria de Girón (Giron Victory) Institute for Basic and Pre-Medical Sciences), where on the 11th. of March a homage was offered to Dr. Enrique CABRERA, a Mexican Physician who died in Moskow.-
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 12/964.-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- When the remains of the Cuban Physician, Dr. Tomas Romay, were moved from the Colon Cemetery to a special crypt in the "Museo Histórico de Ciencias Médicas" (Medical Sciences History Museum), he took part in a honor guard beside such remains.
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 31st., 1964 - Page 1

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- Yesterday at night he received a group of visiting Soviet Physicians in the premise of the National Medical College.- Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - April 22, 1964.- Page 5.-

OCT 15 1964

ARAUJO Leopoldo

FILE TRACES:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo (continued)

the 1st. of May Parade in the company of the Socialist Physicians.- Ref.: Newspaper "Revolución", edition of the 2nd. day of May, 1963, Page 5.-

White Race.- Older than 45 years old. Domiciled in Cuba at No. 1010 Forty First Street, Nuevo Vedado Residential Section.- It is understood that at present he is in the United States. He belongs to the Medical Profession. He belonged to the Staff of the "Centro Benéfico Jurídico de Trabajadores de Cuba" (a Hospital catering to workers) which Hospital belongs to the "Partido Comunista" (Communist Party). He was on record in the "B.R.A.C." (Bureau for Reprisals again Communist Activities).--
Ref.: Report No. CC-124 - Agent (AMOT-14) - May 7, 1963.-

Travels Habana - Mexico on 6/21/63.- Passport 62-631.- Diplomat.-
Ref.: "[illegible]" Passenger List.-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College and Professor of the Medical School of the University of Havana.-
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - February 20, 1964.- Page 5.-

President of the National Managing Committee of the National Medical College.-
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 3, 1964 - Page 8.-

Doctor.- He was in the presidency of an event held at the "Instituto de Ciencias Básicas y Pre-Clínicas "Victoria de Girón" ("Victoria de Girón (Giron Victory) Institute for Basic and Pre-Medical Sciences), where on the 11th. of March a homage was offered to Dr. Enrique CABRERA, a Mexican Physician who died in Moskow.-
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 12/964.-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- When the remains of the Cuban Physician, Dr. Tomas Romay, were moved from the Colon Cemetery to a special crypt in the "Museo Histórico de Ciencias Médicas" (Medical Sciences History Museum), he took part in a honor guard beside such remains.
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 31st., 1964 - Page 1

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- Yesterday at night he received a group of visiting Soviet Physicians in the premise of the National Medical College.- Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - April 22, 1964.- Page 5.-

ARAUJO Leopoldo OCT 15 1964

FILE TRACES:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo E.

President "P.S.E." (could be by Special Substitution) of the National Medical College. He appears signing Resolutions Appointing and/or Dismissing several Physicians.
Ref.: Official Gazette No. 40 of February 27, 1962, Page 2542.

Departed from Mexico on April 9/1962.- Diplomatic Visa.- Ref.: 1675 Sheet No. 2056.-
Ref.: "Amigos" Passenger List.-

As President "P.S.E." (could be by Special Substitution) he signed minutes of the National Medical College.
Ref.: Official Gazette No. 156, Section First, edition of August 14,1962.

Doctor.- Belonging to the "Instituto de Investigaciones de la Actividad Nerviosa Superior" (Research Institute of the Top Level Nervous Activity) of the University of Havana.
Ref.: "Bohemia" magazine - February 8/1963 - Page 99.-

President "P. S. R." (by substitution determined in the Charter) of the National Medical College.
Ref.: Official Gazette No. 102 - September 20, 1963 - Page 9477.-

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

La Habana,
5 de Octubre
de 1964 "AÑO DE
LA ECONOMIA"

COLEGIO MEDICO NACIONAL
Calle 23 No. 201
esq. a N, 3er. piso,
Vedado, La Habana.

Pizarra: 32-9551

Dr. Leopoldo Araujo Bernal, Presidente	C
Dr. Rubén Rodríguez Gavaldó, Secretario General	C
Dr. Daniel Alonso Menéndez, Tesorero	C
Sr. Lucas Escalante Bravo, Contador del Comité Ejecutivo	C
Dr. Ramón Granados Navarro, Vice-Presidente	C
Dr. Alfredo Gómez Sampera, Vice-Secretario	C
Dr. Genaro Suárez Suárez, Vice-Tesorero	C
Comp. Clara Cos, Jefe de Despacho	

INDEX: YES ☑ NO ☐
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

15-9-11

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : SANTIAGO
ACTION: WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, RI/AN, SAS 8, S/C 2.

Index-X (HZP) (UFG)

S E C R E T 251552Z IN48053

DIR INFO MEXI WAVE CITE SAGO 564

26 JUN 1963
AND COPIES MATCHED

EMBRIAR-7 REPORTED THE FOL CUBANS ARR SAGO 24 JUNE VIA CPA FROM MEXI: LEOPOLDO ARAUJO BERNAL DPOB 9 JUNE 12, PINAR DEL RIO, CUBA; occ: MED DOCTOR DIPL PP D/66/531 TO ATTEND PANAMERICAN MEDICAL CONFERENCE; JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY DPOB 8 JAN 11 CUBA, occ MEDICAL DOCTOR DIPL PP D/62/532 PRESIDENT OF PANAMERICAN MEDICAL DELEGATION; ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ MANZANO DPOB 21 MAR 42 CUBA, occ EMPLOYEE INRA SPECIAL PP E-63-347; BARTOLOME SOLIS OLIVA DPOB 5 FEB 13 CUBA, occ EMPLOYEE INRA SPECIAL PP E-63-348. INDEX.

S E C R E T

RI COPY

MIS: Add to info on all four:
CIT: CUBA
Subj among Cubans who arrived Santiago, Chile 24 June 63 from Mexico

ROUTING	INITIALS
FI/D/AN	E.R.
RI/...	
FI/D/FI	

INDEX

ZZ PROCESSED
June 63

15-9-11
26 June 63

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

[illegible] HAVANA--A delegation of five Cuban physicians, presided over by the vice president of the national committee of the Academy of Sciences, Jose Lopez Sanchez, left yesterday morning for Bolivia, where it will take part in the special general assembly of the pan-American medical confederation in La Paz on 28 and 29 June. The remaining members of the delegation are Leopoldo Araujo, the president of the national medical college, Pedro [illegible], the director of the school of medicine of Havana University, Feliciano Bunch, of the staff of the national medical college, and Jose Angel Bustamante, president of the executive committee of the pan-American medical confederation. Leaving Mexico are the ambassador of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosko Vidakovic, and the Cuban manager of the Royal Dutch Airlines, Paul Boecke. (Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish to Latin America 0115 GMT 24 June 1963--E) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

CUBAN DOCTORS--The Cuban doctors taking part in the special congress of the pan-American medical confederation in La Paz, Leopoldo Araujo Bernal and Jose Abel Bustamante, were received by Chilean presidential candidate Salvador Allende during their brief stopover in Santiago de Chile on their way to Bolivia. (Havana Spanish Americas 1100 GMT 26 June 1963--E) ...

SECRET

SUBJECT: ARAUJO Bernal, Leopaldo

SOURCE: Passport D/62/631

DATE: Nov 62

PROCESSED INTO WH/C CICS PHOTO FILE 15 Oct 65
as #501

ADDITIONAL COPIES AVAILABLE IN WH/C CICS ROOM

GH 5510 EXT. 4955.



SECRET

201-771754

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side of form. Type or print. Guide for use of 201 system is contained in CSHB 70-1-1. Chapter III. Annex B.

TO: RID/201 Section

TUBE STATION: DW6

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CANCEL ☐

FROM: NAME

BRANCH

ROOM NO.

PHONE

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO.

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)*

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

10. NAME VARIATIONS

TYPE NAME	*(Last)*	*(First)*	*(Middle)*

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

CODE

16. ORGANIZATION OR INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION

CODE

17. OCCUPATION *(Clear text)*

CODE

18. ACTION DESK

CODE

19. SECONDARY DESK

CODE

20. CRYPTONYM

HARD CARRY IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE

21. COMMENTS

[illegible]

[illegible]

22. SIGNATURE

23. IDN-

201- [illegible]

SECRET

(36)

FORM 11-62 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

LX 320

16 May 1963

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM OF CONTACT

05

SUBJECT : Jose Antonio CASAS Rodriguez (201-327702)

DATE OF CONTACT : 2 May 1963 (2000 to 2345 Hours);
4 May 1963 (0900 to 1300 Hours).

1. On 1 May 1963 I travelled to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and attempted to contact Subject at his home at 216 Cumberland Street 010 at 1930 hours. Subject's son answered the door and advised that his father was out for the evening and wasn't expected to return till 2200 hours. At 2200 hours I returned to Subject's home to be advised that he had not yet returned but was expected momentarily. In view of the late hour, I requested the son tell his father that a representative of the United States Government had called and wished to speak to him on matters pertaining to the situation in Cuba. I indicated I would return about 2000 hours on 2 May.

2. At 2000 hours on 2 May I called at Subject's home and found him present. He was friendly and courteous, requesting that I come into the home where I was introduced to his wife and several of his six children. He requested to see my KUBARK identification which he gave only a cursory glance before returning to me. He then indicated his complete willingness to supply any information known to him on the Cuban situation and personalities.

3. Subject and his wife make an excellent impression. They proceeded to put me at ease, offered coffee, and generally showed themselves to be excellent extroverted hosts. The subsequent conversation lasted until approximately 2345 hours and was somewhat general in nature. Basically we rehashed information already provided by Subject during his debriefing by U. S. authorities in Miami and already reflected in his 201 file. Subject was rather difficult to debrief in that his English is somewhat fractured and he is extremely disorganized in his thoughts. He has a tendency to develop one theme which in turn will remind him

COPY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-334088

3/Rs

of a second, also of interest, which he will proceed to discuss to the confusion of the first. This problem was perhaps compounded by the fact that Subject was uncertain as to the type of information of interest to KUBARK. He grasped quickly, however, the type of information which would be of most interest to us and it rapidly became less difficult to get to the meat of the subject we were discussing. Further contact and debriefing of him will become progressively less difficult.

4. We are consolidating the information obtained from Subject from our two meetings with him on 2 and 4 May below for reporting convenience.

5. Basically Subject is able to supply specific information of interest on only five personalities. He knows and was acquainted with many other personalities in the Cuban government, but his relationship with them is not close enough to enable him to provide information in sufficient detail or depth to allow valid assessment as to their susceptibility to a recruitment or other operational approach.

6. Information on five Cuban government officials, well known to Subject is set forth below:

a. Esubio AZCUE, born about 1912, is presently employed as a consul at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. AZCUE is a long time friend of Subject. They met during the mid-1950's when both were involved in revolutionary activities attempting to bring about a democratic socialist regime in Cuba. AZCUE is married to a Spanish woman and was involved in the Spanish revolution. He was a very close friend of Manolo CASTRO who was reportedly murdered by a group of Communist left wing revolutionaries which included Fidel CASTRO. About 1952 AZCUE was living in France and is believed to have been arrested by French authorities on charges resulting from his involvement in smuggling penicillin and other antibiotics into France. Subject believes that AZCUE has about five children. During early 1961 while in Mexico City, AZCUE was contacted by Subject in order to obtain advice re the advisability of his defecting from the Castro regime and requesting political asylum in Mexico. As a

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

result of this contact Subject obtained the impression that AZCUE is suffering from a lack of funds. Since AZCUE is somewhat of a snob and a fancy dresser, he finds this situation unpleasant. AZCUE also habitually has a mistress which in turn is a drain on his pocketbook.

(1) According to Subject, AZCUE is an excellent draftsman who studied architecture at the University of Habana, although he never obtained a degree. Subject assesses him as a kind man, very happy-go-lucky, but impetuous and one who "blows with the wind". He doesn't seem to have the powers of concentration or of single purpose which would allow him to be successful. Subject feels that AZCUE has appended himself to the Castro regime since it offers him a purpose in life and a feeling of belonging to something.

(2) Subject described AZCUE as being a very brave man. He felt that should AZCUE be approached by KUBARK and requested to cooperate, the physical danger inherent to in-place agent work would not affect his decision. In summary there would be a reasonable chance of persuading AZCUE to cooperate with KUBARK if a suitable monetary and ideological inducement were offered him. Subject feels, on the basis of their 1961 conversations in Mexico City, that AZCUE is not too enthused about the Castro regime and it is possible he has become even less in favor of it during the ensuing period.

(3) Subject appended that it would be helpful in any approach to AZCUE to attempt to convince him that Fidel CASTRO was directly involved in the "gangster" revolutionary group responsible for Manolo CASTRO's murder. AZCUE was a very close friend of Manolo CASTRO's and was affected greatly by his death.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

b. Enrique RODRIGUEZ Loeches: RODRIGUEZ was born about 1912 and is presently Cuban Ambassador to Morocco. RODRIGUEZ was involved for a long time in revolutionary attempts to overthrow the BATISTA and previous regimes in Cuba. He was with CASTRO during the 1958-59 period in the Sierra Maestra. Subject became acquainted with and a close friend of RODRIGUEZ when both were members of the same so-called revolutionary "Directorio". Subject alleges that RODRIGUEZ has disliked CASTRO since their first meeting during the 1958-59 period. Both Subject and his wife alleged to have received a letter from RODRIGUEZ written in the Sierra Maestre in which he listed his dislike of CASTRO and among other things referred to him using the Spanish equivalent of the term "dirty prostitute". Subject advised that unfortunately this letter has been destroyed. Subject is convinced that if he met RODRIGUEZ on the street tomorrow the latter would have no compunctions about sitting down for a long discussion on old times as well as the political situation in Cuba. Subject is also convinced that he could on friendly terms "talk defection or recruitment" with RODRIGUEZ should they have the opportunity to meet.

c. Orlando BLANCO, born about 1922, is married to a woman of Puerto Rican birth which makes her an American citizen. BLANCO, according to the latest information available to KUBARK, is stationed with the Cuban Embassy in Morocco with the rank of counselor. Subject met BLANCO when the latter became subordinate to him in the revolutionary "Directorio" working towards the overthrow of the Batista regime. Despite BLANCO's revolutionary activities, Subject assesses him as being relatively passive politically. Both BLANCO and his wife are believed to have applied for employment with the Cuban foreign service as a means of leaving Cuba. Subject feels it is possible they will not return to Cuba when their tour in Morocco expires. During 1960-61 BLANCO was employed in the National Bank of Cuba. During this period Subject obtained the impression that BLANCO had become anti-Castro. Subject, however, assesses BLANCO as a non-courageous type of individual who might be frightened at the idea of working as an in-place agent. As an example of BLANCO's lack of courage, Subject cited the fact that he and his wife attempted to avoid Subject's wife while Subject was an asylee in the Argentine Embassy in Habana. Incidentally, BLANCO's wife's name is Isabelle LAGO de Blanco and she is on excellent terms with Subject's wife. 08 Subject is apparently convinced that BLANCO would welcome an opportunity to meet with him providing he were assured that the fact of the meeting would not become known to his Cuban superiors.

d. Faure CHOMON Mediavilla (201-270370): In essence Subject was only able to reiterate the background information on CHOMON outlined in paragraph 5 of UFGW 1874, 13 January 1963. In order to place his relationship with CHOMON in perspective, Subject produced a personal letter to him from CHOMON which was written in January 1959 and referred to Subject in the most familiar of terms. Subject alleged that CHOMON has confided in him on many matters of personal and political nature for many years. As an example, he cited a difficulty in which CHOMON became involved during his tenure as Ambassador to the USSR and while Subject was stationed in Moscow. 08 CHOMON at that time was having an affair with a Russian translator/secretary assigned to him by the Soviets. This person's husband became knowledgeable of the relationship between his wife and CHOMON and beat on the door of the Cuban Embassy one day and proceeded to demand that CHOMON leave his wife alone. Subsequently a formal protest was received through Soviet foreign service channels. As a result of this incident, CHOMON asked Subject to take a walk with him 24 (He didn't trust the Soviets and felt the Cuban Embassy was bugged.) in order to discuss this problem and the possible solution for it. Although CHOMON did not specifically state anything in this vein, Subject obtained the impression during the last two meetings in the Argentine Embassy in early 1962 that CHOMON was anything but happy with his lot under the Castro regime. Subject felt it would be worthwhile and alleged his willingness to prepare a "recruitment letter" for mailing to CHOMON in Cuba.

318R

e. Floreal CHOMON Mediavilla was born about 1930 in Camaguey, and, according to latest KUBARK information, is presently Charge d' Affaires of the Cuban Legation in Iraq. Prior to this assignment, CHOMON was First Secretary with the Cuban Embassy in Morocco. Subject described CHOMON as a sensitive, slightly effeminate individual who is relatively disinterested in politics. Subject feels that CHOMON obtained the position with the Cuban foreign service by virtue of the fact that he is Faure CHOMON's brother. Subject feels that Floreal CHOMON would also welcome an opportunity to talk with him if the fact of their meeting could be kept from the Cuban government. He speculated that any attempt to gain CHOMON's cooperation would depend on the position Faure CHOMON has assumed toward the Castro regime. Subject feels that most of Floreal CASTRO's decisions are based on the attitude and opinion of his older brother Faure. If through letters from or conversations with his older brother, Floreal had obtained the impression that Faure was becoming dissatisfied with the Castro regime, he probably likewise would assume such an attitude and conceivably be receptive to a recruitment approach.

7. OPERATIONAL PROPOSALS: We are currently retracing the individuals listed in the preceeding paragraph. Upon completion of these traces, it is suggested that a dispatch be prepared to Mexico City Station outlining all information on Esubio AZCUE including that supplied by Subject. This dispatch would also outline Headquarters' interest in perhaps using Subject in an operational approach to AZCUE. Mexico City Station would be asked to describe the extent to which they could support such an operation through surveillance of AZCUE, locating his present residence and other information relative to his current activities and political orientation. (Comment:) We discussed in principle with the Subject whether or not he would be willing to travel to Mexico City with a KUBARK case officer for the purpose of such an approach. Subject tentatively indicated his willingness to cooperate in such a venture but appeared to have some reservation re the danger that might accrue him. He pointed out that he has a wife and six children to support and soon expects to be joined by his father and mother-in-law who are currently in Miami. We attempted to reassure Subject that very little danger

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

would be involved since he would be under surveillance by KUBARK officers at all times and would serve only as a means of effecting the introduction of KUBARK to AZCUE. Although we cannot be certain, we feel that if properly presented Subject would cooperate with KUBARK in such a venture.

8. The information reflected above and relating to RODRIGUEZ, BLANCO, Floreal CHOMON, and Faure CHOMON, will be made available to SAS/FI in order to determine whether or not they may be interested in exploiting these leads. An operation involving the preparation of a letter by Subject for forwarding to Faure CHOMON would be simple to prepare but difficult to carry out in that we do not have a current home address for him. Subject indicated that he believed Faure CHOMON in 1961 lived on First Street, #105, Apt. 7, in Habana. However, we cannot be sure that this address is current. Subject indicated that perhaps (fnu) San Pedro y Grillo living at Anunciacion 10, 6th floor, in Madrid, as of 1961, is probably the first wife or another relative of Faure CHOMON. She is allegedly the cultural attache with the Cuban Embassy in Madrid. Perhaps it would be possible to obtain CHOMON's current address through COS Madrid. Conceivably COS Madrid could ask its liaison with the Spanish service to place intercepts on this address and thus obtain Faure CHOMON's current home address in Habana, assuming he is corresponding with this individual.

27,15Z
24
15-2

9. MISCELLANEOUS: We were only able to obtain the names of two individuals from Subject who he believed definitely to be G-2 officers. These were the individuals who accompanied Faure CHOMON when he visited Subject in May of 1961 at the Argentine Embassy in Habana. The first of these was Carlos FIGARELLO, aka El Chino. FIGARELLO was born about 1930 and Subject was able to say little more about him than this in as much as he spent most of the time during this meeting talking with Faure CHOMON. On CHOMON's second visit to the Argentine Embassy he was accompanied by (fnu) JIMENEZ, aka Himenito, also born about 1930 and the son of (fnu) Santos JIMENEZ. JIMENEZ was, according to Subject, at one time the director of the revolutionary newspaper "Combate". Subject was unable to supply further information on this individual.

10. Subject was shown the KUBARK list of Cuban diplomatic and consular personnel abroad dated April 1963 and was able to identify a number of individuals appearing on this list as known to him. These individuals would be basically FI leads and Subject indicated he was not

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3/BR

well acquainted enough to describe their personalities or otherwise aid in an operational approach to them. We are listing them below, however, in the event some of them may be of specific operational interest to SAS/FI components. Any individuals falling into this category can be the subject of future detailed debriefing on the occasion of my next meeting with Subject.

a. Jorge SERGUERA Rivieri, aka Papito, is currently the Cuban Ambassador to Algeria. According to Subject, SERGUERA is a homosexual.

b. Eduardo MACHADO Cartas, born about 1925 in Lajas, Cuba, is presently employed as the Cubana Airlines representative in Canada according to latest KUBARK information. Subject hasn't seen MACHADO for about twenty years, but used to know him well in that he dated MACHADO's sister and in this fashion met him and the family.

c. Jose BARRIAL Dominguez: Subject believes this name appearing on the KUBARK list to be incorrect. BARRIAL is listed as Charge d' Affaires, minister counselor at the Cuban Embassy in Chile. Subject knew an individual of this name who was associated with the same revolutionary group to which Manolo CASTRO belonged.

d. Manuel PAYAN Viego is originally from Siego de Avila, Cuba. During BATISTA's regime, PAYAN was studying in Spain. Subject does not believe PAYAN to be a Communist. PAYAN's wife is believed to be identical with Maria Antonio RODRIGUEZ de Payan who is also listed as an employee of the Cuban Embassy in Chile.

e. Oscar PINO Santos, Cuban Ambassador to China, is an acquaintance of Subject. Subject was unable to provide further worthwhile information on PINO.

f. Flora DIAZ Parrado, born about 1910, is currently employed as a counselor with the Cuban Embassy in France. Subject believes that DIAZ is apolitical and has been a member of the foreign service for a long time. He also believes

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

her to be homosexual.

g. Juan David POSADA is currently employed as cultural counselor with the Cuban Embassy in France. Subject describes POSADA as an "arty type" who is an excellent caricaturist.

h. Manuel R. MORALES, listed as an attache with the Cuban Embassy in France, is believed by Subject to be identical with an individual he met who used the nickname Tiburon who was an athlete at Habana University and from Santiago de Cuba.

i. Gustavo MEDIAVILLA de la Pena is listed as commercial attache with the Cuban Embassy in Germany. Subject was acquainted with an individual with this name who was a cousin of the CHOMON brothers.

j. Lionel ALONSO Fiel is believed by Subject to be a young man who he knew from Matanzas Province and who is now Charge d' Affaires with the Cuban Embassy in Indonesia.

k. Gustavo ROBRENO Dolz, aka El Mago ROBRENO, is listed as an attache with the Cuban Embassy in Indonesia. Subject describes ROBRENO as a very unstable individual. Once while drunk, he shot an American in a Cuban bar. He is married to a former prostitute.

l. Jose R. LINARES Delgado is listed as an attache with the Cuban Embassy in Iraq. Subject believes he was at one time acquainted with LINARES who was connected with the Manolo CASTRO group at the University of Habana. Subject describes LINARES as a slender individual with a pleasant personality. He is a mulatto.

m. Gustavo ARCOS y Bergnes is listed as Ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg and resident in Brussels. Subject stated ARCOS' brother was killed in Santiago de Cuba on 26 July 1953 during the attack on the "Moncada".

n. Teresa PROENZA, listed as cultural attache, Third Secretary with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, is related to the Cubana Airlines representative in Mexico. Subject described PROENZA as a cold-blooded emotionless woman who is nicknamed "the mummy".

o. Silvino SORHEGUY Matos is listed as the Cuban Minister to Saudi Arabia with residence in Cairo. Subject knows SORHEGUY to have been once a Cuban foreign service representative to Honduras and to have been declared PNG by that country.

p. Jose Antonio PULIDO y Ledesma is listed as consul to the Cuban Embassy in Sweden. Subject knows PULIDO as being a good friend of Enrique RODRIGUEZ Loeche, Ambassador to Morocco.

q. Armando PEREZ Pinto is listed as commercial counselor with the Cuban Embassy in the USSR. Subject believes PEREZ is not of Cuban birth, but from Haiti. Subject could only say that PEREZ was a nice young man, born about 1935, who did not give the impression of being a rabid Communist.

r. Juan JUARBE y Juarbe is listed as the counselor of the Cuban Delegation to the United Nations. Subject knows JUARBE and thinks he is Puerto Rican or Venezuelan by birth rather than a Cuban.

s. Laura MENESES de Albizu Campos: According to Subject, MENESES is not a Cuban but he is not sure of her nationality. Although he met MENESES he is unable to supply further significant data.

t. Gilberto MEDIAVILLA is listed as a third secretary of the Cuban Delegation to the United Nations. Subject suspects that MEDIAVILLA is a cousin to the CHOMON brothers.

11. Orlando PEREZ was met by Subject during his tour in Moscow. PEREZ was the Charge d' Affaires at the Cuban Embassy in Moscow. Subject became slightly acquainted with PEREZ and obtained the impression that PEREZ is not pro-Castro. He is married to an American citizen, Rina PEREZ, nee Grossman. PEREZ has since quit the foreign service and occupies a position with the National Bank of Cuba.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

12. We asked Subject whether or not he was acquainted with any individual belonging to the Cuban military. He could supply no significant names or information in this sphere. He did advise us that a potential source for this type of information was one Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo. According to Subject, GUTIERREZ was formerly a Cuban army officer and would have many contacts in this area. As an aside, Subject stated that GUTIERREZ had supplied weapons to Fidel CASTRO during the 1958-59 period through an individual who he knew only as (fnu) GONZALEZ. GONZALEZ apparently in turn obtained the weapons from a (fnu) SAGARO who was a resident of Santiago de Cuba. Of even more interest, Subject stated that GONZALEZ was, during this same period, in contact with Otto SKORZENY in Madrid and Belgium. Subject could no longer remember where he had heard this information and could only add that as he remembered, GONZALEZ had seen SKORZENY in Madrid and Brussels, Belgium, during this period. It is felt that this piece of information may be of more than normal significance in that we recall having been told several years ago that SKORZENY was of operational interest to KUBARK. As we remember, SKORZENY was at that time suspected of or reported to be the key figure in a Communist/KGB illegal funding apparatus. We will check with the CI Staff, WE, and EE, in order to determine whether further information on SKORZENY's alleged activities was ever developed.

13. Raul RODRIGUEZ Feo is, according to Subject, a professional in the Cuban foreign service. Subject does not know for certain where RODRIGUEZ is presently stationed but suspects he is in Habana. RODRIGUEZ does not appear in the KUBARK list of Cuban diplomats abroad. RODRIGUEZ is a good friend of Subject and his wife, and Subject's wife has known Mrs. RODRIGUEZ since both were small girls. RODRIGUEZ was born about 1912 and studied at the University of Habana. He and Subject attended the same secondary schools in Sagua La Grande, Cuba. Subject states that RODRIGUEZ is definitely not a Communist and probably would cooperate in any anti-Castro activity KUBARK might ask of him. 08

14. Carlos LAO was born about 1923 in Cuba and is a Certified Public Accountant. Subject is good friends with LAO in that both of them worked together in attempting to overthrow the Batista regime. LAO refugeed to the United States from Cuba in October 1962 and now lives in Willernie, Minnesota. Subject volunteered LAO's name as an individual who knows everybody of any significance in Holguin, Cuba, and the surrounding area.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

VBR

SECRET

15. UFGA 7428, 31 January 1963, contains information obtained by JMWAVE regarding Subject and indicated him to be emotionally unstable, eccentric, and generally reputed to be something of a nut. We are inclined to agree with this information in so far as Subject's economical theory is concerned. During his stay of almost one year as an asylee in the Argentine Embassy in Habana, Subject spent the copious spare time available to him writing an economic treatise. On our meeting with Subject on May 4th, Subject provided us with a handwritten short summary of this document. According to this summary, Subject has been attempting to correlate economic cycles with peaks of sunspot activity. He backs up his "economic argument" with reference to the Old Testament and the Aztec Calendar. If Subject has been expounding this theory in public we are not surprised that he is considered somewhat of a nut. It should be noted, however, that many otherwise sane and useful people believe in horoscopes and other similar superstitions. We do not feel that this quirk in his personality must necessarily be considered derogatory in terms of his possible operational exploitation by KUBARK. Although we have spent less than ten hours with Subject, our impression is that he is a rational individual in terms of his attitude towards and relationships with other individuals and personalities around him. As a matter of fact, we obtained the impression that Subject possesses more than his fair share of what is sometimes termed "common sense". The handwritten summary of Subject's economic theory as pertaining to sunspots is appended to this memorandum as attachment.

Attachment: Herewith
As stated above

03

Galen Peary
SAS/CI

GP:sab

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/SAS/CI (chrono copy)
1 - RID/Index
1 - 201-327702 - Jose Antonio CASAS Rodriguez 05
1 - C/SAS (info copy)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3/Rs

SECRET

30 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 June at 1100 hours

1. Upon Erneido Oliva's request, AMBIDDY-1 went to meet with him last night. At the meeting Oliva mentioned to A-1 that he (Oliva) was receiving the backing of KUBARK and the Pentagon and implied A-1 was also receiving aid. Oliva stated that he has met with Alfredo Rodemeyer, the same Rodemeyer that both of them had met early last year. A-1 replied this was all before the death of Kennedy and he no longer had contact with any of ODYOKE's officials. According to Oliva, Mr. Rodemeyer spoke badly of some of the personnel in A-1's organization, e.g., Antonio Iglesias. Oliva mentioned that he had talked with Thomas Mann recently and expected to see Mr. Mann within the coming week to receive support for his conventional warfare program. A-1 told Oliva he had no objection to the conventional warfare plan and that he would morally support Oliva in liberating Cuba. However, he would continue in his own little way with his unconventional war. According to A-1, he made it clear to Oliva that he was not receiving ODYOKE backing.

2. A-1 expects to leave on 1 July for Costa Rica tomorrow. He again mentioned that Adelaide will soon be leaving the United States. A-1 commented he does not expect to visit the United States as often as he has done in the past. A-1 asked that Enrique and Mr. Archer clearly understand that he does intend to keep his word concerning the changes he has mentioned to us at the last two meetings.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

3. A-1 expressed a desire to meet with Mr. Archer somtime after the August operations.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Oliva - 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

29 June 1964

AMWORLD'S MEETING IN NEW ORLEANS, 24 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Image and Philosophy

1. AMBIDDY-1's preoccupation with his political image shone thru, when he inquired whether we suspected him of dictatorial leanings. We replied, in effect, that we entertained such suspicions and inclined toward taking his protestations of liberalism and laissez faire with a heavy dose of salt. Once in power, he would treat the 1940 as a scrap of paper and run the country along autoritorian lines. Flattered by his implied inclusion in the line of succession, A-1 only voiced mild dissent.

2. Comment: Considering the exigencies of autonomy which deny us much opportunity, let alone leverage in shaping AMBIDDY-1's political philosophy, we have conveyed to him in a variety of ways that we do not particularly care one way or the other, that we do not fancy him as a chosen instrument outside the periphery of AMWORLD and - that by extension - we have no intention of promoting any political aspirations he may harbor. We have also left no doubt in his mind that we view his performance in the AMWORLD driver's seat rather than any philosophical streams of consciousness, as a dependable gauge of how he would be performing in a position of political responsibility.

3. We pointed out to AMBIDDY-1 that Liberation Day would find a prostrate, bankrupt and exhausted people, weary to death of politics and propaganda, craving to be left alone for a while to collect its thoughts. There would be no political infrastructure on which to build and prematurely called general elections would merely serve to debase the currency of parliamentary democracy even more. For a while at least, a benign and just executive would have to restore Cuba's equilibrium and permit her to rebuild the institutions without which a democracy cannot properly function.

SECRET

In this context, we mentioned sentiments expressed by AMBIDDY-1 on Venezuela TV deprecating largescale revenge during the reconstruction phase and voiced hope that he would do his share to see these noble ideas put into effect.

Henry D. Hecksher

cc: Policy
Artime's 201 file ✓

29 June 1964

AMWORLD MEETING IN NEW ORLEANS, 24 June 1964

SUBJECT: Adlaida PADRON y Cruz - Decision to Move Her to Nicaragua

1. Drawing liberally upon data supplied in UFGA 16312, we reminded AMBIDDY-1 about our misgivings regarding his association with Adelaida PADRON y Cruz. He conceded awareness of some of the rumors circulating about her past private life and stated that he had satisfied himself that they were unfounded. We injected that we knew that Jose Mole Rosales has been asked to do some investigating and had given Adelaida Padron a clean bill of health. We also happened to know that MOLE was aware of the true story and for reasons of his own had decided to withhold it from AMBIDDY-1. We inquired what he knew about Senora MOLE and he commented that she had been a "bad woman". We observed that the "had been" was open to question.

2. AMBIDDY-1 averred that he had listened to a telephone conversation between Adelaida and her former husband, Roger Rojas Lavernia, in which the latter had admitted that the story about his having acted under higher orders when marrying Adelaida were unfounded. AMBIDDY-1 also charged the ex-husband of having tried to entice his wife to participate in orgies, but that Adelaida had refused to do so.

3. As regards Adelaida's alleged illicit relationship with ex-President BATISTA, AMBIDDY-1 simply declared the charge to be unfounded. Adelaida did know Carlos CANTILLO Gonzales who was an old friend of the family. She also had met ex-President JIMENEZ, but nothing of a compromising nature had ensued.

4. When asked whether it was true that Adelaida had introduced him to several prominent Venezuelans, he denied this and stated that introductions had been made by Silvia GARCIA, a trusted childhood friend of AMBIDDY-1.

5. Our query why Adelaida, if she had AMBIDDY-1's interests at heart, appeared to have qualms about owning up in respect to past events, was parried by AMBIDDY-1 by claiming that Adelaida was of course aware of all these rumors and had warned him of possible political embarrassment.

6. Evaluating UFGA 16512 on the basis of our talk with AMBIDDY-1, we conclude that its main source has a high batting average. At least there appears to be a hard core of truth to practically all allegations made, to the extent we were able to check them out. We would venture the guess that, despite his protestations to the contrary, AMBIDDY-1 is quite conversant with Adelaida's past history, but can see no practical gain in so telling us. He may reason that an avowal of intent to marry a woman whose antecedents are in fact as described, would seriously blemish his image and that by pleading ignorance now he can, if things should get out of control, always strike a pose of injured innocence and elicit a "here but for the Grace of God go I" reaction from his PBPRIME associates.

7. Agreement that all interested parties would benefit by moving Adelaida's abode from the WAVE area to Nicaragua was reached on the basis of AMBIDDY-1's acceptance of our flat statement that we view Adelaida as a potential hazard to AMWORLD's and KUBARK's security. We based this reasoning upon numerous indications that Adelaida had become all but completely privy to everything that was going on in AMWORLD and that her discretion left a great deal to be desired. We drew no denial from AMBIDDY-1 when stating that Adelaida had become witting of the WAVE training course for AMBIDDY-1 and that she presumably knew about KUBARK support for AMWORLD. We referred to Adelaida's lesbian associates, without stating that we suspected her of holding charter membership in that sorority. We mentioned by name Aida PEREZ and Lucia CANO. When the latter was labelled by us a lesbian believed to be in Adelaida's complete confidence, AMBIDDY-1 evinced surprise and for reasons difficult to fathom almost dismay. We concluded by stressing the importance of breaking up Adelaida's circle of associates and confidants as an indispensable prerequisite for containing the threat her access to information we consider classified represents and asked AMBIDDY-1 to make sure that no member of this group would follow her to Nicaragua.

~~SECRET~~

8. We made no attempt, which in any case would have been vain, to break up the relationship between AMBIDDY-1 and Adelaida. We apologized to him for involving ourselves in matters of a private and intimate nature which unfortunately were beginning to impinge upon ODYOKE security interests. AMBIDDY-1 in turn made it clear that he thinks he is in love and that separation is not in the cards. We dropped the issue by assuring AMBIDDY-1 that the day would come when things could be seen in better perspective and that he could depend on us not to gloat or remind him that we had told him so.

9. We mentioned offhand that we assumed that Adelaida had all the papers necessary to effect her departure from PBPRIME. AMBIDDY-1 replied that she had not been able yet to get the necessary papers. We simply commented that she should ask for them.

Henry D. Heckscher

cc - WAVE
ADELAIDA's 201
ARTIME's 201✓
Counterintelligence

SECRET

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~ IZED

Chief of Station, JMWAVE XX

Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

TYPIC/AMWORLD--Identity

REFS: A. UFGA 16512, 15 June 1964
B. DIR 31528

1. Chief, WH requests that an investigation of the truth of some of the allegations made in Ref A report be held in abeyance pending determination whether Subject in fact has decided to leave PBPRIME for Nicaragua.

2. Headquarters continues to be interested in additional data regarding the house in the WAVE area which AMBIDDY-1 intends to purchase in the name of Nilo Messer.

3. If it should turn out that the conditions described in Ref report are not drastically remedied and continue to pose a festering threat to the security of AMWORLD, your Station may have to be requested to investigate. In the meanwhile, we are hopeful that Subject's removal from the WAVE area will serve to attenuate this bad situation.

4. Thanks to Ref A report, we were able (without going into too much sordid detail) to put AMBIDDY-1 on notice that we view his association with Subject in the WAVE area as a potential threat to AMWORLD's and KUBARK's security and that the political scandal potential of the existing situation is equally formidable. We consequently fell in with AMBIDDY-1's suggestion, made during the latest meeting in Panama City, that he move the center of his illicit affair to Managua where it would be easier to contain unpleasant repercussions than in the WAVE area. We urged AMBIDDY-1, and he promised to heed our advice, that he not permit Subject to take along to Nicaragua members of her present entourage, singling out Identity C of Ref A as a particular case in point.

5. It should be stressed that AMBIDDY-1 is unwavering in his (real or feigned) conviction that Subject is pure as driven snow and badly maligned and that he has a ready explanation for every "rumor." It would have been unwise to attempt coercing him into discontinuing his affair with Subject and most likely he would not have yielded to any pressures. Hence, we had no choice but to settle for the proposed move to Nicaragua which represents a palliative at best.

Kenneth N. Philbrook

Distribution:
4 - COS, JMWAVE

UFGW 3963

29 June 1964

SECRET/RYBAT IZED

19-124-27/3

1 - WH/SA/Exec
1 - WH/SA/SO/HH

WH/SA/SO/HH HDHecksher bh 4215

File: PADRON 201
AMBIDDY-1 201
Lucia Cano 201

DC/WH/SA

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~ TIZED

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UFGW 3062, dated 29 June 64

Identity - Adelaida PADRON y Cruz

SECRET/RYBAT DESENSITIZED

~~SECRET~~

29 June 1964

Debriefing of Russell H. Sambora in Wash., D.C. 16 June 1964

SUBJECT: DMJM Engineers

Sambora reported he met with AMBIDDY/1 at the Miami airport on 5 June 1964 for a brief discussion of organizational changes. After their talk, A/1 requested Sambora accompany him to the airport hotel to act as interpreter with an American engineer (possibly DMJM). Sambora did not recall the name of the engineer but that the engineer had stated the airstrip in Nicaragua would cost somewhere in the vicinity of a million dollars. According to Sambora, A/1 simply listened to the proposal and said he would take the matter under advisement.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: DMJM
Sambora
AMBIDDY/1 ✓

SECRET [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

A-1

AMWORLD Meeting in Miami, 25 June 1964

SUBJECT: Photographs of Adelaida Padron

1. During a lull in the meeting I took AMBIDDY-1 aside (as instructed) and told him it would be best for all concerned to take Adelaida out of PBPRIME as he had suggested. I mentioned to him there is a growing number of reports on Adelaida finding their way to Washington, making it increasingly difficult for us to protect his rear.

2. I then casually mentioned to him that we had received some obscene photographs which have caused us to do some fast talking with "some people in Washington" that are beginning to have some misgivings about AMBIDDY-1 (actually this story is notional).

3. I noticed the remark concerning the photographs upset AMBIDDY-1. "Do you mean immoral pictures, Martin?" AMBIDDY-1 inquired. I nodded and to avoid his asking further questions about the pictures, I reminded him of his promise that Lucia Cano, Natacha d'Angelo (AMBIDDY-1 denied knowing her) and Aida Perez Pozo would not follow Adelaida to Nicaragua.

4. During the rest of the meeting AMBIDDY-1 appeared to be somewhat dejected and preoccupied. It is the opinion of the CO's attending the meeting that this was attributed to the remarks made concerning the existence of these photographs.

5. As the meeting was about to end, AMBIDDY-1 asked me again, "Do you really have some immoral pictures of her (Adelaida), Martin?" Again I said "Yes." These photographs had come into our possession plus much more

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

information that we had not divulged to him. AMBIDDY-1 then inquired if he could see the photographs. I replied that it was our feeling that it would serve no useful purpose other than to satisfy his own curiosity. Inasmuch as he had promised to take Adelaida out of the country, there was no sense in rubbing salt into the wound. Furthermore, we did not wish to reveal our sources to AMBIDDY-1. Lastly, both he and I know that photographs could be fabricated and we did not want to be falsely accused of doing just this. AMBIDDY-1 again asked that I inform BECKHOFF that he is interested in seeing the pictures. In order to drop the entire subject, I promised AMBIDDY-1 I would pass the message to BECKHOFF.

6. BECKHOFF believes that this (notional) intervention jarred AMBIDDY-1 out of his complacent assumption that we lack substantial information to back up our claim that Adelaida's immoralities are more than unprovable rumors. Also, hopefully, he may now have been put on guard and may take adequate precautions against blackmail of himself or Adelaida which we consider a major threat to the security of AMWORLD. If in future meetings AMBIDDY-1 should revert to the existence of these photographs, it may be best to state that they were promptly destroyed but that their also being in the possession of potential blackmailers can never be ruled out. AMBIDDY-1 should be reminded of his assurance to alert us immediately if such blackmail attempts are made since he may need our help in warding them off. He has our assurance that we would not use the cropping up of such difficulties to remind him of his failure to heed our warnings.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/EO/HH

File:
~~AMBIDDY~~-1
Adelaida Padron
Aida Pons
Lucia Cano

~~SECRET~~

AMWORLD Meeting in Miami, 28 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Dream House and Personal Finances

1. Without impugning AMBIDDY-1's right to purchase a home we advised him that many derogatory reports have reached our ears concerning his purchase of a home and for this reason only we wanted to get the record straight and thereby be in a better position to combat malicious rumors. A-1 said he understood and it was evident A-1 did not take it (the inquiry) as a personal affront. During a break in the meeting A-1 went home to obtain the necessary data on the house. Within a few hours A-1 returned with the information plus a blueprint of the house.

2. A-1 stated the only house he owns is the one in which he and Adelaida are now residing. This house is located at 1270 N. E. 85 Street, Miami, Florida. The original downpayment was $6,500. The monthly payment on the house is $230. The funds for the downpayment were obtained from:

a. His own personal bank account ($4,000).

b. Adelaida contributed money she had received from an automobile accident ($1,000).

c. The balance was borrowed from Sixto Mesa ($1,500).

A-1 added that the money borrowed from Adelaida and Mesa was paid back to them. According to A-1 the house is valued at $35,000. A-1 was asked why the house was not registered in his name. A-1 replied this was done to prevent rumors from starting as to where he had gotten the money. For this reason the house is registered in the name of Antonio Sanz (A-1's bodyguard). As soon as Adelaida departs for Nicaragua, A-1 intends to lease the house to Sanz for $130 a month.

SECRET

~~SEC 1~~

3. Without being asked A-1 stated he wanted to clarify his financial situation since his return from prison. A-1 reported he has earned $4,500 from the sale of Marchas de Guerra y Cantos de Presidio; from the sale of the book Bay of Pigs he has so far earned $4,300 in royalties of which $1,000 has been sent to the underground in Cuba. His personal bank account at present totals $1,700. A-1 also maintains he has no other bank account in any other country.

4. We again mentioned to A-1 that our sole purpose was to hear the facts from him to prevent the waggling of idle tongues.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Adelaida - 201
Antonio Sanz - 201

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

6407

FR 1-6408

MRR

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI, 37, FLORIDA

PLAN OF THE HOUSE


MAIN ROOM
BATH
CLOSET
CLOSET
CLOSET
ROOM
DINNING ROOM.
ROOM
CLOSET
UTILITY ROOM
KITCHEN
LIVING ROOM
CLOSET
BATH
GARAGE
OFFICE
WALL

~~SECRET~~

TRANSLATION

1. Address: 1270 N. E. 85 Street, Miami, Florida. The downpayment for the house was $6,500. Monthly payments which have to be madeper month, $230.

2. Where did I get the money?

a. From the book Bay of Pigs I have earned $4,300 of which I have to deduct $1,000 I sent to the underground; thereby leaving a balance of $3,300.

b. From the sale of Marchas de Guerra y Cantos de Presidio, $4,500.

c. This gave me the sume of $4,500 plus $4,300 giving me a total of $8,800.

d. At the time of buying the house: $4,000 from my own bank account, $1,000 from Adelaida, an automobile accident from which she received $1,400 and $1,800 loaned to me by Sixto Mesa. Tito Mesa and Adelaida's money I have paid back to them.

e. I have remaining in the bank $2,300 minus $600 which I have spent on other things leaving me a total of $1,700. The house is not under my name but in Antonio Sans's name.

f. The house is valued at $5,000.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

26 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 26 June at 1130 hours

I telephoned AMBIDDY-1 at his home and informed him that we (Carl, Dick and I) would be meeting with him on Sunday. We would need the following things at this meeting:

a. A complete up-to-date roster of the personnel in the organization as they are reshuffled.

b. Return of all insurance forms which are no longer applicable.

c. To at least have a formulated idea as to what their operational plans will be for July and and any requests for data which Carl will have to obtain.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201✓
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG: H.D. [illegible]
UNIT: WH[illegible]
EXT: 4477
DATE: 26 JUNE 64

3 SECRET

NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

ROUTING
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: DC/WH/SA 3 INFO DDP, VR

valicy
AMBIDDY-1 201
Padron

26 JUN 64 16 37z
SIG CEN

TO: WAVE INFO: CITE DIR 31258

SENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF: WAVE 0176 (IN 94619)*

ON 24 JUNE AT NEW ORLEANS MEETING AMBIDDY-1 AGREED IT BEST IN INTEREST ALL CONCERNED (I.E. AMWORLD, KUBARK, AMBIDDY-1 AND SUBJECT REF) IF SUBJECT MOVES RESIDENCE TO MANAGUA. SINCE THIS IDEA ORIGINALLY BROACHED IN PANAMA BY AMBIDDY-1 HIMSELF, HQS REP SIMPLY APPLAUDED IT. IN THIS LIGHT REQUEST WAVE ADVISE ODURGE TO GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO SUBJECT'S RENEWED APPLICATION FOR FORM I 512. SINCE ODURGE PLAYED MAJOR ROLE ASSISTING KUBARK IN VERIFICATION OF RUMORS ABOUT SUBJECT'S PAST, WAVE SHOULD FEEL FREE ADVISE APPROPRIATE LEVEL ODURGE WHY IT NOW CONSIDERED BEST INTERPOSE NO OBSTACLES IF SUBJECT DESIRES LEAVE PBPRIME. OF COURSE WE CANNOT PROVIDE ASSURANCE SUBJECT DEPARTING FOR GOOD.

END OF MESSAGE

*WAVE will request ODURGE delay issuance I-512.

Jbalzem
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH (SA)

WH/SECURITY M.K. Holbik

HDH
HENRY D. HECKSHER
WH/SA/SO/HH

RELEASING OFFICER 26-9 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

9 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING
1
2 ~~NOB~~ INT 4 ~~SS~~ 5 ~~GB~~
3 LCS LAIS AR
EOB RPTS LOG CA
CI SI BF [✓ HH]
SEC NS

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3
INFO : DDP, VR

Policy
Artime 201
Bosch 201
Quintero 201

S E C R E T 241548Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8396

24 JUN 64 IN 18641

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

1. 22 JUNE AMYUM/19 HAD MEETING WITH AMJAVA/4 AND AMBIDDY/1 AT LATTER'S REQUEST TO RESOLVE LEADERSHIP CRISIS WITHIN AMYUM WHICH HAD POTENTIALLY SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR AMWORLD. A/1 ADMITTED HAVING CONTROL PROBLEMS IN CAMPS AND SAID HE FINALLY UNDERSTOOD WHAT A/19 HAD BEEN COMPLAINING ABOUT. AS RESULT DISCUSSION A/19 BELIEVES A/1 CONVINCED A/19 NOT ATTEMPTING USURP HIS POSITION IN AMYUM AND WILL PERMIT A/19 ASSUME REAL CONTROL OVER ACTIVITIES IN PBPRIME (INCLUDING AUTHORITY OVER INTEL AND PROP ACTIVITIES), IN RETURN A/19 TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES RESOLVE PERSONNEL PROBLEMS IN CAMPS.

2. ACCORDING A/19 RECENT ANALYSIS, WHICH BEING FORWARDED HQS, BASIC PROBLEM IS GROWING BELIEF AMONG AMYUM ACTIVISTS AND INTELLIGENCIA THAT A/1 USING THEM FOR PERSONAL AMBITIONS AND THAT A/1 EXHIBITING TOTALITARIAN LEANINGS WHICH UNACCEPTABLE AMYUM.

3. WHILE ACCEPTING NECESSITY MILITARY DISCIPLINE OPS MATTERS, AMYUM LEADERSHIP, WHICH MORE CONCERNED FURTHERING IDEALS THAN SERVING AS MACHINE TO SUBSTITUTE ONE PERSONAL LEADER FOR OTHER, COMPLAIN A/1, IN EFFORT CAPTURE CONTROL OF ORGANIZATION FOR SELF

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No

HAS DONE FOLLOWING:

A. IGNORED BEST QUALIFIED MEN HEAD UP MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN FAVOR THOSE WHO LACK CONFIDENCE AMYUM RANK AND FILE BUT WHO SUPPORT HIM WITHOUT QUESTION TO KEEP JOB.

B. PERMITTED MILITARY AND PROPAGANDA FIELD BE DOMINATED BY BATISTIANO ELEMENTS WHICH CANNOT EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH PBRUMEN ARMY OR MILITIA.

C. ALLOWED SECURITY SECTION BECOME GESTAPO WHICH INTIMIDATES LOYAL AMYUMS WHO NOT UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTERS A/1, CONTRIBUTING TO AIR INTRIGUE AND INTERNAL CONSPIRACY WHICH SAPS STRENGTH OF MILITARY PHASE, AND PLAYED PERSONAL ENTOURAGE AGAINST PARTY CADRE IN ORDER KEEP CONTROL.

4. ACCORDING A/19 AMYUM LEADERSHIP WANTS A/1 AGREE TO SHARING POLITICAL DECISION MAKING AND SELECTION KEY PERSONNEL WITH AMYUM DIRECTORATE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND OPS PLANNING NOT INCLUDED IN THIS AND ONCE DECISION MADE ORGANIZATION TO BACK A/1 DECISION WITHOUT QUESTION. IF THIS NOT DONE A/19 SAYS IT POSSIBLE LEADERSHIP MAY ATTEMPT DISASSOCIATE SELF FROM AMWORLD IN ORDER PRESERVE IDEOLOGICAL PURITY REGARDLESS EFFECT ON AMWORLD.

5. DIRECTORATE IDEA WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO A/1 ACCORDING A/19. WAVE C/O SUGGESTED THAT BRINGING OTHER ELEMENTS INTO DECISION MAKING MACHINERY WOULD ONLY RESULT MORE PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED THAT PERMITTING A/4 AND A/19 EFFECTIVELY EXERCISE RESPECTIVE OFFICES SHOULD PROVIDE AMWORLD WITH SATISFACTORY BALANCE CENTRALIZED CONTROL FOR EFFICIENCY, AND DIVERSITY AS GUARD AGAINST FEARS CREATING ONE MAN DICTATORSHIP.

6. IT GUERTLER OPINION A/1 SHOULD NOT BE ENCOURAGED ATTEMPT DO IT ALONE. FROM LONG RANGE VIEWPOINT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY RECOGNIZE REAL POLITICAL MOTIVATION MANY AMWORLDERS AND FACT THEY WITH PROJECT AS AMYUMS, NOT AS FOLLOWERS A/1. WHILE A/1 PROBABLY ABLE ATTRACT ENOUGH POLITICAL ACTIVISTS CONTINUE COMMANDO AND SAB OPS SEVERAL KEY AMWORLDERS INCLUDING AMSALON/1, AMYUM/29, AMHINT/27 AS WELL AS REBEL ARMY TYPES WOULD LEAVE IF A/1 BROKE WITH AMYUM FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

SECRET

AMWORLD Meeting in New Orleans, 24 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMYUM-19 or Nice Guys Finish Last

1. HQS conclusion that AMWORLD interests would best be served by not opposing the termination of liaison contacts with AMYUM-19 was prompted by some of the following considerations:

a. AMBIDDY-1's obvious displeasure with the existing relationship, as evidenced by his rather pointed observations about the corrupting effects of such contacts on subordinate levels. The fact that such contacts provide KUBARK with a certain insight into those AMWORLD affairs which AMBIDDY-1 prefers to keep secret is obviously a factor, but not an overriding one. What really worries AMBIDDY-1 is--he claims--that factionalism draws sustenance from working level liaison between Cubans and Americans except in those rare instances where the loyalty of the Cuban representative is beyond cavil.

b. AMBIDDY-1's lack of confidence in AMYUM-19's loyalty. HQS position has been all along that AMBIDDY-1 is the sole judge of who among his co-workers merit trust and who doesn't. To dispute his judgment would entangle KUBARK into intra-AMWORLD power politics with no adequate basis for intelligent judgment. Either we reserve ourselves the right of co-determination on all personnel action or on none. AMWORLD groundrules are unambiguous on that score. We do not become involved except in those instances where our opinions are specifically elicited, as in the field of background checks which only by inference bear upon the issue of loyalty to AMBIDDY-1. In sum, once AMBIDDY-1 withdraws his confidence from a co-worker we have no leg to stand on in persisting that we have the right to consider that particular individual our chosen instrument in the field of liaison.

c. AMYUM-19's dual role as a ranking functionary of AMWORLD and the Number Two Man in AMYUM. Since we have reason for believing that a dichotomy has been opening up between AMWORLD and AMYUM's old guard (to

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

which AMYUM-19 belongs), liaison with AMWORLD conducted through AMYUM-19 ipso facto involves KUBARK in factional strife. We recall that some of the major troubles besetting the action mechanism prior Playa Giron stemmed from the interference of political commissars. Without derogating from the importance of the ideological component in the struggle against AMTHUG, in any showdown between the military command and the political functionary corps, it behooves us to range KUBARK alongside the former unless the points at issue manifestly implicate PBPRIME security. Under AMWORLD groundrules KUBARK supports AMBIDDY-1 as the commander of an unconventional warfare instrument, not an exile organization, let alone the ideology and aspirations which animate it.

d. The AMYUM opposition group represented by AMYUM-19 clearly desires a share in the decision-making processes which KUBARK has entrusted to AMBIDDY-1. While they pay lip service to the principle of non-interference in purely military affairs, in the final analysis it would be impossible to keep the two aspects apart. Any concessions on KUBARK's part to the pretensions of the AMYUM opposition would confront KUBARK with intangibles in the form of occult pressures brought to bear upon AMBIDDY-1 whose impact we could not possibly gauge or control.

e. AMYUM dissidence flourishes in the WAVE area, whereas AMWORLD's center of gravity rests in Central America. Unless AMBIDDY-1's stewardship is unimpeded by AMYUM factionalism, AMWORLD's performance is bound to suffer since AMBIDDY-1's preoccupations will always retain a focus on his WAVE area backyard.

f. The impression that AMWORLD may be disintegrating is fed by intel which essentially reflects WAVE area backstage maneuverings in the political sphere, not the situation in the camps about which we are, as a matter of fact, relatively uninformed. By striving to insulate AMWORLD against the vagaries of WAVE area bickering and strife, the AMWORLD picture is bound to move into clearer focus and any shortcomings for which AMBIDDY-1 should be called to account can no longer be blamed upon the debilitating effects of AMYUM intrigue and--most important--cannot possibly be blamed upon KUBARK once its links with AMYUM-19 have been severed.

[illegible] and declassification

g. An emasculated political apparatus in the WAVE area will deprive AMBIDDY-1 of all excuse to divide his time between Central America (where he belongs) and the WAVE area.

h. The tawdry aftermath of the ZENON II raid can justly be blamed if not on AMYUM, at least on AMBIDDY-1's political representation in the WAVE area. With that representation effectively eliminated, one of the main sources of ODYOKE discomfiture will have been effectively dislocated. Impending changes should at least eliminate the AMYUM press and intel sections.

i. Should there be further unpleasantness in the WAVE area, KUBARK will, once contacts with AMYUM-19 have ceased, have a base for plausible denial of responsibility for not preventing it.

j. If we are to believe certain not altogether unbiased reports, AMBIDDY-1, through his mistress Adelaida PADRON, has become linked with the exile demimonde which moves on the fringes of common crime and which is closely intertwined with the remnants of Batista's regime. While AMYUM, and particularly AMYUM-19, may to some extent serve to counteract and slow down these trends, they are obviously unable to halt them entirely. Hence, what little benefit we could have derived from a tie-in between AMYUM and AMWORLD has not been forthcoming. Short of an enduring political compromise between conflicting viewpoints, which we don't consider within the realm of practical politics, any solution which keeps AMBIDDY-1 out of the WAVE area and close to his command post, serves AMWORLD and hence KUBARK interests.

k. AMWORLD in WAVE area had become a breeding ground for rumors and beyond reasonable doubt a valuable source of classified information for AMTHUG's agents. By placing AMBIDDY-1 and his pals out of reach, PBRUMEN's I. S. may be forced to base a major collection effort on Nicaragua which won't be easy.

2. AMYUM-19 is a "nice guy," personally prepossessing and basically honorable. He evidently and in full measure shares PBRUMEN propensity for political intrigue and fractionalization. He is intensely preoccupied with ideological issues and is unwilling to accept the absolute primacy of overthrowing AMTHUG to which, at least at this rather hopeless stage of the

GROUP 1
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]

struggle, most ideological reservations ought be subordinated. Regarding this fundamental issue he and KUBARK may be at odds. In serving as our principal working level liaison contact, he has not resisted the temptation to try parlaying it into political power vis-a-vis AMBIDDY-1, a fact that has obviously not escaped AMBIDDY-1's notice. Without impugning AMYUM-19's good faith, we have reason for believing that on occasion he has conveyed our views in the garb of KUBARK criticism of AMBIDDY-1's capabilities, e.g., as a paramilitary planner and, it appears, has left AMBIDDY-1 with the completely erroneous impression that we were taking sides in the factional dispute involving AMYUM, in essence backing AMYUM-19 against AMBIDDY-1. In advising AMBIDDY-1 on the pros and cons of dismissing SAMBORA (P), AMYUM-19 told AMBIDDY-1 that dismissal would in all probability spell a break with KUBARK which he must have known and of which he was subsequently reminded, ran completely counter to KUBARK's oft stated position that personnel matters are in AMBIDDY-1's hands. By implication, at least, he may have reinforced AMBIDDY-1's suspicions that SAMBORA was linked with KUBARK. Apparently AMBIDDY-1 has not been unduly influenced by AMYUM-19's continuous harping on the threat posed by AMBANG-1 (AMYUM-19 was never shaken in his conviction that AMBANG-1 receives KUBARK support). Another bete noire has now reared its ugly head in the person of Oliva.

3. AMYUM-19's ideological preoccupations have seriously detracted from his performance as a liaison contact. As a de facto penetration of AMYUM and as a source of personality information he has done well by KUBARK. Thanks to him KUBARK undoubtedly now has a much clearer understanding of the interlock between AMWORLD and AMYUM, although we shall have to observe the course of events before accepting AMYUM-19's premise that they are Siamese twins who if surgically separated will hemorrhage to death. We owe him a debt of gratitude to have alerted us to the impending rift and to have enabled us to arrive at the only possible decision, i.e., to throw the full weight of KUBARK's support behind AMBIDDY-1. Through him we have also learned a great deal bout AMBIDDY-1's salient characteristics as a leader, of course making due allowance for a subtle injection of AMYUM-19's venom. In fairness to AMBIDDY-1 it should be stated that some of the characteristics to which AMYUM-19 takes most violent exception, even if they are ingrained, have been inculcated into AMBIDDY-1 by KUBARK. Since the inception of the program, we have urged AMBIDDY-1 to place himself in unchallengeable control of the paramilitary apparatus and not allow political considerations to intrude upon the conduct of AMWORLD affairs. Any mismanagement

therefore ought not be blamed upon authoritarianism (without which AMWORLD cannot conceivably prosper) but upon a leadership gap in AMBIDDY-1's personality makeup which even "democratic centralism" couldn't correct or cure.

4. In assessing the prospective consequences of a cessation of contact between AMYUM-19 and KUBARK, we shall have to take into account that he is fully cognizant of the fact that KUBARK supports AMWORLD. The relationship that has existed heretofore is known to him in all its facets.

a. Under assumed names, the following KUBARK reps are known to him:

Bobbie Hernandez
Raul Hernandez
Carl Jenkins
Earl Rohrer

Desmond FitzGerald
Henry Heckscher
Richard Beal
James Smith

b. AMYUM-19 has intimate knowledge of AMWORLD funding arrangements, i.e., amounts, identity of bank accounts both Swiss and New York, and related information. Unless we receive unmistakeable indications that AMYUM-19 is on the warpath against AMWORLD and KUBARK, a change in these arrangements does not appear indicated. Nor can we see any merit in dismantling AMWORLD's logistic infrastructure of which AMYUM-19 has full knowledge .

c. He knows the following individuals and may suspect that they are somehow linked with KUBARK:

Russell H. SAMBORA (P)
Peter C. KNITTEL (P)

d. Telephone numbers which were issued to AMYUM-19 are in the process of being discontinued.

e. AMYUM-19 knows the location of the following KUBARK installations and accommodation addresses (which will be given up or changed:

Maryland safehouse.
Lastra P. O. Box

5. Whether or not AMYUM-19 in an attempt to avenge imagined slights by KUBARK (such as the abrupt termination of the existing relationship without farewell) by divulging

[illegible] declassification

what he knows to unauthorised persons, is difficult to assay. Should he in honest conviction reach the conclusion that he was shunted aside because KUBARK considered him an obstacle to establishing full sway over AMWORLD, he could easily rationalize a betrayal. Other "ideological" considerations could be adduced by him to justify actively opposing KUBARK. Whatever he may do along those lines would not be through inadvertence but by design. We have weighed and discarded the possibility of neutralizing him through recruitment. This would not work if our reading of his personality is correct. We can think of a number of deterrents, out of KUBARK's reach, which will probably make him think twice before throwing down the gauntlet. To provoke the enmity of both AMBIDDY-1 and KUBARK would be an act of defiance of which we consider AMYUM-19 incapable. Besides, AMYUM-19 strikes us as an indivudal imbued with a sense of basic decency and of Christian morality.

6. In balance we doubt whether AMYUM-19 is going to pose a major threat to the security of AMWORLD. In any case, HQS decision to accede to AMBIDDY-1's desires on working level liaison, even if it entails a rupture in relations with AMYUM-19, was made in full awareness of the fact that he could cause trouble and inflict damage if this be his intent. Should this come to pass, however, it would be unfair to shift the entire blame onto AMBIDDY-1. While we can hardly applaud the glaring lack of political acumen AMBIDDY-1 has displayed in this whole affair, while his motives in dispensing with AMYUM-19's services may not be entirely honorable, and while MOLE, his main source on the AMYUM cabal, is self serving and questionable to put it mildly, the fact remains that the final decision was KUBARK's as much as it was AMBIDDY-1's.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: COS, JMWAVE

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
AMYUM-19 201
Policy

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

23 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 22 June 1964 at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1, sounding somewhat tired and with a bad cold, mentioned that he would like to advance the date of the meeting to 23 June 1964. A-1 advised there are some administrative matters which have to be resolved in Managua and other problems in Miami that he would like to discuss with "Enrique". A-1 then intends to return to Miami.

2. In that case A-1 was notified that we (Henry and Martin) would hold the meeting with him on 23 June 1964 and that Carl could talk with him and AMJAVA-4 on the morning of 24 June. A-1 was advised that this is a routine meeting in which many items would be discussed, e.g., the Miami reorganization that A-1 had mentioned. There was nothing of a critical nature.

3. The ADELAIDA arrived in Monkey Point as they were leaving for the States (21 June).

4. A-1 inquired if there were any outstanding problems. Martin evasively replied that he preferred not to discuss it over the phone. A-1 then asked if we intended to discuss A-19 and "his friends". The undersigned mentioned we would be disposed to talking about anything which A-1 feels is important.

5. A-1 stated he expects to leave for Central America by the end of next week.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

W File: AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations

SECRET

14-00000

Artime 201

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT
~~SECRET~~
DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
RYBAT/TYPIC/Operational/AMWORLD
AMOT Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE: UFGA-16512 of 15 June 64

Transmitted herewith is additional information concerning AMBIDDY/1's home life which may be of interest to BECKHOFF. It would be interesting to learn the origin of the recurrent rumor that the date of the PILON raid was advanced at the instigation of ODYOKE and that AMBIDDY/1 feels himself betrayed.

Warren K Guthr
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachment:
AMOT Report DD-950
1 Copy herewith
Identities, Under Separate Cover

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA, w/att/h/w & u/s/c

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-267437	DATE TYPED 17 Jun 64	DATE DISPATCHED JUN 23 1964
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-16525	
CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ RYBAT DESENSITIZED	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-6-3/4 19-124-27/3	

RYBAT

~~SECRET~~

Report # DD-950. 11 Jun 64

REF: DD-920.

TO: [redacted].

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: AMRIPPY-1 [redacted] and IDEN A [redacted]

SOURCE: IDEN B [redacted] [redacted].

Source had a conversation with IDEN A [redacted], an SHE [redacted] told source AMRIPPY-1 [redacted] would marry her in spite of everything, even if the marriage was opposed by the Catholics, by the Americans, and by everyone. According to IDEN A [redacted], A-1 [redacted] has made this promise to her.

IDEN A [redacted] said the following to source regarding the attack against Pilón: "'[illegible]' (pet [illegible] by which IDEN A [redacted] calls A-1 [redacted]) and I spent four [illegible] the [illegible] locked up planning the Pilón attack, but th[illegible] [illegible]icans [illegible]nged the date because they suspected I w[illegible] [illegible]y."

IDEN A [redacted] [illegible] source A-1 [redacted] w[illegible] to give up everything and [illegible] from everything to marry her.

Source further reports that an article was published in Rolando MAS[illegible] Rojas' newspaper in New York announcing IDEN A [redacted]'s marriage to A-1 [redacted] although her name was mistakenly given as [redacted] [illegible] (see attached photostatic copy of this clipping). That this article caused [illegible] in the house and gr[illegible]ly scared A-1 [redacted] and IDEN A [redacted]

IDEN A [redacted] told source that A-1 [redacted] had sent for a copy of the newspaper from New York to see what the article said. Then source told HER [redacted] over the phone that she (source) had the newspaper and SHE [redacted] then asked source to read the article to her over the phone. Source did this while A-1 [redacted] was listening in silence through an extension phone.

After hearing what the article said, A-1 [redacted] asked source whether she thought that harmed him, and source replied that it did. A-1 [redacted] complained to source about all that had happened, and admitted buying the house and the high cost of decorating the house by Mod[illegible]nage.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Report # DD-950, CB, 11 Jun 64 (cont.)

Source's impression is that A-1 [redacted] and IDEN A [redacted] have closed their house to all visitors, because both [redacted] are concerned about the way in A-1 which all the information about them has been leaked. One time [redacted] exclaimed with fear: "We have the G-2 in our house!"

After source's telephone conversation with A-1 [redacted], ID A [redacted] called source and said: "Last night 'Tuti' [redacted] could not sleep. All this gossip is going to ruin him."

IDEN A [redacted] told source that one time A-1 [redacted] had called her from Caracas, Venezuela, telling her that he could barely speak because he was hoarse from talking to all wealthy Venezuelans asking them to give money for the Cuban cause.

SECRET

~~SECRET RYBAT~~

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: UFGA-16325 dated JUN 23 1964

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

Iden A. - Adelaida PADRON y Cruz

B. - Silvia GARCIA Acosta

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET RYBAT

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

~~RYBAT/SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM

Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT

AMWORLD--Possible Basis for Entente between AMBIDDY-1 and SAMBORA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. We advised SAMBORA at a Washington meeting with him, 16 June 1964, that from the way things look to us he had painted himself into a corner from which he could not extricate himself. Another error was to have permitted someone like MOLE to block his path to the AMWORLD hierarchy. This in retrospect, however, is all water over the dam.

2. If SAMBORA is to perform his functions as we first conceived them he should go to AMBIDDY-1 and arrive at a new understanding. SAMBORA was informed that we intend to meet AMBIDDY-1 before SAMBORA returns to Miami. At this meeting we intend to state in no uncertain terms that the security of the organization is in a deplorable condition. This perhaps may have the effect of placing SAMBORA in a more favorable bargaining position.

3. We counseled SAMBORA to negotiate a hard contract which would encompass at least the following terms:

a. He would not work under nor be responsible to MOLE but only to the highest echelons of AMWORLD hierarchy.

b. Full access to all files, bases, information needed to perform a professional job.

c. The complete and unhesitating support of AMBIDDY-1 in all security matters.

If Am1 is unwilling to accept these terms or offers any restrictions or conditions SAMBORA has our permission to turn in his badge and bid AMBIDDY-1 a fond adieu.

KENNETH PHILBROOK

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

201-267457

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGW 3918

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT/SECRET

DATE

22 June 1964

HQS FILE NUMBER

19-124-27/3

1 - WH/SA/EOB
1 - WH/SA/SO/HH

A-1-201

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/SA/SO/HH TYPIST: R. Hernandez EXT. 4477

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL DATE OFFICER'S NAME

WH/SA/EOB/HH

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL DATE OFFICER'S NAME

DC/WH/SA

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S ~~SECRET~~

	ROUTING		
1	~~MOB~~ INT	ES	SB
2	ICS	5 FRS	AR
3		6	
EOB	FPTS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	BF	[✓ HH]
☐		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3
INFO : DDP, VR

Policy
Mesa-201
Finances
Artime-201
Amyum-19

S E C R E T 201837Z

DIR CITE WAVE 4196

DESENSITIZED

TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

20 Jun 64 IN 11209

REF DIR 28914

REF DISCUSSED WITH AMYUM-19. DISPATCH BEING FORWARDED HQS. RE PARA 12 A-19 ADMITS AMWORLD FINANCES LEAVE SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED, CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL EXPENSES CHARGED TO AMWORLD. ADMITS HE HIMSELF GUILTY OCCASIONALLY ALTHO SALARY ADEQUATE. A-19 MADE FOLL OBSERVATIONS. AMWORLD 2 PROBABLY RELATIVELY FREE FROM GUILT DUE FEAR EVENTUALLY BEING CALLED TO ACCOUNT. HOWEVER A-2 KNOWLEDGEABLE SITUATION AND DISPENSES MONEY WITHOUT CALLING FOR RECEIPTS. A-19 HAS NEVER BEEN ALLOWED TO SEE BOOKS OR PAYROLL, THIS FOR AMBIDDY-1 EYES ONLY. LARGE PART MISAPPROPRIATIONS FALL UNDER "TRAVEL EXPENSES". IT A-19 VIEW AMOUNT NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO EFFECT AMWORLD OPS CAPABILITY BUT HAS CAUSED MORALE PROBLEM WITHIN AMYUM BECAUSE AMBIDDY-1 MISAPPROPRIATES AMWORLD FUNDS FOR PERSONAL USE, AND THIS KNOWN TO OTHERS. THUS IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR A-1 ENFORCE FINANCIAL PROBITY.

SECRET

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/AN

EXTENSION:

NO. UFGA 16512

DATE 22 June 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/MIS				
2.				
3. RID/FI				
4.				AN (cj) FI [illegible] ~~DESK~~ ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~S E C R E T~~
DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
RYBAT/TYPIC/Operational/AMWORLD
The Private Life of AMWORLD's First Family

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

REFERENCE: UFGW-3514 of 6 April 1964

1. The following AMOT report concerning the not-so-private affairs of AMBIDDY/1 and his fiancee may be of interest to BECKHOFF. According to AMYUM/19, AMBIDDY/1 intends to formalize his relationship with Iden B sometime within the next few months. The marriage will probably take place in Latin America and Iden B will make her home there to avoid a public scandal which would have a harmful effect on the AMYUM organization. Attention is called to paragraphs 14, 17, and 26 which answer, in part, some of the questions raised in ref dispatch concerning ODYOKE involvement in AMWORLD. The Station has forwarded reports of this nature which concern claims by members of the Cuban exile community of KUBARK sponsorship of AMBIDDY/1. Of the specifics cited by the Cuban, intelligent or otherwise, to support their allegations those statements attributed to the AMWORLD principals themselves appear to be the only ones which can make a claim to "knowledge" as opposed to conviction based on AMWORLD's affluence. To date no tangible evidence of KUBARK involvement with AMWORLD has come to our attention.

2. Source: Iden A.

Source states that she has known AMBIDDY/1 since they were children in Esmeralda municipal term, Camaguey province, from where both of them come originally. Source further states she is also a close friend of Iden B, who is now AMBIDDY/1's mistress and a homosexual like source (according to source's statements).

Attachment:
Identities, Under
Separate Cover

(Continued)

Distribution:
✓3 - DC/WH/SA

CS COPY

201-267437
~~19-124-27/3~~

DATE TYPED 15 Jun 64	DATE DISPATCHED JUN 22 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-16512	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-6-3/5 19-124-27/3	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

3. Iden B was Fulgencio BATISTA Zaldivar's mistress in Cuba for about 8 years, and she claims her 5 year old son is BATISTA's son. Iden B met BATISTA through Carlos CANTILLO Gonzalez. When Iden B was BATISTA's mistress she was married to Iden C, who is now in Miami also and has a very bad moral reputation. On various occasions Iden B has received money from BATISTA, always through Orlando*PIEDRA Negueruela. The last money which she received, $200.00, was when she was already living with AMBIDDY/1 Iden B has many friends among MASFERRER's people and is a very close friend of the wife of Enrique MASFERRER Rojas. According to source, AMBIDDY/1 has had various meetings with Orlando PIEDRA Negueruela. Quite some time ago (source doesn't remember exact date). AMWORLD/2 raised $10,000 for AMBIDDY/1 from among "batistianos." AMWORLD/2 and Orlando PIEDRA owned a gasoline firm called "Reca", and at present AMWORLD/2 is still on very good terms with PIEDRA Negueruela.

4. Iden B used to "pose" with her sister, Iden D, to please BATISTA and in the presence and with the approval of her husband, Iden C. Iden B is a very close friend of*"Flor de Loto", Tete *MACHADO, Aida*PEREZ Pozo, a woman called Pat (La Americana) and Natacha*D'ANGELO, all known homosexuals who hold "posing" parties now in Miami like they used to in Cuba. One time when AMBIDDY/1 went to "Flor de Loto's" house he met Iden A.

5. According to source, Iden B was also the mistress of Marcos PEREZ Jimenez, former dictator of Venezuela. Iden B met PEREZ Jimenez through Colonel Pulido*BARRETO who was a friend of PEREZ Jimenez. Pulido BARRETO put Iden B in contact with an individual named PELAEZ, a narcotics trafficker according to source, who introduced her to PEREZ Jimonez. Since then Iden B lived with PEREZ Jimenez for about a year, and every time PEREZ Jimenez visited her he gave her $100.00 for the "visit".

6. Iden B was also the mistress of Pedro*SUAREZ (mat. unk.), former Councilman of Marianao municipal term, Havana province. According to source, Pedro SUAREZ was Iden B's lover here in Miami. One time Pedro SUAREZ took Iden B to see a "witch" mulatto who lives in Miami, who is also Rolando MASFERRER's "witch", according to source. Pedro SUAREZ wanted to control Iden B through this "witch", but she came to an agreement with the "witch" so that the "witch" would write a letter to BATISTA to make him send a large sum of money to her. When Pedro SUAREZ learned about this, he beat up the "witch" and denounced her to the Cuban Refugee Center. According to source, Iden B has another lover named "Chicho"*CARDENAS (mat. unk.), who is now Public Works Minister in the Republic of Panama.

7. AMBIDDY/1 talked to Iden C and asked his help in organizing the AMYUM Intelligence Section. For this objective he gave Iden C a sum of money to begin working. In the month of March or April 1963, Iden B filed a divorce suit against her husband.

8. In the same month of March or April 1963, source received a check for $300.00 from Raul GRANDA Hernandez in behalf of AMBIDDY/1, so that Iden B could pay for her divorce. Raul GRANDA lives with Iden B's sister. Iden C was tried for having a stolen knife from a grocery store in his possession, and he was sentenced to pay a $150.00 fine.

9. Source further states that in view of the fact she (source) has many friends who like "poses", she was able to introduce to AMBIDDY/1 some important Venezuelans including Colonel Pulido BARRETO, Carlos SISO (mat. unk.) and Osvaldo * BAJARES (Venezuelan economist). Source states that, at AMBIDDY/1's request, three meetings were held with those individuals in source's house. According to AMBIDDY/1 the objective of the meetings was to get support for his plans, and the objective of the Venezuelans was to overthrow Romulo BETANCOURT, and they were allied to the National Liberation Armed Forces (FALN). The conversations revolved around CASTRO Leon. The Venezuelans believed they could make a pact with the Communists and later eliminate them. At that time various members of FALN came to Miami (source doesn't remember when). AMBIDDY/1 assured the Venezuelans he could influence GPFOCUS and KUBARK to get support for their cause.

Carlos SISO told source he distrusted AMBIDDY/1 and believed he was a KUBARK penetration to learn all their plans. SISO also told source that when Osvaldo BAJARES returned to Venezuela he had been arrested, and SISO believed AMBIDDY/1 had denounced BAJARES. In the last meeting, SISO told source that he was going to put AMBIDDY/1 to a test. SISO asked him "whether it was true he had gone to Haiti on an official mission as an ODYOKE envoy." AMBIDDY/1 was very surprised and said he had, but insisted in SISO telling him how he had learned that. The meetings with the groups of Venezuelans stopped since that time.

After these happenings, AMBIDDY/1 informed source he had written a report to the Americans about the Venezuelan problem, and that he had treated Rafael CALDERAS very well in this report because CALDERAS had given him financial assistance.

10. AMBIDDY/1 showed source an unbound book and told her this was the most important book ODYOKE had because it contained military secrets which were known to a very few people. AMBIDDY/1 boasted of being one of the few men in the U. S., who had that document. Source leafed through the book and saw some weapons, noticing that some of those weapons were marked. AMBIDDY/1 explained that those marked weapons are the ones which AMTHUG/1 has in his possession.

11. Source further reports that on various occasions, in private conversation which AMBIDDY/1 had with Iden B, Iden E and source, he said that when he seizes power in Cuba he is going to organize guerrillas to invade Mexico and other countries which have denied help to Cuba. According to source, AMBIDDY/1 is convinced he will be President and Iden B, First Lady.

When AMBIDDY/1 talks of the 1940 Constitution he says it must be defended publicly and respected as something sacred, but in private he has said that when he seizes power he is going to use every page of the Constitution as toilet paper.

12. Source heard AMBIDDY/1 talk about a book which had been published which strongly accused KUBARK, and say that he, Iden E, and Iden F had furnished all the data for this book and would receive about $8,000.00 as their share of the sale profits.

13. One time AMBIDDY/1, Iden B and source had a meeting and discussed who should be the pilot of his private aircraft. Iden B proposed a pilot named ALEXANDER (according to source, ALEXANDER had relations with Iden B,) but AMBIDDY/1 opposed this and complained that the PBPRIMERS forced him to select the personnel.

14. About 7 months ago (on or about Nov. 63), AMBIDDY/1 told Iden B and source that he was going to receive a secret training course under PBPRIME direction. AMBIDDY/1 used to leave every day at 6 AM and come back at night. According to source, the course lasted 6 weeks and most of the times Iden B used to drive AMBIDDY/1 in an automobile to a place in Coral Gables where the course was being given. Every time AMBIDDY/1 returned from the classes he talked about the things he had learned and talked about secret writing, codes, of some pens with a substance which could kill instantaneously, about sabotage methods, etc., etc.

15. AMBIDDY/1 frequently spends long hours at night in his house making up accounts to justify expenses.

16. After Iden B's divorce, AMBIDDY/1 moved with her to 881 NE 71st Street. AMBIDDY/1 talks constantly in the house where he lives with her about his future plans, about the single party, about the dictatorship which has to be imposed in Cuba, etc. AMBIDDY/1 often puts on a uniform, poses in front of the mirror an talks about invasion.

WAVE Comment: This is one of several recent reports concerning statements attributed to AMBIDDY/1 in which he has spoken of the need for a strongman to run Cuba. AMSHADY/1 reports that on 10 June Aurelio MARIN Naredo (one of approximately 30 AMWORLDERS recently arrived from the camps) states that AMBIDDY/1 appeared at the training camps, took a dictatorial position on a number of issues terminating with the statements to the effect that he was the only one to liberate Cuba, he was the only one to run it later, and that there would be no voting and no elections. MARIN objected, stating that he had joined a revolutionary group, not a dictatorship, and along with other trainees requested to return to the WAVE area. According to AMSHADY/1 when the trainees arrived and went to the AMYUM offices to receive their final check AMJAVA/4 refused, a fight ensued and AMYUM/19 had to intervene. MARIN characterized AMBIDDY/1 as deceitful, liar, coward, demagogu dictator, power mad, a flagrant opportunist who cannot be trusted, etc. Realizing that AMSHADY/1 is strongly prejudiced against AMBIDDY/1 this comment is forwarded for what it is worth. AMYUM/1 has confirmed the incident at the AMYUM office and states that, whether or not it is justified, there is a considerable number of AMWORLDERS who hold similar views now and who attribute statements to AMBIDDY/1 which are inconsistant with his previous public statements.

17. At the time of President KENNEDY's death, source asked AMBIDDY/1 whether this would harm him and he replied smiling that it did not, that now he was receiving more aid than before. AMBIDDY/1 told source that he had received a card from Mrs. Jacqueline KENNEDY in reply to the condolences which he had sent her, and a card written by Bob KENNEDY with greetings.

18. According to source, AMBIDDY/1 has just given Iden B a fabulous residence in Miami. According to Iden B, the residence is in the name of AMWORLD/2, but they wrote another document specifying that the house belongs to her. Iden B told source that AMBIDDY/1 had made a down payment of $8,000.00 and paid $300.00 a month. Source also reports that AMBIDDY/1 has given to AMWORLD/2

documents, valuables and jewelry which AMWORLD/2 keeps in a safety deposit box.

WAVE Comment: The Station is investigating these rumors of an alleged love nest being built for Iden B. AMYUM/19 claims that he is unaware of any validity to the rumor.

19. At present, Iden B lives with her two sons, AMBIDDY/1 and a maid named Iden G who is also a homosexual. This Iden G has brothers in Cuba who are militiamen and she corresponds with them. Iden G's husband is known as "El Gallego", and he is now in the training camps. Iden G has been a friend of Iden B for many years, and is the one who used to accompany her to her dates with BATISTA. According to source, Iden G knows too much about Iden B and is the one who really directs her.

20. Source further reports that the current AMYUM Chief of Intelligence, Iden H, is married to a woman named Iden I, who practices prostitution. AMBIDDY/1 has ordered the Intelligence Chief to collect information on Iden B, but all the reports he submits on her are good because the AMYUM Intelligence Chief is an unconditional supporter of Iden B. One time the AMYUM Intelligence Chief hit an AMYUM member because he made unfavorable comments about Iden B.

21. Source learned from Iden B that Juan AMADOR Rodriguez is one of the newspapermen in exile who receive money from AMBIDDY/1. Iden B also told source that the articles and declarations made by Iden J are written by Iden K.

22. Source further reports she learned AMBIDDY/1 had difficulties with the ERACORN brothers because Hugo ELIAS Martinez, stationed in one of the encampments, brought contraband whiskey into Nicaragua and this angered the ERACORN brothers. Source also learned that an individual named Raul LEAL Garcia deserted from the encampments together with 21 men. This Raul LEAL is now living in marital relations with Martha BRAVO, a very close friend of Iden D.

23. Source 2: Iden L

Both Iden B and her sister Iden D are homosexuals. Iden C works at the Eden Rock in Miami Beach and lives with a Miami Beach gangster in addition to practicing prostitution. Iden M is an accountant, is registered in the Association of Cuban Accountants in Exile and works on Miami Beach.

24. According to source, Iden B was Fulgencio BATISTA Zaldivar's mistress and had a son by him. In order to avoid trouble in this affair, BATISTA married her off to Iden C, a member of the Constitutional Army with a terrible moral reputation.

Iden B used to "pose" with her sister to please her lover BATISTA and her husband. Afterwards, Iden C continued to exploit Iden B with this "posing".

When Iden B arrived in the U. S., (source does not remember date) she became the mistress of former Venezuelan President Marcos PEREZ Jimenez, and later the mistress of Pedro SUAREZ, a former Marianao Councilman. SUAREZ gave Iden B an automobile for which he made the down payment and paid some installments until he quarreled with her. AMBIDDY/1 finished paying for this automobile.

25. Source further reports that Iden B had homosexual relations with Iden A (source #1). In turn, this Iden A also has homosexual relations with a known homosexual named Iden G, aka "Campeona", who lives with Iden B and AMBIDDY/1.

According to source, this group of "ladies" used to meet with Olga*GUILLOT Vidal both in Cuba and here in Miami to hold "parties". One of Iden B's friends is Aida PEREZ Pozo, aka "La Gorda", who together with Pat (aka "La Americana") are partners of a man called "Chucho" who is in jail on charges of narcotics trafficking in which he was recently surprised.

Source states that she is well acquainted with Iden B's intimate affairs because she knew her in Cuba and lived in her house here in Miami for one year.

26. Source 3: AMCRAG/1

On 17 May 1964, Francisco TABERNILLA Palmero talked to AMWORM/1 and told him KUBARK was investigating the private lives of AMBIDDY/1 and Iden B, because it seems it is feared AMBIDDY/1 is being infiltrated by "batistiano" elements.

The investigation that is being made of AMBIDDY/1 is quite publicly known in Miami.

Warren K. Guenther
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

~~RYBAT SECRET~~

JUN 22 1964

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: UFGA-16512 dated __________

TO : Deputy Chief, WH/SA

Iden. A - Silvia*GARCIA Acosta, friend of Iden B.

Iden B - Adelaida*PADRON y Cruz

Iden C - Roger*ROJAS Lavernia

Iden D - Victoria*PADRON

Iden E - Eineido OLIVA

Iden F - Jose SAN ROMAN

Iden G - Lucia*CANO

Iden H - Jose*MOLE Rosales

Iden I - Olga*GOMEZ Mena

Iden J - Edgar SOPO Granda

Iden K - Roland MERUELOS Baldarrain

Iden L - Milagros*LEIROS Filgueira, friend of Idens A and B.

Iden M - Oneida*PADRON, sister of Iden B.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

RYBAT SENSITIZED SECRET

201-267437

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

A-1 201

WH/SA 64-540
19 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

VIA : Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Review of Deficiencies

1. A meeting with AMBIDDY-1 has been called for weekend of 27 June in order to review certain deficiencies in AMWORLD management and, in this context, convey to AMBIDDY-1 expressions of Chief, WH's serious concern over manifestations of insufficient leadership in giving direction to and exercising supervision over the AMWORLD effort and the personnel assigned to it.

2. In reviewing events of the preceding twelve months, it will be possible to balance praise and stricture. What has happened, it appears, is that after a flying start, the project is beginning to feel the effects of a devolution of CIA controls and that deficiencies in the quality of AMBIDDY-1's leadership now appear in more striking relief.

3. In relating to AMBIDDY-1 our views regarding the state of AMWORLD affairs, we propose to dwell on following aspects:

a. Management Slippages, carrying over into the field of finances. Still no capable administrator. No indications disbursement of funds subjected to controls other than requiring receipts. Doubts whether any kind of budgetting still being enforced since we converted to straight and fixed subsidizing. Faint odor of corruption.

b. Quality of Personnel. Leadership bracket poorly staffed. Since program's inception, recruitment drive

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

above field grade level either at standstill or unavailing. Why is it good people do not flock to AMWORLD's colors, especially after Pilon? Among reasons most frequently mentioned, AMBIDDY-1's alleged unwillingness to delegate authority and tendency to surround himself with dross of exile community which repels good elements. Sierra and Castillo, who above average, have already quit.

c. Political Action. Other than what taken in hand by AMBIDDY-1 personally, media output of deplorably low quality. AMBIDDY-1 himself goofed after Pilon.

d. Operational Planning. June performance below par despite WAVE training and Jenkins' consultation. Last-minute choice of target in Pinar del Rio ill-conceived and slipshod.

e. Operational Security. Virtually non-existent. Twin-strike against Cabo Cruz and Punta Maisi, originally scheduled for June 1964, prematurely blown and Cuban reception committees presumably lying in wait. Preliminary survey indicates likelihood proposes operation widely known in AMWORLD Miami circles. Leakage, therefore, not necessarily attributable to high-level penetration, but hypothesis such penetration exists is quite supportable.

Remedy: Headquarters will cease discussing operational plans inside U. S. and insist on passing intel abroad.

AMBIDDY-1 has consistently ignored our advice to batten down hatches and prepare for major CIS onslaught, especially post-Pilon. His so-called intel section staffed with camp-followers and headed by a thug. Only professional (Major Gomez) about to be ditched.

f. Morale Situation. Poor, except maybe among combat cadres. AMTUM-19 toying with idea to quit. Others may follow suit. Charisma no substitute for managerial ability. AMBIDDY-1's dissoluteness setting poor example.

g. "Adelaida." Clear indications she henpecks him and possibility that after one year of cohabitation he trusts her unreservedly, withholding nothing. Either

GROUP 1
Excluded from
automatic
declassification

refuses to comprehend or does not realize the hugh scandal potential of this relationship. Has proven impervious to low-key advice that scandal could ensue and that its full exploitation by Castro would be foregone conclusion.

4. Above inventory of major defects in AMWORLD probably incomplete and partly based on hearsay and derived from patently prejudiced sources. Some manifestations of disarray may merely be concomitant of organizational shakedown and elimination of marginal personnel. Others may be presumed endemic ills of most resistance organisms left to own devices plus Cuban propensity to fractionalize. In final analysis we could probably justify the Agency input as long as AMBIDDY-1 produces an occasional Pilon. Reconstruction of viable resistance movements inside Cuba, however, is remote prospect, especially if we conclude that target area now virtually denied to all but singleton, short-term operators. Commando raids may continue to prosper as long as we are permitted to render intel support on its present level.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: DC/WH/SA

HDH/bh

Distribution:
  Orig - Addressee
    1 - WH/SA/Exec (blind)
    1 - Wh/SA/SO/HH - Policy File

AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

16 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMYUM-19 and Raul Hernandez

DATE : 18 June 1964 at 0930 hours

1. AMYUM-19 called to say that he had passed the message to AMBIDDY-1 that GUERTLER had given him stating that the Consejo is interested in meeting A-1. A-19 was advised to tell A-1 the meeting would be preferable at the end of next week, 26 or 27 June in New Orleans, whichever date suits A-1. A-19 also mentioned that he had informed A-1 that there was too much loose talk in the organization.

2. A-19 has forwarded to the Consejo the letter requesting the July budget. Also accompanying this letter is a request for funds to purchase uniforms, tools, bedding, etc. for the camps which according to A-19 has been previously discussed.

3. A-4 has asked A-19 to send the DMJM plans to Nicaragua. A-19 inquired if we knew where these plans are. Also A-19 added he was promised the blueprints for the landing field. The undersigned mentioned that Dick was not in the office and if A-19 would call back later we would have the answers for him.

4. A-19, when asked if the charter fee for the ADELAIDA had been paid for this month, stated he did not know if it had been sent but would check with Mesa.

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed private [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~SECR~~

A-19 promised to have the answer when he calls back this afternoon.

5. A-19 stated that Jorge RODRIGUEZ Quesada is not the AMWORLD representative in Costa Rica.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Conversations
RODRIGUEZ - 201
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
DMJM
ADELAIDA

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

3 ~~SECRET~~

ORIG : H.D.HECKSHER/gt
UNIT : WH/SA/SO/HH
EXT : 4477
DATE : 17 June 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

17 JUN 64 18 10z

~~SIG CEN~~

TO JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 3 INFO DDP, VR

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 28814

DESENSITIZED

[illegible] TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

1. TELL AMYUM-19 HQS REPS HAD FRANK TALK WITH AMBIDDY-1 ABOUT RELATIONS WITH AMYUM-19. FOR WHATEVER WORTH, AMBIDDY-1 ASSURED HQS REPS HE CONSIDERS AMYUM-19 PLENIPOTENTIARY PBPRIME WITH FULL AUTHORITY ACT ON ALL MATTERS CONCERNING AMWORLD THIS AREA (INCLUDING ZOLE).

2. AMBIDDY-1 COMPLAINED ABOUT AMYUM-19'S RELUCTANCE EXERCISE FULL RANGE HIS RESPONSIBILITIES, ATTRIBUTES RELUCTANCE TO FEAR OF AMBIDDY-1, EXCESSIVE PREOCCUPATION WITH ANTICIPATED KUBARK VIEWS AND REACTIONS, AND IN THIS CONTEXT CONCERN THAT BY SOME INADVERTENT MOVE HE MIGHT CAUSE RUPTURE BETWEEN AMWORLD AND KUBARK.

3. AMBIDDY-1 ALSO COMPLAINED AMYUM-19 SURROUNDS SELF WITH PEOPLE WHOSE ORIENTATION STRONGLY (EVEN FANATICALLY) CATHOLIC AND THAT AMYUM-19 UPBRAIDED AMBIDDY-1 UPON LATTER'S RETURN FROM DOMREP FOR SEEKING CULTIVATE PROTESTANT MINISTER.

4. ALSO AMYUM-19 IMPARTED TO AMBIDDY-1 RATHER SWEEPING CRITICISM OF PILON RAID PLAN BY "COMPANY" NOT CONFINED TO ALLEGEDLY OVERLOOKED PRESENCE OF MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENT in TARGET AREA.

5. UNDERLYING ALL COMPLAINTS, AMBIDDY-1'S FEELING AMYUM-19 MAY HEAD SOME KIND OF CABAL MASTERMINDED BY KUBARK. (BELIEVE FLAT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 17-7

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM

~~S E C R E T~~

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF. :

INFO :

PAGE 2

TO

INFO.

CITE DIR

DISAVOWALS OF ANY INTENT UNSEAT OR WEAKEN AUTHORITY AMBIDDY-1 MADE SOME IMPRESSION).

6. AMBIDDY-1'S MOST CONVINCING STRICTURE OF AMYUM-19'S LEADERSHIP, IS TENDENCY TO AVOID CLEARCUT DECISIONS (OR AT LEAST FAILURE TO ARTICULATE THEM). OUR OWN IMPRESSION, AMYUM-19 NOT VERY SKILLFUL IN HANDLING AMBIDDY-1, FAILING PANDER TO HIS VANITIES AND TENDING SATIATE HIM WITH BAD NEWS INSTEAD OF MIXING DOSAGES.

7. DO NOT WISH ADJUDICATE OUTSTANDING ISSUES WHICH MOSTLY TRIVIAL. ASSURE AMYUM-19 HQS AWARE THERE TWO SIDES TO EVERYTHING AND OUR SOLE CONCERN RESTORE TRANQUILITY AND ASSURE PROPER FUNCTIONING AMWORLD.

8. HQS REPS OBTAINED AMBIDDY-1'S PERMISSION DRAW FREELY ON ABOVE EXCHANGE IN ATTEMPTING AMELIORATE SITUATION. SUGGEST GUERTLER DO SO, POINT OUT TO AMYUM-19, KUBARK SUPPORT TO AMWORLD IN PRESENT FORM WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS IT DELIVERS GOODS.

9. WE FEEL AMYUM-19 LOSES NOTHING BY ASSUMING FIRM COMMAND AND TESTING AMBIDDY-1'S PURPORTED WILLINGNESS BACK HIM UP, AS LONG AS HE ESCHEWS BACK STAIR MANEUVERINGS. OUR ADVICE HE QUIT LOOKING OVER SHOULDER WHEN MAKING NECESSARY DECISIONS, TRY DISARM AMBIDDY-1'S SUSPICIONS, KEEP KUBARK'S NAME OUT OF INTRAMURAL SKIRMISHES.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM

~~SECRET~~

G :
T :
T :
ATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO:

PAGE 3

TO INFO CITE DIR

10. ASSURE AMYUM-19 HE ENJOYS OUR FULL CONFIDENCE AS LONG AS HE ACTS IN BEST INTEREST AMWORLD. SHOULD HE BE FORCED OUT "IN LINE OF DUTY" KUBARK WOULD NOT BE UNMINDFUL HIS SERVICES IN CAUSE CUBAN FREEDOM. HOWEVER KUBARK WOULD FAIL UNDERSTAND IF HE QUITS UNDER FIRE OR SULKS IN TENT OR WASTES VALUABLE TIME ON ECCLESIASTICAL PURSUITS.

11. ADVISE AMYUM-19 WE CRITICIZED AMBIDDY-1'S OWN SHORTCOMINGS AND LEFT NO DOUBT WHERE KUBARK STANDS SHOULD MAJOR SCANDAL (PERSONAL OR OTHERWISE) ROCK BOAT.

12. REQUEST GUERTLER ELICIT AMYUM-19'S FRANK VIEWS RE AMWORLD PROBITY IN MANAGING FINANCES. OUR IMPRESSION FISCAL CONTROLS INADEQUATE AND SOME FUNDS SYPHONED OFF. WE RECEIVE DISQUIETING REPORTS ON HIGH LIVING IN MANAGUA, SAN JOSE AND MIAMI (LATTER HIS BAILIWICK AND WE HOLD HIM ACCOUNTABLE).

END OF MESSAGE

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH (SA)

HENRY D. HECKSHER
WH/SA/SO/HH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

DEBRIEFING of Russell H. SAMBORA in Washington, D.C., 16 June 1964

SUBJECT: Embezzlement of Funds by Mario Delgado Zuelueta

1. Sambora reported that Delgado, who is the head of logistics in Costa Rica, was accused of embezzling $1,000 from AMWORLD. A/1 conducted a personal investigation of the case. The final outcome of the case: He was asked to make restitution out of his salary until the entire amount had been repaid.

2. This case in point was brought up by Sambora to illustrate that A/1 spends a great deal of his time on relatively minor tasks which could easily be delegated to someone else.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: Sambora
Delgado
A/1 ✓

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

DEBRIEFING of Russell H. SAMBORA in Washington, D.C., 16 June 1964

SUBJECT: Loose Talk on Telephone

As an illustration of poor security of AMBIDDY/1 Sambora cited the example of how A/1 had telephoned Sixto Mesa on 14 June 1964 from Nicaragua to notify him that the operation had been called off due to bad weather.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: Sambora
A/1
Mesa
ops. Bolivar

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 11 JUNE 1964
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE #: UNKNOWN

MANUEL ARTIME

File
A-1

HARRY FLOOD BYRD, VA., CHAIRMAN
RUSSELL B. LONG, LA. JOHN J. WILLIAMS, DEL.
GEORGE A. SMATHERS, FLA. FRANK CARLSON, KANS.
CLINTON P. ANDERSON, N. MEX. WALLACE F. BENNETT, UTAH
PAUL H. DOUGLAS, ILL. CARL T. CURTIS, NEBR.
ALBERT GORE, TENN. THRUSTON B. MORTON, KY.
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, GA. EVERETT MC KINLEY DIRKSEN, ILL.
EUGENE J. MC CARTHY, MINN.
VANCE HARTKE, IND.
J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK.
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN.

ELIZABETH B. SPRINGER, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

June 9, 1964

Mr. Manuel Artime Buesa
Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 Northeast 2nd Court
Miami 37, Florida

Dear Mr. Artime:

This is to acknowledge and to thank you for your thoughtfulness in writing to me.

It was very gratifying for me to mention your daring raid on the port of Pilon in my speech of May 20th. Felicidades. I wish you the very best in your future actions against Castro who poses a grave menace to all of the Americas.

I am very pleased that through the Referendum the Cuban exile community now enjoys a central voice which can serve to co-ordinate effective anti-Castro activity. Hopefully, my Government will turn away from its ill-advised policy of restricting the Cuban exiles, and aid people like yourself to liberate the Cuban people from the Castro-Communist dictatorship. To that end let me assure you of my continued support.

Please do not hesitate to write me again.

With every best wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE A. SMATHERS
United States Senator

GAS:mps

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Sherwood		S
2			
3	Artime 201 File		
4			
5	H H		✓
6	SA/SO/Bobbie		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1-5 Have you come to any decision in regard to an internal mailing to Papa through Mama via the British? Could be done o/a 13 July.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O-[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

The following is a letter from AMBIDDY-1's father to his son.

8 June 1964

My dear son Manolin,

It has been a while since we have received a letter from you. We are writing this to find out how you are and we suppose you are well. Here everyone is well, thank God.

Your mother is not writing you because I am writing it quickly so that it can leave today.

We have presented everything since 20 March as well as depositing the price of the fares and we are only waiting for permission to leave which we will soon have. When it happens we will send you a cable.

Your Godmother Rosa is sick and when I saw her today she told me she hoped you would come to liberate her. Therefore we know you are doing your duty. I support your position. Don Jaime is well, thank God.

I saw Emilita and she sends her love. She also told me to tell you to write Lino and his brother a letter and to send it via this channel. Emilita is not going there until you send it (the letter) and it should be done through this channel if it is possible.

That letter which is addressed to Conseulo de la Campa de B. put a stamp on it immediately and mail it so it arrives at its destination. I am staying in her father's home and I am very anxious to help her.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

Well, Manolin, there is nothing else for the time being; in reality, so much has been said about the situation that there is no_________to resist the atmosphere.

Your mother and I send our blessing and will never forget you.

M. Artime and Otilla Buesa

I congratulate you on Pilon. Emilita also asked me to congratulate you.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

4.1

Let written by A-1's a father
to A-1. Given to HCS by A-1 at New Orleans on 24 June 64

Junio 8/964

Mi querido Hijo Manolin:-

Hace tiempo que no recibimos carta tuya y te hacemos ésta para saber de tu salud que suponemos sea buena, por aquí estamos bien G a D.

Tu mamá no te escribe porque ésta, te la estoy haciendo de momento para que salga ahora-

Tenemos presentado todo desde el día 20 de Marzo del presente año así como depositado el importe de los dos pasajes y solo esperamos el permiso de salida que nos lo darán próximamente, cuando ésto sea te pondremos un cable —

Tu Madrina Rosa M.S está enferma y cuando la vi hoy me dijo que esperaba que tu la vinieras a levantar así pues, ya sabes que estas conminado a cumplir con tu deber, yo apruebo su actitud. Don Jaime está bien G a D.-

al #2

#2

ayer vi a Emilita y te mandó un abrazo cariñoso y también me dijo que le escribieras a Lino una carta para él y las hermanas y que se la mandaras a ella por esta vía. Emilita no va a ir allí hasta que se la mandes y debes hacerlo a vuelta de esta vía si te es posible.

Esa carta que va dirigida a Consuelo de la Campa de B. inmediatamente le pones franqueo y la pones en el correo para que llegue a su destino - yo estoy pasando en la casa de su Padre y estoy interesantísimo en recibirla — Bueno Manolín - nada más por el momento, en realidad, ya tanto se ha dicho de la situación que no hay Termómetro que resista la temperatura - Te bendicen tus padres que no te olvidan. Mª Antonia y Otilia [illegible]

Te felicito por lo de Pilón - Emilita también me dijo que te felicitara -

Junio 8/964

Manolín:

Esa carta que va para la Sra Consuelo de la Campa /Guatemala. le pones franqueo y la mandas enseguida—

Te abraza tu Padre

M. Artime

Panama

AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: Adelaida Padron y Cruz

1. AMBIDDY/1 himself raised this matter with me while neither James nor Ferrer were within earshot. Quoting AMYUM/19, he inquired whether marriage with Subject would be one of the causes for KUBARK to terminate the existing AMWORLD relationship. I emphatically answered in the negative, going over by now well-trodden ground once more and, hopefully, making myself understood.

2. In summary, I stated we held no views one way or the other about his intent to contract marriage. Our concern was strictly political since we could visualize a number of unpleasant consequences flowing from the event. True or false, certain allegations had been made about Subject's past and there were a goodly number of people prepared to testify to the accuracy of those allegations, among them (I presumed) Subject's ex-husband. The political implications of the proposed union could not possibly escape him, especially if AMTHUG should get hold of it.

3. AMBIDDY/1 opined that he had lived in open sin with Subject for over a year. This was what was bothering him and evidently some of his closest associates, not Subject's alleged past. He needed this relationship with Subject to maintain (literal quote) his emotional balance. He was working under considerable strain and the rare moments with Subject alone were his sole relaxation. The issue of sin was deeply disturbing to him, and marriage, he felt, would resolve this situation of conflict. In order to avoid certain political repercussions, he was now giving thought to taking Subject with him to Nicaragua and contract a "secret" marriage. I did not point out to him the evident flaws in his reasoning and merely adverted to the great political responsibility he carries. I made it very clear to him that a major scandal could

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

conceivably crystallize opposition to his person and sink the ship. Since I did not interpose an outright veto (of dubious efficacy at best), he will undoubtedly profess to have convinced me of the soundness of his headlong rush toward matrimony and all that could entail for our program. Short of making a mockery of autonomy, I could not tell him any more than I did.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY/1 201 ✓
Pacron 201

~~SECRET~~

AMWORLD Meeting in ~~San Juan~~ Panama, 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1's Political Reporting

1. I reminded Subject that in the past we had frequently pressed him to keep us abreast of his political activities with particular emphasis upon relations with the host governments in Central America. The response to our urgings had been increasingly disappointing and of late reached the vanishing point. Since it was not curiosity that had prompted us to ask for timely reporting but a desire to be of service in protecting the rear, we were now wondering whether it would not be best to leave the determination whether or not to submit political reports to him rather than continue importuning him which was beginning to place us in a slightly ridiculous position. AMBIDDY/1 pleaded over-work in excuse of his failure to provide timely reporting and we resisted the temptation to point to other more likely causes of mental and physical fatigue.

2. As of now we believe to have reached a clear understanding with AMBIDDY/1 that as always we stand ready to come to his succor if a political crisis or problem arises and is timely signalled to us. Silence will be construed by us as an indication that "all is well."

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Policy
201✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AMWORLD Meeting in [illegible] ~~San Juan~~, 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: Purchase of House

1. I asked AMBIDDY-1 about rumors that he has brought a house in Miami and he admitted the fact without any show of embarrassment.

2. He claimed to have sunk his savings from the "Bay of Pigs" honorarium into the acquisition, i.e., $3,000, to have borrowed money from AMWORLD. Senora Padron y Cruz had also chipped in to the tune of $1,500. I did not delve into the financial aspects of the transaction. AMBIDDY-1 claims that the home where he now lives with subject has been registered in the name of Nilo Messer. He mentioned in passing that a house might come in handy if his parents should be permitted to emigrate to the United States.

Henry D. Heckscher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
PADRON
AMBIDDY-1 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

Panama

AMWORLD Meeting in ~~San Juan~~, 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Father

1. AMBIDDY-1 claims to have learned via QUANTUM 50 that his father is hiding in the home of a friend in the Havana area.

2. AMBIDDY-1 senior sent word that he is in touch with some old CP buddies who have offered to help him get out of PBRUMEN. AMBIDDY-1 is anxious to pass a message to his father but not via QUANTUM 50 because of his distrust in the political orientation of 50's government. In this message, AMBIDDY-1 wants to suggest to his father that he induce an "old CP" emissary to meet with AMBIDDY-1 outside of PBRUMEN, e.g. in Mexico. AMBIDDY-1 believes that the rift between AMTHUG's regime and the old CP offers unprecedented opportunities to cause mischief.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: JMWAVE
C/WH/SA/EOB

File: Artime 201 ✓
Spain

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

AMWORLD Meeting in ~~San Juan~~ Panama, 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMWORLD Venezuela - Radio Facility

AMBIDDY/1 claims that he was promised time, free of charge, by a Venezuelan broadcasting station under Army control which is an ODYOKE gift and which is considered secret.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: 201 ✓
Publicity

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Arti 201

JPRS
DC-10568

THE TROOPS THAT WILL OVERTHROW CASTRO ARE ALREADY IN CUBA

THEY ARE THE PEOPLE WHO CHEERED HIM WHEN THEY BELIEVED HIM A HERO OF OUR LIBERTIES

[Following is a translation of an interview of Manuel Artime by Agustin Camargo, as reported in the Spanish language magazine Bohemia Internacional, Caracas, Venezuela, 7 June 1964.]

Q. - Your group has initiated a new offensive against the Castro regime during the last few days in cooperation with one carried out by other revolutionary units. Do you expect victory soon?

A. - Everyone knows when wars begin, but never when they end.

I would like to say that it will be soon, but my duty as a leader is to prepare the people of Cuba and the Cubans in exile for the kind of war we expect: a long, hard war, but one that we shall win if all Cubans pull together in accordance with their ability.

There may be imponderable factors, "surprises" which could bring about the fall of the tyrant; but we must never count on "miraculous" solutions, on invasions that do not exist or on organizations that will pull our chestnuts out of the fire.

Q. - Are you considering the possibility of eventually uniting your men and resources with those of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta or the Alpha 66 - II Front - MRP or any other unit that may be currently carrying on the struggle inside Cuba?

A. - The frontiers of our movement have never been closed to anyone who wants to fight for Cuba, with the exception of totalitarian movements either of the right or of the left.

What we do think wise to explain is that we do not believe in political action units in exile. We believe only in unity of martyrdom, of sacrifice, of combat. We want the greatest success for our sister revolutionary organizations, which will never be objects of attack on our part because our only enemy is communism.

Q. - You personally and the M.R.R. in general have always been cited as "favorites" of certain North American groups or governmental agencies. Is that correct?

A. - I would like to have those who speak of this favoritism answer me this question:

Do they call the Bay of Pigs episode favoritism?

Do they call the two years I spent in jail waiting to put my back to the wall and be shot favoritism?

Do they call the state of abandonment in which the clandestine M.R.R. was left in Cuba after the battle of Giron Beach favoritism?

Do they call favoritism the fact that on my leaving jail I had to break with the Revolutionary Committee because it had been converted into an instrument for not carrying the war to Cuba?

Do they call favoritism the fact that we have had to leave American territory to be able to continue the struggle against Castro?

Do they call favoritism the fact that we have to fight a long war because we get no help from those who could make it short?

But these campaigns of "favoritism" do not surprise me.

I know that International Communism cannot admit publicly that it is being defeated by the people of little Cuba who are only getting help from their brothers in Latin America, from God and from their indomitable desire to be Free.

Q. - Today you talk of bringing about uprisings in the forces of the Castro regime, and you seem to trust in this as the best way to liberate the island from Soviet and Communist domination. Why didn't you take that position three years ago, since it was just as valid then as now?

A. - Three years ago we took the same position as today. Just remember that the M.R.R. was the first revolutionary organization to rise up against the tyrant Castro to try to overthrow him by internal action at a time when many were convinced that Fidel was a Communist but said "that it was not yet time to say so to the people".

Remember that the first weapons for internal rebellion were carried to Cuba by the M.R.R.

Remember that Francisco, the M.R.R. Coordinator in Cuba was not only the cheerful organizer of the resistance but also eventually the national coordinator of the whole clandestine movement.

Remember that the Bay of Pigs invasion was designed to be only the gold buckle to fasten up the stage of active resistance and guerrilla activities.

Remember the long list of over 150 martyrs of the clandestine war of the M.R.R. which shows clearly the priority we assigned at that time to rebellion in the local forces.

Remember that before the Brigade camps were set up there were infiltration camps provided especially to assist this internal rebellion.

Q. - Some international circles claim that Russia is abandoning Castro, that it has agreed on this abandonment secretly with North America, and that this is visibly evident in the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops from the island. They add that confidence in this agreement has caused North America to "tolerate" this fresh outbreak of armed activities in the Caribbean. Do you share this view?

A. - Frankly I do not believe in international pacts that are not clear to me, and I believe much less in the willingness of Russia to carry out its agreements: Poland, Chechoslovakia and Hungary are historical witnesses of Russian treachery.

As for "tolerating our activities", I cannot speak, because we have not asked for "tolerance" for them. It never occurred to me to "ask permission" to die for my country.

Q. - Would you subordinate the possibilities of liberation of your country to any advantage of an international nature for the United States?

A. - My country's interests are greater than those of any other nation. Any Cuban who does not believe that does not deserve to be called a Cuban.

I do not believe the United States expects such a shocking attitude from the Cubans. They may have many faults but they respect the dignity of man.

This is not the first time we say publicly that this war of liberation of our enslaved Cuba must be carried on "no matter whom it pleases, no matter whom it displeases", since it is true that powerful nations have international obligations to carry out and it is also true that we Cubans have our inescapable duties to our enslaved country.

Q. - If armed action within Cuba -- guerrilla war in the mountains and war of terror in the cities -- should, as expected produce a wave of popular uprisings both among students and workers and in the military units of the dictatorship, do you think that the democratic nations of the hemisphere would come to our help? Aren't you afraid of a repetition of what happened in Budapest?

A. - Although I am convinced that at some definite moment they would come to our help, we cannot base our war on collective assistance. We must plan our strategy as a purely Cuban struggle from beginning to end.

Many Latin American nations have already helped us in accordance with their ability and thanks to them we can do what we are doing.

As for the fear of a repetition of what happened in Budapest taking place in Cuba, we cannot forget that Cuba has no frontier with Russia.

Q. - Some foreign analysts and some governments have studied the situation on the island and treat with Castro as if they believed that all hope of liberation had expired. Can you tell us something about the internal struggle against communism?

A. - To think that all hope of liberation has expired in Cuba is to show a complete lack of knowledge of the condition and character of the Cuban people. The history of Cuba is a history of repeated martyrdom in search of real liberty.

I can say very little about the internal struggle that does not affect its security. But let it be sufficient to say that today there are guerrillas in five of the six provinces of Cuba; that the tyrant knows about them and that he has not been able to wipe them out because of the peasants' support for them; that in the cities the sentiment of the workers has begun to be mobilized toward passive resistance, and that within the very ranks of the militia Cuban patriots are forming independent cells.

Q. - From the days of the Bay of Pigs you seemed to trust blindly in North American material backing for your struggle. But lately we see you shifting your interest toward Latin American countries. Why?

A. - Actually my first glance was toward Latin America. I took residence in Mexico where I published my book Traición (Treachery) and I traveled around Latin America carrying the shout of alarm against communism. Afterward I went to North America in constant search of resources for the war, and although I have never had blind confidence in anything human, because everything that is done blindly is done badly, it is true that I had confidence in North American material help. Reason: because we were seeing it. (I do not think it was a secret to anyone where the weapons we used in the invasion came from.) I had no scruples in accepting American weapons to offset those from Russia which Fidel Castro was receiving in gigantic shipments.

After leaving prison I lost confidence in that assistance because since then not only have I seen none, but also I have not seen the possibility even of getting any.

Not only has my interest switched toward Latin America, but also my gratitude toward these people who have opened their arms to offer us help when all doors were being closed against us. Thanks to them we can continue the struggle.

Q. - What opinion do you think the conduct of nations like England and France deserve, who, turning their backs on principles they claim to hold and on moral and humane considerations, take part in propping up Castro's bloody regime by supplying him with credits and all kinds of financial backing?

A. - First I do not want to confuse countries with governments. Most peoples are innocent of the atrocities and treacheries of their governments.

That kind of behavior never surprised me in the case of the English government, as they did something even worse in Korea where their soldiers were dying under attacks from waves of Chinese from red Manchuria while the government was selling steel to Pekin.

In the case of the French government I was sorrowful because of the figure of Gen. DeGaulle. As a young Cuban I used to hold in my heart the image of DeGaulle, hero of the Second World War, leader of his country's resistance in the fight against the foreign invader.

It was hard for me to realize that this same man would turn his back on the principles which made him beloved by the free world. It is unfortunate that such a brilliant career should have been darkened at its ending.

In any case, some day Cuba will be free and those governments can be sure that, if they do not alter their conduct, they will then receive their payment in the same historical currency that they have passed out to our martyred people.

Q. - You and your party have been accused of being fascists, of being a bee-hive for the Central Intelligence Agency and a "cover" for the worst political and economic interests of our country. What do you have to say about that?

A. - Nothing. Let my actions and my history answer the question. Those who are going to go on saying this are the Communists and the foolish tools of communism.

I believe it would be well to recall that the M.R.R. was the only organization at this stage of the Cuban struggle that, before spending its first funds for weapons, spent them for publishing a statement of its ideology precisely because we wanted everyone to know where we intended to go, how we were going and why we were going there. This background statement circulated throughout the underground and the exiles. It contains our complete ideology, and the same thing is contained in the political testament that I wrote before leaving for the Bay of Pigs, as it also appears in my book Marchas de Guerra y Cantos de Presidio (War Marches and Prison Songs), written while I awaited death, as is clearly explained in the recent pamphlet about my full statement to the members of the A.R.E.C.

If wishing to carry to Cuba a state of independence, liberty, justice, respect for the dignity of human beings; if wishing to have the constitution of 1940 effective as long as it is not revoked by the same people who approved it; if opposing all demagogic extremes and all totalitarian impositions; if all this is being a fascist; then I am a fascist.

But since fascism is totalitarianism established by an oligarchy in the name of supposed racial purity, I cannot be a fascist.

As for the other accusations of obeying or being a cover for unsavory interests, I challenge anyone to give me the name of a single individual among our revolutionary directors who has a blemish in this respect; I challenge anyone to analyze the statistics of our martyrs; I challenge anyone to analyze our history.

Q. - Can you sum up in a few words the ideological base of M.R.R.?

A. - Yes. We dream of independence with liberty, liberty with culture, culture with bread, bread for honest work, honest work with respect for the dignity of the human being; and all this in a democratic regime of Latin American character and Christian morality.

Q. - Would your group favor keeping some laws of the Revolution if it is proved that they correspond to some need, or do you think that the Fidel epoch should be swept out completely and a fresh start made?

A. - When Fidel's regime is overthrown, Cuban needs are going to be quite different from those of our country with the tyrant in power. I believe the laws he made which could answer real Cuban needs were badly conceived and [redacted]-directed even worse.

I believe that without fundamentally changing the 1940 constitution, which means for Cuba a return to the rule of law, it will be possible to make laws which will meet Cuban needs.

Q. - Are you opposed to the negroes?

A. - No; nor am I opposed to the whites, which means the same thing to me. What interests us is not the color of the skin but the color of the soul and of the ideals.

Perhaps that is why our movement is the one that has more black brothers in its ranks, including the highest civil and military positions.

Q. - Do you favor, as has been stated, establishment in Cuba of a semi-confessional state with open predominance of the most conservative elements of the Catholic Church?

A. - Neither of the most conservative nor of the most liberal; that would be "clericalism" and it is expressly condemned in Papal Encyclicals.

I personally am a Catholic and will never deny my faith, because I have no vocation to be an apostate.

But of course, the movement is full of men of all religions and creeds.

Certainly we shall reaffirm with the 1940 constitution our belief in God and the necessity for Christian morality.

We believe that every child has the right to receive preparation in whatever religion he chooses.

Q. - What will the M.R.R. do with the Rebel Army and the Militia once Cuba is liberated?

A. - Those who turn around and fight against the tyrant will be retained in the armed forces with the same rank as before. Those who do not will be discharged and returned to private life if they have committed no crime, but if they have, they will have to answer to the civil courts in normal fashion, which will again function in Cuba in accordance with the 1940 constitution.

The only ones who have anything to fear are foreign Communists and members of repressive agencies.

Q. - Will the death penalty be maintained in Cuba?

A. - I do not favor the death penalty, but of course since the 1940 constitution will be in force, this penalty is recognized only for treason. We must end the revolutionary tribunals and return to the rule of law.

Q. - Do you believe Cuban national interests when freed from communism will be better served if the nation is placed in a position of international neutrality?

A. - We shall always be an aggressive forefront of the West against communism. We can never be neutral in a struggle in which the destiny of civilization is at stake.

Q. - Engineer Ray and you seem to be performing parallel activities as you approach almost five years of struggle against Castro and are apparently the two most important political figures of our future. Could you tell us what keeps you apart?

A. - Starting from the assumption that we are fighting for a democracy, any ideological difference between another group of Cubans and ourselves will be resolved in the future by the Cuban people in free elections. I do not think this is the historic moment to talk about differences. If the regime set up in Cuba after Fidel Castro is defeated is a totalitarianism or a dictatorship of left or right, we shall KEEP ON USING OUR GUNS.

Q. - Why don't you take the command of Brigade 2506 and why has it not been possible to consolidate around the brigade all the exile elements since it is the largest group of veterans of our war?

A. - A great many of our brothers of Brigade 2506 are already in our ranks. The brigade could not consolidate exiles around it because it was formed to be a military unit without political plans; recently arrived from Communist prisons, it went to North American army camps to continue its training. That is why I left its ranks. I did not want anyone to say that I was trying to orient the brigade politically by trying to unite the exiles around it. Besides I thought that I was more useful to my country in trying to carry the war into Cuba than in receiving a training that I did not know whether I would put in practice some day. Time has proved I was right.

Q. - What would you do, or what are you doing with the followers of Batista? Do you think this way of naming some people who form closed blocs with persons of very dissimilar history and interests, is real and does any good for Cuba?

A. - For me there are no Batistianos nor Priistas nor any other discriminative "ista". I only believe in a moral classification of men, and there are good ones and bad ones in all the governments our country has had. The only salvation for Cuba is to bring together all worthy and honest Cubans of all epochs, of all social classes, of all colors, and of all ages, into a new historical generation to consolidate our nation after the traitor's regime has been overthrown. Poor Cuba if we continue to harbor sectarian hates and sterile discriminations!

Q. - It is said that you are an admirer of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, that you are familiar with his ideology, and that his assistants say in private that you are an Antillean version of him. Is this true?

A. - It is a fact that I am familiar with Primo Rivera's ideology, as I am also familiar with that of Mahatma Ghandi, Rousseau, Roosevelt, Lenin, Hitler and all the men who for mankind's good or ill have left a political philosophy to history. A leader has a duty to understand them completely. But the ideoligies that are most familiar to me are moulded in the unforgettable thoughts of Jesus Christ, Martí and Bolívar.

This is the first time I hear myself called an "Antillean version" of Primo de Rivera. If anyone says so, it must be in secret because I have never heard it. What I was called once was a "fascist" when I was in prison awaiting the death penalty; it was the traitor Fidel Castro in person. It is possible that he has friends in exile.

Q. - What do you consider the weakest of the Castro regime?

A. - The people, the people of Cuba, who would rather die on their feet than live on their knees; the people who now realize the total surrender to a foreign power and have seen the complete failure of [illegible] Communist doctrine. The troops that will overthrow Fidel Castro are already in Cuba, the very people who cheered him when they thought him the hero of our liberty.

The presence of Russian occupation troops in Cuba has definitely revitalized the nationalist spirit of our country.

Q. - What will you do in case you come to govern Cuba, with private schools, with the press and with private initiative of an economic nature?

A. - In the first place, our fight is not for the purpose of putting me in the government; it is to make our country independent. But if you ask me what is my idea about what a government ought to do in Cuba in respect to these matters, my answer is: Regarding private education: protect it in every possible way, and raise public education to the same level as private. Regarding the press: liberty of the press and assistance for the school for reporters to make Cuban newspaper men more efficient. The Cuban press will educate our peoples' background so as to definitively wash the wounds which communism has inflicted on the spirit of our children and young people.

Regarding private enterprise: protection for it, assistance for small business, and by means of modern tax laws make sure that business performs its social function. The United States, Western Germany and many other countries can give us an exact idea of what we want.

Q. - What is your final message to your exiled people in this grave moment of history?

A. - That we cannot and must not trust in international solutions nor in easy paths to our country's independence. That we must return to the romantic spirit of our war of independence, to that difficult, self-sacrificing, hard war of a Martí collecting pennies and a Maceo spending them on bullets; to that war of Cubans within and Cubans without against those who are no longer Cubans.

If every Cuban offers what he can; if we obtain, as was done in 1895, the fraternal embrace of our brother peoples; if we put the interests of a country that must be saved before our personal interests, Cuba will be independent. Because this bat-

4 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 29 May 1964 at 0130

1. After being informed by night Security that "Mr. Ignacio" had called I returned A-1's call.

2. A-1 mentioned he would need four RB-12's and two RB-9's for the next operation. A-1 asked if they could be given to him directly to take to Nicaragua. I told him this would have to be checked out with Dick.

3. For security reasons A-1 felt it would be best for AMJAVA-4 alone to meet with Carl. A-4 will be staying at the same hotel he stayed the last time they met. Meeting scheduled for 29 May 64. After 1430 Houston time, A-4 will use alias of Rafael Carela.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Logistics

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

tle has been won. The tyrant who accumulated guns, tanks and planes is beginning to realize that they only guarantee a government when the people who hold those guns and manage those tanks and planes are convinced that the government represents the purest interests of the nation and the highest destinies of the country. And those guns, those tanks and those planes are already being turned against the red beast. The little western David called Cuba has already let fly the stone which will knock down the ugly Goliath of communism.

5670

A CONTROVERSIAL PERSONALITY

It can be said of the Secretary General of the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery, Manuel Artime, that there is much to say, but never that he has lacked spirit to fight for the liberty of Cuba.

Combative and polemical, Artime today occupies a singular position in the fight against Castro in which he collects furious insults and almost fanatical proselytism in equal quantities. His early struggle against Batista's dictatorship and his activity in Sierra Maestra in Column One commanded by Fidel Castro, made him an outstanding figure in the Revolution. His break with Castro and his denunciation of the olive green treachery to the great romance of the Cuban people made him the target for all attacks and insults. In the spring of 1960 Artime went into exile. In Mexico he wrote a book denouncing Castro's apostasy. With other eminent democratic leaders he helped found the Revolutionary Front (later Committee) and exerted intense propaganda and political activity throughout the continent which culminated in the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion. This was one of the most critical points in Manuel Artime's civic career. His activity in it -- personally heroic though it was -- helped throw on him the shadow of new attacks and suspicions. But it also converted him into a leader of the first rank which the maturity of a prison term and his conspiratorial and revolutionary activities afterward only enhanced.

Manuel Artime has become today, by virtue of the attack of his troops on Puerto Pilón, the principal figure of current Cuban activity. His group has been hammered into one of the most disciplined, one of the largest and most efficient in the heroic struggle of the people of Cuba for their liberty. Consequently everything he does and says is of passionate interest for this people in exile, a people which wants to know closely -- and they should -- the thoughts and activities of the men who will probably lead them in the future.

This is why Manuel Artime is brought to these Cuban pages of BOHEMIA, which have been, are now and will continue to be the ideal civic rostrum for the people of Cuba.

Artime has the floor. . .

A. T.

(A. T. is Agustin Tamargo, assistant director of Bohemia)

5670

Bohemia LIBRE
INTERNACIONAL

25c.
Junio 7, 1964



Reportaje Sensacional sobre la Catástrofe en el Stadium Nacional de Lima

EL DIA QUE TITO DERROTO A STALIN

MANUEL ARTIME EN LA TRIBUNA DE BOHEMIA

LA TROPA QUE DERROCARA A CASTRO YA ESTA EN CUBA

Es el pueblo que lo aplaudió cuando veía en él a un héroe de nuestras libertades.

Preguntas de AGUSTIN TAMARGO fotos de Guayo

P.—Su grupo ha iniciado en los últimos días una nueva ofensiva contra el régimen castrista, al unísono con la que desarrollan otras entidades revolucionarias. ¿Considera Ud. que la victoria será pronta?

R.—Las guerras se sabe cuándo empiezan pero nunca cuándo terminan.

Me gustaría decir que será breve, pero mi deber como dirigente es orientar al pueblo de Cuba y al exilio cubano hacia el tipo de guerra que nos espera: una guerra dura y larga, pero que ganaremos si todos los cubanos colaboran en la medida de sus fuerzas.

Puede haber factores imponderables, "sorpresas", que precipiten la caída del Tirano; pero nunca debemos descansar en soluciones "milagrosas" de invasiones que no existen ni en organizaciones que nos saquen las castañas del fuego.

P.—¿Contempla Ud. la posibilidad de una unión eventual de sus hombres y recursos con los de la Junta Revolucionaria Cubana, los del grupo Alpha 66-II Frente-MRP, o cualquier otro que esté luchando actualmente dentro de Cuba?

R.—Las fronteras de nuestro Movimiento jamás han estado cerradas para nadie que tenga el deseo de combatir por Cuba, excepto para los movimientos totalitarios, sean de izquierda o de derecha.

Lo que sí es conveniente aclarar es que no creemos en unidades politiqueras del exilio. Creemos solamente en la unidad del martirio, del sacrificio, del combate. Nosotros deseamos el mayor éxito a las organizaciones revolucionarias hermanas, que jamás recibirán ataques de parte nuestra pues nuestro único enemigo es el Comunismo.

P.—A Ud. personalmente y al M.R.R. en general se les ha señalado siempre como "favoritos" de ciertos sectores o agencias gubernamentales norteamericanas ¿Es eso cierto?

R.—Yo quisiera que los que hablan de este favoritismo me respondieran:

¿Consideran favoritismo el episodio de BAHIA DE COCHINOS?

¿Consideran favoritismo los dos años que me pasé en la cárcel esperando el paredón de fusilamiento?

¿Consideran favoritismo el estado de abandono en que quedó el M.R.R. clandestino en Cuba después de Playa Girón?

¿Consideran favoritismo el que a mi regreso de la cárcel tuviera que romper con el Consejo Revolucionario porque se había convertido en un instrumento para no llevar la guerra a Cuba?

¿Consideran favoritismo el que hayamos tenido que abandonar el territorio norteamericano para poder seguir luchando contra Castro?

¿Consideran favoritismo el que tengamos que realizar una guerra larga por no recibir ayuda de quienes podían hacerla breve?

Pero no me extrañan esas campañas de "favoritismos". Yo sé que el Comunismo Internacional no puede reconocer públicamente que está siendo derrotado por el pequeño pueblo cubano que no recibe más ayuda que la de los hermanos de Latinoamérica, la de Dios y el inderrotable deseo de ser Libre.

P.—Ud. habla hoy de provocar levantamientos en las fuerzas internas del régimen castrista y parece confiar en ello como la mejor vía para liberar a la isla del dominio soviético y comunista. ¿A qué atribuye el no haber asumido hace 3 años esa posición, que era entonces tan correcta como hoy?

R.—Hace 3 años asumimos la misma postura que hoy hemos asumido. Es conveniente recordar que el M.R.R. fue la primera organización revolucionaria que se alzó contra el tirano Castro para lograr el derrocamiento por rebelión interna, cuando muchos ya estaban convencidos de que Fidel era comunista pero decían "que aún no era el momento de denunciarlo al pueblo".

Es conveniente recordar que las primeras armas para la rebelión interna fueron llevadas a Cuba por el M.R.R.

...Cuba será libre, gústele a quien le guste y pésele a quien le pese

Es conveniente recordar que Francisco, Coordinador del M.R.R. en Cuba, no sólo fue el genial organizador de la Resistencia, sino que llegó a ser el Coordinador Nacional de todo el clandestinaje.

Es conveniente recordar que la invasión de BAHIA DE COCHINOS debía haber sido sólo el broche de oro que cerraba toda una etapa de resistencia

PARA PI

NO HAY

Tamargo

Artime

...si caído Castro hay totalitarismo, tomaremos los rifles de nuevo

MI IDEARIO ES EL DE CRISTO, BOLIVAR Y MARTI

activa y de movimientos guerrilleros.

Es conveniente recordar la larga lista de más de 150 mártires del clandestinaje del M.R.R., que indica claramente la primordialidad que concedíamos en aquel momento a la rebelión de las fuerzas internas.

Es conveniente recordar que antes de los campamentos de la Brigada existieron los campamentos de infiltración creados especialmente para ayudar a esta rebelión interna.

P.—En ciertos círculos internacionales se asegura que Rusia está abandonando a Castro, que ha negociado secretamente con Norteamérica tal abandono, y que ello se expresa visiblemente en la retirada gradual de las tropas soviéticas de la Isla. Se añade que es esta seguridad la que ha hecho que Norteamérica "tolere" este recrudecimiento de las actividades armadas en el Caribe. ¿Comparte Ud. este criterio?

R.—Sinceramente, no creo en pactos internacionales que no me consten y mucho menos creo en la lealtad de Rusia para cumplir sus pactos: Polonia, Checoeslovaquia y Hungría son testigos históricos de la falsía rusa.

Con respecto a que "toleren nuestras actividades", no lo sé, pues no hemos pedido "tolerancia" para ellas. No se me había ocurrido "pedir permiso" para morir por mi Patria.

P.—¿Condicionaría Ud. las posibilidades de liberación de su Patria a las conveniencias de índole internacional de los Estados Unidos?

R.—Los intereses de mi Patria están por encima de los intereses de cualquier otra nación.

El cubano que así no lo crea no merece llamarse cubano.

No creo que los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica pretendan de los cubanos esa monstruosidad. Ellos pueden tener muchos defectos pero respetan la dignidad del hombre.

No es la primera vez que decimos públicamente que esta guerra de liberación de nuestra Cuba esclava tiene que ser llevada adelante "gústele a quien le guste y pésele a quien le pese", porque si es verdad que poderosas naciones tienen deberes internacionales que cumplir, es verdad que nosotros los cubanos tenemos otros deberes ineludibles con nuestra Patria esclava.

P.—Si la acción armada dentro de Cuba —guerra de guerrillas en las montañas y guerra de terror en las ciudades— produjera, como se espera, una ola de levantamientos populares tanto entre los estudiantes y obreros como entre los cuerpos militares de la dictadura, ¿cree Ud. que las naciones democráticas del Hemisferio vendrían en nuestra ayuda? ¿No teme que se repita un Budapest?

R.—A pesar de que estoy convencido de que en un momento determinado vendrían en nuestra ayuda, no podemos basar nuestra guerra en el hecho de esa ayuda colectiva. Tenemos que trazar una estrategia de lucha totalmente cubana, desde el principio hasta el final.

Muchas naciones latinoamericanas ya nos están ayudando en la medida de sus fuerzas, y gracias a ellas podemos hacer lo que estamos haciendo.

Con respecto al temor de un Budapest cubano no podemos olvidar que Cuba no tiene fronteras con Rusia.

P.—Algunos comentaristas extranjeros y algunos gobiernos juzgan la situación de la Isla y tratan con Castro, como si pensaran que allí ha muerto toda esperanza de liberación. ¿Puede decirnos algo sobre la lucha interna contra el Comunismo?

R.—Pensar que en Cuba ha muerto toda esperanza de liberación sólo demuestra un desconocimiento total de la condición e idiosincrasia del Pueblo Cubano. La Historia de Cuba es una historia de martirio incesante en busca de la verdadera libertad.

Muy poco puedo decir de la lucha interna que no ofrece la seguridad de la misma, pero bástenos con decir que hoy en día existen guerrillas en 5 de las 6 Provincias de Cuba; que el Tirano conoce de ellas y que no ha podido exterminarlas debido a la colaboración del campesinado; que en las ciudades el movimiento obrero ha comenzado a movilizarse hacia la resistencia pasiva y que dentro de las mismas filas de las milicias los patriotas cubanos se van integrando en células independentistas.

P.—Desde los días de Bahía de Cochinos Ud. parecía confiar de modo ciego en el respaldo material norteamericano a nuestra lucha. Ultimamente, sin embargo, se le ha visto cambiar el interés hacia los países latinoamericanos. ¿Por qué?

R.—En realidad, mi primera mirada fue hacia Latinoamérica: me establecí en México donde publiqué mi libro TRAICION y recorrí Latinoamérica dando el grito de alarma contra el Comunismo. Después fui a Norteamérica en busca incesante de medios para la guerra y aunque confianza ciega nunca he tenido en nada humano, porque todo lo que se hace a ciegas está mal hecho, es cierto que tuve confianza en la ayuda material norteamericana. Motivo: porque la estaba viendo. (No creo que para nadie sea un secreto la procedencia de las armas que usamos en la invasión). No tuve escrúpulos en aceptar armas americanas para contrarrestar las rusas que por lotes gigantescos recibía Fidel Castro.

LEAR POR LA INDEPENDENCIA DE LA PATRIA QUE PEDIRLE PERMISO A NADIE

...las fronteras del MRR están abiertas para todo el mundo

...en Cuba no puede darse un Budapest

...no me consta que Rusia esté abandonando a Castro

Después de salir de presidio perdí confianza en esa ayuda, porque desde entonces, no sólo no la he visto, sino que ni siquiera he visto la posibilidad de conseguirla.

No sólo mi interés se ha desplazado hacia Latinoamérica, sino también mi gratitud hacia estos pueblos que nos han abierto los brazos para brindarnos ayuda cuando todas las puertas se nos estaban cerrando. Gracias a ellos podemos continuar la lucha.

P.—¿Qué opinión le merece la conducta de naciones como Inglaterra y Francia que, de espaldas a principios que dicen sustentar y a consideraciones mismas de orden moral y humano, se vienen dedicando a apuntalar al sangriento régimen de Castro por medio de créditos y todo tipo de operaciones financieras?

R.—Primero, no quiero confundir a los países con los gobiernos. La mayor parte de los pueblos son inocentes de las atrocidades y traiciones de sus gobiernos.

Del Gobierno Inglés nunca me extrañó esa conducta porque algo peor hizo en Corea, donde sus soldados morían luchando contra las oleadas de chinos de la Manchuria roja, mientras el Gobierno le vendía acero a Pekín.

Del Gobierno francés sí me ha dolido. En la figura del Gral. De Gaulle mi corazón de joven cubano tenía la imagen del De Gaulle héroe de la 2ª Guerra Mundial, líder de la resistencia de su país en la lucha contra el extranjero invasor.

Me costó trabajo pensar que este mismo hombre diera la espalda a los principios que le hicieron querido por el mundo libre. Es lástima que una carrera tan brillante se haya opacado en su ocaso.

De todas maneras, algún día Cuba será libre y pueden estar seguros esos Gobiernos que si no cambian de conducta reci-

UNA PERSONALIDAD CONTROVERSIAL

Del Secretario General del Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria, Manuel Artime, pueden decirse probablemente muchas cosas. Pero nunca que le hayan faltado arrestos para luchar por la libertad de Cuba.

Combativo y polémico, Artime ocupa hoy en la lucha contra Castro una posición singular en la que se recogen por igual denuestos furiosos y proselitismo casi fanático. Su temprana lucha contra la dictadura de Batista y su acción en la Sierra Maestra en la Columna 1 que comandaba Fidel Castro le hicieron una figura de relieve en la Revolución. Su ruptura con Castro y su denuncia de la traición verdeolivo a la gran gesta del pueblo cubano, lo colocaron en el blanco mismo de todos los ataques y vilipendios. En la Primavera de 1960 Artime marchó al destierro. Escribió en México un libro denunciando la apostasía de Castro. Contribuyó a fundar junto a otros eminentes líderes democráticos el entonces llamado Frente Revolucionario (luego Consejo) y desarrolló una intensa actividad de orden propagandístico y político por todo el Continente que culminó en la fracasada invasión de Bahía de Cochinos. Aquel episodio es uno de los puntos más críticos de la carrera cívica de Manuel Artime. Su participación en él —heroica por lo demás en lo personal— contribuyó a arrojar sobre su figura la sombra de nuevos ataques y sospechas. Pero lo convirtió a la vez en un líder de primer rango, que la madurez de la prisión y la actividad conspirativa y revolucionaria posterior no han podido más que acrecentar.

Manuel Artime constituye hoy, por virtud del ataque de sus fuerzas a Puerto Pilón, un punto principal de la actualidad cubana. Su movimiento se ha forjado como uno de los más disciplinados, numerosos y eficientes en esta lucha heroica del pueblo de Cuba por su libertad. Por lo tanto, todo lo que él haga y diga es de apasionante interés para el pueblo criollo en el destierro. Un pueblo que desea conocer de cerca —y con mucha razón— el pensamiento y la acción de los hombres que probablemente lo habrán de dirigir en el futuro.

Es por eso que Manuel Artime viene a estas páginas cubanas de BOHEMIA —que eran, son y seguirán siendo la tribuna cívica ideal del pueblo de Cuba.

Artime tiene la palabra... A. T.

Los cubanos tenemos que lanzarnos a la lucha sin esperar por acuerdos o ayudas internacionales que pueden venir o no venir.

...el camino está en la América Latina

birán entonces su pago en la misma moneda histórica que ellos han entregado a nuestro pueblo mártir.

P.—A Ud. y a su Partido se les ha acusado de fascistas, de "empolladura" de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia, y de "pantalla" de los peores intereses políticos y económicos de nuestro país. ¿Qué tiene que decir a ello?

R.—Yo no tengo que decir nada. Que lo digan mi conducta y mi historia. Los que van a seguir diciendo eso son los Comunistas y los "tontos útiles" al Comunismo.

Creo que es conveniente recordar que el M.R.R. fue la única Organización de esta etapa de lucha cubana que antes de invertir sus primeros fondos en armas los invirtió en imprimir su ideario, precisamente porque queríamos que todos supieran a dónde íbamos, cómo íbamos y por qué íbamos. Este ideario circuló por todo el clandestinaje y el exilio. Ahí está nuestra ideología completa, como está también en el testamento político que escribí al partir hacia Bahía de Cochinos, como está en mi Libro "MARCHAS DE GUERRA Y CANTOS DE PRESIDIO" escrito mientras esperaba la muerte, como está claramente definida en el reciente folleto que contiene mi conferencia completa ante los miembros de la A.R.E.C.

Si querer llevar a Cuba a un Estado de Independencia, Libertad, Justicia, respeto a la dignidad de la persona humana; si querer que la Constitución de 1940 tenga vigencia mientras no sea revocada por el mismo pueblo que la aprobó; si oponernos a todos los extremismos demagógicos y a todas las imposiciones totalitarias; si todo eso es ser Fascista, entonces yo soy fascista.

Pero como el fascismo es el totalitarismo implantado por una oligarquía o casta de una supuesta pureza racial, yo no puedo ser fascista.

Con respecto a las demás acusaciones de [illegible] o ser pantalla de intereses turbios, yo reto a que se me diga el nombre de una sola figura de nuestros cuadros dirigentes revolucionarios que tenga una mácula a este respecto; yo reto a que se analicen las figuras de nuestros mártires; yo reto a que se analice nuestra Historia.

P.—¿Puede sintetizar en breves palabras las bases ideológicas del M.R.R.?

R.—Sí. Nosotros soñamos una Independencia con Libertad, una Libertad con cultura, una cultura con pan, un pan por trabajo honrado, un trabajo honrado con respeto a la dignidad de la persona humana; y todo eso en un régimen democrático de proyección latinoamericana con una moral Cristiana.

P.—¿Sería su grupo partidario del mantenimiento de algunas leyes de la Revolución, si se prueba que éstas responden a alguna necesidad, o cree que se debe barrer todo el período fidelista de un plumazo, comenzando de nuevo?

R.—Cuando se derroque al régimen fidelista, las necesidades cubanas van a ser muy distintas a las que tenía nuestra Patria cuando el Tirano ocupó el poder. Creo que las leyes que él hizo, que podían responder a necesidades reales de Cuba, estaban mal concebidas y peor orientadas.

Creo que sin alterar en su base la Constitución de 1940, que significa para Cuba una vuelta al estado de Derecho, se pueden hacer las leyes que hagan frente a las necesidades que encontraremos en Cuba.

P.—¿Está Ud. contra los negros?

R.—No; como tampoco estoy contra los blancos, pues para mí significan la misma cosa. Lo que nos interesa no es el color de la piel sino el color del alma y de los ideales.

Quizás sea por esto que nuestro Movimiento es el que más hermanos negros tiene en sus filas, incluyendo las más altas jerarquías civiles y militares.

...no estoy contra los negros ni contra los blancos

P. Favorece Ud., como se ha dicho, el establecimiento en Cuba de un estado semi-confesional, con predominio franco de las fuerzas más conservadoras de la Iglesia Católica?

R.—Ni de las más conservadoras, ni de las más liberales; eso se llamaría "clericalismo" y está expresamente condenado aún por las Encíclicas Papales.

Yo específicamente soy Católico y jamás negaré mi fé, porque no tengo vocación de APOSTATA.

Ahora bien, el Movimiento está repleto de hombres procedentes de todas las religiones y credos.

Sí reafirmamos con la Constitución de 1940, nuestra creencia en Dios y la necesidad de una moral cristiana.

Sí creemos que todo niño tiene el derecho de recibir preparación sobre la Religión que adopte.

P.—¿Qué hará el M.R.R., una vez liberada Cuba, con el Ejército Rebelde y con las Milicias?

R.—Los que vuelvan sus armas contra el Tirano seguirán en las Fuerzas Armadas con el mismo rango que tenían. Los que no, serán licenciados e incorporados a la vida civil si no han cometido ningún delito común, pues en este caso, tendrían que responder ante los tribunales civiles normales que según la Constitución de 1940 volverán a tener vigencia en Cuba.

Los únicos que tienen que temer son los Comunistas extranjeros y los miembros de cuerpos represivos.

P.—¿Mantendrá Ud. en Cuba la pena de muerte?

R.—No soy partidario de la pena de muerte; pero además, como será aplicada la Constitución de 1940, ésta sólo la reconoce en los delitos de lesa Patria. Hay que acabar con los "Tribunales Revolucionarios" para volver a un estado de derecho.

P.—¿Cree Ud. que los intereses nacionales de Cuba, una vez liberada del Comunismo, estarían mejor servidos si se situase a la Nación en una posición de neutralidad internacional?

R.—Siempre seremos vanguardia agresiva de Occidente contra el Comunismo. Jamás podremos ser neutrales en una lucha donde se está jugando el destino de la civilización.

P.—El Ingeniero Ray y Ud. parecen perfilarse, al borde casi de un quinquenio de lucha contra Castro como las dos figuras políticas de nuestro futuro. ¿Podría decirnos qué lo separa de él?

R.—Si partimos de la base de que estamos luchando por una *Democracia*, cualquier diferencia ideológica entre otro grupo de cubanos y nosotros será solventada en el futuro por el pueblo de Cuba en urnas libres. No creo que sea el momento histórico de hablar de diferencias. Si lo que se implanta en Cuba una vez derrotado Fidel Castro es un totalitarismo o una Dictadura, sea de Izquierda o de Derecha, SEGUIREMOS USANDO LOS FUSILES.

.—¿Por qué no encabeza Ud. la Brigada 2506 y por qué no se ha podido aglutinar alrededor de ella todo el exilio siendo como es el cuerpo mayor de veteranos de nuestra guerra?

R.—Una gran parte de nuestros hermanos de la Brigada 2506 están ya luchando en nuestras filas. La Brigada no pudo aglutinar el exilio alrededor de ella porque fue creada como cuerpo Militar sin proyecciones políticas y recién llegada de las prisiones Comunistas se fue a los Campamentos del ARMY norteamericano a continuar el training. Este fue el motivo de que yo me separase de sus filas. No quise que dijeran que yo pensaba proyectar políticamente a la Brigada al tratar de unir al exilio alrededor de ella. Pensé además que yo le era más útil a mi Patria tratando de llevar la guerra a Cuba que recibiendo un training que no sabía si iba a poner en práctica algún día. El tiempo me ha dado la razón.

P. ¿Qué hará Ud., o está haciendo, con los "batistianos"? ¿Cree que esta manera de denominar de algunos, que agrupan en bloques cerrados a personas de muy distintas historias e intereses, es real y le hace bien a Cuba?

R.—Para mí no hay Batistianos, ni Prietistas, ni ninguna "ista" discriminativa. Yo sólo creo en la clasificación moral de los hombres, y los hay buenos y malos en todos los gobiernos por los que ha atravesado nuestra Patria. La única salvación que tiene Cuba es que se logre sumar a todos los cubanos dignos y honestos de todas las épocas, de todas las clases sociales, de todos los colores, y de todas las edades, en una nueva generación histórica que conduzca a nuestra Nación después de derrumbado el Régimen traidor. ¡Pobre de Cuba si seguimos cultivando los odios sectaristas y los discriminaciones estériles!

P.—Se asegura que es Ud. admirador de José Antonio Primo de Rivera, que está familiarizado con su ideario y que sus colaboradores dicen en privado que es Ud. una versión antillana de él. ¿Que hay de cierto en ello?

R.—Es cierto que estoy familiarizado con el ideario de Primo Rivera, como también estoy familiarizado con el ideario de Mahatma Ghandi, de Roosevelt, de Lenin, de Hitler y de todos los hombres que para beneficio o para desgracia de la Humanidad han dejado una filosofía política en la Historia. Un dirigente tiene el deber de conocerlas perfectamente. Pero los idearios que más familiares me son están plasmados en el pensamiento inolvidable de Jesucristo, de Martí y de Bolívar.

Es la primera vez que oigo eso de que yo sea una "versión antillana" de Primo de Rivera. Si alguno de mis colaboradores lo dice debe ser en secreto porque yo nunca lo he oído. El que sí me dijo una vez que yo era un "fascista", cuando yo estaba preso y esperando la pena de muerte fue el traidor Fidel Castro en persona. Es posible que él tenga amigos en el exilio.

P.—¿Cuál cree que es el flanco más débil del régimen castrista?

R.—El pueblo, el pueblo de Cuba, que prefiere morir de pie a vivir de rodillas; el pueblo que ya es consciente de la entrega total a una Potencia extranjera y ha visto el fracaso completo de la tesis comunista. La tropa que derrotará a Fidel Castro está ya en Cuba, es el pueblo que lo aplaudió cuando veía en él al héroe de nuestra libertad.

La presencia de una tropa de ocupación rusa en Cuba ha sido definitiva en la revitalización del espíritu nacionalista de nuestra Patria.

P.—¿Qué hará Ud., si gobierna en Cuba, con la escuela privada, con la prensa y con la empresa privada de orden capitalista?

R.—En primer lugar, nuestra lucha no es para ponerme a mí en el Gobierno: es la independencia de nuestra Patria. Pero si Ud. me pregunta cuál es mi idea sobre lo que un Gobierno debe hacer en Cuba respecto a estos tópicos, yo le respondería: con respecto a la enseñanza privada: protegerla al máximo y elevar la enseñanza pública al mismo nivel de la privada. Con respecto a la prensa: libertad de la misma y ayuda a las Escuela de Periodismo para que cada vez se superen más los periodistas cubanos.

La prensa cubana sabrá orientar la opinión pública de nuestro pueblo para lavar definitivamente las heridas que el Comunismo ha logrado en el espíritu de nuestros niños y de nuestros jóvenes.

Con respecto a la empresa privada: protección a la misma, fomento de la pequeña propiedad, y por medio de leyes modernas de impuestos, asegurar que dicha propiedad rinda su función social. Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, Alemania Occidental y otros muchos países pueden darnos una idea exacta de lo que nosotros buscamos.

P.—¿Cuál sería su mensaje final en esta hora de gravedad histórica, al pueblo en el destierro?

R.—Que no podemos ni debemos confiar en soluciones Internacionales ni en caminos fáciles para independizar a nuestra Patria. Que debemos y tenemos que volver al espíritu romántico de nuestra guerra de Independencia, a esa guerra difícil, abnegada, dura, de un Martí recogiendo centavos y un Maceo gastándolos en balas. A esa guerra de los cubanos de dentro con los cubanos de afuera contra los que ya no son cubanos.

Si cada cubano aporta lo que puede; si logramos, como se logró en 1895, el abrazo fraterno de los pueblos hermanos; si por encima de nuestros intereses ponemos los intereses de una Patria que está por conquistar, Cuba será independiente. Porque esta batalla la tenemos ganada. El tirano que acumuló fusiles, tanques y aviones comienza a darse cuenta de que sólo sirven para garantizar un gobierno cuando el Pueblo que tiene esos fusiles y maneja esos tanques y esos aviones está convencido de que el Gobierno representa los más puros intereses de la nación y los más altos destinos de la Patria. Y esos fusiles, esos tanques y esos aviones se están volviendo ya contra la bestia roja. El pequeño David Occidental llamado Cuba ha dado ya la pedrada que hará caer por tierra al despreciable Goliat del Comunismo.



¡una
pluma singular
que se llena
de dos formas!

Parker 45

CONVERTIBLE

¡Una nueva y formidable creación de Parker! Con cada Parker 45 usted obtiene la "unidad llenadora" la cual le permitirá llenarla directamente del tintero. Cuantas veces lo requiera podrá quitar la unidad llenadora y cargar su Parker 45 con cartuchos de tinta, los cuales se colocan con facilidad, rapidez y limpieza. Cada cartucho contiene reserva de tinta suficiente para escribir hasta 10.000 palabras.

Cada palabra será escrita con suavidad y uniformidad gracias al punto de oro de 14K de la Parker 45. Escoja entre siete tipos diferentes de punto el que mejor se avenga con su personalidad. Vea hoy mismo la Parker 45, donde su detallista Parker. Permita que él le demuestre por qué esta singular pluma es sin duda de positivo valor para usted.

PARKER

Fabricante de las plumas más solicitadas del mundo

Visite el Pabellón Parker en
la Feria Mundial de Nueva York
1964-1965

Agencia y Centro de Atención: C.A. PARDO & MOSQUERA Sucrs.
Edif. Zinga, Sociedad a Traposos No. 6, CARACAS.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

43 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

EOB [illegible] [illegible] CA

CI SI BF [✓ HH]

SEC NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, VR

Padron 201

201

S E C R E T 050028Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7421

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

5 JUN 64 IN 98804

REF DIR 25079

WAVE INVESTIGATING RUMOR. WILL ADVISE RESULTS UPON RECEIPT.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *RE RUMOR THAT AMBIDDY BOUGHT HIS MISTRESS AN $85,000 HOUSE IN NORTH MIAMI.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

4 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 4 June 1964 at 0930 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 was advised that he should call the Panama Hilton upon his arrival in Panama and ask for Mr. Boysen or Mr. James.

2. Latest report indicates that the ADELAIDA will arrive at Monkey Point at 0400 4 June. A-1 has obtained his re-entry visa. A-1 was again asked to give us the tapes on his Venezuelan conference. A-1 promised to have them done today.

3. A-1 was asked to please make sure that someone sees Mr. Barnes concerning the petroleum arrangements. It was mentioned to A-1 that Mr. Barnes has been waiting for over a week to see someone in A-1's organization. Mr. Barnes has been kind enough to offer his services and we feel it is unfair to keep this gentleman waiting. A-1 plans to send Sixto Mesa and Mr. King today. A-1 will notify us of what transpired at the meeting.

4. A-1 intends calling later in the day because he has some other matters he would like to discuss with us.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
POL

Above conversation conducted
[illegible] frequently,
changed privacy code

SECRET

Excluded [illegible]
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

3 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 May 1964 at 1330 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called the office again to say that he would be meeting Al Burt at 1600. A-1 inquired if it would do any harm in seeing Mr. Summ of the State Department since the latter mentioned to AMJAVA-4 that he had not seen A-1 in over a year. A-1 felt that a courtesy visit was called for. We advised A-1 that we could see no harm in visiting him.

2. A-1 reported that one of his pilots, Ginebra, had received an offer to fly planes in the Congo. A-1 did not know if Ginebra would accept the offer.

3. We told A-1 that we had received a report that in a finca in Nicaragua called Marianita he had met several U. S. Air Force officers and asked if there were any truth to the report. A-1 stated that one of their houses is located in Marianita but he had not met any U. S. officers there.

4. A-1 gleefully reported he contemplates making quite a lot of changes in Miami. A-1 did not elaborate but it appears that most of the propaganda section will be leaving Miami.

5. A-1 was requested to obtain a position report of the DOLORES by 1 June.

W

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
[illegible] code

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

6. We asked A-1 if he had any ideas of where AMBANG-1 is at present. A-1 is of the opinion that AMBANG-1 is probably hiding in some small island off Puerto Rico.

7. A-1 inquired if he could sue the Newsweek magazine. We advised him that he could sue but the likelihood of him winning the case was slight. A-1 was referring to the article which stated he intended to draw the United States into an open conflict with Castro. We asked if there were any truth to the matter. A-1 laughed and said, "Of course not."

8. A-1 was advised that we consider 7 June a firm date for the Consejo meeting. The reason we are pinning him down to a specific date was because of the necessary preparations that have to be made prior to any meeting. A-1 said he would be there on that date.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Ginebra - 201
State Dept
Nicaragua
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
[illegible] code.

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET

3 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 2 June 1964 at 1300 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 expects to get his residency permit today from Immigration in Miami.

2. Concerning A-1's request that we choose frequencies for the 511 radios it was our opinion this task could be done by Felix Rodriguez. In the special commo training given to Felix, a course was specially geared to choosing the correct frequencies and the proper crystals. A-1 mentioned the original request had stemmed from Felix. A-1 was informed that the reports we have gotten about Felix reflect that he likes to give the tedious jobs to someone else and this is the case here.

3. A-1 and AMJAVA-4 will be leaving for Nicaragua on 5 June.

4. A-1 asked if the Consejo meeting could be postponed until 9 June. A-1 was reminded when we originally asked him to pick a day for the meeting we considered it a definite commitment. A-1 acquiesced and said he would be there on 7 June.

5. The tentative date for the departure of the ADELAIDA for the operation is 7 June.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Felix Rodriguez - 201

W

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

2 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Under Deputy Chief, WH/SA

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Haynes Johnson, Author of "Bay of Pigs"

Subject had the chuzpa to attempt to get in touch with AMBIDDY-1 in Miami. He asked for an interview, indicated willingness to go to Central America and "spread any information from Central America."

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: COS, JMWAVE

HDH/bh

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - Publicity File ✓
1 - AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

2 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 May 1964 at 1230

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated that AMJAVA-4 will be meeting with Carl in Houston this afternoon.

2. A-1 wants to meet with the Consejo on 7 June at 0830 in Panama City.

3. A-1 again reminded we would like to have the tapes on what transpired in Venezuela. Martin reiterated that in order to protect his interest we must have current intelligence concerning his organization.

4. It is the opinion of the Consejo that a frank, off-the-record talk with Al Burt of the Miami press would do no harm. We consider Burt to be a responsible newspaperman and he may be in a position to help A-1 put the Pilon raid in its proper perspective. If A-1 thinks this is a good idea he should speak openly to Burt about the Pilon raid omitting the embroidery that has accompanied his recent press statements. A-1 was reminded this interview, if given, should not mention or allude to KUBARK support. Since Burt is an ambitious journalist he may probably ask A-1 for a scoop on his next raid; again we see no harm in this. A-1 said he would ask Burt if he wanted to go on a future raid. We mentioned that we doubted he would accept the offer.

5. According to A-1, AMYUM-19 is still in New York and is expected in Miami shortly.

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

SECRET

6. A-1 was informed that the ADELAIDA is scheduled to leave drydock on 31 May.

7. A-1 reported he has talked to Miguel Angel Quevedo of Bohemia Libre and representatives of Life magazine concerning the release of pictures to be taken by his own combat photographer. A-1 added, however, he had made no firm commitments.

8. A-1 was asked if his next operation had been given a name yet. He said the next one was to be called "Simon Bolivar." We told him that we already learned the code name and warned him against loose talk and the damages that could ensue.

9. A-1 was asked to contact Manolin Hernandez and inquire why the DC-3 cannot be in Panama before 2 June 1964. A-1 was advised that Petrosky can furnish a crew to pick up the plane if necessary but cannot since he has no contact with anyone in Costa Rica. A-1 stated he would call Hernandez in Costa Rica.

10. A-1 was informed that three men aboard the ADELAIDA have signed off and should be returning to Miami on 29 May 64 aboard KLM.

Raul J Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Press
DC-3

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

[illegible]

2 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 28 May 1964 at 1830 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called to say that he had just arrived in the United States and would only be staying a short period and then return to Central America for the next operation phase. He stated he wanted to discuss some matters with "Enrique" in Panama within the coming week. I advised him to let us know exactly when and where and we would be there.

2. A-1 inquired if AMJAVA-4 had requested rubber boats from us at the last meeting A-4 attended in Washington. A-1 was informed that we had discussed the matter but could not recall A-4 placing any order with the Consejo for rafts. A-1 asked if some rafts could be obtained in time for the coming operation. A-1 did not know the exact amount needed but would consult with A-4 and call Martin later in the evening. The rubber rafts could be sent to same address as were the village radios. A-1 mentioned they had the silent motors.

3. A-1 was asked to inquire what had gone wrong in Santo Domingo. A-1 believes that the reason the JOANNE could not be put into drydock was because there was another ship in the military yard undergoing repairs. A-1 was advised that was not the information we had received and could he please check further into the matter. A-1 will have Rafael GARCIA confront President Reid and obtain the true story.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

4. A-1 wanted five metascopes for the next operation. Since those aboard the MV SANTA MARIA will not arrive in time, Dick will get more and give them to Mike GEIDEL who in turn will deliver them to AMYUM-19.

5. According to A-1 Maritima Bam now is officially registered in Nicaragua.

6. A-1 asked Enrique to convey to Mr. Archer his gratitude for the letter Mr. Archer had sent him.

7. A-1 is very pleased concerning the possibilities of extending his operational bases to Venezuela. A-1 was asked to send us a tape of what had transpired and the government officials with whom he had met.

8. The conversation ended with A-1 promising to call later tonight (28 May) as to where he and A-4 wanted to meet with Carl.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Logistics
Special Equipment

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

Excluded [illegible]
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

C- 7-1 701

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
KYBAT/TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/AMWORLD
AMOT Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE: None

Transmitted herewith are five AMOT reports on AMWORLD activities which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

Attachments:
AMOT Reports KE-1291, DD-850,
DD-859, DD-868, DD-891, One
Copy Each Herewith

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA, w/atts/h/w

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

201-267437

DATE TYPED
28 May 64

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 2 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

~~SECRET~~ RYBAT

16 May 64

Report # DD-068.

TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted]. AMYUM

SUBJECT: [redacted]. Activities.

SOURCE: [redacted]. Friend of
AMBIDDY-1 [redacted] and [redacted], who is living with [redacted] as his mistress. Information acquired from [redacted] [redacted], very close friend of [redacted], MISTRESS, [redacted] and [redacted] sister. of MISTRESS
A-1

Source states that Marta [redacted] is one of the persons who knows more about AMBIDDY-1'S [redacted] intimate or personal affairs, and that Marta [redacted] has friendly relations with [redacted], sister of [redacted] who is now living with A-1 [redacted] as his mistress.

According to source, Marta [redacted] informed her that on the night of 12 May 64 SISTER [redacted] made a phone call to A-1 [redacted] (PL-4-[redacted]) right from her house (Marta [redacted] house), and [redacted] said that everything was normal.

The next day, 13 May 64, day of the raid against Cabo Cruz sugar mill, SHE [redacted] returned to Marta [redacted] house and told Marta that [redacted] A-1 had been woken at 5 AM by someone who gave him the news about the [redacted].'s attack against Cabo Cruz sugar mill in Oriente province. When [redacted] A-1 got the news he almost had a stroke. He was hysterical, shouting and hitting the walls with his hands. MISTRESS [redacted] was trying to calm him down, but A-1 [redacted] was shouting and screaming that he had been betrayed.

A-1 [redacted] said: "I cannot take this betrayal! These people think I am an idiot but I am going to show them the opposite! They can't do that to me!"

That same morning, 13 May 64, A-1 [redacted] left for New York. He said he was going there in connection with the betrayal of which he had been the victim.

A-1

When [redacted] travels, he frequently travels under the name of Manuel MARTINEZ.

DESENSITIZED

SECRET RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

9 ~~SECRET~~

ORIG : H.D. Hecksher/bh
UNIT : WH/SA/SO/HH
EXT : 4215
DATE : 2 June 64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

	~~M25~~	IST	SS	SB
1	EOB			CA
2	~~CI~~	~~SI~~		
3				

2 Jun 64 15 03z

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : ~~C/WH/SA 3~~
INFO : DDP, VR

Podeon 201
Ambiddy-1

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 25079

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF: WAVE 7218 (IN 95616) PARA 1*

SINCE RUMOR SPREADING COULD STA INVESTIGATE.

END OF MESSAGE

*AMBIDDY-1 has reportedly bought his mistress an $85,000 house in north Miami.

Halpern
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
C/WH/SA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

H. D. HECKSH
WH/SA/SO/HH

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2-5

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

AMYUM 19
CONTACT RPT #60
UFGA 16215
1 JUNE 64

5. GUERTLER again reminded A-19 that it was no longer sefficient to merely deny ODYOKE involvement in the project but was necessary to take positive steps to implicate other Latin American governments and create the impression of increasing difficulties with ODYOKE. It was left to A-19's discretion on how to do this, but when talking about his problems with AMWORLD-2, Sopo and MAle it was suggested that he do this in strictest confidence as just for the inner circle of AMYUM. This will guarantee the story proper dissemination.

File:
Ambiddy-1 ✓
Sopo
MoLe
MeSA

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

46 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, VR

~~ESB~~ INT SS SB
ICS [illegible] AR
EOB [illegible] [illegible] CA
CI [illegible] EP [illegible]
[illegible] FS

~~Ambiddy 1-201~~
Adelaide -201

S E C R E T 012228Z

1 JUN 64 IN 95616

DIR CITE WAVE 7218

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD AMRAZZ-1

1. ON 27 MAY 64 AMRAZZ-1 SAID AMBIDDY-1 HAD REPORTEDLY BOUGHT HIS MISTRESS, OFELIA PADRON, AN $85,000 HOUSE IN NORTH MIAMI. PADRON, ACCORDING AMRAZZ-1, HAS BEEN MISTRESS VARIOUS PERSONS DURING AND AFTER BATISTA REGIME.

2. AMRAZZ-1 ALSO SAID TONY BUSTILLO, FORMER "THIRD CHIEF POLICE HABANA" EARLY IN CASTRO'S REGIME, HAD TOLD HIM HE HAD HEARD THAT AMBIDDY-1'S FOLLOWERS WERE AUTHORIZED ATTACK ANY OF AMBANG-1'S OR GUTIERREZ' MEN IF ENCOUNTERED ON HIGH SEAS.

3. ON 28 MAY AMRAZZ-1 ADVISED HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY "PIANO" BORREGO WHO, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, IS MEMBER AMBIDDY-1'S GROUP BUT FRIENDLY TO SFNE, THAT AMBIDDY-1 PLANNED MAKE HIT-AND-RUN RAID EITHER 29 OR 30 MAY. BORREGO DID NOT REVEAL SOURCES.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

1 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 1 June 1964 at 1600 hours

1.

1. AMBIDDY-1 would like to know from Jim what frequencies he would recommend for the 511's. A-1 alleges that the crystals for the sets will cost about $2,000.

2. Since Mr. Summ is leaving tomorrow he will be unable to meet with A-1. A-1 feels that he has fulfilled any obligation by calling Mr. Summ. However, perhaps AMJAVA-4 or AMYUM-19 may visit Mr. Summ in the near future.

3. A-1 expects to receive his visa card today and then re-entry bluebook tomorrow from Immigration.

4. A-1 and A-4 are expected to leave Miami on 4 June for Nicaragua. A-1 will come alone to the meeting in Panama.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Communications
m State Department

✓

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
[illegible] code

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : CARACAS

ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

SS SB
ISBS AR
LOG CA
[illegible] LR
[illegible] NS

Venezuela

Ambiddy 1 - 201

S E C R E T 012100Z

1 Jun IN 95478

DIR CITE CARA 8827

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF CARA 8014 (IN 93463)

AMFLORA-1, WHO ACCOMPANIED CIUPAS-1 TO AIRPORT 20 MAY TO SEE AMBIDDY-1 OFF, STATES AMBIDDY-1 TOLD HIM HE PLANS RETURN CARA WITHIN 15 OR 20 DAYS. AMFLORA-1 DOES NOT KNOW REASON FOR RETURN VISIT.

SECRET

Who is amflora 1?

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
	1. RI FILE NO.		
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

AMBIDDY-1
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
INFO RE AUTONOMOUS PROGRAM.
ENCL. 2,3

019-124-027/03
UFGA-16215 E01
01 JUN 64
P1

P/ZR 2008777

2 008 777

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9-60)

27 May 1964

AMWORLD MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY's Reaction to Advice to
Delay Return to U.S.

1. AMJAVA/4 reported that AMYUM-19 conveyed to AMBIDDY-1 my advice that he not return to PBPRIME right away, but permit the dust to settle. According to AMJAVA/4 this advice led AMBIDDY-1 to conclude that ODACID did not want him back in PBPRIME. In order to test this theory, AMBIDDY-1 decided to make a beeline for the U.S. Embassy in Managua to pick up his immigration visa.

2. (Headquarters has learned that the visa was promptly granted and we presume AMBIDDY-1's concern that he had been exiled a second time has as a result been assuaged.) I asked AMJAVA/4 to tell AMBIDDY-1 that we would be honored to welcome him as a potential fellow-citizen. Also, our relationship was based upon complete mutual trust. Our job was to protect his rear in PBPRIME. What we were concerned about was that AMBIDDY-1, should he return at this time, would undoubtedly be talked to by ODACID, ODENVY and the press. All this it would be best to sidestep.

3. AMJAVA/4 was asked to convey to AMBIDDY-1 that we will tell him when the coast is clear. If this notwithstanding he should return to PBPRIME, the decision would, of course, be his. "It is his right to come back at any time, but I think my advice is good."

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: AMBIDDY-1 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

Artime 201

FROM : CARACAS

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3 (MR HECKSHER, WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1830 27 MAY BP)

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

~~MOB~~ IST SS SB
IOS PERS AR
EOB DTS LOG CA
CI SI BF WH
SEC NS

S E C R E T 272005Z

PRIORITY DIR PACY INFO ROUTINE WAVE CITE CARA 8810

SENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF: A. PACY 3615 (IN 89404)

B. CARA 8801 (NOT SENT PACY WAVE) (IN 90576)

27 MAY 64 IN 92631

AMBIDDY-1 ETD 27 MAY PAA 516. DELAYED FLIGHT SCHEDULED DEPART CARA 1610 HOURS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

26 May 1964

AMWORLD MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY'S PERSONNEL POLICY

1. AMJAVA/4 offered the following analysis of AMBIDDY-1's personnel policy as a significant facet of his relationship with others.

2. AMBIDDY-1 is a leader and a very proud leader who does not like to fail in the presence of his associates.

3. AMJAVA/4 was glad that the Miami incident (13 May press conference) happened. "AMBIDDY-1 was really angry with himself."

4. From the start AMJAVA/4 has tried to convince AMBIDDY-1 that Jose MOLE ROSALES is not qualified for intelligence - so far in vain. "To let MOLE fail in doing the job is the way to convince AMBIDDY-1"

5. AMYUM-19 cannot handle MOLE or Edgar SOPO, because AMBIDDY-1 won't let him. "We shall have to wait until they fall down on the job."

6. AMJAVA/4 claims to have a closer relationship with AMBIDDY-1 than does AMYUM-19. He thinks he understands AMBIDDY-1 better than does AMYUM-19, that he (AMJAVA/4) knows how to get things from AMBIDDY-1. AMYUM-19 makes the mistake of using the direct approach where it would be better to go about it in a roundabout way. "There are some things which you BECKHOFF tell GUERSKLER, then GUERSKLER tells AMYUM-19 who tells AMBIDDY-1, which it would be better to tell AMBIDDY-1 direct." AMJAVA/4 related that AMBIDDY-1 took umbrage at AMYUM-19 for conveying to him BECKHOFF's views about the Miami press conference. AMBIDDY-1 was furious when GUERSKLER passed intelligence about the alleged presence of 50 cal. machine guns positioned near Pilon, because he considered this an implied attack of the soundness of the Pilon plan which AMBIDDY-1 himself had drawn up.

7. Headquarters reps pointed out that during the

SECRET

critical period following the Miami press conference, AMYUM-19 was the only available, cleared channel to AMWORLD and time, in view of ODACID's unfavorable reaction, was of the essence. AMJAVA/4 was asked to convey this explanation to AMBIDDY-1 and to stress that we consider AMYUM-19 his senior rep in PBPRIME.

8. AMJAVA/4 stated that there had been many betrayals and consequently AMBIDDY-1 was always careful. At times he might even think that AMYUM-19 was not loyal which, AMJAVA/4 added, "Of course is not true." As AMBIDDY-1 analyzes his own performance, he is satisfied that he is performing well. He has been in the resistance business since Batista's days and many intimate friends have betrayed him. At the present moment, he does not have 100% confidence in anyone. Everything he is told, he analyzes. As an example, AMJAVA/4 briefs Chavez (the Mexican) on a projected operation. AMBIDDY-1 will question AMJAVA/4 closely in order to make sure that the instructions did not deviate from the plan as conceived by him.

9. Among matters which should be taken up with AMBIDDY-1 direct, no matter how ticklish, was e.g. the case of ...MOLE. AMJAVA/4 and AMYUM-19 know that KUBARK have a poor opinion of him. Then why beat around the bush? AMJAVA/4 at least had not witnessed any mention of this by BECKHOFF in AMBIDDY-1's presence. Instead AMYUM-19 had reported GUERÉKLER's statement that he considered MOLE a poor choice for the intelligence job to AMBIDDY-1 and the latter had jumped to the conclusion that it was AMYUM-19 putting words into GUERÉKLER's mouth.

10. BECKHOFF commented as follows: AMYUM-19 will have to tell GUERÉKLER or myself if in a given instance a personal demarche is indicated. There are certain things which, with AMBIDDY-1 out of the country, simply cannot be put on the shelf. We have no choice but to tell GUERÉKLER to tell AMYUM-19 who, however, should feel free to counsel us not to use him as a channel. Headquarters rep conceded that AMBIDDY-1 could rightly resent anything which smacks of a junior officer (i.e. GUERÉKLER) giving orders to him via AMYUM-19, an impression we would do our best to eradicate.

SECRET

11. BECKHOFF stressed that we were anxious not to give AMBIDDY-1 the impression that there exists any special relationship between us and AMYUM-19, AMJAVA/4. Our relationship was with AMBIDDY-1 who is the leader of the movement. AMJAVA/4 replied that he had told AMBIDDY-1 this and that BECKHOFF had made this point very clear at their first meeting in Puerto Rico (see AMWORLD Meeting memo, 3-6 September 1963 Subject: Briefing of AMJAVA/4.) BECKHOFF added that he had told AMYUM-19 and wished to repeat this in the presence of AMJAVA/4 that anything discussed while AMBIDDY-1 was not present, could be told him. Nothing was "off-the-record" in the sense of to be withheld from AMBIDDY-1.

12. According to AMJAVA/4, AMBIDDY-1 knows full well that KUBARK considers him the Chief. If we decided to conspire against AMBIDDY-1 in league with AMJAVA/4 and AMYUM-19, this could only be done within AMYUM, the political movement, since AMJAVA/4 and AMYUM-19 form pars of that organization. Our support, however, is to AMBIDDY-1 and not AMYUM. AMBIDDY-1 knows that.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: Policy
AMBIDDY-1 201
WAVE

SECRET

THE HEMISPHERE

Artime-201

CUBA

"Something Is Moving"

"This is Radio Free Cuba, the anti-Communist voice of Cuba broadcasting on the 40-meter band. Worker, militiaman, rebel soldier, radio ham—help topple the despot! Close ranks so that the fatherland, today bloodied by Russian imperialism, becomes the tomb of Communism in America. This is Radio Free Cuba transmitting from a point in Cuban territory."

In Cuban exile communities from Miami to Caracas, the word was out: "*Algo se mueve*"—Something is moving. First came the faint, crackling anti-Castro broadcast last week from inside Cuba. Then 24 hours later came word of the biggest raid in months on Castro's fortress. The raiders identified themselves as members of the Movement for Revolutionary Recuperation, led by Manuel Artime, who headed the abortive Bay of Pigs landing.

At 10:30 p.m., said an M.R.R. spokesman in Miami, Artime and a "strong force of commandos" had gone ashore at Puerto Pilón, 145 miles from Guantánamo on Cuba's southern coast. Linking up with a second force of guerrillas from the nearby Sierra Maestra mountains, the exiles had captured the town and held it for three hours against Castro's militia, during that time declaring it a "free territory of Cuba." They then blew up the Cabo Cruz sugar mill and disappeared. Puerto Pilón, the exiles noted with satisfaction, was only a few miles from the spot where Castro himself originally landed in 1956, and the Sierra Maestra was his sanctuary in the early stages of the revolution.

Within hours, Radio Havana was on the air railing about the attack. Castro denied that the exiles had sent in a landing party. The mill, he fumed, was bombarded from the sea "by a pirate vessel of the Rex type, which the CIA operates from bases located in Florida, Puerto Rico and Central America." Nevertheless, he admitted damage to shore installations and cried that "70,000 sacks of sugar" had been destroyed. Naturally, he blamed "a new criminal, vandalistic act by the United States Government." Two days later, Castro's internal radio reported two more landings—one by Artime on the southern coast, and the other by Underground Leader Manolo Ray somewhere in the north. But exile groups in Miami would neither confirm nor deny the new raids.



EXILE RAY

Trips to some isolated farms.

Recruits & Munitions. In Washington, the State Department blandly denied all. "These attacks," said a spokesman, "are neither supported nor condoned by the Government." Perhaps not, but Miami was alive last week with exile activity. Once again, Cubans were turning up at the old clapboard house on 23rd Street that served as a recruiting center for the Bay of Pigs operation, getting physical exams, then mysteriously dropping out of sight. Small groups of Cubans were training at isolated farms outside Miami. At Key Largo, a 28-ft. launch loaded with exile munitions caught fire, was popping while firemen were trying to douse the blaze.

No one believes that a second frontal invasion is in the offing. The exiles agree that it would amount to suicide. What does seem to be in the works is an attempt at infiltration, sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Right now, three main groups are operating:

- ▶ The M.R.R., headed by Artime, reportedly has the strong backing of Nicaragua's Tachito Somoza and other anti-Castroites in Central America. Artime, say exile sources, operates from camps stretching from Costa Rica north to Honduras. A U.S. hunter in the northeastern jungles of Costa Rica recently stumbled onto a camp with three large buildings and a landing strip that was in constant use by light aircraft. "Cubans," said his guide. Artime does not have the kind of support inside Cuba to operate a major underground, is gearing his efforts to sabotage teams inside Cuba and commando raids against 17 coastal targets.
- ▶ The *Junta Revolucionaria Cubana* (*Jure*), led by Ray, a onetime Castro leader and a popular man inside Cuba. Ray gets his moral—and reportedly considerable material—support from Venezuela's former President Rómulo Betancourt and Puerto Rico's Muñoz Marín, is said to operate training camps in both countries. He has widely publicized May 20 as his deadline for returning to Cuba to revitalize the island's anti-Castro underground. Last week Ray resigned his job as a consultant to the Puerto Rican Planning Board, and dropped out of sight. He is tough, shrewd—and a man of his word. "We are not worried," he says. "Castro is the man who must worry."
- ▶ A coalition of Alpha 66, the Revolutionary Movement of the People, the Second National Front of Escambray and one or two smaller outfits, led by Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, a longtime guerrilla leader who fought against Batista. Menoyo plans to infiltrate a small force into Cuba—probably into the central Escambray Mountains—and start up a guerrilla network. Two weeks ago, Menoyo left Miami. The exiles say he is in Cuba.

Turn of the Screw. If the U.S. is not directly involved, some U.S. influence and support seem apparent. Washington reportedly gave Artime the green light last July. Recruiting personnel and collecting arms would also be difficult without at least tacit U.S. approval. And then there is the U.S. economic embargo. The British and French deals for buses, trucks and locomotives notwithstanding, Castro remains virtually cut off from free-world trade: As another turn of the screw, Washington last week tightened controls on U.S. exports of food and drugs to Cuba. Both had been exempted from the general U.S. trade embargo. Now exporters will need Government approval for shipments.

EXILE ARTIME

Callers at a clapboard house.

• • •

Brazil last week finally took the action everyone had expected since the revolution that overthrew leftist President João Goulart. Cuban agents, said the Brazilian government, had been engaging in "offensive" propaganda "incompatible with democratic and Christian principles. Such interference in the internal affairs of Brazil can no longer be tolerated." Diplomatic relations with Cuba were therefore formally and officially severed.

Artime - 201

FBIS 39

PANAMA CITY RADIO MIA NETWORK IN SPANISH 1100 22 MAY 64 P

(TEXT) FIVE CUBAN EXILES, INCLUDING MANUEL ARTIME, ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS INVASION, LAST NIGHT MADE CONNECTIONS AT TOCUMEN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOR VENEZUELA. THE GROUP ARRIVED FROM SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, IN THE AFTERNOON AND LEFT AT 2015 HOURS ON PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS FLIGHT 513 FOR CARACAS, VIA MARACAIBO. BESIDES ARTIME, THE GROUP CONSISTED OF CESAR BARO, JESUS SANSI, NILO MESSEN, AND RAFAEL QUINTO QUINTERO. THE GROUP REMAINED AT THE AIRPORT WAITING FOR THE PLANE TO TAKE OFF.

22 MAY 1206P FG/RH

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MANAGUA

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

201

~~MOB~~	INT	SS	SB
	ICS	PECS	AR
EOB	LETS	LCG	CA
CI	SI	BP	[✓ HR]
		STC	NS

S E C R E T 221625Z

201

22 May 64 IN 88913

DESENSITIZED

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MANA 4906

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD YOBITE

REF: DIR 22836*

ARTIME ISSUED 0-1 (IMMIGRANT) VISA ON 19 MAY 64 AT MANAGUA. GAVE ADDRESS AS 1270 N.E. 85TH STREET, MIAMI.

S E C R E T

* C/S COMMENT: RE REF LEAVES UNCLEAR WHETHER OR NOT AMBIDDY-1 ISSUED IMMIGRATION VISA. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

Artime-20

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : San. Jose

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

RCS IST SS SB
IOS PERS AS
[illegible] LETS. [illegible] CA
CI SI LP [illegible]

22 [illegible] IN 88431

SECRET 2201452

PRIORITY CARA PACY INFO DIR WAVE MANA CITE SJOS 6791

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

MANUEL ARTIME DEPARTED AFTERNOON 21 MAY VIA LACSA FOR PACY AND PROBABLY CARA. SOURCE: NUMAP-8. EVAL: C-2.

DISSEM: NONE.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : T.D.Heckster/bh
UNIT : WH/SA/SO/HH
EXT : 4215
DATE : 21 May 64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO : MANAGUA JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : DO/WH/SA 3
INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

Ambiddy 1
201

~~NE 3~~	IST	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
EOB	EPTS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	DP	[✓ EXT]
		SEC	WS

21 May 64 20 46 Z

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MANA INFO WAVE CITE DIR 22836

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF: USARMA CX-28

REF LEAVES UNCLEAR WHETHER OR NOT AMBIDDY-1 WAS ISSUED IMMIGRATION VISA. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: Please add C/WH to distribution.

W Hood
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

Bruce B. Cheever
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

RELEASING OFFICER

21-12

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DOCUMENT
DATE: 19 MAY 1964
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA,
ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN LEADER

Artime - 201

19 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Tad Szulc
Telephonic Conversation

1. Tad Szulc called the undersigned at home shortly before 2200 on 18 May 1964 from Miami, Florida. I began the conversation by telling Szulc that I had discussed the matter of a contact in the Miami area and that it was our opinion that we could best collaborate with him from Washington inasmuch as it was only here that the full story is known. Szulc accepted this with the comment that he would naturally go along with our judgment in this matter. The essence of our general conversation follows:

a. Szulc Meets with RAY in Caribbean.

Toward the end of our conversation Szulc interjected the statement, "Oh, I guess I had better tell you because you will read it in the paper in the morning, that I have just come from a meeting with RAY." Szulc gave the impression of being very satisfied with his trip and convinced that RAY was fully prepared for his venture. In answering a question that I had raised on 16 May, Szulc informed me that he was convinced that there was no serious dissension within the ranks of the JURE. It is my opinion that this is true, but that there are small frictions which are particularly inherent in Cuban organizations. I commented to Szulc that if he had just seen RAY, then in all likelihood RAY would not be in Cuba by the 20th. Szulc assured me that he would be in Cuba by the 20th. (Note: On 17 May I spoke with Rogelio CISNEROS, who informed me that he would have an important message for me in two or three days. I have a promise from RAY and CISNEROS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

that we will be the first to know of RAY's arrival in Cuba.) Szulc reiterated his basic theme that RAY's effort is the last hope to free Cuba. I told Szulc that I certainly felt that RAY's contribution is tremendously important. In this connection I observed that RAY's drawing power was obviously increasing for I had only recently received a query from rather conservative elements asking if it would be proper for them to speak with RAY's representatives, specifically Rogelio CISNEROS. I told Szulc that in keeping with our policy, I had said that RAY and his group appeared to represent a patriotic and dedicated group interested in the liberation of their country and in the restoration of a democratic government. I told the person calling me that it might be wise to speak to RAY's group now when the opportunity presents itself rather than to face the possibility of having to stand in line later. Szulc indicated that he knew of which group I was speaking and he undoubtedly would as Rogelio CISNEROS probably told him of the contact recently made by members of the Cattlemen's Association of Cuba.

b. Defection of Samuel RODILES.

Szulc then asked me if I had heard of the defection of Samuel RODILES. I told him that I had not and that in all likelihood if such a thing had happened, I should know about it.

c. Blas ROCA Breaks with Castro.

Szulc then told me that he had heard via Mexico that Blas ROCA had a falling out with Castro. I again had to tell Szulc that I did not know of any such development, but that I seriously questioned it as this made no sense at all and that Blas ROCA will not openly break with Fidel Castro unless ordered to do so by the Soviet Union. I told Szulc that Blas ROCA is too much of a fox to ever even consider such forthright action.

SECRET

d. Alert in Cuba.

Szulc then informed me that the NEW YORK TIMES had heard via Richard Eder to the effect that the tightest and most general alert in the history of Cuba appeared to be in the making. Eder and all other correspondents have been restricted to Havana. When Eder attempted to make a trip to Pinar del Rio, he was denied this privilege. While discussing these matters with the NEW YORK TIMES by telephone, Eder was cut off and they have not heard from him since. This was presumably yesterday, 18 May.

e. Szulc Asks about General Situation.

Szulc was quite eager to hear something of the general situation in Cuba at this time. I told him that I believed the alert in Cuba was a result of the attack on the sugar mill some days ago and the mounting psychological pressure of RAY's publicized intent to return to Cuba. Szulc then added that in his opinion RAY's publicity was a good thing, particularly given that it was played in a basically moderate key. I agreed with Szulc on this. I then told Szulc that I had heard only a few hours earlier that there was a widespread rumor in Miami to the effect that a U-2 had been shot down over Cuba but that as far as I knew, this was not true. Szulc then naturally asked me: "You would know if this had happened, wouldn't you? You would have heard this from the Defense Department." I answered that it certainly wouldn't be very long before we would know of such a thing, and therefore I did not believe there was any truth to this rumor.

2. On 18 May I discussed with Henry Heckscher the possibility of his releasing certain information regarding AMWORLD which I might subsequently provide to Szulc. In light of this, Henry gave me some indication of the type of thing which he would like to see picked up by the press, the essence of which is an attempt to create a better press

image for ARTIME. In talking with Szulc, the subject of ARTIME arose from time to time. Szulc mentioned that it had come to his attention that ARTIME was in New York "with some babe or another" and nowhere near the scene of the strike. Szulc was also extremely critical of the press releases made by ARTIME. I took this occasion to say that I had discussed the matter of ARTIME with people who are much more familiar with his activities than I, given that they are in another geographical area, and that it was my impression that ARTIME is not being given as much credit for his efforts as perhaps he should be and that it may well be that he has fairly solid plans which cannot be actually initiated until such a time as he has welded together the nucleus of a new organization under fire. Once experienced in their present activity, it could well be that ARTIME could follow the RAY concept of developing resistance within. I told Szulc that I believed that the activities of ARTIME and Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo could not but help RAY's program. Szulc's basic reaction to favorable statements regarding ARTIME may be best described as a snort.

Alfonso Rodriguez
WH/SA/SO/AR

~~SECRET~~

AMWORLD Meeting in Washington, 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Relations with Adelaida Padron y Cruz

1. AMJAVA-4 remarked that AMBIDDY-1 had not mentioned to anyone that BECKHOFF had talked with him about this affair. (See AMWORLD Meeting Memo 15-16 Feb 1964, Subject: Adelaida Padron y Cruz.)

2. BECKHOFF re-affirmed that the matter had been raised in compliance with his wishes that we let him know about any derogatory information on subject. He had been told "in slow English" that we in fact had information from several sources which testify to Subject's former intimate relations with Fulgencio Batista. BECKHOFF had drawn AMBIDDY-1's attention to the following alternatives:

a. Rumors are true. AMBIDDY-1's decision is obvious.

b. Rumors cannot be confirmed. How serious is the damage they cause to AMBIDDY-1s public position.

3. AMBIDDY-1 had listened carefully, merely commenting that all this was "very interesting." He had not been pressed to make a decision. Specifically, BECKHOFF had told him that Subject was reputed to have been the mistress of other prominent Cubans, besides Batista, and that AMBIDDY-1 could conceivably be blackmailed by JURE and the press, to mention only a few sources of threat presumed knowledgeable.

4. AMBIDDY-1 had not been told that his affair with Subject was liable to jeopardize AMWORLD. After all, he was an intelligent man who did not have to be told the obvious, viz. that a press scandal would be serious indeed. DAINOLD, whom BECKHOFF had consulted, had taken the position that AMBIDDY-1 should reach the necessary conclusions himself. Our position was that AMBIDDY-1 could not run a political movement unless he could handle his personal affairs. The blackmail potential in thisaffair was serious as far as KUBARK is concerned.

5. AMJAVA-4 believes that the problem in relations between AMBIDDY-1 and AMYUM-19 stems from the fact that the latter has discussed Subject with AMBIDDY-1. AMYUM-19's and

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AMJAVA-4's plans call for a threat to quit AMWORLD if AMBIDDY-1 makes known his decision to marry Subject. In the same breath, AMJAVA-4 stated that he had not made his views known to AMBIDDY-1 "because then our position would be the way it is now with AMYUM-19. You cannot put AMBIDDY-1 to the wall. He must be led to believe that it was he who made up his mind."

6. In forecasting his and AMYUM-19's strategy, AMJAVA-4 stated the following:

> "AMYUM is not just AMBIDDY-1. It is all of us. He is working for AMYUM and in that regard is answerable to all of us, because he is part of AMYUM. When we talk about the Adelaida problem, we talk about a problem arising within the organization. AMBIDDY-1 knows that he will have KUBARK's support which is meant for him not for AMYUM. But in AMYUM we have to decide. Even the people in jail inside Cuba want to know if it is true that AMBIDDY-1 has a mistress and believe that we are condoning this. AMBIDDY-1 is not only answerable to use but to the people in jail. We, in turn, are responsible for our imprisoned comrades. As part of AMYUM I have to decide if I will fight or not. AMBIDDY-1 is clear on that."

7. In stating our position, we made clear to AMJAVA-4 that marriage is not a deciding factor in determining our course of action. An ensuing scandal might force our hand.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
PADRON 201

cc: COS, JMWAVE

~~SECRET~~

AMWORLD Meeting in Washington, 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: Delivery of DAINOLD's Letter

1. AMJAVA-4 was handed a message, in AMBIDDY-1's code, conveying DAINOLD's congratulations upon the Pilon raid.

2. The original message was read to AMJAVA-4.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
[illegible] II
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓

Attachment:
Letter

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

PADRON to divorce her husband.

Adelaida PADRON is about 26 years old and she is from Yaguajay, Las Villas province. She was a protégée of Fulgencio BATISTA Zaldívar since she was 14 years old. She married Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia and has two children, 5 and 6 years old. According to source, her youngest child is by BATISTA.

Adelaida PADRON was also the mistress of Marcos PEREZ Jiménez, former President of Venezuela.

In addition to being a very attractive woman, Adelaida PADRON is also very intelligent.

According to source, on various occasions (did not specify dates) Adelaida PADRON has talked to BATISTA on the phone from Miami.

SOURCE 3:

P-96 had a conversation with Nazim ELIAS Thumas and told ELIAS that some days ago a Cuban exile lady who was from the City of Santa Clara, Las Villas province, had expressed herself in very bad terms and had criticized AMBIDDY-1 [redacted] while she was in the "Optica López" optical store. That the lady had said A-1 [redacted] had abandoned his fiancée, who is a good girl, to live with another woman who had been married to Roger ROJAS Lavernia.

After hearing this, ELIAS told P-96 it was true that A-1 [redacted] was living with the ex-wife of ROJAS Lavernia.

By the way in which ELIAS answered P-96, it can be understood that ELIAS knows said lady perfectly.

During the conversation, ELIAS told P-96 that when he had arrived in the U.S. Naval Base at San Juan, Puerto Rico, from [redacted], base authorities were [illegible] from him the authorization to return to [illegible] they took away this authorization and therefore he cannot go back to [illegible]

SOURCE 4:

Source reports that, before CASTRO seized power, Adelaida PADRON used to live in Cuba at Milán St. corner of Villoldo, Reparto Apolo, City of Havana. That "big parties" were given in that house in which people posed for pornographic pictures. Source assures that she saw pictures of these parties in Cuba and was shocked by their immorality.

Report # DD-837, CE, 30 Apr 64 (cont.)

According to source, Adelaida PADRON had a poor origin and her marriage to ROJAS Lavernia enabled her to enjoy parties, good food, clothes, etc.

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD [illegible]

DESENSITIZED

~~SECRET~~

11 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Mike GEIDEL and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 8 May 1964 at 1030 hours

1. The undersigned reminded Mike GEIDEL that it is essential that AMBIDDY-1 meet with "RODEMEYER" when the former returns to Miami.

2. Mike stated that YERGO (MRR Dominican Republic delegate) had received a telephone call from President Reid or some other high official in the Dominican Republic which stated that President Reid would like to meet with AMBIDDY-1 on 12 May in the Dominican Republic. YERGO was also informed that they could have anything they wanted in the Dominican Republic. ~~YERGO was also informed that they could have anything they wanted in the Dominican Republic~~.

3. Martin next brought up the subject of the MID. It was GEIDEL's impression that this organization might be nothing more than a provacation. This opinion is also shared by JMWAVE. Mike commented that AMYUM-19 has met with members of this organization who for the most part are unwilling to return to Cuba. A-19 would like to test their mettle before negotiating with them any further. A-19 intends to give this organization some sabotage materials and see what happens.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

File:
Dominican Republic
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Other Exile
Conversations

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible] ESTIMADO DON MANUEL X SU EXITO ESPLENDIDO VINDICA COMPLETAMENTE NUESTRA CONFIANZA EN SU SALIENTE CAPACIDAD DE ORGANIZAR UN MOVIMIENTO POLITICO TAMBIEN PROVEERLO CON UN LIDERATO INSPIRATIVO X LA MAGNITUD DE SU EXITO CMA TOMANDO EN CONSIDERACION LOS OBSTACULOS QUE UD. HA TENIDO QUE VENCER TAMBIEN LA FUERZA DE SU OPOSICION CMA ES TAL QUE NO REQUIERE MAGNIFICACION OSCAR ADORNO. BUEN TRABAJO X CORDIALMENTE X DON ALFA.

END OF MESSAGE

TRANSLATION: 8. DEAR DON MANUEL: YOUR SPLENDID SUCCESS FULLY VINDICATES OUR TRUST IN YOUR OUTSTANDING ABILITY TO ORGANIZE A POLITICAL MOVEMENT AND TO PROVIDE IT WITH INSPIRING LEADERSHIP. THE DEGREE OF YOUR SUCCESS CONSIDERING THE OBSTACLES YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OVERCOME AND THE STRENGTH OF YOUR OPPOSITION IS SUCH AS TO REQUIRE NO MAGNIFICATION OR EMBROIDERY. GOOD WORK. CORDIALLY YOURS, DON A.

14-00000

Artime - 201

Acting Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch

19 May 1964
00A(S) 26484

Chief, Miami Field Office

A(S)3,903,073

WH-1828

Recent Travels of Manuel Artime

Records of the US Immigration Service show that Manuel Artime has made numerous trips in and out of Miami between 3 and 13 May 64. I&NS records show the following:

a. On 30 April Artime was issued an I-512 type visa good for travel to Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. He departed from Miami on 3 May 64 for Managua, Nicaragua on LaNica flight number 413. He returned to the US on 11 May 64. No flight information available on return trip.

b. An I-512 was issued in his name on 3 May 64 good for travel to Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. Artime left Miami on 11 May and returned on 12 May 64.

c. Another I-512 was issued in his name on 11 May, and he left Miami on 13 May on Pan American flight number 503 for Managua. His I&NS file does not presently show evidence that he has returned to Miami from this trip. A reliable I&NS official has orally confirmed to us this date that Artime has not in fact returned from his latest trip abroad.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

[illegible]

Copy to JMWAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

15 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Carl E. Jenkins

DATE : 1800 hours, 12 May 1964

1. AMBIDDY-1 called to report that he had just arrived in Miami and was on his way to a meeting with Al Rodriguez at the Holiday Inn.

2. I told him that some of our friends had notified some activity that indicated mother and baby might be up to something tonight. AMBIDDY-1 said he didn't know anything about it but would check and let us know. I asked him to try to confirm it so we could help him if he wished us to.

Carl E Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Op ZENON VIERA II

✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

11 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 11 May 1964 at 0930

1. AMBIDDY-1 telephoned from the Miami airport to say that he would be leaving in two hours for the Dominican Republic to meet with President Reid on the morning of 12 May 1964.

2. A-1 expects to meet with PETER C. KNITTEL and Tom Murphy at the Miami Airport this morning before A-1 departs for Dominican Republic.

3. A-1 was advised that Mr. Alfredo RODEMEYER would like to meet with him at the Holiday Inn at Coral Gables upon A-1's return tomorrow. A-1 stated he would be at the Holiday Inn after 1800 on 12 May 1964. A-1 was assured this meeting had nothing to do with our operations and not to worry.

4. A-1 has given the commo plans to A-10 who will give them to Mike GUERTLER (P) sometime this afternoon.

5. Due to AMJAVA-4's late arrival in Nicaragua the entire schedule for the operation has been pushed back one day since the ship left one day late. A-1 also mentioned there have been some minor changes in the land operation.

6. Manolin Hernandez is now in Panama dealing with Mike Petrosky concerning the DC-3. A-4 apparently had a narrow escape on a Nicaraguan plane and A-1 appears determined to have his own plane in the air.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

7. According to Maagdenberg, the Dutch engineer, the ship is in fairly good condition and should require no more than five days in drydock. A-1 casually mentioned that the Dutchman had to be dissuaded from going on the operation itself.

8. A-1 was reminded we must have a firm statement from him as to when the operation is to take place if we are to be of assistance to his organization during the critical period. A-1 stated he had promised to break the heads of the commo people aboard the ship if they fail to advise him as to when the Swift departs from the mothership.

9. A-1 would probably leave for Nicaragua on Wednesday to be at the base in time for the operation.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
JOANNE
Dominican Republic
Operation ZENON II
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

~~SECRET~~

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

XXX

FROM: Deputy Chief, WH/Special Affairs

SUBJECT: TYPBIC AMWORLD/ PADRON, Cruz Adelaida Matilda
~~aka: ROJAS, Adelaida Matilda Padron de~~

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. According to AMYUM-19 (DOI 4 May), AMBIDDY-1 once more is giving serious thought to contracting marriage with Subject.

2. According to AMYUM-19, AMBIDDY-1 suffers pangs of conscience and has premonitions of hell. What he has in mind is a church wedding with all the trimmings. Since Subject's previous marriage was not solemnized by the Church, AMBIDDY-1's conscience appears unbothered.

3. AMYUM-19 claims that AMBIDDY-1 brushes off allegations about Subject's alleged affair with Fulgencio Batista as mere calumny. He does not know whether AMBIDDY-1 has ever asked Subject to confirm or deny the rumor.

4. The root of the trouble, as AMYUM-19 sees it, is that AMBIDDY-1 in the person of Subject is encountering a seasoned pro who plays with consummate skill upon his vanity and who exploits his naivete which is that of "a 14 year old." AMBIDDY-1, in fashioning personal relationships, is unable to make adjustments to the circumstance that, being a person of some importance, his personal affections are not always cultivated on purely unselfish grounds.

5. AMYUM-19 claims that Subject's former husband, Roger Hermilio Rojas Lavernia, is attempting to blackmail AMBIDDY-1 and that some of AMBIDDY-1's seemingly closest associates may be harboring similar designs.

6. BECKHOFF restated the position of KUBARK as one of non-intervention as long as matrimony is kept in abeyance. Conversely, marriage and any ensuing scandal would force us to re-assess our position and, in extremes, might force KUBARK to withdraw its backing of AMWORLD.

7. AMYUM-19 expressed the view that AMBIDDY-1 would probably forego marriage if made aware of KUBARK's position as stated above. We rejoined that AMBIDDY-1, should he solicit our views (but not otherwise), would be told just that.

8. GUERTLER is hereby authorized to state KUBARK's position along lines indicated in Para 6 if the occasion presents itself.

END OF DISPATCH

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
Distribution 3 - COS, JMWAVE	UFGW 3868	11 May 1964
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER CS Copy in 19-124-27/3

1 - WH/SA/ESEC
1 - WH/SA/SO/HH
1 - WH/Security

A-1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/SA/SO/HH	Henry D. Heckshar	gt	4477

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/SA		Henry D Heckscher

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DESENSITIZED

DISPATCH

(2. [illegible] 201

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
KYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD
Transmittal of AMOT Reports on AMWORLD Activities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE: None

Transmitted herewith are two AMOT reports on AMWORLD activities which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
AMOT Reports
DD-831, DD-837
One copy each, Herewith

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

201-267437

DATE TYPED
8 May 64

DATE DISPATCHED
MAY 11 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-1584[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

~~RYBAT~~ ~~SECRET~~ [illegible]ITIZED

Report # DD-837.

TO: [redacted].

FROM: CE.

SUBJECT: AMYUM [redacted]. Activities.

SOURCES: 1. AMOT-173 [redacted]. Information acquired from Rolando SANCHEZ Gonzales of 2340 NE 5th Ave., Miami.

2. AMOT-153 [redacted]. Information acquired during a conversation with Silvia GARCIA Acosta (unwitting source), who is a very close friend of Manuel ARTIME Buesa and Adelaida PADRON Cruz.

3. AMOT-163 [redacted]. Information acquired during a conversation with Nazim ELIAS Thumas of 821 SW 23rd Ave., Apt 15, Miami.

4. [redacted]. Information acquired from Acasia VAZQUEZ Gallo of 1836 NW 15th St., Miami, who lived in Cuba at one block from Adelaida PADRON Cruz.

SOURCE 1:

Source reports that a group of 18 men belonging to the action groups broke with AMYUM [redacted] because they were not in agreement with the manner in which AMBIDDY-1 [redacted] uses the money of the organization.

According to these men, A-1 [redacted] has assigned very good salaries to all his friends in addition to paying their rent and giving very good gifts to them. A specific example is AMJAVA-4 [redacted] to whom A-1 [redacted] gave $1,000 when he married.

According to source, A-1 [redacted] bought a boat for a certain sum of money but said that he had paid a much higher price. This immorality has created great unrest among AMYUM [redacted] members.

Source also reports that, at present, there are about 20 prisoners in the Nicaragua bases and that there are problems with KUBARK [redacted]. on account of this (source did not give details).

Source claims that A-1 [redacted] has already distributed all the political appointments for Cuba, including Councilmen's positions, among his friends and unconditional supporters.

SOURCE 2:

Source learned in a conversation with Silvia GARCIA Acosta that, at present, A-1 [redacted] is having an affair with Adelaida PADRON Cruz and that some days ago A-1 [redacted] gave Adelaida PADRON Cruz a house as a gift. That A-1 [redacted] and Adelaida PADRON are now living in this house, which is a "dream." (Phone number PL-4-7912.)

Adelaida PADRON Cruz was married to prerevolutionary army Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia, and A-1 [redacted] paid all the expenses for Adelaida

[illegible] VIOLATION

SECRET DESENSITIZED

SECRET

Libernic

30 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 29 April 1964 at 1630 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 commenced by saying that he has obtained the charter for Libernic which Somoza had to sign. The original copy has been lost; however, A-1 has a photostatic copy with General Somoza's signature.

2. The undersigned requested of A-1 that he make quite clear to President Reid that AMWORLD is not receiving aid from the United States. A-1 was warned about making innuendos or ambiguous statements concerning American aid.

3. A-1 stated he would inform this office as soon as arrangements to go to the Dominican Republic were completed. A-1 was advised that we will be in Puerto Rico on Sunday 2 May.

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO0HH

File:
ambiddy-1 - 201
Conversations
SANTA MARIA
Dominican Republic

W

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Artime

30 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Martin Ferrer and AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 29 April 1964 at 1100

1. AMBIDDY-1 was reminded that he should make a quick trip to the Dominican Republic to see President Reid and to arrange for drydocking and refueling facilities. A-1 was advised to use a more subtle approach than used on Colonel Lopez of Honduras. A-1's main objective should be to get "his foot in the door" in the Dominican Republic. A-1 should pursue the soft sell rather than the hard sell. Since he sounded a bit reluctant to forego the next operational phase in order to repair the ADELAIDA, A-1 was reassured that the overhauling of the ADELAIDA would take place after the operation rather than before. A-1 will take AMJAVA-4 with him to the Dominican Republic. Should President Reid ask for the name of the shipping company who will act as the agent for Maritima Bam, A-1 should say it is the Boyd Brothers Shipping Company.

2. A-1 was asked if he had obtained his U. S. visa. A-1 replied he has all the documents ready and will request it next time he goes to Nicaragua.

3. A-1 has no objection to AMYUM-19's attending the next meeting in Puerto Rico. The undersigned informed A-1 that we are preparing the intelligence data on the ~~[illegible]~~ targets he requested, and they will be presented to him at our meeting.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

[illegible]

4. A-1 commented if it would be possible for Kelly to arrange fueling facilities at Bluff with Texaco Oil rahter than Esso. The person in charge of the Esso company in Bluff apparently is not in sympathy with MRR movement; therefore, A-1 is reluctant to deal with Esso. A-1 inquired if the person in charge of Esso could be replaced. A-1 was informed that although Kelly enjoys a great deal of influence with Esso we doubt that he has that much influence. As it stands now the LCM obtains supplies there and it is then tranferred to the ADELAIDA because A-1 is reluctant to take the ADELAIDA near the Esso installation.

5. In conclusion A-1 was complimented on the manner his organization behaved during the operation.

6. Should A-1 obtain any definite information as to when he will be going to the Dominican Republic he should call our office in order that we may make our own traveling arrangements.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Dominican Republic
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
POL

'Above conv[illegible]
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible] and
[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

Artime

29 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 29 April 1964 at 0800

1. The undersigned telephoned AMBIDDY-1 at his home in an attempt to reach him before his return to Miami became too well-known and he became engrossed in other matters.

2. A-1 was advised that one of the most urgent matters now pending was his trip to the Dominican Republic to meet President Reid to resolve the problem of drydock facilities for the ADELAIDA.

3. It was obvious from the sound of A-1's voice that he was still half asleep and further conversation at this time would be useless. A-1 was requested to call Martin at the office later in the day.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 -201
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequency
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

file 201 - Lu

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

PROCESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	File
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	for action.
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
KYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD
Recent Declarations by Manuel ARTIME Buesa

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE: None

Transmitted herewith is an AMOT report concerning the Referendum and exile reactions to Manuel ARTIME's speech before A.R.E.C., which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
AMOT Report DD-778
One copy herewith

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS, w/att/h/w

201-267437

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DESENSITIZED

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
24 Apr. 64

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 28 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-15592

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

~~SECRET~~

9 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/SA/External Operations Branch

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Ottilia Buesa

1. Subject, who is Manuel Artime's aged mother, has last been reported as hiding out in Iglesia Cristo de Limpias in Havana city.

2. Artime has been without news from her for the last two months. His link to her used to be the Spanish Commercial Attache in Havana.

3. We have promised Artime to study ways and means of contacting her in order to ascertain her state of health, her husband's whereabouts and any personal needs she may have.

4. Can you come up with any ideas?

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

HDH/bh

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/SA/SO/HH - Artime 201 ✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P. R., 2-5 May 1964

SUBJECT: Reality of Autonomy

1. On 4 May 1964 HQS representatives raised with AMYUM-19 the question if AMBIDDY-1 in his own mind accepts the premise of independence from KUBARK control in his management of AMWORLD affairs. AMYUM-19 replied that AMBIDDY-1 had not always done so, but had now become convinced that he was in de facto control of AMWORLD. Commenting upon that fact, AMBIDDY-1 had recently remarked that he now thought he could, if he so decided, fire /sic/ both AMJAVA-4 and AMYUM-19 without KUBARK attempting to gainsay him.

2. The arrival of James ZABOTH on the scene had at first re-kindled AMBIDDY-1's suspicions that KUBARK may after all try to clamp tight controls upon his operations. However, ZABOTH's general approach had disarmed those suspicions and convinced AMBIDDY-1 that he is in fact master of his destiny. AMYUM-19 reminisced that AMBIDDY-1 had in the beginning suspected him and AMJAVA-4 as being KUBARK plants. AMYUM-19 added he wanted to be quite candid in telling us that he would not himself have accepted a position in AMWORLD had he entertained the slightest doubts as to the sincerity of KUBARK's promise of autonomy.

3. We re-emphasized our adherence to the principles of autonomy, witness our desire to disengage from extensive involvement in AMWORLD logistics, our non-interference in personnel matters (except where overriding ODYOKE security interests are involved) and our future handling of subsidy payments.

4. Comment: We found no reason for disbelieving AMYUM-19's acceptance of autonomy as the principle guiding our role in AMWORLD. As an aside, AMYUM-19 observed that AMBIDDY-1 should not be expected to subordinate himself to PBPRIME controls of any kind once PBRUMEN had been liberated and we allowed that this was likely to be the case.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Policy

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : H.D.Hecksher/bh
UNIT : WH/SA/SO/HH
EXT : 4215
DATE : 7 May 64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

	IET	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	
~~ROB~~	~~RPTS~~	~~LOG~~	CA
CI	SI	BY	

7 May 64 18 47z

TO : JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : DC/WH/SA-3

INFO : DDP, VR

AMBIDDY-1 201
Publicity

SIG CEN
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 19632

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

PLEASE ARRANGE FOR MEETING BETWEEN "MR. RODEMEYER" AND AMBIDDY-1 DURING LATTER'S FORTHCOMING MIAMI STAY, PREFERABLY IN WAVE SAFEHOUSE USED FOR TNG SESSIONS. IT MOST IMPORTANT MEETING TAKE PLACE AT THIS TIME. (FYI: PROPOSE DEBRIEF AMBIDDY-1 ON CONTROVERSIAL EVENTS SURROUNDING COL. FRANK EGAN AS SURFACED IN RECENT BOOK ON BAY OF PIGS.) ADVISE TIME OF MEETING.

END OF MESSAGE

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/SA/SO/AR APPROVED IN DRAFT
COORDINATING OFFICERS

H. D. HECKSHER
WH/SA/SO/HH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

7-7

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

1-1

AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P.R., 2-5 May 1964

SUBJECT: Cackling Over Unlaid Eggs

1. AMYUM-19 confided to us that AMBIDDY-1 had, prior to the launching of Operation ZENON, prepared a "three and one half page" news release which laid exaggerated claim to damages inflicted during the raid on Santa Cruz del Sur. Only the last sentence stated, more or less as an afterthought, that this should be considered just a minor MRR operation. AMYUM-19 has told AMBIDDY-1 that in his opinion any future announcements should be held down to one or two brief paragraphs.

2. We pointed out to AMYUM-19 that AMBIDDY-1 was evidently paying no more than lip service to our recommendation that he under--rather than over--play his successes. During the Washington meeting (19-21 March 1964) we had criticized a statement made by AMBIDDY-1 during a Miami press conference to wit: "We do not have enough boats. In one night we can make two trips but not more, but we are doing it. We will fill the country with enough arms to free the country from communism." We took the position that if we were in AMBIDDY-1's shoes we simply wouldn't let on about military matters since this plays into Castro's hands, giving him gratuitous access to military intelligence. AMBIDDY-1 countered by asking us how he could raise the morale of the people without saying anything and without talking about successful ops inside.

3. We mentioned to AMBIDDY-1 that any vital information not publicized makes the task of Castro's espionage service that more difficult. Besides, things had now come to a pass where little credence was placed in claims of success and promises held out by Cuban exile leaders. What really counted was the demonstrable substance of success inside which speaks for itself. AMBIDDY-1 would be much more effective by preserving a posture of inscrutability. We counselled AMBIDDY-1 to resist a natural tendency to

SECRET

inflate the significance of his initial successes and to present them in their proper perspective. We should refer to those successes as mere appetizers, with the main dish to follow later. This approach rather than the claim of a big victory would arouse the kind of interest, and in Castro's case, the kind of premonition which carries psychological impact.

4. We doubt whether AMBIDDY-1 at this stage is prepared to heed our counsel to be conservative in his claims to victory. In the unhealthy climate of competition, engendered by the spectacle of numerous exile organizations vying to be the first, AMBIDDY-1 may be unable to resist the temptation to broadcast his victories and to exaggerate the damage they have inflicted. He will have to learn the hard way.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: COS, JMWAVE

File:
Publicity

1
utomatic
ng and
ification

AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P. R., 2-5 May 1964

SUBJECT: The Nature of the American Commitment

1. Alluding to certain charges levelled against CIA in a recent publication on the Bay of Pigs affair, whose substance was that the Cuban military leadership had been served with erroneous intel estimates by their CIA advisors, I voiced to AMYUM-19 the hope that the U. S. team servicing AMWORLD would never be subjected to similar censure (without implying justification for charges made in the instance of the Bay of Pigs). I reiterated that it was our strong desire to be absolutely forthright with our Cuban counterparts, especially in stressing that our target intelligence had by its very nature to be of limited usefulness, especially when it came to predicting the extent and nature of Cuban defense measures. As an example, certain radar sites had struck us as highly vulnerable to external raids, but that this estimate might not necessarily be borne out if put to the test of an actual operation.

2. In the general context of pacts fulfilled, I once more pointed out to AMYUM-19 that the American commitment to AMWORLD was a tenuous one and that I would never be able to give an estimate of U. S. Government intentions vis-a-vis AMWORLD other than what can be deduced from the events of the preceding day. As an example, official American reaction to the widening repercussions of a limited AMWORLD success in raiding Cuba was simply unpredictable. AMYUM-19 hastened to assure us that AMBIDDY-1 was indeed fully cognizant of the circumstances I had outlined and that this sense of urgency in commencing operations was partly a reflection of a sense of insecurity engendered by the official American posture in respect to Cuba.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: COS, JMWAVE

File:
Policy
Operations

A-1 ✓

SECRET

Excluded [illegible]

C. [illegible] [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
KAPOK/TYPIC/Operational/AMWORLD
AMWORLD Contact Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA-15147 of 8 April 1964

Transmitted herewith are the Contact Reports of Warren K. GUERTLER for the period 5 - 14 April 1964.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
Contact Reports (4)
One Copy Each Herewith

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS, w/atts/h/w

201-267437

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DESENSITIZED

DATE TYPED [illegible] Apr 64	DATE DISPATCHED APR 17 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER ~~UFGA-[illegible]~~ 15435	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

19-124-27/3

CONTACT REPORT # 54

OPERATION: AMWORLD **DATE TYPED: 6 Apr. 64**

CONTACT: AMYUM-19

TIME AND PLACE: 0930-1100 Hrs. 4 Apr. 64, S/H 268

NEXT MEETING: Unscheduled

SUMMARY

1. A-19 was asked to provide the Case Officer with a sample of recent AMYUM radio programs. (Comment: P/W requested this. A Station contact is considering producing a "Monitor"-type program, originating in Miami, and broadcast over WRUL. All exile groups would be represented and it would provide a means for special broadcasts such as announcements of any successful AMWORLD ops, etc.

2. Reports from Nacin Elias frequently mention an action group known as "M.I.D", one of whose leaders uses the war name "el Diablo". A report from Nacin dated 16 March included an appeal for help in exfiltrating "el Diablo" and some others who are in danger. A-19 has heard that six men of the M.IDD. have just come out. One of the men is said to be "el Diablo"(Comment: Confirmed by BARR 1553) After they have been processed and debriefed A-19 will have them debriefed by AMFAST-64 and Alonso. A-19 believes that this group is the source of most of the documents furnished by Nacin and are either the only worthwhile contacts of Nacin or are completely controlled by the GOC. The latter theory is probably the correct one.

3. A-19 thinks that the captain of the Adelaida will eventually be replaced by Hunne if he does not quit first. He is still not exercising the kind of leadership necessary for military ops. This, of course, will necessitate finding a new captain for the Dolores. Of the three crewmen who recently left the Adelaida, two were having difficulties with the rest of the crew and one, Jose Cabezas, left after his brother had been fired by AMBIDDY-1.

4. Guertler asked A-19 if AMWORLD-2 had received a security briefing recently reminding him not to discuss AMWORLD business. A-19 wanted to know if A-2 was still talking too much. The undersigned replied that quite a bit of information pertaining to AMWORLD was coming accross his desk and that it appeared to come from AMWORLD-2. When sufficient details are available it will be called to the attention of the Consejo and AMBIDDY-1, but in the meantime A-19 can remind A-2 to keep quiet about AMWORLD business.

5. Infiltration candidate Pablo Roberto *FERNANDEZ Perez, PDCR

Guantanamo, Oriente Province 7 June 1916 may be identical with the subject of an AMOT report listing him as candidate for councilman of Guantanamo City Hall on the PSP slate during the Grau regime and stating that his son is private secretary to Carlos Olivares, Undersecretary of Foreign Relations Ministry of the GOC. A-19 was so informed and was asked to have and investigation made, taking into consideration both the CI and operational leads aspects of the matter.

6. Aida PEREZ Pozo. Guertler asked what her function was with AMWORLD. A-19 admitted that he was surprised to see her name on the payroll. She is working with Mole in intelligence. She has all the lesbian contacts in the city and knows everything that goes on. Nothing can be done about it because she is another "woman of confidence" of AMBIDDY-1.

7. The Case Officer brought up the matter of telephone security, the possibility that A-19's private line and his hope phone could be tapped, and suggested the use of pay phones for operational calls, especially to the Consejo. In order to make use of direct dialing A-19 could call the Consejo giving his number and await the return call. (The Consejo might want to bring this up with A-1) According to A-19 Mole's group is monitoring all calls to AMYUM headquarters but he does not think his private line (the one used by GUERTLER) is monitored. In reply to the Case Officer's question A-19 said that A-1 does his business calls from his home, i.e. the house of his mistress. The Case Officer commented that this fact was known to another group (unspecified) and let the matter drop.

8. The reason for the blown AMYUM safe house: While the AMYUMS were on the roof stringing the antenna one of them drove his car onto the lawn of the neighbor so that it would be in the shade of the neighbors tree. Naturally the neighbor came out to see what was going on. He did see. As A-19 said, when he learned of the incident he had to laugh (albeit somewhat hysterically) The only Alternative would be to kill the idiot. Guertler agreed. We can only hope that the next safe house will be very isolated.

Warren K. Guertler

CONTACT REPORT # 55

OPERATION: AMWORLD **DATE TYPED:** 7 Apr 64

CONTACT: AMYUM-19

TIME AND PLACE: 1500-1630 Hrs., 6 Apr 64, S/H

SUMMARY

1. Attached are two recent reports covering the activities of Jose Elias aka Nacin. The Habana contact, Bernardo Nievares has informed AMYUM that if he can be picked up he will be able to come to the WAVE area for about 15 days for debriefing and training. The Ramon Mondejar Cid, aka "el diablo" mentioned as having been released by the G-2 and waiting for exfiltration is currently in the WAVE area, having escaped with four others. According to A-19 they have been interviewed by ODURGE and were told to have no contact with any other PBRUMEN groups because they could receive special training and be sent back to work against AMTHUG. The AMYUMS have been debriefing the five for several days with the same idea in mind. GUERTLER will get the reports when the debriefings are over. A-19 has not gotten the preliminary reports but says Alonso is impressed with Mondejar. As for the exfiltration of Nievares AMYUM has no intention of attempting it but A-19 is considering offering the opportunity to do so to Aldo Vera (see below).

2. Aldo VERA Serafin (201-326634) This subject is a former member of the DTI, recently considered for use in an attempt to defect a GOC official in Madrid. The AMYUMS consider him a good action type and sought him out with the intention of infiltrating him and his group into Habana province. He is presently receiving special training for the job. Vera's file generally substantiates A-19's evaluation of the man. However, local traces do contain unsubstantiated accusations that he is a G-2 and that he maintains contacts with alleged G-2 agents and informers. An ODENVY report in 1963 said that Vera was engaged in transmitting and receiving messages by radio with Cuba. The Case Officer informed A-19 that while he had nothing definite to offer by way of proof he had some doubts about Vera and cited the above. A-19 says that Vera does have radio contact with friends in Habana (voice) and that he offered his radio facilities to AMYUM. Assuming that Vera himself is clean, A-19 was cautioned to have all internal contacts checked out and to obtain a complete report on Vera's plans before making any commitments. The undersigned continues to have some reservations but Verawas requested by AMSHAG-1, and A-19 likes him so far. Guertler will pursue the matter further at a later meeting.

3. AMLILAC-2 has been told by ODURGE that as long as AMYUM requests permission for him to leave the country he will be blackballed. (see previous reports for reason for blackballing). According to A-19 ODURGE suggested that if he was to be used he could be taken out as a crewman on the Adelaide. A-19 wanted to know if it was KUBARK that was keeping him on the list. Guertler pleaded ignorance

and remarked that it could be for any number of reasons completely unrelated to his past relations with KUBARK.

4. 16 PRQ Is were turned over for traces. The various group leaders are continuing to recruit for their groups. The Case Officer suggested that they might employ their time more profitably by working with what they already have and leave the recruiting to AMYUM-23. A-19 agreed that the system had to be changed in fact. It was changed in theory some time ago. Guertler suggested that it would be a lot easier on all concerned to look for people with the qualifications to fill existing slots instead of the present procedure of looking for jobs to give all the volunteers that present themselves. After having screened at least a thousand volunteers we still keep getting PRQs on potential cooks or people for whom no specific job exists but who are considered "very good boys". A-19 agreed. Probably nothing will change.

WARREN K. GUERTLER

Miami, Fla. 25 March 64

From: Inocencio ALONSO

Re: Report #9

To: AMYUM-19

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES DEVELOPED BY OUR AGENT NACIN SINCE LAST REPORT DATED MARCH 16 64.

Report of MR. MARIO CASAS WHO WORKS WITH SF-1 IN THE RAILWAY SECTOR OF ORIENTE.

He informs that in Guantanamo, Oriente the railway sector has organized a cell. It is composed of: Pablo Eduardo, Coordinator; Jose Sanches, Vice (coordinator); Luis, Organization and Romualdo, Military Coordinator, promising to advise later on who the Treasurer is.

He also advises that railway equipment continues in the same state; breakages, accidents and stoppages at the Sugar Centrals for lack of sugar case and transport equipment. They continue to move equipment and troops at night in large scale. The opinion is that this movement is merely a bluff.

REPORT OF BERNARDO NIEVARES, OF HAVANA, KNOWN BY BENNY.

Advises he is anxious to have news and instructions from us; states that altho' true that he has made a pact with us, he will not be able to continue under present conditions. Insists it is necessary he be given plans of concrete jobs and instructions he can give the men who are anxious to fight over there; that as long as this does not happen, he feels he is only on the border of activities and while we may be satisfied, he would not like to land anyone (in Cuba) specially under the present circumstances where repression throughout the island is tremendous.

He insists we be sincere with him and give him replies to these various points: What has the National Direction in Exile of the MRR resolved concerning the "MIR" and its integrated organizations. "What plans will they carry out(his group) in the internal fight for the liberation of Cuba" Secondly: "We urgently need a more effective communication; hoping that you already have the necessary means.- On our part, we are already in contact and making arrangements with embassies for the correspondence with Miami.- We'll advise you the results." - Thirdly: "It is necessary that you urgently answer me if we can make contact with the American boats stationed in front of Havana, in order to exfil "DIABLO" and other compatriots who are in much danger". We have the necessary ship to transport them. The boat will give 3 flashes at one minute intervals each with a lapse of 10 to 15 minutes." "I ask you to try and do what you can to help these brothers in misfortune." Fourth - "On the 12th (March) one of our men, "Michel Adam" left for Lebanon via Mexico with correspondence for the address in Miami". - Fifth - Dr. Gomes' contact has not proved as effective as we had hoped; we have met only twice and nothing else has happened."

Miami, 5 April 1964

FROM: INOCENCIO ALONSO

TO : AMYUM-19

REPORT DATED 27 MARCH 1964 RECEIVED FROM OUR AGENT "NACIN"

In a letter dated 27 March 1964 Agent "Nacin" says to SUSPEND THE PRODUCTION OF PASSES FOR THE GUANTANAMO NAVAL BASE, of three colors and with different specifications which were ordered according to samples or patterns he had sent, because the Castro Regime announced that as of 6 April they would be changed. That as soon as he can obtain the new models he will send them so that 50 copies of each color can be made.

Bernardo NIEVARES, more known as "BENNY", in a report dated 18 March 1964, says that Ramon MONDEJAR Cid, known as "EL DIABLO" has been set free, together with four other men who were arrested with him, and now all five have been relieved of all activity for security reasons and are waiting in Havana to leave the country.

He adds that if there is a delay in complying with the promise of getting them out of Cuba, he will have to do it himself.

He also reports that Michel ADAM was able to leave Cuba through the Lebanese Embassy, where he took refuge, and is now at the following address: "HORAY YAPTCHI MIGDALYA, Zagarta, Lebanon".

Regarding Intelligence Reports, he says that he could do much more in that respect, but he has to avoid contacting men whom he cannot brief on our situation, and the state of desesperation which exists among them in Cuba. From what Nacin sees from Benny's messages, he says that he does not have other orientations to give him, and that he has to continue in the same conditions as he has been until now. He says that the person who brought that message refuses to establish contacts, and requests to

OTHER INFORMATION OF BERNARDO NIEVARES, OF HAVANA, KNOWN BY "BENNY", ON MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Proclaims having knowledge that in the place known as "La Puntilla", at the mouth of the river Almendares, there exists large quantities of anti-air batteries, among them "4 barrels", and other major types.

They have also observed large quantities of anti-air artillery in the "Cubanacan" development, along the coast, in front of Villanueva University. This same type has also been observed along the coast of Baracoa, Barlevento development, where they have "4 barrels" and other pieces of major size.

At the Hotel National of Havana, they changed the "4 barrel" anti-air to long range anti-air cannons.

Between the towns of Bahia Honda and Cabanas, there is a Tank Camp where it is calculated there are about 300 tanks of various sizes.

He professes to have knowledge that on the road which goes from La Rotonda of Guanabo to the road to Guanabacoa, there is a Russian Camp where there is a large amount of "rockets".- It is believed they are long range by their size; since they did not see this size at the last military parade they had in Havana.

On the 23th of Jan 64, 26 trailers with this type of cargo were seen on this road; this took place around dawn.

He states: "below I list the various acts of sabotaje commited by "MIR" in Havana province:

At the "Josefita" central in Nueva Paz, Havana province, a piece of steel was put into the sugarcane grinder causing great damage.

In the zone of Nueva Paz, Palos and San Nicolas of Bari, in Havana Province, they caused 10 rows, causing large losses;all this in the month of January. In the month of February they produced 18 fires at the Municipal terminals of San Nicolas, Alquizar, Quivican and Guines, also in Havana province; and lastly, between the 2nd and 3rd of March the "MIR" carried out 9 fires between San Nicolas de Bari and Nueva Paz, destroying more than 300,000 arrobas of sugar cane according to the proper local red authorities.

rapidly answer him because he has to be in Havana early next Saturday and so avoiding things to become complicated.

"Benny" also includes two INTELLIGENCE reports dated 20 March 1964 in which he says:

"The Air Force Captain, Remigio GONZALEZ Espinosa, is being actively sought by the G-2. The charges are that he took apart the controls of five "MIG-21's" on 2 March 1964, one day before practices, in the town of Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province, provoking the ~~crashixx~~ crashing of a "MIG-21" in which the pilot, Captain DOMINGUEZ Blas, and a woman photographer of the "FAR" lost the lives."

The other report says:

"Soldier Armando GUEVARA L., was declared a REBEL because he did not agree with the Government, was captured by the G-2 in Guaimaro, Oriente Province, at the beginning of March 1964 and was executed the 14th of the same month."

CONCLUSIONS: This acting officer says that, according with what was reported by Bernardo NIEVARES, known as "BENNY", in his reports to Nacin, regarding the news that the G-2 set 5 men free: Ramon MONDEJAR Cid, known more as "El Diablo", together with 4 other men, it is to be noted that actually, Ramon MONDEJAR Cid and the other four men, Pablo Gilberto VARGAS Diaz; Ramon NIEVES Guirao, known as "RAMON I"; Jóse ARAGON MILIAN, known as "CARRAGUAO" and Rodolfo LICOR Montesinos arrived to this city on 2 April 1964 ~~xx~~ clandestinally by boat, after they succeeded to arrive 20 miles away from Cuban coasts, where they were picked up by the U.S. Coastguards and taken to Key West, Fla., where they underwent intorrogations by ~~from~~ the American Immigration Authorities and now are free in this city of Miami, Fla.

That all have been located by the undersigned and interrogated separately.

.../

As soon as the job is finished, the results of thiese interrogations will be passed on to the Superior Offices for information.

That the underesigned took note and suspended all production of the passes for the Naval Base which were previously received, waiting to receive the new passes offered in this report.

CONTACT REPORT #56

OPERATION : AMWORLD

DATE TYPED: 10 Apr. 64

CONTACT: AMBIDDY-1, AMJAVA-4, AMYUM-19

TIME AND PLACE: 1030-2400 Hrs., 9 Apr. S/H

SUMMARY

1. The Case Officer confirmed that A-1 had definitely decided not to attempt Operation Genesis and will mount Operation Zenon instead. The undersigned agreed that this was a wise decision since the latest reports indicated increasing hostile naval activity in the area, making chances for survival extremely slight, and reminded A-1 of his recent speech in which he stated that AMWORLD propaganda was in support of military operations and not the reverse, hinting that AMBANG would sacrifice his men for the sake of publicity for himself. A military operation, even if it failed completely would not be as harmful as an obviously publicity stunt that cost lives and equipment. A-1 appeared to accept the necessity for postponing Genesis but was obviously disappointed at not being able to land his sharpshooter to take a shot at the guest of honor during the military review.

2. A-1 and A-4 were given the sequence of Q signs to be transmitted during the test run of the signal plan to be used during the op. The Case Officer reminded A-1 to tell his people that the transmissions will come from one of his bases, and to make certain that the captain of the Adelaida has his copy of the key. The writer suggested that A-1 merely inform that ship to monitor the frequency and to report to A-1 what signals were received and what action would have been taken.

3. Guertler asked that the Consejo be informed of the Q signs to be used by the Adelaida and the intermediate craft and the base. A-4 said that it would be sent up by radio.

4. The writer suggested that the hourly position reports be started right away to be certain that all would function smoothly during the operation. Since around-the-clock monitoring of the ships transmissions will interfere with Disneyland communications with other bases a second radio will be required. One of the agent radios will be taken to the base.

5. A-19 has not located a site for the WAVE transmitter. Alonso has several prospects and A-19 will inspect them and inform the Case Officer soonest. In the meantime, Guertler suggested using the AMYUM office since amidst all the confusion it would probably not attract attention. A-4 was also reminded to furnish us with the signal plan for the WAVE/ Nicaragua link. (The plans to communicate with Managua were abandoned. Commo will be with Disneyland

6. The complete operational plan for Zenon was turned over to the Case Officer on 10 Apr. The essentials were cabled to headquarters.

The remainder will follow by Dispatch.

7. Guertler suggested Curaçao as a suitable place for drydocking Adelaida for needed repairs after the operation. A-1 demurred, stating that it would be needed for an infiltration op on 3 May. A-19 was told that it was of the utmost importance that the AKL Dolores be provided with a top quality captain and engineer, regardless of cost or nationality, that the equipment was very sensitive and was irreplacable. A-19 stated that it would be a problem, especially the engineer, but that he would do so. Guertler offered no suggestions where to look, merely commenting that now that AMWORLD had made many commercial contacts he should be able to obtain assistance in locating a good man for the job.*

8. The complete crew for the Dolores has not been signed yet. Some of the crew from the Adelaida can fill in while she is in drydock.

9. A-19was told that the Consejo was negotiating for Standard Oil of New Jersey to provide AMWORLD will its fuel on a regular basis and that the company wanted a letter from some prominent Nicaraguan official stating that this was acceptable to the GON.

10. The Case Officer asked A-19 if AMWORLD-2 had closed his Swiss account for certain.A-19 replied yes. The writer then told him that that was good because the $25,000 used to open the accound would be refunded to A-2 and that instead of returning it to the Consejo they could keep it and we would deduct the amount from the next month's budget (they have spent ~~most~~ of it already). Shocked looks around the table. They have already spent most of it. It was included in the unexpended assets reported three months ago and was deducted succeeding month's deposit. Henry said we could spend it. The writer professed surprise since this money was not allocated to the project but was only to be used to keep the account open. This lead to a series of complaints about PBPRIME business methods, the fact that Ramsay Scarlet has recently billed them for $30,000 for something incurred in November, and was that any way to run a business. The writer commented that they just didn"t understand anglo-saxon psychology and called it an evening, wishing them the best of luck on their operation.

Warren K. Guertler

*This will be discussed with A-1 later, after the operation.

CONTACT REPORT # 57

OPERATION: AMWORLD **DATE TYPED: 14 Apr. 64**

CONTACT: AMYUM-19

TIME AND PLACE: 1500-1630, 13 Apr. 64, S/H

SUMMARY

1. 22 PRQ Is turned over for traces.

2. As per UFGW-3513 A-19 was reminded that in the future it was absolutely necessary that the AMWORLD monthly accounting be received on time, otherwise our payments may be delayed.

3. Payroll changes: Guertler discussed the payroll changes noted in UFGW-3490. The two crewmen mentioned were terminated for being AWOL but were carriad for two months before being told that they would not be given another chance. The two examples citad for pay increases are explained by the fact that while the two man were still in the WAVE area they received no family allotment. They are not at the camps and so are being paid more. A-19 was reminded that the insurance forms must be submitted in order for an AMWORLDER to be covered and that if a person is terminated all coverage ceases and will not be resumed automatically if the person is re-hired. A-19 says he understands this perfectly and will keep us up to date on all hirings and firings.

4. A-19 was reminded that some of the PRQ Is submitted for traces are unnecessarily vague, citing the case of one submitted from Puerto Rico on Oscar RODRIGUEZ Fernandez. The subjects record of employment lists "Secret Police" without indicating when or for what government.

5. The Case Officer told A-19 that the Consejo had learded that Captain Reinaldo BLANCO and Gustavo de los REYES may wish to contact AMBIDDY-1 and that they might prove useful and should be given a hearing. A-19 replied that BLANCO had been trying to see him for two weeks but that he had been stalling because he did not know what he could do with him at this stage of the project. The Case Officer recommended that he should be given a chance since he might prove useful in the future. A-19 said that he would get in touch with him.

6. Guertler asked A-19 if he knew the circumstances surrounding the case of Blas COMAS Castro, captain of a JURE boat reported to be in trouble after having received a letter from AMBIDDY-1 thanking him for signing up for AMWORLD. A-19 said that he would check, but as far as he knew the man must have filled out a form, and that it was not a frameup.

7. Ramon MONDEJAR Cid and the other members of the M.I.D. recently arrived from Habana have been completely debriefed by the AMYUM intelligence section. Very little was revealed by them during their processing at the Refugee Center, but they have been very cooperative with the AMYUMS. They have been kept isolated from the rest of the PBRUMEN community with the intention of training them and sending them back. A-19 would like to use Aldo VERA Serafin's group to reinfiltrate this group and pick up the Habana coordinator, Bernardo NIEVARES. Now that Nacin is not available, having been kicked out of YOACRE (at KUBARK request, according to A-19) the AMYUMS have no way to contact NIEVARES. A-19 mentioned using his embassy contacts to do this, but the writer strongly urged him to keep this group completely compartmented from any other groups. So far MONDEJAR has made a very favorable impression on his interviewers but very little is known about the coordinator, Benny NIEVARES. Guertler suggested that A-19 should have these people questioned about what they know of NIEVARES, the circumstances surrounding their recruitment. This group was sent with the specific mission of contacting AMBIDDY-1 and asking for material help. From what is known of this organization it seems quite likely to be a provocation, and as A-19 admits, these people are either unusually competent or completely controlled. A-19 wants to put them to the test by providing them with sab material and asking them to hit a specific target before discussing the matter of further financial or material aid.

Warren K. Guertler

~~SECRET~~

9 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1, 9 April 1964, 1315 hours

1. The following was relayed to AMBIDDY-1: "We are glad you have second thoughts about Playa Giron. We have received more information about military, especially maritime, build-up in that sector which would make any landing attempt virtually suicidal." AMBIDDY-1 stated he would confer with AMJAVA-4 and AMYUM-19 and give us his final decision as to whether or not this operation would be run. AMBIDDY-1 commented that one life meant more to him than the entire operation. However, A-1 again reminded this office of the impact an attack on Playa Giron on the 17th of April would have on the morale of the Cuban people. The undersigned replied that there are two sides to the coin; should their operation fail, this would play into the hands of Castro, and it was the opinion of this office that the alternate plan would also do much to raise the morale of the Cuban people.

2. In conclusion it was reaffirmed to A-1 that the final decision is his. He replied that after his meeting with AMJAVA-4 and AMYUM-19 he will let us know the final decision.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Op Genesis

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET~~

AMBIDDY-1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin

DATE : 9 April 1964 at 2000 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated he had been unable to obtain the address of the Tampa barge and he was leaving this matter to AMYUM-19.

2. Concerning the DC-3, A-1 stated that Manuel Hernandes had talked to Petrosky. Petrosky did send a letter to Talaria instead of Carrillo as A-1 had informed this office before. A-1 will get a complete story from Hernandes upon arrival in Costa Rica. A-1 was advised to move the DC-3 to Panama under some pretext beofre Talaria notifies Carrillo of the cancellation of the charter. The logic behind this is should Carillo decide to cause some trouble it would be difficult for the DC-3 to leave Costa Rica.

3. In conclusion the undersigned conveyed to A-1 our wishes for a successful operation.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandes
WH/SA/EO/RH

File: Logistics
C-47

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 9 April 1964

1. A-1 will obtain the address of the Tampa barge today and call our office. A-1 is departing for Nicaragua on 10 April via Lanica at 0730.

2. Manuel Hernandes has gone to Panama and should have returned to Costa Rica by now. A-1 will report on Hernandes' findings upon his arrival in Costa Rica.

3. A-1 told not to forget the budget before his departure. The quarterly charter payment to Talaria for the C-47 is due this month.

4. Petrosky will send a letter to Carrillo stating he would like to charter a C-47. Carrillo will then write back saying that he has a C-47 to sub-let. A-1 hopes that this exchange between Carrillo and Petrosky will culminate in the C-47 being based in Panama.

5. The undersigned asked A-1 if he had his Q signals to be used for the operation. A-1 stated he does have them.

6. A-1 was requested to send the list of those expelled.

7. A-1 should make certain that the Nicaraguan Consulate in New York is alerted to the heavy equipment shipment and the Consular stamped invoice.

8. After signing the Libernis contract General Somoza should mail the contract to the Libernis people.

9. A-1 was advised that someone should now be working on the registration of the DOLORES.

10. We would appreciate A-1 following up on his visa while in Nicaragua.

11. The following was passed to A-1 concerning the village radios: Will arrive in Managua at 1425 hours on 10 April, Pan Am flight no.2501. Air Bill number is Pan Am 026-4-674334. Consists of 27 packages, weighing 2,014. Has been prepaid $603.00. Consignor: Consolidated Electrical Equipment Co. It is identified as transceivers and batteries. No.20763 appears on each case along with the address.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

12. The batteries shipped by Pan American to Managua for use with village radios are dry-charged and "electrolyte" must be added to batteries before they are used. Specifically, "electrolyte" is sulfuric acid and distilled water mixed to a specific gravity of 1.275. "Electrolyte" is available from any filling station or automobile garage. You will need 20 gallons of "electrolyte". This liquid could not be shipped on commercial aircraft.

13. Radios do not have consular invoice which is normal. A-1 stated he could handle the situation.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

Ambiddy-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Log
C-47

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CSDB-3/660,494
SUBJECT	Political Philosophy of Manuel Artime Buesa	DATE DISTR.	9 April 1964
	201	NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCE	
DATE OF INFO.	18 March 1964		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	United States, Miami (6 April 1964)	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A Cuban exile observer who was present during the speech.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a résumé of the political philosophy of Manuel Artime Buesa, leader of the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR, Movement for Revolutionary Recovery) as prepared by Source. It is based on statements made by Artime in his speech on 18 March 1964 to the Associación para Recuperación Económica de Cuba (AREC, Association for Economic Recovery of Cuba), on his first publication entitled Comunismo por qué? (Communism for what?), which was written nine months before Castro came to power, and on Artime's book Traición (Betrayal).

1. Artime does not believe in political extremes — neither the left nor the right. He believes that extremes always end by touching one another. If any extreme gains power in Cuba, and in the case of the extreme right by imposing a dictatorship, he will continue to fight with weapons in hand. Artime does not believe in the classification of men by race, by political ranks in former governments, or by money. He confesses to being an opportunist in the sense that he is taking maximum advantage of each opportunity, but not in the sense of changing his beliefs in accord with opportunities.

2. The main theme of Comunismo por qué? was that more than a change in government a change in the conscience of men is needed. It outlined the duties of the padrón (landowner) toward the workers so that the latter may live in dignity and honor. The padron should feel that the problems of his workers are also his problems. The worker, in turn, has certain obligations to the padron. If this quid pro quo is not adhered to, a (Christian) government has the right to intervene for the common good. In his letter of resignation to Fidel Castro accusing the latter of being a

5
4
3
2
1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	[illegible]	OCR	FBI 2
REPCINCLANT	CINCSO #	TREASURY	USIA	I&NS				

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

SA/EOB	3	SA/SI	[illegible]/PACY	WE/5/R	1		LX-1090
SA/Intel	1	SA/WAVE		WE/MADR	1		NO PROJECT
SA/R	3	SA/SO/HH (1)					CSDB-3/660,494
SA/CI	2			CI/OPS/WH	2		
SA/MOB	1						COORDINATING RELEASING
TOTALS	IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DODS 1, WH (1), WH/SA 12 (1), WE 1 (1)			LIAISON	WH/SA/SO/HH		[illegible]

Communist and traitor, Artime mentioned that he resigned because Castro had not been honest with the businessmen by not telling them their property would be confiscated.

3. The following excerpts from Artime's book Traicion clearly outline Artime's ideology:

a. "We believe the state should foment and stimulate private economy, both national and foreign. We have to have an effective democracy in Latin America because the word democracy in that area has been prostituted too often. Many countries call themselves democratic but in reality are nothing but militarist and demagogic, and many simply go through the motions of elections. Many are simply totalitarian governments which are living off the blood and toil of the people. The corrupt politicians, the strong men, the totalitarians have been the strongest allies of Communism. Our fight is not against one man, it is not a war of personal hatred--it is a war against the doctrine of hatred, be it called Castro or what have you--it is a war against a doctrine; we are as much opposed to Khrushchev as we are against Tito. We are as much opposed to the totalitarian left as we are opposed to the fascist right."

b. "We don't care if they call us extremist. They will continue to call us rightist or leftist, fascist, philocommunist. I recall the words of Don Quixote when he was passing on the outskirts of a small town and Sancho said to Don Quixote, 'Sir, the dogs are barking at us,' Don Quixote replied, 'Let them, Sancho, if they are barking it is because we are moving. And we will continue to move.'"

c. "They say we are very ambitious. Our ambition is that in the coming days when Cuba is liberated people will pronounce our name with respect in our country."

d. "Our men in Cuba are not only fighting for the independence of our country but also for the independence of the American hemisphere, for the survival of Christian principles in America, for the Western world." Artime maintains that the situation today is much the way Lenin would have hoped for. Britain and France have recognized Red China; the U.S. is at odds with these two governments--this is exactly what Lenin would have wanted. Artime has supported his statements, by quoting Lenin, "Within 30 years we will embark on a peace offensive, of coexistence, and we will split the free nations and smash the impotent bourgeois."

e. "The battle-ground for Latin America lies 90 miles from our shores. Should the Western world lose this battle, the sleeping giant (Latin America) will wake up on the side of the Communist camp. Then it would be preferable to be dead because the free world will have ceased to be."

f. "We are all guilty for having turned over Cuba to the hands of men who could not govern her properly. We have knocked on doors and will continue to do so because our cause is honorable. We cannot afford to wait for miracles. We must prepare for a long fight and not expect the aid of such organizations as the OAS and the UN. It is up to the Cubans to liberate Cuba. If we are not going to wage a war of principles, I will not join that struggle."

8 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 8 April 1964 at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 informed he had sent man to Tampa to obtain exact location of Tampa barge; he hopes to have the address later today.

2. A-1 is leaving for Central America on Friday, 10 April. Does not expect to return until latter end of April.

3. A-1 was asked to make certain his financial request to the Consejo is in our office by 15 April. Two papers should be in our possession by the aforementioned date: the form for last month's expenditures plusrrequest to Consejo for $225,000. If these papers are not in our hands by the specified date it will result in unavoidable delay which will make them unable to meet their bill by the beginning of the following month. A-1 assured the undersigned the deadline would be met.

4. A-1 was advised that during the operational phase AMYUM-19 must be available to either Mike or the Consejo at all times. We will not accept any excuse should we wish to contact A-19 and are unable to do so. A-1 stated that A-19 will be on call.

5. ADELAIDA to depart from Disneyland on its first operation on 11 April at 1500 hours (local time, which according to A-1 is one hour less than Washington time).

6. A-1 requested the Consejo supply him with more detailed maps of the city of Playa Giron for Rafael Alvarez. A-1 was told we would check into the matter. Today AMYUM-19 is to give

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible] and

~~SECRET~~

Mike GEIDEL (A) complete schedule for first operation, e.g. ETD, course of ship, ETA, etc.

7. The undersigned advised A-1 we would like to talk to him by telephone tomorrow after we talk to Carl concerning final aspects of the operation.

Raul J. Hernandez

File:
Finance
Sabotage
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓

✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

8 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 8 April 1964, 1500 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 was questioned regarding the present status of the Norwegian engineer, his whereabouts, their plans for his use, etc. A-1 said he didn't know the answer, would have to check with AMJAVA-4, and would call us tomorrow with all the details.

2. A-1 was told that the technicians who are to receive training aboard the Dolores should be ready to leave for New York by 15 April. As the van will be shipped directly, it will only be possible to train the technicians on the Dolores. We will be able to train up to ten technicians, and A-1 should send as many as he wants to. We will let AMYUM-19 know on Tuesday, 14 April, exactly when and where they should report for training.

3. A-1 was advised that we have the information he requested and he will have it by tomorrow night. A-1 was very pleased to hear this.

4. A-1 said he will call this office tomorrow morning for sure.

B. Hernandez
Bobbie Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Training
Commo

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

~~SECRET/KYBAT~~

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM

Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

MICROFILM

SUBJECT

TYPIC/AMWORLD--Training by JMWAVE of AMBIDDY-1 and AMJAVA-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. In the opinion of JAMES D. ZABOTH the training presented to AMWORLD's principal agents was of great value to the project. Project management and operational planning were very effectively highlighted.

2. Proof of the pudding was in the plan presented by AMBIDDY-1 and AMJAVA-4 on 28 March in Miami, which envisions a raid on PBRUMEN about mid-April. The good results of the JMWAVE training sessions were readily apparent in the quality of this plan.

3. We appreciate the time and effort expended by JMWAVE on these training sessions and wish to record our impression that they were successful and highly professional.

KENNETH L. PHILBROOK

Distribution:
4 - COS, JMWAVE

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW 2517	8 April 1964
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KYBAT DESENSITIZED	HQS FILE NUMBER CS Copy In 19-124/27/3

1 - WH/SAESEC
1 - WH/SA/SO/HH
→ AMBIDDY-1 201
AMJAVA-4 201

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/SA/SO/HH	Carl E. Jenkins CEJ	bh	4215

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/SA/SO/HH		Henry Hecksher

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/SA		Henry Hecksher

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT : Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 7 April 1964

1. It was brought to the attention of AMBIDDY-1 that the MRR is the only Cuban exile organization that has not properly registered with the United States Government. A-1 will attend to the registration.

2. A-1 requested to check his P.O. box.

3. A-1 reported receiving information this morning that ADELAIDA en route to Disneyland.

4. Concerning his visa, he stated he had received an FS 510 form. According to A-1 these forms have to be filled and submitted to the American Embassy in Managua. A-1 was asked if AMJAVA-4 now has the U. S. re-entry permit. A-4 does presently has the alien resident [illegible] card, but not the re-entry blue book.

5. A-1 was informed that all village radios will be shipped to Bluefields and none would be sent to Miami for him to hand carry. It is hoped that these village radios will arrive in time for the operation. Should this not be the case they have PRC-10s which could serve the same purpose as the village radios.

6. Mr. Mountain is expected to call Sixto Mesa advising the survey has been completed. Mr. Mountain will request Mesa that his three DMJM engineers return to the States. A-1 was asked to make sure that Mr. Mountain's message reaches the engineers.

7. The soil sample sent from Nicaragua is still NOT in the possession of AMWORLD.

8. A-1 was requested to notify his propaganda personnel not to make any mention of Brasil and their radio broadcasts. A-1 agreed.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed [illegible] code

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: AMBIDDY-1 (201) ✓
Conversations

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

7 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 7 April, 1010 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 confirmed what AMJAVA-4 had related to this office earlier, that is, he wanted one large, two medium and two small village radios. This would suffice for one mothership, two Swifts and two rubber boats to rehearse.

2. A-1 stated the Libernic representative would not be needed in Nicaragua to confer with General Somoza since all the arrangements have been made. Gen. Somoza has found the charter very acceptable.

3. A-1 was asked flatly if the Adelaida is ready to begin operations. He replied that it is ready.

4. A-1 was advised that we would like to schedule the dry-run for 10 April, if this would be acceptable to him. A-1 agreed with this date.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Dolores

✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

7 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 6 April, 2000 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 began the conversation by announcing that he had dismissed seventeen frogmen from AMWORLD and "the next ax to fall" will be on the mothership ADELAIDA.

2. At this time A-1 was informed that the people who had trained Munne were very satisfied with his performance and Munne is now considered capable of being captain of ADELAIDA.

3. A-1 expects to leave for the bases in Nicaragua and Costa Rica on 9 or 10 April.

4. A-1 would like to have the dry run of the operation scheduled between 9-11 April. The operations will commence on 12 April.

5. A-1 was told the idea of using the DMJM engineers has been cancelled. A-1 sounded very pleased and stated they were too elaborate for his operation. However, A-1 would like that the survey conducted by the American engineers be submitted to him. A-1 was advised that since he paid $31,000 for this survey it will be submitted to him by the American engineers. A-1 was also advised that we are conducting a survey of our own which will be sent to him. Our project centers around using the Tampa barge as a floating dock. A-1 commented that AMJAVA-4 had had the same idea. A-1 was asked to send us the exact address of the Tampa barge.

6. A-1 has obtained his visa papers in Nicaragua.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

7. A-1 would like to have several of the village radios sent to him in Miami in order to hand carry them to Nicaragua. A-1 was informed we would have to check into the matter.

8. Upon arriving in Miami, A-1 accidentally met Luis Somoza. The latter stated he is going to Egypt, Italy and West Germany. On his return he will stop in Washington to speak to President Johnson and Attorney General Kennedy concerning "his plan."

9. Regarding General Somoza, A-1 mentioned he had no trouble obtaining the contract for the Dolores from the General. A-1 will get the document on his next trip to Nicaragua.

10. A-1 was asked if there were any difficulties in Costa Rica. A-1 stated there was "a little trouble," but nothing of major importance. Cornelio Orlich had spoken to A-1 during his last visit and the former had stated that there would be some grumbling on the part of the Government of Costa Rica but this was intended only to placate the opposition. Cornelio Orlich is scheduled to be operated on for an ulcer on 7 April. Should there be any need to deal with the Costa Rican Government, A-1 will deal directly with President Orlich. A-1 expects to see the president on his next tour through Central America. (There was no indication during this portion of the conversation that AMWORLD would be asked to leave Costa Rica.) A-1 was asked if he still stood by his original guess on Cornelio's age, that is, 73. Martin informed A-1 that reports we had received indicated him to be in his 50's. A-1 stated if he is 50 he looks like 73. A-1 asked if we wanted toknow his exact age. A-1 was told not to go to any trouble to obtain it; we would just like to know for our own information.

11. Reports received by A-1 indicate Adelaida should presently be at Disneyland.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH"

File:
AMBIDDY-1 n201
Conversations
Costa Rica
DMJM
Munne

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROCESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD
Speeches of Manuel Artime Buesa

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

Reference : None

Transmitted herewith are three AMOT reports concerning recent public appearances of Manuel ARTIME Buesa which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments: H/W
AMOT Report DD-742 - 1 cy
AMOT Report DD-745 - 1 cy
AMOT Report DD-764 - 1 cy

Distribution:
3 - SAS, w/att/h/w

CS COPY

AN/ce	FI	
~~RI~~	~~DESK~~	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

201-267437

~~19-124-27/3~~

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
3 APR 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-15133

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

1 att.

~~SECRET~~

Report # DD-742. 20 Mar 64

TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted] amot-11

SUBJECT: Appearance of Manuel ARTIME Buesa at the A.R.E.C. Session on 18 Mar 64 in the Everglades Hotel, Miami.

At exactly 1550 hours, 18 Mar 64, Manuel ARTIME Buesa appeared before A.R.E.C. members. ARTIME spoke for one hour and twenty minutes, finishing his speech at 1710 hours. During that time he answered questions from the audience.

ARTIME dedicated the first hour of his speech to "presenting his credentials" (that is how he called what he was going to say). During that hour he gave a recount of his actions, beginning with the letter of resignation which he sent to Fidel CASTRO in Cuba, and then reading excerpts from things published in exile by the M.R.R. and from his "Political Testament" which he claimed to have written in the Guatemala training base in the 24 hours preceding the departure for the Bay of Pigs invasion, etc., etc., up to the present time. He finished that part of his speech by declaring that he respected the Constitution of 1940, that he was fighting against a system not against one man, and that he would continue to fight after the fall of Fidel CASTRO Ruz if another dictatorship were established in Cuba—either a rightist or a leftist dictatorship—or if it was simply an attempt to exchange Fidel for another person, no matter who it might be.

Then he said that many persons said he was an extreme rightist and others said he was an extreme leftist, that others said he was an ambitious individual, and others said he was an opportunist. That all he could answer to those who said he was an extremist was that he did not like extremes, either of the right or left, because these extremes always ended by touching each other. That to those who said he was an ambitious individual he replied that yes, he was ambitious, but that his ambition was for his name to be spoken with respect some day in his country. That he had the ambition that at least, after his death, it would be said: He was a worthy man. That, in short, what he had was a great ambition for History. That to those who said he was an opportunist he could say: "If opportunism is making use of every moment and every opportunity to do something for the country, I am an opportunist. If opportunism is

SECRET

RESTRICTED

CS COPY

Att. 1 UFGA-15133

201-267437

Report # DD-742, C-4, 20 Mar 64 (cont.)

changing ideas in accordance with this or that situation, then I am not an opportunist because I do not change my ideas. I have upheld the same ideas since I appeared in the public light, and they are here in my Political Testament and in other declarations and documents which I have made and written. For those reasons I cannot be an opportunist." He also said that he had knocked, was knocking and would continue to knock on all doors to get assistance for the liberation of Cuba. That he classified men into two categories only, worthy men and unworthy men, and there were no other differences. That to him are men were equal, be they black or white, rich or poor, members of one regime or of another. That he has known and knows many worthy men from all regimes, etc., etc., etc.

Questions and Answers:

Following are some of the most outstanding questions and answers:

Question: A man who said he was named Filiberto RIVERO and that he worked for a TV station at Los Angeles, California, asked the following question. "Mr. ARTIME, I am going to ask you a strong question which therefore requires a previous explanation. Some time ago one of your representatives in Los Angeles told me you would be going to that city and I was going to ask you this question, but you did not go. Now that I have the opportunity I am going to ask this question to you. The question is this: In Los Angeles and other places there are rumors that in certain U.S. circles, which are described as extreme liberals, they have the plan of using some Cubans--like you, for example--to keep the rest of the Cubans entertained making them think they will go to war when the fact is that their plan is very different. The plan consists of not having that war and thus be able to show, in a few years, how peaceful coexistence is possible. My question is this: Have you ever considered that you might be the Cuban who has been chosen for this and that you might still not be aware of it?

Answer: I don't know whether such a plan exists or not, what I can guarantee to you is that I would not be the Cuban chosen for that. I am precisely supported by the group which is opposed to those liberals, by the group of Latin American men who fear just that, not by the U.S.

DESENSITIZED

but by the countries of those Latin Americans. I am a Latin American product, not another kind of product. I am receiving help from Latin America and that is why I cannot be chosen for that plan. Maybe others are being selected for that. (Ovation.)

Question: A lady in the audience, not a member of A.R.E.C., who said she was a teacher from Las Villas province, Cuba, asked the next question. She began by saying in brief words the help which she had given to insurgents in Las Villas province, etc., etc., and that she had had to leave Cuba because three of her boys had been executed. Then she asked ARTIME: "Why isn't help given to those insurgents?"

Answer: ARTIME said that he did not understand Americans. Then he said that last week, precisely last week, help had been sent to those insurgents. That unfortunately it was not all that it should be, but it was something. He explained that it is necessary to use small and fast boats and for that reason heavy cargoes cannot be taken, and that it is only possible to make two trips in one night to the Cuban coast and for that reason the help cannot be more effective. That at any rate, they were infiltrating arms, shoes, boots, food and technicians in the handling of armament. He clarified that the function of the technicians was to teach the handling of weapons to the peasants and also to unite them. ARTIME then told the same lady that the person for whom she was asking was precisely where he could help those over there, and for that reason was not in that room. (He was referring to a person for whom the lady had inquired when he accompanied her from the seat to the microphone, as the lady spoke very softly and the audience asked her to go to the microphone to ask her question so all could hear her.)

Question: Another member of the audience asked the following question: "Mr. ARTIME, we understand--through announcements that have been published--that Mr. RAY or JURE will go to Cuba in the coming months, and there are rumors about another organization doing the same thing. Are you thinking in some action of that type to counteract the effects of those possible actions, in favor of your movement?"

DIGITIZED

Report # DD-742, C-4, 20 Mar 64 (cont.)

Answer: ARTIME gave the following answer: "If they go to Cuba, may God be with them. But I hope it won't be a demagogic action in which men will die to give prestige to others. Let me tell you that we don't make public what we do or plan to do. Some people want publicity for their actions, but we put the liberation of Cuba before publicity."

Comments: In the reporting agent's opinion, nothing new was said in this public appearance. The "presentation of credentials" was already too well known to the audience. The only thing which called attention was his clear position of opposing any maneuver to try to impose a "Fidelismo without Fidel" which the majority of the audience interpreted as meaning Manuel RAY Rivero. Even though ARTIME did not name RAY, his implications were quite clear the same as the look on his face when he was asked something in connection with JURE.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Report # DD-745. 23 Mar 64

TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted] [illegible]

SUBJECT: Manuel ARTIME Buesa's appearance before A.R.E.C. on Wednesday, 18 March 1964.

SOURCE: Report from our collaborator [redacted] through direct observation.

Following is a literal transcription of the report from our collaborator [redacted]

"At 3:30 PM, 18 Mar 64, the A.R.E.C. Recording Secretary, Ignacio CANCIO, read the minutes of the preceding A.R.E.C. session in the conference room of the Everglades Hotel, Miami. The minutes were unanimously accepted by the A.R.E.C. members present.

"Abel MESTRE, A.R.E.C. President, announced that the agenda included Dr. Manuel ARTIME as guest speaker at 4 PM. Then the stand was taken by Gerardo ALASCAL who gave a detailed report on the experiences of the newspaperman John CORP (I am not sure of his patronymic because I only heard it spoken), from Life magazine, on his trips around the world.

"At 3:50 PM Abel MESTRE announced that Dr. ARTIME had just arrived and the audience gave him a standing ovation. It is estimated that there were about 500 persons in the audience.

"According to Francisco PRIETO, who is one of the most active members of A.R.EC., this was the A.R.E.C. gathering ever attended by the largest number of persons because the normal audience is from 220 to 240 persons.

"There were from 40 to 45 members of the M.R.R. in the audience, and they could be perfectly identified as such because they had the emblem of that organization in the buttonhole of their lapels.

"ARTIME began his speech by making a recount of his activities since 1959, which he called his 'credentials to A.R.E.C.' He mentioned his letter of resignation to CASTRO six months after the establishment of the CASTRO Government, where he said to CASTRO among other things that he should not deceive the industrialists, merchants and live classes of the nation because when industry, commerce and all private properties passed to the hands of the State that would be Communism. Later he read some paragraphs from the book which he published in exile prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion.

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

"ARTIME said that he is an ambitious man because, since we are on Cuban soil, he wants there to be talk everywhere about ARTIME and the liberation of Cuba.

"That some persons accuse him of being a rightist, others of being a leftist, and others of being an opportunist. That persons who work in favor of collective interests always have detractors. To those who accuse him of being an opportunist, he says that if using some opportunity in benefit of the freedom of Cuba is being an opportunist, then he is the first opportunist.

"ARTIME said that previous Cuban rulers had had their mistakes. That when the Constitution of 1940 had been written it had also had its mistakes, but as it functioned rarely we don't know what those mistakes are. For that reason, until the Cuban people give themselves another Constitution our sole goal upon our arrival at Free Cuba should be to enforce the Constitution of 1940.

"He spoke of the Cuban Case in the international field, in the sense that he does not understand the attitude of the U.S. or of the rest of the Latin American countries which are allowing their fields to be taken by Castro-Communist guerrillas. ARTIME mentioned that he has not the slightest hope the O.A.S. will do something in benefit of Cuba.

"A lady from the audience who said she was a teacher from Encrucijada, Las Villas province, asked ARTIME why help was not given to her young students who were fighting in Las Villas province without shoes, food or ammunition. She also mentioned that some days ago five of her young boys were executed, including a minor.

"When ARTIME went down among the audience to accompany this lady to the microphone, she whispered a name to ARTIME but the audience could not catch the name. ARTIME replied: 'You have mentioned a name who is not now in this room because he is helping in the liberation of Cuba. He is one of my greatest helpers.' However, ARTIME did not mention the name either.

"ARTIME then said that help is being given to the freedom fighters in Cuba, but that he has very few boats and the boats which go to the

DESENSITIZED

Cuban coast have to be light boats and cannot carry large cargoes. That not only rifles are needed, but also boats, food and other things which they (M.R.R.) are now gradually supplying.

"One of the A.R.E.C. guests in the audience, an unidentified man, asked ARTIME whether it might not be possible that the U.S. Government were using him as an instrument leading to a policy of peaceful coexistence with the USSR, and that he were just someone used to keep people entertained with the Cuban Case, naturally, without this being known to ARTIME himself. ARTIME immediately replied that that might be possible because he did not know U.S. policy plans in that respect, but that naturally, if this were confirmed it was certain he would not lend himself to that manoeuvre.

"ARTIME continued making general considerations about the Cuban military might, and he described Cuba as the 7th country of the world in the aspect of military power. He continued with a comparison between the men who wage war against CASTRO and the Cuban Government, and the story of the giant Goliath represented by CASTRO and the boy David represented by the elements engaging in war activities against CASTRO.

"ARTIME closed by saying that war is the only way of uniting all Cubans and he mentioned that that union had already been achieved at the Bay of Pigs where the blood of Cubans from all ideologies and social classes was mixed.

"ARTIME was questioned about the information appearing in different news media about JURE ~~[illegible]~~ being in Cuba fighting before the 20th of May, and he replied: 'May God be with them, but we shall never accept any Government of the extreme right, and much less of the extreme left, and in that case we shall continue fighting with the rifle in our hand.' When he finished saying this the audience gave him a standing ovation.

"The event ended with disguised precipitation because there were rumors in the conference room that Pedro Luis DIAZ Lanz would arrive to ask questions to ARTIME about his past with CASTRO with the intention of ridiculing ARTIME. (Incidentally, AREC gatherings usually end at 6 PM and this one ended at 5 PM.) And in effect, DIAZ Lanz arrived at 5:30 PM but the event was already over. Even AREC President [illegible] was

DESENSITIZED

already out in the street.

"As a personal comment, I don't think [illegible] would have come out too well because it was noticeable that the [illegible] elements present were willing to protect their chief in any eventuality."

DESENSITIZED

~~SECRET~~

Report # DD-764. 31 Mar 64

TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Opinions about Manuel ARTIME Buesa's TV appearance on Sunday, 29 Mar 64.

1. Marcos RODRIGUEZ Menéndez, M.D.C. Executive:

ARTIME showed true leadership qualities. It was a blessing for lawyers when he referred to the 1940 Constitution. He was very good when he said that he was for unity and called all Cubans to war without making any differences among them for their tendencies.

2. José Antonio VALLE (mat. unk.), Miami News distribution manager, attorney, mine owner in Oriente province:

ARTIME is a fake and an egotist, but he is a genius in politics. He scored a win when he said that he did not have time to answer on a political basis because they were at war. RAY and ARTIME are fighting for their future in Cuba. They must be left alone until the Cuban problem is solved because I don't know which of the two is worse.

3. Angel HERNANDEZ Rojo, member of the D.R.E.:

ARTIME is a "yes man" who does not have his own opinion about what he wants and he is unconditionally subjected to the "dollar" without caring for anything else. The D.R.E. has something pending with ARTIME because on one occasion, prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, he took over a base which the D.R.E. had in Puerto Rico.

4. Jaime MARZOL Morales, president of "Triunfo" sugar mill, resides at 3670 SW 25th St., Miami:

ARTIME was very good. The people liked him as they think he will lead them to war and that is what everyone wants. His statements about the 1940 Constitution were very good.

5. Luis ORTEGA Sierra, newspaperman:

ARTIME is the man chosen by the C.I.A. to create an internal problem in Cuba and open the doors for an inva[illegible]

FROM [redacted]

ACTION TO: [redacted]

ADVISE [redacted] BY 13 ON April

ACTION TAKEN:

REASON NO ACTION TAKEN:

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

31 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 March 1964 at 1630 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 began by reminding this office he has not received the check books which will be necessary to draw money from the First National Bank of New York.

2. A-1 has received various identification carnets from inside Cuba which will be forwarded to this office via AMYUM-19.

3. A-1 informed us he had received a check of $10,000 from Cooper Macdonald. A-1 requested guidance concerning the check. A-1 was advised to forward a check with a covering letter to the Atlantic-Chesapeake explaining that Maritima Bam is forwarding this amount on behalf of Mr. Quires as partial payment for the LCM's. A-1 was reminded there are still $27,000 pending on this bill.

4. A-1 will depart on 0400, 31 March for Nicaragua accompanied by AMJAVA-4. A-1 expects to return on 5 April for their meeting with James D. ZABOTH (P).

5. A-1 was asked to send a letter to Chester, Blackburn, and Roder, Inc. requesting purchase and shipment of a 17 ton bulldozer and two vans equipped for office and dispensary use, and also to request shipment of the Little Giant. After a brief discussion it was decided to ship the heavy equipment to the following address:

Maritima Bam
Monkey Point

A-1 felt this address would be sufficient. However, Maritima Bam should send the letter to Chester requesting these

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

heavy items. It was stressed to A-1 the importance of assuring the letter is sent to the attention of Mr. Chester.

6. When the balance of the money ($27,000) is sent to A-1 for the Atlantic-Chesapeake we will also send the $132,000 for construction equipment. The money should be sent to A-1 by 20 April.

7. According to A-1, A-4's travel papers have been returned to him. A-1 also mentioned that he will request his visa on this coming trip to Nicaragua.

8. Manuel Hernandez to leave for Panama as soon as A-1 arrives in Costa Rica.

9. AMWORLD-2 has been told by A-1 to close the Swiss bank account. A-1 was asked to have AMWORLD-2 advise AMYUM-19 when account has been closed in order that the information can be relayed to Mike GUERTLER (P).

10. A-1 stated that the tactical radios can be shipped to Captain Arnoldo PEREZ, Departamento de Immigracion, Managua. A-1 to confirm this address while in Nicaragua and advise us. A-1 told there are 24 tactical radios in all.

11. A-1 commented that the budget was mailed today (30 March) instead of last Thursday as he had previously stated.

12. A-1 inadvertently forgot to ascertain the Tampa barge address. A-19 is to call this office with said information.

13. A-1 requested our opinion concerning the two coming operations. A-1 was informed that the opinion of this office is, "The plan is bold and imaginative and the decision is up to you"

14. A-1 was advised that we have received a report which states that General Somoza is planning a trip to Switzerland in mid-April. A-1 mentioned that he has received reports that General Somoza would leave on the first of April but did not know the destination. A-1 was reminded again not to mention to General Somoza the preventive propaganda we had discussed but rather to use the meat packing story.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

15. A-1 was cautioned not to place all his trust in Cornelio Orlich.

16. A-1 was asked for his opinion about transporting the rest of the infiltration people now in Miami to Costa Rica by means of an off-shore transfer. This would be done in a manner similar to the transfer of sabotage equipment. A-1 advised we would need at least two weeks prior notice. A-1 sounded enthusiastic about the idea and he said he would consider it.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Finance
Commercial

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

30 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 28 March 1964, 1430 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 commented that the meeting between Carl Jenkins, AMJAVA-4 and AMBIDDY-1 went off very satisfactorily. The first operations were discussed and according to A-1, Carl was very pleased. A-1 did not go into specific details but stated he had shown Carl blueprints of the first operation. At the meeting A-4 presented another plan which calls for the assassination of Castro or some high official at Playa Giron on 17 April, the anniversay of the Bay of Pigs.

2. A-1 plans to leave for Nicaragua early part of next week. From Nicaragua A-1 intends to visit Costa Rica. A-1 was asked to check in with us before his departure.

3. A-1 was advised the Libernic representative is standing by in case he is needed. Should A-1 desire the presence of the representative in Managua he should contact us.

4. A-1 was reminded we have not as yet received the budget for last month. A-1 commented he had asked his secretary to mail it a few days ago. A-1 was asked to check again to make sure it has been mailed. A-1 was advised the money has been deposited and should be in his account by the end of the month.

5. A-1 was asked to give us the address of the Tampa barge. A-1 said he would have it for Monday.

6. It was suggested to A-1 not to proach the subject of the naval base propaganda with General Somoza but rather to tell General Somoza that if any inquires are made concerning A-1's operation to use the cover that these materials are for Somoza's own meat packing business.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

7. A-1 was told we have two dispensary vans for him, one with an X-ray machine, but we need name of consignee for shipment.

8. A-1 was reminded to have AMWORLD-2 close the Swiss bank account.

9. A-1 was congratulated on his fine report on Col. Lopez of Honduras.

10. The conversation ended by wishing A-1 a Happy Easter.

Raul J Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Program
Nicaragua
Logistics

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

27 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Martin Ferrer and AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 26 March 1100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 telephoned to say he had received the report from the American engineers. A-1 was informed the cost would be $318,000 without a landing field. A-1 commented it was both his and the engineer's opinion that the job could be done rapidly and well. A-1 was requested to forward a copy to us of the engineer's proposal for our perusal. A-1 was advised not to consult with the engineers until we have completely examined their proposal and suggestions. A-1 agreed.

2. A-1 had received an intelligence survey from MOLE and Manuel GOMEZ on the camps. According to A-1 there are many sound recommendations which A-1 intends to employ. A-1 again inferred that there will be a general house cleaning of personnel.

3. A-1 commented that his representatives (AMYUM-19, GUTIERREZ, NAVARRETE) had gone to New York and could not come to agreement with Mr. Chester and Mr. Zweifach. A-1 would like to purchase supplies in the free port of New Orleans since it would be cheaper than shipping the goods from New York. A-1 also mentioned this was what we had agreed upon at our last meeting. A-1 was informed that as a central point for buying and shipping New York offers many advantages. This does not preclude using other cities in the country or in the world for buying and shipping. However, New York is the best point of control for this activity. The simplest and most efficient way to buy and ship is to determine exactly what is needed and the frequency with which it is to be delivered. Once the list of requirements is drawn up, it should be given to Chester or Zweifach specifying the exact recurring dates of delivery. There is no need for

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SEC

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

A-1's people to waste their time on such things as buying, shipping, getting export licenses, etc. This can all be turned over to professional businessmen, thereby relieving you of all burdens.

4. A-1 then commented that in certain cases Mr. King has been able to purchase some items cheaper than Mr. Zweifach. A-1 was informed that in some specific instances this may be the case. However, in large quantities of a recurring nature a professional company will in the long run obtain better rates and render better services than an individual. Also A-1 was reminded that the professional service and efficiency of delivery cannot be duplicated by individuals. A-1 was advised that King could best be used as an adviser and/or consultant to the professional companies doing the work.

5. A-1 was requested to make certain that A-19 clarify to GUTIERREZ and NAVARRETE that there may have been some misunderstanding on their part that Chester was receiving instructions from someone else.

6. A-1 was requested to return the insurance applications of all personnel he no longer has in his employ.

7. The conversation ended with the usual abrazos.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
DMJM
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Commercial

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

4. RI FILE NO.

5. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

6. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

2. ANALYST

3. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

1926043

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

019-300-003
UFG -04843
27 MAR 64

PAFR

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ HAS MADE RECENT STATEMENTS CONCERNING PLANNED INVASION OF CUBA IN MAY 64

1 926 043

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE ukr

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMWORLD/Operational
Evaluation of AMBIDDY-1's Training During Period 6 to 18 January 1964

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

1. INTRODUCTION: In the period 6 to 18 January 1964, AMBIDDY-1 was given 83 hours of tutorial training, in JMWAVE safehouse facilities, on existing operational doctrine and management techniques applicable to a major clandestine effort against PBRUMEN. A copy of the training schedule which was used in this tutorial training is attached. At the completion of the training course, the various training instructors submitted an evaluation on AMBIDDY-1. These evaluations are outlined in the following paragraph.

2. EVALUATIONS: The below-listed evaluations were prepared by the instructors who participated primarily in Phase I of AMBIDDY-1's tutorial training. The Phase I instruction concentrated on imparting to AMBIDDY-1 current operational doctrine relative to unconventional warfare techniques. The evaluations are as follows:

a. Small Unit Operations and Training: AMBIDDY-1 responded most enthusiastically to all aspects of the training on small unit techniques. He made detailed notes on the material covered, and these notes included copies of training charts and diagrams. AMBIDDY-1 displayed particularly intensive interest in that portion of the training dealing with the principles of survival and the issuance of individual equipment. In the course of the training, AMBIDDY-1 was given several practical tactical problems to solve. AMBIDDY-1's solutions to these problems were logical and reflected a grasp of the techniques to which he had been exposed during the training sessions. Thomas L. DARGUZIS was the primary instructor in this phase of the training, and he assessed AMBIDDY-1 as being an intelligent, alert, highly-motivated individual who has a realistic appraisal of his own limitations and capabilities.

b. Clandestine Activity: AMBIDDY-1 received extensive training in FI tradecraft subjects, including the nature and elements of clandestine activity, security, cover, compartmentation,
(continued) 201-267437

Attachment: herewith
Training Schedule

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO C-S Copy File
19-124-27/2

GROUP 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
24 March 64

DATE DISPATCHED
MAR 27 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-14923

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-267437

organization of a basic net, communications and reporting techniques. In the course of this training, AMBIDDY-1 expressed a particular interest in the subjects of security, cover and compartmentation. Charles F. MASENGILL was the primary instructor for this bloc of training, and he reports that AMBIDDY-1 was a keen student who appreciated the opportunity to learn as much as possible about clandestine operations. MASENGILL believes that AMBIDDY-1 at the completion of his training was probably weakest on the topic of how to report intelligence information.

c. Resistance Activity and Guerrilla Warfare: AMBIDDY-1 received training on the principles and concepts inherent in organizing an infiltration team. In addition, he was trained relative to the principles of organizing a resistance net. Additionally, he was trained in caching, demolition and sabotage techniques. AMBIDDY-1 also received instruction in the principles and concepts of guerrilla warfare. AMBIDDY-1 was also given an opportunity to familiarize himself, through actual range firing, with those weapons which are normally used by anti-AMTHUG-1 forces. Alton T. PIRNACK was the principal instructor for this bloc of training. PIRNACK reports that AMBIDDY-1 was responsive to the subject material which was presented to him. AMBIDDY-1 did not hesitate to ask questions nor to seek clarification of points which he did not clearly understand. AMBIDDY-1 did indicate that he was a neophyte in the subject of PM operations, and, as a result, he was most appreciative of the training which he was receiving on these subjects. It was evident during this bloc of training that caching was an entirely new facet of clandestine operations for AMBIDDY-1.

3. COMMENT: Phase II of AMBIDDY-1's training concentrated on exposing AMBIDDY-1 to those management techniques and principles which are applicable to a major clandestine operation against a target like PBRUMEN. This part of the training was carried out exclusively by Andrew K. REUTEMAN and Stanley R. ZAMKA. In this phase of the training, AMBIDDY-1 constantly expressed a great deal of enthusiasm for the subject material which was being presented. Throughout the training, AMBIDDY-1 gave every indication that he was absorbing the major portion of the training. At the same time, it was clear that he was overwhelmed by the material and the implications of what this training meant in terms of his conduct in future operations. After the management phase of AMBIDDY-1's training was completed, REUTEMAN and ZAMKA reviewed the 83 hours training program in its totality with AMBIDDY-1. In addition, the program was reviewed with all of the instructors who participated in the training. As a result of this review, a consensus was reached that, while AMBIDDY-1 is an intelligent and responsive student, the training which he received does not qualify him for the position of senior officer in a major clandestine undertaking against PBRUMEN. The training did, however, alert AMBIDDY-1 to a number of problems and pitfalls which he should avoid in his activities. This training also provided certain guide posts for AMBIDDY-1, but these guide posts were laid out in such a concentrated dose that they cannot be considered as an adequate substitute for experience or training in depth over an extended period of time.

END OF DISPATCH

DESENSITIZED

201-267437

SECRET

H/W Attachment to
UFGA-14923

ORIENTATION PROGRAM

AMBIDDY-1

PROGRAM PERIOD: 6 - 18 January 1964

TOTAL HOURS : 83

PERIOD	SUBJECT	INSTRUCTOR	INTERPRETER
6 January 1930-2130	Orientation and Review of Schedule	REUTEMAN and ZAMKA	None
7 January 1300-1800	Nature and Elements of Clandestine Activities	MASENGILL	None
8 January 0900-1400	Security (Personal, Physical, Organizational and Operational), Cover	MASENGILL	None
1700-2200	The Infiltration Team Principles and Concepts, Organization of a Resistance Net	PIRNACK	DECONBARD
9 January 0900-1200	Compartmentation and Clandestine Communications	MASENGILL	None
1300-1500	Organization of Basic Net for Clandestine Activity	MASENGILL	None
10 January 0900-1200	Caching and Sabotage Techniques	PIRNACK	DECONBARD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

SECRET

1300-1500	PM Techniques, Reconnaissance, Raid and Ambush	PIRNACK	DECONBARD
1700-2200	Introduction to Clandestine Maritime Operations	FAITELSON	PACHANKIS
11 January 1000-1500	Maritime Operational Planning Techniques	FAITELSON	PACHANKIS
13 January 0900-1200	Introduction to Clandestine UDT Operations	TATTERSFIELD	YASUINAS
1300-1500	UDT Operational Planning Techniques	TATTERSFIELD	YASUINAS
1700-2200	Small Unit Operations, Training and Application in Clandestine Environment	DARGUZIS	DECONBARD
14 January 1300-1800	Weapons Familiarization and Range Firing	PIRNACK	DECONBARD
2000-2200	Review of Training	REUTEMAN and ZAMKA	None
15 January 1000-1200	Management Controls Regarding Agent Selection and Team Composition	REUTEMAN	DECONBARD
1400-1700	Management Review of Team Training and Evaluation	ZAMKA	None
2000-2300	Operational Planning and Use of Operational Plan as Control Device	REUTEMAN and ZAMKA	None

16 January			
1000-1200	Mission Briefings - A Management Control	REUTEMAN	DECONBARD
1400-1800	Commando Raids		
1900-2300	Analysis of an Infiltration (Operation Case History)	ZAMKA	None
17 January			
1000-1200	Management of Maritime Assets	REUTEMAN	DECONBARD
1400-1700	Analysis of a Commando Raid (Case History)	ZAMKA	None
1930-2030	After Action Reports - Management Self-Critique	REUTEMAN	DECONBARD
2030-2230	Cache Operations	REUTEMAN	DECONBARD
18 January			
1400-1700	Analysis of a UDT Operation (Case History)	ZAMKA	None
1000-1200	Photo		
1900-2300	Seminar Discussion and Review	REUTEMAN and ZAMKA	None

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~

Artime

24 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 1300 hours on 24 March 1964

1. AMBIDDY-1 telephoned our office to say that the ADELAIDA is leaving today for the free port of Colon to pick up provisions and to leave three men who are sick. One has a tumor in the neck, the second has a dislocated shoulder, and the third is suffering from stab wounds. A-1 was unable to hospitalize them in Nicaragua because General Somoza felt that this would attract undue attention.

2. A-1 commented that the provisions which they have to buy will be taken from the March budget.

3. A-1 has received a report from AMJAVA-4 indicating that there is a need for a general house cleaning as far as personnel is concerned in many of the camps.

4. A-1 inquired if there was any objection to ADELAIDA leaving for Panama. Martin stated that off hand he could see no objection; however, A-1 should call later in the day for confirmation.

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

Raul J Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
ADELAIDA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

Cutime

24 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 24 March 1964 at 1540 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called as promised to ascertain if there were objections to the ADELAIDA going to the free port of Colon in Panama. A-1 was advised there were no objections. However, the following should be communicated to the ADELAIDA:

   a. To stay away from the Folk River pier (this pier is heavily watched as a pier used for the smuggling of arms).

   b. ADELAIDA will be boarded by the U. S. Canal Zone Customs and the ship's papers should be in order.

2. The ETA to Colon is 25 March.

3. A-1 finally has received the letter from the Philippino.

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
ADELAIDA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

23 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Richard Beal and AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 23 March at 1100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called to say that AMJAVA-4, who arrived in Miami last night, told him that Alegrett is arriving at 1700 hours today at Miami on ~~[illegible]~~ Airlines.

2. Alegrett is bringing with him "movies" which he took of the Puerto Cabezas base (Carlay). While at Carlay taking these pictures, Alegrett stated that he was on official business.

3. AMBIDDY-1 was concerned that U. S. Customs may take the pictures away from Alegrett when he entered the country. AMBIDDY-1 was told not to worry about the pictures, for after all Carlay is an official Nicaraguan National Guard base. AMBIDDY-1 said that he would try to get an opportunity to see the pictures.

Richard B. Beal
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Security
Alegrett - 201
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓

SECRET

23 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and
G. Thornton

DATE : 23 March 1964 at 1000 hours

AMBIDDY-1 called to say that AMJAVA-4 had arrived in Miami on 22 March. Immigration officials have taken his papers and said they would review them at 0830 today. This office told AMBIDDY-1 to call back if AMJAVA-4 ran into any difficulties in the return of his papers.

Gwen Thornton

Gwen Thornton
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
AMJAVA-4 - 201
Conversations

[illegible] 201

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMBANG/AMWORLD
Interviews with AMBANG-1 and AMBIDDY-1 in Puerto Rico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI
REFERENCE: UFG-4784 Para. 3

1. The following information, not disseminated, was reported initially to Gordon R. HAWLOTT by AMING-2 on 8 February 1964 following his return from a month's visit to Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. AMING-2 reported that he had met separately with AMBIDDY-1 and AMBANG-1 in the apartment of a friend in San Juan, the meetings occurring during the last week of January. While HAWLOTT feels that AMING-2 is usually quite reliable and objective on general political reporting, his own participation in exile politics and political ambitions could conceivably influence his objectivity. In an effort to check the accuracy of AMING-2's remarks, the CO again discussed the interviews with AMING-2 on 18 March at which time AMING-2 repeated his account of the interview without any change in text, so that the CO is inclined to accept AMING-2's account as generally accurate.

2. During the last week of January AMBANG-1 told Source at a private meeting in San Juan, Puerto Rico that he would like to enlist Source's assistance as an advisor on medical affairs and as a propaganda worker. Source, per PBRUMEN custom, requested that AMBANG-1 explain to Source what resources he had for the liberation of PBRUMEN and asked AMBANG-1 to offer proof why he should consider himself a leader. Source claims AMBANG-1 replied that he had boats and weapons sufficient for strong military action into PBRUMEN and would be able to place combat forces in PBRUMEN during March 1964, said combat forces having an ability to hold their own for weeks on the island. AMING-2 observed that he had driven out to Mayaguez where he had seen four separate

(CONTINUED)

Distribution:
3-Headquarters

201-267437

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
23 Mar 64	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DESENSITIZED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-14931

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

training installations, one of which was reported to be the property of AMBANG/1. AMBANG/1 replied that he had training installations on the Florida mainland and had training and logistical bases or a base in Venezuela.

3. Source asked AMBANG/1 what backing he had from World Powers for the invasion of PBRUMEN. AMBANG/1 replied that he still had significant White House contacts despite the death of John F. Kennedy. He added that he was in contact with top personnel of ODACID and held regular meetings with a very high ranking officer of KUBARK. He stated he also had been introduced by the KUBARKER to the Chief of Operations at YOACRE and was in regular communication with the ODOATH officer. In general, AMBANG/1 stated, his sources of funds were largely ODYOKE. Source then asked if he was to understand that AMBANG/1 had the approval of ODYOKE for operations into PBRUMEN. AMBANG/1 reportedly replied "I have been given the green light".

4. Around 1 February Source met in San Juan with AMBIDDY/1 for a private talk. AMBIDDY/1 suggested that Source associate himself with AMBIDDY/1's movement in order to help form a post-liberation government. Source replied that he was rather vague as to AMBIDDY/1's plans and backing. AMBIDDY/1 stated that he had been selected by ODYOKE as that PBRUMENER having the necessary leadership and experience for the overthrow of AMTHUG. Source asked if he understood correctly that AMBIDDY/1 was telling him that he had the approval of ODYOKE. If so, why was AMBIDDY/1 drawing support from Venezuela and from Central American Governments. AMBIDDY/1 reportedly replied that he did not actually rely on Venezuela and other Latin American donors for his assistance, since he was receiving all his logistical and financial support from KUBARK. Source stated that he had heard that AMBIDDY/1 was amassing a formidable invasion force in Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panaman CZ. AMBIDDY/1 replied that he had been given very large sums of money, which proved the reliance which ODYOKE had in him and made obvious the fact that ODYOKE had selected him to bring about the liberation of PBRUMEN. Source asked why it was that ODYOKE and KUBARK would select AMBIDDY/1 before all others as the means of liberating PBRUMEN. AMBIDDY/1 reportedly replied that ODYOKE had selected him because, in the opinion of ODYOKE, he represented the most sane and centrist political concentration among the PBRUMEN exiles and ODYOKE knew that in AMBIDDY/1 it had a leader resolved to maintain order and centrist democratic government in PBRUMEN following the liberation.

5. AMING/2 asked both AMBIDDY/1 and AMBANG/1 during his separate interviews with them whether AMBIDDY/1's presence in Puerto Rico signified that the two leaders had met or planned to meet.in an attempt to coordinate their activities. Neither AMBIDDY/1 nor AMBANG/1 denied nor confirmed Source's questions, but gave evasive answers. Source therefore assumes that they had not met, but hoped to meet for talks.

END OF DISPATCH

DESENSITIZED

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
RE DIRECT CONTACT OF SUBJ, MANUEL RAY RIVERO AND ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO AND LACK OF DECISION ON OPERATIONS, FUND ALLOTMENTS BETWEEN JURE AND SFNE. RE DISAFFECTION OF MANUEL QUIZA DOCAL WITH JURE.

019-300-004
UFG -04784
19 MAR 64
P2

1930681
PAFR

1 930 681

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	SA/SO/SB		85
2	SA/SO/AR		
3	Raul		RLB
4			
5			
6	SA/SO/Bobbi		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

File: Ambiddy 1

- Interesting & quite well done in some areas of his remarks. I especially think that he fielded the [illegible] to Jose very well — giving credit to himself & organization. AR

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-61

(40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Whitney Tucker		
2			
3	WH/SA/SO/HH		✓
4			
5	Manuel Artime		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Could this be made a "third person" resume setting forth Ambiddy 1's pol philosophy in condensation?

Done

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961

~~SECRET~~

SYNOPSIS OF AMBIDDY-1'S SPEECH TO AREC

18 March 1964

"You will forgive me if before a gathering the Agrupacion de la Reconstruccion Economical de Cuba I do make profound economic or technical analysis of the reconstruction of Cuba, the reason is very simple, it is because I don't know. Inasmuch as I do not like to talk about things which I know nothing of I prefer not to touch upon the subject. Here at this gathering there are men more capable than I . . . men who will have the difficult task of the reconstruction of Cuba upon their shoulders.

I want to talk about what I know about. But first let me present my credentials. Why the presentation of credentials? When two people speak for the first time the first portion is the presentation and this is the first time I talk with AREC, although I have the pleasure of speaking to some of its members separately and in great lengths. Why this presentation of credentials? Because I know our movement is very controversial. They say we are of the extreme right, they say we are of the extreme left, they say we are opportunist and they say we are ambitious. I do not expect to change anyone's mind by this talk. I believe it is my duty to assert certain principles and to mention our beliefs. Not a criteria of profound economic principles . . . I am not an economist nor an expert on the subject. I believe it useful for our movement to assert before this assembly some of its principles

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS DB-3/660,494

SECRET

in which it professes and will continue to profess and for which we are prepared to give our lives and in some cases already have. I believe it is our duty to mention them here or anywhere else. . .

First of all I do not believe in extremes . . . neither left nor right. I believe extremes always end by touching one another. Secondly I want to state that if any extreme comes to power in Cuba, in the case of the extreme right by imposing a dictatorship; in both cases we shall continue to fight with our weapons in hand.

Thirdly, I do not believe in the classification of men by race, political levels in the government to which they formerly belonged nor by money . . . I know whites who souls are black and I know blacks who souls are white. I know wealthy men who are spiritually poor and poor who are spiritually wealthy. I only believe in one classification of men and that is the moral classification--men of honor and men without honor. Men who keep their word and those who do not keep their word. . . In this classification I do believe . . .

Are we opportunist? This depends what your definition of opportunist is. If by opportunist you mean taking maximum advantage of each opportunity, then ladies and gentlemen, we are opportunist. In order to save Cuba we have to take maximum advantage of every opportunity. But if by opportunists you mean the man who changes his beliefs in accord with the opportunities, then we are not opportunist."

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AMBIDDY-1 goes on to mention his various publications. He describes his first publication, "Communism por que?" (Communism what for?) which he wrote nine months prior to Castro coming to power. The main theme of this pamphlet, according to A-1, was that more than changing a government what is needed is a change in men's conscience. The pamphlet also outlined the duties of the padron (land owner) to the workers so that the latter may live in dignity and honor. The patron should feel that the problems of his workers are also his problems. The worker in turn has certain obligations to the patron. If this quid pro quo is not adhered to the (Christian) government has the right to intervene for the common good.

Later on, after Castro was in power, A-1 wrote his letter of resignation accusing Castro of being a communist and traitor. In this letter A-1 mentions he resigned because Castro had not been honest with the businessmen by not telling them their property would be confiscated.

A-1 then went into exile and there he published a book called Traiccion (Betrayal). This book clearly outlined the ideology of the movement.

"We believe the state should foment and simulate private economy both national as well as in foreign. During the Bay of Pigs I wrote my political thesis. We have to have an effective democracy in Latin America. I say effective democracies because in Latin America the word democracy has been prostituted too

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic [illegible]
[illegible]

often. Many countries call themselves democratic but in reality are nothing but militarist, ic demagogic, and many simply go through the motions of elections. Many are simply totalitarian governments which are living off the blood and toil of its people. The corrupt politicians, the strong men, the totalitarian have been the strongest allies of Communism. Our fight is not against one man, it is not war of personal hatred . . . it is a war against the doctrine of hatred, be it called Castro or what have you . . . it is a war against a doctrine; we are as much opposed to Khrushchev as we are against Tito. We are as much opposed to the totalitarian left as we are opposed to the fascist right.

"They continue to call us extremist. We don't care. They will continue to call us rightist or leftist, fascist, philo-communist. I recall the words of Don Quixote when he was passing on the outskirts of a small town and Sancho said to Don Quixote, 'Sir, the dogs are barking at us.' Don Quixote replied, 'Let them, Sancho, if they are barking it is because we are moving. And we will continue to move.'"

"They say we are very ambitious. Yes, we are very ambitious. We have an ambition which blinds us and we are disposed to give our lives for that ambition. An ambition for what? That in the coming days when Cuba is liberated people will pronounce our name with respect in our country."

"When our men die in Cuba they are not only fighting for the independence of our country . . . they are fighting for the independence of the American Hemisphere, for the survival of Christian principles in America, for the Western world. . . the rest of the Western World." A-1 maintains that the situation today is much the way Lenin would have hoped for. Britain and France have recognized Red China; the U. S. is at odds with these two governments. This, A-1 maintains, is exactly what Lenin would have wanted. A-1 then quotes Lenin, "Within 30 years we will embark on a peace offensive, of coexistence and we will split the free nations and smash the impotent bourgeois."

"The battle ground for Latin America lies 90 miles from our shores in a place called Cuba. Should the Western world lose this battle the sleeping giant (Latin America) will wake up on the side of the communist camps. Then it would be preferable to be dead because the free world will have ceased to be.

"We have knocked on many doors. I have one obsession and that is the liberation of my country and if I have to lose my prestige I will do so. God will know I have not lost it. I do not believe that in order to save my country there are bad doors. The only bad doors are the ones that have been closed to us in order to lock Cuba within them.

"We are all to blame. We are all guilty for having turned over Cuba into the hands of men who could not govern her properly. This is not the time to cry like women for what we were unable to defend as men. I have knocked on doors and will continue to do so because

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

my cause is a moral and honorable one and what I ask for is noble. We cannot afford to wait for miracles because only God can create miracles. We must prepare for a long fight and not expect the aid of such organizations as the OAS, UN. It is up to the Cubans to liberate Cuba. We either have to wage a war of principles or not. If we are not going to wage a war of principles I will not join that struggle.

omit

"The present situation of the case of Cuba. The present state of our homeland. Communism is completely established. We lose daily 10 fighters for freedom. In the cities communism is in complete control. It is necessary for an individual to carry five different credentials in order to travel inside of Cuba. Lack of any one of these credentials brings down the repressive measures of the G-2 until the individual can explain the reason for his missing credentials.

omit

"Guerrillas in the mountains; some resistance groups in the cities; a resentment among the militia because the foreigners have privileges which the militia does not. The campesino who will not accept the communist doctrine and guerrillas in Escambray, Camaguey, which are growing stronger daily. This is the situation in Cuba today.

omit

"The status of Cuba outside of Cuba: The U. S. In the most difficult position and the most unexplainable position of the Western World. I can sum it up in one sentence. I do not understand it. We do not want to be saved by the Marines. Let us make this quite clear. The Cuban people have always maintained that they are willing to die."

A-1 then alludes to the Alliance for Progress which he refers to as an Alka Seltzer in the Pacific. He maintains he is not against the Alliance for Progress but rather that something should also be done for Cuba.

Question and answer period

Question: I understand that in certain sections of the United States Government there exist ultra liberals who believe that communist Cuba could be used as an experimental ground and in the coming years communist Cuba could be used as a proving ground for the coexistence of the great world powers, that is, Russia and the U. S. The question is Dr. Artime, have you considered deep in your conscience the possibility that the U. S. Government is using you and your movement to occupy the Cubans who wish to liberate their homeland with other activities so that they cannot liberate their country with the force and enthusiasm they desire. The question is have you considered the possibility that you, under your best intentions, are the instrument by which these ultra liberal forces in the U. S. can paralyze the liberating activity of the Cuban people?

Answer: A very good question. If the U. S. were giving me something this might be true but I believe the ones who are receiving aid, possibly other ultra liberals, may be in collusion with the U. S. This is very possible. I can make a mistake. I can make two mistakes but after one has spent two years in jail one cannot be fooled so easily, more so when one has been condemned to death. It is possible this plan exists but I do not know since I do not have access to these ultra liberals. It is possible they are looking for someone to do it, this is possible. I can guarantee you one thing. I am not doing this because my power comes from men who believe as I do, as you do, and who are located south of the Rio Grande. These men are gambling the lives of the people in their own countries. Because they know if they do not help in overthrowing Fidel Castro in less than two years, their own countries will be victims of communism. I am a product of the desperation of the Latin American countries.

__Question:__ Dr. Artime, how can we unite the Cubans in order to make the cause of those fighting inside felt more deeply?

__Answer:__ Very good question. Very good. A North American friend of mine once said he would rather carry ten cats in a bag than work with two Cubans. I said to him that he was quite right; however, Cubans are not the only ones that are hard to understand. The Latin American is also difficult to understand. Thank God, we are very individualistic and that is why the communists are having such a difficult time. Because we are very individualistic. The war is the only thing which can unite the Cubans. The only thing which can create an unbreakable bond, between rich, poor, Negroes, whites, Catholics, Protestants, Mason, everyone, is sacrifice. I do not believe in theoretical unions.

Question: In Miami they say that JURE, Manuel Ray's organization, will make an attack on 20 May or early in June. Would there be any possibility that your movement also intends to do something in the near future. Also, what is the possibility of having a government in arms.

Answer: That is the $64,000 question. If they (JURE) decides to go, may God bless them. And please let it not be a demagogic act to give prestige to others. The only thing I ask God is that He accompany them. I say this with all sincerity. Our strategy is mapped out. What we have done cannot be published. We cannot publicize the arms we have sent into Cuba. We cannot publicize the infiltrations we have made to teach the campesinos about guerrilla warfare. These are things we cannot public. Not that we are enemies of publicity but we cannot subordinate the war to publicity, we are subordinating the interests of publicity to the war. In a free election I would admit all political theories but by violence I will not admit any extremism. The war may last three years against Fidel and five against communism. It does not matter. We will use violence to deter any extremism.

Question: About five months ago I arrived here thanks to people with great influence. Students of mine were in the Escambray. I took food and medicines to them. I had 13 girls who helped me gather rosaries and everything in the ways of clothes. There are now 500 students of mine who are now prisoners. Others are being con-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

stantly harassed and persecuted. Why aren't we helping these people?

Answer: There are many, madam, who are now helping. This week we have sent some aid and arms inside, perhaps not as much as we would like but sent some. We also have to send not just weapons but food, shoes, etc. The guerrillas lack everything. The problem of supplying them is very difficult but we are trying. We do not have sufficient boats. To arrive at the coast we cannot use large ships but small boats and these small boats have a limited capacity. These small boats can only make two trips in one day and no more. It is being done on a small scale but it is being done. The force to liberate Cuba is there inside Cuba and it is up to us to assist them.

Question: Doctor, don't you have any confidence in the OAS. I refer specifically to the recent cache of arms discovered in Venezuela?

Answer: I admire the Venezuelan people, I admire Venezuelan democracy and if a strong measure is taken against Cuba, because of the just screams of the Venezuelan people and if the OAS listens to these screams, I will admire the OAS.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

18 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere
Division (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Talk with AMBIDDY-1

AMBIDDY-1 will be meeting with us in the Washington safehouse on 19-20 March. If you can spare the time, it might be helpful if you could have a heart-to-heart talk with him on his relations with Senora Padron, which may be blossoming forth into matrimony. There cannot be much doubt now that she is reputed to have been Fulgencio Batista's mistress and that this fact (if fact it be) is widely known. If he marries her, the political repercussions could be calamitous. It would be helpful if you could tell AMBIDDY-1 point blank that if scandal ensues, this could doom the program.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

DDP/WH/SA/So/HH/HDHecksher:bh (18 Mar 64)

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
1 - PADRON 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

17 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Martin Ferrer and AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 16 March 1964 at 1630

1. AMBIDDY-1 called this office to say that Luis TOMAS Rey and Eladio BAS Trespalacios could not sail because they were unable to obtain their re-entry permits. Since these two could not obtain their permits "the people" had told Amado MUNNE Pantaleon that it was not worthwhile for him to go. Martin asked AMBIDDY-1 if any mention had been made concerning TOMAS's skin rash and that he did not see a doctor. AMBIDDY-1 stated that he had not been so informed by AMYUM-19. AMBIDDY-1 was asked if the only reason BAS and TOMAS could not leave was because they could not obtain their re-entry permits. AMBIDDY-1 answered that was the sole reason and that all three wanted to go desperately. AMBIDDY-1 agreed that under any condition MUNNE should go since he is the most important of the three.

2. AMBIDDY-1 would call this office at 1800 in order to receive a more concrete answer to this situation.

3. Martin asked AMBIDDY-1 if the suitcase containing the uniforms had been sent. AMBIDDY-1 does not know. However, he will investigate and if the uniforms have not been sent, AMBIDDY-1 will bring them to the Consejo meeting on 19 March.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
TOMAS
MUNNE
REX BAS
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1

SECRET

16 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1 and
Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)

DATE : 14 March 1964, 1230 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 would like to have a meeting with the Consejo as soon as possible to talk over many outstanding problems and to discuss thoroughly the new budgetary procedure. Martin informed A-1 that this would be brought to Henry's attention upon his return. A-1 is speaking to the Agrupacion para la Reconstruccion Economica de Cuba on Wednesday, 18 March, so he cannot make it for that date.

2. A-1 advised that Luis Entialgo has accepted the offer to work for AMWORLD and will be returning from Spain shortly.

3. A-1 has not yet heard from the Filipino and requests that we check into this matter.

4. A-1 was asked for his opinions concerning the DMJM people. A-1 is very pleased with the survey and feels that the engineers plans are reasonable and fitting to his project. A-1 estimated, however, that the total figure may be in the $300,000 category. This is another subject which A-1 would like to discuss in the next meeting.

5. Another topic he wants to discuss is the transfer of the C-47 to Nicaragua.

6. A-1 informed us that "key personnel" are no longer listed on the budget, however, there are individuals which fall into the category of guerrillas and infiltrators who are in Miami and are receiving retainers.

7. A-1 was informed that the propagation charts for the month of April are on their way to him.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Entialgo 201

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

16 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1 and Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)

DATE : 16 March 1964, 0930 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 was asked if Thursday, 19 March, would be convenient for him to meet with the Consejo here in Washington. A-1 agreed.

2. A-1 will bring with him to the meeting the bank signature cards.

3. A-1 has received a bill from the Atlantic-Chesapeake Co. for the sum of $132,097.50. A-1 opined that the bill seemed a little exhorbitant for the material they have received. Inasmuch as they have paid $100,000 already, the total bill comes out to $232,097.50.

4. A-1 has also received a bill from the Bruan Shipping Co. for the total of $19,221.12. Included in this bill is the petroleum for October and November.

5. AMJAVA-4, Manuel Gomez, AMWORLD-2 and MOLE left today for Nicaragua. From there all but AMWORLD-2 will proceed to Costa Rica to locate a suitable site to relocate the arms barge.

6. A-1 now has a new telephone number: PL 4-7912. A-1 added this is just a new phone number, but not a new address. A-1 stated he expects to move from where he is living soon. /No further explanation.7

7. A-1 was asked to have Pineda apply at the Mexican Consulate for a 30 day tourist visa and to state that the purpose was to visit Mexico.

8. A-1 willcheck in again later in the day.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201✓
Conversations
Pineda
Mexico
Finances

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently changed
changed privacy code

14 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)

DATE : 13 March 1964, 1800 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 began the conversation by saying that the reason he had been late in checking was that he had been at a meeting with the DMJM engineers. A series of items had been discussed on which A-1 would like to have our suggestions. A-1 expressed the desire to meet with the Consejo as soon as possible in order not to give the impression to the DMJM people that he was being masterminded by someone else. Martin explained to A-1 that Henry was currently out of town, but that his request for a meeting would be brought to Henry's attention upon his return. A-1 went on to say that the deadline for the budget to be submitted is close at hand which also adds to the urgency for a meeting.

2. Martin asked A-1 if he had checked his Post Office box. A-1 replied yes. A-1 was then asked to confirm or deny the rumor concerning Santiago Alvarez which alleged that A-1 has given him full autonomy within AMWORLD. A-1 said that he has not had a chance to talk to Santiago Alvarez since his return to Miami, but would do so soon. A-1 stated, however, that when he had approached Santiago Alvarez, the latter was informed he could bring with him "a mechanic or two," but A-1 never authorized Santiago Alvarez to bring his entire group en masse.

3. A-1 advised that the radio link between Miami and Costa Rica has been established. A-1 was told that there would be no need to obtain a HAM radio license to operate. Should his organization be approached by the local authorities concerning the operation of the radio, they are to plead ignorance of the law and stop transmitting. [This information was obtained from Jim Smith.] A-1 mentioned that he had received the dummy

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

message sent to him in Costa Rica, however he did not receive the accompanying message. A-1 was asked to find out why the private link message did not reach him. Also, it was explained to A-1 who "El Narizon" is.

4. A-1 was casually asked if there would be any objection to AMYUM-19 attending any of the Consejo meetings. A-1 had no objections.

5. A-1 has some motion pictures and photographs of the bases and will bring them to the next Consejo meeting.

6. A-1 was informed that a letter from Luis Sierra, chief of the guerrillas, was intercepted by his own people in Miami. This letter contained a photograph with Sierra and other members of the guerrilla teams dressed in their new uniforms. A-1 was asked to investigate how this letter had been sent from the base and also how Sierra was able to have the picture developed.

7. This brought up the subject of Manuel Gomez. A-1 said that Gomez will be leaving on Monday, 16 March, for Nicaragua to survey AMWORLD installations. A-1 had just a few hours previously spoken to Gomez. In the conversation, Gomez elaborated on the security measures he wishes A-1 to take concerning his own security. A-1 continues to sing the praises of Gomez. A-1 also commented that he has noticed a marked improvement in the security of his personnel since the last time he was in Miami.

8. While in Costa Rica, A-1 detected being followed by another car. A-1 was able to lose the surveiller. Martin took this opportunity to stress to A-1 the need for increasing his personal security measures such as more body guards and more secrecy concerning his movements.

9. The ADELAIDA arrived in Hollywood o/a 8 March. A-1 was not able to examine the contents of the sabotage equipment due to his preoccupation in Costa Rica with the MCRL and Vico Starke. The ADELAIDA onloaded weapons from the barge and sailed for Nicaragua.

10. AMJAVA-4, AMWORLD-2 and "the Mexican" will leave together for Nicaragua on 16 March.

11. A-1 expressed an interest in moving the C-47 out of Costa Rica. A-1 would like to discuss the method of transfer with the Consejo.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

12. A-1 was told that if it can be done in a secure and discreet manner through some contact, we would appreciate having a list of all Cuban nationals in Costa Rica.

13. Concerning the budget, A-1 would like to discuss this in person rather than through the mail.

14. A-1 said he would keep in close contact with us on a daily basis.

Raul J. Hernandez

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Santiago Alvarez
Luis Sierra
Manuel Gomez

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

12 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)

DATE : 12 March 1964, 1000 hours

1. Martin began the conversation by welcoming A-1 home.

2. Martin stated that he had a message from Henry which would have been sent out today had A-1 still been in Costa Rica. There were a few questions that Henry would like answered:

a. Since the Consejo had no previous indications of Calderonista attempts to overthrow the government, we would appreciate any additional information A-1 might have. A-1 began by saying that Vico Starke had had meetings with Francisco Calderon. Calderon's brother, Rafael, had been very friendly with Vico Starke's brother as of late. Vico Starke's brother had been at GUILLOT ever since the first arrival of the AMWORLD contingent. Rafael Calderon had a meeting in GUILLOT with Vico Starke's brother of an unknown nature. A-1 considers the Calderonistas the main opposition to the government. Other substantiating reports had reached Figuls, the head of security for the Costa Rican Government. Vico Starke had placed old Calderonista elements in key positions within the MCRL. A-1 gave Col. Figuls as his source of information. Vico Starke had wanted to place these old Calderonista elements within the AMWORLD organization in a supervisory capacity and they also would have the final say within AMWORLD.

b. What did A-1 mean by other reports reaching Cornelio Orlich and are you certain Starke not acting in concert with Orlichs. A-1 replied that Cornelio had received other reports through his intelligence section, however, Cornelio had placed very little credence in them. Cornelio visited

SECRET

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code.

Starke confronting him with what he had heard. Vico Starke told Cornelio that what he really wanted was to establish a contraband business mainly dealing in whisky. Starke also visited A-1 and timidly told A-1 that he was in financial straits and the reason why he had wanted to move MCRL people into key positions was to use the MRR vehicles as a cover mechanism for contraband. Vico Starke told A-1 that he could obtain the approval of the government to engage in this type of business. It appears to A-1 that Vico Starke did present the contraband proposition to Cornelio Orlich and received tacit approval. A-1 informed both Cornelio and Vico that since it was their country they could do as they pleased, however, he would not permit his vehicles to be used for this purpose. His main concern was to liberate Cuba and not to engage in the internal affairs of Costa Rica. His only desire is to be left alone so he can work effectively.

c. What is Figueres' role in this? A-1 replied that he had not seen any indications that Figueres had been involved. Although he and Vico Starke are close friends, they are political enemies.

d. What were his specific charges against Cabezas? A-1 stated:

(1) The main charge against Cabezas was his collusion with Vico Starke to subordinate AMWORLD to the MCRL.

(2) Cabezas held a meeting with Vico Starke's brother and Rafael Calderon without authorization or informing A-1.

When A-1 initially confronted Rolando Cabezas, the latter refused to answer any of A-1's questions. At a later meeting Cabezas confessed that the reason why Vico Starke had wanted control of the MRR was for the contraband whisky. A-1 feels that this contraband whisky was just an alibi and the main motive had been to overthrow the Costa Rican Government.

e. Will Vico Starke accept defeat or will he try again to control our movement? A-1 feels that Vico Starke no longer poses a direct menace to his organization. Starke has been removed as the intermediary to Cornelio Orlich. Starke, however, is still in close contact with Cornelio Orlich. A-1 emphasized that Vico Starke will not be permitted to enter the camps, mainly GUILLOT, even though it is on his estate.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

~~SECRET~~

f. Has there been an open break between Starke and the Orlichs? A-1 stated that at the beginning of the crisis there had been a break between Starke and Cornelio Orlich, however, Starke has been able to smoothen the rupture by telling Cornelio Orlich that his main interest in controlling the MRR was for financial gains through the contraband trade.

g. Is Cabezas your main source on Starke and Calderon? A-1 commented that Cabezas had been one of his sources, but also Col. Figuls plus reports given to A-1 by his own people in the camps. However, his main source was the facts which speak for themselves.

3. Changing the subject, Martin asked A-1 why he could not go to Guatemala. A-1 explained that what he had wanted to say in his message was that at this particular time Guatemala would have to be ruled out because his passport showed an exit from Mercedes Airport in Nicaragua. However, this did not preclude future meetings in Guatemala. A-1 apologized if he had given us the wrong impression in his message.

4. A-1 stated that within the coming week he might want to have a special meeting with the Consejo concerning the latest political developments in Costa Rica.

5. A-1 is forwarding us a tape on Honduras and Costa Rica as soon as possible.

6. A-1 is not satisfied with the developments in Nicaragua and with Iglesias in particular. A-1 implied that the main problem may be the funding mechanism in Nicaragua and misuse of AMWORLD funds. A-1 is sending AMWORLD-2, who is a public accountant, to review the financial situation there.

7. A-1 was asked to service his post office box since there are several letters waiting for him.

8. A-1 expects to meet with the DMJM people, who are now in Miami, along with AMWORLD-2 and AMJAVA-4.

9. It was requested of A-1 that he precede any Consejo messages which require immediate attention with the word "URGENTE" so that members of this office will not needlessly be called at all hours of the night. A-1 agreed.

10. A-1 was reminded that we still have not received AMWORLD-2's report regarding his interview with Eusebio Mujal.

SECRET

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

11. A-1 promised to call this office again this afternoon.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201✓
Conversations
MCRL
Costa Rica
V.Starke 201
R.Cabezas 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

~~SECRET~~

AMWORLD Meeting in New Orleans, 29 Feb to 1 March 1964

SUBJECT: Adelaida Matilda PADRON y Cruz

Regarding Senora Padron, it is finished so far as our side is concerned. We've gathered all the information that is readily available on the lady, we've turned it over to AMBIDDY-1 and any further action will have to be on his part.

Carl E. Jenkins

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
PADRON 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AMWORLD Meeting in New Orleans, 29 Feb to 1 March 1964

SUBJECT: Galley Proofs of Book, "Bay of Pigs"

1. The two chapters of subject galley proofs were discussed with AMJAVA-4. We called attention particularly to the part referring to "Frank's" discussion of the possible "arrest" of American advisors in case of orders from Washington changing the plan of the invasion. We passed on Mr. Archer's view that A-1 should stick with the story, if it is true, in case reporters should question him about it, but that we felt that the easiest way out of this matter without building up a new controversy would be to take it fairly lightly. In other words, perhaps we could play it as though it had not been considered serious at the time because it was felt that Frank was a bit of a blowhard anyway who tried to involve himself too deeply in everything, plus the fact that we realized he was under considerable strain and probably this was just a brainstorm. A-4 felt that this was a sensible way to handle the matter. He understood it and agreed to discuss the matter with AMBIDDY-1 and felt that this would be acceptable to him.

2. A-4 asked if we had access to the rest of the book. I answered that to my knowledge these were the only two chapters available at the moment. I conjectured that perhaps they were being proofread, re-written, etc., chapter by chapter and that these were the first two which had been considered suitable to go to the printers. We would try to get the remaining chapters so that they could be studied and considered as soon as possible, but I simply had no way of knowing what was their present status and through which channels they would be handled. We would let them know as soon as we knew anything.

Carl E. Jenkins

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
publicity

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Former contacts Havana Station

able personal courage, good security and common sense. In my mind he is the ideal type of Latin American agent. It will be a real loss to the Agency if we lose sight or contact with Adolfo. I have met few men more dedicated and more loyal.

271764

5. 05 [Ramon USATEGUI Lezama.] AMFAN-3. Recruited by AMFAN-2 and so close to each other that we referred to them as the "Gold Dust Twins." Ramon was in the shipping business in Havana and eventually had to leave. He lost his home, cars, furnishings, etc. His firm is now planning to send him to Nicaragua, and I have recommended him to the Nicaragua desk [Dr. Trenta] 05. He has all the qualities ascribed to Adolfo SAN PELAYO (see above) except that he has never been an American citizen. He speaks excellent English. He is dedicated, courageous and most anxious to maintain contact with the Agency. It will be our loss if this is not done.

2510[illegible]

6. Bernard L. Barker. AMCLATTER-1. Wife: Clara. Barker is a Cuban-American. Ex-Captain in the U.S.A.F. See PRQ and 201 for full bio data. I recruited Barker in 1959, and he served faithfully until we had to exfiltrate him sometime in 1960. He recruited a number of valuable agents for the Station (including AMCLATTER-5, which see) and had an amazing encyclopedic knowledge of Cuban persons, events and contacts in all walks of life. He was a boxing manager and knew intimately all Cuban personalities engaged in the sporting industry. He had a puppy-dog loyalty to his case officers and to the Agency. His biggest weakness was his lack of discretion. He was such a loyal American (actually if not technically) that he would fight at the drop of a hat if anyone cast aspersions on the United States or its leaders. In the atmosphere of Castro's Cuba I might say that that was quite often. We are in the process of helping him recover his lost American citizenship. When the Station reopens I would certainly recommend that we continue to maintain contact with Barker. If nothing else he would make a wonderful leg-man for the Chief of Station. His wife is an attractive Cuban gal who is bi-lingual and as belligerently "American" as he is. Barker, by looks and by language, could pass either as an American or a Cuban - a genuine asset if he could be taught to submerge his Americanism.

05

7. [Manolo VEGA Abril.] I met Manolo through Jorge ALONSO PUJOL (now a prisoner in Cuba as a result of the 17th of April invasion). Manolo is working for us now in Miami, and I presume we have full bio data on him. Manolo's family owned, along with Republic Steel, the big steel plant in Havana which was nationalized by the Castro regime (Cia. Antillana de Acero, S.A.). Manolo has a brother, [illegible] who would also be worth cultivating. Through his business and family connections Manolo knew a great many people of operational interest. One of his friends was David SALVADOR, although Manolo did not share SALVADOR's political thinking (extreme left and anti-American). Manolo was as objective a reporter as I have ever encountered among Lat

7

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

3/80

~~SECRET~~

21 mar 60 par

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

2[illegible] January 1932, Moron, Province of Camaguey, Cuba

CI/OA FILE NO.	SECURITY OFFICE FILE NO.	PROJECT
C-32064 201-267437	210838	

SUBJECT (FILL IN ONE ONLY)

TRUE NAME	CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM
ARTIME Buesa, Manuel Francis	AMBIDDY/1	

AKA-Manuel Francisco Perfecto Fernando ARTIME Buesa

NAME CHECK & INVESTIGATIVE RECORD

	CHECK (✓)	INITIAL	DATE
PRO I	bio ✓		28 May 60
PRO II	✓	jwo	30 SEP 1963
99756 GREEN LIST	NPR	Eliz Noell	24 mar 60 ada
	✓		28 Mar 60
RI TRACES	NDI		
O & B DIV TRACES	NDI		
FIELD TRACES	NI OF ?		
	ND	jwo	Jan '63
S.O. INDICES	NDI ✓ [illegible]	TER	24 Mar 60
F.B.I. INDICES	NIC		
	✓		
B.O. IN-[illegible]	✓ NDI		1 June 60

COMMENTS

ISSUED

	CHECK (✓)	DATE	TO
P.O.A	✓	24 mar 60	WH/4/Cuba
	reinst	28 Oct 60	WH/4/Cuba
	Rein	31 Jan 63	SAS
O.A.	✓	2 Feb 61	WH/4/[illegible]
	rein	30 Sept 63	SAS
C.S.A.			
P.C.S.A.			
P.P.A.			
PROP. APP.			
C.N.C.			

COMMENTS

CASE OFFICER	DIVISION	EXTENSION
J. Maughan (~~Joseph [illegible]~~)	~~4/Cuba~~ SAS ~~WH/4/Cuba~~	2971

FORM 1206

~~SECRET~~

(2-3)

Office of Security Investigative Reports

14-00000

SPEED LETTER ~~SECRET~~

REPLY REQUESTED				DATE 4 Aug 72 pm
X	YES		NO	LETTER NO C - 82064 /201- 267437

TO : WH/COG
ATTN:

FROM: CI/OA
Paul Marine, 2B11, x1888

SUBJECT: ARTIME Buesa, Manuel Francis

(1) A review of CI/OA records reflects that Subject was of interest to WH/4/PA(SAS) in 1963; OA dated 2 Feb. 61 was Reinstated 30 Sept. 1963.

(2) CI/OA requests that the responsible desk inform CI/OA by reply whether this case is still active, or whether CI/OA may cancel and retire its folder.

Lee E Pattan for
[illegible]
ACTING Chief, CI/OA SIGNATURE

REPLY DATE 7 Aug 72

TO : CI/OA
FROM : WH/c/os
SUBJECT: ARTIME Buesa, Manuel Fran

(1) Case is:

a. Active ( ) Circle one: CSC, CSA, CA.

b. Inactive (X)

(2) CI/OA may/~~may not~~ cancel and retire Subject file.

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY
9 AUG 1972

31-6036 EX 2 APCCI WN-9ISM SECRET

Vivian A. Barry
SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 5-61 1631 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

JOHN M. BURKE:ghd
WH/COG/OPS
7144/1819
7 JAN 71

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15 1

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

C-82064

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 38 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

WHE INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 0 JAN 71 21 29z CITE DIRECTOR 10037

WH/MIAMI

1. FORMER JMWAVE CONTRACT AGENT NIGEL P. YASUINAS HR (IDEN FOLLOWS) CONTACTED HIS JMWAVE CASE OFFICER, NOW AT HQS, BY TELEPHONE ON 5 JAN AND REQUESTED THAT SOMEONE FROM WH/MIAMI CONTACT HIM. CLAIMED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY-1 WHO WANTED TO GET MESSAGE TO JKLANCE ABOUT SOME FORM OF FOREIGN HARRASSMENT OF AMBIDDY-1. ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE WHAT APPEARED TO HIM TO BE SIGNIFICANT INFO ON CIENFUEGOS FROM REFUGEE SOURCE OR SOURCES WHO CONCEALED IT FROM JMOPAL SCREENERS.

C-82064

2. NO FILE. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

JOHN M. BURKE
WH/COG
7144/1819
7 JAN 71

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 59 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

REF: WHE INFO FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

08 JAN 71 21 29z

CITE DIRECTOR

WH/MIAMI

RE DIR 100371 ?

100372

C-76331

1. IDEN IS RUBEN MARTINEZ, 17240 S. W. 89 COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33157. TELEPHONE 305-233-7894. EMPLOYED BY PROVIDENT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MIAMI.

2. NO FILE. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

C-82064

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 21

~~SECRET~~

ORIG: Al McWade:cb
UNIT: WH/2/HD
EXT: 7163/1946
DATE: 9 October 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY 9 PER ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

DISEM: WH 8 INFO FILE VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12OCT70 16 53Z CITE DIRECTOR 076615

TO DO BASE NEW YORK, TEGUCIGALPA

INFO MANAGUA WH/MIAMI

File

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 9118 (IN 179726)*

13 OCT 1970

1. ~~UNLESS DO BASE NEW YORK WISHES CONTACT,~~ HQS SEES NO NEED AMBIDDY-1 CONTACT. ~~NEW YORK~~

C-82064

2. FILE 201-267437.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *COS Tegucigalpa met AMBIDDY-1 in Managua 4 Oct. A/1 asked by SAMOZA to join Nicaraguan delegation to UN Assembly as special advisor. Defer to Hqs. contact AMBIDDY-1.

C/DO/I/B2 Bob Baker (Telcoord)
C/WH/COG
C/WH/2/N
C/WH/2
WH/COG/OPS

JOHN MARKHAM
C/DOI/2

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

C-82064

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ____ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH 8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI2, SOD6

ACTION NO. 402

S E C R E T 141703Z OCT 69 CITE MANAGUA 7158

DIRECTOR INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, PORT AU PRINCE, WH/MIAMI

14 Oct 69 IN 65351

AMBIDDY

REF: A. MANAGUA 7041 (IN 01386)

B. MANAGUA 7059 (IN 07442)

C. MANAGUA 7069 (IN 10406)

D. DIRECTOR 39886

E. MANAGUA 7134 (IN 49758)

15 OCT 1969

File

C-82064

1. COS MET WITH AMBIDDY-1 NIGHT 13 OCTOBER. HE REPORTED ON DEVELOPMENTS OF REFS AS FOLLOWS: AS AMBIDDY WAS PREPARING LEAVE FOR SALVADOR IN JULY HE WAS VISITED BY SALVADORAN HUMBERTO RODEZNO (PHONETIC) WHO HAD LONG SHOPPING LIST OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION. AMBIDDY EXPLAINED THAT HE COULD NOT GET INVOLVED IN ANY ARMS EXPORT MATTERS, THAT HE IS WELL KNOWN AS PBRUMEN PATRIOT AND DOES NOT WISH CHANGE IMAGE FOR THAT OF ARMS DEALER OR SOLDIER OF FORTUNE. RODEZNO SAID HE ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH AN AMERICAN IN MIAMI WHO WAS GOING TO FURNISH 30-06 AMMO AT TEN CENTS A ROUND, SHIP IT FROM INTERARMCO IN VIRGINIA TO CANADA FOR ONWARD SHIPMENT TO SALVADOR. AMBIDDY WARNED RODEZNO THAT THE AMERICAN, WHOSE NAME WAS NOT

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 7158 S E C R E T

GIVEN, WOULD PROBABLY REPORT HIM TO FBI, CIA, BORDER PATROL, "OR TO THE BOY SCOUTS". AMBIDDY THEN BROKE OFF CONTACT WITH RODEZNO AND DECIDED THERE NO REASON TRAVEL TO SALVADOR.

2. TWO DAYS LATER RICARDO ZUNIGA OF HONDURAS APPEARED IN MIAMI AND CONTACTED AMBIDDY. HE ALSO HAD LONG SHOPPING LIST RANGING FROM SMALL ARMS TO ONE THOUSAND POUND BOMB. MEETING TOOK PLACE IN DUPONT PLAZA HOTEL AND ZUNIGA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HONDURAN CONSUL "MIKE" (LNU). AMBIDDY GAVE THEM ESSENTIALLY SAME STORY, COMMISERATED WITH THEM, AS HAD WITH RODEZNO, SUGGESTED THEY WOULD DO BETTER TO SHOP IN EUROPE, FOR EXAMPLE BELGIUM OR SPAIN, WHO WOULD SELL TO ANYONE. ZUNIGA ASKED IF AMBIDDY THOUGHT FABRIQUE NATIONAL WOULD GRANT CONFIDENTIAL COMMISSION (KICKBACK) OF AT LEAST TEN PERCENT. AMBIDDY ASSURED HIM FN WOULD. ZUNIGA TOLD AMBIDDY THAT IF HE, ZUNIGA, SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING KICKBACK FROM FN, AMBIDDY COULD EXPECT TO RECEIVE NICE PRESENT. AMBIDDY HAS HEARD NOTHING SINCE FROM ZUNIGA BUT HAS HEARD FROM CONTACT IN HONDURAS THAT ZUNIGA BOUGHT ARMS AND AMMO FROM FN AND BOMBS IN PORTUGAL. PORTUGUESE GAVE HIM FIVE PERCENT RAKE-OFF. ZUNIGA TRAVELLED TO EUROPE ON HONDURAN PASSPORT IN ALIAS.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MANAGUA 7158 SECRET

3. AMBIDDY SAYS HE DID NOT GET INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN OBTAINING ARMS FOR EITHER SIDE OTHER THAN REFERRING THEM TO POSSIBLE FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND HAS NO INTENTION OF JEOPARDIZING HIS POSITION WITH U.S. BY GETTING MIXED UP IN ARMS TRAFFIC. HE HAS NO INFORMATION ON ARMS TRAFFIC WITH HAITI. AMBIDDY STILL HAS COPIES OF SALVADORAN AND HONDURAN SHOPPING LISTS AND OFFERED SEND THEM TO BARKER.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-267437.

SECRET

SECRET

C-52 2 26 74 37

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH-8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, SOD 6, CI/CA,

ACTION NO. 326

FI-2

S E C R E T 222223Z SEP 69 CITE MANAGUA 7134

22 Sep 69 IN 49758

DIRECTOR INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, WH/MIAMI

REF: DIRECTOR 39886

1. COS MANAGUA HAS NOT SEEN AMBIDDY-1 SINCE SALVADOR/HONDURAS WAR. AMBIDDY WAS IN TOWN FOR ONE DAY DURING MID-SEPTEMBER INDEPENDENCE HOLIDAYS AND SENT REGARDS TO BARKER THROUGH MUTUAL CUBAN FRIEND SAYING WOULD BE BACK IN MANAGUA SOON AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CHAT. COS WILL ATTEMPT TO CORRAL HIM IF HE DOES SHOW UP AND ELICIT INFO REQUESTED BY REF.

2. FLE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

23 SEP 1969

File

SECRET

C-82064

R Harrington

ORIG: RICHARD HARRINGTON
UNIT: WH/2/HDGES
EXT: 7163/1946
DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 23

AC ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE. VR. C/AN, DDP, ADDP, SDD 6, C/OPS, C/OG, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

22 17 55z SEP 69

CITE DIRECTOR 39886

TO MANAGUA INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, WH/MIAMI

REF: MANAGUA 7059 (IN 07442)

23 SEP 1969

1. REQUEST COS MANAGUA CONTACT AMBIDDY-1 AND DEBRIEF ON REF TRIP TO SAN SALVADOR. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IS ANY INFO AMBIDDY-1 HAS ON HONDURAS/SALVADOR ARMS PURCHASES.

2. FYI: ON 17 SEPTEMBER HQS LEARNED FROM IUSTEER-1 THAT AMBIDDY-1 ARRANGED CONTACT FROM MIAMI FOR A HONDURAS ARMS BUYER TO PURCHASE ARMS IN SPAIN. FOR THIS SERVICE AMBIDDY-1 WILL RECEIVE A COMMISSION FROM THE HONDURAS ARMS BUYER BASED ON THE TOTAL ARMS PURCHASE PRICE. DO NOT REVEAL THIS INFO TO AMBIDDY-1.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-267437 AND 201-283488

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: On 22 July COS Managua received urgent phone call from AMBIDDY-1. AMBIDDY-1 said he just received phone call from Salvador and they (Salvadorans) needed eight pilots and wanted to consult with AMBIDDY. A Salvadoran visa had been authorized. COS Managua instructed AMBIDDY to proceed to San Salvador and obtain info on Salvador war plans. Once he acquired this info AMBIDDY was to inform the Salvadorans that he could not be involved in any way. AMBIDDY agreed and told COS Managua that he would contact COS on his return from the trip to San Salvador

C/WH/2/NIC ____ WH/COG/OPS ____

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOSEPH Y. KIYONAGA
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

C-82064

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		
2		
3		
4		

ORIG: Robert C. Mooney
UNIT: WH/2/Nicaragua
EXT: 4489
DATE: 28 July 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY DKB PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/OA, FI, SOD6.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 28 22 27z Jul 69 CITE DIRECTOR 24584

TO MANAGUA INFO: PORT AU PRINCE, WH/MIAMI

File jk

REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 6311 (IN 10768)

B. MANAGUA 7069 (IN 10406)

29 JUL 1969

C-82064

1. HDQS WELCOMES ANY INFO ON AMBIDDY ARMS DEALINGS.

2. IF TELEPHONE ONLY LINK WITH AMBIDDY, COS IN BEST POSITION DETERMINE POSSIBILITY OF ELICITATION WITHOUT UNDUE SECURITY RISK.

3. FILE: 201-267437

*WH Comment: Ref A indicated Port Au Prince interest in any info obtained by Managua on AMBIDDY involvement in arms sales to Haiti. Ref B reported possibility AMBIDDY and Somoza involved in arms dealings with DUValier and asked addresses if they desire COS try elicit info from AMBIDDY.

AC/WH/7 C B Dickson

WH/COG

Robert F. Rife for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH DIV

JOHN C. MURRAY
AC/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

C-82064

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

BY: ______ AT: ______

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 5 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR. CI/OA-FI2 RI/AN SOD6

146

S E C R E T 261548Z JUL 1969 CIE PORT AU PRINCE 6311 26 Jul 10768

(RACICOT ACTING)

MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR , WH/MIAMI

REF: A. MANAGUA 7069 (IN 10406)

B. WH/MIAMI 4709 (IN 09904)

1. APPRECIATE INFORMATION REFS. STATION ALWYAS INTERESTED IN ANY DUVALIER OR OPPONENT ARMS DEALING DUE SITUATION IN HAITI, WELCOME ANY INFORMATION AMBIDDY MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE.

C-82064

2. FILE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

File

28 JUL 1969

SECRET

C-82064

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 21 PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH-

☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR S O D-6, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI-2, CI/OA

683

10 FEB 69 IN 90565

S E C R E T 100815Z FEB 69 CITE MANAGUA 6868

DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY INFO WH/MIAMI

IUSTEER

REF: DIRECTOR 72449

1. STATION FILES SHOW ERYTHROID-1 (C-72970) REQUESTED TRACES 16 DECEMBER 1964 ON RAFAEL GARCIA BORN 4 FEBRUARY 1932, HABANA, CUBA. WAS ENGINEER EMPLOYED BY MOTOROLA, BEING CLEARED FOR INSTALLATION FM RADIO EQUIPMENT FOR ERYTHROID. NO OTHER TRACES GARCIA.

11 FEB 1969

File

2. BUSINESS PARTNER IS REFLECTED IN STATION FILES AS AMTABLY-27 (C.87513) ON WHOM PRESUME HEADQUARTERS AND WH/MIAMI HAVE EXTENSIVE MATERIAL. STATION FILES SHOW HIM AS EXECUTIVE PILOT.

3. FYI ERLOOP-1 (781872) IS CLOSELY INVOLVED AS BUSINESS PARTNER AND PROTECTOR OF CUBAN CROP DUSTING PILOTS IN NICARAGUA. 0 HAS REPORTEDLY USED HIS OFFICIAL POSITION TO PRESSURE OTHER PILOTS TO LEAVE COUNTRY SO HE CAN MAKE MORE PROFIT FROM CROP DUSTING VENTURES HERE.

4. COS CAN PROBABLY OBTAIN CONSIDERABLE INFO ON REF ACTIVITY BY TRACING ERLOOP-1 DIRECTLY BUT BELIEVE BEST

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 6368 S E C R E T

LET MATTER LIE AT PRESENT.

5. STATION DOES NOT BELIEVE IDEN D OF REF WOULD BE INVOLVED ANY PRO-ARIAS ACTIVITY.

C-82064

6. COS CAN ELICIT FROM AMBIDDY-1 (IDEN E OF REF) WHEN HE NEXT VISITS MANAGUA. HE ALWAYS CHECKS IN WITH COS.

File

7. FILE 201-283488, 206-287180, 201-323565.0

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: 30 PER

ACTION 343 WHP ☐ RID COPY

6 CAS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE. VR. RI/AN WH/COG8 CI/OPS CI/OA

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2	C-82064	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 081957Z JUL 68 CITE PANAMA CITY 6976 (THEBALD ACTING)

8 JUL 68 IN 40093

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR, MANAGUA

REF: MANAGUA 6617 (IN45324)

1. PANAMA CITY MOST INTERESTED EFFORTS ALFREDO ALEMAN JUNIOR, MINISTER OF HACIENDA, CONTACT AMBIDDY-1. C-82064 REQUEST AGENT CONTACT PANAMANIAN CONSUL MIAMI TO SEE IF SHE KNOWS WHAT ALEMAN WANTED.

2. FYI, ALEMAN AMONG THOSE SUPPORTERS OF DAVID SAMUDIO WHO REFUSING ACCEPT ELECTOR DEFEAT OF SAMUDIO. IT NOT IMPOSSIBLE HE SEEKING CONTRACT CUBAN EXILE STRONG ARM TYPES.

S E C R E T

BT

9 JUL 1968

File

SECRET

201 C-82064

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY 1 6 2 7 3 8 4 9 5 10

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION 297 WHP ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN WH/COG 8 DDP ADDP CSDO CI CI/OPS CI/OA FI FI/INT 2 SOD 6

7 JUL 68 ... 45324

S E C R E T 071937Z JUL 68 CITE MANAGUA 6617 (TRECKLER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA, PANAMA CITY, PORT AU PRINCE

C-82064

9 JUL 1968

AMBIDDY-1 TOLD ACOS 7 JULY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM HIS WIFE IN MIAMI ADVISING THAT SOMEONE HAD BEEN TRYING CONTACT HIM. AMBIDDY-1 ASSUMES THIS MIGHT BE HIS HQS CASE OFFICER AND WISHES TO ADVISE HQS THAT HE WILL BE RETURNING TO MIAMI ON 8 JULY.

2. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO PICKED UP IN 2 JULY MEETING WITH AMBIDDY-1 ON EVENTS THAT OCCURRED PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FROM MIAMI FIRST WEEK JULY:

A. (FNU) BLANCA ROBLES, PANAMA CONSUL IN MIAMI CONTACTED AMBIDDY-1 AND TOLD HIM PANAMANIAN MINISTER OF HACIENDA WHO WAS VISITING IN U.S. WANTED TO MEET WITH AMBIDDY-1 TO DISCUSS UNSPECIFIED URGENT MATTER.

B. EUGENE MAXIMILLIAN, HAITIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI TOLD AMBIDDY-1 THAT PRESIDENT DUVALLIER WANTED TO SEE HIM. PURPOSE WAS TO CARRY PRIVATE MESSAGE FROM DUVALIER TO PRESIDENT SOMOZA. CLAIMED THAT IF AMBIDDY-1 DID THIS DUVALLIER WOULD RELEASE THE SON OF LEON CANTAVE FROM PRISON. SOMOZA HAS GIVEN AMBIDDY-1 PERMISSION TO MAKE THE TRIP. ACCORDING AMBIDDY-1, HE AND SOMOZA FIGURE THIS IS A PLAY BY DUVALIER TO TRY OPEN MORE DOORS ACCEPTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA.

SECRET

14-00000

S-82064

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled in)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

AT: Z

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

7/2 PER

WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO.
FILE VR. DDP, ADDP, CSDO, EUR 6

WH/COG 8, FI, CI/OPS, CI, CI/OA, CI/IC 2

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

S E C R E T 201906 MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5618

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE,MADRID , PARIS 20 MAY 68 IN 14784

M

PBRUMEN LISASSY

OVER

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5535 (IN 08508)

B. MADRID 4911 (IN 09784)

1. NR LISASSY-1 RETURNED MEXICO CITY 15 MAY. AFTER MADRID VISIT REF B LISASSY-1 VISITED FRANKFURT, EAST AND WEST BERLIN, AND PARIS. DID NOT CALL CUBAN AMBASSADOR PARIS BECAUSE DECIDED WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE HIS OWN RELATIONSHIP NR LIRING-9 MEXI. ALSO FELT ALTHOUGH HE MET AND KNOWS AMBASSADOR SLIGHTLY, THERE WAS STRONG POSSIBLIITY AMBASSADOR WOULD NOT REMEMBER HIM AND WOULD REFUSE SEE HIM. PURPOSE LISASSY-1 PLANNED CONTACT WAS TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR THAT DR ENRIQUE HUERTAS WHO CONSIDERS SELF MOST REPRESENTATIVE CUBAN EXILES IS WILLING MEET FIDEL CASTRO TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITY RAPPROCHEMENT WITH HUERTAS GROUP. DURING 17-18 APRIL MEET MIAMI HUERTAS CLAIMED HE IN CONTACT WITH HIGH LEVEL PERSONS CASTRO GOVERNMENT WHO MAY BE RECEPTIVE PROPOSAL RAPPROCHEMENT WITHOUT CASTRO.

2. LISASSY-1 TOLD STATION ORIGINALLY HIS TRIP EUROPE WAS TO VISIT PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS ON BEHALF HIS COMPANY NEW CONTRACEPTIVE

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5618 SECRET

PRODUCT PERLUTAL. ONE MONTHLY INJECTION INLIEU PRESENT DAILY PILL CONTRACEPTIVES. ENROUTE EUROPE LISASSY-1 DECIDED VISIT HUERTAS AND AMBIDDY-1. C-82064 0DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH THESE TWO, LISASSY-1 WAS INSTRUCTED BY HUERTAS TO CONTACT MADRID CUBAN EXILES TO FIND ONE WHO HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH CUBAN AMB PARIS. IF SUCH PERSON COULD BE LOCATED, LISASSY-1 WAS TO ASK THAT PERSON TO CONVEY HUERTAS PROPOSAL TO THE AMBASSADOR. FAILING TO LOCATE SUCH A PERSON HE WAS TO DO IT HIMSELF. FOR REASONS CITED PARA 1, ABOVE, LISASSY-1 DID NOT DO SO. LISASSY-1 IS CEROWGN AMBIDDY-1 UNDERSTANDS WHY HE COULD NOT SEE THE CUBAN AMB, BECAUSE AMIBDDY-1 IS ONLY LISASSY-1 FRIEND WHO IS KNOWLEDGEABLE LISASSY-1 DOUBLE ROLE.

3. LISASSY-1 HAD MESSAGE FROM LIRING-9 ON ARRIVAL MEXI, ASKING LISASSY-1 CALL HIM SOONEST. LISASSY-1 PLANS WITHHOLD DETAILS HIS EUROPEAN AND U.S. TRIP FROM LIRING-9 PENDING STATION INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHAT ELEMENTS OF TRIP CAN BE PASSED LIRING-9.

4. PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE MEXICO LISASSY-1 RECEIVED 100 CUBAN PESOS FROM LIRING-9 WITH INSTRUCTIONS PASS TO HUERTAS, WHO LIRING-9 HOPED WOULD GIVE THE MONEY TO AGENTS HUERTAS MAY BE SENDING INTO CUBA. LIRING-9 TOLD LISASSY-1 HE PHOTOGRAPHED THE MONEY SO IT COULD BE TRACED TO WHOEVER TURNS UP WITH IT IN CUBA. LISASSY-1

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

TOTAL COPIES
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE. VR.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 5618

DID NOT PASS THE MONEY TO HUERTAS BUT WILL TELL LIRING-9 HE DID. LISASSY-1 EXPLAINED TO STATION ~~AS~~ THAT HE DID NOT GIVE MONEY TO HUERTAS BECAUSE COULD NOT TELL HIM LIRING-9 PLAN TO TRACE MONEY TO HUERTAS AGENTS. ALSO FELT STATION MAY WISH USE THE MONEY TO BURN SOMEONE, SO HAS IN HIS POSSESSION.

5. WILL ADVISE RESULTS LISASSY-1 MEET WITH LIRING-9.

DIRECTOR: PLS COMMENT RE PARA 4 ABOVE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

#171 3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

DISSEM BY zl PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE VR AdDP, CSDO,

SERVICE

EUR-6, WH/COG-8, CI/OPS, CI, CI/OA, CI/IC-2

MEXICO CITY 5618
STA & NR

20 MAY 68
DATE

14784 -A
IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"EXPLAINED TO STATION C/O HE DID NOT GIVE MONEY"

SECRET

C- 82064

CS DO

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: D AT: 0100 Z

DISSEM BY: 21/21

ACTION WH 8 ☒ NO COPY

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE VR. WH/C.G-8, EUR-8, CI, CI/OPS, CS/DO, CI/OA, FI, SB-8, CI/IC-2,

S E C R E T 170015Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5237

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE MADRID

17 APR 68 IN 92242

PBRUMEN LISASSY

REF A DIRECTOR 90426

B JMWAVE 2031 (IN 90586)

1. LISASSY-1 DID NOT DISCUSS WITH LIRING-9 HIS PANAMA MEET WITH ENRIQUE HUERTAS. AS SUGGESTED PARA 1 REF A LISASSY-1 TOLD LIRING-9 15 APRIL HUERTAS ADVISED BY PHONE ORGANIZING INTERNATIONAL GROUPS TO WORK AGAINST AMTHUG. LISASSY-1 WILL SAY DOES NOT HAVE DETAILS AND NAMES BUT WILL ATTEMPT SOLICIT FROM HUERTAS DURING STOPOVER MIAMI 17 APRIL. LISASSY-1 ALSO BRIEFED PARA 2 REF A AND AGREED GO PRAGUE FOR TRAINING IF ASKED. WILL TELL LIRING-9 HE MAY HAVE UPDATED INFO HUERTAS PLANS WHEN ARRIVES MADRID 20 APRIL FOR TWO WEEK STAY AND WILL REQUEST LIRING-9 FURNISH HIM MADRID CONTACT AND/OR ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS.

NR NR

2. LISASSY-1 ETA MIAMI AFTERNOON 17 APRIL FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH HUERTAS AND AMBIDDY-1. THESE DISCUSSIONS WILL HAVE BEARING HIS MISSION FOR HUERTAS IN MADRID. ON 18 APRIL GOES PUERTO RICO TO VISIT BROTHER WIFE. IN MADRID PLANS SEE QUGROWL-1 AND QUGROWL-2, AND AMSEELY-1.

C-330631 NR C-106471 C-94565

17 APR 1968

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY [illegible] S E C R E T

3. JMWAVE, MADRID: LISASSY-1 VISIT THERE MAY PROVIDE EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FEED HIM DECEPTION INFO FOR PASSAGE LIRING-9, BEARING IN MIND PARA 3 REF A FACTORS. AS STATION REPORTED EARLIER, LISASSY-1 APPARENTLY IN GOOD GRACES PBRUMENERS, THUS NOW IS TIME FOR HIM COME UP WITH INFO OF INTEREST TO THEM.

S E C R E T [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

C-82064

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

#1

ACTION
WH8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE

S E C R E T 021528Z CITE MANAGUA 6400

92041

DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE, JMWAVE

3 JAN 1968

REF: MANAGUA 6399 (IN 21302)

1. AMBIDDY-1 IDENTIFIED HIS NEGRO BODYGUARD OF PARA 2 REF AS EUGENIO CLAUDE WHO RETURNED MIAMI BEFORE CHRISTMAS. DID NOT VISIT COSTA RICA.

2. AMBIDDY IDENTIFIED FREDDY OF REF AS FREDDY BORGES, EMPLOYED BY TIRE COMPANY MIAMI. BORGES IS PART-TIME INFORMANT AND FIXER FOR OK UMA. EFFECTIVE BUT INCLINED SPIN TALES OF OWN IMPORTANCE. AMBIDDY WILL ADVISE HIM SHUT UP.

3. STATION OFFICER HAS IDENTIFIED QUIET CUBAN OF REF AS ALBERTO RUIZ. NO RECORD STATION FILES. AMBIDDY REPORTS BORGES WAS TRYING ARRANGE ENTRANCE TO U.S. FOR CUBAN REFUGEE WHO ARRIVED NICARAGUA FROM SPAIN. DESCRIPTION SIMILAR TO RUIZ.

4. AMBIDDY SAYS NONE OF "HIS" CUBANS IN COSTA RICA RECENTLY.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

C-82064

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 5

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR CI/OPS CI/IC2 WH/COG8 CI/CA/FI

S E C R E T 301726Z CITE MANAGUA 6399 2 JAN 1968

SAN JOSE INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

REF: SAN JOSE 9881 (NOT SENT JMWAVE) (IN 20968) 30Dec67 IN 21302

1. NO ERYTHROIDS WERE IN SAN JOSE AREA 21 DECEMBER.

C-82064

2. AMBIDDY-1 IN MANAGUA FOR CHRISTMAS SEASON, MAY STILL BE IN TOWN. COS WILL ATTEMPT FIND HIM TO SEE IF HE CAN SHED ANY LIGHT ON THREE MEN OF REF. ABOUT 20 DECEMBER AMBIDDY CAME TO COS HOME TO BORROW BABY CRIB, HAD WITH HIM TALL NEGRO WHO APPARENTLY BODYGUARD. AS SAN JOSE AWARE, BOTH ERACORN-1 AND AMBIDDY-1 WERE ON GUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE ASSASSINATION. AMBIDDY MAY HAVE BROUGHT BODYGUARDS WITH HIM FROM MIAMI THIS TRIP AND SOME OF THESE MAY HAVE SPILLED OVER INTO COSTA RICA.

NR

3. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY: ABOUT 13 DECEMBER SALVADOR TOLEDO OF NICARAGUAN IMMIGRATION BROUGHT TWO CUBANS TO ADLON NIGHT CLUB MANAGUA, INTRODUCED THEM TO OWNER AS FRIENDS OF JOSE IVAN "PEPE" ALEGRETT, IMMIGRATION CHIEF, ASKED THAT THEY BE WELL TREATED. ONE CUBAN DID ALMOST ALL TALKING. GAVE NAME AS FREDDY. LAST NAME UNDECIPHERABLE FROM HANDWRITTEN NOTATITN, BEGINS WITH LETTER B, CONTAINS

SECRET

SECRET

23211

ABOUT 5 LETTERS. ADDRESS [redacted] NW 16 STREET, MIAMI, PHONE 633-4584. FREDDY ABOUT FIVE NINE, MEDIUM BUILD AND COMPLEXION, DARK HAIR, NO DISTINGUISHING MARKS. OTHER, QUIET, CUBAN WAS SHORT, WALKED WITH LIMP, BLACK MUSTACHE, VERY HEAVY CUBAN ACCENT. FREDDY FLASHED PLASTIC CARD SHOWING HIM TO BE CUBAN REFUGEE (PROBABLY ALIEN REGISTRATION CARD), SAID HE AND OTHER CUBAN BOTH WORKING FOR WOFIRM. CLAIMED HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH CUBANS PICKED UP IN MANAGUA BY IMMIGRATION. WAS PLANNING GO MIAMI NEXT DAY CARRYING SOME PASSPORTS. WOULD RETURN IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. ON 28 AND 29 DECEMBER TOLEDO AND THE QUIET CUBAN APPEARED AT ADLON CLUB BUT FREDDY HAS NOT SHOWN UP AGAIN ALTHOUGH WAS EXPECTED BACK IN MANAGUA 29 DECEMBER.

4. SINCE JMWAVE DID NOT GET EARLIER TRAFFIC, SUGGEST HQS FILL IN AS APPROPRIATE. JMWAVE PLS CABLE TRACES ON FREDDY.

5. ALEGRETT HAS LOTS OF CUBAN CONTACTS MIAMI AREA AND IS CONSTANTLY BRINGING THEM INTO NICARAGUA ON BUSINESS DEALS. STATION HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH HIM, WILL TRY ELICIT INFO ON FREDDY AND OTHER CUBAN. SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 MANAGUA 6399 S E C R E T

6. SOUNDS LIKE SAN JOSE AND MANAGUA INCIDENTS MAY SIMPLY BE BIG-MOUTHING BY MEN SEEKING ENHANCE IMPORTANCE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

C-82064

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

7

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT: ~4 [illegible]
TIME: 1700Z
BY: S

INFO FILE VR WH 8 CI/OPS CI/OA ICS/PO

6 Nov 67 IN 87575

S E C R E T 061600 CITE MANAGUA 6320

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBIDDY

C. 82064

AMBIDDY-1 HAS LOST PHONE NUMBER OF GROWERY WHOM HE KNOWS AS "MIST[illegible] WILSON". WOULD APPRECIATE PHONE CONTACT AT HIS M[illegible]I RESIDENCE 6 OR 7 NOVEMBER.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: BARRY CAREW:mjr
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: R-9008
DATE: 24 JANUARY 1967

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300923

~~SECRET~~

DISSEM BY 4 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG 8 RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 25 10 13 Z CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 69479

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

File

26 JAN 1967

TYPIC LISASSY/LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 0024 (IN 83232)*

1. HQS CASE OFFICER (GROWERY) IN PROCESS CONTACTING AMBIDDY/1 TO REQUEST HE NOT CORRESPOND WITH LISASSY/1 ON THIS OPERATIONAL MATTER. REQUEST STATION EXPLAIN THIS LISASSY/1.

C-82064

NE

2. DO NOT WISH INTERRUPT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP OR EXILE ORG BUSINESS BECAUSE IT ONE REASON FOR LIRING INTEREST LISASSY/1, AND LISASSY/1 AND AMBIDDY/1 WILL TALK TO EACH OTHER ANYHOW.

3. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE ESTABLISH COMMO FROM LISASSY/1 TO STATION AS DISCUSSED WITH TRECKLER AT HQS.

4. REQUEST STATION SEND PARA FIVE REF COMMO INSTRUCTIONS AND AMSPICE COMMO INSTRUCTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

CONT/

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

~~SECRET~~

1
2
3
4

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

PAGE 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 69479

TO

WH/COG COMMENT:

REPORT ON 16 JAN MEETING WITH LISASSY/1, PARA FIVE: LIRING/1 PROVIDED ELABORATE AND OVER-COMPLICATED COMMO INSTRUCTIONS WHICH APPEAR ENAMATE FROM HAVANA.

C/WH/COG/CICS ____________________

WH/COG/MO E. CHIOCCA (DRAFT)

WH/COG/FI W. MURRAY (DRAFT)

WH/1/MEXICO J. STEWART (DRAFT)

by

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

TOTAL COPIES

ORIG: B. CAREW/mak
UNIT: WH/C/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 26 OCT 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300923

~~SECRET~~

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 7 PER ____ \# ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH8 CI/OPS CI/IC 2 C/FI FI FI/INT 2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

27 17 06 Z CITE DIRECTOR 47286

TO SECRET

MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE MANAGUA

TYPIC LISASSY

file C-82044

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8972 (IN 25337)

B. MEXICO CITY 8860 (IN 17955)

C. HNMA 3667, 5 OCT 66

D. DIR 47285

1. SUBJECT 201-300923, PRINCIPAL REF CASE, ASSIGNED LISASSY/1.

2. BELIEVE SALIENT POINTS RAISED BY PRELIMINARY HQS ANALYSIS TO BE KEPT IN MIND DURING HANDLING CASE ARE:

[redacted]

A. FACT HE HAS RELATIVES CUBA.

B. CLAIMS CONTACTS WITH OTHER WOFACT STATION CASE OFFICERS (HNMA-3667).

CONT/

RELEASING OFFICER 27-7

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

~~S E C R E T~~

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

S E C R E T

47284

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

? How?

C-82064

3. LISASSY-1 IN SECRET WRITING CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY/ AND ALTHOUGH HEADQUARTERS HAS NOT SEEN MESSAGES, BELIEVE HE HAS INFORMED AMBIDDY ABOUT CASE. LATEST MESSAGE BEING ~~[illegible]~~. DECYPHERED. HEADQUARTERS. ~~HEADQUARTERS FOR COMPLETE DEVELOPMENT.~~ DUE SENSITIVITY OF CASE HEADQUARTERS MAY ASK AMBIDDY MINIMIZE OR COMPLETELY STOP CORRESPONDENCE WITH LISASSY WITH AGREEMENT WE INFORM AMBIDDY ANY DEVELOPMENTS THAT MIGHT AFFECT HIM. AMBIDDY MAY REFUSE THIS REQUEST BECAUSE HE VITALLY CONCERNED AND BECAUSE INITIAL CAVEAT TO WOFACT IN REF C THAT CONTROL OF OPERATION NOT BE GIVEN WOFACT. IN ADDITION, REGARDLESS ANY AGREEMENT, LIKELY THEY WOULD CONTINUE CORRESPOND SECRETLY.

4. HEADQUARTERS DISSEMINATING PARTS REF A TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON LIMITED BASIS AS EXAMPLE CUBA REQUIREMENTS.

C-103058

5. FYI: PER PARA SIX REF A, AMBASSADOR TO MOROCCO ENRIQUE (RODRIGUEZ-LOECHES) HERNANDEZ CONTACTED RABAT BY QUWHIP/1 (MADRID STATION ASSET) 12 OCTOBER 1966 IN ATTEMPT RECRUIT OR DEFECT.

CONT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG
UNIT
EXT
DATE

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 47231

TO

C. CURIOUS DESCRIPTION OF 29 SEPT 66 MEETING WITH CAPOTE, INVOLVING EVASIVE ROUTE TO, AND SURVEILLANCE WHILE AT, RESTAURANT (HNMA-3667).

D. POSSIBILITY SUBJECT WITH OR WITHOUT AMBIDDY-1 KNOWLEDGE "PLAYING" ABREU FOR SOME TIME, WHICH MIGHT EXPLAIN WHY SUBJECT IN POSSESSION SUCH LENGTHY LIST CUIS REQUIREMENTS AFTER ONLY FIVE DEVELOPMENTAL MEETINGS WITH C/O.

LITAMIL-9
?

E. CONFIRMATION CAPOTE IN MEXICO ON SCHOLARSHIP AND INVESTIGATION HIS ACTIVITIES.

F. POSSIBILITY IDENTIFY VALVERDE THROUGH TRAVEL MANIFESTS AND LIONION.

G. AS STATION COMMENTED, PUT BRAKES ON [redacted] OPERATIONAL SLANTS [redacted] INITIATED BY SUBJECT.

CONT/

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

~~S E C R E T~~

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

FROM: DIRECTOR

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) S E C R E T (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 47285

TO

752480

ACCUSED QUWHIP BE ASSOCIATED SAME GROUP AS QUBRAVE/1 AND AMLASH/2. NR IMPLIED WOULD SOON BE MEMBER PCC. SAID "KNEW WHAT HE DOING. WAS RETURNING CUBA OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER AND WOULD COME OUT AGAIN IN FEW YEARS". CONSIDER LISASSY/1 [redacted] IDEA SOUND BUT PREFER LET OPERATION STABILIZE BEFORE TAKING ACTION.

whe

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CICS
C/WH/C/CA H Must
C/WH/C/CA/PA C.
C/WH/C/MO
C/WH/C/FI
WH/1-J.Stewart (draft)
WH/2 P. EDWARDS (phone)

Earl Williamson
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Earl Williamson
THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: B.CAREW:mot
UNIT: WH/C/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 26 OCT 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300923

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 7 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH 8 C/DBS C/ICZ

C/OA

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 27 17 05 Z

(REFERENCE NUMBER) CITE DIRECTOR 47285

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE MANAGUA.

TYPIC LISASSY

REFS: A) MEXICO CITY 8972 (IN 25337)

~~B) DIR~~

File

28 OCT 1966

1. TRACES: AMARO ESTEBAN ALVAREZ TORMO BORN 3 AUG 29 MATANZAS CUBA, CUBAN, MEDICAL SURGEON, SON OF AMARO ALVAREZ GONZALEZ AND MERCEDES TORMO LAGULLON, WIFE MARIA CARMEN CAGIGAS ARTESGABEITIA. UFGS-21693. 1 JUN 65: SUBJECT ENGAGED ANTI-BATISTA ACTIVITIES, DID NOT AGREE CASTRO POLICIES AND WENT MEXICO EARLY 1960. MEXICO CITY 7802, 8 APR 61: OFFICIAL DELEGATE, BUSINESSMENS SECTION FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO (FRD). HMYA-1383, 25 NOV 60: MEMBER TOURING FRD TEAM, REPORTEDLY WITH FIDEL CASTRO IN SIERRA MAESTRA. (NO EVAL) UFGA-24076, 21 DEC 65: OFFICER OF JUANA CASTRO GROUP MEXICO. ?

2. NO INDICATION HQS FILES SUBJECT EVER WOFACT ASSET. HE WAS KNOWN PERSONALLY TO ANDREW F. MERTON UNDER EMBASSY COVER AND PROBABLY THOUGHT MERTON WAS WOFACT. HE NEVER USED AS ASSET BY MERTON OR ANY OTHER STATION OFFICER ACCORDING MERTONS BEST

cont/

RELEASING OFFICER

27-6

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

~~SECRET~~

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET
(DATE AND TIME FILED)
(ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 47285

TO PAGE TWO

RECOLLECTION, WHICH IS THAT HE WAS PEST TRYING ESTABLISH HIMSELF WITH AMEMBASSY AS LEADING EXILE, AS PUSHING OWN VISA CASE AND AS LEADING ATTEMPT BY BUSINESSMANS SECTION FRD TAKE OVER POLITICAL CONTROL FRD MEXICO CITY DURING TRIP TO MIAMI. (DOCUMENT POSSIBLY MEXICO CITY 7802 ABOVE WHICH UNAVAILABLE THIS WRITING).

3. SUBJECT WELL-KNOWN LITAMIL/2 WHO SHOULD BE ABLE PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE BACKGROUND.

END OF MESSAGE

28 OCT 1966 File

C/WH/C/CICS
WH/C/MO
WH/C/FI
WH/C/CA
WH/1
WH/2 J. EDWARDS (Phone)
WH/C/CA/PA

Earl J. Williamson
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Earl J. Williamson
THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

ORIG: E.WILLIAMSON/yh ☐ FILE RID
UNIT: DC/WH/C ☐ INDEX
EXT: 3481 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE: 18 OCTOBER 66 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-267437

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 24 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH-8, CI/OA, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 19 1903Z

CITE DIRECTOR 44736

(REFERENCE NUMBER)

TO MEXICO CITY INFO MANAGUA

C-82064

TYPIC AMBIDDY

REF: MEXICO CITY 8860 (IN 17955)

1. RE PARA 4 REF, AMBIDDY/1 Presently ~~CONTINUES~~ TO RECEIVES A SUBSIDY of $3,000 a month FROM WOFACT WHICH HE CLAIMS IS DISBURSED TO FAMILIES OF AMWORLD CASUALTIES. THIS SUBSIDY WAS CUT LAST JULY from $5,000 monthly AND HE HAS BEEN WARNED IT MAY BE ELIMINATED IN THE FUTURE. EJW

2. AMBIDDY/1 HAS MENTIONED IN PAST HE LIKELY TARGET FOR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT BY CASTRO BUT DOUBT ALVAREZ REPORT IS ATTEMPT BY AMBIDDY/1 TO REGAIN STATUS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/FI
C/WH/C/CICS
WH/1 J.Stewart (draft)
C/WH/2/CR&N R Edwards (phone)
DC/WH 2 J. Then (phone)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Earl J. Williamson
THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

19-2

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CS-15

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 2x

~~SECRET~~

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM DISSEM BY 53

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/..., CI, FI,

S E C R E T 150140Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8860

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA

TYPIC AMBIDDY

Fil AMBIDDY/1 (see over)

15 OCT 65 = 17955

REF: A. MANAGUA 5808 (IN 12492)

B. DIRECTOR 41783 c 82064

1. ONLY ELEMENT WHICH WOULD EFFECTIVELY FAN FIRE OF CURRENT ANTI-GOC PROPAGANDA IN MEXICO WOULD BE EXPOSURE OF:

A. CUBAN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS DIRECTED AT MEXICO, OR,

B. COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR MEXICAN SOVEREIGNITY ON PART OF CUBANS INVOLVED IN THIRD COUNNTRY OPS.

2. IN LINE WITH REF B, STATION PLANNING:

A. IDENTIFY VALVERDE AND COLLEAGUES AND TRY DETERMINE IF THEIR ACTIVITIES INVOLVE MEXICANS.

B. TRY TAPE STRONG ANTI-MEXICAN STATEMENTS HOPEFULLY MADE BY VALVERDE AND FRIENDS DURING MEETING WITH DR. ALVAREZ.

3. PLAN HAVE FIRST MEETING WITH ALVEREZ 18 OCTOBER USING LIEMBRACE TEAM FOR SURVEILLANCE MEETING SITE AND TAILING OF ALVAREZ FOR SEVERAL DAYS. WILL EXPLORE WITH ALVAREZ HOW VALVERDE COULD BE TRAPPED INTO MAKING STATEMENTS DETRIMENTAL TO MEXICO IN CONNECTION WITH STRONG ARM TYPE OPS AND HOW THESE STATE-

SECRET

SECRET

MENTS COULD BE RECORDED. CLANDESTINE PHOTOS OF VALVERDE WOULD BE TAKEN AT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS. DEPENDING ON TAKE, TAPES AND PHOTOS COULD BE SENT MEXICAN OFFICIALS WHILE PART OF INFO LEAKED TO FOREIGN PRESS. LIEMBRACE WOULD NATURALLY SURVEIL VALVERDE'S MOVEMENTS FOR PERIOD AFTER INITIAL MONITORED MEETING WITH ALVAREZ.

4. PLEASE ADVISE STATUS AMBIDDY-1 RELATIONSHIP WITH WOFACT. REF A COULD POSSIBLY BE AMBIDDY-1 ATTEMPT TO REGAIN STATUS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

~~SECRET~~

ORIG: E.WILLIAMSON/yb
UNIT: WH/C
EXT: 3481
DATE: 24 JUNE 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1
2 6
3 7
4 8

DISSEM BY 12 PER ____ # ____

[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , C/CA, C/OPS, SOD6

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

25 16 36Z CITE DIRECTOR 15470

TO JMWAVE C-82064

TYPIC AMBIDDY/1

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 13592

B. JMWAVE 1479 (IN 37512)

1. IN MEETING 22 JUNE AMBIDDY/1 (A/1) SAID ONLY GEAR LEFT IN U.S. FROM AMWORLD IS 2-3 RUBBER BOATS AND 6-8 SILENT OUTBOARD MOTORS WHICH STORED SMALL ROOM IN FARM NEAR WEST PALM BEACH. HIS REP, SAENZ, ALSO HAS 6-8 RADIOS IN HIS HOME MIAMI. A/1 CLAIMS HAS NO SIGNIFICANT ARMS OR AMMUNITION IN U.S. AND KNOWS OF NO SOURCES MIAMI AREA WHERE ANY QUANTITY ARMS CAN BE OBTAINED. HE SAID AT TIME GUANTANAMO ALERT HE CHECKED RE PURCHASE ARMS MIAMI AREA IN CASE NEEDED AND COULD ONLY LOCATE ABOUT 60 RIFLES AMONGST 3 EXILE GROUPS.

2. A/1 DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE BOB BROWN (REF B), SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN APPROACHED FOR INFO ON ANY MAGAZINE ARTICLES OR FOR INFO RE PURCHASE OR POSSIBILITY PURCHASE ARMS MIAMI.

3. A/1 TO FURNISH INVENTORY REMAINING AMWORLD GEAR IN U.S. ON RETURN MIAMI. UPON RECEIPT, HQS WILL FORWARD COPY AND ANY ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFO TO WAVE.

....CONTINUED ....

RELEASING OFFICER 25-9

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

10

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

15480

CITE DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

TO

4. A/1 GOING NYC ON OWN EVENING 23 JUNE AND PLANS RETURN MIAMI 24 or 25 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/MO B. Mills

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
for
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
for
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

6 ~~SECRET~~

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ORIG: A.D. ROHLFING/mak
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 6057-1255
DATE: 22 NOV 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

TO: CARACAS MANAGUA SAN JOSE GUATEMALA TEGUCIGALPA PANAMA CITY JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG CEN~~

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

TO CARA MANA SJOS INFO GUAT TEGU PACY WAVE CITE DIR 60386

TYPIC

29 NOV 1965

File

REFS: A. DIR 59681

~~B. DIR~~ _____

e-82064

1. HQS REQUESTED AMBIDDY-1 (A-1) NOT INVOLVE HIMSELF ALEJOS-PONCIANO-SOMOZA MEETING WHICH SEEMINGLY TO TAKE PLACE MANA DURING WEEK 22-28 NOV. WAS ASKED POSTPONE TRIP IN ORDER AVOID GRIST FOR RUMOR MILLS. A-1 UNDERSTOOD BUT EXPLAINED HAD LONG-STANDING APPOINTMENT SOMOZA RELATING OTHER MATTERS SUCH AS TURNOVER OF BASES ETC. AS COMPROMISE OFFERED DEPART MANA 23 NOV FOR SJOS THUS AVOIDING MEETING WITH ROBERTO ALEJOS WHO DUE IN FROM WAVE SAME DAY.

2. IN SJOS A-1 HOPING RECEIVE INVITE FROM IDEN-1 VIA VENEZUELA EMBASSY SJOS. IF FALLS THROUGH WILL RETURN MANA IN ORDER ASCERTAIN WHAT TRANSPIRED AT ABOVE MENTIONED MEET. HOWEVER, IF RECEIVES INVITE PLANS TRAVEL CARA O/A 29 NOVEMBER. HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED STAY TAMANACO HOTEL AND REGISTER UNDER NAME IDEN-2. WAS TOLD IF KUBARK WISHED HIM

CONTINUED//

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

24-2

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

~~SECRET~~

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 60386

PAGE TWO

MAKE CONTACT WITH PLOTTERS MENTIONED REF B WOULD RECEIVE CALL FROM "AMIGO DE ANDRES". IF NO INTEREST IN HIS MAKING CONTACT WOULD NOT BE CALLED AT ALL.

END OF MESSAGE

DC/WH/C/CA

Terrell
WH/2 (telecon)

M. Peake
WH/3 (telecon)

B. Miller
WH/C/MO

Flores for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Flores for
JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 6

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

6 ~~SECRET~~

☐ ROS ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4			

[illegible] 15 47 E

ORIG : A.D. ROHLFING/mak
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW
EXT : 6957-1255
DATE : 22 NOV 65

TO : CARACAS MANAGUA SAN JOSE GUATEMALA TEGUICIGALPA PANAMA CITY JMWAVE

SIG CEN

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY , WH 8, C/OPS, C/CA

TO CARA MANA SJOS INFO GUAT TEGU PACY WAVE CITE DIR 60387

TYPIC

DIR: 60386

IDEN - 1 PRESIDENT RAUL LEONI

IDEN - 2 MANUEL A. BUESA

END OF MESSAGE

Castiller
DC/WH/C/CA

Terrell
WH/2 (telecon)

M. Peak
WH/3 (telecon)

B. Mill
WH/C/MO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER 24-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ARTIME-Buesa, Manuel
201-0267437
Volume XVI

INCLUSIVE DATES:
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:
ROOM:
DELETIONS, IF ANY: Third Agency Documents

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
7 AUG 1978	7 Aug 1978	Leslie WIZELMAN	Leslie Wizelman

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 17 SEPTEMBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ASSOCIATION OF VETERANS OF THE
BAY OF PIGS, BRIGADE 2506

MANUEL ARTIME

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY /3 PER [redacted] TOTAL COPIES 28-3 [redacted] RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

~~S E C R E T~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR PLAN, C/OPS, OS/INT, PS/EG4, OS/DOC, OS/G/CC

T 155286 EIA224 PAGE 01 IN 268135

TOR:312118Z MAY 74 LIMA 28090

S E C R E T 312040Z MAY 74 STAFF,

CITE LIMA 28290 PLAN-AIMORI

Juan Valadez X1222 OS/BARRY

answering Artime file

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

REAM

1. DUSKIRT-2 HAS ASKED IF WE COULD OBTAIN FOR HIM THE CURRENT ADDRESS OF MANUEL ARTIME. D-2 WAS FRIEND AND COLLABORATOR OF ARTIME FROM 1959 UNTIL THEY LOST CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER IN 1968. WHEN D-2 FIRST CAME TO PERU HE CARRIED LETTER SIGNED BY ARTIME IDENTIFYING HIM AS ARTIME PERSONAL REP IN PERU.

2. D-2 WANTS TO CONTACT ARTIME TO ASK HIS HELP IN OBTAINING NICARAGUAN PASSPORT. HE CLAIMS ARTIME RELATIONSHIP WITH SOMOZA IS SUCH THAT ARTIME COULD OBTAIN FOR D-2 NICARAGUAN PASSPORT AND PERHAPS SOME TYPE OF HONORARY CONSUL DESIGNATION. D-2 WILL WRITE LETTER TO ARTIME EXPLAINING HIS SITUATION AND WILL ASK STATION TO POUCH LETTER TO MIAMI FOR MAILING THERE EITHER DIRECTLY TO ARTIME OR TO D-2 SISTER FOR HER TO DELIVER PERSONALLY TO ARTIME.

3. AS ABOVE INDICATES, D-2 REMAINS PREOCCUPIED WITH FACT HE DOES NOT POSSESS VALID PASSPORT. HE HAS TRIED NUMEROUS SCHEMES TO OBTAIN SAME WITHOUT SUCCESS. HE STRONGLY FEELS HE MUST HAVE DOCUMENTATION TO LEAVE PERU IF NECESSARY. HE WORRIES ABOUT

~~S E C R E T~~

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________ ~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR		1	4
				2	5
ACTION #				3	6

T 155286 EIA224 PAGE 02 IN 268135

TUR:312118Z MAY 74 LIMA 20898

POSSIBILITY OF ONE DAY BEING ARRESTED, PERHAPS AS RESULT HIS BKHERALD ACTIVITY, AND DEPORTED TO CUBA BY LEFTIST PERUVIAN GOVT. HE ADMITS THAT HIS EXPERIENCES IN CUBA AFTER CASTRO'S TAKEOVER COLOR HIS PERCEPTION OF THE DANGER IN HIS CURRENT SITUATION BUT HE IS NOT WILLING TO REMAIN VULNERABLE TO SIMILAR DEVELOPMENT IN PERU. EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS WILL OF COURSE NOT REASSURE HIM RE THE SITUATION HERE.

4. OTHER THAN ARTIME GAMBIT, ONLY TWO POSSIBILITIES FOR OBTAINING PASSPORT WHICH REMAIN OPEN TO D-2 ARE PERUVIAN CITIZENSHIP OR GOING TO CUBAN EMBASSY AND ASKING THAT THEY RENEW HIS EXPIRED CUBAN PASSPORT. HE REJECTS IDEA PERUVIAN CITIZENSHIP, CLAIMING HE STILL PLANS EVENTUALLY RETURN TO LIVE IN UNITED STATES BUT ALSO BECAUSE HIS FEARS ABOUT ULTIMATE DESTINATION PERUVIAN REVOLUTION AND POSSIBILITY MARXIST DICTATORSHIP COMING TO POWER HERE. HE AND STATION ARE NATURALLY RELUCTANT HAVE HIM APPROACH CUBANS. THERE PROBABLY THICK FILE ON HIM IN HAVANA AND WE WOULD NOT WISH CALL THEIR ATTENTION TO HIS PRESENCE HERE. HOWEVER THIS OPTION MUST BE EXAMINED AND THEREFORE WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HQS COULD PROVIDE INFO ON EXPERIENCE OTHERS SUCH AS D-2, FORMERLY ACTIVE CASTRO OPPONENTS NOW IN EXILE IN COUNTRIES WHICH MAINTAIN

~~SECRET~~

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER [redacted] TOTAL COPIES [redacted] RUN BY

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

RF FILE VR

N F O

ACTION #

1 2 3 4 5 6

T 188286 EIA224 PAGE 03-03 IN 268135

TOR:312118Z MAY 74 LIMA 28898

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA, WHO STILL CUBAN CITIZENS AND HAVE HAD TO CONTACT CUBAN EMBASSIES FOR PASSPORT RENEWAL. HAVE CUBANS NORMALLY RENEWED THESE PASSPORTS AND IS THERE EVIDENCE CUBANS HAVE OPERATIONALLY EXPLOITED SITUATION OF THESE EXILES?

5. FILE: 201-0754738. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

[redacted] V.

☐ YES ☐ NO
TO FILE NO. 7-5-753 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES [redacted] 22 R.F.
TO FILE NO.
☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

~~SECRET~~

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

24

ACTION C/WH/COG-5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 082102 CITE MANAGUA 6044

DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

[redacted] TYPIC AMWORLD

8 MAR [illegible] 17221

1. AS ADDLESSEES AWARE, WHEN AMWORLD WAS CLOSED OUT TWO YEARS AGO, AMBIDDY-1 WAS AUTHORIZED TO HOLD ROUGH EQUIVILENT OF WEAPONS TO ARM ONE RIFLE COMPANY. WEAPONS STORED AT THE MONKEY POINT OPS BASE, AT EL BLUFF SUPPORT BASE, AND IN MANAGUA. ABOUT ONE YEAR AGO, MONKEY POINT BASE WAS CLOSED AND WEAPONS THERE MOVED TO EL BLUFF. STORAGE IN SEALED CONCRETE VAULT UNDER THE FLOOR OF SAFEHOUSE WHICH IS ON UNINHABITED SIDE OF BLUFF NEXT TO AIRSTRIP BUILT BY AMWORLD. STRIP IS 1,800 BY 50 FEET WITH CLAY BASE MIXED WITH NATURAL ROCK.

2. ARMS IN MANAGUA HAVE BEEN STORED IN A SAFEHOUSE OUTSIDE OF CITY AND CONSIST OF TWO WOODEN CRATES, EACH ABOUT 150 POUNDS AND 37 BY 25 BY 14 INCHES. APPROXIMATE CONTENTS ARE:

25 PISTOLS .45 CAL

5 RIFLES AR-15

3 SMG M3

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Desensitize
Signed: S. Vitale
R.O. [illegible] - [illegible] WH/COG
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

201-267437

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 6844 SECRET

2 SMG SWISS

6 PISTOLS .22 SILENCED

3. FORTY-FIVE BOXES OF UNKNOWN SIZES AND WEIGHTS ARE STORED AT BLUFF. CONTENTS ARE ESTIMATED FROM MEMORY BY ANTONIO SANZ, WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF STORING THEM:

4 HMG .50 CAL

2 RECOILLESS RIFLE 57 MM

2 MORTARS 81 MM

2 MORTARS 60 MM

4 LMG .30 CAL

4 BAR

3 RIFLES FAL

10 SMG M3

10 CARBINES M1

3 CARBINES M2

10 AR-15

10 GARAND M1

4 SHOTGUNS 12 GUAGE

4 SMG K-PISTOL

AMMUNITION FOR ABOVE WEAPONS, C-3 AND C-4 EXPLOSIVE

WITHOUT DETONATORS, AMOUNT UNKNOWN, PLUS 12 TO 15 BOXES GRENADES.

4. AMBIDDY-1 CONTACTED JAMES D. ZABOTH 4 MARCH, SAID HE CLOSING OUT ALL HIS STATIONKEEPERS IN NICARAGUA, DID NOT WANT TO ABANDON WEAPONS TO FALL INTO WRONG HANDS, NOR TO GIVE THEM TO NIC GOVT. GENERAL SOMOZA KNEW AMWORLD WAS LEAVING BEHIND SOME RESERVE EQUIPMENT AND WOULD KEEP ENOUGH WEAPONS FOR LOCAL SECURITY. HE DID NOT KNOW NUMBERS AND TYPES REMAINING. AMBIDDY-1 ASKED IF WOFACT WISHED TO RECOVER WEAPONS, OTHERWISE HE WOULD HAVE TO DUMP THEM IN OCEAN. ZABOTH, AMBIDDY-1 AND AMJAVA-4, WHO IN MANAGUA ON OTHER BUSINESS, VISITED BLUFF ISLAND 6 MARCH TO CHECK SITUATION. IF HQS WISHES RECOVER WEAPONS, MOST FEASIBLE METHOD IS BY AIR. A CARIBOU OR C-123 TYPE AIRCRAFT COULD LAND ON BLUFF STRIP, LOAD WEAPONS AT NIGHT AND FLY THEM OUT NEXT MORNING. IF HQS DOES NOT WISH RECOVER WEAPONS, AMBIDDY-1 COULD BE TOLD TO MAKE OWN ARRANGEMENTS TO DUMP WEAPONS AT SEA.

5. DESPITE AMBIDDY-1 DESIRE NOT INFORM SOMOZA ABOUT ARMS CACHE, COS FEELS THAT SOMOZA SHOULD BE INFORMED IF

SECRET

PAGE 4 MANAGUA 6844 S E C R E T ~~SECRET~~

HQS DECISION IS THAT ARMS SHOULD BE RECOVERED. SOMOZA COULD BE TOLD THAT "SOME EQUIPMENT" LEFT BEHIND BY AMWORLD GROUP NOW STORED AT BLUFF AND LNHARP WISHES RECOVER. BELIEVE HE WOULD AGREE TO AIRCRAFT PICKUP AS PROPOSED ABOVE. IN STATION OPINION BLACK RECOVERY WITHOUT SOMOZA KNOWLEDGE TOO RISKY. STATION ALSO FEELS THESE WEAPONS SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM CENTRAL AMERICA LEST THEY FALL INTO WRONG HANDS.

6. HQS PLEASE ADVISE BY CABLE. SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 15 RUN BY 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

ACTION UNIT LAB

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR [illegible] CS/NARZ 9/CS

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 546453 EIA367 PAGE 01-01 IN 406400

TOR:0522382 NOV 74 SJOS 17826

S E C R E T 0521552 NOV 74 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 17826

TO: DIRECTOR,

REAM

1. ACCORDING LOCAL DEA REP, MANUEL ARTIME BUESA VISITED COSTA RICA DURING LAST WEEK OF OCTOBER. STAYED AT HOTEL COSTA RICA WHERE HE REGISTERED IN ALIAS. ARTIME REPORTEDLY MET WITH HIGH GOCR OFFICIALS INCLUDING HURILL-1, HUSTRAIGHT-1, AND HUGALLY-1; AND ALLEGEDLY TOLD LATTER HE SENT BY "HIGH OFFICIALS" OF NVIDEA TO ASSURE HUGALLY-1 USG POLICY TOWARD CUBA HAD NOT CHANGED. CHARGE UNAWARE ANY CURRENT CONTACT BETWEEN ARTIME AND NVIDEA OFFICIALS. HUFABRIC-2 VERIFIED ARTIME'S PRESENCE IN COSTA RICA.

2. FILE: 201- . E2 IMPDET

TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
INDEX
[illegible] FOR FILING
[illegible]
ACTION (2, 3, 4)
[illegible]
PFO (B)
FOR FILES

201-267437
5 Nov. 74

SECRET

RECORD COPY

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

15-1

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 070029Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 618814

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE [illegible], C/OP-2, LSN/ID, Flops

0 INDEX DISSEN BY: LA

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: SAN JOSE.

REAMY

REF: SAN JOSE 17828 (IN 406400 *)

1. O DO NOT BELIEVE ARTIME IN CURRENT CONTACT WITH ~~[illegible]~~ STATE AND CERTAIN HE NOT AUTHORIZED, OFFICIALLY OR UNOFFICIALLY, TO SPEAK ~~TO [illegible]~~ on State BSBEHALF. IF HUGALLY-1 RAISES QUESTION, SUGGEST COS RECOMMEND HE CHECK WITH CHARGE.

2. AS STATION AWARE, BKHERALD HAS HAD NO CONTACT WITH ARTIME SINCE 1967.

3. FILE: 201-0267437. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: *MANUEL ARTIME BUESA VISITED COSTA RICA AND ASSURED LEADERS ON BEHALF STATE DEPARTMENT THAT USG POLICY TOWARD CUBA HAS NOT CHANGED.

201-267437

7 Nov 74

DATE: 6 NOVEMBER 1974

ORIG: BARBARA GRAHAM:BH

UNIT: C/LA/CAM/CNH

EXT: 1740/7163

C/LA LA/COG C/LA/CAM

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY 057047

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER

TOTAL COPIES 10-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~S E C R E~~ T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IP/AN OSG OC C/OPS

OSG/IC

STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

T 458655 EIA012 PAGE 01 IN 375452

TOR:011645Z OCT 74 MANA 11399

S E C R E T 011445Z OCT 74 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 11399

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, DIRECTOR.

HYEPOCK

REF PANAMA CITY 30061 (IN 374491)

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA IS LONG TIME BUSINESS ASSOCIATE NICARAGUAN LEADER ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE IN CATTLE AND SUPPLY (UNIFORMS) FOR NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD. THERE IS NO INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE ARTIME INVOLVEMENT IN ANY MILITARY/REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. ALSO NO INDICATION GON ENGAGING IN ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AGAINST PANAMA. DEFER HQS FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENT, BUT WISH POINT OUT ARTIME IS FAVORITE TARGET FOR REVOLUTIONARY ALLEGATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. FILE: 201- . E2 IMPDET

GS

[illegible]

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-267437

1 Oct 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 20-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

~~S E C R E T~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO		STAFF
WH8	RF FILE VR	ICIAN CPSINT CI/OPZ	1 4
ACTION #		PSIEG4 OSG	2 5
			3 6

T 456114 EIA591 PAGE 01-01 IN 374491

TOR:302109Z SEP 74 PACY 30061

S E C R E T 301952Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 30061

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, MANAGUA.

HYEPOCH

1. HYGRUFF-1 (LIAISON) REQUESTS ANY INFO INDICATING THAT MANUEL ARTIME BUESA IS CONNECTED WITH MOVEMENTS PLOTTING AGAINST GOVT OF PANAMA. ~~72 ØØ874!!~~ HYGRUFF-1 "KNOWS" ARTIME IS CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH GOVT OF NICARAGUA AND TRAVELS TO COSTA RICA WHERE HE CONNECTED WITH "MOVIMIENTOS SUBVERSIVOS EN CONTRA DE PANAMA (SIC)."

2. ARTIME 201- E2 IMPDET

GS

201-267437
30 Sep 74

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 032044Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 603748

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN OPS/INT

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 7

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, MANAGUA.

HYEPOCHY

REF: PANAMA CITY 30061 (IN-374491)*

1. HQS HAS NO INFO IMPLICATING SUBJECT IN PLOTTING AGAINST GOVT OF PANAMA. HE IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN IMPORTING MEAT FROM NICARAGUA AND HAS BUSINESS FEELERS AND CUBAN EXILE CONTACTS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. OWING TO HIS FORMER PROMINENCE, HE IS OFTEN CONSULTED BY LEADERS AND WOULD-BE LEADERS IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, GIVEN HIS INTELLIGENCE, SOPHISTICATION, AND BUSINESS ACUMEN, IT IS BELIEVED UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD GET ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN REVOLUTIONARY PLANS.

2. FILE: 201-0267437. E2 IMPDET.

WH COMMENT: *HYGRUFF-1 HAS REQUESTED INFO RE SUBJECTS CONNECTION WITH MOVEMENTS PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOVT OF PANAMA.

CS

201-267437
3 Oct 74

DATE: 3 OCT 74
ORIG: ROBERT Y. SHAW:HLL
UNIT: C/LA/PLANS
EXT: 1196

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Paul A. Dinnert
AC/LA/CAM
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054584

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # OF COPIES 10-1

~~S E C R E T~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______

ACTION UNIT INH8 RF FILE VR IP/AN OSG/OC C/OPS

OSG/IC

ACTION #

T 458655 E1A012 PAGE 01 IN 375452

TOR:0110492 OCT 74 MANA 11399

S E C R E T 011445Z OCT 74 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 11399

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, DIRECTOR.

MYEPCCK

REF PANAMA CITY 30861 (IN 374491)

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA IS LONG TIME BUSINESS ASSOCIATE NICARAGUAN LEADER ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE IN CATTLE AND SUPPLY (UNIFORMS) FOR NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD. THERE IS NO INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE ARTIME INVOLVEMENT IN ANY MILITARY/REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. ALSO NO INDICATION GON ENGAGING IN ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AGAINST PANAMA. DEFER HQS FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENT, BUT WISH POINT OUT ARTIME IS FAVORITE TARGET FOR REVOLUTIONARY ALLEGATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. FILE: 201- E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

12-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

~~SECRET~~

STAFF

032044Z

DIRECTOR

605748

0

DISSEM BY: 7

0

0 PER

0 #

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN OPSINT

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, MANAGUA.

HYEPOCHY

REF: PANAMA CITY 30061 (IN-374491)*

1. HQS HAS NO INFO IMPLICATING SUBJECT IN PLOTTING AGAINST GOVT OF PANAMA. HE IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN IMPORTING MEAT FROM NICARAGUA AND HAS BUSINESS FEELERS AND CUBAN EXILE CONTACTS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. OWING TO HIS FORMER PROMINENCE, HE IS OFTEN CONSULTED BY LEADERS AND WOULD-BE LEADERS IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, GIVEN HIS INTELLIGENCE, SOPHISTICATION, AND BUSINESS ACUMEN, IT IS BELIEVED UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD GET ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN REVOLUTIONARY PLANS.

2. FILE: 201-0267437. E2 IMPDET.

WH COMMENT: *HYGRUFF-1 HAS REQUESTED INFO RE SUBJECTS CONNECTION WITH MOVEMENTS PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOVT OF PANAMA.

DATE: 3 OCT 74
ORIG: ROBERT T. SHAW:MLL
UNIT: C/LA/PLANS
EXT: 1196

C/LAD

AC/LA/CAM

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 20-1 RUN BY ______

~~S E C R E T~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

ACTION UNIT: WH8

ACTION #

INFO: FILE CI/VR IDAN OPSINT CI/OPS

PS/EG4 OSG

STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

T 456114 EIA591 PAGE 01-01 IN 374491

TOR:302109Z SEP 74 PACY 38861

S E C R E T 301952Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 38861

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, MANAGUA.

HYEPOCH

1. HYGRUFF-1 (LIAISON) REQUESTS ANY INFO INDICATING THAT MANUEL ARTIME BUESA IS CONNECTED WITH MOVEMENTS PLOTTING AGAINST GOVT OF PANAMA. ~~TI~~ HYGRUFF ~~[illegible]~~-1 "KNOWS" ARTIME IS CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH GOVT OF NICARAGUA AND TRAVELS TO COSTA RICA WHERE HE CONNECTED WITH "MOVIMIENTOS SUBVERSIVOS EN CONTRA DE PANAMA (SIC)."

2. ARTIME 201- . E2 IMPDET

Action [illegible]
PD

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE 17-1

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

~~SECRET~~

STAFF 062211Z DIRECTOR 555934

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, C/OP2, PS/E64 DISSEM BY: 35

PER ___ # ______

TO: LIMA INFO WH/MIAMI. Y

KMSTONE Y

REF: LIMA 28090 (IN 268135*) Y

1. DUSKIRT-2 SHOULD ADDRESS LETTER TO SUBJECT PARAS 1-2 OF REF AS FOLLOWS:

DR. M. A. BUESA
1270 N.E. 85TH ST.
MIAMI, FLA 33138

STATION SHOULD INFORM D-2 THAT BKHERALD HAS NO CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT. CONSEQUENTLY, D-2 SHOULD NOT IMPLY TO SUBJECT THAT BKHERALD WAS SOURCE ADDRESS. WOULD PREFER D-2 MAIL LETTER FROM PERU HIMSELF RATHER THAN HAVE STATION POUCH TO MIAMI. Y

2. HQS STRONGLY RECOMMENDS AGAINST D-2 GOING TO CUBAN EMB AND REQUESTING RENEWAL PASSPORT. WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY SUCH WELL-KNOWN ANTI-CASTRO TYPES AS D-2 APPROACHING CUBAN EMB WITH SIMILAR REQUEZEST. Y

3. FILE 201-754738, X-REF 201-267437. E2 IMPDET.

* REQUESTED HQS PROVIDE ADDRESS OF FORMER AGENT AMBIDDY-1 AND COMMENTS RE FEASIBILITY D-2 APPROACHING CUBAN EMB WITH PASSPORT RENEWAL REQUEST.

DATE: 6 JUNE 1974
ORIG: JUAN VALADEZ
UNIT: WH/3/P
EXT: 1222

C/WH/PLANS ROBERT T. SHAW (IN DRAFT)
DC/WH/COG JOSEPH SKURA (IN DRAFT)

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-267437

RECORD COPY FILED IN 201-754738

C/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/3

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

[illegible] ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT WH/8	INFO	RF, FILE, VR, [illegible], [illegible]-2, [illegible]-2, DDO
ACTION #		

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 945167 PAGE 01 IN 198954

TOR:120206Z MAR 74 MEXI 27099

~~SECRE~~T 120047Z MAR 74 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 27099

TO: DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT KMSTONE KDALCOHOL

REF HMMA-44014

1. DURING RECENT KDALCOHOL-1 (K-1) MEETING WITH SLOTH-21, LATTER PUSHED HIM HARD RE VARIOUS CUBAN EXILE TASKS. SLOTH-21 TOLD HIM THAT "HAVANA" HAD COMMENDED HIS REPORTING TO DATE ON EXILES (ESSENTIALLY OVERT BIO AND BACKGROUND INFO AND CONTRIVED SPECULATION BY K-1 CONCERNING EXILE INTENTIONS). FOLLOWING ITEMS ON EXILES REPORTED TO STATION BY K-1 SEEM OF PARTICULAR INTEREST:

A. DURING DECEMBER VISIT MIAMI, K-1 MET WITH MANUEL FRANCIS ARTIME BUESA (201-0267437). ARTIME ASKED K-1 LOOK OUT FOR MEAT EXPORT/IMPORT OPPORTUNITIES IN MEXICO. ARTIME ALSO TOLD K-1 THAT FROM TIME TO TIME HE MIGHT SEND K-1 (FROM A MIAMI P.O. BOX) LETTERS TO BE SMUGGLED INTO CUBA VIA ANY OF K-1'S FRIENDS TRAVELING THERE FROM MEXICO. K-1 TOLD THIS TO SLOTH-21 WHO BECAME VERY EXCITED ABOUT THE MATTER. SLOTH-21 INSTRUCTED K-1 TO ALERT HIM IF ANY LETTERS ARRIVE (NONE HAVE SO FAR). ACCORDING TO SLOTH-21, LETTERS OF THIS SORT ARE MONITORED BY CUBAN SECURITY

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY FILED IN 201-0908954

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-0267437

14-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED [redacted] [redacted]

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OFFICIALS WHO THEN SURVEIL THE RECIPIENTS. THIS MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR VNTOGA-TYPE OP INTENDED BURN IMPORTANT CUBAN OFFICIAL. RISK TO K-1 WOULD BE MINIMAL SINCE HE WOULD MERELY BE INTERMEDIARY FOR LETTER OSTENISBLY COMING FROM ARTIME OR SOME OTHER EXILE LEADER.

B. SLOTH-21 TOLD K-1 DEVELOP ALL POSSIBLE BACKGROUND INFO ON JOSE IGNACIO RASCO BERMUDEZ (201-0274330), CUBAN EXILE RESIDING IN MIAMI. WHILE SLOTH-21 DID NOT REVEAL REASON FOR CUBAN INTEREST IN RASCO, BASED ON K-1'S KNOWLEDGE OF RASCO AND SLOTH-21'S MANNER, K-1 BELIEVES THAT RASCO ATTEMPTING DIALOGUE WITH CUBAN GOVERNMENT. K-1 KNOWS RASCO ONLY SLIGHTLY, BUT KNOWS HIS BROTHER, RAMON, WELL. K-1 AND RAMON RASCO WERE ASSOCIATED WITH A CREDIT UNION IN MIAMI SOME YEARS AGO. K-1 MET RAMON BY CHANCE WHILE IN MIAMI IN DECEMBER. K-1 KNOWS JOSE RASCO AS LEADER IN DEMOCRATIC CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT IN MIAMI. STATION CARD ON JOSE RASCO LISTS HIM AS PRESIDENT OF "MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO DE CUBA" AS OF AUGUST 1960. CARD ALSO INDICATES THAT "GOBERNACION" HAS A CLASSIFIED FILE ON JOSE RASCO.

C. SLOTH-21 INSTRUCTED K-1 TO COPY FROM FILES OF DR. JOSE MARIA CRUCET BERNAL, CUBAN EXILE ORTHODONTIST WITH

SECRET

[redacted] ~~S E C R E T~~ [redacted]

ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

STAFF	
1	4
2	5
3	6

T 945167 PAGE 03 IN 198954

TOR:1202062 MAR 74 MEXI 27899

WHOM K-1 IS ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONALLY, NAMES AND BIO DATA ON ALL CUBAN EXILES. SLOTH-21 SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR THE NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS REFERRING PEOPLE TO DR. CRUCET.

D. SLOTH-21 HAS INSTRUCTED K-1 TO INFILTRATE AND BECOME INDISPENSABLE TO THE "CIRCULO CUBANO DE MEXICO." SLOTH-21 SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR THE IDENTITY OF THE "CIRCULO" OFFICIAL WHO CONTROLS THE CLUB'S MAILING LIST AND DISTRIBUTES PROPAGANDA TO EXILES. SLOTH-21 HOPEFUL THAT ONCE K-1 REACHES A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE CLUB THAT HE CAN SERVE AS SPOTTER AND ARRANGE FOR FILM SHOWINGS WITH FILMS PROVIDED BY SLOTH-21. INTERESTINGLY, WHEN K-1 TOLD SLOTH-21 THAT HE (K-1) MIGHT MAKE A SHORT SPEECH AT THE CLUB DURING MAY 1974 CUBAN INDEPENDENCE CEREMONIES, SLOTH-21 CAUTIONED HIM AGAINST SAYING ANYTHING CRITICAL OF CASTRO REGIME. ALSO OF INTEREST IS FACT SLOTH-21 DECLINED REIMBURSE K-1 FOR "CIRCULO" ENTRANCE FEES. SLOTH-21 INSISTED THAT IF K-1 BELIEVES IN "THE REVOLUTION" HE WILL ADD THE COST OF FEE ONTO THE BILL OF ONE OF HIS CAPITALIST PATIENTS.

EM BASED ON REPORT TO SLOTH-21 THAT K-1'S FRIEND AND FELLOW "NUEVA GENERACION" MEMBER, RAFAEL ANGEL QUEVEDO, PLANS VISIT MEXICO AND HOPES SETTLE HERE. SLOTH-21 ASKED

~~S E C R E T~~

S ~~E C R~~ E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______ ISSUING OFFICE IS NUMBERED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE . VR .

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 945167 PAGE 04 IN 190954

TOR:1202062 MAR 74 MEXI 27099

IF K-1 COULD GET QUEVEDO TO COOPERATE WITH CUBAN GOVERNMENT AS K-1 IS DOING. K-1 TOLD SLOTH-21 THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY. (ACTUALLY, K-1 IS ALMOST CERTAIN QUEVEDO, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS ANTI-CASTRO AND ANTI-COMMUNIST, WOULD "COOPERATE" WITH CUBANS ONLY IF HE WERE RECRUITED BY U.S. GOVERNMENT.)

2. IN ORDER INSPIRE K-1 IN HIS OVERT ROLE, SLOTH-21 TOLD HIM STORY ABOUT TONY SANTIAGO, CUBAN MILITARY COMMANDER WHO PRETENDED TO WORK FOR BKHERALD AND WAS VIEWED BY CUBANS AS A TRAITOR UNTIL THE STORY OF HIS DOUBLE AGENT ROLE CAME TO LIGHT AFTER HIS DEATH "AT HANDS OF BKHERALD." PRESUME THIS STORY KNOWN TO ADDRESSEES.

3. SLOTH-21 TOLD K-1 THAT "HAVANA" WANTED HIM AVAILABLE FOR BRIEF ASSIGNMENT TO CARACAS IN JULY OR AUGUST 1974. HE IS TO TAKE HIS WIFE TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT HE IS ON HOLIDAY. K-1 TOLD SLOTH-21 THAT HE COULD MAKE THE TRIP IF HE HAD SUFFICIENT ADVANCE NOTICE AND KNEW EXACTLY WHAT IS EXPECTED OF HIM. K-1 HAS INVITATION FROM CLAT OFFICIALS EMILIO MASPERO AND EDUARDO GARCIA TO VISIT CARACAS NEXT SUMMER, SO HE COULD COVER BOTH MATTERS DURING ONE TRIP. K-1 WILL MAKE TRIP ONLY IF WE CONCUR AND ONLY IF HE IS CERTAIN THAT RISK IS MINIMAL. IT WOULD APPEAR SLIME PLANS USE HIM AS COURIER OF SOME SORT.

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] ~~S E C R E T~~ [redacted]

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 945167 PAGE 05-05 IN 190954

TOR:1202062 MAR 74 MEXI 27099

4. SLOTH-21 CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT K-1 AGREE TO SPOT, CULTIVATE AND ASSESS SOMEONE IN THE U.S. EMBASSY AS A POSSIBLE PENETRATION AGENT. SLOTH-21'S GUIDANCE HAS RANGED FROM AMERICAN SECRETARY TO A CONSUL OR VICE CONSUL TO A MEXICAN EMPLOYEE. AS INSTRUCTED BY US, K-1 HAS RESISTED TASK ON BASIS HIS OSTENSIBLE FEAR THAT BECAUSE OF HIS DISSIDENT/LEFTIST LABOR BACKGROUND, U.S. EMBASSY COULD HAVE HIM EXPELLED FROM MEXICO. SLOTH-21 REFUSES ACCEPT THE EXCUSE AND INSISTS THAT HE (SLOTH-21) IS ON THE HOOK TO PENETRATE THE U.S. EMBASSY. SENDING SEPARATE CABLE ON THIS MATTER.

5. PRIORITY (A-7-6).

6. FILE: 201-0900954, 201-0910353, 201-0267437, 201-0274330. E2, IMPDET.

~~S E C R E T~~

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 27 PER

TOTAL COPIES 17

~~S E C R E T~~

2 Y

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED AT

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR [illegible]

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 912962 PAGE 01-01 IN 178948

TOR:271559Z FEB 74 QUIT 19673

S E C R E T 271422Z FEB 74 STAFF

CITE QUITO 19673

TO: DIRECTOR INFO GUAYAQUIL.

REF: HEQM-6869, 13 FEBRUARY 74

1. O ACCESS DEVELOPED BY AMBIDY-1 IN BRIEF STAY QUITO IMPRESSIVE. INFORMATION OBTAINED REGARDING PERU MAY SOUND HYSTERICAL, BUT THERE LITTLE DOUBT IT ACCURATELY REFLECTS MOOD OF ECUADOREAN MILITARY DURING PERUVIAN "CRISIS." INFORMATION ABOUT JARRIN TRIP TO CHILE NEW AND OF INTEREST.

2. SINCE AMBIDY-1 OBTAINED ACCESS THROUGH JORGE DIAZ MOLINA, STATION INTERESTED IN CONTACT WITH DIAZ. COULD AMBIDY-1 PROVIDE DIAZ' ADDRESS AND PHONE AND LETTER ADDRESSED TO DIAZ REFERRING TO BEARER AS PERSON OF CONFIDENCE, ETC., IN WHOM DIAZ CAN CONFIDE? NO STATION TRACES DIAZ. REQUEST HQS TRACES AND COMMENTS.

TRAVEL PROGRAM

[illegible] FOR FILING

FOR FILING

3. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

AMBIDDY-201-?

201-267437

27 Feb 74

~~S E C R E T~~

RECORD COPY

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Quito

INFO Chief of Base, Guayaquil

FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT C Transmittal of Contact Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith for your information only is the account of a meeting between a Headquarters officer and former agent AMBIDY-1 (IDEN). If Station or Base has any interest, AMBIDY-1 can be recontacted for clarification or follow-up questions.

Nina T. MARGANDE

Distribution:
  2 - COS, Quito w/att
  2 - COB, Guayaquil w/att

Attachments:
  1. AMBIDY-1 report h/w
  2. IDEN u/s/c

RECORD COPY

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 032693

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HBQW-6069

DATE 13 February 1974

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 267437

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/E	Barbara Graham	hw	1034

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/3/E	14 Feb	Dorothy Siegle
WH/PLANS	15 Feb	

Distribution:
  1 - IP
  1 - Chrono
  1 - WH/Plans

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL DATE OFFICER'S

per

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

20 November 1973

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Eduardo SUAREZ-Rivas y Morales

Eduardo SUAREZ-Rivas Morales, born 8 January 1935, is a Cuban national and a son of former Cuban ex-Senator Eduardo SUAREZ Rivas. SUAREZ was arrested for counterrevolutionary activities in Cuba in the early 1960's and was released from prison and allowed to come to exile in the U. S. in 1962 with return of the ransomed 2506 Brigade members. He was involved in public relations for Manuel Artime's exile group, the Revolutionary Recovery Movement, in the mid-sixties. He did not work for CIA, and there is no record of any attempt by CIA to recruit him.

201-267437 ✓

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DC/WH	2 NOV 73	
2			
3	AC/WH/COG		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Per conversation

Nov 3: Arrange conversation with Bill [illegible]. Let me know when its done.

3741

(OVER)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
EA/DDO	

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)

1 NOV

CONTACTED Bob Shaw at Senior Seminar. He will come to Hqs on Monday - 5 Nov

5 NOV

Per agreement with DC/WHD, Bob will drop Artime a note and contact him in Miami weekend 10 Nov 73 to convey thanks.

201-267437

DCI/DDCI
Routing Slip

Executive Registry
73-6531

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	IG		
2	DDCI			12	D/PPB		
3	DDS&T			13	SAVA		
4	DDI			14	ASST/DCI		
⑤	DDO	✓	2 NOV 1973	15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	EX/SEC		
7	D/DCI/IC			17			
8	D/ONE			18			
9	GC			19			
10	LC			20			

SUSPENSE ____________
Date

Remarks: Do we have a discreet way to say (sincerely): "Thanks but no thanks"?

11/1/73
DCI/DDCI

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE Y-1

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 26 Oct 73

ACTION: DCI

INFO: VR. File

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

IN 068229

OCT 26 6 15 AM '73

[redacted]

PAID

WUA012 WAF009(0354)(1-001231C299006)PD 10/26/73 0349

55103

ICS IPMMZFA MIA

01116 NL MIAMI FL 100 10-25 652P EDT

PMS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ATTN MISTER COLBY

WASHINGTON DC

M

AT THIS MOMENT OF EVERGENCY MY MEN AND MYSELF ARE READY TO SERVE USA

MANUEL ARTIME BAY OF PIGS INVASION COMMANDER

1270 NE 85TH ST MIAMI FL 33138

616A EDT OCT 26 73

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 26 Oct 73
ACTION: DCI
INFO: UR. file

1	
2	
3	

IN 068229

OCT 26 6 15 AM '73

[redacted]

PAID

WUA012 WAF009(0354)(1-001231C299006)PD 10/26/73 0349

55103

ICS IPMMZFA MIA

01116 NL MIAMI FL 100 10-25 652P EDT

PMS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ATTN MISTER COLBY

WASHINGTON DC

AT THIS MOMENT OF EMERGENCY MY MEN AND MYSELF ARE READY TO SERVE USA

MANUEL ARTIME BAY OF PIGS INVASION COMMANDER
1270 NE 35TH ST MIAMI FL 33138

616A EDT OCT 26 73

File ARTIME 201 267437

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ 20 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John D. Morrison, Jr.
Assistant General Counsel

SUBJECT : Oscar VILA et al

REFERENCE : OGC Request dated 15 August 1973

1. The following information on the individuals mentioned in Reference for the period 1961-1966 who were involved with this Agency is provided herewith:

Manuel Francisco ARTIME Buesa conducted operations against Cuba under the political banner of his exile group, Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR). From June 1963 to April 1965 this Agency supported ARTIME's operations against the Castro regime. This support was terminated on 1 May 1965; support for some operations was resumed in June 1965 at a much more modest rate. This support was gradually reduced and finally terminated in December 1966. The formal Agency relationship with ARTIME was severed in January 1967. ARTIME"S Deputy in the MRR was Rafael Aurelio QUINTERO Ibarbia and the MRR Treasurer was Sixto R. MESA-Aloma. Oscar Jesus VILA Mascot was an MRR trainee and was not in the line of command for the MRR. Edgar SOPO was involved in various MRR operations. Maritima Bam was utilized as a cover for the MRR.

2. A comprehensive file search failed to reveal that Oscar VILA had any access to the MRR funds or that he was involved with Maritima Bam. The following biographic data was extracted from the available files which is pertinent to the individuals mentioned in Paragraph One; above:

a. Oscar Jesus VILA Masot (201-291749)

AKA Oscar Luis VILA and Osca J. VILA

DPOB: 8 November 1940, Batabano, Havana, Cuba

SECRET

201-247437

E2 IMPDET CL 054555.

~~SECRET~~

Father: Oscar J. VILA; DPOB: 28 January 1915
Havana, Cuba

Mother: Zeida MASOT; DPOB: 19 December 1917
Batabano, Cuba

Wife : Vivian VICTORERO Villegas; DPOB:
28 May 1945, Cuba
Married 15 April 1963, Miami, Florida

CIA Affiliation: Trainee for the MRR in 1961. Member of Airborne Unit of the 2506 Brigade. Missing in action and then appeared on prisoner exchange list as A 13-311-637 in December 1962.

b. **Sixto R. MESA-Aloma (201-0727405, AMWORLD-2)**

DPOB: 20 May 1908, Ranchuelo, Las Villas, Cuba

Wife : Iraida GONZALEZ

Mistress: Blanca ACOSTA

CIA Affiliation: MRR operations.

Occupation: 1963, Treasurer and major stockholder of Laboratorios Gravi de Puerto Rico & Industrias Proben de Puerto Rico.

c. **Manuel Francisco ARTIME Buesa (201-267437)**

DPOB: 29 January 1932, Camaguey, Cuba

Occupation: Presently involved in the export of meat from Central America.

Background: ARTIME was an INRA official in the Castro regime in 1959 but broke with it in late 1959 or early 1960 over a Communist issue and was exfiltrated to the United States. He was the political representative for Brigade 2506 and was captured during the Bay of Pigs. He was sentenced to be executed but this was later commuted by Castro to life imprisonment. In 1962 ARTIME was released as part of a prisoner exchange.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

d. **Rafael Aurelio Cipriano QUINTERO-Ibarbia (201-281270)**

DPOB: 16 September 1940, Camaguey, Cuba

Father: Fernando QUINTERO

Mother: Juana Maria IBARBIA

Brother: Rafael A. QUINTERO

Occupation: Presently registered with ISR as working for the Department of Navy.

CIA Affiliation: Deputy to ARTIME in the MRR.

e. **Edgar SOPO-Granda (201-283205)**

DPOB: 26 July 1939, Guantanamo, Cuba

Mother: Josefa SOPO

Wife : Alina Elena CORSA Farray

Occupation: Radio Announcer and Salesman

CIA Affiliation: Propaganda officer for the MRR.

3. The two individuals who had access to funds belonging to this Agency; and who would have had the opportunity of diverting these funds to their personal accounts, were Manuel ARTIME and Sixto MESA. There had been allegations that Agency monies were misused and appropriate investigations were conducted but no evidence was found that this had happened.

Orville Bathe
C/WH/COG

Originator: Vivian A. Barry
WH/C/OS

SECRET

25 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Manuel Artime

1. Artime was an INRA official in the Castro regime in 1959 but broke with it in late 1959 or early 1960 over a communist issue and was exfiltrated by CIA. He was the political representative for Brigade 2506 and was captured during the Bay of Pigs. He was sentenced to be executed but this was later commuted by Castro to life imprisonment. In 1962 Artime was released to the U.S. as part of a prisoner exchange.

2. From June 1963 through April 1965 Artime conducted paramilitary operations (Project AMWORLD) against Cuba under the political banner of his exiled group, Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR). The Project expenses during this period were approximately $7 million. The support was terminated effective 1 May 1965 but support for political operations was restored in June 1965 at the rate of $15,000 per month. This was scaled down to $5,000 a month in September 1965, to $3,000 a month in June 1966, and terminated on 31 December 1966. Artime accepted this termination gracefully in a meeting on 13 January 1967. That ended the formal operational relationship with Artime, although he maintained informal contact with CIA, most recently with Robert Shaw when Shaw was COS, Managua.

Orville Bathe
AC/WH/COG

E2 IMPDET
CLASSIFIED BY 054555

201-267437

SECRET

Artime 201

14-00000

2 25-1

~~S E C R E T~~

AGENCY MESSAGE

WH 8 C/OA, FI; IW MAN, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/FI

529

T :9896 PAGE 01-01 IN 987136

TOR:271626Z JUL 73 MADR 19984

S E C R E T 271623Z JUL 73 STAFF

CITE MADRID 19984

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

AKULE REAM QUZONE

1. QUZONE/1 MET FOR ONE HOUR SESSION 18 JUL. HE ARRIVED AND DEPARTED SAME DAY BUT IN MID-AUGUST EXPECTS BE HERE FOR 5-6 DAYS AT WHICH TIME IN-DEPTH DEBRIEFING CURRENT REQUIREMENTS TO BE HELD. AT MEETING NEW CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AND REQUIREMENTS REVIEWED IN DETAIL. POUCHING FULL REPORT.

2. FILE: 201-796318. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

QUZONE-1

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 16 May 78

TO: LSN/ISR

ROOM NO. 2E306 **BUILDING**

REMARKS:

please file in
Artime 201

201-267437

FROM:

ROOM NO. **BUILDING** **EXTENSION**

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 30-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)
1 FEB 55

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 7/23/73

TO: DC/WH/CCG

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS

Joe O'Neil will transmit (today) by phone the attached info (as we discussed) to Jim Woolsey, General Counsel of the Senate Armed Forces Committee in response to his questions on Osborne's 13 April 1973 memo re "Contribution to Watergate Prisoners Fund"

FROM

ROOM NO. BUILDING JWF EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. ☆ GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

file: Artime 201

23 July 73

Manuel Artime Buesa

DPOB: 29 Jan. 32, Camaguey, Cuba

INRA official who defected and exfiltrated by CIA in December 1959.

Secy. General Movimento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR) -- [illegible]
one of leaders of Bay of Pigs - involved Anti-Castro movements.

Currently in meat importing into U.S. from Nicaragua (Partner is Somoza). Resides in Miami but travels frequently to Nicaragua.

23 July 73

[illegible]

[illegible] ...TIES, [illegible] TO [illegible]

[illegible]

FYI: [illegible] ..MARTINEZ [illegible] 31 AUG 72. [illegible] SOURCE.

Manuel ARTIME [illegible].

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
REGISTRATION REQUEST

FROM: FI/DCG/INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER BU-5	EXTENSION	NO. ISRM 37484	
		DATE 18 JUN 1973	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. ~~TP/AIG~~ ~~HT-3~~				
2.				
3. ~~TP/201 SECTION~~ ~~DW-6~~				P-L-E-A-S-E
4.				E-X-P-E-D-I-T-E
5. IP/EDI GT-6			R	
6.				
7. FI/ISR BU-5				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				FILE NO. 201- 267437
12.				DOCUMENT DATE 18 JUN 73
13.				ABSTRACT XXXX
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Based on: UFAA 4436, 2 Oct
1972
200-11-11/7

SECRET
When Filled In
RECORD COPY
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE STAFF

Lee Alder
FI/ISR
2-E-03. Ext. 5046

REQUEST FOR REGISTRATION

DATE SUBMITTED BY SIGS: 13 June 1973 WH/C/OS

NATIONAL FILE NUMBER: BNDD

X	NEW	RE-REGISTRATION		RE-CHECK	UTILIZATION

DATE RECEIVED IN ISR: 18 JUNE 1973

NAME (Last, First, Middle): ARTIME Buesa, Manuel

ALIASES OR SPELLING VARIATIONS:

201-267437

DATE OF BIRTH: 29 Jan 1932

PLACE OF BIRTH: Moron, Camaguey, Cuba

CITIZENSHIP: U.S. Resident Alien

RESIDENCE: Miami, Florida

PRESENT EMPLOYER: Half-Owner with Reinald Torrente of Norably Quality Meats
Miami, Florida

OCCUPATION: Businessman

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA: Area of Activity is Caribbean and Central America

Send Field Cards to : 872, UFA, HMM

TRACE RESULTS

IP/INDEX REMARKS

Traces not necessary Station has a plethora of info.

NOTED JUN 20 1973

IP/EIB REMARKS

NAI to that already known to BNDD per
Dolly Nickerson WH/NARC

jas 25 June 1973

JUN 19 4 08 PM '73

TO: WH/NARC & WH/C/OS

RESULTS

TO: DIA SOURCE AND DATA REGISTRY	ISRM NUMBER 37,484	DATE 3 JULY 1973	201 NUMBER 201-0267437

1. No information in addition that already known to requestor.

2. ISR has no record of current operational interest in Subject who is hereby registered in ISR to BNDD, Miami.

20 JUN 1973

EVB

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Classified by 002216
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

FORM 11-72 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SENSITIZED ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

X ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT [redacted]/PLMHABYSS/Transmittal of Memos to LNYAPA and LNAGON with Traces on Their Narcotics Sources

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Refs: A. UFAA-4415
B. UFAA-4436

References forwarded the names of LNYAPA and LNAGON sources to Headquarters with a request for registration and traces. Although references were carded (as drug sources), there is some additional information from the SLIGOS in the attached memos which was not included in references. Therefore, you may want to re-index this information to the memos.

Paula A. HOOTNICK

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201-267437

Attachments:
1. CAS/C-038, herewith
2. CAS/D-039, herewith

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, W/atts 1 & 2 herewith

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized:
Signed:
R.O. #510 - Unit
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

[redacted]

RECORD COPY FILED IN 201-294213

E2 IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAA-4479	25 October 1972
	CLASSIFICATION DESENSITIZED SECRET/[illegible]	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-294213

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAY 1 0 1973
MICROFILMED

04479

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAY 1 0 1973
MICROFILMED

19 October 1972

3P

LNAgen

TO : Miami

FROM : CAS, Miami

SUBJECT: Traces on Sources of Information on Drugs

1. The following information has been extracted from our files on the 7 persons mentioned below who are narcotic sources of your office. Additional information on them will be forwarded to you as it becomes known to us.

FR/ 201-294213

AKA A. Bernardo G. de TORRES Alvarez: Also known as Bernardo GONZALEZ de Torres Alvarez. TORRES entered the U.S. in January 1955, and began to play professional baseball. He gave up his studies in civil engineering (he began this career in 1948), and he obtained work with the Ford Motor Co. in Michigan and with the Aldor Co., Inc., for whom he installed garage doors that they manufactured. He went to Cuba in January 1959 to attempt to exfiltrate his father. Although he was unable to do so at that time, due to his father's illness, his father came out himself later. Subject stayed in Havana and worked against the CASTRO regime until November 1959, when he returned to the U.S. After his arrival he took a course given by the Miami Police Department for private detectives, and obtained a certificate allowing him to practice as a detective, which he did for the C.de Torres Detective Firm (C. de Torres is probably his brother, Carlos de Torres). He made two trips to Cuba in early 1960 to discuss shipments of arms to Anti-Castro forces. Torres became the Chief of Intelligence of Brigade 2506. He was captured on 17 April 1961 at Playa Giron, Cuba, and was ransomed for $50,000, after which he was returned to the U.S. on a Pan American charter flight landing at Homestead Air Force Base on 24 December 1962. He later became the Assistant Secretary for Military Affairs and the Chief of Intelligence of the Association of Bay of Pigs veterans. His brother Carlos was the liaison between the Intelligence Department of the Association and the KUBARK and provided the necessary means to guide Subject in his position. Carlos provided information on all matters of

RECORD COPY

201-294213
~~200-11-4~~/7-

importance to the [illegible]. Subject was involved in the investigation carried out by District Attorney of New Orleans James Garrison on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. About the time that Subject was involved in this investigation, it was said of him that he liked to boast about his influence and contacts. Information from March 196[illegible] indicates that Subject was engaged in narcotics trafficking along with his brother, Carlos, and Roberto VEGA (in Puerto Rico), Ernesto VENERO (Brigade 2506 member); Raul LEAL (in Dominican Republic. He is a steady gambling dealer in Las Vegas clubs); Juan GARCIA (fisherman); (fnu)CUSA, engineer of the fishing boat "El Viejo Comus"); Ramon DONESTEVEZ (appears as a revolutionary to cover his illegal activities); Aton CONSTANZO and his brother Abelino CONSTANZO; and Julian VALDEZ Villa (aka "Negrete").

Subject is presently living with his second wife (he had 2 daughters and a son by his first wife) at 2700 S.W. 23rd Terrace, Apt. 403, Miami. In early 1973, he was visited by suspicious looking persons who often parked their cars at some distance and tried to enter and leave the building without being seen. One young man, a Vietnam veteran, did not enter Subject's apartment but took a hidden key to open Subject's car trunk and place there a package he had brought. Subject has a heart condition. Those visits have stopped since early spring 1973.

FR/ 201-0267437

B. Manuel ARTIME. Subject's anti-Castro activities are well known, as is his general prominence in the Cuban exile community in Miami. Therefore, extensive traces on him are not being included since much of the information is surely already available to you.

FR ✓ 201-0289579

C. Reinaldo TORRENTE: The only information we have on hand is that Subject was a member of Brigade 2506. More information on him is expected from our headquarters, and will be forwarded upon receipt.

FR/ 201-0285923

D. Ricardo MORALES Navarrete: Subject was a member of the G-2 in Cuba, and was stationed at Boyeros Airport prior to 31 Decemb 1958. He killed G-2 chief at Boyeros, Rolando MATOS Boson. He joined the Rebel Army on 10 December 1959, and deserted on 28 August 1960. He took asylum in the Brasilian Embassy. Subject was considered suspect G-2 when he arrived in the U.S., because of his past affiliation with the G-2. On his arrival, however, he did give an interview to "Bohemia Libre" magazine on his G-2 past. It was understood, when he arrived, that he intended to penetrate the recruitment office of the FRD (Bay of Pigs), however, he did not do this. He worked at the Hotel Sevilla, Miami, after his arrival. About that time, he was always accompanied by one Manolito RODRIGUEZ. Subject became a member of the Cuban Liberation Army (Ejercito Libertador de Cuba), and had the responsibility of fund raising among the exile Cuban population. Subject also was believed to be a member of the group Cuban Power but he was only related to the leader of that group, whose surname is also MORALES Navarette. Subject was a confident of Manuel ARTIME, and may still be one. In March 1968, Subject was arrested and charged with involvement in a terrorist attempt in Miami.

201-9357[illegible]

E. We have no traces on Miguel O. MERCADO Orenas.

XD NO 201

F. Carlos M. MEICHACA Verdaguer. Subject was suspected of being a G-2 informant in Miami in late 1962. One report from October 1963 said he was (in the past) G-2 but "now" considered to be anti-Castro. He was described as "very talkative", but the same source does not believe him to be G-2. He was in the lumber business in Cuba; in 1962 was selling used cars in Miami; and 1963, he was a piano refinisher.

1/ [illegible], Miami

Originator: HOGTNICK

0-CAS/M Chrono
0-Hqs
1-JMFALCON Liaison Chrono

RA

1972 NOV -1 PM 4 23

010130

201-294212

~~SECRET~~

21 November 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Dr. Manuel Artine Buesa

1. Dr. Manuel Artine Buesa has been a close friend of mine since we first met in Nicaragua in late 1966 or early 1967. It was as a result of Artime's revelations at that time that we recovered several tons of AMWORLD arms and munitions which had been secretly buried at El Bluff. I last saw Artine in Tegucigalpa in July or the first days of August 1972.

2. Artine's business activity has narrowed down pretty much to exporting meat from Central America and arranging its importation into the United States at Miami. His principal partner abroad is General Anastasio Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua. I am not sure with whom he deals in the U.S. although he has mentioned on a couple of occasions a business connection with Edgard Buttarri (not sure of this spelling) who, in turn, is supposed to be tied in with "Bebe" Rebozo. I have also heard Artime mention the "United States Meat Company" or the "American Meat Company" (not sure which) as an importer of his Nicaraguan meats.

3. Artime was quite active during the past year trying to get a meat export business going in Honduras. Acting in concert with Somoza, and using to some extent the Honduran connections of Teofilo Omar Rahun Franco (another close friend of mine), Artime was attempting to refurbish an idle meat packing facility at Puerto Arturo on the north coast of Honduras near Tela. The principal motivating force in this Honduran venture was to have been General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano. After repeated attempts to get the business rolling, Artime threw up his hands in disgust about July 1972 owing to Lopez' failure to carry through on the Honduran end. Artime told me that Lopez was "crazy" and "abnormal" (Artimo is a psychiatrist) and that

Artime: 2 Edgard BUTTARI
intimo friend
of Howard Hunt (Watergate)

E2, IMPDET
CL BY 539700

SECRET

Artime 201

~~SECRET~~

he was going to advise his associates in Nicaragua and the Miami area to forget about doing business in Honduras.

4. Artime lives in Miami and commutes often to Managua, always flying on Lanica Airlines (owned by Somoza). When in Managua he usually stays at the home of Jose Fernandez de la Torre (still another close friend of mine).

5. Artime said he would keep me supplied with Nicaraguan steaks during our stay in the U.S. and made me promise to get in touch with him after we got settled in. I have not yet done so. If you wish, using this pretext I can contact him and elicit more up-to-date information on his commercial activities.

6. It might also be added that Artime is a long-time friend of Howard Hunt.

Robert T. Shaw
Chief, WH/2

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: DRAKE S. REID
UNIT: C/WH/2/CN
EXT: 1454-4489
DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1972

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 41 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/WH5 FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MANAGUA INFO WH/MIAMI

342468

RYBAT

REF: MANAGUA 18366 (IN-766052)

1. NO ADDITIONAL INFO NEEDED AT THIS TIME. WILL ADVISE IF FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

2. NC FILE. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref provided info on commercial activities Manuel ARTIME and offered obtain additional details from local Cuban contacts including AMPAN-3.

WH/2/CN

AC/WH/COG

~~267437~~
267437

28 NOV 1972

201-267437

CS COPY

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

ROBERT T. SHAW
C/WH/2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 234513

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ________

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

avo

S E C R E T 212015Z NOV 72 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 18366 MANA

768052

DIRECTOR INFO ~~WH/MIAMI~~.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 339436

1. FOR AT LEAST TWO AND HALF YEARS ARTIME HAS BEEN INVOLVED MARKETING SOMOZA MEAT EXPORTS MIAMI. ALSO SUSPECT HE ACTS AS PURCHASING AGENT AND/OR GO-BETWEEN FOR OTHER SOMOZA PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS. FOR EXAMPLE WHEN ERYTHROID-33 RECENTLY PURCHASED FIVE AUTOMOBILES MIAMI HE TELEPHONED ARTIME TO HELP EXPEDITE SALE. ARTIME VISITS GADOL AT LATTER'S OFFICE BUT CONVERSATIONS ALWAYS RESTRICTED GENERAL TOPICS. ARTIME HAS INDICATED HE HAS WITHDRAWN FROM WHATEVER ECONOMIC INTERESTS HE HAD COSTA RICA AND EITHER HAS OR IS TRYING DISPOSE OF BUSINESS HE ARRANGED HONDURAS IN COOPERATION WITH GENERAL LOPEZ.

2. ABOVE FRAGMENTARY AS GADOL HAS ATTEMPTED AVOID ARTIME. IF HQS DESIRES, MORE DETAILED INFO CAN BE OBTAINED FROM LOCAL CUBAN CONTACTS PRATICULARLY 201-272764.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

21 NOV 1972

201-267437

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

ARTIME, MANUEL
201-267437 200-011-011/08
SEX M DOB ? UFAA-04479A01
25 OCT 72
CIT ? P4
OCC ?
SUBJ ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES ARE WELL KNOWN
AS IS HIS GENERAL PROMINENCE IN THE CUBAN
EXILE COMMUNITY IN MIAMI
INFO MUST NOT BE USED ON NAME TRACE W/OUT
CONSULTING FILE

R 7211100010

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 267437			

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(7-46)

14-00000

D.S.R.

ORIG: DRAKE S. REID
UNIT: C/WH/2/CN
EXT: 1454-4489
DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 1/4

~~S E C R E T~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 43 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: [illegible] INFO FILE VR, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T [illegible]72 23 51z CITE DIRECTOR

TO MANAGUA INFO WH/MIAMI

342468

RYBAT

REF: MANAGUA 18366 (IN-766052)

1. NO ADDITIONAL INFO NEEDED AT THIS TIME. WILL ADVISE IF FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref provided info on commercial activities Manuel ARTIME and offered obtain additional details from local Cuban contacts including AMPAN-3.

AC/WH/COG

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

ROBERT T. SHAW
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 234513

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE • TOTAL COPIES 8

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 313 PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT c/WH8 | INFO | FILE, VR c/Helow

ACTION NO. 432

S E C R E T 242025Z NOV 72 STAFF

768546

CITE WH/MIAMI 16460

WMim

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 339436

1. ARTIME HAS HAD BUSINESSES IN NICARAGUA SINCE 1963 IN PARTNERSHIP WITH GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA. HE OWNS LARGE RICE, POULTRY AND LIVESTOCK FARMS AND EXPORTS FROZEN MEAT FROM NICARAGUA TO THE U.S. IN ADDITION, HE MAKES PURCHASES FOR NICARAGUAN ARMED FORCES AND REPRESENTS IN LATIN AMERICA COMPANY DEALING IN PHONOGRAPHS WITH TV SCREENS. ACCORDING TO CARDED INFO FROM LNAGON, HE IS HALF OWNER OF NORABLY QUALITY MEATS IN MIAMI ALONG WITH REINALDO TORRIENTE. IN JUNE 1972 HE WAS REPORTED AS BEING ASSOCIATED WITH BERNARD L. BARKER AND AS HAVING COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CUBAN EXILES LINKED TO REPUBLICAN PARTY.

2. HE HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED AS MAIN PARTNER IN VIZCAYA RESTAURANT IN MIAMI, WHICH IS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT CENTER FOR DISTRIBUTION OF NARCOTICS. AS OF 1969, COMMENTS INDICATED ARTIME, WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN DRUG TRAFFICKING

24 NOV 1972

201-267437

CS COPY

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 16460 SECRET

BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND U.S., HAD GOTTEN OUT OF THAT ILLEGAL BUSINESS BECAUSE SOMOZA HAD PRESSURED HIM TO DO SO. AS OF 1965, HE WAS REPORTEDLY OWNER OF PRINTING SHOP AND FACTORY IN MIAMI, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW IF HE STILL IS. IN 1964 HE WAS INVOLVED IN SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES IN COSTA RICA REPORTEDLY IN PARTNERSHIP WITH FRANCISCO J. ORLICH, BROTHER OF FORMER PRESIDENT OF COSTA RICA.

1

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET

AWRENCE STERNFIELD
H/COG
7451 R. 1948
0 NOVEMBER 1972

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES 11-1

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 20NOV72 20 59Z CITE DIRECTOR 330436

WH/MIAMI MANAGUA

1. REQUEST INFORMATION REGARDING COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OF MANUEL ARTIME FOR PAST FEW YEARS.

2. DO NOT MAKE SPECIFIC INQUIRIES ON SUBJECT BUT ONLY PROVIDE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO YOU AT THIS TIME.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

201-267437

C/WH/COG

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-267437

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
WH/COG
7451 R. 1948
20 NOVEMBER 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11-1

~~SECRET~~

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ___ PER ___ ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET [illegible]72 23 59Z CITE DIRECTOR 339436

WH/MIAMI MANAGUA

RYBAT

1. REQUEST INFORMATION REGARDING COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OF MANUEL ARTIME FOR PAST FEW YEARS.

2. DO NOT MAKE SPECIFIC INQUIRIES ON SUBJECT BUT ONLY PROVIDE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO YOU AT THIS TIME.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/2

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

655 CUT/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S E C R E T~~

FILE No. 14-9-9 10

ORIG: R. [illegible]
UNIT: WH/4
EXT: 2060
DATE: 19 February 1960

TO: GUATEMALA CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO: S/C 2

RE FILING (check one)
No CS Record Value Destroy
RI Do this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one)
Marked ☐ None required
Signature

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 19 21 57 '60
REC'D CABLE SECT.

C	☐	DEFERRED	
		ROUTINE	
	☒	PRIORITY	INITIALS
		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT25979
OUT 25979

TO GUAT INFO HAVA (ROUTINE). CITE DIR 15981 15931

RE GUAT 679 (IN 43695)*

DIRECTORATE COMPOSED OF OSCAR ECHEVARRIA Y SALVAT, LAUREANO BATISTA, ROBERTO ORTIZ CRANE, ANGEL FERNANDEZ VARELA, MELCHOR GASTON. PRESIDENT OF MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO IS JOSE IGNACIO RASCO. MOVIMIENTO RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO HEADED BY ANGEL FERNANDEZ VARELA AND PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT IS ANGEL VARGO. SUBORDINATE MEMBERS INCLUDE MANUEL ARTIME AND ANTONIO MICHEL YABUR, BOTH IN MEXI, AND RICARDO DE LA TORRE IN MIAMI.

*(END OF MESSAGE)

*WH Comment: Requested identities of AMPALM group.

MKR

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

J.C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. Reynolds for J.D. ESTERLINE
C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

FORM 1389a

14-4-4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME-BUESA, MANUEL /DR/
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

037-009-005
HNT -02413
12 MAR 71

CIT ?
OCC ?
TO REPRESENT JOINT BUSINESS VENTURE OF JORGE BUESO-ARIAS /201-880782/ AND OSWALDO LOPEZ-ARELLANO /201-183939/

R 7104050633

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation

TO ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID
[illegible]
RID/[illegible]
EXT. 4259

CP-437
[illegible]
TUBE 077

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

25 JAN 1971

BIDDY-1 wants to see us

MICROFILMED
JAN 25 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C	Tube DH-5	25 JAN 1971		S
2. Burke			25	JB
3.				
4. AC/WH/CCG	26 JAN 1971		29 Jan	UL
5. [illegible]		1 Feb 71		[illegible]
6. Marshall		1 Feb 71		R
7. Albright		1 Feb 71		[illegible]
8. Dennis		2 Feb 71		[illegible]
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 20 Jan 71

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFAA 02634

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

64120

~~SECRE~~T TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFAA-2634
FILE NO - 201-267437
DATE - 20 JANUARY 1971
MICROFILM - NO
INDEXING - NO
TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI
SUBJECT - OPERATIONAL/MEETING WITH YASUINAS
REFERENCE - DIRECTOR 100371 // - John Burke

MICROFILMED
JAN 25 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. ON 18 JANUARY 1971 HENRY S. PACHANKIS MET WITH NIGEL P. YASUINAS. YASUINAS INFORMED PACHANKIS THAT HE HANDLES INSURANCE BUSINESS FOR AMBIDDY-1. 201- AMBIDDY-1. RECENTLY TOLD YASUINAS THAT HE WAS VISITED BY ARTURO MUGARRA [redacted] (201-321665) ER (PROBABLY ARTURO ROLANDO MUGARRA Y PUPO) WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE JUST ARRIVED IN THE US AFTER ESCAPING FROM A GOVERNMENT OF CUBA (GOC) JAIL. AMBIDDY-1 ADDED THAT HE KNEW MUGARRA IN CUBA AND BELIEVES HIM TO BE CASTRO AGENT. HOWEVER, HE COULD OFFER NO EXPLANATION WHY HE BELIEVES THIS TO BE SO. YASUINAS TOLD PACHANKIS THAT THERE WAS NO HARASSMENT OF AMBIDDY-1 AS STATED IN REFERENCE.

probably identical to Arturo Magana who visited Subject of 201-267437

2. MUGARRA SAID THAT HE BROUGHT OUT A MESSAGE FROM NICOLAS RIOS NO-201 (PROBABLY NICOLAS RIOS AKAS NO-201 MIEPA) WHO PLANS TO TRAVEL FROM CUBA TO CHILE VIA SPAIN. RIOS WANTS TO SEE AMBIDDY-1. IN SPAIN. NO REAONS WERE GIVEN. AMBIDDY-1 DID NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT TO MAGARRA ABOUT MEETING WITH RIOS. AMBIDDY-1 GAVE YASUINAS NO FURTHER DATA ON THIS CASE.

Cit Cuba

wishes to make contact with subject of 201-267437

4. Manuel Francis ARTIME Buesa

3. AMBIDDY-1 WISHES TO MAKE CONTACT AGAIN WITH

SECRET UFAA-2634 PAGE ONE CONTINUED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

D100-5-14

201-267437

~~S E C R E~~ T UFAA-2634 PAGE TWO

JKLANCE REGARDING MEETING RIOS. HE TOLD YASUINAS THAT HE HAS NOT HAD CONTACT WITH ANY JKLANCER SINCE HE WAS IN NICARAGUE.

4. THE CIENFUEGOS MATTER REFERRED TO IN REFERENCE PERTAINED TO A REPORT RECEIVED BY YASUINAS "SOMETIME LAST YEAR" FROM MOTHER OF ONE OF HIS CLIENTS. SHE STATED THAT GOC WAS "BUILDING CAVES IN THE CIENFUEGOS AREA AND CAMOUFLAGING THEM WELL."

5. AT THIS JUNCTURE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AMBIDDY-1/RIOS MEETING IS ENOUHG JUSTIFICATION FOR STATION CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY-1. HOWEVER, YASUINAS WAS GIVEN PO BOX BY PACHANKIS AND TOLD THAT WE WOULD BE GLAD TO MEET WITH HIM WHENEVER HE HAD ANYTHING OF IMPORTANCE.

MORRIS Z. GERVENOT

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

3-CHIEF, WHD

S E C R E T UFAA2634 PAGE TWO

S E C R E T

BT

N

N

N

S

~~SECRET~~ TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFAA-2634
FILE NO - 201-267437
DATE - 20 JANUARY 1971
MICROFILM - NO
INDEXING - NO
TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI
SUBJECT - OPERATIONAL/MEETING WITH YASUINAS
REFERENCE - DIRECTOR 100371

1. ON 18 JANUARY 1971 HENRY S. PACHANKIS MET WITH NIGEL P. YASUINAS. YASUINAS INFORMED PACHANKIS THAT HE HANDLES INSURANCE BUSINESS FOR AMBIDDY-1. AMBIDDY-1. RECENTLY TOLD YASUINAS THAT HE WAS VISITED BY ARTURO MUGARRA (PROBABLY ARTURO ROLANDO MUGARRA Y PUPO) WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE JUST ARRIVED IN THE US AFTER ESCAPING FROM A GOVERNMENT OF CUBA (GOC) JAIL. AMBIDDY-1 ADDED THAT HE KNEW MUGARRA IN CUBA AND BELIEVES HIM TO BE CASTRO AGENT. HOWEVER, HE COULD OFFER NO EXPLANATION WHY HE BELIEVES THIS TO BE SO. YASUINAS TOLD PACHANKIS THAT THERE WAS NO HARASSMENT OF AMBIDDY-1 AS STATED IN REFERENCE.

2. MUGARRA SAID THAT HE BROUGHT OUT A MESSAGE FROM NICOLAS RIOS (PROBABLY NICOLAS RIOS MIEPA) WHO PLANS TO TRAVEL FROM CUBA TO CHILE VIA SPAIN. RIOS WANTS TO SEE AMBIDDY-1. IN SPAIN. NO REAONS WERE GIVEN. AMBIDDY-1 DID NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT TO MAGARRA ABOUT MEETING WITH RIOS. AMBIDDY-1 GAVE YASUINAS NO FURTHER DATA ON THIS CASE.

3. AMBIDDY-1 WISHES TO MAKE CONTACT AGAIN WITH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET UFAA-2634 PAGE TWO

JKLANCE REGARDING MEETING RIOS. HE TOLD YASUINAS THAT HE HAS NOT HAD CONTACT WITH ANY JKLANCER SINCE HE WAS IN NICARAGUE.

4. THE CIENFUEGOS MATTER REFERRED TO IN REFERENCE PERTAINED TO A REPORT RECEIVED BY YASUINAS "SOMETIME LAST YEAR" FROM MOTHER OF ONE OF HIS CLIENTS. SHE STATED THAT GOC WAS "BUILDING CAVES IN THE CIENFUEGOS AREA AND CAMOUFLAGING THEM WELL."

5. AT THIS JUNCTURE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AMBIDDY-1/RIOS MEETING IS ENOUNG JUSTIFICATION FOR STATION CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY-1. HOWEVER, YASUINAS WAS GIVEN PO BOX BY PACHANKIS AND TOLD THAT WE WOULD BE GLAD TO MEET WITH HIM WHENEVER HE HAD ANYTHING OF IMPORTANCE.

MORRIS Z. GERVENOT

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

1-CHIEF, WHD

SECRET UFAA2634 PAGE TWO

SECRET

BT

14-00000

JOHN M. BURKE:ghd
WH/COG/OPS
7144/1819
7 JAN 71

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15 1

~~S E C R E T~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
SB PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

NF: WHE INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN, C/OPS, C/CI, FI,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 0JAN71 21 29z CITE DIRECTOR 00371

WH/MIAMI

1. FORMER JMWAVE CONTRACT AGENT NIGEL P. YASUINAS (IDEN FOLLOWS) CONTACTED HIS JMWAVE CASE OFFICER, NOW AT HQS, BY TELEPHONE ON 5 JAN AND REQUESTED THAT SOMEONE FROM WH/MIAMI CONTACT HIM. CLAIMED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY-1 WHO WANTED TO GET MESSAGE TO JKLANCE ABOUT SOME FORM OF FOREIGN HARRASSMENT OF AMBIDDY-1. ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE WHAT APPEARED TO HIM TO BE SIGNIFICANT INFO ON CIENFUEGOS FROM REFUGEE SOURCE OR SOURCES WHO CONCEALED IT FROM JMOPAL SCREENERS.

2. NO FILE. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

201- 267437

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

JOHN M. BURKE
WH/COG
7144/1819
7 JAN 71

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

35 _____ PER _____ # _____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. _____

INFO: WHE FILE, VR. R/AN, CI/OPS, CI/CA, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

8 JAN 71 21 29z

CITE DIRECTOR

WH/MIAMI

RE DIR 100371

100372

1. IDEN IS RUBEN MARTINEZ, 17240 S. W. 89 COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33157. TELEPHONE 305-233-7894. EMPLOYED BY PROVIDENT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MIAMI.

2. NO FILE. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

~~SECRET~~

ORIG: JOHN M. BURKE:ghd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144/1819
DATE: 7 JAN 71

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 36 PER ___ # ___

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

REF: WHE INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, C/OPS, C/CA, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 0 JAN 71 21 29z CITE DIRECTOR 00371

WH/MIAMI

1. FORMER JMWAVE CONTRACT AGENT NIGEL P. YASUINAS (IDEN FOLLOWS) CONTACTED HIS JMWAVE CASE OFFICER, NOW AT HQS, BY TELEPHONE ON 5 JAN AND REQUESTED THAT SOMEONE FROM WH/MIAMI CONTACT HIM. CLAIMED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY-1 WHO WANTED TO GET MESSAGE TO JKLANCE ABOUT SOME FORM OF FOREIGN HARRASSMENT OF AMBIDDY-1. ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE WHAT APPEARED TO HIM TO BE SIGNIFICANT INFO ON CIENFUEGOS FROM REFUGEE SOURCE OR SOURCES WHO CONCEALED IT FROM JMOPAL SCREENERS.

2. NO FILE. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CS Coord

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/CO3

8 Jan 71
201-267437

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

ORIG: JOHN M. BURKE
UNIT: WH/COG
EXT: 7144/1819
DATE: 7 JAN 71

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 1-1

~~S E C R E T~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	36
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 36 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

DISSEM TO: WHE INFO FILE, VR. C/FI, C/CS, C/CA, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 8 JAN 71 21 29z CITE DIRECTOR

UFA
WH/MIAMI

RE DIR 100371 Iden 1P 100372

MICROFILMED
FEB 17 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. IDEN IS RUBEN MARTINEZ, 17240 S. W. 89 COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33157. TELEPHONE 305-233-7894. EMPLOYED BY PROVIDENT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MIAMI. Cit Cuba

2. NO FILE. GP-1. AUSA, Florida, Miami
Claimed to be in contact with Subject of 201-267437

END OF MESSAGE

AM W
3
2 "11"
FI

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CS COPY

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG
8 Jan 71
201-267437

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY 24 PER [illegible]. Ref

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

INFO FILE, VR C/RF/SD, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/CA-3

ACTION NO. 481

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES [illegible]

S SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRET 242302Z OCT 69 CITE LIMA 5949

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, MANAGUA

REF DIRECTOR 47568

SD F WH/3/P

24 Oct 69 IN 72959

M

1. AT PRESENT NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON GENERAL LEIGH EITHER IN STATION FILES OR FILES OF ATTACHES. MILATT WILL ADVISE IF TURNS UP ANYTHING.

2. FILE: 201-267437.

SECRET

24 Oct 69

CS COPY

Arbiddy

SECRET

201-267437

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

☐ ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

BY

9

ACTION UNIT

WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, DO 4, DDP, ADDP, C1, C/OPS, C/SO,

137 FL 2

S E C R E T 071628Z OCT 70 CITE TEGUCI~~GALPA 9118~~ TEGU 70 IN 179726

DIRECTOR, DO BASE, NEW YORK INFO MANGUA, WH/MIAMI

REF: BOOK DISPATCH 7552 Meeting with AMBIDDY-1

1. LAWRENCE F. BARKER (COS TEGUCIGALPA) MET AMBIDDY-1 BY CHANCE WHILE IN MANAGUA 4 OCTOBER. AMBIDDY SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY NICARAGUAN PRESIDENT ANASTASIO SOMOZA TO JOIN NICARAGUAN DELEGATION TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS A SPECIAL ADVISOR ON CUBA. AMBIDDY BELIEVES SOMOZA MAY MAKE A STRONG ANTI- CASTRO SPEECH WHEN HE ADDRESSES ASSEMBLY LATER THIS MONTH. AMBIDDY WILL GO TO NEW YORK WITH AMBASSADOR GUILLERMO LANG IN ADVANCE OF SOMOZA.

2. DEFER TO HQS ON CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY. FEEL FREE TO USE BARKER'S NAME IN MAKING CONTACT.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: AMBIDDY-1 201. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN DS
AB X
NBD
WH 2 CHN

OCT 12 1970

CS COPY

SECRET

7 October 1970
201-267437

ORIG: Al McWade:cb
UNIT: WH/2/HD
EXT: 7163/1946
DATE: 9 October 1970

~~SECRET~~

EDITING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 9 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

DISSEM: WH 8 INFO FILE VR, DO 4, CI/OPS CI/CIT

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 OCT 70 16 53z CITE DIRECTOR 076615

TO DO BASE NEW YORK, TEGUCIGALPA
INFO MANAGUA WH/MIAMI

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 9118 (IN 179726)*

1. ~~UNLESS DO BASE NEW YORK WISHES CONTACT,~~ HQS SEES NO NEED AMBIDDY-1 CONTACT. ~~NEW YORK~~

2. FILE 201-267437.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *COS Tegucigalpa met AMBIDDY-1 in Managua 4 Oct. A/1 asked by SAMOZA to join Nicaraguan delegation to UN Assembly as special advisor. Defer to Hqs. contact AMBIDDY-1.

C/DO/I/B2 Bob Baker (Telcoord)
C/WH/COG
C/WH/2/N
C/WH/2
WH/COG/OPS

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~DX~~
~~DEF~~ NFD
FI

JOHN MARKHAM
C/DOI/2

CS COPY

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

12 Oct 70
201-267437

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: TODD D. HAGENAH TH
UNIT: WH/3/P
EXT: 6223/9388
DATE: 17 OCTOBER 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 41 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR. C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CA 3

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

17 23 40Z OCT 69

CITE DIRECTOR 47568

TO MANAGUA, LIMA INFO: WH/MIAMI

RYBAT AMBIDDY

REF: MANAGUA 7157 (IN 65339)*

ABSTRACT INDEX WH/C/OP

1. CERTAINLY INTERESTED IN EXPLORING AMBIDDY-1 LEAD TO GENERAL LEIGH BUT AT THIS TIME ONLY AS SOURCE ON INFORMATION AND NOT AS POTENTIAL PLOTTER AGAINST PERUVIAN GOVT. PLEASE ASK AMBIDDY-1 TO CONTINUE TO ELICIT LEIGH'S OPINIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF INTERNAL SITUATION AND DEVELOPMENTS IN PERU AND TRY TO IDENTIFY LEIGH'S PRINCIPAL SOURCES AND CONTACTS.

2. FOR LIMA: PLS PROVIDE STATION READING ON GENERAL LEIGH WHO IS RELATIVE~~E~~ LY UNKNOWN TO US HERE.

3. FILE: 201-267437.

END OF MESSAGE

*AMBIDDY-~~2~~ 1 told COS Managua that when Peruvian General Guillermo Leigh visited him recently in Miami, he told AMBIDDY-1 that he & others in Peruvian military were

CS COPY

CONT'D

17 Oct 69

201-267437

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____________ PER ____________ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 47568

TO

PAGE TWO

attempting to pressure Velasco to get rid of his advisors with Communist beliefs. Leigh and AMBIDDY-1 intend to meet again in Miami area soon. AMBIDDY-1 offered to assist in any way we want.

C/WH/3 Spera

DC/WH/COG W.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JOSEPH Y. KIYONAGA
C/WH/2

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER ______ # ___

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/WH5 INFO FILE, VR c/FI/SD c/CI c/CA 2 c/FI 2

ACTION NO. 396 DDP

S E C R E T 141720Z OCT 69 CITE MANAGUA 7157

HPL WFA MRNA

DIRECTOR INFO LIMA, WH/MIAMI 2P 14Oct69N65339

RYBAT AMBIDDY

1. FOLLOWING FROM AMBIDDY-1 TO COS MANAGUA NIGHT 13 OCTOBER.

2. AMBIDDY WAS RECENTLY VISITED IN MIAMI BY RETIRED PERUVIAN GENERAL GUILLERMO LEIGH, CLASSMATE OF MANY OF THE OFFICERS NOW IN POWER IN PERU. LEIGH IS AGED 50-60, HAS ONLY ONE EYE. HIS SON-IN-LAW IS AIDE TO THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR. LEIGH ON OFFICIAL PURCHASING MISSION FOR GOP, LOOKING FOR BULLDOZERS, LARGE GENERATORS, PLUMBING FIXTURES, RADIO EQUIPMENT, AND PRE-FAB HOUSING. EXPECTS SPEND ABOUT TEN MILLION DOLLARS. CONFIDED TO AMBIDDY THAT THE COMMISSIONS HE AND HIS CLASSMATES EARN ON THESE PURCHASES WILL BE DEPOSITED IN U.S. BANKS.

3. LEIGH TOLD AMBIDDY THAT MANUEL VELASCO ALVARADO IS CAUGHT UP IN DEMAGOGERY. VELASCO MADE HIS MOVE AGAINST THE IPC IN ORDER TO WIN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR HIS GROUP BUT THE SUBSEQUENT IDOLATRY ACCRUING TO HIM WENT TO HIS HEAD. FURTHERMORE, LEIGH AND MANY OF HIS MILITARY CLASSMATES SEE VELASCO

WH/C/a

MICROFILMED 1969 DOC. MICRO. SER.

14Oct69

CS COPY

SECRET

201-267437

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ___

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT | INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MANAGUA 7157 SECRET

SURROUNDED BY ADVISORS OF COMMUNISTIC BELIEFS. LEIGH SAID THAT HE AND HIS CRONIES ARE PRESSURING VELASCO TO GET RID OF THESE ADVISORS. ~~HS~~ IF HE DOES NOT, THEY INTEND TO FORCE HIM OUT OF THE JUNTA.

4. LEIGH HAS INVITED AMBIDDY TO GO TO PERU IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROCUREMENT MISSION. IN ANY EVENT, AMBIDDY WILL BE SEEING LEIGH AGAIN IN MIAMI SOON WHERE LEIGH STAYS AS AMBIDDY'S HOUSEGUEST.

5. AMBIDDY TOLD COS "IF I CAN HELP IN ANY WAY, YOU CAN COUNT ON ME."

6. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY INTERESTS AND GIVE APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE.

7. INDEX LEIGH. FILE: 201-267437.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION · CLASSIFIED MESSAGE · TOTAL COPIES 20

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

34 SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY. DKB PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION c/WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR. c/R, ISP. DDP, ADDP, CS/DO. c/SOD2. c/ci. c/FI2.

083

S E C R E T 252332Z JUL 69 CITE MANAGUA 7069

25 JUL 69 IN 10406

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, PORT AU PRINCE MANA

RYBAT IUSTEER AMBIDDY

WH/C/FP 4

REF: WH/MIAMI 4709 (IN 09904)

1. LIKE GHOSTLY CARIBBEAN LEGION OF YORE? AMWORLD ARMS KEEP POPPING UP IN TALES BUT NOT IN MATERIAL FORM. WITH TWO MAJOR RECOJRIES OF APRIL 1965 (PACY 6431) AND MARCH 1967 (HNMT-1239) PLUS CEDING OF SOME AMMUNITION TO SOMOZA AND COLONEL BRENES OKDIR 94233, 20 MAR 65 ET SEQ) AND MOST RECENT "FINAL" RECOVERY OF SMALL MANAGUA CACHE MARCH 1968 (HNMA-4086), THERE CAN'T BE MUCH LEFT. MANY AND VARIED TALES ABOUND OF AMBIDDY ENRICHMENT BY SELLING AMWORLD ARMS. IF GIVEN CREDENCE, SHEER VOLUME WOULD LEAD TO CONCLUSION HE SOLD HIS INVENTORY SEVERAL TIMES OVER. AVAILABLE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUBSTANTIATE THESE TALES. FURTHERMORE, AMBIDDY IS NOT RICH.

2. AMBIDDY COULD HAVE TURNED TIDY PROFIT ON EXTENSIVE EL BLUFF CACHE WHICH NEITHER WOFIRM NOR SOMOZA KNEW ABOUT. INSTEAD, ALTHOUGH FINANCIALLY PRESSED, HE INFORMED STATION AND HELPED IN EVERY WAY TO GET THESE ARMS INTO WOFIRM HANDS.

25 July 69

CS COPY

201-267437

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY______ AT________ Z

DISSEM BY________ PER _____ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.________

X-REF TO FILE NO.________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 7069 SECRET

3. AMBIDDY MIGHT BE INVOLVED WITH SOMOZA IN SOME SORT OF ARMS DEALINGS WITH DUVALIER. AS REPORTED SEPARATELY, HE IS NOW IN MEAT EXPORT PARTNERSHIP WITH SOMOZA. DOUBT SERIOUSLY HE WOULD USE NOTORIOUS WINDBAG BENITEZ AS AGENT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. PLS ADVISE IF WISH COS TO ELICIT FROM AMBIDDY AT NEXT OPPORTUNITY ON ANY ARMS DEALINGS WITH DUVALIER.

5. FILE 201-267437.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 40 PER REF

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE. VR. C/A/SD

ACTION NO. 717

S E C R E T 222342Z JUL 69 CITE MANAGUA 7060 MANA

23 JUL 69 IN 07612

SALVADOR INFO
DIRECTOR

REF: SAN SALVADOR 8024 (IN 07549)

WH/C/OP

1. SUBJECT IS DR. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, CIVILIAN LEADER OF BAY OF PIGS INVASION. PROMINENT CUBAN EXILE LEADER, NOW RESIDING MIAMI. VISITS MANAGUA FREQUENTLY WHERE HAS BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH PRESIDENT SOMOZA. IS CLOSE FRIND LAWRENCE F. BARKER.

2. FILE: 201-267437.

S E C R E T

CS COPY

SECRET

23 July 69

201-267437

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: B AT: 2040 Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET (When Filled In) 24

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

FILE. VR. C/2/SD, DDP, ADDP, C/SDC, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3,

ACTION NO. 645

SECRET 221811Z JUL 69 CITE MANAGUA 7059 22 Jul 69 IN 07442

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, WH/MIAMI

RYBAT AMBIDDY

REF: MANAGUA 7041 (IN 01386)

ABS WH/C/OD

1. COS MANAGUA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM AMBIDDY-1 1125 HOURS LOCAL TIME 22 JULY. AMBIDDY IN MIAMI. REFERRED TO REF MATTER. SAID HAD RECEIVED URGENT CALL FIFTEEN MINUTES EARLIER FROM SAN SALVADOR STATING THAT GOES URGENTLY NEEDS EIGHT PILOTS AND WANTS CONSULT WITH AMBIDDY. CALLER TOLD AMBIDDY THAT SALVADORAN VISA WAS AUTHORIZED.

2. AMBIDDY ASKED FOR GUIDANCE. COS ADVISED HIM PROCEED TO SALVADOR, OBTAIN AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON SALVADORAN WAR PLANS, CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS. AFTER OBTAINING ALL POSSIBLE INFORMATION HE IS TO "DECIDE" NOT TO TAKE PART IN ANY WAY. AS MENTIONED IN REF CABLE, AT BEGINNING OF TALKS

CS COPY

22 July 69

SECRET

201-267437

HE WILL INSIST THAT SALVADORANS PROMISE NOT TO REVEAL TO ANYONE, ESPECIALLY "GRINGOS", THAT HE BEING CONSULTED. THIS DESIGNED TO DISASSOCIATE HIM FROM WOFIRM AND AID IN ELICITING MAXIMUM INFORMATION

3. AMBIDDY WILL REPORT RESULTS TO COS MANAGUA ASAP. PHONE CONVERSATION DOUBLETALKED, NO MENTION MADE OF ANY COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY: 21 PER ________ #

ACTION C/WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

695

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE, VR. C/REF, SD

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SALV

S E C R E T 221800Z JUL 69 CITE SAN SALADOR 8024

MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT/AMBIDDY

REQUEST IDENTITY AMBIDDY.

S E C R E T

1 SD

WH/C/AMP [illegible]

22 Jul 69 IN 07549

22 July 69

201-217437

CS COPY

SECRET

14-00000

53-9-1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

DATE : 29 MAR 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, DDO 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 5, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW, SAS 5, DO/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MAR 29 0224Z 63

ROUTINE

IN 96635

TDCS

RI COPY

DIR INFO SNTO PACY MANA CARA SJOS CITE WAVE 6507

UFG-2612

INTEL TYPIC DYVOUR

SUPDATA: IWOG PLS DEFER DISSEM TO NICARAGUA/SAS DESK. SOURCE AMBIDDY-1 FROM SOMOZA AND SCHICK. "STRAW MAN" FOR BIDDY PROTECTION. PADA ALSO CHANGED. FILED 290019Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: CUBA NICARAGUA

SUBJ 1. PLANS OF RENE SCHICK RELATIVE TO HIS ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES IN NICARAGUA 2. OPINIONS OF RENE SCHICK REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO ANTI-CASTRO EXILES

DOI: 22-23 MAR 63

PADA: U.S. 27 MAR 63

AN CLL

~~RD~~

FI

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
RI	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

HW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

CS COPY

BASED ON: 201-267437

LIAISON: 29 May 63

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE

~~S E C R E T~~

TO

FROM

ACTION

INFO

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PAGE TWO

IN 96635

TDCS

R I COPY

UFG 2012

APPR: 3

SOURCE: CUBAN NATIONAL (F) WITH NUMEROUS EXILE CONTACTS FROM MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

[redacted]

R I COPY

C/S COMMENT: *PLEASE SEE PARA 22, PAGE 21, HB 90-400-1 RE USE OF MULTIPLE ACTION INDICATORS.

RW COMMENT:

[redacted]

R I COPY

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING TWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

REPORT NO. TDCS

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

REFERENCES IN 96635

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. ON 22 MARCH 1963 MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, CUBAN EXILE LEADER, FLEW FROM MIAMI, FLORIDA TO MANAGUA, NICARAGUA ON INVITATION OF PRESIDENT RENE SCHICK. ARTIME'S EXPRESS PURPOSE FOR MAKING THE TRIP WAS TO DETERMINE IF SCHICK WOULD SUPPORT HIS (ARTIME'S) ANTI-CASTRO PARAMILITARY CAMPAIGN BY MAKING MILITARY TRAINING SITES AND OPERATIONAL BASES AVAILABLE TO ARTIME.

2. ARTIME ALSO SAID HE HOPED TO DETERMINE WHETHER SCHICK WAS AN EXTENSION OF THE SOMOZA DYNASTY OR WHETHER SCHICK WAS A TRUE STEP TOWARD DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN NICARAGUA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1-63 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

3. ON HIS ARRIVAL IN MANAGUA, ARTIME WAS MET BY CAPTAIN PEREZ (FNU) WHO TOLD ARTIME THAT AN INTERVIEW WAS ARRANGED FOR THAT NIGHT, 22 MARCH, WITH LUIS SOMOZA. THE MEETING WAS HELD AS ARRANGED AND LASTED FOR OVER THREE HOURS. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MEETING WAS AS FOLLOWS:

A. SOMOZA SAID THAT ARTIME COULD TALK WITH SCHICK, BUT SOMOZA WISHED TO EXPLAIN HE CONSIDERS SCHICK AN INDEPENDENT AGENT AND NOT AN EXTENSION OF HIS (SOMOZA'S) RULE. HE SAID SCHICK BY HIS OWN RIGHT HAS PRESTIGE, AND WOULD NEVER CONSENT TO BE A "PUPPET RULER". AS FAR AS SCHICK"S FUTURE PROGRAMS WERE CONCERNED, SOMOZA SAID SCHICK HIMSELF WOULD DISCUSS THIS WITH ARTIME;

B. SOMOZA SAID NICARAGUA HAS GREAT INTEREST IN BETTERING ITS RELATIONS WITH LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS, AND AS AN EXAMPLE SINGLED OUT VENEZUELA;

C. SOMOZA COMMENTED ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND MADE IT CLEAR HE HAS LITTLE USE FOR JUAN BOSCH Y. GAVINO. HE SAID HE IS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT BOSCH HAS MADE A PACT WITH THE COMMUNISTS.

4. ON 23 MARCH ARTIME MET WITH PRESIDENT RENE SCHICK FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT TWO HOURS. SCHICK MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE IMPORTANT TASK FOR NICARAGUA IS TO RID ITSELF OF THE "DICTATOR" TAG. SCHICK SAID THAT BY BRINGING THE OPPOSITION INTO THE GOVERNMENT, AND LETTING THE OPPOSITION SHARE IN THE GOVERNMENT, HE IS CONVINCED THAT NICARAGUA CAN PROGRESS TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. THIS APPROACH, HE SAID, CAN ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF REVOLUTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOCIALIST STATE;

B. SCHICK'S GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM INCLUDES WORKING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE;

14-00000

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
CROSS REFERENCE TO FILE NO
FILE RID — DESTROY — RET. TO BR.

3

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TDCS

IN 96635

PAGE 3

C. SCHICK WISHES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND COSTA RICA AS WELL AS WITH VENEZUELA. HE SAID HE WANTS TO CONCENTRATE HIS EFFORTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, AND THUS HELP ESTABLISH THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET.

D. SCHICK IS CERTAIN IN HIS OWN MIND THAT LUIS SOMOZA HAS NO INTENT OF RETURNING TO POLITICS, AND ADDED THAT HE, SCHICK, ASKED GENERAL "TACHO" SOMOZA TO STAY ON AS CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES. HE EXPLAINED THIS AS GOOD POLITICS, SAYING SOMOZA'S PRESENCE WOULD KEEP THE MILITARY IN CHECK AND ALLOW TIME FOR IMPLEMENTING REFORMS. HE HOPED THAT ON THE EXPIRATION OF HIS, SCHICK'S, TERM OF OFFICE, NICARAGUA WILL HAVE PROGRESSED TO THE POINT WHERE SOMOZA'S PRESENCE WOULD NO LONGER BE NECESSARY IN THE ARMED FORCES;

E. NICARAGUA, LIKE ALL OTHER COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA IS DISPOSED TO HELP THE ANTI-CASTRO CAUSE CLANDESTINELY, BUT SCHICK ADDED THAT SUCH HELP IS CONDITIONED UPON THE IMPLIED APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY. IF SUCH APPROVAL IS GIVEN ARTIME CAN COUNT ON NICARAGUA'S SUPPORT.

5. SUBSEQUENTLY, AS AN ADDITIONAL CONDITION, SCHICK SAID THAT IF PRESIDENT KENNEDY APPROVES, AN AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE MUST BE SENT TO CENTRAL AMERICA TO COORDINATE THIS EFFORT.

5. FIELD DISS. : STATE (MIAMI).

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

201-267437

R I COPY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

37

~~SECRET~~ GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 48 PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR, R1, AN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2,

ACTION NO. #157

S E C R E T 181642Z AUG 69 CITE MADRID 9257 (ROPARD ACTING)

MADR

26017

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

19 Aug 69 IN 26017

TYPIC

1. QUGROWL-1 REPORTS THAT MANUEL ARTIME HAS REQUESTED HIM GET SPANISH VISA FOR HIM ASAP. Q-1 BELIEVES PURPOSE OF TRIP TO GREET ARTIME'S FATHER WHOM CUBAN GOVT MAY BE ABOUT TO GRANT EXIT AFTER TWO-YEAR DELAY.

2. FILE: 201-267437.

S E C R E T

AB JB
AB X
~~IN~~
~~FS~~
~~SX~~
~~DES~~ NFD
~~PI~~
C WH C

CS COPY
SECRET

201-267437
19 Aug 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE · TOTAL COPIES 1

~~SECRET~~ 37

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1 5
2 6
3 7
4 8

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 48 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR, R1 AN, EUR6, O1, CI/OPS, FI 2,

ACTION NO. #157

S E C R E T 181642Z AUG 69 CITE MADRID 9287 (ROPARD ACTING)

(MADR)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

26017

13 Aug 69 IN 26017

TYPIC

1. QUGROWL-1 REPORTS THAT MANUEL ARTIME HAS REQUESTED HIM GET SPANISH VISA FOR HIM ASAP. Q-1 BELIEVES PURPOSE OF TRIP TO GREET ARTIME'S FATHER WHOM CUBAN GOVT MAY BE ABOUT TO GRANT EXIT AFTER TWO-YEAR DELAY.

2. FILE: 201-267437.

S E C R E T

AN JB
AB X
IN
FS
SX
DES MFD
PI
C WH C

CS COPY

SECRET

201-267437

19 Aug 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4			

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT:

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

DISSEM BY 28 PER

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN, CI, C/OPS, C/ICZ, FI2, IW, SB8, DO4, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO

ACTION NO. 5H

S E C R E T 182305Z MAY 70 CITE MANAGUA 7336

085604

18 MAY 70

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

REF: MANAGUA 7332 (IN 081565)

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL FROM AMBIDDY TO COS MANAGUA 14 - 13 MAY. LEIGH STAYED WITH AMBIDDY IN MIAMI 10 - 13 MAY. LOOKING FOR STATESIDE SALES AGENT PERUVIAN FISHMEAL, OFFERED JOB TO AMBIDDY. EXPLAINED GENERAL ARTOLA, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, PUT ANOTHER GENERAL (NAME UNKNOWN) IN CHARGE GOVT CONSORTIUM FISHMEAL INDUSTRY. PERU NOW TRYING TO SELL ON WORLD MARKET. UNIDENTIFIED GENERAL WENT TO EUROPE TRYING TO PEDDLE FISHMEAL WHILE LEIGH IN STATES ON SAME MISSION. IF STATESIDE DEAL CAN BE ARRANGED, AMBIDDY WILL HAVE EXCLUSIVE SALES REIGHTS IN RETURN FOR TWO PERCENT COMMISSION. AMBIDDY PHONED MINNESOTA AND FLORIDA CHICKEN FEED MANUFACTURUERS AND WAS TOLD THEY WOULD BUY ALL FISHMEAL HE COUND FURNISH. HE SENSED SOMETHING "FISHY" IN BEING OFFERED JOB AS MIDDLEMAN FOR PRODUCT SO READILY MARKETABLE AND SOON LEARNED THAT HE WOULD BE EXPECTED KICK BACK HALF HIS COMMISSION TO GENERALS. THIS MIGHT AMOUNT TO OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. LEIGH HAS INVITED AMBIDDY VISIT PERU END OF MAY TO DISCUSS DETAILS. HE PLANS GO.

AN
AB
IN
DESTROYED
FI

CS COPY FILED IN 201-860098

[redacted]

SECRET

file: 18 May 70

201-267437

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 7336 SECRET

2. LEIGH TOLD AMBIDDY THAT SEVERAL CIVILIAN ADVISORS TO ALVARADO HAVE BEEN OUSTEDD OWING TO PRESSURE FROM ARMY OFFICERS WHO CONSIDER THEM COMMUNISTS. ALSO SAID PERUVIAN GOVT FED UP WITH RUSSIANS WHO BEGAN CONTACTING LABOR LEADERS AND HIGH ARMY PEOPLE IN OBVIOUS CAMPAIGN OF DEVELOPMENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARRIVING IN PERU. PERSONS NOW DEALING WITH RUSSIANS ARE BEING CLOSELY WATCHED BY GOVT. LEIGH ADDED THAT PERUVIAN GENERAL STAFF WORRIED ABOUT CHILEAN ARMS PURCHASES AND "AWARE" THAT CHILE PLANNING SOME MOVE AGAINST PERU.

3. OTHER ITEMS ON LEIGH SHOPPING LIST FOR WHICH HE ASKED QUOTATIONS INCLUDE TWO FIELD HOSPITALS IN SIXTY THOUSAND DOLLAR RANGE, TWO IN FORTY THOUSAND DOLLAR RANGE, SIXTY SMALL MEDICAL CLINIC UNITS IN ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR RANGE. MONEY COMING FROM BID LOA . ALSO WANTED QUOTES ON TEN MOBILE FILM PROJECTOR UNITS WITH LOUD SPEAKER SYSTEMS.

4. AMBIDDY SAID WOULD INFORM COS OF RESULTS PERU TRIP ASAP AFTER RETURN. PLEASE ADVISE ANY REQUREMENTS IN CASE COS SEES HIM BEFORE TRIP.

5. FILE: 201-860098, 201-267437. GP-1.

SECRET

[redacted]

SECRET

201-267437

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 33 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 23 PER ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH8 — INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, FI2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, SB8, DO4, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

ACTION NO. 873

S E C R E T 212213Z MAY 70 CITE LIMA 6942 (POLLICOVE ACTING) LIMA

MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI 21 MAY 70 IN 088069

REF: MANAGUA 7336 (IN 085604)

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS RE REF MAY BE USEFUL COS MANAGUA:

A. PERU MAKING REAL EFFORT BECOME WORLD'S LARGEST PRODUCER AND EXPORTER FISHMEAL. EXPECTED KICK-BACK ON COMMISSION TO GENERALS NOT SURPRISING. GENERALS PROBABLY INCLUDE ARTOLA.

B. RE PARA TWO REF, STATION HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF OUSTING LEFTIST CIVILIAN ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT VELASCO ALVARADO, WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF RUIZ ELDREDGE, WHO HAS BEEN NAMED PERUVIAN AMBASSADOR TO BRAZIL. NOT CLEAR WHETHER RUIZ BEING EASED OUT BECAUSE LEFTIST/PRO-COMMUNIST LEANINGS AS RESULT OF PRESSURE FROM ARMY OR WHETHER APPOINTMENT REPRESENTS REWARD TO RUIZ - POSSIBLY COMBINATION BOTH.

C. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN, PARTICULARLY VELASCO AND ARTOLA CONTINUE DENY COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT, DESPITE THIS COMMON KNOWLEDGE. GOVT OFFICIALS PRIVATELY

7

ANQD
ABX
WH/2/N

201-267437

21 May 70

CS COPY

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 LIMA 6942 SECRET

ADMIT LEFTIST/COMMUNIST LEANINGS OF ADVISORS, CLAIMING THEY TOTALLY AWARE THEIR AFFILIATIONS AND USING SUBJECTS TO ADVANTAGE REVOLUTION. CLAIM THEY WILL DISMISS SUCH ADVISORS AT PROPER TIME.

D. ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE SOME OFFICIALS IN GOP WHO AWARE OF DANGERS SOVIETS AND FED UP WITH THEM, THIS NOT REFLRECTED IN OFFICIAL ATTITUDE. GOP RECEIVING SOVIETS WITH OPEN ARMS AND SIZE OF SOVIET MISSION CONTINUES TO GROW. IN ADDITION TO FREQUENT TDYERS, SOVIETS NOW HAVE 33 OFFICIALS IN LIMA; THIS COMPARED TO FOUR OR FIVE PERUVIANS IN MOSCOW. THERE VERY LITTLE GOP SURVEILLANCE OR OTHER ACTIONS CARRIED OUT AGAINST SOVIETS. IN EYES MILITARY GOVT, JKLANCE CONSIDERED FAR GREATER TARGET IN PERU THAN SOVIETS.

2. LIMITED REQUIREMENTS FOR AMBIDDY AS FOLLOWS:

A. GOVERNMENT HAS RECOGNIZED NEED FOR REVISION OF NEW EXCHANGE CONTROL LAW. WHAT PROBLEMS HAVE BROUGHT THIS ABOUT? FEAR OF DOMESTIC REACTION, WITH POSSIBLE COLLABORATION BETWEEN PLUTOCRATS AND MILITARY? INTERNAL CONFLICT IN CABINET?

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 LIMA 6942 SECRET

FEAR OF FURTHER LOSS OF CONFIDENCE FOREIGN INVESTORS?

B. HOW DOES VELASCO GOVERNMENT PROPOSE TO DISCOURAGE CHILEANS FROM WHAT THEY BELIEVE ARE THEIR AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS?

C. ARE RECENT ANTI-COMMUNIST STATEMENTS BY PERUVIAN LEADERS ANYTHING MORE THAN RESPONSE TO FEARS SOME SECTORS PERUVIAN SOCIETY?

3. FILE: 201-860098, 201-267437 GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN

~~SECRET~~

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

DISSEM BY 30 PER

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR RI/AN FI2 CI CI/OPS DDP ADDP CSDO CI/IC2

ACTION NO. 950

S E C R E T 121859Z MAY 70 CITE MANAGUA 7332 (MAHR)

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

REF: MANAGUA 7157, 14 OCT 69 (IN 65339) [illegible]

1. AMBIDDY-1 VISITED COS MANAGUA NIGHT 7 MAY. IN COURSE LONG CONVERSATION MENTIONED HAD BEEN PHONED NIGHT BEFORE IN MIAMI BY GENERAL GUILLERMO LEIGH OF REFERENCE. LEIGH PASSING THRU MIAMI EN ROUTE NEW YORK, SAID WOULD CONTACT AMBIDDY ON RETURN 10 MAY. APPARENTLY INTERESTED IN PLACING SOME MONEY IN U.S. BANKS. REMARKED THAT VELASCO ESSENTIALLY WEAK, BEING RUN BY CIVILIAN ADVISERS AMONG WHOM SOME COMMIES. AMBIDDY WILL REPORT ON RESULTS AND STATION WILL RELAY DETAILS LIMA.

2. AMBIDDY CLARIFIED THAT SUBJECT IS NOT LEGITIMATE GENERAL. WAS MILITARY CLASSMATE PRESENT OFFICERS THAT RANK, LEFT ARMY OWING TO SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED EYESIGHT, IS ~~CALLE~~ CALLED "GENERAL" AS COURTESY BY ARMY FRIENDS WITH WHOM HE STILL KEEPS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS.

3. FILE: 201-860098, 201-267437. GP-1

SECRET

CS COPY FILED IN 201-860098

AN
DES NTD

file in [illegible] 201-267437

12 May 70

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINAT. CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 74 PER ____ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH-8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CS/DA, SOD6, CI/OA, FI-2

ACTION NO. 326

S E C R E T 222223Z SEP 69 CITE MANAGUA 7134 (MANA)

22 Sep 69 IN 49758

DIRECTOR INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, WH/MIAMI

REF: DIRECTOR 39886

1. COS MANAGUA HAS NOT SEEN AMBIDDY-1 SINCE SALVADOR/HONDURAS WAR. AMBIDDY WAS IN TOWN FOR ONE DAY DURING MID-SEPTEMBER INDEPENDENCE HOLIDAYS AND SENT REGARDS TO BARKER THROUGH MUTUAL CUBAN FRIEND SAYING WOULD BE BACK IN MANAGUA SOON AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CHAT. COS WILL ATTEMPT TO CORRAL HIM IF HE DOES SHOW UP AND ELICIT INFO REQUESTED BY REF.

2. FLE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

AN NS
AB X
IX
PP
DR
DES | NFD
FI
WH/2/N

CS COPY
SECRET

201-267437
22 Sep 69

14-00000

35

ORIG: RICHARD HARRINGTON
UNIT: WH/2/[illegible]
EXT: 7163/1946
DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1969

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, [illegible], CI/OPS, CI/OA, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

22 17 55 Z [illegible]

CITE DIRECTOR 39886

TO MANAGUA INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA

MICROFILMED
DEC 29 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REF: MANAGUA 7059 (IN 07442)

1. REQUEST COS MANAGUA CONTACT AMBIDDY-1 AND DEBRIEF ON REF TRIP TO SAN SALVADOR. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IS ANY INFO AMBIDDY-1 HAS ON HONDURAS/SALVADOR ARMS PURCHASES.

2. FYI: ON 17 SEPTEMBER HQS LEARNED FROM IUSTEER-1 THAT AMBIDDY-1 ARRANGED CONTACT FROM MIAMI FOR A HONDURAS ARMS BUYER TO PURCHASE ARMS IN SPAIN. FOR THIS SERVICE AMBIDDY-1 WILL RECEIVE A COMMISSION FROM THE HONDURAS ARMS BUYER BASED ON THE TOTAL ARMS PURCHASE PRICE. DO NOT REVEAL THIS INFO TO AMBIDDY-1.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-267437 AND 201-283488

END OF MESSAGE

AN	A/S
AB	X
~~IN~~	
PS	2
BX	4
SEC	~~NFL~~
RI	
WH/2/HD	

WH/COMMENT: On 22 July COS Managua received urgent phone call from AMBIDDY-1. AMBIDDY-1 said he just received phone call from Salvador and they (Salvadorans) needed eight pilots and wanted to consult with AMBIDDY. A Salvadoran visa had been authorized. COS Managua instructed AMBIDDY to proceed to San Salvador and obtain info on Salvador war plans. Once he acquired this info AMBIDDY was to inform the Salvadorans that he could not be involved in any way. AMBIDDY agreed and told COS Managua that he would contact COS on his return from the trip to San Salvador

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

AC/WH/2/NIC WH/COG/OPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOSEPH Y. KIYONAGA
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

201-267437
22 Sep 69

B201-283488 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY ___ ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ___

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ___

BY: ___ AT: ___ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ___

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ___

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI2, SOD6

ACTION NO. 402

S E C R E T 141703Z OCT 69 CITE MANAGUA 7158 MARA

DIRECTOR INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, PORT AU PRINCE, WH/MIAMI

14 Oct 69 IN 65351

AMBIDDY

REF: A. MANAGUA 7041 (IN 01386)

B. MANAGUA 7059 (IN 07442)

C. MANAGUA 7069 (IN 10406)

D. DIRECTOR 39886

E. MANAGUA 7134 (IN 49758)

1. COS MET WITH AMBIDDY-1 NIGHT 13 OCTOBER. HE REPORTED ON DEVELOPMENTS OF REFS AS FOLLOWS: AS AMBIDDY WAS PREPARING LEAVE FOR SALVADOR IN JULY HE WAS VISITED BY SALVADORAN HUMBERTO RODEZNO (PHONETIC) WHO HAD LONG SHOPPING LIST OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION. AMBIDDY EXPLAINED THAT HE COULD NOT GET INVOLVED IN ANY ARMS EXPORT MATTERS, THAT HE IS WELL KNOWN AS PERUMEN PATRIOT AND DOES NOT WISH CHANGE IMAGE FOR THAT OF ARMS DEALER OR SOLDIER OF FORTUNE. RODEZNO SAID HE ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH AN AMERICAN IN MIAMI WHO WAS GOING TO FURNISH 30-06 AMMO AT TEN CENTS A ROUND, SHIP IT FROM INTERARMCO IN VIRGINIA TO CANADA FOR ONWARD SHIPMENT TO SALVADOR. AMBIDDY WARNED RODEZNO THAT THE AMERICAN, WHOSE NAME WAS NOT

AN	NS
AB	
~~SR~~	
~~RQ~~	
~~SW~~	
~~[illegible]~~D	
~~PT~~	
WH/2/N	

CS COPY

SECRET

14 Oct 69

201-267437

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~SECRET~~ GROUP 1 [illegible]
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

BY: ______ 10 25 11

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

ACTION UNIT FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 7158 SECRET

GIVEN, WOULD PROBABLY REPORT HIM TO FBI, CIA, BORDER PATROL, "OR TO THE BOY SCOUTS". AMBIDDY THEN BROKE OFF CONTACT WITH RODEZNO AND DECIDED THERE NO REASON TRAVEL TO SALVADOR.

2. TWO DAYS LATER RICARDO ZUNIGA OF HONDURAS APPEARED IN MIAMI AND CONTACTED AMBIDDY. HE ALSO HAD LONG SHOPPING LIST RANGING FROM SMALL ARMS TO ONE THOUSAND POUND BOMB. MEETING TOOK PLACE IN DUPONT PLAZA HOTEL AND ZUNIGA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HONDURAN CONSUL "MIKE" (LNU). AMBIDDY GAVE THEM ESSENTIALLY SAME STORY, COMMISERATED WITH THEM, AS HAD WITH RODEZNO, SUGGESTED THEY WOULD DO BETTER TO SHOP IN EUROPE, FOR EXAMPLE BELGIUM OR SPAIN, WHO WOULD SELL TO ANYONE. ZUNIGA ASKED IF AMBIDDY THOUGHT FABRIQUE NATIONAL WOULD GRANT CONFIDENTIAL COMMISSION (KICKBACK) OF AT LEAST TEN PERCENT. AMBIDDY ASSURED HIM FN WOULD. ZUNIGA TOLD AMBIDDY THAT IF HE, ZUNIGA, SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING KICKBACK FROM FN, AMBIDDY COULD EXPECT TO RECEIVE NICE PRESENT. AMBIDDY HAS HEARD NOTHING SINCE FROM ZUNIGA BUT HAS HEARD FROM CONTACT IN HONDURAS THAT ZUNIGA BOUGHT ARMS AND AMMO FROM FN AND BOMBS IN PORTUGAL. PORTUGUESE GAVE HIM FIVE PERCENT RAKE-OFF. ZUNIGA TRAVELLED TO EUROPE ON HONDURAN PASSPORT IN ALIAS.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSE TION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

BY: AT: Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MANAGUA 7158 SECRET

3. AMBIDDY SAYS HE DID NOT GET INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN OBTAINING ARMS FOR EITHER SIDE OTHER THAN REFERRING THEM TO POSSIBLE FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND HAS NO INTENTION OF JEOPARDIZING HIS POSITION WITH U.S. BY GETTING MIXED UP IN ARMS TRAFFIC. HE HAS NO INFORMATION ON ARMS TRAFFIC WITH HAITI. AMBIDDY STILL HAS COPIES OF SALVADORAN AND HONDURAN SHOPPING LISTS AND OFFERED SEND THEM TO BARKER.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-267437.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2
3
4

ORIG: Robert C. Mooney
UNIT: WH/2/Nicaragua
EXT: 4489
DATE: 28 July 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY DKB PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WHB INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, C/OA, FI, SODC.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

2822 27Z JUL 69

CITE DIRECTOR 24584

TO MANAGUA INFO: PORT AU PRINCE, WH/MIAMI

REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 6311 (IN 10768)

B. MANAGUA 7069 (IN 10406)

1. HDQS WELCOMES ANY INFO ON AMBIDDY ARMS DEALINGS.

2. IF TELEPHONE ONLY LINK WITH AMBIDDY, COS IN BEST POSITION DETERMINE POSSIBILITY OF ELICITATION WITHOUT UNDUE SECURITY RISK.

3. FILE: 201-267437

AN PIU
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
DES NPD
~~RF~~
WH/8/N

*WH Comment: Ref A indicated Port Au Prince interest in any info obtained by Managua on AMBIDDY involvement in arms sales to Haiti. Ref B reported possibility AMBIDDY and Somoza involved in arms dealings with DUValier and asked addresses if they desire COS try elicit info from AMBIDDY.

Robert H. Rife for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH DIV
RELEASING OFFICER

AC/WH/7
WH/COG CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN C. MURRAY
AC/WH/2
201-267437
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

28 JUL 69

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 18 JULY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: UNLCASSIFIED
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA
INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA
FBI FILE #: 105-2617 (MIAMI, FLORIDA)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: A AT: 0345 Z

DISSEM BY 41 PER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2A

~~SECRET~~ GROUP 1

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO ✓

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CSDO, CSRF, CI, CI/OPS, FI2, [illegible] MPS/PSG 2, SOD 2, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, EUD, [illegible]

ACTION NO. 853

S E C R E T 130237Z JUL 69 CITE MANAGUA 7841 (MALA) 13 Jul 69 IN 01386

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA

1. FOLLOWING FROM AMBIDDY-1 TO COS 12 JULY.

AMBIDDY 1 RECEIVED PHONE CALL 10 JULY FROM (FNU) ALVAREZ, CUBAN BUSINESSMAN SAN SALVADOR. ALVAREZ DOUBLETALKED THAT HE CALLING ON BEHALF SALVADORAN MINDEF WHICH URGENTLY NEEDS SIX P-51 PILOTS ("MUSTANG DRIVERS") AND WILL PROBABLY ALSO NEED SOME "HEAVY TRUCK DRIVERS" WHICH AMBIDDY 1 SAYS MAY MEAN PILOTS FOR LARGER PLANES OR TANK DRIVERS. ALVAREZ SAID THAT MINDEF WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AMBIDDY 1 SERVE AS TECHNICAL ADVISOR IN UPCOMING OPERATIONS.

2. AMBIDDY 1 WISELY DEFERRED, SAID NEEDED TIME TO THINK MATTER OVER, EXPLAINED THAT HE NEEDS GET ALONG WITH BOTH COUNTRIES, SALVADOR AND HONDURAS, FOR BUSINESS REASONS. IS EXPECTING ANOTHER CALL FROM ALVAREZ MOMENTARILY.

3. COS ADVISED AMBIDDY 1 OF POSITION OUR GOVERNMENT IN THIS DISPUTE AND WAS ASSURED AMBIDDY 1 WILL NOT TAKE ANY ACTIVE PART. IF SUMMONED TO SALVADOR AMBIDDY 1 WILL OBTAIN AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON SALVADORAN WAR PLANS AND THEN "DECIDE" NOT TO PARTICIPATE. ALSO, IF

AN	RO
AB	
~~[illegible]~~	
~~[illegible]~~	
~~[illegible]~~	
DT	UPD
FD	

CS COPY

SECRET

201-267437
13 JUL 69

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: AUG 13 1 01 PM '69

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. 13 11 02 AM '69

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY: RECEIVED, ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO FORWARDED ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 7041 S E C R E T

HE TALKS TO SALVADORANS, HE WILL INSIST BEFORE ANY DISCUSSION THAT THEY PROMISE NOT TO BREATHE WORD TO "GRINGOS" THAT HE IS BEING CONSULTED. THIS PLOY DESIGNED TO SMOKE OUT MAXIMUM INFORMATION. AMBIDDY WILL REPORT ALL FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS TO STATION.

4. DEFER TO HQS FOR DISSEM PARA 1 INFO. AMBASSADOR INFORMED.

SECRET

AUG 13 69

FH

AN
AB
IN
PS
BX
DHS NFD
FI

CS COPY

SECRET

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
OF INTEREST TO SUBJECT OF 201-816438

201-816438
DBC -55478
23 JUN 69
FBI
P4

R 6907101035

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

ORIG: J. SEARS:mamd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 11 JUNE 69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		
2		
3		
4		

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

2 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

DISSEM: WH 8 | 6/0 | FILE, VR. RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 14 50z JUN 69 CITE DIRECTOR 10935

WH/MIAMI MANAGUA INFO PANAMA CITY

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI-4216 (IN 77932)

B. MANAGUA-7018 (IN 77965)*

1. NO OBJECTION REF A.

2. FILE 201-267437.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DES~~ NFD
~~FI~~
wh/cl/op

WH/COG COMMENT: *Managua concurs passage LNERGO.

C/WH/COG Paul Eckert

Ralph Shatuy for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2

Files
201-267437
12 Jun 69

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

380

SIFIED MESSAGE 10 TOTAL COPIES ~~11~~ 19

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO ✓

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE. VR. RI/AN EUR6 FI: ✓

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 111004Z JUN 69 CITE MADRID MADR 8701 11 Jun 69 IN 70505 9

MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY

REF: MANAGUA 7017 (477198)

1P

1. SUBJ PARA 2 REF, QUGROWL-1, PROVIDED FULL DETAILS ARMS SHIPMENT ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO. THANKS.

2. FILE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

AN	Pu
AB	X
IN	
PC	
E	4
DZ	PD
WH/2/N	

[illegible]

MICROFILMED
JUN 2 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

SECRET

B 201-11357
B 201-71455

11 June 69
201-267437

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION
WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

254

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:
FILE, VR, RI/AN CI/OPS FI/2

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 101525Z JUN 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 4216
WMIM

DIRECTOR, MANAGUA INFO PANAMA CITY

10 Jun 69 IN 77932

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY

REF MANAGUA 7017 (IN 77198)

1. REQUEST ADDRESSEES CONCURRENCE PASS REF INFO LOCALLY LNERGO.

2. FILE: 201-267437.

SECRET

AN	
AB	
IP	
ES	
BX	
DES	NFD
FI	
WH/COG	

CS COPY

SECRET

File
201-267437
10 Jun 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______ #

ACTION
WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

259

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:
FILE, VR. RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 101700Z JUN 69 CITE MANAGUA 7018 MANA

10 Jun 69 IN 77965

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY

REF: WH/MIAMI 4216 (IN 77932)

1. CONCUR PASS LNERGO.

2. FILE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

AN	PW
AB	X
IN	
[illegible]	
[illegible]	
CI/ NBD	
FI	

SECRET CS COPY

10 Jun 69
201-267437

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 76 PER

ACTION

WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

(146)

TOTAL COPIES 41 11

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

INFO:

FILE, VR. SUSPENSE WH, CDO, CSDO, 11/AN, EVIL 6 SOD6, ADDP, CA 5, CA/PEG, CI, CI/OPS, CI/PS, CS/SO, FI 3, FI/D, IW

S E C R E T 092056Z JUN 69 CITE MANAGUA 7017 (MANA)

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, MADRID, 9 JUN 69 IN 77198

WH/MIAMI

11P

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY

1. FOLLOWING FROM AMBIDDY-1 TO COS MANAGUA 9 JUNE.

2. ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO ENRIQUE TOUS, AMBIDDY ASSOCIATE SPAIN, WROTE AMBIDDY THAT ARMS FROM SPAIN BEING SENT TO GUATEMALA. AMBIDDY SUGGESTS MADRID STATION MAY WISH CHECK WITH TOUS FOR DETAILS IF NOT ALREADY AWARE OF THIS INFORMATION.

3. SON OF "TITO" ARIAS, LIVING IN CORAL GABLES FLORIDA, RECENTLY HAS PURCHASED 30 FOOT BOAT AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS WORTH OF RADIO BROADCASTING EQUIPMENT TO BE SENT TO GUATEMALA. OPERATION BELIEVED FINANCED BY ARNULFO ARIAS WITH SOME INPUT OF MONEY FROM CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS. INFO FROM AMERICAN GIRL WHO LIVES NEXT DOOR TO SON OF "TITO" ARIAS. AMBIDDY COULD NOT RECALL NAME.

4. FILE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

WH/2/N

MICROFILMED
JUN 24 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

SECRET

B201-11357
B201-71155

9 June 69
201-267437

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

WERDEN, PHILENA
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

DV-152
GA-50
TUBE GT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
C/WH/2		23 MAY 1969		
2.				
3. WH/2/N				NR
4. RM				RM
5. LC				Le
6. PA				Pa.
7. C/WH/C		Karin 27 MAY 1969		
8. C/WH/COG		27 MAY 1969	27 MAY 19	
9. DC/WH/COG		27 MAY 1969		
10. Mr. Sene		2 JUN 1969		
11. Mr. Hopkins		3 JUN 1969	3/Suit	RH
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COMMENTS

COPY DETACHED

MICROFILMED
MAY 23 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

copy sent Miami
Ali

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
15 May 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HNMA 04335

FORM USE PREVIOUS (40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
: Chief of Station, Managua LFB

SUBJECT
0 : Information Received from AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: (A) HNMA-4315, 17 April 1969

(B) HNMA-4324, 1 May 1969

1. Attached (USC) for the information of Headquarters is a copy of a memorandum prepared for the LNPURE Chief on 12 May 1969. This memorandum sets forth information received that day by the COS from AMBIDDY-1 who is considering going into a dry dock venture in Corinto with Jose Maria ZELAYA, private secretary to President Somoza. ZELAYA has cabinet rank. He is believed by many to be pro-Communist although, as in the case of similar reports about Francisco J. LAINEZ, no real proof of these allegations seems to be produced.

2. When shown this memorandum, the LNPURE Chief said he thought it quite likely that ZELAYA is strongly anti-American as reported by AMBIDDY.

3. AMBIDDY says that for the first time he recently heard Somoza utter unfavorable words about the United States and AMBIDDY "wondered" to the COS if ZELAYA could be exerting some evil influence on Somoza.

4. The Station will seek to draw AMBIDDY out at length on this matter at an opportune time.

Lawrence F. Barker
Lawrence F. BARKER

Attachment:
Memorandum USC

MICROFILMED
MAY 23 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

CS COPY

1 att:

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
✓201-822852	HNMA-4335	15 May 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-267437

~~SECRET~~

11

The Ambassador 12 May 1969

Political Attaché

Statements of Jose Maria "Chema" ZELAYA

1. On 12 May I was contacted by a close friend of mine who is engaged in negotiations with "Chema" ZELAYA which may lead to the two forming a business partnership. While my source is not normally a source of intelligence information, I have found him to be a good observer and to be reliable. He told me that ZELAYA told him the following at a meeting on 9 May.

2. The ROCKEFELLER visit is merely a political maneuver on the part of President NIXON to furnish an excuse if anything goes wrong in Latin America. It is preposterous to expect Governor ROCKEFELLER to learn anything about a country in twenty four hours. ROCKEFELLER will go back to the United States, make his report to NIXON, and then go about his normal duties. NIXON will adopt those recommendations regarding U.S. policy for Latin America that are agreeable to him, paying no attention to the rest. If anything goes wrong, NIXON can pin the blame on ROCKEFELLER. In this way he has a scapegoat and also has an opportunity to lessen the prestige of a potential political rival. No possible good can come from this mission.

3. ZELAYA said that he has managed to obtain the blessing (bendición) of the Catholic Church. Now he is working on the blessing of the American Ambassador. In this respect he has proposed setting up youth centers around the country-- places where youngsters can go to read good books, play ping pong, etc. -- and the American Ambassador is interested.

4. My friend is of the opinion that ZELAYA is strongly anti-American.

MICROFILMED
MAY 23 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

S/c att: 1
HNMA-04335

SECRET

201-267437

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

WERDEN, PHILENA
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

DV-152
GA-60
TUBE GT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Consolidated - file

SEE P 12-B

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. ~~[illegible]~~				
2. C/WH/C		13 1969		
3. DC/WH/CA ~~[illegible]~~		13 MAY 1969		
4. ~~C/WH/COG~~	1	1969		
5. Mr Sears		13	13	
6. Mr Hopkins	14 MAY		14 May	BH
7. Nancy Getz		19 MAY 1969		NG
8. ~~[illegible]~~				
9.				
10.				
11. AC/WH/2		20 MAY 1969		
12. WH/2/N				WR
13. RM				RM
14. LC				
15. PA				Pa
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COPY DETACHED

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
1 May 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HNMA 04324

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~S E C R E T~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO : Chief, WH Division
INFO. : Chief, WH/Miami
FROM : Chief of Station, Managua [illegible]
SUBJECT C: AMBIDDY-1
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HNMA-4315, 17 April 1969

There is attached (USC) another memorandum based on a conversation with Subject on 28 April 1969. It is forwarded for your information and should be considered a continuation of the memorandum submitted with Reference.

Lawrence F. Barker
Lawrence F. BARKER

Attachment:

Memorandum (split transmission)
1. Right side, HEREWITH
2. Left side, USC

Distribution:
0&1 - Chief, WHDivision,w/att
2 - Chief, WH/MIAMI, w/att
2 att.

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HNMA-4324	1 May 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267437

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

29 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Manuel ARTIME Buesa

1. On 18 April I saw Subject again briefly and told him that I would appreciate an opportunity to talk to him alone. As he was about to leave town, he promised to contact me again on his next trip to Managua. He phoned me on 28 April. I picked him up that night and drove him up to my house where we had a long conversation over a couple of steaks and a good bottle of wine.

2. I told Subject that I had heard his name mentioned in connection with such unsavory activity as fomenting revolution in Panama and narcotics trafficking--from people who don't know him. My reply to any such dirty-mouthing is that Subject is a hyperactive type who keeps in contact with all sorts of people, some of whom may be involved in unsavory activity. This does not mean Subject is involved. Indeed, I was sure he was not.

3. The provocation yielded desired results and in the ensuing conversation Subject gave me a detailed explanation of his present activities and financial situation.

4. His business dealings are carried on under his company, known as Central South International, Inc. He is president and his wife is secretary. His business activity in Nicaragua consists of :

a. Sales of equipment to the National Guard

b. Sales of livestock (cows) to Nicaragua. These dealings are handled through Colonel Guillermo NOGUERA, the buyer at this end. Subject expects to expand this business to include sales to INFONAC--the National Development Commission.

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

CS COPY

s/c att: 1

HNMA-4324

SECRET

201-267437

Subject obtains the livestock from the Montura Ranch of Florida.

c. Sales of Florida real estate. Subject is not licensed to make such sales in the U.S. but can sell to persons abroad. (About two years ago he was selling lots west of Miami near where a new airport is to be built.)

5. Subject is now involved--on this trip--in a deal with President SOMOZA to furnish well drilling and pumping equipment for an agricultural irrigation system. SOMOZA was approached by a British firm which somehow wangled a U.S.-guaranteed 5 1/2 percent loan to underwrite the same scheme. This low interest was better than Subject's contacts could obtain initially and it appeared that the contract would go to the British outfit. However, Subject's stateside partner, a South Carolina legislator (state level), who operates a business known as INTERGROW, managed to swing the same deal and was due in town on 29 April to talk with SOMOZA. SOMOZA told Subject he would give the business to Subject if he and his INTERGROW friend could equal the British offer. As of 28 April prospects for consumation of a deal looked good.

6. Subject is also trying to work out a deal with SOMOZA regarding export of Nicaraguan meat. Previous dealings with a man from S&W fell through when this chap tried to "go around" Subject by dealing direct with Nicaraguan meat exporters. At present Subject is dealing with SOMOZA to buy meat from CARNIC and IFAGAN to sell in Miami to the Northwestern Meat Company, owned by Elpidio NUÑEZ. In return for his cooperation in the meat business, SOMOZA is to be given a 38% slice of the profits. The remainder would be split up as follows: 16% to Edgardo BUTTARI, 13% to Frank CONDOM, and 33% to Subject. SOMOZA is trying to figure out some way to get his bite without paying U.S. income taxes so the matter of spreading the profits is still up in the air. Central South International Inc. has an account at the Capital National Bank of Miami; Subject showed me an irrevocable letter of credit in the amount of $48,000 issued by this bank to be used for the meat export deal.

FORWARDED BY [illegible] TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~

7. As for possible sales of cattle to INFONAC, Subject is working on a deal with SOMOZA which may involve as much as a million and a half dollars.

8. Subject lives on commissions. He is now in debt to the tune of $9,500 of which he owes $1,600 to American Express and $3,900 to SOMOZA. When he has been down and out three persons have helped him with handouts of money to tide him over. These are Sixto MESA, in the construction business in Miami; Jose Luis GONZALEZ, in the lumber business; and "Tacho" SOMOZA. Subject plans to pay back all three every cent they have given him. He considers these handouts as loans. He is now trying to consolidate his debts through a loan from Diners Club. He is paying on his home mortgage at a rate of 5 3/4 percent, quite low by present-day standards. Two Cuban Negro friends of many-years standing live with him at his home. They are taxi drivers and each pays $25 a week to help defray household costs. One of these loyal retainers fired the first shot during the Pilon sugar mill raid pulled off by Subject's followers several years ago.

9. Contrary to popular belief, Subject does not own a piece of the Vizcaya restaurant in Miami although he could have been a partner had he made a $500 investment when the enterprise began. The owners are Oscar VILA, Aramis PIÑON, and the cook, named Tomás (lnu). VILA and PIÑON were with Subject in the Bay of Pigs invasion and both are old friends. VILA has been rumored involved in narcotics but Subject doesn't think he is. Some time ago the Miami Herald sent its lady gourmet reporter to do a story on the Vizcaya. She found it to her liking and wrote a favorable story but some unidentified character at the Herald told her that narcotics were pushed at the Vizcaya and that Subject was one of the owners. Publisher KNIGHT of the Herald had an investigation run before allowing the gourmet reporter's story to be printed. The restaurant was given a clean bill of health and the story was run.

10. One of the persons most prominently involved in blackening Subject's name is Rolando MASFERRER. Subject classifies him as the scum of Batista's Cuba. One gets the impression that Subject would be unhappy if MASFERRER, who Subject says has been involved in narcotics trafficking, were to say anything good about him.

FORWARDED BY [illegible] TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

SECRET

11. Subject's only other possible connection with narcotics involves a report he gave to Mr. DREW of the FBI. This was as follows: Subject has a friend named Carlos ARMAS who is skipper of a shrimp boat the "Sea Cat". ARMAS lives at 1800 NW 34th Street, Miami. At sea in British waters (around some British island or cay in the Caribbean). ARMAS has "fraternized" with a Cuban shrimper "El Costero" captained by Antonio LOPEZ. LOPEZ has told ARMAS that his boat, "El Costero", often carries aboard a small, very fast speedboat. While anchored in British waters this speedboat, with a crew of 3, is put overboard with a "package" on board. It disappears only to return sometime later minus the package but with large quantities of money. It then refuels from "El Costero" and heads for Cuba on its own power. Subject and ARMAS think it probable that the package contains narcotics and that Fidel CASTRO is raising money this way. Mr. DREW of the FBI told Subject to tell his story to the Coast Guard. Subject did but the CG said they were not interested because the smuggling was taking place in British waters. As far as Subject knows nothing has ever been done about this matter.

12. Subject says that "politically" his program breaks down to:

a. Keeping about 200 men ("my action men") ready for action in case of a sudden change in Cuba or a "go ahead" on raids against Cuba.

b. Keeping on good terms with Edgardo BUTTARI and Frank CONDOM who are both on good terms with "Bebe" REBOZO who is in turn, an intimate friend of President NIXON. (Subject asked me not to discuss or report this owing to its political sensitivity. It would seem prudent not to accentuate this matter).

c. Keeping good relations with Nicaragua and Haiti for possible future operations against Cuba.

13. I asked Subject if he had any dealings with Colonel Angel ARAUZ of Panama in connection with efforts to overthrow the government of Panama. He said that ARAUZ had tried to get him, Subject, to furnish arms, support, and influential

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

friends in the Miami area. Subject successfully avoided ARAUZ when he showed up in Miami. ARAUZ is now in Venezuela where his wife's family is well connected with the COPEI Party. Subject is not in contact with ARAUZ.

14. Throughout our conversation Subject appeared sincere and anxious to make the facts known. He repeatedly stressed his respect for our organization as he has in the past. I believe he was being forthright and honest. He promised to keep in touch.

FORWARDED BY STAT[illegible]SSION
FOR FIELD DISSEMINATION

SECRET

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM : Chief of Station, Managua

SUBJECT : HEREWITH ATTACHMENT (#1) TO HNMA-4324, 1 May 1969

Duplicate

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID, AN.

FROM:

RID:

WERDEN, PHILENA
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

DV-T52
GA-60
TUBE, GT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE
COMMENTS

COPY DETACHED

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/2		28 APR 1969		
2.				
3. [illegible]				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8. C/WH/CAN				WL
9. LC				N
10. PA			30 APR 1969	
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
17 April 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER
INMA 04315

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

XX MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO. : Chief, WH/Miami

FROM : Chief of Station, Managua LFB

SUBJECT 6 : AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: FBI Report of 30 January 1969

The Station has seen a copy of an FBI report of 30 January 1969, concerning AMBIDDY-1, which indicates, among other things, that AMBIDDY reportedly claimed to have arranged an interview with Mr. Richard NIXON at the time the latter was a presidential candidate. Since the content and tone of this FBI report differ somewhat from what the COS, Managua, has learned in direct talks with AMBIDDY-1, there is attached (USC) a memorandum from the COS setting forth observations resulting from meetings with AMBIDDY in Managua.

Lawrence F. Barker
Lawrence F. BARKER

Attachment:
Memorandum (split transmission)
1. Right side HEREWITH
2. Left side, USC

Distribution:
O&1 - Chief, WH Division
2 - Chief, WH Miami

1 att:

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HNMA-4315

DATE: 17 April 1969

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER: ✓201-267437

SECRET

17 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Manuel ARTIME Buesa

1. ARTIME comes to Managua frequently, always using LANICA Airlines and frequently flying over Cuba. He is aware of the possibility of a highjacking and says that he would never make it out of the Havana airport alive if the CASTRO Government were to get hold of him.

2. He explains his trips as legitimate business. One of his enterprises lies in obtaining fatigue uniforms, canteens, web gear, and similar equipment and supplies for the Nicaraguan National Guard. Another enterprise, in which he was involved a year or so ago, involved lumber and cabinet woods which he hoped to export from Nicaragua to the States. He dealt with a Nicaraguan businessman named MOLINA in this matter. It seems to have fallen through. At one point last year (1968) I heard that ARTIME was trying to serve as middleman for investments by KRUPP interests in Germany here. I have heard no more about this. A more recent line is Nicaraguan beef for export to the States. He says that he has made contact with the top man of the S & W restaurants in the States. This man, after checking samples of Nicaraguan beef, says he will buy all he can get. The supplier at this end would be CARNIC, a meat packing enterprise owned by President SOMOZA. (There is no doubt ARTIME could find a ready market in the States but he may be stymied by the import quotas, especially since Nicaragua over-exported to the States in 1968 and had troubles as a result.)

3. ARTIME drops by to see me at my home often although not on every trip. His visits to me have been less frequent of late. We have easy rapport. He knows who I represent.

s/c att: 1

CS COPY

HNMA-4315

SECRET

201-267437

He is usually accompanied by Jose FERNANDEZ de la Torre, Manager of Distribuidora Inter-Americana, S. A. "Pepe" is a Cuban and a close friend of mine. He is ARTIME's closest friend in Nicaragua. ARTIME often stays at his home. On a couple of occasions ARTIME has been by to see me with another mutual Cuban friend, Primitivo ABLANEDO, who used to live at El Bluff on the East Coast. "El Gallego" ABLANEDO now lives in Managua and makes his living renting out dump trucks and construction and hauling equipment. On one occasion ARTIME came by with a Cuban I believe was named VILA. Mirta PADRON, another mutual Cuban friend (she teaches Spanish at the American Embassy) tells me that VILA owns a restaurant in Miami but that ARTIME has no connection with this enterprise. A couple of times ARTIME has come by with Frank CONDOM, a short, quiet, red-faced Cuban who owns some jewelry stores in Miami. CONDOM is now pretty well-off financially and is a good friend and business associate of "Bebe" REBOZO, who, in turn, is a close friend of President NIXON. I believe CONDOM and, perhaps REBOZO, may be involved in the meat deal.

4. ARTIME always comes with someone when he visits me--not because he feels need for a bodyguard as some suspect, but simply because he still doesn't know how to drive a car and I live some distance out of town. Our visits are pleasant, involve a scotch or two at most. The last two times ARTIME has not had anything to drink. We talk no operations or other such business. My personal views on dealing with CASTRO, especially on howwe should have dealt with him in the past, are rather hawkish and I think ARTIME finds these views pleasant to his ear although he is well aware that they are not "policy."

5. ARTIME told me some months ago--before the elections--of meeting with "Bebe" REBOZO. The meeting was arranged through CONDOM. ARTIME has not claimed to me to have met with Mr. NIXON either before or after he assumed the presidency. He has made it known, as is already well known, that REBOZO is close to the President. He has also speculated that REBOZO might have considerable say in formulation of the new

14-00000

administration's Cuban policy. He expects this policy to be more hard-line but has not specifically said that REBOZO has said this would be so. He recently told me that some of my ideas on enforcing the economic blockade had been passed on to REBOZO.

6. In response to my queries as to what direction the new Cuba policy might take, ARTIME said in March 1969 that he did not expect the NIXON administration to address itself to the Cuban problem before May of this year. Then he expects a concerted effort to make the economic blockade work. If that does not yield results, he expects that a go-ahead will be given for the resumption of Cuban exile raids against Cuba from non-U.S. bases. He hopes to be the man chosen to lead in this endeavor. Again, in response to my questions, he said that exiles could be trained in Nicaragua. He favors using Haiti as the actual base of operations, i.e., the raiding parties would leave from there. He mentioned having talked with President DUVALIER and indicated that he has DUVALIER's approval for such operations.

7. ARTIME said that operations against Cuba would be designed to knock out shipping and port facilities. He has not recently referred to his earlier invasion plan as outlined in MANAGUA 6752 of 23 October 1968.

8. ARTIME is still as charming as ever, lot's of fun to be around socially--full of jokes, anecdotes, etc. He has not lost faith, is one of the few of what have been termed elsewhere "the old exile hacks" who have not given up. He really does seem determined to play a leading role in unseating CASTRO. He is beginning to go to fat a bit. I saw him in a bathing suit not long ago and thought that he would do well to get into trim if he hopes to lead in any military operation.

9. ARTIME has never made any discernable efforts to pry secrets from me; indeed, he seems to have taken special pains not to do so. He is mature and quite objective--can see various facets to just about any problem. I believe it is well worthwhile maintaining occasional contact with him.

~~SECRET~~

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Managua

SUBJECT: HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO HNMA-4315, 17 April 1969 (ATT #1)

Duplicate

~~SECRET~~

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY______ AT______ Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ #

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

012

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In) GROUP 1 15

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE VR. RF/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI-2

ACTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 082230Z APR 69 CITE ~~WH~~/MIAMI 3484 (NEBECKER ACTING)
WMIM

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA

8 APR 69 IN 31505
N

REFS: A. MANAGUA 6936 (IN30512)

B. DIRECTOR 90113

1. APPRECIATE REF COMMENTS. WILL ADVISE LNYUMA INFORMALLY THAT WOFIRM HAS NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MANUEL ARTIME AND LEAVE DECISIONS CONCERNING POSSIBLE INVESTIGATION OF HIS BUSINESS ACTIVITIES TO LNYUMA DISCRETION.

2. FILE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

AN	KE
AB	X
[illegible]	
[illegible]	
[illegible]	
[illegible]	
[illegible]	
WH/COG/SP	

Files

CS COPY

~~SECRET~~

201-267437
18 April 69

14-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 5

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO ✓

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE, VR CI/OA, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

S E C R E T 071744Z APR 69 CITE MANAGUA 6936 MANA

7 APR 69 IN 30512

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 98113

1. CONCUR IN REF SUGGESTED ACTION.

2. MANAGUA STATION HAS NO INFORMATION ON CUBAN EXILE TRAINING BASES.

3. FILE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

AC RW
AD X
F
I
FI

CS COPY

~~SECRET~~

7 Apr 69
201-267437

14-00000

ORIG: J. PICCOLO:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144 R. 1819
DATE: 4 APRIL 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN F2 FI C/CFS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica)

SECRET 05 00 34 1 APR 69 90113

CITE DIRECTOR

WH/MIAMI INFO: MANAGUA

REF: WH/MIAMI 3427 (IN 28439)

1. SUGGEST STATION INFORM LNYUMA THAT WOFIRM HAS NO ACTIVE OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MANUEL ARTIME. MAY ALSO SAY THAT ARTIME HAS BEEN IN LEGITIMATE BUSINESS OF SUPPLYING UNIFORMS AND OTHER MATERIALS TO NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD, IS CONSIDERED TO BE FRIEND OF LNHARP, AND UNLESS MANAGUA HAS INFORMATION TO CONTRARY, ARTIME HAS NO TRAINING BASES FOR CUBAN EXILES IN NICARAGUA.

2. LNYUMA MAY OPEN ACTIVE FILE ON ARTIME IF SO DESIRED BUT THERE NO EVIDENCE AT HAND HE PREPARING ANOTHER EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

3. FILE 201-267437.

END OF MESSAGE

AN ee
X
DL
PO
D
FI
WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WH/2/CR&N D.Burris (in draft)

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

201-267437
5 April 69

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

WH 8 ☐ RID COPY RI/AN, FI 2, FI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

517

S E C R E T 031327Z APR 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 3427 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MANAGUA

3 Apr 69 IN 28439

1. DURING RECENT INFORMAL SESSION WITH LNYAPA MIAMI REP HE ASKED IF WOFIRM STILL HAD OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MANUEL ARTIME. ON BEING TOLD NO LOCAL INTEREST, HE SAID ARTIME IS NOW IN THE EXPORT-IMPORT BUSINESS, HAS CONTACTS WITH THE NICARAGUAN MILITARY, AND IS USING NICA AIRLINES TO SHIP EXPORT-IMPORT MERCHANDISE. SAID ARTIME HAD SHIPPED MEDICAL SUPPLIES AMONG OTHER ITEMS TO NICARAGUA.

2. LNYUMA REP OBVIOUSLY SUSPECTS ARTIME IS INVOLVED IN ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN NICARAGUA WHICH MAY BE BACKED BY WOFIRM. AT PRESENT HE UNDECIDED WHETHER TO OPEN AN ACTIVE FILE ON ARTIME OR TO DROP THE MATTER. SEEKING STATION ADVICE.

3. REQUEST COMMENTS.

4. FILE: 201-267437.

S E C R E T

AN
AB X
~~PA~~
D
WH/COG

Files
201-267437
3 April 69

CS COPY

~~SECRET~~

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 26 MARCH 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA
INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA
FBI FILE #: 105-2617 (MIAMI, FLORIDA)

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
< NICARAGUA
HEAD OF REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY MOVEMENT. SUBJ CONTACTED BY JORGE ROBLEJO LORIE /201-300086/ RE SECURING FREEDOM POLITICAL PRISONERS CUBA.

201-300086
DBC -46353
20 MAR 69
FBI
P2

R 6904021210

FILE IN 201-267437

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
< CUBA
OPERATES MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

201-294682
DBC -47308
18 MAR 69
FBI

R 6904110968

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 0-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
PROMINENT ANTI-CASTRO LEADER, MIAMI

019-300-018
DBC -46426
12 MAR 69
FBI

R 6904100167

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

FORM 10-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL	
201-267437	019-300-018
SEX M DOB ?	DBC -45436
	28 FEB 69
CIT ?	FBI
OCC ?	

CUBAN EXILE IN MIAMI WHO FORMERLY IN CHARGE ABORTED BAY OF PIGS INVASION CUBA. ARTIME LATER OPERATED TRAINING CAMPS NICARAGUA. RPDLY HAS QUANTITY OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION NICARAGUA WHICH WANTS TO SELL TO GOVT HAITI. ARTIME RECENTLY VISITED HAITI AND WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HAITIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN MIAMI.

R 6903200234

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID,
FILLMORE, EVELYN
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

EJ-562
GA50
TUBE GT-7

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Chrono detached ah

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C/Ops		23 FEB 1969	27 Fe	K
2. DC/WH/COG		27 FEB	1969	
3. C/WH/COG		28 FEB 1969		
4.				
5. Nancy Gratz		10 March 1969		NG
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
FEB 24 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
11 Feb 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFAA 00544

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

2P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
c Current Rumors in PBRUMEN Exile Community

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
FEB 24 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. As usual the first month of 1969 featured a large number of rumors making the rounds in the PBRUMEN exile community. While we normally tend to ignore such rumors, we are forwarding a couple of tidbits because they relate to GPVALIANT.

2. The first of these rumors deals with a new group which has presumably been formed for the purpose of trying to deal through GPVALIANT. Among those in the group are Carlos Prio, Lincoln Rodon, Juan J. Remos, Sergio Carbo, and Edgardo Butari. This group reportedly meets every Thursday at different houses. The last meeting in January was held at the home of Lincoln Rodon. At this meeting Prio presumably stated that Butari was a better contact to GPVALIANT than is Emilio Nunez Portuando. The general consensus was that Butari is a better contact because he is a business partner of Bebe Roboso and everyone knows Reboso's influence with GPVALIANT. The rumor mill has it that the group intends to pretend that it favors political and democratic solutions to the PBRUMEN problem but that they really seek armed intervention. In this same connection Father O'Farril has recently told AMPALM-4 that AMBIDDY-1 is once more connected with WOFIRM and that AMCORE-2 has joined him. The rumor mill says further that AMBIDDY-1 and AMCORE-2 are planning to open training camps once again with the tacit encouragement of the above group. According to AMPALM-4 O'Farril himself does not agree with the version of AMBIDDY-1 and AMCORE-2 wanting to establish training camps. O'Farril feels that the solution AMBIDDY-1 is looking for is through agreements between LNFORT (GPVALIANT) and the Soviet Union.

3. WIBALDA has picked up information quite similar to that learned through AMPALM-4. He also has reported the existence of this group and said that they are collecting money from the refugees in order to buy arms and equipment to overthrow AMTHUG-1. According to WIBALDA important members of Alpha-66, Segundo Frente, DRE, Autenticos, and Ortodoxos are involved even though these organizations themselves are not participating as groups in the movement.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

FEB 11 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO D - 19-126-65/3	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-544	DATE TYPED: 10 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267437

4. Another rumor has it that AMOTEX-59 is also conspiring in plans for future armed action against PBRUMEN.

5. The above information is being forwarded strictly as unfounded and unconfirmed rumors. We are passing it along only because it represents another indication of what the exiles are expecting from GPVALIANT. We find the rumor concerning AMBIDDY-1 particularly interesting and suspect that it may be an outgrowth of the recent report we have received from AMCHALK-1 that AMBIDDY-1 has been contacted by ACSI.

George T. Copsidas
George T. COPSIDAS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION	
		2. RI FILE NO.	
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
RE ACCOUNT ANTICIPATED INFILTRATION
ATTEMPT CUBA

100-009-014
DBC -43715
04 FEB 69
FBI
P4

R 6903070491

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 30 JANAURY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA
FBI FILE #: UNKNOWN (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 30 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA
FBI FILE #: UNKNOWN (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

#7,

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION

[illegible] WH 8

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, [illegible], WH/COG 2, ADDP

[illegible]

S E C R E T 041527Z AUG 68 CITE MANAGUA 6689

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO JMCOBRA

201-267437 ✓

4Sep 68 [illegible] 34870

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA VISITED COS MANAGUA NIGHT 3 SEP. DEEPLY DISTRESSED, REPORTED HIS MOTHER, DRA. OTILIA BUESA BEAUJARDIN, OVER 80, GRAVELY ILL IN HAVANA, NOT EXPECTED LIVE MUCH LONGER. ARTIME SPOKE WITH PRESIDENT SOMOZA 3 SEP ASKING HELP IN OBTAINING PERMISSION FOR MOTHER LEAVE CUBA. SOMOZA PROMISED CALL MEXICAN PRESIDENT GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ TO INTERCEDE WITH FIDEL CASTRO.

d

AN	2
AB	X
IN	
PS	
~~BX~~	
DES	NFD
FI	

2. ARTIME ASKED COS IF WOFIRM COULD HELP IN ANY WAY, PERHAPS THROUGH DIAZ ORDAZ WHO HE CONSIDERS BEST CHANNEL TO CUBAN GOVERNMENT. FEELS CASTRO MIGHT BE WILLING LET HIS MOTHER LEAVE TO PROVE HE IS "HUMANITARIAN" OR TO KEEP ON GOOD SIDE OF MEXICAN GOVERNMENT.

3. COS EXPRESSED SYMPATHY, SAID DID NOT KNOW WHAT, IF ANYTHING, COULD BE DONE, BUT WOULD RELAY REQUEST TO HQS.

SECRET

SECRET

201-267437

4 Sep 68

CS C[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: Paul E. Cerst:jls
UNIT: DC/WH/COG
EXT: 7451/1948
DATE: 5 September 1968

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☒ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-267437

CONF: WH/COG8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR RI/AN WH8 ADDP

SECRET 05 22 30Z SEP 68 CITE DIRECTOR 30572

TO MANAGUA INFO: MEXICO CITY, JMCOBRA

REFERENCE: MANAGUA 6689 (IN 84970)*

1. ASSURE ARTIME HQS WILL CONSIDER WAYS WE MIGHT INDIRECTLY RENDER ASSISTANCE IF POSSIBLE TO DO SO WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HIS MOTHER'S CHANCES OF GETTING EXIT PERMIT. HE WILL READILY UNDERSTAND THAT OUR DIRECT INVOLVEMENT COULD PROVOKE NEGATIVE RESPONSE IN VIEW CASTRO'S KNOWN ANIMOSITY TOWARD WOFIRM.

2. FOR MEXICO: ASSUME YOU AGREE THAT DIRECT WOFIRM APPEAL SUGGESTED REF MAY NOT BE DESIREABLE FOR REASON STATED ABOVE PLUS POSSIBILITY LIRAMA-1 MIGHT CONCLUDE ARTIME IS WOFIRM AGENT. IF YOU HAVE ANY ALTERNATE SUGGESTIONS PLEASE ADVISE. OTHERWISE HQS BELIEVES HUMANITARIAN APPEAL THROUGH ARTIME'S OWN CONTACTS IS BEST APPROACH.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB
IN
PS
DA
DE/HPD
FI
WH/COP

C/WH/2
C/WH/1

John R. Horton
AC/WHD

CS COPY

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

201-267437
5 Sept 1968

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

ORIG: Paul E. Oberst:jls
UNIT: DC/WH/COG
EXT: 7451/1948
DATE: 5 September 1968

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR RI/AN WH8 ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 05 22 30z SEP 68 CITE DIRECTOR 30572

TO MANAGUA INFO: MEXICO CITY, JMCOBRA

REFERENCE: MANAGUA 6689 (IN 84970)*

1. ASSURE ARTIME HQS WILL CONSIDER WAYS WE MIGHT INDIRECTLY RENDER ASSISTANCE IF POSSIBLE TO DO SO WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HIS MOTHER'S CHANCES OF GETTING EXIT PERMIT. HE WILL READILY UNDERSTAND THAT OUR DIRECT INVOLVEMENT COULD PROVOKE NEGATIVE RESPONSE IN VIEW CASTRO'S KNOWN ANIMOSITY TOWARD WOFIRM.

2. FOR MEXICO: ASSUME YOU AGREE THAT DIRECT WOFIRM APPEAL SUGGESTED REF MAY NOT BE DESIREABLE FOR REASON STATED ABOVE PLUS POSSIBILITY LIRAMA-1 MIGHT CONCLUDE ARTIME IS WOFIRM AGENT. IF YOU HAVE ANY ALTERNATE SUGGESTIONS PLEASE ADVISE. OTHERWISE HQS BELIEVES HUMANITARIAN APPEAL THROUGH ARTIME'S OWN CONTACTS IS BEST APPROACH.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/2
C/WH/1

John R. Horton
AC/WHD

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

201-267437

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: ______ PER SAME AS REF

ACTION
DCI ☐ RID COPY

ISSUED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

INFO
FILE, VR, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CSRF, C/WH6, C/WH/COG 5,

SECRET 232102Z AUG 68 CITE JMCOBRA 0699 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR

23 Aug 68 IN 77099

4

REF: DIRECTOR 26796*

1. MANUEL ARTIME CONTACTED BY STAFF OFFICER FROM JMWAVE, WHO IS SHORTLY TO LEAVE AREA, AND GIVEN MESSAGE.

2. ARTIME EXPRESSED APPRECIATION THAT KNIGHT HAD SENT PERSONAL EMISSARY

SECRET

BT

C/S Comment: *KNIGHT requested JMCOBRA have some appropriate officer contact Mr. Artime and thank him for his thoughtfulness and courageous offer.

201-267437

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

ORIG.: RICHARD HELMS
UNIT: DIRECTOR
EXT.: 6161
DATE: 27 AUGUST 1968

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF.: DCI ☐ RID COPY

INFO.: FILE , VR D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/EF RR

C/WH/COG 5, C/WH6

C/WH/COG

SECRET

22 20 06Z AUG 68

CITE DIRECTOR 26796

TO JMCOBRA

RYBAT

FROM KNIGHT

1. AM IN RECEIPT TODAY OF TELEGRAM WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE IN ANY EVENT OF INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY PLEASE RELY ON ME AND MY MEN UNCONDITIONALLY ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD STOP SIGNED MANUEL ARTIME, BAY OF PIGS INVASION COMMANDER, 1270 NORTHEAST 85 ST. MIAMI FLORIDA UNQUOTE

2. PLEASE HAVE SOME APPROPRIATE OFFICER CONTACT MR. ARTIME AND THANK HIM FOR HIS THOUGHTFULNESS AND COURAGEOUS OFFER. RECOGNIZE THIS APPROACH PRESENTS YOU WITH CONTACT PROBLEM, BUT HANDLE IT AS BEST YOU CAN, INCLUDING USE OF INNOCENT PERSON IF YOU PREFER.

(END OF MESSAGE)

201-269437

RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C. Wayne
ACTING DD/P
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In) 10

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ______

ACTION 297 WHP ☐ NO COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO

CI, CI/OPS, CI/ICA, FI, SI/INT 2, SOD 6, HAITI

SECRET 071937Z JUL 68 CITE MANAGUA 6617 (TRECKLER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA, PANAMA CITY, PORT AU PRINCE

1. AMBIDDY-1 TOLD ACOS 7 JULY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM HIS WIFE IN MIAMI ADVISING THAT SOMEONE HAD BEEN TRYING CONTACT HIM. AMBIDDY-1 ASSUMES THIS MIGHT BE HIS HQS CASE OFFICER AND WISHES TO ADVISE HQS THAT HE WILL BE RETURNING TO MIAMI ON 8 JULY.

MICROFILMED AUG 1 1968 DOC. MICRO. SER.

2. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO PICKED UP IN 2 JULY MEETING WITH AMBIDDY-1 ON EVENTS THAT OCCURRED PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FROM MIAMI FIRST WEEK JULY:

UH41

AN 2	FI	WH/3/N	
ES			
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX	X

A. (FNU) BLANCA ROBLES, PANAMA CONSUL IN MIAMI CONTACTED AMBIDDY-1 AND TOLD HIM PANAMANIAN MINISTER OF HACIENDA WHO WAS VISITING IN U.S. WANTED TO MEET WITH AMBIDDY-1 TO DISCUSS UNSPECIFIED URGENT MATTER. 201-782436

CIT: HAITI

OCC: DIPLOMAT

B. EUGENE MAXIMILLIAN, HAITIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI TOLD AMBIDDY-1 THAT PRESIDENT DUVALLIER WANTED TO SEE HIM. PURPOSE WAS TO CARRY PRIVATE MESSAGE FROM DUVALIER TO PRESIDENT SOMOZA. CLAIMED THAT IF AMBIDDY-1 DID THIS DUVALLIER WOULD RELEASE THE SON OF LEON CANTAVE FROM PRISON. SOMOZA HAS GIVEN AMBIDDY-1 PERMISSION TO MAKE THE TRIP. ACCORDING AMBIDDY-1, HE AND SOMOZA FIGURE THIS IS A PLAY BY DUVALIER TO TRY OPEN MORE DOORS ACCEPTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA.

SECRET CS COPY

201-267437

7 Jul 68

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES [illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 7

ACTION Wukoep 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE VR WH 8 [illegible]

AS/[illegible]	PI	
PB	[illegible]	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

maca

SECRET 121543Z CITE MANAGUA 6377

12 DEC 67 IN 10885

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBIDDY

file: AMBIDDY-1

REF: MANAGUA 6328 (IN 87575)

1. AMBIDDY-1 TOLD BARKER HE TRIED CONTACT "MISTER WILSON" (GROWERY) SEVERAL TIMES BY PHONE AT NUMBER GIVEN HIM EARLY NOVEMBER BY WILSON. PERSONS ANSWERING DID NOT KNOW ANY "WILSON". AS RESULT BROKEN CONTACT, AMBIDDY PASSED ON ONE BIT OF INTELLIGENCE REGARDING SOVIET POLICY ON CUBA TO LNERGO MIAMI.

2. PLS CABLE CORRECT PHONE NUMBER AND NOTIFY PERSONS THAT END TO EXPECT CALLS FOR "WILSON".

SECRET

SECRET

201-267437

12 Dec 1967

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A

TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

7

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT [illegible] TIME 1007 BY 5

INFO
FILE VR WH 8 CI/OPS CI/OA [illegible]

MANA

6 Nov 67 IN 87575

ANAL
ABSTRACT X
INDEX

S E C R E T 06160 . CITE MANAGUA 6320
PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE
TYPIC AMBIDDY

AMBIDDY-1 HAS LOST PHONE NUMBER OF GROWERY WHOM HE KNOWS AS "MIST WILSON". WOULD APPRECIATE PHONE CONTACT AT HIS MIAMI RESIDENCE 6 OR 7 NOVEMBER.

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-267437
6 Nov 1967

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

13. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

15. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

16.

ARTIME-BUESA, MANUEL FRANCIS	
201-267437	201-819744
SEX M DOB ?	DBB -98872
	31 OCT 67
CIT ?	FBI
OCC ?	
RE DOCUMENT	

WAS 053-500

R 6801101234

201-267437

17. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9-40)

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 20 OCTOBER 1967
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: JOSE BENITO PASTORA
FBI FILE #: UNKNOWN
(BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS)

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

1 Sept 67

SUBJECT: (Optional)

3P

FROM: WH/COG/CICS/Laura Carberry

EXTENSION: 5106

NO. CSCI 316/03615-67

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DC/WH/COG/CICS	28/8		STR
2. WH/3/NICARAGUA			
3. ~~C/I/O/WH~~ CI/Liaison 2-C-35	31 AUG 1967		TLH M
4.			
5. RID/AN			
6. RID/MIS			
7. RID/PS			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

MICROFILMED
SEP 12 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-267437

10-10
1 SEP 1967

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

1 SEP 1967

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : ODr. Fnu ARAGON

1. A fairly reliable source reported the following information concerning Dr. ARAGON:

a. According to Source, ARAGON is a well-known Communist at the University of Leon in Nicaragua.

b. He writes to the following addresses:

Lic. Roger ARGENAL Arauz
2515 Rio Grande
Austin, Texas 78705

Dr. Enrique GALLO Zeledon
P.O. Box 21986
University Station
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico 00831

c. ARAGON is reported to be a good friend of one Allan GROSS Quiros.

2. The attached CS 311/14105-65 of 22 November 1965 contains information on one Oscar ARAGON Valdes which may be identifiable with Subject.

3. The files of this Office did not reveal any pertinent identifiable information on either Dr. Enrique GALLO Zeledon or Lic. Roger ARGENAL Arauz.

MICROFILMED
SEP 12 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

B-201-819744

201-267437

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

4. For further information regarding one Allan GROSS Quiros, you are referred to our CSCI 316 03614-67 being disseminated to the Bureau.

5. It is requested that your files be checked for any information they may contain on ARGENAL and GALLO. We would appreciate being apprised of the results of any investigation you might undertake in regard to this matter.

CSCI-316/03615-67

Attachment

28 August 1967

DDP/WH/COG/CICS:L. Carberry:jaf

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RID
1-CI/LIA
1-CI/R&A
1-WH/2/Nicaragua
1-WH/COG/CICS
1-Originator

Source: AMBIDDY

File: 201-267437
201-819744

Based on: LX 3254 of 12 June 1967
CSCI 316/03614-67

26 — LA PRENSA 25 DE AGOSTO DE 196[illegible]

Artime Invita a Revolución Cristiana

Hablando con intensa emoción ante un grupo de empresarios, empleados y obreros, el Dr. Manuel Artime hizo el martes por la noche una rápida revisión del drama de Cuba, invitando a evitar que la sociedad cristiana de Nicaragua enfrente el materialismo dialéctico del comunismo, con el "Materialismo práctico", igualmente destructor.

"No nos dejemos quitar la palabra revolución", proclamó Artime.

El jefe de la invasión de Bahía de Cochinos, que llegó a Nicaragua por décima vez desde el fracaso de la invasión, habló de manera independiente y sin manifestar liga con ningún movimiento, con ninguna agrupación.

Sin embargo, por la insistencia que hizo en citar constantemente las frases de Cristo como doctrina opuesta a la penetración comunista, el combatiente cubano pareció [illegible] hablando como uno de los seglares que la Iglesia Católica utiliza ahora, conforme las nuevas modalidades, para difundir su doctrina.

[illegible] HISTORICO

[illegible] el Dr. Artime por [illegible] una exposición resumida del surgimiento del marxismo, su ideario, su filosofía, sus proyecciones hacia el establecimiento de una sociedad mundial materialista.

[illegible]damente contrapuso, no como ideario político [illegible]mente, sino como una doctrina que puede impulsar definitivamente al hombre hacia la búsqueda de una [illegible] firme al comunismo, la palabra de Cristo.

Lo hizo de manera hermosa, [illegible] y fue [illegible] por los [illegible]

[illegible] vitó a los cristianos a militar "no con tibieza", porque a los tibios es a los que Cristo dijo arrojar por la boca, prefiriendo a los fríos, o los calintes, en los casos extremos.

Después de exponer el pensamiento cristiano y los pasajes más hermosos e imperecederos de los Evangelios, el Dr. Artime expuso por qué en su opinión una sociedad está amenazada de la penetración comunista, cuando la afligen los siguientes males:

—Los religiosos "puros", que nunca entran en la política, porque dicen que la política es sucia y pueden contaminar su alma.

—Los demagogos que dicen al obrero sus derechos, únicamente, y no sus deberes y al capitalista el derecho arrollador de su capital, pero no sus obligaciones.

—Los mercaderes que usan el templo, es decir, la Iglesia, exclusivamente para su propio beneficio y crean una religión de puertas para adentro, sin predicar la verdadera esencia del cristianismo ni ponerla en [illegible]tica.

Otros males que, según el Dr. Artime, predisponen para la instalación del comunismo, son:

—Los indiferentes, que creen que cuando el peligro está a las puertas "eso no es con ellos".

—Los cristianos de caridad farisaica, que regalan 1.000 pesos, cargados de joyas, para salir en primera página en los periódicos.

—Los que están con Dios y con el diablo y predican una moral pública, pero tienen otra moral privada, que deja que desear.

—Los estériles, como la higuera bíblica, que no producen nada.

EL FRACASO Y EL FUTURO

Bajo continuas preguntas, el Dr. Artime analizó el fracaso de Bahía de Cochinos y explicó como un pueblo encarcelado horas antes por centenares de miles, no pudo responder al llamado de la revolución anticomunista y la brigada de 1.400 hombres que atacaba tuvo que enfrentarse con 60.000 soldados protegidos por tanques y artillería.

"Y la protección aérea que hubiera dado el [illegible] en nuestro favor, no nos fue suplida", comentó Artime.

El combatiente de Cochinos insistió en que "sangre cubana, exclusivamente, [illegible] verá a derramarse para liberar a Cuba", y que él [illegible] ha sufrido lo que un sacerdote le predijo a él una vez, como parte de su redención después de haberse olvidado de Dios.

201-267437

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

28

ACTION
C/WH/COG 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/SOD 3, C/CI, DOP, ADDP

WAVE

S E C R E T 171642Z CITE JMWAVE 7746

DIRECTOR DESENSITIZED 17 Jun 67 IN 92320

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

REFERENCE: MANAGUA 6168 (IN 88476)

AMWORLD CACHE SAFELY UNLOADED AND STORED JMWAVE NIGHT 16 JUNE. WILL MAKE PRELIMINARY CHECK AND ADVISE CONDITION.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

AN/CE | FI
~~FS~~ | ~~DEST~~
ABSTRACT X | ~~INDEX~~

S

201-267437
17 June 1967

14-00000

WHEN FILLED IN

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

8 40 AM

FROM: GL

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/2		21	JUN 1967	
2. ADC/WH/2				
3.				
4. WH/2/N				
5.				
6. WH/COG/CI				MR
7.	~~FA~~			fa
8.	FA			
9.				
10.				
11.				
12. RID/AN-GL				GL
13.				
14. RID/MIS				CW
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COPY DETACHED

suspect these be reclassified to AMBIDDY-1's 201 No? since they are his agents.

Barry — What was ref about? We should know about that since appears refer to AMBIDDY.

Bc to FA 8: See ref attached. Recommend reclassification of both docs to AMBIDDY-1 201-267437. If there are dissenters let them stand up and ... lets discuss.
x7657 Barry

18 JUL 1967

12: Please reclassify attached to 201-267437.

AN L	FI	
~~DB~~	~~DESK~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT X	INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-267437
~~53-6-4~~

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 16 June 1967

DOCUMENT NUMBER INMA 03869

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Managua

SUBJECT: 0 Traces on Persons Mentioned in Letters from AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HNMW-2005, 5 June 1967

ACTION : None, For Your Information

1. In reply to the request for traces in Paragraph 2 of reference, James D. ZABOTH personally conducted name checks at SAC and OSN records and offices. There were no SAC traces on any of the persons listed. OSN traces follow:

a. Rodolfo JEREZ Suarez
DOB: 7 September 1917
Owner of Venus Shirt Company in Managua; brother of Julio JEREZ Suarez, a Cuban-oriented Communist who has been active in the FSLN and has been in exile in Costa Rica. Rodolfo JEREZ was found guilty by a board of investigation on 30 July 1959 of promoting and directing the subversive movement "Accion Civica" in support of armed invasion against the Government of Nicaragua. (Managua Station records indicate he was arrested 29 May and released on 17 July 1959.) OSN maintained a record of his travel to Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the United States between 1959 and 1963. On 27 January 1960 he was reported to be second in command of terrorism in Managua for "Accion Civica", the internal front of a revolutionary group. On 10 November 1960 he was reported to be hiding arms in Managua, along with others in a revolutionary group. On 13 November 1960,

continued.....

JDZABOTH:wcg
16 June 1967

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

201-267437
~~53-6-4~~

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HNMA-3869

DATE: JUN 16 1967

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 53-6-4

he was reported to be trying to organize a commercial strike in Leon and Managua. He was arrested in November 1960 as a known conspirator in an attempted revolution and for having been involved in the clandestine movement of revolutionaries across the Costa Rican border.

b. Jose FERNANDEZ de la Torre
On 2 March 1962 a report said he was a Cuban refugee who talks anti-Communist but was actually sent to Nicaragua to make Communist propaganda. On 8 May 1965 he vouched for the entry into Nicaragua of Jesus FERNANDEZ Suarez, a Cuban (no OSN or Station traces). (Note: FERNANDEZ is known personally to ZABOTH and to the Chief of Station, whose opinions about him are that he is a Cuban businessman who is both anti-Communist and anti-Castro because of the loss of his business interests in Cuba. His principal business in Cuba involved distribution of the products of Procter and Gamble, the soap and chemical company. He is now manager of Distribuidora Inter-Americana S.A., an import/export and distribution firm in Managua.) On 18 January 1967 the Guatemalan Security Service requested traces on the subject, along with a list of other Cubans. No reason for the request was given to OSN.

c. Orlando CASTRILLO S., Bachiller
On 20 November 1965 he wrote a letter to La Prensa, the opposition newspaper in Managua, asking them for 30,000 copies of an anti-SOMOZA caricature in order to sell them and raise funds for university student grants.

d. German ARELLANO
On 17 January 1967 a report said he had bought $5,000 worth of arms in Miami for illegal shipment to Nicaragua, and they had been confiscated by authorities at Miami. (Station card shows subject's name as German ARELLANO Morales. See JMWAVE-5188, 20 January 1967 and JMWAVE-5247, 24 January 1967 for further details of this report.)

2. There are no OSN, SAC or Station traces on the other persons mentioned in letter number 2 of the reference.

3. Both ZABOTH and the Chief of Station have discussed with AMBIDDY-1 the "intelligence net" mentioned by the reference. The stated Station position was "we are happy to maintain contact with you and to discuss this matter from time to time on an informal and personal basis, but the policy of our organization is that we do not engage in intelligence activities in a friendly country except in coordination with the local government. Therefore, even though you assure us that General SOMOZA knows and approves this activity, we would have to have a direct request from him before we could cooperate with you in any kind of an official capacity." This appears to have sufficied to keep our lines open to those involved without committing us to do anything more than listen.

Lawrence F. Barker
Lawrence F. BARKER

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 12

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO

FILE VR, [illegible] C/SOD 3, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/CS 3, [illegible]

SECRET 131417Z CITE MANAGUA 6168

13 Jun 67 IN 88476

DESENSITIZED

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

(UN 35114)

REF: MANAGUA 6157

1. NICARAGUAN PHASE REF OP COMPLETED ON SCHEDULE, SECURELY, AS PLANNED, AND WITHOUT INCIDENT. COOPERATION COLONEL BRENES AND ROBERT BARTLETT COMPLETE.

2. PETREL DEPARTED EL BLUFF EARLY MORNING 12 JUNE. COS, ZABOTH AND DAHLEIDEN RETURNED MANAGUA SAME DAY. DAHLEIDEN RETURNING MIAMI 13 JUNE LANICA FLIGHT 418.

3. COS INFORMING COL GENIE, GENERAL MONTIEL AND PRESIDENT SOMOZA OF SUCCESSFUL REMOVAL CACHE.

4. REQUEST WAVE COMPLIMENT PETREL CREW ON EXCELLENT WORK AT EL BLUFF.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
33 PER [illegible] 1

ACTION
C/WH/C 365 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

FILE, VR, DDP

SECRET 122304Z CITE JMWAVE 7675 12 Jun 67 IN 87925

DIRECTOR

TYPIC YOBITE

SITREP 10-12 JUNE 1967

I. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.

A. PW. (IN87923)

JMWAVE 7674 REPORTS STATION PLANS TO EXPLOIT VENEZUELAN BOYCOTT OF SPANINSH SHIP ON 12 JUNE.

B. MARITIME.

PETREL DEPARTED EL BLUFF, NICARAGUA, 121045Z AFTER LOADING 18 TONS CARGO AND PROCEEDING ON SCHEDULE RETURNING TO BASE.

C. SP.

1. I&NS PROCESSED 175 AIRLIFTED REFUGEES PLUS 4 THIRD-COUNTRY ARRIVALS FROM MEXICO ON 9 JUNE. CAC SCREENED 36 MALES. OF JMWAVE INTEREST: EMPLOYEE PLANNING DEPARTMENT ELECTRIC ENTERPRISE CAMAGUEY CITY WITH GENERAL INFO ON ENTERPRISE AND ON UNION ACTIVITIES. GROUP INCLUDED 69 FEMALES 55 CHILDREN 15 MALES OVER 60 YEARS.

2. I&NS AND CAC ALSO PROCESSED AND SCREENED GROUP

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES C
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CA
CICS
CI/OS
RR
F
SS
RS
ESEC

ACTION 7

INFO C/[illegible] ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

FILE VR DDP ADDP C/WH 6 C/SOD 3 C/CI C/FI 2

SECRET 011405Z CITE JMWAVE 7475

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MANAGUA INFO PANAMA CITY

1 Jun 67 IN 79467

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REF JMWAVE 7476 (IN 79491)

IDENTITY: MR. JOHN H. HARPER.

SECRET

BT

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/AN

EXTENSION

NO. LX-3254

DATE 12 June 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. [redacted]				
2.				
3.				
4. RI Files				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

MICROFILMED
MAR 11 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN ☒	[redacted]	[redacted]
PS	[redacted]	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX X

201-267437

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

MICROFILMED
MAR 11 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

LX-3254
Translation

Miami, 12 June 1967

°Cuban propaganda in western hemisphere

Dear Jim:

Just a few lines to inform you:

1. (Mr) Allan GROSS* Quiros frequently writes to the following addresses in the United States: 201*

J.B. PASTORA* NO 201 → contact of Allan Gross Quiros
Δ P.O. Box 676
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

Anibal IBARRA* Gonzales NO 201
Δ 1515 Engel Rd. #423
Lawrence, Kansas 66044

Leonel GARCIA* NO 201
Δ The School for International Training of the Experiment in International Living
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

No 201

(Dr.) ARAGON,* Communist like him and well-known in the Communist circles at the University of Leon, writes to the following addresses:

(Lic) Roger ARGENAL* Arauz No 201 → contact of Dr Aragon
Δ 2515 Rio Grande
Austin, Texas 78705

(Dr) Enrique GALLO* Zeledon No 201
Δ P.O. Box 21986
University Station
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico 00931

(Dr.) Eduardo BISOGNI* NO 201
Δ Sucre 1461 16 281
Buenos Aires, Argentina

Refer to my previous letter for data on these two individuals.

2. Incidentally, my secretary Eugenio Claude spoke with a friend named Pedro Pino who lives at 1132 W 71 St., Hialeah, Florida, 33012. PINO told him that his friend, Lourdes BELLO, who lives at 1124 West 71 Pl., Hialeah, Florida and who has lived there for only a short while, has received correspondence which must have been for the previous tenant at that address. This correspondence came from Cuba and consisted of subversive propaganda. All the correspondence is addressed to:

addressee of Cuban propaganda from U. Masa

(Sr) Carlos GONZALEZ* no 201
1124 West 71 Pl.
Hialeah, Florida USA

The sender of this correspondence appears as:

U. Masa *
Apartado 6240
La Habana, CUBA

No 201

Sender of correspondence of propaganda to Carlos Gonzalez

Being that I was out and that my secretary knows Rafael LLANEZ who works for Sangenis who works for you, gave him this correspondence so that he might sent it to you. I have sent you the propaganda which so far has arrived.

3. I have received from my father, in Cuba, a note with a message in which he tells me that he intends to leave Cuba under a false name. His message is very clear:

I am trying to arrange that the "nucleus" of Gonzalito Penaranda leaves soon. NUMBER IS 117838.

Of course, he is referring to the Airlift from Habana to Miami. I ask you to inform me if you can do anything in this regard as I think it is the last chance my parents have of leaving.

4. Please tell me if it is certain that Fidel intends to go to EXPO 67 in Canada for the 26 of July as it has been rumored. If he is going, I would like to know if Commander Vallejo will go with him as his chief doctor. When I was imprisoned, I received many messages from Vallejo telling me that he was not a Communist and never would change.

REGARDS:
Ignacio

LX-3254

Central South Internacional Inc.

P. O. BOX 1453 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI, FLA. 33138
CABLE: CENSOIN

Miami 12 de Junio de 1967

Querido Jim:

Solo unas letras para informarte:

1-El senor Allan Gross Quiros suele escribir frecuentemente a las siguientess direcciones en los Estados Unidos:

J.B.Pastora
P.O. Box 676
Brattleboro,Vermont 05301

Anibal Ibarra Gonzalez
1515 Engel Rd # 423
Lawrence,Kansas 66044

Leonel Garcia
The School for International Training
of the Experiment in International Living
Battleboro Vermont 05301

El Dr. Aragon,comunista como el ,connotado en los circulos comunistas de la Universidad de Leon,escribe a las siguientes direcciones:

Lic. Roger Argenal Arauz
2515 Rio Grande
Austin Texas 78705

DrEnrique Gallo Zeledon
P.O. Box 21986
University Station
Rio Piedras,Puerto Rico 00931

Dr. Eduardo Bisogni
Sucre 1461 16 281
Buenos Aires Argentina

(Recordar informes de carta anterior sobre estos dos individuos)

2-Accidntalmente,mi secretario Eugenio Claude,hablo con un amigo llamado Pedro Pino,que vive en 1132 W 71 st.Hialeah 33012,el cual le conto que su amigaLourdes Bello,que vive en 1124 West 71 PL.Hialeah,Fla.,y que vivia en esta direccion hacia poco,ha recibido una correspondencia que debe de ser para el inquilino anterior de dicha direccion,cuya correspondencia venia de CUBA y consistia de propaganda subversiva.Toda la correspondencia va dirigida a

D-19-5-52

CS COPY

201-267437

Central South Internacional Inc.

P O BOX [illegible] LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI FLA. [illegible]
CABLE: CENSOIN

(2)

Sr. Carlos Gonzalez
1124 West 71 PL
Hialeah Florida USA

El remitente de esta correspondencia aparece como:

U.Masa
Apartado 6240
La Habana CUBA.

Mi secretario,estando yo ausente y conociendo a Rafael Llaneza,que trabaja Sangenis,que trabaja para Vds.,le dio la correspondencia para que este se la enviara a Vds.De todos modos yo les envio el material de propaganda qu ha llegado hasta ahora.

3-He recibido de mi padre,en Cuba,una nota con un recado,donde me dice que va a intentar salir con nombre falso,y me envia un mensaje muy escueto:

Trata de conseguir que salga pronto el nucleo de Gonzalito Penarand
SUYO-NUMERO ES [illegible] 117838.

Por supuesto,se trata de los Vuelos de la Libertad Habana-Miami.Les pido me informen si se puede hacer algo en este sentido,porque creo que es la unica opo tunidad de que mis padres salgan.

4-Les pido me informen si es cierto que Fidel intenta ir a EXPO 67 en Canada para el 26 de Julio,como se ha rumorado.Si va,me interesa saber si el Comanda te Vallejo va con el como su medico de cabecera.Estando preso recibi muchos recados de Vallejo,diciendome que el no era comunista y que nunca cambiaria.

ABRAZOS:

Ignacio

Central South Internacional Inc.
P. O. BOX 1458 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI FLA. 33138
CABLE: CENSOM

(2)

Sr. Carlos Gonzalez
1124 West 71 PL
Hialeah Florida USA

El remitente de esta correspondencia aparece como:

U.Masa
Apartado 6240
La Habana CUBA.

Mi secretario,estando yo ausente y conociendo a Rafael Llaneza,que trabaja Sangenis,que trabaja para Vds.,le dio la correspondencia para que este se la enviara a Vds.De todos modos yo les envio el material de propaganda que ha ~~ll~~ llegado hasta ahora.

3-He recibido de mi padre,en Cuba,una nota con un recado,donde me dice que va a intentar salir con nombre falso,y me envia un mensaje muy escueto:

Trata de conseguir que salga pronto el nucleo de Gonzalito Penaranda.
~~CUYO~~-NUMERO ES [illegible] 117838.

Por supuesto,se trata de los Vuelos de la Libertad Habana-Miami.Les pido me informen si se puede hacer algo en este sentido,porque creo que es la unica oportunidad de que mis padres salgan.

4-Les pido me informen si es cierto que Fidel intenta ir a EXPO 67 en Canada para el 26 de Julio,como se ha rumorado.Si va,me interesa saber si el Comandante Vallejo va con el como su medico de cabecera.Estando preso recibi muchos recados de Vallejo,diciendome que el no era comunista y que nunca cambiaria.

ABRAZOS:

Ignacio

RADIO HABANA CUBA
APARTADO 70-26, LA HABANA, CUBA

La Habana, 15 de mayo de 1967
"AÑO DEL VIET NAM HEROICO"

Estimado amigo:

Como usted sabe, la OSPAAAL —Organización de Solidaridad de los Pueblos de Africa, Asia y América Latina— acordó celebrar el próximo día 26 de Julio la "JORNADA MUNDIAL DE SOLIDARIDAD CON CUBA".

Con ese motivo, RADIO HABANA CUBA organizó el concurso "Solidaridad con Cuba" que permitirá a ocho de nuestros oyentes de todo el Mundo disfrutar de una visita a nuestro país y participar en esa fecha en el acto central conmemorativo del inicio de la Revolución Cubana. Ahora, además, confeccionamos el ALBUM DE LA SOLIDARIDAD CON CUBA que contendrá las firmas de nuestros oyentes y amigos. Muchas de las hojas impresas que remitimos oportunamente a usted y a otros oyentes ya se encuentran con las firmas en nuestro poder.

Por otra parte, recibimos noticias de muchísimos amigos de la Revolución Cubana que se disponen a efectuar actividades múltiples que incluirán desde desfiles y concentraciones hasta actos artísticos y culturales, charlas, conferencias y exposiciones para celebrar así el inicio de la revolución en nuestro país y expresar su solidaridad con Cuba.

Como sabemos que usted es uno de nuestros amigos sinceros, pensamos que deseará aprovechar esta efemérides de significación extraordinaria para demostrar sus sentimientos de solidaridad hacia nuestro pueblo. En este caso nos gustaría que usted nos comunicara en cual de los actos que se organizan se dispone a participar o si junto con sus compañeros y amigos organiza algún otro acto. En espera de sus noticias en ese sentido, nos despedimos con saludos afectuosos y revolucionarios.

¡PATRIA O MUERTE!... ¡VENCEREMOS!

María Montero Triana
Resp. Dpto. Correspondencia
y Relaciones Internacionales



REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CORREOS
13

HABANA
9 V '67
PERMISO

SR. CARLOS CONZALEZ.
1124 West 71 P. L.
Hialeah, FLORIDA, U. S. A.

Via Aerea

Via Aerea

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted]
#2

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WH/COG TIME 1700 BY S

INFO FILE VR, C/WH 6, CS/DO, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 081602Z CITE MANAGUA 6157

8 Jun 67 IN 85119

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

DESENSITIZED

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

AN	FI	
~~PS~~	DECT	
ABSTRACT X		

REF: MANAGUA 6153 (IN 81259)

1. COLONEL GENIE TOLD COS 7 JUNE PRESIDENT SOMOZA APPRISED OF PLAN AND IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT.

2. ZABOTH AND DAHLEIDEN DEPARTED MANAGUA FOR EL BLUFF MORNING 8 JUNE TO MAKE FINAL INSPECTION CACHE. COS WILL FLY EL BLUFF SATURDAY 10 JUNE TO BE ON HAND FOR LOADING OP.

3. EVERYTHING PROCEEDING NICELY. EXPECT HAVE MATERIAL ON HIGH SEAS EARLY 12 JUNE. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-267437
8 June 1967

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CA CICS
MO CLOS
CI
SS
RS
ESEC

ACTION
Commo 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO
FILE VR, WH8, WH/COG8, FI, FI/D

S E C R E T 061621Z CITE JMWAVE 1573 conf 6✓ 6 Jan 67 83067

KOLASO INFO DIRECTOR

DOLONG ZRPERUSAL PBRUMEN

MV/PETREL ASSIGNED SIGNAL PLAN GEPBAF/M FOR OPERATION "RECOVERY" TO NICARAGUA.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Managua

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
6 Letters from AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See Para. 2.

1. Forwarded in split transmission are two letters from AMBIDDY-1 to his Headquarters Case Officer, which contain a number of interesting items concerning Nicaragua, some of which probably have already been discussed with Station officers. Paragraph 6 of HNMW-2010 of 29 May 1967 also contains pertinent extracts from another of AMBIDDY-1's letters.

2. We are initiating Headquarters traces on the individuals mentioned as comprising the intelligence net of letter No. 2. You will be advised of the results. We would appreciate Station traces on these persons.

Albert K. DANZIGER

Distribution:
2 - Managua w/atts. HW & USC

Attachment:
Two letters - split transmission

1 June 1967

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

201-267437
~~53-6-4~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	HNMW-2005	5 JUN 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	53-6-4

CS copy
AN 1 FI
ABSTRACT X

AN X FI
ABSTRACT X

RECEIVED
RID/MIS

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/2/CR&NIC	Phyllis Edwards	st	6312

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	RID/DP2 RECEIVED	
	JUN 5 2 50 PM '67	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/2	1 JUN 1967	Edwin M. Terrell

FORM 1-64 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

30

ACTION

C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI2

S E C R E T 031830Z CITE MANAGUA 6153 3 Jun 63 IN 8125

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD DESENSITIZED

REF JMWAVE 7542 (IN 81201)

1. REF PLAN SATISFACTORY. NO INSPECTION WILL BE MADE.

2. ADVISE CAPTAIN CREW MEMBERS WILL BE NEEDED FOR HEAVY LABOR MOVING CACHE. STATION WILL ARRANGE FOR LOAN BARTLETT TRUCK. CCS [illegible] BE ON HAND.

3. WILL MEET DAHMEIDEN.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION c/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 031504Z CITE JMWAVE 7542 (STEADMAN ACTING)

PRIORITY MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

3 JUN 67 IN 81201

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REF: A. MANAGUA 6151 (IN [illegible])

B. JMWAVE 7380 (IN 74455)

1. PETREL SCHEDULED DEPART HOME BASE 5 JUNE AND ARRIVE EL BLUFF 2330 HOURS ZULU 11 JUNE. PETREL WILL CHANGE NAME ENROUTE TO M/V FLETE AND WILL ENTER EL BLUFF WITH THIS NAME AND FLYING PANAMA FLAG. NO HOME PORT WILL BE SHOWN. IT IS HOPED CACHE CAN BE LOADED NIGHT 11 JUNE AND M/V FLETE DEPART EARLY 12 JUNE. REQUEST MANAGUA CONFIRM ABOVE PLAN SATISFACTORY AND THAT NO INSPECTION BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES WILL BE MADE.

2. WALTER J. DAHLEIDEN SCHEDULED ON LANICA FLIGHT 411 DEPARTING MIAMI 0800 HOURS LOCAL 6 JUNE AND ARRIVING 0820 HOURS MANAGUA TIME. PLEASE MEET.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted] 7

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT WHK TIME 1640Z BY G

INFO FILE VR. C/WH 6 C/SOD 3 C/CI 0/FI 2 CSDO

S E C R E T 011405Z CITE JMWAVE 7476

1 JUN 67 IN 79491

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MANAGUA INFO PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REF A. JMWAVE 7380 (IN 74455)

B. DIRECTOR 05207

1. REQUEST MANAGUA COMMENT RE LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS PETREL ENTRY EL BLUFF PER REF A.

2. PETREL CAN DEPART 5 JUNE AND ARRIVE EL BLUFF 11 JUNE. NO LOGISTIC SUPPORT WOULD BE NEEDED BY PETREL AT EL BLUFF. PETREL WILL FILE "NO FOREIGN PORT" ON DEPARTURE HOME BASE AS IS USUAL FOR OPERATIONAL TRIPS AND THEREFORE FIRST RETURN PORT MUST BE HOME PORT. WE PLAN TO LIGHTER MATERIAL DURING DARKNESS FROM PETREL TO JMWAVE CONTROLLED SAFE AREA IN KEYS AND THEN TRUCK TO SAFE STORAGE AREA. PETREL WILL THEN RETURN HOME PORT CLEAN.

3. PRESENT CAPTAIN OF PETREL WAS CAPTAIN OF AMWORLD MOTHER VESSEL (AKL) AND FAMILIAR LITEL BLUFF AND KNOWS MANAGER FISH PROCESSING PLANT AS DIABLO. DIABLO PROBABLY ROBERT BARTLETT. IF HEADQUARTERS DESIRES CACHE REMOVAL TO LOOK LIKE AMBIDDY RETURNING FOR HIS EQUIPMENT PETREL

CAPTAIN CAN LET HIMSELF BE SEEN BY BARTLETT AND POSSIBLY OTHERS THUS INDICATING IT AMBIDDY OP TO LOCALS. IF NOT DESIRED PETREL CAPTAIN WILL REMAIN OUT OF SIGHT WHILE AT EL BLUFF.

4. IF MANAGUA REPLY PARA 1 SATISFACTORY WILL SEND (IDEN) WALTER J. DAHLEIDEN, JMWAVE ORDANANCE OFFICER, TO MANAGUA VIA AIR O/A 6 JUNE OR DATE SET BY MANAGUA SO THAT HE MIGHT INSPECT CACHE PRIOR ARRIVAL PETREL. PLAN DAHLEIDEN RETURN JMWAVE VIA AIR AFTER CACHE LOADED ABOARD PETREL AND BE AVAILABLE ASSIST IN UNLOADING UPON PETREL RETURN.

5. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES V

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

28

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/WCS 3

S E C R E T 012147Z CITE MANAGUA 6151 1 JUN 67 IN 79834

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD **DESENSITIZED**

REF: JMWAVE 7476 (IN 79491)

1. MANAGUA UNABLE COMMENT ON JMWAVE 7380 AS HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED IT.

2. BELIEVE RECOVERY BY PETREL CAN BE MADE WITH NO DIFFICULTY. COLONEL BRENES CAN ARRANGE PORT CLEARANCE.

3. REF ASSUMPTION CORRECT THAT "DIABLO" IS ROBERT BARTLETT.

4. PRIMITIVO ABLANEDO BACK IN NICARAGUA. MET WITH COS 1 JUNE, RETURNING EL BLUFF 2 JUNE, WILL INFORM BRENES OF PLAN REMOVE ARMS BY SHIP. COS INFORMED COLONEL GENIE, CHIEF OFFICE NATIONAL SECURITY, OF PLAN REMOVE CACHE BY SEA. GENIE WILL INFORM PRESIDENT SOMOZA.

5. SEE NO OBJECTION HAVE PETREL CAPTAIN SEEN BY BARTLETT, BRENES AND OTHERS AT EL BLUFF.

6. WELCOME VISIT WALTER J. DAHLEIDEN. CABLE FIRM ETA.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

30

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH, C/CI, C/SOD 3, DDP, ADDP, C/FI 2,

SECRET 240317Z CITE JMWAVE 7380 24 May 67 IN 74455

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REF MANAGUA 6140 (IN 74295)

1. JMWAVE M/V PETREL CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ARRIVE EL BLUFF ABOUT 8 JUNE IF HQS DESIRES. PETREL CAPABLE HANDLING CARGO. WOULD PLAN USE CUBAN CREW WITH AMERICAN CASE OFFICER AND ORDNANCE OFFICER. APPEARS ORDNANCE OFFICER DESIREABLE TO INSPECT QUESTIONABLE EQUIP ON RETURN TRIP AND DEEP SIX ALL NOT WORK SALVAGING. IF MANAGUA STATION CAN ARRANGE WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR NO INSPECTION PETREL AT EL BLUFF BELIEVE MOVEMENT CAN BE SECURELY MADE. WOULD PREFER ENTER EL BLUFF WITH NO NAME SHOWING OR USE PHONY NAME. PETREL BONA FIDE NICARAGUAN REGISTERED WITH HOME PORT BLUEFIELDS AND PETREL'S PAPERS SO STATE.

2. IF HQS DESIRES USE PETREL IT MAY BE DESIREABLE SEND JMWAVE CASE OFFICER TO MANAGUA TO FIRM UP DETAILS. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

DISSEM BY ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

23

ACTION

C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH/C, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/PS, C/CI/SGA, C/FI, C/FI/INT 2

C/SOD 5

S E C R E T 241631Z CITE MANAGUA 6140

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

24 [illegible] N 74295

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REFS: A. MANAGUA 6085 (IN 38450)

B. HMMT-1239

1. COS AND GENERAL MONTIEL DISCUSSED REF PROBLEM 23 MAY. DESPITE HIS REASSIGNMENT AS MINISTER TREASURY MONTIEL STILL INTERESTED THIS MATTER, BECAUSE PRESIDENT CHARGED HIM WITH CS SOLUTION. HE EXPLAINED QUANTITY TOO GREAT TO BE BROUGHT MANAGUA AND FORWARDED PANAMA BY GON AS ORIGINALLY ENVISIONED. THUS UP TO WOFACT ARRANGE TRANSPORTATION. SUGGESTED PLANE OR BOAT BE BROUGHT TO EL BLUFF. SAID PRESIDENT SOMOZA HAS MADE IT CLEAR MATERIAL TO BE REMOVED FROM NICARAGUA IN MANNER PRESCRIBED BY COS.

2. AIR LISTS REVEAL PRIMITIVO ABLANEDO HAS DEPARTED FOR MIAMI. ASSUME COLONEL BRENES GUARDING HOUSE WHERE ARMS STORED. COS AND ZABOTH FEEL BEST MEANS REMOVE ARMS IS BRING STOL CARGO PLANE INTO EL BLUFF AIRSTRIP, LOAD AT NIGHT, LEAVE NEXT MORNING. ALTERNATE MEANS, BRING BOAT TO DOCK IN FRONT HOME ROBERT BARTLETT, MANAGER BOOTH FISH PROCESSING PLANT. BARTLETT LIVES

SECRET

CLOSE TO CACHE SITE. HE OWNS ONLY TRUCK IN AREA ADEQUATE TO CARRY ARMS TO DOCK. WAS USED EXTENSIVELY FOR SUPPORT BY AMWORLDERS AND PROBABLY CLOSE TO COMPLETELY WITTING WHOLE SHOW.

3. IF PLANE TO BE USED, SUGGEST LAND AT MANAGUA TO PICK UP COS AND ZABOTH, THEN PROCEED BLUEFIELDS. PILOT CAN BE TAKEN BY SMALL BOAT TO EL BLUFF TO CHECK STRIP ON GROUND BEFORE ATTEMPTING LANDING THERE.

4. PLS ADVISE WHETHER HQS CONSIDERS ANY ITEMS LIST REF B UNSAFE TRANSPORT.

5. SUGGEST EXPEDITE REMOVAL CACHE. BALL NOW DEFINITELY IN OUR COURT.

SECRET SECRET

BT

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/COG

EXTENSION: 7451

NO.

DATE: 23 May '67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/Files				Place file in 201-267437
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

May 23/1967
Date

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Receipt acknowledged of Treasurer's Check drawn on Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York (FE 88018) for the sum of $275.00 (Two hundred seventy-five dollars and no cents).

Manuel Artime Buesa

201-267437

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
ARTIME-BUESA, MANUEL FRANCIS 5P

FROM: RID/AN	EXTENSION	NO. LX-3253	
		DATE 23 May 67	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. [illegible]				
2. R, Files				
3.				ANS [redacted] / PS [redacted] / [redacted] ABSTRACT X INDEX X
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				MICROFILMED SEP 6 1967 DOC. MICRO
11.				
12. RID/AN				RID/SOT
13. [illegible] SED				[illegible]
14.				201-267437
15.				

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

LX:3253

Miami, 23 May 1967

MARTINEZ - BUESA, MANUEL FRANCIS

Dear Jim:

I have delayed the trip to Nicaragua until Wednesday the 24th or Thursday the 25th, because the Nat Harrison Company, which is financing my trip, wants me to take some documents to Managua.

I am sending you the signed reciept herewith.

It looks like Roberto (our friend over there) wants Ablanedo to stay on for a complete month in Nicaragua. If it is going to be that way then I will need the money for this month also. If he stays it is because Roberto orders him, and if Roberto orders him to stay, then Roberto should pay.

MICROFILMED
SEP 6 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

I inform you of the following:

1. The manner used to focus the case of Felipe Rivero is absurd. They are converting him into a hero and a martyr. In order "Not to be a slave of Yankee Imperialism!" even I had to make declarations protesting the imprisonment of Felipe Rivero, although I clearly stated my discrepancy against his ideology and principals.

Boch, the one from MIRR, is taking the anti-North American campaign and turning his hate toward the United States on this problem.

They could have taken Felipe Rivero out of the United States without informing anyone, and then they could have informed the people that he was already in another country. Or they could

CS COPY

201-267437

have started a campaign to discredit him, like the one the Miami Herald started against me at first. But they should never have done it like they did. Another mistake is the public judgement which they are going to give him. Because of that judgement he is going to win more popularity and is going to put the United States in a bad situation.

2. On this trip I am going to see if I can do something about the solidarity of the Central American countries with Venezuela in order to see if anything concrete comes up.

3. I have gotten reports from Cuba that in Bahia Honda they are constructing a subterranean rocket base. I am going to get more reports.

YZR (201-819744)

4. In Nicaragua there is a man, Allan Gross Quiros, chemistry professor at the University of Leon and recently named to be a professor in Managua also, who was in East Germany and Russia for ten months. He returned to Nicaragua 1 - 15 April, passing through New York. He spoke with a man named "Rayo" for a long time on the telephone. In his conversation with this man he told him (Rayo) that he had "taken a flight" from New York to Chicago where he spoke with "the person whom he had to speak to."

Allan Gross Quiros was in Leon and Masaya on the days in which the markets of Leon and Masaya were burned.

He (Allan Gross Quiros) has written two letters to this address:

Herr Hubert Torres
75 Karlsonhe
Stephanienstrasse 29, Federal Republic of Germany

I am trying to investigate several addresses in the United States where he writes. These are reports from "Pepe" Fernandez.

5. In Honduras there is a young man whose surname is WEANEVER, who is from Honduras and the nephew of Ricardo Zuniga, the Presidential Counsellor. WEANEVER was in Cuba taking training, and in conversations with other young men he said that he hoped to go through Nicaragua. Presently he is in Honduras.

6. It is suspected that guerrilla training is taking place in Chinandega. I will go to that zone on this trip.

Ignacio

(read the back)

P.S. I forgot to tell you that Allan Gross Quiros always carries an "executive bag" which he will not let loose for one moment. He is an inseparable companion of ARAGON and Lillian Garcia, who are both Communists at the University of Leon.

(Dr) [illegible] # [illegible]0201

Some money from the University of Leon supports the subversion. There are "Phantom job positions"; that is to say duties which no one carries out and which receive high salaries. This money goes to the ranks of subversion.

Ignacio

201-267437

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/Cog

EXTENSION: 7451

NO.:

DATE: 2 MAY 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/Files				Please file in 201-267437
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

May 2, 1967

Manuel Francis Artime Buesa
1270 N.E. 85th Street
Miami, Florida

Dear Manolo,

Enclosed you will find a check. Please date and sign the receipt and return it to me.

I have found your recent correspondence very interesting and hope you will continue to write me whenever you have an opportunity.

If you run across any information of interest concerning officials at Expo 67 or those planning to attend the Pan American games in Winnipeg, I would appreciate receiving it.

I hope we can get together one of these days--in the meantime good luck in all of your endeavors.

Best regards,

2 Enclosures

201-267437

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Managua X

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

TYPIC/AMBIDDY/AMBUD
Support for Dependents of Operational Personnel

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCE: HMMA 3798, dated 28 March 1967

1. When Wallace A. GROWERY met with AMBIDDY/1 on 13 January 1967 to formally terminate the AMWORLD operation, AMBIDDY/1 discussed in detail reference dependents who had been receiving financial assistance from AMWORLD funds and requested that GROWERY explore the possibility of WOFACT financial assistance following termination of their AMWORLD monthly support payments. An investigation was conducted by both JMWAVE and Headquarters to determine if the agents named by AMBIDDY/1 had been employed by WOFACT in order to determine what, if any, obligation might exist to provide financial assistance to the dependents. The results of the combined Headquarters investigation, keyed to reference dependents, are summarized below for Station Managua information.

(IDEN A) Subject was a WOFACT agent under contract. His KC provided payment of his $[illegible] monthly salary to his dependent parents for two years following possible death while engaged on a WOFACT mission. After Subject's execution in [illegible]62 the parents received his regular monthly salary until 28 June 1963. At that time Headquarters decided to liquidate the remaining balance of $6400 and paid this amount in a lump sum to the parents. Headquarters considers that all legal and moral obligations have been discharged and is not inclined to assume any further financial obligations to the parents. AMBIDDY/1 is apparently unaware that the parents have received approximately $10,000 from WOFACT.

CONT/

27 APR 1967

HMMW 1985

19-124-25/6
201-287437
201-[illegible]

S E C R E T

24 April 1967 WH/COG/CICS N. Gratz ljc 7447

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - Originator

DC/WH/COG Mr. Williamson

C/WH/COG/MO Mr. Ortman

C/WH/COG Thomas J. Flores

(IDEN B) Although IDEN C, the husband of IDEN B, was never directly employed by WOFACT, IDEN B receives $175 per month as a dependent HEROES/MARTYRS widow under the AMBUD program and has been paid a total of $10,850 from March 1962 to date through the JMWAVE/AMBUD cover mechanism. Presumably AMBIDDY/1 is unaware that this dependent has been receiving regular AMBUD assistance in addition to the $125 per month received from AMWORLD funds.

(IDEN D) AMBIDDY/1 provided GROWERY with the complete name and details of the activities of IDEN D's husband prior to his arrest and subsequent 6-30 year prison sentence. With this information traces were run on Subject with negative results. Since neither JMWAVE nor Headquarters records produced any evidence Subject had ever been a WOFACT employee, no obligation exists to provide financial assistance to IDEN B.

2. Although reference indicates the discussion between James D. ZABOTH and Ernest A. LUSBY took place after AMBIDDY/1's conversation with GROWERY in January, it is not clear when, or by whom, the subject was originally brought to ZABOTH's attention. If AMBIDDY/1 was the source of ZABOTH's information it is noteworthy that he apparently neglected to mention his prior detailed discussion with GROWERY.

3. Under the circumstances, it is not possible for Headquarters to take any action to provide support to these individuals.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - COS, Managua
1 - COS, JMWAVE

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/2/CRAN		fe
2	3B 4402		
3			
4	WH/COG/[illegible] Chiccea		EJ
5			
6	G.V. 201- AMBIDDY-		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached letters returned to you for retention per instructions from AC/WH/COG.

for AMbidd, 201 —

per our telecon

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WH/COG/RR 3E19	22 May 67

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61 (40)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/COG/EXO	18	
2	3E04		
3	AC/WH/COG	19 May	
4			
5	C/WH/COG/RR		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:
No Dissem interest at this time, however I would like to see all of the future Artime letters for operational context. I've found these letters very interesting.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WH/2/CK+N 3B4402	18 May

UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61 (40)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICA N TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/2/CR+N/RO		
2	3B01		
3			
4			
5			
6	WH/COG/EXO 3E04		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached for your review for INFO of possible dissem/interest are copies of letters (with translations) from Cuban exile leader Manuel Artime ~~to~~ following his return from Nicaragua where he attended the funeral of Luis Somoza. Letters were written to an CIA officer.

Pls. return to WH/COG/EXO.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
R. Harding WH/COG/RR 3E19 X-7144	10 May 67

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

(40)

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions

MIAMI, 24 April 1967

Dear Jim,

Pardon my lateness in writing to you but I have had to face many problems and I wanted to be calm when I wrote to you.

I was at Luis Somoza's funeral and I think that I made a good impression. I am at present more worried than I was before, but not for my future, because Tacho is a very good friend of mine and Luis was not. I am worried about Nicaragua's destiny. Let us not forget that Nicaragua is the most solid pillar of Central America.

1-Laines grew closer to Tacho during the funeral. Laines took practically all the load of the funeral arrangements upon himself.

2-Many of the good men who gave the Somoza's advice were intimate friends of Luis and they are afraid of coming to Tacho in order to give him advice.

3-The Communists are aware of this and they are also aware of the fact that Tacho is even more violent than Luis, therefore, they take advantage of the situation to provoke Tacho, thereby hoping that without Luis's advisors and possibly with the "bad advice" of "an infiltrator" in Tacho's circle of friends/ he will begin to rule his government with an iron hand, which is just what the Communists want from him.

4-I think that Tacho has grown much closer to me and I will try to do everything possible to see that he keeps calm.

5-There is no doubt about the fact that the Communists have brought in a great quantity of weapons into Nicaragua. The weapons have not been found, in spite of the investigations by the Security Corps; even General Montiel recognizes this.

6-Ithink that there is discontent in the young officer's ranks because of the low salaries which the officials, sub-officials and XXXXXXX enlisted men receive. This is not a problem at the present but it could develop into a problem, if the Communists exploit it skillfully.

7-I also think that the Security Corps which continues to function under the orders of Montiel, who is also chief of Staff and also a merchant, loses all its efficiency because of the fact that Montiel cannot dedicate sufficient time to the Corps and as a result leaves its direction to Captain Willop, who I think is entirely incompetent for the job.

8-I think that the only good thing that panorama has is the loyalty of General Somoza's military troops, for I honestly do not trust some of the high officials.

9-Jose Fernandez made the contact with the Nicaraguan girl who received the proposition to study on a scholarship in Russia, at the Patricio Lumumba University, and she is willing to collaborate with us. I gave the contact to Carlos.

10-According to reports from Pepe Fernandez the "comrades" are going to try to intensify their "infiltrative job" in the Nicaraguan departmentsXXX of Education and Agrarian reform.

The following is expected after 2 May, the day on which Tacho is sworn in: sabotage, terrorism, and kidnappings. Provocations!

11-I sincerely think, and excuse me, that the United States should now, due to the psychological state in which Tacho is in, demonstrate that they have confidence in him XXXX and in the success of his Government. He is grateful to the United States for the help which the United States sent to him so that he could save his brother, therefore take advantage of this.

12-According to the comments which I heard in Tacho's close circles (Col. Sanchez from Lanica, Gen. Camilo Gonzalez, etc), Sevilla Sacasa is not in very good standing with Tacho. I think that Washington should become friendly with Tacho in a direct manner.

13-Camilo Gonzalez's son spoke to me and told me that he had to see me later (I do not know when) in order to inform me about a group of Guatemalan Officials who are planning a coup d'etat against Mendez Montenegro and they want my help. When I know something concrete about this I will tell you. I have also heard rumors from Teo Carrasco (a painter, who is the brother XMXX of General Peralta's paramour) that Peralta is "in something also." When I find out something concrete about these reports I will send it to XXM you and let you know.

14-I am going to Nicaragua for the swearing in ceremonies. I am trying to get free tickets to fly XMM on Lanica. As soon as I see something of interest I will let you know.

P.S. Do not forget about Don Manuel Guillot.

Central South Internacional Inc.
P. O. BOX 1453 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI, FLA. 33138
CABLE: CENSOIN

Miami 24 de Abril 1967

Querido Jim:

Perdona la demora en la carta,pero he tenido muchos problemas a los cuales hacerles frente,y quería tener tranquilidad para escribirte.

Estuve en los funerales de Luis Somoza,y creo que causé buena impresión.Pero ahora est[illegible] más preocupado que antes [illegible] pesar de que mi gran amigo es Tacho y no Luis,pero mi preocupación no es por mi futuro,sino por el destino de Nicaragua.No olvidemos que Nicaragua es el puntal más sólido de Centro-América.

1-Lainez logró acercarse más a Tacho durante este proceso .Practicamente fué el hombre que llevó todo el peso de los funerales.

2-Muchos de los buenos consejeros que tenían los Somoza,estaban intimamente ligados a Luis,y le temen acercarse al Tacho Para darle consejos.

3-Los Comunistas son conscientes de ésto y de que Tacho es un hombre más violento que Luis,por lo tanto se aprestan a provocar al Tacho para que éste,sin los consejeros de Luis y posiblemente con los "malos consejos" de "algún infiltrado" en el círculo de Tacho,unido al carácter violento del Tacho,lleve su gobierno a una mano dura que los comunistas desean en Nicaragua.

4-Creo que Tacho se ha acercado mucho más a mí después de éste proceso y yo trataré de hacer todo lo humanamente posible para que vaya por caminos de tranquilidad.

5-No hay dudas de que los comunistas han logrado meter en Nicaragua una gran cantidad de armas,que no han aparecido a pesar de las pesquisas de los Cuerpos de Seguridad;ésto lo reconoce el mismo General Montiel.

6-Creo que hay un leve desagrado en las filas de los oficiales jóvenes, por el salario tan bajo que reciben los oficiales,sub-oficiales y clases.Por el momento esto no es problema;pero puede ser problema si el comunismo lo explota hábilmente.

7-Creo además que el Cuerpo de Seguridad,al seguir bajo el Mando de Montiel,que además es Jefe de Estado Mayor y además es Comerciante, pierde toda su eficecia,ya que Montiel no puede dedicarle el tiempo necesario y el Cuerpo es dirigido por el Capitán Willop,al cual considero completamente inepto para el cargo.

8-Creo que la única cosa buena que tiene el panorama,es la lealtad de la tropa militar al General Somoza,pues,honestamente desconfío hasta de algunos altos oficiales.

9-José Fernández logró el contacto con una muchacha nicaragüense que ha recibido una proposición de estudio (becada) en Rusia,en la Universidad Patricio Lumumba,y está dispuesta a colaborar con nosotros.Yo le dí el contacto a Carlos.

10-Según informes de Pepe Fernández,los "camaradas" van a tratar de aumentar su intensidad de "trabajo infiltrativo" en los departamentos nicaragüenses de EDUCACION y REFORMA AGRARIA.

También se esperan:sabotage,terrorirsmo y secuestros después del día 2 de Mayo,toma de posesión de Tacho.¡Provocaciones!

11-Creo sinceramente,y perdónenme,que los Estados Unidos deben ahora, dado el estado psicológico del Tacho,demostrarle que tienen confianza en él y en los logros de su Gobierno.Aprovechen que él está agradecido por todos los recursos que Estados Unidos mandó para salvar al hermano.

Central South Internacional Inc.
P. O. BOX 1453 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI, FLA. 33138
CABLE: CENSOIN

12-Según comentarios que oí en círculos muy allegados al Tacho(Coronel Sánchez el de Lanica,General Camilo González etc) Sevilla Sacasa no está muy bien parado con el Tacho .Creo que Washington debe intimar más directamente con Tacho.

13-El hijo de Camilo González me habló de que tenía que verme luego (no sé cuando) para informarme de un grupo de Oficiales Guatemaltecos,que están preparando un golpe de Estado contra Mendez Montenegro y quieren mi ayuda.Cuando sepa algo concreto se los mandaré a decir.También he oído rumores de Teo Carrasco (pintor hermano de la querida del General Peralta)de que Peralta está "en algo también". Cuando concrete más los informes se los enviaré.

14-Voy a Nicaragua para la toma de posesión,estoy consiguiendo boletos gratis para volar en Lanica.Tan pronto vea algo de interés se los comunicaré.

Abrazos:

Ignacio

P.D. No se olviden de Don Manuel Guillot.

MIAMI, 3 April 1967

Dear Jim,

Pardon my lateness in writing, but I have had to run around a lot. The fundamental subjects which I wished to discuss are

1. I was displeased when our Nicaraguan friend discussed the subject of the implements which we had in Bluefield with General Somoza before I had discussed anything with him (Genral Somoza); above all without even consulting with me before he went ahead and did it, this put me in a difficult position with the Government. This is what I discussed with Carlos:

(a) The company will help me get ~~him~~ them out (b) I will tell Somoza that ~~he is one of us~~ they belong to me (c) I move them to another place which is less accessible. He agreed with me on consulting with the company, and the answer he gave to (b) was that ~~XXX~~ he planted the "other friend" in with Somoza, and nothing else was said. Thank God that I did well on that job, and I did pass some unpleasant moments.

2. During Somozas' stay in the USA I have seen him frequently and I have taken American investors, who wish to put their capital to work in Nicaragua, to see him. We have conversed copiously about his projects. He wants to do the following: Turn over his power when his mandate is terminated. Raise the standard of living for the Nicaraguans. Give the

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

farmers the chance to take their products to big markets, through the construction of highways, silos to store grains and favorable legislation for the small farmers. The only thing that worries me is the extraordinary influence that "Che Lainez" has on him in economics. There are diverse comentaries about this individual on whether he is a member of the Communist Party or not; but the truth is (I know him personally) that he is a social outcast, bitter, very intelligent and very ambitious. Furthermore, when he tries to please someone he acts like their servant. If he is not a Communist then he is easy material for the Communists.

3. Somoza has promised me to continue to move the subject of Cuba in the international spheres, and in his appearance in "Meet the Press" he has already done it.

4. There is a "GARCIA" who is a syndicate leader of the ?wharfs? of New York, who through Adolfo Jimenez told me about a new invasion that was planned for Haiti, directed by me and leaving from Nicaragua. I responded negatively. It seems that they spoke with others about the project and a rumor started which said that I was preparing an invasion of Haiti from Nicaragua; I then went to see the Haitian consul in Miami to make it clear to him and his Government that I was not an adventurer, and that neither I nor the Nicaraguan Government had the slightest intention of interfering with Duvalier.

The consul has now told me that Duvalier wishes to speak with me. I told him that I would be glad to speak with him when he wished and when the interview would be kept secret. I think that this interview could be useful, for I have found that the Haitian Government has a grudge against the U.S. I do not know what we will speak about but I think that I can get some good information for you (plural).

5. I think that we can expect violent revolts in Nicaragua, in Panama, in Guatemala, and in Honduras (the opposition is in possession of many arms that have not been found yet). This breakout of guerrilla warfare in Bolivia and Brasil demonstrates Fidel's desperate strategy in trying to start other Vietnams in America whether or not Russia is in agreement.

I think that the dismissal of Raul Castro and Vilma Espin from the key posts in Cuban Communism can cause an internal revolt in disagreement between Cuban Communist elements and we have to be on alert in order to take advantage of the event so that it will not surprise as the "bloody rebellion and cultural revolution of China" surprised us.

I believe that propaganda for CUBA should be centered on planting distrust in the Armed Forces and on making Fidel Castro appear unstable as a person. If he has not even been faithful to his own "brother," then what can the rest of them expect if they are not even his relatives? I think that we should emphasize the fundamental part that Raul and Vilma had in consolidation of Castroism and its rise to power.

I do not think that Almeida has the control nor the influence over the Army that Raul had, and therefore a conspiracy and revolt of the Armed Forces is easier. There is no doubt that Fidel is assigning key posts to men and women who are his personal friends, without regard to whether they are good or bad Communists. This is going to bring about problems with the old guard of the Communist Party and with the people in the new guard who have been hastily taught Fidel's doctrine but have received Communist indoctrination (many of them sympathize with Raul). It seems that Russia is very displeased with Fidel and it would not surprise me if Russia would try to cause an attack on him; we should insinuate this in the propaganda against Castro for we know that his paranoic mentality and his disgust for Russia would most emphatically make him start to purify and take reprisals against Moscow's unconditional demands; an atmosphere of tension would then be created between Russia and Fidel.

The divorce of the Latin American Communist Parties from their obedience to Moscow, seems to be a feeling of disgust for Russia.

I have 200 men ready, who upon receiving weapons, can be taken to Cuba in only 48 hours, in case of a revolt. Their mission would be to overtake a town with a radio station in order to take advantage of the chaos of the revolt and establish a military Government that would be immediately recognized by a number of Latin American Governments and some European Country.

6. Ablanedo tells me in a letter that ROBERTO, the "friend" from Nicaragua, has told him that he cannot go to Bluefield until everything is taken out. That will take part of this month which means that apart from the subsidy that I have given him for last month I will have to give him this month's also. Could the company help me with that? The subsidy comes to $275.00 monthly. That is what I give to his family in Miami. This does not include what he is spending in Bluefield.

7. Tell me if at last you know anything about the request that I made for Mr. Manuel Guillot, for the Fundora widow and for the poor, deaf lady whose husband is in prison.

That's all for now, if there is anything new to tell you I will inform you of it.

Ignacio

Central South Internacional Inc.
P. O. BOX 1453 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI, FLA. 33138
CABLE: CENSOIN

Miami 3 de Abril 1967

Querido Jim:

Perdona la demora en escribir,pero he tenido que correr mucho. Los temas fundamentales que quería tratarles son:

1-Me disgusté cuando vuestro amigo de Nicaragua le trató el tema del General Somoza antes que yo ,de los"implementos" que teníamos en Bluefield; sobre todo,sin haberlo consultado antes conmigo;ya que eso me colocaba en una posición difícil con el Gobierno.Lo que yo traté con Carlos fué: a)La compañía me ayuda a sacarlo b)Yo se lo planteo a Somoza como cosa mía c)Los mudo de lugar a otro más inaccesible.
El quedó conmigo en consultar con la Comapañía y la respuesta fué que el otro "amigo" se lo planteó a Somoza sin hablar nada más.
Gracias a Dios pude salir bien del asunto,pero pasé mi momento desagradable.

2-Durante la estancia de Somoza en USA le he visto frecuentemente y le he llevado inversionistas americanos que desean poner a trabajar su capital en Nicaragua.Hemos conversado largamente de sus proyectos.
Piensa: Entregar el poder cuando termine su mandato.Elevar el nivel de vida del pueblo nicaragüense.Hacer asequible al campesino el sacar sus productos a los grandes mercados,mediante la construcción de carreteras,silos para almacenar granos y una legislación favorable a los pequeños productores.
Lo único que me preocupa,es la extraordinaria influencia que,en materia económica,tiene sobre él el "Che Laínez".Sobre este individuo hay comentarios muy diversos sobre si pertenece al partido comunista o no; pero lo cierto es (lo conozco personalmente) que se trata de un resentido social,amargado ,muy inteligente y muy ambicioso.Además,cuando trata de agradar a alguien,llega hasta al"servilismo".Si no es comunista,es materia fácil para el comunismo.

3- Somoza me ha prometido continuar moviendo el asunto Cuba en las esferas internacionales,y en la comparescencia en "meet the press" ya lo hizo.

4- Hay un tal"GARCIA"que es líder sindical de los muelles de New York,que a través de Adolfo Jiménez,me planteó el asunto de una nueva invasión a Haití,dirigida por mí y saliendo desde Nicaragua.Yo respondí que nó. Como parece que ellos hablaron a otra gente del proyecto y se empezó a rumorar en Miami que yo preparaba una invasión a Haití desde Nicaragua; fuí a ver al cónsulde Haití en Miami para que le aclarara a su Gobierno que yo no era un aventurero,y que ni yo,ni el Gobierno Nicaragüense teníamos la más leve intención de meternos con Duvalier.

El Consul,después de eso me ha dicho que Duvalier quiere hablar conmigo. Yo le dije que yo estaba dispuesto a hablar con él siempre y cuando la entrevista fuera secreta.

Creo que esta entrevista puede ser útil,pues he descubierto en el Gobierno Haitiano,un resentimiento contra los Estados Unidos.No sé cual será el tema que iremos a tratar,pero creo que puedo sacar buena información para Ustedes.

5-Creo que hay que esperar revueltas violentas en Nicaragua(hay muchas armas en poder de la oposición que no han sido encontradas);en Panamá, en Guatemala y en Honduras.

Este brote guerrillero en Bolivia y Brasil,luce una estrategia desesperada de Fidel,de conseguir en América varios "Viet-Nam",quiera o no quiera Rusia.

Creo que la separación de Raúl Castro y Vilma Espín de los cuadros claves del comunismo cubano,puede traer como consecuencia una revuelta interna por pugna entre factores comunistas cubanos,y tenemos que estar alerta para aprovechar al máximum los acontecimientos y que no nos agarre de sorpresa como la "sangrienta revolución cultural china y la rebelión".

Creo que la propaganda para CUBA debe basarse en sembrar dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas la desconfianza y la vacilación hacia Fidel Castro en persona,que no le ha sido leal ni a su "hermano",luego Qué pueden esperar los demás que ni siquiera son familiares de él? Creo que se debía recalcar el papel fundamental qu Raul y Vilma tuvieron en la consolidación del Castrismo y en su llegada al poder.

Creo que Almeida no tiene el control ni la ascendencia sobre el Ejército que tenía Raúl y que por lo tanto,es más fácil la conspiración y la re-

Central South Internacional Inc.

vuelta de las Fuerzas Armadas.

No hay duda de que Fidel está poniendo en los puestos claves a hombres y mujeres,que buenos o malos comunistas,son amigos personales de él,y ésto le va a traer problemas con la vieja guardia del Partido Comunista y con la nueva guardia que por encima de Fidelista,ha recibido un indoctrinamiento COMUNISTA (muchos de ellos simpatizan con Raul).

Parece ser que Rusia está muy descontenta con Fidel y no me extrañaría que intentara un golpe de mano contra él;de todas formas,hay que insinuar ésto en la propaganda contra Castro,ya que con su mentalidad paranoide y el disgusto que tiene con Rusia,es capaz de creerlo a pié juntillas y comenzar a depurar a tomar represalias contra los incondicionales de Moscú;lo cual crearía un ambiente de tensión entre Rusia y él.

El repudio de los Partidos Comunistas Latino-Americanos obedientes a Moscú ,me parece un buen síntoma de disgusto de Ru[illegible].

Yo tengo listos unos 200 hombres,que con solo recibir las armas,pueden ser colocados en Cuba en solo 48 horas,en caso de una revuelta.La misión sería tomar un pueblo con emisora de radio para aprovechar el caos de la revuelta y establecer un Gobierno en armas,que sería reconocido de inmediato por una cantidad de Gobiernos Latino-Americanos y algún país Europeo.

6-Ablanedo me dice en una carta,que ROBERTO,el "amigo" de Nicaragua,le ha dicho que él no se puede ir de Bluefield hasta que todo no se saque. Eso se llevará parte de este mes,lo cual significa que además del subsidio familiar del mes pasado que ya le entregué,le voy a tener que entregar el de Abril.Podía la Compañía ayudarme en eso?Son $275.oo mensuales.Es lo que yo le doy a su familia en Miami.Ahí no está incluído lo que él está gastando en Bluefield.

7-Díganme sipor fin saben algo de la solicitud que hice para Don Manuel Guillot,para la viuda de Fundora y para la pobre señora sorda que tiene su esposo preso.

Bueno,si hay algo nuevo,ya se los comunicaré.Reciban un abrazo de

Ignacio

Ignacio

Dear Jim:

Just a few lines to report the following:

1. I believe that Communism will concentrate on Nicaragua as a point of attack.

2. The men who have returned to Nicaragua after receiving training in Cuba only acted indirectly in the bloody events of the 22nd, because according to information gathered in Nicaragua through "Pepe Fernandez," the "Sandinistas" communists (who follow the Castro line) were awaiting the assassination of the Somoza in Leon and this was never realized (carried out). These men were expecting an outbreak before Tacho Somoza took over the Presidency of the Republic.

3. I am structuring (building) an anticommunist intelligence net in Nicaragua, which I have begun to instruct (train). This net is composed of: Jose Fernández ("Pepe" Fernández) Manager of Casa Hook. Rodolfo Jerez, Owner of casa "Venus." Capitalist of various enterprises.

Orlando Castrillo - Studies law, 5th year (5?) year of age He has a grocery (foodstuffs) business.

Duilio Cabrera - Studies law, 4th year. Works in the Ministry of Agriculture, in the Department of Live Stock. He is 25 years old.

Roberto Arellano - Studies law, 5th year. He works in the National Palace. Department of (Providad?). It is a position related to employees and workers. He is 28 years of age.

Roberto Arias - Studies law, 6th year. Owner of an automobile spare parts business.

These individuals are going to create an anticommunist intelligence net. I have already given them one week of conferences.

4. According to reports received by Pepe, a Nicaraguan named Gustavo Gomez Mesa, acquired through various subjects (persons), about $5,000.00 in arms in Miami, from the Tamiami Gun Shop. The money was contributed by Aguirre, the owner of "Diario de las Americas" (and director), through an individual named Germán Arellano. These arms were going to be infiltrated into Nicaragua in small quantities at a time.

5. Today I received from Adolfo Jiménez (old chief of the Camp "Francisco" of communications, of Costa Rica) the proposition to ask Nicaragua for permision to launch the invasion from there to Haiti. According to him there is a group of Capitalists in New York who are willing to send from Europe about $80,000.00 in arms, to any designated location in Nicaragua. I am attempting to find out the names of these capitalists so that I can report it. I have replied that I will think the proposition over very cautiously before presenting it to Nicaragua. Of course, I will not get involved in this adventure unless you desire the contrary.

Central South Internacional Inc.

P. O. BOX 1658 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI, FLA. 33138
CABLE: CENSOIN

Miami 3 de Marzo de 1967

Querido Jim:

Solo unas letras para informarte:

1- Creo que el Comunismo va a tomar como punto de ataque a Nicaragua.

2- Los hombres que han regresado a Nicaragua después de haber recibido entrenamiento en Cuba solo actuandn indirectamente en los sucesos sangrientos del día 22, pues según informaciones recogidas en Nicaragua a través de "Pepe Fernández", los comunistas "Sandinistas" (linea de Fidel Castro) esperaban el asesinato de los Somoza en León y éste no se llegó a realizar. Estos hombres esperan un brote antes de la toma de posesión de Tacho Somoza a la Presidencia de la República.

3- Estoy estructurando una red de inteligencia anti-comunista en Nicaragua, a la cual he comenzado a instruir. Esta red está estructurada por:

José Fernández "Pepe Fernández" Gerente de la Casa Hook.

[redacted]

Rodolfo Jerez- Dueño de la casa "Venus". Capitalista de varias empressas.

Orlando Castrillo-Estudia leyes, 5to. año. "5 años de edad. Tiene negoccio de venta de viveres.

Duilio Cabrera- Estudia Leyes, 4to. año. Trabaja en el Ministerio de Agricultura, departamento de Ganadería. 25 años.

Roberto Arellano-Estudia Leyes, 5to. año. Trabaja en el Palacio Nacional. Departamento de Providad. Puesto relacionado con empleados y trabajadores. 28 años.

Roberto Arias-Estudia Leyes, 6to año. Dueño de un negocio de respuestos de vehículos.

Estos individuos van a crear una red celular de inteligencia anti-comunista. Ya les dí una semana de conferencias.

4-Según informes recibidos de Pepe, un Nicaragüense llamado Gustavo Gomez Mesa, adquirió a través de varios sujetos, unos $5,000.00 en armas en Miami, en el Tamiami Gun Shop. El dinero fué dado por Aguirre, el dueño del "Diario de las Americas" (Y Director)., a través de un individuc llamado Germán Arellano. Estas armas iban a se metidas poco a poco en Nicaragua.

5- Hoy he recibido de Adolfo Jiménez (antigüo jefe del Campamento "Francis-

Central South Internacional Inc.
P. O. BOX [illegible] LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI, FLA. 33138
CABLE : [illegible]

co" ,de Comunicaciones,de Costa Rica) la proposición de pedir a Nicaragua permiso para sacar de ahí la invasión a Haití. Según él hay un grupo de Capitalistas en New York,que están dispuestos a enviar desde Europa unos $80,000.oo en armas al lugar que se les designe en Nicaragua.Yo estoy tratande de averiguar el nombre de estos capitalistas para informarlo.Les he respondido que pensaré muy detenidamente toda la proposición antes de plantearlo a Nicaragua.Por supuesto no me meteré en esa aventura a menos que Vds. opinen lo contrario.

Un abrazo.

Ignacio

Ignacio.

14-00000

Central South Internacional Inc.
P. O. BOX [illegible] LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI, FLA. [illegible]
CABLE: [illegible]

8

VIA AIR MAIL

REGISTERED
NO. 4430

Mr. Jim Willson
P.O. Box 7224
Apex Station.
Washington D.C. 2004

Name__________
1st Notice MAR - 7 1967
2nd Notice__________
Return__________

MAR 7 1967

MAR 7 1967

HIALEAH, FLA
MAR 6 1967
USA

WASHINGTON, D. C.
MAR 7 1967
REG. DIV

HIALEAH, FLA
MAR 6 1967
USPO

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/COG aew	EXTENSION 7451	NO.
		DATE 18 APR 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/Files				Please file in 201-267437
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

FROM: WH/COG

TO: Finance Division

DATE: 18 April 1967

DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12

NFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY
TURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS:

One-time payment to Artime for services rendered

PAYEE

AMOUNT

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ____________ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

TE SIGNATURE OF PAYEE

TE SIGNATURE OF AGENT

301-267437

YMENT INSTRUCTIONS

AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES
ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREE-
NTS. *(To be signed when applicable)*

TE TITLE SIGNATURE

APPROVED

DATE SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER

CERTIFICA NT OR CREDIT

DATE SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

IGATION REFERENCE NO. CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.

TE SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE AMOUNT SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFF CE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 DESCRIPTION - DVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. SHIP.DOC.NO. 28-33 AIR.	34-39 STATION CODE ACC.RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXC PO ED NE D	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR COST	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO	F.Y.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL CK. NO. REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	71-80 AMOUNT CREDIT

PREPARED BY DATE REVIEWED BY

TOTALS

496 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-46)

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance

Date: 18 April 1967

FROM : DC/WH/COG

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)____________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to Manuel Artime Buesa , CA $275.00
NAME OF PAYEE (True) STATUS (e.g.) CA; SAICE; INTEGREE AMOUNT

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1)______ Devised Cover Check. Account No.______-1100
(2) X Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

☐	BOSTON	☐	DALLAS*	☐	KANSAS CITY	☐	MIAMI	☐	NEW ORLEANS	☐	RICHMOND	☐	ST. LOUIS		
☐	CHICAGO	☐	DENVER	☐	KNOXVILLE	☐	MILWAUKEE	☒	NEW YORK*	☐	SAN FRANCISCO	☐	WASHINGTON, D.C.*		
☐	CLEVELAND	☐	DETROIT	☐	LOS ANGELES	☐	MINNEAPOLIS	☐	PHILADELPHIA	☐	SEATTLE	☐	WILMINGTON		

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following:
(1) Account Name:
(2) Account Number:
(3) Bank Name:
(4) Bank Address:
Zip:
(5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
(6) Payment to be originated from
(SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
(7) Indicate remittor if desired:

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ______ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Officer

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☒ Check to be picked up

Earl J. Williamson 7451 Thomas J. Flores 7451
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER EXT. SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER EXT

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment __________ City __________

FORM 1-66 1864 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(28)

Morgan Guaranty Trust Company OF NEW YORK **FE 88018** $\frac{1-23}{210}$

New York, APRIL 25,1967

Pay MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST CO $275 AND 00 CTS

To the order of MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ##################################

NOT TO EXCEED FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS

FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEPARTMENT

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑈00088018⑈ ⑆0210⑉0023⑆ 404 00 210⑈

☐ YES ☐ NO

TO FILE NO. 201-2

TO FILE NO.

RE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 0 TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM

ACTION C/WH/COG-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR. C/WH6, C/SOD3. C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/INT2.

S E C R E T 052245Z CITE MANAGUA 6085

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD **DESENSITIZED**

6 Apr 67 IN 38450

REF: DIRECTOR 87509

FI
RS
ABSTRACT X

1. INSPECTION AND REPACKING COMPLETED. ORIGINAL ESTIMATE CUBE TOO HIGH. MEASURED VOLUME OF 184 REMAINING BOXES TOTALS 418 CUBIC FEET. ALLOWING 20 PERCENT FOR STACKING LOSS ESTIMATE LOAD CAN BE PLACED IN SPACE 500 CUBIC FEET. LONGEST ITEM 70 INCHES. ESTIMATED WEIGHT 15,000 POUNDS.

2. NO INCENDIARIES OR DETONATING DEVICES. TEN BOXES FRAGMENTATION HAND GRENADES. ALL IN ORIGINAL SEALED CANS. FIVE BOXES 60 MM MORTAR AMMO. ONE BOX 81 MM MORTAR AMMO. ONE BOX TNT IN SMALL BLOCKS. ALL ABOVE BOXES MEASURE 24 BY 14 BY 15 INCHES. DEFER TO HQS ORDINANCE EXPERTISE ON WHETHER THIS MATERIAL SAFE FOR SHIPPING.

3. CONSIDERABLE QUANTITY C-3 AND C-4 PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE. ALL IN APPARENT GOOD CONDITION.

4. DETAILED LIST ENTIRE CACHE BEING POUCHED PRIORITY 7 APRIL.

SECRET

201-267437
6 April 1967

RECEIVED
RID/MIS

SECRET

TRACED

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 6053 S E C R E T   MAR 14 12 51 PM '60
MAR 1 2 21 PM '60

5. PLAN DISCUSS WITH GENERAL MONTIEL 6 APRIL. IN VIEW MAGNITUDE CACHE, MAY HAVE TO FALL BACK ON ORIGINAL SUGGESTION LAND STOL CARGO PLANE AT SITE FOR PICK UP. COLONEL BRENES THINKS THIS COULD BE COVERED ADEQUATELY AS FLIGHT CONNECTED WITH JOINT MANEUVER "OPERACION NICARAO" BUT MONTIEL OR PERHAPS SOMOZA WILL HAVE TO MAKE DECISION. BRENES FEELS CACHE MUCH TOO BULKY AND HEAVY BE TRANSPORTED TO MANAGUA BY GUARDAS MONTIEL HAD PROPOSED.

6. LARGE QUANTITY WEB GEAR, CANTEENS, HOLSTERS PUT ASIDE FOR GUARDIA. BRENES GIVEN ABOUT 1000 ROUNDS 50 CAL MG AMMO, SOME 30-06 MG AMMO, FOR USE BY HIS BOATS. THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS SUBSISTENCE PASSED TO ABLANEDO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MAR 12 60

KW

NNNN

Phyllis Edwards
C/WH/2/CR & NIC
EXT. 6312
DATE: 28 March 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 24 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH-6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH/C-5, C/CCS 3, C/CI-5, C/SOD-3, C/CI, C/FI-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 29 00 20Z CITE DIRECTOR 87509

TO PRIORITY MANAGUA INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REFS: A. MANAGUA 6024 (IN 26753)

B. DIRECTOR 85948

C. MANAGUA 6068 (IN 30488)

1. COS TRAVEL TO EL BLUFF AUTHORIZED AS REQUESTED PARA 1 REF.

2. AUTHORIZE PASSING SMALL QUANTITY 50 CALIBER AMMO TO BRENES PER PARA 2 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Refs concern arms cache belonging AMWORLD Project to be taken from El Bluff by Nicaraguan Air Force plane to Panama City. COS and ZABOTH will supervise preparation and loading of arms and ammo. Also, it may be necessary to dump some of the ammo at sea.

by
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WH/COG Tom Flores
(in draft)

EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PRECEDENCE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 2

ACTION c/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WH/COG TIME 20 BY C

INFO FILE, VR c/WH6 c/CA c/FI2 DDP ADDP c/CA 3 c/CI PS c/SOD CS/DO

S E C R E T 271525Z CITE MANAGUA 6268

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE PANAMA CITY

27 MAR 67 IN 30488

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

Hred fr G.V.

REF A. MANAGUA 6024 (IN 05332)

B. DIRECTOR 85948

1. PERHAPS USE OF WORK UNIT TERMINOLOGY "MAN DAYS" IN REF A CONFUSING. THREE MEN CAN DO JOB IN THREE DAYS HENCE COS WILL MISS ONLY ONE WORK DAY IF JOB DONE OVER WEEKEND. GUARDIA COULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE BUT FOR SECURITY REASONS BELIEVE BEST COS, ZABOTH AND ABLANEDO HANDLE. FOR SAME REASONS DO NOT WISH TDY ASSISTANCE. EL BLUFF "SMALL TOWN." COS AND ZABOTH ALREADY KNOWN THERE AND PRESENCE CAN BE ADEQUATELY COVERED BY OSTENSIBLE FISHING TRIP. PROPOSE BILLET IN ABLANEDO HOME AND WORK STRAIGHT THROUGH UNTIL JOB DONE. IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IS THAT ACTING ON ORDERS FROM GENERAL SOMOZA, GENERAL MONTIEL HAS MADE IT CLEAR TO CONONEL BRENES THAT COS TO MAKE ALL DECISIONS THIS CASE. THUS FEEL COS SHOULD BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT. IN VIEW FOREGOING REQUEST HQS AUTHORIZE COS TRAVEL EL BLUFF.

2. BRENES IS ALSO COMMANDING OFFICER NICARAGUAN COAST

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 CITE MANAGUA 5258 S E C R E T

GUARD SO CAN FURNISH BOAT FOR ANY DUMPING REQUIRED. WOULD APPRECIATE AUTHORIZATION PASS SMALL QUANTITY 50 CALIBER AMMO TO BRENES FOR PRACTICE USE BY HIS BOATS. THIS WILL HELP CEMENT ALREADY GOOD RELATIONS WITH BRENES WHO WORTHY INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT BY STATION.

3. AGREE DESIRABILITY TURN OVER CANTEENS, WEB GOODS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL TO GUARDIA. WILL HELP ALLEVIATE INEVITABLE DROOLING OVER ARMS AND AMMO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	C/	5	
2		6	
3	[illegible]	7	
4		8	

4/ 25/M

ACTION

WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR SOD 6, WH 8, CA 2, CA/O 4, C/OPS,

S E C R E T 211825Z CITE MANAGUA 6065

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE INFO SAN JOSE, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: JMWAVE 5385 (IN 15199)*

21 MAR 67 IN 26817

1. STATION AWARE ARTIME HAS CONTRACT WITH G-4 NIC NATIONAL GUARD, COL GUILLERMO (NOGUERA) ZAMORA, TO FURNISH FATIGUES, COTS, PONCHOS, AND WEB GEAR. THIS STRAIGHT BUSINESS TRANSACTION

2. NO STATION TRACES TORRE AND NO KNOWLEDGE WEAPONS. DO NOT BELIEVE ARTIME INVOLVED ARMS PURCHASES FOR NATIONAL GUARD.

* RE QUERY FROM UNIDENTIFIED COMPETITOR RE AVAILABILITY LARGE QUANTITY MIL EQUIP

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

201-26-138

D

25

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. Whitcarra

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 30/

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CA 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT

S E C R E T 211825Z CITE MANAGUA 6266

AJAX'A

21 Mar 67 IN 26782

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PORT AU PRINCE

REF: JMWAVE 6138 (IN 28609)

IN | PS | ABSTRACT X

1. MANUEL ARTIME WAS IN MANAGUA FROM 11 TO 20 MA HE TOLD STATION OFFICERS HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED AGAIN BY HAITIAN EMIGRES INCLUDING CANTAVE, WHO SOMEHOW THOUGHT HE COULD HELP THEM GET BASES AND ARMS. ARTIME ALSO SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM DUVALIER ASKING HIS HELP IN GETTING GENERAL SOMOZA TO PUSH FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA IN ORDER TO KEEP PRESSURE OFF DUVALIER AT SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

2. ARTIME HAS REPORTED CONTACTS BY HAITIAN EXILES OVER PAST TWO OR THREE YEARS, ASKING FOR HELP TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER, AND FROM DUVALIER REPS ASKING INTERCESSION WITH SOMOZA ON HIS BEHALF. ARTIME SAYS HE HAS LISTENED TO ALL, MADE NONCOMMITTAL REPLIES AND REFUSED TO INVOLVE SELF WITH EITHER GROUP.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

201-267437

21 March 1967

201-26 437

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

BY 25/[illegible]

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR SOD6, WH8, CA2, CA/4, C/OPS,

ABSTRACT X

MACA

S E C R E T 211825Z CITE MANAGUA 6865

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE INFO ~~SAN JOSE~~, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: JMWAVE 5853 (IN 15199)*

21 Mar 67 IN 26817

1. STATION AWARE ARTIME HAS CONTRACT WITH G-4 NIC NATIONAL GUARD, COL GUILLERMO (NOGUERA) ZAMORA, TO FURNISH FATIGUES, COTS, PONCHOS, AND WEB GEAR. THIS STRAIGHT BUSINESS TRANSACTION

2. NO STATION TRACES TORRE AND NO KNOWLEDGE WEAPONS. DO NOT BELIEVE ARTIME INVOLVED ARMS PURCHASES FOR NATIONAL GUARD.

S E C R E T

BT

* RE QUERY FROM UNIDENTIFIED COMPETITOR RE AVAILABILITY LARGE QUANTITY MIL EQUIP

SECRET

201-267437
21 March 1967

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

23

ACTION
c/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH6, DDP, ADDP, C/SCO3, C/CS53, C/CSPS, C/CI, C/FI2, C/6HN2, C/CI/PS, C/CS1590,

INDEX
PSD
ABSTRACT ✗

maa

S E C R E T 211753Z CITE MANAGUA 6064

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

21 Mar 67 IN 26753

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD DESENSITIZED

REF: MANAGUA 6060 (IN 24548)

1. BARKER RETURNED MANAGUA NIGHT 20 MARCH.

2. CACHE MORE EXTENSIVE THAN ANTICIPATED. TIME AND SPACE AVAILABLE DID NOT PERMIT PROPER INVENTORY. CONDITION ARMS OBSERVED VARIES POOR TO GOOD WITH LITTLE EVIDENCE WATERPROOFING. CACHING OBVIOUSLY DONE IN HASTE. SOME ARMS EXPOSED, RUSTY AND MOLDY. IN ADDITION, CACHE CONTAINS CANTEENS, CARTRIDGE BELTS, GAS MASKS, MACHETES, SIGHTING QUADRANTS, BIPODS, CLIPS, FLAME THROWER, ETC. EXAMINED SOME AMMO AND FOUND IN GOOD ORDER WITH OCCASIONAL SLIGHT CORROSION. DID NOT EXAMINE GRENADES WHICH APPARENTLY NEAR BOTTOM AMMO PILE. CRAMPED QUARTERS HAMPERED MOVEMENT.

3. ESTIMATED CUBE 1200 FEET.

4. ABOUT SEVEN OR EIGHT MAN DAYS WORK NEEDED TO SECURELY, ARRANGE WORK SPACE, REPACK EXPOSED ARMS, OPEN ALL BOXES TO VERIFY CONTENTS, SEPARATE INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS, DISPOSE OF ANY ITEMS CONSIDERED DANGEROUS TO SHIP.

SECRET

201-267437
21 March 1967

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 0364 S E C R E T

RID, H.S

5. FOR REASONS SECURITY, PLAN HAVE THIS WORK DONE BY BARKER, ZABOTH AND AMBIDDY CARETAKER, PRIMITIVO ABLANEDO SAN MARTIN WHO OCCUPIES HOUSE ABOVE CACHE. TENTATIVELY PLAN DO THIS FIRST WEEKEND APRIL. BARKER AND ZABOTH WILL FLY TO AREA THUS SAVING TWO DAYS. MEANTIME WILL FUND ABLANEDO TO ENABLE HIM REMAIN EL BLUFF ANOTHER MONTH. HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY SUBSISTENCE MONEY FROM AMBIDDY SINCE JANUARY AND IS ANXIOUS MOVE TO MIAMI.

6. COLONEL BRENES HAS PROVED COOPERATIVE AND SECURE.

SECRET

BT

MNNN

14-00000

SV

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

3 PER PHANT

ACTION C/WH 6 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR/WH/COG 5, CICI, CISOP 3

AT WH WH/C/MO

ABSTRACT X

S E CR E T 181457Z CITE PANAMA CITY PACY 2427

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA, JMWAVE

18 MAR 67 IN 24907

REF: DIRECTOR 83789

1. SOUTHCOM HAS AGREED TO HELP. NEED INFO ON WEIGHTS, CUBS, MARKINGS, AMOUNTS AND TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES AND AMMO IN ORDER PLAN HANDLING.

2. WHETHER MARKINGS ARE FOREIGN AND TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES MOST IMPORTANT IN PLANNING LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Sent to Managua
RI mark

~~CHRONO~~
~~DO NOT REMOVE~~

NNNN

Send to
Ernest Chiocca
WH/COG/MO
for RI marking

201-267437
18 Mar. 1967

Haiti

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

UFG-8633

DISSEM BY 3 PER #

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME 0249 BY D

INFO VR, FILE, ADOP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D CS/DO
FI/INT, IW, SOD 4, DO 7, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, CS/SGO, WH/COG 8

S E C R E T 172236Z CITE JMWAVE 6138 18MAR67 24602

DIRECTOR INFO PORT-AU-PRINCE, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, GUATEMALA CITY, MANAGUA, SAN JOSE, OTTAWA, PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT

INTEL DYVOUR JMUNION

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. OF JMROC INTEREST. PROJECT EVLANE. EVLANE-4. FIRST SUBSOURCE IS UOAMBER-6. REF: JMWAVE 5019. (IN 76125) CROSS-REF 201-267437 (ARTIME), 201-299292 (BOSCH), 201-270455 (GEORGES), 201-118281 (CANTAVE), 201-147945 (FIGNOLE), 201-053765 (HUDICOURT), 201-782436 (MAXIMILIEN).

FILED 172236.

14-00000

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 18 MARCH 1967
IN 24609
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

Distribution for BACKGROUND USE ONLY to: SDO 2, D/ONE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COUNTRY: HAITI/CUBA

DOI : EARLY MARCH 1967

SUBJECT: FORMATION OF CUBAN-HAITIAN EMIGRE ALLIANCE WITH THE GOAL OF INVADING HAITI

ACQ UNITED STATES, MIAMI (16 MARCH 1967) UFG-8833

SOURCE : A HAITIAN BUSINESSMAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG HAITIAN EMIGRES. HE IS AN UNTESTED SOURCE. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM A FORMER LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WHO MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, AND FROM EUGENE MAXIMILIEN, HAITIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN MIAMI.

1. IN EARLY MARCH 1967 CERTAIN CUBAN AND AHITIAN

SECRET

IN 24609

TDCS

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

(classification) (dissem controls)

EMIGRES IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, FORMED AND ORGANIZATION CALLED THE CUBAN-HAITIAN ALLIANCE. AMONG THE TOP CUBAN LEADERS ARE MANUEL ARTIME BUESA AND ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA. THE HAITIAN LEADERS ARE FATHER JEAN BAPTISTE GEORGES, FORMER GENERAL LEON CANTAVE, DANIEL FIGNOLE, AND PIERRE HUDICOURT. (SOURCE COMMENT: HUDICOURT, A MULATTO, IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, A LAWYER AND A FORMER HAITIAN DIPLOMAT.)

2. THE AIMS OF THE CUBAN-HAITIAN ALLIANCE ARE TO PUSH FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA AND AHITI AT THE PUNTA DEL ESTE SUMMIT CONFERENCE, TO COLLECT FUNDS, AND TO OBTAIN ARMS AND A TRAINING CAMP. THE LEADERS OF THE GROUP PLAN TO CONTACT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OF MEXICO, VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA AND COSTA RICA IN AN EFFORT OT OBTAIN ARMS AND A BASE TO TRAIN AND EQUIP A FORCE TO INVADE HAITI. THEY PLAN TO COLLECT FUNDS FROM AMERICAN NEGROES, HAITIANS IN CANADA AND NEW YORK, AND WEALTHY CUBAN EMIGRES.

3. THE GROUP PLANNED TO MEET AT THE MIAMI HOME OF SEYMOUR PILET, A SUPPORTER OF FORMER HAITIAN PRESIDENT FIGNOLE, ON THE EVENING OF 15 MARCH TO DEVELOP THEIR PLAN

SECRET

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

OF ACTION FURTHER.

4. MANUEL ARTIME VISITED EUGENE MAXIMILIEN, HAITIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN MIAMI, AT THE LATTER'S HOME ON THE EVENING OF 8 MARCH. (SOURCE COMMENT: ARTIME AND MAXIMILIEN ARE PROBABLY CONSPIRING TO INFORM HAITIAN PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER OF THE ACTIVITIES AND PLANS OF THE CUBAN-HAITIAN ALLIANCE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN MONEY FROM DUVALIER.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, GUATEMALA CITY, MANAGUA, SAN JOSE, OTTAWA).

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

14-00000

5b

8

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION

C/WH/COG 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH 6, DDP, ADDP, C/CCS 3, C/CSPS, C/CI, C/FI 2

MANA

SECRET 172245Z CITE MANAGUA 6060

18 Mar 67 IN 24548

DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

REF: DIRECTOR 82789 *

RE FI

ABSTRACT X

1. COS MET WITH GENERAL MONTIEL AND COLONEL BRENES 16 AND 17 MARCH. LEAVING WITH BRENES FOR EL BLUFF 0600 HOURS 18 MARCH TO INVENTORY CACHED ITEMS. MONTIEL COOPERATION COMPLETE AND ENTHUSIASTIC.

S

2. DITZION ACTING DURING BARKER ABSENCE. ESTIMATED RETURN 20 OR 21 MARCH.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

* APPARENTLY WRONG REF

201-267437
18 March 1967

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☒ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7 PRECEDENCE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 8

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CS/DO, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, CS/DO, C/SOD 3

MANA

S E C R E T 151506Z CITE MANAGUA 6055

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ~~JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY~~

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD DESENSITIZED 15 Mar 67 IN 22320

REF: MANAGUA 6054 (IN 21593)

1. COS CONFERRED ALONE WITH GENERAL MONTIEL NIGHT 14 MARCH. MONTIEL HAD MET EARLIER WITH GENERAL SOMOZA AND WAS CLOSETED WITH AMBIDDY-1 WHEN COS ARRIVED. MONTIEL CONFIRMED SOMOZA WILLINGNESS FACILITATE RECOVERY ARMS BUT HAD WORKED OUT WITH SOMOZA OWN PLAN OF HOW BEST ACCOMPLISH. MONTIEL BRINGING COLONEL BRENES, GUARDIA COMMANDER BLUEFIELDS/EL BLUFF AREA TO MANAGUA 15 MARCH. WILL INSTRUCT BRENES, WHO WITTING AMWORLD OPERATION, TO GIVE FULL COOPERATION COS. PROPOSES THAT COS AND BRENES GO TO CACHE SITE TO INVENTORY ARMS. BRENES WILL THEN TAKE CHARGE OF MOVING ARMS SECURELY AND IN SMALL AMOUNTS TO MANAGUA. WHEN ALL ARMS AT MANAGUA, NICARAGUAN AIR FORCE PLANE WILL FLY TO CANAL ZONE FOR "ROUTINE MAINTENANCE" AT WHICH TIME ARMS CAN BE TURNED OVER TO DESIGNATED RECIPIENT THERE.

AB CC	FI	
PS	DESK	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

9

2. MONTIEL (THUS SOMOZA) FEELS BEST NOT TRY BRING IN [redacted]

201-267437
15 March 1967

RECEIVED
RID/MIS

MAR 7 2 26 PM '68 [illegible] 14 12 51 PM '68

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 5055 SECRET

LNHARP PLANE OR BOAT TO RECOVER LEST THIS AROUSE CURIOSITY OR ACCIDENT CAUSE INCIDENT. SINCE PLAN OUTLINED ABOVE HAS SOMOZA BLESSING AND NICARAGUAN WILLING TAKE JOB ON THEIR SHOULDERS STATION RECOMMENDS WE AGREE TO IT WITHOUT CHANGE. APPEARS BE SOUND AND SECURE.

3. MONTIEL AND SOMOZA A BIT PUT OUT WITH AMBIDDY FOR STORING ARMS WITHOUT INFORMING THEM. NO APPARENT RESENTMENT OF ANY SORT AGAINST WOFACT. ACCORDING MONTIEL, AMBIDDY SAID HE BROUGHT ARMS UP FROM COSTA RICA AT LAST MINUTE AFTER HAVING REMOVED ALL ARMS FROM NICARAGUA. AMBIDDY CLAIMED SUPPORTER OF FIGUERES KNEW OF CACHE IN COSTA RICA SO AMBIDDY HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO KILL HIM AND TRANSFER ARMS TO KEEP THEM AWAY FROM ENEMIES OF SOMOZA. THUS APPEARS AMBIDDY HAS DONE GOOD JOB OF TAKING BLAME ON SELF.

4. STATION REQUESTS APPROVAL PROCEED PER PARA ONE ABOVE.

SECRET

BT

MAR 15 '68
KW

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

PRECEDENCE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 8

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CS/DO, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, CS/DO C/SOD 3

AN ✓	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

S E C R E T 151506Z CITE MANA~~GUA~~ 6055

MANA

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

15 MAR 67 IN 22320

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD

REF: MANAGUA 6054 (IN 21593)

1. COS CONFERRED ALONE WITH GENERAL MONTIEL NIGHT 14 MARCH. MONTIEL HAD MET EARLIER WITH GENERAL SOMOZA AND WAS CLOSETED WITH AMBIDDY-1 WHEN COS ARRIVED. MONTIEL CONFIRMED SOMOZA WILLINGNESS FACILITATE RECOVERY ARMS BUT HAD WORKED OUT WITH SOMOZA OWN PLAN OF HOW BEST ACCOMPLISH. MONTIEL BRINGING COLONEL BRENES, GUARDIA COMMANDER BLUEFIELDS/EL BLUFF AREA TO MANEDUA 15 MARCH. WILL INSTRUCT BRENES, WHO WITTING AMWORLD OPERATION, TO GIVE FULL COOPERATION COS. PROPOSES THAT COS AND BRENES GO TO CACHE SITE TO INVENTORY ARMS. BRENES WILL THEN TAKE CHARGE OF MOVING ARMS SECURELY AND IN SMALL AMOUNTS TO MANAGUA. WHEN ALL ARMS AT MANAGUA, NICARAGUAN AIR FORCE PLANE WILL FLY TO CANAL ZONE FOR "ROUTINE MAINTENANCE" AT WHICH TIME ARMS CAN BE TURNED OVER TO DESIGNATED RECIPIENT THERE.

2. MONTIEL (THUS SOMOZA) FEELS BEST NOT TRY BRING IN [redacted]

201-267437

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 5055 S E C R E T [redacted]

UNHARP PLANE OR BOAT TO RECOVER LEST THIS AROUSE CURIOSITY OF ACCIDENT CAUSE INCIDENT. SINCE PLAN OUTLINED ABOVE HAS SOMOZA BLESSING AND NICARAGUAN WILLING TAKE JOB ON THEIR SHOULDERS STATION RECOMMENDS WE AGREE TO IT WITHOUT CHANGE. APPEARS BE SOUND AND SECURE.

3. MONTIEL AND SOMOZA A BIT PUT OUT WITH AMBIDDY FOR STORING ARMS WITHOUT INFORMING THEM. NO APPARENT RESENTMENT OF ANY SORT AGAINST WOFACT. ACCORDING MONTIEL, AMBIDDY SAID HE BROUGHT ARMS UP FROM COSTA RICA AT LAST MINUTE AFTER HAVING REMOVED ALL ARMS FROM NICARAGUA. AMBIDDY CLAIMED SUPPORTER OF FIGUERES KNEW OF CACHE IN COSTA RICA SO AMBIDDY HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO KILL HIM AND TRANSFER ARMS TO KEEP THEM AWAY FROM ENEMIES OF SOMOZA. THUS APPEARS AMBIDDY HAS DONE GOOD JOB OF TAKING BLAME ON SELF.

4. STATION REQUESTS APPROVAL PROCEED PER PARA ONE ABOVE.

SECRET [redacted]

BT

RI Files

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 21

ACTION c/WH/COG 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE VR c/WH 6 [illegible]

MAJA

S E C R E T 142140Z CITE MANAGUA 6054

201-267437

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

DESENSITIZED

15 MAR 67 IN 21552

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

REF: MANAGUA 6052 (IN 20511)

1. TO GET DUCKS IN ROW COS, ZABOTH AND AMBIDDY-1 CONFERRED AFTERNOON 13 MARCH. AGREED AMBIDDY WOULD SEEK MEETING WITH GENERAL SOMOZA ASAP TO CONFIRM AND REINFORCE COS STATEMENTS EARLIER THAT DAY IN MEETING COVERED BY REF.

ANI
FI
ABSTRACT
INDEX

2. AMBIDDY AND SOMOZA MET MORNING 14 MARCH. SOMOZA QUITE UPSET WITH AMBIDDY AT FIRST BUT COMPLETELY CALMED DOWN BY END INTERVIEW. AS AGREED, AMBIDDY TOOK FULL "BLAME" FOR HAVING CACHED ARMS WITHOUT SOMOZA KNOWLEDGE. SAID WOFACT ALSO UNAWARE CACHE UNTIL HE REVEALED FEW DAYS AGO. SAID HE CACHED WEAPONS IN GOOD FAITH AFTER THEY MISSED HIS LAST BOAT. DID NOT WISH THEM FALL INTO HANDS PEPE FIGUERES OR ANYONE ELSE WHO MIGHT USE AGAINST SOMOZA.

3. SOMOZA ASKED POINTEDLY IF AMBIDDY IN AGREEMENT HAVE WOFACT RECOVER ARMS. AMBIDDY CONFIRMED, SAID HE HAD MADE SUGGESTION TO WOFACT AND THAT SOLE PURPOSE HIS PRESENT TRIP

SECRET

201-267437
15 March 1967

14-00000

RECEIVED
RID/MIS
MAR 7 2 26 PM '60

PAGE TWO MANAGUA 6054 SECRET SECRET

TO FACILITATE RECOVERY AND REMOVAL ARMS. SOMOZA SAID WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION, COS SHOULD PROCEED LAY ON WITH GENERAL MONTIEL.

4. AT THIS POINT SOMOZA AND AMBIDDY BOTH HAPPY, NEITHER ANGRY WITH OTHER OR WITH WOFACT. STATION READY PROCEED WITH RECOVERY AS SOON AS PLAN CAN BE LAID ON. COS TO SEE MONTIEL EVENING 14 MARCH.

SECRET

BT SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 1-267437

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

Zi

ACTION C/WH/COG-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/SOD-3, C/CI, C/FI-2

SECRET 131817Z CITE MANAGUA 0032

13 Mar 67 IN 20544

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

201-267437

REF: DIRECTOR 81910

1. COS DISCUSSED REF MATTER WITH GENERAL SOMOZA 13 MARCH. SOMOZA SURPRISED TO LEARN OF ARMS CACHE BUT AGREED LET LNHARP REMOVE WEAPONS. MUSED THAT AMBIDDY-1 HAD BEEN "PLAYING FOOTSIE" WITH HIM AND "MUST BE CRAZY".

2. SOMOZA SUGGESTED COS ARRANGE WITH GENERAL MONTIEL FOR REMOVAL WEAPONS. STATION EXPECTS MONTIEL TO BE COOPERATIVE AS USUAL.

AN 4e	FI	
[illegible]		
ABSTRACT	✓	~~INDEX~~

3. BELIEVE STOL PLANE OF C 123 VARIETY COULD HANDLE LOAD. COVER FOR PRESENCE IN AREA CAN BE OSTENSIBLE TESTING OF STRIP PREPARATORY TO JOINT MILITARY OPERATION NICARAO.

4. AMBIDDY-1 AGAIN IN MANAGUA AND MAY CONTACT SOMOZA AT OWN INITIATIVE.

SECRET Re Recovery Amworld weapons

BT

SECRET

201-267437
13 March 1967

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG: Earl Williamson:nes
UNIT: DC/WH/COG
EXT: 7451/1948
DATE: 9 March 1967

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 7 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, . C/WH 6 C/SOD 3 DDP

SECRET 9 21 18Z CITE DIRECTOR 81910

MANAGUA INFO JMWAVE PANAMA

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REF MANAGUA 6044 (IN 17221)

1. HQS WISHES PHYSICALLY RECOVER AMWORLD WEAPONS TO MAKE SURE THEY DO NOT FALL INTO WRONG HANDS.

2. REQUEST COS CONSULT WITH SOMOZA AND OBTAIN HIS APPROVAL IN PRINCIPAL FOR LNHARP TO REMOVE WEAPONS.
LE

3. AFTER SOMOZA AGREEMENT OBTAINED WILL FORWARD OPS PLAN FOR WEAPONS REMOVAL. DO NOT PLAN CONTACT AMBIDDY-1 UNTIL SOMOZA AGREEMENT OBTAINED AND OP REMOVAL PLAN FINALIZED.

END OF MESSAGE

①

WH/COG/MO

C/SOD

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: Earl Williamson:new
UNIT: DC/WH/COG
EXT: 7451/1948
DATE: 9 March 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 7 PER ____ # ____

CONF: c/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-267437 ✓

INFO: FILE, VR, c/WH 6, c/SOD 3, c/CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 9 21 18Z CITE DIRECTOR 81910

TO MANAGUA INFO JMWAVE PANAMA

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

REF MANAGUA 6044 (IN 17221)

AN A/t	FI	
~~DC~~	DDCT	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

1. HQS WISHES PHYSICALLY RECOVER AMWORLD WEAPONS TO MAKE SURE THEY DO NOT FALL INTO WRONG HANDS.

2. REQUEST COS CONSULT WITH SOMOZA AND OBTAIN HIS APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE FOR LNHARP TO REMOVE WEAPONS.

3. AFTER SOMOZA AGREEMENT OBTAINED WILL FORWARD OPS PLAN FOR WEAPONS REMOVAL. DO NOT PLAN CONTACT AMBIDDY-1 UNTIL SOMOZA AGREEMENT OBTAINED AND OP REMOVAL PLAN FINALIZED.

END OF MESSAGE

201-267437
9 March 1967

WH/COG/MO

by

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

for C/SOD James N.

C/WH/2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas J. Flores
for C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

(201-267437)

☐ NO INDEX ~~[illegible]~~

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-267437

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RET. TO FILE NO. ____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. ____

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADV. 21

ACTION C/WH/COG-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3, DDP, ADDP

MANA

INDEX	RI	
~~NO~~	~~OBJ~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

S E C R E T [illegible] CITE MANAGUA 6044

DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

8 MAR 67 IN 17221

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD

1. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, WHEN AMWORLD WAS CLOSED OUT TWO YEARS AGO, AMBIDDY-1 WAS AUTHORIZED TO HOLD ROUGH EQUIVILENT OF WEAPONS TO ARM ONE RIFLE COMPANY. WEAPONS STORED AT THE MONKEY POINT OPS BASE, AT EL BLUFF SUPPORT BASE, AND IN MANAGUA. ABOUT ONE YEAR AGO, MONKEY POINT BASE WAS CLOSED AND WEAPONS THERE MOVED TO EL BLUFF. STORAGE IN SEALED CONCRETE VAULT UNDER THE FLOOR OF SAFEHOUSE WHICH IS ON UNINHABITED SIDE OF BLUFF NEXT TO AIRSTRIP BUILT BY AMWORLD. STRIP IS 1,800 BY 30 FEET WITH CLAY BASE MIXED WITH NATURAL ROCK.

2. ARMS IN MANAGUA HAVE BEEN STORED IN A SAFEHOUSE OUTSIDE OF CITY AND CONSIST OF TWO WOODEN CRATES, EACH ABOUT 150 POUNDS AND 37 BY 25 BY 14 INCHES. APPROXIMATE CONTENTS ARE:

25 PISTOLS .45 CAL

5 RIFLES AR-15

3 SMG M3

SECRET

201-267437

8 march 1967

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 6044 S E C R E T

SECRET

2 SMG SWISS

6 PISTOLS .22 SILENCED

3. FORTY-FIVE BOXES OF UNKNOWN SIZES AND WEIGHTS ARE STORED AT BLUFF. CONTENTS ARE ESTIMATED FROM MEMORY BY ANTONIO SANZ, WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF STORING THEM:

4 HMG .50 CAL

2 RECOILLESS RIFLE 57 MM

2 MORTARS 81 MM

2 MORTARS 60 MM

4 LMG .30 CAL

4 BAR

3 RIFLES FAL

10 SMG M3

10 CARBINES M1

3 CARBINES M2

10 AR-15

10 GARAND M1

4 SHOTGUNS 12 GUAGE

4 SMG K-PISTOL

AMMUNITION FOR ABOVE WEAPONS, C-3 AND C-4 EXPLOSIVE

SECRET

WITHOUT DETONATORS, AMOUNT UNKNOWN, PLUS 10 TO 15 BOXES GRENADES.

4. AMBIDDY-1 CONTACTED JAMES D. ZABOTH 4 MARCH, SAID HE CLOSING OUT ALL HIS STATIONKEEPERS IN NICARAGUA, DID NOT WANT TO ABANDON WEAPONS TO FALL INTO WRONG HANDS, NOR TO GIVE THEM TO NIC GOVT. GENERAL SOMOZA KNEW AMWORLD WAS LEAVING BEHIND SOME RESERVE EQUIPMENT AND WOULD KEEP ENOUGH WEAPONS FOR LOCAL SECURITY. HE DID NOT KNOW NUMBERS AND TYPES REMAINING. AMBIDDY-1 ASKED IF WOFACT WISHED TO RECOVER WEAPONS, OTHERWISE HE WOULD HAVE TO DUMP THEM IN OCEAN. ZABOTH, AMBIDDY-1 AND AMJAVA-4, WHO IN MANAGUA ON OTHER BUSINESS, VISITED BLUFF ISLAND 6 MARCH TO CHECK SITUATION. IF HQS WISHES RECOVER WEAPONS, MOST FEASIBLE METHOD IS BY AIR. A CARIBOU OR C-123 TYPE AIRCRAFT COULD LAND ON BLUFF STRIP, LOAD WEAPONS AT NIGHT AND FLY THEM OUT NEXT MORNING. IF HQS DOES NOT WISH RECOVER WEAPONS, AMBIDDY-1 COULD BE TOLD TO MAKE OWN ARRANGEMENTS TO DUMP WEAPONS AT SEA.

5. DESPITE AMBIDDY-1 DESIRE NOT INFORM SOMOZA ABOUT ARMS CACHE, COS FEELS THAT SOMOZA SHOULD BE INFORMED IF

SECRET

APR 21 10 55 AM '67

APR 23 1 50 PM '67

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 4 MANAGUA 6044 S~~ECRE~~T

HQS DECISION IS THAT ARMS SHOULD BE RECOVERED. SOMOZA COULD BE TOLD THAT "SOME EQUIPMENT" LEFT BEHIND BY AMWORLD GROUP NOW STORED AT BLUFF AND LNHARP WISHES RECOVER. BELIEVE HE WOULD AGREE TO AIRCRAFT PICKUP AS PROPOSED ABOVE. IN STATION OPINION BLACK RECOVERY WITHOUT SOMOZA KNOWLEDGE TOO RISKY. STATION ALSO FEELS THESE WEAPONS SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM CENTRAL AMERICA LEST THEY FALL INTO WRONG HANDS.

6. HQS PLEASE ADVISE BY CABLE.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437
X-REF TO FILE NO. ______
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☒ SIG. ______
FROM
DISSEM BY 22

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES 30

~~SECRET~~

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

PRECEDENCE
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION		ADVANCE COPY	UNIT	TIME	BY
WH/COG8	☒ RID COPY	☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED	CS20	0230Z	

INFO
FILE, VR, CS/DO, CI, CI/OPS, CI/PS, FI, SOD6, FI/SIG, DI7

S E C R E T 062327Z CITE JMWAVE 5883

7 MAR 67 IN 15199

AN	FI	
PS		
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

TYPIC

1. JMWAVE CLEARED CONTACT WHO IS IN MILITARY SURPLUS BUSINESS RECEIVED QUERY FROM UNIDENTIFIED COMPETITOR RE AVAILABILITY 2,000 SETS OF FATIGUES, COTS, PONCHOS, WEB PISTOL BELTS, ETC. FOR SHIPMENT TO NICARAGUA VIA LANICA AIRLINES ON 7 MAR 67. ALSO RECEIVED QUERY FROM MR. PAUL TORRE, 127TH OR 128TH ST. OR AVE., NORWALK, CONNECTICUT RE PRICES AND AVAILABILITY VARIOUS TYPES AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. TORRE SAID HE WOULD CALL BACK IN 30 DAYS. CONTACT PLANS NO ACTION BUT WILL KEEP WAVE ADVISED. WAVE TRACES TORRE NEGATIVE.

2. LOCAL WODISH ALSO RECENTLY REPORTED TO WAVE THAT A SOURCE OF THEIRS IN THE MARINE SURPLUS BUSINESS RECEIVED QUERY FROM MANUEL ARTIME FOR ITEMS IDENTICAL WITH LIST GIVEN WAVE'S CONTACT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-267437
7 March 1967

14-00000

37

☐ UNCLASSIFIED   INTERNAL USE ONLY   ☐ CONFIDENTIAL   ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

38

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Manuel ARTIME Buesa (201 - 267437)

FROM: Kay Mauer WH/COG/MO/FI	EXTENSION 4275	NO.	LX 3212
		DATE	25 January 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RI/AN GA 50	26 JAN 1967		JH	Pls process
2. RID/MIS			CT	
3. RID/PS				
4. RID/FILES				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. ↓				
15. ~~KAY MAU~~ [illegible]				

MICROFILMED
FEB 9 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN	WH/C/MO
PS	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X

201-267437

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

MICROFILMED
FEB 9 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

17 January 1967

LX-3212

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Termination of Manuel Artime Buesa

@ of Eric J. Williamson

1. On the night of 13 January 1967 the writer using the operational alias James E. Wilson met with Artime in a room in the Hotel Columbus in Miami, Florida. The purpose of the meeting was to formally terminate Artime's association with the Agency. This involved the obtaining of termination Secrecy Oath and Quit Claim, the payment of $3,000 to cover the final periodical payment through 31 December 1966 and obtaining outstanding receipts.

2. The meeting was cordial and all paper work involved in the proceedings was accomplished without incident. There was of course the expected lengthy discussion on what he had done (or tried to do) for the Agency in the past and an undoubtedly sincere effort to impress upon me that he was ready and willing for any task he might be called upon to do in the future.

3. Artime made only one request--a rather passionate one--for financial assistance for the immediate family members of two Movement for the Recuperation of the Revolution (MRR) members who were executed as the result of operational missions to Cuba and the wife of another who is serving a 30-year sentence. (It will be recalled that Artime has been furnishing receipts for the $3,000 he has been receiving in recent months claiming that the money goes to the families of MRR members who have lost their lives or been imprisoned while on MRR missions.) We are examining these three cases and if worthy will arrange for financial benefits under the "survivors and martyrs" section of the AMBUD activity.

4. Artime has a sterile Headquarters telephone number and a P.O. box address in Washington, D.C. He was not discouraged in maintaining a loose contact by telephone or correspondence if he had any items of interest to pass along and was assured that if he ever had any "new" ideas, if he put them in writing, they would be studied. It was, however, made very clear to him that his formal association with the Agency was terminated and that there was no prospect of any financial assistance in the foreseeable future.

CS COPY

D 19-124-27/2- ~~conf~~ final

D 19-300-11- ~~conf~~ final

SECRET

201-267437

201-267437

5. Mr. Robert Stevenson, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the Department of State, and Mr. William Bowdler, Staff Member National Security Council (White House Assistant), were notified prior to Artime's termination and voiced no objections.

Earl J. Williamson

Earl J. Williamson
Deputy Chief, WH/COG

201-267437

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE

TO: Nancy AC/WH/COG

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:

Pls. file in

Ambiddy/1 file.

FROM: CICS

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: [illegible] CARSW[illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]/COG/CICS
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] JANUARY 1967

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. [illegible]

S E C R E T

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

Ambiddy

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

S E C R E T

CITE DIR

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

TYPIC LISASSY/LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 0024 (IN 83232)*

1. HQS CASE OFFICER (GROWERY) IN PROCESS CONTACTING AMBIDDY/1 TO REQUEST HE NOT CORRESPOND WITH LISASSY/1 ON THIS OPERATIONAL MATTER. REQUEST STATION EXPLAIN THIS LISASSY/1.

2. DO NOT WISH INTERRUPT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP OR EXILE ORG BUSINESS BECAUSE IT ONE REASON FOR LIRING INTEREST LISASSY/1, AND LISASSY/1 AND AMBIDDY/1 WILL TALK TO EACH OTHER ANYHOW.

3. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE ESTABLISH COMMO FROM LISASSY/1 TO STATION AS DISCUSSED WITH TRECKLER AT HQS.

4. REQUEST STATION SEND PARA FIVE REF COMMO INSTRUCTIONS AND AMSPICE COMMO INSTRUCTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

CONT/

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

~~S E C R E T~~

☐ ABSTRACT ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG.
UNIT.
EXT:
DATE:

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PAGE 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

TO: SECRET

INFO:

CITE DIRECTOR

TO:

WH/COG COMMENT:

REPORT ON 16 JAN MEETING WITH LISASSY/1, PARA FIVE: LIRING/1 PROVIDED ELABORATE AND OVER COMPLICATED COMMO INSTRUCTIONS WHICH APPEAR ENAMATE FROM HAVANA.

C/WH/COG/CICS______
WH/COG/MO E. CHIOCCA (DRAFT)
WH/COG/FI______
WH/1/MEXICO______

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-267437

ORIG: Nancvé Gratz:new
UNIT: WH/COG
EXT: 6753
DATE: 20 Jan 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

~~S E C R E T~~

1 CI
3 C/WH/COG

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 21 PER ____ # ____

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS

S E C R E T

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE 20 20 08 Z CITE DIRECTOR 68288

TYPIC AMBUD

REF UFGW 6351

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL BIO DATA AND ADDRESSES SUBJECTS OF INVESTIGATIONS REQUESTED REF.

A. MANUEL (GUILLOT) MONTES, BORN 22 DECEMBER 1905.
VIRGINIA (CASTELLANOS) DE GUILLOT, BORN 24 JANUARY 1892.
3488 NW 3RD STREET, MIAMI.

B. ROSA RABASA, BORN 3 DECEMBER 25
CHILDREN ARE FRANCISCA, AGE 18; ALFONSO, AGE 12;
MANUEL, AGE 6; JOSE ANTONIO, AGE 4.
1152 1/2 SW 10TH STREET, APT 1, MIAMI.

C. SILVIA HEREDIA, BORN 11 JANUARY 33.
CHILDREN ARE EDUARDO, AGE 8; RAQUEL, AGE 6.
180 SE 14TH TERRACE, MIAMI.

2. PLEASE HAVE INVESTIGATOR OBTAIN BIRTHDATES OF RABASA AND HEREDIA CHILDREN.

END OF MESSAGE

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

17 January 1967

CX-5212

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Termination of Manuel Artime Buesa

1. On the night of 13 January 1967 the writer using the operational alias James F. Wilson met with Artime in a room in the Hotel Columbus in Miami, Florida. The purpose of the meeting was to formally terminate Artime's association with the Agency. This involved the obtaining of termination Secrecy Oath and Quit Claim, the payment of $3,000 to cover the final periodical payment through 31 December 1966 and obtaining outstanding receipts.

2. The meeting was cordial and all paper work involved in the proceedings was accomplished without incident. There was of course the expected lengthy discussion on what he had done (or tried to do) for the Agency in the past and an undoubtedly sincere effort to impress upon me that he was ready and willing for any task he might be called upon to do in the future.

3. Artime made only one request--a rather passionate one--for financial assistance for the immediate family members of two Movement for the Recuperation of the Revolution (MRR) members who were executed as the result of operational missions to Cuba and the wife of another who is serving a 30-year sentence. (It will be recalled that Artime has been furnishing receipts for the $3,000 he has been receiving in recent months claiming that the money goes to the families of MRR members who have lost their lives or been imprisoned while on MRR missions.) We are examining these three cases and if worthy will arrange for financial benefits under the "survivors and martyrs" section of the AMBUD activity.

4. Artime has a sterile Headquarters telephone number and a P.O. box address in Washington, D.C. He was not discouraged in maintaining a loose contact by telephone or correspondence if he had any items of interest to pass along and was assured that if he ever had any "new" ideas, if he put them in writing, they would be studied. It was, however, made very clear to him that his formal association with the Agency was terminated and that there was no prospect of any financial assistance in the foreseeable future.

B-19-124-27/2

B-19-300-11 ✓

201-267437

5. Mr. Robert Stevenson, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the Department of State, and Mr. William Bowdler, Staff Member National Security Council (White House Assistant), were notified prior to Artime's termination and voiced no objections.

Earl J. Williamson
Deputy Chief, WH/COG

~~SECRET~~

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, Manuel F. Artime Buesa, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of the United States Government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I acknowledge that should I again be affiliated with another government agency or department, I will preserve the secrecy of intelligence operations, sources, and methods of the Organization from other persons in such government agencies and departments, even though such persons are fully cleared, or are in possession of any type of security clearance, within their own departments.

3. I further affirm that I will not discuss with or disclose to any government employee, foreign service officer, or other official with whom I may later be associated, any information relating directly to clandestine operations, sources or methods, personnel or fiscal figures of the Organization, or to special operations, security measures, or other matters which may have been acquired by reason of my assignment with the Organization unless by permission of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

4. I certify that I have no monetary claims against the Organization, nor does any organization I now direct or have directed during my association with the Organization. My signature as affixed hereto represents a quit claim absolving the Organization of any financial or other responsibility for myself and above-described organizations and members thereof. Should there be any future claims, I have been advised to submit in writing to the Organization any such claims I or any organization I now direct or have directed during my association

SECRET

with the Organization may have against the Organization or the United States Government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive legal consideration. In the event, however, that the decisions of the Organization concerning such claims are not satisfactory, no other action will be taken to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

5. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

6. During my exit processing and during my period of association with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth below.

7. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

8. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of the United States Government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and the United States Government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 13 day of January 1967.

____________________ (SEAL)
Signature

Witnessed by me this 13 day of January 1967
at Miami, Florida

James Wilson
Signature

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

17 JAN 67

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: DC/WH/COG

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/COG				Authorization for termination attached as background info.
2.				
3. C/WHD	17 JAN 1967		B	
4. DC/WHD			E	
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10. DC/WH/COG (for file)				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

1&3: although Mr C may kick up a little dust. I think Earl deserves a well done for terminating this thing with a minimum of problems.

I fully agree "Well done"

B

See also memo dtd 26 Oct 66

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1966
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME
INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA
FBI FILE #: UNKNOWN (MIAMI, FLORIDA)

~~SECRET~~

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, Manuel F. Artime Buesa, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of the United States Government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I acknowledge that should I again be affiliated with another government agency or department, I will preserve the secrecy of intelligence operations, sources, and methods of the Organization from other persons in such government agencies and departments, even though such persons are fully cleared, or are in possession of any type of security clearance, within their own departments.

3. I further affirm that I will not discuss with or disclose to any government employee, foreign service officer, or other official with whom I may later be associated, any information relating directly to clandestine operations, sources or methods, personnel or fiscal figures of the Organization, or to special operations, security measures, or other matters which may have been acquired by reason of my assignment with the Organization unless by permission of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

4. I certify that I have no monetary claims against the Organization, nor does any organization I now direct or have directed during my association with the Organization. My signature as affixed hereto represents a quit claim absolving the Organization of any financial or other responsibility for myself and above-described organizations and members thereof. Should there be any future claims, I have been advised to submit in writing to the Organization any such claims I or any organization I now direct or have directed during my association

SECRET

with the Organization may have against the Organization or the United States Government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive legal consideration. In the event, however, that the decisions of the Organization concerning such claims are not satisfactory, no other action will be taken to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

5. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

6. During my exit processing and during my period of association with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth below.

7. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

8. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of the United States Government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and the United States Government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 13 day of January 1967.

(SEAL)
Signature

Witnessed by me this 13 day of January 1967
at Miami, Florida

James Wilson
Signature

DR. MANUEL F. ARTIME

File Artime

Enero 13 de 1967

Estimado Jim:

Adjunto te envío el Memorandum sobre los tres casos de que te hablé hoy personalmente:

MANUEL GUILLOT: Este señor es el padre de Manuel Guillot Castellanos, fundador del Movimiento, que trabajó para el MRR y para la "Compañía" durante los años de 1959,1560 y1961,hasta el 30 de Agosto de 1962,en que fué fusilado por la Tiranía Roja en Cuba.

Fue torturado y murió sin decir el nombre de los rectores del Clandestinaje Cubano que el conocía.Fue infiltrado en Cuba por la "Compañia" varias veces,una de ellas,su último vieje en que fué fusilado.

Don Manuel Guillot padre tiene 65 años de edad y su esposa,que vive,es paralítice y sólo se mueve con aparatos ortopédicos.Este pobre viejo no puede hacer trabajo físico y su mujer es inválida.Nosotros le estabamos pasando $300.oo mensuales.No veo forma en que este hombre pueda hacer otro trabajo que el que hace,de oficinista.Su esposa ha sido sometida a tres operaciones quirúrgicas y el médico dice que necesita una más.

SILVIA HEREDIA: es la viuda de Jorge Fundora,el que descubrió el punto de entrada de la mayor parte de armas y "Teams de infiltracion" que fueron a Cuba antes y despues de Bahia de Cochinos. Esta pobre mujer esta sola en el mundo con dos hijos.Ella esta recibiendo tratamiento Psiquiatrico.El MRR le pasa 125 dolares mensuales.Ella no puede abandonar su hogar con los dos hijos para ir a trabajar.Su esposo fue fusilado el 12 de Octubre de 1961 y murió sin decir el punto por donde entraban las armas y los hombres de la "Compañia" en Cuba.

ROSA RABASA: es la esposa de Francisco Echeverria Texier,condenado hace 6 años a 30 años de Presidio por los esbirros rojos.Esta mujer es sorda,solo puede coser en su casa para mantenerse ella y los dos hijos que tiene.No le es suficiente y el MRR le pasa $75.oo dolares mensuales.Este hombre(su esposo) trabajó intensamente con la gente de Francisco,transportando las armas que la "Compañia" metía en Cuba.

En todos estos casos,que son desesperados,el MRR ha costeado hasta los tratamientos médicos.

Para la mayor tranquilidad de los hombres que hantrabajado y trabajan con la "Compañia",sería conveniente que esta gente no pasaran hambre y miseria,ya que han sido sus parientes muertos o presos,hombres que han servido lealmente a la COMPAÑIa y han dado ejemplo de valor y de abnegación;bien distinto de los "héroes" de hoy que van a la Televisión cubana cuando son capturados para hablar mal de la causa anti-comunista,de los EEUU y de la "COMPAÑIA".

Es lo único que me preocupa de la nueva situación creada a partir de Enero de 1967.

Atte. vuestro amigo de siempre:

Manuel F. Artime Buesa

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1 Fill in Sect. 2 on the back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2 Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken, or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

FROM:

RID an

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

GL

TO	ROOM, NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/2			10 JAN 1967	jm
2.				
3.				
4. WH/2/N				
5. This				
6. [illegible]			18 JAN 1967	
7.				
8. WH/FI	18 Jan 67			X
9. DC/WH/CO	[illegible] Jan 1967			
10. WH/C/CI/FA/B				
11. WH/2/CR&W	27 JAN 1967	1 MAR 1967		
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COPY DETACHED

CLASSIFIED
RI/AS
201-267437

MICROFILMED
JAN 16 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

This [illegible] directly from AMBUDDY-1 and [illegible]

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
[redacted] 201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
11 Jan. 1967

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HNMA 03739

FORM 1-61 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

27

TO
Chief of Station, San Jose

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Managua

SUBJECT
201-267437
6 AMBIDDY-1 Discussions with Frank MARSHALL and Daniel ODUBER

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HRS-3845, 12 December 1966
B. HNMW-1930, 19 December 1966

1. AMBIDDY-1 gave the following information to James D. ZABOTH in Managua on 15 December 1966 and was told to pass it on to his Headquarters contact for proper handling and distribution. This report is forwarded as a follow-up in case the information failed to get into proper channels, as it has a direct connection with Reference A and is a sequel to Reference B.

2. Between 7 and 13 December 1966, AMBIDDY-1 talked three times with Frank MARSHALL, at the latter's request. MARSHALL first called AMBIDDY-1 and asked if they could meet at MARSHALL's office to talk about the possibility of MARSHALL investing in the business proposition in which AMBIDDY-1 was involved. (A concession for a commercial record player with a television type screen on which scenes are displayed which are supposed to be synchronized with the music.) After two such meetings, which AMBIDDY-1 described as "get-acquainted" and "feeling-out" sessions (the two men had never met in person previously), MARSHALL asked if he could visit AMBIDDY-1 privately in his hotel room. They met on 12 December 1966 at AMBIDDY-1's suite in the Gran Hotel in San Jose.

continued.....

10 January 1967
JDZABOTH:wcg

Distribution:
2 - COS, San Jose
2 - Chief, WHD

MICROFILMED
JAN 16 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-263437

[redacted]

B-201-51919
0-53-9-8

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[redacted]	HNMA-3735	JAN 11 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER

3. MARSHALL said he knew AMBIDDY-1 had some weapons. AMBIDDY-1 replied that the weapons in Nicaragua had been given to the Nicaraguan Government, but MARSHALL continued to press the point, saying he knew there were others. AMBIDDY-1 at last reluctantly admitted that he did have a few more scattered around under tight security (he says this is not true, in fact), but indicated that he had other plans for their use. MARSHALL said he did not care where they were or what they cost, he would buy them. AMBIDDY-1 asked him why he wanted weapons so badly, and MARSHALL replied that he was always in the market for weapons. AMBIDDY-1 said he was aware of that fact, but this did not sound like just another routine business deal. He went on to say that he would not even consider releasing any of his arms without knowing where they were going and for what use, and that he had heard that MARSHALL had sold weapons previously to the Communists. He would have nothing to do with such an operation, regardless of any possible profit in it. He tried to elicit as much information as possible, but got very little. MARSHALL said they had a common friend in General SOMOZA, to which AMBIDDY-1 replied that this was fairly recent as SOMOZA and MARSHALL had been bitter enemies up until about the last three years. AMBIDDY-1 said he had to know how many arms were wanted, when, where, and for what purpose. MARSHALL said he wanted all he could get, as soon as possible, in Costa Rica, and the reason was that he knew a coup was being prepared and he wanted to get his own people ready in time. AMBIDDY-1 said he would have to think about the proposition and would give him an answer in about three weeks. (He intends to stall and make no commitments, hoping to draw out more information. He will not agree to sell any arms.)

4. On 7 December 1966, AMBIDDY-1 talked with Daniel ODUBER at the latter's office. ODUBER said he was worried about all the talk of coup plotting, weapons and other indicators of possible violence. ODUBER again mentioned to AMBIDDY-1 that he had a finca on the Pacific Coast near the Nicaraguan border which has an airstrip adequate for a C-46 or C-47 type aircraft, and made an effort to feel out AMBIDDY-1 about the possibility of landing arms on that airstrip. AMBIDDY-1 was noncommital and ODUBER did not press the point.

5. AMBIDDY-1 said (as his opinion) that he had gotten the impression from talking with MARSHALL and ODUBER that ODUBER is pushing MARSHALL to stage a coup attempt in the hope that he, ODUBER, can step in at the right time and claim the Presidency. ODUBER considers Jose "Pepe" FIGUERES to be his main rival in such a plan, however. He seems to think the TREJOS administration is doomed in a matter of time.

Lawrence F. BARKER

14-00000

Earl Williamson: File AMBIDD

We sent cable to Mexi asking them to meet with LISASSY-1 and debrief re mission to Venezuela offer.

Discussed commo with Joe Piccolo while he was here and he agreed to give SASSY a means to contact Station (through answering service) when he returns.

Station called Lisassy-1 and met. Results cabled to us. Asked that AMBIDDY-1 be cut out of op and said had lectured SASSY on security.

We asked them if they giving him commo to Station.

fisher

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE 11-

TO: J. Mahoney

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Source Artime.
Follow-up on his meeting with LISASSY in Miami. What has happened in this case?

FROM: EJW

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 30-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(40)

Miami 10 de Enero de 1967

Estimado Jim:

El Dr. Alvarez Tormo estuvo el domingo y el lunes y el martes en Miami.

El motivo de su visita:

1-Contacto con amigo de Carlos en Mejico deficiente. Solo puede hablar con el contacto cuando este lo llama por telefono, y esto lo hace muy de tarde en tarde. Hay cosas urgentes que el espia de la embajada cubana le plantea, que el no puede decidir sin hablar primero con el amigo de Carlos. Por ejemplo: le plantearon un viaje clandestino a Venezuela.

Seria conveniente que Alvarez Tormo pudiera llamar un telefono cada vez que necesite ver al amigo.

2-Los agentes de la Embajada cubana temieron una ruptura con Mejico hace dos semanas y le comunicaron a Alvarez Tormo un sistema de comunicaciones de emergencia, que te envio adjunto en la propia letra de Alvarez Tormo. Antes de venir Alvarez Tormo, el cubano le dijo que la situacion critica con Mejico habia pasado, pero que guardara el sistema de emergencia hasta despues de la "Reunion de Presidentes Americanos"

3-Como vez, le ensenaron a Alvarez Tormo hasta un lugar donde el podia recibir "material" (es decir: Propaganda, materiales de sabotaje, armas etc.)

3-Creo que esto bien trabajado puede dar un resultado formidable, pero creo que si el contacto en Mejico no funciona, Alvarez Tormo va a terminar por evadir lo que para el significa un peligr para sus familiares en Cuba.

4-Ya en Cuba trasladaron al hermano de Alvarez Tormo de la Prision para una granja donde la vida es mas comoda y la familia lo puede ver. Le han traido noticias de su hermano.

Abrazos:

Ignacio

Ignacio

HOTEL MÉRIDA

MERIDA. YUCATAN. MEXICO.

①

Método de Comunicación de Urgencia

Se usarán 2 nombres. El se llamará Luis Gómez (LG

Este se usará para la forma de recados, llamadas, cartas, informes, etc

Yo tendré el teléfono de su Casa solo para usar en urgencias y dejaré el recado en la siguiente forma:

"Le habla Z. Hace varias semanas le dejé mi inscripción de documentos. Me prometieron tenerlo listo todo enseguida".

Esto significa vernos a 10 hs. mas tarde en el lugar de la próxima entrevista que se hubiera concertado

Se usará un lugar indistintamente para las entrevistas pero habrá un lugar de carácter permanente que llamaremos X. Este lugar se usará solo para el caso de rotas las comunicaciones o desconocerse el lugar de encuentro.

En la Habana contaremos con una dirección que será comunicada periódicamente en cada carta anterior. Le escribiré siempre hablándole de negocios relacionados con talleres mecánicos. Es un sujeto de 29 años, casado con una hija. Nombre de la esposa: Iraida Padrón. Si en una carta yo le señalo que L. G debe llegar acá, indicaré la fecha exacta

HOTEL MÉRIDA

MERIDA YUCATAN. MEXICO.

y nos veremos en el lugar y hora permanente señalados. La carta se dirige a Evelio pero en el texto se indica que se le entregue a L.G. Ellos tendrán una dirección mía. Llevarán remitente falso y la enviarán a nombre de G.D. dirigida desde Italia por L.G. Hablará de negocios y fijará la necesidad de vernos a una hora y ~~fecha~~ lugar y día. Sólo marcará el día pues ~~fecha~~ lugar y hora quedan siempre permanentes.

En caso de vernos en Europa no se mencionará el país pero sería España - Madrid.

Hotel Castellana Hilton

② Encuentro ordinario.

Se fijará hora, lugar y fecha en el anterior.

Formas de riesgo:

Para evitar un reconocimiento se usará un pañuelo blanco

Urgencias:

Por parte de Z (L.G) llamarán por teléfono. Esto significa encuentro 7 horas más tarde. Lugar: el preestablecido

Suspensión

Pasará un telegrama explicando algo de visas en trámite.

Esto significa encuentro suspendido 10 días

HOTEL MERIDA

MERIDA YUCATAN. MEXICO.

(5) Suspensión de encuentros por parte nuestra.

Pasaremos un telegrama a su oficina

Texto:

En relación presupuesto documento urge respuesta. G.D.

Remite: Falso

Urgencia: no queda regulada

Restablecimiento:

Se restablecerán automáticamente en:

Lugar

Hora

Fecha: ⓐ Si no hay telegrama: Al día siguiente

ⓑ Si hay telegrama 10 días después.

⑥ Depósito de material informativo:

Puntos de Contactos:

Existirá un punto regular y otros de reserva o emergencias.

Habrá un depósito situado en A, con un puesto de observación.

En el mapa-croquis se muestran: los lugares de depósito de material informativo y los puestos de observación de ambos sitios.

Estos se podrán modificar de acuerdo con las circunstancias.

⑦

Se regulará además que cualquier otra persona podrá llamar a la oficina a nombre de L. G. o podrá establecer una cita refiriendo este nombre.

Se evitarán los contactos a horas desusadas y se esperará en los puntos de contacto únicamente 10 min. antes o después. Al pasar este tiempo se esperarán 10 min. más y en ese caso se traslada el contacto para el día siguiente.

filed 5 Jan 67

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Subversive and Political Activities in Central America

Source of the following information is a prominent Cuban exile who is a fairly reliable reporter. He has a large number of direct and indirect contacts with influential Latin American nationals. Source acquired the information from discussions held with the individuals mentioned, during the month of December 1966.

During a conversation with Frank Marshall in early December 1966, source learned that Marshall wanted to buy arms and asked source to supply them. Marshall said that he needed them for what he called "an expected revolutionary outburst from one moment to the next in Costa Rica", and he did not want his "private arsenal" to be smaller than the arsenals of the Calderon Guardia group, Pepe Figueres' group, Oduber's group and the Communist group. Source asked Marshall when he needed the arms and Marshall answered NOW. Source replied that he would need at least three weeks to think about Marshall's request and then he would give Marshall an answer. After considering what source had said, Marshall replied, "okay, I can give you one month to give me an answer but no more." Source believes Marshall is in a plot to overthrow the Costa Rican Government. In source's opinion "the situation in Costa Rica is very bad because the president does not have a definite political group to support him and therefore is in the hands of diverse groups; Calderon Guardia, Ulate, Echandi, Frank Marshall etc., who respond to their own sectarian interests and not to Costa Rica, and who respond much less to President Trejos. The Partido Liberacion Nacional, (PLN) is expecting a coup d'etat and plan to counter-attack and stay in power."

In a conversation with Daniel Oduber in early December 1966, source states that Oduber "spoke badly about Don Pepe Figueres and "Chico Orlich". Oduber said that "they wanted to eliminate his presidential aspirations for the coming campaign and postulate Don Pepe again." Oduber said that "they (Don Pepe and Orlich) were the

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

File: Ambiddy-1

Page 2

Johnsons of Costa Rica and he (Oduber) was the Kennedy. I'm lucky that they are stupid and that they are not aware of the fact that an attack is being created and they are not prepared for that emergency. I am prepared." Oduber then told source of an airfield on his farm close to the Nicaraguan border where at the determined moment he could receive arms.

SECRET

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	SAS/ESBC	1 Aug 63	KB
2			
3	SAS/CI/Kahle	5 Aug	WC
4	1 Gen - js file		
5	AMCLATTER/1.		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61 (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

Former contacts Havana Station

able personal courage, good security and common sense. In my mind he is the ideal type of Latin American agent. It will be a real loss to the Agency if we lose sight or contact with Adolfo. I have met few men more dedicated and more loyal.

[illegible]

5. 05 Ramon USATEGUI Lezama. AMPAN-3. Recruited by AMPAN-2 and so close to each other that we referred to them as the "Gold Dust Twins." Ramon was in the shipping business in Havana and eventually had to leave. He lost his home, cars, furnishings, etc. His firm is now planning to send him to Nicaragua, and I have recommended him to the Nicaragua desk (Mr. Trental) 03 He has all the qualities ascribed to Adolfo SAN PELAYO (see above) except that he has never been an American citizen. He speaks excellent English. He is dedicated, courageous and most anxious to maintain contact with the Agency. It will be our loss if this is not done.

[illegible]

6. Bernard L. Barker. AMCLATTER-1. Wife: Clara. Barker is a Cuban-American. Ex-Captain in the U.S.A.F. See PRQ and 201 for full bio data. I recruited Barker in 1959, and he served faithfully until we had to exfiltrate him sometime in 1960. He recruited a number of valuable agents for the Station (including AMCLATTER-5, which see) and had an amazing encyclopedic knowledge of Cuban persons, events and contacts in all walks of life. He was a boxing manager and knew intimately all Cuban personalities engaged in the sporting industry. He had a puppy-dog loyalty to his case officers and to the Agency. His biggest weakness was his lack of discretion. He was such a loyal American (actually if not technically) that he would fight at the drop of a hat if anyone cast aspersions on the United States or its leaders. In the atmosphere of Castro's Cuba I might say that that was quite often. We are in the process of helping him recover his lost American citizenship. When the Station reopens I would certainly recommend that we continue to maintain contact with Barker. If nothing else he would make a wonderful leg-man for the Chief of Station. His wife is an attractive Cuban gal who is bilingual and as belligerently "American" as he is. Barker, by looks and by language, could pass either as an American or a Cuban - a genuine asset if he could be taught to submerge his Americanism.

7. 05 Manolo VEGA Abril. I met Manolo through Jorge ALONSO PUJOL (now a prisoner in Cuba as a result of the 17th of April invasion). Manolo is working for us now in Miami, and I presume we have full bio data on him. Manolo's family owned, along with Republic Steel, the big steel plant in Havana which was nationalized by the Castro regime (Cia. Antillana de Acero, S.A.). Manolo has a brother, [illegible] who would also be worth cultivating. Through his business and family connections Manolo knew a great many people of operational interest. One of his friends was David SALVADOR, although Manolo did not share SALVADOR's political thinking (extreme left and anti-American). Manolo [illegible] objective a reporter as I have ever encountered among Lat

2

SECRET

3/BR

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM: CC

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.:

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ES	15 June 65			Jo
2. WH/C/RR/OS	[redacted]	17 JUN 1965		K
3.				
4.				
5. WH/C/MO/CI			NOT	
6. ESY/AK			29 JUL	K
7. [redacted]				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16. CHARGED FROM RID/FI				
17. RID/FI				

[illegible] MICROFILM

NOT [illegible] MICROFILM

YOUCADED

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

FILE TITLE:

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 19-5-1

TO MICROFILMED [redacted]

DOCUMENT DATE: June 1965

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFGA-21693/3

SECRET

(40)

UFGA -1600/14

Att. No. 4 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: ALEMAN, Carlos [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1953 in the home of Agustine ALDAMA Acosta, calle Tejar between San Lazaro y San Anastasio, Lawton, Havana City. Source became a close friend of the Subject during this period because of their mutual activities against the Batista regime. About 1958 Subject was arrested because of his political activities and was confined at Principe prison until the overthrow of the Batist regime. Source believes Subject was a member of the Policia Nacional Revolucionaria in the early days of January 1959. In February 1959 Subject was appointed to a position in the Presidential Palace the same as source, where they were under the direct orders of Cusy AULET (mat unk). In December 1959 Subject was a member of the Policia Nacional Revolutionaria, stationed in a building located at Ave. Misiones y calle Pena Pobre. Subject was transferred to the DTI as chief of the Departamento de Robos about 1961. Source last saw Subject about late 1961 when source went to the DTI to help a friend find his stolen car. Subject was not a communist before 1959, but now he is a staunch supporter of the GOC and a communist. When source left Cuba in March 1964 Subject was residing in Reparto Santos Suarez, Havana City. Subject is divorced and has a minor son. Source believes Subject came to the USA about 1952, but Subject has never travelled to any communist countries.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1928, HavanaCity, probably. Race: white. 5'6". 160 lbs. Hair: light and gray. Eyes: light. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Believed identical with Carlos ALEMAN Grass, 201-752505. <Believed ident w ALEMAN, CARLOS [illegible] [illegible] of 201-754928>

CS COPY

s/o ~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

19-5-1

~~[illegible]~~

[illegible] Att. No. 5 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: VALEJO Iniguez, Delfin [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1940 when they were neighbors at calle San Lazaro between Concepcion and Dolores Streets, Lawton, Havana City. Subject as a young man worked as a piano repairman. Source believes that Subject worked in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas during Batista or Prio regimes. In 1959 Subject was working at the Bolsa de Confecciones (Control Office for textile factories) which was located at the Retiro Odontologico building, located on 23 St. and L. St., but source does not know exactly what type of work Subject did. Source believes that Subject worked in that position until he left Cuba for the U.S. in late 1960 or early 1961. Subject now resides at 1529 SW 7th St. Apt. 6, Miami. Source believes that Subject has never been a communist and that he (Subject) was offered the mentioned position at the Bolsa de Confecciones because of his activities against the Batista regime. Subject has never travelled to any of the communist countries and source believes Subject never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1926, source does not know the place of birth. Race: white. 5'10". 165 lbs. Hair: light brown. Eyes: light brown. Shape of face:round. Build: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

~~CS COPY~~ 2

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14

SECRET

SECRET

UFGA - 21693/14 Att. No. 7 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: AULET, fnu
aka: Cusi

[illegible] DOB: C1928
[illegible]
[illegible] 754935

1. Source met Subject about 1955 when they lived in the same neighborhood, Reparto Santos Suarez, Havana City, and since that time they have had frequent contact with one another because of their activities against the Batista government. About 1958 Subject went into exile in New York where he remained until January 1959, when he returned to Cuba. In early 1959 source was appointed to a position in the Presidential Palace through the influence of Subject. At that itme source worked under Subject's directions and they had developed a close friendship. When source returned to Cuba in December 1959 he saw Subject only occasionally. Subject became a member of the Rebel Army and source heard that Subject attended a military course in Matanzas City. Source last saw Subject about January 1964 about two months before source departed from Cuba. Source says Subject is married and has children and that he resides at calle Luis Estevez between Mayia Rodriguez and Pasaje Oeste, Santos Suarez, Havana City. Source does not know if Subject has ever travelled out of Cuba, or if Subject has relatives outside Cuba nor does source know if Subject has ever received any political or intelligence training. Source does not know to what military unit Subject belongs. When source last saw Subject about January 1964, Subject had been shot in one leg during a personnal quarrel with a militia man, which occured in early 1963. Subject is very reserved and source stated they avoided speaking about politics.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1928, source believes Subject once told him he was born in the USA. Race: white. 5'8". 140 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of Face: long. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

3

UFGA - 21693/14

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Att. No. 8 to UFGA-21693

[illegible] UFGA - 21693/11

SUBJECT: VAULET, fnu
aka: Pichi [illegible]

201-[illegible]

1. Source met Subject in early 1959 when both were appointed to a position in the Presidential Palace and they remained in contact, but not close friendship, until June 1959 when source left this position. Source has not seen Subject since. In 1961 source heard rumors that Subject had a post at the Ministerio de Relaciones Exterioes, but source does not know exact position held. About 1962 source heard rumors that Subject was in some communist country studying mechanics. When source left Cuba in March 1964 he was under the impression that Subject was still in this communist country studying. Subject is single and lived in Reparto Santos Suarez, exact address unknown. Source does not know if Subject has received any political, military or intelligence training, or if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1938, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'7" 125 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

~~SECRET~~ 4

~~C/C ATT 8~~ UFGA-21693/4 SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET UFGA-21693/14

Att. No. 10 to UFGA-21693

[illegible] 1926 [illegible]
[illegible] interrogation [illegible] 754935

SUBJECT: BAEZ, Jorge

1. Source has known Subject since 1956 or 1957, being from the same neighborhood in Reparto Santos Suarez, in Havana City, Both were involved at that time in activities against Batista's regime. During this period Subject used to work as a construction laborer. In early 1959 Subject was appointed Chief of the Cayo Cruz garbage disposal unit and remained in this position until September 1962 at which time he resigned and left Cuba, coming to the USA. He presently resides at 2 Vicent Court, Apt. 2-C, Newark, New Jersey. Source last saw Subject in Cuba in September 1962. In the beginning of March 1965 Subject visited source in his home in Miami. Source states that Subject was never a communist and that since very early in 1959 was against the Castro regime. Subject has never traveled to any of the communist countries and has many relative residing outside Cuba at the present time. Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1926, Havana City (probably). Race: white. 5'11", 210 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

6

UFGA-21693/1 SECRET

UFGA - 21693/14
Att. No. 11 to UFGA-21693

[illegible] dob: c 1930 pob: Havana
[illegible] during interrogation of subj. [illegible] 201-754138

SUBJECT: BARRENA Barrena, Obdulio

1. Source met Subject about 1960 at which time source was working at the Ministerio de obras Publicas as "Chief Buyer" for the District of Havana. Source and Subject became very close friends. Subject resigned his post about 1963, in order to arrange for his exit permit, and is waiting to leave Cuba for Madrid, Spain. Source says he believes Subject was never a communist and is sincerely against the present GOC. Since 1960 Subject resided at calle San Anastasio #678, la Vibora, Havana City. Source heard that Subject was separated from his wife and is living with his mother at the above mentioned address. Subject has never traveled out of Cuba; and has a cousin Berta NORIEGA (this is husband's patronymic) who lives in Miami, address unknown. Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1930, Havana City. Race: white. 6'2", 155 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

7

UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

SECRET UFGA- 21693/14

Att. No. 12 to UFGA-21693

Cit. Cuba DOB. c1925 POB: Cuba, Havana

SUBJECT: *BELLO San Pedro, Gregorio

[illegible] 201-751938

1. Source met Subject about 1950 being from the same neighborhood in Reparto Santos Suarez, Havana. At that time Subject worked in the "La Estrella" (candy factory) located in Via Blanca, Havana City. Source became much more friendly with Subject about 1955 or 1956 when both were engaged in activities against the Batista regime. Subject was arrested in 1958 for such activities and was confined to the Castillo del Principe where he remained until January 1959. Source believes that for a few months in early 1959 Subject was a member of the Policia Nacional Revolucionaria. Source believes Subject then returned to his job at La Estrella. Source has a slight idea that Subject also worked for the ICA (Instituto Cubano del Petroleo) in the domestic gas division. Source last saw Subject about January 1964 in the streets in Reparto Santos Suarez where they had a casual conversation. Source says that in his opinion Subject is one of those persons who wants to remain on the "fence"; that sometimes he speaks in favor of the government and at other times against the GOC. It is source's opinion that Subject has never traveled outside Cuba and that he has no relatives outside Cuba. Source also stated that Subject has never received any kind of political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, Havana City probably. Race: white. 5'8", 130 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: One Gregorio BELLO was the 26th July Movement leader, delegation No. 11 of Santos Suarez, Estrada Palma, and Sola Streets, Havana (AMWREN/1, 6 April 1961).

[redacted] 6

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14 SECRET ~~[illegible]~~

UFGA - 21693/14

Att. No. 13 to UFGA-21693

Cit: Cuba DOB: c 1920

SUBJECT: x #BONITO, Luis [illegible] 201-754938 [illegible] 201-187196

1. Source met Subject in December 1957 in Mexico City where Subject was in exile at that time. Source last saw Subject in January or February 1958. Source saw Subject several times in Mexico but never became friends. Source claims he has heard rumors that Subject has traveled to some of the Communist countries. Source believes that after the communist takeover in Cuba Subject had some position as a labor leader in the CTC (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba) but souce is not able to provide any other info on this matter. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba or if Subject has received any political, military or intelligence training. It is source's opinion that Subject was not a communist at the time they met.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1920, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'9", 160 lbs. Hair: light brown. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is possibly identical with Luis BONITO Milian, 201-187196. <Possibly ident w/ BONITO, Luis who was in [illegible] during interrogation of subj. – 201-754938>

UFGA-21693/14

SECRET

Att. No. 14 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21693/14

SUBJECT: CALDERIN, Pedro

[illegible]

1. Source first met Subject about 1950 when Subject was a taxi driver in Havana, but had no close contact with him until early 1959 when both were appointed to positions at the Presidential Palace under the direct orders of Cusi AULET. They became friends during this period of time which lasted until June 1959, when source left this job. Source again established contact with Subject in 1960 or 1961, at which time source was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas and Subject had been appointed Administrador of "Luis Mion Company" (Terrazo floors) which had been confiscated by the government. Because of Subject's position in said firm he had to frequently go to the Ministerio de Obras Publicas for which Ministerio this firm made terrazo floors. During these visits Subject used to talk with Subject. Source last saw Subject in mid-1963 when source visited him at the office of the Consolidado del Granito (this was the new name for all terrazo floor companies) located at calle Neptuno and Industria, Havana City. Source made this visit in order to try to secure from subject a permit to buy a spare part for his (source) car. Source believes Subject was never a communist prior to 1959, but that he is now a supporter of the CGC. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled outside Cuba or if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba. Source does not know if Subject has ever received any political, military of intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'10", 155 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long and thin. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

~~[illegible]~~

10

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14 SECRET ~~[illegible]~~

14-00000

UFGA 21693/14 Att. No. 15 to UFGA-21693

F [illegible]

SUBJECT: *CALZADILLA, fnu [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in early 1959 when both were appointed to similar positions at the Presidential Palace under the direct supervision of Cusi AULET. Source maintained with Subject the normal relations of fellow employees until source left that position in December 1959. Source last saw Subject in ~~June~~ 1959. Source is not able to provide any info on Subject's life prior to the time they met. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled outside Cuba, or if he has any relatives outside Cuba. Source does not know if Subject has received any political, military or intelligence training. Due to the fact that source was in personnal contact with Subject for a very short time, source is not able to provide any information regarding Subject's political sympathies.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1937, Matanzas City, probably. Race: white. 5'11", 170 lbs. Hair: blonde. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

11

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA - 21693/14 ~~[illegible]~~

UFGA-21693/14

Att. No. 16 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: de CARDENAS, Orlando

[illegible] 201-75453?

1. Source met Subject in June or July 1959, when source was working at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, which Subject used to visit very frequently because he was a personnal friend of many of the Cubans employed there. Subject is a Cuban who has been residing in Mexico since about 1935. Source became a friend of Subject and this friendship lasted until December 1959, at which time source returned to Cuba. They did not see one another again until 1964 when source re-established his contact with Subject. -> Source believes Subject has never been a communist and always expressed himself against the Cuban communist regime. Source says Subject has some medical products representations in Mexico City.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1915, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'8", 190 lbs. Hair: black and gray. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: One Orlando de CARDENAS was a member of the PRD Delegation in Mexico in December 1960. In 1962 one Orlando de CARDENAS Miro attended a meeting in Mexico to discuss the formation of a new Cuban-Mexican anti-Castro organization, where he was named the Provisional Treasurer of the organization (DBA 8997, 30 April 1962).

12

Att. No. 17 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21693/14

[illegible]

SUBJECT: CARRASCO, Irma [illegible] 201-754938

1. Source met Subject in 1962 when Subject was residing in an Apartment building located in Marianao, behind the Colegio de Belen, where a friend of source, Dr. Emilio FORS, used to live. Source maintained the social relationship with Subject until March 1964. Afterwhich they have maintained correspondence from Spain, where Subject has resided since September 1964. Subject according to source, is not a communist and is against the Castro regime. Source believes that Subject has never previously traveled outside of Cuba. Subject informed source that she has a brother (name unknown to source) who has been in the US since about 1961. Source believes Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training. Subject resides at calle Martin de los Heros #74-1, Madrid, Spain, and in Cuba Subject used to live in Reparto La Ceiba, Marianao, Havana Province, complete address unknown. According to source Subject intends to emigrate to U.S. from Spain.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1940, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'5", 130 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of Face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

X

13

Att. No. 18 to UFGA-21693

UFGA 21693/14

[illegible]

SUBJECT: CASAL, Roberto Cited during interrogation [illegible] 201-754938
aka: Pilin

1. Source met Subject about 1960 at the home of Ramon F [illegible] WILTZ Bucelo, who resided on calle Serrano or calle Zapote, Santos Suarez, Havana City. Source had little contact with Subject at that time and they were never close friends. When source arrived in Mexico City in March 1964, he received a letter from WILTZ in which source was given the Subject's US address: 461 E. 13th St., Hialeah, Florida. Source last saw Subject about mid-1961. Source stated that, although he had very little contact with Subject, his opinion is that Subject has never been a communist, and believes Subject never had any position in the Communist regime in Cuba. Source believes Subject left Cuba in early 1962, going to Spain, from where he came to the US. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled to any of the communist countries and does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba. Source does not know if Subject has ever received any political, military or intelligence training. Source cannot provide any information on Subject's private life.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: ca 1928, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'8", 165 lbs. Hair and eyes source can't remember. Shape of face: round. Physique: mid-heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

Cited during interrogation [illegible] 201-754938

✓

~~SECRET~~ UFGA-21693/14 ~~SECRET~~

14

UFGA - 21693/14

Att. No. 19 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: CONCEPCION Morales, Jose Antonio
aka: Tito [illegible]

1. Source has known Subject all his life because they are distant relatives. Source gave Subject a position as laborer in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas in 1960, when source worked there. Prior to this, Subject had never worked, because of his youth. After working in the Ministerio Subject became a member of the Militia and a staunch supporter of the GOC. Source claims that about 1962 Subject accused him of having removed a TV set from his (source's) home, which the source did because at that time he was arranging his exit permit to leave Cuba. Subject on several occasions received military instructions for periods of one to two months, but source is not able to say the exact nature of these courses or where the Subject received the training. Subject has not traveled outside Cuba, and has no close relatives outside Cuba.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1941, Santa Clara (probably), Las Villas Province. Race: white. 5'7", 130 lbs. Hair: blonde. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

✓

~~[illegible]~~ 15

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14 SEC...

14-00000

Att. No. 20 to UFGA-21693
UFGA -1693/14

[illegible] DOB c 1937 [illegible]

SUBJECT: CUENCA, Cesar Ramon

1. Source met Subject in Mexico City in 1957 where Subject was then residing at calle Chapultepec, Colonia Narvarte. During the two months source was in Mexico he saw Subject frequently and they became very close but source has not seen or heard from Subject since about February 1958. In 1959 he heard rumors that Subject was stationed at the Estado Mayor in the Ciudad Libertad, Havana City, and also that Subject worked for a period of time at the Ministerio de Recuperacion de Bienes, but was later transferred to G-2 in Camaguey City. Source later heard that Subject was appointed to a post in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's mentioned positions or as to where he might be working at the present time. Subject's father prior to 1959 owned a drug store in Guanajay, Pinar del Rio Province. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled to any of the communist countries or if he has any relatives outside Cuba, nor whether Subject has ever received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1937, Guanajay, Pinar del Rio Province, probably. Race: white. 5'8", 160 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above believed identical with Cesar CUENCA Montoto, 201-328945. (Believed identical CUENCA, CESAR RAMON [illegible] during interrogation [illegible] 201-754435. Reportedly in G-2 in Camaguey City)

[redacted] 16

SECRET

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

Att. No. 21 to UFGA-21693

UFGA-21693/14

SUBJECT: *DUQUESNE, fnu [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1960 when source was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas at which time Subject was a Labor Leader of the Construction Workers, and acted as "liaison" between the Ministerio and the constructions workers. Source's only contact with Subject was in December 1961 when source resigned his job. Subject is a militia member. Source is not able to provide any background information on Subject. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has traveled outside Cuba, or if he has received military or intelligence training. Source believes Subject has received some kind of political indoctrination or training but is not able to provide any other information on this matter.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1923, place of birth unknown. Race: negro. 5'10", 145 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: black. Shape of face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: One Armando DUQUESNE was listed as a Castroite-Communist employee of the Ministry of Justice (19-6-52/4-2, Report from Monte dated 10 November 1961). May be identical w/ DUQUESNE, fnu cited during interrogation of subj. of 201-754936.

[redacted] 17

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

UFGA- 21693/14

Att. No. 22 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: ESPINO Lezcano, Roberto [illegible] ROBERTO SANTA ANA ESPINO LEZCANO

1. Source met Subject about 1960 when source was appointed to this position at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, at which time Subject was already working there in the Department of Statistical Budget. Source last saw Subject in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas a few days before source left Cuba in March 1964. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's life prior to the time they met. Source heard from fellow employees in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, that Subject was an "old" employee of that Ministerio, and had been working there since about 1950. Source saw Subject again in Mexico City, when Subject arrived in June 1964. Source says that Subject left Mexico about October 1964 and has since been residing at 1134 SW 4th Street, Apt. 20, Miami, Florida. Source says in his opinion Subject was never a communist and never was a member of any of the communist sponsored organizations. Source believes Subject had never traveled outside Cuba before. Source says Subject has many relatives outside Cuba at present time. Source says Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1927, Cardenas, Matanzas Province. Race: white. 5'9", 150 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Roberto Santa Ana ESPINO Lezcano, DPOB: 26 July 1928, Cardenas, Matanzas, a former Public Works employee in Cuba is presently residing in Hialiah, Florida (MEXI 1007, 24 Sept 64).

[redacted] 18

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

Att. No. 23 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: FERNANDEZ, Osmin [illegible] 201-[illegible]
Believed identical w [illegible] 201-334092

1. Source met Subject about 1955 or 1956 in the Castillo del Principe in Havana where Subject was serving time for political crimes and source went there to visit a friend, (Gregorio BELLO San Pedro). Source saw Subject again in 1957 while both were exiles in Mexico City. After his return to Cuba in 1959 source heard that Subject was a member of the Rebel Army. Source saw Subject again in 1959 or 1960 when source visited him at the Marianao City Hall, where Subject was the Comisionado Municipal. Source also saw Subject several times at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas when Subject visited Osmani CIENFUEGOS Gorriaran who was his very close friend. Source believes he saw Subject for the last time in late 1960 on one of the visits Subject made to Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Source claims he is a friend of Subject, although not a very close one. Source believes that Subject has been a Communist sympathizer since 1957, as he heard Subject on several occasions making pro-Communist statements. Source believes that Subject has traveled on different occasions to Communist countries. Source does not know if Subject has relatives outside Cuba. Source believes Subject is a staunch supporter of the Cuban Communist regime. Source is not able to say if Subject has ever received any military, political of intelligence training. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's private life.

Close friend of FERNANDEZ, OSMIN

[illegible] 201-[illegible]

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1937 probably in San Juan y Martinez, Pinar del Rio Province. Race: white. 5'5", 130 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: Source can't remember. Shape of face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed to be identical with Osmin FERNANDEZ Concepcion, 201-334092. < Believed iden w FERNANDEZ, OSMIN who was [illegible] interrogation [illegible] subj. 201-754938 >

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET 19 [redacted]

14-00000

UFGA - 21693/14
Att. No. 24 to UFGA-21693

cit. Cuba dob: c1925 pob: Cuba, Cifuentes

SUBJECT: FORS, Emilio [illegible] 201-754733

1. Source believes he met Subject about 1955 while both were engaged in activities against the Batista government. Source states that since that time he has had a close relationship with Subject, as both used to visit each other frequently. Source states that since 1955 Subject worked in a Medical organization called O.M.P.O. (Source can't say what these letters mean) which was located on calle 23 in Vedado but source can't say the exact address. This was a Medical organization that made house calls for clients of said organization. Source believes Subject continued this same work after 1959, never worked for the government, and has never been a member of any communist sponsored organizations. (Source says Subject is married to Marta (patronymic and matronymic unknown) and has two minor children. Subject has lived since about 1963 at Ave. 41 #6623 Apt. 1, Marianao, Havana Province, Cuba. Source believes that since February or March 1959 the Subject has realized the evils of Castro's regime and has been against it. Source claims Subject has never been a communist sympathizer. Source believes Subject has never traveled outside Cuba. Source says that Subject has a sister named (fnu) FORS (Matronymic unknown), Mrs. Octavio DORESTE who has lived at 105-B Wallworth Park, Cherry Hills, New Jersey, since about 1963. Source says he believes Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, Cifuentes, Las Villas Province. Race: White. 5'9", 140 lbs. Hair: gray. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

[redacted] 20

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

Att. No. 25 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21693/14

SUBJECT: *FUENTECILLA, Fernando

1. Source met Subject in early 1959 when source was working at the Presidential Palace and at this time Subject was applying for a position there, which source believes he never got. When source left Cuba in June 1959 Subject was still frequently visiting the Presidential Palace trying to acquire a position there. The next time source saw Subject was about March 1960 at which time Subject visited source at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas where he was then working, and where Subject wanted to get a job. Through source Subject was appointed office clerk at the Distrito #3, Havana which position he held until late 1960, when he was transferred as office clerk to the offices of Reforma Urbana located on calle O between 23 and 25 Streets, Vedado, Havana City. Source does not know why or when Subject was transferred from the offices of Reforma Urbana to the Ministerio de Transporte in Plaza Civica, but during the first half of 1963 source was accompaning a relative who wanted a taxi permit from the Ministerio de Transporte and at this time souce saw the Subject who was then Chief of the Departamento de Licencias de Autos de Alquiler; source says that Subject was very helpful and through him source's relative got the necessary permit. Source believes that Subject is not a communist and if he is working for the government he is doing it because he has to have a job. Source believes Subject has never traveled outside Cuba, not has he ever received political, military or intelligence training. Source says Subject once told him that he has a married sister residing in the US; but source is not able to provide the name of the husband or the address. Source is willing to establish mail contact with Subject if necessary, who he believes, if properly approached could and would cooperate.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1941, Cuba Guantanamo, Oriente Province. Race: white. 5'8", 150 lbs. Hair: blonde. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars. Face has acne marks. [illegible] during interrogation [illegible] of 201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

21

UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

14-00000

UFG.- 21698/14

Att. No. 29 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: #GAVILAN, Mario [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1957 in Guanabacoa, Havana, through Ezequiel #GOMEZ aka Kelo, who was engaged with activities against the Batista regime. Subject used to work for the Urban buses (routes 3 &5) Guanabacoa, and lived in Cojimar, Havana. On Castro's rise to power Subject continued working as driver in the Urban buses, and never held any position in the Castro regime. Subject went as an "alzado" to Escambray Mountains, with Ezequiel GOMEZ in early 1961 and was arrested in March 1961. When source left Cuba in March 1964 Subject was at the Isle of Pines Prison. Source says Subject has never been a communist and that he was honestly trying to overthrow the Castro regime. According to source Subject has never traveled outside Cuba, not has any relatives residing outside Cuba nor has he ever received any political, military or intelligence training. [illegible]

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1930, Cojimar or Guanabacoa, Havana Province. Race: white. 5'8", 140 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: thin. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

22

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/74 SECRET ~~[illegible]~~

UFGA- 21693/14
Att. No. 31 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: GIL Suarez, Lino [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in Mexico City in June or July 1959 at which time Subject was Military Attache at the Cuban Embassy. Source and Subject had the normal relationship of fellow employees but they were not close friends. At that time Subject was a sympathizer of the Communist system, and used to read communist and anti-USA propaganda. Source saw Subject again in the latter part of 1960, at which time Subject had a position in the Immigration Department of the DTI located at Monserrate and Empedrado, Havana City (this department issued exit permits). Source had gone there to request Subject's assistance in securing an exit permit for a friend and Subject granted said exit permit. In 1962 Subject was working for MINREX at Calzada & G, Vedado. In early 1963 source heard rumors that Subject had been appointed Military Attache to one of the Cuban Embassies in one of the Communist countries, the exact country is unknown to source. Source was not able to provide any information on Subject's private life, work, or any of Subject's activities prior to 1959. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba or if Subject has ever received political, military or intelligence training. Source believes Subject is a complete and staunch supporter of the Communist regime.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1935, Marianao, Havana. Race: white. 5'10", 150 lbs. Hair: light brown. Eyes: light. Shape of face: round. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed to be identical with Gil Lino ~~SUAREZ~~ Hernandez, 201-262638. (Believed to be iden[illegible] w/ GIL SUAREZ, LINO [illegible] + 201-754387)

~~SECRET~~

~~[illegible]~~ 1 UFGA-21693/14 SECRET 23 ~~[illegible]~~

UFGA- 21693/14
Att. No. 33 to UFGA-21693

cit: cuba DOB: c1925 POB: cuba: Guanabacoa

SUBJECT: K *GOMEZ, Ezequiel
aka: K Kelo

201-268917

1. Source met Subject about 1955 at the home of Agustin *ALDAMA Acosta, located in Calle Tejar between San Lazaro and San Anastasio, in Lawton, Havana City. After they met they became close friends and were engaged together in revolutionary activities against the Batista regime. Subject fought in the Escambray Sierra and was there when Batista was overthrown in January 1959. At the time source met Subject he was a labor leader of the Urban Buses (Routes 3 and 5). Source believes in early 1959 Subject went back to his work at this bus line. In early 1960 Subject was appointed to a position at Customs at the Jose Marti Airport, Havana, but source is not able to provide any information on the tasks the Subject performed there. Source last saw Subject in late 1960 or early 1961 in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Some days after this visit Subject went as an "alzado" again to the Escambray Mountains where he remained until 17 March 1961 at which time he was arrested. When source left Cuba in March 1964 he knew from newspapers that Subject was at the Isle of Pines prison. Source is of the opinion that Subject has always been against the communists and that he had been honestly engaged in activities against the Castro regime in Cuba. Source believes that Subject has a 16 year old son who is residing with his mother in New York, address unknown. Subject made a trip to Mexico about 1956, and also a trip to Miami about 1958.

2. DPOB: circa 1925, Guanabacoa, Havana Province. Race: white. 5'5", 135 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: medium. No visible scars. [illegible] 201-754938 [illegible]

3. JMWAVE Traces: One Ezequiel GOMEZ was identified as a pro-Castro infiltree at the Isle of Pines Prison. GOMEZ is a former member of the MRP (DOI: September 1962) (UFGA 6761, E-2, 4 December 1962).

SECRET 24

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14

SECRET

Att. No. 34 to UFGA-21693

UFGA-21693/14

SUBJECT: GONZALEZ Polanco, Horacio

1. Source met Subject about 1955 both having resided in same neighborhood in Reparto Santos Suarez, Havana, and at which time they were both engaged in activities against the Batista regime. About 1957 Subject went to the Sierra Maestra, where he joined Castro's forces, and upon the overthrow of Batista Subject returned to Havana with the rank of Lieutenant in the Rebel Army and now has the rank of Captain. Source last saw Subject in early 1963 at the restaurant "La Antigua Chiquita" in calle Carlos Tercero, Havana, at which time they had a casual conversation. Source has heard rumors that on different occasions Subject has been stationed in Camaguey Province and also at the Isle of Pines. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled outside Cuba, has any relatives outside Cuba, or if he has ever received military, political or intelligence training. Source believes Subject is not a real communist, but a person who under that system has obtained a better position in life and has become one of the "new class".

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1926, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'11", 160 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Traces on Subject follow by special channel.

25

UFGA. 21693/14 SECRET

Att. No. 35 to UFGA-21693

c.s. c. UFGA- 21693/14

SUBJECT: *GONZALEZ, Victoriano

1. Source met Subject about 1940 both having resided in the same neighborhood in Reparto Lawton. At that time Subject worked as a salesman at a fruit store located on Calle San Lazaro and Dolores in Lawton, Havana City. In 1954 or 1955 Subject and source were also in contact because both were engaged in activites against Batista. Subject was one of the men that was placed with the source near the Presidential Palace in Havana to help in the attack that took place on 13 March 1957. They were not able to do so because the weapons they were supposed to use did not arrive on time. In 1960 source appointed Subject as carpenter in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, and source believes Subject has remained in that post until the present time. Subject is not in favor of the present GOC because he is not a communist. Subject has never traveled to any of the communist countries, but source believes Subject came to the US as a baseball player in 19̄3 or 1954. Source says he believes Subject has no relatives outside Cuba, and that Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training. Source says he last saw Subject about October 1963 on the street in Lawton.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1927, Cuba Matanzas City. Race: mulatto. 5'5", 150 lbs. Hair: dark, curly. Eyes: light. Shape of face: round. Physique: mid-heavy. No visible scars.

Regnd. in Subj. [illegible] subj. 201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: No identifiable traces.

[redacted]

26

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted] [redacted]

UFGA 21693/14

Att. No. 36 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: GRANADO, Miguel [illegible] [illegible] 1915 [illegible] [illegible] 201-75[illegible]

1. Source met Subject about April 1960 when source was appointed to his position at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, where Subject was the Administrador of the Distrito #3, Havana. Subject remained in that position until early 1961, at which time he was transferred to another job located in the main building at the Plaza Civica, in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Since then source has seen him about two or three times, meeting him casualy in the street. During the period of time in which source and Subject were working together they became friends although not close friends. Source is not able to provide information on Subject's life prior to the time in which they met. Source believes, based on the conversations he had with Subject, that Subject is against the Cuban communist regime although Subject's brother (fnu) GRANADO was the Sub-secretario tecnico de Obras Publicas about 1961. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba or if Subject has received political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1915, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'7", 125 lbs. Hair: bald. Eyes: light. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

[redacted]

[redacted] UFGA-21693 SECRET 27

UFGA-21693/14
Att. No 37 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: F *GRAUPERA, Roberto [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about April 1960 at which time source was appointed to the Personnel Department at the Distrito #3, Havana, in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, at which time Subject was the Chief Engineer of the said Distrito #3, Havana. In early 1961 Subject was transferred to the main office of Obras Pulicas at Plaza Civica and also at this time source believes Subject was appointed a professor at the University of Havana. At that time source became friendly with Subject. Source went to visit Subject at his home in Calle Santa Catalina, Reparto Santos Suarez, when source heard that Subject was leaving Cuba and coming to the US and source wanted to say goodby. Source has had no contact with him since that time. Source has heard that Subject is living with his family in Miami, and has a position as an Engineer in Nassau, where he goes every week. Source believes Subject has never been a communist, has never traveled to any communist country, nor has received any military, political or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1920, place of birth unknown. Race: white. 6'1", 210 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: black. Shape of face: oval. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. One Roberto GRAUPERA was employed as Cuban manager for MAM Dredging before the advent of the Castro regime (KUJUMP Memo, 18 September 1962).

b. Roberto J. GRAUPERA Graniela departed from Mexico 11 November 1960 (Travel Manifest)

c. Roberto J. GRAUPERA Graniela appeared on a list of the Technological Faculty, School of Engineering, Havana University (DOI: September 1962) (UFG 2714, 22 April 1963)

28

[redacted]

S/[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

SUBJECT: GRIFFIN, fnu

1. Source met Subject about 1960 when source was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas and Subject as one of the labor leaders of the Construction Workers acted as "liaison" with the Ministerio. Source only had contact with Subject while he was in his post in the Ministerio from 1960 until December 1961 when source resigned in order to come to the US. Subject was a militia member at that time but source is not able to provide any information prior to the time in which they met, or after December 1961 when source left the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, nor if Subject has traveled outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1932 place of birth unknown. Race: negro. 6'1", 210 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of Face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. One William GRIFFIN Prado, aka: Willy, 35 years old, a blond with fair skin resides at Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province. He works in a cement factory called "El Morro" as Chief of Fleet, i.e. he is in charge of the ships which belong to the cement factory. His mother is a widow that was a teacher of the American children whose parents used to work and to manage the cement factory. Willy knows English perfectly. He has a brother, Richard GRIFFIN Prado who lives in the U.S. (AMOT Report, 6 June 1963)

b. One Victor GRIFFIN, a Negro is the General Superintendent of Construction Works in "La Antillana" steel rod factory. He is the most dangerous and fanatical defender of the regime. He is rumored to have sent some persons to the "firing wall", but source doesn't remember any specific details about this. Subject gives flash rallies in favor of the regime and against the U.S. (AMOT Report, 24 September 1963).

29

Att. No. 39 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21698/14

SUBJECT: *ISALGUE, Sara SEXIF [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in June 1959 when Subject's husband, Salvador MASSIP was appointed Ambassador in Mexico City. Source stated his only contact with the Subject was from June 1959 to December 1959. Source believes Subject is a complete communist and a staunch supporter of the communist regime. Source has heard that Subject is now residing with her husband in a communist country where he is the Cuban Ambassador.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1890, [illegible] Matanzas Province, probably. Race: white. 5'5", 150 lbs. Hair: gray. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Wife of Subject of 201-218391.

[redacted]

30

[redacted] UFGA- 21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

Att. No. 40 to UFGA-21693
UFGA - 21693/14

[illegible] 1930 [illegible]

SUBJECT: DE JOHN, Roberto

1. Source met Subject in January 1959 when both held positions at the Presidential Place under the direct orders of Cusi AULET. In early 1960 source heard rumors from mutual friends that Subject had a position in the Cuban Embassy in Santiago de Chile but source is not able to provide any information on Subject's position in said Embassy. Source last saw Subject on January 1964 at the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores in Havana City, where source went in order to arraign some of his documents for his future departure from Cuba. At this time Subject was wearing a militia uniform and he told source he was now working at the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Source does not know Subject's political ideologies, if he has traveled to the communist countries, if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if he has received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1930, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'8", 135 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. One Roberto de JOHN replaced Julio T. CRUZ as Cuban Civil Attache in Chile. His wife, Hidia ACOSTA is replacing Carmita ZUNIGA as secretary to the Cuban Ambassador (HCSA 8372, 13 January 1961).

b. Roberto de JOHN Fragua, a Diplomat, entered Mexico on 11 September 1961 and departed Mexico on 14 September 1961 (Travel Manifests).

c. Roberto de JOHN Fragua, Diplomat, departed Mexico on 30 March 1962 (Travel Manifests).

✓

UFGA-21693 SECRET 31

Att. No 41 to UFGA-21693

UFGA 21693/14

SUBJECT: LANTIUOD, Francisco [illegible]
aka: Paquito

1. Source met Subject while both were in exile in Mexico City in 1957. Subject previously worked at the Compania de Electricidad in Havana City. Source heard that when Subject returned to Cuba in early January 1959, he returned to work at the Compania Cubana de Electricidad. Source believes Subject never had any position in the Cuban government. Source heard by rumor from mutual friends that Subject took asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy in La Havana about 1960, and that after a few months he went to Caracas, Venezuela, and then to the U.S. where he has been since late 1960. Source is unable to provide Subject's address. Source believes Subject has never been a communist. Source doesn't know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if he has received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1933, [illegible] Havana City, probably. Race: white. Skin: dark. 5'10", 170 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars. [illegible] 201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

32

[redacted] UFGA 21693/14 [redacted]

Att. No. 42 to UFGA-21693

UFGA-21693/14

SUBJECT: FELLERA, Jorge [illegible] [illegible] 201-754938

1. Source stated he has never personally met the Subject. The Subject's name was given to him by a mutual friend, Ramiro RODRIGUEZ Puentes. Source wrote a letter to Subject addressed to 10 Bulkley Avenue, 3rd Fl., Port Chester, New York, 10573, and Subject answered this letter and told source to use his, Subject's name if necessary with the US Immigration Authorities. Source is unable to provide any furthe information on Subject.

[illegible] 201-754938

2. Physical Description: Note: Source is not able to provide any physical description because he (source) has never seen him.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

[redacted]

1

33

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

Att. No. 43 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21693/14

SUBJECT: *LOFORTE, fnu Cit: Cuba
aka Jimmy

1. Source met Subject in early 1959 while both were working at the Presidential Palace. About 1960 Subject told source that he, Subject, was working at the Ministerio de Interior (at the department of Foreigners resident in Cuba). Source last saw Subject about February 1964, when source went to the Ministerio de Interior to secure his exit permits. They spoke for a few minutes and source is not able to provide any details on Subject's position there. Source is unable to provide any information concerning Subject's political ideology, if Subject has traveled outside Cuba, if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1940, Cuba in Guantanamo, Oriente. Race: white. 5'7", 130 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: slim. No visible scars. [illegible] 201-754938 May be identical w/ Jimmy LOFORTE

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. One Jimmy LOFORTE is either a member of, or the President of the Comite Para la Defensa de la Revolucion, Committee for the Defense of the Revolution, for a sector of Infante Street in Havana (UFGA 3513, 15 March 1962).

b. Jimmy LOFORTE Cit: Cuba is a member of the Cuban I.S. (UFGA 17532 E-1, 26 August 1964).

[redacted]

34

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

Att. No. 45 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: *MACHADO, Manuel [illegible]
aka: Manolo may be identical w/ 201-267298

1. Source met Subject in June or July 1959 because Subject was a frequent visitor to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, where source worked. Subject used to go there because he was a personal friend of many of the Embassy employees. Subject is a Cuban citizen who has been residing in Mexico since about 1945. Source maintained a friendship with Subject since they first met which was interrupted when source returned to Cuba in December 1959. Source re-established contact with the Subject in 1964, when source arrived in Mexico. From the conversations they had, source believes Subject has never been a communist and is against the Cuban communist regime. Source is not able to provide any other information on Subject.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1915, Cuban citizen. Place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 6'0", 150 lbs. Hair: gray. Eyes: light. Shape of face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed to be identical with Manuel MACHADO Llosas, 201-267298 <Believed identical MACHADO MANUEL who was contact of [illegible] 201-754355>

SECRET 35

UFGA-21693/14

Att. No. 46 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

UFGA-21693/14

[illegible]

SUBJECT: *MAS, Juan

1. Source first met Subject about January 1959 when both used to work at similar positions at the Presidential Palace. Source believes that in about 1961 he met Subject who stated that he had recently returned from a post in one of the Cuban Embassies in a Latin American country, but source is not able to state the nature of Subject's position nor in which country this position was held. This was the last time source saw Subject. Subject once told source that he had once worked for the Judicial Police when the head of the organization was, Krundino VILELA, which must have been during the period 1948-1952. Subject told source he was married to an Argentine woman. Source believes Subject still holds some position in the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, but is not able to provide any information on this matter. Source is unable to provide any information on Subject's trips abroad, if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1912, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'7", 165 lbs. Hair: reddish. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: mid-heavy. No visible scars.

201-285681

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed to be identical with Juan MAS y Luna, Cuban Charge in Tegucigalpa (TEGU 3534, 29 June 1960). <Believed to be identical w/ the MAS Juan who worked at Presidential Palace with subj. (201-754938 in 1959>

36

SECRET

UFGA-21693/14

Att. No. 48 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 21693/1 [illegible]

SUBJECT: *MAZORRA, Rigoberto

1. Source met Subject on circa 1957 through Ezequiel *GOMEZ [illegible] aka Kelo at Guanabacoa, where Subject worked in the Urban Buses (Routes 3 & 5). Subject was then engaged in activities against the Batista government, and in 1958 he went with Ezequiel GOMEZ to the Escambray Mountains to fight against Batista remaining there until January 1959. In 1959 Subject returned to his work in the urban buses (routes 3 & 5) and Subject never held a position in the Castro government. In early 1961 Subject went to the Escambray Mountains to fight against Castro and was arrested about March 1961. When source left Cuba in March 1964 Subject was at the Isle of Pines prison. Source says he believes Subject has always been anti-communist. In 1959 Subject went to Guatemala with Agapito AMARO, who was trying to start a transport business in that country, but they returned because that business didn't work out. Source believes that Subject's wife and children are in the US but he is unable to provide names or addresses. According to source Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1923, Cojimar probably. Race: white. 6'0", 200 lbs. Hair: light brown and gray. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

Cited during interrogation of subj of 201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

37

UFGA-21693/1

Att. No. 49 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: MENDEZ, Placido
aka "El Gallego"

[illegible] ~ 201-754938

1. Source met Subject about 1955 through a mutual friend Ezequiel GOMEZ, when they both were engaged in activities against the Batista regime. Source was exiled in Mexico with the Subject in 1957 in Mexico City, where both resided at calle Milan No. 40. In late 1959 Subject told source (in the street) that he was working in an Electrical Appliances store near Carlos Tercero, Havana. About 1960 source learned from a mutual friend that Subject was under arrest and source believes as of March 1964 Subject was still in jail. Source heard that Subject has a son, who is presently about 18 years of age. Source believes that the Subject is truly anti-communist, and that this is the reason why he is under arrest.

CIT: Cuba

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'9", 160 lbs. Hair: blond. Eyes: light. Shape of face: round. Physique: mid-heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. Placido MENDEZ Ramos was listed as under investigation by the Cuban G-2 for anti-Castro acts December 1960 (HKHA 7210, 16 December 1960).

b. One Placido MENDEZ Ramos, formerly MRR Chief for Havana was imprisoned at the Isle of Pines (CK 234, 16 August 1962)

c. Placido MENDEZ, member of the MDM was taken prisoner (AMPAID/4 Production, 31 October 1962)

CS COPY

38

SECRET

UFGA-21693/14

14-00000

Att. No. 50 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21693/14

SUBJECT: f *MENENDEZ, Segundo

1. Source met Subject about 1948 at the Tricunal de Cuentas, Plaza Civica, Havana as source's sister, Blanca MONDEJAR Rodriguez, used to work in the same office of which Subject was the Director. Source last saw Subject in Cuba in early 1963, at which time Subject was leaving Cuba for Mexico. Source saw Subject again in Mexico in 1964. Source does not know if Subject has relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has received any political, military or intelligence training. Source intends to maintain correspondence with Subject.

c. Ticula

2. Physical Description: ~~DPOB~~ DOB: circa 1918, place of birth unknown to source. Race: mulatto. 6'0", 210 lbs. Hair: gray. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: very heavy. No visible scars. [illegible]: 201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

✓

[redacted]

[redacted] UFGA-21693

SECRET

39

[redacted]

Att. No. 51 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: *PAEZ, Juan

CIT: Cuban DOB: c.1930 [illegible] 201-754935 [illegible] Complete Communist [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1961 when Subject was appointed Administrador Distrito #3, Ministry of Obras Publicas, Havana, and source used to work at said Ministerio. Source claimed that their relations were the normal ones between fellow employees, but they were never friends. The last time source saw Subject was in 1963 at the "Bar Canciller" located on calle Paseo y Zapata. Source believes Subject continued working for the Ministerio de Obras Publicas but that he had been transferred to another post. Source is unable to provide any information on Subject's life prior to the time they met. Subject always dressed in the militia uniform and from his conversation source believes Subject is a complete communist and a staunch supporter of the regime in Cuba. Source does not know if Subject is a member of the PURS. Source is not able to say if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba. Source heard that Subject had worked in Brasilia, Brazil, while that city was being built. Source does not know if Subject has ever received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: 1930, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'9", 150 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed identical with Juan PAEZ Martin, brother of Frank PAEZ Martin. Juan was an active member of the 26th of July Movement during the Batista regime. In December 1962 was the Chief of the Auditors Section of the Ministry of Public Works. (UFGA 06929, 18 December 1962).

CIT: Cuba

CS COPY

SECRET

40

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14 ~~[illegible]~~

14-00000

Att. No. 52 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: PENA, Pablo

1. Source met Subject about 1960 when source was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, at which time Subject was one of the labor leaders of the Construction Workers, who acted as a "liaison" between the Ministerio and the Construction workers. Source only had contact with Subject from 1960 until December 1961. Source is not able to provide any information prior to the time in which they met, or after December 1961 when source left the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Subject is a militia member. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, if Subject has traveled outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received militiary or intelligence training. Source believes Subject has received some kind of political indoctrination or training, but is not able to provide any other information on this matter.

CIT: Cuba DOB

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, place of birth unknown. Race: negro. 5'9", 145 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: black. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject is believed identical with Pablo PENA Urrutia, Personnel Chief for Cayo Largo projects; negro. PENA is a member of the Construction Syndicate; lives in a reparto between Cotorro and San Francisco de Paula, Habana; is married and has two children, usually wears an olive drab uniform; is about 38 years of age, 6 feet tall, weighing 190 lbs, and has brown hair and eyes. (KUJUMP Memo, YCAC 2359)

CIT: Cuba DOB: C1927 Believed ident w PENA, PABLO known to subj. of 201-754935

UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

41

Att. No. 53 to UFGA-21693

[illegible] 21693/14

SUBJECT: *PERAZA, Luis [illegible] 201-754938, [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in Mexico City in December 1957 at which time Subject was in exile there. Source stated he was only an acquaintance of the Subject and never became a close friend. During this period he learned that Subject's father was Captain Adjutant for General Ruperto *CABRERA, during the regime of Pres. Prio. After source returned to Cuba in early 1958 he didn't see Subject again until early 1959 at which time source visited at his home, located on the second floor of a house located at Ave. 41 about two blocks from the Obelisco near Camp Libertad. Source made this visit because a few days previously someone had thrown a hand granade into the Subject's house and Subject's brother Sergio *PERAZA was [illegible] severely wounded. Source believes Subject has never held a position in the Castro regime and that Subject has never traveled to any of the Soviet countries, nor received any political, military or intelligence training. [illegible] 201-754938 Brother LUIS PERAZA

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1938, Havana Prov. probably. Race: white. 5'7", 140 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. One Luis PERAZA Barrios recently arrested by BRAC as a communist suspect. Distributor of PSP propaganda under Abelardo J. ADAN y Garcia (HKHA 4549, 14 August 1958)

b. Luis PERAZA Barrios admitted having enlisted in the Republican Army in Spain in 1938 during the Spanish Civil War. He was repatriated from France after the war and returned to Cuba. He said he had been affiliated with the PSP since 1946 and had continued to engage in clandestine activities for the Party after it was declared illegal in Cuba (HKH 1693, 13 August 1958).

c. Luis PERAZA Garcia, common passport 251992 arrived in Montevideo from Paris 23 November 1963 on Air France flt 97. (MONT 8411, 28 November 1963)

d. Luis PERAZA organized the Cuban Branch of Cuban-Polish Friendship Society, DOI: 3 October 1960. (WAVE 8244, 28 November 1963)

e. Luis PERAZA Cabrera is a member of the G-2 with an officer's rank. His mother has a pharmacy at 50 meters from AMRICE/2 (SOURCE) father's home. PERAZA supports CASTRO fanatically. His family is very detested in the neighborhood (AMRICE/2, 22 February 1964)

[redacted]

42

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

Att. 54 to UFGA-21693 dated ____________

SUBJECT: *PERAZA (mat. unk.), Sergio

UFGA - 21693/14

1. Source met Subject in Mexico City in December 1957, at which time Subject was in exile there. Source was only an acquaintance of the Subject and they never became close friends. During that time he learned that Subject's father was Captain Adjudant of General Ruperto Cabrera during the presidency of Prio. After Source returned to Cuba in early 1958, he didn't see Subject again until early 1959 at which time Source visited Subject at his home on the second floor of a house located at Ave. 41, abouttwo blocks from the Obelisco near Camp Libertad. Source went to visit Subject due to the fact that a few days previously someone had thrown a hand-grenade into Subject's house and Subject was severely wounded. Source believes Subject has never held any position in the Castro regime, and has never travelled to any of the Soviet countries or received any political, military or "intelligence" training.

CIT: Cuba

cuba

2. Physical description: DPOB: circa 1937, Havana Province. 5'8", 140 lbs., race: white; hair: blond; eyes: light; shape of face: long; build: medium. Scars on the left cheek produced by wounds from hand grenade explosion, also has difficulty in speaking from same wounds. may be ident w/ SERGIO PERAZA CABRERA.

CIT: Cuba

3. JMWAVE traces: Sergio PERAZA Cabrera, member of the G-2 with the rank of an officer, supports Castro fanatically. PERAZA's mother has a pharmacy 50 meters from AMRICE-2's (Source) father's home. PERAZA's family is very distrusted in the neighborhood (AMRICE-2, 22 February 1964).

[redacted]

43

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

Att. 55 to UFGA-21693 dated
UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: (fnu) PERDIGON (mat. unk.), Presbistero Cit: Cuba DOB: c1930
[illegible] 201-[illegible]38. G-2. [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about February 1960 at which time both were working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Source is not able to provide any information regarding Subject's life prior to this time. Source stated their relationship was merely that of fellow employees. Source last saw Subject in December 1961 at which time Source resigned his post at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Source believes that although Subject is a militia man and has a position in the Purchasing Department at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, Subject really works for the DSE or G-2 as Subject used to go frequently to the personnel department where he secured information from the personal files of the employees. Source does not know if Subject has ever travelled outside of Cuba, if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received any political, military or "intelligence" training. In Source's opinion Subject is a staunch supporter of the Cuban Communist regimo. Subject is married to (fnu) FERNANDEZ (mat. unk.) who is a sister of Osmin FERNANDEZ (mat. unk.) Cit: Cuba Brother-in-law of PRESBISTERO PERDIGON.

2. Physical description: DPOB: circa 1930, San Juan y Martinez, Pinar del Rio. Race: white. 5'10", 150 lbs., dark hair, dark eyes, long face, slim build. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces:

a. Previstero PERDIGON is G-2 and head of the supply department for the Public Works, Havana (Navy Intel Info Rpt 9-S-61, 13 December 1961).

b. Prebistero PERDIGON, DOB: c. 1932, is Chief of Unidad 22, Materials Supply for the Ministry of Public Works, via Blanca and Paso Superior, Havana. Subject is also a Lt. in the Rebel Army and wears a uniform (DCE 15394, 5 August 1962).

c. Previstero PERDIGON, DPOB: 1930, Pinar del Rio. Subject is 5'8" tall, 108 lbs., black hair and eyes, a G-2 agent in Ministerio de la Construccion. Works as "Responsable de Suministros de la Regional Habana" of MICON. Office in the MICON warehouse in Carretera de Rancho Boyeros. Subject is a miliciano and a member of the Rebel Army (Source: Olga FORNES Lopez de Espino, AMSIGH-1 debriefing, dated 15 September 1964).

[redacted]

✓

SECRET

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

SECRET . Att. 56 to UFGA-21693 dated

UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: *RAFART (mat. unk.), Carlota Cit: Cuba
Cit: Spain 201-754938 ← DOB: C.1940

1. Source met Subject in early April 1964 through Olga *GOICOECHEA (mat. unk.) when she visited someone at the boarding house where Source was living in Mexico City. Source was socially acquainted with Subject from March 1964 to 22 December 1964. Subject lived in Cuba with her family until 1959 or 1960 at which time Subject left Cuba with her parents for Mexico where her father, Manuel *RAFART (mat. unk.) was employed by the United Nations. in Mexico Subject is a Cuban citizen by birth, but Subject's father is a Spaniard who went to Cuba (date unknown) where he became a Cuban citizen. Source claims that from conversations he had with Subject, she is not a Communist and is against the Communist regime in Cuba. Subject lives at Calle Versalles #29, Apt. 3, Mexico D.F. Source believes Subject is in some way related to Eloy *GUTIERREZ Menoyo 201-269349 but is not able to say exactly how. Source believes Subject has never received any kind of political, military or "intelligence" training.

SEX: F
CIT: Cuba

CIT: Cuba

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1940, Havana City probably. Race: white. 5'7", 150 lbs., light hair, light brown eyes, oval face, build medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 45 [redacted]

Att. 58 to UFGA-21693 dated ________

SUBJECT: *RAMIRO (mat. unk.), Hector UFGA - 21693/14

1. Source met Subject about 1955 at which time Subject had a small cigar store in the entrance of "La Estrella" candy factory in Via Blanca, Havana City. In early 1959 Subject was appointed to a position in the Presidential Palace where Source had been employed before he went to Mexico in June 1959. Subject remained working at the Presidential Palace but Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's position there. Source frequently saw Subject in their mutual neighborhood in the Reparto Santos Suarez. Subject is married and has three or four children, but Source is not able to provide any other information on Subject's private life. Source does not know if Subject has ever travelled out of Cuba, if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received any political, military or "intelligence" training. Source claims that Subject was never a Communist and that if he is working for the regime, it is because of the need for his job. Source believes that if Subject is properly approached he possibly would cooperate with us, but Source does not have Subject's address nor does he know anyway in which he could establish contact with Subject but is willing to do so if so asked.

2. Physical description: DPOB: dob circa 1925, place of birth unknown to Source. Race: white. 5'8", 155 lbs, dark hair but balding, dark eyes, oval face, medium build. No scars. Has a nervous tick on the left side of the mouth.

Cited by subj. in 201-754938

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

[redacted]

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14. SECRET 47 [redacted]

Att. 59 to UFGA-21693 dated ____

UFGA - 21693/14 [illegible]

SUBJECT: *RODRIGUEZ Fuentes, Ramiro [illegible]

[illegible] 201-75[illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1950 as both resided in the same neighborhood in Havana. Subject was a radio-telegraphist and was employed as such in the Presidential Palace in Havana until 1959. Subject also worked as a radio-telegraphist at the Jose Marti Airport and at the Ministerio de Comunicaciones, all of which positions Subject held prior to the Castro regime. Source believes Subject remained working as a radio-telegraphist in the Jose Marti Airport and that Subject resigned this position in mid 1962 in order to secure his exit permit from the authorities. Since that time, Subject has been trying to leave Cuba. Source is not able to say how Subject has been able to support himself from 1962 up to the present time. Subject left Cuba for Mexico City on 30 October 1964 where they saw each other. Subject resides at Arcos de Belen #73, Mexico D.F., and is attempting to secure a U.S. visa. While in Cuba Subject used to live on Calle Della Vista between Agua and Santa Lutgarda, Reparto Palatino, Havana. Subject is married to Rosa VILCHES Montero and has an 18-year-old son and a 12-year-old daughter. Source says Subject has never been a Communist and is against the Castro regime. Source says Subject has a brother, Juan *RODRIGUEZ Fuentes, who has been residing at Santurce, Puerto Rico since 1959 or 1960. Source believes Subject has never received any political, military or "intelligence" training. [illegible] Rodriguez Fuentes, Ramiro

2. Physical description: DPOB: 1925, Sagua la Grande, Las Villas Province. Race: white. 5'5", 165 lbs., black hair, black eyes, round face, heavy build. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

[redacted]

48

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

14-00000

SECRET

Att. 60 to UFGA-21693 dated

UFGA-21693/14
[illegible] 1961 [illegible]
[illegible] 201-75 [illegible]

SUBJECT: *RODRIGUEZ (Mat. Unk.), Ramon

1. Source met Subject in late 1957 when they lived together for two months at Calle Milan #10, Mexico, D.F.. This was the last time the Source saw the Subject. Source believes the Subject had a business of transporting commercial alcohol in Havana during the period from 1950 to 1957. Source doesn't know why Subject was exiled in Mexico, but knows Subject was a close friend of Placido *MENDEZ (mat. unk.). Source has never heard from Subject again, and is not able to provide any information about his political point of view or on his private life.

[illegible] Rodriguez

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1920, place of birth unknown. Race: white, 5'9", 163 lbs., dark hair, dark eyes. Source cannot remember any other physical characteristics of Subject.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted] HFGA-21693/14 49 [redacted]

Att. 61 to UFGA-21693 dated ________

UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: (pat. unk.)(mat. unk.)(fnu)
aka ROLO [illegible] traces indicate this is nickname for subj 201-335014

1. Source met Subject in 1959 when both were employed at the Presidential Palace, Havana. Source never saw Subject again until 1960 when both were employed at the Ministry of Obras Publicas. Subject was a delegate of the Minister, Osmani CIENFUEGOS. During that time Source saw Subject frequently until December 1961 when Source resigned his post at the Ministry. After this time Source never saw Subject again. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside of Cuba, if Subject has ever travelled outside of Cuba or if Subject has received any kind of political, military or "intelligence" training. Source says he has never talked to Subject and cannot provide any information on Subject's political point of view.

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1930, place of birth unknown to Source. Race: white. 5'10", 150 lbs., black hair, dark eyes, long and thin face, slim build. No visible scars. Subject limps on one leg -- Source believes due to a gunshot wound.

3. JMWAVE traces: Card references for aka: ROLO indicate that this is the nickname for Chafik Homero SAKER Zenni, 201-335014.

One aka ROLO cited by subj. of 201-754938 probably nickname for subject

[redacted]

SECRET 50

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

Att. 62 to UFGA-21693 dated

SUBJECT: *SALINAS (mat. unk.), Pablo UFGA -1693/14

1. Source met Subject about September 1959 when Source visited Ciudad del Carmen, Mexico, where Subject lived. This trip the Source made on instructions of Agustin ALDAMA Acosta who told the Source to visit the Subject who would introduce Source to journalists and directors of newspapers at Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche, and Merida who would write and publish articles in favor of the Cuban Communist regime. Source saw Subject for about three or four days at that time and never saw him again. Source has the impression that Subject was a Communist by the way in which he talked. Source says he heard during this trip that Subject's wife and children lived in Mexico City and Subject remained in Ciudad del Carmen mainly because he had a small coconut plantation there. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's private life prior to the time they met nor afterwards.

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1910, Mexican citizen. Race: white. 6'0", 190 lbs., black hair, light eyes, oval face, heavy build. No visible scars.

Cit. Mexico DOB: c1910

3. JMWAVE traces: One Pablo SALINAS, Communist, who is an agent of Hector GARCIA Vidal, former Cuban Military Attache, is now in southeastern Mexico (CSCI 3/763,359, 9 January 1961, HMM 5286).

[redacted]

SECRET 51

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

[illegible] -16[illegible], 14

Att. 63 to UFGA-21693 dated ________

SUBJECT: *SANTANA (mat. unk.), Odilio [illegible]

1. Source met Subject through Ezequiel GOMEZ (mat. unk.) at Guanabacoa in about 1957. Subject was engaged in activities against the Batista Government and was employed as a conductor in the urban busses (Routes 3 and 5) in Guanabacoa. Source believes Subject was exiled in Miami in 1958. After Subject's return to Cuba, Source believes he went back to work at the urban busses in Guanabacoa. Source has not seen Subject since 1957. Source heard that Subject was "alzado" with Ezequiel GOMEZ (mat. unk.) aka Kelo in the Escambray Sierra in early 1961, and they were arrested together circa March 1961. When Source left Cuba in March 1964 he heard that Subject was at the Isle of Pines Prison. Source believes Subject has no relatives outside Cuba and has not received any military, political or "intelligence" training.

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1932, place of birth unknown to Source. Race: white. 5'10", 150 lbs., blond hair, light eyes, long face, slim build. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

X

SECRET 52

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14

Att. 64 to UFGA-21693 dated

SUBJECT: *SARDA (mat. unk.), (fnu) [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]

1. Source met Subject about early 1960 when Source was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, and at which time Subject was the Secretario of the Constructions Workers and acted more or less as "liaison" between the Ministerio and the Construction Workers. Because of his work, Subject made frequent visits to the Ministerio de Obras Publicas where he would contact Source because of Source's position there. Source had no contact with Subject since 1961 when Source left his position with the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Source says Subject is a militia man, which uniform he constantly uses. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's life prior to the time when they met, or after December 1961. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, if Subject has travelled outside of Cuba or if Subject has ever received military or "intelligence" training. Source believes Subject has received some kind of political indoctrination or training but is not able to provide any other information on this matter.

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1930, place of birth unknown to Source. Race: Negro. 5'10", 165 lbs., black hair, black eyes, long face, medium build. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

X

[redacted]

53

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

Att. 65 to UFGA-21693 dated ________

UFGA- 2169[illegible]

SUBJECT: F*SOLIS Gonzalez, Piedad SEX F CIT: Cuba [illegible] 1933 POB: Mexico [illegible]

Cited in only of 201-754935

1. Source met Subject in 1957 in Mexico City at which time Subject (who is a Mexican citizen) was married to Reinaldo BENITEZ (mat. unk.). According to Source, BENITEZ was one of the men who went to Cuba in 1956 with Castro on the GRANMA . Source stated he saw Subject again in 1958 when Subject visited Cuba. Source believes Subject stayed with the ALDAMA family on Calle Tejar between San Lazaro y San Anastasio, Lawton, Havana City. Source stated he may have seen Subject when he was working in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico from July to December 1959. Source saw Subject again when Subject went to Havana in 1960 when Subject resided at the Edificio Los Colonos on Calle Juan Delgado and Lacret, Santos Suarez, Havana City. Subject returned to Mexico in late 1961. Source does not believe she later returned to Cuba. Between March and December 1964 Source saw Subject once or twice a week as Source received mail at Subject's address in Mexico City. Subject told him that she is separated from her husband. Source does not believe there is another man in Subject's life. Source stated he is almost positive that Subject has never been a Communist and that she is against the Communist regime in Cuba. Source does not know if Subject has ever travelled to any Latin American country or to any Soviet Bloc country. Source says Subject has a brother, Ignacio *SOLIS Gonzalez, who has been in New York since about 1960, address unknown to Source. Cit: Cuba Brother of Solis Gonzalez, Piedad - In New York

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1933, Veracruz (probably) Mexico. Race: white (Indian characteristics). 5'3", 130 lbs., dark hair (straight), light brown eyes, round face, mid-heavy build. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

SECRET 54

UFGA-21693/14

Att. No. 66 to UFGA-21693

UFGA-21693/14

SUBJECT: SUAREZ, Jose [illegible] DOB c1926 [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in late December 1957 in Mexico City, but had very little contact with him then. Source saw Subject again early in 1959 in a public office building in Havana. This was the last time he saw Subject. Source says that Subject was one who attacked the Cuartel Moncada on the 26 of July of 1953 and was arrested with Fidel CASTRO. Source believes the Subject is not a Communist. As far as source knows Subject does not hold any position in the Cuban government. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled to any of the Soviet bloc countries or if he has any relatives outside Cuba.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: Circa 1926, probably Artemisa, Pinar del Rio. Race: white. 5'6", 145 lbs. Hair: light. Eyes: light. Shape of face: long. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: One Jose SUAREZ, member of the 26th of July Movement, N.Y.C., resides at 610 W. 163rd Street, Apt. 16, N.Y. 32, N.Y. (DBF 97723, 29 Dec 61).

X

55

UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

Att. No. 67 to UFGA-21693

UFGA-21693/14

SUBJECT: TOMAS, Israel Cit: Cuban

1. Source met Subject in early 1961 when Subject was appointed Chief of Distrito #3, Havana in the Ministry of Obras Publicas where source also works. Source claims his relation with Subject was as fellow employees and they never became friends. Source heard in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas that Subject had been appointed to that post because of his old membership in the Communist Party. Source is unable to provide any information on Subject's life prior to this period. Source heard that Israel TOMAS is not the real name of the Subject, but an aka used according to Communist practice. Source last saw Subject on December 1961 at which time source resigned his post at said Ministerio. Source is sure that Subject has to be a PURS member. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled outside Cuba. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received any military, political or intelligence training. Source does not know any information on Subject's private life. [illegible] ~ 201-754938

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1910, Cuba Havana Province. Race: white. 5'11", 210 lbs. Hair: gray. Eyes: light. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Believed to be identical with 201-315876.

[redacted]

56

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

UFGA- 21693/14
Att. No 63 to UFGA-21693

[illegible] DOB c 1910 [illegible]
[illegible]

SUBJECT: TORRES Picart, Juan

1. Source met Subject about July 1960 when Subject was appointed Chief of Personnel of Distrito #3, Havana, where source worked. Source learned from Subject that he, Subject, was a Spaniard, who came to Cuba about 1938 after the Spanish Civil War. Source also learned that during the 1930's Subject was a member of the Partido Anarquista in Spain. Source believes he last saw Subject in early January 1962 on a visit he made to the Ministerio Obras Publicas. Source says Subject always wore the militia uniform, and that Subject claims he is a good friend of Carlos DIAZ ex-father-in-law of Osmani CIENFUEGOS Gorriaran, and is an old member of the Communist party. Source says Subject is married and has a son of about 18 years of age, but source is unable to provide any other information about Subject's private life. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba. Source has heard rumors that Subject worked prior to 1960 in the Departamento de Cultura of the Rebel Army. Source was unable to provide any information as to whether Subject had ever received any political, military or intelligence training. [illegible]

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1910, Spain, Cuban citizen. Race: white. 5'6", 185 lbs. Hair: almost bald. Eyes: brown. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. Juan TORRES Armesto's name appeared in a list of alleged Communist, informers and voluntary collaborators. Subject is a resident at the Calixto Sanchez Section in Rancho Boyeros (UFGA 1914, 19 July 1961)

b. One Juan TORRES is the Administrator of the Telephone Company in Cienfuegos. Subject is anti-Communist and trustworthy. (AMOT Report, 22 August 1962)

c. One Juan D. TORRES was identified as a pro-Communist employee at the Cuban Telephone Company. (UFGA 5663, 13 Sept 1963)

d. One Juan TORRES is Head of the Defense Committee in Holguin. Age approximately 50, Address: Marti Street, near the corner to Central Highway. Employed in the Public Works. Subject was repatriated from the U.S. but is dissatisfied with the CASTRO regime and regretted having left the U.S. (AMOT Report, 23 Oct 1962)

e. One Juan TORRES is a member of the Communist Party in Ceiba Mocha. (AMOT Report, 26 October 1965)

f. One Juan B. TORRES works for the Communist regime in Cuba. Address: JZdo. Instruccion Cienfuegos (UR MEMO 110, 13 February 1963)

g. Juan TORRES Picart, is listed as the Head of the Personnel Department of the Havana Regional (AMOT Report, 29 July 1963)

57

UFGA-21693/14

Att. No. 70 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: VALDES Meneses, Pedro

1. Source met Subject when source began to work at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas in 1960, where the Subject also worked, from which time they became very close friends. Source last saw Subject on 31 July 1962 on which date Subject left Cuba and came to the U.S. Subject used to work in private construction companies, before the Castro regime. Source says Subject has never been a Communist and that although he was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas he was against the Cuban Communist regime. Source believes Subject has never traveled before outside Cuba. Source says Subject has some relatives outside Cuba but is not able to provide their addresses. Source says Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

S/T: Cuba

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1938, cuba Marianao, Havana. Race: white. 6'0", 150 lbs. Hair: light brown. Eyes: brown. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None. Cited by subj. in 201-754938

X

X

[redacted]

[redacted] UFGA - 21693/14 SECRET 58 [redacted]

Att. No 73 to UFGA-21693

UFGA-21693/14

SUBJECT: VICTORIA, Aldo [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1953 or 1954 when they were engaged in activities against the Batista regime. Subject used to work as a truck driver for "Expresos Amaro" in Havana City and about 1959 he was employed at the Compania Cubana de Telefonos as a truck driver, working there for about two years when he resigned in order to be able to get an exit permit to leave Cuba. Source does not know why Subject has not as yet been able to leave Cuba. Since about 1961 Subject has been able to support himself as a truck driver, driving a truck owned by Subject's friend. Subject has lived since about 1960 at calle Teresa Blanco #35, Apt. 4, Luyano, Havana, residing there with his wife, Lucia Maria PERDOMO Mirabal, no children. Source says Subject has never been a Communist and is against the Castro regime. Source believes Subject has never traveled outside Cuba. Subject, has one sister in the US and another one in a Central American country, but source is not able to provide their addresses. Source says he is almost sure Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

SEX: F [illegible]

wife of VICTORIA, ALDO

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1932, Las Villas Province. Race: white, dark skin. 5'6", 155 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

SECRET 59

UFGA-21693

Att. No. 74 to UFGA-21693
UFGA 21693/14

CIT: Cuba [illegible]

SUBJECT: *VIDAL, Ricardo DOB: C1910 [illegible] 201-290824

1. Source met Subject in June 1959 at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City where Subject was the first Secretary. During this period source became a friend of Subject's. While in Cuba source heard rumors in late 1960 or early 1961 that Subject had defected from the Castro regime. When source returned to Mexico in March 1964, and after he was denied his entrance in the U.S. he went to see Subject at a printing shop where Subject was employed at calle Sandalo #93, Mexico D.F. The source made this visit to Subject because source knew that Subject had very good relations with many U.S. Diplomats, and also had good contacts in Washington, D.C. (Source knew Subject had been a career diplomat for more than 30 years.) Subject orientated the source in the steps he should take such as writing a letter to the State Department and to others. During the time source was in Mexico from March to December 1964 source saw Subject about six or seven times, sometimes in the streets, or visiting him at the printshop. Subject resided at calle Cholula #109, Apt. 3, Colonia Hipodromo, Mexico, D.F. Since source arrived in the U.S. he has had no contact with Subject. Source believes that Subject has never been a Communist and that if Subject was in a post in Mexico it was because he was an experienced Diplomat and the Cuban Government needed him. Source believes Subject has never traveled to any Communist country. Source believes Subject has his immediate family in Mexico with him, and does not know if Subject has any relatives in Cuba or in the U.S. Source does not know if Subject has received any military, political or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1910, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'4", 140 lbs. Hair and eyes source can't remember. Shape of face: round. Physique: medium. No visible scars. Wearsmoustache.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above believed to be identical with Ricardo VIDAL Dominguez, 201-290824.

VIDAL, RICARDO [illegible] to
Subj. of 201-754938.)

X

UFGA-21693/14 SECRET 60

[illegible]

Att. No. 75 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: *VILLAFANA, Manuel [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in 1959 when Subject was the Military Attache at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, D.F. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's life prior to this date. When source returned to Cuba in December 1959 Subject remained in his post in Mexico City, and source has not seen Subject since that time. Source said he read in the newspapers in 1960 that Subject left his post and had come to the U.S. Source says that he wrote to Subject from Mexico when source was denied his U.S. visa, securing Subject's address through source's sister who was in Miami. In source's opinion Subject is not a Communist and resigned his post when he realized the Cuban regime was a Communist one. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled outside Cuba besides the trip to Mexico and to the U.S. Source does not know if Subject has relatives outside Cuba or if Subject ever received political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'7", 150 lbs. Hair and Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

Cited by subj. 201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed to be identical with Manuel VILLAFANA y Martinez, 201-098818.

201-98818

(Believed to be identical Manuel Villafana cited by subj. ~ 201-754938)

[redacted]

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET 61 [redacted]

UFGA - 21693/14

Att. No. 76 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: *WILTZ Bucelo, Ramon [illegible]
DPOB: c1926 Havana [illegible] 201-75493

1. Source met Subject about 1940 being from the same neighborhood, Reparto Lawton, Havana. Before the Castro regime Subject used to work as office clerk in a Notary Public office. In early 1959 Subject was appointed to a position in the Ministerio de Salud Publica, but source is not able to provide any information on this position. Subject worked at this position for one or one and a half years. About 1960 Subject was appointed as coach of the basket-ball team at the University of Havana but resigned this position in late 1961 in order to secure his exit permit. He left Cuba in early 1962 and presently resides at 2565 SW 25th St. Apt. 2, Miami. Source says that in his opinion Subject has never been a Communist and is completely against the present GOC. Subject has traveled widely to Latin America, the U.S. and also Europe, with different sport teams. Subject has a brother and a sister residing in Miami. Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1926, Havana City. Race: white. 5'9", 165 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Ramon Francisco WILTZ Bucelo. DPOB: 12 December 1926, Arroyo Naranjo, Habana, arrived in the U.S. on 22 June 1962 (DBA 14541, 7 July 1962).

X

[redacted]

21693/14 SECRET

62

[redacted]

to [redacted]169.

SUBJECT: x *YOUNG, Manuel
aka: x "El Chino"

E.I: Cuba DOB: c 1940 POB: Cuba
Cited [illegible] 201-7?+938. Reportedly
G-2 [illegible] Pinar del Rio. [illegible]

1. Source met Subject when both were exiled in Mexico City in late 1957. Source saw Subject again in about 1960 in Pinar del Rio City on a trip source made there accompaning his father who had a farm in Consolacion, Pinar del Rio Province. Source claims he never was a close friend of Subject. Source heard about 1959 that the Subject is a Lieutenant in the G-2 in Pinar del Rio City. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's private life nor does he know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, if Subject has ever traveled to any country in the Soviet bloc, or if Subject has ever received any political, military or intelligence training.

Manuel Young Lezcano.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1940, San Juan y Martinez, Pinar del Rio Province, probably. Race: Mulatto with chinese characteristics. 5'5", 135 lbs. Hair: black and straight. Eyes: dark. Face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

CIT: Cuba

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed to be identical with Manuel YOUNG Lezcano. DPOB: 8 October 1940, Pinar del Rio. YOUNG is the Deputy Chief, G-2, Pinar del Rio. cit

63

19-5-1

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ARTIME-Buesa, Manuel
201-0267437
Volume XIII

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Third Agency Documents

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
7 AUG 1978	7 Aug 1978	Leslie WIZELMAN	Leslie Wizelman

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

~~SECRET~~

8 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1

DATE: 7 January 1965, 2130 Hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 reported that Manolin Hernandez arrived from Central America and reported that Vico Starke and Frank Marshall, with the support of General Anastacio Somoza of Nicaragua, were planning a coup against President Francisco Orlich in Costa Rica. A-1 planned to depart Miami for Managua at 0700 hours, 8 January on Lanica airline to check this information with General Somoza and to attempt to ensure that his equipment is not being used to carry out the coup. A-1 will have his private communications pad and promised to send us a message as soon as he talked with General Somoza and with the Orlichs and Starke in Costa Rica.

2. A-1 agreed to try to return to New York on Saturday, 9 January, for a meeting with Mr. Archer (Chief, WH). A-1 will call as soon as he arrives in New York at which time arrangements will be made to bring him to Washington for the meeting.

3. A-1 reported he and Al Burt had signed a non-aggression pact. A-1 feels there is little to gain from his point of view in continuing the squabble with Burt.

Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/AMWORLD

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Tel Conversations
Costa Rica
Nic
Press

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

019-300-003
DBA -96789
27 JAN 65
P2

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
RE ALLEGATION BY ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO 201-269349 OR MRR WAS WORKING DIRECTLY UNDER THE ORDERS OF A COUNTERINTELL AGENCY OF US AND THAT SUBJ WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SINKING OF SPANISH SHIP SIERRA ARANZAZU.

R 6502082325

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES 6

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OK

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/SA 3

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME 2000

BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP

AMBIDDY-1 201 13 FEB 65 IN 80247

Security

DESENSITIZED

S E C R E T 132358Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8261

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

1. AMCLATTER/1 TOLD 13 FEB 65 BY FRANK FIORINI THAT MANUEL ARTIME'S HOUSE AT 1270 NE 85TH STREET MIAMI WAS RANSACKED DURING EVENING 12 FEB. ARTIME TOLD FIORINI THAT INTRUDERS HAD STOLEN JEWELRY, NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS AND TELESCOPIC LENS RIFLE THAT FIORINI HAD GIVEN ARTIME AS GIFT.

2. ARTIME ASKED FIORINI HELP HIM OUT BY GETTING IN TOUCH LOCAL AUTHORITIES (UNSPECIFIED) WITH REQUEST THEY KEEP MATTER QUIET. FIORINI SAID ARTIME DOES NOT WANT INCIDENT PUBLICIZED.

3. FOR SECURITY REASONS WAVE HAS MADE NO EFFORT OBTAIN CONFIRMATION FROM LOCAL AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, WAVE HAS RECEIVED NO OTHER REPORT ON THIS MATTER AS OF PREPARATION THIS REPORT.

S E C R E T

Note: Artime confirmed this 11 Feb - Event was about 3 Feb — no sensitive documents taken

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/SA 3

INFO

VR. FILE DDP

SECRET 181509Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8420

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

P-1201

18 Feb 65 IN 83422

REF WAVE 8419 (IN83360)

IDEN: JOSE ANTONIO MOLE ROSALES.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

~~SECRET~~

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION C/WH/SA 3

INFO VR. FILE, DDP,

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNIT CI SI BP FI SEC KS

SECRET 181509Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8419

AMBIDDY-1 201 83366

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

Security

DESENSITIZED

REF WAVE 8261 (IN ~~[illegible]~~)

1. AMCLATTER/1 PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS REF 15 FEB 65 BY STATING RANSACKING AMBIDDY/1'S HOUSE ACTUALLY OCCURRED SOME TIME BETWEEN 1-3 FEB AND DISCOVERED BY MAID LUCY ACOSTA 3 FEB. FIORINI HOWEVER LEARNED OF RANSACKING ABOUT 1330 HOURS 13 FEB WHEN RCVD PHONE CALL FROM AMWORLD INTEL CHIEF (IDEN) WHO TOLD FIORINI THAT ALTHO HOUSE BURGLARIZED 8 FEB HE DID NOTHING UNTIL FIRST SPEAKING WITH AMBIDDY/1 WHO OUT TOWN. AMBIDDY-1 RECOMMENDED IDEN CONTACT FIORINI WITH REQUEST FIORINI CONTACT LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF ABLE DO SO WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

2. FIORINI, AFTER RECEIPT TELEPHONE CALL FROM IDEN CONTACTED PERSONAL FRIEND FRANK CAMPBELL, FORMER CHIEF INTEL METRO, WHO ADVISED FIORINI CONTACT POLICE CAPTAIN LEE NAPIR USING CAMPBELL'S NAME. FIORINI, WHO ALSO KNOWN TO CAPTAIN NAPIR, CONTACTED NAPIR WITH IDEN. NAPIR PROMISED MAKE INVESTIGATION WITHOUT MAKING "REPORT."

3. MTG 15 FEB IDEN SHOWED NAPIR 24 PHOTOGRAPHS DEPICTING

SECRET

SECRET

BROKEN DOOR AND LARGE NUMBER DOCUMENTS SCATTERED OVER FLOOR. IDEN ALSO GAVE NAPIR FOLLOWING LIST MISSING ARTICLES: (A) ROLEX WRIST WATCH: (B) ANOTHER INEXPENSIVE WRIST WATCH; (C) RING WITH FOUR TWO CARAT DIAMONDS AND LARGE ZIRCON; (D) TWO EIGHTEEN CARAT GOLD NECKLACES; (E) ONE WOMAN'S IDENTIFICATION BRACELET, AND (F) ONE HIGH POWERED 300 MAGNUM RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC LENS AND TRIGGER GUARD INSCRIBED "AMBIDDY/1, LEADER OF REVOLUTION, FRANK FIORINI." ALTHO SOME DOCUMENTS TAKEN FROM A/1'S HOUSE IMPORTANT PAPERS KEPT HOUSE SAFE WHICH NOT DISTURBED. IDEN WHO CONDUCTING OWN INVESTIGATION, TOLD NAPIR IDEN SUSPECTED HOUSE REPAIRMAN WHO RECENTLY WORKED A/1'S HOUSE WALDO BADO PEREZ, 1285 NW 29TH STREET TERRACE, MIAMI. BADO WHO HAS NO REGULAR MEANS INCOME RECENTLY BOUGHT WIFE 60 CORVAIR (65 FLORIDA LICENSE 1D-4370) AND PAST WEEK MADE PERSONAL GIFTS NUMBER FRIENDS. ALSO PURCHASED FOUR NEW TIRES HIS OWN 61 FALCON (65 FLORIDA LICENSE 1D-4302).

4. IDEN ALSO LOCATED JEWELRY STORE 964 WEST FLAGLER STREET WITH A/1'S ROLEX WRIST WATCH FOR SALE. IDEN HAD WIFE A/1 VISIT STORE AND PURCHASE ROLEX FOR $200 CASH PLUS $45 STILL OWED SALESMAN NAMED GUILLERMO TABRAUE. WIFE A/1 ABLE IDENTIFY WATCH BY TWO MARKS BACK WATCH. NAPIR PROMISED IDEN WOULD HANDLE INVESTIGATION JEWELRY

SECRET

STORE AND SUGGESTED IDEN PUT SURVEILLANCE CUBAN COFFEE SHOP MIAMI EL GOZO.

5. AMCLATTER/1 SAID THAT IDEN HAS NO CURRENT INFO INDICATE "ESPIONAGE" OR "REVOLUTIONARY MOTIVATION" BEHIND ROBBERY.

6. INSPECTOR (CAPTAIN) F. L. NAPIER ASSIGNED DETECTIVE BUREAU MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT POSSIBLY IDENTICAL CAPT NAPIR PARA TWO ABOVE. FRANK CAMPBELL PROBABLY IDENTICAL FRANK KAPPEL FORMER METRO CHIEF INTEL WHO RESIGNED WORK WITH STATE RACING COMMISSION.

7. NO SPECIFIC WAVE TRACES WALDO BADO PEREZ ALTHO ONE WALDO PEREZ REPORTED MAY 62 AS HAVING HELPED ORGANIZE PROPAGANDA AND MILITARY PLANS LIBERATION CUBA IN CUBAN LIBERATION ARMY (UFG 992; 14 MAY 62). WAVE TRACES GUILLERMO TABRAUE INDICATE HE POSSIBLY IDENTICAL GUILLERMO TABRAU NUECER (201-283992).

SECRET

CFN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: SAN JOSE

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO: VR. FILE, DDP

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

SS

S E C R E T 201400Z

DIR WAVE CITE SJOS 7403

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

201

IN 84348

MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED SAN JOSE 17 FEBRUARY ON PAA FLIGHT 501 FROM MIAMI.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

24

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

EOB

CI

UNIT TIME BY

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/SA 3

INFO VR. FILE, DDP

A-1 201

S E C R E T 201927Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8522

DESENSITIZED

KYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

20 FEB 65 IN 85084

U

REF: WAVE 8521 (IN 85083)

IDEN: JOSE ANTONIO MOLE ROSALES

S E C R E T

PR

WH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/SA 3

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO VR. FILE, DDP

AMBIDDY-1 201
Security

S E C R E T 201927Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8521

DESENSITIZED

[illegible] TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

20F[illegible]35083

REFS: A. WAVE 8261 (IN

B. WAVE 8419 (IN [redacted])

C. WAVE 8420 (IN [redacted]

1. AMCLATTER/1, AS FOLLOW UP REFS, REPORTED 19 FEB 65 THAT MIAMI POLICE CAPTAIN NAPIR PHONED FIORINI 18 FEB AND ARRANGED FOR FIORINI AND AMWORLD INTEL CHIEF (IDEN) MEET WITH TWO POLICE SERGEANTS FORM POLICE HEADQUARTERS AT 1145 NW 11TH STREET MIAMI. MTG HELD FROM 1330 TO 1430 HOURS 18 FEB MAYFLOWER RESTAURANT NORTH MIAMI AVENUE AND 36TH STREET WITH SERGEANTS (FNU) DOWDA AND (FNU) MCCRACKEN OF POLICE BURGLARY SQUAD. BOTH SERGEANTS SAID NAPIR INSTRUCTED THEM "KEEP CASE OFF REPORT". IDEN TOLD SERGEANTS THAT AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION HE AND AMWORLD BOTH CONCLUDE ROBBERY WAS "G-2 SPONSORED", POINTED UP FACT $500 LEICA CAMERA AND TWO $300 TAPE RECORDERS VISIBLY ACCESSIBLE NOT TOUCHED. ALSO SUSPECT SOME DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED. SURMISE INTRUDERS WANTED GIVE OUTWARD APPEARANCE ROBBERY.

2. FIORINI SAID ADDITIONAL INFO ON SUSPECT WALDO BADO PEREZ INDICATE HE FORMER BRIGADE MEMBER. POLICE SERGEANTS AND IDEN AGREE

IN 29[illegible]-16

2

AND COULD HAVE CASED HOUSE FOR SOMEONE ELSE.

3. ACCORDING FIORINI NAPIR INSTRUCTED IDEN GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS IN WRITING ON STOLEN RIFLE AND MAIL REPORT TO HIM. NAPIR WANTS REPORT POSTMARKED AND ALLEGEDLY WOULD DISCLOSE CONTENTS ONLY TO CLEAR AMWORLD ANY COMPLICITY OR RESPONSIBILITY EVENT RIFLE USED BY UNKNOWN PARTY SOME FUTURE CRIME.

SECRET

JOSE ANTONIO TOMÉ ROSALES

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15 ~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☐ ☒

JRR

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM CARACAS

ACTION DC/WH/SA 3

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT CI SI

BY AB

SES SS

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, C/WH

201

SECRET 231620Z

DIR INF[illegible]VE PACY SJOS CITE CARA 0003

DESENSITIZED

KA[illegible] TYPIC AMWORLD YOBITE

23 Feb 65 IN 85926

MANUEL ARTIME AND RAFAEL QUINTERO ARRIVED CARA FROM PAC~~S~~Y 20 FEB PAA 513. PLANS REMAIN CARA UN~~X~~TIL 24 OR ~~X~~25 FEB WHEREUPON WILL DEPART FOR COSTA RICA.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

AB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

FILE [illegible]

201

S E C R E T 241320Z

24 FEB 65 IN 86580

DIR PACY CITE SJOS 7460

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

MANUEL ARTIME BUESA LEFT SAN JOSE 20 FEBRUARY FOR PACY ON LACSA 629.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

8 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Phase-out of ARTIME Autonomous Group

1. On the night of 5 March 1965, the case officer for Manuel ARTIME Buesa met with him and outlined the policy decision reached by the 303 Committee on 4 March. ARTIME was told the decision was to terminate our operational relationship in as friendly and cooperative manner as possible, but not later than 1 May 1965. The case officer had been empowered to convey this information and to conduct an exploratory discussion of the problems and possible solutions connected with a phase-out program. The two main points the United States Government was concerned with were (a) fair but reasonable demobilization support to the personnel of the autonomous group, and (b) ARTIME's assistance in insuring that the balance of power in Central America was not upset, particularly by preventing the weapons of his group from falling into the hands of political extremists or free-booters.

2. ARTIME had been on notice for several months that a phase-out might be ordered at any time, and had an inkling that the decision had been made because his regular monthly subsidy had not been received on schedule. He had obviously given the matter considerable thought and made up his mind as to his course of action when he arrived at the meeting. He began the discussion by summarizing the things he might have done had he been so inclined. Among the possibilities mentioned, he included loading up his troops and weapons and taking over Haiti as a base against Cuba, intervening in Costa Rica to bring down the liberal PLN administration in favor of a rightist junta of dissidents, or throwing in completely with General Anastacio SOMOZA in Nicaragua the weapons, personnel and equipment of the autonomous group. He has the capability of fielding an infantry battalion reinforced with artillery (4.2 mortars), supported by air and maritime elements, with a cadre of trained and combat-experienced Cubans, provided he teams up with an organization

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

who can furnish about 1,000 men to flesh out the unit. Case officer acknowledged that we recognized his potential for harmful action, had considered it thoroughly, and hoped he would not do anything of the kind. ARTIME said he had also considered all the possibilities and concluded there was no point in his being childish and trying to "bite us about the ankles."

3. ARTIME accepts the decision and will cooperate in a phase-out program. He does not understand the rationale, and, of course, does not agree with the decision, but he acknowledges our prerogative to make it. If we really wish still to be friends, he is willing, just as he told Mr. FitzGerald originally. He asks only that we help him make it possible to remain friendly and makes two requests from us: (a) help take care of his men and their families until they can rehabilitate and resettle themselves, and (b) do everything possible to get his parents out of Cuba.

4. The major elements to be considered in a phase-out were discussed with the following results:

a. Personnel. The first priority is support payments to dependents which were due 1 March in the total amount of $100,00. This must be done soonest if ARTIME is to maintain control of the situation. The next most immediate problem is re-entry permission for fifteen of his men who have been stranded in Nicaragua trying to return to the United States since December. These men were exfiltrated "black" from the United States with our assistance and require special authority for re-entry from Department of State and Department of Justice, which we thought was arranged in early January.

The demobilization plan proposed by ARTIME seemed as realistic and effective as could be hoped for. He proposes to return the bulk of his men, approximately 200, to the United States during March and give them one month's pay on 1 April as a mustering out payment to support them and their families while they seek other employment. The balance of his men, less than 100, will be held in Central America for one month longer as a security and administrative force muster the group's equipment at Monkey Point from which disposition can be made during the month of April. The security force will be returned during April and will be paid a mustering out payment on 1 May. This will terminate the project.

The cover story which ARTIME intends to use for demobilization is to inform his men that their mothership is out of commission and will require about six weeks for repairs. This is true enough so that it will be believed. He will then grant leave to all men with dependents to get their personal affairs in order before operations commence again. He will publicize the fact that it is less expensive and better for morale to send them on leave than to have men sitting around the camps with no operations to run. When all the first contingent are back home, individual notice will be given each to start looking for other work as operations have been postponed. They will be told that the salary payment of 1 April will be the last one and should be considered as a mustering out bonus. ARTIME feels this method will soften the impact and lower the noise level as the men will be home with their families and scattered throughout the community instead of being in an organized group in Central America when they realize they are being demobilized.

b. Funds. ARTIME had done his homework and brought with him facts and figures upon which phase-out costs could be estimated. These cost estimates are outlined below:

1 March -	$100,000	Dependents support and salaries
	25,000	Travel from Central America to U.S. for approx. 200 men
	50,000	Accrued debts due 1 March, mainly food and other expenses for camps in Central America
	$175,000	(In lieu of regular monthly subsidy of $225,000)
1 April -	$100,000	Mustering out payment for 200 men and salaries for security and administrative details
	12,500	Travel from Central America to U.S. for approx. 100 men
	12,500	Estimated food and other camp expenses
	$125,000	

~~SECRET~~

1 May	- $ 50,000	Mustering out payments for approx. 100 men and final contractual obligations of project
	$ 50,000	

---

c. Weapons. ARTIME agreed that it would be in nobody's interest for his weapons to fall into the wrong hands. He was asked for ideas on disposition of the arms and came up with the following suggestion which appears to be an excellent one. The mothership, MV SANTA MARIA, is in need of repairs and must go into a shipyard. Tentative arrangements have been made to put her in the yards at Galveston, Texas, some time in March or April. ARTIME can order his security detail to store the arms aboard the ship for "security" reasons before she leaves for the yard. They will simply remain on board when the ship leaves and we can take control of the ship and the weapons from that point on.

d. Maritime.

(1) MV SANTA MARIA. See above. The ship would be sailed from Monkey Point with a contract crew supplied by Chester, Blackburn, & Roder, Inc. of New York, who are agents for the ship's owner, Libernic Corporation, a CIA proprietary company. One of ARTIME's senior officers would accompany the ship as his representative, with orders to turn over control of it and the arms upon its arrival at Galveston. CIA officers, possibly documented as Customs officials, would accept custody and Office of Logistics could recover the weapons and any other equipment which might be shipped by this method. The ship would then be disposed of according to Headquarters wishes at any time after 17 April when the charter arrangement with General SOMOZA expires and the ship legally reverts to control of the owner.

(2) Swifts, V-20's, Boston Whalers, rubber ~~boats and other operational craft are all owned,~~ technically, by ARTIME's group. He has had title to the Swifts legally transferred from a Costa Rican politician to one of his own senior officers. He wants to retain these craft for the time being, hoping against hope that lightning will strike and he may, after all, be able to use them in the next

~~SECRET~~

two months. Case officer recommends we go along with him on this, at least for the time being, as it could be sticky legally and might antagonize him at the time when we most need his cooperation. In the end, he should be reasonable about disposition of these craft if we shoot square with him in the meantime.

(3) Support craft, LCMs, Barges, etc. Disposition arrangements to be worked out together on these craft.

e. Aircraft.

(1) DC-3. ARTIME is willing to release the aircraft back to its "owners," TASA, a CIA proprietary company in Panama. However, one month's charter payment of $1,250 was due 1 March, and another will be due by the time the aircraft can be returned. ARTIME was reluctant to let the plane go back without payment, but also reluctant to squeeze the $2,500 out of his budget. Case officer voiced his opinion that the owner would probably be glad to get the plane back and would not likely think it worth going to court. However, in view of the fact that it would be a "closed-circuit" transaction and would actually cost the Government nothing, it is recommended that a special authorization of $2,500 be channeled to ARTIME for payment in order to maintain ARTIME's reputation for fiscal probity. He will surely appreciate this gesture.

(2) L-20 Beaver and Cessna-180. These aircraft technically belong to ARTIME's group and recovery would be a sticky matter, legally. ARTIME hopes to hold control of these aircraft for the time being, and it is recommended that we go along with him, saving disposition arrangements until later.

5. ARTIME again emphasized at the close of the meeting that he must have soonest the March payments for families as an absolute minimum, before he could face his people and maintain control of them in order to insure an orderly phase-out program.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: C/WH
DCWHD/C
C/WH/C/CA

~~SECRET~~

19 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Chief, WH remarks on Termination of AMWORLD

1. At a meeting with DCWHD/C and Mr. Jenkins on 18 March, Chief, WH expressed general satisfaction with the status of termination of AMWORLD and the plans therefor. He stated specifically that he was pleased with the cooperation of AMBIDDY-1 and AMJAVA-4 and would make it a point to inform higher levels in the Agency and the U. S. Government and put a good word for them on the record. He also directed that they be told:

a. He personally appreciates their cooperation and the good sense, goodwill and maturity they displayed in accepting and executing the U. S. Government decision to terminate their operations.

b. He wants to meet with them personally, at the earliest mutually convenient time, in order to discuss the situation with them.

c. After termination of the paramilitary project is completed, he has some other ideas for ventures of mutual interest which he wishes to pursue with them.

2. The gist of the above points had been passed to AMBIDDY-1 and AMJAVA-4 previously by Mr. Jenkins, and on the night of 18 March he confirmed by telephone to AMJAVA-4 that Chief, WH had expressed the above sentiments.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
AMJAVA-4 201
Policy

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

13-1

DISPATCH

~~SECRET~~ DESENSITIZED

TO

Chief, WHD

FROM

Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT

PBRUMEN/AMWORLD - Future of AMBIDDY 1/AMJAVA 4

X

PRIORITY

Action Required: For your information

Reference : DIR 98189

1. Ref cable raises a number of fundamental issues of concern to Caracas Station. In brief, we do not welcome an activation of the movement's center in Caracas, an event which would greatly complicate our operational situation. We have reasons for believing that the host government likewise would probably be embarrassed if AMBIDDY 1 chose Venezuela as a base for whatever program he is planning to undertake. Repeated failures of his attempts at being received by President LEONI are significant in this context.

2. Since we must assume that AMBIDDY 1 has alluded to his close ties with KUBARK (and more specifically with BECKHOFF), the Venezuelan security services may well jump to the conclusion that AMWORLD is in fact a KUBARK operation and sooner or later we would be forced to disavow AMBIDDY 1, a circumstance of which he would be bound to learn with consequent embitterment. All these predictable developments, Caracas is most anxious to forestall. Needless to say, both BECKHOFF and ONTRICH are unhappy about this situation of conflict since it involves a man whom both admire and who (in their opinion) has served ODYOKE interests loyally, at times to the detriment of his abiding cause to liberate PBRUMEN.

3. For the above reasons, we would welcome indeed if formal and institutional ties between AMBIDDY 1 and AMJAVA 4 could be put in abeyance, at least to the extent that AMBIDDY 1 be prevailed upon to pass up Venezuela as a base of operations. This discriminatory approach reflects our awareness that

(CONTINUED)

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

RI COPY

201-[illegible]

[redacted] 201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCA-12232

DATE
5 April 1965

CLASSIFICATION
DESENSITIZED
SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
201 - AMBIDDY/1
201 - AMJAVA/4

AMBIDDY 1 is temperamentally [illegible] Headquarters [illegible] elementary standards of operational security and [illegible] with no regard to consequences. We doubt that AMJAVA 4 would exercise a moderating influence. Should AMBIDDY 1 get himself and his associates into serious trouble, the Station could not help but intercede with concomitant damage to our standing with the liaison services. We can further predict that the Venezuelan trade union movement (which is belligerently anti-AMBUD) may view an active AMBIDDY 1 sponsored program with disfavor and would also bring strong pressure to bear on the Government to curtail or surpress the movement.

4. We realize that the Station's position, as set forth above, saddles Headquarters with an exceedingly delicate task. While as a last resort we could of course drop discreet hints to our Venezuelan liaison contacts suggesting the inadvisability of affording AMBIDDY 1 and his associates sanctuary in Venezuela, we would only entertain that distasteful prospect as a last resort and with the full approval of Headquarters.

5. Another approach, only slightly less unsatisfactory, would be to restrict AMBIDDY 1's radius of activity to an extent tantamount to denying him all freedom of political action while in Venezuela. But all in all, it would probably be best for KUBARK if AMBIDDY 1 could be dissuaded from going through with his proposed move in a manner which does not hurt his pride and which does not alienate him from KUBARK. Headquarters may be able to suggest palatable alternatives to Venezuela.

6. As regards AMJAVA 4, we share some of Headquarters misgivings about surfacing him to Liaison. What prompted us to suggest this approach was a desire to overcome the difficulties which would be facing AMJAVA 4 in any case should he decide to make his home here. We are inclined to doubt that he could obtain permission to enter Venezuela in immigrant status without powerful intercession. He would be used by the Station on projects which we (and presumably the host government) view as compatible with Venezuela's national security interests.

7. Some of the doubts raised by Headquarters are altogether valid and were considered before we made our proposal. We are least concerned, however, about the issues of dual loyalty and dual control etc, because it happens to be one of our objectives in building a more durable relationship with liaison, esp DIGEPOL, to entice them into joint ventures where dual control does exist. We find AMJAVA 4 temperamentally suited (esp since his basic loyalty belongs to KUBARK) to serve as an operational link between Station and liaison, without acting to the detriment of either. Although the tenor of our relationship with DIGEPOL has undergone a notable improvement, there are still deep-rooted reservations and suspicions which a man of AMJAVA 4's personality traits might help to dispel.

8. With regards to the substance of our operations against PBRUMEN, especially those which are CE-oriented, there is a natural congruity of interests between ODYOKE and Venezuela which renders joint pursuits in fact most desirable. More likely than not, DIGEPOL will do Station the favor of facilitating the admission of AMJAVA 4 and of providing him with viable cover, maybe including official (DIGEPOL) documentation, and let it go at that. We rather doubt that unless prodded by Station DIGEPOL would avail itself of AMJAVA 4's services, let alone use him to penetrate Station's operational program. This leaves in the balance the pros and cons of surfacing a valuable KUBARK asset to liaison.

9. The general concepts guiding Caracas Station in desiring to secure the services of AMJAVA 4 were spelled out in HVCA-12052.

10. In presenting Station's proposal to AMJAVA 4, the following points could be made:

A. We do not propose that he sever his longstanding personal and political links with AMBIDDY 1.

B. We do not expect that he disconnect his links with the movement, let alone cease supporting its program.

DESENSITIZED

C. We would oppose, however, his exercising functions of political leadership within the movement, the reason being that such a role would as far as the host government is concerned be an unmistakable admission that [illegible] is officially backing AMWORLD.

D. We would expect AMJAVA-4 to compartmentalize himself to the extent that he treat any knowledge acquired in his clandestine role as operational adjunct to the Station as privileged in the sense of not imparting it to anyone without a need to know. Specifically, this information would have to be withheld from AMBIDDY-1 and other members of the movement.

E. AMJAVA-4 will have to make a clear choice between serving the cause of PBRUMEN liberation by actively associating himself with AMWORLD (a doomed undertaking if our reading of the situation is correct), or by co-ordering PBRUMEN's program to subvert Venezuela under Station control.

[illegible] B. [illegible]

7

2.a AMJAVA/4 told me [illegible]/2 went to Spain on 15 May for 2 or 3 months vacation. A/4 said later that A/2 was starting a new business in Spain and wanted him (A/4) to move over there and manage it for him. A/2 left William King, the Vice-President in charge of Maritima Bam in his absence. AMBIDDY/1 has always had ultimate control of the [illegible] funds and has simply been exercising closer personal control of them since A/2 is gone.

2.b AMBIDDY/1 told me that he is selling off some of the equipment which is not suitable for his current program of Community Development/Civic Action in Latin America in order to raise money to obtain equipment and materials that will be needed. For example, he has bought 22 acres of farm land near West Palm Beach to establish a model farm for training purposes. He has been conducting evening classes for several weeks for about 20 MRR men, who are working full time at other jobs, in rural Community Development. He has gotten some training materials and advice from Prof. George Lodge of Harvard, who, according to letters from him, appears to be enthusiastic about his contact with A/1 and his organization.

2.c A/1 says his only political plans at this time are to try to continue holding his movement (MRR) together while he changes its emphasis and direction toward the constructive activity of help in Community Development for friendly Latin American countries and away from the PM emphasis for which we supported him in the AMWORLD program. The farm in Nicaragua to cultivate rice is a planned cooperative on the east coast (Bluefields - Monkey Point) to complement a shrimp fishing cooperative and boat yard at Bluefields which he has already discussed with President Schick, who requested him to go ahead. A/1 and the MRR part in these enterprises is purely advisory in training local residents and helping them to organize and build facilities. A/4 reports, and A/1 himself admits, that he is simply feeling around now trying to get all the information and ideas he can about this new field of endeavor. (For example, A/1 just bought 300 baby chicks to work with in order to find out they can best fit into a rural development program.)

2.d. Of course, AMWORLD is finished and all members of the organization know it. A/1 and A/4 have both told me they have made it clear to all hands and have advised them to get jobs immediately in order to support their dependents. Most of them have done so, several going back to work for WAVE, for instance. The death of AMWORLD and the reorganization necessary to go into a new phase (Community Development) is no doubt causing a crisis in the MRR, but both leaders believe the movement will weather the crisis and survive. Mr. Tom Clines, who talked with other members of the MRR, believes the same thing, and is certain it will survive with enough support from Washington to pay for publicity, travel, and administrative costs.

3.a There are 5 men at Monkey Point where one cache (a platoon) of weapons is stored. The other two are located at Bluefields and at Managua, under control of the Nicaraguan National Guard. The MRR delegate at Managua is the only person who can authorize their release, and this must be on written authority of A/1 and approved by General Somoza. The 5 men at Monkey Point are simply station-keepers who, in addition to guarding the camp and weapons, are teaching the local Indians to read and write, to operate and maintain basic machinery, and to plant crops to raise their standard of living.

3.b. There has been no evidence from any source of any attempts to sell AMWORLD arms or ammunition.

3.c It is not clear what this source is trying to report, but presumably he is trying to indicate that A/1 is hoarding the AMWORLD money he has been issued for his personal use. Anyone who knows A/1 knows that the last thing he will ever give up is his magazine and radio broadcasts. The ability to make speeches and have them printed and see his picture reproduced is the top requirement in his makeup. The next most important requirement is the capability to travel and hob-nob with Heads of State and other VIPs, at which he excels. These two attributes are of considerable interest to KUBARK, as witness the fact that Mr. Fitzgerald has insisted on retaining these capabilities for A/1 to use in behalf of the Agency. They are certainly more important to him than money, as such, concerning which he is incredibly naive and disinterested. He is notorious for having to have somebody else go around with him to be sure he has necessary documents and money, otherwise he would never have a dime in his pocket. I checked further on this point with A/4 at our last meeting on 27 June and he said there was no evidence of A/1 pilfering the till, the problem if any was simply honest mismanagement. We should remember that A/1 has been paid a salary, with Hqs agreement and at our suggestion for that matter, of $1,000 a month. AMWORLD/2 made it a point to deposit the check in A/1's personal account every month, and A/2 maintained de facto control of the account. A/1 told me this incident because he was amazed to find when A/2 left for Spain and turned the records of the account over to A/1, he found that he had 4 or 5 thousand dollars in the bank, the most he had ever owned in his life. In addition to this salary, it should be remembered that A/1 is a co-author of the "Bay of Pigs" book, which was worth several thousand dollars to each of the 4 co-authors.

Note: This line of reporting has been going on for at least the past 2 years in the case of A/1 and is typical of the incessant gossip and character assassination within the Cuban exile community in Miami that has been going on for the last 5 years. While certainly no paragon of virtue or of efficiency, it will take more than this to convince me A/1 is a crook. In the first place, AMJAVA/4 would be the first one to put the finger on him if he started misappropriating MRR funds or otherwise playing games that would hurt the movement. In the second place, A/1 is too disorganized to be an effective crook, even if he tried, and it would show up in more concrete form than this report.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

~~SECRET~~

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	EA –	5	D
2		6	X
3	CA	7	
4	C	8	

FROM PANAMA CITY

ACTION DC/WH/C 3

INFO RID FILE DDP, C/WH

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY

S E C R E T 222224Z 22 Apr 65 IN 50512

DIR INFO CARA BOGO SJOS MANA GUAT CITE PACY 6583

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD

1. AMBIDDY-1 TOLD ZABOTH HE HAD MEETING PRES LEONI IN MARCH, PRES VALENCIA 7 APRIL, AND PLANS SEE PRES ROBLES 22 OR 23 APRIL. PLANS RETURN VIA COSTA RICA FOR TALKS PRES ORLICH AND FONMIN ODUBER AND NICARAGUA TO SEE PRES SCHICK AND GEN SOMOZA. THEN TO GUATEMALA FOR MEETING PRES PERALTA AND GIVE HIM COMPLETE BRIEFING ROBERTO ALEJOS COUP PLOTTING, WHICH INCLUDES SOME FORMER MRR PEOPLE FOR WHOM A-1 WISHES DISCLAIM ANY RESPONSIBILITY. DURING WEEK 3 MAY HE HOPES MEET DAINOLD TO REPORT ON TERMINATION AMWORLD AND DISCUSS ANY OTHER

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

[illegible]

OPICS DAINOLD WISHES.

2. A-1 FUTURE PLANS APPEAR INVOLVE SELLING IDEA OF PROGRAM TO CASTRO/COMMIE THREATENED COUNTRIES WHICH INCLUDE (1) INTERDICTION CUBAN INFIL OPS, (2) PENETRATE AND ELIMINATE INTERNAL CASTROITE OPS, (3) POSITIVE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM BASED ON "COMANDES RURALES" WHICH WAS BASIS MRR STRENGHT RURAL CUBA AND CONCEPT A-1 DEVELOPED WHICH CASTRO CONTINUED AFTER A-1 DEFECTION. HE BELIEVES SMALL TEAMS TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED CUBANS WORKING DIRECTLY WITH LOCAL GOVTS COULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO LATIN AMERICA COUNTER INSURGENCY PROGRAMS. FEELS WOULD BE IN ODYOKE INTEREST TO ASSEST BUT WILL LEAVE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS TO LOCAL GOVTS.

4. INDICATIONS ARE A-1 MAY ASK DAINOLD IF IN RETURN FOR OPS INTEL AND POL ACTION ON HIS PART, KUBARK CAN CONTINUE ASSIST HIM IN BROADCASTS TO CUBA, MRR MAGAZINE, DELEGATES IN CARIBBEAN AREA, AND CONTINUED CONTACT WITH THE AMLASH GROUP INSIDE CUBA (THEY ARE STILL IN COMMUNICATION). HE INSISTS HIS BASIC ORGANIZATION CONTINUES AND WILL SURVIVE, WITH DOME MEMBERS WIRKING IN FLORIDA, NICARAGUA, AND OTHR PLACES, PLUS EXPANSION LEGITIMATE BUSINESS INTERESTS BBY PEOPLE SUCH AS

SECRET

Enrique

~~SECRET~~ [illegible]

[illegible] MESA, RICARDO ARIAS, MANOLIN HERNANDEZ, ETC. (A-1 AND AMJAVA-1 BOTH SAY THEY INTEND MOVE FROM FLORIDA AND ESTABLISH RESIDENCE CENTRAL AMERICA OR VENEZUELA TO ESCAPE FATE OTHER EXILE LEADERS WHO STYMIED IN MIAMI AND ABLE ONLY TO TALK, NOT TO CONTINUE USEFUL WORK.

5. A-1 APOLOGIZED FOR ANY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY PRANK HE PLAYED COLOMBIA. SAID HE MET AND ACCOMPANIED BOTH BY CUBAN WELL KNOWN KUBARK AGENT AND A-1 CONFESSED SOME EXAGGERATION AND SHOW JOBS FOR HIS BENEFIT. HOPES REPORTS WILL BE CONSIDERED THIS CONTEXT AND TAKEN WITH GRAIN OF SALT. SAID HE ACTUALLY HAS NOT COMMITMENT FROM COLOMBAI, MET WITH PRES VALENCIA FOR TWO HOURS, ONE HOUR TALKING POETRY, ONE HOUR TALKING OPS. NO DECISION BUT VALENCIA WISHES TALK AGAIN AFTER TIME TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES. ABOUT THE SAME RESULTS FROM VENEZUELA ALTHOUGH LEONI APPEARED MORE INDECISIVE BECAUSE NOT SURE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT SUPPORT.

SECRET * DISSEM PER CABLE RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

SECRET

CFN

2 / 201

~~SECRET~~

27 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Present Activities and Possible Future Plans of Manuel Artime Buesa

1. Present Activities:

During the past six weeks Manuel Artime has devoted his time to the task of disbanding his paramilitary establishment in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Artime has returned most of the arms and equipment provided him by this Agency. This includes the mother-ship, nearly all of the heavy weapons such as mortars, machine guns and artillery pieces, as well as other miscellaneous items such as communications vans and earth-moving equipment. The small arms not recovered from Artime are sufficient to equip an infantry company.

2. Future Plans:

During the same period Artime has attempted to gain support for a plan by which he, and a small nucleus of his paramilitary force, would conduct counterinsurgency-type operations against Castro-supported rebel bands operating in several Latin American countries. Artime has outlined these proposals to Presidents Leon Valencia of Colombia and Marcos Robles of Panama, and endeavored to obtain an interview with Raul Leoni of Venezuela, but has been able to conduct conversations on this proposal only on the Venezuelan Cabinet level.

To implement such a scheme Artime envisions using a small group of highly-trained individuals plus

~~SECRET~~

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET~~

two fast motor launches originally provided to him by this Agency. Artime would use this force to patrol the coasts of one or the other of the aforementioned countries to prevent the smuggling of arms and/or general contraband. In exchange for this service, Artime would receive the permission of these governments to keep any arms which he might capture in the course of these patrols. In addition, he would be allowed to maintain bases of operation from which to launch attacks against Cuba. So far none of these governments has made any commitment to Artime. He claims, however, that both Presidents Valencia and Robles have expressed interest in his proposals.

Artime has requested an interview with this Agency, presumably to discuss his future, during which it is expected that he will bring up his scheme as outlined above.

John L. Hart
DC/WHD/C

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/ADRohlfing:bh (27 Apr 65)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

28 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Present Activities and Possible Future Plans of Manuel Artime Buesa

1. Present Activities

For the past six weeks Artime has devoted his time to disbanding his paramilitary establishment in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. He has;

a. returned most of the arms and equipment provided him by us,

b. returned the mothership,

c. returned nearly all the heavy weapons including mortars, machine guns, and artillery pieces.

The small arms not recoovered are sufficient to equip an infantry company.

2. Future Plans

Artime has attempted to peddle a plan to the Venezuelan, Colombian, and Panamanian governments utilizing the nucleus of his paramilitary force. Essentially this program is the same for all three countries and involves a

~~SECRET~~ GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification quid pro quo arrangement whereby:

a. Artime would use his force to patrol the coast of these countries and prevent smuggling of arms and/or general contraband;

b. Artime would receive, in exchange for this service, permission from these governments to keep any arms which he might capture and be allowed to maintain bases from which to launch operations against Cuba.

Some of the specifics follow:

Colombia

Artime wants petroleum, food, and clothing from the government for a group to be stationed there and a beachhead to establish a camp.

If there is a landing in Cuba, Artime wants immediate recognition by the Colombian Government as head of a government in exile.

Artime would guarantee to wipe out smuggling and would patrol from Riohacha to the Panama border. He would also guarantee to solve the guerrilla problem by using two MRR groups. One group to conduct operations against Cuba and the other to act as instructors and field advisors to the Colombian army.

~~SECRET~~

Artime would seek private financing from wealthy Cuban exiles and Latin American sympathizers.

Panama

Artime would start a "comandos rurales" operation, similar to that which was the base of MRR strength in rural Cuba.

Artime would launch a civic action program and also would interdict Cuban infiltration operations.

The above plan would be carried out mainly in Chiriqui Province.

Miscellaneous

We have no information on what Artime proposed in Venezuela but assume it is much the same as for Colombia and Panama. We also believe Artime may ask CIA to continue to assist him in radio broadcasting to Cuba, financing the MRR magazine, and helping him maintain continued contact with the Cubela group. This would be in return for his counter insurgency program outlined above.

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

~~SECRET~~

701

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Proposed Meeting Between
Chief, WH and AMBIDDY-1

1. AMBIDDY-1 went to Nicaragua on 11 May 1965 to remove his remaining men and equipment from that country and to complete secure storage arrangements for the small arms which he has retained. He has a meeting scheduled with General Peralta in Guatemala later this week and expects to be back in Miami by 17 May.

2. He hopes to meet with Chief, WH at any convenient time thereafter to report on the disbanding of AMWORLD and to discuss any other matters which may be of mutual interest. AMBIDDY-1 has indicated that he is willing to continue cooperating with the Agency by furnishing information and undertaking political action tasks as required. He hoped that the Agency, in turn, will be able to assist him in financing a limited publicity program consisting mainly of radio broadcasts and the MRR magazine. This would help to keep his movement alive and maintain him as a recognized exile leader who would thus be of continued value to the Agency in activities of mutual interest.

3. We suggest that his witting deputy, AMJAVA-4, might be invited to visit Washington at the same time to participate in other discussions concerning possible activities in the future. It would be appreciated if Chief, WH were able to set a convenient date for a meeting in order that we may notify AMBIDDY-1 in advance.

John L. Hart
DCWHD/C

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (13 May 65)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

~~SECRET~~

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

17 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with AMJAVA-4

1. In addition to the matter of meeting the AMWORLD Swifts on their arrival in New Orleans, AMJAVA-4 indicated he was even more interested in talking with me about AMBIDDY-1's present frame of mind and plans for the future, about some of which he is a little concerned. AMJAVA-4 intends to see AMBIDDY-1 for a few days the first part of this week and will try to get a complete and current reading from AMBIDDY-1 during this time. AMJAVA-4 wants to discuss this in detail with me prior to the meeting of AMBIDDY-1 with Chief, WH, presently planned for the week of 24 May.

2. AMJAVA-4 also wishes to discuss the two job offers he has received from the Agency, ie, a job with Caracas Station, or to go into university level training in a holding capacity for future commitment to a post-Castro Cuban regime. He has some topics for discussion concerning last-minute questions in the close-out of AMWORLD and disposition of some of the key personnel of the organization.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
Policy
AMJAVA-4 201
AMBIDDY-1 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Meeting with AMJAVA-4 in New Orleans, 21-23 May 1965

Subject: AMBIDDY-1 Activities

1. AMJAVA-4 said he had talked only briefly with AMBIDDY-1 on his return from Guatemala and Nicaragua (21 May, just before A-4 left to meet me in New Orleans). A-1 said he had talked with General Peralta in Guatemala and had disclaimed any connection with Roberto Alejos' coup plotting or the former MRR Cubans who had been involved with it. He had also outlined his proposal for Peralta to consider whereby A-1 and the MRR would undertake, at the invitation of the local government, to assist in countering Castro/Communist infiltration and subversion, and to help develop rural civic action programs as a positive counter-insurgency program. A-1 claimed that Peralta seemed very seriously interested in the proposals and appeared quite appreciative that A-1 had been able to visit him. A-1 expects that Peralta will wish to talk to him further in regard to his counter-insurgency proposals.

2. A-1 also talked again with President Schick in Nicaragua about the above proposal. Schick had thought over their previous discussion and approves a pilot program to be run on the east coast, with the rural civic action program near Bluefields. This will allow A-1 to keep a few of his men in the country to work on the program while maintaining security of the weapons he has stored there. A-1 also talked with Luis Somoza, at the latter's invitation, but indicated there was nothing new or interesting from this source.

3. A-4 is not sure himself how much A-1 has been able to accomplish in his visits in Central and South America, and how much of his reporting is wishful thinking. He is not ready, however, to sell A-1 short and has watched him "selling ice-boxes to Eskimos" successfully over too long a period of time.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

4. A-1 decided to come to New Orleans on the night of 24 May in order to meet the two Swift boats at Morgan City on 25 May (their latest ETA). Having done all the preliminary leg work and made all the arrangements, A-4 decided both of them would not be necessary and he planned to return to Miami the night of the 24th. I promised to contact both of them by phone on Tuesday night (25 May) to make sure the Swifts get in with no problems, and to inform A-1 a firm time for his meeting with C/WH (scheduled for 1500, 27 May).

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
Guatemala
Nicaragua

~~SECRET~~

C.1P

2 JUN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Interview between Mr. George Cabot Lodge and Manuel Artime Buesa

1. Pursuant to your conversations with Manuel Artime on 27 May 1965, the latter has expressed a desire to meet with Mr. George Cabot Lodge in order to further discuss practical means of implementing a civic action program in Nicaragua.

2. Artime's current plans and schedule are as follows: 2-4 June in Miami, Florida; 4-12 June in Nicaragua; 12-14 June in Panama; 14- possible trips to Colombia and Guatemala.

3. Artime emphasized, however, that he could revise this schedule if need be in order to meet with Mr. Lodge in Cambridge, Mass. or any other location at Mr. Lodge's convenience.

(Signed) John L. Hart

John L. Hart
DCWHD/C

DDP/WH/C/C[illegible]EA/ADRohlfing:bh (2 June 65)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/EA/CA

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CAP

~~SECRET~~

3 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/PO/B

ATTENTION : Mr. J. De Stefano

SUBJECT : Background Sketch on Dr. Manuel Artime Buesa

1. Manuel Artime Buesa, a non-practicing medical doctor, began his political activities in Cuba during the year 1959 when he participated in the formation of a civic action type program known as the "Comandos Rurales." The Comandos Rurales actively participated with the Castro regime during its initial agrarian reform, but eventually broke with it due to Castro's shift to Marxism-Leninism. It was at this point that Artime formed the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR, Movement for the Recovery of the Revolution), a political organization which he heads up to date. The degree of Artime's activities in the civic action program was reflected by the fact that Artime, prior to his break with Castro, had been appointed a deputy in the Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agregaria (INRA) for Oriente Province. Artime's first contact with the Agency took place just prior to his open break with Castro and he was exfiltrated from the island by the Agency. Artime dedicated himself to the continued development of the MRR until called upon by the Agency to be the political representative for the Cuban Brigade 2506 which landed at the Bay of Pigs. Artime was captured and sentenced to be executed. This was later commuted by Castro to life imprisonment. In 1962 Artime was among those repatriated to this country under the prisoner exchange.

2. In mid-1963 the Agency again asked Artime to head an autonomous paramilitary organization made up and trained exclusively by Cubans and funded by the Agency. Subject set

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

up a series of training camps in Central America. Using the political banner of the MRR Artime's group conducted several paramilitary operations against the island of Cuba with varying degrees of success. In early 1965 by order of the 303 Committee it was decided to phase out the Agency's support to Artime since it was felt that paramilitary operations against Cuba were futile and ineffective. Although he disagreed with this decision, Artime has been fully cooperative in disbanding his organization. The paramilitary wing of the MRR is now completely disbanded, and a few political representatives remain in Central America and Florida.

3. Subject is currently attempting to re-enlist the Agency's support in order to keep his political organization intact. If approved by the 303 Committee, Artime's MRR will receive a small subsidy. Artime also plans to establish a civic action program along the lines of the Comandos Rurales in various Central and South American countries. In such an endeavor Artime would be strictly on his own without any support from the Agency.

4. It is in order to discuss this future program that Artime is anxious to meet with Mr. George C. Lodge, Jr. The undersigned, who is subject's current case officer, is ready and willing to contact Mr. Lodge directly and travel to Cambridge should this be useful. Artime permanently resides in Miami, Florida and his telephone number is: (305) 754-8144.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

3 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD/C

SUBJECT : Support for Manuel Artime and the MRR for the month of June 1965

1. On the basis of the discussion on 27 May between Chief, WH and Manuel Artime, we are currently in the process of submitting a recommendation to the 303 Committee that we maintain contact with Artime and render support to him on a modest basis. His monthly operating budget, which he submitted to us, would enable him to keep the MRR alive as a recognized exile political organization, and would allow him, personally, to maintain his status as an important exile leader. This would, in turn, continue his access to heads of state and other leading political figures in Latin America.

2. Pending action by the 303 Committee, it is recommended that you grant approval to fund Artime and the MRR for the month of June 1965, on the basis of the following budget estimate:

a.	MRR delegates		
	Spain	$ 500	
	Honduras	350	
	Guatemala	350	
	Colombia	400	
	Costa Rica	350	
	Venezuela	450	
	HQS office expenses	800	$ 3,200
b.	Publishing costs of MRR magazine "Tridente"		$ 2,860
c.	Radio broadcasts to Cuba in name of MRR		$ 1,805

d.	Travel costs of Artime and MRR officers	$ 2,000
e.	Support of dependent families and survivors of MRR members (mostly in Cuba)	$ 5,000
	Total	$14,865

3. If approved, these funds will be channeled through the secure AMWORLD funding channels, which are still in operation.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

Deputy Chief, WHD/C

cc: WH/B&F

Fin

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	FROM AMWORLD/AMBIDDY TO Monetary Division	DATE 4 June 1965	VOUCHER NO. (Finance use only)

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY NATURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS:

Deposit to AMBIDDY/1 INWOVEN Account for extraordinary expenses

I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that subsidy funds previously made available to AMWORLD have been or are being expended for authorized objectives of the activity and further support is warranted.

Carl E. Jenkins

PAYEE AMBIDDY/1	PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS On file in Monetary Division	AMOUNT $14,865.00

THE AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENTS. (To be signed when applicable)

DATE	TITLE WH/C/CA/EA	SIGNATURE Carl E. Jenkins

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO. 4004	CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO. 5135-1182
DATE 6/4/65	SIGNATURE WH/B&F

APPROVED

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER DCWHD/C

CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE	AMOUNT	SIGNATURE OF PAYEE

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF FINANCE DIVISION

PREPARED BY	REVIEWED BY	VOUCHER NO. 7-12

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 DESCRIPTION-ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. P.O. NO. QTY.	34-39 STATION CODE PROP. NO. PROJECT NO.	40-42 EXPEND CODE F.Y.	43 FUNDS	45-46 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	47-52 OBLIG. REF. NO. ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	53 CA YR	54-57 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	58-67 ALLOT. OR COST ACCT. NO.	62-67 CE. NO. X REF. NO.	68-70 DUE DATE OBJECT CLASS	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	71-80 AMOUNT CREDIT
											TOTALS		

FORM 596 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

Fin
Dr Carlo

Miami 4 de Junio de 1965

Srs. del Consejo de Liberacion
P.O. Box 8697.Baltimore 40 Md.

Srs del Consejo:

Disculpen la molestia de solicitar de Vds. la aprobacion de un presupuesto de emergencia para cubrir las necesidades mas urgentes del mes de Junio desde el punto de vista netamente civil.

El presupuestoes el siguiente:

a) **DELEGACIONES:**

Costa Rica	$ 350.00	
Venezuela	450.00	
Espana	500.00	
Honduras	350.00	
Guatemala	350.00	
Colombia	400.00	$ 2,400.00

b) **REVISTA "TRIDENTE":**	$ 2,860.00	$ 2,860.00
c) **Hora Radial:**	$ 1,805.00	$ 1,805.00
d) **Oficina para Hora Radial y Revista:**	$ 800.00	$ 800.00
e) Viajes por Latino-America:	$ 2,000.00	$ 2,000.00
f) Ayuda al personal que se encuentra en el interior de Cuba y familiares de presos que nos siguen informando desde dentro (informes como los queadjuntamos)		$ 5,000.00
	TOTAL:	$14,865.00

Pidiendo la mayor rapidez en la aprobacion de este presupuesto de emergencia para Junio,se despide de Vds. muy atte.

Ignacio

Ignacio

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 26

☐ DISSEM BY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : C. E. JENKINS:1s
UNIT : WH/C/CA/AA
EXT : 4550
DATE : 5 JUNE 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO : GUATEMALA CITY INFO: JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY, NORFOLK

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, WH 7, C/OPS, C/CA, FI, SOD 6, 1

TO GUAT INFO WAVE, PACY, LANT CITE DIR 16781

REF: GUAT 4922 (IN 80580)

TYPIC AMBIDDY ONE

A.1

1. AT MEETING WITH DAINOLD ON 27 MAY, AMBIDDY ONE REPORTED ON HIS MEETINGS WITH PERALTA AND PONCIANO. SAID PERALTA HAD INVITED HIM TO VISIT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. AMBIDDY ONE SAID HE TOLD PERALTA FORMER MRR MEMBERS IN RECENT ROBERTO ALEJOS COUP ATTEMPT HAD NO CONNECTION AND NO SUPPORT FROM AMBIDDY ONE. MAIN THRUST OF TALK WITH PERALTA WAS ON COUNTER SUBVERSION, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND NEED FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS. AMBIDDY ONE SAID PERALTA ASKED AND GOT HIS FRANK OPINIONS ON EACH SUBJECT. SAID HE TOLD PERALTA THAT YON SOSA WAS MAIN THREAT. PERALTA SAID HE UNDER CONTROL, BUT AMBIDDY ONE TOLD HIM SO LONG AS YON SOSA SURVIVES AND HAS FOLLOWING WITH EXTERNAL CONTACT AND SUPPORT HE IS NOT UNDER CONTROL. AMBIDDY ONE SAID PERALTA MUCH INTERESTED HIS IDEAS AND ASKED HIM COME BACK FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS SOON.

2. AMBIDDY ONE ALSO TALKED WITH PONCIANO BRIEFLY. SAID PONCIANO CLAIMED ~~[illegible]~~ HAVE ORGANIZED SUPPORT AND READY MOVE AGAINST PERALTA. IN AMBIDDY ONE OPINION, PONCIANO IS SIMPLY ANOTHER INVETERATE PLOTTER

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF:

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 16781

WH WILL SEIZE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY IF IT APPEARS, BUT IS NOT SERIOUSLY WORKING TOWARD A COUP AT PRESENT. FYI, AMBIDDY ONE CURRENTLY HAS NO CAPABILITY FURNISHING SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT IN MEN OR MATERIAL TO ANY COUP GROUP, EVEN IF HE AGREED, WHICH HE DENIES. ON BASIS PAST PERFORMANCE OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, BELIEVE AMBIDDY ONE NOT LIKELY ALIGN SELF WITH ANY POLITICAL FACTION WITHOUT HDQS APPROVAL.

C/WH/2/Guatemala
C/WH/2
WH/C/Intel Mr. Ortman (in draft)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN L. HART
DC/WH/CUBA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

7 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact of Manuel Artime with Professor George Lodge and with Col. Barrientos of Bolivia

1. I talked with Manuel Artime by phone the night of 4 June. He said he had received a call from Professor Lodge that afternoon but was not at home to talk with him. (This was obviously a follow-up from the offer made to Artime by Chief, WH to put him and Lodge together on his proposed civic action activities.) I told him there was no reason he should not return the call and arrange for a meeting with Lodge at their mutual convenience.

2. Artime said that was his first reaction, but before he could make the call another message had come in from Col. Barrientos of Bolivia asking if he could visit the country for the benefit of his advice and counsel and offering to send a Bolivian Air Force plane to pick him up and bring him to La Paz. I asked if he were acquainted with Barrientos or an expert on Bolivia and he said he knew no more about either of them than what he had read in the papers. He had no idea of the reason for the invitation, but wanted to check with us and find out if we had any requirements for him in case we wanted him to make the visit. I told him I would check with Chief, WH next morning and call him back.

3. On the morning of 5 June I called Artime. He said Professor Lodge had called him at 0700 that morning and told him he was interested in getting together with him. Lodge said he would be in Panama on 14 June, and Artime said he planned to be travelling in that area at that time and could easily meet him there. Artime told Lodge he was willing to make a trip to Boston to see him earlier and that after such a preliminary meeting, the next meeting in Panama would probably be more useful. Lodge seemed delighted and invited Artime

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

to lunch with him on 9 June. I suggested to Artime that he plan to meet Lodge on 9 June, stop in Washington on the way home where I could meet with him (and furnish him a briefing on Bolivia which he desperately requested). I suggested he send a message to Barrientos saying he could be in Panama on 11 June and could see Barrientos as soon thereafter as transportation could be arranged. (Artime has a visit with President Robles of Panama scheduled about that time and can work it in, together with the meeting with Lodge on 14 June in Panama.)

4. Artime said he had found out the background of the invitation from Barrientos. One of Barrientos' trusted aides had been to Washington or New York and in passing through Miami enroute home heard a MRR radio broadcast about countering subversion, civic action, etc. that attracted his attention. There was also a brief analysis of the situation in Bolivia which appealed to him as the best-balanced hehad heard. He thereupon started asking questions about the MRR and Artime and was referred to one of Artime's people who turned over some copies of "Tridente" (magazine of the MRR). The aide remarked that he was going to report to Barrientos of his discovery of a Cuban exile group that seemed knowledgeable of Castro and Communist subversion operations and had some useful ideas of how to counter them. Two days later Artime received the invitation from Barrientos.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: WH/3
WH/PO/B

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET 2P

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

MICROFILMED
JUN 18
DOC MICRO SER

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT
Activities in AMWORLD and of AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: None. For Your Information.

1. The AMOTs have recently submitted two short reports providing some information about AMWORLD and AMBIDDY-1 activities.

2. AMOT-84 reported the following in Report DD-1414, 19 May 1965, which he had acquired from Iden A, whose ultimate source of information was AMWORLD-2:

a. AMWORLD-2 left for New York with his family on 15 May 1965, this being his first step towards disconnecting himself from AMWORLD. Before he left, he handed over to AMBIDDY-1 the AMWORLD money which he had in the bank.

b. AMWORLD-2 said that AMBIDDY-1 was devoting all his attention to obtaining money by the sale of military equipment which he had at the camps. AMBIDDY-1 had already realized U.S. $30,000 in this manner and hoped to raise still another $30,000. AMBIDDY-1 currently had all the AMWORLD money under his absolute control and said he intended to act as treasurer of the organization.

c. AMBIDDY-1 gave the impression of not being involved with any political plan. Occasionally he talked to friends about interviews with his "contacts" and about a budget for propaganda. Other times he gave consideration to propositions of friends, such as the Spaniard who acts as his chauffeur and secretary, concerning various business deals. He also talks of buying a farm in Nicaragua to cultivate rice, etc.

d. The general opinion within AMWORLD is that the organization is entering a crisis and, with the separation of AMWORLD-2 from the organization, AMWORLD members would no longer continue to receive their salaries.

Attachment:
Identities, u/s/c(AUL)

Distribution:
3 - WH/c, w/att.

CS COPY

201-267437

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 June 1965	JUN 11 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-21947

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D-19-124-27/3

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1aa

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-95/4

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-21947

3. In AMOT Report EE-1438, 4 June 1964, AMOT-84 further reported information he had received from Iden A, as follows:

a. Iden B said that AMBIDDY-1 was only concerned with maintaining the small AMWORLD camp in Nicaragua, where there were weapons, ammunition, and seven men, who were there without the knowledge of the ODYOKERs. Iden B said that AMBIDDY-1 was awaiting an opportune moment to arm as many friends as possible and leave for PBRUMEN.

b. Iden C said that there really were arms and ammunition cached in the camp in Nicaragua, but that the seven men there spent all their time looking for persons to buy the arms and ammunition.

c. Iden C also said he believed that if AMBIDDY-1 was keeping up his radio transmissions and payments to some journalists it was because they served as a cover for his commercial operations and that all the propaganda would disappear when AMBIDDY-1 had to use AMWORLD money to keep up the propaganda.

Sophia L. Mayhouse
Philip G. ELMARD

14-00000

1P

Under Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-21947

Iden A - Rolando MERUELO Alfonso, A 12 829 707 (AMOT subsource)

Iden B - Nilo MESSER Pujol (201-294655)

Iden C - Carlos MARTINEZ Baraque (AMOT subsource)

MICROFILMED
JUN 18 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

1/c att. 1 UFGA-21947

201-267437

June 9

Chester Bowles

To: Andy
From: George Lodge
Re: Manuel Artime

In general, Artime impressed me greatly and we got along very well. He is energetic, idealistic, enthusiastic, highly motivated and in my judgement well suited in every way to the task he intends to perform. As you know, he is 33 years old, tough-minded and filled with ideological fire. His weakness would appear to be a certain lack of focus and conceptualization. He does not really have a plan but appears to be reacting to immediate crises and opportunities like a fire fighter. He and his group, therefore, need careful and thoughtful leadership and guidance to get the most out of them and to deal with problems in the proper order of priority and urgency.

He arrived late at the Business School because the taxi driver got lost. We had a quick lunch together which I had to leave early in order to be in class at 1:30. At my request he joined me in the classroom. I was giving a lecture on the role of the manager in the midst of radical change to a group of alumni who are at the School for a short seminar on international business problems. During the discussion period he spoke well and with great conviction about his work in the hills with Castro and the Cuban problem in general. He made an excellent impression.

We then talked in my office for 1½ hours. A summary of the conversation follows:

He told me of his work with the Indians on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua where he has 5 men working on community development problems including health, education, road building, rice marketing and boat building. He has 10 men at his base of operations on the coast. He mentioned that he knew Enrique Pereira, a young manager in Managua closely associated with INCAE and in my judgement a good, active, properly oriented young man.

He discussed his civic action training program in Miami which has just started and in which he said he has 32 men enrolled. This is a 3-month program to prepare men for rural organization work of various kinds. He spoke of his need for help xx with respectxxx to cooperative training and especially cooperative leadership selection and preparation.

He spoke of his conversation with xxx Col. Peralta in Guatemala and said that after a four-day field trip he reported to the President that:

a. The Army was old fashioned, had poor ideas and was ill equipped to fight guerilla warfare or to carry out the civic action program which were urgently necessary.

b. He said he found serious subversion among the Indians largely through small radios which Cuban trained Guatemalans were giving to the Indians and which were tuned in on Radio Cuba only. He knew specifically of 5 Guatemalans engaged in this work.

c. He spoke of the danger of Sosa in the mountains and said that Peralta showed his ignorance by brushing Sosa off as a small-time operator with only a handful of men around him. Artime said he had about 25 men with him and added that this was enough to start a lot of trouble. He said he would like to begin something in Guatemala but had no specific suggestions.

He said he had 3 people working in San Jose, Costa Rica, inside what he referred to as "the Cuban community."

He has one man in Colombia organizing three cooperativos in the Cali area at the request of a local Senator who owns a sugar mill and the Cali newspaper and who Artime described as a very good xxxx man. He is deeply concerned about the pxxxx situation in Colombia.

He is leaving shortly for Bolivia where xxx he has been invited to spend four days by the President.

During the course of the conversation I made the following suggestions which met with his enthusiastic approval:

I believe his key contribution may be in the area of rural organization and motivation. He and his men (he said he has 220 available for immediate action) need rural organization training. Only a few know much about it. I suggested therefore he investigate the cooperative training school at Antigonish, Nova Scotia, which from everything I have been able to find out in Panama and elsewhere is the best thing of its kind in the world. He said he had heard of it very favorably and mentioned he would talk with a Bishop friend of his and see if he could get some of his men enrolled in the school immediately.

I told him in some detail of our work in Veraguas Province and of Bishop McGrath's general development plans and also of the Bishop's intention to establish a cooperative training center in Veraguas. I mentioned the possibility of one or two of his men working in Veraguas alongside my men who will be there this summer and thereafter. He was extremely enthusiastic about this and suggested Nestor Izquierdo, a 29-year-old Cuban Negro whom he said had done rural organization work with him in Cuba. He spoke very highly of him. My thought was that perhaps Mr Izquierdo might join my men during the summer with Bishop McGrath's approval, work on our cooperative project there and perhaps remain to help the Bishop set up his training center and carry on such other activities as might be useful. Izquierdo is apparently very versatile in his talents. He might go to Antigonish somewhere along the way if that seemed wise. We left it that I would see how the Veraguas project goes, would talk informally to the Bishop and would meet Artime and possibly Izquierdo in San Salvador on August 5. At that time we would decide whether it would be wise for Artime and/or Izquierdo to come with me to Veraguas.

He asked me to send him some books about chicken raising in Central America. Could you take care of this?

He gave me his address as 1270 NE 85th Street, Miami, and telephone as 754-8144.

All in all, I was deeply impressed by Artime and would like to work with him.

SECRET

WH/C 65-236
8 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT : Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative in Bern to contact the bank in Zurich to cable transfer the amount of $14,868 to the First National City Bank, New York, for credit to the account of Gregory Cardinal or Charles Ramsey.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/ADRohlfing:bh (8 June 65)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/Esec
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

WH/C 65-235
8 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT : INWOVEN Deposit

For the attached voucher, it is requested that you deposit the amount of $14,865 to the INWOVEN account of AMBIDDY-1.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

Attached:
Voucher

cc: WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA ADRohlfing:bh (8 June 65)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/Exec
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 23

RIG : J. EANKE
NIT : WH/3/BOLIVIA
XT : 5269
ATE : 14 JUNE 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

24 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[illegible]

O : LA PAZ JMWAVE

ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF: WH 8 INFO VR, FILE, WH/C 8, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

CAP

O PRIORITY LAPA INFO WAVE CITE DIR 19220

REF: DIR 19219

IDEN: MANUEL ARTIME, HEAD OF CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION, MRR.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/CA/EA G.D. Eng

WH/SOB

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

HERSCHEL F. PEAK
C/WH/3

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM 23

RIG. J. G. HAKE X
NIT. WH/3/BOLIVIA
T. 5269
ATE. 14 JUNE 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

34 SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

O : LA PAZ JMWAVE

ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF. WH 8 INFO VR, FILE, WH/C 8, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

CAP

O PRIORITY LAPA INFO. WAVE CITE DIR 19219

1. AMBIDDY-1 (IDEN) REP IN WAVE APPROACHED BY AS YET UNIDENTIFIED AIDE OF BARRIENTOS (B) EARLY JUNE WHO SAID B INTERESTED HAVING A-1 COME BOLIVIA SOONEST FOR FOUR DAY VISIT GIVE B BENEFIT A-1 "ADVICE AND COUNSEL" ON CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERSUBVERSION. AIDE SAID HAD HEARD A-1 RADIO PROGRAM WAVE ABOUT THESE SUBJECTS AND UPON RETURN LAPA TOLD B WHO THEN INVITED A-1 TRAVEL LAPA NEXT FLIGHT BOL GOVT AIRCRAFT WHICH MAKES WEEKLY TRIPS WAVE AREA. NO FURTHER INFO AVAILABLE WHETHER PRIMARY INTEREST B IN A-1 IS FOR CIVIC ACTION OR COUNTERSUBVERSIVE MATTERS.

2. TIMING A-1 TRIP BOLIVIA NOT YET CLEAR BUT MUST BE AFTER A-1 TRIP PACY MID-JUNE. A-1 HAS NOT RECEIVED FURTHER WORD ABOUT TRANSPORTATION LAPA AND ATTEMPTING PLACE PHONE CALL DIRECT TO B.

3. HQS VIEWS SHORT EXPLORATORY TRIP BOLIVIA BY A-1 AS OFFERING OPPORTUNITY SEE WHETHER COULD IN FACT HELP ON CIVIC ACTION FRONT. WE ~~BELIEVE~~ BELIEVE COUNTERSUBVERSION ASPECTS TOO POLITICALLY LOADED. A-1 GIVEN BRIEFING AT HQS ON BOLIVIA WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS NEED FOR JUNTA UNITY AND DESIRABILITY QUICK IMPACT PROGRAMS HELP JUNTA IMAGE WITH PUBLIC, PARTICULARLY MINERS. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS WOULD AFFECT ABILITY CARRY OUT CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM ALSO COVERED. DELIBERATELY AVOIDED REFERENCE TO COUNTER-SUBVERSIVE MATTERS AND A-1 CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS WHEN AND IF HE TALKS TO B THAT

- CONTINUED -

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

CONF. INFO

TO INFO CITE DIR 19219

WE WISH HIM RESTRICT SELF SOLELY TO CIVIC ACTION FIELD.

4. A-1 RESPONSIVE KUBARK DIRECTION AND NOT EXPECTED MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION KUBARK, PARTICULARLY SINCE HE SPREAD THIN ALREADY AND HAS OTHER PENDING COMMITMENTS IN HEMISPHERE. THEREFORE WE INTERESTED HAVING STATION CONTACT A-1 TO MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS, GUIDE HIM WHERE NECESSARY AND MAKE FINAL RECOMMENDATION TO HQS ON WHAT UTILITY IF ANY HE MAY HAVE IN BOLIVIAN SITUATION.

5. A-1 TOLD EXPECT CONTACT LAPA FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING SELF AS "FRIEND OF CARL". HE WILL XXXXXXX AWARE NEED KEEP FACT OF STATION CONTACT FROM BOL GOVT.

6. WILL ADVISE A-1 ETA LAPA WHEN KNOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

WH/C/CA/PA

WH/POE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

HERSCHEL F. PEAK
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Joe Di Stefano (3B-4461)		
2	Don Rohlfing (6G-1907)		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1. Attached are copies of Geo. Lodge's report of his day with Artime – which you should find useful.

2. Undersigned called Lodge on 14 June to tell him that we encourage Artime & his civic action training plans and secondly, that Nestor meets with our approval.

3. Any books on "chicken raising" in Central America?

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Andy Cirese	14 June

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 31

RIG : CARL E. JENKINS
NIT : WH/C/CA/EA
XT : 4550
ATE : 14 JUNE 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

~~ref~~ SECRET

☐ DESTR ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1	EA —	5	HU
2		6	CA
3	RR	7	C
4	FI	8	D

O : CARACAS

CAP

ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF: WH/C-8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, WH-7, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD-6, OPSER, CI/OA, CI/PS,

O CARA INFO BOGOTA CITE DIR 19531

REFS: A. CARA 1040 (IN 86689)

B. BOGO 5748 (IN 82355)

1. ~~A/1~~ AMBIDDY-1 TOLD ZABOTH MORNING 11 JUNE HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE CHE GUEVARA LOCATION OR ACTIVITIES AND HAS NOBODY IN VENEZUELA OR ELSEWHERE TRAILING HIM. FABIO FERMIN FERNANDEZ KNOWN ONLY BY SIGHT TO A/1 AS CUBAN EXILE IN BOGOTA. NO OTHER CONNECTION.

2. SINCE HIS LAST VISITS CARACAS AND BOGOTA MARCH AND EARLY APRIL A/1 HAS TRAVELLED IN NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA AND PANAMA IN CONNECTION RETURN OF AMWORLD MOTHERSHIP AND ARMS, DISBANDING PM ORGANIZATION AND DISPOSITION AMWORLD PERSONNEL. ALSO VISITED COL. PERALTA OF GUATEMALA AT HIS INVITATION TO DISCUSS CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERING PBRUMEN SPONSORED SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY OPS. NOW HAS INVITATION VISIT BOLIVIA TO DISCUSS SIMILAR TOPICS WITH JUNTA CO-PRESIDENT BARRIENTOS. WAITING BOLIVIAN OFFICIAL FLIGHT MIAMI TO LA PAZ.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

○ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO :

PAGE # 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 19531

3. FOR COS INFO: A/1 HAS TRAINING COURSE IN PROGRESS AT MIAMI FOR KEY MRR PEOPLE IN CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTER INSURGENCY. APPEARS HAVE ACCEPTED FACT OF LIFE PM OPS ARE OUT AND PUTTING FULL EFFORT INTO SWITCHING MRR TO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES LATIN AMERICA WHILE WAITING OTHER RESOLUTION PBRUMEN PROBLEM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Refs report evidence Che Guevara is in Colombia, and cite AMBIDDY-1 as source of info.

John T. Flynn
DESMOND FITZGERALD
for C/WHD

WH/PO/B
WH/C/CA
C/WH/3

John T. Flynn
JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM LAPAZ

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 1830

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, [illegible], [illegible], FI, [illegible]

S E C R E T 151955Z CM 15 JUN 65 IN 80944

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY WAVE CITE LAPA 8370

REF: DIR 19219 *

1. NO RPT NO BOLIVIAN GOVT AIRCRAFT MAKES WEEKLY FLIGHTS TO WAVE AREA.

2. WHOLE STORY OF REF SOUNDS SUSPICIOUS. ESPECIALLY IN VIEW FACT AIDE OF KICHEER-1 REMAINS IDENTIFIED.

3. BELIEVE STATION CAN SECURELY ATTEMPT DETERMINE VALIDITY OF STORY SINCE CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERSUBVERSION ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN KICHEER-1, KICANAL-1, KICALIX-1, AND COSCW WILL ASK PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS AND WHETHER THEY NEED OTHER ~~TYON~~ THAN ODYOKE HELP?

4. BELIEVE ENTRY OF PBRUMEN EXILE WILL DAMGE REPUTATION OF JUNTA NO MATTER WHAT HIS POLITICAL COLORATION. MILGROUP AND ODWIFE IN BOLIVIA HAVE MANY COMPETENT PERSONS EXPERIENCED IN CIVIC ACTION. IF INCREASED CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS TAKE PLACE IN THE MINES IT WILL BE WITH MILGROUP AND ODWIFE FUNDS AND THEY WILL INSIST ON PARTICIPATION AND SUPERVISION.

*Re A-I TAKING TRIP See whether Could in F Help on Civic Action Front

S E C R E T

SECRET

El Panamá Hilton

PANAMA, REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
TELEFONO: 3-1660 (15 LINEAS)
CABLES: HILTELS

June 15 1965

Roger Garvey

Dear Andy:

I have just come back from a three-day visit to Veraguas where things are going along very well. There are now 9 small cooperatives in the region around Santiago. In the village of San Francisco a large training center is under construction which will house 60 persons for cooperative training courses and for other teaching in rural development. There is dormitory as well as classroom space. The building was financed as follows: $12,000 from the German Bishops, $6500 from the community of San Francisco itself (pop.1000), ~~wix~~ which is really quite remarkable and testimony to the truly unique and effective organization which the Bishop and his associates are creating in Veraguas and $8000 is being raised in Panama. This Center will be where Father Steele will conduct regular four-month cooperative and rural development training courses for persons from all over Latin America. It will also be used for local training. Father Steele's first course was held in Panama city and was attended by 25 men from Ecuador, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Bolivia andPanama. This course seems to be the best of its kind in Latin America.

The land has finally been broken free around San Jose. This is the first real land reform in Panama. My two men are hard at work.

I talked to the Bishop about Nestor and he was most enthusiastic. He wants him to move as soon as possible and work alongside Oswaldo Rodriguez ~~whtw~~ who is the young man in charge of his development operations. His organisation is called CEPAS, Center for Studies, Promotion and Social Assistance. He hopes that Nestor will be able to ~~tak~~ be the executive director and operator of the San Francisco Center now under construction. In my view this would be an ideal set-up. Nest would be in at the beginning of this effort which could have major effects throughout Latin America. He would be learning and also teaching. The Bishop suggested that he could use another man as well and further suggested that four of Nestor's friends from Miami might want to come and take Father Steele's course in January at San Francisco. It costs about $60 a month, including everything.

The Bishop knew Manuel, having met him in Chicago at some meeting, and he has the highest regard for him. He suggested that he could meet Manuel and Nestor in Miami on June 28 when he will be there staying with his ~~[illegible]~~ step-father, Col. Harry Scheibla. 6491 Allison Island Rd., Miami Beach. I called Manuel and he and Nestor will see the Bishop on the morning of June 28. I told the Bishop that financing for Nestor could be arranged, suggesting possibly the Fund but making nothing definite. I suggest that if all this meets with your approval you may wish to contact Manuel and/or Nestor and pin down the financial part of it. I would suggest that Nestor be paid about $200 a month. That is what Oswaldo Rodriguez gets. Incidentally this Oswaldo is really first class — a good man to watch. You may want to just let things go as they are but in any case the Bishop expects Nestor to be ~~[illegible]~~ financed somehow.

I am off to Colombia tomorrow.

All the best,

G.

Meetings with AMJAVA-4 in Washington, 27-28 June 1965

Subject: Proposed Agency Programs

1. Following the demise of AMWORLD, AMJAVA-4 has become familiar with three other Agency programs, or proposed programs, and he asked if he could have some clarification as to just what we wanted from him and his people. I explained that there were three different functions which needed to be done and that the Agency was trying to develop programs to meet each need. The three functions concerning Cuba are:

(a) to maintain the MRR as a respected resistance organization with a political posture which is acceptable to most Cubans and not inimical to U.S. interests. We are asking approval of a minimum budget for subsidy of the MRR which will pay for its published and radio publicity matter, subsistence to survivors of MRR killed, disabled, or captured, and travel expenses for AMBIDDY-1 as the leader of the movement outside Cuba. We are trying to guide A-1 into a program of Community Development/Civic Action projects in Latin America as a means of projecting an image of the MRR and of A-1 as constructive, forward-looking people instead of simply exile counterrevolutionaries. We would hope that such activities would keep the movement together, give the members practical experience which would eventually be useful in Cuba, and in the meantime, would render useful results in countering problems of insurgency in Latin America.

(b) to prepare a managerial and executive team of specially selected Cuban exiles who would be ready to move into Cuba should relations be resumed with the United States in order to furnish effective direction of necessary governmental functions and assist the United States in denying the island to Communist control. Selected candidates would, hopefully, be fairly young as well as intelligent and capable of profiting from extensive training programs which would be designed for each to prepare him to perform a specific function in a future Cuban regime. The program would be apolitical, each person being considered as an individual and not as representative of any organization. This is the program for which A-4 is being considered for training in the field of internal security for work with the Agency in a post-Castro Cuban regime.

(c) to select and maintain a small cadre of Cuban exile paramilitary people who would be ready for emergency contingency situations anywhere in the world on short notice and for short periods of time. When not mobilized, the Agency would assist them inmaintaining employment and supporting themselves. They would also, of course, be available for emergency operational commitment to Cuba if required. (It was explained that this was the program handled by Mr. Tom Clines of SOD, who was present and discussed it more in detail with A-4.)

2. A-4 understood that the programs outlined above were only parts of an overall concept concering Cuba, that the first was designed to meet long-term political considerations, the second to meet long-term strategic requirements, and the third to meet current operational needs. He understood and completely agreed with each program, and agreed to cooperate in executing each of them, to the maximum of his ability. He will be happy to spot and recruit for us in each program, and will try to influence AMBIDDY-1 along the lines we want him to follow. A-4 appreciated our explanations and stated that he could be much more helpful to us now that he understood what we were trying to accomplish.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
CHIEF, WH

INFO.

FROM
CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMBIDDY-1 ACTIVITIES

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

AMLITAINT-1 REPORTED ON 28 JUNE 1965 THAT AMBIDDY-1 WAS AGAIN ACTIVE IN THE WAVE AREA. AMBIDDY-1 HAS RECONTACTED MANY OF HIS AMWORLD MEMBERS. HE HAS TOLD THEM THAT HE IS RE-OPENING THE TRAINING CAMPS FOR THOSE WHO WERE IN THE INFILTRATION TEAMS AND THE GUERRILLA WARFARE TEAMS. HE HAS STATED THAT HIS SUPPORT WILL BE RE-INSTATED ON 1 AUGUST. AMBIDDY-1 HAS ALSO TOLD HIS MEN THAT HE STILL HAS MOST OF HIS WEAPONS AND SOME OF HIS SHIPS FROM THE AMWORLD PROJECT.

CS COPY

PHILIP G. ELMARD

DISTRIBUTION
BY TAPE
3 - WH/C

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-22205	30 JUNE 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267437

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

RECLASSIFIED
~~RI/AN~~
RI/TN
RI/MIS
201-267437
RI/Files

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

PANAMA, REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
TELEFONO: [illegible] LINEAS
CABLES: HILTELS

July 2, 1965
Panama en route Venezuela

For Andy, Bill and others:

I just spoke with Bishop McGrath who saw Art in Miami last Wednesday afternoon. Art was accompanied by a man named Paco (sp?), who the Bishop said had come from Boston. Nestor was not there. After a lengthy conversation, the Bishop said that he and Art agreed that the best plan to follow would be to send from 4 to 6 of Art's younger men to Father Steele's cooperative-community development training course which will be held in San Francisco, Veraguas, around January 15. At the end of the course, which I believe runs four months, the Bishop could then pick one or two of the men to remain and work with him and his group. The Bishop was concerned about having someone with his project who was too closely connected with ~~ART~~ Art. He felt and he said Art did too that probably both [illegible] and Poso were too well known as associates of Art's. That is why they decided on younger men who are less identified.

The Bishop said he made some discreet inquiries about Art among "friends" of his in Miami and found that he had once been the fair-haired and much admired leader of young Cubans, but that in Central America he had had a love affair with the wife of one of Batista's [illegible] which sort of took some of the gloss off as far as his followers were concerned. The Bishop said he has since married the woman and is working his way back to a position of respectability. The Bishop liked him a lot and he said they got along very well.

It sounds to me as though this is a very good plan and could well lead to something of long-term value.

George.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Joe Di Stefano (38-44[illegible])	8 July	
2	Dan Rohlfing		
3	(Rm. 6G 1908)		C
4	Carl		
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1. Attached memo from Elayne re McGrath - Art - meeting in Miami.

2. For your retention.

Anne

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Andy Anne (K-1282)	8 Jul

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

(40)

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—[illegible]

SECRET

12 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD/Cuba

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT : Payment to AMBIDDY-1 for Month of July 1965

It is requested that you approve a payment of $12,000 for the month of July 1965 to be given to AMBIDDY-1. These funds will be used by him for propaganda and political activity of the MRR, plus payment of support to dependents and survivors. In order to expedite getting the funds to AMBIDDY-1, the AMWORLD funding channel will be used until another mechanism has been established which can be more closely controlled by Headquarters.

Carl E Jenkins

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

DC/WHD/C

cc: WH/B&F

SECRET

12 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Activities of AMBIDDY-1, 1-10 July 1965

1. I talked to AMBIDDY-1 by telephone on 2, 8 and 10 July with the gist of the conversations outlined below:

a. AMBIDDY-1 had two long conversations with Bishop McGrath of Panama on 30 June and 2 July. They discussed the center for studies of rural cooperatives at San Francisco village in Veraguas Province, Panama, that is being developed under the Bishop's auspices with support from Harvard University and which has two men there at present. Prof. George Lodge is the Harvard representative and has been visiting the center. A-1 received a letter from Prof. Lodge asking for assignment of an experienced man to the staff of the center. Bishop McGrath repeated the request, saying he would like to have two men as soon as possible, with a total of six by January when he plans to increase the program. The two men selected were Silvano POZO Carrillo (201-73977[illegible]) and Nestor IZQUIERDO Diaz (201-281933) both Negroes from Oriente Province and former Comandos Rurales. A-1 asked the Bishop what part the Panama Government played and was told they approved, although they were not directly involved. A-1 understands that the center will train students from all over Latin America and has already graduated more than twenty students from several countries.

b. The five man security force left by A-1 at Monkey Point, Nicaragua, in addition to guarding a weapons cache, continues to teach the local Indians in reading, writing, basic operation and maintenance of machinery, and rice planting.

c. The community development/civic action training program for MRR members which A-1 has been running in the evenings in Miami is about half finished. He has about twenty men attending regularly after work with several others attending whenever they can get away from their jobs. The

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

class is now studying organization of rural cooperatives. Silvano POZO is chief instructor for this phase and will be sent to Panama as soon as the classes in Miami are completed.

d. A-1 has bought a small farm (22 acres) near West Palm Beach to develop as a model farm for his training program. He is installing generators, water pumps, and starting to raise chickens, etc. He hopes eventually to bring a few students at a time from Latin America as his program progresses to show them what can be done with small plots if proper farming techniques are used.

e. A-1 received another message from Bolivia saying in effect that the situation was still about the same and again asking if he were able to visit there. He stalled them again (at our request) and agreed to be out of town or otherwise scheduled until the matter dies a natural death.

2. The West German Government has issued scholarships paying all tuition plus $100 per month subsistence in German universities to three of A-1's people who have been living in Spain. They will go to Germany in August to study the language for six months then begin their studies. They are Angel LAVANDERA, economics; Carlos MAYO, engineering; and Luis CAVADA, engineering. This is follow-up to the meeting A-1 had in Rome with the German Ambassador that was arranged for him by the Vatican Secretary of State last December.

3. A-1 is leaving 13 or 14 July for about 10 to 15 days visiting Central America. He will go to Nicaragua first to talk with President Schick and General Somoza, then to Monkey Point to check on the condition of the base, security of the arms he has cached there, and to observe the civic action training his men there are conducting for the local Indians. He will then go to Costa Rica to talk with President Orlich and Foreign Minister Oduber who have sent word they would like to meet with him as soon as convenient for him. From there he will go to Panama to see President Marcos Robles, who has been expecting him for several weeks. A-1 will describe the project he is about to enter with Bishop McGrath and Professor Lodge and confirm President Robles' attitude toward it. A-1 will also visit Veraguas Province and look over the training center.

4. I also informed A-1 that his proposal to maintain U. S. support for the MRR to pay for support to dependents and

survivors of MRR people, for delegates, the *Tridente*, and radio broadcasting had been approved for $12,000 monthly. He was gratified to receive continued support for the movement. I told him we would try to get the July payment into the bank through the old AMWORLD funding mechanism pending development of a new funding system.

Carl E Jenkins

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

FROM: WH Division (AMBIDDY)

TO: Monetary Division

DATE: 13 July 1965

DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY NATURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS: Deposit to AMBIDDY/1 INBOVEX Account for extraordinary expenses for July 1965.

I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that subsidy funds previously made available to AMBIDDY have been or are being expended for authorized objectives of the aerivity and further support is warranted.

Carl E. Jenkins

PAYEE: AMBIDDY/1

AMOUNT: $12,000.00

DATE

SIGNATURE OF PAYEE

DATE

SIGNATURE OF AGENT

ENT INSTRUCTIONS

On file in Monetary Division

THE AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENTS. (To be signed when applicable)

DATE	TITLE	SIGNATURE
	WH/C/CA/EA	Carl E. Jenkins

APPROVED

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
	DCWHD/C

CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.	CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.
	2135-1176

DATE	SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER
7/13/65	WH/BAP

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE	AMOUNT	SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 V/A NO. SHIP. DOC. NO. 30-33 DIV.	34-39 STATION CODE REC. RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXPOSED	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR CCST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL 61-66 CK. NO. REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS 68-70 DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	71-80 AMOUNT CREDIT

DATE	PREPARED BY	DATE	REVIEWED BY	TOTALS		

FORM 4-65 496 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-49)

CONFIDENTIAL

13 July 65

NICARAGUAN INVESTMENTS
(INVERNICA)

PRELIMINARY STUDY

SHIPYARDS
and
REPAIR YARDS

IN THE AREA OF BRAGGMAN'S BLUFF * BLUEFIELDS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

GENERAL INDEX

Chapter	Subject	Page
I	Introduction	3
II	Analysis of the Market	5
III	Economic Feasibility of the Project	10
IV	Socio-Economic Justification	13
V	Technological Analysis	15
VI	Financial Analysis	19
VII	Appendix	26
	Diagrams	27-28

I

INTRODUCTION

This industrial development plan is presented by the INVERNICA Company located in the city of Managua, D.N.(Naval District), Nicaragua.

This report is part of the preliminary study which ~~[illegible]~~ INVERNICA has effected in regard to an investment program for the concentration of repair yards and shipyards in the Bluff-Bluefields area. These facilities will provide complete service to the fishing fleets and other boats which operate on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. The initial cost of building these facilities, with their necessary complex operational sections, is high staggering. This cost, however, will be significantly reduced ~~because~~ in view of the equipment, experience and personnel at the disposition ~~of~~ INVERNICA. This study analyzes the various elements of ~~this~~ such investment which totals US$ 237,000 of which INVERNICA is contributing 68.4 percent and INFONAC 31.6 percent.

~~Fundamentally~~ Because of ~~the~~ its status ~~of~~ as a new industry in the country and the benefits which would accrue to the national economy, this plan may be classified as a ~~fundamental~~ key industry (Law Nr 135, Law of Protection and Stimulation for the Development of Industry, 20 March 1958) and, therefore enjoy this protection and stimulation for its full initial development.

As will be seen in this preliminary report, the necessity of modern shipyards and repair yards on the Atlantic coast is of vital importance to the survival of the fishing fleets. These fleets suffer serious operational restrictions because of the absence of ~~these~~ such services which are common to the NorthAmerican and Mexican fleets. We have the necessary equipment and technical personnel, and, moreover, the full con-

CONFIDENTIAL

fidence of being able to offer the most modern and efficient services, facilities and yards in the entire Carribean area.

13 July 1965

Braggman's Bluff, Nicaragua

Eng. Luis A. Prieto Portar
INVERNICA

CONFIDENTIAL

II

ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET

The primary function of the shipyard will be the construction of 20 to 200-ton boats or ~~from~~ steel and wood. This will include shrimpboats, lobsterboats, barges, light cargoships, and passenger and patrol launches. The secondary function of the Combine will be to provide repair and maintenance service to all boats of this class within the Carribean area of equal or better quality than that ~~[illegible] with the services~~ offered in Mexico, Trinidad or the United States.

To a degree, the shipyard will attempt to specialize~~ation~~ in the construction of 35-ton shrimpboats for favorable competition in the world market. Construction will be attempted in ~~from~~ steel and ~~from~~ wood. Construction from wood will be advantageous because of the procurement of wood in large part, if not all, from the local sawmills in Bluefields. Another advantage of construction from wood is a plan for mass production ~~in series~~ in which prefabricated sections of boats will be constructed. It is possible to visualize in the near future not only the sale of fully-equipped shrimpboats but also prefabricated parts for those shipyards which do not have the necessary machinery, wood, and other items.

The Domestic ~~[illegible]~~ and Central American Market: There are only a few countries in America which possess the facilities for construction of boats with ~~of~~ the shrimpboat draft ~~caliber~~. These countries are Peru, Mexico and the United States. The production in Peru is small and relatively insignificant, and its influence in the Carribean is nil ~~nought~~. Mexican boats are constructed from good material, but because of poor workmanship ~~labor~~, together with antiquated designs, they are subject to enormous structural fatigue in heavy seas. In the United States, the production of shrimpboats is limited to ~~covered~~

CONFIDENTIAL

by five main companies ~~because of the annual quota~~ at an average rate of five boats per shipyard. They are excellent products with the latest fishing and navigation equipment. Nevertheless, they are costly because of the high cost of labor and raw materials in the country. Since we possess most of the wood in Bluefields, trained and competent personnel, and a superior funcional boat design, we ~~are~~ will be able to supply the necessities for a national fishing fleet, as well as to place these boats on the world market. We base ~~conclusions~~ this opinion on preliminary calculations which prove the possibility of our ability to produce an excellent boat at less cost and superior to the North American boats.

The ~~National~~ Domestic Market: The immediate market for our shrimpboats is the ~~national~~ domestic fleet. The Booth Fisheries express great interest in procuring ~~six~~ additional boats as soon as possible. It plans possible expansion to 20 more boats in the next two or three years. There is also the possibility of renting or selling these boats on terms to local ~~captaincies,~~ individuals as well as of stimulating investments by other ~~national~~ domestic capital. We estimate a national market of some 25 shrimpboats in the next three years. The demand from the rest of the Carribean can be conservatively estimated at 40 boats, totalling 75 [sic] boats, which ~~they~~ will be purchased ~~from~~ in Mexico and the United States. With our production of 15 boats during this three-year period, it is evident that we possess a rich market here in the Carribean area, not to mention the demand forthcoming from the Pacific and other large fishing areas.

As regards the repair yard, we estimate servicing 400 boats annually with our modern installations. Compare this with the repair yard services of Schooner Key which is offering partial services to 45 boats annually.

The plans for the Nicaraguan shrimpboat fleet this year call for 80 boats. Add 40 coastal boats of all types and the total comes to 120 boats which will require repair yard services four times per year(3 normal ~~groundings~~ beachings and are emergency), that is, a total of 480 ~~groundings~~ beachings annually. The local repair yards are able to service only 100 ~~groundings~~ beachings. This situation forces many shrimpboats to seek repairs outside of the country, either at Honduras, Mexico or the United States, with the resultant loss of fishing time and foreign exchange for Nicaragua.

Initial Technical Limitations: The lack of local technical personnel, and time required to import various mechanical parts and materials.

Consideration for future expansion was taken in designing the shipyard and repair yard. Carpentry and mechanic workshops are also planned. There are two factors however which affect the overall operation. The first factor is the lack of personnel trained in steel construction of boats, but this will be overcome initially by personnel trained by the Company. The second factor will be resolved only by an efficient coordination with the distribution and supply personnel of the Company in Miami. In this way it will be possible to have any spare parts or materials forwarded to Bluff within two weeks after the request is made by the local offices, (via airline). Furthermore, plans have been prepared to stock the shipyard warehouses with spare parts.

External or Internal Competition: As regards the shipyard, there is neither external nor internal competition in Central America. The only competition we will encounter will be Mexican and North American. The following is a comparative study of this competition:

(a) Prices.	Shrimpboat (of wood, 35 tons, no motor)
Mexico	US$ 41,000
United States	US$ 45,000
Nicaragua	US$ 40,000 (Planned)

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Quality of Materials.

Mexico: Good materials; Bad design and ~~[illegible]~~ construction.

U.S.A.: Good materials; excellent designs; construction depends on the Company and varies from good to excellent.

Nicaragua: Good materials; excellent designs and construction.

(c) Channels and Policy of Distribution: Eventhough it will be difficult to compete initially in sales in the Mexican and North American markets, because of their high duties, we will enjoy an unlimited market in the rest of the Carribean. We will compete favorably due to the excellent position of Nicaragua with respect to Central American, Venezuelan, Colombian, and other markets.

As regards the repair yard, it is to be noted that the foreign repair yards are much less ~~[illegible]~~ expensive than the ~~national~~ domestic ones, sometimes up to 500 percent. From the study of typical costs of each repair yard we conclude that we are able to offer more service at equal or less cost. The following examples assume a typical ~~grounding~~ beaching of three days, cleaning, caulking, straightening the shaft, changing a number of sheets of metal, ~~[illegible]~~ tightening the framework or sternposts, ~~securement of~~ tightening the rudder and ~~bottom~~ seating, and finally, the paint:

(a) Cos

Honduras	US$ 330	(excluding straightening of shaft)
Mexico	US$ 350	
U.S.A.	US$ 375	
Schooner Key	US$ 1000	
INVERNICA	US$ 350	(planned)

(b) Quality of Labor

Honduras	Good
Mexico	Good
U.S.A.	Excellent
Schooner Key	Common
INVERNICA	Excellent (planned)

Sales Estimate: Potential sales are estimated from the following three means: The shipyard, the repair yard, and mechanical and electrical services to the community of the area in general.

(a) Costs (assuming the stability of prices in the next three years).

Shipyard: US$ 40,000 for each shrimpboat (excluding motor); costs of other boats will be in proportion.

Repair Yard: Cost of normal beaching, US$ 350. The cost will be higher if there are mechanical problems or spare parts are needed.

(b) Quantity (Output)

Shipyard: two shrimpboats the first year, six the second and six the third years; all domestic sales.

Repair Yard: 300 beachings of a possible 400 the first year; 350 the second, and 450 the third year.

(c) Gross Income (approximate)

	1st year	2nd year	3rd year
Shipyard:	US$ 80,000	US$ 240,000	US$ 240,000
Repair Yard:	US$105,000	US$ 122,500	US$ 157,500
Miscellaneous	US$ 5,000	US$ 7,000	US$ 10,000

III

ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF THE PROJECT

Costs of Overall Production for the First Year of Production:

In the calculation of costs, consideration is taken of the construction of two shrimpboats, complete repair and maintenance service for 300 bearings [redacted], and other miscellaneous service at a total of 31,000 [redacted] work hours.

Production Costs:

(a) Raw Material: The materials required for construction and repair of boats are varied and many times specialized. Following are principal materials at approximate rates:

Wood: Laurel or yellow pine 25,000 square feet;
Mahogany, 1st and 2nd grade 20,000 square feet;
Oak, 1st grade 5,000 square feet.

Metal: Steel and Steel-2(S.A.E.), 40 tons;
Cast-iron and other metals, 10 tons.
At a total value of US$ 30,000.

(b) Materials:

Paints - Epoxy zinc, silver, primece, epoxy bases, latex, copper antifouling, varnishes, etc.).
About 1800 gallons.

General hardware - Zinc, copper, iron, and steel screws and nails; washers; cotter-pins; metal, plastic and rubber tubing; polyfoam, styrofoam, and cement insulation; glass plates and Bakelite, etc.

Miscellaneous Equipment: Propellers(46" x 34"); rust-proof steel

CONFIDENTIAL

shafts, CMC in-line winches, anchors, batteries, ordinary and navigational lighting systems, electrical accessories, electric power plants, bilge pumps, kerosene stoves, cooling and refrigeration units, fathometers, radio-communication equipment, etc.

At a total value of US$ 50,000.

(c) Labor:

During the first year of production the Enterprise will employ a chief of mechanics and lathe shop, two specialist mechanics, two mechanics assistants, a master carpenter, three ship-carpenters, and two carpenter assistants.

At total annual wages of US$ 32,000.

Operation Costs:

(a) Administration Expenses: Administration personnel include one administrater-public accountant, assistant office worker, and two servicemand maintenance managers. Together their annual wages will amount to US$ 8,400, and an annual amount of US$ 2,000 will be kept in reserve.

Total Administration Expenses: US$ 10,400.

(b) Sales Expenses: Because of the nature of the Enterprise no expenses will be incurred from sales, advertisements, etc., and, therefore, we foresee no expenses for this section. Fixed and Variable Costs: All the expenses previously quoted may be considered as fixed costs, and only variable costs will be considered, that is, 20 percent of materials consumed by the mechanics workshops depending on the mechanical repairs. The rest is controlled by a simple system of production which will clearly show the detailed costs of construction and repairs of the boats in consideration.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Plan of Production Costs for the Second and Third Year of Operation.

(See the following statement:)

STATEMENT OF PROFIT AND LOSS

A. Total Income:	1st Year	2nd Year	3rd Year
Shipyard Sales	80 $~~[illegible]~~,000	$240,000	$240,000
Repair Yard Sales	$105,000	$122,500	$157,500
Misc. Sales	$ 5,000	$ 7,000	$ 10,000
Net Sales	$190,000	$369,000	7 $409,500

B. Production Cost:			
Raw Materials	$ 30,000	$ 85,000	$ 90,000
Materials	$ 50,000	$ 90,000	$ 90,000
Direct Labor	$ 32,000	$ 40,000	$ 43,000
Depreciation (Machinery, 20%)	$ 10,000	$ 10,000	$ 5,000
Repairs and Maintenance	$ 2,000	$ 10,000	$ 10,000
Fuel (Electricity)	$ 2,500	$ 2,800	$ 3,000
Plant Secur~~[illegible]~~ity	$ 1,000	$ 1,300	$ 1,300
Sub-Total	$127,500	$239,000	$242,300

C. Administration Expenses:			
Wages	$ 8,400	$ 9,000	$ 9,000
Office Expenses	$ 2,000	$ 3,000	$ 3,000
Sub-Total	$ 10,400	$ ~~[illegible]~~ 12,000	$ ~~[illegible]~~ 12,000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

D. Financial Expenses:	1st Year	2nd Year	3rd Year
Capital	$ 15,000	$ 15,000	$ 15,000
Interest	$ 4,500	$ 3,800 6	$ 2,700
Sub-Total	$ 19,500	$ ~~19,600~~ 18,600	$ 17,700
E. Total Expenses	$157,400	$269,700	$272,000
F. Utility Net	$ 32,600	$ 99,800	$137,500

IV

(IV) SOCIO-ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION

Employment: In the first year of production, 16 men will be employed by the Enterprise, and assigned as follows:

Administration Personnel: 4 employees (one administrator and [illegible]public accountant), one office assistant, and two managers of services and maintenance).

Carpentry [redacted]: 7 employees (one chief of carpentry, three ship-carpenters, two carpenter assistants).

Mechanics [redacted]: 5 employees (one chief of mechanics and lathe-shop, two specialist mechanics, and two mechanics assistants).

The initial wages of all employees of the Enterprise will be based on their technical knowledge, years of experience, etc. This pay scale will surpass the normal in order to attract the best possible personnel to the Enterprise. A plan for increase of fixed and meritorious wages is also being planned as an incentive for the employees.

The number of personnel is expected to increase to 20 in the second

CONFIDENTIAL

year of production, and to 22 in the third year.

Effect on ~~Gains in~~ the Balance of Payments: The shrimpboat fleets in Nicaragua have expanded ~~to some~~ by 10 to 15 boats annually. These boats are bought ~~entirely~~ ~~equipped from~~ in Mexico and the United States. Their total value within a period of three years extends from a minimum of US$ 900,000 to a maximum of US$ 2,025,000. Our production during this period will be 14 shrimpboats at a value of US$ 560,000 which will remain in the country.

Consumer Benefits and Economic Development: At present, most of the shrimp boats in the area have no facilities for mechanical repairs, and, in most cases, no facilities for ~~grounding~~ beaching. This is due in part to ~~the insufficient~~ the shallow draft of the marine railways ~~[illegible]~~ in the local repair yards, as well as to antiquated equipment. Because of these difficulties, many shrimpboats are forced to put into Honduras, Mexico and at times the United States for repairs. [redacted] It is difficult to estimate with certainty the total losses which these boats incur ~~[illegible]~~ through negotiations for entry to and departure from other countries, fuel and personnel expenses, and, of more importance, the incalculable losses in fishing time. Inasmuch as our repair yards will possess a greater capability than normally required, those boats with emergency and other types of damages will be guaranteed service. In this way we will attract to our repair yards those boats which ordinarily would seek repairs outside of the country with the ~~subsequent~~ consequent loss in ~~foreign~~ profits and valuable ~~time~~ fishing time in the waters of Nicaragua.

Protection and Incentive: Because of the ~~[illegible]~~ characteristics of key Industry (See Law Nr 135, of 20 March 1958), a shipyard ~~may request~~ will need governmental aid during the first ~~six~~ years of its development in order to assure the necessary investments required by an enterprise of such complexity and magnitude. The necessary negotiations are presently being undertaken in Managua to obtain for this

CONFIDENTIAL

enterprise the legal recognition of a ~~fundamental~~ industry with all governmental aid.

V

TECHNOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Designs have already been drafted for the first model in wood of a 35-ton shrimpboat, and for the first model in steel of a 30-ton shrimpboat. The general specifications for the steel boat are the following: tonnage - 30; length - 62 feet; breadth - 20 feet; draught - 8 feet; keel (bar/steel-3) 3/4 inch x 8 inches; transverse frames (plate/steel); deck 3/16 inch (plate/steel). Paint: Hart and Burns, Bond Primer, Anticorrosive and antifouling - a total of six coats. Refrigerator: capacity 20 tons, in shrimp-ice, constructed of styrofoam-concrete. Driving power plant: D-342 Caterpillar with supercharger. Propellers, 48 inches x 34 inches, with three Michigan blades. stainless ~~[illegible]~~ steel propellor ~~[illegible]~~ shaft, 3 inches x 14 feet. GMC in-line winch. Eight 8-volt batteries with battery charger. Kerosene cooking-range. Searchlights and navigational lights. RCA Cruisephone 160. Ritchie, magnetic compass, model B453. Raytheon fathometer, model DE-725. Special fuel tanks in the hull, with capacity of 6,000 gals ~~[illegible]~~. Potable water tank, with capacity of 750 gals, etc.

Production Process: The processes in constructing boats and the services required for the boats are necessarily complex, al~~even~~though the processes are immensely simplified by new methods. Below is a description of the processes to be followed in the shipyard and in the repair yard. The construction of a boat begins with the laying of the keel on the slipway, followed by the attachment of the pre-formed transverse framework to the keel. The crossbeams

CONFIDENTIAL

and sternpost are then set in place after the framework is cut to size. The shell plating is next attached from the keel upwards in a such a manner that upon entering the water the wood undergoes a precalculated expansion which completely seals the hull without necessitating calking. A hole is drilled for the shaft and the supports and pin for the rudder are then set in place. Following this is the flooring for the deck and ~~xxxxxx~~ the crew's cabin, and steel reinforcemnts for the prow, stern and machine room. After all of this is completed, the secondary installations are carried out, such as the painting, electrical wiring, plumbing, masts, gavits, winches, and finally the launching of the boat. Final touch-up is effected ~~where~~ when the boat is in the water.

The process for the construction of a boat from steel is a simpler matter, and therefore less costly.

The normal process of drydock-repair service for a boat is as follows: The cradle(See diagrams Nrs 1 and 3) awaits the boat at the entrance of the ramp. With the use of maneuvering-buoys, the boat is lifted onto the cradle where it is made stationary ~~with~~ by transverse beams. The moving cradle is brought up the ramp and the boat is then transferred from it to a lateral cradle. The boat is brought to Section Nr 1 where it is immediately scraped with electric portable brushes and high water pressure. While the hull is drying, a detailed inspection is carried out in search of worm ~~[illegible]~~ holes. ~~[illegible]~~ After drying the hull is ~~[illegible]~~ calked and a general inspection is made. Paint is applied, and while that is drying the necessary interior mechanical work is carried out. Upon termination of the final painting and a final inspection, the boat is launched. The complete operation lasts no more than two or three days in a modern drydock, and the support personnel consist of two carpenters, a mechanic, and two yard assistants, as well as the usual repair and spare parts.

Installations: As can be seen from diagram nr 1, the area occupied by the shipyard is relatively small, [redacted] some [redacted] 15,500 square meters. It consists of a reinforced-concrete ramp with 4-inch rails [redacted], and an area [redacted] 150 meters long by 20 meters wide. The [redacted] [illegible] descends to a depth of 7 meters. The Central Yard contains a lateral cradle (25 x 17 x 1 meters), which rolls [redacted] on a concrete base (117 x 25 x 1 meters); three sections of the cradle (42 x 20 meters) with the third section terminating near the shipbuilding shed [redacted] (33 x 22 x 11 meters). Two identical buildings are planned for the machine [redacted] shops, [redacted] carpentry shop [redacted] offices and warehouses, on a total working area of 1200 square meters. A building will house two 75-kilowatt electric power plants, spare parts and general electrical equipment. A 350-gallon petroleum tank will be installed underground along side of this building to [redacted] provide the fuel. A 6,000-gallon [redacted] fresh-water tank with its well and turbine will complete the first phase of the plan. The second phase will be carried out during the year of production.

Cost of Each Section (Approx):

Retention Wall and Filling in the Swamp	$ 1,500
Ramp	$ 4,000
Central Yard	$ 10,000
Base for the Lateral Cradle	$ 5,000
Buildings for Workshops/Warehouses/Offices	$ 12,000
Building for [redacted] Ship Construction [redacted]	$ 3,000
Building for the Power Plants	$ 2,000
Lateral Cradle	$ 4,000

CONFIDENTIAL

Three Repair Yard Cradles	$ 12,000
Water Tank with Well	$ 500
Electric Wiring, Drainage, Plumbing, etc.	$ 1,000
Total -	$ 55,000

Location of the Operation: It was evident from the beginning that the location of a shipyard-repair yard complex on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua had to be situated in the Bluff-Bluefields area, or at Rio Escondido. The reasons are as follows:

(a) Geo-Economical - The Bluff-Bluefields port is the only port with river and highway access to the interior of the country. (b) It is the only port with sheltered anchorage (compare this with Puerto Cabezas' exposure to the sea). (c) It is the center of the fish market (Booth and Pescanica). These two companies attract a large number of boats and create a local demand for drydocking facilities. (d) It is ~~the~~ a center for supplies of fuel, food, parts, and other articles ~~[illegible]~~. (e) INVERNICA is fully aware of the potentials in the area. Without doubt, ~~this~~ a port with deep draft and good access ~~[illegible]~~ would have been even more advantageous. At present, however, the sandbar of Bluff limits access to the port to boats ~~in~~ with 13 feet of draught or less (a maximum of 800 tons). This greatly limits the commercial traffic to Bluefields. Possibly in the near future, the sandbar may be dredged, and we would then be sufficiently developed to offer floating-drydock services to large boats. The Port of Bluefields would then have the opportunity of becoming a prime mercantile port.

Possible Future Expansion: This preliminary study provides for the construction of an additional 90 x 35 x 7 meter building to serve as a general workshop for the three ~~[illegible]~~ slipways simultaneously, ~~[illegible]~~ and for the con-

CONF

struction of a concrete pier for jobs not requiring drydocking. This pier will be equipped with a mobile crane, and electrical and water facilities. This plan (Phase II) is tentatively SCHEDULED FOR the second year of operations. (See diagram Nr 1).

VI

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

Total Estimated Investments for the Project: The estimated total sum of the project is US$ 237,000. The breakdown of this amount is given at the end of this chapter. The loan requested from INFORNAC is given below under general headings:

Construction Equipment: Two 2½-ton dump-trucks. Carts for concrete, concrete vibrators(we have compressors), crane bucket for concrete, canvas tubing for submerged cement work, iron piping, etc. Total value (approx) US$ 25,000.

Construction Materials: 20,000 bags of Lone-Star cement;

100 tons of corrugated reinforcing rods, 1/2 inch and 3/4 inch; with tie wire

15,000 square feet of zinc sheathing;

5,000 square feet of construction wood;

50 tons of rail[redacted] sections, 4 inches;

64 [redacted] (1 and 1/2 to 2 and 1/2 feet in diameter);

Railroad accessories; etc.;

Total Value of approx US$ 40,000.

Carpentry Equipment: Table saw (2 feet x 10 feet), handsaws, hinged vise, two 2-inch electric drills, two electric sanders, table sander and table presses, 'torsion boxes', two complete sets of tools and electric portable equipment, etc.

Total Value of approx US$ 5,000.

CONFIDENTIAL

Machine Shop
[redacted] Equipment: US$ 25,000 additional investment by INVERNICA, and US$ 5,000 by INFORMAC.

Lathe for shafts (24-foot bed, 48-foot drum);

Southbend precision lathe (6-foot bed, 13-foot drum);

Force
Two-inch Buffalo/drill, with accessories;

Auger [?]
[redacted] Walter-Turner model Nr 3310;

Four manually-operated 20-ton hydraulic presses;

Electric Grinders;

Medium milling machines;

Twelve-inch press;

Differential
~~Differentials~~ systems (1 ton);

torque
Three sets of complete die stocks, ~~torsion~~ wrenches, combination wrenches, anvils, etc;

Two complete sets of [redacted] tools, torsion meters, calibrators, cutters,
one unit for testing engines
VALVES
polishing machines, automatic [redacted], die sets, [redacted].

Total Value of approx US$ 36,500.

company
Characteristics of [redacted] Capital: INVERNICA's [redacted] capital is drawn from two sources, namely, total equipment and materials within Nicaragua which is valued at US$ 150,000, and the [redacted] capital of the Enterprise,
approximately
[redacted] US$ 50,000.

Guarantees: Following is a general list of the equipment of INVERNICA which will be utilized in the project. This equipment for the most part is new and in full operational status, that is, INVERNICA has the necessary technical personnel to operate and maintain this equipment. In spite of the fact that this equipment is new the total [redacted] value is subject to the usual depreciation of 25 percent of the price which INVERNICA paid for the equipment in the United States. The following is exclusive of
freight
[redacted], customs and other fees. Since I do not have price lists, the prices are approximate.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Construction Equipment:

1 D-7 Caterpillar bulldozer;

1 Nr 112 Caterpillar grader;

1 15-ton Little Giant crane;

2 75-Kw D333 Caterpillar electric power plants;

2 Kohler power plants;

1 20-ton L.C.M., with all equipment;

1 40-ton barge;

1 KWIK-MIX concrete mixer, model 6S;

1 1964 Willys truck;

1 1964 Willys Jeep;

1 3-ton trailer;

1 Compressor with Caterpillar equipment, 60 HP;

1 Small Compressor with [redacted] equipment and 9 HP Wisconsin motor;

2 GONDAS turbines, of 2 and 2 1/2 inches diameter, with motors;

1 SEARS turbine, of 1 inch, with motor;

10 Sets of construction tools(picks, shovels, diggers , etc.).

Total Value of approx US$ 90,000, less 25% depreciation.

Mechanical Equipment:

3 Complete sets of tools;

1 Granville lathe (bed 3 feet by 10 inches);

1 Linde/W-2000 electric aluminum welding unit;

1 Hobart, model APB 260, electric welding unit;

2 Oxi-acetylene welding units;

1 Craftsman 3/4 inch drill table

1 Craftsman aluminum AUGER [redacted]; [?]

8 [redacted] electric drills(1½ inch)

CONFIDENTIAL

5 3/4-inch electric drills;

2 Electric buffing and polishing machines;

2 Electric fine saws (portable)

Miscellaneous equipment.

At Total Approx Value of US$ 6,500.

Miscellaneous Materials:

5,000 feet of high-voltage electric wiring;

3,500 feet of 600-volt electric wiring;

2,500 iron sheets, 1 and 1/2 inches by 10 feet;

2 electric chargers 12 and 24 volts;

3 electric transformers;

15 boxes of spare parts for Caterpillar, G.M., and Willys' motors;

Iron, copper, and zinc tubing; paint, plumbing fittings, 12-volt batteries, 1500, 1000, 350, 100 and 50 gallon water tanks, insulators, etc.

At Total Approx Value of US$ 15,000.

TOTAL INVESTMENT PLAN

Investment Fields	INVERNICA	INFCRNAC	TOTAL
A. Installation Expenses:			
a. Construction Equipment	$ 90,000	$ 25,000	$115,000
b. Construction Materials	$ 15,000	$ 40,000	$ 55,000
c. Machine Shop Equipment	$ 31,500	$ 5,000	$ 36,500
d. Carpentry Shop Equipment	$ ———	$ 5,000	$ 5,000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	(INVERNICA)	(INFORNAC)	(TOTAL)
B. Organization Expenses:	$ 500	$ ———	$ 500
C. Workigg Capital:	$ 15,000	$ ———	$ 15,000
D. Contingencies:	$ 10,000	$ ———	$ 10,000
Total:	$162,000 (68.4%)	$ 75,000 (31.6%)	$237,000 (100. %)

Note: The land will be rented to the Booth Fisheries for a nominal fee which will be resolved once the credit is established .

SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS

	Installation Period	Operational Period 1st	2nd	3rd
A. Sources:				
1. Equity Capital	$162,000	———	———	———
2. Medium-term loans	$ 75,000	———	———	———
3. Sales	$ ———	$190,000	$369,000	$409,500
4. Balance from previous year	$ ———	$140,000	$172,600	$221,900
Total Sources:	$237,000	$330,000	$541,600	$631,400
B. Uses:				
5. Fixed Investment				
a. Bldgs, etc.	$ 55,000	$ ———	$ ———	$ ———
b. Machinery	$ 41,500	$ ———	$ ———	$ ———
6. Cost of Production	$ ———	$127,500	$239,100	$242,300
7. Administration Expenses	$ 500	$ 10,400	$ 12,000	$ 12,000
Total Uses:	$ 97,000	$137,900	$251,100	$254,300

CONFIDENTIAL

Cash and Bank Deposits(A-B):	$140,000	$192,100	$290,500	$377,100
a. Amortization of the loan	$ ———	$ 19,500	$ 18,600	$ 17,700
b. Reinvestments	$ ———	$ ———	$ 50,000	$ ———
c. Dividends	$ ———	$ ———	$ ———	$ 50,000
Balance for the Following Year:	$140,000	$172,600	$221,900	$309,400

Note: This capital represents the value of the construction equipment, the working capital and the capital for contingencies, and is, therefore, the maximum figure. It is not necessarily true that this capital will remain intact, but we do believe that it will be no less than US$ 115,000.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Production Potential - Shipyard

Number of

Shrimpboats

Planned production

Demand in Nicaragua

Plant capacity

Years

Production Potential - Repair Yard

Number of

Drydockings,

per annum

Planned production

Demand in Nicaragua

Plant capacity

Years

CONFIDENTIAL

VII

APPENDIX

A re-study of the necessities of the shipyard, of the extensive (and intensive) repairs which the fleets will require, and of the immense volume of maintenance, has revealed the enormous load which the [redacted] machine shop and carpentry [redacted] shop must bear.

With the capital available to INTERMICA at this time, only US$ 25,000 can be channeled to these workshops, (plus [redacted] the US$ 6,500 in equipment in our possession), since [redacted] the present emphasis is placed on construction and immediate production. Nevertheless, I believe that an additional investment in the workshops is of vital importance for less costly [redacted] and efficient production. For mass production [redacted] the shipyard, naturally, requires sophisticated equipment, a significant volume of spare parts and additional capital.

We may choose to purchase this equipment with the first year's profits. But I believe that it is suitable for this sum to [redacted] be incorporated into the plan of initial loans, requested by the enterprise.

L.A.P.P./sl

DIAGRAM NR. 1 - GENERAL VIEW

Storage Yard

Electric Power Plants

Warehouses

Carpentry Workshop

Office

Mechanical Workshop

Shipyard Nr 1

Building for Shipbuilding (Planned)

Winch 1

Section 6

Section 5

Section 4

Section 3

Section 2

Section 1

Winch 2

Lateral Cradle

Ramp

Phase II

Phase I

Working Pier

DIAGRAM NR. 2 - MAIN BUILDINGS

Workshops and Office

Shipyard Nr. 1

CONFIDENTIAL

DIAGRAM NR. 3 - SHRIMPBOAT CRADLE

Specifications:

Net weight - 18 tons

Capacity - 32 tons

Length - 20 meters

Width - 10 meters

Maneuvering time - 15 minutes

Scale

meters



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3

INVERSIONES NICARAGUENSES S. A.
(INVERNICA)

ESTUDIO PRELIMINAR

VARADERO - ASTILLERO

EN EL AREA DEL BRAGGMAN'S BLUFF - BLUEFIELDS

INDICE GENERAL

Capitulo	Tema	Página
I	INTRODUCCION	2
II	ANALISIS DEL MERCADO	2
III	VIABILIDAD ECONOMICA DEL PROYECTO	9
IV	JUSTIFICACION SOCIO-ECONOMICA	13
V	ANALISIS TECNOLOGICO	14
VI	ANALISIS FINANCIARIO	19
VII	APENDICE	25
	DIAGRAMAS	26

1. INTRODUCCION

Este proyecto de desarrollo industrial lo presenta la Compañía INVERNICA (Inversiones Nicaraguenses), ubicada en la ciudad de Managua, D. N., Nicaragua.

El contenido de éste informe forma parte del estudio preliminar que ha efectuado la INVERNICA en torno a un programa de inversión de un concentrado de astilleros - varaderos en el área del Bluff- Bluefields. Dichas facilidades estarán orientadas a dar servicios completos a las flotas pesqueras y demás embarcaciones que operan en la Costa Atlantica de Nicaragua. Dada la complejidad de las operaciones requeridas en los trabajos y servicios de un astillero, el costo del monto de dichas facilidades es inicialmente elevado. Gracias a los equipos, experiencia y personal técnico que posee la INVERNICA, éste costo inicial se reduce enormemente. Este estudio analiza los diferentes elementos que forman parte de dicha inversión y los integra a una cifra total, cuyo valor es de US$ 237,000.00 (DOSCIENTOS TREINTA Y SIETE MIL DOLARES), con dos inversionistas: INVERNICA supliendo el 68.4% (sesenta y ocho punto cuatro por ciento), y el INFONAC supliendo el 31.6% (treinta y uno punto seis por ciento).

Ya por su condición de industria nueva en país, y del alto beneficio que ello conlleva a la economía nacional, éste proyecto puede clasificarse de industria fundamental (Ley #135, Ley de Protección y Estímulo al Desarrollo Industrial, 20 de Marzo de 1958), y por tanto, gozar de dicha protección y estímulo para su pleno desarrollo inicial.

Como se verá en éste informe preliminar, la necesidad de facilidades modernas de varadero y astillería en la Costa Atlantica, es de vital importancia a la sobrevivencia de las flotas de pesca. Dichas flotas sufren graves restricciones operacionales debido a la ausencia de dichos servicios, tan comunes y extensamente brindados a las flotas norteamericanas y mejicanas. Nosotros poseemos los equipos y el personal técnico necesarios, pero más aún poseemos la plena confianza de poder llegar a ofrecer los servicios, facilidades y naves más modernas y eficientes en todas las Costas del Caribe.

12 de Julio de 19[illegible]
Bragman's Bluff, Nicaragua

Ing. Luis A. Prieto Partar
INVERNICA

II. ANALISIS DEL MERCADO

La función primaria del astillero será la construcción de embarcaciones de acero y madera, de 20 a 200 toneladas. Esto incluye camaroneros, langosteros, falúas, cargueros ligeros y lanchones de pasajeros y de patrulla. La segunda función de la empresa, será el darle servicios de reparación y mantenimiento a toda clase de embarcaciones de ésta índole en el área del Caribe, de igual o superior calidad que las ofrecidas en Méjico, Trinidad o los Estados Unidos.

Hasta cierto punto el astillero intentará la especialización en la construcción de un camaronero de 35 toneladas de tal calidad que pueda competir favorablemente en el mercado mundial. Se intentarán construcciones en acero y en madera. La construcción en madera presenta la ventaja que una gran parte, sino toda la madera, puede procurarse en los aserraderos locales de Bluefields. Otra ventaja que posee la construcción en madera es un proyecto de producción en serie, en la cual, las formas de las diferentes piezas de las naves, se construirán en grupos previstos para la prefabricación. Será posible visualizar en un futuro, vender camaroneros, no solamente completamente armados, sino tambien en piezas prefabricadas listas para armar por varaderos con pocas facilidades en maquinaria, madera, etc.

Mercado nacional y centroamericano. Son pocos los paises en la America que poseen las facilidades de astilleros para la construcción de embarcaciones del calado de un camaronero. Estos paises son el Perú, Méjico y los Estados Unidos. La producción del Perú es pequeña y relativamente ineficiente, y su influencia en el Caribe, es nula. Las naves mejicanas están hechas de buen material, pero de pésima mano de obra, unidos a diseños anticuados y crudos, por lo cual sufren enormes fatigas estructurales en mares crecidos. En los Estados Unidos la producción de camaroneros se reduce al producto de cinco compañías principales, a razón de un promedio de unas cinco naves anuales por astillero. Son embarcaciones excelentes, con los últimos adelantos en equipos de pesca y navegación. Sinembargo, son naves costosas, debido al alto costo de la mano de obra y materias primas del país. Ya que poseemos la mayor parte de la madera en Bluefields, un personal técnico adiestrado y competente, y un diseño funcionalmente superior de embarcación, podremos suplir las necesidades para una flota de pesca nacional, así como también exportar dichas embarcaciones al mercado mundial. Nos basamos en cálculos preliminares, de poder producir una excelente nave, de menor costo que las naves norteamericanas, con una calidad que esperamos, sea superior.

El mercado nacional. El mercado inmediato para nuestros camaroneros son las flotas nacionales. La Booth Fisheries tiene mucho interes en procurar seis naves mas de inmediato. Proyecta una posible expansión de veinte naves más en los próximos dos o tres años. Tambien la posibilidad de arrendar o vender a plazos de pago dichas naves a capitanes locales, asi como tambien, estimular las inversiones de otros capitales nacionales. Estimamos un mercado nacional de unas veinticinco naves camaroneras en los próximos tres años. Las demandas del resto del Caribe, podrán estimarse conservadoramente en unas cuarenta naves, haciendo un total de setenta y cinco embarcaciones, que se comprarán en Méjico y los Estados Unidos. Con nuestra producción de quince naves en ese período de tres años, es evidente que poseemos un mercado riquísimo aquí mismo en el Caribe sin contar con las demandas del Pacífico y otras áreas de intensa pesca.

En cuanto al varadero, estimamos que con nuestras modernas instalaciones podremos dar servicio a 400 naves anualmente. Compárese con los servicios del varadero de Schooner Key, que está dando servicios parciales a 4[illegible] naves anualmente.

En proyección, se estima que las flotas camaroneras en Nicaragua llegaría a 80 naves en este año. Añádase unas 40 embarcaciones costeras de todas índoles. Esto constituye un total de 120 embarcaciones que requieren los servicios de un varadero cuatro veces al año (tres varajes al año normales y uno de emergencia), o sea, un total de 480 varajes anuales. Los varaderos locales, podrán satisfacer unos cien varajes en conjunto. Esta situación ha forzado a un gran número de camaroneros tener que irse del país para reparar sus naves (a Honduras, Méjico, y hasta los Estados Unidos), con la consiguiente pérdida de tiempo de pesca y de divisas para Nicaragua.

Limitaciones de orden técnico. Serán las siguientes inicialmente: la ausencia de personal técnico local, y el tiempo de importación de la gran diversidad de piezas y material mecánico.

El diseño del astillero - varadero se ha hecho contemplando expansiones futuras al paso que progresen las demandas. Esta planificación se ha hecho tambien en torno a los dos talleres (carpintería y mecánica). El primer factor, la ausencia de personal adiestro en construcción de naves de acero se superará inicialmente con la utilización del personal maestro de la Compañía. Al asignarle dos o tres asistentes locales, estos podrán aprender prácticamente las especialidades requeridas. El segundo factor, solo podrá resolverse con una eficiente coordinación con el personal de distribución y suministros A. la Compañía en Miami. Será posible tener cualquier pieza o material en el Bluff en no más de dos semanas después de pedida por las oficinas locales.(vía aérea). Se contempla además tener un gran surtido de piezas de repuestos en nuestros almacenes del astillero.

Competencia externa o interna. En cuanto al astillero, no existe competencia externa ni interna en el orden centroamericano. La única competencia que encontraremos serán la mejicana, y la norteamericana. El estudio comparativo de ésta competencia sigue a continuación:

(a) Precios. Camaronero, (madera, 36 ton., sin motor).

Méjico	US$ 41,000.00	
Estados Unidos	US$ 45,000.00	
Nicaragua	US$ 40,000.00	(Proyectado)

(b) Calidad de materiales.-

Méjico: Buen material; malos diseños y construcción general.

EEUU: Buenos materiales; excelentes diseños: construcción varía con la Compañía desde buena hasta excelente.

Nicaragua: Buen material; diseños y construcción excelentes.

Policy

(c) Canales y políticas de distribución: Aunque sin duda será difícil al adentrarse inicialmente en ventas con los mercados Mejicanos y Norteamericanos, debido a los altos aranceles de estos países, tenemos un mercado ilimitado en el resto del Caribe. Competimos favorablemente debido a la excelente posición de Nicaragua con respecto a los mercados Centroamericanos, Venezolanos, Colombianos, etc.

En cuanto al varadero, es de notar que comparativamente, los varaderos extranjeros son por mucho, menos costosos que los nacionales, a veces en un año. Tras un estudio de los precios típicos de cada varadero, llegamos a la conclusión que se puede dar mucho más servicio por un costo igual o menor. En los ejemplos que siguen, hemos asumido un varaje típico de tres días, limpieza, calafateo, enderezar eje, cambiar un número de tablas, asegurar el costillaje o [illegible], asegurar timón y asientos, y finalmente la pintura.

(a) Precios

Honduras	US$ 330.00	(sin enderezar el eje)
Méjico	US$ 350.00	
EE.UU.	US$ 375.00	
Schooner Key	US$1000.00	
INVERNICA	US$ 350.00	(Proyectada)

(b) Calidad de la mano de obra.

Honduras	buena	
Méjico	buena	
EE. UU.	excelente	
Schooner Key	regular .	
INVERNICA	excelente	(Proyectada)

Estimación de ventas. En la estimación del potencial de ventas, entran tres vías de utilidad: los del astillero; los del varadero, y los servicios de mecánica y electricidad a la comunidad del área en general.

(a) Precios (asumiendo estabilidad de precios en los próximos tres años). Astillero: US$ 40,000.00 por cada camaronero (sin motor); otras embarcaciones proporcionalmente cotizadas.

Varadero: precio de varaje normal, US$ 350.00. Cuando se presentan desperfectos mecánicos o piezas de repuestos, el precio será mayor.

(b) Cantidades.

Astillero: Dos camaroneros el primer año, seis el segundo y diez el

Tercer año; todos para venta nacional-

Varadero: 300 varajes de un posible total de 600 el primer año; 350 el segundo y 450 varajes el tercer año.

(c) Ingresos brutos. (aproximados).

	1er año	2ndo año	3er año
Astillero:	US$ 60,000.00	US$ 240,000.00	US$ 340,000.00
Varadero:	US$105,000.00	US$122,500.00	US$ 157,500.00
Misceláneos:	US$ 5,000.00	US$ 7,000.00	US$ 10,000.00

III. VIABILIDAD ECONOMICA DEL PROYECTO

Costo de Producción [illegible] para el primer año de producción. En el cálculo de costos, se toma en consideración la construcción de [illegible] camaroneros, servicios completos de reparación y mantenimiento en 300 varajes, y demás servicios misceláneos, con un total de 31,000 horas de trabajo (en unidad de turno diario).

Costos de Producción.

(a) Materias Primas: Los materiales requeridos para la construcción y reparación de embarcaciones, son muy variados y muchas veces, especiales. A continuacion solo enumero los materiales principales con cotizaciones generales y aproximadas.

Maderas.	Laurel o pino amarillo	25,000 pies cuadrados.
	Caoba de lera y 2nda.	20,000 " "
	Roble de lera.	5,000 " "

Metales. Acero y acero-B (S.A.E.) 40 toneladas.
Hierro colado y demás metales 10 ton.

Con un valor total de US$ 30,000.00

(b) Materiales:

Pinturas: Epoxy zinc, Silver primoco, epoxy bases, latex, copper antifouling, barnices, etc.).
Unos 1800 galones.

Ferretería en general: Tornillos y clavos de zinc, cobre, hierro, acero; arandelas; pasadores; tuberías metálicas, plásticas, goma; insulación de polyf[illegible], styrofoam, cemento; láminas de vidrio y bakelite, etc.

Equipos diversos: Hélices (40" x 34"); ejes de acero inoxidables, winches CHC en línea, anclas, baterías, sistemas de iluminación ordinaria y navegacionales, tendido y accesorios eléctricos, plantas eléctricas, bombas de achique, cocinas de petróleo, unidades de enfriamiento y refrigeración, fatómetros, equipos de radio-comunicación, etc.

Con un valor total de US$ 30,000.00

(c) Mano de obra. La empresa empleará, durante su primer año de producción, un jefe de mecánica y tornería, dos mecánicos especializados,

dos asistentes de mecánica, un jefe de carpintería, tres carpinteros de ribera y marina, y dos asistentes de carpintería.

Con un sueldo anual colectivo de US$ 33,300.00

Costos de Operación.

(a) Gastos de Administración: El Personal de Administración consistirá de, un administrador- contador público, un asistente oficinista y dos encargados de servicios y mantenimiento. En conjunto cobraran un sueldo anual de US$ 8,400.00 y demás, se reservará la cantidad anual de US$ 2,000.00.

Gastos Totales de Administración US$ 10,400.00

(b) Gastos de Ventas: Dada la naturaleza de la empresa, no es necesario incurrir en gastos de ventas, anuncios, etc... y por tanto asumimos un gasto nulo para esta sección. Costos fijos y variables. Todos los gastos anteriormente cotizados, pueden considerarse como gastos fijos, y solo se consideraran gastos variables, el 20% del material consumido por los talleres de mecánica, dada la variabilidad de las reparaciones mecánicas. El resto, está gobernado por un sistema sencillo de producción que produce necesariamente, los costos detallados de la construcción y reparación de las naves en consideración. Proyección de los Gastos de Producción para el Segundo y el Tercer Año de Operación. (Véase el Formato a continuación).

ESTADOS DE PERDIDAS Y GANANCIAS

A.	**INGRESOS TOTALES:**	1er año	2ndo año	3er año
	VENTAS ASTILLERO	$ 80,000.00	$ 230,000.00	$ 240,000.00
	VENTAS VARADERO	$ 105,000.00	$ 122,500.00	$ 157,500.00
	VENTAS MISCELANEAS	$ 5,000.00	$ 7,000.00	$ 12,000.00
	VENTAS NETAS	$ [illegible]	$ 359,500.00	$ 409,500.00
B.	**COSTO DE PRODUCCION:**	1er año	2ndo año	3er año
	MATERIAS PRIMAS	$ 30,000.00	$ 85,000.00	$ 90,000.00
	MATERIALES	$ 60,000.00	$ 90,000.00	$ 90,000.00
	MANO DE OBRA DIRECTA	$ 32,000.00	$ 40,000.00	$ 43,000.00
	DEPRECIACION (MAQ. 20%)	$ 10,000.00	$ 10,000.00	$ 5,000.00
	REPARACION Y MANTENIMIENTOS	2,000.00	$ 10,000.00	$ 10,000.00
	COMBUSTIBLE (ELECTRICIDAD)	$ 2,500.00	$ 2,500.00	$ 3,000.00
	SEGURO DE LA PLANTA	$ 1,000.00	$ 1,500.00	$ 1,500.00
	SUB-TOTAL	$ 127,500.00	$ 238,000.00	$ 242,500.00
C.	**GASTOS DE ADMINISTRACION:**	1er año	2ndo año	3er año
	SUELDOS	$ 8,400.00	$ 9,000.00	$ 9,000.00
	GASTOS DE OFICINA	$ 2,000.00	$ 3,000.00	$ 3,000.00
	SUB-TOTAL	$ 10,400.00	$ 12,000.00	$ 12,000.00
D.	**GASTOS FINANCIEROS**	1er año	2ndo año	3er año
	DEL CAPITAL	$ 15,000.00	$ 15,000.00	$ 15,000.00
	DEL INTERES	$ 4,800.00	$ 3,800.00	$ 2,700.00
	SUB-TOTAL	$ 19,800.00	$ 18,800.00	$ 17,700.00
E.	**TOTAL GASTOS**	$ 157,400.00	$ 269,700.00	$ 272,000.00
F.	**UTILIDAD NETA**	$ 32,[illegible]00.00	$ 89,800.00	$ 137,500.00

IV. JUSTIFICACION SOCIO - ECONOMICA

Empleo. En el primer año de producción, el personal de la empresa será de diez y seis hombres, distribuidos en la forma siguiente:

Personal de Administración: cuatro empleados (un administrador y contador público) un asistente de oficina, y dos encargados de servicios y mantenimiento).

Personal de Carpintería: siete empleados (un jefe de carpintería, tres carpinteros de rivera y marina, dos asistentes de carpintería).

Personal de Mecánica: cinco empleados (un jefe de mecánica y tornería, dos mecánicos especializados, y dos asistentes de mecánica).

Todos los empleados de la ~~empresa~~, recibiran inicialmente sueldos basados en sus conocimientos técnicos, años de experiencia, etc. Dicha escala de pagos será superior a las normales, para atraer a la empresa, el mejor personal posible. Se contempla además un plan de aumentos de sueldos fijos y meritorios, para estímulo de los esfuerzos de superación de los empleados.

Se espera aumentar el número del personal a veinte para el segundo año de producción, y a veintidos para el tercer año. Efectos en la Balanza de Pagos. Las flotas camaroneras en Nicaragua han aumentado sus efectivos por unas diez a quince embarcaciones anualmente. Dichas embarcaciones son compradas en su totalidad, en Méjico y los Estados Unidos. Sus valores conjuntos en un periodo, de tres años, ascendiendo a un mínimo de US$ 900,000.00 a un máximo de US$ 2,086,000.00. Nuestra producción durante éste periodo, será de catorce camaroneros con un valor de US$ 840,000.00 que representan divisas que permanecen en el país.

Beneficios al Consumidor y al Desarrollo Economico. Presentemente, la mayoría de los camaroneros en el área, no tienen facilidades para servicios de reparación mecánica, y en la mayoría de los casos, ni aun facilidades de varaje. Esto es debido en parte, al poco calado de las vías férreas de los varaderos locales, así como también, lo anticuado que resultan sus equipos. Debido a éstas dificultades, muchos camaroneros tienen que remontarse a Honduras, Méjico y a veces hasta los Estados Unidos para efectuar reparaciones de averías normales o accidentales. Es difícil estimar con certeza las pérdidas totales a que incurren dichas embarcaciones, entre los trámites legales de entradas, y salidas a otros paises, los gastos de combustible y personal, y de mayor importancia, las pérdidas enormes que representa el tiempo perdido de pesca. Puesto que nuestros varaderos poseeran mayor capacidad que el requerido normalmente, esto representará una garantía de servicio aquellas embarcaciones con averías de emergencia. etc. De éste modo, captaremos aquellas embarcaciones que ordinariamente tienen que abandonar el país para efectuar sus reparaciones, con las consiguientes repercusiones de divisas y tiempo valioso de pesca en aguas nicaragüenses.

Protección y Estímulo: Dada las características de industria fundamental (Véase Ley #135, del 30 de Marzo de 1958), un astillero requerirá ayuda gubernamental durante sus primeros años de desarrollo, para asegurar las tan necesarias reinversiones requeridas por una empresa de tal complejidad y magnitud. Presentemente, se están haciendo en Managua, las gestiones necesarias para darle a ésta empresa el reconocimiento legal de industria fundamental, con todo auxilio gubernamental.

V. Análisis Tecnológico

Características tecnológicas de los productos a elaborar. Ya está en diseño el primer modelo un camaronero de 30 toneladas (en madera). Igualmente hay otro diseño en acero, de 30 toneladas. Las especificaciones generales para la nave de acero son las siguientes: Tonelaje: 30 toneladas; eslora: 52'; manga: 20'; calado: 8'; quilla: barra/acero-3, 3/4" x 3"; travesaños: plancha/acero; cubierta 3/16" planchas/acero. Pinturas: Hunt & Burns, Bond Primer, Anticorrosivo y antifouling, un total de seis capas. Frigoríficos: capacidad 20 ton, en hielo-camarón., construcción de styrofoam- concreto. Planta motriz Caterpillar # 343 con supercargador. Hélices 46" x 34" de tres paletas Michigan. Eje de transmisión 3" x 14' de acero inoxidable. Winch CMC en línea. Ocho baterías de ocho voltios con cargador de baterías. Fogón de cocina de petróleo. Luces de navegación y sistemas de reflectores. Radioteléfono RCA Cruisephone 100. Compás magnético Ritchie modelo B453. Fatómetro Raytheon modelo DE-721. Tanques de petróleo especiales al casco, con capacidad para 6,000 galones de petróleo. Un tanque para agua potable de 780 galones, etc.

Proceso de Producción

Los procesos de construcción de embarcaciones y los servicios requeridos por dichas naves son por necesidad complejos, aunque con metodología llegan a simplificarse enormemente. A continuación, se da una descripción breve de los procesos a seguir en el astillero, y en el varadero. La construcción de una nave comienza con la colocación de la quilla sobre la plataforma de moldes. Luego se va colocando el costillaje, que ya debe tener su curvatura preformada en las cámaras de torsión a vapor. Se fijan las travesas y codastes, seguido a lo cual se cortan los excesos del costillaje. Empezando desde la quilla hacia arriba se van colocando el entablado del casco de modo que cada pieza posea un ajuste perfecto y parejo (al echar el casco al agua, la madera sufre una expansión precalculada que sella por completo el casco sin necesidad de calafatear). Se barrenan el encauce del eje y se fijan los soportes del timón y su canula. Se colocan los tanques de combustible, agua potable y la bodega de refrigeración. Se tira el entablado de la cubierta y la caseta de la tripulación. Se colocan los refuerzos de acero a la proa, popa y cuarto de máquinas. Ya en ésta etapa comienzan las instalaciones secundarias como son, la pintura, tendido electrico, plomería, colocar equipos y mástiles, plumas con su winch, colocar la planta motriz y echar la nave al agua. Ya en el agua, se llevan a cabo los trabajos finales.

Para una embarcación de acero, el proceso es mucho más sencillo, y por consiguiente de menos costo.

El proceso normal de servicio de varaje a una embarcación es la siguiente: La cuna (ver diagrama No. 1 y No. 3), espera a la embarcación a la entrada de la rampa. Usando las boyas de maniobra, la nave penetra sobre la cuna y queda presa por las travesas que la tripulación sube desde la nave. El winch No. 1 sube la cuna sobre la rampa lateral y de allí la asigna a su sección correspondiente. Ya en la sección, se raspa inmediatamente con cepillos eléctricos portátiles y agua á presión. Mientras el casco se seca, se le inspecciona minuciosamente para advertir alguna señal de penetración por gusanos en la madera.

Se comienzan los trabajos de calafateo y el asegurar el casco en general. Le siguen, las primeras capas de pintura de protección. Mientras tanto, los trabajos necesarios de mecánica se están efectuando en el interior. Al darle las últimas capas de pintura al fondo, se efectúa la inspección final, y al secar la última capa se echa al agua. La operación completa no dura más de dos o tres días en un dique moderno, y conlleva los trabajos coordinados de dos carpinteros, un mecánico, y dos asistentes de patio, así como también el usual surtido de piezas de reparación y repuesto.

Instalaciones

Como se puede observar en el diagrama No. 1, el terreno ocupado por el astillero es relativamente pequeño: de unos 18,800 metros cuadrados. Consiste en una rampa de concreto-reforzado, con vía férrea de 4", y posee una extensión de 150 metros de largo por 20 metros de ancho, y en su parte más profunda desciende a una profundidad de siete metros. El patio central consiste en: una cuna-lateral (26 x 17 x 1 ms.) que rueda sobre la cámara de concreto (117 x 25 x 1 ms.); tres secciones de cuna (42 x 20 ms) la tercera terminando en la nave de trabajos de astillería (22 x 32 x 11 ms). Dos edificios identicos estan destinados para los talleres de carpintería, mecánica, oficinas y almacenes, con un área de trabajo de 1200 metros cuadrados. Un edificio para la instalación de las dos plantas electricas de 75 kilowatts cada una, piezas de repuesto y equipos de electricidad en general (un tanque de 350 galones de petroleo estará soterrado al lado del edificio para proveer las plantas de combustible). Un tanque de agua dulce (4000 galones) con su pozo y turbina, completan las instalaciones de la primera fase del proyecto. La segunda fase se llevará a cabo durante el segundo año de producción.

Costo por cada sección: (aproximado):

Muro de retención y relleno del pantano	$	1,300.00
Rampa	$	4,000.00
Patio central	$	10,000.00
Cúpula de la cuna lateral	$	5,000.00
Edificios de talleres/almacenes/oficinas	$	12,000.00
Edificio del taller de astillería	$	3,000.00
Edificio de las plantas electricas	$	2,000.00
Cuna lateral	$	4,000.00
Tres cunas de varadero	$	12,000.00
Tanques de agua con pozo	$	800.00
Tendido electrico, drenaje, plomería, etc.	$	1,000.00
TOTAL--- --------	$	55,000.00

Dictámen y juicio acerca de la localización de la planta. Fué evidente desde el primer momento, que la localización de un astillero-varadero en la Costa Atlantica de Nicaragua, tenía que residir en el área del puerto del Bluff- Bluefields, o en Río Escondido. Las razones eran las siguientes:

(a) GEOECONOMICA

Es el único puerto con comunicación fluvial y de carretera con el interior del país, con las consiguientes facilidades de movimiento para la compra de piezas de repuesto y materiales de construcción.

(b) Es el único puerto con fondeo guarecido (comparese con lo expuesto que se encuentra Puerto Cabezas al mar abierto).

(c) Es centro de compra de la pesca (Booth y Pescanica). Entre las dos Compañías? atraen un gran número de embarcaciones y crean una demanda local para facilidades de varaje.

(d) Es un centro de abastecimientos de combustible, víveres, piezas, y demás artículos.

(e) Pleno reconocimiento de los potenciales del área por la INVERNICA. Sin duda, de aún mayor beneficio, hubiese sido un puerto con gran calado de fondo y acceso. Presentemente, la barra de arena del Bluff, limita la entrada a dicho puerto a embarcaciones con un calado de 13 pies o menos (un máximo de 800 tons.). Esto limita enormemente el tráfico comercial en Bluefields. Posiblemente, en un futuro no muy remoto, se dragüe dicha barra, y para entonces, nosotros estaremos lo suficientemente desarrollados para dar servicios en diques flotantes a naves de gran tonelaje, haciendo así, del Puerto de Bluefields, un puerto de primera magnitud mercantil.

Posibilidades previstas de Expansiones Futuras:

Se prevee, en éste estudio preliminar, la construcción de una nave adicional de 90 x 35 x 7 metros, para servir de taller general a tres gradas de astilleros simultaneamente. Igualmente, la construcción de un muelle de concreto para aquellas tareas que no requieran varaje. El muelle irá equipado con una grua móvil, y servicios de electricidad y agua potable. Tentativamente, éste plan (Fase II) se llevará a cabo durante el segundo año de operaciones. (Vease el diagrama No. 1).

VI, ANALISIS FINANCIARIO

Monto estimado de la inversión total del proyecto:

El estimado del monto total del proyecto es de doscientos treinta y siete mil dólares (US$ 237,000.00). Sus rubros específicos están presentados en el formato No. 3 al final de este capitulo. El monto del préstamo solicitado al INFONAC, y su utilización se da a continuación en forma general por rubros.

Equipo de Construcción:

Dos camiones de volteo de 2 1/2 toneladas cada uno. Carretillas para concreto, elementos de vibradores de concreto (nosotros poseemos dos compresores), cubo de concreto para la grua, tubería de lamata para echar concreto bajo del agua, tremies y sus tuberías de hierro, etc.

[illegible]

Valor total(aprox.) de US$ 25,000.00

Materiales de Construcción:

[illegible],000 Sacos de cemento Lone-Star
[illegible] toneladas de cabillaje de 1/2" y 3/4" corrugado, con su alambre de amarre.
12,000 pies cuadrados de tejado de zinc.
8,000 pies cuadrados de madera de construcción.
20 toneladas de vía férrea de 4".
64 carriles de ferrocarril (1 1/2' a 2 1/2' diámetro).
Accesorios de vía, etc.
Valor Total (aprox.) de US$ 40,000.00

Equipos Taller Carpintería:

Sierra de mesa (2' x 10').
Sierras de mano, bisagras de presión, dos taladros electricos de 2", dos lijadoras electricas, lijadora y prensadora de mesa, cajas de torsión, dos juegos completos de herramientas y equipos portátiles electricos, etc.
Valor Total (aprox.) de US$ 8,000.00

Equipos Taller Mecánico:

Inversión (adicional) INVENICA de US$ 2[illegible],000.00, y US$ 5,000.00 por INFONAC.

Torno para ejes (cama 24' tambore [illegible]').
Torno de precisión [illegible] (cama [illegible]' tambore 1[illegible]').
Taladro Buffalo Forge de 2" con accesorios
Sinfín SalterTurner modelo No. 3310
Cuatro prensas hidraulicas manuales de 20 tons. cada una.
Esmeriles electricos.
Fresadora mediana.
Prensa de apertura de 12".
Sistemas de diferenciales (1 ton)
Tres juegos de tarrajas completas, juegos de copas, con manerales, extensiones, llaves de torsión, llaves de combinación, yunques de capacidad, etc.
Dos lotes completos de herramientas con sus gabinetes, torciometros, calibradores, cortadoras, pulidoras, auto. de válvulas, juegos de troqueles, una unidad de analisis de motores, etc.
Valor Total (aprox.) de US$ 36,800.00

Características del Capital Social:

El capital de financiamiento de la INVENICA tiene dos fuentes: los múltiples equipos y materiales que ya posee dentro de Nicaragua, con un valor total de más de US$ 130,000.00, y segundo, el capital social de la empresa, suma que asciende a US$ 50,000.00.

Garantías:

A continuación, se presenta la lista general de los equipos de la INVENICA que se utilizaría en el proyecto. Dichos equipos son en su mayoría equipos nuevos y en pleno estado operacional, es decir, que la INVENICA posee el personal técnico necesario para sus operaciones y mantenimiento. A pesar que en su mayoría dichos equipos son nuevos, el monto total de sus valores conlleva la usual depreciación del 25% del precio que pagó la INVENICA por dichos equipos en los Estados Unidos en maquinarias por seis meses de uso. No se incluye costos adicionales de flete maritimo, aduana, etc. Ya que carezco de listas de cotización los precios son aproximados.

Equipo de Construcción.

1 BULLDOZER CATERPILLAR D-7
1 Autoniveladora CATERPILLAR No. 112
1 Grua Little Giant de cap. 15 ton
2 Plantas Electricas CATERPILLAR D333 de 75 Kilowatts cada una
2 Plantas [illegible]
1 L. C. M. de 30 ton. con todos sus equipos
1 Patana de carga de 40 ton
1 Concretera KWIK-MIX modelo 6S
1 Camioneta WILLYS 1964
1 Jeep WILLYS 1964
1 Trailer de tres toneladas.
1 Compresor con equipos CATERPILLAR de 60 H. P.
1 Compresor con equipos chico con motor Wisconsin de 9 H.P.
2 Turbinas GORMAN de 2" y 2 1/2" de diametro con sus motores.
1 Turbina SEARS de 1 " con motor
10 Lotes de herramientas de construcción (picos, palas, cavadoras, etc.
Con un valor total (aprox.) de US$ 90,000.00 con 30% depreciación.

Equipos con Mecánica:

Tres lotes completos de herramientas.
1 torno GRANVILLE (cama 3' x 10")
1 soldadora de aluminio electrica LINDE tipo V - 300G
1 soldadora electrica HOBART modelo APB 300
2 equipos completos de soldaduras de oxi-acetileno.
1 taladro de mesa de 3/4" CRAFTSMAN.
1 Sinfin para aluminio CRAFTSMAN
6 taladros electricos de 1 1/2"
3 taladros electricos de 3/4".
2 cepilladoras y pulidoras electricas.
2 sierras finas electricas de mano
Equipos miscelaneos
Con un valor total (aprox.) de US$ 6,500.00

Materiales Diversos:

6,000 pies de tendido electrico de alto voltaje.
3,500 pies de tendido electrico de 600 voltios.
2,500 planchas de hierro de 1 1/2" x 10'
2 cargadores electricos de 12 y 24 voltios.
3 transformadores electricos.
16 cajas de piezas de repuesto para nuestros motores CATERPILLAR, G. M. y WILLYS.
Tuberias de hierro, cobre, zinc; pintura, lonetas, accesorios de plomeria, baterias de 12 voltios, tanques de agua de 1500, 1000, 250, 100 y 50 galones, [illegible], etc.
Con un valor total (aprox.) de US$ 15,000.

PLAN GLOBAL DE INVERSION

	RENGLONES DE INVERSION	INVERNICA	INFONAC	TOTAL SECCIONAL
A.	GASTOS DE INSTALACION:			
	a. Equipos de Construcción	$ 90,000	$ 25,000	$ 115,000
	b. Materiales de Construcción.-	$ 15,000	$ 40,000	$ 55,000
	c. Equipos Taller Mecánica	$ 31,800	$ 5,000	$ 36,800
	d. Equipos Taller Carpintería.-	$ ———	$ 5,000	$ 5,000
B.	GASTOS DE ORGANIZACION:	$ 800	$ ———	$ 800
C.	CAPITAL DE TRABAJO:	$ 15,000	$ ———	$ 15,000
D.	IMPREVISTOS:	$ 10,000	$ ———	$ 10,000
	TOTAL	$162,000 (68.4%)	$ 75,000 (31.6%)	$ 237,000

NOTA:

Los terrenos serán arrendados a la SOCIEDAD [illegible] por una suma mensual que se acordará una vez colocado los créditos.

FUENTES Y USOS DE FONDOS

		PERIODO INSTALACION	PERIODO OPERACIONAL 1er	2do	3er
A.	**FUENTES**				
1.-	Capital Propio	$ 162,000	-----	-----	-----
2.-	Fincs. a mediano plazo	75,000	-----	-----	-----
3.-	Ventas	------	$180,000	$368,000	$509,500
4.-	Saldo del año anterior	------	$140,000	$173,600	$121,900
	TOTAL FUENTES	$237,000	$320,000	$541,600	$631,400
B.	**USOS**				
5.-	Inversion fija				
	a. Edificios etc.	$ 56,000	$-----	$-----	$-----
	b. Maquinaria	$ 41,500	$-----	$-----	$-----
6.-	Costo de Producción.-	$-----	$127,500	$339,100	$242,300
7.-	Gastos de administración.-	$ 200	$ 10,400	$ 12,000	$ 12,000
	TOTAL USOS	$ 97,700	$137,900	$351,100	$254,300
	FONDOS DISPONIBLES (A-B):	$140,000	$182,100	$190,500	$377,100
a.	Amortización del préstamo	$-----	$ 8,500	$ 18,600	$ 27,700
b.	Reinversiones	$-----	$-----	$ 50,000	$-----
c.	Dividendos	$-----	$-----	$-----	$ 50,000
	SALDO PARA EL AÑO SIGUIENTE:	$140,000	$173,600	$121,900	$299,400

NOTA:

Este capital representa el valor de los equipos de construcción, el capital de trabajo y el capital para imprevistos, y por tanto, es una cifra máxima. No es necesariamente cierto que éste capital permanezca intacto, pero sí estimamos que no sea menor de los US$ 118,000.00.-

POTENCIAL DE PRODUCCION- ASTILLERO



POTENCIAL DE PRODUCCION- VARADERO



NOTA DEL APENDICE:

El preestudio de las necesidades del astillero, de las extensas (e intensas) reparaciones que requieren las flotas, y del enorme volumen del mantenimiento, reveló el enorme peso que tendrá que sobrellevar los talleres de mecánica y carpintería.

Dado el capital que dispone INVEMANICA en estos momentos, solo puede disponer de US$ 25,000.00 para dichos talleres (más US$ 6,500 en equipos que ya poseemos) para dichos talleres, ya que en ésta etapa, el enfasis está en la construcción y una producción inmediata. Creo, sin embargo, que una inversión adicional en los talleres, son de vital importancia para una producción eficiente y de menor costo. El astillero, por naturaleza, demanda en una producción en serie, varios equipos sofisticados, un notable volumen de piezas de repuesto y capital auxiliar.

Podemos optar por comprar dichos equipos con las ganancias del primer año. Pero creo conveniente, que esta suma adicional se le incorpore al plan de préstamos iniciales, solicitados por la empresa.

L.[illegible]D.P./el


PATIO DE MATERIALES
PLANTAS ELECTRICAS
ALMACENES
TALLER C.
OFICINAS
AREA DE ASTILLERO (PROYECTADA)
SECC. 6
SECC. 5
SECC. 4
SECC. 3
SECC. 2
SECC. 1
MUELLE LATERAL
FASE II
FASE I
MUELLE DE TRABAJO

DIAGRAMA NO. 1
VISTA GENERAL



TALLERES Y OFICINA



ASTILLERO NO. 1

DIAGRAMA NO. 2

EDIFICIOS PRINCIPALES



ESPECIFICACIONES :

PESO NETO : 18 TONELADAS
CAPACIDAD : 82 TONELADAS
ESLORA : 20 METROS
MANGA : 10 METROS
TIEMPO DE MANIOBRA : ~ 15'

ESCALA

0 5 METROS



DIAGRAMA NO 3
CUNA PARA CAMARONEROS

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1	ED —	5	CA
2		6	
3	MO	7	D
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

S E C R E T 170017Z

ACTION

16 JUL 65 IN [redacted]8

DIR INFO MANA CITE WAVE 4049

TYPIC AMWORLD AMTABBY

1. FOLLOWING FROM AMTABBY-27 WHO AT 2130 HOURS 14 JULY 65 VISITED MRR OFFICES AND DISCOVERED ARTIME GIVING CLASSES ON "HUMAN RIGHTS," AND ANTONIO IGLESIAS ON STREET FIGHTING TO GROUP ABOUT 20 MEMBERS. INCLUDED IN GROUP WERE FREDDIE BORGES CAIGNET, EDGAR SOPO BARRETO (ARTIME'S AIDE), QUINTANA (MIL SEC) (POSSIBLY RAFAEL QUINTERO IBARBIA) GOILIOT (PROBABLY MANUEL GUILLOT DE LA SERNA) (FORMER MEMBER ALPHA SATT) [illegible]; NILO MESA (POSSIBLY NILO MESSER PUJOL).

2. ARTIME NOW DESCRIBED AS QUITE PLUMP, CHAIN SMOKER, VERY NERVOUS AND NEVER STRAYS FAR FROM PERSONAL BODY GUARD "GALLEGO" SAENZ. ARTIME WHO ON FRIENDLY TERMS A-27, GREETED WARMLY, ASKED WHAT HAPPENED TO KUBARK ASSIGNMENT WHICH PLANNED FOLLOWING A-27 LEAVING MRR. A-27 INFORMED ARTIME HAD TURNED DOWN KUBARK EMPLOYMENT AS INVOLVED ACTIVITIES NOT DIRECTED AGAINST PBRUMEN. ARTIME STATED HE LEAVING FOR ERUOPE ON 16 JULY FOR TWO WEEK TRIP; SIXTO "TITO" MESA ALOMA WHO DESCRIBED AS ARTIME'S "MONEY MAN" IN ERUOPE AS OF 14 JULY.

3. ARTIME HAS PURCHASED PICK-UP TRUCK FROM DUMAS MILNER, LOCAL AREA CHEVY DEALER, AND ALLEGED ACTING VERY CLANDESTINELY RE ACTIVITIES,

Secret IN 13378 Pg 2

ARTIME VISITS MRR OFFICES ONLY AT NIGHT, CHANGES RESIDENCES EVERY OTHER DAY OR SO. THESE ACTIONS PREDICATED ARTIME CONCERN THAT "SOMEONE OUT TO KILL HIM" AND FEAR ATTACK FROM SOME EXILES WHO CONSIDER HIM LIABILITY. HAS "RECRUITED" TWO INDIVIDUALS WHO PREVIOUSLY IN MRR CAMPS NICARAGUA, AND RECENTLY PAID EACH 350 DOLLARS REPRESENTING FIRST MONTH'S PAY. ALSO TOOK THESE TWO TO WAREHOUSE WHERE GREAT AMOUNT CRATES WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS MILITARY EQUIPMENT; MEN SAW NO WEAPONS. ARTIME CLAIMED EXPECTED ADDITIONAL SHIPMENT MATERIEL SHORTLY AND WANTED THESE TWO PREPARE EQUIPMENT FOR SHIPMENT TO MONKEY POINT, NICARAGUA, THEN PROCEED TO MONKEY POINT ASSIST REOPENING CAMP. ARTIME TOLD TWO MEN HAS SUPPORT (UNIDENTIFIED) HIGH ODYOKE OFFICIAL WHO TOLD ARTIME CARRY OUT THREE OR FOUR OPERATIONS. IF OPERATIONS SUCCESSFUL, ARTIME ALLEGED, HE TOLD HE WOULD RECEIVE FULL SUPPORT AS PREVIOUSLY, BUT ONLY IF "HE PRODUCES." ARTIME INFORMED TWO MEN THAT "WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN SECOND CHANCE; WILL NOT FAIL THIS TIME."

SECRET

CFN.4049 AMTAEBY-27 2130 14 65 MRR ARTIME ANTONIO IGLESIAS 20
FREDDIE BORGES CAIGNET EDGAR SOPO BARRETO QUINTANA RAFAEL
RAFAEL QUINTERO IBARBIA GILIOT MANUEL GUILLOT DE LA SERNA ALPHASAYY
NILO MESO NILO MESSER PUJOL GALLEGO SAENZ A-27 A-27 MRR A-27
EUROPE 16 SIXTO TITO MESA ALOMA 14 DUMAS MILNER CHEVY MRR NICARAGUA

SECRET

14-00000

IN 13378 [illegible]

350 DILLARS NO WEAPONS MONKEY POINT NICARAGUA ODYOKE NOT FAIL

BT

SECRET

SECRET

WH/C 65-303
19 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT : Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative in Frankfurt to contact the bank in Zurich to cable transfer the amount of $12,000 to the First National City Bank, New York, for credit to the account of Gregory Cardinal or Charles Ramsey.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (19 Jul 65)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/Exec
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

61

SECRET

WH/C 65-402
19 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT : Deposit to INWOVEN Account

Per attached voucher, it is requested that you deposit the amount of $12,000 to the INWOVEN account of AMBIDDY-1.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

Attached:
  Voucher

cc: WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (19 Jul 65)

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Addressee
  1 - WH/C/Exec
  1 - WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 24
TOTAL COPIES

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : C.E. Jenkins/bh
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EA
EXT : 4550
DATE : 19 July 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

87 SECRET

ROUTING

1	EA-	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	P
4		8	Z

13 JUL 65 22 43 Z

TO : JMWAVE MANAGUA SAN JOSE PANAMA CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WHK 8 INFO: VR . FILE, ☐ RID COPY WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA FI, FI/INT 2

~~SIG CEN~~

TO WAVE INFO MANA SJOS PACY CITE DIR 22330

TYPIC AMBIDDY AMTABBY

REF: WAVE 4049 (IN 13378) (NOT SENT SJOS PACY)

1. KINDLY IDENTIFY TWO INDIVIDUALS SOURCE PARA 3 REF. ANY OTHER EVIDENCE CRATES IN WAREHOUSE CONTAIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT? PLEASE DO NOT INDICATE UNDUE INTEREST THIS MATTER TO AMBIDDY-1 PEOPLE. S.C.

2. FYI, SO FAR AS HQS KNOWS AMBIDDY-1 IS WELL AWARE AMTABBY-27 WORKS FOR WAVE; SIXTO MESA HAS BEEN EUROPE SINCE 16 MAY ON VACATION AND PERSONAL BUSINESS; A-1 LEFT 16 JULY FOR NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA AND PANAMA FOR TWO WEEKS VACATION WITH SOME MEETINGS OFFICIALS ALL COUNTRIES; MRR HAS BEEN RUNNING RURAL CIVIC ACTION TRAINING AT NIGHT BECAUSE MEMBERS WORK DAYTIME; PURCHASED TRUCK TO SUPPORT TRAINING BY DEVELOPING SMALL MODEL FARM; A-1 PLANS VISIT MONKEY POINT TO ASSESS FOR POSSIBLE RURAL CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM IN RICE COOPERATIVES HE DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT SCHICK, ALSO POSSIBLE FISHING COOPERATIVE AT BLUEFIELDS; A-1 SAID HAD RECEIVED INVITATION VISIT PRESIDENT ORLICH AND DONMIN ODUBER; A-1 PLANS VISIT RURAL COOPERATIVE CENTER IN VERAGUAS PROVINCE HE HAS BEEN ASKED TO PARITICPATE BY BISHOP MC GRATH AND MR. GEORGE LODGE OF HARVARD, THEN TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT ROBLES.

3. A-1 CASE OFFICER, JAMES D. ZABOTH, PLANS MEET HIM MIAMI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 19-23 SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO :

PAGE 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 28980

AREA ABOUT 1 AUG. WILL DEBRIEF AND ADVISE ALL STATIONS CONCERNED HIS ACTIVITIES. WILL CONTACT WAVE BY PHONE ON ARRIVAL. WILL LOOK INTO MATTER OF POSSIBLE MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY UNANNOUNCED VISIT TO WAREHOUSE DURING VISIT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/2
WH/C/CA
WH/C/MO

by Jacob D. Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	EA	5	RR-OS
2		6	RE
3	CA	7	[illegible]
4	MO	8	[illegible]

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/C5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, SUSPENSE DC/WH/C, C/SOD, [illegible], DDP, ADDP, CSRF, C/CA 2, C/CA/OB, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 6, [illegible], C/WE 5, C/CI/PS

S E C R E T 220025Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO HAWA CITE WAVE 4156

KAPO[illegible]WORLD AMKNOB

[illegible]IGHT ACTION

DESENSITIZED

22 JUL 65 IN 16311

REF DIR 28960 *

1. AMKNOB-1[1] LEARNED FROM ALFREDO BORGES CAIGNET OF ANYUM[2] GROUP THAT AMBIDDY-1[3] AND WIFE VISITED NICARAGUA WEEK 11 JULY AND MIGHT RETURN MIAMI SOON. AMBIDDY-1[3] PLANS TRAVEL CENTRAL AMERICA IN ORDER MAINTAIN CONTACT THOSE GOVERNMENTS. ONLY ANYUM[2] BASE LEFT IS IN NICARAGUA WHERE ABOUT 50 TRUSTED MEN REMAIN. GROUP HAS ARMS AND EQUIPMENT CACHED THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. ACCORDING BORGES, ODYOKE[4] ASSISTANCE ANYUM[2] REDUCED "SEVERAL THOUSAND DOLLARS MONTHLY FROM HUNDREDS THOUSANDS MONTHLY." CURRENT SUBSIDY FOR PSYCH OPS, MAINTENANCE TWO PT BOATS, AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.

3. BORGES SAID THAT ALTHOUGH ODYOKE[4] HAS FORBIDDEN FURTHER BELLIGERENT OPS, AMBIDDY-1[3] PREPARING AGGRESSIVE OPS AGAINST PBRUMEN[5], ESPECIALLY BLOWING UP OF SPANISH, BRITISH, OR SOVIET SHIP INVOLVED PBRUMEN[5] TRADE. THIS BEING DONE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE ODYOKE[4]. AT SAME TIME AIR ATTACK BEING PLANNED AGAINST CUBA FOR 25 OR 26 JULY.

SECRET

SECRET in 11311 12-2

ACCORDING BORGES, AMYUM[2] HAS ACCESS TWO NON-AMYUM PLANES MIAMI AIRPORT UNKNOWN TO ODYOKE[4] SINCE AIRCRAFT HAVE COMMERCIAL COVER. (AMKNOB[1] SAID PILOT OF ONE MAY BE FRANK FIORINI.) AMYUM[2] GROUP GETTING FUNDS FROM NON-PBPRIME[6] SOURCE. (AMKNOB[1] SAID SOURCE MAY BE JESUITS SINCE AMBIDDY-1[3] HAS CLOSE CONTACTS CATHOLIC CHURCH AND RECENTLY VISITED ROME.)

4. AMBIDDY-1[3] ALLEGEDLY SAID ODYOKE[4] HAS DEFINITE PLANS WHICH WILL BE DECISIVE WHEN PLACED IN EFFECT BUT DETAILS UNKNOWN. AMKNOB-1[1] STATES BORGES CLAIMS KUBARK VERY BUSY INFILTRATING ARMS AND EXILES INTO PBRUMEN[5] SINCE SOME FORMER AMYUM[2] MEMBERS USED BY KUBARK THIS PURPOSE.

5. WAVE ATTEMPTING OBTAIN MORE INFO PLANS AMBIDDY[3] AND AMYUM[2] AND WILL FORWARD SOONEST.

6. WAVE PLANS NOT RPT NOT HAVE AMKNOB-1[1] PASS ABOVE INFO CUIS.

SECRET

CFN 3156 28980 AMKNOB-1 ALFREDO BORGES CAIGNET AMYUM AMBIDDY-1 NICARAGUA 11 JULY MIAMI CENTRAL AMERICA 50 PT SPANISH BRITISH SOVIET CUBA 25 26 JULY FRANK FIORINI ROME NOT HAVE CUIS

SECRET

BT

CS Comment: *AMBIDDY-1 (3) plans to visit Monkey Point to assess for possible rural civic action program.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29

34 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	SA-	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	2
4		8	2

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WHK 8 ☑ RID COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO

FILE VR, WH8, CI/CA, S:06, FI

S E C R E T 220025Z

DIR INFO MANA CITE WAVE 4157

22 Jul 65 IN 16327

TYPIC AMWORLD AMOT

1. DURING WEEK 4 - 10 JULY 65 ROGELIO JHONES AND LUIS H. VIDANA (PLS PROTECT) TOLD AMOT-120 FOLLOWING:

2. AMBIDDY-1 HAS TRANSPORTED STEEL BARGE LOADED WITH EQUIPMENT TO PORT EVERGLADES, FLORIDA. CARGO BELONGED DISMANTLED BASE NICARAGUA. AMBIDDY-1, USING KING (FNU) AS MEDIATOR, OFFERED TEOFILO BABUN OF ANTILLEAN MARINE SHIPPING CORPORATION BARGE FOR $25,000, WHICH 80 BY 27 FEET AND IN VERY GOOD CONDITION. BABUN DID NOT AGREE ON PRICE FOR BARGE BUT MADE OFFER FOR PURCHASE BOTH BARGE AND OTHER EQUIPMENT OF INTEREST HIM.

3. KING OFFERING SELL CONSIDERABLE RADIO EQUIPMENT, SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS, RAFTS AND BOATS, WINCHES, ELECTRIC GENERATORS, ALL OF WHICH KEPT IN TWO WAREHOUSES IN WAVE AREA.

4. ACCORDING PEDRO ACEVO, FORMER HEAD AMYUM'S BASE NICARAGUA, AMBIDDY-1 PLANNING SELL ALL EQUIPMENT THAT WAS USED IN NICARAGUA FOR HIS OWN PROFIT. WIFE OF AMBIDDY-1, IN TALKING WITH CLOSE FRIENDS, SAID HER HUSBAND THINKS HE WILL BE ABLE SELL ALL EQUIPMENT FOR $200,000, WHICH SUM ADDED TO THEIR SAVINGS OF $300,000 WILL MAKE

SECRET

SECRET

ITEM HOLDERS OF $520,222. SHE SAID THIS MONEY WILL BE AVAILABLE TO COPE WITH FUTURE EMERGENCIES.

5. ACEVO SAID HE KNOWS SOME OF AMBIDDY-1'S TRICKY WAYS HANDLING AMYUM FUNDS. AMONG THEM WAS ONE IN WHICH ACEVO APPEARED ON PAYROLL AS HAVING BEEN PAID $30 FOR SPECIAL EXPENSES. ACEVO CLAIMED HE NEVER RECEIVED ANYTHING MORE THAN HIS $400 MONTHLY SALARY. OTHER OF ACEVO'S FRIENDS ALSO APPEARED ON PAYROLL AS HAVING RECEIVED $30 DAILY, BUT THIS ALSO UNTRUE.

6. ACCORDING AMOT-120, VIDANA SAID THAT AMBIDDY-1 BLAMES KUBARK FOR HAVING BROKEN INTO HIS HOME RECENTLY. VIDANA, HOWEVER, SAID HE KNOWS IT WAS "COJO MORIN" WHO ROBBED AMBIDDY-1.

SECRET

CFN 4157 4 10 JULY 65 ROGELIO JHONES LUIS W. VIDANA AMOT-120 AMBIDDY-1 PORT EVERGLADES FLORIDA NICARAGUA KING (FNU) TEOFILO BABUN ANTILLEAN $25,000 80 BY 27 FEET NOT AGREE PEDRO ACEVO $200,000 $300,000 $500,000 $30 $400 $30 AMOT-120 VIDANA "COJO MORIN"

SECRET

BT

TRANSMITTAL
OF
TDCS INFORMATION REPORT 095

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIG. Marge Cora[illegible]	ROUTING				22 16 32
UNIT WH/C/RR/R[illegible]	1		4		
EXT. 5547	2		5		
DATE 22 July 1965	3		6		

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WHC 11

TDCS DB-315/02467-65

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO/H, WE 8, WH 15, SR 4

DATE DISTRIBUTED
22 July 1965

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
WAVE-4156 (IN-16311)
NP (AYKNOB-1)
Liaison *

DISSEMINATION

WHC/RE	3	WHC/SI	1	WH/PACY	1	WE/5/R	1		
WHC/RR	1	WHC/WAVE	2	WH/2/N	2	WE/MADR	1		
WHC/FI	1	WHC/EA	[illegible]	WH/MANA	1	WE/3/BC	2		
WHC/OS	1	WHC/CA/PP	1	WH/2/CR	2	WE/LOND	1		
WHC/MO	1	SE/RR		[illegible]	1	WE/R	1		

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR							

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

A-1 201

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/CA/Jenkins/Rohlfing (in draft)

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/C/RR

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

COPY NO.

FORM 10-64 1l-8 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA/CENTRAL AMERICA

TDCS DB-315/02467-65

DATE OF INFO. EARLY JULY 1965

DISTR. 22 JULY 1965

SUBJECT

ALLEGED PLANS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA TO BLOW UP A SHIP INVOLVED IN TRADE WITH CUBA; PLANNED AIR ATTACK AGAINST CUBA FOR 25 OR 26 JULY 1965

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (22 JULY 1965)

REF IN-16311

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: SELF-EMPLOYED FOREIGN NATIONAL WHO RESIDED IN CUBA FOR MANY YEARS PRIOR TO AND AFTER CASTRO'S ADVENT. HE RETAINS CONTACTS WITH CUBAN FRIENDS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED. SOURCE CLAIMS HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM ALFREDO BORGES CAIGNET, AN MRR MEMBER.

1. ACCORDING TO ALFREDO BORGES CAIGNET, A MEMBER OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MRR, MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY), MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, MRR LEADER, AND HIS WIFE VISITED NICARAGUA THE WEEK OF 11 JULY 1965 AND HE WAS PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO CENTRAL AMERICA AGAIN IN ORDER TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN MID-JULY ARTIME INDICATED THAT HE PLANNED TO GO TO NICARAGUA IN ORDER TO VISIT THE FORMER MRR TRAINING CAMPS AND TO LOOK INTO THE CURRENT STATUS OF A SMALL INDIAN-EDUCATION TRAINING PROGRAM BEING CONDUCTED BY HIS GROUP OF ABOUT FIVE MEN REMAINING IN NICARAGUA. FROM NICARAGUA, ARTIME PLANNED TO PROCEED TO COSTA RICA AND PANAMA TO LOOK INTO A NEW

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [illegible] USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR [illegible] DCS FBI
I&NS REPCINCLANT CIA/NMCC FAA COAST GUARD BORDER PATROL
CUSTOMS

CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM OF INTEREST TO HIM IN THOSE COUNTRIES. HE WAS TO RETURN TO MIAMI, FLORIDA, IN EARLY AUGUST.)

2. BORGES CLAIMS THAT ONLY ONE MRR BASE REMAINS IN NICARAGUA, WHERE THERE IS A GROUP OF ABOUT 50 TRUSTED MEN. THE GROUP HAS ARMS AND EQUIPMENT CACHED THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AMERICA.

3. ACCORDING TO BORGES, ARTIME IS PREPARING AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA, ESPECIALLY THE BLOWING UP OF A SPANISH, BRITISH, OR SOVIET SHIP INVOLVED IN CUBAN TRADE. AT THE SAME TIME, AN AIR ATTACK IS BEING PLANNED AGAINST CUBA FOR 25 OR 26 JULY. THE MRR HAS ACCESS TO TWO AIRPLANES AT THE MIAMI AIRPORT, WHICH DO NOT BELONG TO THE MRR; THE AIRCRAFT HAVE COMMERCIAL COVER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE PILOT OF ONE PLANE MAY BE FRANK FIORINI.) THE MRR GROUP IS GETTING FUNDS FROM A NON-AMERICAN SOURCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDS MAY BE THE JESUITS, BECAUSE ARTIME HAS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND HE RECENTLY VISITED ROME.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO. (ALSO SENT MANAGUA.)

END OF MESSAGE

23 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with George Lodge, Harvard School of Business

1. On 15 July 1965, with Mr. Andy Croce of CA Staff, I met Mr. Lodge at the Key Bridge Marriott Hotel to discuss what he knew about the relations among AMBIDDY-1, Bishop McGrath of Panama, and a rural development program they are all working on in Panama. Mr. Lodge described Bishop McGrath as a real ball of fire, about 39 or 40 years old, born of U. S. parents in the Canal Zone but he has taken Panama citizenship. He graduated from Notre Dame University, did graduate work in Rome and has taught in several European and Latin American universities, such as in Chile. He is one of the three top Catholic prelates in Latin America and has extremely close ties with the Vatican, e.g., he is on the Ecumenical Council and on the birth control group. He has an official operating budget of $2,000 per year which he augments from every conceivable source, particularly from the German bishops. He is politically and operationally minded, an American completely in his attitude and behavior, a typical Irish politician, Mr. Lodge submitted somewhat wryly. His parents are retired and live in Miami where he visits often. He recently met AMBIDDY-1 there on two occasions. On this same visit he also met the Papal Nuncio from Santo Domingo (he appears to receive most of the hot potato type assignments in his part of the world).

2. Veraguas Province of Panama is a selected testing ground for community development programs in rural areas. It is the poorest and most hopeless province of Panama, a small armed uprising took place there in 1958 and was put down. The Communists have their best organization in Panama in this province. The program there is based on the village of San Francisco, about 10 miles off the highway, and is an expansion of the efforts of the parish priest Father VASQUEZ

Pinto who has been thereabout 10 years. He is a dynamic young man who has lead the villagers to rebuild their village and church to develop their land and organize a cooperative and small credit facilities. The village is only 1,200 people but they raised by themselves $1,000 to buy materials and then built a training center capable of housing, feeding and training 60 men at a time in rural cooperatives and rural development. One of their ideas is to select bright looking leaders and potential leaders from rural areas, first in Panama and later, hopefully, from other nearby countries for visits of a few days in which they hope to brain-wash them of Communist type propaganda they may have heard and show them what can actually be done so they can take the good word with them to their own communities. This is in addition to the regular formal course of 4 months for selected young potential leaders from rural communities in Panama and all over Latin America.

3. Another leading light in the program is Father Steele who was thrown out of Dominica by Trujillo for organizing cooperatives and is a recognized authority on the subject. Father Steele uses Veraguas as a home base but travels to Chile, Colombia and other countries conducting short training courses on the ground. There are some Dutch priests on the staff whom Bishop McGrath personally recruited. Father Vasquez Pinto has sent about 10 to 15 local boys to the Antigonish School in Nova Scotia and they are back for duty. Mr. Lodge describes the group as a highly motivated and energetic group and Father Vasquez Pinto as a young and effective Panamanian priest who is a good operator. Mr. Lodge has two men from Harvard University there to study the program and assist in any way they can. The Peace Corps has 54 people in the Central Provinces of Panama, about 30 of them in Veraguas Province. They cooperate with the center, in fact the two Harvard men are interviewing each of the Peace Corps volunteers about their work. Mr. Lodge said they are coming up with some good information and ideas which otherwise would be lost as there is a good deal of experience among the Peace Corps kids but they don't know to recognize its significance or how to organize it into useable form.

4. The above group is trying to organize the center as a viable base with an effective staff to continue the training program even if the present leaders should move on. They hope it will become a pilot program for Latin America and that they will be able to seed other similar programs from

this one. They hope to be able to spot and develop leaders in remote areas for future operations in those areas. Incidental to these major objectives, they are also helping to develop the economy of Veraguas, to develop production, transport to markets, credit facilities, and in general to help alleviate grievances which the Communists have exploited in the past.

5. Bishop McGrath has arranged with AMBIDDY-1 for about six of AMBIDDY-1's people to attend the January 1966 training course, with 3 or 4 to remain on the staff. Hopefully, one of them will develop into the executive director of the center. It was agreed that the first man will not be too closely associated in the public eye with AMBIDDY-1 in order to try to forestall initial bad publicity from opposition elements. AMBIDDY-1 and Bishop McGrath agreed, therefore, that Nestor IZQUIERDO (who is well known as a long-time adherent of AMBIDDY-1 from 1958-59 Comandos Rurales days in Oriente) would not be assigned to the Panama center at this time. AMBIDDY-1 told Bishop McGrath that he would try to obtain sufficient funds to support the men assigned to the center. He has not yet brought up this matter with his case officer, and as the amounts will be very small, he may try to squeeze it out of his newly authorized budget. However, he may ask the Agency for additional help to sponsor these men while they are working their way into the program. It is intended that the Cubans would continue [illegible] cooperation in the program, eventually working them into the field wherever they are needed and acceptable.

6. Mr. Lodge will meet Bishop McGrath next in Panama on 29 or 30 July. As a coincidence AMBIDDY-1 will probably be in or near Panama around the same time, as he left 14 July for Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama for meetings with their presidents and several days visit in each country.

Carl E. Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File: ✓
AMCIVIC

CC: WH/PO/B
C/WH/2
CA STAFF - Close

3 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/3

ATTENTION : Jonathan Hanke, C/WH/3-Bolivia

SUBJECT : Eleodoro VENTOCILA Camara

1. On 29 July 1965 I discussed Subject with Major Lupton of Detachment "A" of ACSI Headquarters. In response to my direct questions Major Lupton stated the following:

a. ACSI is not using subject but they have been considering such use.

b. Subject is not working in Bolivia or anywhere else for ACSI or any other Defense Department component that Major Lupton is aware of.

c. ACSI was unaware that subject had been designating himself as a sort of public relations representative and press man in behalf of General BARRIENTOS.

2. I stated to Major Lupton that we held a poor opinion of subject, regarded him as an opportunist, and a possible candidate for "burn" action. Furthermore we were concerned about his alleged press activities in behalf of BARRIENTOS and felt if he were in anyway connected with a United States Intelligence agency and this became known, it could have an adverse affect on the extremely delicate political situation which now exists in that country and very well place the U.S. Government in an embarrassing position with respect to the Bolivian Government. Based on our views regarding subject I told Major Lupton that we would not coordinate any operational proposal ACSI might put forward aimed at using subject's services.

3. Major Lupton took the above in good grace and asked if it were possible for us to provide him with any information concerning subject's background and other details which would give ACSI a clearer picture of his activities. I told Major Lupton that I would look into this and let him know whether we

could comply.

4. In light of Major Lupton's request in paragraph 3 above, is there any material of such nature that is suitable for passage to his office?

Benjamin A.G. Fuller
WH/POA

c/p

SECRET

5 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD/Cuba

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal foc

SUBJECT : Payment to AMBIDDY-1 for Month of August 1965

It is requested that you approve a payment of $12,000 for the month of August 1965 to be given to AMBIDDY-1. These funds will be used by him for propaganda and political activity of the MRR, plus payment of support to dependents and survivors. In order to expedite getting the funds to AMBIDDY-1, the AMWORLD funding channel will be used until another mechanism has been established which can be more closely controlled by Headquarters.

Carl E Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

DC/WHD/C

cc: WH/B&F

SECRET

SECRET

WH/C 65-332
6 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA: Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT: Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative in Bern to contact the bank in Zurich to cable transfer the amount of $12,000 to the First National City Bank, New York, for credit to the account of Gregory Cardinal or Charles Ramsey.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: C/WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (6 Aug 65)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/Exec
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET

WH/C 65-329
6 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA: Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT: Deposit to INWOVEN Account

Per attached voucher, it is requested that you deposit the amount of $12,000 to the INWOVEN account of AMBIDDY-11

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

Attachment:
Voucher

cc: C/WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (6 Aug 65)

Distribution:
~~Orig & 1 - Addressee~~
1 - WH/C/Exec
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

13 AUG [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~KAPOK~~/SECRET

PROCESSING		
[illegible]	ACTION	[illegible]
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC, Operational/AMWORLD/AMLILACs
Report on AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AUG 1 3 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED - FYI

REFERENCE - None

1. In late July 1965 members of the AMLILAC Group reported the following information as a result of their contacts with various members of AMYUM located in the JMWAVE area.

A. AMBIDDY-1 has a warehouse in the WAVE area in which he is storing equipment brought back from his Central American base. The equipment includes UDT gear, boat motors, rafts, uniforms, and bulldozers. There are no weapons in the building.

B. AMBIDDY-1 is planning to put the BABUN PC into proper condition for use as a Mother Vessel. The vessel is now in Tampa. AMBIDDY-1 spent over $10,000. on this ship last year.

C. AMLILAC-8, a former AMLILAC who was fired a couple of years ago and who has been with AMBIDDY-1's group since then, was in the local area recently and told AMLILAC-6 that A-8 was the caretaker at one of the Bases in Central America along with 9 other men. He stated that they had all the weapons from the last effort and were preparing the camp for re-activation. AMBIDDY-1 told A-8 that $500,000. was available for the reactivation.

2. The penchant of PBRUMEN exiles for exaggeration, embellishments, and contortion of information (as can be seen from para 1 B, and C) continues to plague the remnants of AMWORLD and as a consequence gives rise to jealous fears on the part of the AMLILAC Group particularly as to the real state of AMWORLD. Such reports as those above and others when

~~19-124-27/3~~

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

CS COPY

Distribution
3 - WH/C

~~B 201-267437~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO

[illegible]

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
4 Aug 1965	AUG 10 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-22667

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-267437
19-124-27/3-4

CLASSIFICATION
~~KAPOK~~/SECRET

SITIZED

collected by the AMLYLACs - tend to affect the latters' morale and confidence in KUBARK because the AMLILACs believe that anything AMBIDDY-1 does is done with KUBARK support and blessing. As Headquarters is aware the great fear of the AMLILACs is that AMBIDDY-1 will get all the action and all the glory. However, in view of the current KUBARK/AMBIDDY-1 relationship the AMLILACs have little to fear and a renewed morale crisis is not expected to arise. On the other hand, if AMBIDDY-1 were to re-activate part of his action force and conduct a raid utilizing non-KUBARK support, that would be another matter. It would then be very difficult to convince the AMLILACs that KUBARK was not involved and their morale and confidence would be badly shaken. This situation is brought to your attention simply to show what effect such AMBIDDY-1 activities would have on this Station's painstaking efforts to retain a superior and experienced commando capability under already difficult psychological conditions.

Philip G. ELMARD

DESENSITIZED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROC. ACTION	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT
Possible Arms Purchases from AMWORLD by Bay of Pigs Veterans Association.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information.

References: A. UFGA-21947, 11 June 1965.
B. UFGA-22527, 30 July 1965.

1. On 21 July 1965, AMOT-237 furnished the following in AMOT Report BD-1521, which information he had received from ESIRE-1:

a. Juan Jose PERUYERO Rodriguez (201-294249), President of the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association, Alberto MARTINEZ Echenique (201-290790) and Ruben GONZALEZ de la Heria, are making overtures to buy arms from AMBIDDY-1. The Association's Directorate, and the membership-at-large, have not yet been told officially of this contemplated deal.

b. ESIRE-1 felt this information was partially confirmed by the following comment made to him by Luis Humberto VIDANA Guasch (201-274645) in a conversation: "What do you think that AMBIDDY-1 has been reduced to doing? He now wants to sell the arms he has left over from all that business he was mixed up in ... and to think that a person like him is receiving aid."

c. ESIRE-1 thinks it possible that the BABUN brothers may be the persons financing PERUYERO in the purchase of the AMWORLD arms. ESIRE-1 commented that PERUYERO would not dare tell him about buying any AMWORLD arms as he knows that ESIRE-1 would be opposed to such negotiations on the grounds that this would be immoral.

2. Previous reporting on AMWORLD/AMBIDDY-1 activities has indicated, as in Reference A, that AMBIDDY-1 was interested in buyers for arms and ammunition.

201-267437

Distribution:
3 - C/WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE TYPED
9 August 65

DATE DISPATCHED
AUG 10

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-22709

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-5-96

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

3. ESIRE-1's comment, about a possibility that the BABUN brothers may be the persons interested in purchasing the AMWORLD arms, ties in with the AMCRAG-1 information reported in Reference B that Teofilo BABUN, Luis Humberto VIDANA Guasch, and EMBARB-1 were acting as go-betweens for General IMBERT's Junta in the Dominican Republic and the recruiting of Cuban exiles in Miami.

4. On 30 July 1965 AMOT-14 reported in DD-1532 that AMLINT-1 had been in a local restaurant where he overheard a conversation between Alfredo BORGES Caignet (201-347593), now Immigration Secretary for AMWORLD, and Jose Luis SOSA Sancio (201-746587). BORGES told SOSA: "Be ready to go back to the place where you were before, because you will have to leave for there in the first four or five days of August. AMWORLD will function in the same manner as previously, but with more independence." BORGES also commented to SOSA that AMBIDDY-1 is the current owner of the Vizcaya Restaurant at 142 S.W. 37th Avenue."

Philip G. ELMARD

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	EA2	5	MO
2		6	
3	EI	7	D
4	CA	8	X

FROM SAN JOSÉ

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/CB, CI, CI/OPS, FI

201 Jenkins — for your

12 Aug 65 IN 31282

S E C R E T 122229Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE SJOS 7870

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED IN COSTA RICA 10 AUGUST ON TACA 773 FRROM MANAGUA.

2. PLEASE ADVISE STATION IF HEADQUARTERS STILL DESIRES TRAVEL OF SUBJECT.

SECRET

CFN 7870 MANUEL ARTIME BUESA COSTA RICA 10 TACA 773 MANAGUA

BT

SECRET

WH/2/CR-NIC
will answer —
I made Tele con —
CC

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFI TION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/C/CA - Attn: Don Rehlfing		
2			
3			
4			
5	A/1	201	
6	WH/3/Bolivia		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

See HOPW-4307 which is attached. ~~being sent to you~~. How much, if any, of the VENTOCILLA contact with AMBIDDY-1 do you think we might give to ACSI?

J. Hawke

Nothing now - Wait till (guy) pops up again + if we need more ammo to burn him we may use the 2/1 contact by him - 25 Aug

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WH/3/Bolivia - J. Hawke R-1034	13 Aug

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

TO Chief of Station, La Paz

INFO. Chief of Station, [illegible] 1
Chief of Station, Lima

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT Teodoro [illegible] [illegible] (201-[illegible])

P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. [illegible]-4651, 25 June 1965 (not sent [illegible])
B. [illegible]-81049, 3 June 1965 (not sent Lima and La Paz)

1. The long-delayed meeting with [illegible] took place on 29 July 1965 to discuss whether [illegible] has a serious operational interest in Teodoro [illegible] [illegible]. Headquarters was informed that [illegible] is not using Subject operationally but that they had been considering it. [illegible] was not aware that Subject has been representing himself as a public relations representative for General [illegible] BARRIENTOS, Co-President of the Bolivian Junta. [illegible] was informed that [illegible] had a poor opinion of Subject, regarding him as an opportunist whose dubious activities, ostensibly on behalf of the Bolivian Junta and specifically BARRIENTOS, combined with any covert relationship with [illegible] could, if discovered and exploited by leftists in Bolivia, have an adverse effect on the extremely delicate political situation in Bolivia. As a result, [illegible] was informed that [illegible] would not at this time be in favor of coordinating any operational use of Subject which [illegible] might propose.

2. For Lima: [illegible] said that the initial notification to [illegible] about Subject being handled by an [illegible] detachment in Lima was in error.

3. For [illegible]: [illegible] evidently has some sort of contact with Subject in the [illegible] area since his file had to be requested from their [illegible] representatives before the 29 July meeting could be held. Also, the information in reference B obtained from Subject was most probably gathered by him for transmittal to [illegible]. (The information about the Communist situation in Bolivia is completely erroneous.)

[illegible]

Distribution:
2 - La Paz, w/att ([illegible])
2 - [illegible], w/att ([illegible]-4651)
2 - Lima, w/att ([illegible]-81049)

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [illegible] - 4307	DATE 23 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER [illegible] - 53740

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
C/WH/3/Bolivia	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Distribution:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/[illegible]		

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	[illegible] - 4307

4. For La Paz: Has the Station checked on VERTOCILLA with the Junta contacts as requested in [illegible]? Depending on the results of such checks, Headquarters would have no objection if the Station were to provide liaison with sufficient information extracted from the traces on Subject forwarded with reference A to dissuade [illegible] from having any further contact with Subject. Please advise Headquarters of the action you take in this matter.

Ernest A. [illegible]

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT (AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA)
DATE: 17 AUGUST 1965
SUBJECT: FOREIGN PUBLICATION: PROCUREMENT
FOR INR/CS/FP
UNCLASSIFIED
NO FILE # GIVEN

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION	
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMOT/AMWORLD
Charges Against KUBARK in the Death of Roberto TRUJILLO Rodriguez.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information.

1. On 11 August 1965, AMTAUP-2, accompanied by Dr. Luis CASAS Martinez, former provincial commissioner of Camaguey, held a conversation with AMTAUP-1 in which he learned the information given below. This information was reported in AMOT Report DD-1562, 13 August 1965.

2. According to AMTAUP-1, Alicia TUDELA Sanchez is planning to bring up again the case of the the death of her husband, Roberto TRUJILLO Rodriguez, who died in the AMWORLD training camps which were under the direction of AMBIDDY-1. According to AMTAUP-1, TUDELA plans to blame KUBARK for the death of her husband. TUDELA claims details of her husband's death which she has in her possession will substantiate this accusation.

3. AMTAUP-1 also says that TUDELA is preparing to make an attempt on the life of AMBIDDY-1. She is receiving information from persons close to AMBIDDY-1 on all AMBIDDY-1's movements and is looking for a silencer to put on the gun she will use in this attack. AMTAUP-1 reports that he has attempted to calm TUDELA down and is trying to persuade her to give up the idea of attacking AMBIDDY-1.

4. AMTAUP-2 commented that AMTAUP-1 boasts that he is the one who obtained the information and proof against AMWORLD and KUBARK in the death of TRUJILLO and that he has this proof in his possession. AMTAUP-2 believes that it was AMTAUP-1 who steered TUDELA's accusations from AMWORLD towards KUBARK.

CS cy filed 201-743522

Philip G. ELMARD

201-267437

Distribution:
3 - WH/C

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
19 August 65	AUG 25 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-22868

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☑ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ ERNAL SE ONLY ☐ CON ENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/FIP GE 66	EXTENSION	NO. UFGW-5472	
		DATE 26Aug65	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/AN GA 50				201-267437 Subject: Manuel ARTIME [redacted] 6 to 1: Herewith document erroneously classified to 201-267457 subject of which is Nikoliy BARABULIYA ([redacted]), Attache at Soviet Embassy in Paris. Please review for reclassification to subject's 201-267437
2.				
3. RID/MIS				
4.				
5.				
6. RID/FIP GE 66				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-267437

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

SECRET

XX

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM

Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT

TYPIC/Operational/AMWORLD/AMLILACs
Report on AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED, REFERENCES

ACTION: At WAVE's discretion, pass para 5 to AMLILACs.

REF: UFGA 22667, 10 August 1965

1. As you know, the HQS AMWORLD case officer recently visited the WAVE area and went to the warehouse with AMJAVA-4 and his wife, described as a possible purchaser of some of the equipment. The warehouse is full of moldy and rusting camp and support equipment, most of it of no use in mounting raiding operations. There are outboard motors, small generators, engine spare parts, air drop equipment, bedding, etc. in addition to a large pen of baby chicks purchased by AMBIDDY-1 in his latest venture of training for rural civic development programs in Central America. There was one custodian working around the warehouse and taking care of the chickens. AMBIDDY-1 has also purchased an off-set printing press, for $10,000 according to him, which is set up a few blocks away. He plans to use it to print the AMYUM magazine, plus hopefully making some profit for AMYUM from it on commercial printing jobs.

2. AMJAVA-4 and AMBIDDY-1 both laughed heartily at the idea that the PC of BABUN could be converted to a mothership. This was considered and rejected several months ago when AMWORLD was still authorized to operate. They turned down the offer of the ship as a gift then on grounds that it would be uneconomical even if given to them free of charge.

3. AMBIDDY-1 said he did have a total of ten men in Nicaragua; five at Monkey Point guarding a cache of small arms and teaching the local Indians to read, write and grow rice; three men at Bluefields guarding a cache of small arms and working to develop a small boat yard for repair and maintenance of shrimp boats from which AMBIDDY-1 hopes to build a fishing cooperative; and two men at Managua with a smaller cache of small arms, one of whom is the AMYUM delegate to the Nicaraguan Government. AMBIDDY-1 kept about 150 small arms, with the knowledge and consent of HQS, in return for his giving back or accounting for the heavier and crew-served weapons and most of the small arms from AMWORLD. He claims that all three caches in Nicaragua are in concrete underground locations which are rigged

- continued -

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGW 5472 CS COPY

DATE: 23 August 1965

26 AUG 1965

201-267437

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: ~~201-267457~~ 201-267457

① - WH/C/CA/EA
1 - WH/C/Esec

ABSTRACT INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/C/CA/EA	CEJenkins	bh	4550

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/MO		
DC/WH/C/CA		
ADC/WH/C		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH		

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

for immediate destruction by the custodians should an attempt be made to seize them. AMBIDDY-1 said he had neither plans nor money to reactivate any bases, except as they might be used for local civic action type programs.

4. AMBIDDY-1 was advised by his case officer in strongest terms to sell or throw away everything from the Central American camps, to concentrate on trying to project a new image of himself as a constructive and progressive leader involved in community development and civic action type programs in Latin America by invitation of the local governments, and to stop talking or acting as a paramilitary operator. He was advised in even stronger terms to get out of the WAVE area as soon as possible to remove himself as a target of constant personal attacks against which he could not defend himself. He agreed in principle, subject to waiting three months for his wife to deliver their first child.

5. WAVE may assure the AMLILAC leader that, to the best knowledge of KUBARK, the AMWORLD program is dead, that AMBIDDY-1 has no real intention and only limited capability of mounting raids, and that anything he might do along the lines of paramilitary action would certainly be without ODYOKE support or blessing given the present political climate in HQS area.

6. FYI, HQS continues to try to influence AMBIDDY-1 to stay out of paramilitary matters entirely. To this end, we shall try to keep his top operational personnel otherwise occupied in KUBARK or other employment, to keep him as fully and usefully occupied as possible away from the WAVE and PBRUMEN area, and to convince him to sell or lease his two Swift boats to commercial enterprises or to another KUBARK program outside the WAVE area.

7. HQS will welcome continued reporting on AMBIDDY-1's activities from WAVE sources, which serves a useful purpose as a check and monitor for the case officer to compare and contrast with AMBIDDY-1's reports to him. In addition, we are recruiting the former AMWORLD Deputy for Support and Administration, who also serves as legal and political advisor to AMBIDDY-1. He is now residing in the HQS area, is back on the staff of a large university and has agreed to assist in keeping AMBIDDY-1 on the straight and narrow path following the lines of paragraphs 4 and 6 above.

ERNEST A. LUSBY

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

201-267437

SECRET

26 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : AMBIDDY/1 - 23 August 1965

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 discussions with General Anastasio SOMOZA, President SCHICK and other Nicaraguan officials, 24 Jul-20 Aug 1965.

1. A/1 first met with General SOMOZA 27/28 July. The following points were made in these discussions:

a. General SOMOZA said the State Department is making an investigation of how much money he is using to control the government and win the next presidential elections. SOMOZA told A/1 that he intended to run and fully expected to win the election, but would not need to buy any votes. He asked A/1 to please tell "Washington" that State is very clumsy and if they really want to know anything they should call on the Agency, or the FBI, either of which is much more effective. SOMOZA said everybody in Managua knows about State's efforts to block his candidacy and are laughing at them.

b. SOMOZA said he was meeting Daniel ODUBER of Costa Rica at the border shortly, and they would make a "non-aggression pact" agreeing that neither will make trouble for the other's campaign for election to Presidency. ODUBER had asked for the interview. SOMOZA told A/1 that he thought ODUBER had made a "live and let live" agreement with the Communists, and that at their meeting, he would demand from ODUBER a public denunciation of the Communists to be followed by effective control measures against them.

c. The MRR will be allowed to build and operate a small boatyard for construction, maintenance and repair of shrimp boats at Bluefields without SOMOZA or the Nicaraguan Government to be cut into the proceeds. This is part of A/1's community development program, aimed at developing a large fishing cooperative based on Bluefields which will be self-sustaining and profitable for the members and the local economy. SOMOZA also approved continuation of the basic education program being conducted by A/1's five man contingent at the old Monkey Point base and eventual development of that area as a rice-growing cooperative for the benefit of the local Indians.

SECRET

d. General SOMOZA, at A/1's strong recommendation, agreed to start pushing Civic Action programs through the National Guard in an effort to enhance his personal image preparatory to the next Presidential campaign. SOMOZA asked A/1 to assist and advise in this effort.

2. The next meeting with General SOMOZA by A/1 was on 4 August, with following points:

a. SOMOZA said that the latest program of Fidel CASTRO is targetted against Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. Part of the plan includes assassination of the presidents of the three countries as part of a terror campaign to soften them up. He said that in Panama, particularly, President Marcos ROBLES is a prime target but the Communists are exploiting a recent turn against him by the National Guard because he has cut down on their costs, pensions, and other privileges. If ROBLES is eliminated from power, the Communists feel the chief of the National Guard will take over and they thinking they can handle him more easily than they can ROBLES.

b. Source for above, according to SOMOZA, was a close associate of Marcial AGUILUZ, whom he described as the top Communist in Costa Rica and one who had recruited (fnu) FONSECA, a Nicaraguan now living in Mexico. FONSECA is a bastard son of one of SOMOZA's foremen, a Communist, and an agent working directly under order of Fidel CASTRO.

c. A/1 and SOMOZA talked again about a Civic Action program in Nicaragua and SOMOZA said again that he would support it. He will assign Father LUGO, a Cuban priest who served with the Bay of Pigs forces, to a position similar to a chaplain in the National Guard in order to assist in the program. SOMOZA will support MRR community development programs with whatever authorizations are required and with whatever official or personal prestige he may offer.

3. A/1 next returned to Managua on 17 August and met with Major PEREZ of the Nicaraguan Customs Service, a personal aide to the General. PEREZ said SOMOZA was very angry (not at A/1 or his people) and difficult to see. He said 3 Colonels were under arrest for 3 days each for disobeying orders. PEREZ was afraid to see SOMOZA for fear he might be arrested also. However, A/1 called SOMOZA by phone and was invited to visit him next day at Tipitapa. A/1 met him the next day (18 Aug) and had lunch with SOMOZA and (fnu) BENITEZ, a Puerto Rican, former politician there who is now in business but remains in contact with and working for the U. S. Government. After lunch, BENITEZ left

and A/1 went with SOMOZA in his car. While they were riding, SOMOZA told A/1 why he was so angry.

d. A message had recently come to General SOMOZA from the Nicaraguan Ambassador in Panama saying that he had it from authoritative sources that the U. S. not only would not support his candidacy for the Presidency, but would strongly oppose it. In addition, SOMOZA had word that Sydney ROSS, Director of El Tiempo (Spanish language newspaper in New York), after a recent interview with Asst. Secretary Jack Vaughn of the State Department, had an off-the-record talk with VAUGHN after the interview. VAUGHN had said that, so far as he was concerned, SOMOZA was no different from the other Latin American dictators such as TRUJILLO, PERON, DUVALIER, STROESSNER, Col. LOPEZ, or Gen. CASTELL Branco, and that he could certainly not support installing another military dictator in Nicaragua. The two reports were confirmatory in SOMOZA's mind and made him feel extremely bad as he said he has always talked favorably about the U.S. and tried to cooperate with them at every chance.

e. SOMOZA checked with the U.S. Ambassador in Nicaragua (whether in person or by sending Pres. SCHICK was not made clear) about the matter, and received a typical State Department reply that the U.S. was neutral in Nicaraguan internal affairs and would take no action about the elections. The Ambassador said he could not believe VAUGHN could have made such statements because of the U.S. position of neutrality in Nicaraguan affairs.

f. SOMOZA also said he had sent a message to Washington suggesting that if some of the other countries heard about themselves being lumped with TRUJILLO, PERON, etc. they might well call back their troops from Santo Domingo and tell Washington to go to hell.

g. He said he was going ahead with his plans regardless of what the U.S. does about it and reminded A/1 of Mr. J. C. KING's talk with him (SOMOZA) at the airport in Washington to let him know after the mistaken attack on the SIERRA ARANZAZU that Washington would understand if SOMOZA decided to kick A/1 and his camps out of Nicaragua. He used this as an example of an attempt from Washington to dictate to him which he had ignored, telling A/1 that he was a friend, would continue to be, and would continue to make his own decisions regardless of what Washington might want from him. A/1 made another strong suggestion that SOMOZA take off his uniform and start making public his civic action ideas. In addition, he again advised him to go personally to Washington to talk directly with VAUGHN and other U. S. officials to get the picture cleared up. A/1 said, "Let's try to get along with the Norteamericans, it's better to have them with us than against us." SOMOZA agreed, but said he had sent his brother, Luis SOMOZA, ahead.

h. The following day, 19 Aug, General SOMOZA called A/1 and said Luis had called him, reporting he had talked to Vaughn in Miami. Said Vaughn had denied talking to Sydney ROSS or of passing such information to the Ambassador in Panama. Luis said he dropped the subject at that point and talked about other things. (A/1 believes Luis could be fabricating as usual or could have botched up the interview if it did take place.) A/1 again strongly recommended that General SOMOZA make his own visit to Washington and talk to Vaughn and others in person.

4. On 19 August, A/1 interviewed President SCHICK for the Tridente (MRR news magazine). He had previously interviewed General SOMOZA. The interview reports will be relatively innocuous coverage of some of the major events of the day. The agenda of points for each interview is attached. A/1 intends to dedicate an issue of Tridente to each country which has helped the MRR, e.g. Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

Atts.

SECRET

INTERVIEW WITH HIS EXCELENCY THE CHIEF DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE ANASTACIO SOMOZA DERAYLE DIVISION, FOR THE TRIDENTE MAGAZINE

1. GENERAL, WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE TECHNICAL CAPACITY OF THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD?

2. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD IS DULY PREPARED TO FIGHT ANY COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE PLANS IN YOUR COUNTRY.

3. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE COMMUNIST DANGER IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

4. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE ROLE THAT THE ARMY SHOULD PLAY IN THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATES IN LATINAMERICA.

5. ARE YOU SATISFIEDWITH THE ROLE THAT YOUR TROOPS HAVE PLAYED AS INTEGRANT PART OF THE INTERAMERICAN PEACE FORCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

6. GENERAL, WE WOULD LIKE FROM YOU A FEW WORDS FOR THE CUBANS VICTIMS OF THE COMMUNIST TYRANY.

SECRET

INTERVIEW WITH THE EXCELENCY. THE PRESIDENT OF NICARAGUA, DR. RENE SCHICK FOR THE TRIDENTE MAGAZINE.

1. MR. PRESIDENT, YOU WHO HAVE BEEN AN EXAMPLE AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL, EVEN FOR YOUR PARTY'S OPPOSITION, YOU SHOULD HAVE IN YOUR GOVERNMENT WORK SOMETHING ELSE WHICH YOU CONSIDER THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE AND WHICH IS THE MOST LOVED ONE. WHICH IS YOUR MOST IMPORTANT WORK AND YOUR MOST LOVED ONE?

2. DO YOU HAVE FAITH IN THE CENTROAMERICAN COMMON MARKET? WHAT FUTURE DO YOU SEE IN IT?

3. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE DOMINICAN PROBLEM?

4. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE VIET NAM PROBLEM?

5. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE DANGER OF COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA IS DANGEROUS ENOUGH, AS FOR THE GOVERNMENTS TO HAVE IT AMONG THEIR PRINCIPAL PREOCCUPATIONS?

6. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THE WAYS OF FIGHTING COMMUNISM?

7. TO WHAT DO YOU ATTRIBUTE THE PREPONDERANCE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF NICARAGUA? IN THESE LAST YEARS?

8. WE WOULD LIKE A MESSAGE FROM YOU FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

SECRET

SECRET

27 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : AMBIDDY/1

SUBJECT: Vidal ESPINAL Herrero, possible CI suspect

1. Subject is a Spaniard who is believed to be working now at the Ron Carta Vieja factory in Panama City. He previously lived in Managua and worked for Colonel Miguel RUIZ Herrera (a Costa Rican sometimes employed by General Anastasio SOMOZA) as a specialist in guerrilla warfare.

2. About late May or early June, ESPINAL was drinking in a Managua bar and engaged one of A/1's delegation in conversation, not knowing who he was. He claimed to have been in Guatemala recently where he had worked with some "good people of the lower classes" in an attempt to overthrow the Guatemalan government. He quoted at length, and accurately, from Che GUEVARA and used examples, also accurately, for some Fidel CASTRO operations on how to overthrow a government. A/1's man played the part of a leftist sympathizer to elicit from subject. Through the Nicaraguan security service, the MRR people found out that Col. RUIZ H. claimed subject had come to him and presented himself as a GW expert saying he was willing to work for him in an attempt to make a coup against the government in Costa Rica. In early July, subject told Col. RUIZ H. that the Costa Rican operation was taking too long and nothing much was going on, so he was going to Panama from where he could be called back immediately when they were ready to go in Costa Rica. Subject had also been overheard to say in Managua that he had a special mission to assassinate a Central American president.

3. A/1 said the Nicaraguan service believes that Angelini's Restaurant in Panama City is a source of false passports for Communists. A/1 looked at the place on his visit in Panama and found it to be in a poor section inhabited by Communists not far from the International Hotel.

SECRET

4. A/1 said he reported the above information to Major ARAUZ, Chief of the Presidential Guard in Panama City. He was unable to see President ROBLES, who was away in the interior.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

27 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : AMBIDDY/1

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 meeting with son of Colonel PERALTA of Guatemala

1. On 24 July 1965, A/1 met with the son of Col. PERALTA, at his request, at the Lido Palace Hotel in Nicaragua. The meeting was arranged by General MONTIEL, chief of the Nicaraguan security service.

2. Young PERALTA said that his father had no faith in the Agency, and neither did he. They still think the Agency put Luis SIERRA to work with Roberto ALEJOS to overthrow Col. PERALTA. They are not satisfied with their liaison with the Agency or with the Embassy, and not at all clear on what U.S. policy or wishes are in connection with Guatemala. Col. PERALTA is willing to do whatever he is able to do, within reason, to meet U.S. expectations, if he only knows what they are, but he is tired of hearing how bad things are without concrete and constructive suggestions about how to improve them.

3. A/1 tried to reassure him, telling him that he (A/1) knew the Agency people in Guatemala very well (not true, of course) and could guarantee it was not true that they had supported ALEJOS or any other coup attempt. A/1 also asked Gen. MONTIEL to try to soothe young PERALTA.

4. A/1 said young PERALTA was in Managua to attend a meeting concerning tourism in Central America.

Carl. E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

SECRET

27 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : AMBIDDY/1

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 discussion with President ORLICH, Foreign Minister ODUBER and other Costa Rican officials, late July to mid-August 1965.

1. In late July, A/1 went to Costa Rica and met with President ORLICH, telling him the MRR was out of business so far as operations directly against Cuba are concerned, and no longer needs bases, money, or other support for such paramilitary activities. A/1 described the latest MRR program to combat CASTRO/Communist efforts in Latin America by engaging in community development and counter-insurgency activities. He asked only for help in projecting a progressive and constructive image and some basic prestige for the MRR and for himself. To that end, he reminded President ORLICH that both of them knew full well that in the whiskey smuggling scandals and coup attempts for which A/1 had taken the rap, not only was he not guilty, but had been, in fact, the first one to give the warning in both cases. In return for those past favors, he now wants Pres. ORLICH to put him together with Daniel ODUBER (the PLN candidate for president who will almost certainly be elected) in order to counteract the bad-mouth put on A/1 to ODUBER by Manolo RAY, Colonel FIGULS, and Teodore "Yo-yo" QUIROZ. A/1 proposed to meet ODUBER personally, and let him make up his own mind. Pres. ORLICH called ODUBER's office, but he was off politicking on the coast. ORLICH then sent A/1 with Colonel LIPPA (a good friend of A/1) to talk with ODUBER's secretary, who also is a good friend of Col. LIPPA. The secretary (actually a male assistant) said everybody talks about A/1 but nobody really knows him or very much about him. Some good liberal revolutionaries say he is a good man, others say he is a S. O. B. A/1 replied that was the reason he had taken the trouble to come to see ODUBER, that he would make his position clear himself and would be glad to confront any accusers if ODUBER so desired. The secretary said they were concerned about the campaign because the oppostion was uniting and was getting plenty of money from big businessmen. A/1 offered to help by printing posters, leaflets, and other campaign material if they needed it, free of charge at his "Quality Off-Set Printing Shop" in

SECRET

201-267437

Miami. He also offered to help Pres. ORLICH's secretary, Roberto MADRIZ, who may run for Deputy if he can be convinced to ignore his shyness and reluctance to make political speeches.

2. On 8 and 9 August, A/1 was again in Costa Rica and met with ODUBER, this meeting was arranged by Roberto MADRIZ. ODUBER admitted that he knew the Cubans were not guilty of the smuggling charges that had been levied against them. He also appreciated A/1's previous refusals to assist coup plotters and his help in squelching their efforts. A/1 said he told ODUBER, "I know you have been told I am a S. O. B. and I want you to see for yourself what I am and make up your mind. I know the people who have so described me and would like to meet you together with them so you can make your own judgement." A/1 said these opening remarks brought on ODUBER's replies about the smuggling and coup reports.

A/1 said he gave ODUBER a quick history of the MRR, what it has done, and what it stands for. He told ODUBER he realized they had not been close before, but he felt ODUBER and the PLN were the best choice for Costa Rica and therefore the MRR was prepared to support him in any way they can, including training, men and equipment. ODUBER asked for a specialist to do some training of his personal security group, and to furnish some walkie-talkie radios for them if possible. A/1 assigned Luis ARRIZURIETA Sardinas (201-298890), a member of the MRR delegation to Costa Rica, who is well-known and trusted by ODUBER, to full-time duty as a security adviser and trainer. A/1 also offered to donate one issue of Tridente, the MRR news magazine, to Costa Rica with favorable emphasis on ODUBER, and send free copies to Costa Rica. ODUBER also took A/1 up on his previous offer to print posters, etc. A/1 told him that the MRR people had heard of a Communist plot to trap ODUBER by waiting to the strategic moment and making a widely publicised declaration that they are supporting him completely. This would split the PLN and might lose the election for ODUBER, thus putting in a weak or reactionary group whom the Communists could control or overthrow. ODUBER said he would expose this scheme and get the jump on them by saying he doesn't want or need anything from the Communists. A/1 offered to help him with this through Tridente.

ODUBER said he would be a different president that was "Chico" ORLICH and will be more independent of the

U. S., dealing directly with other countries on Costa Rican interests instead of falling in line always with the U.S. and the OAS. A/1 mentioned Pres. ORLICH's offer to recognize a Government of Free Cuba if A/1 could manage to seize and hold a piece of Cuba and declare such a government. ODUBER agreed to honor the agreement, without committing troops, but through his good offices in foreign affairs. He agreed to exert moral pressure on the U.S. in behalf of such an undertaking, if necessary, by exploiting the favorable press and public attitude toward him in the U.S.

3. In A/1's opinion, ODUBER is not a Communist by any stretch of the imagination, nor will he be a later edition of "Pepe" FIGUERES. If he does take over, there will be many problems for the U.S. in contrast to the easy-going relationship with "Chico" ORLICH. ODUBER's personal circle includes a strong group of violently anti-U.S. people. One of them, according to A/1's delegation in San Jose, is (fnu) ZUNIGA, a government official who is the Costa Rican in charge of Alliance for Progress matters. He has been heard to say that if ODUBER were president, no Costa Rican troops would be sent to Santo Domingo nor would Costa Rica support OAS decisions forced by the U.S.

Carl E. JENKINS
WH/C/CA/EA

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION ON TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WH/C/CA		✓
2	WH/C/COPS		
3	DCWH/C		
4			
5			
6	WH/C/CA/EA		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1 - I talked to WH/2 people and got follow-up requirements - CET

2 to 6: I believe copies of these memos should go to appropriate stations for their info.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C. E. Jenkins 1908 - Ph. 6567	27 Aug

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-61

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282 (40)

SECRET

27 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : AMBIDDY/1

SUBJECT: Vidal ESPINAL Herrero, possible CI suspect

1. Subject is a Spaniard who is believed to be working now at the Ron Carta Vieja factory in Panama City. He previously lived in Managua and worked for Colonel Miguel RUIZ Herrera (a Costa Rican sometimes employed by General Anastasio SOMOZA) as a specialist in guerrilla warfare.

2. About late May or early June, ESPINAL was drinking in a Managua bar and angaged one of A/1's delegation in conversation, not knowing who he was. He claimed to have been in Guatemala recently where he had worked with some "good people of the lower classes" in an attempt to overthrow the Guatemalan government. He quoted at length, and accurately, from Che GUEVARA and used examples, also accurately, for some Fidel CASTRO operations on how to overthrow a government. A/1's man played the part of a leftist sympathizer to elicit from subject. Through the Nicaraguan security service, the MRR people found out that Col. RUIZ H. claimed subject had come to him and presented himself as a GW expert saying he was willing to work for him in an attempt to make a coup against the government in Costa Rica. In early July, subject told Col. RUIZ H. that the Costa Rican operation was taking too long and nothing much was going on, so he was going to Panama from where he could be called back immediately when they were ready to go in Costa Rica. Subject had also been overheard to say in Managua that he had a special mission to assassinate a Central American president.

3. A/1 said the Nicaraguan service believes that Angelini's Restaurant in Panama City is a source of false passports for Communists. A/1 looked at the place on his visit in Panama and found it to be in a poor section inhabited by Communists not far from the International Hotel.

SECRET

4. A/1 said he reported the above information to Major ARAUZ, Chief of the Presidential Guard in Panama City. He was unable to see President ROBLES, who was away in the interior.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

SECRET

27 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : AMBIDDY/1

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 meeting with son of Colonel PERALTA of Guatemala

1. On 24 July 1965, A/1 met with the son of Col. PERALTA, at his request, at the Lido Palace Hotel in Nicaragua. The meeting was arranged by General MONTIEL, chief of the Nicaraguan security service.

2. Young PERALTA said that his father had no faith in the Agency, and neither did he. They still think the Agency put Luis SIERRA to work with Roberto ALEJOS to overthrow Col. PERALTA. They are not satisfied with their liaison with the Agency or with the Embassy, and not at all clear on what U.S. policy or wishes are in connection with Guatemala. Col. PERALTA is willing to do whatever he is able to do, within reason, to meet U.S. expectations, if he only knows what they are, but he is tired of hearing how bad things are without concrete and constructive suggestions about how to improve them.

3. A/1 tried to reassure him, telling him that he (A/1) knew the Agency people in Guatemala very well (not true, of course) and could guarantee it was not true that they had supported ALEJOS or any other coup attempt. A/1 also asked Gen. MONTIEL to try to soothe young PERALTA.

4. A/1 said young PERALTA was in Managua to attend a meeting concerning tourism in Central America.

Carl. E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

27 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : AMBIDDY/1

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 discussion with President ORLICH, Foreign Minister ODUBER and other Costa Rican officials, late July to mid-August 1965.

1. In late July, A/1 went to Costa Rica and met with President ORLICH, telling him the MRR was out of business so far as operations directly against Cuba are concerned, and no longer needs bases, money, or other support for such paramilitary activities. A/1 described the latest MRR program to combat CASTRO/Communist efforts in Latin America by engaging in community development and counter-insurgency activities. He asked only for help in projecting a progressive and constructive image and some basic prestige for the MRR and for himself. To that end, he reminded President ORLICH that both of them knew full well that in the whiskey smuggling scandals and coup attempts for which A/1 had taken the rap, not only was he not guilty, but had been, in fact, the first one to give the warning in both cases. In return for those past favors, he now wants Pres. ORLICH to put him together with Daniel ODUBER (the PLN candidate for president who will almost certainly be elected) in order to counteract the bad-mouth put on A/1 to ODUBER by Manolo RAY, Colonel FIGULS, and Teodore "Yo-yo" QUIROZ. A/1 proposed to meet ODUBER personally, and let him make up his own mind. Pres. ORLICH called ODUBER's office, but he was off politicking on the coast. ORLICH then sent A/1 with Colonel LIPPA (a good friend of A/1) to talk with ODUBER's secretary, who also is a good friend of Col. LIPPA. The secretary (actually a male assistant) said everybody talks about A/1 but nobody really knows him or very much about him. Some good liberal revolutionaries say he is a good man, others say he is a S. O. B. A/1 replied that was the reason he had taken the trouble to come to see ODUBER, that he would make his position clear himself and would be glad to confront any accusers if ODUBER so desired. The secretary said they were concerned about the campaign because the oppostion was uniting and was getting plenty of money from big businessmen. A/1 offered to help by printing posters, leaflets, and other campaign material if they needed it, free of charge at his "Quality Off-Set Printing Shop" in

Miami. He also offered to help Pres. ORLICH's secretary, Roberto MADRIZ, who may run for Deputy if he can be convinced to ignore his shyness and reluctance to make political speeches.

2. On 8 and 9 August, A/1 was again in Costa Rica and met with ODUBER, this meeting was arranged by Roberto MADRIZ. ODUBER admitted that he knew the Cubans were not guilty of the smuggling charges that had been levied against them. He also appreciated A/1's previous refusals to assist coup plotters and his help in squelching their efforts. A/1 said he told ODUBER, "I know you have been told I am a S. O. B. and I want you to see for yourself what I am and make up your mind. I know the people who have so described me and would like to meet you together with them so you can make your own judgement." A/1 said these opening remarks brought on ODUBER's replies about the smuggling and coup reports.

A/1 said he gave ODUBER a quick history of the MRR, what it has done, and what it stands for. He told ODUBER he realized they had not been close before, but he felt ODUBER and the PLN were the best choice for Costa Rica and therefore the MRR was prepared to support him in any way they can, including training, men and equipment. ODUBER asked for a specialist to do some training of his personal security group, and to furnish some walkie-talkie radios for them if possible. A/1 assigned Luis ARRIZURIETA Sardinas (201-298890), a member of the MRR delegation to Costa Rica, who is well-known and trusted by ODUBER, to full-time duty as a security adviser and trainer. A/1 also offered to donate one issue of Tridente, the MRR news magazine, to Costa Rica with favorable emphasis on ODUBER, and send free copies to Costa Rica. ODUBER also took A/1 up on his previous offer to print posters, etc. A/1 told him that the MRR people had heard of a Communist plot to trap ODUBER by waiting to the strategic moment and making a widely publicised declaration that they are supporting him completely. This would split the PLN and might lose the election for ODUBER, thus putting in a weak or reactionary group whom the Communists could control or overthrow. ODUBER said he would expose this scheme and get the jump on them by saying he doesn't want or need anything from the Communists. A/1 offered to help him with this through Tridente.

ODUBER said he would be a different president that was "Chico" ORLICH and will be more independent of the

U. S., dealing directly with other countries on Costa Rican interests instead of falling in line always with the U.S. and the OAS. A/1 mentioned Pres. ORLICH's offer to recognize a Government of Free Cuba if A/1 could manage to seize and hold a piece of Cuba and declare such a government. ODUBER agreed to honor the agreement, without committing troops, but through his good offices in foreign affairs. He agreed to exert moral pressure on the U.S. in behalf of such an undertaking, if necessary, by exploiting the favorable press and public attitude toward him in the U.S.

3. In A/1's opinion, ODUBER is not a Communist by any stretch of the imagination, nor will he be a later edition of "Pepe" FIGUERES. If he does take over, there will be many problems for the U.S. in contrast to the easy-going relationship with "Chico" ORLICH. ODUBER's personal circle includes a strong group of violently anti-U.S. people. One of them, according to A/1's delegation in San Jose, is (fnu) ZUNIGA, a government official who is the Costa Rican in charge of Alliance for Progress matters. He has been heard to say that if ODUBER were president, no Costa Rican troops would be sent to Santo Domingo nor would Costa Rica support OAS decisions forced by the U.S.

Carl E. JENKINS
WH/C/CA/EA

14-00000

201

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3/p SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MADRID

ACTION: WH/SA 8 (WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1540, 2 JUL (J)

INFO : DOP, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, WE 6, WH 7, VR

~~MOB~~ INT SS SB
IOS PERS AR
~~EOB~~ RPTS LOG CA
~~OI~~ SI BF ~~EH~~
SEC NS

2 JUL 64 IN 20035

SECRET 021523Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE MONT CITE MADR 1194 (AUMONT ACTING)

TYPIC QUANTUM

1. QUANTUM RECEIVED CABLE FROM HABANA 2 JULY SAYING PARENTS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA IN SERIOUS DANGER. IF FATHER ARRESTED, PROBABLY WOULD BE SHOT.

2. QUANTUM SOURCE SAID ONLY WAY SAVE THEM WOULD BE FOR GOVT URUGUAY TO ORDER CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HABANA GRANT ASYLUM.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

201

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

HH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIG.	Marge Coraggio:es	ROUTING				
UNIT	WH/SA/Intel/Reports	1		4		
EXT.	5547	2		5		JUN 32 22 00 '64
DATE	2 July 1964	3		6		

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH/SA 11

TDCS-314/00124-64

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DODS, WE 4, WH 10

DATE DISTRIBUTED
2 July 1964

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

SA/R	3	SA/SI	1	WH/PACY	1	WE/5/R	1	MONT	#
SA/Int	1	SA/WAVE #	1	WH/4/U	1	WE/VADR	1		
SA/EOB	2	SA/SO/HH	1						
SA/CI	1								
SA/MOB	1								

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
MADR-1194 (IN-20035)
QUANTUM
Liaison K

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR						

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/SA/Intel

COPY NO.

FORM 10-63 1G-8 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA/URUGUAY

TDCS -314/00124-64

DATE OF INFO. 2 JULY 1964

DISTR. 2 JULY 1964

SUBJECT

SERIOUS SITUATION OF PARENTS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

PLACE & DATE ACQ. SPAIN, MADRID (2 JULY 1964)

REF IN -20035

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE.

1. ACCORDING TO A MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM HAVANA, CUBA, ON 2 JULY 1964, THE PARENTS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, LEADER OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO (MRR, MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY), ARE IN SERIOUS DANGER, AND IF THE FATHER IS ARRESTED, HE WILL PROBABLY BE SHOT. (SPANISH SERVICE COMMENT: THE INFORMANT SAID THAT THE ONLY WAY TO SAVE THEM WOULD BE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF URUGUAY TO ORDER ITS CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN HAVANA TO GRANT THEM ASYLUM.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XIS USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO FBI INS TREASURY

SECRET

3 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 June 1964 at 2130

1. I was called at home by the security officer and informed that AMBIDDY-1 wished to speak to me. When I returned A-1's call he mentioned that he would be leaving for Costa Rica on 1 July. AMJAVA-4 would be remaining in Miami for four or five days to get the new reorganization under way. A-1 asked if we could intercede with INS in facilitating the departure of four or five of his men who wish to leave for the camps. A-1 was informed that we would be unable to take any action until the names have been submitted to us.

2. A-1 asked that we assist in obtaining a visa for Inocencio ALONSO Ramirez who will be sent to Mexico. Alonso will replace Pineda in the job that he was originally going to do. A-1 would prefer that Alonso have no contacts with any other Cuban exile organization while in Mexico.

3. A-1 stated that some of the MRR secretariats would need at least one or two weeks to wind up their affairs in Miami. A-1 was advised that we realize the dismantling of MRR in Miami could not be done over night. However, any procrastination would be viewed as an act of bad faith.

4. I informed A-1 that the ADELAIDA is being insured for $14,000 per annum. A letter of confirmation from the Consejo would be sent shortly.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

5. In concluding our telephone conversation A-1 stressed that he would like to meet Mr. Archer in August to report on the reorganization and improvements of his movement.

6. A-1 asked when he could meet with Carl in Latin America. I again reminded him that any time he wishes to meet with any of the Headquarters personnel he needs only to send us a message.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Inocencio ALONSO Ramirez - 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

6 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

VIA : Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Proposed Meeting between Chief, WH and AMBIDDY-1 in August 64

1. AMBIDDY-1 has expressed a desire to meet with Chief, Western Hemisphere Division after the raids in August 64.

2. We have replied via AMJAVA-4 that Chief, WH will be glad to meet with AMBIDDY-1 at that time.

3. We intend to hold on to the Maryland safehouse until after the meeting has taken place. Preferably AMBIDDY-1 should be routed via San, Puerto Rico, to Baltimore Friendship Airport whence he would be picked up at a nearby motel and taken to the safehouse.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/MH

HDH/gt (6 July 64)

Distribution:
Orig - C/WHD

File:

SECRET

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

VIA : Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--AMBIDDY-1, Personality and Handling Problems

1. Has AMBIDDY-1, who is the linchpin of AMWORLD, acquitted himself well so far and by and large lived up to our expectations? The answer to this question is a qualified "yes."

2. Not having been selected by CIA as the man most likely to rally the best elements of the Cuban exile community round his cause, AMBIDDY-1's disappointing showing as a political figure should come as no shock to anyone.

3. AMBIDDY-1 never claimed that remnants of his movement inside Cuba were active or could be directed from abroad.

4. AMBIDDY-1's ability to enlist and organize some good activists has been successfully put to the test. Given the extent of American help (and our methodical harassment of competing action groups), to have accomplished less would have been difficult to excuse.

5. AMBIDDY-1's personality was formed in the crucible of student conspiracy against Batista, American exile, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, two years imprisonment under sentence of death and, since July 1963, headship of an unconventional warfare mechanism supported by the United States. He is a man of many engaging traits: Sincerity of demeanor, seeming ability to place events in a broader context of history, ready wit and self-depreciation, empathy based on shrewd evaluation of his interlocutors, to mention a few. Subjected

SECRET

[illegible] downgrading and declassification to stress or suffering misfortune, some of the obverse traits begin to show: Uncontrollable outbursts of fury, impulsive reactions, peevish vindictiveness and self-pity (none of which have been observed by us firsthand).

6. Imbued with a somewhat shallow philosophy, AMBIDDY-1 is prone to tailor ideas to what he strives to accomplish at any given moment and to the impression he desires to leave with his opposites. Since he rightly views his relationship with the Americans as crucial toward the achievement of main goal, viz., to overthrow and succeed Castro, his pronounciamentos usually hew close to what he conceives to represent the main lines of American thought.

7. AMBIDDY-1's personality feeds on adulation and surface manifestations of loyalty, despite the fact that he claims to view loyalty to his person as ephemeral and as under continuing threat of subversion, especially by his American allies. To the extent possible, we have attempted to assuage his preoccupations on that score.

8. In the final analysis, AMBIDDY-1 trusts only himself and views even his closest associates as mere pawns whose relative value fluctuates as the chess game progresses.

9. Endowed with an inquisitive and retentive mind, AMBIDDY-1 has a remarkable knowledge of facts which in any discussion he ably marshals and articulates.

10. AMBIDDY-1's views of things American is conditioned by his quest for a key position in the struggle to overthrow Castro. Hence, any advice is selectively accepted or (usually tacitly) rejected, depending on whether it serves to strengthen that position. There is, of course, nothing reprehensible about this.

11. AMBIDDY-1 relates to his environment in essentially conspiratorial terms. His world is peopled with demons and saints, the latter frequently epitomized by CIA, the former by the Department of State. All American moves toward himself and his organization are interpreted by him in those terms.

12. AMBIDDY-1 probably fancies himself as an adept student of human behavior. Applying as a gauge his choice of intimates and bedmates, he appears to be capable of committing appalling blunders in his judgements of human nature.

SECRET

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

13. AMBIDDY-1 has permitted himself to get snared in a web finely spun by a squad of hardened veterans of Havana's halfworld. This can be analyzed as manifestation of rank immaturity. More difficult to explain is that AMBIDDY-1 has relinquished control over this affair to an extent where it now threatens his life's work. In AMBIDDY-1's PRQ II we predicted, more boldly than wisely, that he would not get caught up in female entanglements. While we did not underrate the power of sex, we probably overrated AMBIDDY-1's character and motivation.

14. In a project which may have vast consequence as regards the security of the United States (transcending by far its intrinsic value as an unconventional warfare instrument) we, of course, have to take into consideration the possibility that AMBIDDY-1 could be working for the other side--either now or later. We view this possibility as most unlikely, yet feel somewhat remiss in not having paid much attention to what transpired between the landing at Playa Giron and the Rose Bowl ceremony. There has been some talk about his having undergone marked personality changes during that period in his life, but we actually do not know whether and, if so, to what extent hispsyche suffered damage.

15. AMBIDDY-1's aged parents live in Cuba. He professes intense filial devotion toward his mother. Thus, Castro has in his power two valuable hostages. We havehad some frank talks with AMBIDDY-1 about this subject and he knows that we are not unmindful of the purpose to which such hostages can be put. We have received no indications that pressures have as yet been brought to bear upon AMBIDDY-1, nor do we have any concrete reason for believing that such pressures would be of much avail.

16. AMBIDDY-1's intense love of country strikes me as unfeigned. In the light of his resistance record and feats of personal sacrifice, we doubt whether he could consciously bring himself to harming Cuba. His hatred of Castro stems in the main from the latter's betrayal of the revolution. AMBIDDY-1 frequently mentions Cuba's subvervience to the USSR as the darkest betrayal of all, but also voices exception to other aspects of Castro's tyrany.

17. Can we take AMBIDDY-1's professions of faith in democratic principles and the Constitution of 1940 at face value? I submit that we not do so as long as we are unable

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

to fathom the bedrock of his political convictions. I am reluctant to accept his writings and the program of the MRR as a valid base for judgement in this regard. In the final analysis, it may turn out that what animates AMBIDDY-1 in his unwavering opposition to Castro is the fact that as long as Castro is "in" AMBIDDY-1 is likely to remain "out." That, for purposes of justifying our support to him, may suffice.

18. Our methods of handling AMBIDDY-1 will have to remain circumscribed by the imperatives of autonomy. He cannot be treated as a controlled agent without making a mockery of autonomy.

19. One of the benefits we have reaped from autonomy is that the American position vis-a-vis AMWORLD and particularly the elements of self-interest which animate us in supporting this project can be clearly spelled out without necessarily jeopardizing the project.

20. AMBIDDY-1's manifest dependency upon American goodwill, while an element of latent control and as such recognized by AMBIDDY-1, ought not be kept in the forefront of our dealings with him inasmuch as it injects another element of instability which forces AMBIDDY-1 to worry about his rear whereas he ought be concentrating on his front. Too frequent harping on the consequences of American displeasure cannot serve to forward our project.

21. AMBIDDY-1 has been known to make quite a fetish of his resentment at deceptive promises and broken commitments. Our record in this respect, while not unblemished, is fairly good. We can see no merit in practicing deception and much to commend candor in dealings with him. AMBIDDY-1's own record of living up to commitments is somewhat marred by his shortcomings as an organizer and administrator. There have been no instances of demonstrable bad faith. However, seeming indications of assent on his part are frequently meant to denote no more than that he comprehends what has been said.

22. In providing AMBIDDY-1 with political guidance, we should strive to relieve him of all preoccupation with the vagaries of United States foreign policy and to discourage sterile demonological speculation.

23. Hopefully, recent realignments within AMWORLD will serve to usher in a period of political tranquility

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

in CIA's relations with AMBIDDY-1. For purposes of AMWORLD, the task in hand is in the realm of paramilitary and not political warfare.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: DC/WH/SA

HDH/bh

Distribution:
  Orig - Addressee
      1 - AMBIDDY-1 201
      1 - Policy File
      1 - Counterintelligence File

cc: COS, JMWAVE

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

V SECRET

ROUTING

1	~~WH~~	INT	4 SS	SB
2			5	
3		ICS	6 ~~PERS~~	~~AR~~
	EOB	RPTS	LOG	CA
	CI	SI	BF	(EE)
	☐		SEC	WS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : *DDP, C/WH, VR

201 WS

SECRET 061835Z

DIR INFO MANA WAVE CITE SJOS 6865 6 Jul 64 IN 21980

RYPIC AMWORLD

ON 3 JULY TACA CARRIED FOL CUBANS TO MANA: MANUEL FRANCISCO ARTIME BUESA; JACINTO LUZARRAGA GARCIA.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT YOBITE CABLES.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

SECRET

AMWORLD Meeting in Panama, 10 July 1964

SUBJECT: Photographs of Adelaida Padron y Cruz

The subject of photographs of AMBIDDY-1's mistress was not raised by him at this meeting. He made no reference to Adelaida, and I did not bring up the subject. I did get the impression on no basis in particular that he was not concerned about the problem of Adelaida and apparently she is settled in Managua and not causing any problems at the moment. As the subject was not discussed, however, I would like to state that as a nebulous personal opinion, not as a reporting of fact.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Padron - 201
AMBIDDY-1 - 201

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

7 [illegible] f.-1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMWORLD--Identity [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : UFGW-3963, 29 June 1964

1. WAVE has determined that IDEN presently resides at 881 N.E. 71st Street, Miami. The house she lives in has a "For Sale" sign on it by a real estate broker named Henry Chamberlain whose office is located at 7768 Biscayne Blvd.

2. WAVE has checked the public records pertaining to the above property and the following information was obtained:

A. "The property is reported being located at 881 N.E. 71st Street, Lot 124, Washington Place, Plot Book 20, Page 54. The house was built in 1943 and purchased on 4 May 1951 by Miriam C. Humes for $19,000. Miss Humes married John C. McCarthy on 4 October 1961. The couple got a mortgage from First Federal Bank, Miami, for $12,400, at which time the house was appraised for $18,475. McCarthy died on 15 August 1962, and the title is now in the name of Miriam C. McCarthy. She has approximately $6,000-$7,000 in equity. Present mortgage is $11,495.57, and she pays $87.00 per month."

3. WAVE was unable to obtain any information regarding AMBIDDY-1's interest, if any, in the property. It is possible that he intends to purchase some other property. WAVE will continue to check all leads regarding houses in Miami of interest to AMBIDDY-1 and will inform Headquarters of the results.

201-267437

Attachment - USC
IDEN Sheet

ATTACHED

Distribution:
3 - Addressee
Att. - USC

CS COPY

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

~~19-124-27/3~~

1 att.

DESENSITIZED

ANKE	FI	
~~RI~~	~~DG~~	
ABSTRACT		~~INDEX~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
21 Jul 64	JUL 27 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-17035

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

CLASSIFICATION
DESENSITIZED
SECRET

SECRET

RYBAT
DESENSITIZED

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
TO UFGA-17035

IDENTITY - **Adelaida PADRON y Cruz**

[illegible]
✓ 3-WH/SA

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

~~DESENSITIZED~~

S/C att. 1 UFGA-17035 CS COPY 201-267437

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
new	7957	DATE 27 JUL 64

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/AN			ke	Please reclassify into 201-267437
2. RID/MIS			CT	
3.				
4.				
5. RID/Files				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				Subj. ~~This~~ is
11.				Mrs. AMBIDDY-1
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

29 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/Security

SUBJECT : (Artime) Buesa, Manuel Francisco
201-210838

1. It is requested that the sterile telephone answering service on Washington, D. C. telephone number 638-4640 be extended until 25 September 1964.

2. It would be appreciated if your office handle the necessary arrangments to extend the answering service.

Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/SO/HH

R.J.Hernandez/gt (29 July 1964)

File:

Telephone Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

SECRET

29 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reported Marriage of AMBIDDY-1

SAMBORA has received conflicting reports concerning the possibility that AMBIDDY-1 has married Adelaida PADRON. One of the reports stated that AMBIDDY-1 married Adleaida in Miami during the first part of July. Another report originating from Sixto Mesa reported that AMBIDDY-1 was married in Costa Rica during the latter part of July.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
SAMBORA - 201
AMBIDDY-1 - 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AMWORLD Meeting in Houston, 31 July

SUBJECT: Status of AMBIDDY-1's Parents

AMJAVA-4 stated that he had received in Miami a letter from the Spanish Consul in Cuba that AMBIDDY-1's parents had planned to come out of Cuba before the Pilon raid. Afterwards they felt that it would be too dangerous and had stayed in place. Now orders are out to find them and to pick them up. The Spanish want them to take refuge in the Mexican Embassy at the earliest moment. The Spanish say that they can arrange to deliver the aged couple to the Mexican Embassy. The question is, can we at HQS check with the Mexican Government to try to arrange that they guarantee to receive and afford safe travel to Mexico for AMBIDDY-1's parents. I agreed to investigate but gave no commitment or real hope of any success.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

31 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMJAVA-4
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 31 July 1964, 1300 hours

1. AMJAVA-4 complained that the regular budget funds for August had not arrived at their bank and inquired as to the reason for the delay. Martin stated he would check into the matter and Carl would have the explanation at their meeting tonight. In the meantime, A-4 will ask AMWORLD-2 for a loan. A-4 also asked for an itemized account of the deposits still remaining in Bank Account II.

2. A-4 claimed he spoke to Mr. Summ recently concerning the exit of AMWORLD personnel from Miami. According to A-4 it is presently impossible for their people to leave.

3. A-4 asked that we obtain radio cryptographic pads since their supply is running short.

4. A-4 stated that ADELAIDA is being repaired at their base and, in his opinion, the ship will be able to carry out operations in the early part of August. A-4 suggested that Mr. Mitchell go to the base and talk to Francisco NIN Morales who is handling the repairs on the ADELAIDA. A-4 felt that these are only temporary repairs and the ADELAIDA will have to go into drydock. A-4 believes that a meeting of the minds between Mitchell and Nin would be beneficial on how to best keep the ADELAIDA operational. The undersigned stated he did not know if this would be possible for security reasons and the results would be passed through Carl.

5. A-4 stated he had received the spare parts for the 50 caliber machine guns and the 20 mm. cannons.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

6. According to AMJAVA-4 Carrillo has paid all the bills of Talaria.

7. A-4 deported that AMBIDDY-1 was married in Nicaragua on 13 July. A-4 was asked to convey our best wishes.

8. Carl stated he would meet A-4's flight into Houston. In the event they did not meet at the airport, A-4 was to proceed to the usual place.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMJAVA-201
Conversations
ADELAIDA
AMBIDDY-1 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged security
changed privacy code

SECRET

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

R.D. SANCHEZ/gt
WH/SA/SO/HH
6 August 64
34477

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/2

ROUTING

CI

SPC HS

TO: PANAMA CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible]/SAB

INFO: DDP, [illegible], VC, [illegible] Admin

A-1 201

TO: PRIORITY PACY

INFO

CITE DIR 40248

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF: DIR 40165

FOR JENKINS:

1. MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM AMBIDDY-1, ETA PANAMA 7 AUGUST.

2. ALSO RAISES SUBJECT PARENTS DIFFICULTIES IN PBRUMEN AND ASKS IF WE CAN ARRANGE ASYLUM THRU MEXICANS. WHILE MOST SYMPATHETIC AMBIDDY-1 PERSONAL PROBLEM, SEE NO WAY SECURELY INTERCEDE HIS BEHALF WITHOUT COMPROMISING RELATIONSHIP AND INDICATING ODYOKE INTEREST TO MEXICANS.

END OF MESSAGE

W Hood
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

Halpern
SAMUEL HALPERN
ADC/WH (SA)

RELEASING OFFICER 63

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : YOGURT (TEMP FOR MR SANCHEZ WH/SA 0300 6 Aug

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 2

INFO : DDP, VR

6 August

SECRET 060545Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE YOGU 1304

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPE

AMWORLD LASBAR TYPIC

FOLLOWING RECEIVED AT 06/0540Z

GROUPS 53

Fackan

201

IMMEDIATE

IN 44129

FOLLOWING RECEIVED ON THE AMBIDDY PRIVACY LINK (THO NOT SLUGGED AMBIDDY)

XXXX SEIXK ENTER ADOPO RGALL INAKG AJLIN AMISP ADRES TIENE

SITU ACION DIFIC ILRFT DIFIC ILENC UBAKC UBAKS UPLIC OLESV

RSIK SIPUE DENCO NSEGU IRCON GESTI ONESE NEMBA JADAD EMEJI

[illegible] [illegible]COE NCUBA KCUBA CMAAS ILUPA RAELL CSKIR EALFA MANZA

APAR AVERA LFACA RLOSK CARLO SCMAV IERNE SSIET EKGRA CGASK

EVO

END OF AGENT MESSAGE

SECRET

TRANSLATION

Informed my Omar that my parents are having difficult situation in Cuba. I request you see if arrangements can be made with Mexican embassy in Cuba for their asylum. I will go to Panama 7 Aug. to meet Carl. Thank you. Ignacio

SECRET

SE

AMWORLD Meeting in Panama City, 8 August 1964

SUBJECT: Parents of AMBIDDY-1

In connection with his parents I told AMBIDDY-1 that my HQS had investigated the possibility of intercession with Mexico in their behalf. Our considered opinion was that this would not serve a useful purpose and might be counter-productive. The relations with Mexico are strained at present because of their adverse vote in the OAS meeting and my people could see no way in which they could intercede without directly indicating an official U. S. Government interest in AMBIDDY-1 himself. He agreed that this was probably the situation. He asked only if in my opinion we might be able to assist in expediting their entry into the United States as refugees seeking asylum in case they were able to make their way to Mexico. I stated that in my opinion we would be able to assist in such a situation.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

13 SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
CI
SI
RI
SPC
MS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PANAMA CITY

ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

S E C R E T 072130Z

DIR CITE PACY 4244

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REF: A. DIR 40165 [illegible]

B. DIR 40248 - A-1 201

C. DIR 40297 [illegible]

D. DIR 40466 [illegible]

E. DIR 40534

8 Aug 64 IN 45982

1. REFS DISCUSSED WITH ZABOTH 6-7 AUG. HE WILL TAKE UP WITH AMBIDDY-1 8 AUG.

2. LAROUSSE ADVISED STA 7 AUG THAT 60-DAY TOURIST VISAS OF AMWORLD DC-3 CREW EXPIRED THAT DATE. COULD EXTEND VISAS LOCALLY BUT THIS WOULD REQUIRE SPECIAL APPLICATION AND SUBJECT CREW TO TAX DECLARATIONS AND OTHER RED TAPE TO SECURE EXIT PERMITS LATER. ZABOTH AND STA AGREED PREFERABLE CREW RETURN MANA AND SECURE NEW VISAS THERE. LAROUSSE SO ADVISED. ZABOTH WILL BRIEF AMBIDDY-1 THIS ASPECT AND A-1 WILL DIRECT CREW RETURN PACY AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM IN NIC.

3. ZABOTH ETD PACY 9 AUG. WILL CALL FROM HOUSTON.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CS COMMENT: *AMBIDDY-1 DELAYED UNTIL 8 AUG DUE VISA PROBLEMS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER [illegible]

DESENSITIZED

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:
UFGA-14759, 21 August 1964

SUBJECT: Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa

DATE : 15 July 1964

FROM : Carlos A. RIVERA

A few days ago I was able to read a report on the activities in large scale of Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, and the beginning of his intimate relations with his present mistress.

Of this report I can mention the most outstanding passages as I had to memorize them.

"Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa takes his first steps in the public life as Political Sargent of the 'Partido del Pueblo Libre' (Party of the Free People) whose leader at that time was Dr. Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling.

Later he directed his activities in the fight against General BATISTA, going in the Sierra Maestra where he was apointed Lieutenant by Major Humberto SORI-MARIN.

He was appointed Lieutenant because of his friendship with Major SORI-MARIN, because he was catholic, and because of the lack of trained persons in the Sierra Maestra.

There are more news on Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa when he published the open letter in the newspaper "Avance" denouncing the Castro Regime. The letter was published after he left Cuba, while in Exile in Mexico.

In answering, the CASTRO Regime accuses him of having stolen funds from the Cooperative of which he had charge. This was certified by his friend Major Humberto SORI-MARIN.

When he arrives in the USA, that is in Miami, Florida, he is a guest of Mr. Ricardo LORIE and Mr. Michael YABOR.

An argument begins within the MRR, in which there are two sides, one includes Ricardo LORIE and Michael YABOR, and the

DESENSITIZED CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

other Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa and Miss Pepita Riera.

This argument becomes stronger because of the appointment of the MRR Delegate to the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa aspires with all his strength and intrigues to this position.

He seeks the help of Mr. "Macko" BAQUER, who is said to belong to the CIA and who at the same time supports the FRD (DRF).

He holds a meeting with Mr. SANJENIS in the Cafeteria Dough-Nuts, at 8 and 33 Ave., SW.

Later, at a luncheon at the home of Mr. SANJENIS, in Fort Lauderdale, he obtains the support of Manuel VILLAFANA, Pepita RIERA, SANJENIS, and Mr. PAULA, who agree to help him in his plans

Nevertheless, he continues to look for support and tries with the BATISTA sector, maintaining reunions with MUJAL, Chile MENDOZA and Engineer BADIA.

The plans of the Council are being completed as far as the camps in Guatemala, etc., and in order to get the control on the civil and military sections, due to his excessive ambitions, he tries and obtains the support of the following persons: Col. BASCO, Dr. SARDINAS, Col. Orlando PIEDRA, Miguel SUAREZ Fernandez, Caho HERMIDA, Laureano BATISTA Falla and Mr. Juan MESA, who is said to be a CIA representative. It is common understanding that this gentleman has helped him quite a bit.

He also receives the help of the Catholic Front through Father GONZALEZ Posada and Father LLORENTE, who refused it at a beginning.

With all this in his hands, he obtains the control of the military phase and appoints officers of his trust to the commanding posts in Guatemala, such as the brothers San Roman, SUEIRAS, Eneido OLIVA, Andrew Jr., Manuel VILLAFANA and Carol.

After the disaster of the Bay of Pigs and the return to Miami, he continues with his activities, taking active part in the Orange Bowl act, where President John F. KENNEDY is presented with the "false" banner of the Brigade 2506.

DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED

That banner was never, at any time, in front of the Bay of Pigs, but came from Guatemala, brought by MORO-MOLINET and which bears his signature on one corner.

The Government of the USA was advised that they would make a political play with this banner, so it is returned to Fort Bernnet, and is later destroyed by true revolutionaries.

Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa has had contact with the BIRCH Society, group of crazy Nazi who is an infiltree of the Communists.

There are reports that his father has been a communist for years in a department of Las Villas Province.

Beginning of his relations with his present mistress and date on several figures forming his group.

A certain morning Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa visits the Restaurant Rancho Luna, at 8 and 9 Ave., SW, accompanied by his chauffeur, BASULTO.

Casually or prearranged, he meets Mr. Edgar SOPO Granda, friend of Dr. ARTIME and member of the Brigade 2506. (This young man is the son of a Navy officer under BATISTA, who committed suicide in La Cabana at the beginning of the Revolution.)

SOPA Granda was in the company of his close friend Aida PEREZ Pozo, who in turn was in the company of her "intimate" friends Juana MANUELA and Adelaida PADRON.

At this meeting Dr. ARTIME and Adelaida PADRON liked each other, and the great idyl is born.

Dr. ARTIME set up a house for Mrs. Adelaida PADRON on 71 NE 6 Ave., where she lives with her two smaller children by her first marriage to Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia. It is rumored in the circles close to this couple that Dr. ARTIME will soon marry this woman.

These three women: Adelaida PADRON, Juana MANUELA, Aida PEREZ Pozo, are known for their sexual deviations, that is, they are three famous lesbians.

DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED

They began to visit the MRR offices, and several of its members complained because of their lack of morals.

Nevertheless, Mrs. Aida PEREZ Pozo was assigned in the Intelligence department of the MRR with a salary of $100.00 per month. It is rumored this was because of her close friendship with Adelaida PADRON and ARTIME.

Adelaida PADRON:

Of humble family, she is known as servant of Mrs. Maria Luisa GOMEZ-MENA, famous lesbian of the high society of Cuba.

She is her favorite servant and takes her along in her trips to Europe, having great regards for her.

At the time that Adelaida PADRON was working for Mrs. Ma. Luisa GOMEZ-MENA, the chauffeur of the latter was a brother of the well known lesbian, Mrs. Lucia CANO, better known by the nickname of "La Campeona" (The Champion).

This is the reason for the great friendship between Adelaida PADRON and Lucia CANO - "La Campeona".

Adelaida PADRON is also a close friend of Flor de Lotto LARRUA and Toni LAVERNIA, famous artists in Cuba.

Adelaide PADRON has arrived to her corruption. She boasts of having had intimate contacts with leading women of the Cuban society.

While she was still married to Major Roger ROJAS, she gave a party at her house at 445 NE & 30 Ave., Miami, where among the approximately thirty persons who assisted, there were about fifteen lesbians and about five homosexuals. There is a picture of this party in the "Revista Farandula", published about one and a half years ago.

General Fulgencio BATISTA was the witness at the wedding of then Lieutenant Roger ROJAS Lavernia and "Miss" Adelaida PADRON.

This wedding took place with great roar in the Night-Club Tropicana, of Havana, Cuba.

It is said that Adelaida PADRON maintained intimate relations

DESENSITIZED

with General BATISTA, and that it is even certain that one of her sons is of the General.

Later Adelaida PADRON gets the divorce and maintains intimate relations with Mr. Pedrito SUAREZ.

Mr. Pedrito SUAREZ was a candidate for Mayor of Marianao and is a close friend of Dr. Rolando MASFERRER.

At present Mr. SUAREZ has intimate relations with a woman named YOLANDA.

Mr. SUAREZ requested that Adelaida PADRON return a Chevrolet Belair, 1953, to him, since he bought it, but she does not return it because she says that "it is in her name and it is hers".

Mr. SUAREZ at this time has a business of fruit seeds in Homestead, Florida.

Mr. Roger ROJAS Lavernia:

Of rich family, son of Mr. Pedro ROJAS Bermudez, Chamber representative for the Liberal Party in the Oriente Province, Cuba, for several terms. Owner of sugar cane farms and live stock ranches. Roger ROJAS Lavernia entered the Cadet School, graduating a sub-officer. He served in several squadrons of the Rural Guard and because of his close friendship with General BATISTA, in 1957 he was sent to the USA (Washington) to take an intelligence course, in order to create the BRAC (Buro de Repression de Actividade Comunistos - Bureau of Repression of Communist Activities)- "Cuerpo de Investigaciones Anticommunistas" (Anti-Communist Investigation Corps).

After working for a while in the BRAC, he was promoted to Major, Chief of this corps,

It is said that this promotion was due to the relations of Adelaida PADRON with General BATISTA.

At the present time Mr. Roger ROJAS Lavernia resides at 445 NW 30 Ave., is owner of a boarding house, but he is going to dispose of it this month.

Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia faced problems at the beginning of the Revolution, but through his friendship with the rebel Major,

DESENSITIZED

William GALVEZ, he was able to take care of them.

It is to be noted that Major William GALVEZ is the lover of Adelaida PADRON's sister.

Aida PEREZ Pozo and Juana MANUELA:

Aida PEREZ Pozo and Juana MANUELA entered the USA through the Mexican border, crossing the Rio Bravo.

They are lesbians and it is said that Juana Manuela is the "husband" in this couple.

Juana MANUELA is the daughter of a District Attorney of Las Villas, who has lately run into trouble with the Miami Police.

Because of their obscure positions here, it is believed that they are infiltrees of the G-2.

At the present time Aida PEREZ Pozo resides with her sister, Migdalia PEREZ Pozo, at 1432 NW 16 St., Apt. 1, Miami, Florida.

Migdalia PEREZ Pozo is married to Mr. Santiago SANCHEZ, who is a revolutionary, working at this time for the MRR.

Lucia CANO "La Campeona":

Lucia CANO, known by the nickname of "La Campeona", is a lesbian, famous in this milieu.

The brother of this "lady" is the chauffeur of Mrs. Maria Luisa GOMEZ-MENA; he is known to be a communit; he even made trips to Russia and Czechoslovakia.

The sisters of Lucia CANO are also communist and are still in Cuba.

The husband of Lucia CANO is Jose REBLEDO, known as "El Gallego", and is almost always around the restaurant owned by TURQUITO, on 8 St. SW. This TURQUITO is the one of the ORFILA trouble. Mrs. Lucia CANO has a lover, a married man with two children. His name is unknown.

Mrs. Lucia CANO, "La Campeona", is "intimate" friend of Adelaida PADRON.

DESENSITIZED

Although Adelaida PADRON maintains "intimate" relations with several of her girl friends in Miami, she has confessed that the one she likes completely is her "intimate girl friend", the wife of Dr. Pedro RAMOS, well known doctor who resides in Miami, Florida.

Dr. Pedro RAMOS resides at 213 NW 50 St., Miami, Florida.

Victoria PADRON:

She is the sister of Adelaida PADRON. She is tied in this matter because whe introduced and directs all of her sister's activities.

Victoria PADRON is married to an Italian-American whose name is unknown.

Victoria PADRON lives in common-law with Mr. Raul GRANDA, married, ex-chief of the Military G-1 in the era of General BATISTA.

According to what Aida PEREZ Pozo informed to Mr. Manolin GARCIA, when the counter-revolution will succeed, Mr. Raul GRANDA will occupy his post because it is a family affair through ARTIME, Adelaida, etc.

NOTE: In all this love intrigue around Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, there could be the influence of two factors: either the infiltration of BATISTA elements, as almost all the components of the groups have some link with him; or else infiltrees of Castroites who work in the USA, since there are involved the relatives of Lucia CANO, who are communists and still in Cuba. There is also the link of Adelaida PADRON's sister with Major William GALVEZ.

DESENSITIZED

14-00000

AMBUD4-1 201

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO	Deputy Chief, WH/SA
INFO	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE
SUBJECT	RYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD Reports on AMBIDDY/1 Activities
ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES	

PROCESSING

	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : None.

1. The Station continues to receive numerous reports on AMBIDDY/1 activities. Most are fragmentary and based on stories which someone has heard about town but invariably cannot be traced to exact sources. Some of these reports are as follows:

a. AMRAZZ/1. The departure of AMBIDDY/1 and his group from the WAVE area was due to pressure from ODACID. This action was the result of the publicity generated by AMWORLD after their successful operation. The departure did not signify a loss of aid to AMWORLD from ODYOKE. The exit of AMYUM/19 from AMWORLD was due to his dissatisfaction with AMBIDDY/1's immoralities. It is supposed that AMYUM/19 is a spokesman in this regard for the AGRUPACION CATOLICA. AMBIDDY/1 is accused of leading a licentious life for some time; having a mistress who was formerly a mistress of Batista; and buying a house and presenting it to this woman. It is also reported that he will marry this woman soon.

b. AMRAZZ/1. Carlos MONTANER advised that AMBIDDY/1 has almost run out of funds and that his group will soon be liquidated.

c. AMSHADY/1. The talk around town is that AMBIDDY/1 is now married to his girl friend. However, he is still living with a male friend and she is still living with a girl friend.

CONTINUED

Attachment: U/S/C
1 cy, Rpt by Carlos A. RIVERA

CS COPY

201-267437

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee w/att U/S/C

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
21 Aug 64	AUG 24 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
UFGA-17459	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

d. AMCHEER/25. (This information is from Pedro LEYVA Ugarizza, sub director of the paper, REPLICA, through Carlos RIVERA.) Report attached under separate cover.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

CS COPY

14-00000

(24)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

47 SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE 201

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH/SA 8, VR

CS SB
AR
LOG CA
CI
SEC NS

4 SEP 64 IN 68301

SECRET 042315Z

DIR INFO PACY WAVE CITE SJOS 6987

TRAVEL RECORDS INDICATE MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED SAN JOSE FROM PACY 3 SEPT TACA FLT 730.

SECRET

CS COPY

RECLASSIFIED	
RI/AN	✓
RI/MIS	✓
201-267437	✓
RI/Files	

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 8 RI ☐ COPY ☑ DESTROY

30 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
SAN Jose

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION
DC/WH/SA 3

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT CI TIME SI BY

INFO
DDP, C/WH, VR

A-1 201

S E C R E T 220302

22 SEP 64 IN 78499

DIR INFO MANA PACY WAVE CITE SJOS 7013

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT/AMWORLD/TYPIC/YOBITE

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED SAN JOSE 16 SEPTEMBER FROM PACY IN PRIVATE PLANE. TRAVEL RECORDS INDICATE FOLLOWING CUBANS ON PLANE WITH ARTIME: ANTONIO GONZALEZ TORRECILLA, JORGE MINERVINO NAVARRO RODRIGUEZ, PABLO ANTONIO ASTUDILLO OJEDA, CARLOS ORLANDO PILOTO Y VALLES. A JESUS ANTONIO SANZ DE ACEDO Y OLEA, LISTED AS SPANISH CITIZEN, ALSO IN THE GROUP.

2. ARTIME LEFT SAN JOSE FOR PACY 19 SEPT ON LACSA 629 AND RETURNED SAN JOSE 20 SEPL LACSA 628.

3. ARTIME AGAIN LEFT SAN JOSE 20 SEPT FOR MANA IN PRIVATE PLANE. RECORDS INDICATE GONZALEZ, NAVARRO, ASTUDELLIO, SANZ, AND A ADELAIDA PADRON CRUZ ON SAME PLANE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

23 Sep 64

UNCAN CENES AAYUD AQUER ECIBE YANKE EQUES ISHIF ICALA ULTIM
ACPOR -UNID ACDEL IBERA CIOMD EMIPA TRIAE SCLAV AAYER POHES
PANAM ESPAN AYANK EEHOY POREL COMUN ISMOK RESPE TUCSA MENTE
KHUEV O----

ABOVE MESSAGE RECEIVED ON FREQUENCY 14355 KCS. FIELD ENDED SCHEDULE WITH "VA VA" VICE LONG DASH, WHICH INCORRECT PROCEDURE.

WASH S/C NOTE: NO AMBIDDY/1 SLUG USED.

SECRET

14. MR PRESIDENT OF THE "CONSEJO DE LIBERACION": 1) I ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ERROR THAT WAS COMMITTED. 2) I GUARANTEE THAT IT WAS AN HONEST MISTAKE. 3) FORTUNATELY WE DISCOVERED A CLANDESTINE CARGO GOING TO BENEFIT MANY CUBAN COMMUNISTS. THE ERROR HAS PARALYZED 12 SUGAR MILLS. FORTUNATELY MARITIME INSURANCE RATES GOING TO CUBA HAVE INCREASED 30%. 4) FORTUNATELY THE COUNTRY THAT OWNS THE SUNKEN SHIP HAS NEVER BEEN A LOYAL FRIEND OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND IS REBUKED BY ITS FORMER COLONIES WHICH TODAY ARE FREE LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS. 5) NEVERTHELESS, I AM AWARE OF THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THIS ERROR AND BECAUSE OF IT, IF NECESSARY, I OFFER MY RESIGNATION OF MY DUTIES AND MY SEPARATION FROM THE CUBAN PROBLEM BUT I REQUEST OF THE CONSEJO THAT NONE OF MY FIGHTING MEN OR ORGANIZATION BE DENIED THE AID THEY ARE RECEIVING WHICH SIGNIFIES THE LAST OPPORTUNITY TO LIBERATE MY ENSLAVED HOMELAND, YESTERDAY BY SPAIN AND TODAY BY COMMUNISM. RESPECTFULLY, ARTIME.

SECRET

A-1

20

AMWORLD Meeting in New York, 6 October 1964

SUBJECT: AMWORLD Contingency Plans

1. AMJAVA-4 said that AMBIDDY-1 was very enthusiastic about the AMEIJEIRAS operation and felt this was the real key to success of our program to overthrow the Castro regime. He is prepared to concentrate on this operation completely for the immediate future.

2. I asked A-4 if they had done any planning on the basis that the AMEIJEIRAS operation might not pan out. He asked me directly whether a decision had been made to continue or to cut off support to AMWORLD. I told him that a decision had not been made but that my Headquarters was very interested in the outcome of the AMEIJEIRAS operation on which he was working. He recognized the importance of this operation and stated that he and A-1 had conjectured that future support to AMWORLD might be contingent on success or failure of their handling of that case. I did not confirm or deny this point but told him that the organization would surely be happy if they were able to handle it with success.

3. A-4 then explained that he and A-1 had spent considerable time discussing the future of their program and their prospects vis a vis the Agency. He said that in their opinion one of two things would happen; either the AMEIJEIRAS operation would pay off in which case they would be able to continue to operate with Agency support but with a diversion of major objectives or the operation would peter out, in which case they would have to consider what to do without Agency support. He said that A-1 was not only prepared to accept a diversion of primary objective but felt that present circumstances dictated the wisdom of such a move. However, both of them feel that their present paramilitary program must be continued, not because it is crucial to the outcome of the Cuban situation, but because the strength which they exhibit through these operations is the only attraction to AMWORLD that has caused the AMEIJEIRAS group to contact them.

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

4. In case the AMEIJEIRAS operation fails to develop, and the Agency should decide to cut off support to AMWORLD, A-4 says they will continue to try to operate as long as they can. He said that instead of 200 people they might be operating with 20, but they could do something. So long as they have the hardware with which to operate they can "sell" operations each time. For example, he said, they would go to Cuban exiles, to Venezuela, to American businessmen, etc. and would tell them, "The October operation will cost $25,000. If you will underwrite it we will dedicate it to you and run it in your name." He feels this would carry them for a few months provided they can run a few successful operations.

5. A-4 said that when the support ran out, the hardware was all gone, and there was nothing left with which to operate, A-1 would take 12 or 15 of his hard core followers and go into the Escambray in Las Villas to make one last ditch effort. I asked him if A-1 felt he would have any chance of a success and A-4 stated that should such a state come to pass, A-1 would definitely go in with the expectation of being run down eventually and shot but that he would do this in order to go out in a blaze of glory and to continue to serve as a martyr. A-4 said there was absolutely no doubt in his mind that A-1 would follow this course, that he had a hero compulsion and a martyr complex and was completely without fear of death. A-4 again mentioned an idea held by A-1 that he will not live past 29 January 1965 (his birthday) because he is convinced that he is destined to reach the peak moment of his life during his 33rd year (as did Jesus Christ) and does not expect to live beyond that time.

6. I asked A-4 where he, personally, stood in such a future undertaking. He said that he was no hero, but he had dedicated seven years of his life as a schoolboy and young man to Cuban independence, and he could not stop now. He would not go in deliberately to die as a martyr, but he would continue with his work doing the best he could with whatever means he could come by. He stated, "A-1 is not such a leader as Tony VARONA who can separate himself completely from the struggle and go out to sell used cars. A-1 cannot exist in a life which is routine and without personal power. He will die first even in a suicidal mission." A-4 stated that

he, himself, was of a different nature but that it would be just as impossible for him to go to a routine type of work and leave the work of liberation of his country.

7. I asked A-4 what AMWORLD would do if they were able to commence operations again. He said they had two targets on the north coast that they would like to hit when they have another chance. One is Puerto Vita, the other is Manati. They have target studies on Puerto Vita and have just recruited a refugee from Manati who knows the area thoroughly and brought out a large number of photographs of the target with him from Cuba. Unfortunately some of them were confiscated by U. S. Customs when he came through Miami, but there were still enough remaining to plan an operation. He asked if we might be able to help recover the confiscated photos. I told him that if approval to recommence operations was given, I was sure we could do so. In the meantime, I was, of course, not authorized to discuss possible future operations but/was interested in what AMWORLD was thinking along these lines. A-4 understood our position with the current suspension of operations.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Internal ops
AMJAVA-4 - 201
Policy

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTINE RUFSA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

200-300-024
UFG -06030
14 OCT 64

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
RE SANTIAGO ALVAREZ SR. AND JR. EXPRESS
UNHAPPINESS AT CONDITIONS AT A BASE OPERATED
BY MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

R 6410232076

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

19 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation betweeen AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 16 October 1964 at 1045 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 said he had met yesterday with a newspaperman named Robert Stark of the London Times. A-1 first knew Stark during his imprisonment after the Bay of Pigs and claims Stark was one of the few correspondents who was allowed to interview the prisoners. According to A-1 Stark and the governor of the Bahamas are involved in smuggling to and from Cuba. Stark smuggles salt pork into Oriente Province and brings out rum and cigars. Stark is the owner of an LCM (Andros Engineer) and an LCU (Charlestown). While A-1 was jotting down the names of the vessels Stark said, "Now don't go sinking my ships." A-1 replied, "We don't sink anyone's ships." Stark is leaving today for Canada to purchase fire bricks for sugar centrals in Cuba. Stark advised A-1 that Ramon Castro, Fidel's brother, would like to defect. Stark is willing to assist Ramon exfiltrate clandestinely provided that A-1 supply a boat to meet the exfiltrating party somewhere in the open seas. Before A-1 commits his organization to such a plan he would like to have Headquarters investigate Stark. A-1 expects to meet Stark within a week and give him an answer at that time.

2. A-1 has received a report from his base that ALBUERNE is involved in a narcotics and numbers racket based in Miami. A-1 is requesting that the complete report be forwarded to Miami in order to turn it over to us.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

3. A-1 is leaving today for Puerto Rico to solicit funds from several wealthy businessmen. He then expects to leave for Santo Domingo to meet with President Reid. He will then return to New York where he will talk to some New York businessmen and attempt to collect financial support for his organization.

4. AMWORLD has been notified by the Justice Department that they have to register as agents of a foreign government. Manolin Hernandez drafted a letter in reply objecting to being called "agents of a foreign government." A-1 maintains that his organization does not report to nor is responsible to any other government, etc. A-1 was asked to send us a copy of their reply for our records.

5. A-1 commented he has hired Luis PRIETO Portar to head the AMWORLD "Brain Trust."

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Robert Stark - 201
Luis PRIETO Portar - 201
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations

cc. DC/WH/SA

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

SECRET

19 Oct 1964



REPUBLICA
DE
NICARAGUA

PASAPORTE
(PASSPORT)



REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA

PASAPORTE

32 Paginas (PASSPORT) 32 Pages

No [illegible]017

Nombre del Portador
Bearer's Name

IGNACIO MARTINEZ [illegible]AÑOS.

Acompañado de su Esposa
Accompanied by his wife

y de
and

niño
child

Válido hasta
Valid until
19 DE OCTUBRE DE 1964

PARA REVALIDACIONES VEASE PAGINA 6
(For Revalidations See Page 6)

14-00000



2

FILIACION:
PERSONAL DESCRIPTION

	Portador (Bearer)	Esposa (Wife)
Estatura Height	5.10 PLG	
Peso Weight	[illegible] LBS	
Color Complexion	[illegible]	
Ojos Eyes	CAFES	
Frente Forehead	AMPLIA	
Nariz Nose	REGULAR	
Pelo Hair	CASTAÑO	
Señas particulares Personal marks	NINGUNA.-	

Niños Children

Nombre Name	Edad Age	Sexo Sex

3

PASAPORTE
(PASSPORT)

(Decreto Legislativo de 3 de Agosto de 1917)
(Legislative Decree of August 3rd, 1917)

ALFONSO ORTEGA URBINA.-
Secretario de Estado en el despacho de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Nicaragua

Concede pasaporte a / Extends the passport to IGNACIO [illegible] [illegible]

Para dirigirse a / For travelling to NORTE - CENTRO Y SUR AMERICA

y suplica a las autoridades Civiles y Militares de los países por donde transite, no le pongan obstáculo y le presten ayuda y protección en caso necesario.
and requests the civil and military authorities of the countries through which the bearer travels not to offer any obstacle and to give him such aid and protection as may be necessary.

Dado en / Given at MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.-

a los / the 19 días del mes de / day of the month of OCTUBRE de 19[illegible]

4

FOTOGRAFIA
PHOTOGRAPH



Nacido en / **Born in** SAN MARCOS NICARAGUA.-

el / **the** 23 **de** / **of** ENERO **de** / **of** 1932

Profesión / **Profession** COMERCIANTE.-

Estado civil / **Civil status** SOLTERO.-

Domicilio / **Residence** LAS CONCHITAS NICARAGUA.-

Firma del Portador
Bearer's Signature

5

FOTOGRAFIA
PHOTOGRAPH

Nacido en / **Born in**

el / **the** **de** / **of** **de** / **of**

Profesión / **Profession**

Estado civil / **Civil status**

Domicilio / **Residence**

Firma
Signature

REVALIDACIONES
REVALIDATIONS

Revalidado este pasaporte de
This passport is revalidated from

Válido hasta } Valid until

Firma Autorizada
Authorized Signature

Revalidado el } Revalidated on

Válido hasta } Valid until

Firma Autorizada
Authorized Signature

Revalidado el } Revalidated on

Válido hasta } Valid until

Firma Autorizada
Authorized Signature

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA · AMERICA CENTRAL ·

OBSERVACIONES
OBSERVATIONS

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA · AMERICA CENTRAL ·

8

VISAS

OFICINA DE RACION

Departamento ntes

Visa No. ____ Tar

BUENO PARA

La Visa

por u

hasta ____

NOV 1964

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA

AMERICA CENTRAL

9

VISAS

33

VISAS

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA
AMERICA CENTRAL

VISAS

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA
AMERICA CENTRAL

26 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 25 October 1964 at 1330 hours

1. The Office of Security called the undersigned to advise that AMBIDDY-1 had telephoned.

2. Upon returning A-1's call, he stated he telephoned merely to inform us that he would be going into retreat on 26 or 27 October. He will be staying at the Diplomat Hotel in Hollywood, Miami as a guest of the management since the manager is one of the "100 men." A-1's rooms are 2255 and 2257. The telephone number is WA2-8111. A-1 can be reached at that number for the next week.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

30 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 October 1964 at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 inquired as to when the organizational charts he requested from Carl would be ready. A-1 explained these charts are urgently needed to prepare future plans concerning the "dissident group." At present Nilo Messer is being groomed to go to Madrid to be the liaison after "Cuco" de Leon is replaced. "Cuco" de Leon is leaving shortly for Nicaragua to commence infiltration training.

2. As to A-1's future plans he intends to leave for Central America on Tuesday or Wednesday, 3 or 4 November. AMJAVA-4 is leaving for Nicaragua on 2 November.

3. AMBIDDY-1 is sending Rafael Garcia, Luis Grillo, and Amado Cantillo to the Dominican Republic to survey the new location which President Reid has offered AMWORLD. According to A-1 Reid has offered them an operations base much closer to Cuba than Isle de Beata. At present A-1 is getting cost estimates on the 12 Swifts which President Reid wishes to buy in the U. S. The different estimates will be sent to President Reid with the three aforementioned AMWORLDers. According to A-1 President Reid suggested that AMWORLD could paint their Swifts the same colors as the ones which the Dominicans will have.

4. A-1, Sixto Mesa, and John Monahan intend to meet a group of wealthy American and Cuban businessman on Sunday to solicit funds for AMWORLD. A-1 was advised to take a hard look as to the motives of Mr. Monahan before getting

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

too involved with this gentleman. A-1 feels that Monahan is perhaps looking into the future to the day when Cuba will be liberated.

5. A-1 was asked to check if they had purchased the extra commo equipment and spare parts.

6. A-1 was asked to investigate if the steel planking has been paid.

7. A-1 expects a telephone call from Robert Starkie tomorrow, 31 October, concerning the fire bricks. This matter is now being handled by Manuel Hernandez.

8. A-1 was advised that Carl would have the charts by Tuesday night. A-1 will be called on Monday to make arrangements for the meeting between himself and Carl.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201✓
Dissident group
Dominican Republic
Business Support
Sabotage Equipment

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

701 ✓

SECRET

3 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 2 November 1964, 2100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated that he, AMWORLD-2 and John Monahan met some wealthy, American businessmen on 1 November. One of the Americans was the President of the American Medical Association in Miami who promised AMWORLD medical supplies. A-1 mentioned that John Monahan spoke eloquently before the group on behalf of AMWORLD. The undersigned mentioned to A-1 that unlike Cuban businessmen, one has to take a more direct approach with American businessmen as far as money is concerned. A-1 said the reason he has not made a direct pitch for money is because he does not want to take the same approach other exile organizations do. A-1 felt he would have better success in getting a little from alot of people instead of alot from a few.

2. According to A-1, AMJAVA-4 will be leaving Thursday for Nicaragua.

3. A-1 advised that Nilo Messer and Antonio Sanz are now in Spain. Antonio Sanz will return after placing Nilo in contact with appropriate people in Spain. A-1 expects to meet with a representative of the dissident group within the next two weeks. A-1 did not elaborate as to the reason for his expectation. A-1 again asked if the charts he requested would be turned over to him when he meets Carl. A-1 was assured that Carl would bring the charts to the meeting.

4. "Cuco" de Leon is leaving on 3 November for Nicaragua.

5. The three man group scheduled to go to the Dominican Republic to survey the new AMWORLD site has been temporarily

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

SECRET

delayed due to expired visas. A-1 has obtained the necessary information for President Reid concerning the purchase of twelve Swifts. This information will be sent with the three man group. When asked why President Reid has not negotiated the purchase of the Swifts himself, A-1 stated Reid tried to but found embezzeling within his group. President Reid wants to show the naval group he can purchase the Swifts on his own.

6. A-1 expects the Philco training school to begin on 3 November. Approximately 25 AMWORLDERS will attend the school. A-1 said he had submitted a list of needed spare parts to Philco but he has not received a reply. A-1 is checking other radio corporations to obtain the lowest possible prices.

7. The MV SANTA MARIA is anchored off Monkey Point and according to A-1 is in top notch condition.

8. A-1 said he terminated his contract with station WRUL in New York. A-1 intends to use the Dominican Republic to beam long-wave programs to Cuba.

9. As of this month the "Tridente" will be reduced in size and will be published monthly.

10. A-1 was informed that Carl will arrive in West Palm Beach at 2130 on 3 November. A-1 will be expecting a call from Carl at the Diplomat Hotel.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Converxations
Financial Aid
Internal Ops
DR

Abc = conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

SECRET

4 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 3 November 1964 at 2130

1. After several unsuccessful attempts I was finally able to contact AMBIDDY-1 and advise him that Carl wold be unable to meet him at the agreed time. I informed A-1 that Carl would contact him at 0900 on 4 November and make arrangements for their meeting.

2. A-1 said he had received confirmation that the Philco school had started on 2 November.

3. During this non-operational period A-1 is having all his vessels checked out to see that they will be in good operational condition. A-1 specifically alluded to the LCM's that are presently being overhauled. The Swift GITANA is also undergoing maintenance repairs.

4. Besides setting up Nilo Messer as AMWORLD's liaison to the dissident group, Antonio Sanz is inquiring as to the departure date of the RIO CAONAO. A-1 intends to broach the topic of attacking the CAONAO with Carl. A-1 stated that he hopes that Carl will have a final decision for him on the CAONAO

5. Feeling that A-1 was probing for a sign as to what decision has been made on the CAONAO, I changed the subject and asked A-1 if he was watching the election returns. A-1

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

stated that he was, and the election was progressing nicely. Judging from the tone of A-1's voice, he apparently feels that the re-election of President Johnson and the election of Robert Kennedy would guarantee the continuation of AMWORLD.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
RIO CAONAO
Commo

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE PLANS TO ESTABLISH A CUBAN
GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE IN BRAZIL

019-006-041/04
UFG -06142
04 NOV 64
WAVE-04258
P2

R 6412100287

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

9 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE: 7 November at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated he expects to leave for Central America on 11 November. He is waiting for the return of Antonio Sanz from Madrid. Sanz is bringing "some information" with him (A-1 did not elaborate) which A-1 wants to evaluate before he (A-1) returns to the bases.

2. A-1 reiterated his promise of obtaining a new roster for Headquarters. A-1 mentioned he is having all his materiel inventoried and expects to have the results for his meeting with Mr. Archer.

3. A-1 was notified that perhaps it would be better if he proceeded to the camps and we would contact him as to the time and place of the meeting with Mr. Archer.

4. A-1 was reminded to submit his request for the December budget.

5. A-1 said he would telephone prior to his departure for Central America.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: Telephone Conversations
Antonio SANZ 201
A-1 201 ✓
Finance

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

A-1

12 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
And Martin Ferrer

DATE : 12 November 1964, 1100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 reported that Antonio Sanz returned from Spain last night (11 Nov) and according to Sanz a representative of the dissident group will be leaving for Spain on 15 Nov. Sanz does not have the name of the representative, however, all indications point to Dr. Faustino Perez. A-1 has only talked to Sanz briefly by phone and therefore did not have all the details of Sanz trip.

2. According to A-1 Sanz talked to the captain of the Caonao and the captain is more willing than ever to deliver the ship to AMWORLD. The Caonao will leave Spain on 16 Nov. A-1 said he would like a reading from Carl on the status of the Caonao operation.

3. A-1 stated that some of his men who were formerly in the U. S. Army are being recalled. A-1 requested that we do whatever possible to remedy this situation. A-1 was advised to submit a list of names of the individuals involved and we would review the problem.

4. Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez is encountering difficulties with I&NS in leaving the U. S. A-1 did not elaborate as to the difficulty, however, it appears to be a matter of not having the proper papers.

5. A-1 said he is very pleased by the intelligence section in Miami, particularly the debriefing of Cuban exiles. A-1 promised to give Headquarters copies of all intelligence reports.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

6. A-1 commented that there is a possibility that AMWORLD may get a free ship from Babun. A-1 feels that by acting as an intermediary for the JOANNE, Babun will give AMWORLD another ship after obtaining possession of the JOANNE.

7. A-1 expects to leave within the next few days for Central America. He will see AMJAVA-4 and get up-to-date reading on the situation at the camps and obtain the inventory from A-4. A-1 would like to see Carl in the U. S. rather than in Panama.

8. A-1 claimed that the $18,000 balance due on the JOANNE repairs had been sent to Ramsey Scarlett.

9. A-1 was advised that Carl would meet him tonight (12 Nov) in West Palm Beach. A-1 should make reservations at a motel in that city and call Headquarters at 1600 hours today with the name of the motel.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Internal Op
Rio Caonao

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

14-00000

SECRET

16 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE: 16 November 1964, 1100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 expects to leave on 17 November for Costa Rica. He has received an urgent message that Cornelio Orlich would like to talk to him. A-1 hopes to return to Miami as soon as possible to be on call for the meeting with representative of the dissident group.

2. AMJAVA-4 is leaving on the same flight as A-1 but will go directly to Managua. A-4 would prefer to meet with Carl on 19 November in Panama. A-1 was requested to tell A-4 to bring the plans for Jucaro, Casilda, Santa Cruz del Sur and Guayabal to the Panama meeting. A-1 will tell A-4 the address of the Panama safehouse.

3. A-1 said he received word from Managua that several shots were fired at his private automobile yesterday (15 November) in Managua. Fortunately the bullets went astray and the driver was unharmed. The assailant or assailants escaped.

4. According to A-1 approximately a week or so ago the Guardia Fiscal in Parismina, which is near Tortuguero, saw a light out at sea. When they went to see what it was they saw a submarine. A-1 also claims that the U.S. Army is in that area building a tower of some sort.

5. A-1 believes the weapons ordered by Costa Rica from the U.S. were requested by Pepe Figueres under the pretext ~~that~~ of turning them over to Manolo Ray. A-1 opined that some may be given to Ray but a great bulk of the arms would be kept by Figueres.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. A-1 said he is mailing the plan for the RIO CAONAO defection and the silencer developed by AMWORLD to Headquarters this very day.

7. A-1 was asked to call Headquarters upon his return from Costa Rica. A-1 agreed to do so.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Telephone Conversations
AMJAVA-4 201
Costa Rica
RIO CAONAO
Operations

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

17 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1, Norman Santell and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 17 November 1964, 1030 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated William King will advise Philco today that AMWORLD no longer wished to employ Jim Lee. A-1 sent a message to the base for Lee to return to the U. S.

2. A-1 reported he received a call from Nilo Messer who said that Robreno wished to see AMJAVA-4 to make arrangements for the "summit" meeting. It appeared to A-1 that the representative of the dissident group in Spain wants to deal with a higher ranking person than Nilo Messer. Nilo has received indications that the representative has already left Cuba and is somewhere in Europe on a shopping spree. Mr. Santell suggested perhaps it would be best for AMJAVA-4 to arrange the meeting in Paris rather than in Spain. A-1 agreed. AMJAVA-4 will probably leave for Spain on 21 November after his meeting with Carl.

3. A-1 was advised that HQS had received a report stating Guayo is in possession of photographs presumed to be on the ARANZAZU affair that were not turned over to AMWORLD for censorship. A-1 stated that Guayo was searched thoroughly after the ARANZAZU affair and doubts he has photographs in his possession unbeknownst to AMWORLD, however, A-1 will investigate. We advised A-1 we had no way of checking the veracity of the report, however, wanted to alert him of the possibility. A-1 said Guayo is now in Caracas working for "Bbhemia Libre."

4. A-1 plans to leave for Costa Rica on 19 November. We informed him that one of the topics which Cornelio Orlich may discuss is the increasing publicity being generated by the training of Cuban exiles in that country.

5. A-1 was asked to call HQS on his return from Costa Rica.

Raul J Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

File:
A-1 201, Conv
~~Int Ops~~, ARAN, C.R.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

☐ COPY ☑ [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
SAN JOSE

ACTION
DC/WH/SA 3

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO
VR. FILE, DDP, C/WH

MOB INT SS SB
EOB RETS LCG CA
CI SI EF [✓ WH]
SEC NS

SECRET 202000Z

20 Nov 64 IN 27486

DIR CITE SJOS 7154

RYBAT TYP~~[illegible]~~ IC ~~[illegible]~~ A WORLD

DESENSITIZED

~~[illegible]~~ (BUESA ARRIVED SJOS 18 NOVEMBER.
MANUEL ARTIME)

201

SECRET

DISSEM PER RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE.

SECRET

SECRET

21 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1, Norman Santell and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 20 November 1964, 2100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called to say he had just returned from Costa Rica where he spoke to President Orlich and his brother. The Orlichs made no mention of expelling A-1, but, to the contrary, are willing to continue to support AMWORLD. The only request made by President Orlich was that the arms barge be taken out of Costa Rica for fear the Communists would learn of its existence. A-1 said he will comply.

2. The topic of conversation quickly changed to the newspaper article by Hal Hendrix which greeted A-1 upon his arrival from Costa Rica about A-1 involvement in smuggling activities in Costa Rica. We informed A-1 that Al Burt had intended to publish a similar story but was scooped by Hendrix. We asked A-1 what he thought of the idea of having President Orlich issue a complete denial as soon as possible of A-1's smuggling activities in Costa Rica. A-1 felt a presidential denial was essential in counteracting this damaging publicity. A-1 stated he would call President Orlich the first thing in the morning on this matter. Another suggestion to neutralize Hendrix's story was for A-1 to see Al Burt as soon as possible and categorically deny the story. If need be A-1 might want to invite Burt to Costa Rica to speak to President Orlich and confirm A-1's side of the story.

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed security code.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
A-1 201✓
Conv
C. R.
Press

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

21 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1, Norman Santell and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 21 November 1964, 1030 hours

1. The undersigned telephoned AMBIDDY-1 to see if he had an opportunity to speak with President Orlich. A-1 stated he was unable to reach the President but did speak to the President's secretary. The secretary advised A-1 that he was unaware of the Hendrix story but he assured A-1 the entire story would be denied. A-1 informed Headquarters that he has sent Manolin Hernandez with a copy of the story to see President Orlich. A-1 commented that the initial reaction in Miami to the story was one of indignation toward Hendrix.

2. When we called A-1, he was on his way to see Al Burt. A-1 had already talked to Burt by phone and they had made an appointment to discuss the entire matter this morning. Burt told A-1 on the phone that rumors concerning A-1's activity had reached him. A-1 said he would tell Burt that President Orlich would issue a complete denial of the Hendrix allegations. A-1 was cautioned not to forget that Burt is primarily a newspaperman and therefore to be on guard as to what he tells Burt.

3. A-1 was advised to take a firm stand against Philco concerning Jim Lee. Lee should be sent back to the U. S. as soon as possible. A-1 was requested to reject any proposals by Philco for consultations in Miami or Central America concerning Lee. A-1 should tell King to telephone Philco on Monday (23 Nov) and make it quite clear AMWORLD cannot afford to pay needless travelling expenses of Philco representatives. King should also ask for a price list for the spare parts. If Philco cannot comply, A-1 was advised to tell them he will buy his spare parts elsewhere.

SECRET

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed arbitrary code

SECRET

4. According to A-1 Babun has loaned a PC to A-1. He promised to send us data on the boat.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
a-1 201 ✓
Conversations
CR
Press
Commo
Maritime

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code.

SECRET

FR

23 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Dick

DATE: 21 November 1964, 1600 hours

1. At 1600 hours, 21 November 1964, I complied with AMBIDDY-1's request relayed through the Security Office that he be called on FRanklin 3-1568 in Miami.

2. AMBIDDY-1 described reports reaching him of mysterious phone calls being received by various Cubans in Miami, mostly MRR personnel or wives of MRR members. These calls started during the morning of 21 November. The caller was a North American who spoke Spanish and gave his name as "Bill Jones." The caller sought in each case to solicit derogatory information about AMBIDDY-1, with particular emphasis on A-1's alleged participation in smuggling activities. The caller offered money (A-1 did not know how much) for derogatory information.

3. A-1 mentioned two persons who received calls: AMYUM-19 and the wife of Manolin Hernandez. In addition to smuggling, A-19 was also asked if the reason he broke with A-1 was because of the marriages of AMJAVA-4 or A-1. A-19 denied these allegations to the caller.

4. A-1 said that the story spreading through Miami as a result of these calls is that the U.S. Government -- and probably CIA specifically -- was attempting to discredit A-1 as a basis for denouncing him. A-1 was obviously distressed by these speculations, and in reporting them he was in reality asking the question. I gave him my unequivocal assurance that the U.S. Government was not responsible for the calls.

5. I asked A-1 who he thought was responsible and he said "maybe the Miami Herald." A-1 said that he had seen Al Burt earlier in the day (Saturday, 21 November) and that Burt was angry because he felt that the recent

SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

TV coverage of the AMWORLD camps and activities in Central America was a scoop to which he was rightfully entitled because of a prior agreement with AMBIDDY-1. A-1 gave Burt his side of the stories being circulated about AMWORLD's contraband activities. A-1 felt that he made an impression. Burt was particularly interested in a denial of these charges which A-1 told Burt would be issued very soon by the President of Costa Rica (see following paragraph). A-1 said he thought that he may have mollified Burt somewhat by having the meeting and by promising him scoops in the future, but that Burt still holds a grudge against him.

6. AMBIDDY-1 said he was expecting momentarily a call from Manolin Hernandez in San Jose. Hopefully, Hernandez' call would be to read a public letter from President Orlich officially denying the presence of AMWORLD training camps in Costa Rica and disavowing charges that A-1 or his people were involved in smuggling. Orlich promised A-1 to issue such a letter. When he gets a copy of this letter A-1 intends to hold a press conference and use it as the heart of his effort to set the record straight about charges that AMWORLD is involved in running contraband.

7. I told A-1 that we would look into his report on the mysterious phone calls and that we would let him know what we find out.

Richard B. Beal

Richard B. Beal
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: MOB

File: Telephone Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Publicity
Rumors

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING

XXX

TO	Deputy Chief, WH/SA
INFO.	Chief, WHD Chief of Station, Santo Domingo
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE
SUBJECT	Operational/TYPIC AMBIDDY-1's Involvement in Haitian Affairs

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

1. On 18 October 1964 AMCARBON-1 accidentally met AMBIDDY-1 in the lobby of the hotel El Embajador in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. AMBIDDY-1 was obviously embarrassed by the fact that he had the chance meeting with AMCARBON-1 and he asked that AMCARBON-1 not tell anyone in Miami that he had seen AMBIDDY-1 in Santo Domingo. As an aftermath of this chance meeting, AMCARBON-1 arranged for AMBIDDY-1 to talk with Mr. Bernard DIEDERICH, a free-lance newspaperman residing in Santo Domingo. The purpose of this conversation was to enable Diederich to give AMBIDDY-1 a briefing on the Haitian scene and, as a follow-up, arrange a meeting between AMBIDDY-1 and certain Haitian exile leaders. The meeting with the Haitians took place at Diederich's house on 18 October 1964. The meeting was attended by AMCARBON-1, AMBIDDY-1, a Cuban known as Nilo Jesus MESSER Pujol (201-294655), Father *BAJEUX and Sylvia *WADESTRANDT. After a preliminary series of discussions, AMBIDDY-1 adjourned to another room of the Diederich house to talk privately with Father Bajeux and Sylvia Wadestrandt. At the end of this private meeting, AMCARBON-1 had an opportunity to talk with AMBIDDY-1. As a result, AMCARBON-1 learned that, as of 18 October 1964, it was AMBIDDY-1's intention to help the Haitians in their fight against Duvalier. AMBIDDY-1 believed that he could furnish the arms and the transportation for the invasion of Haiti by Haitian exiles. AMBIDDY-1 was also talking about committing some of his troops to such an invasion as he felt that, if he were successful in this venture, he could obtain significant base rights for his organization in Haiti. These bases would in turn be used by AMBIDDY-1's operations against PBRUMEN.

2. On the morning of 19 October 1964, AMCARBON-1 had an opportunity to talk in Santo Domingo with a Cuban called Rafael Garcia who is AMBIDDY-1's representative in the Dominican Republic. Garcia indicated that he doubted that AMBIDDY-1 would participate in a Haitian invasion. In this connection, Garcia made the point

(continued) 201-267437

Distribution:
2 - DC/WH/SA
2 - C/WHD
2 - COS/Santo Domingo

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS Copy filed in
019-124-027/3

DESENSITIZED

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
23 Nov 64	NOV 2 7 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
UFGA-18793	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
201-267437	

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-18793

that AMBIDDY-1 had a tendency to get excited about various projects, but he very rarely followed through on any project. As a result, Garcia felt that the Haitians could not count on AMBIDDY-1.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

2

SECRET

24 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 24 November 1964, 0630 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 said he is leaving this morning at 0800 for Nicaragua. He expects to return to Miami within three to four days. A-1 requested that the information Carl had promised be ready upon his return. Although A-1 would not say specifically what the information was, he apparently was referring to detailed maps of the coming operation.

2. A-1 reported the 100-man squad has been increased to 120 men.

3. A-1 asked if it would be possible to obtain Esso road maps of Havana pinpointing strategic locations such as G-2 headquarters, communications centers, police precincts, etc. A-1 also requested a list of all prisons in Cuba and other pertinent data on the prisons.

4. A-1 has complied a breakdown on how he would like to arm the 120 men. He is sending this information directly to the Lastra address before he departs for Nicaragua today.

5. A-1 commented he had received a cable from President Orlich branding the Hendrix story a complete falsehood. A-1 is circulating this cable around Miami in order toclear himself of the smuggling charges.

6. A-1 said he would call HQS upon his return.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

File: ✓
A-1 201
Conversations
"Palace Guard"
CR
Press

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM SAN JOSE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION DC/WH/SA 3

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, C/WH

SEC SI EP

SSE C R E T 242238Z

DESENSITIZED

DIR CITE SJOS 7163

RYBAT/TYPIC/~~YO853~~ YOBITE/AMWORLD

MANUEL ARTIME BUESA LEFT COSTA RICA 20 NOV PAA 501.

S E C R RE T

201

25 Nov 64 IN 30071

SECRET

SECRET

7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1

DATE: 7 December 1964

1. I telephoned Subject in Miami and introduced myself as "Andres" and indicated that I was calling for "Carlos" who wished to know what Subject wanted as per his telephone call to "Martin" on the previous Friday.

2. Subject indicated that he had three messages he wished to deliver and they were as follows:

   a. The President of Panama had given his whole-hearted consent to "Manolin" (Hernandez) in helping them establish their operations in Panama. This message was then relayed to "Carlos" (Jenkins) who was listening in on the conversation.

   b. Subject then stated that he had promised to pay the passage of the individuals who were supposed to take part in the meeting set for 10 December. He indicated that he was worried since he had not heard from the "Flechero." This was related to Carlos who indicated that the money had been approved but as yet had not been forwarded to the bank. This information was relayed to A-1 and he seemed satisfied.

   c. Subject stated that he was leaving for Nicaragua tomorrow. He also asked if we had read his message to the base. I said that we had not and he then gave me the gist of his message to the effect that the "foreign power" had as yet not vetoed their plans but that in the event they did, he (A-1) would have to drastically revise his policy of adherence to their views. Subject stressed that the message was only to bolster the morale of the men.

Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
A-1 201
Conversations
Panama
Finances
Op VICTORIA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

14-00000

SECRET

7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversations with AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE: 6 December 1964, 1630 and 1645 hours

1. After being notified by the Office of Security that AMBIDDY-1 had called on the emergency number, the undersigned returned A-1's call. A-1 stated he had just received a message from AMJAVA-4 saying the SANTA MARIA was located at Cerrania Bank due to bad weather and would remain six hours at that position. In the message A-4 said he would comply with the order given him to return, however, requested Operation VICTORIA be reconsidered. A-1 requested that the following portion of A-4's message be passed to appropriate persons: "I (A-4) request the suspension of Operation VICTORIA be reconsidered for the good of future operations because a person who loses faith in operations, believing himself subject to foreign decisions, is a demoralized person." In light of A-4's message, A-1 urged that suspension of Operation VICTORIA be reconsidered. I assured A-1 that his message would be delivered.

2. DC/WH/SA was notified of the above message. On the instructions of DC/WH/SA the undersigned called A-1 and advised him that the contents of his conversations with Mr. Santell (Sanchez) on 5 December were still valid and our position regarding Operation VICTORIA remained the same.

For Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: ✓
A-1 201
Conversations
Op VICTORIA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

SECRET

7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE: 3 December 1964

1. AMBIDDY-1 called from Houston, Texas to say that he had just arrived from Central America. A-1 was advised to proceed to New York to meet with Mr. Santell and Carl. A-1 agreed to get on the first plane to JFK airport.

2. A-1 stated that VICTORIA was the operation against Casilda. A-1 stated that AMJAVA-4 had gone on theoperation. A-1 contended that he could no longer hold his troops back. A-1 asked if approval had been given to the CAONAO operation and to the Casilda operation. The undersigned stated that Mr. Santell would discuss the entire matter with him at their meeting. A-1 expects to return to Miami for a few days and then go to the Dominican Republic for the CAONAO operation. After the CAONAO operation, A-1 will go to Paris to meet with the pepresentative of the dissident group.

for Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Operations

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

8 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Juan Antonio CANCELA Gomez (201-758689)
Possible Connection with Cuban G-2

1. On 7 December 1964 during the course of a telephone conversation with AMBIDDY-1, he indicated that it was possible that Subject was connected with the Cuban G-2. AMBIDDY-1 suspects that CANCELA was sent by the G-2 to penetrate the AMYUM training camps.

2. Subject spent one month at the training camps and then asked to return to Miami. Upon his return to Miami he then made plans to travel to Nassau alleging that he had to go to Nassau in order to obtain a permanent visa to enter the U.S. AMBIDDY-1 had this story checked out with the U.S. I&NS and discovered that this was not necessary to enter the country on a permanent basis. AMBIDDY-1 therefore concluded that Subject was attempting to go to Nassau and eventually work his way back to Cuba.

3. No further information was obtained on this matter.

Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: WH/SA/CI
WH/Security

File: CANCELA 201
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
CI & Sec

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ARTIME-Buese, Manuel
201-0267437
Volume XIV

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Third Agency Documents

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
7 AUG 1978	10.45 7Aug 1978	Leslie WIZELMAN	Leslie Wizelman

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROC. ACTION	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO
COS, Caracas

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/AMBIDDY/CIHARSH/Operational
Venezuelan Right Wing Plotters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

REFERENCES: A. DIR 60049, 23 Nov 65
B. HVCW 6746, 1 Nov 65
C. CARA 8309, 2 Jan 64
D. WAVE 9889, 3 Jan 64

1. References A and B concern reporting by AMBIDDY/1 on an alleged conspiracy developing in Venezuela among right-wing members of COPEI to overthrow the LEONI regime. JMWAVE reviewed the two reports (references) and is forwarding pertinent information developed for appropriate use by addressees.

2. Reference A paragraph 2 states AMBIDDY/1 said Venezuelan Major (fnu) *GUTIERREZ (Miami representative for plotters) commutes between Caracas and Miami, and his telephone number in Miami is 887-0795.

A. The Miami numerical telephone directory lists the telephone number 887-0795 for Anselmo *ALVARADO, 550 Falcon Ave., Miami Springs, Florida. (For additional WAVE info re one Anselmo ALVARADO, see Reference D.)

B. Reference C reported that a (fnu) GUTIERREZ, 550 Falcon Ave., Miami Springs; telephone: TU 7-0795 (i.e. same number), was listed in the telephone notebook which belonged to Major Rafael Angel MOLINA Franco when he (MOLINA) was captured.

Distribution:
3 - WH/C
2 - COS, Caracas
2 - C/WH

201-267437

(continued)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
20 Dec 65

DATE DISPATCHED
DEC 24 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-24109

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
C S C [illegible]
201-768511

3. Reference B states that their (coup group) military contact is Colonel (fnu) *MARTIN Parada. On 30 July 1965 CIHARSH/1 reported he had received the following information on a Colonel (fnu) MARTIN Parada from Major Hugo *ARAQUE, a retired member of F.A.V. (Venezuelan Armed Forces) residing in Miami, who claims to be a close friend of Colonel MARTIN:

A. (fnu) MARTIN Parada, a retired colonel of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, arrived from Venezuela on 28 July 1965 aboard a LEBCA plane as "an extra passenger", and was staying at the Hotel DiLido on Miami Beach.

B. ARAQUE said Colonel MARTIN had participated in several ill-fated uprisings since General Marcos PEREZ Jimenez was ousted.

C. In 1962 MARTIN was imprisoned and later released by presidential decree. However, upon his release, he was dismissed from the Venezuelan Armed Forces.

D. CIHARSH/1 commented that from conversations with ARAQUE, he believes that MARTIN is active in conspiracies supported by financially strong elements such as Eugenio *MENDOZA, who collaborates with the PCV/FALN in order to protect his interests. CIHARSH/1 said MENDOZA pays the PCV/FALN for protection as do many wealthy people in Venezuela.

Philip G. ELMARD

19 de Diciembre de 1965

Mr. F.R. Lastra
P.O. Box 8697
Baltimore 40 MD.

Estimado Señor:

La presente es para notificarle de varios asuntos de interés:

1-Una conspiración militar guatemalteca, encaminada a derrocar al Gobierno de Peralta, ha fijado como plazo hasta un término de 15 días a partir de la fecha de la presente, para dar el golpe. Dicho grupo militar envió una representación al Coronel Ponciano para ponerle la siguiente alternativa: o se une al Golpe y lo eligen Jefe de Gobierno, o de lo contrario, lo sacarían del país en caso de que ellos triunfaran. El Coronel Ponciano está dudoso y ha mandado a preguntar al General Somoza su opinión al respecto. Le han dado 3 días para decidir. Procuraré averiguar los nombres de los militares y su fuerza real dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas. El estado del país es caótico y de terror por los secuestros perpetrados por las guerrillas de SOSA, que amenazan con el secuestro y hasta con la muerte, a quienes no colaboran con dinero.

2-El Licenciado Oduber, de Costa Riza, me ha pedido ayuda abierta del Movimiento para demostrar en su campaña electoral que él no es un nuevo Fidel Castro. La revista Triden iniciará a partir del número de Diciembre, una serie de reportajes exclusivos con Oduber, encaminados a este fin.

3- Voy a verificar una lista que me han dado de casas en Costa Rica, donde se supone haya armas escondidas, parte de los comunistas, y parte de los conspiradores Frank Marshall y Compañía. Cuando la verifique se las envío.

4- Tengo toda la organización de seguridad de Costa Rica (la del MRR) para tratar de secuestrar al tal Giovanni que luce ser el Jefe de subversión para el Caribe de Fidel Castro.

5-Les envío el último ejemplar de "Criterio Juvenil", órgano de nuestras juventudes, que circula por todas las organizaciones juveniles, incluyendo las universitarias, de todo el mundo, y más ampliamente por latino-américa.

6-Se iniciará en Enero la Construcción del Astillero de Bluefields y de la Escuela técnica para enseñanza de los indios de mecánica, electricidad y soldadura y manejo de Equipos pesados.

7-Esperamos que a fines de Enero venga el primer grupo de Indios a tomar el curso de cooperativas en nuestra Granja Modelo. El Gobierno Nicaragüense paga el viaje, nosotros pagamos la estancia y solo necesitamos saber, cómo conseguimos las visas de los Estados Unidos. Los cursos durarán 3 meses. Cada grupo será de tres indios.

8- La Revista Tridente ha aumentado su venta y su tirada, y actualmente se distribuye en:

Miami, New York, Chicago, California, Los Angeles, Puerto Rico, Tampa, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Venezuela, España y Alemania. En España se distribuye gratis y personalmente, pues el Gobierno no ha permitido su venta libre.

9- Se está terminando el Círculo de Política Internacional de la Escuela de Capacitación de Dirigentes del MRR.

10- Adjunto varios ejemplares del folleto: "Puntos de Meditación", que forma parte de los textos que se editan para los militantes del Movimiento, pero que puede ser útil para quien quiera conocer la idiosincracia del Latino-Americano.

11-Este año el Movimiento repartirá juguetes en Navidad (sin la humillación de la publicidad) entre los hijos de los mártires y presos del Movimiento que estén en Miami.

12- Está listo para la impresión el libro: "Cuba: Rostow, Marx o Lim-Piao?" del que les escribe, que es un analisis de los factores que han intervenido en el subdesarrollo económico de latino-america y que analiza muy de cerca la excepción del caso Cuba. Sostiene que los comunistas jamás han sido Marxistas en la aplicación del determinismo económico, y que la tesis China es peligrosa porque no es marxista, sino que analiza los problemas económicos de acuerdo con la tesis realista y verídica de Rostow.

13- Están en estudio dos panfletos que circularían periódicamente por correo, uno para los cubanos: Cuba por dentro. Otro para circular por Latinoamérica: Cuba: la vecina dolorosa.

14- Volvemos a insistir en la necesidad de empezar cuanto antes con un programa en onda larga para Cuba, dos o tres veces a la semana, donde se nos dé oportunidad de hablarle a los milicianos, a los becados, a los militares, a los técnicos, a los estudiantes, a los obreros y a los campesinos. Solo necesitamos el espacio de tiempo y el costo de los "Tapes". Lo demás va por cuenta del Movimiento.

Sin otra cosa por el momento se despide de Vds. con un abrazo, en "Cuba o nada":

Ignacio

15 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

SUBJECT: Status of AMCIVIC - AMBIDDY-1

1. The status of the AMCIVIC activity has reached the point where it must either be made into a useful ongoing activity or die for lack of purpose and justification.

2. As it now stands the activity's Principal Agent, AMBIDDY-1, is both literally and figuratively "flaying about" in a series of half-projects and half-plans which are neither meaningful to the Agency, meaningful to A-1 nor meaningful to his political movement. If he is to be taken at his word he is currently deeply involved both financially and politically with General Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua. Financially he has committed some $75,000 of his Movement's money in a shipbuilding scheme supposedly to be established at Monkey Point, Nicaragua. The plan, as envisioned by A-1, would be, that upon completion of these shipyards, they would offer employment and educational opportunities for the ignorant and poverty stricken Indians of the area. Once in operation, A-1 expects that the profits from this operation will be plowed back into other endeavors such as a fishing cooperative and a farming cooperative--also to ultimately benefit the area's indigenous population. All of this, of course, hinges upon two fundamental factors: Firstly, it depends upon the continued goodwill of General Somoza, together with his willingness to contribute monies to the previously mentioned scheme. Secondly, it depends to a lesser extent upon A-1's ability to forge ahead with the program. This in turn hinges upon A-1's financial status and abilities.

3. As to the first factor, General Somoza has never had a reputation for benign magnanimity. The facts show quite the opposite. He has a reputation for being a hard-headed self-seeking businessman/militarist who now aspires to political office. Anyone who can help obviously receives his support.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

Therefore, should A-1's project meet with success, Somoza would benefit both financially and politically. It is difficult to imagine A-1 deriving the same advantages especially when added to these considerations, is the fact that they have nothing whatever to do with Cuba or Cubans.

4. As to the second factor, and returning to the more realistic aspects of the problem, A-1 in the past has demonstrated his ability to sell ideas and projects. In a word he is a politician. However, when it comes to administrative, business and financial matters he is singularly inept. This was amply demonstrated during the AMWORLD era when it was only thanks to the efforts of other well-qualified people that the project was ever able to sustain itself. In summary, as it now stands A-1 is in the position of being wholly beholden of the good offices of General Somoza. He further derives no political advantages from this and is engaged in projects for which he has no basic qualifications. In a sense he is leading with his weakest card. More seriously, his efforts are politically out of focus.

5. The above presents an admittedly gloomy picture of A-1 and his current activities, however, there are certain aspects of the situation which might be used in order to rechannel A-1's efforts. For one, A-1 claims that his magazine Tridente is now running in the black (this, of course, comes from A-1 who probably has difficulty distinguishing an asset from a liability). Secondly, he has purchased 22 acres of land in West Palm Beach where he is supposedly to start training Nicaraguan Indians in the complexities of cooperative farming. Both of these endeavors represent the positive and realistic side of A-1's program. They also represent, or could represent, his Cuban efforts instead of his Nicaraguan efforts. Instead of Nicaraguan Indians, A-1 should be concentrating on training Cuban exiles. Using the proceeds from the two Swift launches, he should expand the acreage of his farm to the point of possibly making it a self-sustaining show place for his cooperative students. In so doing he would be refocusing his political efforts while at the same time improving his Cuban image. From the Agency's point of view it could also be more easily supervised.

6. It is therefore requested that the undersigned be allowed to sit down with A-1 and point out the folly of his current activities and attempt to refocus them along the lines mentioned above. Should he accept these suggestions further efforts would then be made to encourage A-1 to hire a

competent businessman to supervise his financial affairs. Further, once located (preferably by us) future support payments would be made to the business manager instead of to A-1, with stricter accounting and double-checking involved. It would also be suggested that less security would be observed and more direct looking into A-1 business would be the order of the day. As such, it is also recommended that the undersigned be allowed to actually visit the farm and report back on the actual status of the farm. A-1 would also be told that henceforth, except on FI collection missions, he should confine his efforts to the farm and developing a sensible program for cooperative training of Cubans, not Nicaraguans, or any other nationals.

7. In summary A-1 should be told that unless he is prepared to refocus his activities more realistically the Agency's gravy train is about to pull into the station.

Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/EW

DDP/WH/C/CA/EW: nancy [illegible]

Dist.
Orig - addressee (file) AMBIDDY
1 - AMCIVIC
1 - EW chrono

SECRET

SECRET

Rohlfing

CA—

FROM [illegible]

ACTION WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

INFO FILE, VR, WHI, CS/DO, SOD6, CA2, CA/24, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/SPG, FI/INT

S E C R E T 111826Z

11Dec65 IN12969

PRIORITY DIR INFO MEXI CITE WAVE 7851

NO NIACT

TYPIC AMKNOB MHGUILE AMNIP

1. PROPOSE HAVE AMKNOB-1 PASS FOLLOWING TO CUIS VIA SW LETTER:

A. FROM ALFREDO BORGES: MANUEL ARTIME ARRIVED MIAMI 6 DEC FROM NICARAGUA WHERE HE INSPECTED BASE WHICH HE STILL HAS THERE. ARTIME CONTINUES BE VERY FRIENDLY WITH PRESIDENT LUIS SOMOZA.

B. FROM OSIEL GONZALEZ: "EL COJO" ROCHE WAS FORMERLY G-2 CHIEF IN CAMAGUEY. LATER TRANSFERRED TO HAVANA. TOOK EXILE IN EMBASSY OF ECUADOR AND LEFT CUBA VIA BRASIL. ACCORDING TO OSIEL ROCHE HAS MADE VISITS TO PUERTO RICO AND MIAMI, BUT IS NOW IN NEW YORK.

C. FROM OSIEL GONZALEZ AND HECTOR PONCE: BOTH II FRENTE AND EJERCITO LIBERTADOR HAVE DEVELOPED NEW MOMENTUM AND ARE CURRENTLY MAKING PLANS FOR ACTION. NEITHER SOURCE GAVE ANY DETAILS.

D. FROM FATHER INURRIETA: DOMINGUEZ LOYO, SUB DIRECTOR OFICINA DE GOBERNACION IN MEXICO, IS COMPLETELY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND IS OPPOSED TO THE REVOLUTION.

(3)

E. FROM FATHER INURRIETA: NAME OF PRIEST WHO IS CONFESSOR OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ IS FATHER MENDOZA, WHO IS FROM PUEBLA. HE IS

SECRET

SECRET

2. SINCE ITEM B LEGITIMATELY PICKED UP BY AMKNOB-1, BELIEVE IT SERVES PURPOSE BETTER THAN SUGGESTION IN DIR 63500.

3. ITEMS D AND E ARE RESPONSES TO ABREU REQUIREMENTS WHICH AMKNOB-1 DID NOT HAVE OPPORTUNITTY TO PASS BEFORE LEAVING MEXICO AND WERE DISCUSSED WITH MEXI BY DORENFEST AND TOBIASON.

4. PLEASE ADVISE PRIOR 1200 HOURS 13 DECEMBER.

SECRET

CFN 7851 NO NIACT AMKNOB-1 CUIS SW ALFREDO BORGES MANUEL ARTIME 6 NICARAGUA LUIS SOMOZA OSIEL GONZALEZ EL COJO G-2 CAMAGUEY HECTOR PONCE II FRENTE EJERCITO LIBERTADOR FATHER INURRIETA DOMINGUEZ LOYO OFICINA DE GOBERNACION PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ FATHER MENDOZA PUEBLA B -1 63500 D E ABREU -1 NOT HAVE DORENFEST TOBIASON 1200 13

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

>/ SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CICS	5	FI
2		6	CA
3	MO	7	D
4	RR	8	L

FROM
SAN JOSE

ACTION
WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C8, CI/OPS, CA2,

S E C R E T 110026Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE SJOS 8157

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

11 DEC 65 IN 12701

REF: WAVE 7832 (IN 12626)

1. BASED MAYLOTT'S DISCUSSIONS WITH JMWAVE OFFICERS ON 2 AND 8 DECEMBER, SUGGEST HQS RELAY STATE TRAFFIC RE ALEGRETT/RUIZ CASE, PARTICULARLY SAN JOSE ASSESSMENTS AND RESULTS MANAGUA TALKS WITH SCHICK AND SOMOZA.

2. FOR WAVE: ALTHOUGH RUIZ MAY HAVE BEEN SLOWED DOWN, BOTH STATION AND EMBASSY, AS WELL AS HOST GOVERNMENT CONTINUE CONCERNED WITH COUP POSSIBILITIES. THUS WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONTINUED COVERAGE ALEGRETT.

S E C R E T

CFN: 8157 WAVE 7832 1 MAYLOTT'S 2 8 RE ALEGRETT/RUIZ SAN JOSE MANAGUA SCHICK SOMOZA 2 WAVE RUIZ

BT

SECRET

SECRET

10 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1

1. AMBIDDY-1 telephoned the undersigned and indicated that he was forced to postpone his projected interview with President Raul Leoni of Venezuela due to the latter's having a tight schedule. As it now stands, A-1 plans to travel to Venezuela within ten days for the projected meeting.

2. A-1 stated that he was in contact with Costa Rican Presidential candidate, Daniel Oduber, during his last visit. Oduber supposedly asked for A-1's assistance in trying to overcome a recent spate of rumors surrounding his (Oduber's) allegiance with Communists. (Note: A-1 is already printing some of Oduber's campaign material, so presumably this request falls within the context of the general propaganda discussions which A-1 and Oduber held).

3. A-1 was asked if he had picked up any further information on the "mysterious Italian" which he reported on during his previous Costa Rica visit. He said that he had not but that his local representative in San Jose had been given instructions to try in every way possible to develop further information on the man. As an aside, A-1 stated that he had discussed the matter with the Chief of the Costa Rican Security Service. More specifically, A-1 asked that if by chance his own men located the individual, whether the Costa Rican Service would mind if he "transported" the man across the border to Nicaragua where they would be better able to deal with him. He claimed that the chief offered no objections to this plan. The undersigned cautioned A-1 on any international "transporting" schemes.

4. From Costa Rica, A-1 traveled to Nicaragua where he held a meeting with Anastasio Somoza. The discussion centered on A-1's scheme for setting up a shipbuilding and dry dock facility near Monkey Point. In the course of this discussion, A-1 claims to have obtained an offer from the GON for the

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

financing of the shipyard in the amount of $125,000. A-1 claims that this amount, coupled with his own contribution of $75,000, should be enough to begin construction of the facility as well as a school for teaching the indigenous people of the area how to read and write in addition to acquiring a skill in shipbuilding and repairing.

5. As for politics, A-1 stated that Somoza was definitely not interested in embroiling himself with the Guatemalan and Costa Rican coup planners such as Roberto Alejos Arzu and Miguel Ruiz Herrera. The main reason for this was his concern with his own campaign in Nicaragua. Somoza, however, admitted to A-1 that he had given some money to Guatemalan Col. Ponciano in order that the latter would be able to start his electoral campaign in Guatemala. A-1 emphasized that the money was intended to support a legal campaign within the framework of the current constitutional and electoral laws and not for support of the extra-legal efforts of Alejos and company.

6. As an item of incidental interest, A-1, while in Costa Rica, met with Roberto Madrid, the current Secretary to the Costa Rican President (possibly Secretary to the future President). Madrid in the past had been most helpful to AMBIDDY-1's movement in Costa Rica. By coincidence, Madrid was on his way to Miami for a one-week vacation so that A-1 invited him to stay at his house and attend his daughter's baptism. Madrid and his wife, therefore, are current AMBIDDY-1 house guests.

7. Finally, the undersigned queried AMBIDDY-1 on whether he had been successful in obtaining a Nicaraguan passport for AMJAVA-4 in order that the latter might proceed with his plans for enrolling in the University of Mexico. A-1 replied that the passport was issued by the GON and would be mailed direct to A-4 within the next week or two.

A. D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/PW

SECRET

10 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1

1. AMBIDDY-1 telephoned the undersigned and indicated that he was forced to postpone his projected interview with President Raul Leoni of Venezuela due to the latter's having a tight schedule. As it now stands, A-1 plans to travel to Venezuela within ten days for the projected meeting.

2. A-1 stated that he was in contact with Costa Rican Presidential candidate, Daniel Oduber, during his last visit. Oduber supposedly asked for A-1's assistance in trying to overcome a recent spate of rumors surrounding his (Oduber's) allegiance with Communists. (Note: A-1 is already printing some of Oduber's campaign material, so presumably this request falls within the context of the general propaganda discussions which A-1 and Oduber held).

3. A-1 was asked if he had picked up any further information on the "mysterious Italian" which he reported on during his previous Costa Rica visit. He said that he had not but that his local representative in San Jose had been given instructions to try in every way possible to develop further information on the man. As an aside, A-1 stated that he had discussed the matter with the Chief of the Costa Rican Security Service. More specifically, A-1 asked that if by chance his own men located the individual, whether the Costa Rican Service would mind if he "transported" the man across the border to Nicaragua where they would be better able to deal with him. He claimed that the chief offered no objections to this plan. The undersigned cautioned A-1 on any international "transporting" schemes.

4. From Costa Rica, A-1 traveled to Nicaragua where he held a meeting with Anastasio Somoza. The discussion centered on A-1's scheme for setting up a shipbuilding and dry dock facility near Monkey Point. In the course of this discussion, A-1 claims to have obtained an offer from the GON for the

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-267437

SECRET

financing of the shipyard in the amount of $125,000. A-1 claims that this amount coupled with his own contribution of $75,000 should be enough to begin construction of the facility as well as a school for teaching the indigenous people of the area how to read and write in addition to acquiring a skill in shipbuilding and repairing.

5. As for politics, A-1 stated that Somoza was definitely not interested in embroiling himself with the Guatemalan and Costa Rican coup planners such as Roberto Alejos Arzu and Miguel Ruiz Herrera. The main reason for this was his concern with his own campaign in Nicaragua. Somoza, however, admitted to A-1 that he had given some money to Guatemalan Col. Ponciano in order that the latter would be able to start his electoral campaign in Guatemala. A-1 emphasized that the money was intended to support a legal campaign within the framework of the current constitutional and electoral laws and not for support of the extra legal efforts of Alejos and company.

6. As an item of incidental interest, A-1, while in Costa Rica, met with Roberto Madrid, the current Secretary to the Costa Rican President (possibly Secretary to the future President). Madrid in the past had been most helpful to AMBIDDY-1's movement in Costa Rica. By coincidence, Madrid was on his way to Miami for a one-week vacation so that A-1 invited him to stay at his house and attend his daughter's baptism. Madrid and his wife, therefore, are current AMBIDDY-1 house guests.

7. Finally, the undersigned queried AMBIDDY-1 on whether he had been successful in obtaining a Nicaraguan passport for AMJAVA-4 in order that the latter might proceed with his plans for enrolling in the University of Mexico. A-1 replied that the passport was issued by the GON and would be mailed direct to A-4 within the next week or two.

A. D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/EW

DDP/WH/C/CA/EW/Rohlfing:fph
Distribution:
Orig - File (AMBIDDY
1 - EW Chrono
1 - Rohlfing's File
1 - WH/2 (Attn: P. Edwards
1 - WH/3 (Attn: R. Hernandez

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

26 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CICS	5	FI
2		6	CA
3	FI	7	D
4	ICR	8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 102137Z

10 DEC 65 IN 12628

DIR INFO MANA SJOS TEGU CITE WAVE 7832

DYVOUR PERUMEN

REF A DIR 63132

B WAVE 7503 (IN 02576)*

* COL MIGUEL RUIZ DEPARTED U.S. FOR CENTRAL AMERICA INT'L AIRPORT.

1. HAWLOTT ON TDY MEXI BUT WILL RETURN WAVE CIRCA 22 DEC. WILL HAVE HIM CONTACT ALEGRETT, TELL LATTER THAT HIS INFO PASSED TO APPROPRIATE QUARTERS, THAT THESE HAD NO INTEREST IN FOLLOWUP AND THUS ALEGRETT MAY CONSIDER MATTER CLOSED. ALONG LINES REF HAWLOTT THEN CAN GIVE PERSONAL ADVICE TO ALEGRETT TO ACT IN LEGAL MANNER AND REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO ODENVY ANY MATTERS WHICH HE BELIEVES WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO ODYOKE.

2. IF HQS WISHES ALEGRETT BE CONTACTED BEFORE 22 DEC WAVE CAN ARRANGE GIVE HIM WORD BY PHONE. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CFN 7832 63132 7503 HAWLOTT TDY 22 ALEGRETT NO INTEREST 22

BT

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL/PROPAGANDA/AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are tape recordings of talks which have been taped by AMBIDDY-1 at the request of Headquarters for possible re-broadcast into Cuba. As originally conceived, it was thought that AMBIDDY-1 would firstly set forth in broad terms reasons for his talks and then proceed through a series of short speeches to address various political and economic groups within Cuba - such as the "becados" and the Military elements. In each case the overall theme would be to appeal to the basic patriotic emotions of the various social groups and then contrast this patriotism with the current regime which has not only betrayed the ideals of genuine social justice but has betrayed the nation itself.

2. It is therefore requested that the Station review the attachments, which have been submitted on a pilot basis, and that any suggestions and/or comments regarding their usage be forwarded to Headquarters for further consideration. Please also include views on what Radio Station would be most appropriate for the broadcasts.

Ernest A. LUSBY

Attachment:
As Stated Herewith

Distribution:
3 - COS/JMWAVE

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGW-5717

CS COPY

DATE: 07 DEC 1965

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-267437

1 December 1963
Distribution:
1 - WH/C/CA/EW
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - WH/C/MO

RI — WH/C/ES
ABSTRACT X INDEX
DEC

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/C/CA/EW	A.D. Rohlfing	jmg	6957

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DC/WH/C/CA	3C	David Ronis
DCWHD/C		John L. Hart
WH/C/MO	DEC 10	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	4	William V. Broe

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

7 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

SUBJECT : Current Status of AMJAVA-4

1. AMJAVA-4 is currently awaiting news from Nicaragua on obtaining a Nicaraguan passport for use in getting into Mexico. AMBIDDY-1 has promised to look into the matter for him and upon his return from Venezuela, via Nicaragua, should have definite news. AMBIDDY-1 returns from his trip around 15 December. In the interim, AMJAVA-4 has been doing some work for SOD/Maritime such as spotting and recruiting suitable candidates in the JMWAVE area for use in an operation currently being run on Lake Tanganyika. He was also scheduled to travel to Buenos Aires in order to give a familiarization course in Maritime operations to a group of Argentine naval people who were to be used in Africa. This latter plan, however, fell through. He has also been enrolled at a junior college in the JMWAVE area in order to improve his English.

2. AMJAVA-4 has been asked in very general terms if he could put together a sabotage team composed of trained ex-AMWORLD personnel. He was most enthusiastic and stated that he was in constant touch with many of the ex-AMWORLD group and that he could put together a team in fairly quick order. It was emphasized that we (KUBARK) did not have anything specific in mind but if his Mexican schooling plans failed we might have to consider other possibilities including his use in a sabotage operation.

Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/EW

DDP/WH/C/CA/EW/Rohlfing:mak
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - AMBIDDY File
1 - AMJAVA-4 File
1 - EW Chrono

14-00000

RET. TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

F.le

20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
JM WAVE

ACTION
WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, COMMO 2, CI/OA

SECRET 062350Z

DIR INFO CARA CITE WAVE 7728

TYPIC AMWORLD AMBIDDY-1

7 Dec 65 IN 08990

1. FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM AMJOKE-1, 4 DEC 65:

A. AMBIDDY-1 HAS 18 OR MORE WT SETS, SUPPOSEDLY RS-511, STORED IN HOUSE IN DOWNTOWN MIAMI NEAR COURTHOUSE AND VICINITY RIVER AT 12 STREET. THEY ORIGINALLY ISSUED TO HIM AND PICKED UP IN NORFOLK, VA., WHEN HE LEADING AMWORLD.

B. ACCORDING JULIO YANEZ PEREGRIN (201-741155), AMBIDDY-1 SAID HE WANTED TALK WITH YANEZ SOON RE OPPORTUNITY YANEZ WORK WITH AMBIDDY-1 FROM BASE IN VENEZUELA. AMBIDDY-1 SAID HE CONDUCITNG HIGHLY SELECTIVE RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGN IN ORDER AVOID SOME OF PITFALLS OF AMWORLD DAYS. YANEZ GAVE AMJOKE-1 IMPRESSION THIS OPPORTUNITY MEANS "GOOD MONEY."

C. ACCORDING RENE CANCIO (PROB IDEN WITH SUBJ 201-285784) AMBIDDY-1 SAID HE EXPECTS TO START WORKING ON CUBAN CAUSE IN TWO OR THREE MONTHS.

SECRET

SECRET

CFN: 7728 AMJOKE-1 4 DEC 65 AMBIDDY-1 18 WT RS-511 MIAMI 12 NORFOLK VA AMWORLD JULIO YANEZ PEREGRIN 201-741155 -1 -1 VENEZUELA

201-267437

MESSAGE FORM 59
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ [illegible] BY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG : [illegible] CASTRODIST
UNIT : [illegible]/C/CICS
EXT : 9256
DATE : 4 DECEMBER 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-[illegible] 721077

S/ SECRET

ROUTING	DDP		
1	CICS	5	CA-
2		6	RRRE
3	MO	7	C
4	FI	8	D

TO : JMWAVE MANAGUA SAN JOSE TEGUCIGALPA

[illegible]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR . FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/SPG, CA 2, CA/O 4

TO WAVE INFO MANA SJOS TEGU CITE DIR

File - AMBIDD[illegible] 3132

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 7572 (IN 04077)

1. FYI: HQS HAS BEEN ADVISED BY COACID THAT ON MORNING 3 DEC 65, COL MIGUEL RUIZ DEPARTED US FOR CENTRAL AMERICA FROM MIAMI INT'L AIRPORT. OOURGE, AT THE REQUEST OF ODBOON, AFFIXED CANCELLATION STAMP HIS VISA THUS PRECLUDING RE-ENTRY. IT INEVITABLE ALEGRETTE WILL SOON LEARN HIS CO-CONSPIRATOR'S FATE AND HOPEFULLY PROFIT BY EXAMPLE.

2. WAVE ONLY: SUGGEST HAWLOTT RE-CONTACT ALEGRETTE AND ADVISE HIM HE MUST ABIDE BY LAWS OF LAND WHILE HERE. THIS TO INCLUDE REGISTERING AS SOMOZA AGENT WITH ODENVY SHOULD THEY REQUIRE THIS. FINALLY, THAT KUBARK HAS NO INTEREST IN HIM AND THAT HE IS TO REFER TO ODENVY [redacted] ANY FUTURE CONTACTS HE MAY WISH TO MAKE WITH ODYOKE. SUGGEST HAWLOTT APPROACH BE PHRASED IN TERMS OF PERSONAL ADVICE RATHER THAN OFFICIAL ADMONITION. FYI: WISH POINT OUT ANY HARASSMENT ALEGRETTE MAY BE EXPERIENCING IS MOST LIKELY WORK OF ODBOON RATHER THAN ODENVY.

3. SINCE ALEGRETTE CAN LOGICALLY ASSUME HAWLOTT SPEAKING FOR GALBOND, HQS EXPECTS NO FURTHER ATTEMPTS ON HIS PART TO RECONTACT KUBARK.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

6-4

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

:S
T :
T :
TE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE TWO

INFO CITE DIR 63132

[illegible]

C/WH/C/CICS

C/WH/C/[illegible]

DC/WH/2 Charles Katsainos (telecoord)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance   date: 3 December 1963

FROM : WH/C/CA

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)________________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to **Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria** $ **5,000**
NAME OF PAYEE (True) STATUS (e.g.) CA:SA:CE: INTEGREE AMOUNT

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1) ______ Devised Cover Check. Account No. ________-1100
(2) __X__ Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

☐	BOSTON	☐	DALLAS*	☐	KANSAS CITY	☐	MIAMI	☐	NEW ORLEANS	☐	RICHMOND	☐	ST. LOUIS
☐	CHICAGO	☐	DENVER	☐	KNOXVILLE	☐	MILWAUKEE	☒	NEW YORK*	☐	SAN FRANCISCO	☐	WASHINGTON, D.C.*
☐	CLEVELAND	☐	DETROIT	☐	LOS ANGELES	☐	MINNEAPOLIS	☐	PHILADELPHIA	☐	SEATTLE	☐	WILMINGTON

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following:
(1) Account Name: ________________
(2) Account Number: ________________
(3) Bank Name: ________________
(4) Bank Address: ________________
________________ Zip: ________
(5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
(6) Payment to be originated from ________________
(SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
(7) Indicate remittor if desired: ________________

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ________ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Officer

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☒ Check to be picked up

Andrew D. Schalfing	6957	John L. Hart	7264
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER	EXT.	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER	EXT.

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment ________________ City ________________

FORM 1-63 1264 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS   SECRET   GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification   (88)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Chrono Copy

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	FROM WH/C AMCIVIC/AMBIDDY TO Confidential Funds Division	DATE 3 Dec 65	DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY NATURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS:

December payment to AMBIDDY-1 of $5,000 for supporting the dependents of members of his Revolutionary Recovery Movement who are currently imprisoned in Cuba. I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, funds passed to AMBIDDY-1 are being used or have been used for the purpose intended and further advances are warranted.

Andrew D. Rohlfing

PAYEE AMBIDDY-1	AMOUNT $5,000

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to __________ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF PAYEE
DATE	SIGNATURE OF AGENT

PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS

See 1834 Attached

THE AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENTS. *(To be signed when applicable)*

DATE	TITLE	SIGNATURE
	WH/C/CA/EW	Andrew D. Rohlfing

APPROVED

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER

CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER
	John L. Hart

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.	CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.
DATE	SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER WH/B&F

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE	AMOUNT	SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT
	$5,000	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 / DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. / SHIP.DOC.NO. / 32-33 DIV.	34-39 STATION CODE / REC.RPT. NO. / PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXPENDED	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. / ADVANCE ACCT. NO. / EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA CR COST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL	61-66 CK. NO. / REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS / 68-70 DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	71-80 AMOUNT CREDIT

DATE	PREPARED BY	DATE	REVIEWED BY	TOTALS		

FORM 4-65 496 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-49)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1	CICS	5	FI
2		6	CA
3	MO	7	
4	RR	8	

2 DEC 65 23 63

ORIG : E.SCOGGIN:ST SCS
UNIT : WH/C/CICS
EXT : 9286
DATE : 2 DECEMBER 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-742618

SECRET

TO : MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG CEN~~

CONF: WH/C8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY WH8,

TO MEXI INFO WAVE CITE DIR

62469

TYPIC AMBIDDY

REF: DIR 58809*

AMBIDDY/1 ASKED BY HQS CO TO IDENTIFY CUBAN INTERROGATORS IN EFFORT DETERMINE IF ONE COULD HAVE BEEN ABREU. A/1 STATED UNABLE MAKE IDENTIFICATION BECAUSE CONSTANT FOCUS BRIGHT LIGHT IN EYES PROHIBITED SEEING INTERROGATORS.

END OF MESSAGE

*Ref concerns Hqs attempts identify AMKNOB/1 CO who claimed he interrogated AMBIDDY/1 Cuba

C/WH/C/CICS
WH/1
WH/C/MO
WH/C/FI/~~TC~~

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

2-15

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MRR

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
3212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Miami 30 de Noviembre de 1965

Mr. Federico R. Lustra
Baltimore Md.

Estimado Señor:

Primero quiero enumerarle el significado de los documentos que le adjunto:

#1- Copia fotostática de la carta que se supone Daniel Oduber escribió a Mora Valverde. No hay certidumbre de ésto, pues el documento es procedente de José Ivan Alegret, quien lo recibió de Miguel Ruiz Herrero.

#2 y # 3 -Copias fotostáticas de peticiones hechas por Daniel Oduber a distintos funcionarios del Gobierno Costarricense, presentando a ciertos comunistas para que les resuelvan los problemas que tienen. Tienen la misma procedencia que el documento anterior.

#4 y # 5- Cartas recibidas por Eduardo Mora Valverde y Manuel Mora Valverde de la República Dominicana, donde se exponen detalles interesantes sobre Raúl Castro y sobre la situación interna de Costa Rica. Fuente de origen: Luis Arizurrieta, delegado nuestro en Costa Rica, obtenidas a través de un amigo de "Costa Rica Libre", que parece ser amigo también de Ruiz Herrero. Pero estos documentos, si son inventados, lo son por el amigo de Miguel Ruiz, no por él.

6.- Documento que se supone sea la organización comunista en Centro América y el Caribe. Fuente de origen: Luis Arizurrieta.

7 .- Lista de los miembros de la S.C.A.P., sociedad que se supone sea la que suministra hombres en Costa Rica, para ser entrenados en Cuba y regresar a su país con planes de subversión y sabotaje. Fuente de origen: Luis Arizurrieta.

El Sr Luis Arizurrieta tiene un grupo de muchachos jóvenes, reclutados entre los amigos de un jóven costarricense que trabajó con nosotros cuando teníamos campamentos allí; que se han infiltrado en la juventud socialista de Costa Rica. A través de esta red; se han obtenido los siguientes informes:

1-Que desde Julio de 1965, hay un hombre en Costa Rica, que llegó al parecer de Méjico, que es conocido con el nombre de "Giovanni", que luce ser italia-

14-00000

MRR

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria

3312 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

(2)

no, que medirá aproximadamente 1.75 ms. de alto, delgado, pálido, que siempre suele llevar gafas, que tiene el pelo largo y lacio, con entradas pronunciadas, y manchas canosas a los lados de la cabeza (sienes), que viste bien y suele andar erguido. Manos largas y afiladas. Nuez del cuello prominente.

Este individuo ha sido visto en Turrialba, Costa Rica, en conversaciones con Marcial Aguiluz, que lo trata con mucho respeto. También ha sido visto en el Restaurant "El Príncipe", frente al Hotel Costa Rica, en charla con individuos de acento panameño. Ha sido visto también en el Restaurant "Chi-Kon" San José.

Una vez estaba en este último Restaurant, conversando con Isidoro Guzmán, policía de las Radio-Patrullas, vestido de paisano Guzmán.

Todos lo tratan con mucho respeto y se han oído comentarios entre ciertos sectores comunistas, de que este hombre viaja mucho por Centro-América. Lo consideran un jefe de muy alta jerarquía.

Según lo que se ha reportado de Costa Rica; la Embajada Cubana en Méjico, envía mensajes a Costa Rica a través de la Embajada de Bolivia en San José; muchas veces, a través del Apartado 1261 de San José.

Parece ser que Ubaldo García, cubano que trabaja en Televisión, canal 9 y Francisco Gamboa, son los encargados de manejar el asunto de cubanos infiltrados en Costa Rica, bien para Costa Rica, o bien para otros países de Centro-América.

Sin más nada por el momento se despide de Vds. muy atte. su s.s.

Ignacio

29 November 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, WH/[illegible]

SUBJECT : Accounting for Advance in Amount of $5,000 to [illegible]-1 for Month of October

There follows a breakdown of expenses incurred by [illegible]-1 during the month of October:

A) Amount sent to Father Llorente for delivery to dependents inside Cuba via the Embassy of Spain $ [illegible],000

B) Breakdown of pensions or allotments to dependents of ex-MRR members who have either been imprisoned or executed by the Castro regime in Cuba:

[illegible] Alonso	275.00
Alfredo [illegible] [illegible]	250.00
[illegible] [illegible]	200.00
[illegible] [illegible] Vidal	275.00
[illegible] [illegible]	250.00
[illegible] del [illegible]	150.00
[illegible] [illegible]	125.00
[illegible] [illegible]	250.00
Antonio [illegible] [illegible]	200.00
[illegible] [illegible]	250.00

Antonio Sanz de Acedo	200.00
Nilo Messer Pujol	275.00
Eugenio Claudo	100.00
TOTAL	$5,000.00

Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/EW

DDP/WH/C/CA/EW/Rohlfing:mak
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Chrono
1 - AMBIDDY File

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

ORIG : B. MILLS/ear
UNIT : WH/C/MO/PM
EXT : 4215
DATE : 26 Nov 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1	MO	5	RR
2		6	A
3	CI	7	
4	CA-	8	

26 NOV 65 22 52Z

TO : JMWAVE INFO: MANAGUA SAN JOSE TEGUCIGALPA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, WH8, SOD6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2

TO PRITY WAVE INFO MANA SJOS TEGU CITE DIR 61115

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMTABBY-27

REFS: A. WAVE 7490 (IN 01866)

B. WAVE 7491 (IN 01886)

1. AS GENERAL MONTIEL ACTUALLY SAID TO AMTABBY-27 PER REF A, THAT "COUP A NECESSARY UNDERTAKING IN COSTA RICA", CONSIDERABLE CREDENCE ADDED REF A AND PAST REPORTS THIS SUBJECT. VIEW THIS, REQUEST WAVE RECONFIRM MONTIEL STATEMENT ABOVE MADE TO AMTABBY-27 AND IF POSSIBLE ELABORATE.

2. CAN WAVE OFFICER WHO CONTACTS ALEGRETT DISCREETLY DETERMINE VALIDITY IMPLIED SOMOZA SUPPORT TO COUP EFFORT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/MO B. Mills
WH/C/CICS J. Castoro (draft)
WH/2/CR P. Edwards (draft)

for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

for
JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

26-28

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

3 Dual

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
CARACAS

ACTION
WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, 10H/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/IC 2, CA/PS, SOD 6, FI, FI/INT 2

ACTION

SECRET 251520Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE CARA 3117

IN 50079

REF DIR 60049

1. MAJ. (FNU) GUTIERREZ REF IDENTICAL (RETIRED) MAJOR JOSE ISABEL GUTIERREZ RODRIGUEZ, VENEZUELAN MILITARY ACADEMY CLASS 44. HISTORY AS RIGHTEST PLOTTER, IN LATER YEARS INFLUENCED BY MARXIST IDEAS OF LT. COL. JUAN DE DIOS MONCADA VIDAL WHO IN JAIL. GUTIERREZ DECLARED ENEMY OF ACCION DEMOCRATICA PARTY AND LEONI GOVERNMENT. INVOLVED SEVERAL CONSPIRACIES LAST ONE BEING THAT OF GENERAL JESUS MARIA CASTRO LEON. ACCORDING CIWHIM-5 VENEZUELAN ARMY G-2 AND SIFA AWARE BUT NOT CONCERNED OVER HIS ACTIVITIES. MILITARY ARREST ORDER PENDING, THEREFORE DOUBT GUTIERREZ OPENLY TRAVELS CARACAS.

2. ACCORDING CIWHIM-9, GUTIERREZ INVOLVED CONTRABAND BETWEEN MIAMI AND VENEZUELA IN CONJUNCTION SEVERAL VENEZUELAN PILOTS SUCH AS (FNU) PARODI (PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH GONZALO PARODI GRANES; SEE WAVE 6881 8JAN 65). GUTIERREZ REPRESENTS ANSELMO ALVARADO WHO MARRIED TO SISTER OF GUTIERREZ'S WIFE. ALVARADO IS UNION REPUBLICAN DEMOCRATICA (URD) POLITICIAN AND OWNER OF RACE HORSES

SECRET

Copy detached and logged

201-267437

PAGE 2
IN 62279

WHICH SOMETIMES RUN IN MIAMI. INVOLVED WITH ALVARADO IN HORSE BUSINESS IS DR. MIGUEL TORREALBA ALSO URD POLITICIAN WHO MARRIED TO SISTER OR COUSIN OF ALIRIO UGARTE PELAYO'S WIFE AND RELATED TO COLONEL GONZALO MURILLO SPERANDIO. SINCE GUTIERREZ'S BUSINESS AND FAMILY TIES ARE WITH URD POLITICIANS DOUBT HE PLOTTING WITH PROMINENT COPEI LEADER.

3. GUTIERREZ WAS CLOSE FRIEND OF GENERAL CASTRO LEON AND THEREFORE IN GROUP WHICH SUPPORTED GENERALS SANCHEZ VALDERRAMA, MERCHAN LOPEZ, TRUJILLO ECHEVERRIA, MAJOR LUIS MARCELO PACHECO. THESE INDIVIDUALS EITHER IN SEMI-MILITARY POSITIONS SUCH AS ARMY SOCIAL SERVICES OR PRIVATE BUSINESS. OTHER FRIENDS ARE:

A) MAJOR ALI CHALBAUD GODOY, RETIRED, WANTED BY SIFA FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST GOVERNMENT.

B) MAJOR CARDIER RODRIGUEZ

C) COL. MIGUEL ANGEL NIETO BASTOS, RETIRED NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER

D) MAJOR OSWALDO GRAZIANI FARINAS, RETIRED

E) LT. COL. JUAN DE DIOS MONCADA VIDAL, SAN MARCOS JAIL.

F) MAJ. RAFAEL ANGEL MILINA FRANCO

G) MAJOR EDGAR DUHAMEL CASTRO

H) COL. OSCAR TAMAYO SUAREZ 201-42094 RETIRED.

OF PRIME IMPORTANCE IN MILITARY COUP IS INVOLVEMENT OF OFFICERS WHO

[illegible]

SECRET

PAGE 3
IN C2277

SECRET

COMMAND TROOPS. NONE OF GUTIERREZ'S FRIENDS IN SUCH POSITION. IN CARACAS IT ESSTENTIAL CONTROL OR NEUTRALIZE MINIMUM FOUR KEY UNITS, BOLIVAR INF. BN., AYACUCHO ARTILLERY GP, BERMUDEZ TANK BN, AND PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, TO SAY NOTHING OF NATIONAL GUARD MOBILE DETACHMENT AND MILITARY POLICE BN. GARRISONS IN MARACAY, ORIENTE (PRESUMABLY MATURIN) AND CIUDAD BOLIVAR REPORTEDLY CONTROLLED BY SO-CALLED CENTRALIST MOVEMENT. STATION HAS NO INFO PTJ INVOLVED IN ANY PLOT.

4. STORY INVOLVING COMMANDO GROUP BEING TRAINED BY EX WWII GERMAN OFFICERS SOUNDS LIKE OLD STORY PARROTED FOR YEARS BY CARLOS SAVELLI MALDONADO WHOSE LINE INVOLVES "SHOCK TROOPS" TRAINED BY "NAZI INSTRUCTORS," "ABDUCTIONS AND ASSASSINATIONS" OF POLITICAL LEADER. POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GUTIERREZ AND SAVELLI, OR WITH ANY GROUP WORKING AGAINST GOVERNMENT PROVIDED THEY WOULD ACCEPT GUTIERREZ WHO HAS LITTLE TO OFFER. GUTIERREZ DISCONTENTED INDIVIDUAL WITH COMPLEX REACTIONS, HIGHLY INFLUENCED BY WIFE. STATION SERIOUSLY DOUBTS HE PLAYS IMPORTANT ROLE IN ANY PLOTTING GROUP. HE MAY HAVE GOTTEN WIND OF CENTRALISTS AND ATTEMPTING GET CLOSE THIS GROUP.

5. PARASA, 201-98533, RETIRED AND DISCREDITED OFFICER OF NO IMPORTANCE.

SECRET

PAGE 4
IN 62279

6. CONCERNING POSSIBLE CHURCH INVOLVEMENT, PARSON AT NUESTRA SENORA DE FATIMA IS FATHER TEODORO AGUIRRE, NOT KNOWN AS CONSPIRATOR. PARSON AT PARISH EL ROSAL (NOT ROSARIO) MONSENOR BERNARDO HEREDIA WHO REPORTEDLY ADECO ENEMY AND FREQUENTLY INVOLVED POLITICAL ACTIVITY AGAINST GOVERNMENT. OTHER CONSPIRING PRIESTS ARE FATHER SALVATIERRA PITO, FATHER AGUAS AND FATHER RAFAEL MARIA ALVAREZ FLEGAL. THERE IS GROUP WITHIN CHURCH PRESSURING CARDINAL TO INTERVENE AGAINST GOVERNMENT BUT PRESENT CHURCH POLICY IS TO STAY CLEAR OF OR AT BEST ON FRINGE SUCH ACTIVITY.

7. SINCE DOUBT VALIDITY REF REPORT AUTHORIZE PASSAGE ABOVE (MINUS PARA 6) TO AMBIDDY-1 FOR USE AS APPROPRIATE WITH GUTIERREZ WHOSE GUNS SHOULD BE SPIKED.

SECRET

CFN 3117 MAJ (FNU) GUTIERREZ JOSE ISABEL GUTIERREZ RODRIGUEZ 44 JUAN DE DIOS MONCADA VIDAL LEONI JESUS MARIA CASTRO LEON CIWHIM-5 G-2 SIFA NOT CONCERNED 9 PARODI GONZALO PARODI GRANES 6881 8 63 ANSELMO ALVARADO URD DR. MIGUEL TORREALBA ALIRIO UGARTE PELAYO'S GONZALO MURILLO SPERANDIO COPEI SANCHEZ VALDERRAMA MERCHAN LOPEZ TRUJILLO ECHEVERRIA LUIS MARCELO PACHECO ALI CHALBAUD GODOY CARDIER RODRIGUEZ MIGUEL ANGEL NIETO BASTOS OSWALDO GRAZIANI FARINAS JUAN DE DIOS

PAGE 5
IN 62279

MONCADA VIDAL RAFAEL ANGEL MOLINA FRANCO EDGAR DUHAMEL CASTRO OSCAR TAMAYO SUAREZ 291-42794 NONE OF BOLIVAR INF. BN. AYACUCHO BERMUDEZ ORIENTE MATURIN CIUDAD NO INFO PTJ EX WWII 201-98533 NO IMPORTANCE NUESTRA SENORA DE FATIMA TEODORO AGUIRRE NOT KNOWN EL ROSAL NOT ROSARIO BERNARDO HEREDIA ADECO SALVATIERRA PITO AGUAS RAFAEL MARIA ALVAREZ FLEGAL 6 AMBIDDY-1

BT

201-267437

☐ DESK ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 4

ORIG : A.D. ROHLFING/mak
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW ☐ INDEX
EXT : 6957-1255 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 22 NOV 65 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

6 SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1	EW—	5	RR
2		6	C
3	CA	7	E
4	HA	8	

TO : CARACAS MANAGUA SAN JOSE GUATEMALA TEGUICIGALPA PANAMA CITY JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH 8

INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY, WH 8, C/OPS, C/OA

TO CARA MANA SJOS INFO GUAT TEGU PACY WAVE CITE DIR 60387

TYPIC

DIR: 60386

IDEN - 1 PRESIDENT RAUL LEONI

IDEN - 2 MANUEL A. BUESA

File AMBIDDY-1

END OF MESSAGE

DC/WH/C/CA

Terrell
WH/2 (telecon)

M. Peak
WH/3 (telecon)

WH/C/MO

Flores
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Flores
for
JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER 24-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG : R. HERNANDEZ
UNIT : WH/3/VENEZUELA ☐ INDEX
EXT : 4521 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 22 NOVEMBER 65 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

X XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1	Ew –	5	RE
2		6	FI
3	CA	7	CI
4	MO	8	OA

23 NOV 65 15 02z

TO : CARACAS INFO JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG CEN~~

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO CARA INFO WAVE CITE DIR

60049

REF: A. DIR-59681*

B. HVCW-6746**

1. AMBIDDY-1 CONTACTED IN MIAMI BY VEN MAJOR (FNU) GUTIERREZ CLAIMING HE LOCAL REP FOR GROUP OF PLOTTERS CURRENTLY TRAINING FOR COUP AGAINST LEONI REGIME. A-1 UNABLE OBTAIN NAMES OTHER THAN COL. MARTIN PARADA. ACCORDING A-1 LEADER OF PLOT LOCATED IN CARACAS CONVENT NUESTRA SENORA DE FATIMA OR NUESTRA SENORA DEL ROSARIO.

2. A-1 SAID GUTIERREZ COMMUTES BETWEEN CARA AND MIAMI. TELEPHONE IN MIAMI 887-0795 (NO GUTIERREZ LISTED MIAMI DIRECTORY WITH THIS NUMBER).

3. GUTIERREZ GAVE A-1 FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTACTING LEADER: A-1 SHOULD PROCEED CARA AND CALL DR. (FNU) MORELOS (WHOM A-1 SUSPECTS MAY BE PRIEST). MORELOS WILL THEN TAKE A-1 TO LEADER.

4. A-1 REPORTED CONSPIRATORS HAVE ENLISTED SUPPORT PROMINENT COPEI LEADER (A-1 UNABLE SUPPLY NAME). PURPORTEDLY GARRISONS IN MARACAY, ORIENTE AND BOLIVAR ALREADY HAVE GIVEN TACIT CONSENT JOIN

CONTINUED.....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO :

PAGE #2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR . FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 60049

PLOTTERS. ALSO CARA ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ JUDICIAL TECHNICAL POLICE WILLING GO ALONG WITH PLOT. ALLEGEDLY PLOTTERS IN CONTACT WITH SPANISH EMB CARA.

5. A-1 REPORTED/COUP TO EVOLVE AS FOLLOWS: COMMANDO GROUP CURRENTLY BEING TRAINED BY EX-WW II GERMAN ARMY OFFICERS TO SURROUND HOMES OF 60 PROMINENT CIVIL AND MILITARY LEADERS ON DATE DESIGNATED AS "NOCHE DE LOS CUCHILLOS LARGOS" (NIGHT OF THE LONG KNIVES). SIMULTANEOUSLY ABOVE MENTIONED GARRISONS WOULD SEIZE LEADERSHIP ARMED FORCES.

6. HQS TRACES PARADA: IDEN WITH SUBJ 201-98533; LEADER MIL PLOT AGAINST BETANCOURT REGIME 196 . LATER SOUGHT ASYLUM COLOMBIAN EMB AND EXILED. ODENVY REPORT DBB-6953 DATED 28 JUL 65 STATED SUBJ ARRIVED MIAMI 28 JULY.

7. ONLY HQS TRACE ON MORELOS REFLECTS ONE FATHER JOSE MARIA MORELOS IN MEXI APPROX 1956. NO OTHER IDEN INFO. WISH TO POINT OUT POSSIBILITY DR. MORELOS MAY BE IDEN WITH DR. MORENO (201-42[illegible]33) WHO ALSO KEY FIGURE 1961 MILITARY PLOT.

CONTINUED......

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible]

XX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

RIG :
NIT :
XT :
ATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

0 :

PAGE #3

ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF :

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

0 INFO CITE DIR 60049

8. SEPARATE CABLE TO FOLLOW OUTLINING A-1'S VEN ITINERARY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *A-1 confirms Alegrett approach to buy arms and former in direct contact with Vene and Guat plotters.
**Re A-1 Conversation with alleged Vene right wing plotters.

WH/C/MO E. Chiocca (by phone)

WH/CA D. Rohlfing (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

HERSCHEL PEAK
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

22 November 1965

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Contact Report

1. I contacted AMBIDDY-1 (A-1) 17 November in order to discuss the rumors surrounding his having met with Nicaraguan Captain Jose Ivan Alegrette. A-1 confirmed that he had held a meeting with Alegrette 16 November. During the course of the meeting Alegrette had proposed to purchase the remaining AMWORLD arms currently located in Nicaragua. A-1 refused to discuss the matter with Alegrette and told him they were not for sale. He assured the undersigned that KUBARK need not worry about the arms falling into Alegrette's or anyone elses hands. Alegrette also offered to put A-1 in contact with Roberto Alejos Arzu, Guatemalan millionaire and a constant plotter against the regime of Peralta. A-1 met Alejos the following day and the details of the meeting are outlined below. In any case, A-1 assured the undersigned that the arms in his possession are currently hidden in the basement of two houses located in Managua and Bluefields respectively. The arms total about 100 rifles, sub-machine-guns and carbines. There are also two bazookas and four small (60 millimeter) mortars. A-1 also stated that only three trusted AMWORLDER's are aware of the location of the arms; one of these being AMJAVA-4. I later checked with AMJAVA-4 and he confirmed this last point.

2. A-1 plans to travel to Managua on 22 November in order to meet with Anastasio Somoza and turn over the bases to the latter. A-1 feels that he cannot use the bases any-more, and the ammunition which is now located there constitutes a serious hazard to the local populace since A-1 no longer has people to guard the storehouses. Hence, all of the ammunition at the bases will be turned over to Somoza. Another reason for A-1's visit is to discuss Somoza's election campaign with him (A-1 is printing Somoza's campaign posters for him and he provided me with two exemplars). A-1 also stated that his "cooperative training center at West Palm Beach" will soon receive its first three natives from

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Nicaragua. Somoza has promised to pay the passage of the three trainees while A-1 for his part will provide them with food lodging and training while in the U.S.

3. From Nicaragua A-1 plans on travelling to Costa Rica. A-1 will possibly meet with the Presidential candidate Daniel Oduber in order to discuss his campaign, since A-1 has offered to print his posters for him. However, the main purpose of A-1's visit to Costa Rica is to obtain a Venezuelan entry visa. A-1 reasoned that it would be more discreet to apply from Costa Rica, in addition to which he is expecting an invitation from President Leoni via the Venezuelan embassy in San Jose. As yet, however, he has received no word on the matter so that if this latter plan falls through he will return to Miami. A-1 provided a complete account on his latest dealings with a certain group of Venezuelan plotters (again courtesy of Alegrette, who put him in touch with them). There follows the two accounts mentioned previously:

Guatemala

At a meeting which A-1 held with Alejos (18 November), the latter invited A-1 to attend a meeting between himself, Colonel FNU Ponciano and Somoza. The purpose of the meeting will be to attempt to enlist the support of Somoza in an attempt against the government of Enrique Peralta. A-1 asked for instructions from KUBARK on whether or not to attend the meeting. In any event, Alejos stated that the plans call for the calling of a general strike throughout the country, followed by a coup under the leadership of Ponciano. Ponciano would then set up a two year provisional government after which general elections would be called. As with Alegrette, A-1 promised Alejos nothing.

Venezuela

A-1 has been in contact (in Miami) with a Venezuelan Major by name of FNU Gutierrez who claims to be the local representative and cut-out for a group of plotters who are currently training for a coup against the regime of Raul Leoni. A-1 has not been able to ascertain the names of any of the principles other than a Colonel Martin Parada, who in the past worked with the Perez Jimenez regime in flying arms to Somoza (who in turn was attempting to overthrow the Costa Rican government). The leader of the plot is currently located in a convent in the Caracas area. He is located at either the convent of Nuestra Senora de Fatima or Nuestra Senora del Rosario. Gutierrez has offered to put A-1 in contact with the leader and has even given him contact instructions. A-1 is to proceed to Caracas and call on a Dr. Morelos, who A-1 suspects may be a priest. The Doctor will then take him to the leader. The conspirators have enlisted the support of a prominent COPEI leader of the right-wing faction but again his name remains a mystery. In addition, the garrison a Maracai, the Provinces of Oriente and Bolivar states have already given their tacit consent to join. The judicial police of Caracas are also willing to go along with the plotters.

The actual plan will consist of a group of commandos (who are currently being trained by ex-WW II German Army officers) surrounding the homes of 60 of the most prominent Civil and Military leaders of the country on a date designated as the "night of the long knives". Simultaneously, the above-mentioned garrisons will rise up and take over the leadership of the Armed forces. Again, A-1 awaits KUBARK instructions as to whether or not to attend a meeting with the secret leader of the coup group.

Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/EW

MRR

Movimento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Miami Nov 22 1965.

Mr. F.R. Lastra
P.O. Box 8697
Baltimore 40 Md.

Estimado Amigo:

Tengo el gusto de reportar el empleo de los $5,000.00 recibidos para gastos del mes de Octubre.

Entregadas al Padre Llorente para enviar a través de la Embajada de España ———— $ 2,000.00

Entregados para su envío a Cuba, a familiares de presos o fusilados del Movimiento ————:

Inocencio Alonso	275.00
Alfredo Borges Caignet	250.00
Rolando Tapanes	200.00
Gustavo Fernández Vidal	375 300.00
Angel García	300.00
Emilia del [illegible]	100.00
Silvio Heredia	125.00
Jacinto Luzárraga	300.00
Antonio Crespo Olivero	300.00
Rafael García	300.00
Antonio Sanz de Acedo	200.00
Nilo Messer Pujol	275.00
Eugenio Claude	100.00

Totals $5,0[illegible].00
000.00

MRR

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
3313 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Como se vé, en subsidios a familiares de presos o fusilados hemos gastado $25.00 más de lo que recibimos.

Esto sin contar con los gastos de :

- Revista "Tridente"
- Oficina
- Delegaciones de Costa Rica
  - Nicaragua
  - Venezuela
  - España
  - Honduras
  - Guatemala

Todo ésto ha costado en Octubre : $ 5,700.00 dólares

Tampoco estáincluido aquí:

- Mis viajes
- Mi supervivencia
- El personal que cuida las armas en N.
- El personal de Acción Cívica
- El personal de la granja modelo

Sin más nada por el momento se despide de Vds. muy atte.

Ignacio

Ignacio

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	EW -	5	HC
2		6	
3	CI	7	D
4	FI	8	X

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH/C 8

INFO
FILE VR, WH 8, CCS 3,

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

20 Nov 65 IN 98944

S E C R E T 201718Z

DIR INFO GUAT CITE WAVE 7386 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC

REF DIR 59291

SPYCHALSKI DEPARTED STATION PRIOR RECEIPT REF.

S E C R E T

CFN 7386 59291 SPYCHALSKI

BT

7

me

DON

N
NNN

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION
062 **SECRET** CA

ORIG. T. Iwanowski
UNIT WH/2/G
EXT. 6312
DATE 20 Nov 65

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Nov 20 19 35 65

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 18

TDCS DB-315/03788-65

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, IW DO,2, DO/H 4, WH/C 8

DATE DISTRIBUTED
20 November 1965

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/R	1	WH/2/N	2	WH/C/RR	8	LANT	#
WH/Reg	1	WH/2/ES	2				
WH/FI	1	WH/2/CR	2				
WH/CA	1						
WH/2/G	4						

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
GUAT 5503(IN 98668)
WAVE 7343(IN 97731)
HGG 4039, UFG 7736
NP (AMTABBY-27)
ESGARDEN (ESGARDEN-1)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

RELAY REQUEST ATTACHED FOR PACY, LANT, GUAT, MANA, SJOS, WAVE, BARR, AND SALV

Rohlfing — Have you seen this?

File (AMBIDDY/) [illegible]

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

file [illegible]

Yes - [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]!

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
DC/WH/2

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/C

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/R Flores

COPY NO.

FORM 10-64 1W-8 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY GUATEMALA/EL SALVADOR/NICARAGUA

TDCS DB-315/03768-65

DATE OF INFO. 17 AND 19 NOVEMBER 1965

DISTR. 20 NOVEMBER 1965

SUBJECT
1. TRAVEL OF MARIO SANDOVAL ALARCON TO EL SALVADOR TO REQUEST AID OF SALVADORAN PRESIDENT FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF MIGUEL ANGEL PONCIANO SAMAYOA.
2. PLANS OF ROBERTO ALEJOS TO OBTAIN SUPPORT OF GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA IN A PLAN TO OVERTHROW GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT.

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (18 NOVEMBER 1965)
GUATEMALA, GUATEMALA CITY (19 NOVEMBER 1965)

REF IN 97731
98668

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG 7736
HGG 4030

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: PARA 1 AND 2: MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN) WHO HAS CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG LEADERS OF THE MLN AND RIGHTIST POLITICAL GROUPS. HE HAS BEEN REPORTING FOR MORE THAN SEVERAL YEARS, AND THE INFORMATION HE HAS PROVIDED USUALLY HAS BEEN ACCURATE. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION DIRECTLY FROM SANDOVAL.

PARA 3: A CUBAN EMIGRE, FORMER MEMBER OF A CUBAN COMMANDO GROUP, WHO IS NO LONGER ASSOCIATED WITH ACTIVISTS. SOURCE IS REGARDED AS RELIABLE, AND PREVIOUS REPORTING FROM HIM HAS PROVED TO BE ACCURATE. HE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM A CONVERSATION WITH ALEGRETTE WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY GIVEN INDICATIONS OF BEING MENTALLY UNSTABLE. THIS INFORMATION CANNOT BE ACCURATELY APPRAISED.

1. MARIO SANDOVAL ALARCON, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (MLN-RIGHTIST PARTY), PLANNED TO GO TO EL SALVADOR ON 30 NOVEMBER TO CONFER WITH JULIO RIVERA, PRESIDENT OF EL SALVADOR. SANDOVAL WILL PRESENT A COMPLETE REPORT ON THE GUATEMALAN POLITICAL SITUATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE APPROACHING NATIONAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD ON 6 MARCH 1966. SANDOVAL WILL ASK PRESIDENT RIVERA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
CIA/NMCC FBI I&NS

FOR FINANCIAL AID FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF COLONEL MIGUEL ANGEL PONCIANO SAMAYOA, THE CANDIDATE OF THE MLN FOR PRESIDENT, AND HE WILL ALSO URGE RIVERA TO EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE UPON COLONEL ENRIQUE PERALTA AZURDIA, CHIEF OF THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT, THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY OFFICERS, TO BACK PONCIANO'S CANDIDACY.

2. ON 22 NOVEMBER SANDOVAL PLANS TO GO FROM EL SALVADOR TO MANAGUA, NICARAGUA, TO MEET PRIVATELY WITH ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, GUATEMALAN EXILE RESIDENT IN MIAMI. THIS MEETING BETWEEN SANDOVAL AND ALEJOS WAS ARRANGED ON 18 NOVEMBER BY ALEJOS THROUGH THE FORMER NICARAGUAN CONSUL IN MIAMI BY TELEPHONE TO SANDOVAL IN GUATEMALA CITY. ALEJOS TOLD SANDOVAL THAT GENERAL SOMOZA HAD ASKED HIM TO COOPERATE POLITICALLY AND FINANCIALLY WITH THE MLN DIRECTLY THROUGH SANDOVAL. IN MANAGUA ON 22 NOVEMBER SANDOVAL WILL REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH ALEJOS IN FAVOR OF PONCIANO'S CANDIDACY.

3. ON 17 NOVEMBER JOSE IVAN ALEGRETTE, FORMER NICARAGUAN VICE CONSUL IN MIAMI, WHO IS INVOLVED IN A PLOT OT OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA, MET WITH ALEJOS, MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, A CUBAN EXILE, AND A GUATEMALAN KNOWN AS "BRAN" DESCRIBED AS THE RIGHT HAND MAN OF ALEJOS. ALEJOS AND BRAN ASKED ALEGRETTE TO ARRANGE A MEETING FOR THEM IN NICARAGUA WITH COLONEL PONCIANO AND WITH GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA. ALEGRETTE AGREED TO DO THIS. ALEJOS HOPES TO OBTAIN SOMOZA'S BACKING OF A PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS HIS ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING WEAPONS. (FIELD COMMENT: "BRAN" IS PRESUMED TO BE IDENTICAL WITH CARLOS ADOLFO BRAN SANCHEZ, FORMER GUATEMALAN RIGHTIST LEADER AND DEPUTY, ARRESTED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS

BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA, AND EXPELLED FROM GUATEMALA IN FEBRUARY 1964 AT WHICH TIME HE WENT TO NICARAGUA. SUBJECT HAS WORKED WITH ALEJOS AND FORMER GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES. SEE CS-311/06517-65.

4. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, ARTIME SAID THAT ALEJOS HAD INVITED ARTIME TO ATTEND A MEETING IN MANAGUA BETWEEN HIMSELF, COL. PONCIANO (FNU) AND SOMOZA. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WILL BE TO ATTEMPT TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF SOMOZA IN AN ATTEMPT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF ENRIQUE PERALTA. ALEJOS ALSO STATED THAT HIS PLANS CALL FOR A GENERAL STRIKE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, FOLLOWED BY A COUP UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PONCIANO. PONCIANO WOULD THEN SET UP A TWO YEAR PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AFTER WHICH GENERAL ELECTIONS WOULD BE CALLED).

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE,ARMY,AIR,CINCLANT,CINCSO,COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, BORDER PATROL, AND USCG. (ALSO SENT PANAMA CITY, GUATEMALA CITY, MANAGUA,SAN JOSE, SAN SALVADOR).

END OF MESSAGE

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

☐ [illegible]OY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : A.D.Rohlfing:new
UNIT : WH/C/CA
EXT : 6957/1255
DATE : 19 Nov 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MANAGUA JMWAVE TEGUCIGALPA CARACAS PANAMA CITY GUATEMALA CITY
SAN JOSE

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG CEN~~

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WH8 SOD6

TO MANA INFO WAVE TEGU CARA PACY GUAT SJOS CITE DIR 59881

TYPIC

REF DIR 58232 (NOT SENT CARA)

1. AMBIDDY-1 CONFIRMS ALEGRETTE APPROACH AND OFFER BUY REMAINDER AMWORLD ARMS. A-1 REJECTED OFFER AND PROMISED WOULD NOT SELL OR GIVE ARMS TO ANYONE. WEAPONS WHICH TOTAL 100 PIECES CURRENTLY HIDDEN IN MANA AND BLUEFIELDS. A-1 CLAIMS ONLY THREE PERSONS AWARE LOCATION. AMJAVA-4 QUERIED SEPARATELY CONFIRMS LATTER POINT.

2. A-1 LEAVES FOR MANA 22 NOVEMBER IN ORDER TURN OVER BASES TO ANASTASIO SOMOZA. IN SO DOING WILL TURN OVER FAIRLY SIZEABLE AMOUNT OF AMMO CONSISTING 30 AND 50 CALIBER BULLETS, GRANADES AND SOME MORTAR SHEELS. ALSO FIVE CARBINES. BELIEVES TURNING OVER AMMO NECESSARY SINCE CANNOT USE HIMSELF AND MOSTLY UNGUARDED CASES COULD EASILY CONSTITUTE HAZARD TO LOCAL NATIVES NEAR BASES.

3. A-1 REITERATED THAT ALEGRETTE ROLE IN VENEZUELA COSTA RICA AND GUATEMALA PLOTS IS THAT OF MIDDLEMAN SOLELY INTERESTED IN GAIN. AS SUCH IN CONTACT ALL PARTIES. FURTHER, SINCE ALEGRETTE AWARE A-1 IN POSESSION ARMS LOGICALLY FOCUSES ATTENTION ON HIM AS POSSIBLE SOURCE FOR LUCRATIVE BUSINESS DEAL. A-1 ALSO OPINES ALEGRETTE BEING SQUEEZED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 20-5

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

Y [redacted]

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 59681

OUT AS MIDDLEMAN SINCE PLOTTERS NOW IN DIRECT CONTACT A-1. SEPARATE CABLES FOLLOW ON INFO PROVIDED BY A-1 REGARDING GUAT AND VENEZUELA PLOTS.

4. FOR CARA: SEE HVCW 6746.

END OF MESSAGE

John L Hart
William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

WH/C/CA
WH/C/MO
WH/3 (Mr. Welch by phone)
WH/2 (Mr. Katsainos in draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

John L. Hart
DCWHD/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

14-00000

C. Chine

☐ RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

GDR
ORIG : D.ROHLFING/mak
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW
EXT : 6957-1255
DATE : 16 NOV 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

23/SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1	EW -	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	D
4	FI	8	X

TO : JMWAVE PANAMA CITY SAN JOSE MANAGUA TEGUCIGALPA SALVADOR GUATEMALA

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY WH 8, SODC

TO PRITY WAVE INFO PACY SJOS MANA TEGU SALV GUAT CITE DIR 58323

TYPIC

REF: A. WAVE 7209 (IN 93794)

1. HQS C/O LEONARD L. SPYCHALSKI (IDEN 1) PLANS MEET AMBIDDY-1 (IDEN 2) ASAP IN ORDER CLARIFY AND/OR DISSUADE HIM FROM PROVIDING WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT TO ALEGRETTE. WILL CALL STATION ON ARRIVAL.

2. AMJAVA-4 (IDEN 3) CONFIRMS HAVING MET ALEGRETTE BUT STATED LATTER ONLY INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING REMAINING AMWORLD MATERIAL FOR RESALE IN WAVE AREA. A-4 ALSO STATED V-20 BOATS CURRENTLY IN WAVE AREA.

3. FYI LARGER MORE POWERFUL SWIFT LAUNCHES ALREADY RETURNED KUBARK BY AMBIDDY-1 AND CURRENTLY AF.

END OF MESSAGE

CONTINUED/

RELEASING OFFICER 16-16 COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO PAGE TWO INFO CITE DIR 58323

[illegible]

DC/WH/C/CA

B. Mills
WH/C/MO

WH/2

for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

for
JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 24

CIPF

ORIG : D. ROHLFING/mak
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW
EXT : 6957-1255
DATE : 13 NOV 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

23/SECRET

ROUTING			
1	EW	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	D
4	FI	8	X

TO : JMWAVE PANAMA CITY SAN JOSE MANAGUA TEGUCIGALPA SALVADOR GUATEMALA

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH/C 8

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY WH 8, S001

TO PRITY WAVE INFO PACY SJOS MANA TEGU SALV GUAT

CITE DIR 58324

TYPIC

DIR 58323

IDEN 1 - ANDREW D. ROHLFING

IDEN 2 - MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

IDEN 3 - RAFAEL QUINTERO IBARBIA

END OF MESSAGE

DC/WH/C/CA

B. Mills
WH/C/MO

WH/2

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER 16-17 COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

FROM	WH/C Amcivic/AMBIDDY
TO	Finance Division
DATE	12 Nov 65
DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12	[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY NATURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS:

November payment to AMBIDDY-1 of $5,000 for supporting the dependents of member of his Revolutionary Recovery Movement who are currently imprisoned in Cuba. I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, funds passed to AMBIDDY-1 are being used or have been used for the purpose intended and further advances are warranted.

PAYEE	AMOUNT
AMBIDDY-1	$5,000

[illegible]

DATE	SIGNATURE OF PAYEE

PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS

See attachment

DATE	SIGNATURE OF AGENT

THE AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENTS. *(To be signed when applicable)*

DATE	TITLE	SIGNATURE
	WH/C/CA	Andrew D. Rohlfing

APPROVED

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
	John L. Hart (Signed) John L. Hart Walter T. Cirl

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.	CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.
738	6135-1176

DATE	SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER
11/15/65	WH/B&F

CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE	AMOUNT	SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT
	$5,000	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 SHIP. DOC. NO.	34-39 STATION CODE REC. RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.	40-41 F X C P O E D N E D	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. L.I.C. CODE	50 CA OR COST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL F.Y. FUNDS	61-66 CH. NO. X REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS 68-70 DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT
Nov Pmt Ambiddy/ AMBIDDY-1				039262			1441		2384	016	5000 00	
												5000 00

DATE	PREPARED BY	DATE	REVIEWED BY	TOTALS
11/22	Joseph C Carey			

FORM 4-65 496 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-49)

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance Date: 13 Nov 65

FROM : WH/C/CA

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)__________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria $ 5,000
   NAME OF PAYEE (True) STATUS (e.g.) CA: SA: CA: INTEGREE AMOUNT

2. Method of Payment

   a. By check:
      (1) _____ Devised Cover Check. Account No. _______-1100
      (2) X Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

☐	BOSTON	☐	DALLAS*	☐	KANSAS CITY	☐	MIAMI	☐	NEW ORLEANS	☐	RICHMOND	☐	ST. LOUIS
☐	CHICAGO	☐	DENVER	☐	KNOXVILLE	☐	MILWAUKEE	☒	NEW YORK*	☐	SAN FRANCISCO	☐	WASHINGTON, D.
☐	CLEVELAND	☐	DETROIT	☐	LOS ANGELES	☐	MINNEAPOLIS	☐	PHILADELPHIA	☐	SEATTLE	☐	WILMINGTON

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

   b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
      Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following
      (1) Account Name:
      (2) Account Number:
      (3) Bank Name:
      (4) Bank Address:
      Zip:
      (5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
      (6) Payment to be originated from
      (SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
      (7) Indicate remittor if desired:

   c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ______ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Office

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☒ Check to be pick

/S/ Walter T. Cin

Andrew D. Rohlfing 6953 John L. Hart 72
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER EXT. SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER EXT.

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment __________ City __________

FORM 1-65 1064 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance

Date: 27 October 1965

FROM : WH/C/CA/EA

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)__________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria _____ $ 5,000
NAME OF PAYEE (True) STATUS (e.g.) CA:SA:CE: INTEGREE AMOUNT

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1) _____ Devised Cover Check. Account No. _____-1100
(2) X Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

	BOSTON		DALLAS*		KANSAS CITY		MIAMI		NEW ORLEANS		RICHMOND		ST. LOUIS
	CHICAGO		DENVER		KNOXVILLE		MILWAUKEE	X	NEW YORK*		SAN FRANCISCO		WASHINGTON, D.C.*
	CLEVELAND		DETROIT		LOS ANGELES		MINNEAPOLIS		PHILADELPHIA		SEATTLE		WILMINGTON

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following:
(1) Account Name: _____
(2) Account Number: _____
(3) Bank Name: _____
(4) Bank Address: _____
_____ Zip: _____
(5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
(6) Payment to be originated from ~~New York~~ _____
(SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
(7) Indicate remittor if desired: _____

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country _____ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Officer

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☒ Check to be picked up

Andrew D. Rohlfing 6958 John L. Hart 7264
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER EXT. SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER EXT.

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment _____ City _____

FORM 1-64 1604 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

FROM: WH/C

TO: ~~FI~~ Finance Division

DATE: 27 October 1965

DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY NATURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS:

October payment to AMBIDDY-1 - ~~$~~ $5,000 for supporting the dependents of ~~his~~ members of his Revolutionary Recovery Movement who are currently imprisoned in Cuba. ~~and are incapable of providing for their support of their dependents~~.

PAYEE: AMBIDDY-1

AMOUNT: $5,000

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ______ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE | SIGNATURE OF PAYEE

DATE | SIGNATURE OF AGENT

PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS

See Attachement

THE AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENTS. *(To be signed when applicable)*

DATE	TITLE	SIGNATURE
	WH/C/CA/EA	Andrew D. Rohlfing

APPPOVED

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
	John L. Hart

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.	CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER
	WH/B & F

CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE	AMOUNT	SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT
	$5,000	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 / DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. / SHIP.DOC.NO. / 32-33 DIV.	34-39 STATION CODE / REG.RPT. NO. / PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXPOKED	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. / ADVANCE ACCT. NO. / EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR COST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL / 61-66 CR. NO. / REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS / 68-70 DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT

DATE	PREPARED BY	DATE	REVIEWED BY	TOTALS		

FORM 4-65 496 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-49)

14-00000

14-15 OCT 65

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 Report on Nicaragua, and on General Anastacio SOMOZA, and on Costa Rica

1. A/1 visited Washington and saw me on 14 and 15 October 1965. He visited Gen. SOMOZA at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore the night of 15 October and called me later to report on his meeting. The following items were derived from his reports to me on these occasions:

a. Gen. SOMOZA has been in the hospital since late September for a general physical check-up but specifically for a special diet and treatments for gout and over-eating and drinking. He has had no unusual problems, shows no evidence of neurosis or mental problems, and in fact, exhibited an alert and aggressive mental attitude. SOMOZA intends to run for President next year, and A/1 will print campaign posters for his approval. A/1 will print them at his Quality Off-Set Printing Company in Miami. (I saw the poster lay outs; they are an attempt to show "Tachito" as a man of the people. one has him on horse-back much resembling Sgt. Bilko and surrounded by a lot of Indians also mounted on horses and waving machetes in the air. the other shows "Tachito" directing the National Guard in Civic Action work building roads and bridges and helping in peasant villages, etc.). SOMOZA has heard that Jack Vaughan opposes his election. When he gets out of the hospital (estimated about 25 October), SOMOZA plans to run a party at the Nic Embassy in Washington to which Vaughan will have to come, and to confront him on this point. SOMOZA is not worried about being elected, with or without U.S. support, and says he will not have to steal or buy the election either.

SECRET

He has always been a friend of the U.S. and tried to work with them, and will be very happy if they will simply relax and try to live with him for a few years. They may find out it will not be so difficult as they seem to expect. On the other hand, if the U.S. cuts him off, there are other countries eager to fill the gap.

b. On the latter point (made about mid-September 1965), A/1 followed up by eliciting from the Nic Consul-General in Miami, who revealed that the French Ambassador in Managua had offered to match the U.S. Alliance for Progress commitments to Nicaragua if the State Dept. cut them off because of SOMOZA's election. A/1 followed up further on this point with Gen. SOMOZA the night of 15 October and he confirmed the report, saying that the French Ambassador had by-passed Pres. SCHICK and come to him direct.

c. Gen. SOMOZA told A/1 that, when he met with Daniel ODUBER at the Costa Rican border for their "non-aggression pact", he had handed ODUBER $80,000 in cash to help with his candidacy. SOMOZA later contacted a representative of the CR opposition and gave him $20,000 in cash, telling them he was little short of cash but wanted to help them as much as he could. He told A/1 it is good business to bet most of your money on a sure winner, even if you don't particularly like his form. (A/1 is doing the same thing by printing 8,000 posters for ODUBER free of charge; he would rather ODUBER owe him a favor than vice versa.) A/1 will check with ODUBER and sources close to him on the alleged donation by SOMOZA next time he gets to CR.

d. SOMOZA's sources and A/1's representatives in Costa Rica agree that ODUBER is going to win handily, but he will have to push for a good majority as the opposition is working hard. Frank MARSHALL and his cohorts continue to conspire but pose no real threat.

e. One of A/1's men, a former AMWORLDer named Luis ARRIZURIETA Sardinas, is a member of ODUBER's personal security group and has gotten rather close to him. He was assigned by A/1 at (201-298890)

SECRET

ODUBER's request for a specialist in personal security who was trustworthy as ODUBER was afraid of assassination attempts. ARRIZURIETA reported that the leader of the CR opposition party had met secretly with the French Ambassador there on two occasions. He will investigate further and report if he can get more information.

Carl E. Jenkins

SECRET

14 Oct 65

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 Report on Nicaragua, and on General Anastacio SOMOZA, and on Costa Rica

1. A/1 visited Washington and saw me on 14 and 15 October 1965. He visited Gen. SOMOZA at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore the night of 15 October and called me later to report on his meeting. The following items were derived from his reports to me on these occasions:

a. Gen. SOMOZA has been in the hospital since late September for a general physical check-up but specifically for a special diet and treatments for gout and over-eating and drinking. He has had no unusual problems, shows no evidence of neurosis or mental problems, and in fact, exhibited an alert and aggressive mental attitude. SOMOZA intends to run for President next year, and A/1 will print campaign posters for his approval. A/1 will print them at his Quality Off-Set Printing Company in Miami. (I saw the poster lay outs; they are an attempt to show "Tachito" as a man of the people, one has him on horse-back much resembling Sgt. Bilko and surrounded by a lot of Indians also mounted on horses and waving machetes in the air, the other shows "Tachito" directing the National Guard in Civic Action work building roads and bridgesand helping in peasant villages, etc.). SOMOZA has heard that Jack Vaughan opposes his election. When he gets out of the hospital (estimated about 25 October), SOMOZA plans to run a party at the Nic Embassy in Washington to which Vaughan will have to come, and to confront him on this point. SOMOZA is not worried about being elected, with or without U.S. support, and says he will not have to steal or buy the election either.

SECRET

He has always been a friend of the U.S. and tried to work with them, and will be very happy if they will simply relax and try to live with him for a few years. They may find out it will not be so difficult as they seem to expect. On the other hand, if the U.S. cuts him off, there are other countries eager to fill the gap.

b. On the latter point (made about mid-September 1965), A/1 followed up by eliciting from the Nic Consul-General in Miami, who revealed that the French Ambassador in Managua had offered to match the U.S. Alliance for Progress commitments to Nicaragua if the State Dept. cut them off because of SOMOZA's election. A/1 followed up further on this point with Gen. SOMOZA the night of 15 October and he confirmed the report, saying that the French Ambassador had by-passed Pres. SCHICK and come to him direct.

c. Gen. SOMOZA told A/1 that, when he met with Daniel ODUBER at the Costa Rican border for their "non-aggression pact", he had handed ODUBER $80,000 in cash to help with his candidacy. SOMOZA later contacted a representative of the CR opposition and gave him $20,000 in cash, telling them he was little short of cash but wanted to help them as much as he could. He told A/1 it is good business to bet most of your money on a sure winner, even if you don't particularly like his form. (A/1 is doing the same thing by printing 8,000 posters for ODUBER free of charge; he would rather ODUBER owe him a favor than vice versa.) A/1 will check with ODUBER and sources close to him on the alleged donation by SOMOZA next time he gets to CR.

d. SOMOZA's sources and A/1's representatives in Costa Rica agree that ODUBER is going to win handily, but he will have to push for a good majority as the opposition is working hard. Frank MARSHALL and his cohorts continue to conspire but pose no real threat.

e. One of A/1's men, a former AMWORLDer named Luis ARRIZURIETA Sardinas, is a member of ODUBER's personal security group and has gotten rather close to him. He was assigned by A/1 at

ODUBER's request for a specialist in personal security who was trustworthy as ODUBER was afraid of assassination attempts. ARRIZURIETA reported that the leader of the CR opposition party had met secretly with the French Ambassador there on two occasions. He will investigate further and report if he can get more information.

Carl E Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT
Activities of AMWORLD and AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. On 17 September 1965, AMOT 246 held a conversation with AMWORLD-2 in which he learned the following concerning the activities of AMWORLD and AMBIDDY-1, reported in AMOT Report LU-1609 of 21 September 1965.

2. The three-months' period during which AMWORLD received aid amounting to $12,000.00 ended with the month of August 1965. According to AMWORLD-2, AMBIDDY-1 covered the AMWORLD payroll, which amounted to $18,000.00 for the period, with the above aid money to which he added the sum of $6,000.00 which he received from the sale of equipment from the camps in Central America.

3. Iden is in charge of the warehouse in Miami where the AMWORLD equipment brought back from the camps, such as arms, radios, tape recorders, medical supplies, etc., is stored. AMBIDDY-1 believes that this equipment in the warehouse has a sale value of $250,000.00. Iden, however, believes the sale of the equipment will not bring in more than $15,000.00. Because of the low price he believes he would receive, Iden has refused to sell the equipment for fear AMBIDDY-1 will think he has been stealing money. Iden informed AMWORLD-2 that things are disappearing daily from the warehouse since several members of AMWORLD have access to the place. Several tape recorders and one piece of equipment worth $2,500.00 have already disappeared. The medical supplies are spoiling because of the haphazard way in which they are being stored.

4. AMWORLD-2 has suggested to AMBIDDY-1 that he return all the equipment to the people who supplied it, accept at least a fifty percent reduction in its value, and ask that payment for

201-267437

Attachment:
Iden, USC

Distribution:
2 - WH/C, w/att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO
COPY

DATE TYPED
30 Sep 65

DATE DISPATCHED
OCT 7 - 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23356

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

whatever the equipment is worth be made in monthly installments. AMBIDDY-1 is not interested in this plan. He is interested in obtaining new aid, independent of what he may obtain from the sale of the equipment, in order to maintain what remains of his group.

5. AMBIDDY-1 is planning to make some changes in his propaganda activities. He is considering a radio broadcast through stations in PBPRIME which can be heard in PERUMEN. He also wants to publish a high-level theoretical magazine which will be distributed exclusively to opinion makers on the continent, the press, universities, and the diplomatic corps. All these plans hinge on AMBIDDY-1's receiving aid. According to AMWORLD-2, AMBIDDY-1 is expecting to receive aid next month.

Philip G. ELMARD

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-23356

IDEN - fnu KING (probably William Kenneth KING-GODFREY
(201-742345))

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance Date: 6 October 1968

FROM : WH/C/CA/PP

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)__________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to **Abel Mestre** (NAME OF PAYEE (True)), __________ (STATUS (e.g.) CA/AGENT, INTERNAL) $ **20,000** (AMOUNT)

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1) ______ Devised Cover Check. Account No. ______-1100
(2) ______ Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

☐	BOSTON	☐	DALLAS*	☐	KANSAS CITY	☐	MIAMI	☐	NEW ORLEANS	☐	RICHMOND	☐	ST. LOUIS
☐	CHICAGO	☐	DENVER	☐	LOUISVILLE	☐	MILWAUKEE	☐	NEW YORK*	☐	SAN FRANCISCO	☐	WASHINGTON, D.C.*
☐	CLEVELAND	☐	DETROIT	☐	LOS ANGELES	☐	MINNEAPOLIS	☐	PHILADELPHIA	☐	SEATTLE	☐	WILMINGTON

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following:
(1) Account Name: **Abel Mestre**
(2) Account Number: **Acct. #2 (Acct. #005-237-002)**
(3) Bank Name: **Chemical Bank, New York Trust, N.Y.**
(4) Bank Address: **49th & Park Avenue, N.Y.**
__________ Zip: ______
(5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
(6) Payment to be originated from __________ (SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
(7) Indicate remittor if desired: __________

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ______ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Officer

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☐ Check to be picked up

K.I. Harrison — SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER — **5518** EXT.

John L. Hart — SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER — **7264** EXT.

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment __________ City __________

FORM 1-68 1864 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT
Activities of AMWORLD and AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. According to AMOT Report DD-1619 of 27 September 1965, AMOT-246 held a conversation on 22 September with AMWORLD-2 in which he learned the following.

2. On the morning of 21 September 1965, AMBIDDY-1 held a meeting with a group of his friends and followers to notify them that he had been notified by his "contact" that AMWORLD aid would cease at the beginning of October.

3. AMBIDDY-1 also notified Iden A that he should inform the persons who take part in the radio program that the program will not be broadcast after 1 October and therefore, their employment and salaries will cease. This will affect Iden A, AMRAZOR-1, Iden B, and AMOT-246.

4. AMBIDDY-1 planned to leave for Washington, D. C. on 22 September 1965 in order to meet with Iden C and discuss the handing over to Iden C of two hundred tons of arms which AMBIDDY-1 is holding at Iden D. AMBIDEY-1 decided to take this action in order to avoid having to pay the salaries of the seven men of AMWORLD in Nicaragua who each receive $300.00 per month.

5. AMBIDDY-1 is thinking of selling a barge for the sum of $20,000 and the rest of the equipment in storage in Miami for the sum of $19,000. With this, AMBIDDY-1 hopes to pay off all his debts, plus the salaries of the personnel. AMBIDDY-1 told AMWORLD-2 that he has only $18,000 in the bank. AMWORLD-2, however, believes this is not true and that AMBIDDY-1 has more money than he claims.

AN rel	FI	
~~RS~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

201-267437

Philip G. ELMARD

19-124-27/3

Attachment:
Idens, usc. (att.)

Distribution:
3 - WH/C,

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
29 Sep 65	
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
UFGA-23354	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
19-124-27/3	

1 att.

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-23354

IDEN A - Edgar SOPO Barreto, director of the "Tridente" radio program (probably 201-283205)

IDEN B - Martha Elena RODRIGUEZ (201-338880)

IDEN C - Anastasio SOMOZA

IDEN D -Camp "Zenon Viera" in Nicaragua

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

201-267437
[illegible]/3

S/C att. 1 UFGA-23354

CS COPY

S E C R E T

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
UFGA-23354

CO

IDEN A	Raul GARCIA Casanas 201-783725
IDEN B	Jesus COLE
IDEN C	Jorge PEON Perez
IDEN D	Jaime CALDEVILLA, counsel for Economic Affairs in Spanish Embassy in Havana

S E C R E T

201-267437

~~19-124-27/3~~

201-~~267437~~ per DRS

S/C att
UFGA 23354

CS COPY

~~19-124-27/3~~

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance **Date:** 28 September 1965

FROM : WH/C/CA/EA

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)__________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to Manuel Artime Buesa (NAME OF PAYEE (True)), PA (STATUS (e.g.) CA:SA:CE: INTEGREE) $ 532.55 (AMOUNT)

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1)____ Devised Cover Check. Account No.____-1100
(2) X Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

☐	BOSTON	☐	DALLAS*	☐	KANSAS CITY	☐	MIAMI	☐	NEW ORLEANS	☐	RICHMOND	☐	ST. LOUIS
☐	CHICAGO	☐	DENVER	☐	KNOXVILLE	☐	MILWAUKEE	X	NEW YORK*	☐	SAN FRANCISCO	☐	WASHINGTON, D.C.*
☐	CLEVELAND	☐	DETROIT	☐	LOS ANGELES	☐	MINNEAPOLIS	☐	PHILADELPHIA	☐	SEATTLE	☐	WILMINGTON

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following:
(1) Account Name:
(2) Account Number:
(3) Bank Name:
(4) Bank Address: Zip:
(5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
(6) Payment to be originated from (SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
(7) Indicate remittor if desired:

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ____ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Officer

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☒ Check to be picked up

Andrew [illegible] (SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER) 4257 (EXT.) John L. Hart (SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER) 7264 (EXT.)

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment ________ City ________

FORM 1-65 1884 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(33)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT
Financial Circumstances and Plans of AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information.

1. On 5 September 1965, AMOT-246 held a conversation with AMWORLD-2 in which he learned the following information concerning the activities of AMBIDDY-1, reported in AMOT Report DD-1599 of 10 September 1965. AMWORLD-2 obtained most of his information on AMBIDDY-1 from a friend, Iden A, who is closely linked with AMBIDDY-1 in matters regarding the sale of the military equipment AMWORLD had in Latin America. In addition, some data was given to AMWORLD-2 personally by AMBIDDY-1, who would like to get AMWORLD-2 on his side again. AMBIDDY-1 introduced Iden A to "his contacts in KUBARK," and plans to introduce AMWORLD-2 to them in the near future. AMBIDDY-1 says he is doing this because of his confidence in both AMWORLD-2 and Iden A.

2. According to AMWORLD-2, AMBIDDY-1 has some $80,000.00 at present, although AMBIDDY-1 told Iden B that he only had $30,000.00 at his disposal. AMBIDDY-1 followed the advice of his secretary, Iden C, his wife, and others in investing money in the following businesses:

a. A printing establishment costing $20,000.00.

b. A factory, about which the Source had no details.

c. A "farm" where he is thinking of raising poultry and grain for which he paid $1,000.00 down and is paying $300.00 a month on the mortgage.

3. AMBIDDY-1 received notice from his "contacts" of the suspension of further aid in the presence of Iden A, who got the impression that it would be very difficult for AMBIDDY-1 to receive aid again. According to Iden A, during the interview between

Attachment:
IDENs, u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - WH/C w/att

201-267437

Copy

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE TYPED
20 Sept 65

DATE DISPATCHED
SEP 23 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23133

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
CS [illegible] 19-124-27/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

AMBIDDY-1 and his "contacts", he noticed that the relationships seemed strained and that on some occasions the "contacts" made fun of AMBIDDY-1 with regard to his investments. One of the "contacts" made reference to the "chickens of liberty bought by AMBIDDY-1."

4. In view of the financial situation with which he is faced AMBIDDY-1 has begun to reduce expenses. He has stopped having his radio programs recorded by America Production in order to save $250.00 per month. If his present financial condition continues, it is possible that next month he will also suspend his hour radio program "Trident."

5. However, despite the suspension of aid, AMBIDDY-1 is planning to maintain one radio program and to carry on other propaganda activities following new guide lines. Among the plans he has in mind is the publication of a "high-level theoretical" review. AMBIDDY-1 is thinking of presenting this latter plan to his "contacts."

Philip G. ELMARD

Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-23186

IDEN A - fnu *KING (probably William Kenneth KING-GODFREY
(201-742345)

IDEN B - Edgar *SOPO Barreto (probably 201-283208)

IDEN C - Nilo MESSER Pujol (201-294655)

7-1 201

20 September 1965

MICROFILMED
DEC 13
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONTACT REPORT

FROM: AMBIDDY-1, 1 September 1965

SUBJECT: Costa Rica Communist Activities

1. A-1 told me he had followed up with his delegates in Costa Rica and got some details on his former vague report about a Costa Rican official name ZUÑIGA who was anti-American and Communist-influenced. The man's name is Eduardo Zuñiga, a high official of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda Urbana (INVU), in which there is a Communist cell directed by Architects Pablo JENKINS and Cano ROJAS. 201 201

2. ZUÑIGA has a girl friend named Thelma (lnu), whose family is Communist. Her father is a Communist and a member of the INVU cell mentioned above. He is chauffer for Macho CARAZO who is running for Deputy under the PLN and is very close to Daniel ODUBER.

Carl E Jenkins
Carl Jenkins

CS COPY

XAAZ 23269

20 Sept. 1965
201-267437

SECRET

20 September 1965

CONTACT REPORT

FROM: AMBIDDY-1, 1 September 1965

SUBJECT: Death of Gervasio Silvano POZO Carrillo (201-739773)

1. A/1 reported that subject was shot dead the night of 30 August 1965 by a jealous husband in a cafe in Miami. He has been chief instructor in rural rehabilitation for the MRR, and was slated to go to Panama to teach in the Veraguas project about the first of next year.

2. The Panama slot will be filled by Eugenio CLAUDE (201-747928), a negro Cuban of Haitian descent, who is also a former Comando Rurales. A/1 will inform Bishop McGrath of the change at their next meeting.

Carl E. Jenkins

Distribution:
1 - A/1 Contact Reports
1 - AMCIVIC

SECRET

15 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

SUBJECT : Request for Payment to AMBIDDY-1

1. It is hereby requested that you approve a payment of $532.55 for AMBIDDY-1. This payment is to reimburse him for expenses incurred during a trip taken by him in August 1965 on our behalf.

2. Attached for your information is a translation of AMBIDDY-1's request in which he outlines his expenses.

Carl E. Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

DCWHD/C

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Artime 201

SECRET

8 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

SUBJECT : Status Report on AMBALLOT as of 1 September 1965

1. GENERAL

a. We have completed preliminary arrangements with DODS and are prepared to move into the Community Development Counseling Service, Inc. (CDCS) cover offices in Arlington at any time. I propose to furnish the office they have available during September, to install our own telephone, and to start making an appearance there for an hour or so daily in order to begin switching my Cuban contacts to that address and phone number. In October I should like to move the young lady we discussed in there and start processing the correspondence, applications for training, etc. which I hope to have generated by that time preparatory to the selection of about five or six men for the Spring Semester under AMTRACE.

b. From 23 to 31 August Tom Clines and I were in Miami making arrangements to buy the two Swifts from Artime and recruiting Ricardo Chavez (The Mexican) to put together two AMWORLD crews for the boats to be used on Lake Tanganyika. We agreed on a net to Artime of $100,000 for the two boats and got the sales agreements signed. My proposal for handling the $100,000 is included under AMCIVIC below. Chavez had already applied for enrollment in an Accounting and Public Administration program at the University of Miami, but we talked him into delaying it for the Fall Semester in order to handle the Congo operation for us. I told him we would consider him as a candidate for a future job handling a Coast Guard and Customs Service position in a post-Castro regime and would look into the possibility of getting him some support under AMTRACE after he returns. He likes the idea and will be a good candidate.

SECRET

2. AMTEACH

a. Quintero cannot get into the University of Mexico before the regular school year starts next February. He will have trouble getting in then unless he spends some time in Mexico to make his own arrangements. The only way he can get into Mexico is to have been accepted by a university in Mexico and to prove financial security. The only university he can get an acceptance from in time is the University of the Americas (formerly Mexico City College), a five-year degree granting institution run on the U. S. quarter system and accredited by the Southern Association of Secondary Schools and Colleges. He has applied as a special student (non-degree candidate) for the Fall Quarter only and I have worked out a program of studies with him for that period. This will give him a scholastic record and a transcript, none of which he now has, which will meet the documentation requirements for admission to the University. He can also go in person and take care of his admission, visa, and other problems. He will have a chance to get acquainted with the city, to meet the case officer who will handle him there and get an idea of his operational requirements, and to find himself suitable quarters. School will be finished mid-December and he can return to Miami, pick up his family, and get moved and settled in during January. He will then be ready to go to school and to work on a regular basis starting in February. If, for some reason, he cannot get enrolled in the National University, the worst that will happen then is that he must continue in the other school for his first year. This is not lost time as the credits he earns are transferable to U. S. schools.

b. Inocencio Alonso Ramirez, the fifty-one year old former Police Chief of Pinar del Rio Province, is the man who has handled the internal operations of the MRR for the past three or four years. He was detailed a few months ago to go to Mexico as the MRR representative there and had a Mexican visa issued to him which has expired. He is trying ~~to get a new one issued and believes~~ he will be able to do so. He is the man who helped WAVE ~~in debriefing refugees~~, whom Clines says is top-notch. He also controls the passage of support to dependents and survivors inside through the Spanish Mission. Quintero strongly recommends him as a valuable asset to our Mexico City program, working with him or directly with our Station officers.

c. We have about fifteen files on possible candidates for AMTEACH, culled from names known to me, to Clines, to Artime, to Quintero, and anybody else I have been able to get suggestions from. I propose to select five or six of the most likely looking ones to bring into the program by next February (Spring Semester), then to get WAVE into the act and look over any candidates they can come up with for screening and consideration prior to next summer. In the meantime, I would like to generate an authentic appearing mechanism through CDCS by which we can cover our contacts and selection of candidates through applications and awards of special grants through various foundations. I am waiting for Jake Golder, Chief of the A&E Staff, to get back from leave this week in order to start working out a testing and evaluation program for the candidates.

3. AMCIVIC

a. Artime appears to be going ahead with a local civic action program at his old base at Monkey Point, Nicaragua. In addition, he is going ahead to put in a boatyard at Bluefields around which he proposes to organize a local fisheries cooperative. His man there is Luis Prieto, a physicist who worked on the DEW line project in Canada before joining AMWORLD about a year ago. The Panama program had a set-back due to the death by shooting by a jealous husband of Silvano Pozo, the Negro Rural Comando who had been slated to go to Veraguas Province and head up Artime's contribution to the school being sponsored there by Bishop McGrath and Harvard University. An alternate has been selected, another Negro of Haitian descent from Oriente named Eugenio Claude.

b. Later this week, Artime plans to return to Central America, particularly to visit Panama and talk with Bishop McGrath and President Robles. He will also go through Costa Rica and Nicaragua, for which I gave him intelligence requirements from WH/2.

c. We paid two subsidies of $12,000 each for July and August through the old AMWORLD funding mechanism, and allowed him the remaining $13,000 from the "insurance money" of the LOBO team as the payment for September. I propose that starting October we inform him of a new decision from the "policy committee" that we will subsidize him for $5,000 a month for six months to cover payments to dependents and survivors. At the end of that time, they

SECRET

will take another look at him and the MRR and see what progress they have made in organizing constructive programs in Latin America which the U. S. could justify supporting through the MRR under the AMCIVIC concept. The $100,000 from the Swifts should give him capital to operate on for that long.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

CEJ/bh

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee

File:
AMCIVIC
AMTEACH
AMTIMES 201
QUINTERO 201

SECRET

TRANSLATION

MRR Letterhead

Miami
4 September 1965

Mr. Carl J. James
P. O. Box 9549
Arlington 22209, Virginia

Dear Friend:

I wish to submit for your approval this extraordinary budget in order to be able to reimburse the Movimiento for the expenses I incurred during my last trip, during which I believe I obtained very interesting reports.

PanAm ticket Miami-Managua (4 Aug)	$ 92.00
Stay in Managua (4-10 Aug) (I only paid for food since the MRR rents a house there)	$ 25.00
Extra expenses in Managua (Gas for the MRR station wagon, dinner with Major Perez and drinks with Lt. Corrales (aide of General Somoza)	$ 20.00
Pan Am ticket Managua-San Jose (10 Aug)	$ 22.00
Stay in San Jose (10-13 Aug) (Only food since I lived in the house of the MRR delegate)	$ 12.00
Extra expenses in San Jose (taxis, invitation for dinner to Guillermo Vargas of INVU and Roberto Madriz, secretary to the President, invitation for drinks to the people of INVU, invitation for drinks to Colonel Lippa and people of the Resguardo Fiscal	$ 53.00
TACA ticket San Jose-Panama-Managua	$103.02
Quarters in Panama, Motel "La Siesta," 13-15 Aug	$ 57.53

Extra expenses in Panama (taxis, drinks with Major Arauz, aide of the President	$ 20.00
Stay in Nicaragua from 15-20 Aug (food only)	$ 30.00
Extra expenses in Managua (Gas, drinks with Major Perez, Captain Morales and Major Brennes)	$ 18.00
Lanica ticket Managua-Miami	$ 76.00
Taxi - airport to residence	$ 4.00
Total expenses for trip	$532.55

This is only my last trip, taken at your behest. If it is possible to reimburse this amount, I would be extraordinarily appreciative..

MRR

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2° COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Miami Septiembre 4 de 1965

Mr. Carl J. Janes
P.O. Box 9549
Arlingtong 22209.Virginia.

Estimado Amigo:

Tengo el gusto de remitirle cuentas del dinero recibido por el Consejo de Liberación para los meses de Julio,Agosto y Septiembre.

MES DE JULIO

Recibí del Consejo $ 12,000.oo

Lo empleé en:

Revista Tridente (Imprenta,colaboraciones,circulación)-----	$ 3,000.oo
Hora Radial (Grabacion,colaboraciones,emisoras)	1,805.00
Oficina (Alquiler---$200.oo Don Manuel Guillot$ 400.oo Valdés Castilla $ 200.00 Rafael Garcia $ 300.oo)	1,100.oo
Delegado de Costa Rica (Luis Arrizurrieta)	350.oo
Delegado de Venezuela (Maximo Díaz)	450.oo
Delegacion de Espana: Enrique Tous	150.oo
Cuco León	250.oo
Mago "Rohreño"	250.oo

Honduras (Jose Antonio Molé)	350.00
Guatemala (Oscar Vila,)	200.00
Clandestinaje:	
Entregado al Padre Llorente para enviar a traves de la Embajada de España-	$2,600.00
Entregado a los siguientes sujetos para hacerlos efectivo en Cuba a familiares de presos o fusilados de sus provincias:	
Inocencio Alonso ————	275.00
Alfredo Borges Caignet ———	250.00
Rolando Tapanes ————	200.00
Gustavo Fernandez Vidales ——	300.00
Domingo Borges Carbot————	300.00
Emilia del Mar ————	100.00
Silvia Heredia ————	125.00
Jacinto Luzárraga ————	300.00
(Aqui tuve que adelantar 3 meses por operación de la senora,)	
Antonio Crespo Olivero ———	300.00
Angel García Alvarez ———	275.00
Antonio Sanz de Acedo ———	200.00
TOTAL DE GASTOS:	$12,530.00

Como se ve,en Julio invertí en los gastos $530.oo más que lo que recibi,sin contar con los gastos de mis viajes por latino-America,ni mi subsidio familiar con el que tengo que mantener mujer,dos hijos y mis dos padres.

(3)

MES DE AGOSTO

Recibi del Consejo: $ 12,000.oo

Lo empleé en:

Revista "Tridente" ----------		$ 3,000.oo
Hora Radial ----------------		1,805.oo
Oficina ---------------- (tuve que aumentar el gasto en:		
Articulos de consumo	$100.oo	
Luz y telefono	50.oo	
Nilo Messer (secretario) ✓	275.oo)	
		1,525.oo
Delegado de Costa Rica ---------		350.oo
Delegado de Venezuela ----------		450.oo
Delegacion de España(suprimí al "Mago Robreno") ----------		400.oo ✓
Delegado de Honduras ----------		350.oo
Delegado de Guatemala ---------		200.oo
Clandestinaje:		4,625.oo
TOTAL DEL MES DE AGOSTO:		$12,705.oo

Como se vé,en Agosto invertí en gastos,$705.00 más que lo que recibí,sin contar con los gastos de mis viajes,ni el subsidio familiar con el que tengo que mantener mi hogar y mis padres.

MES DE SEPTIEMBRE

Recibi del Consejo $ 12,000.oo

Lo empleé en:

Revista Tridente -----------$ 3,000.oo

MRR

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

(4)

Hora Radial	$ 1,805.00
Oficina	1,525.00
Delegado de Costa Rica	350.00
Delegado de Venezuela	450.00
Delegado de España	400.00
Delegado de Honduras	250.00
Delegado de Guatemala (este mes no le pagué pues regresa el mes que viene a Guatemala, pero este mes va a estar aquí)	
Clandestinaje	4,625.00
TOTAL DEL MES DE SEPTIEMBRE	$12,505.00

Como se ve, gasté $505.00 más que lo que recibí del Consejo. Todo esto sin contar mis viajes y mi subsidio familiar.

Por supuesto, nada de esto incluye mi delegado en Nicaragua, que recibe $400.00 dolares mensuales (Antonio Sanz), ni el personal que cuida de las armas en los tres puntos donde se hayan en Nicaragua, ni el personal que se haya haciendo Acción Civica en Monkey Point y el Bluff, ni el personal que cuida de la Granja Modelo, ni el pago de gastos del almacen donde tengo los equipos de los campamentos (equipos civiles todos) en Miami.

De Vds. muy atte. su s.s.

Ignacio

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REIMBURSEMENT VOUCHER FOR PURCHASES AND SERVICES OTHER THAN PERSONAL	NAME OF CLAIMANT AMBIDDY-1 (Carl E. Jenkins)	DATE-VOUCHER NO. Z-12

DESCRIPTION OF EXPENDITURE - ATTACH RECEIPTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS	AMOUNT
Reimbursement for operational travel expenses for trip to Central America in August 1965 per attached letter dated 4 Sep 1965 which outlines expenses.	$532.55

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY, OR EMERGENCY NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ________ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF PAYEE
DATE	SIGNATURE OF AGENT

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIG. REF. NO.	CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.
DATE	AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

APPROVED

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER John L. Hart, DCWHD/C

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS RECEIVED

PAYMENT RECEIVED IN THE AMOUNT OF $

DATE	SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33		34-39 STATION CODE	40-41 EXCPOENED	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR COST YR	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL		67-70 OBJECT CLASS	71-80 AMOUNT	
DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. SHIP.DOC.NO.	REC.RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.		ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.				F Y O B S	61-66 CE. NO. X REF. NO.	68-70 OC OR DUE DATE	DEBIT	CREDIT

DATE	PREPARED BY	DATE	REVIEWED BY	TOTALS		

FORM 2-65 264 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

Miami Septiembre 4 1966

Mr. Carl J. James
P.O. Box 9549
Arlingtong 22209 .Virginia.

Estimado Amigo:

Quiero someter a Vd. la aprobacion del presupuesto extraordinario para poder restituir al Movimiento, los gastos que tuve en mi ultimo viaje, durante el cual creo que obtuve informes muy interesantes.

Tiket de Panamerican Miami-Managua-(4 de Agosto)------	$ 92.00
Estancia en Managua (del 4 de Agosto al 10 Agosto)---- (Solo pague comida, pues el M.R.R. tiene alquilada una casa alli)	$ 25.00
Gastos extras en Managua ------------------------------ (Gasolina del Station Wagon del Movimiento, invitacion al Mayor Perez a comer y tragos con el Tte. Corrales, ayudante del General Somoza) . ------	$ 20.00
Tiket de Panamerican Managua-San Jose (10 de Agosto)---	$ 22.00
Estancia en San Jose (del 10 de Agosto al 13 de Agosto)- (Solo comida, pues vivi en casa del delegado del MRR).	$ 12.00
Gastos extras en San Jose (taxis, invitaciones a comer a Guillermo Vargas, del INVU y Roberto Madriz, secretario del Presidente, invitacion a tragos a la gente del INVU, invitacion a tragos a Coronel Lippa y gente del Resguardo Fiscal) --	$53.00
Tiket de Taca International Airline San Jose-Panama, Panama-Managua --	$101.02
Gastos estancia en Panama, Motel "La Siesta", del 13 al 15 de Agosto --	$ 57.53
Gastos extras en Panama (taxis, tragos con el Mayor Araus, ayudante del Presidente)-------------------------	$ 20.00

Estancia en Nicaragua desde el 25 de Agosto al 20 de Agosto—— (solo comida)	$ 30.00
Gastos extras en Managua (gasolina, tragos con Mayor Perez, Capitan Morales y Mayor Buerres)	$ 18.00
Tiket de Lanica Airline Managua-Miami ————————	$ 76.00
Taxi de Aeropuerto a la casa ————————————	$ 4.00
TOTAL DE GASTOS DEL VIAJE,	$ 532 ,55

Este es solamente mi último viaje, realizado con conocimiento de Vds. Si fuera posible el reintegro de esta cifra, les estaria extraordinariamente agradecidos.

De Vds. muy atto. su s.s.

Ignacio

14-00000

AMCLVIC

TRANSLATION

MRR Letterhead

Miami
4 September 1965

Mr. Carl J. James
P. O. Box 9549
Arlington 22209, Virginia

Dear Friend:

I wish to submit for your approval this extraordinary budget in order to be able to reimburse the Movimiento for the expenses I incurred during my last trip, during which I believe I obtained very interesting reports.

PanAm ticket Miami-Managua (4 Aug)	$ 92.00
Stay in Managua (4-10 Aug) (I only paid for food since the MRR rents a house there)	$ 25.00
Extra expenses in Managua (Gas for the MRR station wagon, dinner with Major Perez and drinks with Lt. Corrales (aide of General Somoza)	$ 20.00
Pan Am ticket Managua-San Jose (10 Aug)	$ 22.00
Stay in San Jose (10-13 Aug) (Only food since I lived in the house of the MRR delegate)	$ 12.00
Extra expenses in San Jose (taxis, invitation for dinner to Guillermo Vargas of INVU and Roberto Madriz, secretary to the President, invitation for drinks to the people of INVU, invitation for drinks to Colonel Lippa and people of the Resguardo Fiscal	$ 53.00
TACA ticket San Jose-Panama-Managua	$103.02
Quarters in Panama, Motel "La Siesta," 13-15 Aug	$ 57.53

Extra expenses in Panama (taxis, drinks with Major Arauz, aide of the President	$ 20.00
Stay in Nicaragua from 15-20 Aug (food only)	$ 30.00
Extra expenses in Managua (Gas, drinks with Major Perez, Captain Morales and Major Brennes)	$ 18.00
Lanica ticket Managua-Miami	$ 76.00
Taxi - airport to residence	$ 4.00
Total expenses for trip	$532.55

This is only my last trip, taken at your behest. If it is possible to reimburse this amount, I would be extraordinarily appreciative...

SECRET

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Costa Rican Counter-intelligence Reports
from AMBIDDY-1, 1 September 1965

1. AMBIDDY-1 reported that Capt. ALEGRETTE (El Ladron) of the Nicaraguan National Guard, ostensibly vice-consul in Miami, is trying to buy arms in Miami for a coup attempt in Costa Rica. A-1 believes he has had no luck, but has forbidden any of his people to have anything at all to do with ALEGRETTE.

2. A-1 said that he saw a young Costa Rican named Francisco GAMBOA Guzman at the airport in San Jose in late July. He rode to Panama on the same flight as A-1. GAMBOA was described by the MRR delegate, who was with A-1, as a pro-Communist who had just returned from Cuba about a month earlier. He claims to be finishing his studies in Costa Rica, after which he plans to return to Cuba. He is a reporter who interviewed Teodore (Ted) PICADO when he was imprisoned in Cuba and published the story from there.

3. In late May or early June 1965, A-1 said some of his people who had been guarding the AMWORLD arms barge near Tortuguero in Costa Rica had picked up a rubber boat, not of U. S. manufacture, floating just off the Costa Rican coast. They gave the boat to Colonel LIPPA of the Costa Rican Civil Guard. A-1 said the thought had occurred to him, could the Cubans be infiltrating people into Panama through the Costa Rican coast and then overland?

Carl E. Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: WH/2/CR
WH/C/RR

File: AMBIDDY-1 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

301

CRET

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

SUBJECT : Meeting with AMBIDDY-1, 30 August 1965

1. Disposition of "Insurance" Claim for AMWORLD Team LOBO. AMBIDDY-1 showed me the savings books indicating trust accounts in the Coconut Grove Bank, Miami, Florida for the two LOBO team members:

Acct. No. 25203, 26 Aug 1965 for Elpidio DELGADO Soto	$4,000
Acct. No. 25202, 26 Aug 1965 for Nilo ALONSO Morejon	$4,000

Manuel J. GUILLOT and/or Jose GONZALEZ Puig must co-sign with the account owner in person before withdrawals can be made.

2. AMCIVIC Subsidy Payment for September 1965, and Subsequent Support. I told AMBIDDY-1 that Headquarters had approved our proposal to consider the remaining $12,000 of the "insurance" money ($20,000 total minus $8,000 in the two accounts mentioned above) as the AMCIVIC subsidy payment for September. He agreed and told me that payments of $12,000 for July and for August had been received. He promised to submit certified budgets soonest for the three months.

AMBIDDY-1's understanding is that the "policy" committee in Washington had approved a provisional subsidy payment for three months, or until 1 October 1965. At that time he believes there will be a new hearing and the decision may be that he will get anything from nothing up to the $15,000 monthly budget he originally requested. In

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

view of the fact that we have just paid him for the two Swift boats ($100,000 net), which will furnish him a capital reserve to operate on for a few months, I recommend that we tell AMBIDDY-1 the decision has been made to continue only that part of the subsidy ($5,000 per month) that was budgetted for support of dependents and survivors of MRR dead, wounded, and imprisoned. We may then consider, on a case by case basis, reimbursement to him for actual expenses of travel incurred on our behalf. We may also wish to invest something in individual civic action programs he may sponsor in Latin America, again on a case by case basis. In the meantime, he has enough capital to operate on for a few months and to generate civic action programs. He will continue to travel on MRR business and is quite agreeable to handling any requirements we place on him for intelligence or political action. He is not yet willing to sign an agent contract, and I propose we go along with him till the end of the year on this basis and see what he can generate on his own in the way of meaningful assets.

Carl E Jenkins

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

DCWHD/C

DEPT DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DATE: 2 SEPTEMBER 1965
SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF USSOUTHCOM INTEREST
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT #: 2 230 0878 65
FILE # NOT GIVEN

14-00000

TRANSMIT
OF
TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

119

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

EA

SEP 1 [illegible]

ORIG. HELEN MORGAN
UNIT WH/2/CR & NIC
EXT. 6312
DATE 1 SEPTEMBER 1965

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 17

TDCS DB-315/02854-65

INFORMATION COPIES Dci, D/Dci, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF,
CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO/H, WH/C 10.

DATE DISTRIBUTED
1 SEPTEMBER 1965

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/REG	1	WH/2/CR	5	WH/C/CA/EA	3
WH/R	1	WH/2/N	3	WH/WAVE	1
WH/PO/A	1	WH/2/P	2		
WH/PO/B	1				
WH/6	1				

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
TX-1031
NP (AMBIDDY/1)
LIAISON *
HC: WAVE 5431 (IN 43038)
(AMCLATTER/1)

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ☒ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ AIR ☐

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

BASIC DOCUMENT HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE DCI.

RECOMMEND FOR EXO.

RELAY REQUEST ATTACHED FOR RELAY TO PACY, LANT, SJOS, AND MANA. d/

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Wayne D. Bray
C/WH/2/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/C/R - W. Tucker (Telephone)
WH/C/CA/EA - C. Jenkins (Telephone)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER
Leo Fraenkel
C/WH/R

COPY NO.

FORM 10-63 1I-2 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY NICARAGUA/COSTA RICA/PANAMA

TDCS DB-315/02854-65

DATE OF INFO. 27-28 JULY AND 4 AUGUST 1965

DISTR. 1 SEPTEMBER 1965

SUBJECT

REMARKS MADE BY GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA CONCERNING DANIEL ODUBER OF COSTA RICA AND COMMUNIST PLANS FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTION AGAINST COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, AND PANAMA

PLACE & DATE ACQ. 27 AUGUST 1965

REF IN

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A PROMINENT CUBAN EXILE, WHO IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE REPORTER. HE HAS A LARGE NUMBER OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONTACTS WITH INFLUENTIAL LATIN AMERICAN NATIONALS. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FROM DISCUSSIONS HELD WITH GENERAL SOMOZA, WHO WAS AWARE THAT HIS REMARKS WOULD PROBABLY REACH OFFICIALS IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

1. DURING CONVERSATIONS HELD ON 27 AND 28 JULY 1965 GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA, CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN NICARAGUA, SAID THAT HE WOULD SOON MEET DANIEL ODUBER, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN COSTA RICA, AT THE BORDER AND THAT THEY WOULD MAKE A "NON-AGGRESSION PACT," AGREEING THAT NEITHER WOULD MAKE TROUBLE FOR THE OTHER DURING THEIR CAMPAIGNS FOR PRESIDENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. ODUBER HAD ASKED FOR THE INTERVIEW. SOMOZA SAID THAT HE THOUGHT ODUBER HAD MADE A "LIVE AND LET LIVE" AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND THAT AT THEIR MEETING HE WOULD DEMAND FROM ODUBER A PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OF THE COMMUNISTS TO BE FOLLOWED BY EFFECTIVE CONTROL MEASURES AGAINST THEM.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OCX EXO

CIA/NMCC INS FBI DCS D/OCI 2 SECRET SERVICE (PRS)

2. (**HEADQUARTERS COMMENT**: TDCSDB-315/02574-65, 31 JULY 1965, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED ON ODUBER'S VERSION OF A MEETING BETWEEN ODUBER AND SOMOZA ON 29 JULY. ODUBER SAID THAT SOMOZA TOLD HIM HIS FRIENDS IN WASHINGTON WERE CONCERNED ABOUT ODUBER'S LEFTIST AND POSSIBLE PRO-COMMUNIST BACKGROUND BUT THAT HE (SOMOZA) REALIZED THIS WAS NOT TRUE. THEY AGREED TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES.)

3. ON 4 AUGUST SOMOZA SAID THAT A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF MARCIAL AGUILUZ ORELLANO, A LEADING COMMUNIST IN COSTA RICA, HAD SAID THAT THE LATEST PROGRAM OF FIDEL CASTRO IS TARGETED AGAINST NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA, AND PANAMA. PART OF THE PLAN INCLUDES ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE THREE COUNTRIES AS PART OF A TERROR CAMPAIGN. HE SAID THAT IN PANAMA, PARTICULARLY, PRESIDENT MARCO ROBLES IS A PRIME TARGET, THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE EXPLOITING OPPOSITION TO ROBLES BY THE NATIONAL GUARD, BECAUSE HE HAS CUT DOWN ON THEIR PENSIONS AND OTHER PRIVILEGES. IF ROBLES IS ELIMINATED, THE COMMUNISTS FEEL THAT THE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD WILL TAKE OVER; AND THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN HANDLE HIM MORE EASILY THAN THEY CAN HANDLE ROBLES.

4. (**HEADQUARTERS COMMENT**: ~~A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN~~, WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HAVANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND WHO HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE, REPORTED ON 31 AUGUST THAT DR. JULIO GARCERAN DEL VAL SOUZA, FORMER CUBAN SUPREME COURT MAGISTRATE, SAID THERE IS A PLOT AFOOT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT (ALSO SENT SAN JOSE AND MANAGUA).

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 32

☐ DESTD ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1	EA	5	OA
2		6	CA
3	RI	7	D
4	CS	8	X

IG: John Davis:sd
IT: WH/2/Panama
T: 5421
TE: 1 Sept 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

1 SEP 65 22 59 G

PRIORITY

~~SIG CEN~~

: SAN JOSE INFO: PANAMA

OM: DIRECTOR

NF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY with 2 ~~cc/pes, cofes 2.~~

PRITY SJOS INFO PACY CITE DIR 39815

REF: A. SJOS 7908 (IN 38832)*
B. SJOS 7923 (IN 42636)

1. ONLY ADDITIONAL INFO ON VIDAL ESPINAL ERREA WHICH WAS NOT MENTIONED IN REF IS CONTAINED IN HNMA 3348, 9 JUNE 65.

2. HDQS MEMO DATED 27 AUG 65 (SOURCE AMBIDDY-1) MENTIONS ESPINAL AS BEING A SPANIARD, WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE WORKING NOW AT THE RON CARTA VIEJA FACTORY IN PANAMA CITY. HE PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN MANAGUA AND WORKED FOR COL. MIGUEL RUIZ HERRERA (A COSTA RICAN SOMETIMES EMPLOYED BY GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA) AS A SPECIALIST IN GUERRILLA WARFARE. ABOUT LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE, ESPINAL CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN IN GUATEMALA RECENTLY WHERE HE HAD WORKED IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVT. HE QUOTED AT LENGTH, AND ACCURATELY, FROM CHE GUEVARA AND USED EXAMPLES, ALSO ACCURATELY, FOR SOME FIDEL CASTRO OPERATIONS ON HOW TO OVERTHROW A GOVT. SUBJ HAD ALSO BEEN OVERHEARD TO SAY IN MANAGUA THAT HE HAD A SPECIAL MISSION TO ASSASSINATE A CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENT.

CONTINUED...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

PAGE TWO

TO: DIRECTOR

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE ~~XX~~ TWO

INFO

CITE DIR 39815

3. NO PERTINENT IDEN INFO ON OSCAR RAMIREZ HEILBRON.

4. SUBSTANCE PARA 2 INFO MAY BE PASSED LIAISON. PLEASE PROTECT SOURCE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Requested Hdqs traces Vidal ESPINAL Arrea and Oscar RAMIREZ Heilbron.

WH/2/CR Edward

WH/PO/A

WH/C Carl Jenkins by phone

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

Exclude automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

file: AMCIVIC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING BY INDIVIDUAL FOR ADVANCE

NOTE: *Follow Instructions on Reverse*

SUBMITTED BY: Carl E. Jenkins

PERIOD OF ACCOUNTING: FROM July 65 TO Sep 65

VOUCHER NO. (*Finance use only*)

RECEIPTS

1. CASH ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD $

1a.

2. RECEIPT NUMBER	DATE	DESCRIPTION	$
2087	July	AMCIVIC subsidy	12,000
2129	Aug	AMCIVIC subsidy	12,000
		TOTAL TO ACCOUNT FOR	24,000

DISBURSEMENTS

3. VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT
	4 Sep	See attached translations and accountings for July & Aug AMCIVIC subsidies. (In Sept no subsidy was furnished although an acct. has been rendered for purposes of C/O control.	$
		TOTAL EXPENSES	$ 24,000

3a.

4. REFUNDED HEREWITH ☐ CASH ☐ CHECK ☐ MONEY ORDER

5. CASH ON HAND END OF PERIOD

TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR $ 24,000

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER

APPROVED

DATE

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE

SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

I certify that the expenditures listed hereon and on any attachments were incurred for official purposes of a confidential nature, that payment or credit therefor has not been received, and that this accounting is true and correct.

SIGNATURE OF PAYEE

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF FINANCE DIVISION

PREPARED BY

REVIEWED BY

VOUCHER NO. 7-12

DESCRIPTION - ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. P.O. NO. 28-33 DIV.	34-39 STATION CODE PROP. NO. PROJECT NO.	40-42 EXPEND CODE FY	43 FUNDS	45-46 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	47-52 OBLIG. REF. NO. ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	53 CAL YR	54-57 GENER. LEDGER ACCT. NO.	58-67 ALLOT. OR COST ACCT. NO. 62-67 CE. NO. & REF. NO.	68-70 DUE DATE OBJECT CLASS	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT
									TOTALS			

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS

1. If funds, in the form of other than U.S. Dollars were on hand, received, or disbursed during the accounting period, all pertinent data, i.e., rate, method of acquisition, etc., must be shown. If advances have been made to third parties, enter the total of such advances outstanding at the beginning of the accounting period on line 1a.

2. If more space is required to explain receipts, prepare receipt form, number and attach hereto. In every case, completely identify the source of receipts.

3. Attach a voucher for each expenditure and assign a number thereto in numerical sequence. The voucher may be the receipt obtained from the payee. When a receipt is not obtained, prepare a certificate and attach as a voucher. When space on form is not sufficient to list all vouchers, prepare a listing on a separate sheet and enter the total under item 3. If advances to third parties are outstanding at the close of the accounting period, attach an itemized list and enter the total on line 3a.

4. Final credit will not be given for disbursements which are advances to be accounted for. When accounting for advances are obtained, list as expenditures or refund of cash, as appropriate.

5. Total receipts entered on the line "Total to Account For" must agree with the total disbursements entered on the line following "Total Accounted For."

SECRET

✓ ✓ ✓

ACCOUNTING FOR AMCIVIC SUBSIDIES FOR JULY, AUG & SEP 1963

(TRANSLATION)

Gentlemen:

I have the pleasure to submit accountings for money received from the Consejo de Liberacion for the months of July, August and September.

JULY

Received from the Consejo - $12,000

I spent it as follows:

"Tridente" magazine (Printing, collaborations, circulation)		$ 3,000.00
Radio Time (Recording, collaborations, broadcasts)		1,805.00
Office		1,100.00
Rent	$200.00	
Manuel Guillot	400.00	
Valdes Castilla	200.00	
Rafael Gracia	300.00	
Delegate in Costa Rica (Luis Arrizurrieta)		350.00
Delegate in Venezuela (Maximo Diaz)		450.00
Delegates in Spain: Enrique Tous		150.00
Cuco Leon		250.00
Mago Robreno		250.00
Delegate in Honduras (Jose Antonio Mole)		350.00
Delegate in Guatemala (Oscar Vila)		200.00
Clandestine work:		
Delivered to Father Llorente to be sent through the Spanish Embassy		2,000.00
Delivered to the following persons to maintain them in Cuba to families of prisoners o killed in their provincesx		
Inocencio Alvarez		275.00
Alfredo Borges Caigant		250.00
Rolando Tapanes		200.00
Gustavo Fernandez Vidales		200.00
Domingo Borges Carbot		200.00
Emilia del Mar		100.00
Silvia Heredia		125.00
Jacinto Lasarraga (Here I had to advance 3 months for the wife's operation)		200.00

Antonio Crespo Olivero	300.00
Angel Garcia Alvarez	275.00
Antonio Sanz de Acedo	200.00
TOTAL EXPENSES	$12,530.00

As you see, in July I spent $530.00 more than I received, without taking into account the expenses for my travel in Latin America, or my personal expenses of my family, with which I have to maintain my wife, two sons and parents.

AUGUST

Received from the Consejo - $12,000

I spent it as follows:

"Tridente" magazine		$ 3,000.00
Radio Time		1,805.00
Office		
(I had to increas expenses as follows:		
Office supplies	$100.00	
Light & telephone	50.00	
Nilo Messer (secretary)	275.00	1,525.00
Delegate in Costa Rica		350.00
Delegate in Venezuela		450.00
Delegation in Spain (I cancelled Mago Robreno)		400.00
Delegate in Honduras		350.00
Delegate in Guatemala		200.00
Clandestine work		4,625.00
TOTAL FOR AUGUST		$12,705.00

As you see, in August I spent $705.00 more than I received, without accounting for my travel expenses, nor my personal expenses of maintaining my home and parents.

SEPTEMBER

Received from the Consejo - $12,000

I spent it as follows:

"Tridente" magazine	$ 3,000.00

Radio Time	$ 1,805.00
Office	1,525.00
Delegate in Costa Rica	350.00
Delegate in Venezuela	450.00
Delegate in Spain	400.00
Delegate in Honduras	350.00
Delegate in Guatemala (this month was not paid but next month he will return to Guatemala, but this month will be here)	
Clandestine work	4,822.00
TOTAL FOR SEPT	$12,585.00

As you see, I spent $505.00 more than I received from the Consejo. All this without taking into account my travel or my family. Of course, none of this includes my delegate in Nicaragua who receives $400.00 per month (Antonio Sama) nor the personnel who guard the arms in the three locations in Nicaragua, nor the personnel involved in Civic Action in Monkey Point and el Bluff, nor the personnel who take care of the "Granja Modelo," nor the storage payments for the warehouse where I have the equipment from the bases (all civilian equipment) in Miami.

Truly yours,

(signed)

Ignacio

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Anderson		
2	Mr. Barnes		
3	E. Williamson		EJW
4	It would depend on		
5	circumstances, but might be		
6	too obvious a vehicle.		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

These are put out by Artime's group. Do you see any use for these as a mechanism to surface items which are to ~~be~~ appear as inspired by US? or CIA?

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

File — Artime: EJW

TO: WILLIAMSON
SUBJ: COMMENTS ON TRIDENT
FROM: CHACONAS
DATE: 16 MAY 66

1. I DO NOT REGARD TRIDENT AS A PARTICULARLY USEful
VEHICLE FOR PROP ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THE TRIDENT IS CLOSELY
IDENTIFIED WITH ARTIME AND AS SUCH IS LESS ~~[illegible]~~ A CONVINCING PROP
OUTLET THAN WOULD BE THE CASE OTHERWISE. I WOULD NOT THEREFORE FAVOR
FINANCIAL SUPPORT (KUBARK) OF THE TRIDENT, ESPECIALLY SINCE KUBARK
IS NOT IN POSITION CLOSELY TO MONITOR THE CONTENTS PRIOR TO PUBLICATION.
ALSO, THE CIRCULATION IS EXTREMELY LIMITED TO WARRANT PLACING A CASE
OFFICER IN CHARGE FOR THIS ACTIVITY, I.E. GUIDING THE PROP LINE OF
TRIDENT.

2. WE HAVE NOT USED TRIDENT IN THE PAST(AS FAR AS I
AM AWARE) FOR PLANTING MATERIAL AND I DONT FOR THE MOMENT VISUALIZE
USING TRIDENT FOR OUTLET IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER, THE "MIG-21
PROJECT", CONCEIVABLE MIGHT FIND TRIDENT USEFUL - THAT IS, IF IT
IS DESIREABLE TO ADD A QUASI-OFFICIAL AURA TO THE PROPOSAL.

GC

CHACONAS

This seems to have no value to us
C Anderson

OK

HARRY — BM

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WH/C/OP		
2			
3	C/WH/C/PA		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Pls attach your comments as to possible utility of this publication for your purposes - Either positive or negative appraisal should be made -

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
D. R	

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 2-61 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—[illegible]

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	ADC/WH/C		
2	WH/C Plans	13	WZ
3	WH/C/CA		JK
4			
5	C/WH/C/FI		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: 2 to 5:

In view of distribution in Latin America, WH/CA should also be consulted - WZ

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Earl J. Williamson	12 Nov

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

SECRET

12 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Tridente Publication

1. Tridente is a slick news-type magazine published by Manuel Artime Buesa and the MRR. A copy is attached to this memoranda.

2. According to Artime 6000 copies of Tridente are being published every two weeks at an approximate cost of $2,000 a month. The publication is sold on newstands in the U.S. and also to some extent in Latin America. He gave the following figures for monthly distribution in Latin America.

Costa Rica	- Approximately 500 copies
Nicaragua	- Approximately 100 copies
Mexico	- Approximately 200 copies
Panama	- Approximately 75 copies
Venezuela	- Approximately 150 copies

Artime claims that most of the above copies are sold but some are sent gratis to his contacts. In addition 200 copies are sent to Spain as hand-outs because they do not have permission from the Spanish Government to put them on sale. The distribution in Spain is done by Enrique Tous his representative in Madrid. Artime also claims that the copies in all the countries are passed along to friends and relatives and therefore the publication has a larger audience than the circulation figures would indicate. He says that only about $500.00 is derived from the sale of Tridente and he personally has been putting in about $1,500 monthly to keep the magazine going.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3. Recently Artime inquired if the Agency had any interest in supporting Tridente or furnishing any material for publication in it. He indicated he could probably not keep the magazine going much longer without financial support and inasmuch as his "assistance" from the Agency will be cut from $5,000 to $3,000 monthly effective 1 June 1966 this is undoubtedly true.

4. Artime was told that he would be advised in the near future if there was any Agency interest in the publication or in seeing it continued. I would therefore appreciate a hard appraisal of the publication in terms of WH/C/CA overall propaganda objectives together with any indication of interst in using the publication. On the latter point it might be a good idea to bear in mind that Artime may continue the publication on his own for several months and in view of our present subsidy to him we could possibly make some use of the magazine in the interim period at no additional cost.

Earl J. Williamson

Earl J. Williamson

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☑ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/SERVICES/DISSEMINATION
1 B 4004

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE: 13 MAY 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ESEC		16 MAY	AH
2. WH/C/RR/OS		16 May	JM
3. wh[redacted] WH/C/CECS			
4. WH/C/FI (Williamson) FI/D/OB DUBOIS 16 May			
5. (someone has not done their homework – RCD)			
6.			
7. FI/SIG			g
8. a g 8	8 JUN 1966	8 June	
9.			
10. FI/SIG/B			
11.			
12. DCS/SD-Virginia Thorne	6/14	6-14	
13.			
14. FI/INT/L/Betty Burgin 4C17			BB
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

This document has not been integrated into the CS records system.

If you feel it should be classified into a CS file, please indicate file number (and other necessary processing) and return to RID/AN.

RETAIN: 201-267437
File Number

INDEXING: YES ☐ NO ☒

Do not return this document to RID if coding and indexing are not required.

WH/C/FI maintains regular contact with Antonio and he is presently receiving a monthly payment from the Agency

201-267437

DCS concurrence interested

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☑ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

201-267437

14-00000

12 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [illegible]
[illegible]

FROM : Director, [illegible]

SUBJECT : Alien Interview **ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL F.**

This office has requested FBI approval to contact **MANUEL F. ARTIME BUESA**, an alien national described in the attachment, and expects to exploit him as a source of foreign intelligence information.

Please advise Mrs. Virginia L. Thorne, Extension 2738, regarding any interest you may wish to have considered in this connection.

Virginia L. Thorne
for B. FRANK YOUNG
Chief, Services Division

Attachment: Biographical Data On Subject Alien

VLThorne: par

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

201-267437
12 May 66

case 47640 - Sullivan

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NO.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME – FIRST NAME – MIDDLE NAME
Artime Buesa, Manuel F.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
[redacted] Zora - Cuba

2. ALIASES

4. SEX
M

5. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No., and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
		1270 NE 85th Street, Miami, Florida

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
1962	Present	Employed in anti-GOC activities in US and Latin America	

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

1. Former Graduate Medical Doctor
2. Participated in Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba
3. Frequent travel to Cuba and Dominican Republic.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 160 USE PREVIOUS
3-58 EDITIONS
MFG. 4-64

14-00000

SECRET

10 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

File

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1

1. The attached material was furnished by AMBIDDY-1 to the undersigned during a meeting in Miami, Florida on 4 May 1966. As noted AMBIDDY-1 had only a vague conception of the date when the information originated and was unaware of the identity of the end sources. Obviously these copies were made from old material in AMBIDDY-1's files on the spur of the moment so that he could bring some material to our meeting.

2. AMBIDDY-1 was told that the attached reports had no significance because of the lack of details as to date and place acquired and source.

Wallace A. Growery

Wallace A. Growery

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CON LOS FUNCIONARIOS QUE SE PUEDEN CONTAR EN EL MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA son los siguientes:

Dr.Jose [illegible] [illegible]--Director de la Caja de Resarcimiento.

Gustavo Rivero--Jefe del Departamento de Entrada y Salida de Documentos.

Luis Gomez--Segundo Jefe del Departamento de Antecedentes Penales.

Jesus Miranda Medina--ex-Superintendente y por anticomunista hoy simplemente empleado del Registro de Entrada y Salida con categoria de Jefe.

Pedro Diaz Gil--Jefe del Departamento de Ancedentes Penales.

Esteban Puebla Pacheco--Jefe del Departamento de Matrimonios.

Dr.[illegible]--Jefe del Departamento de Informes Legales.

Dr.[illegible]--adscripto al Departamento Legal.

Dr.Llerena--Jefe del Departamento de Legalizaciones y Firmas de Jueces.

Frita Rita Martinez--Jefe de Barnizadores.

Celestino Gomez Saavedra--Supervisor de Superintendencia.

Jorge Felin--Jefe del Departamento de Bibliotecas.

FUNCIONARIOS ADICTOS DEL REGIMEN a la vez colaboradores directos del Ministro para con el sistema.

Dr Arturo Ferber Orozco--Sub-Secretario.

Dr.Gerardo Arrezola Ferrer--Director Legal de Justicia.

Dr.Juan Gualberto Caballero Moreira--Jefe del Departamento Legal.

Adela Hallib Hallib--Jefa Departamento de Compras.

Migdalia [illegible]--Jefa Departamento de Suministros.

Dra.Ada Guerrero--Departamento de Biblioteca.

Dr.Rigoberto Betancourt Martinez--Jefe del Registro del Notariado.

Dr.Eugenio Arza Ortega--Director de los Registros y del Notariado.

Dra.Concepcion Portela--Jefe del Departamento D.S.F.

Gustavo [illegible]--Jefe Departamento de Personal.(Cursa estudios en una de las llamadas escuelas de "Cuadros Politicos".

Marina Diaz Calvet--Jefa del Departamento de Tabulacion.

Humberto Chediak Chediak--Jefe del Departamento de Estadistica.

Carlos Vega Vega--Director de racionalizacion y sustituto en mi cargo de Director General.Despues de mi asilo,Agente del G-2.

Claro Rafael Cordero [illegible]--Jefe del Departamento de Contabilidad y dirigente de la juventud comunista.

Julio Lorenzo Crespo--Jefe del Departamento de Carpinteria.

Rafael Bouza Calvo--Superintendente del Edificio.

Dr.Guido [illegible]--Jefe Contabilidad Caja de Resarcimiento.

Por ultimo,deseo exponer tambien que han sido creadas,varias Escuelas de Capacitacion,obligatoria a los empleados,cuya capacitacion consiste en una nueva humillacion de adoctrinamiento comunista, por lo tanto puedo informar con toda honradez, que la contrarevolucion en el Ministerio de Justicia abarca por lo menos un 80 por ciento de los empleados, así como se nota claramente el desmoronamiento moral y físico del actual sistema.

[illegible]

PROVINCIA DE ORIENTE

Término de Santiago de Cuba

Felipe Quintero Revillas

Dra. María Luisa Caminero Roman

El Sr. Quintero y la Dra. Caminero son localizables a través de Dulce María Regueiro, en la dirección de ella.

Dulce María Regueira
Dirección: 705 Lacret (altos)
Stago. de Cuba

Dr. Vicente Guash Oviedo

Término de Puerto Padre

Francisco Concepción
Finca Platería "La Redención"
Esta finca está en el centro
de Chaparra, San Andrés y Velasco

[illegible] Ramón Pérez Banda
Vive en el mismo pueblo de Puerto Padre

Rafael Mora Quesada
Coordinador Municipal

Barrio Norte: Andrés Suarez Calvo

Barrio Sur: Abelardo Hurtado

Pueblo San Andrés: Eliecer Martin Porcell

Barrio Los Alfonsos: Guillermo Lasa Castellanos

Barrio La [illegible]: Enrique Pérez Pi[illegible]

[illegible] Campos

Barrio Santa María: [illegible] Carballo

Central Chaparra: [illegible] Bustamante

Central Delicias: Victor [illegible]

San Martín: Roger Batista

Término de Manzanillo

Angel Ballester

[illegible]

[illegible] Alvarez

Manuel Praia, Coordinador Manzanillo-Niquero-Campechuela

José Ramón Aguilar

Enrique Almaga, este es correo y enlace de la Sierra al pueblo.

Zona de Veguita

Rey Gonzales, correo y enlace.

Rafael Chaves

Juan Tabanda

Roberto Rodríguez

Pantaleon Rodríguez

Término de Yateras

Sr. Enrique Iglesias Avilé
Coordinador Municipal

Término de Bayamo

Ursinito Gonzalez Longoria de la Torre
Dirección: Prolongación de García S/N (La Quinta)
Ganadero

Manuel Castillo García
Dirección: Edificio Vallejo (Banco Canadá)

Enrique Hernández [illegible]
Dirección: Reparto [illegible]
Ex-panadero

Enrique [illegible]
Dirección: Padre Batista S/N, por la Iglesia Católica Mayor

Municipio del [illegible]

Santiago Martínez

[illegible] Castellanos Urdaneta

[illegible] Ocaña Quiala

Término de Guantánamo

Manuel Borgellá
Coordinador Municipal

Sr. Fernando [illegible]
Coordinador Municipal y
jefe de [illegible]

Alvaro Infante
Tarqraro

Barrio Caimanera: Rufino Quevedo Sarret

Organización: Teodoro Raymond Orozco
Loma del Sur #31
Coordinador Civil: Ramón Robles Díaz

Coordinador Militar: DEL MRR – Claudio Fernandes Roche

Barrio [illegible] Ramón López Ivllé
Coordinador

Mario Casas
Delegado Provincial Oriente Sector Ferroviaria
y vive en Guantánamo

Antonio Guet
Calle 2da. Oeste e/. 5 y 6 Sur, Gtnmo.

Dr. Ramon Bobé Reyes
Paseo e/. 1 y 2
Guantánamo

[illegible] Rebé Reyes
Santa Rita e/. Donato Mármol y Varona
Guantánamo

[illegible] del Río
Calle Beneficencia e/. 8 y 9 Sur Gtnmo.

[illegible]
Calixto García #1383 Sur, Gtmo.

Municipio de [illegible]

[illegible] Ramoth
Coordinador Militar

[illegible] Vega
Obrero

Dioscórides Roger
Organización

Srta. Melba Idelisa Quevedo Peña
Coordinadora

Municipio de [illegible]

[illegible] Quevedo — Obrero
[illegible]
[illegible] Fonseca — Coordinador Militar
[illegible] Ríos — Organización

Barrio Caimanera:

Juan Guerra Pérez
Calle Marina Norte #60
Caimanera
y
Faustino Pérez
De la plaza del mercado

Ramon Rey
Marina Norte S/N

Anstergilio Hernandez
del comercio

Miguel Pérez
Correo frente al mercado

Términos de Palma Soriano, Jiguaní y San Luis:

Javier Bosch

Dr. Yuti Sozodeville
Delegado

Término del Caney:

[illegible] [illegible] conocido por [illegible]

14-00000

[illegible] DE PINAR DEL RIO

[illegible] M.R.R.

1-[illegible]

Jose Miguel [illegible]
[illegible] calle Colon # 2106 en Artemisa.
Coordinador de [illegible] desde la fundacion del M.R.R. en dicho Termino.

[illegible]
[illegible] del Bar de Arturo [illegible], Cabaña.

2-[illegible]

[illegible]
Calle [illegible] de Brasil. Contador Publico.
Coordinador del M.R.R.

3-[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] Cabaña.

[illegible]
Republica y Primera [illegible] del M.R.R.

Olga Valdes [illegible]
Calle [illegible] # 2104, Reparto [illegible]

4- [illegible]
[illegible] 2100, Artemisa.

5-CANDELARIA
Pedro [illegible]
Calle Maceo [illegible]

6-SAN CRISTOBAL
Eligio [illegible]
Vive en Santa Cruz de los Pinos.

[illegible]-LOS PALACIOS

Alfredo [illegible].
Vive en Paso Real de San Diego. Los Palacios.

Enrique Fernandez Martinez
Entronque de [illegible]. Los Palacios.

8-CONSOLACION DEL SUR

Baldomero Torres Perez.
Vive en Barrio de [illegible]. Consolacion del Sur. Fundador del M.R.R.

9-PINAR DEL RIO

Lazaro Hernandez. Maestro de Escuela.
Localizarlo a traves de la Iglesia de [illegible].

Pedro [illegible] de [illegible].
Vive en calle [illegible] entre [illegible] y Solano Ramos.
Trabaja en el Departamento Provincial de Educacion.

Efrain Saavedra Perez.
Calle B 10[illegible]. Reparto [illegible]. Pinar del Rio. Comerciante.

10-SAN JUAN Y MARTINEZ

Ingeniero [illegible]
Vive al [illegible] del M.R.R.

Andres [illegible].
Vive en la Finca [illegible]. Barrio [illegible] Sainz. (Lagunilla).

11-SAN LUIS

Juan Garcia Gonzalez.
Barrio Barbacoa. Coordinador Municipal del M.R.R.

Ernesto Cruz.
Calle [illegible]. Comerciante.

12-GUANE

[illegible]
Localizarlo con [illegible] del Pueblo.

Tomas Delgado. (Tomasito)

Ricardo Cuetara Santovenia.

Florentino Fernandez [illegible].

Roberto [illegible]

13-MANTUA

[illegible]

Faustino C[illegible]

[illegible]el Corrales.

Eladio Villanueva.

14-00000

14-VIÑALES.

Sergio Suarez.
Localizarlo estacion ferrocarril, Pinar del Rio.

Miguel Perez.
Vive en Puerto Esperanza.

Vicente San Juan.
Puerto Esperanza. Viñales.

15-CONSOLACION DEL NORTE

Silvio Cruz.
Miembro del [illegible]

Simon Cruz.

Francisco [illegible]

Matanzas

[illegible] [illegible]

1.- MANGUITO

Lolo García Barreiros
(Independencia esq. a/a "La Ferretería"

Nota: Su dueño

Presos: Fidel Barreto Llanes
(Isla de Pinos)

Juan González Pajardo
(Isla de pinos)

2.- JOVELLANOS

René Revoredo Vallejo
([illegible] #2 Jovellanos Electricidad Local C.N.R.)

Presos: Enrique Revoredo Vallejo
(Jovellanos, Isla de pinos, 50 Años)

Ismael Ramos [illegible]
(Isla de Pinos 20 Años)

3.- PERICO

[illegible] Sotolongo
(Presidente de los Colonos, Santa Rosa Esq. a Carretera Central)

Preso: Pedro del [illegible]
([illegible] [illegible] [illegible] en San Severino)

Rafael [illegible]
(Obras Públicas, Isla de Pinos)

4.- COLON

Ignacio de Armas
(Calle Central, Máximo Gómez, Carnicería de Zinguaro, lugar donde trabaja)

Presos: José Guerra [illegible]
(Isla de Pinos)

[illegible] Alonso y José García

5.- JAGUEY GRANDE

Arturo Lorenzo Alvarez
(Administrador de las Fcas. del Padre, vive en los altos de la Farmacia "Dr. Reyes"

__Presos__: Dr. Mario Rodríguez (Abogado)
(Isla de Pinos)

Jorge Gutierrez Izaguirre
(sheriff, Isla de Pinos)

6.- CARLOS ROJAS

Ignacio Nodarse
(Calle Lagunilla, Dueño Café, Restaurant)

__Presos__: Wilfredo Fernández Riverón
(Isla de Pinos)

Orlando Fernández Riverón
(Isla de Pinos)

7.- SAN JOSE DE LOS RAMOS

Nicolás Sánchez
(Calle [illegible] s/n. Ex-Oficial Constitucional)

__Presos__: José Miguel Gómez Reveredo

Ramiro Tomé Rodríguez

8.- MATANZAS

Antonio Rivera
([illegible] 111/2 Matanzas, Trabaja en Audiencia)

__Presos__: Leonel Rodríguez de la Torre
(Isla de Pinos)

Pedro Casas Carrillo
(Isla de Pinos)

Rogelio Cruz
(Isla de Pinos)

9.- CARDENAS

Ing. [illegible] Pérez [illegible]
(Calle 35 [illegible] Varadero)

Presos: Juan Argüelles
Isla de Pinos)

Javier Márquez
(Cabaña)

10.- UNION DE REYES

Alberto Ferret (Dueño Fundición "Ferret")

Francisco Arencibia
(Agente Seguros, American National)

Presos: Evelio Martín González
(Isla de Pinos)

Humberto López García)
(Cabaña 10 años)

11.- BOLONDRON

Aurelio Rivero P.
(Vive en su Finca y en el Calle Central del Pueblo)

Presos: Generoso [illegible]
(San Severino)

12.- CANASI

[illegible] Prieto
[illegible] cerca de [illegible]

Presos: Eligio Santana
(Isla de Pinos)

13.- SANTA ANA

Carmen Fernández (Maestra)

Presos:

15
5 6

COMITES DE [illegible] DE LA REVOLUCION

Abel Santamaria...25 No.164.Vedado
Amistad No.532..Habana.Cuba
Amistad No.556...Habana.Cuba
Animas No.29.Casablanca.Habana.Cuba
Arango y Reforma.Luyano.Habana.Cuba
Aranguren No.665.Habana.Cuba
Ave.de Maceo.No.511.Habana.Cuba.
Ave.de Maceo No.513.Habana.Cuba
Calzada del Cerro No.1469.Habana.Cuba
Calzada [illegible].Habana.Cuba
[illegible]
Campanario No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba
Carmen No.17[illegible].Habana.Cuba
Clavel No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba
Clavel No.217.Habana.Cuba
Comandante.J.A.[illegible].Compostela No.758.Habana.Cuba.
Corrales No.75[illegible].Habana.Cuba
Crespo No.122.Habana.Cuba
Cuba No.660.Habana.Cuba
Dominguez No.467.Cerro.Habana.Cuba
Empedrado No.415.Habana.Cuba
Escobar No.71[illegible].Habana.Cuba.
Estevez No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba
Industria No.462.Habana.Cuba
Jose A.Echeverria.[illegible] No.68.Habana.Cuba
J.M.Diaz.Compostela No.758.Habana.Cuba.
Lealtad No.995.Habana.Cuba.
Manuel Porto Peña.Estrada Palma No.95.Habana.Cuba
Marcelo Salado.Soledad No.368.Habana.Cuba
Marques Gonzalez.No.310.Habana.Cuba
Marti No.111.Guanabacoa.Habana.Cuba.
Monte No.213.Habana.Cuba.
Mercaderes No.16.Habana.Cuba.
Neptuno No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba.
Nueva del Pilar.No.209.Habana.Cuba
[illegible].12.Cerro.Habana.Cuba

Patricio Lumumba..Sol.No.462.Habana.Cuba.
Puerta Cerrada [illegible]o.222.Habana.Cuba.
Belascoain.No.659.Habana.Cuba
Pepe Gomez Wanguemert..11.No.808.Vedado.Habana.Cuba.
Porvenir No.73.Arroyo Apolo.Habana.Cuba.
Santa Teresa No.420.Habana.Cuba.
Santo Tomas No.10.Habana.Cuba
Sitios No.777.Habana.Cuba.
K.No.318.Vedado.Habana.Cuba.
23.No.63.Vedado.Habana.Cuba
17.No.4414.Marianao.Habana.Cuba
25.No.6494.Marianao.Habana.Cuba.
26.No.3518.Marianao.Habana.Cuba.
43.No.5010.Marianao.Habana.Cuba.
Ave.de los [illegible] No.[illegible] Habana.Cuba.
B.No.159.Vedado.Habana.Cuba.
Campanario [illegible] Habana.Cuba.
Lindero No.[illegible] Habana.Cuba.
17 y B.Vedado.Habana.Cuba.
[illegible] No.13606.Marianao.Habana.Cuba.
"JOSE LUIS TASENDE"..50.(e).35 y 37.Marianao.Habana.Cuba.
"ABEL SANTAMARIA".Industria.No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba.
"HERMANAS GIRAL".Hospital No.658.Habana.Cuba.
"ROSA M.HERNANDEZ".[illegible] 69.Santos Suarez.Habana.Cuba.
Emilio [illegible].Presidente Comite de Defensa.JUAN DE DIOS PRIETO.
Inquisidor [illegible].Habana.Cuba.
MARIA TERESA [illegible]..Responsable Nacional Instruccion Revolucio-
naria.Es de la Vieja Guardia.
ANGEL VALIENTE..Responsable Nacional de Educacion.
RADAMES MANCEBO...Secretario Organizacion Nacional.
RIGOBERTO PORRAS..Dirigente Nacional.
PEPE SIMEON... "
ENRIQUE TOLEDO..Coordinador Provincial de la Habana.
OSCAR FRAGA..Coordinador General.Coordinacion 11.Arroyo Apolo.Habana.
ROBERTO [illegible].....Vigilancia Orden Publico " " "
MANUEL [illegible]..Resp.Reforma Urbana. " " "

CONSUELO ALVAREZ.........Resp.Fiscalizadora....Arroyo Apolo.Habana.
ENRIQUE DOMINGUEZ........Resp.Defensa Popular. " " "
ALIVIA [illegible]..........Resp.Salud Publica. " " "
LUISA PERALTA............Resp.Educacion... " " "
FRANCISCO BLANCO........Resp.Inst.Revolucionaria." " "
ELSA MORALES.............Resp.Frente de Paz. " " "
ORLANDO HERNANDEZ.......Resp. Deportes. " " "
SALUSTIANO [illegible].......Resp.Propaganda. " " "
DR PEDRO M.[illegible]..Comite "Luis Gomez Wanguemert.Lca a/n/
Loma de Chaple.Vibora.Secc.4.Arroyo Apolo.
CARMEN VAZQUEZ....Presidenta.
RAUL SANCHEZ...PEPITO TAY.San Mariano 176,Vibora.
DR ANTONIO MARTINEZ BELLO...PEPE PRIETO.Ofarrill 42.Vibora.
TOMASA SANSANO..BERNARDO RODRIGUEZ.Milagros 403.
WILFREDO ALONSO TORRES.Presidente. de Comite de Defensa situado
[illegible] 409.San Antonio de los Baños.
FRANCISCO [illegible].....Distrito 1.45 A.y 99.Marianao.
TEOBALDO [illegible]...Comite [illegible] 23 # 1410.La Sierra.Marianao.
CONRADO [illegible]...COORDINADOR PROVINCIAL DE MATANZAS
RADAMES LOPEZ ...Responsable.[illegible].LAS VILLAS.
ISRAEL RUIZ.....COORDINADOR PROVINCIAL DE CAMAGUEY
NESTOR [illegible]..Secc.ORGANIZADOR.

COMITES DE DEFENSA DE LA REVOLUCION DEL INTERIOR

[illegible]

148 No.[illegible]
Ave.[illegible].No.15087.
Ave.235.No.13403.
Ave.249.No.15606.(Zona 2).
138. No.23320.
138. No.25710.
138. No.25716.

COTORRO

Independencia No.7.
Independencia No.489.
10 de Octubre No.8.(Seccion 4).
Republica s/n.Santa Maria del Rosario.
Abel Santamaria.[illegible] No.55.
Armando Mirabal.Callejon de Guanabacoa No.5[illegible]
Camilo Cienfuegos.Independencia No.396.
[illegible] No.19.
Frank Pais.3a No.10
[illegible] No.42.
Independencia No.[illegible]
10 de Octubre No.79-A.
Jose A.Echeverria.[illegible] 1.
Jesus Menendez.[illegible] Palma No.28.
[illegible] Alegre.

GUINES

Habana No.661.

JARUCO

Jose M.Zayas No.3.

MADRUGA

Cespedes No.312.

QUIVICAN

Ave.23.No.1803.

SAN JOSE DE LAS LAJAS

Coordinacion.Norte No.[illegible]

Antonio Maceo Fco.Delgado.No.155.

SANTA CRUZ DEL NORTE

Alfredo Lima No.42.

SANTA FE

Comite Municipal Ave.1a.No.3220.

Occidentales A.N.[illegible].1a.No.5202.

SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS

11.No.8.

Ave.General [illegible].

Maiceles [illegible] de la Habana.

14 y 9.

SURGIDERO DE BATABANO

Maximo Gomez No.207.

14-00000

COMITES DE DEFENSA DE LA REVOLUCION

ORIENTE

MANOLO BORJAS....COORDINADOR PROVINCIAL ORIENTE.

OVELIO VALDES.... " " SALUD

CANDIDO JUSTIZ... " " VIGILANCIA

HUMBERTO TORRES.. " " TRABAJO VOLUNTARIO

MERCEDES DESPAIGNE...Resp.Organizacion.San Luis.Oriente.

GONZALO HERRERA.... " RECUPERACION VALORES DEL ESTADO

ARISTIDES BAEZA... " Organizacion.DEL DISTRITO.San Luis.

ALBERTO VILA.... " Instruccion Revolucionaria.San Luis.Oriente.

MIRTA DIAZ............Presidente Comite San Luis Oriente.

ISABEL BORGES PORRILLO....Comite de Vigilancia de San Luis.Oriente

AMIN GONGORA......RESPONSABLE PROVINCIAL DE LOS C.D.R. EN LAS E.I.R.

[illegible] Y.O. DE [illegible]

[illegible] TRAIDORES [illegible] DE PINAR DEL RIO

[illegible] DE 1962

COMERCIANTES.

Felipe [illegible] MARQUEZ.
Alcides ALV[illegible] [illegible].
Carlos [illegible].(Puerto Esperanza). (muerto).
[illegible] PEREZ.
Orlando VALDES ALV[illegible] DE LA CAMARA.
[illegible] [illegible].
Isidro [illegible].
Pedro [illegible].

[illegible]

Pedro DIAZ [illegible].
Andres N. MASSON [illegible].
Francisco ALFONSO CANAL.
Reinaldo [illegible].
[illegible] PORTE.
[illegible] ROCA.
[illegible]
[illegible] HERRERA.
[illegible]

SECTOR MAGISTERIAL.

Reynaldo VALLEY [illegible].
Anibal LLANES TRUJILLO.
Pablo ALVAREZ TRUJILLO.
Marta LARA CAMACHO.
Diosdado FERNANDEZ.
Jacinto MELLA.
Leopoldo GONZALEZ PEREZ.
Norma AGUILAR.
Alfonso VALDES.
Esther VALDES PEREIRA.
Hilda CLAUSELL DE GONZALEZ.
Zoraida ALVAREZ TRUJILLO.
Juanita COLLADO DE CABRERA.
Manolo AMADOR.
Osvaldo HERRERA QUINTANA.
Yolanda LABORI.
Teresa OTERO.

CHIVOTAS Y G-2.

"Chiquitin" y Candido ALVAREZ
Panchito JUNCO.
Israel CARDENAS
Raul BARCON.
Emilito REGALADO.
"Cobito" ESCOBAR.
[illegible] DE ARMAS.
Agustinito MIER.
Elena MARTINEZ [illegible]
Enrique CAMPOS.
Jose M. PARIS (Padre).
Jose GRAVITA-SUERO.
[illegible] P. CALLEJA.
[illegible] R. BALLAGA [illegible] y sus hijos.
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Manolo [illegible] (Laboratorista)
Rafael PEREZ [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] J. SANTANA.
[illegible] CAMPS.
Dr. Luis [illegible]
[illegible]
Carmelo ARIAS [illegible]

GUANAJAY.
[illegible] y [illegible], Cobrador del Agua.

[illegible]
[illegible] ZILLIAN propietario de una ferretería y Juan GARCIA EMPLEADO de la Compañía de Electricidad.

RELACION DE LOS MIEMBROS COMUNISTAS Y MILICIANOS PARA EL M.R.R.

Termino Municipal.-- GUINES.

Provincia Habana.

ROGELIO [illegible]. Miembro de las Milicias. Fue profesor en la escuela Superior de Guines. Es propietario de una vidriera de cigarros y apuntaciones situada en el Bar Pancho. En su casa funciona un Comite de Defensa, situado en la Calle Concha o General Asbert entre Trujillo y Clemente Fernandez.
Caracteristicas. Mide aproximadamente 6-3 pesa unas 170 a 180 lbs. ojos azules, pelo risado y canoso, tiene bigote y usa espejuelos, complexion fisica mediana.

SRA. ARMANDA RODRIGUEZ. Divorciada. Miembro de las Milicias y de la Federacion Cubana, empleada de la oficina del Hospital Municipal, reside en la Calle Habana esquina a Cinco en el Reparto Praga, miembro del Comite de Defensa de su cuadra, y del que funciona en el Hospital, mide 5-2 unas 115 lbs., pelo rubio o castano pintado usa espejuelos.

ANTONIO SOLANA. Miliciano, miembro del G 2 y actual administrador del que fuera Central Providencia, fue interventor del Grocery Estrada en el que trabajaba desde hacia 5 anos, mide 5-8 unas 140 lbs. vive en la Calle Molino esquina a Concha.

RUBEN ROQUE. Miliciano, miembro del Partido Comunista, pertenece a la llamada vieja guardia, posee un carro amplificador por el que da las consignas comunistas, posee un Comite de Defensa en su casa, situado en la Calle Dos entre Tres y Ave. Juan Rodriguez en el residencial Mayabeque, mide 5-2, unas 140 lbs.

HAROLDO SIGLER. Miliciano, miembro del C.D.R. de la Cia. de Electricidad donde trabaja, mide unos 5-6 de alto, de 150 a 160 lbs. reside en la calle Habana esquina a 8 en el Nuevo Vedado.

WILLIAM DEGRACIA. Miembro de la Cruz Roja, ex director del Instituto de Segunda Ensenanza de Guines, confidente del G-2, de procedencia Portorriquena, mide aproximadamente 5-8, unas 180 lbs., ojos obscuros pelo trigueno y piel triguena, usa bigote y espejuelos, habla y fue profesor de Ingles, y vive en el callejon de Muerte entre Soparda y Amistad.

OLGA GONZALEZ. miembro de la Federacion de Mujeres Cubana, de la que es ejecutivo, maestra del Centro Escolar en el que adoctrina, pertenece al C. D. R. de su barrio, asi como tambien al de los maestros.

DR. ANTONIO DIAZ ABASCAL., conocido por el Polacero, medico, miliciano aunque viste de uniforme en raras ocasiones, trabaja en el hospital Municipal, mide unos 6 pies. pesa aprox, 190 lb. recide en el Callejon Suarez entre San Julian y Maximo Gomez.

DR. FRANCISCO ORTEGA, conocido por Panchitan, dentista, miembro del C.D.R. radicado en la casa del Sr. Estrada, (antigua agencia de seguros), posee su consulta en la calle habana entre Soparda y Maximo Gomez, en la cera de los numeros impares, vive en [illegible] calle en la farmacia Chambles, frente a la calle Maso.

SR. FRANCISCO CHILLA JR. hijo del anterior, estudiante de la Universidad de la Habana, este sujeto pertenece a la Aso. de Jovenes Comunistas, tiene la funcion de abrir las casas que abandonan los cubanos al trasladarse al extranjero, reside en la misma direccion de su padre.

HORACIO FERNANDEZ, dueno de la casa Galiato (efectos electricos en la calle San Julian esq. a Trujillo), miembro de las Milicias, aunque no usa uniforme., miembro del C.D.R de su barrio, funciona como activo delator, es ademas activo del G-2, vive en el residencial Mayabeque.

TITI, conocido por la Catalinera, pertenece al C.D.R. miembro del G-2 denuncio a Hugo Marlen, que estuvo preso durante 7 meses, reside en [illegible] frente al Grupo Yath Club.

ADRIAN FERNANDEZ, conocido por Pata de Plancha, jefe del G-2 en Guines, ha sembrado el panico y el terror en la poblacion con sus abusos y desmanes, es considerado como muy peligroso, mide unos 5-5 y unas 180 lbs. de peso, reside en la calle Maceo esquina a la calle Dos.

CARMEN BETANCOURT, fue empleada de la compania de telefonos de Guines delatora de su centro laboral, trabaja en la actualidad en la oficina de la Estacion de Trenes, tiene un comite de Defensa.

CASIMIRO PEREZ, dueno de la ferreteria del mismo nombre, activo militante del P.A.U. en epoca de Batista, mason, miliciano, posee un comite de defensa en su casa, ACTIVO DELATOR, reside en Maceo entre [illegible] y Clado, frente a la antigua bodega Espiga de Oro.

CARLOS PEREZ, hijo de Casimiro Perez, hoy es medico de nueva formacion comenzo sus estudios en el ano 1959, operaba en la Habana y Guines como propagandista del regimen, practicaba la cirujia sin tener titulo bajo la responsabilidad del Dr. Marin, la misma direccion de supadre.

[illegible] PEREZ, hijo tambien de Casimiro Perez, miliciano y delator, mecanico, reside con su padre.

CARLOS SAAVEDRA, colaborador del regimen en lo que a la ensenanza se refiere, delator, reside en el Edificio Balerdi.

[illegible] PEREZ GALERO, miembro de la Cruz Roja de la que fue [illegible] jefe, miembro de las milicias y del G-2, dueno de la Casa Perez en el Edificio Balerdi en ropa de hombres y ninos, mide 5-1 unas 150 lbs. reside en Trujillo frente al parque Central de Guines en el edificio Balerdi.

GUIDO BETANCOURT, empleado del Instituto de Segunda Ensenanza de Guines Miliciano y miembro del G-2, posee un comite de Defensa en su casa situada en la Calle 2. entre Herrera y Medio por la acera de los numeros impares.

ESTEBAN GARCIA DAVILA, dentista, colaborador del regimen, vive en Trujillo entre Marti y Concha.

PEDRO RODRIGUEZ DU[illegible], empleado del Juzgado de Guines, delator veve en entre Palmas y Maceo, al lado de la Sociedad Bella Union.

RAMON MESA, conocido pr Mesita, Miliciano, joven comunista y G-2 vive en Valdes y Maximo Gomez

RAMON ROSA padre, miliciano y G-2 viejo miembro del Partido Comunista vive en Valdés y Maximo Gomez

Rafael GUZMAN, conocido por Cepillo, miliciano, trabaja en la agencia bancaria de Guines No. 308-21, delator vive en Maximo Gomez y Primera en el Residencial Mayabeque.

WILFREDO GALANO, bancario, miliciano vive en Maximo Gomez casi esquina a Beneficencia.

CHITA PERDAN, esposa del anterior, miliciana muy activa, miembro de la Federacion de mujeres y delatora.

LINCON FONTANIL, miliciano, jefe de los jovenes comunistas, delator vive en la Ave. Juan Rodriguez y M. Gomez.

FRANK FONTANIL, miliciano, comunista y G-2, misma direccion del anterior, su hermano.

ANTONIO [illegible], dueño de la tienda La Nueva, comunista, miembro del C.D.R. vive en Herrera entre Habana y Maso. es e sujeto tiene dos hijos que son del G-2 a uno le dicen o se llama Pino.

FELIPE MARRERO, responsable de las estaciones de gasolina, miliciano.

DRAFT

The following are the highlights of operational meeting with AMBIDDY-1 on 3-4 May 1966 conducted in Room 1609 in the Hotel Everglades in Miami, Florida.

The first part of our discussion concerned reports which he had recently originated or been responsible for concerning possibility of agitation and disturbances in Costa Rica preceeding and during the inauguration of President-elect Trejos 9 May 1966.

AMBIDDY-1 first spent considerable time in attempting to justify his ~~assets~~ efforts to establish relations with various Government leaders in Central America and why he had placed certain of his people in position to develop information on these Governments. He said that sometime ago it had been ~~stressed~~ impressed upon him by other people ~~which~~ with whom he had been in contact including agency personnel that it would be important to the future of his movement to be sure that he had the support of the Central American Governments. This he added was considered important in connection with the necessity of ~~this~~ their support in establishing his training basis in Costa Rica and Nicaragua but also ~~that the~~ political support of these ~~Contributions~~ countries would be essential if and when the movement had any success in developing internal opposition within Cuba and to bring about circumstances for Castro's overthrow.

He said that ~~his~~ as part of the efforts he has maintained or tried to maintain ~~is~~ periodic ~~personal~~ contact either personally or thru one of his Representatives with Government leaders in Central America, ~~and that~~ the recent source of information on activities in Costa Rica, ~~is~~ Luis Arrizurieta Sardinas, is a man of his personal confidence and a member of the MRR, and was placed as Secretary to Former Pres. ODUBER in Costa Rica through his

(AMBIDDY-1's) effor He admitted that Arrizurieta had been ~~was~~ on his payroll for $380 a month. Arrizurieta is now in Miami and will remain there and not return to Costa Rica, principally according to AMBIDDY-1, because it is necessary to cut back his financial commitments.

AMBIDDY-1 said that Arrizurieta had four sources of information which he used in Costa Rica which he claims were the following: Walter Vazquez, ~~which~~ who he said had been infiltrated into the Movimiento Costa Rica Libre, Jose Luis Cascante, student who had been infiltrated into the ~~Use~~ Youth Section of the Communist Party, Rigo Marin, a farmer employed as chauffer who was an infiltration of the farm section of the Communist party and Jose Gamboa, nickname "Chepe," who works as a laborer in Puerto Limon and is allegedly an infiltration of the Communist Party in Puerto Limon. AMBIDDY-1 said that all four of the above had been in direct contact with Arrizurieta for the purpose of furnishing him with information. He claimed that Jose Luis Cascante, a student, was the most intelligent of the four.

~~Speaking of the~~ In connection with a recent report which ~~was~~ originated with Arrizurieta concerning Communist Party Plans ~~in connection with~~ along with former President Pepe Figueres to agitate during President-elect Trejos' inauguration ~~there was~~ and the reported plan to attempt the assassination of Pres. Samoza, ~~was~~ if he attended the inauguration, AMBIDDY-1 said he rechecked this information with Arrizurieta. He said that according to Arrizurieta Jose Gamboa was the original source of the information on the strikes and agitation. This information however was conveyed verbally to Arrizurieta by an unnamed Captain of Guardia Fiscal stationed in Puerto Limon. According to Arrizurieta this unnamed Captain said that Gamboa told him the Communist Party had their people mobilized for a strike at the time of the inauguration. As far as former Pres. Figueres' activities in relation to the strike activity and assassination attempt on Samoza were concerned, AMBIDDY-1 said Arrizurieta told him that he knew that there had been a meeting in Figueres house on 17 April and there were several people present at this meeting who expressed concerned about the possibility that Samoza would attend the inauguration with a large number of Nicaraguan officials and military and that this would be an insult to the National DIGNITY of Costa Rica. Pepe Figueres is reported to have said that "it might bo a good idea to have a dead one to aid the cause" but as far as AMBIDDY-1 is concerned there is no direct reference made by Figueres to Samoza. AMBIDDY-1 further could not confirm that Figueres had discussed this matter with any members of the Costa Rican Communist Party.

With regard to AMBIDDY-1's personal relationship or contact with Figueres he said he knows him but that they are not friends. According to AMBIDDY-1 he felt it necessary to circumvent Figueres and go directly to Orlich when he had to obtain training camp sites in Costa Rica ~~and~~ which naturally did not help their relationship with Figueres. In regard to the Figueres-Nunez group previously reported AMBIDDY-1 said his source of information on this group is Guillermo Vargas who is Chief of the Exterior Relation of INUU (Costa Rican housing agency). He said that his access to the P.L.N. and the Orlich-Odubr group is through Roberto Madriz who is his personal friend and is Orlich's personal secretary. Arrizurieta is also an intimate friend of Madriz and obtained information from Madriz while in

Costa Rica.

In regard to an earlier report which allegedly originated with Freydue Borges from Luciano Nieves concerning the possibility of Nieves Agitation-Propaganda mission to Costa Rico, AMBIDDY-1 said he had no further information on this but had rechecked it again and had been told that Nieves was living very well in Miami apparently without any obvious employment. He had been unable to confirm the report that Nieves was receiving support from Figueres.

Highlights of the draft incorporated in dispatch to interested station. No further action - EJW

MRR
Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA
TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

File [illegible]

Received from AMBODY-1 [illegible] 3.7
No [illegible]

Memorandum sobre hora Radial

Nombre del Programa (posibles): Hora Cubana
La Voz Verde Olivo
La Voz del pueblo
La voz cubana
Conciencia Revolucionaria

Orientación: La programación constaría de tres partes:

1-Una sección dedicada a comentar noticias internacionales, encaminadas a crear en el miembro de las Fuerzas Armadas la conciencia de que:
  a)El Comunismo Internacional está dividido y perdiendo terreno
  b)Rusia se siente insegura con Fidel y por eso le está quitando el apoyo y la ayuda
  c)Rusia no ayudaría a Fidel en caso de una rebelión interna
  d)Fidel es mal visto por el resto de los comunistas internacionales

2-Una sección dedicada a comentar noticias internas de Cuba, encaminada a
  a)Con Fidel no lograrán más que miseria, inseguridad física y opresión
  b) Fidel es el único que se interpone en el camino de la riqueza nacional, la felicidad y el progreso económico.
  c)Fidel no confía en nadie y elimina a sus mejores amigos, a la más leve sospecha, aunque esta sea infundada.
  d)El pueblo vería como un héroe al hombre o grupo de hombres que quitara de en medio a Fidel Castro, y de seguro las riendas del Gobierno caerían en sus manos, sin ninguna interferencia del exilio.
  e)El pueblo odia a los que sirven a Fidel de soporte.

3-Una sección dedicada específicamente al miembro del Ejército Rebelde, la Milicia, la Marina, la Fuerza Aérea, los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución, etc. Los Becados.
  Objetivos:
  a)La lucha no es contra ellos
  b)Todo lo contrario, esperamos que la iniciativa sea de ellos y que ellos asuman las riendas del poder a su caída.
  c)Estamos para ayudarlos y brindarle garantías.
  d)Con Fidel, nadie está seguro, lo mismo que le pasó a Camilo, Hubert Matos, Ché Guevara, Cubelas, Almejeiras, le pasa a cualquiera de ellos en cual-

quier momento.No importa que sean comunistas.

e)América entera está esperando la Revolución que Castro comenzó y prometió y que después fué puesta en manos de extranjeros.America tiene los ojos puestos en ellos, no en los politiqueros ni en los viejos líderes gastados de antaño.

f) Las necesidades económincas más elementales tocará a las puertas de las más altal jerarquías si Fidel sigue en el poder.

g) La muerte de Fidel no es tan difícil si se lo propone un grupo valiente.Esos serán los hombres que demostrarán que pueden llevar las riendas del poder.

h) La Cuba tan feliz y rica que ellos podrán gobernar si Fidel es eliminado.(Dibujar el futuro)

Costo del Programas

1- En la WRUL (onda corta para Cuba), cada 15 minutos cuestan $100.00 mensuales, de modo que si tenemos 3 programas a la semana, serían $300.00 semanales por 4 semanas que tiene el mes: $1,200.00 mensuales.

2-La transmisión telefónica del programa de Miami a New York cuesta unos $250.00

3-Tres individuos que trabajarán el programa, a $300.00 cada unos $900.00

4-En "Radio America" luce que todo es más barato, pero no tenemos cotizaciones. "Radio America" tiene la ventaja de que los programas son en onda larga y lo pueden captar más radios en Cuba.

Nota final: En el programa se pueden lanzar consignas de sabotajes fáciles.Pero ha de ser cosas muy fáciles de hacer, pues en Cuba cae mal que los que están afuera le manden a hacer cosas difíciles.Me refiero al pueblo.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ([illegible]) ([illegible])

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Memorandum alternativo sobre hora radial

Nombre del programa (posibles): Diálogo con Cuba
La Voz de la Revolución
Conciencia Verde Olivo
La voz de las palmas.

Duración: 5 minutos diarios

Orientación: Voz de Manuel Artime dedicada a los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas Cubanas, a los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución, a las Milicias, a los becados?

Objetivos:

1-La lucha no es contra las fuerzas armadas.

2-Nos sentimos parte de ellos.

3-Esperamos la iniciativa y el liderazgo de ellos.

4-Los ayudaremos sin aspiraciones que solo corresponden a los que salven a Cuba

5-Con Fidel nadie está seguro; lo mismo que le pasó a Camilo, Hubert Matos, Ché Guevara, Cubelas, Almejeiras etc, le pasa a cualquiera de ellos, aunque sean comunistas y aunque la sospecha que sobre ellos se tenga sea falsa, pues Fidel no confía en nadie.

6-America entera está esperando la Revolución que Castro prometió y después traicionó. America tiene los ojos puestos en ellos, no en los dictadores y politiqueros de antaño.

7-El pueblo y América entera odian a los que sirven de sostén a Fidel, pero verían como héroes a los que lo derribaran del poder.

8-Las necesidades económicas más elementales tocará a las puertas de las más altas jerarquías del régimen si Fidel sigue en el Poder.

9-Fidel es un desprestigio para el Comunismo, por eso Rusia le está retirando el apoyo

10-Rusia nunca se comprometería defendiendo a Fidel contra una rebellón interna.

11-Fidel es el único obstáculo en el camino de la felicidad, la riqueza y el bienestar delpueblo.

12-Eliminar a Fidel no es tan difícil si se lo propone un grupo valiente de oficiales que no solo tomarían las riendas del poder, sino que pu-

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
4313 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

sarían a la Historia como los Libertadores de la nueva guerra de Independencia.

13-Recordación de los ideales de la Sierra Maestra, y del brillante futuro que aguarda a Cuba con un Gobierno Revolucionario verdadero(planteamiento de futuro).

14-Revolución que Cuba necesita y que solo ellos pueden dar al pueblo.

Condiciones técnicas: debe ser transmitido en onda larga (solo conozco Radio América) e ignoro el presupuesto que haga falta, ya que no conozco las cotizaciones de esta Emisora.Solo haría falta el dinero que esta emisora cobrara y unos $250.oo para el técnico de grabación y los "tapes" de la grabación.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

23

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MANAGUA

ACTION WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, DO4, DD/H3, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/O4

S E C R E T 022317Z

86

DIR SJOS INFO PACY WAVE CITE MANA 5674 2 May 66 [illegible]0[illegible]01

TYPIC PBRUMEN

REF: SJOS 8588 (IN 07232)*

1. AMBIDDY-1 WENT MIAMI 30 APRIL. HE INDICATED ARIZURRIETA WAS PRIMARY ACCESS TO PLN AND HAD HANDLED CP PENETRATION. A-1 SAID ARIZURRIETA HAD MOVED BACK TO MIAMI AND HE HAS NO REPRESENTATIVE IN COSTA RICA AT PRESENT.

2. A-1 STATED HE MET THREE TIMES WITH ERACORN-1 LAST WEEK AND DISCUSSED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, STRIKE PLANS AND POSSIBLE DEMONSTRATIONS IN COSTA RICA. ERACORN-1 SAID ERACERB-1 WOULD ATTEND TREJOS INAUGURATION WITH A SMALL PLAIN CLOTHES SECURITY DETAIL.

S E C R E T

CFN 5674 SJOS 888 AMBIDDY-1 MIAMI 30 APRIL ARIZURRIETA PLN CP A-1 MIAMI NO REPRESENTATIVE COSTA RICA A-1 ERACORN-1 COSTA RICA ERACORN-1 ERACERB-1 TREJOS

BT

SECRET

*REF DEBRIEF AMBIDDY-1

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES 45

26 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	CI
2		6	CA
3	FI	7	FA
4	TC	8	HO

FROM
San Jose

ACTION
WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT RE TIME BY DM

INFO
FILE VR, WH 8, CI, CI/ICZ, CI/OPS, CI/PS, FI, FI/D4, FI/INT, IW, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, SOD6,

S E C R E T 291755Z

29 APR 66 07232

DIR INFO MANA PACY WAVE CITE SJOS 3538

TYPIC PBRUMEN

REFS: A. DIR 97358 (NOT SENT MANA OR PACY)

B. SJOS 3564 (NOT SENT MANA OR PACY (IN 00907)

C. HNMA-3536, 27 APRIL (NOT SENT WAVE)

1. REF C REPORT FROM AMBIDDY-1 (RE FIGUERES/CP PLAN FOR BANANA ZONE STRIKE AND POSSIBLE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION SHOULD SOMOZA ATTEND TREJOS INAUGURATION) IS SECOND QUESTIONABLE REPORT HE HAS "PASSED ON" IN LAST TWO WEEKS. (FOR PACY AND MANA: FIRST REPORT CONCERNED FIGUERES PLAN TO IMPORT AGIT PROP MISSION TO CREATE CLIMATE FOR OVERTHROW PRESENT REGIME.)

2. REQUEST APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER DEBRIEF AMBIDDY-1 IN DETAIL ON HIS PRESENT ACCESS TO PLN AND ATTEMPT PIN HIM DOWN ON REF REPORTS. WE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED HIS CP HMUCP PENETRATION WHICH HE STATED LUIS ARIZURRIETA IS RUNNING. FYI ARIZURRIETA HAS BEEN WORKING WITH HURILL-1 ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE VERY CLOSE TO HUGALLY-1 WHO COULD NOT REMEMBER HIS LAST NAME WHEN

SECRET

SECRET
WHEN FILLED IN

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

APR 29 12 12 PM '66

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK. IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

BL

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
WH/C/ES	2	May 66		Jo
2. wh/c/ca				new
3. WH/C/FI (Williamson)				
4. wh/c/ca/PP				SC
5.				
6. wh/c/ca/PA		11 MAY 1966	11 May 66 1966	UD
7. ~~[illegible]~~ wh/c/ca/EW				
8.				
9. wh/c/MO/F		12 MAY 1966	14 MAY 1966	Ejr
10. ~~[illegible]~~				
11. ~~[illegible]~~				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
27 April 66

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFGA 25031

14-00000

wdk

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Divisio.

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMLASH/AMHAM/AMTRUNK/AMOT
Statements made by Manuel ARTIME Buesa and Article Reporting His Appearance on TV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: None, For Your Information

Reference: UFGA-24875, 31 March 1966

Forwarded under separate cover is AMOT Report DD-1820, dated 31 March 1966, concerning statements made by Manuel ARTIME Buesa which were broadcast to Cuba; and its attachment which is a copy of an article reporting the appearance of ARTIME on the TV program "Panamericana" on 13 February 1966.

for Gary L Nestoff
PHILIP G. ELMARD

Att'D Rolan

Attachment:
AMOT Report - USC

Distribution:
~~3~~ - WH/C, w/att

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 ATT.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

201-267437

DATE TYPED

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 27 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-25031

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-95/4

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

SECRET

FROM: [redacted] DD-1820

AGENT: [redacted] 31 March 1966

VIA: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Statements made by Manuel ARTIME Buesa which were broadcast to Cuba

SOURCE: Edgar SOPO Barreto

REF: DD-1810, paragraphs 2 and 3

1. The following information was obtained by P-112 at 4:30 p.m. on 30 March 1966 at Station WMIE during a conversation with Edgar/SOPO Barreto, propaganda chief of the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MRR).

2. The statements of Manuel ARTIME Buesa, which were mentioned in DD-1810 and which were to be broadcast on 19 March 1966 over the radio programs, "Newspaper of the Air" and "Panamerican News", were not given by ARTIME to the directors of these programs to be broadcast. ARTIME decided not to do so after consulting with the Executive Committee of the MRR. (See DD-1815 which covers the radio broadcasts of the above-mentioned programs on 17, 18, and 19 March in which no mention is made of ARTIME's statements.)

3. ARTIME's statements were broadcast four time over Station WRUL and Radio Americas. According to SOPO the taping of the statements by ARTIME lasted eight minutes.

4. According to SOPO, the reason ARTIME's statements were not broadcast on "Newspaper of the Air" was that Juan AMADOR Rodriguez, the director of the program, had been attacking the members of the Armed Forces of CASTRO in his comments on the program, whereas ARTIME's statements were precisely directed to the Rebel Army.

5. SOPO also said that the statements were not given to Norman DIAZ Artiles

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Statements of Manuel ARTIME Buesa, etc. (cont.)

for broadcasting because the language of the statements was "leftist", maintaing the thesis of the "revolution betrayed" and "Fidelism without Fidel" and defending the revolution of the Sierra Maestra, the revolutionary laws, and Agrarian Reform.

6. According to SOPO, the statements made by ARTIME were directed especially to Cuba and to those who are connected with the CASTRO regime, whereas the exiles were not ready to assimilate the advanced ideas which ARTIME set forth in his statements. It was for this reason, said SOPO, that during a meeting with ARTIME he was advised not to make his statements public to the exiles,for the leftist language would fall like a bomb and would not fit in with the idea that the exiles had of ARTIME as a centrist or a moderate.

NOTE FROM SE:

Attachment No. 1 of DD-1815 carried the statements made by ARTIME as published by Tridente in March, with reference to the CUBELA affair.

Attached to this report is a copy of an article reporting the appearance of ARTIME on the program "Panamericana" on TV Channel 10 on 13 February 1966. This article appeared in Tridente in February 1966.

Comparecencia del Doctor MANUEL ARTIME en el Programa "Pan Americana", Transmitido por el Canal 10-TV de Miami, Florida, el dia 13 de Febrero de 1966.


DR. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

GANDERO: Muy buenos días, amables televidentes.

Tenemos hoy, ante nuestras cámaras, a un anti-Castrista muy conocido por ustedes. Pese a su juventud, ha sido actor de grandes acontecimientos en la lucha contra el dictador de Cuba. Me refiero al Doctor Manuel Artime Buesa, a quien el destierro quiere oir porque tiene muchas declaraciones importantísimas que hacer y, por lo tanto, no vamos a hacerle una larga presentación, sino hacer ésta lo más breve posible. No hace falta presentar al Doctor Manuel Artime Buesa..... Así que voy a presentarles el Panel de esta mañana que se compone del conocido Periodista y Gran Comentarista de Miami, Norman Díaz, quien dirige el Periódico "Pan-Americano", y a Ricardo Nuñez, también muy conocido de ustedes y que escribe en dos diarios aquí en esta ciudad.

Así que, cedo la palabra a Norman Díaz, para la primera pregunta.....

NORMAN DIAZ: Muchas gracias, compañero Gandero....

Doctor Manuel Artime, su presencia en este programa tiene un doble interés, en lo que representa su opinión y el hecho de ser usted uno de los cubanos combatientes que más cauteloso ha sido en el uso de los vehículos de propaganda; al grado que a nosotros, los Periodistas, se nos ha hecho a veces difícil conseguir oportunidad para entrevistarlo.

Pero hay algo más significativo, Doctor Artime. En cada ocasión que usted se ha presentado en público es debido a acontecimientos que, indudablemente, tuvieron apariencia de ser decisivos en la lucha contra los comunistas. Tenemos que agregar a esto que, casi siempre, usted dijo lo que resultó después una amarga verdad... ¿Que la lucha iba a resultar "larga, dura y penosa..."

En esta oportunidad, Doctor Artime, y ante sucesos tan espectaculares como los presentes, también cree usted que ahora la liberación es un problema que está lejos de resolverse?

ARTIME: Bien, Norman, creo que ahí hay varias cosas que contestar...

En primer lugar, las pocas veces que yo he hecho uso de los canales de publicidad. En realidad -por desgracia- el tipo de labor a que estamos dedicados nosotros, nos impide muchas veces dar pautas para entrevistas periodísticas, porque ustedes los Periodistas preguntan demasiado y uno muchas veces, queriendo infundir ánimo o queriendo contestar realmente a la pregunta que se hace, comete indiscreciones que, a la larga, redundan en perjuicio de la Patria.

Es el cuento del famoso monito de la selva, que estaba haciendo ejercicios... Pasó una jirafa y le preguntó: "Monito, que estas haciendo?..." "Estoy haciendo ejercicios para ponerme fuerte y darle un golpe de karate al león y tumbarlo"... Al poco rato, pasa un rinoceronte... "Monito, que tú estás haciendo?"... dice. "Yo, aquí, haciendo ejercicios para ponerme fuerte y tumbar al león..." Le llegaron los comentarios al león y pasó el león y le dijo: "Monito, una cosa que te estás haciendo?"... Dice él:

"Mira, haciendo ejercicios y hablando más basura que el diablo..."

(Se escucha un murmullo de risas)

Yo no quiero, yo no quiero hacer el papel del monito. Efectivamente, yo dije que la guerra iba a ser muy larga y muy dura... que iba a ser muy cruel. Sé que, con esto, no me gané simpatías: yo lo siento, mi función no es de ganarme simpatías mi función es dedicarme por entero a la labor de liberación de mi Patria. Y esa labor de liberación de mi Patria exije que cuando haya que decir una cosa dura se diga esa cosa dura, aunque no sea simpático.

Yo creo hoy que la liberación de Cuba está cerca... Y creo que la liberación de Cuba estaba distante, hoy digo que estoy completamente convencido que la liberación de nuestra Patria se acerca...

NORMAN DIAZ:.... Exponga las razones Comandante...

ARTIME: Varias razones... Primera razón, el estado interno de Cuba. No sólo el estado de desesperación de un pueblo que con la burla de que el que quiera salir podría salir, llenaron sus planillas y hoy se ven discriminados y en la miseria, sabiendo que a lo mejor van a demorar tres años en salir por la vía de salida que les ha ofrecido el Dictador.

Por el estado de las Fuerzas Armadas: de estado no sólo de desmoralización sino de división y de conspiración de las Fuerzas Armadas. Y no solamente los que están conspirando con una idea occidentalista, sino los que están conspirando con una linea china que existe dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas que fué inaugurada por el desaparecido Che Guevara... Y por último, por la Tricontinental, mi querido Norman.

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Existe o existía?

ARTIME: Existe, existe.

NORMAN DIAZ: Al desaparecer el Ché Guevara de las filas del Ejército Rebelde de Cuba, no desapareció la linea china?

ARTIME: El Comunismo nunca pone todas las esperanzas en un solo hombre, sino en organizaciones que crea. Y el Comunismo-Chino no es una excepción.

NUÑEZ: Comandante, esta resrespuesta què usted le ha dado al colega Norman Diaz me plantea una duda que yò quisiera que usted me la esclareciera. La duda consiste en lo siguiente: Usted detuvo los ataques comandos que se realizaban: Cuando usted detuvo estos ataques comandos, ¿se debió a que eran inefectivos o estos ataques comandos usted los detuvo porque encajaban dentro del plan de liquidación del régimen de Fidel Castro, o sea, dentro de la estrategia occidental?

ARTIME: Ricardo, en realidad, nosotros estamos dentro de una estrategia en la cual no solamente estamos nosotros sino que creo que está Occidente entero empeñado en ella.

En el momento en que nosotros hicimos ataques comandos, lo que había que hacer eran ataques comandos. La gente decía, "¿pero, con ataques comandos ustedes van a tumbar a Fidel Castro?" ¡No!, con ataques comandos no vamos a tumbar a Fidel Castro; pero, con ataques comandos Fidel Castro tuvo que sacar, de las filas de la producción, cuatrocientos mil hombre para cuidar las costas de Cuba. Y la crisis económica violentísima que tiene hoy Fidel Castro, se debe, en parte, a aquellos ataques comandos que paralizaron en gran porcentaje, la producción cubana.

Ahora bien, en estos momentos no hacemos ataques comandos, porque creo que hay labores más indispensables que nosotros concretamente podemos hacer. No estoy condenando los ataques comandos: todo lo contrario. Yo creo que cualquier esfuerzo contra Fidel Castro es un esfuerzo bueno. Quiero decir que nosotros, concretamente, nosotros tenemos cosas más importantes que hacer que ataques comandos. ¿Quiere decir que ya nosotros no volveremos a la etapa de la guerra? ¡No! no quiere decirlo tampoco... Van a seguir sonando las balas. Y van a seguir sonando las balas, pero de una manera distinta.

Unas balas con objetivos concretos; unas balas que están detras de un plan previamente trazado. En aquel momento, la estrategia correcta eran los ataques comandos. En estos momentos no quiere decir que sean malos. ¡No! son buenos los ataques comandos; pero creemos que nosotros nos podemos dedicar a labores que sólo nosotros podemos realizar para incluir a Cuba dentro de un plan latino-americano que ha venido a concretarse en la agresión de la Tri-Continental.

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor, yo quisiera que usted me concluyera una pregunta, a modo de esclarecimiento. Yo le pregunté que Ernesto Guevara, alias el Ché, que representaba la línea china dentro del Ejército, al desaparecer, todavía continuaba habiendo pués rezagos en las filas del Ejercito de Cuba, de la tendencia pro-

PAN
AMERICANA

ALBERTO GANDERO

China.

¿Usted considera que Guevara fué "separado del cargo" o "liquidado fisicamente"?

ARTIME: Guevara fué liquidado. porque era el hombre de China para eliminar a Fidel Castro concretamente...

Lo dijimos ya una vez en un programa radial, cuando se anunció el canje. Dijimos que habia una violenta pugna y que Ché Guevara era el precio que Rusia habia exigido para seguir relaciones con Fidel Castro. La pugna comenzó cuando se llevó a Marcos Rodriguez al juicio... quien fué al juicio aquel es la vieja guardia y quien llevó a Marcos Rodríguez ante el juicio , es precisamente la tendencia pro-China.

NORMAN DIAZ: Vamos a esclarecerle a los oyentes, Doctor Artime, quien es Marcos Rodriguez.

ARTIME: El famoso comunista que fué juzgado y, según dicen, condenado a muerte por haber "delatado" el lugar donde se escondian los estudiantes fusilados durante la época de Batista.

Fueron condenados, en realidad, en aquel juicio, toda la "Vieja Guardia", que sabia la historia de Marcos Rodriguez y habia apañado a Marcos, en aquella oportunidad.

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Quien fué quien la condenó?

ARTIME: Quien la condenó fue, la línea china... y todos los dirigidores e intimos amigos del Ché Guevara. Fidel Castro sirvió de intermediario, al final, para que la censura recayese sólo en la figura de Marcos Rodriguez y no en la figura de la "Vieja Guardia".

NUÑEZ: Comandante Artime, ¿qué resultados cree usted que se produzcan de la Conferencia Tricontinental que se acaba de celebrar en Cuba?

ARTIME: Desde 1935, en que Dimitrov lanzó -en el Congreso del Komitern- la tesis de los "frentes populares", no se habia producido un impacto de estrategia tan violento como el que se ha producido con la Tri-Continental. La Tri-Continental ha puesto a los paises latinoamericanos- y yo vengo de Latino América ahora exactamente- y a los gobiernos latinoamericanos en la disyuntiva de una declaración de guerra.



NORMAN DIAZ

Y así lo han reconocido grandes personajes de Latino-América; entre ellos, Lleras Camargo de Colombia. Sus resultados han influído, inclusive, en las elecciones de Costa Rica.

En estos momentos, Latino-América es completamente consciente que se encuentra en guerra con Cuba. Esta es una jugada rusa... es una jugada rusa para quitarle el control de los comunistas "cabezas calientes" de Latinoamérica a China de la mano. ¿Y a quién utiliza? ¡Utiliza al peón que puede quemar! ¡Utiliza a Fidel Castro.!

¿Quiere decir que Rusia va, hasta sus últimas consecuencias con esta tesis que ha avanzado en la Tri-Continental? Me luce que no. Me luce que Rusia se está guardando las espaldas. Y prueba de ello es que líderes francamente pro-soviéticos -como Mora Valverde de Costa Rica, Prestes de Brasil y como Lombardo Toledano de México- no asistieron a la Tri-continental, ni se comprometieron con la Tri-Continental.

Moscú está preparándose para otra etapa que no es la de la Tri-continental; pero necesita la Tri-Continental para arrebatarle los partidos comunistas jóvenes a China de la mano y necesita para socabar la retaguardia de los Estados Unidos de Norte América.

Nosotros tenemos las primeras consignas que han llegado a Latino América, de la Tri-Continental. Las primeras consignas fueron, en primer lugar, intensificación de la campaña de paz; denuncia del imperialismo norteamericano, tanto en su aspecto militar como económico, fundamentalmente en Viet-Nam, tratando de llevar esta campaña de paz a un "boycot" a los buques de cualquier país que lleven ropa o armas, o tropas o alimentos a Viet-Nam.

Segunda consigna: Penetración de los partidos de izquierda, para hacer que estos partidos de izquierda adopten posiciones radicales que hagan juego con el Comunismo.

Tercera consigna: Cambio de la palabra "Comunismo" por la palabra "Socialismo"... porque se han dado cuenta que la palabra "Comunismo" inspira asco ya hasta en las zonas sub-desarrolladas.

Incremento de las revoluciones y de la subversión en cada uno de los paises. Y, en esto, los comunistas jóvenes tendrán que caer en manos de Moscú, si quieren recibir alguna ayuda para sus planes subversivos. La van a recibir, pero tendrán que comprometerse con la linea moscovita.

Y, por último, campaña contra el imperialismo, en los dos aspectos, militar y económico dentro de Latino América. Incrementación de las revueltas en Santo Domingo, para tomar a Santo Domingo como una espina irritativa constante que de base a esta campaña.

Todos los paises latinoamericanos son conscientes de esto. Todos los paises latinoamericanos! Y hay países latinoamericanos que no pueden darse el lujo de continuar la estabilidad de su pais con la presencia de un Fidel Castro en Cuba.

La O.E.A. está en una disyuntiva: o toma la decisión para la cual fué creada, o sencilla y llanamente, la O.E.A. perderá su vigencia en Latino América.

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor Artime, en los rotativos internacionales, como en los hilos cablegráficos también internacionales, se ha destacado extraordinariamente la crisis Castro Pekín. ¿Ese hecho puede beneficiar a Castro o, de lo contrario, cree usted que le hará daño suficiente como para contribuir a su derrocamiento?

ARTIME: La linea china, en estos momentos, ya está ocasionándole grandes dificultades a Fidel Castro. Raúl Castro está reunido, hace tres dias, con su Estado Mayor y con la Jefatura Suprema de los Cuerpos Represivos para una purga que se avecina en estos dias próximos.

Como usted comprenderá, el señor Embajador Chino, que reparte la propaganda, no va a ir campamento por campamento repartiendo la propaganda china. Habia vehiculos, dentro de esos campamentos, que hacian circular esa propaganda; y hay hombres, dentro de los campamentos militares de Cuba, que son fanáticos de la linea china. El Che Guevara fué eliminado porque el Ché Guevara era la cabeza visible de aquello; pero queda la organización y está vigente y será- en los próximos dias- la primera de la serie de purgas que amenaza al Ejército Rebelde Cubano...

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor, yo vuelvo a insistir otra vez... "Eliminado" ¿en'que sentido? ¿Separado de las filas del Ejército o eliminado...?

ARTIME: Eliminado fisicamente.

NORMAN DIAZ: ...físicamente.. Gracias.

ARTIME: ....El Comunismo los grandes fallos no los perdona con separación del cargo...

NORMAN DIAZ: Gracias Doctor.

NUÑEZ: Doctor Artime, usted sabe que los comunistas -como regla general- utilizan una serie de medidas para difamar y una serie de rumores para difamar a los dirigentes que se enfrentan contra ellos con éxito.

...Con respecto a esto, me viene a la memoria una anécdota de un Profesor mejicano, que era profesor Universitario, que era destacado anticomunista. Y, a este Profesor, los comunistas empezaron a decir que él había aumentado y se había superado en su carrera debido a que su hermana mantenía relaciones con un influyente personaje. Tiempo después, este señor fué a un programa de Radio y un Periodista, no pudiendo contenerse ante esos rumores que existían, le preguntó "Oigame, existen rumores Profesor, de que su hermana ..." Dice el hombre... "pues mire, yo soy el primer sorprendido, porque yo soy hijo único, yo no tengo hermanas"... o sea, yo quisiera que usted me dijera a qué atribuye usted, Comandante Artime, el hecho de que Fidel Castro lo haya tomado como centro de los ataques a los exilados, inclusive llegando a atribuirle riquezas personales y acusaciones de otros tipos?

ARTIME: Esas campañas hace tiempo que yo las conozco... la célebre campaña del restaurant que yo tengo, de los cuatro supermarkets; creo que también di dinero para una joyería, vivo en un palacio, que es mío... Esto es viejo...

Cuando yo dije que Fidel Castro era un traidor, muchos creían en Fidel Castro. La primera acusación que me lanzaron por la espalda fué la de "ladrón de los fondos del INRA"... Ya estoy acostumbrado a esto, es decir, el pueblo de Cuba no cree en nada. ¡Eso es lo que me interesa! Los gobiernos que me ayudan a mí en Latino América, ¿lo creen? No son tontos... no son tontos. ellos no se dejan llevar por campañas; ellos sí saben la verdad. Y saben que todo esto es mentira.

Hay un drama que se está representando en *Europa*, que es ge-

RICARDO NUÑEZ





PANEL

nial. Se llama "La Hoguera Feliz". Ponen a Juana de Arco en la actualidad y, por supuesto, Juana de Arco llevada por su espiritualismo combate contra el Comunismo.

Se reúne la Dirección del Partido Comunista Francés y toman una línea contra Juana de Arco... ¿Quemarla? ¡No!, porque se crea un mártir... ¡INFAMARLA! Y empiezan a decir que Juana de Arco lleva una vida libre, que Juana de Arco se ha entregado a las drogas, que Juana de Arco vive con los Capitanes de su Ejército... y el drama termina cuando Juana de Arco, llorando, le suplica a los comunistas ¡que la quemen! Y el Dirigente del Partido Comunista le dice: ¡NO!, ya tú estas quemada hace rato.....

Esa es una vieja campaña... que puede circular dentro de ciertos límites, pero, después de esos límites, ya no circula.

Me da ganas de reír, porque el otro día me encontré yo con el dueño de una Joyería y me dijo: "¿Tu sabes que dicen que me diste 10,000 pesos ...?" Yo le dije: "Empiézamelos a pagar, porque de verdad que me hacen gran falta....

Yo sí tengo riquezas... pero no son esas. La riqueza mía es saber que nosotros tenemos una organización, en toda el área del Caribe que está velando por la seguridad de esos países y más de un Presidente nos debe la vida a nosotros.

La riqueza mía es saber que nosotros tenemos una pequeña "Granja Modelo" donde se están formando hombres para el futuro y, a partir del mes que viene, empezarán a venir indios latinoamericanos a recibir formación para cambiar el medio ambiente en que ellos se están desarrollando.

La riqueza mía es saber que hay diez muchachos, en distintas universidades, preparándose en campos en que, hasta ahora, Cuba no tenía técnicos y los tendrá en el futuro.

La riqueza mía es saber que las viudas y los familiares de los presos nuestros no están abandonados ni van a pasar hambre.

La riqueza mía está en saber que, dentro de Cuba, se recibe la ayuda del Movimiento... y eso nos cuesta mucha sangre.

Quizá la única riqueza que yo le deje a mi hija sea el nombre mío, limpio... porque, por desgracia, ni siquiera un seguro de vida me quieren hacer las compañías aseguradoras. ¡Será lo único que, por tristeza, le pueda dejar yo a mi familia! Y como sí lo cuido, y eso sí lo cuidaré hasta sus últimas consecuencias...

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor Artime, todo proceso revolucionario produce siempre nuevas figuras. Y el mensaje de la revolución democrática cubana entraña un gran anhelo, que sólo puede llevarse adelante con figuras, como usted acaba de decir hace unos momentos, de promociones limpias y sin compromisos pasados.

¿Serán estas figuras, que emergen de este proceso, las que lleven a Cuba liberada el noble mensaje de estos años de sacrificio, de dolor, para darnos una patria mejor que la que teníamos? ¿Tiene usted fé en la fuerza espiritual de su generación? ¿Es usted eminentemente revolucionario, Doctor?

ARTIME: Yo me considero revolucionario, Norman, porque yo quiero revocar todas las medidas demagógicas y desastrozas que se han implantado en mi Patria. Yo quiero acabar con el paredón; yo quiero acabar con la abolición de la propiedad privada; yo quiero acabar con la discriminación de los hombres que hoy, más violentamente que nunca, se está estableciendo en mi Patria; yo quiero acabar con la oligarquía que disfruta de las riquezas de mi Patria, mientras el pueblo se muere de hambre.

Yo tengo fé en mi generación, Norman. Pero mi generación no es de edad; mi generación es histórica. La generación mía es la de todos los hombres limpios de todos los gobiernos, de todas las edades, de todas las clases sociales y de todos los colores de piel que han pasado por la Historia de Cuba. Hombres que, dentro de sus posiciones, han querido una Cuba mejor que la que siempre tuvimos... Yo en esa generación histórica creo, Norman... tengo fe en ella y creo que el pueblo de Cuba tiene suficiente reserva moral como para obviar todas las dificultades.

Yo creo que nosotros tenemos que lograr la unidad. La unidad de la base, la unidad de la masa, que se acaben ya las pugnas tontas... Vamos a olvidarnos de Presidencias de Repúblicas y vamos a, olvidarnos de Generelaturas.... vamos a acabar con todos los individuos que están concretamente por una ambición personal.

Que se unan las masas a espaldas de los líderes... Que los líderes se tendrán que unir si se unen las masas... Vamos a lograr esa unidad necesaria.

Yo quisiera ver, por ejemplo, obras como las de los Municipios Cubanos. Una obra que no es política, una obra que se da ayuda mutua, una obra que para lograr la unidad de nuestra Patria en pequeños sectores... Obras como esa, apolíticas; unidades como esta, que son unidades de bases, mientras no tengan el control político de nadie... Yo creo que eso es fundamental para el futuro de los que se están lanzando por el camino de la guerra.

Y porque mi organización está constituida por hombres de todas las procedencias, por hombres de todas las edades y por hombres de todas las clases sociales, nosotros tenemos fuerza moral para lanzar un mensaje de esperanza al futuro de Cuba.

Y yo creo que sí, Norman; yo creo que hay una generación histórica que tiene la responsabilidad moral de esta liberación; y tengo fe en esa generación histórica.

NORMAN DIAZ: Lo felicito, Doctor, porque ese es el pensamiento mío.

GANDERO: Ricardo Nuñez, una pregunta rápida y una explicación rápida...

NUÑEZ: Doctor Artime...

¿Qué nos puede decir usted sobre este reciente proceso de Costa Rica, que ha sido tan importante para toda Latino América. Cual es su opinión sobre este proceso y sobre los factores que llevaron a la victoria al ya Presidente Trejos?

ARTIME: En primer lugar, yo creo que es un resultado de la Tri-Continental. Era tal el miedo, que la sospecha de que un candidato pudiera tener contacto con el Comunismo - la sospecha, porque me consta que no había tal pacto - fué suficiente para liquidar a un hombre. Pero, además, se debatió un punto muy importante. Se debatió el control total de la economía por el Estado ó se debatió la libre empresa con proyección social. Eso fué lo que se debatió en realidad en Costa Rica. y el pueblo dió el voto; y el voto del pueblo costaricense es un resumen de lo que es la opinión pública latino-americana en estos momentos.

Yo creo que el momento histórico de los extremismos, tanto de derecha como de izquierda, ya pasó.. Y yo creo que el voto, en definitiva, fué dado en San José de Costa Rica.

GANDERO: Una última pregunta rápida, creo que quedan unos segundos...

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Doctor, realmente usted considera que la pauta trazada en las elecciones efectuadas en estos momentos, en Costa Rica, va a ser decisiva en el resto de Centro y Sur América?

ARTIME: Yo sí lo creo. Yo creo que el que quiera salir por elección popular tiene que analizar, muy detenidamente, el resultado de las elecciones de Costa Rica. Yo lo creo honestamente. Y yo quiero felicitar al Señor Presidente de Costa Rica porque ha mantenido la dignidad de ser el hombre que está en el poder y garantizar unas elecciones libres y garantizar la entrega del poder. Es un hombre a quien nosotros los cubanos debemos mucho y es un hombre -el Presidente Orlich- que merece el máximo de respeto.

Yo quisiera utilizar este medio para mandar un mensaje a él. No llega, porque se queda en Miami, pero alguien se lo dirá, dandole las gracias a él, en nombre de todos los cubanos que luchamos por la independencia de nuestra Patria.

GANDERO: Muchísimas gracias, Doctor Manuel Artime, por su comparecencia aquí esta mañana y quiero agradecerle también al buen amigo y compañero Norman Díaz y a Ricardo Nuñez, de servir de Panelistas en este domingo.

Así es que quedan invitados para el próximo domingo, a las 10:30 de la mañana, como de costumbre.

Les deseo atodos muy buenos días.

DR. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA



S E C R E T

FROM: [redacted]

DD-1820

AGENT: [redacted]

31 March 1966

VIA: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Statements made by Manuel ARTIME Buesa which were broadcast to Cuba

SOURCE: Edgar SOPO Barreto

REF: DD-1810, paragraphs 2 and 3

1. The following information was obtained by P-112 at 4:30 p.m. on 30 March 1966 at Station WMIE during a conversation with Edgar/SOPO Barreto, propaganda chief of the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MRR).

2. The statements of Manuel ARTIME Buesa, which were mentioned in DD-1810 and which were to be broadcast on 19 March 1966 over the radio programs, "Newspaper of the Air" and "Panamerican News", were not given by ARTIME to the directors of these programs to be broadcast. ARTIME decided not to do so after consulting with the Executive Committee of the MRR. (See DD-1815 which covers the radio broadcasts of the above-mentioned programs on 17, 18, and 19 March in which no mention is made of ARTIME's statements.)

3. ARTIME's statements were broadcast four time over Station WRUL and Radio Americas. According to SOPO the taping of the statements by ARTIME lasted eight minutes.

4. According to SOPO, the reason ARTIME's statements were not broadcast on "Newspaper of the Air" was that Juan AMADOR Rodriguez, the director of the program, had been attacking the members of the Armed Forces of CASTRO in his comments on the program, whereas ARTIME's statements were precisely directed to the Rebel Army.

5. SOPO also said that the statements were not given to Norman DIAZ Artiles -

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Statements of Manuel ARTIME Buesa, etc. (cont.)

for broadcasting because the language of the statements was "leftist", maintaing the thesis of the "revolution betrayed" and "Fidelism without Fidel" and defending the revolution of the Sierra Maestra, the revolutionary laws, and Agrarian Reform.

6. According to SOPO, the statements made by ARTIME were directed especially to Cuba and to those who are connected with the CASTRO regime, whereas the exiles were not ready to assimilate the advanced ideas which ARTIME set forth in his statements. It was for this reason, said SOPO, that during a meeting with ARTIME he was advised not to make his statements public to the exiles, for the leftist language would fall like a bomb and would not fit in with the idea that the exiles had of ARTIME as a centrist or a moderate.

NOTE FROM SE:

Attachment No. 1 of DD-1815 carried the statements made by ARTIME as published by Tridente in March, with reference to the CUBELA affair.

Attached to this report is a copy of an article reporting the appearance of ARTIME on the program "Panamericana" on TV Channel 10 on 13 February 1966. This article appeared in Tridente in February 1966.

Comparecencia del Doctor MANUEL ARTIME en el Programa "Pan Americana", Transmitido por el Canal 10-TV de Miami, Florida, el dia 13 de Febrero de 1966.

GANDERO: Muy buenos días, amables televidentes.

Tenemos hoy, ante nuestras cámaras, a un anti-Castrista muy conocido por ustedes. Pese a su juventud, ha sido actor de grandes acontecimientos en la lucha contra el dictador de Cuba. Me refiero al Doctor Manuel Artime Buesa, a quien el destierro quiere oir porque tiene muchas declaraciones importantísimas que hacer y, por lo tanto, no vamos a hacerle una larga presentación, sino hacer ésta lo más breve posible. No hace falta presentar al Doctor Manuel Artime Buesa..... Así que voy a presentarles el Panel de esta mañana que se compone del conocido Periodista y Gran Comentarista de Miami, Norman Díaz, quien dirige el Periódico "Pan-Americano", y a Ricardo Nuñez, también muy conocido de ustedes y que escribe en dos diarios aquí en esta ciudad.

Así que, cedo la palabra a Norman Díaz, para la primera pregunta.....

NORMAN DIAZ: Muchas gracias, compañero Gandero.

Doctor Manuel Artime, su presencia en este programa tiene un doble interés, en lo que representa su opinión y el hecho de ser usted uno de los cubanos combatientes que más cauteloso ha sido en el uso de los vehiculos de propaganda; al grado que a nosotros, los Periodistas, se nos ha hecho a veces difícil conseguir oportunidad para entrevistarlo.

Pero hay algo más significativo, Doctor Artime. En cada ocasión que usted se ha presentado en público es debido a acontecimientos que, indudablemente, tuvieron apariencia de ser decisivos en la lucha contra los comunistas. Tenemos que agregar a esto que, casi siempre, usted dijo lo que resultó después una amarga verdad... Que la lucha iba a resultar "larga, dura y penosa..."


DR. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

En esta oportunidad, Doctor Artime, y ante sucesos tan espectaculares como los presentes, también cree usted que ahora la liberación es un problema que está lejos de resolverse?

ARTIME: Bien, Norman, creo que ahí hay varias cosas que contestar...

En primer lugar, las pocas veces que yo he hecho uso de los canales de publicidad. En realidad -por desgracia- el tipo de labor a que estamos dedicados nosotros, nos impide muchas veces dar pautas para entrevistas periodísticas, porque ustedes los Periodistas preguntan demasiado y uno muchas veces, queriendo infundir ánimo o queriendo contestar realmente a la pregunta que se hace, comete indiscreciones que, a la larga, redundan en perjuicio de la Patria.

En el cuento del famoso monito de la selva, que estaba haciendo ejercicios... Pasó una jirafa y le preguntó: "Monito, que estás haciendo?..." "Estoy haciendo ejercicios para ponerme fuerte y darle un golpe de estado al león y tumbarlo"... Al poco rato, pasa un rinoceronte... "Monito, que tú estás haciendo?"...dice, "¡Yo, aquí, haciendo ejercicios para ponerme fuerte y tumbar al león..." Le llegaron los comentarios al león y pasó el león y le dijo: "Monito, que es lo que tu estas haciendo?"... [illegible] el-

"Mira, haciendo ejercicios y hablando más bavera que el diablo..."

(Se escucha un murmullo de risas)

Yo no quiero, yo no quiero hacer el papel del mesías. Efectivamente, yo dije que la guerra iba a ser muy larga y muy dura... que iba a ser muy cruel. Sé que, con esto, no me gané simpatías: yo lo acepto, mi función no es de ganarme simpatías, mi función es dedicarme por entero a la labor de liberación de mi Patria. Y esa labor de liberación de mi Patria exige que cuando haya que decir una cosa dura se diga esa cosa dura, aunque no sea simpático.

Yo creo hoy que la liberación de Cuba está cerca... Y creo que la liberación de Cuba estaba distante, hoy digo que estoy completamente convencido que la liberación de nuestra Patria se acerca...

NORMAN DIAZ:.... Exponga las razones Comandante...

ARTIME: Varias razones... Primera razón, el estado interno de Cuba. No sólo el estado de desesperación de un pueblo que con la burla de que el que quiera salir podría salir, llenaron sus planillas y hoy se ven discriminados y en la miseria, sabiendo que a lo mejor van a demorar tres años en salir por la vía de salida que les ha ofrecido el Dictador.

Por el estado de las Fuerzas Armadas: de estado no sólo de desmoralización sino de división y de conspiración de las Fuerzas Armadas. Y no solamente los que están conspirando con una idea occidentalista, sino los que están conspirando con una línea china que existe dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas, que fué inaugurada por el desaparecido Che Guevara... Y por último, por la Tricontinental, mi querido Norman.

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Existe o existía?

ARTIME: Existe, existe.

NORMAN DIAZ: Al desaparecer el Ché Guevara de las filas del Ejército Rebelde de Cuba, no desapareció la línea china?

ARTIME: El Comunismo nunca pone todas las esperanzas en un solo hombre, sino en organizaciones que crea. Y el Comunismo-Chino no es una excepción.

NUÑEZ: Comandante, esta res-respuesta que usted le ha dado al colega Norman Diaz me plantea una duda que yo quisiera que usted me la esclareciera. La duda consiste en lo siguiente: Usted detuvo los ataques comandos que se realizaban. Cuando usted detuvo estos ataques comandos, ¿se debió a que eran inefectivos o estos ataques comandos usted los detuvo porque encajaban dentro del plan de liquidación del régimen de Fidel Castro, o sea, dentro de la estrategia occidental?

ARTIME: Ricardo, en realidad, nosotros estamos dentro de una estrategia en la cual no solamente estamos nosotros sino que creo que está Occidente entero empeñado en ella.

En el momento en que nosotros hicimos ataques comandos, lo que había que hacer eran ataques comandos. La gente decía, "¿pero, con ataques comandos ustedes van a tumbar a Fidel Castro?" ¡No!, con ataques comandos no vamos a tumbar a Fidel Castro; pero, con ataques comandos Fidel Castro tuvo que sacar, de las filas de la producción, cuatrocientos mil hombre para cuidar las costas de Cuba. Y la crisis económica violentísima que tiene hoy Fidel Castro, se debe, en parte, a aquellos ataques comandos que paralizaron en gran porcentaje, la producción cubana.

Ahora bien, en estos momentos [illegible] porque creo que las labores más indispensables que nosotros [illegible]. No estoy condenando los ataques comandos: todo lo contrario. Yo creo que cualquier esfuerzo contra Fidel Castro es un esfuerzo bueno. Quiero decir que nosotros, concretamente, nosotros tenemos cosas más importantes que hacer que ataques comandos. ¿Quiere decir que ya nosotros no volveremos a la etapa de la guerra? ¡No! no quiere decirlo tampoco... Van a seguir sonando las balas. Y van a seguir sonando las balas, pero de una manera distinta.

Unas balas con objetivos concretos: unas balas que están detrás de un plan previamente trazado. En aquel momento, la estrategia correcta eran los ataques comandos. En estos momentos no quiere decir que sean malos. ¡No! son buenos los ataques comandos; pero creemos que nosotros nos podemos dedicar a labores que sólo nosotros podemos realizar para incluir a Cuba dentro de un plan latino-americano que ha venido a concretarse en la agresión de la Tri-Continental.

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor, yo quisiera que usted me concluyera una pregunta, a modo de esclarecimiento. Yo le pregunté que Ernesto Guevara, alias el Ché, que representaba la línea china dentro del Ejército, al desaparecer, todavía continuaba habiendo pués rezagos en las filas del Ejercito de Cuba, de la tendencia pro-

PAN
AMERICANA

ALBERTO GANDERO



China.

¿Usted considera que Guevara fué "separado del cargo" o "liquidado físicamente"?

ARTIME: Guevara fué liquidado porque era el hombre de China para eliminar a Fidel Castro concretamente...

Lo dijimos ya una vez en un programa radial, cuando se anunció el canje. Dijimos que había una violenta pugna y que Ché Guevara era el precio que Rusia había exigido para seguir relaciones con Fidel Castro. La pugna comenzó cuando se llevó a Marcos Rodríguez al juicio... quien fué al juicio aquel es la vieja guardia y quien llevó a Marcos Rodríguez ante el juicio, es precisamente la tendencia pro-China.

NORMAN DIAZ: Vamos a esclarecerle a los oyentes, Doctor Artime, quien es Marcos Rodríguez.

ARTIME: El famoso comunista que fué juzgado y, según dicen, condenado a muerte por haber "delatado" el lugar donde se escondían los estudiantes fusilados durante la época de Batista.

Fueron condenados, en realidad, en aquel juicio toda la "Vieja Guardia", que sabía la historia de Marcos Rodríguez y había apañado a Marcos, en aquella oportunidad.

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Quien fué quien lo condenó?

ARTIME: Quien lo condenó fue, la línea china... y todos los dirigidores e íntimos amigos del Ché Guevara. Fidel Castro sirvió de intermediario, al final, para que la censura recayese sólo en la figura de Marcos Rodríguez y no en la figura de la "Vieja Guardia".

NUÑEZ: Comandante Artime, ¿qué resultados cree usted que se produzcan de la Conferencia Tricontinental que se acaba de celebrar en Cuba?

ARTIME: Desde 1935, en que Dimitrov lanzó -en el Congreso del Komintern- la tesis de los "frentes populares", no se había producido un impacto de estrategia tan violento como el que se ha producido con la Tri-Continental. La Tri-Continental ha puesto a los países latinoamericanos- y yo vengo de Latino América ahora exactamente- y a los gobiernos latinoamericanos en la disyuntiva de una declaración de guerra.

Y así lo han reconocido grandes personajes de Latino-América; entre ellos, Lleras Camargo de Colombia. Sus resultados han influído, inclusive, en las elecciones de Costa Rica.

NORMAN DIAZ

En estos momentos, Latino-América es completamente consciente que se encuentra en guerra con Cuba. Esta es una jugada rusa... es una jugada rusa para quitarle el control de los comunistas "cabezas calientes" de Latinoamérica a China de la mano. ¿Y a quién utiliza? ¡Utiliza al peón que puede quemar! ¡Utiliza a Fidel Castro.!

¿Quiere decir que Rusia va, hasta sus últimas consecuencias con esta tesis que ha avanzado en la Tri-Continental? Me luce que no. Me luce que Rusia se está guardando las espaldas. Y prueba de ello es que líderes francamente pro-soviéticos -como Mora Valverde de Costa Rica, Prestes de Brasil y como Lombardo Toledano de México- no asistieron a la Tricontinental, ni se comprometieron con la Tri-Continental.

Moscú está preparándose para otra etapa que no es la de la Tricontinental; pero necesita la Tri-Continental para arrebatarle los partidos comunistas jóvenes a China de la mano y necesita para socavar la retaguardia de los Estados Unidos de Norte América.

Nosotros tenemos las primeras consignas que han llegado a Latino América, de la Tri-Continental. Las primeras consignas fueron, en primer lugar, intensificación de la campaña de paz; denuncia del imperialismo norteamericano, tanto en su aspecto militar como económico, fundamentalmente en Viet-Nam, tratando de llevar esta campaña de paz a un "boycot" a los buques de cualquier país que lleven ropa o armas o tropas o alimentos a Viet-Nam.

Segunda consigna: Penetración de los partidos de izquierda, para hacer que estos partidos de izquierda adopten posiciones radicales que hagan juego con el Comunismo.

Tercera consigna: Cambio de la palabra "Comunismo" por la palabra "Socialismo"... porque se han dado cuenta que la palabra "Comunismo" inspira asco ya hasta en las zonas sub-desarrolladas.

Incremento de las revoluciones y de la subversión en cada uno de los países. Y, en esto, los comunistas jóvenes [illegible] que caen en manos de Moscú, si quieren recibir alguna ayuda para sus planes subversivos. La van a recibir, pero tendrán que comprometerse con la línea moscovita.

Y, por último, campaña contra el imperialismo, en los dos aspectos, militar y económico dentro de Latino América. Incrementación de las revueltas en Santo Domingo, para tomar a Santo Domingo como una espina irritativa constante que de base a esta campaña.

Todos los paises latinoamericanos son conscientes de esto. Todos los paises latinoamericanos! Y hay paises latinoamericanos que no pueden darse el lujo de continuar la estabilidad de su pais con la presencia de un Fidel Castro en Cuba.

La O.E.A. está en una disyuntiva; o toma la decisión para la cual fué creada, o sencilla y llanamente, la O.E.A. perderá su vigencia en Latino América.

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor Artime, en los rotativos internacionales, como en los hilos cablegráficos también internacionales, se ha destacado extraordinariamente la crisis Castro Pekín. ¿Ese hecho puede beneficiar a Castro o, de lo contrario, ¿cree usted que le hará daño suficiente como para contribuir a su derrocamiento?

ARTIME: La línea china, en estos momentos, ya está ocasionándole grandes dificultades a Fidel Castro. Raúl Castro está reunido, hace tres días, con su Estado Mayor y con la Jefatura Suprema de los Cuerpos Represivos para una purga que se avecina en estos días próximos.

Como usted comprenderá, el señor Embajador Chino, que reparte la propaganda, no va a ir campamento por campamento repartiendo la propaganda china. Había vehículos, dentro de esos campamentos, que hacían circular esa propaganda; y hay hombres, dentro de los campamentos militares de Cuba, que son fanáticos de la línea china. El Che Guevara fué eliminado porque el Ché Guevara era la cabeza visible de aquello; pero queda la organización y está vigente y será- en los próximos días- la primera de la serie de purgas que amenaza al Ejército Rebelde Cubano...

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor, yo vuelvo a insistir otra vez... "Eliminado" ¿en que sentido? ¿Separado de las filas del Ejército o eliminado...?

ARTIME: Eliminado físicamente.

NORMAN DIAZ: ...físicamente. Gracias.

ARTIME: ...El Comunismo los grandes fallos no los perdona con separación del cargo...

NORMAN DIAZ: Gracias Doctor.

NUÑEZ: Doctor Artime, usted sabe que los comunistas -como regla general- utilizan una serie de medidas para difamar y una serie de rumores para difamar a los dirigentes que se enfrentan contra ellos con éxito.

...Con respecto a esto, me viene a la memoria una anécdota de un Profesor mejicano, que era profesor Universitario, que era destacado anticomunista. Y, a este Profesor, los comunistas empezaron a decir que él había aumentado y se había superado en su carrera debido a que su hermana mantenía relaciones con un influyente personaje. Tiempo después, este señor fué a un programa de Radio y un Periodista, no pudiendo contenerse ante esos rumores que existían, le preguntó "Oígame, existen rumores Profesor, de que su hermana ..." Dice el hombre... "pues mire, yo soy el primer sorprendido, porque yo soy hijo único, yo no tengo hermanas"... o sea, yo quisiera que usted me dijera a qué atribuye usted, Comandante Artime, el hecho de que Fidel Castro lo haya tomado como centro de los ataques a los exilados, inclusive llegando a atribuirle riquezas personales y acusaciones de otros tipos?

ARTIME: Esas campañas hace tiempo que yo las conozco... la célebre campaña del restaurant que yo tengo, de los cuatro supermarkets; creo que también di dinero para una joyería, vivo en un palacio, que es mío... Esto es viejo...

Cuando yo dije que Fidel Castro era un traidor, muchos creían en Fidel Castro. La primera acusación que me lanzaron por la espalda fué la de "ladrón de los fondos del INRA"... Ya estoy acostumbrado a esto, es decir, el pueblo de Cuba no cree en nada. ¡Eso es lo que me interesa! Los gobiernos que me ayudan a mí en Latino América, ¿lo creen? No son tontos... no son tontos, ellos no se dejan llevar por campañas; ellos sí saben la verdad. Y saben que todo esto es mentira.

Hay un [illegible] que se está representando en Europa, que es ge-

RICARDO NUÑEZ





PANEL

nial. Se llama "La Hoguera Feliz". Ponen a Juana de Arco en la actualidad y, por supuesto, Juana de Arco llevada por su espiritualismo combate contra el Comunismo.

Se reúne la Dirección del Partido Comunista Francés y toman una línea contra Juana de Arco... ¿Quemarla? ¡No!, porque se crea un mártir... ¡INFAMARLA! Y empiezan a decir que Juana de Arco lleva una vida libre, que Juana de Arco se ha entregado a las drogas, que Juana de Arco vive con los Capitanes de su Ejército... y el drama termina cuando Juana de Arco, llorando, le suplica a los comunistas ¡que la quemen! Y el Dirigente del Partido Comunista le dice: ¡NO!, ya tú estás quemada hace rato......

Esa es una vieja campaña... que puede circular dentro de ciertos límites, pero, después de esos límites, ya no circula.

Me da ganas de reír, porque el otro día me encontré yo con el dueño de una Joyería y me dijo: "¿Tú sabes que dicen que me diste 10,000 pesos ...?" Yo le dije: "Empiézamelos a pagar, porque de verdad que me hacen gran falta....

Yo sí tengo riquezas... pero no son esas. La riqueza mía es saber que nosotros tenemos una organización, en toda el área del Caribe que está velando por la seguridad de esos países y más de un Presidente nos debe la vida a nosotros.

La riqueza mía es saber que nosotros tenemos una pequeña "Granja Modelo" donde se están formando hombres para el futuro y, a partir del mes que viene, empezarán a venir indios latinoamericanos a recibir formación para cambiar el medio ambiente en que ellos se están desarrollando.

La riqueza mía es saber que hay diez muchachos, en distintas universidades, preparándose en campos en que, hasta ahora, Cuba no tenía técnicos y los tendrá en el futuro.

La riqueza mía es saber que las viudas y los familiares de los presos nuestros no están abandonados ni van a pasar hambre.

La riqueza mía está en saber que, dentro de Cuba, se recibe la ayuda del Movimiento... y eso nos cuesta mucha sangre.

Quizá la única riqueza que yo le deje a mi hija sea el nombre mío, limpio... porque, por desgracia, ni siquiera un seguro de vida me quieren hacer las compañías aseguradoras. ¡Será lo único que, por tristeza, le pueda dejar yo a mi familia! Y eso sí lo cuido, y eso sí lo cuidaré hasta sus últimas consecuencias...

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor Artime, todo proceso revolucionario produce siempre nuevas figuras. Y el mensaje de la revolución democrática cubana entraña un gran anhelo, que sólo puede llevarse adelante con figuras, como usted acaba de decir hace unos momentos, de promociones limpias y sin compromisos pasados.

¿Serán estas figuras, que emergen de este proceso, las que lleven a Cuba liberada el noble mensaje de estos años de sacrificio, de dolor, para darnos una patria mejor que la que teníamos? ¿Tiene usted fé en la fuerza espiritual de su generación? ¿Es usted eminentemente revolucionario, Doctor?

ARTIME: Yo me considero revolucionario, Norman, porque yo quiero revocar todas las medidas demagógicas y desastrosas que se han implantado en mi Patria. Yo quiero acabar con el paredón; yo quiero acabar con la abolición de la propiedad privada; yo quiero acabar con la discriminación de los hombres que hoy, más violentamente que nunca, se está estableciendo en mi Patria; yo quiero acabar con la oligarquía que disfruta de las riquezas de mi Patria, mientras el pueblo se muere de hambre.

Yo tengo fé en mi generación, Norman. Pero mi generación no es de edad; mi generación es histórica. La generación mía es la de todos los hombres limpios de todos los gobiernos, de todas las edades, de todas las clases sociales y de todos los colores de piel que han pasado por la Historia de Cuba. Hombres que, dentro de sus posiciones, han querido una Cuba mejor que la que siempre tuvimos... Yo en esa generación histórica creo, Norman... tengo fe en ella y creo que el pueblo de Cuba tiene suficiente reserva moral como para obviar todas las dificultades.

Yo creo que nosotros tenemos que lograr la unidad. La unidad de la base, la unidad de la masa, que se acaben ya las pugnas tontas... Vamos a olvidarnos de Presidencias de Repúblicas y vamos a olvidarnos de Generalaturas... vamos a acabar con todos los individuos que están concretamente por una ambición personal.

Que se unan las masas a espaldas de los líderes... Que los líderes se tendrán que unir si se unen las masas... Vamos a lograr esa unidad necesaria.

Yo quisiera ver, por ejemplo, obras como las de los Municipios Cubanos. Una obra que no es política, una obra que es de ayuda mutua, una obra que para lograr la unidad de nuestra Patria en pequeños [illegible]... Obras como esa, apolíticas; unidades como esta, que son unidades de bases, mientras no tengan el control político de nadie... Yo creo que es [illegible] fundamental para el futuro de los que se están lanzando por el camino de la guerra.

Y porque esa organización está constituida por hombres de todas las procedencias, por hombres de todas las edades y por hombres de todas las clases sociales, nosotros tenemos fuerza moral para lanzar un mensaje de esperanza al futuro de Cuba.

Y yo creo que sí, Norman; yo creo que hay una generación histórica que tiene la responsabilidad moral de esta liberación; y tengo fe en esa generación histórica.

NORMAN DIAZ: Lo felicito, Doctor, porque ese es el pensamiento mio.

GANDERO: Ricardo Nuñez, una pregunta rápida y una explicación rápida...

NUÑEZ: Doctor Artime...

¿Qué nos puede decir usted sobre este reciente proceso de Costa Rica, que ha sido tan importante para toda Latino América. Cual es su opinión sobre este proceso y sobre los factores que llevaron a la victoria alya Presidente Trejos?

ARTIME: En primer lugar, yo creo que es un resultado de la Tri-Continental. Era tal el miedo, que la sospecha de que un candidato pudiera tener contacto con el Comunismo - la sospecha, porque me consta que no había tal pacto - fue suficiente para liquidar a un hombre. Pero, además, se debatió un punto muy importante. Se debatió el control total de la economía por el Estado ó se debatió la libre empresa con proyección social. Eso fué lo que se debatió en realidad en Costa Rica. y el pueblo dió el voto; y el voto del pueblo costarricense es un resumen de lo que es la opinión pública latino-americana en estos momentos.

Yo creo que el momento histórico de los extremismos, tanto de derecha como de izquierda, ya pasó.. Y yo creo que el voto, en definitiva, fué dado en San José de Costa Rica.

GANDERO: Una última pregunta rápida, creo que quedan unos segundos...

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Doctor, realmente usted considera que la pauta trazada en las elecciones efectuadas en estos momentos, en Costa Rica, va a ser decisiva en el resto de Centro y Sur América?

ARTIME: Yo sí lo creo. Yo creo que el que quiera salir por elección popular tiene que analizar, muy detenidamente, el resultado de las elecciones de Costa Rica. Yo lo creo honestamente. Y yo quiero felicitar al Señor Presidente de Costa Rica porque ha mantenido la dignidad de ser el hombre que está en el poder y garantizar unas elecciones libres y garantizar la entrega del poder. Es un hombre a quien nosotros los cubanos debemos mucho y es un hombre -el Presidente Orlich- que merece el máximo de respeto.

Yo quisiera utilizar este medio para mandar un mensaje a él. No llega, porque se queda en Miami, pero alguien se lo dirá, dándole las gracias a él, en nombre de todos los cubanos que luchamos por la independencia de nuestra Patria.

GANDERO: Muchísimas gracias, Doctor Manuel Artime, por su comparecencia aquí esta mañana y quiero agradecerle también al buen amigo y compañero Norman Diaz y a Ricardo Nuñez, de servir de Panelistas en este domingo.

Así es que quedan invitados para el próximo domingo, a las 10:30 de la mañana, como de costumbre.

Les deseo atodos muy buenos días.

DR. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA



DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, San Jose

INFO: Chief, WH Division; Chief of Station, Panama

FROM: Chief of Station, Managua

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1 Report on Internal PLN Maneuverings; Possible Plans to Disrupt Inauguration of President-Elect TREJOS; and Plans for Major Strike in Banana Plantations on Pacific Coast of Costa Rica and Panama

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI or such action as COS, San Jose may wish to take

NOTE: This report is being sent FYI and not in intel format because of the fact that it comes from uncontrolled sources which cannot be checked out by this Station. It is passed along mainly because of the mention of a possible assassination plot in Paragraph 3. We believe any dissemination should be done from Headquarters, if applicable.

1. AMBIDDY-1 arrived in Managua on 22 April 1966 to discuss with Nicaraguan contacts a private business operation involving the publishing of a Central America oriented news magazine. On 25 April 1966, he received by mail the report outlined below and passed it to James D. ZABOTH, his former case officer who is now a Staff Agent for Managua Station. The report was written by Luis ARIZURRIETA, a Cuban member of AMBIDDY-1's organization, who has been working for about a year as a security advisor and member of the personal security guard of Daniel ODUBER. According to AMBIDDY-1, he has been documented as a member of the PLN security detail, has been a trusted aide to ODUBER, and is privy to confidential information from ODUBER and from other PLN officials. ARIZURRIETA returned to Miami on 22 April 1966, where he was located as of 26 April 1966.

continued.....

JDZABOTH:wcg

Distribution:
2 - COS, San Jose
2 - Chief, WHD
2 - COS, Panama City

26 April 1966

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HNMA-3536	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	

2. Contents of this paragraph are based on personal observation and personal contacts with PLN officials by ARIZURRIETA. They constitute his analysis of the current state of affairs within that party.

A. The PLN is now split into two main groups, with "Chico" ORLICH and Daniel ODUBER in a temporary marriage of right and left wings opposing a second group headed by "Pepe" FIGUERES and Father NUÑEZ. The ORLICH-ODUBER group proposes to turn over the government peacefully to President-elect TREJOS, then to operate as a democratic opposition through the National Assembly where they hold the real power and can cooperate with or oppose the President when it is to their advantage. They feel that, in the long run, this will strengthen their party and allow them to win the next elections. They do not want to fight with the SOMOZA's on the grounds that this might unnecessarily force TREJOS and the SOMOZA's closer together.

B. The FIGUERES-NUÑEZ group do not wish to turn the power over to TREJOS under any circumstances. They are trying to stir up trouble as soon as possible, saying the election was won by immoral means and is, therefore, not valid. They say that now is the time to strike before TREJOS and his people get into power and get better organized. They claim to be waiting only for a reasonable pretext to make their move. On 17 April 1966 at FIGUERES' plantation "La Lucha", he met with a group of PLN leaders, mostly loyal to himself, but with a few whom he believed would go along with his plans, and discussed what steps to take. The decision was to make a big publicity campaign through the National Assembly, accusing the SOMOZA's of violating Costa Rican dignity and national integrity by bringing along a large unit of Nicaraguan armed soldiers each time they visit their holdings in Costa Rica. (ARIZURRIETA stated the campaign was actually begun on 19 April 1966. At about that time, Managua Station noted articles in the same vein in the local opposition newspaper, "La Prensa".)

who?

3. ARIZURRIETA says he got the contents of the following sub-paragraphs from a young Costa Rican who worked at one of the AMWORLD training bases, was approached by the Communists for recruitment, and has been handled since as a penetration of the Party by ARIZURRIETA. This individual is unidentified. — for PLN?

A. Classes in subversion and guerrilla warfare are being conducted at training centers in Limon for the Atlantic Coast region, and at Nicoya for the Pacific area. One of their basic texts is a pamphlet titled "Cuba en Marcha" by Francisco GAMBOA. Their objective is to organize a general strike in the banana fields, particularly on the Pacific Coast to include Chiriqui and David in Panama. This strike is planned for about 8 or 9 May 1966 so it will be in progress during the TREJOS inauguration. At the same time, the Party is preparing agitators and student organizers to make demonstrations against the presence of either of the SOMOZA brothers at the ceremony. They are considering two possibilities:

continued.....

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	HMMA-3536

(1) If a big bodyguard accompanies SOMOZA, they will make accusations of violation o. Costa Rican sovereignty and national integrity by an invasion of armed Nicaraguans and try to get demonstrations started that will snowball into uncontrolled riots.

(2) If SOMOZA does not bring a large bodyguard, they will shoot him. (Note: ARIZURRIETA says the Communists claim that FIGUERES is in league with them. They say that after the 17 April 1966 meeting at "La Lucha", he discussed the plans for the strike and student demonstrations with them. When talking about SOMOZA, he was quoted as saying, "Perhaps we need a dead man to help our revolution.")

3. AMBIDDY-1 says the following information has come to him and to ARIZURRIETA from Roberto MADRIZ, described as personal secretary to President ORLICH. MADRIZ says he has heard ORLICH and ODUBER discussing FIGUERES' opposition to TREJOS taking over the Government, and they decided the real reason was that he owes the National Bank several millions that he cannot repay and which were borrowed over the years on the basis of his political prominence without sufficient collateral. FIGUERES feels that if this fact were revealed by an unfriendly government, such as that of TREJOS, he would be finished forever politically.

Michael H. MARTUFFI

SECRET

SAN JOSE

WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

ITC
CI

FILE, VR WH8 CI/OPS CI/IC2, CA2 CA/PROP CA/O4

28 Apr 66 300807

IN 00407

IN 07232
24 Apr 66

S E C R E T 282155Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE SJOS 8564

TYPIC PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 97358

1. NO STATION TRACES ON NIEVES OR BORGES THUS WE SOMEWHAT IN DARK.

2. WHILE IT POSSIBLE THAT FIGUERES MAY BE INVOLVED IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING SHOULD CALDERON ELEMENTS ASSUME PREDOMINANT POSITION IN TREJOS GOVERNMENT, STATION HAS HAD NO INDICATION THAT FIGUERES HAS EITHER FUNDS OR INCLINATION TO IMPORT AN AGIT PROP MISSION. PLN SOURCES CONTINUE TO STATE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO MOVE IF CALDERONISTAS RETURN TO POWER POSITION WITH ENSUING POLICE BRUTALITIES AND OTHER EXTRA LEGAL ACTIONS THEY REPORTEDLY USED IN 1940'S. GIVEN PRESENT SITUATION THIS DANGER SOMEWHAT FARFETCHED ALTHOUGH IT POSSIBLE THAT FIGUERES MAY BE THINKING OF CREATING INCIDENTS SAY CIRCA OCTOBER 1966 WHEN TRUE COMPLEXION OF NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE MORE EVIDENT.

⑤

3. IN 15 APRIL MEETING WITH COS, FIGUERES SEEMED

SECRET

TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN CONTINUING POLITICAL PRESSURE (WITH PBSWING ASSISTANCE IF POSSIBLE) ON TREJOS TO KEEP CALDERONISTAS OUT OF KEY PUBLIC SECURITY POSITIONS THAN ANY MACHAVELLIAN SCHEME TO CREATE A CLIMATE FOR OVERTHROW OF TREJOS GOVERNMENT. (NOTE: WE ASSUME AMBIDDY-1'S SOURCE DID NOT MEAN PRESENT ORLICH GOVERNMENT WHICH TURNS OVER POWER ON 8 MAY.)

SECRET

CFN: 8564 97358 1 NO STATION NIEVES BORGES 2 FIGUERES TREJOS NO INDICATION PLN CALDERONISTAS 1940'S 1966 3 15 COS A AMBIDDY-1' NOT MEAN ORLICH 8

BT

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG: R.P. [illegible]EY:JCK
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: R. 1271
DATE: 19 APRIL 1966

SECRET

X [illegible] 201-758521

MOP

TO : JMWAVE INFO: SAN JOSE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE X RID COPY [illegible]

TO WAVE INFO SJOS CITE DIR 97358

TYPIC PBRUMEN

IN 07332 24 april 66

IN 00907 20 april 66

W[illegible] 331 4/22/66

1. HQS RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM AMBIDDY 1 ON 18 APRIL DURING WHICH HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INFO FROM FREYDUC BORGES THAT LUCIANO NIEVES BEING SUPPORTED BY JOSE FIGUERES IN MIAMI AND FIGUERES HAS REQUESTED NIEVES AND ANOTHER CUBAN BY NICKNAME "YOYI" TO COME COSTA RICA ON AGITPROP MISSION TO CREATE CLIMATE FOR OVERTHROW PRESENT REGIME. AMBIDDY 1 CLAIMS NIEVES LIVING WELL IN MIAMI WITH NO VISIBLE MEANS SUPPORT. HQS UNDER IMPRESSION HE IMPOVERISHED AND LIVING HAND TO MOUTH.

2. ALTHOUGH CONSIDER AMBIDDY 1'S REPORT RATHER WILD RUMOR WOULD APPRECIATE WAVE AND SJOS COMMENTS AND CURRENT READING NIEVES ACTIVITIES.

(4)

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/COMMENT: AMBIDDY 1 reported the above information by telephone.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 59

☐ RESTRICT ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : E.T. MAHONEY:ck
UNIT : WH/C/FI/TC
EXT : R. 1271
DATE : 19 APRIL 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-788521

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	MCP-[illegible]	5	RID
2		6	[illegible]
3	CI	7	[illegible]
4	TC	8	[illegible]

TO : JMWAVE INFO: SAN JOSE

ES AMBIDDY-1

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR . FILE ☒ RID COPY WH 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CA/PROP, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, C/OA

TO WAVE INFO SJOS CITE DIR 97358

TYPIC PBRUMEN

1. HQS RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM AMBIDDY 1 ON 18 APRIL DURING WHICH HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INFO FROM FFSYDUC BORGES THAT LUCIANO NIEVES BEING SUPPORTED BY JOSE FIGUERES IN MIAMI AND FIGUERES HAS REQUESTED NIEVES AND ANOTHER CUBAN BY NICKNAME "YOYI" TO COME COSTA RICA ON AGITPROP MISSION TO CREATE CLIMATE FOR OVERTHROW PRESENT REGIME. AMBIDDY 1 CLAIMS NIEVES LIVING WELL IN MIAMI WITH NO VISIBLE MEANS SUPPORT. HQS UNDER IMPRESSION HE IMPOVERISHED AND LIVING HAND TO MOUTH.

2. ALTHOUGH CONSIDER AMBIDDY 1'S REPORT RATHER WILD RUMOR WOULD APPRECIATE WAVE AND SJOS COMMENTS AND CURRENT READING NIEVES ACTIVITIES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/COMMENT: AMBIDDY-1 reported the above information by telephone.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG :
NIT :
XT :
ATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

PAGE TWO

ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

INFO CITE DIR 97358

[illegible]

C/WH/C/FI Sean [illegible]

C/WH/C/MHAPRON C. LeMaistre (in draft)

C/WH/C/CA/PM C. Anderson (in draft)

C/WH/C/MO B. Mills (in draft)

C/WH/C/CI J. Vidal (in draft:)

John T. Flynn
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/2 [illegible]

C/WH/2/C.R. R. Edwards

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN T. FLYNN
A/DCWHD/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 57

☐ ..STROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : H.T. MAHONEY:cck
UNIT : WH/C/FI/TC
EXT : 1271
DATE : 19 APRIL 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-768321

/ SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : JMWAVE INFO: SAN JOSE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY WHP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CA/PROP, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI, CI/INT 2, C/FI

TO WAVE INFO SJOS CITE DIR 97358

TYPIC PBRUMEN

1. HQS RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM AMBIDDY 1 ON 18 APRIL DURING WHICH HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INFO FROM FREYDUC BORGES THAT LUCIANO NIEVES BEING SUPPORTED BY JOSE FIGUERES IN MIAMI AND FIGUERES HAS REQUESTED NIEVES AND ANOTHER CUBAN BY NICKNAME "YOYI" TO COME COSTA RICA ON AGITPROP MISSION TO CREATE CLIMATE FOR OVERTHROW PRESENT REGIME. AMBIDDY 1 CLAIMS NIEVES LIVING WELL IN MIAMI WITH NO VISIBLE MEANS SUPPORT. HQS UNDER IMPRESSION HE IMPOVERISHED AND LIVING HAND TO MOUTH.

2. ALTHOUGH CONSIDER AMBIDDY 1'S REPORT RATHER WILD RUMOR WOULD APPRECIATE WAVE AND SJOS COMMENTS AND CURRENT READING NIEVES ACTIVITIES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/COMMENT: AMBIDDY-1 reported the above information by telephone.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

MSG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 97358

[illegible]

C/WH/C/FI Sean Dm

C/WH/C/MHAPRON C. LeMaistre (in draft)

C/WH/C/CA/PM C. Anderson (in draft)

C/WH/C/MO B. Mills (in draft)

C/WH/C/CI J. Vidal (in draft:)

C/WH/2

C/WH/2/C.R. Ph Edwards

COORDINATING OFFICERS

John T. Flynn
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN T. FLYNN
A/DCWHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED   INTERNAL USE ONLY   ☐ CONFIDENTIAL   ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

AMBIDDY-1 file

FROM: [illegible]
GG 2702
X 6578

COPY DETACHED 22apr66

EXTENSION

NO. UFGA - 15729

DATE 18apr66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/C/CA/EW (~~[illegible]~~)			L	
2. WH/C/FI Williamson				
3. WH/C/CICS WH/C/CA/PP	29 Nov 6[illegible]			— AA Anything for us.
4.				W/S/catt 22apr66
5. WH/C/MO				
6.				
7. WH/C/FI		21		disseminated to 7 B1 10 June 66
8. Ray S —				
9.				
10. WH/HONDURAS				CSCI-316/02850-66
11. Carole Ann				7-10 This should be sent Honduras for comments, I think.
12.				
13. WH/2/HD			cf	10 + 11
14.				See me on this pls.
15. WH/C/FI				sent to Station

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE BPV

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational
Transmittal of Letter

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: FYI

1. The Station has received, via William S. WIBALDA, a letter addressed to AMBIDDY-1, JMHOPE Post Office Box.

2. The JMWAVE KURIOT office opened the letter covertly, after which it was passed to the addressee. A copy of the letter is forwarded, under separate cover, for your information.

Arlene W. [illegible]
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment:
Letter u/sc

Distribution:
3-WH/C, w/att u/sc

201-267437

DATE TYPED
14 Apr 66

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 18 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO
19-126-3-16/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-15729

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-126-30/3

PERSONAL

REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS
L 0.20

REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS
L 0.04
CENTAVOS DE LEMPIRA
5

MAR
18
19

CORREO AEREO
VIA AIRMAIL

SR: Manuel Artime
Apartado Postal 1144
Miami 1-Florida
E:U:A



San Pedro Sula, Honduras Centro America.
Marzo 18-1966.-

SR: Manuel Artime
Director Frente Revolucionario Cubano en el Exilio.
Miami Florida E:U:A.-

Van estas lineas para desearle toda clase de ventura personal y al mismo tiempo exitos en el Honrrozo cargo que esta depositado en sus manos, para destruir definitivamente de Cuba al sanguinario Gobierno Comunista de Fidel Castro.-

A continuacion quiero manifestarle lo siguiente: En esta Ciudad de San Pedro Sula vive una familia de Idiologia Marxista, ademas mandaron a un Hijo de ellos a prestar sus servicios al Gobierno Comunista de la Habana en Marzo de 1961, este peligroso Comunista Internacional se llama Eliceo Mejia Cabrera O Rovelo, segun tenemos datos esta siendo entrenado en diferentes ramas de sabotage y Terrorismo es Hombre de toda confianza del Sanguinario Jefe del G=2 Cubano Ramiro Valdez.

Esta sirviendo como enlace del Comunismo Internacional para varios Paices de Centro América y la America del Sur, entre los cuales se encuentra Guatemala- HONDURAS- Panama- Venezuela-Colombia-Peru-Bolivia.-Dando Consignas para Derrocar a estos Paices Democráticos de América y ponerlos a las ordenes de Moscu- Pequin y la Habana, el Pasaporte lo tiene con nombre distinto lo mismo que apellido y Nacionalidad tambien, a viajado a Paices Comunistas tales como ,Praga-Moscu- Pequin.-

Sus viajes para nuestra America los hace via Mexico, Paiz éste que se presta para la infiltracion Comunista en nuestra America, UD: SR. Artime lo comprende que haci es.-

Aqui esta otra Informacion importante para UD: Con ordenes de Eliceo Mejia Rovelo, O Cabrera quien se encuentra en la Habana, se han traslado a fijar su Recidencia a los Angeles Estado de California E:U:A: tres primas Hermanas de este Peligroso Comunista Internacional, llamadas Nora- Oneyda y Marina Amaya Cabrera, las tres cumplieron ordenes de Eliceo desde la Habana para dicho viaje, el dinero para sus pasages en Avion y demas gastos en este Consulado se los envio su muy famoso primo Hermano Eliceo desde la Habana. Tambien tenemos noticias que existe correspondencia desde la Habana con ellas tres , pero con nombre y direccion distinta, cosa que les va ser difil controlar estas cartas , estas tres Comunistas que se encuentran alli en los Angeles son muy vivas y astutas.

Tienen ordenes de su primo hermano Eliceo de la Habana que vijilen todas las Actividades de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (Cia) y del F-B-I.- Tambien tienen Ordenes de su primo hermano Eliceo de negar bajo todo punto de vista que son primas Hermanas de él y que todo eso quede en el misterio mas grande ,para burlar una ves más a las Actoridades de los E:U:A.- Debido que si la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) llega a saber ese parentesco existente con él serian extrañadas de los E:U:A.-y el perderia el control que tiene por el momento con ellas tres, las cartas que ellas mandan van a dar directamente a manos del Comandante Raul Castro, para mejor Informacion suya .-

Nora- Oneyda y Marina Amaya Cabrera, burlaron al Honorable Consul Americano de esta Ciudad en toda forma, tambien se manifestarle que cuando Marina Amaya Cabrera recibio ordenes de Eliceo de la Habana para que se trasladara a los Angeles, no quiso sacar su visa en este Consulado de San Pedro Sula, donde tenia que sacarla por recidir ella aqui en esta Ciudad, xxxxxxxxxx segun tengo Informacion fue a sacar su Visa a Tegucigalpa sorprendiendo una ves mas a dicha Embajada Americana, pues ella ya tenia datos que se le estaba siguiendo la pista, UD: sabe muy bien SR: Artime que los Comunistas agotan todos los recurzos que poceen para triunfar con sus planes que tienen y súgun las ordenes que reciben.-

Tambien le comunico que tiene viaje a fijar su Recidencia a los Angeles Estado de Ca California otra prima Hermana del Comunista Eliceo Mejia Robelo O Cabrera y Hermana de las tres Comunistas que xxxx le mencione en esta carta , llamada Lila Amaya Cabrera V de Lopez, llegando en esa forma a cuatro primas Hermanas del peligroso Comunista Internacionalque tendran su asiento en los E:U:A. saboteando la Labor de la (CIA) Sirviendo todas ellas de Puente de Enlace del Comunismo Internacional.-

La Señora. Lila Amaya Cabrera V de Lopez solamente espera el dinero que le enviara su primo Hermano Eliceo desde la Habana, para presentarce al Consulado Americano xxx xxxxxxxxxxxx para su correspondiente Visa burlando una ves mas al Consul Americano de esta Ciudad.-

Seria correcto SR: Artime que se le ordene al Consulado Americano de esta Ciudad que cancele la Visa de la Señora Lila Amaya Cabrera V de Lopez por ser enemiga de los E:U:A. y profesar Idiologia Extra-Continental y por tener un primo Hermano prestando sus servicios a un Gobierno que busca la destruccion de la Gran Democracia Americana, ~~como son: la Habana Moscow y Pequin~~.- Desterrar de los Angeles Estado de California a estas tres Comunistas Internacionales llamadas Nora- Oneyda y Marina Amaya Cabrera, por las vinculaciones familiares y Correspondencia, con su primo Hermano Eliceo Mejia Robelo O Cabrera quien se encuentra prestando sus servicios al Gobierno Comunista de la XXXXXX Habana, para que sean remitidad a su Paiz de Origen San Pedro Sula, Honduras Centro America.-

Tengo la plena seguridad que UD: sabra atender esta mi carta, debido que esta basada a la verdad y nada mas que a la verdad, tengo la seguridad que al ser cauturadas estas tres Comunistas alli en los Angeles negaran a pie junto toda clase de vinculaxxx ciones familiares con Eliceo Mejia Robelo O Cabrera,todo eso se debe que tienen ordenes del Comunista Mejia Robelo de negar ese parentesco Familiar.- Se manifestarle tambien que tiene Viaje para Cuba Comunista un sobrino del Peligroso Comunista Internacional Eliceo Mejia Robelo O Cabrera llamado Heicel Mejia Moralez, quien Estudia en un Instituto de esta Ciudad , el propio XX Eliceo lo llama de la Habana, Heicel tiene viaje para Cuba en Septiembre de este Año segun tengo noticias, Heicel es sobrino de estas cuatro Comunistas Mujeres que le menciono en esta mi carta, tres de ellas ya tienen fijada su Recidencia alli en los E:U:A. otra mas esta por irce de esta Ciudad hacia los Angeles con el mismo propocito.-

Pongace en contacto con la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) para desterrar de los Angeles a estas tres Comunistas que le menciomo en esta mi carta y que den ordenes al Consul Americano de esta Ciudad para cancelar la visa que le menciono, dela Señora Lile Amaya V de Lopez.- Quiero que mi nombre no balla hacer revelado por temor a las represalias de esta Familia Comunista.- Afmo.-=

GILBERTO NAVARRO R

14-00000

Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria
2212 N.E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Miami Marzo 31 de 1966.

Estimado Jim:

Tengo el gusto de reportar el empleo del dinero recibido durante los meses de Enero, Febrero y Marzo.

Enero

Recibí $ 5,000.oodólares

Entregué:

Para su envío a Cuba a través de la Embajada Española ——— $ 2,000.00

Entregados para su envío a Cuba. para familiares de presos o fusilados ———:

Inocencio Alonso	$275.00
Alfredo Borges Caignet	250.00
Rolando Tápanes	200.00
Gustavo Fernández Vidal	300.00
Angel García	300.00
Emilia del Mar	100.00
Silvia Heredia	125.00
Jacinto Luzárraga	300.00
Antonio Crespo Olivero	300.00
Rafael García	300.00
Antonio Sanz de Acedo	200.00
Nilo Messer Pujol	275.00
Eugenio Claude	100.00

Total: $3025.00 —— $ 3,025.00

Total del Mes: $ 5,025.00

Febrero

14-00000

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

(2)

Febrero

Recibí: $5,000.00

Entregué:

Para su envío a Cuba a través de la Embajada Española ———— $ 2,000.00

Entregados para su envío a Cuba para familiares de presos y fusilados ————:

Inocencio Alonso	275.00
Alfredo Borges Caignet	250.00
Rolando Tápanes	200.00
Gustavo Fernández	300.00
Angel García	300.00
Emilia del Mar	100.00
Silvia Heredia	125.00
Jacinto Luzárraga	300.00
Antonio Crespo	300.00
Rafael García	300.00
Antonio Sanz de Acedo	300.00
Nilo Messer Pujol	275.00
Eugenio Claude	200.00
	$3,225.00

———— $ 3,225.00

Total del mes: $ 5,225.00

Marzo

Recibí: $5,000.00

Entregué:

Para Cuba a través de la Embajada Española: ———— $ 2,000.00

Para Cuba a través de familiares:

Inocencio Alonso: 275.00

Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria
[illegible] N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Alfredo Borges Caignet	250.00
Rolando Tápanes	200.00
Gustavo Fernández	300.00
Angel García	300.00
Emilia del Mar	100.00
Silvia Heredia	125.00
Jacinto Luzárraga	300.00
Antonio Crespo	300.00
Rafael García	300.00
Antonio Sanz de Acedo	300.00
Nilo Messer Pujol	275.00
Eugenio Claude	200.00
	$3,225.00

Entregados a Sofía Angel Bello, esposa de José Fernández Planas, recien llegada de Cuba, para su encaminamiento en el exilio ——$300.00

Total: $ 5,525.00

Por supuesto, en nada de ésto está contado: Revista "Tridente", Oficina del MR, Delegaciones en Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Venezuela, España, Honduras, Guatemala y Perú. Tampoco está incluído: viajes de agentes y míos propios, el personal que cuida las armas en Nicaragua, el personal de Acción Cívica, el personal de la Granja Modelo, y mi propia subsistencia/

Sin más nada por el momento se despide de Vds. muy atte.

Manolo

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS.
371-6407
371-6408

Miami 31 de Marzo de 1966

Estimado Jim:

Como acordamos, te envío un reporte del resultado de la visita de Antonio Sanz a Europa.

1- Antonio salió para Francia el 12 de Marzo de 1966.

2- Pasó de Francia a España en automóvil (no exigen mas que la presentación de Pasaportes a los ciudadanos españoles y Antonio lo es) por Irún. Llegó a San Sebastian.

3- Se entrevistó el 16 de Marzo de 1966, a las 12 de la noche con el "Mago" Robreño y con "El gallego" López Lourido. La entrevista se prolongó hasta las 3 de la madrugada.

4- Lo que se trató:

a) Almejeiras, el Comandante Angel Quevedo Valdivia (el de la Universidad), el Comandante Almeida y el Comandante Guillermo García. Estaban en el complot. Es de notar que cuando se celebró la entrevista, aún no se había detenido a Almejeiras en Cuba; es decir, no puede haber sido invención del "Mago".

b) Que en realidad, el grupo complotado no necesitaba de nosotros militarmente, sino politicamente, pues nuestros contactos internacionales y nuestro prestigio con el pueblo cubano, iba a acortar la lucha y conduciría rapidamente a la estabilización del país.

c) Que a través del piloto de Cubana que le servía de correo, supo que lo que quedaba de la conspiración (si es verdad que Almeida y Guillermo García están, lo que queda es lo principal) quería establecer contacto con gente de Artime y que como "El Mago" ya estaba "quemado", tratarían de hacerlo a través del Embajador de Cuba en Suiza.

5- Q d) Que sería conveniente que alguien importante del grupo de Artime hablara con el Embajador de Cuba en Suiza.

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2312 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

(2)

Esto que te envío es un resumen de lo importante que se habló.

Como ves, si es cierto todo lo que dice, merecería la pena ir a Suiza (Antonio Sanz u otro) para hacer contacto con este señor.

El viaje de Antonio, más los gastos de transporte para no ir directamente a España, más otros gastos, como fué darle $300.00 al "Mago", no me permite seguir en ésto si * Vds. no consideran ésto de valor. Si creen que debo seguirlo, por indicios de que pueda ser cierto, entonces sí estoy dispuesto a seguirlo, cueste lo que cueste.

Adjunto te envío unas declaraciones que creo se están trasmitiendo por onda larga (radio) a Cuba. Si es cierto, opino que los párrafos que están subrayados pueden ser muy negativos para cualquier conspiración que exista dentro de Cuba. Si pudiera evitarse el que esto se trasmitiera para Cuba, sería muy bueno, pues a ningún militar rebelde le va a gustar que lo traten como "corrompido", "inmoral", etc, etc.

Suplícote hagas lo posible por conseguir el programa radial para Cuba.

Sin más nada por el momento se despide de tí, tu amigo que te aprecia:

Manolo advised by phone 5 April that we had no interest in further trips or contacts in Europe.

Manolo

SECRET

9 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Manuel Artime Buesa (201-267437)

1. As a result of a conversation with Carl Jenkins, Artime's present C/O, the following was decided:

a) Jenkins will continue to see and handle Artime in Nicaragua. (Jenkins plans to go to Managua PCS within the next two weeks.

638-5074
[illegible]
[illegible]

b) Jenkins will set up a Hqs contact with Artime by telephone. Artime is to be given the name "Jim Wilson" and the direct line phone [illegible], located in the ~~IO Section~~ [illegible] Office of ~~FI~~ WH/Cuba to call when he needs an agency contact and has something important he wants to discuss. The Hqs C/O for Artime will either be Thomas Hazlett or the undersigned.

c) Artime can be reached at his Miami address, 1270 NE 85th St. Phone 751-~~3648~~ (Code 305).
751-5981

Earl J. Williamson
Earl J. Williamson

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

3. DATE

4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

5. DATE OF INFO.

6. EVALUATION

8. ANALYST

9. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

AKTINE BUESTA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?
CIT ?
OCC ?
VISITED ORLANDO PIEDRA /201-247879/ ON
11 FEB 66
ARRIVAL IN FLORIDA OF ORLANDO PIEDRA
NEGUERUELA FROM VISIT WITH FULGENCIO BATISTA
ZALDIVAR

201-247879
UFG -07971
21 FEB 66
P1

R 6603031094

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-59 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

☐ [illegible] ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1	EW —	5	
2		6	CA
3		7	[illegible]
4		8	X

ORIG : WAYNE CARLEY
UNIT : WH/3/PERU
EXT : 6223
DATE : 4 FEB. 1966

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-754138

S E C R E T

4 Feb 66 22 59z

TO : LIMA JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH-8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, WH/C 8, FI, FI/INT 2, SIG CEN
CI/Ops

TO LIMA INFO WAVE CITE DIR 77832

file AMBIDDY-1

REFS: A. LIMA 8423 (IN 45015)
B. WAVE 8858 (IN 45106)

ARTIME CONFIRMED 3 FEBRUARY THAT AMSKIRT TWO "APPOINTED" AS FORMERS LIAISON WITH CUBAN COLONY PERU.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: A-2 is walk-in to Lima who claimed be Manuel ARTIME's liaison man in Peru. Refs requested validation this claim. ARTIME confirmed in telecon night of 3 Feb. 66.

WH/C D. Rohlfing (by phone)
WH/FI ✓

Rohlfing

Thomas Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HERSCHEL F. PEAK
DC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRE

21

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	MO—	5	CA
2		6	RF
3	FI-TC	7	D
4	CI	8	X

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, RB WH8

S E C R E T 312256Z

DIR INFO LIMA CITE WAVE 8858

31 JAN 66 IN 45106

TYPIC

REF: LIMA 8423 (IN 45015)

SINCE ALL CONTACT WITH ARTIME HANDLED BY HQS DEFER TO HQS FOR ANSWER REF.

S E C R E T

CFN 8858 8423 ARTIME HQS HQS

BT

SECRET

CS COPY

RECLASSIFIED	✓
RI/AN	✓
RI/MIS	
201-267437	✓
RI/Files	

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

24 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	MO -	5	CA
2		6	RR
3	FE-TC	7	D
4	CE	8	S

FROM LIMA

ACTION WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

SECRET 311550Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE LIMA 8423

TYPIC

REF WAVE 8716 (IN 41088)

ACTION

31 JAN 66 IN 45015

REQUEST WAVE CHECK WITH ARTIME GROUP TO ESTABLISH WHETHER AMSKIRT-2 IN FACT APPOINTED LIAISON WITH CUBAN COLONY PERU. ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN 8423 8716 WAVE ARTIME AMSKIRT-2

BT

SECRET

Wayne Carley x C223

CS COPY

DECLASSIFIED ✓
RI/AN ✓
RI/MIS ✓
201-267427
RI/Files

Eduardo Garcia Partagat

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

15 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM CARACAS

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, a/ops, CI/OA

S E C R E T 291330Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE CARA 3517 29 Jan 66 IN 44250

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY-1

REF: CARA 3478 (IN 41127)*

AMBIDDY-1 DEPARTED CARA FOR MIAMI 28 JANUARY 1500 HOURS PAA 442. DID NOT HAVE INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LEONI.

S E C R E T

CFN 3517 3478 AMBIDDY-1 28 1500 PAA 442 NOT HAVE LEONI

BT

*AMBIDDY-1 ARRIVED CARA 22 JAN.

SECRET

201-267437

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

24 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PIC	5	FI
2	-	6	C
3	CC	7	
4	1-D	8	

FROM Managua

ACTION LUHC-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI CI/OPS FI

S E C R E T 262327Z

WAVE INFO DIR PACY CITE MANA 5584

TYPIC AMTABBY-27 AMLITAINT-1 AMWORLD

REF: WAVE 8529 (IN 36542)

27 Jan 66 IN 42124

1. STATION HAS NO INFO RE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN ERACORN-1 PERMISSION TO REOPEN MONKEY POINT CAMP. HOWEVER AMBIDDY-1 ARRIVED MANA 17 JAN VIA LANICA FROM MIAMI.

2. ERACORN-1 LEFT MANA 24 JAN FOR PBPRIME VIA LANICA. ACCORDING LOCAL PRESS PERSONAL BUSINESS IS PURPOSE OF VISIT. ERFACT-1 SAYS REASON IS MEDICAL RECHECK.

S E C R E T

CFN 5584 AMTABBY-27 AMLITAINT-1 AMWORLD 8529 NO INFO RE ERACORN-1 MONKEY POINT CAMP AMBIDDY-1 17 JAN VIA LANICA MIAMI 24 PBPRIME ERFACT-1

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CA-	5	IC
2		6	FI
3	MD	7	D
4	KR	8	X

FROM CARACAS

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR WH/C 8 CI CI/OPS CI/OA FI

S E C R E T 251900Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE CARA 3478

25 Jan 66 IN 41127

PERUMEN AMBIDDY-1

CIPUN-1 REPORTS AMBIDDY-1 ARRIVED CARA 22 JANUARY 1966 PAA 515 ACCOMPANIED BY ANTONIO SANZ. UNDERSTAND HE TRYING ARRANGE APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT LEONI.

S E C R E T

CFN: 3478 CIPUN-1 AMBIDDY-1 CARA 22 1966 PAA 515 ANTONIO SANZ LEONI

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ORIG : A. [illegible]:ST
UNIT : [illegible]/C-CICS
EXT : 9206
DATE : 24 JANUARY 1966

☐ INDEX 7
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-749553

CICS / HO
FI
TC

23 [illegible]

TO : JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/C 5 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ FID COPY ADDP C/WH 6 C/CI C/FI 2 C/FI/D 4

TO WAVE INFO MEXI CITE DIR 74986

DESENSITIZED

KAPOK TYPIC AMSPICE AMHOUN

REF: WAVE 8603 (IN 38412)

1. RE PARA 5 REF: RATHER THAN SPECULATE ON IDENTITY ARTIME GROUP PENETRATION HQS INTENDS TO ASK ARTIME SERIES SUITABLY DISGUISED QUESTIONS IN EFFORT EDUCE IDENTITY PERUVIAN. WILL ADVISE.

What this about?
JL

2. TO INDUCE COOPERATION AND/OR DEFECTION CUBANA PILOTS ON HAVA MEXI ROUTE, HQS SEEKING APPROPRIATE MEANS (WITHOUT ATTRIBUTION TO AMSPICE/1) APPRISE SELECTED CUBANA PILOTS OF ABREU'S COMMENT THAT DAYS NUMBERED FOR BOURGEOIS PILOTS. WOULD WELCOME MEXI AND WAVE COMMENTS. DOES AMSPICE/1 KNOW IF RQMT TO REPORT ON CUBANA MEMBERS GIVEN TO OTHER CUIS AGENTS MEXI?

C/WH/C/CICS
WH/COPS
WH/1
WH/C/FI

(5)

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

25-3

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	MO	5	[illegible]
2		6	CF
3	JH	7	[illegible]
4	FI/RC	8	D

FROM
LIMA

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, RI/AN

D

SECRET 212330Z

DIR WAVE CITE LIMA 8360

22 JAN 65 IN 39233

1. ON 21 JAN CHIEF OF EMB POLITICAL SECTION MET WITH INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFYING SELF AS EDUARDO GARCIA DARTAYET, CUBAN REFUGEE, WHO UNTIL RECENTLY RESIDED MIAMI. GARCIA SAID HE RECENTLY SOLD HIS BUSINESS IN MIAMI (BUSINESS CARD INDICATES HE WAS PRES OF MINIMAX SUPER MARKET FOOD INC, 1545-47 S.W. 27 AVENUE, MIAMI) TO COME TO PERU TO MARRY DAUGHTER OF EX-PERUVIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI AND SEEK EMPLOYMENT HERE. SAID HE WAS APPOINTED AS LIAISON FOR ARTIMES' GROUP WITH CUBAN RESIDENTS PERU. ALSO INDICATED THAT WHILE IN MIAMI HE HAD COLLABORATED WITH KUBARK AND ODENVY.

2. REQUEST TRACES GARCIA. IF GARCIA BONA FIDES SATISFACTORY STA DESIRES CONSIDER HIM AS SOURCE OF INFO ON LOCAL CUBAN COLONY.

3. INDEX.

SECRET

CFN: 8360 21 JAN EMB EDUARDO GARCIA DARTAYET PRES OF MINIMAX SUPER MARKET FOOD INC, 1545-47 S.W. 27 AVENUE MIAMI ARTIMES' ODENVY BONA FIDES STA

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____
X-REF TO FILE NO. ____
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. ____

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO
FILE, WH/C, CI/OPS, CI, FI

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	RC	5	CA
2		6	CI
3	FD	7	CA
4	FI	8	

UNIT | TIME | BY

file

S E C R E T 182315Z

DIR INFO PACY MANA CITE WAVE 8529 19 JAN 66 IN 36540

TYPIC AMTABBY 27 AMLITAINT 1 AMWORLD

REF A WAVE 937 (NOT SENT MANA) (IN 31428)

B DIR 72[illegible] (NOT SENT MANA)

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL TO INFO FORWARDED REF A.

2. AMTABBY 27 ON 17 JAN 66 ADVISED BY JOSE ALEGRETTE THAT ON 15 JAN JAIME VARELA CANOSA VISITED ALEGRETTE ASKING ALEGRETTE CONTACT SOMOZA TO OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR VERELA AND "HIS GROUP" USE FORMER AMBIDDY-1 CAMP MONKEY POINT. VARELA STATED "HIS GROUP" SHORTLY TO RECEIVE ENOUGH AID TO START OPERATIONS AGAINST PBRUMEN AND WOULD USE AMBIDDY-1 NICARAGUA CAMPS AS BASES.

3. WAVE OFFICER ON 17 JAN CONTACTED AMLITAINT-1 WHO LONG TIME FRIEND VARELA TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY BASIS VARELA STATEMENTS. A-1 STATED THAT HAD SEEN VARELA LAST TIME NOV 65 AT WHICH TIME VARELA STATED HE WORKING WITH ODBEAT ALONG WITH PERUYERO OF 2506 BRIGADE VETS ASSOCIATION.

4. WAVE COMMENT: TRACES INDICATE VARELA FORMER PRESIDENT 2506 BRIGADE VETS ASSOCIATION REPLACED BY PERUYERO. VARELA ALSO IDENTIFIED AS ACSI SOURCE NUMBER 1002 AS OF 17 JUN 65.

SECRET

14-00000

IN 36[illegible]
PAGE 2

SECRET

5. IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE ODEEAT INVOLVEMENT WAVE NOT FOLLOWING SUGGESTION PARA 3 REF B TO PERMIT DIR CHECK OUT ODEEAT INVOLVEMENT.

6. FOR MANA: REF A FORWARDED INFO FROM AMTABBY-27 WHO APPROACHED BY PERUYERO, CURRENT PERSIDENT OF BRIGADE 2506 VETS ASSOCIATION TO JOIN PERUYERO AS HE OBTAINED UNSPECIFIED AID FROM UNSPECIFIED ODYOKE AGENCY WHICH WOULD PERMIT ASSOCIATION START OPERATIONS AGAINST ~~PBRUMEN~~ FROM PACY BASES. NEITHER DIR NOR PACY COULD CONFIRM SUCH AID.

SECRET

CFN ✓ REF RYBAT.

8529 8374 72665 A 27 17 66 JOSE ALEGRETTE 15 JAIME VARELA CANOSA SOMOZA AMBIDDY-1 MONKEY POINT NICARAGUA 17 AMLITAINT-1 A-1 65 PERUYERO 2506 2506 ACSI 1002 17 65 NOT FOLLOWING 3 B -27 2506 NEITHER DIR NOR PACY

BT

SECRET

SENDER WILL CHECK CLA ATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Rastetter		
2			
3			
4	Per my telecon with		
5	Mr. Chacones		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: Attached are CV's of Cubans recommended y Artime to George Lodge for inclusion in he next class at Veraguas. Unfortunately: 1) Carlos Orlando Piloto Valle and Juan ernandez Garrido seem to be either unqualified r disqualified , and Felipe J. Villerans allo is a dubious choice; and(2) X George odge sent all five CV's to Veraguas without aiting for our opinion. We are asking George o write another note to Father Steele at eraguas ~~xxkingxfx~~ saying that he, George, onders whether all these men are qualified nd akking for Father Steele"s opinion. f Steele would prefer some other candidates, hen George can ask Artime for ~~sxme~~ more names.
(over)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Chris Russell #R-1254	14 Jan 66

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL		[✓ SECRET]

(43)

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

CA/4's interest, obviously, is to protect project KMOCHROID, our proprietary fund in Philadelphia which wuxdx would pay for the training, from becoming tarnished in liberal Latin American circles by sponsoring Cubans who lack qualifications xx in the rural labor field but are overqualified as guerrila warriors.

Meanwhile, any comments you might have on Artime's candidates would be appreciatedx, and we wxxxxxxxxx be sure that you are kept informed of George's next xxxxxxx moves.



Resume

Name: Carlos Orlando Piloto Valle

Age: 29 years old

Civil Status: Single

Nationality: Cuban

Address: 5830 W. 15 Ct. Hialeah, Fla.

Telephone: 821-0325

Ocupation in Cuba: Businessman. Underground against communism; 5 months in jail before leaving the country in Pinar del Rio Prov.-

Ocupation in U.S.A: Working for the liberation of Cuba. Member of the Bay of Pigs Invasion (Bon. 3 Infantery) 22 more months in jail.

Studies: High School in Cuba (Bachillerato)

Experience Student until 1958. Working as a businessman until 1960. In training camps from 1961. Bay of Pigs Invasion. In jail until Dec.1962. Working for the liberation of Cuba from 1962 until today.

Resumé

Name: Felipe [illegible] Villa[illegible] Gulio

Age: 34 years

Status civil: single

Nationality: cuban

Address: 1349 W. 62 st. Hialeah Fla.

Telephone: 8215808

Languages: Spanish and English

Occupation in Cuba: Lawyer
Salesman and Public Relation
Journalist

Occupation in U.S.A.: Working for the Liberation of Cuba during the last five years.

Studies: High School - La Salle del Vedado-Havana, Cuba-Sept 1938 to June 1950
Doctor in Law - Universidad Católica de Santo Tomás de Villanueva-
Havana-Sept 1950 to June 1955.
Post-Graduate- Madrid University-Madrid, Spain-Dec. 1958 to May 1959
Journalism School-Havana- 1948 to 1950.

Experience: 1950-1955: Salesman and Public Relation in a factory of food products.
1955-1959: Lawyer (own law office) in Havana. Specialist in customs
and Import and export laws.
1950-1958: Director of V.T.C. magazine.
Sport writer of Prensa Deportiva, "Prensa Libre" newspaper.
Member of the Lion Club of Havana
Delegate of the Board of Lawyer of Havana.
President of the promotion 1950 La Salle School.
Director of Public Relation and Propaganda (1955-1958) of
Former Students Asotiation in Universidad Católica de Santo Tomás de Villanueva.
1960-1965: Psycological War Fare.

[illegible]

Name: Eugenio Claude Garcia

Age: 29 years

Civil Status: single

Nationality: cuban

Address: 1035 NW 10 st. Miami Fla.

Telephone: 3773321

Languages: Spanish

Occupation in Cuba: Gastronomic Labor. (1954-1962)

Electro-Mecanic School Of Belen, student 1954-1956 Havana, Cuba

Social Studies Board of Electro-Mecanic School of Belén (member) 1954-1955. Havana-Cuba.

Occupation in U.S.A.: Working for the Liberation of Cuba during the last four years.

Studies: High School-Instituto de Camagüey-Camagüey province, Cuba-1949 to 1953.

Electrical Equipment-Electro-Mecanic School of Belén, -Havana, Cuba-1954 to 1956.

Cooperative principles-Social Studies Board of Electro Mecanic School of Belén. Havana, Cuba

Experience: Gastronomic labor (1954-1962)

Refrigeration mecanic (1951 to 1963)

Cooperative. La Lisa . Marianao. Havana. Cuba (1961-1963)

Guerrilla War Fare. 1963 to 1964

Resumé

Name: Luis Fernández Rocha Iglesias

Age: 25 years

Civil Status: single

Nationality: cuban

Address: 3079 NW 15 St. Miami Fla.

Telephone: 634-5013

Languages: Spanish and English

Occupation in Cuba: Ciencias Sociales Student in the University of Havana

Occupation in U.S.A.: Working for the Liberation of Cuba during last four years.

Studies: High School- La Salle del Vedado-Havana, Cuba-Sept 1947 to June 1957

Social Sciences- Havana University-Havana, Cuba- Sept 1959 to June 196

Experience: Farmers Asociations-Comandos Rurales-Agrarian Reform Program, Provincia de Oriente, Cuba-1959-1960.

Clandestine Operations-1960-1964

Aspirante Instructor Agrupación Católica Universitaria-Havana, Cuba-1960.

Resumé

Name: Juan Fernández Garrido

Age: 32 years

Civil Status: single

Nationality: cuban

Address: 121 NW 42 pl. Miami Fla.

Telephone: 448 2421

Language: Spanish

Occupation in Cuba: Farmer (1953-1957) Las Villas province. Cuba
Policeman (1957-1960)
Guerrilla man (1960-1962) Escambray mountains. Las Villas province, Cuba.

Occupation in U.S.A.: Gastronomic labor (1962-1963)
Working for the Liberation of Cuba during the two last years.

Studies: Primary School in Las Villas Province. Cuba (1940-1948)
High School (only two years) Las Villas province Institute, 1949-1950.

Experience: Farmer
Gastronomic labor
Policeman
Guerrilla War Fare
Agriculture (1953-1957)

10 Jan 66

SECRET

10 [illegible]

WH/C 66-14

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Transmission of Booklet Written by Manuel Artime Buesa

1. Attached is a booklet entitled Points for Meditation written by Manuel Artime. It is essentially written for the younger elements of his Revolutionary Recovery Movement and in effect assembles a list of quotes and observations of an essentially political or philosophic nature.

2. The inscription on the inside cover is dedicated to you and translated reads as follows:

> "To Mr. Arthur - the generous lawyer of difficult causes - with affection in Cuba or Nothing"
>
> (signed)
>
> Manuel Artime Buesa

(Signed) John L. Hart

John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

DDP/WH/C/CA/EW/A. Rohlfing:fph
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - C/WH
1 - WH/Registry
1 - DCWHD/C
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - DC/WH/C/CA
1 - WH/C/CA/EW

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Miami 9 de Enero de 1966

Mr. F.R. Lastra
P.O. Box 8697
Baltimore 40 Md.

Estimado amigo:

Quisiera notificarles de lo siguiente:

1-Han sido becados para estudiar en Panamá, por la Universidad de Harvard:

Felipe Villaraus
Eugenio Claude
Luis Fernández Mayato
Juan Fernández Garrido
Orlando Piloto

2-Ha sido invitado por Daniel Oduber a presenciar los comicios de Costa Rica:

Rafael García(Secretario de Juventudes)

3- Ha partido para Lima, Perú, como Delegado del Movimiento, que informará de la situación en ese lugar: Eduardo García Dantayet

4- El Genral Somoza se entrevistó con el Coronel López de Honduras, para aconsejarle dejara la bebida y prestara más atención a su Gobierno, pues las Fuerzas Armadas estaban muy inquietas y descontentas.

5- La Base "Zenón Viera" fué entregada al fin al Gobierno, por lo que retiramos los hombres que allí nos quedaban. Hemos tenido que dejar personal en el Bluff por motivos que Vds. comprenderán.

6- El detenido Albuerne fué entregado al Gobierno Nica para que lo condujese a El Salvador con algún dinero que se le entregó. El detenido parece que no formará escándalo dado que tenemos un papel escrito por una madre donde se le acusa de violación de un menor de edad en Miami.

7- Insisto en la necesidad de un programa de onda larga para Cuba.

8- A través de una tía política del líder estudiantil preso Pedro Luis Boytell (la tía se llama Esperanza Valdés) me he enterado por cartas de la madre de Pedro Luis, que se encuentra en estado de coma en el Hospital del Presidio de Isla de Pinos. La madre dice que la única forma de salvarlo es sacándolo de Cuba por canje con otros Gobiernos Latino-americanos. Es decir: cambiándolo por otros presos comunistas. Yo le dije a la tía que haría gestiones con Somoza pero que dudaba que él tuviera presos comunistas para canjear. La madre de Pedro Luis cometió el error de hablar por teléfono con la tía y mencionar mi nombre como individuo que quizás pudiera hacer algo por él. (La madre habló desde Cuba)

9- Por carta de Emilia Luzárraga me he enterado que la situación de los presos que han rechazado el indoctrinamiento comunista, es terrible. Entre ellos están los [redacted] presos del M.R.R. y por supuesto Lino Fernández entre ellos.
La esposa y los hijos de Andrés Cao posiblemente salgan para Miami.

10- Noto ciertas irregularidades en el vehículo español con respecto a la correspondencia, estoy tratando de comprobar si algunas cartas "se pierden" y tratando de "chequear" si el dinero que se manda se recibe en esa. Sé que el dinero se recibe, lo que no sé es si en la cuantía en que se manda.

11- A petición de Daniel Oduber hemos publicado un reportaje en "Tridente" donde se rebate la posibilidad de que Daniel sea comunista. Daniel utilizará esto en su campaña.

12- Informes de Panamá me dicen que la situación en ese país empeora por días, ya que el Gobierno tiene una actitud muy débil y muchos amigos que rodean a Marcos Robles han caído en robos al dinero del Estado, desacreditando al Gobierno. El recién surgido Partido Demo-Cristiano, está en plan de agitación, habiendo hecho contactos con la gente de Arias y según me cuentan, con algunos elementos comunistas. Parece ser que el comunismo se está escudando detrás del Partido Demo-Cristiano. Lo que sí es positivo, es que la agitación tiene un franco matiz anti-norteamericanista, y que el Gobierno está a la defensiva, una defensiva muy débil. Que carece

de elementos capacitados para iniciar una ofensiva propagandística de defensa.
El tema del nuevo contrato del Canal, será uno de los temas más candentes de la campaña de agitación. Los muchachos nuestros becados, tienen instrucciones de observar e informar al respecto.

13-En Venezuela el anti-norteamericanismo se hace cada vez más patente en las esferas gubernamentales. Parece ser que Paz Galarraga es el centro de esta actitud hostil. Parece ser que en conversaciones privadas ha llegado a llamar al dinero de la Alianza para el Progreso: "el dinero maldito". Parece ser que tiene una gran influencia sobre Leoni y posiblemente sea el próximo candidato del Gobierno a la Presidencia de la República. Se habla insistentemente de que si "El Partido Copey" sigue ganando campo, el Gobierno soltará a Perez Jiménez para que aspire y divida la oposición restando votos al Copey.

Cada vez hay más militares en estado de descontento.

14-Suplico se me dé el nuevo teléfono de vuestra Oficina, ya que al llamar al que yo conocía, me sale un "record" que me dice que el teléfono no está en uso, creándome una dificultad si tengo que notificar algo urgente e importante.

Con un abrazo de su amigo:

Ignacio

S E C R E T

19 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Bernard BARKER's Contract

1. Mr. Hudson of Finance Division called this date concerning his search for a copy of Bernard BARKER's signed contract with the Agency. He is unable to locate it. Mr. Hudson has talked with Jan in Contract Personnel Office and asked that I check with her re same.

2. I called Jan on X 9179 and asked that she request any information on Bernard BARKER available at Headquarters or in Archives either under his name or his pseudonym Spencer O. Tertiling. She is to make a request on a priority basis. Any available information should be provided to this office by 22 April 1974.

Chris Hopkins
WH/COG/OS

201-[illegible]

SECRET

19 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Limited Release from Secrecy Agreement--
Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio R. Martinez

copy located and sent to [illegible] 24 Apr. 1974

1. In preparing the letter of 18 April 1974 (copy attached) from the General Counsel to Daniel E. Schultz in response to Mr. Schultz's letter of 9 April, I obtained from Ms. Chris Hopkins, WH/COG (x-1325), copies of (1) a secrecy agreement (in Spanish) by Eugenio Rolando Martinez dated 3 April 1965, (2) an unexecuted contract (an executed copy cannot be located) between the U.S. Government and Mr. Spencer O. Terteling (Bernard L. Barker) and (3) a termination secrecy oath signed by Bernard L. Barker dated 12 August 1966. Copies of those documents are attached.

2. After discussing the matter with Mr. David Phillips, C/WH Division, I prepared the 18 April letter adding the second sentence of the first paragraph at the request of Mr. Joe Skura, AC/WH/COG (x-1948). After completing the letter, I coordinated it on 15 April 1974 with Mr. Skura and agreed to send him a copy of the final.

3. On 18 April I met with Mr. Schultz. I questioned him as to his intentions regarding the information he was seeking as, in the Agency's view, clearly there is no connection between the Agency's association with Messrs. Barker and Martinez and the subject case. Mr. Schultz explained that he, as the lawyer representing them, feels obligated to know what they did for the Agency in order that he can make the determination as to whether it is relevant to the current trial--currently scheduled for 17 June. He mentioned that to date both Messrs. Barker and Martinez had been completely unwilling to discuss any aspect of their duties with the Agency. They had been reluctant to even acknowledge

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 098473

their association with the Agency. I explained the Agency's serious reservations concerning the possibility of compromise of agents and operations that are still in being. I explained that the Agency continues to have associations with some of the individuals with whom Messrs. Barker and Martinez had contact during their Agency association. Mr. Schultz seemed to appreciate this problem. Thus, in order to attempt to protect those individuals, I explained that the Agency is currently not in a position to give Messrs. Barker and Martinez blanket authorization to identify individuals with whom they had contact during their Agency association. Mr. Schultz readily acknowledged those conditions.

4. I mentioned to Mr. Schultz that if, as a result of the discussions that are now being authorized, Mr. Schultz believes that certain individuals need to be identified he can make such a narrow request to the Agency at that time. I made no guarantee that we would approve such a request, only that we would consider it in view of (1) the rationale that Mr. Schultz would offer as to his needs, (2) the possibility of publication, (3) the damage to current operations, and (4) the precedent in terms of weakening the confidence of current and potential Agency relationships.

J. Edwin Dietel

J. EDWIN DIETEL
Assistant General Counsel

cc: IG
OLC
D/Security
AC/WH/COG

RAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

18 April 1974

Daniel E. Schultz, Esq.
Schultz & Overby
1990 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Schultz:

Re: Defendants Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio R. Martinez, in the case of *United States v. Ehrlichman, et al.*, Criminal No. 74-116, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia

In response to your letter to me of 9 April, this letter will serve to authorize Messrs. Barker and Martinez, pursuant to their security agreements with this Agency, to discuss with you their employment with this Agency. This authorization does not include, however, the identification of individuals with which Messrs. Barker and Martinez had association or contact in conjunction with their duties for this Agency.

You recognize that during those conversations some information may be revealed that is classified. As a result, it is herein agreed that you will not reveal any information concerning the employment by this Agency of either Mr. Barker or Mr. Martinez without the prior written approval of the Central Intelligence Agency. I appreciate your cooperation in this matter and acknowledgment of the terms of this agreement.

Sincerely,

John S. Warner
General Counsel

ACKNOWLEDGED,
Daniel E. Schultz

DATE

cc: The Honorable Leon Jaworski

[redacted] SECRET [redacted]

18 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Request from OGC for Signed Copy of Bernard BARKER's Contract

1. On 18 April 1974 Mr. Dietl of OGC asked if I had been able to locate a signed copy of Bernard Barker's contract which we were unable to locate a few days ago. The answer was no. I took advantage of Pete Palmer's presence at Hqs. on TDY to ascertain whether a signed copy of BARKER's contract could possibly be at [redacted] Station WH/Miami. Pete said with certainty there was no signed copy at Station WH/Miami since much of the material at the Station had been destroyed. Also, since BARKER was terminated in mid-1966, the Station file should have been transferred to Hqs. back then.

2. I passed the foregoing informaton to Mr. Dietel who simply asked that I double check with WH/Contracts and the Contract Personnel Division for same which I promised to do and advise.

Chris Hopkins
WHD Task Force
Watergate

SECRET

15 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Information in re Watergate Passed to Mr. Dietl of OLC

1. On 15 April 1974 I gave to Mr. Dietl of OLC the following documents which he requested:

   a. Copy of AMSNAP-3's Secrecy Agreement dated 3 April 1965, which I translated for him verbally oat the desk.

   b. Copy of Termination Secrecy Oathlby Bernard Barker dated 12 August 1966. Also a General Release signed by Barker 12 August 1966.

Chris Hopkins
WH/COG/OS

✓

201-251689
201-289937

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Bernard Barker/Helms' Statement

FROM: DC/WHD

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE 11 March 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDO				We went through Barker's 201 again plus all other material provided to the 7th floor on this case and cannot find any statements which could conceivably serve as a source for Mr. Helms' testimony in question. A copy of this is also being sent to Scott Breckenridge. JEF
2.				
3.				
Mr Scott Breckenridge IG.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

11 March 1974

SUBJECT: Bernard Barker

1. POA granted 16 April 1959. Terminated amicably 31 July 1966. Review of Barker's file does not reveal that he had any association with gambling interests. Mr. Helms might have confused Barker with Frank Sturgis who allegedly had Mafia connections. Please note Mr. Sturgis was never associated in any manner with this Agency.

2. Miss Christine Hopkins has discussed Mr. Helms' testimony, which appeared in the "Washington Post" on 11 March 1974, with Mr. Fred Evans, Office of Security, Mr. Scott Breckenridge, Inspector General's Office, and Mr. Lyle Miller, Office of Legislative Counsel. Mr. Sturbitts received a call from Mr. Miller early on 11 March 1974 and referred Mr. Miller to Miss Hopkins who subsequently talked to him.

SECRET

1407 Scott Breckinridge co.
X5521 X-1407

Bernard Barker - over week end 7 Feb 73

test. released - Helms said Barker left mid 60's because of "criminal connections."

details of Barker's termination noted

'66 when he terminated amicably ~~and~~ nice

Barker phoned last nite say he mildly indignant re "criminal associations".

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

CASE OFFICER: Norris Z. GERVENOT TIME:

PROJECT : AMABDUCT DATE: 11 March 1971

AGENT : AMSNAP-3 PLACE:

NARRATIVE : FUNDS PASSED: None RECPT RCVD:

1. AMSNAP-3 reported on 11 March 1971 that the charges of sale of narcotics levied on Jorge ALONSO, the son of Guillermo ALONSO Pujol (AMECRU-1), were dropped (no exact date given). Jorge was arrested 21 June along with forty others and charged with being a top figure in the heroin and cocaine distribution racket.

2. AMSNAP-3 stated that he had talked with a friend of his, Ray BARKER, on the morning of 11 March. BARKER told him that he had spoken to Attorney Miguel SUAREZ. SUAREZ is a law partner of Fernando FREIRE. FREIRE told SUAREZ that Jorge ALONSO had been released because all charges stemming from the 21 June arrest were dropped by the authorities. Therefore, there will be no trial.

3. CO Comment: It is a sad day when justice can be bought by the likes of ALONSO. The little man loses again because if he were charged with an offense 1/10th the magnitude of Jorge ALONSO's, he would be behind bars for a long time, ~~and~~ to make it worse, Jorge ALONSO can now go back ruining lives.

SECRET

SECRET

10 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION : Mr. Paul Wilson

SUBJECT : Bernard L. Barker

1. Reference is made to our discussions regarding the letter written to this Agency by Mrs. Edwin T. Moffett in regard to her son's marriage to Subject's daughter.

2. As discussed with you, Mrs. Moffett was telephonically contacted and was advised that the Agency could not give her any information regarding Subject's possible employment with the Agency. Mrs. Moffett understood this and did not attempt to argue the point. Mrs. Moffett also was advised that her fears regarding the possible kidnaping of her daughter-in-law were not based on any known incident.

3. Mrs. Moffett was also advised that she should contact her daughter-in-law and son in order to get more information regarding the daughter-in-law's background. Mrs. Moffett said that she had only met the daughter-in-law for a brief time and was not able to ask all the necessary questions.

SECRET

SECRET

4. Mrs. Moffett was satisfied with our call and there was no indication that she would pursue this further with any government agency or Congressman.

Steven L. Kuhn
Assistant Deputy Director of Security
for Personnel Security

SECRET

31 MAR 1970

See [illegible]

In response to your letter of March 10, we wish to advise we are unable to provide you with any information concerning ~~the~~ ~~former~~ employment of Mr. Bernard L. Barker.

With regard to your concern for the safety of your daughter-in-law, we are unaware of any cases of a former resident being kidnapped and returned to Cuba. Furthermore, since it is assumed Mrs. Moffett is a U. S. citizen, such a possibility ~~seem~~ appears rather ~~too~~ remote to warrant ~~justify~~ the apprehension expressed by her family.

24 MAR 1970

PERSONNEL DEPT.
C.I.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

I CONTACTED THE FBI AND THEY SAID I SHOULD WRITE YOU FOR THIS INFORMATION.

HAS BERNARD L. BARKER OF HAVANA, CUBA, CHICAGO AND MIAMI, FLORIDA (5229 N.W.4th St.) EVER BEEN IN THE EMPLOY OF THE C.I.A IN THE ABOVE PLACES?

OUR SON MARRIED HIS DAUGHTER (MARIAELENA) IN CALIFORNIA AND WE KNOW NOTHING OF BACKGROUND....ONLY WHAT SHE TOLD US.

IF YOU CAN CONFIRM ANY OF THE ABOVE OR GIVE US ANY INFORMATION ON HER FAMILY, I WOULD APPRECIATE IT. MARIAELENA SAID SHE CAME TO THIS COUNTRY AT AGE 13 TEN YEARS AGO.

IS SHE IN ANY DANGER OF BEING KIDNAPPED BACK TO CUBA AS SHE AND HER FAMILY BELIEVE COULD HAPPEN?

SINCE SHE SAID HER FATHER HAD BEEN WITH THE C.I.A. I FELT THIS WAS THE FIRST PLACE TO START TO FIND OUT ABOUT HER.

THANK YOU FOR ANYTHING YOU CAN DO FOR ME.

SINCERELY YOURS,

MRS. EDWIN T. MOFFETT
2931 CENTER STREET
BETHLEHEM, PA. 18017

MARCH 10, 1970

P.S. I'M CONCERNED OVER MARIAELENA'S LARGE COLLECTION OF PRICELESS JEWELS. SHE TOLD US THEY WERE SMUGGLED INTO THE U.S.A. OF (OUT OF CUBA) WHICH ¼ ONLY REACHED HERE BECAUSE THE BALANCE WERE STOLEN..(FROM THEM)

I UNDERSTAND THIS WILL BE COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL, AM I CORRECT?

NDI


Barker - Herrera - Jimenez - Collazo
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
sN

SRY
11/5/67
Rel

14-00000

FORM G - 325 A (11-1-60)

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIC

Immigration and Naturalization Service

WH

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 43-R436

(FAMILY NAME) Barker	(FIRST NAME) Clara	(MIDDLE NAME) Elena	☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (MO.-DAY-YR.) 8-12-1917	NATIONALITY Cuban	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (IF ANY) A12 418081
ALL OTHER NAMES USED none	NDI 15 May 67		CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH Havana, Cuba			SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (IF ANY) 262-68-6012

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE)	FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
Yes	Barker 83	Bernard	3-17-17	Havan.Cuba	7-6-45	Hav.Cuba

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE) 201-251689 (husband)

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE
Herrera	Alberto		march 1935, N.Y.	1936 or 37, Cuba.

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	Jimenez	Amado	Cuba	deceased
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)	Collazo	America	2-24-1895, Hav.Cuba	Augusta, Ga. U.S.A.

RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM: MONTH	YEAR	TO: MONTH	YEAR
2572 W. Summerdale	Chicago	Illinois	U.S.A.	15 Oct.	1966	PRESENT TIME	
4400 NW 5 St.	Miami	Florida	U.S.A.	4 July	1962	30 Sept.	1966
420 NW 44 Ave	Miami	Florida	U.S.A.	2 Sept.	1960	3 July	1962
			CHH				

EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS. (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
Housewife		Aug.	1965	PRESENT TIME	
G.C. Murphy Co. 3709 NW 7 St., Miami Fla.	Buyer	Aug.	1958	Aug.	1965
G.C. Murphy Co. 3709 NW 7 St., Miami, Fla.	saleslady	[illegible]	1963	Aug.	1965
Before that date, housewife.					

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE): CITY Havana COUNTRY Cuba FROM 19 48 TO 19 60

LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE): CITY COUNTRY FROM 19__ TO 19__

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY) Residence

10 MAY 1967

12-16-66
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

FORM G-325 A REV. 1-1-67

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

WH

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 43-R436

482-P

(FAMILY NAME) BARKER	(FIRST NAME) BERNARD	(MIDDLE NAME) LEON	☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (MO.-DAY-YR.) 3-17-1917	NATIONALITY ~~Stateless~~ CUBAN	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (IF ANY) A 10 144 090
ALL OTHER NAMES USED NONE OTHER				CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH HAVANA CUBA		SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (IF ANY) 213-07-0844

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	BARKER	BERNARD	1-2-1890, COLUMBIA TENN.	U.S.A (DEC)
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)	TERRY	ALICIA	CIENFUEGOS CUBA	(DECEASED)

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
FERNANDEZ	CLARA	8-12-1917	HAVANA CUBA	6/4/1945	HAVANA CUBA

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE) NONE

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

201-251689

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	YEAR	TO MONTH	YEAR
9390 N.W. 20 ST	MIAMI	FLA	U.S.A.	3-2	67	PRESENT TIME	
2552 W. SUNNYSIDE	CHICAGO	ILL	USA	6-1	66	2-15	67
4400 N.W. 5 ST	MIAMI	FLA	U.S.A.	7-1	63	6-1	66
420 N.W. 44 AVE	MIAMI	FLA	U.S.A.	7-1	61	7-1	63

BARKER BERNARD L. DOB 17-3-17

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS. (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

HAVANA

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	YEAR	TO MONTH	YEAR
SELF EMPLOYED	TRANSLATOR	3-1	67	PRESENT TIME	
THE RAVAND CORPORATION 2407 W. NORTH AVE CHI. ILL.	ASS. WORKS MANA.	7-15	66	2-15	67
SELF EMPLOYED	TRANSLATOR	1-15	60	7-15	66

NDI 21 MAR 67

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE) CITY	COUNTRY	FROM (MONTH)	(YEAR)	TO (MONTH)	(YEAR)	LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE)	CITY	COUNTRY	FROM (MONTH)	(YEAR)	TO (MONTH)	(YEAR)
HAVANA	CUBA	7	1946	1	1960	[illegible]	HAVANA	CUBA	1-	1959	1-	1960

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☒ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY):

10 MAR 1967

3-8-1967
DATE

Bernard L. Barker
(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

File 201-251689

14-00000

[CLATTER-1]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-251689
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, CI/OA

RI COPY

SECRET 152235Z

DIR CITE WAVE 9534

TYPIC

REF UFGW 4928

REQUEST AMCLATTER/1 POA BE EXTENDED THROUGH 1 APR 65. POUCHING PRQ PART II.

SECRET

CFN

AN AC | FI
PS | DEST → WH5A/10
ABSTRACT X | ~~INDEX~~

15 MAR 65 IN 23389

DM

SECRET

RI COPY

RI COPY

201-251689

15 MAR 65

FORM 1-63 1389 RI COPY RI COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC
AMCLATTER/1 Progress Report for February 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: None, For Your Information.

I. OPERATIONAL CHRONOLOGY

A. During the period under review AMCLATTER/1 was transferred from the PW Branch to the CI Branch for future handling. Subject's files were turned over to CI on 27 January 1965 and he was informed by his PW case officer of his proposed transfer at a meeting on 2 February. A subsequent meeting was scheduled for 8 February with AMCLATTER/1 and the PW case officer at which time the latter introduced him to the CI case officer. Subject appeared to be pleased with this turn of events expressing the wish that he could be put to more frequent use and be given a heavier work load. He said that he enjoyed his 2½ year association with his previous case officer but looked forward to getting into a new line of activity, preferably some type of PM activity or investigative work which he claims to enjoy as a result of his previous police experience in Cuba. Subject was told by the CI case officer that his duties would remain essentially the same as they had been and that he should continue his coverage of exile activities with emphasis on any rumors of impending exile raids on Cuba.

B. On 18 February Subject was introduced to AMBLINK/1 and was told that AMBLINK/1 would keep in daily touch with him either by telephone or by personal meeting. Subject and AMBLINK/1 know one another from the time when they both were working in Cuba and both

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA

CS Copy

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
4 March 65	MAR 9 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-20209

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-126-3-21/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

seem pleased with the current arrangement whereby they will be in contact with one another. In addition to this daily contact, meetings are held with Subject and AMBLINK/1 about once a week by the CI case officer to discuss Subject's reporting as well as any difficulties he may have encountered or guidance he may need. For all practical purposes, however, AMCLATTER/1 is being handled by AMBLINK/1. Subject knows nothing about AMBLINK/1's other operational duties and contacts, and the latter has been instructed to limit his discussions with AMCLATTER/1 to any mutual business at hand. AMCLATTER/1 knows AMBLINK/1 by true name (which he knew in Cuba) and has his home telephone number. During the absence of AMBLINK/1 from the area the CI case officer will meet directly with Subject.

II. PRODUCTION

Subject provided a number of useful reports during the period under review mainly concerned with proposed MIRR bombing missions over Cuba and details concerning the ransacking of AMBIDDY/1's house. The following disseminations were made as a result of Subject's production:

A. UFG-6635 (WAVE 7900; 3 February 1965) from Frank Fiorini: Alleged abortive Air Raid over Cuba by the MIRR.

B. WAVE 8261 (Rybat; 13 February 1965): Ransacking of AMBIDDY/1's house.

C. UFG-6710 (WAVE 8326; 16 February 1965) from Frank Fiorini: Planned Air Strike Against Havana by the MIRR.

D. WAVE 8419 (Rybat; 17 February 1965): Additional information on Ransacking of AMBIDDY/1's House.

E. UFG-6727 (WAVE 8394; 17 February 1965) from Frank Fiorini: Decision of Orlanda Bosch Avila to Use Cuban Pilot on MIRR's Air Strike of Havana.

F. WAVE 8521 (Rybat; 20 February 1965): Additional information on Ransacking of AMBIDDY/1's House.

G. UFG-6747 (WAVE 8618; 23 February 1965) from Frank Fiorini and Bill Johnson: Insistence of Orlanda Bosch Avila that the MIRR Bomb Havana.

III. FINANCES

Subject was paid his February salary in the amount of $433.77. (This amount is arrived at after withholding his income tax from $500.)

IV. FUTURE PLANS

AMBLINK/1 will continue to contact Subject on a daily basis either by telephone or by personal meetings and will see that Subject's reports are promptly relayed to the CI case officer. Subject has been instructed to continue his coverage of exile activities in the area with emphasis on prompt reporting of any impending exile raids on Cuba. Subject will also continue to report in writing any conversations that he has with Cuban exiles who appear of operational interest and will explore his wide array of contacts for any information that may lead to the identification of Cuban intelligence assets operating in the area. In this connection Subject is currently exploring a lead involving two Cuban mulatto women who allegedly have hit the bolita numbers frequently (six or seven times) and for large sums of money. Subject, who has a theory that Fidel Castro may be using the bolita racket to fund agents in the U.S., is trying to learn the identities of the two mulattos. He has been cautioned not to delve too deeply in this matter however since he may become involved with local underworld elements who may take drastic action against him in the belief that he is working for either the local ODENVY or the police. Subject said that he is well aware of this possibility and is making very discreet inquiries with the assistance of certain friends (Cuban ex-policemen) who are bolita runners and who know that he has no interest in their bolita activities per se except to learn the identities of the two Cuban mulatto women. Subject said that his friends, in addition to possibly helping him, would like to know the identities of the two women since they would then play the same number as the two women and make some money on their own.

for Chester R Murdock
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 28 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMASH

ACTION : WH 9

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

NOV 28 1920Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 48700

PRITY DIR CITE MASH 1935

JMNET

NO NIACT

REF TRAV 0158 (IN 48394)

1. STRUGGLE UNDERWAY BETWEEN CIVIL AND MIL ELEMENTS OF AMRASP. MARTIN ELENA HAS REJECTED AMHAWK THESIS THAT ESTADO MAYOR IS SUBJECT (AT) AMCIGAR, WHEREAS TWICKER FEELS NECESSARY ESTABLISH PRINCIPLE THAT MIL POWER DERIVES FROM CIVIL.

2. AS COMPROMISE WE MIGHT MAKE SELECTION OF ESTADO MAYOR SUBJECT TO AMCIGAR APPROVAL AND PERMIT SUBORDINATE NOMINATIONS, PROMOTIONS, ETC. TO BE FILLED BY ESTADO MAYOR ON INDEPENDENT BASIS.

3. AMHAWK POINTS OUT THAT EVEN MARTIN ELENA REFERS TO GOUDIE AS "MINISTER OF WAR" WHEREAS GOUDIE MAIN FUNCTION IS LIAISON BETWEEN MASH REPS AND MIL ELEMENTS. IN RECENT TALK WITH AMCLATTER-1 SANJENIS ACCUSED GOUDIE OF "SABOTAGING MIL EFFORT" AND OF PUTTING LOYALTY TO AMWAIL ABOVE AMRASP INTERESTS. WHETHER TRUE OR NOT FACT IS THAT AT LEAST ON CIVIL SIDE GOUDIE IS BECOMING HEATEDLY CONTROVERSIAL.

4. FIRM ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL ASCENDENCY IN AMRASP (PER USA PATTERN) WOULD GO FAR TOWARD RESTORING CORRECT FOCUS. REQUEST HQS CONCUR.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

FORM 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. [illegible]

BILL :

Things turned out very well, for I was invited to a small dinner party last night. Ernesto was there, and he freely brought out the subject personally with me, as though he wanted me to know. He expects the NYT man--HARPER--to return from Miami this week (I do not know if he meant back to Washington or to New York), and something to appear in the paper some time after that. As I told you, the NYT is convinced there are three related events:

a) The Watergate affaire.
b) The break-in at the Chilean Embassy.
c) An attempt to "beat up" ELLSBERG on the Capitol grounds.

These three events, in turn, were carried out by a single group of Cubans either recruited by or in the pay of the Agency. In fact, they think that Uram GONZALEZ and another one of the people that I mentioned to you were actually in the Watergate, but managed to escape. In addition, as they say, this group has links not only with the Agency, but also with the GOC...perhaps separately, but with similar objectives. A very serious charge. That is precisely the connection that the NYT wants to establish. The NYT man claims--according to Ernesto--to have a photo of Manuel GIBERGA, a Cuban who is a White House assistant for Spanish-speaking affairs--and Bernard BARKER, who they think is the key man ("A CIA agent recruiter"), together.

HARPER also visited Felipe PAZOS, a well-known Cuban economist who, at present, is with the Inter-American Development Bank. Harper might have also seen some Chilean dips, but this is only an inference on my part.

The other birds on the list that I gave you were specifically tied to the Ellsberg case. They were brought up from Miami--armed--to physically disrupt Ellsberg's appearance before a Congressional Committee. The Cubans were unable to get to him, but did fight with some of his supporters, who were arrested. The Cubans were not. Official protection is what they are looking for in this particular case.

John V. HANNON (T)

Harold V. KARABLY (P)

1971 - Retired as Staff employee

1971 - June - Picked up as contract employee by FR Division

1972 - June 30 - that contract terminated.

1972 - June 30 - retired under CIARDS.

1972 - June - new contract with FR Division as a retired annuitant. Came aboard as independent contractor.

1973 - 30 June - that contract was terminated.

FR Division has the following address for HANNON, but does not know the date of the info:

150 Ridgewood Drive
San Rafael, Calif 94901
Tele: 454-1322

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 12 TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ROUTING

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CLCS	5	OS
2	[illegible]	6	170
3	[illegible]	7	RI
4		8	FI-TC

FROM Dissem By 24

ACTION WH/C-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI/OPS

19 MAY 66 Ⓘ 20644

20644

S E C R E T 191802Z CITE JMWAVE 0947

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMCLATTER

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7348 (IN 18355)

NO TRACES JMWAVE NOR LOCAL ODENVY NAMES GIVEN REF.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

ACTION - D.A.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Cuba

Photographs of Grain Silos at
Ensenada de Guanabacoa, Regla,
Havana

9 March 1966

1

1962 - December 1965

United States, Miami
(4 March 1966)

UFG-8016

Angel M. Maceda Sanchez (A 14 088 180) a Cuba refugee who was a welder and mechanic employed by the Cuban Ministry of Construction and participated in the construction of silos at Ensenada de Guanabacoa, Regla, Havana. Maceda departed by air from Cuba on 16 December 1965 and arrived in the United States that same day.

1. In 1962 the Government of Cuba drew up plans for the construction of a grain silo complex at Ensenada de Guanabacoa, Regla, Havana on property adjoining an edible oils manufacturing plant which had a daily capacity for processing 300 tons of soy beans. Actual construction of the silo complex started on 3 November 1964 following the September arrival of a number of Polish technical personnel who were to supervise the construction.

2. The silo complex consists of 36 silos, each 37 feet high and six feet (as received) in diameter. The complex is arranged into two groups of 18 silos each with a building to be built between the two groups. The top of the silos will be interconnected by a railway. In addition a system of tubing and pipes will interconnect the silos at the bottom.

3. On deposit in the   Graphics Register are four photographs of the silo complex under construction which were probably taken about December 1965. Copies of these photographs may be obtained by requesting the following control numbers:

Field Comment: Maceda, who is not a highly qualified technician, was of the opinion that an inordinate amount of cement was being utilized in the construction of these silos. He also states that on one occasion a delivery of cement was returned to the cement plant as it did not meet certain technical specifications.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S E C R E T

JMWAVE UFG-7831

John H. SCHOENDIENST/Leonard W. [illegible]
Henry J. SLOMAN/Gabriel J. RADESKIN 9 Feb 66

John C. TARBELL/bcp

Philip G. ELMARD

AMWRIST-1/AMOT-237
UNAMBER-3/AMCLATTER-1

Miami reps of: State
FBI
I&NS
Customs
Border Patrol
USCG

4 - Hqs.
1 - DCS
2 - Mexico City
2 - Madrid

TYPIC

SOURCES: Paras./1 to 7: UNAMBER-3, 16 December 1965 and 7 January 1966. Para. 8:/ AMCLATTER-1, 13 December 1965. He received the information from AMOT-245 who received it from Israel SOTO Barroso. Para. 9: AMOT-237 (DD-1733) 17 January 1966, from Alfredo GALLO Cantus. Field Comment 4: First sentence from AMOT report DD-1767, 4 February 1966, from GALLO who received the information from Ruben BATISTA. Balance from AMWRIST-1, 16 December 1965. Field Comment 11 is based on UFG-7907. Please add dissem number. Subject of 201-064127 is mentioned in para. 7 because the omission of his name might jeopardize his security. FYI, according to the source of para. 8, he also attended the meeting reported therein.

RID: Index: NAME: BATISTA Godinez, Ruben
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
CIT : Cuban
Occ or Status: Son of Fulgencio BATISTA. Titular head of BAR (Buro de Aclaraciones y Respuestas) BATISTA'S personal organization in Miami.

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

(continued)

NAME: FERNANDEZ Miranda, Roberto
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban

Occ or Status: Activities in Miami for Fulgencio BATISTA, his brother-in-law.

NAME: SAIF Yapor, Nicolas Jacobo
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit: ?
Occ or Status: Fulgencio BATISTA's brother-in-law. In Miami. Activities on behalf of BATISTA.

NAME: TORRA, Antonio D.
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : ?
Occ or Status: Member of BAR, Fulgencio Batista's personal organization in Miami. On Batista payroll

NAME: GUERRA Suarez, Florencio
SEX : M
DOB : 30 Oct 1899
POB : Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Former Cuban ambassador. Emigre in Miami. Member of BAR, Batista's personal organization in Miami. On Batista payroll.

NAME: COBAS Reyes, Mario
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Former Cuban Min of Transportation, Emigre in Miami. Member of BAR, Batista's personal organization in Miami. Also journalist, radio commentator. On Batista payroll.

SECRET

Cover Sheet Page Three

UFG-7981

NAME: GONZALEZ Puente, Jose
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Former Cuban senator. Emigre in Miami. Mbr BAR, Batista's personal organization in Miami. Journalist & Radio commentator. On Batista payroll.

NAME: PIZZI de Porras, Enrique
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Mbr BAR, Batista's personal organization in Miami. On Batista payroll.

NAME: PIEDRA Negueruela, Orlando
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in New Orleans, La. Former head Cuban Natl Police. Trusted mbr Batista's entourage in US. To Spain to confer with Batista Jan 66.

NAME: ATORRESAGASTI Garcia, Manuel
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Former military aide of Batista. In charge Batista's office Miami.

NAME: MONTANER, Ernesto
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : ?
Occ or Status: Journalist. Miami. Receives $400 monthly from Fulgencio BATISTA.

SECRET

NAME: KRAMER, Oscar aka "Bebo"
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : ?
Occ or Status: Receives $400 monthly fm Fulgencio BATISTA for his newscast on radio WMIE, Miami.

NAME: FLORES, Martha
SEX : F
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Receives $300 per mo fm Fulgencio BATISTA for her radio program station WMIE, Miami

NAME: GUAS Inclan, Rafael
SEX : M
DOB: ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Former vice-Pres of Cuba. Receives $300 fm Fulgencio BATISTA. Journalist & Radio commentator.

NAME: SIRGO, Otto
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit: Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Actor, also journalist, radio commentator. Receives $200 monthly fm Fulgencio BATISTA.

NAME: GUELL Morales, Gonzalo
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Former Cuban Prime Minister. Receives $500 per mo fm Fulgencio BATISTA

14-00000

SECRET

Cover Sheet Page Five UFG-7951

NAME: RIERA Hernandez, Mario
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : ?
Occ or Status: Author of book "Historial Obrero Cubano". Fulgencio BATISTA financed publication, $2,000.

NAME: RODRIGUEZ Rotger, Alberto
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. With "Patria", Fulgencio BATISTA's newspaper.

NAME: BLANCO Cortina, Miguel Angel Antonio
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : ?
Occ or Status: On editorial staff of Oscar "Bebo" KRAMER, newscaster, Miami radio WMIE, who paid by Fulgencio BATISTA.

NAME: FREYRE Varona, Ernesto
SEX : M
DOB : 21 July 10
POB : Camaguey, Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Ldr RECE. Past with Fulgencio BATISTA reps.

NAME: RIVERO Hernandez, Jose Ignacio
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre. Plans publish newspaper "Foto Impresiones de la Marina". Financed by Fulgencio BATISTA.

Also: cross reference to 201-106808, 201-004187.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Cuba

Activities in Miami on Behalf of
Fulgencio Batista Zaldivar

9 February 1966

5

Mid-November 1965 to mid-
February 1966
United States, Miami
(16 December 1965 to 4 February 1966)

UFG-7951

See below

Summary. Fulgencio Batista Zaldivar has an organization in Miami which is composed of a small group of his trusted followers. The main function of this group is in the field of propaganda. Between $5,000 and $7,000 per month of Batista's money is channeled through this group, most of which is spent in support of these activities. On Batista's instructions, the newspaper Patria will adopt a more moderate line, including a friendly attitude toward the United States Government and its foreign policy. Attacks on agencies of the Government and support for RECE, with which the Batista group is making an agreement, will be published in a different newspaper. A Batista confidant left the United States for Spain in January on Batista's invitation.

Source for paras. 1 to 7: Former high-level Latin American Government official who has travelled frequently throughout the Caribbean and Central America where he maintains close friendships with a wide range of military and political leaders. He is a rightist, a trained reporter and his information has been fairly reliable in the past. Because of his past and present political affiliations, it can be assumed that he is biased in favor of Batista.

1. Fulgencio Batista Zaldivar, former President of Cuba, has a personal organization in Miami known as the Buro de Aclaraciones y Respuestas (BAR, Bureau of Explanations and Answers) which is composed of a small group of men who enjoy his trust and confidence. The titular head of BAR is Ruben Batista Godinez, Batista's son, and includes the following people:

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Roberto Fernandez Miranda, Fulgencio Batista's brother-in-law who lives at 5424 Alton Road, Miami Beach, Florida.

Nicolas Jacobo Saif Yapor, another brother-in-law[2]

Antonio D. Torra

Florencio Guerra Suarez, former Cuban ambassador

Mario Cobas Reyes,[3] former Cuban Minister of Transportation

Jose Gonzalez Puente,[3] former Cuban senator

Enrique Pizzi de Porras[3]

Other trusted members of Batista's entourage include Orlando Piedra Negueruela,[4] former head of the Cuban National Police, who lives at 1505 Westbrook, Apartment D, New Orleans, Louisiana; and Atorresagasti (fnu), Batista's former military aide and confidant, who is now in charge of Batista's office in Mexico.[5]

2. Members of BAR meet on an irregular basis in an office in Cobas' garage at 2770 S.W. 22nd Avenue, Miami, because Cobas, who is in poor health, does not leave his home. The group monitors news media for items of interest to Batista, particularly those items in which he is mentioned. Members of the group recommend items to be published, and Guerra is responsible for the preparation of a weekly report to be released to the press and radio.

3. The finances of BAR are handled by Fernandez, with the assistance of Saif. Batista provides between $5,000 and $7,000 (U.S.) per month, which is used for salaries, propaganda and other expenses and contributions. Following is a list of some of the regular monthly payments:

Patria newspaper, $2,000

Ernesto Montaner, journalist, $400

Oscar "Bebo" Kramer, for his newscast, $400[6]

Martha Flores Montero, for her radio program, $300[6]

Rafael Guas Inclan,[3] former vice-President of Cuba, $300

Otto Sirgo, actor,[3] $300

Gonzalo Guell Morales, former Prime Minister of Cuba, $300

Also, Torra, Guerra, Cobas, Gonzalez, Pizzi and others each receive between $200 and $300 each month.

4. Requests for financial assistance are received from other Cuban emigres such as former military and naval personnel and policemen. Often these requests are honored, on a one-time basis, and in a manner that will assure that they do not become permanent financial obligations on the part of Batista. Some publications are financed with Batista's money, such as the book Historial Obrero Cubano by Mario Riera Hernandez, a journalist, which was published in the latter part of 1965 at a cost of $2,000.

5. Batista does not contribute a fixed amount of money to any emigre organization. However, he does offer financial assistance to individual members of organizations, particularly those of the Alianza Para la Libertad de Cuba (ALC, Alliance

for the Liberty of Cuba) which is headed by Generoso Campos Marquetti. The majority of the members of the ALC are Batista adherents.

6. At a meeting on 8 December Ruben Batista and Fernandez relayed Batista's instructions to a group of his followers who are employed in the news media. The instructions included the following:

   a. The newspaper Patria must take a more moderate line. Attacks on agencies of the United States Government and on emigres who were formerly followers of Fidel Castro Ruz will no longer be published. The newspaper must adopt an attitude friendly toward the United States Government and its foreign policy.

   b. Batista is pleased with the news program broadcast by Kramer and would like to increase the program from one half to a full hour. The expansion of this program is not for the purpose of enhancing Batista's stature, because he no longer aspires to return to Cuba in a position of power. He realizes that such aspirations would be unrealistic. Batista feels that the time that will be favorable for the liberation of Cuba is approaching, and he wants Cuban emigres to re-double their efforts in working toward the liberation.[8]

7. Among others who attended the 8 December meeting were Arnando Garcia Sifredo, editor and publisher of Patria, Alberto Rodriguez Rotger, also of Patria, Kramer, Miguel Angel Antonio Blanco Cortina, a member of Kramer's editorial staff, Saif, and Santiago Rey Perna, a news commentator on radio station WMIE.

   Source for para. 8: A Miami businessman who was a resident of Havana for several years. The source has contacts who recognize him as a channel to U. S. Intelligence. The ultimate source of this information is a Cuban emigre in Miami whose reliability cannot be judged.

8. In about mid-November 1965 a group of Batista's followers met at Fernandez' house to discuss policy changes which were considered necessary to prevent persecution of Ruben Batista and Fernandez by Cuban emigres in Miami, and by authorities of the United States Internal Revenue Service. The following decisions were reached:

   a. They would proceed to arrange an agreement with the Representacion Cubana en el Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile).[9] In this agreement, Batista would support RECE in Batista-sponsored press and radio, and furnish RECE with war materiel, such as boats and arms. In exchange RECE would pledge to support Batista's political organization in Cuba after Cuba has been liberated. To show good faith in this agreement Ernesto Freyre Varona, leader of RECE, would be asked to appear on a radio interview in which he would indicate "tacit tolerance" of Batista.[10] The agreement between the two groups will not be acknowledged.

   b. Mundo Americano will be given financial support.[11] This newspaper will be used instead of Patria for publishing attacks on agencies of the United States Government, and for articles supporting RECE.

Source for para. 9: A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.

9. On 13 January Jose Ignacio Rivero Hernandez, former editor of the newspaper El Diario de la Marina in Cuba, said he is planning to publish a newspaper which will be called Foto Impresiones de la Marina. Montaner will assist Rivero in this endeavor. The newspaper will be financed by Batista. Rivero opined that when this newspaper is established, Patria will no longer be published.

1. Source Comment. Followers of Batista ("Batistianos") fall into two categories: (1) those who are directly associated with Batista, are employed by him, and receive instructions from him or his intermediaries; and (2) those who were formerly connected with his administration and, even though they are no longer directly associated, they remain loyal to him.

2. Field Comment. Source has also reported that Fernandez' wife, Adela, is Saif's sister.

3. Source Comment. Cobas, Gonzalez, Guas and Sirgo are also journalists and radio commentators. Pizzi was at one time employed by the newspaper Mundo Americano, a job which he received on Batista's recommendation.

4. Field Comment. An independent source reported that Piedra left the United States for Spain during the week of 16 to 22 January. He went at Batista's invitation. In mid-December another usually reliable source reported that it was rumored in the emigre community in Miami that Piedra and Laurent (fnu) were to meet with Batista in the near future, after they had concluded an agreement with Aureliano Sanchez Arango whereby Sanchez and his group would cooperate with Batista in an effort to overthrow Castro. Laurent is probably identical with Julio S. Laurent Rodriguez, former Cuban Chief of Naval Intelligence. Sanchez is a leader of the Frente Nacional Democratico Triple A (FNDTA, National Democratic Front/Triple A/).

Source Comments:

5. Since the death of Leopoldo Pio Elizalde, Atorresagasti has been in charge of the publication Defensa Institucional Cubana. Formerly Atorresagasti assisted Fernandez in handling finances, the function now performed by Saif.

Field Comment. Atorresagasti is probably Manuel Atorresagasti Garcia. Pio directed the publication of Defensa Institucional Cubana from Mexico City.

6. The two radio programs which are sponsored and controlled by Batista are those of Flores from 1:30 to 1:45 p.m., and Kramer from 1:45 to 2:15 p.m., both on Miami radio station WMIE.

7. The attitude of the RECE has become more favorable to "Batistianos." Although it has not been acknowledged, it is possible that Batista has helped that organization.

8. Batista feels that it is useless to attempt to finance a war against Castro with personal funds. Such ventures are costly and the results are negative. Therefore, he refuses to consider plans for military action.

Field Comments:

9. TDCSDB-315/03734-65 from an independent source, reported that Batista had instructed his representatives in the United States to attempt to gain control of RECE.

10. According to the source of paras. 1 to 7, Freyre has appeared on Kramer's radio program twice.

11. The last issue of Mundo Americano was published in New York on 29 November 1965. An independent source reported that a new weekly newspaper called Nuevo Mundo Americano will be published in New York. Rolando Masferrer Rojas will be the director of the newspaper. It was believed that Batista would provide $20,000 with which to establish the publication. (Cf.).

Source Comment. Masferrer writes under the name Policarpo Pineda.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC
AMCLATTER/1 Progress Report: October-December 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

1. During the reporting period AMCLATTER/1 has continued to serve as contact point for matters pertaining to Cuban exile activities and related affairs of possible CI interest. He has maintained his large number of contacts within the Cuban exile community, contacts representing such varied sectors as exile political leaders, officials of exile organizations, former members of the police force, as well as suspected underworld characters. AMCLATTER/1's close relationship to Identity A has resulted in a number of reports which were of interest to other Station components and some of which were disseminated. AMCLATTER/1 is at his best when asked to furnish information about individuals in the WAVE area who may be of operational interest to the Station; he pursues such assignments with the zeal of a trained bloodhound, combing his many and various contacts for information and rarely coming up with a negative report. AMCLATTER/1 works diligently and likes to be kept busy. It is preferable to give AMCLATTER/1 highly specific and detailed instructions, which he will then follow to the letter. When left to his own devices he will at times not use the best operational judgment, which is usually the result of over-zealousness and expediency rather than lack of operational know-how or experience.

2. In November 1965, with the increase in the refugee flow, the CI Branch began using the services of AMCLATTER/1 in interviewing refugees of interest to this Branch and preparing debriefing reports. In this respect he is performing the same kind of work as members of the AMSERVE Team. However, because of his continuing reporting on Cuban exile matter, his many contacts within this community, and the fact that he is known to be in touch with KUBARK among a large number of this

1 att.

Attachment:
IDEN, u/s/c (att'd)

Distribution:
3 - WH/C, w/att. u/s/c

CS COPY

201-251687

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-24268	JAN 17 11 January 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-126-3-21/3

community, it was decided not to incorporate AMCLATTER/1 into the AMSERVE Unit but rather continue running him as a singleton agent. It was also felt that he responds more favorably under the direction and guidance of one case officer rather than as a team member. AMCLATTER/1 has performed very well in his new duties as refugee debriefer, and his debriefing reports are models of thoroughness, if not of organization.

3. During the reporting period October-December, AMCLATTER/1 conducted a total of 16 refugee debriefings and prepared reports on these. Some of the debriefings required as many as four separate sessions. In addition, AMCLATTER/1 submitted ten operational reports dealing with information concerning the Cuban exile community, the majority of these stemming from contacts with Identity A. Two of these were disseminated.

4. During the period October-December 1965 the following funds were expended for AMCLATTER/1: Salary - $1,344.87; reimbursement for POV mileage and operational expenses - $209.44; total - $1,554.31.

John H. Schoendienst
for FREDERICK J. INGHURST

SECRET

JAN 14 1 22 PM '66 Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-24268

TYPIC

IDENTITY A: Dr. Julio GARCERAN Del Vall Souza
Leader of the PGCC (Pro-Constitutional
Government of Cuba)

Distribution:
~~3~~ - WH/C

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible] 0005 05
UFGA 24268

CS COPY

201-254678

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/AN

EXTENSION:

NO. UFGA-24306

DATE 14 JAN 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ESEC		25 JAN 66	
2. WH/C/MO			
3. WH/C/RR/RK			
4.			
5. WH/C/FI		[illegible]	
6. WH/C/CA			
7. WH/C/CFCS	3 FEB	[illegible]	
8. Barry C			
9. Al [illegible]			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

amlatter file

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AND ULTIMATELY DISPOSE OF IT MAY BE AS HIGH AS $1.00 MORE IMPORTANT - HANDLING UNNEEDED COPIES WASTES OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE - TIME!

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
WH/C, COS Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT DYVOUR/JMPALM/AMCLATTER-1 Production
Activities of Roberto ALEJOS Arzu (201-281386)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

RID: Please see last paragraph.

1. On 7 January 1966 AMCLATTER-1 reported the following information concerning recent activities of Roberto ALEJOS Arzu, wealthy Guatemalan emigre in Miami. AMCLATTER-1 got the information from his 19-year-old daughter, who in turn got it in conversation with Cristina ALEJOS, 19-year-old daughter of Roberto ALEJOS, during a visit to the ALEJOS residence on 5 January. The two young women are close friends.

a. Roberto ALEJOS has leased his house at 180 Palm Island Drive, Miami Beach, to an unknown person effective 15 January, for a period of one year. The ALEJOS family will move to another house owned by ALEJOS and located at 2395 North Meridian Avenue, Miami Beach, Telephone No. 538-3148. This house has been used as a guest house for relatives and friends from Guatemala visiting Miami. The house is currently occupied by Rafael CASTILLO Menocal /see copy of his card, attached/, who is related to the Cuban MENOCALS.

b. CASTILLO arrived in Miami from Guatemala on 17 December 1965 for a two-week visit, extended since. A close friend or relative of ALEJOS, CASTILLO is

Att: ASA H/W

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/atts.
2 - WH/C, w/atts.
2 - COS, Guatemala City, w/atts.

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
19-126-3-4	UFGA-24306	JAN 18 1966 14 January 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	(201-281386)

ORIGINATING

wealthy, in his early 50's, well educated, and speaks Spanish, French, Italian, and English. He is deaf in his left ear. His daughters, who attended schools in Brussels, are also well educated and speak several languages. CASTILLO plans to return to Guatemala on 12 January 1966.

c. Cristina ALEJOS plans to leave for Guatemala on 15 January. For the past month her father has been training her on his properties in Guatemala about which she is to give him a report after her arrival there. Her father is particularly worried about "his large farm which is losing money." ALEJOS has indicated to Cristina that eventually she will take over control of all his property in Guatemala. She will stay with the CASTILLO Menocal family for three weeks, after which she will stay with her father's brother Arturo in Guatemala City.

d. Roberto ALEJOS does not plan to go to Europe this year because of the uncertain status of his financial affairs. He often speaks of his concern about the tense political situation in Guatemala and the danger of a Communist takeover. He is also concerned about his daughter's American boy friend, Arthur GORDICK (phonetic), who has had some problems in Guatemala involving the police. ALEJOS has forbidden Cristina to see GORDICK, but she is not complying with his order.

2. Station index files have no traces on Cristina ALEJOS, Arturo ALEJOS, or Arthur GORDICK; nor are there any traces identifiable with Rafael CASTILLO Menocal.

3. RID, please index:

a. NAME : *ALEJOS, Cristina
SEX : F
DOB : Ca. 1946
POB : ?
CIT : Guatemalan
OCC : (See below)

19-year-old daughter of Roberto ALEJOS Arzu (201-281383). Re conversation in Miami 6 Jan 66 with AMCLATTER-1's daughter, her close friend. Subj plans to leave for Guat 15 Jan. Eventually to take charge her father's properties in Guat.

b. NAME : *CASTILLO Menocal, Rafael
SEX : M
DOB : Ca. 1914
POB : ?
CIT : ? Probably Guatemalan
OCC : Rep of Wayne Motorbus Assembly Plant, Guatemala City

(continued)

Arrd Miami from Guat 17 Dec 65; plans to leave for Guat 12 Jan 66. Close friend or relative of Roberto ALEJOS Arzu (201-281386). Staying in ALEJOS' guest house. Wealthy, well educated, speaks Spanish, French, Italian, English. Deaf in left ear.

c. NAME: *GORDICK (phon.), Arthur
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
CIT : United States
OCC : ?

Friend of Cristina ALEJOS (daughter of Roberto ALEJOS Arzu - 201-281386), who is seeing Subj against her father's orders. Subj has problems in Guat involving police.

Philip G. ELMARD

Planta Ensambladora de Carrocerias WAYNE
TODO METAL – PARA AUTOBUSES

Rafael Castillo Menocal

INGUACA
7a. Av. 19-72, Zona 1.

GUATEMALA, CITY
CENTRAL AMERICA

SECRET

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM (Requester's name): Judi [illegible]			
BRANCH: WH/C	ROOM: GG14	EXTENSION: 1263	DATE:
RID CONTROL NO.:			

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		20 Oct	
REQUESTER				②
RID/FILES	DT-6			
REQUESTER				③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7			
RID/201	DW-6			
RID/MIS	GT-6			
RID/INDEX	GT-5			

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

RECEIVED
RID/IN
20 10 OC AM '65

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: LAMAR LAINE, GIVEN NAMES: MARGARITA

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED:

AKA, ALIASES: N

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, sex, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.):

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
	20 MAY 07	Havana		Mexico

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS: Confined to a wheelchair

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction). Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

Note 1. Records of COI, DDU, OHS and OIO are in RID/AMD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there would be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201.

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject:

RESTRICTION (If any)

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in RR/OCR X7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

LAMAR PA 201-157175*

BORN - - CHIN H K

RES. CHIN OCCUPATION

HO TUNG ROBERT 01[illegible]9/2839 201-157175*

2 APR 57

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX

029258

LAMAR, fnu

201-43786
(XX-5379)
(17 Feb 45)

029259

XX-5379

LAMAR, FNU

019-004-0115
EGBA-[illegible]
03 JAN [illegible]
E., P. B

BULGARIAN
MEMBER, PRESIDIUM OF THE GOVERNING BOARD
OF THE WRITERS UNION.

[illegible] FILED IN [illegible] IN[illegible]

029260

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM	ROOM	EXTENSION	DATE	RID CONTROL NO.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS	CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
RID/INDEX	GT-6				K	
REQUESTER					②	
RID/FILES	GT-6					
REQUESTER					③	
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-5					
RID/201	GG-6					
RID/MIS	GT-6					
RID/INDEX	GT-5					

RECEIVED
RID/IN
20 10 00 AM '65

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME Lamar Laine	GIVEN NAMES Maria Luis A.

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (*Occupation, sex, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.*)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH 21 July 1900	PLACE OF BIRTH Havana	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐	NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	COMMENTS
☑	CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label, type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

DESIGNATION (*If any*)	CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED DIV / [illegible]
STAFF INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS	FILE TO / RI RET. [illegible] / [illegible]

Note 1. Records of OCI, ORR, CRS and OSI are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in those records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR X7977.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

FORM 8-65 362 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-6-80)

008

Lamar Maria

Rio de Janeiro-CIA-Int-1
Folder [illegible]

3

029281

SECRET

WH/C 65-499

9 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

ATTENTION : Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT : Admission to the U.S. for Two Aunts of Bernard L. Barker's Wife

1. Bernard L. Barker, a Cuban-American refugee in Miami (and former Captain in the USAF) has been actively cooperating with this agency since 1959 in Havana and Miami. He has shown his loyalty to the U.S. Government and his work for this agency has been very satisfactory.

2. It has now been learned that two aunts of subject's wife arrived in Mexico from Cuba on 22 September 1965. On 28 September 1965 they applied for visas to the U.S. Applicants are: Margarita LAMAR Laine; DPOB 20 May 1907, Havana, Cuba; PP 51527 (confined to a wheelchair since 1933) and her sister Maria Luisa LAMAR Laine; DPOB 21 July 19[illegible], Havana, Cuba; PP 44495.

3. Headquarters and Miami Station traces on applicants are negative as are Miami FBI traces.

4. It is requested that Alien Affairs Staff arrange with Immigration and Naturalization Service for the expediting of these applicants into the U.S.

(Signed) Thomas J. Flores
Thomas Flores
WH/C/COPS

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/RSMC
1 - WH/SEC
1 - WH/C/MO
1 - Subject File

SECRET

Originated by B. Hidalgo, WH/C/MO/FI-CI

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
CHIEF, WHD

SUBJECT
AMCLATTER-1'S IN-LAWS DESIRE TO ENTER PBPRIME FROM MEXICO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED - FYI

REFERENCE - WAVE 6697 /IN 76287/

1. AS WAVE IS AWARE CERTAIN STEPS MUST BE TAKEN BY ALL FOREIGN NATIONALS DESIRING TO ENTER PBPRIME BEFORE KUBARK CAN INTERCEDE WITH ODACID TO EXPEDITE THE ISSUANCE OF A VISA.

2. IN THIS CASE, REFERENCE APPLICANTS MUST PERSONALLY APPLY PBSWING MEXI FOR ADMISSION TO PBPRIME. SPECIFICALLY THEY SHOULD HAVE NOTARIZED STATEMENTS FROM RELATIVES IN PBPRIME CERTIFYING THAT APPLICANTS WILL NOT BECOME PUBLIC CHARGES.

3. AS ADMISSIBILITY TO PBPRIME DEPENDS /ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF INVALIDS/ ON THE PRESENT PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE APPLICANTS, A HEALTH CERTIFICATE IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME OF APPLICATION.

4. ONCE HQS HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE ABOVE ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN, EXACT DATE PROVIDED WHEN VISA APPLICATIONS WERE SUBMITTED TO PBSWING AND NO DEROG FOUND KUBARK HQS FILES, KUBARK CAN THEN ASK ODACID TO EXPEDITE ISSUANCE OF VISAS.

5. FYI - HQS TRACES ON REFERENCE APPLICANTS NEGATIVE.

ERNEST A. LUSBY

ISTRIBUTION BY TAPE -

3 - COS, JMWAVE

201-251679

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
UFGW-5632	22 OCTOBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-251689

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT
WH/C/MO/FI-CI	Barney Hidalgo	7147

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
/WH/C/MO/FI-CI		Ernest Chiocca E Chiocca
/WH/C/MO		Robert Ortman R Ortman
/WH/C/FI/TC		[illegible]
H/1		[illegible]

Distribution:
1 - WH/C/RNRC
1 - WH/C/MO
1 - OS/AAB

AN AC | WH 6 | ABSTRACT X

RELEASING

C/WHD 72

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

PLS INEX

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-251664
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM J.M.WAVE

ACTION Delawk 5

INFO FILE, VR, C/OPS, WH8

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

20 Oct 65

DESENSITIZED

SECRET 200153Z

DIR CITE WAVE 6697

~~X~~POK TYPIC AMCLATTER

20 OCT 65 IN 76281

1. AUNT ~~OF WIFE~~ w.sf AMCLATTER 1, MARGARITA (LAMAR) LAINE, DPOB 20 MAY 07, HAVA, PP 51527, ARRIVED MEXI FROM CUBA 22 SEPT 65 ACCOMPANIED BY SISTER, MARIA LUISA (LAMAR) LAINE, DPOB 21 JUL 1900, HAVA, PP 44495. MARGARITA CONFINED TO WHEELCHAIR SINCE 33.

2. AMCLATTER 1 HAS ASKED FOR KUBARK AID IN EXPEDITING ADMITTANCE SUBJECTS PARA 1 TO PBPRIME WHERE THEY HAVE RELATIVES WHO HAVE CERTIFIED WILLINGNESS SUPPORT THEM. RECENT CONSULTATION BY WAVE OFFICER MEXI INDICATED ACTION TO EXPEDITE VISA CLEARANCE MUST BE UNDERTAKEN BY HQS WITH ODACID WASH.

3. VIEW AMCLATTER 1 LONG LOYAL SERVICE CONSIDER KUBARK INTERVENTION WARRANTED IF THIS DOES NOT INVOLVE MAJOR EFFORT BY HQS. PLS ADVISE HQS VIEWS.

4. NO WAVE OR LOCAL ODENVY TRACES SUBJECTS PARA 1.

SECRET

CFN 6697 AMCLATTER 1, MARGARITA (LAMAR) LAINE DPOB 20 MAY 07 ,VA PP 51527 CUBA 22 SEP 65 MARIA LUISA (LAMAR) LAINE DPOB 21 JUL 1900 HAVA PP 44495 33 ! ! NOT INVOLVE NO WAVE !

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

C [illegible]

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

41

SECRET

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

MFG 1-65

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3	HO–	7	
4		8	

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: IW ☒ RID COPY(COPIES ISSUED TO: IW, SDO & CSDO 2330 JM)

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6
DCI, D/DCI, DDP, CS/DO, SOD 4, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, FI/SPG, RI/AN, WH 10, WH/C 12, CS/RF

SECRET 130107Z 13 OCT 0304Z 65 IN 71454

PRIORITY DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR MANA SJOS GUAT MEXI SALV

TEGU CITE WAVE 6516

EC/BFB

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM

SUPDATA: 1 AMCLATTER-1 FROM GARCERAN ON 8 OCT 65. PARA 7 BASED HMM-9901, 29 SEPT. POSSIBLE TRACE ONE OF BARRIOS PENA BROTHERS MAY BE MARIO WHO, ACCORDING GUAT 996, 4 AUG 60, WORKING FOR HONDURAN GOVERNMENT. RID: INDEX ALEJOS, GARCERAN, ROJAS, MALDONADO, ARENAS, KRAMER, MENDEZ. FILED 130107Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

GUATEMALA/CUBA/NICARAGUA/COSTA RICA

SUBJ: INTEREST OF ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU IN RECRUITING CUBAN EMIGRES THROUGH JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA FOR TRAINING IN NICARAGUA IN PREPARATION FOR AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE

IW COMMENT:

WH/REG	8
WH/2/N	1
WH/2/CR	1
WH/C	12

TDCS DB-315/03317-65

☐ ROUTINE ☒ PRIORITY

BASED ON: UFG-7601
NP(AMCLATTER-1)

LIAISON: N

RELEASING IWO: E. J. MULLANEY

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 13 OCTOBER 0506Z65

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

MFG 1-65

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

PAGE 2 IN 71454

GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT DOI: 8 OCTOBER 1965

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (11 OCTOBER 1965) UFG-7601

SOURCE: A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HABANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE SOURCE HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CONFIDANT OF JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA.

IW COMMENT:

TDCS

ROUTINE PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY GUATEMALA / CUBA / NICARAGUA / COSTA RICA

TDCSDB-315/03317-65

DATE OF INFO. 8 OCTOBER 1965

DISTR. 13 OCTOBER 1965

SUBJECT INTEREST OF ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU IN RECRUITING CUBAN EMIGRES FOR TRAINING IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (11 OCTOBER 1965)

REF IN 71454

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-7601

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HABANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. HE HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CONFIDANT OF JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, GUATEMALAN MILLIONAIRE RESIDING IN MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, PLANNED TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA IN THE SPRING OF 1965, USING A GROUP OF CUBAN EMIGRES WHOM HE HAD RECRUITED FOR THE OPERATION. ON 4 MAY ALEJOS AND LUIS SIERRA LOPEZ, MILITARY LEADER OF THE GROUP, WERE APPREHENDED AND THEIR ARMS CACHES SEIZED BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS).

2. ON 8 OCTOBER 1965 DR. JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA, LEADER OF THE PRO-GOBIERNO CONSTITUTIONAL DE CUBA (PGCC, PRO-CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CUBA), SAID THAT ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU HAD INDICATED TO HIM THAT DAY THAT HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC OCI ONE OCR ORR
TREASURY FBI I&NS CUSTOMS BORDER PATROL COAST GUARD FAA D/OCI 2 CIA/NMCC EXO

RECEIVING AID FROM GARCERAN IN THE FORM OF ABOUT 40 CUBAN EMIGRES WHO WOULD BE WILLING TO GO TO NICARAGUA FOR TRAINING IN PREPARATION FOR AN EVENTUAL COUP AGAINST THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT. ALEJOS PROMISED GARCERAN THAT IF THE COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL, ALEJOS WOULD ESTABLISH A CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE IN GUATEMALA WITH GARCERAN AS ITS "PRESIDENT."

3. GARCERAN SAID THAT THE PLAN IS MERELY IN THE "TALKING STAGE" AND STRESSED THAT THERE ARE AS YET NO SPECIFIC PLANS, LOCATIONS, OR TIMETABLES IN EFFECT.

4. ALEJOS SAID THAT HE HAD MADE SEVERAL TRIPS TO GUATEMALA, AND SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED A MEETING HE HAD HAD WITH ROJAS MARROQUI (FNU) ON 14 SEPTEMBER DURING THE COURSE OF A FOUR-DAY TRIP "THROUGH THE FRONTIER." ON THE SAME TRIP ALEJOS ALSO MET WITH ABUNDIO MALDONADO, JOSE LUIS ARENAS, VILLAGRAN KRAMER, TWO BARRIOS PENA BROTHERS, AND MARIO MENDEZ MONTENEGRO. (FIELD COMMENT: MENDEZ MONTENEGRO WAS CHIEF OF POLICE DURING THE REGIME OF JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMAN AND RAN FOR PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY TICKET IN 1957.) IN ADDITIONA ~~LAEJOS~~ ALEJOS MET WITH UNNAMED "NON-COMMUNIST" SUPPORTERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT JUAN JOSE AREVALO AS WELL AS WITH SUPPORTERS OF ENRIQUE PERALTA AZURDIA, CHIEF OF STATE, AND COLONEL MIQUEL ANGEL PONCIANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GUATEMALAN ARMY. (FIELD COMMENT: TDCSDB-315/03135-65, 25 SEPTEMBER 1965, REPORTED THAT ALEJOS WAS ASKED TO LINE UP BEHIND PONCIANO IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW PERALTA.) ALEJOS SAID THAT HE MET WITH THE MILITARY LEADERS

AT CAMPO DE MARTE IN FRONT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE GUARD OF HONOR. HE SAID THAT DURING HIS ILLEGAL TRIPS TO GUATEMALA HE HAD STAYED IN ABOUT 11 DIFFERENT HOUSES.

5. ALEJOS TOLD GARCERAN THAT, IN ORDER FOR HIS COUP TO HAVE ANY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT HE HAVE THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE GUATEMALAN AIR FORCE. HE ASSURED GARCERAN THAT HE HAS SUCH SUPPORT.

6. ALEJOS SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPLY THE NECESSARY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO THE CUBAN EMIGRES RECRUITED BY GARCERAN. HE REVEALED THAT THE LOCATION OF THE TRAINING SITE WOULD BE IN NORTHERN NICARAGUA, A NECESSARY CHOICE BECAUSE SOUTHERN NICARAGUA IS TO BE USED BY THE SOMOZA/SCHECK FORCES AS A LAUNCHING SITE FOR A COUP AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS PROBABLY INVOLVES THE PLANS OF MIGUEL RUIZ HERRERA, A COSTA RICAN REVOLUTIONARY AND LEADING ORGANIZER IN NICARAGUA OF A COUP EFFORT AGAINST COSTA RICA, ON WHICH THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL REPORTING.)

7. (FIELD COMMENT: A NEW SOURCE, WHOSE ACCESS IS BELIEVED TO BE GOOD, REPORTED IN LATE SEPTEMBER THAT ONE CARLOS ALEJOS, RESIDENT OF MIAMI, HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MOVING A LARGE QUANTITY OF ARMS INTO GUATEMALA VIA EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS AND THAT HE HAS ALSO BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN ENLISTING THE SUPPORT OF GUATEMALAN EXILES IN MEXICO FOR HIS COUP. ALEJOS IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU.)

8. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS

OF STATE, FBI, I&NS, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, FAA, AND USCG.

(ALSO SENT PANAMA CITY, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, SAN JOSE AND MANAGUA.)

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] will [illegible] require additional info needed to meet CS indexing requirements.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-251689
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION C/WH 6 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR ADDP, ACWH/C5, C/CI, C/FI2

AN PI DEST PS ABSTRACT INDEX

S E C R E T 292302Z

DIR INFO MANA CITE WAVE 6214

KAPOK/DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMCLATTER/1

REF A WAVE 5431 (IN 43038)

B DIR 43562

C WAVE 5849 (IN 54607)

DESENSITIZED PER CSN 43-43

65 IN 62395

1. AMCLATTER/1 MET DR JULIO (GARCERAN) DEL VALL SOUZA AFTER LATTER'S RETURN FROM WASHINGTON 22 SEP 65. GARCERAN REPORTED HE INVITED BLANCA ROSA MAYORGAS AND HUSBAND COL JOHN KELLY DINNER 20 SEP 65. COL KELLY DID NOT ATTEND DINNER, HIS WIFE EXPLAINING TO GARCERAN THAT HER HUSBAND HEAVY DRINKER AND HAD EXCEEDED HIS QUOTA THAT DAY. FROM COMMENTS MADE BY MAYORGAS GARCERAN INFERS COL KELLY RETIRED BUT "STILL WORKS PENTAGON IN CIVILIAN STATUS IN ALLOCATION OF TROOPS IN VIET NAM."

2. MAYORGAS TOLD GARCERAN SHE HAD NOT YET TRAVELED TO NICARAGUA BUT STILL PLANS DOING SO "AROUND FIRST PART OF 66." GARCERAN DID NOT PURSUE MATTER FURTHER ORDER NOT AROUSE UNDUE SUSPICION HIS INTEREST HER PLANNED TRIP.

3. GARCERAN FURTHER LEARNED THAT MAYORGAS NOT CUBAN BUT NICARAGUAN CITIZEN. HE HAD KNOWN HER IN CUBA WHEN SHE WAS STUDYING

DESENSITIZED PER CSN 43-43

SECRET

201-251689

SECRET IN 62395 PAGE 2

ITALIAN IN HAVANA. AT THAT TIME SHE MARRIED TO FNU DEBARGAS (PHONETIC), A MEMBER OF ITALIAN EMBASSY HAVA. LIVED AT PASEO AND 17 STREET, VEDADO. MAYORGAS ALSO SAID SHE "AT ONE TIME" WAS MEMBER NICARAGUAN CONSULAR STAFF IN SAN FRANCISCO.

4. WAVE FILES REFLECT NO TRACES DEBARGAS OR VARIANTS. PERHAPS ODACID COULD IDENTIFY. DID ODENVY INTERVIEW GARCERAN PER REF B.

SECRET

CFN 6214 5431 43562 5849 AMCLATTER/1 DR JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA 22 65 BLANCA ROSA MAYORGAS COL JOHN KELLY 20 65 NOT ATTEND VIET NAM NOT YET 66 NOT PURSUE NOT AROUSE NOT CUBAN FNU DEBARGAS PASEO 17 STREET VEDADO NO TRACES B

BT

SECRET

14-00000

AMCLATTER-1
201

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

22 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CICS	5	FI
2		6	RR
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

EJC
LD

S E C R E T 082127Z

8 Nov 65 IN 90695

DIR BOGO CITE WAVE 7112

TYPIC MHGUILE

REF DIR 56346 *

RE PARA 2 REF. IN TALKING WITH AMCLATTER/1 HECTOR CLETO ORIZONDO SAID HE JUST RETURNED FROM BOGO, IS NOW LOOKING FOR RANCHLAND EVERGLADES AREA FOR CATTLE RAISING AT REQUEST UNNAMED WEALTHY COLOMBIANS.

SECRET

CFN: 7112 56346 RE 2 AMCLATTER/1 HECTOR CLETO ORIZONDO BOGO EVERGLADES COLOMBIANS

* CAN YOU CONFIRM ORIZONDO'S RETURN FROM BOGO

BT

SECRET

14-00000

File - AMCLATTER-1

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 8

☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET 7

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	TC	5	90
2		6	00
3	FI	7	D
4	CI	8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C 8 CI/OPS

S E C R E T 021737Z

EJC
LD
BH

BOGO INFO DIR CITE WAVE 6982

2 NOV 65 IN 85580

DYVOUR PERUMEN

REF A BOGO 6317 (IN 77677)

B BOGO 6262 (IN 69601)*

STATION ASSET AMCLATTER/1, USING APPROPRIATE COVER LOCAL CUBAN EXILE GROUP, CONTACTED HECTOR CLETO ORIZONDO-BORGES 29 OCT 65. ORIZONDO CLAIMS NEVER HEARD OF JULIO TOMAS CRUZ, A/1 BELIEVES HE TELLING TRUTH.

SECRET

*REQUESTED TRACES ON HECTOR HORIZON

CFN 6982 6317 6262 AMCLATTER/1 HECTOR CLETO ORIZONDO-BORGES 29 65 JULIO TOMAS CRUZ A/1

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH/C CD

AC

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME 1348 BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/SPG, FI/INT 2.

S E C R E T 172193Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO MANA CITE WAVE 5649

17 SEP 65 IN 54607

DYVOUR FORMUL ANCLATTER/1

REF: DIR 43562

1. WAVE HAS NO OBJECTION FBI [redacted] CONTACT true name [redacted] IN CONNECTION AME PLOT. HOWEVER STRONGLY URGE HQS IMPRESS FBI [redacted] WITH NECESSITY PROTECT WAVE SOURCE THIS MATTER AND ATTRIBUTE INFO TO OTHER THAN WAVE SOURCE, E.G. ONE OR SEVERAL KELLY'S "WIDE MILITARY CONTACTS WASHINGTON" COULD IMPLY same true name [redacted] BEING QUESTIONED RE HIS OWN POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT SINCE HE KNOWN BE FRIEND OF KELLY'S.

2. RE PARA 2 QUERY SEE NO NECESSITY FBI [redacted] CONTACT ANCLATTER/1. SINCE HE HAS NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF PLOT BEYOND THAT TOLD HIM BY same true name [redacted] WHICH FULLY REPORTED BY WAVE. WOULD RECONSIDER FBI [redacted] CONTACT ANCLATTER/1 IN EVENT DIRECT QUESTIONING same true name [redacted] FAILS ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE.

S E C R E T

CFN 5649 43562 NO OBJECTION same true name [redacted] KELLY'S WASHINGTON 2 NO NECESSITY ANCLATTER/1 NO PERSONAL [redacted] same true name.

SECRET

14-00000

DEPARTM OF STATE
FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

REQUEST FOR NAME CHECK

☐ IMMIGRANT ☑ NONIMMIGRANT

2. DATE 8/31/65

3. TO: Department of State
☒ Visa Office
☐ Office of Security - Att'n SY/I Liaison

4. APPLICANT (Include maiden name/aliases, etc.)
Clara Elena FERNANDEZ Collazo de BAKER
maiden name formerly JIMENEZ Collazo
(Fernandez apparently step-father)

5. FROM: AmConGen, Toronto

6. PLACE OF BIRTH Habana, Cuba

7. DATE OF BIRTH Aug/12/17

8. ACTION REQUESTED
☐ SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION ☐ WAIVER UNDER 212(d)(3)(A)
☐ NAME CHECK ☐ OTHER (See Item 27)

9. PRESENT ADDRESS
4400 N.W. 5th St., Miami, Fla.

WH

10. REFERENCE (Previous correspondence, Foreign Affairs Manual, etc.)

11. DISTINGUISHING MARKS OF IDENTIFICATION
none

12. SEX F

13. MARITAL STATUS Married

14. OCCUPATION (Include name and address of employer)
Floorlady at Dept. Store

15. NATIONALITY Cuban

16. PURPOSE OF VISIT AND DESTINATION OR ITINERARY IN U.S.
to reside

17. REASON FOR REQUEST, OR TYPE OF PROGRAM

18. LENGTH OF STAY permanently

19. TYPE PASSPORT Cuban

20. FATHER'S NAME
Amado JIMENEZ Campo

21. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME
America COLLAZO Laine

22. SPOUSE (Maiden name)
Bernard L. BARKER

23. APPLICANT TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY:
none

24. RESIDENCES PAST 15 YEARS (Dates, street addresses, cities, countries)
8/33 to 5/~~33~~ 34, Hotel Roma O'Reilly St., Habana, Cuba
5/34 to 8/36 Hargrave Hotel 72nd St. New York, N.J.
8/36 to 6/46 San Miguel and Lealtad, Habana, Cuba
6/46 to 5/47 Vernam Field Jamaica B.W.I.(Husb. U.S.Army)
5/47 to 2/60 Calle 98 #5901 Marianao, Cuba
2/60 to pres. 420 N.W. 44th Ave., Miami, Fla.
4400 N.W. 5th St., " "

25. RELATIVES IN U. S. (Names, street addresses, cities, states)
Mrs. America Alvarez 1401 Magnolia Dr., Augusta, Ga. Mother

26. AFFILIATIONS
Partido Democrata

☐ Return to Visa Office

REQUESTING OFFICER

DATE

(For use of Office of Security)

RESULTS OF THIS REQUEST
☐ NO RECORD ☐ SECURITY INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐ NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION ☐ OTHER (See below)

CHECKED BY

DATE

1119 65

WO

REMARKS

NPH
16 Sept 65
HKP

10 SEP 1965

FORM FS-402
8-60

FILE IN 201-751687 (Clara ... 201)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
AMCLATTER-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 20475

Subject was granted an Operational Approval 31 March 1965.

CHESTER D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - JMWAVE

201-281689

CS COPY

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-8080

DATE
13 APR 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-281689

1 - WH/C/RR/OBOA
1 - WH/C/RRRO
1 - 201-281689

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: WH/C/RR/OBOA
OFFICER: W. Ullery
TYPIST: db
DATE: 9 Apr 65
EXT: 7840

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/RR/OBOA	12 Apr 65	J. Houghan
WH/C/MO/FI		M. Darling
WH/FI		

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WHD
DATE: 12 Apr 65
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: Desmond Fitzgerald

FORM 1-61 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

CLATTER-1

SECRET

201 No.251689

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ~~WH/C/RR/OSOB~~ ~~O.A. Williams~~

WH/C/MO/FI (Darling)

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of AMCLATTER/1 __________, for the purpose specified in your request dated 29 March 1965.

UFGA 20475

FYI & file

FI-CI Support Agent.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 31 March 1965 dlm

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

201-251689

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

FORM 124 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (6)

CLATTER-1

S E C R E T

29 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~Chief, CI-OA~~

SUBJECT : AMCLATTER/1
201-251689

Attached for your retention is one copy of Subject's PRQ Part II. An Operational Approval is hereby requested.

Joseph Moughan
for John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WH/C

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w att.
1 - WH/C/RR/OSOA
1 - 201-251689

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

201-251689

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC
PRQ Part II for AMCLATTER/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Process Subject for an OA

Refs: A. UFGW-4928, 5 March 1965
B. WAVE-9534, 15 March 1965

Attached herewith as requested in Reference A is a completed PRQ Part II for AMCLATTER/1.

staff agent

[redacted]

for ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Depletion would be too [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - DC, WH/SA (w/PRQ II, h/w)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
16 Mar 65

DATE DISPATCHED
MAR 2 3 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-20475

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

10 SEP 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Involvement of Blanca Rosa MAYORGAS,
Wife of U.S. Army Colonel John H. Kelly,
in Plans to Overthrow the Government of Nicaragua

1. Reference is made to paragraph 4 of TDCSDB-315/02854-65, dated 1 September 1965, Subject: Remarks Made By General Anastasio SOMOZA Concerning Daniel ODUBER of Costa Rica and Communist Plans for Revolutionary Action Against Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama.

2. Source of the following information, who was also source of above reference, is a Miami businessman, who was a resident of Havana for several years and who has contacts who recognize him as a channel to U.S. intelligence. The information was received on 31 August 1965.

A. Dr. Julio GARCERAN del Vall Souza, former Cuban Supreme Court Magistrate, said there is a plot afoot to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua.

B. On 3 August 1965, GARCERAN visited Blanca Rosa MAYORGAS, whom he knew in Cuba, at her home, 1310 Longfellow Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., where she resides with her husband, U.S. Army Colonel John H. KELLY, who is employed in the Pentagon. Blanca Rosa told GARCERAN that she would soon be leaving for Nicaragua where her cousin, who married Tachito SOMOZA, lives. At the request of Francisco AGUIRRE, owner of Diario Las Americas and brother of Horacio AGUIRRE, managing editor, Blanca Rosa has agreed to deliver messages and reports to a number of Nicaraguans who, with Francisco AGUIRRE, are involved in plans to overthrow the SOMOZA government.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C. GARCERAN explained that on 4 August he accompanied his "Washington delegate," Gerardo MORA, to the home of Col. KELLY, who, according to MORA, has wide military contacts in Washington because of his position in the Pentagon. GARCERAN had prepared a memorandum which he left with KELLY, who was to try to arrange an interview with Secretary MCNAMARA for GARCERAN. When GARCERAN changed his mind about the proposed meeting with Secretary MCNAMARA, who would probably not receive him anyway because of pressing problems in Vietnam, he returned to the KELLY home on 5 August to request return of his memorandum. He was received by Blanca Rosa, who told him that Francisco AGUIRRE had waited to see him but had to leave. She then told GARCERAN about her mission for AGUIRRE for which she was especially suited because of her relationship to Mrs. "Tachito" SOMOZA and because her husband is a U.S. Colonel, whose status would place her above suspicion.

3. No additional information is available to this office concerning Blanca Rosa MAYC[illegible].

4. Files of this office identify one Gerardo MORA, of Cuban origin, as a lawyer employed at the OAS in Washington, D.C.

5. Additional information is available in this office concerning GARCERAN, Francisco AGUIRRE, and Horacio AGUIRRE.

CSCI-316/0[illegible]13-6[illegible]

CC: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Dept. of State (Security)
I&NS

DDP/WH/2/N Helen Morgan

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee   1 - WH/C/MO/FI
1 - WH/[illegible]/MIC
1 - RI ([illegible])   7 September 1964
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/OA
1 - Off. Sec. of Defense   BASIC: WAVE 0431
1 - Dept. of State   (AMLATTER-1)
1 - I&NS [illegible]ward, WH/C/R
(Whitney Tucker)

AMCLATTER-1 (201)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 35

2/30 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C8, C/ICX, C/OPS, C/FI, C/OA, C/PS, SOD6, FI/INT

DIR INFO MANA CITE WAVE 5431 31 Aug 65 IN 43038

DYVOUR ~~PBRUMEN~~ AMCLATTER-1

1. ACCORDING AMCLATTER-1, DR. JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA, FORMER CUBAN SUPREME COURT MAGISTRATE, SAID THERE PLOT AFOOT TO OVERTHROW SCHICK GOVERNMENT.

2. ACCORDING GARCERAN, ON 5 AUG 65 HE VISITED BLANCA ROSA MAYORGAS, WHOM HE KNEW IN CUBA, AT HER HOME, 1319 LONGELLOW ST., NW, WASHINGTON, D. C., WHERE SHE RESIDES WITH HER HUSBAND, U.S. ARMY COLONEL JOHN H. KELLY WHO EMPLOYED PENTAGON. BLANCA ROSA TOLD GARCERAN THAT SHE WOULD SOON BE LEAVING FOR NICARAGUA WHERE HER COUSIN LIVES, WHO MARRIED TO TACHITO SOMOZA. AT REQUEST OF FRANCISCO AGUIRRE, OWNER OF DIARIO LAS AMERICAS AND BROTHER OF HORACIO AGUIRRE, MANAGING EDITOR, SHE HAS AGREED DELIVER MESSAGES AND REPORTS TO NUMBER OF NICARAGUANS WHO WITH FRANCISCO AGUIRRE INVOLVED PLANS OVERTHROW SCHICK GOVERNMENT.

3. GARCERAN EXPLAINED THAT ON 4 AUG HE HAD ACCOMPANIED "HIS WASHINGTON DELEGATE" GERARDO MORA TO HOME OF COL. KELLY WHO, ACCORDING TO MORA, HAS WIDE MILITARY CONTACTS WASHINGTON BY VIRTUE HIS POSITION

SECRET

IN PENTAGON. GARCERAN HAD PREPARED MEMO WHICH HE LEFT WITH KELLY WHO WAS TO TRY OBTAIN INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA FOR GARCERAN. WHEN GARCERAN CHANGED HIS MIND ABOUT PROPOSED MEETING WITH MCNAMARA, WHO WOULD PROBABLY NOT RECEIVE HIM DUE PRESSING VIETNAM PROBLEM, HE RETURNED TO KELLY HOME ON 5 AUG TO REQUEST RETURN OF MEMO. HE RECEIVED BY BLANCA ROSA WHO TOLD HIM THAT FRANCISCO AGUIRRE HAD BEEN WAITING TO SEE HIM BUT HAD TO LEAVE. SHE THEN TOLD GARCERAN HER MISSION FOR AGUIRRE (DESCRIBED PARA 2), ONE FOR WHICH SHE ESPECIALLY SUITED IN VIEW HER RELATIONSHIP TO MRS. TACHITO SOMOZA AND FACT HER HUSBAND U.S. COLONEL. LATTERS STATUS WOULD PLACE HER ABOVE SUSPICION.

4. WAVE WILL ADVISE IF AND WHEN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RECEIVED THIS REGARD.

5. WAVE FILES REFLECT NO TRACES ROSA MAYORGAS, KELLY OR TACHITO SOMOZA. MORA MAY BE IDEN WITH GERARDO MORA RIVERA WHO LAWYER EMPLOYED OAS WASHINGTON. ACCORDING DBF-45084, 9 MAR 60, FRANCISCO AND HORACIO (201-045645) AGUIRRE BACA REPORTEDLY MET WITH CASTRO BROTHERS OCT 59 TO DISCUSS PLANS FOR INVASION NICARAGUA. FRANCISCO DENIED THIS IN DBF-69629, 31 JAN 61. POA OBTAINED ON FRANCISCO CANCELLED FEB 61. ACCORDING TDCS-3/387,024, 4 FEB 59, HORACIO ACTING AS LIASON AGENT

SECRET #IN 43078 PAGE 3

BETWEEN NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARIES AND CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS. ACCORDING DBF-40783, 20 JAN 60, PERSONS ACQUAINTED WITH HORACIO BELIEVED HE NOT ENGAGED REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES AGAINST NICARAGUA. HE LABELLED COMMUNIST AGENT OPERATING MIAMI AREA BY DOMINICAN INTEL CHIEF TORRES IN HDCA 2000, 21 APR 60.

SECRET

CFN: 5431 -1- DR JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA CUBAN SCHICK GARCERAN 5 65 BLANCA ROSA MAYORGAS CUBA 1319 LONGFELLOW ST NW WASHINGTON D C U.S. ARMY COLONEL JOHN H KELLY PENTAGON BLANCA ROSA GARCERAN NICARAGUA TACHITO SOMOZA FRANCISCO AGUIRRE DIARO LAS AMERICAS HORACIO AGUIRRE NICARAGUANS FRANCISCO AGUIRRE SCHICK GARCERAN 4 "HIS WASHINGTON DELEGATE" GERARDO MORA COL KELLY MORA WASHINGTON PENTAGON GARCERAN KELLY MCNAMARA GARCERAN GARCERAN MCNAMARA NOT RECEIVE VIETNAM KELLY 5 BLANCA ROSA FRANCISCO AGUIRRE GARCERAN AGUIRRE 2 MRS TACHITO SOMOZA U.S. WAVE WAVE NO TRACES ROSA MAYORGAS KELLY TACHITO SOMOZA MORA GERARDO MORA RIVERA OAS WASHINGTON DBF 45084 9 60 FRANCISCO HORACIO 201-045645 AGUIRRE BACA CASTRO 59 NICARAGUA FRANCISCO DBF 69692 31 61 POA FRANCISCO 61 TDCS-3/387,024 4 59 HORACIO NICARAGUAN CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS DBF 40783 20 60 HORACIO NOT ENGAGED NICARAGUA COMMUNIST MIAMI DOMINICAN TORRES HDCA 2000 21 60

BT

SECRET

[illegible] Use Previous Editions

(REVISED 4-65)

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

30 SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT
SOD 4, CA/O 4, CI/PS, RI/AN, IW, WH/C 8,

AD/CI 2

SECRET 121901Z 12 JUN 65 2124Z IN 89148

DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR GUAT MEXI TEGU SJOS CITE WAVE 2946

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM

SUPDATA: AMCLATTER-1 FROM HIS DAUGHTER WHO OBTAINED INFO FROM ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU'S DAUGHTER 10 JUNE 65. FIELD COMMENT PARA TWO BASED UFG-7266. RID: INDEX. FILED 121901Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTILA CONTROLLED DISSEM

CUBA/GUATEMALA

SUBJ: CANCELLATION OF EUROPEAN VACATION BY ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, QUATEMALAN EXILE REPORTED TO BE RESUMING EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT

DOI: 10 JUNE 65

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (11 JUNE 65)

UFG-7270

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS

☐ ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

(REVISED 4-65)

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

IN 89148

SOURCE: A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HABANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE SOURCE HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A PERSON WHO SPOKE WITH THE DAUGHTER OF ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU.

IW COMMENT:

14

TDCS

ROUTINE PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

FORM 10-61 3000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SIFG. 12-64

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN IN 89148

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. ON 10 JUNE 1965, CRISTINA ALEJOS, DAUGHTER OF ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, A GUATEMALAN MILLIONAIRE LIVING IN EXILE IN MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, SAID THAT HER FATHER HAD CANCELLED HIS PLANS TO VACATION IN EUROPE THIS SUMMER. SHE SAID THAT HE CANNOT OBTAIN THE FUNDS THAT HE HAS IN GUATEMALA AND THAT HE DOES NOT WANT TO USE THE MONEY HE HAS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE TRIP. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO TDCSDB-315/01726-65, DATED 20 MAY 1965, THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT ALEJOS HAD PLANNED TO TAKE HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER ON A EUROPEAN VACATION IN EARLY JUNE AND THAT HIS ITINERARY INCLUDED ITALY, FRANCE, AND SWITZERLAND).

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

2. (FIELD COMMENT: ALEJOS HAD RECRUITED ABOUT 30 CUBAN EXILES IN THE MIAMI AREA WHOM HE INTENDED TO USE IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THE OPERATION ABORTED IN EARLY MAY WHEN HE AND LUIS SIERRA LOPEZ, MILITARY LEADER OF THE EXILES, WERE APPREHENDED AND THEIR ARMS CACHES WERE SEIZED BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HOWEVER, ON 8 JUNE, ALEJOS IS REPORTED TO HAVE ASKED ODELIO GARCIA DERIZANZ, A CUBAN EXILE LIVING IN MIAMI, TO RECRUIT ABOUT 50 MEN FOR A VENTURE THAT ALEJOS IS PLANNING, WHICH IS BELIEVED TO INVOLVE THE AREA OF PETEN, IN NORTHERN GUATEMALA. ACCORDING TO GARCIA, ALEJOS SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO COSTA RICA WITHIN A WEEK WHERE HE EXPECTED TO SEE FORMER GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES AND WHERE HE WOULD REMAIN FOR ABOUT ONE MONTH. ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED THAT ALEJOS TOLD GARCIA THAT HE (ALEJOS) HAD ALREADY MADE ONE TRIP TO HONDURAS AND COSTA RICA AND HAD MET WITH YDIGORAS. ALEJOS CLAIMED THAT HE AND YDIGORAS HAD AGREED TO REMAIN QUIET UNTIL JULY WHEN THEY WOULD BE BACK IN BUSINESS BUILDING THE FORCES FOR A COUP).

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, FAA, BORDER PATROL, USCG, (ALSO SENT GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, TEGUCIGALPA, AND SAN JOSE).

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX [ ] YES [ ] NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE RID [ ] RET TO BRANCH [ ]

DESTROY [ ] SIG

ROUTING

1
2
3
4

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: IW [X] RID COPY (COPY ISSUED TO IW 3 SOD 2330 10 JUNE ...)

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, /P, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, II, FI/D, ... SOD 4, DO/H, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, FI/SPG, RI/AN, WH/C 12, WH ..., ...

~~SECRET 110114Z~~ ~~11 JUNE 03002 65 IN 87815~~

PRIORITY DIR SDOM INFO PACY LANT BARR CITE WAVE 2835

PITEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMCLATTER-1 FROM [redacted] (PLS PROTECT), FORMER CUBAN POLICEMAN, FROM ATON CONSTANZO PALAU ON 8 AND 9 JUNE 65. RID: INDEX. FILED 110114Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

CUBA/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

SUBJ: RECRUITMENT OF CUBAN EXILES BY ATON CONSTANZO PALAU TO JOIN THE RANKS OF THE LOYALIST FORCES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST FRANCISCO CAAMANO DENO

DOI: 8-9 JUNE 1965

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (10 JUNE 1965)

UFG-7261

W COMMENT:

WH/REG
WH/2/DR/RP
WH/C

RELEASING IWO Laurie H. Kirkell

LAURIE H. KIRKELL

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 11 JUNE 1965 0834 Z

TDCS DB-315/02005-65

[ ] ROUTINE [X] PRIORITY

BASED ON: UFG-7261

NO PROJECT (AMCLATTER-1)

LIAISON: H

SECRET

SECRET
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(REVISED 4-63)

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO. VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

PAGE 2 IN 87815

SOURCE: A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HABANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE SOURCE HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CUBAN EXILE WHO SPOKE WITH ATON CONSTANZO PALAU.

COMMENT:

IDCS

ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING TWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

MFG 11-63

CONTROLLED DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

TDCS DB-315/02005-65

DATE OF INFO. 8 - 9 JUNE 1965

DISTR. 11 JUNE 1965

SUBJECT

RECRUITMENT OF CUBAN EXILES BY ATON CONSTANZO PALAU TO JOIN RANKS OF THE FORCES OF GENERAL IMBERT AND GENERAL WESSIN Y WESSIN

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (10 JUNE 1965)

REF IN 87815

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-7261

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HAVANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE SOURCE HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CUBAN EXILE WHO SPOKE WITH ATON CONSTANZO PALAU.

(SEE TDCSDB-315/01965-65)

1. FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN REPORTED/THAT A COMMANDO TEAM OF 49 CUBAN EXILES AND 11 AMERICANS IS BEING FORMED IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, BY ODELIO GARCIA DERIZANZ AND GERALD PATRICK HEMMING, AN AMERICAN ADVENTURER AND SOLDIER-OF-FORTUNE. ATON CONSTANZO PALAU AND RAMON ESCARDA RUBIO APPEAR TO BE LEADERS WITHIN THE GROUP. THE COMMANDO TEAM IS ALLEGEDLY TO BE USED BY DOMINICAN GENERAL ANTONIO IMBERT BARRERAS, HEAD OF THE LOYALIST FORCES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, PRESUMABLY TO TRY TO TOPPLE FRANCISCO CAAMANO DENO, LEADER OF THE REBEL FORCES. THE FINANCIAL BACKER OF THE COMMANDO TEAM HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS AN AMERICAN LAWYER LIVING IN MIAMI.)

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC OCI ONE OCR

AD/CI 2, CIA/NMCC, FBI, I&NS, USCG, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, FAA

2. ON 8 JUNE 1965, ATON CONSTANZO PALAU, A FORMER CUBAN REBEL ARMY CAPTAIN WHO RESIDES AT 752 SW 4TH STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA, SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE RECRUITMENT OF 60 CUBAN EXILES WHO ARE TO FIGHT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE EXILES ARE BEING RECRUITED TO JOIN THE FORCES OF DOMINICAN GENERALS ELIAS WESSIN Y WESSIN AND ANTONIO IMBERT BARRERAS IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST THE REBEL FORCES OF FRANCISCO CAAMANO DENO, AND ARE TO BE PAID $50 A DAY FOR THEIR SERVICES. ALL OF THE RECRUITS HAVE A REVOLUTIONARY BACKGROUND BUT DO NOT INCLUDE FORMER MEMBERS OF THE FORCES OF FULGENCIO BATISTA. CONSTANZO SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN RECRUITING THESE MEN FOR A RICH DOMINICAN BUSINESSMAN WHO LIVES IN THE MIAMI AREA.

3. CONSTANZO SAID THAT IN ABOUT APRIL 1965 HE HAD RECRUITED SEVERAL CUBAN EXILES FOR ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, A GUATEMALAN MILLIONAIRE LIVING IN MIAMI BEACH, WHO WERE TO BE USED BY ALEJOS IN HIS ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF ENRIQUE PERALTA AZURDIA. CONSTANZO STRESSED THAT THERE WERE POLITICAL COMMITMENTS INVOLVED IN ALEJOS' RECRUITMENT OPERATION, IN THAT THE CUBAN EXILES WERE TO BE PERMITTED TO ESTABLISH AN ANTI-CASTRO BASE OF OPERATIONS IN GUATEMALA IF THE ATTEMPTED OVERTHROW WERE SUCCESSFUL. (FIELD COMMENT: ALEJOS' ATTEMPTED OVERTHROW ABORTED IN EARLY MAY AND THE CUBAN EXILES DISBANDED. CONSTANZO HAD BEEN RECRUITED FOR THE OPERATION AS A TEAM LEADER.) IN THE PRESENT RECRUITMENT OPERATION, HOWEVER, CONSTANZO POINTED OUT THAT THE PRIMARY ATTRACTION IS THE $50-A-DAY PAYMENT FOR SERVICES RENDERED.

4. GERALD PATRICK HEMMING, AN AMERICAN, IS REVIEWING ALL THE FORMS SUBMITTED BY THE POTENTIAL RECRUITS FOR THE OPERATION AND HAS THE AUTHORITY TO GIVE FINAL APPROVAL TO THE CANDIDATES. ON 8 JUNE HE WAS SEEN DRESSED IN COVERALLS AND WAS WEARING A SILVER-COLORED HELMET, ATTIRE WHICH IS USUALLY EMPLOYED BY MEN ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK.

5. AS OF 9 JUNE, A GROUP OF THE EXILES WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART FROM THE UNITED STATES ON 12 JUNE, PRESUMABLY FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

6. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, BORDER PATROL, FAA AND USCG. (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO.)

END OF MESSAGE

AMCLATTER-1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
XXXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

MICROFILMED
MAY 10
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC Operational
Receipt of Threatening Telephone Calls by AMCLATTER/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

1. AMCLATTER/1 reported on 19 April 1965 that he had received that same evening a total of four phone calls from an unidentified party threatening to kill both his wife and himself.

2. The first three phone calls were received between 1800 and 1830 hours whereas the fourth call was received at 2130 hours. The caller spoke fluent English and used extremely vile language insulting to both A/1 and his wife. The conversation during each phone call was short and made no sense to A/1 who said the caller at one point identified himself as Jerry WALKER when A/1 asked who was speaking. A/1 has never heard of anyone by this name and believes it to be fictitious. The caller also said on one occasion, "I've been hearing the things you said about me up in Fort Lauderdale." Again, this remark made no sense to A/1.

Re: Threatening phone calls received by 201-251699.

3. A/1, when offered by his JMWAVE C/O the use of a motel room or safehouse for the evening, said that he appreciated our offer but was armed with a 38 caliber revolver and could take care of himself. He said that his wife and 18 year old daughter agreed with him about staying in their own house since they had fled their home once before in PBRUMEN and did not intend to run again. A/1 is of the opinion that the caller is a crank but has not ruled out the possibility that it may be PBRUMEN intel inspired. He said that one of his friends (IDEN) also had recently received a number of threatening phone calls from someone who spoke fluent Spanish but refused to identify himself by name.

4. WAVE traces on WALKER are negative.

for Chester R.
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Distribution:
3-WH/Cuba (w/IDEN u/s/c) (attached)

CS COPY

201-251699

DATE TYPED 29 Apr 65	DATE DISPATCHED APR 30 1965
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-21355
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-126-3-21/3

CLA-1

1P

Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-21355

IDEN- Reynaldo PICO Ramon (201-284658)

MICROFILMED
MAY 10 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
3 - WH/Cuba

C3 COPY

S/c
Att #1 to UFGA-21355

SECRET

[illegible]

201-257689

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: WH/COG/FI

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Bill Fritze

FROM:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO : [illegible] (47)

SECRET

TO : Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Alicia CRUZ Bustillo

It is requested that the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of State be searched for any information they may contain regarding Alicia CRUZ Bustillo, and that information be forwarded to this Office. Available information indicates that Miss BUSTILLO, a Cuban ballet dancer, is about 19 years of age, and was one of the group of Cuban ballet dancers which recently made a tour of Europe. She reportedly has recently injured her foot and is not now dancing but is working as a secretary to Alicia ALONSO, the prima ballerina of Cuba.

CSCI-316/[illegible]-67

21 February 1967

DDP/WH/COG/CICS/Elaine Ayers:mak Source: DCS [illegible] 17967

Distribution: File : 19-2-4
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RID
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/COG/FI/TC-B.Frietse
1 - Originator
2 - WH/COG/CICS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

FORM 2020A 9-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

F

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

W/hc

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: S AT: 1835 Z

DISS BY: 12 PER

ACTION: WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:
FILE, VR. CS/DO, EUR 8, WH 8
C1/OPS, C1/OA, FI

S E C R E T 131712Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1634

PRIORITY MADRID, DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, FRANKFURT

TYPIC MHAPRON AMMEDIA

REF JMWAVE 1633 (IN 69663)

13 Mar 68 IN 69673

IDENTITY: FORMER WITHRUSH ASSET WHO TERMINATED FEB 66 FOR INSUITABILITY IN PROPOSED CONGO ASSIGNMENT.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-289885

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 38

17 SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Leopoldville

ACTION SOD6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, AF7, S/4, WH/C8, WE8, CCS3,

S E C R E T 101550Z

WAVE DIR CITE LEOP 3961 (LAMPRIGHT ACTING)

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

10 FEB 66 IN 52472

1. FOLL ITINERARY FOR BARTES: DEPT LEOP 9 FEB VIA SABENA TO MADRID. ARRIVE NEW YORK VIA TWA 901, 11 FEB.

2. FOR WAVE: BARTES VERY UNHAPPY OVER TERMINATION CLAIMING HE NOT TREATED FAIRLY BY AO'S OR TRAVIESO. FACT IS HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENT HOME A MONTH AGO. REQUEST LORENTZ MAY WANT TO USE TRAVIESO IF BARTES PROVES BE DIFFICULT.

3. BARTES PAID USD 200 AND SIGNED RECEIPT STATING HE HAS NO FURTHER MONEY DUE HIM.

S E C R E T

CFN 3961 BARTES DEPT 9 VIA SABENA MADRID NEW YORK VIA TWA 901 11 NOT TREATED AO'S TRAVIESO A LORENTZ USD 200 NO FURTHER

BT

SECRET

201-289885

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

4/15 SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION
SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, AF 7, CI/OA, OPSER

SECRET 071105Z

IN 49760

DIR INFO WAVE CITE LEOP 3892 LAMPRIGHT ACTING

7 FEB 65 IN 49760

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF A. LEOP 3701, PARA 2 (IN 42743)*

B. LEOP 3274 (IN 26440)

1. FURTHER OBSERVATION BARTES (B) INDICATES HE CONTINUALLY EMPLOYS DANGEROUS PRACTICES ALTHOUGH GIVEN REPEATED INSTRUCTION. B SHOWS NO SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT NOR ABILITY TO RETAIN INSTRUCTION. CHECK FLIGHT GIVEN BY CHIEF PILOT TRAVIESO (T) 4 FEB CONVINCED T THAT B SHOULD BE TERMINATED. T INFORMED SAO THAT HE HAS GIVEN UP TRYING TO TEACH B WHO ARGUMENTATIVE AND MAKES NO EFFORT TO IMPROVE HIMSELF.

2. PLAN RETURN B MIAMI 10 FEB.

SECRET *PERTAINS TO TRAINING / STANDARDS AT WAVE.

CFN

3892 3701 2 3274 BARTES (B) B NO SIGNS NOR ABILITY TRAVIESO (T) 4 T B T SAO B NO EFFORT B 10

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO 201-282285

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-237535

X-REF TO FILE NO. See below

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☒ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

0000005

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR AF 7 WH/C 8 CI/OA OPSER

S E C R E T 012043Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8881

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: LEOP 3701 (IN 42743)

AN
PS
ABSTRACT X
INDEX

1 FEB 66 IN 45963

1P

1. REF INDICATES EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH EVALUATION BY PBRUMEN 201-282295 FLIGHT EVALUATORS IN MIAMI OF BARTES (B) AND NAVARRO (N).

2. PLS SEE WAVE 7591 (IN 04663) FOR (B) EVALUATION. AFTER RECEIPT OF LEOP 2362 (IN 97504), WAVE CONCENTRATED ON MULTI-ENGINE PROCEDURES BASED UPON PROPOSED USAGE OF SUBJ.

3. PLS SEE WAVE 7846 (IN 12088) FOR (N) EVALUATION.

S E C R E T

CFN

8881 3701 MIAMI BARTES B NAVARRO N 7591 B 2362 7846 N

BT

SECRET

MICROFILMED
APR 14 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B-201-282295

201-282295
1 Feb. 1966

[illegible]

IN-45640-

(C) OSCAR CORDO LUGO - CO-PILOT

(D) ANGEL PEDRIANES - CO-PILOT (E/E ALBERT)

3. DEPARTURE FORECAST:

RENE TRAVIESO - 31 MARCH (BACK IN TWO MONTHS).

FAUSTO VALDES - 30 APRIL (RETURN TO U.S.A.)

ERNESTO DESPAIGNE - WILL DECIDE IN FEBRUARY.

JORGE QUINTERO - INDEFINITE.

EFRAIN MORANTES - 30 [illegible]

CASTOR CERECEDA - WILL REPORT 30 DAYS BEFORE LEAVING.

ANGEL DE LA CUESTA - WILL DECIDE IN FEBRUARY

JUAN PERON - POSSIBLY ONE YEAR.

ENRIQUE CADENAS - 10 APRIL (DEPENDING ON WORK).

FRANK CARTES - [illegible] JUNE -

JORGE NAVARRO - POSSIBLY ONE YEAR.

ROBERTO DE CARDENAS - MORE THAN SIX MONTHS.

RAUL CRUZ - POSSIBLY 8 MONTHS.

[illegible] HERNANDEZ ROJO - WILL DECIDE IN FEBRUARY.

RAFAEL GARCIA - 15 JANUARY (BACK IN 30 DAYS).

ARMANDO PIEDRA - JUNE OR JULY

ROBERTO [illegible] - 30 JUNE (WILL BE BACK IN 30 DAYS).

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(D) [illegible]

[illegible]

45640
1 Feb 66

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

7/5 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION
SOD 6 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, AF 7, C/OP, CI/SEC,

S E C R E T 271647Z

27 JAN 65 IN 42743

DIR CITE LEOP 3701

WAVE CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

*Reg PCA TRAC

REF: A. WAVE 8539 IN 38365

B. DIR 73665

C. DIR 71114

1. REQUEST CECELIO PADRON (P) BE REINTRACTED PER PARA 2 REF B ASAP. WAVE CAN TELL (P) THAT HE WILL FLY T-28'S.

2. NAVARRO (N) AND BARTES (B) CHECKED BY SAO AND CONCLUSION REACHED THAT STANDARDS PREVIOUSLY APPLIED TOO HIGH. STA WILL GIVE ADDITIONAL TRAINING TO N AND B WITH VIEW TO USING BOTH CONGO OPS. PROBLEM BASICALLY CIVILIAN PILOTS NOT FAMILIAR WITH T-28 NOR TACTICAL APPLICATION OF T-28. NEITHER PILOT MEASURED UP TO EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH EVALUATION GIVEN BY PBRUMEN INSTRUCTORS WAVE. SUGGEST THAT PBPRIME INSTRUCTOR/CHECK PILOT BE INTEGRATED INTO WAVE/PBRUMEN PROGRAM ASAP.

S E C R E T

CFN 3701 8539 73665 71114 CECELIO PADRON P B B ASAP WAVE P

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : W.WAINWRIGHT:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 10 Jan 66

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-289885
201-282285

31 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

10 JAN 66 23 32z

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: SOD 6 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY, AF 7, WH/C 8, DDP/AIR, CI/OA, RI/AN, CS3, OP2

TO LEOP INFO WAVE CITE DIR 71114

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 70172*

WITH STATION CONCURRENCE AND IF SUBJ REFS NOT ALREADY DEPARTED, REQUEST THEY BE HELD LEOP UNTIL MOCERINO (M) RETURN O/A 18 JAN 66. FYI, M DESIRES RE-EVALUATE AS RESULT PERSONAL EXAMINATION THEIR RECORDS AT WAVE. MEANWHILE PERHAPS SUBJS USEFUL IN ADMIN DUTIES.

Bartes
Navarro

END OF MESSAGE

*Hqs concurred termination contracts two WITHRUSH pilots.

SOD/AB/OPS/3

AF/5

WH/C/MO Brian Mills (phone)

AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP | **DATE**

TO: Bill T.

ROOM NO. | **BUILDING**

REMARKS:

Can we get a check on State files — I vaguely recall talking with this gal in 1960 just before her first trip to USSR —

Travel lists —
CI files — etc.

FROM:

ROOM NO. | **BUILDING** | **EXTENSION**

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55
REPLACES FORM 30-4 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(40)

CLASSIFIED ☐ TERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Mr. Frank Bartes

FROM:
DCS/OSS
Archie J. Richardson/js
900 Key Building

EXTENSION 2268

NO. DCS HH-17967

DATE 9 January 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DO/OS			S
2. WH/C/CA 404 Ames Building	10 JAN		
3. C/WH/COG			
4. C/WH/COG/FI			
5. Bill F.			
6. Mr Murray			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

cc: OS

Attached: NO-380-66, dated 28 Dec 66.

4-6:
Let's name trace
alien and Frank Bartes.
Looks like there could
be something here.

→ Nothing on the Dancer
I have Frank Bartes'
201 file. ¿What action?

CSCI 316/00869-67

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECRET/SENSITIVE NO-380-66

Memorandum

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service DATE: 28 December 1966
Attn.: Operational Support Staff

FROM : Chief, New Orleans Office

SUBJECT: Possible Opportunity to Recruit Agent in Place in Cuba

1. On Tuesday, 20 Dec 66, I received a call from Mr. Frank Bartes, former President of the Consolidated Railroads of Cuba. He is an alien but we have FBI approval to contact dated 14 Apr 61. Mr. Bartes is the source of five reports on Cuba and we, as well as the FBI, have been in frequent contact with him.

2. He called on me primarily to tell me that his mother had arrived from Cuba and would be willing to talk to me.

3. In the course of our conversation Mr. Bartes told me that he had a cousin still living in Cuba named Alicia Cruz Bustillo, who is a ballet dancer associated with Alicia Alonzo, the prima ballerina of Cuba and also a well-known Communist. Bartes says that Alicia Bustillo is not a Communist and he and his family have been in contact with her.

4. Miss Bustillo, who is about 29 years of age, was one of the group of Cuban ballet dancers which recently made a tour of Europe. A group of these Cubans defected while the troupe was Paris, and this received wide publicity in our newspapers. Miss Bustillo, however, did not defect and continued on the tour and returned to Cuba with the group. According to Mr. Bartes, Alicia Bustillo has recently injured her foot and is not now dancing, but is working as secretary to Alicia Alonzo.

5. Mr. Bartes told me that he had planned to meet Alicia Bustillo in Paris and that she had agreed to meet him in Paris, but Mr. Bartes did not have the money to make the trip nor did he think that he would be able to obtain the necessary visa for the trip to Paris because of his status as a Cuban refugee.

6. Mr. Bartes says that Miss Bustillo has traveled all over the world with the Cuban ballet group and has visited most of the Communist countries including China. He feels quite certain that the Cuban group will make another tour and that he will be advised in advance of the date and itinerary. He feels quite certain that he will be able to arrange a meeting with Miss Bustillo provided the group visits a non-Communist country. He claims that he has always been very close to Miss Bustillo whom he considers almost as a sister. He feels quite certain that she would be willing to help the US if she were approached in the proper manner, and he feels that the approach should be made through him because of his relationship and former closeness to her.

7. He says that he believes Miss Bustillo does not attempt to

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Director, Domestic Contact Service
Attn.: Operational Support Staff

NC-383-56
28 Dec 66

leave Cuba because of the fact that her family is there and that she would not leave unless she could also get her family out. He believes that, despite the risk involved, she would be willing to act as an agent in place.

8. My relations with Mr. Bartos have been very good, and I am inclined to believe what he says. However, this whole matter, of course, would have to be evaluated by the Clandestine Services.

9. There is one other matter I would like to mention in connection with Mr. Bartes and that is that he served for two and a half months with a group of Cuban fliers in the Congo, as he holds a pilot's license. He did not tell me and I did not ask who the sponsors of this group were or what their duties were. He did, however, mention a Colonel Weber and a Mr. Saunders. I strongly suspect, of course, that this was an agency operation and, if so, the Clandestine Services will already have a good deal of information about Mr. Bartes.

10. I pass this on for whatever it is worth and, if there is any further information which I can provide, I shall be glad to do so.

Lloyd A. Ray

LARay:gg

SECRET/SENSITIVE

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 27

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : W.WAINWRIGHT:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 5 Jan 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201- 201-

34 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE JMWAVE

6 JAN 66 23 12z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF : SOD 6 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/C8, AF7, CI/OA ~~SIG GEN~~

DDP-AIR

TO LEOP INFO WAVE CITE DIR 70172

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: LEOP 3274 (IN 26440)*

1. VIEW REF CIRCUMSTANCES HQS HAS NO OBJECTION TERMINATION Both CONTRACTS.

2. HQS RECORDS INDICATE FOLL:

A. BARTES: 1145 HRS. NOTARIZED LETTER IN 201 FILE FROM CESSNA DEALER STATES "MR BARTES IS THOROUGH AND COMPETENT PILOT".

B. NAVARRO: 1525 HRS. PBRUMEN AF 1956-58.

3. REQUEST ANY INFO LEOP MIGHT HAVE SUBJS FALSIFIED RECORDS. IF SO, WOULD BE POSSIBLE TERMINATE CONTRACTS WITHOUT 30 DAY PAY (AT LEOP DISCRETION).

4. PLS CLARIFY STATUS RENE GARCIA "ACTING CHIEF PILOT". HQS UNDER IMPRESSION TRAVIESO CHIEF PILOT, GARCIA EMPLOYED AIR CONGO.

5. FOR WAVE: IN FUTURE INCLUDE QUERY RE STATED FLIGHT TIME ON LOFLUTTER.

END OF MESSAGE

*Suggested termination two pilots.

SOD/AB/COPS
AF/5
WH/C/MO

AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

28/30 SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

FROM
LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION
SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C 8, CI/OA, OPSER,

SECRET 041700Z

DIR WAVE CITE LEOP 3274 4 Jan 65 IN 26440

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

REF: A. WAVE 7846 (IN 12688)

B. WAVE 7591 (IN 04663)

C. LEOP 3037 (IN 17722) *

1. MARYINOTTI AND MACIOCE HAVE DEVOTED MOST OF THEIR TIME TO TRAINING NAVARRO AND BARTES SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL IN CONGO. FOLL IS SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

A. BARTES: FIRST FLIGHT LEO 13 DEC, LAST FLIGHT 2 JAN. TOTAL TIME IN AIR LEOP 23 PLUS 35 (IN WAVE 14 PLUS 55). SUBJ CONSISTENTLY FAILS SET UP RADIO PANEL CORRECTLY; POWER SETTINGS USUALLY WRONG FOR IN FLIGHT MANEUVERS; UNABLE PERFORM BASIC MANEUVERS SUCH AS LAZY EIGHT, SPLIT S, CHANDELLE, ETC; ROUNDS OUT HIGH ON LANDINGS; NAVIGATION EXTREMELY POOR; FAILS REPEATEDLY TO ANSWER TOWER OPERATOR; AO FORCED RECOVER AIRCRAFT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS FROM AELERON ROLL; LIED ON NUMBER OCCASIONS RE FLIGHT TIME WHEN AO IN BACK SEAT; CONSISTENTLY FORGETS USE CHECK LIST; DRANK BEER BEFORE ONE FLIGHT AND AO REFUSED FLY WITH

SECRET

HIM; RENE GARCIA CLEARED HIM FOR SOLO 31 DEC AND TOLD SUBJ FLY IN PATTERN MAKING LANDINGS, SUBJ FLEW TO RIVER HOUSE WHERE HE BUZZED FRIENDS AND THEN ENGAGED IN DOG FIGHT WITH NAVARRO, MADE ONLY ONE LANDING; DOES NOT RETAIN TRAINING EVEN THOUGH REPEATED TIME AND AGAIN.

B. NAVARRO: FIRST FLIGHT LEO 16 DEC, LAST FLIGHT 3 JAN. SICK THREE TIMES, ONCE FROM DRINKING TOO MUCH; GROUNDED ONCE FOR DRINKING BEFORE A FLIGHT; DOES NOT CHECK VOR OR COMPASS (IN FIRST FLIGHT COMPASS OFF 90 DEGREES AND DID NOT NOTICE); WILL NOT DO 60 DEGREE TURN BECAUSE "I DON'T LIKE 60 DEGREE TURNS"; SAME AS BARTES ON SIMPLE MANEUVERS IN AIR; TOUCH AND GO LANDINGS TOLD REPEATEDLY USE 40 INCHES BUT STILL USES 42-45 INCHES; SPEED BRAKES DOWN ONE ENTIRE FLIGHT; POWER SETTINGS AND MIXTURES CONSISTENTLY WRONG; CLEARED BY AO FOR SOLO 31 DEC BUT ONLY TO FLY IN PATTERN AND MAKE TOUCH AND GO LANDINGS, INSTEAD BUZZED RIVER HOUSE AND GOT INTO DOG FIGHT WITH BARTES. WHEN AIRCRAFT RETURNED AO CHECKED G METER AND FOUND MINUS THREE G REGISTERED. SUBJ SOAKING WET INDICATING HE HAD BEEN IN SOME TROUBLE.

8. FULL REPORT FOLLOWS BY POUCH. ABOVE HIGHLIGHTS ONLY

SECRET

BUT FULLY DOCUMENTED FROM AO NOTES TAKEN WHILE RIDING IN BACK SEAT.

3. RENE GARCIA, ACTING CHIEF PILOT, TOLD AO'S THAT IN HIS OPINION NEITHER MAN HAS HAD MORE THAN 250 FLIGHT HOURS EACH. GARCIA, WHO PRONE PLAY UP PBRUMEN PILOTS AS BEING BETTER THAN THEY ARE, SAID BOTH NEED MINIMUM 50 ADDITIONAL FLIGHT HOURS.

4. MARYINOTTI AND MACIOCE HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT POSSIBLE TRAIN THESE MEN ADEQUATELY IN MINIMUM TIME, CONSISTENT WITH SAFE OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT. DUE ALLOWANCE MADE FOR LANGUAGE PROBLEM AND FACT T-28 NEW TO SUBJS, AO'S BELIEVE FOLL IS MINIMUM REQUIRED, IN ADDITION TO WHAT ALREADY GIVEN, TO MAKE SUBJS MARGINALLY ACCEPTABLE; TOTAL 55 MORE FLIGHT HOURS BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS - 8 TRANSITION; 25 FORMATION AND GUNNERY; 10 NAVIGATION; 12 INSTRUMENTS.

5. ON BASIS ABOVE RICANDA BELIEVES PARTES DEFINITELY NOT WORTH ADDITIONAL HOURS REQUIRED TRAIN HIM TO MARGINAL PROFICIENCY. THUS INTEND RETURN HIM TO CONUS UNLESS HQS DISAPPROVES. NAVARRO IS AT BEST MARGINAL CASE ALSO. WEIGHED AGAINST GIVING NAVARRO ADDITIONAL 50 HOURS (WHICH WILL REQUIRE MINIMUM 4-5 WEEKS) IS TRANSITION TRAINING TO BE GIVEN THREE

RECENT PILOT ARRIVALS PLUS POSSIBILITY TRAINING 2-3 21ST SQDN PILOTS. ON BALANCE AND CONSIDERING FACT LEOP CANNOT AFFORD TIE UP COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN TRAINING PROGRAM, BELIEVE ADVISABLE ALSO RETURN NAVARRO TO CONUS.

6. REQUEST HQS EARLY REPLY.

SECRET * RE FLIGHT TRAINING

CFN: 3074 7746 7591 3037 MARYINOTTI MACIOCE NAVARRO BARTES BARTES LEO 13 2 23 35 14 55 S CHANDELLE AO AO AO RENE GARCIA 31 NAVARRO NOT RETAIN NAVARRO 16 3 A NOT CHECK VOR 90 NOT NOTICE WILL NOT 60 I 60 BARTES 47 AO-43 AO 31 AO C C AO RENE GARCIA AO'S 250 GARCIA 50 MARYINOTTI MACIOCE T-28 AO'S 55 - 8 25 13 12 RICARDA BARTES NAVARRO NAVARRO 50 A-5 2-3 21ST SQDN LEOP CANNOT NAVARRO

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT Possible Rocket Launching Site in Oriente Province

REPORT NO. 00- B-3161353

DATE DISTR. 14 Jul 60

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Late May 1960

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Late May 1960

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, a pathologist who has recently returned from Cuba where he spent five years in charge of rice production and associated research on a large rice plantation at Jaboba near the Camaguey/Oriente border.

1. Just prior to my departure from Cuba on 26 May 60 I talked with a Vice President of one of Cuba's larger railroads. He occasionally goes on inspection tours of the railroad's facilities, and had just returned from an inspection of the company's spur lines in the Sierra Maestra region of Oriente province. He was accompanied at all times by a Cuban Army officer.

2. One of the spur lines in the Sierra Maestra ran into a restricted area. In this area my friend observed under construction numerous large concrete slabs, immediately adjacent to which were very tall towers of metal framework and wire construction. He says that these were not TV or radio antenna-type towers. From his very limited knowledge of the subject, i.e., the few pictures he has seen in magazines and newspapers of rocket launching sites, he said that these towers appeared similar to steel structures he has seen in pictures of rocket launching bases. He asked his Cuban Army escort what purpose the construction was to serve, and was told "It is not a good idea to ask too many questions where lightning might strike".

3. The concrete construction work was being handled by Russian technicians.

4. Castro's construction of large storage tanks "for pure water" on Cayo Largo is widely known in Cuba, but few accept the fact that the storage tanks are for water. It is the consensus that these tanks are for fuel storage and will serve as a refueling base for submarines. I have flown over Cayo Largo and seen these tanks from the air. They do not look like water storage tanks to me.

5. I have heard that the tenth floor of the Havana Hilton is reserved for the Soviets. While staying there just prior to my departure from Cuba I noticed the elevators never stopped on the tenth floor. I inquired of elevator boys, the desk clerks, and even the assistant manager, why the tenth floor wasn't open to guests. I was told that there were no guests on the tenth floor, that it was not completed, and accommodated no guests. The next day my laundry was returned to me with several pairs of sheets which did not belong to me. The laundry is marked by room number at the Havana Hilton and the number stamped in these sheets was a tenth floor room number.

- end -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

201-239865

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN LIMITED NO DISSEM ABROAD LIMITED
Dissemination limited to full time employees of CIA, AEC, and FBI and within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echelons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-289335
X-REF TO FILE NO. cc below
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ [illegible]
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

21 SECRET

058

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/CF, CI/OA

S E C R E T 062222Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7720

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 7591 (IN 04663)

201-238305
201-283323
201-

MICROFILMED
6 Dec 65 ... 08933
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. FRANCISCO BARTES (B), JUAN PERON (P), AND SANTIAGO MENDEZ (M) DEPARTING NY VIA PAN AM 150/7 WITHOUT CONGO VISA. PLEASE MEET.

2. P AND M UNDER CONTRACT 3 DEC. P ADVANCED $600 AND M ADVANCED $600. BOTH CONTRACTS STIPULATE BASE PAY USD 600 UNTIL CERTIFIED BY FAC THAT SUBJECTS HAVE MET LOCAL STANDARDS FOR PIC. CONTRACT CONTAINS CLAUSE FOR UPGRADING AUTOMATICALY TO USD 800 BASE PAY.

3. P RECEIVED 6 PLUS 30 HOURS ACTUAL INSTRUMENT TRAINING AND M RECEIVED 2 HOURS T-28 REFRESHER AND 4 HOURS AND 30 MIN ACTUAL INSTRUMENT AND VOR WORK.

4. B RECEIVED U$12 FROM ODURGE IN NEW ORLEANS AND P AND M RECEIVED PBPRIME MULTI ENTRY DOCUMENTS MIAMI.

5. TO EXPEDITE P DEPARTURE UNABLE TO GIVE SECOND PLAGUE SHOT, REQUEST LEOP GIVE IMMUNIZATION UPON ARRIVAL.

SECRET KRG BARTES DEPARTING NY 7 DEC.

CFN 7720 7591 FRANCISCO BARTES B JUAN PERON P SANTIAGO MENDEZ M

201-244885
6 Dec. 1965

A 201-138305
B 201-253212

SECRET IN 08933

PAGE 2

NY VIA PAN AM 150/7 P M 3 P $800 M $600 USD 600 FAC PIC USD 800

FEB 10 11 18 PM '66

P 6 30 M 2 T-28 4 30 VOR 1512 P M P

BT

SECRET

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2306 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

3 Dec. 1965

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Florida

Re: BARTES, FRANK

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Bartes was examined by me 20 November 1965 for routine Federal Aviation Agency Class II physical examination which he successfully completed and was issued a medical certificate. He has a glasses limitation due to distant and near vision deficiency.

He was given the following vaccines; Cholera, Typhus, Typh. para-typh., Small Pox, Dipth. Tet. and Plague.

Mr. Bartes is to return at a later date for his Chest Xray and Hbg.

Thank you for referring this airman.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Piper, MD

William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM: JMWAVE
ACTION: SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
INFO: FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C R, DDP/AIR

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
[✓ 3]		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

SECRET 301717Z

30 Nov 65 IN 04683

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7591

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH TRUMEN

1. FRANCISCO BARTES HAS CONCLUDED MIAMI FLIGHT EVALUATION. SCHEDULED DEPART NY 1 DEC.

2. BARTES UNDER CONTRACT 1 DEC AND ADVANCED USD 600 REPRESENTING ONE MONTH SALARY ADVANCE. CONTRACT STIPULATES THAT ONCE QUALIFIED IN ACCORD FOR FAC STANDARDS AS PIC, BASE SALARY TO INCREASE TO USD 800.

3. SUBJECT RECEIVED 3 HOURS NAVIGATION GROUND SCHOOL, 1 HOUR SURVIVAL; 10 PLUS 55 T-28A FLT TIME; 4 HOURS ACTUAL INSTRUMENTS AND 4 HOURS MULTIENGINE PROCEDURES IN APACHE; 17 HOURS T-28A AND C GROUND SCHOOL. IP RATES SUBJECT AS QUALIFIED FOR MULTI-ENGINE CP BUT WILL REQUIRE TACTICS AND GUNNERY IF UTILIZED IN T-28. HOLDS VALID PBPRIME PRIVATE PILOT LICENSE. KNOWN PERSONNALY TO FAUSTO VALDES.

4. WILL CONFIRM ACTUAL DEPARTURE.

SECRET

CFN 7591 FRANCISCO BARTES NY 7 1 USD 600 FAC PIC USD 800 3 1 10 55 T-28A 4 4 APACHE 17 T-28A C IP T-28 FAUSTO VALDE

SECRET

WITHRUSH PERSONNEL CABLE LOCATOR

NAME BARTES Clarens, Francisco Antonio WITHRUSH NUMBER 102

201 NUMBER 289885 C NUMBER

ACTION TAKEN	CITE NUMBER	IN NUMBER	DATE
NOMINATED FOR WITHRUSH			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
LOCAL I & N TRACES N.D.	WAVE 3002	92934	17 Jun 1965
LOCAL POLICE AND CREDIT TRACES N.D.	WAVE 2901	88050	11 June 1965
LOCAL FBI TRACES N.D.	WAVE 2516	81431	2 June 1965
CONTRACT SIGNED			
NOTIFICATION OF POA GRANTED			
DEPART U.S.			
ARRIVED LEOPOLDVILLE	LEOP 2627	11713	9 Dec 65
CONTRACT TERMINATION			
RETURNED TO MIAMI			
BANKING INSTRUCTIONS	WAVE 7590	04662	30 NOV 1965
LCFLUTTER			
REQ LEOP ARRANGE BOARD WITHOUT VISA	WAVE 7569	04212	29 NOV 65
CABLE SENT AUTHORIZING SUBJ BOARD	LEOP 2704	07256	8 Dec 65

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	**DATE**
TO: Bill T.	
ROOM NO.	**BUILDING**

REMARKS:

Can we get a check
on State files — I
vaguely recall
talking with this girl
in 1968 just before
her first trip to USSR —
Travel lists —
CI files — etc.

FROM: Pete [illegible]		
ROOM NO.	**BUILDING**	**EXTENSION**

FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 30-4 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

OLDVILLE

SOD6

PPIE WITHRU

P: LEOP 32

1. VIEW

NTRACTS.

2. HQS

A.

CESSNA D

B.

3. REQU

SO,

4.

5.

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Mr. Frank Bartes

FROM: DCS/OSS
Archie J. Richardson/js
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS HH-17967

DATE: 9 January 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/OS			S	cc: OS
2. WH/C/CA 404 Ames Building	10 JAN			Attached: NO-380-66, dated 28 Dec 66.
3. C/WH/COG				
4. C/WH/COG/FI				4-5: Let's name Trace Alexa and Frank Bartes. Looks like they could be something here.
5. Bill F.			wf	→ Nothing on the Dancer & None Frank Bartes' 201 file. ¿What action?
6. Mr Munoz				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				CSCI 316/00869-67
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECRET/SENSITIVE NO-380-66

Memorandum

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service DATE: 28 December 1966
Attn.: Operations Support Staff

FROM : Chief, New Orleans Office

SUBJECT: Possible Opportunity to Recruit Agent in Place in Cuba

1. On Tuesday, 20 Dec 66, I received a call from Mr. Frank Bartes, former President of the Consolidated Railroads of Cuba. He is an alien but we have FBI approval to contact dated 14 Apr 61. Mr. Bartes is the source of five reports on Cuba and we, as well as the FBI, have been in frequent contact with him.

2. He called on me primarily to tell me that his mother had arrived from Cuba and would be willing to talk to me.

3. In the course of our conversation Mr. Bartes told me that he had a cousin still living in Cuba named Alicia Cruz Bustillo, who is a ballet dancer associated with Alicia Alonzo, the prima ballerina of Cuba and also a well-known Communist. Bartes says that Alicia Bustillo is not a Communist and he and his family have been in contact with her.

4. Miss Bustillo, who is about 29 years of age, was one of the group of Cuban ballet dancers which recently made a tour of Europe. A group of these Cubans defected while the troupe was Paris, and this received wide publicity in our newspapers. Miss Bustillo, however, did not defect and continued on the tour and returned to Cuba with the group. According to Mr. Bartes, Alicia Bustillo has recently injured her foot and is not now dancing, but is working as secretary to Alicia Alonzo.

5. Mr. Bartes told me that he had planned to meet Alicia Bustillo in Paris and that she had agreed to meet him in Paris, but Mr. Bartes did not have the money to make the trip nor did he think that he would be able to obtain the necessary visa for the trip to Paris because of his status as a Cuban refugee.

6. Mr. Bartes says that Miss Bustillo has traveled all over the world with the Cuban ballet group and has visited most of the Communist countries including China. He feels quite certain that the Cuban group will make another tour and that he will be advised in advance of the date and itinerary. He feels quite certain that he will be able to arrange a meeting with Miss Bustillo provided the group visits a non-Communist country. He claims that he has always been very close to Miss Bustillo whom he considers almost as a sister. He feels quite certain that she would be willing to help the US if she were approached in the proper manner, and he feels that the approach should be made through him because of his relationship and former closeness to her.

7. He says that he believes Miss Bustillo does not attempt to

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Director, Domestic Contact Service
Attn.: Operational Support Staff

NC-383-66
28 Dec 66

leave Cube because of the fact that her family is there and that she would not leave unless she could also get her family out. He believes that, despite the risk involved, she would be willing to act as an agent in place.

8. My relations with Mr. Bartes have been very good, and I am inclined to believe what he says. However, this whole matter, of course, would have to be evaluated by the Clandestine Services.

9. There is one other matter I would like to mention in connection with Mr. Bartes and that is that he served for two and a half months with a group of Cuban fliers in the Congo, as he holds a pilot's license. He did not tell me and I did not ask who the sponsors of this group were or what their duties were. He did, however, mention a Colonel Weber and a Mr. Saunders. I strongly suspect, of course, that this was an agency operation and, if so, the Clandestine Services will already have a good deal of information about Mr. Bartes.

10. I pass this on for whatever it is worth and, if there is any further information which I can provide, I shall be glad to do so.

Lloyd A. Ray

LARay:gg

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

28/30 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION
SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C 8, CI/OA, OPSER,

S E C R E T 041700Z

DIR WAVE ~~CITE LEOP~~ 3274 4 JAN 65 IN 26440

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

REF: A. WAVE 7846 (IN 12688)

B. WAVE 7591 (IN 04663)

C. LEOP 3037 (IN 17722) *

1. MARYINOTTI AND MACIOCE HAVE DEVOTED MOST OF THEIR TIME TO TRAINING NAVARRO AND BARTES SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL IN CONGO. FOLL IS SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

A. BARTES FIRST FLIGHT LEO 13 DEC, LAST FLIGHT 2 JAN. TOTAL TIME IN AIR LEOP 23 PLUS 35 (IN WAVE 14 PLUS 55). SUBJ CONSISTENTLY FAILS SET UP RADIO PANEL CORRECTLY; POWER SETTINGS USUALLY WRONG FOR IN FLIGHT MANEUVERS; UNABLE PERFORM BASIC MANEUVERS SUCH AS LAZY EIGHT, SPLIT S, CHANDELLE, ETC; ROUNDS OUT HIGH ON LANDINGS; NAVIGATION EXTREMELY POOR; FAILS REPEATEDLY TO ANSWER TOWER OPERATOR; AO FORCED RECOVER AIRCRAFT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS FROM AELERON ROLL; LIED ON NUMBER OCCASIONS RE FLIGHT TIME WHEN AO IN BACK SEAT; CONSISTENTLY FORGETS USE CHECK LIST; DRANK BEER BEFORE ONE FLIGHT AND AO REFUSED FLY WITH

SECRET

HIM; RENE GARCIA CLEARED HIM FOR SOLO 31 DEC AND TOLD SUBJ FLY IN PATTERN MAKING LANDINGS, SUBJ FLEW TO RIVER HOUSE WHERE HE BUZZED FRIENDS AND THEN ENGAGED IN DOG FIGHT WITH NAVARRO, MADE ONLY ONE LANDING; DOES NOT RETAIN TRAINING EVEN THOUGH REPEATED TIME AND AGAIN.

B. NAVARRO: FIRST FLIGHT LEO 16 DEC, LAST FLIGHT 3 JAN. SICK THREE TIMES, ONCE FROM DRINKING TOO MUCH; GROUNDED ONCE FOR DRINKING BEFORE A FLIGHT; DOES NOT CHECK VOR OR COMPASS (IN FIRST FLIGHT COMPASS OFF 90 DEGREES AND DID NOT NOTICE); WILL NOT DO 60 DEGREE TURN BECAUSE "I DON'T LIKE 60 DEGREE TURNS"; SAME AS BARTES ON SIMPLE MANEUVERS IN AIR; TOUCH AND GO LANDINGS TOLD REPEATEDLY USE 48 INCHES BUT STILL USES 42-43 INCHES; SPEED BRAKES DOWN ONE ENTIRE FLIGHT; POWER SETTINGS AND MIXTURES CONSISTENTLY WRONG; CLEARED BY AO FOR SOLO 31 DEC BUT ONLY TO FLY IN PATTERN AND MAKE TOUCH AND GO LANDINGS, INSTEAD BUZZED RIVER HOUSE AND GOT INTO DOG FIGHT WITH BARTES. WHEN AIRCRAFT RETURNED AO CHECKED G METER AND FOUND MINUS THREE G REGISTERED. SUBJ SOAKING WET INDICATING HE HAD BEEN IN SOME TROUBLE.

8. FULL REPORT FOLLOWS BY POUCH. ABOVE HIGHLIGHTS ONLY

SECRET

BUT FULLY DOCUMENTED FROM AO NOTES TAKEN WHILE RIDING IN BACK SEAT.

3. RENE GARCIA, ACTING CHIEF PILOT, TOLD AO'S THAT IN HIS OPINION NEITHER MAN HAS HAD MORE THAN 250 FLIGHT HOURS EACH. GARCIA, WHO PRONE PLAY UP PBRUMEN PILOTS AS BEING BETTER THAN THEY ARE, SAID BOTH NEED MINIMUM 50 ADDITIONAL FLIGHT HOURS.

4. MARYINOTTI AND MACIOCE HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT POSSIBLE TRAIN THESE MEN ADEQUATELY IN MINIMUM TIME, CONSISTENT WITH SAFE OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT. DUE ALLOWANCE MADE FOR LANGUAGE PROBLEM AND FACT T-28 NEW TO SUBJS, AO'S BELIEVE FOLL IS MINIMUM REQUIRED, IN ADDITION TO WHAT ALREADY GIVEN, TO MAKE SUBJS MARGINALLY ACCEPTABLE: TOTAL 55 MORE FLIGHT HOURS BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS - 8 TRANSITION; 25 FORMATION AND GUNNERY; 10 NAVIGATION; 12 INSTRUMENTS.

5. ON BASIS ABOVE RICANDA BELIEVES BARTES DEFINITELY NOT WORTH ADDITIONAL HOURS REQUIRED TRAIN HIM TO MARGINAL PROFICIENCY. THUS INTEND RETURN HIM TO CONUS UNLESS HQS DISAPPROVES. NAVARRO IS AT BEST MARGINAL CASE ALSO. WEIGHED AGAINST GIVING NAVARRO ADDITIONAL 50 HOURS (WHICH WILL REQUIRE MINIMUM 4-5 WEEKS) IS TRANSITION TRAINING TO BE GIVEN THREE

RECENT PILOT ARRIVALS PLUS POSSIBILITY TRAINING 2-3 21ST SQDN PILOTS. ON BALANCE AND CONSIDERING FACT LEOP CANNOT AFFORD TIE UP COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN TRAINING PROGRAM, BELIEVE ADVISABLE ALSO RETURN NAVARRO TO CONUS.

6. REQUEST HQS EARLY REPLY.

SECRET * RE FLIGHT TRAINING

CFN: 3274 7346 7591 3037 MARYINOTTI MACIOCE NAVARRO BARTES BARTES LEO 13 2 23 35 14 55 S CHANDELLE AO AO AO RENE GARCIA 31 NAVARRO NOT RETAIN NAVARRO 16 3 A NOT CHECK VOR 90 NOT NOTICE WILL NOT 60 I 60 BARTES 42 42-43 AO 31 AO 9 6 AO RENE GARCIA AO'S 250 GARCIA 50 MARYINOTTI MACIOCE T-28 AO'S 55 - 8 25 10 12 RICANDA BARTES NAVARRO NAVARRO 50 A-5 2-3 21ST SQDN LEOP CANNOT NAVARRO

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-138305
X-REF TO FILE NO. [illegible]
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

21

058

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
SOD 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C 8, CI/OA

S E C R E T 062222Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7720

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 7591 (IN 04663)

201-138302
201-283206
201

MICROFILMED
6 Dec 65 [illegible] 08933
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. FRANCISCO BARTES (B), JUAN PERON (P), AND SANTIAGO MENDEZ (M) DEPARTING NY VIA PAN AM 150/7 WITHOUT CONGO VISA. PLEASE MEET.

2. P AND M UNDER CONTRACT 3 DEC. P ADVANCED $800 AND M ADVANCED $600. BOTH CONTRACTS STIPULATE BASE PAY USD 600 UNTIL CERTIFIED BY FAC THAT SUBJECTS HAVE MET LOCAL STANDARDS FOR PIC. CONTRACT CONTAINS CLAUSE FOR UPGRADING AUTOMATICALY TO USD 800 BASE PAY.

3. P RECEIVED 6 PLUS 30 HOURS ACTUAL INSTRUMENT TRAINING AND M RECEIVED 2 HOURS T-28 REFRESHER AND 4 HOURS AND 30 MIN ACTUAL INSTRUMENT AND VOR WORK.

4. B RECEIVED U512 FROM ODURGE IN NEW ORLEANS AND P AND M RECEIVED PBPRIME MULTI ENTRY DOCUMENTS MIAMI.

5. TO EXPEDITE P DEPARTURE UNABLE TO GIVE SECOND PLAGUE SHOT, REQUEST LEOP GIVE IMMUNIZATION UPON ARRIVAL.

SECRET K RE BARTES DEPARTING NY 7 DEC.

CFN 7720 7591 FRANCISCO BARTES B JUAN PERON P SANTIAGO MENDEZ M

A 201-138305
B 201-283206

201-284555
6 Dec. 1965

SECRET IN 08933
PAGE 2

NY VIA PAN AM 150/7 P M 3 P $800 M $600 USD 600 FAC PIC USD 800

FEB 10 11 18 PM '66

P 6 30 M 2 T-28 4 30 VOR 1512 P M P

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
(3)		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C 8, DDP/AIR

S E C R E T 301717Z

30 Nov 65 IN 04663

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7591

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH FORMEN

1. FRANCISCO BARTES HAS CONCLUDED MIAMI FLIGHT EVALUATION. SCHEDULED DEPART NY 7 DEC.

2. BARTES UNDER CONTRACT 1 DEC AND ADVANCED USD 600 REPRESENTING ONE MONTH SALARY ADVANCE. CONTRACT STIPULATES THAT ONCE QUALIFIED IN ACCORD FOR FAC STANDARDS AS PIC, BASE SALARY TO INCREASE TO USD 800.

3. SUBJECT RECEIVED 3 HOURS NAVIGATION GROUND SCHOOL, 1 HOUR SURVIVAL; 10 PLUS 55 T-28A FLT TIME; 4 HOURS ACTUAL INSTRUMENTS AND 4 HOURS MULTIENGINE PROCEDURES IN APACHE; 17 HOURS T-28A AND C GROUND SCHOOL. IP RATES SUBJECT AS QUALIFIED FOR MULTI-ENGINE CP BUT WILL REQUIRE TACTICS AND GUNNERY IF UTILIZED IN T-28. HOLDS VALID PBPRIME PRIVATE PILOT LICENSE. KNOWN PERSONNALY TO FAUSTO VALDES.

4. WILL CONFIRM ACTUAL DEPARTURE.

SECRET

CFN 7591 FRANCISCO BARTES NY 7 1 USD 600 FAC PIC USD 800 3 1 10 55 T-28A 4 4 APACHE 17 T-28A C IP T-28 FAUSTO VALDES

SECRET

WITHRUSH PERSONNEL CABLE LOCATOR

NAME BARTES Clarens, Francisco Antonio WITHRUSH NUMBER 102

201 NUMBER 289885 C NUMBER

ACTION TAKEN	CITE NUMBER	IN NUMBER	DATE
NOMINATED FOR WITHRUSH			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
LOCAL I & N TRACES N.D.	WAVE 3062	92924	17 Jun 1965
LOCAL POLICE AND CREDIT TRACES N.D.	WAVE 2901	88650	11 June 1965
LOCAL FBI TRACES N.D.	WAVE 2516	81431	2 June 1965
CONTRACT SIGNED			
NOTIFICATION OF POA GRANTED			
DEPART U.S.			
ARRIVED LEOPOLDVILLE	LEOP 2627	11713	9 Dec 65
CONTRACT TERMINATION			
RETURNED TO MIAMI			
BANKING INSTRUCTIONS	WAVE 7590	04662	30 Nov 1965
LCFLUTTER			
REQ LEOP ARRANGE BOARD WITHOUT VISA	WAVE 7569	04012	29 Nov 65
CABLE SENT AUTHORIZING SUBJ BOARD	LEOP 2704	07286	8 Dec 65

14-00000

C28

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO. [illegible]

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, AF 7, DDP/AIR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3,

SECRET 292121Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7569

29 Nov 65 IN 04012

CHAPPIE/WITHRUSH/PBRUMEN

1. REQUEST LEOP ARRANGE WITH PAN AM TO BOARD FOLLOWING PERSONNEL NY FOR PAA 150 ON 7 DEC WITHOUT CONGO VISAS.

SOD/AB

FRANCISCO BARTES

JORGE NAVARRO - 201-282285

SANTIAGO MENDEZ - 201-738305

JUAN PERON - 201-283202

2. WILL CONFIRM ACTUAL DEPARTURE.

3. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN: 7569 PAN AM NY PAA 150 7 DEC CONGO FRANCISCO BARTES JORGE NAVARRO SANTIAGO MENDEZ JUAN PERON

BT

SECRET

MICROFILMED
FEB 25 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B. 201-282285

B- 201-738305

B-201-283202

201-[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

-2- SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION 5026 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, OS 4, WH/68, AF 7, CI/IPS, CI/OA

SECRET 292121Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7567

CHAPPIE SECUR WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

Y-2016

1. PBPRIME MULTIPLE ENTRY PERMITS ISSUED TO ANGEL DE LA CUESTA AND ERNESTO DESPAIGNE. I-512 ISSUED TO JORGE NAVARRO.

29 NOV 65 IN 03984

2. MIAMI ODURGE NOT IN RECEIPT AUTHORITY TO ISSUE I-512 FOR FRANCISCO BARTES, AND ADVISED SUBJECTS FILE LOCATED NEW ORLEANS. RETURNING SUBJECT TO NEW ORLEANS TO CONCLUDE PERSONAL AFFAIRS PRIOR TO DIRECT DEPARTURE FROM NEW ORLEANS TO NY/LEOP. REQUEST ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFF ARRANGE FOR ISSUANCE I-512 IN NEW ORLEANS (PER MIAMI SUGGESTION) AND ADVISE LORENTZ VIA TELECON NAME OF CONTACT FOR BARTES. TO MEET URGENT LEOP PILOT REQUIREMENTS, WISH FOR SUBJECT TO DEPART NY ON 7 DEC. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN 7567 PBPRIME ANGEL DE LA CUESTA ERNESTO DESPAIGNE I-512 JORGE NAVARRO MIAMI ODURGE NOT IN I-512 FRANCISCO BARTES NEW ORLEANS NY/LEOP I-512 LORENTZ VIA NY 7

BT

SECRET

Ⓦ ✓

cew

* Call Jerry

wna info

In the Name of God. Amen

I, Francisco Bartes Clarens a citizen and resident of

Metairie County, State of Louisiana, being of sound and

disposing-mind and memory, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my last

Will and Testament

hereby revoking any and all prior wills, codicils and testamentary dispositions.

FIRST ~~XXgiveX bequeath and deviseXX~~ I direct my executor to use the proceeds of all insurance proceeds on my life payable to my estate to first pay debts, estate inheritance taxes, claims and charges of administration and then I give and bequeath all of my estate real, personal or mixed wheever situated to my beloved wife Esperanza Vazquez Ramirez, 1608 Mason Smith, Metairie La.

I hereby make, constitute and appoint Mr Roberto [illegible], 1012 NW 19 Terr [illegible] Fla.

as executor of this my last Will and Testament,

and that no bond or security will be required by such executor.

(Seal

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

BARTES CLARENS, FRANCISCO ANTONIO
201-289885
SEX M DOB ?

1CC-300-017
WAVE-00483
04 DEC 67

CIT ?
OCC ?
FRANCISCO ANTONIO BARTES CLARENS FILE GIVES NO INDICATION OF ANY EMPLOYMENT OTHER THAN THE SHORT TERM CONGO ASSIGNMENT LATE 65

R 7205101529

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 289885

FORM 867 [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

(9-60)

and direct him to pay all of my lawful debts, if any, and the funeral and burial expenses.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto subscribe my name and affix my seal the 27th day of November A. D. 19 55, in the presence of attesting witnesses.

(SEAL)

The foregoing instrument, part being printed and the residue written, was subscribed, sealed, published and declared by Francisco Bartes Clarens *as and for* his *last Will and Testament, in our presence and in the presence of each of us, and we, at the same time, at* his *request, in* his *presence and in the presence of each other, hereunto subscribe our names and addresses as attesting witnesses, this* 27th *day of* November *A. D. 19*65

Armando J. Piedra **Witness**	5614 Rogero Rd. Jacksonville, Fla. **Residence**
Eck Daga **Witness**	219 Antilla Ave. C. Gbls. **Residence**
Witness	**Residence**

RAMCO FORM 35

Will

OF

Executors

November 27,1965

I hereby authorize any salaries or monies due me to be paid to my checking account No. 0015-24-527 at The National Bank of Commerce in New Orleans located at 210 Baronne in said city.

Francisco Bartes

file

SECRET

201 No. 289885

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/AB/OPS/3 — Larry Murphy

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of BARTES Clarens, Francisco Antonio, for the purpose specified in your request dated 9 September 1965.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward R. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 19 November 1965 jab

Distribution:
  Orig. to Addressee
  1 to Files

SECRET

[illegible]

FORM 11-64 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(0)

SECRET

Chief, KUSODA

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

PJDUST/LCFLUTTER/PERUMEN
Transmittal of LCFLUTTER Results

Action: None Required

1. Forwarded herewith (HYBAT) are the following LCFLUTTER reports with below list of IRD numbers, and if available, 201 numbers and cryptonyms: Also forwarded herewith are copies of the reports to be transmitted to COS, Caracas and COS, Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

IRD NUMBERS	201 NUMBERS	CRYPT
(#)	(355496)	(SUBELT/7)
(#)	(267488)	( )
(#54931)	(294451)	(AMTORY/13)
(#55377)	(310133)	(AMSPAN/29)
(#54903)	(T36622)	(AMREGIN/34)
(#T2648)	(231207)	(CIMAVOC/7)
(#T2649)	(T63730)	(SMADOFT/1)
✓(#T2650)	( )	( )

2. The identities of the above reports are forwarded as a separate cover attachment along with copies for Chief of Station, Caracas and Chief of Station, Tegucigalpa.

28801/04

Attachments:
A. Reports (HYBAT)
B. Identities (HYBAT)

Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:
3-C/KUSODA w/atts. A/1-3 B/w:B/1-3 u/s/c
2 WH/C w/o atts.

Copy

201-289885

17 Nov 1965

NOV 17 1965

UFGA-28801

201-355496, -267488,
-294451, -310133,
-T36622.

SECRET

UFGA 28801/04

SECRET

# 72650
15 November 1965

Subject: Iden A

Subject was interviewed and tested on 13 November 1965 at a safe site in the Miami area at the request of Edward W. LORENTZ. The interview was conducted in English.

Subject is being considered for use as a pilot with the WITHRUSH Program.

RESULTS

Subject has never cooperated with any Castro intelligence or security service and except for PBPRIME he has no connection or agreement with the government of any other country.

Subject has never taken part in any communist activity and he is not obligated to any Cuban exile group.

Subject has been essentially truthful in regard to his personal history and he does not feel he is liable to blackmail for any reason. Subject has never been involved in the use or sale of narcotics.

There is no indication that Subject has engaged in homosexual activities in his adult life.

DETAILS

Subject stated that he is an informant for the ODENVY office in New Orleans, Louisiana. His ODENVY contact is Iden B.

Subject stated he is a close friend of Iden C, who is connected with the WITHRUSH Program.

DESENSITIZED
[illegible]

U F G A 23881/04
[illegible] 23881/04

Basic doc in 201-387488

CS COPY

19 Nov 65

UFGA 23881/04

SECRET

201-289885

[redacted]

SECRET

# 72650
15 November 1965
IDENs

Iden A Francisco Antonio BARTES Clarens
DPOB: 14 September 1920
Havana, Cuba

201-289885

Iden B Warren C. de BRUEYS

Iden C Fausto VALDEZ

UFGA 23981/04

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET

SOD 5-1418
16 NOV 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, OS

ATTENTION: Mr. Lou Weinokowski

SUBJECT: Project WITHRUSH

1. SOD and AF Division are jointly interested in obtaining the services of the Cuban nationals identified below for employment in the Congo under Project WITHRUSH.

	Personnel Data	Document Needed
Name:	Ramon Alonso ALVAREZ Fdez	Re-entry Document
Status:	Unknown	
DOB:	20 January 1923	
POB:	Havana, Cuba	
"A" Number:	12460263	
POA Granted:	10 November 1965	
OS Case Number:	T[illegible]3008	
Remarks:	None.	
Name:	Ernesto DESPAIGNE Perez	Re-entry Document
Status:	Unknown	
DOB:	7 September 1925	
POB:	Havana, Cuba	
"A" Number:	12411027	
POA Granted:	24 August 1965	
OS Case Number:	55[illegible]487	
Remarks:	None.	
Name:	Jorge Minervino NAVARRO Rodriguez	Re-entry Document
Status:	Unknown	
DOB:	31 December 1934	
POB:	Artemisa, P. Del Rio, Cuba	
"A" Number:	11[illegible]526	
POA Granted:	16 September 1965	
OS Case Number:	819090	
Remarks:	None.	

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~Name: David R. RODRIGUEZ Santiana~~ Re-entry Document
~~Status: Unknown~~
~~DOB: 22 October 1931~~
~~POB: Esperanza, L.V., Cuba~~
~~"A" Number: 12438004~~
~~POA Granted: 6 July 1965~~
~~OS Case Number: 220764~~
~~Remarks: None.~~

Name: Francisco Antonio BARTES Clarens Re-entry Document
Status: Unknown
DOB: 14 September 1920
POB: Havana, Cuba
"A" Number: 12552976
POA Granted: 7 October 1965
OS Case Number: 225714
Remarks: None.

Name: Juan PERON Sosa Re-entry Document
Status: Unknown
DOB: 24 November 1940
POB: Havana, Cuba
"A" Number: 12164158
POA Granted: 30 November 1964
OS Case Number: 223425
Remarks: None.

2. It is requested that your office facilitate prompt and favorable action by the Miami office, INS, to provide the documentation required.

Sidney D. Stembridge
Security Officer
Special Operations Division

SOD/AB/OPS/B:L.MURPHY:hss(16 Nov 65)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - SOD/SEC/JCV
1 - SOD/AB/OPS/B
1 - SOD/WI
1 - Chron

6 - 201 files
201 - 310981
201 - [illegible]
201 - [illegible]
201 - [illegible] Clarens
201 - [illegible]
201 - [illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

DEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
LASSIFY TO FILE NO.
-REF TO FILE NO.
ILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
ESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ROM
JMWAVE

CTION
6026

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

FILE, VR, AF7, WH/C8, DD/AIR

S E C R E T 122116Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7286

12 DEC 65 IN 93713

CHAPPIE/VITHRUSH/PBRUMEN

REFS: LEOP 1841 (A)(IN 80410).

LEOP 2189 (B)(IN 82044)*

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS

1. FOR PLANNING PURPOSE, WILL HAVE JUAN PERON DEPART 14 DEC REF (A).

2. HAVE THREE POTENTIAL T-28 PILOTS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING LOCAL CHECKOUT (NAVARRO, RODRIGUEZ AND BARTES) IN ADDITION TO MENDEZ AND SEDA.

3. ALL FIVE SHOULD BE DISPATCHED WITHIN THREE TO FOUR WEEKS.

SECRET

CFN: 7286 1841 2189 LORENTZ MIAMI JUAN PERON 14 DEC 3 T-28 NAVARRO RODRIGUEZ BARTES MENDEZ SEDA

BT

* MENDEZ AND T-28 PILOT.

V

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

☐ [illegible] BY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG : W.WAINWRIGHT:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS3 ☐ INDEX
EXT : 4475 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 25 OCT 65 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

~~26~~ SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

FROM: DIRECTOR

Bartes

26 OCT 65 22 00z

CONF: SOD 6 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY WH/OA, AF7, CI/OA ~~SIG CEN~~

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR ~~53420~~ 53428

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 6607 (IN 74001)*

SUBJECT GRANTED POA.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested clearance status of Subject.

WH/C/MO Mr Monaghan Kilcon

SOD/AB/COPS

CI/OA G.Ball/Telecon

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BERNARD J. [illegible]INAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

23/30 SECRET GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
(3) ✓		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, AF7, WH/C8, CI/OA

S E C R E T 152331Z

DIR CITE WAVE 6607

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 3062 (IN 92924) *

15 Oct 65 IN 74001

IN 74001

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

REQUEST INFO CLEARANCE STATUS OF FRANCISCO (BARTES) CLARENS.

S E C R E T *Requested POA Re Subj.

CFN 6607 3062 LORENTZ FRANCISCO BARTES CLARENS

BT

SECRET

NNNN

WITHRUSH PERSONNEL CHECK LIST NUMBER 102

	XXXX LAST	MATRONYMIC	FIRST MIDDLE
NAME	BARTES	Clarens	Francisco Antonio

JOB PILOT

201-NUMBER 289885

C-NUMBER

RI TRACES REQUESTED 21 May 1965

RI TRACES RETURNED 24 May 1965 - No derog

DPOB 14 MAR 1920 HAVANA

DIVISION TRACES REQUESTED 24 May 1965

DIVISION TRACES RETURNED 24 May 1965 - No derog

FIELD TRACES REQUESTED Auto

FIELD TRACES RETURNED ND per WAVE 2195 IN 76667

MIAMI ACTIONS ACCOMPLISHED AS FOLLOWS:

A. I & N SERVICE and ND per WAVE 3062 IN 92924 ND PER WAVE 2195 IN 76667

102

B. LOCAL (WAVE) POLICE AND CREDIT 14 June per WAVE 2901 (IN 88650)

C. WAVE FBI 2 June per WAVE 2516 IN 81431

POA REQUESTED 27 May 65

GREEN LIST REQUESTED 27 May 65

IF REQUIRED:

A. MEMO TO CI/OA RE RI TRACES

B. MEMO TO CI/OA RE DIVISION TRACES

C. MEMO TO CI/OA RE FIELD TRACES

POA GRANTED 20 July 1965

CONTRACT SIGNED

I & N ASSISTANCE REQUESTED ________ FOR ________
DATE DOCUMENT

POA CANCELED

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/AB/OPS-3 - Larry Murphy	NUMBER 201-289885
	SUBJECT BARTES Clarens, Francisco A.
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 27 May 1965 prc

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Please forward PRQ Part II.

Sent 9 Sept

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	30 JUNE 1965

FORM 1-64 126 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

SOD. 5-879
15 JUL 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT: Francisco A. BARTES Clarens

REFERENCE: CI/OA Memorandum Dated 6 July 1965

1. The document cited in the reference has been reviewed and found to contain no derogatory information on Subject.

2. It is, therefore, requested that a POA be granted Subject.

SIGNED

William Wainwright
SOD/AB/OPS/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Addressee
1 - C/SOD/AB
1 - SOD/SECUR
1 - SOD/AB/OPS/3
1 - 201-289885
1 - SOD/RI
1 - Chrono

SOD/AB/OPS/3:W.WAINWRIGHT:kas(14 Jul 65)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)

~~BARTES Clarens, Francisco Antonio~~

201-285787-03/03

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

~~14 September 1920~~ Havana, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP

Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Real Estate Salesman
Landco Investment Corp.
3525 Veterans Hwy. Nov 64-Present
Metairie, La.

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

Pilot

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 167232

DATE 27 May 1965

[redacted]

74

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME Larry Murphy
OFFICE DESIGNATOR SOD/AB/OPS/3
ROOM, BUILDING 2 D 55
EXTENSION 4475

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
- ☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
- ☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
- ☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
- ☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
- ☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
- ☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Vice President - Consolidated Railroads of Cuba	Havana, Cuba	1953-1958
President - Consolidated Railroads of Cuba	Havana, Cuba	1958-1960
President & Director - Arrozax Bartes, S.A.	Camaguey, Cuba	1951-1960
Vice President-Santa Ceoizis Sugar Refin.	Oriente, Cuba	1947-1951
Real Estate Salesman-Ted Homes, Inc. 2311 Veterans Hwy.	Metairie, La.	Mar 63-Oct 64
Real Estate Salesman-Weber Homes, Inc. 1809 Veterans Hwy.	Metairie, La.	Nov 63-Oct 64
Real Estate Salesman-Lanco Investment Corp. 3525 Veterans Hwy.	Metairie, La.	Nov 64-Present

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5'8"	178	Brown	Brown	White	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

Esperanza Vazquez R.

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

Father: Francisco Bartes Marsal
Mother: Maria Antonia Clarens

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

Jun 14 1 52 PM '65

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY, SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 801 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TO: Larry Murphy

14 June 1965
DATE

FROM: FI/D [redacted]

67

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

* Except

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO ~~XXXXXXX~~ INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

* Previous green list request from WH/4, 30 Dec 1960, op, GL 107415, No record.

Ccm
CI/OA

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 27 May 1965

TO:
- ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM:
Larry Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS/3
2 D 55

SUBJECT: *(True name)* BARTES Clarens, Francisco Antonio

PROJECT: WITHRUSH

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 289885

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Africa, Congo, Leopoldville

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE:

Pilot

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPIES ATTACHED	☒	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 167838

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY WH	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☒	NO DEROGATORY INFO. WAVE	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: Larry Murphy

EXTENSION: 4473

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: Bernard J. Finan, Jr.

FORM 9-60 772

SECRET

(8)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☒ COPY ☐

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE
ACTION SOD 6
INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

VR. FILE, WH/C 8, RF, C/ops

S E C R E T 262110Z

DIR CITE WAVE 2195

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH BRUMEN

26 Mar 65 IN 76667

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

ODURGE TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJS 98, 99 AND 95. WAVE AND ODURGE TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJS 100, 101 AND 102. Bartis ADDITIONAL INFO WILL FOLLOW.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CFN

CSCI Memo
Abuses - Sec'y of State.

CSCI Memo
Aliens - Sec of State.

IN CONSIDERATION of my employment on the terms hereinafter set forth, I, **Francisco Bartes** hereinafter called employee, hereby agree to the following conditions of employment:

1. That the term "employer" as used in this agreement shall be the Government of the Republic of the Congo, or any designated Department or Agency of said Government, or any Company or Agency that the said Government may designate.

2. That the service to be rendered by the employee under this agreement is to be an aircraft pilot, with no specific aircraft assignment.

3. That the term of employment under this agreement shall be for a period of one -1- year from **1 December** 1965. During the first six month term of this agreement, this agreement may be terminated by the employer at any time by thirty -30- days written notice in advance to the employee. During the last six month term of this agreement, this agreement may be terminated by either the employee or the employer by thirty -30- days written notice in advance to the other party.

4. That the employee shall be paid a basic, all inclusive, salary of Six Hundred -$600.00- Dollars per month during the first six month. However, at any time during the tenure of this contract, that you are certified in writing by the Chief Pilot as Pilot in Command, your base salary will be increased to Eight Hundred -$800.00- Dollars per month on the effective date of such certification. Additionally, you shall be paid an additional hourly rate per flying hour for all flight time in excess of sixty hours per schedule listed in amendment No. 2 of this contract. During the last six month term of this agreement, the employees base pay is increased an additional One Hundred -$100.00- Dollars.

5. That the employee accepts the responsibility of the payment of all applicable taxes on all income earned by him under the terms of this agreement.

6. That the employee shall be furnished round trip tourist class air transportation costs from Miami, Florida, to destination, and return, and all other expenses directly relating to the travel involved. In the event at the termination of this agreement, the employee accepts employment with an employer other than the Government of the Republic of the Congo, the return transportation cost shall not be paid said employee. The return ticket shall be surrendered upon arrival at destination.

7. INSURANCE BENEFITS:

The employee shall be enrolled in the employer's group insurance program for which the emplyer pays the total premium. The insurance program provides death disability and medical benefits for the employee substantially as follows:

(1) $10,000 payable in the event of the employee's death from any cause whatsoever during the term of this agreement.

(2) $40,000 payable in the event of the employee's death from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, provided death occurs within one (1) year from the date of the accident. This benefit is in lieu of (1) above and is also reduced by any payments made under (3) below for the same accident.

(3) Temporary and permanent total and permanent partial disability benefits plus medical expenses for injuries or disablement to the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment. Said benefits are paid in accordance with the terms and limits of said insurance coverage and the maximum payable thereunder is $40,000 for the same injury or disablement.

CONTINUANCE OF PAY AND ALLOWANCE

(1) In the event the employer determines the employee to be missing in action, the authorized designee of the employee will receive his basic salary plus an additional 25 per cent thereof for a period of up to six (6) months. If, at the end of the missing in action period, findings indicate that the employee is deceased, the appropriate insurance benefit provided for above will be paid to the employee's designated beneficiary.

(2) If the employee is captured and imprisoned, his authorized designee will receive the employee's basic salary plus an additional 25 per cent thereof for the duration of his confinement. In addition, the appropriate death benefit insurance provided for above will be paid if the employee dies during said confinement.

8. That the employee agrees to undergo a medical examination within five calendar days after his return.

9. That the employee promise he will not reveal in writing or any method, the activities, the sponsors, or any other facts that come to his attention by virtue of the performance of services under this agreement.

SIGNED AND SEALED BY me this ________ day of ________________, 1965.

________________________ -Seal-

ACCEPTED at Leopoldville, the Republic of the Congo, this ________

day of ____________________, 1965.

________________________ -Seal-

AMENDMENT #1

This contract is considered the binding agreement between both parties and any oral or verbal agreements as partains to any portions of said contract are not considered binding unless said agreement becomes a written part of this contract.

SIGNED AND SEALED BY me this ___________ day of _____________, 1965.

Paul Brulle ______________________________ -Seal-

ACCEPTED at Leopoldville, the Republic of the Congo, this ____________ day of ___________________, 1965.

______________________________ -Seal-

Amendment No. 2

Pay Scale

1. As employee is hired as a Pilot, you will receive $600.00 base plus $5.00 per hour over 60 hours actual flight time.

2. Once certified in writing as Pilot in Command, your base pay automatically is raised to $800.00 per month - pro-rated to that portion of the month applicable. Additionally while acting as Aircraft Captain, all time over 60 hours flying is compensated at the rato of $10.00 per hour. However, although certified as Pilot in Command, any time over 60 hours not considered command time (Co-Pilot), the hourly compensation is reduced to $7.50 per hour.

3. All flight time must be actual flight time and Dead Heading, Passenger, etc. time may not be recorded as meeting minimum hours, overtime or hazard pay.

4. The Chief Pilot has sole discretion of upgrading and/or down grading pilot status in writing and the employee shall have no recourse towards this decision.

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE **PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION**	PRQ NO.
	DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM T/N Francisco Antonio BARRES Clarens	2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I **CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT**

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

1. Subject first considered in JMATC project December 1960 for possible FI/PM operations primarily against transportation targets in Camaguey and Oriente Provinces. POA requested by administrative case officer, Joseph Mecolo. It was granted 30 January 1960 and cryptonym assigned was AMSERF/1.

Subject submitted job application form to Roberto Medell (principal agent, WITHRUSH, Miami, Florida) on 3 May 1965 for the purpose of consideration as a pilot in the WITHRUSH Project.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible case officer, however, a mature, politically inclined case officer would probably have more success handling Subject. He has long experience in management of transportation and agriculture enterprises. He is well educated and articulate in Spanish and English.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN, GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

File does not show that Subject personally knew his case officers.

FORM 10-60 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(0-001)

SECTION II — **MOTIVATION AND CONTROL**

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Estimate Subject's primary motivation is financial. He has large family (wife and seven children) and has, in the past, been accustomed to high standard of living. Possibly his present occupation in real estate is not meeting his requirements for income and status. Also, he probably has continuing ideological interest in deposing Castro.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

No real control exists over Subject other than financial. He needs guaranteed employment to provide for his family. However, manipulation of his resident alien status, aviation occupation property, and U.S. licenses could offer control elements.

SECTION III — **COVER**

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

The principal agent represents himself as an employee of the WAVE case officer, who in turn is documented as an agent of the Government of the Republic of the Congo. However, although no U.S. Government interest is overtly manifested, it is realistic to assume that Subject suspects [illegible] of the operation.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

NA

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

In all probability he is or will become aware that the GOC air program is sponsored by KUBARK.

SECTION IV — **INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING**

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject was a leader in one of the anti Castro resistance cells in Cuba prior to 1960. He was also a leader of an anti-Castro resistance group in New Orleans after emigration. His file indicates liaison with the FBI concerning this groups' willingness to cooperate with the U.S. Government in operations against Cuba. In his connections with the FBI he was extremely conscious of all aspects of security to the extent that he volunteered to be prosecuted for any breach of security or evidence of collusion. His record indicates no connection with any other national intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Probably wife and brother, Mario, and possibly some cousins residing in the Miami area. However, Subject's file indicates attention to personal security in control of information concerning political affiliations and objectives.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has no KUBARK training in clandestine operations. However while residing in Cuba he participated in resistance operations against Castro. His planning in sabotage shows thought, originality, and daring.

SECTION V — **COLLABORATION POTENTIAL**

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject may collaborate with any Government or group presenting a well conceived, financed, and disciplined program for re-invasion of Cuba. Still, prospects of collaboration become less likely as his personal contacts in Cuba are lost and urgent political issues cool.

SECTION VI **OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT**

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE WAS FURNISHED.

He was granted a POA in January [illegible] for prospective [illegible]/FI use in the [illegible] operation; however, he departed for the United States prior to being used.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

NA

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

NA

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject has education, language ability, and management experience. Given training in tradecraft and proper handling he probably could function successfully in FI or CI operations, particularly in the Western Hemisphere.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject presently projected to be used as a pilot in counterinsurgency air operations.

SECTION VII **PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY**

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII **AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT**

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT; I.E., TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject under ostensible contract to the GOC although presumably he knows the program is under U.S. sponsorship.

SECRET

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

He is a qualified fixed-wing pilot in light aircraft.

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject's contract calls for base pay of $800 per month, plus $10 per flight hour over sixty hours, also $10 per flight hour which is considered hazardous. Contract additionally contains life insurance up to $10,000.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None known.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Subject granted POA's on two occasions. It is assumed pertinent Headquarters, field and Agency files checks and investiggtions have been made. These include in the Subject's case, WAVE Station, FBI, I&NS, and Headquarters.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

Polygraph and personal interview at WAVE Station.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Yes. (C-7424)

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

POA on 30 January 1960 and 30 July 1963.

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject's record indicates no adverse character traits. His records show consciousness of importance of security in clandestine operations.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

None.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

No use of liquor or narcotics, gambling or parnmours is indicated in 201 file.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII | **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject's record does not reflect hobbies or avocational interests.

SECTION XIV | **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Perhaps certain Central American countries.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

PRQ Part I is supplied by Subject; Part II by check of file and assessment of informationocontained therein by case officer.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (Also see para. 43b, supra)

None.

SECTION XV | **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

NA

SECTION XVI | **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

From 1947 1960 Subject acted as vice president and later president of family railroad and agriculture enterprise. He made a commercial successof these operations which were later confiscated by the Castro Regime. He lost a large personal fortune as did other close members of his family. He was an ardent anti-Castro, anti communist leader of resistance groups both in Cuba and in New Orleans.

Subject previously used his own private aircraft in managing his commercial interests. It is hard to judge from the Subject file precisely why he has applied for a flying position in the Congo for reasons other than obvious financial aspects. Further, his 18 May 1965 applicationsto Roberto Medell indicates a [illegible] degree of stability and solvency in his present position as a real estate salesman. Given Subject's age and previous back- available to him [illegible]

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
8 Sept	

SECRET

NAME: Francisco A. Bartes

DATE OF BIRTH: September 14,1920

MARITAL STATUS: Married

WIFE'S NAME & AGE: Esperanza Vazquez Ramirez 41 yrs.

NAMES OF CHILDREN & AGES:

Olga Maria Bartes 22yrs.
Maria Esperanza Bartes 18yrs.
Miriam Bartes 16yrs.
Maria Antonia Bartes 14 yrs.
Maria Leonor Bartes 13 yrs.
Maria Teresa Bartes 5yrs.
Ana Maria Bartes 1 yrs

NAMES OF PARENTS/RELATIVES [illegible] (give name of close relative or friend)

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.
Francisco Bartes	father	deceased	
Maria Antonia Clarens	mother	Linea 507 Havana,Cuba	

EMPLOYEE'S POSITION TITLE: Pilot

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Pilot

SALARY: $800

PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.
Esperanza Vazquez Ramirez	wife	1608 Mason Smith Ave.Metairée LA.	835-3462

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY:

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.
	wife		

LIST OF ALL INSURANCE POLICIES:

DATE OF POLICY	COMPANY	POLICY NO.	COVERAGE	BENEFICIARY	CONTAIN WAR OR AIR CLAUSE YES	NO
none						

LAST WILL & TESTAMENT IF EXECUTED:

DATE OF WILL	LOCATION OF ORIGINAL	COPY ON FILE WITH
	R.Medell	

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON HOLDING POWER OF ATTORNEY:

DATE________________________ SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frank Bartes

#162

PERSONAL INFORMATION

REF. A-12 552 978
I-5[illegible]

NAME Borges Francisco Ernesto [illegible]
LAST FIRST MIDDLE

PHONE NUMBER 835-5462 **SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER** 436-68-1566 ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

PRESENT ADDRESS 1008 Mason Smith Ave Metairie La.
STREET CITY STATE

MARITAL STATUS
☐ SINGLE
☒ MARRIED
☐ ENGAGED
☐ WIDOWED
☐ DIVORCED
☐ SEPARATED

PERMANENT ADDRESS SAME

DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR) 9-14-1920

PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY) Havana - Cuba

WEIGHT 178 **COLOR OF HAIR** Brn **COMPLEXION** Strong
HEIGHT 6'8" **COLOR OF EYES** Brn
DESCRIBE ANY SPECIAL OR OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OR IDENTIFYING MARKS.

PASSPORT PARTICULARS:
ISSUING AUTHORITY State Dept.
PLACE OF ISSUE Havana - Cuba
PASSPORT NO. 09063
DATE OF ISSUE 4-8-454
KIND OF PASSPORT
VALIDITY PERIOD 4-8-462

CITIZEN OF U.S.A. YES ☐ NO ☒
NATURALIZED: DATE — PLACE
NATIONALITY: Cuban
HAS YOUR PASSPORT EVER BEEN CANCELLED? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS:

LAST FIRST MIDDLE

EDUCATION	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	DATES ATTENDED	GRADUATE DEGREES	MAJOR SUBJECTS
HIGH SCHOOL	La Salle Catholic School at Havana	4 years	1940	[illegible] of Arts & Sciences
COLLEGE	University of Havana	5 years	1946	Public Accountant
TRADE, BUSINESS OR CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, OTHER WITH DATES				

SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL STUDY OR RESEARCH WORK Statistics

VOCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS LICENSE, CERTIFICATE, ETC. Aviation - ~~[illegible]~~ Counselor Pilot. CUBA

WHAT FOREIGN LANGUAGES DO YOU SPEAK FLUENTLY? Spanish & English **READ** Yes **WRITE** Yes

U.S. MILITARY SERVICE (BRANCH) None **FROM.** **TO:** **TYPE OF DISCHARGE:** **RANK:** **PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN NATIONAL GUARD OR RESERVES**

ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS (CIVIC, ATHLETIC, FRATERNAL, ETC.) [illegible] Contadores [illegible] - Havana [illegible] Havana [illegible] Club - [illegible] of Havana

PREVIOUS ADDRESSES DURING PAST TEN YEARS

DATES		STREET	CITY/STATE	COUNTRY
FROM	TO			
1955	1960 [illegible]	[illegible] - [illegible] [illegible]	Havana	Cuba
[illegible] 1960	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] La.	U.S.A.

SPOUSE (INCLUDE FIANCE AND PRIOR MARRIAGES) - CHILDREN

	NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
Wife	[illegible]	[illegible]	1008 Mason Smith Ave Metairie La	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	" " " " "	"
	[illegible]	[illegible]	" " " " "	" "
	[illegible]	[illegible]	" " " " "	"
	[illegible]	[illegible]	" " " " "	

EMPLOYMENT — In the spaces provided below describe every position which you have held since you first began to work, including any active military service. Start with present position and work back to the first position which you held. Account for any periods of unemployment. USE CONTINUATION SHEET IF NECESSARY.

A. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: Nov. 1964 TO PRESENT TIME Date

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Real Estate Salesman

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $? PER YR. FINAL $ PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT Landis Investment Corp. 3130 Veterans Hwy Metairie La.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Lloyd P. Guefet Presi[illegible]

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU Salesman

REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT

B. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: Nov. 1963 TO: Oct. 1964

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Real Estate Salesman

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER YR. FINAL $ 1,777.? PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT Weber Homes Inc. - 1809 Veterans Hwy. Metairie La.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Fred Weber President Manager

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU Salesman & Draftsman

REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT Low earnings. - [illegible] quit - Company now operates under [illegible] Real Estate

C. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: March/63 TO: Oct. /64

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Real Estate Salesman

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER YR. FINAL $ 1690.00 PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT Ted Homes Inc. - 2711 Veterans Hwy. Metairie La.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Fred Weber (Manager)

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU Salesman

REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT Low earnings. -

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☒ YES ☐

HAVE YOU NOW OF EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER? GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☒ YES ☐

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY ANY POLICE OR MILITARY AUTHORITY? IF SO NAME THE ARRESTING AUTHORITY GIVE TIME, PLACE AND REASON FOR SUCH ARREST OR DETENTION, AND THE DISPOSITION OR COURT ACTION. NO ☒ YES ☐

JOB APPLIED FOR: Pilot

MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SALARY $ Open PER YR.

REFERENCES. LIST FIVE PERSONS, NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY DEFINITE INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY. DO NOT GIVE NAMES OF SUPERVISORS LISTED ABOVE.

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
Raphael Ballestero	Sioux Sanatorium Rapid City S. Dak.	M.D.
Douglas Sinclair Jr.	1218 Whitney Bldg. N.O. 12 - La.	Asst. Sales Manager A. L. Mechling Barge Lines
Bruce Hancock	[illegible] West Indies - El Campo, Texas	President [illegible] Corp.
William C. Davis	American Consulate General APO 653 N.Y.	Visa Technician
Ernesto Vandiz	9411 West 36 Terrace Hialeah Fla.	Pilot

FATHER'S NAME Francisco [illegible] Marrero DATE OF BIRTH 7-1-1873 PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY) [illegible] Spain

PRESENT ADDRESS (Died in 1944) PRESENT OCCUPATION

NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Spanish PRESENT NATIONALITY

MOTHER'S FULL NAME Maria Antonia C[illegible] DATE OF BIRTH 1-16-1896 PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY) [illegible] Cuba

PRESENT ADDRESS Linea #507 Vedado - Havana Cuba PRESENT OCCUPATION Housewife

NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban PRESENT NATIONALITY Cuban

IN CASE OF EMERGENCY NOTIFY (wife) Esperanza Vazquez - 1818 Paterson Smith, Metairie La. 833-4462
NAME ADDRESS PHONE NO.

IF THE ABOVE SPACE IS NOT SUFFICIENT USE CONTINUATION SHEET.

I authorize investigation of all statements contained in this application. I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts called for is cause for dismissal.

?-19-65 Raul Baez
DATE SIGNATURE

Continuation Sheet—Employment

D. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 1940 TO: 1947

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Office Assistant

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 1200.00 PER YR. FINAL $ 4300 PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: Guantanamo & Western R.R. Co. 4?? Aguiar St. Havana Cuba.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: F. Aizcorbe Jr. (President)

REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: General office work accounting & statistics

E. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 1947 TO: 1951

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Vice-President

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 6000.00 PER YR. FINAL $ 9600.00 PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: Santa Cecilia Sugar Mill - Guantanamo. Oriente. Cuba.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: F. Aizcorbe Jr. (President)

REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: Sugar mill was sold

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: In charge of sugar sales and preparation of financial reports & statements etc.

F. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 1951 TO: 1960

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: President & Director

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 12.000.00 PER YR. FINAL $ 24.000.00 PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: Arrocera Barres S.A. - [illegible] - Camaguey. Cuba.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Board of Directors

REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: Confiscated in 1960

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Full responsibility and supervision of the 7.300 acres of rice land totally mechanized.-

G. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 1953 TO: 1958 —
1958 1960 —

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Vice President
President

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 12.000.00 PER YR. FINAL $ 60.000.00 PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: Consolidated Railroads of Cuba - Ambar Motor Bldg. Havana Cuba.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Board of Directors

REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: Confiscated in 1960

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Full responsability & supervision of 1400 miles of freight & passenger service - five seaport terminals and a bus company.

Continuation—Other

SUPPLEMENTARY PERSONAL INFORMATION

FLIGHT CREW

Name and Rank: Francisco R. Bartes

I. General Flying Experience:

A. Military Flying:

B. Airline: As a Private Pilot, inland and over water flying. Single & multi-engine

C. Far East:

II. Equipment Types and Flying Times	PILOT (IN HOURS)	CO-PILOT (IN HOURS)	OTHER CREW TITLE	OTHER CREW (IN HOURS)
A. C-46				
B. C-47				
C. DC-4/C-54				
D. DC-6				
E. DC-7				
F. Jet Transport (By Type)				
G. Amphibian (By Type)				
H. Flying Boat (By Type)				
I. Helicopter (By Type)				
J. Cessna 172 (in Cuba)	120:00			
K. " 182 (in Cuba)	[illegible]			
L. " 310 (in Cuba)	[illegible]	(Multi-engine)		
M. " 172 (in USA)	15:37	(Includes [illegible] minutes Piper Apache)		
III. TOTAL FLYING TIME	1,145:37			
IV. Total Instrument Time — Hood	5:00			
IV. Total Instrument Time — Actual	10:00			
V. Total Night Time	1:30			
VI. Total Flying Time in Past Six Months	15:27			

VII. Type Equipment in Past Six Months Cessna 172 & Piper Apache

VIII. Aviation Licenses & Ratings

	Type	Number	Ratings
A.	From Cuba - Pilot License	1017	Single-Multi-engine Land VFR
B.	USA Private Pilot (Pending)		Single Engine Land - VFR
C.	FAA → ([illegible])		
D.			
E.			

IX. Selection of an applicant may well be influenced by the type and amount of ground and flight training received. To assist in evaluating your overall qualifications it is important that you endeavor to submit documentary evidence, in a thorough and detailed manner, of all training received during the past three year period. (This information may be submitted in the form of notarized statements, photostats, etc.)

X. Are you willing to be based at any station at the discretion of the Company? Yes ☒ No ☐

I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts requested is cause for dismissal.

11-19-60
DATE

Frank R. Bartes
SIGNATURE

SUNNY SOUTH
AIRCRAFT SERVICE, INC.
Cessna
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] 196[illegible]

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

[illegible] Cessna 17[illegible] [illegible] Cessna 210. [illegible] thoroughly checked [illegible] a more than average amount of [illegible] in the Cessna 210, [illegible]

To the best of my knowledge, [illegible] thorough and competent [illegible]

SUNNY SOUTH AIRCRAFT SERVICE, INC.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] subscribed this
[illegible] day of [illegible], 196[illegible]

NOTARY
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

SALES
AIRPLANES
AIRPLANE PARTS
ENGINES
ACCESSORIES
GAS-OIL
ELECTRONICS

Pan Air Corporation

SERVICE
REPAIRS AND
MODIFICATIONS
OF ALL TYPES OF
LAND & SEAPLANES
OR AMPHIBIANS
ELECTRONICS

AIRCRAFT SERVICE-MAINTENANCE AND SALES
APPROVED REPAIR STATION No. 3823
286-1471
P. O. BOX 20425 • NEW ORLEANS AIRPORT • NEW ORLEANS 20, LA.

14 April, 1965

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have known Mr. Francisco A. Bartos since June, 1962. He contacted our company tp obtain a license permitting him to continue flying in the United States after his departure from Cuba.

Mr. Bartos held a Cuban pilot license issued by the Civil Aeronautics Commission of Cuba, November 22, 1956, No. 1017, Multi-engine Aircraft VFR.

The total aircraft flying time has been estimated due to the fact all personal effects including his log books were left in Cuba. A certification from Sunny South Aircraft, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, substantiates his estimated time due to single and multi-engine aircraft he purchased from them:

Cessna 172	130:00
Cessna 182	250:00
Cessna 310	750:00

Mr. Fausto A. Valdez, a Cuban citizen now residing at 10 SW 32nd Ave., Miami, Florida, holding an ATR certificate, 1515842, issued 11/28/61, has also certified via affadavit, Mr. Bartos, has close to 1,000:00 hours of multi-engine time.

Mr. Bartos has completed the Private Pilot course with us and has the necessary papers pertinent to an FAA license. He is presently continuing his studies for a Commercial Pilot rating - single and multi-engine.

PAN AIR CORPORATION

A.LeCagle, Chief Flt. Instructor

ALC/e

CESSNA
ANNIVERSARY
FLEET



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WE/2 MARION E. LINDE

NO.
CSCI - 3/753,461

DATE
11 ~~26~~ February 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WE/2				RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce D.D. 23 FEB 1959 BLOCK, MORRIS 201 | 177 | 251 ABSTRACT ~~IX~~ INDEX DATE 12 Jul 1959
2.				
3. CI/Liaison	11 FEB 1959			
4.				
5. RI/AN				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. RID/MIS			Cm	
15. RID/FI				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

13 FEB 1959

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT : Mollie BLOCK; Morris BLOCK (201-194231)

No 201

1. The following information on Subjects has been received from the Dutch Internal Security Service (BVD). 29

2. On 4 November 1958 Mollie BLOCK (born 6 November 1911 in New York), holder of American passport No. 116708, left Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam on a KLM flight bound for Moscow via Warsaw. She traveled with her child Johanna Morris BLOCK, born in 1950, who was said to be in possession of a Greek passport. Mrs. BLOCK had originally planned to fly to Moscow on 2 September, but her trip was postponed by the circumstances outlined below.

3. On 30 August 1958 Morris BLOCK, husband of Mollie BLOCK, arrived at Amsterdam on a KLM flight from Montreal. BLOCK was carrying American passport No. 921617, issued 12 April 1956 but changed by him to read 12 April 1958 so that it would appear to be still valid. Morris BLOCK was refused entry to The Netherlands on the basis of his falsified passport. The American Consulate in Amsterdam validated his passport for a single return trip to New York, and he was sent back to New York on a KLM plane at 2359 hours on 30 August 1958.

4. Morris BLOCK was born in New York on 30 March 1920; he is a machinist by occupation, and his home address was given as 258 Corbin Place, Brooklyn, New York. BLOCKS's passport carried the following stamps:

England IN via London Airport 23-7-1957
OUT via Dover 24-7-1957
IN via Dover 16-10-1957
OUT via London Airport 16-10-1957

France IN via Dunkirk 24-7-1957
OUT via Strassbourg 25-7-1957

SECRET CS COPY 201-194231

1-JD

Denmark IN via Kastrup Airport 15-10-1957
OUT via Kastrup Airport 16-10-1957

Canada IN via Montreal Airport 17-10-1957

BLOCK stated to the Dutch passport control officer that he had visited the USSR 25 July 1957 - 15 October 1957 as a delegate to the World Youth Festival held in Moscow in 1957. BLOCK stated it was his plan to travel from The Netherlands to Moscow and to settle himself and his family there. He said his visa for Russia was ready at the Soviet Embassy in The Hague and that since he was not permitted to obtain a new valid passport, he had changed the date of issuance of his former passport to make it appear to be still valid. Since he had not known for sure that he would be allowed to depart from the United States, his wife and child were to take a later plane to Amsterdam after his wife knew he had reached Canada. He said that he had been unemployed in the United States and that his wife had had to support the family on her salary of $65 a week.

3. BLOCK stated to the Dutch passport control officer that there was only one country in the world where freedom was really possible, and that he wished to go there. He no longer wanted to live in America, for the laws were made there by three or four families and the rest had to fall in line. He had had more than enough of the clique around Eisenhower. He stated he no longer valued his American nationality and asked if they could not admit him so that he could apply to the Russian Embassy. He said his wife had the money and tickets for the trip to Moscow from Amsterdam.

4. BLOCK had with him a suitcase and a cage with a parrot; his wife was to take the rest of their belongings with her. Also in his possession were:

a. Membership book for District 65, Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, 13 Astor Place, New York 3, issued to Morris BLOCK -- 238 Corbin Place, Brooklyn 35, Membership number 58923, membership paid up to 25 August 1958. In addition, he carried a District 65, AFL-CIO Employment Office Guide giving a registration date of 29 July 1958.

b. Birth certificate No. 14861, issued by State of New York certifying the birth of Morris Block on 3 March 1930.

c. Two visiting cards on which were: SH 35145 and SE 31054.

d. A small pin with the legend "VIth World Festival of Youth and Students Moscow 1957";

e. Two visiting cards, on which were:

Stanley FAULKNER, Counselor at Law, 9 East 40th Street, New York 16, Lexington 2-7760. Hunter 7-4093 was written on this.

Stella ELIASHOW, Remedial Reading, English Tutoring, 56 Seventh Avenue, New York 11, New York.

7. BLOCK also threw away a used piece of carbon paper which he obviously did not want to have with him on his return to the USA. The carbon read as follows:

WINDSOR Clothing Company
97 5th Avenue
New York City, NY

27 August 1958
gr

For Mr. Jack ELGERT	
1 round-trip United Air ticket 162.2.361424	$ 54.90
La Guardia-Cleveland-La Guardia - 10% tax	5.49
For Mrs. Jack ELGERT	
1 round-trip United Air ticket 162.2.361425	$ 40.85
10% tax	4.09
	$ 105.33

8. BLOCK had $63 with him. A room had been reserved at the Hotel Krasnapolsky in Amsterdam for him and his wife, since they had planned to travel together to Moscow on 2 September 1958. On his departure for the United States, BLOCK exclaimed as follows: "Oh, now I have to go back to the United States, but I have no money and I also had not paid for the trip, so what more can happen to me?"

CSCI - 3/753,461

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - FBI
1 - RI/AN
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/Staff
1 - WE/2

Prepared by: Marion E. Linde
10 February 1959

13 Feb

201-114231

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: [illegible] NOVEMBER 1968 (EXCERPT - [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL [illegible])
SUBJECT: [illegible] JESUS [illegible]
FBI FILE NO: 105-[illegible] (LOS ANGELES)

DATE: [illegible] NOVEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: 105-[illegible] (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: [illegible] OCTOBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR (GROUP OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA)
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: BOMBING ACTIVITIES BY CUBAN EXILES
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855

DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: CUBAN POWER (PC)
MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-15556; 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; THREE MEN ALLEGED TO HAVE LEFT THE NEW YORK AREA AUG 16 68 TO PLACE A BOMB NEAR THE WHITE HOUSE...
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 23 SEPT 1968 CLASS: ~~NONE~~ SECRET
SUBJECT: CUBAN POWER (PC) FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (LOS ANGELES)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: [illegible] SEPTEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; EXPLOSION ABOARD BRITISH FREIGHTER "CARIBBEAN [illegible]"...
FBI FILE NO: 45-1156 (MIAMI)

DATE: 29 AUGUST 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA PODER CUBANO (CUBAN POWER)
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 28 AUGUST 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR, ALSO KNOWN AS CUBAN POWER
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 18 AUGUST 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA CUBAN POWER
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 16 AUGUST 1968 (EXCERPT - COPY AVAILABLE IN IP/AR)
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; EXPLOSION IN ENGINE ROOM OF BRITISH FREIGHTER "GRANWOOD"...
FBI FILE NO: 45-1156 (MIAMI) 4 MAY 68

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Panama City
Chief of Base, JMCOBRA

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Origin of a Telegram Concerning the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR) and Poder Cubano, Headed by Orlando BOSCH Avila (201-299292)

Action: Panama City: See Paragraph 3
JMCOBRA : See Paragraph 4

References: A. DBC-22108, dated 15 July 1968 (Not sent Panama City or JMCOBRA)
B. DBC-23423, dated 23 July 1968 (Not sent Panama City or JMCOBRA)

1. The Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR--Insurrectional Movement of Revolutionary Recovery) is an anti-Fidel Castro organization of Cuban exiles headquartered in Miami, Florida, under the leadership of Orlando BOSCH Avila, who has been involved in numerous revolutionary acts, some of which have involved violence. He allegedly issues press releases and other communications which are signed "Ernesto, General Delegate, Cuban Power."

2. On 7 July 1968, the following communication was sent via Tropical Radio Telegraph Company, Panama City, Panama, to the Associated Press in Miami, as follows:

"CAB500

" A TEP118 VIA TRTCKC RSA117 KKCRC MPA183 PR300
" UTMI EL PAPA 54
" PANAMARP VIATROPICAL 54 7 1830
" LT
" MR TED EDIGER
" ASSOCIATED PRESS
" 2125 BISCAYNE BLVD MIAMI/FLA
" BEING MIAMI VITAL CENTER CUBAN EXILES WE INFORM YOU ECUBAN POWER IS FULLY RESPONSIBLE SABOTAGES HAVANA'S NICO OIL REFINERY AND CLIENTE'S FEED FACTORY STOP ALL MEN SAFE STOP CONSIDERABLES LOSSES AND DAMAGES ON GOVERNMENT PROPERTY STOP HAVANA MAKING LONG REPORT ON DAMAGES STOP
"ERNESTO

201-299292

Distribution:
2 & 1 - COS, Panama City
- COS, JMCOBRA

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HXPW-2153	DATE: 12 AUG 1968 Typed: 7 August 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-299292

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
		rson pi	5421

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		Art Kamm (In Draft
CI/LS		I. Roman

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/2		Edwin M. Terrell

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

" CPN 2125
" AP MIA 1MY
" 1000P EDT"

Investigation reflects that BOSCH has a friend or representative of his organization in Panama, name and address unknown. Circumstances indicate that BOSCH may have telephoned or cablegrammed this individual on or about 7 July 1968, from Miami, Florida, requesting that the above-quoted telegram be transmitted.

3. Headquarters received the above information from LNERGO accompanied by a request to initiate appropriate inquiries in Panama City in an effort to determine the sender of the aforementioned transmission and also to discover if Orlando BOSCH Avila or one of his immediate associates may have been responsible for having this message sent. LNERGO cautioned that its role as the source of the above information should not be revealed in making the requested inquiries, though the data itself could be utilized.

4. If feasible, it is requested that JMCOBRA check its sources and report any information which connects BOSCH or any of his associates with the transmission of the above-quoted telegram.

Alice J. Borchsenius
Alice J. BORCHSENIUS

CS COPY

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 15 JULY 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA CUBAN POWER
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 22 JULY 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA CUBAN POWER...
FBI FILE NO: (LA) 97-4474 (WASH.D.C.)

DATE: 27 JUNE 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 20 JUNE 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA CUBAN POWER...
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 20 JUNE 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA CUBAN POWER...
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, [illegible]

Chief, WH Division

[illegible] - [illegible] Report ([illegible]) possible bombing of a plane from Nassau to Cuba.

The following paragraphs were extracted from a detailed report on the activities of Dr. Orlando BOSCH Avila, a Cuban medical doctor and head of the anti-Castro revolutionary organization, MIRR, and resident in the U.S.:

"On June 10, 1968, MM T-3 reported that BOSCH claims to have a man now in Nassau, Bahama Islands, who is checking British flights used by Cuban United Nations personnel traveling from New York City to Cuba. MM T-3 expressed the belief that this procedure is a preliminary survey to some form of action, possibly the bombing of a plane going from Nassau to Cuba with Cuban United Nations personnel aboard.

"On June 17, 1968, MM T-3 reported that BOSCH had declared that he intends to continue bombing ships of countries trading with Cuba. On June 19, 1968, BOSCH disclosed to MM T-3 that he has men in New York City, Tampa and Miami who are checking out BOSCH's plan to bomb ships."

Dalla H. [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, [illegible]

201-299292

201-299292

[illegible] 1 August 1968

S E C R E T [illegible]

WH/1/[illegible] [illegible]

1 - [illegible] Chrono
1 - [illegible]
1 - [illegible]/WH/[illegible] [illegible]

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 14 JULY 1967
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 3 JULY 1967 (CROSS REFERENCE SHEET -
DOCUMENT AVAILABLE IN ITEM 68 -
MIRR)
CLASS: NOT KNOWN
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: NOT KNOWN

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 8 APRIL 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 26 JULY 1967
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: FRANK ANGELO FIORINI;
DR. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA; ....
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1967

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: MOVIEMENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE
RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR)

FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

O. WILLIAMS:JAF
WH/COG/CICS/OS
9044
28 APRIL 67

SECRET

153

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
☒ ☐ 201-299292
201-7266087

☒ RID COPY

SECRET

AN FI
RESTRICT

AN FI
PS
ABSTRACT INDEX

28 14 Z

97049

CITE DIRECTOR

MICROFILMED
JUL 12 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

PRIORITY JMWAVE

DESENSITIZED
~~SUBJECT~~ TYPIC

1. FOLLOWING PERSONS WILL BE CHARGED WITH VIOLATION ARMS CONTROL ACT, CONSPIRACY, NEUTRALITY ACT. ~~THE~~ U.S. ATTORNEY MIAMI WILL PROBABLY PRESENT ~~THE~~ CASE TO ~~THE~~ GRAND JURY 15 MAY 1967.

A. ORLANDO BOSCH Y AVILA (201-299292) DPOB 18 JULY 1926, SANTA CLARA, CUBA. RESIDING 1849 N.W. 35TH STREET, MIAMI.

B. LOUIS CONCEPTION BERTOT AGE 36, U.S. CITIZEN, RESIDING 910 N.W. 29TH AVE. MIAMI.

C. JOSE ANTONIO MULET Y GONZALES (201-728607) DPOB 31 DECEMBER 1921, SANTIAGO DE CUBA. RESIDING 201 N.W. 35TH STREET, MIAMI.

D. JOSE DIAZ Y MOREJON DPOB 23 MARCH 1942, CUBA. RESIDING 72½ S.W. 11TH STREET, MIAMI.

E. MARCOS RODRIGUEZ Y RAMOS DPOB 16 JUNE 1944, CUBA. RESIDING 227 N.W. 17TH AVENUE, MIAMI.

F. BARBARO BALAN Y GARCIA DPOB 4 DECEMBER 1936, CUBA. RESIDING 735 S.W. 1ST STREET, MIAMI.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized:
Signed:
R.O. #
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate

201-299292
28 april 1967

DESENSITIZED

201-728607

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

☐ RID COPY

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 97049

6. ARTHUR ANDREW GIRTEIT RESIDING 890 N.W. 45TH AVENUE, MIAMI. (POSSIBLY [illegible] WITNESS RATHER THAN [illegible] DEFENDANT IN CASE).

2. PLEASE FORWARD PRIOR COB [illegible] MAY 67 ANY TRACES NOT ALREADY AVAILABLE HQS ON SUBJECTS PARA 1.

3. JMWAVE'S COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED ON POSSIBLE EFFECT THIS TRIAL ON STATION'S OPERATIONS AND SECURITY IN SAME CONTEXT AS MASFERRER CASE. HEADQUARTERS ALSO INTERESTED [illegible] KNOWING WHETHER OR NOT ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF ANY KIND EVER EMPLOYED AGAINST THESE INDIVIDUALS (INCLUDING SURREPTITIOUS RECORDING OF SGSWIRL INTERVIEW).

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/~~[illegible]~~ FI

C/WH/COG/CICS

Flores

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☒ RID COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

ACTION

INFO FILE, [illegible]

1280PM 3-29-67 FBC

DBA-77240

TO SECRETARY OF STATE 2

TO DIRECTOR CIA 1

TO DIRECTOR DIA 1

TO DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 1

TO DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: SECRET SERVICE (PID) 1

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

CE 2-3P

AN
PS
ABSTRACT
INDEX

MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR)

INTERNAL SECURITY -CUBA

NEUTRALITY MATTER -CUBA

(SECRET)

MICROFILMED
APR 14 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

29 MAR 67 IN 32580

MIRR IS AN ANTI-CASTRO ORGANIZATION HEADED BY DR. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA AND HAS CONDUCTED RAIDS AGAINST CUBA IN THE PAST.

201-299292

ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY WHICH CONDUCTS INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS ON MARCH TWENTYTHREE, SIXTYSEVEN, ~~[illegible]~~ ADVISED THAT AN ANONYMOUS TELEPHONE CALL HAD BEEN RECEIVED ON MARCH FIFTEEN, SIXTYSEVEN, STATING AN AMERICAN PILOT INTENDED TO RENT AN AIRPLANE IN APRIL, SIXTYSEVEN, AND DROP SEVERAL ONE HUNDRED POUND BOMBS OVER CUBA FOR ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA.

CS COPY

D-19-300-20

SECRET

201-299292

THE ANONYMOUS PERSON ON MARCH TWENTYTWO, SIXTYSEVEN, AGAIN CALLED AND CLAIMED THAT THEIR TARGET WOULD BE PUNTO ALLEGRO, CUBA. FOUR TO SIX BOMBS WOULD BE USED. THE RAID WOULD BE WITHIN TWO WEEKS. A TWIN ENGINE AIRPLANE WOULD BE USED. THE FLIGHT WOULD BE OUT OF OPA-LOCKA, FLA. AND THE PILOT WOULD RECEIVE BETWEEN FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS.

A SECOND SOURCE, WHO HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH BOSCH IN THE PAST AND WITH WHOM INSUFFICIENT CONTACT HAS BEEN HAD TO DETERMINE HIS RELIABILITY, ON MARCH TWENTYNINE, SIXTYSEVEN, FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

ON FEBRUARY TWENTYTWO, SIXTYSEVEN AND MARCH TWELVE, SIXTYSEVEN, BOSCH MET WITH AN AMERICAN PILOT CONCERNING A BOMBING MISSION OVER CUBA. BOSCH SAID THAT BETWEEN THIRTYFIVE HUNDRED AND FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS WOULD BE USED TO FINANCE THE RAID, A RENTED AIRPLANE WOULD BE ACQUIRED FROM OUTSIDE FLORIDA, A PILOT AND TWO OTHERS WOULD CARRY OUT THE MISSION, AND THAT BETWEEN FOUR AND SIX ONE HUNDRED POUND BOMBS WOULD BE USED. THE TARGET WOULD BE A SUGAR MILL ON THE NORTH COAST OF CUBA.

THIS SOURCE REPORTED THAT BOSCH IS VERY SECURITY CONSCIOUS, WOULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CREW OF THE AIRPLANE, THE SOURCE OF THE

[illegible]

BOMBS, OR FROM WHERE IN THE UNITED STATES THE PLANE WOULD TAKE OFF.

BOSCH SAID HE WOULD CONTACT THE PILOT ON APRIL ONE, TWO OR THREE, SIXTYSEVEN, BRIEF HIM ON THE MISSION, FINALIZE ALL ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE PILOT WOULD BE READY TO LEAVE AFTER THE BRIEFING. BOSCH INDICATED THE PILOT AND CREW WOULD NOT KNOW EACH OTHER'S IDENTITIES OR THE DESCRIPTION OF THE AIRCRAFT UNTIL THE TIME OF THE MISSION.

U.S. CUSTOMS IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, ADVISED THAT IT IS CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION IN THIS MATTER. ACCORDINGLY NO INVESTIGATION IS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY FBI.

GP-1

END

201-299292

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

3. DATE

4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

5. DATE OF INFO.

6. EVALUATION

7. ANALYST

8. DATE PROCESSED

9. DISSEMINATED IN

10. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

11. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

12. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

13.

BUSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292 036-009-006
SEX M DOB ? WAVE-06130
18 MAR 67
CIT ? UFG -08833
OCC ? P2
RE FORMATION OF CUBAN-HAITIAN EMIGRE VALLIANCE
WITH GOAL OF INVADING HAITI.

HTPHHHHVCHGGHHHHRS- R 6704130682

FILE IN 201-299 292

14. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-83 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-40)

DISPATCH

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

TYPIC/AMOT/Operational

Anti-US/CIA Cuban Exile Rally Held in New York on 19 February 1967

Action Required: None, FYI

1. Attached herewith is AMOT Report Number DD-2048, dated 20 February 1967, Subject: Rally Held in New York on 19 February 1967 Under the Sponsorship of the Cuban Nationalist Association (ANC) and the MIRR-Comandos L Alliance.

2. As noted in the report, Felipe *RIVERO Diaz, ANC leader, and Orlando *BOSCH Avila, MIRR leader, violently attacked the United States and CIA during the rally.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment - herewith
AMOT Report

Distribution
3 - WH/COG

File in
201-299292

CS COPY FILED IN 19-300-30

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-281688
201-299292

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
24 Feb 67	MAR -1 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27081

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-3/4

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 24 FEBRUARY 1967

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: MIRR

FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]9292
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION [illegible]

INFO [illegible]

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT [illegible] TIME [illegible] BY [illegible]

FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T 170849Z CITE JMWAVE 4132 (LAWAVE)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

TYPIC

1[illegible] 40572

1. LOCAL QKMAGNET RECEIVED PHONE CALL 15 NOV 66 FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING SELF AS DR. ORLANDO BOSCH WHO REPORTED ONE OF HIS TWO ENGINE AIRCRAFT MISSING ON BOMBING RAID ON CUBA STAGED FROM CENTRAL AMERICA. HE REFUSED DETAILS ON ROUTES USED BUT IDENTIFIED CREW AS EVELIO GUTIERREZ AND RAUL FONTONY. JMWAVE TRACES NEGATIVE.

2. QKMAGNET TALKED WITH MRS. GUTIERREZ AND TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS MIRR EVENING 15 NOV. SHE DESCRIBED MISSING AIRCRAFT AS DARK IN COLOR, TWIN ENGINE, NO NUMBER. AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED FIRST ATTACK FROM BIMINI. SECOND ATTACK ALSO LAUNCHED FROM BIMINI WITH MATANZAS OR LOS VILLAS PROVINCES AS TARGETS BUT AIRCRAFT DID NOT RETURN.

SECRET

AB FI
ABSTRACT

201-299292
16 Nov., 1966

14-00000

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 4132 S E C R E T **SECRET**

3. SKYAEKEY ADVISED BY LACOLD OF SAN JUAN RUMOR THAT UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL PICKED UP TWO MEN NAMED (FNU) GUTIERREZ AND EVELIO ALPIZAR ON RAFT. SAN JUAN QUMASHET ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE VALIDITY RUMOR. STATION TRACES SHOW ALPIZAR POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH EVELIO ALPIZAR PEREZ DOB 27 NOV 1931 HAVANA CUBAN AIR FORCE PILOT UNDER BATISTA, NOW RESIDING MIAMI.

S E C R E T

3T

SECRET

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO R 2.1 - 2?? CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH R

DESTROY ☐ SIG. ________

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME 0200Z | BY B

INFO FILE, VR, CS/EE, DCI, D/DCI, DCI (GOODWIN), DDP, ADDP, C/OZ, CA/PROP, CI, C/OPS, C/ICZ, FI, SOD6, CCS3, EUR8, C/OA, DOH, DO/H3

SECRET [illegible]542Z CITE JMWAVE 3413

70[illegible]11650

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

1. EVENING 5 OCTOBER ORLANDO BOSCH GIVEN THREE YEAR SUSPENDED SENTENCE BY NAPLES COURT WHEN FOUND GUILTY OF TRANSPORTING EXPLOSIVES WITHOUT LICENSE IN APRIL 66. TWO COMPANIONS TO BE TRIED SEPARATELY.

2. EVENING 5 OCTOBER AMOT REPORTED THAT AMTAUP-2 HAD BEEN TELEPHONED BY JORGE GUITERREZ ULLA, CHIEF OF PROPAGANDA OF MIRR, TO ATTEND PRESS CONFERENCE 6 OCTOBER. AMTAUP-2 ALSO REPORTED THAT AT TRIAL JORGE VEGA, BOSCH DEFENSE ATTORNEY, HAD MADE STATEMENT TO COURT TO EFFECT THAT BOSCH SHOULD NOT BE CONVICTED BECAUSE HE WAS TRYING TO FREE HOMELAND FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION AND IN DOING SO WAS NOT ACTING ANY MORE ILLEGALLY THAN WAS WOFACT, WHICH WAS CONDUCTING "SAME TYPE OF ACTIVITY" FROM A BASE LOCATED AT THE "CAYO GORDO" SECTION OF NAPLES.

3. "CAYO GORDO" UNDOUBTEDLY IS GARBLE FOR GORDON PASS AREA OF NAPLES AT WHICH BERTHING SITE FOR JMWAVE MARK I SWIFT [illegible]

SECRET

201-299292

7 Oct 66

SECRET

WITH CURRENT WAVE RIGGER IS LOCATED. HOWEVER, RIGGER HAS NOT BEEN AT [illegible] SEPTEMBER WHEN REMOVED FOR OPS USE AND REPAIRS. WAS SCHEDULED RETURN TO BERTH CIRCA 1 OCTOBER BUT THIS POSTPONED BECAUSE OF HURRICANE INEZ. RIGGER NOW AT TARPON PROPERTIES BERTH, KEY LARGO, WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO NAPLES SITE. AS HQS AWARE LATTER SITE ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR TERMINATION OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 66.

4. UPON RECEIPT AMOT INFO JMWAVE CONTACTED AND BRIEFED AGENTS SERVING AS CUSTODIANS AT NAPLES SITE. TO DATE THEY HAVE NOT REPORTED ANY QUERIES. OFFICIALS OF COVER CORPORATION, GULFLANT, WHICH OWNS RIGGER AND RENTS BERTHING SITE WERE ALERTED AND BRIEFED 6 OCTOBER.

5. MORNING 6 OCTOBER AMTAUP-2 REPORTED PRESS CONFERENCE NOT HELD BY MIRR BUT THAT GUTIERREZ STATED HE HAD PHONED UPI, AP, MIAMI HERALD TO GIVE THEM PRESS RELEASE INCLUDING VEGA CLAIM RE WOFACT ACTIVITIES NAPLES AREA.

6. AS OF 1700 HRS 6 OCTOBER STATION HAD NOT SEEN ANY MENTION IN PRESS OF ALLEGED VEGA STATEMENTS. MIAMI HERALD AND MIAMI NEWS COVERAGE OF BOSCH TRAIL DID NOT MENTION STATEMENTS. CHECKING NAPLES PRESS COVERAGE OF TRIAL.

SECRET

☒ [illegible] ☐ ☐ ☐

SECRET

SECRET

7. AT GUTIERREZ REQUEST AMTAUP-2 2 TAPED STATEMENT FOR RADIO PROGRAM. REVIEW OF STATEMENT BY AMOT 1 SHOWS THAT WOFACT NOT MENTIONED.

8. ALTHO NO FIRM EVIDENCE TO DATE ANTICIPATE THAT MIRR MAY SEEK PUBLICIZE FURTHER "REVELATIOONS" RE JMWAVE ACTIVITY, NOTABLY RE COMBINED OPS FACILIITIES, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL. INFO FROM AMOT 1 AND OTHER CONTACTS IN EXILE COMMUNITY INDICATES FELIPE RIVERO AND HIS ANC GROUP ALSO TALKING OF "EXPOSING" WOFACT 3 ACTIVITIES. STATED AIM OF BOTH GROUPS IS TO SHOW "TWO-FACED" ATTITUDE OF U.S. GOVT WHICH STOPS ANTI-COMMUNIST EXILE FIGHTERS FROM USING U.S. AS BASE FOR ACTION AGAINST CASTRO CUBA BUT ALLOWS WOFACT 3 TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTIVITY. FURTHER AIMS ARE TO SHOW EXILE COMMUNITY THAT MIRR AND ANC ARE "ACTIVIST" GROUPS AS COMPARED WITH OTHER EXILE ORGS AND TO RIDICULE AND TRY INTIMIDATE THOSE CUBANS WHO WORK FOR JMWAVE.

9. STATION EVALUATES INCIDENT AS HAVING NO SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPS OR GENERAL STATION SECURITY. STATION HAS DIRECTED INCREASED STATE OF VIGILANCE AT ALL COMBINED OPS SITES BUT DOES NOT ENVISAGE ANY BASIC CHANGES IN COVER

SECRET

201-299292

SECRET

OR OPS SECURITY PROCEDURES WHICH HAVE PROVIDED REQUIRED LEVEL OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL PLUS EFFECTIVE MASKING OF SENSITIVE DATA RE COMBINED OPS.

RID/MIS
Oct 17 11 01 AM '66

S E C R E T

BT

NN SECRET

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 6 OCTOBER 1966
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 27 JULY 1966
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION		ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/AMOT
Statements Made by Orlando BOSCH Avila at His Trial

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, For Your Information

Reference: JMWAVE 1326, 6 June 1966

1. Forwarded herewith is AMOT Report DD-1875, dated 9 June 1966, and its attachment which is a copy of a "Diario Las Americas" article dated 5 June 1966, concerning BOSCH's testimony that he was encouraged by the CIA to plan an attack against a refinery in Cuba in 1965.

2. The reference in AMOT Report DD-1875, DD-1848, was disseminated in UFG-8249 on 5 May 1966.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

Attachment:
AMOT Report - H/W

Distribution:
~~3~~ - WH/C, w/att

Copy

201-299292

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-299292

CS Copy #10

DATE TYPED

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 21 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-25340

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-300-20

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

FROM: [redacted] DD-1878

AGENT: [redacted] 9 June 1966

VIA: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Activities of the MIRR

SOURCE: Diario Las Americas

REF: DD-1848, para. 9

1. With regard to the statement made by Orlando BOSCH Avila, director of the MIRR, on 4 June 1966 at the trial going on in Orlando, Florida to the effect that the CIA had encouraged him to set up an attack against a refinery in Cuba (see the attached copy of the item in Diario Las Americas on 5 June) we have the following to report.

2. On 30 April 1966 BOSCH told P-86 during a conversation (see DD-1848, para. 9) that he intended to involve the United States in his plans, thus using this form of blackmail against the authorities of the United States.

DIARIO LAS AMERICAS

5 Junio 66

Afirmó Orlando Bosch que la CIA lo Alentó a Volar una Refinería

ORLANDO, Florida, junio 6 (UPI) — El líder cubano anticastrista Orlando Bosch testificó hoy en el juicio que se le sigue bajo el cargo de exportar armamento bélico, que la Dirección Central de Inteligencia "CIA" alentó una conjura para volar una refinería de petróleo en La Habana en 1965.

El proceso ante un tribunal federal, que se sigue asimismo a otros tres exiliados cubanos (Marcos Rodríguez, José Díaz y Gerulio Gutiérrez, deberá culminar mañana con la entrega del caso a un tribunal de 12 hombres.

Bosch declaró que un tal Bill Johnson, a quien identificó como agente de la CIA, le propuso bombardear desde el aire la refinería, para lo cual le prometió un avión, un piloto y las bombas. Admitió haber convenido el traslado de los explosivos a la casa de Frank Swanner, el piloto que atestiguó por la fiscalía, que los reos intentaron contratarlo para la incursión aérea.

El acusado dijo a los abogados del gobierno que no intentaba infringir las leyes estadounidenses de neutralidad y exportación de municiones, pues el plan fue concebido por la CIA.

Mientras los acusadores señalan que Bosch fue advertido sobre las normas federales, sus defensores aducen que el Gobierno Federal proporcionó los materiales y había contratado a Johnson.

El abogado defensor argumentó que la incursión no iba a ser realizada desde territorio de Estados Unidos, y que las bombas que debían utilizarse no estaban clasificadas como armamentos bélicos.

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 3. DATE
	4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 5. DATE OF INFO. / 6. EVALUATION
7. ANALYST / 8. DATE PROCESSED	9. DISSEMINATED IN / 10. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

11. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	12. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

13.

BUSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
POSSIBLE PICKETING IN MIAMI BY THE MIRR ON BEHALF OF RAMON DONESTEVEZ DOMINGUEZ.

019-300-020
UFG -08238
03 MAY 66
P2

R 6605100753

FILE IN 201-299292

14. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

7 1/21/66 C/S 3/5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

21 SECRET

ROUTING

1 5
2 6
3 RE 7
4 8

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION IN ☒ RID COPY (ADVANCE COPY TUBED TO CSDO AT 0815 D)

INFO DCI, D/DCI, EX/DIR, DDP, CS/RF, VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, CS/DO, SOD 4, RI/AN, DO/H 4, WH 8.

ALDES: WH/C 12, VR

SECRET 202318Z 21 JAN 0046Z 66 IN 38401

DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR CITE WAVE 8598

INTEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMTAUP-2 IN AMOT DD-1740 OF 19 JAN 65 FROM SERGIO SANCHEZ SUAREZ. RID: INDEX SUAREZ, BOSCH. FILED 202318Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

CUBA

SUBJ: REPAIR OF TWIN ENGINE VESSEL TO BE USED BY THE MIRR TO
INFILTRATE PERSONNEL INTO LAV VILTAS PROVINCE

DOI: 19 JANUARY 1966

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (20 JANUARY 1966)

UFG-7902

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EMIGRES TRAINED IN THE

IW COMMENT:

201-299292

		WH/C	12				
		WH/REG	8				

TDCSDB-315/00235-66

X ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

BASED ON: UFG-7902
TP (AMTAUP-2)

LIAISON: x

RELEASING IWO: Launie M. Ziebell
LAUNIE M. ZIEBELL

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
21 JANUARY 1966
0316 Z

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

[illegible]

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM:

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

PAGE 2 IN 38401

TECHINQUES OF INFORMATION COLLECTION. THE GROUP HAS PROVIDED USEFUL REPORTS SINCE 1961.

[illegible]

IV. COMMENT:

[illegible]

TDCS

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA

TDCS DB-315/00235-66

DATE OF INFO. 19 JANUARY 1966

DISTR. 21 JANUARY 1966

SUBJECT

REPAIR OF TWIN ENGINE VESSEL TO BE USED BY THE MIRR TO INFILTRATE PERSONNEL INTO LAV VILTAS PROVINCE

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (20 JANUARY 1966)

REF

IN 384[illegible]

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-7902

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A MEMBER OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EMIGRES TRAINED IN THE TECHNIQUES OF INFORMATION COLLECTION. THE GROUP HAS PROVIDED USEFUL REPORTS SINCE 1961.

1. ON THE MORNING OF 19 JANUARY 1966 SERGIO SANCHEZ SUAREZ, 3635 NW 23RD COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA, WAS REPAIRING A TWIN-ENGINE VESSEL OWNED BY THE MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECSPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR, INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY). SUAREZ HAD ALREADY COMPLETED WORK ON ONE ENGINE AND WAS EXPECTED TO FINISH WORK ON THE OTHER BY THE AFTERNOON OF 19 JANUARY.

2. THE MIRR PLANS TO USE THE VESSEL TO INFILTRATE TEN MEN INTO THE NORTH COAST OF LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. THE GROUP IS ONLY WAITING FOR THE WEATHER TO IMPROVE BEFORE MAKING THE TRIP. THE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC OCI ONE OCR EXO

CIA/NMCC, FBI, I&NS, TREASURY, COAST GUARD, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL

201-244242

VESSEL WILL TAKE THE MEN TO WITHIN EIGHT MILES OF THE COAST WHERE THEY WILL THEN BOARD A SMALLER BOAT AND PROCEED TO LAND.

3. ACCORDING TO SUAREZ, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, LEADER OF THE MIRR, HAD SAID THAT THE INFILTRATION TEAM WOULD BE CARRYING OUT "A VERY IMPORTANT ACTION" IN CUBA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, BORDER PATROL, AND USCG.

END OF MESSAGE

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 17 DECEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT : MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 13 DECEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE (RECE)
FBI FILE NO: 105-8280 (MIAMI)

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

JMWAVE

ACTION

WH/C 7 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, CS DO, ADDC, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, [illegible] C/CI, FE, FI/D, FI/INT [illegible], DDI, [illegible]

S E C R E T 030021Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7653

IN 00784

TYPIC AMOT

1. FYI AMOT REPORT DD-1698 DTD 30 NOV REPORTS GIST OF 27 NOV TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMTAUP-2 AND MARCELINO GARCIA JIMENEZ OF MIRR. GARCIA STATED HAD TALKED ON TELEPHONE ON 27 NOV TO ORLANDO BOSCH WHO IN HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT. BOSCH INDICATED STUDENTS AT HARTFORD UNIVERSITY HAD MADE $5000 BOND FOR BOSCH PERMITTING HIS RELEASE: BOND ORIGINALLY SET AT $15,000 SUBSEQUENTLY REDUCED TO $5,000. ACCORDING BOSCH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS HAVE ASKED THAT BOSCH BE TRIED IN "PUBLIC TRIAL" BUT ACCORDING BOSCH THIS INFO CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. SAME CAVEAT PASSED TO A-2 BY GARCIA. BOSCH ALSO INDICATED WOULD SPEND THREE OR FOUR DAYS AT HARTFORD, HAVE MEETING AT THE UNIVERSITY AND ATTEMPT COLLECT FUNDS "FOR AN OPERATION HE (BOSCH) HAD PLANNED".

2. GARCIA INDICATED TO A-2 THAT PREVIOUSLY PLANNED PROTEST DEMONSTRATION CANCELLED WHEN BOSCH RELEASED, AND ADDED THAT HENCEFORTH ALL EFFORTS OF MIRR WOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS EFFECTING PLANNED AIR RAID OVER PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE. (WAVE

SECRET

201-299292

2 Dec 65

SECRET IN 06764 PAGE 2

COMMENT: SEE UFG 7754 FOR INFORMATION ON PLANNED DEMONSTRATION AND UFG 7739 FOR INFORMATION ON PROPOSED STRIKE).

3. WAVE DOES NOT INTEND DISSEMINATE INFORMATION LOCALLY SINCE ASSUME SUBSTANCE ABOVE INFO KNOWN TO ODENVY WILL CONTINUE MONITORING MIRR PLANS. WOULD APPRECIATE DIR DETERMINE WHETHER HARTFORD UNIVERSITY STUDENTS DID IN FACT MAKE BOND, WHETHER PLANNED MEETING HELD, AND ESTIMATE AMOUNT COLLECTED IF ANY. WILL USE REPLIES IN SUBSEQUENT DISSEMINATIONS IF APPROPRIATE.

SECRET

CFN 7653 FYI DD 1698 DTD 30 NOV 27 NOV AMTAUP-2 MARCELINO GARCIA JIMENEZ MIRR 27 NOV ORLANDO BOSCH HARTFORD CONNECTICUT HARTFORD UNIVERSITY $5000 $15,000 $5,000 NOT FOR A-1 GARCIA A-2 PINAR DEL RIO UFG 7754 UFG 7739 NOT INTEND

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 43

26/3 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, SOD6, CA2, CA/PEG, PPB, OGC2, FI, FI/INT, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H3, DDP, ADDP

ABSTRACT

SECRET 012209Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7629

TYPIC AMOT

1 Dec 65 IN 05856

FOR YOUR INFORMATION ON BASIS AMOT REPORT DD 1699 OF 30 NOV 65. AMOT-2 OBTAINED FOLLOWING FROM MARIO BARRERA DIAZ, WHO IN NEW YORK AND REGULAR AMOT SUB-SOURCE. WHILE VISITING NEW YORK OFFICES "EL TIEMPO" 30 NOV DIAZ WAS INFORMED BY PEDRO YANES OF MIRR ORGANIZATION THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WOULD MEET SENATOR DODD ON 3 DEC AT WHICH TIME BOSCH TO COMPLAIN ABOUT "PERSECUTION, INSULTS AND OTHER ATROCITIES" COMMITTED AGAINST HIS PERSON BY ODYOKE OFFICIALS.

SECRET

CFN 7629 AMOT DD 1699 30 NOV 65 AMOT-2 MARIO BARRERA DIAZ NEW YORK EL TIMEPO 30 NOV PEDRO YANES MIRR ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA SENATOR DODD 3 DEC

BT

SECRET

201-299292

1 Dec 65

6 JJ

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	4. RI FILE NO.
	5. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 6. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
2. ANALYST / 3. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
POSSIBLE RAID PLANS BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, LEADER OF MOIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA/MIRR, INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY/

019-002-004
UFGA-23848
22 NOV 65
+19-2-4-2
A02

R 6512031956

FILE IN 201-299292

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9-60)

14-00000

m.m

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

BUSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-006-095/04
WAVE-07391
20 NOV 65
UFG -07739
P3

POSSIBILITY THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
MAY BE PLANNING AN AERIAL RAID OVER
CUBA.

MZP

R 6511301958

FILE IN 201-

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 29 92 92

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9-60)

m. m

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

3. DATE

4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

5. DATE OF INFO.

6. EVALUATION

7. DISSEMINATED IN

8. DATE

ANALYST

DATE PROCESSED

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-300-020
WAVE-07369
19 NOV 65
UFG -07738
P4

ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA 201-299292, LEADER OF THE MIRR, INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT OFR REVCLUTIONARY RECOVERY, IS PLANNING AN ATTACK ON CUBA WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ADOLFO JIMENEZ AGUILERA 201-327701, HAS BEEN ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OPERATION. DOI 18 NOV 65.

MZP

R 6511301959

FILE IN 201-

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➩ 29 92 92

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

3. DATE

4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

5. DATE OF INFO.

6. EVALUATION

7. ANALYST

8. DATE PROCESSED

9. DISSEMINATED IN

10. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

11. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

12. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

13.

BUSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
LDR OF THE MIRR, INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT
FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECUPERATION
PLANS OF CUBAN EMIGRES TO ATTEND CONF- ERENCE
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN RIO DE JANEIRO

019-006-095/04
WAVE-07282
17 NOV 65
UFG -07719
P3

R 6512060194

FILE IN 201-299292

14.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(10-61)

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

24 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, CI/OPS, FI, CI

SECRET 172226Z

DIR INFO WIOD CITE WAVE 7315 (INCHURST ACTING)

MHMOOSE PBRUMEN

17 Nov 65 IN 96796

REFS A. DIR 47960

B. WAVE 7282 (IN 95999)*

1. ODFOAM REPORTS: JUAN JOSE CERILO (MORENZA) ABREU AND HIS CLOSE FRIEND MARIO (BARRERA) DIAZ (201-281387) PREPARING TRAVEL RIO OAS MEETING. BOTH ASSOCIATED COLLEGE OF NEWSPAPERMEN IN EXILE AND FRIENDS ORLANDO (BOSCH) AVILA, HEAD INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECUPERATION (MIRR), MILITANT ACTIVIST ORGANIZATION.

2. ODFOAM IN JULY 1965 INVESTIGATED AND CLEARED MORENZA FOR ALLEGED THREAT GPLOGIC. ODFOAM OPINION THERE NO INDICATION SUBJECTS PLAN HOSTILE ACTION OAS MEETING DESPITE BOSCH ASSOCIATION.

3. AMOTS REPORT MORENZA BORN 1904, NEGRO, ALLEGEDLY NOT ALLOWED MEXICO BECAUSE INVOLVED ROLLASON VISA SALES. IN PAST WAS DELEGATE TO MEXICO FOR AGENCIA DE INFORMACIONES PERIODISTICAS (AIP) AND ASSOCIATED PRIO ELEMENT PRO-GOBIERNO CONSTITUCIONAL DE CUBA (PGCC).

4. MORENZA ON FINANCE DEPT DELEGATION CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (CRC) IN MEXICO 1962.

201-299292
17 Nov 65

[illegible] IN 96796
PAGE 2

SECRET

CFN 7515 47968 7282 JUAN JOSE CERILO MORENZA ABREU MARIO CARRERA DIAZ 201-261387 RIO OAS ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA MIRR 1965 MORENZA NO INDICATION OAS BOSCH 1964 NEGRO NOT ALLOWED MEXICO AIP PRO-GOBIERNO PDCC CRC 1962

BT

x CUBANS PLANS TO ATTEND RIO CONF

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 12 NOVEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 8 NOVEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; MINING OF SPANISH
VESSEL "SATRUSTEGUI" AT SAN JUAN...
FBI FILE NO: 105-10602 (MIAMI)

14-00000
104-10164-10054
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 29 NOVEMBER 1974

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)

FBI FILE NO: 105-21947 (MIAMI)

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

X

Chief, Latin America Division

HCO HCB

Chief of Station, Quito; Chief of Station, Bogota

Chief of Base, Guayaquil TPS

Orlando BOSCH Avila (Efrain LEITONE)

10

DOC MICRO SER. DEC 1974 MICROFILMED

Forwarded herewith are two photographs of Orlando Bosch Avila, Cuban exile pilot who is believed to be traveling on a Colombian passport using the alias Efrain Leitone. During the recent OAS Conference in Quito, Ecuadorean immigration officials added Bosch to the Ecuadorean watchlist of known and extremely dangerous terrorists. The photographs were provided by PJBREEZY-3.

Theodore E. Kuvallis
Theodore E. KUVALLIS

1 Attachment:
As stated above h/w

Distribution:
✓Orig. & 1 - C/LAD w/att
1 - COS, Quito w/att
1 - COS, Bogota w/att

RECORD COPY

DEC 23 5 02 PM E-2 IMPDET

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HEGA-4688	13 December 1974
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-0299292 ~~201-0855937~~

14-00000

DOC. MICRO. SER.
DEC 24 1974
MICROFILMED



RECORD COPY

S/w att #1 to HEGA-04688

201-0299292
13 Dec 74

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 29 NOVEMBER 1974

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; BOMB RECEIVED IN MAIL
AT POST OFFICE, MADRID, SPAIN...

FBI FILE NO: 105-22456 (MIAMI)

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 38 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 26-2 RUN BY

SECRET

ZY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED DDO/DO BY 0? AT 2205

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

RF FILE VR [illegible] CI/OPS, [illegible] [illegible]

T 592818 EIA298 PAGE 01 IN 423538

TOR:2222592 NOV 74 CARA 26354

4

S E C R E T 2222482 NOV 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 26854

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, SANTO DOMINGO INFO PRIORITY QUITO, LA/MIAMI.

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 15971 (IN421799)

1. VENEZUELAN LIAISON ADVISES THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IS IN CURACAO. STATION DOES NOT YET KNOW CIRCUMSTANCES OF BOSCH'S MOVE FROM VENEZUELA TO CURACAO, BUT HOPE OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO NIGHT 22 NOVEMBER.

2. GOV WAS FULLY AWARE THAT PERSON THEY DETAINED WAS BOSCH EVEN THOUGH HE WORE DISGUISE AND CARRIED VALID DOMINICAN PASSPORT. WHEN U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE DECIDED NOT EXTRADITE BOSCH, VENEZUELANS WERE SOMEWHAT UNSURE WHAT TO DO WITH HIM. THEIR CASE AGAINST BOSCH FOR COMPLICITY IN LOCAL AND QUITO BOMBINGS WAS LARGELY HEARSAY; THIS COUPLED WITH POTENTIAL ADVERSE REACTION FROM LOCAL CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IF ATTEMPT MADE TO PROSECUTE, PROBABLY MADE EXPLUSION TO DOM REP (FEIGNING IGNORANCE OF HIS TRUE IDENTITY) AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE. WHETHER HE HAS NOW BEEN EXPELLED ONLY SO FAR AS CURACAO OR TO SOME FURTHER POINT (INCLUDING

Lm

TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
INDEX

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-0299292
22 Nov 74

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 592810 EIA298 PAGE 02-02 IN 423538

TOR:222259Z NOV 74 CARA 26854

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC) IS NOT YET KNOWN. IF IT IS VENEZUELAN INTENTION TO SEND BOSCH TO DOM REP, THE COURSE MAY BE CLOSED TO THEM IF THEY ACKNOWLEDGE TO GODR THEIR AWARENESS BOSCH TRUE IDENTITY AND RESULTANT OBVIOUS FALSITY OF DOM REP PASSPORT. STATION DOES NOT WISH TO ACT AS BROKER TO PUT GOV ON OFFICIAL NOTICE, ON BEHALF OF GODR, THAT SUBJECT IS BOSCH AND THEREBY COMPLICATING GOV HANDLING OF MATTER.

3. FYI STATION UNILATERAL SOURCE IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH BOSCH PRIOR TO HIS ARREST, SAID BOSCH TOLD HIM THE DOMINICAN PASSPORT WAS VALID AND HAD COST HIM U.S. $3000 IN DOM REP.

4. FILE: DEFER.

DEC 9 74

06

SECRET

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT LA8

INFO RF FILE VR

T 592597 EIA879 PAGE 01 IN 423455

TOR:222138Z NOV 74 SDOM 15980

S E C R E T 222125Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 15980

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 15971 (IN421799)

DUPLICATE COPY FOR CROSS FILING INTO 201-299292

1. 22 NOVEMBER EDITION "EL CARIBE" NEWSPAPER REPORTS ORLANDO BOSCH (201-299292) DEPORTED FROM VENEZUELA TO CURACAO ON 21 NOVEMBER FOLLOWING HIS ARREST ON 19 NOVEMBER. STORY CARRIES AP NEW YORK BYLINE AND WAS WRITTEN BY MIGUEL GALLASTEGUI.

2. WHEN HE RECEIVED NEWS, EMPYREX-1 CALLED DOMINICAN CONSUL IN CURACAO AND TOLD HIM TO ADVISE LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF BOSCH ARRIVAL AND REQUEST THEY TAKE AWAY FALSE DOMINICAN PASSPORT HE CARRYING. CONSUL ALSO TOLD TO ADVISE AUTHORITIES THAT BOSCH WILL NOT BE PERMITTED ENTER DOMREP. EMPYREX-1 TOLD STATION EFFORTS DISCOVER NAME UNDER WHICH BOSCH TRAVELING HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL. HE HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN ABLE TO LOCATE PHOTOGRAPH OF BOSCH AND THESE HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO AIRPORT SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN ALERTED TO PICKUP BOSCH IN EVENT HE TRIES TO GET INTO THE COUNTRY.

3. FILE 22-9-28; BOSCH 201. E2 IMPDET

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER TOTAL COPIES 20 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR [illegible]

CCS2

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 574700 E1A725 PAGE 01 IN 416946

TOR:152215Z NOV 74 CARA 25993

S E C R E T 152115Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 25993

TO: DIRECTOR, QUITO INFO LA/MIAMI.

REF: QUITO 21108 (IN 411939)

1. FYI WKSCARLET-3 MET WITH ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IN CARACAS EVENING 13 NOVEMBER AND HE CERTAIN BOSCH HAS NOT LEFT VENEZUELA RECENTLY. BOSCH HAS ALIAS DOMINICAN PASSPORT AND VENEZUELAN 30-DAY TOURIST CARD WHICH HAS EXPIRED. BOSCH HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO IMPROVE LOCAL DOCUMENTATION AND THEREFORE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY GETTING BACK INTO VENEZUELA IF HE LEFT.

2. WKSCARLET-3 SAID BOSCH IS USING DARK WIG WHICH LAYS OVER TO RIGHT SIDE OF HEAD. IS USING A COSMETIC TO BLEND A SKIN DISCOLORATION AT RIGHT SIDE OF MOUTH AND RIGHT CHEEK. HAS SHAVED OFF MOUSTACHE HE WORE FOR MANY YEARS AND NOW APPEARS WEIGH ABOUT 210 POUNDS.

3. BOSCH CLAIMED AC RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME OF BOMBINGS IN QUITO AT MFM AND THAT IT ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE LAST WEEK IN WASHINGTON.

4. STATION ADVISING LOCAL LEGATT ORALLY ABOVE PARA TWO DESCRIPTION AND THAT BOSCH IN CARACAS 13 NOVEMBER; SOURCING TO

S E C R E T

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-0299292

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	STAFF 1 4 2 5 3 6
ACTION #			

T 574788 EIA725 PAGE 02-02 IN 416946

TOR:1522152 NOV 74 CARA 25993

"A CUBAN EXILE IN MIAMI". REQUEST QUITO ADVISE CARACAS ASSISTANT LEGATT GORDON ELLISON SAME. CITING SAME SOURCE.

5. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

[illegible]

FBI CABLES

DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA - FIGITIVE, PAROLE VIOLATOR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, AKA - FUGITIVE - PAROLE VIOLATOR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 18 PER LA # 6 TOTAL COPIES 39-1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED DDO/ISO AT 2350

ACTION UNIT LA 15

ACTION #

RF FILE VR [illegible], SECUR 4, ISO/[illegible], CI/OP, DDS/[illegible], [illegible], DDO, DDCDO, ANO2, PS/EG 4.

STAFF

T 501013 EIA048 PAGE 01-01 IN 411939

TOR:1123452 NOV 74 QUIT 21108

S E C R E T 1123302 NOV 74 STAFF

CITE QUITO 21108

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, GUAYAQUIL INFO CARACAS, LIMA, LA/MIAMI,

VWLOFTY

REF: QUITO 21087 (IN 410675)

1. STATION PASSED TO SECURITY CHIEF COPIES OF PHOTO OF ORLANDO BOSCH PROVIDED BY LEGATT GORDON ELLISON. SECURITY HEAD REPORTED THEY HAVE TRACED RESIDENCE OF ROBERTO VERDAGUER BOAN TO GUAYAQUIL. RESIDENCE IS BEING ~~COAGHOLJO~~ *SURVEILLED AND PHOTO WILL ASSIST POLICE IF BOSCH MAKES CONTACT WITH VERDAGUER.

2. DFILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET

* BEING SVGD

SECRET

DUPLICATE COPY FOR CROSS FILING IN [illegible] 0399472

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

S E C R E T

STAFF 091603Z DIRECTOR 620133

CONF: LA 15 INFO: FILE OFEINT, SECUR4, LOWHD, OPCIT6, FHA, DDO, DDO/CO, DWD2, SS/SEC6, PSI/EG4, IW 0 0 0 0

RID: NO LA

#6

TO: IMMEDIATE QUITO, LIMA INFO GUAYAQUIL. V

CLVULOFTY V

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 619616 (NOT SENT OR NEEDED LIMA, GUAYAQUIL)

B. LIMA 29138 (IN 410127) V

1. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FBI INDICATES BOSCH MAY BE TRAVELING ON FALSE COBLOMBIAN PASSPORT BUT NO INFO ON ALIAS BEING USED. BOSCH WAS RELEASED FROM ATLANTA FEDERAL PENITENTIARY 15 DEC 72 ON PAROLE. HE SUBSEQUENTLY FOUNDED A SMALL ACTION GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES CALLED ACCION CUBA (AC). THIS GROUP HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR SENDING PACKAGE BOMBS TO CUBAN CONSULATES IN LIMA, OTTAWA AND MADRID DURING PAST YEAR. V

2. FBI DESCRIBES EEBOSCH AS EGOTISTICAL AND DANGEROUS FANATIC WITH A FLARE FOR THE DRAMATIC. THE GBI SOURCE HAS SPECULATED THAT BOSCH MAY SEEK ASSISTANCE FROM ROBERTO VERDAGUER, CUBAN EXILE PILOT WHO IS REPORTED TO RUN A CROP DUSTING BUSINESS IN ECUADOR. THSE GBI SOURCE DID NOT HAVE FURTHER INFO ON VERDAGUER BUT HE MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH SUBJECT OF 201-231540 WHO HAS SAME NAME AND CARDED AS BOTH ECUADOREAN AND CUBAN WITH OCCUPATION AS PILOT.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-0299292

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

2 2

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

620133

6

BRIEF NOTATION STATED HE WAS INVOLVED IN ARMS SMUGGLING FROM MIAMI TO NICARAGUA. CHECKING FURTHER, WILL ADVISE.

3. FOR LIMA: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IS CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST WANTED BY FBI AND REPORTED TO BE IN QUITO (OR WITH INTENT OF TRAVELING TO QUITO) TO CONDUCT TERRORIST OPERATIONS AGAINST OAS MINISTERS MEETING. REF B MENTION OF EFRAIN LEYTONE YATE TRAVELING ON COLOMBIAN PASSPORT AND ARRESTED FOR CARRYING ARMS RAISES QUESTION WHETHER LEYTONE MIGHT BE ALIAS BEING USED BY BOSCH. EBOSCH BORN 18 AUG 26, LAS VILLAS PROVINCE, CUBA IS DESCRIBED AS 5 FEET E010 INCHES TALL, WEIGHT 170 POUNDS, DARK COMPLEXION, BOOOBLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, THICK LIPS, RED BIRTHMARK ON CHIN, WEARS HORN RIMMED GLASSES. HE IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. REQUEST LIMA COORDINATE WITH LIAISON TO INSURE LEYTONE IS HELD UNTIL END OF OAS CONFERENCE (12 NOV) AND ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF LEYTONE IS BOSCH.

4. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

LA/COG

DATE: 9 NOV 74
ORIG: HARRY ARCHER:TM
UNIT: LA/NW/E
EXT: 1034

Archer

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/NW
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

STAFF

T 980406 EIA547 PAGE 02 IN 418642

TOR:082036Z NOV 74 CARA 25048

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FOR SUBJECT'S PAROLE INTO THE UNITED STATES FOR PROSECUTION HOWEVER, ADDITIONAL DEPARTMENTAL APPROVAL NECESSARY BEFORE ARREST CAN BE OFFICIALY REQUESTED. THIS APPROVAL IS FORTHCOMING MONDAY MORNING AND CAN BE EXPEDITED IF ARREST ACTUALLY EFFECTED SOONER OR IF CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE THIS IS NECESSARY.

D. BOSCH DESCRIBED AS BORN AUGUST 18, 1926, LAS VILLAS, CUBA, 5 FEET 10 INCHES, 170 POUNDS, DARK COMPLEXION, BLACK HAIR BROWN EYES, THICK LIPS, VERY NOTICIBLE RED BIRTHMARK ON CHIN, WEARS HEAVY HORN RIMMED GLASSES.

E. CONSIDER BOSCH ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS."

2. ASSISTANT LEGATT GORDON F. ELLISON WILL ARRIVE QUITO ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 11 NEXT, ON AF 217 AT APPROXIMATELY 10:15 AM. ELLISON WILL BRING PHOTOGRAPHS AND FINGERPRINTS TO FACILITATE INQUIRY.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

32 LA6 IN 379

SECRET

STAFF

LA/5 OPS/INT, SECUR 4, LSN/OC/LOO, OPS/ITG, I/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, DIV D2, PS/EG 4

T 950281 EIA729 PAGE 01-01 IN 618075

TOR:0922352 NOV 74 QUIT 21067

SECRET 0922292 NOV 74 STAFF

CITE QUITO 21067

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, CARACAS, LIMA INFO LA/MIAMI, GUAYAQUIL.

VWLOFTY

REFS: A. CARACAS 25942 (NOT NEEDED LIMA, GUAYAQUIL) (IN 410642)

B. DIRECTOR 620113 (NOT NEEDED LA/MIAMI, CARACAS)

1. REF A AND B INFO ON ORLANDO BOSCH POSSIBLE TRAVEL TO QUITO, HIS PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION, DOCUMENTATION AND POSSIBLE LOCAL CONTACT WAS PASSED TO HEAD OF LOCAL SECURITY SERVICE AFTERNOON 9 NOV.

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-0299292

2

SECRET

LA WAS

LA8

RF CI/OPS, LSN/ID, SOD

T 550080 E14547 PAGE 01 IN 410042

TOR:0916362 NOV 74 CARA 25942

SECRET 091600Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 25942

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, QUITO INFO LA/MIAMI.

NIACT QUITO.

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 619018

B. QUITO 21073 (IN 410089)

1. FOLLOWING INFO PASSED STATION BY ASSISTANT LEGAT GORDON ELLISON. ELLISON SAYS INFO MAY BE PASSED BY STATION TO ECUADORAN SECURITY FORCES:

"A. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IS CURRENTLY IN FUGITIVE STATUS FOR HAVING VIOLATED HIS PAROLE. HE WAS CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO 10 YEARS IN MIAMI ON CHARGES RELATED TO SHIP BOMBINGS, EXTORTION AND CONSPIRACY. HE WAS RELEASED ON PAROLE DECEMBER 15, 1972.

B. BOSCH ALLEGEDLY ARRIVED QUITO ON NOVEMBER 5 OR 6, 1974 IN POSSESSION OF COLOMBIAN PASSPORT. NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE RE NAME BEING USED OR SPECIFIC DESTINATION IN QUITO. HOWEVER, HE MAY CONTACT ROBERTO VERDAGUER, CUBAN EXILE PILOT, WHO NOW OPERATES A COMMERCIAL AIRLINE TRANSPORT AND FUMIGATION COMPANY IN ECUADOR.

C. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS OBTAINED APPROVAL FROM

DUPLICATE COPY FOR CROSS FILING INTO 201-0299292

SECRET

[illegible] 25 [illegible]

S E C R E T

[illegible] LA [illegible] 1/10 AT 2030

LA8

[illegible] eLA8, CI/OPS, OPS/ITG5, OPS/INT, LEN/10

STAFF PRECEDENCE

T 555066 E1A507 PAGE 01-01 IN 409983

TOR:0810928 NOV 74 LMIN 22611

S E C R E T 0810392 NOV 74 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 22611

TO: IMMEDIATE QUITO, DIRECTOR.

1. FBI/MIAMI INFORMS US THAT IT HAS REPORT THAT ORLANDO BOSCH, LEADER OF CUBAN ACTION IS IN QUITO.

2. BOSCH HAS RECENTLY SERVED FIVE YEARS IN ATLANTA FEDERAL PENITENTIARY FOR BOMBING OF POLISH SHIP IN MIAMI HARBOR. ARREST WARRANT CURRENTLY OUT ON HIM FROM FBI. FBI HAS BEEN SEARCHING FOR HIM FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.

3. FOR DIRECTOR: WE UNDERSTAND THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN REPORTED TO FBI HEADQUARTERS. SUGGEST YOU MAY WISH TO CONTACT FOR FURTHER DETAILS.

4. FILE: ~~DEFER~~, E2, IMPDET

201-299292

[illegible] PROGRAM

LA/[illegible]

8NOV74

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

201-299292

14-00000

OUTGOING

93-1

SECRET

00000 0322462 0000000000CIA 619753

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/PLAN, C/CI/OPS, C/OPS/INTS, C/OPS, DDO, DDO/DO, C/LA/NIO

INDEX BY: 3B

TO: IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

ATTENTION: SY/PIB MR. BENNINGTON

FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1. WE ARE ADVISED THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN CITIZEN AND KNOWN TERRORIST MAY BE PRESENT IN QUITO. BOSCH HAS SERVED 5 YEAR SENTENCE ATLANTA PENETENTIARY FOR BOMBING POLISH SHIP IN MIAMI HARBOR. HE IS CURRENTLY FUGITIVE WANTED BY FBI AND CONSIDERED EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

2. BOSCH, BORN 18 AUGUST 1926 LAS VILLAS PROVINCE, CUBA. HEIGHT 5 FEET 10 INCHES, WEIGHT 170 POUNDS, DARK COMPLEXION, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, THICK LIPS, RED BIRTH MARK ON CHIN, WEARS HORN RIMMED GLASSES.

3. OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN QUITO IS AWARE OF THIS INFORMATION AND WILL COORDINATE WITH YOUR SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE ON THIS MATTER.

4. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

DATE: 8 NOVEMBER 74
ORIG: HARRY WARCHER
UNIT: C/LA/NW/E
EXT: 1034

D C/LA/NW J. Hennessy

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-0299292

C/OPS/
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 062063

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 0822112 DIRECTOR 639838

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE IR/AN, CI/OPS, LSN/10, C/OPS

DISSEM BY: 05

TO: IMMEDIATE QUITO INFO CARACAS, LA/MIAMI.

REFS: A. QUITO 21071 [IN 410029] (NOT SENT OR NEEDED CARACAS.)

B. CARACAS 25938 [IN 409912]

C. LA/MIAMI 22614 [IN 410070] (NOT SENT OR NEEDED CARACAS)

FBI

1. [redacted] STATES REF SUBJECT IS CUBBAN CITIZEN AND WANTED ON SEVERAL CHARGES INCLUDING ASSAULT FBI [redacted] OFFICER. SUBJECT CONSIDERED EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. FBI [redacted] HQS STATES THAT ITS REPRESENTATIVE IN CARACAS HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR HANDLING CASE AND PREFER WE DO NOT BECOME INVOLVED ANY ASPECT THIS MATTER.

2. BSNO ADDITIONAL BIO DATA TO ADD REF C. ADVISING STATE [redacted] SEPARATELY.

3. FOR CARACAS: REF A AND C INVOLVE ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA POSSIBLE PRESENCE QUITO.

4. SUGGEST QUITO ADVISE STATE [redacted] SECURITY DETACHMENT OF POSSIBLE PRESENCE BOSCH IN QUITO AND LET LATTER COORDINATE MATTER WITH LOCAL SECURITY LIAISON OFFICER.

5. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

H. Archer

DATE: 8 NOVEMBER 74
ORIG: HARRY ARCHER
UNIT: C/LA/NW/E
EXT: 1034

OPS/LSN C. ENWRIGHT (IN SUBSTANCE)

DC/LA/CAR

C/LAD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/NW

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO [illegible]1-0299294

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 1-1 RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED CA 2040

ACTION UNIT LAB

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR IP/AN, CI/CC2 DCO2

CSN/ITD C/OPS

STAFF [redacted]

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 555986 EIA619 PAGE 01-01 IN 418029

TOR:0820342 NOV 74 QUIT 21071

S E C R E T 0820132 NOV 74 STAFF

CITE QUITO 21071

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI.

REF: LA/MIAMI 22611 (IN 409983)

1. NEED TO KNOW CITIZENSHIP OF ORLANDO BOSCH. IF HE IS AMERICAN, HQS PLS PUT THIS INFO THRU OTHER CHANNEL TO STATE SECURITY FOR PASSAGE TO COL. CABRERA IN QUITO. EITHER WAY, PLS ALSO CABLE BIO DATA AND PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION.

2. NO FILE: E2 IMPDET

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-0299326

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-21947 (MIAMI)

DATE: 19 AUGUST 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-6193 (SAN JUAN)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 28 SEPTEMBER 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

DATE: 31 JULY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-21947 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENT (EXCERPTS - DOC. AVAILABLE IN IP/CFS)

DATE: 25 JUNE 1974

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: "ZERO" (AN ORGANIZATION)

FBI FILE NO: 105-22094; 9-2690 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 20 JUNE 1974
CLASSIFICATION: AIUO
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA; ACCION CUBANA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

DATE: 1 MARCH 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA (FLNC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-21892 (MIAMI)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

BOSCH Avila, Orlando

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. 201 FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

6

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/CA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER CA 97563.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 299292

FORM 10-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 30 APRIL 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA (FLNC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-[illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 8 APRIL 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: AGRUPACION ABDALA ESTUDIANTIL;
AKA ABDALA
FBI FILE NO: 105-[illegible] (CHICAGO)

DATE: 27 MARCH 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: 105-1742 (MIAMI)

DATE: 14 MARCH 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: REVOLUTIONARY MEDICAL UNION
FBI FILE NO: 105-21663; 105-21664 (MIAMI)

DATE: 28 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MAX LESNICK
FBI FILE NO: 105-3492 (COPY AVAILABLE IN FILE OF
MAX LESNICK - No. 30)

DATE: 27 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: UNITY OF CUBAN PARACHUTISTS
GOLDEN FALCONS
FBI FILE NO: 105-20898

DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ALFREDO SANTIAGO SOLER ALVEREZ
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 1[illegible] FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: UNSUB; BOMB RECEIVED IN MAIL AT CUBAN
EMBASSY, OTTAWA, ONTARIO, CANADA,
JANUARY 29, 1974
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: REVOLUTIONARY DIRECTORY (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20202 (MIAMI)

DATE: 12 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: JOSE ANTONIO COLMENARES IZQUIERDO
FBI FILE NO: 105-21598

DATE: 16 JANUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: BOMBING OF CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY,
DECEMBER 3, 1973
FBI FILE NO: 174-728 (MIAMI)

DATE: 18 JANUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 15 JANUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: FRENTE CUBANA DE LIBERACION
FBI FILE NO: 105-21892 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MAX LESNICK, AKA MAX EDGARDO LESNICK-MENENDEZ
FBI FILE NO: 105-3492 (DOCUMENT AVAILABLE IN
FILE OF MAX LESNICK, NO. 30)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 10 DECEMBER 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20202 (MIAMI)

DATE: 8 NOVEMBER 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20202 (MIAMI)

DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20202 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 AUGUST 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: RICARDO FELICIANO CASANUEVA
FBI FILE NO: 105-21501 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 AUGUST 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 AUGUST 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: SERGIO FRANCISCO GONZALEZ ROSQUETE
FBI FILE NO: 105-21500 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 JULY 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLE (PRP)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20913 (MIAMI)

DATE: 29 JUNE 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: 105-1742 (MIAMI)

SECRET

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCE COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Disseo. No., etc., if applicable)

BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

019-002-004
UFAA-05126A01
15 JUN 73

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

DEROG TRACE REPLY TO SECRET SERVICE IN CONNECTION W/ BREZHNEV VISIT. 11 OCT 68 ARRESTED BY FBI AGENTS CHARGE CARRYING OUT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. LATER SENTENCED 10 YRS PRISON FOR PLANNING TERRORIST CAMPAIGN.

R 7306270349

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 299292

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-60)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 26 JUNE 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 27 APRIL 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 30 MARCH 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (PRP)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20913 (MIAMI)

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO
FBI FILE NO: 105-20913 (MIAMI)

DATE: 24 JANUARY 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (PRP)
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 18 JANUARY 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (PRP)
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1972
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATEX



Impresión pulgar derecho.
Thumbprint, right hand.

REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA

PASAPORTE

(PASSPORT)

LA DIRECCION GENERAL DE MIGRACION
DEL MINISTERIO DE SEGURIDAD PUBLICA

Suplica a las autoridades civiles y militares
Requests the civil and military authorities of the
countries

de los países por donde transita el portador,
through which the bearer travels to provide

no le pongan obstáculo y le presten ayuda y
protección en caso necesario.
assistance without delay or hindrance and protection as may be necessary.

30 Páginas 30 Pages

RECORD COPY

A/W [illegible] to HQCA. 11056. [illegible]



No. DEL PASAPORTE 2446-71

[illegible] Dr José Luis Cariaga Meindez

[illegible] boliviano Estatura 1.75 m.

[illegible] Cajuela C.R.

Fecha de nacimiento / Date of birth 24 Marzo 1935

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] 1-241-102

[illegible] [illegible] Blanco

[illegible]

Dado en / Given at SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

a los 18 días del mes de Febrero

The of

de 1971

of

Válido hasta / Valid until 18 Febrero 1973

Pudiendo ser renovado a su vencimiento hasta completar diez [illegible]

Director General de Migración



PERSONAS INCLUIDAS EN ESTE PASAPORTE
PERSONS INCLUDED IN THIS PASSPORT

Nombre de la esposa / Wife's name

Céd. de Identidad / Identification card

Nombre del niño / Child's name

Fecha de nacimiento / Date of birth

Nombre del niño / Child's name

Fecha de nacimiento / Date of birth

Nombre del niño / Child's name

Fecha de nacimiento / Date of birth

FOTOGRAFIA / Photograph

CR

CR

San José, Costa Rica

Firma del Portador / Bearer's Signature

REVALIDACIONES
REVALIDATIONS

Revalidado el
Revalidated on } 11-Set-74

Válido hasta
Valid until } 11-Set-76

Director General de Migración

Revalidado el
Revalidated on }

Válido hasta
Valid until }

Director General de Migración

Revalidado el
Revalidated on }

Válido hasta
Valid until }

Director General de Migración

ESTE PASAPORTE ES VALIDO PARA DIRIGIRSE A
THIS PASSPORT IS VALID FOR TRAVEL TO

Panamá

14-00000

7

VISAS

[illegible]

6

OBSERVACIONES
REMARKS



DELEGADO DE MIGRACION

VISAS

SALIDA

16 SET. 1971

DEPTO. DE MIGRACION

SALIDA

SET. 20 1971

REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
DEPTO. DE MIGRACION

ENTRADA

SET. 16 1971

DELEGADO DE MIGRACION

ENTRADA

20 SET. 1971

MAR 23

NICARAGUA

VISAS

315624

Panamá

Guillermo

17

SET.



VISAS

SALIDA
15 SET. 1972

Pas 3673

DELEGADO DE MIGRACION

ENTRADA
30 SET. 1972

PEÑAS BLANCAS
COSTA RICA
26 MAR 1976
SALIDA



10
VISAS

VISA: No. 4141/972
DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION
REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA
Panama
Cuota
San José 12 SET 1972

13

VISAS

VISA Nº [illegible]

DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION

Esta visa caduca a los [illegible] días

Buena para dirigirse a [illegible]

Vía Cualquier Dirección [illegible]

San José, 24 [illegible]

Director de Migración



12

VISAS

VISA No. 41419

DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION

REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA

[illegible] Panamá

[illegible] SET [illegible]



15

VISAS

23

30 [illegible] 1973

23

31 [illegible] 1973

VISAS [illegible]

MANAGUA

Visado [illegible] No. 52

Fecha de Expedición [illegible]

Expira el [illegible]

Válido para visitar a la República [illegible]

A favor de [illegible]

29 73

DOMINICANA

17

VISAS

16

VISAS

24/1/11

Frma

24/2/31 1200

20

VISAS

"William Hitchie".

$ 115.- 30-9-76

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] AND [illegible] SHEET

PRIOR TO FILING

1. [illegible] and forward to RID.
2. [illegible]

TO ACTION BRANCH

[illegible] RID/AN.

FROM:

IP/AN
EXT. 7327

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/1A		21 MAR 1972	23 MAR 1972	
2. [illegible]				
3. DC/WH/C		21 MAR 1972		
4. [illegible]				
5. Amori		22 Mar		
6. OS		27 Mar		
7.				
8. WH/3/V		APR 1972		
9. ND			4 APR 1972	
10.				
11. WH/COG/FI		6 Apr		
12.				
13.				
14. IP/AN				
15. IP/Files				
16. ~~[illegible]~~				
17. IP/FI				

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 12 1972
MICROFILMED

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized:
Signed:
R.O. #
Note:

Chimo detailed

please inform re Carrera interest. pls

PLEASE INDICATE ACTION
☐ Destroy. Records Officer Stamp and Signature Req'd.
☒ Classify to 201-299292
Return to [illegible] for final [illegible]

Pls index.

AN
AB X
IN X
DS
BX 2
DES NFD
FI

201-299292

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE MICROFILMED		

FILE TITLE: IP/Ed - Already indexed [illegible]

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): ~~201-299292~~ 7 July 72

DOCUMENT DATE: 22 Mar 72

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFAA 03979

14-00000

29

[redacted]

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO UFAA 3979

DATE 22 MARCH 1972

FILE DEFER

FILM NO

INDEX NO

TO CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

SUBJECT MARCO RODRIGUEZ RAMOS

DOC MICRO SER.
APR 12 1972
MICROFILMED

1. LNERGO/MIAMI PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WITH A REQUEST FOR ANY DATA STATION COULD PROVIDE ON SUBJECT:

MARCO RODRIGUEZ RAMOS, A DEFENDANT IN THE ORLANDO BOSCH CASE, JUMPED BOND AND SKIPPED OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HE WAS APPREHENDED IN VENEZUELA AND RETURNED TO MIAMI 12 MARCH 1972 IN THE CUSTODY OF "CIFENCE-4 (IDEN U/S/C), A FORMER KUTRUST EMPLOYEE NOW WORKING WITH THE VENEZUELAN POLICE." RODRIGUEZ RAMOS SAID THAT HE WENT TO CHILE ON A MISSION TO ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO WHEN CASTRO VISITED CHILE LAST YEAR. THE MISSION WAS NOT CARRIED OUT FOR VARIOUS REASONS. RODRIGUEZ RAMOS ALSO SAID THAT ONE OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ASSASSINATION MISSION WAS JESUS DOMINGUEZ BENITEZ. RODRIGUEZ RAMOS THREATENED THAT, IF HE IS TRIED FOR BOND JUMPING THAT HE WILL "EMBARRASS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT." HE IMPLIED THAT HE WAS ON THE MISSION FOR A COMPONENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

no 201

Member of Chile mission to assassinate Fidel Castro

2. STATION FILES DISCLOSED THAT STATION CARACAS REQUESTED TRACES ON RODRIGUEZ RAMOS IN FEBRUARY 1972 (CARACAS 18711) WHEN SUBJECT REQUESTED A VENEZUELAN RESIDENT VISA AND INDICATED THAT HE HAD LIVED IN MIAMI FOR SEVERAL YEARS. STATION TRACES

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH UFAA 3979 PAGE ONE

DESENSITIZED

22 Mar 72

201-299292

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

/AIH(asc)

FORWARDED TO CARACAS IN UFA/MIAMI 43739 AND 43762) NOTED THAT SUBJECT ENTERED THE U.S. ON 23 JANUARY 1964 WITH OCCUPATION NOTED AS "[illegible]". HE WAS ONE OF THE SEVERAL LEADERS ARRESTED BY LNERGO ON 11 OCTOBER 1968 FOR PARTICIPATION IN CUBAN POWER AND MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR) ACTIVITIES. FILES ALSO INDICATED THAT SUBJECT WAS ONE OF FOUR CUBAN EXILES ARRESTED IN ZELLWOOD, FLORIDA, ON 10 JUNE 1965 AND LATER INDICTED ON A CHARGE OF CONSPIRING TO EXPORT MUNITIONS.

3. AS WILL BE RECALLED, JESUS DOMINGUEZ BENITEZ WAS ANOTHER OF THE BOSCH DEFENDANTS (9 IN ALL, INCLUDING BOSCH) ARRESTED IN MIAMI ON 11 OCTOBER 1968 IN CONNECTION WITH CHARGES INVOLVING ANTI-CASTRO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.

4. FILE TRACES ON BOTH MARCO RODRIGUEZ RAMOS AND JESUS DOMINGUEZ BENITEZ WERE PASSED TO LNERGO/MIAMI WITH A FIRM ASSURANCE THAT BKTRUST WAS IN NO WAY INVOLVED WITH THE "MISSION" OF RODRIGUEZ RAMOS. THIS FIRM ASSURANCE WAS GIVEN SINCE RODRIGUEZ RAMOS, THREATENED " TO EMBARRASS THE USG" IF HE IS TRIED FOR BOND JUMPING. RODRIGUEZ IMPLIED HE WAS ON THIS MISSION FOR A COMPONENT OF THE USG.

LEWIS J. SHOQUIST

DISTRIBUTION VIA TELEPOUCH

ATTACHMENT: U/S/C (IDENTITY)

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

DESENSITIZED

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH UFAA 3979 END

1P

SECRET RYBAT SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UFAA 3979

IDENTITY: LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES

SECRET RYBAT SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT O UFAA 3979 END

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 12 1972
MICROFILMED

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: [illegible] MARIO GUTIERREZ-VIDAL
FBI FILE NO: 105-1[illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: JORGE LUIS GUTIERREZ ULLA
FBI FILE NO: 105-1[illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: JOSE DIAZ MOREJON, AKA TONY PRINTO
FBI FILE NO: 105-1[illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 26 FEBRUARY 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE TO FREE CUBAN POLITICAL PRISONERS
FBI FILE NO: 105-19785 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1970
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: COMANDOS MARCELINO GARCIA
FBI FILE NO: 105-19269 (MIAMI)

DATE: 27 JANUARY 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 12 FEBRUARY 1970
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MARCELINO GARCIA JIMENEZ
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 1[illegible] SEPTEMBER 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA; ET AL
FBI FILE NO: [illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 26 JUNE 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN

DATE: 17 JUNE 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 11 JUNE 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-3[illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 10 JUNE 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 30 APRIL 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 8 APRIL 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 28 MARCH 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN JUAN)

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: [illegible] MARCH 1969
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: MOVIMIENTO NACIONALISTA CUBANO (MNC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-[illegible] (NEW YORK)

DATE: 21 MARCH 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 10 MARCH 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 28 FEBRUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DIRECCION CENTRAL DE ORGANIZACIONES
REVOLUCIONARIAS DEMOCRATICAS CUBANAS
FBI FILE NO: 105-16691 (MIAMI)

DATE: 28 FEBRUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: AGUSTIN ARMANDO SOSA RODRIGUEZ
FBI FILE NO: 105-15889 (MIAMI)

DATE: 18 FEBRUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 149-225 (MIAMI)

DATE: 10 FEBRUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: OMAR BOSCO OSCAR JESUS DE LA CARIDAD
SOTO PUJOL
FBI FILE NO: 105-15774 (EXTRACT OF DOC. WITH
ALL PERTINENT INFO ENCLOSED)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN JUAN)

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: CUBAN POWER (CP)
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 28 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MIGUEL SAN PEDRO GARCIA
FBI FILE NO: 105-12822 (MIAMI)

DATE: 27 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

DATE: 27 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: C ONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 15 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: EJERCITO SECRETO ANTICOMUNISTA (ESA)
FBI FILE NO: 105-14843 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENT (CROSS-REFERENCE SHEET)

DATE: 11 DECEMBER 1968

CLASSIFICATION: NOT KNOWN

SUBJECT: RE RECENT ATTEMPT TO BOMB BRITISH
BRITISH FREIGHTER LANCASTRIAN PRINCE

FBI FILE NO: NOT KNOWN

DOCUMENT AVAILABLE FROM RECORDS CENTER:
FILE 19-300-21
JOB # 69-839/59

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
VOL. IV

INCLUSIVE DATES: ________

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: ________

ROOM: ________

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10/10 ~~1 AUG~~ 78	8/1/78	BETSY PALMER	Betsy Palmer

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

~~APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993~~
~~CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM~~

US AIR FORCE CABLE

FROM JCS

DATE: 10 JANUARY 1978

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

(VENEZUELAN)

SUBJECT: VEN/AIRCRAFT SECURITY THREAT EXPANDS

FILE NO: MSGNO 46 (MTIR)

FBI CABLES

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE 8 DECEMBER 1977
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS (CORU)

FROM DIRECTOR FBI
DATE: 6 DECEMBER 1977
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: DOORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

STATE CABLES

DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1977 FM UNINT HAVANA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: VISAS FOR WIFE AND CHILD OF O. BOSCH

DATE: 26 NOVEMBER 1977
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: WIFE AND CHILD OF ORLANDO BOSCH APPLY
FOR VISAS

FBI CABLE

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 16 JULY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA (FLNC)

FBI

STATE CABLES

FROM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 2883
DATE: 13 JULY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIAMI TERRORISTS CLAIM BOMB BLAST

FROM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 1281
DATE: 12 JULY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: BOMB BLAST IN BRIDGETOWN

FROM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 2852
DATE: 12 JULY 1976
SUBJECT: BOMB BLAST AT AIRPORT
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 24 JUNE 1976 CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA (FLNC)

DATE: 24 JUNE 1976 (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA (FLNC)

DATE: 7 JUNE 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN JUAN)

14-00000

85/20/03

SECRET

FRP: .2. . . . . .

INTEL

ACTION: LA-20 (001) INFO: EPS-E, VR, DDO-6, AF-8, C/PCS, CA-4, EUR-8, FR-5, IP/DMS, LSA/ID, DDPD-2, PCS/INT, PCS/ITC-4, PCS/LSN, SIA, SIA/FL, (63/8)

90

TO 0025222

PAGE 001 OF 001
TOR: 161600Z MAR 78

IN 0025222
CARA 35705

S E C R E T 161515Z MAR 78 INTEL

TDFIR DB-315/03752-78
HVC-7806

CITE CARACAS 35705 (LADENBURG ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LAGOS, MONROVIA, PANAMA CITY, MILDIST.

WNINTEL INTEL KETONE

SUPADATA: SOURCE: WKRAPIER/WKRAPIER-5 FROM SUBJECT CARACAS 33185. SOURCE PARA 3 FIELD COMMENT WKDIET/WKDIET-5. NOT FOR LIAISON. OO OBJECTIVE: J.1. NO KINDEX. FILE: DEFERRED. MILDIST: PLEASE PASS ALL AFTER FILED TO CINCSO (J-2) ONLY). CL BY 037171.

FILED: 161515Z XXXXXX

MAR 16 2 03 PM '78

94

IP/[illegible]		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	☒	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/[illegible]		[illegible]
IP/CRU		[illegible]

RECORD COPY

SECRET

201-299292

16 Mar 78

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTINE
IN 8425222
PAGE 001 OF 002

Intelligence Information Cable

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

STATE/INR JCS/MC(DIA) CIA NMCC SS/ID FBI
(SY/TAG) SOS NSA TREAS SVC (HARD COPIES TO:
NCS/S NFAC [illegible] DCA [illegible] 00S).

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

[illegible]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL-NOFORN-NOCONTRACT

CITE TDFIR DB-315/03752-78
DIST 10 MAR 78

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

SUBJECT: STATUS OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH
(DOI: 9 MARCH 1978)

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS REPORTING IS OF GENERALLY RELIABLE.

1. ON 9 MARCH 1978 FRANCISCO LEANDRO MORA, LAWYER FOR CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, SAID THAT A GROUP OF BOSCH'S CUBAN EXILE FOLLOWERS PLANNED TO MEET IN THE CARACAS HILTON HOTEL IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, ON THE EVENING OF 1 APRIL 1978. TO ATTEND THIS MEETING, LEANDRO SAID, ONE INDIVIDUAL WOLD BE COMING FROM MIAMI, FLORIDA, AND ONE FROM PUERTO RICO. REPRESENTATIVES FROM VENZUELA WOULD ALSO BE ATTENDING. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE REASON FOR THE MEETING IS NOT KNOWN.)

2. LEARDRO ASSURED BOCH THAT HE FELT THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT WOULD SOON MOVE ON BRINGING BOSCH TO TRAIL AND THAT HE HOPED TO GET A FIRM DECISION BY EARLY APRIL. IN ADDITION, LEANDRO TOLD BOSCH THAT THE EXILE COMMUNITY IS

SECRET

201-299292

SENDING FINANCIAL AID TO BOSCH'S FAMILY.

3. BOSCH'S PHYSICAL CONDITION IS MUCH IMPROVED SINCE HE ABANDONED HIS HUNGER STRIKE AND ACCEPTED MEDICAL ATTENTION. (FIELD COMMENT: A GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCE INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED THAT WHILE BOSCH IS NOW EXPECTED TO RECOVER, HIS GENERAL PHYSICAL CONDITION IS POOR. BOSCH GAVE UP HIS STRIKE WHEN CUBAN EXILE LEADERS CONVINCED HIM THAT PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ HAD AGREED TO EXPEDITE HIS CASE. THE EXILES, HOWEVER, EXAGGERATED PEREZ' COMMENTS SO AS TO GET BOSCH TO GIVE UP HIS STRIKE. PEREZ MERELY PROMISED THE EXILES THAT HE WOULD TRY TO DETERMINE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO SPEED UP THE COURT.)

4. ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS 15 MARCH 1978) FIELD NO. HVC-7866.

5. FIELD DISSEM. EMBASSY, FBI, SECRET SERVICE AT CARACAS: SENT TO BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LAGSO, MONROVIA , USCINCSO (J-2 ONLY), PANAMA CITY.

REPORT CLASS SECRET -WARNINING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOEIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

D [illegible]

14-00000

IP AN

05/27/65 SECRET FRP: .2. . . . . .

INTEL

ACTION: LA-13 (302) INFO: FILE, VR, C/PCS, CA-4, EPS/EG-2, IID, IP/DMS, LSN/ID, DDO/DO, PCS/INT-5. (38/W)

TD-7

78 0290008 PAGE 001 OF 001 IN 0290008
TOR: 041604Z FEB 78 CARA 35420

S E C R E T 041540Z FEB 78 INTEL

TDFIR DB-315/01009-78
MVC-7009

CITE CARACAS 35420

TO: DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL ANNUM INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE: AKDIET/AKDIET-5 FROM IDEN (BY OPS CABLE DIRECTOR ONLY). NOT FOR LIAISON. DD OBJECTIVE: J.1. NO INDEX. FILE DEFERRED. ALL AFTER FILED ANVIEW. CL BY 035133.

FILED: 041540Z XXXXXX

INTEL PROGRAM
[illegible]
IP/AN
IP/CRU

301-199292
4 Feb 78

RECORD COPY

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 1290008

PAGE 001 OF 002

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

STATE/INR JCS/MC(DIA) CIA/NMCC SS/ID FBI (SV/TAG) SecS NSA TREAS SDO (HARD COPIES TO: NSC/S OFAC AMSITOM OCR SECUR DOA).

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

[illegible]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS SECRET--NOINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT

CITE TDFIR DB-315/01669-78
DIST 04 FEB 78

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

SUBJECT POSSIBLE RELEASE OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH (DOI: LATE JANUARY 1978)

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WHOSE ACTIVITIES BRING HIM INTO CLOSE CONTACT WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE.

1. IN LATE JANUARY 1978 AN ADVISER TO VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ SAID THAT PEREZ IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING GIVING FINANCIAL AID TO CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH IN RETURN FOR BOSCH'S AGREEMENT NOT TO MOLEST VENEZUELAN PERSONNEL OR FACILITIES. BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DENTENTION IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER, WILL BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL SOON, THE ADVISER SAID. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF GETTING A LEGAL CONVICTION AGAINST BOSCH.

2. PRESIDENT PEREZ IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING GIVING BOSCH'S WIFE BS. 10,000 (U.S. $2,300) A MONTH. UPON BOSCH'S RELEASE FROM PRISON PEREZ PLANS TO GIVE HIM U.S. $50,000 ON THE CONDITION THAT HE NOT RETURN TO VENEZUELA AND THAT THE

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

CUBAN EXILE GROUPS HE LEADS NOT ATTACK VENEZUELAN FACILITIES.

3. ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (2 FEBRUARY 1978) FIELD NO. HVC-7849

4. FILED DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT ACARACAS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOVLED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

55/21/69 SECRET 23 FRP: .2. . . . .

INTEL

ACTION: LA-13 (111) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, CA-4, EPS/EG-2, IID, IP/C-8, ODPD-D, PCS/INT-5, (32/W) TD

T8 0350612 PAGE 001 OF 001 IN 0350612
TOR: 2310482 FEB 78 CARA 35501

S E C R E T 2310212 FEB 78 INTEL TDFIR DB-315/04830, HVC-7853

CITE CARACAS 35501

TO: DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL INTEL WHSTONE

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKDIET/WKDIET-5 DIRECTLY. NOT FOR LIAISON.
OD OBJECTIVES: J.1. NO INDEX. FILE DEFERRED.
CL BY 035133.

FILED: 2310212 XXXXX

1. C/[illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible] Horace S
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]
6. [illegible]
7. O/L
8. O/E
9. O/[illegible]
10. O/WH

CV

Estella Corbet
IP/EIS
DW-7
201-299292

SECRET File: Orlando BOSCH

SECRET

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 0350612
PAGE 001 OF 003

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

STATE/INR JCS/MC(DIA) CIA/NMCC SS/ID FBI
(ST/TAG) SWS NSA TREAS SDO (HARD COPIES TO:
NSC/S NFAC WHSITRM OCR SECUR DDA).

[illegible]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL-NOFORN-NOCONTRACT

CITE TDFIR DB-315/02582-7
DIST 23 FEB 78

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

SUBJECT: FEARS THAT THE DEATH OF ORLANDO BOSCH AS A RESULT OF A HUNGER STRIKE MAY BRING ABOUT REPRISALS (DOI: 20-21 FEBRUARY 1978)

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WHO MAINTAINS CONTACTS WITH CUBAN EXILES. HIS REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.

1. BOTH THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AND THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN VENEZUELA ARE CONCERNED THAT CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH MAY DIE AS A RESULT OF HIS CURRENT HUNGER STRIKE. FURTHERMORE, THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT FEARS THAT SHOULD BOSCH DIE, CUBAN EXILE GROUPS WILL STEP UP THEIR ATTACKS ON VENEZUELAN FACILITIES. THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY, IN TURN, FEARS THAT EXILE ATTACKS ON THE VENEZUELANS WOULD BRING ABOUT FURTHER VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT REPRISALS AGAINST THE EXILE COMMUNITY. (FIELD COMMENT: BOSCH HAS BEEN IMPRISONED IN VENEZUELA SINCE OCTOBER 1976 IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. HE, AND THE OTHER INDIVIDUALS ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING, HAVE NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT TO TRIAL. BOSCH, WHO SUFFERS FROM A HEART AILMENT AND ULCERS, HAS BEEN ON A

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

UNGER STRIKE FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS.)

2. ON 20 FEBRUARY 1978 OCTAVIO LEPAGE, VENEZUELAN INISTER OF INTERIOR, DISCUSSED BOSCH'S CONDITION WITH A UBAN EXILE LEADER IN VENEZUELA. LEPAGE SAID THAT HE HAD CEIVED REPORTS ON BOSCH'S PHYSICAL CONDITION AND THAT HE AND HER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE CONCERNED THAT BOSCH MIGHT NDEED DIE. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, LEPAGE SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT HAT VENEZUELA WOULD BECOME THE TARGET FOR CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST TTACKS. LEPAGE EXPLAINED THAT BOSCH'S DEATH WOULD MEAN PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND THE EXILE COMMUNITY. THEREFORE, LEPAGE ASKED THE EXILE LEADER TO TALK WITH BOSCH AND ATTEMPT O DISSUADE HIM FROM CONTINUING WITH THE STRIKE.

3. THE CUBAN EXILE LEADER ACCOMPANIED BY REINALDO MARTIN CANO, A CUBAN EXILE PHYSICIAN, VISITED BOSCH IN THE HOSPITAL ON 21 FEBRUARY AND FOUND HIM TO BE IN SERIOUS PHYSICAL CONDITION. BOSCH ALLOWED MARTIN TO GIVE HIM INJECTIONS O COMBAT BRAIN DEHYDRATION, BUT REFUSED ANY OTHER TREATMENT. BOSCH ALSO REFUSED TO GIVE UP HIS HUNGER STRIKE.

4. BOSCH EXPLAINED THAT HE WANTS TO BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL, BUT ADDED THAT VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ IS AFRAID TO BRING HIM BEFORE A COURT OF LAW. PRESIDENT PEREZ, BOSCH SAID, BETRAYED HIM AND THE CUBAN EXILES. FURTHERMORE, PRESIDENT PEREZ WILL BE PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS DEATH AND WILL PAY THE PRICE FOR HIS GUILT. (SOURCE COMMENT:

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

DETAILS OF PEREZ' SUPPOSED BETRAYAL OF BOSCH ARE NOT KNOWN. THE OPINION OF THE EXILE COMMUNITY IS THAT BOSCH AND PEREZ HAD SOME SORT OF DEAL WHICH BOSCH FEELS PEREZ BETRAYED.)

5. ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (22 FEBRUARY 1978) FIELD NO. HVC-7853

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2

10/29/ SECRET FRP: . . . .

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (911) INFO: FILE, VR, CA-4, CA/SOG-4, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, EUR-8, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/INT, PCS/ITC-4, SIA, SIA/FL. (40/W)

78 0196415 PAGE 001 IN 0196415
TOR: 0714532 JAN 78 CARA 35159

SECRET 0714402 JAN 78 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 35159 (LADENBURG ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY THE HAGUE INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RNMUM REAM

REF: THE HAGUE 33452 0193080

1. FOR PAST 14 MONTHS VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES HAVE HAD CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH AND THREE OTHER INDIVIDUALS UNDER DETENTION IS CONNECTION WITH THE OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. DURING THE PAST WEEKS SEVERAL BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST VENEZUELAN INSTALLATIONS IN THE U.S. HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITH CALLERS INDICATING THAT THEY HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS IN RETALIATION FOR BOSCH'S IMPRISONMENT. STATION RECENTLY RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM WKRAPIER-5 (A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY) THAT THE GOV HAD INFORMATION THAT ADDITIONAL ATTACKS AGAINST VENEZUELAN INSTALLATION AND/OR GOVERNMENT FIGURES BOTH INSIDE VENEZUELA AND ABROAD WERE BEING PLANNED. (THIS LAST SENTENCE MAY NOT BE PASSED LIAISON.)

2. REF REQUEST IS PROBABLY IN RESPONSE TO A GENERAL GOV DIRECTION URGING ADDITIONAL CAUTION AT ALL VENEZUELAN INSTALLATIONS.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

File: Orlando Bosch
201

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

14-00000

55/24/57

SECRET

INTEL

ACTION: LA-11 (527) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA-4, CA/SDG-4, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, EUR-8, FR-5, IID, IP/DPS, LSN/ID, ODPD-3, PCS/INT-5, PCS/ITC-4, SIA, SIA/FL. (59/1) TD

77 0164663

PAGE 001 OF 001
TOR: 241502Z DEC 77

IN 0164663
CARA 35091

S E C R E T 241429Z DEC 77 INTEL

TDFIR DB-315/15285-77
HVC-7828

CITE CARACAS 35091 (LADENBURG ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL RNMUM INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKRAPIER/WKRAPIER-5 FROM SUBJECT OF CARACAS 33185. NOT FOR LIAISON. OO OBJECTIVE: J-1. NO INDEX. FILE: DEFERRED. ALL AFTER FILED: RNVIEW. CL BY 035133.

FILED: 241429Z XXXXX

DEC 24 11 23 AM '77

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-294292
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]
IN [illegible]
PAGE 001 OF 002

Intelligence Information Cable

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

STATE/INR JCS/MC(DIA) CIA/NMCC
SDS NSA TREAS SOD FBI SSI[illegible]
(HARD COPIES TO: NSC/S NFAC ONSITRM OCR NSA).

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Classified by Designated Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B(1), (2) impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WARNING NOTICE- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

CITE TDFIR DB-315/15285-77
DIST 24 DEC 77

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA/NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

DOI MID DECEMBER 1977

SUBJECT: INTERCEPTED MESSAGE FOR CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH ON CUBAN EXILE MEETINGS IN CURACAO

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (23 DECEMBER 1977) FIELD NO. HVC-7828

SOURCE A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH A WIDE RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH OFFICIALS OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE OF VENEZUELA.

1. IN MID DECEMBER 1977 VENEZUELAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES INTERCEPTED A CODED MESSAGE WHICH WAS BEING SMUGGLED INTO THE PRISON CELL OF ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE NOTE:

"WE EXPECT THAT YOU WILL REGAIN YOUR FREEDOM AROUND THE FIRST OF THE YEAR. THERE WILL BE A MEETING OF FRIENDS ON 20 JANUARY, AT THE HOTEL CURACAO INTERNATIONAL. WE WILL DISCUSS A VERY

SECRET

SECRET

IN 210400
TDFIR DB-315/15285-77
PAGE 002 OF 002

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

IMPORTANT MATTER. TONY"

2. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDS REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

SECRET

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-0299292
SEX M

200-012-200/01
DIR-117021
29 OCT 77
P2

SUMMARY OF INFO TO THE FBI AND ASSISTANT U. S. ATTORNEY RE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF ORLANDO LETELIER, INFO ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CORU.
FURTHER INFO CONTAINED: 316-0360577 AND 312-0329077

DATE 07 DEC 77 CORR CARD 09559825

201-299292

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

CIA

315038

CONF: C/LA/E INFO: FILE [illegible] C/TS [illegible]

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R.K. MCHARGUE/GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

CIR-316/03605-77

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF ORLANDO LETELIER: INFORMATION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CORU

REFERENCE: FIRCIR-312/03290-77, 7 OCTOBER 1977

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PERTAINS TO INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN REFERENCE. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY EUGENE M. PROPPER.

2. THIS AGENCY HAS NO INFORMATION ON ROBERTO CARRERAS, AN ARGENTINE NATIONAL WHO WAS IDENTIFIED AS A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE GULF AND WESTERN CORPORATION AT THE FALCONBRIDGE PROJECT, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (SIC) AND WHO IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY "EL ROSARIO" MINE. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN DECEMBER 1976 THE SAME SOURCE WHO PROVIDED PARAGRAPHS 2 - 6 OF REFERENCE REPORTED THAT EULALIO FRANCISCO "FRANK" CASTRO PAZ AND ROLANDO OTERO (HERNANDEZ) TRAVELLED AT LEAST

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2 IMPDET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

CONF

SECRET

115030

CIA

CONF INFO FILE

TWICE TO LA ROMANA TO SEE ALVARO CARTA, CUBAN BORN PRESIDENT OF GULF AND WESTERN AMERICAS, TO SEEK ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.) (SANTO DOMINGO STATION COMMENT: CARTA NOW HAS A TOP JOB WITH GULF AND WESTERN IN CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA.)

3. RUBEN SOTO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE SOTO PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED TO YOU AS ONE OF THE BEST FRIENDS OF U.S. ARMY MAJOR JUAN ARMAND MONTES. SOTO, THE OWNER OF "LA FRANCESA" BAKERY (PASTRY SHOP) AND A CUBAN EXILE, IS KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA AND FRANK CASTRO.

A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED IN LATE 1976 THAT HE WAS TOLD BY A CUBAN EXILE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC THAT A DELEGATION OF LOCAL CUBANS, AMONG THEM RUBEN SOTO, WAS SOLICITING MONEY FOR CUBAN RIGHTIST ACTIVITIES.

ONE RUBEN SOTO HAYET, WHO WAS BORN IN ISLA DE PINOS, CUBA, ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1937, WAS A MEMBER OF BRIGADE 2506 AND WAS A CANDIDATE TO RECEIVE PARAMILITARY TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY IN EARLY 1962. THERE HAS BEEN NO AGENCY CONTACT WITH SOTBO HAYET SINCE THEN.

IN 1963 ONE RUBEN SOTO AULET, POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH RUBEN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 309499

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

3

SECRET

CIA
115005

SOTO WAVEY, WAS DESCRIBED AS A FORMER 2506 BRIGADE MEMBER WHO WAS AN EXECUTIVE MEMBER OF THE MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY {MRR}.V

4. IN DECEMBER 1976 THE SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 2 - 6 OF REFERENCE REPORTED THAT IN JULY OR AUGUST 1976, DURING A MEETING OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES AT THE PIZZA RESTAURANT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ARMANDO CABALLEROS, OWNER OF THE RESTAURANT, SPOKE OPENLY ABOUT PLANS TO ASSASSINATE "UN GRAN FUNCIONARIO AMERICANO" IN COSTA RICA. {HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: PLEASE SEE CIOL-0445-76, 23 DECEMBER 1976, WHICH PROVIDED YOU WITH INFORMATION ON TERRORIST PLOTTING OF CUBAN EXILES AND INFORMATION RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF U.S. ARMY MAJOR MONTES. IN RELATION TO THE PARAGRAPH TWO MEETING, SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER MET IN EITHER MEXICO OR COSTA RICA WITH "AN IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT NAMED HART" {PROBABLY ARMANDO HART DAVALOS}. KISSINGER WAS LABELED A TRAITOR AND PLANS WERE DISCUSSED TO ASSASSINATE HIM IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH COORDINATING THIS ACTION WAS PETER {OR PEDRO}

201-112675

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007499

14-00000

SECRET

CIA
115000

MARTINEZ. SOURCE BELIEVED THAT MARTINEZ RESIDED IN MIAMI. THE PLAN WAS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE THE "CIA FOUND OUT" AND "AN IMPORTANT EXILE," IDENTIFIED AS MANOLO REYES, WHO ALSO LIVED IN MIAMI, OBJECTED AND THREATENED TO ADVISE A PROMINENT U.S. POLITICIAN [redacted] BY 101-294915

ONE ARMANDO CABALLERO PARODI, WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 30 JULY 1941, WAS A FORMER MEMBER OF THE 2506 BRIGADE. HE WAS TERMINATED BY THIS AGENCY IN MAY 1963. IN LATE 1963 THERE WAS INTEREST IN USING CABALLERO IN TEACHING INFILTRATION TECHNIQUES BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS CONTACTED IN THIS REGARD.

NO 201

3. THIS AGENCY HAS NO INFORMATION ON DANILO GONZALEZ, IDENTIFIED AS PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN CLUB IN SANTO DOMINGO, OR ON LOCAL EMPLOYEES OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN SANTO DOMINGO, JOSE RENE ROMAN, JOSE JEREZ OR FRANKLIN POLANCO.

NO 201   NO-201   201-778761   NO-201

4. JOREGE ALONSO PUJOLS IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JORGE ALONSO-PUJOL BERMUDEZ WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 20 JULY 1923. HE IS THE SON OF FORMER CUBAN VICE PRESIDENT GUILLERMO ALONSO-PUJOL, WHO SERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF CARLOS PRIO. ALONSO-PUJOL RECEIVED

~~NO 201~~ 783235   61063

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 009499

SECRET

CIA

115000

TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY DURING 1961 AND WAS CAPTURED AT THE BAY OF PIGS. HIS FATHER PURPORTEDLY PAID $100,000 FOR HIS SON'S RELEASE. HOWEVER, AT THE TIME THE RANSOM WAS EFFECTED, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION AMONG EXILES IN THE MIAMI AREA THAT HIS FATHER DID NOT PAY THE RANSOM BUT HAD MADE A DEAL WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT FOR ALONSO-PUJOL TO UNDERTAKE PRO-CASTRO PROPAGANDA IN LATIN AMERICA IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS FREEDOM. ALONSO-PUJOL WAS ARRESTED IN MIAMI IN JUNE 1970 ON NARCOTICS-RELATED CHARGES. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION ON JORGE ALONSO-PUJOL BERMUDEZ.Y

7. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY ERNESTO ✓ HERNANDEZ (no-201) BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.Y

✓ 201-834598

[illegible]4-534598

8. PABLO ✓ MARTIN IS THE PEN NAME USED BY AVENOL FRANCO, WHO IS ALSO KNOWN AS FRANCISCO AVENOLL. ✓ 201-834598N FRANCO, WHO MAY NOT BE IDENTICAL WITH THE MARTIN MENTIONED IN REFERENCE, WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 26 JUNE 1936. FRANCO HAS SERVED AS PROPAGANDA SECRETARY FOR THE CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION "JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA" AND WAS EDITOR OF THE ANTI-CASTRO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:009499

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE .115000 DISSEM BY:

PER

PUBLICATION "AMIGO DEL PUEBLO" AS OF MAY 1968.

201-853367

✓ 9. FRANK TEIRA IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH FRANCISCO ANTONIO ✓201-853367 TEIRA ALBBFONSO WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 18 JULY 1934. TEIRA IS A FORMER CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHO JUMPED SHIP IN PANAMA IN JULY 1969 AND REQUESTED ASYLUM. HE HAS APPEARED BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY AND HAS GIVEN TESTIMONY RBELATING TO THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE U.S. VIA THE CARIBBEAN.

10. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY LUIS ✓Null ROSS BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.

201-332281

✓ 11. JOSE AGUILA IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH JOSE RAMON FLORENCIO 201-332281 AGUILA CALIMANO WHO WAS BORN IN LAS VILAS, CUBA, ON 27 OCTOBER 1932. AGUILA HAS LONG BEEN IDENTIFIED AS AN INFORMANT FOR DOMINICAN INTELLIGENCE.

✓201-298826

12. ONE A. WILFREDO BLANCO (DEL) CASTILLO, BORN IN GUINES, CUBA, ON 6 FEBRUARY 1943, WAS SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE PARAMILITARY TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY IN EARLY 1961. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON A. WILFREDO BLANCO DEL CASTILLO.

Null

13. LEVI MARRERO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH LEVI C. MARRERO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 309499

OUTGOING MESSAGE

7

ORF D D D D D D D

SECRET

CIA
115000

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER

ARTILES WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 5 OCTOBER 1930. MARRERO HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF THE PEOPLE (PRP) SINCE ITS FORMATION IN COSTA RICA IN NOVEMBER 1972.Y

14. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY JOSE
✓115 7 1
LUIS PRADO BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.Y
✓201-335380

15. ANDRES SARGEN IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ANDRES NAZARIO
✓201-335380
SARGEN WHO WAS BORN IN LAS VILAS, CUBA, ON 11 MARCH 1926. NAZARIO IS A LONG TIME ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVIST AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION "ALPHA 66."Y
✓201-617811

16. JORGE MAS CANOSA IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JORGE LINCOLN
✓201-277217 amended
MAS CANOSA WHO WAS BORN IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1939. MAS WAS RECRUITED BY THIS AGENCY IN MARCH 1961 TO PARTICIPATE IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. HE HAS NOT BEEN USED BY THIS AGENCY IN ANY OPERATIONAL CAPACITY SINCE THE BAY OF PIGS. MAS HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE (RECE) GROUP. IN JANUARY 1966 HE WAS THE SUBJECT OF A DEPARTEMENT OF JUSTICE INQUIRY REGARDING CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN A HIT-AND-RUN RAID CONDUCTED IN THE HAVANA HARBOR AREA IN NOVEMBER 1965.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 009999

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8

SECRET

CIA
115000

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:
PER

201-285794

/ 17. JUAN PEREZ FRANCO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JUAN EDUARDO PEREZ FRANCO WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 28 JANUARY 1928. PEREZ RECEIVED PARAMILITARY TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY IN LATE 1960 AND WAS ACTIVE IN THE B2506 BRIGADE. AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH PEREZ WAS TERMINATED IN JANUARY 1962.

201-285794

H 110-201

18. FREDDY LUGO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE FREDDY LUGO WHO WAS ARRESTED IN 1976 IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBANA AIRLINER CRASH.

N 0 201

H 19. GERMAN LOZANO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH GERMAN RICARDO LOZANO WHO WAS ARRESTED ALONG WITH FREDDY LUGO IN 1976.

20. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY FERNANDO BUENO BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.

N 201

201 355001

21. GENERAL JUAN NEPOMUCENO FOLCH PEREZ, AIR ADVISOR TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WAS BORN IN PUERTO PLATA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ON 3 AUGUST 1926. FOLCH HAS SERVED AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE AND MORE RECENTLY AS AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF. IN LATE MAY 1972 USDAO, SANTO DOMINGO, REPORTED THAT FORMER CHIEF OF THE CUBAN NATIONAL POLICE, GENERAL MANUEL BENITEZ VALDEZ, HAD

201-106192

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: C09499

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

9

SECRET

CIA
115000

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER

#

VISITED THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN AN EFFORT TO SELL, TO THE DOMINICANS, ARMAMENT AND SPARE PARTS FROM A U.S.-BASED FIRM WHICH BENITEZ WAS REPRESENTING. BENITEZ HAD CONTACTED TWO DOMINICAN GENERALS, ONE OF THEM BEING FOLCH. USDAO COMMENTED THAT FOLCH'S ASSOCIATION WITH CUBAN EXILES AND ARMS SALESMEN HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE DURING 1972 AND THAT FOLCH WAS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED WITH MILITANT CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, SUCH AS "ALPHA 66," DURING 1962-1963.Y

22. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, IN LATE DECEMBER 1965 ONE VIRGILIO H-00201 POU WAS IDENTIFIED AS A MEMBER OF A RIGHTIST GROUP WHICH WAS ORGANIZED TO COUNTER THE SPREADING OF INFLUENCE BY FORMER "CONSTITUTIONALISTS" IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE GROUP WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLACING PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE AT THE GRAVESITE OF LT. COLONEL RAFAEL TOMAS H— No201 FERNANDEZ DOMINGUEZ IN SANTIAGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, IN MID-DECEMBER 1965 IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO MURDER COLONEL FRANCISCO 201-775139 CAAMANO DENO, WHO WAS ATTENDING A CEREMONY IN HONOR OF FERNANDEZ. THE GROUP WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN ITS ATTEMPT TO DETONATE THE EXPLOSIVE.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 004499

CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CMF. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 10

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

CIA

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

.115006

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

✓201-878329

23. FRANK CABRAL IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH DR. FRANK CABRAL CALCAGNO WHO WAS BORN IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ON 6 FEBRUARY 1942. CABRAL SERVED AS CIVILIAN ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER FROM 1970 UNTIL HIS ARREST IN LATE JUNE 1974 AS A RESULT OF THE DISCOVERY OF NUMEROUS WEAPONS AND TELTAP EQUIPMENT IN HIS HOME. CABRAL HAD USED HIS RESIDENCE AS A CENTER OF OPERATIONS WHILE RUNNING HIS OWN INTELLIGENCE NETWORK. CABRAL WAS SENT INTO EXILE AND RETURNED TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM SPAIN IN JULY 1975. HE HAS SERVED AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE DISSIDENT FACTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUISQUEYAN PARTY (PQD).Y

✓201-842677

24. MAJOR JUAN POU CASTRO, MORE COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS JUAN POU, JUNIOR, IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE BROTHER OF MAJOR JOAQUIN ✓201-842677 ANTONIO POU CASTRO. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON JUAN POU. HOWEVER, HIS BROTHER JOAQUIN, WHO WAS BORN IN SANTO DOMINGO ON 1 MARCH 1935, GAINED NOTORIETY BY "NEUTRALIZING" TERRORISTS WHEN HE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION (J-2) OF THE DOMINICAN ARMED FORCES.Y

H ✓ NO 201

25. IN APRIL 1966 ONE COLONEL PAULINO REYES DE LEON, WHO IS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0047499

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

CIA 115000

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER

PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE REYES MENTIONED IN REFERENCE, WAS ONE OF THREE DOMINICAN MILITARY OFFICERS WHO WAS CALLED TO SANTO DOMINGO TO BE QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED PLOT TO ASSASSINATE GENERAL JOSE MORILLO. PREVIOUS INFORMATION FROM 1965 INDICATES THAT JOSE PAULINO REYES DE LEON, WHO WAS BORN ON 5 MAY 1932 IN LA VEGA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, WAS COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL POLICE IN SAN FRANCISCO DE MACORIS.Y

26. AN FBIS ITEM FROM JULY 1966 IDENTIFIES ONE CAPTAIN FELIPE E. ROJAS LOPEZ AS AN AIDE WITH THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ROJAS LOPEZ. (SANTO DOMINGO STATION COMMENT: SOURCE WAS NOT POSITIVE THAT ROJAS ATTENDED THE MEETING.)Y

27. ONE MAJOR DARIO L. DIAZ GIL, WHO WAS BORN IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ON 19 DECEMBER 1936, IS A MEMBER OF THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE PARACHUTE BRIGADE.Y

28. ANA MARGARITA (DE) WINDT IS THE WIFE OF EULALIO FRANCISCO (FRANK) CASTRO PAZ.Y

29. IN MAY 1977 OUR MEXICO CITY FIELD STATION IDENTIFIED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 009499

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12

S E C R E T

CIA 115000

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

No 201

WINFRED E. HODGEN AS THE PARTNER OF FRANK CASTRO. THE STATION ADVISED THAT IN EARLY 1977 HODGEN GAVE A PHONY CHECK FROM A MIAMI BANK IN THE AMOUNT OF $23,000 TO A DOMINICAN MONEY CHANGER (FNU) SANTANA. SANTANA STATED THAT HE HAD CHANGED "■■■■MANY MANY" DOLLAR CHECKS INTO DOMINICAN PESOS FOR HODGEN/CASTRO AND THIS■■■ WAS THE FIRST PHONY CHECK. SANTANA ALSO SAID HE BELIEVED HODGEN WAS HIDING IN GUATEMALA.Y

IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE FAA MAY HA~~D~~VE ADDITIONAL PEERTINENT INFORMATION ON WINFRED E. HODGEN.Y

30. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY THIS AGENCY ON EULALIO FRANCISCO CASTRO PAZ (201-142365), ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ (201-284811), ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA (201-299292) AND GUILLERMO NOVO SAMPOL (NO 201) HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO YOU IN PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE.Y

31. THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS ACQUIRED BY CIA PURSUANT TO ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE ON FOREIGN ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THIS AGENCY.Y

32. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-1.2.H

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 009499

014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 13

SECRET

CONF. INFO: FILE .115000

DISSEM BY:

PER

#

"B CODE" TO FOLLOWING: 201-0292411 {SOTO-HAYET}, 201-0284805 {CABALLERO}, 201-0294335 {ALONSO-PUJOL}, 201-0834598 {FRANCO} 201-0853367 {TEIRA}, 201-0332287 {AGUILA}, 201-0298826 {BLANCO}, 201-0355380 {NAZARIO}, 201-0297817 {MAS}, 201-0285794 {PEREZ, 201-0355001 {FOLCH}, 201-0878309 {CABRAL}, 201-0842677 {POU, JOAQUIN}, INDEX: MAJOR DARIO L. DIAZ GIL; WINFRED E. HODGEN, AND ANA MARGARITA DE WINDT, WIFE OF CASTRO PAZ {201-0742365}.

ORIG: LA/AN/CH {BASHAW X1034}; COORD: C/LA/AN {BEARDSLEY}; C/LA/CAR {PALMER}; C/LA/COG {LATRASH}; AGC/DDO {GOLDIN}; C/LA/OPS {DISTEFANO}; SA/C/LA {STURBITTS}; AUTH: C/LAD {WARREN}; REL: C/PCS/LSN/ID {KUHN}.

C/LA/AN Beardsley

C/LA/CAR

C/LA/COG

AGC/DDO Goldin

C/LA/OPS ✓

SA/C/LA

DATE: 20 OCTOBER 1977

ORIG: ALICE BASHAW

UNIT: LA/AN/CH

EXT: 1034

C/PCS/LSN/ID

C/LAD

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 009499

SECRET

SECRET

LA-11

FILE, VR, DDO, EPS/EG, IP/DMS, [illegible], PCS/INT 5

CI-4, CA/-4, SIA/I, SIA, SIA/IC, PCS/ITC-4,

FR-5

T 217472 EIA626 PAGE 01 IN 41632

TOR:211915Z OCT 77 CARA 34322

S E C R E T 011444Z OCT 77 INTEL TDFIRDB-315/11414 [illegible]
HVC-7763

CITE CARACAS 34322 (LADENBURG ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKRAPIER/WKRAPIER-5 FROM SUBJECT OF CARACAS 33185. NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. (in 41446)

FILE DEFERRED. NO INDEX. CL BY 035133.

FILED: 011444Z XXXXX

12 OCT 1977

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-229292
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
[illegible]
[illegible] (SY/TAS) [illegible] FBI SECSR
[illegible]

● [illegible]
IN 639327
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

CRET

TDFIR DB-315/11436-77

DIST 3 OCTOBER 1977

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI LATE SEPTEMBER 1977

SUBJECT EFFORTS BY PROMINENT VENEZUELANS TO ENSURE IMPARTIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE CASE AGAINST CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (30 SEPTEMBER 1977) FIELD NO. HVC-7761

SOURCE A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH A WIDE RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH OFFICIALS OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INCLUDING THOSE OF VENEZUELA.

1. IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1977 A GROUP OF PROMINENT VENEZUELANS MET WITH PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ TO DISCUSS THE CASE AGAINST CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY IMPRISONED IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER, AND TO SPEAK IN BOSCH'S BEHALF. WHILE NOT SOLICITING PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT

S E C R E T

FOR BOSCH. THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO IMPRESS UPON THE PRESIDENT THAT THE CASE SHOULD BE HANDLED UNEMOTIONALLY ON ITS JUDICIAL MERITS. AS PART OF THEIR ARGUMENT THE GROUP REMINDED PRESIDENT PEREZ THAT BOSCH AND HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN HELPFUL TO MEMBERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY(AD) WHEN THEY WERE FORCED TO LIVE IN EXILE IN CUBA.

2. PRESIDENT PEREZ ASSURED THE GROUP THAT ATTORNEY GENERAL JOSE RAMON MEDINA IS FULLY AWARE OF THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE BOSCH CASE. FURTHERMORE, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT MEDINA IS WORKING WITH THE SUPREME COURT AND OTHER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES TO EXPEDITE THE RESOLUTION OF THE BOSCH AFFAIR.

3. THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT INCLUDE ANTONIO DIAZ MARTINEZ, MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PETROVEN; ANTONIO LEIDENZ, A FORMER MINISTER OF LABOR AND AN AD MEMBER; LUIS ALVAREZ DOMINGUEZ, MINISTER OF DEVELOPMENT; AND JOSE VARGAS, PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATION OF VENEZUELAN WORKERS.

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS SECRET-WARNING NOTICE- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

BOSCH-AVILA, ORLANDO
201-0299292
SEX M

200-011-009/63
DCMS-00066/77
23 SEP 77
P6

IN 63 WAS GENERAL COORDINATOR OF THE INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY

DATE 10 FEB 78 C9579116

201-299292

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

24

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY [illegible]

LA 8		FILE, VR, [redacted] IP/[illegible], IID, PCS/INT,
		CA 4

T 131110   E30672   PAGE 01   IN 388621

TOR:3021102 AUG 77

CARA 34872

WVC-7730

S E C R E T 302047Z AUG 77 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 34872

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL INTEL WEAM

SUPDATA: JRWAHOO FOR LA/MIAMI COMMENTS ON PARA 2. DEFER TO HQS ON DISSEM TO THE HAGUE. SOURCE: WKRAPIER/ WKRAPIER-5 FROM SUBJECT CARACAS 33185. (IN 299037) NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. NO INDEX, FILE DEFERRED. CL BY 035133.

FILED: 302047Z   XXXXX

IP/CD	✗	TRAVEL PROGRAM	
		ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/RD		CODE NO. (2, 3)	
		RQMT REST. CODE	
		CABLE SEC (11)	
		[illegible] (8)	
IP/CR		FOR FRNG	

Orlando BOSCH AVILA

201 in Chris 'Hopkins' vault

JHW 4 Nov 77

31 AUG 77 20 06

30 Aug 77

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

201-299292

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

DATE 31 AUGUST 1977
IN [illegible]
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

The following report, transmitted from a CIA field station, requires review within the Directorate of Operations before being used in any other document or publication, or released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is provided for your advance information.

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DISTRIBUTION TO: [illegible]

[illegible]

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA/NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

DOI: LATE AUGUST 1977

SUBJECT: INTERCEPTED MESSAGE FOR CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH; POSSIBLE EXILE ACTIVITIES IN CURACAO

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (30 AUGUST 1977) FIELD NO. HVC-7730

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH A WIDE RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH OFFICIALS OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE OF VENEZUELA.

1. IN LATE AUGUST 1977 VENEZUELAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES INTERCEPTED A CODED MESSAGE WHICH WAS BEING SMUGGLED INTO THE PRISON CELL OF ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE NOTE:

"ACTIVITIES SUSPENDED. WE AWAIT INSTRUCTIONS.

SECRET

IN [illegible]

TDFIR

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

I AM GOING TO CURACAO. MEETING TO BE HELD THE TWENTIETH. OMAN."

2. THE ABOVE REFERENCE TO CURACAO REINFORCES THE BELIEF BY SOME VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES THAT CURACAO IS BECOMING A STAGING AREA FOR CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITIES. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED BY VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES, CUBAN EXILE LEADERS FROM THE UNITED STATES HAVE RECENTLY MADE FREQUENT TRIPS TO CURACAO. FURTHERMORE, CUBAN EXILE MEETINGS HAVE OF LATE TAKEN PLACE AT THE PARK AND INTERNATIONAL HOTELS IN CURACAO. MOREOVER, A STORE KNOWN AS THE "ALMACEN AMERICANO" IN CURACAO IS BEING USED TO MASK SOME TYPE OF CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITY.

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

SECRET

FI/LH

11-4-99

SECRET

STAFF

C/LA 8 FILE C/LA/DDS, C/NEG, ADC/DDO, PDO3, SEPS/EG2, SE14, C/CA3, C/RES/ITCH, C/RS, C/SIA/IC, C/SA, C/FR4

T 633655 E1A948 PAGE 01 IN 132125

TOR:162922Z DEC 76 SDOM 17932

SECRET 161930Z DEC 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17932

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL [redacted] MHSPIKE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 951524

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17881 (IN 115115)

1. EMFIST-1 MET WITH COLONEL USINO G U Z M A N LIRIANO FEW DAYS AGO, TOOK TACK DESCRIBED PARA 3 REF B (SANS MENTION OF MAJOR MONTES). SAID HE WAS WORRIED GUZMAN WOULD GET HIMSELF IN TROUBLE. GUZMAN WAS VERY CONCERNED, TALKED ABOUT MEETINGS OF CUBAN EXILES WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE SANTO DOMINGO, BUT WAS NOT CLEAR ON WHICH OF THESE MEETINGS HE PERSONALLY ATTENDED. FOLLOWING IS INFORMATION PROVIDED BY GUZMAN:

A. ONE OF THE MEETINGS ATTENDED BY MAJOR MONTES IN SANTO DOMINGO IN EARLY NOVEMBER 1976 TOOK PLACE IN THE HOME OF A FORMER SENATOR IN THE BATISTA GOVERNMENT WHO LIVES IN SANTO DOMINGO. (EMFIST-1 FORGOT THE NAME. HE IS CERTAIN IT WAS NOT SANTIAGO R E Y PERNA.) MONTES CAME TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO GET DOMINICAN SUPPORT FOR THE "CRUSADE AGAINST CASTRO." MONTES SAID THAT CUBAN EXILES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, TOGETHER WITH DOMINICAN MILITARY

Cit. Cuba

Executive
MKOflander
[illegible]

301-0299293 201-0869734
301-0300135 201-0285774
201-0299613 201-0267892

SECRET

201- 299293

DO NOT [illegible]

028

SECRET

STAFF

T 463455 814940 PAGE 02 IN 332125

TOR:1620202 DEC 76 SDOM 17032

AND CIVILIANS ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE.

B. THE LIAISON MAN BETWEEN THE VARIOUS CUBAN EXILE GROUPS WAS, AND PERHAPS STILL IS, JUAN (OR JOSE) ANTONIO X 201-274073 PRAT. (EMFIST-1 GOT THE IMPRESSION PRAT LIVES IN MIAMI.)

C. AT ONE MEETING (DURING THE PERIOD ORLANDO BOSCH WAS RESIDING IN SANTO DOMINGO), THE PARTICIPANTS SPOKE OF PLACING BOMBS ON CUBAN AIRCRAFT AND IN CUBAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, SABOTAGING CUBAN AND SOVIET SHIPS. THEY TALKED OF KIDNAPPING THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN ORDER TO EFFECT THE RELEASE OF POLICTICAL PRISONERS AND DISCUSSED KILLING CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ, "AN IMPORTANT CUBAN FUNCTIONARY IN LISBON", BECAUSE HE IS CONTRIBUTING TO IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA.

D. DISCUSSED AT THE SAME MEETING WAS THE FACT THAT SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER MET IN EITHER MEXICO OR COSTA RICA WITH "AN IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT NAMED HART" (PROBABLY ARMANDO HART DAVALOS). KISSINGER WAS LABELED A TRAITOR AND PLANS WERE DISCUSSED TO ASSASSINATE HIM IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH COORDINATING THIS ACTION WAS PETER (OR PEDRO) MARTINEZ. (EMFIST-1 BELIEVES MARTINEZ RESIDES IN MIAMI. STATION HAS TRACE ON ONE PEDRO MARTINEZ, CUBAN EXILE [illegible] EXPERT

SECRET

SECRET

STAFF

RF FILE VR

ACTION

T 463655 EIA948 PAGE 03 IN 132125

TOR:1620222 DEC 76 SDOM 17632

WHO WORKS FOR VICINI FAMILY IN SANTO DOMINGO.) THE PLAN WAS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE "CIA FOUND OUT" AND "AN IMPORTANT EXILE", MANOLO REYES (WHO LIVES IN MIAMI), OBJECTED AND THREATENED TO ADVISE HIS FRIEND, CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR RONALD REGAN.

E. AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING DESCRIBED IN SUB-PARAS C AND D ABOVE WERE ORLANDO BOSCH, DOMINICAN AIR FORCE GENERAL SALVADOR LLUBERES MONTAS, AIR FORCE COLONEL ABREU (POSSIBLY COLONEL JUAN DISLA ABREU, COMMANDER OF THE NORTHERN ZONE, OR GENERAL ELADIO MARMOLEJOS ABREU, COMMANDER OF SAN ISIDRO AIR BASE, WHO IS CURRENTLY VERY CLOSE TO GENERAL LLUBERES), CUBAN EXILE JUAN PEREZ FRANCO (NOT CLEAR WHERE HE LIVES), AN ARGENTINE NAMED RAUL OR RUBEN BLINDER (PHONETIC), DOMINICAN FERNANDO MUNIZ (POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH RIGHTIST LABOR LEADER WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE U.S. CITIZEN), JOSE BADURRI (PHONETIC, CITIZENSHIP UNKNOWN), AND LUIS POSA, PEZA OR POSADA. (RE LAST NAME, STATION WILL ASK EMCLIPPER-1 TO CHECK ON POSSIBLE TRAVEL TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC OF LUIS POSADA WHO WAS ARRESTED BY VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES ALONG WITH ORLANDO BOSCH).

✓ 201-869730

✓ 201-285794

✓ 201-[illegible]

2. REQUEST HQS TRACES [illegible], MARTINEZ, PEREZ, BLINDER,

14-00000

⑤

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	10

T 463655 EIA948 PAGE 04-04 IN 132125

TOR:162022Z DEC 76 SDOM 17932

BADURRI.

3. INDEX: GUZMAN, MONTES, PRAT, MARTINEZ, REYES, BOSCH, LLUBERES, ABREU, PEREZ, BLINDER, MUNIZ, BADURRI. FILE: 22-9-28, 201-299292.

E2 IMPDET

SECRET

14-00000

12 NOV 1976 NEW TIMES

[illegible] sarcastically [illegible] preferred not to hear.

Council members are said now to fear that they, once again, will be subjected to what one called "Henry's interminable Germanic monologues." But a few of them hope to escape—by getting jobs with the new administration in Washington themselves.

The saga of Orlando Bosch (NT: October 29)

The case of the anti-Castro terrorist leader whose network reportedly extends from Miami deep into Latin America has taken its most bizarre turn.

Amid widespread speculation about Orlando Bosch's involvement in both the September 21 car-bomb slaying in Washington of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and the October 6 crash of a Cuban airline jet that claimed the lives of all 73 persons aboard, Venezuelan authorities suddenly announced the arrest of the 49-year-old Miami pediatrician and old CIA hand on October 14. Since then, the veil of intrigue around Bosch has begun lifting, threatening to implicate the CIA, FBI, Miami-based Cuban exiles and high-ranking officials of Venezuela and Chile.

It all began when Caracas police rounded up 14 anti-Castro Cubans—including Bosch and Venezuela's own former security chief—and accused them of involvement in a terrorist ring responsible for the Letelier assassination and the Cuban plane sabotage. Further attacks in the U.S. and six Latin nations were said to have been planned.

The next day, speaking at a mass funeral rally in Havana for the Cuban plane crash victims, Castro accused the CIA of backing a campaign that had resulted in nine incidents against Cuban diplomatic missions and its national airline since April 6. Therefore, he announced, he was canceling the 1973 Cuba-U.S. anti-hijacking agreement. Castro also named a Venezuelan photographer, Hernando Ricardo, as a CIA agent who had [illegible] the Cuban airliner's destruction. Henry Kissinger promptly denied any U.S. complicity.

In [illegible], who is the ill-fated Cuban [illegible] engineered the plot [illegible] suspect. Ricardo [illegible] Venezuela and [illegible] an FBI agent stationed in Caracas, whom the U.S. embassy confirmed had been in contact with Ricardo. Meanwhile, back in Venezuela, two Cuban exile brothers were identified as primary suspects in the Letelier killing.

Then, on October 22, three U.S. journalists arrived in Venezuela on the same plane with a group of Florida police and prosecutors. One of the journalists—Hilda Inclan of the Miami *News*—recognized a man greeting the Florida officials as Ricardo (The Monkey) Morales Navarrete—a former CIA agent and FBI informant in Miami who is today the number-two man in Venezuela's intelligence service.

Anti-Castro terror: police with the body of a passenger on the bombed plane

When the reporters tried to interview Morales—addressing him by his true name—in front of his fellow security officers, he became outraged and placed them under house arrest. After being held incommunicado for 10 hours, Inclan, Taylor Branch of *Esquire*, and free-lancer John Rothschild were forcibly expelled from Venezuela and placed on flights back to Miami. Branch flew on to Washington to meet with State Department officials and prepare a written formal protest. (The Venezuelan government denied the American journalists' charges.)

Nobody was talking about how Morales—and a number of other anti-Castro Cubans—happened to hold such high positions in the Venezuelan government, but this much seemed clear: the Morales affair, like all the rest, focused finally on Orlando Bosch. Morales, a former CIA operative [illegible] bomb that nearly demolished the [illegible]

Bosch went on to head a Coordination of the United Revolutionary Organizations (CORU), which is believed responsible for most of the international wave of anti-Castro terrorism. Until recently, Bosch had been in Chile, where he had close ties to the right-wing military junta. Some Miami sources say that Morales lured Bosch to Venezuela to arrest him, while others claim that Morales had made peace with Bosch.

Meanwhile Bosch's fate remains up in the air. He was arrested once before in Venezuela, only to gain release and resume his hemispheric wandering. Latin American governments are said to fear retribution if he is treated harshly. Representatives of five Caribbean governments, including Cuba, have assembled in Trinidad to discuss jurisdiction (the U.S. has sought his extradition on the parole-jumping charge).

Guarded by heavily-armed security men, Bosch appeared October 22 in a Venezuelan courtroom to deny any involvement in the airplane sabotage or the Letelier murder. As cries of "assassin" echoed outside, Bosch was asked if he was a CIA agent. He declined to answer.

—*Dick Russell*

Mind & Body

Beyond loose shoes

A U.S. foot surgeon has returned from a 16-year stint in India and Africa convinced that going barefoot protects feet. The surgeon, Paul Brand, acknowledges that people have to wear shoes to work, but he says if Americans went barefoot at home they probably would never develop corns, bunions, hammer toes, athlete's foot, or ingrown toenails—afflictions he found nonexistent in barefoot populations overseas.

Brand, who teaches orthopedic surgery at Louisiana State, told last month's American College of Surgeons meeting in Chicago that a "shod foot sleeps inside an unchanging environment and gradually loses its sensitivity, mobility and intrinsic muscle strength. The average person who walks barefoot has much healthier

201-299292

65-5

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 282006Z DIRECTOR 890731

DISSEM BY: 27

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, EUR8, AF7, EAS, FE5, ODO2, AGC/OCO, OPS/IT64, LSN/IO, NE8, C/OPS, CI4, ODO/DO, PS/EG2 [illegible]

TO: LASS, MADRID, PARIS, LONDON, LISBON, ROME, BONN, BONN BASE, COPENHAGEN, KINSHASA, LUSAKA, TOKYO, OTTAWA, FR/NEW YORK, FR/WASHINGTON. Y

TOO MANY ACTION [illegible]
SEE HHB 90-1 & DOI 10-19

UNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE MHPROSE Y

REF: DIRECTOR 850160 (SENT LISBON, MADRID, MEXICO CITY, PANAMA CITY, LA/MIAMI ONLY. NOT NEEDED BY OTHERS) Y

1. FYI only: RECENT REPORTS FROM SENSITIVE FBI SOURCE DESCRIBE INCREASED AGGRESSIVENESS AND COORDINATION ON PART OF CERTAIN ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATIONS. ONE OF NEWEST AND MOST UNIFIED GROUPS IS CALLED "COORDINACION DE ORGANIZACIONES REVOLUCIONARIAS UNIDAS" (COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS - CORU), ALSO PREVIOUSLY REPORTED REF AS "EJERCITO SECRETO ANTICOMUNISTA LATINO-AMERICANO (SECRET LATIN-AMERICAN ANTI-COMMUNIST ARMY - LACA). FOLLOWING IS AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON CORU AND BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE FIVE EXILE ORGANIZATIONS IT EMBRACES: Y

A. [redacted] CORU WAS FORMED AT A MEETING, HELD SANTO DOMINGO ON 10-13 JUNE 1976 OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM FIVE ANTI-CASTRO EXILE ORGANIZATIONS: ACCION CUBANA (AC), FRENTE DE LIBERACION

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 085821

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR
890701

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER

#

NACIONAL DE CUBA (FLNC); MOVIMIENTO NACIONALISTA CUBANA (MNC); BRIGADE 2506; AND MOVIMIENTO 17 DE ABRIL (M-17-A). AS A RATHER LOOSELY FORMED FEDERATION OF THESE FIVE GROUPS, CORU HAS NO SEPARATE MEMBERSHIP OF ITS OWN AND HAS BEEN REFERRED TO IN PRESS AS "ORU." EACH MEMBER GROUP IS TO HAVE ITS OWN MILITARY CHIEF WHOSE PRESS RELEASES CONCERNING TERRORIST ACTIONS BY HIS ORGANIZATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE FLNC PROPAGANDA CHIEF, WHO IN TURN WILL CLAIM CREDIT FOR SUCH ACTIONS IN THE NAME OF CORU. TWO COVER ORGANIZATIONS (TERRORIST CELLS) WERE FORMED TO CARRY OUT AND CLAIM CREDIT FOR ANTI-CASTRO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES BENEFICIAL TO CORU: JOVENES DE LA ESTRELLA (YOUTH OF THE STAR) IN THE MIAMI, FLORIDA AREA; AND F-14, A NEW NAME TO REPLACE OMEGA 7, IN THE NEW YORK AREA. CORU WILL CONDEMN SUCH ACTIVITIES SO THAT CUBAN EXILES AND AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL NOT CONDEMN CORU BUT VIEW IT RATHER AS A LEGITIMATE ANTI-CASTRO UNIFIED FRONT FIGHTING COMMUNISM OUTSIDE AND CONDEMNING TERRORISM WITHIN THE U.S. ROGELIO LOPEZ AVALO, FORMER SECURITY CHIEF OF FLNC, WILL BE THE CORU SECURITY CHIEF. LOPEZ IS TO MAINTAIN SECURITY AND INSURE THAT "LEAKS" DO NOT OCCUR. A STRICT POLICY OF COMPARTMENTATION HAS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 025831

SECRET

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR
840701

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

BEEN STRESSED TO PREVENT "LEAKS." A SO-CALLED "ZERO GROUP" WILL HANDLE EXECUTIONS OF "TRAITORS" SUCH AS FBI AND CIA SOURCES OF INFORMATION. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA PROPOSED THAT CORU MOUNT A CONCERTED EFFORT AGAINST A COUNTRY, BE IT THE U.S. OR ANOTHER, IN WHICH A MEMBER, OR AN EXILED CUBAN PATRIOTIC COMBATANT (NON-MEMBER) BECOMES JAILED. IT WAS PROPOSED THAT A DIPLOMAT FROM THAT COUNTRY WOULD PROMPTLY BE KIDNAPPED AND OFFERED FOR EXCHANGE; SHOULD NO EXCHANGE OCCUR, THE DIPLOMAT WOULD BE PROMPTLY EXECUTED SO AS GAIN NATIONS' RESPECT FOR CORU FUTURE SITUATIONS.

B. ACCION CUBANA (CUBAN ACTION - AC) IS A SMALL TERRORIST GROUP IN MIAMI HEADED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA. AC IS TO CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO AND HIS ALLIES, WITH COLOMBIA, MEXICO, PANAMA SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED. GASPAR JIMINEZ (AKA GASPARITO) IS AC MILITARY CHIEF. THE MILITARY UNIT TWICE HAS ATTEMPTED TO BLOW UP A CUBANA AIRLINES PLANE SINCE THE SANTO DOMINGO MEETING: A BOMB PLACED ABOARD CUBANA PLANE IN PANAMA, CIRCA MID-JUNE 1976, WHICH DID NOT EXPLODE; AND BOMB IN SUITCASE TO BE LOADED INTO CUBANA PLANE IN KINGSTON, JAMAICA, ON 19 JULY 1976, WHICH EXPLODED [illegible]

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR 890701

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

BEFORE SUITCASE WAS PLACED ~~[illegible]~~ ON BOARD. {CORU REPORTEDLY CLAIMED CREDIT FOR BOTH THESE BOMBING EFFORTS.} {ACCORDING TO MEXICAN LIAISON REPORT DATED 26 JULY, CORU ALSO CLAIMING AUTHORSHIP OF ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP CUBAN CONSUL IN MERIDA, MEXICO ON 24 JULY.} Y

C. FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA {CUBA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT - FLNC} IS ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WITH HEADQUARTERS IN MIAMI. ITS TITULAR HEAD, FRANK CASTRO, LIVES IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOM. REP. GUSTAVO CASTILLO IS FLNC MILITARY CHIEF, AND OSCAR ANGULO ITS PROPAGANDA CHIEF. FLNC REPORTEDLY IS CONTINUING ITS NAVAL OPERATIONS {ATTACKS ON CUBAN AND RUSSIAN VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS}, AS WELL AS BOMBINGS OF COMMUNIST COUNTRY EMBASSIES OUTSIDE THE U.S. AT THE SANTO DOMINGO MEETING CASTRO PROPOSED THAT FLNC CARRY OUT HARRASSING TACTICS AGAINST TARGET COUNTRIES TO INCLUDE CALLS TO AIRLINES ADVISING THAT BOMB IS ABOARD A PLANE IN FLIGHT SO AS FORCE EMERGENCY LANDING. ALSO PROPOSED WAS ACTUALLY PLANTING A BOMB EVERY TEN OR MORE HOAX CALLS TO PREVENT TARGET COUNTRY FROM DISTINGUISHING HOAX FROM REAL THING; PLACING BOMBS IN UNOCCUPIED AIRCRAFT SO AS PREVENT INJURY INNOCENT PERSONS AND

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTI[illegible] BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

SECRET

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S

SECRET

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE 890701

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

AVOID GIVING FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISM A BAD NAME. FRANK CASTRO REPORTEDLY HAS ALREADY FORMED A TERRORIST GROUP IN VENEZUELA HEADED BY DR. AURELIO ALVAREZ ECHEVARRETA, A CUBAN PHYSICIAN RESIDENT CARACAS. ALVAREZ' GROUP PURPORTEDLY IS FORMED OF CUBAN EXILES, SOME OF THEM U.S. CITIZENS. FLNC HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR SEVERAL BOMBINGS AND ACTIONS VIOLATORY OF U.S. NEUTRALITY ACT. Y

D. MOVIMIENTO NACIONALISTA CUBANA (CUBAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT - MNC) IS AN ANTI-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION WITH HEADQUARTERS IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, HEADED BY FELIPE RIVERO DIAZ. MNC DELEGATES AT SANTO DOMINGO MEETING WERE JOSE DIONICIO SUAREZ ESQUIVEL AND DR. JUAN B. PULIDO. SUAREZ PRESENTED A PLAN FOR THE FORMATION OF A MILITARY COORDINATION (MC) GROUP CONSISTING MILITARY CHIEF OF EACH GROUP. IT WOULD JOINTLY PLAN GENERAL ACTIONS AND ISSUE GUIDANCE RELATIVE TO IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES AND EXISTING NEED OF CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY. THIS PROPOSAL APPROVED, MC'S FIRST MEETING WAS SET FOR 20 JUNE 1976 AT A LOCATION IN FLORIDA. DR. PULIDO PROPOSED THE EXECUTION OF RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, CHIEF OF AIR FORCE SECURITY AT CARACAS, VENEZUELA BECAUSE HE HAD DOUBLE-CROSSED DR.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET.
CL BY: 088231

SECRET

14-00000

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

890701

BOSCH. THIS PROPOSAL ALSO APPROVED. V

E. BRIGADE 2506 COMPRISES VETERANS OF THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION CUBA. ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA IS MILITARY CHIEF, AND PEDRO "FICO" ROJAS RAMIREZ CHIEF OF PRESS, PROPAGANDA AND CULTURE. BRIGADE 2506 PREVIOUSLY DISCLAIMED ASSOCIATION WITH MILITANT OR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, BUT WILL NOW PUBLICLY CLAIM SOLIDARITY AND FORMAL PACT WITH THE OTHER FOUR ORGANIZATIONS, I.E., WITH CORU. THIS CLAIM WILL BE MADE EVEN THOUGH M-17-A AND FLNC MEMBERS HAVE NEVER OPENLY DECLARED EXISTENCE OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS OR MEMBERSHIP IN THEM. BRIGADE 2506 ACTIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN CUBA AS DISTINCT FROM ITS RADIO STATION ON SWAN ISLAND BEAMING ANTI-CASTRO PROPAGANDA INTO CUBA. BRIGADE 2506 DISCLOSED AN ACTIVITY IN PROGRESS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE "BLOQUE MILITAR CUBANO" WHICH BELIEVED BE A CLANDESTINE GROUP OPERATING INSIDE CUBA REPORTING TO SOMEONE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. V

F. MOVIMIENTO 17 DE ABRIL (17TH OF APRIL MOVEMENT - M-17-A) IS BRIGADE 2506 SPLINTER GROUP FORMED BY JUAN PEREZ FRANCO, OF MIAMI, FLORIDA AFTER HIS DEFEAT AS BRIGADE 2506 PRESIDENT ON 17 APRIL

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTIO[illegible]Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROH[illegible]D

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 085211

SECRET

SECRET

STAFF

CONF: INFO: FILE

DIRECTOR
890701

1976 BY ROBERTO CABALLO. BOTH PEREZ AND CABALLO WERE DELEGATES TO SANTO DOMINGO MEETING. THE SPLIT WAS THE FIRST MATTER DISCUSSED. BRIGADE 2506 REPRESENTATIVES CLAIM THAT FORMATION OF M-17-A HAS CAUSED A SPLIT WITHIN THE BRIGADE. ACCORDING TO PEREZ, M-17-A HAS MAJORITY OF CUBAN PROFESSIONALS AND MEMBERS OF CUBAN MUNICIPALITIES IN EXILE, AS WELL AS BRIGADE 2506 VETERANS, AND IS IN HARMONY WITH PATRIOTIC GOALS OF THE EXILE COMMUNITY. THE DISPUTE WAS SETTLED IN FAVOR OF M-17-A, WHICH WILL HANDLE ALL NAVAL OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA. RAMON OROSCO WILL BE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, RAUL CABRERA CHIEF OF MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY, AND PEREZ THE POLITICAL LEADER AND REPRESENTATIVE WITHIN CORU. END FYI Only. Y

2. WISH AGAIN EMPHASIZE THAT DUE ITS NATURE AND SOURCE SENSITIVITY, ABOVE INFO IS FOR ADDRESSEES BACKGROUND ONLY, AND IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED OR OTHERWISE DISCLOSED OUTSIDE BKHERALD WITHOUT PRIOR HQS AUTHORIZATION. ONLY ACTION REQUIRED OF ADDRESSEES IS TO PROVIDE HQS ANY INFO THAT COMES TO ATTENTION YOUR SOURCES RELATIVE TO ACTIVITIES OF THESE GROUPS IN YOUR AREAS. STATION SHOULD NOT MOUNT COLLECTION OPS THIS MATTER WITHOUT PRIOR HQS APPROVAL. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058831

SECRET

SECRET

STAFF

CONF: INFO: FILE

DIRECTOR 890701

3. CONDUCTING HQS TRACES ON AFOREMENTIONED INDIVIDUALS TO DETERMINE PAST OR PRESENT AGENCY AFFILIATION. WILL CABLE RESULTS.

4. FILE: 19-300-21 19-300-26 19-9-9. E2 IMPDET.

E/ROC J Salten
AGC/OOO OE Goldin
OPS/ITG - PAUL PLUMB (DRAFT)
C/EA/JKJ
AC/CI
C/OPS/LSN Curtis Glenn
C/LA/PNC F. J. Desmond
C/LA/M&CA
C/LA/CAR
C/FR/OPS
C/E/BC
AC/E/IB Brunstead
DC/LA

DATE: 27 JULY 76
ORIG: CHRIS HOPKINS
UNIT: LA/COG
EXT: 1493

C/LAD
AC/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTI Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO ED E 2 IMPDET

SECRET

CL BY: 025231

CU.GOING MESSAGE 7 - 3

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3

SECRET

STAFF 3719582 DIRECTOR 885958

CONF: C/LA 5 INFO: FILE C/Whitney

25 Sep

11/ XL

TO: GUATEMALA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO.V

RYBAT HUFANG.V

REF: A. GUATEMALA CITY-19637 (IN-978269)

B. SAN JOSE 19715 (IN-978488)

C. KINGSTON 21021 (IN-978299) (BEING RELAYED GUATEMALA).V

AL

1. HQS FILES CONTAIN NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES ON HECTOR E. D'AVANZO, OR DABANSO. OTHER THAN THAT PROVIDED IN REF B, HQS HAS NO INFORMATION THAT A'VANZO IS AN ALIAS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA.V

2. THE FOLLOWING TRACES ON BOSCH, IN ADDITION TO PARAGRAPHS ONE, TWO AND THREE OF REF C, MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON:V

BOSCH, AKA PEDRO ANTONIO PENA, BORN 18 AUGUST 1926, SANTA CLARA, CUBA, CUBAN CITIZEN, IS A MEDICAL DOCTOR AND HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN CUBAN ANTI-CASTRO [illegible]TERRORIST GROUPS SINCE 1957. IN 1960, HE CAME TO THE U.S. TO SERVE AS CIVILIAN COORDINATOR FOR THE MOVIMIENTO INSURRECTIONAL DE RECUPERACION (MIRR). IN 1965, HE REPORTEDLY PLANNED AN AERIAL RAID OVER CUBA. IN 1967 HE ATTACKED THE U.S. AND BKHERALD AT A RALLY IN

DATE: [redacted]
ORIG: [redacted]
UNIT: [redacted]
EXT: [redacted]

D. 18-9-5

RECORD COPY

201-299292
17 July 76

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 084090

OUTGOING MESSAGE

2 3

CONF: INFO: FILE 855958

DISSEM BY:

PER

NYC UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF CUBAN NATIONALISTIC ASSOCIATION (ANC) AND THE MIRR. IN 1967, HE WAS CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF FLORIDA STATE LAW CONCERNING THE TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES. IN 1968, HE WAS CONVICTED IN A MIAMI FEDERAL COURT OF CHARGES RELATING TO BOMBING OF SHIPS, CONSPIRACY AND EXTORTION, SERVED A SENTENCE IN THE ATLANTA FEDERAL PENITENTIARY AND WAS RELEASED ON PAROLE IN DECEMBER 1972. HE SUBSEQUENTLY FOUNDED A SMALL ACTION GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES CALLED ACCION CUBA (AC). IN 1974 THE FBI HAD AN ARREST WARRANT OUT FOR BOSCH AND CONSIDERED HIM DANGEROUS. HIS GROUP HAD CLAIMED CREDIT FOR SENDING PACKAGE BOMBS TO CUBAN CONSULATES IN LIMA, OTTAWA AND MADRID. IN NOVEMBER 1974 , HE WAS REPORTED TO BE IN CARACAS USING ALIAS DOCUMENTATION AND DISGUISE. IN FEBRUARY 1976 HE WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA FOR ENTERING THE COUNTRY WITH ILLEGAL CHILEAN DOCUMENTS. VARIOUS SOURCES REPORTED BOSCH WAS SUPPOSEDLY PLANNING TO KILL SECSTATE KISSINGER AND/OR CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN CARACAS OR A NEPHEW OF SALVADOR ALLENDE, ECHILEAN EXILE LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, WHO WAS THEN IN SAN JOSE. IN APRIL 1976, HE WAS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE 885958

DISSEM BY:

PER

REPORTED TO BE IN SANTIAGO, CHILE WITH A CONTRACT TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH CHILEAN OFFICIAL. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ARREST HIM ON 10 APRIL BUT HE SUCCESSFULLY [illegible]ESCAPED LEAVING BEHIND A CHILEAN AND ECUADOREAN PASSPORT (PASSPORT NAMES NOT AVAILABLE). IN MAY 1976, HE WAS REPORTED TO BE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, WHERE PRESIDENT BALAGUER WAS ALLOWING HIM TO REMAIN LONG ENOUGH FOR AN EYE OPERATION.

3. FILE: 201-299292, 18-9-5. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: REF A REQUESTS TRACES ON DABANSO FOR PASSAGE TO ESLOGIC-27, WHO MAY PASS THE INFO TO FOREIGN MINISTER MOLINA.
REF B STATES D'AVANZO IS A DOCUMENTED ALIAS OF BOSCH.
REF C SUMMARIZES PRESS REPORTS THAT THE BOSCH LED GROUP [illegible] ORU UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED TO PLACE A BOMB ON A CUBANA FLIGHT AT KINGSTON.

C/LA/COG/OPS W. DEVINE (DRAFT)

LA/GJT (DRAFT) B. BOYLE

LA/SB/CH (DRAFT) B. TURBEVILLE

C/LA/CAR

DATE: 16 JULY 1976
ORIG: MASSEY/BOYLE
UNIT: LA/M&CAM/GES, LA/GJT
EXT: 9041/1249

201-299292

C/LA/DDO
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/M&CAM
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 026010

OUTGOING MESSAGE

7-4

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4

SECRET

STAFF 152153Z DIRECTOR 884725

CONF: 495 INFO: FILE IP/AN

0 DISSEM BY: 45

0

0 PER 505

0 # 111

TO: PRIORITY KINGSTON INFO LA/MIAMI.

KMSTONE

REF: KINGSTON 21021 (IN 978299)

1. INFORMATION ON ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA FOR PASSAGE TO AMBASSADOR FOLLOWS:

HE WAS BORN 18 AUG 1926 IN SANTA CLARA, CUBA, CUBAN CITIZEN, IS MEDICAL DOCTOR AND HAS [redacted] BEEN INVOLVED IN ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN TERRORIST GROUPS SINCE 1957. IN 1960 HE CAME TO U.S. TO SERVE AS CIVILIAN COORDINATOR OF MOVIMIENTO INSURRECIONAL DE RECUPERACION (MIRR).

IN 1965 IT WAS REPORTED HE PLANNED AN AERIAL RAID OVER CUBA. IN 1967 HE ATTACKED U.S. AND BKHERALD IN RALLY IN NYC UNDER SPONSORSHIP OF CUBAN NATIONALISTIC ASSOCIATION (ANC) AND MIRR. IN 1967 HE WAS CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF FLORIDA STATE LAW CONCERNING TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES.

IN 1968 HE WAS CONVICTED IN FEDERAL COURT IN MIAMI ON CHARGES RELATING TO BOMBING OF SHIPS, CONSPIRACY AND EXTORTION AND SERVED SENTENCE IN ATLANTA PENETENTIARY AND WAS RELEASED DECEMBER 1972

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILMING
CODE NO. (2, 3)
CODE IDEN (11)
INFO (8)

15 Jul 76

201-299292

RECORD COPY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET.
CL BY: 012913

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

SECRET

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE 884725

ON PAROLE. HE SUBSEQUENTLY FOUNDED A SMALL ACTION GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES CALLED ACCION CUBA (AC).

IN 1974 THE FBI HAD AN ARREST WARRANT OUT FOR BOSCH AND CONSIDERED HIM DANGEROUS. HIS GROUP HAD CLAIMED CREDIT FOR SENDING PACKAGE BOMBS TO CUBAN CONSULATES IN LIMA, OTTAWA, AND MADRID. IN NOVEMBER 1974 HE WAS REPORTED TO BE IN CARACAS USING ALIAS DOCUMENTATION AND DISGUISE.

IN FEBRUARY 1976 HE WAS IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA AND ARRESTED FOR ENTERING WITH ILLEGAL CHILEAN DOCUMENTS. VARIOUS SOURCES REPORTED POSSIBLE PLANS OF BOSCH TO KILL DR. HENRY KISSINGER AND/OR CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN CARACAS OR CHILEAN EXILE LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, NEPHEW OF SALVADOR ALLENDE, WHO THEN IN SAN JOSE.

IN APRIL 1976 HE WAS REPORTED TO BE IN SANTIAGO, CHILE WITH CONTRACT TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH CHILEAN OFFICIAL. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ARREST HIM ON 10 APRIL BUT HE SUCCESSFULLY EVADED THE CHILEAN INVESTIGATORS, LEAVING BEHIND A CHILEAN AND ECUADOREAN PASSPORT AND PERSONAL CLOTHING.

IN MAY 1976 HE WAS REPUTED TO BE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. E 2 IMPDET

SECRET CL BY: 012913

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR 284725

CONF: INFO: FILE

PRESIDENT BALAGUER WAS ALLOWING HIM TO REMAIN LONG ENOUGH FOR AN EYE OPERATION.

2. FOLLOWING TWO PARAS FOR STATION ONLY:

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, HQS FILE ON BOSCH (201-299292) INCLUDES SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL INFO FROM FBI. PERTINENT AND TIMELY FBI INFO INCLUDES FACT THAT BOSCH WAS INVOLVED IN MEETING OF CONGRESS OF TERRORISTS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN SANTO DOMINGO ON [illegible]2, 3 AND 4 JUNE 76, INCLUDING THREE DELEGATES FROM BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BRIGADE 2506, THREE DELEGATES FROM NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT FOR CUBA (FLNC), THREE DELEGATES FROM AC (INCLUDING BOSCH), AND THREE MEMBERS OF THE APRIL 17TH. THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILES. (NOTE: THIS CONGRESS OF TERRORISTS PROBABLY IS UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION REFERRED TO IN REF, BUT FBI REPORT DID NOT REFER TO ORGANIZATION AS SUCH; HOWEVER, EMBTEL 2883 STATES "ORU IS HEADED BY CUBAN EXILE DOCTOR BOSCH".)

IN JANUARY 1962 BOSCH WAS GRANTED A POA FOR USE IN PM OPERATIONS FOR USE BY LA/MIAMI STATION. APPARENTLY HE WAS WITTING, AS HE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012913

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4

SECRET

STAFF DIRECTOR 884725

CONF: INFO: FILE

WAS SUCCESSFULLY SGSWIRLED IN MAY 1962. HIS CLEARANCE WAS CANCELLED IN NOVEMBER 1962 AND BBBBTHERE IS NO INDICATION HE WAS ACTUALLY USED.Y

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: REF CONCERNS [redacted] ORU, REPORTEDLY HEADED BY BOSCH, CLAIMED CREDIT FOR ATTEMPTING TO PLACE BOMB ON CUBANA FLIGHT AT KINGSTON AIRPORT. STATION REQUESTS INFO ON BOSCH AND ADVISE ON INFO WHICH CAN BE PASSED TO THE AMBASSADOR.

29 JUL 1976

6

DATE: 15 JUL 76
ORIG: BARBARA BOYLE
UNIT: LA/CAR/JAM
EXT: 1249

C/LA

AC/LA/COG

C/LA/CAR

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012919

14-00000

BOSCH ORLANDO

CUBA

COSTA RICA

FOREIGN MINISTER FACIO CLARIFIES COUP REPORT

San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 1730 GMT 7 Jul 76 PA

[Text] Referring to the news conference he held yesterday in connection with the alleged plotting of a coup d'etat in Guatemala, Foreign Affairs Minister Gonzalo Facio said that his statements were distorted by certain international news agencies.

BF

Facio said that the Guatemalan Government was not involved and had no part in the plot. He added that the coup was under preparation and this was why he and the security minister had gone to Guatemala to investigate the armed movement apparently headed by Cuban Orlando Bosch.

Facio said the coup was not imminent but that it was suspected in view of Bosch's trips to Guatemala.

Congressmen Concerned Over Rumors

San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 1730 GMT 7 Jul 76 PA

[Text] A motion was submitted today at the Legislative Assembly to summon Public Security Minister Mario Charpentier Gamboa and Foreign Affairs Minister Gonzalo Facio to explain in full detail at a plenary session what is really happening in Guatemala. Furthermore, we see some connections in the plot, which is now a chronic occurrence originating in Guatemala and El Salvador, against our country's institutional stability with the CIA's collaboration. Precisely this week the Public Security Ministry ordered James Williamson to leave the country. As we all know, Williamson is the CIA's chief in Costa Rica. During Figueres' administration he was declared persona non grata for publicly bragging about the activities of the CIA, the Costa Rica Libre Movement and other groups trying to overthrow the government in power at the time.

We expect Charpentier and Facio to explain to the deputies and the nation what is really happening in Guatemala and what role the CIA is playing in the plot to overthrow our democratic institutions and to place Costa Rica under a fascist dictatorship similar to those which exist in the continent's southern cone.

ODUBER STRESSES COUNTRY'S FREEDOM OF PRESS

Paris AFP in Spanish 0240 GMT 7 Jul 76 PA

[Text] San Jose, Costa Rica, 6 Jul--President Daniel Oduber today reiterated that there is unlimited freedom of press in Costa Rica. He was speaking on a nationwide radio and television network in connection with the forthcoming UNESCO conference on mass communications media, which will open in San Jose on Monday.

He said that Costa Rica is willing to allow the holding there of a discussion reflecting all the various trends of thought regarding freedom of information. "We want the delegates to make an on-the-spot evaluation of the system of freedoms--including freedom of speech--existing in Costa Rica," Oduber emphasized.

Oduber contended that he is against state control of publicity agencies and the communications media, although, he said, a certain amount of coordination between the government and those agencies is necessary.

FBIS DR #132 (LA) 8 Jul 76

14-00000

BOSCH Orlando

1-1

COSTA RICA

FOREIGN MINISTER REPORTS ON ALLEGED COUP PLOT

San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 1730 GMT 6 Jul 76 PA

[Excerpts] Costa Rican Foreign Affairs Minister Gonzalo Facio told newsmen during a news conference just ended that he spent the weekend in Guatemala with Costa Rican Public Security Minister Mario Charpentier Gamboa talking with Guatemalan Government officials about a coup that was supposed to take place in the next few days in Guatemala to overthrow President Kjell Laugerud Garcia.

Facio said that Orlando Bosch and other persons were presumably involved in it but that the names of the others would not be immediately revealed. The Guatemalan Government has the situation under control and the plan has failed.

BF

Facio said: [recording] (?And since we also knew) that Orlando Bosch had entered and left Guatemala several times using different passports he has [words indistinct]. He came and went from here. We felt that it would be advisable to make a fast trip to Guatemala to take a close look at things and to talk [word indistinct] with Guatemalan officials.

Mario Charpentier and I went to Guatemala on Sunday afternoon and held the pertinent conversations. Of course, I talked with the foreign minister; Mario talked with the defense minister. The two (?reported to the president), and we reached the conclusion that there was nothing serious--that there is always the same group, which is connected or [words indistinct] with the same group which people say is a (?cell) of world communism and must be smashed.

To me these people are completely half-witted and irrational, and I believe that part of the whole thing was the usual gossiping by Orlando Bosch and the group that helps him. He boasted of (?having support) from other governments [words indistinct] and the important thing was that the Guatemalan Government learned that there was at least talk about a movement and offered, very sincerely in my opinion, all cooperation to avert continued activity of this type.

Minister Charpentier and I came back pleased with the results of our efforts. I wanted to tell you this so there will be no other interpretations of our trip to Guatemala. [end recording]

Facio said in connection with the coup brewing in Guatemala that, unquestionably, there are groups who are interested in violently changing the government to establish a rightist regime, such as the one sponsored by the Free Costa Rica Movement [MCRL].

Asked if this coup plan was related in any way to one former President Jose Figueres was allegedly hatching, Facio said there was no connection. Asked if U.S. citizen Williamson--a former U.S. Embassy official--had anything to do with it, Facio said he has no concrete evidence involving him. He added that Williamson has 15 days to leave the country.

The Guatemalan Mano Blanca and the MCRL have always been involved in these matters, Facio said. He ended by saying that he has nothing concrete about the coup and that his and Charpentier's purpose in going to Guatemala was to gather information and to inform the Guatemalan Government so it may thwart any further coup attempts against Costa Rica.

FBIS, DR # 131 (LA) 7 JUL 76

Further Details

Paris AFP in Spanish 2329 GMT 6 Jul 76 PA

[Text] San Jose, 6 Jul--Costa Rican Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio denied today that he went to Guatemala because a coup was being planned there against President Kjell Laugerud. At a news conference Facio said that he went to Guatemala to discuss with his colleague Adolfo Molina the rumors circulating here to the effect that Guatemalan groups led by the Cuban Orlando Bosch are attempting to create problems in Costa Rica, provoking a delicate situation.

Facio added that Bosch and the Guatemalans are plotting outside Guatemala and that they would implement a subversive plan in Costa Rica, including the assassination of President Daniel Oduber and Facio himself. He added that for months Guatemalan groups [words indistinct] the Costa Rican Government. Facio said repeatedly that he went to Guatemala accompanied by Public Security Minister Mario Charpenteir to report on the rumors to the Guatemalan Government.

OPPOSITION PARTY DEMANDS VESCO'S EXPULSION

Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1640 GMT 6 Jul 76 PA

[Text] San Jose, 6 Jul (ACAN-EFE)--The opposition Democratic Renovation Party [PRD] has asked the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to have U.S. millionaire Robert L. Vesco expelled from Costa Rica on the charge of meddling in the country's domestic politics. The accusation was made by the president of the PRD's Executive Committee, Rodrigo Carazo Odio, based on public charges which have been lodged here..

One of those charges is based on former President Jose Figueres' statements to a newsman from Mexico City's newspaper EXCELSIOR to the effect that Vesco had financed several political parties during the 1974 election campaign. Another one is based on statements by Deputy Sigurd Koberg who some time ago said that Vesco had offered financial aid to his party. Carazo Odio also recalled the incident of a speech delivered by Vesco justifying his presence in Costa Rica, his businesses and his ties with politicians, a speech based on notes drafted by Figueres himself while in office as president.

A constitutional norm forbids foreigners from interfering in domestic politics. Vesco came to Costa Rica in 1972 and immediately caused intense discussions over his invesments and his ties with known politicans. Here he has escaped from legal action to recover $224 million belonging to the Investors Overseas Services, a mutual fund which he managed.

EL SALVADOR

PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE UNITES AGAINST GOVERNMENT

Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1930 GMT 1 Jul 76 PA

[Text] San Salvador, 1 Jul (ACAN-EFE)--It was learned here today that a 30 July Committee of People's Organizations (COP-30 de Julio) has been created which, according to its members, seeks to rally support this month for mass mobilization "to honor the memory of our student heroes who were killed on the aforementioned date" during the repression of a demonstration.

Peasant, worker, student organizations and opposition parties--the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN)--announce that the committee also seeks to strengthen the unity and fighting spirit of the people in their struggles against what they term a "dictatorship."

3

TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

9/AB

DDO2

T 878690 &14283 PAGE 01 IN 978260

TOR:1317032 JUL 76 GUAT 19637

SECRET 1316402 JUL 76 STAFF

CITE GUATEMALA CITY 19637

TO: DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO.

RYBAT WUFANG

REF: GUATEMALA CITY 19625 (IN 975057)

1. DURING LATE 9 JULY MEETING WITH ESLOGIC-27, HE BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF COSTA RICAN COUP PLOT AND ACCUSATIONS OF ROBERTO "TITO" ARANA INVOLVEMENT AS PUBLICIZED IN GUATEMALAN NEWS MEDIA. ESLOGIC-27 SAID THAT AS SOON AS HE HEARD ABOUT THE ALLEGED PLOT HE CALLED GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINSTER TO FIND OUT IF ANY NAMES HAD BEEN MENTIONED. HE TOLD CASE OFFICER BY WAY OF EXPLANATION THAT "EVERY TIME COSTA RICANS COME UP WITH A GUATEMALAN PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE COSTA RICAN GOVT, HIS (ISLOGIC-27'S) NAME HEADS THE LIST OF GUATEMALANS MENTIONED." HE CLAIMS FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD HIM FACIO DID NOT MENTION ANY GUATEMALAN NAMES.

2. ESLOGIC-27 DID HAVE ONE NAME WHICH HE SAID FACIO ASKED ABOUT: HECTOR DABANSO, CHILEAN CITIZEN WHO HAD ENTERED COSTA RICA ON CHILEAN PP NO. 26583. FACIO CLAIMED TO HAVE INFO THAT DABANSO HAD RECENTLY TRAVELED GUATEMALA SEVERAL TIMES FROM COSTA RICA ON ABOVE PASSPORT AND THEY SUSPECTED DABANSO CONNECTED

HDf-6-1

SECRET

201-281675

14-00000

23

SECRET

STAFF

RF FILE VR

INFO

ACTION

T 878839 E14C33 PAGE 02 IN 878269

TOR:131723Z JUL 76 GUAT 19637

WITH PLOT. ESLOGIC-27 CLAIMED NOT TO KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT DABANSO AND SAID HE WOULD BE INTERESTED OKMERALD TRACES.

3. IN GENERAL CONVERSATION BASED ON MEDIA COVERAGE THIS SUBJECT, ESLOGIC-27 PROFESSED NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PLOT AND REITERATED OPINION EXPRESSED BY SOME THAT COSTA RICANS PERIODICALLY COME UP WITH PLOT STORY TO TAKE PRESSURES OFF OTHER PROBLEMS. PER SAN JOSE AND HQS GUIDANCE, STATION CASE OFFICER DID NOT ASK ESLOGIC-27 ANY QUESTIONS BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED IN PREVIOUS TRAFFIC THIS SUBJECT.

4. NO STATION TRACES DABANSO. WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ADDEE TRACES INDICATING WHAT, IF ANYTHING, CAN BE PASSED LIAISON.

5. RE ACCUSATIONS OF TITO ARANA INVOLVEMENT REPORTED REF, 9 JULY GUATEMALA CITY PRESS QUOTED STATEMENT BY FACIO CATEGORICALLY CONDEMNING "IRRESPONSIBLE AND UNFOUNDED SPECULATION BY NEW COMMENTATORS" LINKING TITO ARANA TO "SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT."

6. FILE: 18-9-5, 201-0281695, 201-0184708. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES 32   17-2

SECRET

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

LA 8

FILE   VR   c/WH/P, c/ci 4

c/LA/C2

T 878841   E14788   PAGE 01   IN 978466

TOR:132227Z JUL 76   SJOS 19715

S E C R E T 132036Z JUL 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19715

TO: GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO.

RYBAT WUFANG

REF: GUATEMALA 19637 (IN 978269)

CHRONO

DO NOT REMOVE

1. BELIEVE NAME MENTIONED PARA 2 REF IS GARBLE OF HECTOR E. D'AVANZO CINTOLESI WHICH IS A DOCUMENTED ALIAS OF DR. ORLANDO BOSCH. WHEN BOSCH WAS APPREHENDED IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976 HE HA AIN HIS POSSESSION A CHILEAN PASSPORT IN THAT NAME #265831 IT WAS PRESIDENT DANIEL ODUBER QUIROS WHO CONJURED UP INVOLVEMENT OF BOSCH IN THE ARMS MOVEMENT STORY WHICH WAS SUBJECT OF RECENT TRAFFIC. STATION HAS NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM ANY SUCH INVOLVEMENT BY BOSCH. ODUBER OBVIOUSLY PASSED HIS THOUGHTS TO FACIO RE BOSCH.

2. WHEN BOSCH WAS APPREHENDED IN SAN JOSE HE WAS FOUND WITH HIS DAUGHTER, LOURDES TERESITA BOSCH DE BRINDER (OR BRINER), BORN IN CUBA ON 17 FEBRUARY 1958, AND AMERICAN CITIZEN, HOLDING U.S. PASSPORT #C-2267692 ISSUED ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1972. HER HUSBAND, MARIO RUBIN BRINDER (BRINER), WAS BORN IN BUENOS AIRES ON 27

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO

RF FILE VR

STAFF

1

2

3

T 078641 EIA708 PAGE 02-02 IN 078488

TOR:132227Z JUL 76 SJOS 19719

APRIL 1955 AND HOLDS ARGENTINE PASSPORT 7234917. THE BRINDERS HAVE BEEN MARRIED ABOUT ONE AND ONE-HALF YEARS AND ONE OR BOTH WAS STUDYING MEDICINE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS IN GUATEMALA. AS A RESULT OF THE EARTHQUAKE THEY LEFT GUATEMALA FOR COSTA RICA ON 9 FEBRUARY 1976. THERE ARE RUMORS HERE THAT THE BRINDERS HAVE SINCE RETURNED TO GUATEMALA. BOSCH IS NOW IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

3. FILE: 18-9-5, 201-388985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

Chief, Latin America Division

Orlando BOSCH/Rightist Cuban Activities in the Dominican Republic

None

1. Forwarded herewith are two Federal Bureau of Investigation reports dated 23 June 1976 concerned with Subject.

2. Your attention is called to paragraph eight, page two, of the report which dscusses the Cuban meetings in the Dominican Republic. Although we know of no mountains close to Santo Domingo, we recall that EMFETCH-9 was well known for his "hideway" on a mountaintop "in the clouds" outside of either San Cristobal or Bani. Given the indications that we have received of EMANTHEM-1's interest in Orlando BOSCH, and the occasional "confusion" by EMPYREX-10 and EMFETCH-9 on BOSCH's presence in Santo Domingo, is it possible that EMFETCH-9 might be concealing what he really knows about the BOSCH matter? If anything does turn up along this line, we would be interested in learning about it.

Howard T. BAGAUS

Attachments: as stated above h/w

Distribution: 3 COS, Santo Domingo

ABSTRACT

INDEX

PURPOSE FOR FILMING

LA/CAR

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE
1 July 1976

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-299292

SECRET

ORIGINATING

Internal Distribution
1 - OPS/ITG
1 - LA/COG
1 - LA/DRH Chrono

OFFICE
LA/CAR/DRH

TYPIST
gue/rd

EXT.
1349

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
OPS/ITG	1 76	
LA/COG	7 6	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
/LA/CAR		Fisher DS

(40)

DEPT OF DEFENSE DOCUMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT DATED 9 JUNE 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST GROUP

REPORT NO: 2 231 0021 76
470th MI Group
Ft. Amador, CANAL ZONE

X-REF. SHEET   S-E-C-R-E-T   DATE 08/07/76

X-REF.	STRC. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-0244292	CIA -070676	26 JUN 76	073-012-200

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT(S) ARE CROSS-REFERENCED
TO THE 201 FILE LISTED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF
THE FILE CONTAINING THE RECORD COPY DOCUMENT,
CALL FILES SECTION, EXTENSION 4367.

S-E-C-R-E-T   E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FILE IN 201-0244292

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET 317

STAFF 250014Z DIRECTOR 875197

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE [illegible], C/OS, OPS/ITG 4, [illegible], SS4, SS/SOG-4, CI-4 DISSEM BY: 49

TO: [redacted] CARACAS INFO SANTO DOMINGO, PANAMA CITY, SAN JOSE.

MHSPIKE KMSTONE

REFS: A. CARACAS 30159 (IN 958679)*

B. SAN JOSE 19662 (IN 959993)**

1. INFO ON HAND AT HQS INDICATES THAT ORLANDO BOSCH HAS BEEN IN DOMREP SINCE EARLY APRIL 76.

2. ON 21 JUNE 76 DOMREP CHIEF OF POLICE TOLD STATION THAT HE CONSIDERING THROWING BOSCH OUT OF COUNTRY.

3. SANTO DOMINGO: WHILE NOT NECESSARY MAKE EFFORT MONITOR BOSCH'S ACTIVITIES, PLS ADVISE IF YOU HEAR HE LEAVES DOMREP.

4. FILE: 201-299292, 22-12-200. E2, IMPDET.

*A CUBAN EXTREMIST GROUP OF WHICH ORLANDO BOSCH IS A LEADER PLANNING TO BOMB CUBANA FLIGHT TRAVELLING BETWEEN PANAMA AND HAVANA ON 21 JUN 76. BOSCH CURRENTLY RESIDING IN SANTO DOMINGO. HE WAS ARRESTED IN COSTA RICA IN FEBRUARY. IT UNKNOWN WHEN HE RELBEASED.

**BOSCH WAS ESCORTED/DEPORTED TO NICARAGUA BY OVERLAND ROUTE 26 MARCH 76.

RECORD COPY

DATE: 24 JUN 76
ORIG: R SPRAGUE
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 1349

OPS/ITG Paul Plumb (telecoord)
LA/MCA
LA/PNC
LA/COG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

25 Jun 76
201-299292

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET D22-12-200

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012913

14-00000

29 23-2

S E C R E T

C/LAS

FILE C/LA/[illegible], C/OPS/ITG4, C/CI4, C/PS/EG2, C/OPS, C/LSN/10

STAFF

T 819878 E1A422 PAGE 01 IN 958889

TOR:2221322 JUN 76 SDOM 17584

S E C R E T 2221022 JUN 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17584

TO: DIRECTOR.

[redacted] MHSPIKE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 862914

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17445 (IN 935896)

C. DIRECTOR 861876

1. LINCOLN RONDON, WELL-KNOWN CUBAN RESIDING MIAMI, VISITED SANTO DOMINGO FEW DAYS AGO, ASKED EMGARNET-1 IF HE KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT RECENT VISITS OF RIGHTEST CUBANS TO CONTACT ORLANDO BOSCH. EMGARNET-1 EXPRESSED SERIOUS DOUBTS SUCH MEETING TOOK PLACE, POINTING OUT THAT AIRPORT CONTROLS OF ENTERING CUBANS VERY TIGHT. RONDON (WHO IS AN OLD BOSCH HATER) SAID HE WAS CERTAIN MEETING TOOK PLACE AND CLAIMED CUBANS ENTERED COUNTRY WITH FALSE PUERTO RICAN DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE BEING USED INCREASINGLY BY EXTREME RIGHTEST CUBANS BECAUSE THEY ARE SO EASY TO OBTAIN.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The appropriate action is authorized: characterize
Joan M. [illegible]
[illegible]/COG/EA
[illegible], cite reasons and coordinate, if appropriate.

2. EMGARNET-1 REPEATED RONDON'S REMARKS TO EMFETCH-9, WHO SAID HE WAS SICK OF WASTING TIME CHECKING ON BOSCH'S ACTIVITIES AND ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO POLICE OFFICER TO

22 Jun 76

201-299292

Desensitized and to files

SECRET

RECORD COPY

X

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

RF FILE VR

T 810870 814422 PAGE 02-02 IN 958689

TOR:222132Z JUN 76 SDOM 17584

TELL BOSCH TO DEPART DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WITHIN A WEEK.

3. AT RECEPTION ON 21 JUNE, EMFETCH-9 TOLD COS HE WAS "THROWING BOSCH OUT". HE SAID HE HAD LONG SUSPECTED THAT BOSCH WAS ACTUALLY CASTRO AGENT (HE UNDOUBTEDLY IS INFLUENCED BY EMGARNET-1 IN THIS REGARD) AND WONDERED IF THE BEST THING WOULDN'T BE TO "GET RID OF BOSCH." COS EXPRESSED AMAZEMENT, SAID HE DID NOT THINK SUCH ACTION SHOULD BE GIVEN SERIOUS THOUGHT, POINTING OUT, AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THE COUNTRY AND PRESIDENT BALAGUER COULD ILL-AFFORD THE RESULTANT PUBLICITY. [redacted] THINKS THIS IS SIMPLY A CASE OF EMFETCH-9 TALKING MACHO.

4. REQUEST QUERY FBI IF REF C MEETING ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE.

5. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.

EEK

MAR 16 77

108

SECRET

SECRET

CI DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL CI FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

BOSCH, ORLANDO
201-0299292
SEX M

096-009-009
HZPA-21288
03 JUN 76

CIT CUBA

RES NICA. CUBAN EXILE LDR OF GRP CALLED CUBAN ACTION GRP /CAG/. MBRS ARE KNOWN BOMB-THROWERS ND MAJORITY ARE YOUNG MEN BETWEEN 20-35 YRS OLD UBJ ALLEGEDLY TRAINED CAG IN NICA, MEXI AND U.S. CAG WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT BOMBING IN PANA CITY. SUBJ RPTDLY HAS AN ARMS CACHE IN M X E R SE N EVENT CASTRO TRAVELED TO MEX

ATE 21 JUN 76

05411078

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY

TOTAL COPIES 334

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

9417

FILE VR 9EPAW 0002

9SS/SO63 9CI4 9PS/EG2

9OSG 9C/S/INT2 9IID 9SS3

T 997293 EIA216 PAGE 01 000100 CAQ IN 950364

TOR:150035Z JUN 76 SUSPENSE 9/C4 SJOS 19625

SECRET 142302Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19625

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

RYBAT HUFANG

REF: SAN JOSE 19569 (IN 928580)

1. MEETING WITH HUFANG-1 (F-1) ON 14 JUNE BEGAN WITH LEFMONH F-1 QUESTION TO CASE OFFICER REGARDING WHAT USE WOULD BE MADE OF INFO REGARDING PLAN TO OVERTHROW COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT. F-1 WAS TOLD THAT USG HAS NO DESIRE INTERVENE DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THAT SOURCES AS WELL AS INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED WOULD BE PROTECTED. COMMENT: INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED ARE CLOSE PERSONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASSOCIATES OF F-1. WITHOUT SUCH ASSURANCES IT IS CONSIDERED THAT F-1 WOULD NOT HAVE SPOKEN FURTHER OF THE MATTER.

Bosch

2. IN EARLY MAY ONE MARIO FERNANDEZ PIZA (PIT), EX JEFE DEL ESTADO MAYO UN TRAVELLED TO CHILE TO ATTEND A MILITARY SCHOOL REUNION. FERNANDEZ WAS A CLASSMATE OF PRESIDENT PINOCHET AND THEY REMAIN GOOD FRIENDS. ACCORDING TO F-1, WHILE IN CHILE FERNANDEZ SECURED AGREEMENT THAT A QUANTITY OF SOVIET AND CZECH WEAPONS CAP CAPTURED BY THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT FROM LEFTIST FORCES IN CHILE AFTER THE FALL OF THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SENT TO COSTA RICA

SECRET Hufang-1

D. 15 9-15 [illegible]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 997293 EIA218 PAGE 02 IN 950364

TOR:150035Z JUN 76 SJOS 19625

VIA GUATEMALA FOR USE IN OVERTHROWING THE CURRENT COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT. THE WEAPONS ARE SAID TO CONSIST OF RIFLES AND SUB-MACHINE GUNS FOR A FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 300 MEN, AS WELL AS SOME 3 MILLION ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION. THE CONTRACTING PARTIES IN CHILE, PRESUMED TO BE THE GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY BUT NOT CONFIRMED, HAVE AGREED TO SEND 2 MEN TO COSTA RICA TO ASSIST IN PREPARATIONS. THE WEAPONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN SHIPPED FROM CHILE.

3. THE PLOTTING GROUPS IN COSTA RICA CONSIST OF THE RECENTLY FORMED "LEGION OF EX-MILITARES" WHICH INCLUDES MANUEL ENRIQUE "PIYIQUE" GUERRA VELASQUEZ (201-226625), AND ROGELIO CASTRO PINTO (201-0926755); THE "SINDEP" GROUP OF CONSERVATIVE BUSINESSMEN LED BY LEONEL PINTO AND ARMANDO GUARDIA VILLALAS; THE MCRL ~~CON~~INCLUDING RAFAEL ANGEL ULLUA, EDGAR CARDONA QUIROZ AND BERNAL URBINA PINTO; AS WELL AS FERNANDO ONTUNO SOBRADO, ROBERTO FERNANDEZ DURAN AND GERARDO FERNANDEZ DURAN.

4. HUFANG-1 IS CATEGORICALLY OPPOSED TO THE PLAN BUT UNABLE TO EITHER CONVINCE HIS ASSOCIATES TO DESIST OR ESCAPE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLANNED ACTION. ~~N~~EVEN IF HE DOES NOT

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 997293 EIA218 PAGE 03 IN 950364

TOR:1500352 JUN 76 SJOS 19625

PARTICIPATE. HE AND THE GROUP WILL RECEIVE THE BLAME FOR THE CONSEQUENCES. AND IF HE OPPOSES TOO STRONGLY FROM WITHIN HIS ASSOCIATES WILL STOP CONFIDING IN HIM, AND BLAME HIM FOR ANY FAILURES. F-1 IS THEREFORE DESIROUS OF FRUSTRATING THE PLAN BUT NOT AT THE COST OF BETRAYING HIS FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATES.

5. F-1 BELIEVES THE PLAN WILL FAIL, AND FEARS THAT IT MAY RESULT IN GIVING EX-PRESIDENT JOSE "PEPE" FIGUERES A MOTIVE FOR TAKING CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY IN ORDER TO SAVE "DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM". GIVEN THE LONG TIME ASSOCIATION OF "PIYIQUE" GUERRA VELASQUEZ WITH FIGUERES, THERE IS SPECULATION THAT FIGUERES HAS MANIPULATED THE SITUATION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE HIMSELF A MOTIVE FOR RETURNING TO POWER.

6. WHILE ALL THE ABOVE REMAINS SOMEWHAT MURKY, THE STATION AND F-1 ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT SOMETHING BE DONE TO PREVENT ANY MOVEMENT OF ARMS, BUT WITHOUT BETRAYING TO THE GOCR NAMES AND DETAILS OF INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED. STATION PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING TWO STAGE PLAN FOR HQS APPROVAL:

A. SANTIAGO STATION APPROACH HIGHEST POSSIBLE LIAISON CONTACT TO ADVISE/WARN OF INCIPIENT PLAN TO MOVE ARMS FROM CHILE TO COSTA RICA VIA GUATEMALA, FOR USE IN OVERTHROWING THE

SECRET

[illegible]-28116 76

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 997293 EIA218 PAGE 04 IN 950364

TOR:1520352 JUN 76 SJOS 19625

COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT. NO OTHER DETAILS KNOWN. PURPOSE OF APPROACH BEING TO MAKE CHILEANN OVERNMENT AWARE THAT PLAN IS KNOWN, AND THUS DISCOURAGE SHIPMENT OF WEAPONS, IF INDEED THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT HAS A PLAN TO DO SO. DETAILS OF PERSONS AND GROUPS INVOLVED IN COSTA RICA WOULD NOT BE REVEALED TO CHILEANS.

6. CHIEF OF STATION WILL RAISE SUBJECT WITH HUGALLY-1 AS HAVING ORIGINATED IN CHILE, AGAIN WITHOUT OTHER DETAILS THAN MOVEMENT OF ARMS FROM CHILE TO COSTA RICA. THIS WILL SERVE TO ALERT HUGALLY-1, ~~DEMUSTYING~~ DEMONSTRATING TO HIM STATION AND USG GOOD FAITH IN OUR DESIRE TO PROTECT DEMOCRACY AND THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA. IT WILL BE EMPHASIZED TO HUGALLY-1 THAT GOCH NOT KNOWN TO BE INVOLVED IN ORDER TO NOT PREJUDICE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

7. COS HAS REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH HUGALLY-1 (FOR OTHER REASONS) FOR MORNING 16 JUNE. THEREFORE REQUEST HQS APPROVAL PARA 5 ACTION PRIOR COB 15 JUNE.

8. REQUEST HQS MAKE NO DISSEMINATION ABOVE INFORMATION WITHOUT PRIOR STATION APPROVAL.

9. FILE: 201-281695," 10-9-15. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

(3c-1)

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 0227922 DIRECTOR 862924

CONF: LA 15 INFO: FILE, OPSINT, SE WR3, LSN/ID, OPS/ITG 4, IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DC, DIVD 2,

0 DISSEM BY: 7

0

0 RETURN TO LA

0 #6

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO.Y

VWLOFTY Y

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 861876 |*|

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17445 |IN 935896**|

C. DIRECTOR 862497 |***| Y.

1. FBI ADVISED THAT SUBSTANCE REF A MAY BE PASSED TO LOCAL LIAISON AND SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE DETAIL, PROVIDING NO RPT NO REFERENCE IS MADE TO FBI INFORMANT PARTICIPATION IN EXILE MEETINGS OR PRESENCE SANTO DOMINGO. FBI, HOWEVER, RECOGNIZES RISK THAT INFORMANT STILL MIGHT BE ARRESTED ALONG WITH OTHER CUBAN EXILES BY DOMINICAN POLICE.Y

2. FILE: 200-4-495. E2 IMPDET.H

* FBI REPORT ON PLANS OF ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILES TO HOLD CONGRESS OF TERRORISTS IN SANTO DOMINGO 2, 3, AND 4 JUNE 76.

** STATION REQUESTED PERMISSION PASS SUBSTANCE REF A TO LOCAL LIAISON AND DISCUSS WITH SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE TEAM. SAID CHANCES GOOD, HOWEVER, THAT POLICE MIGHT ARREST FBI INFORMANT ALONG WITH OTHER CUBAN EXILES.

*** ADVISED STATION THAT FBI NOT YET DECIDED ON HOW TO HANDLE REF B REQUEST BUT WILL ADVISE.

DATE: 2 JUNE 76

ORIG: DAN SMITH

UNIT: C/LA/CAR/DRH

EXT: 1349

C/LA

RELEASING OFFICER

OPS/LSN S. KUHN (TELECOORD)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAR

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 012912

14-00000

30-1

0:IF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1

SECRET

STAFF [illegible] DIRECTOR 652497

CONF: LA 15 INFO: FILE OPSINT, SE/WR3, LSN/ID, OPS/ITG 4, IP/AN, DDO, DDS/DO, DIVD 2,

0 DISSEM BY: 7
0
0 PER LA
0 # 6

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO.Y

VULOFTY Y

REF: A. DIRECTOR 861876

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17445 |IN 935896| Y

1. FBI HAS BEEN ADVISED OF YOUR CONCERN ABOUT DOMINICAN REACTION TO CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST GROUPS MEETING IN SANTO DOMINGO AND OF YOUR REQUEST TO BRIEF LIAISON AND SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE TEAM. BUREAU HAS NOT YET DECIDED HOW IT WANTS TO HANDLE MATTER. WE WILL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS SOME RESPONSE RECEIVED.Y

2. FILE: 200-06-495. E2 IMPDET.H

A - FBI SOURCE TO ATTEND MEETING OF ANTI-CASTRO TERRORIST GROUPS SANTO DOMINGO JUNE 2-5.
B - SANTO DOMINGO ASKS PERMISSION TELL EMPYREX, EMWISE AND SECRET SERVICE ABOUT THE MEETING.

DATE: 1 JUNE 76
ORIG: FISHER AMES
UNIT: C/LA/TFK
EXT: 1349

Ops/LSN - Steve Kuhn, Telecoord

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/TFK
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012713

14-00000

7 · 4 · SECRET

STAFF

LA15 · FILE · CI/INT SECUR3 · LSN/ED CI/SI/TG4 IPAW · ADO ADD/DO AIUA2

T 962263 · E14654 · PAGE 01 · IN 935896

TOR:311034Z MAY 76 · SDOM 17445

SECRET 311025Z MAY 76 STAFF

B.

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17445

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

NIACT DIRECTOR

VWLOFTY

REF: DIRECTOR 861876

1. PLEASE ASK FBI FOR PERMISSION PASS SUBSTANCE REF TO EMPYREX AND EMWISE.

2. AIRPORT CONTROLS ON CUBANS ARE NORMALLY TIGHT AND WOULD EXPECT SCREENING TO BE FURTHER TIGHTENED PRIOR KISSINGER VISIT.

3. ONE POSSIBLE REASON REF MEETING PLANNED FOR SANTO DOMINGO IS PRESENCE HERE OF ORLANDO BOSCH. WHETHER VISITING CUBANS MEET WITH BOSCH OR NOT, JUDGE CHANCES THAT POLICE WILL ARREST THEM (AND FBI SOURCE) AS FAIRLY GOOD.

4. HAS REF INFO BEEN PASSED TO S JRET SERVICE? REQUEST PERMISSION DISCUSS WITH SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE TEAM WHICH ARRIVING 1 JUNE.

5. NO FILE.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

STAFF 11/27 DIRECTOR [illegible]

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO.

1. FOLLOWING IS QUOTE OF REPORT PROVIDED BY FBI WHICH WE ARE FORWARDING FOR YOUR INFO ONLY:

"THE FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA (FLNC) IS A CUBAN TERRORIST GROUP HEADQUARTERED IN MIAMI WHICH HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR BOMBINGS OF CUBAN EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AS WELL AS BOMBINGS WITHIN THE U.S. ON MAY 26, 1976, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THERE HAD BEEN A MEETING OF SOME LEADERS OF THE FLNC IN MIAMI ON MAY 25, 1976. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS A CONGRESS OF TERRORISTS SCHEDULED IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ON JUNE 2, 3 AND 4, 1976. THE LEADERS DESIRE THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTATION AT THIS MEETING: THREE DELEGATES FROM THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BRIGADE 2506, THREE DELEGATES FROM THE FLNC, THREE DELEGATES FROM ACCION CUBANA AND THREE MEMBERS OF THE APRIL 17TH GROUP. ALL OF THE FOREGOING ORGANIZATIONS ARE COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILES."

2. BUREAU HAS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AGENCY CONCURRENCE TO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012938

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

851876

HAVE THEIR SOURCE TRAVEL SANTO DOMINGO FOR THREE OR FOUR DAYS TO MEET WITH LEADERS AND REPS OF THESE GROUPS.V

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 28 MAY 76
ORIG: WM. RANDOLPH
UNIT: DC/LA/CAR
EXT: 3497

C/LA/CAR

COORDINATING

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 28 MAY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

14-00000

25 [illegible] (Reg) 41

S E C R E T

LA STAFF

4/LA 7 [illegible] 9/059 [illegible]

T 007001 E14506 PAGE 01 IN 906392

TOR:0321212 MAY 76 SDOM 17355

S E C R E T 032040Z MAY 76 STAFF

3P

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17355

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO ROUTINE SAN JOSE, CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES.

HCS HRS NVC BAB

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 28 1976
MICROFILMED

MHSPIKE EMWISE

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17347 (IN 906509)

1. EMFETCH-9 TOLD LYNER 3 MAY THAT EMWISE LOCATED ORLANDO BOSCH, CALLED HIM IN FOR QUESTIONING BASED ON STATION'S PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN HIS WHEREABOUTS. EMFETCH-9 CONFIRMED THAT ADMIRAL DE WINDT PERSUADED PRESIDENT BALAGUER TO LET BOSCH REMAIN SANTO DOMINGO LONG ENOUGH FOR EYE OPERATION. EMFETCH-9 SAID PRESIDENT ANNOYED BOSCH HAS NOT YET HAD OPERATION, WANTS BOSCH ATTEND TO THIS IMMEDIATELY AND GET OUT OF COUNTRY ASAP.

TRAVEL PROGRAM
[illegible] (2, 3) 2
FOR FILING

2. BOSCH NOW STAYING HOTEL CERVANTES UNDER LOOSE SURVEILLANCE. STATION SUGGESTED SURVEILLANCE BE STEPPED UP BECAUSE BOSCH CAPABLE GETTING FALSE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND AGAIN DISAPPEARING FROM SIGHT. EMFETCH-9 GAVE EMWISE-15 INSTRUCTIONS TO TIGHTEN SURVEILLANCE.

3. EMFETCH-9 ASKED IF BKHERALD PREFERENCE IS TO KEEP

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

3 May 76

201-299292

S E C R E T

STAFF

T 007001 E1A900 PAGE 02 IN 980392

TOR1032121Z MAY 76 SDOM 17355

BOSCH IN SANTO DOMINGO UNTIL OAS MEETING IN SANTIAGO HAS ENDED. LYNER THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE IDEAL SOLUTION. REQUEST HQS COMMENTS. (WHILE BELIEVE EMFETCH-9 WILL TRY TO KEEP BOSCH IN SANTO DOMINGO IF THIS IS WHAT WE WANT, PRESIDENT MAY NOT BE WILLING TO GO ALONG.)

4. EMFETCH-9 HOPED USG WOULD NOT FORMALLY REQUEST EXTRADITION. HE SAID PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE FAVORABLY INCLINED BECAUSE OF FEAR OF POSSIBLE REPRISALS AGAINST DOMINICAN INSTALLATIONS ABROAD.

5. EMWISE-15 TOLD LYNER IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION THAT AT TIME BOSCH PICKED UP FOR QUESTIONING, HE WAS LIVING IN APARTMENT OF PEDRO DANIEL REYNOSO, CHILEAN ENGINEER WHO WORKS FOR COMPANIA DOMINICANA DE ELECTRICIDAD. NO STATION TRACES.

N 121

36

6. CHARGE APPRISED THAT BOSCH DEFINITELY IN SANTO DOMINGO AND INFORMED MATTER BEING HANDLED LIKE HOT POTATO BY SECURITY SERVICES BECAUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT. CHARGE WILL NOT SEND MESSAGE, BUT REQUESTS DIRECTOR INFORM DEPARTMENT.

7. DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO: REQUEST TRACES REYNOSO.

S E C R E T

16-3-14

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER #

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO

RF FILE VR

T 007981 E1A506 PAGE 03-03 IN 900302

TOR:0321218 MAY 76 SDOM 17355

8. INDEX: REYNOSO. FILE: 201-299202. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ORF 0 0 0 0 0 0

111

SECRET

STAFF 201-299292 DIRECTOR 851473

CONF LA5 INFO FILE IPAN CASETCH

RID: Sp

111

TO: SANTO DOMINGO INFO SANTIAGO, SAN JOSE, CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES. V

RNSPIKE ENUISE V

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 37355 (IN 908392) V

1. STATE, FBI AND SECRET SERVICE NOTIFIED THAT BOSCH NOW IN DOMREP. WHILE THEY WELCOME WHATEVER INFO IS OBTAINED, THEY DO NOT NOW HAVE PRIORITY INTEREST IN BOSCH AND DO NOT EXPECT THE AGENCY TO MAKE EFFORT TO COVER HIM. V

2. FYI. SECRET SERVICE HAS ADVISED US THAT ALTHOUGH BOSCH WANTED IN U.S. FOR PAROLE VIOLATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONSIDERS HIM TO BE AN "UNWANTED ALIEN" AND U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY DECLINE ANY OFFERS FOR EXTRADITION TENDERED BY ANOTHER COUNTRY. MOST RECENT INTEREST GREW FROM REPORTS THAT HE WAS POSSIBLY INVOLVED IN PLOT TO KILL NEPHEW OF FORMER CHILEAN PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE WHILE KISSINGER WAS TOURING LATIN AMERICA FEB 76. SINCE THIS WOULD HAVE EMBARRASSED U.S., EFFORTS WERE MADE TO PREVENT IT. HE IS NOT CONSIDERED THREAT TO U.S. OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, AND WE SEE NO REASON TO HARRY HIM FROM PLACE TO PLACE. REPORTING ON TRAVEL FROM DOMREP WOULD STILL BE WELCOME. V

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILMING
FILE NO. (C. S)
RECORD MULT. CODE
[illegible] IDEN (11)

10 May 76

201-299292

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY.

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

2

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

851473

0
0
0 PER
0

3. HQS TRACES NEGATIVE ON PEDRO DANIEL REYNOSO. Y

4. FILE: 201-299292. E2,IMPDET.A

*ASKED FOR GUIDANCE ON HOW TO HANDLE BOSCH'S PRESENCE IN DOMREP AND REQUESTED THAT STATE BE NOTIFIED.

OPS/LSN
C. ELLAUN

DATE: 5 MAY 76
ORIG: D. SMITH:JP
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 1349

C/OPS/ITG J. REAGAN (IN SUBSTANCE)

C/LA/SB

AC/LA/MDCAM

C/LA/PSNC

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODU[illegible]N O[illegible]HER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS P[illegible]IBIT[illegible] E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

191

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

[redacted] 0619372 CIA 649936

CONF: C/LA7 INFO: FILE C/PLAN, C/ENI/IO, C/OPS, C/CI4, C/OPS/ITG4

0
0
0 PER
0 #

DISSEM BY: 29

TO: SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FBI//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DEPARTMBENT OF STATE (SY/I/PIB). Y

S E C R E T/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. Y

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA Y - Trace Reply SS, FBI, State

CIR-316/02000-76 Y

1. AN OFFICIAL DOMINICAN SERVICE HAS CONFIRMED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIBC AND AS OF 3 MAY 1976 WAS STAYING AT THE HOTEL CERVANTES. THIS AGENCY WILL MAKE NO SPECIAL EFFORT TO MONITOR BOSCH'S ACTIVITIES AND TRAVELS UNLESS REQUESTED BY ADDRESSEES. Y

✓201-299292 Amended

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. E2,IMPDET.H

BASED ON: SANTO DOMINGO 17355 (IN 9083

PROJECT: EMFETCH/9 LIAISON: 22

OBJ: L

DATE: 5 MAY 76
ORIG: V. GARDELLA/JP
UNIT: LA/CAR/
EXT: 1249

C/OPS/ITG

C/OPS/LSN

C/LA/CAR 7

for C/LA

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	☒	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
		PREPARE FOR FILMING
		CODE NO. (2, 3)
		RYBAT RLST. CODE
		CABLE IDEN (18)
		RID (8)
		FOR FILING

CIR-316/02000-76
6 MAY 76
201-299292

RECORD COPY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012913

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 22 PER TOTAL COPIES 22-2 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T 22

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED LA BY 2005

ACTION UNIT C/LA7

ACTION #

INFO: ~~RF~~ FILE VR C/IP/AN, CCI4, C/OPS, C/OSG, C/OSG/IC, C/OPS/ITG4, C/PS/EG2.

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 862115 ~~EIA666~~ PAGE 01 IN 986589

TOR:3022021Z APR 76 SDOM 17347

S E C R E T 301940Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17347 301940Z APR 76 STAFF

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO ROUTINE SAN JOSE, CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT MHSPIKE EMPREDICT EMPYREX

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 848677

B. SANTIAGO 34147 (IN 891569)

C. SANTO DOMINGO 17299 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES) (IN 881352)

LA/DCT

1. OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS, EMPYREX AND EMWISE HAVE CLAIMED TO HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT ORLANDO BOSCH IS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. HOWEVER, EMPREDICT COVERAGE OF ADMIRAL DE WINDT ON 27 APRIL INDICATES THAT BOSCH IS IN SANTO DOMINGO, HAS NOT ENTERED LOCAL HOSPITAL FOR CATARACT OPERATION (PER PARA TWO REF C), AND WAS PICKED UP BY ONE OF THE DOMINICAN SECURITY SERVICES AFTERNOON 27 APRIL. PRESENT WHEREABOUTS NOT KNOWN.

2. EMPYREX-20 SAYS HE HAS NO PERSON KE KNOWLEDGE WHERE BOSCH LOCATED OR WHO DETAINED HIM ON 27 APRIL. EMPYREX-20 ADVISED STATION THAT HE WOULD TAKE NO FURTHER INVESTIGATIVE ACTION SINCE HE CONVINCED BOSCH MATTER BEING HANDLED OUT OF PALACE BY PRESIDENT BALAGUER.

RECORD COPY

SECRET

30 Apr 76

201-299292

9-71 MFG 2/8

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 082115 EIA666 PAGE 02-02 IN 986580

TOR:302021Z APR 76 SDON 17347

3. DAY FOLLOWING BOSCH DETENTION, EMFETCH-9 TOLD EMGARNET-1 THAT PRESIDENT WAS FOOLISH TO PERMIT BOSCH ENTER COUNTRY, SAID HE SHARED AMERICANS CUNCERN OVER BOSCH ON THE LOOSE AND SAID HE WOULD PICK HIM UP IF HE LOCATED HIM. STATION BELIEVES IT POSSIBLE POLICE ARRESTED BOSCH AND EMFETCH-9 SIMPLY NOT ADMITTING FACT TO EMGARNET-1.

4. FILE: 201-299292, E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

X-REF. SHEET S-E-C-R-E-T DATE 26/05/70

X-REF.	SYMB. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-0299292	SJOS-19491	30 APR 70	201-0300965

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT(S) ARE CROSS-REFERENCED TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF THE FILE CONTAINING THE RECORD COPY DOCUMENT, CALL FILES SECTION, EXTENSION 4127.

S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FILE IN 201-0299292

11700 0

FORM 1401 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U.S.A.

BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO

CUBA

VI. 22 Apr 76 C U B A

BF

'FORMER CIA AGENT' MANUEL DE ARMAS HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE

Havana Domestic Radio/Television Services in Spanish 0109 GMT 22 Apr 76 FL/PA

[Press conference held by "Former CIA Agent" Manuel de Armas in Havana on 22 April 1976--videotape]

[Text] First of all, I would like to explain that I am going to read a written statement which I have great interest in presenting in such a way that there is no doubt about the quality of its contents. That is why, due to a problem I have in expressing myself in Spanish, I would like to proceed in this manner.

I would like to take this opportunity to denounce what has been a phase of my life, also to briefly explain my presence in this country. My objective is to openly denounce all immoral acts carried out, directly or indirectly, against Cuba under the sponsorship of the North American government, of which I have knowledge.

I left Cuba 2 years after the triumph of the revolution for family reasons. Thus I was a member of a family which did not know how to or was not able to adapt itself to the life here and opted to live abroad. I attended secondary school and college in the United States until 1969 when I was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency. My relations with the CIA and a number of U.S. repressive organizations began then.

In doing this, great difficulties arise in cases such as mine. There are always many unanswered questions as to my possible motives or political affiliation. My motivation has been created over a period of 5 years of personal, political and ideological degradation resulting in a high degree of personal frustration. Regarding my political affiliation, I unfortunately have none.

I know that many who listen to this press conference abroad will identify me as part of this system. Nevertheless, I would like to make a brief explanation. I want to make it very clear that it is not directed to those who accuse me of being allied to the system, because I do not owe them an explanation. Perhaps, the thing I would like best now is that those who accuse me would be right, but unfortunately their concept of identification, just like mine during the past 5 years, has no meaning in this revolutionary system.

The past 17 years of revolution have not been based on identifications but on principles, principles that many are not capable of recognizing precisely because they lack them.

As a North American intelligence agent and, of course, functioning at the service of North American political interests, I lived approximately 5 years in a world of opportunism, in an immoral manner of ideological degradation and in an antiprogressive position which have forced me to come to Cuba to denounce these facts from a totally personal viewpoint and under my responsibility, and thus denounce the activities of the CIA and other U.S. governmental organizations which work for that system's interests.

It is necessary to explain certain characteristics which are common to them as part of such a system. In that system I lived, grew, studied and finally functioned as an active part of the intelligence community, and that is why I consider it my right to make the following comments.

In the environment that I lived in until very recently, like others, I was never able to adjust. I do not believe there is any other system like that, capable of developing a lack of personal and social identity due to its capitalist nature, which does not grant values to any type of ideology or social progress but only to an apathetic materialism characteristic of the already degraded interests of that system.

FBIS DRM 79 (LA) 22 APR 76

The CIA, as defender of those interests, acts without moral scruples to support them. This system is well-known to all but not all are willing to admit it. We can talk extensively about this, but it is not my intention to point out generalities but facts, facts in which the CIA has participated in activities against revolutionary interests within and without the Republic of Cuba by using counterrevolutionary groups.

Historically, the CIA has been a principal factor in the coordination, financing, direction and absolute control over these counterrevolutionary groups. Oddly enough, they consider themselves bulwarks of rebellion and heroism as well as possessors of a high level of ideological independence in the struggle for recovery of the liberties removed, according to them, by the Cuban revolution. These are the same groups that have carried out various activities against Cuba, financed and coordinated by the CIA. These are the same groups which have proudly assumed responsibility for the cowardly attack against Cuban fishermen last 8 April, which the world will have to judge and condemn.

My relations with these elements began in 1970 and it specifically began with the group ABDALA, of which I was coordinator for the Chicago cell at the very beginning. Later, in 1971, I became ABDALA coordinator for all cells of the midwestern part of the United States. My fundamental mission as CIA agent was to penetrate the ABDALA organization at the highest level in order to concretely evaluate its political orientation, have the necessary information to be able to fully and effectively control the organization and, through it, be able to control other counterrevolutionary organizations associated with ABDALA.

I began my activities by attempting to determine the possible affiliation of some members of the organization with the illegal drug traffic in North America. This CIA task was aimed at ascertaining the relations of these elements with the Cuban Revolutionary Government, in other words, to demonstrate that those persons were acting as counterrevolutionary elements to cover up the illegal drug traffic under orders from the Cuban Government.

After a year of investigations, that theory was not proved. Despite that, the CIA and other organs continued to look for evidence aimed at involving Cuba and distorting its foreign image. In 1971, the CIA leadership decided to transfer me to New York State where I was given the identification of a high-level official in the drug control commission of the state. These activities did not affect my ties to the ABDALA group but, on the contrary, helped strengthen my ties with the organization's board of directors.

I maintained relations with the following CIA officials: Brackenhouse, first CIA agent to contact me and recruit me; and Richard (Tomly), staff officer of the McLean, Virginia, Operations Office, who conducted my initial training and acted as evaluating supervisor in the ABDALA organization. By then, the main interest of the CIA in ABDALA was in determining the operational capacity of this counterrevolutionary group, the possibility of using it in terrorist activities and predicting its future development. The ABDALA program was known not only to the CIA but also to other governmental organizations and their respective intelligence organs.

At the time the ABDALA leadership, which was tied to terrorist activities, was made up of Gustavo Marin, Enrique Encinosa, Lazaro Alvarez, Eduardo Lima, Leo Viota and myself. The CIA Operations Office considered ABDALA to be one of the best possibilities as opposed to the rest of the organizations, which are believed to be made up of ineffective elements and charlatans who waste the agency's funds without any results.

Now I will enumerate the activities of this organization that were coordinated or directed by the CIA as an organ of the U.S. Government.

New York: Through Gustavo Marin I learned about a general coordination of ABDALA with persons of other counterrevolutionary groups to create a more concrete and stronger program of terrorist actions. It is in this manner that ABDALA directly participated in the founding of the so-called Cuban Front of National Liberation (FLNC), whose fundamental objective was to carry out terrorist acts. The talks on the founding of the FLNC were held by the ABDALA leadership and Orlando Bosch, Dr Vasquez Leyva and Dr Humberto Fontana. I was introduced to a counterrevolutionary by the name of Gutierrez, a militant of ABDALA who directly participated in the terrorism against the Cuban Consulate in Madrid, Spain. A powerful explosive was placed at the entrance of the Cuban offices in Madrid, causing severe material damages. Two offices were totally destroyed and the rest of the offices were seriously damaged as well as other floors of the building where the consulate was located. Present at the time of the explosion were the Cuban consul, his wife and other officials.

Knowledge of plans of terrorist acts against Venezuelan tourist offices in Puerto Rico: These acts were carried out by Juan de Dios who resided in Puerto Rico. They were developed in reprisal for the temporary detention of Orlando Bosch in Venezuelan territory and were of course made known to the CIA by me. Nothing was done to stop them. The CIA also knew of and coordinated through ABDALA a public event in New York City when a terrorist act was to be carried out against the building of the Cuban mission to the United Nations using molotov cocktails. This was called off by the CIA through officer Brackenhouse when some contradictions arose in coordinating with the FBI on how it should be done.

The CIA knew of attacks by persons residing in Miami against Cuban fishing vessels in international waters in which leader Gustavo Marin directly participated. Cesar Sanchez, a CIA informer, also took part.

Knowledge by the CIA and coordination of terrorist activity against the Cuban Embassy in Montreal, Canada: In this second attempt, the ABDALA group, which was going to use me as liaison, was given a certain quantity of explosives. I must explain that this was not carried out because the required prior coordination with the RCMP, the Canadian authorities, was not made, even though the coordination with the FBI had been made. In personal conversations held with FBI agents, the NSA--this is the National Security Agency--and representatives of the Justice Department at the federal level, which took place in the Federal Building of the southern district in the City of Manhattan, the possibility of controlling the activities of these terrorist groups inside U.S. territory was discussed. However, despite the talks, we--that is, the CIA--did not interrupt the activities in these terrorist programs. In conversations with the ABDALA leadership, I learned of possible attempts on the lives of certain individuals in exile who had defrauded the counterrevolution. This took place 3 months before the death of the notorious counterrevolutionary leader Jose de la Torriente. I also learned about the attack on the Hispano Warehouse in New York City because it was sending goods to Cuba. This was carried out by ABDALA militant Fernando [illegible]. The activity was authorized by the CIA to determine how far the ABDALA terrorist apparatus would go. By then, Bob (Dynus), a CIA officer who supplied explosives, was participating in the operational program with ABDALA. Bob (Dynus) now works in CIA programs related to Chile.

The CIA knew about and approved acts against the Cubana de Aviacion offices in Mexico City. Participating in this act was Leo Victa, an ABDALA leader who traveled to Mexico from Venezuela.

BF

Knowledge by the CIA of personal contacts with representatives of the present Chilean Government in New York City to take Orlando Bosch to Chile after his arrest in Venezuela: Representing ABDALA was Enrique Encinosa, who is a rabid admirer of Orlando Bosch, and representing the Chilean intelligence services was Mr Julio Solose.

Knowledge by the CIA of the financing of ABDALA by the ultraright John Birch Society and the Latin American Club of the University of Illinois: Participating in the talks on financing was Senator Buckley of the U.S. Congress, who maintains close relations with ABDALA leader Encinosa as well as the notorious Carlos Prio Socarras and Nicaraguan President Somoza.

CIA coordinated a program for collecting funds for ABDALA, extorting cash from the President of the Republic National Bank in Miami and assassinating Rolando Masferrer. For the killing of Rolando Masferrer, CIA officer Robert "Bob" Mills gave me four packages [petacas] of C-4. I personally gave them to Lazar Alvarez, a leader of ABDALA. Later, as everybody knows, Masferrer was murdered.

I must explain that my relations with CIA officer Mills came about because of his experience in Cuban problems. He acted as liaison officer between the CIA and the Justice and Defense departments. These are all the activities that I personally participated in as a CIA agent. I will now enumerate other activities which I learned about during my stay in the United States and while traveling in other countries. I had no direct participation in these programs. At this time I would like to explain that, even though I say that I had no direct participation there should be no doubt as to the veracity of the following events. I mainly learned about these things through official sources, and that is work, comrades.

Attempt on the life of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro during his stay in Chile: It was prepared and directed by the CIA, which introduced counterrevolutionary Antonio (Beciana) to the Alfa-66 organization, requesting from its chief, Nazario Sargent, the men needed. The (?chambers) and diplomatic passports were prepared by the CIA. Participating for Alfa in this activity were Jesus Dominguez Benitez and several others.

Kidnaping of Cuban fishermen in May 1970: It was directed by the notorious CIA agent Ramon Orozco Crespo and Raul Carreras, former member of the 2506 Brigade who participated in the Playa Giron landing. This activity was also carried out by members of Alfa-66. In activities against Cuban fishing boats, counterrevolutionary Roberto Tur acted as permanent informer, establishing the positions of the boats. He lives at 12th Avenue between 8th and 9th Streets in southwest Miami.

Other activities carried out by Alfa-66 were: Attacks on the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in the early hours of 20 January 1974, when two explosive devices were used. One exploded and the other, which did not explode, was hurled at the children's playground at the Cuban Mission. In the early hours of 5 August 1974, a bomb exploded in the garden of the Cuban Embassy in Jamaica. In October 1974, the Bahamian authorities captured seven Cuban counterrevolutionaries who, on orders of the Alfa-66 organization, were going to infiltrate Cuba through the northern coast of Oriente Province. They were to land Luis Lobaina and Aristides Marques armed with M-1 carbines and pistols with silencers. The objective of this mission was to assassinate Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

14-00000

SECRET

STAFF

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

IN 667839

[illegible] APR 76

CARACAS 26642

SECRET [illegible] APR 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 26642

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY (FOR LACSS), IMMEDIATE LA/MIAMI.

WHSPALSH KMSTONE SGCHART WHABYSS

REF: DIRECTOR 814526

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 299292
DO NOT DESTROY

1. FYI, CARACAS DAILY NEWSPAPER ULTIMAS NOTICIAS, 22 APR 76 CARRIES PRENSA LATINA STORY DATELINED HABANA 21 APR TITLED: CIA ACCUSED OF MURDERING ANTI-CASTRO LEADERS. STORY CENTERS AROUND ALLEGED PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH MANUEL DE ARMAS, CLAIMING TO BE A FORMER CIA AGENT, "TELLS ALL" ABOUT "OPERATION ABDALA." DE ARMAS CLAIMS THAT WHILE STATIONED IN NEW YORK IN 1971 HE MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH TWO CIA OFFICIALS (FNU) BLACKENHOUSE WHO HAD RECRUITED HIM TWO YEARS PREVIOUSLY, AND RICHARD TOMLEY OF MCLEAN, VIRGINIA, WHO HAD TAINED HIM AND WHO EVALUATED HIS PERFORMANCE INITIALLY IN OPERATION ABDALA. DE ARMAS ALSO CLAIMS THAT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST VENEZUELAN TOURIST OFFICIALS IN PUERTO RICO WERE COORDINATED WITH THE CIA AND CARRIED OUT BY A PERSON NAMED JUAN DE DIOS IN REPRISAL FOR THE DETENTION OF ORLANDO BOSCH IN CARACAS. FURTHER, DE ARMAS CLAIMS TO HAVE HAD KNOWLEDGE

✓201-[illegible]1137

✓201-0019[illegible]

P,201-299292 P,201-[illegible]966 P,201-[illegible]

201-299292

S E C R E T

STAFF

T 036445 EIA780 PAGE 02 IN 697535

TOR:2210512 APR 76 CARA 20641

OF PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACKS AGAINST EXILES AND THAT THIS PLANNING HAD BEGUN THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF JOSE DE LA

201-335909 [illegible]

TORRIENTE. DE ARMAS SAYS BOB DYNES, A CIA OFFICER, PARTICIPATED IN ABDALA FOR THE SUPPLY OF EXPLOSIVES IN CIA MISSIONS RELATED TO CHILE. DE ARMAS SAID HE SERVED IN THE ABDALA OPERATION ALSO AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN ROBERT BUD MILES AND LAZARO ALVAREZ FOR THE DELIVERY OF 5 PACKS OF C-4 EXPLOSIVE WHICH WERE USED IN

201-43667 [illegible]

THE KILLING OF ROLANDO MASFERRER. DE ARMAS IDENTIFIES MILLS AS A LIAISON OFFICER BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE AND DEFENSE. DE ARMAS REFERRED TO ATTACKS AGAINST CUBAN FISHERMEN AND SAID ROBERTO TUR, A CIA INFORMANT LIVING ON 12TH AVENUE BETWEEN 8 AND 9 (SIC) IN SOUTHWEST MIAMI, HAS THE MISSION OF LOCATING THE BOATS.

2. DE ARMAS CLAIMS THE CIA IS ENGAGED IN A PLAN TO BRING ABOUT RUPTURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND CUBA, AND THAT FRED DUNCAN DOUGH PHILLIPS, UNDER DIPLOMATIC COVER, ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE PLAN. DUNCAN AND PHILLIPS ARE ALLEGED TO BE USING AN APARTMENT IN THE "MY FLOWER" BUILDING IN CARACAS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS PLAN.

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS CONFERENCE, DE ARMAS IS REPORTED

S E C R E T

SECRET

STAFF

T 036469 E1A700 PAGE 02 IN 667535

TOR:211810Z APR 76 CARA 30[illegible]

TO HAVE READ A LIST OF CIA OFFICERS WHICH INCLUDED JOHN [illegible] [illegible] OPERATOR IN THE AREA OF LA FLORIDA (SECTION OF CARACAS, STATE OF FLORIDA NOT CLEAR) AND RICHARD TOMBLY, AN OPERATIONAL OFFICER IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA SPECIALIZING IN CUBAN OPERATIONS. BOB JONES IS IDENTIFIED AS BEING IN CHILE, FRED DUNCAN AS AN OPERATOR IN THE CARACAS STATION, DOUGH PHILLIPS AS A LIAISON OFFICER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A. NASS, AN OFFICER OF THE SANTO DOMINGO STATION, AND LUIS MESA SOTO, A CIA OPERATOR IN THE MIAMI AREA. 201-087814 ANSELMO ALLIEGRO IS IDENTIFIED AS A CIA AGENT-INFORMANT IN MIAMI. [illegible] JUSTO ALFONSO ALIAS EL GALLEGO, ANOTHER AGENT-INFORMANT IN MIAMI. 201-085503 RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, A CIA OPERATOR IN CARACAS, ARMANDO RUIZ, AN AGENT IN CARACAS AND ANTONIO DE LEON, AN AGENT IN MEXICO.

4. AS HEADQUARTERS AWARE FRED DUNCAN AND LEE PHILLIPS ARE THE TWO CARACAS DEA DISTRICT OFFICERS. DEA USED SAFEHOUSE IN MAY FLOWER BUILDING TO MEET DE ARMAS. NESS IS (OR WAS) STATE SECURITY IN SANTO DOMINGO.

5. AMBASSADOR HAS DIRECTED NO COMMENT EMBASSY RESPONSE TO ANY INQUIRIES.

6. FILE: 200-120-150. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

19-2

SECRET

1932562 CIA 041240

C/LA7 C/IPAN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/LAN/IO, C/OPS, C/CI2, C/OPS/ITG4

29

50P

132

TO: U.S. SECRET SERVICE, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INFO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. Y

CIR-316/01680-76 Y

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. Y

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA Y

1. IN EARLY APRIL 1976, A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD ARRIVED IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, USING A COSTA RICAN PASSPORT WITH A FALSE NAME. BOSCH WAS REPORTEDLY TO ENTER A CLINIC IN SSANTO DOMINGO FOR A CATARACT OPERATION. Y

2. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL CHILEAN SERVICE, BOSCH ARRIVED IN SANTIAGO, CHILE, ON APPROXIMATELY 5 APRIL 1976. HE IS BELIEVED TO BE IN CHILE WITH A CONTRACT TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH CHILEAN OFFICIAL. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ARREST BOSCH ON 10 APRIL BUT HE SUCCESSFULLY EVADED THE CHILEAN INVESTIGATORS LEAVING BEHIND A CHILEAN AND AN ECUADOREAN PASSPORT AND HIS PERSONAL CLOTHING. Y

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM

DATE: 16 APRIL 1976
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

19 Apr 76

201-299292

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 016988

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

0 8 0 0 3 2 2 2

SECRET

CIA

84/248

GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 011652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.#

BASED ON: SANTIAGO 34347 |IN 893569| AND SANTO DOMINGO 37299 |IN 883352|

[illegible]

C/LA/SB

C/LA/CAM

C/LA/NW

DATE: 16 APRIL 1976
ORIG: W. A. CANTRELL:MM
UNIT: C/LA/SB/CH
EXT: 2471

DC/LA/CAR W J L Smith

C/OPS/LSN

C/OPS/ITG
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018952

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

23-1

SECRET

STAFF 170018Z DIRECTOR 640677

CONF: LA 7 INFO: FILE IP/AN, OPS/ITGS, CIOPS, LSN/IOP, CI-4, PS/EG-2

DISSEM BY: 4/9

TO: SANTIAGO INFO SAN JOSE, CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES, SANTO DOMINGO.

MHSPIKE

REFS: A. SANTO DOMINGO 17299 (IN 881352) (BEING RELAYED SANTIAGO, NOT NEEDED OTHER ADDRESSEES)

B. SANTIAGO 34147 (IN 891569) (BEING RELAYED SANTO DOMINGO)

1. GIST PARA 1 REFS A ~~AND B IS~~ Info Bosch BEING FURNISHED TO U.S. SECRET SERVICE AND FBI. SUGGEST STATION ALSO ADVISE APPROPRIATE EMBASSY OFFICER. ?

2. VIEW BOSCH'S PREVIOUS ASSOCIATION WITH ACCION CUBANA, WHICH REPORTEDLY RESPONSIBLE FOR BOMBING SEVERAL FOREIGN COUNSULATES IN U.S. AND ABROAD, AND POSSIBLE VISIT OF DR. HENRY KISSINGER TO SANTIAGO OAS MEETING IN JUNE, WILL APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS AVAILABLE RE BOSCH'S ACTIVITIES, TRAVEL AND/OR INTENTIONS.

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: REPORTED UNSUCCESSFUL CHILEAN ATTEMPT TO ARREST ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA ON 10 APRIL, AND THE ARRIVAL IN SANTIAGO OF FIVE "SCOPED RIFLES" ON 12 APRIL FROM ARGENTINA.

9

TRAVEL PROGRAM
IP/AN ☒ ABSTRACT
INDEX
IP/CRT PREPARE FOR FILMING
CODE NO. (2, 3)
NFU (6)
IP/CRT FOR FILING

C/LA/NW -F. DESMOND (IN DRAFT)
OPS/ITG -PAUL PLUMB (IN DRAFT)

201-299292
17 Apr 76

DATE: 16 APRIL 1976
ORIG: W.A. CANTRELL:MM
UNIT: C/LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

C/LA/CAM

AC/LA/CAR W J L Smith

G.T. Matthews for C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 016952

14-00000

BOSCH 201

OUTGOI... MESSAGE

9-1

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1.

SECRET

STAFF · 162353Z DIRECTOR 840584

CONF: LA7 INFO: FILE -2

DISSEM BY: 47

PER

#

TO: CABLE SECRETARIAT. Y

PLEASE RELAY SANTIAGO 34147 |IN 891569| TO SANTO DOMINGO

FOR INFO. E2 IMPDET.H

COPY ATTACHED

DATE: 16 APRIL 1976
ORIG: W.A.CANTRELL:MM
UNIT: C/LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

For C/LA

C/LA/SB

AC/LA/[redacted] CAR

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

29   18-2

SECRET

1976

STAFF

LA7   RF FILE   VR   PLAN, CI4, CI/OPS, PS/EG2.
OSG

T 843565   EIA291   PAGE 01   IN 891569

TOR:152036Z APR 76   34147

S E C R E T 152212Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 34147

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES.

FUBARGAIN

941865

1. NEW FUBARGAIN (IDEN FOR HQS ONLY) LIAISON CONTACT WHO WILL BE WORKING WITH ROGOVER UNTIL OAS MEETING ADVISED 15 APRIL ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA SHOWED UP IN CHILE APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS AGO. BELIEVED BOSCH HERE WITH CONTRACT ASSASSINATE HIGH GOC OFFICIAL. FUBARGAINS ATTEMPTING LOCATE IN ORDER ARREST AND POSSIBLY TURN OVER FBI FOR EXTRADITION TO U.S. BOSCH EVADED INVESTIGATORS 10 APRIL BY MATTER OF 10 MENUTES, LEAVING CHILEAN AND ECUADOREAN PASSPORT AND ALL CLOTHES BEHIND.

2. POSSIBLY RELATED TO ABOVE (ACCORDING FUBARGAINS) IS ARRIVAL FIVE SCOPED RIFLES 12 APRIL FROM ARGENTINA. ROGOVER SUGGESTED THEY ALSO CONSIDER POSSIBILITY THIS SEPARATE CASE AND RELATED TO DIRECTOR 839291 CASE.

3. IDEN REFRAINED FROM PROVIDING DETAILS AND IN THAT HE NEW CONTACT ROGOVER RELIED ON ELICITATION. NONETHELESS HE HAS VOLUNTEERED MORE INFO THAN MOST FORMER STATION

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 843565 EIA291 PAGE 02-02 IN 891569

TOR:1528362 APR 76 SAGO 34147

CONTACTS.

4. DEFER FILE. E2. IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 29 PER TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF	
1	4
2	5
3	6

ACTION UNIT LA7

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR SP/ic, OSG/IC, CI4, C/OPS, PS/EG2, OSG,

T 839881 EIA633 PAGE 01-01 IN 898828

TOR:1416362 APR 76 MANA 12278

S E C R E T 1416292 APR 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12278

TO: SAN JOSE INFO DIRECTOR.

REFS: A. SAN JOSE 19402 (IN 884044)

B. CARACAS 29876 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE) (IN 826512)

1. ACCORDING TO ERYTHROID-33, BORDER AND LOCAL RECORDS SHOW ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA DID NOT ENTER NICARAGUA TO DATE ON REF A CHILEAN PASSPORT OR REF B ALIAS DOCUMENTATION IN NAME OF PEDRO ANTONIO PENA.

2. FILE: 201-299292, E2. IMPDET.

Kel

TRAVEL PROGRAM
☒ ABSTRACT
INDEX
[illegible] FOR FILMING
[illegible]
[illegible]
CABLE [illegible]
[illegible] (3)
[illegible]

14 Apr. 76
201-299292

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 9 APRIL 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA - FUGITIVE; PAROLE VIOLATOR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FM DIRECTOR, FBI)

DATE: 8 APRIL 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MARTIAN INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT (MIM)
FBI FILE NO: 105-22201 (MIAMI)

FORM [illegible]
[illegible]

IN

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 18 -1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT LA-7	INFO	FILE VR (Smi), a.d. [illegible]-2 OSC [illegible]	
ACTION #			

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 625210 EIA375 PAGE 01-01 IN 004844

TOR:081943Z APR 76 SJOS 19402

S E C R E T 081905Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19402

TO: MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: MANAGUA 12256 (IN 882463)

1. ACCORDING HUFABRIC-14 ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA CARRIED CHILEAN PASSPORT IN NAME OF HECTOR E. D' AVANZO CINTOLESI, NUMBER 26583. REQUEST MANAGUA CHECK TO SEE IF BOSCH ENTERED NICARAGUA ON ABOVE CHILEAN PASSPORT.

2. FILE: 201-299292, E2 IMPDET.

FILE PROGRAM
CASE
FOR FILING

08 Apr. 76
201-299292

RECORD COPY

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 35 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 21 7 RUN BY (E-4)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

ACTION UNIT LA 7

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR Plans CCS2 OS9/IC
C/OPS OS9 C/4 RS/EG2

T 021238 EIA455 PAGE 01-01 IN 002463

TOR:071633Z APR 76 MANA 12256

S E C R E T 071614Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12256

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE.

REF: SAN JOSE 19295 (IN 853351)

1. ACCORDING TO ERYTHROID-33, THERE IS NO RECORD TO DATE OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAVING ENTERED NICARAGUA SUBSEQUENT TO HIS RELEASE FROM JAIL IN COSTA RICA. HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE BOSCH MAY HAVE ENTERED NICARAGUA USING ALIAS DOCUMENTATION.

2. FILE: 201-299292, E2, IMPDET.

[illegible] COPY

07 Apr 76
201-299292

SECRET

/ OUTGOING MESSAGE 60-3

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 072200Z DIRECTOR 835291

CONF: NE8 INFO: FILE. FP/AN EUR LA7, FRS, SPG3, PS/PG, (PS/ITG), PS/EG2, SS4, PS/INT, ITG, CI4, OSG, D/OMS2, DDO, DDO/DO, SS/SOO4, ODS/SS40 DISSEM BY: 45

TO: STOCKHOLM, OSLO, COPENHAGEN, LONDON, PARIS, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, FRANKFURT, BONN, BERLIN, MUNICH, HAMBURG, GENEVA, BERN, MADRID, LISBON, VIENNA, ATHENS, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, NICOSIA, ROME, [redacted], MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA CITY, SAN JOSE, PANAMA CITY, TEGUCIGALPA, CARACAS, BOGOTA, QUITO, LIMA, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, LA/MIAMI, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, SANTO DOMINGO, MANAGUA, BUENOS AIRES, TUNIS, RABAT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV INFO AMMAN.

9/

R

ARJUICE MHSPIKE

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, WHICH HAS BEEN DISSEMINATED TO WASHINGTON TERRORIST ADDRESSEES, WAS RECEIVED FROM AN OFFICIAL JORDANIAN SERVICE ON 21 MARCH AND 1 APRIL 1976. THE JORDANIANS HAVE NOT DISSEMINATED THE INFORMATION TO OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OUR DOING SO. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT NO ATTRIBUTION SHOULD BE MADE TO THE JORDANIANS IN PASSING THE INFORMATION TO OTHER SERVICES. PARAS 2 THROUGH 4 BELOW MAY BE PASSED LOCAL LIAISON SERVICES.

2. "ACCORDING TO A RELIABLE SOURCE, CIRCA MID-MARCH 1976 FIVE FATAH MEMBERS LEFT BEIRUT FOR AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION, EITHER IN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

SECRET

CONF: INFO FILE.

835341

NORTH OR SOUTH AMERICA. THE GROUP PLANS TO LOCATE THEMSELVES IN A HOTEL SOMEWHERE IN NORTH OR SOUTH AMERICA AND SUBSEQUENTLY DRAW UP A DETAILED OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR AN OPERATION AGAINST AN UNKNOWN TARGET. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE OPERATION, ATIF BUSAYSU RECENTLY TRAVELED TO BEIRUT FROM CAIRO. ~~THE FOLLOWING DAY~~ ONE ABU-'AYSHA SUBSEQUENTLY WENT TO BEIRUT ALSO, AND ON ORDERS FROM FATAH OFFICIAL SALAH KHALAF (ABU IYAD), WAS APPARENTLY INVOLVED IN PROCURING WEAPONS FOR THE OPERATION. WHILE ATIF BUSAYSU WAS IN CAIRO, HE SENT THREE GIRLS TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION FOR THE SAME OPERATION.

gm

3. "THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS WERE TO TRAVEL TO THEIR DESTINATION BY AIR FROM BEIRUT VIA ATHENS CIRCA MID-MARCH:

A. SUBHI 'ARIF, A JORDANIAN CARRYING A FORGED LEBANESE PASSPORT IN THE NAME OF MITRI KARAM. SUBJECT WAS LATER SEEN, HOWEVER, ~~[illegible]~~ IN BEIRUT IN THE OFFICE OF SALAH KHALAF.

gm

B. MUHAMMAD ABU-AL-KHAYR, A PALESTINIAN WHO RESIDES IN LEBANON AND WHO CARRIES A FORGED LEBANESE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

3 3

SECRET

835391

PASSPORT IN THE NAME OF ELIA MUZAWWAR.

C. SAMI SALIM MIKHAIL, CARRYING A FORGED PASSPORT IN THAT NAME.

D. SAMIH SALIM MIKHAIL, CARRYING A FORGED LEBANESE PASSPORT IN THAT NAME AND POSING AS SAMI'S SISTER.

E. WILLIAM NASIR, CARRYING ~~ABBB~~ FORGED JORDANIAN PASSPORT IN THAT NAME.

~~3~~ 4. "ON 28 MARCH TWO OTHER UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF FATAH ALSO TRAVELED TO ~~BBBBBBB~~ 'AMERICA.' ALSO INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION IS AN INDIVIDUAL IN SALAH KHALAF'S OFFICE KNOWN ONLY AS 'COLONEL SAMI' WHO CARRIES AN ALGERIAN PASSPORT."

5. PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBHI ARIF, SAMI SALIM MIKHAIL AND 'COLONEL SAMI' WILL BE FORWARDED VIA TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST CIRCA 8 OR 9 APRIL FOR PASSAGE TO LIAISONS.

6. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

RELEASED PER AUTHORITY OF MR. JONATHAN PETRY, DC/SPG/DDO/TELECON

DATE: 6 APR'76
ORIG: B.FOSTER/KAD
UNIT: NEARN/F/R
EXT: 1474

DCNE/AD
EUR/EXO
C/LA

OPS/ITG

for CNE/NA

SUE ALBERTSON
DDO/SPG/TELECON

CNEARN

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

14-00000

[illegible] 27

S E C R E T

LA [illegible] 2035

LA7 [illegible] FILE [illegible] IP/AN, CI/X, PS/I[illegible]

T 016417 E1A745 PAGE 01 IN 081352

TOR:0620272 APR 76 SDOM 17290

S E C R E T 0620132 APR 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17290

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO PRIORITY LA/MIAMI.

1. EMGARNET-1 REPORTED 5 APRIL THAT ORLANDO BOSCH IS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DESPITE RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT MADE BY POLICE CHIEF GENERAL NIVAR THAT BOSCH IS IN SPAIN. EMGARNET-1 LEARNED FROM LOCAL CUBAN CONTACTS THAT BOSCH ARRIVED IN FALSE NAME ON COSTA RICAN PASSPORT ISSUED BY GOCR, THAT TRAVEL WAS CLEARED BY GOCR WITH PRESIDENT BALAGUER, WHO ACCEDED TO REQUEST OF ADMIRAL DE WINDT (FATHER-IN-LAW OF UMBERTO LOPEZ, WHO DEPORTED TO U.S. A FEW MONTHS AGO).

2. EMGARNET-1 CONFORNTED EMFETCH-9 WITH ABOVE INFORMATION. EMFETCH-9 DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE AND SUBSEQUENTLY RAISED WITH PRESIDENT BALAGUER WHO FINALLY ADMITTED THAT BOSCH WAS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BECAUSE ADMIRAL DE WINDT HAD APPEALED TO HIM ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. IT APPEARS THAT BOSCH NEEDS CATARACT OPERATION AND SCHEDULED TO ENTER PEREZ PATINO CLINIC.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
IP/AN	☒	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/CR/1		PROCESS FOR TRACES	
IP/MS		CODE NO. (7, 3)	
		[illegible]	
		[illegible] (11)	
		[illegible] (1)	
IP/CRD		[illegible]	

6 apr 76

201-299292

RECORD COPY

BOSCH, ORLANDO

12 6 Apr 76 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

PCD ATTACKS POLITICAL LEADER PEREZ

Santo Domingo Radio Clarin Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 2 Apr 76 FL

[Text] The Dominican Communist Party [PCD] today asserted that if Luis Julian Perez becomes president he will persecute PCD members. The PCD Political Committee, in a press statement sent to Radio Clarin, indicates that Julian Perez has retreated and postponed his anticommunist offensive. The former chairman of the National Development Commission had asserted that he would disclose the names of each member of the communist party thatholds positions with the government.

The PCD adds in its statement that Julian Perez now states that he never said it. In fact, he contradicts himself, retreats and is avoiding a political confrontation in which he can only lose. The PCD also points out that his statement was nothing but a gross lie.

MEMBERSHIP IN SUGAR PRODUCERS UNION OPPOSED

Santo Domingo Radio Clarin Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 2 Apr 76 FL

[Station commentary]

[Text] We have insistently said that to belong to the famous Union of Latin American Sugar Producers--to which the Philippines has been added--is not [word indistinct] or beneficial to the Dominican Republic because there is a notable difference between producing and exporting countries and in their respective interests.

We have also criticized the series of limitations imposed on the Dominican Republic by virtue of meetings held and commitments acquired. These limitations and commitments are made in exchange for nothing because a country that produces sugar but does not export it has nothing to lose in agreeing to limitations on its free right to negotiate, to sell, and so forth.

Right now the Philippines has acquired a contract on sugar sales for a 5-year period with a U.S. refinery amounting to 650,000 tons annually. Did the Dominican Republic know anything about this? Or did it learn about it, as we did, from international news dispatches? What prior consultations were made? How does this (?agree) with the famous meetings and agreements of Cozumel, Puerto Plata, Lima and Cali?

It is not that we believe the deal with the Philippines will have any effect on the price of sugar or the market; however, we take the opportunity to stress this example and make known the reasons we have had and have to criticize the Dominican Republic's entry in an international group from which we will get no benefits.

AUTHORITIES DENY ARRIVAL OF ANTI-CASTRO LEADER

BK

Santo Domingo Radio Clarin Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 30 Mar 76 FL

[Excerpts] It is not true that anti-Castro exile Orlando Bosch is in the Dominican Republic, Immigration Director General Commodore (Ret) Enrique Rafael Valdez Vidaurre declared today. He added that a report to the effect that Dr Bosch had been expelled from Costa Rica to our country was journalistic speculation. The report had been made in San Jose, Costa Rica, last night by a spokesman for the government of President Daniel Oduber.

The Foreign Relations Secretariat today also pointed out that it had no knowledge that Bosch had been expelled to our country on orders of the Costa Rican Supreme Court after many countries consulted by the government of that Central American country refused to admit the anti-Castro exile.

FBIS, DK#67 (LA) 6 Apr 76

14-00000

OUTGOIN MESSAGE

15-1

SECRET

IP

0300032Z

C/LA 7 C/OPS [illegible] C/SE/IO [illegible]

47

SAP

231

TO: SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INFO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.V

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.V

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA.V

REFS: A. SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE SAN JOSE [illegible] 21 FEBRUARY 1976

B. CIR-316/01060-76.V

CIR-316/01441-76.V

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUL 13 1978
MICROFILMED

1. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL COSTA RICAN SERVICE, CUBAN EXILE ACTIVIST ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS DEPORTED FROM COSTA RICA ON FRIDAY, 26 MARCH 1976 ON AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO NICARAGUA.V

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.H

BASED ON: SAN JOSE 19367 (IN 875024)

CIR# 316/01441-76.Y

03 Apr. 76

201-299292

DATE: 2 APRIL 1976
ORIG: KAY MAUER:PDL
UNIT: AC/LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1946

[illegible] D COPY

B Graham
AC/LA/CAM

C/OPS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

14-00000

~~[illegible]~~

[illegible] EIBOZBLAOCOO

RR RUEAIIB RUEAIIB

DE RUEHFB #0022 0950210

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

R 040115Z APR 76

APR 3 9 42 PM '76

APR 3 9 15 PM '76

DDO/ISS
Sec/ISS

Bosch
201

FM DIRECTOR, FBI

TO RUEBWJA/DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

ATTN: ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION UNIT

RUEBWJA/ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION

ATTN: INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

ATTN: GENERAL CRIMES SECTION

RUEAIIA/DIRECTOR, CIA

RUEHSE/U.S. SECRET SERVICE (PID)

RUEHC/SECRETARY OF STATE

RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

ATTN: BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

BT

UNCLAS

UNSUB: THREAT TO BOMB COSTA RICAN CONSUL, MIAMI, FLORIDA, MARCH 29, 1976, EID: PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS.

14-00000

PAGE TWO DE RUEHFB 0022 UNCLAS

RE MIAMI TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU DATED MARCH 29, 1976.

ON APRIL 3, 1976, MR. DIEGO LOPEZ, COSTA RICAN CONSUL, MIAMI, FLORIDA, ADVISED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A SECOND LETTER DIRECTED TO THE CONSUL GENERAL OF COSTA RICA WHICH MADE A [illegible]. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS LETTER WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE MIAMI OFFICE, FBI, ON APRIL 3, 1976. THE LETTER IS IN SPANISH AND AGAIN MAKES REFERENCE TO DR. BOSCH BELIEVED TO BE DR. ORLANDO BOSCH. THE LETTER NOTES THAT IT WILL BE COSTLY TO THE COSTA RICAN CONSUL FOR HAVING TURNED OVER DR. BOSCH TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SO THAT THAT GOVERNMENT CAN RETURN DR. BOSCH TO A UNITED STATES JAIL.

THE LETTER WAS ENDED WITH THE SENTENCE THE BOMB IS READY. THE LETTER IS SIGNED SIMILAR AS THE FIRST WITH THE SIGNATURE GROUP X.

SECRET SERVICE AGENT PHILLIP LINDSEY, MIAMI, FLORIDA, WAS CONTACTED ON APRIL 3, 1976 REGARDING CONTENTS OF THE LETTER.

BT

#0022

BOSCH, ORLANDO

CUBA



... most among young people and failing to instill "Communist virtues" in them.

BP WASH POST 3 APR 76

Costa Rica Ousts Anti-Castro Cuban

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica, March 30 (AP) — Orlando Bosch, an anti-Castro Cuban, was deported by Costa Rica to the Dominican Republic Sunday, government sources report.

Bosch came to Costa Rica Feb. 8, a few days before the arrival of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during a Latin American tour.

Bosch was arrested Feb. 12 and was accused by Security Minister Mario Charpantier of entering the country illegally with a Chilean passport issued in the name of Hector Emilio Davanzo. He was transferred from the jail to a hospital after a 10-day hunger strike.

14-00000

1. REVIEW OF ~~XXXXXXX~~ RECENT TRAFFIC ON BOSCH, ~~WHICH SOMEWHAT CONFLICTING, TENDS TO~~ -ES INDICATE THAT BOSCH HAS PROBABLY BEEN IN DOMREP SINCE EARLY PART APR 76, FOLLOWING DEPORTATION FROM COSTA RICA.

2. EMGARNET-1, A SANTO DOMINGO ASSET WITH GOOD ACCESS TO LOCAL CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY AND TO DOMINICAN CHIEF OF ~~XXX~~ POLICE, ~~XXXX~~ GEN. NEIT NIVAR, REPORTED ~~XXXXXXXX~~ ON 5 APR 76 THAT BOSCH WAS IN DOMREP, ~~[illegible]~~ THAT HE HAD ARRIVED FROM COSTA RICA WITH ALIAS ~~NAME~~ ~~FALSE~~/COSTA RICAN ~~XXX~~ PASSPORT PROVIDED BY GOCR, AND THAT ENTRY TO DOMREP WAS APPROVED BY DOMINICAN PRESIDENT BALAGUER. EMGARNET-1 CONFRONTED NIVAR WITH THIS INFO WHO SUBSEQUENTLY RAISED QUESTION WITH BALAGUER. BALAGUER REPORTEDLY ADMITTED TO NIVAR THAT HE HAD ALLOWED BOSCH TO TRAVEL TO DOMREP ON "HUMANITARIAN" GROUNDS SO THAT BOSCH COULD RECEIVE "CATARACT OPERATION." AN ARTICLE IN SAN JOSE NEWSPAPER "LA NACION" AS WELL AS AN FBI REPORT DATED 8 APR 76 FROM A "HIGHLY-~~XXXX~~ PLACED ACCION CUBANA SOURCE IN PUERTO RICO" ALSO INDICATED THAT BOSCH WAS ~~XXXXXXX~~ FLOWN TO THE DOMREP FROM COSTA RICA.

3. EMPREDICT COVERAGE INDICATED THAT BOSCH WAS IN DOMREP BY AT LEAST 27 APRIL, WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED. ~~AND THAT HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY AN UNKNOWN DOMINICAN SECURITY SERVICE ON THAT DATE~~. CHIEF OF DOMINICAN LIAISON TOLD STATION THAT HE WOULD TAKE NO INVESTIGATIVE ACTION SINCE HE CONVINCED THAT "MATTER BEING HANDLED OUT OF PALACE BY PRESIDENT BALAGUER." ~~XXXX~~ LIAISON REPORTED THAT AS OF 3 MAY 1976, BOSCH ~~HAD BEEN~~ WAS STAYING AT THE HOTEL CERVANTES IN SANTO DOMINGO.

SANTO DOMINGO:

4. FBI REPORT WHICH JUST RECEIVED (AND BEING POUCHED SANTO DOMINGO) COMMENTED ON RECENT CUBAN RIGHTIST MEETINGS HELD IN SANTO DOMINGO WHICH INCLUDED PARTICIPATION OF BOSCH. ONE OF MEETINGS WAS HELD ON 12 JUNE AT A "HOUSE LOCATED ATOP A MOUNTAIN NEAR SANTO DOMINGO." THERE ARE FEW IF ANY ~~XXXX~~ MOUNTAINS IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF SANTO DOMINGO, HOWEVER, GENER NIVAR IS FAMOUS FOR HIS HOUSE" LOCATED IN THE CLOUDS " ON TOP OF A HIGH MOUNTAIN NEAR SAN CRISTOBAL AND BANI, WEST OF SANTO DOMINGO. IN VIEW OF ABOVE INDICATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST IN THIS CASE, IS IT POSSIBLE THAT NIVAR MIGHT BE CLOSER TO THE ACTION THAN HE HAS ADMITTED TO DATE?

5.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE

TO:

ROOM NO. | BUILDING

REMARKS:

2 April 76

Paul Plumb of TOPS/ITG checked w Secret Service & FBI. They have no interest in BOSCH activs in Nicaragua.

FROM: Jerry Maue

ROOM NO. | BUILDING | EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 30-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

C/LA 15 ACTION

C/SN/10 [illegible]

C/C14 [illegible]

T 723683 E:4633

IN 842549

TOR:212217Z MAR 76

SJOS 19272

S E C R E T 212152Z MAR 76 STAFF

4362

CITE SAN JOSE 19272

CIRA 25 [illegible] 76

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS.

RYBAT VNLOFTY

REF: SAN JOSE 19265 (IN 841160)

1. UPON RECEIPT OF DIRECTOR 810820 STATION CONTACTED HUFABRIC (HUGLIB-8) TO ADVISE OF A POSSIBLE THREAT AGAINST THE LIFE OF PASCAL ALLENDE, AS INSTRUCTED BY HEADQUARTERS. HUGLIB-8 SAID THE SAME INFORMATION HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GONZALO FACIO FROM THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT; FACIO HAD ALREADY PASSED THE INFORMATION TO THE HUFABRICS. PRIOR TO HUGLIB-8'S RECEIPT OF THE INFORMATION FROM THE STATION HE HAD ALREADY PERSONALLY VISITED ALLENDE TO WARN HIM OF THE THREAT.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

WKSCARECI-3/76

Put all in 201 [illegible]

S E C R E T

UVTP 4303 9 July 1973

SECRET

LA NACION, jueves 1º de abril de 1976

San José, Costa Rica

Bosch viajó a Dominicana con nombre falso

A pesar de las declaraciones hechas por funcionarios del Gobierno dominicano, es un hecho que el exiliado cubano, líder anticomunista que estuvo preso en Costa Rica por más de dos meses, se encuentra en República Dominicana, a juzgar por información dada a conocer ayer por voceros del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores.

Lo que ha ocurrido es que Bosch ingresó en aquel país con el nombre de Emilio Lavanza, con el cual aparece en un pasaporte chileno falsificado, el mismo que usó para venir a nuestro país.

El encargado de negocios a. i. de la República Dominicana en San José, señor Schiffino, negó la versión dada a conocer por La Nación en el sentido de que Bosch había viajado a su país. Pero la aclaración hecha por los funcionarios de la Cancillería determina cuál es la real situación.

Bosch fue deportado a Dominicana tras una serie de gestiones del Gobierno costarricense, que lo tuvo detenido desde el [illegible] de febrero, fecha en que ingresó en nuestro territorio, días antes de que visitara el Secretario de Estado norteamericano, Henry Kissinger.

14-00000

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 77 PER

TOTAL COPIES 15-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT LA 7

ACTION #

INFO: RF. FILE VR I/AN, OSG, C/4 PS/EG2, C/OPS

STAFF	
1	4
2	5
3	6

T 802364 EIA304 PAGE 01-01 IN 875024

TOR:311517Z MAR 76 SJOS 19367

S E C R E T 311506Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19367

TO: DIRECTOR, MANAGUA,

REF: SAN JOSE 19295 (IN 853351)

1. ALTHOUGH LOCAL PRESS OF 30 MARCH REPORTED VARIOUSLY THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD BEEN DEPORTED TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC OR EUROPE, ACCORDING TO HUFABRIC-14 ON 30 MARCH, BOSCH WAS IN FACT DEPORTED FROM COSTA RICA ON FRIDAY, 26 MARCH, ON OVERLAND ROUTE TO NICARAGUA.

2. FILE: 201-299292, E2 IMPDET.

TRAVEL PROGRAM

31 Mar 76
201-299292

RECORD COPY

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 29 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 23-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO		STAFF			
LA 7		RF. FILE. VR. (D)LAN, CI 4, CI/OPS,	1		4	
ACTION #		PS/EG 2, OS 6, OSG/IC,	2		5	
		OPS/ITG 4	3		6	

T 737196 EIA722 PAGE 01-01 IN 848642

TOR:052253Z MAR 76 MANA 12202

S E C R E T 052248Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12202

TO: DIRECTOR.

REF MANAGUA 12179 (IN 835555)

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 299292
DO NOT DESTROY

II/ca

1. OF POSSIBLE INTEREST FOR HQS ACTION, ERYTHROID-33 NOTIFIED STATION THAT IGNAZIO O NO 201 PALOMERA PEREZ OBTAINED NICARAGUAN EXIT PERMIT ON 5 MARCH FOR TRAVEL TO UNITED STATES. DATE OF HIS PROPOSED TRAVEL IS UNKNOWN. PER REF. PALOMERA IS PROBABLY TRAVELING ON COSTA RICAN PASSPORT NUMBER 3208-69 WHICH CONTAINS VALID FOUR YEAR MULITIPLE ENTRY U.S. VISA GOOD UNTIL JANUARY 1977. PALOMERA IS CUBAN NATIONAL WHO IS APPRENTLY CLOSE CONTACT AND OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, TERRORIST AND LEADER OF ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT GROUP KNOWN AS ACCION CUBANA.

2. NO FILE. E2. IMPDET.

SECRET

E-201-299292

5 Mar 76
200-6-484/3

FBI CABLES

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 4 APRIL 1976
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: THREAT TO BOMB COSTA RICAN CONSUL, MIAMI, FLORIDA

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 30 MARCH 1976
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: THREAT TO BOMB COSTA RICAN CONSUL, MIAMI, FLORIDA, MARCH 29, 1976..

SAN JOSE, C.R.

File, BOSCH 201

LA NACION, martes [illegible] de 197[illegible]

23 March 76

Extraño aislamiento del doctor Bosch

Del Movimiento Costa Rica Libre, recibimos la siguiente comunicación:

"La incomunicación de que es objeto el Dr. Orlando Bosch, dirigente anti-comunista cubano con más de veinticinco años de lucha, primero contra la dictadura de Batista y luego contra la dictadura comunista de Fidel Castro, es una vergüenza para el prestigio internacional de nuestro país.

La negación de asistencia médica adecuada y la prohibición de que un abogado le visite son una clara [illegible]ción de los Derechos Humanos. Si el señor Ministro de Seguridad Pública después de haber manifestado públicamente que no le importaba que el señor Bosch continuara en huelga de hambre, anuncia ahora —sin que podamos confirmar— que le ha dado este Gobierno asistencia médica, ello ha sido obligados por la presión del Movimiento Costa Rica Libre que amenazó con denunciar esta actitud ante Amnistía Internacional en Londres y ante la Comisión de Derechos Humanos en New York.

La actitud del Gobierno de Costa Rica con el dirigente anticomunista G. Bosch, contrasta con la asumida con el terrorista marxista Allende, quien disfruta en nuestro país de todos los derechos y comodidades necesarios brindados por las esferas oficiales.

¿Cuál es la razón para mantener aislado al Dr. Bosch como si fuese un delincuente común? ¿Por qué no se permite ser visto por un médico de su confianza? ¿Por qué no puede ser visitado por un abogado? ¿Va el Dr. Orlando Bosch a permanecer en una cárcel indefinidamente hasta que algún país le reciba? ¿Es esta la forma como el Gobierno de Costa Rica entiende los Derechos Humanos?

Resulta extraño que el Ministro de Seguridad Pública que ahora no contesta interpelaciones de quienes como contribuyentes pagamos su sueldo, le moleste que se haga publicidad alrededor de un caso que tiene alarmados a la opinión pública, pero sí permiten toda clase de publicidad cuando se trata de detenidos de filiación comunista. ¿Cuáles son y de dónde provienen las presiones contra el señor Ministro para que haya tomado esta actitud? Todos conocemos la filiación anticomunista del Ministro. Entonces, ¿por qué actúa así?

El Ministro Charpentier debe explicar claramente las razones del Gobierno para mantener a un anticomunista que no es un delincuente, sin asistencia médica de confianza y sin asesoramiento legal. Explique el señor Ministro por qué se le mantiene incomunicado. ¿Es acaso que existe temor que el Dr. Orlando Bosch diga algo inconveniente para el Gobierno?

El señor Ministro debe explicar en forma clara y sin irritarse; todas estas interrogantes, ya que él es un servidor público y por lo tanto está obligado a dar explicaciones a los ciudadanos que las solicitan. De no ser así tendremos que recurrir a otros organismos para que se ponga en claro esta extraña persecución y aislamiento del dirigente anticomunista cubano Dr. Orlando Bosch".

Junta Directiva
Movimiento Costa Rica
Libre.

BOSCH, ORLANDO

COSTA RICA

NO GOVERNMENT WANTS TO ACCEPT CUBAN EXILE

Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0229 GMT 19 Mar 76 PA

[Text] San Jose, Costa Rica, 18 Mar--The fate of exiled Cuban leader Orlando Bosch has been complicated by the fact that no government in the hemisphere is willing to grant him territorial asylum.

Meanwhile, Bosch began today his 7th day on a hunger strike which he is staging to call attention to his case, and is accepting only water in his cell in the prison of Cartago, east of San Jose, where he is being held.

Bosch was deprived of his freedom when his presence and illegal entry into Costa Rica were proved. He used a Chilean passport with a false name to enter the country shortly before U.S. Secretary of Stat Henry A. Kissinger's official visit.

Bosch's deportation has been ordered, but no government has shown any willingness to receive him. Today, Foreign Affairs Minister Gonzalo J. Facio negotiated with a country not previously consulted--one of the latest to be approved--Facio explained. The results of these negotiations were negative.

Apparently, Bosch's guerrilla background influences these rejections.

The anti-Castro leader claims to be a victim of the circles which foster a reconciliation with Prime Minister Fidel Castro's regime.

FACIO ON CUBAN-COSTA RICAN RAPPROCHEMENT

Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0036 GMT 23 Mar 76 PA

[Text] San Jose, Costa Rica, 22 Mar--(ACAN-EFE)--Costa Rican Foreign Minister Gonzalo J. Facio this afternoon rejected criticism by newsmen who have said he is propitiating a rapprochement with the Cuban regime. Facio said that the Castroite adventure in Angola and the proletarian internationalism doctrine it represents have thrown cold water on the possibility of renewing relations with that island.

The minister thus responded to a newspaper editorial which noted the dangerous inclination of the Foreign Ministry toward reconciliation with Cuba at a time when, according to the commentary, the Havana regime has decided to embark on an expansive and aggressive foreign policy.

Facio rejected this criticism and freed his ministry from all responsibility for what officials from other ministries said or did after their trip to Cuba. Some have praised the system in effect there.

The foreign minister commented that the adventure in Angola and the theory advanced by Cuba--according to which it is prepared to back insurrections provoked by communist movements--are very much taken into account by Costa Rica and are considered to be enough reason for cooling the possibility of a renewal of relations with Havana.

Facio also said that he did not share the opinion of the New York TIMES which commented that Jamaica and Guyana have become beachheads for Cuban penetration in the hemisphere.

FBIS, DR# 57 (LA) 23 MAR 76

CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 17 MARCH 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA

Bosch, Orlando

Policiales/Judiciales

Orlando Bosch n variará su vida como terrorista

Orlando Bosch, [illegible] por la [illegible] de tres [illegible] de prisión en los Estados Unidos, [illegible] la posibilidad de ser [illegible] en Chile o de ser [illegible] a tiros en cualquier país de América por las variadas aventuras en que se ha visto envuelto en su larga e [illegible] lucha contra el régimen de Fidel Castro.

Bosch de [illegible] años de edad considera que es un hospital ambulante. El único de los cinco jefes contrarrevolucionarios de las Villas que logró escapar con vida de Cuba, hace más de 12 años, ha sido operado dos veces de úlceras, ha recibido 81 transfusiones de sangre y sostiene que tiene poco que perder, incluyendo la vida.

Bosch, arrestado en San José el 18 de febrero, se encuentra recluido actualmente en la cárcel de Cartago y la posibilidad de que hoy o mañana sea deportado [illegible] ha sido completamente descartada.

Hasta ahora esa decisión se había visto retrasada por motivos políticos. Bosch, a quien se señaló como el responsable de colocar una bomba en la sede de las Naciones Unidas en Nueva York, de dinamitar un buque soviético en Miami y de ingresar a Costa Rica para conspirar contra la vida del señor Kissinger, durante la visita de éste a nuestro país, ha llegado a ser muy conocido en el ámbito latinoamericano y con sus antecedentes pocos países se han mostrado interesados en darle asilo, excepto en los que tiene pendientes varias cuentas con la justicia.

Bosch disfruta en la cárcel de una libertad de movimientos excepcionales y ha captado la simpatía de todos [illegible] de la [illegible] es un hombre [illegible] y [illegible]

Aunque al principio las [illegible] la [illegible] le [illegible] y [illegible] luego en que [illegible] Cartago [illegible] ha recibido un tratamiento incomparable, dijo.

Antes de ser referido a la cárcel de Cartago, Bosch fue duramente interrogado, incluso por un agente de la Central de Inteligencia Norteamericana, según manifestó.

"Un señor macho, con el pelo chuzo, hablando con acento inglés y acompañado de un perrito faldero cubano de apellido Menéndez estuvo a interrogarme en la Tercera Compañía. Aunque inicialmente acepté responder a unas preguntas, me incliné [illegible] que los [illegible] y [illegible] que [illegible]", añadió Bosch.

Estima de otro lado que ninguno de los cargos que se le formularon en su contra es [illegible]. En cuanto a la [illegible] Bosch [illegible] en [illegible] en ese [illegible].

Bosch se llama asimismo el hombre que ha tenido que salvar la dignidad tantas veces mancillada del pueblo cubano, "pues alguien tiene que saber poner en alto su hidalguía".

Afirma también que es parte de un frente continental de lucha contra el régimen de Fidel Castro.

Asegura que, "hemos castigado duramente al enemigo en América" y cita el caso del embajador cubano en Argentina, "el enlace entre la izquierda argentina y el comunismo cubano, el cual escapó milagrosamente de un atentado".

Opina firmemente que Castro está ampliando su esfera de influencia en América, gracias a la actitud feminoide de políticos y gobernantes, entre los cuales incluyó, también a los nuestros.

Dijo que los diplomáticos latinoamericanos son figuras feminoides disfrazadas para los bufets, las comilonas y la intriga.

Expresó que, por un lado Castro está protegido por los Estados Unidos y por otro por los diplomáticos y políticos blendengues.

Cuando un periodista le preguntó si se podía comparar a Pascal Allende con Matos, señaló que era absurdo, pues en su opinión eso equivaldría a mancillar la memoria de un hombre valiente como Matos, preso actualmente en las mazmorras del régimen de Castro.

Refiriéndose a los métodos violentos a veces empleados por cubanos anticastristas, declaró: "La violencia puede ser noble, justa, digna, o no. Nosotros luchamos solos por nuestra patria, y racionalmente la defendemos".

Dijo por ejemplo que aquí mismo en Costa Rica, un país al que creía libre y en el cual la gente podía asilarse, había interés en hacerle daño. "Aquello del atentado a Kissinger es una falacia. Ningún cubano atacó nunca a funcionarios norteameri-

Llegué a Costa Rica para hacer una pausa en mis actividades. Pero también aquí le hicieron el juego a Fidel Castro, de modo que me voy desilusionado, dijo Bosch. (Foto: Córdoba).

[illegible]

A pesar de
cajones en
de Costa Ri
fila general
luego afirm
no hay repres
libertad abso

Bosch tien
Atlanta, Mia
la. Su hija L
con un nort
apellido Pita
tole dos días
gresar a Cu
sido llamada
una entrevist

Actualment
en huelga de
protesta por
cibió de las a
ro especialm
ma en que lo
tarricenses le
a los interese
tro en el con

"Fui interr
agente del
norteameric
to faldero cu
Menéndez",
ba).

EXCELSIOR

ndo Bosch no iará su vida o terrorista

[illegible] posibilidad de que hoy o mañana sea expulsado. [illegible] completamente [illegible]

Hasta ahora sus [illegible] se había visto rechazado por motivos políticos. Bosch, a quien se señala como el responsable de colocar una bomba en la sede de las Naciones Unidas en Nueva York, de dinamitar un buque soviético en Miami y de ingresar a Costa Rica para conspirar contra la vida del señor Kissinger, durante la visita de éste a nuestro país, ha llegado a ser muy conocido en el ámbito latinoamericano y con sus antecedentes pocos países se han mostrado interesados en darle asilo, excepto en los que tiene pendientes varias cuentas con la justicia.

Bosch disfruta en la cárcel de una libertad de movimientos excepcionales y ha captado la simpatía de todos [illegible] de su [illegible]. La mayoría de [illegible] opina que es un hombre valiente y un líder.

Aunque al principio fue [illegible], [illegible] luego se me trasladó a Cartago. En la Comandancia he recibido un tratamiento incomparable", dijo.

Antes de ser referido a la cárcel de Cartago, Bosch fue duramente interrogado, inclusive por un agente de la Central de Inteligencia Norteamericana, según manifestó.

"Un señor macho, con el pelo chuzo, hablando con acento inglés y acompañado de un perrito faldero cubano de apellido Menendes estuvo a interrogarme en la Tercera Compañía. Aunque inicialmente acepté responder a unas preguntas, me incliné [illegible] por [illegible], pues comprendí que las autoridades costarricenses y [illegible] eran las que tenían ese derecho", añadió Bosch.

Estima de otro lado que ninguno de los cargos que se le formularon en su contra es verídico. En cuanto a la ONU, "nunca me [illegible] a poner los pies en ese [illegible]".

Bosch se llama asimismo el hombre que ha tenido que salvar la dignidad tantas veces mancillada del pueblo cubano, "pues alguien tiene que saber poner en alto su historia".

Afirma también que es parte de un frente continental de lucha contra el régimen de Fidel Castro.

Asegura que, "hemos castigado duramente al enemigo en America" y cita el caso del embajador cubano en Argentina, "el enlace entre la izquierda argentina y el comunismo cubano, el cual escapó milagrosamente de un atentado".

Opina firmemente que Castro está ampliando sú esfera de influencia en América, gracias a la actitud feminoide de políticos y gobernantes, entre los cuales incluyó también a los nuestros.

Dijo que los diplomáticos latinoamericanos son figuras feminoides disfrazadas para los bufets, las comilonas y la intriga.

Expresó que, por un lado Castro está protegido por los Estados Unidos y por otro por los diplomáticos y políticos blandengues.

Cuando un periodista le preguntó si se podía comparar a Pascal Allende con Matos, señaló que era absurdo, pues en su opinión eso equivaldría a mancillar la memoria de un hombre valiente como Matos, preso actualmente en las mazmorras del régimen de Castro.

Refiriéndose a los métodos violentos a veces empleados por cubanos anticastristas, declaró: "La violencia puede ser noble, justa, digna, o no. Nosotros luchamos solos por nuestra patria, y racionalmente la defendemos".

Dijo por ejemplo que aquí mismo en Costa Rica, un país al que creía libre y en el cual la gente podía asilarse, había interés en hacerle daño. "Aquello del atentado a Kissinger es una falacia. Ninguno [illegible]

[illegible]

"Estoy dispuesto", dijo Bosch, "a [illegible] Los Estados Unidos [illegible] Chile también, porque [illegible]. Me gustaría ir a Chile pero [illegible] de Costa Rica. "Que me envíen adonde quieran, menos a Cuba. En mi lucha no hay lugar ni pido favores", agregó más adelante.

A pesar de todo Bosch se expresa en forma elogiosa de Chile. Reconoció el espíritu generoso de su pueblo. Luego afirmó que en Chile no hay represión y que existe libertad absoluta.

Bosch tiene familiares en Atlanta, Miami y Guatemala. Su hija Lourdes, casada con un norteamericano de apellido Hinter, fue deportada dos días después de ingresar a Costa Rica. Había sido llamada por Bosch para una entrevista formal.

Actualmente Bosch está en huelga de hambre como protesta por el trato que recibió de las autoridades, pero especialmente por la forma en que los políticos costarricenses le hacen el juego a los intereses de Fidel Castro en el continente.

una pausa en mis actividades. Pero también aquí le hicie- modo que me voy desilusionado, dijo Bosch. (Foto: Córdo-

"Fui interrogado por un agente del servicio secreto norteamericano, y un perrito faldero cubano de apellido Menéndes". (Foto Córdoba).

[illegible]

[illegible] de mis actividades. Pero también aquí le [illegible] que me voy desilusionado, dijo Bosch. (Foto: Córdo-

mparte un cuarto con los choferes de las Radiopatrullas de la Co-
e *EXCELSIOR*, manifiesta que entró al país con un pasaporte falso,
e lo haría alguien llevando un cargamento de explosivos, se iba a
(Foto: Córdoba).

[illegible]

Expresó que, por un lado Castro está protegido por los Estados Unidos y por otro por los diplomáticos y [illegible].

Cuando un periodista le preguntó si se podía comparar a Pascal Allende con Matos, señaló que era absurdo, pues en su opinión eso equivaldría a mancillar la [illegible] de un hombre valiente como Matos, preso actualmente en las mazmorras del régimen de Castro.

Refiriéndose a los métodos violentos a veces empleados por cubanos anticastristas, declaró: "La violencia puede ser noble, justa, digna, o no. Nosotros luchamos solos por nuestra patria, y racionalmente la defendemos".

Dijo por ejemplo que aquí mismo en Costa Rica, un país al que creía libre y en el cual la gente podía asilarse, había interés en hacerle daño. "Aquello del atentado a Kissinger es una falacia. Ningún cubano atacó nunca a funcionarios norteamericanos. Pero, como tantos otros países de América, en Costa Rica políticos y diplomáticos como el señor Facio le siguen haciendo el juego a Castro", dijo Bosch.

Añadió que nadie ha hecho tanto para dejar sin efecto el bloqueo a Cuba que el señor Facio y sin embargo, Castro le ha respondido en forma rápida. Eso demuestra, dijo, que él es un peligro que hay que combatir.

SEGUIRE CONSPIRANDO:

Bosch declaró que tiene una misión que cumplir y que, no importa donde el gobierno lo mande, ahí encarará a su suerte: "Seguiré luchando racionalmente como lo he hecho hasta ahora. Seguiré envuelto en actividades conspirativas. Nadie debe tenerme miedo, excepto los comunistas", dijo Bosch.

Bosch ingresó al país a principios de este año con un pasaporte falso a nombre de otro, según afirma, con el propósito de permanecer unos días fuera de acción, descansando. "No pensaba en realidad disfrutar del sol y la playa, pues como solía advertir Martí: "Los pueblos deben tomarse un descanso pero no sus líderes". Sin embargo, consideré que podía hacer una pausa aquí. No tenía interés en comprometer al Gobierno. Después de lo que me han hecho me voy desilusionado", añadió.

Repuso que el pasaporte falsificado no es chileno, sino un pasaporte emitido en La Habana y que estaba en [illegible] un ex-militar chile-

[illegible]

"Fui interrogado por un agente del servicio secreto norteamericano, y un presunto líder cubano de apellido Mercados". (Foto Córdoba).

BOSCH Avila Orlando

CUBA

BF

Bosch: seguiré conspirando

Orlando Bosch, el controvertido anticastrista cubano que se encuentra recluido en la cárcel de Cartago, espera para ser deportado en las próximas horas. Bosch, dijo que políticos "feminoides" le están haciendo el juego a Castro en el continente, y aseveró que no importa donde lo envíen ni lo que le hagan, seguirá conspirando contra el régimen comunista de Fidel. (Foto: Córdoba). Amplia información en página 6.

Excelsior, 16 March '76

OUTGOING MESSAGE

14-2

SECRET

1520172 CIA 822742

CONF: c/CA FILE c/[illegible] c/[illegible] c/[illegible] c/[illegible] c/CI4

[illegible] 231

TO: SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INFO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.V

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.V

SUBJECT: PALOMERA PEREZ, IGNAZIO.V

DPOB: 16 MARCH 1940, HAVANA, CUBA.V

REF: SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE SAN JOSE 105, 21 FEBRUARY 1976.V

CIR-316/01060-76V

1. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL NICARAGUAN SERVICE, IGNAZIO PALOMERA PEREZ OBTAINED A NICARAGUAN EXIT PERMIT ON 5 MARCH 1976 FOR TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES. THE DATE OF HIS PROPOSED TRAVEL IS UNKNOWN. PALOMERA PROBABLY WILL TRAVEL ON COSTA RICAN PASSPORT NUMBER 3208-69 WHICH CONTAINS A FOUR YEAR U.S. MULTIPLE ENTRY VISA VALID UNTIL JANUARY 1977. THIS VISA WAS ISSUED ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS IN JANUARY 1973 TO PERMIT PALOMERA TO ATTEND HIS FATHER'S FUNERAL IN THE UNITED STATES.V

2. PALOMERA MAY BE A CONTACT OF CUBAN EXILE ACTIVIST ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, WHO WAS ARRESTED BY AUTHORITIES IN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

12 Mar 76

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL. BY: [illegible]

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

9 8 3 0 0 0 2 2

SECRET

CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE

822742

SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976 ON CHARGES OF FALSE DOCUMENTATION. AS OF 10 MARCH 1976 BOSCH CONTINUED IN THE CUSTODY OF COSTA RICAN AUTHORITIES IN SAN JOSE. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO DEPORT HIM BUT ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN FINDING AN APPROPRIATE COUNTRY.

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

BASED ON: SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE SAN JOSE 105, 21 FEBRUARY 1976
SAN JOSE 19295 (IN 853351)

DATE: 12 MARCH 1976
ORIG: KAY MAUER:PDI
UNIT: LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1946

C/OPS/LSN

C/LA/CAM

LAD

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 15 PER 62 86 TOTAL COPIES 9? 2

S E C R E T

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/LA 15

FILE VR [illegible] D/SECUR 3 C/[illegible] C/[illegible] [illegible] DDO [illegible] C/[illegible] 2 C/CI [illegible] C/[illegible] C/SS 3

T 719245 EIA237 PAGE 01 IN 841160

TOR:2820422 FEB 76 SJOS 19265

S E C R E T 2808282 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19265

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS.

RYBAT VHLOFTY

REF: DIRECTOR 814328

1. FOLLOWING ARE PERTINENT QUOTES FROM EXCELSIOR ARTICLE RE PASCAL:

SIXTH PARAGRAPH: "BOSCH, ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES ARRIVED HERE WITH A PASSPORT, PRESUMED TO BE CHILEAN, TO PREPARE A PLOT AGAINST THE LEADER OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), PASCAL ALLENDE".

ELEVENTH (AND FINAL) PARAGRAPH: "THE REVELATION THAT BOSCH HAD ENTERED THE COUNTRY WITH A CHILEAN PASSPORT, APPARENTLY CONFIRMED BY THE RESPONSE OF THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY TO THE SUPREME COURT, WOULD CONFIRM THE THESIS THAT HE CAME HERE WITH THE INTENTION OF PARTICIPATING IN A PLOT AGAINST PASCAL ALLENDE, POLITICAL SOURCES SAID YESTERDAY".

2. STATION UNAWARE ORIGIN EXCELSIOR CONNECTION OF BOSCH WITH PLOT AGAINST PASCAL. SPECULATE THAT SOURCE WAS PROBABLY SOMEONE IN LOCAL SECURITY STRUCTURE. CAN EXPLORE WITH HUFABRIC IF THIS

C/LA/ICW — Talked with DC/[illegible] [illegible] and agreed that [illegible] I could be [illegible] on Monday, with [illegible] [illegible]. Bill

C/LA/ICW/C — [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Copy of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

S E C R E T

WC Schmeer 3/[illegible]

2-21 [illegible] 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	STAFF
ACTION #			1 2 3 4 5 6

T 719245 EIA237 PAGE 02-02 IN 041168

TOR:280042Z FEB 76 SJOS 19265

DESIRED.

3. BASED STATION KNOWLEDGE THAT HUFABRIC AWARE BOSCH BACKGROUND OF BOMBINGS AND POSSIBLE THREAT TO SECRETARY KISSINGER DURING VISIT, PLUS HUFABRIC KNOWLEDGE THAT PASCAL LIFE MIGHT BE THREATENED, HUFABRIC OR OTHERS COULD HAVE PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER. HUFABRIC CONCERNED FROM ARRIVAL PASCAL HERE ON 2 FEBRUARY THAT SOMEONE MIGHT WISH TO ELIMINATE HIM. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER ScPIII TOTAL COPIES S-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT CAS

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 748286 EIA471 PAGE 01-01 IN 853351

TOR:102333Z MAR 76 SJOS 19295

S E C R E T 102316Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19295

TO: DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA.

REF: DIRECTOR 819272

1. WE HOLD NO STATION TRACES ON IGNAZIO PALOMERA PEREZ. AKA ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

2. AS OF 10 MARCH BOSCH WAS STILL BEING HELD BY COSTA RICAN AUTHORITIES. INDICATIONS ARE THEY WOULD LIKE TO DEPORT HIM BUT ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN FINDING AN APPROPRIATE COUNTRY.

3. FILE: 201-299292, E2 IMPDET.

IP/DDI		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
	☒	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/CR/V		[illegible] FOR FILMING	
IP/MS		CS [illegible] NO. (2, 3)	
		[illegible] CODE	
		CABLE [illegible] (11)	
		[illegible] (6)	
IP/CCU		FOR FICHE	

DO

SECRET

RECORD COPY

D-200-6-484/3

10 MAR 76

201-299292

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 3 MARCH 1976

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEWARK)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY 11-1

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 062387Z DIRBECTOR 819272

CONF: LAS INFO: FILE RAN OPS/ITG 4.. DISSEM BY: 37

PER 505

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-299292 # 111

[illegible]

TO: SAN JOSE INFO MANAGUA.Y

TRACEY

REFS: A. MANAGUA 12202 |IN 848642| (BEING RELAYED SAN JOSE)

B. MANAGUA 12179 |IN 835555|

C. SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE SAN JOSE 105 - 21 FEBRUARY 1976Y

1. PLS FURNISH STATION TRACES ON IGNAZIO PALOMERA PEREZ, DPOB 16 MARCH 1940 HAVANA, CUBA. REFS INDICATE HE RESIDENT MANAGUA, NICARAGUA, HOLDS COSTA RICAN PASSPORT NUMBER 3208-68 OR 3208-69. MAY BE CONTACT OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA (201-299292). HQS PLANS NOTIFY SECRET SERVICE AND FBI OF PALOMERA'S INTENDED TRAVEL TO THE U.S.Y

2. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER BOSCH STILL BEING HELD BY COSTA RICAN AUTHORITIES.Y

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.N

LA/COMMENT: PALOMERA OBTAINED NICARAGUAN EXIT PERMIT ON 5 MARCH FOR TRAVEL TO THE U.S. HE MAY BE CONTACT OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE ACTIVIST ARRESTED SAN JOSE 18 FEBRUARY ON CHARGESFALSE DOCUMENTATION. BOSCH REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN PLOT TO ASSASSINATE CHILEAN ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE IN SAN JOSE.

No Traces" [redacted] SJOS-19295 10 Mar 76

DATE: 8 MARCH 1976
ORIG: KAY MAUER:PDL
UNIT: LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1946

OPS/ITG Paul Plumb (telecord) 8 Mar 76 200-6-4PY

C/LAD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAM

CLASSIFICATION 3-201-299292
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

FBI DOCUMENTS

CABLE FM DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 7 MARCH 1975
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DATE: 6 MARCH 1975
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: 105-1742 (MIAMI)

5 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/LA/CAM

FROM: C/LAD

1. In a meeting with Assistant Secretary Rogers today, he told me that he had learned from Foreign Minister Facio that Bosch, at the time of his arrest in San Jose during the Kissinger visit, had two recently issued passports from the current Chilean government. Facio also said that 10 to 12 persons also had come into Costa Rica with Bosch but the Costa Ricans do not know who they are nor have they been able to locate them. I mentioned to Rogers that a U.S. Secret Service agent had interviewed Bosch.

2. In view of State's interest in this case, I suggest you send a cable to San Jose and try to find out the number of these Chilean passports and to whom they were issued. Also it might be worthwhile to have a summary of what Bosch and the U.S. Secret Service agent talked about.

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

36-1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 272142Z DIRECTOR 814328

CONF: C/LA15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECOR3 C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/ITG4, C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DWD3 C/CI4, C/PS/EG2

0 DISSEM BY: 45
0
0 PER LA
0 # 6

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS.

27 FEB

RYBAT VULOFTY

UKSE ALLET-3 201

REF: SAN JOSE 19260 (IN 839451) (RELAYED TO CARACAS)

1. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER REF "EXCELSIOR" ARTICLE CONTAINS ATTRIBUTION FOR ALLEGATION THAT BOSCH INVOLVED IN PLOT AGAINST ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. IS STATION AWARE OF ORIGIN OF "EXCELSIOR" OR GOCR KNOWLEDGE/PRESUMPTION THAT BOSCH PRESENCE IN COSTA RICA POSSIBLY CONNECTED WITH PLOT AGAINST PASCAL?

2. HQS HAS ADVISED SAIC MASTROVITO OF SUBSTANCE REF. MASTROVITO REPORTS THAT SUBJECT OF PASCAL NEVER BROUGHT UP EITHER BY HIM, BY BOSCH OR BY HUFABRICS.

3. PLEASE KEEP CARACAS ADVISED OF ALL FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS MATTER. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: SAN JOSE DAILY "EXCELSIOR" CARRIES 26 FEB ARTICLE THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, IN JAIL IN COSTA RICA, WAS INTERROGATED BY NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AGENT. ARTICLE ALSO REPORTS ALLEGATION BOSCH CONNECTED WITH PLOT AGAINST CHILEAN ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, CURRENTLY IN COSTA RICA.

NOTE: U.S. OFFICIAL WHO INTERVIEWED BOSCH WAS SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

DC/LA/NW - WILLIAM DEVINE (DRAFT)
(FOR) C/TFK - LEHMAN SMITH (TELECOORD)
OPS/LSN/ID - CURTIS GLENN (TELECOORD)

DATE: 27 FEB 76
ORIG: ROBERT GULLOIME
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1966

RLConnolly
for C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAM
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

OUTGOING MESSAGE

15

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 2

SECRET

STAFF 272024Z DIRECTOR 614215

CONF: C/LA 7 INFO: FILE HIP/AN C/LCN/IB-C/OPS/ITG4 C/OPS 0 DISSEM BY: 45 0 0 PER SOP 0 # 231

TO: IMMEDIATE SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.V

ATTENTION: JAMES MICHAEL MASTROVITO.V

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASEABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.V

SUBJECT: INTERROGATION OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, TERRORIST AND LEADER OF ACCION CUBANA.V Summary of traces to Secret Service

CIR-316/20,060-76V

1. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THIS AGENCY IN SAN JOSE HAS REPORTED THAT THE POLICE AND JUDICIAL PAGE OF THE SAN JOSE DAILY NEWSPAPER "EXCELSIOR" ON 26 FEBRUARY 1976 CARRIED AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "BOSCH WAS INTERROGATED BY A U.S. AGENT WHO ARRIVED IN THE COUNTRY WITH KISSINGER." THE ARTICLE STATES THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS VERY DISPLEASED THAT A NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AGENT WHO ARRIVED WITH A DELEGATION THAT ACCOMPANIED KISSINGER HAD INTERROGATED HIM IN A COSTA RICAN JAIL.V

2. THE ARTICLE FURTHER STATES THAT BOSCH SAID HE ACCEPTED

DATE: 27 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: E. DREISONSTOK
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/R
EXT: 1668

RECORD COPY

TRAVEL PROGRAM
☒ ABSTRACT
INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILMING
CODE NO. (2, 3)
[illegible]
[illegible]
NID (1)

27 Feb 76

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 201-299292

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

814215

THE FACT THAT ANY COSTA RICAN POLICE OR SECURITY AGENT WOULD INTERVIEW HIM BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT THE FACT THAT AN AMERICAN AGENT WOULD INTRODUCE HIMSELF INTO THE COSTA RICAN POLICE SYSTEM TO INTERROGATE HIM. THE ARTICLE FURTHER MENTIONS THAT BOSCH ENTERED COSTA RICA WITH AN ILLEGAL CHILEAN PASSPORT AND ALLEGEDLY CAME TO COSTA RICA IN CONNECTION WITH A PLOT AGAINST THE CHILEAN EXILE ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE.

3. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL COSTA RICAN SERVICE, AS OF 26 FEBRUARY THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT HAD MADE NO DECISION ON BOSCH'S STATUS. ONE POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE RELEASED AND REMAIN IN COSTA RICA AND THE OTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE DEPORTED.

4. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B {1} {2}. IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. E2 IMPDET.

BASED ON: SAN JOSE 19260 !IN 839451!
HUFABRIC {HUFABRIC-148}
OBJECTIVE L

DATE: 27 FEB 76
ORIG: E. DREISONSTOK
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/R
EXT: 1868

C/OPS/ITG

C/LA/CAM

C/OPS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

BOSCH, ORLANDO

CUBA

No advantage can be gained and no good conclusions reached from a visit which lasted less than a day and during which he spoke for only a half hour with each foreign minister, the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy said.

In this regard, Socialist Action Party Deputy Mora Valverde said Kissinger's visit was a failure for U.S. imperialism, since the chiefs of state who had been invited to the meeting decided not to come, considering Dr Kissinger's visit of little interest.

Nothing can be achieved in such a short period of time, the Soviet official said.

Regarding former President Nixon's visit to the PRC, the Soviet official said it will not affect Soviet foreign policy in any way. It is only another of the many tourist or courtesy trips to the PRC. This is why we do not attribute any importance to it, he said.

Regarding Fidel Castro's participation in the CPSU congress which began 2 days ago, Mr Arnold Moaclov said all countries in the world were represented at the congress, but that the visitors were participating as observers in the discussions of what the Soviet people have done and will do in the field of development.

The Soviet official said regarding Cuba's intervention in Angola: The Cuban Government is helping Angola because the latter needs it. Previously, when the U.S. Government blocked aid to Cuba, the latter had to ask for the Soviet Union's cooperation, because it was being suffocated by the economic blockade imposed by the U.S. Government. Now the Angolan people had to ask for Cuba's help because the United States refused to help and in addition was blocking aid.

On this issue of the peoples' liberation struggle the blame lies with the United States, the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy concluded.

CUBAN EXPELLED FOR PLOT AGAINST PASCAL ALLENDE

Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0123 GMT 26 Feb 76 PA

BF

[Excerpt] San Jose, 25 Feb--(ACAN-EFE)--The Costa Rican Government ordered anti-Castro Cuban Orlando Bosch to leave the country. He is allegedly involved in a plan to attack Chilean Marxist leader Andres Pascal Allende, in exile in Costa Rica.

It was reported that Bosch, who entered this country on 19 February, resides in the Dominican Republic and entered Costa Rica with a Chilean passport.

He categorically denied any links with subversive groups and the authorities were unable to prove this association, but as a preventive measure they ordered him to leave the national territory.

FBIS, DR #40 (LA) 27 Feb 76

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER CA6 TOTAL COPIES 212 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT LA15

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR [illegible] [illegible] ADO ADO/DO [illegible] [illegible] SECUR3 [illegible]

T 715898 E1A158 PAGE 01 IN 839451

TOR:2618062 FEB 76 SJOS 19263

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: [illegible]

Signed: [illegible] LA/CAN

R.O. #

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

LA/CAN

S E C R E T 2617242 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19268

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: SAN JOSE 19248 & 31824

1. POLICE AND JUDICIAL PAGE OF LOCAL DAILY "EXCELSIOR" ON 26 FEBRUARY 1976 CARRIED ARTICLE RE ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA ENTITLED "BOSCH WAS INTERROGATED BY A U.S. AGENT: WHO ARRIVED IN THE COUNTRY WITH KISSINGER." ARTICLE STATES THAT BOSCH WAS VERY DISPLEASED THAT A NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AGENT WHO ARRIVED WITH A DELEGATION THAT ACCOMPANIED KISSINGER HAD INTERROGATED HIM IN A COSTA RICAN JAIL. ARTICLE FURTHER STATES THAT BOSCH SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT ANY COSTA RICAN POLICE OR SECURITY AGENT WOULD INTERVIEW HIM BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT THE FACT THAT AN AMERICAN AGENT WOULD INTRODUCE HIMSELF INTO THE COSTA RICAN POLICE SYSTEM TO INTERROGATE HIM. ARTICLE FURTHER MENTIONS THAT BOSCH ENTERED WITH ILLEGAL CHILEAN PASSPORT AND ALLEGEDLY CAME HERE IN CONNECTION WITH A PLOT AGAINST ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. POUCHING ARTICLE.

2. PLEASE PASS ABOVE TO SAIC MASTROVITO OF THE

Bosch

SECRET

RECORD COPY

26 Feb 76

201-299292

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 715898 EIA158 PAGE 02-02 IN 839451

TOR:2618062 FEB 76 SJOS 19268

SECRET SERVICE.

3. ACCORDING TO HUFABRIC-14 ON 26 FEBRUARY, NO DECISION YET BEEN MADE CONCERNING BOSCH. ON POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE RELEASED AND REMAIN IN COSTA RICA AND THE OTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE DEPORTED.

4. FILE: 201 BOSCH. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE 37-1

8 1 1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

STAFF 231840Z DIRECTOR 811488

CONF: C/LA 15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECURITY, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/ITG 5, D/P/AN, DDO, DDD/DO, C/DCI/D2, C/CI/4, C/OS/6 DISSEM BY: 45 PER LA #6

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO WIMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS.Y

RYBAT VWLOFTYY

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 299292
DO NOT DESTROY

REFS: A. SAN JOSE 19250 (IN 834109)

B. BUENOS AIRES 35654 (IN 834057)Y

LA/CNH

1. WKSCARLET-1 AND WKSCARLET-3 ARE PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS WORKING FOR PROMINENT VENEZUELAN WHOSE NAME WAS USED IN RETURN ADDRESS ON LETTER BOMB SENT TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN VENEZUELA IN LATE 1975. W-1 AND W-3 HAVE BEEN COMMISSIONED TO DETERMINE AUTHORSHIP OF LETTER BOMB, AND WHETHER IT WAS CUBAN EXILE EFFORT. W-1 AND W-3 TRAVELS ARE RELATED TO INVESTIGATION. INCLUSION OF SAN JOSE ON ITINERARY DUE TO PRESENCE THERE OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, WHOM THEY PLAN "INTERVIEW" IN CONNECTION WITH LETTER BOMB.Y

2. IN ORDER TO APPEAR UNWITTING OF BOSCH ARREST IN COSTA RICA, PER REF B W-3 STILL PLANNING DEPART BUENOS AIRES FOR SAN JOSE ON ABOUT 26 FEBRUARY.Y

3. FILE: 201-0931810, 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET.#

LA COMMENT: A. ASKS PURPOSE OF W-3 VISIT TO COSTA RICA

B. W-3 ADVISED OF BOSCH ARREST, STILL PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO COSTA RICA

B-201-240849

B-201-299292

DATE: 23 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: ROBERT GULLO:SA
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1946

- BOSCH

DC/LA/CAM

C/LA/NW

AC/LA/SB

B3 FEB 76
201-300985

C/LA/TFK
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Robert Gull

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL. BY: 054524

300985

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER -- CA6 TOTAL COPIES 21 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF PRECEDENC

ACTION UNIT C/CA15

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/DSENT C/CSN/CO D/SECUR 4 [illegible] C/DSIT 6 5 ODO ODO/DO C/DIC/D2 C/CI 4

1		4		
2		5		
3		6		

T 702475 EIA615 PAGE 01 IN 834062

TOR:211652Z FEB 76 CARA 29161

S E C R E T 211629Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29161

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO BUENOS AIRES.

NIACT DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE.

RYBAT VWLOFTY SGCHART

REF: DIRECTOR 610829

1. WKTANGO-1 TOLD WKSCARLET-9 20 FEBRUARY THAT CHILEAN SERVICE (DINA) HAD CONTRACTED WITH TWO GROUPS, THOSE OF CASTRO AND BOSCH, FOR ASSASSINATION OF PASCAL. CASTRO TO HAVE FIRST SHOT AT PASCAL. ACCORDING TO WKTANGO-1, CASTRO'S GROUP TO ENTER COSTA RICA FROM NICARAGUA CIRCA 20-22 FEBRUARY. IF CASTRO GROUP FAILED, BOSCH TO HAVE NEXT SHOT. (WKTANGO-1 OBVIOUSLY UNAWARE OF BOSCH ARREST.) WKSCARLET-9 UNAWARE OF SOURCE WKTANGO-1'S INFO.

2. FILE: 201-09[illegible]; 200-6-495. E2, IMPDET.

B. CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-299292 DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

SECRET SERVICE CABLE

FROM SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE SAN JOSE 105

DATE: 21 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: RE ARREST OF JUAN BOSCH AT THIS LOCATION

14-00000

FORM 2460
2-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER LA/ 6 TOTAL COPIES 39 - 2 RUN BY 22

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/LA15

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/OPS/INT, DC/EUR/Y, C/SS/IO, C/OPS/ITGS, C/IPLAN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DIVD2, C/OSG, C/CI4, C/PS/EG2,

T 702789 EIA110 PAGE 01 IN 834109

TOR:2122142 FEB 76 SJOS 19250

Doc

P.IN X

LA/CNH

S E C R E T 2121232 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19250

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, CARACAS.

RYBAT WNLOFTY 0 Bosch Avila, Orlando

REF: BUENOS AIRES 39654 (C 834057)

1. TELL WKSCARLET-3 THAT, BASED ON INFO PASSED TO LIAISON BY FBI, BOSCH HAS BEEN TARGET OF INTEREST TO LOCAL LIAISON FOR ABOUT ONE YEAR. LIAISON AWARE OF BOSCH BOMBING BACKGROUND AND THEIR INTEREST IN HIM INCREASED AS RESULT SERIES LOCAL BOMBINGS AND IMMINENT VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. THROUGH THEIR INFORMANTS THEY LEARNED THAT BOSCH GETTING SUPPORT LOCALLY (HOUSING, ETC); THAT HE USING NAME CONRADO CORTEZ OR CORTES,HRND, IN EARLY FEBRUARY, THAT HE KNOWN TO BE USING A CHILEAN PASSPORT IN ANOTHER NAME. IN LATE JANUARY THEY PINPOINTED NEIGHBORHOOD IN WHICH HE WAS LIVING AND BEGAN INTENSIVE SEARCH (THEY ALSO HAD REPORTS OF HIS PRESENCE IN DOWNTOWN AREA). THROUGH POSTAL AUTHORITIES AND OTHER LOCAL SOURCES THEY PINPOINTED THE EXACT LOCATION OF HIS HOUSE IN JARDINES DE CASCAJAL AND ARRESTED HIM (THIS DONE BEFORE SAN JOSE STATION WAS ADVISED BY W-3 VIA BUENOS AIRES AS TO HIS EXACT LOCATION). ALL ABOVE CAN BE PASSED TO W-3 AND HE SHOULD

SECRET

RECORD COPY

21 FEB 76
201-299292

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 702789 EIA118 PAGE 02-02 IN 834109

TOR:2122142 FEB 76 SJOS 19250

ALSO BE CLEARLY TOLD HIS INFO DID NOT RESULT IN BOSCH ARREST.

2. RE CONTACT WITH CASTRO IN SAN JOSE, WE CAN ONLY SAY THE FOLLOWING:

A. WE HAVE NEVER DISCUSSED OR MENTIONED CASTRO WITH LIAISON, SO WE DO NOT KNOW IF THEY EVEN AWARE HIS EXISTANCE, HIS BACKGROUND, HIS INTENTIONS, OR THAT HE IN COSTA RICA.

B. IF THEY ARE AWARE OF CASTRO'S PRESENCE HERE, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT THEY MIGHT PICK HIM UP TOO. THAT BEING CASE, W-3 COULD ALSO BE PICKED UP (WHICH AGAIN RAISES QUESTION OF PURPOSE WKSCARLET-1 AND 3 VISIT TO COSTA RICA).

3. FILE: 201- BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO. E2 IMPDET.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: Desensitize

Signed: Jane D. Zeeman

R.O. # [illegible] WAPCAG

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 43-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

20 FEB 76 1 DD

SECRET

STAFF 202350Z DIRECTOR 810829

CONF: C/LA15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT D/SECUR4 C/CS/ANQ C/OPS/HG5 C/RPLAN DDO DDO/DO C/DIVO2 C/SS3 C/CI4 C/OS9/HG C/PS/EG2 C/OS9

0 DISSEM BY: 0 PER LA 0 # 6

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES. Y

NIACT FOR CARACAS, SAN JOSE. Y

RYBAT VWLOFTY Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 29144 (IN 872705)

B. BUENOS AIRES 35646 (RELAYED CARACAS)

C. DIRECTOR ~~802823~~ 810006 Y

1. CASTRO'S PRESENCE IN SAN JOSE, AS REPORTED IN REF B, ADDS WEIGHT TO WKSCARLET-3'S REPORT THAT CASTRO PLANS TO KILL ALLENDE'S NEPHEW. ANY SUCH ACTION AGAINST ALLENDE'S NEPHEW ON EVE OR DURING SECSTATE'S VISIT, WOULD BE ~~[illegible]~~ DOUBLY UNFORTUNATE. BELIEVE IT IS INCUMBENT ON US NOW TO ADVISE HUFABRICS THAT BKHERALD HAS UNCOVERED INFORMATION THAT A SERIOUS THREAT EXISTS AGAINST THE LIFE OF ALLENDE'S NEPHEW, LUIS ANDRES PASCAL. Y

2. FOR CARACAS: COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PVP) FEARS THAT SOMEONE WILL ATTEMPT TO KILL PASCAL DURING HIS STAY IN COSTA RICA, POSSIBLY PASCAL'S EX COHORTS IN THE CHILEAN MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR). ALSO CHILEAN PRESS OF 30 NOV 75 REPORTED THAT THE MIR HAS CONDEMNED PASCAL AS A TRAITOR AND SENTENCED HIM

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

D-200-6-495/14

RECORD COPY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

X SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 301646

14-00000

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

SECRET

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

810829

0 DISSEM BY:

0

0 PER

0 #

TO DEATH. (THIS REPORT MAY HAVE BEEN A GOC HILE PROP PLAY).

3. SUGGEST THAT SAN JOSE STATION USE THE ABOVE PRESS REPORT AS THE PEG FOR SURFACING PLOT ON [redacted] PASCAL. HOPEFULLY, COMBINATION OF PRESS REPORT AND SKHERALD WARNING WILL PRO~~[illegible]~~VOKE HUFABRICS TO SPEED PASCAL'S DEPARTURE FROM COSTA RICA.

4. THEREFORE, UNLESS CARACAS PERCEIVES OVERRIDING OBJECTIONS, REQUEST THAT SAN JOSE INFORM HUFABRICS AS OUTLINED ABOVE.

5. FILE: 201-0931810; 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 20 FEB 76
ORIG: W. DEVINE
UNIT: AC/LA/NW
EXT: [redacted]

R.S. Sayre
C/LAD

LA/CAM
LA/SB
LA/TKT
AC/LA/NW

REPRODU N BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS P ITED

14-00000

FORM 3020
7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER LA #6 TOTAL COPIES 33 - 1 RUN BY 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED TUBED LA BY C AT 1545

STAFF

ACTION UNIT
C/LA 15
ACTION #

INFO
RF FILE VR C/OPS/INT, D/SECUR 4, DDO
C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/ITGS, C/LPRN, C/DIVD 2
DDO, DO

T 609255 EIA660 PAGE 01-01 IN 832905

TOR:201349Z FEB 76 CARA 29144

S E C R E T 201334Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29144

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, BUENOS AIRES, SAN JOSE.

RYBAT VWLUFTY SGCHART

REF: DIRECTOR 810006

1. CONCUR ADVISING WKSCARLET-3 OF BOSCH ARREST PER PARA 2 REF. AGREE HE SHOULD CONTINUE TRIP TO SAN JOSE.

2. BELIEVE FACT OF BOSCH ARREST AND ALMOST SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE TO LIAISON OF SPECIFIC PLOT INFORMATION RUNS TOO HIGH RISK OF COMPROMISE WKSCARLET-3.

3. FILE: 201-0931810; 200-6-495. E2, IMPDET.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-0299292
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

STAFF

ACTION UNIT: C/LA-15

INFO: RF. FILE. VR. DDO. [illegible]

T 697542 EIA305 PAGE 01 IN 832155

TOR:2021202 FEB 76 SJOS 19243

S E C R E T 2002092 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19243

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, DIRECTOR, CARACAS.

RYBAT VNLOFTY

REF: CARACAS 35629 *

1. WE BELIEVE WKSCARLET-3 SHOULD BE INFORMED OF BOSCH DETENTION SOONEST. W-3 SHOULD ALSO BE ADVISED THAT HOUSE WHERE BOSCH ARRESTED HERE IS SAME ADDRESS AS THAT PROVIDED BY W-3 PER REF PARA ONE.

2. PLS ADVISE IF W-3 STILL INTENDS COME SAN JOSE DESPITE ARREST OF BOSCH. BOSCH MAY ALSO BE EXPELLED FROM COSTA RICA PRIOR ARRIVAL W-3 ON 26 FEBRUARY. IF YES, REASON FOR VISIT WILL ENABLE SAN JOSE DECIDE IF CONTACT WITH W-3 HERE DESIRABLE.

3. FILE: 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET

* PORTION SUCD

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: [illegible]

Signed: [illegible]

R.O. LA/CAR

LA/CNA

Note: [illegible] and coordinate [illegible] SECRET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

2-201-299292

20 FEB 76
201-300975

(C)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SS-1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 202257Z DIRECTOR 810735

CONF: C/LA 15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SEC/R 4, C/LSN/10, C/OPS/ITG 5, ~~C/TFTAG~~, ODO, ODO/DO, C/DIV D2, C/CI 4, C/PS/EG 2

0 DISSEM BY: 29

0 PER LA

0 # 6

TO: IMMEDIATE BOGOTA, SAN JOSE.

RYBAT VULOFTY

1. FYI: SECRET SERVICE ADVISED US 20 FEBRUARY THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM FBI/MIAMI TO EFFECT THAT ACCION CUBANA IN MIAMI KNOWS THAT ORLANDO 201-299292 BOSCH AVILA HAS BEEN ARRESTED IN COSTA RICA. SOURCE OF INFO, ALDO VERA SERAFIN, SAID THAT A BOMB WOULD GO OFF IN SAN JOSE ON 23 FEBRUARY AND THAT THIS WOULD BE A "GOOD RECEPTION" FOR DR. KISSINGER, BUT WOULD NOT BE AIMED AT HIM.

2. VERA, 201-326634, IS FORMER CHIEF OF INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT OF CUBAN NATIONAL POLICE. HE WAS MOST PROMINENT 26 OF JULY MEMBER IN URBAN GUERILLA MOVEMENT IN HAVANA IN LATE 1950'S. CAME TO U.S. ABOUT 1959-60. WAS USED BY BKHERALD IN AN APPROACH TO CUBAN OFFICIAL IN PARIS WHERE HE PERFORMED WELL.

3. FILE: 200-6-495/E4. E2, IMPDET.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 299292
DO NOT DESTROY

B-201-326634
B-201-299292

DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: D. GEISLER:LH
UNIT: LA/CAR/CARI
EXT: 1249

C/LA/CAR

AC/LA/NH

30 Feb 76
200-6-495/E4

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/TFK
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. E 2 IMPDET
SECRET CL BY:

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

1

SECRET

STAFF 2000032 DIRECTOR 810006

CONF: C/LA15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECUR 4, C/LSN/ID 0 DISSEM BY: 45
C/OPS/ITG5, C/IP/AN, DDO 0 PER LA
C/IS/CG2, DDO/DD, C/OI/JD2, C/CI4, JOSE E 0 #6

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, ROUTINE SANTIAGO.

RYBAT VULOFTY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 808822

B. CARACAS 29129 |IN 830506|

C. SAN JOSE 19235 |IN 830494|

D. CARACAS 29135 |IN 830540|

E. SAN JOSE 19237 |IN 830647|

19 FEB

COPY: UKSCARLET-3/76

1. SHARE CARACAS CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF UKSCARLET-3 IF INFO HE RECEIVED FROM CUBAN EXILE SOURCES AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED TO BKHERALD IS REVEALED TO LIAISON SERVICES IN CARACAS AND SAN JOSE, AND THEY TAKE ACTION TO FRUSTRATE PLANNED ASSASSINATION. CUBAN EXILES INVOLVED IN REPORTED ATTEMPT WILL NOT ASK WHERE SERVICES OBTAINED THEIR INFORMATION, BUT LOOK FOR LEAKS IN THEIR MIDST. HOWEVER, BELIEVE DANGER OF COMPROMISE TO UKSCARLET-3 LESSENS WITH PASSAGE OF TIME BECAUSE OF PROBABLE REVELATION OF PLANS TO ADDITIONAL PERSONS. THEREFORE, SUBJECT CARACAS CONCURRENCE SUGGEST THAT SAN JOSE ADVISE HUFABRIC THAT STATION HAS RECEIVED TIP THAT THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. PLACE OF ACQUISITION SHOULD

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019453

ONF 0 3 0 0 0 0 2

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

810006

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

NOT BE REVEALED.

2. ALTHOUGH ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA NOT RESULT OF WKSCARLET-3 INFORMATION, WE HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER OR NOT HE SHOULD BE INFORMED OF BOSCH ARREST IN SAN JOSE. WE DEFER TO CARACAS, HOWEVER, TO ADVISE BEST COURSE. IF AFFIRMATIVE REQUEST BUENOS AIRES ATTEMPT CONTACT WKSCARLET-03 AND ADVISE HIM BOSCH ARRESTED, BUT THAT ARREST WAS NOT BASED ON ANY INFORMATION OR ACTION ON OUR PART. HE SHOULD ALSO BE ADVISED TO CONTINUE TRIP TO SAN JOSE AS THOUGH HE HAD NO FOREKNOWLEDGE OF ARREST.

3. FILE: 201-0931810; 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: REF A - ADVISES AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY TO DETERMINE POSSIBILITY USE AGENCY INFO TO PREVENT HIGHLY IMPROPER ACTIVITIES SUCH AS PLANNED ASSASSINATIONS.

REF B - ALLENDE WIDOW IN CARACAS. BELIEVE BEST WE COULD DO AND STILL PROTECH WKSCARLET-3 IS ADVISE THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF MEMBER ALLENDE FAMILY IN CARACAS.

REF C - PASCAL STILL IN SAN JOSE. REQUEST PERMISSION ADVISE HUFABRIC OF MURDER THREAT.

REF D - PLEASE ADVISE IF ORLANDO BOSCH ARREST IN COSTA RICA DUE TO PASSAGE OF W-3 INFO. IF SO, SUGGEST NO FURTHER DISSEM OF W-3 INFO OUTSIDE LNDUZZ SINCE RISK OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 017452

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 22 PER [illegible] TOTAL COPIES [illegible] RUN BY 2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED [illegible] BY [illegible] AT 1750

ACTION UNIT C/LA 15

ACTION #

INFO RID FILE VR [illegible]

C/LA/10, [illegible], [illegible]

DDO, DDO/SO, [illegible]

STAFF

T 696462 E14963 PAGE 01

TOR:191730Z FEB 76

RECORDS OFFICER [illegible]

The following [illegible] SJOS 19240 [illegible]

Signed Jack D. Zumas

R.O. LA/CAN

Note: [illegible], cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

S E C R E T 191700Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19240

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT VNLOFTY

REF: DIRECTOR 809281

1. O SECRET SERVICE REP MASTROVITO ADVISED OF CONTENTS REF. AT HIS REQUEST, AND IN VIEW QUESTION OF LENGTH BOSCH DETENTION, STATION ARRANGED FOR MASTROVITO TO INTERVIEW BOSCH AT HUFABRIC HQS AT 1400 HRS LOCAL TIME 19 FEBRUARY. NO STATION REP WILL PARTICIPATE THAT INTERVIEW. MASTROVITO HAD INTERVIEWED BOSCH SEVERAL YEARS AGO IN THE U.S.

2. COSTA RICANS ARE DISCUSSING HOW LONG THEY CAN HOLD BOSCH ON ENTRY WITH FALSE DOCUMENTS CHARGE. THEY CONSIDERING CONTACTING GENERAL GENI IN MANGUA AND DEPORTING HIM TO THAT COUNTRY. WILL KEEP HQS ADVISED FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

3. STATION HAS REMINDED DCM OF BACKGROUND THIS CASE (ESSENCE PARAS 1 AND 2 SAN JOSE 19237), OF PLANNED MASTROVITO INTERVIEW, AND ESSENCE REF.

Dm

IP/EIO		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
	X	~~ABSTRACT~~	
		INDEX	
IP/CR/V		PREPARE FOR FILMING	
IP/MS		CODE NO. (2, 3)	
		RYBAT REST. CODE	
		CABLE IDEN (11)	
		RID (8)	
IP/CRU		FOR FILING	
LA/CAN			

RECORD COPY

SECRET

D-200-6-495/14

19 FEB 76

IN-299292

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	STAFF 1 ____ 4 ____ 2 ____ 5 ____ 3 ____ 6 ____
ACTION #			

T 696460 EIA963 PAGE 02-02 IN 031024

TOR:191738Z FEB 76 SJ08 10248

4. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

00 SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

52-2

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1

SECRET

STAFF

192304Z DIRECTOR 609923

CONF: C/LA 15 INFO: FILE C/CS/INT, D/SECURITY, C/ISS/LD, DDO, DDCI/DO, C/DIVD 2, C/OPS/ITG 5 0

0

0 DISSEM BY: 27

0 PER 1A

0 # 6

C/LA/2

TO: IMMEDIATE MANAGUA INFO IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE, CARACAS.

RYBAT VULOFTY

REF: CARACAS 29076 (IN 826512)

1. COSTA RICAN LIAISON HUFABRIC HAS REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, TERRORIST AND LEADER OF ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT GROUP KNOWN AS ACCION CUBANA, WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE AT MIDDAY ON 18 FEBRUARY. HE WAS CHARGED WITH ENTERING COSTA RICA WITH ILLEGAL DOCUMENTS AND COULD BE HELD FOR MINIMUM 24 HOURS. AT REQUEST SECRET SERVICE REP MASTROVITO, SAN JOSE STATION ARRANGED FOR MASTROVITO TO INTERVIEW BOSCH AT HUFABRIC HQS AT 1400 HOURS LOCAL TIME 19 FEBRUARY. MASTROVITO HAD INTERVIEWED BOSCH SEVERAL YEARS AGO IN U.S.

2. COSTA RICANS ARE DISCUSSING HOW LONG THEY CAN HOLD BOSCH ON ENTRY WITH FALSE DOCUMENTS CHARGE. THEY CONSIDERING CONTACTING ERYTHROID-33 IN MANAGUA AND DEPORTING HIM TO THAT COUNTRY.

3. VARIOUS SOURCES REPORTED POSSIBLE PLANS OF BOSCH TO KILL DR. HENRY KISSINGER AND/OR CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN CARACAS OR CHILEAN EXILE LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, NEPHEW OF SALVADOR

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

IP/DCI
☒ ABSTRACT
TRAVEL PROGRAM
INDEX
IP/CRV PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/MS
CODE NO. (2, 3)
RYBAT (EST. CD.)
CABLE IDEN (11)
HFQ (8)
FOR FILMING

D-200-5-495/14

19 Feb 76

201-299292

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

SECRET

RECORD COPY

LA/CNM

CL BY: 054584

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

2

SECRET

STAFF

CONF: INFO: FILE

809923

ALLENDE, WHO NOW IN SAN JOSE.

4. SECRET SERVICE HQS ADVISED THAT ALTHOUGH BOSCH WANTED IN U.S. FOR PAROLE VIOLATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONSIDERS BOSCH AN "UNWANTED ALIEN" AND USG PROBABLY WOULD DECLINE ANY OFFERS FOR EXTRADITION.

5. ALL ABOVE IS FYI IN CASE NICARAGUAN AUTHORITIES BRING MATTER TO YOUR ATTENTION. NO ACTION ON YOUR PART IS NECESSARY AT THIS TIME.

6. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: ATTEMPT MAY BE MADE ON DR. KISSINGER'S LIFE WHILE HE IS IN CARACAS

C/LA/CAM

C/LA/NW

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: Desensitize

Signed: LA/CAM

R.O. #

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

DATE: 18 FEB 76
ORIG: E. DREISONSTOK:ME
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/TFK
EXT: 1868

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/TFK
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 054824

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ___ PER LA/ ___ TOTAL COPIES 23 ___ 23

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ___ LA/C 195

ACTION UNIT		
C/LA 5	I	FILE VR C/DSINT O/SECUR 4
ACTION #	N	C/SCI/CS C/DS/OPS [illegible]
	F	
	O	DDO DDO/DO C/OTC/AD2

STAFF [illegible]

T 696788 [illegible] PAGE 01 IN 831949

TOR:191934Z FEB 76 SJOS 19241

S E C R E T 191910Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19241

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT VNLOFTY

REF: SAN JOSE 19237 (IN 830647)

1. BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH HUFABRIC-14 EVENING 18 FEB AND MORNING 19 FEBRUARY, WHAT FOLLOWS ARE DETAILS OF EVENTS LEADING TO ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA:

A. BASED ON EARLIER BACKGROUND TO THIS CASE (PARAS 1 AND 2 REF), SPECIFICALLY FBI INVOLVEMENT, BOSCH HAS BEEN OF INTEREST TO HUFABRIC LIAISON SINCE ABOUT FEBRUARY 1975. THEIR INTEREST WAS INTENSIFIED BY THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF BOSCH'S INVOLVEMENT WITH BOMBINGS, NOT ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT BOMBINGS IN COSTA RICA BUT ALSO IN CONNECTION WITH KISSINGER'S VISIT.

B. AS INDICATED PARA 3 REF, LIAISON HAD PINPOINTED NEIGHBORHOOD WHICH BOSCH WAS BELIEVED TO RESIDE. RECENTLY LIAISON LEARNED THAT BOSCH WAS INTERESTED IN TALKING TO THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS OF THE LIAISON SERVICE (HUGLIB-8, A STATION PENETRATION OF THAT SERVICE) BUT WAS ADVISED BY OTHER

DDO

	TRAVEL PROGRAM
IP/ADM	X ABSTRACT
	INDEX
IP/ER/V	PREPARE FOR FILMING
	CODE NO. (2, 3)
IP/MB	RYBAT REST. CODE
	CABLE ID (11)
	NBD (0)
IP/CRD	FOR FILING

LA/CAR

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

DT 800-6-495/14

19 Feb 76

201-299292

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 696780 EIA280 PAGE 02 IN 831949

TOR:1919342 FEB 76 SJOS 19241

GOVERNMENT CONTACTS NOT TO DO SO. BOSCH SOON LEARNED THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE HIM. LIAISON ALSO LEARNED FROM ITS SOURCES THAT BOSCH WAS ALSO USING THE NAME CONRADO CORTEZ (THIS ALL HAPPENED BEFORE HUFABRIC-14 WAS ADVISED THAT BOSCH MIGHT BE TRAVELLING UNDER THAT NAME).

C. THROUGH ITS CONTACT WITH LOCAL POSTAL AUTHORITIES AND THE OWNER OF A LAUNDRY KNOWN TO BE PROVIDING SERVICES TO BOSCH, LIAISON PINPOINTED HIS RESIDENCE IN PRIVATE HOME IN A SECTION IN THE SOUTHEASTERN PART OF THE CITY OF SAN JOSE CALLED JARDINES DE CASCAJAL WHERE HE WAS APPREHENDED AT 1100 HOURS ON 18 FEBRUARY.

D. THROUGH ANOTHER SENSITIVE SOURCE, LIAISON LEARNED THAT BOSCH WAS USING DOCUMENTS UNDER THE GARBLED VERSION OF THE NAME HECTOR E. D'AVANZO CINTOLESI. BASED ON PARAS 4 A AND B OF REF, LIAISON LEARNED THAT D'AVANZO HAD ARRIVED IN COSTA RICA ON 6 FEBRUARY ON COPA FLIGHT 317 FROM NICARAGUA. INCIDENTALLY, LIAISON DOUBTS THAT BOSCH WAS IN VENEZUELA RECENTLY.

D. AFTER HIS APPREHENSION ON 18 FEBRUARY, BOSCH

SECRET

OMF 0 0 C 0 0 0 3

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

810006

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

COMPROMISE TO V-3 RUNNING TOO HIGH.

REF E HUFABRIC HAD ALREADY WATCHED FOR AND LOCATED BOSCH DUE PREVIOUS TIPS {UNRELATED PASCAL} FROM DEA AND FBI. PASSED ONLY INFO THAT BOSCH HAD BEEN SEEN IN CARACAS 7 FEB AND MIGHT TRAVEL COSTA RICA USING DOCS IN NAME "COTTEZ".

R

COORD:
C/LA/CAM
A C/LA/SB
C/LA/TFK

DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: ROBERT W. ANDREWS
UNIT: LA/NW/V
EXT: 1535

R.S.
C/LAD

C/LA/NW

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CABLE FROM SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA - 103

DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT NO. 2 FOR THE VISIT OF SEC. KISSINGER TO SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA ON 23-24 FEBRUARY, 1976

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY ________

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR
ACTION #		

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 696780 EIA280 PAGE 03 IN 831949

TOR:1919342 FEB 76 SJOS 19241

PRODUCED HIS CHILEAN PASSPORT IN THE NAME OF D'AVANZO AND WAS NOT RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS THE HISTORY OF HIS BOMBING VENTURES.

E. APPREHENDED WITH BOSCH WERE HIS DAUGHTER LOURDES TERESITA BOSCH DE BRINDER AND HER HUSBAND MARIO RUBIN BRINDER. LOURDES WAS BORN IN CUBA ON 17 FEBRUARY 1958 AND IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN HOLDING U.S. PASSPORT C-2267692 ISSUED ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1972. SHE ARRIVED IN THE U.S. IN 1968 AND CLAIMS THAT HER CURRENT ADDRESS IS 7501 SOUTHWEST 19TH TERRACE, MIAMI, FLORIDA. BRINDER WAS BORN IN BUENOS AIRES ON 27 APRIL 1955 AND HOLDS ARGENTINE PASSPORT 7234917. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE LIVED IN THE U.S. FOR SOMETIME WITH HIS FAMILY AND GAVE A FAMILY ADDRESS OF 4101 HARVEST LANE, TOLEDO, OHIO. THE BRINDERS HAVE BEEN MARRIED ABOUT ONE YEAR AND BRINDER (AND POSSIBLY LOURDES) WERE STUDYING MEDICINE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS IN GUATEMALA. AS A RESULT OF THE EARTHQUAKE, THEY LEFT GUATEMALA FOR COSTA RICA ON 9 FEBRUARY 1976. (WHICH MIGHT ACCOUNT FOR BOSCH'S RETURN TO COSTA RICA FROM NICARAGUA.) THE BRINDERS ARE NO LONGER UNDER DETENTION.

SECRET

201-299292

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 696780 EIA280 PAGE 04-04 IN 831949

TOR:1919342 FEB 76 SJBS 19241

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: Desensitize

Signed: Jane A. Zuranse

R.O. [illegible] 10/24

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 22 PER M6 TOTAL COPIES 38-2 RUN BY [illegible]

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/LA 13

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR A/SECUR 4, C/OPS/INT, C/OPS/ITG 5, C/ESN/LO, C/I/PAN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DIVD 2, C/CI 4, C/OSG/IC

T 694049 EIA619 PAGE 01 IN 830647

TOR:190155Z FEB 76 SJOS 19237

S E C R E T 182342Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19237

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: CARACAS 29135 (IN 830540)

1. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO FBI IN EARLY 1975. ITINERANT FBI REP FROM MEXICO CITY (CAMAROTA) MENTIONED NAME TO STATION AND IT IS BELIEVED HE DID SAME TO LOCAL SERVICE (HUFABRIC), AND MAY HAVE LEFT SOMETHING IN WRITING WITH THEM. BOSCH NAME ALSO MENTIONED TO STATION BY LOCAL DEA REP BUT IT NOW DETERMINED THIS WAS BASICALLY ON FBI BEHALF.

2. ON OCCASION OF COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ODUBER'S MEETING AT HIS RANCH WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS ON 10 JULY 1975, ITINERANT FBI REP MEXICO CITY CALLED STATION TO WARN COSTA RICANS OF AN ~~ONLEGED~~ ALLEGED CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION OF BOSCH ON PACIFIC COAST TO DISRUPT THAT MEETING. HUGLIB-3, WHO HAD SECURITY FOR THAT MEETING, CHECKED OUT INFO TO NO AVAIL. THIS INFO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED TO STATION BY HOS AND EMBASSY (WHICH RECEIVED IT VIA COSTA RICAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON).

3. AT MEETING WITH CHIEF, HUFABRIC-14 ON 12 FEBRUARY HE

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR.	STAFF 1 4 2 5 3 6
ACTION #			

T 694049 EIA619 PAGE 02 IN 830647

TOR:1901552 FEB 76 SJOS 19237

REPORTED THAT HIS SERVICE HAD DEFINITELY SPOTTED BOSCH ON TWO OCCASIONS ON OR ABOUT 10 FEBRUARY, HAD LOCATED THE AREA WHERE HE WAS BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED AND HOPED TO GRAB HIM SOON.

4. ON 17 FEBRUARY STATION INFORMED HUFABRIC-14 OF THE FOLLOWING INFO FROM PARA 3 OF CARACAS 29109:

A. BOSCH WAS KNOWN TO BE IN CARACAS ON 7 FEBRUARY.

B. BOSCH MIGHT HAVE LEFT CARACAS SOME TIME AFTER 6 FEBRUARY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA.

C. BOSCH MIGHT BE USING CHILEAN PASSPORT (WHICH THEY ALREADY KNEW) AND MIGHT BE TRAVELLING UNDER NAME CORTEZ. HUFABRIC-14 HOWEVER STATED THAT BOSCH TRAVELLING UNDER NAME HECTOR E. DAVANZO CINTOLESI, USING CHILEAN PASSPORT NUMBER 20983.

NO OTHER PORTIONS OF CARACAS 29109 OR ANY OF PART OF CARACAS 29110 PASSED TO ANYONE.

5. WE CHECKING WITH HUFABRIC-14 ON DETAILS OF EVENTS LEADING TO ARREST AND WILL ADVISE SOONEST.

6. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

Note - per Caracas 29109 (IN 828709) WHSCARGET-5 told us That in contacting Bosch by telephone in CR, he should ask for "Cortez."

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

16

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP 182236Z

CITE ~~[illegible]~~

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER ~~089159~~

CONF: C/LA 7 INFO: FILE (IP/AN), DDO, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/INT 2, C/CI 2, D/OCI, 0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX 0 RETURN TO PER 0 IP FILES DISSEM BY: 48 #

TO: IMMEDIATE FBI//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, SECRET SERVICE// INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.Y

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALSY

SUBJECT: ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, TERRORIST AND LEADER OF ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT GROUP, IN COSTA RICAY

CIR-316/20,049-76Y

IP/DW		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	✓	~~ABSTRACT~~
		INDEX
IP/CRV		PREPARE FOR FI
IP/DB		CODE NO. (2, 3)
		RYBAT REST. CO.
		CABLE IDEN (11)
		NFD (6)
~~C.I.D~~		FOR FILING

LA/C/OP

1. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL COSTA RICAN SERVICE, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, A TERRORIST AND LEADER OF THE ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT GROUP KNOWN AS ACCION CUBANA, WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE AT MID-DAY ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976. HE WAS CHARGED WITH ENTERING COSTA RICA WITH ILLEGAL DOCUMENTS AND CAN BE HELD FOR A MINIMUM OF 24 HOURS.Y

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1), (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.H

BASED ON: SAN JOSE 19236 (IN-
HUFABRIC
OBJECTIVES L

RECORD COPY

18 Feb 76
201-299292

DATE: 18 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: E. DREISONSTOK:LW
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/TFK
EXT: 1864

C/LA/CAM E. Dreisonstok

C/LA/TFK (FISHER AMES) (PHONE)

C/OPS/EGN/TG
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY J PER CA6 TOTAL COPIES 38 - 1 BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

1		4
2		5
3		6

ACTION UNIT LA15

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR SECUR 4, OPS/INT, OPS/HGS, LSN/ID, ICHLA, DDO, DIVD2, CI4, OCS/IC, ADC/DO,

T 693558 EIA150 PAGE 01 IN 830540

TOR:182143Z FEB 76 CARA 29135

S E C R E T 182135Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29135

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES,

NIACT DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REFS: A. SAN JOSE 19236 (IN 830508)

B. CARACAS 29110 (IN 828721)

C. CARACAS 29109 (IN 828704)

D. CARACAS 29120 (IN 830506)

E. SAN JOSE 19235 830494

1. PLEASE ADVISE IF REF A ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA RESULTED FROM REFS B AND C INFORMATION. ~~IF SO, SUGGEST~~ NO FURTHER DISSEM OF PARA TWO REF C PLOT INFORMATION OUTSIDE LNBUZZ CHANNELS AS RISK COMPROMISE WKSCARLET-3 TO EXILE EXTREMISTS RUNNING TO HIGH.

2. FILE: 200-6-495, E2 IMPDET

WKSCARLET-3 [illegible]

SECRET

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY J PER LA TOTAL COPIES 11-1 BY 22 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

VANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

CTION UNIT LA 15

CTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR c/OPS/INT, 1/SECURITY, c/OPS/PROG 5, ISA/DO, c/KRAD, DDO, c/AVDO2, DDO/PC, c/CI4, c/PS/EG2, c/OSG, c/OSG/IC

T 693460 EIA055 PAGE 01 IN 830506

TOR:182041Z FEB 76 CARA 29129

S E C R E T 182030Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29129

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 808822

B. CARACAS 29094 (IN 827361)

1. IN CONTEXT OF ARRIVAL CARACAS HORTENSIA BUSSI DE 201-05740 ALLENDE PER REF B, STATION BELIEVES WE COULD ADVISE LOCAL LIAISON UNILATERALLY THAT WE HAVE TIP THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF MEMBER ALLENDE FAMILY HERE IN CARACAS. FEEL THIS AS SPECIFIC AS WE COULD GET AND STILL REASONABLY PROTECT SOURCE. EVEN THEN THERE IS RISK TO WKSCARLET-3 WHO OBTAINED INFO DIRECTLY FROM SELF-DECLARED PRINCIPAL IN PLOT; WKSCARLET-3 IS ONLY PERSON WE SURE FRANK CASTRO HAS TOLD. POSSIBLY ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ IS NOT YET AWARE VICTIM IDENTITY. IF WKSCARLET-3 COMPROMISED TO EXILE EXTREMISTS, STATION FEELS HIS LIFE WOULD BE IN JEOPARDY.

2. FILE: 201-0300985. E2, IMPDET.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- [illegible]
DO NOT DESTROY

TOTAL COPIES 39-2

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED 6A AT 2035 Z

ACTION UNIT CA15

INFO FILE VR OPS/INT, SECURITY, OPS/ITG, IPLAN, CI4, PS/EG2, DDO/DO, DIUD2,

T 693416 EIA620 PAGE 01 IN 832494

TOR:182025Z FEB 76 SJOS 19235

18 Feb

S E C R E T 182000Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19235

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 808822

B. SAN JOSE 19195 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (IN 812972)

C. SAN JOSE 19215 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (IN 818963)

D. SAN JOSE 19227 PARA 2 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (IN 826

E. DIRECTOR 808856

1. RE PARA 3 REF A AND REF E: REFS B, C, AND D REPORTED ARRIVAL ON 2 FEBRUARY AND PRESENCE OF ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE REPEAT ANDRES PASCAL ALENDE, NEPHEW OF SALVADOR ALLENDE, IN COSTA RICA. AFTER SPENDING DAY IN LOCAL HOTEL HE MOVED TO HOME OF MARXIST DANIEL CAMACHO MONGE, POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR IN POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF UNIVERSITY OF COSTA RICA. CAMACHO HOME LOCATED IN SUBURBAN TOWN OF CURRIDABAT 25 METERS NORTH OF HOME OF FORMER PRESIDENT PEPE FIGUERES. PASCAL KNOWN TO BE AT ABOVE LOCATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY.

2. PASCAL AND GIRLFRIEND MUST REMAIN COSTA RICA FOR SIXTY [illegible] ARRIVAL TO GIVE COSTA RICAN COURTS OPPORTUNITY TO [illegible]ITY OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT REQUEST TO EXTRADITE THEM.

S E C R E T

14-00000

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ... BY ... AT ...

ACTION UNIT

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

STAFF

T 693416 EIA820 PAGE 02-02 IN 832494

TOR:1820252 FEB 76 SJOS 19235

(IN 516963)

3. SOURCE SAN JOSE 19215 WAS HUCOD-1.

4. IN VIEW KISSINGER VISIT, ADVISE IMMEDIATE PERMISSION DISCUSS MURDER THREAT WITH LOCAL LIAISON (HUFABRIC).

5. FILE: 201-931810. E2 IMPDET

A medium-level of Costa Rican CP (PVP). His reporting has been usually reliable in the past.

CIR-316/20049-76

Official CR service

Bosch arrested in San Jose 18 Feb 76

CHC : TD

1349

SECRET

U.S. SECRET SERVICE CABLE

DATE: 18 FEBRUARY 1976

FROM: CARACAS, SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS 779

SUBJECT: DEPARTURE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM
CARACAS, VENEZUELA

CLASSIFICATION: AIUO

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11-7

C/LA/SB

DC/LA/SB

C/LA/SB/AR

C/LA/SB/CH

C/LA/SB/UP

LA/SB Sec'y

MG -

CMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

STAFF 181443Z DIRECTOR 236822

CONF: LA 7 INFO: FILE MRO, OSC, C/OPS

DISSEM BY: 37

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, INFO SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

REF: CARACAS 29109 (IN 828704)

1. IN ORDER AVOID CRITICISM OR ALLEGATIONS THAT AGENCY FAILED IN SOME RESPONSIBILITY REGARDING HIGHLY IMPROPER ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS PLANNED ASSASSINATIONS, THE AGENCY MUST EXAMINE SUCH ACTIVITIES TO DETERMINE IF IT IS POSSIBLE OR PROPER TO USE AGENCY INFORMATION TO DIVERT OR ARREST THE ACTIVITY. IN SOME SITUATIONS NOTHING CAN BE DONE EITHER BECAUSE NO CHANNEL EXISTS TO AFFECT THE SITUATION OR THE SOURCE CANNOT BE PROTECTED.

2. REF PARA TWO REPORT FROM UKSCARLET-3 ON ALLEGED ~~[illegible]~~, PLOT ~~[illegible]~~ AMERICAN CITIZEN ~~[illegible]~~ TO KILL ALLENDE'S NEPHEW IN EXCHANGE FOR UNSPECIFIED HELP FROM CHILEAN GOVERNMENT, IS THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY WHICH MUST BE EXAMINED PER ABOVE TO SEE IF THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF USING UKSCARLET-3'S REPORT TO MODIGATE THE PLANNED ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER YOU BELIEVE UKSCARLET-3'S REPORT CAN BE PASSED TO APPROPRIATE VENEZUELAN LIAISON, OR OTHER FOREIGN LIAISON SERVICES, WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING UKSCARLET-3'S IDENTITY AND SAFETY.

3. SAN JOSE: LATEST HQS INFO IS THAT LUIS ALLENDE RESIDES IN

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

CL BY:

14-00000

OUT n 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

S E C R E T

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0

305822

SAN JOSE. PLEASE CONFIRM.

4. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: WILLIAM J. DEVINE
UNIT: LA/NW
EXT: 1128

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/NW
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUC[illegible] BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR[illegible]ITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019453

14-00000

3

IID SIX 22

SECRET

LA/SDO 1810 17FEB76 15 18

LA 27 FILE, VR, DDO, PS/EG2, IID, OPS/INT 5

CI 4, SS 4, OSG/IC, OPS/ITG 4

T 000305 EIA870 PAGE 01 IN 070721

TOR:171815Z FEB 76 CARA 29110

S E C R E T 171722Z FEB 76 INTEL

TDFIRDB 315/01603-76 3P

WVC-7327

CITE CARACAS 29110

HRS HBB HBR HPL

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA,

HLB HGC HAB HCS

BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY, BUENOS AIRES, SANTIAGO.

INTEL VNLOFTY

SUPDATA: ERWAHOO FOR SOURCE DESCRIPTION. SOURCE: WKSCARLET/
WKSCARLET-3 DIRECTLY (SEE OPS CABLE FOR DETAILS
WHICH DO NOT AFFECT DISSEM). OD OBJECTIVE: J.1.
NOT FOR PASSAGE LIAISON. WILL BE PASSED WKSCARLET69
UNILATERALLY. INDEX BOSCH. FILE DEFERRED. CL. BY 059820.

FILED: 17/1722Z

IID COMMENT: LIFTER CABLE SENT WITH CHANGES PER DESK:

DELETED FOLLOWING RELIABILITY STATEMENT FROM SOURCE BYLINE: "HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED." INSERTED A MODIFIED RELIABILITY STATEMENT.

P/CS		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
	☒	ABSTRACT	
	☒	INDEX	
P/CR/I		PREPARE FOR FILMING	
P/RR	☒	CODE NO. (2, 3)	2
		RYBAT REST. CODE	
		CABLE IDEN (11)	
		INFO (8)	
		FOR FILING	
LA			

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 11 1976
MICROFILMED

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

D-200-120-495/14

17 Feb 76

201-299292

14-00000

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

BOSCH, ORLANDO
201-0299292
SEX M

201-0931810
CARA-29119
17 FEB 76
HVC-07328
P2

HIS ANTI-CUBAN GOVM EXILE GROUP IS TO ATTEMPT TO KILL PASCAL ALLENDE, LUIS ANDRES /201-0931810/ IN CARACAS AS RETURN FOR AID GIVEN BY CHILEAN GOVM
RES VENE, CARACAS.

DATE 04 MAR 76

09380026

201-299292

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER LA#6 TOTAL COPIES 33 (4)

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

(TUBED)

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA BY C AT 1800

ACTION UNIT LA 15

FILE VR OPSINT, SEWLT, LSN/ID

ACTION # ALS/ITG5, C/AN, DDO, DDO/DO

DIVD 2,

STAFF

Y 689340 E1A832 PAGE 01 IN 826784

TOR:171757Z FEB 76 CARA 29189

S E C R E T 171722Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29189

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY.

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REFS: A. CARACAS 29029 (BEING RELAYED ALL ADDRESSEES LESS SAN JOSE, BUENOS AIRES) 818997

B. CARACAS 29076 (BEING RELAYED ALL ADDRESSEES LESS SAN JOSE) 826512

C. CARACAS 29118 (HVC-7327)

1. WKSCARLET-3 LOCATED ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IN SAN JOSE 16 FEBRUARY AND SPOKE BRIEFLY BY TELEPHONE WITH HIM TO ARRANGE INTERVIEW IN SAN JOSE FOUR OR FIVE DAYS HENCE. WKSCARLET-3 LEAVING CARACAS WITH WKSCARLET-1 FOR BUENOS AIRES AFTERNNON 17 FEB AND ANTICIPATES STAYING BUENOS AIRES FOR ABOUT THREE DAYS BEFORE GOING SAN JOSE. WKSCARLET-3 CAN BE CONTACTED IN EITHER BUENOS AIRES OR SAN JOSE BY TELEPHONE CALL FROM NATIVE SPANISH SPEAKER IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS "RAMIREZ." HE WILL BE STAYING SHERATON HOTEL IN BUENOS AIRES BUT DOES NOT YET KNOW NAME OF HOTEL IN SAN JOSE. AT BOTH LOCATIONS HE WILL BE ALERT FOR CALL

SECRET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-0199141

DO NOT DESTROY

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

FEB 25 3 03 PM '76

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________

STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 680349 EIA032 PAGE 02 IN 028704

TOR:171757Z FEB 76 CARA 29109

FROM "RAMIREZ" BETWEEN 0800 AND 0930 DAILY. CAUTION NATIVE SPANISH SPEAKER MUST MAKE CALL IN ORDER AVOID AROUSING EXTREMELY SUSPICIOUS NATURE WKSCARLET-1 WHO MAY ANSWER TELEPHONE AND IS UNWITTING WKSCARLET-3 CONTACT WITH BKHERALD. IN ORDER VERIFY BOSCH EXACT MOVEMENTS DURING VWLOFTY, SUGGEST SAN JOSE MAY WISH FORWARD CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS TO BUENOS AIRES FOR PASSING TO WKSCARLET-3.

2. WKSCARLET-3 HAD NO INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE REPORT OF BOSCHS INTENTIONS ON LIFE OF CUBAN AMBASSADOR OR SECRETARY KISSINGER IN CARACAS. WKSCARLET-3 DID SEE FRANK CASTRO AT VENEZUEL'S MAIQUETIA AIRPORT ON 16 FEB. CASTRO TOLD WKSCARLET-3 THAT HE WAS HERE TO KILL LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, A RELATIVE OF FORMER PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE, AND THAT HIS SPONSOR WAS THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. CASTRO SAID ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ WOULD BE HELPING HIM AND INDICATED HE EXPECTED OTERO TO ARRIVE IN VENEZUELA WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR SO. WKSCARLET-3 INTERPRETS CASTRO'S CLAIM OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP TO MEAN QUASI-GOC SPONSORSHIP: POSSIBLY MILITARY. CASTRO SAID THIS ACTION WAS BEING PERFORMED IN EXCHANGE FOR UNSPECIFIED HELP THAT BOSCH, CASTOR OR CALATAYUD (FNU), ANOTHER ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO CUBAN, HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THE GOC.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

A

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OT
ISSUING OFFICE IS PR

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 689349 EIA032 PAGE 03-03 IN 820734

TOR:171757Z FEB 76 CARA 29109

3. USSS SECRET SERVICE REP CARACAS ADVISES THAT CARACAS LEGATT HAS INFORMATION FROM RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETTE (ALLEGEDLY FROM TELTAP) THAT BOSCH WAS IN CARACAS ON 7 FEBRUARY 1976 AND LEFT FOR CENTRAL AMERICA USING CHILEAN PASSPORT. SINCE WKSCARLET-3 HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO ASK FOR "CORTEZ" WHEN HE TELEPHONED BOSCH IN SAN JOSE ON 16 FEB, SUGGEST BOSCH MAY HAVE ENTERED COSTA RICA SOMETIME AFTER 6 FECRUARY USING CHILEAN PASSPORT IN NAME OF CORTEZ.

4. ABOVE INFOR ON WHEREABOUTS BOSCH, OTERO AND CASTRO PASSED SECRET SERVICE AND LEGATT AT CARACAS. ✓

5. FILE: 200-6-495; 75-2-20/4. E2 IMPDET.

Ricardo Morales Navarrette

SECRET

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

● PRIORITY

IN 828721

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO CRS
{SY/I/PIB} SS/ID FBI SECUR

Classified by Secondary Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB 315/01683-76

DIST 17 FEBRUARY 1976

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASEABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/COSTA RICA

DOI: 16 FEBRUARY 1976

SUBJECT: WHEREABOUTS OF ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT TERRORIST ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (17 FEBRUARY 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7327

SOURCE: A BUSINESSMAN WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.

1. AS OF THE EVENING OF 16 FEBRUARY 1976 ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, A TERRORIST AND LEADER OF THE ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT GROUP KNOWN AS ACCION CUBANA, WAS IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. (SOURCE COMMENT: BOSCH'S EXACT LOCATION WITHIN SAN JOSE IS NOT KNOWN.) WHILE BOSCH'S PLANS ARE UNKNOWN, HE HAS INDICATED THAT HE WILL REMAIN IN SAN JOSE AT LEAST UNTIL 22 FEBRUARY.

2. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFATT, SECRET SERVICE AT CARACAS. SENT TO BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, GUATEMALA CITY.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIONCE

SECRET

201-299292

IN 828721

TDFIR DB 315/01683-76

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--
NOT RELEASEABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMTPION CATEGORY 5B (2).
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SWS NSA SS/ID FBI TREAS CIA/OPSCEN

U.S. SECRET SERVICE CABLES

FROM SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE CARACAS 778

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT NO. 5 FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER TO CARACAS

FROM: SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS 777

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT NO. 4 FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER TO CARACAS VENEZUELA ON FEB. 16-18, 1976

7-71 MFG. 10/76

5

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 33 PER LA6 TOTAL COPIES 33-3 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT LA15

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR DDO OPSINT LSN/ID OPSITG 5 IP/AN DIV DZ SECUR 4 DDO/DO

T 686394 EIA146 PAGE 01 IN 827484

TOR:152016Z FEB 76 CARA 29096

S E C R E T 151951Z FEB 76 STAFF

3P L

		INDEX PROGRAM
IP/ODI	☒	ABSTRACT
	☒	INDEX
IP/CCS		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/MD		CONT NO. (2, 3) 2
		EVENT HIST. CONT
		CABLE DESK (11)
		NFD (0)
		FOR FILING
23/Nov/		

CITE CARACAS 29096

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO. HCS

NIACT DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 29076 (IN 826512)

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 11 1976
MICROFILMED

1. ADDRESSEES WILL APPRECIATE USSS CONCERN TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE CURRENT WHEREABOUTS ORLANDO BOSCH-AVILA. 201-0299292 THRUST USSS EFFORT NOW IS DETERMINE SUB-SOURCE FOR RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETTE 201-285923 REPORT THAT BOSCH IN CARACAS. ASSISTANT LEGATT HAS DIRECT CONTACT WITH MORALES WHO EXPECTED RETURN FROM MIAMI EVENING 15 FEBRUARY. USSS ATTEMPTING SET UP INTERVIEW WITH MORALES THROUGH LEGATT.

2. WKSCARLET-9 HAS MOUNTED 24 HOUR STAKE-OUT CARACAS HOME OF DOCTOR TEBELIO RODRIGUEZ MACEDA WITH WHOM BOSCH ALLEGEDLY STAYING; AS OF EARLY AFTERNOON 15 FEB BOSCH WAS NOT SEEN. A WKSCARLET INITIATED TELEPHONE TAP ON RODRIGUEZ WAS OPERATIVE UNTIL WEEK 9 FEBRUARY AND NO INDICATION THAT BOACH MIGHT BE IN CARACAS HAD BEEN DETECTED.

3. STATION ANTICIPATES NEXT CONTACT WITH WKSCARLET-3

15 Feb 76

RECORD COPY

SECRET

D-75-2-20/4

201-0299292

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______ S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

FEB 20 3 03 PM '76

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF, FILE, VR,	STAFF			
			1		4	
ACTION #			2		5	
			3		6	

T 686394 EIA146 PAGE 02 IN 827484

TOR:152016Z FEB 76 CARA 29096

MORNING 16 FEBRUARY. WKSCARLET-3 IS AWARE STATION INTEREST BOSCH AND, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW IF HE AWARE MORALES REPORT THAT BOSCH IN CARACAS, HE HAS NOT INITIATED EMERGENCY CONTACT TO REPORT BOSCH PRESENCE HERE: A COURSE OF ACTION HE WOULD FOLLOW IF HE LEARNED OF BOSCH PRESENCE.

4. SO FAR, ALL ATTEMPTS VERIFY BOSCH MOVEMENT/PRESENCE CARACAS, INCLUDING SANTIAGO TRAVEL CHECK, NEGATIVE. WKSCARLET IS PROVIDING ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STREET DUTY FOR VWLOFTY EVENT WITH PHOTOS AND DESCRIPTION OF BOSCH.

5. SANTIAGO: IF YOU HAVE NECESSARY ASSETS, WOULD APPRECIATE ATTEMPT DETERMINE RESIDENCE ADDRESS FOR LESSEE PARA 3 REF POSTAL ADDRESS AND UNILATERAL STAKE-OUT OF ADDRESS TO POSSIBLY VERIFY BOSCH LOCATION. BOSCH IS FIVE FEET NINE INCHES, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, FIFTY YEARS OLD. MAY BE WEARING GOATEE IN EFFORT HIDE PROMINENT STRAWBERRY BIRTH MARK, LOWER MOUTH AREA. WEIGHT LAST REPORTED 190 POUNDS BUT UNDERSTAND HE HAS LOST SIGNIFICANTLY IN LAST TWO YEARS.

6. AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN UNDERSTANDS THAT JULIO DURAN, CHILEAN RADICAL PARTY FIGURE WHO WAS AT ONE TIME SANTIAGO CA CONTACT, HAS BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH BOSCH IN PAST

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO

RF FILE VR

T 686394 EIA146 PAGE 03-03 IN 027484

TOR:1520162 FEB 76 CARA 29096

AND PROBABLY HAS GIVEN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO HIM. CAN SANTIAGO CONTACT DURAN AND QUESTION HIM ABOUT BOSCH'S CURRENT WHEREABOUTS?

7. FILE: 201-6-495; 75-2-20/3. E2 IMPDET

00

SECRET

201-0299292

14-00000

U.S. SECRET SERVICE CABLES

FROM: SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS 775
DATE: 15 FEBRUARY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT NO. 3 FOR THE VISIT OF
SEC. KISSINGER TO CARACAS

FROM: SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS
DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT NO. 2 FOR THE VISIT OF
SEC. KISSINGER TO CARACAS

FBI CABLE

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: VISIT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO LATIN AMERICA, FEBRUARY 16-23, 1976

U.S. SECRET SERVICE CABLES

FROM: SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS 771
DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLAN TO ASSASSINATE SECRETARY KISSINGER IN VENEZUELA

FROM: SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS
DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLAN TO ASSASSINATE SECRETARY KISSINGER IN VENEZUELA

FROM: SECRET SERVICE HQS INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (FIB) FILE: 650.0

DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLAN TO ASSASSINATE SECRETARY KISSINGER IN VENEZUELA

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER LA#6 TOTAL COPIES 39-2

SECRET

STAFF

LA15

FILE VR IPS/INT, SEC WAY, LA/LD

OPS/ITGS, IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, DIV D2

C14, PS/EG2

T 003822 E14987 PAGE 01 IN 026512

TOR:131848Z FEB 76 CARA 29076

S E C R E T 131610Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29076

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO, MANAGUA INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI, BUENOS RES.

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REFS: A. CARACAS 29063 (IN 924723)

B. SANTIAGO 33711 (IN 825993)

1. USSS HEADQUARTERS HAS FORWARDED TO CARACAS ADVANCE TEAM NOTICE THAT USSS MIAMI REP RECEIVED REPORT ON 12 FEB 76 FROM "EXTREMELY RELIABLE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT" THAT ATTEMPT TO BE MADE ON DR. KISSINGER'S LIFE WHILE HE IN VENEZUELA. INFORMANT DESCRIBED AS "VERY CLOSE" TO ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA (USSS LATER IDENTIFIED SOURCE AS RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE). BOSCH ALLEGEDLY ARRIVED CARACAS FROM MANAGUA TWO DAYS AGO.

✓ 201-0299292

✓ 201-285723

2. REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSEES CHECK OF TRAVEL CONTROL FOR POSSIBLE CONFIRMATION BOSCH TRAVEL. CONSIDER MORE LIKELY BOSCH WOULD BE TRAVELING WITH DOMINICAN PASSPORT 086768 IN NAME PEDRO ANTONIO PENA.

✓ 201-0299292

3. FYI: WKSCARLET-3, WHO PLANNED CONTACT BOSCH IN SANTIAGO [illegible] HE SENT TELEGRAM TO SANTIAGO ACCOMMODATION

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-0299292
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

@DL .12 123 L

STAFF 76

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

T 603022 E1A987 PAGE 02-02 IN 026512

TOR:1318402 FEB 76 CARA 29076

ADDRESS LAST WEEK ASKING CONFIRMATION BOSCH WOULD BE AVILABLE. NO REPLY YET RECEIVED. ADDRESS TO WHICH TELEGRAM SENT IS:

SRTA. ADRIANA DELGADO
CASILLA 477 CORREO CENTRAL
SANTIAGO DE CHILE

4. FILE: 200-6-495; 75-2-28/4. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER [illegible] TOTAL COPIES [illegible]

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED [illegible] AT [illegible]

ACTION UNIT

LA 15

ACTION #

INFO

FILE VR [illegible]

T 683619 E1A477 PAGE 01-01 IN 826738

TOR:1322552 FEB 76 MANA 12173

S E C R E T 1322462 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12173 (MANKUNAS ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, SANTIAGO INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 29076 (IN 826512)

1. IMMIGRATION AND AIRPORT TRAVEL CONTROL REPORT NO TRAVEL BY BOSCH OR PEDRO ANTONIO PENA THROUGH NICARAGUA 8 FEBRUARY TO PRESENT. BOTH NAMES HAVE BEEN PUT ON WATCH LIST AND STATION WILL BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY IF BOSCH ENTERS OR LEAVES NICARAGUA.

2. FILE: 200-6-495I ~~75-2-20/4.~~ E2. IMPDET.

TRAVEL PROGRAM
☒ ABSTRACT
INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILMING
CODE NO. (2, 3)
RYBAT REST. CODE
CABLE IDEN (11)
RID (8)
FOR FILMING

RECORD COPY

D-200-6-495/14

13 Feb 76

201-299292

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 66 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 32-3 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

ADVANCE COPY [✓ ISSUED] SLOTTED LA BY C AT 1630 Z

ACTION UNIT LA7

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR [illegible] CA/ITG 4

C/OPS CI4 OSG PS/EG 2

STAFF

T 679200 EIA993 PAGE 01 IN 824723

TOR:121625Z FEB 76 CARA 29863

S E C R E T 121605Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29863

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES, LA/MIAMI INFO PANAMA CITY.

WKBOXER SECURE MHSPIKE

REF: HVC-7280, 4 DEC 75

1. WKSCARLET-3 (FORMER UNILATERAL ASSET) CONTACTED STATION 11 FEB 76 TO ADVISE HE AND WSKCARLET-1 PLAN TRAVEL SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES AND POSSIBLY MIAMI DURING WEEK 15 FEB. PURPOSE IS INVESTIGATION OF ATTEMPTED LETTER BOMBING CUBAN AMBASSADOR CARACAS.

2. BOMBING INCIDENT SURFACED WHEN CUBAN AMBASSADOR NORBERTO HERNANDEZ CURBELO REPORTED TO WKSCARLET ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO ALLEGED RECEIPT OF BOMB. WKSCARLET-10 DEACTIVATED DEVICE WHICH CONTAINED IN LARGE MANILA ENVELOPE BEARING RETURN ADDRESS DR. GUSTAVO A. VOLLMER. WKSCARLET-1, FORMER WKSCARLET CHIEF IS SECURITY CONSULTANT TO VOLLMER AND HE HAS RETAINED WKSCARLET-3, A FORMER WKSCARLET OFFICER NOW OPERATING COMMERCIAL INVESTIGATIONS SERVICE, TO DETERMINE WHO USED VOLLMER'S NAME. WKSCARLET-3, CUBAN EXILE, RETAINS SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS WITH EXTREMIST EXILES AND HAS REGULAR CORRESPONDENCE WITH ORLANDO

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-0299292
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

C. 12/75

SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

UNIT NOTIFIED ________

FEB 2 3 03 PM '76

CS COPY ISSUED SLOTTED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

679288 EIA993 PAGE 02 IN 824723

TOR:1216252 FEB 76 CARA 29863

O S C H AVILA IN SANTIAGO.

3. IN A LETTER APPROXIMTELY THREE MONTHS AGO BOSCH TOLD KSCARLET-3 HE HAS MADE AGREEMENT WITH EXTREMIST GROUP IN RGENTINA (WKSCARLET-3 THINKS GROUP CONNECTED WITH OR IS ERP) FOR UTUALLY SUPPORTIVE ACTION: I.E. (ACCORDING WKSCARLET-3) IF BOSCH ROUPS WANTS SOMEONE KILLED WHERE IT DOES NOT HAVE ASSETS, THE RGENTINE GROUP WILL TAKE ACTION IF IT HAS THE ASSETS, AND IF THE RGENTINE GROUP WANTS THE SAME THING ANY WHERE ELSE INCLUDING UERTO RICO, HIS GROUP WILL TAKE ACTION. WKSCARLET-3 SAID TI WAS ON ASIS THIS AGREEMENT A PAST ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ASSASSINATE UBAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES.

4. WKSCARLET-3 PLANS INTERVIEW BOSCH AND OTHERS IN SANTIAGO, UENOS AIRES AND POSSIBLY MIAMI IN ATTEMPT LEARN WHETHER CARACAS ETTER BOMB WAS EXILE EFFORT OR POSSIBLY DGI COVERT ACTION PERATION.

5. PLEASE ADVISE ANY ADDRESSEE STATIONS INTEREST CONTACT ITH WKSCARLET-3.

6. FOR DIRECTOR: STATION HAS OBTAINED LETTER BOMB VIA KSCARLET LIAISON. EXPLOSIVE CONSISTS OF COILED PRIMA CORD. ETONATOR HAS BEEN REMOVED AND OBTAINED SEPARATELY. WOULD LIKE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 076008 EIA093 PAGE 03-03 IN 024723

TOR:121625Z FEB 76 CARA 29063

EXPERT OPINION RE ORIGIN OF MATERIALS USED: PLEASE ADVISE SHIPPING INSTRUCTIONS.

7. FILE: 75-2-28/3. E2. IMPDET.

[illegible] - SECUR Doms

IF ISSUED SEND FORM 1884 TO C/AN [illegible]

[illegible] PER DIR 806385

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 6 NOVEMBER 1975

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)

FBI FILE NO: 105-21947 (MIAMI)

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 5 SEPTEMBER 1975
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HECTOR DURAN
FBI FILE NO: 105-22[illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 9 JULY 1975
CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
CLASSIFICATION: AIRO
SUBJECT: ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)
CONFERENCE, JULY 16-1[illegible], 1975, IN COSTA RICA

DATE: 9 JUNE 1975
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: EDUARDO PAZ BELLO
FBI FILE NO: 105-21552 (MIAMI)

DATE: 12 MAY 1975
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: GUSTAVO BIENVENIDO MARIN Y DUARTE
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 8 MAY 1975
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DUNNEY PIO PEREZ ALAMO
FBI FILE NO: 105-4953 (MIAMI)

DATE: 18 MARCH 1975
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: LEONARDO S. VIOTA SESIN
FBI FILE NO: 105-22254 (MIAMI)

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

BOSCH, ORLANDO	
201-0299292	075-120-028
SEX M	HVC-07280
	04 DEC 75
CIT CUBA	P2

RES CHIL. LDR OF LATIN AMERICAN ANTI-COMMUNIST
R VOLUTIONARY COUNCIL PLANS TO ASSASSINATE
MB HERNANDEZ. FLED TO CHILE IN DEC 74
FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE FROM JAIL FOR ILLEGAL
EXILE ACTIVITIES IN VENE

DATE 22 DEC 75 09362139

201-299292

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET XX

Chief, Latin America Division
Chief of Station, Caracas
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo
Orlando BOSCH Avila

References: A. CARACAS 26054
B. SANTO DOMINGO 15980

Forwarded as an attachment are copies of a memorandum addressed to the Dominican Foreign Office from the Dominican Ambassador in Caracas regarding Orlando *Bosch Avila, the Subject of References. The document was passed to the Station on 4 February 1975 by EMPYREX-1. The memorandum notes that Bosch was travelling on Dominican documents in the name of Pedro Antonio *Pena, and that the documents were procured in Santo Domingo.

Wendel J. RAMOVA

Attachment:
Memorandum H/W

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-299292

Distribution:
3 - C, LAD w/att
2 - COS, Caracas w/att

E2, IMPDET

HDCA-10887 5 February 1975

SECRET 22-9-28

20 de Enero de 1974

Al : Excelentísimo Señor
Doctor Víctor Gómez Bergés
Secretario de Estado de Relaciones
Exteriores,
Santo Domingo, República Dominicana

Asunto : El hombre que ha jurado matar a Fidel Castro: TRES MESES TENIA EN VENEZUELA CUBANO TERRORISTA EXPULSADO.

Ref. : a) Nuestro C-105 del 25 de Nov. 1974, y
b) Nuestro oficio O-550 del 26 de Nov. de 1974.

En adición a nuestro Cable y Oficio de referencia, cumplimos con informarle sobre este caso lo siguiente:

a) Que el ciudadano cubano señor doctor Orlando Bosch Avila, ingresó a Venezuela por el aeropuerto de Maiquetía el día 8-7-74, portando el pasaporte número 036768, dominicano, a nombre de Pedro Antonio Peña y la cédula de identidad No. 26741, también dominicana.

b) Que salió de Venezuela para Curazao el día 21-11-74 y regresó como transeunte el 29-11-74, saliendo para Chile el día 2-12-74.

c) Que salió de Venezuela con la tarjeta de turismo No. 298715 y finalmente, que actualmente debe encontrarse en Chile.

Que todos los documentos dominicanos le fueron expedidos en Santo Domingo, según la información que me ha ofrecido el Sub-director de la Dirección de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención (DISIP), Dr. Gustavo Rodríguez M. quien me visitó para darme una información completa del caso, hoy en mis oficinas de esta Misión.

Atentamente le saluda.

Rafael Bonilla Aybar
Embajador

CAUTION - THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH

SECRET

X

Chief, Latin America Division

Acting Chief of Station, Bogota *Awl*

Orlando BOSCH Avila AKA Efrain LEITONE

Reference: HEGA-4686, dated 13 December 1974

There are no Station traces on Efrain LEITONE. According to CIFENDER-2, Colombian Passport No. G-034892 was issued on 7 July 1970 to one Efrain LEITON Yate for the purpose of travel to Ecuador. Leiton was born in Ortega, Tolima Department on 7 August 1924. He is described as 1.65 m. tall, black hair, brown eyes, medium complexion. The photograph on his passport application does not appear to be identical with that of the Subject of referenced dispatch.

Warren K. Guertler
Warren K. GUERTLER

Distribution:
3-Chief, LA Division

RECORD COPY

Note: 2 copies to Quito (T.M.)
2 Guayaquil (T.M.)

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HLBA-14009

DATE
14 January 1975

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-0299292
~~201-0833937~~

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 5 FEBRUARY 1975
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: SJ 105-16193 (SAN JUAN)

DATE: 30 DECEMBER 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA - PAROLE VIOLATOR
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. — 3. DATE
	4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM — 5. DATE OF INFO. — 6. EVALUATION
8. ANALYST — 9. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN — 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CROWDER, EDWARD /JR./
201-059919
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
U.S. CITIZEN ON WHOM [PANAMANIAN DEPT OF NATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS] HAS DEROGATORY INFO MAR 62.

23
[056-]006-004
PACY-07673
23 MAR 62
24

144079

PLZR

0144079

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 10-61 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

2/PV

9 May 1963

CONTACT REPORT

WUBRINY - General
02

1. 02 WUBRINY/1 called on the sterile line from Washington at 1430 hours to discuss the subject covered below.

2. Tire Recap: 02 WUBRINY/1 said that he had just heard from the Mohawk people who will be in New York the week of 20 May and has stated that they are now prepared to go ahead investing some $30,000 of their own money in a tire recap plant in Greece. 02 WUBRINY/1 will give us more details as he has them and feels that Lodi will also come in with some money and that WUSALINE can also, if this is desired or needed.

3. 02 WUBRINY/4: 02 WUBRINY/1 said that Luis Borwne 04 is briefed him in detail on the difficulties that apparently have built 02 up regarding WUBRINY/4's suspicisons and said that he plans to have RECKREY devote himself to this monest. WUBRINY/1 said 02 that if this is as serious as Mr. Browne appears to believe 04 it may be necessary to isolate him elsewhere in the WUBRINY 02 interests, such as the partnership, and taper him off for termination at the end of his six months. WUBRINY/1 suggested 02 that it might be useful to send him to Greece in conjunction with the Mowhawk tire recap plant.

4. Martinique - Pumice: 02 WUBRINY/1 said that all arrangements are now made and this is ready to go forward and that KUBARK should decide right away the contribution we wished to b e made by RECKREY. I told WUBRINY/1 we would be back on this 02 early next week, but I felt sure it was as had been earlier discussed, namely, that we will foot the bill for RECKREY's time and travel, etc., expenses. Note: I trust Mr. Allen will give this priority attention when he returns.

5. Haitian Banker - M. CHARLES: 02 WUBRINY/1 said that he had encountered M. Charles at the National Airport in Washington at 1920 hours just at the time he was reporting in to me at my 02 home. WUBRINY/1 said that M. CHARLES was nattily dressed in a gray silk suit and said that he was on his way to Chicago but had not said why. M. CHARLES was accompanied by George deMOHREN-02 SHILDT. WUBRINY/1 asked M. CHARLES what in the world is going on now in Haiti and M. CHARLES shrugged and said that he felt that they would "bring down Papa Doc." No further details were given and this was apparently a personal opinion rather than something based on fact or knowledge.

Distribution:
Orig - EQ subject, 1 - Chrono
1 - WUBRINY Ops
02

SECRET

C. FRANK STONE III
Chief
DO/CORO

[illegible] Excluded from automatic [illegible] and [illegible]

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

19/BR

201-299292
Aug 76 - Oct 76
Vol ~~III~~ V

ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

On 28 October 1976 INS informed OPS/LSN over the telephone that Bosch has no immigration status. In 1968 he was granted an "A" card but he never fulfilled the requirements to become a U.S. person. In 1973 he was granted indefinite voluntary departure.

MG

OUTGOI[illegible] MESSAGE

14-7

SECRET

2419432 CIA/330 934476

C/LA 7 INFO C/LSN/IO, C/OPS

C/SI 2

TO: IMMEDIATE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. ATTN: LEE BEAUCHAMP Y

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED Y

CIR-316/04416-76 Y

SUBJECT: STATUS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA Y

1. THIS AGENCY WOULD APPRECIATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE CLARIFICATION ON THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION STATUS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE BORN 18 AUGUST 1926, SANTA CLARA, CUBA. Y

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM [illegible] GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.#

FILE: 200-12-200/1, 201-299292.

AC/LA/SB

TRAVEL PROGRAM
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] (2, 3)
[illegible]
[illegible] (11)
NFO (3)
FOR FILING

316/04416-76
28 Oct 76
201-299292

DATE: 28 OCT 76
ORIG: M. GINN:AA
UNIT: LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

C/OPS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

SECRET 200-12-200/1

OUTGOING MESSAGE

16-1

CNF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 282232Z DIRECTOR

CONF: LA 8 INFO FILE

TO: SANTIAGO INFO CARACAS, 0 SAN JOSE. Y

UNINTEL Y 0 Bosch passport

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 35326 (IN 077749) HCS-10,772 (BEING RELAYED SAN JOSE)

B. SANTIAGO 35332 (IN 079599) 0 (NOT NEEDED SAN JOSE) Y

1. FOLLOWING IS CORRECTION ISSUED FOR HEADQUARTERS CUSTOMERS ON 28 OCTOBER 1976: "A FOUR-PAGE INFORMATION REPORT WITH THE ABOVE HEADING AND NUMBER WAS ISSUED ON 22 OCTOBER 1976. ACCORDING TO PARAGRAPH FOUR OF THAT REPORT, THE PASSPORT FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF ORLANDO BOSCH BWAS ISSUED IN CHILE IN 1966. ON 26 OCTOBER THE SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH FOUR, CORRECTING HIS EARLIER INFORMATION, REPORTED THAT BOSCH'S PASSPORT WAS AN ORDINARY CHILEAN PASSPORT BEARING THE NUMBER 26583 AND WAS ISSUED IN SANTIAGO ON 25 SEPTEMBER 1975." Y

2. REF A BEING RELAYED TO SAN JOSE FOR DISSEM TO AMBASSADOR

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: REF A CHILEAN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ON CUBAN EXILE LEADERS ORLANDO BOSCH AND ROLANDO OTERO

B .UPDATING ON BOSCH'S PASSPORT

C/LA/MCA

28 Oct 76

201-299292

DATE: 26 OCTOVER 1976
ORIG: MARY GINN
UNIT: KX LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1473

C/LA/PNC

RECORD COPY

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY

OUTGOIN MESSAGE

14-1

CNF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

SECRET

2819432 CIA/DDO 934476

CONF: C/LA 7 INFO: FILE O/MAN, C/LSN/IO, C/OPS, C/CI 2

0

0

0 PER

0

TO: IMMEDIATE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. ATTN: LEE BEAUCHAMP Y

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED Y

CIR-316/04416-76 Y

SUBJECT: STATUS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA Y

1. THIS AGENCY WOULD APPRECIATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE CLARIFICATION ON THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION STATUS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE BORN 18 AUGUST 1926, SANTA CLARA, CUBA Y

File

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

FILE: 200-12-200/1, 201-299292.

AC/LA/SB

DATE: 28 OCT 76
ORIG: M. GINN:AA
UNIT: LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

C/OPS/LSN

C/LA

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

14-00000

FORM SIZE

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 21-2

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR SA/CAN COPS/INT CI/CA
NH/EG3 DDO3

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 336956 EIA875 PAGE 01 IN 082793

TOR:2815152 OCT 76 SJOS 20051

S E C R E T 2815022 OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 20051

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, CARACAS.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 35352 (IN 081609) LAS/CH

B. SAN JOSE 19715 (NOT SENT CARACAS) (IN 978488)

Source: HVGALLY-1

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS RE PARA 2 OF REF A ARE BEING REPEATED FOR CLARIFICATION.

2. PER PARA 1 OF REF B, IT WAS COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ODUBER QUIROS WHO APPARENTLY CONJURED-UP INVOLVEMENT OF ORLANDO BOSCH IN THE ARMS MOVEMENT STORY DISCUSSED BETWEEN COSTAN RICAN FOREIGN MINISTER GONZALO FACIO AND CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO COSTA RICA JORGE ARANDA PARRA. "CONFIDENTIAL FUNCTIONARIES OF THE U.S. EMBASSY" (ACTUALLY U.S. AMBASSADOR USING STATION INFO) WHO ADVISED THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT OF AN ULTRA-RIGHTIST PLOT DID NOT REPEAT NOT MENTION THAT BOSCH WAS INVOLVED IN ANY WAY WITH THIS PLOT, AND STATION HAS NO INFORMATION INDICATING THAT BOSCH WAS INVOLVED.

3. ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF BOSCH WAS APPARENTLY PURE INVENTION BY PRESIDENT ODUBER AND FOREIGN MINISTER FACIO AND THEY TOLD INVENTION

B201-300985
D200-12-200/1

RECORD COPY

28 Oct 76
201-249292

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____ RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 336956 EIA875 PAGE 02-02 IN 002793

TOR:281515Z OCT 76 SJOS 20051

TO ARANDA POSSIBLY TO STRENGTHEN THEIR CASE SINCE BOSCH TRAVELLED ON CHILEAN PASSPORT.

4. FILE: 201-300985, 200-12-200/1. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

OUTGOIN MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

14-2

272336Z CIA/DDO 934175

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/PPAN, C/LSN/ID, C/PS, C/PS/INT

0 DISSEM BY

0

0 PER

0 # B2

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R. K. MCHARGUE/GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.Y

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS Y

FIRCI-312/03218-76 Y

SUBJECT: CONTACT BETWEEN ORLANDO BOSCH AND THE NOVO BROTHERS IN MIAMI SHORTLY BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER Y

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH 2: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT BEMPLOYEE WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.Y

2. SINCE HIS ARREST ON 15 OCTOBER 1976 ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE LEADER, HAS ADMITTED TO AN OFFICIAL OF THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) THAT HE HAD CONTACT WITH THE ZZNOVO BROTHERS IN MIAMI SHORTLY BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER,

DATE: ~~27 OCTOBER 1976~~
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

Bosch 201

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 2 2

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

934175

0
0
0 PER
0

FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO A NUMBER OF PRESS ARTICLES, IGNACIO NOVO AND GUILLERMO NOVO HAVE BEEN CHARGED BY SEVERAL OF THEIR COMPATRIOTS IN VENEZUELA AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER. IT IS BELIEVED THAT YOUR ~~AGENCY~~ BUREAU HAS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE NOVO BROTHERS, IGNACIO AND GUILLERMO.)Y

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

~~E2 IMPDET~~

BASED ON: CARACAS 31234 (IN 080249)
WKSCARLET (WKSCARLET-17)

OBJ: J

CI/R&A W. GODSON(TELECOORD)
C/LA/PNC Beardsley
C/LA/RR

* CS SUGGESTS ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO HQ.

DATE: 27 OCTOBER 76
ORIG: M. GINN:AA
UNIT: LA/SB/CH
EXT: 3473

for

AC/LA/ND

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. E 2 IMPDET

14-00000

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 000687

M

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

LA 10

ACTION #

INFO: FILE, VR, [redacted] IP/AN, IID, CPS/INT, SS 4, OSG/IC 2.

T 334209 EIA113 PAGE 01 IN 001640

TOR:271832Z OCT 76 SAGO 35351

HCS-10,775

S E C R E T 271700Z OCT 76 INTELL

CITE SANTIAGO 35351

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS, SAN JOSE.

HVC HRS

7P

WNINTEL

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR HQS REVIEW. SOURCE: FUDOUBLE-49 FROM DOCUMENT CITED, COPY OF WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED HQS. SEE CPS CABLE PRIOR DISSEM. RELATED TO ODIK1A. NOT PASSED LOCAL LIAISON. INDEX BOSCH, DAVANZO CL BY 04869. FILE: 15-5-1/1.

FILED : 271700Z XXXXX

27 [illegible]

DOC. MICRO. SER.
DEC 8 1976
MICROFILMED

NAT

LA/SBCH

[illegible]

D15-5-1

27 Oct 76
201-299292

14-00000

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE: 27 OCTOBER 1976
IN 028643
PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

The following report, transmitted from a CIA field station, requires review within the Directorate of Operations before being used in any other document or publication, or released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is provided for your advance information.

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

COUNTRY: CHILE/COSTA RICA

DOI : FEBRUARY-MARCH 1976

SUBJECT: O ADDITIONAL DATA ON CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS USED
BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

ACQ : CHILE, SANTIAGO (27 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HCS-10,775

SOURCE : A MEDIUM LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS
TO OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
HIS REPORTING IS FAIRLY RELIABLE.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: HCS-10,772 ( ) FROM THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED CHILEAN CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN COSTA RICA IN EARLY 1976 CARRYING CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS. THIS REPORT PROVIDES FULL DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT AS REPORTED AT THE TIME BY THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA.)

201-299292

2. ACCORDING TO SECRET AIRGRAM NUMBER 2 OF THE CHILEAN

SECRET

EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, DATED 16 MARCH 1976, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976 ON SUSPICION OF BEING INVOLVED IN A PLOT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. BOSCH WAS CHARGED WITH HAVING ENTERED COSTA RICA ILLEGALLY USING DOCUMENTATION IN THE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI. AS OF 16 MARCH 1976, BOSCH WAS UNDER DETENTION IN CARTAGO, COSTA RICA. THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT WAS STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPELLING HIM BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FIND A COUNTRY WILLING TO ACCEPT HIM.

3. WHEN ARRESTED, BOSCH WAS CARRYING THE FOLLOWING CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS:

A. A BIRTH CERTIFICATE IN THE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI, ISSUED BY THE CIVIL REGISTRY OFFICE OF THE QUINTA NORMAL (A SANTIAGO SUBURB) ON 6 AUGUST 1975. THE CERTIFICATE WAS SIGNED BY ALBERTO CASAL, A CIVIL REGISTRY SECTION CHIEF, AND REFLECTED A BIRTH DATE OF 6 AUGUST 1927, REGISTRY NUMBER 953 OF THE LAS BARRANCAS (A LOWER CLASS SANTIAGO SUBURB) INSCRIPTION OFFICE. THE PARENTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS HECTOR DAVANZO AND AMALIA ENRIQUETA CINTOLESI.

B. CHILEAN IDENTITY CARD NUMBER 2357422, ISSUED IN

SANTIAGO. THE CARD ALSO LISTED A TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF 2,357,422-5. (FIELD COMMENT: NO DATE OF ISSUANCE WAS REPORTED FOR THIS ITEM.)

C. AN AUTOMOBILE TITLE FOR A SIMCA 1000, ISSUED BY THE SANTIAGO PROPERTY REGISTRY OFFICE ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1966 AND BEARING REGISTRY NUMBER 682712.

D. CHILEAN ORDINARY (RED COVER) PASSPORT NUMBER 26583, ISSUED 25 SEPTEMBER 1975, IN THE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI. THE PASSPORT CONTAINS PRINTING OFFICE REGISTRY NUMBER 14441-1975, AND THE SIGNATURES OF VICTORIA MORAN DOREN AND MARIA ELENA SELMAN AS ISSUING OFFICERS. IT CONTAINS THE APPROPRIATE TAX STAMPS, WATERMARKS, AND SEAL ON THE PHOTOGRAPH.

4. THE CHILEAN PASSPORT CARRIED BY BOSCH CONTAINED ENTRY AND EXIT STAMPS INDICATING THE FOLLOWING TRAVEL:

A. EXIT FROM CHILE VIA PUDAHUEL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 28 DECEMBER 1975.

B. ENTRY AND EXIT FROM PANAMA VIA TOCUMEN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 29 DECEMBER 1975.

C. ENTRY IN EL SALVADOR ON 29 DECEMBER 1975.(FIELD

COMMENT: NO PLACE OF ENTRY OR SUBSEQUENT EXIT WAS RECORDED.)

D. ENTRY IN COSTA RICA ON 7 JANUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF ENTRY WAS REPORTED.)

E. EXIT FROM COSTA RICA AND ENTRY INTO NICARAGUA ON 30 JANUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF EXIT OR ENTRY WAS REPORTED.)

F. EXIT FROM NICARAGUA AND ENTRY INTO COSTA RICA ON 6 FEBRUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF EXIT OR ENTRY WAS REPORTED.)

5. BOSCH REMAINED IN SAN JOSE FROM 6 FEBRUARY 1976 UNTIL HIS ARREST ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976. ACCORDING TO A SECRET SOURCE OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, BOSCH OBTAINED THE FALSE IDENTITY DOCUMENTS FROM A FRIEND IN CHILE WHO IS A COLONEL IN ONE OF THE BRANCHES OF THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SECRET SOURCE OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY WAS NOT IDENTIFIED, BUT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THE SOURCE ALLOWED A CHILEAN EMBASSY OFFICER TO EXAMINE BOSCH'S FALSE IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, IT WAS PROBABLY GONZALO FACIO, COSTA RICAN FOREIGN MINISTER. IT IS NOT KNOWN IF IN FACT THE CHILEAN EMBASSY'S SECRET SOURCE FAILED TO PROVIDE THE IDENTITY OF THE

CHILEAN COLONEL OR IF THE PREPARER OF THE REPORT PHRASED IT IN THIS MANNER IN ORDER TO AVOID DIFFICULTIES WITH HIS SUPERIORS.)

6. THE REPORT WAS SIGNED BY FRANCISCO CRUZ PACHECO, CHILEAN CHARGE IN SAN JOSE. (SOURCE COMMENT: CRUZ IS NORMALLY THE CHILEAN CONSUL IN SAN JOSE, BUT WAS CHARGE IN MARCH 1976 DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR ON LEAVE. IN OCTOBER 1976, CRUZ WAS SUDDENLY RECALLED FROM SAN JOSE SHORT OF TOUR, AND IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN SANTIAGO IN LATE OCTOBER. THE REASON GIVEN WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR CRUZ' RECALL IS THAT A NIECE OF PRESIDENT AUGUSTO PINOCHET HAD OCCASION TO REQUEST CONSULAR ASSISTANCE FROM HIM DURING A PRIVATE VISIT TO COSTA RICA, AND FOUND HIM ABSENT FROM HIS OFFICE DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS. UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS IN THE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, THIS IS A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION, AND THERE IS NO CONTRADICTORY INFORMATION AVAILABLE.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT SANTIAGO (PRINCIPAL OFFICERS ONLY). ALSO SENT SAN JOSE (PRINCIPAL OFFICERS ONLY) AND CARACAS (PRINCIPAL OFFICERS AND LEGATT ONLY).

REPORT CLASS SECRET -- WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED -- NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN

SECRET

[illegible]

IN 081648

TDFIR

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

SECRET

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

NATIONALS -- NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/
CONSULTANTS -- DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

SECRET

201-299292

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 29 PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 15-J

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA ___ 1535

ACTION UNIT C/LAS

FILE, CI/PLAN, CI/OPS/INT, CI/PS/EG2, AG/1020

STAFF PRECEDENCE

T 334884 E14749 PAGE 01 IN 001680

TOR:2710032 OCT 76 SAGO 35352

S E C R E T 271700Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 35352

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, CARACAS.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

O [illegible] Orlando Bosch

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 35326 (id onanda) (HCS-10.772 ZRWAHOO)(NOT SENT SAN JOSE)

B. SANTIAGO 35351 (id orwulo) (HCS-10.775 ZRWAHOO)

1. IN ADDITION TO DOCUMENT REPORTED REF B, FUDOUBLE-49 PROVIDED COPY OF CHILEAN EMBASSY COSTA RICA "RESERVADO" AIRGRAM 228/34, DATED 7 JULY 1976, WHICH TOGETHER WITH REF B DOCUMENT WERE BASIC DOCUMENTS IN FILE WHICH FOREIGN MINISTRY ASSEMBLED ON ORLANDO BOSCH, DESCRIBED REF A. (SUGGEST REF A AND CORRECTION BE RELAYED SAN JOSE.) REMAINING DOCUMENTS WERE NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS AND DOCUMENTS ORIGINATED IN OCTOBER 1976 AFTER BOSCH ARREST IN CARACAS.

2. THE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENT REPORTS THAT IN CONVERSATION WITH COSTA RICAN FOREIGN MINISTR GONZALO FACIO, CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO COSTA RICA JORGE ARANDA PARRA WAS TOLD THAT "CONFIDENTIAL FUNCTIONARIES OF THE U.S. EMBASSY" HAD ADVISED THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT THAT AN ULTRA-RIGHTIST PLOT, LED BY BOSCH, WAS BEING ORGANIZED IN GUATEMALA TO OVERTHROW THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT. FACIO WENT ON TO SAY BOSCH CLAIMED TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE GUATEMALAN

SECRET

RECORD COPY

270476

201-299292

SECRET

STAFF

INFO RF FILE VR

T 334804 E1A040 PAGE 02 IN 861689

TOR:2710032 OCT 76 SAGO 35352

AND CHILEAN GOVERNMENTS IN THIS PLOT. HE ADDED THAT OF COURSE NEITHER HE NOR PRESIDENT ODUBER PLACED ANY CREDENCE IN THIS CLAIM, WHICH THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT HAD INVESTIGATED.

3. ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR ARANDA, FACIO SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT MAKE AN EFFORT TO RECOVER BOSCH'S ALIAS CHILEAN DOCUMENTATION FROM GUATEMALAN POLICE AUTHORITIES. THE DOCUMENT DOES NOT SAY (AND F-49 DID NOT KNOW) WHY GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES HAD THE DOCUMENTS, BUT APPARENTLY BOSCH RETAINED THEM WHEN HE WAS EXPELLED FROM COSTA RICA.

4. STATION DEFERS TO HQS ON HOW TO HANDLE THIS INFORMATION. COPIES OF BOTH DOCUMENTS BEING POUCHED 2 NOVEMBER.

5. AS SIDE ISSUE, STATION BECOMING CONCERNED OVER SOURCE PROTECTION FOR FUDOUBLE-49 IN THIS MATTER. BECAUSE HE MADE SAME ERROR ON DATES IN COMMENTS TO EMBASSY OFFICER (EMBASSY SANTIAGO 10187) AND IN INITIAL REPORT TO STATION (PER REF B, 1966 DATE APPLIES TO EARLIEST DOCUMENT IN HIS POSSESSION, WHICH WAS MOTOR VEHICLE TITLE, NOT PASSPORT), CORRECTION TENDS TO CALL ATTENTION TO THIS COINCIDENCE. STATION PREPARED REF B WITH HIS REGULAR SOURCE DESCRIPTION, BUT IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT MISLEADING CONSUMERS OR PROVIDING FALSE CONFIRMATION, WOULD PREFER USE ALTERNATE,

(m3/202)

SECRET

SECRET

STAFF

T 334834 E14849 PAGE 03 IN 881689

TOR:271603Z OCT 76 SACS 35352

6. SUGGEST USING FOLLOWING AS ALTERNATE SOURCE DESCRIPTION IF POSSIBLE:

"A CONSERVATIVE CHILEAN BUSINESSMAN WITH OCCASIONAL ADVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. HE IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE REPORTER. HE PROVIDED THE INFORMATION BASED ON REVIEW OF SEVRET AIRGRAM NUMBER 2, OF 16 MARCH 1976, FROM THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, A COPY OF WHICH HE PROVIDED. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH OR USED TO ELICIT INFORMATION FROM OFFICIALS OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT."

7. STATION IS ATTEMPTING TO IDENTIFY SANTIAGO ADDRESS WHICH APPEARS AS MARGINAL NOTATION IN REF B DOCUMENT. FUDOUBLE-49 IDENTIFIED HANDWRITING AS THAT OF COLONEL ENRIQUE VALDEZ PUGA, VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, WHO HAD DOCUMENT IN HIS POSSESSION EVER SINCE IT RECEIVED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY (FUDOUBLE-49 DID NOT KNOW OF EXISTENCE OF REF B DOCUMENT UNTIL 15 OVTOBER, WHEN HE NOTED REFERENCE TO IT IN THE SECOND DOCUMENT DESCRIBED ABOVE). ADDRESS IS MIGUEL CLARO 1129, APARTMENT B, AND STATION OPERATING ON ASSUMPTION IT POSSIBLY BOSCH'S SANTIAGO ADDRESS.

8. FILE: 201-299292; 15-5-1/1. E2. IMPDET.

SECRET

201-299292

SECRET

STAFF

PAGE 01 OF 01

IN 008240

T0*1201905Z OCT 76

CARA 31234

SECRET 201915Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31234

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

1. WKSCARLET-17 (W-17) REPORTED ON [illegible] OCTOBER THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAS ADMITTED TO DISIP OFFICER THAT HE HAD CONTACT WITH THE NOVO (FNU) BROTHERS IN MIAMI SHORTLY BEFORE THE BOMBING DEATH OF ORLANDO LETELIER IN WASHINGTON ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1976. W-17 ACQUIRED ABOVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH DISIP OFFICERS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF DISIP INVESTIGATION OF BOSCH. AS YET THERE ARE NO AMPLIFYING DETAILS ON CONTACT AND OFFICERS DID NOT NOTE TO WHOM SPECIFICALLY ADMISSION WAS MADE.

2. SUGGEST ABOVE BE PASSED TO FBI, IF APPROPRIATE.

3. FILE: 201-0933924; 200-12-203/[illegible], E2, IMPDET.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

S E C R E T

272336Z CIA/DDO 924375

c/LA 8 [illegible]

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: [illegible] CHIEF, INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

FIRCI-312/03816-76

SUBJECT: CONTACT BETWEEN ORLANDO BOSCH AND THE NOVO BROTHERS IN MIAMI SHORTLY BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH 2: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

2. SINCE HIS ARREST ON 15 OCTOBER 1976 ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE LEADER, HAS ADMITTED TO AN OFFICIAL OF THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) THAT HE HAD CONTACT WITH THE NOVO BROTHERS, IN MIAMI SHORTLY BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER

DATE: 22 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

19 2 2

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

934175

DISSEM BY:

PER

FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO A NUMBER OF PRESS ARTICLES, IGNACIO NOVO AND GUILLERMO NOVO HAVE BEEN CHARGED BY SEVERAL OF THEIR COMPATRIOTS IN VENEZUELA AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER. IT IS BELIEVED THAT YOUR ~~AGENCY~~ BUREAU HAS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE NOVO BROTHERS, IGNACIO AND GUILLERMO.)V

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

[redacted]

BASED ON: CARACAS 31234 (IN 080249)
UKSCARLET (UKSCARLET-17)

OBJ: J

CI/R&A W. GODSON (TELECOORD)
C/LA/PNC Beardsley
C/LA/RR J. S. Bring

* CS SUGGESTS ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO 4U.

DATE: 27 OCTOBER 76
ORIG: M. GINN:AA
UNIT: LA/SB/CH
EXT: 3471

for

C/LA/SB

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19-2

SECRET

2300032 CIA 932740

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/IPAN C/LSN/10 C/OPS C/CI2 AG/ODO C/OPS/ITG2 D/OMS2 DISSEM BY: 47 PER SOP # 132

TO: IMMEDIATE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (INTD/3).Y

2P

SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS Y

SUBJECT: ARRIVAL IN PUERTO RICO OF CUBAN EXILE GUSTAVO CASTILLO Y

CIR-316/03981-76 Y

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ACQUIRED ABROAD IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND WHATEVER ACTION YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE. IT IS FELT THAT THE SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT MAY BE INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. ON 15 OCTOBER 1976 GUSTAVO CASTILLO, DPOB 28 APRIL 1946, HAVANA, CUBA, U.S. PASSPORT NUMBER 1764302, ARRIVED SANTO DOMINGO FROM CARACAS ON VIASA 970. AS CASTILLO LISTED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS BELONGING TO TERRORIST GROUP OF ORLANDO BOSCH, HE WAS NOT ALLOWED ENTER THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. DOMINICAN AUTHORITIES PLANNED TO PUT CASTILLO ON RETURN FLIGHT TO CARACAS, BUT THEY ACQUIESED TO HIS REQUEST TO BE PUT ON 15 OCTOBER DOMINICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 603 TO PUERTO RICO BECAUSE HE IS AN AMERICAN. CASTILLO IS REPORTED TO BE MILITARY CHIEF OF CUBAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. IT APPEARS HIS

Info sent to FBI

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 19 1976
MICROFILMED

316/03981-76
23 Oct 76
201-299292

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

RECORD COPY

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 2

S E C R E T

CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE 932740

DISSEM BY:

PER

DEPARTURE FROM CARACAS COINCIDES WITH THE PICKUP OF BOSCH IN VENEZUELA.Y

2. CIA TRACES, IF ANY, ON CASTILLO WILL BE SENT SEPARATELY.Y

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS 1.2.A

BASED ON: SANTO DOMINGO 17806, 22 OCTOBER 76.

CABLE SEC: PLS MAKE CCS COPY AVAILABLE TO IP/AN FOR 201-299292.

NOV 9 76

DQ

LN, ET3
Regina

DATE: 22 OCT 76
ORIG: LEN THERRY
UNIT: LA/CAR
EXT: 9156

LA/COG, TOM CLAYTON (TELECOORD)
AGC/DDO, TONY GOLDIN (TELECOORD)
LA/CAR

C/PCS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY: [illegible] PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 23 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT: C/LA8

ACTION #

INFO: RF, FILE, VR, [illegible] C/CI-4, C/PS/EG-2

C/LA/[illegible], EPS, C/PSG, C/SIA-2

T 324692 E14927 PAGE 01 IN 878163

TOR:2219062 OCT 76 SDOM 17803

S E C R E T 2218422 OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17803

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

REF: DIRECTOR 931119

1. STATION ASSUMES (BASED ON REPORTING FROM CARACAS) THAT POSSIBILITY OF CORU INVOLVEMENT IN LETELIER SLAYING IS UNDER ACTIVE LNERGO INVESTIGATION. CORU LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH LIVED IN SANTO DOMINGO SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE HIS DEPORTATION ON 29 AUGUST. HIGH RANKING CORU MEMBER EULALIO FRANCISCO (FRANK) CASTRO PAZ (201-742365), A U.S. CITIZEN MARRIED TO A DOMINICAN, LIVES IN SANTO DOMINGO. VIEW IN EMPYREX AND EMWISE, BASED IN PART ON CASTRO'S PATTERN OF EXTENSIVE TRAVEL, IS THAT HE IS BOSCH'S CONTACT MAN AND MESSENGER CARRIER TO CUBAN RIGHTEST GROUPS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. STATION PROPOSES CONCENTRATE ON DEVELOPING INFORMATION ON CORU AND ROLE OF FRANK CASTRO, INCLUDING POSSIBLE RESORT TO TELEPHONE TAPS, WITH MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF DETERMINING IF CORU INVOLVED ON ITS OWN OR AT BEHEST FOREIGN POWER IN LETELIER MURDER.

2. FOLLOWING CONTACTS/ASSETS MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE

(F1)

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-[illegible]

DO NOT DESTROY

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

PSON UNIT NOTIFIED ________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF . FILE . VR .

ACTION #

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 324692 EIA987 PAGE 02 IN 078163

TOR:2219062 OCT 76 SDOM 17803

TO EFFORT:

A. EMPYREX-20

B. EMFETCH-9

C. EMCLIPPER-1

D. EMPYREX-2

E. EMPYREX-8

F. EMGRANET-1

G. EMPYREX-14.

3. PROPOSE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. TALK TO EMPYREX-20 AND EMFETCH-9 TOGETHER AND ENLIST OFFICIAL SUPPORT OF EMPYREX AND EMWISE TO TARGET ON ASSOCIATES OF BOSCH/CASTRO IN SANTO DOMINGO. MAKE EFFORT TO RECRUIT PENETRATION OF CORU. MOUNT TELTAP OF CASTRO OR PERSONS WITH WHOM HE IN CONTACT.

B. INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO MONITOR CASTRO TRAVEL THROUGH EMCLIPPER-1 (UNILATERAL) AND EMPYREX-20 (LIAISON). WORK TO GET ADVANCE NOTICE OF TRAVEL.

C. WORKING THROUGH EMPYREX-2 (UNILATERAL) GET EMPYREX-8 IN MIAMI TO INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO DEVELOP INFORMATION ON CORU. (IF THIS APPROACH LOOKS PROMISING, COULD PROBABLY ARRANGE

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF . FILE . VR .

T 324692 EIA987 PAGE 23-23 IN 078163

TOR:2219062 OCT 76 SDOM 17803

THROUGH EMPYREX-2 TO HAVE SKHERALD OR LNERGO OFFICER MEET DIRECTLY WITH EMPYREX-2.)

D. HAVE EMGARNET-1 (UNILATERAL) STEP UP HIS CONTACTS IN SANTO DOMINGO AND ELSEWHERE WITH CUBANS KNOWN TO SYMPATHIZE WITH BOSCH. WOULD PLAN HAVE EMGARNET-1 TRAVEL TO MIAMI TO CONCENTRATE ON DEVELOPING LEADS. IN THIS CASE, HE SHOULD BE IN REGULAR TOUCH WITH SKHERALD OFFICER.

E. USE EMPYREX-14 (UNILATERAL) TO OBTAIN PHONE NUMBER LEADS FROM KEY CONTACT IN TELEPHONE COMPANY, MAINTAIN CAPABILITY FOR UNILATERAL TEP TAP.

4. FILE: 200-12-299/1, 201-681118, 201-299-292, 201-742365, E2, IMPDET.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 25 PER   TOTAL COPIES 27-2   RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED   BY   AT

ACTION UNIT: C/LA8

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR C/DAN, C/CI 4, C/OPS, C/PS/EG 2, C/OSG, C/SIA 2, C/OSG/ICG 2, C/OPS/ITG4

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 324085   EIA383   PAGE 01   IN 077831

ADDED: C/LA 8 VR FILE

TOR:221529Z OCT 76   102   MANA 12534

S E C R E T 221454Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12534

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

REF: DIRECTOR 931119

1. FOLLOWING KEYED TO PARA 3 REF REQUEST:

A. BELIEVE ERYTHROID-1 MAY BE ABLE TO SHED LIGHT ON POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONS SUCH AS 201-
ORLANDO BOSCH
~~299292~~ AND THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT (GON). VIW FACT PRESIDENT SOMOZA OPENLY SUPPORTIVE OF CUBAN EXILES AND THEIR OBJECTIVES, IT PROBABLE HE OR HIS AGENTS, SUCH AS MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, NOT ADVERSE TO ALLOWING EXILES TO USE NICARAGUA AS A SAFEHAVEN AND/OR SUPPORT BASE. CURRENT GON ATTITUDE PERHAPS BEST EXEMPLIFIED BY TARDY ANSWER RE DPARTURE OF 201-~~2~~99292 PROVIDED BY ERYTHROID-33 AND REPORTED TO HQS IN MANAGUA 12486. ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIPT OF ERHAPPY-1 201 FILE (REQUESTED DURING COS' RECENT HQS TDY) WHO MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE SOME USEFUL INSIGHT INTO LOCAL EXILE COMMUNITY.

076-LA-27/160876 OCT c/s

S E C R E T

FORM 3236
7-71 MFG 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 324085 EIA383 PAGE 02 IN 077831

TOR:221529Z OCT 76 MANA 12534

B. WILL TASK ERYTHROID-13 WITH ABOVE REQUIREMENT AT NEXT MEETING. ALSO PLAN TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH ERYTHROID-33 TO GET CURREN GON LINE. BELIEVE THIS
MAY ALSO LEAD ERYTHROID-3 TO DISCUSS SUBJECT WITH ERYTHROID-13 WHO MAY BE ABLE TO ELICIT INFORMATION RELATING TO REF.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS DESK REVIEWING 201 FILES OF FORMER STATION ASSETS IN EFFORT LOCATE CUBAN EXILE OR OTHER INDIVIDUAL WHO IN PAST PROVIDED ACCESS TO LOCAL EXILE COMMUNITY.

3. RE PARA 4 REF: IT POSSIBLE MANAGUA STATION EFFORTS MAY TIRN UP INFORMATION OF INTEREST ON 201-742365 FRANK CASTRO WHO CAME TO MANAGUA WITH 201-299292 - SEE MANAGUA 12461 AND MANAGUA 12470. DEPENDING ON WHAT INFORMATION MAY TURN UP INITIALLY, PLEASE ADVISE IF STATION MAY CONDUCT FOLLOWUP INVESTIGATION AND HOW INFORMATION ON THIS PERSON SHOULD BE RECORDED IN STATION AND REPORTED TO HQS.

4. FILE: 200-12-200/1. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

7-5

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT

LA 13

ACTION #

INFO FILE, VR, [redacted] PS/EG2, IP/AN, IID, OPS/INT 5, CI 4,

SS 4, OSG/IC 2

T 323958 E1A266 PAGE 01 IN 077749

TOR:221444Z OCT 76 SAGO 35326

S E C R E T 221413Z OCT 76 INTEL TDFIRDB-315/10576-76

HCS-10,772

CITE SANTIAGO 35326

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS. INC

WNINTEL

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR HQS REVIEW. PLEASE CALL THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT TO THE ATTENTION OF AMBASSADOR POPPER. SOURCE PARA 3-4 IS FUDOUBLE-49; PARAS 6-7 IS FUBARGAIN TAKEN FROM SANTIAGO 34147* AND 34309.* RELATED TO ODIK1A. NOT PASSED LOCAL LIAISON. INDEX: BOSCH AND OTERO. CL BY 04869.

FILE: 15-5-1/1.

FILED : 221413Z XXXXX

IID COMMENT: LIFTER CABLE SENT. SENT ELECTRICALLY TO S&S PER DESK REQUEST.

51

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 269292
DO NOT DESTROY

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 077749

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE and JCS/MC (DIA) CIA NMCC SWS NSA TREAS [illegible] SDO and CBS

(SY/I/PTB) SS/ID FTT SECUR

Classified by [illegible] Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B(1)(2) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIRDB-315/10576-76

DIST 22 OCTOBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: CHILE

DOI : MID-APRIL TO MID-OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: (U) CHILEAN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ON CUBAN EXILE LEADERS ORLANDO BOSCH AND ROLANDO OTERO

ACQ : CHILE, SANTIAGO (21 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HCS-10,272

SOURCE : SEE BELOW.

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 3-4: A MEDIUM LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS TO OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HIS REPORTING IS FAIRLY RELIABLE.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: SANTIAGO EMBASSY TELEGRAM 10107 OF 19 OCTOBER REPORTED THAT THE CHILEAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD BEEN KEEPING AN EYE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO P201-[illegible] BOSCH, AND WAS NOW REVIEWING ALL ITS INFORMATION, PRESUMABLY IN LIGHT OF HIS RECENT ARREST IN VENEZUELA.)

3. ON 15 OCTOBER, FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ASSEMBLED

SECRET

A FILE ON BOSCH AT THE REQUEST OF ADMIRAL PATRICIO CARVAJAL, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE FILE CONSISTS MAINLY OF EXCHANGES OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CONCERNING BOSCH'S ARREST IN SAN JOSE IN MARCH 1976, AND THE FACT THAT HE HAD CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION.

4. THE DOCUMENTS INCLUDED A BIRTH CERTIFICATE, IDENTITY CARD, TAX IDENTIFICATION CARD AND PASSPORT, ALL IN THE NAME OF RICARDO RAMON DAVANZO CERUTI. THE PASSPORT WAS ISSUED IN CHILE IN 1966, AND HAD NEVER BEEN RENEWED. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHILEAN PASSPORTS NORMALLY REQUIRE RENEWAL EVERY TWO YEARS.) THE PASSPORT CONTAINED ONE CHILEAN EXIT STAMP, DATED 1966, AND NO INDICATION THAT IT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN USED TO ENTER OR EXIT CHILE. IT CONTAINED MANY EXIT AND ENTRY STAMPS INDICATING EXTENSIVE TRAVEL BY ITS BEARER IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND PANAMA, BETWEEN 1966 AND MARCH 1976. THE PASSPORT AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION WAS SHOWN TO CHILEAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN SAN JOSE BY COSTA RICAN OFFICIALS; HOWEVER, THE COSTA RICANS DID NOT GIVE THE DOCUMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

14-00000

5. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 6-7: AN OFFICIAL CHILEAN SERVICE.

6. IN MID-APRIL 1976, THE DIRECTORATE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (DINA) RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT BOSCH HAD JUST ARRIVED IN CHILE WITH A CONTRACT TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH LEVEL CHILEAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (UNIDENTIFIED). ACCORDING TO DINA, BOSCH EVADED AN ARREST ACTION ON 18 APRIL, ESCAPING BY A MATTER OF MINUTES BUT LEAVING BEHIND ALL HIS CLOTHES AND TWO PASSPORTS.

7. ON 29 APRIL, DINA, HOWEVER, SUCCESSFULLY APPREHENDED ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ, AN ASSOCIATE OF BOSCH, WHO ALONG WITH THE LATTER WAS WANTED AS A FEDERAL FUGITIVE IN THE UNITED STATES. IN EARLY MAY, DINA INFORMED THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) OF OTERO'S ARREST, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TURNED OTERO OVER TO FBI AGENTS FOR RETURN AND PROCESSING IN THE UNITED STATES. (FIELD COMMENT: HVC-7328 (TDFIRDB-315/01696-76) FROM AN UNTESTED SOURCE WITH ACCESS TO CUBAN EXILES REPORTED THAT OTERO WAS PLANNING TO ASSASSINATE CHILEAN MARXIST EXTREMIST ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, AND THAT HE WAS WORKING UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. DINA'S ARREST AND DEPORTATION TO THE U.S. OF

15-5-1

OTERO RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ALLEGATION OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF OTERO AND HIS GROUP.)

8. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT SANTIAGO; SENT TO CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-1, 2.

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SWS NSA SS/ID FBI TREAS CIA/OPSCEN.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

S E C R E T

3000322 CIA/ 935633

CONF: 9LA 8 INFO: FILE Hitan, DDO3, DI/DC, 4ISNIID 4ORS, 4CI2

/13 1-

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R.K. MCHARGUE/
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.Y

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

FIRCI-311/01327-76

SUBJECT: (C) VIEW OF THE COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY ON THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER AND SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF OBRLANDO BOSCH Y

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH TWO: A MIDDLE-LEVEL FUNCTIONARY OF THE COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PVP) WHO HAS CLOSE CONTACTS IN THE PVP CENTRAL COMMITTEE. HE IS BELIEVED TO BE A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE.Y

2. DURING THE 23-25 OCTOBER 1976 PLENUM OF THE PVP, SENIOR PARTY OFFICIALS COMMENTED THAT ORLANDO LETELIER, FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, HAD BEEN KILLED BY RIGHTIST CUBAN EXILES BASED IN MIAMI AND UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA. ONE OF THE PARTY LEADERS SAID THAT THE CHILEAN NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DINA) HAD DIRECTLY FINANCED BOSCH'S GROUP IN THIS EFFORT AS IT HAD DONE PREVIOUSLY IN THE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS [illegible]
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

~~201-744479~~

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

18 2

SECRET

CIA/DDO

CONF INDEX FILE

935633

ABORTIVE ATTEMPT IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, TO KILL LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, FORMER SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR).Y

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

BASED ON: SAN JOSE 20052 (IN 083169)
HURUM (HURUM-9)
OBJ: J

DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: MARY GINN/LL
UNIT: LA/SU/CH/RR
EXT: 1471

C/LAD

C/LA/MCA
C/LA/RR
CI/RBA - W. GODSON (TELECOORD)

C/LA/SD

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18-6

SECRET

2930122 C/N000 934832

DISSEM: 49

CONF c/LA 8 INFO FILE VIFKAN c/LSW/10 c/OPS/INT
c/CI 2 0003 000/00

TO: PRIORITY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R.K. MCHARGUE/ GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, DEPT OF STATE/SY/I/PIB, SECRET SERVICE/INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.Y

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS-DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR Y

FIRDI-312/03225-76 Y

Chile

SUBJECT: 0 ADDITIONAL DATA ON CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS USED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA Y

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS THREE THROUGH SEVEN: A MEDIUM-LEVEL CHILEAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS TO OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HIS REPORTING IS FAIRLY RELIABLE. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL WHO SAW THE DOCUMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH OR USED TO ELICIT INFORMATION FROM OFFICIALS OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. Y

2. (FIELD COMMENT: HCS-10,772 (TDFIRDB-315/10576-76) FROM THE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

29 Oct 76
201-299292

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018952

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ORIG 0 0 0 3 P 3 2

SECRET

DIRECTOR CIA/DDO

CONF: INFO: FILE

934832

SAME SOURCE REPORTED CHILEAN CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN COSTA RICA IN EARLY 1976 CARRYING CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS. THIS REPORT PROVIDES FULL DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT AS REPORTED AT THE TIME BY THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA.) Y

3. ACCORDING TO SECRET AIRGRAM NUMBER 2 OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, DATED 16 MARCH 1976, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976 ON SUSPICION OF BEING INVOLVED IN A PLOT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. BOSCH WAS CHARGED WITH HAVING ENTERED COSTA RICA ILLEGALLY USING DOCUMENTATION IN TBHE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI. AS OF 16 MARCH 1976, BOSCH WAS UNDER DETENTION IN CARTAGO, COSTA RICA. THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT WAS STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPELLING HIM BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FIND A COUNTRY WILLING TO ACCEPT HIM. Y

4. WHEN ARRESTED, BOSCH WAS CARRYING THE FOLLOWING CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS:

A. A BIRTH CERTIFICATE IN THE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 016958

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

64/020

CONF: INFO: FILE

924832

DAVANZO CINTOLESI, ISSUED BY THE CIVIL REGISTRY OFFICE OF THE QUINTA NORMAL (A SANTIAGO SUBURB) ON 6 AUGUST 1975. THE CERTIFICATE WAS SIGNED BY ALBERTO CASAL, A CIVIL REGISTRY SECTION CHIEF, AND REFLECTED A BIRTH DATE OF 6 AUGUST 1927, REGISTRY NUMBER 953 OF THE LAS BARRANCAS (A LOWER-CLASS SANTIAGO SUBURB) INSCRIPTION OFFICE. THE PARENTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS HECTOR DAVANZO AND AMALIA ENRIQUETA CINTOLESI. Y

B. CHILEAN IDENTITY CARD NUMBER 2357422, ISSUED IN SANTIAGO. THE CARD ALSO LISTED A TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF 2,357,422-5. (FIELD COMMENT: NO DATE OF ISSUANCE WAS REPORTED FOR THIS ITEM.) Y

C. AN AUTOMOBILE TITLE FOR A SIMCA 1000, ISSUED BY THE SANTIAGO PROPERTY REGISTRY OFFICE ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1966 AND BEARING REGISTRY NUMBER 8882712. Y.

D. CHILEAN ORDINARY (RED COVER) PASSPORT NUMBER 26583, ISSUED 25 SEPTEMBER 1975, IN THE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI. THE PASSPORT CONTAINS PRINTING OFFICE REGISTRY NUMBER 14441-1975, AND THE SIGNATURES OF VICTORIA MORAN DOREN AND MARIA ELENA SELMAN AS ISSUING OFFICERS. IT CONTAINS THE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONF: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

4

S E C R E T

STAFF

CAPDO [redacted]

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER

934832

APPROPRIATE TAX STAMPS, WATERMARKS, AND SEAL ON THE PHOTOGRAPH. Y

5. THE CHILEAN PASSPORT CARRIED BY BOSCH CONTAINED ENTRY AND EXIT STAMPS INDICATING THE FOLLOWING TRAVEL:

A. EXIT FROM CHILE VIA PUDAHUEL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 28 DECEMBER 1975. Y

B. ENTRY AND EXIT FROM PANAMA VIA TOCUMEN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 29 DECEMBER 1975. Y

C. ENTRY IN EL SALVADOR ON 29 DECEMBER 1975. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF ENTRY OR SUBSEQUENT EXIT WAS RECORDED.) Y

D. ENTRY IN COSTA RICA ON 7 JANUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF ENTRY WAS REPORTED.) Y

E. EXIT FROM COSTA RICA AND ENTRY INTO NICARAGUA ON 30 JANUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF EXIT OR ENTRY WAS REPORTED.) Y

F. EXIT FROM NICARAGUA AND ENTRY INTO COSTA RICA ON 6 FEBRUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF EXIT OR ENTRY WAS REPORTED.) Y

6. BOSCH REMAINED IN SAN JOSE FROM 6 FEBRUARY 1976 UNTIL HIS ARREST ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976. ACCORDING TO A SECRET SOURCE OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, BOSCH OBTAINED THE FALSE IDENTITY

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

S E C R E T

REPRODUC[illegible] BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR[illegible]ITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0[illegible]

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

[redacted]

CIA/DDO [redacted]

0 DISSEM BY:

COMP: INFO: FILE

934832 0

0 PER

0

DOCUMENTS FROM A FRIEND IN CHILE WHO IS A COLONEL IN ONE OF THE BRANCHES OF THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SECRET SOURCE OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY WAS NOT IDENTIFIED, BUT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THE SOURCE ALLOWED A CHILEAN EMBASSY OFFICER TO EXAMINE BOSCH'S FALSE IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, IT WAS PROBABLY GONZALO FACIO, COSTA RICAN FOREIGN MINISTER. IT IS NOT KNOWN IF IN FACT THE CHILEAN EMBASSY'S SECRET SOURCE FAILED TO PROVIDE THE IDENTITY OF THE CHILEAN COLONEL OR IF THE [redacted]PREPARER OF THE REPORT PHRASED IT IN THIS MANNER IN ORDER TO AVOID DIFFICULTIES WITH HIS SUPERIORS.)

7. THE REPORT WAS SIGNED BY FRANCISCO CRUZ PACHECO, CHILEAN CHARGE IN SAN JOSE. (SOURCE COMMENT: CRUZ IS NORMALLY THE CHILEAN CONSUL IN SAN JOSE, BUT WAS CHARGE IN MARCH 1976 DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR ON LEAVE. IN OCTOBER 1976, CRUZ WAS SUDDENLY RECALLED FROM SAN JOSE SHORT OF TOUR, AND IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN SANTIAGO IN LATE OCTOBER. THE REASON GIVEN WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR CRUZ' RECALL IS THAT A NIECE OF PRESIDENT AUGUSTO PINOCHET HAD OCCASION TO REQUEST CONSULAR ASSISTANCE FROM HIM DURING A PRIVATE VISIT TO COSTA RICA, AND FOUND HIM [redacted]ABSENT FROM HIS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-299292

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

6

SECRET

[redacted]

CIA/DDO [redacted]

CONF: INFO: FILE

934832

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

OFFICE DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS. UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS IN THE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, THIS IS A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION, AND THERE IS NO CONTRADICTORY INFORMATION AVAILABLE.}Y

8. THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADORS IN SANTIAGO, CARACAS AND SAN JOSE AND THE LEGAL ATTACHE INE CARACAS.Y

9. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2. H

BASED ON: SANTIAGO 35351 |IN 081640|
HCS-10,775
FUSMIRK {FUDOUBLE-49}
OBJ: J

CI/R&A (W. Goodson) telecond

C/LA/RR J. C. Benin

C/LA/OPS

C/LA/MCA

C/LA/PNC Beardsley

DATE: 28 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: MARY GINN
UNIT: XB/LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

DC/LAD

C/LA/SB

REPRODUCTIO OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI E 2 IMPDET
CL BY

FBI CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 28 OCTOBER 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN PROTEST REGARDING ALLEGED FBI INFORMATION WHICH APPEARED IN THE N.Y. TIMES ON OCT. 24, 1976

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
DIRECTOR 932728	22 Oct 76	73	6	46	/3

DOC. SUBJECT
PLMHBLANKET

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

PER 20 OCT 76 ISSUE OF WASHINGTON POST, ORLANDO BOSCH IS DESCRIBED AS A RIGHT-WING CUBAN EXILE LEADER WHO IS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF THE CUBAN AIRPLANE ON 6 OCT AND THE MURDER OF ORLANDO LETELIER ON 21 SEPT. BOSCH IS APPARENTLY NOW UNDER ARREST IN VENEZUELA AS A RESULT OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THESE ACTIVITIES. THE POST ARTICLE SAYS THAT BOSCH IS THE LEADER OF AN ANTI-CASTRO UMBRELLA GROUP KNOWN AS THE UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION. BOSCH IS WANTED IN MIAMI FOR A PAROLE VIOLATION STEMMING FROM THE 1968 CONVICTION FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)
BOSCH, Orlando Avila

201- 299292

FORM 10-78 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (7-40)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY BJ/H! PER   TOTAL COPIES 38-1   RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED   BY   AT

STAFF

ACTION UNIT
LA8
ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR 18(AN), DDO3, REC/DDO, OPS/ITG 4, NE8, CI 4, PS/EG2, OS6, S/OPS, SIA2,

T 323732   EIA147   PAGE 01-01   IN 076560

TOR:211625Z OCT 76   SJOS 20031

S E C R E T 211541Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 20031

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL REAM HUFABRIC MHSPIKE

1. LOCAL LIAISON HAS REQUESTED STATION ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING DETAILS COSTA RICAN PASSPORT REPORTEDLY USED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA TO ENTER VENEZUELA. LIAISON HAS TRIED TO OBTAIN INFO DIRECTLY FROM VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES WITHOUT SUCCESS.

2. ANY DATA CARACAS MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ON THE COSTA RICAN PASSPORT WHICH MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON WILL BE APPRECIATED.

3. FILE: ~~201-300785~~, 18-6-20/3. E2 IMPDET

TRAVEL PROGRAM

RECORD COPY

21 Oct 76

SECRET

D18-6-20/3

201-299292

Terrorist Plot by Rightist Cuban Exiles See

By Joanne Omang

Washington Post Foreign Service

CARACAS, Venezuela, Oct. 19—Venezuelan police have uncovered what they believe to be wide-ranging plans by right-wing Cuban exiles to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States and six other nations, according to a newspaper report here.

The respected Caracas newspaper El Nacional said today that the alleged terrorist acts by anti-Castro agents included the killing of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean ambassador to the United States, in Washington last month, and the bombing of a Cuban airliner off Barbados Oct. 6. The plane crash killed 78 persons.

Venezuelan police have already arrested a group of anti-Castro Cubans including right-wing Cuban exile leader Orlando Bosch, in connection with the Cuban plane crash. At least 14 persons have been arrested by Venezuelan security agents and about 30 other Cuban refugees called in for questioning, according to United Press International.

[In Washington, sources close to the investigation of the bombing death of former Ambassador Letelier have said that Bosch is wanted for questioning. Bosch is not, however, regarded at this time as a target of the Letelier investigation, the sources said.]

El Nacional said that the rightest Cuban terrorist plans were discovered in a raid on a private home in Caracas during the investigation of the Cuban plane crash. The reported terrorist acts were planned to take place in the United States, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, Panama and Colombia, the newspaper said. Past acts related to these plans included the bombing of Guyana's consulate in Trinidad and Tobago, according to the newspaper account.

The wide-ranging terrorist plans reported by El Nacional today were the latest development in a broad investigation in several nations of the Letelier killing, the Cuban plane crash and other incidents.

Letelier, a former ambassador to Washington, foreign minister and minister of defense in the government of the late Chilean President Salvador Allende, died Sept. 21 when a bomb exploded beneath his car as he drove along Washington's Embassy Row.

[In Washington, sources close to the Letelier investigation said Tuesday that they expect Bosch to be returned to the United States and to be questioned about Letelier's death. A State Department source said the United States is urging Venezuela to return him informally as an undesirable alien rather than to go through formal extradition procedures.

[Bosch is the leader of a rightist anti-Castro umbrella group known as the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations. He is wanted in Miami, Fla., for a parole violation stemming from his 1968 conviction for attacks on Polish and other foreign ships.]



ORLANDO BOSCH
... detained in Venezuela

The Caracas newspaper El Nacional has previously reported that Cuban exiles arrested in Caracas have implicated two brothers—identified only as the "Novos"—in the Letelier killing. (The paper's reference was apparently to Ignacio and Guillermo Novo, who were indicted in 1963 on charges of firing a bazooka at the United Nations. The indictments were later quashed on the ground that their constitutional rights were violated when confessions were taken from them. Guillermo Novo was convicted in 1974 in connection with a 1969 bombing incident and sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment and 5 years' probation. No more could be learned of Ignacio Novo.)

In Caracas this week, a high government source disclosed apparent links between the present Chilean military junta and the Cuban exile community in Venezuela. Critics of the Chilean government have accused it of taking part in the Letelier killing. Chilean officials have denied any link to Letelier's death and denounced his murder.

The Venezuelan government source said that the Chilean government has helped finance activities by rightist Cuban exiles against the Cuban government of Prime Minister Fidel Castro. "We've known it for years, but there's no way to do anything about it," the source said.

This and other sources also ported that Bosch was among se Cubans who regularly made trips Santiago, Chile. A Venezuelan nalist has letters written to him Bosch last January. The letters return addresses of apartments to be used for guests of the Chi government.

Authorities in Trinidad have tained two suspects, Hernan Lozano and Freddy Lara, in tion with the Cuban plane crash, cording to information reaching from Trinidad. Ricardo was carry an address book listing the numbers of the U.S. ambassador a an FBI agent stationed at the U.S. bassy here. A U.S. embassy spok man said the embassy did not why Ricardo — who reportedly fessed planting the bomb — had phone numbers.

[The Institute for Policy Studies [illegible]-based leftist think tan where Letelier worked until his dea reported Monday that it had been by the FBI that FBI agents were f ing to Venezuela in connection w the investigation. Sources close to investigation and the Institute said Tuesday however that no F agents would fly to Venezuela. stead, the sources said, the FBI stationed in Caracas as the legal attache would help pursue investigation.]

The Washington Post
20 October 1976

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 5 PER TOTAL COPIES 34-1 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA AT 1345

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/LA5

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DDO3 AGC/DDO, C/PS/ITG 4 C/NEG C/EPS C/IPS/AN C/CI/ C/PS/EG 2

T 328618 EIA826 PAGE 01-01 IN 076506

TOR:2115412 OCT 76 CARA 31192

SECRET 211454Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31192

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT MHSPIKE KMSTONE

1. AMBASSADOR WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AT OUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE RESUME OF ORLANDO BOSCH'S TRAVELS FROM BEGINNING OF 1974 TO PRESENT. HE IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ALLEGED TRIP TO CHILE WHICH VENEZUELAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CONTACT HAS MENTIONED DURING TALK ON CUBANA BOMBING CASE.

2. FILE: 201-0299292. E2, IMPDET.

P/CR		LOGIC PROGRAM
	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
P/CR.T		PREPARE FOR FILMING
P/CR		CODE NO. (2, 3)
		RYBAT REST. COD:
		CABLE MGH (11)
		NFO (0)
		FOR FILMING

RECORD COPY

SECRET

201-299292

21 Oct 76

SECRET

201 DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

BOSCH, ORLANDO	
201-0299292	075-008-015
SEX M	CARA-31189
	20 OCT 76
CIT CUBA	HVC-07522

RES VENZ, CUBAN EXILE LDR, CUBAN GOVT HOLDS SUBJ DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR 6 OCT 76 BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINER. CUBANS WILL REQUEST HE BE TURNED OVER TO THEM FOR PROSECUTION. CUBAN GOVM INTENDS TO LIQUIDATE SUBJ EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW

DATE 01 NOV 76 09446974

201-299292

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 05497

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ORF B 0 0 0 0 0 0 L

SECRET

STAFF 201700Z DIRECTOR 930679

CONF: 1A5 INFO: FILE EUR4 14 OPS/ITG 4

TO: PRIORITY LONDON.

UNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE TRACE

REFS: A. LONDON 77234 (IN69943)

B. DIRECTOR 917974

1. RE REF A, HQS HAS EXTENSIVE TRACES ON ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA (201-0299292), WHO IS LEADER OF CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION AND BELIEVED TO BE A "U.S. PERSON". WE ASSUME BOSCH IS THE BUSH OF REF A. SINCE BOSCH IS BELIEVED TO BE A "U.S. PERSON", HOWEVER, WE MUSBT COMPLY WITH REF B BEFORE PASSING INFO TO JAGUAR.

2. PLEASE PROVIDE THE DETAILS AND JUSTIFICATION REQUESTED IN REF B SO WE CAN PROCESS JAGUAR'S REQUEST.

3. FILE: 201-0299292. E2. IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: REF A: REQUESTED PRIORITY TRACES ON BOSCH FOR PASSAGE TO JAGUAR.

REF B: BOOK CABLE [redacted] PROVIDING GUIDANCE TO STATIONS AND BASES ON COLLECTION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING "U.S. PERSONS".

20 Oct 76

201-299292

DATE: 19 OCTOBER 76
ORIG: KAREN CRANDALL/MS
UNIT: LA/COG/CI
EXT: 7808/3443

RECORD COPY

EUR/BC

DC/EURO
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/COG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

PAPER SCORES ACTIVITIES OF CUBANS IN MEXICO

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 2256 GMT 19 Oct 76 FL

[Text] The Mexican daily EL DIA in today's edition denounces the existence of real ties between the Latin American dictatorships and the organizations of Cuban counterrevolutionaries financed by the CIA. The daily affirms that the sabotage of a Cubana de Aviacion airliner has uncovered the radius of activities of the so-called worms and their ties with the North American State Department, the CIA and the fascist dictatorships of the continent.

The daily adds that the investigations into the sabotage of the aircraft have delineated the profile of a sinister personage called Orlando Bosch to whom Pinochet's junta assigned the task of assassinating Chilean revolutionary Andres Pascal Allende.

The daily mentions the charges filed against Bosch, implicating him in the assassination of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier and in placing a bomb on the Cuban aircraft destroyed off Barbados.

Bosch 201

HAVANA COMMENTARY EQUATES CIA WITH NAZI SS

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1730 GMT 19 Oct 76 FL

["Inside the News" commentary by Rafael Berastegui--read by announcer]

[Excerpts] Since its very beginning, the repressive institutions created by the capitalist production system have included espionage organizations.

The criminal machinery at the service of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, perhaps can be compared to a degree to the one which, in the days of Hitler's Germany, obeyed the orders of the SS chief Heinrich Himmler.

The Central Intelligence Agency, which was created at the end of the decade of the forties in the midst of the cold war against the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialist camp, also has as its official function the centralization of intelligence supplied by the different North American espionage organizations to facilitate the decisions of the U.S. president.

But the book "The Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti, a former high CIA official, acknowledges that unofficially the fundamental mission of the agency is to carry out the decisions of the President which, if implemented by other public bodies, could cause difficulties. Even though it recruits all types of mercenaries, the established image of the CIA agent is the same stereotype of the supposed superman of the SS troops used by the fascist propaganda.

During the war against the Vietnamese people, the United States confined in so-called strategic hamlets entire populations of southern peasants who were scrutinized by and under the custody of civilians working for the agency.

A special department of the Central Intelligence Agency has the exclusive task of carrying out actions that attest its criminal nature such as coups d'etat abroad, economic destabilizations, attempts against the lives of leaders and others.

Equally, the CIA offers counseling to reactionary regimes in the methodic torture of its opponents. The sinister traditions of the SS troops and its modern continuator, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, coincide in many concrete ways.

Let us cite as last example a CIA protege which bears the initials DINA, considered to be the Gestapo of the Chilean military junta and whose last known villainy is the assassination of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier in Washington. The DINA was organized by [Walter Rauche], a former official of Hitler's SS troops who designed the gas chambers for the NAZI concentration camps.

CUBA SCORES RECRUITMENT OF MERCENARIES FOR US

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 2232 GMT 19 Oct 76 FL

[Text] Cuba today denounced before the United Nations the recruitment of mercenaries in Western Europe and the United States and their use against national liberation movements and legitimately constituted governments.

The Cuban delegate to the UN Commission on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs, Miguel Alfonso, declared that there are reliable reports on the increased recruitment of mercenaries as a result of the changes that have taken place in the political panorama of the African Continent.

Alfonso demanded the creation of international mechanisms that would forbid such activities and offered the cooperation of the Cuban Government in attaining such a goal. The Cuban delegate stressed that the FRG, the United States, France and Great Britain have maintained a growing pace of capital investment and a flow of technologically advanced arms to South Africa.

Miguel Alfonso indicated that the manner and the means with which the peoples struggle for self-determination have not been delineated in the UN Charter or in international accords on human rights. Restricting the peoples from using the means at their disposal--including armed struggle--in the face of the violence unleashed by those subjugating them would practically amount to keeping them at the mercy and benevolence of those oppressing them, Alfonso pointed out.

The Cuban delegate added that Puerto Rico has been transformed into an appendage of the North American economy. It is impossible, Alfonso said, to pretend to be defenders of self-determination in Zimbabwe and at the same time practice colonialism in the Caribbean and neocolonialism in other places.

HAVANA LASHES AT IMPERIALISM'S HIRING OF MERCENARIES

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 20 Oct 76 FL

[Alberto D. Perez commentary]

[Text] Imperialism headed by the United States has increasingly resorted to the recruitment of mercenaries to attack legitimately constituted governments or peoples struggling for freedom. Let us recall, for example, that in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia the CIA recruited what it euphemistically termed irregular forces to assist it in its efforts to crush the massive insurrection of the Indochinese peoples in the zone occupied by the enemy.

Against the legitimate government of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, a government determined to end the terrible economic and social situation of the African population caused by the greedy actions of the mining transnationals and centuries of colonial exploitation, the imperialists also used mercenary armies. The former Belgian Congo, known today as Zaire, continues to pay the consequences of these actions of imperialism.

SECRET

DDO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

BOSCH, ORLANDO
201-0299292 075-005-009
SEX M CARA-31174
19 OCT 76
CIT CUBA HVC-07521
P3

CUBAN EXILE LEADER CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION BY VENE AUTHORITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER 6 OCT 76. MET WITH LUIS POSADA /201-0300985/ IN COSTA RICA IN SEPT. SHORTLY BEFORE COMING TO VENE.
RES VENE.

DATE 27 OCT 76 09446117

201-299292

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

STATE CABLES

FROM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA COVERAGE OF CUBANA CRASH AFTERMATH

FROM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: LETELIER ASSASSINATION: ORLANDO BOSCH

SECRET

ACTION UNIT
LA 13

FILE, VR, [illegible], PS/EG2, IP/AN, IID, OPS/INT 5
CI 4, SS 4, SS/SOG 4, OSG/IC 2, OPS/ITG 4,
FR 5

T 314352 EIAC26 PAGE 01 IN 273655
TOR:191757Z OCT 76 CARA 31174

S E C R E T 191516Z OCT 76 INTEL
TDFIRDB-315/10454-76
HVC-7521

CITE CARACAS 31174

TO: DIRECTOR INFO PORT OF SPAIN.

WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE

Chile

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR RESOLUTION CARACAS 31137. SOURCE DESCRIPTION, AND RELIABILITY STATEMENT, WKDIET-3. SOURCE PARAS 2-3 WKMAYOR/WKSCARLET-17. SOURCE PARAS 5-8 NP/WKDIET-3 FROM WKNOBLE-24. SOURCE PARAS 10-11: WKNOBLE/WKNOBLE-8 - SOURCE DESCRIPTION FOR APPROVAL, NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: K.1.A. INDEX ALL NAMES. FILE: 75-5-9.

FILED: 19/1516Z XXXXX

LIFTER SENT. PER LA INSTRUCTION, FOLLOWING DELETED FROM SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 4 TO THAT IN TEXT. "HE IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE REPORTER."

SECRET

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

O ROUTINE

IN 073[illegible]

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE [illegible]

[illegible]

AND

Classified by [illegible] Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category [illegible] Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIRDB-315/10454-76

DIST 19 OCTOBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE FOR FOREIGN NATIONALS NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

DOI: MID-OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO TIE THE SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY TO INDIVIDUALS LINKED TO THE BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (16 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7521

SOURCE: SEE BELOW.

SUMMARY: OFFICIALS OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO FULLY INVESTIGATE THE VENEZUELAN CONNECTIONS TO THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. UNOFIFICIALLY, HOWEVER, DISIP OFFICERS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BUILD A CASE LINKING COPEI TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS IMPLICATED IN THE INCIDENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, DISIP OFFICERS FEAR THAT INFORMATION LINKING SOME DISIP OFFICIALS TO CUBAN EXILE ORLANDO BOSCH MIGHT BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, EMBARRASSING THE GOVERNMENT AND FURTHER TAINTING DISIP. END OF SUMMARY.

SECRET

FORM 8-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 073859

TDFIR DB-315/10454-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 2-3: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

2. WHILE OFFICIALS OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) HAVE RECEIVED OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO CARRY OUT A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION OF ALL VENEZUELANS CONNECTED WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER, UNOFFICIALLY DISIP OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO CONCENTRATE THEIR INVESTIGATION ON MEMBERS OF THE SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY (COPEI). DISIP OFFICIALS, THEREFORE, HAVE DRAWN UP A LIST OF LOW TO MEDIUM-LEVEL OFFICIALS OF COPEI WHOM DISIP INTENDS TO TIE TO LUIS POSADA, A FORMER DISP OFFICER WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING. AS CURRENTLY PLANNED, DISIP WILL BEGIN PICKING UP THESE COPEI LEADERS FOR QUESTIONING DURING THE WEEK OF 18 OCTOBER. (SOURCE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH POSADA DOES HAVE COPEI CONNECTIONS, MOST DISIP OFFICERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT COPEI PLAYED A ROLE IN POSADA'S ANTI-CUBAN ACTIVITIES. RATHER THEY

14-00000

BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS ATTEMPTING TO IMPLICATE COPEI FOR POLITICAL REASONS.)

3. AT THE SAME TIME THAT IT IS WORKING ON ITS CASE AGAINST COPEI, DISIP OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED THAT INFORMATION CONNECTING DISIP OFFICIALS AND CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, WILL BECOME PUBLIC. SUCH REVELATIONS, DISIP OFFICERS BELIEVE WOULD BE HIGHLY EMBARRASSSING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRESA PEREZ AND DISASTEROUS FOR DISIP, WHICH HAS RECENTLY BEEN HURT BY CHARGES OF MISTREATING PRISONERS ACCUSED OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPING OF WILLIAM F. NIEHOUS.

4. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 5-8: A VENEZUELAN WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

5. ON 14 OCTOBER DISIP DIRECTOR RETIRED GENERAL RAUL GIMENEZ GAINZA SAID THAT PRESIDENT PEREZ HAD ORDERED HIM TO CARRY OUT AN EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION OF THE VENEZUELAN CONNECTION IN THE CUBANA INCIDENT. ALTHOUGH GIMENEZ SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO CARRY OUT THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS, HE PERSONALLY FEARED THAT SUCH AN INVESTIGATION MIGHT LEAD TO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES OR TO COPEI LEADERS. IN EITHER CASE, GIMENEZ SAID

3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 073859

TDFIR DB-315/10454-76

PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THAT HE FELT THERE COULD BE DIFFUCLTIES FOR THE PEREZ ADMINISTRATION.

6. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, GIMENEZ SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY CONCERNED THAT ORLANDO GARCIA, PRESIDENT PEREZ' INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ADVISER WHO HAS BEEN ACTING AS DE FACTO HEAD OF DISIP, MIGHT BE IMPLICATED. GIMENEZ QUICKLY ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE LINKING GARCIA TO THE BOMBING INCIDENT, BUT THAT HE IS KNOWN TO BE INVOLVED IN UNSPECIFIED ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES. GIMENEZ SAID THAT AS AN ADDED PRECAUTION HE HAS ASSIGNED SPECIAL GUARDS FOR BOSCH AND POSADA, BOTH OF WHOM ARE CURRENTLY UNDER DISIP DETENTION.

7. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON BOSCH'S RECENT ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA AND POSADA'S AND GARCIAS'S CONNECTION WITH HIM SEE HVC-7514, TDFIRDB-315/10256-76, FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. IN NEWS BROADCASTS A LOCAL TELEVISION STATION (CHANNEL 2) HAS REPORTED THAT SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS CURRENTLY HOLDING POSITIONS WITH DISIP WERE SEEN ABOUT CARACAS WITH BOSCH. THE STATION INDICATED THAT IT WOULD REVEAL THE IDENTITIES OF THESE OFFICERS AT A LATER DATE.)

SECRET

8. AS FOR A POSSIBLE COPEI CONNECTION WITH THE CUBAN EXILE MOVEMENT IN VENEZUELA, GIMENEZ DENIED THAT HE OR THE PEREZ ADMINISTRATION ARE ATTEMPTING TO IMPLICATE COPEI IN THE INVESTIGATION FOR POLITICAL REASONS. THE FACT IS, GIMENEZ SAID, MANY PEOPLE WITH COPEI CONNECTIONS APPEAR TO BE INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND THEY MAY HAVE HAD THE BACKING OF UNSPECIFIED COPEI LEADERS. (FIELD COMMENT: VARIOUS SOURCES HAVE INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED THAT VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN CONVINCED THAT POSADA'S PRIVATE INVESTIGATION COMPANY KNOWN AS COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL INVESTIGATIONS (ICI) WAS BEING USED BY COPEI.)

9. SOURCE OF PARAGRAHS 10-11: AN AD PARTY ACTIVIST WITH GOOD ACCESS TO HIGH LEVELS IN THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.

10. THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IS AWARE THAT GARCIA AND POSADA TRAVELLED TO COSTA RICA TOGETHER SHORTLY BEFORE BOSCH CAME TO VENEZUELA FROM COSTA RICA IN SEPTEMBER. THE OBJECT OF THEIR TRAVEL TO COSTA RICA WAS TO MEET WITH BOSCH.

11. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONCERN WITHIN THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF THE RELATIVE LARGE NUMBER OF CUBAN EXILES

IN 073859

TDFIR DB-315/10454-76

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

HOLDING POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE WITHIN THE VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS GROWING ALARM WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT THAT THESE EXILES MAY HAVE GOTTEN VENEZUELA INTO A DIFFICULT SITUATION.

12. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS: SENT TO PORT OF SPAIN. REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 3 PER TOTAL COPIES 12

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT U8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IP/AN C/SINT

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 314727 EIA398 PAGE 01 IN 073952

TOR:192007Z OCT 76 SAGO 35307

S E C R E T 191942Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 35307

TO: DIRECTOR,

WNINTEL INTEL

REF: DIRECTOR 885958

1. REF PROVIDED A SUMMARY OF HQS TRACES ON ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA. COULD HQS PLEASE PROVIDE THE SOURCE FOR THE APRIL 1976 PORTION REFERRING TO HIS ALLEGED PRESENCE IN CHILE TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH LEVEL CHILEAN OFFICIAL AND FACT THAT HE ESCAPED AN ATTEMPT TO ARREST HIM, LEAVING BEHIND A CHILEAN AND ECUADOREAN PASSPORT.

2. EMBASSY HAS A REPORT (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM) THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS REVIEWING ALL INFO IN ITS FILES ON BOSCH. STATION WILL TRY TO OBTAIN MORE ON THIS FROM FUDOUBLE-49 OR OTHER APPROPRIATE SOURCE.

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

RAT

[illegible]

LA/COG

RECORD COPY

19 Oct 76

201-299292

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

13-2

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1

S E C R E T

1801202

~~[illegible]~~

~~806789~~

CONF: C/LA7 INFO: FILE 000, DDO/DO, C/P/AN, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS

0 DISSEM BY: 45

0

0 PER 501

0 # 132

TO: PRIORITY FBI//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION/WSS/ID.Y

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS Y

SUBJECT: FRANK CASTRO Y

CIR-316/20.041-76 Y

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO TDFIRDB-315/01696-76 WHICH PROVIDED INFORMATION ON A POSSIBLE ATTEMPT ON THE LIBFE OF A RELATIVE OF FORMER PRESIDENT OF CHILE, SALVADOR ALLENDE, TO BE CARRIED OUT SOMETIME SOON AFTER 17 FEBRUARY 1976. ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN THIS ATTEMPT, WHOSE NAME DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE FOREGOING DISSEMINATION, IS FRANK CASTRO, A CUBAN EXILE WHO WAS NATURALIZED AS US CITIZEN IN NOVEMBER 1971 AND WHO IS WELL KNOWN TO THE FBI.Y

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

BASED ON CARACAS 29119 IN

PROJECT(SOURCE): NP/UKSCARLET-3

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

201-Bosch

201-[illegible]

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019403

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2

SECRET

COMP: INFO: FILE

808789

0
0
0 PER
0

OBJ: J

Gf
Frank [illegible]

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: HOWARD BRUBAKER
UNIT: LA/NW/V
EXT: 1535

[illegible] DDO/PO
C/3/LSN

C/[illegible]

C/LA/NW

REPRODU[illegible]ION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS [illegible]HIBITED. E 2 IMPDET

FBI CABLES

FROM DIRECTOR FBI
DATE: 16 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: AIUO
SUBJECT: SUSPECTED BOMBING OF CUBAN AIRLINES
DC-8 NEAR BARBADOS, WEST INDIES, OCT 6,76

FROM DIRECTOR FBI
DATE 16 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: AIUO
SUBJECT: SUSPECTED BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINES DC-8
NEAR BARBADOS, WEST INDIES, OCT. 6, 1976

Cuban Exiles Arrested In Crash of Airliner

CARACAS, Venezuela, Oct. 14 (AP)—Vene[illegible] authorities announced tonight the arrests of Cuban bana Airlines crash that killed 73 persons near th exile leader Orlando Bosch and several other persons in connection with the investigation of a Cu island of Barbados.

The Interior Ministry said evidence had been found linking one of those arrested, Cuban-born Venezuelan citizen Luis Posada Carriles, with two Venezuelans being held in Port of Spain, Trinidad in connection with the Oct. 6 creash.

The DC-8 jet, operated by Cubana Airlines under lease from Air Canada, reported explosions on board and plunged into the sea off Barbados shortly after takeoff from Bridgetown airport. There were no survivors.

Cuban officials said later that sabotage was a possibility and a group calling itself El Condor telephoned the Miami Herald and claimed it had planted a magnetic bomb aboard the aircraft.

(Bosch is wanted in the United States for questioning on Miami-area attacks laid to exile groups under his umbrella organization. Federal investigators in the case of Chilean exile Orlando Letelier, killed by a bomb in Washington, indicated last week that they have under scrutiny Cuban exiles [illegible] linked to Bosch.)

Washington Post
15 Oct 76
Friday

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER Sei'11 TOTAL COPIES 12-1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA BY AT 1310

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT
LA5

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR Jthn/ EVR4

T 304707 EIA625 PAGE 01-01 IN 069943

TOR:1512512 OCT 76 LOND 77214

SECRET 1511352 OCT 76 STAFF

CITE LONDON 77214

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

AKULE REAM MHSPIKE TRACE

1. JAGUAR REQUESTED PRIORITY TRACES ON ONE ORLANDO BUSH (PH). ONLY INFO ON SUBJ IS HE LEADER OF CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

2. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET

IP/DIS	☒	TRAVEL PROGRAM
		ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/CI,V		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP,FIB		FILE NO. (7, 8)
		[illegible] CODE
		[illegible] (11)
		[illegible] (9)
		FOR FILING

dly

15 Oct 76

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-299292

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL OF TDFIR INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIG.	HARRIET WEILER	ROUTING	
UNIT	LA/PNC/V/R	1	4
EXT.	9454	2	5
DATE	14 OCTOBER 1976	3	6

CONF. LA 22

OPS/INT 5, HQ, PS, EG 2, CI 2, SS 4, SS/SOG 9, OPS/ITG 5,
OSG IC 2, FR 5, DDO 2.

TDFIR DB-315/10256-76

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 14 OCTOBER 1976

DISSEMINATION

C/LA	1	LA/PNC/C	1
DC/LA	1	LA/CAR	3
LA/OPS	1	LA/MCA	3
LA/RR	1	LA/SB	2
LA/REG	1	LA/COG	4
LA/PNC/V	3		
LA/PNC/P	1		

PRECEDENCE: ☒ ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
HVC-7514
CARACAS 31117 (IN 069101)
WKMAYOR (WKSCARLET-5)
OBJ: J1

LIAISON: *

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — PLACE X IN APPROPRIATE SPACE

☒ DISSEM ELECTRICALLY TO: (List electrical addresses and deliver with extra copy to IW)
TO IID: STATE, DIA, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, NSA, SWS, CIA/OPSCEN, TREASURY, SS/ID, FBI.
CIID COMMENT: ADVANCE COPY TO SIG CENTER FOR ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION AT 2335 HRS LOCAL.JC

☒ ZRWAHOO LIFTER CABLE SENT: PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA

☐ EXCLUSIVE FOR (List addressees)

☐ RELAY CABLE PREPARED (Deliver with extra copy to Cable Secretariat)

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS—
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/
CONSULTANTS

☒ NOT FOR LIAISON

REPORT CLASSIFIED BY: 038133

CS INTERNAL USE ONLY

DO NOT REMOVE

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER: C/LA/PNC/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S):

RELEASING OFFICER: C/LA/RR

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CL BY 007622
E 2 IMPDET

COPY NO.

FORM 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

9-75 EDITIONS

SECRET (When Filled In)

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

●PRIORITY

IN 069101

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (D I) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO CRS (SY/I FIB) SS/ID FBI SECUR

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

Classified by Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB-315/10256-76

DIST 14 OCTOBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER - 12 OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZUELA

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7514

SOURCE: A FORMER VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO STILL MAINTAINS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1976 A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH WAS IN VENEZUELA UNDER THE PROTECTION OF VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ. FURTHERMORE, PEREZ HAD APPOINTED HIS SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ADVISER ORLANDO GARCIA TO PROTECT AND ASSIST BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZURLA. FOR THIS INFORMATION SEE HVC-7490, TDFIRDB-315/09834-76. IN HVC-7483, TDFIRDB-315/09430-76.

SECRET

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 069101

TDFIR DB-315/11256-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

OF MID-SEPTEMBER, A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED THAT BOSCH ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA ON APPROXIMATELY 13 SEPTEMBER.)

2. UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, BOSCH WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY GARCIA AND LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA, A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR AND ONE-TIME MEMBER OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), WHO ESCORTED BOSCH TO HIS CARACAS HOTEL. (FIELD COMMENT: WHILE CURRENTLY NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZENS, BOTH GARCIA AND POSADA ARE NATIVE-BORN CUBANS.)

3. SOMETIME FOLLOWING BOSCH'S ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, A BS. 5,000 (APPROXIMATELY U.S. $1,118) A PLATE FUND-RAISING DINNER FOR BOSCH WAS HELD AT THE HOME OF HILDO FOLGAR, A PROMINENT SURGEON AND CUBAN EXILE. IN ADDITION TO BOSCH, AMONG THOSE ATTENDING THE DINNER WERE GARCIA; RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE, GARCIA'S DEPUTY WHO IS ALSO A NATIVE-BORN CUBAN; POSADA; AND AN UNIDENTIFIED HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

4. DURING THE EVENING BOSCH APPROACHED THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL THROUGH GARCIA PROPOSING THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CASH CONTRIBUTION TO HIS ORGANIZATION. IN RETURN, BOSCH AGREED TO GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CUBAN EXILE DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES DURING PRESIDENT PEREZ' PLANNED

SECRET

NOVEMBER APPEARANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS(UN). (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS BELIEVED THAT BOSCH'S PROPOSITION WAS AT LEAST TENTATIVELY ACCEPTED BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL.)

5. ALSO DURING THE EVENING BOSCH MADE THE STATEMENT THAT, "NOW THAT OUR ORGANIZATION HAS COME OUT OF THE LETELIER JOB LOOKING GOOD, WE ARE GOING TO TRY SOMETHING ELSE." BOSCH DID NOT NAME THE ORGANIZATION NOR DID HE EXPAND ON HIS MEANING. (FIELD COMMENT: THE LETELIER MENTIONED ABOVE IS PROBABLY FORMER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER ORLANDO LETELIER, WHO WAS ASSASSINATED IN THE UNITED STATES ON 21 SEPTEMBER.)

6. A FEW DAYS FOLLOWING THE FUND-RAISING DINNER, POSADA WAS OVERHEARD TO SAY THAT, "WE ARE GOING TO HIT A CUBAN AIRPLANE;" AND THAT "ORLANDO HAS THE DETAILS." (SOURCE COMMENT: THE IDENTITIES OF THE "WE" AND "ORLANDO" MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENT ARE NOT KNOWN.)

7. FOLLOWING THE 6 OCTOBER CUBANA AIRLINE CRASH OFF THE COAST OF BARBADOS, BOSCH, GARCIA AND POSADA AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR BOSCH TO LEAVE VENEZUELA. THEREFORE, ON 9 OCTOBER POSADA AND GARCIA ESCORTED BOSCH TO THE COLOMBIAN BORDER, WHERE THE LATTER CROSSED OVER INTO COLOMBIAN TERRITORY.

8. ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM TRINIDADIAN

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 069101

TDFIRDB-315/10256-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

AUTHORITIES IMPLICATING HIM, POSADA WAS ARRESTED BY DISIP AUTHORITIES ON 12 OCTOBER. HIS OFFICE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RAIDED AND ALL FILES AND EQUIPMENT CONFISCATED.

9. MEANWHILE, PRESIDENT PEREZ HAS ASSURED THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT, THROUGH CUBAN AMBASSADOR NORBERTO HERNANDEZ CURBELO, THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT WILL ENERGETICALLY PURSUE THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CUBANA CRASH. IN RETURN, HOWEVER, CUBA WILL BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT VENEZUELA'S ANTI-TERRORISM POSITION AT THE UN.

10 (EMBASSY COMMENT: THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTS: "THE LEGATT HAS DIFFERENT INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER BOSCH WAS EXFILTRATED OR IS OR IS NOT IN VENEZUELA. GARCIA SPOKE TO LEGATT SUNDAY MORNING, 10 OCTOBER, AND ON THE AFTERNOON OF 12 OCTOBER TOLD HIM "INFORMALLY" THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD SHORTLY ADVISE ME THAT BOSCH WOULD BE TURNED OVER TO US. THIS WAS REPEATED TO LEGATT BY DISIP DIRECTOR RAUL GIMENEZ GAINZA AND OTHER DISIP OFFICIALS (INCLUDING GARCIA) IN A MEETING THE MORNING OF 13 OCTOBER. CONCEIVABLY GARCIA CAN BE PLAYING A DARK GAME, BUT THE DISCREPANCIES ARE NOTEWORTHY. I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL WORD AS TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION.")

11. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, LEGATT AT CARACAS. SENT TO

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 069101

TDFIR DB-315/10256-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON , MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO: STATE, DIA, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, NSA, SWS,
CIA/OPSCEN, SS/ID, FBI, TREASURY.

SECRET

DISSEM BY . PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BY 2 10

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 004687

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED 1125A BY AT 1450 Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT
LA 10

ACTION #

INFO FILE, VR, [redacted]S/EG2, IP/AN, IID, OPS/INT, SS 4, SS/SOG 4, OSG/IC, OPS/ITG 4.

T 302470 EIA453 PAGE 01 IN 069101

TOR:141957Z OCT 76 CARA 31117

60 HVC-7514

S E C R E T 141900Z OCT 76 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 31117

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA.

WNINTEL INTEL REAM

SUPDATA: ZNWAHOO FOR DESK REVIEW: SOURCE PARAS 1-8: WKMAYOR/
WKSCARLET-5 FROM WKSCARLET-8 FROM WKSCARLET-3.
SOURCE PARA 9: WKMAYOR/WKSCARLET-5 FROM WKSCARLET-3
FROM 201-0285923. NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE:
J.1. INDEX GARCIA, POSADA, MORALES, FOLGAR.
FILE: 75-120-28. CL. BY 002063.

FILED: 141900Z XXXXX

pdg

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 17 1976
MICROFILMED

RECORD COPY

14 Oct 76

SECRET

D 75-120-28

201-299292

EDITIONS

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 15 OCTOBER 1976
IN 069101
PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

The following report, transmitted from a CIA field station, requires review within the Directorate of Operations before being used in any other document or publication, or released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is provided for your advance information.

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI : LATE SEPTEMBER -12 OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZUELA

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7514

SOURCE : A FORMER VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO STILL MAINTAINS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1976 A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH WAS IN VENEZUELA UNDER THE PROTECTION OF VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ. FURTHERMORE, PEREZ HAD APPOINTED HIS SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR ORLANDO GARCIA 47 TO PROTECT AND ASSIST BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZUELA. FOR THIS INFORMATION SEE HVC-7498, TDFIRDB-315/09834-76. IN HVC-7483, TDFIRDB-315/09497-76.

SECRET

OF MID-SEPTEMBER. A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED THAT BOSCH ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA ON APPROXIMATELY 13 SEPTEMBER.)

2. UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, BOSCH WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY GARCIA AND LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA, A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR AND ONE-TIME MEMBER OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), WHO ESCORTED BOSCH TO HIS CARACAS HOTEL. (FIELD COMMENT: WHILE CURRENTLY NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZENS, BOTH GARCIA AND POSADA ARE NATIVE-BORN CUBANS.)

3. SOMETIME FOLLOWING BOSCH'S ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, A BS. 5,000 (APPROXIMATELY U.S. $1,116) A PRIVATE FUND-RAISING DINNER FOR BOSCH WAS HELD AT THE HOME OF HILDO 201-290306 FOLGAR, A PROMINENT SURGEON AND CUBAN EXILE. IN ADDITION TO BOSCH, AMONG THOSE ATTENDING THE DINNER WERE GARCIA; RICARDO 201-285923 MORALES NAVARETTE, GARCIA'S DEPUTY WHO IS ALSO A NATIVE-BORN CUBAN; POSADA; AND AN UNIDENTIFIED HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

4. DURING THE EVENING BOSCH APPROACHED THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL THROUGH GARCIA PROPOSING THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CASH CONTRIBUTION TO HIS ORGANIZATION. IN RETURN, BOSCH AGREED TO GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CUBAN EXILE DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES DURING PRESIDENT PEREZ' PLANNED

NOVEMBER APPEARANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS(UN). (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS BELIEVED THAT BOSCH'S PROPOSITION WAS AT LEAST TENTATIVELY ACCEPTED BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL.)

5. ALSO DURING THE EVENING BOSCH MADE THE STATEMENT THAT, "NOW THAT OUR ORGANIZATION HAS COME OUT OF THE LETELIER JOB LOOKING GOOD, WE ARE GOING TO TRY SOMETHING ELSE." BOSCH DID NOT NAME THE ORGANIZATION NOR DID HE EXPAND ON HIS MEANING. (FIELD COMMENT: THE LETELIER MENTIONED ABOVE IS PROBABLY FORMER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER ORLANDO LETELIER, WHO WAS ASSASSINATED IN THE UNITED STATES ON 21 SEPTEMBER.)

6. A FEW DAYS FOLLOWING THE FUND-RAISING DINNER, POSADA WAS OVERHEARD TO SAY THAT, "WE ARE GOING TO HIT A CUBAN AIRPLANE," AND THAT "ORLANDO HAS THE DETAILS." (SOURCE COMMENT: THE IDENTITIES OF THE "WE" AND "ORLANDO" MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENT ARE NOT KNOWN.)

7. FOLLOWING THE 6 OCTOBER CUBANA AIRLINE CRASH OFF THE COAST OF BARBADOS, BOSCH, GARCIA AND POSADA AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR BOSCH TO LEAVE VENEZUELA. THEREFORE, ON 9 OCTOBER POSADA AND GARCIA ESCORTED BOSCH TO THE COLOMBIAN BORDER, WHERE THE LATTER CROSSED OVER INTO COLOMBIAN TERRITORY.

8. ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM TRINIDADIAN

AUTHORITIES IMPLICATING HIM, POSADA WAS ARRESTED BY DISIP AUTHORITIES ON 12 OCTOBER. HIS OFFICE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RAIDED AND ALL FILES AND EQUIPMENT CONFISCATED.

9. MEANWHILE, PRESIDENT PEREZ HAS ASSURED THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT, THROUGH CUBAN AMBASSADOR NORBERTO HERNANDEZ CURBELO, THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT WILL ENERGETICALLY PURSUE THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CUBANA CRASH. IN RETURN, HOWEVER, CUBA WILL BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT VENEZUELA'S ANTI-TERRORISM POSITION AT THE UN.

10 (EMBASSY COMMENT: THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTS: " THE LEGATT HAS DIFFERENT INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER BOSCH WAS EXFILTRATED OR IS OR IS NOT IN VENEZUELA. GARCIA SPOKE TO LEGATT SUNDAY MORNING, 10 OCTOBER, AND ON THE AFTERNOON OF 12 OCTOBER TOLD HIM "INFORMALLY" THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD SHORTLY ADVISE ME THAT BOSCH WOULD BE TURNED OVER TO US. THIS WAS REPEATED TO LEGATT BY DISIP DIRECTOR RAUL JIMENEZ GAINZA AND OTHER DISIP OFFICIALS (INCLUDING GARCIA) IN A MEETING THE MORNING OF 13 OCTOBER. CONCEIVABLY GARCIA CAN BE PLAYING A DARK GAME, BUT THE DISCREPANCIES ARE NOTEWORTHY. I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL WORD AS TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION.")

11. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, LEGATT AT CARACAS; SENT TO

SECRET

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IP/AN

IN 069101

TDFIR

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON , MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA, REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTOS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 2-1 ZY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA 8 PSC

ACTION UNIT C/LA8

ACTION #

RF FILE VR [illegible]

[illegible]

T 302409 E1A452 PAGE 01 IN 069100

TOR141957Z OCT 76 CARA 31118

S E C R E T 141900Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31118

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY BOGOTA, ROUTINE PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN.

WINTEL RYBAT REAM MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 31117 (HVC-7514) (IN 069101)

1. ACCORDING TO REF, ORLANDO BOSCH MAY HAVE BEEN DEPORTED TO COLOMBIA 9-10 OCTOBER, ALTHOUGH VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE CONTINUED TO ASSURE AMBASSADOR AND LEGATT THAT AS OF 13 OCTOBER BOSCH STILL IN VENEZUELA AND WILL BE PRODUCED SHORTLY FOR DEPORTATION TO U.S. AMBASSADOR HAS NO OBJECTION TO BOGOTA STATION CHECKING FOR BOSCH'S PRESENCE COLOMBIA THROUGH UNILATERAL SOURCES BUT ASKS THAT NO INQUIREIES BE MADE THROUGH LIAISON OR OTHER OFFICIAL CHANNELS UNTIL IT CLEAR WHAT VENEZUELANS REALLY HAVE DONE OR PROPOSE TO DO ON BOSCH'S DEPORTATION.

2. BOSCH EARLIER ALLEGED TO BE TRAVELLING ON COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME OF PEDRO ANTONIO PENA OR CARLOS LUIS PANIA GUU A MENDEZ. ON THE OTHERHAND, WE HAVE ONE REPORT THAT HE ENTERED VENEZUELA IN TRUE NAME.

3. FILE: 201-0299292. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

RECORD COPY

14 Oct 76

201-299292

TRANSMITTAL
OF
TDFIR INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION **SECRET**

ORIG. HARRIET BEILER
UNIT LA/PSC/V/R
EXT. 9054
DATE 14 OCTOBER 1976

129

CONF. LA 21 | OPS. INT 3, RD, PS/EG 2, CI 2, SS 4, SS/SOG 3, OPS/ITG 5, OSG/IC 2, FR 4

TDFIR DB-315/10239-76

DATE DISTRIBUTED 14 OCTOBER 1976

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

C/LA	1	LA/MCA	3
DC/LA	1	LA/SB	2
LA/OPS	1	LA/COG	4
LA/RR	1	LA/REG	1
LA/PNC/V	3		
LA/PNC/P	1		
LA/CAR	3		

BASED ON (FLD. RPT. PROJ.)
HVC-7513
CARACAS 31111(IN 067787)
NP(WKMIXER-1)
OBJ: CIE

LIAISON:

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — PLACE X IN APPROPRIATE SPACE

☐ TO IID:
DISSEM ELECTRICALLY TO:
(list electrical addresses and deliver with extra copy to IW)

☒ ZRWAHOO LIFTER CABLE SENT CARACAS, PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO

☐ EXCLUSIVE FOR
(list addressees)

☐ RELAY CABLE PREPARED
(Deliver with extra copy to Cable Secretariat)

☒ NOT FOR LIAISON

REPORT CLASSIFIED BY: 035133

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR
CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

CS INTERNAL USE ONLY

CHRONO
DO NOT REMOVE

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
C/LA/PNC/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
LA/CAR LA/CO ELECOORD)
LA/SB

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CL BY 007622
E 2 IMPDET

RELEASING OFFICER
C/LA/RR L.E. Bring

COPY NO.

FORM 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

F)B[illegible] 201

(10-00-00-67)

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

IN 067747

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR [illegible] DIA CIA NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NIC'S SDO ONE CRS

FBI

Classified by [illegible] Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category [illegible] Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification

0

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB-315/10239-76

DIST 14 OCTOBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI 8 OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF A CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL IN CARACAS ON RECENT ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE CUBANS

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (11 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7513

SOURCE A FOREIGN DIPLOMAT WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. ON 8 OCTOBER 1976 LUIS JORGE MARTINEZ MENOCAL, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, SAID THAT THE CUBAN EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE CUBAN EXILE GROUP HEADED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 6 OCTOBER BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER OUT OF BARBADOS. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON CUBAN REACTION TO RECENT

SECRET

TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE CUBANS, SEE HVC-7509, TDFIRDB-315/10100-76, OF 8 OCTOBER 1976, FROM THIS AND ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY.)

2. MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE EMBASSY BELIEVES BOSCH HAS BEEN RECEIVING ECONOMIC AND OTHER ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (USG), VIA ITS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, SINCE BOSCH IS ABLE TO MOVE ABOUT FREELY AND OBVIOUSLY WITH FALSE DOCUMENTATION, AS HIS MOVEMENTS CANNOT BE TRACED. HOWEVER, MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE CUBANS DO NOT BELIEVE THE USG IS OR WOULD BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF THE CUBANA FLIGHT. USG INVOLVEMENT IN THE INCIDENT, MARTINEZ SAID, WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO THE USG'S INTERESTS BECAUSE CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO RUZ WOULD SURELY BREAK THE AIR PIRACY AGREEMENT, WHICH IS TO THE BENFIT OF THE USG.

3. THE CUBANS, MARTINEZ SAID, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT APPARENT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN BOSCH AND CUBAN EXILES WORKING FOR THE CAPRILES PUBLISHING CHAIN IN VENEZUELA. SHOULD FREDDY LUGO, ONE OF THE TWO VENEZUELANS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN TRINIDAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE PLANE CRASH AND A REPORTER FOR ONE OF THE CAPRILES PUBLICATIONS, BE DEFINITELY IMPLICATED IN THE AFFAIR, THE CUBANS WILL BE CONVINCED OF THIS BOSCH/CAPRILES CONNECTION. ANOTHER

EXAMPLE OF THIS CONNECTION, MARTINEZ SAID, IS A 2 OCTOBER ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE CAPRILES PAPER "EL MUNDO" WHICH DESCRIBES AN EARLIER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON A CUBANA FLIGHT OUT OF BARBADOS AND, WHILE DEPLORING SUCH ACTS, SAYS THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT STARTED THEM. THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK DESCRIBED IN THE ARTICLE, AND ABOUT WHICH THE CUBANS KNOW NOTHING, IS BELIEVED TO BE SIMILAR TO WHAT MAY HAVE OCCURRED IN THE CASE OF THE 6 OCTOBER DISASTER. THE CUBANS, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THAT THE AUTHOR MAY WELL HAVE HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATTACK ON THE CUBANA AIRLINER. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON CUBAN CONCERN ABOUT ARTICLES APPEARING IN "EL MUNDO," SEE HVC-7495, TDFIRDB-315/09683-76, 27 SEPTEMBER 1976, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY.)

4. WITH REGARD TO THE 21 SEPTEMBER ASSASSINATION OF FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ORLANDO LETELIER IN THE U.S., MARTINEZ SAID THAT THIS KILLING SHOWED THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WORK DONE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILEAN PRESIDENT GENERAL AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE. DESPITE SOME MEDIA SPECULATION TO THE CONTRARY, MARTINEZ SAID THAT HE DOES NOT PERSONALLY BELIEVE THE USG IS IN ANY WAY INVOLVED WITH LETELIER'S DEATH.

[illegible] [illegible]

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN).

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

IN 067787

TDFIRDB-315/10239-76

SECRET FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT
(classification) (dissem controls)

5. CONCERNING THE 8 OCTOBER MACHINEGUN ATTACK ON THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS, MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE CUBANS ARE PLACING NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE ON THE EVENT. THE ATTACK, MARTINEZ SAID, WAS PROBABLY THE WORK OF CUBAN EXILES; HOWEVER, HE DOUBTED THAT IT WAS CARRIED OUT BY BOSCH'S GROUP.

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS: SENT TO PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

SECRET

DDO ID/53 ... 2215

FILE, VR, [illegible] IP/AN, IID, OPS/INT, CI 4, SS 4, SS/SO6 4, OSG/IC, OPS/ITG 4, FR 5.

LA 10

T 303532 EIA361 PAGE 01 IN 067767

TOR:132157Z OCT 76 CARA 31111

S E C R E T 132025Z OCT 76 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 31111

BVC-7513

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO.

WNINTEL INTEL REAM

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR DESK REVIEW. SOURCE: NP/WKMIXER DIRECTLY. NOT FOR LIAISON. DO OBJECTIVE: C.1.E. (THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO DIRECTOR 925568 AND DIRECTOR 924067.) INDEX LUGO, LLANO. FILE: 75-190-28. CL. BY 062063.

FILED: 132025Z XXXXX

O/CI

Orlando Bosch

13 Oct 76 15 36

SECRET

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 13 OCTOBER 1976
IN [illegible]7757
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

The following report, transmitted from a CIA field station, requires review within the Directorate of Operations before being used in any other document or publication, or released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is provided for your advance information.

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DISTRIBUTION TO. SDO

E-2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI : 8 OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF A CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL IN CARACAS ON RECENT ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE CUBANS

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (11 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7513

SOURCE : A FOREIGN DIPLOMAT WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. ON 8 OCTOBER 1976 LUIS JORGE MARTINEZ MENOCAL, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, SAID THAT THE CUBAN EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE CUBAN EXILE GROUP HEADED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 6 OCTOBER BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER OUT OF BARBADOS. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON CUBAN REACTION TO RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THEM SEE HVC-7509, TDFIRDB-315/10100-76, OF 8 OCTOBER, FROM THIS AND ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY.)

2. MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE EMBASSY BELIEVES BOSCH HAS BEEN RECEIVING ECONOMIC AND OTHER ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES

SECRET

14-00000

3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 067787

TDFIR

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

(classification)

GOVERNMENT (USG), VIA ITS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, SINCE BOSCH IS ABLE TO MOVE ABOUT FREELY AND OBVIOUSLY WITH FALSE DOCUMENTATION, AS HIS MOVEMENTS CANNOT BE TRACED. HOWEVER, MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE CUBANS DO NOT BELIEVE THE USG IS OR WOULD BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF THE CUBANA FLIGHT. USG INVOLVEMENT IN THE INCIDENT, MARTINEZ SAID, WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO THE USG'S INTERESTS, BECAUSE CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO RUZ WOULD SURELY BREAK THE AIR PIRACY AGREEMENT WHICH IS TO THE BENEFIT OF THE USG.

3. THE CUBANS, MARTINEZ SAID, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT APPARENT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN BOSCH AND CUBAN EXILES WORKING FOR THE CAPRILES PUBLISHING CHAIN IN VENEZUELA. SHOULD FREDDY LUGO, ONE OF THE TWO VENEZUELANS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN TRINIDAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE PLANE CRASH AND A REPORTER FOR ONE OF THE CAPRILES PUBLICATIONS, BE DEFINITELY IMPLICATED IN THE AFFAIR, THE CUBANS WILL BE CONVINCED OF THIS BOSCH/CAPRILES CONNECTION. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THIS CONNECTION, MARTINEZ SAID, IS A 2 OCTOBER ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE CAPRILES PAPER "EL MUNDO" WHICH DESCRIBES AN EARLIER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON A CUBANA FLIGHT OUT OF BARBADOS, AND WHILE DEPLORING SUCH ACTS, SAYS THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT STARTED THEM. THIS ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN BY ANTONIO

SECRET

LLANO MONTES, A CUBAN EXILE WHO WHILE LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES, WRITES A COLUMN FOR "EL MUNDO." THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK DESCRIBED IN LLANO'S ARTICLE AND ABOUT WHICH THE CUBANS KNOW NOTHING, IS BELIEVED TO BE SIMILAR TO WHAT MAY HAVE OCCURRED IN THE CASE OF THE 6 OCTOBER DISASTER. THE CUBANS, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THAT LLANO MAY WELL HAVE HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATTACK ON THE CUBANA AIRLINER. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON CUBAN CONCERN ABOUT ARTICLES APPEARING IN "EL MUNDO" SEE HVC-7495, TDFIRDB-315/ -76, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY.)

4. WITH REGARD TO THE 26 SEPTEMBER ASSASSINATION OF FORMER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER ORLANDO LETELIER IN THE UNITED STATES, MARTINEZ SAID THAT THIS KILLING SHOWED THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WORK DONE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILEAN PRESIDENT GENERAL AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE. DESPITE SOME MEDIA SPECULATION TO THE CONTRARY, MARTINEZ SAID THAT HE DOES NOT PERSONALLY BELIEVE THE USG IS IN ANY WAY INVOLVED WITH LETELIER'S DEATH.

5. CONCERNING THE 8 OCTOBER MACHINE GUN ATTACK ON THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS, MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE CUBANS ARE PLACING NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE ON THE EVENT. THE ATTACK, MARTINEZ SAID,

FORM 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-73

IN 067787

TDFIR

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

WAS PROBABLY THE WORK OF CUBAN EXILES; HOWEVER, HE DOUBTED THAT IT WAS CARRIED OUT BY BOSCH'S GROUP.

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS; SENT TO PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

STATE CABLES

FROM SECSTATE WASHDC STATE 252295
DATE: 9 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: US POSITION ON INVESTIGATION OF
CUBANA AIRLINES CRASH

FROM AMEMBASSY CARACAS 12098
DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1976
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DEPORTATION OF BOSCH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

STATE CABLES

FROM AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 2652
DATE: 9 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DEPORTATION OF BOSCH

FROM SECSTATE WASHDC STATE 251567
DATE: 9 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DEPORTATION TO US OF
FUGITIVE ORLANDO BOSCH

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL
OF
TDFIR INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION
D

ORIG.	D. THOMPSON
UNIT	LA/PNC
EXT.	1454
DATE	9 OCTOBER 1976

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

CONF.
LA 19

INFO OPS/INT 5, IID, PS/EG 2, CI 4, SS 4, ITG 4,
FR 5

ITY

DATE DISTRIBUTED
9 OCTOBER 1976

DISSEMINATION

LA/REG	1	LA/CAR	4	LA/PACY
LA/RR	1	LA/M&CA	2	LA/SA. DOM
C/LA	1	LA/PORT SPAIN	#	LA/MIAMI
DC/LA	1	LA/GEORGETWN	#	LA/KINGS
LA/OPS	1	LA/MEXI	#	
LA/PNC	4	LA/MANAGUA	#	
LA/COG	4	LA/GUAT	#	

DIET-3)
MIXER-1)

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — PLACE X IN APPROPRIATE SPACE

☐ TO IID:
DISSEM ELECTRICALLY TO:
(List electrical addresses and deliver with extra copy to IID)

☒ ZRWAHOO LIFTER CABLE SENT CARACAS, PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON,
MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY,
SANTO DOMINGO, LA/

☐ EXCLUSIVE FOR
(List addressees)

☐ RELAY CABLE PREPARED
(Deliver with extra copy to Cable Secretariat)

NOT RELEASA
NOT RELEASA
CONTRA

☒ NOT FOR LIAISON
REPORT CLASSIFIED BY: 035133

For Orlando Bosch
Bosch file
299292

CS INTERNAL U

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
LA/PNC/P/F.

COORDINATING
LA/COG

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CL BY 007622
E 2 IMPDET

RELEASING
LA/PNC
COPY NO.

FORM 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-60-44-47)

299292

FORM 10-75 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET (When Filled In)

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

● PRIORITY

IN 064422

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO CRS
FBI SECUR (SY/I/PIB) SS/ID

Classified by [illegible] Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIRDB-315/10100-76

DIST 9 OCTOBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE -SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/ CUBA

DOI 30 SEPTEMBER -7 OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT REACTION OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS TO RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST CUBAN AIRCRAFT AND INSTALLATIONS.

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (8 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7589

SOURCE SEE BELOW.

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CLOSE CONTACTS IN BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

2. ON 7 OCTOBER 1976 PEDRO GOMEZ FERNANDEZ, SECOND SECRETARY AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, SAID THAT THE CUBAN EMBASSY WAS AWARE THAT A BOMB WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRASH OF THE CUBANA AIRLINE FLIGHT OFF THE COAST OF BARBADOS ON 6 OCTOBER. THE CUBANS, GOMEZ SAID, DID NOT KNOW ON WHICH LEG OF THE FLIGHT THE BOMB WAS PLACED HOWEVER.

(FIELD COMMENT: THE PLANE WAS DOWNED WITH THE LOSS OF 73 LIVES

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 064422

TDFIR DB-315/10100-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

INCLUDING FENCING TEAM WHICH HAD RECENTLY COMPLETED COMPETITION IN VENEZUELA.)

3. GOMEZ SAID THAT ON 30 SEPTEMBER THE CUBAN EMBASSY HAD INFORMED THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), THE VENEZUELAN CIVILIAN SECURITY SERVICE, THAT A CUBAN EXILE NAMED SALVADOR ROMANI WAS OBSERVING THE CUBAN FENCING TEAM AT ITS CARACAS HOTEL. ROMANI, GOMEZ SAID, IS A UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AGENT. (SOURCE COMMENT: GOMEZ IMPLIED THAT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IS LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITY THAT ROMANI'S ACTIVITIES ARE INVOLVED WITH THE PLANE CRASH.) FURTHERMORE, THE CUBANS TOLD DISIP THAT THE TEAM WOULD DEFEND ITSELF SHOULD ROMANI CAUSE TROUBLE. SHORTLY AFTER THE CUBANS MADE THEIR FEELINGS KNOWN TO DISIP, GOMEZ SAID THAT ROMANI'S ACTIVITIES CEASED. (FIELD COMMENT: IN HVC-7495, TDFIRDB-315/09683-76, OF 28 SEPTEMBER, THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE CUBAN EMBASSY HAD COMPLAINED TO DISIP ABOUT ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE LOCAL PRESS. IN THIS INSTANCE THE CUBANS INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE NEWSMAN INVOLVED IF DISIP DID NOT

SECRET

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 064422

TDFIR DB-315/10100-76

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

TAKE ACTION).

4. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6: A FOREIGN DIPLOMAT WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

5. DURING THE WEEK OF 4 OCTOBER LUIS MARTINEZ MONOCAL, CUBAN FIRST SECRETARY, SAID THAT THE EMBASSY WAS AWARE THAT CUBAN EXILE EXTREMIST ORLANDO BOSCH WAS IN VENEZUELA. THE EMBASSY, HE SAID, WAS ATTEMPTING TO INVESTIGATE BOSCH'S ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE WAS STILL IN THE COUNTRY. MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT BOSCH HAD MOVED OUT OF THE CARACAS AREA AND WAS THEN IN THE VENEZUELAN INTERIOR. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON THE PRESENCE OF BOSCH IN VENEZUELA, SEE HVC-7498, TDFIRDB-315/09814-76, OF 30 SEPTEMBER, FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.)

6. IN ADDITION TO AND IN CONNECTION WITH INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF BOSCH IN VENEZUELA, CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MACHINE-GUNNING OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS ON THE EARLY MORNING OF 8 OCTOBER.

7. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS: SENT TO

SECRET

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 064432

TDFIR DB-315/10100-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

TRV

OCT 14 76

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 9 SEPTEMBER 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, PAROLE VIOLATOR

FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DISSEM BY ______ PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

34
24

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL BY: 006087

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT
LA 9

ACTION #

FILE, VR, [redacted] IP/AN, IID, OPS/INT , CI 4,
SS 4, AGC/DDO, OSG/IC, PR 4, NE 8, OPS/ITG 4

T 263627 E1A559 PAGE 01 IN 854142

TOR:2916142 SEP 76

3P

CARA 38979

HVC-7498

S E C R E T 291429Z SEP 76 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 38979 (HACKELING ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

HMM HGG HMM HJK HWS HRS HFG HZP

WNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKBOXER/MURAWSKI (NOC) FROM WKNORTH-6. NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. INDEX BOSCH, GARCIA. FILE DEFERRED. CL. BY 035133.

FILED: 29/1429Z XXXX

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 24 1976
MICROFILMED

29SEP 19 84

201- 299292
29 Sep 76

RECORD COPY

SECRET

FORM 8-75 3015 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 29 SEPTEMBER 1976
IN 054142
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

The following report, transmitted from a CIA field station, requires review within the Directorate of Operations before being used in any other document or publication, or released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is provided for your advance information.

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

E-2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: O PRESENCE OF ORLANDO BOSCH IN VENEZUELA UNDER THE PROTECTION OF VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (28 SEPTEMBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7498

SOURCE: A MILITARY OFFICER WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

1. IN LATE-SEPTEMBER 1976 GENERAL RAUL GIMENEZ GAINZA, HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PRVENTION (DISIP), SAID THAT ORLANDO BOSCH, A CUBAN EXILE LEADER, IS CURRENTLY IN VENEZUELA UNDER THE PROTECTION OF PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ. THE PRESIDENT, GIMENEZ SAID, HAS ORDERED ORLANDO GARCIA, A PRESIDENTPAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR, TO PROTECT AND ASSIST BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN

PR [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 3307 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IP/AN

IN 054142

TDFIR

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

VENEZUELA. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR ANOTHER REPORT ON BOSCH'S PRESENCE IN VENEZUELA SEE HVC-7483, TDFIRDB-315/09430-76, OF MID SEPTEMBER, FROM A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY. FOR A REPORT ON GARCIA'S ROLE AS DE FACTOR DISIP CHIEF SEE HVC-7493, TDFIRDB-315/ -76, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY. WHILE CURRENTLY A NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN, GARCIA IS A NATIVE BORN CUBAN.)

2. PRESIDENT PEREZ, GIMENEZ SAID, HAS BEEN SYMPATHETIC TO BOSCH FOR SOME TIME. FURTHERMORE, GIMENEZ SAID THAT WHEN BOSCH WAS DETAINED BY DISIP IN NOVEMBER 1974, PRESIDENT PEREZ PERSONALLY ARRANGED HIS RELEASE AND SUBSEQUENT TRAVEL TO CHILE.

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS: SENT TO MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2

201-299292

CC

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 22 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 32-1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF, FILE, VR, IP/AN, NE8, CLPS, ADCI/DDO, OPS/ITG4, CI4, ODPZ, LSN/ID

T 249378 EIA655 PAGE 01-01 IN 045877

TOR:2320072 SEP 76 SDOM 17706

SECRET 2319542 SEP 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17706

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL REAM HHSPIKE

1. STATION WOULD APPRECIATE HQS THINKING ON WHO OR WHAT ORGANIZATION CARRIED OUT LETELIER ASSASSINATION.

2. HAS FBI INVESTIGATION EXPLORED POSSIBILITY ASSASSINATION MIGHT BE WORK OF ORLANDO BOSCH'S CORU?

3. FILE: 201-299292, E2, IMPDET.

jdg

UP/EDR	☒	MSAVER PROGRAM
		ABSTRACT
		INDEX
UP/CR 7		APPROVE FOR FILMING
UP/MD		DUCE N.J. (2, 3)
		EYDAT REST. (
		CABLE ID (11)
		[illegible] (8)
		FOR FILING

23 Sep 76

201-299292

SECRET

D19-300-28

RECORD COPY

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 17 PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 11-1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR PLAN

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 246282 EIA282 PAGE 01-01 IN 047613

TOR:2221272 SEP 76 SDOM 17702

S E C R E T 2221152 SEP 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17702

TO: PORT OF SPAIN INFO DIRECTOR, CARACAS, MANAGUA, GEORGETOWN, LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL REAM

REF: A. CARACAS 30917 (IN 046859)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17682 (NOT SENT OR NEEDED LA/MIAMI) (IN 039341)

1. NO OBJECTION RELEASE OF REF B MATERIAL ON ORLANDO BOSCH.

2. FILE: 201-299292, E2 IMPDET

SECRET

IP/[illegible]		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	✓	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/[illegible]		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/[illegible]		CODE NO (2, 3)
		RETAIN W/O CODE
		CABLE IDEN (11)
		RID (8)
IP/[illegible]		FOR FILING

RECORD COPY

22 Sep 76

201-299292

en/113

The RCMP Liaison Office,
2450 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20008

No. 76WLO-1S-83(B)

11 September 1976

S E C R E T

Mr. Arthur Stimpson,
C.I.A.,
Washington, D.C.

Re: *EJERCITO SECRETO DE CUBA
(SECRET ARMY OF CUBA - USA)

Dear Arthur

My Headquarters advises that the above captioned faction, which is Miami based, has been sending what appears to be warning letters to several Canadian establishments, public and private, at home and abroad. We had the handwriting analyzed and our expert stated that those letters we do have were all written by the same person.

Recently the EJERCITO SECRETO DE CUBA (ESC) has come to our attention again and we are speculating that it may be tied in with the *UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION (URO), headed by Orlando Bosch AVILA, and composed of five anti-Castro Cuban exile (ACE) terrorist groups: ACCION CUBANA (AC), FRENTE NACIONAL DE LIBERACION CUBANO (FLNC), MOVIMIENTO NACIONALISTA CUBANO (CNM), BRIGADE 2506, and THE 17th OF APRIL MOVEMENT.

URO came into being in June 1976 and since that time has claimed responsibility for several terrorist attacks, i.e., the airport bombing in Kingston, Jamaica; the attempted kidnapping of the Cuban Consul in Merida, Mexico; and murder of an official of the Cuban Institute

Cont'd...

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

76WLO-18-83(B)
SECRET

1 September 1976

of Fisheries during the attempted kidnapping, as well as the bombing of the Guyanese Consulate General in Port of Spain, Trinidad.

We would appreciate receiving any background data you may be able to supply us regarding the URO and EJERCITO SECRETO DE CUBA.

A similar request is being made to the FBI.

Yours truly,

Kenneth G. Osborne,
Assistant Liaison Officer

This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided on condition that it is for use solely by the intelligence community of the receiving Government and that it not be disseminated without the express permission of the Government of Canada.

SECRET

14.2-22

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 6-

1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

SECRET

STAFF 221712Z DIRECTOR 2 917046

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE 2

0

0

0 PER

RO 7 0 #

IA

SEC

DISSEM BY: 5

TO: CABLE SEC. V

PLS RELAY CARACAS 30907 [IN 043608] TO SANTO DOMINGO FOR INFO.

E2 IMPDET.H

Orlando Bosch 201 ?

COPY ATTACHED.

COORD:

C/LA/~~CAR~~

DATE: 20 SEPT 76
ORIG: HARRIET WEILER
UNIT: C/LA/V/R
EXT: 9454

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

14-00000

FORM 2005 (20-44)

28

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL BY: 006687

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED 5D0 BY [illegible] AT 855

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT: LA 10

INFO: FILE, VR, [redacted] IP/AN, IID, OPS/INT, CI 4, AGC/DDO, OPS/ITG 4

T 236560 EIA535 PAGE 01 IN 043688

TOR:181953Z SEP 76 CARA 30987

HVC-7483

5D

S E C R E T 181707Z SEP 76 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 30987 (HACKELING ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS AIRES, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

HNM HGG HMMI HAB HJK HWS HRS HFG

WNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR SOURCE DESCRIPTION. SOURCE: NP/WKDIET-5 DIRECTLY. SOURCE PARA 2 FIELD COMMENT MURAWSKI (NOC). NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. INDEX BOSCH, FERNANDEZ, AND PENA. FILE DEFERRED. CL. BY 035133.

FILED: 18/1910Z

DOC. MICRO. SER.
SEP 29 1976
MICROFILMED

11 SEP

IP/ON ABSTRACT
INDEX
IP/RCV PREPARE FOR FILMING
CODE NO. (2, 3) 3
IP/AN ✓ STORE PART. CODE
[illegible] (.1)
[illegible] (.)
IP/LAW FOR FILING

201-299292
18 Sep 76

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

FORM 3015 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 18 SEPTEMBER 1
IN 043608
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

The following report, transmitted from a CIA field station, requires review within the Directorate of Operations before being used in any other document or publication, or released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is provided for your advance information.

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTOORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI : MID-SEPTEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: ARRIVAL OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH IN VENEZUELA; AND HIS COMMENTS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF HIS GROUP

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (18 SEPTEMBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7483

SOURCE : A CUBAN EXILE WHO MAINTAINS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH OTHER EXILES. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1976 ORLANDO BOSCH, A CUBAN EXILE LEADER, SAID THAT HE HAS UNITED ALL OF THE VARIOUS CUBAN EXILE GROUPS INTO ONE CLOSELY-KNIT ORGANIZATION WHICH FOLLOWS HIS LEAD. BOSCH GAVE THE GROUP NO TITLE, BUT SAID THAT IT WAS WELL-ORGANIZED AND PLANNED TO CONTINUE FIGHTING THE REGIME OF CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO.

2. BOSCH, WHO ARRIVED IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, VIA AN UNSPECIFIED ROUTE ON OR ABOUT 13 SEPTEMBER, SAID THAT ON A PREVIOUS VISIT TO VENEZUELA HE HAD MET WITH PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ AND ORLANDO GARCIA, AN EXTRA-OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY

SECRET

CHIEF. DURING THIS MEETING PEREZ TOLD BOSCH THAT HE SYMPATHIZED WITH BOSCH'S ANTI-CASTRO EFFORTS BUT THAT HE WOULD ALLOW NO SUCH ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA. AT THAT TIME BOSCH GAVE PEREZ HIS WORD THAT HE WOULD UNDERTAKE NO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA, AND PEREZ, IN TURN, GAVE BOSCH A TOKEN CONTRIBUTION OF U.S. $500.00 FOR HIS ORGANIZATION. IN RECENTLY ARRANGING FOR HIS RETURN TO VENEZUELA, BOSCH SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO FIND THAT VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES ISSUED HIM A VISA, IN HIS TRUE NAME, WITHOUT DELAY. (FIELD COMMENT: AN OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICE INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED THAT LUCILO PENA AND ARMANDO FERNANDEZ, BOTH MEMBERS OF RADICAL CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA ON APPROXIMATELY 6 SEPTEMBER. THE NATURE OF THEIR ACTIVITIES IS NOT KNOWN.)

4. BOSCH COMPLAINED THAT HE WAS RUNNING OUT OF SAFE HAVENS. THE DOMINICANS, HE SAID, HAD ASKED HIM TO LEAVE AND THAT, OF COURSE, HE WAS NOT WELCOME IN THE UNITED STATES. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE, HE SAID, HAD DONE NOTHING TO CURB HIS ACTIVITIES, IT ALSO GAVE HIM NO REAL SUPPORT. COSTA RICA, HE NOTED WITH DISDAIN, IS PRO-CASTRO.

5. BOSCH SAID THAT HE NOW REALIZED THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE TO

FORM 9-75 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 043608

TDFIR

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

HAVE CARRIED OUT BOMBINGS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT PLAN TO MAKE UNITED STATES PERSONNEL OR PROPERTY THE TARGETS OF ANY FURTHER INCIDENTS. IN COMMENTING ON HIS FEBRUARY 1976 DETENTION BY COSTA RICAN OFFICIALS, BOSCH SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER INTENDED TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE WHO WAS AT THAT TIME VISITING LATIN AMERICA.

6. IN COMMENTING ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, BOSCH SAID THAT DESPITE RUMORS TO THE CONTRARY, HIS GROUP HAD NOT KIDNAPPED THE CUBANS. BOSCH OPINED THAT THE CUBANS HAD PROBABLY DEFECTED AND WOULD TURN UP SOONER OR LATER.

7. BOSCH, WHO HAS GAINED A GOOD DEAL OF WEIGHT, SAID THAT HE WAS ILL AND PHYSICALLY EXHAUSTED. NEVERTHELESS, BOSCH INDICATED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE FIGHTING AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME. (SOURCE COMMENT: BOSCH IS OBVIOUSLY ILL AND SUFFERING FROM EYE PROBLEMS. DESPITE BOSCH'S CLAIMS OF A STRONG, UNITED ANTI-CASTRO GROUP, BOSCH'S DETERIORATING PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKE IT DOUBTFUL THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF IT FOR VERY LONG.)

8. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS. SENT TO: SANTO DOMINGO, SAN JOSE, BUENOS AIRES, MANAGUA, MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA

SECRET

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 043606

TDFIR

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

CITY, KINGSTON, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2

SECRET

201-299292

STATE CABLES

FROM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 6515
DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLOTTING BY CUBAN EXILE
ORLANDO BOSCH

File
Ops Leads
& Contacts

SEP 17 1976

S E C R E T 171325Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/NEW YORK 26893

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

OPERATIONS SERVICES GROUP (WALKER) FROM SILVERMAN

WNINTEL

SUBJ: POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL ACCESS TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC OFFICIAL

1. OUR COOPERATIVE CONTACT, GEORGE H. LEWSON OF OCEANOGRAPHY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, DANBURY, CONNECTICUT, HAS INFORMED US THAT ANSELMO PAULINO, DOMINICAN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND, MAY WISH TO ASSIST THE AGENCY IN REGARD TO THE DETERIORATING POLITICAL SITUATION IN HIS HOME COUNTRY. PAULINO'S SON, A NATURALIZED US CITIZEN, WORKS WITH LEWSON AND WILL BE INTRODUCED TO US IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

2. PLEASE DETERMINE FOR US WHETHER LA DIVISION HAS ANY OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN PAULINO AND/OR IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN GENERAL.

FILE: MISC "O" (OCEANOGRAPHY DEVELOPMENT)
E2 IMPDET CL BY 013344
S E C R E T

"No Interest"
DCD informed
28 Sept 76

14-00000

FORM 6-76 3005 (20-44)

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 2 SECRET RUN BY

E2, IMPDET CL. BY: 006687

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED SDO BY d AT BST

ACTION UNIT LA 10	INFO	FILE, VR, [redacted] IP/AN, IID, OPS/INT, CI 4,	AGENCY MESSAGE
ACTION #		AGC/DDO, OPS/ITG 4.	

T 236560 EIA535 PAGE 01 IN 043600

TOR:181953Z SEP 76 CARA 30907

S E C R E T 181707Z SEP 76 INTEL HVC-7483 7/15

CITE CARACAS 30907 (HACKELING ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS AIRES, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR SOURCE DESCRIPTION. SOURCE: NP/WKDIET-5 DIRECTLY. SOURCE PARA 2 FIELD COMMENT MURAWSKI (NOC). NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. INDEX BOSCH, FERNANDEZ, AND PENA. FILE DEFERRED. CL. BY 035133.

FILED: 18/1910Z

1858

18 SEP 76 19 34

F) 22-9-28

F) BOSCH-201

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 8-75 3015 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 20 SEPTEMBER 19
IN 043608
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

The following report, transmitted from a CIA field station, requires review within the Directorate of Operations before being used in any other document or publication, or released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is provided for your advance information.

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

E-2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTOORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI : MID-SEPTEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: ARRIVAL OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH IN VENEZUELA; AND HIS COMMENTS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF HIS GROUP

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (18 SEPTEMBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7483

SOURCE : A CUBAN EXILE WHO MAINTAINS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH OTHER EXILES. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1976 ORLANDO BOSCH, A CUBAN EXILE LEADER, SAID THAT HE HAS UNITED ALL OF THE VARIOUS CUBAN EXILE GROUPS INTO ONE CLOSELY-KNIT ORGANIZATION WHICH FOLLOWS HIS LEAD. BOSCH GAVE THE GROUP NO TITLE, BUT SAID THAT IT WAS WELL-ORGANIZED AND PLANNED TO CONTINUE FIGHTING THE REGIME OF CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO.

2. BOSCH, WHO ARRIVED IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, VIA AN UNSPECIFIED ROUTE ON OR ABOUT 13 SEPTEMBER, SAID THAT ON A PREVIOUS VISIT TO VENEZUELA HE HAD MET WITH PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ AND ORLANDO GARCIA, AN EXTRA-OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY

SECRET

FORM 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 043608

TDFIR

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

CHIEF. DURING THIS MEETING PEREZ TOLD BOSCH THAT HE SYMPATHIZED WITH BOSCH'S ANTI-CASTRO EFFORTS BUT THAT HE WOULD ALLOW NO SUCH ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA. AT THAT TIME BOSCH GAVE PEREZ HIS WORD THAT HE WOULD UNDERTAKE NO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA, AND PEREZ, IN TURN, GAVE BOSCH A TOKEN CONTRIBUTION OF U.S. $500.00 FOR HIS ORGANIZATION. IN RECENTLY ARRANGING FOR HIS RETURN TO VENEZUELA, BOSCH SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO FIND THAT VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES ISSUED HIM A VISA, IN HIS TRUE NAME, WITHOUT DELAY. (FIELD COMMENT: AN OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICE INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED THAT LUCILO PENA AND ARMANDO FERNANDEZ, BOTH MEMBERS OF RADICAL CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA ON APPROXIMATELY 6 SEPTEMBER. THE NATURE OF THEIR ACTIVITIES IS NOT KNOWN.)

4. BOSCH COMPLAINED THAT HE WAS RUNNING OUT OF SAFE HAVENS. THE DOMINICANS, HE SAID, HAD ASKED HIM TO LEAVE AND THAT, OF COURSE, HE WAS NOT WELCOME IN THE UNITED STATES. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE, HE SAID, HAD DONE NOTHING TO CURB HIS ACTIVITIES, IT ALSO GAVE HIM NO REAL SUPPORT. COSTA RICA, HE NOTED WITH DISDAIN, IS PRO-CASTRO.

5. BOSCH SAID THAT HE NOW REALIZED THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE TO

HAVE CARRIED OUT BOMBINGS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT PLAN TO MAKE UNITED STATES PERSONNEL OR PROPERTY THE TARGETS OF ANY FURTHER INCIDENTS. IN COMMENTING ON HIS FEBRUARY 1976 DETENTION BY COSTA RICAN OFFICIALS, BOSCH SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER INTENDED TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE WHO WAS AT THAT TIME VISITING LATIN AMERICA.

6. IN COMMENTING ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, BOSCH SAID THAT DESPITE RUMORS TO THE CONTRARY, HIS GROUP HAD NOT KIDNAPPED THE CUBANS. BOSCH OPINED THAT THE CUBANS HAD PROBABLY DEFECTED AND WOULD TURN UP SOONER OR LATER.

7. BOSCH, WHO HAS GAINED A GOOD DEAL OF WEIGHT, SAID THAT HE WAS ILL AND PHYSICALLY EXHAUSTED. NEVERTHELESS, BOSCH INDICATED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE FIGHTING AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME. (SOURCE COMMENT: BOSCH IS OBVIOUSLY ILL AND SUFFERING FROM EYE PROBLEMS. DESPITE BOSCH'S CLAIMS OF A STRONG, UNITED ANTI-CASTRO GROUP, BOSCH'S DETERIORATING PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKE IT DOUBTFUL THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF IT FOR VERY LONG.)

8. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS. SENT TO: SANTO DOMINGO, SAN JOSE, BUENOS AIRES, MANAGUA, MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 35 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 35-1

PERSONS/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

STAFF

ACTION UNIT: LA 8

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR DDO2 OPS/INT ... NE8 AGCDDO CN PS/EG2 OS/IC C/OPS OS9

T 231316   EIA423   PAGE 01   IN 041818

TOR:162305Z SEP 76   MANA 12488

S E C R E T 162244Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12488

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY INFO CARACAS, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. MANAGUA 12478 (NOT SENT ALL ADDEES) (IN

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17682 (IN 039241)

1. ERYTHROID-33 REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH DEPARTED MANAGUA FOR GUATEMALA CITY ON 8 SEPTEMBER VIA COPA FLIGHT 310.

2. ERYTHROID-33 APOLOGIZED FOR DELAY IN ADVISING STATION, BUT SAID HIS SURVEILLANCE HAD LOST BOSCH AND ONLY DISCOVERED HIS DEPARTURE ON 13 SEPTEMBER AFTER REVIEWING FLIGHT MANIFESTS.

3. FOR MEXICO CITY: PLEASE ADVISE LEGAL ATTACHED OF BOSCH'S TRAVEL.

4. FOR GUATEMALA CITY: REF A AND PREVIOUS TRAFFIC REPORTED BOSCH ARRIVAL IN MANAGUA ON 30 AUGUST.

5. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.

ddg

	☒	INDEX PROCESSING ABSTRACT INDEX
P,CKY		[illegible]
6,WB		[illegible] (2, 3) [illegible] COD [illegible] (11) [illegible]
		FOR FILING

16 Sep 76

201-299292

SS

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

CITY, KINGSTON, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 27 AUGUST 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ORLANDO LAZARO FERNANDEZ VAZQUEZ

FBI FILE NO: 105-22619 (MIAMI)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 151907Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 913396

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 0

CONF: CA-E INFO: FILE

TO: IMMEDIATE GEORGETOWN INFO SANTO DOMINGO.Y

WNINTEL KMSTONE Y

REF: A. DIRECTOR 910267*

B. GEORGETOWN 21275 (IN 040247)** Y

1. (PERMISSION GRANTED TO PASS INFO CONTAINED IN SANTO DOMINGO 17682, PARAGRAPH TWO, TO CHARGE FOR FOREIGN MINISTER WILLS.Y

2. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.H

*REF STATED THAT NICARAGUA LIAISON REPORTED BOSCH AND CASTRO WERE IN NICARAGUA AND THIS COULD BE PASSED TO GOG VIA CHARGE. IF NO OBJECTION RECEIVED FROM MANAGUA STATION (NO OBJECTION RECEIVED).

**REF REQUESTED PERMISSION PASS INFO THAT BOSCH WAS DEPORTED BY DOMINICAN GOVT ON 29 AUG AND IS CURRENTLY IN MANAGUA. FRANK CASTRO TRAVELLED ON SAME FLIGHT AS BOSCH.

TRAVEL PROGRAM

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

PREPARE FOR FILMING

CCUE NO. (2, 3)

RYBAT FLST. CODE

CABLE IDEN (11)

NIS (0)

FOR FILING

15 Sep 76

201-299292

DATE: 15 SEPT 76

ORIG: JOANNE HARRIS

UNIT: LA/CAR/GT

EXT: 1249

C/LA/COG

C/LA/MCA

C/LA/CAR

C/LA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 012913

SECRET

RECORD COPY

FORM 1100 OBSOLETE

14-00000

DISSEM BY: 33/FA TOTAL COPIES 42-1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

STAFF

1AB

RF FILE VR IP/AN, DDO2, AGC/DDO, DB/ITG4, NE8, PS/EG2, SS4, SS/SOG4, CI4, DB/LNT,

Y 224998 EIA267 PAGE 01 IN 039291

TOR:142329Z SEP 76 GUAT 19822

S E C R E T 142228Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE GUATEMALA CITY 19822

TO: DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, LA/MIAMI, SANTO DOMINGO.

WNINTEL MHSPIKE

REF: DIRECTOR 912772

8

File: Orlando Bosch 201

1. REF BOMBING, WHICH WIDELY COVERED IN LOCAL PRSSS, OCCURRED ON 31 AUGUST IN THE MEXICAN CONSULATE IN DOWNTOWN GUATEMALA CITY. THE CONSULATE SUFFERED SOME DAMAGE AND A RECEPTIONIST WAS SLIGHTLY INJURED. SINCE BOMB EXPLODED WITHIN THE MEXICAN CONSULATE OFFICES, WHICH LOCATED IN A LARGE BUILDING, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE CONSULATE WAS INDEED THE TARGET. NEITHER ESMICA-68 NOR ESCE--4 (WHO INVESTIGATED THE BOMBING) HAD ANY HARD INFORMATION ON THE IDENTITIES OR MOTIVES OF THE BOMBERS, ALTHOUGH SOME SUSPICION WAS ATTACHED TO THE GUARD WHO WAS HOME SICK ON THE DAY OF THE BOMBING.

2. NO FILE. E2. IMPDET.

SECRET

STATE CABLE

FROM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 4497

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: TERRORISM AND ASSASSINATION PLOTS:
MEETING WITH WILLS

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 24 3/2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY SLOTTED LA ...CA ... 2144

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LAS

ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR (PLAN) NE8, 0002, AGC/000, OPS/ITG4, OPS/INT, CI4, PS/EG2

T 224821 EIA098 PAGE 01 IN 039241

TOR:1421402 SEP 76 SDOM 17682

S E C R E T 1421292 SEP 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17682

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, GEORGETOWN INFO PRIORITY CARACAS, GUATEMALA CITY, KINGSTON, MANAGUA, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE.

jdg

TRAVEL PROGRAM
☒ ABSTRACT
INDEX
[illegible] FOR FILES

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. EMBASSY GEORGETOWN EXDIS 1810 (# 95266)

B. EMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO EXDIS 4497 (#

1. REF A MESSAGE, WHICH SENT TO INFO ADDEE EMBASSIES, REPORTS ON 10 SEPT MEETING OF AMBASSADOR AND LEGAL ATTACHE LEO (WHO IS APPARENTLY ASSIGNED CARACAS) WITH FOREIGN MINISTER WILLS CONCERNING CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATIONS AND BOMBING OF GUYANESE CONSULATE IN PORT OF SPAIN. ACCORDING TO REF A, LEO SAID THAT CORU AND ORLANDO BOSCH OPERATING OUT OF SANTO DOMINGO.

2. AT AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST STATION DRAFTED FOLLOWING REF B REPLY ON 14 SEPTEMBER:

"SRF ADVISES THAT ORLANDO BOSCH WAS DEPORTED BY DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT ON 20 AUGUST AND IS CURRENTLY IN MANAGUA. FRANK CASTRO TRAVELLED ON SAME FLIGHT WITH BOSCH.

SRF REQUESTS ANY USE THIS INFORMATION BE CLEARED WITH

14 Sep 76

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-299292

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ /

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF . FILE . VR .

ACTION #

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 224821 EIA898 PAGE 02-02 IN 039241

TOR:141402 SEP 76 SDOM 17682

SRF HEADQUARTERS."

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2, IMPDET.

X NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 381 1 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

STAFF 141732Z DIRECTOR 912771

CONF: dSTIT64 INFO: FILE IPAS LAB DDO 2
DDO/DO NEB AGC/DDO
CSN/HD CI4 ESIEG2 SA/S064 PDB

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

TO: GUATEMALA CITY INFO MEXICO CITY, [illegible]/MIAMI, SANTO DOMINGO.Y

UNINTEL MHSPIKE Y

1. FYI: PER LNERGO INFO DTD 3 SEP 76, ORLANDO BOSCH, HEAD OF CUBAN EXILE GROUP "CORU", CALLED CONTACTS IN U.S. ADVISING THAT CORU REPS BOMBED MEXICAN EMBASSY IN GUATEMALA CITY ON 1 SEP, CAUSING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE. END FYI. HOWEVER, FBIS INFO DTD 2 SEP INDICATED THAT MEXICAN CONSULATE, GUATEMALA CITY, BOMBED, AND THAT ATTACK MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED FOR MINING COMPANY OCCUPYING SAME BLDG AS CONSULATE.Y

2. WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION OF BOMBING, PLUS ADDITIONAL INFO INCLUDING CLARIFICATION OF TARGET, IF POSSIBLE.Y

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.H

COORDINATION: LA/M&CA/M
LA/M&CA/GS/G JD
LA/CAR
LA/COG

IP/[illegible]		[illegible]
	✓	[illegible]
		[illegible]
IP/CA-Y		[illegible]
		[illegible]
IP/[illegible]		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible] (3)
IP/[illegible]		FOR FILING

D-200-6-484/3

14 Sep 76

201-299292

DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1976
ORIG: EASTON WARNER:JAB
UNIT: OPS/ITG
EXT: 9496

RECORD COPY

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/OPS/ITG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058783

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 31-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 1 OF 2

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

0823132 DIRECTOR

910267

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE LA/AN, NE8, AG/DDO, DDO2, DDO/DO, OPS/ITG4, CSN/ID, DDO3, C/OPS

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY GEORGETOWN INFO PRIORITY MANAGUA.Y

UNINTEL MHSPIKE Y

REF: GEORGETOWN 21260 (IN 031993)* (NOT NEEDED MANAGUA) Y

1. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS REQUESTING INFORMATION FROM THE FBI ON THE ACTIVITIES AND PERSONNEL OF THE COORDINATION OF THE UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION (CORU). THE DEPARTMENT WILL INFORM EMBASSY GEORGETOWN WHAT INFORMATION THE FBI IS WILLING TO RELEASE FOR PASSAGE TO THE GOG. RATHER THAN REQUEST SEPARATE AND DUPLICATE INFORMATION FROM THE FBI, WE SUGGEST THAT YOU ADVISE THE CHARGE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S ACTION IN THIS REGARD.Y

2. THERE IS NO IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ON GIL NOBLE. TRAVEL INFORMATION SHOWS ONE G.H. NOBLE, U.S. CITIZEN, BORN 4 AUG 1944, PLANNED TO TRAVEL TO EAST GERMANY IN 1964, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION OF TRAVEL.Y

3. WE HAVE NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CORU. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM NICARAGUA LIAISON THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA AND FRANK CASTRO PAZ WERE IN NICARAGUA AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER. IN VIEW OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

8 Sep 76

B 201-742365

RECORD COPY

201-249292

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0129138

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

910267

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER ,
0 IP FILES #

THE LACK OF SENSITIVITY RE THE TRAVEL OF BOSCH AND CASTRO TO NICARAGUA. YOU MAY PASS THIS INFORMATION (SOURCING DELETED) TO THE CHARGE FOR PASSAGE TO THE GOG IF MANAGUA DOES NOT DISAGREE BY COB 9 SEPTEMBER. YOU MAY ALSO SAY THAT BOSCH AND CASTRO DO NOT RESIDE IN U.S.

4. FILE: 201-299292; 201-742365. E2 IMPDET.

* GEORGETOWN WOULD LIKE TO ASSIST THE CHARGE IN HIS DEALINGS WITH FRED WILLS, GUYANESE FOREIGN MINISTER, ON THE ACTIVITIES ON CORU.

TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILMING
CHCL NO. (2, 3)
ALST. CODE
CABLE IDEN (11)
(6)
FOR FILING

DATE: 8 SEPT 76
ORIG: R. ALLENBACH
UNIT: AC/LA/CAR/GT
EXT: 1849

DC/LA/MCA, JOHN BECKWITH
(TELECOORD)

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018913

14-00000

FORM 3020
7-71 MFG 2-76

Dicky

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER TOTAL COPIES 33-1 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT: LA8

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR IP/AN, DDO2, ACC/DDO, OPS/ITG4, OS/IC, CI4, NEE, PS/EG2, OPS/INT, LSN/ID

T 210060 EIA294 PAGE 01 IN 033325

TOR:082204Z SEP 76 MANA 12470

S E C R E T 082100Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12470

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY INFO SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, CARACAS, PANAMA CITY, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. MANAUGA 12461 (027103) (033311)

B. MANAGUA 12468 (SENT DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY ONLY)

1. ERYTHROID-33 REPORTED FRANK CASTRO PAZ DEPARTED MANAGUA FOR MIAMI ON 5 SEPTEMBER 76 VIA TACA FLIGHT NO. 310.

2. ORLANDO BOSCH IS STILL IN MANAGUA AND, ACCORDING TO ERYTHROID-33, HAS CONTACTED SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL CUBAN COMMUNITY. E-33 HAS BOSCH UNDER SURVEILLANCE AND WILL PASS TO STATION SUMMARY OF REPORTS INCLUDING NAMES OF BOSCH'S LOCAL CONTACTS. WILL POUCH TO HQS WHEN RECEIVED.

(IN 033133)

3. FOR MEXICO CITY: PER MEXICO CITY 37673, PLEASE ADVISE LEAGAL ATTACHE THAT BOSCH IS STILL IN MANAGUA.

4. FILE: 201-299292. E2. IMPDET.

8 Sep 76

201-299292

RECORD COPY

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 65 PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 17-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ___ BY ___ AT ___

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LAF

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR (PLAN) LSN/ID C/OPS

CI4 PS/EG2

T 209997 EIA232 PAGE 01-01 IN 033311

TOR:0821232 SEP 76 MANA 12468

S E C R E T 0820502 SEP 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12468

TO: MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL

REFS: A. MANAGUA 12461 (027103)

B. MEXICO CITY 37673 (032133)

1. PER REF A, LEGAL ATTACHE MAY BE TOLD THAT BOSCH WAS IN MANAGUA AS OF 30 AUGUST.

2. STATION STILL WAITING FOR GENERAL GENIE TO REPORT ON WHERE BOSCH IS CURRENTLY LOCATED. WILL ADVISE WHEN THIS INFORMATION RECEIVED.

3. DEFER FILE. E2, IMPDET.

Orlando Bosch 201

RECORD COPY

SECRET

08 Sept 76

201-299292

14-00000

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

LA 8

FILE IP/AN

STAFF

T 207172 E:A476 PAGE 01-01 IN 032133

TOR:0723592 SEP 76 MEXI 37673

S E C R E T 0722162 SEP 76 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 37673

TO: MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR.

1. REQUEST PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM LEGAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY: "FOR: ROBERT FAMBRINI-MANAGUA. FROM: LEGAT, MEXICO. URGENTLY REQUEST THAT GENERAL GENIE BE APPROACHED FOR ANY CONFIRMATION THAT ORLANDO BOSCH, ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVIST, WAS IN MANAGUA AS OF SEPTEMBER TWO LAST."

2. FILE 50-2-4/A. E2. IMPDET.

[illegible]		[illegible]
	X	ABSTRACT
		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible] FOR FILMING
[illegible]		[illegible]
		RYBAT [illegible]
		CABLE FILE (11)
		[illegible] (2)
[illegible]		FOR FILING

RECORD COPY

SECRET

07 Sept 76

201-299292

FBI CABLE

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

DATE: 3 SEPTEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY
ORGANIZATIONS (CORU)

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

0220222 CIA 907954

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/LA/AN, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS, C/CI 2, C/OPS/ITG 2

0 DISSEM BY: 31
0
0 PER SUP
0 # 132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DEPT OF STATE//SY/I/PIB, SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

SUBJECT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - NICARAGUA, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST.

FIRCI-312/02698-76

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO FIRCI-312/02647-76, DATED 31 AUGUST 1976. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED ON ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA:

ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1976 AN OFFICIAL NICARAGUAN SERVICE REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD ARRIVED IN MANAGUA, ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK CASTRO PAZ, AND WAS GIVEN PERMISSION TO REMAIN THERE IN TRANSIT STATUS FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO THIRTY DAYS.

ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1976 AN OFFICIAL DOMINICAN SERVICE REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD OBTAINED A VENEZUELAN VISA IN MANAGUA.

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EGDS 1,2,d

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

IP/ERN

2 Sep. 76

201-299292

RECORD COPY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 026090

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

SECRET

CIA

COMP: INFO: FILE 907954

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

BASED ON: MANAGUA 12461 |IN 027103| AND SANTO DOMINGO 17653 |IN 027288| 1 SEPTEMBER 1976. PROJECTS: ERRATIC/EMPYREX OBJECTIVE: J

CABLE SEC: PLS MAKE CCS COPIES AVAILABLE TO IPAN FOR 201-299292.

LR

JAN 1 1 77

C/LA/CAR

OPS/LSN C. ENRIGHT |IN DRAFT|

LA/COG C. LANGALIS |IN DRAFT|

C/LA/M&CAM

DATE: 8 SEPTEMBER 1976
ORIG: E. CHARLES PAYNE
UNIT: LA/M&CAM/CN
EXT: 9041

OPS/ITG
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 025090

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY: CJ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 30-1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

STAFF

ACTION UNIT: LA8

ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR IP/AN, NE8, DCO2, AGC/DDO, OPS/ITG4, LSN/ID, C14, C/OPS, PS/EG2

T 194519 EIA168 PAGE 01-01 IN 027383

TOR: 012212Z SEP 76 CAR 30756

S E C R E T 012200Z SEP 76 STAFF

File Book-201
cc 22-5-76

CITE CARACAS 30756 (CARROLL ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MANAGUA, LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL BEAM MHSPIKE

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17653 (IN027258)

1. REQUEST PERMISSION ADVISE LOCAL LNERGO REP OF REF DEVELOPMENT TO HAVE HIM ALERT VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES. AMBASSADOR ADVISED.

2. FILE: 201-0299292; 201-0742365. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 27 PER ________ TOTAL COPIES 30-1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________ S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA/COG/ITG ... AT 1945

STAFF [illegible]

ACTION UNIT LA 8

ACTION #

INFO: RF, FILE, VR, 3202, A64/000, [illegible], DDS/1764, OSG, C14, PS/EG2, C/OPS, SS/SO64

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 194282 EIA865 PAGE 01 IN 027288

TOR:011941Z SEP 76 SDOM 17653

S E C R E T 011920Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17653

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MANAGUA, CARACAS INFO SAN JOSE, MEXICO CITY, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY, LA/MIAMI. pdg

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. MANAGUA 12461 (027103)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17647 (024537)

C. SANTO DOMINGO 17646 (024037)

D. SANTO DOMINGO 17629 (NOT NEEDED MANAGUA, SAN JOSE) (016194)

[illegible] PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
INDEX
[illegible] FOR FILING
[illegible] (2, 3)
[illegible] REST. [illegible]
CABLE [illegible] (11)
NFO (8)
FOR FILING

1. EMWISE-15 REPORTED MORNING 1 SEPTEMBER THAT ORLANDO BOSCH GRANTED VISA BY NICARAGUAN AUTHORITIES. HE SAID BOSCH HAD ALSO OBTAINED VENEZUELAN VISA IN MANAGUA. HE COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT FRANK CASTRO HAD ALSO GOTTEN VENEZUELAN VISA BUT ASSMED THIS TO BE THE CASE.

2. AS NOTED REF D, CASTRO CARRIES U.S. PASSPORT N-2567917.

3. ACCORDING EMWISE-15, LOCAL CUBANS CLOSE TO BOSCH HAVE DECIDED NOT TO PUBLICLY DENOUNCE POLICE ACTION IN DEPORTING BOSCH BECAUSE "THEY WANT AMERICANS TO THINK HE'S STILL IN SANTO DOMINGO."

4. FILE: 201-299292, 201-742365, E2, IMPDET.

1 Sep 76

201-299292

SECRET

B201-742365

RECORD COPY.

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG 2/76

Derby.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER

TOTAL COPIES 26 RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LP AT 1650,

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR. IP/AN. DDO2 AGG/DDO OPS/ITG4 C/OPS, CI4, OSG, PS/EG2, OSG/IC.

T 193696 EIA364 PAGE 01 IN 027103

TOR:011650Z SEP 76 MANA 12461

S E C R E T 011630Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12461

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO INFO LA/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY.

MININTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. SANTO DOMINGO 17646 (024037)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17647 (024537)

IP/[illegible]	☒	TRANSIT PROGRAM
		RESTRICT
		INDEX
IP/[illegible]		[illegible]
IP/[illegible]		[illegible] (2, 3)
		[illegible]
		CABLE IDEN (11)
		NFG (3)
[illegible]		FOR FILING

pdy

1. ON MORNING 1 SEPTEMBER ERYTHROID-33 (CHIEF, LOCAL LIAISON) REPORTED THAT BOSCH AND CASTROL ARE IN MANAGUA. E-33 SAID THEY LEFT PARA 1, REF A FLIGHT AND WERE GIVEN PERMISSION TO REMAIN IN MANAGUA IN TRANSIT STATUS. THEIR REQUEST BASED ON THEIR CLAIM THAT THERE NO ROOM ON PLANE FOR THEM. IN ACCORDANCE LOCAL PROCEDURES, NON-US CIT TRANSIT PASSENGERS MAY REMAIN IN MANAGUA FOR UP TO THIRTY DAYS, BUT HAVE TO LEAVE THEIR PASSPORTS WITH IMMIGRATION. E-33 HAS BOSCH'S COSTA RICAN PASSPORT AND SHOWED IT TO COS. NAME IN PASSPORT IS AS REPORTED REF A, NUMBER 8746-71, DATED 10 FEB 71, VALID TO 1 SEPT 76. DOMINICAN EXIT STAMP IS DATED 29 AUGUST 1976. E-33 SAID CASTRO IS CARRYING US PASSPORT.

2. E-33 WILL ATTEMPT TO LOCATE BOSCH AND CASTRO, FIND OUT

1 Sep 76

B201-742365

RECORD COPY R E T

201-299292

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER______ TOTAL COPIES______ RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______

S E C R E T

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED______ BY______ AT______ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 193696 EIA364 PAGE 02-02 IN 027103

TOR:0116502 SEP 76 MANA 12461

WHERE THEY ARE STAYING IN MANAGUA, WHEN THEY PLAN TO LEAVE AND THEIR DESTINATION. WILL REPORT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS RECEIVED.

3. FILE: 201-299292 AND 201-742355. E2, IMPDET.

OUTGOING MESSAGE 18-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ABE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO		PAGE	OF	PAGES
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		

OMF

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
[illegible]	312043Z	CIA	906701

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/AF/AN, C/LSN/10, C/OTS C/OTS/176 2, D/OMS 2, C/CI 2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 27
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER 508
0 IP FILES # 132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DEPT OF STATE//SY/I/PIB, SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.Y

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.Y

SUBJECT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - COSTA RICA, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST.Y

FIRCI-312/02647-76 2Y

1. IN REFERENCE TO YOUR MESSAGE DATED 16 JULY 1976, ENTITLED "NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA", COPY SENT ADDRESSEES, THIS AGENCY HAS THE FOLLOWING CURRENT INFORMATION ON ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA:Y

ON 29 AUGUST 1976 AN OFFICIAL DOMINICAN SERVICE REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAS BEEN DEPORTED TO COSTA RICA USING HIS ECOSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN THE NAME OF CARLOS LUIS PANIAGUA MENDEZ. BOSCH DEPARTED SANTO DOMINGO 29 AUGUST 1976 ON IBERIA FLIGHT NO. 979 FOR SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA VIA MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.Y

312/02647-76

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS 1,2,4

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

31 Aug 76

201-299292

D22-9-28

ABSTRACT
INDEX

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018913

TO REGISTER HERE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES

2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF

CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE

906701

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

BASED ON: SANTO DOMINGO 17646 (IN 024037) 30 AUGUST 1976

PROJECT: EMPYREX

OBJECTIVE: J

CABLE SEC: PLS MAKE CCS COPIES AVAILABLE TO IPAN FOR 201-299292 & 22-9-28

[illegible]

DATE: 30 AUG 76
ORIG: D. SMITH:JI
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 3487

C/LA/CAR
OPS/LSN CHARLES ENRIGHT (TELECOORD)
C/LA/COG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

OPS/ITG
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 015819

OUTGOING MESSAGE

14-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

WH/7/CR 2
C/

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
312218Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
906799

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE - 2 OPS/ITG 4 - 7

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
SEC
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 27

TO: SIGNAL CENTER.Y

PLBBEASE TRANSMIT SANTO DOMINGO 17646 TO SANTIAGO FOR INFORMATION. E2,IMPDET.d

Orlando Bosch 201

*COPY ATTACHED

DATE: 30 AUG 76 021
ORIG: D. SMITH:JI
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT:

OPS/ITG P. PLUMB (TELECOORDS)

C/LA/COG

C/LA

C/LA/CAR

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 015913

ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX

OUTGOING MESSAGE

27-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
312218Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
906798

DISSEM BY: 27

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE DDO 2, A6C/DDO, NE8, OPS/IT64, C/OPS, IP/AN, DDO/DO

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: SANTO DOMINGO. Y

UNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE Y

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17646* (IN 024037)

1. (S) REF BEING RELAYED TO STATION SANTIAGO AND SUBSTANCE REF TO FBI. Y

2. FILE: 201-299292; 22-9-28. E2, IMPDET.

*CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA DEPORTED TO COSTA RICA.

TRAVEL PROGRAM
INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILMING
CABLE ICEN (11)

31 Aug 76

201-299292

D22-9-28

DATE: 30 AUG 76
ORIG: D. SMITH:JI
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 1497

OPS/ITG P. PLUMB (TELECOORD)

LA/COG

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018912

CAUTION - THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS PROCESSING
- INDEXING REQUESTED
- NO INDEXING
- APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO: Chief, Latin America Division

INFO.: COS, San Jose, COS, Managua, COS, Guatemala City

FROM: Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

SUBJECT: O Passport Used by Orlando BOSCH to Enter and Depart the Dominican Republic

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

REFS:
A. SANTO DOMINGO 17646
B. SANTO DOMINGO 17643
C. SANTO DOMINGO 17629
D. SAN JOSE 19662

1. Forwarded herewith is a Xerox copy of the Costa Rican passport used by Orlando BOSCH to enter the Dominican Republic in the name of Carlos Luis PANIAGUA Mendez. The passport was obtained and Xeroxed by EMCLIPPER-1 who provided a copy to the Station.

2. EMWISE-15 had previously reported that BOSCH entered the Dominican Republic with a false Costa Rican passport in the name of Pedro Antonio PENA. While BOSCH may be carrying a second Costa Rican passport in the PENA name, it appears that he entered the Dominican Republic with the PANIAGUA passport. The PANIAGUA passport forwarded herewith shows the following:

A. The Department of Migration of Costa Rica issued a visa on 24 March 1976 for travel to "C.A., Republica Dominicana" (p.13).

B. BOSCH departed Costa Rica at Pena Blancas on 26 March (p. 11) and entered Nicaragua (p. 9).

C. The Dominican Consulate in Managua issued a one-trip visa for the Dominican Republic on 30 March (p.14).

Attachment:
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
3 - C/LAD, w/att
2 - COS, San Jose, w/att
2 - COS, Managua, w/att
2 - COS, Guatemala City, w/att

To OUT Pouch

RECORD COPY

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HDCA-11056

DATE: 30 August 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-299292

CAUTION - THIS FORM REQUIRES
SECURE STORAGE

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HDCA-11056

D. It appears that BOSCH entered Guatemala City by air on 30 March and departed 31 March (p. 15).

E. BOSCH arrived in Santo Domingo at Las Americas airport on 31 March (p. 15).

3. BOSCH told EMCLIPPER-1 that the real PANIAGUA had undertaken most of the travel shown in the passport, but EMCLIPPER-1 did not establish the date the passport was acquired by BOSCH or how.

4. As reported Ref A, BOSCH was deported to Costa Rica via Managua on 29 August on Iberia Flight 979. EMWISE-15 reported that the PANIAGUA passport was used to deport BOSCH.

for Rutherford J. LYNER

[illegible] EDITION

☐ CONTINUED

NO.

9 1 3-4

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED 45 BY 1310

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO: RF, FILE, VR, DDO2, AGC/ADDO, OPS/ITG4, NE 8, CI4, PS/EG2, C/OPS (IP/AN), OSG

T 186729 EIA112 PAGE 01 IN 024037

TOR:3313022 AUG 76 SDOM 17646

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T 301245Z AUG 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17646

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE, MANAGUA, DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. SANTO DOMINGO 17643 (NOT SENT MANAGUA, SAN JOSE) (IN 022601)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17629 (NOT SENT MANAGUA, SAN JOSE) (IN 016194)

1. EMWISE-15 ADVISED STATION AT 0945 HOURS ON 29 AUGUST THAT ORLANDO BOSCH HAD BEEN DEPORTED ON IBERIA FLIGHT 9[illegible]9 AT 0600 HOURS, WITH DESTINATION SAN JOSE VIA MANAGUA. DECISION TO PUT BOSCH ON THIS FLIGHT WAS MADE ON VERY SHORT NOTICE. BOSCH TRAVELLED ON SAME COSTA RICAN PASSPORT WITH WHICH HE ENTERED DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN NAME OF CARLOS LUIS PANIAGUA MENDEZ. (EMWISE-15 HAD PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT BOSCH HAD ENTERED WITH COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME OF PEDRO ANTONIO PENA. THIS INFO WAS IN ERROR.)

2. ON 27 AUGUST STATION OBTAINED COPY OF PANIAGUA PASSPORT FROM EMCLIPPER-1 WHICH BEING POUCHED TO ACTION ADDEES.

3. NO OBJECTION ACTION ADDEES STATIONS INDICATING TO LIAISON THEY AWARE OF BOSCH TRAVEL WITH COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME

30 Aug 76

SECRET

201-299292

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY___ ____PER__ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF . FILE .. VR .
ACTION #		

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 186729 EIA112 PAGE 02-02 IN 024037

TOR:301302Z AUG 76 SDOM 17646

PANIAGUA.

4. FILE: 201-299292, E2 IMPDET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 42 PER TOTAL COPIES 35-3

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

STAFF

ACTION UNIT
LA8
ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR IP/AN DDO2 AGC/DDO NE8 OPS/ITG4 OSG C/OPS CI4 PS/EG2 LSN/ID

T 163140 EIA621 PAGE 01 IN 022917

TOR:272050Z AUG 76 SDOM 17645

S E C R E T 272030Z AUG 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17645

K

TO: DIRECTOR.

7

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 905008

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17629 (IN 016194)

Orlando BOSCH
201

1. PER PARA 2 REF B. ENCLIPPER-1 HAS PROVIDED STATION WITH FULL RUN-DOWN ON TRAVEL OF FRANK CASTRO PAZ (201-742365) FROM FEBRUARY 1975 THROUGH JULY 1976 AS FOLLOWS:

EXITS FROM SANTO DOMINGO:

1 FEBRUARY 1975

1 APRIL 1975

15 JUNE 1975

30 JUNE 1975

30 JULY 1975

17 AUGUST 1975

18 SEPTEMBER 1975

4 OCTOBER 1975

1 NOVEMBER 1975

15 FEBRUARY 1976

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF . FILE VR	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 183148 EIA621 PAGE 02 IN 022917

TOR:2728582 AUG 76 SDOM 17645

28 FEBRUARY 1976

12 APRIL 1976

23 APRIL 1976

28 MAY 1976

16 JUNE 1976

ENTRIES TO SANTO DOMINGO:

4 FEBRUARY 1975

18 APRIL 1975

22 JUNE 1975

13 JULY 1975

8 AUGUST 1975

6 SEPTEMBER 1975

30 SEPTEMBER 1975

28 OCTOBER 1975

25 NOVEMBER 1975

16 FEBRUARY 1976

29 FEBRUARY 1976

14 APRIL 1976

5 MAY 1976

28 MAY 1976

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1 4
2 5
3 6

T 103148 EIA621 PAGE 03-03 IN 022917

TOR:272058Z AUG 76 SDOM 17645

8 JULY 1976.

2. ACCORDING EMPYREX, CASTRO DEPARTED SANTO DOMINGO 5 AUGUST AND RETURNED 15 AUGUST.

3. REQUEST HQS COMPARE DATES OF CASTRO TRAVEL WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECTED CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ACTS.

4. NO OBJECTION PASS PARAS ONE AND TWO TRAVEL DATE TO LNERGO OR LOCAL SERVICES.

5. FILE: 201-742365. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

7

38 2

SECRET

DSM- DDO/DO

LA 1610

LA 8

INFO

R/AN DDO 2, AGC/DDO, OPS/ITG 4, NE 8, PS/EG 2, SS 4, OSG, C 14, C/OPS

STAFF PROCEEDING

T 182374 EIA864 PAGE 01 IN 822681

TOR1271685Z AUG 76 SDOM 17643

S E C R E T 271541Z AUG 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17643

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17629 (016194)

1. MEMORANDUM OF ORLANDO BOSCH CITED PARA 3 REF HAS NOT GIVEN TO CHIEF OF POLICE, GENERAL NIVAR, UNTIL 25 AUGUST WHEN HE RESUMED HIS POST FOLLOWING EMERGENCY APPENDECTOMY. NIVAR IMMEDIATELY GAVE EMWISE-15 INSTRUCTIONS TO "LOCATE BOSCH AND THROW HIM OUT."

2. MEMORANDUM, WHICH SHOWN TO LYNER BY EMWISE-15 ON 26 AUGUST, STATES THAT BOSCH HAD ENTERED COUNTRY WITH COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME PEDRO ANTONIO PENA. EMWISE-15 CONFIRMED THAT BOSCH IS CARRYING ANOTHER COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME CARLOS LUIS PANIAGUA MENDEZ, AS REPORTED PARA 1 REF.

3. EMWISE-15 SAID HE HAS NOT YET LOCATED BOSCH. HE WAS ASKED TO INFORM STATION WITH AS MUCH LEAD TIME AS POSSIBLE WHEN BOSCH BEING DEPORTED, AIRLINE FLIGHT NUMBER AND NAME

27 Aug 76

201-299292

RECORD COPY.

SECRET

DISSEMINATION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

BY AT

ACTION

RF FILE VR

T 182374 EIA864 PAGE 02-02 IN 022681

TOR:2716052 AUG 76 SDOM 17643

AND PASSPORT BEING USED. ALTHOUGH EMWISE-15 HAS PROMISED DO THIS, SLIP UP IS POSSIBLE. IN ORDER KEEP TABS ON BOSCH'S FUTURE WHEREABOUTS, SUGGEST HQS INFO LA STATIONS THAT BOSCH MAY BE DEPORTED IMMINENTLY, WILL PROBABLY TRAVEL, AT LEAST DURING FIRST LEG OF TRIP, WITH COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME PEDRO ANTONIO PENA OR CARLOS LUIS PANIAGUA MENDEZ. STATION'S GUESS IS THAT DOMINICAN'S WILL INSIST HE LEAVE WITH PENA IDENTIFICATION, SINCE THIS IS HOW HE ENTERED COUNTRY. NO OBJECTION PASS ABOVE INFO TO LNERGO AND TO LOCAL LIAISONS AS APPROPRIATE.

4. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

Attachment to IN-469937

SRF/M-105

27 August 1976

Chronology
Files
Orlando
BOSCH

MEMORANDUM FOR: LNERGO, Miami

FROM : SRF, Miami

SUBJECT : Orlando BOSCH Avila

According to a reliable source in Santo Domingo, the Government of the Dominican Republic has decided to deport Orlando BOSCH Avila as soon as security officials can locate him. BOSCH may be deported using a Costa Rican passport in the name of Pedro Antonio PENA or Carlos Luis PANIAGUA Mendez. We suspect that the Dominican Government will insist that BOSCH depart from the Dominican Republic in the name of PENA since this is how he entered the country. There is to date no evidence as to what country BOSCH will be deported.

OUTGOING - MESSAGE

27-3

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1

S E C R E T

STAFF

2700322 DIRECTOR 905008

CONF: LA5 INFO: FILE I/PIAN, EURY, AFY, EAY FRY, OPS/ITGY

DISSEM BY: 45

PER SOP

0 ///

TO: LASS, MADRID, PARIS, LONDON, LISBON, ROME, BONN, BONN BASE, COPENHAGEN, KINSHASA, LUSAKA, TOKYO, OTTAWA, FR/NEW YORK, FR/WASHINGTON. Y

ORLANDO BOSCH 201

UNINTEL REAM MHPROSE TRACE Y

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 896657

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17629 (IN 0161941 NOT SENT OR NEEDED ALL ADDEES

1. REF B ADVISED THAT FRANK CASTRO PAZ, LIVING IN SANTO DOMINGO, IS KNOWN TO BE ORLANDO BOSCH'S CONTACT MAN AND MESSENGER CARRIER TO CUBAN RIGHTIST GROUPS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. IT REQUESTED CONFIRMATION OF INFO ON FRANK D. CASTRO PEREZ CITED PARA 1 C REF A. THIS IS TO CLARIFY THAT THE FRANK CASTRO INVOLVED WITH FLNC IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IS IN FACT EULALIO FRANCISCO CASTRO PAZ, AKA FRANK CASTRO, OF REF B, AND NOT THE FRANK D. CASTRO PEREZ CITED IN PARA 1 C REF A. Y

2. MOST OF FOLLOWING IS SENSITIVE FBI SOURCE INFO, FYI ONLY IN CONNECTION REF B, AND NOT TO BE DISCUSSED OR OTHERWISE DISCLOSED OUTSIDE BKHERALD WITHOUT PRIOR HQS APPROVAL. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 025231

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES
2

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR
905008

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY:
PER
#

CONF: INFO: FILE

3. THE CASTRO CITED PARA 2 REF B IS EULALIO FRANCISCO CASTRO PAZ (201-742365), BORN 4 JUNE 42 AT MARIANAO, CUBA; AKA PAPO, E. CASTRO, F. ASTRO, AND FRANK CASTRO. PHOTO AVAILABLE. REPORTEDLY LEFT CUBA FOR U.S. CLANDESTINELY BY BOAT 11 DEC 62 (SIC - BELIEVED BE 61). RESIDED PHILADELPHIA JAN TO OCT 62; NEW YORK OCT TO NOV 62; SERVED U.S. ARMY 5 NOV 62 THRU 6 DEC 63 AS LIGHT WEAPONS INFANTRYMAN. REPORTEDLY WORKED FOR MANUEL ARTIME IN APR 65 RECRUITING PEOPLE IN MIAMI TO FIGHT COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA. AS OF MAR 74 WAS EMPLOYED AS SALESMAN WITH FABRIC BAZAAR, INC., MIAMI, FLA. MOVED TO DOM REP EARLY 75. AS OF MAR 75 WAS ESTABLISHING INTERIOR DECORATOR FIRM CASTEVILLE C. POR A. IN SANTO DOMINGO. REPORTEDLY WAS TRYING SET UP EXPORT-IMPORT BUSINESS IN DOM REP APR 75. DURING 72 MARRIED ANA MARGARIETA DE WINDT, DAUGHTER OF RETIRED REAR ADMIRAL CESAR DE WINDT LAVANDIER OF DOMINICAN NAVY. CASTRO REPORTEDLY TOLD FBI SOURCE OCT 75 THAT HEAD OF SANTO DOMINGO POLICE HAD IT IN FOR HIM AND WOULD BE REPLACED BY FRIEND OF CASTRO'S FATHER-IN-LAW.

4. CASTRO TRAVELS FREQUENTLY BETWEEN DOM REP AND MIAMI. WAS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E 2 IMPDET

14-00000

OUTGOIN~ MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES
3

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR
90500 8

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

CONF: INFO: FILE

DEPORTED FROM DOM REP 4 OCT 75 WITH HUMBERTO LOPEZ JR., A FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA (FLNC) LEADER AND FEDERAL FUGITIVE ARRESTED BY FBI UPON ARRIVAL FLA. UPON ARRIVAL MIAMI 4 OCT 75 CASTRO'S U.S. PASSPORT BORE CACHETS SHOWING DEPARTURE VENEZUELA 23 SEPT 75; ENTRY "ELDORADO-BOGOTA" COLOMBIA 27 SEPT 75. CASTRO CLAIMED HE AND OTHERS PLACED BOMBS AT RUSSIAN EMBASSY AND IN THEATRE IN BOGOTA. CASTRO IS LICENSED PILOT, PROFICIENT PARACHUTIST AND SKYDIVER. WAS/IS LEADER OF "GOLDEN FALCONS" SKYDIVING CLUB OF CUBAN EXILES OPERATING OUT OF HOMESTEAD, FLA. HE BECAME U.S. CITIZEN 5 OCT 71. HQS RECORDS CONTAIN NO INDICATION HE EVER EMPLOYED BY BKHERALD. Y

5. FILE: 201-742365; 201-309124. E2, IMPDET.

LA/COG/COMMENT: SANTO DOMINGO REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF INFO ON FRANK CASTRO CITED IN DIRECTOR 896657.

DATE: 24 AUGUST 76
ORIG: CHRISTINE HOPKINS:MS
UNIT: LA/COG/CICS
EXT: 1491

C/LA/OPS
AP Cups
EA Cups

AC/EHR
AC/LA
C/EA
C/AP
DC/FR

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 052231

14-00000

bed for [illegible]

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Plot to Assassinate Kissinger

A reported plot to assassinate Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in Costa Rica six months ago was blocked by U.S. and Costa Rican authorities four days before it was to have been carried out.

We have pieced together the story from secret testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and from interviews with Cuban exiles and U.S. intelligence sources.

A Cuban terrorist named Orlando Bosch Avila was reported to be gunning for Kissinger. The attempt on Kissinger's life was expected, according to reports, during his visit to Costa Rica in February.

Shortly before Kissinger's arrival, Bosch slipped into Cost Rica on a false passport. But the FBI and the Secret Service had been alerted. They traced Bosch's movements and notified Costa Rican authorities. Bosch was arrested and put in jail four days before Kissinger arrived.

The plot to kill Kissinger apparently grew out of his overtures to improve relations with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro in 1973. This reportedly upset an anti-Castro terrorist band, Cuban Action, which Bosch headed.

We reported part of the story in 1974 after a lengthy investigation in Miami. In columns on Sept. 1 and Nov. 19, 1974, we warned that anti-Castro terrorists planned an "assassination . . . against American congressmen and businessmen who supported a . . . thaw." We noted that Kissinger had been in touch with Castro.

The first hint that Kissinger was a target came later from Carlos Rivero Collado, son of the man elected to the presidency of Cuba in 1958. Rivero was active in the anti-Castro underground in Miami's Little Havana. He later re-defected to Cuba where he gave a fascinating interview.

"I have known privately since 1972," he said about "the plan to assassinate the U.S. Secretary of State." He said the plot had taken "certain form" by 1973 and had been "actualized" by 1974.

In a reference to our 1974 columns, he added: "This fact, which, I repeat, I've known privately, has been corroborated by the U.S. journalist Jack Anderson."

Rivero named Bosch as one of the 18 anti-Castro leaders who had conspired to kill American and other leaders promoting a Cuban-American detente. Bosch had been convicted in 1968 of shelling a Polish freighter with a bazooka while it was moored in Miami. He jumped federal parole and fled to Venezuela in 1974.

Forida's Dade County Public Safety Department, because of the huge Cuban population in Miami, has excellent ties throughout Latin America. In early 1976, the county's terrorist expert, Lt. Thomas Lynch, picked up some electrifying news.

He told the Senate subcommittee about it in secret testimony. "We received information from confidential sources," he testified" that there was going to be attempt on the life of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger . . . We passed the information on to the FBI, and they had also received the information, and we notified the Secret Service, so they have the protective duty for the Secretary of State."

The plot was linked to Kissinger's two-day stay in Costa Rica, and Bosch was picked up and questioned. He was held on a false passport charge until Kissinger was safely out of the country.

Bosch later insisted: "My only crime was entering the country with a false passport." Certainly, it was never proged in court that he hoped to knock off Kissinger. He is now at large somewhere in Latin America.

Johnson's Junkets — Democratic presidential nominee Jimmy Carter must have Don Johnson mind when he charges that the Republicans find cushy jobs in the bureaucracy for defeated GOP legislators.

Johnson, a former Iowa congressman, was appointed by President Nixon to head the Veterans Administration. But he was forced out of office when he proved to be a lackluster leader. So he was shuffled over to the Commerce Department, where he has been ensconced as deputy assistant secretary for domestic and international business.

Johnson has used both posts to travel, mostly to Iowa, where he has kept his political fences mended in the hope of running for office again.

At the Commerce Department alone, he has spent at least $7,000 on travel, $5,204 in the last year. He always goes first class, despite the fact that government regulations require coach travel for federal employees. The enterprising Johnson, however has a ready excuse for his luxury accommodations.

"I'm a hell of a big man," he told our reporter Barbara Takel. "I'm 6-foot-6 and weigh 270 pounds." Johnson also said his bad back forced him to fly in the forward compartment. Despite his many excursions to his home state, he denied having any plans for a comeback in politics.

Bosch

24

"THE WASHINGTON STAR"

23 AUGUST 1976

Miami Called Base Of Cuban Terrorists

United Press International

Militant pro- and anti-Castro Cuban groups in the Miami area are engaged in terrorist activities both in and outside the United States, according to closed-door testimony before a Senate subcommittee released yesterday.

The testimony came last May before a Judiciary subcommittee on internal security chaired by Sen. James O. Eastland, D-Miss. It said that as many as 50 different Cuban groups of various shadings have been operating in Miami at any one time, many of them engaged in violent plots involving local actions and activities in Mexico, Central and South America and Cuba itself.

Lt. Thomas Lyons, who has been with the Dade County, Fla., Public Safety Department for more than nine years, and Raul J. Diaz of the department's organized crime, terrorist and security unit, told of efforts to track down terrorist elements in the greater Miami area.

LYONS SAID MOST Cubans in the area are hard-working and industrious, but some individuals "use Dade Country as a base for international terrorism against allied governments of Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purported Communists and individuals who take a stand against their terroristic-type tactics."

During the last two years, Lyons said, there have been four homicides with strong indicators on each that the motivations were political in nature and terroristic by design."

Diaz said some Castro groups have infiltrated exile organizations and there were plans to assassinate Latin American diplomats and foreign ministers.

Lyons said his unit received information from a confidential source early this year that there would be an attempt on the life of Secreatry of State Henry A. Kissinger during his February visit to Costa Rica.

THE FBI AND Secret Service were notified, he said. A widely-known fugitive exile, Orlando Bosch, was jailed after illegally entering Costa Rica. There were no incidents during the Kissinger visit.

He did not mention the CIA's own efforts to use Cuban exiles in Florida and U.S. gangsters to kill Castro.

Two weeks ago, the body of underworld figure John Roselli was found stuffed in a chain-weighted, 55-gallon drum floating in a bay near Miami. Roselli had testified last year before the Senate Intelligence Committee that he and Chicago gangster Sam Giancana were hired by the CIA to recruit Cubans to kill Castro.

Giancana was killed by unknown persons last year just before he was to testify before the Washington panel.

IT WAS LEARNED yesterday a lawyer for Roselli told the FBI in 1967 that the underworld figure, recruited by the CIA to kill Castro, believed agents of the Cuban leader were involved in slaying President Kennedy.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Edward P. Morgan, Roselli's former lawyer, was included in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation. But it did not identify Morgan as the interviewee.

Morgan told the FBI, according to the summary, that Roselli and another client were called on to participate in a government-approved project aimed at assassinating Castro. He said Castro employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

Egyptian Plane Hijacked, Other Arabs Blamed

CAIRO (AP) — An Egyptian airliner was hijacked today by seven gunmen believed to be Libyans, Palestinians and Lebanese, informed sources said.

The plane was on its way from Cairo to Luxor, 330 miles to the south.

A spokesman for Egyptair, the Egyptian airline, said the plane, a Boeing 737, landed in Luxor, and the hijackers threatened to blow it up unless fuel was provided.

Security men surrounded the plane, the spokesman said.

He reported there were 95 passengers and crew members aboard. Some of the passengers were foreign tourists on their way to Luxor to see the ancient Temples of Karnak and the Valley of the Kings. But their nationalities were not available.

14-00000

7-71 MFG 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 25 PER TOTAL COPIES 31-3 RUN BY 2X 19

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT LA 8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DDO/AI AGC/DDO OPS/DDO CI/OPS NE8 DDO2 CI4 PS/EG2 059 OS9/IC SS4

T 166233 EIA163 PAGE 01 IN 016194

TOR:202134Z AUG 76 SDON 17629

S E C R E T 202108Z AUG 76 STAFF 30

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17629

TO: DIRECTOR INF LA/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 896657

B. DIRECTOR 899232

DOC. MICRO. SER.
DEC 17 1976
MICROFILMED

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
[illegible]	☒	RESTRICT
	☒	INDEX
[illegible]		PREPARE FOR [illegible]
[illegible]	✓	[illegible] (2, 3) 3
		[illegible]
		CABLE [illegible] (11)
		[illegible]
		FOR [illegible]

1. EMCLIPPER-1 HAS ADVISED STATION THAT ORLANDO B O S C H CALLED ON HIM A FEW WEEKS AGO TO REQUEST THAT DOMINCAN GOVERNMENT ISSUE VISAS TO HIS MOTHER AND SISTER TO VISIT HIM IN SANTO DOMINGO. (VISAS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED BY CONSULATE IN MAIMI) ON THIS OCCASION EMCLIPPER-1 ASKED BOSCH IF HE HAD ENTERED DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WITH FALSE DOMINICAN PASSPORT. DENYING THIS, BOSCH BRANDISHED COSTA RICAN PASSPORT WITH EMCLIPPER-1 ASKED TO SEE. PASSPORT IS IN NAME OF CARLOS LUIS P A N I A G U A MENDES AND PHOTO IS GOOD LIKENESS OF BOSCH. BOSCH SAID HE HAD HIS EYE OPERATION FOR CATARACTS AND WOULD BE LEAVING DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SHORTLY.

2. STATION HAS RECEIVED REPORT FROM EMPYREX (WRITTEN BY EMPYREX-6 IN MAIMI) STATEING THAT FRANK C A S T R O PAZ.

20 Aug 76

201-742365

201-299292

SECRET

RECORD COPY

14-00000

7-71 MFG. 2/70

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR

ACTION #

T 166233 EIA163 PAGE 02 IN 016194

TOR:2021342 AUG 76 SDRM 17629

WHO IS MARRIED TO DAUGHTER OF RETIRED DOMINICAN ADMIRAL AND LIVING IN SANTO DOMINGO. (SEE PARA 1 C REF A) IS KNOWN TO BE BOSCH'S CONTACT MAN AND MESSENGER CARRIER TO CUBAN RIGHTEST GROUPS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. STATION BELIEVES THIS MAY WELL BE TRUE. CASTRO, WHO CARRIES AMERICAN PASSPORT B-2097917, DEPARTED AND RETURNED SANTO DOMINGO THREE TIMES DURING MAY AND JUNE ALONE. EMPYREX REPORTS HIS MOST RECENT RETURN ON 15 AUGUST. SMCLIPPER-1 WILL ATTEMPT DETAIL ALL OF FRANK CASTRO'S TRAVEL DURING PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. HE IS ALSO THINKING OF LIFTING CASTRO'S PASSPORT NEXT TIME HE ENTERS SANTO DOMINGO AIRPORT IN EFFORT PIN DOWN TRAVEL DESTINATIONS. WE NOTE THAT REF A, PARA 1 C LISTS CASTRO'S MATRONYMIC AS PEREZ RATHER THAN CORRECTLY AS PAZ. ALSO, EMPYREX REPORTS THAT U.S. PASSPORT (B-2097917) WHICH HE USING AT LEAST FOR TRAVEL BETWEEN DOMINCAN REPUBLIC AND PUERTO RICO, LISTS HIS BIRTH DATE AS 6 JUNE 1942 RATHER THAN 4 SEPTEMBER 1915 AS REPORTED REF A PARA 1 C. PLEASE CONFIRM 201 NUMBER FOR CASTRO IN REF A IS ACCURATE.

5. ON 18 AUGUST EMWISE-15 SHOWED TO SMCARNET-1 COPY OF MEMO HE HAD WRITTEN TO CHIEF OF POLICE URGING THAT BOSCH BE THROWN

SECRET

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY   TOTAL COPIES   RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED   BY   AT   Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF . FILE . VR .

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 166233   EIA163   PAGE 03-03   IN 016194

TOR:2021342 AUG 76   SDOM 17629

OUT OF COUNTRY. MEMO STATES THAT INFO HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY POLICE FROM RELIABLE SOURCES THAT DURING HIS STAY IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BOSCH HAS MET WITH CUBAN EXILE LEADERS FROM PUERTO RICO, MIAMI, NEW YORK, CARACAS, MEXICO CITY AND "POSSIBLY PANAMA".

4. INDEX BOSCH, CASTRO. FILE: 201-299292, 201-390124.

E2, IMPDET.

50

SECRET

10/09/64 ~~SECRET~~ 23 FRP: , 2, , , , ,

INTEL

ACTION: LA-13 (287) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IID,
IP/DMS, LSN/ID, ODPD-D, PCS/INT-5, SIA, SIA/FL, SIA/IC, (37/N) 20TD'S

78 0366244 PAGE 001 OF 001 IN 0366244
TOR: 281740Z FEB 78 CARA 35621

S E C R E T 281715Z FEB 78 INTEL TDFIR DB-315/02855-78
HVC-7858

CITE CARACAS 35621

TO: DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKDIET/WKDIET-5 DIRECTLY AS DESCRIBED IN CARACAS 35583. NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. FILE DEFERRED. CL BY 013533.

FILED: 281715Z XXXXX

9e

RECORD COPY

~~SECRET~~

299392
28 Feb 78

Form 1-76 30368

SECRET

ROUTINE
IN 0100248
PAGE 001 OF 002

Intelligence Information Cable

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

STATE/INR JCS/MC(DIA) CIA/NMCC SS/ID FBI
(SY/TAG) SWS NSA TREAS SDO (HARD COPIES TO: NSC/S
NFAC WHSITRM SECUR DDA DDST OSI D/OMS OCR).

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS SECRET WNINTEL-NOFORN-NOCONTRACT

CITE TDFIR DB-315/02855-78
DIST 28 FEB 78

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

O

SUBJECT: DETERIORATING PHYSICAL CONDITION OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH (DOI: 27 FEBRUARY 1978)

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WHO MAINTAINS CONTACTS WITH CUBAN EXILES. HIS REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.

1. THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH IS NOT CRITICAL AND CUBAN EXILE LEADERS AS WELL AS THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT HIS DEATH IS NEAR. IN A LAST EFFORT TO GET BOSCH TO SUBMIT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT AND TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS HUNGER STRIKE, CUBAN EXILE LEADERS ARE TRYING TO GET FORMER VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT ROMULO BETANCOURT TO VISIT BOSCH AND REASON WITH HIM. BOSCH ADMIRES BETANCOURT FOR HIS STAUNCH ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT STAND AND CUBAN EXILE LEADERS BELIEVE HE IS THE ONLY ONE WHO MIGHT BE ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY APPEAL TO BOSCH.

2. BOSCH'S PHYSICIAN REINALDO MARTIN CANO, WHO IS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, HAS ADVISED THE AUTHORITIES THAT BOSCH'S VITAL SIGNS ARE

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

WEAKENING AND THAT HIS GASTRIC CONDITION IS DETERIORATING. EXILE LEADERS HAVE ASKED GOVERNMENT PERMISSION TO HAVE BOSCH ADMITTED TO A PRIVATE HOSPITAL AND HAVE INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PAY ALL EXPENSES. THE CUBAN EXILES HAVE ALSO APPEALED TO PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ TO EITHER RELEASE BOSCH OR BRING HIM TO TRIAL. PEREZ, HOWEVER, HAS REPLIED THAT HE CANNOT YIELD TO ANY TYPE OF PRESSURE INCLUDING THAT OF A HUNGER STRIKE.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: IN HVC-7853, TDFIRDB-315/02582-78, THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT MINISTER OF INTERIOR OCTAVIO LEPAGE SAID HE FEARED BOSCH'S DEATH WOULD BRING ABOUT INCREASED TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AND, IN TURN, OFFICIAL REPRISALS AGAINST THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY.)

4. ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (28 FEBRUARY 1978)
FIELD NO. HVC-7858.

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

AC MAR14'78

14-00000

55/21/69

SECRET 23 F.RP: 2,

INTEL

ACTION: LA-13 (111) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, CA-4, EPS/EG-2, IIO, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/INT-5, (32/W)

TD 92

78 0350612

PAGE 001 OF 001
TOR: 231648Z FEB 78

IN 0350612
CARA 35581

S E C R E T 231621Z FEB 78 INTEL

TDFIR DB-315/02582-78
HVC-7853

CITE CARACAS 35581

TO: DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKDIET/WKDIET-5 DIRECTLY. NOT FOR LIAISON.
OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. NO INDEX. FILE DEFERRED.
CL BY 035133.

FILED: 231621Z XXXXX

TRAVEL PROGRAM
INDEX
FOR FILING

201-299392

23 Feb 78

RECORD COPY

SECRET

30068

SECRET ROUTINE
IN 0250612
PAGE 001 OF 003

Intelligence Information Cable

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

STATE/INR JCS/MC(DIA) CIA/NMCC SS/ID FBI
(ST/TAG) SWS NSA TREAS SDO (HARD COPIES TO:
NSC/S NFAC WHSITRM OCR SECUR ODA).

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL-NOFORN-NOCONTRACT

CITE TDFIR DB-315/02582-78
DIST 23 FEB 78

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

SUBJECT: FEARS THAT THE DEATH OF ORLANDO BOSCH AS A RESULT OF A HUNGER STRIKE MAY BRING ABOUT REPRISALS (DOI: 20-21 FEBRUARY 1978)

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WHO MAINTAINS CONTACTS WITH CUBAN EXILES. HIS REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.

1. BOTH THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AND THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN VENEZUELA ARE CONCERNED THAT CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH MAY DIE AS A RESULT OF HIS CURRENT HUNGER STRIKE. FURTHERMORE, THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT FEARS THAT SHOULD BOSCH DIE, CUBAN EXILE GROUPS WILL STEP UP THEIR ATTACKS ON VENEZUELAN FACILITIES. THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY, IN TURN, FEARS THAT EXILE ATTACKS ON THE VENEZUELANS WOULD BRING ABOUT FURTHER VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT REPRISALS AGAINST THE EXILE COMMUNITY. (FIELD COMMENT: BOSCH HAS BEEN IMPRISONED IN VENEZUELA SINCE OCTOBER 1976 IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. HE, AND THE OTHER INDIVIDUALS ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING, HAVE NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT TO TRIAL. BOSCH, WHO SUFFERS FROM A HEART AILMENT AND ULCERS, HAS BEEN ON A

HUNGER STRIKE FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS.)

2. ON 20 FEBRUARY 1978 OCTAVIO LEPAGE, VENEZUELAN MINISTER OF INTERIOR, DISCUSSED BOSCH'S CONDITION WITH A CUBAN EXILE LEADER IN VENEZUELA. LEPAGE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED REPORTS ON BOSCH'S PHYSICAL CONDITION AND THAT HE AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE CONCERNED THAT BOSCH MIGHT INDEED DIE. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, LEPAGE SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT VENEZUELA WOULD BECOME THE TARGET FOR CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ATTACKS. LEPAGE EXPLAINED THAT BOSCH'S DEATH WOULD MEAN PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND THE EXILE COMMUNITY. THEREFORE, LEPAGE ASKED THE EXILE LEADER TO TALK WITH BOSCH AND ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE HIM FROM CONTINUING WITH THE STRIKE.

3. THE CUBAN EXILE LEADER ACCOMPANIED BY REINALDO MARTIN CANO, A CUBAN EXILE PHYSICIAN, VISITED BOSCH IN THE HOSPITAL ON 21 FEBRUARY AND FOUND HIM TO BE IN SERIOUS PHYSICAL CONDITION. BOSCH ALLOWED MARTIN TO GIVE HIM INJECTIONS TO COMBAT BRAIN DEHYDRATION, BUT REFUSED ANY OTHER TREATMENT. BOSCH ALSO REFUSED TO GIVE UP HIS HUNGER STRIKE.

4. BOSCH EXPLAINED THAT HE WANTS TO BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL, BUT ADDED THAT VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ IS AFRAID TO BRING HIM BEFORE A COURT OF LAW. PRESIDENT PEREZ, BOSCH SAID, BETRAYED HIM AND THE CUBAN EXILES. FURTHERMORE, PRESIDENT PEREZ WILL BE PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS DEATH AND WILL PAY THE PRICE FOR HIS GUILT. (SOURCE COMMENT:

DETAILS OF PEREZ' SUPPOSED BETRAYAL OF BOSCH ARE NOT KNOWN. THE OPINION OF THE EXILE COMMUNITY IS THAT BOSCH AND PEREZ HAD SOME SORT OF DEAL WHICH BOSCH FEELS PEREZ BETRAYED.)

5. ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (22 FEBRUARY 1978) FIELD NO. HVC-7853

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2

14-00000

9 IP AN

/33/ SECRET FRP: . . . .

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION: IP/DP-5 (057) INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (7/W)

78 0335346 PAGE 001
TOR: 172030Z FEB 78 CARA 35550

S E C R E T 171943Z FEB 78 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE CARACAS 35550

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: LA/VCE

SUBJECT: O/I POSSIBLE RELEASE OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH

REFERENCE: WASHINGTON 173605

1. LEGALLY THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE OF CONVICTING BOSCH AND THE OTHERS BECAUSE THE CRIME WAS NOT COMMITTED IN VENEZUELA AND THUS VENEZUELA HAS NO JURISDICTION IN THE CASE. SECONDLY, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AGAINST BOSCH AND GROUP. THESE ARE THE OPINIONS OF A NUMBER OF STATION AGENTS AND CONTACTS INCLUDING VENEZUELAN LEGAL EXPERTS SUCH AS WKALIKE-1, WKDIET-6 AND WKSCARLET-9.

2. WHILE HERNAN AND LUGO SUPPOSEDLY CONFESSED TO THE CRIME IN TRINIDAD, THEIR CONFESSIONS ARE NOT ADMISSABLE IN COURT AND THEY HAVE DECLINED TO REPEAT THEM FOR VENEZUELAN JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES. THE EVIDENCE LINKING HERNAN AND LUGO TO POSADA COMES FROM TELEPHONE TAPS, WHICH ARE LIKEWISE INADMISSABLE. BOSCH'S CONNECTION WITH THE CASE COMES FROM A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN LUGO AND POSADA IN WHICH THE NAME "ORLANDO" IS MENTIONED. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS COULD MAKE A GOOD CASE THAT THE "ORLANDO" WAS DISIP OFFICER ORLANDO GARCIA AND NOT ORLANDO BOSCH.

3. THE GOV COULD, OF COURSE, PUT PRESSURE ON THE COURT AND JUGGLE THE EVIDENCE TO GET A CONVICTION, BUT TO DO SO WOULD LEAVE IT OPEN FOR CRITICISM INTERNALLY AND REPRISALS FROM THE CUBAN EXILES, AND WOULD MAKE IT MORE LIKELY THAT THE DEFENDANTS WOULD DIVULGE EMBARRASSING INFORMATION CONNECTING GOVERNMENT FIGURES TO BOSCH AND THE EXILES HE LED.

4. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

[illegible]
ABSTRACT
INDEX
CODE NO. (D. S.)
[illegible]

RECORD COPY

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

201 299292
17 Feb 78

50/51 DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 30

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______ SECRET 23 E2 IMPDET CL BY 035133

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA, IID BY D AT 2150

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT LA 13

ACTION #

INFO FILE, VR, DDO 4, EPS/EG 2, IP/DMS, IID, PCS/INT 5

CI 4, CA 4, CA/SOG 4, SIA, SIA/FL, PC: ITC 4, FR 5

T 970598 EIA909 PAGE 01 IN 328368

TOR:282148Z JUN 77 CARA 33517

SECRET 282126Z JUN 77 INTEL TDFIRDB-315/07585-77
HVC-7690

CITE CARACAS 33517 (HACKELING ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI, FR/NEW YORK.

WNINTEL INTEL MKSTONE

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKRAPIER/WKRAPIER-5 FROM SUBJECT OF (IN 290237) CARACAS 33185., WHO SAW THE DECIPHERED NOTE. NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. NO INDEX. FILE DEFERRED. (NOTE: INFO SHOULD BE PASSED TO DUPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SECURITY.) CL BY 035133.

FILED: 282126Z XXXXX

29 JUN 77 15 11

1. C/COG	
2. DC/COG	
3. COG/OPS	
4. RR	1
5. CA	
6. CI/OS	2
7. O/WHA	
8. O/EUR	
9. O/EA	
10. O/NEAF	

File
Orlando
BOSCH

SECRET

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

● PRIORITY

IN 328368

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NIC/S SDO AID OCR PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
(SY/TAG) . SS/ID FBI SECUR USISTIN FAA O50 OMS

Classified by Department Operating Official. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDHR DB-315/07585-77

DIST 28 JUNE 1977

REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS- NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS-DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

DOI: 24 JUNE 1977

SUBJECT: INTERCEPTION BY VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS OF A NOTE BEING SMUGGLED IN TO THE SAN CARLOS PRISON FOR ORLANDO BOSCH

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (28 JUNE 1977) FIELD NO. HVC-7690

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH A WIDE-RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL.

1. ON 24 JUNE 1977 VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS INTERCEPTED A MESSAGE WHICH WAS BEING SMUGGLED INTO THE SAN CARLOS PRISON FOR CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. ALTHOUGH THE MESSAGE WAS INTERCEPTED, VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES COPIED IT AND THEN ALLOWED IT TO BE DELIVERED

TO BOSCH, WHO PRESUMABLY IS UNAWARE THAT THE MESSAGE WAS INTERCEPTED. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE IDENTITY OF THE SENDER IS UNKNOWN.)

2. THE NOTE WAS WRITTEN IN THE SAME CODE WHICH VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BREAK. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE NOTE:

"URBAN GUERRILLAS BEGINNING. SOON YOU WILL BE SET FREE. APARTMENT RESOLVED. ANITA GAVE ME THE MONEY. MARCOS"

3. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR INFORMATION ON AN EARLIER MESSAGE WRITTEN IN CODE FROM BOSCH TO AN ANA P. SEE HVC-7680, TDFIRDB-315/06944-77, OF 14 JUNE, FROM THE SAME SOURCE.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS. SENT TO USUN. REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS-DISSEMINATION OR EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR SWS NSA JCS CIAOPS CENTER FBI TREAS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY V PER 5/20 133 TOTAL COPIES 7

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION UNIT TDbPS

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

T 938337 EIA419 PAGE 01 IN 316089

TOR:161117Z JUN 77 GORG 21986

S E C R E T 161250Z JUN 77 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE GEORGETOWN 21986.

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/LA

O JP

SUBJECT: WNINTEL/ORLANDO BOSCH - "THE NEW TIMES" INTERVIEW

REF: DIRECTOR 030287 Loc - 299292

1. WORKING PEOPLE'S VANGUARD PARTY (WPVP), A SPLINTER PARTY WITH FEW ADHERENTS LED BY BRINDLEY BENN, PUBLISHED 3 JUNE MIMEOGRAPHED FLYER WITH HALF BACK PAGE DEVOTED "JAMAICAN DAILY NEWS" INTERPRETATION "THE NEW TIMES" ARTICLE. ARTICLE'S FOCUS IS THE BOSCH/PERES CONNECTION AND THAT BOSCH IS A SELF-PROCLAIMED CIA AGENT.

2. UPI ARTICLE HAS NOT BEEN REPLAYED IN THE GUYANESE DAILIES. THE WPVP FLYER REACHES FEW READERS AND THEIR REACTION IS NOT MEASUREABLE.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

IP/DCI	☒	CABLE TELEGRAM
		ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/RMS		[illegible]
		[illegible]
IP/SRU		[illegible]

16 Jun 77

S E C R E T

D200-120-102

RECORD COPY

201-0299292

14-00000

32/31 DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 23

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 2066??

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA, IID BY D AT 2150 Z

ACTION UNIT
LA 13

ACTION #

INFO: FILE, VR, DDO 4, EPS/EG 2, IP/DMS, IID, PCS/INT 5
CI 4, CA 4, CA/SOG 4, SIA, SIA/FL, PCS/ITC 4, FR 5

T 978598 EIA989 PAGE 01 IN 328368

TOR:2821487 JUN 77 CARA 33517

S E C R E T 2821262 JUN 77 INTEL TDFIRDB-315/07585-77

HVC-7590

CITE CARACAS 33517 (HACKELING ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI, FR/NEW YORK.

WNINTEL INTEL MKSTONE

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKRAPIER/WKRAPIER-5 FROM SUBJECT OF (201-290237) CARACAS 33185., WHO SAW THE DECIPHERED NOTE. NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. NO INDEX. FILE DEFERRED. (NOTE: INFO SHOULD BE PASSED TO DUPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SECURITY.) CL BY 035133.

FILED: 2821262 XXXXX

29 JUN 77 15 37

IP/[illegible]		[illegible] PROGRAM	
	X	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/[illegible]		CODE NO. (7, 8)	
		[illegible]	
		[illegible] (11)	
		[illegible] (6)	
IP/[illegible]		[illegible]	

SE

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-299292
28 June 77

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 328368

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO OCR PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
(SY/TAG) SS/ID FBI SECUR WHSITRM DDA OSO OMS

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB-315/07585-77

DIST 28 JUNE 1977

REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS-DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

DOI: 24 JUNE 1977

SUBJECT: INTERCEPTION BY VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS OF A NOTE BEING SMUGGLED IN TO THE SAN CARLOS PRISON FOR ORLANDO BOSCH

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (28 JUNE 1977) FIELD NO. HVC-7698

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH A WIDE-RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL.

1. ON 24 JUNE 1977 VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS INTERCEPTED A MESSAGE WHICH WAS BEING SMUGGLED INTO THE SAN CARLOS PRISON FOR CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. ALTHOUGH THE MESSAGE WAS INTERCEPTED, VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES COPIED IT AND THEN ALLOWED IT TO BE DELIVERED

SECRET

IN 328368

TDFIR DB-315/07585-77

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

TO BOSCH, WHO PRESUMABLY IS UNAWARE THAT THE MESSAGE WAS INTERCEPTED. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE IDENTITY OF THE SENDER IS UNKNOWN.)

2. THE NOTE WAS WRITTEN IN THE SAME CODE WHICH VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BREAK. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE NOTE:

> "URBAN GUERRILLAS BEGINNING. SOON YOU WILL BE SET FREE, APARTMENT RESOLVED. ANITA GAVE ME THE MONEY. MARCOS"

3. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR INFORMATION ON AN EARLIER MESSAGE WRITTEN IN CODE FROM BOSCH TO AN ANA P. SEE HVC-7680, TDFIRDB-315/06944-77, OF 14 JUNE, FROM THE SAME SOURCE.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS. SENT TO USUN. REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS-DISSEMINATION OR EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR SWS NSA JCS CIAOPS CENTER FBI TREAS

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER

TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT LA 8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. (P)DMS, CA4, EPS/EG 2, PCS/INT,

T 924801 EIA191 PAGE 01 IN 310970

TOR:102012Z JUN 77 SJOS 20831

S E C R E T 101941Z JUN 77 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 20831

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO.

WNINTEL

REF: DIRECTOR 030287

1. TO DATE, THERE HAS BEEN NO LOCAL COVERAGE OF "NEW TIMES" ARTICLE MENTIONED REF.

2. 10 JUNE 77 FRONT-PAGE ARTICLE IN SAN JOSE DAILY "LA REPUBLICA" QUOTES DOMINICAN MAGAZINE "AHORA" AS PUBLISHING DECLARATIONS BY ORLANDO BOSCH IN WHICH LATTER SAYS COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ODUBER GAVE HIM THREE PASSPORTS, ONE PERUVIAN AND TWO COSTA RICAN, AS COMPENSATION FOR BOSCH'S ARREST IN COSTA RICA ON 16 FEBRUARY 76. HE WAS EXPELLED FROM COSTA RICA ON 27 MARCH 76.

3. WILL ADVISE ANY REACTION TO ABOVE.

4. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

SECRET

10 Jun 77

201-299292

CAUTION - [illegible]
SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS. PROCESSING	
			INDEXING REQUESTED
		XX	NO INDEXING
			APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO
Chief of Station, Santiago

INFO.
Chief, Latin America Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
RYBAT/FUDWELL/Orlando BOSCH Avila; LETELIER Assassination

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

The Legal Attache has requested that the Station pouch the attached memorandum entitled "Orlando BOSCH Avila; LETELIER Assassination," dated 27 May 1977, and the photograph of Hector Emilio Ramon DAVANZO CINTOLESI to Santiago Station.

Paula L. MOTTART

ATTACHMENTS HEREWITH:
A. 2-page memo
B. One photo

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 2 - COS, Santiago w/atts. A & B h/w
2 - C/LAD w/att. A only

[illegible] TRIGBY
LA/COG

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 251292
DO NOT DESTROY

E2 IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABA - 26179	1 June 1977
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-12-200/1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : POL/R, SANTIAGO

DATE: 5/27/77

FROM : LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER, BUENOS AIRES

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA;
LETELIER ASSASSINATION

The Chilean Department of Investigations advised that the International Police located a record of entry for PEDRO ANTONIO PENA RODRIGUEZ into Chile on 8/30/75 from Colombia as a tourist. PENA RODRIGUEZ was carrying Dominican Passport #OS6768, which disclosed his date of birth as 1/8/29. PENA RODRIGUEZ was admitted to Chile as a tourist. No record for PENA RODRIGUEZ's departure from Chile could be located.

The Chilean Department of Investigations advised that the Chilean Passport Office located a record for HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI, who was born on 8/15/27 in Santiago, the son of HECTOR DAVANZO and AMALIA ENRIQUETA CINTOLESI. This individual has Chilean Santiago Cedula de Identidad #2.357.4 and Chilean Passport #27.671, the latter being issued on 10/22/75. Chilean Passport Office records list DAVANZO CINTOLESI's address in Santiago as Calle Miguel Claro #1129.

Attached is a copy of a photograph of DAVANZO CINTOLESI, which was copied from his Cedula de Identidad.

The Chilean Department of Investigations advised that the International Police reported that DAVANZO CINTOLESI departed Santiago on 12/28/75 enroute to Panama. According to International Police Records, DAVANZO CINTOLESI was carrying Chilean Passport #26.583, when he departed Chile on 4/26/75.

The Chilean Department of Investigations reported that the Chilean Passport Office advised that Chilean Passport #26,583 actually belongs to RAUL MARTINEZ TORRES, Chilean Cedula de Identidad 6.020.932. Chilean Passport Office records dis-

CONFIDENTIAL

Attachment

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

closed that MARTINEZ TORRES resides in Santiago at Avenida Las Soporas 98, Apartment 401.

It is noted that PEDRO ANTONIO PENA RODRIGUEZ and HECTOR EMILION RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI were false identities utilized by ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA during travels throughout South America.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Ray Reardon
OS/SAG

FROM : Maurice A. Sovern
O/SA/DO/O

SUBJECT : Directorate File Holdings on Orlando Bosch Avila

REFERENCE : FBI Memorandum, 1 June 1977, Subject: Ralph W. Stavins

5
File
Orlando
BOSCH

1.(C) With regard to reference, and to the Assistant Attorney General's (criminal) memorandum, dated 20 May 1977, same subject as reference, this Directorate maintains a personality (201) file on Orlando Bosch Avila, presently in six volumes and containing material classified through "Secret."

2.(U/FOUO) Please keep this office advised if there is any possibility that the files or a Directorate officer as custodian of the files will be involved in the possible prosecution of the subject of reference.

(signed) Maurice A. Sovern

Maurice A. Sovern

O/SA/DO/O:MASovern:kaw (1542)

Distribution
Original & 1 - OS/SAG
1 - SA/C/LA
1 - SA/C/LA (201-299292)
1 - OGC
2 - SA/DO/O

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Ray Reardon
OS/SAG

FROM : Maurice A. Sovern
O/SA/DO/O

SUBJECT : Directorate File Holdings on Orlando Bosch Avila

REFERENCE : FBI Memorandum, 1 June 1977, Subject: Ralph W. Stavins

1.(C) With regard to reference, and to the Assistant Attorney General's (criminal) memorandum, dated 20 May 1977, same subject as reference, this Directorate maintains a personality (201) file on Orlando Bosch Avila, presently in six volumes and containing material classified through "Secret."

2.(U/FOUO) Please keep this office advised if there is any possibility that the files or a Directorate officer as custodian of the files will be involved in the possible prosecution of the subject of reference.

(signed) Maurice A. Sovern

Maurice A. Sovern

O/SA/DO/O:MASovern:kaw (1542)

Distribution:
Original & 1 - OS/SAG
1 - SA/C/LA
1 - SA/C/LA (201-299292)
1 - OGC
2 - SA/DO/O

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630

CONFIDENTIAL

DISSEM BY IID PER JCR TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY: 066687

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA, IID BY LB AT 1715 Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT LA 15

ACTION #

INFO: FILE, VR, DDO 4, EPS/EG 2, ~~IP/DMS~~, IID, PCS/INT 5, CI 4, SIA, CA 4, CA/SOG 4, SIA/FL, PCS/ITC 4, FR 5.

T 932697 EIA898 PAGE 01 IN 313892

TOR:1417102 JUN 77 CARA 33397

TDFIRDB-315/06944-77

HVC-7680

S E C R E T 1416332 JUN 77 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 33397

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI, FR/NEW YORK.

WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR POSSIBLE SPECIAL HANDLING. SOURCE: WKRAPIER/WKRAPIER-5 FROM SUBJECT OF CARACAS 33185, WHO SAW THE DECIPHERED NOTE. NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. NO INDEX. FILE DEFERRED. (AMBASSADOR REQUESTS THAT THIS INFORMATION BE PASSED PROMPTLY TO DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SECURITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF PRESIDENT PEREZ TO THE UNITED STATES.)

CL BY 035133.

FILED: 1416332 XXXXX

(IID COMMENT: AT REQUEST OF LA REPORTS OFFICER, INSERTED "USUN" IN FIELD DISSEM LINE. LIFTER CABLE SENT.)

SC

IP/AN		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
	X	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/ED		CODE NO. (2, 3)	
		WYBAT DEST. CLOE	
		CABLE TOCK (11)	
		HSO (0)	
IP/CRU		FOR FILING	

201-299292

14 Jun 77

SECRET

RECORD COPY

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 313892

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE INR JCS/MC DIA CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S [illegible] OCR (SY/TAG) SS/ID FBI SECUR WHSITRM DDA D70HS

Classified by Originating Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category [illegible] impossible to Determine Dat[illegible] Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB-315/06944-77

DIST 14 JUNE 1977

REPORT CLASS SECRET --WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED- NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS- NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY VENEZUELA

DOI EARLY JUNE 1977

SUBJECT INTERCEPTION BY VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS OF A NOTE FROM ORLANDO BOSCH THREATENING VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 JUNE 1977) FIELD NO. HVC-7688

SOURCE A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH A WIDE-RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL.

1. VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS RECENTLY INTERCEPTED A MESSAGE WHICH CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER, WAS ATTEMPTING TO SMUGGLE OUT OF THE PRISON WHERE HE IS BEING HELD. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS NOT KNOWN HOW BOSCH'S NOTE WAS BEING SMUGGLED OUT OF THE PRISON OR WHETHER BOSCH IS AWARE THAT THE NOTE HAS BEEN FOUND BY VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES. THE IDENTITY OF THE ADDRESSEE

SECRET

201-299292
14 Jun 77

IN 313892

TDFIRDB-315/06944-77

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

IS ALSO UNKNOWN.)

2. THE NOTE WAS WRITTEN IN A CODE WHICH VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES WERE SUCCESSFUL IN BREAKING. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF BOSCH'S NOTE:

"ANA P.

"OTHER MESSAGES WILL FOLLOW. ATTEMPTS TO KIDNAP VENEZUELAN DIPLOMATS ARE GOING TO OCCUR. VENEZUELAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS INVOLVES A TREMENDOUS RISK FOR ME AS I AM STILL IN JAIL. WE HAVE TO ATTACK EVERYTHING, EXCEPT THEIR PLANES IN THE AIR. THEIR OFFICES ON THE GROUND, YES. I HOPE TO BE FREE SOON. THERE IS NO PROOF. O.B."

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS, USUN.

REPORT CLASS SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND MEHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER, XGDS-2

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO: STATE, DIA, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, NSA, SWS, CIA/OPSCEN, FBI, SS/ID, TREASURY.

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT (MEMO FROM DIRECTOR)

DATE: 1 JUNE 1977

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: RALPH W. STAVINS - POSSINLE ESPIONAGE

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

29

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

SECRET

STAFF

061915Z DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 046666

DISSEM BY: 45

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE IP/DMS NE8 DDO4 AG4/DDO DDO/DO PCS/ITC/CI C/PCS

1. C/COG	
2. DC/COG	
3. COG/OPS	
4. RR	
5. CA	
~~6. CI/OS~~	/
7. C/WHA	
8. O/EUR	
9. O/EA	
10. O/NEAF	

NO INDEX
RETURN TO
PER #5

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS.

WNINTEL MHSPIKE KMSTONE

REF: DIRECTOR 043403

1. HEADQUARTERS URGENTLY NEEDS STATION COMMENTS ON MESSAGE FORWARDED REFERENCE. IS THERE ANY CONFIRMATION THAT BOSCH GAVE INTERVIEW AS ALLEGED AND THREATENED VIOLENCE ON PART OF HIS FOLLOWERS UNLESS HE IS BROUGHT TO TRIAL WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY?

2. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.

5.

File Bosch

LA COMMENT: REF TRANSMITTED FBI MESSAGE CONCERNING ALLEGED RADIO INTERVIEW GIVEN BY JAILED CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH. STATION WAS ASKED FOR ANY INFORMATION RELATED TO INTERVIEW.

ORIG: LA/PNC {KENNER X9454}; COORD: PCS/ITC {SHIELDS - TELECOORD}; LA/COG {WINTERS}; AUTH: DC/LA/PNC ~~{DESMOND}~~ BUSTOS; REL: C/LAD ~~{WARREN}~~ BORING.

PCS/ITC {SHIELDS - TELECOORD}

AC/LA/COG

DATE: 6 JUNE 1977
ORIG: HILDA KENNER:LW
UNIT: LA/PNC/R
EXT: 9454

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Bustos
DC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007288

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

10

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES
1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
022314Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
044858

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/LSN/ID

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 45
PER SOP
#152

TO: CARACAS.

UNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

S

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FBI CABLE 280510Z, DATED 28 MAY 1977. THIS INFO IS FOR ADDRESSEE'S BACKGROUND ONLY, NOT TO BE DISCUSSED OR OTHERWISE DISCLOSED OUTSIDE AGENCY WITHOUT PRIOR HQS AUTHORIZATION.

|SIG CENTER: PLS TRANSMIT ATTACHED FBI CABLE |IN 277480| BEGINNING WITH "ON MAY 23, 1977, A SOURCE. . ."|

File Orlando BOSCH

2. FILE: 019-300-028; 201-299292. E2, IMPDET.

S.

ORIG: LA/COG/EXILE {SPEED, X1325}; COORD: C/PCS/LSN {KUNNZ} C/LA/COG {LATRASH}; AUTH: C/LA/PNC/V {ANDREWS}; REL: C/LAD {[illegible]}.

1. C/COG	
2. DC/COG	
3. COG/OPS	
4. NR	
5. CA	
6. CI/OS	/
7. O/WHA	
8. O/EUR	
9. O/EA	
0. O/NEAF	

DATE: 2 JUNE 1977
ORIG: HORACE SPEED:RCW
UNIT: LA/COG/EXILE
EXT: 1325

C/PCS/LSN
C/LA/COG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 010034

OUTGOING MESSAGE

3/-4

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1

SECRET

STAFF 052256Z DIRECTOR 030287

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE IP/DMS, CA4, CA/SOG 4, DDO 4, PCS/ITG 4, DDO/DO, DDA, EPS/EG 2 C/PCS

DISSEM BY: FA4

PER

911

TO: PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, MEXICO CITY, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, PORT OF SPAIN, MANAGUA, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY, LIVIMIPMI INFO CARACAS.

UNINTEL

1. 13 MAY EDITION OF "THE NEW TIMES," U.S. MONTHLY LIBERAL SENSATIONALIST NEWS MAGAZINE, CARRIES ARTICLE BY FREE LANCE JOURNALIST BLAKE FLEETWOOD BASED ON HIS INTERVIEW WITH CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ORLANDO BOSCH, IMPRISONED IN VENEZUELA CHARGED WITH INVOLVEMENT IN BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRPLANE LAST OCTOBER. ARTICLE WHICH ALSO CARRIED AS UPI ITEM AND EXCERPTED RECENTLY IN CARACAS DAILY NEWSPAPER, IS MIXTURE OF DIRECT QUOTES FROM BOSCH AS WELL AS ALLEGATIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, ETC. FROM OTHER EXILES AND OTHER NEWSPAPER REPORTS.

2. AFTER DISCUSSING CIA SPONSORSHIP AND SUBSEQUENT BETRAYAL OF ACTIVITIES OF SOME 6,000 ANTI-CASTRO EXILES IN EARLY SIXTIES, BOSCH LAUNCHES ATTACK ON VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ FOR BEING TRAITOR TO DEMOCRACY, TO CUBA AND TO INTERAMERICAN CAUSE AND SAYS HE THEREFORE DECLARING WAR ON VENEZUELAN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

05 May 77
201-299292

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL. BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

030287

0

0

0 PER

0 #

DISSEM BY:

GOVERNMENT. BOSCH CHARGES VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT, MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND TOP POLICE OFFICIALS CONSPIRED WITH HIM AND SHOULD BE IN JAIL. HE CLAIMS HE WAS OFFERED WEAPONS AND BODYGUARDS WHICH HE REJECTED, AND WAS PROVIDED WITH SAFE BASE OF OPERATIONS TO PLAN TERRORIST ACTS. Y

3. BOSCH CLAIMS HE "SET UP" MURDER OF TWO CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS LAST AUGUST IN ARGENTINA AND THAT HE WAS ALLOWED LIVE IN CHILE FROM DEC 74 TO DEC 75 FROM WHICH HE PLANNED AND ENGAGED IN SHOOTINGS AND BOMBINGS IN SOUTHERN CONE. HE THEN ENGAGED IN SIMILAR ACTIVITIES WHILE LIVING IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND DETAILED FORMATION OF CORU (UMBRELLA GROUP OF ANTI-CASTRO MILITANT EXILE ORGANIZATIONS) LAST JUNE AND SAYS CORU HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR OVER FIFTY BOMBINGS IN US, MEXICO, VENEZUELA, PANAMA AND MEXICO SINCE THAT TIME. BOSCH ALSO CLAIMS COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT ODUBER FURNISHED HIM WITH FALSE PASSPORTS. BOSCH DENIED INVOLVEMENT IN ALLEGED DINA PLOT TO ASSASSINATE NEPHEW OF SALVADOR ALLENDE AND INVOLVEMENT IN LETELIER ASSASSINATION. HOWEVER, THE ARTICLE CLAIMS WHEN HE WAS FIRST ARRESTED IN VENEZUELA,

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

SECRET

STAFF

CONF: INFO: FILE

DIRECTOR

030287

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

HE REPORTEDLY INDICATED THAT FELLOW CUBAN EXILES WITH WHOM HE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN BOMBING OF LETELIER.

4. IN ADDITION TO ABOVE ARTICLE REFERS TO BOSCH'S TRAVEL IN CARIBBEAN TO ESTABLISH ALLIANCES WITH FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS IN NICARAGUA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, COSTA RICA AND VENEZUELA WHERE POWERFUL CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITIES EXIST. ALSO MENTIONS SERIES OF BOMBINGS INCLUDING THAT OF PANAMANIAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS AND GUYANESE EMBASSY IN TRINIDAD. REFERRING TO ALLEGED PACT HE MADE WITH VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT NOT TO ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST CERTAIN COUNTRIES, BOSCH CLAIMS HE WOULD EXCLUDE VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BUT INSISTED ON INCLUDING PANAMA (BECAUSE IT A LEFTIST DICTATORSHIP) AND GUYANA (WHOSE EMBASSY WAS ALREADY ATTACKED). ALSO REFERS TO ARREST AND INTERROGATION IN TRINIDAD (BY POLICE CHIEF [redacted]) OF TWO CUBAN EXILES WHO AT FIRST ADMITTED COMPLICITY IN CUBANA BOMBING AND INVOLVEMENT OF BOSCH AND THEN LATER REPUDIATED THEIR CONFESSION.

5. SINCE UPI CARRYING FLEETWOOD INTERVIEW OF BOSCH, IT LIKELY APPEAR [redacted] IN ADDRESSEE AREAS SOON. PLEASE CABLE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

4

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

COMF: INFO: FILE

030287

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

HIGHLIGHTS OF LOCAL COVERAGE AND REACTION. ¥

6. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

ORIG: SHEILA O'NEILL, LA/OPS X1173; COORD: C/LA/AN { };
C/LA/SB { }; C/LA/MCA { }; C/LA/PNC { };
C/LA/CAR { }; C/LA/COG{ }AUTH: C/LA/OPS {J. DiStefano
DISTEFANO X9439} REL: DC/LAD {Laudel X[illegible]1431}.

C/LA/AN ✓
C/LA/SB ✓
C/LA/MCA ✓
C/LA/PNC ✓
C/LA/CAR ✓
C/LA/COG. ✓

DATE: 5 MAY 1977
ORIG: SHEILA O'NEILL
UNIT: LA/OPS
EXT: 1173

C/LAD

DiStefano
C/LA/OPS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIF TION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	LA/COG/CUB EXILES TUBE: EU-7		
2	ATTN: HORACE S.		S
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FYI; THOUGHT THAT THIS MAY BE OF INTEREST. YOUR COPY.

EASTON
PCS/ITC/LA
6448/9054
TUBE: ES-2
5 MAY 77.

File
Orlando
Bosch

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

Exclusive Jailhouse Interview with Cuban Terrorist Orlando Bosch

MAY [illegible] 77 [illegible]
THE FEATURE NEWS MAGAZINE ®

New Times

UNFIT FOR FISH ■ UNFIT FOR PEOPLE

AMERICA'S KILLER WATER

BY LAWRENCE WRIGHT



"I am going to declare war"

By Blake Fleetwood

Orlando Bosch is in a Venezuelan jail, charged with ordering the bombing of a Cuban plane in which 73 people died. In an exclusive interview, he talks about his years as a terrorist, his secret alliances with Latin American governments and his plans to get even with the "traitors" who put him in jail

It had been a long time since Dr. Orlando Bosch had talked to a reporter. He had been a fugitive for three years—ever since he boasted he was going "underground to direct the internationalization of the war" against his one-time comrade Fidel Castro. Sometimes, as he flew from one Latin American capital to another, he would forget what name he had decided to use and would begin fumbling among his four phony passports.

He had once been a practicing pediatrician, first in Cuba, then in Miami, but for more than 20 years now the tools of his real trade had been instruments of death—plastic explosives, rifles and bazookas. He led a group of Cuban exiles implicated in some 150 bombings and some 50 murders in the last two years (*New Times*, October 29, 1976). His group had been linked to the car-bomb assassination of Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C., last September, and now he was under arrest in Caracas, Venezuela, charged with ordering the bombing of a Cuban commercial airliner last October 6, which killed 73 people. He is one of the most famous terrorists in the world.

A tall, heavy-set man with thick glasses, he was sitting in the sun in the Caracas prison when I walked up to him.

"Dr. Bosch?" I asked hesitantly.

"Yes?" he replied.

I introduced myself as a reporter from New York. He squinted as he carefully looked me over.

"How did you get in here?" he asked suspiciously.

I told him I had called his lawyer two weeks before and been told to come down to Venezuela. By the time I arrived, his lawyer had gone on vacation and I couldn't reach him. I was in despair. I'd flown 3,000 miles for nothing. It seemed that it would be impossible to see Bosch. I knew that Joanne Omang of the *Washington Post* had spent weeks in Caracas trying to see Bosch and hadn't been successful. In desperation I had called another lawyer, who surprised me with a simple suggestion. "Tomorrow is visiting day," he said. "Be there at 8 a.m. and maybe you can get in."

At eight the next morning, I showed up at the prison gates and saw two lines of visitors waiting to enter the prison. On the left were about 300 women burdened down with baskets of fruit, pies, cakes and fresh linen for their imprisoned menfolk. To the right stood the four male visitors to the prison. In a few minutes the line started to move and I followed along. I passed a table where someone asked me for my *cédula*. Although I understand some Spanish, this was not a word I knew. Everyone else handed him what looked like an I.D. card, so I took out my passport. He took it and gave me a small plastic stub. One of the guards, who spoke a rough, country Spanish that was difficult to understand, told me to put down my briefcase and ushered me into a small bathroom where I was frisked. Then my briefcase was quickly searched and handed back to me. I followed the other four men through two barred gates. And suddenly I realized I was in the prison—at liberty to find Bosch among the mingling prisoners. I asked one of the more respectable-looking prisoners where I could find Orlando Bosch.

"You're in the wrong place altogether. I'll take you to him." And he did—through endless corridors and cell blocks. We ended up in a small courtyard in a section of the prison reserved for special prisoners. He pointed to a man 20 feet away, as if he didn't want to get too close to the most famous killer in all of South America. "Over there—at that table. That's him."

I told Bosch that not only hadn't they asked me whom I was going to see, but that they had somehow missed the compact tape recorder in my briefcase. Bosch, as it turned out, was anxious to talk to a foreign reporter, saying that the Venezuelan government had prevented other interviews. For six hours, over the din of homemade drums in a nearby courtyard, he poured out his story.

"Fidel Castro and I were born in Cuba the same month 50 years ago. We both came from fairly prosperous middle-class families. We both ended up at the University of Havana in the late 1940s. I was in medical school and president of the student council, and Castro was a delegate to the student council from the law school. Although we had our differences, we worked together often and were both elected to our positions from the same political party, which was very much in the center between the right and left. It's not like today when all Latin American universities are dominated by Marxists. We were both very anticommunist and anti-Batista and very nationalistic."

Bosch left Cuba in 1952 for two years of internship in pediatrics at Toledo Hospital in Ohio. "When I finished in 1954, I returned to my hometown of Santa Clara and set up a practice as a pediatrician. But the tyranny of the Batista dictatorship made me join up with Castro again.

"The Batista dictatorship was choking us. I became the leader of the July 26th Movement in my province and we won the fight. I was appointed to the government as a minister of communication. But even as the war was ending, we were having problems with the Communists. They were taking over everything. I complained, I fought against it, but there was nothing I could do. At the time, I still had faith in Castro and his revolution. But then it got too bad, and after a month I resigned from the government. That's when I started conspiring against Castro."

Bosch told me about the group of anti-Castro guerrillas he had led in the Escambray mountains in Cuba in 1960. Castro, Bosch says, sentenced him to death. After running out of supplies, he and his followers fled to Florida, where they found a benefactor in the CIA. At one point, the agency had up to 6,000 Cuban exiles on its payroll.

Bosch interrupted himself and took me to his cell, a small six-by-eight-foot room lined with Spanish tile wallpaper. A small Sony television sat on a shelf in the corner, and there were fresh "designer" sheets on the bed. Bosch introduced his cellmate, Luis Posada, who is also being held in connection with the plane bombing. Posada pulled out a box of Havana cigars and offered me one: "America may have an embargo against Cuban cigars, but we don't."

Bosch and Posada had worked together during the heyday of CIA-sponsored anti-Castro activities in the early sixties, including bombing missions against Cuban sugar mills and gunboat attacks against Castro's fishing boats. But, in 1963, after the Cuban missile crisis and the subsequent reduction of anti-Castro activities by the Kennedy administration, Bosch realized that the CIA was no longer wholeheartedly committed to his cause. "I felt betrayed by the Kennedy administration and by the CIA. They held out a dream to us and then let us down."

"The Dominican government let me stay in the country and organize 'actions.' I wasn't going to church every day. We were conspiring there. Planning bombings and killings"

His own militancy had only increased. An exile group he led claimed credit for 11 bombing attacks against Cuban territory; six times Bosch was arrested for violating U.S. neutrality laws. Finally, on September 16, 1968, he was caught in the act of firing a makeshift bazooka into the hull of a Polish ship docked in Miami.

Most of the testimony against Bosch at his subsequent trial came from Ricardo Morales Navarrette. Morales is a man of many hats—terrorist, informant, hit man, mercenary and cop. He had been an agent in Castro's secret police, a CIA operative, a paid informant for the FBI, an agent provocateur, an anti-Castro terrorist. Today he is a top Venezuelan secret-police official.

Bosch and Morales met in Miami in 1968. Morales, acting on instructions from the FBI, supplied Bosch with dynamite and C-4 explosives for blowing up ships. He also fixed and put in firing condition the bazooka Bosch used against the Polish ship. Morales testified that Bosch had said he was sorry that the bomb he planted in a ship called the *Osaka Maru* went off in Tampa Bay, because "the thing that he wanted was for that ship to blow up outside in the middle of the sea because he was anxious to see all the Japs swimming and screaming 'Wee, wee, wee!' while the ship was sinking."

Bosch was sentenced to ten years in federal prison, but was freed on parole on November 1, 1972.

During his imprisonment, Bosch's wife had left him. His voice broke as he told me about it. "This fight cost me my family and my five kids. They love me and are very proud of their daddy, but I was in jail for five years when they really needed me. They were 13, 11, 10, 8 and 5. They grew up without me. You know how society is there, all the drugs and crime. I wasn't a very good husband."

Bosch has always lived simply, wearing a succession of old baggy suits, often staying at the slum houses of his supporters. "If I had stayed in Miami and practiced medicine I would have made many millions by now. But I could not do that while my country was in agony. I have paid very much for the struggle, very expensively, but that's the only way I know. Sometimes a man has a higher duty than to his children. Sometimes a man has a duty to his homeland. That's the duty I feel."

Soon after his release from prison, Bosch's sense of duty took an ominous new turn. Detente between the United States and Communist countries was chilling to the militant Cuban exiles. A new exile group formed—the National Front for the Liberation of Cuba, or FLNC, said to be modeled after the Palestinian terrorists. Soon an FLNC death list began to circulate around Little Havana, and then one exile leader on that list, Jose Elias de la Torriente, was assassinated. Ricardo Morales narrowly escaped death when a bomb exploded under the front seat of his car. The Miami homicide squad wanted to talk to Bosch, but he had disappeared.

A few months later, in a clandestine interview with the *Miami News*, Bosch praised the Torriente assassination as "a good lesson to the exile community, so that no one else will now come forth with phony theories to fool and rob the people." Nevertheless, he disclaimed direct responsibility, and said he had gone underground because he had coincidentally violated his parole by traveling to New Jersey around the time

---

New York free-lance writer Blake Fleetwood last wrote for New Times *on mercury poisoning in Canada.*

of the assassination. But, he added, "I went underground to direct the internationalization of the war. I thought that the action people [terrorists] should get out of the U.S. and operate from different bases throughout Central and South America." In the next 18 months, four of the ten people on the FLNC list were killed, and a fifth had his legs blown off.

During that period, Bosch was traveling widely in the Caribbean. (Did he ever slip back into the U.S.? Bosch laughed. "If I have to go to the United States, I go.") His main goal was to forge alliances with friendly governments in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and Venezuela—all countries with powerful Cuban exile communities.

Bosch claims that he made his first pact with the Venezuelan government in 1974. He had entered Venezuela from the Dominican Republic in June of that year, using a false Dominican passport in the name of Pedro Penya. "We set off a bomb in front of the Panamanian embassy in Caracas. We chose the 10th of October because that is the date the liberation of Cuba was announced in 1898. We did it because the Torrijos dictator [Panama's president] announced that he was going to Havana, and he did, and he kissed Castro. At the beginning the authorities blamed some Panamanian general who was in exile here. About two weeks later a Communist Cuban official was invited to speak at the Venezuelan-Cuban friendship club. I infiltrated into the audience and before the guy could speak the whole thing blew up. We had to do it. We didn't want to hurt anyone, but we just didn't want the guy to talk.

"I continued conspiring all that fall, raising money and planning bombings and other actions. But about the middle of November I was arrested by the DISIP [the Venezuelan secret political police]. They denied to the press that I was in the country or even under arrest. [The U.S. knew of Bosch's detention, but passed up the opportunity to extradite him.] Then I made my first formal agreement with the Venezuelan government. I dealt with Rivas Vasquez and Orlando Garcia [second and third in command of the DISIP].

"I promised that no more actions against Castro's friends would be taken in Caracas, and they promised me in the name of President Carlos Andres Perez that no high official of the Cuban regime would be allowed into Venezuela."

Bosch was then released. He flew to Curacao, where he met with Guillermo Novo and other Cuban exile leaders



LYNCHBURG has some of the oldest homes in Tennessee. And the oldest registered distillery in America.

Its name, of course, is Jack Daniel's. Where we still make whiskey the way Mr. Jack made it in 1866. And then smooth it out with his age-old charcoal mellowing process.

If you're interested in old Tennessee homes, we'd be glad to show you around Lynchburg. If you're curious about old Tennessee Whiskey, let a sip of Jack Daniel's be your guide.

CHARCOAL MELLOWED
DROP
BY DROP

Tennessee Whiskey • 90 Proof • Distilled and Bottled by Jack Daniel Distillery
Lem Motlow, Prop., Inc., Lynchburg (Pop. 361), Tenn. 37352
Placed in the National Register of Historic Places by the United States Government.

from the U.S. "From Curacao," he said. "Novo and I flew to Chile and mad[illegible]t of effort there." Bosch lived in Chile from December 1974 to December 1975, where he had another family with a Chilean woman. According to press reports, he lived as a guest of the government in a government apartment. "I passed several times from Chile to Argentina. We tried to shoot some Cuban diplomats in the middle of 1975 and we set off a bomb at the Mexican embassy in Buenos Aires. We made good contacts there with members of the triple-A party [a right-wing extremist group]. Because of the contacts we made down there, we set up the murder of two Cuban diplomats. That was part of the agreement I had with them. On August 9th last year, I had a call from our people down there. They said, 'You read the papers today?'" Bosch then made a slashing motion from one end of his throat to another. The two members of the Cuban embassy in Argentina who were kidnapped August 9 last year, and who have not been heard from since, apparently will not be heard from again.

"We have contacts with people like that all over Latin America and even in Europe. After doing everything that is possible in the South Cone [Chile, Argentina and Uruguay], we had three good actions [bombings or shootings]. It was not only the job that we did but also the image and relationships that we established while we were down there which was the main purpose."



Was Bosch involved? Orlando Letelier (top) was murdered in Washington, D.C. The bombing of a Cuban jet off Barbados killed 73; in bottom photo, rescue workers examine a body pulled from the water

Carlos Rivero Collade, a former Cuban exile leader who has returned to Cuba, has written that Bosch received special instruction in assassination and personal attacks during his year in Chile from the Chilean National Intelligence Department. "The purpose behind the training was to have Bosch assassinate Andres Pascal Allende, nephew of the slain Chilean president," he wrote.

According to former Costa Rican Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio, Bosch arrived in his country with the Andres Pascal assassination assignment given to him by the Chilean junta. Using a Chilean passport, a Chilean driver's license and other Chilean documents in the name of Hector D'Avanzo Cintolessi, Bosch entered the country from Nicaragua where, according to Facio, he had met with "close aides of President Anastasio Somoza." On the basis of intelligence reports Bosch was detained in Costa Rica and, while being held, according to Facio, "he told interrogators he intended to kill Secretary of State Kissinger, who was due to arrive here soon thereafter." Bosch admitted to me that he had been in Costa Rica, but would not acknowledge any role in the alleged assassination plots.

"After leaving Costa Rica I went to live in Santa Domingo until August of 1976. I had a number of good friends there and we planned many actions.

"The Dominican government let me stay in the country and organize actions. I wasn't going to church every day. We were conspiring there. Planning bombings and killings. . . . People were coming in and going out. I was plotting with them. Secretly, of course."

Bosch's plotting culminated in a secret meeting of the top terrorist leaders of the hemisphere in the Dominican Republic. "The story of CORU [Coordination of the United Revolutionary Organizations] is true," he told me. "There was a meeting in the Bonao mountains of 20 men representing all different [Cuban exile] activist organizations. It was a meeting of all the military and political directors with revolutionary implications. It was a great meeting. Everything was planned there."

The top men from Alpha 66 (New Jersey), Abdalah (a New York-based youth group), the 2506 Brigade (veterans of the Bay of Pigs Invasion), FLNC, F 14 (New York City) and Accion Cubana (a group Bosch headed) met for two days in the Bonao mountains in early June, 1976. They decided to band together under an umbrella organization, CORU, with Bosch as the only identified spokesman and leader.

"At last we had all the Cuban revolutionary fighters and leaders together, after 17 years. We decided to upscale the action after that. We wanted to beat the guy [Castro] or at least make his life impossible. I told them that we couldn't just keep bombing an embassy here and a police station there. We had to start taking more serious actions—hijacking." (According to a Cuban exile newspaper, one of the resolutions that came out of that meeting was a vow "to begin attacking Castro's planes in the air.")

"I accepted the leadership of CORU because I wanted to set everything up on an organized basis. We were tired of being frustrated and not accomplishing everything that we wanted to do." Bosch brought the other leaders up-to-date on the kind of help they could expect in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela and Chile. Then the group dispersed. In the 11 months since that meeting, Bosch boasts, CORU has been responsible for over 50 bombings in Miami, New York, Venezuela, Panama, Mexico and Argentina. (Bosch refused to admit any personal involvement in bombings within the United States; police sources say the leaders had agreed not to take credit for actions within the U.S. because the FBI was putting too much heat on them.)

After the Bonao meeting the Dominican government called Bosch in and told him he was "too hot" and would have to leave the country.

"I told them how cowardly they were and how scared of Castro they had become, but to no avail. I went back to Costa Rica, and Oduber [the president], to make up for the damage they had done when they arrested me [for the alleged Kissinger assassination plot], gave me three passports. One from Peru and two others from Costa Rica. Then I went back to Nicaragua, where I began getting phone calls from Orlando Garcia [security adviser to Venezuelan President Perez and a top officer in the DISIP]. Garcia told me that he had been jogging with the president—he exercises with the president every day—and that Perez had told him to invite me to Venezuela to make a deal. I didn't pay any attention, but after he called me three times and sent me a visa, I came.

"At the airport I was met by Garcia and Ricardo Morales [the man whose testimony had sent Bosch to jail, and who had by that time become a high official in the DISIP]. They took me to a luxurious government apartment in the Anauco Hilton and we made a deal. I agreed that there would not be any actions in Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. In exchange they would let me live in Venezuela under an assumed name and organize other terrorists' actions elsewhere. They wanted me to include Panama and Guyana.

"I said emphatically, no. I agreed to include Costa Rica, but I didn't want to include Panama because it is a [leftist] dictatorship. And I didn't want to include Guyana. We had already attacked Guyana. The CORU already blew up the Guyana embassy in Trinidad.

"Finally they said, 'All right. We'll just include the three countries. You can do what you want in all the others.' They offered me use of weapons, but I refused, saying that we already had all that we could use. They offered me bodyguards from the DISIP [the secret police], but I didn't need those either. They gave me an identification card from the DISIP which I took—I think it was in the name of Sucre. I was always traveling around the countryside with a great many bodyguards and lots of weapons. If I got stopped, I would just show my secret-police card and I wouldn't have any problems."

Bosch's secret pact with Venezuela "was going perfectly well. In fact, I was supposed to meet with President Perez on October 10, but then the plane blew up on the 6th and all the trouble started"

So Bosch had found in Venezuela a seemingly secure base for his terrorist activities. Then, within a two-week period last fall, two terrorist incidents put the Cuban exiles on the front pages—and landed Bosch in jail. The first was the September 21 assassination in Washington, D.C., of Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier, whose car blew up as he drove past the Chilean embassy in Sheridan Circle. Cuban exiles were immediately suspected of carrying out the crime as hit men for the Chilean junta.

The second was the October 6 explosion in flight of a Cuban airline jet shortly after takeoff from Barbados. All 73 persons aboard were killed. The next day, two Cuban exiles, Hernan Ricardo and Freddy Lugo, were arrested in Trinidad. According to secret court documents obtained by *New Times*, they confessed to planting a bomb in the plane—and implicated Orlando Bosch [see the box on page 52].

Up till that point, Bosch told me, "the pact [with Venezuela] was going perfectly well. In fact, I was supposed to meet with President Perez on October 10, but then the plane blew up on the 6th and all the trouble started. I had a lot of conversations with Garcia. He lived in the Anauco Hilton also. I asked him what should I do and he said, 'Nothing is going to happen, just stay quiet. Don't worry, everything is going to be nice.'

"Then one day he calls me up and says, 'The president wants you to stay here [at the police headquarters]. No problem. You'll be safe.' But I have been under 'protective custody' for seven months now, and the president has said on television that I was a member of the CIA and trying to destabilize his government."

Bosch claims that Orlando Garcia has told him to "sit tight, everything will be all right. We will let you go as soon as the publicity blows over." But Bosch is not sure he believes him, and is getting very impatient. He spoke to me with extreme bitterness about "the betrayal of the Cuban people" by the Venezuelans who had so recently befriended him. He is even willing to entertain charges that Venezuela set him up from the day he was invited to live there. Could his old archenemy Morales have cleverly gotten even in this way?

"Some of my friends said that they called me back deliberately to betray me. I don't know. It is possible."

In any case, Bosch has decided to resume the offensive. "When I was brought to the court the last time, reporters crowded around me, but I didn't say anything. They asked me if I had a DISIP card. I denied it, but I can't keep quiet anymore.

"We're pushed up against the wall by [President] Perez. We're going to accuse him of betraying us. A traitor to democracy, a traitor to the Cubans, and also a traitor to the American cause. I am going to declare war on the Venezuelan government in the name of the Cuban cause. I don't care that I am sitting in jail. Perez is a traitor. He was making a pact with Castro at the same time that he was making a pact with us.

"If they want to put me on trial, they will also have to accuse the minister of the interior, the DISIP director and the president. These people conspired with me. They should be put in jail as well.

"Did you see the Viasa [Venezuelan Airline] office blown up in Puerto Rico yesterday? My Cubans blew it up, but nobody is going to take credit for it.

"The bus has left with the dogs": How they blew up the Cuban plane

The following account of the bombing of the Cubana Airline jet is based on secret Venezuelan court documents. Most of the information comes from the confessions, since repudiated, of the men charged with the crime.

Hernan Ricardo, 22, had been working at the private detective office of Luis Posada in Caracas for about a year when, on September 10, 1976, Posada introduced him to a "Mr. Panyagua." Posada assigned Ricardo to help "Mr. Panyagua" get around, as he was a stranger in the country. After a few days of helping "Mr. Panyagua," Ricardo realized that he was really Orlando Bosch, "the maximum leader of the Cuban people."

On the night of October 5, Ricardo, Bosch and Freddy Lugo, 25, met at a Cuban exile meeting. At midnight that same day, Ricardo and Lugo flew to Trinidad aboard a Pan American flight. They stayed overnight and the next morning inquired about Cubana Airline flight 455, stopping in Barbados en route to Cuba. The clerk told them that the Cuban plane had been delayed, but that there was another flight to Barbados leaving immediately. Ricardo protested, but had trouble getting his message across since his English was not very good.

Standing behind Ricardo in line were a few members of Cuba's championship fencing team, who were returning home after an international tour. One of the fencers, also booked on Cubana flight 455, translated for Ricardo. "He says that he doesn't want to go on an earlier flight. He only wants to travel on Cubana 455 and he's willing to wait until it's ready to go."

Lugo and Ricardo each checked a bag, and Lugo carried with him a dark alligator shoulder bag with two cameras and a tube of Colgate toothpaste in it. With 16 Cuban fencers, 6 medical students from South America, 5 Koreans and 45 other, mostly Cuban, passengers and crew, Lugo and Ricardo finally got on the plane. About half-way through the 20-minute flight, Ricardo got up to go to the bathroom to plant the explosive. The bomb made a big bulge in Ricardo's pocket and he was very nervous.

It took only a few minutes in the toilet, but then Ricardo found he couldn't get out. He panicked and started banging on the door. The stewardess tried to open the door from the outside, but she couldn't. She called one of the pilots from the cockpit who kicked at it three times with his foot. Finally the door opened and Ricardo stumbled out. By the time he got back to his seat he was drenched in sweat and appeared very nervous. For the rest of the flight Ricardo held a newspaper in front of his face.

They got off the plane in Barbados, collected their luggage, and made their way to the Hotel Village. At one point in the cab ride Ricardo told the driver to stop, jumped out and looked up at a passing plane. He was very agitated and nervous.

Lugo described the scene ten minutes later as follows. "The people in the streets were very agitated and pointing up to the sky, saying that a plane had fallen. Ricardo said that we were in big trouble because we had traveled on false passports. At the hotel Ricardo told me to take the bags up to the room while he registered in a false name. He said he was calling [illegible] Venezuela for advice."

He had difficulty getting through. One call that he did get through was to his girlfriend, Marines Vegas. She testified that he gave her a number and told her to get the following message to Luis or Gustavo: "Tell them I am in a desperate situation and that they should send someone quick. That this is a question of life or death and that 'the bus has left with the dogs.' Tell them that I threw away the phone numbers."

Ricardo got a phone call back from Caracas during which Lugo quotes him as saying, "What's happening, Luis? I have a lot of problems. I don't know what to do. The bug has fallen into the water. Tell this to Panyagua [Bosch]."

Just as he put down the phone Ricardo saw someone staring at him and ran up to the room in a panic. Lugo says Ricardo told him, "Let's get out of here right away. The man who stared at me in the lobby is a G-2 [agent of Castro's secret police]."

"We took a cab to the docks," Lugo said, "and Ricardo threw something in the water. Then he said, 'We should get the first plane out of here, no matter where.'"

They caught a plane to Trinidad, leaving their bags in the hotel room in Barbados. On the plane Ricardo buried his head in his hands and said to Lugo, "Shit, Lugo! I'm desperate and I feel like crying. I have never killed anyone before."

At the Holiday Inn in Trinidad, Ricardo called Bosch, who told him, "Friend, we have to see each other in Caracas. You never should explode a bomb while a plane is in the air."

Meanwhile, the Barbados cab driver, struck by Ricardo's erratic behavior, had contacted the police. They tracked Ricardo and Lugo to Trinidad. In their hotel room the police found two phone books containing many different addresses, including those of Orlando Bosch, Luis Posada and Joseph Leo, an FBI legal attache in the United States embassy in Caracas.

The Trinidad police separated Lugo and Ricardo and during the questioning that followed over the next few days—the police threatened to send them back to Cuba unless they talked—they both confessed. Ricardo told Police Chief Denis Elliott Randwar that he had planted the bomb on the airplane. He also said, "I am a membe of a secret organization, the CORU or CONDOR, and the chief of this organization is Orlando Bosch." Ricardo added that he "was a CIA agent of the grade B-1" and that he had been recruited in 1971. He said that he had received training in the manufacturing of bombs, the handling of firearms and photography by the CIA.

Before a number of Trinidad policemen he drew a picture of the bomb and described the plastic explosive that had been used. He said he kept the "pencil" detonator in the tube of Colgate toothpaste. Different colored chemical pencils could trigger an explosion in 8 minutes, 45 minutes, 2 hours, 8 hours or 24 hours, he said. He said he had been paid $25,000 to plant the bomb.

On October 20, after signing his confessions, Ricardo tried to kill himself by slashing his wrist with a razor, but he was taken to the hospital and survived.

At funeral services for those killed on the plane, Fidel Castro charged that the CIA was directly responsible for the bombing. As a result, he terminated the hijacking agreement Cuba had signed with the United States.

This is just a message. There will be a couple of messages more."

I asked him if there was going to be a kidnapping attempt against Venezuelan diplomats. (An FBI informant reported a plan to kidnap the Venezuelan ambassador to the United Nations in March. The ambassador was informed and surrounded with extra security.) Bosch replied: "There are going to be a lot of things after I declare war. This is going to be a tremendous risk for me because I'll still be in jail. After the war declaration there are going to be a lot of bombings, a lot of kidnappings, a lot of shootings. We have to attack everything except their planes in the air. Their offices on land, yes."

And what about the spectacular crimes that put the Cuban exiles in the spotlight?

Cuban government officials have told recent American visitors that Orlando Bosch was enlisted and paid by the Chilean junta to carry out the Letelier assassination. Bosch, they claim, parceled out the money to other members of CORU who actually blew up Letelier. Bosch concedes that the Cuban exiles "discussed Orlando Letelier at [the Bonao] meeting, and the fact that [Letelier's] campaign [to discredit the junta abroad] was bothering some of our friends in Chile. Chilean officials told me many times when I lived there that they wanted him dead." But Bosch denied knowing anything about the Letelier assassination. "Even if I did know," he added, "I wouldn't tell anyone. I'm not a stool pigeon or an informer."

Bosch concedes that the Cuban exiles discussed Orlando Letelier. "Chilean officials told me many times when I lived there that they wanted him dead"

According to a confidential intelligence report obtained by *New Times*, however, Bosch was not so reticent about the Letelier case when questioned by Venezuelan authorities shortly after his arrest. The report states that Bosch told Rivas Vasquez, second in command of DISIP, that, while he had nothing to do with the Letelier assassination, "the Novo brothers are directly involved."

Guillermo and Ignacio Novo are among the most militant and activist Cuban exile leaders in the United States. They were arrested in 1964 for firing a bazooka at the United Nations while Che Guevara was speaking there, but charges were dropped because they were not read their rights before they confessed. Guillermo Novo (or Bill, as he is known at the Chevrolet dealership in Union City, New Jersey, where he is a new-car sales manager) was sentenced to five years in jail in 1971 for possession of explosives. He served six months, and was given probation for five years. Under the terms of his parole he was not allowed to leave New Jersey. But Bosch told me of two foreign trips Bill Novo took—the first to Curacao and Chile, the second to Bonao. Bill Novo could be sent back to jail for these trips in violation of parole—which he denies making.

Bosch's story to Vasquez about the Novos' involvement in the Letelier murder correlated with a story that had been told to authorities by an FBI informant in Washington. (Contrary to reports in most American papers, no U.S. official has been allowed by the Venezuelan government to see Bosch.) On the basis of these two leads Eugene Propper, the Assistant U.S. Attorney in charge of the Letelier investigation, has called about ten Cuban exile leaders before a Washington grand jury. Bill Novo was called before the Letelier grand jury twice, and twice took the Fifth Amendment. The government has now begun offering limited immunity to some of the other Cuban exiles, hoping to force them to talk. Recently a friend of Bill Novo's was jailed after refusing to testify before the grand jury about Novo's travels to Curacao.

As for Bosch, his future is unclear. Venezuelan legal experts say the likelihood of convicting him in the airplane explosion case is not great. Ricardo and Lugo, the chief potential witnesses against him, have repudiated their confessions after being deported to Venezuela from Trinidad. In any case, confessions made in Trinidad are not admissible in Venezuelan courtrooms. The government has tapes of Ricardo's telephone calls to Venezuela, but these, too, are inadmissible, since they were not obtained legally. It is thus entirely possible that Bosch will be released.

If that happens, he will surely slip again into the violent, murky world where desperate men are alternately used and betrayed by the secret agencies of governments. It is a far cry from the life of a prosperous pediatrician, a family man, a pillar of his community. But "some of us," as he told me, "have other roles to play." ●

FLASH!
[illegible] news! Ocean-front Southampton College [illegible] Education-Vacation! Room & board approx. $30 a week for family of 4. Undergraduate, graduate and teacher credits. American studies, art, business, public management, [illegible], English, history, political science, psychology, social sciences, etc. Many one-week intensives. Vacation fun, swimming, sports, crafts, theatre, day camps for kids. 40-page brochure. Dept. G, Ms. [illegible], Southampton College, LIU, Southampton, NY 11968. (516)283-4000.

RESEARCH
SEND $2.00 for large catalog of prewritten research. Original writing also. Professional, Reasonable. Fast! Information Clearinghouse, Box 4391, Washington, D.C. 20012 (202) 723-1715

NOTICE:
Record Raters Wanted
(No experience required.) Each month you will receive nationally released albums to rate. You pay only a small membership fee which covers all costs of the albums, including postage and handling. There is no extra charge for the albums you receive. In return for your opinion you will build a substantial album collection. Applicants accepted on "first come basis." For application and further details write:
E.A.R.S., INC., Dept. NT, Box 10245, 5521 W. Center St., Milwaukee, WI 53210
The research program is guaranteed.

New Times Subscriber Service
Address Change: Please attach the label for your old address here and write in your new address below.
Inquiries & complaints: We can serve you better and faster if you will enclose your label with all correspondence.
Mail this whole form to: New Times P.O. Box 10046 Des Moines, Iowa 50340
Note: Your present subscription will end with the issue noted in the upper right corner of your mailing label.
Entering a new subscription?: Check the box and fill in your name and address below. (To order gift subscriptions please attach a separate sheet).
Renewing?: Check the box below and make sure your mailing address is correct. There is an additional charge of $2.00 per year to cover postage and handling of issues to Canada.
Please send New Times for 1 year, $15.00
☐ New subscription ☐ renewal
☐ payment enclosed ☐ bill me later
Name (please print)
Address
City State/Province Zip/Postcode
For even faster service, phone toll free 800-247-2160 (in Iowa call 1-800-362-2860)

7-71 MFG 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY D PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 7-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION UNIT LA/DPS ACTION #	INFO	RF . FILE . VR .	1	4
			2	5
			3	6

T 628685 EIA171 PAGE 01 IN 197268

TOR:241805Z FEB 77 MADR 34654

S E C R E T 241735Z FEB 77 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE MADRID 34654

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: LA/COG INFO: E/IB

SUBJECT: WNINTEL/RYBAT/MHSPIKE - OTP BRIEFING OF LEGAL ATTACHE ON "ORLANDO CASE"

REF: DIRECTOR 991279

IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF, MADRID LEGAL ATTACHE WAS BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS ON "ORLANDO CASE". LEGAL ATTACHE WAS TOLD THAT THERE IS A U.S. CUSTOMS AGENT IN SPAIN, THAT STATION IS IN CONTACT WITH HIM, AND THAT HE MIGHT BECOME AWARE OF DETAILS OF A CUBAN EXILE (FORMER MEMBERS BRIGADE 2506) PLOT TO COMMIT A TERRORIST ACT AGAINST A CUBAN OFFICIAL IN SPAIN. LEGAL ATTACHE SAID HE HAD HEARD NOTHING OF THIS, AND APPRECIATED BEING ADVISED. DID NOT REVEAL SOURCE IDENTITY OR LOCATION, AND HE DID NOT ASK FOR ANY DETAILS. HE WAS GIVEN NAME OF MR. CHARLES BUTERA SHOULD HE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. E2 IMPDET

HBT

IP/AN		STAFF PROGRAM
		ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/CR		[illegible]
IP/		CODE NO. (2, 3)
		EVENT DATE [illegible]
		[illegible] (11)
		[illegible] (9)
		FOR [illegible]
28/5/77		

RECORD COPY

SECRET

D19-300-28

24 Feb 77

201-299292

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 19

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

0808002 CIA 982910

DISSEM BY: 48

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/IPloms, C/LSN, D.C., C/EUR6, AGC/DDO,

TO: IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY.

ATTENTION: U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE; ATTENTION MR. CHARLES BUTERA

SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NO FOREIGN DISSEM.

CIR-316/00500-77

SUBJECT: INTER-AGENCY MEETING ON THE "ORLANDO CASE"

REF: CIR 316/00486-77

1. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE DISCUSSIONS HELD BETWEEN MESSRS. VIRUSIO AND BUTERA OF U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, AND CIA REPRESENTATIVES ON 4 FEBRUARY 1977 CONCERNING SUBJECT. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS [redacted] TO ARRIVE AT A [redacted] MUTUALLY AGREED UPON COURSE OF ACTION IN THE EVENT SUBJECT IS CONTACTED BY MILITANT CUBAN EXILES FOR THE PURPOSE OF PARTICIPATING IN A LOCALE TERRORIST ACT.

2. THIS AGENCY TOOK THE POSITION THAT IF SUBJECT SHOULD PROVIDE [redacted] CREDIBLE INFORMATION INDICATING THAT Cuban exiles [redacted] INTEND TO CONDUCT A TERRORIST ACT IN SPAIN, THEN THIS AGENCY [redacted] WOULD HAVE LITTLE RECOURSE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

019-300-28

RECORD COPY

08 Feb 77

201-299292

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

ROUTING

OMF	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	OCI
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
CIA

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

982910

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

BUT TO ALERT THE PROPER SPANISH AUTHORITIES ~~OF~~ TO THE IMPENDING PLOT.Y

3. AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES REAFFIRMED THAT ALL REASONABLE STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN TO TRY TO PROTECT THE IDENTITY OF THE SOURCE WHEN PASSING VITAL INFORMATION TO THE SPANISH AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE AGENCY COULD NOT FULLY GUARANTEE THAT SUBJECTS'S NAME WOULD NOT BE DISCLOSED TO OR UNCOVERED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THEIR FOLLOWUP INVESTIGATION SINCE MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE DEGREE OF SUBJECT'S BINVOLVEMENT.Y

4. U.S. CUSTOMS REPRESENTATIVES EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SUBJECT UNDERTAKE NO ACTIVITY WHILE IN SPAIN THAT MIGHT VIOLATE LOCAL LAWS. THEY AGREED THAT THE DECISION MADE BY OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN SPAIN WAS CORRECT IN THAT SUBJECT SHOULD AVOID THE PROCURING OF WEAPONS FOR THE CUBAN EXILE GROUP WHICH ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA HAD REQUESTED.Y

5. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY BY U.S. CUSTOMS OFFICIALS, IT WAS STATED [redacted] THAT U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN ROTA, SPAIN WILL SERVE SONLY AS AN ALTERNATE COMMUNICATION LINK FOR SUBJECT TO USE IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY, [redacted] THIS AGENCY WOULD CONTINUE TO HANDLE SUBJECT CASE IN SPAIN AS HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY U.S. CUSTOMS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2, IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE

982910

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

SERVICE.Y

6. CLASSIFIED BY 059405. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.Y

LA COMMENT: REF PROVIDED REPORT OF "ORLANDO'S MEETING WITH MADRID STATION WHICH WAS FORWARDED TO U.S. CUSTOMS.

CABLE SEC: PLS PROVIDE CC TO IP/AN FOR FILING IN 201-0284498;
201-0030022;
019-300-028.

RELEASED PER AUTHORITY: MR. RALPH KATROSH, OPS/LSN

AC/LA/
C/LA/CAR
C/E/IB
PCS/LSN
E/ROG
AGC/DDO
4M/OPS J.F. Mathews

DATE: 7 FEB 77
ORIG: RAUL HERNANDEZ:BB
UNIT: LA/COG/WHA
EXT: 1819

ROBERT MAYHEW, DDODO
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 059405

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY 96 - 5

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 5

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR ~~STAFF~~

DATE-TIME GROUP 032210Z

CITE ~~DIRECTOR~~ CIA

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 981153

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: C/O, CH
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], EUR 8, [illegible], [illegible]

TO: IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY.

ATTENTION: U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE: MR. CHARLES BUTERA

SECRET/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.

CIR-316/00486-77

SUBJECT: THE ORLANDO CASE

REF: CIR-316/00439-77

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
		DISTRIBUTE
		INDEX
IP,CO,V		PREPARE FOR FILING
IP,MB		COPY NO. (2, 3)
		PREP RIST TO FILE
		CABLE ALLN (11)
		SPD (2)
~~IP GRU~~		FOR FILING
LA/SB	CH	

1. THIS AGENCY'S REPRESENTATIVE ADVISED HE HAD [redacted] MET "ORLANDO" (WHO SUBJECT OF REF), AND INTRODUCED HIM TO NAVAL INTELLIGENCE [redacted] ROTA (NIS/ROTA) REP NIGHT 1 FEBRUARY 1977. "ORLANDO" WAS GIVEN ROTA BASE PHONE NUMBERS HE CAN CALL DAY OR NIGHT TO ARRANGE MEETING WITH NIS REP AT SITE NEAR HIS HOTEL (TO WHICH HE TAKEN) TO REPORT IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS. SHOULD HE FAIL MAKE CONTACT VIA ROTA NUMBERS, "ORLANDO" IS TO CALL NUMBER HE GIVEN IN MADRID. IN ALL CASES HE WILL ASK FOR "FELIX."

2. "ORLANDO" PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFO DURING 1 FEB MEETING:

A. HE HAD TWO MEETINGS WITH JOSE MACIAS (WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS CURRENT NUMBER TWO OF BRIGADE 2506) IN MIAMI BEFORE

201 289504

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

B201-289504
B201-9240
B201-284498

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
019-300-28

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

03 Feb 77

201-273992

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

~~STAFF~~

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE ~~DIRECTOR~~ CIA

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

951153

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

COMING TO SPAIN. AT FIRST MEETING, MACIAS TALKED ABOUT POSSIBILITY BLOWING UP CUBAN AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM MADRID. THIS WAS DISCARDED AT SECOND MEETING BECAUSE OF PROBLEM OF FINDING EXPLOSIVES FOR THAT MISSION. MACIAS, INSTEAD, INDICATED HIS ORGANIZATION WAS INTERESTED IN KILLING SENIOR CUBAN VISITOR TO MADRID, MEMBER OF LOCAL CUBAN EMBASSY OR, IF THIS NOT POSSIBLE, IMPORTANT SPANISH COMMUNIST. ONLY NAME MENTIONED WAS THAT OF NICOLAS GUILLEN (201-9240), WELL KNOWN CUBAN POET AND LONG TIME COMMUNIST, WHO CURRENTLY IN SPAIN TO RECEIVE LITERARY HONOR. MACIAS GAVE "ORLANDO" MISSION OF OBTAINING TWO OR THREE HAND GUNS FROM ROTA MILITARY PERSONNEL. HE COMMENTED THAT "SINCE GI'S SELL EVERYTHING" "ORLANDO" SHOULD HAVE LITTLE PROBLEM BUYING GUNS FOR LITTLE MONEY. ON SAME DAY HE LEFT U.S. (30 JAN), "ORLANDO" RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM ARMANDO LOPEZ (201-254448) ESTRADA WHO CONFIRMED TO HIM HE SHOULD PURCHASE "TWO BEDSPREADS" (TWO GUNS).

B. PER MACIAS BRIEFING, "ORLANDO" IS TO EXPECT CONTACT AT HIS HOTEL WITHIN TNE DAYS AFTER HIS ARRIVAL BY TWO MEN SENT BY LOPEZ WHO WILL IDENTIFY SELVES AS "NUMBER 8." REFER TO "ORLANDO" AS "NUMBER 6" AND SHOW THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF BRIGADE 2506 HISTORY.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

~~STAFF~~

~~DIRECTOR~~ CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: COO

0 NO INDEX M

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

981153

"ORLANDO" DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WILL RECEIVE PREVIOUS PHONE CALL FROM LOPEZ. HE GATHERED THAT LOPEZ HIMSELF MAY BE ONE OF TWO MEN WHO WILL CONTACT HIM.

C. OUR MADRID REPRESENTATIVE ASKED WHY ARMANDO LOPEZ HAS TO SEND MEN FROM UNITED STATES TO UNDERTAKE TERRORIST MISSION IN SPAIN WHEN MANY CUBAN EXILES LIVE IN THAT COUNTRY. "ORLANDO" SAID THAT [redacted] EITHER NO ONE FROM BRIGADE 2506 RESIDES IN SPAIN OR THERE IS NO MEMBER OF THAT BRIGADE IN SPAIN WHOM LOPEZ TRUSTS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN CHANGES IN THE HIERARCHY OF THE BRIGADE IN LAST SIX MONTHS. "ORLANDO" BOSCH MADE BID TO TAKE OVER BRIGADE LEADERSHIP FROM VENEZUELA BUT THIS WAS REJECTED BY LOPEZ SO THAT BOSCH SET UP HIS OWN ORGANIZATION AND WENT ON WITH THE RECENT DESTRUCTION IN FLIGHT OF CUBAN PLANE WITHOUT ANY CONNECTION WITH BRIGADE 2506. OUR REPRESENTATIVE GOT IMPRESSION THAT LOPEZ, WHO "ORLANDO" SAID WAS "DELIGHTED" WITH BOSCH'S "SUCCESS", IS NOW TRYING TO COMPETE IN CUBAN TERRORIST BUSINESS AND IS PLANNING KILL ANY CUBAN FIDELISTA OR EVEN SPANISH COMMUNIST HE CAN GET ACCESS TO DURING TRIP TO SPAIN.

D. MACIAS TOLD "ORLANDO" THAT HE HAS SISTER ALEJA, MARRIED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

4

SECRET

~~STAFF~~

~~DIRECTOR~~ CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE

981153

0 INDEX DISSEM BY

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO (FNU) SUAREZ, WHO HAS CHILDREN STUDYING AT UNIVERSITY OF VALLADOLID IN SPAIN. SUAREZ COUPLE USED TO LIVE IN VALLADOLID, BUT SUAREZ CURRENTLY HAS JOB IN MIAMI AS REFRIGERATION TECHNICIAN. HE AND WIFE (BOTH U.S. CITIZENS OF CUBAN ORIGIN) MAKE FAIRLY FREQUENT VISITS TO VALLADOLID. MACIAS TOLD "ORLANDO" THAT SUAREZ IS COWARD AND LOUDMOUTH WHO CANNOT BE COUNTED ON. IT REMAINS, HOWEVER, THAT MEN SENT BY LOPEZ COULD VISIT MACIAS CHILDREN OR EVEN STAY WITH THEM A FEW DAYS.

3. "ORLANDO" HAS DONE NOTHING AT ROTA BASE ABOUT POSSIBILITY OBTAIN HAND GUNS. HE AGREED CURRENT INTERNAL SITUATION IN SPAIN GIVES HIM READY EXCUSE TO INFORM LOPEZ AND HIS MEN THAT IT TOO RISKY AT THIS TIME TO TRY OT OBTAIN WEAPONS. "ORLANDO" SAID HE KNOWS NAMES OF ONE OR TWO AMERICANS OF CUBAN BACKGROUND LIVING IN SPAIN, BUT CLAIMED HE DID NOT HAVE THEIR ADDRESSES AND THUS HAS NO INTENTION OF CONTACTING THEM. HE KNEW NO ONE AT ROTA BEFORE STARTING WORK THERE.

4. CLASSIFIED BY 059405. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.#

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 5

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
~~STAFF~~

~~DIRECTOR~~ CIA

CDO

981153

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: IN
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

BASED ON: MADRID 34360 (IN 172821)

CABLE SEC: PLS PROVIDE CC TO IP/AN FOR FILING IN 201-0284498, 201-030022, 19-300-28. [redacted]

Bjorn
Bjornerud
Dreng

AC/LA/
C/LA/CAR

DATE: 8 FEB 77
ORIG: RAUL HERNANDEZ/RD
UNIT: LA/COG/
EXT: 3819

PCS/ITC
RELEASING OFFICER

~~DC/LA/~~
DC/ LE/IB Bumoting (telecon)
~~DUR/~~
LSN
PCS/[redacted] Ralph Cornely
E/ROG Jalteman (telecon)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

201-244298

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

STATE CABLE

FROM AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0854

DATE: 27 JANUARY 1977

SUBJECT: INTERROGATION OF ORLANDO BOSCH

14-00000

50

DISSEM BY IID PER GD

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 006687

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	
LA 21		FILE, VR, DDO 3, EPS/EG 2, IP/DMS, IID, PCS/INT 5,
ACTION #		D/DCI, CS/RF, ADDO/D, CI 4, CA 4, PCS/ITC 4, EA 4,
		EA/CO 4

T 438491 EIA925 PAGE 01 IN 122257

TOR: 072140Z DEC 76 CARA 31636

S E C R E T 071946Z DEC 76 INTEL

TDFIRDB-315/12267-76
HVC-7554

CITE CARACAS 31636

TO: DIRECTOR INFO PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, SANTIAGO, HONG KONG.

WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE FUDWELL

SUPDATA: SOURCE PRAS 2-6: WKDIET[1]/WKDIET-5[2] DIRECTLY AND PARA 4 FROM WKTANGO-1[3]. SOURCE PARAS 8-10 WKMAYOR[4]/WKSCARLET-9[5] DIRECTLY (SEE CARACAS 31404 (IN 097588)). NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1; NO INDEX. FILE: 75-120-28 CL BY 035133.

FILED 071946Z XXXXX

9/

		[illegible]
	X	[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]

7 DEC [illegible]

201-299372
7 Dec 76

RECORD COPY

SECRET

D 75-8-15

SECRET (When Filled In)

ROUTINE

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 122257

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO CRS
FBI

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer, Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1),(2) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

CITE TDFIR DB-315/12267-76

SECRET

DIST 7 DECEMBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFRMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI EARLY-MID-NOVEMBER 1976

SUBJECT COMMENTS BY ORLANDO BOSCH ON THE BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (11 NOVEMBER -1 DECEMBER 1976)
FIELD NO HVC-7554.

SOURCE: SEE BELOW

SUMMARY: WHILE DENYING HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASSASSINATION OF FORMER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER ORLANDO LETELIER, CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH IMPLIED THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. BOSCH SAID THAT PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ IS ANGRY AT HIM BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THAT BOSCH BROKE HIS AGREEMENT AND PLANNED THE CUBANA INCIDENT IN VENEZUELA, WHICH BOSCH DENIES. HERNAN RICARDO WHO IS ALSO IMPLICATED IN THE PLANE CRASH ADMITTED THAT HE WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THIS BOMBING AS WELL AS OTHERS. FURTHERMORE, HE SAID THAT THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN VENEZUELA

SECRET

HAS APPROXIMATELY 40 POUNDS OF C-4 EXPLOSIVE. END SUMMARY.

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 2-6: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WHOSE ACTIVITIES BRING HIM INTO CLOSE CONTACT WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM SOMEONE WHO SPOKE WITH ORLANDO BOSCH.

2. IN MID-NOVEMBER 1976 CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER, SAID THAT THE BOMBING OF THE PLANE IN THE AIR HAD BEEN A MISTAKE. ACCORDING TO THE PLAN, THE PLANE WAS TO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED WHILE ON THE GROUND IN TRINIDAD AND NOT IN THE AIR, BOSCH SAID. BOSCH ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED THAT ANY ONE SHOULD BE KILLED AND AS IT TURNED OUT, THE INCIDENT HAS BEEN COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. BOSCH BLAMED THIS ON THE STUPIDITY OF HERNAN RICARDO AND FREDDY LUGO, WHO ARE CURRENTLY UNDER ARREST IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCIDENT. (SOURCE COMMENT: WHILE BOSCH DID NOT ACTUALLY ADMIT THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE CUBANA BOMBING, HIS STATEMENT CLEARLY INDICATES THAT HE HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT.)

3. BOSCH SAID THAT VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ IS ANGRY AT HIM BECAUSE HE BELIEVES BOSCH PLANNED AND DIRECTED THE

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 122257

TDFIR DB-315/12267-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

CUBANA INCIDENT FROM VENEZUELA. THIS, BOSCH SAID, IS NOT TRUE. BOSCH FURTHER ASSERTED THAT HE HAS HONORED HIS AGREEMENT WITH PEREZ THAT HE WOULD NOT CARRY OUT ANTI-CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA IF PEREZ LET HIM ENTER VENEZUELA WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. (SOURCE COMMENT: BOSCH IMPLIED THAT, WHILE HE DID PLAN THE OPERATION, SUCH PLANS WERE NOT CARRIED OUT IN VENEZUELA.)

4. BOSCH SAID THAT SHORTLY AFTER THE CUBANA CRASH, ORLANDO GARCIA, PRESIDENT PEREZ' INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ADVISER, HAD PLANNED TO GET BOSCH OUT OF VENEZUELA. PRESIDENT PEREZ, BELIEVING BOSCH HAD GONE BACK ON HIS AGREEMENT, ORDERED GARCIA TO ARREST BOSCH. GARCIA DID, HOWEVER, WARN BOSCH OF HIS FORTHCOMING DETENTION AND GAVE HIM AN HOUR AND A HALF TO ARRANGE HIS AFFAIRS BEFORE GARCIA ARRESTED HIM. BOSCH SAID THAT AT THE TIME HE DID NOT REALLY TAKE GARCIA'S WARNING SERIOUSLY. (FIELD COMMENT: IN HVC-7514, TDFIRDB-315/10256-76, OF 15 OCTOBER, A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT GARCIA INTENDED TO ESCORT BOSCH TO THE COLOMBIAN BORDER.)

5. IN DISCUSSING OTHER TERRORIST ACTS WITH WHICH HIS NAME HAS BEEN LINKED, BOSCH DENIED HAVING BEEN IN ANY WAY INVOLVED WITH THE MURDER OF FORMER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER ORLANDO LETELIER. ALSO, BOSCH SAID THAT REPORTS THAT HE HAD INTENDED TO KILL ANDRES

SECRET

PASCUAL ALLENDE, NEPHEW OF THE LATE CHILEAN PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE, IN COSTA RICA IN FEBRUARY ARE COMPLETELY FALSE. UNFORTUNATELY, BOSCH SAID, HE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO CONVINCE PEREZ OF HIS INNOCENCE WITH REGARD TO PASCUAL. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT BOSCH STRONGLY DENIED HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE LETELIER CASE AND THE POSSIBLE ATTEMPT AGAINST PASCUAL, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NOT DENYING HIS CONNECTION WITH THE CUBANA AFFAIR.)

6. IN DISCUSSING HIS FUTURE, BOSCH SAID THAT HE EXPECTS THE VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES TO EVENTUALLY RELEASE HIM AS THE VENEZUELANS HAVE NO PROOF AGAINST HIM. BOSCH SAID THAT HE IS OLD AND TIRED AND WANTS TO GO BACK TO SERVE OUT HIS PRISON SENTENCE IN THE UNITED STATES. FURTHERMORE, BOSCH SAID THAT HE FEARS FOR HIS LIFE AND MERELY WANTS TO "RETIRE" IN PEACE.

7. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 6-10: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

8. IN EARLY NOVEMBER, RICARDO ADMITTED PRIVATELY THAT HE WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF THE CUBANA PLANE. RICARDO SAID THAT HE

FORM 9-75 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 122257

TDFIR DB-315/12267-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

HAD CARRIED C-4 EXPLOSIVE IN HIS POCKETS AND THAT LUGO CARRIED THE TIME PENCIL INSIDE HIS CAMERA. THE BOMB, RICARDO SAID, WAS PLACED IN ONE OF THE PLANE'S LAVATORIES.

9. IN ADDITION TO THE 6 OCTOBER BOMBING, RICARDO ADMITTED THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN AN ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF A CUBANA PLANE IN PANAMA IN THE SUMMER OF 1976, AND ATTEMPT ON A CUBANA PLANE IN JAMAICA, AND THE BOMBING OF THE CUBAN CONSULATE IN GUYANA. ANOTHER BOMBING HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR HONG KONG, BUT RICARDO SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE THE TRIP.

10. ACCORDING TO RICARDO, THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN VENEZUELA HAS APPROXIMATELY 40 POUNDS OF C-4 EXPLOSIVES AT ITS DISPOSAL. INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT BY VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES TEND TO CONFIRM THIS INFORMATION AND THE VENEZUELANS ARE ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THE EXPLOSIVES.

11. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS: SENT TO PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, SANTIAGO, HONG KONG. REPORT CLASS SECRET- WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS- NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR / CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

SECRET

201-299292

19-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

JMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET BCF

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP 0721102

CITE CI.

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/IP/DMS, C/LSN/ID, C/PCS/ITC2, AGC/DDO C/CI2

SEN BY: 3 15 of 32 RAL

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN:
EMB
INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONRTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

FIRCI-312/00159-77

SUBJECT: BOMBING OF FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES: TRAVEL OF GUILLERMO NOVO TO CHILE IN LATE 1974.

THIS CABLE IS ~~[illegible]~~ IN RESPONSE TO ~~REQUEST MADE BY THE ASSIS- [illegible]~~ AND A MEMORANDUM FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI, DATED 17 DECEMBER 1976, FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING FOREIGN TRAVEL OF GUILLERMO NOVO AND JOSE DIONISIO SUAREZ. THIS AGENCY HAS ALREADY FORWARDED TO YOU ~~ADDITIONAL~~ INFORMATION CONCERNING ON ~~FOREIGN TRAVEL OF~~ NOVO.

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH TWO: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN NATIONALS, INCLUDING ~~THOSE~~ MEMBERS OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018958

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

967391

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

2. ON 2 DECEMBER 1974 ORLANDO BOSCH AND GUILLERMO NOVO BOTH CUBAN EXILE LEADERS, TRAVELED TO CHILE FROM VENEZUELA AT THE INVITATION OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. ANOTHER ASSOCIATE OF BOSCH, JOSE DIONISIO SUAREZ ESQUIVEL, DID NOT ACCOMPANY THEM FROM VENEZUELA BECAUSE HE WAS UNABLE TO GET A VISA TO CHILE AS HE STILL HELD CUBAN CITIZENSHIP. Y

3. THE ABOVE SURFACED DURING A RECHECK OF AGENCY RECORDS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT YOUR AGENCY HAS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE TRAVEL OF BOSCH TO CHILE. Y

4. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.H

BASED ON: HVCA-20698, 13 DECEMBER 1976
WKSCARLET (WKSCARLET-9)
OBJ: J

FILE: 200-12-200/1
201-299292

11/DMS
Jones
GTT

C/LA/OPS (L. LASER IN DRAFT)

DATE: 7 JAN 77
ORIG: MARY GINN/JC
UNIT: LA/SB/CH/RR
EXT: 1471

AGC/DDO (TONY GOLDIN IN DRAFT)

CI/R&A (B. ACHILLES TELECOORD)

DC/LA/PNC

C/PCS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/SB - R. BERG IN DRAFT
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY:

14-00000

DISSEM BY 25 PER TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA AT 2040

ACTION UNIT C/LA8

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR C/LPBAMS, C/CI4, C/CA3, C/PCS/LIT64, C/PCS, C/EPS/EG2, C/CA/SOG3

T 492519 EIA167 PAGE 01 IN 142668

TOR:322025Z DEC 76 SAGO 35714

S E C R E T 302200Z DEC 76 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 35714

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

REF: DIRECTOR 931119

1. FOR THE MOST PART INFO ON LETELIER CASE NO LONGER FORTHCOMING. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. AREAS THAT SHOULD BE CHECKED ARE INACCESSABLE TO STATION.

2. ALTHOUGH STATION HAS NO HARD EVIDENCE. WE BELIEVE THAT AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE (DIRECION DE INTELIGENCIA DE LA FUERZA AEREA - DIFA) AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE (DINE) WARRANT A CLOSER LOOK. IN RELATION TO THEIR POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN LETELIER ASSASSINATION.

3. THE FOLLOWING ARE GLEANINGS ELICTED FROM VARIOUS SOURCES DURING THE LAST FOUR WEEKS:

A. THE GENERAL PRATTS BOMBING IN ARGENTINA WAS PROBABLY THE WORK OF DINE. (SOURCE: LT. COLONEL JUAN-BALDLAS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF DINA: TO STATION OFFICER.)

B. APPROXIMATELY 25 DAYS PRIOR TO PRATTS

201-299292

SECRET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-299292 DO NOT DESTROY

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	STAFF 1 4 2 5 3 6
ACTION #			

T 492519 EIA187 PAGE 02 IN 142668

TOR:302025Z DEC 76 SAGO 35714

ASSASSINATION DINE REQUESTED THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE A FULL CASING REPORT ON PRATTS, TO INCLUDE HOME ADDRESS IN BUENOS AIRES, HIS DAILY MOVEMENTS, ETC. (SOURCE: FUDOUBLE-56). (PRATTS KILLING MENTIONED HERE BECAUSE OF LEGATT STATEMENT THAT THERE MANY SIMILARITIES IN PRATTS BOMBING WITH THAT OF LETELIER CASE.)

C. APPROXIMATELY 2 TO 3 WEEKS PRIOR TO LETELIER KILLING, CHIEF OF DIFA ASKED SOURCE RHETORICAL QUESTION AS TO HOW ONE WOULD REIMBURSE A HIT MAN. (SOURCE: FUDOUBLE -58)

D. ON 29 DECEMBER FUDOUBLE-56 EXPLAINED POSSIBLE REASON FOR RAPID COOLING OF ATTITUDE OF INVESTIGATIVE POLICE (DIRECION GENERAL DE INVESTIGACIONES - DGI) TOWARDS U.S. EMBASSY AND DEA AGENTS. IMMEDIATELY AFTER LETELIER KILLING DGI INITIATED INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE ACTIVITIES OF ORLANDO BOSCH DURING HIS 1975 STAY IN SANTIAGO. FUBARGAIN-1 LEARNED OF INVESTIGATION AND APPARENTLY WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN ORDERS FROM PRESIDENT'S OFFICE INSTRUCTING DGI CEASE INVESTIGATION IMMEDIATELY AND AT SAME TIME NOT TO DISCUSS CASE WITH ANY AMERICAN - OFFICIAL OR OTHERWISE. FUDOUBLE-56 CONTINUED THAT AT TIME HE WAS

SECRET

SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF . FILE . VR .

ACTION #

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 492519 EIA167 PAGE 03 IN 142668

TOR:302025Z DEC 76 SAGO 35714

UNAWARE OF ABOVE ORDERS AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (SIN) WAS IN FACT CONDUCTING ITS OWN INVESTIGATION ON BOSCH. BEFORE THEY CEASED WORKING THE CASE SIN HAD DETERMINED THAT BOSCH APPARENTLY HAD EXTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH DIFA (NOT DINA AS MANY HAD PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED) AND IN FACT DIFA WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING HIM WITH MOST OR ALL OF HIS FALSE CHILEAN DOCUMENTATION. IN SUPPORT OF ABOVE THESIS IS PREVIOUS STATION REPORTING CONCERNING REPRESSIVE ACTIONS WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY THOUGHT TO BE WORK OF DINA BUT SUBSEQUENTLY PROVEN TO BE DIFA.

4. NOTE: APPRECIATE FACT THAT ABOVE NOT HARD EVIDENCE BUT ALL OF ABOVE WERE DROPPED IN CASUAL DISCUSSIONS AND DUE TO CHILEAN SENSITIVITIES CASE OFFICER FELT ANY ATTEMPT TO PROBE FOR SPECIFICS WOULD HAVE BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

5. UNLESS HQS OBJECTS STATION PLANS DISCUSS ABOVE POINTS WITH BUENOS AIRES LEGATT DURING HIS NEXT VISIT TO SANTIAGO."

6. FILE: 200-12-200/1. E2 IMPDET

14-00000

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-0299292 022-009-028
SEX M CIOL-00445/76
23 DEC 76
P2

LOC DOMR.
SUMMARY OF INFO TO FBI AND ARMY
INTELL-TERRORIST PLOTTING BY CUBAN EXILES.

DATE 29 JUL 77 19526953

201-299292

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

TRANSMITTAL SLIP | **DATE**

TO:

ROOM NO. | **BUILDING**

REMARKS:

C/LA/SB________ ✓
DC/LA/SB________ ______
~~C/LA/SB/AR~~________ ______
[illegible]________ wt Pat Ed
C/LA/[illegible]/UP________ ______
LA/SB Scc'y________ ______

Bosh Info

OM:

NO. | **BUILDING** | **EXTENSION**

241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

14-00000

SECRET

(CLASSIFY IF APPROPRIATE WHEN FILLED IN)

CAUTION - Blank form requires secure storage in field.

TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

DATE 16 December 1976

TO	FROM	
Chief, LA Division FUDWELL	ACOS, Guatemala City	№ 180212

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	REMARKS
	Copy of ESMIDWAY-3 report on	
	Orlando BOSCH h/w. Report	
	received from COS, Tegucigalpa	
	at Station's request.	
		Cecil R. KLEINBECKER

1236a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(CLASSIFY IF APPROPRIATE WHEN FILLED IN)

(10-47)

14-00000

H/W Attachment to
TM 180212, 16 Dec 76

Informe Noviembre 22 de 1976

[redacted]

Respecto a sus instrucciones de indogar sobre las actividades de Orlando Boch durante sus visitas a Guatemala, paso a informarle lo siguiente.

El Embajador de Costa Rica en Honduras, Eduin Góngora, me dijo (21 de noviembre) que a principios de este año recibió de su Gobierno instrucciones de averiguar cuales eran sus contactos en Guatemala. Dijo que el propio ministro de relaciones exteriores de Costa Rica, Gonzalo Faccio, le había mostrado un documento procedente de la CIA (estas fueron sus palabras) en el cual se demostrabaja que Boch había tenido relaciones en Guatemala con el hijo del ex-presidente Arana, Jorge Roberto Arana España (Tito).

Agregó Góngora que era muy probable que el contacto entre Boch y Tito Arana se hubiera hecho por medio de los cubanos Gerardo Sampedro y Moreira, con quienes el segundo tiene negocios.

Recuerdo que, efectivamente, cuando Góngora me habló de este asunto, a principios de este año (más o menos en mayo) me mencionó la circunstancia de que Faccio fué a Guatemala para comunicar al canciller guatemalteco, Adolfo Molina Orantes, los temores del Gobierno costarricense por las actividades de Boch. Góngora recordó en nuestra última conversación que tal visita había coincidido con el atentado de que fué víctima Tito Arana y que, inclusive se mencionó que una cosa y la otra podrían estar relacionadas: sus contactos con Boch y el atentado.

Comentó Góngora también que Tito Arana hacía frecuentes viajes a Miami, donde es posible -dijo- que hubiera hecho amistad con otros cubanos anticastristas residentes allí.

Agregó Góngora que cuando se le comunicó de parte de su gobierno este asunto, recuerda haber escuchado que el otro hijo del expresidente Arana (Carlitos) tambiénn estaba relacionado con las actividades subversivas contra Oduber. Comentó que Carlitos es aviador y pudo haber ofrecido ayuda aerea, mediante sus amigos que tiene en las FAG.

Dice Góngora que Faccio le mencionó también la posibilidad de que Boch hubiera tenido conección con el vicepresidente guatemalteco, Mario Sandoval Alarcón, pero que se carecía de pruebas sobre ello. Me dijo ahora que el Presidente Laugerud le ofreció a Faccio poner freno a esas actividades y que desde enconces no ha recibido ninguna otra instrucción de su Gobierno, por lo que supone que Laugerud cumplió su promesa. Cree Góngora que desde entonces (mayo de este año) Boch no volvió a Guatemala.

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 15 DECEMBER 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA- PAROLE VIOLATOR

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

STATE CABLE

FROM SECSTATE WASHDC (STATE 303401)

DATE: 15 DECEMBER 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: REQUEST TO INTERROGATE BOSCH

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY Q PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 29-1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA8	INFO	RF, FILE, VR, PLANS, NE8, ACS/ITC4, C/PCS, AGC/DDO, DDO 3, CI4, EA8/EG2.	1 ___ 4 ___ 2 ___ 5 ___ 3 ___ 6 ___

T 457046 EIA480 PAGE 01 IN 129501

TOR:141905Z DEC 76 SDOM 17922

SECRET 141845Z DEC 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17922

TO: DIRECTOR, CARACAS.

WNINTEL MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 3290 (IN 043608)

1. AT 13 DECEMBER MEETING, EMFETCH-8 (IDENTITY FOR CARACAS) SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD "BY AN ACTIVE SUPPORTER OF CORU" THAT PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ OF VENEZUELA WAS KNOWLEDGEABLE AND IN FAVOR OF CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ACTIONS. UNNAMED SOURCE FEELS PEREZ TURNED ON ORLANDO BOSCH BECAUSE HE FEARED BECOMING TARRED BY INTERNATIONAL PRESS WITH COMPLICITY IN CUBAN RIGHTIST ACTIONS. SOURCE "BELIEVES" CORU MAY TAKE REPRISAL ACTION AGAINST VENEZUELA BECAUSE OF BOSCH ARREST.

2. EMFETCH8 WAS ASKED TO QUERY SOURCE ON HIS KNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE CORU PLANNING. (STATION BELIEVES EMFETCH-8'S SOURCE IS EITHER RAUL OR LUCIANO RODRIGUEZ PORTUONDO.)

3. FILE: 201-742365, 201-299292. E2 IMPDET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

14-00000

19-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE OF PAGES 1 (C.H)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP 072110Z
CITE CIA
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 967391

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/IP/DMS, C/LSN/ID, C/PCS, C/PCS/ITC2, AGC/DDO, D/OMS2, C/CI2

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SOP
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 30 15

#132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R. K. MCHARGUE/GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION. Y

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONRTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS Y

FIRCI-312/00159-77 Y

SUBJECT: BOMBING OF FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES; TRAVEL OF GUILLERMO NOVO TO CHILE IN LATE 1974. Y

THIS CABLE IS ~~[illegible]~~ IN RESPONSE TO ~~A REQUEST MADE BY THE [illegible] U.S. ATTORNEY [illegible] DECEMBER [illegible] AN~~D A MEMORANDUM FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI, DATED 17 DECEMBER 1976, FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING FOREIGN TRAVEL OF GUILLERMO NOVO AND JOSE DIONISIO SUAREZ. THIS AGENCY HAS ALREADY FORWARDED TO YOU ~~ADDITIONAL~~ INFORMATION CONCERNING ~~[illegible] TRAVEL OF~~ OF NOVO.

3. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH TWO: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REBPORTS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN NATIONALS, INCLUDING ~~THOSE~~ MEMBERS OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-Bosch

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 016958

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

DMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

DIRECTOR

967391

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

2. ON 2 DECEMBER 1974 ORLANDO BOSCH AND GUILLERMO NOVA BOTH CUBAN EXILE LEADERS, TRAVELED TO CHILE FROM VENEZUELA AT THE INVITATION OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. ANOTHER ASSOCIATE OF BOSCH, JOSE DIONISIO SUAREZ ESQUIVEL, DID NOT ACCOMPANY THEM FROM VENEZUELA BECAUSE HE WAS UNABLE TO GET A VISA TO CHILE AS HE STILL HELD CUBAN CITIZENSHIP. Y

3. THE ABOVE SURFACED DURING A RECHECK OF AGENCY RECORDS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT YOUR AGENCY HAS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE [illegible] TRAVEL OF BOSCH TO CHILE. Y

4. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.H

BASED ON: HVCA-20698, 13 DECEMBER 1976
WKSCARLET {WKSCARLET-9}
OBJ: J

FILE: 200-12-200/1
201-299292

C/LA/OPS {L. LASER IN DRAFT}

DATE: 7 JAN 77
ORIG: MARY GINN/JC
UNIT: LA/SB/CH/RR
EXT: 1471

AGC/DDO {TONY GOLDIN IN DRAFT}

CI/RSA {B. ACHILLES TELECOORD}

DC/LA/PNC

C/PCS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/SB - R. BERG IN DRAFT
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

15-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

072325Z

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

954250

CONF: LAS INFO: FILE IP/AMS, PCS/ITC4, NE4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: P
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: MANAGUA. Y

UNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE Y

REF: MANAGUA 12617 [IN 119265] Y

1. BELIEVE SUBJECT PARA 3(A) REF IDENTICAL TO ERNESTINO (ERNESTO) CECILIO ABREU HORTA (201-327664) BORN 11 NOVEMBER 1924 IN AMARILLAS, MATANZAS, CUBA. CUBAN CHEMIST WITH LONG ASSOCIATION WITH MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MRR - CUBAN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY GROUP) DURING EARLY 1960'S. WAS MRR COORDINATOR IN MATANZAS PROVINCE WHERE HE ORGANIZED GUERRILLA MOVEMENT PRIOR TO BAY OF PIGS INVASION. MANAGED TO ESCAPE ARREST/CAPTURE BY CASTRO FORCES THROUGH ASYLUM IN VENEZUELAN EMBASSY, HAVANA. FIRST ARRIVED IN U.S. AT MIAMI ON 10 AUG 61 AFTER TWO MONTH STAY IN VENEZUELA. POA GRANTED 2 AUG 62 FOR INTENDED USE AS MEMBER MRR INFILTRATION TEAM INTO ORIENTE, CUBA BUT MIAMI STATION DECIDED SUBJECT MORE FAMILIAR WITH MATANZAS PROVINCE THAN TARGET AREA. POA REINSTATED 27 JUN 63 TO ALLOW BASIC TRADECRAFT AND PARAMILITARY TRAINING WITH VIEW TOWARDS MAKING SUBJECT TRAINING INSTRUCTOR FOR MRR CADRE. IN OCTOBER 1963 SUBJECT TRAVELED TO NICARAGUA WHERE HE ESTABLISHED TWO MRR CAMPS AND TRAINED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

file
[illegible] FOR
201- 292292
DO NOT DESTROY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 026090

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF 2

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

954250

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

100 CUBAN EXILES. HE DEPARTED NICARAGUA FOR MIAMI ON 11 APR 65 AFTER RECEIVING ORDERS FROM MANUEL ARTIME (SECY GEN MRR) TO ABANDON ALL MRR ACTIVITIES SINCE PLANS TO OVERTHROW CASTRO REGIME HAD COMPLETELY FAILED. THERE NO FURTHER REPORTING IN FILE OR EVIDENCE OF RENEWED AGENCY CONTACT WITH SUBJECT. 1971 NICARAGUAN TELEPHONE DIRECTORY LISTS SUBJECT RESIDING MANS TEIDELINDA 3 C S 2 C O AND TELEPHONE NO. 2-6860. NO INFO AVAILABLE IN FILE INDICATING SUBJECT IS U.S. PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER E. O. 11905. Y

2. THERE ARE NO IDENTIFIABLE HEADQUARTERS TRACES ON ALBERTO CRESPO MOLINA. Y

3. FILE: 201-271764, 201-299292, 201-327664. E2 IMPDET.H

LA/COMMENT: REQUESTED TRACES ON TWO CUBAN EXILES LIVING IN NICARAGUA.

DATE: 7 DECEMBER 1976
ORIG: E. CHARLES PAYNE/PM
UNIT: LA/MBCAM/CN
EXT: X9041

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

LA/COG

C/PCS/ITC
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/MBCAM
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 026090

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 47 PER

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

TOTAL COPIES 32-2 RUN BY JJ

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

REPRODU ISSUING

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR iRDDMS NE8 AGC/DDO DDO3 PCS/ITC4 C/PCS EPS/EG2 C14 SIA/IC SIA/EZ SIA

STAFF 1 2 3

T 430301 EIA671 PAGE 01

TOR:032157Z DEC 76 IN 11

MANA 1

SECRET 032134Z DEC 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12617

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REF: MANAGUA 12616 (119258)

1. ACCORDING TO ERHAPPY-1 (E-1), ERNESTO ABREU (NO STATION TRACES) IS THE LEADER OF THE CUBAN ACTIVISTS RESIDENT IN NICARAGUA, AND WAS THE LOCAL CONTACT FOR ORLANDO BOSCH WHEN THE LATTER VISITED MANAGUA IN SEPTEMBER 1976 (SEE MANAGUA 12460 AND PRIOR REFS). ABREU TOLD E-1 THAT HE SET UP MEETING BETWEEN BOSCH AND ERACORN-1 DURING WHICH BOSCH ASKED FOR UNSPECIFIED HELP FOR HIS CAUSE. ABREU TOLD E-1 THAT ERACORN-1 WAS FRIENDLY TOWARD BOSCH, BUT WAS NON-COMMITAL ON THE SUBJECT OF AID.

2. E-1 ADDED THAT HE HAD ONE BRIEF SOCIAL CONTACT WITH BOSCH IN MANAGUA, AND ALSO KNEW THAT FRANK CASTRO PAZ WAS WITH BOSCH.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON FOLLOWING CUBAN EXILES RESIDENT NICARAGUA:

A. ERNESTO ABREU: ACCORDING TO E-1, ABREU WAS AN

CIC FOR 299292 DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

201-

FORM 3020
7-71 MFG 7/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES: 17

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR
ACTION #		

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 450301 EIA871 PAGE 02-02 IN 119265

TOR:032157Z DEC 76 MANA 12617

ON-ISLAND ASSET AT THE TIME OF THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION WHO TOOK ASYLUM AFTER THE OPERATION FAILED. HE IS CURRENTLY RUNNING RICE PLANTATIONS AND PROCESSING PLANTS BELONGING TO THE ERACORN-1 FAMILY.

B. ALBERTO CRESPO MOLINA: SELF-EMPLOYED RICE JOBBER.

4. FILE: 201-271764, 201-299292. E2. IMPDET.

14-00000

Pat

US News & World Report Dec 6, 76

SPECIAL REPORT

Cuban Extremists in U.S. A GROWING TERROR THREAT



201-Bosch

Out from Miami spreads a wave of violence. Terrorists' aim is to topple Castro, free Cuba. Nearly all Cuban refugees share this dream. But the acts of a few zealots create trouble for fellow exiles and for the U.S.

Reported from
MIAMI and WASHINGTON

Terrorism by radical Cuban refugees has become a thorny problem in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and, in the view of some authorities, a potential threat to the lives of American leaders.

The terrorists' goal is to wrest control of Cuba away from its Communist dictator, Fidel Castro.

In pursuit of that goal, they have blazed a trail of violence from Miami across the Caribbean Sea, not only to Cuba but also to Mexico, Barbados, Jamaica and Panama—even across the South Atlantic to Argentina.

They have engaged in a series of bombings in the U.S. and abroad. They have carried out military-style attacks on Communist ships. They are strongly suspected of several killings.

A federal grand jury in Miami is investigating their activities and their leaders.

Now, as a new Administration prepares to take over in Washington, it is feared that the Cuban terrorists will step up their attacks in an effort to thwart any turn toward reconciliation with Castro.

Officials familiar with their operations warn that some of the Cuban extremists will stop at nothing, not even at assassinating members of the Carter Administration.

"The Cuban terrorists are the most highly trained assassins in the world today," says one U.S. official.

Many of the terrorists were trained by the Central Intelligence Agency in the days when this country was trying to overthrow Castro, or kill him.

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee recently held hearings on the Cuban-terrorist threat. It heard this testimony from Lt. Thomas Lyons, head of a special antiterrorist squad of the Dade County public safety department in Miami, where Cuban refugees are concentrated:

Dr. Orlando Bosch, an anti-Castro leader, is accused in plane bombing fatal to 73.

"The overwhelming majority of the Cubans in Miami are strongly anti-Castro. That's why they came to Miami in the first place. They are also law-abiding citizens who, with minor exceptions, manifest their opposition to Castro in legal ways.

"However, there are a small number of individuals whose hatred of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and Communism has led them to engage in extralegal actions and to violate the laws of the country which gave them sanctuary. These individuals use Dade County as a base for international terrorism ... against governments allied with Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purported Communists and individuals who take a stand against their terrorist-type attacks. ...

"Some Cuban groups purporting to be involved in terrorist-type attacks against the Cuban Government are no more or no less than outright criminals, feeding upon the Cuban population and diverting the collected funding for their own purposes."

Other investigators charge that the terrorists, to finance their crusade, have dealt in cocaine and prostitution and in extortion from wealthy fellow refugees.

The number of hard-core terrorists is small, officially estimated at fewer than 300. But their reach is wide. In this year alone they have either bragged about or been accused of such acts as

- Machine-gun attacks on the high seas against vessels from Cuba and other Communist nations.
- Bombing a wide variety of targets in the United States, Latin America and Portugal.
- Planting a bomb that caused the crash of a Cubana Airlines plane near Barbados on October 6, with the loss of 73 lives.
- Possible involvement in the still-unsolved bomb death of

CUBAN EXTREMISTS

[continued from preceding page]

a former Chilean Ambassador in Washington, D.C., on September 21.

- Kidnaping two Cuban officials in Argentina.
- Attempting to kidnap a Cuban consul in Mexico.

Who are these terrorists? What motivates them? How do they operate? And why are U.S. officials so concerned about what they may do in the future?

To answer such questions, Orr Kelly and Carl J. Migdail of the *U.S. News & World Report* staff dug deeply into the records, interviewed Cuban refugees who share the hopes though not the methods of the terrorists, and talked to law-enforcement officials who are trying to stem the violence.

BREEDING GROUND FOR TERRORISM

After Fidel Castro took over Cuba in 1959 and it became apparent that he intended to establish a Communist state, 800,000 Cubans "voted with their feet" and fled their homeland. Some 600,000 of them settled in the United States. They and their children now total 750,000. Most of them live in the Miami area.

The majority of these immigrants are law abiding. But Miami's "Little Havana" provides a culture in which the virus of violence can grow.

"In Miami," explains one refugee leader, "the Cubans keep their national identity, their heritage, traditions, hatreds—and their hopes of going back to their homeland. And they know they can't go back until Castro is gone. So they dream of toppling Castro. What is clearly unrealistic in other places in the United States seems very possible in the atmosphere in Miami."

In the early 1960s, the overthrow of Castro seemed to the Cubans in exile to be not only possible but almost inevitable. It was U.S. policy to drive him from power. There was an attempt to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 with an army of Cuban exiles recruited and trained in secret by the CIA. The invaders were not given the air cover necessary for a successful attack, and the operation was a disaster. Only 180 of about 1,300 invaders escaped death or capture. The Cubans felt betrayed.

Then came other American moves against Castro. There was a secret "Operation Mongoose," which included efforts to assassinate the Cuban leader. The United States backed an economic blockade of Cuba in an attempt to prevent Castro from obtaining sorely needed supplies and equipment from abroad. Later, Cuban refugees were used to carry out secret operations not only in the Caribbean but also in other parts of Latin America—and even in Africa.

To many Cuban refugees, attacking Castro and Communism became a way of life.

Since then, however, American policy has failed to match in intensity the fierce anti-Castro passion of the more militant refugees. In recent years, prominent members of the U.S. Senate have visited Cuba. In 1973, Cuba made an agreement with the United States to curb the airplane hijackers who had been using Cuba as asylum. There were moves on both sides toward normalization of relations between Cuba and the U.S.

As their hopes of American action against Castro ebbed, some Cuban refugees turned to violence on their own. The box on this page gives the chronology of developments.

TERRORIST LEADERS AND TACTICS

Though their numbers are small, the 300 or fewer active terrorists have organized themselves into many groups. Slogans of one group chalked on the walls in "Little Havana" have barely begun to fade before they are replaced by the

EXILES vs. CASTRO— *A Relentless Pursuit*

On Jan. 1, 1959, Fidel Castro took power and the first wave of refugees fled Cuba. A small number of the 600,000 exiles who settled in the U.S. have become extremists.

Highlights of events in those 18 years, some involving law-abiding exiles, others involving the extremists—

1961: A 1,300-man Cuban Brigade, armed and trained by the U.S. in Florida, Guatemala and Nicaragua, landed at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's south shore. The invasion was a failure.

1962: Survivors of the Bay of Pigs were released by Castro after payment of a 53-million-dollar ransom in drugs, food, medical equipment and other supplies from "private contributions." President John F. Kennedy, in Miami, pledged to the Cuban exiles that the Brigade flag would one day fly over a liberated Cuba.

U.S. launched its secret "Operation Mongoose"—a plan to use Cuban exiles in paramilitary war against Castro while U.S. maintained an economic blockade to shake the island's economy. The attacks generally failed.

1964: Cuban extremists in New York City fired a mortar shell at United Nations as Cuba's Ché Guevara addressed the General Assembly.

1967: Cuban exile specialists and U.S.-trained Bolivian troops trapped and killed Guevara and some of his Communist guerrillas in Bolivia.

1968-72: Cuban-exile extremists bombed ships of nations considered to be friendly to Castro, terrorized other exiles to keep them in line.

1972: Cuban exiles trained by Central Intelligence Agency took part in Watergate break-in, later testified that they thought it would help their anti-Castro campaign.

1973: U.S. and Cuba signed agreement aimed at controlling hijacking of aircraft and piracy of ships at sea.

1974-76: Cuban extremists exploded more than 100 bombs in Miami area in two-year period, hitting offices of the FBI, a State attorney and the Miami police department.

Exile terrorists attacked airline offices and consulates of governments that have diplomatic relations with Castro. Bombings took place in Jamaica, Mexico, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Panama, other countries.

Fishing boats based in Cuba and Soviet cargo ships were attacked by high-speed motor launches manned by exile extremists.

Terror reached its peak with the bomb sabotage of a Cuban airliner and the death of 73 passengers and crew last October 6 near Barbados. Police seized Cuban exiles in Caracas, Venezuela, on suspicion of involvement in the sabotage. Castro canceled U.S.-Cuba hijacking agreement.

slogans and initials of yet another group. Among groups named in testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee are: Accion Cubana, or Cuban Action; Alpha 66, a name adopted when victory in 1966 seemed possible; FLNC, standing for Frente de Liberacion Nacional de Cuba, which means Cuban National Liberation Front, and Pragmatistas, which means what it sounds like—pragmatists.

A group calling itself Zero issued a "death list" of people marked for killing and, according to officials, several persons on the list soon died violent deaths.

Dade County's antiterrorist head, Lieutenant Lyons, says he has stopped trying to keep track of the groups and instead concentrates on trying to solve the crimes that they are suspected of having committed. He has no shortage of business. Here is a sample of the violence attributed to terrorists in the last two years:

- Since February, 1975, there have been at least seven assassination attempts directed against refugee leaders who were viewed as opponents of the terrorists' tactics. Three men were shot to death. One was killed by a bomb. Three other attempted killings failed, but a prominent radio broadcaster lost both legs below the knees when a bomb ripped his car apart.
- On Dec. 3-4, 1975, bombs blasted the Miami office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a Social Security office, a State unemployment office, two post offices, a bank, a State attorney's office and the Miami police-department headquarters. A man accused of those bombings, and also the bombing of the Miami International Airport two months earlier, was acquitted recently in a federal court. He is to be tried again in a State court.
- A number of bombs have been exploded in New York. One blew out the window of the Venezuelan consulate on Fifth Avenue, across the street from St. Patrick's Cathedral.
- On Feb. 12, 1976, a Soviet freighter, the *Dzhordano Bruno*, was sitting motionless 35 miles off Cuba's north coast while its tanks were being cleaned. Suddenly a small boat raced close to the freighter and raked it with heavy machine-gun fire. No one was injured.
- On April 6, 1976, two Cuban fishing boats were attacked and a fisherman was killed.
- On Sept. 21, 1976, in Washington, D.C., a bomb exploded in a car and killed Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean Ambassador to the U.S. under the Marxist regime of the late President Salvador Allende. Although the crime is officially unsolved, there have been persistent reports that the bomb was planted by Cuban terrorists as a "favor" to the secret police of the present anti-Communist Government in Chile.

NEW TERRORIST STRATEGY

Leaders of the terrorist bands are hard to identify. But one man has emerged as an apparent leader: Dr. Orlando Bosch, a pediatrician. He was caught firing a bazooka at a Polish ship in Miami harbor in 1968 and was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Dr. Bosch was released on parole after four years, but he reportedly returned to the movement. He is now under arrest in Venezuela, charged along with three other men in connection with the Cuban airliner bombing. Dr. Bosch is described as the leader of the group calling itself Accion Cubana.

In June of this year, Dr. Bosch called a small group of his fellow activists together in the Dominican Republic. They were sharply divided on policy and strategy.

Some wanted to avoid the risks of further attacks in the United States and to concentrate their efforts against Castro outside this country. Others held out for continuing their activities both here and abroad.

After a heated argument, a shaky agreement was reached to focus their efforts outside the U.S. To direct the activities, a new group was formed with the initials CORU, which stand for Coordinacion de Organizaciones Revolucionaires Unidas in Spanish or Co-ordinating Committee of United Revolutionary Organizations in English.



Automobile bombing that killed a Cuban refugee in Miami is one of many unsolved crimes attributed to anti-Castro terrorists.

American law-enforcement officials say that members of CORU have the backing of powerful forces, perhaps even the governments themselves, in some countries of Latin America. The terrorists are described as "at home" in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Chile. They are well armed for terroristic acts, as shown in the box on page 32.

Since the June meeting, a new wave of terrorism has swept across the Caribbean and beyond. Bombs have damaged Cuban airline facilities in Barbados, Jamaica and Panama. Two Cuban officials were kidnaped in Argentina.

On July 23, three men who had flown from Miami carrying three coffee cans filled with plastic explosive attempted to kidnap Cuban Consul Daniel Ferrer Fernandez in Mérida, Mexico. He escaped, but a Cuban fisheries expert was killed.

The most serious act of terrorism came on October 6, when a Cubana Airlines DC-8 exploded in flight shortly after taking off from Barbados. The plane fell into the sea, killing 73 persons including members of the Cuban national fencing team.

In messages to news media, both CORU and El Condor, a group unheard of previously, claimed responsibility for the crash of the plane.

Dr. Bosch, who has traveled freely on documents apparently provided by officials of Governments friendly to the anti-Castro movement, was picked up in Venezuela and on November 2 was charged with homicide in connection with the plane crash. Three other men are similarly charged.

The arrests of Dr. Bosch and his cohorts, instead of reducing terrorist violence, may actually stimulate more violence. El Condor, in a message to the United Press International on November 10, said the four men held by the Venezuelans are innocent and warned that, if they are convicted, planes of the Venezuelan International Airways will be attacked. On the same day, CORU sent a message saying it would join with the Honduran Anti-Communist Alliance in attacks on three airlines that plan excursion flights to Havana.

Roberto Carballo, a militant leader of veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion, denounced the threatened attacks. "It aids Castro by making all Cuban exiles look like mad bombers," Carballo said.

CRACKDOWN BY LAW OFFICERS

Since last spring, there has been a sharp reduction in terroristic violence in the Miami area. That may be as much due to a successful counterattack by law-enforcement agencies as to the policy that was adopted by CORU last June.

Early this year, an antiterrorist task force was organized. It

CUBAN EXTREMISTS

[continued from preceding page]

includes representatives from Dade County and Miami police, the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation is not formally a part of this task force, its agents work closely with it.

With co-operation from Cuban refugees who are sick of the terrorist violence, law officers have arrested a number of suspects. Police also have learned enough about other suspects so that their freedom to engage in new acts of violence can be limited even though there is not enough evidence to prosecute them.

A federal grand jury is interrogating witnesses who might have some knowledge of terror operations.

Efforts of law-enforcement officials to deal with the terrorist groups face formidable handicaps, however. The terrorists seem to know what police are doing. Lieutenant Lyons relates that one suspect "identified one of my officers who had never met him before, called him by name and told him what section he worked in and what his duties were."

Terrorists are protected by a web of old loyalties. Most of them worked at one time or another for the U.S. Government. Many have had several roles: members of the U.S. Army, CIA operatives and FBI informants. One refugee leader suggests that law-enforcement officials have not found the killers of Cubans "because they don't want to."

A further complication is the heavy infiltration of the terrorist movement by members of Castro's intelligence corps. They not only gather intelligence but sometimes act as *agents provocateurs*, instigating terrorist acts designed to discredit the refugees and influence American policy.

The Cuban Prime Minister has "surfaced" enough of such agents to reveal their pattern of operation. Early this year, for example, Manuel de Armas, a Cuban refugee who was named in Senate committee testimony as having been involved in terrorist activities in Miami, showed up in Havana. In an April 22 broadcast by Radio Havana, De Armas said that he had supplied the explosives used in the killing of a man named Rolando Masferrer and that a CIA agent had provided him with the explosives.

In a speech on October 15, Castro boasted of a double agent who Castro claimed had passed on coded instructions from the CIA. Said Castro: "From the very moment when he was recruited by the CIA and over a period of 10 years, the supposed agent has kept the Cuban Government fully informed of all his contacts with [the CIA] and of the equipment and instructions he has received."

Castro blamed the CIA for the airliner bombing and other acts of violence. "Who else but the CIA . . . can carry out these acts?" Castro asked.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has flatly denied U.S. involvement in the airliner bombing. He said: "I can state categorically that no official of the United States Government, nobody paid by the American Government, nobody in contact with the American Government has had anything to do with this crash of the airliner. We consider actions like this totally reprehensible."

The CIA declines to discuss Cuban refugee terrorism. Officials of other Government agencies say they seriously doubt that the CIA, after all the criticism it has received for some of its earlier activities, is still involved in operations against the Castro regime. However, the agency is described as providing very little help in combatting the terrorist groups. "We have absolutely no contact with the CIA," says Lieutenant Lyons. "I'd like to, but they don't talk to us." One reason for that attitude may be that laws bar the CIA from domestic law-enforcement activities.

Other laws, or the lack of them, also complicate the fight against the terrorists. U.S. agencies cannot become involved in investigations of terrorism outside the United States unless the crime involves violations of neutrality laws making it illegal to conspire in this country to commit crimes abroad or to export arms without a license.

Although shocked by the October 6 airliner bombing, U.S. officials reluctantly decided there was no authorization for the FBI to enter that case.

With such handicaps as these, law-enforcement officials say they can look forward to only limited success against the terrorists. Any real solution to the problem must come from within the Cuban refugee community—and investigators state that the co-operation they get there does not extend to cases of violence committed outside the U.S.

WHAT HAVE TERRORISTS GAINED?

As officials size up the effects of the terrorist campaign: The only tangible accomplishment has been to push Castro into renouncing the antihijacking treaty, thus discouraging efforts toward a diplomatic reconciliation between the United States and Cuba.

Despite all the terrorist plots and attacks, Castro remains firmly seated as head of a Communist regime in Cuba. And it appears to the refugees almost inevitable that the movement toward some kind of accommodation with Castro will be resumed by American policy makers. Throughout "Little Havana," the fear is widespread that Jimmy Carter, when he becomes President, will give new impetus to this movement, and that their homeland will never be liberated from Communist rule.

To both officials and Cuban refugee leaders, it seems inevitable that the terrorists will continue their attempts to keep the two countries apart by the only method they know—further acts of violence.

TERRORISTS' ARSENAL: PLANES TO CANNONS

One measure of the military equipment that is available to Cuban terrorists is provided by this partial inventory compiled by authorities:

- 10 or more high-speed motor launches about 30 feet long, with special fuel tanks for extra range
- A number of small, spotter aircraft
- Large-caliber recoilless rifles
- Missile-antitank weapons
- Wide assortment of smaller weapons
- Large quantities of C-4 explosives developed by the U.S. Army

A further measure comes from this tally of extremists' weapons confiscated by Miami law-enforcement officers so far in 1975-76:

- 1 20-mm cannon, with 100 rounds of explosive ammunition
- 498 submachine guns, 480 of them with silencers
- 62 explosive devices
- 3,265 pounds of dynamite and TNT
- 4 boxes of napalm
- 6 rifles
- 20 handguns
- Thousands of rounds of ammunition

The Senate created a commission to investigate terrorist activities, conspiracies to disrupt order and disrespect for authorities.

The commission will also submit to the Senate a bill to regulate the activities of the exile organizations and persons not subject to the control of the state.

Senator Hermogenes Lopez stated that the commission should also investigate the "300 Cubans who form part of the Cuban Embassy in Venezuela."

Organizations of exiles from Cuba, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Spain and Portugal are currently operating in Caracas.

CUBAN ANTI-CASTRO LEADER DENIES ACCUSATIONS

Madrid EFE in Spanish 1534 GMT 16 Nov 76 PA

[Text] Caracas, 16 Nov--The anti-Castro leader Orlando Bosch categorically denied he had planned the assassination of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, of Costa Rican Foreign Affairs Minister Gonzalo Facio and of Pascal Allende and his girl friend.

Bosch's denial was conveyed by his lawyer Francisco Leandro Mora, who said that his defendant "never talked to Facio and that when Pascal Allende arrived in Costa Rica, Bosch had been in this country for 40 days."

Bosch said: "Even if they try to make me look like a professional hoodlum, I am a gentleman who respects agreements." By this he meant that "he came to Venezuela sponsored by some influential personalities," Mora pointed out.

Mora also said: "As a politician, Bosch still does not understand what the plot is against him, in which Fidel's intelligence services show an interest in Kissinger's life and CIA agents are trying to destroy all those struggling against the Cuban regime."

Leandro Mora added that Bosch claims that he personally does not know Rolando Otero, a Cuban, also hired to kill Kissinger, according to reports from Miami, but that "he knows who he is."

Bosch is being prosecuted by Venezuelan authorities, presumably as the brain behind the sabotage of the Cuban plane which on 6 October exploded near Barbados killing 73 persons. Bosch claims he is innocent.

201-Bosch

PCC LEADER ACCUSES U.S. OF INTERVENTION IN L.A.

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 17 Nov 76 FL

[Text] PCC Central Committee member Raul Valdes Vivo, who is participating as a guest in the opening conference of autumn courses of the School of Economy of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, said in a lecture he gave today that the United States has intervened in Latin America with troops and capital.

This year's autumn courses of the Mexican university deal with the topic "World economy and social changes." In his speech, the chief of the PCC Central Committee Foreign Relations General Department pointed out that Mexico as a people and as a country has always defended the right of the Cuban people to choose its own path.

Valdes Vivo said that Cuba is building true socialism since it began to follow a process different from the one being followed to date by the other countries of the continent, a process which makes the right to self-determination a common cause for the rest of Latin America. Internationalism and its practice, Valdes Vivo said in his speech, has always been directed at--from the days of the Paris commune to the Spanish Civil War and to the Angolan conflict--giving support to peoples who struggle with their own strength for the continuation of their own history and against forces that have come from abroad sent by the enemies of those peoples.

Valdes Vivo affirmed that revolutions cannot be exported; nevertheless, the United States has intervened in Latin America with its troops and its dollars and has taken part of the territories of some countries, as in the case of Mexico.

GOVERNMENT HAS SUPPORT OF THE MASSES, SAYS OVALLE

Mexico City INFORMEX in Spanish to ANSA Buenos Aires 2131 GMT 16 Nov 76 FL

[Text] Mexico City, 16 Nov (ANSA--INFORMEX)--"The Mexican state does not control or manipulate the worker, peasant and popular sectors; on the contrary, it only has their support and that is why the government is not afraid of fascism," affirmed Ignacio Ovalle Fernandes, secretary of the presidency of the republic, who asked all Mexicans to stop listening to the rumors that are being spread throughout the country.

In statements made prior to the opening ceremony of the first international conference on the family, which is being held in this capital, Ovalle Fernandes warned that, in view of the consolidation of the popular base, any aggression of the minority classes will not have any possibility of success in Mexico.

$1.33-BILLION TRADE DEFICIT REPORTED

Mexico City INFORMEX in Spanish to ANSA Buenos Aires 2110 GMT 15 Nov 76 FL

[Text] Mexico City, 15 Nov (ANSA--INFORMEX)--Mexico's trade balance experienced a $1.33-billion deficit in the first 8 months of this year. This is contained in an Industry and Commerce Secretariat study which also discloses that growth in importations was similar to that during all of 1975.

As far as exports are concerned, the drop experienced in sugar exports should be pointed out. Sugar sales during the first 8 months of 1975 amounted to 1.979 billion pesos, while the figure was only 1,696 billion pesos for the same period this year. The increase in importations is based primarily on the acquisition of nondurable consumer goods, including condensed and evaporated milk, cereals, pharmaceutical products and alcoholic beverages.

FILE SEC DISSEM BY Y/ PER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION

INFO: FILE VR DDM8 NE8 AGC/DDO DDO3 PCS/ITC4 C/PCS CI4 EPS/EG2 CA/SOG4 SIA/FL SIA ADDO/O LSN/ID

T 415934 EIA758 PAGE 01 IN 115212

TOR: 302116Z NOV 76 SDON 17865

SECRET 302253Z NOV 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17885

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL MHSPIKE

REFS: A. SANTO DOMINGO 17881 (NOT NEEDED LA/MIAMI) (IN 115115)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17695 (IN 044891)

C. LA/MIAMI 25308 (IN 041641)

1. STATION IMPRESSION IS THAT DOMINICAN MILITARY (PARTICULARLY AIR FORCE) ARE WELL DISPOSED TOWARD CUBAN RIGHTIST TERRORISTS. EMDASH-3 WAS ASKED TO EXPLORE SUBJECT WITH EMFETCH-19 (E-19) AND FOLLOWING IS INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY HIM OVER LAST FEW WEEKS.

2. E-19 IS FRIENDLY WITH ORLANDO BOSCH, FRANK CASTRO AND OTHER CUBAN RIGHTISTS. E-19 SAYS HE HAS ALWAYS "COLLABORATED WITH THEM" BECAUSE THEY ARE FRIENDS OF THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE PARACHUTISTS (E-19 IS A PARACHUTIST, NOT A PILOT). E-19 ARRANGED (DATE UNKNOWN) FOR A NUMBER OF THESE CUBANS WHO HAD FORMED A PARACHUTIST CLUB KNOWN AS THE "HALCONES DORADOS", TO JUMP WITH THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE PARACHUTE BATALLION.

SECRET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-[illegible]
DO NOT DESTROY

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES________RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 419934 SIA758 PAGE 02 IN 115212

TOR:322116Z NOV 76 SDOM 17885

3. E-19 FOSTERED THE IDEA OF ASSIGNING AIR FORCE OFFICERS AS SECURITY GUARDS ON DOMINICANA AIRLINES FLIGHTS BECAUSE THEY COULD BE USED "PARA ENVIAR QUALQUIER MATERIAL." E-19 PERSONALLY INTRODUCTED AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT FRANCISCO ESTEVEZ RAMIREZ ALIAS PANCHO (DOMINICANA SECURITY GUARD PRESENTLY CUT ON BAIL IN MAIMI PENDING TRIAL ON ARMS SMUGGLING CHARGES) TO FRANK CASTRO. ESTEVEZ WAS USED MANY TIMES TO DELIVER ARMS AND PACKAGES TO "CASTRO'S GROUP" ON BEHALF OF E-19 AND THE AIR FORCE. THESE SAME CUBANS HAVE SOLD ARMS TO DOMINICAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS, INCLUDING COLONEL ISIDORO MARTINEZ, (AN INTIMATE FRIEND OF E-19), COLONEL CASTRO CRUZ AND COLONEL LUIS BEAUCHAMPS JAVIER (PRESIDENT OF DOMINICANA AIRLINES AND BROTHER OF SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE ARMED FORCES, GENERAL RENE BEAUCHAMPS JAVIER).

4. HQS MAY WISH PASS ABOVE INFO ON ACTIVITIES OF ESTEVEZ (AND PRESUMABLY OTHER DOMINICANA SECURITY GUARDS) TO FBI AND CUSTOMS. PLS ADVISE IF PASSED.

5. FILE: 201-742365, 201-299292, 201-869734, E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 3 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 8 /

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY
ISSUING OFFICE IS

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT 9LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/LA 9B/EC2 9CI4

STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

T 385422 EIA116 PAGE 01

TOR:162147Z NOV 76

IN 101997

CARA 31454

SECRET 162117Z NOV 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31454

TO: DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL WKBOXER

REFS: A. CARACAS 31443 (NOT SENT/NEEDED SANTIAGO) (IN 100628)

B. HVCT-7029, 16 NOVEMBER 1976

C. DIRECTOR 940767

1. REFERENCE B TRANSMITTED XEROX COPY OF COSTA RICAN PASSPORT ISSUED TO ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IN NAME CARLOS LUIS PANIAGUA MENDEZ WHICH IS LATEST TRAVEL DOCUMENT USED BY BOSCH. QUALITY OF XEROX IS UNFORTUNATELY NOT BEST AND SOME OF TRAVEL ENTRIES NOT COMPLETELY LEGIBLE. FORWARDING ANOTHER XEROX COPY OF ATTACHMENT TO REF B TO SANTIAGO UNDER TM 144725.

2. FILE: 201-0001113, E2, IMPDET.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- [illegible]
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

CAL

THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS. PROCESSING
☐ INDEXING REQUESTED
☐ NO INDEXING
☐ APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO: Chief of Station, San Jose

INFO.: Chief, Latin America Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: REAM/HUFABRIC/WKBOXER
Transmittal of Reference Passport

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: CARACAS 31443

WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Forwarded herewith is the Xerox copy of the passport mentioned in reference.

Frederick C. BRADSPIES

Attachment:
Passport Xerox Copy, h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - COS, San Jose, w/att h/w
② - C/LA, w/att h/w

E2 IMPDET

CHRONO

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HVCT-07029

DATE: 16 November 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

[illegible] 2-4

[illegible] PER -83741

TOTAL COPIES 38-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. 18/AN, DDO3, AGC/DDO, OPS/IT6 4, NE8, CI 4, PS/EG2, OS6, SOB, SIA2,

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 320732 EIA147 PAGE 01-01 IN 276533

TOR:211625Z OCT 76 SJOS 20031

SECRET 211541Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 20031

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL REAM HUFABRIC MHSPIKE

1. LOCAL LIAISON HAS REQUESTED STATION ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING DETAILS COSTA RICAN PASSPORT REPORTEDLY USED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA TO ENTER VENEZUELA. LIAISON HAS TRIED TO OBTAIN INFO DIRECTLY FROM VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES WITHOUT SUCCESS.

2. ANY DATA CARACAS MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ON THE COSTA RICAN PASSPORT WHICH MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON WILL BE APPRECIATED.

3. FILE: 201-300785, 18-6-20/3. E2 IMPDET

Copy to A7

CHRONO

** SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 29 PER

TOTAL COPIES 35-1 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

NOV 15 10 01 PM '76

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO		STAFF			
LA6	RF. FILE. VR. IPLAN, NE8,		1		4	
ACTION #	OPS/ITG4, DDO3, AGC/DDO,		2		5	
	CI4, C/OPS, PS/EG2, OSG		3		6	

T 382256 EIA004 PAGE 01-01 IN 100628

TOR:152214Z NOV 76 CARA 31443

S E C R E T 152153Z NOV 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31443

TO: SANJOSE INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL REAM MUFABRIC MHSPIKE

REF: SAN JOSE 20031 (IW076560)

1. POUCHING XEROX COPY OF REF PASSPORT WHICH FINALLY OBTAINED FROM WKSCARLET LIAISON 12 NOVEMBER. REGRET DELAY DUE NON-AVAILABILITY OF PASSPORT WHICH HAD BEEN IMPOUNDED FOR TRIAL EVIDENCE PURPOSES. WHEN PASSING XEROX COPY TO STATION, WKNOBLE-24 COMMENTED THAT COPY HAD ALREADY BEEN PASSED TO COSTA RICAN EMBASSY IN RESPONSE URGENT REQUEST FROM EMBASSY. WKNOBLE-24 HAS NO OBJECTION TO SAN JOSE STATION PASSAGE OF XEROX TO LOCAL LIAISON.

2. FILE: 201-0300765, 10-6-23/3, 82. IMPDET.

S E C R E T



Impresión pulgar derecho.
Thumb-print, right hand.

REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA

PASAPORTE
(PASSPORT)

LA DIRECCION GENERAL DE MIGRACION
DEL MINISTERIO DE SEGURIDAD PUBLICA

Suplica a las autoridades civiles y militares
Requests the civil and military authorities of the countries

de los países por donde transite el portador,
through which the bearer travels, to provide

no le pongan obstáculo y le presten ayuda y protección en caso necesario.
assistance without delay or hindrance and protection as may be necessary.

20 Páginas 20 Pages



No. DEL PASAPORTE 2446-71

Nombre del portador
Bearer's name Carlos Luis Paniagua Méndez

Nacionalidad
Nationality Costarricense Estatura
Height 1.75 M.

Domicilio
Address Alajuela. C.R.

Fecha de nacimiento
Date of birth 27 Agosto 1935

Profesión u Oficio
Profession or occupation Comerciante

Cédula de Identidad No
Identification card 1-241-109

Estado civil
Married or single Soltero Color Blanco

Peculiaridades físicas
Physical scars and Marks

Dado en
Given at } SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

a los 18 días del mes de Febrero
The of
de 1971
of

Válido hasta
Valid until 18 Febrero 1973

Pudiendo ser renovado a su vencimiento hasta completar diez años

Director General de Migración

PERSONAS INCLUIDAS EN ESTE PASAPORTE
PERSONS INCLUDED IN THIS PASSPORT

1. Nombre de la esposa
Wife's name

Cédula de Identidad
Identification card

2. Nombre del niño
Child's name

Fecha de nacimiento
Date of birth

3. Nombre del niño
Child's name

Fecha de nacimiento
Date of birth

4. Nombre del niño
Child's name

Fecha de nacimiento
Date of birth

FOTOGRAFIA
Photograph

CR
San José, Costa Rica

Firma del Portador
Bearer's Signature

REVALIDACIONES
ALIDATIONS

ado el / ated on } 11. Set. 74

} 11-Set-76

Director General de Migración

Revalidado el / Revalidated on }

Válido hasta / Valid until }

Director General de Migración

Revalidado el / Revalidated on }

Válido hasta / Valid until }

Director General de Migración

Revalidado el / Revalidated on }

Válido hasta / Valid until }

Director General de Migración

ESTE PASAPORTE ES VALIDO PARA DIRIGIRSE A
THIS PASSPORT IS VALID FOR TRAVEL TO

Panamá

6

OBSERVACIONES

REMARKS

7

VISAS

20 FEB 19[illegible]

8

VISAS

31562-71.

Panamá

Guillermina 17

DELEGADO DE MIGRACION

VISAS

REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
DEPTO. DE MIGRACION
SALIDA
SET. 20 1971
PASO DE CANOAS

DELEGADO DE MIGRACION

[illegible] IDA
16 SET. 1971

REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
DEPTO. DE MIGRACION
ENTRADA
SET. 16 1971
PASO CANOAS
INSPECTOR

PASO CANOAS

ENTRADA
20 SET. 1971

10

5

MAR 20

ENTRADA
NICARAGUA
30 DIAS

10

VISAS

VISA No. 484/6/72.

DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION
REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA

[illegible] Panamá

en Cualquier [illegible]

[illegible] días

San José, 12 SET 1972 de 19

[illegible] Delegado de Migración

Pas 2673

SET.

11

VISAS

DELEGADO DE MIGRACION
C.R.

PASO CANOAS

SALIDA
15 SET. 1972

DELEGADO DE MIGRACION
C.R.

PASO CANOAS

ENTRADA
30 SPT. 1972

SET.

PEÑAS BLANCAS
COSTA RICA

26 MAR 1976

1

SALIDA

12

VISAS

VISA

No. 41416

DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION

REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA

Buena para dirigirse a Panamá

Vía aéreo [illegible] 30 [illegible]

11 SET 197[illegible]

13

VISAS

VISA

No. [illegible]

DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION

REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA

Esta visa caduca a los Treinta días

Bueno para dirigirse a E.U. Rep. Dominicana Panamá

San José, [illegible]

Firma del Visador

10 5 5 10

BENEMERITA C1.00

TIMBRE

CRUZ ROJA COSTARRICENSE

VISAS

REPUBLICA DOMINICANA
MANAGUA

Visado [illegible] No. [illegible]

Expira el

Válido para viajar a la República Dominicana

A favor de

292735

18

VISAS

23

30 XII 1975

DELEGACION DE MIGRACION
AEROPUERTO "LA AURORA"
GUATEMALA, C. A.

REPUBLICA DOMINICANA
AEROPUERTO [illegible]

3 29/8/76

SALIDA

16

VISAS

17

VISAS

SEGUN AUTORIZACION DIE-1-[illegible]-65
DE FECHA [illegible] de Junio de 1974

REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
EMBAJADA EN
NICARAGUA
SECCION
CONSULAR
No. [illegible]
VISTO BUENO DE TURISTA
PARA QUE el señor [illegible]
[illegible]
ENTRE A VENEZUELA [illegible]
MANAGUA, [illegible] DE Setiembre DE 197[illegible]

HERNANI ESCOBAR
SEGUNDO SECRETARIO

18

VISAS

19

VISAS

20

VISAS

"[illegible]".

#115 30-4-72

4 — 20/7/71

Firma

241 = 400 / 131 / 3

[illegible] - Imp. [illegible] - 1971.

14-00000

1. Apellido (Last name): [illegible]

2. Segundo apellido: [illegible]

3. No. de expedición: Nº 572305

4. Nombre (First name): [illegible]

5. Segundo nombre: [illegible]

6. No. de Cédula: V ☐ E ☐

7. Sexo: M. ☐ F. ☐

8. Edad:

9. Profesión (Occupation): Comerciante

Cod.

10. Nacionalidad (Nationality): Costarricense

Cod.

11. No. de Pasaporte: 27[illegible]

12. Tipo de Visa: Turismo

13. Duración (Length of Stay): 30

14. Autorización M.R.I.: [illegible] 27-6-74

15. Lugar de expedición (Place issued): Managua Nicaragua

16. Firma del expedidor:

17. Dirección en Venezuela (Address in Venezuela):

17. Nombre del expedidor: [illegible]

18. Sello del expedidor: EN NICARAGUA

20. Aéreo ☐ Marítimo ☐ Terrestre ☐

21. Transportista

22. Destino

23. Aéreo ☐ Marítimo ☐ Terrestre

25. Transportista

26. Procede

Salida

Entrada

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOO TPE WRO

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 162000Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 944136

CONF: C/LA 6 INFO: FILE C/CI

C/SN/IR 3 C/OS

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY:

#: 132

TO: IMMEDIATE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R.K. MCHARGUE/ GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

FIRCI-312/03416-76

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF THE NOVO BROTHERS IN THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH TWO: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

2. IN EARLY NOVEMBER 1976 RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE, A HIGH OFFICIAL OF THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), SAID THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE UNDER ARREST IN VENEZUELA FOR THE CUBANA AIRLINES BOMBING, HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE NOVO BROTHERS HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMBING OF THE AUTOMOBILE OF ORLANDO LETELIER, FORMER

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

GROUP FILE COPY FOR
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

44

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO	OCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
944136

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES. MORALES DID NOT AMPLIFY HIS INFORMATION. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO A NUMBER OF PRESS ARTICLES, IGNACIO NOVO AND GUILLERMO NOVO HAVE BEEN CHARGED BY SEVERAL OF THEIR COMPATRIOTS IN VENEZUELA AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER. IT IS BELIEVED THAT YOUR BUREAU HAS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE NOVO BROTHERS, IGNACIO AND GUILLERMO.)

3. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: FIRCI-312/03218-76 FROM A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED AND WHOSE INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT, REPORTED THAT SINCE HIS ARREST ON 15 OCTOBER BOSCH HAD ADMITTED TO AN OFFICIAL OF DISIP THAT HE HAD CONTACT WITH THE NOVO BROTHERS IN MIAMI SHORTLY BEFORE LETELIER'S ASSASSINATION.)

4. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.H

BASED ON: CARACAS 31432 (IN 1003381)
WKSCARLET (WKSCARLET-9)
OBJ:

REC/DDC [illegible]

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1976
ORIG: MARY GINN
UNIT: LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

CI/R&A (W. GODSON TELECOORD)

C/LA/PNC Beardsley

C/LA/RR

C/RE-Y/LSN

[illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR PROCESSING
TO Chief, Latin America Division		INDEXING REQUESTED
		NO INDEXING
INFO.		APERTURE CARD REQUESTED
FROM Chief of Station, Quito		
SUBJECT RYBAT KMSTONE VWNOCK/NOC Byron W. GUTRADT's Past Contacts with Orlando Bosch and WKSCARLET-3		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES & METHODS INVOLVED

1. We understand from press accounts that Orlando Bosch, WKSCARLET-3 and several other Cuban exiles were recently arrested and charged with the sabotage of a Cubana Airlines airliner on 6 October. After having read these accounts NOC Byron W. GUTRADT reported, for the record, that he once knew Bosch and WKSCARLET-3 in the early 1960's. GUTRADT met WKSCARLET-3 in 1964 when both were enrolled in OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia. GUTRADT at that time had already terminated his relationship with BKHERALD. While at OCS GUTRADT was not particularly close to WKSCARLET-3 but WKSCARLET-3 was generally knowledgeable of GUTRADT's background and past BKHERALD activities. GUTRADT has not seen WKSCARLET-3 since 1964 after completion of the OCS course and doubts seriously that WKSCARLET-3 would remember him.

2. GUTRADT met Bosch circa 1963 in Miami when GUTRADT was training Bosch in a BKHERALD-sponsored program. Bosch only knew GUTRADT in alias. GUTRADT has not seen Bosch since completion of this training.

3. Given the length of time that has elapsed plus the lack of closeness to either WKSCARLET-3 or Bosch, GUTRADT and the Station do not believe that their knowledge of his past BKHERALD activities presents any security problems today. GUTRADT, of course, was unwitting of their alleged current activities and was surprised to hear of the bombing of the Cubana airliner.

Gerald R. GIZZI

Distribution:
3-C/LAD

E2 IMPDET

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
B 201-299292	HEQA-09809	15 Nov [redacted] 76
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

14-00000

SECRET

DD/O 76-8559

15 NOV 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Alleged Chilean Plot to Use Cuban Exiles to Kill Andres PASCAL Allende, Nephew of Former Chilean President Salvador ALLENDE

1. The Washington Post carried an article on 12 November 1976 claiming that a Venezuelan Secret Police Officer, Ricardo MORALES, had told FBI contacts that early last year Chile's Secret Police (DINA) sought to assassinate Andres PASCAL Allende and his companion Anne Marie Brussier. The information contained in the article for the most part coincides with information in our files.

2. A source of the Caracas Station reported on 17 February 1976 that anti-Cuban government exiles were planning to kill PASCAL Allende who was in exile in Costa Rica at the time. This source also reported that the Cuban exiles claimed to be working under the sponsorship of the Chilean Government and that the attempt against PASCAL Allende would be carried out by the Cubans in return for unspecified aid to be given certain Cuban exile leaders, including Orlando BOSCH and Frank CASTRO. These individuals reportedly would engineer the assassination. This information was passed to the FBI and the Department of State.

3. On 17 February the San Jose Station notified the local authorities that BOSCH might be on his way to a Central American country and that he might be using a Chilean passport. BOSCH had been of interest to these officials for some time because of his possible involvement with bombings in Costa Rica and also because of the then expected visit of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. On 18 February BOSCH was apprehended.

4. On 20 February the San Jose Station raised with the local authorities the specific threat against PASCAL Allende. These authorities stated that they had already advised PASCAL Allende of the possible threat against his life. BOSCH was deported on 20 March 1976.

Signed
Raymond A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 016052

SECRET

SUBJECT: Alleged Chilean Plot to Use Cuban Exiles to Kill Andres PASCAL Allende, Nephew of Former Chilean President Salvador ALLENDE

CONCUR:

William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

15 NOV 1976
Date

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Alleged Chilean Plot to Use Cuban Exiles to Kill Andres PASCAL Allende, Nephew of Former Chilean President Salvador ALLENDE

DDO/DC/LA/SB: John J. Devine/11 (12 November 1976)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - DDCI
1 - DCI
1 - Ex Reg
2 - DDO
1 - ADDO
2 - C/LA
1 - LA/SB
1 - 201-931810 (PASCAL)
1 - 201-299292 (BOSCH)
1 - Memo Chrono

SECRET

14-00000

7-71 MFG 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY P PER ~~[illegible]~~ TOTAL COPIES 27-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR. C/LA/AO, C/OPS/ICC, C/OPS/ITG4, C/CI4, C/SS3, C/PS/EG2, C/FOD3.

T 381485 E1A259 PAGE 01-01 IN 100338

TOR:151652Z NOV 76 CARA 31432

S E C R E T 151642Z NOV 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31432 (CARROLL ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

REFS: A. CARACAS 31388 (096295)

B. CARACAS 31234 (080249)

1. WKSCARLET-9 REPORTED 10 NVEMBER 1976 HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE (201-0285923) ON UNSPECIFIED DATE THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD TOLD MORALES THE (FNU) NOVO BROTHERS HAD DONE THE BOMBING OF ORLANDO LETELLIER AUTOMOBILE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. MORALES DID NOT AMPLIFY ON THIS INFOMATION WHICH MAY ALSO BE THE BASIS OF REFERENCE A INFO.

2. FILE: 200-12-200/1; 201-081118. E2, IMPDET.

FIRCI-312/03218-76

Venezuelan Govt Emp whose
reliability not est.
Sees about 15 Oct 76
Bosch admitted to an
official of Vene. Direccion de SE
Servicios de In

201-BOSCH

SECRET

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ABS CDI ACP DO TPS MRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 J 34-3 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 130056Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 943114

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE I/IAN, SS4, PS/EG 2, LSN/10, 4/OPS, 0003, OPS/ITG 4, DDO/DO, C/4, SS/SOG 4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 44

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO SAN JOSE, CARACAS. Y

UNINTEL Y

1. ON 12 NOVEMBER 1976 THE "WASHINGTON POST" PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE BY JOE CRANKSHAW IN MIAMI WHICH REPORTED THAT FBI HAD BEEN TOLD OF A DINA PLOT TO USE CUBAN EXILES TO KILL LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE AND ANNE MARIE BRUSSIER (SIC - SHOULD BE BEAUSIRE). FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM ARTICLE: Y

A. RICARDO MORALES, VENEZUELAN INTEL OFFICIAL, REPORTED TO FBI THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD OF A PLOT TO KILL PASCAL AND BRUSSIER BY ROLANDO OTERO. ACCORDING TO OTERO, HE WENT TO SANTIAGO IN EARLY FEBRUARY AND IDENTIFIED HIMSELF TO DINA OFFICIALS AS A FUGITIVE FROM THE U.S. AT DINA HQS, OTERO SAID HE WAS TOLD THAT THE SECRET POLICE SUPPORT THE CUBAN EXILES' CAUSE AND WOULD PROVIDE FUNDS AND ARMS FOR THEM IN RETURN FOR A "FAVOR." THE FAVOR WAS TO KILL PASCAL AND BRUSSIER IN COSTA RICA BEFORE 22 FEBRUARY 1976. OTERO QUOTED DINA SPOKESMEN AS SAYING BOSCH WOULD BE BACKUP IF OTERO FAILED IN THE MISSION. ACCORDING TO OTERO, HE REFUSED TO DO THE "FAVOR," LEFT CHILE AND TOLD MORALES. HE THEN RETURNED TO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 016988

OUTGOIN MESSAGE

SIGNAL CS - TSB USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

CONF: INFO: FILE 0 NO INDEX

943114 0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

SANTIAGO AND WAS ARRESTED TWO WEEKS LATER. Y

B. BOSCH WAS ARRESTED ON 19 FEBRUARY ENTERING COSTA RICA WITH A FALSE PASSPORT AND CHARGED WITH PLOTTING TO KILL SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, PASCAL AND BRUSSIER. NO TRIAL WAS HELD AND BOSCH WAS LATER DEPORTED. HE RETURNED TO SANTIAGO AND APPARENTLY REMAINED THERE UNTIL GOING TO CARIBBEAN TO ORGANIZE CORU. Y

C. INFO ON THIS ALLEGED DINA-CUBAN EXILE CONSPIRACY WAS SUPPRESSED DURING THE SEPTEMBER 76 FEDERAL BOMBING TRIAL OF OTERO IN JACKSONVILLE. WHEN OTERO STARTED TO TESTIFY ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES IN CHILE, GOVT PROSECUTORS OBJECTED THAT INFO WAS IMMATERIAL TO BOMBING CHARGES. OTERO WAS FOUND INNOCENT; HIS TRIAL ON RELATED STATE CHARGES WAS TO BEGIN IN MIAMI ON MONDAY (8 NOV) BUT WAS ORDERED POSTPONED UNTIL EARLY 1977. Y

D. OTERO HAD LIVED IN [redacted]FLORIDA UNTIL LATE DECEMBER 1975 WHEN HE WAS TOLD BY FBI INFORMANT THAT FBI WAS PREPARING TO HAVE HIM INDICTED ON BOMBING CHARGES. OTERO THEN WENT TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WHERE HE WAS ARRESTED AND PAROLED. WHEN MIAMI FEDERAL GRAND JURY RETURNED INDICTMENTS AGAINST OTERO, HE FLEW TO CARACAS WHERE STAYED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 3 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 943114

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

WITH MORALES. INFO IN REPORTS ALLEGES THAT OTERO WAS TOLD THAT IF VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES MOVED TO ARREST HIM, HE COULD RECEIVE ASYLUM WITH NEW CHILEAN AMBASSADOR. WHILE IN CARACAS, OTERO ALLEGEDLY TOLD MORALES THAT HE HAD COMMITTED THE BOMBINGS IN MIAMI AND MORALES PASSED THIS INFO TO FBI.

2. MUCH OF INFO ON PLOT TO KILL PASCAL AND BRUSSIER APPARENTLY TAKEN FROM 25 FEBRUARY 1976 FBI REPORT WHICH COULD COME FROM MORALES. MORALES WAS SOURCE OF NUMEROUS SECRET SERVICE REPORTS DURING KISSINGER VISIT TO CARACAS IN FEBRUARY 76 ON REPORTED ATTEMPT BY BOSCH TO KILL KISSINGER. ONE SECRET SERVICE REPORT INDICATED THAT MORALES HAD PROVIDED CARACAS LEGAL ATTACHE WITH RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST.

[redacted]

3.A. FILE: 201-284611, 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.

8

DATE: 12 NOVEMBER 1976
ORIG: MARY GINN
UNIT: LA/SB/CH/R
EXT: 1471

C/PCS/LC (For Info)
C/LA/CAR (For Info)
AC/LA/PNC
C/LA/MCA
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 014952

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (3) 1 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 122140Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 942799

CONF: LAB INFO: FILE FPLW DDI/INT RETOL

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO. Y

UNINTEL Y (UC 27841)

REFS: A. EMBASSY TELEGRAM SANTIAGO 9991, 15 OCTOBER 1976

B. DIRECTOR 929297

C. DIRECTOR 941265 Y

1. IN VIEW OF 12 NOVEMBER 1976 ARTICLE IN "WASHINGTON POST" (BEING RELAYED SANTIAGO), DEALING WITH ALLEGED DINA PLOT TO KILL PASCAL ALLENDE, WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO ON DINA-CUBAN EXILE CONTACTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE RELATED TO REFS A AND C. Y

2. FILE: 15-5-1, 201-299292, 201-284811. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: A. ALLEGED ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILE CONTACTS IN CHILEAN GOVT.
B. REQUEST FOR INFO ON REF A.
C. EXTRACT FROM FBI REPORT OF 4 NOV 76 ON VISIT IN EARLY 75 TO CHILE BY CUBAN EXILE AND HIS CONTACT WITH "PATRIA Y LIBERTAD."

8

DATE: 12 NOV 76
ORIG: MARY GINN:RP
UNIT: LA/SB/CH/R
EXT: 1471

CH

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018988

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Nov. 12, 1976

FBI Told of Chilean Plot to Use Cubans to Kill Allende K

By Joe Crankshaw

The Miami Herald

MIAMI—The Chilean secret police last February attempted to recruit two alleged Cuban exile terrorists to assassinate the nephew of Chile's late deposed Marxist President Salvador Allende, a ranking South American intelligence official told U.S. authorities.

The intelligence official, Ricardo Morales of the Venezuelan secret police, told FBI contacts that Chile's secret police (DINA) sought the assassination of both Andres Pascal Allende and his companion, Anne Marie Brussier, according to documents made available to The Miami Herald.

Morales, himself a Cuban exile, said the DINA plot, which was never carried out, was reported to him by Rolando Otero, who currently faces trial in Miami on 39 felony charges related to nine terrorist bombings here.

[Suspicions of Chilean secret police involvement in plots against political exiles have been widely expressed in emigre circles. This was the first reported instance of an allegation to the FBI by a high-ranking intelligence official suggesting complicity of the Chilean intelligence service in political assassination activities. Morales had himself been associated with the Central Intelligence Agency and FBI as an operative and informant after fleeing Cuba following Castro's accession to power.]

At the time of Morales' report to the FBI, Otero was a fugitive from a Miami federal grand jury indictment related to the bombings. He was subsequently acquitted of that charge earlier this year at a federal trial in Jacksonville.

Morales quoted Otero as saying DINA had attempted to recruit both Otero and Orlando Bosch for the assassination. Bosch was charged in Venezuela last week with first-degree murder in the sabotage of a Cuban airliner that claimed 73 lives.

Morales quoted Otero as saying DINA offered arms and funds to Cuban exile groups.

Otero refused to do the "favor," left Chile and told the Latin American intelligence official on Feb. 15, then returned to Santiago. He was arrested two weeks later and held until he was handed over to the United States in May.

Bosch was arrested entering Costa Rica with a false passport on Feb. 19. He was charged with plotting to kill U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Andres Pascal Allende and Anne Marie Brussier.

No trial was held and Bosch was later deported. He returned to Santiago and apparently remained there until going to the Caribbean area to organize CORU, a militant anti-Castro group which claimed credit for the Cuban airliner bombing last month.

Morales made the reports to the FBI in an exchange of intelligence with U.S. officials about exiled terrorists' plots.

An FBI spokesman in Washington said Monday the bureau would have no comment on the reported DINA plot. [FBI officials in Caracas had no comment on the case in response to independent inquiries by The Washington Post.]

Information on alleged DINA Cuban exile conspiracy against the surviving Allende family and government members was suppressed during the federal bombing trial of Otero in Jacksonville in September, 1976.

When Otero started to testify about his activities in Chile, government prosecutors objected that the information was immaterial to the bombing charges.

Otero was found innocent of federal charges that he placed bombs at Miami International Airport in October, and at the Miami FBI office, Social Security Office, State Unemployment Office, two post offices, a bank, the Dade State Attorneys Office and the Miami Police Department Headquarters on Dec. 3-4.

His trial on related state charges was to begin here Monday but was ordered postponed until after the beginning of the year and transferred to Pensacola.

Otero remained in Florida until late December, 1975, when he was told by an FBI informant that the FBI was preparing to have him indicted on the bombing charges.

Otero then went to the Dominican Republic, where he was arrested, then paroled to the custody of Admiral Cesar de Windt, father-in-law of Frank Castro, an Otero friend.

When a Miami federal grand jury returned indictments against Otero in the bombings, Otero flew to Caracas.

Otero had $50 in his pocket when he landed in Venezuela, according to information in FBI reports. He stayed with Morales, a former Cuban political police agent and anti-Castro exile then working with the Venezuelan secret police.

Information contained in the reports alleges that Otero was told that if Venezuelan authorities moved to arrest him, he could receive asylum with the new Chilean ambassador.

While in Caracas, Otero allegedly told Morales that he had committed the bombings in Miami, except for the Miami police department explosion. He said he knew who placed that bomb. Morales sent the information to the FBI.

In early February, Otero flew to Santiago, according to the intelligence reports in the hands of investigators.

Otero told Morales, whom he believed would help in an exiles' plot against Castro later this year, that after arriving in Santiago, he went to DINA headquarters and identified himself and said he was a fugitive from the United States.

At DINA headquarters, he was told the secret [illegible] ported the Cuban exiles' would provide funds for turn for a "favor."

The DINA spokesmen, the intelligence agent, wan kill Andres Pascal Allende Marie Brussier, in Costa Feb. 22, 1976.

Allende is the nephew of Allende, who died when righ enents overthrew his M ment in September, 1973. The Allende is a member of MI leftist revolutionary group tha the junta.

Otero quoted DINA spol [illegible] Bosch would be a bac [illegible] in the mission.

On Feb. 15, Otero relayed D quest to the intelligence age turned to Santiago where mained until March 8, when peared.

Chilean authorities later [illegible] taken him into custody 27 and charged Otero with undesirable alien. They deported following a hearing

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	AC/LA/SB/CH		G
2			
3	DC/LASB [illegible]C/LA/SB		
4			
5	IP D&P GA-58	9 NOV 1976	
6	LA/SB/CH 3E05		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Photo of Bosch

EM__

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
B. MONTGOMERY 3H05 1471	27 Oct

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

SECRET
(CLASSIFY IF APPROPRIATE WHEN FILLED IN)

CAUTION – Blank form requires secure storage in field.

TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

DATE
27 October 1976

TO
COS, Santiago

FROM
Chief, LA Division

№ 148959

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	REMARKS
1	Envelope containing photo of	Ref: SANTIAGO 35330
	Orlando BOSCH Avila	

9 NOV 1976

FORM 6-75 1236a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET
(CLASSIFY IF APPROPRIATE WHEN FILLED IN)

(10-47)

10

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

QMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 1120312Z

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 941917

DISSEM BY: 41

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN,

TO: CARACAS. Y

UNINTEL KMSTONE Y

REF: CARACAS 31117 (IN 0691011) Y

1. FOR STATION INFORMATION, FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF 201 FILE ON [illegible] HILDO FOLGAR MONTERO (201-0290306), REPORTED IN REF TO HAVE HOSTED FUND-RAISING DINNER FOR ORLANDO BOSCH. Y

2. FOLGAR WAS BORN IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA 29 MAY 1918. DESCRIBED BY WODISH SOURCE NOVEMBER 59 AS EXCELLENT BUT UNETHICAL SURGEON-GYNECOLOGIST OPERATING LARGE AND LUCRATIVE ABORTION MILL IN HAVANA. HAD BEEN EARLY AND ARDENT CASTRO SUPPORTER, CONTRIBUTING MONEY AND SETTING UP SYSTEM OF ARMS PROCUREMENT, BUT TOLD SOURCE NOVEMBER 59 HE COMPLETELY DISILLUSIONED AND WILLING DO ALMOST ANYTHING TO ASSIST IN CASTRO'S OVERTHROW. IN TWO MEETINGS WITH A JMWAVE OFFICER ARRANGED BY WODISH CONTACTS IN DECEMBER 60, FOBLGAR SAID HE WAS A FORMER RANKING OFFICIAL OF ORTHODOX (CUBAN COMMUNIST) PARTY, THAT HE WAS CURRENTLY WORKING CLANDESTINELY AGAINST CASTRO REGIME, BUT THAT HE STILL HAD CLOSE CONTACT WITH CASTRO AND OTHER HIGH REGIME OFFICIALS AND ABLE PROVIDE INTEL. ALSO CLAIMED HE CLOSE FRIEND OF PRESIDENT

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 291292
DO NOT [illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOI   MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | PAGE 2 OF PAGES 72

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF | DIRECTOR

CONF: | INFO: FILE

941917

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

BETANCOURT AND HAD SHELTERED LATTER IN HIS HOME 48-52. FILE REFLECTS NO FURTHER BKHERALD CONTACT WITH SUBJECT, APPARENTLY BECAUSE HIS CLAIMS RE PARTICIPATION IN EXFILTRATIONS AND OTHER ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES WERE FOUND TO BE EXAGGERATED AND HE CONSIDERED POSSIBLE PROVOCATEUR.

3. FOLGAR LEFT CUBA FOR MIAMI 21 SEPTEMBER 61 BUT WAS DENIED ENTRY TO U.S. AND AFTER WEEK'S DETENTION BY INS PROCEEDED TO VENEZUELA. DURING FOLGAR'S SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS TO GAIN ADMISSION TO U.S., PRESIDENT BETANCOURT PERSONALLY VOUCHED FOR HIM, STATING HE WAS LONG-TIME PERSONAL FRIEND AND PHYSICIAN WHO HAD ONCE SAVED BETANCOURT'S LIFE. AMONG THOSE WHO WROTE LETTERS IN SUPPORT OF FOLGAR WAS DR. MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN MIAMI. HAC-3037, 15 OCTOBER 64, REPORTED THAT FOLGAR HAD HANDLED MOST OF THE APPOINTMENTS FOR DELEGATES OF CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE (RECE) WHO VISITED VENEZUELA DURING TOUR OF LATIN AMERICA. OFFICIALS WHOM RECE DELEGATES MET INCLUDED FOREIGN MINISTER IGNACIO IRRIBAREN BORGES, INTERIOR MINISTER GONZALO BARRIOS, PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY MANUEL MANTILLA, AND AD CONGRESSIONAL LEADER CARLOS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T | REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. | E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 3 OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

941917

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: -

ANDRES PEREZ. RECE REPORTEDLY WAS PLANNING TO NAME A COMMITTEE OF FOUR CUBANS AND ONE VENEZUELAN TO REPRESENT IT IN VENEZUELA, AND FOLGAR WAS MENTIONED AS A PROBABLE MEMBER. Y

4. FILE: 201-0290306, 201-0299292. E2 IMPDET.

REF - REPORT ON ORLANDO BOSCH'S ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA, LATE SEPTEMBER - EARLY OCTOBER 1976

DATE: 9 NOV 76
ORIG: L.COOLEY
UNIT: LA/PNC/V
EXT: [illegible]1715

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

LA/COG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007888

OUTGOING MESSAGE

1314

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	CDI	ACP	TOO	TPS	SRO	OCI
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
88888

DATE-TIME GROUP
101557Z

CITE
CIA/DDO

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
940952

CONF: LA-8 INFO: FILE c/c CSN/12 c/o

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0

DISSEM BY: 2
PER
122

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R.K. MCHARGUE/GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION. Y

LA/SB

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS Y

FIRCI-312/03247-76 Y

SUBJECT: UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATION THAT ORLANDO BOSCH INVOLVED IN PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT IN JUNE-JULY 1976 Y

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH TWO: A COSTA RICAN BUSINESSMAN WHO RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE FREE COSTA RICA MOVEMENT (MCRL) WHO HAS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH MCRL LEADERS. HIS PAST REPORTING HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. HIS POLITICAL CONSERVATISM MAY AT TIMES COLOR HIS REPORTING ON MEMBERS AND ACTIVITIES OF MORE LIBERAL GROUPS. Y

2. IN EARLY MAY 1976 A GROUP OF COSTA RICAN PLOTTERS MADE AN AGREEMENT THAT A QUANTITY OF SOVIET AND CZECH WEAPONS CAPTURED BY THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SENT TO COSTA RICA VIA GUATEMALA FOR USE IN OVERTHROWING THE CURRENT COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT. THE WEAPONS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

D-18-9-15

312/03247-76 Y
10 Nov. 76
201-299292

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 016958

ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX. TYPE THE WORD "ALIGN" TO REGISTER HERE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CIA/DDO

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

94052

ARE SAID TO HAVE CONSISTED OF RIFLES AND SUBMACHINE GUNS, AS WELL AS SOME THREE MILLION ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION, FOR A FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 300 MEN. THE CONTRACTING PARTY IN CHILE, PRESUMED TO BE THE GOVERNMENT OR THE MILITARY, HAS AGREED TO SEND TWO MEN TO COSTA RICA TO ASSIST IN THE PREPARATIONS. HOWEVER, THE WEAPONS HAD NOT LEFT CHILE AS OF EARLY MAY.V

B. ON 7 JULY 1976 THE LOCAL PRESS IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, AND GUATEMALA CITY CARRIED STATEMENTS BY GONZALO FACIO, COSTA RICAN FOREIGN MINISTER, THAT THERE WAS A GROUP OF PROMINENT PEOPLE WHO WERE COMPROMISED IN A PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA. FACIO INDICATED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO HAD BEEN TRAVELEING BETWEEN GUATEMALA AND COSTA RICA ON FALSE PASSPORTS, WAS IN CHARGE OF THE OPERATION. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ON 9 JULY AN OFFICIAL OF THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT WHO HAS ACCESS TO HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND WHO IS A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT WHILE IN GUATEMALA TO TELL THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE PLOT, FACIO HAS ASKED ABOUT HECTOR DABANZO, A CHILEAN WHO HAD ENTERED COSTA RICA ON CHILEAN PASSPORT NUMBER 86682. FACIO CLAIMED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 3 OF PAGES 4

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE CIA/DDO

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

940952

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO HAVE INFORMATION THAT DABANSO HAD RECENTLY TRAVELED TO GUATEMALA SEVERAL TIMES FROM COSTA RICA AND THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT SUSPECTED THAT DABANSO WAS INVOLVED IN THE PLOT. IN MID-FEBRUARY 1976 AN OFFICIAL OF THE COSTA RICAN MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED SAID THAT BOSCH WAS TRAVELING UNDER THE NAME HECTOR E. D'AVANZO CINTOLESI, USING CHILEAN PASSPORT NUMBER 26583.) Y

4. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH 5: A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA AND CONFIDANT OF THE PRESIDENT OF COSTA RICA. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. PRESIDENT ODUBER MAY HAVE INTENDED THAT THIS INFORMATION REACH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. Y

5. THE REPORT THAT BOSCH WAS INVOLVED IN THE PLOT WAS A FABRICATION BY DANIEL ODUBER QUIROS, PRESIDENT OF COSTA RICA. Y

[redacted] Y

6. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.H

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-297292

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 016988

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 4 OF PAGES 4

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA/DDO

CONF: INFO: FILE

940952

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

FIRCI-312/03247-76

BASED ON: PARA 1:
SAN JOSE 19625 |IN 950364|, 14 JUNE 1976
HURUM {HUFANG-1}
{HQS COMMENT PARA 3: GUATEMALA CITY 19637 |IN 978269|,
13 JULY 1976 - ESLOGIC-27 AND SAN JOSE 19237 |IN 830647|
18 FEBRUARY 1976 - HUFABRIC-14

PARA 4:
SAN JOSE 19715 |IN 978488|, 13 JULY 1976 - NP {HUGALLY-1}
IDEN OF SOURCE PROVIDED BY FORMER COS {SAN JOSE} AT HQS

OBJ: J

DATE: 8 NOVEMBER 1976
ORIG: MARY GINN:MM
UNIT: LA/SB/CH/RR
EXT: 1471

CI/R&A - W.GODSON
{TELECORD}

C/LA/RR J.P. Briny

C/LA [illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

AC/LA/MCA John Puckett
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 016988

OUTGOING MESSAGE

15-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPC	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 1015562   CITE DIRECTOR   MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 940950

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY: 0

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO   PER

0 IP FILES   #

CONF: C/LA-8   INFO: FILE, C/[illegible]/SOG 2, C/CSN/12, C/OS[illegible]

TO: SANTIAGO INFO SAN JOSE, CARACAS. Y

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL Y

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 35352 |IN 081609|

B. SAN JOSE 20051 |IN 082793| Y

1. INFORMATION IN REF A WAS REPORTED IN EARLIER TRAFFIC FROM SAN JOSE AND GUATEMALA CITY AND SENT SANTIAGO. HQS PROCESSING FIRCI TO FBI BASED ON EARLIER REPORTING, WHICH WILL BE RELAYED TO ADDRESSEES FOR INFO. Y

2. FILE: 200-12-200/1, 201-0299292. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: A. DOCUMENT ON CONVERSATION IN JULY 1976 BETWEEN CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO COSTA RICA AND COSTA RICAN FOREIGN MINISTER OF PLOT, LED BY ORLANDO BOSCH, WHICH WAS BEING ORGANIZED IN GUATEMALA TO OVERTHROW THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT

B. CLARIFICATION ROLE OF BOSCH

DATE: 8 NOVEMBER 1976
ORIG: MARY GINNIMM
UNIT: LA/SB/CH/RR
EXT: 1471

AC/LA/MCA John Beckwith

C/LA/PNC/V.

C/LA/RR

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
299292
DO NOT DESTROY

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018988

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF U 0 0 0 0 0 19 2 1 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP — 1001002

CITE — DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER — 940757

CONF: C/LA 8

INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, AGC/DDO, DDO3, DDO/CO, C/CS/110, C/OPS, C/PS/EG 2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 4/5

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: SANTIAGO, CARACAS. Y

UNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL Y

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 35330 (IN 077799) (NOT SENT NOR NEEDED CARACAS)

B. SANTIAGO 35408 (IN 090372) (NOT SENT OR NEEDED CARACAS)

C. DIRECTOR 931119 Y

1. REGRET DELAY IN REPLY TO REFS A AND B BUT HQS HAS BEEN AWAITING CLARIFICATION ON WHETHER OR NOT ORLANDO BOSCH IS "U.S. PERSON." BASED ON INS INFO, BOSCH IS NOT REPEAT NOT "U.S. PERSON"; THEREFORE COLLECTION EFFORT AGAINST HIM, INCLUDING FUPRONG-5 INVESTIGATION OF HIS CONTACTS AND ACTIVITIES IN CHILE, IS IN ACCORD WITH REF C. Y

2. RE PARA 4A REF A, FOLLOWING IS PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND KNOWN ALIASES FOR ORLANDO BOSCH. PHOTO BEING POUCH 11 NOV. Y

A. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA; DPOB 18 AUG 26, SANTA CLARA, LAS VILLAS PROVINCE, CUBA. HEIGHT 5' 10", WEIGHT 170 LBS. MEDIUM BUILD. HAIR: BLACK, SOME GRAY SIDES. EYES: BROWN, USUALLY WEARS BLACK HORN-RIMMED GLASSES. COMPLEXION: DARK. SCARS AND MARKS: RED BIRTHMARK ON CHIN. PECULIARITIES: THICK LIPS, SOMETIMES WEARS

DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1976

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY

201- 279292

DO NOT DESTROY

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION — REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 0?4953

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE O

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

STAFF

DIRECTOR

94 0767

CONF: INFO: FILE

3 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 FILES #

DISSEM BY:

MUSTACHE. WIFE: MIRIAM BOSCH, M.D. HAS FIVE CHILDREN. V

B. ALIASES: PEDRO ANTONIO PENA -DOMINICAN PASSPORT; HECTOR E. D'AVANZO CINTOLESI, CHILEAN PASSPORT; LUIS PANIAGUA MENDEZ, BJJBCOSTA RICAN PASSPORT; AKA "BOCA DE ROSA" (DUE TO BIRTHMARK ON LOWER LIP AND CHIN), "PIRO" BOSCH, "ERNESTO". V

3. FOR CARACAS: SANTIAGO STATION HAS REQUESTED TRAVEL DATA ON ORLANDO BOSCH WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE VENEZUELAN LIAISON FROM SUBJECT'S PASSPORTS. HQS ALSO INTERESTED DDTHIS INFO. PLS ADVISE IF INFO CAN BE OBTAINED. V

4. FILE: 200-12-200/1, 201-881118. E2 IMPDET. H

LA/OPS d. Gleason

AGC/DDO - A.E. GOLDIN (IN DRAFT)

C/LA/PANC/4

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-299222

DO NOT DESTROY

DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1976

ORIG: ED MONTGOMERY:MM 12 Montgomery

UNIT: LA/SD/CH

EXT: 1471

PCS/LSN/IDD

C/LA

RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/SC

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY 011157

COI ACP TOG TPE BRP OUI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR [illegible]

DATE-TIME GROUP 130059Z

CITE ~~DIRECTOR~~ C/A

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 943126

CONF: C/CI 2 INFO: FILE DDO3, DDDO,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 48

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER. CI

0 IP FILES # 7

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

CIOL-0379-76

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

SUBJECT: STATEMENTS BY SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA REGARDING INDIVIDUALS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST CUBA

--INFORMATION ON SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA IS IN OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FILES BECAUSE OF HIS REPORTED CONTACTS WITH PANAMANIAN AND CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

--INFORMATION ON ALDO VERA IS IN OUR FILES BECAUSE HE WAS SUSPECTED OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

--INFORMATION ON ~~JUAN~~ ORLANDO BOSCH IS IN OUR FILES BECAUSE HE IS SUSPECTED OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM AN OFFICIAL OF A PANAMANIAN SERVICE WHO IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. IN THIS CASE HE HAS NO BASIS FOR JUDGING THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION. HE PROVIDED THE INFORMATION WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SERVICE OR

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-299512
DO NOT DESTROY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 007858

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE

AGE / COI / ACP / TOO / TPE / MRO / DCI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
~~STAFF~~

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
~~DIRECTOR~~ CIA,

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF:

INFO: FILE

943126

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

GOVERNMENT. THE INFORMATION IS VERY SENSITIVE, AND NO ACTION BASED UPON IT SHOULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THIS AGENCY.YR

2. ON 13 OCTOBER 1976, SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA SAID THAT THE "COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS" (CORU) HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SABOTAGE OF THE CUBAN AIRCRAFT IN BARBADOS. CORU, ACCORDING TO ALDEREGUIA, OFFERED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OPERATION BUT THEIR OFFER WAS REJECTED. ALDEREGUIA SAID THAT THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SABOTAGE OF THE AIRPLANE WAS ALDO VERA SERAFIN WHO WAS OPERATING OUT OF PUERTO RICO. ALDEREGUIA ALSO ATTRIBUTED TO VERA THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO CUBAN DIPLOMATS IN ARGENTINA. ALDEREGUIA SAID THAT ORLANDO BOSCH WAS NOT LOCATED IN SANTO DOMINGO, BUT THAT INSTEAD BOSCH WAS IN VENEZUELA. ALDEREGUIA SAID THAT HE HAD THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF TWO PERSONS WITH WHOM BOSCH WAS IN CONTACT IN VENEZUELA. ALDEREGUIA STATED THAT HE ALSO HAD THE ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF A RESIDENCE BOSCH HAD ESTABLISHED IN NICARAGUA.Y

3. THIS AGENCY PROVIDED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO THE FBI ON ALDEREGUIA VIA CIOL-0324-76, DATED 13 OCTOBER 1976 WITH SUBJECT TITLE "ACTIVITIES OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN ON BEHALF OF THE PANAMANIAN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007258

14-00000

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MHO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0		0	0		3		

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CRS | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

C/A

CONF: INFO: FILE

943126

☐ INDEX   DISSEM BY:
☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO   PER
☐ IP FILES   #

AND CUBAN SECURITY SERVICES." Y

4. PORTIONS OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION ARE BEING PROVIDED SEPARATELY TO THE FBI AND TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF SECURITY AND BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH VIA FIRCI-312/03322-76. Y

5. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

FILE: 56-8-13; 56-2-9/3; 201-281197; 201-236634; 201-299292.

AC/LA/COG
DC/LA/CAR
C/LA/OPS
P&CS/ITG
AGC/DDO
CI/OG
CI/R&A/O W.H. GODSON (IN DRAFT)

DATE: 9 NOV 76
ORIG: DAVID F. THOMPSON:MEH
UNIT: LA/PNC/PA/R
EXT: 1484

C/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 008492

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CO 105.3-C

TO : Charles Enright

DATE: November 5, 1976

FROM : Varlan L. Beauchamp

SUBJECT: Your CIR/04416-76

Subject was granted indefinite voluntary departure from the United States on January 16, 1973. When he departed from the United States, he lost that status. He no longer has any legal immigration status in the United States.

VL Beauchamp

5010-110

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

14-00000

FBI CABLE

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

DATE: 4 NOVEMBER 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINES DC-8 NEAR
BARBADOS, WEST INDIES, OCT. 6, 1976

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 25 TOTAL COPIES 33-2 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR IPLAN, NE8, DDO 3, AGC/DDO, OPS/ITG4, C/OPS, CI 4,

T 352499 EIA046 PAGE 01 IN 888993

TOR:0317432 NOV 76 CARA 31326

SECRET 031722Z NOV 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31326

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL MHSPIKE KMSTONE

REF: CARACAS 31255 (IN 681911)

1. FYI. CARACAS NEWSPAPERS MORNING 3 NOVEMBER 1976 REPORT FOLLOWING RESULTS 2 NOVEMBER JUDICIAL HEARING ON INVESTIGATIN OF CUBANA AIRCRAFT BOMBING:

A. JUDGE ORDERED CONTINUED DETENTION OF HERNAN RICARDO LOZANO, FREDDY LUGO, LUIS POSADA CARRILES AND ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA.

B. HERMES ROJAS PERALTA, GUSTON OLEG RODRIGUEZ DE LA SERRA TRETIACOFF, WILLIAM WOLF FIGUEREDO AND FRANCISCO NUNEZ VALLEJO WERE SET FREE BUT WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUBJECTED TO FURTHER INVESTIGATION.

C. ALFREDO RAFAEL MAZINI (MASSINI) PERRE AND CELSA MARY TOLEDO ALEMAN WERE ABSOLVED OF ANY TIES TO THE CASE.

2. IN COMMENTING ON DECISION, JUDGE SAID ALL FOUR DETAINEES HAD VIOLATED ARTICLES 408 AND 275 OF THE CRIMINAL

SECRET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-[illegible]

DO NOT DESTROY

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ____

TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF, FILE, VR

ACTION #

STAFF

1
2
3
4
5
6

T 352499 EIA748 PAGE 02-02 IN 098993

TOR:2317432 NOV 74 CARA 31326

CODE AND WERE ALLEGEDLY GUILTY OF "QUALIFIED HOMICIDE" AND MANUFACTURE AND USE OF WEAPONS OF WAR. BOSCH AND POSADA WERE ACCUSED AS AUTHORS OF THE BOMBING. BOSCH WAS ALSO CHARGED WITH VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 320, 323 AND 327 OF CRIMINAL CODE FOR USE AND FABRICATION OF FALSE IDENTIFICATION. JUDGE COMMENTED THAT COURT HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROSECUTE.

3. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT/SECRET

IN FIELD

ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS. PROCESSING

INDEXING REQUESTED

NO INDEXING

APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO
Chief, Latin America Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Santiago

SUBJECT
RYBAT FUDWELL - Forwarding of Documents

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. SANTIAGO 35326 (HCS-10,772)
B. SANTIAGO 35351 (HCS-10,775)
C. SANTIAGO 35352

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Forwarded herewith are sanitized copies of the documents cited in references.

Peter D. HALISKY

Distribution:
3 - C/LA w/atts h/w

CROSS FILE CO
201-297292
DO NOT DESTROY

E2 IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HCSA-10881

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE
2 November 1976

HQS FILE NUMBER
200-12-200/1

SECRETO

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
EMBAJADA EN SAN JOSE, C. R.

EJEMPLAR N° \
HOJA N° 1

E.COSTA RICA.
SEC.N° 2

OBJ. Informa sobre detención de ORLANDO BOSCH AVIL
REF. Telex Sec. N° 20.MINRELACIONES. de 15.III.197

SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, 16 de MARZO de 1976.

DEL: EMBAJADOR DE CHILE EN SAN JOSE DE COSTA RICA
AL : SEÑOR MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE CHILE (Subsec)
- Secreseg - Info
SANTIAGO, Chile

1.- Tengo el honor de dirigirme a US. para hacer de su conocimiento que el día 18 de FEBRERO de 1976, fué detenido en Costa Rica el ciudadano cubano, anticastrista ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA al comprobarse que su ingreso al país había sido usando documentación extendida a nombre de HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI.

2.- BOSCH AVILA, es el único de los cinco jefes contrarrevolucionarios de las Villas que logró escapar con vida de Cuba, hace más o menos 12 años. Se le señala como el responsable de colocar una bomba en la sede de las Naciones Unidas, en Nueva York; de dinamitar un buque soviético en Miami y actualmente, de ingresar a Costa Rica, presumiblemente, para conspirar contra la vida de H. Kissinger durante su reciente visita a este país.

3.- Actualmente, se encuentra recluido y en huelga de hambre en la cárcel de Cartago. En sus declaraciones a la prensa, ha manifestado: "Tengo una misión que cumplir" "Seguiré luchando racionalmente como lo he hecho hasta ahora. Seguiré envuelto en actividades conspirativas" "No tengo interés de comprometer al Gobierno. Después de lo que me ha hecho me voy desilusionado".

4.- El Gobierno de Costa Rica estudia la posibilidad de expulsarlo, pero, no existe un país interesado en darle asilo.

5.- Al ser detenido BOSCH AVILA portaba la siguiente documentación:

a) Certificado de Nacimiento extendido en el Registro Civil de Quinta Normal el 8.AGOSTO.1975 a nombre de HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI, firmado por Alberto Casal, Jefe Sección del Registro Civil. Nacido el 6.AGOSTO.1927. Inscripción N° 953 Circunscripción de Barrancas. Hijo de Héctor Davanzo y de Amalia Enriqueta Cintolesi.

b) Carnet de Identidad N° 2357422, del Gabinete de Santiago. RUT. 2.357.422-5.

c) Conservador de Bienes Raíces Stgo. Registro de Vehículos Motorizados N° 882712. Auto Simca 1000. Fecha 21.SEPTIEMBRE.1966.

d) PASAPORTE corriente (color rojo) N° 26583, de 25 SEPTIEMBRE. 1975, extendido a nombre de HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI. Registro del Libreto de Pasaportes de la Casa de Moneda N° 14441-1975. Existen sellos, timbre de agua en la fotografía y las firmas de VICTORIA MORAN DOREN y MARIA ELENA SELMAN.

Este documento tiene registradas las siguientes anotaciones:

- 28. XII. 1975. Salida de Chile, por Pudahuel.
- 29. XII. 1975. Entrada y salida de Panamá, por Tocumén.
- 29. XII. 1975. Entrada en El Salvador.

- 7. I. 1976. Entrada en Costa Rica.

-30. I. 1976. Salida de Costa Rica y entrada en Nicaragua.

- 6. II. 1976. Salida de Nicaragua y entrada en Costa Rica.

6.- Desde el 6.FEBRERO.1976 permaneció como turista en Costa Rica y fué detenido el 19.FEBRERO. 1976, al comprobarse que su documentación era falsa.

7.- Se ha podido averiguar, secretamente, que esta documentación habría sido otorgada en Chile por una persona amiga de Bosch, perteneciente a alguna Institución de las FF. AA. y que tendría el grado de Coronel.

Esta información
mente lo es de la Embajada y de la fuente informativa.

DIOS GUARDE A US.

FRANCISCO CRUZ PACHECO
Encargado de Negocios a.i.

HILE
S EXTERIORES
OSE, C. R.

E. SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA Of.Res.N° [illegible]
OBJ.: Refiérese a rumores sobre comp
derrocamiento Gobierno.
REF.: No hay.-

SAN JOSE, 7 de Julio de 1.976.-

DEL: EMBAJADOR DE CHILE EN "SAN JOSE" DE COSTA RICA
AL SR.MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES (SUBSEC y DIRELAND)

1.- Tengo el honor de poner en conocimien
de US.que en los últimos días de la semana pasada, fue infor
do el Gobierno de la República por funcionarios confidencial
de la Embajada de los EE.UU., que en Guatemala estaríase pre
rando un complot ultra-derechista con el objeto de derrocar
Gobierno de COSTA RICA, por estimársele pro-marxista o comun
ta.

Dicho grupo clandestino anti-comunist
estaría dirigido por el exiliado cubano ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA,
dividuo que ingresó a Costa Rica el 6 de Febrero del año en
so, como se expresa en el Oficio Secreto (Subsec) N° 2, del
de Marzo de 1.976 ~~[illegible]~~
do posteriormente expulsado del ~~territorio [illegible]~~

2.- Pues bien, en razón de la gravedad de
los hechos que se comentaban, el Canciller Facio recibió ord
del Primer Mandatario de trasladarse urgentemente a Guatemal
acompañado del Ministro de Seguridad Pública Sr. Mario Charp
tier Gamboa, a fin de verificar la veracidad de los hechos y
realizar las diligencias indagatorias pertinentes, incluso a
nivel de Gobierno; fué así como viajaron al país mencionado
Domingo 4 de Julio último, para regresar a San José en las
timas horas del día Lunes 5.-

3.- Antes del viaje a la vecina Repúblic
el Canciller y yo nos reunimos en dos oportunidades, a obje
de cambiar impresiones en torno a los comentarios en cuesti
fundamentalmente porque el cubano Bosch habría manifestado,
gún el Canciller, que para consumar el golpe de estado en C
Rica contaba con el concurso de los Gobiernos de Guatemala
Chile, a lo cual, obviamente, no le daba crédito alguno, 6)
el Sr. Presidente Oduber.

A pesar de la inverosimilitud admitida por el Canciller, le manifesté que tal imputación, amén de grave y canallesca, no podía concebirse ni siquiera como versión interesada, por cuanto el Gobierno chileno ha reiterado su gratitud incontrovertible para el Ministro Facio y el Gobierno costarricense, por sus leales intervenciones y nobles actitudes evidenciadas en la Asamblea General de la OEA, recientemente realizada en Santiago.

El Canciller, compartiendo mis aseveraciones, me solicitó le coordinara una entrevista para el día Domingo, con el Embajador de Chile en Guatemala, General (R) Dn.Sylvio Salgado Ramírez, a quien deseaba participarle los comentarios referidos, máxime si se considera que el exiliado cubano Orlando Bosch Avila lanzó la versión del complot en dicho país y, además, es portador de un Pasaporte chileno, obtenido ilegítimamente y con nombre diferente.

4.- A su regreso, el Ministro me manifestó que nada se había establecido, no obstante las múltiples diligencias practicadas, estimando conveniente desmentir la especie, por tener el carácter de un estúpido rumor, derivado de las habladurías del Sr.Bosch, quien, sin duda, debe estar muy molesto con el Gobierno, porque estuvo arrestado y posteriormente fue expulsado del país.

Me agregó que el Gobierno de Guatemala no tenía conocimiento de los rumores comentados y que los Ministros de Defensa y de Relaciones Exteriores de dicho país, le dieron las más amplias y categóricas seguridades de cooperación, manteniéndose atentos a cualquier intento de derrocamiento que pudiera generarse en su territorio.

Acotó el Canciller también, que había tenido una cordial entrevista con el Embajador Salgado, a quien expresó, como está dicho, que nada se había comprobado, rogándole de todos modos estar atento a la circulación de versiones de la índole señalada.

Por último, me insinuó la conveniencia de recuperar el Pasaporte ilegítimo de Bosch, valiéndose de la colaboración que puedan dispensarle las autoridades policiales de Guatemala, al Jefe de Misión mencionado.

En tal virtud, ruego a US. se sirva tener a //

[redacted]

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
EMBAJADA EN SAN J[illegible], C. R.

/ bien instruir al Sr. Embajador Salgado respecto del modr operandi en el caso planteado, teniendo en consideración c el Pasaporte aludido es "ordinario", con tapas color rojo, tiene el Nº 26583, fue extendido el 25 de Septiembre de 19 a nombre de HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI y regist varias anotaciones de entrada y salida de diversos paises.

En suma, después de las conversaciones so tenidas con el Ministro Facio y también con el Embajador d los EE.UU. en Costa Rica, Mr. Terence Todman, con quien mantengo óptimas relaciones oficiales y de amistad, deduzco q los comentarios que circularon en torno al posible plan su versivo para derrocar el Gobierno del Presidente Oduber, no han pasado más allá de ser meros rumores surgidos de habl durías imputables a Orlando Bosch; lo anterior, por ciert no es óbice para admitir la posibilidad de una estrategia marxista.-

Se adjuntan recortes de los distintos diar de la capital que expresan lo que el Embajador infrascrito ha sintetizado en el presente oficio.

DIOS GUARDE A US.

ARANDA PARRA
Embajador

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 7-6

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

1	C/CI	4
2		5
3		6

PAGE OF PAGES 01

ACS CSI ACP TOO TPO NRO DCI
OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
[redacted]

DATE-TIME GROUP 030008Z

CITE CIA/DDO

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 937064 mek

CONF: C/CI2 *

INFO: FILE DDO3, DDO/DO

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SOP
0 IP FILES # 132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION/INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.Y

CIOL - 0367-76 Y

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR Y

SUBJECT: REPORT RECEIVED BY PANAMANIAN NATIONAL GUARD ON ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILES POSSIBLY INVOLVED IN TERRORISM Y

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM AN OFFICIAL OF A PANAMANIAN SERVICE WHO IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. HE PROVIDED THE INFORMATION WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SERVICE OR GOVERNMENT. THE INFORMATION IS VERY SENSITIVE, AND NO ACTION BASED UPON IT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THIS AGENCY.Y

2. ON 22 OCTOBER 1976, THE G-2 SECTION OF THE PANAMANIAN NATIONAL GUARD (GN) RECEIVED A HANDWRITTEN DOCUMENT WHICH APPARENTLY WAS OBTAINED FROM A NEW GN G-2 SOURCE IN MIAMI. ALTHOUGH THIS SOURCE IS NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME IN THE DOCUMENT, THE WRITER APPEARS TO BE THE PROPRIETOR OF "PASCO'S SEA FOOD," 1030 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET, HIALEAH, WITH TELEPHONES 888-7344 (OFFICE), 888-6267 (HOME). THE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

* CABLE SEC. SUGGESTS ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO: c/LA, c/ops/ITG, ACL/DDO

Bosch 201-

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CIA/DDO

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
SE 0 FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

937064

PHONE NUMBER 854-4031 FOLLOWED BY NOTATION "MY HOUSE." ALSO APPEARS ON DOCUMENT. THE WRITER IS ASKING US.S $10,000 FOR HIS SERVICES.Y

3. PRESUMABLY TO ESTABLISH HIS BONA FIDES AND SUBSTANTIATE HIS ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT, THE WRITER SUBMITTED A LENGTHY REPORT ON ALLEGED RECENT CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITIES ACCOMPANIED BY A LONG LIST OF CUBAN EXILE ACTIVISTS. THE DOCUMENT CONTAINS AN ALLEGATION OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN THIS ACTIVITY. THE DOCUMENT STATES THAT ORLANDO BOSCH IS UNDER ARREST IN VENEZUELA TOGETHER WITH LUIS POSADA CARRILES ALIAS "EL BAMBI." BOSCH WAS TRAVELING ON A COSTA RICAN PASSPORT AND ALSO HAD NICARAGUAN, DOMINICAN, AND CHILEAN PASSPORTS.Y

DT

4. THE REPORT LISTED BOSCH'S CONTACTS AS MANUEL PORRO IN NICARAGUA, (DESCRIBED AS BEING CLOSE TO GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA) ORLANDO NUNEZ IN COSTA RICA, AND MARIO RIVADILLA IN SANTO DOMINGO. POSADA IS DESCRIBED IN THE REPORT AS A FORMER U.S. ARMY RANGER, WHO WORKED FOR THE VENEZUELAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF POLICE (DIGEPOL) FOR EIGHT YEARS AND THEN ORGANIZED A PRIVATE DETECTIVE AGENCY WHICH EMPLOYS OVER 1,000 MEN. POSADA, ACCORDING

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

937064

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO THE REPORT, DIRECTED ALL VIOLENT ACTIONS IN VENEZUELA AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS. HIS ALIASES WERE "INSPECTOR BASILIO" AND "EL CALICHE." THE RECENT OPERATION AGAINST THE CUBANA PLANE WAS MOUNTED BY POSADA, ASSISTED BY ALDO VERA. THE WRITER OF THE REPORT CONTINUES THAT BOSCH'S RECENT TRIP TO VENEZUELA WAS AN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN "ALDO'S GROUP" AND THE "COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS" (CORU). BOSCH'S MISSION WAS SUCCESSFUL AS IT APPEARS CORU AND ALDO'S GROUP WILL UNITE. ALDO VERA IS REPORTEDLY IN PUERTO RICO. THE WRITER ADDS THAT ALDO'S GROUP WILL ENTER VENEZUELA IN NOVEMBER 1976 TO MOUNT A SERIES OF ATTACKS AGAINST CUBAN EMBASSIES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA. Y

5. IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR FROM THE REPORT, BUT IT APPEARS THAT THE WRITER IS REQUESTING THAT VIVIAN FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO, POSSIBLEY JAILED IN CUBA, BE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL TO PANAMA SINCE SHE HAS ALREADY SERVED HER SENTENCE. FERNANDEZ WOULD THEN TRAVEL FROM PANAMA TO MIAMI WHERE SHE WOULD BE OF SERVICE TO THE WRITER. Y

6. THIS AGENCY PROVIDED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO THE FBI

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

PAGE OF PAGES
4

CONF: INFO: FILE

937064

DISSEM BY:
0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO FER
0 IP FILES #

ON LUIS POSADA VIA CIR-294-76 ON 12 OCT 1976. NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON MANUEL PORRO. ORLANDO NUNEZ MABY BE IDENTICAL TO ORLANDO NUNEZ PEREZ, WHO ACCORDING TO THE RECORDS OF THIS AGENCY, IS A CUBAN EXILE RESIDING IN COSTA RICA AND SERVING AS PRESS SECRETARY OF COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT JOSE FIGUERES AS OF MARCH 1971. MARIO RIVADILLA MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH MARIO RIVADULLA CARCEDO, DPOB: CIRCA 1930, CUBA. IN 1952 A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE SAID THAT HE WAS A COMMUNIST MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE ORTHODOX CUBBAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (PPC) AND CHIEF OF THE PROPAGANDA BUREAU OF THE ORTHODOX YOUTH, AN ARM OF THE PPC. IN A 1970 PRESS ARTICLE BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH RIVADULLA, HE CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED IN CUBA FROM 1961 TO 1967 FOR ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES. HE LEFT CUBA IN 1970. IN A 1972 NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW, RIVADULLA CLAIMED TO BE A JOURNALIST LIVING IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SINCE 1970 AND A MEMBER OF THE INTER-AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION WORKING FOR THE FREEDOM OF NEWSMEN IMPRISONED IN CUBA. IN ANOTHER INTERVIEW IN 1972 HE CLAIMED TO HAVE ACTIVELY OPPOSED THE FULGENCIO BATISTA REGIME AND BACKED FIDEL CASTRO, BUT BECAME

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES 5

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

CONF: INFO: FILE

937064

DISILLUSIONED WITH THE CASTRO REGIME. IN 1974 HE WAS REPORTED TO BE A RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMENTATOR IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. IN NOVEMBER 1975, A WOMAN LIVING IN MIAMI WHOSE SON IS CURRENTLY A PRISONER IN CUBA ADVISED A CONTACT OF THIS AGENCY THAT RIVADULLA ALLEGEDLY HAD BEEN IN PRISON WITH HER SON. THEY HAD PROMISED EACH OTHER THAT THE FIRST ONE TO BE RELEASED WOULD DO ALL IN HIS POWER TO OBTAIN THE FREEDOM OF THE OTHER. IN THIS CONNECTION, RIVADULLA FURNISHED TO THE MOTHER OF THE PRISONER THE NAME OF A WOMAN IN NEW YORK CITY WHO PROMISED TO GET THE SON OUT OF JAIL IN RETURN FOR PAYMENT OF U.S. $25,000. THE WOMAN IS MARTA JIMENEZ MARTINEZ, WHO IS DESCRIBED IN AGENCY RECORDS AS VERY CLOSE TO FIDEL CASTRO, AN OPPORTUNIST, IRRATIONAL, AND UNPREDICTABLE. HER ESTRANGED HUSBAND, BERNAL JAMIS FAYAD, IS REPORTEDLY A CUBAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) OFFICER. JIMENEZ IS ATTACHED TO THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND IS FREQUENTLY A DELEGATE TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. [redacted] FBI REPORT SJ-105-14608, DATED 27 JUNE 1974, CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RIVADULLA. NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON VIVIAN FERNANDEZ

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 6

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO FER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

CONF: INFO: FILE

937064

DE CASTRO. Y

7. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. CLASSIFIED BY 007255.HB

FILE: 56-8-11; 56-2-9/3; 201-281694; 201-281197; 201-876630; 201-784065; 201-920333; 201-299292.

AC/LA/PNC ______
AC/LA/COG ______
AC/LA/M&CA John ______
C/LA/CAR ______
C/LA/OPS ______
P&CS/ITG ______
AGC/DDO ______
CI/OG ______
CI/R&A ______

DATE: 3 NOVEMBER 1976
ORIG: DAVID F. THOMPSON:MEH
UNIT: LA/PNC/PA/R
EXT: 1854

C/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAPD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL [illegible]

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 5 OCTOBER 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)

FBI FILE NO: 105-16193 (SAN JUAN)

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-406

FROM AMEMBASSY, PORT-AU-PRINCE

DATE: 11 APRIL 1963

CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: U.S. BUSINESSMAN SIGNS CONTRACTS WITH HAITIAN GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL BANK

14-00000

CHARLES, Clemard Joseph L. HAITI

President and General Manager
of the Commercial Bank of Haiti

President and /General /Manager of the Commercial Bank of Haiti (Banque Commerciale d'Haiti - BCH), Clemard Joseph Charles is known as a confidant of President François Duvalier and as a businessman of questionable repute. One well-informed official source reports ~~that~~ Charles, as a "slippery character"; ~~and that although~~ is active on the Haitian scene; ~~there is~~ considerable doubt exists ~~as to Charles'~~ concerning his importance or political significance despite the fact that he appears to have a "line into the Palace" and is persona grata with the President. Source: President, National Bank of Haiti [Regarding Charles' business interests, a prominent and knowledgeable Haitian recently (March 1963) reported that the Commercial Bank ~~of Haiti~~ is in bad shape, "holding a worthless portfolio made up of notes guaranteed by political figures," and that Charles himself was dishonest. ~~—having~~ for example, he recently approved a loan for $14,000 on his daughter's signature alone. Furthermore, Charles was alleged by this same source to know nothing about banking and to be a favorite of President Duvalier.] This estimate is confirmed by one U S official who adds that Charles is more accurately described as a "promotor" than as a businessman and that he is a partner in the BCH rather than the sole owner. Charles ~~frequently~~ endeavors to attract US venture capital for various Haitian projects and claims to be an honorary citizen of Long Beach, Long Island, New York, having promoted a "sister city" relationship between that town and Port-au-Prince.

?

A dark Negro about five-feet seven-inches tall, Clemard Joseph Charles

S REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED IN ROUGH UNEDITED — for biog. file, Report on Haitian opposition personalities
M TO EXPEDITE THE SERVICING OF AN URGENT REQUEST. CONFIDENTIAL

201-457029

14-00000

was born of peasant parents at Gonaives, Haiti, on 21 April 1923, ~~and received~~ [illegible] received his primary education at a ~~P~~arochial school, and graduated from the Lycée Geffrard in 1939. According to Charles' own account, during his early career he taught in rural Haitian schools, and worked as an upholsterer, time-keeper, plantation supervisor and free lance journalist. In 1947 he was appointed comptroller-general of the Haitian Southern Banana Industry, and in 1949 he became general agent, ~~in 1949;~~ he then established himself as a manufacturer's representative and created his own export-import business. Charles traveled to London in 1953 and to Brussels in 1957 as a member of various Haitian Government missions. Charles ~~further~~ states that he created the Commercial Bank of Haiti in 1960 and is its sole owner, as well as being the sole representative in Haiti of the General Electric Company, Ltd., of London, England and of Siemens Schuckert Werke, Germany.

Charles and his wife, Sophie, have one adopted son.

March 1963

DJR

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED IN ROUGH UNEDITED FORM TO EXPEDITE THE SERVICING OF AN URGENT REQUEST.

Y-1

STATE

Page 4 of 5
Enclosure No. 1
Port-au-Prince A-345
5 March 63

Pres Natl. Bk. of Haiti

Smaller Commercial Banks in Bad Shape

Antoine André remarked quite flatly that there are really only two banks in Haiti, the BNRH and the Royal Bank. The others are pretty sad affairs. The BANQUE COLOMBO-HAITIAN, for example, has a portfolio of $1.4 million which is, as André put it, "all fraud". The president of that bank, he said, is a rich man today. His technique, according to André, is to find someone willing to accept a loan which he knows cannot or will not repay on which he kicks back in some cases more than half. André said he knows personally of one man who was leaving for the United States who signed notes for $10,000 and accepted $2,000, the remainder going into the pocket of the bank president. As for reserves, the Colombo-Haitian bank has been below the legal requirements for months and is now paying, in accordance with law, fines of $150 daily. What will happen when depositors want their money back he, André, would rather not think about.

André said he knew the bank had tried to interest some American investors in the business, perhaps in the hope of getting new capital with which to keep going. He, André, however, understood that the Americans were a rather dubious Miami group; even if they did come in (which he did not at the moment foresee) he didn't think it would improve the situation. The Colombo-Haitian bank, he said, was in such poor shape it would take a major overhaul to save it.

I had led the conversation over to the Colombo-Haitian bank because of certain special interests we have. I now took the occasion to ask about Clemard CHARLES and his COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI. André replied that the situation was practically the same. The bank held a worthless portfolio made up of notes guaranteed by political figures. Charles himself was dishonest - recently, for example, he had approved a loan for $14,000 on his daughter's signature alone - and he also knew nothing about banking but he was something of a favorite with the President who gave him support. The BNRH holds mortgages on the Commercial Bank of Haiti, for example, and, since payments are now substantially in arrears, André said, he might have foreclosed. The President, however, had asked him not to in order to avoid a scandal.(5)

Balance of Payments Situation Temporarily Improved

Turning briefly to the balance of payments question, I asked André how matters now stood (having in mind, but not mentioning, some

---

(5) The latest balance sheet on the Commercial Bank of Haiti, with some comment on its president, was forwarded with Embassy A-325, February 15, 1963.

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-325

DATE: 16 FEBRUARY 1963

CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FROM: AMEMBASSY, PORT-AU-PRINCE

SUBJECT: BANKING: BALANCE SHEET OF THE
BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 2 AUGUST 1962

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: RE: CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES
INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: 105-6311 (MIAMI)

SECRET

File: 201-97839

JOSEPH D. CHARLES

Joseph D. Charles, a Negro, was born 15 November 1907, at Limbe, Haiti. He is married and has five children. He received his law degree at the Law School in Cap Hatien in 1928. A former law professor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney and Judge of the Civil Court in Cap Hatien (1928 - 1940), Charles served as Ambassador to the United States from 8 October 1946 until 1 June 1960. During this period, he served also as Ambassador on the Council of the Organization of American States (1949 - 1950). He resigned his ambassadorial post after the fall of the government of President Estime who had appointed him. On 29 February 1952, he was designated Secretary of Education and Public Works by President Magloire and resigned from the cabinet on 31 March 1953, allegedly because of his opposition to increasingly close ties between the governments of Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Charles chaired the Haitian delegation to the second post of the first session of the UN General Assembly (1946), the second session (1947) and the fourth session (1949). He chaired also the delegation to the Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogata (1948) and is reported to have been friendly to the United States.

Charles has in the past been mentioned more than once as a possible successor to the incumbent president. The most recent occasion was in 1955 when he was mentioned as a possible successor to President Paul E. Magloire.

SECRET

Madame Charles, nee Telson, is a sister of Adelphin Telson, formerly Minister of Defense and Justice, formerly President of the Chamber of Deputies, who is friendly to the US and in contact with US officials in Port-au-Prince. A sister of Madame Charles is married to Colonel Marcaisse Prosper, former Chief of Police under the Magloire government. It has been alleged that the three men, Charles, Telson and Prosper, constitute a potentially strong political force in Haiti.

SECRET

COUNTRY Haiti

SUBJECT Interview with Clemard Joseph Charles/ Possible Duvalier Successor/His Ideas/ Friends and Supporters/Interpretation of Current Situation

REPORT NO. 00-B-3,260,765

DATE DISTR. 10 May 1963

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES 00/CD Case 40556

DATE OF INFO. To early May 63

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---/2 May 63

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, former journalist, who has followed developments in the Caribbean area closely for many months and maintains contact with persons directly concerned with the area.

His command of French and his habit of making detailed shorthand notes enable him to report with an unusual degree of accuracy.

1. On 2 May 63, we had a four-hour interview with Clemard Joseph Charles, president and general manager of Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, Port-au-Prince, vice president of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, and cousin of Joseph D. Charles, former Haitian ambassador to the US.

2. Clemard Charles, whose PO Box in Port-au-Prince is No. 5751, told us that he was a man of peasant stock and that while a business leader he has the full confidence of the predominantly peasant population of Haiti, and, that with the additional backing of forcibly retired anti-Duvalier army officers, intellectuals, journalists and businessmen, he is in a position to become the head of a provisional government after Duvalier is removed. He believes the span between now and 15 May when Duvalier's term expires and 22 May, when his new term is scheduled to commence, will be the most crucial period for Haiti. He believes Duvalier is ready to institute a reign of terror, killing those who oppose him, and is willing to accept Sovbloc help. About two weeks ago the Polish charge d'affaires left Port-au-Prince for Poland, and Charles believes he carries Duvalier's request for economic and possibly military help.

3. As vice president of the Chamber of Commerce, he learned that in early April 1963 a Czechoslovak delegation arrived in Port-au-Prince, presumably to discuss trade matters, a fact which gave rise to rumors that it consisted of military technicians.

4. Charles firmly believes this will be the last chance for the US Government to help establish a democratic Haiti friendly to the US and save the country for a Castro-type Communist takeover. Although he has been on good terms with Duvalier, he now feels that the President "went crazy and must be stopped before he liquidates the opposition. Shortly after Charles made this statement he was called to the phone. Returning, he told us that one of his friends had been killed two days before by Duvalier forces. He declined to give the name of the alleged victim, but talked freely about some of his own influential supporters on whom he could rely with a firm pledge of holding free elections:

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NO DISSEM ABROAD

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

CONTROLLED

DISSEM: The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

Ambroise IHARIN (201-345467) told FBI in Nov 62 that DESINOR is one of two card-carrying Communists in Gov't.

a. Clovis Desinor, Secretary of Commerce & Industry, and a good friend.
b. Timothy Paret, retired colonel, former Haitian military attache in Washington
c. Col. (fnu) Honorat, now an asylee in the Brazilian Embassy, Port-au-Prince
d. Col. H. Alcenio, retired officer, "a good and honest man."
e. Former Ambassador Joseph D. Charles
f. Dr. Emile Saint-Lot, former law professor; president of Haitian Senate and National Assembly in 1957; former ambassador to France, now in exile in New York (Apt. 12J, 392 Central Park West at 100th St., tel. UN 5-5015). Charles called him a "player," that is, an Opportunist, but anti-Duvalier.
g. Col. (fnu) Cham

5. Charles intimated that he had many other prominent supporters who are violently anti-Duvalier and who are ready to back "my government." He has just passed his 40th birthday (he was born 21 Apr 1923 in Gonaives), ~~who~~ which makes him eligible for the presidency in so far as the constitutional age requirement is concerned. In case he did not become provisional president after Duvalier's overthrow, he would be satisfied with the post of Secretary of Finance & Economic Affairs. He said the present secretary, Dr. Herve Boyer, has leftist tendencies, and his wife is definitely a Communist.

HARNETT described BOYER as second card-carrying Commie known to him

6. Charles added that as he is of "100% black origin" (He is very black), he would be qualified to become president. He said that only those who are in this category can become president.

7. Charles said he would need the "moral and economic help of the US Government and people" to transform Haiti into a true and prosperous democracy. He said he would need about one year to put into ~~the~~ effect his "plan for the economic and social development of Haiti," which, among others has these salient points:

a. Creation of a balanced economy adapted to Haitian conditions
b. Development of industry and exploitation of natural resources
c. Modernization of agriculture

8. Charles would like to present his plan to US officials for consideration. He said about 90% of Haitians are against Duvalier, who maintains his rule by keeping the militia strong. ~~Duvl~~ Duvalier no longer has funds to pay the militiamen but allows them to "live off the land." Charles believes that in the event of an anti-Duvalier uprising, the army would kill the hated militiamen who are responsible only to Duvalier.

9. Once Duvalier is finished, Charles would suggest that as a goodwill gesture toward the Haitians, who are overwhelmingly pro-US, the US construct the promised airport and thus create jobs. Another way to bolster the economy would be to encourage tourists.

10. Charles hopes the Dominican Republic will not invade Duvalier's Haiti. He believes the Dominicans could easily defeat Haiti's army and militia but an invasion would cause the Haitians to rally around Duvalier in defense of their country.

11. Before leaving Port-au-Prince, Charles worked out a telephone code with his wife, Sophie. On 30 Apr 63, he called her, and she told him "not to rush home," which meant that his life might be in danger if he returned to Haiti now. In view of this, he told the Haitian Consul in New York that he has to stay a few days longer to buy parts for machines used in his Haitian sisal enterprise.

12. Charles gave the following data concerning his career: He went to parochial school; in 1937, was graduated from Lycee Geffrard, Gonaives; taught in rural schools after his father's death in 1939, and also supported his family by working as upholsterer, timekeeper, plantation supervisor and

free-lance journalist. In 1947 he was appointed controller general of southern Haiti banana industry and became general agent in 1948. In 1949 he established his own export-import business. In 1953 he went to London as a member of a Haitian government economic mission. In 1954 on behalf of Haiti he negotiated a contract with General Electric, Ltd., of Coventry, UK, for modernisation and extension of Haiti's telecommunications system. In 1957 he was appointed member of a Haitian mission to an international conference in Brussels. In 1960 he founded Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, of which he is sole owner. In addition, he is full or part owner of the following Haitian enterprises: Universal Enterprises SA; National Deutsch (sic) Associates; Clemard Joseph Charles Import-Export; a South Haiti cocoa enterprise; J.C.Charles & Co. He is sole representative of General Electric, Ltd., of London, and Siemens Schukert Werke, West Germany. In the past few years he has made many business trips to the US, UK, France, Italy and West Germany. He said he had invested about US$500,000 in the Haitian economy and as a patriot under no circumstances will he take money out of Haiti.

Merit

13. Charles, who is married and has one adopted son, has received many honors, including the Civil Mast Order, Officer of the Labor Order, etc. In 1962 he was given the Key of the City of New York.

14. Charles concluded by saying that in the world today there are two alternatives: The US or the USSR. He says he and his group have chosen the US. As to how to get rid of Duvalier, he said "the tyrant may be killed by the army" before 22 May 63. He did not elaborate; he merely called attention to Trujillo's fate.

-end-

14-00000

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE NO. ______

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE: 2 MAY 196[illegible]

☐ ROUTINE ☒ PRIORITY ☐ URGENT

FROM: WH [illegible]

ORIGINATING OFFICER: LATIN AMERICA DR

PHONE EXTENSION: [illegible]

TRANSMIT TO:

NYOR CITY W______

CONFIDENTIAL
(CLASSIFICATION)

TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS, DOUBLE SPACED

~~[illegible]~~

NEW CASE 40556: RE FREUND-CZARNOWSKI TELECONS OF 1 AND 2 MAY: THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS ARE SUBMITTED FOR CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES:

A. WHOM DOES CHARLES SEE AS THE MOST DESIRABLE INTERIM PRESIDENT IN CASE DUVALIER IS OUSTED? WHAT ARE HIS REASONS FOR THIS PREFERENCE?

B. WHAT IS SOURCE'S ASSESSMENT OF CERTAIN HAITIAN POLITICAL FIGURES WHO ARE COMMONLY CHARACTERIZED AS LEFTISTS OR COMMUNISTS? AMONG THESE ARE PAUL BLANCHET, EDRISS ST. ARMAND AND HERVE BOYER. DOES HE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE UNDER MOSCOW DISCIPLINE?

C. DOES CHARLES KNOW ANYTHING OF THE REPORTED ENTRANCE INTO HAITI IN EARLY APRIL OF A SMALL NUMBER OF CZECH MILITARY TECHNICIANS?

D. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN BACKGROUND DATA ON CHARLES. SEE CASE 40257. ALSO, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE PLACE AND DATE OF HIS BIRTH FOR NAME CHECK PURPOSES.

Harry A. McC[illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

OO/C learned from Army intell that Charles [illegible]
OO/ [illegible] for following [illegible]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 172 REPLACES FORM 35-7 [illegible] 1949
1 SEP 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, DO/COEO	EXTENSION 2224	NO. IX-122
		DATE 2 May 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/COEO/Allen				
2. DO/COEO/Bessette				
3. 14 MAY 1963 RI/AN Attn: Dick Leach				Please classify into ~~200-6-203/3~~ 201-357039
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8. 10 MAY 1963 DO/COEO/Bessette				File Copy - 201 file
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
~~[illegible]~~	

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

IX-122

2 May 1963

CONTACT REPORT

WUBRINY - M. Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. WUBRINY/1 telephoned on the sterile line from Chicago, on his way to the West Coast, to report his final contact before departing with subject.

2. Subject telephoned WUBRINY/1 on 1 May and said that because of the recent unpleasant developments in Haiti he thought it would be quite inappropriate to continue discussions regarding WUSALINE possible investment in the area at least until things were clarified.

3. M. CHARLES indicated that he was returning to Haiti shortly and asked if WUBRINY/1 could visit him there. WUBRINY/1 said that he would consider this or have one of his representatives go, if it later seemed desirable. He indicated, however, a continuing interest in the investment picture in Haiti if, as, and when.

C. FRANK STONE, III
Chief
DO/COEO

DO/COEO/CFS:jj(2 May 1963)
Distribution:
Orig - EO subject
1 - EO chrono
1 - WUBRINY Ops

201-352029
ABSTRACT X
INDEX
IX 122
DATE

CS COPY

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

IX-104

30 April 1963

CONTACT REPORT

WUBRINY - Haitian Operation

1. WUBRINY/1 telephoned from his residence on the sterile line at approximately 0930 hours to report the following.

2. WUBRINY/1 said that he believed that the meeting that is to be held by Mr. CHARLES and WUBRINY/1 plus an unnamed third party would involve a Mr. Tardieu.

3. I told WUBRINY/1 there had been considerable interest in this general development on the part of the Department of State and cited (without identification) A-406, Amembassy, Port-au-Prince, dated April 11, 1963, subject: U.S. Businessman Signs Contracts with Haitian Government and Local Bank. I told WUBRINY/1 that the Department information I had before me cited Le Moniteur of March 13, 1963 and said that the Airgram also mentioned a Mr. Bert Cindine TARDIEU. I also gave WUBRINY/1 the points raised under "comment" on page 2 of the Airgram.

4. WUBRINY/1 said that he agreed with all of these comments as he had come to the same conclusions.

5. I told WUBRINY/1 that there was obviously considerable interest in any reporting that he can do on the subject and requested that he let me know when the meeting takes place and continue his detailed reporting as heretofore. He agreed to do so.

C. FRANK STONE, III
Chief
DO/COEO

DO/COEO/CFS:jj(30 Apr 63)
Distribution:
Orig - EO subject
1 - EO chrono
1 - WUBRINY Ops

[illegible]
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible] and
[illegible]

~~CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM~~
~~RELEASE IN FULL~~
~~1999~~

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-419

FROM: AMEMBASSY, PORT-AU-PRINCE

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES
OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI ON APRIL 1
18, 1963

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
DO/HQT
Rm. 5 B 2825

EXTENSION: 4551

NO.

DATE: 25 April 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/COEO Attn: Gale W. Allen		30 APR 1963		2-4. Suggest additional info obtained from B/1 be added to the official 201.
2. C/DO/COEO	[illegible]	[illegible]		
3. DODS/ops/Janney				
4. DO/COEO/ALLEN				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

IX No. 76

23 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: DO/COEO

ATTENTION : Mr. Gale W. Allen

SUBJECT : Trace Reply - Clemard Joseph CHARLES

REFERENCE : DO/COEO Memorandum dated 23 April 1963 requesting traces on CLEMARD, Joseph Charles

1. There are no traces on Clemard Joseph CHARLES (201-357-029) born 21 April 1923 at Gonaives, Haiti, who is President and General Manager of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, in RID or at the WH/Haitian Desk. In March 1963, Biographics Register prepared a summary of information on Mr. CHARLES for inclusion in the Biographic Intelligence Report on Haitian Opposition Personalities. This summary is made up of information obtained from several different sources. One source classifies CHARLES as a slippery character who is active on the Haitian scene and refers to him as a "promoter" rather than a businessman, who endeavers to attract United States "venture" capital for various Haitian projects and then becomes a partner by virtue of the promotion. Biographics Register has a very high opinion of this Source, who is the State Department's Haiti Desk Officer. During a debriefing on CHARLES, in February 1963, this same source stated that CHARLES is a confidant of President Duvalier and that he has emerged as an active businessman by virtue of his priviledged position with the President.

2. Another source of information regarding CHARLES' business interests is the President of the National Bank of Haiti who considers CHARLES, himself, as dishonest. For example, according to Source, CHARLES approved a loan of $14,000.00 on his daughter's signature alone. Also, the Commercial Bank of Haiti held a worthless portfolio made up

SECRET

SUBJECT: Trace Reply - Clemard Joseph CHARLES

of notes guaranteed by political figures. This Source also stated that CHARLES was "something of a favorite of the President, who gave him support."

3. Attached to this memorandum is a copy of Department of State Airgram No. A-325, dated 16 February 1963, from the United States Embassy, Port-Au-Prince, Haiti, subject: Banking: Balance Sheet of the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti which includes some information on CHARLES' life story. You will note the comment in the last paragraph of Airgram A-325 that reads, ". . . Be all that as it may, the Embassy has no strongly adverse information concerning Mr. Charles' integrity or banking honesty. And as the balance sheet shows, his bank, if not thriving, is at least still a going concern.

4. It may be that a check with OO/C through Mr. Schreyer's office and a request for field station traces will provide additional information concerning CHARLES. A copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to RID with a request for a 201 file on Subject which will be forwarded to you on permanent charge.

Anna Panor

Anna Panor
DO/HQT

Enclosures:
1. State Airgram No. A-325 (copy)
2. Draft BR Summary

14-00000

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

24 April 1963

201

CONTACT REPORT

WUBRINY/1 - Ambassador Boengnignon - Clemard Joseph Charles

1. Ambassador Boengnignon had previously informed WUBRINY/1 that Clemard Joseph Charles, President of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, was coming to New York on 24 April and suggested that WUBRINY/1 might work with him in financing Boengnignon's diplomatic residence in Haiti.

2. Mr. Allen informed WUBRINY/1 that Charles is a confident of President Duvalier and could be expected to report on all Americans with whom he had conversations and the substance of these conversations. WUBRINY/1 was admonished that in any contact with Charles the security of WUBRINY/1's relationship with KUBARK should be uppermost in his mind. WUBRINY/1 was informed that Charles is reported as a businessman of questionalbe repute. He is characterized as slippery, dishonest, and more of a promoter than businessman. His bank holds a worthless portfolio of notes guaranteed by political signatures. For example, he approved a loan of $14,000 for his daughter on her signature alone. He is also reported to be a partner in the bank rather than sole owner, as he alleges.

3. Mr. Allen said that Charles was of great interest and that we would like to know why he was in the U. S. at this time. WUBRINY/1 was admonished in any conversations with Charles to concentrate on economic rather than on political matters unless Charles himself first raised political matters. It was suggested to WUBRINY/1 that he might inquire about Haiti's economic status, the outlook for the coffee crop on which Haiti's economy may stand or fall, and how the currency is being backed in the absence of a foreign aid program.

4. It was further suggested to WUBRINY/1 that should the conversation with Charles get loose that he might inquire as to whether top Haitian officials are putting aside funds outside the country and question the rationale for an expensive inaugural celebration for the President, given the bad state of the Haitian economy. WUBRINY/1 said that he could easily add the flight of capital question by discussing the availability of Haitian capital for investment outside Haiti.

5. WUBRINY/1 said that in view of the delicacy of this operation that he would wear his other hat, i.e., represent his own firm rather than WUSALINE in making this contact. He foresaw no problems stating

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

that it is routine for business people to ascertain each other's views. Messrs. Stone and Allen concurred in the use of WUBRINY/1's private firm and admonished WUBRINY/1 to keep Charles on the string in view of our interest in him.

6. Mr. Allen indicated to WUBRINY/1 that we were definitely interested in [illegible] and needed a good assessment such as WUBRINY/1 had done on [illegible]/1. WUBRINY/1 said that this presented no problem. He stated that he had not specifically asked [illegible] who his opposition sources are because he did not want [illegible] to become suspicious.

Gale W. Allen

Gale W. Allen
[illegible]

Distribution:
Orig - [illegible]
1 - [illegible] Ops
1 - [illegible]
1 - [illegible] Chrono
1 - Charles - 201

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201- 97839

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

C/4

CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** (When Filled In)

		ROUTING			
ORIG.	HELEN E MORGAN				
UNIT	WH/6/H	1		4	
EXT.	4506	2		5	
DATE	7 MAY 1963	3		6	

MAY 7 13 26:53

CONFIRMATION COPIES: WH 11

TDCS DB-3/654,521

INFORMATION COPIES: CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI/D, FI, FI/INT 6, IW 2, CA/O 4, CA/PEG 2, CA 2, SAS 5

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 7 MAY 1963

PRECEDENCE: ☒ ROUTINE

BASED ON (Fld. Rpt., Proj.)
WAVE 8122 (IN 32935)
NO PROJECT
EMTIN-1
LIAISON*

DISSEMINATION

~~WH/6/H~~	3		WH/PRIN	1	
WH/6/DR	1		WH/PACY	1	
			WH/SNTO	1	
			JMWAVE	1	

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

RECOMMEND FOR EXO

RELAY REQUEST ATTACHED FOR RELAY TO DOPA

DD/P INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S): SAS/INTEL/R (BY PHONE)

CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** (When Filled In)

RELEASING OFFICER: C. Bauer
JMWS/R

COPY NO.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY HAITI

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/654,521

SUBJECT REMARKS MADE BY FELIX FRANCIS CONCERNING THE HAITIAN SITUATION

DATE DISTR. 7 MAY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 5 MAY 1963

REFERENCES TDCSDB-3/654,459 IN 32935

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (6 MAY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3 (THAT THE REMARKS WERE MADE)

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-2784

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE CUBAN (F) IN TOUCH WITH PRO- AND ANTI-DUVALIER HAITIANS, FROM FELIX FRANCIS, WHO HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS A CONFIDANT OF PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER.

1. ON 5 MAY 1963 RUDOLPH BABOUN, HAITIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN MIAMI, TOLD FELIX FRANCIS THAT IT WAS THE BELIEF OF THE HAITIAN FOREIGN OFFICE THAT THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WOULD NOT ATTACK HAITI UNLESS THE UNITED STATES INTERVENED MILITARILY. BABOUN SAID THAT THIS BELIEF WAS SUBSTANTIATED BY INFORMATION WHICH THE HAITIAN FOREIGN OFFICE OBTAINED FROM ALBERTO ZULETA ANGEL, HEAD OF THE COMMISSION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) WHICH VISITED HAITI.

2. FRANCIS SAID THAT THE ONLY RESISTANCE TO THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER WAS THE WEAK CLANDESTINE GROUP HEADED BY CLEMENT BARBOT. HE ALSO SAID THAT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT BARBOT COULD TOPPLE DUVALIER; HOWEVER,

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	[illegible]	[illegible]	OCI	ONE	OCR	[illegible]	[illegible]	FBI
STATE/DIR	REPCINCLANT															

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

IF SUCCESSFUL, HE WOULD PROBABLY INSTALL JOSEPH D. CHARLES, FORMER HAITIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, AS HEAD OF THE GOVERNING JUNTA.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (MIAMI) CINCLANT CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

6 may

XXXXX ZEA

SECRET TDTG 061700Z

PRITY WA CITE NYCR 8910

L/A BR INFO SUPPORT (STUNTZ) AND CZAJKOWSKI

GROUP ONE EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

CASE 40556

THIS IS REPORT NY 2147-3 FOR 00-A(S) CREDIT.

1. THE SITUATION CONCERNING CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES ACTIVITIES IS JUST AS "FLUID" AS THE SITUATION IN HAITI. CHARLES ADVISED US THAT HIS FRIEND OF MRS. DOROTHY MATLOCK (SEE WHAT I MEAN BY "FLUID"?) HAD CHANGED HIS TRAVEL PLANS TO WASHINGTON. INSTEAD OF TUESDAY HE (DRYER) NOW EXPECTS TO BE IN WASHINGTON IN THURSDAY OR FRIDAY. CHARLES INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO GO TO WASHINGTON SOME TIME THIS WEEK. HE ASKED US TO SEE HIM AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON. OUR MEETING (THE THIRD SINCE THIS WEEK. HE ASKED US TO SEE HIM AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON. OUR MEETING (THE THIRD SINCE LAST THURSDAY) IS SCHEDULED AT 1430. BALOG (STILL CAPTAIN BALOG, US ARMY TO CHARLES) WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH STUNTZ RE THEIR TELECON AFTER BALOG-CHARLES MEETING.

2. CHARLES TOLD US THAT HIS "SPIRITUAL FATHER", B. GINDINE TARDIEU, A FRENCH CITIZEN, A CONSULTANT TO CHARLES' BANK IN PORT-AU-PRINCE IS IN NEW YORK NOW. TARDIEU WHO HAS SPENT AT LEAST 20 YEARS IN HAITI, IS NOW STAYING AT THE PARTK SHERTON HOTTEL, ROOM 2032.

SECRET

CFN PRITY NYCR 8910 L/A INFO (STUNTZ) CZAJKOWSKI BALOG 40556 NY 2147-3

00-A(S) REPORT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES "FLUID" HAITI [illegible] DRYER [illegible]

XXXXX ZEA

S E C R E T TDTG 031830Z 3 May PRIORITY

PRITY VA CITE NYOR 8918 8919

L/A BR INFO CZAJKOWSKI FROM BALOG

GROUP ONE EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

MAY 3 4 PM '63

CASE 40556

THIS IS REPORT NY-2128-3 FOR OO-A(S) CREDIT. IT IS SUPPLEMENTAL TO NY-2119-3.

1. AT HIS REQUEST, ON 3 MAY 63 WE HAD AN ADDITIONAL INTERVIEW WITH CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES. HE INFORMED US THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM JOSEPH F. DRYER, TAMPA, FLORIDA. DRYER TOLD CHARLES THAT HE COULD NOT SEE HIM OVER THE WEEK END, BUT WOULD VISIT HIM IN NEW YORK CITY NEXT WEDNESDAY, 8 MAY. PRIOR TO THAT DRYER PLANS TO MEET IN WASHINGTON DC JACQUELINE DELMAR, 3130 P STREET, NW, TEL: FE 3-9066, A FRIEND OF MISS MADLOCK'S TO DISCUSS "THINGS OF MUTAL INTEREST CONCERNING HAITI."

2. CHARLES TALKED TO US ABOUT THE WORSENING SITUATION IN HAITI. HE BELIEVES THAT IT WAS TIME FOR THE US TO LAND THE MARINES IN HAITI TO LIBERATE THE COUNTRY FROM "MADMAN DUVALIER" AND PROTECT THE LIVES OF AMERICANS THERE. HE FEELS THAT THE US SHOULD ACT UNDER THE AEGIS

OF OAS IN THE INTEREST OF HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY. HE MENTIONED THAT THE US DID NOT HESITATE TO SEND MARINES TO LEBANON WHEN US INTERESTS WERE THREATENED.

3. CHARLES DECIDED TO STAY IN NEW YORK "FOR THE TIME BEING". TODAY HE SENT A CABLE TO HIS BANK IN PORT-AU-PRINCE INDICATING THAT HIS BUSINESS TRANSACTION (BUYING MACHINE PARTS FOR HIS ENTERPRISES) WILL KEEP HIM IN US FOR AWHILE.

4. DISCUSSING THE REPORTED MASSACRE OF ANTI-DUVALIER ARMY OFFICERS CHARLES URGED FAST ACTION ON PART OF US. HE REITERATED HIS OPINION THAT DUVALIER WOULD BE "ELIMINATED" BY 22 MAY, BUT WARNED AGAINST LETTING ANTI-DUVALIER EXILES NOW IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, CUBA AND ELSEWHERE RETURN TO HAITI AND "START SHOOTING THERE". HE BELIEVES THAT THE BEST POLICY FOR THE US TO FOLLOW WOULD BE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT WITH LEADING HAITIAN ARMY OFFICERS. IN ADDITION TO PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED NAMES, HE FEELS THAT GENERAL CONSTANT, COL. CHAM AND COL CAILLARD COULD BE WON OVER FOR COOPERATION. HE CLAIMS TO KNOW THESE OFFICERS WELL AND IN CASE OF LANDING OF US MARINES HE WOULD BE GLAD TO GO ALONG AND SERVE AS AN INTERMEDIARY. HE FEELS THAT HE HAS ENOUGH INFLUENCE TO BRING ABOUT A SITUATION WITHOUT BLOODSHED IN WHICH SETTING UP A PROVISIONAL

GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FEASIBLE. IF NECESSARY HE WOULD BE WILLING TO STAY IN THE BACKGROUND IN THE ROLE OF "EMINENCE GRIS" FOR THE GOOD OF HIS COUNTRY.

SECRET

CFN PRITY NYOR 8918 L/A BR INFO CZAJKOWSKI BALCO 49556 NY-2128-3 00-A(S)
CREDIT NY-2119-3 3 MAY 63 CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES A JOSEPH F. DRYER
TAMPA NOT SEE NEW YORK WEDNESDAY 8 MAY PRIOR DC
JACQUELINE DELMAR 3130 P STREET, NW, TEL: FE 3-9066 A MISS MADLOCK'S
"THINGS OF MUTAL INTEREST CONCERNING HAITI"
US DUVALIER US AEGIS OAS US NOT HESITATE LEBANON US A PORT-AU-PRINCE
US ANTI-DUVALIER US "ELIMINATED" 22 MAY US GENERAL CONSTANT, COL.
CHAN COL CAILLARD US A WITHOUT BLOODSHED A PROVISIONAL "EMINENCE GRIS"
HBT

03/2026Z MAY ESG

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Miami, Florida

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

A-2

FILE NO. (If any)

DATE December 29, 1966

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters): CHARLES,
First Name: Clemard
Middle Initial: J.

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP: Haiti

UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code): Consulate General of Haiti, Miami, Fla.

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL: PAA 432

Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 626 Pacot, Port Au Prince, Haiti

BIRTH DATE: 4-21-23
BIRTH PLACE: Gonaives, Haiti

NAI Per CSCI-316/03952-66 Subj. has above
12 Jan 67 [illegible]

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION: 12-20-66 - Miami, Fla.

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION: A-2 - Duration of status

DESTINATION: Consulate General, Haiti, Miami, Fla.

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.
O.N.I.

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

File in 201-357029

FORM I-67
(REV. 6-1-65)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Instructions: Any handwritten entry [illegible] capital letters. All Spanish names shall be [illegible] father's name first and the mother's [illegible]

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

FILE NO.

DATE
12-4-66

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) First Name Middle Initial
C[illegible], C[illegible] J.

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP
Haiti

UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)
Ambassador of Haiti, Washington, D. C.

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL
PAA 23[illegible]

Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE
Pacot, Port au Prince, Haiti

BIRTH DATE
4-21-32

BIRTH PLACE
Haiti

NAI
22 Dec 66

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION
11-27-66 NYC

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION
A-2 D/S

DESTINATION

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F.B.I.

cc: C.I.A. Jwp
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.
O.N.I.

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

File in 201-357024

19

FORM I-69
(REV. 6-1-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO. (If any) 17/2

DATE 7/12/66

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle): CHARLES - Clemard
NATIONALITY (Citizenship): Haiti
UNITED ~~STATES ADDRESS~~: Haitian Consul - NYC
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL: PAA 119
PERMANENT ADDRESS: PACUT #26 PTO prince Haiti
BIRTH DATE: 7/13/66
BIRTH PLACE: GONALVES Haiti
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION: 7/13/66 NYC
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION: OFFICIAL D/S
DESTINATION: Haitian Consul - NYC

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

201 reg 22 Jul 66

NAI
2 Aug 66

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

22 July 66
Ref.

cc CIA.
G2
OSI.
State Dept.

Form I-97
(Rev. 7-15-63)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Miami, Florida

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters., All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	5-3-67

A-2

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) CHARLES	First Name CLEMARD	Middle Initial J.
COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP HAITI		
UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code) WALDORF ASTORIA NEW YORK CITY		
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PAA 432		
Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE PORT AU PRINCE HAITI		
BIRTH DATE 4-21-23	BIRTH PLACE Gonaives, Haiti	

NAI
6 June 67

201-357029

CHARLES CLEMARD JOSEPH

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION 4-30-67 Miami, Fla.
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION official-dur. of status
DESTINATION above U.S.

201-357029 *

lh

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

cc: C.I.A.
[illegible]
[illegible]
State Dept.
ANI

fi
02/5/67

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

201-357029

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 28 DECEMBER 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET - NO FORN DISSEM

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI
INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

UAT

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	12-4-66

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters)	First Name	Middle Initial
CHARLES, Clemmard J.		

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP: Haiti

UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code): Ambassador of Haiti, Washington, D. C.

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL: PAA 234

Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE: Pecot, Port au Prince, Haiti

BIRTH DATE	BIRTH PLACE
4-21-32	Haiti

NA1
22 Dec 66

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION: 11-27-66 NYC

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION: A-2 D/S

DESTINATION:

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F.B.I.

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.
O.N.I.

Jwp

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

File in 201-357029+ 12-19-

FORM I-57
(REV. 6-1-66)

S-1 [illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029
X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-739205
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. 201-737125
Z [illegible]
DISSEN BY 23 PER ______ # ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

TDCS-314/15055-66
HTP 971

1		6	C
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION IW (ELH) ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME 1840 BY [illegible]

INFO VR. FILE. ADDP. CA 2. CA/PEG. CA/PROP. CI/OPS. CI/IC 2. FI. FI/D CS/DO
FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO/H 5, CA/O 4, CI/PS, FI/SPG, CS/SGO, WH/REG 8, WH/7/H/RE 3, WH/C 9

AN		WH/7/HT
PS		
ABSTRACT	X	

PRIN

S E C R E T 191615Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4164

DIRECTOR INFO REP/LANT, PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

19 Nov 66 IN 42726

INTEL

SUPDATA: EVMISER-1. FIELD COMMENT PARA FIVE FROM EVLEMON-2. NO INDEX.

4P

FILED 191615Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

MICROFILMED
DEC 1 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B 201-739205
B 201-737125

19 NOV 66
201-357029

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 42726

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

FBI I&NS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T 192027Z CITE TDCS-314/15055-66

DIST 19 NOVEMBER 1966

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI MID-NOVEMBER 1966

SUBJECT POWER JOCKEYING AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS

ACQ HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE, 18 NOVEMBER 1966 (HTP-971)

SOURCE A HAITIAN STUDENT AND MEMBER OF THE CLANDESTINE CATHOLIC ACTION PERSONNALISTE MOVEMENT WHO HAS MANY CONTACTS AMONG CATHOLIC, COMMUNIST, AND DUVALIERIST STUDENTS. SOURCE USUALLY REPORTS ACCURATELY THE INFORMATION HE RECEIVES. HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM FOUR DIFFERENT SOURCES WITH ACCESS TO OPPOSITION AND PRO-DUVALIER CIRCLES INCLUDING FRANTZ LEROY, PRIVATE SECRETARY TO AGRICULTURE MINISTER VICTOR NEVERS CONSTANT.

1. WITHIN DUVALIER'S ENTOURAGE THERE ARE THREE

PERSONS VYING FOR POWER AFTER THE FALL OF PRESIDENT DUVALIER. THEY ARE JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE HAITIAN BANK OF COMMERCE, CLOVIS DESINOR, MINISTER OF FINANCE, AND LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS. EACH OF THEM HAVE THEIR SUPPORTERS WITHIN THE GOH OR DUVALIER POWER STRUCTURES AND SOME HAVE SUPPORT FROM SOME OPPOSITIONISTS. ALL THREE REMAIN OUTWARDLY PRO-DUVALIERIST AND THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT THEY INTEND TO TRY TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER THEMSELVES. THEY ARE PRESENTLY JOCKEYING FOR SUPPORT FOR THEIR BID FOR POWER WHEN DUVALIER LEAVES THE PRESIDENCY.

2. CLOVIS DESINOR IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST POWERFUL. HE HAS THE SUPPORT OF COLONEL JACQUES LAROCHE, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, AND IS WIDELY CONSIDERED TO BE A RUTHLESS AND UNSCRUPULOUS SEEKER OF POWER. (SOURCE COMMENT: DESINOR HELD POSTS UNDER PRESIDENTS DUMARSAIS ESTIME AND PAUL MAGLOIRE YET SUPPORTED THE OVERTHROW OF BOTH THESE PRESIDENTS.)

3. JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES HAS THE SUPPORT OF FORMER ASSISTANT FINANCE MINISTER LIONEL LAJOIE AND AGRICULTURE

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

MINISTER VICTOR N. CONSTANT PLUS THAT OF SEVERAL PRO-DUVALIER BUSINESSMEN IN PORT AU PRINCE.

4. LUCKNER CAMBRONNE HAD THE SUPPORT OF COLONEL DANIEL BEAUVOIR AND THEREFORE LOST GROUND WHEN BEAUVOIR WAS DISMISSED FROM THE ARMY AND TOOK ASYLUM IN THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY. THE HOUSE OF CAMBRONNE'S MISTRESS, NEE LAFOREST, WHO IS THE SISTER OF MRS BEAUVOIR, WAS PILLAGED BY THE MILITIA ALONG WITH THE HOUSE OF BEAUVOIR, AND THIS IS INTERPRETED BY MANY OBSERVERS AS AN INDICATION OF CAMBRONNE'S LACK OF INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOH HIERARCHY. WITHIN THE PALACE IT IS RUMORED THAT CAMBRONNE WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO KEEP HIS DEPUTY'S SEAT FROM ARCAHAIE IN THE JANUARY ELECTION AND THAT HE WILL BE REPLACED BY DABELMAR MENTOR. (FIELD COMMENT: IN 1961, DABELMAR MENTOR WAS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE.)

5. (FIELD COMMENT: ANOTHER RELIABLE SOURCE WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS WITHIN THE GOH HAS REPORTED MUCH THE SAME INFORMATION AS ABOVE.)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSM

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-357029

14-00000

ISR

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-357029

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted]

DISSEM BY 2

ACTION

WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR, IDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

SECRET 211435Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 3939 PRIN

21 JUL 66 IN 61072

DIRECTOR

AN ~~[illegible]~~	~~[illegible]~~	WH/7/~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~	~~[illegible]~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

1. EVMOUNT-1 REPORTED 19 JULY FOLLOWING:

A. FROM HIGH RANKING PALACE SOURCE WHO CLAIMS OBTAINED INFO FROM TOP PALACE PERSONALITY THAT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES TRAVELED TO ITALY TO ARRANGE CONTACT AND PAYMENT OF 125 THOUSAND DOLLARS TO WOFACT OFFICER WHO KEEPING DUVALIER INFORMED RE WOFACT PLANS FOR HAITI. - Wow!!!

B. FROM SEPARATE SIMILAR SOURCE THAT DUVALIER RECEIVING INFO FROM POLE WHO MILITARY LEADER WOFACT SUPPORTED CARIBBEAN LEGION.

C. FROM SAME SOURCE A ABOVE THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON SENT DUVALIER PEN USED BY JOHNSON IN SIGNING IMPORTANT CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION.

2. EVMOUNT-1 ANESAIEMISE DUVALIER LEAKING FALSE INFO IN EFFORT TRACK DOWN INFORMERS IN ENTOURAGE. FOR THIS REASON EVMOUNT-1 HAS NOT SENT INFO TO EVMEND.

3. SEE ALSO PORT AU PRINCE EMBTEL 62.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

21 JUL 66

[redacted]

201-357029

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted]

DISSEM BY 2

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2.

21 Jul 66 IN 61072

SECRET 211435Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 3939

DIRECTOR

1. EVMOUNT-1 REPORTED 19 JULY FOLLOWING:

A. FROM HIGH RANKING PALACE SOURCE WHO CLAIMS OBTAINED INFO FROM TOP PALACE PERSONALITY THAT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES TRAVELED TO ITALY TO ARRANGE CONTACT AND PAYMENT OF 125 THOUSAND DOLLARS TO WOFACT OFFICER WHO KEEPING DUVALIER INFORMED RE WOFACT PLANS FOR HAITI.

B. FROM SEPARATE SIMILAR SOURCE THAT DUVALIER RECEIVING INFO FROM POLE WHO MILITARY LEADER WOFACT SUPPORTED CARIBBEAN LEGION.

C. FROM SAME SOURCE A ABOVE THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON SENT DUVALIER PEN USED BY JOHNSON IN SIGNING IMPORTANT CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION.

2. EVMOUNT-1 ANESAIEMISE DUVALIER LEAKING FALSE INFO IN EFFORT TRACK DOWN INFORMERS IN ENTOURAGE. FOR THIS REASON EVMOUNT-1 HAS NOT SENT INFO TO EVMEND.

3. SEE ALSO PORT AU PRINCE EMBTEL 52.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CHRONO

CHRONO

201-357029

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

UAT

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO. (if any) 14/2	
DATE 7/17/66	

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle) CHARLES - Clemard	NATIONALITY (Citizenship) Haiti
UNITED ~~STATES ADDRESS~~ Haitian consul - NYC	
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PAA 119	
PERMANENT ADDRESS PACUT #26 PTO Prince Haiti	
BIRTH DATE 7/13/66	BIRTH PLACE GONALVES Haiti
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION 7/13/66 NYC	
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION OFFICIAL D/S	
DESTINATION Haitian Consul- NYC	

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

201 req 22 Jul 66

NAI
2 Aug 66
fm3

HMB
22 July 66
Ref.

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.

Form I-57
(Rev. 7-15-63)

14-00000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

W76

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	7-4-66

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle) CHARLES CLEMARD	NATIONALITY (Citizenship) HAITI
~~UNITED STATES ADDRESS~~ IN TRANSIT	
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PA 26	
PERMANENT ADDRESS HAITIAN CONSUL, Port Au Prince	
BIRTH DATE 1-21-23	BIRTH PLACE HAITI
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION 6-28-66 NYC	
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION A-2 D/S	
DESTINATION TRANSIT	

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

201 mg 13 July 66

NA 19 Jul 66
DMS TO CCI 216

REF

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

cc C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.

FILE IN 201-350029

Form I-57
(Rev. 7-15-63)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 23 JUNE 1966

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: 109-51 (CHICAGO)

Atts to OOE 3,260,843

Attachment #2
OOE 3,260,843

PLAN FOR THE ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF HAITI

By Clement Joseph Charles

The very best way to affirm the existence of true Democracy lies in the creation of a political agency which would consecrate the inalianable rights of men to live, to enjoy freedom and happiness. A true an effective political decentralization would then corroborate the existence of this Democracy.

Fully confident in the power of the truth which cannot ever be hidden, much more in the indisputable justness of the cause we are endeavouring to diffuse; convinced of the practical possibility to put an end to the leonine privileges of a minority whose personal interest stands against all honest and impartial government managements, as the son of peasants, we reaffirm here our faith in the final trimph of a true and indispensable political evolution through a broader representation of the interest of the people, thereby assuring to our miserable co-citizens still fighting for the acknowledgement of their most sacred rights new reasons to believe and to hope. In this view our action shall tend toward the evolution of our masses in order that they may enjoy living conditions compatible with their dignity. And by means of social productivity expressed in terms of the welfare of our rural population, we shall formulate the economic requirements of the country within the framework of a realist and rational program. In line with this goal we are outlining below a program for the economic reconstruction and the social promotion of our rural masses.

An objective consideration of the present condition of our country makes it clear that the solution of the country's social and economic problem lies in the following considerations:

1.- Creation of a balanced economy adapted to the conditions of the country;
2.- Development of Industry and exploitation, of our natural ressources so as to promote an improvement of living conditions;
3.- Transformation of rural way of living and modernization of agriculture so that the peasants who represent the largest portion of the country's population come out of their ancestral misery and participate in the prosperity of the nation. And then, arrive at the integration of the rural population of the country in its economic life by means of literacy and the preparation of skilled workers in order to increase the productivity of the agricultural activities, also that of the traditional handcrafts and of the manufacturing industries which are still got a primitive stage.

The formation of man and the preparation of leaders is a factor of primary importance for the speedy achievement of the contemplated objectives.

.../....

These phases of equal importance are linked together. Therefore, they cannot be separated without endangering the whole pattern. Of course errors have been made repeatedly. However, the straightening which is a must calls for a general review of the principles and objectives of our economic and financial policy, which should be considered the first steps to be taken towards a true economic start.

For a long time, the people responsible for our Economic and Financial Policy had built their programs upon illusions. The continuous demographic pressure and the influence of social progress, together with the normal desire of the different classes of the population to benefit a reasonable part of the national revenue, have made indispensable the development of a well balanced economy. This development can be conceived but in terms of industries using to the latest extent the raw materials and the resources of the country. As a matter of fact, the mobilization of these resources is paramount for the achievement of true progress in the way of political liberty and for the improvement of material living. Education, medical care, transportation facilities and the improvement of living conditions are the primary requirements for modernizing the living conditions of the population. To sum up, the increased production of riches through the creation of industries and the systematic exploitation of our subsoil, added to other natural assets, shall furnish the resources necessary to the adequate operation of our system. For fault of considering the situation in this point of view, any and all idea of generalized social welfare and national grandeur will remain purely a dream.

The modernization of agriculture, and the improvement of the rural way of living which will result therefrom should go abreast with Industrialization. The rapid increase of the rural population and the recession of infantile mortality, as well as the extension of life limit obtained through the application of Hygiene rules, make it necessary to use to the largest extent the rejects of agricultural production in Processing Manufactures in order to assure the surplus subsistence to the surplus population and, through the export of the thus processed agricultural rejects and products, supply the Treasury with the proper foreign exchange stock necessary to maintain a well balanced economy.

The improvement of the living standard, as said before, is subject to the adequate development of the production assets, which cannot be attained without the improvement of the people. Brought up to a level which make them aware of their needs and of the role that Society and the development of their region request from them, those people will understand that the essential data of the problem reside in the following: better cultivated land, adequate equipment, creation of industries, application of experienced agricultural techniques, processing industries, skilled labor.

.../...

It may be well to recall that at the Conference in Punta del Este was emphisized the importance of the transformation of the people in the development process of under developed countries.

All this leads to consider the protection and preservation of the understructure works of which the urgency cannot be underestimated. Electric power, roads, bridges, urbanism, irrigation and drainage system etc, are the factors that the contemplated development calls for its full realization.

Of course the Haitian State has always cared for the understructure equipment of the country. However, the investments - very important at times- to this end have been made without an all out plan, not with a statisticol and rational estimae of the country's needs, but with such awastes in the execution that the general problem of the country's basis equipment is still a matter of consideration.

In Haiti, the National Capital comprises broadly the understructure equipment and the production equipment, as a result of the fact that our social and Economic System lacks a natural repartition of the functions as exist in the advanced countries where the State takes care of the understructure equipment while private enterprise engages in production. The obligation for the State to devote its activities to both the understructure and the production problem, the latter private initiative cannot assume due to failure or lack of experience, compels saw state to build proper methods and means to accelerate the formation ofthe National Capital through the adequate and honnest exploitation of our financial sources.

To this end, we propose to build a program including the execution of specific projects already studied and for which the financing can be obtained from abroad:

A.- PRIMARY FACILITIES:

1.- Hydro-Electric Plant at Peligre	$ 20.000.000.-
2.- Electrification of the Southern Peninsula - Saut Mathurine-Saut du Baril & others	9.000.000.-
3.- Wharf and Airport - Port-au-Prince	6.000.000.-
4.- Wharf and Port facilities in the Southern Peninsula	3.000.000.-
5.- Market - Port-au-Prince	1.500.000.-
6.- Telecommunication system	4.000.000.-
7.- Sewage system - Port-au-Prince	1.500.000.-
8.- Port-au-Prince - Cayes (156 km) & Dufort-Jacmel (66 km) roads.	8.000.000.-
9.- Along the coast way, Miragoane - Jérémie	4.000.000.-

.../....

10.-	Dam & Hydro-Electric Plant - Trois Rivières	$ 7.000.000.-
11.-	Improvements - Water Supply - System - Port-au-Prince	4.000.000.-
	TOTAL	$ 68.000.000.-

B.- PROJECTS ESSENTIAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT:

12.-	Sugar Mill in the Artibonite	
13.-	" " " " North West	
14.-	" " " " South	
15.-	" " " " North	
16.-	Vegetable Oil refinery	
17.-	Castor Oil Extracting Plant	
18.-	Tapioca Starch Extracting Plant	
19.-	Salt Refinery (Gonaives)	
20.-	Sesame Oil Processing Plant	
21.-	Banana Industry	
22.-	Canned Fruits Plant	
23.-	Spinning Mill	
24.-	Kenaf Industry	
	Estimated cost for the whole	$ 32.000.000.-
	GRAND TOTAL	$ 100.000.000.-

Within the framework of the objectives outlined in this summary, we propose the creation of an agency titled "National Planning Committee". Concurrently with this Committee would be created a Bank for Economic Development.

The National Planning Committee would build a plan of general development of which the execution would spread over a period of 25 years, split into 5 year periods. The plans and programs applicable to each period would be executed under the close supervision of the Committee, and modified in accordance with such economic changes as may happen. The program would be maintained in a permanent basis. In the course of its execution and as a result of the possible modifications, would follow the curve of international progress and thereby remain actual.

First of all would be prepared a priority order which would be based on the nervous centers of the economy to be straightened. This priority order would embrace a well coordinated and concrete actions, based upon observation and experience.

The lack, or rather the absence of financial means against the important disbursements called for by the general program obliges to rely upon investments from abroad. It would be the duty of the Bank for Economic Development to channel the foreign under the form of grants - counterpart funds - or of private investments jointly with the mobilization of our national resources.

As for the assistance to be given to private initiative towards the development of new agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprises, it will be necessary to reorganize our banking system by the creation of a Central Bank : Stock Exchange, Mortgage Bank, Agricultural & Rural Credit Bank and other financial institutions such as: Savings & Credit Bank, Bank for Financing low cost Housing for the people with low revenue, etc.

Besides, negociations shall be made with the International Financing Company which has been created lately in order to finance national private enterprises. We will work jointly and closely with the International Monetary Funds, the BIRD, and the BID in view of obtaining the financing of a certain amount of revenue - producing projects. At the same time, we shall endeavour to strengthen the position of our national currency.

In addition, the Budgetary Reform will be accomplished. A National Budgetary policy which observes the difference between administrative expenses and capital expenditures shall permit a proper adaptation of the budget to the requirements of the economy so as to make of it a true instrument of a general policy.

Also The Fiscal policy shall take into account the requirements of the economy. A revision of the Customs Tariff shall be pursued and made. Measures shall also be taken to guaranty honesty and integrity in handling the State's Funds. Just consider that for the fiscal years 1949-1950 to 1956-57, the total disbursements of the state has reached the sum of G: 1,350,596,631.-, or around $270.000.000.-, and that the largest portion of this sum has gone into triple expenses or served for spectacular works most of which with absolutely no economic justification. In this sum are not included neither the various financial disbursements made outside of the budget through loans obtained during the same period and which brought the public debt up to G: 249,184.000.- or $49.836.800.- as at September 30, 1957, nor the expenses supported by the non-fiscal accounts and the various autonomous enterprises of the State. All this is the evidence that the formation of the National Capital can be worked out through sound administration.

As regard Public Finance, emphasis shall be made on the following points:

1.- Harmonization of the fiscal policy with the economic policy;

2.- Harmonization of the budgetary policy with the economic policy;

3.- Improvement of our banking system in to mainly smooth credit conditions;

.../...

4.- Creation of new private banks for the development of handcrafst and industry;

5.- Reorganization of the Supreme Court of Accounts upon such basis as shall guaranty its most complete autonomy;

6.- Reorganization of the Department of Finance. Integration of the Finance Inspection Service and the Public Accounting within the General Accounting;

7.- Complete reform of our fiscal legislation by means of measures able to modify the structure of fiscality so to attain a better orientation of the economic and financial policy of the country;

8.- Remodelling our Code of Commerce in order to give more guaranties to local and foreign creditors, and to adapt the law to the requirements of internal exchange.

If the straightening of our public finance is of primary importance, production and equipment are likewise necessary. Therefore, in the execution of the 25 year development plan submitted and within the priority order to be invited out by the National Planning Committee, serious consideration shall be given to the following revenue producting and understructure projects:

a) Colonization and transformation of the rural centers through the integration of the agricultural section in the economic, political and social life of the country in order to obtain better economic and social results, and to attain the following primary objectives:

I : Increase production.

II : Build villages in order to avoid the dispersion of the rural groups and thus, to better use the working force of the community:

III: Raise the rural living standard, and,

IV : Assure to the rural laborer a permanent living upon the economic lot through an adequate agrarian reform; fight the peasant's inclination to migrate to the towns and thereby, protect agriculture.

All of this implies that problems shall have to be sold in as various fields as Education, Public Health, Housing, Transportation, Agricultural Credit, Agricultural Extension, Agricultural Equipment, Irrigation, Drainage, Reforestation and the control of Erision, Access roads, Professional and Handicrafst Schools, Rural Police, Electric Power, Hygiene, Sanitation, Creation of Cooperatives, Transformation of our 550 Rural Sections into villages where the priest, the doctor, the sanitation Inspector, the Agricultural Agent, the Teacher, the Judge, the Tax Collector, the Minister, the Mayor, the natural leaders of these villages shall join together toward a mutual action including mainly the improvement of the diary, the organization of sound recreations, a modification in the usual behaviour of the peasants with regards to the problems of their families and the community to which they [illegible] the radio and television.

audio-visual centers, movies with well balanced programs.

However, the transfer of part of the agricultural labor to Industry, to be appreciable, shall necessitate the creation, besides the agricultural industries, of other enterprises to process either the resources of our sub-soil, or imported raw-materials.

In this field, we shall concentrate our efforts on the following:

1.- Project for the processing of coconut and vegetable oils.
2.- Factory for deshydrate coconut for export.
3.- Vegetable oil extrating Plant for local consumption.
4.- Toilet soap Factory
5.- Extension of Palm Oil Plants and Production of Oleaginous.
6.- Cocoa Production along with a Processing Plant.
7.- Extension of Cotton Production for a modern spinning-Mill.
8.- Spinning-Mill.
9.- Plant for the preparation of Hydrophil and Absorbent Cotton) (1oo.cons).
10.- Creation of a Mechanical Industry with branches over the whole territory for the manufacture of agricultural tools and spare parts for all kinds machines.
11.- Plant for the manufacture of low cost electric range and of all electric accessories.
12.- Plant for the Production of Organic Fertilizer.
13.- Assembling Industries to work for Export.
14.- Sisal, Fruits sugar Cane Straw Processing Plants.
15.- Bottle manufacture.
16.- Safety match factory.
17.- Paper Mill.
18.- Cattle Raising Industry to intensify the development of our live-stock.
19.- Fishing Industry.
20.- Tourism.

In preparing our plan, we will not underestimate the fact the transportation, and communication determine at all their stages the rhythm and the trend of the economic development. Therefore shall have to be given due consideration the improvement and extension of our road and rail network in order to enlarge the rural market. Only through good roads and sufficient and low-cost transportation means shall the agricultural products reach the consumers at moderate prices. This will contribute towards raising the living standard of the entire population. Also shall be necessary proper communication means to ease the mobility of labor and attenuate to the price fluctuations. These facilities make it possible to decide on the geographic implantation of new industries and on the extent to be given to the development of various zones in line with the all our program.

These shall be considered:

a) The asphalting or cementing of all main roads; the stonning of all secondary roads, and the construction of new roads.

b) The construction of telepheries to join certain commodity-producing centers to urban centers.

c) Organization of an adequate railway system.

d) Nationalization of general transportation (transport en commun).

As for marine transportation, our country has not yet exploited its insular position and its geographic situation. Rather than developing normally, our coasting-vessel is jeopardy for lack of well equiped dry docks, also due to the insufficient technical preparation of our sailors. Yet, the marine way remains the cheapest in internal trade.

We shall consider the creation of a Navigation School, the acquisition of a merchant Marine for external trade, and we shall give such facilities as can facilitate the modernization of the coasting-vessels, the opening of new ports for external trade; the construction of a modern and free port in Port-au-Prince to serve as warehousing for goods consigned to certain south-American countries, also the repair and modernization of our existing ports.

In the field of air-transportation, these shall be created a national airline to link Port-au-Prince with foreign cities. Shall also be created airports in the large towns of the Republic.

It is obvious that the success of this program which calls for disbursements amounting to around one billion five hundred millions dollars ($1.500.000.000.-) over 25 years, shall depend largely upon the competence of all engaged in the Public Administration.

We shall also concentrate our efforts on the following points:

a) Complete autonomy to the Communes. The Council of Notables shall be re-established on new basis in both the Commune and the Village (Rural Section). Periodic Congress between the Mayors of a same Department and the different officers of this Department shall make possible the preparation of local programs of which the execution shall promote the general plan.

b) Organization of the Administrative carper which shall be free from political influence. A law shall fix the statute of public officers;

c) Remodelling of our different codes to adapt them to the present economic and social conjuncture, and the adoption of each measures as can speed up legal decision;

d) Complete emancipation of women who shall be able to fill the same administrative and technical positions as men, inasmuch as they are quqlified;

e) Technical assistance shall be requested from the following International Institutions: FAO, CEU, BIRD, FMI, and BID towards a complete remodelling of public administration, mainly for the adequate execution of the general plan.

f) Remodelling of National Education, for Education is basic for the success of all actions understaken by the community. The remodelling of our universities and the new orientation to be given to our Primary, Secondary, Superior and Professional Schools shall be in line with the formation of our technicians and our Philosophie of Education;

These are, briefly, the various phases of the programs intended to change the social and economic structure of the country.

Ever since the conquest of his independence, the Haitian, to-date, has been suffering: morally as the result of an excessive discrimination; physically because of a criminal misunderstanding and a generalized corruption, so much so that the impression remains this corruption, has been made a political system.

A new concept is imperative to assure the normal distribution of the National riches. A new concept of which the concretion shall be accomplished by the sound portion of the country jointly with the specialized agencies of the United States Government.

14-00000

Attachment #6

(Translation of #5)

OOE - 3,260,843

FRIDAY 24th August 1962:

CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, a pioneer
by
EMMANUEL C. PAUL

If the competitive communities are so dynamic and impose by the rate of their cycle of evolution, it is because, to the end, their social struggles result into economic terms through the production of valuable men superior to their consumption.

Because we failed to draw up our balance-sheet at each epoch of our life, we do not seem to understand that we are arriving at inverse reports. Our backwardness is the result of this negative unbalance between the production and the consumption of our valuable men.

We should be concious of the urgency if not to change our method of struggling, at least to come up with superior principles susceptible of making our struggles less nocive and much more profitable to the community. On this point, the example offered by more advanced countries of which we are copying the bad sides can be of service to us. To decrease the rate of consumption of our valuable men in order to increase their production in the course of time is to learn to appreciate, then to utilise and to respect them. We shall, thereby, create the condition that will preserve and fecundate them.

We know, indeed, that it is extremely hard to come to this reasoning, it is much more difficult to adopt it as the motto of our collective behavior. We are only a few to grasp this thruth because this phase of our social competitions results into a mass of historic factors. The first effect of our internal divisions generated by colonialism and fed up, afterwards by the old regime of oppresion was the creation, at the various levels of our societies of a complex of self destruction, that turned into a social cannibalism. In the production of this event where everyone, without undergoing in any way the influence of a mystic or of a superior principle, is moved while believing he is moving towards his rightful interest, one has the impression that the community is unable to find its way without the help of a trustee, hence the implicite or public acknowledgement of the superiority of the former boss.

These truths that are found in filigree thoughout the pages of modern and contemporary history of colonialism should rouse the Haitians' thought in order that they may endeavour to increase their national potentiallities and ever appreciate and respect their social values.

.../..

Of course in the political, military and intellectual domain we have had real stars. However, our economic and social history is rather poor on a certain point of view. This means that very few are those who, in spite of numerous obstacles, have succeeded by notably increasing the national economy and improving the living condition of our people. Our understanding of the "Benevolent State" requires that this objective be its main job.

There have been numerous attempts, indeed. Comes to our memory Pantaléon Guilbaud, the tobacco king during the time of our youth, but at last! just fugitive attempts! If this is the case and of we really love this country we wish to be fully ours, our duty is to tie up the old man binding us, and meaning hatred, meanness, above all, envy. Then we will limit the consumption of our valuable men.

Not so long ago, we have written an article about Dr.Day when his laboratory was consumed by fire. We did it then because in our opinion, for two generations, this name stood as the sumbol of continuity for the community. In the same spirit, we would like to evoke a new name, another social value who deserves admiration. This name is Clemard Joseph CHARLES.

This emersion dates back from yesterday, and yet, he is already a pioneer. Dark, average in size. Quick yes under a boad forehead which is already graved by a premature baldness. This is his phisical stature in brief. Still young, only 39 years of age. Clemard Joseph CHARLES was born in Gonaives in April 1923 and is proud of his peasant origin. It was in this town that he received his primary and secondary education, at the "Frères de l'Instruction Chrétienne" and the "Lycée Geffrard" Schools. It was also in this Artibonite that he began the struggle for life, first as a rural teacher. His father's death in 1939 marked a stage in his life. He had to take over the heavy responsibility of meeting his family needs. Charles then proved to be a disciplined man and became successively craftsman, plantation supervisor, without giving up intellectual studies; he ventured in journalism as an amateur. As a progressivemind, he strongly believes in the value of effort. From one activity, he goes to another and is never discouraged by obstacles. He is a man who searches his way and is determined to find it. In 1947, he was General Controller of the Banana Industry in the south and the year after, he was appointed General Agent for a Corporation. His numerous contacts gave him at this time sufficient business experience for him to undertake his own business. In 1949, he settled as Manufacturer's Agent and dealt in import-Export. By dint of discipline, of dynamism and tenacity, the little rural

..../..

teacher of the year 1939 is already well know as an experienced businessman, and his relations overseas are such that in 1953, he was appointed as a member of an Economic Mission sent to London by the Government. He did so well that one year later, he was encousted by the Government with the mission of negociating a contract with the General Electric of Coventry for the improvement and extension of our telecommunication system. In 1957, as a member of another mission, he took past in the International Conference in Brussels. In the meantime, Clemard Joseph CHARLES devoted himself to various commercial and industrial activities. His life is shared between his office in the Capital City and numerous trips in the country where he kept inquiring on possibilities of investment. Whenever you happen to meet him, he speakes of new projects for the development of the country. His waiting-room is always full of people either awaiting instructions for the countries, or agents, also of other people asking for credit. Among his enterprises we note the Universal Enterprise Co. (USACO) the National Deutsch Associates, The Cotton Industry in the South and Charles-Mews & Co., without mensionning the branches of his store, All These activities do not hinder him from representing the General Electric Co.,Ltd. of London and the Siemens Schukert Werke Co.

But the masterpiece of his life as a businessman was the creation in 1960 of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, a project he had long been dreaming of! His initiative ranks him as a great Pioneer. The Commercial Bank of Haiti is the first private Haitian Bank. When one reals that the National Bank was redeemed only in 1949 to become property of the Haitian State, then one will realize the amount of daring throught, tenacity and broadness of view it took Clemard Joseph CHARLES in such a place to materialise this creation that will have a part in the Economic History of our country. Clemard Joseph CHARLES is the image of a new type of businessman we did not know before. He broke up with the low customs of tradesmen, these brokers who find themselves selfishly satisfied with profit margins which the accumulate in banks abroad and who begin again the routine each year. The reason for the backwardness of our masses is that they do not have the support of an enterprising bourgeoisie creating welfare opportunities. Charles believes that it should not be left to the State alone the duty of promoting the economic development of the country. He is well aware of his mission and he knows that he must give a hand to the less fortunate ones to help their evolution. Therefore, this Commercial Bank that has met with so much success in so short a time is the center of multiple activities profitable to many people with low pay. If we do not loose faith in this country and that we believe in its potentialities, then we believe that a Pioneer as Clemard Joseph CHARLES ought to be better known in order to be better understood and encouraged.

.../..

This is the reason for our writing this article. At the same time we would like to present to the youth a model of honesty, discipline and tenacity in a community that so much lakes these qualities.

00E 3, 260,843

CLÉMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

PRÉSIDENT ET DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL
BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

Apt [illegible]
396 Central Park [illegible]
NYC
Tel UN 5-5815

COE 3.260.843
Attachment #10

CURRICULUM VITAE

DR. EMILE SAINT-LOT.

Né à Port-au-Prince, Haiti, le 11 Septembre 1908.
Etudes classiques : Institution St.Louis de Gonzague,
Baccalauréat 2e. Partie.
Licencié en Droit, Avocat du Barreau de Port-au-Prince.
Docteur ès-lettres, honoris causa, de l'Université de Lybie(1957)

ENSEIGNEMENT. Professeur d'Enseignement primaire, Secondaire et Supérieur,
Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
Professeur de Sociologie et d'Histoire du Droit,
Professeur de Droit à l'Académie Militaire d'Haiti,
Professeur d'Economie Politique et de Géographie Commerciale à l'Institut Commercial d'Haiti,
Doyen de la Faculté de Droit de Port-au-Prince (1946).

CARRIERE PUBLIQUE. Commissaire du Gouvernement près le Tribunal Civil de Port-au-Prince,
Juge au Tribunal Civil de Port-au-Prince,
Sénateur de la République (1946-1957)
Président du Sénat et de l'Assemblée Nationale (1957)
Secrétaire d'Etat de l'Education Nationale et de la Justice(1947)
Secrétaire d'Etat du Travail et de la Santé Publique (1950)

CARRIERE DIPLOMATIQUE. Membre de la Délégation d'Haiti à la Première Session de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies (1946) et à la Première Partie de la Deuxième Session de la dite Assemblée (1947)
Délégué Permanent aux Nations-Unies (1947)
Ambassadeur à Paris (1948)
Chef de la Délégation d'Haiti à la Troisième Session de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies, tenue à Paris en 1948,
Rapporteur de la Troisième Commission (Droits de l'Homme)
Chef de la Délégation d'Haiti à la Conférence Générale de l'UNESCO, tenue à Mexico en 1947,
Président de la Délégation d'Haiti à la Conférence Interparlementaire tenue à Helsinki (1955),
Délégué des Intellectuels Haitiens au Premier Congrès de Culture des Intellectuels Noirs, tenu à Paris en 1956,
Chef de la Mission Permanente d'Haiti aux Nations-Unies (1957),
Observateur à la Conférence des Etats Indépendants d'Afrique(19[illegible])
Ambassadeur d'Haiti en Ethiopie (1958)

DECORATIONS. Officier de l'Ordre de l'Education Nationale,
Officier de l'Ordre du Mérite Agricole,
Grand Officier de l'ordre du Bénin Noir,
Grand Officier de l'Ordre Honneur et Mérite,
Grand'Croix de l'Ordre de l'Indépendance de la Lybie,
Grand'Croix de l'Ordre de l'Etoile de la République de Somalie,
Vice-Président de la Société Africaine de Culture.

14-00000

[illegible] #4

00E,3,260,843

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAÏTI


BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

SOCIETE ANONYME DE BANQUE
AU CAPITAL AUTORISE DE UN MILLION DEUX CENT CINQUANTE MILLE GOURDES
FONDÉE EN 1960
MEMBRE DE : THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

JANVIER 1963

CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

Président et Directeur Général

14-00000

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Bilan arrêté au 21 Janvier 1963

ACTIF

DISPONIBILITES :		Gdes 262.640.30
Encaisse	Gdes 178.322.65	
Dépôts — Banques locales	31.858.40	
Chèques s/Banques locales	31.040.10	
Dépôts — Banques étrangères	21.419.15	
REALISABLES :		Gdes 2.580.599.75
Souscripteurs	Gdes 421.500.00	
Titres et Bons du Trésor du Gouvernement Haïtien	197.950.00	
Bons à Présentation (Warrant et Divers)	579.080.05	
Prêts, Escomptes et Autres	1.219.841.70	
Prêts hypothécaires	151.606.75	
Divers débiteurs	10.621.25	
IMMOBILISES :		Gdes 97.882.10
Matériel et Mobilier	Gdes 72.057.10	
Véhicules	24.750.00	
Cautionnement	1.075.00	
INTANGIBLES :		Gdes 347.870.75
Frais de constitution	Gdes 25.666.35	
Frais de premier établissement	322.204.40	
VALEUR A REGULARISER :		Gdes 127.025.80
Intérêts acquis non perçus	Gdes 37.162.25	
Frais à régler	89.566.95	
Manques et Surplus de caisse	296.60	
PARTS DE FONDATEURS :		Pour mémoire
TOTAL ACTIF :		Gdes 3.416.018.70

PASSIF ET CAPITAL

EXIGIBILITES :		Gdes 2.126.802.25
Dépots.— Comptes Courants	Gdes 617.122.90	
" Comptes d'Epargne	1.141.550.45	
" Compte Marginal	12.937.55	
" Marginal Account garantie de de Prêts	158.803.05	
" A Terme	108.232.05	
" A l'ordre spécial	3.195.20	
Divers créditeurs	11.297.00	
Chèques de Direction	3.017.40	
Chèques certifiés	70.646.65	
RESERVES ET AMORTISSEMENT :		Gdes 10.938.65
Provisions pr. int. à payer s/dépôts à Terme	Gdes 6.679.90	
Provisions pour divers	92.10	
Réserves pour dépréciation	4.166.65	
VALEUR A REGULARISER :		Gdes 14.010.55
Escomptes perçus non acquis	Gdes 14.010.55	
CAPITAL AUTORISE :		Gdes 1.250.000.00
PROFITS A CE JOUR :		Gdes 14.267.25
TOTAL PASSIF ET CAPITAL :		Gdes 3.416.018.70

ADRIEN LAURENCEAU : CHEF DE LA COMPTABILITE

CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES : PRESIDENT ET DIRECTEUR GENERAL

CONSEIL TECHNIQUE

Dr. Lebert JEAN-PIERRE : *Ancien Membre du Conseil d'Administration de la B. N. R. H.* — 1960-1961

St. Louis JEANTY : *Ancien Directeur Général des Contributions* 1947-1950

J. Remusat THEBAUD : *Ancien Directeur de la B. N. R. H.* 1912-1958

Moïse E. CADET : *Ancien employé de la B. N. R. H.* 1946-1949

Nelson GELIN : *Ancien employé de la B. N. R. H.* 1949-1957

CORRESPONDANTS ETRANGERS

IRVING TRUST COMPANY : New-York

EMPIRE TRUST COMPANY : New-York

PAN AMERICAN BANK OF MIAMI : Miami

MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST COMPANY : New-York

THE AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY Inc. : New-York

AMERICAN TRUST COMPANY : New-York

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON : Boston, Massachusetts

MIDLAND BANK LIMITED : London, Angleterre

CREDIT LYONNAIS : Paris, France

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Exécute toutes opérations de Banque en Haïti et à l'Etranger :

NOTAMMENT :

Crédits Commerciaux et Lettres de Crédit

Chèques de Voyage

Dépôts à vue (Compte Courant)

Dépôts à Terme

Compte d'Epargne

Effets de commerce

Hypothèques

Ouverture de crédit à l'Importation et à la Production

Achats et Ventes de change (chèques et transferts)

Warrant, etc. etc.

14-00000

00E 3,260,843

5

SYLVANIA
LIGHTING PRODUCTS U.S.A.
Le plus grand choix d'ampoules, de Tubes luminescents—(toutes couleurs)
La Marque de confiance et de Durée …
Distributeur :
DON MOHR SALES CORPORATION S.A.

Le Nou
MEMBRE DE L'ASSOCIATION INT
No. 25.627 QUOTIDIEN LE PLUS ANCIEN D'HAITI —FONDE EN 1898 67EME ANNEE Direct

Figure de Pionnier: Clémard Joseph Charles

Par Emmanuel C. PAUL

Si les sociétés compétitives sont tellement dynamiques et s'imposent par la rapidité de leur cycle d'évolution, c'est parce qu'au fond les luttes sociales qui s'y livrent se soldent en termes économiques par une production de valeurs supérieures à la consommation.

Nous autres, pour ne nous être pas souciés de faire, à chaque époque notre bilan, nous n'avons pas l'air de nous rendre compte que nous aboutissons à des rapports inverses. Notre retard est dû à ce déséquilibre négatif entre la production et la consommation de nos Valeurs. Nous en sommes tous responsables.

Il nous faut être conscients de la nécessité sinon de changer la forme de nos luttes, du moins d'y introduire des principes supérieurs susceptibles de les rendre moins nocives et plus profitables à la collectivité. Sur ce point, l'exemple d'autres pays plus avancés dont nous imitons les mauvais côtés peut nous servir. Ralentir le rythme de la consommation de nos Valeurs pour en augmenter la production dans le temps, c'est en effet apprendre comme ailleurs à les apprécier, à les utiliser, à les respecter. Du coup, nous aurons créé des conditions à leur conservation à leur fécondation.

Nous savons certes, qu'il est extrêmement difficile d'arriver à ces raisonnements, voire d'en faire le mobile de comportements collectifs. On est une minorité à saisir cette vérité parce qu'un tel aspect de nos compétitions sociales résulte d'un ensemble de facteurs historiques. Les divisions internes de tous ordres secrétées par le colonialisme et approfondies par la suite sous l'influence des séquelles de l'ancien régime d'oppression ont pour premier ef [illegible]

de répondre aux besoins de la famille. Charles fait alors preuve de discipline et devient tour à tour artisan, superviseur de plantation, sans négliger le commerce des choses intellectuelles en faisant du journalisme amateur. Esprit progressiste, il croit ardemment en la valeur de l'effort. Il passe d'une activité à une autre et ne se laisse jamais décourager par les obstacles. C'est un homme qui cherche sa voie et est déterminé à la trouver. En 1947,nous le voyons comme Contrôleur Général de l'Industrie bananière dans le Sud et l'année suivante comme Agent Général d'une Compagnie. Ses divers contacts lui donnent déjà assez d'expériences en affaires pour lui permettre d'entreprendre son propre «business». Il s'etablit en 1949 comme Représentant de Manufactures et fait le commerce d'importation et d'exportation. Le petit instituteur rural des environs de 1930 à force de discipline, de dynamisme, de ténacité, est déjà assez connu par ses expériences en affaires et ses relations à l'Etranger pour qu'en 1953, il soit choisi comme Membre d'une Mission Economique du gouvernement à Londres. Il s'y est si bien tiré que c'est lui qui, une année plus tard, négociera pour le gouvernement un contrat avec la General Electric de Conventry pour la modernisation et l'extension de notre système de Télécommunication. En 1957, il se voit envoyé dans une autre Mission à la Conférence Internationale de Bruxelles. Entre temps, Clémard Joseph Charles s'adonne à de multiples activités commerciales et industrielles. Sa

(voir suite page 4)

Brillante réception à l'Ambassade Américaine

La réception qu'ont offerte hier soir en leur résidence à Bourdon, l'Ambassadeur des Etats Unis et Mme Thurston a connu un très grand succès. Elle avait été organisée en l'honneur du nouveau conseiller de l'Ambassade américaine et de Mme Edward Glion Curtis Jr.

De nombreuses personnalités avaient répondu à l'aimable invitation de l'Ambassadeur et de Mme Thurston. Ce furent deux heures magnifiques. Les amphitryons, dont l'amabilité est connue, comblèrent leurs invités d'attentions.

On eut l'occasion de prendre contact, de causer avec le nouveau Conseiller de l'Ambassade américaine dont nous prenons plaisir à publier le curriculum vitae:

x x x x

BIOGRAPHIE DE M. E. G. CURTIS JR.

Né à St Louis (Missouri), le 8 septembre 1909, Mr. Edward Glion Curtis Jr., 1er Secrétaire et Ministre Conseiller de l'Ambassade des Etats Unis en Haiti, est un officier de carrière du Service Diplomatique.

Après avoir obtenu sa Licence en Lettres à l'Université de Washington, il reçut son diplôme à l'Institut Cesare Alfieri à Florence (Italie). C'est en 1935 qu'il fit son entrée dans le Service Diplomatique. Le premier poste qu'il occupa fut celui de vice - Consul à Budapest (Hongrie), de 1935 à 1938, avant de se rendre à Wellington, en Nouvelle Zélande.

Nommé 3ème Secrétaire de Légation à Port - au - Prince (Haiti), le 24 Avril 1939, M. Edward Glion Curtis Jr. devait occuper ce poste jusqu'en 1943. Il fut promu 2ème Secrétaire de Légation à Port - au - Prince, le 23 Août 1943. Après avoir quitté Haiti en 1944, M. Curtis Jr. se rendit à Madrid (Espagne) en qualité de Second Secrétaire d'Ambassade et Vice Consul (1944-1947).

Il fut nommé par la suite Consul et 2ème Secrétaire à La Haye. En 1950, il occupa les fonctions d'officier économique et celles de Consul à Zurich (Suisse) de 1950 à 1951. Nommé 1er Secrétaire et Consul à Panama, M. Curtis Jr. séjourna à Managua comme Conseiller (1953-57), avant d'être assigné au poste d'officier en charge de la Securité Inter - américaine et d'Assistant aux Affaires du Département d'Etat, le 28 juillet 1957.

M. Edward Glion Curtis Jr. est marié et il a quatre enfants.

Le Vatican et le cas Sherry Finkbine

CITE DU VATICAN — AFP

Il était un homme vivant et innocent, on l'a tué on a commis un crime, a déclaré la presse du Vatican en commentant le cas d'avortement de la nord américaine Sherry Finkbine.

Après avoir critiqué le cas de la mère qui se fait opérer pour ne pas donner naissance à un enfant déformé, la radio du Vatican déclare que «même les malades désirent vivre.» La félicité est un fait intérieur. Un secret de l'esprit que personne, même une mère ne peut imposer de l'extérieur. Ce n'est pas un privilège de riche, ni de jeunes, ni de forts de personnes saines. Ceux qui ont essayé de justifier le cas de Finkbine ignorent ce que c'est que l'amour, le secret de la félicité, le fondement de la vraie grandeur humaines, ajoute la Presse du Vatican.

Les puissances

truction se tra[illegible] par un véritable cannibalisme social. Dans la production de ce phénomène, où chacun sans subir nullement l'influence d'une mystique ou d'un principe supérieur, est agi tout en croyant agir dans le sens de ses intérêts les plus légitimes, on a l'impression que la communauté ne peut se frayer sa voie sans un tuteur, d'où la reconnaissance implicite ou avouée de la supériorité de l'ancien patron.

Ces vérités qu'on trouve en filigramme à travers les pages de l'histoire moderne et contemporaine du colonialisme, devraient susciter des réflexions chez les haitiens pour qu'ils s'efforcent d'augmenter les potentialités nationales et se dépasser dans l'appréciation et le respect de leurs Valaurs sociales.

Si dans le domaine politique, militaire, intellectuel, nous avons compté des étoiles, notre histoire économico - sociale est bien pauvre en un certain sens.

On veut dire que l'on trouve très peu de gens qui, en dépit des obstacles, sont arrivés à faire époque, en augmentant de façon notable la richesse nationale, en améliorant les conditions de vie de notre peuple. Notre représentation de l'Etat - Bienfaisance veut que cet objectif soit son job principal.

Nous avons certes, bien noté des tentatives — et nous songeons à un Pantaléon Guilbaud, le roi du tabac du temps de notre enfance — mais seulement des tentatives sans lendemain, hélas! Nous pensons que s'il en est ainsi que si nous aimons sincèrement ce pays que nous voudrions être globalement nôtre, il nous faut ligoter en nous le vieil homme — ce condensé de haine, de petittesse, de haine, et surtout d'envie — et limiter la consommation de nos Valeurs de cet ordre.

Il n'y a pas longtemps, nous avons consacré une page au Docteur DAY, à l'occasion de l'incendie d'un Laboratoire, parcequ'à notre sens, à travers deux générations, nous avons trouvé en ce nom un symbole de continuité dans le travail, une Valeur sociale positive, enrichissante pour la communauté. Dans le même esprit nous voudrions évoquer ici un nouveau nom, une autre Valeur sociale qui mérite l'admiration. Nous citons Clémard Joseph CHARLES.

Son émersion est d'hier et pourtant c'est déjà une figure de Pionnier, Noir, taille et corpulence moyennes. Des yeux vifs sous un front large que ronge déjà une calvitie précoce. Voilà, en deux traits, l'homme au physique. Encore jeune: 39 ans seulement, Clémard Joseph Charles qui est né aux Gonaïves en avril 1923 est fier de son origine paysanne. C'est dans cette région qu'il a fait ses études primaires et secondaires à l'Ecole des Frères de l'Instruction Chrétienne et au Lycée Geffrard. C'est aussi dans cette Artibonite qu'il a commencé la bataille de la vie d'abord comme instituteur rural. La mort de son père survenue en 1939 n'est que une étape dans sa vie; il lui faut prendre la lourde succession

---

Anciens Régiments. Coup d'jaill. Casser D'janne. Sérénade.

Pétion Gé-Pé-Té

Par Constantin DUMERVE

Dédié à mon aimable confrère Lucien Montas, rédacteur en Chef du Quotidien Le Nouvelliste

Haiti devenue Nation — 1er Janvier 1804 — le premier soin des dirigeants fut de promouvoir l'essor du nouvel Etat. Les Arts ne furent pas négligés. L'Armée trouva dans la Musique un stimulant pour appuyer ses manifestations pacifiques ou guerrières.

Les régiments étaient répartis ainsi :

1er Port-au-Prince, 2ème Cap-Haitien, 3ème Port-au-Prince, 4e Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, 5e Dondon, 6ème St Michel de l'Attalaye, 7e et 8ème St Marc, 9ème Port de Paix, 10ème Mirebalais, 11 et 12èmes Port-au-Prince, 13e Les Cayes, 14ème Gonaives, 15e Aquin, 16e Anse à Veau, 17ème Les Cayes, 18ème Jérémie, 19ème Anse d'Hainault, 20ème Verrettes, 21ème Léogâne, 22ème et 23ème Jacmel, 24ème Petit Goâve, 25ème Gonaives, 26ème Borgne, 27ème Grande Rivière du Nord, 28ème Trou du Nord, 29e Fort Liberté, 30ème Cap Haitien, 31ème Lascahobas, 32ème Môle St Nicolas, 33ème Aux Côteaux, 34ème Limbé, 35ème Vallières, 36ème Hinche, 37ème Plaisance 38ème Saltrou.

Ces régiments, annuellement, tenaient garnison six mois à la Capitale. Ce séjour permettait aux soldats de compléter leur formation militaire et les musiciens attachés aux régiments de s'initier à la théorie et à la pratique sous la direction d'instructeurs spéciaux.

Les Batteries Sonores groupaient les bruyants tambours, les clairons au timbre éclatant, les fibres aux effets ingénieux. Leur jeu d'ensemble déterminait un programme compliqué selon occasion et leur rythme varié d'une technique parfois endiablée se multipliait sans perdre haleine.

Vers quelle époque ont paru ces manifestations musicales dénommées Coup d'Jaille (non coudiallez), Casser d'janne, (diane) (espagnole : diana), les Sérénades?

Aux premiers jours de l'Indépendance.

Le 30 Octobre 1804 lors de la cérémonie du Sacre de l'Empereur Dessalines, les Coup d'Jaill s'emparant du pays, le peuple ne put contenir son allégresse.

En 1805, un coup d'Jaill de 400 tambours — batteries sonores se fusionnant avec les musiques militaires, le premier anniversaire de l'Indépendance connut un éclat dont le souvenir ne s'effacera jamais.

CASSER D'JANNE : (Diane), a été institué pour stimuler le réveil des soldats au point du jour dès quatre heures du matin, les Batteries Sonores parties des postes militaires (Fort National, Bureaux arrondissement, la Place, Fort etc) fendaient l'air. Le Leitmotiv conducteur modulé, transformé en mille manières, suivant les péripéties de l'action, changeait d'expression ou de sens.

A ces mélodies vivantes, de couleur locale, l'esprit haitien adapta d'un souffle admirable, paroles que tout le monde enthousiasme, chantait avec une bonne humeur communicative. Nous en détachons parmi les quatorze formant le Casser d'janne les couplets suivants :

Toutt moun lévé, lévé, lévé, lévé, lévé,
Soldats ! lévé, lévé, lévé, lévé, lévé,
Si nous pas lévé,
Ya mété'n lan Salle police,
Si nous pas lévé
Ya mete'n lan Salle police.

—II—

Si nous té gain l'agent
Nou ta fait gnou gros bouillon,
Général si nous gain l'agent
N'a fait gnou gros bouillon

—III—

Pour se faire distinguer, la Batterie de chaque régiment se signalait par le numéro d'ordre. Par exemple, celle de ma ville natale Môle St Nicolas (32ème) faisait éclater :

Trentt déxième pas gangnin manman (bis)
Trentt déxième pa gangnin papa
Toutt ti qui choille
Cé trentt déxième
Toutt gra'n qui choille
Cé trentt déxième

—IV—

Maintenant, tour de la Méringue. Du copieux catalogue nous extrayons la mélodie et paroles suivantes parues sous Tirésias :

Gadé Zouzoutt, (bis
Gadé Thémo,
Thémo piti, piti, piti con ça
Fait bo[illegible] zouzoutt tout doucement boutt.

Voici en quelle circonstance ce Chanté a été trouvé. Commissaire Zouzoutt chef de la police, gran gabari, arrogant, ventru se tenait au Bureau Central (actuellement Centre de Santé près de la Cathédrale).

Commissaire Thémo, sous Chef de la police sympathique, court de taille, mince en un mot Ti-corps répondait au service du bureau.

Un jour à la suite d'une vive altercation, Commissaire Zouzoutt, s'oubliant, administra trois coups de cocomaquatt à Thémo. Celui-ci indigné enleva le bâton et à son tour ronfla une dégelée en règle à Zouzoutt qui, ne pouvant plus tenir, ouetta. L'incident fit sensation. La chanson s'en empara.

Sait-on que peu de jours après, les deux cocomaquateurs se rencontraient journellement chez Rose Pinpin au wharf sherh (Cité

(Suite page 4)

WASHINGTON (AFP)

Les Etats Unis, [illegible] Grande Bretagne remettront [illegible]bablement avant la fin de semaine leurs notes au Gou[illegible]ment Soviétique à propos de [illegible]lin. Dans cette note, les trois [illegible]sances occidentales réitéré[illegible] leurs positions respectives à [illegible]gard de la décision unilatéral[illegible] l'URSS d'abolir son Comma[illegible]ment militaire à Berlin Est.

Prêts de l'AID à un syndicat

WASHINGTON — AFP

L'agence pour le Dévelo[illegible]ment International a octroyé[illegible] prêt de 400.000 dollars au sy[illegible]cat de la Compagnie de Che[illegible] de Fer du Honduras pour la [illegible]truction de logements.

Incidents entre cubains à Kingsto

KINGSTON (AFP).

Une fois de plus on a enr[illegible]tré hier des incidents avec l[illegible]légation cubaine à Kingston. [illegible]cident le plus grave a été [illegible]gistré au marché «Victori[illegible] où il y eut bagarre entre [illegible]bains de la délégation et l[illegible]lés résidant à la Jamaique.

D'après une version, les fi[illegible]tes ont attaqué les exilés; d'[illegible] une autre c'est le contraire [illegible] est dit. Il n'y a aucun rapp[illegible]ficiel à ce sujet.

Depuis la police jamaica[illegible] pris des mesures spéciales [illegible]caution.

Le système de fus[illegible] des USA est invulnérable

WASHINGTON — AF[illegible]

Le Ministre de la Défe[illegible] Namara a affirmé que le sy[illegible] de fusées télé - guidées des [illegible] Unis est «invulnérable» [illegible] peut être détruit par l'Uni[illegible]viétique.

Interrogé par les journ[illegible] au sujet de la possibilité [illegible] Russie de détruire les fu[illegible]méricaines avant même [illegible] ne soient lancées de leurs [illegible] le Secrétaire d'Etat M[illegible] déclaré: «Il n'existe pas [illegible]sibilité immédiate pour l[illegible] Soviétique de désorganiser [illegible] d'une façon notre systè[illegible]sées téléguidées.»

Mort de Mme Maurice Castera

Madame Maurice Caste[illegible] Lucie Tancrède Auguste [illegible] son âme à Dieu le merc[illegible] Août 1962 à 7 hres [illegible]

Nos sincères condoléan[illegible] son époux, M. Maurice [illegible] ainsi qu'aux autres pare[illegible] cruellement éprouvés.

Institut des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Port-au-Pce signe un Accord

Des nouvelles qui nous parvien nt, il semble qu'un accord est arvenu entre l'Ecole des Hau Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Montréal que dirige — Mo sur Roger Charbonneau et l'I ut des Hautes Etudes Commer ales et Economiques (IHECE) Port - au - Prince, dirigé par ssieurs Gérard R. Latortue et ranz Alcindor.

C'est grâce au dévouement de otre compatriote le Docteur Vé Leroy, professeur de Sciences conomiques à l'Ecole des H. E. de Montréal que Gérard R. atortue a pu prendre contact vec Messieurs R. Charbonneau Directeur des H. E. C. et Fran is Albert Angers Directeur de Institut d'Economie Appliquée, Ecole des H. E. C. Montréal.

Nous sommes en mesure de enseigner nos lecteurs sur les oints importants de cet accord.

1 — H. E. C. se fera un plai ir d'envoyer à IHECE de Port - au - Prince tous les livres à caractère économique et commer cial qu'elle a en double. — Des instructions seront passées au Directeur de la Bibliothèque Mr. Allen — dans ce sens.

— H. E. C. envoie à IHECE. les revues et une copie des cours professés à HEC.

IHECE. devra également envo yer à Montréal une copie des dif férents cours — ceux qui sont ronéographiés — de ses profes seurs.

— HEC. va faire des démar ches près du Ministère des Af faires Culturelles pour établir a vec l'IHECE un programme d'é change de professeurs et peut - être même d'étudiants.

— HEC. est prête à faciliter le sé jour au Canada d'hommes d'affai res haitiens que l'IHECE lui re commanderait, à charge bien en tendu pour l'IHECE de faciliter le séjour en Haiti d'hom mes d'affaires canadiens qui se raient intéressés à avoir des re lations en Haiti.

— En outre l'Institut d'Eco nomie Appliquée publie une re vue «L'Actualité Economique». Le Directeur de cet Institut Mr. Albert Angers est prêt à publier les articles des professeurs de l'I HECE et en général de tout é conomiste haitien que l'IHECE lui recommanderait. L'IHECE se ra le correspondant de la revue à Port - au - Prince où elle sera vendue par la Librairie Athénée au No. 139 de la Rue Pavée.

Nul doute qu'un tel accord fa cilitera le développement des é changes commerciaux culturels et économiques avec le Canada et qu'un plus grand nombre de nos compatriotes, s'intéresseront da vantage à l'Institut des Hautes études Com. et Economiques qui répondait à une nécessité dans notre milieu.

Monsieur et Mme Otto Ed. Thur, professeurs de Sciences E conomiques à Montréal et à l'Uni versité Laval ont grandement en couragé les initiatives de l'Insti tut des Hautes Commerciales et Economiques. Ils seraient prêts dès Mai prochain à venir prononcer quelques conférences surtout sur l'épineuse question de la «Sta bilisation des prix des matières premières». Monsieur THUR s'in téresse particulièrement au pro blème des fluctuations économiques.

[illegible]

TOCKHOLM (AFP)

Les unités de la Marine sué doise ont dû faire usage de bom bes marines pour expulser des eaux territoriales de Suède, un sous-marin non identifié, qui [illegible] au commandement [illegible] adressé, d'émerger.

MAGIC CINE

DIMANCHE à 5 hres, 7 hres et [illegible] - Vendredi - Samedi, [illegible]

EPOUSER UN HORS LA LOI

[illegible] Sullivan, Marjorie, [illegible]

LA SITUATION A BERLIN

Policier tué à Berlin

BERLIN — AFP —

Un membre de la police de transport en uniforme de la R. D. U. a été tué cette nuit par la police de Berlin. Est, au moment où il essayait de traverser le mur.

x x x

A propos de Berlin

WASHINGTON — AFP —

Les Etats Unis continueront à considérer l'Union Soviétique comme responsable du secteur Soviétique à Berlin. Les gouver nements des Etats Unis du Ro yaume Uni et de France conti nueront d'exercer pleinement leurs droits et d'assumer leurs responsabilités à Berlin, ajoute une déclaration publiée cette nuit par le Département d'Etat.

Et aucune mesure unilatérale du gouvernement soviétique ne peut affecter l'unité de Berlin dans son ensemble conclut-il.

Jean 23 et Pie 9

CITE D UVATICAN — AFP—

Pie IX sera-t-il béatifié au cours du prochain Concile oecu menique? Le Pape Jean 23 a confié aujourd'hui au cours d'u ne audience générale accordée à Castelgondolfo que son voeu le plus cher est de voir «que le Sei gneur lui accorde la grâce de dé créter les honneurs de l'autel à celui qui a convoqué le premier Concile du Vatican.» En parlant de la fête du Coeur Immaculée de Marie que l'église célébrait ce jour, le Pape a dit que trois pon tifs s'étaient distingués par leur dévotion à la Vierge: Pie VIII qui inaugura le culte de Marie, Pie IX qui a proclamé le dogme de l'Immaculée Conception et Pie XII qui a consacré le genre hu main au Coeur Immaculée de Ma rie. Jean 23 a insisté sur les mé rites de Pie IX et a dit que beau coup ont comparé ce pape avec Jésus Christ pour avoir été à la fois l'homme le plus chéri et le plus haï par ses contemporains.

FIGURE DE PIONNIER

(Suite)

vie se partage entre ses bureaux à la Capitale et de multiples vo yages à l'intérieur du pays où il enquête sans cesse sur les possibi lités d'investissement. A chacune de nos rencontres, il nous parle de projets nouveaux qu'il a pour contribuer au développement du pays. Sa salle d'attente est tou jours remplie de gens venus pren dre des instructions pour la Pro vince, d'intermédiaires, de sollici teurs de crédits. Parmi les En treprises qu'il dirige, nous no tons La Universal Enterprise Co. (USACO) la National Deutsch Associates, la Cocon Industry in the South et Mews Charles et Co sans compter des Succursales de sa Maison de Commerce. Cela ne l'empêche pas de représenter la General Electric Co Ltd. de Lon dres et la Siemens Schuckert Werke Co.

Mais le chef d'oeuvre de la vie d'homme d'affaires de Clémard Joseph Charles, c'est la création en 1960 de la Banque Commercia le d'Haiti dont il a longtemps ca ressé le projet. C'est cette ini tiative qui fait de lui un Grand Pionnier. La Banque Commercia le est la première banque privée haitienne. Si l'on s'imagine que même la Banque Nationale n'a été rachetée qu'en 1949 pour devenir propriété de l'Etat Haitien, on s'imagine ce qu'il a fallu à Clé mard Joseph Charles dans un mi lieu comme le nôtre, de hardies se de pensée, d'audace, de ténaci té et de largeur de vue pour ar river à une telle création, laquelle fera époque dans l'histoire écono mique de notre pays. Clémard Charles nous donne l'image d'un nouveau type d'hommes d'affai res que nous ne connaissions pas avant lui. Il a divorcé d'avec ces usages sans grandeur de com merçants - - courtiers à la petite semaine qui se contentent égois tement d'une marge de profits qu'ils accumulent à l'Etranger et qui recommencent la routine chaque année. Si nos masses res tent si arriérées c'est parce qu'el les ne sont pas encadrées par u ne bourgeoisie entreprenan te, créatrice d'opportunités de bien - être. Charles pense qu'il ne faut pas laisser à l'Etat tout seul la tâche de promouvoir le développement économique du pays. Il est conscient de sa mis sion sociale et sait qu'il doit don ner la main aux moins munis pour les faire monter. Aussi cet te Banque Commerciale qui a con nu dans le public un succès si étonnant en un court laps de temps est - elle conçue comme le centre de rayonnement de multi ples activités dont tireront pro fit de milliers de gagne-peu. Les projets à l'étude, lorsqu'ils se ront réalisés, feront de cette ini tiative, une véritable institution nationale.

Si nous ne désespérons pas de ce pays et que nous croyons en ses virtualités, nous pensons qu'u ne figure de Pionnier comme cel le qui vient d'être esquissée mé ritait d'être mieux connue afin d'être comprise et encouragée. C'est pourquoi nous avons écrit cet article. Nous voudrions en mê me temps avoir proposé à la jeu nesse un Modèle d'honnêteté de discipline, de ténacité dans une communauté qui en manque telle ment.

Emmanuel C. PAUL

TOU

LE GOUVERNEUR C. POLETTI ET SA EN AMERIQUE LA

Hier après midi, co demment annoncé, le Charles Poletti et sa épouse Jean Ellis son la capitale, accompag George H. Bennett. accueillis à l'aéroport lentin Edward Blacqu Commercial à l'Amba tats Unis à Port au sa charmante femme par M. Mc Elhannon, la Pan American.

Le gouvernuer Pol à la boutonnière la Commandeur avec Etoi dre du St. Grégoire le ne distinction, du Pape plus haut rang jamais un laique pour les ren services rendus comm neur militaire allié en rant la guerre. Le vic dent des Affaires Int les de la prochaine Foi le de New York répon un français impeccable haits de bienvenue qui té adressés. Avenant, gouverneur Poletti a l enveloppant d'un parfa du monde. On compren son don de persuasion sons qui ont porté les teurs de la Foire à le d la mission délicate de adhésions des pays du cette grande manifesta diale de la Paix.

Gouverneur Poletti vi ter la Jamaique, nou née à l'indépendance, à nifestation. Il s'est ent vec le Chef de la nouv blique, Monsieur Bu avec les Ministres des et du Commerce, avec dent de la Chambre de ce et le Chef de la Ja dustrial Development tion, M. Braham pour quer l'objectif de cette

Il était accompagné ces réunions du Dr. Gé Bennett, Docteur en Ph l'un de ses huit Assista

Ici, le vice - présid Foire mondiale a pris hier avec le Secrétaire Tourisme, M. Victor N. il s'est entretenu ce m la Secrétaire d'Etat du ce, M. Clovis Désinor avec le Ministre des M. Herve Boyer. Dema une conversation avec dent de la Chambre de ce, M. Louis Décatrel, conférence de presse roulera au local de cet sation.

C'est l'ingénieur Har hauer qui a été chargé des plans du Stand d' Foire de New York de - Gouverneur Poletti Haiti Samedi pour se Quito où il sera reçu p sident Arosemena qui comment visité l'aire d tion à Flushing Mead ensuite à Bogota où l'A deur des Etats Unis est sin de sa femme et tour tournée dans l'Amérique pour une visite à Cara

Nous souhaitons la p diale bienvenue au Go et Mme. Charles Poletti et

[illegible] #2

OOE-3,260,843

MR. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

President & General Manager, Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, Port-au-Prince.

Life Story

Born at Gonaives, Haiti, on April 21, 1923, of peasant parents; went to Parochial School; in 1939 graduated from Lycée Geffrard, Gonaives; taught in rural schools; in addition, father having died in 1939, did various jobs to support his family; upholsterer, time-keeper, plantation supervisor, free lance journalist, etc.

In 1947, appointed Controler General of Haytian Southern Banana Industry; became General Agent in 1948.

In 1949 established himself as Manufacturers' Representative and created his own export and import business.

In 1953 went to London as Member of the Economic Mission of the Haytian Government, and in 1954 negotiated on the Haytian Government's behalf a contract with the General Electric Co.Ltd., of Coventry, England for the modernizing and extending of the telecommunication system in Haiti.

In 1957, appointed Member of the Haytian Mission to the International Conference held in Brussels, Belgium.

In 1960 created the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti.

- - - - - -

Mr. Charles is the sole owner of the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti and the full or part owner of several industrial and commercial enterprises in Haiti, such as :

Universal Enterprises Co.,S.A. (U.S.A.C.O.)
National Deutsch Associates, S.A. - Clemard Joseph Charles Import-Export
Cocoa Industry in the South - Clemard Joseph Charles & Co.
Mevs Charles & Co.

He is the sole Representative in Haiti of the following concerns :

The General Electric Co.,Ltd., London, England
Siemens Schuckert Werke, Germany

Bank References :

Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti
Port-au-Prince, Haiti
The Royal Bank of Canada, New York
Irving Trust Company, New York

Member of :

The Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Rural Sections of Haiti
The Haitian Chamber of Commerce
The International Club of Commerce, Haiti
Commerce & Industry Association of New York - Charter Member
Rotary Club, Port-au-Prince, Tennis Club of Port-au-Prince.

ea/

Honors & Awards :

Knight of the National Order " Honor & Merit "
Officer of the Labor Order
Commander of the Civil Merit Order
Honorary Citizen of the City of New York - Honorary Citizen
Of the City of Long Beach, L.I.,N.Y.

Mr. Charles married his wife, Sophie, in 1952; they have one adopted son.

June 21, 1962

G

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. R Galante

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Dissem BY 24

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CA-2, CA/PEG ~~DO~~ WH/7/HT

ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 202054Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 3885 PRIN 20 Jun 66 IN 41197

DIRECTOR

1. COLONEL CLAUDE RAYMOND, DR. ROGER LAFONTANT, PORT AU PRINCE UNIVERSITY MILITIA LEADER, AND DUVALIER'S PRIVATE SECRETARY PIERRE BIAMBY APPLIED U.S. CONSULATE 17 JUNE FOR TRANSIT VISAS FOR SPECIAL MISSION TO LONDON. TRIO REQUESTED TWO WEEKS STAY U.S. GOING TO UK AND TWO WEEKS ON RETURN TRIP.

2. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES TRAVELLING AS INSPECTOR HAITIAN EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES REQUESTED SEPARATELY TRANSIT VISA FOR TRIP TO EUROPE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

20 JUN 66

201-357029

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/CE

EXTENSION:

NO. CSCI 316/02952-66

DATE 10 June 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI STAFF 2C 35	14 JUN 1966		
2.			
3. XXXXXX XXXXX			
4.			
5. RID/AN GA 50			
6.			
7. RID/MIS			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. RID/FI 1B 4003			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

TO: DIM/FBI

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER 201-357029

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT

DOCUMENT DATE 16 JUN 1966

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

16 JUN 1966

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: CHARLES, Clemard
DOB: 21 April 1923
POB: Gonaives, Haiti
VISA: Haitian

1. Reference is made to the I-57 request form concerning Subject who entered the United States on 3 April 1966. The files of another Office of this Agency contain the following pertinent information regarding Subject more recent than that contained in TDCSDB-315/00977-64 dated 9 October 1964, subject: Inquiries Regarding the Possibility of Buying Aircraft for Haiti.

2. According to an unevaluated report dated 14 April 1966, from a United States national with forty years' experience in the tobacco industry who makes frequent trips to Latin America and who is considered a shrewd observer, which contained biographic information concerning Subject, CHARLES was specifically referred to as President DUVALIER's banker and financial manager. Subject was regarded by Source as being "very close to the Palace" and as having ready access to DUVALIER. Source described Subject as a "crook and poor liar; in other words, truly a Haitian political character and not to be trusted under any conditions." Subject had mentioned to Source his activity in 1954 as a negotiator on behalf of the Haitian Government with the General Electric Company of England for modernization of Haiti's telecommunications system. As a result of this contract, Haiti experienced one of its greatest political scandals, for the contract was for 4 million dollars, and the actual delivery of products was only 1 million dollars. Source observed that CHARLES was president of the Haitian Banana Corporation which was originally operated by Eric TIPPENHAUER and Colonel PROSPER, and subsequently went bankrupt because of financial mismanagement; further, Subject had headed the Essential Oils Company since the death of Senator Louis DE JOIE. Source was satisfied that these companies headed by Subject were actually owned and/or controlled for the benefit of DUVALIER. At the time of the report CHARLES' principal assistant in the tobacco industry was Remy AUCLAIR, who

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FILE IN 201-357029

201-357029

was director of the Haitian Tobacco Monopoly and secretary-treasurer of Le Tabac Haitien, S.A. SICLAIT was generally believed to be Subject's "hatchet man" but Source was unable to verify this.

CSCI-316/02932-66

RID/CE: JMA/MD/mac

Based on: 00-E-324/06340-66

FILE IN 201-352,029

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

UH

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO. (If any)

DATE 4/11/66

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle) CHARLES Clemard	NATIONALITY (Citizenship) Haiti
UNITED STATES ADDRESS Haitian Cons NY	
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PAA 234	
PERMANENT ADDRESS Pncot Haiti	
BIRTH DATE 4/31/23	BIRTH PLACE Gonaives
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION JFKIA 4/3/66	
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION A2 D/S (TS)	
DESTINATION As Above	

Oth[illegible] any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

[illegible] COORDINATION
Date 2 May 66 | INITIALS
BY ANALYST | [illegible]
DIV. | BRANCH | WH/HAITI
RI EDITION
RI [illegible]

cc: C.I.A.
[illegible]
O.S.I.
[illegible]

Form I-[illegible]
(Rev. 7-15-63)

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

Ref B.A.
4/23/66

FILE IN 201-352,029

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 24 APRIL 1966

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

SECRET

12 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCS/OSS
Attention: Mr. Musulin

SUBJECT : Contact with Clemard Charles

1. Pursuant to our telephone conversation on 8 March, it is requested that your representative, in talking with Clemard Charles, obtain the latter's views on the following:

a. the economic and political stability of the Haitian Government for the next four months;

b. current threats to President Duvalier and origin of these threats;

c. ability of President Duvalier to control opposition from within or outside the country;

d. attitudes of Haitian business men in Port-au-Prince relative to the present government.

2. I would be very interested in any indication from Clemard Charles that he is anti-Duvalier or that Duvalier's tenure is limited.

Paul V. Harwood
C/WH/7

WH/7/Ht/MJGremillion:rae

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 201-357029 ✓ file in ISR 4C 24
1 - Memo chrono

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 6 APRIL 1966

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

14-00000

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONTROLLED DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO 00-E-324/16,349-66

SUBJECT Clémard Joseph Charles Believed to be President Duvalier's Personal Financial Manager/Biographical Data on C J Charles

DATE DISTR [illegible]

NO PAGES 5

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Feb - Mar 66

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Port-au-Prince/Feb - Mar 66

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, sales representative of a US tobacco manufacturing company who has had 40 years' experience in the industry. Source makes frequent business trips to Latin America and recently returned from a six weeks' visit to Ecuador, Panama, and Haiti. He has excellent contacts in the areas he visits, speaks moderate Spanish and French, and is a shrewd observer.

1. During the period 1952-59 I tried to establish business association with certain Haitians including such characters as Eric Tippenhauer, Colonel M Prosper, Senator Louis De Joie, George Léger, and many others. On the occasion of my first visit to Port-au-Prince in five years, I encountered a new set of characters, but they are obviously of the identical "cut" as my previous acquaintances.

2. A reportedly privately-owned tobacco company known as Le Tabac Haitien, S. A. is directed by Clémard Joseph Charles, a black Haitian who also happens to be President of the Commercial Bank of Haiti. This cigarette manufacturing firm is the direct descendant of the long defunct Haitian-American Tobacco Co. Some six months ago Le Tabac Haitien began ordering moderate quantities of leaf tobacco and providing letters of credit to pay for the leaf. When I held my first series of conferences with Mr Charles, he immediately attempted to impress me with his political, social, and economic influence in Haiti and then proceeded to enlist my principal's financial participation to the small sum of US$300 thousand. Fully cognizant of the Haitian style of business, I deferred the offer and proceeded to discreetly inquire of Mr Charles' status in Haiti.

3. As a matter of convenience Mr Charles provided me with a curriculum vitae which I quote as follows:

CLÉMARD JOSEPH CHARLES: President & General Manager of the 'BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI'
President of the CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF HAITI

5 4 3 2 1 S-YES U-NO 5 4 3 2 1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

201-357039

CURRICULUM VITAE

Born in Gonaives, Haiti, on April 21, 1923, from a peasant family. Had his primary schooling at the 'Ecole des Freres des Gonaives,' and his secondary schooling at the 'Lycée Geffrard' in the same town.

Upon his father's death, did various jobs to support his family. Was in turn schoolmaster at the rural school of Verrettes, at $15 a month, free lance teacher at $0.40 per month per child, time-keeper, plantation supervisor, photographer, sanitary clerk, free lance journalist. In the latter capacity, founded 'L'Intrepide' and 'L'Aurore' in cooperation with the late Emmanuel C. Paul.

Phyto-Pathologist.

In 1946, was appointed Controller General of the Banana Development Company (BADECO), of which he became the General Agent in 1948. The following year, established himself as Manufacturer's Agent, and created an Import-Export trade house.

Married in 1952, Sophie Lherisson.

In 1953, went to London as a Member of the Economic Mission sent to England by the Haitian Government, and in 1954, negotiated, on behalf of the Government, a contract with The General Electric Co., Ltd., Coventry, England. This contract was in connection with the extension and modernization of the Telecommunication System in Haiti.

In 1957, was appointed as a member of the Economic Mission to the International Conference held in Brussels, Belgium.

Created in 1960, the 'BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI,' of which he is the President and Director General. Is also the President of the following firms he himself created:

Universal Enterprises Co. S.A. (USACO)
National Deutsch Associates, S.A.
Makcorp d'Haiti, S.A. (Kenaf Cultivation)
Magéco Enterprises, S.A.
Société Haitienne de Peaux à Cuirs (Leather & Skins)
Le Tabac Haitien
Administration Portuaire de Port-au-Prince
Caribbean Cordage Mill
Corporation Philatélique d'Haiti
Shada Division, Montrouis
Automobile Insurance Division - Third Party Liabilities
Les Essences Aromatique d'Haiti (Essential Oils)
Produits Nationaux, S.A.
Assurance Vieillesse Obligatoire (ONA)
Entrasa, S.A.
Société Général de Matériaux de Constructions (SOGEMACO)
Société Nationale de Fruits et de Légumes (SONAFRUCO)

He is the exclusive Agent for the following firms:

The General Electric Co., Ltd. of Coventry
Siemens Schuckertwerke A. G. Erlangen, Germany

Presently: President of the Chamber of Commerce of Haiti

Member of: Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Rural Sections of Haiti
Commerce & Industry Association of New York
Rotary Club of Port-au-Prince
Tennis Club of Port-au-Prince
Action for Latin American Unity, Mexico
Academia de Derecho International, Mexico

Awards & Distinction:

Knight of the National Order 'Honor & Merit' (HAITI)
Officer of the Labor Order
Commander of the Civil Merit Order
Commander of the International Order for Public Welfare - France
Commander of the National Order for Agricultural Merit
Commander of the Order 'Petion & Bolivar' - for services rendered to the cause of Pan Americanism
Honorary citizen of the City of Longbeach, L. I., New York
Honorary citizen of the City of New York
Honorary citizen of the City of Berlin
Medal of His Holiness Pope Paul-VI.

4. In addition Mr Charles made available two other papers that are likewise of interest. One is a list of correspondents for the Commercial Bank of Haiti and the second consists of enterprises controlled by that bank which were not included in the latest balance sheet. I quote these papers as follows:

BANKS - LIST OF CORRESPONDENTS

U. S. A.:

(1) Bank of America (International)
P. O. Box 3415
Rincon Annex, San Francisco 20, California

(2) First National City Bank
399 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10022

(3) Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company
44 Wall Street
New York 15, N. Y.

(4) Irving Trust Company
One Wall Street
New York 15, N. Y.

(5) First National Bank of Boston
Boston 6, Mass.

(6) Pan American Bank of Miami
P. O. Box 831
Miami 30, Florida

FRANCE:

Crédit Lyonnais
19 Boulevard des Italiens
Paris, France

SWITZERLAND:

(1) United Overseas Bank (Banque Unie pour les Pays d'Outre-Mer)
3-5 Rue du Conseil Général
Genève, Suisse

(2) Union de Banques Suisses
8, Rue du Rhone
Geneve, Suisse

ENGLAND:
MIDLAND BANK LIMITED
(Overseas Branch)
P. O. Box 831
60 Gracechurch Street
London, E. C. 3

ENTERPRISES CONTROLED BY BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Not Included in the Balance Sheet

(1)	SHADA - St. Marc Division (Yearly Income)	$ 500.000.-
(2)	PORT AUTHORITY - PORT-AU-PRINCE (Yearly Income)	$ 600.000.-
(3)	THIRD PARTY LIABILITY - VEHICLE INSURANCE (Yearly Income)	$ 1.000.000.-
(4)	ESSENTIAL OILS (Yearly Income)	$ 300.000.-
(5)	SEAFOOD - EXPLOITATION (Yearly Income)	$ 250.000.-
(6)	MODERN TANNERY (Yearly Income)	$ 250.000.-
(7)	PHILATELIC CORPORATION (Yearly Income)	$ 300.000.-
(8)	EMERASA (Yearly Income)	$ 150.000.-
(9)	U.S.A.C.O. (Yearly Income)	$ 275.000.-
(10)	TOYOTA SALES DIVISION - C. J. Charles Import-Export (Yearly Income)	$ 150.000.-
(11)	SEGUIN - LUMBER DIVISION (Yearly Income)	$ 100.000.-
(12)	O.N.A. - RETIREMENT INSURANCE (Yearly minimum income expected)	$ 2.000.000.-

---

5. Since my previous commercial associations in Haiti dated prior to 1959, I found it extremely difficult to locate old acquaintances, for most are dead or in voluntary exile. I did manage to assemble some data on

Mr Charles that I regard as reliable. He is specifically referred to as "Papa Doc's" banker and financial manager. Mr Charles, as would be expected is "very close to the Palace" and has ready access to President Duvalier. As for his character, he is described as "a crook and a poor liar." In other words, Mr Charles is truly a Haitian political character and not to be trusted under any conditions.

6. I noted that Mr Charles mentions his activity in 1954 as a negotiator on behalf of the Haitian Government with the General Electric Co of England for modernization of the country's telecommunications system. As a result of this contract Haiti experienced one of its greatest political scandals for the contract was for US$4 million, and the actual delivery of products was only US$1 million. I, likewise, observed that Mr Charles is president of the Haitian Banana Corp which was originally operated by Eric Tippenhauer and Colonel Prosper, and subsequently was bankrupt because of financial mismanagement. Still further, Essential Oils Co was at one time the exclusive domain of Senator Louis De Joie, and since his death the company is headed by Mr Charles.

7. I am personally satisfied that Mr Clémard Joseph Charles is President Duvalier's personal financial manager, and the companies directed by Mr Charles are in fact owned and/or controlled for the benefit of Haiti's chief executive. At the moment Mr Charles' principal assistant in the tobacco industry is Henry Siclait, who just happens to be Director of the Haitian Tobacco Monopoly and Secretary-Treasurer of Le Tabac Haitien, S. A. Siclait is believed to be Mr Charles' "hatchet man" but I was not able to verify this allegation.

- end -

[redacted]

14-00000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

UAH

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO. (If any) A-2	
DATE 2-13-66	

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle) CHARLES, Clemard Joseph	NATIONALITY (Citizenship) Haiti
UNITED STATES ADDRESS Hatian Consulate, New York, N.Y.	
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PAA 234	
PERMANENT ADDRESS c/o Banque Commerciale, Port-au-Prince, Haiti	
BIRTH DATE 4-21-23	BIRTH PLACE Port-au-Prince, Haiti
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION 2-2-66, NYC	
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION Duration of status	
DESTINATION see above	

NAI
9 Mar 66
mac

28/66

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.

201-357029 *

Form I-57
(Rev. 7-15-63)

14-00000

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE [illegible] 65

FROM: Name OFFICE ROOM PHONE TUBE ADDRESS

1. TYPE ACTION	☐	OPEN	2. FILE RESTRICTED	☐	YES	3. PERMANENT CHARGE	☐	YES
	☐	AMEND		☐	NO		☐	NO
	✓	CLOSE						

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) 01
CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

5. 201 NO. 725692 02

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
02			
02			
02			
02			
02			
02			

7. SEX F1 M F

8. DATE OF BIRTH F2

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH 01

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH 01

11. CITIZENSHIP N1

12. OCCUPATION (clear text) J1 OCC. CODE J2

13. SWL K1

14. OI CODE M1

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER K1 DATE K1

16. RESIDENCE

17. COMMENTS (text for index cards)

[illegible] 201
[illegible] 357029

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE 01

19. ACTION DESK CODE [illegible]

20. SECONDARY DESK CODE 01

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES 01 & 01

22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO. 725692

FORM 6-63 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

4 November 1965

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Attention: IRR

FROM: Interagency Source Register

SUBJECT: CHARLES, Joseph Clemard (ID 11612)

1. Reference is made to your requests concerning Subject dated 8 May 1963 and 27 October 1965. The files contain no pertinent information in addition to that which has been incorporated into the enclosed Biographic Report dated July 1964.

2. The Interagency Source Register has no record of a current operational interest in Subject.

ISRM-11,348

Encl. 1 attachment as stated above

RID/CE: JMA/HP/bjr

Based on: 201-357029*

FILE IN 201-357029

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

WH

Glenn Crispell FI/ISR 4 C24 X5045 RECHECK REGISTRATION REQUEST	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE ISRM NO. 11,348 DATE 27 Oct 1965 201 NO. 357029

NAME
CHARLES, Joseph Clemard

dup 725692

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
21 April 1923	Gonaives, Haiti	Haitian

PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, (Presently travelling in the U.S. '63)	Unknown

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT
Unknown

TRAVEL

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA

RID/CE: Both 201s are held by ISR.

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION	
Date 29 Oct 65	INITIALS
RI ANALYST	H.V.P.
DIV. / BRANCH	
WH / 7/Haiti	
FI / ISR	
RI EDITOR	
RI TYPIST	

RECEIVED
RID/IM
27 8 48 AM '65

10/27/65
RH ReFs

FILE IN 201-357029

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 30 SEPTEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: CLEMARD JOSEPH CLARLES
REGISTRATION ACT - HAITI
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

DATE: 30 SEPTEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES
INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

AGENC. CHECK SHEET

WH

DATE: 16 Sep 65

TO: ☐ FBI ☐ G2 ☐ ONI ☐ OSI ☐ DO4 ☐ CSC ☐ HCUA ☒ OTHER CIA

FROM: Defense Intelligence Agency

LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME - MAIDEN NAME (If any): Charles, Clemard Joseph, or Clemard, Joseph Charles

ALIAS(ES) OR NICKNAMES: [illegible] C/

SEX	MARITAL STATUS	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH (City and state)
Male	Unk/	Unk	Unk (Haiti)(?)

PURPOSE OF CHECK: Request for Record Check.

LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS, SOCIETIES OR CLUBS WITH WHICH AFFILIATED: President, Chamber of Commerce, Port-au-Prince, Haiti

MILITARY SERVICE

BRANCH OF SERVICE	SERVICE NUMBER	FROM (Dates)	TO	ALIEN REGISTRATION NUMBER	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SPOUSE'S FULL NAME	ALIAS(ES) OR NICKNAMES	DATE OF BIRTH / PLACE OF BIRTH (City and state)
Unk		

RESIDENCES DURING PAST 15 YEARS

DATES FROM	DATES TO	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE OR COUNTRY
Unk	Present		Port-au-Prince	Haiti

NAI to ~~[illegible]~~ dated 9 Oct 64 TDCS-DB-315/00974-64, subject: Inquiries Regarding the Possibility of Buying Aircraft for Haiti

For additional information [illegible] are referred to the Department of State (commercial references).

me d 6 Oct 65

EMPLOYMENT DURING PAST 15 YEARS

DATES FROM	DATES TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT
Unk	Present	Director, Commercial National Bank of Haiti, Port-au-Prince, Haiti	

(2) 201's req. 1 Oct

Office of Sec. info req. 1 Oct

EDUCATION

DATES FROM	DATES TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	LOCATION OF SCHOOL

RETURN TO RID/CE/CS -

Ref 30/9/65

REMARKS OF CHECKING AGENCY

5

29 SEP 1965

W

This is a request for a name check only and is not a request for an investigation or a clearance.

DIA FORM 6 (Rev 3-65) 031932 OPI: DIACI

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1965

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAMS

FROM PORT AUPRINCE EMBTEL 1188

DATE: 5 FEBRUARY 1965

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: VERBATIME TEXT

DATE: 23 JANUARY 1965
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
PORTAUPRINCE 1214
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN (RE CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-357029
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 38

RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
Port au Prince

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION
WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
VR, FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CI/SP, CA 2, CA/[illegible]
DO 4, DDP 2, SOD 6, EE 4, FI, NE 4

S E C R E T 291525Z

29 Dec 64 IN 50391

DIR INFO GNVA BERN CITE PRIN 2974 FIASCONARO ~~ACTING~~

AN	[illegible]	~~PS~~	WH/2/HT
		~~PE~~	~~DESTROY~~
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~	

REF: DIR 68358 (NOT SENT GNVA, BERN)

1. PER PRIN DAILY LE NOUVELLISTE REPEAT LE NOUVELLISTE, ELIZABETH DABINOVIC LEFT PRIN 23 DECEMBER AFTER FIVE DAY VISIT WITH MRS. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, WIFE PRESIDENT COMMERCIAL BANK HAITI.

2. VISIT SIGNIFICANT SINCE PER REF, BOZO DABINOVIC, ELIZABETH'S HUSBAND, POSSIBLY INVOLVED MOHAMMED FAYED'S EFFORTS PURCHASE ARMS FOR HAITI. CLEMARD CHARLES IS HAITIAN MOST INVOLVED FAYED'S AFFAIRS PRIN. PER GNVA INFO, BOZO'S SHIPPING FIRM GNVA REGISTERED IN ELIZABETH'S NAME.

S E C R E T

~~Barry, Joseph~~

SECRET

29 Dec 64

201-357029

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-357??
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. J. Mangham

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1-1

3 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

19 JAN 1965 ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
PORT AU PRINCE

ACTION
WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ LOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE, DO4, DD/H3, FI/SPG, FI,

AN | | ~~PG~~ | |
FI | | ~~FL~~ | DESTROY |
ABSTRACT | X | ~~INDEX~~ | |

SECRET 231525Z

DIR CITE PRIN 2966

REF: PRIN 2953 (IN 42019)

23 Dec 64 IN 48045

1. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES RETURNED PRIN 21 DECEMBER. NO INFO AS YET AVAILABLE RE RESULT HIS NEGOTIATIONS.

2. LUCKNER CAMBRONNE RETURNED SAME FLIGHT BUT, PER PRESS REPORTS, PROBABLE HE TRAVELED TO ESCORT DUVALIER'S DAUGHTER FROM GNVA SCHOOL TO PRIN.

SECRET

RI COPY

201-357029
23 Dec 1964

FORM 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY

-15

WH A2

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO. (If any)

DATE
12-13-64

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle) CHARLES CLEMARD JOS	NATIONALITY (Citizenship) HAITI
UNITED STATES ADDRESS 66 E 42 ST CONSULATE OF HAITI NY CITY	
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PAA 222	
PERMANENT ADDRESS PACOT PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI	
BIRTH DATE 4-25-23	BIRTH PLACE HAITI
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION 12-12-64 JFKIA	
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION A-2 (T.S) DUR. OF STATUS	
DESTINATION CONSULATE OF HAITI, NY CITY	

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

NAI to TDCS DB 315/00974-64
dated 9 Oct 64

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

cc C.I.A.
G-2
O.N.I.
State Dept.

JJB 8 Feb 65
JJB

Form I-87
(Rev. 7-15-63)

FILE IN 201-357029 *

201-357029 ([illegible])

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

131 SECRET

OCT 9 21 59 '64

ORIG.	HELEN MORGAN	ROUTING			
UNIT	WH/2/HAITI	1		4	
EXT.	6026	2		5	
DATE	9 OCTOBER 1964	3		6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES: WH 12

TDCS DB-315/00974-64

INFORMATION COPIES

CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI/FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA/O 6, CA/PEG, DODS, WH/SA 5, SOD 4

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 9 OCTOBER 1964

PRECEDENCE: ☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/2/HAITI	4		WH/PRIN	1	WH/PRIN	#
			WH/JMWAVE/JMPALM			1

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)

IN 89699 (WAVE 2976)
UFG-6004
NP (UOAMBER/8)
LIAISON #

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE	XX	ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

RELAY REQUEST ATTACHED FOR RELAY TO CINCSO AND CINCLANT. B

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER

m C/WH/R H. Benches

COPY NO.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY HAITI

TDCS DB-315/00974-64

DATE OF INFO. 3 OCTOBER 1964

DISTR. 9 OCTOBER 1964

SUBJECT

INQUIRIES REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF BUYING AIRCRAFT FOR HAITI

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (7 OCTOBER 1964)

REF IN 89699

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-6004

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: UNITED STATES CITIZEN (C) WHO OPERATES A BUSINESS IN HAITI, WHERE HE ENJOYS THE FRIENDSHIP OF MANY MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS, AND WHO IS A FORMER MILITARY OFFICER AND A TRAINED REPORTER, FROM SAUDERS V. ROBERSON. APPRAISAL: 3.

1. ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 1964 THE AVIATION INVESTORS COMPANY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA, RECEIVED AN INQUIRY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF BUYING A C-119 AIRCRAFT FOR THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT. THE CALL WAS MADE BY RAYMOND (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) TO SAUDERS V. ROBERSON, AN AVIATION INVESTORS COMPANY EMPLOYEE, WHO AGREED TO INVESTIGATE THE PROPOSED AIRCRAFT PURCHASE.

2. ON 5 OCTOBER ROBERSON RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A MAN WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS "RASH" (PHONETIC) REGARDING THE POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF A P-51 AIRCRAFT OSTENSIBLY FOR THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT, BUT IT WAS ACTUALLY INTENDED FOR HAITI. ROBERSON AGREED TO MEET WITH "RASH" AT THE CONGRESS BUILDING IN MIAMI TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF BOTH PURCHASES.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
TREASURY FBI INS

SECRET

3. SOURCE COMMENT: ROBERSON IS A CAUCASIAN BORN CIRCA 1917 WHO ONCE ATTEMPTED SUGAR NEGOTIATIONS IN HAITI, WHERE HE BECAME KNOWN TO SEVERAL HAITIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI. (FIELD COMMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT CHARLES HAD UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED TO BUY T-28 AIRCRAFT IN ARIZONA.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CUSTOMS, FBI, I&NS, BORDER PATROL, CINCLANT, CINCSO (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE).

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM

FROM PORT-AU-PRINCE CONTROL: 7094

DATE: 8 OCTOBER 1964

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN (RE CLEMARD CHARLES AND
FNU SANJURJO)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CHARLES, JOSEPH D.
201-097839
SEX M DOB ?

CIT HAITI
OCC ?

201-727690
UFGA-14051
19 FEB 64
◆200-120-63
P2

1892208
PAFR

```
..00000000_000000000 0
111.1.11111111.111111
2222222222222222...22
.33333333.3333333333
.4444444444444444444
55555555555555555555
6.6666J66666666666666
77J7.77777.777777777
88888888J888888.8888.
9999999J99999999.9999
```

SUBJ REPORTEDLY WOULD RECEIVE POWER POSITION IF DUVALIER GOVT OVERTHROWN IN HAITI. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY.

#HTP

1 892 208

WH/6/DR

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

[illegible]

201-97839

13 June 1963

Evlucil/1 Comments:

IV. Joseph D. Charles (Black): A man of correct behavior, cultured, honest, would like to be Chief of State, but does not have the real stuff to lead the people.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CHARLES, M. CLEMARD JOSEPH
201-357029
SEX M DOB ?

201-725439
IX -00193
21 MAY 63

PAZR 2054126

```
0100001 00000000 00000
111111111111111111 11
22222222222222 2222 2
333333333333333333333
4444444444444444 444
555555555555555 5555
66666666666666666666
777777777777777777777
888888888888888888888
999999999999999999999
```

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ HAS RETURNED TO HAITI AND IS BEING SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED AS THE NEXT PRES. SUBJ 201-725439 SAID THAT M. CHARLES IS RECEIVING CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT.

AR218
5/5/64 718

2 054 126

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: Chief, Contact Division (Support) Stuntz	EXTENSION 2270	NO. Case ~~40,506~~ 39,201	DATE 21 May 63

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Fritz Janney, DODS			fj	for the 201
2.				I sent a copy to K.T. Ripley
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

COA(S) 3, 262, 278

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN: Support (Stuntz)
INFO: LA (McCrea) and Czajkowski

17 May 1963

Chief, New York Office

Case-40,556 --- Clemard Joseph Charles

1. At Clemard Joseph Charles' request, on 14 May 63 C/S Balog had a "farewell" interview with the Haitian banker. The private conversation, which took place at Charles' room at the Park Sheraton Hotel in New York, lasted about one hour. On 15 May 1963 Charles flew back to Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

2. At the outset of our "confidential" interview Charles' showed us a letter written by William Stix Wasserman, 40 Wall Street, New York 5, N.Y. whom Charles' described as a "big financier and my adviser" and addressed to Senator Hubert Humphrey. According to Charles, Humphrey and Wasserman are good friends, an allegation which may be true since the salutation of the letter was "Dear Hubert" and the general tone of it indicated a fairly close relationship between the two.

3. In his letter, Wasserman asked the Senator to receive Charles whom he described as a man with "liberal views in regard to cooperatives." Wasserman went on saying that Charles sees "the necessity of creating a new relationship between capital and labor primarily through profit sharing that will at least nullify to some extent the siren song of Communist propaganda." Wasserman concluded by stating the following: "I think at this very critical time in Haitian affairs and with Castro only 60 miles away that the Administration might begin to look for men with Mr. Charles' ability and attitude to see what can constructively be done to bring some hope to that unfortunate island."

4. Charles stated that since he was unable to make another trip to Washington to see Senator Humphrey he asked his friend and business partner, Joseph F. Dryer, Tampa, Florida to present Wasserman's letter to the Senator and request him to receive Charles when the Haitian banker returns to the US on one of his frequent business trips.

5. Charles reiterated his willingness to cooperate with the US Government. He wishes to be contacted at his bank in Port-au-Prince, but not his his home, Pacot St. He stated that after his return to Haiti he will contact "in utmost confidence" some of his influential friends: Army officers, intellectuals, writers, journalists, business men and will be

SECRET

glad to talk with a US Government official concerning the "general political climate in Haiti." Although he has had several contacts with members of the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince, he prefers to cooperate with "one of Captain Balog's friends." All the US official has to do is to walk into his office at the bank and say that "Im am a friend of Captain Balog's". If a contact is made this way he will be willing to cooperate "to the fullest."

6. He told us that he was not prepared to give his support to those anti-Duvalier politicians in exile who had a few days ago announced the formation of a government in exile since "they are not the right people to take over in Haiti." He emphasized that he would not under any circumstance support Duvalier with whom he is thoroughly disillusioned. In fact, he thinks that Duvalier "went crazy and must be and will be eliminated." He did not elaborate and stated that first he must go back to Haiti and talk with his friends. He mentioned, however, that his cousin, Joseph D. Charles, a former ambassador of Haiti to the US who now lives in "forced retirement" in Cap Haitien, was ready to re-enter the political life at a propitious moment. He believes that his cousin will have enough Army support to become provisional President and then with popular support will be elected President of Haiti. Upon his return to Port-au-Prince, Charles will work toward rallying support for Joseph D. Charles. He is confident that once in power, his uncle would pursue a pro-US policy. At this point, Charles intimated that "a Joseph Charles government could grant the US rights to establish a naval base at Môle St.-Nicolas, which is about 60 miles from Cuba."

7. We wished Charles bon voyage and, of course, promised nothing concerning his offer to be contacted in Port-au-Prince. We merely told him that we would report our conversation to "our mutual friends in Washington" for their decision. Regardless of this decision, Charles" stated that during his next trip to New York he would call us on the telephone to discuss "things" in confidence.

JAY B.L. REEVES

JXBalog:pas

file - Charles - 201
Card ✓

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

10 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. On 29 April 1963 Dorothe Matlack, Domestic Exploitation Section, ACSI, telephoned to the effect that a banker named Clemard Joseph Charles had left Haiti six days earlier and had just arrived in New York. A friend of Charles, named Joseph Dryer, 109 Lakewood Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida, had written to General Delmar, former CG Antilles Command, recommending Charles as a man of great interest to the US government in view of the events in Haiti. Charles was described as President of the Banc Commerciale, Port au Prince, Haiti, who is in President Duvalier's favor. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that she had alerted Col. Sam Kail in Miami to contact Dryer in order to obtain more background information and an assessment on Charles.

2. On 1 May 63 Mrs. Matlack advised that Charles was staying at the Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, and that he had telephoned her since her name had been supplied to him by Dryer. Charles considered her to be his point of contact in Washington. According to Mrs. Matlack, Charles had appointments to see Vice President Johnson, Senator Keating, and Congressman Rogers (Florida). However, Charles was willing to talk to representatives of Mrs. Matlack's office. Mrs. Matlack stated that the Haitian Desk man in ACSI was ready to go to New York to talk to Charles and invited CIA to accompany him. Charles speaks very little English and a fluency in French was therefore required for the interview. Mrs. Matlack stated that she might be able to obtain a French linguist from First Army, Governor's Island, but he would not be an intelligence officer. It was decided that James Balog, New York Office, who has a knowledge of the French language would accompany the ACSI representative [redacted]. It was also arranged that Balog would meet the ACSI representative (Captain Rogers) at the Park Sheraton Hotel where Charles was staying.

3. On 2 May 63 Mrs. Matlack reported that Col. Kail had interviewed Mr. Dryer in West Palm Beach. Dryer had appointed Charles as Director of his bank in Haiti. Charles, according to Dryer, formerly had no political ambitions but in view of the current political situation in Haiti, Charles now thinks that he may some day be president. Dryer described Charles as well-connected, politically and financially, on both sides of the fence in Haiti. He is also a good friend of President Duvalier. Dryer had given Charles letters of introduction to Senator Keating and to other officials in Washington. Charles wanted to see President Kennedy and indeed had gone to the White House to arrange for an appointment. He was well received by the President's appointment secretary and invited to dinner that evening with the appointment

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

secretary. Through a misunderstanding, however, Charles did not attend the dinner but went to New York instead.

4. Charles is travelling, according to Dryer, with a Texan geologist named de Mohrenschildt. de Mohrenschildt is associated with Charles in a business venture in Haiti and is trying to arrange a meeting for Charles with Vice President Johnson.

5. On 3 May 63 Jim Balog telephoned to advise that he had had a five-hour session the previous day with Charles and that he had obtained both personality data and views by Charles on what the United States should do in the current Haitian situation. Balog advised that he was transmitting the information to Washington. Upon arrival, copies of the teletypes were transmitted to ACSI (Mrs. Matlack), WH Division, and the Latin America Branch.

6. On 6 May 63 Mayo Stuntz, Support Branch, advised that WH Division wished to speak to Charles and Balog was asked to arrange an appointment. Mrs. Matlack telephoned at approximately 1715 to advise that she had just received a telephone call from Mrs. de Mohrenschildt asking assistance in obtaining hotel reservations in Washington. Upon being told that we had no special means of obtaining reservations, Mrs. Matlack stated that she would check with the State Department Protocol Office to determine which hotels would admit negro guests. Mrs. Matlack finally made reservations at the Alban Towers. A check with Jim Balog revealed that he had arranged for Charles to meet the WH representative in the lobby of the Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 12:00 noon on 7 May. Attempts to reach Mrs. Matlack that afternoon were unsuccessful. At 0830, 7 May, a call was made to Mrs. Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in Washington on that day and that arrangements had been made for a meeting with an Agency representative for 12:00 noon. Mrs. Matlack retorted that both Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and Charles had called her that previous evening to confirm a 12:00 luncheon appointment with her. Mrs. Matlack was concerned that CIA and Army should not be working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from ACSI to meet Charles at lunch and felt that it would not be politic for her to withdraw from her appointment since Army considered her the point of contact with Charles. Mayo Stuntz informed WH Division of the conflict and passed on the suggestion that the WH Division representative might meet Charles and Mrs. Matlack at noon and that Mrs. Matlack offered to withdraw shortly thereafter. The WH representative declined the offer and requested that a meeting later in the afternoon be arranged. Mrs. Matlack believed that due to conflicting instructions, she had been placed in the middle in the situation from which she could not graciously withdraw and requested that someone accompany her.

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

7. I met Mrs. Matlack in the lobby of the Hotel Willard shortly before noon, and a few minutes later, Mr. Charles arrived, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt. We lunched in the restaurant in the hotel. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he had been born in Batu, Russia, but during the Bolshevik Revolution had been taken to Poland as a small child. He had spent approximately 20 years in Poland prior to World War II and had served in the Polish Army. He also mentioned that he had been a member of an ICA Team to Yugoslavia in 1957 and while in Belgrade had met Gomulka who was visiting Belgrade at the time. He had spoken to Gomulka and was invited to visit Poland, which invitation he had accepted. His home is in Dallas, Texas. He has a PhD. in geology and has had some teaching experience. Mrs. de Mohrenschildt was born in Peking, China. Her father was Russian and her mother French, and she is now or has been a fashion designer. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he has known Charles for sometime and that he is a partner with him in a sisal business in Haiti.

8. Both Charles and de Mohrenschildt were anxious to arrange meetings with government officials in Washington. I mentioned to Charles that a meeting had been arranged for him at 2:15 and that a Mr. Green would meet him in the lobby. At 1410 Mrs. Matlack, Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and I departed and Charles remained in the lobby waiting for contact.

9. In the course of the luncheon conversation, Charles had mentioned to Mrs. Matlack that he desired to see a Mr. Wise, AID, to discuss US aid to Haiti. Later that afternoon Mrs. Matlack called to state that she had called the State Department to pass along Charles' request. Mr. Zagorski (State) had called her back to pass on the Haitian Desk man's extreme displeasure that anyone in the United States Government should be in official contact with Charles. The desk man considered Charles to be close to the Duvalier Government, to have been involved in several shady financial dealings, and in general, to be an undesirable character. Mrs. Matlack asked whether the Agency had any interest in Charles which would dictate further contact with Charles.

10. Mayo Stuntz checked with WH Division and determined that as a result of the meeting with Charles, the DD/P Haitian Desk had no further plans to contact him. I told Mrs. Matlack that our interest seemed to have been satisfied and that I believed we should disengage ourselves as gracefully as possible.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11. [redacted], DD/P Coordinator, called on 7 May to inquire concerning our involvement in the Charles case. He stated that ACSI had called him earlier that day to assure him that ACSI had no direct interest in Charles and that it was acting as an intermediary at the request of General Delmar who had passed the lead to General Fitch. ACSI was concerned that due to the mix up in appointments to see Charles, charges might later be made that ACSI had interferred or had obstructed CIA contact with Charles. I explained to Nelson what had happened and he later called back to state that ACSI was completely satisfied in the way the matter had been handled.

12. On 8 May Mrs. Matlack telephoned to advise that the Operational Branch of ACSI was discussing the Charles case with DD/P to determine future course of action. She was still somewhat concerned over her own position in the case since Charles considered her to be the focal point in Washington. I reiterated to her that the matter was one for either the State Department or the operational elements to handle and that we preferred to disengage ourselves. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that a dispatch had been received to the effect that a cousin of Charles was prominently mentioned as a successor to Duvalier should the latter be overthrown. She was of the opinion that the US government should continue to "play ball" with Charles as a future asset in Haitian affairs.

A. F. CZAJKOWSKI

Distribution:
Orig - O/Chief
1 - New York Office
1 - Support (Stuntz)
1 - LA Branch
1 - Index (Control)
1 - Dep/Coll chrono

AFCzajkowski:aer

[redacted]

file - Charles - 201
Card ✓

10 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. On 29 April 1963 Dorothe Matlack, Domestic Exploitation Section, ACSI, telephoned to the effect that a banker named Clemard Joseph Charles had left Haiti six days earlier and had just arrived in New York. A friend of Charles, named Joseph Dryer, 109 Lakewood Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida, had written to General Delmar, former CG Antilles Command, recommending Charles as a man of great interest to the US government in view of the events in Haiti. Charles was described as President of the Banc Commerciale, Port au Prince, Haiti, who is in President Duvalier's favor. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that she had alerted Col. Sam Kail in Miami to contact Dryer in order to obtain more background information and an assessment on Charles.

2. On 1 May 63 Mrs. Matlack advised that Charles was staying at the Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, and that he had telephoned her since her name had been supplied to him by Dryer. Charles considered her to be his point of contact in Washington. According to Mrs. Matlack, Charles had appointments to see Vice President Johnson, Senator Keating, and Congressman Rogers (Florida). However, Charles was willing to talk to representatives of Mrs. Matlack's office. Mrs. Matlack stated that the Haitian Desk man in ACSI was ready to go to New York to talk to Charles and invited CIA to accompany him. Charles speaks very little English and a fluency in French was therefore required for the interview. Mrs. Matlack stated that she might be able to obtain a French linguist from First Army, Governor's Island, but he would not be an intelligence officer. It was decided that James Balog, New York Office, who has a knowledge of the French language would accompany the ACSI representative under Army cover. It was also arranged that Balog would meet the ACSI representative (Captain Rogers) at the Park Sheraton Hotel where Charles was staying.

3. On 2 May 63 Mrs. Matlack reported that Col. Kail had interviewed Mr. Dryer in West Palm Beach. Dryer had appointed Charles as Director of his bank in Haiti. Charles, according to Dryer, formerly had no political ambitions but in view of the current political situation in Haiti, Charles now thinks that he may some day be president. Dryer described Charles as well-connected, politically and financially, on both sides of the fence in Haiti. He is also a good friend of President Duvalier. Dryer had given Charles letters of introduction to Senator Keating and to other officials in Washington. Charles wanted to see President Kennedy and indeed had gone to the White House to arrange for an appointment. He was well received by the President's appointment secretary and invited to dinner that evening with the appointment

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

secretary. Through a misunderstanding, however, Charles did not attend the dinner but went to New York instead.

4. Charles is travelling, according to Dryer, with a Texan geologist named de Mohrenschildt. de Mohrenschildt is associated with Charles in a business venture in Haiti and is trying to arrange a meeting for Charles with Vice President Johnson.

5. On 3 May 63 Jim Balog telephoned to advise that he had had a five-hour session the previous day with Charles and that he had obtained both personality data and views by Charles on what the United States should do in the current Haitian situation. Balog advised that he was transmitting the information to Washington. Upon arrival, copies of the teletypes were transmitted to ACSI (Mrs. Matlack), WH Division, and the Latin America Branch.

6. On 6 May 63 Mayo Stuntz, Support Branch, advised that WH Division wished to speak to Charles and Balog was asked to arrange an appointment. Mrs. Matlack telephoned at approximately 1715 to advise that she had just received a telephone call from Mrs. de Mohrenschildt asking assistance in obtaining hotel reservations in Washington. Upon being told that we had no special means of obtaining reservations, Mrs. Matlack stated that she would check with the State Department Protocol Office to determine which hotels would admit negro guests. Mrs. Matlack finally made reservations at the Alban Towers. A check with Jim Balog revealed that he had arranged for Charles to meet the WH representative in the lobby of the Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 12:00 noon on 7 May. Attempts to reach Mrs. Matlack that afternoon were unsuccessful. At 0830, 7 May, a call was made to Mrs. Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in Washington on that day and that arrangements had been made for a meeting with an Agency representative for 12:00 noon. Mrs. Matlack retorted that both Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and Charles had called her that previous evening to confirm a 12:00 luncheon appointment with her. Mrs. Matlack was concerned that CIA and Army should not be working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from ACSI to meet Charles at lunch and felt that it would not be politic for her to withdraw from her appointment since Army considered her the point of contact with Charles. Mayo Stuntz informed WH Division of the conflict and passed on the suggestion that the WH Division representative might meet Charles and Mrs. Matlack at noon and that Mrs. Matlack offered to withdraw shortly thereafter. The WH representative declined the offer and requested that a meeting later in the afternoon be arranged. Mrs. Matlack believed that due to conflicting instructions, she had been placed in the middle in the situation from which she could not graciously withdraw and requested that someone accompany her.

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

7. I met Mrs. Matlack in the lobby of the Hotel Willard shortly before noon, and a few minutes later, Mr. Charles arrived, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt. We lunched in the restaurant in the hotel. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he had been born in Batu, Russia, but during the Bolshevik Revolution had been taken to Poland as a small child. He had spent approximately 20 years in Poland prior to World War II and had served in the Polish Army. He also mentioned that he had been a member of an ICA Team to Yugoslavia in 1957 and while in Belgrade had met Comulka who was visiting Belgrade at the time. He had spoken to Gomulka and was invited to visit Poland, which invitation he had accepted. His home is in Dallas, Texas. He has a PhD. in geology and has had some teaching experience. Mrs. de Mohrenschildt was born in Peking, China. Her father was Russian and her mother French, and she is now or has been a fashion designer. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he has known Charles for sometime and that he is a partner with him in a sisal business in Haiti.

8. Both Charles and de Mohrenschildt were anxious to arrange meetings with government officials in Washington. I mentioned to Charles that a meeting had been arranged for him at 2:15 and that a Mr. Green would meet him in the lobby. At 1410 Mrs. Matlack, Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and I departed and Charles remained in the lobby waiting for contact.

9. In the course of the luncheon conversation, Charles had mentioned to Mrs. Matlack that he desired to see a Mr. Wise, AID, to discuss US aid to Haiti. Later that afternoon Mrs. Matlack called to state that she had called the State Department to pass along Charles' request. Mr. Zagorski (State) had called her back to pass on the Haitian Desk man's extreme displeasure that anyone in the United States Government should be in official contact with Charles. The desk man considered Charles to be close to the Duvalier Government, to have been involved in several shady financial dealings, and in general, to be an undesirable character. Mrs. Matlack asked whether the Agency had any interest in Charles which would dictate further contact with Charles.

10. Mayo Stuntz checked with WH Division and determined that as a result of the meeting with Charles, the DD/P Haitian Desk had no further plans to contact him. I told Mrs. Matlack that our interest seemed to have been satisfied and that I believed we should disengage ourselves as gracefully as possible.

11. Wayne Nelson, DD/P Coordinator, called on 7 May to inquire concerning our involvement in the Charles case. He stated that ACSI had called him earlier that day to assure him that ACSI had no direct interest in Charles and that it was acting as an intermediary at the request of General Delmar who had passed the lead to General Fitch. ACSI was concerned that due to the mix up in appointments to see Charles, charges might later be made that ACSI had interferred or had obstructed CIA contact with Charles. I explained to Nelson what had happened and he later called back to state that ACSI was completely satisfied in the way the matter had been handled.

12. On 8 May Mrs. Matlack telephoned to advise that the Operational Branch of ACSI was discussing the Charles case with DD/P to determine future course of action. She was still somewhat concerned over her own position in the case since Charles considered her to be the focal point in Washington. I reiterated to her that the matter was one for either the State Department or the operational elements to handle and that we preferred to disengage ourselves. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that a dispatch had been received to the effect that a cousin of Charles was prominently mentioned as a successor to Duvalier should the latter be overthrown. She was of the opinion that the US government should continue to "play ball" with Charles as a future asset in Haitian affairs.

A. F. CZAJKOWSKI

Distribution:
Orig - O/Chief
1 - New York Office
1 - Support (Stuntz)
1 - LA Branch
1 - Index (Control)
1 - Dep/Coll chrono

AFCzajkowski:acr



HAITI

CHARLES, CLEMARD JOSEPH. BANKER,

PORT-AU-PRINCE.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY CIA-P-162573

WARNING !
NOT FOR RELEASE
This photograph may be protected by Copyright and related laws and is therefore limited to OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Its use or publication in unclassified documents may require a release which can be granted only by the Copyright owner. Users are warned that unauthorized use of this photograph can subject the user to personal liability and jeopardize the source of this material.

Y-59

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

BIOGRAPHIC SUPPLEMENT

HAITI

Clémard Joseph CHARLES

President and General Manager
of the Commercial Bank of Haiti

CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE

Clémard Joseph Charles, a man who has insisted on numerous occasions that he will be the next President of Haiti, has been chronically involved, directly or indirectly, in rumored plots against President Duvalier which have never materialized. In May 1963 Charles is reported to have passed word to US officials through an American journalist that he was in a position to head a provisional government after President Duvalier had been removed from power. In subsequent years, particularly in 1966 and 1967, Charles approached US officials both in New York and Port-au-Prince with the apparent intention of enlisting US support for a group of conspirators he claimed to lead which was determined to topple Duvalier from power. None of these plots materialized, however, and there was never any evidence to suggest that any serious plans had been made.

In January 1969 Charles had a lengthy conversation with an official of the US Embassy in which the former candid discussed his grievances against Duvalier and the plot he claimed to be instigating to overthrow Duvalier and replace him as President of Haiti. Charles stated that the group supporting his efforts consisted primarily of soldiers, a few militiamen, some professional men, priests, students, and assorted other well-placed individuals. He claimed that representatives of these groups had already agreed on the essential elements of a constitution which would include a bicameral legislature and an operative political party structure. The reporting official cautioned, however, that Charles' remarks should be viewed in light of his previous history of relating such conspiracies.

When President Duvalier was reported to be seriously ill in mid-May 1969, Charles' name was again mentioned in connection with myriad rumors of imminent government takeovers. According to a reliable source, a military junta was formed to take power in the event of the death of Duvalier. The junta purportedly included Gen. Gérard Constant, Col. Octave Cayard, Col. Kesner Blain, Col. Roger St. Albin, and Col. René Prosper. Charles was said

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Clémard Joseph CHARLES (cont.)

to be aware of the identities of these men. Furthermore, according to an official of the US Embassy, at one time it appeared that Charles had originated the idea of the junta, hoping to utilize it eventually to launch his own candidacy for the Presidency. Subsequently, however, Charles changed his statements about being "the next President" to being "a future President," and he seemed to be placing some distance between himself and the proposed junta.

During Charles' aforementioned conversation with an Embassy official in January 1969, he revealed other facets of his personality as well as his penchant for plotting. He conceives of his role in Haiti in grandiose, almost messianic terms. He said that he had invested $2 million in Haiti and had done more for the development of the country than any other indigenous Haitian. He claimed, for example, that the workers in the Artibonite were passionate admirers of his because his tannery in Port Sondé (now closed) provided needed jobs. He also claimed the special allegiance of the chauffeur guides, the only truly organized workers in the country, because when he directed the compulsory Government Motor Vehicle Insurance program, legitimate chauffeur claims were paid. He implied that such claims were no longer honored.

Discussing the internal problems of his country, Charles stressed the need for immediate steps to prevent the total destruction of Haiti's land and resources, to control the spiraling population growth, and to rejuvenate the country's secondary cities. To achieve these goals before current trends become irreversible, Charles believes that it is essential to pursue relations with the United States that would be conducive to massive assistance and investment. In this respect he insists that Duvalier has been grossly unrealistic and has done Haiti great damage by his refusal to recognize the role the United States must play in Haitian affairs.

DR:eab May 1969

CONTROLLED DISSEM | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. OO- B 321/36801-68

SUBJECT Clemard Charles Statement That He Will Attempt Duvalier Overthrow Feb-Mar 69/ Charles Comment On No. 2 and 3 Men In Duvalier Regime; Confirmation by UK Consul General/Weak Condition of Banque Commerciale d'Haiti/Background On Various Personalities and Their Present Location

DATE DISTR. 23 DEC 1968

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES (360) C-DC8-54950

DATE OF INFO. Dec 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Haiti/Dec 68

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen; independent businessman who has visited in Haiti for extended periods during the past four years. He is currently attempting to promote private financial backing for installation of generating equipment at the Barrage de Peligre dam and for educational television in Haiti.

[This report was developed and prepared by a US Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I recently spent approximately three days in Haiti (9-12 Dec 68) and while there had extended visits with Clemard Joseph Charles, President, Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, and also owner of a sisal plantation and mill. Present during my visits with Charles was his personal assistant and confidant, Ludovich Celestines. Charles, a devout Catholic, personally told me that he intended to attempt to overthrow Duvalier. He has made specific plans for this overthrow in late February or early March 1969. He claims that he definitely has the Army and the Catholic Church with him, and that the overthrow will be without bloodshed.

2. I had not intended to contact other officials or individuals in Haiti. However, on the last day of my stay I was invited to visit with Clovis M. Desinor, formerly Haiti's representative to the UN and currently Dr. Duvalier's Minister of Finance. He is said to be the No. 2 man in Haiti - next to Duvalier. Present at the meeting with Desinor was his assistant, Dr. Herve Boyer and reportedly the No. 3 man.

BACKGROUND

3. I first met the individuals mentioned above in 1965-66 while on an extended stay in Haiti for business purposes. I was introduced to Charles by Max Rowe, a driver assigned to me by the Haitian Government and whose wife, Raymonde, was the personal secretary for Charles. Rowe continued to drive for me on that first and subsequent visits to Haiti except on this latest visit when he was absent in the US.

Charles

4. When I first met Charles he was President of the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, owned the Sisal plantation and mill, also owned a tannery financed by West German interests, and was the President of the Haiti Chamber of Commerce and Haitian correspondent for the First National City Bank of New York. During the period approximately one year prior to June 1967, Charles put into effect a system of Social Security (Office of National Assurance) which was working well and liked by the Haitian

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | S YES

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

Sent [illegible] Jan 69

people. He also devised an automobile insurance system and was financing this through the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti.

5. In a period just prior to June 1967 Duvalier was convinced by Desinor and Boyer that Charles was, or at least had been, plotting Duvaliers' overthrow. Together with a large group Charles was imprisoned in Port-au-Prince from June 1967 to June 1968.

6. Just prior to the arrest of Charles, Max Rowe's wife, Raymonde, took US$200,000 out of the bank and hid it near Cap Haitien in the north and advised Charles' wife of the location. In addition, Max Rowe claims that in June 1967 he and his wife [Raymonde Rowe is in process of getting US citizenship. Max is in the US on a visitor's permit] brought papers incriminating Charles to the US and destroyed them.

BANK'S FINANCIAL CONDITION

7. Although Charles has the bank, his position at present is difficult. I saw the bank balance sheet which shows assets of US$2.9 million but only US$29,000 (as of 10 Dec 68) cash on hand. With this small amount of cash he can no longer make loans. He says that he has found it necessary to make sizeable loans to Haitians who have in turn made highly speculative loans to others at exorbitant rates of interest. Very minor amounts of these loans have been repaid to the bank and thus his current financial position.

8. Charles is hopeful that when Duvalier's overthrow has been completed he will be able to get private financial assistance from the US. According to Charles, US financial organizations have almost completely stopped their assistance because of the oppressive Duvalier Government.

9. Charles says that Max Rowe is aware of his plans to overthrow Duvalier which were communicated to Rowe by a La Bonte Jean, who is also in the US. Charles says that the Army is unhappy with Duvalier because of the execution of fourteen officers after the abortive May 1968 invasion, which included Major Toma, who was popular and powerful in his position as a censor and in control of all foreigners coming into Haiti. Charles maintains that the Ton Ton Macoutes are no longer a potent force - not operational. They have no food and are receiving no pay.

10. John Pierre La Grand, UK Consul General in Haiti and Shell Oil General Manager, agrees with Charles that Desinor and Boyer are Duvalier's closest confidants. Fito Metales (alias Fritz Belmont) is said by Rowe and La Grand to be Duvalier's hatchet man. He is manager of the Croupiers at the Royal Cabaret. La Grand says that the "old man", (Duvalier) is stronger than ever, both in health and power.

- end -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM (EXCERPT)

A-347

DATE: 3 AUGUST 1968

~~CLASSIFICATION:~~ HAITIAN FINANCIAL STATESMEN,
SUBJECT: MID-1968

CLASSIFICATION: NOT KNOWN

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM **CONFIDENTIAL** NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. 00-E-324/21215-68

SUBJECT Clemard Joseph Charles Has Reportedly Paid US$200 Thousand Ransom And Promised An Additional US$400 Thousand in Return for Release from Prison And Reinstatement As President of Commercial Bank of Haiti

DATE DISTR 26 JUL 1968

NO PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Jul 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---------/Jul 68

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, official of an import-export company. Source maintains close contact with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti.

1. Effective 10 Jul 68, Clemard Joseph Charles was reinstated as the president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti (BCH), as announced in the Haitian public press. A stockholders' meeting is scheduled for mid-Aug 68.

2. I have heard from previously reliable sources that Charles was compelled to pay to the Government of Haiti (GOH) the sum of US$200 thousand (not Haitian gourds) as the price of reinstatement as head of the BCH. Charles has also promised, as part of the price of reinstatement, to pay an additional US$400 thousand. This total of US$600 thousand closely approximates the US$605 thousand cited earlier as the "ransom" for Charles' release from prison. I understand that the US$200 thousand has already been paid. Where Charles got this sum I do not know. He could have withdrawn the US$100 thousand which he has on deposit at the First National City Bank in New York City; I do not know whether or not he has done so. It seems clear that President Duvalier has decided that the possible long-term benefits of allowing the bank to function (and thus enabling Charles to raise the required US$400 thousand and also possibly attracting foreign investment capital to Haiti) outweigh the benefits of refusing him permission to operate until the total "ransom" should have been paid.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U NO

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S NO

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

24 July 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Attention: Source Register

FROM: Interagency Source Register

SUBJECT: CLEMARD, Joseph Charles 80-11612
aka: CHARLES, Clemard Joseph

1. Reference is made to your request for registration dated 3 June 1968 concerning Subject. You are referred to OO-E-324/06340-66 dated 14 April 1966, subject: Clemard Joseph Charles Believed to be President Duvalier's Personal Financial Manager/Biographical Data on C J Charles; OO-A(S) 322/14068-68 dated May 1968, subject: Clemard Joseph-Charles Must Raise US $605 Thousand Before He Can Resume His Banking and Other Activities; and OO-A(S) 322/14367-68 dated 22 May 1968, subject: Rearrest of Clemard Joseph Charles/Charles Is Not Able to Raise US$605 Thousand Ransom/Data Concerning Charles' US Bank Accounts/President Duvalier Might Settle for US$100 Thousand Cash/Charles Has Credit of US$300 Thousand in National Bank of the Republic of Haiti and Claims an Additional US$100 Thousand. Copies are attached for your retention.

2. The Interagency Source Register has no record of a current operational interest in Subject. DCS reserves the right to contact Subject under the provisions of DCID 2/3.

ISRM-28,910

Encl. 3 attachments as stated above
RID/CE: JMA/JD/bdt
BASED ON: 201-357029
FILE IN: 201-357029*

FILE IN 201-357029

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET (When Filled In)

PRIORITY

ISR LOG

FROM: *IMMEDIATE*

SERVICE NO.:

INDEX		SECURITY	DATE
TO:	FROM:		
TO OO:	RESULTS	COVER	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
			TERM NO. 28,910 / DATE 7 JUN 68

AREA DESK: TO: [illegible] - 13 June 1968

OTHER: No Present Contact

SOI:

COMMENTS: No objection to registration. DCS reserves the right to contact subject under provisions of NSCID 2, DCID 2-3 and 2-8/GSM/b

FORM 11-63 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20-28)

SECRET WH
(When Filled In)

VINCENT A. DI BENEDETTO
FI/ISR
2-E-03
Ext. 5045

REGISTRATION REQUEST

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISRM NO. 28,910
DATE 3 Jan 68
201 NO. 357029

NAME: CLEMARD, Joseph Charles

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS:

DATE OF BIRTH: 21 April 1923

PLACE OF BIRTH: Gonavives, Haiti

CITIZENSHIP:

PRESENT ADDRESS:

OCCUPATION: Sole representative of

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT: General Electric Co., Ltd, London

TRAVEL: US, UK, France, Italy, and West Germany

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA:

201 filled by FI/ISR.

SD 11612

RECEIVED
RID/IN
PRIORITY
JUN 11 41 AM '68

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION		
Date 18 Jul 68		INITIALS
RI ANALYST CB7		JHD
DIV.	BRANCH	
ISR		
WH/7/HT		
RI EDITOR		
RI TYPIST		

18 JUL 1968

SD-11612 Recheck

24 Jul 68

1. Subject is being carried under SD-11612. SD-19022 is hereby cancelled.

JDW

FILE IN 201-357029

12 JUN 1968

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY:______ AT:______ ______Z

DISSEM BY ___Z___ PER ______#

ACTION WH8 (38) ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.______

X-REF TO FILE NO.______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/COG8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRINT

S E C R E T 191640Z JUL 68 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 5289

DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO, JMCOBRA

19 JUL 68 IN 53746

HENRI SICLAIT DIRECTOR OF TOBACCO MONOPLY AND INTRIGUER AGAINST CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, AND WHO IS NOW RUMORED IN DIFFICULTIES SINCE CHARLES RELEASE, LEFT PORT AU PRINCE 17 JULY ON PANAM 234 PRESS STATED PURPOSE TO VISIT WIFE'S SICK MOTHER.

S E C R E T

BT

AN
AB
IN
DS
BK
DES MD
FI

CS COPY

SECRET

19 JUL 68

201-357029

SECRET

16 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Domestic Contact Service
Operational Support Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. George S. Musulin

SUBJECT : DCS Case 47540 - Contact
with Louis A. Brun

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 12 April 1966 and subsequent communications on the subject of WH/7 interest in the contact which had been established by DCS representatives in New York with Louis A. Brun. This contact served to monitor the activities of Clemard Joseph Charles, the Haitian banker, who was plotting to overthrow the Duvalier regime in Haiti.

2. In June 1967, Charles was arrested in Port-au-Prince and has spent the majority of the time since then in jail. He is released at various intervals by Duvalier apparently to give him the opportunity to locate more money for the regime. Since Charles fell from grace, it has become apparent that any hopes or plans he may have had to overthrow Duvalier have long since past. Accordingly, we wish to advise that WH/7 has no special interest in DCS maintaining contact with Brun to cover Charles' activities. Likewise, we do not feel that there are any special requirements at this time which Brun could service regarding Haitian matters.

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

3. We do not, however, wish to interpose any objection to DCS maintaining contact with Brun for its own purposes and we would appreciate being advised of any information of significance on Haiti which may be produced through this contact.

Paul V. Harwood
Chief, WH/7

DDP/WH/7/Haiti/RWBerg:klh (16 Jul 68)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addee
1 - WH/7/Ht
1 - Subj file

NY-529-68

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : Operational Support Staff (Musulin)

15 July 1968

Chief, New York Field Office

Letter from Louis A. Brun to Clemard Joseph Charles (to be Forwarded Via Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti)

REFERENCES: (A) NY-467-68 (20 June 1968); (B) CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 80548;
(C) Case 47,540

1. Reference "A" forwarded to you a letter from Louis A. Brun, B&B International Corporation, 134 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, to Clemard Joseph Charles, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. This letter was to be sent by State Department diplomatic pouch to Mr. Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and given by him to Charles. Brun had told us that Felder had agreed to act as intermediary for correspondence between himself and Charles and added that he and Charles had already used the system. The letter in Reference "A" was the first time we had been approached in the matter.

2. Reference "B" stated that the letter had been dispatched via Message Center Courier to the State Department on 24 June 1968.

3. On or about 2[illegible] June 1968 Brun telephoned us and stated that Charles had not received the letter. We telephoned Mr. Musulin, who double-checked and assured us that the letter had gone to the State Department and that it should go out in the next pouch.

4. On 10 July 1968, Brun telephoned us and stated that on 9 July 1968 he had received a telephone call from a Ray Alvarez. Alvarez identified himself as a State Department employee in Washington and told Brun that he had the letter destined for Charles. Alvarez then told Brun that he would return the letter if Brun would tell him how it had reached the State Department. Brun refused to give Alvarez any information. We then telephoned Mr. Musulin and relayed the foregoing information. Mr. Musulin inquired into the matter and learned that the letter had gone to Haiti in the State Department pouch, had not been delivered to Felder and had been returned to Washington. He and we surmised that the State Department did

not wish to lay itself open to the charge of becoming embroiled in local Haitian politics and so had refused to deliver the letter to Felder. We reported this information to Brun.

5. On 11 July 1968 Brun telephoned us and told us that he had received a letter from Charles via the Felder channel. This letter bore a New York City postmark. We gave this information to Mr. Musulin. We told Brun that it is quite probable that Felder has a personal arrangement with unknown parties which permits him to use the diplomatic pouch facilities. Since we do not, letters can go only from Charles to Brun and not from Brun to Charles. Brun and we agreed that he will not henceforth attempt to use Felder to send letters to Charles.

6. Mr. Musulin agreed to retrieve the letter from the State Department and to send it to us. We shall return it forthwith to Brun.

Jackson R. Horton

JRMitchell:ch

FILE: Louis A. Brun
B&B Int'l Corp.
134 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY

and Case 47,940

B. & B. INTERNATIONAL CORP.
134 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10011

Mme. Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
HAITI

SECRET

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

New York, N.Y.

Mme Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

Ma chère Sophie,

Cette lettre est pour t'accuser réception des tiennes des 17 et 26 mai écoulés et du 4 juin en cours.

Si tu n'as pas eu de mes nouvelles depuis mon départ d'Haiti le 7 mai dernier, c'est que premièrement, je me proposais de retourner voir Clémard la semaine suivante. Le voyage a dû être différé lorsque j'ai su que Clémard avait, à nouveau, été arrêté le 11 mai. J'ai même eu à faire un câble à un ami pour lui annoncer mon arrivée et je suis sûr qu'il a dû t'en informer.

Dueièmement, l'arrestation de Clémard ainsi que les nouvelles des derniers événements en Haiti on eu des effets négatifs sur les négociations en cours que j'avais entamées pour Clémard et qui semblaient vouloir aboutir. Je n'ai pas besoin de te dire combien j'en ai été bouleversé. Alors que nos amis d'ici et moi pensions pouvoir aider Clémard que nous estimons comme un frère, sa nouvelle arrestation est venue nous assommer avec une rigueur dont nous nous remettons à peine.

Avant d'aller plus loin, je dois te dire que tu ne dois point douter de notre dévouement pour Clémard. Il sait, et tu dois aussi le savoir, que nous ne saurions jamais marchander notre concours à un ami pour qui nous avons la plus grande affection et pour qui nous sommes prêts à consentir tous les sacrifices personnels que les circonstances peuvent exiger. Je crois devoir te dire que si, en dehors d'Haiti, je n'arrive à le tirer de l'impasse dans laquelle il se trouve, je doite fort, sans fausse modestie, que quelqu'un d'autre puisse réussir à le faire.

Nos puissants amis communs tant à New York, Washington, Miami et ailleurs ont tous manifesté un désir sérieux de lui venir en aide dans les limites de leurs possibilités respectives.

Depuis mon retour d'Haiti je me suis mis en action à cette fin et ai personellement vu plusieurs personnalités du monde financier qui n'ont pas hésité à consacrer une grande partie de leur temps précieux à la concrétisation des plans que j'ai eu à envisager avec Clémard en vue de le tirer d'embarras le plus rapidement possible.

/...

SECRET
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Mes espoirs de réussite ainsi que ceux de tous les amis contactés se sont heurtés aux effets négatifs inévitables provenant tant de la nouvelle arrestation de Clémard que des derniers événements survenus en Haiti depuis le 20 mai écoulé. Je t'envoie, pour preuve, copie d'une lettre d'un de ces grands amis, Mr. Howard Burris de Washington, D.C. Je te demande de garder cette lettre strictement confidentielle car je n'aurais pas aimé que le nom de Mr. Burris soit mentionné à quiconque en Haiti. Si cela arrivait, nous pourrions perdre un très bon ami.

Pour ton information, je te dirai que Mr. Burris est un colonel retraité du Corps de Génie de l'armée américaine, ami personnel et conseiller du Président Johnson et extrêmement influent à Washington tant dans le monde politique que financier. J'ai eu à faire deux voyages à Washington entre le 8 et 11 mai au cours desquels lui et moi envisagions les moyens d'aider Clémard selon le "modus" envisagé. La copie de sa lettre du 7 juin en cours saura te confirmer ce qui précède.

J'ai aussi vu personnellement et lui ai causé maintes fois au téléphone, Joseph Dryer, qui devait se rendre en Haiti le 24 mai pour te vois mais qui a dû renvoyer son voyage après les nouvelles de la dernière tentative d'invasion. Je lui ai encore causé récemment au téléphone et il a eu à me faire part des résultats négatifs de ses efforts, toujours en fonction des mêmes circonstances.

Le lettres adressées aux autres amis de l'étranger, dont Dabinovick, par example, sont restées jusqu'ici sans réponses. Je vais une nouvelle fois écrire longuement à Dabinovick pour lui transmettre ta dernière communication avec l'espoir d'avoir un mot encourageant de lui.

Comme tu dois le comprendre, ma chère Sophie, nos efforts, malgré toute notre bonne volonté, ne sauraient se concrétiser à brève échéance, car les valeurs en question qu'il nous faut trouver ne sont pas insignifiantes. Je te signalerai en passant un point qui a été soulevé au cours des négociations et qui fait ressortir que même si nos amis seraient en mesure d'avancer à Clémard les valeurs nécessaires, ils ont des doutes sérieux non pas sur la sincérité de Clémard à faire face aux obligations qui devront être contractées, mais à la possibilité matérielle de rapatrier, en dollars américains, les valeurs avancées. J'ai personnellement assisté à des contacts avec des banquiers d'ici qui affirment qu'avant longtemps, Haiti n'aura presque plus de devises-dollars pour solder ses comptes à l'étranger. Autant d'obstacles que je suis malheureusement obligé de te signaler pour que tu saches à quoi t'en tenir.

Concernant maintenant le grand banquier noir dont j'ai eu moi-même à dire à Clémard que je croyais pouvoir nous aider, celui-ci a eu à me faire comprendre qu'il ne pouvait en l'occurrence intéresser son institution à une affaire de ce genre qui comporte trop de risques. De ce côté là il n'y a donc pas grand espoir.

/...

SECRET

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Ceci dit, malgré tous ces obstacles qui sembleraient insurmontables, je n'ai pas totalement perdu l'espoir de pouvoir t'aider à sortir Clémard, sain et sauf, de la prison où sa santé se détériore rapidement, je le sais. L'essentiel est que le Chef lui-même soit persuadé que l'inhabilité que nous éprouvons à satisfaire les exigences du moment, ne sont en aucune façon imputables à Clémard mais plutôt à des circonstances totalement indépendantes de notre volonté.

Je prie Dieu Tout-puissant pour que l'on finisse par réaliser que Clémard, en bon patriote haïtien, a eu foi en son pays et n'a pas cru bon d'expatrier, comme plus d'un l'a fait, le fruit de ses durs labeurs et de son intelligence productive.

Je me proposais d'écrire personnellement à Son Excellence le Président à Vie d'Haiti, pour implorer sa clémence et sa générosité pour un ami qui nous est cher. Je me suis alors demandé si c'était là un geste sage qui pourrait avoir la vertu de l'épargner et, dans le doute, j'ai préférer m'abstenir.

Pour revenir maintenant aux possibilités de réaliser au moins partiellement, la valeur exigée, je dois te dire que je suis heureux de savoir que tu détiens une procuration générale en bonne et due forme t'habilitant à ratifier tout ce que nous pourrions entreprendre à cette fin.

Séparément, par cette même voie, je te communiquerai toutes les formalités à remplir pour nous mettre en mesure de réaliser dans un délai raisonable au moins le tiers de la somme réclamée. Il serait souhaitable que tu sois mise en mesure de venir ici à New York, ce qui faciliterait beaucoup les choses, mais dans l'impossibilité d'une pareille alternative, tu devras donc agréer aux conditions stipulées. Il faudra donc agir avec dilligence pour nous permettre d'aller au plus vite.

Ma chère Sophie, je terminerai cette lettre déjà longue et ardue en te renouvelant mon dévouement le plus entier à la cause de notre ami Clémard et en te priant une nouvelle fois de ne jamais douter de mes sentiments propres et ceux de ma famille pour Clémard, toi et les tiens.

Affections à Gros-Miche, Marie-Claudine, Toto, Eddie et sa femme.

Bon courage!

Invariablement,

Louis A. Brun

Louis A. Brun

LAB/jvb
encl. 1

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

SECRET

HOWARD L. BURRIS

SUITE 101, R.C.A. BUILDING
1725 K STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

June 7, 1968

Mr. Louis A. Brun
R. [illegible] International Corp.
154 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10011

Dear Mr. Brun

I apologize for the delay in responding to your suggestion concerning the commercial bank in Haiti. My activities here have been such that I have been unable until the past day or so to give your proposal adequate thought and consideration.

First I must admit that the recent abortive invasion attempt caused certain reflection and it is this kind of activity, successful or unsuccessful, that could create serious dislocations for those established in business. However I must assure you that this was only a reflection and the reason that I will be unable to accept your offer is the extent and nature of my activities here in Washington. I believe I alluded to some of them during your visit. The occasions when I would find it possible to visit Port-au-Prince or to devote any significant amount of time to the bank's activities here would be rare indeed. I shall confess to you that I declined a similar position on a bank board here in the states for the same reason.

I regret that this decision is necessary but I hope that in future relationships we may be able to do something useful and successful in Haiti.

Sincerely,

Howard L. Burris

SECRET
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

FORMALITES A REMPLIR PAR SOPHIE:

1) Envoyer, signe par Sophie, un mandat original notarie et legalise par le Consul Americain, a une personne amie ou parent habitant New York, donnant a cette personne les memes pouvoirs donnes par Clemard a Sophie. Ce mandat devra etre accompagne d'une copie authentifiee de celui de Clemard a Sophie.

2) Envoyer les clefs des deux "safe deposit box" qui se trouvent a la First National City Bank avec les formes attachees qui doivent aussi etre legalisees par le consul americain.

3) Indiquer le nom et la fonction de la personne autorisee par le gouvernement haitien a regler la transaction avec Clemard pour communication eventuelle relative a la transaction.

Ma chere Sophie:

Cette communication te parviendra par une voie que Clemard a eu a m'indiquer et que je crois etre sure. Fais bien attention a ce qu'il n'y ait pas d'indiscretion.

Je voudrais suggerer que tu habilites Paulette selon le paragraphe 1 ci-dessus.

Je t'envoie aussi par cette meme voie une lettre qui saura te renseigner sur l'etat de nos demarches et possibilites.

Encore une fois, Bon Courage et bonjour a tous.

Invariablement,

Loulou

in Duplicate

DATE ____________________

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK
SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT

________________________________ BRANCH

____
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY

____
ADDRESS OF DEPUTY

THE SIGNATURE APPEARING ABOVE IS THAT OF ____________________ WHO HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO HAVE ACCESS TO SAFE NO. __________ IN THE VAULTS OF YOUR BANK.

____

SD 84 REV. 10-61

SECRET
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

In Duplicate

66 (L) REV. 10-61
PRINTING OF 12-61

DEPUTYSHIP FORM

DATE ____________________

__________ HEREBY AUTHORIZE ____________________

TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF SAFE NO. __________ NOW RENTED BY __________________ IN THE VAULT OF **FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK**, SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT AT __________________, NEW YORK, TO EXCHANGE SAID SAFE FOR ANY NEW SAFE OR SAFES IN SAID VAULT AND FROM TIME TO TIME TO MAKE LIKE EXCHANGES, AND IN MY NAME AND ON MY BEHALF TO EXECUTE A LEASE OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES UPON SUCH TERMS AS HE MAY DEEM PROPER AND TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, AND TO RECEIVE ALL THE LESSEE'S KEYS TO ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, WITH POWER AT ALL TIMES TO SURRENDER THE SAID SAFE NO. __________ AND ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES; THIS AUTHORITY TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS REVOCATION IS RECEIVED BY THE SAID BANK.

____

STATE OF
SS.:
COUNTY OF

ON THE DAY OF ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND

BEFORE ME CAME

TO ME KNOWN TO BE THE INDIVIDUAL DESCRIBED IN, AND WHO EXECUTED, THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE EXECUTED THE SAME.

____

SECRET

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
RWBerg
WH/7/Ht
RB 2630

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 12 July 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/7/Ht	12 JUL 1968			
2. c/wh/7			K	
3. DC/WH/7				
4. c/wh/7/MS			✓	
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

12 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Letter from Louis A. Brun to FSO Felder

1. I talked with George Musulin (DCS/Ops Support Staff) at 0840 hours this morning about the letter mailed to FSO Felder at the American Embassy in Port au Prince. Musulin said that he had spoken with Brun about the letter and Brun had assured him that Felder said to mail letters to him through Foreign Service mail channels. Brun is in contact with Felder during his visits to Haiti and this system was laid on between them during one of his trips.

2. Brun also said that he was a little upset about the problems which had arisen in sending his letter. Brun said that he had received a letter from Felder (mailed in New York City) saying that he had never received the letter from Brun. Brun was concerned that the letter may have fallen into the wrong hands in Haiti. Musulin said that he would try to recover the letter and send it back to Brun.

3. I told Musulin that Ambassador Ross was very much disturbed about this matter and that any further involvement by the Agency with correspondence between Brun and Felder should be avoided. Brun is a business agent of Clemard Joseph-Charles and thus any correspondence between Brun and an official of the American Embassy is of particular concern to the Ambassador because of the obvious political implications. Musulin said he understood this and would tell Brun that the dispatch of any correspondence in the future would be his own responsibility.

Harold O. Chaldez

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM:
GSMusulin/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. Case 47540

DATE: 17 July 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	17 JUL 1968	17 JUL 1968		
2. WH/7/HT Mr. Berg 3 B 0001 Hq.	17 JUL 1968	17 JUL 1968	e	For your information.
3. C/WH/7				
4. DC/WH/7				
5. C/HATT				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

NY-529-68

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : Operational Support Staff (Musulin)

15 July 1968

Chief, New York Field Office

Letter from Louis A. Brun to Clemard Joseph Charles (to be Forwarded Via Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti)

REFERENCES: (A) NY-467-68 (20 June 1968); (B) CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 80548;
(C) Case 47,540

1. Reference "A" forwarded to you a letter from Louis A. Brun, B&B International Corporation, 134 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, to Clemard Joseph Charles, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. This letter was to be sent by State Department diplomatic pouch to Mr. Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and given by him to Charles. Brun had told us that Felder had agreed to act as intermediary for correspondence between himself and Charles and added that he and Charles had already used the system. The letter in Reference "A" was the first time we had been approached in the matter.

2. Reference "B" stated that the letter had been dispatched via Message Center Courier to the State Department on 24 June 1968.

3. On or about 26 June 1968 Brun telephoned us and stated that Charles had not received the letter. We telephoned Mr. Musulin, who double-checked and assured us that the letter had gone to the State Department and that it should go out in the next pouch.

4. On 10 July 1968, Brun telephoned us and stated that on 9 July 1968 he had received a telephone call from a Ray Alvarez. Alvarez identified himself as a State Department employee in Washington and told Brun that he had the letter destined for Charles. Alvarez then told Brun that he would return the letter if Brun would tell him how it had reached the State Department. Brun refused to give Alvarez any information. We then telephoned Mr. Musulin and relayed the foregoing information. Mr. Musulin inquired into the matter and learned that the letter had gone to Haiti in the State Department pouch, had not been delivered to Felder and had been returned to Washington. He and we surmised that the State Department did

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NY-529-68
15 July 1968

not wish to lay itself open to the charge of becoming embroiled in local Haitian politics and so had refused to deliver the letter to Felder. We reported this information to Brun.

5. On 11 July 1968 Brun telephoned us and told us that he had received a letter from Charles via the Felder channel. This letter bore a New York City postmark. We gave this information to Mr. Musulin. We told Brun that it is quite probable that Felder has a personal arrangement with unknown parties which permits him to use the diplomatic pouch facilities. Since we do not, letters can go only from Charles to Brun and not from Brun to Charles. Brun and we agreed that he will not henceforth attempt to use Felder to send letters to Charles.

6. Mr. Musulin agreed to retrieve the letter from the State Department and to send it to us. We shall return it forthwith to Brun.

Jackson R. Horton

JBMitchell:eh

FILE: Louis A. Brun
F&B Int'l Corp.
134 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY

and Case 47,540

B. & B. INTERNATIONAL CORP.
134 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10011

Mme. Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

SECRET

New York, N.Y. Le [illegible] juin [illegible]

Mme Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

Ma chère Sophie,

Cette lettre est pour t'accuser réception des tiennes des 17 et 26 mai écoulés et du 4 juin en cours.

Si tu n'as pas eu de mes nouvelles depuis mon départ d'Haiti le 7 mai dernier, c'est que premièrement, je me proposais de retourner voir Clémard la semaine suivante. Le voyage a dû être différé lorsque j'ai su que Clémard avait, à nouveau, été arrêté le 11 mai. J'ai même eu à faire un câble à un ami pour lui annoncer mon arrivée et je suis sûr qu'il a dû t'en informer.

Dueièmement, l'arrestation de Clémard ainsi que les nouvelles der derniers événements en Haiti on eu des effets négatifs sur les négociations en cours que j'avais entamées pour Clémard et qui semblaient vouloir aboutir. Je n'ai pas besoin de te dire combien j'en ai été bouleversé. Alors que nos amis d'ici et moi pensions pouvoir aider Clémard que nous estimons comme un frère, sa nouvelle arrestation est venue nous assommer avec une rigueur dont nous nous remettons à peine.

Avant d'aller plus loin, je dois te dire que tu ne dois point douter de notre dévouement pour Clémard. Il sait, et tu dois aussi le savoir, que nous ne saurions jamais marchander notre concours à un ami pour qui nous avons la plus grande affection et pour qui nous sommes prêts à consentir tous les sacrifices personnels que les circonstances peuvent exiger. Je crois devoir te dire que si, en dehors d'Haiti, je n'arrive à le tirer de l'impasse dans laquelle il se trouve, je doute fort, sans fausse modestie, que quelqu'un d'autre puisse réussir à le faire.

Nos puissants amis communs tant à New York, Washington, Miami et ailleurs ont tous manifesté un désir sérieux de lui venir en aide dans les limites de leurs possibilités respectives.

Depuis mon retour d'Haiti je me suis mis en action à cette fin et ai personellement vu plusieurs personnalités du monde financier qui n'ont pas hésité à consacrer une grande partie de leur temps précieux à la concrétisation des plans que j'ai eu à envisager avec Clémard en vue de le tirer d'embarras le plus rapidement possible.

/...

SECRET

Mes espoirs de réussite ainsi que ceux de tous les amis contactés se sont heurtés aux effets négatifs inévitables provenant tant de la nouvelle arrestation de Clémard que des derniers événements survenus en Haiti depuis le 20 mai écoulé. Je t'envoie, pour preuve, copie d'une lettre d'un de ces grands amis, Mr. Howard Burris de Washington, D.C. Je te demande de garder cette lettre strictement confidentielle car je n'aurais pas aimé que le nom de Mr. Burris soit mentionné à quiconque en Haiti. Si cela arrivait, nous pourrions perdre un très bon ami.

Pour ton information, je te dirai que Mr. Burris est un colonel retraité du Corps de Génie de l'armée américaine, ami personnel et conseiller du Président Johnson et extrêmement influent à Washington tant dans le monde politique que financier. J'ai eu à faire deux voyages à Washington entre le 8 et 11 mai au cours desquels lui et moi envisagions les moyens d'aider Clémard selon le "modus" envisagé. La copie de sa lettre du 7 juin en cours saura te confirmer ce qui précède.

J'ai aussi vu personnellement et lui ai causé maintes fois au téléphone, Joseph Dryer, qui devait se rendre en Haiti le 24 mai pour te vois mais qui a dû renvoyer son voyage après les nouvelles de la dernière tentative d'invasion. Je lui ai encore causé récemment au téléphone et il a eu à me faire part des résultats négatifs de ses efforts, toujours en fonction des mêmes circonstances.

Le lettres adressées aux autres amis de l'étranger, dont Dabinovick, par example, sont restées jusqu'ici sans réponses. Je vais une nouvelle fois écrire longuement à Dabinovick pour lui transmettre ta dernière communication avec l'espoir d'avoir un mot encourageant de lui.

Comme tu dois le comprendre, ma chère Sophie, nos efforts, malgré toute notre bonne volonté, ne sauraient se concrétiser à brève échéance, car les valeurs en question qu'il nous faut trouver ne sont pas insignifiantes. Je te signalerai en passant un point qui a été soulevé au cours des négociations et qui fait ressortir que même si nos amis seraient en mesure d'avancer à Clémard les valeurs nécessaires, ils ont des doutes sérieux non pas sur la sincérité de Clémard à faire face aux obligations qui devront être contractées, mais à la possibilité matérielle de rapatrier, en dollars américains, les valeurs avancées. J'ai personnellement assisté à des contacts avec des banquiers d'ici qui affirment qu'avant longtemps, Haiti n'aura presque plus de devises-dollars pour solder ses comptes à l'étranger. Autant d'obstacles que je suis malheureusement obligé de te signaler pour que tu saches à quoi t'en tenir.

Concernant maintenant le grand banquier noir dont j'ai eu moi-même à dire à Clémard que je croyais pouvoir nous aider, celui-ci a eu à me faire comprendre qu'il ne pouvait en l'occurrence intéresser son institution à une affaire de ce genre qui comporte trop de risques. De ce côté là il n'y a donc pas grand espoir.

/...

Ceci dit, malgré tous ces obstacles qui sembleraient insurmontables, je n'ai pas totalement perdu l'espoir de pouvoir t'aider à sortir Clémard, sain et sauf, de la prison où sa santé se détériore rapidement, je le sais. L'essentiel est que le Chef lui-même soit persuadé que l'inhabilité que nous éprouvons à satisfaire les exigences du moment, ne sont en aucune façon imputables à Clémard mais plutôt à des circonstances totalement indépendantes de notre volonté.

Je prie Dieu Tout-puissant pour que l'on finisse par réaliser que Clémard, en bon patriote haïtien, a eu foi en son pays et n'a pas cru bon d'expatrier, comme plus d'un l'a fait, le fruit de ses durs labeurs et de son intelligence productive.

Je me proposais d'écrire personnellement à Son Excellence le Président à Vie d'Haiti, pour implorer sa clémence et sa générosité pour un ami qui nous est cher. Je me suis alors demandé si c'était là un geste sage qui pourrait avoir la vertu de l'épargner et, dans le doute, j'ai préférer m'abstenir.

Pour revenir maintenant aux possibilités de réaliser au moins partiellement, la valeur exigée, je dois te dire que je suis heureux de savoir que tu détiens une procuration générale en bonne et due forme t'habilitant à ratifier tout ce que nous pourrions entreprendre à cette fin.

Séparément, par cette même voie, je te communiquerai toutes les formalités à remplir pour nous mettre en mesure de réaliser dans un délai raisonable au moins le tiers de la somme réclamée. Il serait souhaitable que tu sois mise en mesure de venir ici à New York, ce qui faciliterait beaucoup les choses, mais dans l'impossibilité d'une pareille alternative, tu devras donc agréer aux conditions stipulées. Il faudra donc agir avec dilligence pour nous permettre d'aller au plus vite.

Ma chère Sophie, je terminerai cette lettre déjà longue et ardue en te renouvelant mon dévouement le plus entier à la cause de notre ami Clémard et en te priant une nouvelle fois de ne jamais douter de mes sentiments propres et ceux de ma famille pour Clémard, toi et les tiens.

Affections à Gros-Miche, Marie-Claudine, Toto, Eddie et sa femme.

Bon courage!

Invariablement,

Louis A. Brun

Louis A. Brun

LAB/jvb
encl. 1

SECRET

14-00000

HOWARD L. BURRIS

SUITE 101, R.C.A. BUILDING
1725 K STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

June 7, 1968

Mr. Louis A. Brun
R. [illegible] International Corp.
134 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10011

Dear Mr. Brun

I apologize for the delay in responding to your suggestion concerning the commercial bank in Haiti. My activities here have been such that I have been unable until the past day or so to give your proposal adequate thought and consideration.

First I must admit that the recent abortive invasion attempt caused certain reflection and it is this kind of activity, successful or unsuccessful, that could create serious dislocations for those established in business. However I must assure you that this was only a reflection and the reason that I will be unable to accept your offer is the extent and nature of my activities here in Washington. I believe I alluded to some of them during your visit. The occasions when I would find it possible to visit Port-au-Prince or to devote any significant amount of time to the bank's activities here would be rare indeed. I shall confess to you that I declined a similar position on a bank board here in the states for the same reason.

I regret that this decision is necessary but I hope that in future relationships we may be able to do something useful and successful in Haiti.

Sincerely,

Howard L. Burris

SECRET

FORMALITES A REMPLIR PAR SOPHIE:

1) Envoyer, signe par Sophie, un mandat original notarie et legalise par le Consul Americain, a une personne amie ou parent habitant New York, donnant a cette personne les memes pouvoirs donnes par Clemard a Sophie. Ce mandat devra etre accompagne d'une copie authentifiee de celui de Clemard a Sophie.

2) Envoyer les clefs des deux "safe deposit box" qui se trouvent a la First National City Bank avec les formes attacheed qui doivent aussi etre legalisees par le consul americain.

3) Indiquer le nom et la fonction de la personne autorisee par le gouvernement haitien a regler la transaction avec Clemard pour communication eventuelle relative a la transaction.

Ma chere Sophie:

Cette communication te parviendra par une voie que Clemard a eu a m'indiquer et que je crois etre sure. Fais bien attention a ce qu'il n'y ait pas d'indiscretion.

Je voudrais suggerer que tu habilites Paulette selon le paragraphe 1 ci-dessus.

Je t'envoie aussi par cette meme voie une lettre qui saura te renseigner sur l'etat de nos demarches et possibilites.

Encore une fois, Bon Courage et bonjour a tous.

Invariablement,

Loulou

SECRET

14-00000

in Duplicate

DATE ____________

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK
SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT

____________________ BRANCH

____
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY

____
ADDRESS OF DEPUTY

THE SIGNATURE APPEARING ABOVE IS THAT OF ____________________ WHO HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO HAVE ACCESS TO SAFE NO. __________ IN THE VAULTS OF YOUR BANK.

____

SD 54 REV. 10-61

SECRET

SECRET
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

[illegible] REV. 10-61
PRINTING OF 12-61

DEPUTYSHIP FORM

DATE________________________

____________HEREBY AUTHORIZE____

TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF SAFE NO.______________NOW RENTED BY ______________________________ IN THE VAULT OF **FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK**, SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT AT______________________, NEW YORK, TO EXCHANGE SAID SAFE FOR ANY NEW SAFE OR SAFES IN SAID VAULT AND FROM TIME TO TIME TO MAKE LIKE EXCHANGES, AND IN MY NAME AND ON MY BEHALF TO EXECUTE A LEASE OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES UPON SUCH TERMS AS HE MAY DEEM PROPER AND TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, AND TO RECEIVE ALL THE LESSEE'S KEYS TO ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, WITH POWER AT ALL TIMES TO SURRENDER THE SAID SAFE NO.__________AND ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES; THIS AUTHORITY TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS REVOCATION IS RECEIVED BY THE SAID BANK.

____

STATE OF
SS.:
COUNTY OF

ON THE DAY OF ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND

BEFORE ME CAME

TO ME KNOWN TO BE THE INDIVIDUAL DESCRIBED IN, AND WHO EXECUTED, THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE EXECUTED THE SAME.

____

ONLY

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
RWBerg
WH/7/Ht
BB 2630

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 12 July 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/7/Ht	12 JUL 1968			
2. C/WH/7				
3. DC/WH/7				
4. C/WH/7/HT			✓	
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

12 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Letter from Louis A. Brun to FSO Felder

1. I talked with George Musulin (DCS/Ops Support Staff) at 0840 hours this morning about the letter mailed to FSO Felder at the American Embassy in Port au Prince. Musulin said that he had spoken with Brun about the letter and Brun had assured him that Felder said to mail letters to him through Foreign Service mail channels. Brun is in contact with Felder during his visits to Haiti and this system was laid on between them during one of his trips.

2. Brun also said that he was a little upset about the problems which had arisen in sending his letter. Brun said that he had received a letter from Felder (mailed in New York City) saying that he had never received the letter from Brun. Brun was concerned that the letter may have fallen into the wrong hands in Haiti. Musulin said that he would try to recover the letter and send it back to Brun.

3. I told Musulin that Ambassador Ross was very much disturbed about this matter and that any further involvement by the Agency with correspondence between Brun and Felder should be avoided. Brun is a business agent of Clemard Joseph-Charles and thus any correspondence between Brun and an official of the American Embassy is of particular concern to the Ambassador because of the obvious political implications. Musulin said he understood this and would tell Brun that the dispatch of any correspondence in the future would be his own responsibility.

Harold O. Chaides

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: GSMusulin/bm DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Bldg.	EXTENSION 2268	NO. Case 47540 DATE 17 July 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	17 JUL 1968	17 JUL 1968		
2. WH/7/HT Mr. Berg 3 B 0001 Hq.	17 JUL 1968	17 JUL 1968		For your information.
3. C/WH/7				
4. DC/WH/7				
5. C/HAM				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

NY-529-68

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : Operational Support Staff (Musulin)

15 July 1968

Chief, New York Field Office

Letter from Louis A. Brun to Clemard Joseph Charles (to be Forwarded Via Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti)

REFERENCES: (A) NY-467-68 (20 June 1968); (B) CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 80548;
(C) Case 47,540

1. Reference "A" forwarded to you a letter from Louis A. Brun, BAM International Corporation, 134 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, to Clemard Joseph Charles, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. This letter was to be sent by State Department diplomatic pouch to Mr. Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and given by him to Charles. Brun had told us that Felder had agreed to act as intermediary for correspondence between himself and Charles and added that he and Charles had already used the system. The letter in Reference "A" was the first time we had been approached in the matter.

2. Reference "B" stated that the letter had been dispatched via Message Center Courier to the State Department on 24 June 1968.

3. On or about 26 June 1968 Brun telephoned us and stated that Charles had not received the letter. We telephoned Mr. Musulin, who double-checked and assured us that the letter had gone to the State Department and that it should go out in the next pouch.

4. On 10 July 1968, Brun telephoned us and stated that on 9 July 1968 he had received a telephone call from a Ray Alvarez. Alvarez identified himself as a State Department employee in Washington and told Brun that he had the letter destined for Charles. Alvarez then told Brun that he would return the letter if Brun would tell him how it had reached the State Department. Brun refused to give Alvarez any information. We then telephoned Mr. Musulin and relayed the foregoing information. Mr. Musulin inquired into the matter and learned that the letter had gone to Haiti in the State Department pouch, had not been delivered to Felder and had been returned to Washington. He and we surmised that the State Department did

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NY-529-68
15 July 1968

not wish to lay itself open to the charge of becoming embroiled in local Haitian politics and so had refused to deliver the letter to Felder. We reported this information to Brun.

5. On 11 July 1968 Brun telephoned us and told us that he had received a letter from Charles via the Felder channel. This letter bore a New York City postmark. We gave this information to Mr. Musulin. We told Brun that it is quite probable that Felder has a personal arrangement with unknown parties which permits him to use the diplomatic pouch facilities. Since we do not, letters can go only from Charles to Brun and not from Brun to Charles. Brun and we agreed that he will not henceforth attempt to use Felder to send letters to Charles.

6. Mr. Musulin agreed to retrieve the letter from the State Department and to send it to us. We shall return it forthwith to Brun.

Jackson R. Horton

JBMitchell:ch

FILE: Louis A. Brun
B&B Int'l Corp.
134 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY

and Case 47,540

SECRET

B. & B. INTERNATIONAL CORP.
134 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10011

Mme. Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

SECRET

LOUIS A. BRUN
134 Fifth Ave.
New York, N.Y.

Le 14 juin 1968

Mme Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

Ma chère Sophie,

Cette lettre est pour t'accuser réception des tiennes des 17 et 26 mai écoulés et du 4 juin en cours.

Si tu n'as pas eu de mes nouvelles depuis mon départ d'Haiti le 7 mai dernier, c'est que premièrement, je me proposais de retourner voir Clémard la semaine suivante. Le voyage a dû être différé lorsque j'ai su que Clémard avait, à nouveau, été arrêté le 11 mai. J'ai même eu à faire un câble à un ami pour lui annoncer mon arrivée et je suis sûr qu'il a dû t'en informer.

Dueièmement, l'arrestation de Clémard ainsi que les nouvelles der derniers événements en Haiti on eu des effets négatifs sur les négociations en cours que j'avais entamées pour Clémard et qui semblaient vouloir aboutir. Je n'ai pas besoin de te dire combien j'en ai été bouleversé. Alors que nos amis d'ici et moi pensions pouvoir aider Clémard que nous estimons comme un frère, sa nouvelle arrestation est venue nous assommer avec une rigueur dont nous nous remettons à peine.

Avant d'aller plus loin, je dois te dire que tu ne dois point douter de notre dévouement pour Clémard. Il sait, et tu dois aussi le savoir, que nous ne saurions jamais marchander notre concours à un ami pour qui nous avons la plus grande affection et pour qui nous sommes prêts à consentir tous les sacrifices personnels que les circonstances peuvent exiger. Je crois devoir te dire que si, en dehors d'Haiti, je n'arrive à le tirer de l'impasse dans laquelle il se trouve, je doute fort, sans fausse modestie, que quelqu'un d'autre puisse réussir à le faire.

Nos puissants amis communs tant à New York, Washington, Miami et ailleurs ont tous manifesté un désir sérieux de lui venir en aide dans les limites de leurs possibilités respectives.

Depuis mon retour d'Haiti je me suis mis en action à cette fin et ai personellement vu plusieurs personnalités du monde financier qui n'ont pas hésité à consacrer une grande partie de leur temps précieux à la concrétisation des plans que j'ai eu à envisager avec Clémard en vue de le tirer d'embarras le plus rapidement possible.

/...

Mes espoirs de réussite ainsi que ceux de tous les amis contactés se sont heurtés aux effets négatifs inévitables provenant tant de la nouvelle arrestation de Clémard que des derniers événements survenus en Haiti depuis le 20 mai écoulé. Je t'envoie, pour preuve, copie d'une lettre d'un de ces grands amis, Mr. Howard Burris de Washington, D.C. Je te demande de garder cette lettre strictement confidentielle car je n'aurais pas aimé que le nom de Mr. Burris soit mentionné à quiconque en Haiti. Si cela arrivait, nous pourrions perdre un très bon ami.

Pour ton information, je te dirai que Mr. Burris est un colonel retraité du Corps de Génie de l'armée américaine, ami personnel et conseiller du Président Johnson et extrêmement influent à Washington tant dans le monde politique que financier. J'ai eu à faire deux voyages à Washington entre le 8 et 11 mai au cours desquels lui et moi envisagions les moyens d'aider Clémard selon le "modus" envisagé. La copie de sa lettre du 7 juin en cours saura te confirmer ce qui précède.

J'ai aussi vu personnellement et lui ai causé maintes fois au téléphone, Joseph Dryer, qui devait se rendre en Haiti le 24 mai pour te vois mais qui a dû renvoyer son voyage après les nouvelles de la dernière tentative d'invasion. Je lui ai encore causé récemment au téléphone et il a eu à me faire part des résultats négatifs de ses efforts, toujours en fonction des mêmes circonstances.

Le lettres adressées aux autres amis de l'étranger, dont Dabinovick, par exemple, sont restées jusqu'ici sans réponses. Je vais une nouvelle fois écrire longuement à Dabinovick pour lui transmettre ta dernière communication avec l'espoir d'avoir un mot encourageant de lui.

Comme tu dois le comprendre, ma chère Sophie, nos efforts, malgré toute notre bonne volonté, ne sauraient se concrétiser à brève échéance, car les valeurs en question qu'il nous faut trouver ne sont pas insignifiantes. Je te signalerai en passant un point qui a été soulevé au cours des négociations et qui fait ressortir que même si nos amis seraient en mesure d'avancer à Clémard les valeurs nécessaires, ils ont des doutes sérieux non pas sur la sincérité de Clémard à faire face aux obligations qui devront être contractées, mais à la possibilité matérielle de rapatrier, en dollars américains, les valeurs avancées. J'ai personnellement assisté à des contacts avec des banquiers d'ici qui affirment qu'avant longtemps, Haiti n'aura presque plus de devises-dollars pour solder ses comptes à l'étranger. Autant d'obstacles que je suis malheureusement obligé de te signaler pour que tu saches à quoi t'en tenir.

Concernant maintenant le grand banquier noir dont j'ai eu moi-même à dire à Clémard que je croyais pouvoir nous aider, celui-ci a eu à me faire comprendre qu'il ne pouvait en l'occurrence intéresser son institution à une affaire de ce genre qui comporte trop de risques. De ce côté là il n'y a donc pas grand espoir.

/...

Ceci dit, malgré tous ces obstacles qui sembleraient insurmontables, je n'ai pas totalement perdu l'espoir de pouvoir t'aider à sortir Clémard, sain et sauf, de la prison où sa santé se détériore rapidement, je le sais. L'essentiel est que le Chef lui-même soit persuadé que l'inhabilité que nous éprouvons à satisfaire les exigences du moment, ne sont en aucune façon imputables à Clémard mais plutôt à des circonstances totalement indépendantes de notre volonté.

Je prie Dieu Tout-puissant pour que l'on finisse par réaliser que Clémard, en bon patriote haïtien, a eu foi en son pays et n'a pas cru bon d'expatrier, comme plus d'un l'a fait, le fruit de ses durs labeurs et de son intelligence productive.

Je me proposais d'écrire personnellement à Son Excellence le Président à Vie d'Haiti, pour implorer sa clémence et sa générosité pour un ami qui nous est cher. Je me suis alors demandé si c'était là un geste sage qui pourrait avoir la vertu de l'épargner et, dans le doute, j'ai préférer m'abstenir.

Pour revenir maintenant aux possibilités de réaliser au moins partiellement, la valeur exigée, je dois te dire que je suis heureux de savoir que tu détiens une procuration générale en bonne et due forme t'habilitant à ratifier tout ce que nous pourrions entreprendre à cette fin.

Séparément, par cette même voie, je te communiquerai toutes les formalités à remplir pour nous mettre en mesure de réaliser dans un délai raisonable au moins le tiers de la somme réclamée. Il serait souhaitable que tu sois mise en mesure de venir ici à New York, ce qui faciliterait beaucoup les choses, mais dans l'impossibilité d'une pareille alternative, tu devras donc agréer aux conditions stipulées. Il faudra donc agir avec dilligence pour nous permettre d'aller au plus vite.

Ma chère Sophie, je terminerai cette lettre déjà longue et ardue en te renouvelant mon dévouement le plus entier à la cause de notre ami Clémard et en te priant une nouvelle fois de ne jamais douter de mes sentiments propres et ceux de ma famille pour Clémard, toi et les tiens.

Affections à Gros-Miche, Marie-Claudine, Toto, Eddie et sa femme.

Bon courage!

Invariablement,

Louis A. Brun

Louis A. Brun

LAB/jvb
encl. 1

[redacted] SECRET

HOWARD L. BURRIS

SUITE 101, R.C.A. BUILDING
1725 K STREET, N. W
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

June 7, 1968

Mr. Louis A. Brun
B. & [illegible] International Corp.
134 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10011

Dear Mr. Brun

I apologize for the delay in responding to your suggestion concerning the commercial bank in Haiti. My activities here have been such that I have been unable until the past day or so to give your proposal adequate thought and consideration.

First I must admit that the recent abortive invasion attempt caused certain reflection and it is this kind of activity, successful or unsuccessful, that could create serious dislocations for those established in business. However I must assure you that this was only a reflection and the reason that I will be unable to accept your offer is the extent and nature of my activities here in Washington. I believe I alluded to some of them during your visit. The occasions when I would find it possible to visit Port-au-Prince or to devote any significant amount of time to the bank's activities here would be rare indeed. I shall confess to you that I declined a similar position on a bank board here in the states for the same reason.

I regret that this decision is necessary but I hope that in future relationships we may be able to do something useful and successful in Haiti.

Sincerely,

Howard L. Burris

SECRET

SECRET

le 14 juin 1968

FORMALITES A REMPLIR PAR SOPHIE:

1) Envoyer, signe par Sophie, un mandat original notarie et legalise par le Consul Americain, a une personne amie ou parent habitant New York, donnant a cette personne les memes pouvoirs donnes par Clemard a Sophie. Ce mandat devra etre accompagne d'une copie authentifiee de celui de Clemard a Sophie.

2) Envoyer les clefs des deux "safe deposit box" qui se trouvent a la First National City Bank avec les formes attacheed qui doivent aussi etre legalisees par le consul americain.

3) Indiquer le nom et la fonction de la personne autorisee par le gouvernement haitien a regler la transaction avec Clemard pour communication eventuelle relative a la transaction.

Ma chere Sophie:

Cette communication te parviendra par une voie que Clemard a eu a m'indiquer et que je crois etre sure. Fais bien attention a ce qu'il n'y ait pas d'indiscretion.

Je voudrais suggerer que tu habilites Paulette selon le paragraphe 1 ci-dessus.

Je t'envoie aussi par cette meme voie une lettre qui saura te renseigner sur l'etat de nos demarches et possibilites.

Encore une fois, Bon Courage et bonjour a tous.

Invariablement,

Loulou

SECRET

in Duplicate

DATE ____________________

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK

SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT

____________________ BRANCH

____
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY

____
ADDRESS OF DEPUTY

THE SIGNATURE APPEARING ABOVE IS THAT OF ____________________ WHO HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO HAVE ACCESS TO SAFE NO. __________ IN THE VAULTS OF YOUR BANK.

____

SD 54 REV. 10-61

SE

SECRET

[illegible] REV. 10-61
PRINTING OF 10-61

DEPUTYSHIP FORM

DATE____________________

__________ HEREBY AUTHORIZE ____________________

TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF SAFE NO.__________ NOW RENTED BY ____________________ IN THE VAULT OF **FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK**, SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT AT____________________, NEW YORK, TO EXCHANGE SAID SAFE FOR ANY NEW SAFE OR SAFES IN SAID VAULT AND FROM TIME TO TIME TO MAKE LIKE EXCHANGES, AND IN MY NAME AND ON MY BEHALF TO EXECUTE A LEASE OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES UPON SUCH TERMS AS HE MAY DEEM PROPER AND TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, AND TO RECEIVE ALL THE LESSEE'S KEYS TO ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, WITH POWER AT ALL TIMES TO SURRENDER THE SAID SAFE NO.__________ AND ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES; THIS AUTHORITY TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS REVOCATION IS RECEIVED BY THE SAID BANK.

____

STATE OF
SS.:
COUNTY OF

ON THE DAY OF ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND

BEFORE ME CAME

TO ME KNOWN TO BE THE INDIVIDUAL DESCRIBED IN, AND WHO EXECUTED, THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE EXECUTED THE SAME.

____

SECRET

Clemard Joseph Charles

George Musulin/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

2268

Case 47,540

1 July 1968

DO/DCHL

WH/7/Haiti
3 B 0001, Hqs.

For your information.

SECRET

ENY 00-A(S) 322/17664-68

COUNTRY: Haiti

27 June 1968

DCS Case: 67,540

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph Charles Has Gained Postponement of Deadline for Ransom Payment/Charles' Relationship with Rene Adrien and Yvon Saint-Victor and Background of His Rearrest/President Duvalier's Need for Money May Possibly Induce Him to Accept Scheme for Reorganized Banque Commerciale d'Haiti

1. Recently-released Clemard Joseph Charles has received a postponement of the deadline by which he must produce the US$605 thousand required as "ransom" for his permanent release. The new deadline is late September 1968.

2. Shortly before Charles' rearrest in May 1968 Rene Adrien visited him at his residence and remonstrated with him. Adrien, one of the directors of the Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti (BNRH), told Charles that he (Charles) had not done enough since his release to procure the US$605 thousand and added that Charles was receiving too many visitors. Charles responded with such a tirade of abuse that Adrien left the house. Charles was rearrested that same afternoon. At about the same time, Yvon Saint-Victor visited Charles and talked to him in much the same vein as had Adrien. Charles' response to Saint-Victor was about the same as his answer to Adrien. Saint-Victor's wife is President Duvalier's secretary.

3. Since his release in June 1968, Charles has agreed to intensify his efforts to raise the US$605 thousand and to cease receiving so many visitors at his house.

4. Charles will undoubtedly revive the scheme to raise the US$605 thousand through subscription by foreign investors and to place it in a reorganized Banque Commerciale d'Haiti (BCH). [Collector's Note: this plan is outlined in 00-A(S) 322/14367-68 (Paragraph Two).] Alternatively, he may try to interest the Government of Haiti (GOH) in his visible cash assets and GOH bonds now on deposit in banks in New York City [Collector's Note: see 00-A(S) 322/14367-68 (Paragraphs Three, Four and Five.) See also 00-A(S) 322/17056-68.].

5. The idea of the reorganized BCH was formulated in order

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

BNY 00-A(S) 322/17664-68

27 June 1968

DCS Case: 47,540

to get the required sum into Haiti and at the same time to ensure that it would not simply be confiscated by the OOH. The idea was born because Charles and his friends felt (and still feel) that if he simply handed over US$605 thousand he would then be liquidated. Thus, the BCH scheme would serve as a sort of insurance policy on Charles' life. On the other hand, it is possible that the OOH would refuse to accept the BCH scheme as a substitute for a direct payment and would continue to insist on the direct payment of the US$605 thousand as ransom. It is possible, however, for the following reasons that President Duvalier would consent to the BCH scheme. First, he is desperate for money and does not much care in just what form it may enter Haiti. Second, he approaches his problems on a day-to-day basis and does not plan far into the future. Third, he is obsessed with the idea of retaining power for life. Now, Duvalier is perfectly well aware, I am sure, that the BCH scheme will not net him US$605 thousand. On the other hand, however, he is quite anxious for foreign investors to place their money in Haiti, both for the economic benefits which such investments will bring to Haiti and also for the propaganda value which a new foreign business will bring to him. If he liquidates Charles, either before or after receiving the US$605 thousand, he will suffer much unfavorable publicity. It is possible, too, that he may think that he may be able to get his hands on the US$605 thousand even though it may be tied up in the BCH scheme. In any event, Charles is, I believe, going to make the effort to induce the President to allow the BCH scheme and thereby to bring an end to the "ransom" demands.

-end-

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Letter Concerning Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: George S. Musulin/js 4481 DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Building	EXTENSION 2268	NO. DCS Case 47540 DATE 25 June 196

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	6/25		CE	Attached is a copy of a letter in French from Mr. Brun to Mme. Charles. The original of this letter was sent to Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, via State Department channels, for transmittal to Mme. Charles.
2. C/WH/7/Haiti 3 B 0001, Hqs.	26 JUN	26 JUN		
3. WH/7/HT Chief Int				
4. Ext I/A				
5. R/O Sec				
6. File				
7.				
8. FI/BR				108: For filing in 201-357029
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

LOUIS A. [illegible]
[illegible] Fifth Ave.
New York, N.Y.

Le 14 juin 1968

Mme Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

Ma chère Sophie,

Cette lettre est pour t'accuser réception des tiennes des 17 et 26 mai écoulés et du 4 juin en cours.

Si tu n'as pas eu de mes nouvelles depuis mon départ d'Haiti le 7 mai dernier, c'est que premièrement, je me proposais de retourner voir Clémard la semaine suivante. Le voyage a dû être différé lorsque j'ai su que Clémard avait, à nouveau, été arrêté le 11 mai. J'ai même eu à faire un câble à un ami pour lui annoncer mon arrivée et je suis sûr qu'il a dû t'en informer.

Deuxièmement, l'arrestation de Clémard ainsi que les nouvelles des derniers événements en Haiti ont eu des effets négatifs sur les négociations en cours que j'avais entamées pour Clémard et qui semblaient vouloir aboutir. Je n'ai pas besoin de te dire combien j'en ai été bouleversé. Alors que nos amis d'ici et moi pensions pouvoir aider Clémard que nous estimons comme un frère, sa nouvelle arrestation est venue nous assommer avec une rigueur dont nous nous remettons à peine.

Avant d'aller plus loin, je dois te dire que tu ne dois point douter de notre dévouement pour Clémard. Il sait, et tu dois aussi le savoir, que nous ne saurions jamais marchander notre concours à un ami pour qui nous avons la plus grande affection et pour qui nous sommes prêts à consentir tous les sacrifices personnels que les circonstances peuvent exiger. Je crois devoir te dire que si, en dehors d'Haiti, je n'arrive à le tirer de l'impasse dans laquelle il se trouve, je doute fort, sans fausse modestie, que quelqu'un d'autre puisse réussir à le faire.

Nos puissants amis communs tant à New York, Washington, Miami et ailleurs ont tous manifesté un désir sérieux de lui venir en aide dans les limites de leurs possibilités respectives.

Depuis mon retour d'Haiti je me suis mis en action à cette fin et ai personnellement vu plusieurs personnalités du monde financier qui n'ont pas hésité à consacrer une grande partie de leur temps précieux à la concrétisation des plans que j'ai eu à envisager avec Clémard en vue de le tirer d'embarras le plus rapidement possible.

/...

Mes espoirs de réussite ainsi que ceux de tous les amis contactés se sont heurtés aux effets négatifs inévitables provenant tant de la nouvelle arrestation de Clément que des derniers événements survenus en Haiti depuis le 20 mai écoulé. Je t'envoie, pour preuve, copie d'une lettre d'un de ces grands amis, Mr. Howard Burris de Washington, D.C. Je te demande de garder cette lettre strictement confidentielle car je n'aurais pas aimé que le nom de Mr. Burris soit mentionné à quiconque en Haiti. Si cela arrivait, nous pourrions perdre un très bon ami.

Pour ton information, je te dirai que Mr. Burris est un colonel retraité du Corps de Génie de l'armée américaine, ami personnel et conseiller du Président Johnson et extrêmement influent à Washington tant dans le monde politique que financier. J'ai eu à faire deux voyages à Washington entre le 8 et 11 mai au cours desquels lui et moi envisagions les moyens d'aider Clément selon le "modus" envisagé. La copie de sa lettre du 7 Juin en cours saura te confirmer ce qui précède.

J'ai aussi vu personnellement et lui ai causé maintes fois au téléphone, Joseph Dryer, qui devait se rendre en Haiti le 24 mai pour te voir mais qui a dû renvoyer son voyage après les nouvelles de la dernière tentative d'invasion. Je lui ai encore causé récemment au téléphone et il a eu à me faire part des résultats négatifs de ses efforts, toujours en fonction des mêmes circonstances.

Le lettres adressées aux autres amis de l'étranger, dont Dabinovick, par exemple, sont restées jusqu'ici sans réponses. Je vais une nouvelle fois écrire longuement à Dabinovick pour lui transmettre ta dernière communication avec l'espoir d'avoir un mot encourageant de lui.

Comme tu dois le comprendre, ma chère Sophie, nos efforts, malgré toute notre bonne volonté, ne sauraient se concrétiser à brève échéance, car les valeurs en question qu'il nous faut trouver ne sont pas insignifiantes. Je te signalerai en passant un point qui a été soulevé au cours des négociations et qui fait ressortir que même si nos amis seraient en mesure d'avancer à Clément les valeurs nécessaires, ils ont des doutes sérieux non pas sur la sincérité de Clément à faire face aux obligations qui devront être contractées, mais à la possibilité matérielle de repatrier, en dollars américains, les valeurs avancées. J'ai personnellement assisté à des contacts avec des banquiers d'ici qui affirment qu'avant longtemps, Haiti n'aura presque plus de devises-dollars pour solder ses comptes à l'étranger. Autant d'obstacles que je suis malheureusement obligé de te signaler pour que tu saches à quoi t'en tenir.

Concernant maintenant le grand banquier noir dont j'ai eu moi-même à dire à Clément que je croyais pouvoir nous aider, celui-ci a eu à me faire comprendre qu'il ne pouvait en l'occurrence intéresser son institution à une affaire de ce genre qui comporte trop de risques. De ce côté là il n'y a donc pas grand espoir.

/...

Ceci dit, malgré tous ces obstacles qui sembleraient insurmontables, je n'ai pas totalement perdu l'espoir de pouvoir t'aider à sortir Clémard, sain et sauf, de la prison où sa santé se détériore rapidement, je le sais. L'essentiel est que le Chef lui-même soit persuadé que l'inhabilité que nous éprouvons à satisfaire les exigences du moment, ne sont en aucune façon imputables à Clémard mais plutôt à des circonstances totalement indépendantes de notre volonté.

Je prie Dieu Tout-puissant pour que l'on finisse par réaliser que Clémard, en bon patriote haitien, a eu foi en son pays et n'a pas cru bon d'expatrier, comme plus d'un l'a fait, le fruit de ses durs labeurs et de son intelligence productive.

Je me proposais d'écrire personnellement à Son Excellence le Président à Vie d'Haiti, pour implorer sa clémence et sa générosité pour un ami qui nous est cher. Je me suis alors demandé si c'était là un geste sage qui pourrait avoir la vertu de l'épargner et, dans le doute, j'ai préférer m'abstenir.

Pour revenir maintenant aux possibilités de réaliser au moins partiellement, la valeur exigée, je dois te dire que je suis heureux de savoir que tu détiens une procuration générale en bonne et due forme t'habilitant à ratifier tout ce que nous pourrions entreprendre à cette fin.

Séparément, par cette même voie, je te communiquerai toutes les formalités à remplir pour nous mettre en mesure de réaliser dans un délai raisonnable au moins le tiers de la somme réclamée. Il serait souhaitable que tu sois mise en mesure de venir ici à New York, ce qui faciliterait beaucoup les choses, mais dans l'impossibilité d'une pareille alternative, tu devras donc agréer aux conditions stipulées. Il faudra donc agir avec dilligence pour nous permettre d'aller au plus vite.

Ma chère Sophie, je terminerai cette lettre déjà longue et ardue en te renouvelant mon dévouement le plus entier à la cause de notre ami Clémard et en te priant une nouvelle fois de ne jamais douter de mes sentiments propres et ceux de ma famille pour Clémard, toi et les Siens.

Affections à Gros-Miche, Marie-Claudine, Toto, Eddie et sa femme.

Bon courage!

Invariablement,

Louis A. Brun

LAB/jvb
encl. 1

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clomard Joseph Charles/Data Concerning Bozo Dabinovic Dabinar X 202-2744

FROM: George S. Musulin/js
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS Case 47540

DATE: 21 June 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	6/20	6/20	CE	cc: SR/HYA
2. WH/7/Haiti 3 B 0001, Hqs.	24 JUN 1968	24 JUN 1968	R	Attached for your information is copy of 00-A(S) 322/17056-68.
3.				WH/7/Ht Chief C Int Ex: I/A (Card) Wn R/O Sec File 201-
4. ~~FI/ISR~~				
5. ~~AC/WH/7/CI~~ WH/7/CI	[illegible]	[illegible]		
6. Att: M. Osborne		1 Jul	✓	
7. RID/AN	8 AUG 1968		8L	to 9: Please file in 201-357029
8. ~~EUR/SA~~ FI/ISR				INDEX as indicated
9. FI/ISR				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

MICROFILMED
JUL 26 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN	RI		E	4S	S
ES	DEST				
ABSTRACT	X		INDEX	X	

201-357029
2NOV68

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

XAAZ-27949

ENY 00-A(S) 322/17056-68

COUNTRY: Haiti

19 June 1968

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph Charles Spared During Rumored Recent Wave Of Executions in Fort Dimanche Prison/Charles Must Produce Ransom Money/Charles Is Living Under Rigorous Prison Conditions/Data Concerning Bozo Dabinovic Dabinac, Swiss Friend of Charles

DCS Case: 47,540

Supplement to:
00-A(S) 322/14367-68

1. During the week of 27 May 1968, the Government of Haiti (GOH) is reported to have carried out many executions among the prisoners held in Fort Dimanche prison. Clemard Joseph Charles, Haitian banker, was not among those executed, because his life was spared on direct orders from President Duvalier.

2. The GOH is becoming more insistent than ever that Charles produce the ransom of US$605 thousand, which it has set as the price for his release. Charles now seems to feel that if he does not produce the money, he will be executed. During May 1968, he gave to his wife, Madame Sophie Harrisson Charles, a general power of attorney. This power of attorney gives to Mme Charles the right to function as her husband's alter ego and sell or otherwise dispose of any or all of his assets.

3. Charles still has the US$100 thousand in cash in New York City banks [Collector's Note: See reference, Paragraph Four.] His holdings in GOH bonds total US$400 thousand [Collector's Note: See reference, Paragraph Two]. These bonds are guaranteed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Mme Charles is now endeavoring to collect the US$100 thousand cash and to pledge as collatoral the US$400 thousand in GOH bonds, in the hope that the GOH will accept as payment of the US$605 thousand ransom whatever she is able to realize from the bonds plus the total of the cash. She hopes to place this sum in the reorganized Banque Commerciale d'Haiti (BCH) [Collector's Note: See reference, Paragraph Two] and hopes that the GOH will accept that as the payment of the ransom.

4. Charles is not being treated as well in Fort Dimanche

CS COPY

201-357029

CONF[illegible]

[illegible]

HKY 00-A(S) 322/17056-68

19 June 1968

DCS Case: 47,540
Supplement to:
00-A(S) 322/16367-68

as he had been before his release in late April 1968. The Fort Dimanche authorities now refuse to accept food and clothing parcels sent to Charles from the outside. In consequence, he is still wearing the clothes in which he was rearrested in May 1968 and is compelled to subsist solely on the regular prison meals. During his previous incarceration he was permitted to receive food and clothing from the outside and lived not too badly.

5. The following individual is a good friend of Charles.

[illegible] Boso Dabinovic Dabimar
120160/62
Geneva, Switzerland
[illegible]

[Collector's Note: Source did not volunteer Dabimar's postal address; we did not judge it suitable to press him for it. We do not know the significance of the number listed above. We copied the above name and address from an envelope addressed by Mme Charles to Dabimar.] Dabimar is a Swiss citizen who owns a fleet of cargo ships. Until about 1961 or 1962 he had a contract with the GOH, under the provisions of which he sailed his ships under the Haitian flag. The GOH ultimately canceled the contract, because, I understand, Dabimar failed to pay the royalties called for under the terms of the contract. Dabimar is opposed to President Duvalier, because the latter canceled the contract just discussed, but is (or was) interested in developing projects (no additional data available) in Haiti. The letter which Mme Charles has just addressed to Dabimar contains an urgent appeal for financial assistance.

-end-

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM **CONFIDENTIAL** NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY **Haiti**

REPORT NO 00-B-321/16909-68

SUBJECT **Invaders Have Gained Control of Quartier Morin And Citadelle Laferriere/Government of Haiti Has Adopted Defensive Attitude/Reported Execution of 100 Prisoners in Fort Dimanche/Status of Clemard Joseph Charles**

DATE DISTR

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case: 47,540

DATE OF INFO 30 Jun 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ -- --/Jun 68

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, official of a US import-export enterprise. Source makes occasional trips to Haiti and has many contacts among Haitian business and political figures both in the US and in Haiti.

1. The Government of Haiti (GOH) has issued claims that the invaders of 20 May 68 have been wiped out and that total victory against them has been achieved. A special Thanksgiving mass was celebrated recently in Port-au-Prince to commemorate and celebrate the event. On the surface, things are politically quiet.

2. The realities seem, however, to differ to a marked degree from the foregoing. Although the populace has remained quiet, it does not believe the GOH claims of total victory. In point of fact, the invaders have not been wiped out and they have succeeded in gaining of control of the small town of Quartier Morin and of the Citadelle Laferriere (both situated near Cap Haitien). The GOH has decided not to begin military operations against them, but to adopt a defensive attitude and wait and see what happens. The GOH realizes that to dislodge the rebels from the citadel, which is located in very rugged terrain, would be extremely difficult militarily and would be quite inadvisable politically, because the citadel has strong emotional historical associations for Haitians. To bombard it into rubble, which would be the only feasible way to recapture it, would create resentment among the populace. Accordingly, the GOH seems prepared to do nothing, in the hope that the rebels will fade away. Such an eventuality seems unlikely, however, because the invaders have not only succeeded in gaining control of the two above-mentioned places, but also have succeeded in rallying about 140 of the local populace to their side. Reports in the US Spanish-language press of 12 Jun 68 stated that the rebel force is now 300 strong and that 140 of these are local people who have rallied to them. My information corroborates those figures. The populace in Port-au-Prince expects further action from the rebels. The latest rumors (and the word "rumors" must be emphasized) in Port-au-Prince are that another invasion will be launched into southern Haiti this time, and that Cuba has infiltrated a number of illegal entrants

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U NO

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-3,7029

S NO

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

into Haiti (not into the present rebel force). I have no way of knowing whether or not there is any substance to these rumors.

3. The latest invasion was launched from Inagua Island, Bahama Islands. The mayor of Cap Haitien went personally to Port-au-Prince to ask for troops to defend his area. He received none. The invaders themselves and Haitian exiles in general are now all very optimistic, after having been quite depressed at the beginning of the invasion.

4. The GOH, which seems to be about to sit tight and await further action by the rebels, has not been idle in dealing with the local population. During the week of 27 May 68, many people (no additional data available) were arrested. And the GOH has executed about 100 of the prisoners held in Fort Dimanche prison. The well-known banker, Clemard Joseph Charles, was not, however, among those executed. His life was spared on specific instructions from President Duvalier.

5. During the recent debate in the United Nations Security Council concerning the Haitian complaint about the invasion, Haitian ambassador AlexanderBonhomme stated that Jean Theard, Haitian diplomat, had been killed by the invaders. This is not true. Theard was, in fact, killed by GOH troops. He had gone to Cap Haitien to make some sort of survey designed to put a sugar mill there into working order.

6. There are a number of Syrians in Haiti. These individuals are sensitive to the directions in which political winds are blowing. I learned that one of these Syrian businessmen is, for the first time, considerably worried about the outcome of the invasion. Previous invasions have left him totally unperturbed. Now, however, he is worried, because he has for some years done business with the GOH and fears reprisals at the hands of a new government.

-end-

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Washingtonian Howard L. Burris

FROM: CSMusulin/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. Case 47540 DCE I 6157

DATE ~~3 June 1968~~ 27 May 68

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	3 JUN 1968	3 JUN 1968	S	For your information and retention.
2. WH/7/Haiti 3 B 0001 Hq.	5 JUN 1968	5 JUN 1968	R	
3. DC/WH/7				Here we go again.
4. C/WH/2			H	
5.				
6.				
7. WH/7/HT/ Ruth		6 June 68		– [illegible]
8. RID/AN			CH	7708: Pls index and classify to 201-357029 Insufficient Bio Data. Poss. ID/W 201-145770, BURRIS, LEE /LTCL/. RID/201/
9.				
10.				
11. FI/ISR (filing				
12. IN 201-357029)				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

4P

DCE 18157
27 May 68

MICROFILMED
JUN 20 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

WAS-247-68
27 May 1968

Director, Domestic Contact Service
Attn: Operational Support Staff

Chief, Washington Field Office

0 Washingtonian Howard L. Burris Begged to Accept Chairmanship of Commercial Bank of Haiti

REFERENCE: Especially WAS-602-67, dated 5 September 1967; but also WAS-787-67 dated 21 December 1967.

201-145770

1. Contact Specialist R.K. Oakley of the Washington Field Office 21 May 1968 received a telephone communication from Howard L. Burris, 1725 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., a wealthy Texas oil man currently engaged primarily in real estate development in this area. Considerable background is afforded in the memoranda under reference but, briefly, Burris (Colonel, USAF retired) is a former chief of Air Force Foreign Liaison and later was attached to the White House staff, prior to his retirement a few years ago. His social contacts in Washington at present reach well into both Kennedy and (President) Johnson circles. The US citizen of Haitian origin mentioned below is the same as that referred to in the earlier memorandum under reference. He is said to travel "freely" between his home in New York City and Port au Prince.

CIT USA
OCC: BUSP

NO 201

2. Burris recently had a visit from Louis A. Brun of B. & B. International Corporation, 134 Fifth Avenue, New York City, a US citizen of Haitian origin whom he has known for several years. Brun brought a letter from Clemard Joseph Charles dated 6 May 1968 in Port au Prince. A copy is attached but in essence it says he, Charles, was illegally imprisoned for ten months but now is released. As President of the Commercial Bank of Haiti in Port au Prince, Charles professes great interest in the patriotic duty of developing his country economically. He states that the bearer, Mr. Brun, is charged with presenting orally a proposition from him, Charles. He also asked Burris to deliver a letter addressed to Vice President Humphrey. (Burris declined and suggested it be sent through the mails.)

CIT USA
POB: HAITI
OCC. BUSP

3. About a year ago Brun approached Burris in Charles' behalf, urging Burris to buy at a low price, stock in the Commercial Bank of Haiti, and to accept a directorship if not the Chairmanship of the Board. On this latest visit Brun importuned Burris to buy 50 to 51 percent of the stock at a "nominal fee, probably US$1.00 and other considerations" and definitely to accept the Chairmanship. Burris is not interested

CS COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

201-145770

because he thinks this would be merely an opening gambit to attract investment funds from Burris' contacts. Moreover, he is not sanguine about the prospects in Haiti at present, to use understatement. However, Oakley has reason to believe that Burris might be cooperative should it suit official purposes to have him become involved. This aspect was not discussed in the least.

4. Burris says that Brun and Charles are somehow involved with the Bank of Nova Scotia which apparently operates in Haiti. Moreover, the two banks are offering participation in some kind of concession which they have, or hope to obtain, involving mineral rights throughout Haiti. Burris (and Oakley) are not overly impressed that this consists of more than the usual promotional effort.

W. J. Sheridan

[illegible]Oakley:em

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Le Président

Port-au-Prince, le 6 Mai 1968.

Cher Monsieur Barrie,

Pour avoir compris que la faiblesse de l'Economie Haitienne réside dans l'inutilisation des forces de travail du pays, j'ai créé une Institution dynamique qu'est la Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, génératrice de nouveaux standards économiques et qui doit engendrer l'intégration de la personnalité à partir d'une massification radicalisée et qui bien assimilée aurait pû projeter les approches de développement culturo-social en vue d'arriver à un déplacement économique en faveur des éternels démunis par la pullulation de toute une gamme d'initiatives telles qu'Haiti puisse devenir une ruche d'activités.

Mais, [illegible] la conception dynamique de ce Renouveau Economique d'Haiti, bien peu semblent l'avoir pénétrée: c'est ce qui m'a valu cette "cabale" montée contre moi à desseins par des attardés qui feignent d'ignorer que, bien plus qu'à la politique on doit accorder le primat à l'économique.

Dieu aidant, après dix mois de détention illégale je suis encore vivant et, je profite de la visite de notre ami commun Louis A. [illegible] pour vous remercier de votre grande sollicitude à mon endroit durant ce contre temps. Mais si ma situation et la votre ne me laissent guère entrevoir la possibilité de vous être utile, soyez assuré du moins que je serai toujours prêt à vous témoigner ma gratitude.

Notre ami commun est chargé de vous parler de vive voix de mon problème et de vous remettre en mains propres une lettre adressée à l'Honorable Hubert H. HUMPHREY où se trouve exprimer mes voeux sincères pour son triomphe total aux Elections de Novembre prochain sur lesquelles reposent bien des espoirs!

Le Président

Il est difficile en vérité, de déraciner cette propension à la politique tapageuse, à la politique verbeuse à l'infra-politique néfaste pour le citoyen, et encore plus néfaste pour la Nation Haitienne.

Cependant ma sagacité à résoudre les problèmes de l'heure et l'impact constructif et évolutif engendré par la R.C.H., m'ont permis de faire école et cette nouvelle génération politico-économique qui partage avec moi les responsabilités que posent ce renouveau de la Nation. Des Missionnaires de la Régénération Nationale, des Missionnaires "dont la valeur et l'efficacité mettent en jeu des hommes convaincus qui travaillent à discipliner l'Economie en vue d'un objectif bien défini; des hommes qui rejettent systématiquement toute idée de" fatalités économiques", mutation de la conscience sociale", Voilà ce qu'impose notre triomphe total pour et en faveur de notre peuple.

Cette cabale je puis l'attribuer à l'oeuvre du Destin. La foi en mon Destin réprime l'inquiétude maladive de l'esprit et le fixe dans la vérité.

"La vérité ne triomphe jamais mais ses ennemis succombent toujours" je vaincrai! Oui je vaincrai ! C'est dans cette guerre de chaque moment que je me perfectionne et c'est en combattant avec une foi ardente dans mon Destin que je peux dire comme l'Apôtre: "Je ne pense point être encore arrivé où j'aspire; mais oubliant ce qui est en arrière et m'étendant à ce qui est devant, je cours au terme de la carrière pour saisir le prix que Dieu nous a destiné la félicité à laquelle il nous a appelés par le Christ".

Je vous souhaite la santé et le bonheur pour vous et pour votre famille et le succès dans vos entreprises.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Mr. Burris l'expression de mes respectueux sentiments et reconnaissants.

Clémard JOSEPH CHARLES.-

COLONEL HOWARD L. BURRIS
WASHINGTON D.C.,-

201-357024

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM:
GSMusulin/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. Case 47,540

DATE: 22 May 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	22 MAY 1968	22 MAY 1968		Attached copy of 00-A(S)-322/14367-68 and NYOR (TWX) 9891 is furnished for your information and possible interest.
2. C/WH/7/HT 3 B 0001 Hq.	22 MAY 1968	22 MAY 1968		
3. WH/7/Ht Chief				
4. Int Ext L/				
5. R/D Sec				
6. File				
7. DC/WH/7				Brun is recognized by Joseph as self-serving and an enemy of the coalition. Highly doubtful if Joseph made any of the statements attributed to him. There was no need for Joseph to call the Haitian consulate to find out about the invasion.
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12. FI/ISR				Please file 201-357029
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 8-65 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

MAY 21 11 43 AM '68

S E C R E T 211344Z MAY 68 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 9891

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (GNUSBULIN) FROM JMMITCHELL

SUBJECT: CASE 47,548

ON 20 MAY 1968, LOUIS A. BRUN TOLD US THAT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES IS SEEKING HELP IN RAISING THE REQUIRED US$600,000 RANSOM FROM TWO PRINCIPAL SOURCES. ONE SOURCE IS BRUN HIMSELF, TOGETHER WITH SOMEBODY NAMED ALBERT (NO ADDITIONAL DATA AVAILABLE), IN NEW YORK CITY. AS ALREADY REPORTED, THIS GROUP HAS FAILED TO RAISE THE MONEY, BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO COMMUNICATE THIS MELANCHOLY INTELLIGENCE TO CHARLES. THE SECOND GROUP IS CONNECTED WITH A MAN NAMED JOSEPH DRYER. MME. CHARLES WROTE TO BRUN (LETTER RECEIVED ON 20 MAY 1968), TOLD HIM THAT MR. DRYER WAS INVOLVED IN THE MONEY-RAISING EFFORT AND MADE A CRYPTIC REFERENCE TO THE CARNER BANK IN MIAMI, FLORIDA. BRUN, WHO KNOWS DRYER, STATED THAT HE HAS QUERIED DRYER ABOUT THE CARNER BANK AND THAT DRYER TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD NEVER EVEN HEARD OF IT. BRUN DESCRIBED DRYER AS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE INVESTMENT FIRM GOODBODY IN MIAMI AND SAID THAT HE HAS BUSINESS INTERESTS IN HAITI AND THE NETHERLANDS, AMONG OTHER PLACES. BRUN AND DRYER ARE MEETING DURING THE EVENING OF 20 MAY 1968, AFTER

WHICH BRUN WILL TAKE DRYER TO THE AIRPORT. DRYER IS TO FLY TO HAITI ON 24 MAY 1968. BRUN SAID THAT DRYER IS A FRIEND OF THE FAMILY OF JOSEPH P. KENNEDY. WE BROUGHT UP THE NAME OF MME. SAINT-VICTOR, SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT DUVALIER, WHOM WE REPORTED AS HAVING BEEN IN MIAMI SINCE 9 MAY 1968. IT NOW DEVELOPS THAT IT IS MR. SAINT-VICTOR (NOT MME.) WHO HAS BEEN IN MIAMI SINCE 9 MAY 1968. SAINT-VICTOR, WHO IS OFTEN EMPLOYED BY PRESIDENT DUVALIER ON CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS AND WHO CONTROLS THE HAITIAN PHILATELIC CORPORATION (WHICH ISSUES HAITIAN STAMPS), HAS ACTED AS THE INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN PRESIDENT DUVALIER AND CHARLES AND HIS WIFE. HE REPORTEDLY VISITED CHARLES WHILE THE LATTER WAS IN FORT DIMANCHE AND DELIVERED TO HIM THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH HE WOULD BE SET FREE (I.E., THE US$605,000). BRUN OPINED THAT THE REASON FOR SAINT-VICTOR'S PRESENCE IN MIAMI MIGHT POSSIBLY BE TO OBTAIN SOME OR ALL OF THE US$605,000 FROM SOMEBODY THERE.

NEW SUBJECT: BRUN ALSO KNOWS A REPUTED MULTIMILLIONAIRE NAMED JOHN BOLTEN AND INTRODUCED HIM, VIA CABLE APPOINTMENT, TO LOUIS LEVEQUE. BOLTEN IS REPORTEDLY A NATURALIZED US CITIZEN OF EITHER GERMAN OR AUSTRIAN BIRTH AND IS NOTED FOR HIS PHILANTHROPIC INTERESTS.

NEW SUBJECT: BRUN WHO KNOWS MITCHELL AS COLONEL MITCHELL (RETIRED) OF THE ARMY, SAID THAT HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE REPORTED 20 MAY 1968 INVASION OF HAITI BY EXILES IS THE WORK OF THE HAITIAN COALITION AND OF CIA. HE TOLD US THAT HE IS A GOOD FRIEND AND CONTACT OF RAYMOND JOSEPH, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE HAITIAN COALITION IN NEW YORK AND THAT JOSEPH TOLD HIM THAT THE HAITIAN COALITION IS SPONSORED IN EVERY WAY BY THE CIA. BRUN SAID THAT WHEN HE HEARD ABOUT THE REPORTED INVASION HE CALLED JOSEPH AND ASKED HIM WHETHER OR NOT THE REPORT WAS TRUE. JOSEPH FIRST DENIED IT, BUT LATER (AT ABOUT 1130 HOURS) CALLED BRUN BACK AND TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD CHECKED WITH HIS PATRONS IN WASHINGTON. THE PATRONS TOLD HIM THAT THE INVASION STORY IS TRUE, BUT THAT THE INVASION WAS LAUNCHED NOT FROM CUBA, BUT FROM "SOME OTHER PLACE". BRUN TOLD US THAT JOSEPH DID NOT IDENTIFY THE "OTHER PLACE". BASING HIS BELIEF UPON JOSEPH'S BEHAVIOR AND ANSWERS, BRUN IS CONVINCED THAT THE INVASION HAS BEEN ORGANIZED BY CIA. LOCAL NEWS MEDIA REPORT THAT A B-22 PLANE DROPPED EITHER THREE OR FIVE BOMBS ON PORT-AU-PRINCE. ONE FELL NEAR THE PALACE, ONE IN THE CITY AND ONE AT THE AIRPORT (NO INFORMATION CONCERNING THE OTHER TWO). BUT ONLY ONE

EXPLODED. NO CASUALTIES WERE SUFFERED BY THE HAITIANS. JOSEPH CALLED THE HAITIAN CONSULATE AND WAS TOLD THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN INVASION AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS THINGS FIRMLY UNDER CONTROL. BRUN TELEPHONED PAN AMERICAN AND WAS TOLD THAT DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS IN PORT-AU-PRINCE ARE PROCEEDING NORMALLY.

FILE: LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT
B&B INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
184 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
AND
CASE 47,540

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM CONFIDENTIAL NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO 00-P
B-321/14367-68

SUBJECT Rearrest of Clemard Joseph Charles/Charles Is Not Able to Raise US$605 Thousand Ransom/Data Concerning Charles' US Bank Accounts/President Duvalier Might Settle for US$100 Thousand Cash/ Charles Has Credit of US$300 Thousand in National Bank of the Republic of Haiti And Claims an Additional US$100 Thousand

DATE DISTR 22 MAY 1968

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case: 40,556
47,54[illegible]

SUPPLEMENT TO: 00-B-321/14068-68

DATE OF INFO to 16 May 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 4-7 May 68/--------,16 May 68 (Paragraph One only)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Source maintains close contacts with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti and travels at irregular intervals to the Caribbean countries.

1. Clemard Joseph Charles was rearrested at 1600 hours 11 May 68. His present whereabouts are not known to me.

2. It became clear, during the period between 3 May 68 and 16 May 68 that Charles would not be able to raise the ransom sum of US$605 thousand. His release from prison, which took place on 25 Apr 68, was apparently contingent on his ability to produce that sum. /Collector's Note: See 00-B-321/14068-68./. Immediately following his release, Charles attempted to interest foreign investors in subscribing to a fund of US$605 thousand. This sum was to be placed in a reorganized Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, formerly Charles' private preserve, and used to pay off depositors and to stimulate investment in Haitian enterprises. Charles soon learned, however, that the present political and particularly the present economic conditions in Haiti were such as to discourage foreign investors from risking their money there. Nobody would invest US dollars. Nobody wants gourds. Nobody is interested in investing in a bankrupt country. Even Charles' reported willingness to pledge as collateral his extensive holdings in Haiti (essential oils and various other business enterprises, land, buildings and Haitian government bonds) failed to change the negative opinions of those approached as possible investors.

3. Charles holds a receipt from the Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti (BNRH) in the amount of US$300 thousand dated 1956, and claims from the BNRH another personal credit of US$100 thousand, dated 1965. He does not, however, hold a copy of any receipt for the latter sum. Charles apparently cannot utilize these sums, or his credit for them, to pay off the US$605 thousand ransom.

4. Charles' current visible cash assets consist of US$100 thousand, deposited in the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company and the First National City Bank, both of New York City. He originally had US$110 thousand in these two banks. When he was first

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U NO

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S NO

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

imprisoned in 1967, the Haitian authorities (no additional data available) compelled him to sign a number of blank checks of these two banks. The authorities then cashed a check for US$10 thousand, which the bank honored. When the Haitian authorities next presented filled-in checks, however, the bank refused payment, because it knew of his arrest and refused to believe that he had signed a check after his arrest. The Haitian authorities then abandoned their attempts to lay their hands on the rest of the money.

5. It is possible that President Duvalier might settle with Charles for the US$100 thousand on deposit in New York, when, as and if he finally realizes that Charles is not able to raise the original US$605 thousand demanded. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that Charles has other funds secretly deposited outside of Haiti. It must be recalled that he acted for some time as courier for President Duvalier, periodically took money for the President to Switzerland and deposited it there for him. Charles may therefore have utilized the opportunity to deposit some of his own money outside of Haiti.

6. If Charles did in fact deposit money of his own in Switzerland or some other locality outside of Haiti, President Duvalier may know or suspect that he has done so. He definitely does know about Charles' US$100 thousand in New York. Accordingly, Charles' 11 May 68 rearrest may be the preliminary to renewed pressure to induce Charles to part with his New York money and/or the funds which he may have secreted elsewhere outside of Haiti.

-end-

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM:
George S. Musulin/js SM
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS Case 47540

DATE: 21 May 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	21 MAY 1968	21 MAY 1968	SH	Attached, for your information, is copy of New York (TWX) 9881).
2. C/WH/7/HT 3 B 0001, Hqs.			X	
3. WH/7/HT Chief				
4. Sat S/A				
5. R/O Soo File				
6.				
7. FI/ISR				for filing in 201-357029.
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 20 11 25 AM '68

CONFIDENTIAL 201444Z MAY 68 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 9881

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (OMUSULIN) FROM JHMITCHELL

SUBJECT: CASE 47,540 (CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES)/PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S SECRETARY IN MIAMI/GUERRILLA LANDING IN HAITI

FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES USES THE PSEUDONYM "JACOBY" IN HIS CONFIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE AND ALLOTS THE PSEUDONYM "HEAD" TO LOUIS LEVEQUE.

NEW SUBJECT: THE 20 MAY 1968 ISSUE OF "THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS" CARRIES ON PAGE 20 A REUTERS REPORT FROM SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, THAT ANTI-GOVERNMENT GUERRILLAS FROM CUBAN HAVE LANDED IN HAITI. REUTERS QUOTES REPORTS FROM PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI, THAT ACCORDING TO SOURCES CLOSE TO PRESIDENT DUVALIER, TROOPS WERE SENT OUT TO DEAL WITH THE INVADERS, SAID TO INCLUDE ARMED HAITIAN EXILES, A NUMBER OF CUBANS AND SOME EUROPEAN MERCENARIES. THEY LANDED ON THE HAITIAN COAST FROM ORIENTE PROVINCE, CUBA, ACCORDING TO REUTERS. PRESIDENT DUVALIER IS SAID TO BE DIRECTING MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.

LOUIS A. BRUN TOLD US ON 15 MAY 1968 THAT MADAME SAINT-VICTOR, WHOM HE IDENTIFIED AS PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S SECRETARY, HAD BEEN IN

PAGE 2 CONTACTS/NEW YORK 9681 CONFIDENTIAL

MIAMI, FLORIDA, SINCE 9 MAY 1968. HE DID NOT KNOW THE REASON FOR VISIT, BUT SPECULATED THAT SHE MIGHT BE COLLECTING INFORMATION CONCERNING AN INVASION, RUMORED IN NEW YORK AS ABOUT TO BE LAUNCHED. SOME HAITIAN EXILES IN NEW YORK (NO ADDITIONAL DATA AVAILABLE) ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MISSING FROM THEIR USUAL HAUNTS SINCE THE FIRST WEEK OF MAY 1968. WE CANNOT VOUCH FOR THE ACCURACY OR TRUTH OF ANY OF THE FOREGOING BITS OF INFORMATION CONCERNING INVASIONS AND MERELY PASS THEM ALONG TO YOU FOR TRANSMITTAL TO INTERESTED PARTIES.

FILE: LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT
B&B INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
134
[redacted] FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
AND
CASE 47,946

CONFIDENTIAL

CCC: RE FILE: BOTTOM MESSAGE LINE THREE SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS
134 FIFTH AVENUE XXX VICE OER

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: George S. Musulin/js DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Building	EXTENSION 2268	NO. DCS Case 47540 DATE 20 May 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	20 MAY 1968	MAY 1968	5	Attached for your information and possible interest is copy of OO-A(S) report 322/14068-68.
2. C/WH/7/HT 3 B 0001, Hqs.	20 MAY 1968	20 MAY 1968		
3. DC/WH/7				
4.				
5. WH/7/Ht Chief Int				
6. Ext I/A				
7. RID/[illegible] See File C.J.C.				
8.				
9. FI/SR				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				201-357029
15.				

FORM 8-60 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

CONTROLLED DISSEM CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO B-322 OO-[redacted]/14068-68

SUBJECT Clemard Joseph-Charles Must Raise US $605 Thousand Before He Can Resume His Banking And Other Activities/Outline Of Charles's Plans/President Duvalier Reportedly Hopes To Improve His Image And To Attract Foreign Capital And Business Activity/ Rumors Continue Concerning Possible Reorganization Of Haitian Government

DATE DISTR

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Cases 40,556 and 47,540 Supplement to: 00-B-321/12106-68

DATE OF INFO May 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ Port-au-Prince, Haiti, May 68

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth. Source maintains close contacts with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti and travels at irregular intervals to the Caribbean countries.

1. Clemard Joseph-Charles was released from prison during the evening of 25 Apr 68 in return for a "ransom" of US $605 thousand.

2. Charles has been given until 24 May 68 to produce the US $605 thousand. This sum must be in an irrevocable letter of credit on an American bank in favor of the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti. It has been intimated that the 24 May 68 deadline can be extended, should Charles be experiencing any really unusual difficulties in producing the required money.

3. In order to obtain his release from prison, Charles had to sign a memorandum of understanding that he would produce the US $605 thousand plus some unidentified real property. These terms were agreed to by both Charles and his wife prior to the release. At the same time, Charles wrote a personal letter to President Duvalier asking for release and promising to hand over the money and property in question.

4. Charles is now under house arrest in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

5. Charles's immediate resources consist of about US $100 thousand in cash in two US banks (no additional data available), various homes, businesses (essential oils, an automobile dealership and others (no additional data available)), buildings, land and about US $400 thousand worth of Haitian government bonds. He did have another US $300 thousand in personal funds in Haiti. He can no longer count on this money to help raise the US $605 thousand, however, because prior to his release from prison the Haitian authorities (no additional data available) confiscated it.

6. Charles has agreed to raise the US $605 thousand on condition that it be used to pay off legitimate claims of depositors in his Banque Commerciale d'Haiti. He has stated that he will permit the money to be paid out only to those depositors who are able to produce documentary proof that they had deposited funds in his bank.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U NO

CONFIDENTIAL/CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S NO

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

7. Charles and several associates now propose to reorganize the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, formerly his private preserve, into a corporate entity and to incorporate it in the US. The associates plan to raise US $500 thousand for this new corporation. This sum will be separate from the US $605 thousand and will serve to put the new banking corporation into business. Secretarial help and at least some of the six directors of the corporation will be US citizens. Two of the directors will be Charles himself and Louis Levesque.

8. President Duvalier is reportedly most interested in the new venture and is anxious to see it succeed. He has finally realized that the economic situation in Haiti has deteriorated so badly during the past 18 months that he must do something before total bankruptcy occurs. Accordingly, President Duvalier wants to improve his "image" in the eyes of the outside world, particularly in the US, and by doing so hopes to attract investments and business activities from outside Haiti. He apparently hopes that the new, incorporated, Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, will help attract such activity to Haiti and is therefore permitting Charles to proceed.

9. [Collector's Note: 00-B-321/18106-68 described a possible reorganization in the Haitian government. This reorganization, sponsored by Duvalier, would place Duvalier on the elevated plane of spiritual adviser and father of the people and would, on the surface, at least, turn over to a president the day-to-day management of Haitian government affairs. Various names have been mentioned for the position of president under the possible new system.] The name of Luc-Albert Foucard has recently been mentioned frequently in Haiti as the possible new president under the rumored reorganization of the government. Foucard is a son-in-law of Duvalier and lives in Haiti. He is in charge of tourism. Some say that Duvalier listens to Foucard and is, to a degree, influenced by him. I doubt this very strongly.

- end -

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO A(s)322/ 00 [illegible]/14068-68

SUBJECT Clemard Joseph-Charles Must Raise US $605 Thousand Before He Can Resume His Banking And Other Activities/Outline Of Charles's Plans/President Duvalier Reportedly Hopes To Improve His Image And To Attract Foreign Capital And Business Activity/Rumors Continue Concerning Possible Reorganization Of Haitian Government

DATE DISTR.

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Cases 40,556 and 47,540
Supplement to: 00-B-321/12106-68

DATE OF INFO. May 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Port-au-Prince, Haiti, May 68

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth. Source maintains close contacts with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti and travels at irregular intervals to the Caribbean countries.

1. Clemard Joseph-Charles was released from prison during the evening of 25 Apr 68 in return for a "ransom" of US $605 thousand.

2. Charles has been given until 24 May 68 to produce the US $605 thousand. This sum must be in an irrevocable letter of credit on an American bank in favor of the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti. It has been intimated that the 24 May 68 deadline can be extended, should Charles be experiencing any really unusual difficulties in producing the required money.

3. In order to obtain his release from prison, Charles had to sign a memorandum of understanding that he would produce the US $605 thousand plus some unidentified real property. These terms were agreed to by both Charles and his wife prior to the release. At the same time, Charles wrote a personal letter to President Duvalier asking for release and promising to hand over the money and property in question.

4. Charles is now under house arrest in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

5. Charles's immediate resources consist of about US $100 thousand in cash in two US banks (no additional data available), various houses, businesses (essential oils, an automobile dealership and others (no additional data available)), buildings, land and about US $400 thousand worth of Haitian government bonds. He did have another US $300 thousand in personal funds in Haiti. He can no longer count on this money to help raise the US $605 thousand, however, because prior to his release from prison the Haitian authorities (no additional data available) confiscated it.

6. Charles has agreed to raise the US $605 thousand on condition that it be used to pay off legitimate claims of depositors in his Banque Commerciale d'Haiti. He has stated that he will permit the money to be paid out only to those depositors who are able to produce documentary proof that they had deposited funds in his bank.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U

C 1 IAL/CIA INTERNAL ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S ET

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organiza-

7. Charles and several associates now propose to reorganize the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, formerly his private preserve, into a corporate entity and to incorporate it in the US. The associates plan to raise US $500 thousand for this new corporation. This sum will be separate from the US $605 thousand and will serve to put the new banking corporation into business. Secretarial help and at least some of the six directors of the corporation will be US citizens. Two of the directors will be Charles himself and Louis Leveque.

8. President Duvalier is reportedly most interested in the new venture and is anxious to see it succeed. He has finally realized that the economic situation in Haiti has deteriorated so badly during the past 18 months that he must do something before total bankruptcy occurs. Accordingly, President Duvalier wants to improve his "image" in the eyes of the outside world, particularly in the US, and by doing so hopes to attract investments and business activities from outside Haiti. He apparently hopes that the new, incorporated, Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, will help attract such activity to Haiti and is therefore permitting Charles to proceed.

9. [Collector's Note: 00-B-321/12106-68 described a possible reorganization in the Haitian government. This reorganization, sponsored by Duvalier, would place Duvalier on the elevated plane of spiritual adviser and father of the people and would, on the surface, at least, turn over to a president the day-to-day management of Haitian government affairs. Various names have been mentioned for the position of president under the possible new system.] The name of Luc-Albert Foucard has recently been mentioned frequently in Haiti as the possible new president under the rumored reorganization of the government. Foucard is a son-in-law of Duvalier and lives in Haiti. He is in charge of tourism. Some say that Duvalier listens to Foucard and is, to a degree, influenced by him. I doubt this very strongly.

- end -

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: George S. Musulin/js
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS Case 47540

DATE 20 May 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	20 MAY 1968	20 MAY 1968	S	Attached for your information is copy of New York (TWX) 9873.
2. C/WH/7/Ht 3 B 0001, Hqs.			R	
3. WH/7/Ht Chief Int				
4. Ext I/A				
5. R/O Sec File CSC				
6.				
7. FI/ISR				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				201-357029
14.				
15.				

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 16 4 09 PM '68

CONFIDENTIAL 161949Z MAY 68 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 9573

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (GMUSULIN) FROM JHMITCHELL

SUBJECT: REARREST OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES (CASE 47,540)

MR. BRUN TOLD US ON 16 MAY 1968 THAT ON 11 MAY 1968 AT 1600 HOURS CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES WAS REARRESTED. HIS PRESENT WHEREABOUTS ARE NOT KNOWN TO MR. BRUN. MR. BRUN TOLD US THAT HE RECEIVED THE WORD IN A LETTER RECEIVED DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 16 MAY 1968.

FILE: LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT
B&B INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
134 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: George S. Musulin/jsgam
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS Case 47540

DATE: 2 May 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DO/DCSL 3 MAY 1968		3 MAY 1968	
2. WH/7/Haiti ATTN: Mr. Berg	3 MAY 1968	3 MAY 1968	R
3. DC/WH/7			
4. C/WH/7			H
5.			
6. C/WH/7/RO			PRO
7. WH/7/RO/HT			BB
8.			
9. WH/7/HT — Ruth			
10. George			
11.			
12. FI/ISR file			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

REF: Ripley/Musulin Telecon, 2 May 1968

Attached 00-A(S)322/13163-68, which was summarized in ref telecon is furnished for your information and interest.

We shall confine our reply to ~~New York~~ to advise our New York Office to counsel source to check in with US Embassy in Haiti and to thoroughly debrief source on his return to New York.

- clemard joseph charles.

201-357029

FORM 8-63 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible]

COUNTRY: HAITI

DATE OF INFO: 27 APRIL 1968

SUBJECT: CLEMARD JOSEPH-CHARLES HAS BEEN RELEASED FROM PRISON AND APPARENTLY MUST PAY RANSOM OF US$605,000

My 00A(S) 322/13163-68
27 Apr 68

PLACE AND DATE ACQUIRED: --- 30 APRIL 1968

THIS IS MY REPORT NO. 00-A(S) 1316368

SOURCE DESCRIPTION: NATURALIZED US CITIZEN OF HAITIAN BIRTH. SOURCE MAINTAINS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH HAITIANS IN THE US AND WITH PROMINENT BUSINESS AND POLITICAL FIGURES IN HAITI AND TRAVELS AT IRREGULAR INTERVALS TO THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.

1. CLEMARD JOSEPH-CHARLES WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ON THE EVENING OF 25 APRIL 1968 AND PROCEEDED TO HIS RESIDENCE. OUR SOURCE TELLS US THAT CHARLES IS BOTH PHYSICALLY AND MORALLY WELL AND IS NOW MAKING PREPARATIONS TO RETURN TO WORK.

2. [redacted] SOURCE HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY CHARLES, THROUGH A [illegible] PARTY, EDMOND VILAIRE, PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI, TO TRAVEL TO HAITI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BECAUSE CHARLES WANTS TO TALK TO HIM. CHARLES HAS BEEN COMPELLED TO AGREE TO TAKE OUT A LETTER OF CREDIT IN FAVOR OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI IN THE AMOUNT OF US$605,000. THIS LETTER IS TO REMAIN VALID FOR 30 DAYS FROM THE TIME IT IS TAKEN OUT. CHARLES HAS BEEN GIVEN A SHORT TIME (NOT SPECIFIED) TO PRODUCE THE MONEY AND THE LETTER OF CREDIT.

3. MADAME CHARLES COMMITTED HER HUSBAND TO THE FOREGOING COURSE OF ACTION. FOLLOWING HER OWN RELEASE FROM PRISON, SHE WAS VISITED BY AN UNKNOWN (TO OUR SOURCE) PARTY. THIS INDIVIDUAL SET FORTH THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH CHARLES WOULD BE RELEASED. THE CONDITIONS INCLUDED THE US$605,000 MENTIONED ABOVE. MADAME CHARLES ACCEPTED THE CONDITIONS AND SIGNED A PAPER TO THAT EFFECT. HER SIGNATURE COMMITTED HER HUSBAND.

4. OUR SOURCE BELIEVES THAT WHAT CHARLES WANTS HIM TO DO IS TO TAKE THE MONEY FROM WHEREVER CHARLES HAS IT (THE SOURCE PROFESSES NOT TO KNOW WHERE THE MONEY NOW IS) AND DELIVER IT TO HAITI.

5. THE SOURCE PLANS TO FLY TO PORT-AU-PRINCE ON EITHER 2 MAY 1968 OR 3 MAY 1968 AND TO RETURN TO NEW YORK ON 6 MAY 1968. THIS SCHEDULE IS, OF COURSE, SUBJECT TO CHANGE, DEPENDING UPON THE LOCATION OF CHARLES'S MONEY AND DEPENDING UPON WHETHER OR NOT SOURCE IS CORRECT IN HIS SURMISE THAT CHARLES WANTS HIM TO ACT AS COURIER.

6. SOURCE REQUESTED US TO NOTIFY THE US EMBASSY IN HAITI THAT HE WILL BE IN THE COUNTRY. HE WISHES THE EMBASSY TO BE NOTIFIED AS A PRECAUTION. SOURCE IS A NATURALIZED US CITIZEN OF HAITIAN BIRTH AND DOES NOT FEAR THAT ANYTHING UNTOWARD WILL HAPPEN TO HIM. HE FEELS THIS WAY NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF HIS US CITIZENSHIP BUT ALSO BECAUSE HE REASONS THAT THE HAITIANS WILL NOT HARM THE [illegible] OF US$675,000. HE IS, HOWEVER, MOST ANXIOUS THAT THE EMBASSY KNOW THAT HE WILL BE IN HAITI. SOURCE IS VERY PROUD OF HIS US CITIZENSHIP AND SWORE THAT HE WILL DO NOTHING TO [illegible] IT OR OTHERWISE GET HIMSELF IN TROUBLE.

WE SUGGESTED STRONGLY TO HIM THAT AS SOON AS HE ARRIVED IN PORT-AU-PRINCE HE VISIT THE EMBASSY AND LET THE PEOPLE THERE KNOW THAT HE IS IN HAITI. WE ALSO TOLD HIM TO TELL THE EMBASSY PEOPLE HIS DATE OF DEPARTURE AND TO CHECK IN WITH THE EMBASSY JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. SOURKE AGREED TO DO THIS.

8. WE UNDERSTAND THAT KENNETH RIPLEY, DDP, IS AU COURANT OF THIS ENTIRE AFFAIR. ~~AGED~~, PLEASE HAVE HIM NOTIFY THE APPROPRIATE INDIVIDUALS IN HAITI THAT SOURCE WILL BE THERE DURING THE TIMES MENTIONED ABOVE.

SECRET

2 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph-Charles - Plans for Payment of Ransom

1. Mr. George Musulin (DCS) called today to give WH/7/Haiti advance notice of a report his office has received relative to the release from prison of Clemard Joseph-Charles.

2. Louis BRUN, who is the business representative of CHARLES in New York, has been urgently requested to come to Port au Prince. The request came to BRUN from one Edmond VILAIRE who, BRUN asserts, represents CHARLES in Haiti. BRUN plans to leave New York on 2 or 3 May and return on 6 May.

3. According to BRUN, CHARLES has agreed to pay $605,000 to the Duvalier Government for his release from prison. BRUN claims not to know where the money is located but suspects that it may be in Europe. He further suspects that he will be asked to act as courier.

4. BRUN, who is a naturalized U.S. citizen, has some qualms about his own safety in Port au Prince and has asked his DCS contact in New York, Mr. Mitchell, that the Embassy in Port au Prince be advised of his arrival. He was told that he should go to the Embassy himself upon arrival and make his position known.

5. Mr. Musulin said he assumed WH/7/Haiti would pass the information to the State Department.

John B. Kensett

SECRET

[illegible] Charles (201-357029)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO [redacted]
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE [redacted] TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

TDCSDB-315/00106-68
HTP-1126

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION
IW (ACD) ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 5 CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI,

CS/DO, FI/D . FI/INT 6, DDP, SOD 4, WH/COG 8, WH/REG 8, WH/7/H/RE 3, DO 5.

9 JAN 68 IN 26694

S E C R E T 091700Z JAN 68 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4912
DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, SANTO DOMINGO, JMWAVE
INTEL
SUPDATA EVLEMON 2 FROM EVLEMON 14
FILED 091700Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-357029

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN-26694

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS

FBI I&S XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/ CONTROLLED DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET 092148Z

CITE TDCSDB-315/00106-68

DIST 9 JANUARY 1968

COUNTRY: HAITI

DOI: 30 DECEMBER 1967

SUBJECT: AMNESTY OF PRISONERS

ACQ: HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (8 JANUARY 1968) HTP 1126

SOURCE: A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1963. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM A HAITIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS ANTI-DUVALIER BUT WHO HAS CONFIDENTIAL ACCESS TO KEY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER ENTOURAGE. HIS INFORMATION HAS PROVED ACCURATE DURING THE SHORT PERIOD OF HIS REPORTING.

1. PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER RELEASED 107 PRISONERS IN A NEW YEARS AMNESTY. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LUCIEN BELIZAIRE, MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN THE FOURTH AND FIFTH DUVALIER CABINETS FROM 4 NOVEMBER 1958 TO 21 DECEMBER 1959, WERNER APOLLON, FORMER OFFICIAL IN THE TABAC REGIE,

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Mme Clemard Joseph Charles Reportedly Released From Prison

FROM: GSMusulin/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. Case 47,540

DATE: 4 January 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	4 JAN 1968	4 JAN 1968		For your information and retention. (00-B-00156-68)
2. WH/7/Haiti 3 B 0001 Hqs.	5 JAN 1968	5 JAN 1968	R	
3. Ruth		5 Jan 68		
4. George		5		
5. Don			KHR	
6. Carrie				
7. Bernie				
8.				
9. WH/7/HT/RO			BSB	
10.				
11.				
12.				
13. FI/ISR				Please file in 201-357029
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM | CONFIDENTIAL | NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY	Haiti	REPORT NO.	00-B-321/00156-68
SUBJECT	Mme Clemard Joseph Charles Reportedly Released from Prison/Clemard Joseph Charles May Be Released from Prison	DATE DISTR.	4 JAN 1968
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	DCS Case: 40,556 00B-321/36765-67 00B-321/37063-67
DATE OF INFO.	Late December 1967		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	---, Late December 1967		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, official of a US import-export company. Source's business activities make it necessary for him to travel at irregular intervals to the various countries of the Caribbean area. During such trips, he maintains existing business and personal contacts and develops new ones.

I have learned that during the last week of December 1967 Mme Clemard Joseph Charles was released from prison. Reports persist that Clemard Joseph Charles will soon be released. No date has been indicated for the reported forthcoming release.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U | NO

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S | NO

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence compon
of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically cont
in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government
participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to
tions or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM CONFIDENTIAL NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. 00- B-321/36765-67

SUBJECT Rumored Release of Clémard Joseph Charles

DATE DISTR. 27 Dec 67

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DCS CASE: 40556
49755

DATE OF INFO. December 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---, December 1967

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, official of a US import-export company. Source's business activities make it necessary for him to travel at irregular intervals to the various countries of the Caribbean area. During such trips, he maintains existing business and personal contacts and develops new ones.

I have heard that Clémard Joseph Charles may be released at the end of December 1967. President Duvalier has reportedly sent people to restore Charles' residence to its former state and has ordered the return of the items which were stolen from the house at the time of Charles' arrest. Duvalier has also ordered new clothes to be sent to Charles in jail.

-end-

201-357029

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U NO CONFIDENTIAL GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification S NO

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator

SECRET SENSITIVE

NY-909-67
10 October 1967

Subject: Case 47,540 - Reported Relationship Between Haitian Banker Clemard Joseph Charles and Colonel Max Dominique, Son-in-Law of Haitian President Duvalier

1. On 6 October 1967, Louis A. Brun, President, B & B International Corporation, 1182 Broadway, New York City, stated that Haitian banker Clemard Joseph Charles has, in fact, contrary to previous information, been in contact with Colonel Max Dominique, son-in-law of Haitian President Duvalier. While Brun was not able to supply any details concerning this relationship, he believes that it is political in nature and possibly not unrelated to the various stories now circulating concerning plots to unseat the President.

2. Brun also stated that Dominique is scheduled to arrive in New York City for a visit in the near future (no additional details available).

201-357029

SECRET SENSITIVE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

(Charles) 201-357029

TDCSDB-315/03967-67

HTP 1101

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 3 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐

ADV. COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT: 2125

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION IW (PMB) ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI,

CS/DO, FI/D, FI/INT 6, DDP, SOD 4, DO 5, CA/O 4, CI, WH/COG 8, WH/REG 8, WH/7/H/RE 3.

SECRET 031630Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4728 RACHFIELD ACTING

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, SANTO DOMINGO, JMWAVE 3 Oct 67.

IN 64877

INTEL

SUPDATA PARA 1 EVLEMON 2 FROM EVLEMON 14

PARA 2 EVLEMON 2 FROM EVLEMON 5

FILED 031630Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-357029

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 64877

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC [redacted] NSA ONE OCR [redacted] SDO [redacted] [redacted]

D/ORR 5

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

032238Z CITE TDCS DB-315/03967-67

S-E-C-R-E-T

DIST 3 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 30 SEPT 1967

SUBJECT 1. ATTEMPTS BY HAITIAN GOVERNMENT TO GET MONEY FROM THE SWISS BANK ACCOUNT OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES.

2. POSSIBLE RELEASE OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES FROM PRISON.

ACQ 2 OCTOBER 1967, PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI, HTP 1101

SOURCE A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1965. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FOR PARAGRAPH 1 FROM A HAITIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS ANTI-DUVALIER BUT WHO HAS CONFIDENTIAL ACCESS TO KEY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER ENTOURAGE. HIS INFORMATION HAS PROVED ACCURATE DURING THE SHORT PERIOD OF HIS REPORTING. PARAGRAPH 2 RECEIVED

FROM A HAITIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS
OPPOSED TO DUVALIER, WHO HAS ACCESS TO THE
FILES OF A HAITIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
AND WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION.

1. ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO EUROPE HERVE BOYER, EX-MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND FINANCE (PORTION MISSING) FRANCOIS DUVALIER. BOYER HAD WITH HIM TWO BLANK CHECKS ON A SWISS BANK WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED UPON INSTRUCTIONS FROM DUVALIER BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, EX DIRECTOR OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI. BOYER WAS SHOCKED WHEN THE SWISS BANK REFUSED TO HONOR THE CHECKS.

2. IT IS STRONGLY RUMORED WITHIN THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT THAT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES WILL SOON BE RELEASED FROM PRISON.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO, (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

4. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: MISSING PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CHARLES, JOSEPH CLENARD
201-357029
SEX M DOB ?

CIT HAITI
OCC ?
< HAITI
SUBJ RPTDLY IS STILL ALIVE.

036-006-020/03
UFGA-28501
19 SEP 67
P3

HTP:1JR804

R 6709290819

FILE IN 201-357029

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 8 AUGUST 1967

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES
INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

14-00000

DISPATCH

KAPOK
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Port au Prince

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Plotting Against the Duvalier Regime

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Information Only

Forwarded under separate cover is a Memorandum for the Record prepared by an LNGOLD Official on the reported plotting by Clemard Joseph Charles to overthrow the Duvalier regime. The memorandum was prepared on the basis of a conversation held with a representative of Charles in Washington on 29 June 1967.

Harold O. CHAIDEZ

Distribution:
2 - COS, Port au Prince

Attachment:
1 - Memorandum, U.S.C.

KAPOK

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HTPS-696	DATE 12 JUL 1967 Typed: 11 July 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-357029

1 - RI
1 - WH/7/Haiti

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
		sld	5598

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/7	11 JUL 1967	ul V. Har ood

FORM (40) SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard J. Charles

FROM:
GSMusulin/cs GSM
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. Sensitive Case 47540

DATE: 11 July 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DO/DCSL	7/11	7/11	
2. WH/7/Haiti Messrs. Gremillion and Ripley	11 JUL 1967	11 JUL 1967	
3. 3 B 0001 HQS [redacted] 2/14/17			H
4. Ruth		12 July 67	
5. Carrie File		12 Jul	cd
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. SECRET/SENSITIVE			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached for your retention is Clemard Charles' letter carried by Mr. Brun which was passed to our New York Office and in turn delivered to Mrs. Matlack. Mrs. Matlack bucked this copy to us. She also encouraged Mr. Brun to use our New York Office for similar transmittals. Brun also passed a copy of his 10 page "opus" dated 20 June 1967 to Mrs. Matlack. A copy of this report was previously furnished your office.

201-357029

Clemard Joseph Charles

C. J. Charles

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI
SOCIETE ANONYME DE BANQUE
AU CAPITAL AUTORISE DE UN MILLION DEUX CENT CINQUANTE MILLE GOURDES

ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE
COMBANK
P. O. BOX 1007
CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES
PRESIDENT ET DIRECTEUR

SIEGE SOCIAL ET BUREAU PRINCIPAL
RUE DU CENTRE
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

PORT-AU-PRINCE June 6, 1967
REFERENCE Confd.

Miss D. K. Matlack
CACSI/DA
Washington 25, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Miss Matlack:

May I recall the kind reception you gave me in May 1963, when I was in Washington, also your courtesy in recommending me the Albun Towers Hotel, 3700 Massachusetts Avenue, where I lodged in Room 522. You will remember the conversation I had with you regarding the future of my country, and the hope I expressed that the assistance of the U. S. would not fail us.

I have earnestly worked since in order that Haiti may be relieved from the tyranny and misery in which has been inconsiderately thrown, and have succeeded in securing the sympathy and support of a great majority of the populations all over the Republic, including religious people, businessmen, professionals, intellectuals, etc. A plan has been prepared and will be executed by a Military man who has with him most of the officers in the Army. These people are ready and eager to begin operations and are only awaiting word from me.

I would have already given them order to strike, through the Chief who is the only one in contact with me, were it not for my apprehension that the turmoil that will necessarily follow might serve Castro's plan to introduce communist agitators in the country. I also have reason to wonder about Balaguer's position on account of his friendly feelings for Duvalier. Therefore, before going any further, I feel that it would be wise for me to have the U.S. assurance that these two forces will be properly neutralized, and I am requesting your kind cooperation so that this assurance may be given to me.

/2

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI
SOCIETE ANONYME DE BANQUE
AU CAPITAL AUTORISE DE UN MILLION DEUX CENT CINQUANTE MILLE GOURDES

ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE
COMBANK
P. O. BOX 1007
CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES
PRESIDENT ET DIRECTEUR

SIEGE SOCIAL ET BUREAU PRINCIPAL
RUE DU CENTRE
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

PORT-AU-PRINCE June 6, 67.

Page 2.-

REFERENCE Confd.

I have requested my friend and associate in New York, Mr. Louis A. Brun, to turn personally this letter over to you, also to give you all the details that it would not be proper for me to write. You may feel free to talk at length with Mr. Brun on all matters relating to my project. You will also be kind to give him any reply you may have for me, which he will keep in New York until my next visit to the U. S. shortly.

Permit me to thank you in advance for your contribution to the relief of my country, and to assure you that your cooperation will ever live in my memory.

Respectfully yours,

Clémard JOSEPH CHARLES.-

[illegible] Brown

20 Jun 67

Pres. [illegible]
[illegible] Corp.
NYC

The following is my humble appraisal of the political situation now prevailing in Haiti.

As I repeatedly stated to anyone who may have asked me, my motivations are purely patriotic while I am also moved by a sincere desire to see Haiti emerge as a democratic independent nation friendly to the United States.

Since I left Haiti with my family ten years ago to later become an American citizen, I have made several trips to Haiti and have maintained close contacts with people in all walks of life both in Haiti and with those who were forced out of the country for political reasons or otherwise.

My latest visit to Haiti took place on June 5th of this year and I stayed two days in Port-au-Prince. Although the purpose of my trips were mostly business I also had the opportunity to discuss the Haitian political situation with politicians, as well as with average Haitian citizens concerned with the situation. My personal conclusions are as follows:

The fact is that the Duvalier regime is, at present, in a state of internal political confusion in which no one directly or indirectly connected with it can predict the outcome. There is strong evidence showing that his son-in-law, Colonel Max Dominique, has in fact tried to overthrow Duvalier in order to personally assume the direction of Haiti's political affairs. How Duvalier became aware of Colonel Dominique's intentions is the question everybody is trying to find the answer to. Nevertheless, Duvalier rounded up the alledged associates of Colonel Dominique and, after a mock court martial accusing and convincing 19 young army officers of treason they were all killed by a firing squad on June 8, 1967 at Fort Dimanche on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. Duvalier himself was present at the slaughter and he ordered Col. Dominique to be a member of the firing squad. Non-confirmed information from usually reliable sources

/...

indicates that several other persons, low ranking military personnel, militia men and civilians were also executed on similar charges, without fanfare. It is also the general concensus of opinion that the "purge" will continue at a rate that no one can yet determine.

No one ignores that there has been and still are very hostile feelings between two groups within the President's family and close associates. One is headed by Colonel Dominique and his wife Marie-Denise Duvalier, and another is led by Mrs. Yvon St.Victor, the President's private secretary and confidante. The names of the President's wife, Simone, his son Jean-Claude and his younger daughter Simone, are being mentioned as being part of the first group. In the second group, Mrs. St.Victor's brother, the present Head of the Department of Tourism, Mr. Luc-Albert Foucard, who is also married to one of the President's daughter, is among other names such as Henri Siclait, head of the Regie, Minister Lebert Jn.Pierre, etc. mentioned to be siding with Mrs. St.Victor. So far, the President has shown signs that he favors the latter group. The ramifications of both groups extend to people who were considered the most fanatic supporters of Duvalier himself. The fact is that none of the remaining so-called strong men of Duvalier in the militia, the Tonton Macoutes or the Army know for sure how the president feels towards them and are very much concerned about their own future and survival. In other words, confusion and insecurity are wide spread amongst Duvalier's followers.

I believe that in spite of the actual confusion and sense of insecurity prevailing in government circles, there is no real organized opposition as such against Duvalier at this moment, except for what I will point out later in this paper.

There is, however, strong anti-Duvalier feelings in the middle and upper classes of Haiti, representing only a small percentage of the whole population. A segment of the population to be taken into very serious consideration is the one made up of the people living in the slum areas,

/...

both within and on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. These people to be differentiated with the rural peasants, live in abject poverty with no established means of subsistance, and represent the most volatile and dangerous political force to be watched closely in the event of any significant development of the political and social situation. These people which formed, in 1956 and 1957, the core of former president Daniel Fignole's followers, can be swung to any movement and play a decisive role in the confusion that may arise in the event of a coup. We are convinced that these people will welcome a change should any demagogue lead them to believe that they will benefit by such a change.

I am informed that in Port-au-Prince there are some political personalities, in and out of the Government, that are waiting for an opportunity to swing that sector in their favor, whenever a serious attempt to overthrow Duvalier is made, whether by them or anyone else.

Under those circumstances, Duvalier loosing his old grip on key elements committed to his support, a large portion of which he has recently liquidated, is trying to instore a new political philosophy reaching out for elements of the middle class as well as those of the slum areas mentioned above. I have a feeling that the new philosophy is aimed at antagonizing the U.S. Government for its hands-off policies and the economic squeeze applied by the U.S. against his government. This antagonism will go as far as necessary even to an almost impossible alliance with communist countries such as Cuba or other communist nations of Europe, Africa or Asia. As evidence of that direction in Duvalier's Government, he has allowed the so-called "Little Red Book" of Chairman Mao-Tse-Tung of Communist China to circulate freely in Haiti, whereas previously the same book was banned and seized in local librairies and newastands in Haiti. Several articles appearing in local Haitian newspapers have lately referred with much emphasis to the "Cultural Revolution" of Duvalier which has yet to take place. The appointment in his newly formed cabinet of three Blanchet brothers, all well-known communist sympathizers, is also an indication of his subtle shift towards a

/...

radically leftist oriented Government. If allowed time, Duvalier may well succeed to turn the country into a new communist satellite and work out some agreements with communist countries. Here again, we should not fail to mention the new exchange of diplomatic representations between Haiti and some communist countries. The most significant one is the new appointment in Haiti of an Ambassador from Poland with whom, I was told, Duvalier is closely working with.

Taking everything into consideration:

1. The non existence of any organized opposition in Haiti;

2. The state of non cohesiveness and distrust amongst the exiled political elements abroad, therefore nullifying any positive action from outside Haiti;

3. The fear of local politicians that, if outside forces were to come in, their safety and security would be very much at stake, therefore they should resist such intervention and do whatever is necessary to prevent it at all cost;

4. The fear of Duvalier's so-called followers that they may be eliminated upon mere suspicion, just or unjust denonciations;

5. The middle and upper classes sentiment that the U.S. is not working as it should to bring about the downfall of Duvalier and that the U.S. is even supporting the regime intentionally or unintentionally by not encouraging or allowing the opposition to organize itself;

6. The interpretation of the above classes which are at a loss to understand the silence of the U.S. press in general for not having raised the usual indignation about the recent mass killings, therefore making room for the belief of a possible collusion by means of money or otherwise of Duvalier with said press, particularly the New York Times, to refrain from bringing these facts to the attention of international public opinion;

7. The strong belief that compromises have been worked out with President Balaguer in the Dominican Republic to return to Haiti all opponents of Duvalier who had fled there.

all this leads to believe that Duvalier will hold in power for quite a while more.

/...

It would be childish, however, to formulate an opinion only on the basis of the mentioned facts, although on the surface, they appear logical enough to confirm these conclusions.

I am convenced in my own mind, that when some politicians close to Duvalier will feel that their lives are in real danger, some of them will successfully attempt to eliminate him even though they may not be, themselves, in a position to control the chaotic situation that will necessarily follow. This is where the real danger is. If any such unplanned action was allowed to take place, the U.S. will then find itself with a real "hot potato", requiring such drastic action similar to those takin in 1965 during the recent crisis in the Dominican Republic. Such actions are not to be desired, not only because they are costly to the American taxpayers, but because they inevitably provoke strong Anti-American feelings based on the opinion that the U.S. did nothing to help bring about the collapse, but is merely there to impose its choice and decisions against the will of the people. If the U.S. is to wait for the OAS to decide on joint action in the eventuality of chaos, we are afraid that communist influence and even control of the situation by forces based in Cuba and other countries, will make it much more difficult to cope with within the context of our national security. It is, therefore, imperative, in our opinion, that the U.S. take some steps towards working with local politicians to take the initiative of a coup which, when performed, would receive the strong backing of this country, militarily, financially and otherwise, to secure an orderly succession of the present regime. As far as Haiti is concerned, I feel that I have the most adequate solution for the proposed action. I feel that whenever the security of this nation or any nation is concerned, there is no time for wait-and-see considerations. In the case of Haiti, in particular, where the political scene is really deprived of individuals of strong convictions, one way or the other, we feel that the U.S. should not have any problem in finding someone that they can build politically and work with in a sincere and loyal effort to help that small nation solve some of its perennial problems.

/...

In connection with the possibility of finding a political leader, as indicated above, I must say that I have been in contact with a man whom, I feel, could very well fill the position. His name is Clémard Joseph Charles, President of Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, President of Haiti's Chamber of Commerce, a director of several other business and industrial organizations in Haiti.

I have known Mr. Charles since 1951. We have been friends and business associates eversince. To me, Mr. Charles is a true and sincere patriot. Of course, today, a number of people question his patriotism on the basis of his close cooperation with the Duvalier regime. I have myself, sometimes, felt that he went too far. I have also told him so, many times. His answers on such occasions have, most of the time, satisfy my own judgement. In fact, Mr. Charles told me that, knowing Duvalier, as he knows him, it would have been a question of life or death if he were to behave in a different manner. What would his death serve if he had taken a position of non-compromise? He feels that in order to be able to control the situation and outlive Duvalier, it was better to be "in" than "out" or to put it another way to be alive than dead. I can say that on several occasions, was it not for Mr. Charles' influence on Duvalier, this latter would have done more harm to the poor pelple of Haiti , in general, than he has done so far.

I have always maintained a dialogue with Mr. Charles and passed on to him as much as possible the judgements of Haitians and others with whom he had no direct contact. I must say that I have always find him receptive to their opinions.

Eversince I have known Mr. Charles, he has always told me of his ambitions and determination to be a great Haitian. He asked me to never let him down and to stay with him to help him carry out his dream. Though it has cost me some of my friends, I have extended to him everything that I could possibly offer to help him reach his goals.

Unlike the majority of Haitian politicians, Mr. Charles has an unsurmontable faith in the future of his country. He feels that if Haiti, under Duvalier, has considernbly regressed in every way, the time will come

/...

where, like a miracle, the country will again take its course forward to join the other progressive nations of this hemisphere. Unlike those politicians who have seen their prominent positions as a temporaty state of affairs with absolutely no future beyond Duvalier, Mr. Charles has practically invested in Haiti almost all the wealth that he has accumulated before and during Duvalier's reign through genuine efforts and self-discipline. Of course, I will admit that his wealth would not have increased in its present proportion if it was not for Duvalier's favors to him. But who else under the previous regimes who were in the same position have genuinely directed their efforts in using their gains for the betterment of the people? I have always find that Mr. Charles took very much satisfaction in giving employment and assistance to as many people as he possibly could. As a matter of fact this is one of his biggest assets in his present struggle.

Mr. Charles is not a demagogue. He believes in the realities of the modern world. He realizes that without the assistance of the U.S., progress is impossible for Haiti. He sincerely believes in the spirit of the Alliance for Progress. Having traveled extensively, he is fully aware of the tragic state of stagnation in which his country is in. He deeply wishes to see Haiti make some progress in the fields of human dignity, education, technology and above all, Freedom.

All that I have said so far are my own personal opinion and also the opinion of a large number of people in and out of Haiti. If some defer in their evaluation of Mr. Charles, it is their privilege and undeniable rights.

Now, if we are to take for granted my opinions, what does Mr. Charles have to offer to the U.S. to prevent the chaos that will necessarily follow Duvalier's downfall? First of all, Mr. Charles is at present ready and willing to provoke the desired collapse of Duvalier's regime. This, he assured me, he can do without any outside assistance. I am personally aware of certain confidential dispositions taken by him to assure the success of a coup if and when he decides to make it. Why does

/...

not he go ahead and make it, you may ask? His reply is that should he make it, what assurances does he have that his action will satisfy the U.S. As I stated before, Mr. Charles feels that without United States backing, no government can possibly exist in Haiti except under the very same conditions of Duvalier's Government. There would be no reason to precipitate a change if Haiti were to remain under a tyranical dictatorship like Duvalier's.

What Mr. Charles is asking as a prerequisite of any action to be sponsored or initiated by him is the assurance from a person of established authority in the U.S. Government that the United States will support the provisional government that will necessarily have to assure power after Duvalier.

The dispositions taken by Mr. Charles are that a military coup by a Junta will take over and stay in power until free elections are held. The members of that military junta have been already selected by Mr. Charles, who has their commitments to that effect. Mr. Charles believe that if free elections are held he should not have any great difficulty in selling his plans and programs to the people and therefore be elected the next president of Haiti. In my opinion, Mr. Charles is not asking too much. Should the United States consent to his request in the form mentioned above, I feel that the Haitian situation, long a sore note in the U.S. hemispheric relations, could be changed without risk for all parties concerned.

Why should the United States gamble on any other calculated risk, while I feel, it can wrap up the situation safely in accord with Mr.Charles' plans? The military junta proposed by Mr. Charles will be made up by high ranking officers of the Haitian army loyal to him, therefore on the side of the U.S. With U.S. assistance - it is almost impossible otherwise - the steps proposed by Mr. Charles after the junta will take over are as follows:

1. Disarm the Militia and the Tonton Macoutes immediately;
2. Reorganize the Army and the Government services;
3. Prevent the interference of communist forces made of exiles Haitians based in Cuba or elsewhere;

/...

4. Prevent the return to the Haitian political scene of such "rabble-rouser" so-called leaders as Daniel Fignole and Henri Vixamar;

5. Start the ground work for free elections as soon as possible. Mr. Charles feels that although it will probably be impossible to prevent acts of reprisals during the first 72 hours of the military take over, strong efforts should be made to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.

Mr. Charles, in my opinion, is one of the few individuals around whom a reconciliation of all the social divisions and subdivisions of the Haitian family can be achieved. I will mention some of the basic reasons behind this opinion:

1. He is of modest rural extraction, therefore is what is called in Haiti a "son of the masses";

2. He is black, therefore representing the vast majority of the Haitian people who, at this point, considers the light-skin Haitian as a threat for the return of the domination of the mulatto minority;

3. He is deprived of the prejudice of color, therefore the mulatto minority will find in him a certain feeling of security and can be assured that it will not be persecuted solely on the basis of the color of their skins;

4. He is wealthy, therefore credited for not ambitioning power for mere personal gains;

5. He is known to be a hard, intelligent industrialist and administrator capable of promoting and encouraging the establishment of new business and industries in Haiti;

6. He has shown respect for certain moral values such as the undeniable right of the individual to live without fear within the framework of the laws of the land;

7. He is a Roman Catholic who professes to have nothing to do with "Voodoo" as a religion or a cult and who has given all the other religious denominations functioning in Haiti all the evidence of his encouragement and support for their pastoral activities;

/...

8. Being a businessman in his own right, the business community with which he has dealt through the Chamber of Commerce and his bank will always have a dialogue with him and therefore will find him receptive to their suggestions and endeavours;

9. Having dealt with elements of the actual regime who have his confidence, he will be able to control them in a way which will avoid unnecessary hardships should someone else - a complete stranger to them - be in a position of Government leadership;

10. He is known to be strongly anti-communist and pro-American, therefore opening the door to close cooperation with the United States, under the doctrine of the Alliance for Progress, to promote better understanding and opportunities for the Haitian people with the help of the United States;

11. He will welcome the return of all Haitian exiles to take their place anew within the Haitian community and to work with him to the task of making the country a safer and better place to live;

12. He does not contemplate any reprisals or even sanctions against anybody for their past political affiliations, his efforts to be mainly directed not to solve the errors of the past, but to provide a better present and future for those who want to live in Haiti.

The task, if and when he succeeds to gain power, will not be an easy one. I am sure, however, that Mr. Charles will be able to find the support of enough honest and patriotic Haitians to help him carry out his dream of building up a better Haiti.

Mr. Charles' past affiliation with the Duvalier regime should not, therefore, be held against him. As a matter of fact, this affiliation may give him the foresight that he should do his utmost not to repeat the same mistakes.

In conclusion, I feel that the U.S. Government, through its qualified Agencies, should give Mr. Charles' offer to topple the Duvalier regime, all the required careful consideration and make a decision as fast as possible.

June 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

June 29, 1967
3:30 p.m.

ARA/CAR - Edward T. Long

Plot of Clemard Charles to Overthrow Duvalier

At the suggestion of Mr. Bowdler, Howard L. Burris, 1725 K St., N.W., a Washington businessman who served in the past as an assistant military aide to the President, telephoned this morning and asked me to meet Mr. Louis A. Brun at Mr. Burris' office. This I did this afternoon.

Mr. Brun, a nationalized American, owns and operates the B & B International Corporation, 1182 Broadway, New York. A native-born Haitian, he has lived in the States since 1957. He is a close friend and confidant of Clemard Joseph Charles, a Haitian banker who has been deeply involved with the Duvalier government. Charles has fallen in disfavor with Duvalier and several of his government concessions have been cancelled. Charles is actively plotting the overthrow of Duvalier and, according to Brun who saw Charles in Port au Prince June 5-7, has 167 military and civilians ready to move with him. None of this group was represented by the 19 officers who were recently executed or the 80 some Haitians who are currently in diplomatic asylum.

In the past, Charles has made efforts himself and through Brun to get the U.S. Government to commit itself in favor of the overthrow of Duvalier but until recently all of these approaches were rebuffed, U.S. officials having stated U.S. policy was such that no plot of this nature could be supported. Brun showed me a letter he had just received from Charles written on June 23 stating in a commercial language code which Brun and Charles use in their correspondence that an American official last week had met with Charles in Port-au-Prince and that Charles was most pleased with the meeting. The implication was that this "American" had indicated to Charles that the U.S. Government favored the plotting. I flatly told Brun that the U.S. was not interested in supporting plotting of this nature, that our policy had not changed, and that he should know this categorically. Brun smilingly accepted this statement, but obviously considered the "approach" in Port-au-Prince was more important than my exposition of U.S. policy.

Brun said he was in regular contact with Major James Balog who, he described, as an intelligence officer from the Pentagon. He said that he, Brun, had written a report on his opinion re things Haitian and had given one copy to Major Balog and one to Mr. Burris. He then handed me a copy which is attached. This report is basically a plea for U.S. prior indication to Charles that the U.S. would support any Charles-formed provisional government created following the overthrow of Duvalier.

I closed the half hour meeting with Brun insisting again that he should clearly understand the U.S. Government was not interested in becoming involved in this sort of an operation.

Attachment

[illegible]

ARA:CAR:ETLong:jr

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-3

DATE: 7 JULY 1967

CLASSIFICATION: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUBJECT: WOES OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES INCREASE

FROM: AMEMBASSY, PORT AU PRINCE

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 2[illegible]-35[illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ? TOTAL COPIES 44

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 12

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 1515Z BY J

INFO FILE, VR, IS/DO, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, WH/COG 8, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, IW, FOR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY / DDI, D/OCI 3

S E C R E T 061345Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4547 PRIN

6 JUL 67 IN 05671

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO, JMWAVE

AN	FI	
ABSTRACT		

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 4545 (IN 05039)

CLEMARD JOSEPH*

1. RACHFIELD CHECKED AT CHARLES HOUSE MORNING 6 JULY. NO MEMBERS FAMILY IN SIGHT AND TWO GUARDS WITH RIFLES ON DUTY WHO SAID CHARLES AND WIFE "NOT THERE." OBVIOUSLY CHARLES IS UNDER ARREST.

2. COMMUNIQUE SIGNED BY ANTONIO ANDRE PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL BANK 5 JULY 1967 STATES THAT NATIONAL BANK HAS TAKEN CHARGE OF COMMERCIAL BANK AND THAT "THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI JUSTIFIABLY ALARMED AT THE SITUATION IN THE COMMERCIAL BANK HAS DECIDED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO SEE TO IT THAT THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI MR. CLEMARD JOSEPH *CHARLES IS MADE TO FURNISH THE COMMERCIAL BANK WITH THE MEANS TO PAY ITS DEBTS." THIS FIRST NOTICE THAT CHARLES IS EX-DIRECTOR.

S E C R E T

BT

6 Jul 67
201-357029

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. Chibnan

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOT 29

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 38

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 22

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CSDI TIME 2245Z BY f

INFO FILE, VR, CSDO, CA2, CA/PEG, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SOD 6, FI/INT 2, ADDP, DDP

S E C R E T 052200Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4545 PRIN

5 JUL 67 IN 05039

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

1. NATIONAL BANK DIRECTOR ANTONIO ANDRE TOLD EMBASSY ECON OFFICER THAT HE WAS TOLD BY DUVALIER TO GO TO CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES AT FORT DIMANCHE AND GET HIM TO SIGN CHECK FOR BALANCE HIS NEW YORK BANK ACCOUNT. Antonio Andre told by Duvalier to get Saly to sign check for balance his New York bank account.

2. RACHFIELD SURVEILLANCE CONTRADICTS ABOVE. WILL CHECK ON HOUSE DETERMINE WHETHER CHARLES THERE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MICROFILMED
JUL 31 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

	FI	
ABSTRACT ☒	INDEX ☒	

5 Jul 67

201-357029

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029
X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-244418
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
[redacted]
38

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
67

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, RYAN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

AN	FI	
RS		
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

S E C R E T 292140Z CITE SANTO DOMINGO 3786 SDOM

30 JUN 67 IN 01443

DIRECTOR INFO PORT-AU-PRINCE, JMWAVE

INDEXED AND CONTROL COPIES MATCHED

EVMUSCLE HTP UFG

MICROFILMED
JUL 31 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. DURING REGULAR MEETING AFTERNOON 27 JUNE EVMUSCLE-1 SAID IN RESPONSE TO QUERY THAT:

A. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES IS A SLIPPERY, LESS THAN ORDINARY INTELLIGENT, AND GENERALLY WEAK MAN WHO IS A TOADY OF DUVALIER'S. CHARLES MADE ALL HIS MONEY THROUGH VARIOUS MANIPULATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH OR KNOWN TO DUVALIER.

B. COLONEL JACQUES LAROCHE IS A STRONG, INTELLIGENT MAN AND A GOOD LEADER. HE IS UNACCEPTABLE AS A POSSIBLE LEADER OR HEAD OF STATE TO THINKING EXILES AND PERSONS IN HAITI DUE TO HIS KNOWN LEFTIST SYMPATHIES AND BELIEFS OVER A LONG PERIOD OF YEARS. DESPITE A GOVERNMENT BAN ON OFFICERS BELONGING TO POLITICAL PARTIES, HE WAS KNOWN AMONGST FREINDS TO HAVE BEEN A SECRET MEMBER OF THE OLD PSP (PARTI SOCIALISTE POPULAIRE). IT IS NOT KNOWN IF HE IS A SIMILAR TYPE MEMBER OF THE PSP'S SUCCESSOR (PEP). HE HAS BEEN A STAUNCH SUPPORTER OF DUVALIER AND APPEARS TO ALL AS A TRUE DUVALIERIST.

2. BELIEVE ABOVE MAY PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHT INTO THESE PERSONS WHO ARE OF CURRENT INTEREST.

3. INDEX: CHARLES, LAROCHE.

SECRET

30 Jun 67
201-357029

S E C R E T
IB 201-244418

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 30 JUNE 1967

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD (WASH., D.C.)
ARA/CAR

DATE: 29 JUNE 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET - LIMDIS

SUBJECT: PLOT OF CLEMARD CHARLES TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-349

CLASSIFICATION: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DATE: 28 JUNE 1967 FROM AMEMBASSY, PORT AU PRINCE

SUBJECT: CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES FALLS FROM GRACE

SENSITIVE

SECRET

JUN 29 10 29 AM '67

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE 291405Z CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 8319

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (MUSULIN) FROM BALOG

SUBJECT: CASE 47348

CONFIRMING FREUND/MUSULIN TELECON, 28 JUN

1. BALOG TALKED BRUN OUT OF PAYING A "COURTESY VISIT" TO DOROTHY.

2. BRUN WILL SEE COL. BURRIS IN WASHINGTON TODAY. - 29 June.

3. YESTERDAY BALOG INTRODUCED HARRY REAL TO BRUN. DURING BALOG'S VACATION IN JULY HARRY WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH BRUN.

4. BRUN TOLD US THAT ON 28 JUN HE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM HAITIAN BANKER CHARLES ADVISING THAT HIS HEALTH WAS MUCH BETTER AND THAT HE WAS ABLE TO VISIT FRIENDS IN PORT-AU-PRINCE. APPARENTLY CHARLES' HOUSE ARREST WAS LIFTED.

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

BT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

201-357029
Charles 201 [illegible]

14-00000

☑ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM:
George S. Musulin/js GSM
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO.: DCS Case 47540

DATE: 28 Jun 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	6/28		CEX	
2. WH/7/HT ATTN: Messrs. Gremillion and Ripley	28 JUN 1967	28 JUN 1967		Attached copy of New York 8312 per our telephone conversation, this date.
3. 3 B 2630, Hqs.				
4. C/WH/7	28 JUN 1967	28 JUN 1967		
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible]

SENSITIVE

SECRET

JUN 27 3 11 PM '67

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE 271859Z CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 8312

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (HUSULIN) FROM BALOG

THIS IS SENSITIVE

CASE 47348

1. IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THIS TWX FOLLOWING CODE USED BY HAITIAN BANKER CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES AND LUIS A. BRUN IS QUOTED:

A. BELL & CO -- "MAJOR" BALOG AND DOD

B. FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NY -- US GOV'T

C. D. K. & CO. -- DOROTHY MATLACK OF DOD

E. THE HOWARD CORPORATION -- COL. BURRIS, A FORMER MILITARY AID TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

D. BUSINESS TRANSACTION -- HELP OF US GOVERNMENT TO CHARLES

2. ON 21 JUN 67 AFTER REPEAT AFTER HIS ARREST AND CONFINEMENT TO HIS HOME IN PORT-AU-PRINCE CHARLES WROTE FOLLOWING FRENCH-LANGUAGE LETTER VIA AIR MAIL TO LOUIS BRUN.

3. " ... AS FAR AS BUSINESS IS CONCERNED I RECEIVED AT MY HOME A REPRESENTATIVE OF BELL & CO. I AM VERY HAPPY NOW. I THINK WE HAVE NO FURTHER WORRY CONCERNING THE BUSINESS TRANSACTION. HE ACCEPTED TO SPONSOR THE BUSINESS TRANSACTION WITH D. K. & CO. THE

PAGE 2 CONTACTS/NEW YORK 8518 S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

HOWARD CORPORATION AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES. THIS IS A VERY BIG SUCCESS, AND I HOPE THAT WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK WE'LL MAKE RAPID PROGRESS. AFTER ALL OUR EFFORTS WILL NOT HAVE BEEN IN VAIN AND OUR FIELD OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY WILL BE ENLARGED."

4. BRUN BELIEVES THAT PAPA DUVALIER "DOES NOT DARE TO KILL CHARLES WHO HAS MANY FOLLOWERS IN HAITI" (SEE BRUN'S 16-PAGE MEMO MEMO POUCHED ON 27 JUN, THIS CASE).

5. BRUN WILL SEE COL. BURRIS WITHIN A FEW DAYS. HE'LL BRIEF BURRIS ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS; ALSO WILL GIVE HIM A COPY OF MEMO.

6. BRUN IS IN TOUCH WITH CHARLES VIA MAIL AND TRAVELERS FROM HAITI (US, HAITIAN AND CANADIAN BUSINESSMEN).

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

BT

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029 ([illegible])
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/7/H BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
B.E. Bachman
DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

TDCSDB-315/02404-67
HTP 1072
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION
IW (ASV) ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI,

CS/DO, FI/D, FI/INT 6, WH/REG 8, WH/7/H/RE 3, SOD 4, DO 5, CA/O 4, WH/COG 8,

DDP.

PRIN

28 JUN 67 00388

SECRET 272055Z CI WKTE PORT AU PRINCE 4515

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, SANTO DOMINGO

~~PH~~

JMWAVE

INTEL

SUPDATA EVLEMON-2 FROM EVLEMON-10

FILED 272055Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

AN	~~PT~~	WH/7/H
~~PO~~	~~DESK~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

201-357029
28 Jun 67

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
IN 00388
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
FBI USIA ONE ORR

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T 290212Z CITE TDCS DB-315/02404-67

DIST 28 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 25 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT VIEWS OF GENERAL GERARD CONSTANT ON PRESENT SITUATION

ACQ 26 JUNE 1967, PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI, HTP-1072

SOURCE A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1963. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM A HIGH RANKING OFFICER IN THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES WHO IS CLOSE TO GENERAL CONSTANT.

1. THE REASONS FOR PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER'S MEASURES AGAINST CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK ARE NOT HARD TO FIND. DUVALIER HAS

LEARNED THE LESSONS OF HAITIAN HISTORY. PRESIDENT ESTIME AND PRESIDENT PAUL MAGLOIRE WERE OVETHROWN BY THEIR CLOSE ASSOCIATES. DUVALIER HIMSELF WAS IN THE FOREFRONT OF THOSE CONSPIRACIES AND KNOWS FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE THE MOTIVATION OF THE PLOTTERS. WHEN HE GETS RID OF MILITARY MEN OR CIVILIANS FROM TIME TO TIME EVEN THOUGH THEY HELPED HIM GAIN POWER, IT IS BECAUSE AS CHIEF OF STATE HE IS FULLY AWARE OF THE REALITIES OF HAITIAN POLITICS. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, WHO GAINED MUCH OF WHAT HE HAS UNDER MAGLOIRE, WAS AMONG THOSE WHO FINANCED DUVALIER'S CAMPAIGN. IT IS ONLY LOGICAL THAT DUVALIER WOULD RESENT THAT FACT. FURTHERMORE, SINCE CHARLES IS ACTUALLY A CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY AND MANEUVERING AGAINST DUVALIER, DUVALIER WILL DISCOVER SOME "EVIDENCE" LINKING CHARLES WITH THE NINETEEN EXECUTED OFFICERS.

2. IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT CHARLES WAS NOT REALLY AN ASSOCIATE OF DUVALIER'S. HE WAS REALLY NOTHING MORE THAN AN EMPLOYEE. IT WAS NOT BECAUSE OF HIS PRETTY EYES THAT DUVALIER MADE CHARLES THE CONTROLLER

OF A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIES. DUVALIER ARRANGED THIS FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES. HE NEEDED TO HAVE A BANK TO RECEIVE NON-FISCAL DEPOSITS FROM WHICH HE COULD MAKE WITHDRAWALS AS HE WISHED. OUT OF THIS ALSO GREW ANOTHER REASON WHY DUVALIER IS ANGRY AT CHARLES. WHEN THE NON-FISCAL ACCOUNTS IN THE COMMERCIAL BANK RAN DRY, THE BANK ADVANCED THE GOVERNMENT MONEY AGAINST BONDS. CHARLES USED THESE BONDS IN HIS FINANCIAL MANIPULATIONS AND THEY FELL INTO THE HANDS OF FOREIGN SPECULATORS WHO ARE NOW DEMANDING PAYMENT.

3. PLOTS SUCH AS CHARLES WAS ENGAGED IN WILL NOT SUCCEED. DUVALIER HAS SO ORGANIZED THE GOVERNMENT THAT THE OLD WAYS OF OVERTHROWING A REGIME ARE DENIED TO CONSPIRATORS. HE IS NOT INVULNERABLE BUT ONLY BY ASSASSINATION WILL HE BE REMOVED. HIS GOVERNMENT IS BASED ON TERROR AND INTIMIDATION. THE BOLD STROKE IS HIS STRENGTH. HE EXECUTED THE NINETEEN OFFICERS IN ORDER TO STRIKE THE POPULAR IMAGINATION AND CREATE A PSYCHOSIS OF FEAR. HE MEANS IT WHEN HE SAYS THAT HE ADMIRES LENIN, NKRUMAH, MAO, LUMUMBA, ETC. THE DANGER IN HIS

IN 00388

TDCSDB-315/02404-67

RECEIVED
RID/MIS
JUN 30 10 43 AM '67

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

REGIME LIES IN ITS DRIFT TO THE LEFT. PROFESSORS LIKE RENE PIQUION AND ULYSSES PIERRE-LOUIS, TWO CLOSE DISCIPLES OF DUVALIER, ARE PREACHING TO THEIR STUDENTS A RACIST, LEFTIST, PHILOSOPHY. IT IS TIME THAT THE AMERICANS REALIZE THIS AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION AGAINST THE HAITIAN CALIGULA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

(ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

REPORT CLASS SECRET/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/ CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

NO INDEX

NO. 201-357029	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A	TOTAL COPIES 24	
NO.	SECRET		REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
RET. TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		1 · 5
SIG. WH/7/HT			2 · 6
8 R Kilman			3 · 7
			4 · 8
ACTION WH 8	☑ RID COPY	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	UNIT · TIME · BY
INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, FI, FI/INT 2, CI, CI/OPS			

PRINT

SECRET 281420Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4517

28 JUN 67 IN 00401

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO, JMWAVE

REF: DIRECTOR 14279

AB	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

MB

1. STATION AGREES CHARLES LIFE IN IMMINENT DANGER DUE HIS PLOTTING AND AMBITIONS. BELIEVE CHARLES PLACING HOPES ON AMERICAN FINANCIAL ASSOCIATES AND U.S. GOVERNMENT TO SAVE HIM IN CASE HE IS ARRESTED. AMERICAN FLAG NOW FLYING DAILY OVER CENTRAL OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL BANK.

2. UNFORTUNATELY RACHFIELD CONFINED TO HOME FOR ONE WEEK DUE CIRCULATORY DISTURBANCE AND CHUBB HAS NO ACCESS. WILL ARRANGE EVLEMON-2 WHO LIVES FAIRLY CLOSE TO MAKE PERIODIC NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK. DAILY DRIVE-BY PAST CHARLES HOUSE REVEALED NOTHING ABNORMAL MORNINGS 26 AND 27 JUNE. ALSO WILL ASK EMBASSY JUNIOR OFFICER TENANTS OF ANOTHER CHARLES HOUSE TO LOOK IN ON HIM.

3. LEGISLATIVE SESSION AFTERNOON 26 JUNE PROMULGATED STIFF OMNIBUS LAW ON "DESERTION" WHICH COULD EASILY BE USED BY DUVALIER MAKE ARREST AND

SECRET

SECRET

28 JUNE 67

201-357029

14-00000

RECEIVED RID/MIS

SECRET

PAGE 2 PORT AU PRINCE 4517 S E C R E T

EXECUTION CHARLES "LEGAL".

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM:
George S. Musulin/js
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO.: DCS Case 47540 (SENSITIVE)

DATE: 27 June 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	6/27		CCH	Copy of NY-556-67, with attached letter designated for Mrs. Dorothy Matlack is forwarded for appropriate handling, coordination , and disposition. We are not familiar with the contents of Charles' letter to Mrs. Matlack, but would urge that all matters referred to this case should be confined to channels already established for this purpose to avoid duplication and multilateral communications.
2. WH/7/HT ATTN: Messrs. Gremillion and Ripley	28 JUN 1967			
3. 3 B 2630, Hqs.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				SECRET/SENSITIVE

FORM 8-60 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET SENSITIVE

NY-556-67
22 June 1967

Director, Domestic Contact Service
FOR : OSS
Chief, New York Office

Case 47,540 - Clemard Joseph Charles of Haiti

1. Please forward attached letter of Haitian banker Clemard Joseph Charles to Mrs. Dorothy Matlack, Department of Defense. In his letter Charles asks the Department of Defense to support him against President Duvalier.

2. Mrs. Matlack asked Louis A. Brun, President, MAB International Corp., NYC, to have letter forwarded to her by "Major" Balog.

Jackson R. Horton

JBalog:gh
Attachment: a/s

SECRET SENSITIVE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Davis = Chief Defector Committee
Don Huffman FI/ICG

SECRET

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : OSS (Musulin) - Info: International Div. (Alyea)
Chief, New York Office

NY-577-67
27 June 1967

Case 37,540

1. The attached paper describing the present political situation in Haiti was written by Louis A. Brun, President, B&B International Inc., NYC, before the arrest of Haitian banker Clemard Joseph Charles.

2. Brun asked "Major" Balog to forward a copy to Dorothy Matlack, DOD. He will furnish a copy to Col. Burris, the one-time military aid to President Johnson.

Jackson R. Horton

JJBalog:gh
Attachments: (2)

SECRET

SENSITIVE

[illegible]

Louis A. Brou
President
B&B International Corp.
NYC

20 June 67

The following is my humble appraisal of the political situation now prevailing in Haiti.

As I repeatedly stated to anyone who may have asked me, my motivations are purely patriotic while I am also moved by a sincere desire to see Haiti emerge as a democratic independent nation friendly to the United States.

Since I left Haiti with my family ten years ago to later become an American citizen, I have made several trips to Haiti and have maintained close contacts with people in all walks of life both in Haiti and with those who were forced out of the country for political reasons or otherwise.

My latest visit to Haiti took place on June 5th of this year and I stayed two days in Port-au-Prince. Although the purpose of my trips were mostly business I also had the opportunity to discuss the Haitian political situation with politicians, as well as with average Haitian citizens concerned with the situation. My personal conclusions are as follows:

The fact is that the Duvalier regime is, at present, in a state of internal political confusion in which no one directly or indirectly connected with it can predict the outcome. There is strong evidence showing that his son-in-law, Colonel Max Dominique, has in fact tried to overthrow Duvalier in order to personally assume the direction of Haiti's political affairs. How Duvalier became aware of Colonel Dominique's intentions is the question everybody is trying to find the answer to. Nevertheless, Duvalier rounded up the alledged associates of Colonel Dominique and, after a mock court martial accusing and convincing 19 young army officers of treason they were all killed by a firing squad on June 8, 1967 at Fort Dimanche on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. Duvalier himself was present at the slaughter and he ordered Col. Dominique to be a member of the firing squad. Non-confirmed information from usually reliable sources

/...

indicates that several other persons, low ranking military personnel, militia men and civilians were also executed on similar charges, without fanfare. It is also the general concensus of opinion that the "purge" will continue at a rate that no one can yet determine.

No one ignores that there has been and still are very hostile feelings between two groups within the President's family and close associates. One is headed by Colonel Dominique and his wife Marie-Denise Duvalier, and another is led by Mrs. Yvon St.Victor, the President's private secretary and confidante. The names of the President's wife, Simone, his son Jean-Claude and his younger daughter Simone, are being mentioned as being part of the first group. In the second group, Mrs. St.Victor's brother, the present Head of the Department of Tourism, Mr. Luc-Albert Foucard, who is also married to one of the President's daughter, is among other names such as Henri Siclait, head of the Regie, Minister Lebert Jn.Pierre, etc. mentioned to be siding with Mrs. St.Victor. So far, the President has shown signs that he favors the latter group. The ramifications of both groups extend to people who were considered the most fanatic supporters of Duvalier himself. The fact is that none of the remaining so-called strong men of Duvalier in the militia, the Tonton Macoutes or the Army know for sure how the president feels towards them and are very much concerned about their own future and survival. In other words, confusion and insecurity are wide spread amongst Duvalier's followers.

I believe that in spite of the actual confusion and sense of insecurity prevailing in government circles, there is no real organized opposition as such against Duvalier at this moment, except for what I will point out later in this paper.

There is, however, strong anti-Duvalier feelings in the middle and upper classes of Haiti, representing only a small percentage of the whole population. A segment of the population to be taken into very serious consideration is the one made up of the people living in the slum areas,

formed cabinet of three Blanchet brothers, all well-known communist sympathizers, is also an indication of his subtle shift towards a

/...

radically leftist oriented Government. If allowed time, Duvalier may well succeed to turn the country into a new communist satellite and work out some agreements with communist countries. Here again, we should not fail to mention the new exchange of diplomatic representations between Haiti and some communist countries. The most significant one is the new appointment in Haiti of an Ambassador from Poland with whom, I was told, Duvalier is closely working with.

Taking everything into consideration:

1. The non existence of any organized opposition in Haiti;

2. The state of non cohesiveness and distrust amongst the exiled political elements abroad, therefore nullifying any positive action from outside Haiti;

3. The fear of local politicians that, if outside forces were to come in, their safety and security would be very much at stake, therefore they should resist such intervention and do whatever is necessary to prevent it at all cost;

4. The fear of Duvalier's so-called followers that they may be eliminated upon mere suspicion, just or unjust denonciations;

5. The middle and upper classes sentiment that the U.S. is not working as it should to bring about the downfall of Duvalier and that the U.S. is even supporting the regime intentionally or unintentionally by not encouraging or allowing the opposition to organize itself;

6. The interpretation of the above classes which are at a loss to understand the silence of the U.S. press in general for not having raised the usual indignation about the recent mass killings, therefore making room for the belief of a possible collusion by means of money or otherwise of Duvalier with said press, particularly the New York Times, to refrain from bringing these facts to the attention of international public opinion;

7. The strong belief that compromises have been worked out with President Balaguer in the Dominican Republic to return to Haiti all opponents of Duvalier who had fled there.

all this leads to believe that Duvalier will hold in power for quite a while more.

/...

It would be childish, however, to formulate an opinion only on the basis of the mentioned facts, although on the surface, they appear logical enough to confirm these conclusions.

I am convenced in my own mind, that when some politicians close to Duvalier will feel that their lives are in real danger, some of them will successfully attempt to eliminate him even though they may not be, themselves, in a position to control the chaotic situation that will necessarily follow. This is where the real danger is. If any such unplanned action was allowed to take place, the U.S. will then find itself with a real "hot potato", requiring such drastic action similar to those taken in 1965 during the recent crisis in the Dominican Republic. Such actions are not to be desired, not only because they are costly to the American taxpayers, but because they inevitably provoke strong anti-American feelings based on the opinion that the U.S. did nothing to help bring about the collapse, but is merely there to impose its choice and decisions against the will of the people. If the U.S. is to wait for the OAS to decide on joint action in the eventuality of chaos, we are afraid that communist influence and even control of the situation by forces based in Cuba and other countries, will make it much more difficult to cope with within the context of our national security. It is, therefore, imperative, in our opinion, that the U.S. take some steps towards working with local politicians to take the initiative of a coup which, when performed, would receive the strong backing of this country, militarily, financially and otherwise, to secure an orderly succession of the present regime. As far as Haiti is concerned, I feel that I have the most adequate solution for the proposed action. I feel that whenever the security of this nation or any nation is concerned, there is no time for wait-and-see considerations. In the case of Haiti, in particular, where the political scene is really deprived of individuals of strong convictions, one way or the other, we feel that the U.S. should not have any problem in finding someone that they can build politically and work with in a sincere and loyal effort to help that small nation solve some of its perennial problems.

/...

In connection with the possibility of finding a political leader, as indicated above, I must say that I have been in contact with a man whom, I feel, could very well fill the position. His name is Clémard Joseph Charles, President of Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, President of Haiti's Chamber of Commerce, a director of several other business and industrial organizations in Haiti.

I have known Mr. Charles since 1951. We have been friends and business associates eversince. To me, Mr. Charles is a true and sincere patriot. Of course, today, a number of people question his patriotism on the basis of his close cooperation with the Duvalier regime. I have myself, sometimes, felt that he went too far. I have also told him so, many times. His answers on such occasions have, most of the time, satisfy my own judgement. In fact, Mr. Charles told me that, knowing Duvalier, as he knows him, it would have been a question of life or death if he were to behave in a different manner. What would his death serve if he had taken a position of non-compromise? He feels that in order to be able to control the situation and outlive Duvalier, it was better to be "in" than "out" or to put it another way to be alive than dead. I can say that on several occasions, was it not for Mr. Charles' influence on Duvalier, this latter would have done more harm to the poor pelple of Haiti , in general, than he has done so far.

I have always maintained a dialogue with Mr. Charles and passed on to him as much as possible the judgements of Haitians and others with whom he had no direct contact. I must say that I have always find him receptive to their opinions.

Eversince I have known Mr. Charles, he has always told me of his ambitions and determination to be a great Haitian. He asked me to never let him down and to stay with him to help him carry out his dream. Though it has cost me some of my friends, I have extended to him everything that I could possibly offer to help him reach his goals.

Unlike the majority of Haitian politicians, Mr. Charles has an unsurmontable faith in the future of his country. He feels that if Haiti, under Duvalier, has considerably regressed in every way, the time will come

/...

where, like a miracle, the country will again take its course forward to join the other progressive nations of this hemisphere. Unlike those politicians who have seen their prominent positions as a temporaty state of affairs with absolutely no future beyond Duvalier, Mr. Charles has practically invested in Haiti almost all the wealth that he has accumulated before and during Duvalier's reign through genuine efforts and self-discipline. Of course, I will admit that his wealth would not have increased in its present proportion if it was not for Duvalier's favors to him. But who else under the previous regimes who were in the same position have genuinely directed their efforts in using their gains for the betterment of the people? I have always find that Mr. Charles took very much satisfaction in giving employment and assistance to as many people as he possibly could. As a matter of fact this is one of his biggest assets in his present struggle.

Mr. Charles is not a demagogue. He believes in the realities of the modern world. He realizes that without the assistance of the U.S., progress is impossible for Haiti. He sincerely believes in the spirit of the Alliance for Progress. Having traveled extensively, he is fully aware of the tragic state of stagnation in which his country is in. He deeply wishes to see Haiti make some progress in the fields of human dignity, education, technology and above all, Freedom.

All that I have said so far are my own personal opinion and also the opinion of a large number of people in and out of Haiti. If some defer in their evaluation of Mr. Charles, it is their privilege and undeniable rights.

Now, if we are to take for granted my opinions, what does Mr. Charles have to offer to the U.S. to prevent the chaos that will necessarily follow Duvalier's downfall? First of all, Mr. Charles is at present ready and willing to provoke the desired collapse of Duvalier's regime. This, he assured me, he can do without any outside assistance. I am personally aware of certain confidential dispositions taken by him to assure the success of a coup if and when he decides to make it. Why does

/...

not he go ahead and make it, you may ask? His reply is that should he make it, what assurances does he have that his action will satisfy the U.S. As I stated before, Mr. Charles feels that without United States backing, no government can possibly exist in Haiti except under the very same conditions of Duvalier's Government. There would be no reason to precipitate a change if Haiti were to remain under a tyranical dictatorship like Duvalier's.

What Mr. Charles is asking as a prerequisite of any action to be sponsored or initiated by him is the assurance from a person of established authority in the U.S. Government that the United States will support the provisional government that will necessarily have to assure power after Duvalier.

The dispositions taken by Mr. Charles are that a military coup by a Junta will take over and stay in power until free elections are held. The members of that military junta have been already selected by Mr. Charles, who has their commitments to that effect. Mr. Charles believe that if free elections are held he should not have any great difficulty in selling his plans and programs to the people and therefore be elected the next president of Haiti. In my opinion, Mr. Charles is not asking too much. Should the United States consent to his request in the form mentioned above, I feel that the Haitian situation, long a sore note in the U.S. hemispheric relations, could be changed without risk for all parties concerned.

Why should the United States gamble on any other calculated risk, while I feel, it can wrap up the situation safely in accord with Mr.Charles' plans? The military junta proposed by Mr. Charles will be made up by high ranking officers of the Haitian army loyal to him, therefore on the side of the U.S. With U.S. assistance - it is almost impossible otherwise - the steps proposed by Mr. Charles after the junta will take over are as follows:

1. Disarm the Militia and the Tonton Macoutes immediately;
2. Reorganise the Army and the Government services;
3. Prevent the interference of communist forces made of exiles Haitians based in Cuba or elsewhere;

/...

4. Prevent the return to the Haitian political scene of such "rabble-rouser" so-called leaders as Daniel Fignole and Henri Vixamar;

5. Start the ground work for free elections as soon as possible.

Mr. Charles feels that although it will probably be impossible to prevent acts of reprisals during the first 72 hours of the military take over, strong efforts should be made to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.

Mr. Charles, in my opinion, is one of the few individuals around whom a reconciliation of all the social divisions and subdivisions of the Haitian family can be achieved. I will mention some of the basic reasons behind this opinion:

1. He is of modest rural extraction, therefore is what is called in Haiti a "son of the masses";

2. He is black, therefore representing the vast majority of the Haitian people who, at this point, considers the light-skin Haitian as a threat for the return of the domination of the mulatto minority;

3. He is deprived of the prejudice of color, therefore the mulatto minority will find in him a certain feeling of security and can be assured that it will not be persecuted solely on the basis of the color of their skins;

4. He is wealthy, therefore credited for not ambitioning power for mere personal gains;

5. He is known to be a hard, intelligent industrialist and administrator capable of promoting and encouraging the establishment of new business and industries in Haiti;

6. He has shown respect for certain moral values such as the undeniable right of the individual to live without fear within the framework of the laws of the land;

7. He is a Roman Catholic who professes to have nothing to do with "Voodoo" as a religion or a cult and who has given all the other religious denominations functioning in Haiti all the evidence of his encouragement and support for their pastoral activities;

/...

8. Being a businessman in his own right, the business community with which he has dealt through the Chamber of Commerce and his bank will always have a dialogue with him and therefore will find him receptive to their suggestions and endeavours;

9. Having dealt with elements of the actual regime who have his confidence, he will be able to control them in a way which will avoid unnecessary hardships should someone else - a complete stranger to them - be in a position of Government leadership;

10. He is known to be strongly anti-communist and pro-American, therefore opening the door to close cooperation with the United States, under the doctrine of the Alliance for Progress, to promote better understanding and opportunities for the Haitian people with the help of the United States;

11. He will welcome the return of all Haitian exiles to take their place anew within the Haitian community and to work with him to the task of making the country a safer and better place to live;

12. He does not contemplate any reprisals or even sanctions against anybody for their past political affiliations, his efforts to be mainly directed not to solve the errors of the past, but to provide a better present and future for those who want to live in Haiti.

The task, if and when he succeeds to gain power, will not be an easy one. I am sure, however, that Mr. Charles will be able to find the support of enough honest and patriotic Haitians to help him carry out his dream of building up a better Haiti.

Mr. Charles' past affiliation with the Duvalier regime should not, therefore, be held against him. As a matter of fact, this affiliation may give him the foresight that he should do his utmost not to repeat the same mistakes.

In conclusion, I feel that the U.S. Government, through its qualified Agencies, should give Mr. Charles' offer to topple the Duvalier regime, all the required careful consideration and make a decision as fast as possible.

JUNE 20, 1967

ORIG: R. Berg
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 5995
DATE: 24 June 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 28 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG 8, FI, FI/INT 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

24 17 09 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 14279

TO PORT AU PRINCE H INFO: SANTO DOMINGO JMWAVE

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 4600 (IN 97136)*

1. APPRECIATE REF REPORT ON CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES. THIS CORRESPONDS TO REPORTS FROM LNERGO, WODISH, AND OTHER SOURCES. LNERGO ALSO HAS REPORT FROM SOURCE CONSIDERED RELIABLE THAT CHARLES LIFE IS IN IMMINENT DANGER BECAUSE OF ALLEGED OPPOSITION HE HAS ORGANIZED AGAINST THE DUVALIER REGIME. CAN YOU ~~EX~~ CONFIRM THIS?

2. PLS REPORT PRIORITY ALL DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: CHARLES HAS BEEN PLACED UNDER HOUSE ARREST AND ALL PROPERTY TAKEN AWAY FROM HIM.

WH/FI M McCullough

WH/COG

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Paul V. Harwood
C/WH/7
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

C/WH/3 -- 67

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: 6 AT: 2000

DISSEM BY 37 PER DIC # 20

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE. VR, CS/RF, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/DC, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D4, CS/SEO, FI/INT2, DDI 2Q, D/OCI 3, BR, OCI/L2, OCI/LAH, SOD 6, CI/PS,

217PM 6-23-67 MLT 18 53

TO THE PRESIDENT 08

TO SECRETARY OF STATE 08

TO DIRECTOR CIA 05

TO DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 05

TO DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 02

TO DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 02

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

(CONFIDENTIAL - FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI)

23 JUN 96894

ON JUNE TWENTY THREE, NINETEEN SIXTYSEVEN, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT HE HAD LEARNED THE FOLLOWING CONCERNING CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN HAITI:

JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI AND FINANCIAL ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER, UPON LEAVING A HOSPITAL IN PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI, AFTER HAVING HAD A TONSILLECTOMY PERFORMED WAS ARRESTED BY DUVALIER HENCHMEN ON JUNE TWENTYONE, AND IMMEDIATELY INCARCERATED IN AN UNKNOWN LOCATION

CONFIDENTIAL

201-357029

IN PORT-AU-PRINCE BY HIS CAPTORS. CHARLES' BANK ACCOUNTS AND FINANCIAL HOLDINGS HAVE BEEN SEIZED BY DUVALIER. CHARLES' LIFE IS IN IMMINENT DANGER AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT CHARLES WILL BE KILLED BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGED OPPOSITION WHICH HE HAS ORGANIZED AGAINST THE DUVALIER REGIME.

THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE SITUATION IN HAITI HAS DETERIORATED GREATLY DURING THE PAST MONTH AND SAID THAT HE FELT THAT THIS SITUATION IS THE WORST IT HAS BEEN IN THE LAST YEAR.

GP 1

SECRET 23 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Report from George Musulin

1. George Musulin, Washington DCS representatived, called this afternoon to advise the following:

a. Dorothy Matlack (Dept. of Army G-2) has now been cut out of the contact between the DCS and Mr. B in New York. Presume that Mr. B refers to Luis Brun, the New York lawyer and representative of Clemard Joseph Charles.

b. Mr. C. (Clemard Joseph Charles) has been placed under house arrest as of 21 June. He cannot leave the country. All of his properties and possessions have been taken from him. The only thing Chrles has left is his interest in the Commercial Bank. The situation in Haiti is believed to be deteriorating very rapidly. (Note: Musulin or Brun apparently have no explanation as to how Charles managed to retain his banking interest after having everything else stripped from him.)

c. Two children of Max Dominique from his previous mariage arrived in New York last night by plane from Port au Prince.

d. Papa Doc is very concerned about the impression one gets from business interest in the city. Apparently the place ~~takes~~ looks like a ghost town after dark. Accordingly he has issued ~~[illegible]~~ orders that all stores stay open from 8-12 in the morning and 4-9 in the evening.

2. Will advise when more info available. Musulin believes that Duvalier placed Charles under arrest because ~~we~~ he got wind of his proposed conspiracy. He does not know where the leak occurred.

uides

SECRET

HTP-1067
TDCSDB-315/02303-67

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO (Charles)
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/7/HT BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. B.C. Backman
DISSEM BY 28 PER

ACTION
IW (EJMD) ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOT'FICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: m AT: 2135Z

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI,

CS/DO, FI/D , FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO 5, CA/O 4, WH/COG 8, WH/REG 8, WH/7/H/RE 3

PRIN

S E C R E T 231726Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4500 23 Jun 67 IN 97136

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, SANTO DOMINGO, JMWAVE

INTEL

AB/IL	~~FI~~	WH/7/HT
~~RS~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT X		~~INDEX~~

6

SUPDATA PARA 1 EVLEMON-2 FROM EVLEMON-6 FROM COLONEL GRACIA JACQUES

PARA 2 EVLEMON-6

FIELD COMMEND FROM OBSERVATION AND TALK FRANCIS D. RACHFIELD HAD WITH CHARLES.

FILED 231726Z

S E C R E T

201-357029
23 Jun 67

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 97136

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	OCR	SDO	[illegible]
TREASURY	FBI		INS		D/MS 2			~~[illegible]~~	ONE	~~[illegible]~~	~~[illegible]~~	~~[illegible]~~

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET

CITE TDCSDB-315/02303-67

DIST 23 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 22 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK

ACQ 23 JUNE 1967, PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI, HTP-1067

SOURCE A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1963. HE RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM A HAITIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS ANTI-DUVALIER BUT WHO HAS CONFIDENTIAL ACCESS TO KEY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER ENTOURAGE AND HAS BEEN PROVED TO BE ACCURATE IN THE INFORMATION HE PROVIDES.

1. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK, HAS CAUSED PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER TO BE ANGRY WITH HIM. HE IS PUBLICLY CAMPAIGNING FOR THE PRESIDENCY

TO SUCCEED DUVALIER. WHILE IN THE GENERAL HOSPITAL FOR A THROAT OPERATION DURING THE WEEK OF 12 JUNE 1967 CHARLES MAINTAINED A REGISTER IN WHICH ALL THOSE WHO CAME TO SEE HIM COULD SIGN THEIR NAMES. DUVALIER NOW KNOWS THAT CHARLES IS AMBITIOUS AND LACKING IN GRATITUDE, FOR WITHOUT DUVALIER HE WOULD BE NOTHING. BUT CHARLES WILL FEEL DUVALIER'S WRATH. ALL HIS PROPERTY WILL BE TAKEN AWAY FROM HIM AND HE WILL BE KEPT UNDER HOUSE ARREST.

2. WHILE CHARLES WAS IN THE HOSPITAL HIS BUSINESS VENTURES WERE SEIZED BY THE TAX OFFICE AND PLACED UNDER THE CONTROL OF TWO TAX INSPECTORS, SERGE SALOMON AND MAURICE LAFONTANT.

3. FIELD COMMENT: CHARLES RETURNED TO HIS HOME ON 19 JUNE 1967 AND WILL REMAIN THERE FOR AT LEAST FIFTEEN DAYS UNDER DOCTORS ORDERS TO RECUPERATE. HIS HOUSE IS NOT UNDER GUARD NOR UNDER VISIBLE SURVEILLANCE. CHARLES CLAIMS TO BE CONTINUING TO PLOT THE OVERTHROW OF DUVALIER WHOM HE CONSIDERS INSANE AND WILL NOT SEEK

ASYLUM DESPITE FACT HE HAS LOST MOST OF HIS BUSINESS VENTURES. CHARLES IS STILL DIRECTOR OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK WHICH IS NOW CONTROLLED BY AN UNNAMED INVESTMENT CORPORATION IN NEW YORK CITY TO PREVENT ITS SEIZURE BY THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET 21 June 1967

Bob,

Mr. Musulin (DO), extention 2268, called to say that Dorothy Matlack had called to inform him that she had reached Mr. B and that per instructions Mr. B. would pass info for Matlack ~~tm~~ to Balog in New York. Mr. Musulin said that from his conversation with her he believed that Matlack wanted to be cut in on this activity and wanted to receive copies of any disseminations.

Mr. Musulin mentioned that ~~x~~ Mr. B had told Matlack that he had heard that the operation (tonsillectomy) was performed on Charles and he is feeling fine.

SECRET

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 20 JUNE 1967
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 21 JUNE 1967 (cross reference sheet)
DBB 84012

SECRET

SENSITIVE

JUN 15 2 01 PM '67

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE 151540Z CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 8213

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (MUSULIN) INFO: MCCONNELL FROM BALOG

SUBJECT: CASE 47540

1. ON 14 JUNE 67 LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT, B&B INTERNATIONAL CORP., NEW YORK CITY, SAW IN WASHINGTON COLONEL (HOWARD) BURRIS. THEY DISCUSSED IN PRIVATE THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HAITI.

2. COLONEL BURRIS, WHO THINKS VERY HIGHLY OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, TOLD BRUN THAT HE FULLY SUPPORTS THE HAITIAN BANKER'S PLANS AND THAT HE WILL SEE PRESIDENT JOHNSON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BURRIS TOLD BRUN THAT HE WILL URGE THE PRESIDENT TO CONSIDER GIVING US GOVERNMENT HELP TO CHARLES.

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

BT

201-357029

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

C. J. Charles

SECRET

15 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES (201-357029)

1. Background: Clemard Joseph CHARLES, born Gonaives, Haiti, 21 April 1923, is a Negro of peasant origin. CHARLES is a shrewd, opportunistic, basically dishonest individual whose natural talents have been channelled to President DUVALIER's advantage over a period of ten years. Having made considerable money in the banana business, CHARLES was able, in 1960, to create the Commercial Bank of Haiti, of which he is still the sole owner. Since its beginning, the Bank has been an instrument for DUVALIER's financial manipulations, and CHARLES is a subservient agent for the President in many of the latter's clandestine operations conceived to evade U. S. Government surveillance. CHARLES, for example, was DUVALIER's agent in the operation designed to smuggle surplus U. S. military aircraft to Haiti and, in fact, made a trip to a USAF base in Arizona to effect purchase, which was later blocked. After long, close association with DUVALIER, during which CHARLES had become extremely wealthy, he managed to incur DUVALIER's displeasure. Gradually CHARLES' influence diminished in favor of Henri SICLAIT, Director of the Regie de Tabac. As CHARLES began to realize that he no longer enjoyed DUVALIER's favor, he began, for the second or third time, to seek channels to the U. S. Government and to solicit support for himself as a successor to the President.

2. Agency Contact: CIA contact with CHARLES in the U.S. dates back to May 1963 when he was visited in his suite in the Hotel Willard in Washington by a representative of WH Division. Since that time, he has made his every visit to the U.S. an occasion to talk to some official of the U. S. Government. The most persistent of his approaches has been made to DCS/New York, which he believes leads him to the Department of Defense. Never has this unscrupulous, overly-ambitious charlatan offered any evidence that he has anything going for him inside Haiti. The names he has furnished as his alleged collaborators have meant little or nothing. His approach to a Station representative in Port-au-Prince in January 1967 produced nothing in the way of hard information. His reports, passed to DCS/NY through his business representative in New York, have been evasive and, in some instances, utterly false. Fabrication has in some cases been obvious.

3. In brief, CHARLES is trying to coerce the U. S. Government into some sort of support for his presidential aspirations. Should anyone listen to him, it would simply mean that the U. S. would have to take over the entire operation and move him in behind a regiment of Marines. State Department, Haiti Desk, has long considered him highly undesirable. Let higher-placed buyers beware!

K. T. R.

SECRET

SECRET

15 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/7

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. At 1500 hours, the DCS representative, George Musulin, informed the Haiti Desk that Mr. BRUN, lawyer for Clemard Joseph CHARLES, had met COLONEL HOWARD L. BURRIS on 14 June and had passed the "word" to him plus allegedly the two letters from CHARLES. BURRIS assured BRUN that his plea would be taken to the White House level.

2. DCS will keep Haiti Desk informed of further developments.

R. Lehman

SECRET

15 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WHD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. At 1530 hours, the DCS representative, George Musulin, called WH/7/Haiti Desk to report the following:

> "On 14 June 1967, Mr. BRUN met Colonel HOWARD L. BURRIS in Washington, D. C. They discussed in private the current developments in Haiti. Colonel BURRIS, who thinks very highly of CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, told BRUN that he fully supports the banker's (CHARLES) plans and that he will see the President as soon as possible. BURRIS told BRUN that he will urge the President to consider giving U. S. Government support to CHARLES."

2. No other information available.

SECRET

201-357029

SECRET

15 June 1967

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

REFS: Attached two teletypes from DCS/New York City

1. At 1115 hours, 15 June, Dorothy MATLACK, Department of the Army, called the DCS Washington representative, George MUSULIN, to inform that she had just received a phone call from Louis BRUN, President, B & B International, NYC, requesting an "audience". MATLACK contacted DCS for advice. Allegedly, BRUN wants to pass the two letters from Haitian Banker CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES to MATLACK. DCS called the Haitian Desk for advice to formulate a reply to MATLACK.

2. WH/7/Haiti has identified the two American contacts mentioned in references as follows:

a. DOROTHY MATLACK: Employed in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army. Has been a participant on the Interagency Defector Committee and has been issued an Agency badge. Both TSD and OCR have shown interest in her.

b. COLONEL HOWARD LAY BURRIS: Born Texas, 1918, graduate of U. S. Military Academy. Believed to be retired from the USAF. His name, along with Pierre SALINGER, etc. was included on a list from the Office of the Vice President requesting an SI clearance, 10 February 1961. Considered to be a Texas millionaire.

3. DCS suggested that MATLACK inform BRUN to contact Major BALOG (DCS representative, New York City) with whom BRUN has been in contact, and pass the letters to him. Final decision rests with WHD.

SECRET

14-00000

file 201-357029

Chukos

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION #154 **SECRET**

ORIG. B. E. BACKMAN
UNIT WH/7/HAITI
EXT. 4222
DATE 14 JUNE 1967

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 14

TDCS DB-315/02061-67

INFORMATION COPIES
CS/DO, CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA/O 4, CA/PEG, CA 3, WH/COG 4, DO 5

DATE DISTRIBUTED
15 JUNE 1967

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

CI/OP/WH	1	WH/7/HL	4	WHC/CA	1		
		WH/7/DR	2	WHC/FI	1		
CA/INT	1	WH/R	1	WHC/MO	1		
CA/PROP	1						

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
TX-1191
NP
(NRS)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

REQUEST FOR RELAY TO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, PORT AU PRINCE, SANTO DOMINGO, AND JMWAVE ATTACHED

BASIC DOCUMENT HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE DCI.

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

sent to EXO

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
C/WH/7/Haiti
C/WH/7/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

RELEASING OFFICER
Kitchens
C/WH/7

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

COPY NO.

OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN

PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC FBI I&NS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

7

CITE TDCS DB-315/02061-67

DIST 15 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 9 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT 1. CONTINUING BIDS BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR HIS PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

2. CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS IN HAITI

ACQ 9 JUNE 1967

FIELD NO.

SOURCE FOREIGN BUSINESSMAN WITH WIDE CONTACTS IN PORT-AU-PRINCE WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT ACCURATELY WHAT HE LEARNS. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CLOSE FRIEND OF CHARLES. THE CLOSE FRIEND AND CHARLES WERE AWARE THAT THE INFORMATION WOULD REACH U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

1. (SUMMARY: CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, AGAIN IS PLANNING TO SEEK U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR HIS PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO CHARLES, HE NOW HAS 290 SOLDIERS (OFFICERS AND MEN) WHO ARE READY TO STRIKE AT ANY TIME AND KILL PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER, AND HE HAS NAMED SOME OF HIS SUPPORTERS AND "FELLOW CONSPIRATORS" THROUGHOUT HAITI. CHARLES SAID THAT HE AND HIS ARMY FRIENDS WILL GET RID OF DUVALIER,

BUT THEY ARE NOT STRONG ENOUGH WITHOUT FOREIGN HELP TO STAY IN POWER. HE WARNED THAT IF U.S. GOVERNMENT HELP IS NOT FORTHCOMING, THE CASTROITE HAITIANS HAVE A VERY GOOD CHANCE OF SEIZING POWER.)

2. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES HAS BEEN DRAWN FROM INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS RELIABLE SOURCES: SINCE ABOUT 1963, CHARLES HAS TRIED TO GAIN U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR HIMSELF AS THE SUCCESSOR TO PRESIDENT DUVALIER; HE HAS THE REPUTATION OF BEING AN OPPORTUNIST, SHREWD, CAPABLE, AND UNSCRUPULOUS, AND HAS DUVALIER'S CONFIDENCE WHICH HE HAS USED TO FURTHER HIS OWN EFFORTS AGAINST DUVALIER. THE INFORMATION WHICH FOLLOWS APPEARS TO BE NOTHING MORE THAN AN EXTENSION OF CHARLES' ATTEMPTS TO PANIC THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THEREBY GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WHICH MAY CONSIDER CHARLES AS THE LESSER OF A NUMBER OF EVILS. HIS ALLEGED SUPPORTERS, LISTED BELOW, ARE BELIEVED TO BE INSIGNIFICANT AND HIS ALLEGED ARMY SUPPORTERS ARE SUSPECT. CHARLES' REFERENCE TO FIDEL CASTRO AND DOMINICAN PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER AS HIS COMPETITORS IN A RACE TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER IS CONSIDERED TO BE WITHOUT BASIS - A CALCULATION BY CHARLES TO FORCE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S HAND IN HIS FAVOR.

FOR OTHER RECENT REPORTING ON CHARLES' PLANS TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER, SEE TDCSDB-315/01965-67, CSDB-312/01428-67, AND CSDB-312/01625-67.)

3. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, WHO IS PLOTTING TO OVERTHROW THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT, IS TO UNDERGO A MINOR THROAT OPERATION ON 14 JUNE 1967 IN PORT-AU-PRINCE. CHARLES WANTED TO HAVE THE OPERATION IN THE U.S., BUT DUVALIER "STRONGLY SUGGESTED" THAT IT BE DONE LOCALLY.

4. CHARLES, WHO IS INCREASINGLY FEARFUL THAT DUVALIER WILL BECOME AWARE OF HIS PLOT AND WILL "ELIMINATE" HIM, AGAIN PLANS TO SEEK U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT. HE DESCRIBED THE CONDITIONS IN HAITI AS NEAR CHAOTIC AND REITERATED THE NEED TO GET RID OF DUVALIER. HE SAID THAT HE NOW HAS 290 SOLDIERS (OFFICERS AND MEN) WHO ARE READY TO STRIKE AT ANY TIME AND KILL DUVALIER. CHARLES SAID THAT HE AND HIS "HIGH-RANKING ARMY OFFICER FRIEND" FEEL THEY HAVE ENOUGH AMMUNITION AT THEIR COMMAND TO HOLD OUT FOR 24 HOURS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: CHARLES MAY BE REFERRING TO MAJ. COICOU,(FNU), COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, OR CAPT. WALTER PREVAL REPORTED IN

CSDB-312/01625-67.) HOWEVER, AFTER 24 HOURS, THEY DEFINITELY WOULD NEED U.S. HELP AGAINST THE FOLLOWING THREE POSSIBILITIES:

A. COUNTERACTION BY FANATICAL DUVALIER FOLLOWERS

B. AN INVASION ATTEMPT BY CUBAN-TRAINED HAITIAN EXILES

C. DOMINICAN PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER'S ACTION TO SUPPORT THE DUVALIER FOLLOWERS SO THAT CHARLES AND HIS MILITARY JUNTA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TURN HAITI INTO A STAGING AREA FOR DOMINICAN ANTI-GOVERNMENT EXILES.

5. CHARLES NAMED THE FOLLOWING AS SOME OF HIS CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS AND "FELLOW CONSPIRATORS" THROUGHOUT HAITI:

A. IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

(1) SYLVESTER JEAN-BAPTISTE, A TANNER

(2) PIERRE GABRIEL, A MERCHANT

(3) G. PAINSON, A BUSINESSMAN

(4) EUGENE PAUL, A MERCHANT

(5) WALLACE B. TURNBULL, A PROTESTANT CLERGYMAN

(6) JOSEPH VOLCY, AN INFLUENTIAL BUSINESSMAN IN BEL-AIR SECTION

(7) ANDRE BALE, "POPULAR LEADER" IN BEL-AIR SECTION

(8) JOSEPH RAYMOND, IN MORNE A TUF SECTION

(9) PIERRE JEAN-BAPTISTE, IN CARREFOUR SECTION

B. TRADE UNION LEADERS

(1) JACQUES ST. LOT

(2) ACHILLE LA ROSE

(3) JEAN BERNARD

(4) LELIO JOSEPH

C. CATHOLIC CLERGYMEN

(1) ROGER AUGUSTINE, OF CATHOLIC RELIEF

(2) MSGR. PETER CAYES

(3) MSGR. CONSTANT (FNU), OF GONAIVES

(4) FATHER HILAIRE (FNU), WHOSE BROTHER, AN ARMY OFFICER, WAS FIRED BY DUVALIER

(5) FATHER DELVA (FNU), OF THE GENERAL HOSPITAL IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

(6) BROTHER VICTOR, OF THE JEAN-MARIE GUILLOUX SCHOOL IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

(7) BROTHER RICHARD

D. SYRIAN BUSINESSMEN IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

(1) NAGIB HANDAL

(2) NASTRI AND ELIAS BABOUN

(3) THE ACRA BROTHERS

(4) FOUAD MOURU

E. ITALIAN BUSINESSMEN IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

(1) THE PETOIA FAMILY

(2) THE MAGLIO FAMILY

F. OTHERS

(1) FRANK PEURIES, A BUSINESSMAN IN CORAIL

(2) ALPHONSE BAZIL, A LAWYER IN JEREMIE

(3) JEAN BOURGEOIS, A BUSINESSMAN IN CAYES

(4) MIDOUIN TURNIER, A BUSINESSMAN IN JACMEL

(5) LEON ST. REMY, A BUSINESSMAN IN GONAIVES

(6) CLAUDE FORBIN, A BUSINESSMAN IN GONAIVES

(7) SERGE HARLIEN, A BUSINESSMAN IN CAP HAITIEN

(8) FELIX ANGELOUSE, A BUSINESSMAN IN CAP HAITIEN

(9) CHARITE JEAN, A BUSINESS LEADER IN PLAISANCE

(10) MARC BELOT, A LAWYER IN PETITE RIVIERE DE L'ARTIBONITE

(11) MICHEL FEQUIRE, A BUSINESSMAN IN PETIT TROU DE NIPPES

(12) GERARD BARTHOLOMY, A PHARMACIST IN MIRAGOANE

54521

54526

S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

6. CHARLES CLAIMS THAT THE FOLLOWERS OF THE LATE CLEMENT JUMELLE, A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN 1957, ARE AMONG HIS SUPPORTERS, AS WELL AS THE FOLLOWING INFLUENTIAL NEWSPAPERMEN:

A. DUMERIC (FNU), PRESIDENT OF PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, WHO WRITES FOR LE MATIN

B. MAX CHAUVET, PUBLISHER OF LE NOUVELLETTE.

HE ALSO COUNTS ON THE SUPPORT OF A NUMBER OF PERSONS WHO ARE STUDYING IN WEST GERMANY, SPAIN, AND OTHER COUNTRIES ON SCHOLARSHIPS WHICH HE GAVE THEM.

7. CHARLES, THROUGH HIS AGENTS, ALSO HAS GOOD CONNECTIONS WITH WITCH DOCTORS AND "PERSONALITIES IN THE VOODOO MOVEMENT."

8. ALTHOUGH CHARLES GAVE NO DATE FOR THE ACTION, HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS ARMY FRIENDS WILL GET RID OF DUVALIER, BUT THAT THEY ARE NOT STRONG ENOUGH WITHOUT FOREIGN HELP TO STAY IN POWER. HE WARNED THAT IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REFUSES TO HELP THEM, THE CASTROITE HAITIANS HAVE A VERY GOOD CHANCE OF SEIZING POWER.

9. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT (ALSO SENT PORT AU PRINCE)

S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

SECRET

12 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM : Kenneth T. Ripley

SUBJECT : Assessment of Clemard Joseph-Charles.

Clemard Joseph-Charles, President of the Commercial Bank of Haiti and President of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, is the source.

For four years Charles has tried to gain U.S. support for himself as successor to President Duvalier.

He is an opportunist of the first water-shrewd, capable and unscrupulous. He has played Duvalier's game to the hilt, often entrusted with missions abroad which were, in effect contrary to U.S. government interests. (He played a principal role in the attempt to smuggle B-26 aircraft out of the U.S. for Duvalier's use. In that connection he went to Arizona to try to purchase U.S. Air Force surplus planes, using U.S. citizens of suspicious nature as his agents.)

Charles has been forced in recent months to make loans to the Duvalier government, the last one having been in the vicinity of $700,000. As a result he claims that his bank is in a precarious position. Therefore, he wants out.

Charles has many business interests in Haiti apart from his banking operation (essential oils, sisal etc.). Haitian exiles estimate that as many as 4,000 persons may be dependent upon him for their livelihood. (This includes dependents of his employees).

Charles is poorly regarded by the State Department. The department's stance towards him as a successor to Duvalier has been even more negative than is customary.

The current report turned in by Louis BRUN, his representative in New York, appears to be nothing more than an extension of his attempts to panic the U.S. and thus to gain for himself support as the lesser of a number of

SECRET

201-357029

evils. The list of names of his alleged supporters is meaningless. His adherents in the army are not identified and are suspect.

His referral in this, and in a previous report, to Castro and Balaguer as his competitors in a race to overthrow Duvalier is considered to be nonsense. All this is calculated to force the U.S. hand in his favor.

His attempt to find a channel to the Pentagon are in the pattern of his action for several years. Should he succeed he might be convincing enough to cause trouble.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. W. L. [illegible] WH/7/RR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 30

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/04, MPS/PSG 3, DDP, ADDP, SOD 6,

S E C R E T 091840Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE DRIN 4468

9 JUN 67 IN 86208

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO

AB SL
PS DEST WH/7/RR
ABSTRACT X INDEX MBH

REF: DIRECTOR 08970

1. CHARLES USING VISA BUSINESS AS EXCUSE CAME TO EMBASSY. WHILE THERE HE ASKED SPEAK TO POLITICAL OFFICER. WAS DIRECTED TO MR. CLARENCE BREAUX WHO LISTENED TO HIS STORY WHICH ALMOST IDENTICAL REFERENCE.

2. DUE FACT CHARGE LIMITING CABLE TRAFFIC MEMCON WILL BE POUCHED. CHARLES INSISTED NO ACTION WOULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL OCTOBER. STATION CONCURS HQS COMMENT THERE NO INFORMATION SUBSTANTIATE CHARLES CAPABILITY FOR A COUP.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

9 JUN 67

201-357029

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. CSDB-312/01625-67

SUBJECT Further Plans of Clemard Joseph Charles To Overthrow the Haitian Government; His Military Supporters and His Bids For Support from Haitian Exiles

DATE DISTR. 8 June 1967

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Mid-late May 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. (15, 22 May 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A foreign businessman with wide contacts in Port-au-Prince who is believed to report accurately what he learns. This information was obtained from a close friend of Charles who probably was aware that it would reach U.S. officials.

1. Clemard Joseph Charles, president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, claims that since Maj. Colcou (fnu),[1] a close friend, has replaced Capt. Harry Tassy in the Presidential Guard, he (Charles) now has an access to arms and ammunition in the basement of the Palace and is in a position to carry out a coup against President Francois Duvalier "in the near future." Although no definite date has been set yet for the coup, Charles is convinced that it must be carried out "within the next few months" to save Haiti from economic and political chaos. Charles, and especially his military friends, feel that 1967 is the year of decision.

2. Although Col. Pierre-Louis (fnu),[2] commander of the Dessalines Barracks, was not named as a fellow-conspirator, Charles believes that Pierre-Louis knows of and approves his plans to overthrow Duvalier, and that he (Charles) "controls" the Dessalines Barracks through Pierre-Louis. Col. Octave Caillard is one of the key military figures on whom Charles pins his hopes. Caillard is thoroughly disillusioned with Duvalier and is willing to cooperate. Caillard fears that if Duvalier remains in power, Haiti's economy will be completely ruined and Haitian exiles receiving guerrilla training in Cuba may attempt to seize power in Haiti.

3. Charles has the support of Capt. Preval (fnu),[3] of the Presidential Guard, and realizes that high-ranking officers loyal to Duvalier could cause bloodshed; Charles and his associates expect violence during the initial stages of the coup.

4. In addition to ships of the Haitian Coast Guard, Charles now has the use of a 352-ton converted landing craft (LC) which normally sails between Jamaica and Port-au-Prince carrying flour, fuel oil, etc.

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

5. Charles had no contact with Haitian exile groups until early May 1967, when he sent an emissary to New York City to talk to Louis Sansaricq, a prominent anti-Duvalier exile, whose entire family was killed by Duvalier's henchmen. Sansaricq agreed to support Charles in a final showdown with Duvalier and promised to line up some of his fellow exiles to support Charles. A close friend of Charles was planning to go to New York in mid-May 1967 ostensibly to discuss port development projects in Port-au-Prince with a U.S. construction firm; however, the real purpose of the trip is to contact Haitian exiles to gain their support for Charles.

6. On 19 May 1967, a group of prominent Haitian exiles held a meeting in New York City to celebrate Haitian Flag Day. One of the organizers of the meeting was Dr. Jumelle (fmu),[4] a medical doctor whose brother was a former Haitian Minister of Finance and who was killed by Duvalier. Another exile who attended the meeting was Vixamar (fmu)[5] who claims to be a legal advisor to the Republic of Chad and who said that he was going to be the next president of Haiti. The group of Haitian exiles, believed to call itself the "National Organization of Haitian Exiles", has some members who back Charles.

7. Following are prominent Haitians who Charles believes must be eliminated after the coup:

   a. Col. Gracia Jacques of the Presidential Guard - Jacques, who is no longer blindly loyal to Duvalier, will be needed in the execution of the coup, and can be bought; however, once power is in the hands of a military junta and Charles, Jacques will be eliminated.

   b. Luc Desir, head of the Tonton-Macoute.

   c. Clovis Desinor, Minister of Finance - an "anarchist" with presidential aspirations who has an "underground movement in Haiti."

   d. Gen. Gerard Constant, Chief of Staff.

   e. Col. Jacques Laroche, Deputy Chief of Staff - a "convinced Communist."

8. If the coup is successful, Charles hopes to give Andre Theard, former Haitian Ambassador to the United States, a diplomatic post; Theard is strongly pro-U.S. Charles regards Gerard Philippeaux, Minister of Health, as a very sick man with no further political aspirations.

9. Close friends of Charles are convinced that Charles has no choice but to carry out a coup with or without foreign help, and that his chances of success are good because several of Duvalier's new appointees to key positions are friends of Charles; also, that Charles must act soon because the morale of many of Duvalier's military and civilian supporters has reached an all-time low and because the Haitian Treasury is almost empty.

Headquarters Comments

1. Coicou may be Maj. Serge Coicou.

2. Probably Lt. Col. Luc Pierre-Louis.

3. Another source has identified Preval as Capt. Walter Preval.

4. Probably Dr. Gaston Jumelle.

5. Probably Henri Vixamar.

CSDB-312/01428-67 recently reported other plans of Clemard Joseph Charles.

file 201-357029

Charles

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION #163 **SECRET**

		ROUTING			
ORIG.	B. E. BACKMAN				
UNIT	WH/7/HAITI	1		4	
EXT.	4222	2		5	
DATE	8 JUNE 1967	3		6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 13

TDCS DB-315/01965-67

INFORMATION COPIES
CS/DO, CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA/O 4, CA/PEG, CA 3, WH/COG 4, DO 5 DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF

DATE DISTRIBUTED
8 JUNE 1967

PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

CI/OP/WH	1	WH/7/Ht	4	WHC/CA	1
		WH/7/DR	1	WHC/FI	1
CA/INT	1	WH/R	1	WHC/MO	1
CA/PROP	1				

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
TX-1189
NP
(NRS)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

RECOMMEND FOR EXO. BASIC DOCUMENT HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE DCI.

REQUEST FOR RELAY TO REP/LANT, PANAMA CITY, PORT AU PRINCE, JMWAVE, AND SANTO DOMINGO ATTACHED.

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
C/WH/7/Haiti
WH/7/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
CI/R&A

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/R

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

COPY NO.

OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00090

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

E+O DO/F FBI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE TDCSDB-315/01965-67

DIST 8 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI LATE MAY 1967

0 22 20Z

SUBJECT READINESS OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES TO OVERTHROW THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

ACQ 6 JUNE 1967

FIELD NO.

SOURCE FOREIGN BUSINESSMAN WITH WIDE CONTACTS IN PORT AU PRINCE WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT ACCURATELY WHAT HE LEARNS. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CLOSE FRIEND OF CHARLES WHO PROBABLY WAS AWARE THAT IT WOULD REACH U.S. OFFICIALS

1. ON 24 MAY 1967, CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, SAID THAT HE WAS "100 PERCENT READY TO GO THROUGH WITH THE 'BUSINESS TRANSACTION' " AND DID NOT WANT TO WASTE TIME BECAUSE "LOCAL BUSINESS COMPETITORS" MIGHT GET AHEAD OF HIM. CHARLES REITERATED THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT HIS TWO PRINCIPAL "FOREIGN COMPETITORS," I.E., FIDEL CASTRO AND DOMINICAN PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER, BE NEUTRALIZED TO PREVENT THEM FROM SPOILING HIS "PROMISING BUSINESS DEAL."

S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

(SOURCE COMMENT: THIS DEAL IS, OF COURSE, CHARLES' ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT.)

2. ON 30 MAY, CHARLES AGAIN WARNED OF THE NECESSITY OF NEUTRALIZING CASTRO AND BALAGUER BECAUSE OF THE "EXTREME URGENCY OF THE BUSINESS MATTER." (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS BELIEVED THAT EVEN IF CHARLES IS SUCCESSFUL IN HIS COUP AGAINST DUVALIER, HE STILL WILL FEAR INTERVENTION BY CASTRO AND BALAGUER.) IN THIS RESPECT, CHARLES HAS URGED HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES TO DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO PREVENT CASTRO AND BALAGUER FROM ANY ACTION AGAINST HIS PLAN, AND HAS ENDEAVORED TO SECURE SUPPORT FROM HAITIAN EXILES IN THE UNITED STATES.

3. LOUIS SANSARICQ, A HAITIAN EXILE IN THE UNITED STATES, AND HIS SON HAVE PROMISED CHARLES THEIR FULL COOPERATION. SANSARICQ'S SON, WHO IS CONNECTED WITH THE HAITIAN COALITION IN NEW YORK, NOW IS PLANNING TO INTENSIFY PROPAGANDA AGAINST DUVALIER AND HIS HENCHMEN. FROM TIME TO TIME, THIS PROPAGANDA WILL ATTACK CHARLES FOR HIS "SUPPORT" OF THE DUVALIER REGIME IN ORDER NOT TO AROUSE DUVALIER'S SUSPICION; THESE ATTACKS, HOWEVER, WILL BE LESS SHARP THAN THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME. THE SANSARICQS WILL TRY TO MAKE CHARLES

ACCEPTABLE TO THE HAITIAN COALITION IN THE UNITED STATES. FOR THEIR EFFORTS, CHARLES HAS PROMISED THE SANSARICQS "IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POSTS IN HIS (CHARLES') FUTURE CABINET."

4. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: FOR SOME TIME, CHARLES HAS SAID THAT HE PLANS TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER WITH OR WITHOUT U.S. SUPPORT. HIS STATEMENTS IN THIS REPORT THAT HE IS READY TO GO THROUGH WITH THE COUP MAY BE ONE OF HIS FINAL BIDS FOR U.S. SUPPORT. SEE CSDB-312/01428-67 AND CSDB-312/01625-67 FOR SOURCE'S RECENT INFORMATION ON CHARLES' PLANS AND HAITIAN SUPPORT FOR A COUP. THERE IS NO INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES TO SUBSTANTIATE CHARLES' CAPABILITY FOR A COUP.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT (ALSO SENT PORT AU PRINCE AND SANTO DOMINGO.)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles, Plot to Overthrow Duvalier Government

FROM:
George S. Musulin/js
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO.: DCS Case 47540 (Sensitive)

DATE: 7 June 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	6/7			Attached is copy of Contacts/ New York 8152 for your info and retention.
2. WH/7/Ht ATTN: Messrs. Gremillion and Ripley 3 B 2630, Hqs.				
3. Curi				
4. C/WH/7/AO				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET SENSITIVE

JUN 6 2 27 PM '67

S E C R E T /SENSITIVE 061330Z CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 8152

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (MUSULIN) FROM BALOG

THIS SENSITIVE

CASE 47,540

CONFIRMING MUSULIN/BALOG TELECON 2 JUN 67

1. AT MIDNIGHT SUNDAY, 4 JUNE, LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT B & B INTERNATIONAL CORP, NYC CALLED AND TOLD BALOG ABOUT LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN HAITI.

2. A TRUSTED HAITIAN FRIEND JUST ARRIVED IN NYC AND BROUGHT BACK NEWS OF WIDESPREAD FEAR GRIPPING HAITI. COLONEL TASSY, IN CHARGE OF CRIMINAL DIVISION AT PORT-AU-PRINCE AND HIS BROTHER TOOK REFUGE AT AN UNNAMED (PRESUMABLY LATIN AMERICAN) EMBASSY IN THE CAPITAL. THE COLONEL WAS RECENTLY TRANSFERRED TO "DEPARTMENT OF N NORTH"; INSTEAD OF TAKING UP HIS NEW POSITION HE FLED TO EMBASSY.

3. RELATIVES OF DE CATALOGNE, FORMEER DIRECTOR OF TOURISM (PRESENT DIRECTOR IS DUVALIER'S SON-IN-LAW) ALSO SOUGHT AND FOUND REFUGE AT AN EMBASSY.

4. FEAR PERMEATES PORT-AU-PRINCE; NO ONE KNOWS WHO IS NEXT TO BE ARRESTED, DISMISSED, TRANSFERRED OR SIMPLY TO "DISAPPEAR". TON TON [illegible]

[illegible]

5. [illegible]

[illegible]

MACOUTE IS BUSIER THEN EVER.

5. SUNDAY EVENING A NEPHEW OF CANADIAN CITIZEN HARRY A. DOLANSKY, LEFT PORT-AU-PRINCE TOGETHER WITH ALLAN COLTON, CANADIAN OWNER OF HAITIAN INTERNATIONAL LEATHER CORPORATION, PORT-AU-PRINCE. DOLANSKY'S NEPHEW CALLED BRUN FROM MONTREAL. ACCORDING TO HIM DUVALIER LEARNED ABOUT CHARLES' PLOTTING AND ALSO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF BRUN'S INVOLVEMENT. THE NEPHEW STRONGLY ADVISED BRUN TO FOREGO HIS TRIP TO PORT-AU-PRINCE AT THIS TIME; HE FEELS THAT THE LIFE OF BRUN, A NATURALIZED US CITIZEN OF HAITIAN DESCENT MAY BE IN DANGER IF HE GOES TO PORT-AU-PRINCE SINCE PAPA IS "COMPLETETLY UNPREDICATABLE AND FEELS CORNERED BY HIS ENEMIES AND FRIENDS SUCH AS CHARLES AND OTHERS". THE NEPHEW REMINDED BRUN THAT HE (BRUN) HAS A WIFE AND FOUR SMALL CHILDREN IN NYC.

6. NOW BRUNS IS TORN BETWEEN HIS LOYALTY TO HIS FRIEND CHARLES AND HIS OWN FAMILY. IN HIS PLIGHT HE ASKED BALOG FOR ADVICE. WE TOLD HIM THAT, WHILE PERSONALLY WE SYMPHATIZE WITH HIM, PROFESSIONALLY WE ARE NOT IN POSITION TO ADVISE HIM ON HIS PROJECTED TRIP TO PORT-AU-PRINCE WHICH WAS SCHEDULED FOR 11:30 AM, 5 JUNE. BRUN INFORMED US THAT HE'LL ALSO SEEK THE ADVICE OF HIS FBI CONTACT MAN WHO HAS DEALT WITH HIM RE HAITIAN DEVELOPMENTS FOR

SOME TIME.

7. AT 7 AM MONDAY, 5 JUNE, BRUN CALLED CHARLES IN PORT-AU-PRINCE. THE BANKER REPEATED HIS TELEPHONE REQUEST MADE ON MONDAY, 4 JUN FOR BRUNS'S TRIP TO HAITIAN CAPITAL ON MONDAY TO DISCUSS "URGENT BUSINESS MATTERS." CHARLES EMPHASIZED THAT "NO POLITICS WAS INVOLVED; THE PURPOSE OF THEIR GET TOGETHER IS PURELY BUSINESS NATURE." AFTER THAT BRUN, OVERRULING HIS WIFE'S OBJECTIONS, DECIDED TO GO. HE TOOK OFF FROM KENNEDY IAP, MONDAY, AT 11:30 AM ON PAN AM.

8. AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE BRUN WILL REGISTER WITH US DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION AT PORT-AU-PRINCE. HE HAS NOT DONE THAT BEFORE.

9. BRUN HOPES TO BE BACK WEDNESDAY THIS WEEK AT WHICH TIME HE'LL CALL BALOG.

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

[illegible] ITAL. THE COLONEL WAS RECENTLY TRANSFERRED TO "[illegible] NORTH", INSTEAD OF TAKING UP HIS NEW [illegible] HE FLED [illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

3. RELATIVES OF DR. CATALOGNE, FORMER DIRECTOR OF TOURISM (PRESENT DIRECTOR IS [illegible]'S SON-IN-LAW) ALSO SOUGHT AND FOUND ASYLUM AT AN EMBASSY.

4. FEAR PERVADES PORT-AU-PRINCE; NO ONE KNOWS WHO IS NEXT TO BE ARRESTED, DISMISSED, TRANSFERRED OR SIMPLY TO "DISAPPEAR". TON TON [illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY SECRET/SENSITIVE ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard Joseph Charles, Plot to Overthrow Duvalier Government

FROM:

Operational Support Staff, DCS
George S. Musulin:yj gsm
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO.: DCS Case 47,540 (Sensitive)

DATE: 6 June 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	6/6		CB	Attached is copy of NY-8149 for your retention.
2. WH/7/HT ATTN: Messrs Gremillion and Ripley 3 B 2630, Hqs.			M	
3. C/WH/RO	8 Jun 67	8 Jun 67	BLB	
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

SECRET

SECRET/SENSITIVE 052031Z CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 8149

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (MUSULIN) FROM BALOG

THIS IS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: CASE 47,540

JUN 6 10 42 AM '67

1. CLEMARD JOSEPHQ CHARLES AND LOUIS A. BRUN HAVE BEEN IN FREQUENT PHONE CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER IN RECENT DAYS. IN ADDITION BRUN RECEIVED SEVERAL LETTERS FROM CHARLES WHICH WERE HANDCARRIED BY TRUSTED FRIENDS.

2. IN A LETTER, DATED 24 MAY, CHARLES STATED THAT HE WAS "100 PER CENT READY TO GO THROUGH BUSINESS TRANSACTION AND I DON'T WANT TO WASTE TIME BECAUSE LOCAL BUSINESS COMPETITORS MAY GET AHEAD OF ME." CHARLES REPEATED HIS PREVIOUS REQUEST THAT "MR BELL AND COMPANY" (THE CODE NAMES CHARLES BESTOWED ON MAJOR BALOG AND THE PENTAGON) MUST MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE TWO PRINCIPAL FOREIGN COMPETITORS, I.E., CASTRO AND BALAGUER, TO SPOIL THE "PROMISING BUSINESS DEAL." THIS DEAL IS OF COURSE HIS ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT.

3. IN ANOTHER LETTER, DATED 30 MAY, CHARLES WARNS BRUN OF THE "EXTREME URGENCY OF THE BUSINESS MATTER VIS-A-VIS MR. BELL AND

DB-312/01625-67

COMPANY" AND AGAIN REQUESTS THE "NEUTRALIZATION OF FOREIGN COMPETITION BY SAID COMPANY". BRUN FEELS THAT EVEN IF HIS COUP AGANST DUVALIER SUCCEEDS CHARLES STILL FEARS INTERVENTION BY CASTRO AND BALAGUER. CHARLES URGED BRUN "TO DO EVERYTHING TO PERSUADE MR. BELL'S COMPANY HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO GET RID OF POSSIBLE FOREIGN COMPETITION." CHARLES ALSO ADVISED BRUN THAT HE HAS TO UNDERGO AN OPERATION TO REMOVE A BENIGN GROWTH FROM HIS THROAT.

4. AT CHARLES' REQUEST BRUN HAS BEEN IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH HAITIAN EXILES IN NYC TO SECURE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE BANKER. LOUIS SANSARICQ, AND HIS SON PROMISED FULL COOPERATION. SANSARICQ'S SON WHO IS CONNECTED WITH THE HAITIAN EXILE RADIO BROADCASTING ANTI-DUVALIER MATERIAL FROM THE US TO HAITI NOW REGULARLY DELIVERS TAPED PROPAGANDA TO BRUN BEFORE TRANSMISSION. BRUN AND YOUNG SANSARICQ ARE NOW PLANNING TO INTENSIFY PROPAGANDA AGAINST DUVALIER AND HIS HENCHMEN. FROM TIME TO TIME EXILE RADIO WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACK CHARLES FOR HIS SUPPORT OF REGIME SO AS NOT TO AROUSE PAPA'S SUSPICION. THESE ATTACKS, HOWEVER, WILL BE LESS SHARP THAN THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME. IN ANY EVENT, THE SANSARICQS WILL TRY TO MAKE CHARLES ACCEPTABLE TO THE

PAGE 3 CONTACTS/NEW YORK 8149 S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

"HAITIAN COALITION" IN NYC. FOR THEIR LABOR THEY WERE PROMISED "IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POSTS IN CHARLES' FUTURE CABINET."

5. BRUN INFORMED US THAT CHARLES'S SUPPORTER EDMOND VILAIRE, PORT-AU -PRINCE SHIPOWNER, WILL RETURN FROM NYC TO HAITI ON 8 JUN 67 AND THAT LOUIS LEVEQUE WILL VISIT NYC AGAIN MID-JUN. BEFORE HIS RETURN TO HAITI LEVEQUE EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE THROUGH BRN TO MMEET BALOG AGAIN IN NYC.

END

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BT

CCC: PARA 5. SHOULD HAVE BEEN INDENTED THREE SPACES SRI

PARA 5. LINE FOUR VA THROUGH BRUN VNCE BRN

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. CSDB-312/01426-67

SUBJECT Plans of Clemard Joseph Charles, President of the Commercial Bank Of Haiti, to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

DATE DISTR. 22 May 1967

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Early May 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. (9 May 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A foreign businessman with wide connections in Port-au-Prince. Source reports infrequently, but his information is believed to be reliable. He received the information from a person close to Charles.

1. In discussing the possibility of overthrowing the Duvalier Government in the near future, Clemard Joseph Charles, president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, said he now is ready to execute his long-planned scheme to seize power with his military and civilian friends in Port-au-Prince, with or without the help of the U.S. Government.[1] If he fails in his efforts to obtain U.S. support for his plan, Charles still intends to go ahead with the plot, but he said the execution of his scheme will take more time. However, Charles believes that it is in the best interest of the U.S. to give him all necessary help in his effort to get rid of President Duvalier who has brought Haiti to the brink of total economic collapse.[2]

2. Charles said that he has rifles and hand grenades hidden "somewhere in Haiti" and that through his good friend Colonel Octave Cayard,[3] commander of the Haitian Coast Guard, three Haitian boats, which carry cannons, will be under his control. Cayard cannot furnish enough ammunition for the cannons, but Charles hopes to obtain the necessary amount from the U.S. Government. He would like to get the ammunition from the U.S. aircraft carrier, BOXER, which has been on duty in the Caribbean area for some time.

3. Besides Cayard, Charles has the support of an unnamed high-ranking Haitian Army officer.[4] Charles and his military and civilian friends plan to set up a provisional junta and get rid of the "enemies of Haiti," that is, Duvalier and his supporters. After the consolidation of power in the hands of the junta, Charles plans to run for President and is convinced that he can win since he has many supporters in Port-au-Prince as well as in the rural areas of Haiti. Charles claims that he "controls" the Catholic and Episcopal clergy, teachers and students, several businessmen, and key militiamen in the rural areas who are waiting for his signal to overthrow the present regime.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4. Charles has stated that should he become President of Haiti, he would pursue a pro-U.S. policy, eliminating the Duvalierists and the Communists and establishing a "liberal democratic" regime.

5. Charles still is pretending to be a loyal supporter of Duvalier; however, his position has become shaky and he believes that his life is in danger. He feels that he may fall victim to Duvalier unless he (Charles) strikes first. For the time being, Charles will continue to support Duvalier in an effort to allay the President's suspicions. As president of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, Charles soon will deliver a speech praising the achievements of Duvalier. He is anxious for the U.S. to know that his overtures toward Duvalier are pretense and that he is determined to go into action against the present regime.

Headquarters Comments

CS-311/05457-67, from another reliable source, reported that Charles and Herve Boyer, former Minister of Finance under Duvalier, were contending for power in the Haitian Government.

1. In the past several months, Charles has made numerous attempts to elicit support from several U.S. Government agencies for his plot against the Duvalier Government.

2. No reason was given for Charles' belief that it would be in the best interest of the U.S. to support his scheme to overthrow Duvalier. However, he may be referring to his claim that should he become President of Haiti following the overthrow of Duvalier, he intends to pursue a pro-U.S. policy and establish a "liberal democratic" regime.

3. Source Comment: Cayard, who enjoys the confidence of Duvalier, is a secret ally of Charles.

[illegible]
[illegible] May 19[illegible]
Case [illegible] ([illegible])

SUBJECT: New Messages from Clemard J. Charles/Current Haitian Exile Activities in New York City

1. On 20 May 1967, Louis A. Brun, President, B & B International Corporation, New York City, furnished the following information:

2. Clemard Joseph Charles, President, Banque Commercial d'Haiti, Port-au-Prince, claims that his military and civilian anti-Duvalier forces are organized in "strong cells ready to strike when the time arrives." He also claims to have supporters among Haitian exiles in the US and "on the islands surrounding Haiti."

3. Charles reiterated his previous assertion that he will depose Duvalier with or without the help of the US, but he would prefer to make contact with a "US liaison man in Port-au-Prince to speed up things."

4. The financial crisis deepens each day. Revenues are falling, and foreign capital continues to stay away. Attempts to sell Treasury bonds abroad and attract tourists have utterly failed. In an effort to attract foreign investment, Mr. Auguste, Haiti's former ambassador to the UN and recently appointed ambassador to West Germany, persuaded a businessman from Kuwait (name not given) to have an audience with President Duvalier on 25 May 1967 in order to discuss a business deal. Charles expects to be present on this occasion.

5. Duvalier is not well. In addition to diabetes, he has what Charles describes "arteriosclerosis psychosis." He is very much upset by the failure of his son-in-law, the Minister of Tourism, to sell Haiti to foreign tourists. He is also disturbed about the recent behavior of his other son-in-law, Lt. Col. Maximilien Dominique. According to Charles, Dominique incurred the presidential wrath by moving out of the palace with his wife and Mrs. Duvalier without Papa's permission. After Duvalier personally brought the party back to the palace, Dominique resigned his palace assignment via his wife. Duvalier angrily refused to accept the letter of resignation from his daughter saying that, "as long as I am the president, people cannot resign--they are fired."

201-357029

6. Charles states that Gracia Jacques, chief of the Presidential Guard, "will be needed in the execution of the plan." He feels that Jacques is no longer blindly loyal to Duvalier and that he can be bought. Once the power is in the hands of a military junta and Charles, Jacques "will be eliminated."

7. The banker further states that honest and competent citizens, who are also pro-US, will be brought into the government. Some of the exiles now in the US will be in the government.

8. Charles insists that he and his friends are strong enough on the domestic scene to do away with the Duvalier government "sooner or later." His greatest fear is that either Castro or Balaguer might interfere in Haiti's affairs following a coup against Duvalier. He earnestly hopes that the US will neutralize Castro and Balaguer. Charles is convinced that Duvalier and Balaguer are "close friends." He feels that the time has definitely come for the US Government to get in touch with him now in Port-au-Prince. If his wish is granted, he will divulge his plan (names, etc.) to the "liaison man."

9. On 19 May 1967, a group of prominent Haitian exiles had a meeting in New York City to celebrate Haitian Flag Day. One of the organizers was Dr. Jumelle, an M.D. whose brother, a former Minister of Finance, was killed by Duvalier. Another exile in attendance was (fnu) Vixamar, who claims to be a legal adviser to the Republic of Chad. Vixamar, who is described by Brun as a mystic, stated, "I am going to be the next president of Haiti." Brun believes that the group calls itself "National Organization of Haitian Exiles." According to him, some of the members are now backing Charles' presidential aspirations.

10. Louis Lévesque, a member of the Economic Planning Board of Haiti, a confidant of Charles', will come to New York City after a few days' stay in Miami, Florida, and Memphis, Tennessee. On 24 May 1967, Levesque will meet with representatives of the J. G. White Engineering Corporation, 80 Broad Street, NYC, to discuss the port modernization project of Port-au-Prince. According to Brun, Levesque has "some very important information relative to the Charles' plan."

NY-[illegible]
12 May 1967
Case 47,540 (Baupenal)

SUBJECT: Additional Information Concerning Plans of Haitian Banker, Clemard Joseph Charles, to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

1. Louis A. Brun, B and B International Corporation, 1132 Broadway, New York, NY, furnished the following additional information concerning new developments in Haiti and plans of Haitian banker, Clemard Joseph Charles, and his military and civilian associates to overthrow the Duvalier government.

2. Colonel Gaillard, Chief of the Haitian Coast Guard, is definitely one of the key military figures on whom Charles pins his hopes. Gaillard is thoroughly disillusioned with Duvalier and is willing to cooperate with Charles. Gaillard fears that if Duvalier remains in power, the economy of the country will be completely ruined and that Haitian exiles now being trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba may attempt to seize power. As a prosperous dairy farmer, whose wealth is estimated to be approximately US$1 million, Gaillard has a large stake in the future of Haiti. He feels that "patriots such as Charles and himself" must eliminate Duvalier and his henchmen.

3. Although Charles did not name Colonel Pierre Louis, officer in charge of the Casernes Dessalines, Port-au-Prince, as a fellow-conspirator, there is reason to believe that Louis knows and approves the plans to overthrow Duvalier. Charles and Louis are good friends; the banker was best man at the wedding of the Colonel's daughter. When the government was unable to pay Louis and his soldiers on time, on several occasions, Charles advanced money so that Louis and some of his trusted associates "could eat."

4. Engineer Louis Levesque, a member of the Economic Planning Board of Haiti, is also aware of Charles' plans. Levesque is a respected public figure who has made several trips to the US in an effort to obtain capital for the Haitian economy. He has given up all hope and is convinced that the Duvalier government must be eliminated.

5. Charles claims the support of a substantial segment of the clergy, intelligentsia, teachers, and students as well as peasants in the rural areas. As a devout Roman Catholic, he maintains a close relationship with the church authorities and also befriended Père Rene P. Gilles, Bishop Voegeli's successor at the Episcopalian Church's St. Trinité Cathedral in Port-au-Prince. In addition, he claims to have several important newspapermen on his payroll.

6. Charles is fully aware of the danger confronting him and his fellow-conspirators, but they are determined to "eliminate" Duvalier and his key supporters. Since Charles "controls" Casernes Dessalines through Colonel Louis, and the Coast Guard through Colonel Gaillard, he is confident that in the event of a successful coup by a military junta he and his associates will be able to round up the principal supporters of Duvalier. Although he has his man, Captain Preval, in the Presidential Guard, he realizes that high-ranking officers loyal to Duvalier could cause bloodshed. Charles and his associates expect violence during the initial stages of their coup. No definite date has yet been set for action, but Charles is convinced that the coup must be carried out "within the next few months" to save the country from economic and political chaos. In any case, Charles and especially his military friends feel that 1967 is the year of decision.

7. At present, Charles has no contact with Haitian exile groups. However, initial steps to establish a good relationship with exiles in the US have been taken. In early May 1967, Brun met Leslie Sansaricq, a prominent anti-Duvalier exile, whose entire family was killed by Duvalier's henchmen. Sansaricq agreed to support Charles in case of a final showdown with President Duvalier. Moreover, he promised to line up some of his fellow-exiles for Charles and his friends. Negotiations between Brun and Sansaricq are in progress.

8. Dr. Fourcand, an M.D. in Haiti, is no longer trusted by Duvalier. Now Duvalier and his family have the services of four doctors: Dr. Medard, an orthopedist; Dr. Tournay, another orthopedist; Dr. Bontemps, a general practitioner; and Dr. Marie-Thérèse Duplessi. Duvalier's dietitian is Mrs. Susie Scott Mahu. A male nurse, Turgo Jeudi, is entrusted with taking periodic blood sugar tests of Duvalier. Jeudi is well liked by the President, who made him a member of the Legislative Chamber.

9. Charles is of the opinion that Duvalier is determined to remain in Haiti and face any opposition from inside and outside the country. Although Duvalier is confident that he can meet any inside crisis, he has made a secret agreement with President Joaquin Balaguer of the Dominican Republic. Duvalier asked for and was granted asylum in the Dominican Republic in the event his government is overthrown. The two presidents maintain close liaison through Andre Simon, a member of the Legislative Chamber in Haiti. Simon, who, according to Charles, is responsible for the murder of several anti-Duvalier persons in the Jacmel area, frequently travels in a jeep with diplomatic license plate between Santo Domingo and Port-au-Prince. Simon received a diplomatic passport from Duvalier. While on business in Santo Domingo, he stays in the presidential palace.

10. It seems that the "battle of the sons-in-law" has been won by Foucard, Minister of Tourism. In early May 1967, Duvalier's other son-in-law, Dominique, who is an Army officer, moved out of the presidential palace together with his wife. They took up residence in Port-au-Prince but their independence did not last long. After a few days in their new home, President Duvalier and his bodyguards made a "friendly visit" to the Dominique home and took his daughter and son-in-law back to the presidential palace. Charles believes that Dominique is now virtually a prisoner. He also learned from those close to the palace that Duvalier either will appoint or has already appointed Dominique to a foreign diplomatic post, which amounts to "golden exile." At the same time Foucard continues to enjoy Duvalier's full confidence. He was allowed to visit New York City with his wife "to promote Haitian tourism." After an unsuccessful stay in the US, Foucard flew to Mexico City, where he was also unsuccessful in his bid to attract Mexican tourists; but as a consolation prize, he received a decoration from the Mexican government.

11. Charles made the following comments to Brum concerning certain individuals in Haiti:

a. Gracia Jacques, in charge of the Presidential Guard. No compromise with him in case of coup; he must be eliminated.

b. Luc Desir, head of Ton Ton Macoute. Must be eliminated.

c. Clovis Desinor, Minister of Finance. He is an "anarchist" with presidential aspirations who has some "underground movement in Haiti." To be eliminated.

d. Gerard Philippeaux, Minister of Health. In early May 1967, he was in New York City to seek treatment of a serious brain tumor condition. A very sick man, he no longer has political aspirations.

e. General Gerard Constant, chief of staff. To be eliminated.

f. Théard, a former ambassador to the US. He is strongly pro-US. Charles "hopes" to give him a diplomatic post when he is in a position to do so.

g. Colonel Jacques Laroche, deputy chief of staff, "a convinced Communist." To be eliminated.

12. Charles stated that Dr. Laughlin, a US citizen, an M.D., who lives with his son in Port-au-Prince, is "an undercover agent for Duvalier." At one-time Laughlin was running a tannery for Duvalier; his son is now in charge of an extensive rice plantation.

13. If Charles receives no US help against Duvalier, he will act on his own. However, he knows that without US help (ammunition, weapons) it may take several months before he and his friends are ready to strike. During the interim period, he will endeavor to undermine the Duvalier government on the economic front. To be specific, he plans to tell his foreign friends connected with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that they must abandon the present regime to complete economic chaos. In addition to furnishing a copy of his memorandum addressed to Duvalier to the US ambassador in Haiti on the wrongdoings of Henri Siclait, president of the Haitian Tobacco and Match Monopoly, he gave copies to "foreign communists." Charles feels that once the "economic situation of Haiti is absolutely hopeless" he and his friends will be able to carry out the coup.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard J. Charles

FROM: Operational Support Staff, DCS George S. Musulin:yj gsm 900 Key Bldg.	EXTENSION 2268	NO. DCS Case 47,540 (Sensitive) DATE 16 May 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL			16/5/67	
2. WH/7/Haiti (ATTN: Messrs. Gremillion and Ripley) 3 B 2630, Hqs.			WT	Attachment: NY-419-67 w/encls.
3.				2 & 4: Pass copy of this to Paul Harwood so he can keep abreast of the Charles affair.
4. C/WH/7/RU		17 May 67		2 to 8: Put in Charles' file.
5. DC/WH/7		17 MAY 1967		
6. C/WH/7				
7. WH/7/HAITI			WT	
8. Shari				
9. FI/ISR 2E03				Pls. file in Clemard J. Charles 201. 357029
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Case 47,540 (Reopened) New Developments in Plans of Haitian Banker, Clemard Joseph Charles to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

NY-419-67

Chief, New York Field Office(JJBalog/br)

15 May 1967

Director, DCS

ATT: OOS (Masselin)

Contacts:

Louis A. Brun
B & B International Corp.
New York, N. Y.

and

Edmond Vilaire
Commission Agent
Shipping Service
Box 916
Port-au-Prince, Haiti

A copy of this memorandum will be furnished to DO/NY.

Info contained herein is responsive to requirements of WH/H which "Major" Balog received from Ken Ripley. On 12 May 67, in telecon with Ken and his boss, Balog passed on portions of this memo. They requested this memo indicating that new info is "vital."

Info on stealing of UN funds comes from Brun's wife, an employee of the UNDP in NYC. Brun, who has been a contact of the FBI in NYC, on Haitian exile matters, decided not to tell his FBI contact about Charles' plans.

NY-419-67
15 May 1967
Case 47,540 (reopened)

SUBJECT: New Developments in Plans of Haitian Banker, Clemard Joseph Charles, to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

1. On 11 May 67, Edmond Vilaire, a Haitian national, who operates a 352 ton converted LC as a cargo ship in Port-au-Prince, arrived in New York City. On 12 May 67 in the company of Louis A. Brun, B & B International Corp., New York City, he stated the following. (Letterhead of the Port-au-Prince firm is attached.)

2. President Duvalier has just transferred Captain Harry Tassy of the Presidential Guard to a rural post and replaced him with Major Coicou, who happens to be a good friend of Clemard Joseph Charles. Charles claims that through Coicou, he now has access to arms and ammunition in the basement of the palace and is in a position to carry out a coup "in the near future."

3. After an explosion near the palace in mid-April 1967, Duvalier quietly embarked upon a major shake-up in the military and the civil service. He dismissed or transferred a number of Army, Militia, and Ton Ton Macoute officers and civil servants, including those who had previously served in the presidential palace. To date no official announcements have been made concerning these important changes.

4. In addition to Captain Tassy, the following officers lost their positions in Port-au-Prince:

   a. Captain Laroche of the Presidential Guard; transferred to an unknown post outside the capital.

   b. Major Sony Borge of the Army; Borge, a confident of Duvalier, was in charge of radio propaganda. He used to see the president at least twice a day. Borge was transferred to a town in the northwest region of Haiti.

   c. Paul Veriquin of the VSN.

5. Veriquin, who was in charge of the VSN in the Petionville section of Port-au-Prince, was dismissed by Duvalier because the President suspected him of siding with the Dominique clique. Dominique, an Army officer and son-in-law of Duvalier, was offered a military attache position either in Spain or Italy, which he refused to accept as his wife is reluctant to leave Haiti at this time. This situation is complicated by the decision of Duvalier's wife to side with her daughter. The rift in his own family as well as the attempt of his enemies to disrupt the celebration of his 60th birthday and the 10th anniversary of his taking office prompted Duvalier to remark that the only man he trusts is Gracia Jacques, commander of the Presidential Guard. This statement antagonized even those who have hitherto been loyal to Duvalier. Moreover, even the most faithful Duvalier supporters now fear for their lives. Colonel Caillard, who is in charge of the Coast Guard, bitterly complained to Charles about Duvalier's remark and reassured the banker that he and his friends were ready to set up a military junta.

6. In addition to the Coast Guard ships, Charles would have the use of Vilaire's converted LC, which normally plies the waters between Jamaica and Port-au-Prince carrying flour, fuel oil, etc. Vilaire is convinced that Charles has no choice but to carry out the coup with or without foreign help and that his chances of success are good since several of the new Duvalier appointees to key military and civilian positions are Charles' friends. Vilaire feels that Charles must act now since the morale of many of the military and civilian supporters of Duvalier have reached an all-time low and the Haitian Treasury is almost empty. Since Duvalier has been unable to obtain foreign capital, he has again resorted, through his Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry Lebert Jean-Pierre, to a shake-down of commercial and industrial enterprises. In a circular letter, dated 2 May 67, the Secretary appealed for "voluntary contributions as a fitting homage to the Venerable President for Life, Chief of the Duvalierist Revolution." (A copy of the letter is attached.)

7. Jean-Pierre and Henri Siclait, confidants of Duvalier in charge of the Regie du Tabac and des Allumettes, are among the staunchest supporters of the president. Both men have stolen considerable amounts of public funds and succeeded in smuggling some of their money out of Haiti.

8. Secretary of State for Justice Rameau Estimé, who is a good friend of Captain Tassy, is in serious trouble. Estimé, a brother of a former president of Haiti, may lose his position. Since he himself has presidential ambitions, he may become a candidate for this office if he survives the present crisis.

9. Another potential rival for the presidency is Secretary of State for Labor and Social Welfare Max A. Antoine, who claims the support of the labor unions.

10. According to Vilaire, the wildest rumors are rampant in Haiti. For example, even intelligent persons give credence to the allegation that the US Government is not really anxious to see the downfall of Duvalier and that a portion of the US$40 million hitherto allocated to President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic as development loans was passed on, with the tacit consent of the US, to "Balaguer's good friend," Duvalier. Another rumor states that the CIA is now in the process of training Haitian exiles in the US for a possible invasion of Haiti. The name of Luc Fouche, a former Senator in Haiti and a former Ambassador to the US now in exile in New York City, has been mentioned as one of those receiving training in guerrilla warfare.

11. One of Vilaire's aims during his present visit to the US is to convince influential Haitian exiles that Charles is not a Duvalier supporter and that he would make a good president. Vilaire has already contacted, through Brun, Louis Bessaring, a prominent anti-Duvalier exile in New York City, and hopes to meet other exile leaders.

12. Brun stated that the newly appointed representative of the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) in Port-au-Prince, a Greek, has just returned to New York and stated that he will not go back to Haiti because he discovered that funds granted by the UNDP were "misappropriated by the Duvalier government."

13. Brun also asserted that an organization comprised of US citizens and calling itself the "Society for Haiti" will try to raise money for "nutrition, education, reforestation, cultural and economic developments in Haiti." Bonhomme, Haiti's ambassador to the US, is connected with this organization. An OAS mission is expected to be in Port-au-Prince this week and Bonhomme will be on hand. (A copy of a list of the names of persons supporting the Society for Haiti is attached.)

14. Engineer Louis Leveque, a member of the Haitian Economic Planning Board and a close friend of Charles', is expected in New York on or about 19 May 67 ostensibly to discuss port development projects of Port-au-Prince with the J. G. White Engineering Corporation, 80 Broad NYC. . The real purpose of his visit, however, is to contact US friends and Haitian exiles in an effort to gain support for Charles.

15. Charles and Brun talked on the phone 12 May 67. The banker stated that he is "tied down" in Port-au-Prince until the end of May, at which time he may make another business trip to the US.

16. Brun is firmly convinced that Charles has already made the decision to overthrow the Duvalier government with his friends and that he must act fast to prevent chaos and a possible Communist take-over. Vilaire and Brun agree that the political and economic situation in Haiti is such that "the population wants a change, any change, and would even welcome a Communist coup." They added that Charles and his military friends wish to prevent a Castro-supported Communist seizure of power.

[illegible]
SHIPPING SERVICE
BOX 618
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

[illegible]

PORT-AU-PRINCE, le 2 Mai 1967.-

Messieurs,

A l'occasion des grandioses manifestations commémoratives de l'AN X de la Révolution Duvaliériste, les forces vives de la Nation se sont associées pour donner à cette célébration toute l'ampleur qu'elle mérite.

A cet hommage que la Nation tient à rendre à Son Vénéré Président à Vie, Son Excellence le Docteur François DUVALIER, digne Chef de la Révolution, il est louable que le Commerce et l'Industrie apportent leur participation effective.

C'est pourquoi, il vous est donné l'opportunité d'inviter les employés de votre entreprise à apporter eux aussi leur contribution suivant le barème ci-après.

De	5	à 200	Gourdes	: Gdes	5.00
De	201	à 500	Gourdes	: Gdes	10.00
De	501	à 1500	Gourdes	: Gdes	15.00
à partir de	1501		"	: Gdes	25.00

Il demeure entendu qu'il est laissé à vous individuellement, ainsi qu'à votre haut personnel, la liberté d'accomplir tout geste de générosité, le plafond de la contribution, en l'espèce demeurant illimité.

Les valeurs ainsi recueillies par vos soins, seront converties en chèques à l'ordre de la Secrétairerie d'Etat des Finances et des Affaires Economiques, accompagnées de la liste de votre personnel et transmises au Département du Commerce et de l'Industrie.

Agréez, Messieurs, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Docteur C[illegible] [illegible]PIZARRE
Secrétaire d'Etat

Society for Haiti

Miss Ella F. Harllee – President of Educational Community Association

John Paul Riddle – founder of American Airline/Riddle Airline/Embry Riddle University

Dr. Simpson – Economist (in Roosevelts first Braintrust)

Dr. Hock – Economist

Col. King – Retired Executive with Park Service

Dr. deBessonyey – Retired Vice President of Ociam University & Regent of Peru

Mrs. Denby – Editor of "Grace" Magazine

Ray Libson – Developer Architect

Marshall Diggs – Attorney/past Comptroler General of U.S.

SECRET SENSITIVE

[illegible]

Case 47,540 (Reopened) New Developments in Plans of Haitian Banker, Clemard Joseph Charles to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

NY-419-67

Chief, New York Field Office(JIBalog/br)

15 May 1967

Director, DCS

ATT: OSS (Musulin)

Contacts:

Louis A. Brun
B & B International Corp.
New York, N. Y.

and

Edmond Vilaire
Commission Agent
Shipping Service
Box 916
Port-au-Prince, Haiti

A copy of this memorandum will be furnished to BO/NY.

Info contained herein is responsive to requirements of WH/H which "Major" Balog received from Ken Ripley. On 12 May 67, in telecon with Ken and his boss, Balog passed on portions of this memo. They requested this memo indicating that new info is "vital."

Info on stealing of UN funds comes from Brun's wife, an employee of the UNDP in NYC. Brun, who has been a contact of the FBI in NYC, on Haitian exile matters, decided not to tell his FBI contact about Charles' plans.

SECRET SENSITIVE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-357029

14-00000

SECRET

NY-419-67
15 May 1967
Case 47,540 (reopened)

SUBJECT: New Developments in Plans of Haitian Banker, Clemard Joseph Charles, to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

1. On 11 May 67, Edmond Vilaire, a Haitian national, who operates a 352 ton converted LC as a cargo ship in Port-au-Prince, arrived in New York City. On 12 May 67 in the company of Louis A. Brun, B & B International Corp., New York City, he stated the following. (Letterhead of the Port-au-Prince firm is attached.)

2. President Duvalier has just transferred Captain Harry Tassy of the Presidential Guard to a rural post and replaced him with Major Coicou, who happens to be a good friend of Clemard Joseph Charles. Charles claims that through Coicou, he now has access to arms and ammunition in the basement of the palace and is in a position to carry out a coup "in the near future."

3. After an explosion near the palace in mid-April 1967, Duvalier quietly embarked upon a major shake-up in the military and the civil service. He dismissed or transferred a number of Army, Militia, and Ton Ton Macoute officers and civil servants, including those who had previously served in the presidential palace. To date no official announcements have been made concerning these important changes.

4. In addition to Captain Tassy, the following officers lost their positions in Port-au-Prince:

   a. Captain Laroche of the Presidential Guard; transferred to an unknown post outside the capital.

   [illegible]

   b. Major Sony Borge of the Army; Borge, a confident of Duvalier, was in charge of radio propaganda. He used to see the president at least twice a day. Borge was transferred to a town in the northwest region of Haiti.

   c. Paul Veriquin of the VSN.

SECRET [illegible]TIVE

GROUP 1
[illegible] automatic
[illegible]

5. Veriquin, who was in charge of the TTM in the Petionville section of Port-au-Prince, was dismissed by Duvalier because the President suspected him of siding with the Dominique clique. Dominique, an Army officer and son-in-law of Duvalier, was offered a military attache position either in Spain or Italy, which he refused to accept as his wife is reluctant to leave Haiti at this time. This situation is complicated by the decision of Duvalier's wife to side with her daughter. The rift in his own family as well as the attempt of his enemies to disrupt the celebration of his 60th birthday and the 10th anniversary of his taking office prompted Duvalier to remark that the only man he trusts is Gracia Jacques, commander of the Presidential Guard. This statement antagonized even those who have hitherto been loyal to Duvalier. Moreover, even the most faithful Duvalier supporters now fear for their lives. Colonel Cailliard, who is in charge of the Coast Guard, bitterly complained to Charles about Duvalier's remark and reassured the banker that he and his friends were ready to set up a military junta.

6. In addition to the Coast Guard ships, Charles would have the use of Vilaire's converted LS, which normally plies the waters between Jamaica and Port-au-Prince carrying flour, fuel oil, etc. Vilaire is convinced that Charles has no choice but to carry out the coup with or without foreign help and that his chances of success are good since several of the new Duvalier appointees to key military and civilian positions are Charles' friends. Vilaire feels that Charles must act now since the morale of many of the military and civilian supporters of Duvalier has reached an all-time low and the Haitian Treasury is almost empty. Since Duvalier has been unable to obtain foreign capital, he has again resorted, through his Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry Lebert Jean-Pierre, to a shake-down of commercial and industrial enterprises. In a circular letter, dated 2 May 67, the Secretary appealed for "voluntary contributions as a fitting homage to the Venerable President for Life, Chief of the Duvalierist Revolution." (A copy of the letter is attached.)

7. Jean-Pierre and Henri Sialait, confidants of Duvalier in charge of the Regie de Tabac and des Allumettes, are among the staunchest supporters of the president. Both men have stolen considerable amounts of public funds and succeeded in smuggling some of their money out of Haiti.

SECRET

8. Secretary of State for Justice Rameau Estimé, who is a good friend of Captain Tassy, is in serious trouble. Estimé, a brother of a former president of Haiti, may lose his position. Since he himself has presidential ambitions, he may become a candidate for this office if he survives the present crisis.

9. Another potential rival for the presidency is Secretary of State for Labor and Social Welfare Max A. Antoine, who claims the support of the labor unions.

10. According to Vilaire, the wildest rumors are rampant in Haiti. For example, even intelligent persons give credence to the allegation that the US Government is not really anxious to see the downfall of Duvalier and that a portion of the US$40 million hitherto allocated to President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic as development loans was passed on, with the tacit consent of the US, to "Balaguer's good friend," Duvalier. Another rumor states that the CIA is now in the process of training Haitian exiles in the US for a possible invasion of Haiti. The name of Luc Fouche, a former Senator in Haiti and a former Ambassador to the US now in exile in New York City, has been mentioned as one of those receiving training in guerrilla warfare.

11. One of Vilaire's aims during his present visit to the US is to convince influential Haitian exiles that Charles is not a Duvalier supporter and that he would make a good president. Vilaire has already contacted, through Brun, Louis Sansaricq, a prominent anti-Duvalier exile in New York City, and hopes to meet other exile leaders.

12. Brun stated that the newly appointed representative of the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) in Port-au-Prince, a Greek, has just returned to New York and stated that he will not go back to Haiti because he discovered that funds granted by the UNDP were "misappropriated by the Duvalier government."

13. Brun also asserted that an organisation comprised of US citizens and calling itself the "Society for Haiti" will try to raise money for "nutrition, education, reforestation, cultural and economic developments in Haiti." Bonhomme, Haiti's ambassador to the US, is connected with this organisation. An OAS mission is expected to be in Port-au-Prince this week and Bonhomme will be on hand. (A copy of a list of the names of persons supporting the Society for Haiti is attached.)

[illegible]

SECRET

14. Engineer Louis Leveque, a member of the Haitian Economic Planning Board and a close friend of Charles', is expected in New York on or about 16 May 67 ostensibly to discuss port development projects of Port-au-Prince with the G. G. White Engineering Corporation, 80 Broad Street, NYC. The real purpose of his visit, however, is to contact US friends and Haitian exiles in an effort to gain support for Charles.

15. Charles and Brun talked on the phone 12 May 67. The banker stated that he is "tied down" in Port-au-Prince until the end of May, at which time he may make another business trip to the US.

16. Brun is firmly convinced that Charles has already made the decision to overthrow the Duvalier government with his friends and that he must act fast to prevent chaos and a possible Communist take-over. Vilaire and Brun agree that the political and economic situation in Haiti is such that "the population wants a change, any change, and would even welcome a Communist coup." They added that Charles and his military friends wish to prevent a Castro-supported Communist seizure of power.

Cable A [illegible] EDVIL.

EDMOND VILAIRE

COMMISSION AGENT
SHIPPING SERVICE
BOX 916
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

TEL. No. 3104

DEPARTEMENT DU COMMERCE ET DE L'INDUSTRIE

PORT-AU-PRINCE, Le 2 Mai 1967.-

Messieurs,

A l'occasion des grandioses manifestations commémoratives de l'AN X de la Révolution Duvaliériste, les forces vives de la Nation se sont associées pour donner à cette célébration toute l'ampleur qu'elle mérite.

A cet hommage que la Nation tient à rendre à Son Vénéré Président à Vie, Son Excellence le Docteur François DUVALIER, digne Chef de la Révolution, il est louable que le Commerce et l'Industrie apportent leur participation effective.

C'est pourquoi, il vous est donné l'opportunité d'inviter les employés de votre entreprise à apporter eux aussi leur contribution suivant le barème ci-après :

De	5	à 200 Gourdes	: Gdes 5.00
De	201	à 500 Gourdes	: Gdes 10.00
De	501	à 1500 Gourdes	: Gdes 15.00
à partir de	1501	"	: Gdes 25.00.

Il demeure entendu qu'il est laissé à vous individuellement, ainsi qu'à votre haut personnel, la liberté d'accomplir tout geste de générosité, le plafond de la contribution, en l'espèce demeurant illimité.

Les valeurs ainsi recueillies par vos soins, seront converties en chèques à l'ordre de la Secrétairerie d'Etat des Finances et des Affaires Economiques, accompagnées de la liste de votre personnel et transmises au Département du Commerce et de l'Industrie.

Agréez, Messieurs, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Docteur [illegible] PIERRE
Secrétaire d'Etat

"Society for Haiti"

Miss Ella F. Harllee - President of Educational Communicati Association

John Paul Riddle - founder of American Airline/Riddle Airline/Embry Riddle Universit

Dr. Simpson - Economist (in Roosevelts first Braintrust)

Dr. Hock - Economist

Col. King - Retired Executive with Park Service

Dr. deBessenyey - Retired 1st President of Ociam University & Represent of Peru

Mrs. Denby - Editor of "Grace" Magazine

Roy Mason - Developer Architect

Marshall Digs - Attorney/past Comptroler General of U.S.

NY 406-67
10 May 1967

SUBJECT: Plans of Haitian Banker Clemard Joseph Charles to Overthrow the Duvalier Government - Case 47,540 (Re-opened)

1. On 9 May 1967 Louis A. Brun, B&B International Corp., New York City, furnished the following information.

2. He and Clemard Joseph Charles, President of the Banque Commerciale D'Haiti and President of the Chamber of Commerce of Haiti, have discussed in detail the possible overthrow of the Duvalier Government in the near future. During his visit to New York City in the first week of May, 1967, Charles stated that he is now ready to execute his long-planned scheme to seize power with his military and civilian friends in Port-au-Prince, with or without the help of the United States Government. Charles further stated that he had rifles and hand grenades hidden "somewhere in Haiti." In addition he will have, through his good friend Colonel Caillard, Chief of the Haitian Coast Guard, three Haitian boats under his control. Caillard, who enjoys the confidence of Duvalier, is a secret ally of Charles and is now ready to place the three boats, which carry cannons, at the disposal of Charles. The trouble is that Caillard does not have enough ammunition for the cannons. Charles hopes to obtain the necessary ammunition from the US Government. He would like to receive the ammunition from the US Carrier, BOXER, which has for some time been on duty in the Caribbean area. Charles believes that it is in the best interest of the US Government to give him all necessary help in his effort to get rid of Duvalier who has brought Haiti to the brink of total economic collapse.

3. Besides Caillard, Charles has the support of an unnamed high-ranking Haitian Army officer. Charles and his military, as well as civilian, friends plan to set up a provisional Junta and get rid of the "enemies of Haiti," that is, Duvalier and his supporters. After the consolidation of power in the hands of the Junta, Charles will run for President. He is convinced that he can win since he has many supporters in Port-au-Prince as well as in rural areas. Charles claims that he "controls" Roman Catholic and Episcopalian clergy, teachers and students, several businessmen, and key militia figures in the rural areas who now wait for his signal to overthrow the present regime.

4. Charles is still pretending to be a loyal supporter of Duvalier. However, he feels that his life is now in danger and unless he strikes first, he may fall victim to the President. His position has become shaky. In early 1967, at Duvalier's request, he submitted a memorandum to the President describing the wrong doing of Henri Siclait, who is in charge of the Regie de Tabac and Des Allumettes (tobacco and match industry),

SECRET

but it appears that Duvalier took Siclait's side. According to Charles, Siclait has been successful in raising money for Duvalier and also had beautiful homes built for some of the President's key supporters. Charles stated that he had given a copy of his memorandum on Siclait to the US Ambassador in Port-au-Prince.

5. Although he has relationships with the US diplomatic service in Port-au-Prince, Charles expressed his desire to "cooperate with a Liaison Officer from the US". When asked to elaborate, he stated that it would be too dangerous to contact a US diplomat in Port-au-Prince; instead he would prefer to cooperate with "a Liaison man from the Pentagon."

6. Charles stated that as President he would pursue a pro-US policy, eliminating the Duvalier elements and the Communists and establishing a "liberal democratic" regime. If he fails to receive US help in his effort to overthrow the present Haitian Government, he will still go ahead with the planning, but the execution of his scheme will take more time.

7. For the time being, Charles will continue to support the Duvalier government, in an effort to allay the suspicions of the President. Charles, in his capacity as the President of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, will soon deliver a speech praising the achievements of Duvalier. Charles is anxious for the US Government to know that this is just a pretense, that he now is determined to go into action against the regime, and that he knows that he and his friends are facing an extremely difficult task.

SECRET SENSITIVE

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. CS-311/05457-67

SUBJECT Efforts by Haitian Civilians And Military to Gain Power In Haitian Government

DATE DISTR. 10 May 1967

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. April 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. 28 April 1967

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A foreign businessman who has lived in Haiti for a number of years and who is acquainted with high officials of the Haitian Government. He is an untested source. Source obtained this information from a high-level Haitian Government official.

1. Haitians Clemard Joseph Charles and Herve Boyer are contending for power in the Haitian Government, and each has hopes of succeeding President Francois Duvalier. Although they are working together and will join forces in order to get rid of Duvalier, they probably will start fighting between themselves once this objective is obtained.[1]

2. Colonel Jacques Laroche is the military's primary contender for power, and undoubtedly he will be the one to consolidate a military movement against Duvalier. Since the dismissal of high-ranking military officers by Duvalier in November and December 1966, Laroche has enjoyed the greatest power within the Army.[2]

3. If Duvalier is assassinated, it is likely that there will be bloodshed in the streets. In this event, it would be the Army who would step in immediately and control the situation. Despite the fact that the Army is small and weakened from its loss of high-ranking offficers, it still would be powerful enough to neutralize any effort by the Haitian militia (VSN) because the VSN is disorganized and would be unable to cope with the confusion which would be caused by an unnatural death of Duvalier. However, if Duvalier dies a natural death there would be less chance of hostilities because the people around Duvalier would have a better chance of taking power.

4. There is little chance that Duvalier will step down from power voluntarily because of his pride. However, in this respect his family, particularly Mrs. Duvalier, has constantly encouraged him to give up the presidency and appoint a successor.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	
		CINCSO #						

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".) (Also sent Port-au-Prince)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CA/INT	2	WH/7/Ht	6	WHC/CA	1
CA/PROP	1	WH/PRIN	1	WHC/WAVE	1
WH/R	1	WHC/MO	1	WH/PACY (CINCSO) 1	
		WHC/FI	1		

TOTALS IN 2, CI 2, FI 3, CA 3, WH/COG 3 (1), WH 7 (2), DO/H 1.

LIAISON

TX-1173
NP
(MVMOUNT-1)
CS-311/05457-67

COORDINATING

RELEASING
HK
ELV/SEB
beg

FORM NO. 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (50)

Headquarters Comments

1. Charles is president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, and Boyer is a former Minister of Finance under Duvalier. Another source, whose reporting has been infrequent, but considered reliable, has reported that Boyer has signed a contract to work with an international organization in Europe. If Boyer leaves Haiti, it is possible that he will forego his ambitions for power in the Haitian Government, or that his endeavors will be hampered seriously by his absence from the country.

2. Laroche is Deputy Chief of Staff of the Haitian Armed Forces. His ambitious and corrupt character, and his overtures toward Duvalier, have gained him his power within the Army over the placid, easy-going General Gerard Constant, Chief of Staff of the Haitian Army. For biographic information on Laroche see CSIT-313/00918-67.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 201-351629

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. CSDB-312/01428-67

SUBJECT Plans of Clemard Joseph Charles, President of the Commercial Bank Of Haiti, to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

DATE DISTR. 22 May 1967

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Early May 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. (9 May 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A foreign businessman with wide contacts in Port-au-Prince. Source reports infrequently, but his information is believed to be reliable. He received the information from a person close to Charles.

1. In discussing the possibility of overthrowing the Duvalier Government in the near future, Clemard Joseph Charles, president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, said he now is ready to execute his long-planned scheme to seize power with his military and civilian friends in Port-au-Prince, with or without the help of the U.S. Government.[1] If he fails in his efforts to obtain U.S. support for his plan, Charles still intends to go ahead with the plot, but he said the execution of his scheme will take more time. However, Charles believes that it is in the best interest of the U.S. to give him all necessary help in his effort to get rid of President Duvalier who has brought Haiti to the brink of total economic collapse.[2]

2. Charles said that he has rifles and hand grenades hidden "somewhere in Haiti" and that through his good friend Colonel Octave Cayard,[3] commander of the Haitian Coast Guard, three Haitian boats, which carry cannons, will be under his control. Cayard cannot furnish enough ammunition for the cannons, but Charles hopes to obtain the necessary amount from the U.S. Government. He would like to get the ammunition from the U.S. aircraft carrier, BOXER, which has been on duty in the Caribbean area for some time.

3. Besides Cayard, Charles has the support of an unnamed high-ranking Haitian Army officer.* Charles and his military and civilian friends plan to set up a provisional junta and get rid of the "enemies of Haiti," that is, Duvalier and his supporters. After the consolidation of power in the hands of the junta, Charles plans to run for President and is convinced that he can win since he has many supporters in Port-au-Prince as well as in the rural areas of Haiti. Charles claims that he "controls" the Catholic and Episcopal clergy, teachers and students, several businessmen, and key militiamen in the rural areas who are waiting for his signal to overthrow the present regime.

* Per Memo for Record dated 16 May 1967 - (EVMEND-1) Capt. Walter Reevar

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI 2
		CINCSO #						I&NS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".) (Also sent Port-au-Prince)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

(WH) EVMEND-1

CA/INT	2	WH/7/Ht	4	WHC/MO	1	TX-1176 NP (NRS) CSDB-312/01428-67
CA/PROP	1	WH/FRJH	2	WHC/WAVE	1	
WH/R	1	WHC/FI	1	WH/PACY (CINCSO) 1		
		WHC/CA	1			

TOTALS IN 2, CI 2, FI 3, CA 3, WH/COG 3 (1), WH 5 (2), DO/H 1.

LIAISON

COORDINATING

RELEASING HK
NLV/BEB
D/H

4. Charles has stated that should he become President of Haiti, he would pursue a pro-U.S. policy, eliminating the Duvalierists and the Communists and establishing a "liberal democratic" regime.

5. Charles still is pretending to be a loyal supporter of Duvalier; however, his position has become shaky and he believes that his life is in danger. He feels that he may fall victim to Duvalier unless he (Charles) strikes first. For the time being, Charles will continue to support Duvalier in an effort to allay the President's suspicions. As president of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, Charles soon will deliver a speech praising the achievements of Duvalier. He is anxious for the U.S. to know that his overtures toward Duvalier are pretense and that he is determined to go into action against the present regime.

Headquarters Comments

CS-311/05457-67, from another reliable source, reported that Charles and Herve Boyer, former Minister of Finance under Duvalier, were contending for power in the Haitian Government.

1. In the past several months, Charles has made numerous attempts to elicit support from several U.S. Government agencies for his plot against the Duvalier Government.

2. No reason was given for Charles' belief that it would be in the best interest of the U.S. to support his scheme to overthrow Duvalier. However, he may be referring to his claim that should he become President of Haiti following the overthrow of Duvalier, he intends to pursue a pro-U.S. policy and establish a "liberal democratic" regime.

3. Source Comment: Cayard, who enjoys the confidence of Duvalier, is a secret ally of Charles.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. CS DB-312/01625-67

SUBJECT Further Plans of Clemard Joseph Charles To Overthrow the Haitian Government; His Military Supporters and His Bids For Support from Haitian Exiles

DATE DISTR. 8 June 1967

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Mid-late May 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. (15, 22 May 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A foreign businessman with wide contacts in Port-au-Prince who is believed to report accurately what he learns. This information was obtained from a close friend of Charles who probably was aware that it would reach U.S. officials.

1. Clemard Joseph Charles, president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, claims that since Maj. Coicou (fnu),[1] a close friend, has replaced Capt. Harry Tassy in the Presidential Guard, he (Charles) now has an access to arms and ammunition in the basement of the Palace and is in a position to carry out a coup against President Francois Duvalier "in the near future." Although no definite date has been set yet for the coup, Charles is convinced that it must be carried out "within the next few months" to save Haiti from economic and political chaos. Charles, and especially his military friends, feel that 1967 is the year of decision.

2. Although Col. Pierre-Louis (fnu),[2] commander of the Dessalines Barracks, was not named as a fellow-conspirator, Charles believes that Pierre-Louis knows of and approves his plans to overthrow Duvalier, and that he (Charles) "controls" the Dessalines Barracks through Pierre-Louis. Col. Octave Caillard is one of the key military figures on whom Charles pins his hopes. Caillard is thoroughly disillusioned with Duvalier and is willing to cooperate. Caillard fears that if Duvalier remains in power, Haiti's economy will be completely ruined and Haitian exiles receiving guerrilla training in Cuba may attempt to seize power in Haiti.

3. Charles has the support of Capt. Preval (fnu),[3] of the Presidential Guard, and realizes that high-ranking officers loyal to Duvalier could cause bloodshed; Charles and his associates expect violence during the initial stages of the coup.

4. In addition to ships of the Haitian Coast Guard, Charles now has the use of a 352-ton converted landing craft (LC) which normally sails between Jamaica and Port-au-Prince carrying flour, fuel oil, etc.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI 2
		CINCSO #						I&NS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".) (Also sent Port-au-Prince)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/IC	1	AF/345/R	2	WHC/FI	1	TX-1188 HRS (HQ3: EVMEND-1) CSDB-312/01625-67
CI/OP/WH	1	WH/R File	1	WHC/CA	1	
		WH/R	1	WHC/MO	1	
CA/INT	2	WH/7/Th	1	WHC/WAVE	1	
CA/PROP	1	WH/PRIN	1	WH/PACY (CINCSO)	1	COORDINATING: CI/ ; RELEASING: HK / FJM / DWG
TOTALS	IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, AF 2, WH/COG 3 (1), WH 5 (2), DO 1.			LIAISON		

FORM NO. 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

5. Charles had no contact with Haitian exile groups until early May 1967, when he sent an emissary to New York City to talk to Louis Sansaricq, a prominent anti-Duvalier exile, whose entire family was killed by Duvalier's henchmen. Sansaricq agreed to support Charles in a final showdown with Duvalier and promised to line up some of his fellow exiles to support Charles. A close friend of Charles was planning to go to New York in mid-May 1967 ostensibly to discuss port development projects in Port-au-Prince with a U.S. construction firm; however, the real purpose of the trip is to contact Haitian exiles to gain their support for Charles.

6. On 19 May 1967, a group of prominent Haitian exiles held a meeting in New York City to celebrate Haitian Flag Day. One of the organizers of the meeting was Dr. Jumelle (fnu),[4] a medical doctor whose brother was a former Haitian Minister of Finance and who was killed by Duvalier. Another exile who attended the meeting was Vixamar (fnu)[5] who claims to be a legal advisor to the Republic of Chad and who said that he was going to be the next president of Haiti. The group of Haitian exiles, believed to call itself the "National Organization of Haitian Exiles", has some members who back Charles.

7. Following are prominent Haitians who Charles believes must be eliminated after the coup:

   a. Col. Gracia Jacques of the Presidential Guard - Jacques, who is no longer blindly loyal to Duvalier, will be needed in the execution of the coup, and can be bought; however, once power is in the hands of a military junta and Charles, Jacques will be eliminated.

   b. Luc Desir, head of the Tonton-Macoute.

   c. Clovis Desinor, Minister of Finance - an "anarchist" with presidential aspirations who has an "underground movement in Haiti."

   d. Gen. Gerard Constant, Chief of Staff.

   e. Col. Jacques Laroche, Deputy Chief of Staff - a "convinced Communist."

8. If the coup is successful, Charles hopes to give Andre Theard, former Haitian Ambassador to the United States, a diplomatic post; Theard is strongly pro-U.S. Charles regards Gerard Philippeaux, Minister of Health, as a very sick man with no further political aspirations.

9. Close friends of Charles are convinced that Charles has no choice but to carry out a coup with or without foreign help, and that his chances of success are good because several of Duvalier's new appointees to key positions are friends of Charles; also, that Charles must act soon because the morale of many of Duvalier's military and civilian supporters has reached an all-time low and because the Haitian Treasury is almost empty.

__Headquarters Comments__

1. Coicou may be Maj. Serge Coicou.

2. Probably Lt. Col. Luc Pierre-Louis.

3. Another source has identified Preval as Capt. Walter Preval.

4. Probably Dr. Gaston Jumelle.

5. Probably Henri Vixamar.

CSDB-312/01428-67 recently reported other plans of Clemard Joseph Charles.

☐ ☐
☐

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

30

ACTION WH 3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WHKOG8, DO 7, RI/AN, FI, FI/INT 2, CI, CI/OPS, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 052306Z CITE JMWAVE 7027

DIRECTOR INFO PORT AU PRINCE, DO BASE/NEW YORK

JMUNION EVLOFT

6 MAY 67 IN 61236

REF DIRECTOR 98884

B. UFGT 19382

1. ON 4 MAY 1967, EVLOFT-1 LEARNED FROM CONSUL EUGENE MAXIMILIEN THAT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES IS IN NEW YORK CITY ATTEMPTING BORROW MONEY ON GOH BONDS. ACCORDING TO MAXIMILIEN, PRESIDENT DUVALIER HAS INSTRUCTED CHARLES TO ADVANCE $50,000 FROM ONA (SOCIAL SECURITY) FUNDS FOR PURCHASE OF CARS FOR TOURISM DEPARTMENT. MAXIMILIEN STATED THAT ALTHOUGH ONA SUPPOSEDLY HAS $425,000 IN CASH, CHARLES HAS ALREADY ADVANCED $125,000 AND CANNOT FIND ENOUGH CASH TO MEET DUVALIER'S REQUEST. BECAUSE OF THIS, CHARLES IS SCARED TO RETURN HAITI ESPECIALLY IF PRESENT NEW YORK NEGOTIATIONS FAIL. CHARLES IS ALSO WORRIED THAT HE MAY NOT BE ABLE DEPART HAITI.

2. MAXIMILIEN ALSO SAID THAT FRITZ GREGER, DUVALIER TROUBLE-SHOOTER, NOW IN NEW YORK AND WAS INVOLVED IN COUNTERFEITING HAITIAN STAMPS AND MONEY AND HAS BEEN BANISHED FROM HAITI. EVLOFT-1 OPINES THAT HIS STORY FALSE AND GREGER

SECRET

201-357029

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 7327 S E C R E T

ACTUALLY IN NEW YORK OBTAIN INFO HAITIAN EXILES. SECRET

3. JMWAVE FORWARDING UNDER REF B COPY OF DOCUMENT PREPARED BY PRESIDENT OF BANK OF HAITI, ANTONIO ANDRE, FOR TREAGER BROS AND ASSOCIATES, MIAMI EXPORTERS, WHICH OUTLINES FINANCIAL SITUATION OF HAITI AS OF 26 DECEMBER 1966. EVLOFT-1 OBTAINED DOCUMENT FROM TRAEGER BROS WITH WHOM HE HAS PERSONAL CONTACT. TRAEGER BROS APPARENTLY APPROACHED FOR HELP IN PROPOSED GOH $2 MILLION BOND ISSUE, BUT HAS NOT RESPONDED. THE DOCUMENT WAS PASSED TO STATION ON 4 MAY.

4. INDEX CHARLES, GREGER, ANDRE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

4 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Telephone Conversation with Genevieve Alyea (Domestic Contact Service) re Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. At 1600 hours, 26 April 1967, Genevieve Alyea, DCS, (Green Phone 3024) relayed the following message to the undersigned, re Clemard Joseph CHARLES.

2. Today the DCS Headquarters received the following teletype from Mr. BALOG, New York City DCS representative, from Luis A. BRUN, President of B&B International Corporation, New York City.

A. Haiti's financial situation is now catastrophic. All efforts by President DUVALIER to attract foreign capital have failed. Domestic financial resources exploited through threats, extortion, etc. are rapidly drying up and unless the Government receives foreign help, it faces complete financial ruin.

B. In another effort to raise money abroad, DUVALIER gave permission to Banker Clemard Joseph CHARLES to visit the United States and contact his business friends there. (See Cases 40570 & 40576). CHARLES' visit to the U.S. is scheduled on or about 9 May 1967, at which time he will contact his business partner, Joseph DRYER, in Miami.

C. According to BRUN, CHARLES also plans to go to Washington where he wants to tell "U.S. Government officials in strict confidence that he is ready and able to overthrow DUVALIER's regime provided he receives U.S. help." BRUN will fly to Miami to meet CHARLES and will, in turn, tell "Capt. BALOG" about the results of CHARLES' efforts.

201-357039

3. There is a possibility that CHARLES will also come to New York City. If he does, BRUN and Capt. BALOG will discuss the latest developments with him.

4. During the past few days, CHARLES and BRUN have been in almost daily telecommunications, ostensibly discussing business matters. Using certain code words previously agreed upon in person, CHARLES is able to tell BRUN about the recent situation in Haiti without arousing the suspicions of Haitian phone censorship. Parts of the information contained in Paragraph 1 was received from CHARLES by BRUN during their teleconversation on 25 April 1967.

Wilma R. Van Scoy

Genevieve Alyea stated she would obtain copies of the DCS reports referred to in Para. 2-B above and call the Haiti Desk on 27 April 1967.

3 May 1967

Requirements for BALOG Contact With Clemard Joseph Charles

A. Basic Points To Be Stressed:

1. The U.S. Government cannot make any commitment of support to Clemard Joseph Charles.

2. Clemard Charles should not infer, imply or boast of U.S. support in his attempts to gain support for his project. The U.S.G. does not wish to be accused of overthrowing other governments.

3. Charles should be told, however, that any information concerning his plans, intentions and movements will not under any circumstances be divulged to the GOH nor to other countrymen of his.

4. Balog and his friends are definitely interested in Charles' activities and information he can provide relative to the situation in the latter's country.

B. Specific Requirements Relative to His Plans Since he Claims to Have Certain Capabilities:

1. What elements or groups within the GOH, the military and police do you have actually committed to your plan of overthrowing Papa Doc (Duvalier)?

2. Give the strength of each group? Names of leaders?

3. When do you plan to execute your project?

4. How do you intend to handle the situation with regard to the Presidential Guard, the Dessalines troops and the police in Port au Prince?

5. In the execution of your scheme what is the extent of violence foreseen?

6. What connection do you have with exiles and where?

7. In case you decide to act would you notify Mr. Brun beforehand?

C. Other Requirements:

1. What is the true evaluation of Papa Doc's health?

2. Who are his personal doctors?

3. In view of the deteriorating economy of the country do you think Papa Doc will step down and depart?

4. What is the reason or circumstances for the recent dismissals and transfers of junior officers within the military?

5. In a struggle for power what would be the situation between Lt Col Max Dominique and Luc Fourcard? Are these two individuals part of your scheme?

6. What part would Gracia Jacques, Luc Desir, Clovis Desinor, Gerard Philippeaux and General Constant play in case Papa Doc goes or there is a power struggle?

7. What part would the people outside of Port au Prince play in an attempt of an overthrow? What groups in the interior and other cities would begin fighting each other at this juncture?

SECRET

1 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Telephone Conversation with Genevieve ALYEA, DCS, re Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. At 1530 hours, the DCS Hqs. representative, Genevieve ALYEA (Green phone 3024), relayed the following message received this date from the DCS New York office, Mr. BALOG:

2. The "EARL" referred to in my previous message is Earl SMITH, former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba and a friend of the KENNEDYS. SMITH, who was approached by Joseph DRYER, florida businessman, to take Haitian banker Clemard Joseph CHARLES to the State Department, refused to do so. In turn, DRYER contacted Paul ROGERS, Congressman from Florida, who agreed to talk with Senator Ted KENNEDY. According to Luis A. BRUN, KENNEDY agreed to make an appointment for CHARLES at the State Department.

3. Last night (presumably 30 April), CHARLES flew from Port au Prince to New York City. He is staying at the Lincoln Square Motor Inn, Suite 1002-1003, SU-7-6800, until Wednesday (3 May) when he plans to go to Washington and Miami.

4. Also, last night, Luc Albert FOUCARD, son-in-law of President DUVALIER who is Minister of Tourism, and his wife arrived in New York City. They are staying at the Waldorf Astoria, EL 5-3000.

5. Allan COLTON, part owner of Haiti International Leather Corp, Port au Prince, a Canadian national who requested an interview with Capt. BALOG, flew back to Haiti yesterday. He told us (DCS) that his efforts to sell Haitian treasury bonds in the United States and Canada were unsuccessful.

Wilma R. VAN SCOY

SECRET

SECRET

25 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Melville Osborne
ARA/CAR
Department of State

Per our telephone conversation, there follows a copy of the message from Ambassador TIMMONS, dated 22 April 1967, concerning Clemard Joseph CHARLES:

> "As Department and CIA Washington are well aware, CHARLES has inordinate ambitions and has several times in past taken similar line. In my judgment he is again fishing to see if he can attract some form of U.S. Government support. We are most circumspect here in dealing with CHARLES and I am sure Washington is handling in same fashion. Ambassador asks this message be shown to LONG AND OSBORNE, ARA/CAR, State."

Original & 1 - addressee
1 - WH/7/Haiti Chrono
① - Clemard Joseph CHARLES 201

SECRET

201-357029

SECRET

24 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Genevieve ALYEA, Domestic Contact Service re CLemard Joseph CHARLES (201-357029)

1. At 1500 hours, 21 April 1967, Miss Genevieve ALYEA, Domestic Contact Service, X3026 (Green Phone 3024) called the undersigned to inform the Haiti Desk of comments made on a teletype message from their DCS representative in New York City, Mr. BALOG. According to Miss ALYEA, Mr. BALOG had interviewed a U.S. businessman who travels frequently in Latin American (later identified as Luis BRUN), on conditions in Haiti. Mr. BALOG had teletyped the report to DCS Headquarters, and had added the following comment at the end of the report.

"On 20 April, Mr. BALOG in New York City, interviewed the source (BRUN). The source visited Port au Prince during the latter part of February 1967 and spent one week as the guest of CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES (President of the Commercial Bank of Haiti). Source, who maintains telephone and cable contact with CHARLES, is convinced the latter (CHARLES) has decided with his unnamed Army friends, to overthrow President DUVALIER now. Source says CHARLES had asked his U.S. business partner, Joseph DRYER, Palm Beach, Florida (Home phone: 655-2610; Business phone: 832-6331) and another person identified as "EARL" (probably Earl O. FINNEY, AID official) to get in touch with the U.S.State Department before the end of this week. "EARL", who is supposed to have influential friends at the State Department, will try to persuade the U.S. Government that CHARLES, who has presidential aspirations, now has the power and determination to get rid of DUVALIER. CHARLES, who now fears for his life, sent his son to New York City a few weeks ago for a medical checkup and advised him to remain in the U.S."

2. Mr. BALOG then referred to Paragraph 6 of the intelligence report which contained the following question and answer:

Question: What is your assessment of youths, their political orientation or lack of one and their general outlook for the future?

SECRET

SECRET

Source Anwer: Students, as well as educated persons, listen regularly to two foreign radio broadcasts -- one emanating from the United States and one from Cuba. The Cuba station, which emphasizes Communist ideology, appears to be popular with the intelligencia and students while the "~~man~~-in-the street" prefers the U.S. broadcasts.

3. Mr. BALOG then commented regarding paragraph 2 above as follows:

"The radio station mentioned above is located somewhere in Massachusetts, according to our source and his Haitian friends in New York City. The believe it is a CIA operation."

4. Clemard Joseph CHARLES' Army friends mentioned above may possibly include Jacques LAROCHE, Deputy Chief of Staff.

5. At 1630 hours, the undersigned contacted Miss ALYEA to obtain additional information from Mr. BALOG concerning his interview with BRUN. Unfortunately, Mr. BALOG put the above message on the teletype and then departed for the weekend and will not be available for recontact until Monday, 24 April 1967.

Wilma R. Van Scoy
Wilma R. VAN SCOY

Distribution:
Original - 201-357020
1 - WH/7/Haiti Memo file
1 - 36-9-10

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. FI/ISR
A. Schumer

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 40

SECRET

PRECEDENCI

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH

FROM
22

ACTION
WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 1645 BY S

INFO
FILE, VR, C/S2, S/D6, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/SPG, FI/INT2, WE5, S/D6, CS/SGO

S E C R E T 221522Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4390

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

PRIN

22 Apr 67 IN 51252

AN 74	25	FI/ISR
~~DO~~		
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

REF: DIRECTOR 95076

1. REF SHOWN TO AMBASSADOR MORNING 22 APRIL.

2. FOLL FROM AMBASSADOR: AS DEPT AND WOFACT WASHINGTON WELL AWARE, CHARLES HAS INORDINATE AMBITIONS AND HAS SEVERAL TIMES IN PAST TAKEN SIMILAR LINE. IN MY JUDGMENT HE IS AGAIN FISHING TO SEE IF HE CAN ATTRACT SOME FORM OF USG SUPPORT. WE ARE MOST CIRCUMSPECT HERE IN DEALING WITH CHARLES AND I AM SURE WASHINGTON IS HANDLING IN SAME FASHION.

3. AMBASSADOR ASKS THIS MSG BE SHOWN TO LONG AND OSBORNE, ARA/ CAR, * STATE.

S E C R E T * BEING SERVICED

SECRET

BT

22 APR 67

201-357029

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 36

SECRET

ORIG: R.LEIMAN:sld
UNIT: WH/7/Haiti
EXT: 5595
DATE: 21 April 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO CI/ISR BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-357029

CONF: WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR SOD 6 CS/SG 6 CI CI/OPS CI/PS FI FI/SPG FI/INT 2 CA 2 CA/PEG CA/O 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 21 23 10Z CITE DIRECTOR 95076

TO PRIORITY PORT AU PRINCE

[redacted]

AN 71		FI/ISR
ABSTRACT	X	

1. ON 21 APRIL, ANOTHER WOFACT COMPONENT PASSED FOLLOWING INFO RE CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES WHICH OBTAINED FROM SOURCE WHO IN ALMOST DAILY CONTACT WITH CHARLES. SOURCE CLAIMS HE SPENT WEEK LATTER PART FEBRUARY AS GUEST CHARLES IN PORT AU PRINCE.

2. SOURCE REPORTED 20 APRIL HE CONVINCED CHARLES HAS DECIDED OVERTHROW DUVALIER NOW WITH AID FROM UNNAMED ARMY FRIENDS. SOURCE STATED CHARLES HAD REQUESTED U.S. BUSINESS PARTNER AND ANOTHER FRIEND TO GET IN TOUCH WITH STATE DEPARTMENT "BEFORE END OF WEEK" TO PERSUADE U.S. GOVT THAT CHARLES NOW HAS THE POWER AND DETERMINATION TO GET RID OF DUVALIER. SOURCE ALSO REPORTED THAT CHARLES, WHO FEARS FOR HIS LIFE, SENT HIS SON TO NYC FEW WEEKS AGO FOR MEDICAL CHECKUP WITH INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN IN U.S.

3. SOURCE ABOVE INFO NOT AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER QUESTIONING PRIOR 24 APRIL. HQS PASSING INFO TO MR. OSBORNE OF STATE DEPT. ACOS PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR.

21 APR 67
201-357029

END OF MESSAGE

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Paul V. Harwood
C/WH/7
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Port au Prince WHC

SUBJECT: 0 Operational/Contact with Clemard Joseph Charles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-357029

Reference: PORT AU PRINCE 4342

1. On 8 January 1967 Subject again made contact with RACHFIELD. Contact was established through one of Subject's assistants who came to RACHFIELD's home at approximately 1750 hours on 7 April 1967. Subject's assistant asked RACHFIELD if he would like to borrow some books on the history of Haiti and if so he could go to Subject's home and make a selection. RACHFIELD, in order to stall for time to affect the proper coordination, stated he would be able to proceed to Subject's home the following afternoon at 1600 hours. On the morning of 8 April RACHFIELD touched base with both the COS and Chief, LAPURE who agreed that RACHFIELD should go to see Subject.

who is assistant?

2. Subject was expecting RACHFIELD and apologized to RACHFIELD for not proceeding to RACHFIELD's home himself but explained that he was afraid RACHFIELD may have had guests. He proceeded to tell RACHFIELD that the economy of Haiti was in a deplorable condition and that noone can tell the President what to do. He then left the room and returned a minute later with a copy of "Le Moniteur", the official Haitian newspaper, which, he said, would not be released until sometime the following week. This newspaper stated that the Haitian Government plans to pay for the minting of new silver coins. Subject was very upset because, he stated, the Haitian Government cannot afford such an expense. The newspaper was turned over to LAPURE.

/continued/

gold +

Distribution:
2-Chief, WHD

CS COPY

201-357029

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HTPA-2011	11 April, 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HTPA-2011 (cont)

3. Subject once again reiterated to RACHFIELD that he was willing to answer any questions. He also stated that he hoped that the outgoing Chief, LARUMA would inform the incoming Chief, LAPUMA that he is most willing to cooperate with LAHARP because he believes that the salvation of his country depends on such cooperation.

4. Case Officer Comments. Charles appeared much more at ease during this meeting than he did at the previous one. It appeared as though he actually wanted to talk to someone and knew that he could trust RACHFIELD not to leak the conversation to the GOH. RACHFIELD, once again, left the door wide open for future conversations.

Francis D. Rachfield
Matthew H. CHUBB

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Port au Prince		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Summary of LNPURE Traces on Clemard Joseph CHARLES

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 85314, 21 March 1967

1. A dark negro about 5'7" tall, Clemard Joseph L. Charles was born at Gonaives, Haiti, on 21 April 1923. According to himself, his father was a professor and his mother a "simple peasant". According to others he is sensitive about his origins and is reported to have changed his name from Çanerien because of the connotation of nothingness implied in the name. His father is variously reported to have been a carpenter and a peasant. He received his primary education at the parochial school and graduated from the Lycee Geffrard in Port au Prince in 1939. According to his own account he taught in rural schools, worked as a pathologist, upholsterer, time-keeper, plantation supervisor, and free-lance journalist. In 1947 he was appointed Controller General of Haitian Southern Banana Industry and in 1948 became General Agent. The following year he established himself as Manufacturer's Representative and created his own export and import business. In 1959 he went to London as a member of the Economic Mission of the Haitian Government, and in 1954 negotiated on the Haitian Government's behalf a contract with the General Electric Co., Ltd. of Coventry, England for the modernizing and extending of the telecommunications system of Haiti. He later said that both his ventures into the banana and telecommunications businesses were unsuccessful due to political interference. His success story, according to a U.S. official "apparently hinges on the fact that he feels that he has achieved stature in the community both socially and politically". Charles states that he created the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti (CH) in 1960 and is now the sole owner. The

/Continued/

Distribution:
2-Chief, WHD

CS COPY

201-357029

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HTPA-2005	DATE 29 March 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

principal officer in Charles' bank when the bank was opened in 1960 with Charles as president was an American citizen in the savings and loan business named ZOLLA (fnu), who was later indicted, convicted and jailed in the United States for using the mails to defraud. Another original partner of the bank, one Gerald F. CONNOLLY, allegedly from Chicago, Illinois has a criminal record and various jail sentences and convictions. Neither Zolla or Connolly are currently signatories to the bank, nor partners. The bank is reported to have a very poor portfolio of loans since, according to rumor, the loans have been made to government officials on the basis of their signature and without proper collateral. Besides the bank, he is also full or part owner of several other industrial and commercial enterprises in Haiti and is the sole representative in Haiti of the General Electric Co., Ltd., London England, and the Siemens Schukert Werke, Germany. He is Director of Port Concession (after Mohammud Fayed departed) and also took over the oil refinery concession which originally belonged to Valentine. (Now involved in litigation with AID over their investment guarantee.)

2. Charles is President of the Chamber of Commerce, and also belongs to several other commercial and civic organizations including the Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Rural Sections of Haiti, the International Club of Commerce of Haiti, the Commerce and Industry Association of New York, and the Rotary Club. (According to a report of March 1967 he was dropped from the last club in 1966 for non-attendance.)

3. In March 1967 he was forced to give up his interest in a number of smaller concerns (Sonafrugo, Haitian Tobacco, Haitian International Leather, etc.) but retained his monopoly of the insurance business and the bank as well as his individually owned export-import business.

4. Although it is obvious that Clemard Joseph Charles has been a favorite of President Duvalier, the recent changes in his financial empire indicate a loss of trust. The economy is in such a poor shape that Charles is not making as much out of his enterprises and the money and credit squeeze is hitting him as well as the rest of the more honest businessmen in Haiti. As symbols of past favor Charles has been decorated with the Order of Petion and Bolivar (Commander), the Order of Agricultural Merit (Commander), Knight of the National Order "Honor and Merit", Officer of the Labor Order, and Commander of the Civil Merit Order.

5. One well-informed high United States official reported in early 1963 that Charles was a "slippery character" but that some doubt existed concerning his importance or political significance within the regime. A few months after this estimate was made, Charles conversed with a US Embassy official. Throughout their talk he showed an obvious desire to demonstrate his total political disinterest in the past while simultaneously hinting that he could become a political figure in the near future. He made guarded statements about the Duvalier regime, unhesitatingly giving the impression that he was the President's friend, both through desire and necessity, but that he definitely did not agree with some of the government's policies. He attributed his support of the current government to the fact that it would be dangerous for a Haitian to withhold it. The following month (May 1963), on a business trip to the United States, Charles told a former US journalist that he was in a position to become head of a provisional government after Duvalier was removed from the scene. He expressed a belief that the President was ready to institute a reign of terror and that he was willing to accept Soviet aid. In the opinion of the journalist, Charles firmly believed that this was the last chance for the United States to help establish a democratic Haiti, friendly toward the United States, and save the country from a Castro-type Communist takeover. Charles said that although he was on good terms with the President, he felt

/continued/

that he had gone crazy and must be stopped before he liquidated the opposition. Charles talked freely of his wide range of support (peasants; forcibly retired, anti-Duvalier army officers; intellectuals; journalists and businessmen) and of the prominent individuals who were anti-Duvalier and ready to back "my government". He added that if he did not become Provisional President he would be satisfied with the post of Secretary of Finance and Economic Affairs. In addition to his having reached the constitutional age requirement for President (40), Charles gave as another qualification the fact that he was of "100 per cent black origin," noting that only those in this category could win the presidency.

6. Charles said that if he were to be President he would need the "moral and economic help of the US Government and people" to transform Haiti into a true and prosperous democracy. He noted that he would need about a year to put into effect his "plan for the economic and social development of Haiti", which included the following points: creation of a balanced economy adapted to Haitian conditions; and modernization of agriculture. He said that he would like to present this plan to US officials for their consideration.

7. Charles endeavors to attract US venture capital for various Haitian projects and claims to be thoroughly pro-United States. He is reported to be an honorary citizen of the city of Long Beach, Long Island, New York, having promoted a "sister city" relationship with that town and Port au Prince; in 1962 he reportedly received the key to the City of New York. He has visited the United States, the United Kingdom and Western Europe many times on business trips. In July 1964 Charles traveled to Mexico and the United States, ostensibly to discuss the establishment of a sisal cordage factory in Haiti, but in reality to obtain 30 surplus T-28 trainer aircraft. Charles subsequently was reported to be attempting to purchase 24 US surplus naval craft for Haiti's armed forces.

8. He is married to Sophie, nee Lherisson, and has an adopted son.

9. Personality. Charles is generally considered as shrewd but not intelligent. This is borne out by his willingness to cooperate with the international swindler, Mohammed Fayed in a number of money-making schemes which came to a grinding halt when Fayed absconded with an undetermined but large amount of money. He has little sense of economic realities and is apparently sensitive about his knowledge or lack thereof. The Embassy reported in December 1965 that at a meeting Duvalier was holding with Antonio Andre (President of the National Bank of Haiti - BNRH) that Andre should be made to divert some of the "coffee money" from the National Bank to Duvalier's own needs. (Apparently Charles was referring to certain taxes on coffee exports which go to the Bank for debt amortization.) Andre roundly criticized Charles and other self-styled financial and fiscal experts in the Government, and ended by telling Duvalier that if the latter followed the advice of such persons he would wreck Haiti. Charles reportedly burst into tears and was taken ill. This gave rise to the story which was current at the time that he had had a nervous breakdown.

Matthew H. CHUBB

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357079

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑

DESTROY ☐ SIG. FI/ISR

attn: Vance

FROM: #1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION: WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/CI

AN 71	RF	
~~DS~~	~~REST~~	FI/ISR
ABSTRACT X		~~IX~~

SECRET 221522Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4332 PRIN

22 MAR 67 I 27 43

DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 85314

1. NO TRACES WOFACT FILES OTHER THAN REF TO REF AND 00-B-3,260,765, 10 MAY 1963.

2. SEE BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER REPORT OF JULY 1964 FOR SUMMARY EMBASSY TRACES. POUCHING ADDITIONAL DETAILS WHICH HOWEVER DO NOT CHANGE PICTURE OF SHREWD UNSCRUPULOUS MONEY MAD PROMOTER WITH UNORTHODOX IDEAS ABOUT BUSINESS AND WITH HIGH POLITICAL AMBITIONS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NW 53 [illegible]

22 Mar 67

201-357079

Clemard Joseph Charles

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM #1

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR c/o/ps

SECRET 221522Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4332

22 MAR 67 IN 27432

DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 85314

1. NO TRACES WOFACT FILES OTHER THAN REF TO REF AND 00-B-3,260,765, 10 MAY 1963.

2. SEE BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER REPORT OF JULY 1964 FOR SUMMARY EMBASSY TRACES. POUCHING ADDITIONAL DETAILS WHICH HOWEVER DO NOT CHANGE PICTURE OF SHREWD UNSCRUPULOUS MONEY MAD PROMOTER WITH UNORTHODOX IDEAS ABOUT BUSINESS AND WITH HIGH POLITICAL AMBITIONS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ORIG: M.J.GREMILLION:sld
UNIT: C/WH/7/Haiti
EXT: 5595
DATE: 21 March 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 25/M PER ______ # ______

CONF: WH 8

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85314

TO PRIORITY PORT AU PRINCE 21 1956Z

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 4324 (IN 22385)

1. EVMEND-1 RECEIVED WORD CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES DUE ARRIVE NEW YORK 21 OR 22 MARCH. CAN STATION CONFIRM SOONEST.

2. REQUEST TRACES ON CHARLES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref describes contact of Clemard CHARLES with Station officer.

Thomas Polgar

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

Paul V. Harwood
C/WH/7

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO. 201-257026

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

ORIG: M.J.GREMILLION:sld
UNIT: C/WH/7/Haiti
EXT: 5595
DATE: 21 March 1967

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 25/M PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85314

TO PRIORITY PORT AU PRINCE 21 1958Z

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 4324 (IN 22365)

1. EVMEND-1 RECEIVED WORD CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES DUE ARRIVE NEW YORK 21 OR 22 MARCH. CAN STATION CONFIRM SOONEST.

2. REQUEST TRACES ON CHARLES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref describes contact of Clemard CHARLES with Station officer.

Thomas Polgar
William V. Broe
C/WHD

Paul V. Harwood
C/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-257024

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. FI/ISR
R. Wellman
FROM
FI
ACTION
ANP
INFO
FILE, LR: C/AF, FI, FI/INT-2

~~☐ RID COPY~~

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRET 151634Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4324 PPIN

15 MAR 67 IN 22385

AN Y2 | ~~FI~~ | FI/ISR
~~RS~~ | DEST |
ABSTRACT ✓ | ~~INDEX~~

DIRECTOR

1. ON 11 MARCH CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES VISITED RACHFIELD'S HOME OSTENSIBLY TO DISCUSS NEEDED REPAIRS. (RACHFIELD RENTS HOUSE FROM HIM). AFTER ABOUT FIFTEEN MINUTES SOCIAL CONVERSATION, CHARLES ASKED RACHFIELD IF IT POSSIBLE TO PASS A MSG OUT OF CHANNELS DIRECTLY TO CHIEF LNPURE. RACHFIELD ASKED FOR MSG WITH COMMENT THAT HE WOULD MAKE ATTEMPT BUT COULD NOT SPEAK FOR CHIEF LNPURE. CHARLES SAID MSG NOT READY. RACHFIELD SAID THAT WHILE CHARLES PREPARED MSG HE WOULD CHECK WITH CHIEF LNPURE. RACHFIELD THEN REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO COS WHO STATED CHIEF LNPURE SHOULD BE NOTIFIED SOONEST. CHIEF LNPURE THEN GAVE HIM PERMISSION ACCEPT MSG.

2. SAME EVENING RACHFIELD WENT CHARLES' HOME TO PICK UP MSG. CHARLES AGN STATED MSG NOT READY BUT PROCEEDED TELL RACHFIELD HE VERY PRO-WOLADY AND WELL KNOWN HIGH LEVELS LNHARP. CHARLES SAID HE WOULD HAVE MSG READY BY 1000 HOURS FOLLOWING MORNING AND WOULD BRING TO RACHFIELD'S HOME.

3. NEXT MORNING CHARLES ARRIVED ON TIME CARRYING RECORD

SECRET

15 Mar 67

201-357029

SECRET

JACKET CONTAINING CONCEALED MANILA ENVELOPE SEALED WITH SCOTCH TAPE. RACHFIELD STATED THIS PACKAGE NOT IN KEEPING WITH MEANING OF WORD MSG AND HAD NO AUTHORITY TRANSPORT PACKAGE TO CHIEF LNPURE. IN ATTEMPTS MAKE CHARLES REVEAL CONTENTS, RACHFIELD STATED HE NOT PREPARED TALK AGAIN WITH CHIEF LNPURE UNLESS HE ABLE INFORM CHIEF LNPURE CONTENTS OF PACKAGE. CHARLES STATED PACKAGE CONTAINED REPORT OF COMMERCIAL BANK AND TOBACCO MONOPOLY. RACHFIELD SET UP ANOTHER MEETING FOR ONE HOUR LATER WITH CHARLES. RACHFIELD MET WITH COS AND CHIEF LNPURE WHO TOLD HIM TO ACCEPT PACKAGE.

4. WHILE PICKING UP PACKAGE CHARLES MADE ALL OUT PITCH TO IMPRESS RACHFIELD WITH HIS PRO-WOLADY TENDENCIES. HE TOLD RACHFIELD HE FORCED GO ALONG WITH DUVALIER TO PROTECT HIS TWO AND HALF MILLION DOLLAR INVESTMENTS HAITI AS WELL AS PROTECT HIS LIFE. ALSO, JUST PRIOR RACHFIELD'S DEPARTURE CHARLES STATED HE WILLING TELL ANYTHING CHIEF LNPURE WANTS TO KNOW. RACHFIELD LEFT DOOR WIDE OPEN FOR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS.

5. PACKAGE CONTAINED OVERT MATERIAL PLUS TWO MEMOS CHARLES HAD WRITTEN TO DUVALIER POINTING OUT DISCREPANCIES

SECRET

TOBACCO MONOPOLY FUNDS. PAPERS ADDED NOTHING NEW. WILL POUCH COPIES.

6. AS HQS AWARE, CHARLES PRESENTLY IN POWER STRUGGLE WITH HENRI SICLAIT AND RUMOR IS THAT CHARLES LOSING. FROM CONVERSATION RACHFIELD BELIEVES CHARLES RUNNING SCARED. IT ALSO RACHFIELD'S OPINION THAT CHARLES WANTED OPEN CHANNEL TO LNPURE, AND BEING UNSURE TYPE RECEPTION, USED PAPERS OF SOME BUT LITTLE VALUE TO OPEN CONTACT. HOWEVER, WHAT MOST INTERESTING IS NOT VALUE OF ORIGINAL PAPERS BUT FACT HE DID PASS ANYTHING AT ALL PLUS HIS OFFER ANSWER QUESTIONS.

7. CHARLES APPROACHED LNFORT BEFORE. SINCE HE OPPORTUNIST SEEKING REINSURANCE LNHARP AND LNPURE HAVE TAKEN POSITION WILLING TO LISTEN ANY TIME CHARLES WANTS TO TALK BUT NO STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN IN HIS DIRECTION IN HAITI. COS HAS INSTRUCTED RACHFIELD TO FOLLOW LNPURE PATTERN. HOWEVER STATION WILL BE ALERT TO CHARLES EXTERNAL TRAVEL PLANS AND WILL ADVISE HQS AND AFFECTED STATIONS IMMEDIATELY.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

NNNN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Miami, Florida

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

UAH

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	5-3-67

A-2

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) CHARLES	First Name CLEMARD	Middle Initial J.
COUNTRY OF ~~CITIZENSHIP~~ HAITI		
UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code) WALDORF ASTORIA NEW YORK CITY		
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PAA 432		
Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE PORT AU PRINCE HAITI		
BIRTH DATE [illegible]-21-23	BIRTH PLACE Gonaives, Haiti	

NAI
25
6 June 67
RB

201-357029 *

CHARLES CLEMARD Joseph

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION 4-30-67 Miami, Fla.
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION official-dur. of status
DESTINATION above U.S.

201-357029 *

lh

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

ckm
fc
22/5/67

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.
O.N.I.

FORM I-97
(REV. 6-1-68)

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 02/02/67

X-REF. S

X-REF.	SYM NUMBER	DOC. DATE	CLASSIFICATION
201-357029	HTPA-01960	06 JAN 67	201-808464
	DBB -66019	03 JAN 67	036-009-010
	DBB -66106	03 JAN 67	036-009-006
	DBB -66473	03 JAN 67	036-009-010

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT (S) IS CROSS REFERENCED
TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.

S-E-C-R-E-T

(1)

REPORT

On Friday, 19 June, departed Miami for Kingston, Jamaica via Pan American, leaving Miami at 0800 and arriving Kingston via Montego Bay at 10:15 AM. This flight continues to on to San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Latin passengers are commonplace. In passing through immigration and customs, it is necessary to give the immigration inspector the name of a specific hotel or address at which you can be reached in Jamaica.

Obtained rental car from Hertz Car Rental and departed Kingston Airport at 10:45 AM via Highway A-4 for Port Antonio of the north coast. Highway A-4 follows the coast around the eastern tip of the island. There is another route to Port Antonio, over the mountains, but it is not recomended. As shown on the standard highway map of the island, there is a small cove about seven miles east of Port Antonio designated as "Blue Hole". The cove is roughly 200 feet wide by 500 feet long, and completely protected from the open sea and weather. The cove is extremely deep, and is reported to have a minimum depth of six feet at the entrance. Tidal range appears to be very small, perhaps one to two feet.

When I arrived at Blue Hole, which is about 2-1/2 hours by road from Kingston, Robin Moore was not available; I went into Port Antonio and secured a room at the Bonnie Vue Hotel. I returned to Blue Hole about five o'clock and there met Robin Moore. Mr. Moore owns most of the land surrounding Blue Hole, with the Jamaican government owning the balance. On the beach facing the sea, Moore has built and operates a bar-restaurant which he calls the Teahouse of the Blue Lagoon. This accounts for the confusion between Blue Hole and Blue Lagoon. On the side of the mountain descending to the water, Moore has built and lives in a small studio apartment. He also owns another small house overlooking Blue Hole. This house was occupied temporarily by a girl who was introduced to me as his fiancee, Margot Palmer, and her mother, Rita Palmer. They are supposed to return to their home in Vancouver, B.C., about the end of June.

About five o'clock I introduced myself to Moore as a friend of Antonio de la Carrera, and gave him the note with the recognition symbol. We talked from five o'clock until about 7:30 at which time we had dinner and parted until the next morning at 11:30.

I spent the night at the Bonnie Vue Hotel and noted in passing that a U. S. destroyer escort based at Guantanamo Bay was anchored in the harbor for the weekend, with the sailors being given liberty in Port Antonio. This seems to be a common occurrence, and could perhaps be a source of information about Cuban patrol practices along the south coast.

Saturday morning, 20 June, met Moore again, and continued our discussion of the previous day. During our conversation, he introduced me to Fred Barrett, a native Jamaican (colored), who is in charge of the operation of the bar-restaurant. I left Mr. Moore and Blue Hole about 2:00 o'clock and drove to Kingston, catching the 6:30 Pan American flight back to Miami, via Montego Bay.

Following my two serious conversations with Moore, plus my observations of the man himself, plus my reconnaissance of the site itself, I submit the following items of information as being of significance:

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. Robin Moore

a. Moore has just returned from Viet Nam where he participated in the combat operations of the American Special Forces in Viet Nam, after he had gone through about eight months of training at the Special Forces School at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Some understanding of Moore's personality may be obtained from reading an interview between him and the magazine U. S. News and World Report, which was published recently, and copy of which was left with Maria. Further understandings and impressions of Moore may be obtained from reading his previously published book about Jack Youngblood, an American who participated in the events leading to Castro's overthrow of Battista.

b. In my opinion, Moore has a burning desire to be known as a tough, two-fisted, rip roaring soldier of fortune. He has participated in real war in Viet Nam, and has received what is probably the best training in the world for guerilla fighters, namely, the U. S. Special Forces. This includes training as a parachutist. He is inclined to brag, and is probably inclined to intemperate use of alcohol and women, and his judgement of important matters is probably immature. However, he definitely understands and is experienced in guerilla fighting, is experienced in military operations, and must surely understand military security.

c. He is definitely willing to help, but cannot contribute cash directly; is willing to furnish the use of the guest house on his property for limited periods of time. Is willing to participate and aid in an operation to land people on the south coast of Cuba, but is not willing to commit the use of his property and facilities as a staging area for resupply in the future.

d. Is willing to come to Miami, for conferences if his expenses are paid.

2. Site Evaluation

a. Blue Hole is an excellent harbor; protected against all weather, and with six feet of water at the bar. Is surrounded by very steep slopes, heavily wooded. Dock facilities are presently very meager, but could be quickly and easily improved. No fuel for a boat is available at Blue Hole, and at Fort Antonio (the closest source), the fuel available is diesel fuel or automotive gasoline; no marine white gasoline is available anywhere is the area. This is a most significant factor in selecting a suitable boat.

b. The nearest source of food and other supplies is Port Antonio; Fred Barrett, manager of the Blue Lagoon Club, orders and hauls supplies from Port Antonio constantly, and could deliver whatever supplies were desired. Firearms and explosives are not obtainable on the island. They would have to be smuggled in illegally.

c. A small station wagon is available for transportation, provided expenses are paid by users.

3. Miscellaneous Information

a. A local man, George Munroe, is reported to be a very experienced small boat captain and one who has brought boats down from Miami on five different occasions. He is reported to be available to serve as captain on a fishing boat, and to train a crew.

b. The S.S. Evangeline sails every two weeks from Miami direct to Port Antonio, and could be employed for the delivery of supplies and even a boat to Robin Moore.

c. Fred Barrett, manager of the bar-restaurant, seems to be a very capable man, and for an additional $10 per week added to his regular pay, would be quite willing to assist any operation.

d. A Mr. Anthony Gason, a retired British army colonel, is the Jamaica representative for TROJAN boats, at a place called Turtle Cove, between Port Antonio and Blue Hole.

e. The immigration chief for Jamaica is a man by the name of George Eubanks, who is the former chief of police at Port Antonio: Moore claims that they are very close personal friends.

d. Moore is acquainted with a man by the name of Mike Hedges, who is a nephew of Burke Hedges, the American who became Cuba's ambassador to Chile some years ago. Mike lives in Kingston, and, if he is not a Battista sympathizer, might prove to be a very valuable connection. The family is reported to be quite wealthy, and would establish an excellent cover.

4. Operational Considerations

a. In order to avoid the use of significant names, I instructed Moore to refer to Manolo as George King, and the operation of landing him in Cuba would be referred to as OperationKing. The most likely scheme seems to be to establish a suitable boat at Blue Hole, with the cover story to be that it belongs to American friends of Robin Moore. Housing is available locally for a limited number of Cubans, with Moore being able to accommodate up to six on his own property. The local boat captain, George Munroe, could be employed as captain initially, to train the Cuban crew in the local marine conditions, as well as serving as an effective cover. In my opinion, it will not be too difficult for persons to enter Jamaica without difficulty, provided they know a certain minimum amount of English.

I think a suitable location could be found for radio transmission and reception facilities on the hills surrounding Blue Hole, but this would have to be examined by someone skilled in radio techniques. Mateo would be excellent.

In summary, I would say that Robin Moore and his property and buildings at Blue Hole would serve as an excellent base of operations, but that the boat necessary for the operation would have to be acquired and equipped in the states and shipped down there, except for the remote possibility that a suitable boat could be found in Kingston. I think a headquarters could be established at small cost through Moore's good offices, and I think that Rudy would be a good choice to coordinate the initial operations there.

03
[Jack Reed]

201-353107

1/80

Clemard Joseph CHARLES
Vol: III

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CHARLES CLEMARD JOSEPH
201- # 357029
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:40 ~~2 AUG 78~~		~~BETH LICHTENFELS~~	
9AM 16 AUG 78	11:00 16 Aug 78	BETH LICHTENFELS	Beth Lichtenfels
11AM 24 AUG 78		SUREL BRADY	
18 DEC		S. BRADY	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

Clemard Joseph CHARLES
Vol: III

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CHARLES, CLEMARD JOSEPH
201-#357029
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:40 ~~3 AUG 78~~		~~BETH LICHTENFELS~~	
9AM 16 AUG 78	11:00 16 Aug 78	BETH LICHTENFELS	Beth Lichtenfels
11AM 24 AUG 78		SUREL BRADY	
18 DEC		S. BRADY	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

2D

Political Prisoner in Hospital

Clémart Joseph Charles was taken from the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince to Haiti's General Hospital. The former Duvalier banker has been jailed since 1971 "for political reasons." No proper trial was held.

Mr. Charles is suffering from an acute liver infection and the physicians attending him have warned that he will die unless he's allowed to travel abroad for special treatment.

This isn't the first time Mr. Charles was taken from his cell to a hospital. Last year he was rushed to Haiti's military hospital for treatment of the same disease.

Mrs. Charles has been allowed to visit her husband.

This is the first time the Duvalier regime has acted half humanely with a political prisoner. It's been pointed out that Marie-Denise Duvalier Dominique, a friend of Mr. Charles, has often interceded for him.

● Army chief-of-staff Jean-Baptiste Hilaire will soon be replaced, say military sources in Port-au-Prince. His likely replacement? Col. Roger St. Albain.

On a lighter note, the General ran for cover on September 22 while there was a review on the Palace grounds to commemorate Duvalier's "election" in 1957. Accidentally the loaded automatic weapon of a militiaman went off. Many officials, General Hilaire among them, scrambled for protection. Jean-Claude, his mother and their bodyguard General Gracia Jacques were trembling, but they kept standing, says a source that was standing close to them.

201 357029
"Haitian Observateur"
4-11 Oct 74

Clemard CHARLES
301

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. FIRLT-313/01268-74

DATE DISTR. 18 October 1974

COUNTRY Haiti

DOI Early October 1974

SUBJECT Transfer of Political Prisoner Clemard Joseph Charles to Port-au-Prince General Hospital.

ACQ 15 October 1974

FIELD NO.

SOURCE A reliable source from a Haitian exile leader who is well educated and who has a wide variety of contacts in Haitian exile groups. The exile was aware that his information would reach the U.S. Government.

1. Clemard Joseph Charles, former president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti who has been held political prisoner since April 1970 on charges of plotting against the government, was recently transferred from jail to the general hospital in Port-au-Prince. Charles is said to be dying of cirrhosis of the liver and was transferred to the hospital on orders of Madame Simone Ovide Duvalier, mother of Haitian President Jean Claude Duvalier.

2. Doctors recommended that Charles be sent abroad for proper medical treatment but Mme. Duvalier authorized his transfer only to the local hospital. According to close relatives, this occurred only after Minister of Interior and Defense Paul Blanchet told the President and his mother that he would refuse to become involved in this case and would not sign any papers required of him as Minister of Interior certifying that Charles had died in prison. Relatives of Charles still intend to press for his removal from the country.

3. Field Dissem: Sent to Port-au-Prince.

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	OCI	FBI		CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

CI/OP/LA	1		CLASSIFIED BY 010116		TX-1853 NP(EVMEND-1) FIRLT-313/01268
LA/ER	1				
LA/CAR/HT	3				
LA/PAP	(4)				
			OBJ:KIb		COORDINATING RELEASING RH:ER VG:lh
TOTALS	OPS/INT 1, PS/EG 1, LA 4 (4) CI 2		LIAISON		

3

r) Charles 201-357039

FORM 4-73 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20)

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM

PORT AU PRINCE 1630

DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1972

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT GRANTS CLEMENCY TO 89
PRISONERS

14-00000

TDCS INFORMATI REPORT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ORIG. BETTY A. VAZQUEZ
UNIT WH/7/HAITI/REPORTS
EXT. 4178/1528
DATE 24 MARCH 1972

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

#178

CONF. WH-20

CA 5, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CS/DO,

FR-4, FI 5, IW, EUR-6, DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF

TDCS -314/01961-72

DATE DISTRIBUTED
24 MARCH 1972

PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/REG	1	F/INTEL	2	F/BC/R	2
WH/RR	1	F/F/R	2	CA/INT	1
WH/FI	1	WH/7/DR	2		
WH/CA	1	WH/1	2	CA/B4	1
WH/7/H	10	WH/3/V	2		

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
TX-1534
EVMEND
(EVMEND-1)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE | ARMY | NAVY | AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS (Place X in appropriate space. List electrical addressees.)

CABLE SEC
- RECOMMEND EXO ☒ NO FOREIGN DISSEM
- BASIC DOCUMENT NOT MADE AVAILABLE DCI ☒
- RELAY CABLE ATTACHED ☒ FOR PORT AU PRINCE, PARIS, SANTO DOMINGO, CARACAS, MEXICO CITY, OTTAWA
- SHOW IW ☐

IW
- DISSEM ELECTRICALLY ☐ TO:

OTHER
- EXCLUSIVE FOR USIB ☐
- USIB PERSONAL ATTN ☐
- ZRWAHOO CABLE SENT ☐
- NOT FOR LIAISON ☒

25 MAR 72 08 03Z

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
C/WH/7/RP

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

RELEASING OFFICER
Robert Hopkins
C/WH/RR

COPY NO.

FORM 3-69 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(13-20-44-67)

File 201- 357029 (Clément Joseph Charles)

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS

FBI, EXO, DDI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDCS -314/01961-72

DIST 24 MARCH 1972

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 20 MARCH 1972

SUBJECT FURTHER EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI TO BRING ABOUT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH HAITIAN EXILES

ACQ 22 MARCH 1972

FIELD NO.

SOURCE A YOUNG HAITIAN EXILE LEADER WHO IS WELL EDUCATED AND WHO HAS A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS IN HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE.

1. ON APPROXIMATELY 20 MARCH 1972 LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, HAITIAN MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE, TELEPHONED FERMIN JOSEPH, AN OFFICIAL OF THE NEW YORK-BASED, HAITIAN EXILE NEWSPAPER "HAITI OBSERVATEUR," AND TOLD JOSEPH THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED AT THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT OF HAITI (GOH) STANCE TAKEN BY THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" IN GENERAL AND JOSEPH IN PARTICULAR IN THE 18 MARCH EDITION OF THE PAPER. CAMBRONNE STATED THAT HE HAD HOPED THAT HIS RECENT INVITATION TO ALL HAITIAN EXILES TO RETURN TO HAITI, COUPLED WITH HIS PRIVATE DISCUSSION

WITH JOSEPH, WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE PAPER CAUSE TO RE-EXAMINE ITS POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE GOH.

2. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED IN TDCS-314/01942-72 THAT DURING A MEETING ON 16 MARCH 1972 BETWEEN THE TWO, CAMBRONNE TOLD JOSEPH THE GOH CONSIDERED THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" AND ITS SUPPORTERS TO BE THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO THE GOH'S PLANS TO REUNITE ALL HAITIANS IN AN EFFORT TO BUILD A NEW, PROGRESSIVE NATION. AS A FIRST STEP TO RAPPROCHEMENT, CAMBRONNE ASKED JOSEPH TO REALIGN HIMSELF WITH THE GOH AND RETURN TO HAITI. IF JOSEPH ACCEPTED, CAMBRONNE SAID, THE GOH WOULD BE WILLING TO NAME HIM TO WHATEVER OFFICIAL POSITION HE DESIRED EITHER INSIDE HAITI OR ABROAD.)

3. JOSEPH REPLIED THAT BEFORE HE OR THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" COULD GIVE ANY THOUGHT TO SOFTENING THEIR POSITIONS ON THE GOH, THE GOH WOULD HAVE TO SHOW ITS GOOD INTENTIONS THROUGH DEEDS RATHER THAN MERE PROMISES. CAMBRONNE THEN INVITED THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" TO SEND A TEAM OF REPORTERS TO HAITI TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES THE CHANGES WHICH WERE BEING BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER. BEFORE SUCH A TRIP COULD BE MADE, JOSEPH SAID, POLITICAL PRISONERS WOULD HAVE TO BE RELEASED. ALSO,

THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" WOULD INSIST THAT ANY SUCH TEAM OF REPORTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY NEWSMEN FROM OTHER NATIONS WHO WOULD ACT AS GUARDS AGAINST ANY PRESSURE THE GOH MIGHT APPLY AGAINST THE HAITIAN REPORTERS.

4. JOSEPH ASKED CAMBRONNE WHETHER THE GOH INDEED INTENDED TO RELEASE SUCH POLITICAL PRISONERS AS HUBERT LEGROS, CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, AND COL. KESNER BLAIN AS CAMBRONNE HAD INTIMATED DURING HIS 15 MARCH PRESS CONFERENCE. TO THIS CAMBRONNE REPLIED THAT HE CONSIDERED LEGROS TO BE A VERY DANGEROUS MAN AND THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF EVER RELEASING HIM. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: LEGROS, A LAWYER AND SELF-PROCLAIMED COMMUNIST, WAS ARRESTED IN MAY 1970 AFTER HAVING BEEN SOUGHT BY HAITIAN AUTHORITIES FOR SEVERAL YEARS. CHARLES, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, AND BLAIN, FORMER COMMANDANT OF THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS, WERE ARRESTED IN APRIL 1970 FOR PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOH.)

5. CAMBRONNE REITERATED THAT HE BELIEVED THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" POSED THE NUMBER ONE THREAT TO THE GOH'S PLANS TO REUNITE ALL HAITIANS. CAMBRONNE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOH ALSO BELIEVED GEORGES RIGAUD, A LEADER OF THE HAITIAN

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN MONTREAL, AND A PROFESSOR RENE SAINT-LOUIS, WHO IS ALSO LOCATED IN CANADA, TO BE IMPORTANT ENEMIES OF THE GOH.

6. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO PORT AU PRINCE, PARIS, SANTO DOMINGO, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, OTTAWA.

RC
MAR 29 72

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY IW PER JSP

MAR 17 23 14 Z 71

TDCS-314/02923-71

HTP 1409

ACTION UNIT
WH 13

INFO FILE. VR. ADDP. CS/DO. FI 5, ID. RI/AN.

ACTION NO.
544

DDP, CA 3, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, DO 4, EUR 5, SOD 3.

S E C R E T 171719Z MAR 71 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 17429

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, PARIS, REP/LANT, SANTO DOMINGO

INTEL

17 Mar IN 289530

SUPDATA: EVLEMON/2 FROM EVLEMON/10 FROM SUBJ PORT AU PRINCE 7355 WHO TALKED TO RAYMOND. NO INDEX. FILE: 35-9-11.

FILED: 171719Z

201-357029

SECRET

Clemard Joseph Charles

DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

IN 289539

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDCS-314/02923-71

DIST 17 MARCH 1971

COUNTRY : HAITI

DOI : MID-MARCH 1971

SUBJECT : RESULTS OF THE INTERROGATION OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES AND KESNER BLAIN

ACQ : HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (16 MARCH 1971) HIP-1469

SOURCE : A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAD THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS PAST REPORTING HAS GENERALLY BEEN ACCURATE. HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM A HIGH RANKING MEMBER OF THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF.

1. ACCORDING TO BRIG. GEN. CLAUDE RAYMOND, CHIEF OF HAITIAN ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF, PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER COMPLETED HIS PERSONAL INTERROGATION OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, AND COL. KESNER BLAIN, FORMER QUARTERMASTER OF THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES, ON 15 MARCH 1971.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

(FIELD COMMENT: HTP-1467, TDCS-314/02737-71 , REPORTED THAT DUVALIER HAD SEEN BLAIN PRIVATELY ON 9 MARCH 1971 AND BLAIN AND CHARLES TOGETHER ON 12 MARCH 1971. THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT DUVALIER HAD AGAIN SEEN BLAIN AND CHARLES ON 15 MARCH 1971.)

2. RAYMOND SAID THAT, IN HIS INTERROGATION OF CHARLES, DUVALIER APPEARED PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH DETERMINING IF CHARLES HAD SERVED AS A FUNDING CHANNEL FROM AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN TO THE HAITIAN CONSPIRATORS. IN THE COURSE OF THE INTERROGATION, DUVALIER SHOWED CHARLES A PHOTOCOPY OF A CASHIER'S CHECK FOR $170,000 DRAWN IN CHARLES' NAME. CHARLES ALLEGEDLY REPLIED THAT HE HAD DEALINGS WITH MANY FOREIGNERS AND HAITIANS. HE DENIED DUVALIER'S CHARGES SAYING THAT, IF HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A PURELY HAITIAN AFFAIR AND THAT HE WOULD NOT SULLY HAITI'S HONOR BY SEEKING HELP FROM FOREIGNERS.

3. ACCORDING TO RAYMOND, BLAIN ALSO DENIED ANY FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT ALL THE CABINET MEMBERS HAD CONSPIRED WITH HIM AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, EXCEPT FOR AURELE JOSEPH, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERIOR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; MAX ANTOINE, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS; AND ANDRE DUBE, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FINANCE AND ECONOMIC

AFFAIRS. BLAIN ALSO IMPLICATED ABOUT ONE QUARTER OF THE 49-MAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, INCLUDING SUCH PERSONS AS ULRICH ST.-LOUIS, PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY AND DEPUTIES LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, VICTOR NEVERS CONSTANT, AND MME. MARCELLE AUGUSTIN. BLAIN ADDED THAT HE HAD ALSO CONSPIRED WITH COL. BRETON CLAUDE, COMMANDER OF THE DESSALINES BATTALION, AND COL. FRED M. ARTY, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES. BLAIN SAID THAT, LONG BEFORE APRIL 1970, CLAUDE HAD ALSO BEEN INVOLVED IN VARIOUS CONSPIRACIES WITH CLOVIS DESINOR, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FINANCE AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, AND THE LATE LEON BORDES, AND THAT THESE MEN HAD FORMED A CLANDESTINE POLITICAL PARTY WITH DESINOR AS PRESIDENT.

4. RAYMOND SAID THAT DUVALIER WAS CONTINUING A SECRET INVESTIGATION OF THESE ADMISSIONS, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FOREIGN FINANCING OF THE PLOT. IN RAYMOND'S OPINION, DUVALIER WILL TAKE NO ACTION UNTIL THE INVESTIGATION IS COMPLETE.

5. CONCERNING THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL WHICH WAS CONVENED IN EARLY MARCH 1971, RAYMOND SAID THAT THE TRIAL WAS SIMPLY

FOR THE SAKE OF FORM. THE SENTENCES HAVE ALREADY BEEN DECIDED UPON, BUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEM AWAITS WORD FROM DUVALIER. THE TRIAL OF THE THREE DEFENDANTS CURRENTLY IN EXILE, ALPHONSE LAHENS, CLEMENCEAU PROSPER, AND GERARD LOISEAU, IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD ON 3 APRIL 1971.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, DEFATT, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

(ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

MAR 19 71

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. CS-311/07138-70

DATE DISTR. 28 AUGUST 1970

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI LATE AUGUST 1970

SUBJECT PROSPECTIVE RELEASE OF REMAINING POLITICAL PRISONERS ARRESTED IN APRIL 1970 FOR ALLEGEDLY PLOTTING AGAINST GOVERNMENT

ACQ HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (26 AUG. 1970) FIELD NO. HTP-1435

SOURCE A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1963. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM AN OFFICIAL OF THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT WHOSE POSITION PROVIDES HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF ARRESTS ALTHOUGH HE HAS BEEN REPORTING FOR ONLY A SHORT TIME, HIS INFORMATION TO DATE HAS APPEARED RELIABLE.

1. ACCORDING TO A HIGH-RANKING OFFICER IN THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, THE THREE REMAINING POLITICAL PRISONERS ARRESTED IN APRIL 1970 ON CHARGES OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING, WILL BE AMNESTIED ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1970, THE ANNIVERSARY OF PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER'S ELECTION AS PRESIDENT FOR LIFE. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: CS-311/06776-70 REPORTED THE RELEASE OF THE OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS ARRESTED IN APRIL AND MAY 1970.) THE PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED IN SEPTEMBER ARE COL. KESNER BLAIN, FORMER QUARTERMASTER OF THE ARMED FORCES; CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF

S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

CI/ICG	2	WH/PRIN	1	PORT AU PRINCE 7103		HTP-1435
CA/INT	1	WH/7/DR	1	(IN 151419)		EVLEMON
CA/PROP	1	WH/SDOM	#		(EVLEMON-2	from EVLEMON-17)
WH/R (1)	1	WH/PACY (CINCSO) #				CS-311/07138-70
WH/7/Ht	4	REP/LANT	#			COORDINATING / RELEASING
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 6 (2), DO 1.				LIAISON *		RR BEB

Charles 201-357029

S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

HAITI; AND EDMOND PIERRE-PAUL, FORMER CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE HAITIAN SUPREME COURT. ALL THREE MEN, CURRENTLY CONFINED IN THE NATIONAL PENITENTIARY, ARE IN POOR STATE OF HEALTH.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, DEFATT, CINCSO, CINCLANT. (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. CS -311/06776-70

DATE DISTR. 13 AUGUST 1970

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI EARLY AUGUST 1970

SUBJECT RELEASE OF HAITIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS

ACQ HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (11 AUGUST 1970) FIELD NO. HTP-1432

SOURCE A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1963. HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM AN OFFICIAL OF THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT WHOSE POSITION PROVIDED HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF ARRESTS. ALTHOUGH HE HAS ONLY BEEN REPORTING FOR A SHORT TIME, HIS INFORMATION TO DATE HAS APPEARED RELIABLE.

1. AS OF 3 AUGUST 1970, FORTY OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS ARRESTED BETWEEN EARLY APRIL AND LATE MAY 1970 FOR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING OF COL. KESNER BLAIN, FORMER QUARTERMASTER OF THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES, AND COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, FORMER COMMANDER OF THE HAITIAN COAST GUARD, HAD BEEN RELEASED. BY 7 AUGUST 1970, AN ADDITIONAL NINETEEN PRISONERS WERE RELEASED, MAKING A TOTAL OF 59. AMONG THE PRISONERS RELEASED WERE FRITZ THEBAUD, FORMER SECRETARY OF FINANCE; VOLVICK CAYARD, FORMER DEPUTY AND BROTHER OF COL. CAYARD; MAX PIERRE-PAUL, FORMER

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CBS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

CI/IC	ZWH/PRIN	1	PAIN 7087 (IN 141314) HTP-1432
CA/INT	1WH/7/CR	1	EVLEMON
CA/PROP	1WH/SDOM	#	(EVLEMON-2 FROM EVLEMON-17)
WH/R (1)	1WH/PACY(CINCSO) #		CS-311/06776-70
WH/7/Ht	4REP/LANT	#	

BY CABLE - DEFERRED

TOTALS
IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 6(2), DO 1.

LIAISON

COORDINATING

RELEASING
DB
PRO
Tmm

Charles · 201 · 357029

DEPUTY; RAMEAU ESTIME, FORMER SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; MME. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES; MME. CLEMENCEAU PROSPER AND HER DAUGHTER MARYSE; AND ALL OF THE DETECTIVES OF THE PORT AU PRINCE POLICE DEPARTMENT WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED.

2. AS OF 11 AUGUST 1970, THE ONLY PERSONS STILL BELIEVED TO BE UNDER ARREST ARE CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI; COL. BLAIN; EDMOND PIERRE-PAUL, FORMER CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE HAITIAN SUPREME COURT; AND A COUSIN OF CLEMENCEAU PROSPER. OF THE PERSONS ARRESTED IN THIS CONNECTION, ONLY TWO, CITE DOUGE AND LEON BORDES ARE DEAD. BOTH DIED AS A RESULT OF MISTREATMENT WHILE IN PRISON.

3. (SOURCE COMMENT: SEVERAL OF THE FORMER PRISONERS, INCLUDING THEBAUD, MME. PROSPER, AND PIERRE-PAUL, HAVE BEEN SEEN ON THE STREETS OF PORT AU PRINCE SINCE THEIR RELEASE. ALL OF THE FORMER PRISONERS ENCOUNTERED THUS FAR HAVE EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT AT THEIR HAVING BEEN RELEASED AND ARE UNABLE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE UNEXPECTEDLY LENIENT TREATMENT THEY RECEIVED. ONE UNSUBSTANTIATED RUMOR CIRCULATING AROUND PORT AU PRINCE HAS IT THAT THEIR RELEASE WAS THE RESULT OF PRESSURE EXERTED ON THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, DEFATT, CINCSO, CINCLANT. (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM
PORT AU PRINCE 957
DATE: 6 AUGUST 1970
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM
PORT AU PRINCE 5[illegible]
DATE: 8 MAY 1970
CLASSIFICATION: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
SUBJECT: MEASURES TAKEN BY GOH AGAINST ALLEGED
CONSPIRATORS

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM
PORT AU PRINCE 546
DATE: 8 MAY 1970
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: CONFISCATION ASSETS CLEMARD JOSEPH
CHARLES

14-00000

FORM 3020 10-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

MAY 8 7 52 PM '70

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ACTION COPY

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 2 PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH 8

FILE, VR DDP, ADDP, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI2, CAS

ACTION NO. 605

S E C R E T 231600Z MAY 70 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6879

DIRECTOR

IN 078292

1. ACCORDING MORNING PRESS 8 MAY, LEGISLATIVE CHAMBER PASSED DECREE 7 MAY WHICH STRIPPED FOLLOWING PERSONS OF HAITIAN CITIZENSHIP AND CONFISCATED THEIR GOODS AND CHATTELS; CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, CLEMENCEAU PROSPER, ALPHONSE LAHENS, AND KESNER BLAIN. STATED REASON FOR DECREE WAS THAT THESE PERSONS WERE ACCOMPLICES OF REBEL COASTGUARDSMEN. THIS DECREE ESSENTIALLY SAME AS ONE PASSED 27 APRIL ACCORDING IDENTICAL TREATMENT TO COASTGUARDSMEN.

2. PALACE ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD NOT PROCEED WITH EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS AGAINST COASTGUARDSMEN BUT WOULD JUDGE THEM IN ABSENTIA. THIS ACTION FOLLOWED NOTE RECEIVED BY EMBASSY ON 7 MAY WITHDRAWING EARLIER REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION.

3. NET EFFECT THESE ACTIONS LENDS CREDENCE TO IMPRESSION THAT HAITIAN GOVT PREPARED ACT IN OUTWARDLY LEGAL WAY IN DEALING WITH REBELLION. ON ONE HAND, REMOVAL OF CITIZENSHIP AND CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY LEAVES FAMILIES DESTITUTE WHICH PROBABLY AMPLE OBJECT LESSON TO OTHERS CONSIDERING REBELLION

SECRET

Charles 201

FORM 3020 10-69 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE TWO PORT AU PRINCE 6879 SECRET

WHILE AVOIDING ADVERSE PUBLICITY ENGENDERED BY WHOLESALE ARRESTS AND KILLINGS IN PAST. ON OTHER, WITHDRAWAL OF EXTRADITION REQUEST PROBABLY DONE IN RECOGNITION OF FACT THAT U.S. WOULD NOT HONOR REQUEST AND THUS NEEDLESS CONFRONTATION WITH U.S. AVOIDED.

4. IN BOTH RESPECTS, THESE MOVES REPRESENT MUCH MORE MODERATE RESPONSE THAN HAD BEEN TRUE IN PAST. WHILE THEY SUGGEST DUVALIER MAY BE MELLOWING WITH PASSING YEARS, INCLINED BELIEVE THAT THEY PROMPTED MORE BY HIS BELIEF THAT HIS POSITION SUFFICIENTLY SOLID TO MAKE MORE DRASTIC MEASURES UNNECESSARY TEMPERED BY NOTION THAT SUCH MEASURES MIGHT PROVOKE ADDITIONAL REBELLIONS. THUS DUVALIER WOULD APPEAR ONCE AGAIN TO HAVE STRUCK WORKABLE POLITICAL BALANCE BETWEEN VARIOUS CONTENDING FORCES AND FACTIONS IN HIS ENTOURAGE.

5. ON PERSONAL SIDE, FRAYNE'S LIFE SOMEWHAT COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT CHARLES WAS HIS LANDLORD AND EFFECT OF CONFISCATION ORDER REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

6. NO FILE. GP-1.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET (When Filled In)

ORIG. BERYL E. BACKMAN
UNIT WH/7/HAITI/REPORTS
EXT. 4222
DATE 7 MAY 1970

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

#07A

CONF: WH 15

CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CS/DO, DO 5, FI 6, FI/D, IW

TDCS-314/04593-70

DATE DISTRIBUTED 7 MAY 1970

PRECEDENCE: ☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/REG	1 WH 7/Ht 7
WH/R	2 WH 7 DR 1
WH/FI	1 WH SDOM 1
WH/CA	1 WH PACY (CINCSO) #
WH/7/R	1 REP LANT #

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
PORT AU PRINCE 6870,6871
(IN 075915, 075925)
HTP-1406, 1405
EVMISER (EVMISER-8)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS (Place X in appropriate space. List electrical addressees.)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CABLE SEC
- RECOMMEND EXO ☐
- BASIC DOCUMENT NOT MADE AVAILABLE DCI ☐
- RELAY CABLE ATTACHED ☐
- SHOW IW ☐

IW
- DISSEM ELECTRICALLY ☐ TO:

OTHER
- EXCLUSIVE FOR USIB ☐
- USIB PERSONAL ATTN ☐
- ZRWAHOO CABLE SENT ☐
- NOT FOR LIAISON ☐

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
R Olson
C/WH/7/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/R

COPY NO.

FORM 3-69 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Charles 201-357029

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 075915
075925

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
FBI SS/ID I&NS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDCS -314/04593-70

DIST 7 MAY 1970

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI APRIL 1970

08 14 32Z MAY 70

SUBJECT
1. STATUS OF COL. KESNER BLAIN, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF ARMED FORCES, AND CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF COMMERCIAL BANK, IMPRISONED FOR ALLEGED ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING
2. DENUNCIATION OF COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, COMMANDER OF COAST GUARD, BY LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, DEPUTY FROM ARCAHAIE

ACQ HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (1 MAY 1970) **FIELD NO.** HTP-1406, 1405

SOURCE A HAITIAN UNIVERSITY GRADUATE WHO HAS GOOD CONTACTS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE HAITIAN MILITARY. HE IS A NEW SOURCE AND THE RELIABILITY OF HIS REPORTING HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED.

1. ONE OF THE SOLDIERS AT THE DESSALINES BARRACKS WHO IS GUARDING COL. KESNER BLAIN, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, WHO WERE ARRESTED IN EARLY APRIL 1970 FOR ALLEGED ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING, SAID THAT BOTH MEN STILL WERE ALIVE AS OF 30 APRIL. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCS-314/03869-70 REPORTED THE ARRESTS OF BLAIN AND CHARLES.)

2. ACCORDING TO A SOLDIER AT THE NATIONAL PALACE, COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, COMMANDER OF THE COAST GUARD, WAS SUMMONED

TO THE PALACE ON 22 APRIL 1970 BY PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER AS A RESULT OF A DENUNCIATION BY LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, A DEPUTY FROM ARCAHAIE. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCS-314/03869-70 REPORTED THAT CAMBRONNE WAS A MEMBER OF A COMMISSION ASSIGNED BY DUVALIER TO INTERROGATE THE PERSONS ARRESTED DURING THE WEEK OF 1 APRIL 1970.) WHILE CAYARD WAS WITH DUVALIER, CAMBRONNE TELEPHONED DUVALIER TO SAY THAT CAYARD SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED BECAUSE HE (CAMBRONNE) HAD IRREFUTABLE PROOF OF CAYARD'S COMPLICITY IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING. DUVALIER ASKED CAMBRONNE TO REPEAT HIS ACCUSATION WHILE HE GAVE CAYARD THE TELEPHONE RECEIVER TO LISTEN. FOLLOWING THE CONVERSATION WITH CAMBRONNE, DUVALIER REASSURED CAYARD OF HIS TRUST IN HIM AND REQUESTED CAYARD TO ARREST TWO COAST GUARD OFFICERS DURING THE COURSE OF THAT WEEK. CAYARD AGREED TO FOLLOW THE ORDER, BUT TOLD DUVALIER THAT HE KNEW THE ADDRESS OF ONLY ONE OF THE TWO OFFICERS. (FIELD COMMENT: ON 24 APRIL 1970, CAYARD LED AN ABORTIVE REVOLT BY THE COAST GUARD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. SEE TDCS-314/04646-70 AND SUBSEQUENT REPORTING ON THIS SUBJECT.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, DEFATT, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

(ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM

PORT AU PRINCE 472

DATE: 28 APRIL 1970

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: REPORTS OF EXECUTIONS OF PERSONS ALLEGEDLY
INVOLVED IN COAST GOARD ATTACK

14-00000

[redacted]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CHARLES
201-357029
SEX M DOB ?

036-009-006
PRIN-06803
15 APR 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
ACCUSED OF COUP PLOTTING

HTP

R 7005080679

FILE IN 201-357029

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIG. BERYL E. BACKMAN
UNIT WH/7/HAITI/REPORTS
EXT. 4222
DATE 13 APRIL 1970

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

#104

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 15

TDCS -314/04019-70

INFORMATION COPIES
CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/PS, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CS/DO, DO 5, FI 6, FI/D, IW, SOD

DATE DISTRIBUTED
13 APRIL 1970

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/REG	1	WH/7/Ht	7	WH/SDOM	#
WH/R	2	WH/7/DR	1	WH/MIAMI	#
WH/FI	1			WH/PACY (CINCSO)	#
WH/CA	1			REP/LANT	#
WH/7/R	1				

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., NO.L)
PORT AU PRINCE 6798
(IN 060590)
HTP-1379
EVLEMON (EVLEMON-19)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ AIR ☐

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
R Olson
C/WH/7/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER
Robert H. Rife
C/WH/R

COPY NO.

FORM 63-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Charles 201-357029

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

IN 060590

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

13 22 02Z APR 70

CITE TDCS -314/04019-70

DIST 13 APRIL 1970

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 9 APRIL 1970

SUBJECT DENUNCIATION BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOT

ACQ HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (10 APRIL 1970) FIELD NO. HTP-1379

SOURCE A HAITIAN PROFESSIONAL MAN WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HE IS A NEW SOURCE AND THE RELIABILITY OF HIS REPORTING HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED.

1. ACCORDING TO DR. JACQUES FOURCAND, ONE OF THE PERSONAL PHYSICIANS TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER, DUVALIER WAS INFORMED OF THE RECENT ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOT, WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY LED TO SEVERAL ARRESTS OF SUSPECTED PLOTTERS, BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI. CHARLES DENOUNCED THE PLOT TO DUVALIER WHEN HE REALIZED HE HAD BEEN "DOUBLE-CROSSED" BY COL. KESNER BLAIN, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES, WHO HAD PROMISED TO MAKE CHARLES PRESIDENT OF HAITI IN RETURN FOR $100,000 TO FINANCE

A REVOLT AGAINST DUVALIER. CHARLES ALSO HAD REFUSED TO GIVE THE MONEY TO BLAIN. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ALTHOUGH SOURCE DID NOT INDICATE HOW BLAIN HAD "DOUBLE-CROSSED" CHARLES, CHARLES WAS REPORTED IN OCTOBER 1969 TO BE FINANCING A PLOT BEING HEADED BY COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, COMMANDER OF THE COAST GUARD. SEE TDCS-314/15048-69. ALSO IN OCTOBER 1969, TDCS-314/15083-69 REPORTED ANOTHER PLOT AGAINST THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT BEING HEADED BY BLAIN. CHARLES, HOWEVER, WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT AS BEING INVOLVED IN BLAIN'S PLOT.)

2. FOURCAND SAID THE INQUIRY IS CONTINUING. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD DEFEND THE PRISONERS AND ADDED THAT NO ONE WOULD BE SHOT AS HAD HAPPENED BEFORE. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: FOURCAND PROBABLY IS REFERRING TO A SIMILAR PURGE OF SUSPECTED PLOTTERS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT CARRIED OUT BY DUVALIER IN MID-1967, WHICH RESULTED IN THE EXECUTION OF 19 ARMY OFFICERS.) (FIELD COMMENT: TDCS-314/03869-70 AND TDCS-314/03496-70 REPORTED THAT FOURCAND IS A MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION INTERROGATING BLAIN AND THE OTHER PERSONS ARRESTED DURING THE WEEK OF 1 APRIL 1970.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCSO, CINCLANT. (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

(When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 5 PER ______ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8 | FILE, VR Suspense WH, CDO [illegible] CA, CA/PEG [illegible]

ACTION NO. 599 | [illegible] FI, FI/INT [illegible] MPS/PSG 2

S E C R E T 091700Z APR 70 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6795

DIRECTOR

9 Apr 70 059504

1. CONSIDERING FACT THAT BLAIN AFFAIR IS FIRST JUICY MORSEL LOCAL RUMOR MILL HAS HAD TO CHEW ON IN SOME MONTHS, RUMOR CIRCUIT REMARKABLY QUIET AS OF MORNING 9 APRIL. STATION ASSETS HAVE HAD NOTHING NEW TO REPORT SINCE EVMISER/8'S ACCOUNT OF UNCERTAINTY IN COAST GUARD. EVEN LEPURE INFORMANTS WHO SOMETIMES WORK OVERTIME CONCOCTING RATIONALES OF PAST EVENTS AND GUESSTIMATES OF FUTURE IN THIS TYPE OF SITUATION HAVE BEEN SILENT.

2. CURRENT BOX SCORE OF DETAINEES COMPRISES BLAIN, DOUGE, BORDES, CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES AND HIS ASSISTANT, APOLLO GARNIER. ALPHONSE LAHENS STILL AT LARGE AND REPORTEDLY UNSUCCESSFUL IN SEEKING ASYLUM AT VARIOUS LATIN EMBASSIES. MME. LAHENS NO LONGER IN CUSTODY. ALSO CONSTANTIN DUPLESSIS HAS BEEN RELEASED.

3. NO HARD INFO AND LITTLE INFORMED SPECULATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE ON NATURE OR EXTENT OF PLOT IF ONE ACTUALLY EXISTED. MOST PERSISTENT RUMOR IS THAT BLAIN SOMEHOW PLANNED SEIZE GC-10 AND LAY SIEGE TO PALACE WITH

SECRET

Charles 201 file

(When Filled In) EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____________

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____________ BRANCH ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ____

ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE TWO PORT AU PRINCE 6795 SECRET

PORT AU PRINCE POLICE SOMEHOW PLAYING ROLE OF GROUND TROOPS IN ATTACK ON PALACE. IF THERE ANY SUBSTANCE AT ALL TO THIS RUMOR, SEEMS ODD THAT GOVT HAS NOT MOVED AGAINST COAST GUARD. SEEMS EQUALLY ODD THAT BLAIN WOULD HAVE BEEN BADMOUTHING COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE IN TALKING TO EVMENDS LAST DECEMBER IF HE ENVISIONED SOME ROLE FOR THEM.

4. OUR TENTATIVE JUDGEMENT AT THIS POINT IS THAT PLOT, IF ONE EXISTED, STILL VERY MUCH IN TALKING STAGE AND THAT ARRESTS PROMPTED MORE BY INDISCREET TALK BY BLAIN, CHARLES, ET AL WHO NOTORIOUSLY VOLUBLE THAN REAL CAPABILITY FOR ACTION. ALSO BY FACT THAT GOVT HAD NOT TAKEN DECISIVE ACTION OF THIS SORT FOR SOME TIME AND DUVALIER MAY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT TIME RIPE TO REMIND DISSIDENTS THAT HE STILL IN SADDLE.

5. NO FILE. GP-1.

SECRET

SECRET

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM

PORT AU PRINCE 295

DATE: 7 APRIL 1970

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ARRESTS OF COMMERCIAL BANK OFFICERS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

MIAMI FLA.

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

G-5

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	1-21-70

NAI 11 Feb 70 FB

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters): CHARLES — First Name: JOSEPH — Middle Initial:

AKA CLEMARD, JOSEPH

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP: HAITI [redacted] [redacted]

UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code): UNIVERSITY PLACE 2 E. ORANGE, NY

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL: AF 242

Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE: RUE LAMARRE #2 PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI

BIRTH DATE: 10-07-39

BIRTH PLACE: CAPOTILLE, HAITI

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION: MIAMI, FLA. 1-17-70

RW 2/5/70 REF

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION: official dur of status

DESTINATION: USA above

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F.B.I.

pm

cc: CIA

RW 2/4 70 REF

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

file in 201-357029

FORM I-57
(REV. 9-1-67)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: S AT: 1720 Z

9

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

PRECEDENCE

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT: WH8 | INFO: FILE, VR FI, I/AN, DO 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2, WH/ADDP

ACTION NO: W7

S E C R E T 281630Z OCT 69 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6531

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO DO BASE NEW YORK

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REFS: A. DO BASE NEW YORK 7075 (N 70936)

B. DO BASE NEW YORK 7106 (N 74095)

28 Oct 69 IN 74687

1. INTERESTED TO NOTE THAT REF A CITES IDENS F AND H REF A AS ONLY POSSIBLY WITTING OF REF A PLOT, WHEREAS IDEN H IS SOURCE OF INFO ON REF B PLOT IN WHICH IDEN F IS ALLEGEDLY PRIME ACTIVIST. POSSIBILITY THUS EXISTS, IF THERE ANY VALIDITY TO EITHER REF, THAT REF B IS SIMPLY EFFORT BY IDEN H AND/OR IDEN F TO SMOKE OUT INFO ON REF A PLOT FROM EVMEND/1. EVMEND/1'S ACTION IN INFORMING IDEN H AND URGING BC TO COORDINATE WITH IDEN F SEEMS FOOLHARDY SINCE IT BROADENS SPECTRUM OF LOOSE-LIPPED HAITIANS PRIVY TO ONE OR BOTH ALLEGED PLOTS.

2. ALSO INTERESTING THAT BC EMERGES FROM BOTH REFS WITH ACTION CAPABILITY OF WHICH WE HITHERTO UNAWARE. WHILE THIS POSSIBLY MORE CASE OF EVMEND/1 ATTEMPTING CREATE IMPRESSION OF IN COUNTRY CAPABILITY THAT ACTUAL FACT, WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL LIGHT 29 OCTOBER MEETING ABLE SHED ON BC PERSONALITIES AND ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

56657

[illegible] DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE TWO PORT AU PRINCE 6531 S E C R E T

3. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE HQS COMMENTS ON IMPLICATIONS FOR BC OF APPARENT RIFT BETWEEN EVMEND/1 AND EVMEND/4.

4. CONCERNING PARA 5 REF A REQUEST FOR FAST COMMO BETWEEN EVMEND HQS AND BC, HQS MAY WISH CONSIDER FLOATING FRAYNE'S NAME AS PERSONAL FRIEND OF GILBRIDE FROM SAIGON WHO RECENTLY ARRIVED LNGOLD OFFICER BUT PROBABLY WILLING PASS ON PRIVATELY ANY WORD FROM BC. THIS PLOY USEFUL IN SMOKING OUT EVMEND/1 WILLINGNESS IDENTIFY BC OPERATIVES, WHILE LEAVING FRAYNE FREE TO DISAVOW IN EVENT CIRCUMSTANCES ON GROUND SO DICTATE. THIS ALSO PRESUPPOSES EVMEND/1 CONTINUING VIABILITY AS CHANNEL TO EVMEND ORG DESPITE RIFT WITH EVMEND/4 SINCE WE SEE LITTLE VIRTUE IN OFFER OF COMMO CHANNEL BECOMING SOURCE OF FURTHER FRICTION BETWEEN VARIOUS EVMENDS.

5. FILE: 36-124-25/3.

S E C R E T

27 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Chief, WH/7

REFERENCE : Your request this subject

Following our receipt of information that Clemard-Joseph Charles had taken a list of requirements into the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince and asked help in filling them, WH Division sent a memorandum on 19 August 1969 to the Chief, DCS, asking that DCS's contact with Louis A. Brun (from whom Charles had received the requirements) be terminated.

The DCS New York office on 29 August 1969 sent a memorandum to Chief, DCS, which reviewed the case, noted Brun had been guilty of sloppy security, and concluded that no further requirements would be given him. This memorandum did not, however, say that contact would be terminated; in fact, it said they would continue to debrief Brun whenever he returned from a trip to Haiti. This memorandum was sent to Port-au-Prince (HTPW-1347, 17 Sept 1969).

The Station replied (Port-au-Prince 6496, 11 Oct 69) that this was not enough, that the contact should be completely severed. WH/Branch 7 officers then met with Mr. George Musulin of DCS to discuss the matter further, WH/7 officers maintaining that there was more political action hazard to this contact than the FI product justified. Musulin agreed to raise the matter with C/DCS. The result was a memorandum on 16 October 1969 from C/DCS to C/WHD which referred to the original WHD memorandum of 19 August and advised that contact with Brun has been terminated. Port-au-Prince was so informed (DIR 48277, 21 Oct 69).

James P. Mullen

James P. Mullen
C/WH/7/HT

SECRET

[illegible]

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 6 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

ES/DO

BY: D AT: 2320 Z

DISSEM BY: ✓ PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. __________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. __________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO __________ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

FILE, VR, RI/AN, DC4, ES/DO, ADDP, DDP, SEX, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION NO.: FE7, CI/PS, FI 2, CAS, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, MPS/PSG 2

S E C R E T 272212Z OCT 69 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 7186 27 Oct 69 IN 74095

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PORT AU PRINCE

NO NIACT

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REF A DO BASE NEW YORK 7075 (IN 70936)

B DO BASE NEW YORK 7076 (IN 70937)

1. SOURCE PARA 2 BELOW IS IDEN H (MARCEL BONT) OF REF B VIA EVMEND/1. DOI CA 25 OCTOBER.

2. SEPARATE PLOT FROM THAT DESCRIBED REF A IS UNDER WAY HEADED BY IDEN F (KESNER BLAIN) REF B WITH ALLEGED SUPPORT OF UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS WHO PLANNING TO TAKE POWER USING TWO COMPANIES FROM DESSALINES BARRACKS. IDEN F (BLAIN) REQUESTS THAT EVMENDS LAUNCH FAKE INVASION PLOT DIVERSION SIMILAR TO ONES IN PAST, LETTING IDEN F (BLAIN) KNOW DATE AND PLACE INVASION SUPPOSED TO OCCUR. COUP WOULD THEN BE TIMED ACCORDINGLY. IDEN H (BONT) IMPLIED THAT COAST GUARD ONCE ALERTED COULD BE COUNTED ON TO GO ALONG WITH INSURGENTS BUT DID NOT MENTION IDEN A (CAYARD) REF B IN THIS CONTEXT.

SECRET

Bosch
3. EVMEND/1 INFORMED IDEN H IN GENERAL TERMS THAT REF A PLOT
Balan
IS JELLING AND ANY ACTION BY IDEN F GROUP AGAINST PRESIDENTIAL GUARD WOULD BE MISTAKE. EVMEND/1 INFORMING BUREAU CENTRAL OF IDEN
Balan
F PLANS AND URGING THEM COORDINATE, SAYS EVMENDS WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO FLOAT INVASION STORY OR APPROVE ANY SUCH ATTEMPT ON PART OF EMIGRES.

4. EVMEND/4 HAS NOT BEEN INFORMED BY EVMEND/1 OF INFO PARA 2 ABOVE, ALTHOUGH EVMEND/4 AWARE THAT EVMEND/1 HAS BEEN SEEING
Bosch
IDEN H. EVMEND/1 HAS APPRAISED EVMEND/3 OF GENERAL FEATURES OF REF A PLAN BUT NOT OF PARA 2 ABOVE. RELATIONS BETWEEN EVMEND/1 AND EVMEND/4 APPEAR TO BE AT NADIR, HENCE SUGGEST GILBRIDE PLAN DETAILED DISCUSSION PRESENT SITUATION IN HC WITH BASE PRIOR TO AFTERNOON MEETING WITH EVMEND/1 ON 29 OCTOBER.

5. FILE: 35-124-25/3. INDEX DEFER.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______ #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, DO 4, FI 2.

232

S E C R E T 231325Z OCT 69 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6520

DIRECTOR INFO DO BASE NEW YORK

23 OCT 69 IN 71559

9

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REF: DO BASE NEW YORK 7075 (IN 70936)

1. ONLY POSSIBLE INDICATION OF REF PLOTTING IN RECENT STATION REPORTING WAS DELPHIC COMMENT BY EVLEMON/10 TO E-2 ON 21 OCTOBER THAT WHILE MEN LIKE DESINOR, RAMEAU ESTIME, FREDERIC DESVAPIEUX MANEUVER TO REPLACE DUVALIER, IT IS ARMED FORCES WHICH HAS THE LAST WORD IN SUCH MATTERS. ALSO THAT THERE ARE TIMES, IN POLITICS, WHEN E/10 MUST BE RETICENT DESPITE HIS CONFIDENCE IN E/2'S INTENTIONS, ALSO WHEN E/2 LEAST EXPECTED IT, E/10 WOULD TELL HIM EVERYTHING THAT WAS GOING ON. REMARKS WERE MADE IN RESPONSE TO E/2 QUESTION ABOUT IMPACT OF RECENT NOUVEAU MONDE ARTICLE BY ANTOINE HERARD WHICH BEING INTERPRETED BY E/10 AS DUVALIER PLANT FORESHADOWING PURGE OF MORE CORRUPT ELEMENTS IN GOVT. (REACTION OF E-5, 10 AND 16 TO ARTICLE BEING DISSEMED). THUS E/10'S REMARKS MAY SIMPLY HAVE REFERRED TO THIS SORT OF PURGE INSTEAD BROADER PLOT NOTED REF.

2. FRAYNE HAS APPOINTMENT WITH IDEN B REF 0930 27 OCT TO .

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE TWO PORT AU PRINCE 6520 SECRET

DISCUSS NEW LEASE ON HOUSE HE OCCUPYING. PLAN USE MEETING TO OPEN LOW KEY CHANNEL TO IDEN B. REALIZE THIS DUPLICATES EXISTING CHANNELS OTHER LNPURE OFFICERS AND IDEN B NOTORIOUSLY INDISCREET, BUT MAY BE OF VALUE IF REF PLOT JELLS.

3. ALSO PLAN PAY COURTESY CALL ON IDEN A WHO LIVES TWO HOUSES AWAY IN CONTEXT GETTING ACQUAINTED WITH NEIGHBORS.

4. RE IDEN I WHO ENCRYPTED EVLEAF/1, BELIEVE UPCOMING PERLITE ONE VISIT MAY AFFORD CHANCE GET FIRST HAND READING HIS VIEWS. OR FRAYNE MAY APPROACH DIRECTLY AS PERSON TEEGAST SUGGESTED WAS WELL INFORMED ON HAITIAN AFFAIRS. PLS ADVISE IF HQS HAS OBJECTIONS TO LATTER TACK.

5. ACCORDING MILATT, IDEN D REF IS PROBABLY MAJOR JEAN THOMAS, PDOB, ST. MARC, HAITI, 5 JUN 35, GRADUATED HAITIAN MILITARY ACADEMY '56.

6. UPON CLEARANCE FROM HQS, WILL PASS SUBSTANCE PARAS 2 AND 3 REF TO CHARGE. ALSO PLEASE ADVISE WHEN LNGOLD INFORMED.

SECRET

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION #179 SECRET 23

ORIG. BERYL E. BACKMAN
UNIT WH/7 REPORTS/HAITI
EXT. 4222
DATE 23 OCTOBER 1969

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES WH 18

TDCS -314/~~70936-69~~ 15647-69

INFORMATION COPIES DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF
CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CS/DO, DO 5, FI 6, FI/D, IW

DATE DISTRIBUTED 23 OCTOBER 1969

PRECEDENCE ☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/REG	1	WE/7/Ht 7
WH/R	2	WH/7/DR 2
WH/FI	1	
WH/CA	1	
WH/7/R	1	

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
DO BASE NEW YORK 7075
(IN 70936)
EVMEND (EVMEND-1)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE | ARMY | NAVY | AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS TD IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO PORT AU PRINCE, SANTO DOMINGO, PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, AND DO BASE NEW YORK.

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
C/WH/7/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
DO/L/RR: Kenny (by phone)

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH R

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)
GROUP 1

COPY NO.

OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Charles 201-357029

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

IN 70936

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA

Eku DO/I

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

23 21 01Z OCT 69

CITE TDCS-314/15048-69

DIST 23 OCTOBER 1969

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI MID-AUGUST - MID-OCTOBER 1969

SUBJECT PLANS BY HAITIAN MILITARY OFFICER TO OVERTHROW THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT AND TO ESTABLISH A JUNTA

ACQ (23 OCTOBER 1969)

FIELD NO.

SOURCE A YOUNG HAITIAN EXILE LEADER WHO IS WELL EDUCATED AND WHO HAS A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS IN HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS IN EUROPE AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM ONE OF HIS CONTACTS INSIDE HAITI WHO HAS BECOME INVOLVED IN THE PLOTTING. SOURCE WAS AWARE THAT THE INFORMATION WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

1. ALTHOUGH NO SPECIFIC DATE HAS BEEN GIVEN FOR THE ACTION, COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, COMMANDER OF THE COAST GUARD, GEN. GERARD CONSTANT, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND COL. GRACIA JACQUES, COMMANDER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, ARE LAYING PLANS TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT FRANCOIS

DUVALIER AND TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES AS A JUNTA. THE PLOT IS BEING HEADED BY CAYARD AND IS BEING FINANCED BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, IN THE AMOUNT OF $600,000.

2. IN THE ORIGINAL PLAN, THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD WAS REGARDED AS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PLAN AND, THEREFORE, CAYARD AND CONSTANT AGREED TO INCLUDE JACQUES IN THE JUNTA ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS A NECESSARY EVIL. CAYARD'S ONLY CONTACT WITH JACQUES, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN INDIRECTLY THROUGH CAPTAIN THOMAS (FNU). (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THOMAS PROBABLY IS IDENTICAL WITH MAJOR JEAN THOMAS, EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.)

3. BESIDES THE ASSISTANCE THE PLOTTERS HAVE OBTAINED FROM INSIDE HAITI, THEY ALSO ARE SEEKING SUPPORT FROM HAITIAN EXILES WHO ACTIVELY OPPOSE THE DUVALIER REGIME.

4. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN MID-MAY 1969, A MILITARY JUNTA, WHICH INCLUDED CAYARD AND CONSTANT, WAS BEING FORMED TO OVERTHROW THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT. AT THAT TIME, IT WAS NOT CLEAR IF THE GROUP HAD ACTUALLY APPROACHED JACQUES, BUT IT WAS THOUGHT THAT AS COMMANDER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO

OFFER NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR THEIR PLAN. SEE TDCS-314/07619-69. THE PLANNING IN MID-MAY 1969 WAS FOR ACTION IN THE EVENT OF DUVALIER'S DEATH. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PRESENT PLOT IS IN FACT ONLY A CONTINUATION OF THAT CONTINGENCY PLANNING.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT. (ALSO SENT PORT AU PRINCE AND SANTO DOMINGO)

3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

BY: 8 AT: 1740 Z

DISSEM BY 2 PER #

ACTION UNIT WH 8

FILE, VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH, ADY, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OC 2, C/FI, CAS, CA/PEG,

ACTION NO. 101

F12

SECRET 221622Z OCT 69 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 7876 (ALLENSWORTH ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PORT AU PRINCE

22 Oct 69 IN 70937

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REF DO BASE NEW YORK 7875 (IN 70936)

IDENS

A. OCTAVE CAYARD

B. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

C. GENERAL CONSTANT

D. CAPTAIN FNU THOMAS, PROBABLY JEAN

E. GRACIA JACQUES

F. KESNER BLAIN

G. ROLAND MAGLOIRE

H. MARCEL BONY

I. BERTHONY MADHERE

J. FNU RIGAUD

K. FRITZ HYACINTHE, DOB CA 1929, CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF HUBERT LEGROS, EMPLOYED EITHER AT BANQUE COLOMBO-HAITIENE OR BANQUE NATIONALE DE LA REPUBLIQUE.

L. WILNER CADET, BROTHER OF FRANCKEL, DPOB CANADA, 21 JUNE 1936, EMPLOYED SNEM PORT AU PRINCE.

SECRET BT

SECRET

SECRET

ADV COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

WH

J AT: 1740

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

1 of 2

WH 8 FILE, VR. DO2, DDO2, CI/OA, DO 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/R3, CA 5, CA/PEG, FI 2

S E C R E T 221602Z OCT 69 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 7275 (ALLENSWORTH
CTING)

RIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PORT AU PRINCE

22 Oct 69 IN 70596

KULE DOMOPS EVMEND

EF DO BASE NEW YORK 7275 (IN 70937)

1. SOURCE PARAS 2 THRU 4 BELOW IS BUREAU CENTRAL (BC) REPORTS ATED 16 SEPT THRU 11 OCTOBER. REPORTS ENCODED IN PRIVATE NUMERICAL ODE USED BETWEEN EVMENDS AND BC, MAILED TO EVMEND/1 OVERT LETTER ROP WHICH SAME AS THAT USED BY EVMOUNT/1.

2. IDENS A, C AND E PLANNING OVERTHROW DUVALIER AND SET UP ELVES AS JUNTA. TIMING NOT GIVEN. IDEN B FINANCING THE PLOT TO INE OF $600,000. INSIDE WITTING PARTIES ARE IDENS D AND POSSIBLY F. TSIDE WITTING PARTIES ARE EVMENT/1, EVMEND/4 IDEN G, AND POSSIBLY EN H WHO BROTHER OF IDEN F.

3. CHRONOLOGY OF BC INVOLVEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: 21 AUG, BC ETING WITH IDEN B, WHO INDICATED HE PLANNING SUPPORT COUP WHICH ICIPIENT BUT NEEDS HELP IN REMOVING OBSTACLE OF PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. GAVE HIM NAMES OF RELIABLE INDIVIDUALS AT SPECIFIC POSTS AND IGGESTED APPROACH TO IDEN E VIA IDEN D. 11 SEPTEMBER, BC MEETING TH IDEN B WHO REVEALED THAT HE DEALING WITH IDEN C. BC PLACED

SECRET

TO INDIRECT CONTACT WITH IDEN C VIA IDEN I. 16 OR 17 SEPTEMBER, C CONTACT WITH IDEN I, LEARNED THAT IDEN A IS HEADING PLOT. BC SKED FOR CONTACT WITH IDEN A. 25 SEPTEMBER AND 2 OCTOBER, BC EETING WITH IDEN A. 23 SEPTEMBER, LAST BC MEETING WITH IDEN B. ROM THAT DATE TO 11 OCTOBER ONLY BC CONTACT WAS IDEN A. AS OF 11 CTOBER BC FELT HAD COMPLETED BROKER ROLE IN PLAN AND UNDERSTANDS HAT IDENS A AND C AGREED TO INCLUSION OF IDEN E IN JUNTA ON GROUNDS HIS NECESSARY EVIL. IDEN A MAINTAINS INDIRECT CONTACT WITH IDEN E IA IDEN D. IDEN C IS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH IDEN I. NAMES OF ITTING GUARDS OTHER THAN IDEN D NOT DISCLOSED BY BC TO EVMENDS.

4. BC MEMBER WHO CARRYING BALL THIS OP IS IDEN J.

5. BC REQUESTS FOLLOWING ACTION FROM EVMENDS: ESTABLISHMENT OF AST TWO-WAY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN BC AND EVMENDS HQ, AND AUNCHING OF DIVERSIONARY ACTION TO DISTRACT DUVALIER ATTENTION. VMENDS 1 AND 4 REQUEST RVROCK ASSISTANCE ON FIRST ITEM AND ADVICE N SECOND.

6. EVMOUNT/1 PLANNING TRIP TO NYC 2 NOVEMBER. EVMENDS WOULD CCEPT HIM AS COMMO LINK TO BC BUT UNSURE HOW BC WOULD REACT TO AKING HIM WITTING. EVMEND/1 PROPOSES TWO OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR NTERMEDIARY, IDENS K AND L, COULD ASCERTAIN FROM BC BY TELEPHONE HETHER EITHER OR BOTH ABLE TRAVEL TO US ON SHORT NOTICE. EVMEND/4 TTITUDE THESE CANDIDATES NOT YET KNOWN.

7. MEETING SCHEDULED FOR EVMEND/1 AND GILBRIDE FOR 29 CTOBER. WILL ADVISE RE EVMEND/4 AVAILABILITY 30 OCTOBER. LELAND MEETING EVMEND/4 23 OCTOBER.

E C R E T

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: R. LEHMAN:gt
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 1349-5595
DATE: 21 OCTOBER 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY [illegible] PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, R/AN [illegible] FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 21 23 41Z OCT 69 CITE DIRECTOR 48277

TO PORT AU PRINCE

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 6496 (IN 63672)*

1. ON 16 OCTOBER, WODISH ADVISED AKULE THAT IT HAD TERMINATED CONTACT WITH SUBJECT OF REF.

2. FILE: 201-357029.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Subject of Ref is Louis A. BRUN, contact of Clemard Joseph CHARLES.

SM

AN UP
~~AD~~ X
WH/7/HT

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DAVID L. SMOCK
C/WH/7

21 Oct 69

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

201-357029

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: R. LEHMAN:gt
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 1349-6595
DATE: 21 OCTOBER 1969

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR.

(elite) (pica)

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 21 23 41z OCT 69 CITE DIRECTOR 48277

TO PORT AU PRINCE

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 6496 (IN 63672)*

1. ON 16 OCTOBER, WODISH ADVISED AKULE THAT IT HAD TERMINATED CONTACT WITH SUBJECT OF REF.

2. FILE: 201-357029.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/7/Ex
Chief
Int
Ext
I/A
P/P
Sec
File

WH COMMENT: *Subject of Ref is Louis A. BRUN, contact of Clemard Joseph CHARLES.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DAVID L. SMOCK
C/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CJC

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONF ENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
DCS Contact With Louis A. Brun

FROM: GSMusulin/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. Case 47540

DATE 16 October 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	10/16	10/16		See Attached Memorandum.
2. Acting Chief, WH Division 3 D 3107 Headquarters				
3. C/WH/F1 Hatry	20 OCT 1969	20		
4. C/WH/7	21 OCT 1969			
5. C/WH/7		21 Oct		
6. DC/WH/7		21 OCT 1969		
7. C/WH/7/Haiti	21 OCT 1969			Pls. advise P-au-Prince.
8. Ruth				Done - by DIRECTOR 48277 dtd 21 Oct 1969
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

16 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : DCS Contact With Louis A. Brun

REFERENCE : 19 August 1969 Memorandum To DCS From WH

We have terminated contact with Louis A. Brun.

JAMES R. MURPHY
Director
Domestic Contact Service

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 25 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY 45 PER ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION C/WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/CI/SO DDP ADDP C/CA 3 C/CI
218 C/FI-2 C/SOD-3 C/CI/PS C/MPS/BG

S E C R E T 102219Z OCT 1969 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6496

(CHAIDEZ ACTING)

11 Oct 69 IN 63672

DIRECTOR

RYBAT

REF: HTPW-1347, 17 SEP 69

1. APPRECIATE REF RESPONSE BUT CANNOT SEE HOW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DCS WODISH AND LOUIS A. BRUN IS ALTERED TO ANY APPREICABLE DEGREE THROUGH NEW HANDLING PROCEDURES NOR IS THE POTENTIAL FOR COMPROMISE LESSENED. THE FINE NUANCES RE WODISH HANDLING OF BRUN (DEBRIEFING BUT NO BRIEFING) MAY BE UNDERSTANDABLE TO US BUT WILL BE UTTERLY MEANINGLESS SHOULD BRUN WIND UP IN FRONT OF A FIRING SQUAD. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE DO NOT SEE HOW RVROCK WOULD BE IN POSITION TO DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRUN'S INVOLVEMENT.

2. HARDLY A WEEK GOES BY BUT THAT LNPURE IS NOT MADE AWARE OF ANOTHER PLOTTING EFFORT BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER. CHARLES PLOTTING EFFORTS HAVE AGAIN REACHED A PITCH STRANGELY REMINISCENT OF THE ONE WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDED HIS ARREST IN 1967. CHARLES NOW CLAIMS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IN POLICE, COAST

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY: ________ PER ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 PORT AU PRINCE 6496 SECRET

GUARD, AND DESSALINES BATTALION. HIS PLAN THIS TIME IS TO CREATE PANIC IN PORT AU PRINCE BY SETTING FIRES IN CITY AND CUL-DE-SAC AREA AND THEN MOVE THE GC-10 INTO THE HARBOR TO START LOBBING SHELLS AT THE NATIONAL PALACE. PLOTTING GROUP THUS FAR HAS FAILED TO BUY SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, FUEL FOR GC-10, AND PAY-OFF THE RIGHT PEOPLE.

3. THE FACT THAT WODISH DOES NOT BELIEVE BRUN IS INVOLVED IN ANY CURRENT REVOLUTIONARY SCHEME IN HAITI IS NOT VERY REASSURING WHEN WE RECALL THAT AS LATE AS MAY 1969, BRUN SERVED AS AN INTERMEDIARY TO PASS ON REQUEST FROM PLOTTING GROUP FOR SECRET INTERVIEW WITH LNHARP OFFICIAL. DETAILS THIS REQUEST WHICH INCLUDED OPEN CODE MESSAGES TO SET-UP MEETINGS AND RECOGNITION SIGNALS GIVEN BY DIRECTOR 02376. BRUN MAY NOT BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED [illegible]OTTING GROUP BUT HE IS GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION WHICH IS MORE THAN ENOUGH IN DUVALIER'S HAITI TO ENSURE HIS SPEEDY DISPATCH SHOULD DUVALIER DECIDE TO POUNCE ON CHARLES AND BRUN HAPPENS TO BE IN THE COUNTRY.

4. THE TWO ADDITIONAL SUB-SOURCES OF BRUN CITED

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT:

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY: PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE VR.

PAGE 3 PORT AU PRINCE 6496 SECRET

PARA 2,C. REF ACTUALLY TEND TO IMPLICATE HIM MORE IN INTERNAL PLOTTING. ALFONSO LAHENS WAS IDENTIFIED BY BRUN IN DIRECTOR 02376 AS MEMBER OF PLOTTING GROUP WHO WAS IN SEMI-HIDING IN MAY 69. LOUIS LEVEQUE WAS IDENTIFIED AS PLOTTING WITH CHARLES AND BRUN PER DIRECTOR 97813, 20 APR 66.

5. 5. STATION HARVIEWED LIMITED AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION PRODUCED BY BRUN AND CANNOT SEE HOW IT PROVIDES ANYTHING NOT KNOWN (RUMOR OR FACT) TO LNPURE, WHICH HAS STRONG ECONOMICS REPORTING OFFICER. SUSPICION THAT BRUN HAS NO WORTHWHILE SOURCES IS SUPPORTED BY INCIDENT REPORTED PORT AU PRINCE 6323 WHEN CHARLES APPROACHED LNPURE REQUESTING INFO TO SERVICE THE CIRL REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON BRUN BY WODISH.

6. BRUN IS ADMITTEDLY UNPROFESSIONAL, UNTRAINED, AND APPARENTLY UNCONTROLLED. AS LONG AS WODISH CANNOT PREVENT BRUN FROM CONTACTING CHARLES (OR ANYBODY ELSE) IN HAITI, THIS ACTIVITY WILL CONTINUE TO POSE RISKS FOR RVROCK. BRUN IS A NATURALIZED AMERICAN OF HAITIAN ORIGIN, BUT WHILE HE IS IN HAITI, HE IS CONSIDERED A HAITIAN. LNPURE CAN GIVE

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 4 PORT AU PRINCE 6496 SECRET

HIM NO PROTECTION.

7. FILE : 201-357029.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: 25 PER

ACTION C/WH8 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO FILE, VR, C/CI/SP DDP ADDP C/CA 3 C/CI 2, 1, 8 C/FI 2 C/SOD 3 C/CI/PS C/MPS/BG

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 102219Z OCT 1969 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6496 PREN

(CHAIDEZ ACTING)

DIRECTOR

RYBAT

ESD PS WH/7/HT

11 Oct 69 IN 63672

REF: HTPW-1347, 17 SEP 69

1. APPRECIATE REF RESPONSE BUT CANNOT SEE HOW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WODISH AND LOUIS A. BRUN IS ALTERED TO ANY APPREICABLE DEGREE THROUGH NEW HANDLING PROCEDURES NOR IS THE POTENTIAL FOR COMPROMISE LESSENED. THE FINE NUANCES RE WODISH HANDLING OF BRUN (DEBRIEFING BUT NO BRIEFING) MAY BE UNDERSTANDABLE TO US BUT WILL BE UTTERLY MEANINGLESS SHOULD BRUN WIND UP IN FRONT OF A FIRING SQUAD. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE DO NOT SEE HOW RVROCK WOULD BE IN POSITION TO DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRUN'S INVOLVEMENT.

2. HARDLY A WEEK GOES BY BUT THAT LNPURE IS NOT MADE AWARE OF ANOTHER PLOTTING EFFORT BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER. CHARLES PLOTTING EFFORTS HAVE AGAIN REACHED A PITCH STRANGELY REMINISCENT OF THE ONE WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDED HIS ARREST IN 1967. CHARLES NOW CLAIMS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IN POLICE, COAST

11 Oct 69

SECRET

CS COPY

Charles C.

201-357029

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled in)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY ________ AT ________

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 PORT AU PRINCE 6496 SECRET

GUARD, AND DESSALINES BATTALION. HIS PLAN THIS TIME IS TO CREATE PANIC IN PORT AU PRINCE BY SETTING FIRES IN CITY AND CUL-DE-SAC AREA AND THEN MOVE THE GC-10 INTO THE HARBOR TO START LOBBING SHELLS AT THE NATIONAL PALACE. PLOTTING GROUP THUS FAR HAS FAILED TO BUY SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, FUEL FOR GC-10, AND PAY-OFF THE RIGHT PEOPLE.

3. THE FACT THAT WODISH DOES NOT BELIEVE BRUN IS INVOLVED IN ANY CURRENT REVOLUTIONARY SCHEME IN HAITI IS NOT VERY REASSURING WHEN WE RECALL THAT AS LATE AS MAY 1969, BRUN SERVED AS AN INTERMEDIARY TO PASS ON REQUEST FROM PLOTTING GROUP FOR SECRET INTERVIEW WITH LNHARP OFFICIAL. DETAILS THIS REQUEST WHICH INCLUDED OPEN CODE MESSAGES TO SET-UP MEETINGS AND RECOGNITION SIGNALS GIVEN BY DIRECTOR 02376. BRUN MAY NOT BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED PLOTTING GROUP BUT HE IS GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION WHICH IS MORE THAN ENOUGH IN DUVALIER'S HAITI TO ENSURE HIS SPEEDY DISPATCH SHOULD DUVALIER DECIDE TO POUNCE ON CHARLES AND BRUN HAPPENS TO BE IN THE COUNTRY.

4. THE TWO ADDITIONAL SUB-SOURCES OF BRUN CITED

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY______ AT:________ Z

DISSEM BY______ PER \#

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.______

X-REF TO FILE NO.______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 3 PORT AU PRINCE 6496 SECRET

PARA 2,C. REF ACTUALLY TEND TO IMPLICATE HIM MORE IN INTERNAL PLOTTING. ALFONSO LAHENS WAS IDENTIFIED BY BRUN IN DIRECTOR 02376 AS MEMBER OF PLOTTING GROUP WHO WAS IN SEMI-HIDING IN MAY 69. LOUIS LEVEQUE WAS IDENTIFIED AS PLOTTING WITH CHARLES AND BRUN PER DIRECTOR 97813, 20 APR 66.

5. 5. STATION HARVIEWED LIMITED AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION PRODUCED BY BRUN AND CANNOT SEE HOW IT PROVIDES ANYTHING NOT KNOWN (RUMOR OR FACT) TO LNPURE, WHICH HAS STRONG ECONOMICS REPORTING OFFICER. SUSPICION THAT BRUN HAS NO WORTHWHILE SOURCES IS SUPPORTED BY INCIDENT REPORTED PORT AU PRINCE 6323 WHEN CHARLES APPROACHED LNPURE REQUESTING INFO TO SERVICE THE CIRL REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON BRUN BY WODISH.

6. BRUN IS ADMITTEDLY UNPROFESSIONAL, UNTRAINED, AND APPARENTLY UNCONTROLLED. AS LONG AS WODISH CANNOT PREVENT BRUN FROM CONTACTING CHARLES(OR ANYBODY ELSE) IN HAITI, THIS ACTIVITY WILL CONTINUE TO POSE RISKS FOR RVROCK. BRUN IS A NATURALIZED AMERICAN OF HAITIAN ORIGIN, BUT WHILE HE IS IN HAITI, HE IS CONSIDERED A HAITIAN. LNPURE CAN GIVE

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY:________ AT:____________ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.____________

X-REF TO FILE NO.____________

DISSEM BY__________PER________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 4 PORT AU PRINCE 6496 SECRET

HIM NO PROTECTION.

7. FILE : 201-357029.

SECRET

RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

ORIG: R. BERG/gt
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 1349-5595
DATE: 15 MAY 69

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 2 PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

DISSEM: WH 8 | FILE, VR. [illegible] 15 17 52Z [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY PORT AU PRINCE INFO: SANTO DOMINGO DO BASE NEW YORK

AIDE 02378

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 6024 (IN 57320)*

1. GIVEN BELOW IS TEXT OF DCS REPORT CONCERNING REQUEST BY HAITIAN OPPOSITION GROUP FOR SECRET INTERVIEW WITH U.S. OFFICIAL. DCS REPORT CAME FROM LOUIS A. BRUN ON BEHALF OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES. BRUN IS CHARLES' NEW YORK LAWYER AND BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVE. DCS WAS ADVISED THAT WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN CONTACTING ANY REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF PLOTTING GROUP.

2. DIFFICULT AT THIS STAGE TO DETERMINE DEGREE (IF ANY) CHARLES INVOLVED IN PLOT. THERE GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT CHARLES HAS ONLY HEARD OF PLOT AND ATTEMPTING TO ACT AS BROKER BETWEEN PLOTTERS AND U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR OWN INTERESTS. IN MID-67, CHARLES USED THE BRUN-DCS CHANNEL IN ATTEMPT OBTAIN U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ONE OF HIS PLOTS.

3. LAHENS, FNU, MENTIONED IN DCS REPORT PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ALPHONSE LAHENS, FORMER DEPUTY FROM ARCAHAIE, WHO IN JUN 68 WAS REPORTED BY DCS TO BE ORGANIZING PLOT

Continued. . .

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SEC/DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF:

INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 02376

TO

WITH GENERAL CONSTANT, COLONEL BLAIN, AND OTHERS. CF. PORT AU PRINCE 5247 (IN 40289) (NOT SENT DO BASE NEW YORK) NO TRACES EDGARD BONI. PLS PASS REPORT TO AMBASSADOR ROSS. HQS SENDING COPY TO ARA/CAR. REPORT FOLLOWS:

4. ONE OF THE UNDERGROUND OPPOSITION GROUPS IN HAITI IS CENTERED IN THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS: LAHENS, FNU (FORMER DEPUTY, NOW IN SEMI-HIDING); COLONEL KESNER BLAIN (HEAD OF ARMY QUARTERMASTER WAREHOUSES); COLONEL CATARD (HEAD OF THE COAST GUARD); CONSTANT, FNU (CHIEF OF STAFF). THEY WISH TO ORGANIZE A JUNTA, FOLLOWING THE DEATH OR RETIREMENT OF HAITIAN PRESIDENT DUVALIER, AND EXERCISE POWER DURING TRANSITION PERIOD. FOLLOWING TRANSITION PERIOD, THIS GROUP WISHES TO HAVE FREE ELECTIONS AND THEN RETIRE FROM POLITICAL ACTIVITY. LAHENS WOULD LIKE TO BECOME A MINISTER. BLAIN WOULD LIKE DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENT. CATARD WOULD LIKE TO RETIRE TO HIS CATTLE RANCH. THE GROUP HAS NO PARTICULAR CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT.

5. THIS GROUP ALLEGES THAT IT COMMANDS WIDE SUPPORT AMONG ARMY PERSONNEL IN PORT-AU-PRINCE AND IN THE HAITIAN HINTERLAND. THE GROUP IS REPORTEDLY WILLING TO WORK WITH ANY

Continued.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ---- BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

FILE. VR.

SECRET PAGE THREE

CITE DIRECTOR 102376

OTHER NON-HAITIAN POWER.

6. UNTIL RECENTLY, THE PLAN OF THIS GROUP WAS TO SIT BACK, WAIT FOR INTERNAL UPHEAVALS AND THEN MOVE IN TO ASSUME POWER. THEY DID NOT WANT TO ACT ON THEIR OWN, BUT PREFERRED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN INTERNAL UPHEAVAL CREATED BY SOMEBODY ELSE.

7. THE MOST RECENT RUMORS CONCERNING PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S HEALTH HAVE, HOWEVER, CAUSED THE GROUP TO CHANGE ITS MIND. THE MEMBERS NOW DECLARE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND THAT AS SOON AS PRESIDENT DUVALIER "GOES ON THE OPERATING TABLE" THEY WILL MOVE.

8. THE GROUP RECOGNIZES, HOWEVER, THAT CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES LIE IN ITS PATH AND IS MOST ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS THE ENTIRE MATTER IN SECRET WITH A U.S. ENVOY. WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY TO THIS ENVOY IS NOT KNOWN.

9. THE GROUP HAS ORGANIZED THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE FOR THE ENVOY TO FOLLOW. FIRST, HE MUST SEND A CABLE TO THE FOLLOWING CABLE ADDRESS: ETHLAHAB, PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI.

CONTINUED. . . .

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET PAGE FOUR

CITE DIRECTOR

C2376

THE CABLE MUST READ AS FOLLOWS: "ARRIVING ON (LIST DATE) TO DISCUSS THE SISAL DEAL. PLEASE RESERVE ROOM FOR ME AT THE SANS SOUCI HOTEL." THE NAME SIGNED TO THE CABLE DOES NOT MATTER. THE CABLE ADDRESS IS THAT OF ESTABLISHMENTS LAKERE-BLAIN & CO., PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI. SECOND, HE MUST REGISTER AT THE SANS SOUCI AND AWAIT CALL OR VISIT FROM MAN NAMED EDGARD BONI. BONI IS KESHER BLAIN'S BROTHER. THE ORIGINAL FAMILY NAME IS "BONI"; BLAIN CHANGED HIS NAME. BONI WILL EITHER TAKE THE ENVOY TO TALK TO CONSTANT OR WILL INFORM HIM OF ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE INTERVIEW. THE ONLY PERSON PRESENT AT THE INTERVIEW WILL BE CONSTANT AND THE ENVOY. THIRD, WHEN THE ENVOY MEETS CONSTANT HE MUST ESTABLISH HIS BONA FIDES BY SAYING "I HAVE BEEN SENT BY MR. EISENHOWER TO DISCUSS SISAL." THE KEY WORD IS "EISENHOWER."

10. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE, BUT NOT MANDATORY, IF THE SECRET U.S. ENVOY WAS ABLE TO SPEAK FRENCH." (END OF REPORT)

11. FILE : 30-0-6.

CONTINUED. . . .

COORDINATING OFFICER

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

DISSEM:

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica)

(reference number)

SECRET

PAGE FIVE

CITE DIRECTOR

C2376

*WH COMMENT: On 10 May, Clemard Joseph Charles told Embassy Officer and COS of plot against Duvalier. Date of plot may be advanced now that Duvalier is ill.

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/[illegible]

THOMAS S. CLAYTON
AC/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Port au Prince

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Subject of 201-357029

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HTPA 2457, 19 August 1969
B. DIRECTOR 26288, 1 August 1969
C. PORT AU PRINCE 6323, 29 July 1969
D. HTPA 2443, 29 July 1969

1. Headquarters agrees with Station that the continued contact between Subject of 201-357029 and IDEN A, on behalf of WODISH, poses a potential security threat for the LNHARP components in Haiti. Upon receipt of Ref C, the Desk sent a memorandum to Chief, WODISH, on 19 August 1969, which forwarded a resume of the Ref C information, and requested that the contact between IDEN A and Subject on behalf of WODISH be terminated.

2. On 29 August 1969, the WODISH officer who is in contact with IDEN, replied to the Desk's memorandum as follows.

"a. We (WODISH) have carefully considered the Desk's comments re IDEN A and his relationship with Subject. We have concluded that in the matter of the nine questions concerning the activity of foreign companies in Haiti, IDEN A has been guilty at least of sloppy security procedures and (we) have decided to modify our relationship with him.

"b. ~~Subject has never doubted that IDEN A~~ represented a channel to LNHARP authority which he could use to supplement his contacts with members of the LNPURE staff in Port au Prince. IDEN A

Attachment: UNDER SEPARATE COVER Continued. . . . . .
IDENS

Distribution:
2 - Port au Prince w/att U/S/C

23 SEP 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HTPW-1347

DATE
17 September 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-357029

① RI
1 - WH/7/HT

AS
A3
IP
PI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE WH/7/HT/Ruth Lehman:gt
EXT. 5595

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/7	18-9-69	David L. Snock

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

was originally introduced to WODISH in New York City by Subject on 15 April 1966. Until the early fall of 1967, much of WODISH activity with IDEN A was devoted to arranging contacts with various elements of LNHARP, which IDEN A requested on behalf of Subject, and reporting operational information. To the best of WODISH knowledge and belief, however, none of these contacts produced any tangible assistance to Subject's various schemes. With two exceptions, WODISH relationship with IDEN A since October 1967 has been exclusively that of foreign intelligence collection. The exceptions were Subject's request for a secret meeting with a WOLADY envoy in May 1969, and an independent similar request from another group in the same month. As has been fully reported, IDEN A made it perfectly clear to WODISH and to Subject and to the other group that he was acting only as a channel and that he was not actively involved or interested. We (WODISH) simply transmitted the request. We wish to point out that what the Desk calls IDEN's "Lobbying" for Subject ended before October 1967. During the nearly two years in which the contact in the WODISH New York Office has dealt with IDEN A, the latter has never sponsored or "lobbied" for Subject's various schemes. IDEN A has occasionally relayed information concerning them, but has told WODISH repeatedly that he no longer wishes to be involved politically with Subject.

"c. We wish also to point out that IDEN A, as a regular supplier of foreign intelligence on Haiti, has supplied data which originate with Haitians other than Subject, and, therefore, IDEN A is not merely Subject's mouthpiece. Specifically, IDEN B and IDEN C are two of IDEN A's Haitian sources. IDEN B is a well-known Haitian businessman; IDEN C is a former deputy.

"d. We (WODISH) are not concerned with Subject, but are very much so with IDEN A. We do not believe that IDEN A is involved in any current revolutionary scheme in Haiti. We are, however, disturbed at the unprofessional way in which IDEN A handled the questions concerning foreign companies in Haiti. We did not request IDEN A to consult Subject about the requirements on foreign companies and, in view of the manner in which IDEN A handled our requirements, we shall continue only to accept information which he proffers on his return from his frequent trips to Haiti, and shall refrain from briefing him. We have requested our WOROMP customers to give us an evaluation of IDEN A's intelligence reporting. Unless this evaluation is unfavorable, we shall continue to exploit IDEN A in the manner just described. Insofar as contact between IDEN A and Subject is concerned, (1) we cannot prevent IDEN A from talking to Subject (or anybody else), but (2) we have never in the past and shall not in the future request that IDEN A contact Subject on behalf of WODISH."

3. To date, the WOROMP evaluation of IDEN A's reporting has not been received. However, since WODISH has agreed to refrain from briefing IDEN A prior to any future trips he may make to Haiti, there should be no recurrence of the type of situation described in Ref C.

Wilma R. VAN SCOY

201-3574

Attachment: U/S/C
HTPW-1347, 17 Sept 1969

IDENTITIES: A. Louis A. Brun

B. Louis Leveque

C. Alfonse Lahens

CS COPY

U/C ATT 1 TO HTPW 1347

201-357029

WE/7/HT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Port au Prince

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Subject of 201-357029

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HTPA 2457, 19 August 1969
B. DIRECTOR 26288, 1 August 1969
C. PORT AU PRINCE 6323, 29 July 1969
D. HTPA 2443, 29 July 1969

1. Headquarters agrees with Station that the continued contact between Subject of 201-357029 and IDEN A, on behalf of WODISH, poses a potential security threat for the LNHARP components in Haiti. Upon receipt of Ref C, the Desk sent a memorandum to Chief, WODISH, on 19 August 1969, which forwarded a resume of the Ref C information, and requested that the contact between IDEN A and Subject on behalf of WODISH be terminated.

2. On 29 August 1969, the WODISH officer who is in contact with IDEN, replied to the Desk's memorandum as follows.

"a. We (WODISH) have carefully considered the Desk's comments re IDEN A and his relationship with Subject. We have concluded that in the matter of the nine questions concerning the activity of foreign companies in Haiti, IDEN A has been guilty at least of sloppy security procedures and (we) have decided to modify our relationship with him.

"b. Subject has never doubted that IDEN A represented a channel to LNHARP authority which he could use to supplement his contacts with members of the LNPURE staff in Port au Prince. IDEN A

Attachment: UNDER SEPARATE COVER Continued. . . . . .
IDENS

Distribution:
2 - Port au Prince w/att U/S/C

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HTPW-1347

DATE
23 SEP 1969
17 September 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-357029

1 - RI
1 - WH/7/HT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/7/HT/Ruth Lehman:gt			5595

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/7		David L. Smock

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

was originally introduced to WODISH in New York City by Subject on 15 April 1966. Until the early fall of 1967, much of WODISH activity with IDEN A was devoted to arranging contacts with various elements of LNHARP, which IDEN A requested on behalf of Subject, and reporting operational information. To the best of WODISH knowledge and belief, however, none of these contacts produced any tangible assistance to Subject's various schemes. With two exceptions, WODISH relationship with IDEN A since October 1967 has been exclusively that of foreign intelligence collection. The exceptions were Subject's request for a secret meeting with a WOLADY envoy in May 1969, and an independent similar request from another group in the same month. As has been fully reported, IDEN A made it perfectly clear to WODISH and to Subject and to the other group that he was acting only as a channel and that he was not actively involved or interested. We (WODISH) simply transmitted the request. We wish to point out that what the Desk calls IDEN's "Lobbying" for Subject ended before October 1967. During the nearly two years in which the contact in the WODISH New York Office has dealt with IDEN A, the latter has never sponsored or "lobbied" for Subject's various schemes. IDEN A has occasionally relayed information concerning them, but has told WODISH repeatedly that he no longer wishes to be involved politically with Subject.

"c. We wish also to point out that IDEN A, as a regular supplier of foreign intelligence on Haiti, has supplied data which originate with Haitians other than Subject, and, therefore, IDEN A is not merely Subject's mouthpiece. Specifically, IDEN B and IDEN C are two of IDEN A's Haitian sources. IDEN B is a well-known Haitian businessman; IDEN C is a former deputy.

"d. We (WODISH) are not concerned with Subject, but are very much so with IDEN A. We do not believe that IDEN A is involved in any current revolutionary scheme in Haiti. We are, however, disturbed at the unprofessional way in which IDEN A handled the questions concerning foreign companies in Haiti. We did not request IDEN A to consult Subject about the requirements on foreign companies and, in view of the manner in which IDEN A handled our requirements, we shall continue only to accept information which he proffers on his return from his frequent trips to Haiti, and shall refrain from briefing him. We have requested our WOROMP customers to give us an evaluation of IDEN A's intelligence reporting. Unless this evaluation is unfavorable, we shall continue to exploit IDEN A in the manner just described. Insofar as contact between IDEN A and Subject is concerned, (1) we cannot prevent IDEN A from talking to Subject (or anybody else), but (2) we have never in the past and shall not in the future request that IDEN A contact Subject on behalf of WODISH."

3. To date, the WOROMP evaluation of IDEN A's reporting has not been received. However, since WODISH has agreed to refrain from briefing IDEN A prior to any future trips he may make to Haiti, there should be no recurrence of the type of situation described in Ref C.

Attachment: U/S/C
HTPW-1347, 17 Sept 1969

IDENTITIES: A. Louis A. Brun

B. Louis Leveque

C. Alfonse Lahens

[illegible]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum SECRET

NY#632-69

DATE: 29 August 1969

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

ATTN: OSS (Musulin)

FROM : Chief, New York Field Office

SUBJECT: DCS Relationship with Louis A.Brun
Ref: WH/7 Memoranda, 28 May 69, and 19 Aug 69, same subject

1. We have carefully considered WH/7's comments about Louis A. Brun and his relationship with Clemard Joseph Charles. We have concluded that in the matter of the nine questions concerning the activity of foreign companies in Haiti Brun has been guilty at least of sloppy security procedures and have decided to modify our relationship with him.

2. Charles has never doubted that Brun represented a channel to US government authority which he could use to supplement his contacts with members of the US Embassy staff in Port-au-Prince. Brun was originally introduced to DCS in New York City by Charles on 15 Apr 1966 (see memorandum NY-251-66). Until the early fall of 1967, much of our activity with Brun was devoted to arranging contacts with various elements of the US government, which Brun requested on behalf of Charles, and reporting operational information. To the best of our knowledge and belief, however, none of these contacts produced any tangible assistance to Charles's various schemes. With two exceptions, our relationship with Brun since October 1967 has been exclusively that of foreign intelligence collection. The exceptions were Charles's request for a secret meeting with a US envoy in May 1969 and an independent similar request from another group in the same month. As has been fully reported, Brun made it perfectly clear to us and to Charles and to the other group that he was acting only as a channel and that he was not actively involved or interested. We simply transmitted the requests. We wish to point out that what WH/7 calls Brun's "Lobbying" for Charles ended before October 1967. During the nearly two years in which Mitchell has dealt with Brun, the latter has never sponsored or "Lobbied" for Charles's various schemes. He has occasionally relayed information concerning them, but has told us repeatedly that he no longer wishes to be involved politically with Charles.

SECRET

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY#632-69
29 August 1969

3. We wish also to point out that Brun, as a regular supplier of foreign intelligence on Haiti, has supplied data which originate with Haitians other than Charles, and, therefore, that Brun is not merely Charles's mouthpiece. Specifically, Louis Leveque and Alfonse Lahens are two of Brun's Haitian sources. Leveque is a well-known Haitian businessman; Lahens is a former deputy.

4. We are not concerned with Charles, but are very much so with Brun. We do not believe that Brun is involved in any current revolutionary scheme in Haiti. We are, however, disturbed at the unprofessional way in which Brun handled the questions concerning foreign companies in Haiti. We did not request Brun to consult Charles about the requirements on foreign companies and in view of the manner in which Brun handled our requirements we shall continue only to accept information which he proffers on his return from his frequent trips to Haiti and shall refrain from briefing him. We have requested our DD/I consumers to give us an evaluation of Brun's intelligence reporting. Unless this evaluation is unfavorable, we shall continue to exploit Brun in the manner just described. Insofar as contact between Brun and Charles is concerned, (a) we cannot prevent Brun from talking to Charles (or anybody else) but (b) we have never in the past and shall not in the future request that Brun contact Charles on behalf of DCS.

6. Please pass the foregoing information to WH/7.

JACKSON R. HORTON

JHMitchell:kf

File: Louis A. Brun, President
B&B International Corporation
230 Fifth Avenue
New York City

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM | CONFIDENTIAL | NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

SUBJECT New Opposition Group Allied With Clemard Joseph Charles/Outline of Charles's Future Political Plans

REPORT NO. 00- B-321/24207-69

DATE DISTR. 27 AUG 1969

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES
Supplement to: 00-B-321/06913-69
00-B-321/14515-69

C-DC9-55300

DATE OF INFO. Late Jul 69

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Port-au-Prince/Late Jul 69

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, who makes frequent trips to Haiti. Source maintains close contact with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti.

1. Opponents of Haitian President Francois Duvalier have formed a new political opposition group. The following are members: Colonel Cayard (Commandant of the Haitian Coast Guard); Captain Daniel (assistant to Cayard); Gérard Constant (Haitian Army Chief of Staff); Colonel Kesner Blain (in charge of Haitian Army quartermaster depots); and Colonel Gracia Jacques (Commandant of the Presidential Palace Guard). [See 00-B-321/06913-69 (paragraph 2-e) and 00-B-321/14515-69 (paragraph 3) for earlier data concerning some of the members of this group.]

2. This group is now working with Clemard Joseph Charles and has formulated, largely under the direction of the latter, a tentative political plan for the organization of a post-Duvalier Haiti. The group is anxious to act, because some of the members, notably Daniel and Cayard, fear that they will be arrested in the not-too-distant future. The entire membership displays, however, the trait common to all Haitian opposition groups: they will not act until President Duvalier dies, becomes totally incapacitated or is overthrown by somebody else. Jacques is an important addition to the group. He is completely loyal to President Duvalier, but has no use for the other members of the Duvalier family. Consequently, he will play no active part unless the President in some manner disappears from the scene.

3. This group still wishes to exercise power during a transitional period following President Duvalier's departure [see 00-B-321/14515-69 (paragraph 3)]. Charles does not want to hold any political appointment during this transition period, but plans to recover his position as the head of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce and travel abroad, to raise money for foreign economic assistance to Haiti. He plans to establish a political party, to be known as TOP (Travail,

U NO | CONFIDENTIAL | S NO

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

CHARLES

Ordre, Progres). Charles hopes that TOP will become one of two or three political parties in the post-Duvalier period and is convinced that TOP will win a constitutional victory at the polls and propel him to power. In the meantime, Colonel Kesner Blain will be the head of the provisional government. Blain has no long-range political ambitions. Charles and his colleagues plan a new constitution for Haiti, which will provide for a President and for a Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will exercise the effective power. Charles expects that TOP's electoral victory will make him, as TOP's leader, Prime Minister in the new constitutional government.

4. Reportedly, Charles recently received from the US (no additional data available) the sum of US$230 thousand. This money is to be used to finance the overthrow of President Duvalier. I cannot confirm the accuracy of this reported gift.

-end-

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ORIG: R. LEHMAN:gt
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 1349-5595
DATE: 21 AUGUST 1969

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY dls PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: W18 INFO FILE, VR. Do4. RilAn C. clops 52

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

21 21 53z AUG 69

CITE DIRECTOR 31845

TO DO BASE NEW YORK

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 31844 *

IDENTITY: MR. JOHN MITCHELL

END OF MESSAGE

WH/7/Ht
Chief ____
Int ✓
Ext ____
. ____
I/A ____
R/O ____
Sec ____
File ____

*Cable Secretariat: Pls insert DIR number.

WALTER O'BRIEN
C/DOI/2

Robert H. Riefe
JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CHARLES

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

ORIG: R. LEHMAN:gt
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 1349-5595
DATE: 21 AUGUST 1969

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION BY dkb PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. Fr 4, RI/AN, cicelops 52

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

WH/7/Ht
Chief
I/ATE DIRECTOR
Ext
I/A
R/O
Sec
File [illegible]

SECRET 21 21 53z AUG 69

TO DO BASE NEW YORK

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 26288

31847

1. ON 21 AUGUST, IDEN, WODISH NEW YORK REP WHO ~~HANDLES~~ IN CONTACT WITH RR LOUIS A. BRUN, SUBJECT OF REF, PHONED WODISH WASHINGTON OFFICE TO INQUIRE IF EVMEND-1 OR THE EVMEND ORGANIZATION WAS OF INTEREST TO RVROCK. BASIS FOR INQUIRY IS THAT BRUN HAS REPEATEDLY MENTIONED TO IDEN THAT EVMEND-1 AND HIS ORGANIZATION ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN EXILE WORK IN NEW YORK AND THAT BRUN SUSPECTS THEY HAVE SOME CONNECTION WITH RVROCK. WODISH REPS SPECULATE THAT BRUN SEEKING CONFIRMATION OF RVROCK CONNECTION AND THAT BRUN MAY TRY PENETRATE EVMEND ORGANIZATION.

2. WODISH WASHINGTON REP WAS INFORMED THAT EVMEND-1 AND HIS ORGANIZATION ARE OF INTEREST TO WOMACE AND THAT IDEN SHOULD REFRAIN FROM MAKING ANY CONTACT WHATSOEVER WITH THEM. WODISH AGREED PASS ABOVE TO IDEN AND SUGGEST WODISH RELATIONS WITH BRUN BE DISCONTINUED.

3. IN VIEW ABOVE, REQUEST CLELAND TELL EVMEND-1

CONTINUED.....

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR

TO ⌐ 73/844

DROP ANY CONTACT HE MAY HAVE WITH BRUN, SINCE BRUN SUSPECTS HE CONNECTED WITH RVROCK AND MAY BE TRYING CONFIRM.

4. FILE: 36-124-25/3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * BRUN, who collaborator of Clemard Joseph CHARLES on political matters in Haiti, is contact of WODISH, N.Y. office.

DOI/B2

WALTER O'BRIEN
C/DOI/2

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

19 AUG 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT : DCS Case 47540 - Contact with Louis A. Brun/Clemard Joseph Charles

1. On 29 July 1969, Station Port au Prince advised that Clemard Joseph Charles had passed a list of nine questions concerning the Haitian economy to an official of the United States Embassy in Port au Prince. The list of questions was written in English in standard U.S. Government format and, although sterile, appeared to be intelligence requirements. Charles told the Embassy official that he had just finished a "big job" for the Pentagon and implied that the list also came from the Pentagon. The Embassy official suspected that Charles had passed a copy of the list to the National Palace.

2. On 2 August, a representative of the WH/Haiti Desk contacted Mr. George Musulin, Operational Support Staff of DCS, and learned that the DCS office in New York had briefed Mr. Louis A. Brun and had orally passed a list of CIRL requirements to Brun concerning Haiti prior to his trip to Haiti during the week of 21 July. Mr. Musulin speculated that Brun had probably noted the DCS requirements on paper and then had passed a copy to Charles upon his arrival in Haiti.

3. For a number of years, the United States Government has been aware of the political ambitions of Charles and his alleged plotting to overthrow the Duvalier regime. In 1967, this rather open plotting led to his imprisonment for over one year. Also, since May 1963, Charles has been trying to obtain support from the United States Government for his plots but he has been consistently rebuffed. Charles is not held in high esteem by U.S. officials and his motives are highly questionable. He owes his position in Haiti to his relationship with Duvalier and his ability to successfully manage some of

SECRET

Charles file

the more notorious financial rackets of the regime. Charles enjoys no political following and even the "plots" with which he is associated are viewed with considerable reserve. For example, we have never been able to confirm that Charles was involved with the "military junta" formed in May 1969, as he claimed. In February 1969, the U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince commented that, with regard to the most recent plotting of Charles, "the possibility cannot be excluded that Charles....could be a provocation to determine the real motives of the United States Government towards the Duvalier regime." We concur in the Embassy's views.

4. During the past three years, the WH Division has been kept advised of the contact between DCS and Brun and his relationship with Charles. We are also aware from DCS and other sources of the efforts by Brun to obtain support from the United States Government for Charles. Brun is, of course, a close collaborator of Charles and a business representative of his in New York City. Brun has contacted officials of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and even a person with access to President Johnson on Charles' behalf. The Chief of Caribbean Affairs of the Department of State categorically told Brun in June 1967 that the United States Government was not interested in supporting the plots of Charles or anyone else against Duvalier, but this advice seems to have fallen on deaf ears. The most recent example of Brun's lobbying was in May 1969 when Brun passed on to DCS a request from Charles for a secret meeting between a U.S. envoy and a representative of the "military junta." Brun's involvement with Charles requires that he be considered a biased source of information. While some of the information Brun has obtained from Charles has been of interest, there is hardly anything that was not available through other channels and indeed, much of it was slanted.

5. As was set forth in WH/7 memoranda to the Operational Support Staff, DCS, on 16 July 1968 and 28 May 1969, we interpose no objection to DCS maintaining contact with Brun for its own purposes. However, the

relationship between Brun and Charles has now taken on operational characteristics (agent/sub-agent) with Brun levying requirements on Charles in Haiti to service on behalf of DCS. The relationship between Brun and Charles also has manifested political and security aspects which could adversely affect the interests of the United States Government regarding Haiti. Accordingly, we request that the contact between Brun and Charles on behalf of DCS be terminated.

Signed John R. Horton

John R. Horton
Acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/7/Ht: R.Berg gt

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee
  - 1 - C/WHD
  - 1 - WH/7/Ht Chrono
  - 1 - WH/Registry
  - 1 - WH/7/HT (CHARLES)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Port au Prince

SUBJECT
Subject of 201-357029

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 26288 dated 1 August 1969

B. HTPA-2443 dated 29 July 1969

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paragraph 5.

1. The Station would like to offer its views on the WODISH contact, through Identity of Paragraph 1 Reference A (hereinafter IDEN), with 201-357029, as well as on the question of the requirements which 201-357029 gave LNPURE and which were forwarded to Headquarters in Reference B.

2. Since IDEN has been told that his contact is with LNSHOE and since he has told 201-357029 that fact, and since 201-357029 has apparently, in his mind at least, converted that fact into contact with RVROCK, and has probably spread both stories with his associates and thereby throughout the local milieu, we have, in effect, a dangerous security situation. When we consider that the LNPURE receives all the information that 201-357029 gives IDEN anyway, and most of the time receives the information directly from 201-357029, then we have an operation that is difficult to justify.

3. In the case of the requirements forwarded with Reference B, we have a situation in which WODISH levied requirements on 201-357029, through IDEN. 201-357029 then turned those requirements over to LNPURE which returned them via 201-357029 and IDEN to WODISH. Why not cut out the middleman and the security complications, and save the headaches?

4. The Station feels that the WODISH handling of 201-357029 results in a case that has the potential of causing severe problems for AKULE, and that it could well be that AKULE will be made to bear the blame since elements within RVROCK might feel that the ultimate responsibility for supervision of the case lies with AKULE.

Distribution:
③ - C/WHD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HTPA-2457	19 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-357029

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HTPA-2457

5. We would appreciate obtaining Headquarters' views on our thoughts as expressed above as well as on what seems to be a contradiction between Reference A, paragraph 2 and the evidence presented in Reference B Attachment. It appears unlikely to us that IDEN could have typed the Attachment.

Vincent H. RACICOT

201-357029

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 17 AUGUST 1962

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

FBI FILE NO: 105-6311 (MIAMI)

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-134

DATE: 13 AUGUST 1969

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE

SUBJECT: FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

14-00000

SECRET

Aug 4, 69

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT : DCS Case 47540 - Contact with Louis A. Brun/Clemard Joseph Charles

1. On 29 July 1969, Station Port au Prince advised that Clemard Joseph Charles had passed a list of nine questions concerning the Haitian economy to an official of the United States Embassy in Port au Prince. The list of questions was written in English in standard U.S. Government format and, although sterile, appeared to be intelligence requirements. Charles told the Embassy official that he had just finished a "big job" for the Pentagon and implied that the list also came from the Pentagon. The Embassy official suspected that Charles had passed a copy of the list to the National Palace.

2. On 2 August, a representative of the WH/Haiti Desk contacted Mr. George Musulin, Operational Support Staff of DCS, and learned that the DCS office in New York had briefed Mr. Louis A. Brun and had orally passed a list of CIRL requirements to Brun concerning Haiti prior to his trip to Haiti during the week of 21 July. Mr. Musulin speculated that Brun had probably noted the DCS requirements on paper and then had passed a copy to Charles upon his arrival in Haiti.

3. For a number of years, the United States Government has been aware of the political ambitions of Charles and his alleged plotting to overthrow the Duvalier regime. In 1967, this rather open plotting led to his imprisonment for over one year. Also, since May 1963, Charles has been trying to obtain support from the United States Government for his plots but he has been consistently rebuffed. Charles is not held in high esteem by U.S. officials and his motives are highly questionable. He owes his position in Haiti to his relationship with Duvalier and his ability to successfully manage some of the more notorious financial rackets of the regime. Charles enjoys no political following and even the "plots" with which he is associated are viewed with considerable reserve. For example, we have never been able to confirm that Charles was involved with the "military junta" formed in May 1969, as he claimed. In February 1969, the

SECRET

201-357029
Charles soft fil

U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince commented that, with regard to the most recent plotting of Charles, "the possibility cannot be excluded that Charles could be a provocation to determine the real motives of the United States Government toward the Duvalier regime " We concur in the Embassy's views.

4. During the past three years, the WH Division has been kept advised of the contact between DCS and Brun and his relationship with Charles We are also aware from DCS and other sources of the efforts by Brun to obtain support from the United States Government for Charles Brun is, of course, a close collaborator of Charles and a business representative of his in New York City Brun has contacted officials of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and even a person with access to President Johnson on Charles' behalf The Chief of Caribbean Affairs of the Department of State categorically told Brun in June 1967 that the United States Government was not interested in supporting the plots of Charles or anyone else against Duvalier, but this advice seems to have fallen on deaf ears The most recent example of Brun's lobbying was in May 1969 when Brun passed on to DCS a request from Charles for a secret meeting between a U.S. envoy and a representative of the "military junta " Brun's involvement with Charles requires that he be considered a biased source of information While some of the information Brun has obtained from Charles has been of interest, there is hardly anything that was not available through other channels and indeed, much of it was slanted

5 As was set forth in WH/7 memorandums to the Operational Support Staff, DCS, on 18 July 1968 and 28 May 1969, we interpose no objection to DCS maintaining contact with Brun for its own purposes. However, the relationship between Brun and Charles has now taken on operational characteristics (agent/sub-agent) with Brun levying requirements on Charles in Haiti to service on behalf of DCS. The relationship between Brun and Charles also has manifested political and security aspects which could adversely affect the interests of the United States Government regarding Haiti. Accordingly, we request that the contact between Brun and Clemard Joseph Charles on behalf of DCS be terminated.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

S-E-C-R-E-T

	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: RUTH LEHMAN; nvs
UNIT: WE/7/HT
EXT: 5595/1349
DATE: 1 AUGUST 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY DKB PER _______ # _______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. _______

CONF: WH8
INFO: FILE. VR. RIAN DO 5. FI 2. CI/OPS CI/OA.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T

01 22 22z Aug 69

CITE DIRECTOR 25288

TO PORT AU PRINCE INFO: DO BASE NEW YORK

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 6323 (IN 12581)*

1. PER REF REQUEST, ONE LUIS BRUN, WELL KNOWN COLLABORATOR OF SUBJECT REF ON POLITICAL MATTERS IN HAITI, IS CONTACT OF WODISH OFFICE, NEW YORK. PRIOR TO BRUN'S TRIP TO HAITI, WEEK OF 21 JULY, WODISH BRIEFED BRUN AND ORALLY PASSED LIST OF CIRL REQUIREMENTS ON HAITI. FYI, BRUN BELIEVES WODISH CONTACT IS FROM DEFENSE AND THAT REQUIREMENTS LEVIED BY DOD.

2. IT WODISH BELIEF THAT BRUN PROBABLY NOTED REQUIREMENTS ON PAPER FOLLOWING BRIEFING, AND PASSED COPY TO SUBJECT REF UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN HAITI.

3. FYI, SUBJECT REF WAS REGISTERED IN INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER UNTIL 17 MARCH 69, WHEN ACSI TERMINATED HIM, WITHOUT PREJUDICE. SUBJECT WELL KNOWN FOR HIS REPEATED ATTEMPTS OBTAIN USG BACKING FOR HIS [redacted] PLANS TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER.

AN JB
AB X
~~SN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DE~~ NFD
~~FI~~
WH/7/HT

Continued . . .

CS COPY

CI/APPS RI
201-357029

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

01 AUG 69
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY _______ PER _______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

SEP 4 5 10 PM '69

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

FORWARDED

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE DIRECTOR 26288

PAGE 2

TO

4. WODISH BRIEFED ON CONTENTS REF AND PROMISED TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION.

5. FILE: 201-357029.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Clemard Joseph CHARLES passed list of questions to EMBOFF re Haitian economy. Advised Emb. he had finished "big job" for Pentagon. Advise if list of WOFIRM origin.

SEP 15 69

RH

Robert H Rolfe
for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

FI/DCG D Hen

DOI/B-2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C.B. Dickens
CHARLES B. DICKENS
AC/WH/7

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

VANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

AT: ______ Z

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

SSEM BY 30 PER

CTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR RI/AN 204 DDP ADDP CS/DO F2 CI

CI/OPS

F402

S E C R E T 292Ø5Z JUL 69 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6323 (RACICOT ACTING)

29 Jul 69 IN 12581

DIRECTOR INFO DO BASE NEW YORK

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

L 1. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES PASSED TO EMBOFF COPY OF LIST

OF 9 QUESTIONS WRITTEN IN ENGLISH DEALING WITH HAITIAN ECONOMY.

MENTIONED HE HAD JUST FINISHED "BIG JOB" FOR PENTAGON AND

IMPLIED LIST ALSO CAME FROM PENTAGON. ALTHOUGH STERILE, QUES-

TIONS WRITTEN IN STANDARD GOVERNMENT FORMAT AND APPEAR TO BE

INTEL REQUIREMENTS.

L 2. STATION POUCHING LIST TO HQS ONLY PER HTPA 2443 DTD

29 JULY SINCE CANNOT DUPLICATE LOCALLY. WOULD APPRECIATE

LEARNING IF LIST IS OF WOFIRM ORIGIN. FYI EMBOFF SUSPECTS

CHARLES HAS PASSED LIST AT PALACE AND STATION THEREFORE FEELS

SECURITY ASPECTS RE HANDLING CHARLES BY ANY USG AGENCY SHOULD

BE REVIEWED. SINCE CHARLES HAD PASSED LIST TO EMBASSY FOR

ANSWERING OF QUESTIONS, IT WOULD APPEAR "INTELLIGENCE" COULD

HAVE BEEN OVERTLY OBTAINED.

2. FILE: 2Ø1-357Ø29.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

VHR

FROM
Chief of Station, Port au Prince (VHR Acting)

SUBJECT
Subject of 201-357029

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: Port au Prince 6323 dated 29 July 1969.

Per Reference attached is the list of questions given Subject.

Vincent H. Racicot
Vincent H. RACICOT

Attachment:
As stated above (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att h/w

CS COPY

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HTPA-2443	DATE 29 July 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-357029 ✓

US manufacturers are setting up subsidiary companies in Haiti or are forming partnerships with Haitian enterprises to produce such itesm as underwear, baseballs, footwear and other export items. They use Haitian facilities and materials imported from the US.

1. What specific companies are involved in producing these goods, and are they completely owned by Haitians (US?) or are they in partnership with US companies?
2. Are there prospects that other companies are entering the field (using Haitian enterprises to produce goods from imported US materials)?
3. Will these enterprises expand? How important would it be to Haiti if these enterprises expanded? discontinued production?
4. What articles are produced?
5. What materials are imported to produce the final product? What percentage of the imported materials are part of the finished product?
6. Give the figures on the value of the imported goods vs. the value of the export goods to gain Haitian profit figures.
7. How do the domestic producers and the US importers feel about operating under President Duvalier? Are there any difficulties? Have investment conditions in Haiti changed since these enterprises began operating?
8. Does the Haitian workers' lack of education affect their training?
9. How effective is the Haitian social security system? Do US importers contribute to the social security fund?

H/waa 1 HTPA-2443 CS COPY 201-357029

SECRET

28 May 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director, Domestic Contact Service
Operational Support Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. George S. Musulin

SUBJECT : DCS Case 47540 - Request by Haitian Opposition Group for Secret Interview with U.S. Official

1. This memorandum will serve to confirm the telephone conversations between your office and the Chief of the Haiti Desk on 15 and 27 May 1969 concerning the request made through Mr. Louis A. Brun on the above subject. During these conversations, your office was advised that the WH Division has no interest in contacting any representative or member of the plotting group.

2. The WH Division considers Cleeard Joseph Charles to be a perennial anti-Duvalier plotter in Port au Prince with little means or following to carry out his anti-government designs. During the week of 11 May 1969, Charles approached the Embassy in Port au Prince with basically the same information as relayed to the DCS office in New York by Mr. Brun. The only difference was that he did not request that a U.S. Government official make contact with the internal group, but rather that the Embassy provide some assurance that the U.S. Government would look benevolently on the group once the coup was launched. The Embassy replied that the U.S. Government had a firm policy not to intervene in such matters and that no such assurance could be expected.

3. Since 1967, Charles has made similar overtures to the U.S. Government for support of his anti-government plans. When reviewing these approaches, there has always been some doubt as to the accuracy of the information that Charles (or Brun) has furnished. While it was accepted that Charles was actually plotting against Duvalier, it could never be determined if he was actually a member of the plotting group, which usually included members of the Haitian Army, or if Charles had simply become aware of an anti-Duvalier plot and was trying to act as a broker between the plotters and the

SECRET

U.S. Government for his own interests.

4. At the present time, fairly reliable reports have been received that certain officials of the Haitian Army are trying to form a junta to take power in the event Duvalier dies. Some members of this junta are reportedly anxious to overthrow Duvalier, should he recover, but so far have not established a timetable or decided how they intend to carry out the coup. Also, the illness of Duvalier has undoubtedly inspired anti-Duvalier plotting by other groups in Haiti but no reliable information is available on their plans. It is interesting to note that Clemard Joseph Charles is not identified as a plotter in any of the reports from internal sources.

5. As was mentioned in the WH/7 memorandum dated 16 July 1968, we do not interpose any objection to DCS maintaining contact with Brun for its own purposes. However, we feel that in the interests of security and also in conformance with U.S. policy, that Brun should clearly understand that we have no interest in establishing contact with any member of the internal group through his channel and further that the U.S. Government has no interest in becoming involved in any anti-Duvalier activities.

Charles B. Dickens
AC/WH/7

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Addressee
    1 - WH/7
    2 - WH/7/HT (CHARLES file)

☑ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Request by Haitian Opposition Group For Secret Interview with US Official

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
GSMusulin/bm DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Bldg.	2268	Case 47540 DATE 23 May 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCS	5/22	5/2		For your information.
2. C/WH/7/HT 3 B 0001 Hq.	26 MAY 1969			Shirley Stetson.
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

S E C R E T 021542Z MAY 69 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 1588

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF ([illegible]) FROM [illegible]

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY HAITIAN OPPOSITION GROUP FOR SECRET INTERVIEW
WITH US OFFICIAL

REFERENCE: S E C R E T/SENSITIVE OOA(D) -303/13[illegible]-69

OUR SOURCE RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM GROUP MENTIONED IN REFERENCE ON 22 MAY 1969, WHICH STATED THAT "THE TRANSACTION HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE". THIS TELEGRAM THEN REQUESTED "URGENTLY" THAT THE TRANSACTION BE SET IN MOTION. SOURCE HAS ALREADY EXPLAINED TO REFERENCE REQUESTERS THAT HE IS NOTHING BUT A CHANNEL. WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO SOURCE THAT WE ARE NOTHING BUT A CHANNEL (WHICH HE UNDERSTANDS). WE PASS ALONG THE REQUEST FOR THE RECORD. THANK YOU.

FILE: LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT
B&B INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
250 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY

S E C R E T

NOTE: LINE SUBJECT: REQUEST .... ETC WILL READ REQUEST SORRY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM:
GSMusulin/bx
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. Case 47540

DATE: 21 May 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	5/21	5/21		For your information and file.
2. WH/7/HT 3 B 0001 Hq.				
3. DC/WH/7				
4.				
5. WH/7/HT				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, WHO HAS STATED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THAT HE WILL BE THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF HAITI AND WHO HAS GATHERED ABOUT HIMSELF A PERSONAL FOLLOWING OF INDIVIDUALS COVERTLY OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT DUVALIER /COLLECTOR'S NOTE: SEE 00-B - 321/ 26913-69./, HAS NOW DECLARED THAT ACTION AGAINST HAITI'S PRESIDENT IS IMPERATIVE AND THAT DUVALIER'S OVERTHROW MUST AND CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE 1969. HE HAS SET A 1 JULY 1969 DEADLINE FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF HIS GOAL. CHARLES HAS ALSO STATED THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE BECAUSE OTHER OPPOSITION GROUPS /COLLECTOR'S NOTE: PRESUMABLY, HE REFERS TO ONE OR MORE OF THOSE GROUPS LISTED IN 00B-321/269.3-69./ MAY TRY TO ACT BEFORE HE CAN. CHARLES LISTS NO REASON FOR THE SPECIFIC TIME LIMIT OF 1 JULY 1969.

2. CHARLES HAS REQUESTED THAT "THE PENTAGON" (SPECIFICALLY, HIS FORMER INTERMEDIARY, COLONEL HOWARD BURRIS) DISPATCH A SECRET ENVOY TO TALK TO HIM. HE LAYS DOWN NO MODUS OPERANDI FOR THE ENVOY AND PRESUMABLY WILL TALK TO HIM IN PORT-AU-PRINCE. THIS REQUEST HAS BEEN LABELED "URGENT".

-END-

SECRET/SENSITIVE

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CHARLES, CLEMARD JOSEPH
201-357029
SEX M DOB ?

CIT HAITI
OCC ?
< HAITI
MBR OF OPPOSITION GP.

036-009-006
PRIA-06024
13 MAY 69

HDCUNDHTP

R 6907311254

RI
FILE IN 201-
357029

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

10 MAY 69

REPORT CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

REFERENCES: NONE

COUNTRY/S: HAITI

DATE OF INFO: 5-10 MAY 1969

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY HAITIAN OPPOSITION GROUP FOR SECRET INTERVIEW WITH US OFFICIAL

1. ONE OF THE UNDERGROUND OPPOSITION GROUPS IN HAITI IS CENTERED IN THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS: FNU LAVENS RPT LAVENS (FORMER DEPUTY, NOW IN SEMI-HIDING); COLONEL WESTNER BLAIN RPT BLAIN (HEAD OF ARMY QUARTERMASTER WAREHOUSES); COLONEL CAYARD RPT CAYARD (HEAD OF THE COAST GUARD); FNU CONSTANT RPT CONSTANT (CHIEF OF STAFF). THEY WISH TO ORGANIZE A JUNTA, FOLLOWING THE DEATH OR RETIREMENT OF HAITIAN PRESIDENT DUVALIER, AND EXERCISE POWER DURING A TRANSITION PERIOD. FOLLOWING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, THIS GROUP WISHES TO HAVE FREE ELECTIONS AND THEN RETIRE FROM POLITICAL ACTIVITY. LAVENS WOULD LIKE TO BECOME A MINISTER. BLAIN WOULD LIKE A DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENT. CAYARD WOULD LIKE TO RETIRE TO HIS CATTLE RANCH. THE GROUP HAS NO PARTICULAR CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT.

2. THIS GROUP ALLEGES THAT IT COMMANDS WIDE SUPPORT AMONG ARMY PERSONNEL IN PORT-AU-PRINCE AND IN THE HAITIAN HINTERLAND. THE GROUP IS REPORTEDLY WILLING TO WORK WITH ANY OTHER OPPOSITION GROUP, EXCEPT THE COMMUNISTS BUT IT DOES NOT WANT TO APPEAR PUBLICLY BEHOLDEN TO THE US OR TO ANY OTHER NON-HAITIAN POWER.

3. UNTIL RECENTLY, THE PLAN OF THIS GROUP WAS TO SIT BACK, WAIT FOR INTERNAL UPHEAVALS AND THEN MOVE IN TO ASSUME POWER. THEY DID NOT WANT TO ACT ON THEIR OWN, BUT PREFERRED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF

AN INTERNAL UPHEAVAL CREATED BY SOMEBODY ELSE.

4. THE MOST RECENT RUMORS CONCERNING PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S HEALTH HAVE, HOWEVER, CAUSED THE GROUP TO CHANGE ITS MIND. THE MEMBERS NOW DECLARE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND THAT AS SOON AS PRESIDENT DUVALIER "GOES ON THE OPERATING TABLE" THEY WILL MOVE.

5. THE GROUP RECOGNIZES, HOWEVER, THAT CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES LIE IN ITS PATH AND IS MOST ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS THE ENTIRE MATTER IN SECRET WITH A US ENVOY. WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY TO THIS ENVOY IS NOT KNOWN.

6. THE GROUP HAS ORGANIZED THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE FOR THE ENVOY TO FOLLOW. FIRST, HE MUST SEND A CABLE TO THE FOLLOWING CABLE ADDRESS: ETSLAHAB, PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI. THE CABLE MUST READ AS FOLLOWS: "ARRIVING ON (LIST DATE) TO DISCUSS THE SISAL DEAL. PLEASE RESERVE A ROOM FOR ME AT THE SANS SOUCI HOTEL." THE NAME SIGNED TO THE CABLE DOES NOT MATTER. THE CABLE ADDRESS IS THAT OF ESTABLISSEMENTS LAHENS-BLAIN & CO., PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI. SECOND, HE MUST REGISTER AT THE SANS SOUCI AND AWAIT A CALL OR VISIT FROM A MAN NAMED EDGARD BONI RPT BONI. BONI IS KESTNER BLAIN'S BROTHER. THE ORIGINAL FAMILY NAME IS "BONI"; BLAIN CHANGED HIS NAME. BONI WILL EITHER TAKE THE ENVOY TO TALK TO CONSTANT OR WILL INFORM HIM OF ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE INTERVIEW. THE ONLY PERSONS PRESENT AT THE INTERVIEW WILL BE CONSTANT AND THE ENVOY. THIRD, WHEN THE ENVOY MEETS CONSTANT HE MUST ESTABLISH HIS BONA FIDES RPT BONA FIDES BY SAYING: "I HAVE BEEN SENT BY MR. EISENHOWER TO DISCUSS SISAL". THE KEY WORD IS "EISENHOWER".

7. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE, BUT NOT MANDATORY, IF THE SECRET US

ENVOY WAS ABLE TO SPEAK FRENCH.

-END-

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONTROLLED DISSEM | CONFIDENTIAL | NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/10754-69

SUBJECT Reported Final Terms for Award of Gambling Concession/Clemard Joseph-Charles' Involvement

DATE DISTR. 21 APR 1969

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

Supplement to: 00B-321/07210-69

DATE OF INFO. Apr 69

PLACE & DATE ACQ. /Apr 69

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, who makes frequent trips to Haiti. Source maintains close contact with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti.

1. As part of his effort to obtain foreign exchange, Haiti's President Duvalier has decided to award a gambling concession. A US syndicate, consisting of a New York City firm, Keynote Associates, and of Count Michel Levitch, Bishop of the American Orthodox Church, has been trying to obtain the concession. /Collector's Note: see reference for additional details./.

2. The Bishop has severed his connections with Keynote, which bombarded President Duvalier with telegrams and made an unannounced trip to Haiti to obtain the concession.

3. However [redacted], Keynote received a telegram from Antonic André, Director of the Bank of the Republic of Haiti. This message informed them that they would not receive the concession. President Duvalier relies very heavily upon André for advice and guidance in economic matters.

4. Almost at the same time that Keynote received André's telegram, Clémard Joseph-Charles notified the Bishop that he would receive the concession on the following terms:

   a. A new group of associates of the Bishop will receive 80 percent of the gross receipts from the concession.

   b. The Government of Haiti will receive 10 percent of the gross receipts.

   c. The Bishop and his chief partner will receive five percent of the gross receipts.

U 20 | CONFIDENTIAL | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | S ED

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organiza- [illegible] under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

d. The remaining five percent of the gross receipts will be used by the Bishop, reportedly under Haitian supervision, to begin construction of schools and child care centers in Haiti. These schools and centers will be under the auspices of the American Orthodox Church.

5. Joseph-Charles's authorship of the telegram which virtually promised the concession to the new group indicates that his fortunes may be on the mend. He certainly could never have sent such a message without the approval of President Duvalier. That he was permitted to send it indicates that the President may be beginning to look upon him more favorably than he has done in the recent past.

- end -

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONTROLLED DISSEM | CONFIDENTIAL | NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/10768-69

SUBJECT Possible Improvement in Fortunes of Clemard Joseph-Charles/Possible Reason for President Duvalier's Harsh Treatment of Charles/Eclipse of Luc-Albert Foucard

DATE DISTR. 22 APR 1969

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

Supplement To: 00B-321/07210-69
00B-321/06914-69

DATE OF INFO. Apr 69

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Port-au-Prince, Haiti/Apr 69

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, who makes frequent trips to Haiti. Source maintains close contact with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti.

1. During recent weeks, the fortunes of Clemard Joseph-Charles seem to have improved. He has been playing a not unimportant role in the award of the Haitian gambling concession /Collector's Note: see reference./, an activity which is designed to bring to Haiti some badly-needed foreign exchange. Although I do not believe that he sees President Duvalier as frequently as he used to prior to his incarceration, he does seem to have recovered some of the confidence which the President used to repose in him.

2. One reason for President Duvalier's dislike of Charles (and one possible reason why the President eventually threw him in jail) is that Charles was instrumental in bringing about the marriage of the President's daughter, Marie-Denise Duvalier, to Colonel Max Dominique. Charles and Marie-Denise have been close friends for many years. Marie-Denise became pregnant by Dominique and went to Charles for help. Charles then intervened with President Duvalier, who was furious, and persuaded him to agree to the marriage. The President was bitterly angry at Dominique and somewhat unjustly blamed Charles for the marriage. He agreed to the necessity for the wedding, but resented his new son-in-law and, by association, so to speak, resented Charles. The President and Dominique have formally reconciled. The President met Colonel Dominique at the airport, when the latter returned to Haiti, and made a point of inviting his son-in-law to ride in the presidential limousine from the airport to the palace. The purpose was to demonstrate the burial of old grudges. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not the reconciliation was genuine and whether or not the President has really forgiven his son-in-law.

U NO | CONFIDENTIAL | S NO

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

3. Luc-Albert Foucard, Haitian Minister of Tourism, is now in political, if not personal, eclipse. He no longer goes to his office. The New York City manager of the Haitian Tourist Bureau, Jean Sorel, is in Haiti and is acting in Foucard's stead. Ramah Theodore, Deputy Director of Tourism, is amiable and is a friend of President Duvalier. He is, however, of little stature and is not capable of doing anything more than the routine daily chores of the office. Foucard cannot afford to call attention to himself, because he is fearful for the physical safety of his sister, Madame Saint-Victor. President Duvalier recently dismissed her as his personal secretary and replaced her with his daughter, wife of Colonel Max Dominique. Since then, rumors have abounded that Madame Saint-Victor may be marked for physical liquidation /Collector's Note: see reference./. Whether or not these rumors have any foundation in fact, there is no doubt that the members of the Foucard family (i e, Luc-Albert, Madame Saint-Victor and their sister, Madame Bella Foucard Poitvien) have all made themselves as inconspicuous as possible. The President's change in secretaries has led to a diminution of the power and influence of the Foucard clan.

- end -

17 March 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REGISTRATION REQUEST

ISSUE NO.
28,910

DATE

201 NO.
357029

NAME
CHARLES, Clemard Joseph

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS

DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP

PRESENT ADDRESS

OCCUPATION

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT

TRAVEL

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA

SD 11612 is terminated without prejudice by the Department of the Army.

For additional information, you are referred to the Army Source Registry.

DATE: 17 Mar 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP - 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1797

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-14

FROM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE

DATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1969

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLOT OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Letters from Clemard Charles, Haiti, to US Officials and Businessmen

FROM: Daniel J. Shine for GSMusulin/js DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Building	EXTENSION 2268	NO. DCS Case 47540	DATE 10 January 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	13 JAN 1969	13 JAN 1969		Attached, for your information, is copy of PHI-457-68, with attachment.
2. WH/7/Haiti 3 B 0001, Hqs.	21 JAN 1969		R	
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7. Return to FI/ISR				
8. ATTN: VINCE 2-E-03				
9.				
10.				To 8: Pls file in Charles 201
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

PHI-457-68

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

Attn : International Division (GAlyea)

DATE: 24 December 1968

FROM : Chief, Philadelphia Office

SUBJECT: Letters From Clemard Charles, Haiti, to US Officials and Businessmen

Ref : Phil 00-B-321/36801-68 dated 17 Dec 68

1. Attached for your information are letters from Clemard Joseph Charles addressed to Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey and President-elect Richard Nixon. These letters were received in person from Charles, in Haiti, by Donald E. Rowe, source of reference, and brought to the US by the latter. The letters have not been delivered as of this date. Rowe plans to ask the New Jersey Third District Member of the US House of Representatives to deliver them.

2. In addition to the correspondence referred to above, Rowe also received letters of introduction from Charles to:

Howard L. Burris (believed to be a lawyer)
Suite 101, RCA Building
1725 K. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Mr. A. E. Incledon, Vice President
J. G. White Engineering Corp.
80 Broad Street
New York, N. Y. 10004

Monsieur Albert J. Krieger (believed to be an accountant and business acquaintance of Charles)
401 Broadway
New York, N. Y. 10013

Mr. Herman Albert Miller (an accountant)
230 W. 41st Street
New York, N. Y. 10036

Mr. N. V. Rosello (an old friend and very reliable acquaintance of Charles)
Export Credit Western Hemisphere Corp.
477 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10022

The addressees are individuals from whom Charles is seeking financial assistance.

JAY B. L. REEVES

BRWatson/cjs
Attachments

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

01-357029

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Le Président

Port-au-Prince, le 8 Novembre 1963

Excellence,

Vous n'ignorez pas l'intérêt avec lequel j'ai suivi les étapes de la campagne électorale qui devait aboutir au Triomphe de votre Compétiteur Républicain aux élections présidentielles Américaines.

Vous le savez, à n'en pas douter, que j'ai souhaité de tout coeur Votre propre Triomphe. Je le croyais irrésistible.

Vous avez fait de votre mieux, mais Vous avez perdu.

Que pouviez-Vous faire? Les sages sentent qu'il y a quelque chose qu'on ne peut écarter par des mots ou des votes - une ceinture qui enserre le monde.

> " Tout ce qui a été décidé arrivera.
> La volonté infinie et supérieure de
> Dieu ne peut pas être transgressée."

Certes, pour atteindre l'objet de vos aspirations, Vous Vous êtes heurté à des bornes immuables. Vous Vous êtes enflammé de l'espoir de bousculer les faits et les hommes.

Après maintes expériences Vous conviendrez que depuis le départ la victoire constituait pratiquement une gageure, et qu'il fallait commencer plus tôt: c'est dire que le monde est régi par des lois.

Maintenant que le rideau est tiré, je prends plaisir à formuler des voeux pour que se maintienne intact le courage magnifique dont Vous avez fait preuve tout au long de Votre campagne électorale.

Je sais, pour répéter le Président JOHNSON, que "Vous continuerez à servir l'Amérique aussi longtemps que Vous vivrez".

.../.2

14-00000

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Le Président

Annexe 1

Je Vous prie, Excellence, de recevoir l'expression de mes hommages respectueux, et en même temps Vous assurer de mes sentiments indéfectibles d'attachement et d'admiration.

Clémard JOSEPH CHARLES, P.I.B.A.

CJC/pcl

SON EXCELLENCE
L'HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
VICE-PRESIDENT DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Le Président

Port-au-Prince, le 8 Novembre 1968

Monsieur le Président Elu,

J'ai suivi, comme tous les Haïtiens d'ailleurs, les élections présidentielles Américaines qui constituent toujours un événement international de première importance.

En effet, le Monde entier a enregistré les différentes phases de la campagne électorale qui devait aboutir à Votre Avènement à la Présidence des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Un vent de renouveau souffle sur l'Amérique consciente de Sa force et de Son rayonnement dans le Monde.

Vous jouissez, Monsieur le Président Elu, d'un prestige incontesté.

Je suis donc certain que, sous Votre Administration, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, avec le prestige que lui donnent Son passé incomparable et Ses grandes ressources tant humaines qu'économiques, sauront remplir sa vocation de Leadership du Monde libre et Sa place de premier plan parmi les autres Nations du Globe qui soupirent ardemment après un monde pacifique et plus humain.

C'est le souhait que je forme à l'occasion de Votre Triomphe aux élections présidentielles Américaines.

Je Vous prie de recevoir, Monsieur le Président Elu, mes voeux sincères pour Votre Bonheur personnel et la prospérité du peuple Américain.

Clémard Joseph Charles, P.I.B.A.

CJC/pel

MONSIEUR RICHARD NIXON
PRESIDENT ELU DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CHAYES, ABRAM
DCD FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: DCD

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
[illegible]		BETH LICHTENFELS	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

A-19-91-59

PROF. ABRAM CHAYES

BUSINESS:

Subject is with the following:

A000723 - Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA.

CONFIDENTIAL

DCD-458/78
19 April 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/ISS/IP/EIS

FROM : Ruth Elliff
DCD/FIO/PAO

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations Request (OLC 78-0986/1)

The following material is forwarded in response to subject request:

a. DCD file A-19-91-59 on Abram Chayes (on loan).

b. Documents concerning Monica Kramer and Rita Naman. (Please excuse the poor quality of some of this material, it was impossible to get a clear reproduction from our microfilm.)

Ruth Elliff
Ruth Elliff

Attachments a/s

RELLIFF:wfc
Distribution
0 - Addressee
1 - DCD Chrono
1 - Staff A
3 - RElliff
3 - Control

E2 IMPDET CL BY 386090

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CONFIDENTIAL

yellow

19-91-59

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PES-263-77
31 August 1977

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Boston Field Office
Chief, New York Field Office
Chief, San Francisco Field Office
Chief, Syracuse Field Office
Chief, Washington Field Office

FROM : Acting Chief, USSR-EE Collection Group, DCD

SUBJECT : Case 64574 - USSR External Policy - Pugwash Conference, Munich, Germany, August 1977

1. Enclosed you will find a list of attendees (Enclosure A) to the Pugwash Conference held in Munich, Germany, in August, and a set of questions (Enclosure B) prepared by the ORPA analysts at our request. Since the original list of attendees contained only the last name and first initial of each US participant, we had to make some educated guesses as to the true identities of many of them. As a result, do not be surprised if some question why we felt they had attended. In many cases, however, there was no question as to the true identity of the source.

2. ORPA has been quite pleased with the reporting generated by their previous requirements. As a result, they have made an extra effort to write even more thought provoking requirements. We feel that the enclosed questions are the best we have sent out to date.

3. Responsive reporting should cite the current CIRL, Objective A1a and KIQ 90. We look forward to receiving your responses.

William P. Blake
for THOMAS A. NESSER

Enclosures: As stated above

WPBlake/bjp

9c

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

E2 IMPDET CL BY
476500

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Green →

ENCLOSURE A

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Abram Chayes Harvard University	A 199159
Carl Djerassi Stanford University	A 49345
Paul Doty Harvard University	A 46309
Bernard T. Feld MIT	A 5927
George B. Kistiakowsky Harvard University	A6304
Richard N. Rosecrance Cornell University	A 124263
Jack P. Ruina MIT	A 99072
Herbert Scoville McLean, Va.	A157380
W. Murray Todd National Academy of Sciences	A 123586
John S. Toll State University of New York Stony Brook, New York	A 28995

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

19-91-59

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD/RESIDENT OFFICE (1-4)	ORGANIZATION NUMBER (5-10)	11-15	CASE NUMBER (16-20)	FORWARDED MO. DAY YR. (21-26)	(27-33)	JOINT (34)	UO (35)	36
H B O S			6 4 5 7 4	0 9 1 4 6	X 2 6 6 5 9 7 6			

SUBJECT AND AREA
Four Papers by Soviet Scientists on Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, the Complete General Ban of Nuclear Tests, and European Security
(USSR)

RELEASED MO. DAY YR (40-44): 0 9 2 3 6

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Prof. Abram Chayes
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, MA

INDIVIDUAL NO.:

ORGANIZATION NO.:

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Documentary

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.:

ORGANIZATION NO.:

SUBJECT 47-50			
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	–	–	–
5	S	D	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	–	–	–
9	M	I	S

(2 circled; 8 written beside it)

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ. PROCESSING ELEMENT 51	52
[✓ 1]	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	[✓ 6]
7	7
8	8
9	9

METHOD OF COLLECTION
☐ INTERVIEW
☒ OTHER DOCUMENT
☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM: 1

EXCHANGES (COL. 35)
1-EXCHANGE
2-BILATERAL
3. COMMERCIAL
4. ARTICLE IV

DIRECTED TO	OSG	SREE	ICG	ETF	DESK OFFICER
		X			TWebbe.

FIELD COMMENTS

AIA-06-01

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS
Extra copies of documents to:

① JOHN SOUDERS OCI/SRE 7G31
② MARTHA MAUTNER STATE/INR/DDR/RSE/SOV 4841
③ GLENN BUCHAN OSR 5F25
④ WILLIAM CHAPIN STATE/INR/DDR/PAT 6638

MOO (55-58)	KIQ (59-61)	GRADE (62-66)	INDIVIDUAL NO. (67-72)	MA (73)	TR (74)	COUNTRY (75-79)
AIA	06	01		1	B	166

I.O.: CCPyeatts

F.O. CHIEF: John H. Mahoney

DESK OFFICER:

BRANCH SECTION CHIEF: Tom Webbe

FORM 25 7-75 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 006687

(20-41)

1

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N- -A-L

Domestic Collection Division

Foreign Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

COUNTRY	USSR	**DCD REPORT NO.**	OO-B-321/26659-76
SUBJECT	Four Papers by Soviet Scientists on Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, the Complete General Ban of Nuclear Tests, and European Security	**DATE DISTR.**	Sept. 23, 1976
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	DCD Case: 6 ,574 C-JT-6-50174

DATE OF INFO. August 1976

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

FEENY DOCUMENTS

SOURCE Documentary

[Available in CRS Central Libraries Division, Document Services Branch are four papers presented by Soviet scientists at the 26th Pugwash Conference on Disarmament, Security and Development, Muhlhausen, German Democratic Republic, 26-31 August 1976. The papers are as follows: (1) "On Complete and General Ban of Nuclear Weapon Tests" by L.S. Semeiko of the USSR Institute of the USA and Canada; (2) "Implementation of the Agreements of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" by Professor V.G. Trukhanovsky, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO); (3) "Concerning the Question of Atomic Power Energetics and Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" by Academician V.S. Emelyanov; and (4) "Pugwash and Development" by Academician V.A. Engelhardt - UNCLASSIFIED.]

- end -

COPY REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

5
4
3
2
1

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 001595. Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

THE DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS CONTROLLED BY DCID 1/2.

FORM 1-76 2290 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

19-91-59

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD/ RESIDENT OFFICE 1 2 3 4	ORGANIZATION NUMBER 5 6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	FORWARDED MO. DAY YR 21 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT SERIES & NO. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34 35 36
H B O S			6 4 5 7 4	0 9 1 4 6	X 2 6 5 1 4 7 6	

SUBJECT AND AREA
Reports of the Four Working Groups at the 26th Pugwash Conference

(USSR/INTERNATIONAL)

RELEASED MO. DAY YR 40 41 42 43 44: 09236

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Prof. Abram Chayes
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, MA

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE CODE GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Documentary

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
[✓ 2]	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	W	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ. PROCESSING ELEMENT 51	52
[✓ 1]	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	[✓ 6]
7	7
8	8
9	9

METHOD OF COLLECTION
- INTERVIEW
- ☒ OTHER DOCUMENT
- TRIP REPORT
- OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM: 1

EXCHANGES (COL. 35)
1-EXCHANGE
2-BILATERAL
3. COMMERCIAL
4. ARTICLE IV

DIRECTED TO	OSS	SREE	ICG	ETF	DESK OFFICER
		X			Webber

FIELD COMMENTS

AIB-06-01

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS
Extra copies of documents to:
① JOHN SOUDERS OCI/SRE 7G31
② ~~MARTHA~~ MAUTNER STATE/INR/DDR/RSE/SOV 4841
~~WAYNE LIMBERG CAR/USSR 5632~~
③ GLENN BUCHAN OSR 5F25
④ WILLIAM CHAPIN STATE/INR/DDR/PMT 6638

MBO 55 56 57 58	KIO 59 60 61	GRADE 62 63 64 65 66	INDIVIDUAL NO. 67 68 69 70 71 72	MA 73	TR 74 75	COUNTRY 76 77 78 79
A1 ar	X6	01		1	B	1E6

I/O JScoye/ds

F.O. CH. John H. Mahoney

DESK OFFICER

BRANCH SECTION CHIEF Tom Willey

E2 IMPDET CL BY 006687

(20-61)

FORM 7-75 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Domestic Collection Division
Foreign Intelligence Information Report

COUNTRY USSR/International

DCD REPORT NO. 00-B-321/26514-76

SUBJECT Reports of the Four Working Groups at the 26th Pugwash Conference

DATE DISTR. Sept. 23, 1976

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DCD Case: 64,574
C-JT-6-50174

DATE OF INFO. August 1976

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Documentary

[Available in CRS Central Libraries Division, Document Services Branch are copies of the reports of the four Working Groups at the 26th Pugwash Conference on Disarmament, Security and Development held at Mulhausen, German Democratic Republic, 26-31 August 1976. The subjects discussed in each of the Working Group reports are as follows: "Problems of Limiting and Reducing Strategic Nuclear Armaments and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction," "Controlling the Spread of Nuclear Armaments," "European Security and Co-operation Issues," and "Development and Security" - UNCLASSIFIED.]

- end -

WARNING NOTICE–SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 001595. Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

THE DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS CONTROLLED BY DCID 1/7.

The Aaron E. Norman Fund, Inc., New York, New York

Purposes and Activities: Interests include the improvement of inter-cultural and inter-racial relations; the protection of civil liberties; the prevention and treatment of emotional disturbances, etc.

Norman Fund channeled the following amounts of CIA money to CIA projects:

1961 – $15,000 to American Society for African Culture (AMSAC)

1962 – $10,000 to African-American Institute (AAI)

1963 – $15,000 to Pan American Foundation (PAF). (This represented a part of the total budget for PAF in 1963. Virtually all PAF funds in 1963 were used for grants to individual recipients of Agency operational interest. No domestic organizations received any of the funds.)

1964 – $10,000 to International Development Foundation (IDF)

Norman Fund gave its own money to the following CIA projects:

1962 – $7,500 to American Society for African Culture (AMSAC)

1962 – $3,000 to African Research Foundation

1962 – $3,100 to U.S. National Student Association (USNSA)

We hold copies of Schedule of Ordinary Grants of the Norman Fund for 1962 and 1963. These documents confirm the figures and the recipients cited in the Drew Pearson column. No CIA funds were given for other than the four grants listed above.

SECRET

20 FEB 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Alleged CIA Use of the Norman Foundation and the J. M. Kaplan Fund, Inc. to Pass Funds to Organizations Involving Mr. Leo Cherne

REFERENCE : New York Times Article of February 19, 1976 by Mr. John M. Crewdson, Same Subject

1. Reference reports that the President of the Norman Foundation, Mr. Frank Weil, said that he was approached by a "mysterious gentleman" from the CIA in 1963 or 1964 and asked to pass about $15,000 in Government funds to the International Rescue Committee of which Mr. Leo Cherne was then Chairman of the Board. CIA files reveal that the Norman Foundation (formerly the Aaron E. Norman Fund, Inc.) was never used to pass CIA funds to the International Rescue Committee as implied in Reference. Attached is the record of CIA funds passed through the A. E. Norman Fund, Inc. and bonafide grants made by the funds to CIA projects. It is noted that in 1961, the Norman Fund passed $15,000 of CIA funds to the American Society for African Culture (AMSAC). Possibly Mr. Weil confused this funding for African activities with the International Rescue Committee.

2. It is true as reported in the article and sourced to an executive of the J. M. Kaplan Fund, Inc., that the Fund supported a single Agency program in the 1960s. This program was the Institute of International Labor Research, Inc. (IILR) an Agency-controlled non-profit organization active inthe Latin American labor field. CIA's use of the J.M. Kaplan Fund, Inc. to fund the IILR terminated in 1964 when use of the Kaplan Fund was exposed in Congressional hearings of thje Patman Committee on Tax-exempt Foundations. CIA files confirm that the J.M. Kaplan Fund, Inc. made in 1963 a bonafide grant to the International Rescue Committee for Czech refugee relief. There is no evidence that CIA funds were passed to the Kaplan Fund for any other purpose than support of the IILR.

3. Although there is no evidence that CIA ever directly or indirectly funded the International Rescue Committee or Freedom House, Mr. Cherne personally and through his firm, Research Institute of America, Inc., actively assisted the Agency in the past. A CSO agent, Joel A.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 559779

SECRET

SECRET

SHALLOWAY (P) currently in Paris was provided cover in Paris, France from 1954-1965 by the Research Institute of America, Inc. During operations against Cuba in 1959-60 Mr. Cherne was active in both an FI and CA capacity. He was also subsequently a DCD source.

/s/ ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff

Attachment: Pending Record

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Aise (handcarried)
1 - 18382 (Shalloway) file
1 - C/CCS
1 - LPCORSET/46 - FS-1121 (Aaron E. Norman Fund)
1 - MD-296 (International Rescue Committee)
1 - 201-76662 (Cherne, Leo)
2 - CCS/PRG chrono & board

DDO/C/CCS/PRG/GWAllen:ekw (20 February 1976)

SECRET

SECRET
Classification

JFK MICROFILM FILE SUMMARY

SUMMARY; REEL 4 , FOLDER(S) 3, CREATED 02/07/94 by ES

SUBJECT OF FOLDER : Abram Chayes

201 NUMBER, IF ANY

INCLUSIVE DATES OF FILE MATERIAL Undated THRU APRIL 1978

RELEVANCE OR NON-RELEVANCE TO OSWALD & JFK ASSASSINATION:

Neither the information or time frame is relevant. See Summary below.

REASON OR ASSUMED REASON FOR INCLUSION IN THIS COLLECTION.

A review of the HSCA volumes did not surface an "Abram" Chayes but an "Abraham" Chayes, a legal advisor to the State Department, who maintained that at the time Oswald received his visa to enter Russia from the Soviet Embassy in Helsinik, normally at least 1 week would elapse between the time of a tourist's application and the issuance of a vias. It would appear that Abram and Abraham are not identical to each other. Betty Lichtenfeld of the HSCA reviewed the file on 17 August 1978.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION WITHIN FILE:

Harvard Law School professor who attended a Pugwash Conference in Munich in 1977.

CIA/U. S. GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP:

None.

PAGES OF NON-JFK-RELATED MATERIAL: 8

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

A1412371)

RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE REQUEST FOR SECURITY CHECKS

OS FILE NUMBER 532 652

FROM: Clearance Support Branch, Personnel Security Division

DATE 7 May 1973

TO : Domestic Contact Service, FO: MIAMI (MOCubria)

20 October 1972

SUBJECT'S NAME Last	First	Middle		US CITIZEN	ALIEN
CISNEROS	Rogelio	Wenceslao	US		

OTHER NAMES USED INCLUDING MAIDEN, ALIASES, ETC.
CISNEROS Diaz, Rogelio Wenceslav

THIS NOTICE IS VALID THRU May 1978 (Mo-Yr.)

USE OF SUBJECT DURING THIS PERIOD BY OFFICES OTHER THAN DCS (except those having prior interest) MUST BE COORDINATED WITH DCS.

1. Reference is made to your request for security checks on the Subject person. If the identifying information furnished is erroneous in any way, this division should be *notified* immediately. Checks based upon erroneous information *are invalid*.

2. The necessary checks have been completed and no pertinent information has been obtained except as noted below:

CITIZEN:

☒ Passport data attached.

☐ Subject was last favorably investigated in ____

☐ Denied Area Case: FBI Check was completed ____ Other NAC's were completed ____. This office has no objection to Subject being used in accordance with DCI's memorandum dated 25 November 1961.

☐ Summary of noteworthy information is attached for your consideration in determining the extent and level of your use of Subject.

ALIEN: This is *not an approval* for this alien's access to classified information.

☐ FBI has no objection to your *preliminary* contact with Subject. *(Resubmit with full biographic data if contact is to continue.)*

☐ FBI has no objection to continuing contact with Subject. ☐ Pertinent information has been developed, and is attached.

3. This advisory on investigative results is *for contact purposes only* and is not to be construed as a clearance of Subject person beyond that.

4. Coordination of prior covert interest:

☐ Not necessary ☐ No objection interposed by ____

☐ Please contact ____

5. Remarks:

Chief, Personnel Security Division

FOR DCS/HQS USE ONLY

APPROVED/SECRET

FORM 2-70 2941 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

3 – DCS/HQ

14-00000

SUBJECT: [illegible]

NUMBER : [illegible] DATE: [illegible]

The passport file of SUBJECT in: ☐ name as shown above; or ☐ under the variation ______ was reviewed at the Passport Office, Department of State, with the following results:

BIRTH: On [illegible] at [illegible]

PASSPORTS ISSUED:

Most recent-# [illegible], issued on [illegible] at [illegible]

for (time) [illegible] travel to or residence in [illegible]

[illegible]

for purpose of [illegible]

SPOUSE: Name ______; born at ○ ______

______ on ○ ______. Married (date) ○ ______ and

marriage not terminated; or terminated on ______ due ______.

Never Married ☐

FATHER: Name ______

Born at ○ ______ on ○ ______

If foreign born, U. S. citizen: ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Deceased

MOTHER: Name ______

Born at ○ ______ on ○ ______

If foreign born, U. S. citizen: ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Deceased

PERMANENT RESIDENCE: [illegible]

MAILING ADDRESS: [illegible]

OCCUPATION: [illegible]

. . . .

Previous - ☐ Over

☐ File at FRC, Suitland, Md., (Check if applicable)

"X" in circle indicates verification of information on Bio Sheet. Any discrepancies or variations are written in as shown on Passport application.

14-00000

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

A11457

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE REQUEST FOR SECURITY CHECKS

OS FILE NO. (OS Use Only)

TO : Clearance Support Branch, Personnel Security Division, Office of Security

FROM: Domestic Contact Service, FO: MIAMI (MOCabrie)

DATE 20 October 1972

SUBJECT'S NAME Last CISNEROS | First Rogelio | Middle Wenceslao

US US CITIZEN | ALIEN

OTHER NAMES USED INCLUDING MAIDEN, ALIASES, ETC.
CISNEROS Diaz, Rogelio Wenceslao

SEX Male

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 20 March 1927/Camaguey, Cuba

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 265 | 78 | 6136

CITIZENSHIP (Country) US (Naturalized)

NATURALIZATION NUMBER, PLACE AND DATE 9260415/Miami, Florida/July 1969

ALIEN REGISTRATION NO.

	FULL NAME	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
SPOUSE			
FATHER			
MOTHER			

RESIDENCES – COMPLETE ADDRESS (Current and last 5 years)

FROM	TO	
1963	1969	549 DeLeon Drive, Miami Springs, Florida
1969	Present	264 Palmetto Drive, Miami, Florida

HF 15660

EMPLOYMENTS (Current and last 5 years)

FROM	TO	EMPLOYER'S NAME	ADDRESS
1972	Present	Reine Trading Corporation	5576 S.W. 8th Street Coral Gables, Florida
1970	Aug 1972	Colombia Institute of Language	1005 S.W. First Street Miami, Florida

EDUCATION (College, Graduate Work)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE AND MAJOR

PRIOR US GOVERNMENT SERVICE INCLUDING MILITARY

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY CLEARANCES HELD

☐ NEW REQUEST ☒ RECHECK

OS NUMBER AND DATE (If a recheck) 6532 652 – 22 Nov 67

REMARKS

26 OCT 1972

FORM 2-70 2941 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

4 – DCS/HQ

14-00000

F-14-12-37
Miami Office

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

DATE : 22 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT : CISNEROS Diaz, Rogelio Wenceslav
#532 552

1. This will confirm our report that the FBI interposes no objection to the proposed interrogation of the Subject alien and is to inform you that security checks on Subject have been completed.

2. The FBI has requested that they be advised if information of an intelligence nature, which may be of interest to that Bureau, is developed as a result of the contemplated interrogation.

3. This is not a security clearance of this person.

4. Any additional information we have obtained is attached and is submitted for your confidential use only. It is not to be disseminated outside of CIA.

William R. Kotapish
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION
Office of Security

CONTACT APPROVED
(ALIEN)

FORM 7-65 1998 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-60)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 18 October 1967

TO: SERVICES DIVISION

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Form 160 attached on:

Rogelio Wenceslav CISNEROS Diaz

FROM: Miami Field Office/ACharneco

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO : [illegible]

(47)

14-00000

Miami (Charnue)

23 OCT 1967

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 October 1967

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NO.

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME
CISNEROS Diaz, Rogelio, Wenceslav ✓

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
20 Mar 27/Camaguey, Cuba

2. ALIASES
141237

4. SEX
M

5. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No., and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
1947	1959	Owner - teacher at private school in Camaguey
1957	1959	Coordinator in Camaguey for 26 July Movement
1960	1961	Coordinator in Camaguey for Peoples Revolutionary Movement (Anti-Castro)
1961	Present	In exile in the US; present address 549 De Leon Drive, Miami Springs, Florida PHONE: 887-8830

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
1961	1964	Traveled considerably in the Caribbean area on JURE affairs	
	Present	Post, Buckley, Mooney and Schuh Inc., Engineers S-140902 R# 141238	225 Westward Drive Miami Springs, Florida

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

23 OCT 1967

A 12 406 212

Cisneros has five children 5 to 17 years old; foster daughter age 22, named Mirtha Borras.

☐ CONTINUED

FORM 300 USE PREVIOUS
6-66 EDITIONS
MFG. 11-66

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L F-14-12-37
(When Filled In)

DATE 17 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, MIAMI FIELD OFFICE

ATTENTION : CHARNECO

SUBJECT : FBI Approval to Contact Alien

REFERENCE :

A-141237

Re ROGELIO WENCESLAV CISNEROS-DIAZ, Security Division has informed us that the FBI has no objection to your proposed interrogation.

Security checks will be completed.

SECURITY

Virginia L. Thorne

VIRGINIA L. THORNE
Security Liaison Officer

CC:

SECURITY MESSAGE# 3451

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

VLT:rre:pat

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET

A-14-12-37

ROGELIO WENCESLAV CISNEROS DIAZ

549 De Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida
Phone: 887-8830

BUSINESS:

Subject is with:

A141238 - Post, Buckley, Mooney and Schuh Inc., Engineers, 225 Westward Drive, Miami Springs, Florida

Subject is now affiliated with the following organization as of October 1972:

A172020 - Relma Trading Corporation, Coral Gables, Florida

14-12-37

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

18 JU...

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD OFFICE	CASE NUMBER	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR.		
X M I M	# 63307	06165	R X 1686475	

RELEASED MO. DA. YR.: 062445

SUBJECT AND AREA

Construction and Expansion of Sugar Mills/Activities of Cuban Infiltrated Guerrillas and Agitators

(Honduras)

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Cisneros
Relma Trading Co.
5574 S. W. 8th St.
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.:

ORGANIZATION NO.:

TYPE DO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

* NOT DISSEMINATED

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.:

ORGANIZATION NO.:

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
[✓ 2]	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ PROCESSING ELEMENT

51	52	53	54
1	S	R	E
[✓ 2]	I	N	T
3	D	S	S
4	A	L	N
5	F	O	R

METHOD OF COLLECTION

X	INTERVIEW		TRIP REPORT
	OTHER DOCUMENT		OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	SUP	SREE	INT	DESK OFFICER
			X	(Metcalf)

FIELD COMMENTS

CIA X

C/A

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

OCI/WH/HQ - J. WALLACE sent
6D28

OER/D/LA - METZGER sent
4B31

DDO/LA/CNH thru OSS HALL sent
3B4402

OCI/WH - D. Lynch

Luis---I attempted to get a reaction from the analyst regarding the information in paragraph 2.Unfortu[illegible]ely there is a new analyst for Honduras who is now a~~w~~way on vacation and he left no second who understands the situation in Honduras. So rather than hold on to this report--I am returning it with no response from the analyst.

Fred

7-018

OBJECTIVE REFERENCES

55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66
C	l	a		X							

File

Mesa-Soto:ljh for

BENALMARING

DESK OFFICER

BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 1-74 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

1

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF
OPERATIONS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Honduras	**DCD REPORT NO.**	00-B 321/16864-75
SUBJECT	Construction and Expansion of Sugar Mills/Activities of Cuban Infiltrated Guerrillas and Agitators	**DATE DISTR.**	07 JUL 1975
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	DCD Case 63307

DATE OF INFO. May 1975

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Tegucigalpa, Honduras/May 1975

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, executive of an import/export company with extensive business connections in Central America and the Caribbean. He makes frequent trips to these areas, and has contact with high ranking military and political leaders. He speaks Spanish fluently.

1. The Government of Honduras (GOH) recently obtained a US$12 million loan from the Central American Bank of Economic Integration for the expansion of the Azucarera del Sur sugar mill located in Choluteca, Honduras. In addition, the GOH has purchased two sugar mills, one in Brazil and the other in Puerto Rico. The mills, bought at a cost of US$15 million each, will be dismantled and shipped to Honduras, where they will be reassembled with the aid of foreign technicians. Also, another sugar mill is to be built in the country at a cost of US$20 million; however, the Japanese Mitsubishi enterprise will be the major stockholder, while Honduran private businessmen will hold a minority interest. This is part of an expansion and modernization program by the GOH with hopes of obtaining a larger share of the world's sugar market.

2. The GOH is somewhat concerned with the infiltration through Mexico and Guatemala of Communist agitators and guerrilla training personnel. These guerrillas, mostly Cubans who remained in the country after they had arrived allegedly to assist the GOH following Hurricane Fifi, are causing growing concern as a result of several uprisings and invasion of private lands by peasants in several parts of the country. The Cubans, who stayed in the country following Hurricane Fifi and others who have arrived clandestinely since that time, reportedly are training leftist militants and sympathizers among the Honduran peasants. The agitators and guerrilla instructors are taking advantage of growing unemployment and the overall poor national economic situation to stir the peasants into activity against the government.

- end -

5
4
3
2
1

U	YES

S	YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 007672. Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

DCID 1/7 establishes the controls for the dissemination and use of the intelligence and intelligence information in this report. The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. Dissemination of this report outside the States of the United States, or to any individual or organization, other than those specified above, is forbidden without the specific approval of the Domestic Collection Division, Directorate of Operations.

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4): X M I M

CASE NUMBER (14 17 18 19 21): 6 3 3 0 7

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. (22 23 24 25 26): 0 6 1 3 5

27 ~~28~~ 29 30 31 32 33: 1 6 7 1 6 7 5

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44): 0 6 2 4 5

SUBJECT AND AREA
Negotiations for Economic Agreement with Venezuela/Influential Officers in National Defense Council

(Honduras)

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rogelio Cisferos
Relna Trading Company
5574 S. W. 8th St.
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

45 TYPE CODE
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

ORGANIZATION NO.

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
[✓ 2]	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	–	–	–
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	–	–	–
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ PROCESSING ELEMENT

51	52	53	54
1	S	P	E
[✓ 2]	I	N	T
3	O	S	S
4	A	L	N
5	F	O	R

METHOD OF COLLECTION

X	INTERVIEW		TRIP REPORT
	OTHER DOCUMENT		OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	SUP	SREE	INT	DESK OFFICER
			X	(Metcalf)

FIELD COMMENTS

KIA 51

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS
OCI/WH/HS – I WALLACE
6G28
DDO/LA/CNH thru OSS (HALF)
3B4402
OEK/P/LA – METZGER

7-018

OBJECTIVE REFERENCES

55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66
K	1	a		5	1						

LLlesa-Soto:ljh

for BENAL WARING

DESK OFFICER F Metcalf

BRANCH CHIEF for P Austin

FORM 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
8-74

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(20-41)

1

DIRECTORATE OF
OPERATIONS

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

DCD REPORT NO. 00-B 321/16716-75

SUBJECT Negotiations for Economic Agreement with Venezuela/Influential Officers in National Defense Council

DATE DISTR. 03 JUL 1975

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DCD Case 63307

DATE OF INFO. May 1975

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Tegucigalpa, Honduras/May 1975

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, executive of an import/export company with extensive business connections in Central America and the Caribbean. He makes important trips to these areas and has contact with high ranking military and political leaders. He speaks Spanish fluently.

1. The new military regime in Honduras currently is holding talks with Venezuela and hopes to sign an economic agreement in the very near future. With that in mind, the Government of Honduras (GOH) recently sent a high level commission to Venezuela headed by Captain Armando San Martin, Secretary of State for Economy and Commerce and by Attorney Antonio Jose Cuello to hold discussions with high ranking Venezuelan Government officials. Prior to the talks, the GOH recently sold to Venezuela 25 million linear feet of lumber at a total cost of US$5 million. The GOH hopes to reach an agreement by which Venezuela would buy Honduran agricultural products for an unspecified mix of cash and petroleum products. In addition, Venezuela would support a new agricultural production plan to be implemented in the very near future by Fernando Montes, Honduran Secretary of State for Agriculture.

2. Despite reports that Chief Executive Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar Castro has unquestioned authority, Honduran military sources have indicated that Mario Maldonado, Agrarian Reform Chief; Lieutenant Colonel Mario Fonseca, Director of the Military Academy, and Lieutenant Colonel Juan Ramon Molina Cisneros, Commander of the First Artillery Battalion are the real "power behind the throne." These officers, who profess a strong nationalist ideology, are interested simply in the general welfare of the Honduran people, and they are maintaining a "watchdog" attitude to insure that no one, especially people in positions of power, uses such positions for his own personal benefit. These officers are members of the National Defense Council (NDC), which also includes the commanders of all major military units in the country. Maldonado, Fonseca, and Molina appear to be the "first among equals" in the 15 member NDC.

- end -

5
4
3
2
1

U	YES

S	YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 007622. Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

CONTROLLED DISSEM **NO DISSEM ABROAD**

DCID 1/7 establishes the controls for the dissemination and use of the intelligence and intelligence information in this report. The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. Dissemination of this report outside the States of the United States, or to any individual or organization, other than those

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD OFFICE: Y M T M

CASE NUMBER:

FORWARDED: 0 3 1 8 5

0 6 7 1 5 7 5

SUBJECT AND AREA

Current Political and Economic Situation/Expected Nationalization of Fishing Industry/Leftist Influence in Cabinet

(Honduras)

RELEASED (MO. DA. YR): 0 4 0 1 5

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Cisneros Diaz
[redacted] Relma Trading Co.
5574 S. W. 8th Street
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

TYPE CODE: R — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

* NOT DISSEMINATED

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
[✓ 2]	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ PROCESSING ELEMENT

51	52	53	54
1	S	R	E
[✓ 2]	I	N	T
3	O	S	S
4	A	L	N
5	F	O	R

METHOD OF COLLECTION

X	INTERVIEW		TRIP REPORT
	OTHER DOCUMENT		OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	SUP	SPEC	INT	DESK OFFICER
			X	(Metcalf)

FIELD COMMENTS

KIB 52
53

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

OCI/WH - Joanna Wallace
6 G-28 HQ

PDO 7 3B4402 HQ-CHA/CAM
EARL DREISONSTOK
COORDINATE THRU CRAIG WARE
OSS Rm 900

OEK-4G31 ID/LA
C. SPALDING

OBJECTIVE REFERENCES

KIB ~~48~~

7-018

Desa-Soto:ljh

J. MAINWARING

DESK OFFICER: F.M.

BRANCH DESK CHIEF: P. Austin

FORM 25 1-74 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(20-41)

1

DIRECTORATE OF
OPERATIONS

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

DCD REPORT NO. 00-E 324/06715-75

SUBJECT Current Political and Economic Situation/Expected Nationalization of Fishing Industry/Leftist Influence in Cabinet

DATE DISTR. 1 APR 1975

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. February 1975

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Tegucigalpa/February 1975

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US national, executive of an import-export company. He is a frequent traveler to Central and South America where he has developed good contacts in the political and business sectors. He speaks Spanish fluently.

1. Businessmen in Honduras have reported that the economic and political situation in the country, currently in a sad state of affairs, is bound to become worse as a result of the indifference being exhibited by President Oswaldo Lopez Arellano. On the economic side, the private business sector is quite concerned about an expected government move to nationalize the fishing industry. Some foreign firms already are pulling out of the country and moving to nearby countries like Nicaragua and El Salvador. On the political side, President Lopez has failed to name a permanent foreign minister since November 1974, when Cesar Batres occupied that post. Ricardo A. Pineda is performing those duties on an interim basis. The President also has undermined Honduran youth by giving in to the demands of the leftist-controlled labor unions. He gives businessmen the impression that he does not know much about government; consequently, the situation in the country has become very unstable.

2. Apparently, the regime in Honduras wants to emulate the current Peruvian Government in failing to even consider elections at all. In fact, the government, which is controlled by the military, has three pro-left ministers in the cabinet. They are Manuel Acosta Bonilla, Secretary of State for Finance; Guatama Fonseca Zuniga, Secretary of State for Labor and Social Security, and Manlio Martinez Cantor, Executive Secretary, Planning Board. At one time, Acosta was the private secretary of the Mexican leftist leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano, so he has been thoroughly indoctrinated along Marxist lines.

- end -

5
4
3
2
1

U	YES	S	YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 007622. Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

DCID 1/7 establishes the controls for the dissemination and use of the intelligence and intelligence information in this report. The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. Dissemination of this report outside the States of the United States, or to any individual or organization, other than those specified above, is forbidden without the specific approval of the Domestic Collection Division, Directorate of Operations.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4): X M I M

B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15): 60000

C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20):

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR (22 23 24 25 26): 1 1 0 7 2

REPORT NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): 3 3 4 1 9 7 2

(34 35 36) J U O: 2

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
Horacio Moya Posas, Agrarian Reform Director/Rigoberto Sandoval in Italy/His Attitude Towards the US

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39)

RELEASED MO. DA YR (40 41 42 43 44): 1/1/72

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rogelio Wenceslao Cisneros
Relsa Trading Corporation, 5574 S.W. 8 St.
Coral Gables, Fla.

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, R REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
[✓ 7]	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
[✓ 2]		N	T
3			
4			

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
IRS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	RHeller

FIELD COMMENTS
- Army report

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS
Copies To:

OCI - G. Rufty
6728

DIA - DI-5D3
MB-877
[redacted]
Pentagon

CRS 7-08

C/S: MCCabria:bmm MCC

F.O. CHIEF: REMAINWARING

CASE OFFICER: Hellen

DIVISION/STAFF/DESK: Mo H. Snitzer

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. X 00-E-324/33419-72

SUBJECT Horatio Moya Posas, Agrarian Reform Director/Rigoberto Sandoval in Italy/ His Attitude Towards the US

DATE DISTR. 14 NOV 1972

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DIRM NO.: 1-7-B8
(2356)

DATE OF INFO. October 1972 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Honduras/1972

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who has worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has numerous social contacts and business connections with officials of the government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. Horacio Moya Posas is the present director of Agrarian Reform in Honduras. He is inefficient and lacks some of the necessary qualifications for that position. In spite of his being a lawyer by profession, he is not astute, is only of average intelligence, is far from decisive, and frequently vacillates when called upon to make decisions. He is, however, extremely anti-Communist. His deputy director is Roberto Oliva. He is no asset. He has no outgoing personality whatsoever, and in fact, he is rather innocuous. One thing that can be said in his favor is that he is reported to be a good engineer.

2. The previous Agrarian Reform director was Rigoberto Sandoval. He is an extremely capable lawyer, very sagacious, intelligent and he displayed great foresight in that position. His present and future course of life is worth observing closely because a possibility does exist that he may be a candidate for an important political position in the not too distant future. To date Sandoval has not mentioned which political position he plans to seek. Another reason for observing him is that he is exceedingly anti-US.

3. If Sandoval does decide to seek a political office, it would most probably be General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano who would sponsor him.

4. Early in October 1972 a US importer-exporter received a very pleasant personal letter from Rigoberto Sandoval. By the tone of the letter one would judge that a close relationship has existed between them for some time. Sandoval stated that he was in Italy working for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and that for the present his stay there was for an indefinite period. He enclosed a long list of items which he requested the US importer-exporter to send to him immediately if at all possible. The list consisted mostly of furniture, household furnishings, electrical appliances, etc.

- end -

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4): X M I M

B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15): 00000

C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20):

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED (MO. DA. YR) (22 23 24 25 26): 1 1 0 7 2

REPORT NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): B 3 3 4 1 8 7 2

J U O (34 35 36): 2

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
Possible Reactivation of The Central American Common Market/
Labor Not Endorsing Any Specific Political Party

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39):

RELEASED (MO. DA YR) (40 41 42 43 44): 1115

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rogelio Wenceslao Cisneros
Relma Trading Corporation
5574 S.W. 8th Street
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT				*	AREA			
47	48	49	50	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN	51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O		1	S	O	V
1	S	&	T	2. TOO GENERAL	2		N	T
2	P	O	L		3			
3	M	I	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES	4			
4	-	-	-					
5	S	O	C	4. OTHER MISC				
6	G	E	O	5. COMBINED WITH				
7	B	I	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST				
8	-	-	-					
9	M	I	S.					

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	RHeller

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

115

On 18 October an interim agreement was reached that re-established a free trade area among the five CACM countries. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are now in. Honduras remains outside.

FIELD COMMENTS
- Army report

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

7-018

C/S. MOCabris:hmm MOC

F.O. CHIEF BEMAINWARING

CASE OFFICER Hell

DIVISION/STAFF DESK L. H. SHITZER

FORM 7-60 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

SUBJECT Possible Reactivation of The Central American Common Market/Labor Not Endorsing Any Specific Political Party

REPORT NO. OO- B-321/33418-72

DATE DISTR. 23 NOV 1972

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES CIRL NO.: IRG-LA2-72 (2356)

DATE OF INFO. Early October 1972

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Honduras/1972

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who has worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has numerous social contacts and business connections with officials of the government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. Honduran merchants, industrialists and some of the people have been urging the revival of the Central American Common Market (CACM). To all intents and purposes it has been practically non-existent. Salvadorians and Guatemalans have also expressed the same desire.

2. In early October 1972, these urgings were taken into consideration by the Secretaryship of Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) (Secretaria Permanente de Integracion Economica Centro Americana). SIECA appointed a president, and a board of directors was selected. Eduardo Ortes Colindres, a Honduran lawyer was named president. General Somoza of Nicaragua and General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano approved the appointment of Eduardo Ortes Colindres so much that they offered to aid him in revitalizing the CACM. The board is composed of members from Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Honduras. They are authorized to represent their countries in all matters pertaining to the CACM.

3. It is interesting to note that in spite of Honduras having informally retired from the CACM, not only is the president a Honduran, but so is the president of the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (BCIE), with headquarters in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. The fact that General Samoza of Nicaragua and General Lopez Arellano of Honduras have volunteered their assistance to Eduardo Ortes Colindres has led most of the Central Americans to believe that the CACM can once again be made active. If this does occur, it would indeed be most beneficial to the Central American countries concerned.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

4. Labor is better organized in the northern part of Honduras than anywhere else in that country. It has a headquarters in every city where administrative activities are conducted and where meetings of union leaders are held. So far meetings have not taken place at work centers.

5. Transactions between labor and the government are carried out by labor delegates Celio Gonzalez, through the Ministry of Labor, never directly.

6. Labor, as such, does not subscribe to any one particular political party. The Marxist theories do not appear to appeal to Labor Unions. However, many of their members do seem to be leaning towards the Liberal Party.

7. On the surface Labor Unions' actions in Honduras appear to be demagogic at times. They make demands on the government, industry and businesses in spite of their knowing that their demands may prove to be harmful to the economy of their country. It would be rather unfair to always hold the Honduran Union Leaders responsible for this demagogism, because frequently the union members themselves are guilty of pressuring their leaders to execute some specific demand, even though they had already been warned of the possible harmful effects.

- end -

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4		B. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15	C. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20
X M I M		6000	

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT NO. A B C D E F 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	J U O 34 35 36
1 1 0 6 2	B 3 3 4 1 5 7 2	2

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

General Lopez Arellano Unwilling to Lead Coup d'etat at Present/Army Officers Being Trained in Peru/Zuniga's Stratagems to Retain Present Power (Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA YR. 40 41 42 43 44

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Wenceslao Cisneros
Relma Trading Corporation
5574 S.W. 8th Street
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
[✓ 2]	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

- 1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
- 2. TOO GENERAL
- 3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
- 4. OTHER MISC
- 5. COMBINED WITH
- 6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
[✓ 2]	[illegible]	N	T
3			
4			

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

IBS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	RHeller

FIELD COMMENTS

- Army report

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

7-018

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF DESK
MOCUBRIA:hmm MOC	BEMAINHARING		

FORM 749 (25) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-61)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY					FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6 7 8 9 10	C. REQ CODE 11 12 13 14 15	D. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	E. 21	RECEIVED MO DA YR 22 23 24 25 26	B 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	U O 34 35 36
X M I M		60000		X	06160	1731870	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Sandoval's Dissatisfaction with the US/Possible Lopez "Continuismo" Maneuver

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO DA YR 40 41 42 43 44

06190

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio CISNEROS
549 De Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATION, REPORTS, OTHER

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT				AREA			
47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
0	E	C	G	1	S	O	V
1	S	S	T	[✓ 2]			T
[✓ 2]				3			
3	M			4			
4	-	-	-				
5	S	O	C				
6	G	E	C				
7	S		C				
8	-	-	-				
9	M		S				

1 SUBJECT WELL KNOWN
2 TOO GENERAL
3 DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4 OTHER, MISC
5 COMBINES WITH
6 INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

IRS

FIELD COMMENTS

Please direct to:
International Division
(RHeller)

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

7-019

C/S **HHaldane/css**

F.O. Chief **JFGLEICHAUF**

Case Officer Heller

Division/Staff/Desk L H Sultzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

2

(20-41)

14-00000

L_elligence Information : port

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. 00- B-321/17318-70

SUBJECT Sandoval's Dissatisfaction with the US/Possible Lopez "Continuismo" Maneuver

DATE DISTR. 24 JUN 1970

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL LA1-70 (2356)

DATE OF INFO. Jun 70 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE —/Jun 70

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen, an engineer who has worked and lived in Honduras. He maintains contact with high ranking Honduran Government and business leaders and travels frequently to that country.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I have recently had the opportunity to spend an evening with Rigoberto Sandoval, who as the General Secretary, Planification Board, is responsible for agrarian reform within the Republic of Honduras. He told me the following information:

2. Sandoval is making a trip to West Germany and possibly other non-Communist European countries in an attempt to procure technical assistance, credit and other unspecified help for the Honduran agrarian reform program. He feels it is in the best interests of Honduras to turn to countries other than the US for assistance. He claimed the US is now in decline; that she is both unable and unwilling to fulfill her international obligations, particularly within Latin America, and that she is slow to react and bogged down with bureaucratic red tape. Sandoval also suspicions that the Peace Corps, initially very beneficial to Honduras, is a tool of the CIA.

3. Sandoval considers himself to be the enemy of foreign businesses, particularly American, as they are holding large amounts of property which should figure in the agrarian reform movement. He did not mention plans to appropriate foreign land holdings however.

4. Sandoval has not heard President Oswaldo Lopez Arellano personally claim interest in another term. The feeling inside government circles is that Lopez will request a constitutional amendment permitting him to remain in office for six more years without benefit of election. If this happens Sandoval will resign. Although Lopez is behind the agrarian reform program his remaining in office would not be beneficial to the country.

- end -

5
4
3
2
1

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6 7 8 9 10	C. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15	D. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	E. 21	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT NO. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	I U O 34 35 36
X M I M		C C C C C		X	0 5 2 0 [illegible]	1 4 3 [illegible] 3 7 [illegible]	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Interest of Lopez in Second Term/Decline in Influence of Zuniga/Lack of Support for Candidacy of Fernandez (Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio CISNEROS
1885 SW First Street
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OC-E
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
[✓ 2]	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. [illegible]
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHERWISE
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
[✓ 2]		N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report

☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

IRS

FIELD COMMENTS

Please direct to:
International Division
(RHeller)

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

An excellent report. I am sure OCI will find it useful. It answers their questions. Another reason that it appears that Lopez plans to continue in office after 1971 is that he keeps the threat from El Salvador on a high key.

Heller

7-018

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
DWHaldane/css	JFGLEICHAUF		L. H. SNITZER

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

2

(20-41)

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/14313-70

SUBJECT Interest of Lopez in Second Term/ Decline in Influence of Zuniga/ Lack of Support for Candidacy of Fernandez

DATE DISTR. 2 JUN 1970

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL LA1-70
(2356)

DATE OF INFO. May 70 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Honduras/May 70 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who has worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has numerous social contacts and business connections with officials of the government, the armed forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. President Oswaldo Lopez Arellano is interested in a second term. This opinion is based on a growing consensus among Congressmen, Honduran business leaders and the military that Lopez desires to remain in office for another term. The thinking in these Honduran circles is that the lack of disclaimers by Lopez is, in itself, a strong indication of his "continuismo" plans. Approximately ten days ago Herman Pascua, manager of the National Railroad, headquartered in San Pedro Sula, had a discussion with the President during which Pascua passed the remark that he would like to remain with the railroad as long as Lopez remained in office. Lopez made no specific rejoinder to this but Pascua left the President's office with the distinct impression that Lopez would run for reelection.

2. Lopez would probably be reelected with relative ease. The opposition Liberal Party is divided internally and lacks both an effective candidate and the capital necessary to offer a serious challenge.

3. The power and influence of Ricardo Zuniga has declined drastically in recent months. This is not due to any specific act but more to a growing realization by President Lopez of Zuniga's dishonesty, ambition for power and his inability to get along with some government officials and prominent military officers. President Lopez was particularly dismayed at Zuniga's handling of Honduran propaganda during the recent Honduran/El Salvadoran border war. Lopez allegedly felt that the invective against El Salvador often mirrored the type used by Cuban Communism.

4. Miguel Andonie Fernandez, a self-appointed presidential candidate, is an honest, sincere and well respected man. There is a small group of roughly ten Arab and Jewish businessmen in San Pedro Sula known as the "economic mafia" because they control so much of Honduran business activity. This group has taken note of the candidacy of Fernandez and has been impressed by his honesty and sincerity. They will not support him however, because they feel he lacks the political experience and popular base for a successful campaign.

- end -

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

SECRET
(When Filled in)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR.		
1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	16 17 18 19 20	21	22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34 35 36
X M I M -		60000		X	1 1 1 2 9	3 3 7 1 5 6 9	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Anti-American Sentiment/Apparent Industrial Incentive/
Purchase of Armament

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44: 11149

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Cisneros
1885 S. W. 1st Street
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
[✓ 0]	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
[✓ 2]		C	
3	M		
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	8	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

1 SPECIFIC ENTITY UNKNOWN
2 TOO GENERAL
3 DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4 OTHER MISC.
5 COMBINED WITH
6 INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	C	V
[✓ 2]			
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

IRS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

7-018

C/S ARCharneco/jls

F.O. Chief JPGLEICHAUF

Case Officer

Division/Staff/Desk

FORM 366 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

2

(20-41)

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM | **CONFIDENTIAL** | **NO DISSEM ABROAD**

COUNTRY Honduras

SUBJECT Anti-American Sentiment/Apparent Industrial Incentive/Purchase of Armament

REPORT NO. OO-B 321/33715-69

DATE DISTR. 19 NOV 1969

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL LA2-69

(2356)

DATE OF INFO. Oct 69 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Tegucigalpa/Oct 69

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has social and business contacts with officials of the government, the armed forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. For over five years I have been in close contact with Hondurans of different backgrounds and social position. Never before have I seen the anti-American sentiment which is sweeping Honduras at the present time. The feeling is not only evident among student and labor organizations, but among sectors of what is considered to be the best informed and educated individuals in the country. Most of them are convinced that the US has the influence to exert diplomatic pressures on El Salvador in order to settle the pending border dispute, but has failed to do so. They see the US Government as favoring El Salvador.

2. During conversations with several government officials they emphatically stated that Honduras was not going to open the Pan American Highway to Salvadoran traffic. This is the attitude of almost everybody that I talked with. This single issue has served to unite the country like never before. There is a new feeling of patriotism which was lacking before the conflict with El Salvador.

3. The campaign against Salvadoran products has resulted in an incentive for Honduran investors. I have had several inquiries from Honduran businessmen who are interested in establishing production facilities for consumer articles which were normally imported from El Salvador. These individuals are eager to invest and establish factories in order to fill the demand for products which were imported from El Salvador.

4. Honduras has been purchasing arms and ammunition from Portuguese and Belgian sources. Some of this armament has arrived in the country. According to a military informant most of the armament has not been delivered, but is expected in the country before the end of the year.

- end -

U YES | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | S YES

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR.	REPORT NO.	IUO
1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	16 17 18 19 20	21	22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34 35 36
X M I M		6 C 0 0 0		X	0 9 0 2 9	2 6 1 1 3 6 9	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Honduran Government Interest in Purchasing Weapons to Arm Reserves/Alleged Purchase of Combat Aircraft by Honduran Official (Honduras/El Salvador)

ESTPA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44: 0 9 0 7 9

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rogelio CISNEROS
1885 SW First Street
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	D
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
[✓ 3]	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
[✓ 2]	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
IRS

FIELD COMMENTS

The business associate referred to in the body of the report is the contact.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Advance to:
Al Sype-Roch, OCI

7-018

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff Desk
ARCharneco/css	FGLEICHAUF		H Snitzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

2

(20-41)

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L **NO DISSEM ABROAD**

COUNTRY	Honduras/El Salvador	**REPORT NO.**	OO-B-321/26113-69
SUBJECT	Honduran Government Interest in Purchasing Weapons to Arm Reserves/ Alleged Purchase of Combat Aircraft by [redacted]	**DATE DISTR.**	11 SEP 1969
		PAGES	1
		REFERENCES (2356)	C-DC9-55300
DATE OF INFO.	Aug 69 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Tegucigalpa/Aug 69		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has social and business contacts with officials of the government, the armed forces, and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. During early August 1969 a close business associate met with Colonel (fnu) Coreccolli (phonetic) and members of the Honduran Army General Staff. Colonel Coreccolli and members of the Staff were alarmed by the continuing reports of arms and ammunition stockpiling by El Salvador. These individuals were of the opinion that the armament of the Honduran Armed Forces was inferior to that of El Salvador.

2. During the meeting Colonel Coreccolli inquired about the possibility of a legal or illegal purchase of approximately 2500 M-1 rifles and an undetermined amount of .30 caliber ammunition from US sources. He explained that the weapons were needed to arm personnel with prior military service in case of a renewal of hostilities with El Salvador. These individuals were considered to be a reserve for the Honduran Armed Forces.

3. My associate explained to Colonel Coreccolli that under the circumstances the US Government would not issue an export permit for the armaments. As for illegal sources my associate disclaimed knowledge of any. He also considered the transportation problem. Colonel Coreccolli stated that if acquired the weapons could be smuggled aboard a Honduran refrigeration ship which was anchored in the Miami River at that time. Following this Colonel Coreccolli closed the meeting indicating that he was going to explore other possibilities.

4. Following the meeting my associate had a conversation with Rigoberto Sandoval, a member of the Planification Board. Upon being informed of the meeting, Sandoval warned my associate to be careful in any dealings with Colonel Coreccolli, since he was known as a corrupt government official, a "thief". Sandoval stated that this was the opinion of President Oswaldo Lopez Arellano who distrusted Coreccolli. A few days later my associate learned that Ricardo Zuniga, Minister of the Presidency, has been given the task of purchasing arms and ammunition for Honduras.

5. Mauricio Hernandez, wealthy owner of a lumber mill in Honduras, visited the US during the first part of August 1969. He told me that he was going to purchase two "combat aircraft" for the Honduran Government. He did not specify the type nor the source of the aircraft. About a week later I had a telephone conversation with Hernandez, during which he told me that he had been "successful" in his purchasing mission. He did not give any details. - end -

U YES C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification **S** YES

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ. CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)
X M I M X				X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22-26)	REPORT NO. A, B, C OTHER (27-33)	I U O (34-36)
1 1 0 4 8	A 3 3 1 1 4 6 8	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Alleged Dissatisfaction of Aurelio Trillo, Cuban Merchant Marine

(Cuba)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39): |

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40-44): 11 23

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio W. Cisneros
1885 S.W. First Street
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E: (S) GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS ✓

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

#H 19634

FYI - Possible Interest

Copies to. WH/COG/OPS.

CI/LS.

PD

11)

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
ACharneco:msb	JFGILKICHAUF		DS/SS.

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

(20-41)

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY: Cuba

[illegible] 00-A(S) 322/33114-63

SUBJECT: Alleged Dissatisfaction of Aurelio Trillo, Cuban Merchant Marine

4 November 1963

1. A contact of this office recently reported the information presented below.

2. I had a conversation with some relatives who arrived from Cuba during October 1963. During the course of the conversation I inquired on the whereabouts of Aurelio Trillo Huerta, a former close friend of my family. From my relatives I obtained the below information and impressions concerning Trillo and members of his family.

3. Trillo is the second or third officer aboard the [illegible] ship "La Plata". He is dissatisfied with the GOC. This dissatisfaction arises from the unjust imprisonment of his father, Aurelio [illegible] Trillo de [illegible] from September 19[illegible] to October 19[illegible]. He was convicted for "counterrevolutionary activities" by the GOC. Subsequently his father was released and at the present time is in Mexico waiting for a visa to enter the US. During the time of his father's imprisonment Aurelio was planning to leave the island by clandestine means but was dissuaded by his family.

4. Trillo remains in the Merchant Marine because of the privileges obtained as an officer and because of the opportunity to travel. In his trips he acquires items which are scarce in Cuba and gives them as gifts to his family. Most of these gifts are then sold or bartered in the black market for foodstuffs and other necessities.

5. Trillo has two sisters who are married to Merchant Marine officers. Teresa Trillo Huerta is married to Alfredo [illegible]. She is a government secretary who works in classified foreign trade activities. She has one child, four years old. Among her close relatives, she is openly anti-GOC. The other sister is Lilian Trillo Huerta. One of these Merchant Marine officers is a captain but I don't recall which one.

6. Aurelio Trillo is about 23 years of age, intelligent and an introvert. He is not married. Though it has been about nine years since I have seen him, from what my relatives told me I believe that Trillo would be willing to cooperate against the GOC. During the fourth week of October the "La Plata" was supposed to be at Bilbao, Spain undergoing repairs.

-end-

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR.	REPORT NO. OTHER	I U O
1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	16 17 18 19 20	21	22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34 35 36
X M I M I				X	0 1 2 5 8	0 1 7 6 3 6 8	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Opinions of Moises Lopez Maldonado on Possible Presidential Candidates

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Cisneros
549 de Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT			
47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA			
51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report

☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

IRS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

P

Ca

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
ACharneco:mzb	JFOLEICHAUF		L H Snitzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

(20-41)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. 00- K 323/01763-68

SUBJECT Opinions of Moises Lopez Maldonado on Possible Presidential Candidates

DATE DISTR. 1 FEB 1968

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53900

(2356)

DATE OF INFO. Jan 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Tegucigalpa-Jan 68 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, an engineer who has worked and lived in Honduras for several years. During this time he has developed social and business contacts with officials of the government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. During the middle of January 1968 I had a lengthy conversation with Moises Lopez Maldonado, Honduran Consul in Costa Rica and a leading personality in the Partido Nacional (PN). He is a very close friend of Martin Aguero, leader of the PN. Lopez spends about half of his time in Honduras. He is an intelligent and cunning politician with a lot of common sense. He is critical of the soft lines used by the US in internal and foreign affairs.

2. During our conversation he stated that the next President of the country would be a civilian. He doubted very much if the Armed Forces could come up with a suitable candidate. He gave his opinions about several individuals with presidential aspirations.

> "Armando Velazquez Cerrato has completely disregarded the Party machinery. He is ambitious, but too individualistic. He has no political future in the country.
>
> "Manuel Acosta Bonilla present Minister of Economy, is capable, a hard worker and a good man. His Presidential ambitions at the present time are very subtle.
>
> "Ricardo Zuniga is well qualified and would have support from most of the influential people in the government who would like to see him as a Presidential candidate. A hard working individual, he is the right hand of President Lopez Arellano. I consider him the best qualified to run for the Presidential office."

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

[illegible]

S YES

14-12-37

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6 7 8 9 10	C. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15	D. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	E. 21	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT NO. B E F OTHER 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	I U O 34 35 36	
X M I M I				X	C 1 1 5 8	0 1 0 2 0 6 8 (F: X)		

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Opinions on Rigoberto Sandoval/Manuel Acosta Bonilla/Armando Velasquez Cerrato/Activities of Ricardo Zuniga/Status of Present Government (Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44: 0 1 1 7 8

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Cisneros
549 De Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
ACharneco:mzb	JFGLEICHAUF		L R Spitzer

FORM 25 3-66 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

(20-41)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. 00- OCK 323/01020-68

SUBJECT Opinions on Rigoberto Sandoval/Manuel Acosta Bonilla/Armando Velasquez Cerrato/Activities of Ricardo Zuniga/Status of Present Government

DATE DISTR. 22 JAN 1968

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53900
(2356)

DATE OF INFO. Jan 68 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Tegucigalpa-Dec 68 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, an engineer who has worked and lived in Honduras for the last two years. During this period he has developed contacts with officials in government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I have known Rigoberto Sandoval for approximately eight months. As the General Secretary of the Planification Board he is a very capable and competent individual. He is progressive and liberal in his ideas, though at times seems to be inclined to the left. He is a man of great potential for the development of the country. Sandoval was instrumental in instituting a housing project of approximately one thousand houses, to be constructed in San Pedro de Sula. The houses will be built for needy families. A loan of US$2 million has been granted by the "Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo" for the project.

2. The Minister of Economy, Manuel Acosta Bonilla, is an honest, hard working, and responsible individual. I have talked with him and with people who are close to him and got the impression that Acosta has no higher political aspirations. At least he does not show any outward signs of it.

3. Armando Velasquez Cerrato is being handled by the government very carefully. He is considered to be a dangerous individual. However, he is regarded by some of his followers as a scapegoat of the present government. Personally I don't think that he has any opportunities or enough popular support to intervene in the government successfully.

4. Ricardo Zuniga, Minister of Presidency, remains as an influential figure with President Lopez Arellano. Zuniga provides financial support to the non-Communist student organizations who support his claims that the US is intervening in Honduran internal affairs. In a recent confrontation with an official of the US Embassy, President Lopez Arellano openly supported Zuniga.

5. Since the last two years there has been a marked change in the country. There could have been more progress but the government is not dynamic enough, even though President Lopez Arellano is in complete control of the government. The opposition to the government is weak, plagued by differences of opinions, and lacking unity. The large majority of the people are undergoing great misery and poverty. Still, the masses are contented. Their interest is in subsisting from one day to the other, not politics.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

14-12-37

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY / FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ. CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22-26)	REPORT NO. S E G OTHER (27-33)	I U O (34-36)
X M I M I				X	0 1 1 2 8	0 1 0 1 3 6 8	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Proposed Steel Plant and Paper and Pulp Plant

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)	RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40-44)
	/ /

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio CISNEROS
549 de Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

45 TYPE OO-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division, Staff/Desk
[illegible]	[illegible]		L H Snitzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

(20-41)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L **NO DISSEM ABROAD**

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. OO-B 321/01013-68

SUBJECT Proposed Steel Plant and Paper and Pulp Plant

DATE DISTR. 19 JAN 1968

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53900 (2356)

DATE OF INFO. Jan 68 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Honduras/Jan 68 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, an engineer, who has worked and lived in Honduras for the last two years. During this period he has developed social and business contacts with officials in the government, the armed forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. Negotiations are going on with Mexico for the establishment of a steel plant in Honduras. The principal force behind the establishment of this industry is (fnu) Alduvin, an engineer with the "Banco Central". Alduvin studied in Mexico, and is a very intelligent and capable person. Alduvin was Minister of Public Works during the regime of Villeda Morales. At that time he was a supporter of Brown and Root, a US company with offices in the country. Though Alduvin was instrumental in granting several important projects to the company he now criticizes it as another extension of "Yankee Imperialism".

2. A US firm, International Paper Company, has been selected as one of the major stockholders, with participation of ADELA and the Government of Honduras, for the establishment of the paper and pulp plant and for the exploitation of lumber reserves in the country. The paper and pulp plant is tentatively to be established at the junction of the Aguan and Mame rivers. The area selected by the government for the exploitation of lumber reserves covers approximately 15 thousand square kilometers in the departments of Olancho and Yoro. The government is going to face a problem trying to determine the ownership of property in the area. I estimate that it will take three years to survey the boundaries and to set landmarks in the area.

3. Two access roads will be constructed to serve the area. One, "Carretera del Projecto Forestal de Olancho", will connect the paper plant with the forest reserves, extending from Mame to Salama, a total of 130 kilometers. The other road will connect the plant to the coast, from Mame to the port of La Ceiba, a total of 100 kilometers.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L S YES

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR.	REPORT NO. S E K OTHER	IUD
1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	16 17 18 19 20	21	22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34 35 36
X M I M I				X	0 1 1 2 8	0 0 3 6 9 6 8	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Civic Action Program Success/Armed Forces Capability to Cope with Insurgency/Activities of CIAC, Cuban Propaganda Organization
(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio CISNEROS
549 de Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47 48 49 50	*	AREA 51 52 53 54
0 E C O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN	1 S O V
1 S & T	2. TOO GENERAL	2 I N T
2 P O L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES	3
3 M I L		4
4 — — —	4. OTHER/MISC.	
5 S O C	5. COMBINED WITH	
6 G E O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST	
7 B I O		
8 — — —		
9 W I S		

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
ACharnaco:ead	[illegible]		L H Snitzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

(20-41)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/00869-68

SUBJECT Civic Action Program Success/Armed Forces Capability to Cope with Insurgency/ Activities of CIAC, Cuban Propaganda Organization.

DATE DISTR. 19 JAN 1968

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53900 (2356)

DATE OF INFO. Jan 68 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Honduras/Jan 68 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE. Cuban national, an engineer, who has worked and lived in Honduras for the last two years. During this period he has developed social and business contacts with officials in government, the armed forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. The armed forces are doing a splendid job in their civic action projects. Their primary interest seems to be the construction and repair of roads throughout the Republic. In conversation with a liaison officer between the army and other government agencies he mentioned that the only difficulties they are facing in their programs is the lack of adequate equipment, and the lack of cooperation by the Public Works Office. He told me that in most instances the requests made by the army for the use of additional transportation or utilization of existing equipment are disregarded by minor officials. This creates problems requiring the action of higher officials, who are given the impression that the army is the originator of these problems.

2. Considering the available resources and facilities of the country the armed forces are well trained and disciplined. During the latter part of 1967 President Anastacio Somoza and a group of other Nicaraguan dignitaries visited Honduras. Several groups under Communist influence demonstrated against the visit. I had the opportunity to observe the development of the demonstration, from a meeting to a riot, from a vantage point. Despite the fact that the army riot control troops were stoned and abused they were disciplined enough to prevent what could have been a serious incident. They did not attack or fire at the mob, as would have been the desire of the leaders, who incidentally always remained behind the mob and utilized other people to direct and incite the demonstrators. The troops and junior officers who were present during the demonstration were highly praised by the responsible elements of the society.

3. If a guerrilla movement started I believe the armed forces would act swiftly. A special counter-guerrilla unit is well trained and equipped to prevent development of small units into large and organized guerrilla bands.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | [illegible] | S YES

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

4. Two or three months ago I met three Cuban nationals, Jose de Jesus Plana, Carlos Morris, and Eduardo Garcia, members of the "Confederacion Latino Americana Cristiana", CLAC, with central offices in Caracas. These individuals travel through Latin America with the purpose of familiarizing groups with Communist methods of operation and spreading democracy. I talked several times with them, and with people who had attended their meetings. It is my impression, as well as that of others, that they tended to create the wrong impression. Several times they justified the actions of Fidel Castro, and seemed to be anti-American in their line of propaganda. Certainly they did not do anything worthwhile to aid democracy. These individuals claimed not to have any association with the US, and to receive financial support from Germany.

-end-

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. OO-B-321/33415-72

SUBJECT General Lopez Arellano Unwilling to Lead Coup d'etat at Present/Army Officers Being Trained in Peru/Zuniga's Stratagems to Retain Present Power

DATE DISTR.

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES (2356) CIRL NO.: IRG-LA2-72 DIRM NO.: 1-C 1

DATE OF INFO. Late September 1972 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Honduras/1972

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who has worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has numerous social contacts and business connections with officials of the government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. The Honduran economy is in a deplorable state. Some young army officers are urging General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano to lead a coup d'etat to displace President Ramon Ernesto Cruz, and have offered to help him. Early in October 1972 a government official and several young army officers stated in a private conversation that Lopez Arellano did not believe it advisable for him to lead a coup d'etat until most of the following events took place:

   a. A rally in the general economy of the country.

   b. Improved diplomatic and commercial relations between Honduras and El Salvador. This improvement would further a better functioning of the Central American Common Market (CACM).

   c. Completion of the Pan American Highway extending between El Salvador and Honduras. Completion would benefit both countries by giving access to new markets for their products.

   d. Decreased corruption among government officials. Not only are some of them feathering their future nests with currency, but also permitting individuals to do likewise in return for something the government official desires the recipient to give or to do for him.

   e. Enrichment of the Treasury so that funds could be made available for projects beneficial to the country and its people.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

2. During the same private conversation, General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano was quoted as having stated that it would be futile for him to lead a coup d'etat unless there was hope of improving the welfare of the masses and the general economy of the country as well; he firmly believes it would be impossible to accomplish that goal until a change in most of the above conditions were met prior to any coup d'etat in which he would be interested.

3. Selected Honduran army officers have attended special courses at an army facility in Peru since approximately 1967. According to an army officer the number of candidates sent since early 1972 has not only been increased but also each has been ordered to specialize in any one of the branches of their choice. They previously attended the various courses given at that facility.

4. The army gives an outward appearance of being in sympathy with the present regime, but in reality not all the members sympathize with President Cruz. In private conversations some speak of him in a derogatory manner, especially young officers.

5. A man who continues to wield a great deal of power in Honduras is Ricardo Zuniga Augustinus, Minister of Government and Justice, also leader of the Nationalist Party. Zuniga's ability to continue wielding power is due to his being a very clever, astute, wealthy man. He always knows exactly what he wants, and does not hesitate to utilize his personal characteristics and his wealth in obtaining his objectives.

6. Zuniga's present ambition for continued power has forced him to feign being a firm constitutionalist. That is, he is claiming loud and clear that commitments made between the government and political parties must not only be respected but must also be adhered to. Zuniga does not claim this because he really believes this to be a moral obligation, or because he is a fervent democrat. The fundamental reason is that he knows he is the recognized leader of the Nationalist Party, as well as having become influential in the Liberal Party. He believes these parties are the ones sustaining the present regime of President Ramon Ernesto Cruz in power. Therefore, he calculates that through these two parties he can protract the power he has today.

7. Today relations betwen General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano and Zuniga are not as cordial as they were previously. However, one must not be led to believe that this situation is unrepairable because if Zuniga needed Lopez Arellano's help, or vice versa, the former pleasant relationship would be hastily nursed back to life. It is just possible that if a coup d'etat led by General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano should take place, and be successful, Zuniga would make a great effort to settle any differences existing between them. This might not please some of the army officers who dislike Zuniga due to his character and the procedures used by him to obtain power.

8. Up to the present time the Armed Forces do not appear to be leaning towards the "left". They are naturally desirous of improving their way of life. The Air Force has recently organized a company whose entire net profits will go to the Air Force for the benefit of its members. General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano is investing in various industries and small private industries. He has very recently established a company called Empacadora de Carnes (meat packing firm) whose net profits will be for himself alone. The Armed Forces hold General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano in the highest esteem. This knowledge is based on his observations and personal contact with officers and enlisted men.

- end -

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2-35-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1–5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6–10)	C. REQ. CODE (11–15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16–20)	E. (21)	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22–26)	(27–33)	I U O (34–36)
J A T L A			4 3 7 9 9	X	0 1 1 1 8	0 0 8 2 1 6 8	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Naval Interest in Ceramic Radome Developments/New Technique for Fabricating Silica Radomes (France/USSR/China)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37–39) | RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40–44)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Professor Jesse Walton S-23537
(Georgia Tech) High Temperature Laboratory
DeKalb-Peachtree Airport
Atlanta, Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO. A# 142336

ORGANIZATION NO A-23537

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER WISE
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same as Contact.

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FLEX 8
CASE
X-REF K.D.
FILED on

24 JAN 1968

C/S WDPan[illegible]
F.O. Chief
Case Officer
Division/Staff/Desk

4 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

4

14-12-37

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1–5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6–10)	C. REQ. CODE (11–15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16–20)	E. (21)
XMIMI				Y

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22–26)	REPORT NO. B E K OTHER (27–33)	I U O (34–36)
11027	3311867	

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37–39)	RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40–44)

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Economic Conditions in Rural Areas/Unemployment/Lack of Economic Development

(Honduras)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio CISNEROS
549 de Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	–	–	–
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	–	–	–
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

P

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
SAcosta ACharpentier	JEGLEY/CHAUP		I. H. Smith

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

(20-41)

FILE TI
CUSTO
DELETIO
DATE RECEIVE
NO.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

IAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. 00-K-323/33118-67

SUBJECT Economic Conditions in Rural Areas/ Unemployment/Lack of Economic Development

DATE DISTR. 10 Nov 67

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53550 (356)

DATE OF INFO. Oct 67 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. --- Oct 67 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, and engineer, who has worked and lived in Honduras for the past two years. During this period he has developed social and business contacts with officials in government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. My work takes me to the rural areas in Honduras where I have opportunity to talk with the peasants. It is my considered opinion, based on personal observations, that the peasants in the rural areas are bitter and disgusted with their lot. They have little or no faith left in anyone. Economically, their condition is second only to Haiti, in comparison with the countries in the Caribbean. The prices of staples compare with prices in the US, but Honduran wages are far below US wages. Unemployment is a very grave problem. My company hires unskilled labor but does not need more than 200. We have had to refuse hundreds who applied because we had no need for them. A small fraction of those turned back will be able to find work, the rest will remain unemployed.

2. There is little economic development in the country and almost complete lack of initiative and vigor. Seldom is a man found in Government or industry who is not afflicted with the two major vices among this segment of the population: wine and women. The economic inactivity at times appears to be the result of indifference, other times the result of intentional delays by Communist infiltrators in Government. As an example of this "lack of initiative" I will make reference to the road in the Olancho area. The loan for this 110 kilometers of road was approved in October 1963. The road is badly needed to move agricultural products from this region, to provide employment for hundreds of needy people, and to provide the only access for the construction of a US$ 20 million pulp and paper plant in the area. Until the summer of 1967, these funds remained idle. Preliminary studies were not even made. With luck, construction may commence in 1968, but by this time payments on the principal and interest are due to start.

-end-

COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-1237

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY					FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ. CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22-26)	REPORT NO. B E K OTHER (27-33)	I U O (34-36)
XMIMI				X	11017	3311767	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Activities of Ricardo Zuniga/Colonel Armando Velasquez Cerrato

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39)

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rogelio CISNEROS
549 de Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50	*
0	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
1	S	&	T	2. TOO GENERAL
2	P	O	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
3	M	I	L	
4	-	-	-	4. OTHER/MISC.
5	S	O	C	5. COMBINED WITH
6	G	E	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST
7	B	I	O	
8	-	-	-	
9	M	I	S	

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
[illegible]

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS
[illegible]
[illegible] W.H./Honduras
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

C/S SAcosta
ACharneco:ead

F.O. Chief [illegible]

Case Officer

Division/Staff/Desk

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

SUBJECT Activities of Ricardo Zuniga/Colonel Armando Velasquez Cerrato

REPORT NO. 00-K-323/33117-67

DATE DISTR. 10 Nov 67

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53550 (356)

DATE OF INFO. Oct 67 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. --- Oct 67 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, an engineer, who has worked and lived in Honduras for the past two years. During this period he has developed social and business contacts with officials in government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. Ricardo Zuniga, Ministry of Presidency, is the hardest working man in the Honduran Government. He enjoys his liquor as well as any other official in government, and when he goes on a drinking spree it may last for days. However, he has a great capacity for work and lately he has cut down on his drinking. He is too intent in his presidential aspirations. President Lopez Arellano has left the administration of government to Ricardo Zuniga. Zuniga's trusted man is Lucas Lozano Zelaya, Procurador General (Attorney General).

2. There are two others who have designs on the presidency, Mario Rivera Lopez, President of Congress, and Colonel Armando Velasquez Cerrato, Honduran Ambassador to Mexico. Rivera Lopez' chances are very small, but Colonel Velasquez is a very serious contender. Both Zuniga and Lopez Arellano are fully aware of his strength. Even though Colonel Cerrato has publicly denied that he is behind the pro-Cerrato committees being formed within the National Party, I am informed that he is in fact supporting them.

- end -

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES

CONFIDENTIAL

S YES

201-169934
COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK
201-169934

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENT

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
6 NOV. 78		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

OLC-78-0070/29

FBI REFERRALS TAB ___

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT ___ MEMO X DATE: 12 September 1972

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Leibel Bergman 201-780814

BUREAU FILE:

FIELD OFFICE FILE: NK-105-23027

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBD-43223, 12 september 1972 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT ___ MEMO X DATE: 9 July 1971

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Re: Foreign Political matters - albania - internal security - albania

BUREAU FILE: none

FIELD OFFICE FILE: none

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBD-18022, 9 July 1971 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT X MEMO ___ DATE: 16 July 1971

ORIGIN: New Haven

SUBJECT: Arthur William Galston - sec. matter - communist.

BUREAU FILE: 100-415809

FIELD OFFICE FILE: 100-16221

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBD 18046, 16 July 1971 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER X REPORT ___ MEMO ___ DATE: 9 December 1964

ORIGIN: Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe - Espionage - Russia - China.

BUREAU FILE: (SC-100-364447)

FIELD OFFICE FILE: none

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA-92503, 9 December 1964 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT ___ MEMO X DATE: 23 March 1966

ORIGIN: San Francisco, Calif.

SUBJECT: Robert Stephen Coe

BUREAU FILE: none

FIELD OFFICE FILE: none

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBB-44105, 23 March 1966 (attached)

14-00000

OLC-78-0070/29

FBI REFERRALS TAB ____ [illegible]

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT X MEMO ___ DATE: 23 March 1959

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447

FIELD OFFICE FILE: NY 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: unnumbered, 23 March 1959 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT X MEMO ___ DATE: 2 July 1959

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe - Espionage - R

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447

FIELD OFFICE FILE: N.Y. 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBF-28133, 2 July 1959 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT X MEMO ___ DATE: 9 March 1958

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe - Espionage - R

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447

FIELD OFFICE FILE: N.Y. 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBF-01292, 9 March 1958 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT X MEMO ___ DATE: 28 January 1958

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe - Espionage - R

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447

FIELD OFFICE FILE: N.Y.- 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB-97368, 28 January 1958 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT X MEMO ___ DATE: 29 May 1958

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe - Espionage - R

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447
WASH. F.O. 77-2536

FIELD OFFICE FILE: N.Y. 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBF-03883, 29 May 1958 (attached)

OLC-78-0070/29

FBI REFERRALS TAB____ ~~ER-~~

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT X MEMO___ DATE: 20 December 1957

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virgenius Frank Coe - Espionage - R

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447

FIELD OFFICE FILE: NY. 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB-95144, 20 December 1957 (attached)

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 12 march 1951

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, V. Frank

BUREAU FILE: File-100-004-020/32

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB 08099/04 (ser. 2) 12 march 1951

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 23 october 1964

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, Virgenius Frank

BUREAU FILE: File- 016-500

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA- 88780 (pg. 1) 23 october 1964

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 15 april 1964

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, Virgenius

BUREAU FILE: File- 100-300-003

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA- 70905 (pg 6) 15 april 1964

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 8 August 1962

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, Virgenius Frank

BUREAU FILE: File- 100-008-017

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA 20943 (pg 4) 8 August 1962

14-00000

FBI REFERRALS TAB ____

OLC-78-0070/29

Doc___ **LETTER** **REPORT**___ **MEMO**___ **DATE:** 19april 1961
ORIGIN:
SUBJECT: Milton Harry Freedman (201-251919)
BUREAU FILE:
FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)
CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBF-75040, 19april 1961

Doc___ **LETTER** **REPORT**___ **MEMO**___ **DATE:** 6 may 59
ORIGIN:
SUBJECT: Coe, Virginius Frank
BUREAU FILE: filed-201-251919 Milton Harry Freedman
FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)
CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBF 23226 (pg 8) 6 may 59

Doc___ **LETTER** **REPORT**___ **MEMO**___ **DATE:** 17april 1953
ORIGIN:
SUBJECT: File- 100-4-20-13-4
BUREAU FILE:
FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)
CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB-26027, 17april 1953

Doc___ **LETTER** **REPORT**___ **MEMO**___ **DATE:** april 1946
ORIGIN:
SUBJECT: The Gregory Case (FBI Document
BUREAU FILE:
FIELD OFFICE FILE:
CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: (gist attached)

Doc___ **LETTER** **REPORT**___ **MEMO**___ **DATE:** 12 march 1951
ORIGIN:
SUBJECT:
BUREAU FILE:
FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)
CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB 8099, (pg 36) 12 march 1951

FBI REFERRALS

TAB___

OLC-78-0070/29

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 10 October 1952

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT:

BUREAU FILE: File - 100-4-20-4-10

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB-21674, 10 october 1952

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 29 mar 1965

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, Frank

BUREAU FILE: Filed 201-251919.
Milton Harry Friedman

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBB-03533 (pg 8) 29 mar 1965

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 8 February 1960

ORIGIN: 201-083341
on temp. charge to John Clancy

SUBJECT: IP/EIS X 9228

BUREAU FILE:

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBD-08302, 8 February 1960

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 30 June 1964

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, Virginius Frank

BUREAU FILE: File 201-731043 in IP files)

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA-77091 (pg 4) 30 June 1964

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: april 1946

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: TS-46492-F (Control)
Coe, Virginius Frank

BUREAU FILE:

FIELD OFFICE FILE:

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA-81235/04, april 1946

14-00000

THIRD
AGENCY
DOCUMENTS

14-00000

OUTGOING TELEPOUCH

8-4

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

TEL 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

TELEPOUCH 17/DP 7

DATE-TIME GROUP 2722322

File

DISPATCH NUMBER WASHINGTON 101637 27

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

IMPDET
CL BY 013522
E 2

TO: BONN INFO HAMBURG, GERMANY.

FROM: CH/EULA INFO EUR/G/DAO

SUBJECT: ~~UNINTEL~~ TAPPER/CO CAREPLICA INTEL OP - IDENTIFICATION OF LONG-TIME U.S. RESIDENT OF PEKING

REF: BONN 62743 (IN 404398)

1. FOLLOWING, IN RESPONSE PARA 2 REF REQUEST FOR IDENTIFICATION OF FRANK COOK (SIC), LONG-TIME RESIDENT OF PEKING AND EMPLOYEE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE SECTION OF "PEKING REVIEW," SUBJECT IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO VIRGINIUS FRANK C O E AKA FRANK COE, DPOB: 5 JANUARY 1907, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA (201-0169934). FILE SUMMARY, GIVEN BELOW, IS PROVIDED FOR STATION INTERNAL USE ONLY AND IS NOT REPEAT NOT BE PASSED REPS OC

2. PER FBI REPORTING SUBJECT IS [redacted]

DATE: 21 SEPT 77
ORIG: [redacted] AB
UNIT: CH/EULA
EXT: 1972

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RECORD COPY

IP USE ONLY

27 Sep 77
201-169934

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

OUTGOING TELEPOUCH

PAGE OF PAGES
2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
AGE CO ACP TOC TPE RRO
TEL ▪ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
TELEPOUCH

DATE - TIME GROUP

DISPATCH NUMBER

101637

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO:
☐ IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019522

[redacted]

3. [redacted] RS

[redacted] JULY 1971 FBI REPORT

STATES [redacted]

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

COORDINATING OFFICERS

IP USE ONLY

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

TEL 0 0 0 1 0 0

3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

DISPATCH NUMBER

TELEPOUCH

101637

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO
☐ IP FILED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019522

[redacted] JULY 1970 "NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE REPORTED IT WAS NOT KNOWN IF SUBJECT SERVED PRC AS FINANCIAL SPECIALIST BUT OPINED SUBJECT WAS MAINLY EMPLOYED IN EDITING ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWS AND PROPAGANDA MATERIAL, A VIEW WHICH CORRESPONDS TO REF REPORTING FROM CAREPLICA/6.

4. SUBJECT'S FAMILY: SUBJECT AND HIS WIFE RUTH BOTH RESIDED IN PRC WITH THEIR TWO DAUGHTERS. ONE DAUGHTER, ELIZABETH COE, LEFT PRC IN 1971 AND WENT TO LONDON; PER 1971 FBI REPORT [redacted] FILE DOES NOT INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S DAUGHTERS HOLD U.S. PASSPORTS. SUBJECT ALSO HAS ONE SON, ROBERT COE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF EARTH SCIENCES AT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ. ROBERT COE VISITED HIS PARENTS IN PEKING IN SEPTEMBER 1974 AND WAS FETED BY KUO MO-JO, VICE CHAIRMAN OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

IP USE ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

201-169934

14-00000

OUTGOING TELEPOUCH

SIGNAL CENTER USE

PAGE OF PAGES

TEL 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4

SECRET

TELEPOUCH

101637

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019522

STANDING COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT OF CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. Y

5. REPLY TO PARA 5 REF REQUEST FOR TAILORED REQUIREMENTS IN BRIEFING CAREPLICA/6 WILL FOLLOW. Y

6. FILE: 201-0169934. E2 IMPDET.

ORIG: [redacted]

CH/RS ( ) [redacted]

CEA/SACI [redacted]

DATE: 21 SEPT 77
ORIG: [redacted]AB
UNIT: CH/EULA
EXT: 1972

[redacted]
EUR/G
RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS
DCEA/CH [redacted]
DCH/RS [redacted]
EUR/G/D [redacted]
E4/CI [redacted]

IP USE ONLY

ANALYST CHECKLIST F OPS/ITG FILE REDUCTION PROGR

SUBJECT: Coe Virginius Frank 201 NUMBER 016-9934

IP MACHINE LISTING SS / (REVIEWED) 24 Aug (DATE REVIEWED) 12 July 1974

OPS/ITG INTERNAL TRACE ____ (REVIEWED) ____ (DATE REVIEWED)

RAG HIT ____

SENSITIVE FILE ____

MACHINE DOSSIER NUMBER ____

REVIEWED BY ____

DISPOSITION OF FILE : ____

COMMENTS: Visited China

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY SEP 16 6 03 '77

DEFERRED/TELEPOUCH

ACTION UNIT

RDP7

ACTION #

RF. FILE. VR.

INFO

T 175635 EIA496 PAGE 01 IN 404398

TOR:161645Z SEP 77 BNNB 62740

S E C R E T 161250Z SEP 77 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE BONN 62740 /ADASKA ACTING/

TO: WASHINGTON INFO HAMBURG, GERMANY. ✓ACTION

FOR CH/EULA INFO E/G/DAO

SUBJECT TAPPER/CO CARELPLICA INTEL - CAREPLICA/6 TRIP TO PRC.

REF A. WASHINGTON 087988

B. HAMBURG 31545 (IN

C. HAMBURG 31830 (IN 258717)

1. CAREPLICA/6 MET ADASKA IN KOELN EVENING 12 SEPT. REPLICA/6 HAD JUST RECEIVED LETTER FROM LIAO CHENG CHIH ADVISING HIM THAT HE HAD ARRANGED VISA FOR MRS. CAREPLIC/6 TO REMAIN IN PEKING FOR THREE MONTHS. HE ALSO RECEIVED LETTER FROM STMIMOSA/1 CONFIRMING ARRANGEMENTS FOR REF B ACUPUNCTURE CLASSES AND MIMOSA/1 INVITATION FOR MRS REPLICA/6 TO RESIDE AT MIMOSA/1 HOME DURING HER STAY IN PEKING. MRS REPLICA/6 WILL DEPART HAMBURG CIRCA 21 SEPT TO REACH PEKING IN TIME FOR WEDDING OF MIMOSA/1'S SON TO DAUGHTER OF LONG TIME AMERICAN RESIDENT OF PEKING FRANK COOK /SIC/. COOK /REPLICA/6 NOT CERTAIN OF SPELLING/ IS

RBH
RB
-EH

Stan Bergmann
Jim Lilly are pretty sure
this is
Frank COE not
Frank Cook re
have initiated DDO & CI
trace

S E C R E T

201-169934

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER D TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.
ACTION #		

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 175635 EIA496 PAGE 02 IN 404398

TOR:161645Z SEP 77 BNNB 62740

EMPLOYEE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE SECTION OF PEKING REVIEW. REPLICA/6 BELIEVES HE AND HIS DAUGHTER STILL HOLD AMERICAN PASSPORTS.

2. IN SAME LETTER MIMOSA/1 TOLD REPLICA/6 HIS SON AND NEW DAUGHTER-IN-LAW WILL TAKE HONEYMOON IN EUROPE AND US. THEY WILL STAY WITH REPLICA/6 IN HAMBURG DURING PART OF EUROPEAN TRIP. CAN YOU FURTHER IDENTIFY COOK?

3. REPLICA/6 HIMSELF WILL LEAVE FOR PRC CIRCA 15 OCTOBER TO ATTEND CANTON TRADE FAIR AND WILL JOIN HIS WIFE IN PEKING FOR ONE WEEK FOR VISITS WITH LIAO CHENG CHIH AND MIMOSA/1. HAVE SUGGESTED TO REPLICA/6 THAT RECENT AIRE OF RELAXATION IN PRC AFTER 11TH PARTY CONGRESS MAY GIVE HIM GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO ELICIT INFO ON PRC FOREIGN POLICY FROM LIAO. ALSO MRS REPLICA/6'S THREE MONTH STAY IN HOME OF MIMOSA/1 MAY BE RARE OPPORTUNITY FOR INSIGHTS INTO RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SENIOR PARTY CADRE. DURING RECENT ONE DAY MEETING IN WASHINGTON MRS REPLICA/6 IMPRESSED ADASKA AS BEING BRIGHT, SAVY, AGGRESSIVE, PRAGMATIC WOMAN. SHE IS INDEPENDENT, FASHION CONSCIOUS AND DECIDEDLY WESTERNIZED BY TRADITIONAL CHINESE STANDARDS. SHE HAS DEEP INTEREST IN

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES RL BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 175635 EIA496 PAGE 03 IN 404398

TOR:161645Z SEP 77 BNNB 62740

PAGE 2 BONN 62740 SECRET

CHINESE PAINTING AND PORCELAIN /SHE VISITED EVERY ORIENTAL ART COLLECTION IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK SHE COULD FIND/ AND HAS MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH MANY FORMER SCHOOL FRIENDS FROM HER STUDENT DAYS IN U.S. REPLICA/6 SAYS SHE IS NOT WITTING OF HIS AGENT ROLE. SHE HAS APPARENTLY ESTABLISHED GOOD RAPPORT WITH MIMOSA/1 AND HIS WIFE.

4. REPLICA/6 IS SKEPTICAL THAT LIAO AND/OR MIMOSA/1 WILL BE ANY MORE FORTHCOMING THAN ON PREVIOUS VISITS AND DOUBTS WIFE WILL LEARN MORE THAN PERSONAL LIFE STYLE OF MIMOSA/1 AND SOMETHING ABOUT ACUPUNCTURE. HE BELIEVES HOWEVER THAT HE MAY GAIN SOME INSIGHTS BY CONTINUING HIS EARLIER CONVERSATIONS WITH LIAO'S DAUGHTER WHO IS MFA JAPANESE INTERPRETER /SEE REF C PARA 4/.

5. PLAN BRIEF REPLICA/6 PER RECENT CHINA NARRATIVES. ALSO WELCOME ANY TAILORED REQUIREMENTS YOU MAY WISH LEVY. PLS CABLE HAMBURG INFO BONN PRIOR 3 OCT.

6. HAMBURG. HAVE ARRANGED TO MEET REPLICA/6 IN HAMBURG ON 3 OCTOBER FOR REQUIREMENTS BRIEFING. REQUEST RESERVATIONS FOR HOTEL ROOM SUITABLE FOR BRIEFINGS FOR

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

#

INFO

RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 175635 EIA496 PAGE 04-04 IN 404398

TOR:161645Z SEP 77 BNNB 62740

ALIAS PAUL L. HOWELL, U.S. ARMY PROCESSING AND PLACEMENT UNIT, FRANKFURT FOR EVENINGS 2 AND 3 OCTOBER.

7. RE CONTACT WITH LOCAL EMBASSY. FOUR MEMBERS OF TRADE MISSION VISITED REPLICA/6'S EXHIBIT AT KOELN FOOD FAIR ON AFTERNOON 12 SEPT. THEY WERE CHU CHIEN-HUA, HO NAI-HUA, TIEN TSENG-CHENG AND NEW ARRIVAL UNKNOWN TO REPLICA/6. THEY STOPPED AT HIS STAND 30 MINUTES TO DISCUSS DELIVERY PROBLEMS WITH ORDERS HE PLACED AT LAST CANTON FAIR. HO ASKED IF REPLICA/6 HAD HEARD RECENTLY FROM ''LIAO KUNG'' /1675/0361/ /TERM OF RESPECT FOR LIAO CHENG CHIH WITHIN PARTY RANKS/ AND INVITED HIM TO NATIONAL DAY FEST. REPLICA/6 WILL NOT GO TO NATIONAL DAY, BUT WILL SEEK INTRODUCTION TO NEW PRC AMBASSADOR VIA LIAO WHEN HE IS IN PEKING.

8. FILE - 201-290073. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

SECRET

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In
SECRET

30 January 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on COE, Virginia (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ____________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☑ all others. OI Code A6. CI interest.

Signed R. Stec (name) Analyst (title) OPS/ITG (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ____________ (initials) 26 Nov 1975 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-169934

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

SECRET
When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

COE, FRANK	
201-0169934	201-0204693
SEX M	OCOA-18437 A01
	25 JUN 74
	P3

SUBJ HAS BEEN IN CHIN SINCE BEFORE 58. SUFFERED FROM HEPATITIS. WILL BE GOING TO VISIT SOUTHERN CHINA

DATE 09 APR 77 CORR CARD 09281445

201-169934

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

COE, FRANK	
201-0169934	016-120-041/01
SEX M	OCOA-18779
	25 FEB 75
	P3

SUBJ IN CONTACT W/PRC MISSION OTTAWA, CAN

DATE 28 MAR 75 09263806

201- 169934

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

COE, FRANK	
201-0169934	016-120-041/C1
SEX M	OCOA-18437 A01
	25 JUN 74
	P3

SUBJ HAS BEEN IN CHIN SINCE BEFORE 58. SUFFERED FROM HEPATITIS. WILL BE GOING TO VISIT SOUTHERN CHINA

DATE 14 MAY 75 09281445

201-0169934

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

COLLINS, GEOFFREY	
201-0169934	016-120-041/01
SEX M	OCOA-18397
	02 JUN 74
CIT USA	P5

NEPHEW OF RUTH AND FRANK COE USA WAS APPROVED TO VISIT THE PRC W/HIS MOTHER

DATE 18 DEC 74 09219883

201- 169934
Coe, Virginia

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

TO:
1. BW
2.
3.

DATE: 31 Jan 74

SUBJECT OF REQUEST:
201- 169934
Coe, Virginius

REQUESTER: Jackie
COMPONENT: IP\EIB2
PHONE: X1885

FILE REQUESTED:
DOC. REQUESTED:
SYMBOL & NO.
DATE:

T.C. ✓ or P.C. __

REASON REQUESTED:
trace for FBI. Any deragatory
No Derog

ACTION TAKEN:

SECRET

SECRET

TO:

1. ____________________

2. ____________________(file holder)

3. CI/SO/F

DATE 15 July 1971

SUBJECT OF REQUEST: Coe, Robert
Coe, Frank
Coe, Virginius Frank

201- 169934

REQUESTER: Bill Neuman

COMPONENT: Office of Security

PHONE : 9371

T.C. ☐ or P.C. ☐

FILE REQUESTED: 201-169934
or
DOCUMENT REQUESTED: ____________________

Symbol & No.	Date	Filed

REASON REQUESTED: Office of Security is running a check and they are interested in seeing the 201

ACTION TAKEN:

SECRET

File in 201- __________

SECRET

CI STAFF USE ONLY

N. HAVATY FID/CE
Ext14 23 Nov. 1967

SUBJECT: COE, Frank
AKA: COE, Frank Virginius

EX- 61851

Virginius Frank COE, former Sectary of International Monetary Fund, in June 1953, was called before the McCARTHY Senate Investigation subcommittee concerning his alleged involvement in a Communist spy ring. Prior to this in the 1930's, Subject was implicated in the espionage ring that included Alger HISS, Henry COLLINS (COE's brother-in -law), John ABT, and others. He allegedly was a relatively unimportant member of the Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER espionage network. In 1958 Subject was elected a member of the Awards Committee of the Fund for Social Analysis, formerly Fund for Social Studies, (a Communist propaganda organization). During the year 1958 Subject and his wife, Ruth Coe, were associated with Isidore Gibby NEEDLEMAN, a suspected Soviet espionage agent. In the fall of 1958 Subject wrote an article for the Chinese Communist publication China Reconstructs , praising the industrial and agriculture advancements of the Chinese Communists. Subject visited China, at that time, and could still have been there in Februaty 1959. While in Peking he and his wife studied the Chinese language at Peking University. Subject was

SECRET

+ A15868

CI STAFF USE ONLY

SECRET

a member of the governing board of the Two Continent Commodity Corporation (TCCC) an import-export firm whose other board members were:

Milton FRIEDMAN-an Excutive of the Queens County Communist Party.

Tom JONES- a Brooklyn negro attorney. a CP member.

Jeremiah C. INGERSOLL,- a contributor to the CP in the early 1940's.

Harriet and Chao Ting CHI- both member of Chinese Communist Party.

In 1959 Subject was employed as an analyst and economist in the Communist State Economic apparatus in Peking.

Subject's wife Ruth Alice Coe was identified as a Communist. Confronted with this accusation, she denied that she had ever been connected with the Communist Party.

BASED ON: 201-169934

Processed: H. McClintick

SECRET

COE, Virginius Frank

~~See FIS NOTEBOOK on Subj~~
filed dossier 100-4-20-13.

Collected info
for Sov. St Sec
apparat active in
WASHINGTON dur
WWII

Subj in GREGORY
case.

Member of the
SILVERMASTER
Group.

over ->

Subj requested to resign from Internat'l Monetary Fund 2 Dec 52, refused to testify before Fed Grand Jury 20 Nov 52, and refused to testify before McCarran Committee 1 Dec 52. Whittaker CHAMBERS has said that while he was in Sov espionage apparatus in 30's he heard from various sources of plans to bring Subj from Canada so he could be placed in Treas. Dept. In 43, Eliz BENTLEY testified, SILVERMASTER told her that Sub. had said he met former friend of his in Canada who was "in same category", i.e. Communist. BENTLEY doesn't recall name of Subj's friend but it might poss be Eric ADAMS. It is known that Subj knew ADAMS was on the Canadian For Exchange Control Board, but it hasn't been est whether men were personally acquainted. IFB-26027, 17 Apr 53, 100-4-20-13-4.

14-00000

COE

Virginius Frank COE

Family: Brother: Robert. Member of the CPUSA known to W. CHAMBERS. CHAMBERS saw Robert in connection with the Underground Wash Group to whom he was a courier in the middle 1930..CHAMBERS admitted he did not see Robert attend any of the meetings of the Group under Harold WARE.

Passport: In Sept 1941, COE returned to the US from London. He had a dip passport.

Address: 1945, Wash DC NW 2700 35th St.
1948, Wash DC NW 1918 N Roosevelt St.

History as it relates to the Gregory Case.
1934-1939, Canada. Taught at McGill Univ.
XXXX Prior to 1940 employed by the Treasury Dept.
1940, August. Resigned from the Advisory Commission to the Council of Nat'l Defense to return to the Treasury Dept.
At unknown date went to England in connection with US Gov't work. Returned to the US in Sept 1941.
1941, Dec. XXXXXXXXXXX Listed as the Assistant Director of the Division of Monetary Research in the Treasury Dept. This division was headed by Harry Dexter WHITE.
1942, Dec. Attended the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference at Mt Tremblant. At this time he indicated his position as Assistant to the Executive Director of the Board of Exonomic Warfare and well Mas his position mentioned above.
1945 Still with Monetary Research Division.
1945, Dec. Was Assistant Administrator in the Foreign Ec Admin.
1948, Secretary of the Internat'l Monetary Fund

Espionage Activities in Connection with The Gregory Case:
Member of the SILVERMASTER Group.
BENTLEY advised that COE was considered relatively unimportant to the S Group.
When BENTLEY first became aware of COE he was in South America on a mission for the Treasury Dept., but during all but two months while he was away he was in touch with the SILVERMASTERS. He communicated directly with the SILVERMASTERS, sending them reports and other info to which he had access.
BENTLEY believes that COE also gave the info to Harry Dexter WHITE and that this info was eventually furnished by WHITE to the SILVERMASTERS.
BENTLEY in 1946 could not definitely recall having seen any material which could be identified as definitely originating with COE, but she does state that the info supplied by him was made available for transmittal to BENTLEY's superiors.
It is BENTLEY's recollection that he supplied economic info.

Contacts in the Gregory Case.
WHITE, Harry Dexter
CURRIE, Lauchlin
KAPLAN, Dorothy and Irving.
ULLMAN, William
SILVERMASTER, Abraham George
Contacts not subj of Case:
LAWLER,
References: The Gregory Case, FBI Document, Apr 1946
Newspaper clippings
IFB 5099, 12 March 51, p 36.

ABOVE IS ALL FROM THE FIVE BY EIGHT CARDS.

ADLER, Solomon, also in Gregory Case. It is reported that at one time Subj directed the work of ADLER in the Treasury Dept and in 1941 signed ADLER's efficiency rating. Subj was listed by ADLER as a ref on ADLER's Form 57. It is also noted that ADLER on his return from China in 1946 was in c/w Subj and visited the COE household. IFB 21674, 10 Oct 1952
100-4-20-4-10

on 1 Dec 52 Subj refused to tell a Senate Internal Security subcommittee in New York if he was eve ever a Communist or a member of an underground spy ring. He had flatly denied the same charges when they were made by Elizabeth Bentley in 1948. Subj claimed the constitutional right which prohibits a witness from being forced to testify about matters which might incriminate him. Subj was fired as secretary of the International Monetary Fund 3Dec 52. Subj lives at 1918 N. Roosevelt st., Arlington Va.
Wash. Post, 4 Dec 52.

[illegible] CE

[illegible]

Collected info for Sov II [illegible] active in [illegible] during WW II. Subj in [illegible] case. Member of the Silvermaster group.
See [illegible] dossier on subj.

(1)

CE's [illegible] in RI/Files

[illegible]

Few [illegible]

SECRET

COE, Frank

201-103780
(DFB 82715)
(24 [illegible] 56)

COE, Frank

100-4-10-1314
([illegible]-2056)
([illegible]. 1)

COE, Frank

100-4-20-14-11
([illegible]A-852

COE, FRANK

[illegible]

14-00000

[redacted] [redacted]

SECRET

COE, Frank

201-46537
DFB-30273

201-46[illegible]
(DFB-[illegible])
(Encl. 1)
(19 Oct 53)

If this card is of value
Please complete

Date of birth:
Place of birth:
Citizenship:

COE, FRANK
DOB ?

CIT USA

201-231758
DBF -14238
03 DEC 53
P7

- MEMBER OF A SOVIET E[illegible]IONAGE GRP. ACTIVE IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

COE, Frank

100-4-20-1-6

U.S.

Aug. 48

COE, Frank

201-108780
DFB-60128

201-10[illegible]
([illegible])
([illegible])
(Encl. 2)

If this card is of value
Please complete

Date of birth:

COE, Frank

201-11425-4
(9 Jan 53)

T[illegible]D FILED
[illegible]
[illegible] INDEX

14-00000

SECRET

[redacted] [redacted]

COE, FRANK 201-169954.

held

CS COPY ATTACHED
PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY

SEX M DOB ?
USA
CIT USA
OCC ECONOMIST
REF
A CHINA
AKA OF COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK
FORMER SECTY OF IMF. AS OF NOV 58 ATTENDING PEKING UNIF STUDYING CHINESE LANGUAGES. DEFECTOR TO EAST. FORMER RIS AGENT. FORMER HUSBAND OF NORA COE /201-148442/. HUSBAND OF RUTH ALICE COE /201-762723/

COE, Frank

201-185053
(DFB-13003)
(29 Oct 51)

If this card is of value
Please complete

Date of birth
Place of birth
Citizenship
Pers. info

THIS
CARD
FILED IN
[illegible]
INDEX

8 NOV 57

COE, Frank

201-110029
(DFB -64238)
(4 Jun 56)

If this card is of value
Please complete

Date of birth
Place of birth
Citizenship
Pers. info

THIS

COE, Frank

201-562 1
DFB - 35 57
Encl. 1
27 May

[illegible]
(DFB-35557)
[illegible]
page 9

THIS CARD FILED

COE, Frank

100-4-19-1
p. 5

U.S. - Aug 48

SECRET

COE, Frank

100-4-20-26-2
DBF-13003)
(Encl. 1)
P. 23

THIS CARD FILED
27FEB'52
IN MAIN INDEX

2 422103

COE, Frank

201-62004
(EGMA 12571)
(21 Sept 54)

14OCT54

201-62004
EGMA-12571
21 Sept 54

2 42210

SECRET

FORM [illegible]
[illegible]

SW

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER SIP 133 (E0) TOTAL COPIES 8-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

AGENCY
~~STATE~~ MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT
!cps/ICG3
ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR DDO C/CSN/ID.

1	Summit 7	4	
2	MT	5	
3		6	

"EYES ONLY"

T 110427 EIA002 PAGE 01-01 ~~NC 27505~~

TOR:151853Z MAY 74 IN 253040

R 151822Z MAY 74
FM DIRECTOR, FBI
TO RUEAIIA/DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BT

SECRET

CHARLES JOSEPH COE, AKA: IS - CH.
VIRGINIUS FRANK COE, AKA: IS - CH.

REFERENCE IS MADE TO YOUR TELETYPE MAY 10, 1974, YOUR REFERENCE 549248.

THIS BUREAU INTERPOSES NO OBJECTION TO YOUR PASSING TO MI-5 INFORMATION RELATING TO SUBJECTS AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED TELETYPE.

CLASSIFIED BY 4915, XGDS III, INDEFINITE.
XGDS-III

SECRET

V.F. COE

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY People's Republic of China

SUBJECT Background Information on Frank COE, Sol ADLER, and Dr. Hans MUELLER

REPORT NO. 00- B-321/16221-73

DATE DISTR. 18 June 1973

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DCS Case 56,929

DATE OF INFO. May 1973

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE May 1973 Peking

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US Citizen; Businessman who has visited relatives who reside in China

1. Frank Coe has received a promotion within the ranks of the Ministry of Finance; however, the specific position to which he has been promoted is unknown. When the US devalued the dollar, Coe determined Chinese policy regarding the devaluation. It is speculated that the People's Republic of China (PRC) will be taking a more active role in the world money market and that Coe will be in charge of that operation. He recently was given a new home that is extremely large and beautiful. It contains approximately 25 rooms with two large courtyards. The interior is beautifully decorated with paintings and artifacts. The house is comparable to the home of Madame Sun Yat-sen, which would also tend to indicate that Coe has become a person of prominence.

2. Sol Adler, who has acted as a financial advisor to the PRC for a number of years, had a lung removed in 1972 because of cancer and he is making a satisfactory recovery. He has been able to work only a few hours since his operation, but outwardly he appears healthy once again. He recently traveled to Hai Nan Tao with Dr. George Hatem to inspect the island, but it was mostly a rest trip for Adler. Adler's wife, Pat, is teaching higher education at the University of Peking.

3. Dr. Hans Mueller, head of the Medical School, University of Peking, was granted a visa from the Japanese Government to travel to Japan with his wife. Mueller's wife is Japanese and she has been permitted to travel to Japan, but it took ten years before they could travel together. They brought her mother back to Peking with them and she is now living with them. Mueller stated that there is continuous pressure on him to increase the production of medical doctors, and he is finding it difficult to find qualified students to enter the medical school; this means qualified educationally and by Party standards. He feels a cut in curriculum time would be detrimental rather than beneficial, so he continues to advocate a five- to six-year course of study.

- end -

5
4
3
2
1

[illegible]

5
4
3
2
1

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

U NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

S NO

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It should not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

FILE IN 201-169934

14-00000

SECRET

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - If applicable)

COE, FRANK
201-169934 201-169934
SEX M DOB ? OCOA-17674
24 APR 73
CIT USA
OCC ?
RES CCOM. POSS IDEN TO VIRGINIUS FRANK COE.

WAS 016-120-041/01
647 R 7305300871

Indicate The Subject, Project Or
201 File No. In Which This
Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	
Coe, Virginius Frank	201- 169934

FORM 867

SECRET

14-00000

LY

FUNERAL CEREMONY HELD FOR NPC VICE CHAIRMAN HO HSIANG-NING

Peking NCNA International Service in English 2210 GMT 6 Sep 72 B

[Text] Peking, September 6, 1972 (HSINHUA)--Ho Hsiang-ning, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang and honorary president of the National Women's Federation of the People's Republic of China, died of illness in Peking on September 1, 1972 at the age of 95.

A solemn ceremony in her memory took place in the capital yesterday afternoon, and flags were flown at half mast at Tienanmen Square and in front of Hsinhuamen and the Foreign Ministry. A funeral ceremony was held today for the deceased in Nanking.

The ceremony in Peking was held in the Great Hall of the People. A portrait of Ho Hsiang-ning hung in the meeting hall.

Wreaths presented by the great leader Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China were placed there.

There were also wreaths presented by Tung Pi-wu, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and acting chairman of the People's Republic of China; Soong Ching-ling, vice-chairman of the People's Republic of China; Chu Te, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and chairman of the NPC Standing Committee; Chou En-lai, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and premier of the State Council; Kang Sheng, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee; Liu Po-cheng, Chiang Ching, Hsu Shih-yu and Chen Hsi-lien, members of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee; and Nieh Jung-chen, vice-chairman of the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee; and wreaths from the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee, the NPC Standing Committee, the State Council, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee, the National Women's Federation of the People's Republic of China, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Public Health and other departments, and the CCP Peking Municipal Committee and the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee.

Attending the ceremony were Tung Pi-wu, Soong Ching-ling, Chu Te, Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, Li Hsien-nien, Chi Teng-kuei, Li Te-sheng, Wang Tung-hsing, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Kuo Mo-jo, Ngapo Ngawang-Jigme, Chou Chien-jen, Chen Yun, Li Fu-chun, Hsu Te-beng, Pu Tso-i, Tsai Chang, Yeng Ying-chao, Hua Kuo-feng and Wu Te. They expressed sympathy with Liao Cheng-chih, Liao Meng-hsing and Ching Pu-chun, family members of the late Ho Hsiang-ning.

Chu Te, chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, presided over the ceremony. Vice-Chairman Soong Ching-ling made a memorial speech.

Vice-Chairman Soong Ching-ling said: "Madame Ho Hsiang-ning in her earlier years followed Dr. Sun Yat-sen in carrying out the revolution of 1911 to overthrow the feudal rule of the Ching dynasty. Later, she took an active part in the punitive expedition against Yuan Shih-kai and in the movement to uphold the provisional republican constitution. In 1924, she firmly supported Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary programme of the new three peoples principles, the reorganization of the Kuomintang and co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party.

COE, Virginius Frank 201

After Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution in 1927, she firmly upheld Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three great policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers, resolutely resigned all her posts in the reactionary Kuomintang government, openly exposed the reactionary features of Chiang Kai-shek and waged an uncompromising struggle. During the war of resistance against Japanese aggression, she actively responded to the call issued by the Chinese Communist Party for [a] national united front against Japan and resolutely opposed Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary policy of passive resistance against Japan and active opposition to the Communist Party, and of false democracy and real dictatorship. She took an active part in the anti-Japanese democratic movement. After the southern Anhwei incident of January 1941, she sternly condemned Chiang Kai-shek's criminal plot to launch a civil war and waged unremitting struggle to persist in resistance and oppose capitulation, persist in unity and oppose a split and persist in progress and oppose retrogression. During the period of the liberation war, she was indignant at Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary policy of national betrayal, dictatorship and civil war; she actively called on and organized the democratic forces in the Kuomintang to oppose Chiang Kai-shek, organized the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, responded to the May 1, 1948 call of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the convening of the new Political Consultative Conference, and contributed to China's new democratic revolution.

"After nation-wide liberation, Madame Ho Hsiang-ning became member of the Council of the Central People's Government, vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, chairman of the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs and chairman of the Union of Chinese Artists. She consistently supported the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and took the socialist road. In the struggle against foreign and domestic enemies, she stood firmly and showed a clear distinction of whom to love and whom to hate. Particularly, in the struggle against the rightists in 1957, she sternly condemned the anti-party and anti-socialist fallacies of the bourgeois rightists. She warmly praised the great socialist motherland, often through her poems and paintings. She paid great attention to affairs of state, supported the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and worked energetically and consistently in defence of the territorial integrity of the socialist motherland and for the liberation of Taiwan.

"Madame Ho Hsiang-ning was a revolutionary comrade-in-arms of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary companion of Mr. Liao Chung-kai, a close friend of the Chinese Communist Party and an outstanding representative of the Kuomintang revolutionaries. She warmly loved the motherland, the socialist system, the Chinese Communist Party and the great leader Chairman Mao. Madame Ho Hsiang-ning remained a revolutionary and a fighter all her life.

"We deeply mourn over the death of Vice-Chairman Ho Hsiang-ning. Let us turn our sorrow into strength and, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, closely follow the great leader Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and unite to win still greater victories!"

Also present at the ceremony were:

Members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Ma Chun-ku, Ou Tang-liang, Pei Shih-chang, Teng Chu-min, Lu Han, Shih Liang, Chuang Hsi-chuan, Chu Liang-tsai, Yen Chi-tzu, Wu Yu-hsun, Wu Leng-hsi, Chang Yun, Chen Chi-han, Wu Hsin-yu, Mao I-sheng, Lin Lan-ying, Lin Chiao-chih, Lo Shu-chang, Chu Ko-chen, Chi Fang, Chao Chung-yao, Hu Tzu-ang, Hu Chueh-wen, Hu Yu-chih, Hu Yao-pang, Tung Yi-chou, Hsieh Fu-min and Feng Shao-hui;

Member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Liu Fei, Chu Yun-shan, Yang Tung-chun, Chang Hsi-jo, Chen Tzu-sheng, Chou Pei-yuan, Chao Pu-chu, Jung I-jen, Hsu Po-hsin, Tseng Tse-sheng and Tung Chi-wu;

Leading members of various departments under the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, the offices of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and the National Women's Federation Wang Liang-en, Yang Te-chung, Liu Chien, Liu Yu-fa, Li Chi-huang, Li Chin-te, Lien Kuan, Kang Ko-ching, Chiao Kuan-hua, Han Nien-lung, Ma Wen-po, Ho Ying, Wang Hai-jung, Lin I-hsin, Hsieh Hua, Wu Ching-tung and Ho Chun-huai;

Members of the Central Standing Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang Kan Tzu-sen, Liu Chung-jung, Wu Mao-sun, Hou Ching-ju, Hsu Wen-tien and Chien Chang-chao, and members of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang Wang Pao-chen, Li Ping-heng, Li Chun-lung, Li Cheng, Chen Li and Chiao Shih-chai;

Deputies to the National People's Congress, representatives of fine art circles, well-known personages and Ho Hsiang-ning's relatives and friends Wang Chen, Wu Te-feng, Sha Chien-li, Chuang Ming-li, Huang Ting-chen, Tien Pu-ta, Wu Huan-hsing, Chu Kuang-ya, Huang Chang-shui, Chang Kuo-chi, Ku Ching-chang, Ho Lien-chih, Chang Jui-hua, Yu Li-chun, Fu Ya, Ku Yuan, Li Ko-jan, Chiang Chao-ho, Chou Hai-ying, Lung Chien, Cheng Szu-yuan, Teng Kuang-yin and his wife, Ma Hai-te (George Hatem), Su Fei, Frank Coe, Ruth Coe, Sol Adler, Pat Adler, Ichihei Sugiyama and his wife, Rewi Alley and Jack Chen.

More than 500 party and government functionaries and representatives of the masses attended.

After the ceremony, Ho Hsiang-ning's coffin was transported by special train to Nanking to be buried by the side of Mr. Liao Chung-kai's coffin in the same grave.

Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Kuo Mo-jo and leading members of departments concerned escorted the coffin to Peking railway station.

Liu Yu-fa, Teng Ying-chao, Hsieh Fu-min, Li Chin-te, Liu Fei, Chu Yun-shan, Chen Tzu-sheng and Kan Tzu-sen and Ho Hsiang-ning's relatives Liao Cheng-chih, Liao Meng-hsing and Ching Pu-chun escorted the coffin to Nanking.

Ho Hsiang-ning's coffin arrived in Nanking this afternoon and the funeral ceremony was held at the grave of Mr. Liao Chung-kai on the eastern outskirts of the city.

Present at the ceremony were Hsu Shih-yu, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, first secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee of the CCP and chairman of the Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and leading members of the Kiangsu Provincial and Nanking municipal party and revolutionary committees Tu Ping, Wu Ta-sheng, Yang Kuang-li, Hsiao Yung-yin, Chiang Ko, Fang Min, Liu Chi-chang and Fang Ming.

Liu Yu-fa and others and relatives of the deceased who had escorted the coffin to Nanking attended the ceremony.

Also present were deputies to the National People's Congress, members of the Kiangsu provincial and Nanking city committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and leading members of the provincial and municipal committees of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang Wu I-fang, Liu Kuo-chun, Chi Yu-ting, Liu Shu-hsun, Chang Ching-li, Chang Kuang-chung, Jen Chung-kao, Chen Ho-chin, Pan Tsun-chung, Ting Kuang-hsun, Chan Chung-fan, Liao Yun-tse, Liao Yun-sheng and Lai Ti-an, and 300 cadres and representatives of local people.

During Ho Hsiang-ning's illness, Vice-Chairman Soong Ching-lin, Premier Chou En-lai and other leaders went to the hospital to see her.

Ho Hsiang-ning's remains were encoffined on September 3. The coffin was placed in Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall in Peking's Chungshan Park. Party and state leaders paid last respects to her at the hospital. Also paying last respects to the deceased were members of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, leading members of departments concerned and Ho Hsiang-ning's friends. Among them were Li Chen, Wang Shu-sheng, Su Yu, Fang I, Shen Kuang, Tseng Tao, Liu Hsin-chuan, Chang Hsiang-shan, Chang Wen-chin, Yang Chi, Ting Hsueh-sung, Lin Yuen-chin, Wang Ting-kuo, Liu Chung-jen, Tung Hsiao-peng, Li Chih-chung, Chou Jung-hsin, Shen Chien, Pu Chieh and his wife, and Paul T.K. Lin and his wife.

A wreath was presented by Prasit Kanchanawat, deputy director of the Division for Economics, Finance and Industry of the National Executive Council of Thailand, when he was in Peking.

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CH/OCCR 23 FEB 1972	4 March	Y
2	Betty [illegible] June 72		
3	CH/FCOT		WA
4			
5			
6	CI/SO - [illegible] for Frank CCE file 1 MAR 1972		

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

7) RAH - FYI / RA

8) Ly-file

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 (40)

USFA-06335 | [illegible]-20-075 | 16 FEB 72
[illegible] 10-5/71
(SOLOG TREAST
DR. ROBERT S. COE

SECRET - (when filled in)

Chief, CO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, FR Division

INFO.
Chief, CO Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Base, San Francisco

SUBJECT
ISOLOG TPFAST
Dr. Robert S. Coe

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: FYI

Ref: USFA-6217 dated 14 December 1971 - 201-196934

Attached herewith is a copy of DCS Memorandum SF 68-72 reporting the results of contact with Professor Aaron C. Waters of the University of California at Santa Cruz concerning the individual and organization which contacted Santa Cruz in early summer 1971 with reference to the travel to China of Dr. Robert Coe. As will be seen, this contact did not resolve the issue, however, from the details given, it appears possible that the contacting organization was LMERGO.

Oliver C. WHIKEHART

Attachment:
Memorandum, h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/FR w/att
2 - C/CO w/att

FRank COE 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
USFA-6338

DATE
15 Fe

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

DO/SF

SF-68-72

26 January 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : International Division (CCS/Durbin)
Operational Support Staff (Grant)
Chief, San Francisco Office

Case 57,563 - Robert S. Coe, Report of Initial Contact - Professor Aaron C. Waters, Department of Earth Sciences, University of California at Santa Cruz

REFS - Headquarters memo on Case 57,563, 30 December 1971
SF-994-71 (Sensitive), Robert S. Coe, 28 December 1971, on Case 54,496

1. On 20 January 1972 we met with Professor Aaron C. Waters, Department of Earth Sciences, University of California at Santa Cruz, and a cordial but not very productive discussion ensued concerning the "US Government official" who showed up on campus during the early part of the summer 1971. Professor Waters could recount few lucid details of what transpired on that particular day. In general, Waters appeared confused and even slightly pixillated over the whole matter; at one point he remarked that he was very pleasantly surprised to discover that Hudson was not the same individual who badgered him a few months ago. How Waters formed the belief that the same man was going to see him at the time of our appointment is unclear, for we explicitly outlined our reason for seeing him when we scheduled the interview. At any rate, the following information, incomplete as it may be, was provided by Waters.

2. The incident occured in late June or early July 1971 just prior to Coe's visit to mainland China. A man came to the door of Waters' office and said that he wished to ask some questions about Robert Coe. He was about five feet eight inches in height, weighed about 150 pounds, had dark hair, and used glasses only for writing. He wore a sport coat and a colored shirt. Neither the name of this individual nor his affiliation can be recalled by Waters for "he mumbled a great deal." Nor can any of the information on the credentials be remembered except that they were similar in design to the ones used by the Agency (we allowed Waters to scrutinize ours) but were not in color. For openers the man asked why Coe was going to China, and then began to ask about Coe's parents. He then inquired about Coe's character and whether he belonged to any subversive organizations. This persistent and offensive line of questioning really turned Waters off, and the man was asked to leave. Waters doubts if the individual were any kind of an impersonator because he has had "similar experiences

SECRET

SF-69-72
26 Jan 72
c. 57.56?

with the FBI in the past. Needless to say, Waters maintains a high regard for Robert Coe and felt such questions were an infringement upon Coe's privacy and were completely unwarranted.

3. During our conversation with Waters he left the room momentarily and went into Robert Coe's office directly across the alcove. When he returned he explained that he told Coe about our presence and asked him to join us for a few moments. Coe would not. Unless directed otherwise, we plan no further action on this matter.

JEROME V. [illegible]

[illegible]

cc. [illegible]/SF

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

CIT USA
OCC ?
< CHINA
SUBJ AND WIFE RUTH RPTD LIVING CHINA FOR NEARLY 6 YRS DESCRIBED AS OLD MAN LIVING SUBURBS PEKING NEAR CHINESE MILITARY MUSEUM ALLEGED HAVE LED AMERICAN PORTION OF DEMONSTRATION HELD PEKING DURING CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS SUBJ AND WIFE WORK CHINA PEACE COMMITTEE.
WAS DEFERRED

016-120-041
FCHA-29293
07 FEB 72
P5

R 7204061293

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201-169934

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
8-66

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-60)

C-150 LY file

He praised the heroic Cuban people for the tremendous victories they won under the leadership of Prime Minister Fidel Castro in opposing U.S. imperialist aggression, subversion and interference, defending national independence and state sovereignty and building up their motherland.

He said: This year U.S. imperialism unreasonably detained Cuban fishing boats and fishermen on the high seas on two occasions and savagely attacked a fishermen's village in Cuba and killed innocent inhabitants there, committing one crime after another gainst the Cuban people. The Cuban navy recently captured two pirate ships which participated in the counter-revolutionary activities against Cuba. This is an entirely just action. U.S. imperialism has gone so far as to rampantly bluff and threaten Cuba and other Latin American countries and people who are fighting in defense of their national independence and state sovereignty. The Chinese people strongly condemn U.S. imperialism for its criminal activities against Cuban and other Latin American people and resolutely support the people of Cuba and other Latin American countries in their just struggle against U.S. imperialism.

He said the fact that people of all Latin American countries are joining forces to resist U.S. imperialist aggression and control has become an irresistible historical trend. Whatever tricks it may resort to, U.S. imperialism can never stop the people of Cuba and other Latin American countries in their victorious advance.

Ambassador Jesus Barreiro Gonzalez said: "We are very glad to be invited to attend the gathering this afternoon in commemoration of the 13th anniversary of the victory of our country's liberation, which is filled with fraternal friendship."

He said that January 1, 1959 was a day of special significance. It marked the successful completion of a stage in the struggle for the liberation of Cuba. In a century and more, the ambassador continued, the Cuban people have resisted attempts at colonialist and neo-colonialist domination, the basic hallmark being the liberation wars in 1868 and 1895 against the Spanish colonial yoke and the struggle against U.S. imperialism which attempted to replace Spain and occupy the land of Cuba. He said a new stage began in 1959 after the overthrow of the Batista dictatorial regime which was abetted by the United States.

The ambassador pointed out that the U.S. imperialist government has continued carrying out its policies of aggression, sabotage, subversion, blackmail, economic blockade, invasion and piratical attack against Cuba. But all these schemes have met with the most ignominious failure.

He said that the restoration to the People's Republic of China of her lawful rights in the United Nations and the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from the UN is a victory for the people of the world and a failure for the U.S. imperialist government.

A Cuban film "Hundred Years of Struggle" and a Chinese film "The Working Class Creates Miracles" were shown at the reception.

PARTY, STATE OFFICES FETE FOREIGN EXPERTS AT NEW YEAR

Peking NCNA International Service in English 2145 GMT 31 Dec 71 B

[Text] Peking, December 31 (HSINHUA)--The General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Office of the State Council gave a New Year's

Virginius Frank Coe
201 -

Eve banquet here today in honor of foreign experts and their wives coming from various countries of the five continents.

Seated at the tables for guests of honor were Rajko Lutovac and his wife, Vasili[illegible], Un Bon Su and his wife, Ha Huu Cy, Frank Coe and his wife, Sol Adler and his wife, Tatsu Tokuda, Rani Karthigesu, Hamid Rashid, Thorz Souvarin and his wife, Mohammed Hassan Aydie, Aysha Amour Zahor, Claudio Cini, Adriana Beltinti, Denise Ly, Jayme Martins, Maria Angelina Picchi, Yaw Ansante, Sid Engst, Joan Chase Hinton, Julian Schuman, Rose Smith, and Leopold Christer and his wife.

Attending the banquet and happy get-together with the foreign friends to greet the militant new year of 1972 were Chou En-lai, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and premier of the State Council; Yao Wen-yuan, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee; Li Hsien-nien, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and vice premier of the State Council; Chi Teng-kuei, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee; Keng Piao, member of the CCP Central Committee and head of the International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee; Chi Peng-fei, acting foreign minister; Li Po-shih, a leading member of the Bureau of Foreign Experts Affairs; and others.

The banquet was presided over by Wang Tung-hsing, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee.

When the leading Chinese party and government comrades entered the banquet hall, they warmly shook hands with the foreign experts and their wives and thanked them for their valuable contributions to China's socialist revolution and construction.

Making a speech at the banquet, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien extended warm festival greetings and cordial regards to the foreign experts and their wives.

He said: "You experts have come to China from thousands of miles away and have worked diligently in the press, publication, education, health and other departments of our country with your efforts and know-how, you have made valuable contributions to China's socialist revolution and socialist construction and to the support and assistance to the world revolution. Your noble internationalist spirit is well worthy of our emulation. On behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Government and people, I extend to you our sincere gratitude!"

Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien said: "In his solemn statement of May 20, 1970, the Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao said: 'The danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of all countries must get prepared. But revolution is the main trend in the world today. The development of the world situation in the past year and more has fully proved the correctness of Chairman Mao's wise conclusion. The three Indochinese peoples have won brilliant victories in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. The Palestinian and other Arab peoples are persevering in their struggle against U.S.-Israeli aggression. The Pakistan people are waging a just struggle in defense of state sovereignty and territorial integrity and against aggression and interference.

"The national liberation movements of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are continuing to surge forth vigorously. The revolutionary mass movements of the peoples of Europe, North America and Oceania are developing in depth. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution--this has become an irresistible historical trend. The truculent practice of power politics and hegemony by the superpowers has met with the strong resistance of an increasing number of small and medium countries; the superpowers are beset with internal and external difficulties and are having a tougher and tougher time."

The Chinese vice premier said: "In external affairs, our country has firmly carried out Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line in foreign affairs and won great victories. The exchange of friendly visits between our people and the people of other countries, including the American people, is continuously expanding; and the number of countries which have established diplomatic relations with our country is ever increasing. The vain scheme of the superpowers to blockade and isolate China has gone totally bankrupt!"

He continued: "The domestic situation of our country is also excellent. Since the Ninth Congress and the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of our party, the whole party, the whole army and the whole nation, acting on our great leader Chairman Mao's instruction 'carry out education in ideology and political line', have unfolded a deep-going movement for criticizing revisionism and rectifying the style of work, further heightened their consciousness of class struggle, the struggle between the two lines and of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and have won great victories. The struggle-criticism-transformation campaign of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is continuing to develop in depth. We have reaped bumper harvests for 10 years running. A new upsurge is emerging in industrial production. Prices are stable and the market [is] flourishing. The revolutionary spirit of our people is rising higher than ever. Our socialist motherland is prospering and thriving with each passing day."

Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien wished the experts success in their work and good health. In conclusion, he said: "Let us work together to better promote the mutual understanding and militant friendship between the Chinese people and the people of other countires and support and assist the world revolution!"

The banquet proceeded in a warm and friendly atmosphere. Hosts and guests talked cordially and proposed toasts to the daily consolidation and development of the revolutionary friendship and militant unity of the people of various countries.

Also attending the banquet were leading members of departments under the CCP Central Committee, Chinese Government departments, the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries and other departments concerned Wang Liang-en, Wu Ching-tung, Ma Wen-po, Yang Te-chung, Tu Wan-jung, Hsieh Hua, Chang Chi-chih, Liu Chien-kung, Cheng Shih-chang, Lu Ying, Li Meng-fu, Liu Fu, Chiu Wei-kao, Liu Chuan-hsin, Wu Yin-hsien, Ting Hsi-lin, Li Ching-chuan, Wang Lei, Chu Kai-yin, Chu Chih-tung and Chiang Shou-li.

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASS—CATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐ NFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CH/OCDU	16 DEC 1971	JE
2	CI/SO Bev Aurucal	20 DEC 1971	BS
3	GB-07		
4	~~CH/[illegible]/CK~~		
5	RAH		RAK
6	CI/SO LY-file		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

For 201 of
Virginius Frank Coe

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
CH/OCDU - J Elliott	16 Dec 71

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

(40)

FORM NO. 237 1-67 Use previous editions

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - USFA-6217

FILE NO - HQS PLS ASSIGN

DATE - 14 DECEMBER 1971

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF, DOMESTIC OPS

INFO - CHIEF, CHINA OPS

FROM - CHIEF OF BASE, SAN FRANCISCO

SUBJECT - ISOLOG TPFAST - ROBERT S. COE, PHD

ACTION - FYI

REF - NONE

THIS RECORDS ISOLOG TELECONS OF WEEK 6 DEC RE SUBJECT, WHO PROFESSOR GEOLOGY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT SANTA CRUZ AND REPORTEDLY MADE 10 WEEK TRIP TO CHINA CIRCA JULY 71 TO VISIT "ILL FATHER." (NOT CLEAR IF SUBJECT NAME ANGLICIZED VERSION OF ORIGINAL CHINESE NAME OR WHAT.) VIA UNIVERSITY CHANCELLOR, WODISH ATTEMPTED MAKE CONTACT WITH SUBJECT CIRCA OCTOBER TO DEBRIEF RE TRIP BUT SUBJECT REBUFFED. WODISH LATER HEARD FROM CASUAL SOURCE THAT SUBJECT HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY SOMEONE PRIOR CHINA TRIP CLAIMING BE JKLANCE WHO TRIED "BADGER" SUBJECT INTO COOPERATION. BASIS YOUR ADVICE THAT THERE NO HQS RECORD ANY JKLANCE INTEREST ASIDE FROM RECORD WODISH CLEARANCE ACTION, WODISH IS GOING TO TRY TO GET TO BOTTOM OF INCIDENT AND FIND OUT WHO CONTACTED SUBJECT AS JKLANCE. WILL ADVISE OUTCOME.

WILLIAM G. BOLAND

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

2-CHIEF, DO

2-CHIEF, CO

SECRET TELEPOUCH

Frank Virginius COE 201

[illegible]

C1/SC/K4

ARRIVALS, DEPARTURES, ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN VISITORS

Arrival of 'American Friends'

Peking NCNA International Service in English 0744 GMT 12 Sep 71 B

[Text] Peking, September 12 (HSINHUA)--American friends Jack Shulman and his wife arrived in Peking by air today for a visit at the invitation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. They were welcomed at the airport by leading members of the organizations concerned including Tu Wan-jung and Lin Chen.

Kuo Meets U.S., British Guests

Peking NCNA International Service in English 1507 GMT 10 Sep 71 B

[Text] Peking, September 10 (HSINHUA)--Kuo Mo-jo, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and president of the Academy of Sciences of China, met and feted this evening American scientist Robert Coe and Judy Coe and British Doctor David Adler as well as Geoffrey Collins. The meeting and banquet proceeded in a friendly atmosphere, during which the host and guests talked cordially.

Attending the meeting and banquet were American friends in Peking Frank Coe, Ruth Coe, Sol Adler and Pat Adler.

Present on the occasion were leading members and staff members of Chinese organizations concerned Tang Ming-chao, Li Hsiao-pai, Hsing Chu-fang, Ku Kung-hsu, Shih Chen-liang and Tai Sheng-pu.

Departure of American Couple

Peking NCNA International Service in English 1500 GMT 10 Sep 71 B

[Text] Peking, September 10 (HSINHUA)--American friends Mr and Mrs Bronson Clark left Peking by air for home today via Canton, after paying a friendly visit to China. They were seen off at the airport by leading members of Chinese organizations concerned Hsu Chung-ching, Hsi Chen-huan, Liu Ko and Liu Tzu-han.

Mr and Mrs Clark arrived in China on August 18. They visited factories, people's communes, schools and a hospital and scenic spots and places of historical interest in Peking, Chengchow, Sian, Yenan, Nanking and Linhsien County in Honan Province. They were given a warm welcome by people in these places.

American Mathematician in Shanghai

Peking NCNA International Service in English 1502 GMT 10 Sep 71 B

[Text] Peking, September 10 (HSINHUA)--After visiting Peking, American mathematician Professor Chandler Davis emplaned here this morning on a visit to Shanghai and Canton before leaving China for home. He was seen off at the airport by leading members of Chinese organizations concerned and scientists including Hsu Chung-ching, Hsi Chen-huan and Tien Fang-tseng.

Frank Coe
201-169934

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATI… TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CI/SO-GB-C7		BS
2	Bev Simcoe		
3			
4	CI/SOG-file		
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Please file in 201 of Virginius Frank Coe

Found more when I was searching

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
CH/CCDU June	16 Dec 71

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

S/C 2A?? TO
[redacted]SLA-1705

SECRET

1 July 1971
DATE

CONTACT REPORT

TP

A. AGENT STCLOY/1

B. DATE, PLACE, TIME OF MEETING 30 June 1971; Ting Ho Restaurant, Highland Av., Hollywood; 1230 - 1330 hours.

C. MEETING ARRANGEMENTS On 25 June 1971, called STCLOY/1 and made this arrangement.

D. PURPOSE OF MEETING To seek confidential information.

E. SECURITY FACTORS Nothing derogative observed.

F. PAYMENT MADE Nil

G. MEETING EXPENSES Lunch to cover meeting $9.85

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 3 1971
MICROFILMED

H. MATERIAL PASSED AGENT Nil

I. MATERIAL RECEIVED FROM AGENT One 'Biomedical News' II/5-71 published in Washington, D.C.

J. NEXT MEETING Will see STCLOY/1 the next day to give him the address of Dr. S.C. SUNG and the 'Biomedical News'.

K. NEW BIO DATA ON AGENT/NEW LEADS Please see para. L for info re news article 'Scientists Bid for Travel to China', the identity of 'Mrs. YANG' who was the original source of information re engineers' travel to Mainland.

KPP

SECRET

S/C USLA-1705

S/C 2A77 TO USLA-1705

CS COPY

201-757818

L. DETAILS OF MEETING (continued)

1. DELASCIO initiated this meeting with STCLOY/1 to discuss about the following operational matters:-

   a) Can he write to Dr. S.C. SUNG, the Taiwanese bio-chemist in Vancouver, B.C., and invite him down to Los Angeles for a visit?

   b) What is the medical publication he has received which purports a travel of American scientists to Mainland China?

   c) Has he found out the name of that 'Mrs. YANG' who first talked about the travel plans of the American/Chinese engineers?

2. In reply, STCLOY/1 answered as follows:

   a) He can write to Dr. S.C. SUNG, but he does not have a good reason to request for his visit. Unless there is a medical conference or certain occasion of interest to SUNG, STCLOY/1 feels he can not just suggest SUNG to make a trip to see him.

   b) The medical publication which reports the interest of some American scientists in the travel to Mainland China is 'Biomedical News' (copy of the news attached). The II/5-71 issue of the news has published an article written by Harry I. TENNANT entitled 'Scientists Bid For Travel to China', which names Dr. William McElroy, director of the National Science Foundation, and Dr. Philip HANDLER, president of the National Academy of Science, as ones who had suggested to make a trip jointly to China. The article also promotes the cultural exchange of scientists between Mainland China and U.S., and it credits members of two academic committees for their efforts.

   c) The name of that 'Mrs. YANG' is 'Mrs. Paul YANG'. Paul YANG, husband of the woman who first talked about the travel plan of a group of local Chinese engineers to Mainland China, is an engineering staff of Southern California Edison Company, Los Angeles. STCLOY/1 does not think that the travel plan as mentioned by Mrs. YANG has materialized yet. Therefore, there is not much to be found out.

3. STCLOY/1 showed DELASCIO two postcards which STGAZER/1 and STMEEK/1 had sent him from Spain. He undertood that STGAZER/1 had returned to Los Angeles a few days ago, and he is going to meet STGAZER/1 to find out when is he going to Canada to bid for travel permission to China. STCLOY/1 also agreed to contact Dr. ROSENFELD tocheck about their movements as well as new activities of HAN Suyin. STCLOY/1 believed that HAN might play an active role in the near future in the Chinese-American relation developments.

4. DELASCIO sought STCLOY/1's assistance to look for a job for TS'AI Yin-Ying (201-875838), wife of P'AN Han-Sung. STCLOY/1 regretted that he could not help because he does not know directly any hospital laboratory in this area, but he estimated that she should find a position of Lab Assistant to work under a licensed laboratory technician or to work as a clinical assistant in a physician's office if she persists in trying.

M. ACTIONS PLANNED OR REQUIRED - RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. HQ - For information.

b. Local - Please make Xerox copies of Biomedical News and forward to HQ as members of these committees may be good sources to provide us with information about exchanged scientists.

Will see STCLOY/1 to give him the full address of Dr. SUNG because STCLOY/1 has mislaid it. Then will discuss with him again about what reason he can invite his SUNG's visit. Will also pursue the case of Paul YANG and STGAZER/1 and Dr. ROSENFELD.

K. ACTIONS (continued)

On 30 June 1971, DELASCIO returned STCLOY/1 with the 'Biomedical News'. At the same time, DELASCIO gave him the business address of Dr. S.C. SUNG, and convinced STCLOY/1 that he could try to write Dr. SUNG, stating that STCLOY/1's office xxxxxxx will soon move to a new address and that STCLOY/1 welcomes SUNG for a visit because SUNG will surely enjoy the new tourist attractions in Los Angeles such as 'The Magic Mountain' and 'The Lion Safari'. STCLOY/1 still doubted that SUNG would spend so much money to make such a trip, but he promised to write this letter inviting him.

Scientists Bid for Travel to China

by Harry L. Tennant

WASHINGTON—Nearly 100 U.S. scientists who are hoping to be China-bound this summer are thread-
ray through papers, reports, journals and third country
s while they patiently
ance from the People's Re-
China. This was evident
reports that three U. S.
have been cleared to enter

epped-up activity here in scientific quarters seems to have spurred preparation for what could be an influx into China of U. S. scientific specialists of all types. Early indications point to the possibility that an exchange of citizens between U. S. and China might place the scientist in a priority position over professions of other areas, as well as the general tourist himself.

Meantime, the overall rush was ob. as by a flood of applications and inquiries from U. S. professors to China's new and only embassy in North America at Ottawa, Canada. The fast-moving breaks came after the two U. S. scientists, Dr. Arthur W. Galston, Yale University plant physiologist, and Dr. Ethan Signer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology biologist, had received clearance. Another scientist, Dr. Robert Coe, geophysicist, University of California at Santa Cruz, also was cleared for entrance.

The National Academy of Sciences said large groups of biochemists and

Biomedical News
The newspaper for the life scientist
II/5-71 Washington, D.C.© May 1971

Nobel Winner to Get Cancer Research Aid

by Faye Marley

A man who claims to know how to cure cancer can have all the research help he needs from the National Cancer Institute.

Dr. Saul Schepartz, assistant scientific director for drug research and development, says the institute would be glad to collaborate with Nobelist Albert Szent-Gyorgyi of Woods Hole,

FASEB Surveys Research

Some 10,000 experimental biologists discussed the frontiers of research in physiology, pharmacology, pathology, immunology and nutrition in mid-April when the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology met in Chicago.

A last-minute change in speakers was made at the General Session April 13 because Dr. Marshall W. Nirenberg, Nobelist in physics in 1968, was

in this country were present.

The 400 industrial and institutional exhibits at McCormick Place featured instruments applicable to research in experimental biology.

Among the session highlights were 28 symposiums of invited speakers and 45 intersociety meetings having to do with current fundamental problems of the diseases that research biologists in all fields are trying to conquer. . . .

biomedical, biological, and natural scientists are eager to survey the scientific scene. At the same time it was pointed out that Dr. William McElroy, director of the National Science Foundation, and Dr. Philip Handler, president of the National Academy of Sciences, had suggested that they make a trip jointly to China. This view was part of the feeling in science quarters in Washington that an exchange of scientists between both countries would be very beneficial to the two countries even though all sorts of understandings would have to take place. This was the reasoning expressed by President Nixon's science advisor, Dr. Edward Davis, Jr.

Up to this point there has been no official Government effort to initiate exchanges and an early appraisal of this possibility indicates that funds would have to be obtained to finance any sizeable program. Nevertheless, those on the scene say these could probably come from foundations. It is even quite possible that the White House would push for early passage of an emergency request for funds to see that such a scientific venture got underway. The present Administration, which credits itself with the break-through which led to the ping pong matches, is certain to push harder for a more forceful exchange now that the door is slightly open, even if the Administration has to finance an exchange from funds which it might consider of an emergency nature.

The updating of papers on Chinese advancements has been underway for some time. The National Academy of Sciences prepared about 300 papers for just such a possibility in 1968. But the papers remained undisturbed after it became known that an exchange was far in the future.

The Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China, a highly placed group, has been studying the activity intensely. Headed by Dr. John Lindbeck until his recent death, this committee is perhaps the most knowledgeable of any group as to just what is to be found in China, if and when an exchange takes place. Committee members are Professor A. Doak Barnett, Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Brookings Institution, (Chinese Studies); Dr. Horace R. Byers, Academic Vice President, Texas A & M University, (Meteorology); Dr. James

See China . . . p. 12

China . . . *from p. 1*

Cahill, Department of Art, University of California, Berkeley, (Fine Arts); Professor Jerome A. Cohen, Langdell Hall, Harvard Law School, (Law, Chinese Studies); Dr. Paul Doty, Department of Chemistry, Harvard University, (Physical Chemistry), and Dr. Alexander Eckstein, Department of Economics, University of Michigan, (Economics). Dr. Eckstein heads another group interested in scholarly exchanges, the National Committee on United States-China Relations, and is a well known authority on Chinese economics.

Others on the Scholarly Communications committee are: Dr. Caryl P. Haskins, President, Carnegie Institution of Washington, (Physiology, Genetics); Dr. Gerald J. Holton, Department of Physics, Harvard University, (Physics); Dr. Walsh McDermott, Department of Public Health, Cornell University Medical College, (Medicine); Dr. Emil Smith, Department of Biological Chemistry, University of California, Los Angeles, (Biochemistry, Biophysics); Dr. Kenneth V. Thimann, Provost and Professor of Biology, University of California, Santa Cruz, (Botany, Plant Physiology), and Dr. John A. Wheeler, Palmer Physical Laboratory, Princeton University, (Physics).

Medical Progress

Despite a 25-year period of no exchange of information between the U.S. and China, a vast amount of detailed data has been accumulated, all indicating that China has again stabilized itself after the turmoil of 1966. Since 1969 over 2,000 types of Chinese traditional and Western medicines have been reduced in price by an average of 30 per cent. Imports of scientific equipment and chemicals such as pharmaceuticals, fertilizers and synthetic fibers have dropped because of China's improving capability to produce its own instruments, machinery and chemicals. This accounts in some measure for the fact that the Department of Commerce does not expect a vast amount of medical goods and equipment to be exported when and if the Administration relaxes controls on movement of non-strategic goods to China.

Western Influence

The Autumn Canton Trade Fair recently gave some indication of the trends in China. Among the changes noted were the 30 per cent increase in customers and the Chinese favoritism for West European countries, especially France and Italy, at Japan's expense. Exhibits at the fair reflected numerous technological advances over the previous year. Among the displays were silicon-controlled automatic electronic and punch-tape-controlled tools, measuring and testing instruments, oscilloscopes, microscopes, and a wide range of synthetic plastics, resins and such basic drugs as antibiotics, sulphur drugs and vitamins.

The revolution in Chinese education has produced many schools such as the Shantung University of Science and Technology in Tsinan which opened last October.

Chairman Mao's thinking along medical lines is responsible for the "cooperative medical service" intended to bring medical treatment to all rural areas. It has been reported that one-

third of a million city medical workers and graduates of medical colleges have settled in rural areas while 400,000 others were organized into mobile medical teams to tend rural areas. This has prompted shifting of some hospitals from large metropolitan centers to the country. The Hailung area, it is reported, has set up a so-called "red medical network" designed to enable each production team and factory to have its own highly publicized "barefoot doctors."

In another area all medical school graduates have been dispatched to the countryside and one-half of the medical workers in Harbin, Tsitshihar, Mutanchiang and Chiamusze have been sent to the rural and mountainous regions. "In this spirit," the Chinese say, "they have converted rural homes to allow for surgical operations."

Curing the 'Incurable'

Other reports point out that the integration of western medicine and Chinese traditional medicine has resulted in successful treatment of many common and recurrent diseases as well as curing some of the "incurable" diseases such as osteomatosis, epilepsy and chronic laryngitis proliforans.

A mass program in which Chinese traditional medicine and medicinal herbs are being used to prevent and treat diseases and heal injuries is sweeping the country, according to reports. Several instances of rejoining severed limbs to the body by using herbal drugs have been described. As part of this broad movement "red medical counters" have been set up in Canton's state-run drugstores to treat minor injuries and illnesses and recurring diseases by several methods including acupuncture and injections.

To assist in the struggle against disease a new type of diadynamic current stimulator used for back strains, sprains and neuralgia has been developed. Transistors substitute for electronic tubes and ordinary dry batteries for alternating current, the stimulator no larger than a book. A transistor device with a freezing microtome and a unit for cryotherapy has been developed, lessening the time for making thin sections for rapid biopsy inspections and used in the treatment of skin diseases and surgical procedures in dealing with warts and tiny vascular tumors.

Population Control

Shanghai recently has been the scene of posters urging young people to marry later in life, prompting observers to believe the Chinese are taking serious note of the population increase. At a Tokyo family planning conference recently it was reported that the mainland China urban birth rate was down. If this is true, it is the result of a 15-year birth control campaign. Through a combination of contraception, abortion, sterilization and encouragement of the late marriages, China is said to have almost halved its earlier population growth pace.

New developments in the pharmaceutical industry also have been reported. Of particular pride are drugs made from indigenous herb medicines. A new medical herb in Yunnan proved effective in curing 12 cases of acute hepatitis and streptomycin and another antibiotic have been produced from active carbon.

On the research front, there is continued interest in prevention of pollution and re-utilization of waste products. In Shanghai it is reported that an electrolysis plant made six different commodities including cryolite, pure soda and liquified ammonium chloride from waste materials.

Peking Pollution

According to published reports, Peking shares the Western world's concern for environmental control. Methods for anti-pollution measures include producing new substances from chemicals extracted from waste materials for medical and commercial purposes, using unwanted materials from large-sized factories to construct smaller industries, and maximizing possible usage and resusage of material products in order to economize in production costs are under study.

In a controlled set of laboratory experiments using operant conditioning techniques, five of seven patients with moderate to severe hypertension were able to reduce their systolic blood pressure by 9 per cent through their conscious reaction to external stimuli such as tones, lights and projected slides.

The reductions in blood pressure occurred during a series of studies under the direction of a group of four Harvard investigators in the behavioral laboratory of the Thorndike Memorial Laboratory and the Channing Laboratory, Boston City Hospital.

14-00000

2 U.S. SCIENTISTS WILL VISIT CHINA

Biologists Critical of War Said Either to Be There or About to Go From Hanoi

11 May 71 NYT

By WALTER SULLIVAN

Two American biologists are reported by their colleagues to be in China or about to go there from Hanoi, the North Vietnamese capital. A third American, a geophysicist from the University of California at Santa Cruz, is also said to have received permission to visit Peking shortly.

The biologists are Dr. Arthur W. Galston, professor of biology at Yale University, and Dr. Ethan Signer, an associate professor of biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The geophysicist is Dr. Robert Coe, whose father has been living in Peking. Dr. Galston is a specialist in plant physiology who has been an outspoken critic of American defoliation in Vietnam. Dr. Signer, a specialist in the genetics of bacterial viruses, has also been an active critic of the war in Vietnam.

Few, if any, American scientists have been able to visit the Chinese mainland since the

Continued on Page 12, Column 1

2 U. S. SCIENTISTS REPORTED IN CHINA

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

Communists took control in 1949. For a number of years scholarly journals were exchanged, but in about 1966 with the onset of the Cultural Revolution this flow was cut off. In fact, publication of many journals in China was apparently suspended during that period of turmoil.

However, a trickle of publications out of China has continued, primarily to scientists in countries other than the United States. Thus there has been a limited flow of information on developments in such fields as astronomy, archeology and biochemistry.

Some Western Visitors

There have also been some scientific visitors from Western nations whose relations with China were less hostile than those of the United States, notably Britain, France and Canada. In recent years such visits have become rare. However, it is reported that Dr. Pierre Chouard, professor of botany at the Sorbonne in Paris, has now received clearance for a trip.

The sudden opening of China to visits by American journalists a few weeks ago has raised hopes for a breakdown of the barriers against scientists. Last week the Committee for the Development of Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China met in Washington to consider possible action.

The committee was headed by Dr. John Lindbeck, director of the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, until his death in January, and a new chairman has not been chosen. It represents the National Academy of Sciences and other learned societies. Under consideration by the committee is an invitation to some Chinese scientists to meetings to be held in this country next summer.

Another group interested in scholarly exchanges is the National Committee on United States-China Relations. It is headed by Dr. Alexander Eckstein of the University of Michigan, an authority on Chinese economics, and includes businessmen and retired government officials as well as scholars.

Of major importance to the scholarly community will be the restoration of exchanges of specialized journals. Visitors to China have found American journals on file at research centers, but the flow has been one-way and, apparently, of a limited nature.

Dr. Arthur W. Galston

DEEP SEA STUDY FINDS

Virginia Grant Co

47

FILE IN 201-169934

W [illegible]

[illegible] ay

[illegible] 1

[illegible] THERS USE [illegible] FREE BREAKFAST' CASH TO FREE HUEY * [illegible] MAP ACADEMY * [illegible] ENT STEPS UP SPY-CATCHING EFFORT * [illegible] NEWS FA[illegible] PICKETS * [illegible] N SETS TRAP FOR BOMB CALLS * YALE MEETING DISCUSSED [illegible]

PANTHER [illegible] TO BAIL OUT HUEY NEWTON: Investigators of the House [illegible] ternal S[illegible] Committee [illegible] established that money designated for use in the Black Panther [illegible] ver-[illegible] "free" breakfast program was used to [illegible] free [illegible] Supreme C[illegible] Hu[illegible] The Committee has made publ[illegible] evidence [illegible] collected by subpoena [illegible] shows that [illegible] designated by an anonymous donor for specific [illegible] of the [illegible] program" found its way to the Alameda County (Calif.) [illegible] as Newton bail. [illegible] unearthed the identity of the anonymous donor: Paul Moore III of Berkeley, [illegible], son of the Episcopal bishop of New York. The [illegible] hearing, [illegible] by the press, consisted of investigators recounting the complicated trail of the check [illegible] ents made public show that Moore purchased a $20,000 [illegible] c[illegible] in New [illegible] July 23; the check was marked "For Black Panther Party breakfast program." [illegible] it was deposited to a BPP account in [illegible], Calif. [illegible] On August [illegible] withdrew $20,000 [illegible] from the [illegible] rty's funds at that branch) and immediately purchased [illegible] cashier's check payable to Alameda County as bail for Newton. (Another [illegible] on's [illegible] came out of [illegible] another Panther account in San Francisco.) Committee investigators found that the BPP has never filed income tax quarterly reports, and pays no salaries (although [illegible] withdrawals in cash of $12,000 may possibly constitute unnamed salary settlements [illegible] sides [illegible] of [illegible] contributions, HISC's [illegible] turned up a [illegible] ing [illegible] foreign source. The telegram, sent from [illegible] ing, [illegible] THOUSAND DOLLARS FROM [illegible] STOP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible] RECEIVIN[illegible] K AND COP[illegible] [illegible] E FRANK COE [illegible] CHI C[illegible] his strong, an ex[illegible] merican journalist, devoted [illegible] years to promoting [illegible] and Chinese [illegible] ed [illegible] China earlier this year. Coe, now the rank[illegible] merican serv[illegible] in Peking, was [illegible] onetime CP member in Wash[illegible] during the 30's and 40's and was named as a Soviet [illegible].

[illegible] ING GROUP [illegible] OOL PROB[illegible] The Subversive Activit[illegible] tro[illegible] the government [illegible] ncy [illegible] gress [illegible] alleged [illegible] Opening day was [illegible] Z-out [illegible] John Gallo, who then admitted to newsmen that he was, indeed, [illegible] munist Party. Gallo was accompanied by the attorney for the School, [illegible] virtua[illegible] the [illegible] d [illegible] nsel for the [illegible] and CP mem[illegible] by [illegible] celebrities as [illegible] Oswald, [illegible] ionage. [illegible] Dav[illegible] that the [illegible] led i[illegible] [illegible] rator [illegible] a certi[illegible] incorp[illegible] was not [illegible]" the [illegible] school's [illegible] lists [illegible] later, an[illegible] r, not [illegible] the

COE 201-169934

Vault

'American Friends' at Rallies in Peking

cx

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, July 10 — Frank Coe and Sol Adler, two aging former officials of the United States Treasury Department, appear to be filling the social niche formerly occupied in Peking by Anna Louise Strong, the 84-year-old American leftist who died last March after years of service in the cause of Chinese Communism.

For the second time in little more than a month Mr. Coe and Mr. Adler were listed this week in Peking reports sent here by Hsinhua, the Chinese Communist press agency, as "American friends" present at a mass function along with top Chinese and foreign officials.

The function, on Tuesday, was a sports performance before 20,000 people in an indoor stadium arranged in honor of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, former Chief of State of Cambodia who now heads a Cambodian government in exile in Peking.

Mao's Wife Present

Tung Pi-wu, the aging deputy head of state; Premier Chou En-lai; Chiang Ching, the wife of Mao Tse-tung; and Huang Yung-sheng, chief of staff of the armed forces, were among the Chinese officials present. In the Prince's entourage were his premier, Penn Nouth, his wife, Princess Monique, and three sons and others of the Cambodian community in Peking.

Associated Press

Frank Coe

The previous occasion at which Mr. Coe and Mr. Adler were listed in attendance as "American friends" was a Peking mass rally on May 21 held to mark the statement made by Chairman Mao the evious day calling for world evolution against "United ates imperialism."

Mr. Coe and Mr. Adler figured in Washington investigations of alleged Communist subversives in the United States Government in the late 1940's and early 1950's, at the time of the Alger Hiss case. They have both been in Peking for many years and seem to have escaped serious trouble during the Cultural Revolution purges in 1967-68.

Wives Also in Peking

Whether they have helped the Chinese Communists as financial specialists is not known, but it is thought here they have mainly been employed in editing English-language news and propaganda material.

Both have wives in Peking. Mr. Adler is author of a book on the economy of Communist China.

There are a few other Americans in Peking in good standing with the regime there, but only Mr. Coe and Mr. Adler have been listed as "American friends" at the two functions. This is believed to indicate that they have been selected to act as the American representation at public affairs at which the Chinese wish to give the impression of broad international participation.

COE - 201/ VAULT

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JULY 11, 1970

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Cable

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

[illegible]

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

100-006-139/04
CD -02166
10 NOV 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
MENTIONED IN HOW HARRY DEXTER WHITE PULLED WIRES FOR RUSSIA PUBLISHED BY US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 25 DEC 53 WASH, DC

R 7012040647

FILE IN 201-169934

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

COE, FRANK V.
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

201-000212
EX -00816
07 MAR 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
NAME MENTIONED IN CI STUDY ON NICOLAS KAGAN/201-212/. SEE INDEX FOR P NUMBER.

R 6707190237

FILE IN 201-169934

16. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

COE, FRANK
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

201-251919
DBB -03533
29 MAR 65
FBI
P8

CIT ?
OCC ?

SUBJ WAS A MEMBER OF THE SOVIET ESPIONAGE GROUP WHICH WAS HEADED BY NATHAN GREGORY SILVERMASTER /201-099537/ AND WAS ACTIVE IN WASHINGTON, D.C., IN THE EARLY 40'S.

WAS 100-008-017

CORR CARD

R 6505171577

From here back
Input to Defector Machine 22/6/65
Program AB

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

SECRET

FORM 6-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(9-60)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

016-500
DBA -88780
23 OCT 64
FBI
PI

AN AMERICAN ECONOMIST, FORMERLY SECY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, NOW LIVING IN PEKING, CHINA, WOULD ATTEND THE OCT 1 CHINESE COMMUNIST NATIONAL HOLIDAY

R 6504090082

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 6-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

201-731043
DBA -77091
30 JUN 64
P4

FAZ.R 2037814

000000 00000000 00000
11 11 1111111111111 1
2 222222222222 222222
333333333333333 3333
4444444444444444444
5555555555555555555
6666666666666666666
7777 777777777777 777
88888888888888888 88
999999 999999999999

ELIZABETH T. BENTLEY, SELF-CONFESSED FORMER ESPIONAGE COURIER ADVISED SUBJ TO BE A MBR NATHAN GREGORY SILVERMASTER-ESPIONAGE GRP, WHICH CONSISTED OF GOVT OFFICIALS WHO WERE FURNISHING INFO FROM GOV FILES TO AGENTS SOV UNION.

2 037 814

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

1976810

COE, VIRGINIUS
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

100-300-003
DBA -70905
15 APR 64
P6

PAZR

CIT ?
OCC ?

GEORGE HENRY JAFFIN, ON APR 17, 53 WAS INTERVIEWED CONCERNING ASSOCIATION WITH SUBJ, ADVISED THAT HE AND SUBJ EMPLOYED DIFFERENT FIELDS ON OCCASION DID SIT IN DISCUSSIONS THEORETICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS SUBJ TOOK PART. SUBJ IMPRESSED JAFFIN OVER-BEARING, POMPOUS INDIVIDUAL THOUGHT POSSESSED SUPERIOR QUALITIES.

*

1 976 810

000000 0000000000000
11 11 11111111 1111 1
2 22222222222222222222
33333333333333333333333
44444444444444444444
5555555555555555555555
6666666666666666666 666
7777 77777777777 7777
88888888888888 8888 88
999999 9999999 99999

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

SECRET

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-40)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 3. DATE
	4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 5. DATE OF INFO. / 6. EVALUATION
7. ANALYST / 8. DATE PROCESSED	9. DISSEMINATED TO / 10. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

11. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
12. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

13.

COL. VIRGINIUS FRANK
201-[illegible]
SEX M DOB ?

100-008-017
~~DBA [illegible]~~
08 AUG 62
P4

PAGE 1113440

CIT ?
OCC ?
REPORTEDLY MBR OF SOV ESPIONAGE GROUP WHICH WAS HEADED BY NATHAN GREGORY SILVERMASTER AND WAS ACTIVE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. IN EARLY 40'S.

1 113 440

14. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201 169 934

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

3 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Charles Joseph COE
John [illegible]
George Shaw WHEELER
Charles Oscar JUDGE

1. The following report was received from a source of unknown reliability.

"An American with the name of (first name unknown) COE arrived in Prague in August and stayed there until September 1961 ostensibly as a tourist. He had his hotel room booked beforehand by the Party headquarters. (He lived at the new hotel "International.")

"During his stay there he had several conferences with the Communist Americans resident in Prague, George S. WHEELER and a [illegible]. COE is reportedly a fattish man in the fifties with dark hair and rather smallish (about 165 cm.).

"Regarding the recent U.S. defector to the CSR, Professor Charles JUDGE, who came to Prague with wife and child, everything was reportedly prepared before his arrival and his hotel room had been booked. His son, Larry, had a Czech tutor after his arrival."

2. The COE referred to above is presumably identical with Charles Joseph COE, the subject of your memorandum of August 21, 1961 from the Baltimore Field Office. George S. WHEELER is presumably identical with a George S. WHEELER born May 22, 1908 in Tacoma, Washington. [illegible] may be identical with John [illegible] born June 28, 1901, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Professor Charles JUDGE is presumably identical with the subject of your memorandum of November 13, 1961 captioned Charles Oscar JUDGE, Josephine JUDGE, nee: [illegible].

CSCI-3/769,713
Based upon: IR 97178
IC/Sec JJMdr/jlb

Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - FI/D
1 - WE/C
1 - CI/SIG
1 - CI/LS
1 - CI/R&A
1 - IC/Sec
1 - IC/Rpts
4 - RI
(201-810)
(201-169934)
(201-216906)
(201-219559)

Original file in 201-810

SECRET

201-169934
3 May 1962

14-00000

26 Jan 1962

Charles Joseph Coe

TO: [illegible]

FROM: [illegible], SR. Evaluator,
CS Research & Evaluation Section,
[illegible] ext. [illegible]

I have been informed by a source which may be considered reliable that an American of the name /fnu/ COE who arrived in Prague in August and stayed there until September 1961, ostensibly as a tourist, had his hotel room booked beforehand by the Party headquarters /he lived in the new hotel "International"/.

During his stay there he had several conferences with the Communist Americans resident in Prague, George S. WHEELER and /fnu/ [illegible]. COE is reportedly a fattish man in the fifties with dark hair and rather smallish /about 165 cm/.

Regarding the recent U.S. defector to CSSR, Prof. Charles JUNGE, who came to Prague with wife and child, everything was reportedly prepared before his arrival. His son Larry had a Czech tutor after arrival and the hotel room had been booked.

FILE IN 201-169934

ORIGINAL FILED IN 201-310966

26 Jan 62

14-00000

6/30/64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
	2. RI FILE NO.		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

COE Virginius, Frank

VT.

Virinius COE, FRANK
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

201-083341
DBD -08302
08 FEB 60
FBI

CIT ?
OCC ?
AT JOHN HOPKINS UNIV 28-29 ACQUAINTANCE
OF FRANK NEWTON TRAGER STU 28-30

See GI [illegible]

2-6

Frank
Coe

R 7104120583

FILE IN 201-169934

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

PAX

AIJARFPMA

COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK
DOB ?

201-251919
DBF -23226
06 MAY 59
P 8

PAZR

CIT ?
201-169934*

ELIZABETH T. BENTLEY, TESTIFIED IN
JULY '48, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE
UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, THAT FRANK COE
WAS A MEMBER OF A SOVIET ESPIONAGE GROUP
WHICH WAS HEADED BY NATHAN GREGORY SILVER-
MASTER AND WHICH WAS ACTIVE IN WASH.,D.C.
IN THE EARLY 1940'S. ACQUAINTANCE OF
MILTON HARRY FRIEDMAN /201-251919/

19. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

SECRET

FORM 10-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-46)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM: RI/ RI/AN

DOCUMENT NUMBER FCTA-22190

DOCUMENT DATE 24 Feb. 1959

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [illegible]			9 MAR 1959	Sm
2.				
3. Trmi	Austin	1959		
4.				
5. Chi/ops Supp		MAR 1959	17 MAR 17 Mar	R
6.				
7. 18 MAR 1959 FE-CH-PP			18 Mar	
8.				
9. Ops/Sig		18 MAR 1959	20 MAR 1959	eto
10.				
11.				
12. FE/Chi				
13.				
14. RI/FI	1400L			

COMMENTS

NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files at the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.

RECORD COPY

PUNCHED
30 NOV

[illegible] in RI/AN

FILE TITLE
C E FRANK

FILE NUMBER
201- 169934

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT
0321
INDEX

DATE PROCESSED 24 Feb 59

FORM NO. 610a
1 OCT. 55

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
FCTA-22190

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO Chief, FE

INFO Attn Chief, KUSODA

FROM Chief of Station, Taipei EES | Rfn

DATE 24 FEB 1959

SUBJECT PJDCST

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED None, for information only

REFERENCE(S)

1. The Chinese Communists publish in Peking, China, a magazine named China Reconstructs. This publication parallels other Communist publications in its attacks on the United States, Imperialism, etc.

2. Iden, who, it is believed, was of previous interest to KUSODA had written for this magazine a highly laudatory article on the industrial and agricultural progress made by the Chinese Communists during the preceding year. Iden reportedly visited the Mainland during the fall of 1958 and may still be in that area.

3. The January 1959 issue of China Reconstructs carries the article by Iden.

Robert K Hinchrick
Robert K. HINCHERICK

Enclosures:

1. Iden, UNDER SEPARATE COVER

20 February 1959

Distribution:

2 - CFE, w/encls as stated
2 - C/KUSODA, w/encls as stated - 200's - To OS

24 Feb 59
201-114934

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

Separat wer Encl #1 to PCIA-22190

Dated: ____________________

IDEN - Frank Coe, American economist, formerly Secretary of the International Monetary Fund and Director of International Finance, U.S. Treasury Department.

CS COPY

201-169934

SECRET ~~NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL~~

The following information is SECRET:

COE, Virginius Frank
Traveled to China
c 1958

Formerly Secretary of the International Monetary Fund and Director of International Finance, U. S. Treasury Department, Virginius Frank COE is reported to be currently employed as an economist in the Chinese Communist State apparatus. It will be recalled that in 1948 Elizabeth ~~Terrill~~ BENTLEY, an admitted former Soviet espionage agent, testified before the Committee on Un-American Activities ~~Authorities~~, United States House of Representatives, that Frank COE was a member of a Soviet espionage group headed by Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER, which was active in Washington, D. C., in the early 1940's. According to our records, COE and his wife, Ruth Evans COE, are residing in Peking, China, at the present time. Prior to the fall of 1958, the COEs ~~was~~ resided in New York City.

SECRET ~~NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL~~

201-169934

14-00000

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 JUNE 1953

[illegible]
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 34824

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: CR REP MEXICO CITY

ROUTINE

ACTION: WH 4

2006Z 19 JUNE 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/PI 2 Coe, Frank-

MEXI 568

Saly. " "

TO: DIR

CITE: SMEXI

RE: MEXI 562 (IN 32856)

NO INDICATION SUBJECT ARRIVED HERE BY AIR. SOURCES AND CONTACTS HAVE NO INFO REGARDING VISIT. BELIEVED POSSIBLE SUBJECT DID NOT VISIT MEXICO CITY.

END OF MESSAGE

201-169934

~~201-149[illegible]~~ 3

ABSTRACT X INDEX

DATE 26 JUN 1953

[illegible]
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 7

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 JUNE 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 32856

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP MEXICO CITY

ROUTINE

ACTION: WH 4

1833Z 12 JUNE 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

Coe, Frank

MEXI 562

TO: DIR

CITE: SMEXI

RE: DIR 97664 (OUT 67001) on subject

Subj! NO INFO NOW AVAILABLE. INVESTIGATION UNDERWAY.

END OF MESSAGE

201-169934

ABSTRACT X INDEX

DATE 26 JUN 1953

COPY NO.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

FORM NO. 35-82
JULY 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

9 JUNE 1953

OUT 67001

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: CHIEF OF MISSION, MEXICO (MEXI)

R. CONNALLY WH 455

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

CONF: WH 4

20387 10 JUN 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

Coe, Frank

DIR 07664

TO: SMEXI Subj; CITE: DIR

CABLE ALL AVAILABLE INFO RE ACTIVITIES OF FRANK COE, FORMER SECRETARY OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WHILE IN MEXICO. SEE AP DISPATCH DATELINED WASHINGTON 8 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

201-169934

~~201-[illegible]~~

RESTRICT [illegible]

DATE 26 JUN 53

J. C. King
J. C. KING

O. H. DORNFLINGER

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

4 THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 4, 1953

Coe Calls Charges 'Outrageous, False'

By Herbert Foster
United Press Reporter

V. Frank Coe, former secretary of the International Monetary Fund, yesterday denounced as "outrageous and false" charges that he was a fugitive and once tried to regulate Austrian currency valuations to favor the Communists.

FRANK COE

He read his statement to reporters after secret questioning by the Senate Permanent Investigating Subcommittee. Acting Chairman Karl E. Mundt (R-S.Dak.) said Coe refused to say under oath whether he is a Red.

Apparently there was little testimony concerning charges by two former United States officials in Austria that Coe tried in 1949 to block negotiations to devalue the Austrian shilling because Communist Czechoslovakia had objected.

Mundt gave Coe until Friday to go over his records. At that time, he will be questioned in private again before testifying in public.

Coe told reporters the subcommittee had released "two serious allegations concerning me . . . that I was a fugitive, and that I in some manner had attempted, in concert with the Russians or Czechs in 1949, to have the Austrian currency devalued in a way desired by those governments.

"Those allegations are outrageous and false," he said.

Mundt said Coe testified that he is not a spy now nor was he one last December 2. But he said the witness refused to say whether he had been a spy on December 1, when he was questioned by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Last Friday, Mundt announced that the subcommittee was unable to locate Coe and was asking the Attorney General to search for him.

The 46-year-old Coe said he has been out of work since his forced resignation from the Monetary Fund last December and had traveled in Canada, Cuba, the Bahamas and Mexico looking for a job. He would not say why his wife did not know his whereabouts.

201-169934

Wash Post 6 June 1953

McCarthy Suggests Borders Of Nation Be Closed to Coe

By G. Milton Kelly
Associated Press Reporter

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) suggested yesterday that the State Department "immediately close the borders" to Frank Coe, saying the former secretary of the International Monetary Fund should not be allowed to leave the country.

"I think he is an extremely dangerous man," McCarthy said after Coe, a former Federal financial expert, refused to say whether he is a Communist or was a Communist spy while holding his $20,000-a-year job with the Monetary Fund.

Coe protested what he called McCarthy's "command" to the State Department.

McCarthy told him he had not commanded the State Department to do anything but had suggested that Coe be forbidden to leave the country.

The exchange came at a hearing by McCarthy's Senate Investigations subcommittee.

Coe was called before a televised public hearing of the subcommittee to answer testimony that in 1949 he had tried to block a revaluation of the Austrian currency opposed by Communist Czechoslovakia.

He came with a lengthy prepared statement in which he denied he had a hand in any such intrigue.

The currency matter was scarcely mentioned, however, as the Senate investigators went over his record and fired questions at him about Communist Party membership and espionage.

McCarthy asked Coe if he had contacted any member of the Russian secret police on a recent trip to Mexico.

Coe replied that he saw a great many people in Mexico, but so far as he knew none was a member of the Soviet secret police.



Associated Press Photo

FRANK COE
... in exchange with McCarthy

Asked if he had met with any members of the Communist Party in Mexico, Coe refused to answer. He said that to do so might tend to incriminate him.

Were any of the persons he met there members of an espionage ring? McCarthy asked.

Again Coe replied that so far as he knew none was.

It was at that point that McCarthy suggested to L. M. Drury, a State Department security officer present as an observer, that the borders of the United States immediately be closed to Coe.

Coe, 46, is a witness McCarthy's group has been trying to get before it for a long time.

Coe, who showed up Wednesday, denied he was a fugitive. He said he had been looking into employment possibilities in Mexico, Cuba and elsewhere. He resigned his well-paid job with the Monetary Fund last December 2 after refusing to tell another Senate group whether he was a Communist.

Coe testified he is "not engaged in espionage now" and was not last December 2. But he refused, on grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate him, to say whether he was so engaged on December 1.

201-1699 3y

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

COE, V. FRANK
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

100-004-020/32
DFB -08099 /04
12 MAR 51
SER 2

1878187

PAZR

RE CONTACTS AND ASSOCIATES OF IRVINA KAPLAN. WAS NAMED BY ELIZABETH TERRILL BENTLEY AS HAVING BEEN ENGAGED IN SOV ESPIONAGE IN EARLY 40'S.

```
000000_00000000000000000
11111_11111111_111_11
22_2222222222222222222
333333333333333333333333
4444444444444444444444
555555555555555555555555
6_66666666666666666666
7777_777777777777_777_
88888888888888888_8_8_8
999999_9999999999999999
```

1 878 187

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

WHITTAKER CHAMBERS

Washington Post Article dtd 30 Nov. 1949
"HISS TRIAL NOTE HINTS REDS GOT SHIP PLANS"

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 201 ~~100~~ 466 4 16 6

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE 30 Nov. 1949

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

X 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE COE, Virginius Frank

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Datelined: New York, Nov. 29, (AP).

"A cryptic note hinting that the Russians obtained plans for two prewar American superbattleships was read today at an explosive session of Alger HISS' perjury trial.

"The Government also bared secret reports intended to show how a fantastic Soviet underground web was woven deep into Washington in the early New Deal days to influence United States Government Policy.

"Both disclosures came in the form of reports by Government officials of talks with Whittaker CHAMBERS, chief accuser of HISS and former courier for a Russian spy ring.

"The battleship note, jotted by Assistant Secretary of State Adolph BERLE in 1939, read:

'Plans for two superbattleships -- secured in 1937 -- who gave KARP -- brother-in-law of MOLOTOV -- working with Scott FERRIS got this released -- now; naval architect working on it, why; FIELD was original contact. He introduced Z to GOMPERTZ (Hedda) -- Z relationship was casual -- shall excuse? ---where is Hedda GOMPERTZ? --Z and FIELD supposed to have been both members of party.'

"The Z referred to an individual whose name was blacked out. Defense Attorney Claude B. CROSS said he did not object to the document but thought use of the name would affect the reputation of a dead man.

"MOLOTOV, former Russian Foreign Minister, now is Deputy Premier.

"A Hedda GUMPERZ MASSING is a former wife of Gerhart EISLER, who fled the U.S. last spring after being identified as the No. 1 Communist in this country.

"Mrs. MASSING has been described as a 'cooperative witness' in post-war American spy hunts.

"There was no clew to the identity of "FIELD" or the "Scott FERRIS" mentioned.

(continued)

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 109934

"CHAMBERS has testified that he approached BERLE in 1939 to warn him of Communist activities in the U.S.

"CHAMBERS has also accused HISS of feeding him State Department secrets before the war in wholesale fashion. HISS was indicted for perjury when he denied ever giving CHAMBERS state documents or even seeing him after January 1, 1937.

"HISS was tried for perjury last spring but a jury split eight for conviction and four for acquittal, and a new trial was ordered.

"The second report in the form of twin memos on the underground was full of some of the names from Franklin D. ROOSEVELT's early New Deal. The individuals were described as 'anti-Administration' at the time.

"The names came out in memos written by Raymond MURPHY, Security officer of the State Department, who made notes of two talks in 1945 and 1946 with CHAMBERS.

"The underground's purpose was said in the memos to be 'far more important and cunning' than spying.

"'.......... each member (was) to advance as high as possible in the Government to shape legislation favorable to the program of the Communist government,' read the hitherto secret reports.

"Named in the memos were: Alger HISS and his brother, Donald (HISS); Harold WARE, Lee PRESSMAN, Henry COLLINS, Charles KRAMER (KRIVITZKY), Helen WARE, Alice MENDHAM, Harry Dexter WHITE, Nathan KAPLAN, Rose WEINSTEIN, Nathan WITT, John ABT, Eleanor NELSON, Nat PERLOW, and persons identified by their last names only, as CDLER, GLASSER AND COE.

"The guiding genius of the entire underground was identified as Hungarian-born J. PETERS, a 'little dark fellow, small feet and wavy black hair.'

"Top man and founder of the 10-man Washington cells was said to be the late Harold WARE, who died in 1936, and was allegedly succeeded by Nathan WITT and later by John ABT.

"Immediately below him in order of importance, the reports charged, were Lee PRESSMAN, former general counsel of the CIO, and Alger HISS, later to become a top-level State Department aide.

"The memos said HISS' job 'was never to make converts -- his job was to mess up policy.'

"The Government aides whom CHAMBERS accused were said in the memos to have 'arranged among themselves a program committing this Government to a policy in keeping with the desires of the Communists.'

"Underground headquarters in Washington, the memos said, included 'a violin study near Dupont Circle run by Helen WARE, (and) a school on the outskirts of Washington run by Alice MENDHAM.'

"CHAMBERS was quoted as saying he entered 'the Washington picture' in 1935 and left it and the party at the end of 1937.

"'The heads of the various underground groups in Washington who met with PETERS,' the memos continued, 'were the HISSES, KRAMER (KRIVITZKY), Henry COLLINS who was either a secretary or treasurer of the group; John ABT, Lee PRESSMAN, Nat PERLOW and Nat WITT.

"'These men met regularly at special meetings, with the exception of Donald HISS, who did not have an organization. They headed parallel organizations......'

"The memos alleged there were other underground Communist groups in Washington at the time, 'but this was the elite policy-making, top-level group.'

"'It was not a spy ring,' read the records, 'but one far more important and cunning because its members helped to shape policy in their departments.'

"The memos described Henry COLLINS, as an employee of the forestry division of the Agriculture Department at the time and said he took the lead in deliverying Government documents to CHAMBERS.

"In testimony after the memos were read, CHAMBERS said sailors or stewards of the North German Lloyd Line usually took Government secrets to Europe for the ring."

201-169934

SECURITY INFORMATION

TO: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank COE, was., Espionage - R

1. Reference is made to a communication from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated 17 April 1953, subject "Virginius Frank COE, was., Espionage - R", your reference 100-361447.

2. This Agency is attempting to comply with your request that Mr. O. J. McDIARMID, presently employed by the Mutual Security Agency in Manila, Philippines, be interviewed concerning the activities of subject. The Bureau will be notified immediately the Bureau's request has been fulfilled.

CS DB 6372

FE/3
BJHouston/sg
DFB-26027 (100-4-20-13-4)

SECRE

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

REPUNCH

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION
DATE: 24-3-59
ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☒ CLOSE ☐
FROM: RID/201
ROOM NO.: 1019 L
TELEPHONE: 2677

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE ☐ NONSENSITIVE ☐
201 NO. 1. 169934
SOURCE DOCUMENT: DBF - 20409

NAME (Last) COE (First) VIRGINIUS (Middle) FRANK (Title)
SEX 3.

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)
V	COE	FRANK		

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4. YES ☐ NO ☐
BIRTH DATE 5. D — M — Y —
COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6. —
CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7. —
OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.
OCCUPATION/POSITION: 11/58 attending Peking University studying Chinese language
OCC/POS. CODE 9. STU

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM:
PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. CHIN
ACTION DESK 11. FE/CHIC
SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.
THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS: CIT: ?
Connected with the Two Continent Commodity corporation, 246 Fifth Ave. New York City.

VERIFIED

PUNCHED

~~PUNCHED~~

CS COPY

201- 169934

PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐
RESTRICTED FILE: YES ☐ NO ☐
SIGNATURE: Lira

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 9 May 57	ACTION: X OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM Lee Everitt RI/CO per FE/3	ROOM NO. 2021 L	TELEPHONE 2231

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE ☐ NONSENSITIVE ☐

201 NO. 169934

1. SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) COE (First) Virginius (Middle) Frank (Title)

SEX 3. ☐ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2. (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

RECORD

PHOTO 4. ☐ YES ☐ NO

BIRTH DATE 5. D M Y

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.

OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC. POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.

ACTION DESK 11. FE/3

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS:

Formerly filed in 100-4-20-13

201- 169934

PERMANENT CHARGE: ☐ YES X NO

RESTRICTED FILE: ☐ YES X NO

SIGNATURE

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
Oct. 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5
2 SECRET
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED MR. NAPOLI

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT WH TIME 2222 BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C8, SOD 6, DO4, DO/H3, CI/OPS, CI/CA, CCS 3, CA 2, CA/19, FI, FI/SPG

30 Aug 65 IN 4 2 2 5 1

S E C R E T 313126Z

16-10 16-26

IMMEDIATE [SDOM] INFO IMMEDIATE DIR [SNDR] CITE WAVE 5413

31 AUG 1965

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

21-10

REF [SDOM] 6746 (IN 42256)*

File

1. PLANE PROCUREMENT PROBLEM DIFFICULT DUE SHORT DEADLINE BUT HAVE STARTED TRY WORK OUT SOLUTION. TRYING ARRANGE CHARTER IN AMCORE-2 NAME DC-3 TYPE AIRCRAFT. WAVE AIR OFFICER USING CLEARED CONTACT WITH [KUBARK PROPRIETARY] AS FRONT IN TRYING ARRANGE CHARTER WITH OTHER AIR SERVICE SUCH AS MACKEY AIRLINES. CLEARED CONTACT WOULD TELL SUPPLIER THAT AMCORE-2 HEAD OF GROUP TRAVELLING NEWSMEN STRANDED SDOM THRU PLANE FAILURE, ADD AMCORE-2 KNOWN TO HIM AS RELIABLE PERSON AND HE WILLING VOUCH FOR AMCORE-2 FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND IF NECESSARY TO ADVANCE CHARTER PRICE. CONTACT WOULD TELL SUPPLIER AMCORE-2 WILL ARRANGE NECESSARY LANDING, REFUELLING CLEARANCES AT SDOM COMMERCIAL AIRPORT.

24

91

2. IF SUCCESSFUL IN ARRANGING CHARTER, MAY WISH FOR COVER REASONS THAT AMCORE-2 SEND CABLE (PHONE NOT NECESSARY AND MIGHT CONFUSE SITUATION) TO SUPPLIER CONFIRMING REQUEST FOR CHARTER FLIGHT. WILL ADVISE LATER RE DETAILS.

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4/PJ

3. IN ORDER TRY ADD COVER AT SDOM END SUGGEST AMCORE-2 INDICATE TO HIS PARTY THAT IMBERT PROVIDING HIM WITH FUNDS TO CHARTER REPLACEMENT PLANE TO GET GROUP BACK TO MIAMI. 16-10 [SDCM] CAN THE PASS FUNDS TO AMCORE-2. POSSIBLY 16-10 [SDCM] COULD GET IMBERT TO BACKSTOP STORY HE GAVE MONEY TO AMCORE-2.

SECRET

CFN 5413 6745 AMCORE-2 DC-3 24 [KUBARK] MACKEY AIRLINES -2 THRU -2 -2 -2 -2 NOT NECESSARY RE -2 IMBERT MIAMI -2 IMBERT -2

BT

* PRIVATE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE OBTAINED FOR TRIP.

SECRET

3/01

OUTGOING MESSAGE

31-1

PAGE 1 OF 1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

STAFF

CONF: C/LA/0 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, C/EUR6 C/CI/OP2

1423592

DIRECTOR

656936

DISSEM BY: 50.

15-20 15-13

TO: [FRANKFURT] INFO [BONN] Y

02 02 02

RYBAT [AKULE] [VWMAGNA] [CABELL] Y

REF: DIRECTOR 654470 Y

02

1. NEXT [VW]MAGNA-1 CALL, IN ADDITION REF PLEASE ALSO ASK: Y

A. DOES SHE KNOW WHEN THE FAMILY OF ENRIQUE PLANS TO DO THE THING OF CONTE? Y

B. IF SHE DOES NOT KNOW, ASK IF SHE GOT IMPRESSION FROM HER FRIEND THAT IT WAS TO BE DONE NOW/SOON OR LATER. Y

2. FILE: [56-6-42/3.] E2, IMPDET.#

23

this refers to
Cuban plan to expose
Luis CONTE Aguero
as CIA agent.
It's a [VW]TOGA op
02

1.	C/COG	
2.	DC/COG	
3.	ER	
4.	[illegible]	
5.	[illegible]	V
6.	[illegible]	
7.	[illegible]	I
8.	O/[illegible]	
9.	D/LEAF	

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1975
ORIG: [LOUIS/DE SANTI/LJ] 03
UNIT: DC/LA/SOD
EXT: 8061

C/DDLA/COG

[Lawan] 03
DC/EUR/CS
RELEASING OFFICER

W Phelps
C/EUR/G
COORDINATING OFFICERS

03
C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 10087

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING

ACTION		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
INTEL/TYPIC - AMCORE 2 Production
Deployment Sketch of Battalion Defensive Positions

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. On 16 August 1963 AMCORE-2 delivered to his Case Officer the attached document which was obtained through the mails from Agent 1995, also identified as Modesto VENTOSO Mendez. 05 The letter was postmarked 15 April 1963.

2. The sketch is described as showing a defensive position for a battalion size force; three companies are on the line, and the fourth company is in reserve.

END OF DISPATCH

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Attachment: H/W
Sketch

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SAS, w/att. h/w

201-278130

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE TYPED 24 AUG 63	DATE DISPATCHED AUG 29 1963
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-10362	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-126-3-20/4	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

1/6R

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC
Letters Received by AMCORE-2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: As stated below

REF: UFGT 3613, 3 January 1963

1. Headquarters appreciates receiving the enclosures to UFGT 2737 and the reference. The usefulness of this material, however, could be enhanced considerably if AMCORE-2's source were guided as to the items to be diverted. Also, headquarters envisions an excellent possibility for placing or exchanging items, were it possible to communicate with AMCORE-2's source. Could this be achieved, a profitable relationship with the source might develop, gradually dropping AMCORE-2 out of the picture.

2. JMWAVE is requested to try to get the identity of AMCORE-2's source and/or to consider ways to establish contact.

END OF DISPATCH

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE
1 - SAS/PA-PROP
1 - SAS/[illegible]
1 - C/SAS

201-278130

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
21 Feb 63	27 FEB 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW 1661

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-278130

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SAS/PA-PROP 03	B. McMaster	tw	7824

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SAS/PA-PROP		Seymour R. Bolten
SAS/FI		[illegible] 03

RELEASING

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
		DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. C/COG				discussed with DC/CA & Hector. R
2. DC/COG			R	
3. COPS/COG				
4.				
5.				Letter to Mrs. Cuesta did not go out. — I'll hold this on desk.
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				C. Hughes CB/COG/4
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

16 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/LA/COG

SUBJECT : Letter from Mrs. Lourdes CUESTA, Ex-wife of Antonio CUESTA Valle, Formerly of Interest to JMWAVE Station

1. Lourdes CUESTA, ex-wife of Antonio CUESTA Valle, currently imprisoned in Cuba, wrote to the Director of CIA on 4 August 1975. She requested that the Agency "give her some kind of verification that her ex-husband was not connected nor the CIA had any knowledge that he was preparing the raids mentioned in Attempts No. 21 and 22" cited in a 31 July 1975 Miami Herald newspaper article following Senator McGovern's recent trip to visit Fidel CASTRO.

2. A carefully worded reply was prepared for signature by an assistant to the DCI; however, per instruction of the DC/LAD (from the DDO) it was requested that the letter not be sent, but rather that a DCD representative in Miami handle the matter with Mrs. CUESTA personally.

3. A DCD representative in Miami contacted Mrs. CUESTA and told her that the Agency preferred that the matter be handled with a personal touch rather than by letter. Mrs. CUESTA did not accept this and has subsequently phoned the DCD representative several times requesting a written reply. Mrs. CUESTA said that she plans to send a copy of the reply to Fidel CASTRO and one to Senator McGovern. According to the DCD representative, Mrs. CUESTA (a naturalized U.S. citizen of Spanish birth) works for a lawyer (name unknown) and perhaps is following legal counsel.

4. On 11 September 1975 the AC/LA/COG phoned the DC/LAD and advised him of the foregoing. Following the conversation it was decided that we would check out applicable maritime records in Archives, in addition to CUESTA's 201 file, and if we still uncovered no evidence that CUESTA was involved with CIA in the cited infiltration operations, draft a very brief letter of acknowledgement to Mrs. CUESTA and resubmit it for approval.

SECRET

5. Antonio CUESTA came to the U.S. from Cuba on 31 May 1960 as a refugee. According to his 201 file, he has had the following U.S. Government association:

Fbi [illegible]

a\. As of February 1961 he was cited as a crewman aboard the M/V TEJANA. A POA was requested on 15 March 1961 for his use in PM maritime ops as a crewman on the vessel TEJANA under Project JMATE. Due to cessation of JMATE activities, processing of the clearance was suspended on 1 May 1961 until new interest was apparent. JMWAVE Station advised the Army of CIA operational interest in CUESTA on 26 May 1962. JMWAVE advised Headquarters on 5 June 1962 that CUESTA was not then being used and requested the basis of other Agency interest. There is no indication in pertinent maritime files or his 201 file that he was ever used on an operational mission by CIA.

6(1)(B)

b\. ISR records show that CUESTA was registered as an Army source on 22 May 1962. There is no indication that he was dropped; however, it is recorded that he was reinstated on 12 August 1965. He was dropped again on 10 May 1966, without prejudice. There is no further record of Army association. The specifics of his association with the Army are unknown to the Agency. not subject to control

6. From the time he came to the U.S. in 1960 until he was arrested by the Cuban Government, CUESTA was associated with the MRR, UR, Alpha 66 and Commando L organizations. The hit and run raids made by these groups were well-known to all government agencies and, in fact, openly known in Miami because of the propensity of the Cubans to talk. There were a number of discussions at the highest level (President) concerning what should be done about such raids. They were not sponsored by or connected with the U.S. Government. Two of these unauthorized raids are the ones referred to (attempts 21 and 22) in the article attached to Mrs. CUESTA's letter.

7. Mrs. CUESTA was born 21 May 1936 in Madrid, Spain. As of 30 March 1963 she was married to Antonio CUESTA, had one small son, and reportedly resided with Antonio in Miami, Florida. She currently refers to him as her ex-husband, but particulars of a separation or divorce are unknown. She is also known as Mrs. Maria Viza CUESTA, Maria Luisa Viza Blanco and Mrs. Vincente CUESTA. Following are items of interest:

a\. Antonio CUESTA told the FBI that she lived with him in Miami, Florida as of 30 March 1963.

b. Mrs. CUESTA told the FBI in 1969 that she arrived in the U.S. 9 June 1963 at Miami, Florida.

c. ACSI advised JMWAVE Station in November 1966 that she had been in contact (date unknown) with Chafik Homero SAKER Zenni of the New York Cuba UN Mission. The FBI was advised of this and monitored her activities. [SAKER is a known long-time DGI officer PNG'd from the U.S. in 67/68 for support to Black Panther and SDS activities. He was DGI Chief of Center in Mexico City from 70-73, one of the founding fathers of the DGI and the DGI expert on illegal operations against the U.S.]

d. Mrs. CUESTA legally travelled to Cuba from Miami, via Mexico City, in April 1967 for a two week visit with her husband. In June 1967 the FBI advised JMWAVE Station that she was recruited by the CUIS while in Cuba and to hold this knowledge to a minimum because they intended to operate her as a double agent. She said the pitch was made on behalf of the DSE and would benefit both her and her husband. She was told if she successfully reported on anti-Castro activities in Miami, especially Commando L activities, for a period of six months, they would release her husband from custody and after three years of reporting permit him to leave Cuba. Her contact in the U.S. was to be Chafik Homero SAKER Zenni.

e. Mrs. CUESTA travelled to Cuba from Miami via Mexico City again on 9 February 1968 taking nine suitcases. She called Havana from Mexico City and asked to be met at the airport in Havana by two cars because of the excess baggage. While in Cuba she saw her husband several times. She returned to Mexico City on 4 March 1968.

8. This case was coordinated with the FBI representative, via Ops Liaison, on 12 September who asked that we hold up a response to her letter until he could check out the status of the case. It was recognized that Mrs. CUESTA could be acting in behalf of the DGI. On 16 September the FBI representative advised that FBI operational interest in Mrs. CUESTA was terminated circa December 1974 and that it would not be necessary for us to coordinate our response to Mrs. CUESTA's letter with the Bureau. Details of the FBI operational handling of Mrs. CUESTA are unknown. The FBI representative

advised that Mrs. CUESTA had inquired what it would cost to obtain documents in the FBI files on her under the FOIA.

9. Attempts are being made to obtain the name of the attorney for whom Mrs. CUESTA works.

10. Attached is a suggested reply to Mrs. CUESTA, based on the facts in para 5 a, for approval.

Chris Hopkins

Chris Hopkins
LA/COG/CIOS

Filed: 201-281313 (Antonio CUESTA)
201-335014 (SAKER)
201-821216 (Lourdes CUESTA)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 025231

CIA LETTERHEAD

Suggested reply to Mrs. CUESTA's letter of 4 August 1975

Mrs. Lourdes Cuesta
2155 S.W. 5th Street
Miami, Florida 33135

Dear Mrs. Cuesta:

This is in reply to your letter of 4 August 1975 and subsequent conversations with one of our ~~Miami, Florida~~ representatives.

~~In response to your inquiry,~~ We wish to advise that your ex-husbands alleged activities, cited as Attempts No. 21 and 22 in the newspaper article enclosed with your letter, were in no way sponsored by or associated with this Agency. Concerning prior knowledge of such activities, we can only say that anticipated activities of some of the independent exile groups often became public knowledge because of discussion within the exile community of such activities.

Sincerely,

Assistant to the Director

```
L      [illegible]
L      [illegible]
L      [illegible] I  CAE OF FOUNDERS 6 [illegible]-PRESIDENT [illegible] IN [illegible] WAS UNK
L      [illegible] M  [illegible] NEW YORK
L      [illegible] M  CUBA EMB
L      62A01 M  UK                         LONDON             62
L      62A01 Q  PCS
L      64A01 M  CAN                                           APR 64
L      64A01 Q  EXPECTED TO ARRIVE CAN APR 64
L      64A02 M  MEX                        MEXICO CITY        64
L      64A02 Q  KNOWN TO BE IN MEX CITY AS OF 1[illegible] DEC, DEPARTED FOR HAVA 21
L      64A03 M  MEX DF                     MEXICO CITY        DEC 6.
L      64A03 Q  TEMP ON VISIT TO SEE AGENT
L      64A04 M  CUBAN EMBASSY                                 MAR 64
L      64A04 M  CAN
L      64A04 Q  TDY
L      64A05 M  69 AND 51ST AVES AND 78 AND 80TH STS LARGAZABAL
L      64A05 M  CUBA HAVANA                HAVANA MARIANAO    APR 64
L      64A05 Q  OFFICE MAIN DGI HDQS
L      64A06 M  MEX                        MEXICO CITY        23 MAR 64
L      64A06 Q  TRAV MEX FM HAV 21-23 MAR 64 BY PLANE ECCA 465 ENROUTE CAN
L      65A01 M  CUBA                                          65
L      65A02 M  UNITED NATIONS                                               16 OCT 67
L      65A02 M  USA NEW YORK               NEW YORK           65

28/08/75      PAGE     1944      SECRET/NOFORN      116781   E2 IMPDET CL BY 063723
```

```
                                SECRET/NOFORN
116781                          CONT.
L      65A02 Q  DEPORTED PNG
L      68A01 M  CUBA                                          68
L      69A01 M  CUBA                                          69
L      70A01 M  MAZATLAN CONDESA                                             66
L      70A01 M  MEX                        MEXICO CITY        11 DEC 70      27 AUG 73
L      70A01 Q  PCS
L      73A01 M  CUBA HAVANA                HAVANA             27 AUG 73      OPEN
L      62A02 R  CID COLON                  DIMAS                             115501
L      62A02 S  UK                         LONDON             CA JUL 62
L      62A02 T  COLLEAGUE
L      62A02 U  ODENVY                     DBA-18727                         21 JUL 62
L      64A08 R  DOMENECH GADEA             CAMILO                            114207
L      64A08 S  MEX                        MEXICO CITY        18 DEC 64
L      64A08 T  ASSOCIATE-SPENT AFTERNOON WITH SAKER AT CUBAN EMB AND DOMEN
L      64A08 U  LIEMBRACES                 MEXI-2067 IN-50724                30 DEC 64
L      64A09 R  LNU                        LUCIO                             116
L      64A09 S  CUBA HAVANA                HAVANA             APR 64
L      64A09 T  SUPERIOR PEREZ WORKS FOR LUCIO ILLEGAL DEPT
L      64A09 U  AMMUG-1                    CSCI 3/781,763     19-6-102/4     11 JUN 64
L      73A02 R  SANTIESTABAN               ROBERTO LAZARO     CASANOVA       115249
L      73A02 S  MEX                        MEXICO CITY        20 JUL 73
L      73A02 T  SAKER ACCOMPANIED SANTIESTEBAN MEX CUBA
L      73A02 U                             HMMA 43312                        13 AUG 73
L      00A01 U  ODENVY                     DBA-18727                         21 JUL 62
L      00A03 U  AMMUG-1                    CS311/00115-64                    8 JUL 64
L      00A05 U                             HMMA 27312                        30 SEP 65
L      00A06 U  SLIGOS                     OTA 2947                          03 FEB 71
L      00A06 W  P 925
L      00A07 U  SLIGOS                     OTA 2947                          03 FEB 71
L      00A08 U  SLIGOS                     OTA 2947                          03 FEB 71
L      00A09 U  SLIGOS                     OTA 2947                          03 FEB 71
L      00A10 U  SLIGOS                     OTA 2947                          03 FEB 71
L      62A01 U                             OCOW-4646                         17 APR 64
L      64A01 U  VARIOUS
L      64A02 U  LIEMBRACES                 MEXI-2067 IN-50724                30 DEC 64
L      64A03 U  AMSPICE-1                  WAVE-6967 IN-56945                10 JAN 65
L      64A04 U  PASSPORT
L      64A04 W  TSD PASSPORT MACHINE RUN AUG 65
L      64A05 U  AMMUG-1                    CS 311/00115-64
L      64A05 W  FORMER CUBAN IS OFFICER SERVED W CUBAN IS UNTIL APR 64
L      64A06 U  AMMUG-1                    CSCI 3/781,763     19-6-102/4     11 JUN 64
L      64A06 W  FORMER CUIS OFFICER SERVED W CUBANIS UNTIL APR 64
L      64A07 U  AMMUG-1                    CSCI 3/781,763     19-6-102/4     11 JUN 64
L      64A07 W  FORMER CUIS OFFICER SERVED W CUIS UNTIL APR 64
L      65A01 U                             [illegible]-95650  201-335016     13 JAN 35
L      65A02 U                             HMMA 26340                        11 JUN 65
L      65A02 W  PASSPORT                   [illegible]                       [illegible]
```

```
[illegible]
L    [illegible]                         [illegible]       ZENNI         1
L    00A03 C  CUBA HAVANA                HAVANA            11 MAR 36     M
L    00A03 D  CUBA
L    00A03 O  WIFE DORA RIVERA HERNANDEZ 06 JAN 38
L    00A02 B  ROLO                                                       A
L    00A03 B  [illegible]                ROLO                            A
L    64A05 B  PEREZ                      SANTIAGO                        A
L    65A02 B  ZAKER                      HOMERO            ZENNI         V
L    69A01 B  MARTINEZ                   ROLO                            A
L  A 99A01 B  SAKER                      CHAFIK HOMERO     ZENNI         1
L    00A06 D                             D0034619
L    64A01 C  CUBA HAVANA                HAVANA            11 MAR 36     M
L    64A04 D  CUBA                       D0006168          HAVANA        13 MAR 64
L    65A01 C  CUBA                                         04 MAY 37
L    65A02 D                             D00065278         HAVANA
L    70A01 D                             D000[illegible]968
L  A 99A01 C  CUBA HAVANA                HAVANA            11 MAR 36     M
L  A 99A01 D  CUBA
L    00A06 E  BLA/BK/STRAIGHT
L    64A06 E                             MEDIUM/S/10       160
L    00A06 E  BRO
L    64A06 F  UNK/BK                     CAUCASIAN
L    00A06 I   SCAR ON RIGHT TEMPLE                                      SKIN
L    00A06 O   SON HOMERO
L    00A07 I   SON ROLANDO
L    00A07 O   SON IVAN JUAN
L    00A08 I   FATHER CHAFIK RAFOUL SAKER
L    00A08 O   MOTHER SURALIA ZENNI
L    00A09 I   SISTER MARGOT SAKER ZENNI
L    00A09 O   SISTER GLADYS SAKER ZENNI
L    00A10 I   SISTER NORMA SAKER ZENNI
L    00A10 O   SISTER FRANCISCA SAKER ZENNI
L    64A04 O                                                         MB 01 525
L    64A05 O                                                         MB 01 437

28/08/75      PAGE     1943                       116781
                     SECRET/NOFORN                          E2 IMPDET CL BY 063729
```

```
                              SECRET/NOFORN
116781                        CONT.
L    64A06 I   PROTRUDING TEETH
L    65A02 O                                                         MB 01 526
L    70A01 O                                                         MB 03 466
L  A 99A01 O   WIFE DORA RIVERA HERNANDEZ 06 JAN 38
L    00A01 G  DIPT ATTACHE
L    00A01 H  EMBASSY CUBA/LONDON
L    62A01 G  DIPT
L    62A01 H  CUBA FORN MIN
L    64A04 G  DIPT INSPECTOR CONSULATES
L    64A04 H  CUBA FORN MIN
L    68A01 G  DIPT FIRST SECRETARY 66
L    68A01 H  CHUN
L    70A01 G  DIPT FIRST SECRETARY DEC 70-AUG 73
L    70A01 H  EMBASSY CUBA MEXICO CITY
L    00A06 J  MEMBER
L    00A06 K  PCC
L    62A01 J  OFFICER
L    62A01 K  CUIS                 G-2
L    64A03 L   CASE OFFICER
L    64A05 J  OFFICER
L    64A05 K  CUIS                 DGI               ILLEGAL DEPT
L    70A01 L   DGI CHIEF OF CENTER IN MEXICO
L    00A01 X   PLAYS IMPORTANT ROLE IN EMB AND CORDOVA COORDINATES ACTS WI
L    00A02 X   CLAIMED CUIS USING EVERY AVAILABLE DOLLAR TO PAY AGENTS
L    00A02 Z   CLAIMED CARRYING OVER US DOLL 100,000 TO PAY AGENTS US AND
L    62A01 X   REPORTED G-2 MEMBER & FORMER STUDENT HAVA MILITARY ACADEMY
L    64A01 X   RECALLED HAVA SEP 62
L    64A03 X   OFFERED PAY US 4000 DOLLARS FOR INFO ON FOREIGN AGENTS INFI
L    64A03 Z   CUBA AND PLANS TO ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO DEC 64
L    64A07 X   JEWISH APPEARANCE BUT NOT OF DESCENT OR RELIGION
L    64A07 Z   SOURCE AND PEREZ MET MEXI WENT OUT FOR HAIRCUT TOGETHER
L    65A01 X   VISAS REQUESTED FM US EMB MEXICO CITY, MES. JAN 65
L    69A01 X   ONE OF FOUNDERS OF DGI-PRESENT POSITION IN DGI WAS UNK
L    00A05 H   USA NEW YORK
L    67A01 H   CUBA FMN
```

21 x 4418
Green 3124 X6

1. Charlie Murphy, DCS - Key Bldg
4 Sept had call from DCD Hq.
Lourdes Cuesta contacted DCS Miami
& said she wants written response
to her letter. DCS concerned that
she will get lawyer to make request
if we don't comply.

2. I have letter written by Len Fleury.
DC/LAD decided it should not go out.
& Did Ray W. coordinate w/ Blue and
lawyer in OGC?

3. What should we do now. Send out
letter already prepared by L.F.
or ~~send~~ another rewrite.

① Reported letter from AC/LAD and attached
Docs. left with Mary Mullan, 11 Sept 75
for decision by C/LAD.

② Advise DCD Charlie Murphy & have him
advise Josh Hemeny, Hq.

your husband has never
worked for the agency

2 O'clock

X2268

Jack
Mr Henessy

Miami Field
Office
— he said to
State
[illegible]

1 cc — Castro —
1 cc — McDaden

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

[illegible]

Chris [illegible]

☒ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

MURPHY

OF (Organization)

☒ PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. 2268

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

[illegible]

But pls call him on GREEN 3124

RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME
Owen	8/9/75	1150

STANDARD FORM 63 ☆U.S. GPO: 1972-47?-020 63-108
REVISED AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

FBI doc
7 oct 71 (Miami)
Re: antonio Cuesta Valle

FBI doc
30 Mar 71 (Miami)
Re- antonio Cuesta Valle

N. CRATT:mli
WH COG/SA
1163/1325
27 JANUARY 1971

S E C R E T

/WH-7

C/FI/AN, C/CI, C/FI-2 DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T

MAR 5 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

23 JAN 71 01 14z

CITE DIRECTOR 105957

WH/MIAMI

R.O. unlcea

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMECRU AMDENIM

REF: WH/MIAMI-0125 (IN-248374)

1. SUGGEST LNERGO BE ADVISED JKLANCE HAS NO PRESENT OR FUTURE OPERATIONAL INTEREST AMDENIM-14 AND CAN NEITHER INFLUENCE NOR ASSIST ANY EFFORT OBTAIN RANSOM TO EFFECT RELEASE. ANY PROPAGANDA VALUE RESULTING FROM RELEASE CONSIDERED HIGHLY UNLIKELY. LNERGO CERTAINLY AWARE SEVERAL FORMER PRISONERS OF EQUAL STATURE RANSOMED BY FAMILIES IN PAST TWO YEARS WITH LITTLE IF ANY PROPAGANDA MILEAGE GAINED FROM RELEASES.

MICROFILMED
FEB 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2. SINCE LNERGO FULLY AWARE LNGOLD IS APPROPRIATE CHANNEL TO APPROACH FOR GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE IN CONDUCT OF SUCH DELICATE MATTER, HQS SUSPECTS RATHER TRANSPARENT APPROACH TO JKLANCE MOTIVATED BY POSSIBLE RUMORS IN EXILE COMMUNITY THAT JKLANCE PROVIDED RANSOM FOR AMSIGH-2 AND OTHERS.

3. ALTHOUGH HQS RECORDS FAIL REFLECT EXTENT LNERGO

CS COPY

/CONTINUED/

28 JAN 1971

28 Jan 71

B 201-061063

201-281313

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ———— BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

RECEIVED
RID/EDI

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 105957

PAGE 2

RELATIONSHIP WITH AMDENIM-14, HE OBVIOUSLY WAS VOLUNTARY LNERGO INFORMANT FROM 62 UNTIL 65 WHEN HE WAS RECRUITED BY LNMICA. LNMICA TERMINATED THE RELATIONSHIP 10 MAY 66, SHORTLY BEFORE THE FATAL COMMANDOS L EXPEDITION WHICH RESULTED IN AMDENIM-14'S CAPTURE 29 MAY 66.

4. FILE: 201-281312, 201-061063.

END OF MESSAGE

MAR 17

OS

James E. Flannery for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W. L.
WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

JAN 20 [illegible] 71

ACTION COPY

ACTION NO. 770

FILE, VR c/ci/iu, c/ci, c/cl2, [illegible]

S E C R E T 202031Z JAN 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 0125

20 JAN 71 240374

DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC AMECRU

1. LNERGO/MIAMI ADVISED STATION THAT:

A. CONFIDENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN INITIATED BY WIFE OF AMDENIM-14 WITH AMECRU-1, TO ATTEMPT RANSOM HUSBAND. DR. MARTINIANO ORTA, A FRIEND OF AMDENIM-14'S, IS ACTING AS INTERMEDIARY WITH AMECRU-1 AND MET WITH HIM CIRCA 1 JAN 1971 IN MIAMI BEACH TO DISCUSS RANSOM TERMS.

B. RANSOM PRICE QUOTED BY AMECRU-1 WAS $50,000 AND HE WANTED ASSURANCE IN WRITING FROM WIFE OF AMDENIM-14 THAT SHE COULD RAISE THE MONEY. SHE GAVE ASSURANCE ALTHOUGH SAID PRIVATELY SHE HAD NO IDEA WHERE SUCH AN AMOUNT WOULD COME FROM.

C. AMECRU-1 WAS IN NEW YORK 9 JAN ON HIS WAY TO PARIS PRESUMABLY TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS.

D. LNERGO HAS A "HUMANITARIAN" INTEREST IN FREEING AMDENIM-14 AND ASKED FOLLOWING QUESTIONS INFORMALLY OF STATION:

(1) CAN JKLANCE SUBSCRIBE TO THIS RANSOM IN ANY AMOUNT?

(2) CAN JKLANCE INFLUENCE OR OTHERWISE ASSIST IN THIS RELEASE, I.E., GET PRICE REDUCED?

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT	INFO	FILE, VR
ACTION NO.		

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 0125 S E C R E T

(3) CAN JKLANCE SUGGEST ANY SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR THIS PURPOSE OR ACT AS INTERMEDIARY IN OBTAINING SUCH FUNDS?

2. LNERGO/MIAMI COMMENTED THAT RELEASE OF AMDENIM-14 MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO JKLANCE AS SOURCE OF INFORMATION (AND, POSSIBLY, AS OPERATIONAL AGENT) AS WELL AS BEING A PROPAGANDA VICTORY IN THE CUBAN COMMUNITY.

3. STATION WH/MIAMI HAS REMAINED NON-COMMITTAL RE THIS CASE AS WELL AS ENTIRE SUBJECT OF RANSOMING CASTRO PRISONERS. PLEASE ADVISE TACK HQS WISHES STATION TO TAKE WITH LNERGO CONCERNING ABOVE.

4. FILE: 201-281313; 201-061063. GP1.

SECRET

SECRET

FBI doc
27 Oct 69 (Miami)
Re - Antonio Cuesto Valle
Bureau # 105-1795

634498 01 CUESTA VALLE ANTONIO 606 26

SUPPLEMENTARY MASTER LIST NO 103 MO YR

NCL 17/12/64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CUESTA (DFL) VALLE, ANTONIO
201-281313 100-009-014
SEX M DOB ? DBC -23857
22 JUL 68
CIT CUBA FBI
OCC ?
< CUBA, HAVANA

R 6901100852

FILE IN 201-281313

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI doc
10 May 68 (Miami)
Re - Antonio Cuesta Valle
(aka - Tony Cuesta)

Bureau # mm 105-1795

FBI doc
29 April 68 (Miami)
Re: Commandos L

OGC 68-0374

5 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/COG

SUBJECT: James C. Wray

1. I called Mr. James C. Wray today to determine his reason for having called the Agency on 27 February regarding Antonio CUESTA Del Valle's patent application. At that time Wray had stated that as a patent attorney he was representing CUESTA who had an application pending on which some $140 in fees was due.

2. Wray advised that he had been retained by CUESTA several years ago to file an application concerned with a high speed boat on which a patent was ready to issue upon payment of $140 in filing fees. He stated further that as a consequence of CUESTA's subsequent capture he had been unable to communicate with him and that he had failed in his efforts to interest CUESTA's friends in assuming responsibility for the fees. Wray readily accepted my representations that the Agency had no responsibility in the matter. According to him, he had called us merely as a matter of last resort.

3. I found Wray's description of the boat's configuration and attributes to be interesting. While emphasizing that we had no responsibility for his client's present situation or for his fees, I suggested that he might want to provide me with the boat's specifications. Wray accepted this suggestion. My thought here was that an item of this nature might be of interest to SOD/Maritime Branch.

Robert J. Bladergroen
ROBERT J. BLADERGROEN
Assistant General Counsel

cc: Mr. George Ladner (CS)

SECRET

201-281313

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Nancy Gratz		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

After much zigging and zagging, we agreed it would be desirable to return call as a matter of courtesy. Please ask OGC to do so — denying any knowledge of the matter.

Mr. Bladergroen called & will handle matter 3/4/68

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
	3/4/68

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

14-00000

[illegible] BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE 21 February 1968

TIME 1520 Hours

NAME James C. WRAY GRADE N/A OFFICE N/A
Munsey Building, Room 1204
1329 "E" St., N.W., Washington, D.C.
Phone: NA 8-5555
INCIDENT Request for assistance TIME 1520 Hours PLACE Headquarters

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

At 1520 hours, Mr. James C. WRAY called identifying himself as a Patent Attorney and requested someone contact him concerning Mr. Anthony CUESTA. Mr. Cuesta, according to Mr. Wray, filed a patent application, $472 763, on 19 July 1965, for a high speed boat with a flexible hull. Mr. Wray siad that after filing, Mr. Cuesta left the United States and is now in a Cuban prison. Mr. Wray stated the reason he called is that he wants the Agency to either pay $145.00 for the patent issue fee as the deadline is 10 April 1968, or talk to the Patent Office. Advised Mr. Wray that a report would be made of his call.

201- 281313

Security discussed with OGC (Bladergroen) and WH/COG/EXO. Agreed no response desired.
3/1/68 PEo.

WH/Security/Hannah called and said OS recommend return telecon. WH/COG will ask Bladergroen to handle.

ACTION TAKEN:

A check in SR & CD was negative re Mr. Wray but two files, 242 093 and 530 946, were found on Mr. Cuesta.

REPORTING OFFICER
William E. Craig

CHIEF, BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH
for ROBERT D. BUCKLEY

DISTRIBUTION:
ORIG: DD/SEC (PTOS)
COPY: C/PHY. SD
COPY: C/PSD
FILE: BSB/PHYS. SD
COPY:

FORM 9-67 1798 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM:

RID/CL

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DDCOG/Reg		22 JUL	1967	WR
2. WH/C/CI/				MR
3.	MC CL		27 Jul 28 Jul	
4. WH/Reg	CT AK CT	2 AUG 1967	2 AUG 1967	
5. RID/AN				
6. WH/C/CI Alice D.				
7. WH/C/CI				
8. RECORDS OFFICER STAMP				
9. The following action is authorized: Destroyed				
10. Sign: R.O. WH/Cog				
11. Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.				
12. WH/C				
13. RID/CL				
14. RID/MIS				CE
15. WH/C/CI Alice Williams				
16.				
17.				

re a detailee to be processed for main Operational files

To: H/T. Please copy in my file folder.

PROCESSING DEFERRED
PLEASE INDICATE ACTION
☐ Destroy. Records Officer Stamp and Signature Required. Route to RID/DU, RM G-150
☑ Classify to: 201-281313 (CS File Number) Route to RID/AN, RM G-123 for final processing.

RID/		WH/C/CI	
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX	X

DEFERRED

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE MICROFILMED	

FILE TITLE: Doc - 821216

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-281313

DOCUMENT DATE: 19 Jun 67

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFGA 27020

FORM 610e USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

KAPOK/SECRET

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/Operational
CUIS Recruitment of IDENTITY

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. On 8 and 13 June 1967 the local LNERGO officer who is handling the *IDENTITY case informed a JMWAVE officer that she had been recruited by the CUIS on her recent visit to Cuba. LNERGO requests that the knowledge of this information be kept to a minimum, for they intend to operate her as a double agent. LNERGO does not intend to disseminate any information on the case, at this time; however, the following information was provided so that JMWAVE could furnish LNERGO with traces and comments:

A. IDENTITY received permission from U.S. and Cuban authorities to travel to Cuba to visit her imprisoned husband. She arrived in Cuba on 7 April 1967 and *(fnu) INFANTE of the MININT met her at the airport. In general, INFANTE was her escort; however, she also had to keep Tita (lnu) at *telephone number 30-2056 informed of her movements. *Enrique ECHEVARRIA was also assigned to IDENTITY's case and she thought possibly that he was INFANTE's superior officer. She described ECHEVARRIA as a DSE officer who had formerly been in the U.S. and who had some type of a back ailment.

Attachment: USC

IDENTITY

Distribution:

③ - WH/CCG w/att. U/S/C

/continued/

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION: KAPOK/SECRET

DATE TYPED: 16 Jun 67

DATE DISPATCHED: JUN 19 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-27[illegible]20

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-[illegible]01313

B. *Omar HERNANDEZ was in charge of her husband's case and *Raul ALFONSO was his assistant. IDENTITY said that her husband was normally kept at the Campo Libertad Hospital, not at the main building, but at a small building on the hospital grounds. She visited him frequently at the hospital and on one occasion they met in an office at the Villa Marista Detention Center. This office had *telephone numbers 40-3535 and 40-3536.

C. On 13 April INFANTE made the recruitment pitch to IDENTITY. He said the pitch was on behalf of the DSE and would benefit her and her husband. He said if she would successfully report on anti-Castro activities in Miami, and especially activities of the Commando L, for a period of six months they would release her husband from custody; and after three years of reporting they would grant him permission to depart from Cuba. She said that she certainly wanted to help her husband; however, she did not have any information regarding her husband's activities nor information about anti-Castro activities in Miami. INFANTE instructed her to just do her best and he thought everything would work out all right.

D. For the next few days, INFANTE debriefed her on her family, friends, work, etc.

E. From 20 thru 22 April she was picked-up daily by INFANTE and taken to a safehouse in the Marianao district of Havana for training. Somewhere along the route, they would stop and pick-up the instructor, *Pascual (LNU). NK & part Pascual gave IDENTITY training in document photography, development, and techniques in the collection of information. She was instructed in the use of a single lens reflex camera and although she claimed to have done very poorly, Pascual assured her, that with more practice, she would do OK. He told her to purchase a camera and two goose neck table lamps with 100 watt bulbs on her return to Miami and practice until she became proficient.

F. IDENTITY was instructed to print or typewrite (using all uppercase letters) her reports as she obtained the information, hold them and every fifteen days photograph them, develop the film, destroy the reports, and hold the negatives. Every six months she would take all of the negatives to New York and deliver them to *Chafik Homero SAKER Zonni (201-335014) at the Cuban U.N. Mission. Her first assigned meeting with SAKER was scheduled for any work day between 28 September and 2 October 1967.

G. IDENTITY was told that she would have no further contacts with the DSE in Cuba, but should she have any serious trouble, she could write to *"Rafaela Domenech E.
Avenida 41 # 6011
Ent. 68 y 70, Ceiba,
Marianao, Havana, Cuba"

NK; which might [illegible] to DGI [illegible]

She was told to make up a false name and return address and sign the letter with the first name used in the return address. She did not receive a code name, was told nothing about SW, was not promised money nor expenses, and was not given any further information or training.

/continued/

2. Possible JMWAVE traces on the above are as follows:

A. Havana telephone number 30-2056.

(a) Number listed to Ma Antonieta MARRERO; 8 No. 10 Vedado. (1965 Havana Telephone Directory)

(b) Lt. (fnu) MARRERO was listed as a DSE member assigned to Villa Marista and in charge of prisoners. (UFGA-26564, 30 Dec 66)

Lt. Marrero, [illegible]

B. Avenida 41 # 6811. Address listed to Pedro Raul RODRIGUEZ. (1962 Havana Address Book)

C. Omar HERNANDEZ.

(a) Omar HERNANDEZ name appeared on list of Cuban G-2 agents and/or Cuban officials involved in the Revolutionary Trials in La Cabana from 18 April 1960 through 25 August 1961. (UFGA-03228, 6 Feb 62)

(b) Omar HERNANDEZ was identified as a Communist and a G-2 agent in Havana who infiltrated anti-Castro groups. (UFGA-03492, 13 March 62)

(c) Lt. Omar HERNANDEZ was identified as a DSE interrogator at Villa Marista. (UFGA-24423, 8 Feb 66)

(d) Omar HERNANDEZ was described as a DSE agent who has acted as an investigator in several trials acted on by the Cuban Revolutionary Courts. (UFGA-25012, 25 April 66)

D. Raul ALFONSO was described as a DSE interrogator stationed at Villa Marista. (UFGA-27168 A01, 16 March 67)

John H. BARENDRIER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH
[illegible] INFORMATION

CLASSIFICATION: KAPOK SECRET

[illegible]-27[illegible] page 4

INSTRUCTIONS: [illegible]

1 SURNAME: IDENTITY
GIVEN NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX:
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

2 SURNAME: INFANTE
GIVEN NAME: fnu
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: Cuban
OCCUPATION: MINIST/[illegible] [illegible]
RESIDENCE: Cuba
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

3 SURNAME: ECHEVARRIA
GIVEN NAME: Enrique
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: Cuban
OCCUPATION: MINIST/[illegible] [illegible]
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Has formerly been in U.S. Has some type of a back ailment.

4 SURNAME: Havana Telephone No. [illegible]3
GIVEN NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX:
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION: [illegible]
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

[illegible] -2056

5 SURNAME: HERNANDEZ
GIVEN NAME: Omar
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX:
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: Cuban
OCCUPATION: [illegible] [illegible]
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

FORM 10-58 53d OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION: KAPOK SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

[illegible] SECRET [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	GIVEN NAME [illegible]	MIDDLE NAME	201-
DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH	
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION [illegible]	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

---

vana Telephone No. 40-3535	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH	
	OCCUPATION [illegible]	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

40-3535

No. at Villa Marista Detention Center

---

vana Telephone No. 40-3536	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH	
	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

40-3536

No at Villa Marista Detention Center

(LNU)	GIVEN NAME Pascual	MIDDLE NAME	201-
DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH	
uban	OCCUPATION [illegible]	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

D instructor

27

AKER Zonnl.	GIVEN NAME Chafik	MIDDLE NAME Homoro	201- 335014
DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH	
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

[illegible] 167

FORM 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION KAPOK SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 5

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH
[illegible] INFORMATION

CLASSIFICATION: KAPOK SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-27920

INSTRUCTIONS: Enter "ASSIGN" after 201 if number needed.

SURNAME: [illegible] GIVEN NAME: [illegible] S. MIDDLE NAME: [illegible] 201-

SEX: DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: MINIST/USB Lottery Corp RESIDENCE:

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Avenida 41 #6811
Ent. 68 y 70, Ceiba
Marianao, Havana, Cuba

2 SURNAME: GIVEN NAME: MIDDLE NAME: 201-

SEX: DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

3 SURNAME: GIVEN NAME: MIDDLE NAME: 201-

SEX: DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

4 SURNAME: GIVEN NAME: MIDDLE NAME: 201-

SEX: DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

5 SURNAME: GIVEN NAME: MIDDLE NAME: 201-

SEX: DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

201-721214

FORM 10-60 [illegible] OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION: KAPOK SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	KAPOK/SECRET	USC Att. to UFGA-27620

IDENTITY

[illegible]

✓ Maria Lourdes BLANCO Diez de Cuesta (201-921416) [illegible]

JUN 19 1967

201-921416

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION KAPOK/SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

S/C att: "1" to UFGA-27620

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	**REPORT NO.**	00-K-323/16570-67
SUBJECT	Treatment of Antonio Cuesta Valle, Political Prisoner of the GOC	**DATE DISTR.**	9 Jun 67
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	LA CIRL C-DC7-53338

(356)

DATE OF INFO. 17 May 67

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---17 May 67

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Honduran national, US resident, executive of a foreign airline. Through travels and contacts he keeps in touch with events occurring in foreign countries.

[This report was developed by an Air Force AFNIN representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. My secretary recently returned from a 17-day visit to Havana, Cuba. Through conversation, with her, I learned of her visit and permission to visit her husband, Antonio Cuesta Valle, a political prisoner of the Cuban government.

2. Cuesta, who was active in an anti-GOC movement, was taken prisoner on 29 May 66 in company of four other men, while on an infiltration mission. While trying to escape he supposedly blew up his boat and as a result of the explosion he lost his left hand at the wrist. He was captured along with Eugenio Saldivar Cadena, and both are presently held prisoners at the Military Hospital in Marianao, Havana.

3. While in Havana she was permitted, on a daily basis, to visit with her husband in his hospital cell. She was permitted to visit alone with him on one occasion in a room that had several mirrors and for a period of approximately 15 minutes. The remainder of her visits were in the presence of her assigned escort or the guard assigned to her husband's ward. She knew her escort as "Infante," and he was always dressed in civilian clothes. He was most polite and courteous at all times. She was told what hours she could visit her husband by phone each specific day, and her escort would pick her up and take her to the hospital.

4. I was told that her husband has been given the best treatment available and that he had no complaints in that respect. He is suffering from advanced active cataracts and is almost blind. He has been treated by two Soviet doctors, but due to the language barrier proper treatment was not administered and the Soviets became very angry at the nurses at the hospital. Considering his background he is being treated like a VIP. He was told that a Cuban specialist is going to take his case in the near future. He said that his food is very good and generous servings are the order of the day. By direct order of Fidel he is furnished a box of the best cigars, and they are replenished each time the box becomes empty. During a Sunday afternoon he and his wife were taken to the beach, complete with a picnic lunch, in company of four guards that kept a distance of about 100 feet.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S YES

201-281313

5. He has not been formally charged and she was told that because of his condition a date could not be set. However, she was told not to worry because Fidel was a kind man and would be most lenient with his case. She was also told that as far as the Cuban government was concerned she could visit with him again at any time in the future.

6. She stayed with family members of her husband and was permitted to go anywhere she liked when not visiting her husband, but because of fear she stayed in her quarters.

-end-

CO MAR 27 68

14-00000

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-281313

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 23

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CA, CA/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 071945Z CITE [redacted]WAVE 6475

7 Apr 67 IN 40135

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 74423 (NOT SENT MEXICO)

AN 9		
[redacted]	[redacted]	
ACT	X	[redacted]

1. FYI: AMOTS AND AMCLEVE-15 HAVE REPORTED LOURDES BLANCO DE CUESTA, WIFE OF TONY CUESTA, DEPARTED MIAMI FOR MEXICO CITY 2 APRIL, PLANS LEAVE FOR HAVANA 7 APRIL FOR TWO WEEK VISIT WITH HUSBAND.

2. FYI. IN NOVEMBER 1966 LOCAL ACSI INFORMED STATION OF BLANCO PLANS TO GO CUBA AND VISIT IMPRISONED HUSBAND WHO FORMERLY ACSI SD 6836. ACSI SAID SHE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH CHAFIK HOMERO SAKER ZENNI OF NEW YORK CUBAN UN MISSION. ACSI ASKED IF STATION WANTED TO PURSUE AS OPS LEAD. STATION DECLINED OFFER AND SUGGESTED ACSI INFORM FBI. FBI WAS INFORMED AND THEY HAVE BEEN MONITORING CASE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

Antonio de la Cuesta Valle, 281313

201-281313
7 April 67

DIA doc
20 May 66
Subject - Withdrawal of U.S.
Army Proposal - Cuba

SECRET

[redacted]

4.25.66

SD 15413 ILLAS GONZALEZ, Francisco (201-783822)

Subject was terminated without prejudice by ACSI on 17 January 1966

File: F/DC/8-66

Lt. Col. Francis notified 4/25/66 that SD 15413 and SD 15410 were dropped in January.

28 Apr 66: ACSI requested reinstatement of SD-15413 and SD-15410.

Reinstated 28 Apr 66.

SECRET

201-281313

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	5. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 6. DATE OF INFO. / 7. EVALUATION
8. ANALYST / 9. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CUESTA (DEL) VALLE, ANTONIO
201-281313
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
MEMBER OF THE PUERTO RICO GROUP OF COMANDOS L. OF INTEREST TO WESTERN INTELL.

019-002-012
UFGA-25032
02 MAY 66
019-2-4-7
P2

R 6605170628

FILE IN 201-281313

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Cuesta, Antonio Valle	2. RI FILE NO.
	~~3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.~~ ~~4. DATE~~
	~~7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM~~ ~~8. DATE OF INFO.~~ ~~9. EVALUATION~~
5. ANALYST nl 6. DATE PROCESSED 23 Jun 61	~~10. DISSEMINATED IN~~ ~~11. DATE~~

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Jo. Piccolo

WH/4

8565

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 90118.

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

C

file

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

7 April 1966

FOR DETAILS OF COORDINATION, PLEASE SEE: F/DC/8-66

File in: 201-281313

SECRET

OGC 66-0119

19 JAN 1966

Honorable J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

By letter of 5 January 1966, you advised that the Department is contemplating prosecutive action against certain individuals involved in the hit-and-run raid conducted in the Havana Harbor area in November 1965. In this connection, you requested our comments relative to any past or current interest this Agency might have had or has in Antonio CUESTA Del Valle and whether disclosure of that interest in the event of prosecution would be detrimental to its operations. In addition, you also requested to be advised whether this Agency has or ever had an operational interest in Jorge MAS Canosa or his anti-Castro organization, the Cuban Representation In Exile (RECE).

This Agency has no present operational interest in CUESTA or MAS, although it did have in times past. We do not believe that disclosure of these past interests would have any serious consequences for the Agency.

For your information, with 303 Committee approval, this Agency does have a relationship with the RECE pursuant to which limited financial support is provided for the maintenance of its Miami office. While MAS should not be knowledgeable of this fact, any statements he might make should not affect our relationship with that organization.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

cc: Thomas Flores
Donald Huefner ✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

MC

Jan. 14, 1966

1. Mr. Bladergroen of OGC phoned on 12 January. After checking back with Dept. of Justice he learned that latter is in contact with Army concerning Cuesta. He suggested I not tell Army this but tell them that Justice has an interest in the man.

2. This date I called Maykovich who was well aware of the Justice interest. He said that Justice was now waiting for an assessment of the man by Army.

D. Huefner

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RB

REGISTRATION REQUEST

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	
ITEM NO.	1979
DATE	
201 NO.	281313

NAME: CUESTA VALLE, Antonio

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS:

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP

PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT:

TRAVEL:

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA:

Terminated without prejudice 10 May 1966

SUBJECT would not submit to control.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM

DISSEM BY 26

ACTION

WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

2 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY
CS/DO	0030Z	D

FILE VR, DCI, D/DCI, DCI(MCRAN), DDP, ADDP, CS/RF, CS/DO, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/OA, CA2, CA/PROP

ISR 1

S E C R E T 302315Z CITE JMWAVE 1209

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

TYPIC PBRAMPART

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 1208 (IN 26931)*

'30 MAY 66 IN 26933

filed

ISR

file CUESTA 201

1. FOLLOWING FILE INFO SUPPLEMENTS REF.

A. NO INDICATION JMWAVE FILES THAT OTHER THAN GUILLERMO ALVAREZ GONZALEZ ANY OF PERSONS MENTIONED HAVE EVER BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH KUBARK. ONLY POSSIBLE TRACE RE GUILLERMO ALVAREZ GONZALEZ IS UNDATED CARD CITING 201-301881, STATION SUBJECT ON "FRD" PAYROLL, POA NOT REQUESTED.

B. GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES, LATER IDENTIFIED AS CUESTA, ROMER, FERNANDEZ ANTA, DIAZ, ZALDIZAR, EXERCISING WITH SEABIRD BEARING REGISTRATION FL-8509-F, WERE SPOTTED BY WAVE OFFICER IN FLAMINGO KEY AREA ON 18 APRIL 66. SINCE CUESTA KNOWN AS ACSI AGENT, CHECK MADE WITH LOCAL ACSI, WHICH REPLIED THAT CUESTA STILL BEING USED BUT ACTIVITY IN QUESTION NOT SPONSORED BY ACSI.

SECRET

C. SEE ATTACHMENT TO FI/DEPARTMENTAL COORDIN-

201-281313

SECRET

ATION GROUP MEMO DATED 11 APRIL 66 (POUCHED TO JMWAVE WITHOUT MANIFEST). ATTACHMENT, DATED 5 APRIL 66, CONCERNS COORDINATION OF ACSI OP INTO CUBA INVOLVING USE OF ANTONIO CUESTA, CRAFT OWNED BY HIM, AND NINE OTHER EXILES ASSOCIATED WITH COMMANDOS L AND ALPHA 66.

2. ON 16 MAY, AFTER RECEIVING INFO INDICATING CUESTA AND COMMANDOS L PLANNING SOME FORM OF OP INTO CUBA OR HAITI, COS JMWAVE QUERIED CHIEF LOCAL ACSI DET RE STATUS OF CUESTA. ACSI CHIEF STATED CUESTA IN PROCESS OF BEING TERMINATED.

3. UPON RECEIPT REF INFO COS JMWAVE CHECKED BY TELEPHONE WITH CHIEF LOCAL ACSI CONCERNING ALL PERSONS MENTIONED REF. LOCAL ACSI CHIEF STATED FOLLOWING:

A. CUESTA TERMINATED BY ACSI MORNING 23 MAY.

B. ON 19 APRIL LOCAL ACSI "ESTABLISHED INTEREST" IN ALVAREZ, FERNANDEZ ANTA AND ZALDIZAR BUT THIS STILL PENDING, NAMELY, THEY HAVE NOT HEARD FROM ACSI HQS RE THEIR REQUEST.

C. ROMER AND DIAZ NEVER OF OPS INTEREST

SECRET

[illegible]

TO LOCAL ACSI ALTHO THEY KNOWN TO ACSI AS SOMETIME MEMBERS CF BOAT CREW HEADED BY ENRIQUE GONZALEZ (PERSON INVOLVED IN NORTORICUS BAHAMAS INCIDENT OF APRIL 66)

4. WHILE IMPOSSIBLE PREDICT CUBAN REACTION BELIEVE THEY MAY CHARGE THAT 29-33 MAY INCIDENT WAS OPERATION BY U.S. ARMY AND PRESENT INFO FROM CAPTURED PERSONNEL AS SUBSTANTIATING THEIR CLAIM. IT CLEAR THAT ACSI HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH CUESTA AND THRU HIM WITH VARIOUS COMMANDOS L-ALPHA 66 PERSONALITIES SINCE AT LEAST 65, PROBABLY EARLIER. CUESTA ASSOCIATION WITH ACSI WIDELY KNOWN IN LOCAL EXILE AND ODYOKE CIRCLES. ALSO POSSIBLE THAT CUBANS WILL CHOOSE TO CHARGE THAT OP WAS DIRECTLY SPONSORED OR MASTERMINDED BY KUBARK. IT WOULD APPEAR UNLIKELY THAT CUBANS CAN PRODUCE ANY PLAUSIBLE EVIDENCE LINKING INCIDENT PARTICIPANTS WITH KUBARK.

SECRET *Reported a clash at sea between a Cuban exile group and the Cuban Armed Forces.

BT

NNNN

201-281313

FBI doc
13 Dec 65 (Miami)
Re- Representacion Cubana del
Exilio (RECE)

FBI doc
19 Nov 65
Re- Representacion Cubana del
Exilio (RECE)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 RE
2
3 HO
4

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY (COPY ISSUED TO CS/DO AT 2338 21 OCT 65)

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, EX DIR, CS/DO, DDP, VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW,
SOD 4, CI, CI/PS, WH 8, CS/RF.
D/OCI 2, D/ONE.

S E C R E T 220021Z 22 OCT 65 03072 IN 75044

DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR CITE WAVE 6751

INTEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMMED-16, 21 OCTOBER 1965. INFO WAS PASSED TO EWAN K. SCHWAMBORN (P) BY PETER B GUAROTTI (P) MARI BRANCH CREW MEMBER WHO RECEIVED INFO FROM AMMED-16. NOTE GUESTA IS ACSI SOURCE NO. 232. FIELD COMMENT BASED UFG 7574. NO INDEX FILED 220021Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET CONTROLLED DISSEM CUBA

SUBJECT: PLANS OF COMANDOS L FOR ATTACK AGAINST CUBA

DOI: 21 OCTOBER 1965

PADA: UNITED STATES, MAIMI (21 OCTOBER 1965) UFG 7645

SOURCE: A CUBAN EMIGRE WHO IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH CUBAN EMIGRE MARITIME MATTERS IN THE MIAMI AREA. HE IS CONSIDERED TO BE A RELIABLE REPORTER.

COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON

DATE DISTRIBUTED

LIAISON

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 78044

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL

1. ON OR ABOUT 25 OCTOBER 1965 ANTONIO CUESTA DEL VALLE, CHIEF OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE COMANDOS L, A MILITANT CUBAN EMIGRE ORGANIZATION, PLANS TO LEAVE FLORIDA FOR CUBA WITH A GROUP TO CONDUCT AN OPERATION AGAINST CUBA. THE PURPOSE OF THE ACTION IS TO DISRUPT THE MOVEMENT OF CUBAN REFUGEES FROM CUBA TO THE UNITED STATES, BECAUSE CUESTA FEELS THAT THIS EMIGRATION IS AN INDICATION THAT THE UNITED STATES IS MOVING TOWARD A POLICY OF COEXISTENCE WITH FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.

2. CUESTA WAS SOLICITING MONEY IN MIAMI ON 21 OCTOBER TO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

FINANCE THIS OPERATION. CUESTA OWNS A GASOLINE STATION ON 12TH AVENUE, HIALEAH, MIAMI, FLORIDA. HE OWNS A 55-FOOT BOAT.

3. (FIELD COMMENT. A RECENT REPORT FROM AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE, REPORTED THAT CUESTA WAS A LEADER OF A GROUP OF 13 MEMBERS OF COMANDOS L WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE MIAMI FOR PUERTO RICO ON 10 OCTOBER.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, I&NS, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, USCG, US ARMY FIELD APPRAISAL DETACHMENT 1.

END OF MESSAGE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WHSAFSC			17FEB65	QH
2.				
3. WH/SA/Rcts			23 Feb.	D
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Copy Detached

CS DB - 312/00[illegible]

23 Feb 65

MICROFILMED
FEB 16 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT INDEX	X

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-281313

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 10 Feb 1965

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFG 06676

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(48)

HQS

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

REF. NO. UFG-6676

FROM: JMWAVE

DATE OF REPORT: 10 February 1965

REPORTING OFFICER: James D. TATTERSFIELD

RD NO:

REPORTS OFFICER: Margaret R. NANKALL/uta

PROJ.:

APPROVING OFFICER: Andrew K. REUTEMAN

SCE CR.:

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

TYPIC

Source: AMDECK-1 from Luis Diaz, a friend who joined Comandos L in 1963.

RID: Please index.

MICROFILMED
FEB 16 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

REPORTS
FEB 11 1965

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs. 1 - OO/C 2 - Santo Domingo out pouch 2 - JMBARR 2 - Panama (for CINCSO) out pouch	1 cy. each to Miami reps. of: State, F.B.I., I&NS

HQS RI COPY

COUNTRY:

NO. OF ENCLOSURES:

NO. PAGES: 1

SUBJECT:

REFERENCES:

PADA:

APPR:

SECRET

DOI:

FORM 8-60 1407 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CS COPY

201-281313

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. [illegible] Cannot be judged. [illegible]

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba/Dominican Republic

REPORT NO

SUBJECT Attempts of Antonio Cuesta del Valle of Comandos L to Establish a Training Camp in Puerto Rico or the Dominican Republic

DATE OF REPORT 10 February 1965

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 3 February 1965

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (5 February 1965)

UFG-6676

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

A Cuban exile with good access to activities of exile activist groups. His reporting on raider activities has been generally reliable since 1962. This information was obtained from Luis Dias.

cit Cuba & Puerto Rico

201-281313

1. According to Luis Dias, a member of Comandos L, a militant Cuban exile organization, Antonio Cuesta del Valle has been in Puerto Rico for several months attempting to set up a camp there for training Cuban exiles. He has also been attempting to obtain permission from the Dominican Republic to use the Dominican camp which was used by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, a military leader of the Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray (SFNE, Second National Front of the Escambray), and has been making regular trips to the Dominican Republic from Puerto Rico for that purpose.

2. On 3 February 1965, Ramon Font Saumell, second in command of Comandos L, told Diaz that the recent accusations made against the top Dominican military personnel by Gutierrez after his capture in Cuba in January had jeopardized his organization's good relations with the Dominican Government.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISTRIBUTION

HQS RI COPY

CS COPY

201-281313

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

6. DATE OF INFO.

7. EVALUATION

8. ANALYST

9. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CUESTA DEL VALLE, ANTONIO
201-281313
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RECRUITING MEN FOR ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO'S CAMP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

019-300-003
UFG -06214
17 NOV 64
WAVE-04911
P1

R 6501053230

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: DAVIS, THOMAS E.
50-1987

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/OA (ARCHIVES)

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
28 June		LESLIE WIZELMAN	Leslie Wizelman
"		JAMES P. KELLY	James P. Kelly

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

pdt 29 Jan 58

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

CI/OA FILE NO. SO-1987	SECURITY OFFICE FILE NO. 67378	PROJECT

SUBJECT (FILL IN ONE ONLY)

TRUE NAME DAVIS, Thomas E.	CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

NAME CHECK & INVESTIGATIVE RECORD

	CHECK (✓)	INITIAL	DATE
PRO I			
PRO II			
GREEN LIST			
RI TRACES			
OPS & DIV TRACES			
FIELD TRACES			
S.O. INDICES			
F.B.I. INDICES			
S.O. INVESTIGATION			

ISSUED

	CHECK (✓)	DATE	TO
P.O.A			
O.A.			
C.S.A.			
P.C.S.A.			
P.P.A.			
PROP. APP.			
C.N.C.			

COMMENTS

COMMENTS

CASE OFFICER	DIVISION Cover WE/1	EXTENSION

SECRET

FORM NO. 126a
1 MAY 56

(D-5)

14-00000

ECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF SUBJECT

DATE: 6 Mar [illegible]

CI/OA FILE NO.: 50 [illegible]

TO : Chief [illegible]/1

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : Thomas E. DAVIS

1. A review of the files of CI/OA is being made for the purpose of retiring files on covert personnel who:

(a) ✓ No longer are being used;

(b) Do not satisfy the requirements for operational approval;

(c) Are of no further interest to the office of original request.

2. CI/OA records indicate the subject has been of interest to you since 1952 for: Mapping work

☑ operational use

☐ informational purposes

3. It is requested that you notify CI/OA of the present operational status of subject, using the bottom of this form for your comment.

4. If no answer is received from you within 30 days, CI/OA will assume that you are no longer interested in the subject and will retire the file without further notification to you.

COMMENTS FROM OFFICE OF ORIGIN

INITIALS

EXTENSION

DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL & 1 TO ADDRESSEE; 1 TO CI/OA FILE

FORM NO. 700
JUN 55

SECRET

(30)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF SUBJECT

DATE [illegible]

CI/OA [illegible]

TO : FI/[illegible]

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : Thomas [illegible] [illegible]

1. A review of the files of CI/OA is being made for the purpose of retiring files on covert personnel who:

[✓ (a)] No longer are being used;

(b) Do not satisfy the requirements for operational approval;

(c) Are of no further interest to the office of original request.

2. CI/OA records indicate the subject has been of interest to you since for:

☑ operational use

☐ informational purposes

3. It is requested that you notify CI/OA of the present operational status of subject, using the bottom of this form for your comment.

4. If no answer is received from you within 30 days, CI/OA will assume that you are no longer interested in the subject and will retire the file without further notification to you.

COMMENTS FROM OFFICE OF ORIGIN

New Querysent Cover

INITIALS

EXTENSION

DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL & 1 TO ADDRESSEE; 1 TO CI/OA FILE

NO. 66 700

SECRET

(38)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF SUBJECT

DATE 6 Mar '56

CI/OA FILE NO. SO 1987

TO : Chief WE

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : Thomas E. DAVIS

1. A review of the files of CI/OA is being made for the purpose of retiring files on covert personnel who:

[✓ (a)] No longer are being used;

(b) Do not satisfy the requirements for operational approval;

(c) Are of no further interest to the office of original request.

2. CI/OA records indicate the subject has been of interest to you since 1952 for: MAPPING WORK

☑ operational use

☐ informational purposes

3. It is requested that you notify CI/OA of the present operational status of subject, using the bottom of this form for your comment.

4. If no answer is received from you within 30 days, CI/OA will assume that you are no longer interested in the subject and will retire the file without further notification to you.

COMMENTS FROM OFFICE OF ORIGIN

Send query to FI/Cover/Plans.

INITIALS

EXTENSION

DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL & 1 TO ADDRESSEE; 1 TO CI/OA FILE

FORM NO. 700 JUN 55

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

T. E. D.

8 February 1952

#67378

The files of G-2, Department of the Army, were checked in Subject's name on 5 February 1952. A file in the name of Thomas Edgar ________ was reviewed and disclosed the following information:

In a letter to the Commanding General, 2nd Army, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland from Intelligence Division, General Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C., dated 25 May 1949, the Investigations Section states that information has been received from the Plans and Operations Division, General Staff, U. S. Army, liaison agency with the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, for the Department of the Army, that ________, Thomas Edgar was granted "Q" clearance on 2 February 1949. The AEC clearance number if NY 6514.

The above information was predicated upon an L/S from 2nd Army, to Director of Intelligence, requesting verification of "Q" clearance regarding above individual.

File further reflects that the FBI conducted investigations on 18 January 1949 at Cincinnati, Ohio and 12 January 1949 at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania regarding Subject.

FIELD OFFICE
FEB 52 8 29 AM '52
CHICAGO

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Case No: 67378 8 April 1952

SYNOPSIS:

SUBJECT presently resides at 2596 Neil Avenue and not at 1596. He is married, has a son, about 25 years of age. SUBJECT attended Ohio State University from 1935 to 1939, receiving a B.S.C. degree. He was formerly employed as a garage mechanic in Hilliard, Ohio and is presently Assistant Director of a Research Foundation at the Ohio State University. Neighborhood investigation was extremely favorable, nothing of a derogatory nature was developed. Credit favorable and Police negative. SUBJECT reportedly investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This data is property of Inspection and Security Office, to be returned when subject is no longer covertly used. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned

SECRET

Case No: 67378 8 April 1952

BIRTH AND CITIZENSHIP:

At Columbus, Ohio:

According to the records of the Registrars Office, Ohio State University, SUBJECT was born in Wellston, Ohio during January 1903.

EDUCATION:

At Columbus, Ohio:

The records of the Registrars Office, Ohio State University on 21 February 1952, revealed that SUBJECT was a student from 1935 to 1939, at which time he graduated with a B.S.C. degree.

EMPLOYMENT:

At Columbus, Ohio:

On 7 February 1952, the records of the Ohio Bureau of Credits revealed that SUBJECT is presently the Assistant Director of the Research Foundation of the Ohio State University. Upon graduation from O.S.U., or shortly thereafter in December 1939, SUBJECT was employed by the university as Assistant Fraternity Auditor. He later moved from that position to that of Assistant Director in 1946. Prior to the time, he was employed as a mechanic in Arch Alder's Chevrolet Garage, Hilliards, Ohio.

NEIGHBORHOOD:

At Columbus, Ohio:

On 2 April 1952, it was determined that SUBJECT resides in an apartment building located at 2596 Neil Avenue, near the university. Mrs Mae OWEN, Apt. "D", 2596 Neil Avenue, stated that she has known the SUBJECT and his wife since the time of their moving in the building, which was about three years ago. She described them as "most substantial people" and added that SUBJECT is the Assistant Director of the Research Foundation, Ohio State University. He is most capable, likeable and respectable man and enjoys a fine reputation in the building and in the neighborhood generally. She further stated that the FBI had investigated him several years ago, apparently in connection with his job at the Foundation. She described SUBJECT and his wife as "upper middle class" with one son, about twenty-five years of age who is married and resides out of Ohio, although he is presently staying with his folks because his wife is in a hospital in Columbus with their newly arrived baby. Informant stated that she knew nothing but good relative to SUBJECT and his family and that he is truly a patriotic American.

On 2 April 1952, Mrs Thomas REEDER, Apt. "B", 2506 Neil Avenue, stated that she has known SUBJECT and his wife as neighbors and that they are fine people, respected in the community and are conservative in their living and habits. They have one son, Ed, who is precntly staying with them. SUBJECT, according to informant, is "homey" and does not drink or have any bad habits to her knowledge. She considers him a one-hungred percent American.

On 2 April 1952, Mrs. F.W. HOMSHER, Apt. "C", 2590 Neil Avenue, stated that she has been acquainted with the SUBJECT and his wife for about a year as neighbors. She knew little about them except that they are nice people and well thought of in the neighborhood, They are quiet, do not engage in many social activities. Informant confirmed SUBJECT's employment and added that she knew of nothing of a derogatory nature regarding the SUBJECT or his family.

Mrs John R. SNOWBALL, Apt. "A", 2596 Neil Avenue, stated that she has known SUBJECT and his wife just three years or since the time they moved into the building, three years ago this month. She stated that she liked them very much and knew of no finer people. They are respected in the community and are quiet and conservative. SUBJECT neither drinks or carouses and is a "homebody", except that he plays a great deal of golf with her husband. Informant stated that SUBJECT's son Ed is presently with SUBJECT coming here from West Virginia for the arrival of their newborn youngster. She added that SUBJECT has a fine poistion with the Research Foundation as Assistant Director, and is a thorough American.

REFERENCES:

At Columbus, Ohio:

On 3 April 1952, Mrs Harvey BROWER, 2268 Summit Street, stated that she purchased the premises on which she now resides, from SUBJECT about twelve years ago and although she did not know the ----- family except for the real-estate transaction, she had heard many good things about them from neighbors that used to live in this part of the community. She stated that everyone seemed to have a good word for both SUBEJCT and his wife and she knew of nothing derogatory in the regard. She added that Mrs John MONROE, 2262 Summit Street, knew the SUBJECT and his wife.

On 3 April 1952, Mrs John MONROE, was interviewed and stated that she had known the SUBJECT's wife since they were younsters living in Hilliard, Ohio and that she has known SUBJECT since he and his wife married nearly thirty years ago. The -----'s were wonderful people and well thought of by everyone. SUBJECT was formerly employed by Arch Alder's Chevrolet Gagage in Hilliard, Ohio after which he returned to Ohio State University. He was later employed by O.S.U. in some capatity, becoming Assistant Director of the Research Foundation. Informant suggested another person that was acquainted with the -----'s, Mrs Harry MYERS, 6500 Dublin Road, north of Columbus, Ohio.

On 3 April 1952, Mrs Harry MYERS, was interviewed and stated that she had known the -----'s and that they were very close friends. She knew of nothing derogatory regarding SUBJECT and stated that she considered the ----- family as the highest type of people. SUBJECT's son, Ed, is engaged in some type of Engineering work, believed to be in Detroit, Michigan

AGENTS NOTE:

It was determined that Arch Adler, SUBJECT's former employer. and personally known to the writer, is presently confined to a hospital and not available for interview.

Norman ARMENTROUT, Manager, Alder's Garage, Hilliard, Ohio stated that SUBJECT was the best mechanic they had ever had in the garage. Informant stated that he has heard Mr. Adler make this statement many times since SUBJECT left in 1937. He further stated that SUBJECT and his wife had a fine reputation and were patriotic Americans. Informant had attended high school with SUBJECT's son Ed, whom he described as a first rate fellow, who displayed that he came from good people.

CREDIT AND CREDIT REFERENCES:

At Columbus, Ohio:

The records of the Ohio Credit Bureau, 83 S. 4th Street, examined on 7 February 1952, revealed that SUBJECT married Helen

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Case No: 67378 8 April 1952

B. in Hilliards, Ohio; that he has worked for Alder's Garage in Hilliards until about 1927; that he had been hurt and collected a claim from the Ohio Industrial Commission; further that he went to Ohio State University and graduated with a B.S.C. degree in 1939 and then went on the payroll of O.S.U. in December 1939. Presently Assistant Director of the O.S.U. Research Foundation, and prior to this was Assistant Fraternity Auditor. Further, in 1949 he had financed an automobile through General Motors with a mortgage of $949.00 which is prompt; that his credit rating is good, nothing against him and most purchases are for cash.

POLICE (CRIMINAL AND SUBVERSIVE) RECORDS:

At Columbus, Ohio:

The records of the Columbus Police Department, on 7 February 1952, failed to reveal any information on SUBJECT. The files of the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission were examined on 4 April 1952 and failed to reveal any information on SUBJECT.

SECURITY INFORMATION

23 APR 1952

SECRET

S E C R E T

TO : Assistant Director for Special Operations
ATTENTION: Staff C

FROM : Chief, Special Security Division

SUBJECT : PZ 2359
#67378

1. Reference is made to your request dated 27 December 1951 for a recommendation as to whether an Operational Clearance should be granted to permit the Subject's use as cover in Europe under cover of present employment.

2. The attached information regarding the Subject is furnished to you as an aid in determining whether or not the Subject should be used under the authority of an Operational Clearance in the capacity set forth in your request.

3. This memorandum pertains only to the assignment mentioned in Paragraph 1 above. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision as to whether you intend to use the Subject. If the Subject is not used, the attached material should be returned to the writer in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only," indicating the reasons for not using the Subject.

O.C.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

Robert H. Cunningham

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

Attachments:
NCD 2/19/52
Inv. rpt. 3/8/52
Biog. Data

S E C R E T

SECRET

TO: Chief, Special Security Division
Attn: Mr. Clayton

FROM: STC SSB 700

SUBJECT: PZ-2359

1. The following biographical data is available on Subject:

Thomas Edgar Davis
1596 Neil Avenue
Columbus, Ohio

Acting Head of Research, Ohio State University
Research Foundation

BSC in Business Administration 1939 Ohio State U.

1939-1942 Assistant Auditor, Dean's Office

Since 1942 has been Assistant to Director
Research Foundation.

2. Date of Birth will be forwarded as soon as received.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

SECRET

COVERT NAME CHECK REPORT

DATE: 19 February 1952

SUBJECT: T.E.D. 67378 OC OSO

In accordance with your request, a covert name check was conducted on Subject with results as indicated below:

AGENCY	RETURN	DATE
G-2	SA	2/6
ONI	NR	2/19
STATE (less Passport)	NR	2/11
FBI	*	2/13
CSC	NR	2/12
HCUA	NR	2/6
OSI	NR	2/5
PASSPORT	NR	2/13
I&N		

* 10/12/50 - Investigation revealed nothing derogatory regarding Subject's character, reputation, employment, neighborhood, and associates.

This data is property of Inspection and Security Office, to be returned when subject is no longer covertly used. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned

SECRET

SECRET

FORM NO. 38-46
JUL 1952

P2-2359F 1987

FBI-CPENA - Oct 50 Listing Derog

OSI - NR

ONI - NR

15 Feb 52

Talked to Bill [illegible] on 23 Jan 52 — He will call [illegible]

Called Osborne & gave secretary info that will check again 23 Jan

Called Ken Clayton 15 Jan 4:10. Is going to Lafayette Here checks and will let me know sometime the results. Couldn't say how long it will take

Called Clayton 23 Jan 52

Clayton called me & said clearance was still cooking 24 Jan

SC Air Force Navy

19 Jan 1903 Wellston Ohio

Q clearance NY 6514 Feb 48.

TO: Chief, Special Security Division
Attn: Mr. Clayton

FROM: STC SFB

SUBJECT: PZ-2359

1. The following biographical data is available on Subject:

Thomas Edgar Davis
1596 Neil Avenue
Columbus, Ohio

Acting Head of Research, Ohio State University
Research Foundation

BSC in Business Administration 1939 Ohio State U.

1939-1942 Assistant Auditor, Dean's Office

Since 1942 has been Assistant to Director
Research Foundation.

2. Date of Birth will be forwarded as soon as received.

SECRET

Received this info from Osborne 11 Dec 58
Birth date etc to come.

Thomas Edgar Davis
1596 Neil Avenue
Columbus, Ohio
Act Head of Research
OSU Research
Foundation
BSC - Bus Adm 1939
Ohio State U.
1939-1942 Asst Auditor
Dean's Office
Has been asst to Director
Research Foundation Aug 1942

S E C R E T

TO : Chief, Special Security Division
Attn: Mr. Clayton
FROM : STC/SPB
Date 27 December 1951

SUBJECT: Thomas E. Davis **
~~James B. Owens, Director, Ohio State University Research Foundation~~
P.Z. # 2359
EE-742-AD

A. DEADLINE: (1)____ (2)____ (3)____ (4)____ (5)____

B. CHARACTER OF CASE: (1)O.C. x (2)P.O.C. x (3)C.N.C.__ (4)C.S.C.__ (5)P.__

C. CLASSIFICATION: Agent___ Clerical___ Service___ Other Cover

D. AREA: Europe x Middle East__ Far East__ Latin America__ Specific____

E. SUBJECT'S COVER: U.S. Govt.____ For. Govt.____ Academic____
Commercial____ Religious____ Professional____ Pres. Empl. x
Undesignated____ Other____

F. ACTION: Investigation, including covert name checks x
Covert name checks only____
Development of biographic data____
Reply as soon as possible re I&S check__ FBI check__ Other____
Special name checks____

G. SUGGESTED COVER FOR INVESTIGATION:
General U.S. Government interest____
Non-government, commercial interest x
Special____

H. The chief of the interested Division has certified that OSO operational files and documents contain no information of investigative or security interest in addition to that set forth in PRQ I and II. (Reviewed by): ____

I. Please return attached PRQ Part I PHS 57's Biog.Data with result of your action.
Biographic Data is contained in EE-742-AD

OO has granted a release for subject's use by the Division.
**Per telephone conversation McMahon/Clayon 29 Dec 51

S E C R E T

Tom,

Pls. make paper changes to replace Owens with Davis in this action, because Owens resigned his position and Davis has taken his place. I have orally done this with K. Clayton I&S - 29 Dec 51. Att. paper should be returned to Osborn of Plans Staff when new papers have been initiated.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CS-1124 (Osborn)
Priority
21 December 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, STC/SPB

FROM: Chief, FLANS

SUBJECT: Request for Operational Clearance on James S. Owens, Director, Ohio State University Research Foundation

1. With reference to the conversation between Mr. Kaufman and Mr. Osborn on 20 December 1951, it is requested that action be taken to secure provisional operational clearance on Dr. James S. Owens, Director, Ohio State University Research Foundation.

2. Subject to successful clearance, it is planned to have a representative of FDW contact Dr. Owens through an appointment arranged by OO to determine if he would be willing to prepare a letter from the Foundation to the American-Scandanavian Foundation in New York. The content of this letter would introduce and sponsor financially an agent whom FDW has arranged to send to one of the Scandanavian countries under sponsorship of the American-Scandanavian Foundation.

3. Mr. Owens and his assistant, Thomas B. Davis, already possess a CIA clearance up to and including "Secret" in connection with a classified CIA project being carried out by the Mapping and Charting Laboratory of the Foundation. The O.S.U. Research Foundation has a considerable unclassified program, however, and its connection with CIA is not publicly known. It is understood that Mr. Harris Lyons, IASS, has all the details concerning the clearances on Dr. Owens and Mr. Davis.

U S daily's [illegible] [illegible]
clearance
[illegible]
[illegible]
Has limited
clearance
Hair Bramwell

4. FDW is extremely anxious to complete these arrangements, and it would be appreciated if you would treat this request as a priority matter.

cc: FDW/Barringer

SECRET

OFFICE MESSAGE

(DATE)

TO:

NAME (PERSON CALLING)

IN PERSON ☐
TELEPHONE ☐

A. M.   P. M.

DISREGARD

TELEP.   NO.   EXTENSION

RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐
WILL CALL AGAIN ☐
PLEASE CALL ☐

REMARKS:

~~Please write up a POC. I've already telephoned this to Osborne on 27 Dec.~~

~~TPO.~~

RECEIVED BY

FORM NO. 36-9
SEP 1946

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—60874-1

Dr. Owens

cross EE-742-AD

HCUA
SC
FBI - NCI
ONI
G-2

} neg

went

2/1987

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: Chief, PLANS

NO.

DATE 21 Dec 1951

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. STC/SPB		Entered	26 Dec 51		BY HAND ONLY
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

Clayton checking to find proper 1 & 5 desk (Cobrook not Dynos !!) 27 Dec 51

POC 1541 eff 27 Dec 51

OSBorne states they have clearance from OO to use name 27 Dec 51
TDO

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CS-1124 (Osborn)
Priority
21 December 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, STC/SPB

FROM: Chief, PLANS

SUBJECT: Request for Operational Clearance on James S. Owens, Director, Ohio State University Research Foundation

1. With reference to the conversation between Mr. Kaufman and Mr. Osborn on 20 December 1951, it is requested that action be taken to secure provisional operational clearance on Dr. James S. Owens, Director, Ohio State University Research Foundation.

2. Subject to successful clearance, it is planned to have a representative of FDW contact Dr. Owens through an appointment arranged by OO to determine if he would be willing to prepare a letter from the Foundation to the American-Scandanavian Foundation in New York. The content of this letter would introduce and sponsor financially an agent whom FDW has arranged to send to one of the Scandanavian countries under sponsorship of the American-Scandanavian Foundation.

3. Dr. Owens and his assistant, Thomas E. Davis, already possess a CIA clearance up to and including "Secret" in connection with a classified CIA project being carried out by the Mapping and Charting Laboratory of the Foundation. The O.S.U. Research Foundation has a considerable unclassified program, however, and its connection with CIA is not publicly known. It is understood that Mr. Harris Lyons, IASS, has all the details concerning the clearances on Dr. Owens and Mr. Davis.

4. FDW is extremely anxious to complete these arrangements, and it would be appreciated if you would treat this request as a priority matter.

SECRET

SECRET

SUPPORT AND PROTECTION BRANCH
Operational Clearance Work Sheet

SPB File No. 1982

Name ~~[illegible]~~ DAVIS, Thomas E.
(real, pseudo or Crypto)

	(check)		(date)
PRQ I		Project ______ Reviewed	
Division Traces		EFF 25 JAN 52	
OP Files		Sent FEB 2 1952 Provisional O.C.	1763
Green List		Operational Clearance	2362 MAY 7 1952
Staff C			
Local Field Traces		Operation Reviewed	
Other Field Traces			
I&S Indices	✓ [illegible] 15 Jan 52		
I&S Covert Report	[illegible] telephone conv.		
I&S Investigation			
Biog data	✓		
PRQ II			

Checked w/ JAK [illegible] Osborne for in such a hurry, thought it would be all right to [illegible] the PO [illegible] the Q on the clearance of AFL + [illegible] Francis 5e Navy [illegible] to be [illegible] called in [illegible] something concrete develops 25 Jan 52 TDO

Osborne [illegible] more [illegible] info 7 Feb 52 TDO

~~SECRET~~

2 FEB 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: SAUREL, Jean E.
DOB: 17 December 1929
POB: Port au Prince, Haiti
VMA: Haitian

1. Reference is made to the I-57 form regarding Subject who entered the United States on 2 October 1964. The files of this office contain the following pertinent information.

2. According to another office of this Agency, a Pan American Airways employee who spends considerable time in Haiti stated that during her many trips there she learned Subject has demanded and received things from members of the Ton Ton Macoutes (TTM, President DUVALIER's internal Security Force). One incident occurred at a DUVALIER rally held at the Presidential Palace on 1 May 1964. A palace guard refused to allow Subject to leave the grounds while someone was speaking. SAUREL called a member of the TTM, demanded to be released, and was allowed to leave. On 20 September 1964, a subsource of unknown reliability, whose family was well acquainted with Subject, commented that Subject was a member of the TTM.

3. According to a report received in September 1964 from an untested source, Subject, a former employee of Pan American Airways in Port-au-Prince who was recently named Director of the Haitian Tourist Bureau in New York, is an agent of President DUVALIER. DUVALIER is counting heavily on SAUREL because of the latter's experience in dealing with American personalities and situations.

CS COPY FILED IN 100-2-82

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

CSCI-316/00444-56 2/2/65
ROUTINE TRAFFIC

~~SECRET~~

201-725439

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

4. In a report dated 23 June 1964, a Pan American Airways employee who spends considerable time in Haiti advised another office of this Agency she attended a cocktail party in Port-au-Prince in late November 1963. Other guests included Jean and Suzanne SAUREL and George and Jeanne DEMCHRENSHILDT. [This office has previously furnished the Federal Bureau of Investigation with information concerning the DEMOHRENSCHILDT's (file 100-32965) who were acquainted with Lee Harvey OSWALD.] Although it was not clear to Source if Subject and his wife were personally acquainted with the DEMCHRENSCHILDT's, the SAURELS provided the following information about George DEMOHRENSCHILDT at the party:

a. He is of Polish descent or citizenship.

b. At the time of the KENNEDY assassination, he had a $104 thousand contract with the Haitian Government to explore the country's natural resources.

c. He is said to be a geologist.

5. It is requested that the above information not be disseminated further without the prior approval of this Agency.

CSCI-316/00444-65

RID/CE: JMA/JB/ab

Based on: MIM 469-64 [Marilyn Wilcox] 06
[Mrs. A. LEVEQUE Bernadine] 06
[HTPA] 22 1414 [EVLEMON-5] 01
extract of DCE 17071 [WILCOX] 06 provided by Paul Hartman,
CI/RA

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

5/11

DIAZ Lanz

SECRET

22 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversations with REICHHARDT, 8, 9, 16, 17 September 1959

1. On 8 September Reichhardt phoned to report the following:

a. He took Marcos DIAZ Lanz to the office of INS on Monday, 7 September to take care of his immigration status. (Comment: I was later called by Bill COTTER of the Alien Branch, CS concerning this. COTTER said that when they reported this to INS - that service said that AHRENS, the INS man in Miami has told them that DIAZ' hearing had already been held shortly after his arrival. COTTER implied that Bernie was not reporting accurately on the situation in Miami. I have not repeated this to Bernie, because Alien Branch seems to be in something of a tissy in regard to the new people in INS with whom they are dealing as a result of recent transfers of personnel.)

b. Bernie asked me to clarify what I wanted in the way of an affidavit of support for the wife of Marcos DIAZ. I dictated a simple statement and told Bernie to have it notarized and accompanied by a bank statement or similar document indicating WILLIAMS' ability to support Mrs. D should it become necessary.

c. Bernie reported that Mrs. Catherine TAAFE, the international busybody claims that she is going to Cuba on our instigation. She is accompanied by her entire family. This information came from the Miami Chief of Detectives to the OO Representative.

d. Bernie asked how he could identify himself to the three evacuees in Miami we have instructed him to contact re going to the Dominican Republic on our behalf. I told him to use Dave Morales' name.

e. He asked me for information on our dispatch to Cuba in connection with the PRQs for AMCOO and the gift. I told him I'd check and let him know. (Comment: The same day I saw a dispatch from Havana answering the questions, an info copy of which went to Bernie.)

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2. I phoned Reichhardt on 9 September and we discussed the following matters:

04

a. I told him about the visit of Angel ROS. He said he had talked with BYERS on this matter and that BYERS 04 reported that ROS came to Miami on 1 September and left on 3 September. 04 BYERS thinks ROS is a secret police agent. Bernie is to see BYERS for details on 04. this. (Comment: Reichhardt's report was received on 11 September.)

b. Reichhardt asked me to check on his money situation since no deposit has been made.

c. Reichhardt asked if I had seen copies of the news letter being distributed by Emilio NUNEZ Portuondo called Latin American Events. NUNEZ is listed as editor and publisher and the firm is Latin American Affairs Inc., 1028 Connecticut Avenue, Washington. The first issue was published on 7 August. The 17 August issue includes a list of Communists. (Comment: I am arranging for the CIA library to procure loan copies of the publication for me to review.)

d. NUNEZ was in Miami last week. ORTEGA did not see him, but according to ORTEGA's sources, NUNEZ strongly implied that he has succeeded in obtaining US support in the Departments of State and Defense including commitments for training sites in the United States. NUNEZ also said that he is in touch with Col. King. This was covered in UFGA-15.

3. On 15 September I talked with Reichhardt concerning the following:

a. Ricardo LORIE saw ROS. Bernie will see LORIE about this.
b. Bernie will see FOX this week.
c. The addresses for the two evacuees who came by way of El Salvador are not correct. I told Bernie to try to find out where they are from the third, with whom he is in contact.
d. Bernie asks that his local travel order be renewed. (Comment: I checked this and the order has been renewed through 31 December 1959.)

4. On 16 September the following matters were discussed with Reichhardt:

4188

* ([illegible] 24)

a. SALVENTIS: He called in the morning to ask for information on this man. According to Reichhardt, LORIE says that he was fired from the DIER for anti-Communist activities and was expected to arrive in Miami last night. LORIE is worried about him because of his previous post as No. 2 man in the DIER. The Cuban card confirms that he held the latter post.

b. De LORIE says that he knows ROS well, and likes him. They met in Miami last week. ROS is in Miami again. ROS is principally interested in getting Reynaldo BLANCO out of Cuba. ROS says he was told the American Embassy can have no part of this but suggested he (ROS) ask De LORIE to see his Miami contact about assistance. Bernie discouraged LORIE about helping BLANCO. Bernie feels it is strange that Station Havana would tell ROS about LORIE's Miami contact and that the former might have mis-represented what was said. (Comment: We cannot positively identify BLANCO - although such an individual was listed by LORIE and the DIAZ Lanz as an Army officer. He may have been one of the 1957 regular army plotters.)

c. LORIE also asked help in converting Pesos to dollars. Bernie did not give him an answer on this.

d. LORIE said he wants to establish contact with ROS. The plan we have so far only envisages communication from ROS in Havana to LORIE. While Bernie would prefer to handle the matter personally, I think I convinced him that this is unfeasible because of the danger of provocation. He therefore suggested having 04 Cheesman brought into the picture, anonymously, as an individual who would get in touch with LORIE when there is something for him from ROS - and who will call LORIE periodically to find out if LORIE wants to transmit anything to ROS. This sounds OK to me. Bernie will see CHEESMAN within the next few days on this.
04

e. LORIE told Bernie that Cuban opposition views BONSAL's trip to the US as a victory for the opposition - but that if BONSAL returned to Cuba they will view the return as a triumph for CASTRO.

f. According to an OO source Mrs. Katherine TAAFE will be returning to the US from Cuba in a few days. She told at least one American in Cuba, Harry Rosenfeld, that she is working for CIA.

2188

g. In connection with my earlier query re the report from Cuba that the Revolutionary Air Force is planning to remove a couple of planes from the US to Cuba without an export permit, Bernie got the following information 04 from BYERS. A Cuban air force mission is in Miami concerning the aircraft. The Cubans are happy with the 04 way BYERS has handled things for them even though they don't have the export license yet. BYERS has been asked 04 to a party in Havana to be given by Juan Almeida in his honor. He may go on Friday. Do we have requirements for him?

5. On the morning of 17 August I phoned Bernie to tell him about the followup on the report concerning the planes (Haba 2653). He said Reynolds 03 phoned him on the evening of 16 September about this. Bernie said he passed the information to Customs, who said that since the Cuban Air Force are the owners of the planes (they are AT 6's) there is little that can be done if they file flight plans for a local flight and then leave for Cuba. They asked Bernie for suggestions and he said he had none. BYERS reports that 04 the Cubans asked him if he could find American pilots for the planes - and he said he'd try, but actually has no intention of doing so. BYERS 04 was impressed at the speed and accuracy of our information, but believes that the Cuban Government is being precipitate in expecting to get the planes out.

03
T. J. Flores
WH/III/AO

7/BR

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
RID/

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. THARE WH/3 Ca				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				
18.				
19. RIMS				
20. RID/FI	1400L			2351

PERMANENT CHARGE
FOR YOUR RETENTION

RECORD COPY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

QDCHAR

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT INDEX	FILE NUMBER 201-259716
DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE 18 Aug 59	DOCUMENT NUMBER UMWA-12

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. UMMA 12

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. 03 WH/III/AO/Flores			
2.			
3. AO/Then			
4. Carib/C			R
5. AO/Tharpe			m
6.			
7. Carib/R			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14. RI/AN			
15. RI/FI			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1- COPY DETACHED for chrono

1 to 3: Please see that copy goes to Hava. Discuss this w/WH 3/Carib

Copy sent to Station Havana non accountable pouch 2 Sept

14 - Pls process for 201-259.716. Leave this cover sheet attached

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

1/BR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
UMWA-12

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM
Miami (KARHLEY) ([illegible])

DATE
13 August 1959

SUBJECT
Report of Contact with QDCHAR on 13 August 1959

RE "O X" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
See Para 10.

REFERENCE(S)
UMWA-11

1. QDCHAR was asked first to bring me up to date on what he and the others in his group have been doing and he reported that they were not doing much of anything except waiting. Waiting, first, for some funds which they are expecting to come primarily from the sale of the C-46; and, second, waiting for the establishment of some better communication with their contacts in Cuba.

2. With regard to the aircraft, DALEM told me on this date that he believes he does now have a sale for the aircraft and he thinks the sale price will be between US$50 and US$55 thousand.

3. QDCHAR said that 02 QDCOVE has communicated with someone (he wasn't sure of the name) in an attempt to solicit funds from people in Cuba. QDCHAR presented this in the light that 02 QDCOVE was "authorizing" some people in Cuba to go ahead and solicit funds. In this connection, QDCHAR mentioned that at one time in the past Julio LOBO (note: this name has never been mentioned in any previous conversations with this group) had considered donating US$100 thousand for the air force school which QDCHAR was promoting at that time, but apparently became frightened of the deal and nothing along this line materialized. QDCHAR said that he was hopeful that sometime he would be able to re-establish contact with LOBO. All this reference is entirely coincidental to my suggestions made to LEBANOW that I might try to bring this group together with Julio LOBO. Having learned of this previous connection, I want to revive this idea and proceed with the plan to bring these two together.

4. If and when they are able to accumulate some funds, it is their intention to go ahead with their plans for the establishment of a propaganda program which would be initially voice radio. QDCHAR said that he had been trying to persuade 02 QDBIAS and QDCOVE to a more narrow program within the limitations which I had cited for them in a previous meeting (See UMWA-11). He said he thinks now that this is the more realistic approach, but 02 QDCOVE holds to the original thinking that they cannot commit themselves to such limitations. QDCHAR informed me that 02 QDCOVE requests another meeting with me. He was told that I would be away for a few days but would contact him as soon as I return.

5. I then questioned QDCHAR about his knowledge and QDBIAS' knowledge of the presence of Soviet Russians in Cuba. QDCHAR stated that his only information had come 05 to him through Douglas ROOT (this is the Canadian whom QDCHAR referred to frequently in his earlier debriefing by SADELLY et al). Root claimed to him to have seen the 05 Soviets in Santiago de Cuba and QDCHAR said that furthermore he had obtained the names which he passed to Colonel NICHOLS in the American Embassy in Havana. When asked if he thought these were the same Soviets that QDBIAS had referred to in his testimony in Washington, QDCHAR said he felt that they were, although he believed QDBIAS' information was obtained independent of his, QDCHAR's, source.

6. Going on in this vein, QDCHAR stated that 05 ROOT is one of several people whom QDCHAR encouraged to remain in place and to go along with Raul CASTRO and others for the purpose of obtaining more specific information on Communists and Communist activities in the armed forces. He said that along this line ROOT had been intro- 05 duced to Fidel CASTRO's secretary, whose name is Maria. QDCHAR said her full name is a Russian name but at the moment he can only recall the name "Maria". Through this relationship, it was expected that ROOT 05 would develop a good deal of information. Others named in this connection were Ramir VALDES, who is close to Raul Castro, Juan FERNANDEZ de Castro of the Air Force, and Efrain FAJARDO, whom QDCHAR says is an American. QDCHAR is certain that if he by some means can re-establish communication with these individuals he will obtain important information regarding Communist activities in the Cuban armed forces.

201-259716

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.
1 of 2

10/BR

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
		[illegible]-12

7. In answer to his appeal for assistance, I said I would try to help him devise some means of establishing this communication. He suggested that we pass word to his wife to contact Juan FERNANDEZ de Castro before she leaves for the purpose of putting him in contact with anyone we want to name and to instruct him in QDCHAR's name to pass on any and all information he has at this time.

8. This group still believes, in spite of what has been reported from Cuba, that, while they may have some little different view as to how much MORGAN can be trusted, Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo and MORGAN and the men of the Second Front of the Escambray are and will remain anti-Castro and eventually will move against him.

9. It was learned that QDCHAR is presently living in Frank FIORINI's house at 2030 SW 60th Court, Miami, telephone MO 7-[illegible]. He also informed me that ODENVY had been talking with him about some local friends through whom he produced the names of some acquaintances of those whose names are Russian. I have not yet had an opportunity to discuss this with the ODENVY agent involved.

10. I will meet with the group again at the end of this week, at which time I expect they will have some modified position with regard to their activities and will appeal again for assistance. Meantime, it is recommended that QDCHAR's recommendation with regard to having his wife get in touch with FERNANDEZ de Castro and to get him debriefed be passed to the Havana Station.

Hanley
PATRICK I. HANLEY

3-WH

FORM 10-57 53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.
				2 of 2

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS 2/WH/3 31

DISPATCH

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO. Chief, Special Affairs Staff		NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE AKF		ABSTRACT MICROFILM

SUBJECT JMPALM/Operational
Progress Report for the Months of November and December 1963 for Identity

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCES: A. UFGA 12038, 24 October 1963
B. UFGA 11883, 15 October 1963 → 201-301754
C. UFGA 12903, 10 October 1963

[illegible] is a regular contact of 201-301754

OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Identity was originally contacted by JMPALM Case Officer in mid-1963. The results of Identity's assessment by the JMPALM Case Officer were reported in detail in Reference B. It later developed that Identity was an acquaintance of AMPAL-1 who was subsequently put in contact with Identity for training and subsequent recruitment.

2. Training sessions continued between AMPAL-1 and Identity through most of November and early December 1963. As in other newly recruited JMPALM assets, the agent was regularly critiqued as to the value of his information and was provided with regular guidance in order to better strengthen his value to JMPALM. Following is a list of those persons with whom the subject is in contact on a regular basis or with whom he corresponds frequently:

No 201 ✓ a. Dominican Air Force Colonel Pedro BENOE who visited Miami from the Dominican Republic. BENOE plans to return to Miami in early 1964. 05 CIT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

No 201 ✓ b. Antonio LLANO Montes, a Cuban newspaperman now living in the Dominican Republic who occasionally visits the Miami area. 05 05 CIT CUBA [illegible]

No 201 ✓ c. Retired Dominican Army Colonel Fernando CARTAGENA who resides in Miami but who maintains regular correspondence with many Dominican military leaders. 05

201-330804 05 FR 201-330804 CIT HAITI @ MIAMI [illegible]

✓ d. Edward DENIS, a Haitian exile currently residing in Miami, who corresponds regularly with several Haitian youth leaders who are in opposition to Duvalier and who visit Miami from time to time.

(continued)

Attachment: u/s/c
Identity

CS COPY

att Dominican/AN 7 SAS/ESC

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/attach USC
2 - C/SAS w/attach USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO

INDEX

DATE TYPED 18 Jan 64	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-13643	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 200-120-69 201-301754	

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 Encl - 5

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MISFILED -

5

12/[illegible]

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH 05	SECRET	UFGA-13543

201-7[illegible] e. George FRANCIS, [illegible] Consul in Miami. FRANCIS is in almost daily contact with [illegible] when the latter is in Miami, and is visited by Identity frequently.

f. Mario, [illegible]OBA del Caribe and Jean Louis [illegible]ROSSIER, Dominican newspapermen who frequently visit Miami and are old acquaintances of Identity. 05 05

201-737853 g. Lamy CAMILLE Lamille, [illegible] Haitian diplomat who now resides in Port-au-Prince. CAMILLE Lamille has known Identity for many years. He is now residing in ~~Port-au-Prince,~~ but plans to visit Miami, Fla. in early 1964. (See UFGA-11973). 05

3. Identity uses several exile front groups as cover for his meetings with his Miami contacts and in strengthening his position as a trusted acquaintance in his communications with the aforementioned sub-sources in the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

4. Identity has presented no problems of a security nature during the period under review and no problems are foreseen at this time. He knows the JMPALM Case Officer only as "Jorge" and meets regularly with AMPAL-1 under secure conditions.

5. Subject has not yet been granted a JMPALM cryptonym as was requested in reference C which transmitted Identity's PRQ Part II to Headquarters.

RUDOLPH SABOUN 201-737802 CIT: HAITI nephew of George Francis (201-737803); Subj is Haitian Consul in Miami, Florida.

PRODUCTION

6. During the months of November and December Identity is credited with having provided JMPALM with the following intelligence reports:

UFG 4045	"Visit to the Dominican Republic by Unidentified Representative of Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt".
UFG 4046	"Political Activities Against the Civilian Junta in the Dominican Republic"
UFG 4169	"Permission for the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC) to Establish a Cuban Exile Base in Venezuela" and "Involvement of Former Cuban President Carlos Prio Socarras with the MDC."
UFG 4187	"Plans of the Dominican Triumvirate to Appoint General Elias Wessin y Wessin to the Post of Minister of War."
UFG 4255	"Alleged Plans for a Military Coup d'etat in Venezuela."
UFG 4256	"Plans of Dominican Military Leaders to Sabotage the San Isidro Air Base."
UFG 4258	"Attempts of the 14th of June Movement to Deter Recognition of the Dominican Triumvirate by the U.S."
UFG 4264	"Cuban Exile Plans to set up anti-Communist Radio and Television Programs in the Dominican Republic."

COST

7.

November 1963 Salary	$175.00
December 1963 Salary	180.00
Christmas Bonus	25.00
Total	$380.00

4

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2.

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-13563

FUTURE PLANS

8. Identity will continue to be met by AMPAL-1 until 1 March 1964 when his production will be further evaluated and he will be turned over to AMDOROTHY-1 for handling on a permanent basis. It will be noted that AMDOROTHY-1, who was recruited for a job as JMPALM principal agent to handle several recently acquired assets, is now undergoing training by AMPAL-1 in an effort to better groom this agent for the principal agent job.

END OF DISPATCH

201-301257

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 8.

0

5/pd

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA 13543

✓ IDENTITY: F 04 [Pedro VALDIVIA] 201-301754 CIT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC?

Δ MIAMI, FLORIDA Re: contact of subj

IN MIAMI, FLORIDA.

S/C

Encl P/ to UFGA 13543

21 Jan 64 201-301754

SECRET

1/PV

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. 22 [HSSA]-3054
TO Chief, WH INFO Chief of Station, Habana 16-26		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 23 Field File [30]118.30
FROM COS, [San Salvador]		DATE 18 June 1959
SUBJECT Operational Delivery of Material to Subjects of HAVA-2027		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED See Para 1		

REFERENCE(S)
HAVA-2027 (RYBAT)

It is requested that the following items sent under separate cover be delivered to subjects of reference.

1. _Tribuna Libre_ dated 13 May 1959
2. _Opinion Estudiantil_ dated 15 May 1959
3. Notebook containing notes on communists and communist activities extracted from local publications.
4. March issue of _Latinamerica_
5. Copies of _La Jolarria_ dated 23 May 1959
6. Copy of _Las Historias de Espionaje_ mas asombrosos del mundo by Kurt Singer
7. _Paradojas del Comunismo_ by Jose H. Leitz
8. _Cartas de un Cura Comunista_ by Agustin B. Elizalde
9. Two copies of the study mentioned in HSSA-3039
10. Book entitled KRUSCHEV by David Rosenberg and Mauricio Carlavilla and newspaper clippings.

Arthur K. [illegible]

Enclosure:
1-10 As listed above USC

16 June 1959

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters w/encl
1 - Habana w/o encl
3 - Files w/o encl

AKH:lhe

201-259120

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1.

3/90

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
RID/AN

RI/AN

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH [illegible]			3 Jun 1959	E/2
2. CH/M/IPS				PT
3. SALV/R				
4.				
5. Cuba				M
6. WH/3/Martin Thorpe				MT
7. WH/3/J Then				
8.				
9.				
10. WH/3/C				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				
18.				
19.				
20. RID/FI	14[illegible]			

RECLASSIFIED
RI/AN
RI/MIS
RI/Files

RECORD COPY

COMMENTS

COPY DETACHED

Subjects are Pedro Diaz Landa and Andres Diaz Rojas

6 & 7 AMWARBLE 03 Believe ~~Owen~~ [Faunt] is holding these things.

10, [illegible]
FOR YOUR RETENTION

8341 S.W. 27th Terrace
Miami 55, Florida

~~removed~~ it docs sent to umw. W-13 Triami for delivery to him.

~~AMWARBLE~~
~~Zite~~

Cross reference to 201-185,869
Pedro Diaz Lanz

~~[illegible]~~

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER 201-259120
~~63-120-11~~

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 19 June 59

DOCUMENT NUMBER 23 [DBS]-03344

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

H07

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET (When Filled In) AUG 24 17 58 '62

ORIG. J. Langdon:jg
UNIT TFW/Intel/Reports
EXT. 5547
DATE 24 August 1962

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] CABLE SECT.

CONFIRMATION COPIES: TFW 13

TDCS DB-3/651,144

INFORMATION COPIES: CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 5, IW 2, CA 2, CA/PRG, OS, WH 9

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 24 August 1962

PRECEDENCE: ☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

TFW/R	2	TFW/PA-PROP	2	WH/PACY	1
TFW/INT	2	TFW/WAVE	1	WH/3/CR	1
TFW/FI	2	TFW/SI	1	WH/3/P	2
TFW/CI	2				
TFW/PM	1	OS/SSD/Bauman 1			

BASED ON (Fld. Rpt.-Proj.)
PACY-8333 (IN-46636)
NP (HY IF-1) 02
PACY-8349 (IN-49327)
NP (HY HULA-1) 02
WAVE-7053 (IN-45475)
~~NP (AMBUD - 1)~~
Liaison *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

CONTROLLED DISSEM

~~Thinfe~~
Ryan File Varone

DD/P INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S): WH/3/P/R

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET (When Filled In)

[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER: C/TFW/Intel John W. Koppel for QCB 03

COPY NO.

3/8R

14-00000

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY	CUBA/PANAMA	REPORT NO.	TDCS DB-3/651,144
SUBJECT	ATTEMPT OF ANTONIO VARONA, OF CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, TO OBTAIN SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT CHIARI OF PANAMA IN ACTION TO OVERTHROW CASTRO REGIME	DATE DISTR.	24 AUGUST 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	14-21 AUGUST 1962	REFERENCES	IN -46636 IN-49327 IN-45475
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	PANAMA, (PANAMA CITY (15-21 AUGUST 1962)		
APPRAISAL	2	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PARA 1: PANAMANIAN (F) CLOSE TO PRESIDENT CHIARI. PARAS 2-3: PANAMANIAN (C) WITH CONTACTS IN HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL CIRCLES.

1. ON 15 AUGUST 1962 ANTONIO VARONA LOREDO, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (CRC), VISITED PRESIDENT ROBERTO CHIARI OF PANAMA AND REQUESTED CHIARI TO ORGANIZE AND HOST A MEETING OF CENTRAL AMERICAN CHIEFS OF STATE ON THE CUBAN ISSUE WITH EMPHASIS ON INFILTRATION OF CASTRO AGENTS INTO CENTRAL AMERICA. VARONA SAID THAT SUCH A MEETING SHOULD BE HELD AT A VERY EARLY DATE AND THAT CHIARI SHOULD INVITE PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO ATTEND. CHIARI TOLD VARONA THAT THIS WOULD BE A MOST SERIOUS UNDERTAKING REQUIRING INTENSIVE STUDY AND THAT HE COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT TO VARONA ON THE MATTER. ON 16 AUGUST VARONA LEFT PANAMA FOR SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, SAYING HE WOULD RETURN TO PANAMA ON

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T
CONTROLLED DISSEM

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	FBI

INS REPCINCLANT

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

1/BR

20 AUGUST AND HOPED TO TALK TO PRESIDENT CHIARI AGAIN AT THAT TIME.

2. ON 20 AUGUST A GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES IN PANAMA CALLED ON MARCOS ROBLES, PANAMANIAN MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT AND JUSTICE, AND REQUESTED ROBLES TO TRY TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT CHIARI TO PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT IN PANAMA OF A TRAINING BASE FOR CUBAN EXILES.

3. ON 21 AUGUST PRESIDENT CHIARI SAID THE MAIN PURPOSE OF VARONA'S VISIT WAS TO REQUEST CHIARI'S APPROVAL OF A TRAINING BASE IN PANAMA, AND THAT HE HAD TOLD VARONA HE WOULD TAKE THE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER, CHIARI DISCUSSED IT WITH MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT SUBSEQUENTLY AND IT WAS AGREED THAT PERMISSION WOULD NOT BE GRANTED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRAINING SITE.

4. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ON 13 AUGUST DR. JOSE MIRO CARDONA, PRESIDENT OF THE CRC, SAID IN MIAMI THAT VARONA WAS LEAVING MIAMI 14 AUGUST ON A TRIP TO PANAMA AND COSTA RICA. MIRO SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WAS GENERAL PUBLIC RELATIONS WITH NO PARTICULAR MOTIVE IN MIND. HE MENTIONED THAT VARONA WOULD SEE PRESIDENT CHIARI WHILE HE WAS IN PANAMA TO DISCUSS THE CUBAN PROBLEM IN GENERAL AND ATTEMPT TO ENLIST "FURTHER SUPPORT FOR THE CAUSE." HE SAID VARONA WOULD ALSO INQUIRE OF CHIARI WHETHER THERE WERE ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON A SUGGESTED MEETING OF THE

FOREIGN MINISTERS OF CENTRAL AMERICA WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WHEN HE (MIRO) WAS IN THE AREA IN JUNE. THERE WERE APPARENTLY REASONS FOR VARONA'S TRIP OTHER THAN THE OSTENSIBLE ONES STATED BY MIRO. THERE ARE RUMORS THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN MIAMI ARE MAKING EFFORTS TO OBTAIN HELP IN CONVINCING PRESIDENT CHIARI TO PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT IN PANAMA OF A CUBAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE HEADED BY DR. MIRO CARDONA.

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCLANT

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

de Varona

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Base, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
JMATE/
Transmittal of Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Alberto PONZOA y Alvarez 04

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Process MOC

1. Transmitted herewith is the Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Mr. Alberto PONZOA y Alvarez 04 (aka "Junior" 08).

2. Subject was originally a contact of the Havana Station and in the summer of 1960, using his boat PISCIS 08 made the first of four successful sea rendezvous operations with MATUSA TIME. He was subsequently forced to escape from Cuba, in PISCIS 08, in December 1960. Since this date Subject has sailed on many maritime operations in WASP, MATUSA TIME and on several Cuban-crewed boats. On several occasions he has effected rubber-boat beach landings to meet reception parties under extremely hazardous circumstances.

3. In Miami Subject was associated with the AMDIPs but has become disenchanted with this group because of constant political squabbles and their lack of ability to perform to his satisfaction. He now wishes to disassociate himself completely from any Cuban political group and desires to place himself under KUBARK control.

4. It is proposed to use Subject as a small boat captain in maritime operations; as an intermediate craft crewman in beach landings; as interpreter on American-crewed vessels; to assist in training Cuban, non-English-speaking crews and to assist generally where and when needed.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
MOC

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
10 August 61

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

5/BR

14-00000

de Varona

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACTION PERFORMED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Base, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
JMATE/
Transmittal of Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Alberto PONZOA y Alvarez

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Process MOC

1. Transmitted herewith is the Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Mr. Alberto PONZOA y Alvares (aka "Junior").

2. Subject was originally a contact of the Havana Station and in the summer of 1960, using his boat PISCIS, made the first of four successful sea rendezvous operations with MATUSA TIME. He was subsequently forced to escape from Cuba, in PISCIS, in December 1960. Since this date Subject has sailed on many maritime operations in WASP, MATUSA TIME and on several Cuban-crewed boats. On several occasions he has effected rubber-boat beach landings to meet reception parties under extremely hazardous circumstances.

3. In Miami Subject was associated with the AMDIPs but has become disenchanted with this group because of constant political squabbles and their lack of ability to perform to his satisfaction. He now wishes to disassociate himself completely from any Cuban political group and desires to place himself under KUBARK control.

4. It is proposed to use Subject as a small boat captain in maritime operations; as an intermediate craft crewman in beach landings; as interpreter on American-crewed vessels; to assist in training Cuban, non-English-speaking crews and to assist generally where and when needed.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:

MOC

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
10 August 61

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-2011

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

10/29/ DISSEM PER SOP #111 SECRET FRP: STAFF

ACTION: LA-5 (487) INFO: FILE, VR, IP/DMS, ODPO-D, (8/W)

78 0380176 PAGE 001 IN 0380176
TOR: 031910Z MAR 78 [GAYA] 22066

22

S E C R E T 031840Z MAR 78 STAFF

16-14
CITE [GUAYAQUIL] 22066

16-12 16-4
TO: DIRECTOR INFO [QUITO,] LA [MIAMI.]

WNINTEL REAM TRACE

16-14
REFS: A. [GUAYAQUIL] 22069 TOO OLD
B. DIRECTOR 180640

D

08
1. [BASE] HAS NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN EVELIO DUQUE MIYAR. DUQUE RECENTLY OPENED CONFECTIONARY/BACKERY STORE DIRECTLY ACROSS STREET FROM CONSULATE AND CATERS LIGHT LUNCHES TO MANY OF 08 CONSULATE EMPLOYEES. DURING RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH [COB] HE MADE REFERENCE TO HIS ACTIVITY WITH GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN CUBA AND THEN 08 MIAMI. ALTHOUGH HE NEVER ADMITTED TO WORKING FOR RIACTION, [BASE] WAS INTERESTED IN KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT HIS PAST ASSOCIATION WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT.

2. DUQUE HAS BEEN IN ECUADOR APPROX 5 YEARS; IS ECUADOREAN CITIZEN 08 AND MARRIED TO ECUADOREAN OF LEBONESE EXTRACTION. [BASE] HAS NO INFO SHOWING HE IN ANYWAY INVOLVED IN DRUG ACTIVITIES SUBSEQUENT TO 1973 REPORT.

3. FILE: 201-0302008. E2, IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

3 Mar 78
201-302008

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

9/80

/221 DISSEM PER SOP #111 SECRET FRP: . . . .

STAFF

CONF: LA-5 INFO: FILE, VR, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, (8/P)

78 0374944 PAGE 001

TOT: 021727Z MAR 78 DIRECTOR 180640

S E C R E T

STAFF 021727Z DIRECTOR 180640 16-4, 16-12

TO: [GUAYAQUIL] INFO LA/[MIAMI, QUITO.]

16-14

WNINTEL REAM TRACE

REFERENCE: A. [GUAYAQUIL] 22049 -16-14

B. [GUAYAQUIL] 17852 (DATED 01 AUG 73) 16-14

1. FOLLOWING ARE HQS TRACES ON EVELIO D U Q U E MIYAR (201-0302008):

A. IN 56 DUQUE STARTED HIS FIGHT AGAINST BATISTA IN THE ESCAMBRAY AND OBTAINED THE RANK OF CAPTAIN. IN JUN 59 HE FORMED AN ORGANIZATION UNDER THE NAME OF "CUBAN ANTI-COMMUNIST YOUTH" IN ORDER TO COMBAT THE CASTRO REGIME. IN AUG 60 HE OPENLY RAISED ARMS AGAINST CASTRO IN THE ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS.

approx 1 July 61

B. DUQUE AND FOUR OTHERS ARRIVED MIAMI AREA BY BOAT ON 5 JUN 61. A POA WAS GRANTED DUQUE ON AUG 61 AND HE WAS CONTACTED AND DEBRIEFED. HE WAS PUT IN TOUCH WITH JMWAVE. DUQUE ASKED FOR OUR ASSISTANCE TO OBTAIN ARMS AND RE-GROUP HIS GUERRILLA FIGHTERS IN CUBA. IT WAS AGREED TO ASSIST DUQUE AND GROUP. HE RECEIVED NO SALARY AND THE ONLY COMMITMENT MADE WAS TO TRAIN AND INFILTRATE DUQUES GROUP IF THEY FOLLOW OUR DIRECTION AND CONTROL. ON MAY 62 HIS POA WAS CANCELLED BECAUSE DUQUE REFUSED TO PERMIT TEAM TO ENTER CUBA. SINCE THEN WE HAVE HAD NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH DUQUE.

recruited
opa 1 oct 61
knew c/o's
in alias

C. IN JULY 63 DUQUE NOW LEADER OF THE EJERCITO CUBANO ANTICOMMUNISTA, FRENTE ESCAMBRAY (ECA) AND HIS ECA GROUP PLANNED TO TAKE THE KEYS ON NORTHERN COAST OF LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. THE TRUE PURPOSE OF THE MISSION, HOWEVER, WAS TO EMBARRASS THE USA AND FORCE IT INTO DIRECT ACTION AGAINST CUBA. ALSO WANTED TO SEEK RECOGNITION FROM OAS AND UN WITH THE HOPE OF PUTTING THE USA IN THE MIDDLE.

D. IN 66 THE FBI REPORTS THAT DUQUE AND HIS ECA GROUP HAVE NOT BEEN ACTIVE BECAUSE OF A LACK OF FUNDS.

E. FROM 1966 UNTIL 1973 WE HAVE NO INFORMATION REGARDING HIS ACTIVIITES.

F. 24 IN 73 (REFERENCE B) YOUR STATION REPORTED THAT A SENSITIVE [UNILATERAL] PENETRATION OF THE LOCAL DRUG MILIEU REPORTED THAT

RECORD COPY SECRET

2 Mar 78

201-302008

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

5/80

SECRET

STAFF

78 0374944 PAGE 002
TOT: 021727Z MAR 78 DIRECTOR 180640

GUAYAQUIL DRUG TRAFFICKER ALFREDO ORDONEZ GONZALEZ TRAVELLED TO SAN JOSE AND MET WITH DRUG TRAFFICKERS, --- EVELIO DUQUE BORN CA 33, CUBA: SERVED IN CUBAN REBEL ARMY, LEFT CUBA IN 60 AND OWNS HACIENDA NEAR SAN JOSE. TRACES AT THAT TIME AND PRESENT REVIEW OF 201 FILE FAIL TO CONTAIN ANY INFORMATION CONNECTING DUQUE WITH DRUG TRAFFICKING.

2. HQS INTERESTED IN LEARNING YOUR INTEREST IN DUQUE. PLEASE ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-302008. E2, IMPDET.>
LA/COMMENT: REF REQUESTED TRACES ON SUBJECT. 03
ORIG: LA/CO/WH (BARR X1491); COORD: C/LA/CO/WH [(MANELL)];
LA/CARI ( ); AUTH: LA/VCE/E (TURBEVILLE); REL: C/LA/VCE (BEARDSLEY); CL BY 012034.

AP MAR 30 78

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

18 4

$/AD

IP/AN

02/42/ SOP111 SECRET FRP: STAFF

ACTION: LA-5 (302) INFO: FILE, VR, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, (8/W)

78 0366173 PAGE 001 IN 0366173
TOR: 281725Z FEB 78 [LMIM] 27950
22

S E C R E T 281712Z FEB 78 STAFF

16-5
CITE LA/[MIAMI] 27950

16-14 16-12
TO: [GUAYAQUIL] INFO DIRECTOR, [QUITO]

WNINTEL REAM

16-14
REF: [GUAYAQUIL] 22049 0361298

1. EVELIO DUQUE MIYAR IS SUBJECT OF 201-0302008, DPOB 13 JAN 1927, LAS VILLAS, CUBA. DEFER TO HQS FOR TRACES.

2. FILE: 201-0302008. E2 IMPDET

RECORD COPY

28 Feb 78

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

201-302008

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

5/90

10/04/ SOP 111 SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA-5 (239) INFO: FILE, VR, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, (8/W)

~~78-0361298~~ PAGE 001 IN 0361298

TOR: 271519Z FEB 78 [GAYA] 22049

22

S E C R E T 271438Z FEB 78 STAFF

CITE [GUAYAQUIL] 22049

16-14 16-~~4~~ 16-12

TO: DIRECTOR INFO LA [MIAMI], [QUITO.]

WNINTEL REAM

1. REQUEST TRACES ON FORMER CUBAN CITIZEN EVELIO DUQUE MIYAR, APPROX 50 YEARS OLD AND FORMER RESIDENT OF CAMAGUEY PROVENCE; POSSIBLY INVOLVED CUBAN OPERATIONS IN MIAMI AREA DURING EARLY SIXTIES.

2. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

27 Feb 78

201-302008

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4/90

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 13 PER TOTAL COPIES 17 RUN BY 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

24

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION # 043

INFO ~~RF.~~ FILE. VR.

WHRC-2, FI

DOC. MICRO. SER.
SEP 11 1973
MICROFILMED

T 431215 PAGE 01 IN 991390

TOR:012110Z AUG 73 GAYA 17852

22

S E C R E T 012040Z AUG 73 STAFF

CITE GUAYAQUIL 17852 16-14 16-15 16-12 16-4

TO: WH/MIAMI, SAN JOSE INFO DIRECTGD, QUITO, GUATEMALA, MEXICO CITY. UFA HRS HEQ AGG HMM 872 16-4 16-2 16-3

02 02

MHABYSS PJBREEZY LEADS

1. FOLLOWING INFO NOT PASSABLE DEA FOR TIME BEING: PJBREEZY-1 (02) SENSITIVE UNILATERAL (24) PENETRATION LOCAL DRUG MILIEU REPORTED 1 AUGUST THAT GUAYAQUIL DRUG TRAFFICKER ALFREDO O R D O N E Z GONZALEZ RETURNED GUAYAQUIL 28 JULY AFTER TRAVELLING THRU MEXICO (CULIACAN), GUATEMALA AND SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. WHILE SAN JOSE, ORDONEZ MET WITH DRUG TRAFFICKERS EVELIO D U Q U E AND HERMINIO OR ERMENEGILDO D I A Z. PJBREEZY-1 PROVIDED FOLLOWING DATA:

NO: C: ECUADOR

201-302008 201-203040

DPOB: C1923, SPAIN CIT: CUBA OCC: GROCER

A. NAME: EVELIO DUQUE (201-0302008) <MET WITH GUAYAQUIL DRUG TRAFFICKER ORDONEZ>

DPOB: CUBA, CIRCA 1933

OCC: OWNS HACIENDA NEAR SAN JOSE

REMARKS: SERVED IN CUBAN REBEL ARMY BUT LEFT IN 1960 THRU INTERVENTION ITALIAN EMBASSY.

B. NAME: HERMINIO OR ERMENEGILDO DIAZ (201-0203040) <MET WITH GUAYAQUIL DRUG TRAFFICKER ORDONEZ>

DPOB: SPAIN, CIRCA 1923

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

B201-0203040
D-24-120-25
D200-11-11/3

201-0302008
01 AUG 73

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

13/25

14-00000

2

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT

RECEIVED IP/201 AUG 10 3 59 PM '73

AGENCY MESSAGE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

AUG 11 25 AM '73

RF, FILE, VR.

ACTION #

FORWARDED IP/AN

T 431215 PAGE 02-02 IN 991390

TOR:0121102 AUG 73 GAYA 17852

OCC: OWNS SUPER MARKET IN SAN JOSE.

REMARKS: NATURALIZED CUBAN CITIZEN. SERVED AS COCAINE CHEMIST FOR ANTONIO PRIETO MOREJON WHO PRESENTLY IMPRISONED ATLANTA FEDERAL PENITENTIARY.

2. FOR WH/[MIAMI] 16-4 REQUEST [STATION] 16-4 AND SLIGO TRACES DUQUE/DIAZ. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP NOT KNOW.

3. FOR [SAN JOSE] 16-15 REQUEST [STATION] 16-15 TRACES DUQUE/DIAZ. REQUEST [LIAISON] 08 NOT BE QUERIED. NO OBJECTION [UNILATERAL] 24 CHECK. 23

4. INDEX DUQUE/DIAZ, ORDONEZ. FILE: 200-11-11/3. [24] 120-25.

E2 IMPDET.

FORWARDED IP/201 AUG 13 9 40 AM '73

RECEIVED IP/AN AUG 13 11 59 AM '73

MICROFILMED
SEP 11 1973
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

7/90

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 24 ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ BY 67

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

95 AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION # 973

INFO RF. FILE. VR. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

T 450044 PAGE 01 IN 998438

TOR:092054Z AUG 73 SJOS 16381

21-15

S E C R E T 091955Z AUG 73 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 16381 (16-15)

TO: GUAYAQUIL (HEQ 16-14) INFO DIRECTOR, QUITO (HEG 16-12), WH/MIAMI (UFA 16-4) 872,
GUATEMALA CITY (HGG), MEXICO CITY (HMM) -16-3

HMABYSS PJBREEZY TRACE REPLY (02 02)

REFS: A. GUAYAQUIL 17852 (16-14) (IN 991390)
B. SAN JOSE 16364 (16-15) (IN 995294)

DOC. MICRO. SER.
SEP 11 1973
MICROFILMED

1. FOLL TRACES ON EVELIO D U Q U E PROVIDED BY HUFABRIC-5 (01) (UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF LIAISON) (24):

NAME: EVELIO D U Q U E MIVAR (201-0302008)

RESIDENT CEDULA: 113-67225-2168 SUMMARY OF TRACES

DPOB: 13 JAN 1927; LAS VILLAS, CUBA

FATHER: BENITO D U Q U E HERNANDEZ (DECEASED)

MOTHER: ELISA M I V A R MORALES (DECEASED)

WIFE: MARIE B A R A C A T (ECUADOREAN, RESIDED ECUADOR IN 1972)

SON: EVILIO CARLOS D U Q U E ESTEVEZ (U.S. CITIZEN)

ADDRESS: HOTEL DIPLOMAT, CALLE 6 BETWEEN AVENIDAS 8 AND 2 (1972)

OCCUPATION: INVESTOR

PASSPORT: ECUADOREAN NO. 0107 OF 14 APR 1972

S E C R E T

23

DE4 120-25
D200-11-11/3

RECORD COPY

201-0302008
09 AUG 73

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

13/80

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________ BY____ AT____ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 450044 PAGE 02-02 IN 998438

21-15

TOR:092054Z AUG 73 SJOS 16381

PHYSICAL DESC: WHITE, 1.80 METERS TALL, GREY HAIR,
BROWN EYES, THICK EYEBROWS

NOTE: IN 1972 DUQUE LISTED AS REFERENCES COL. MANUEL ANTONIO QUIROS NUNEZ (201-029837) OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY; RODOLFO LEITON, A LOCAL BUSINESSMAN; AND EVERADO CHAVES, CHIEF OF THE FOREIGNERS DEPARTMENT. [QUIROZ IS FORMER STATION ASSET TERMINATED IN 1967.] 24

01,24

2. [HUGLIB-8 (PENETRATION OF MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY)] REPORTS THAT DUQUE HAS FINCA NEAR ATLANTIC COAST PORT OF LIMON. [STATION] ATTEMPTING DEVELOP ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

1675

MICROFILMED
SEP 11 1973
DOC. MICRO. SER.

3. INDEX EVELIO DUQUE MIVAR. FILE: 200-11-11/3, 201-302008, [24]-120-25. E2 IMPDET.

23

SECRET

5/90

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 98 PER

TOTAL COPIES 15-3

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT	INFO			
WH8	RF. FILE . VR.		1	4
ACTION #			2	5 29
513			3	6

T 441306 PAGE 01 IN 995071

TOR:061855Z AUG 73 WMIN 19175

21-4

S E C R E T 061527Z AUG 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 19175

TO: GUAYAQUIL INFO DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE, QUITO, GUATEMALA, MEXICO CITY.

16-4 HEG 16-14 HRS ~~HCS~~ 16-12 HEQ 16-2 HGG HMM 16-15 16-3 872 3P

MHABYSS PJBREEZY

REF: GUAYAQUIL 17852 (IN 991390)

1. FOLLOWING ARE STATION TRACES SUBJECTS REF:

DOC. MICRO. SER.
SEP 12 1973
MICROFILMED

A. EVELIO D U Q U E: SUBJECT POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH EVELIO DUQUE MIYAR AKA LUIS M A R T I N HERNANDEZ (201-302008). FILE WAS TRANSFERRED HQS MAY 1968. INDEX CARDS REFLECT DOB REPORTED AS 13 JAN 27 AND 13 DEC 26. ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. A12 418 168. PER UFGW-271, 27 FEB 61, SUBJECT WAS ONE OF MOST WANTED GUERRILLA LEADERS ESCAMBRAY AND HAD BEEN OBJECT INTENSIVE SEARCH BY CUBAN GOVT. HIS GUERRILLA GROUP WAS KNOWN AS LEGION DEMOCRATICA CONSTITUCIONAL (LDC). ENTERED U.S. 5 JUNE 61 AT MIAMI. POA WAS GRANTED AUG 61. PER SEPT 61 FBI REPORT, DUQUE WAS COMMANDER ANTI-CASTRO FORCES FROM AUG 60-APR 61.

B. HERMINIO D I A Z: IN 1964, ONE HERMINIO DIAZ GARCIA (201-283848) WAS REPORTEDLY SMUGGLING NARCOTICS OR

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

B201-0203040
D200-11-11/3
D24-120-25
23

201-0302008
06Aug73

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

13/910

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY_________ PER______ TOTAL COPIES______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED_________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED_____ BY_____ AT_____ Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO

RF. FILE. VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 441386 PAGE 02 IN 995871

21-4

TOR:0618552 AUG 73 WHIM 19175

ACTING AS COURIER BETWEEN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS IN MEXICO AND U.S., USING PUERTO RICAN DOCUMENTATION. WOULD VISIT HIS MEXICAN WIFE WHO RESIDED HAVANA. THEY HAVE SON WHO BORN U.S. IT ALSO RUMORED THAT DIAZ HAD MEETINGS WITH LOCAL MEXICAN POLICE SHIEF WHO PERSONAL FRIEND. DIAZ TRAVELLED FREQUENTLY BETWEEN MIAMI AND NEW YORK AND ALWAYS SEEMED TO HAVE LARGE AMOUNTS MONEY. ANOTHER 1965 REPORT INDICATED DIAZ WAS MILITARY COORDINATOR 30TH NOVEMBER MOVEMENT AND WAS ONE OF GROUP WHICH ATTEMPTED INFILTRATE CUBA 1966.

2. SLIGO TRACES CONTAIN NO INFORMATION CONNECTING DUQUE WITH DRUG TRAFFICKING. THEY OF OPINION DIAZ IDENTICAL WITH SANDALIO HERMINO DIAZ GARCIA WHO WAS REPORTED BY CUBAN RADIO AS HAVING BEEN KILLED DURING 1966 ATTEMPT TO INVADE ISLAND. HE WAS ALSO REPORTED 1966 AS POSSIBLE GOC AGENT INFILTRATED U.S. ONLY ADDITIONAL SLIGO INFO ON DUQUE AS FOLLOWS: DPOB: 13 JAN 1927, LAS VILLAS. DURING STRUGGLE WITH BATISTA REGIME, SUBJECT WAS MEMBER "13TH OF MARCH REVOLUTIONARY DIRECTORATE." AND JOINED GUERRILLAS ESCAMBRAY 1958. IN JAN 1959, JOINED REBEL ARMY WITH RANK OF SARGEANT. HAS

S E C R E T

11/90

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 441306 . PAGE 03-03 IN 995071

TOR:061855Z AUG 73 21-14 WHIN 19175

ACTIVE EXILE GROUPS U.S. AND CONNECTED WITH RECE. IN 1963, HE WAS ACCUSED BY ORLAND BOSCH AVILA OF MISAPPROPRIATION FUNDS GIVEN HIM TO CARRY OUT WARLIKE ACTIVITIES AGAINST CUBA. BOSCH CLAIMED DUQUE USED FUNDS ON WOMEN AND PARTIES AND DEMPED ARMS HE RECEIVED INTO SEA. NO OTHER INFO.

3. FILE: 200-11-11/3; ~~24~~ 23 -120-25. E2, IMPDET

SECRET

201-0302008

2/90

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 27/74 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 14-1 BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

1		4	21
2		5	
3		6	

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION # 182

INFO RF FILE . VR . IP/AN NARC2

T 433965 PAGE 01-01 IN 992462

OR 022051Z AUG 73 [QUIT] 18654. 21-12

C O N F I D E N T I A L 022016Z AUG 73 STAFF

16-12
CITE [QUITO] 18654.

HEG 16-14 16-4 UFA 16-15 HRS 16-2 HGG HMM 872
TO: 16-3 [GUAYAQUIL] INFO DIRECTOR, ~~WH/~~[MIAMI] [SAN JOSE,] [GUATAMALA CITY,]
[MEXICO CITY.]

702
[MH]ABYSS

16-14
REF [GAYAQUIL] 17852 (IN 991390)

1P

1. 16-14 [STATION] FILES SHOW EVELIO DUQUE CUBAN CITIZEN ARRIVED QUITO 24 OCT 1966 VIA ECUATORIANA AIRLINES FROM PANAMA. PASSPORT TT-13173. NO ADDITIONAL INFO.

2. FILE: 200-11-11/3; [24] 23 120-25. E2, IMPDET.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
SEP 12 1973
MICROFILMED

D 200-11-11/3
D [24]-120.25
P3

C O N F I D E N T I A L

201-0302008
02 AUG 73

RECORD COPY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

12/90

UFGA - 105
2 April 1962

Chief, Task Force/W
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Operational/GYROSE
FAL/Vertice Tres

05

1. On 31 March 1962 [Alberto Mariano Parajon Cardenas, A 12895479], born 11 December 1933, a bank employee, Miami address: [4901 NW 18th Ave.], no telephone, was interviewed. 10

2. Source said he was a member of SAC, FAL and Vertice Tres ("The Third Position").

3. Source said that SAC (Salvar a Cuba) was destroyed by Cuban security forces.

4. Source said that FAL (Fuerza Anti-Comunista de Liberacion) is well organized, the best organized being the forces in Pinar del Rio Province. He said that FAL has some arms and ammunition, and is an action type group, conspiring to provoke an uprising and cutting off communications. Source was reluctant to name any FAL contact, but finally named 06 [Roberto Parajon Perez] as a contact man. He said that he could arrange bona fides with Parajon, and he was told that perhaps in the future someone would call upon him and introduce themselves as "amigos de Roberto" and discuss this in further detail. He agreed. He said that some months ago the FAL sent out microfilmed maps showing sites for landing arms and also its proposed caching sites, but he did not know to whom this information was passed.

MRP uses microfilm all the time to transfer its documents

5. Source said that he was also associated with Vertice Tres, and described this organization as being composed of intellectuals and professionals. Its mission is not clear because as he described it one of the functions is to explain the horrors of the Communist system to the masses by the adoption of a third position. Vertice is also interested in more subtle approaches, such as industrial slowdowns and sabotage. The emphasis, however, appears to be on propaganda and he said Vertice is on the point of obtaining a radio plant. He was asked if this was a "pirate radio", but he replied no, that it would remain on the air so that it could be heard. When asked about the DFing problems, he said he was told by an engineer who is working on this project that it was a "Delta System Radio" and they would not have to be afraid of DFing. (This does not make sense, but it was all the source knew on this subject.)

6. Source said that Vertice needs supplies, such as Minox cameras, but he would not or could not give the name of a Vertice contact in Habana.

He said there/

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

31BR

He said there is a Vertice contact in Miami, Gerardo (lnu) and although he did not know the lastname or address of Gerardo, he was going to try and locate him. He was again reminded of the "amigos" who would call on him for this information.

06.08

06 7. Source said that before he left Cuba he met with Maccio Carrillo, the niece of Justo Carrillo. She told him that Justo sent in a message saying "Be careful with Flavio." 06 Maccio asked the source to get in touch with Justo and tell him that if he had derogatory information on Flavio he should send the details. 06 She thought Justo's message was confusing. Source said that "Flavio" is the war name for Evelio Duque who also uses "Frank" and "Manolito." Source said that it is believed that the name Evelio Duque is in itself a war name.

8. Source identified Arturo Golpi, an employee of the National Bank, Agencia 4-10-40 , Linea y O Vedado, Habana, as a self-admitted member of G-2. Arturo is about 32 years old, white, stocky (about 190 pounds), 5'8" tall, white, black hair and has a large mustache. He was formerly the handyman at the bank, but because of his G-2 position he is now a man of prestige and catered to by all.

Nelson L. RAYCOCK

4180

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
Headquarters traces

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED AUG 30 1966 DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA-24799

1. Headquarters traces on the Subjects of reference and the Hudson Institute follow:

A. Alberto LLERAS Camargo (201-102576) was born in Bogota, 3 July 1906. He left school at the age of seventeen to become a journalist. He traveled to Argentina and lived in Buenos Aires for three years (1926-29) writing for various Argentina periodicals. His political career began upon his return to Colombia in 1929, when he was appointed secretary of the Liberal Party (1930-33) and received tremendous impetus under the aegis of Alfonso LOPEZ, Liberal Party leader and former President of Colombia (1934-38 and 1942-45). Subsequently, LLERAS served in the National House of Representatives (1931-34). When alfonso LOPEZ was inaugurated President in 1934, he took LLERAS into his government as Secretary General of the Presidency (1934-35), and later made him Minister of Government from 1943 to 1945. The latter year he was made Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as First Vice President of Colombia. His public service culminated then in his accession to the Presidency on the resignation of President LOPEZ in 1945. After discharging the duties of Chief Executive for a year (1945-46), LLERAS was elected Secretary General of the Pan American Union in 1947, a post which he held until 1954. He then resigned and returned to Colombia to accept the position of Rector (President) of the University of The Andes (1955-56). Devoting himself once again to politics, LLERAS began writing a column in the Liberal Daily El Espectador. In his columns he strongly criticized the Rojas regime (1953-57) and called for the return of constitutional government in Colombia. In March 1956, he was elected President of the Liberal Party and shortly thereafter (June 1956) travelled to Spain and had conversations with Laureano GOMEZ, a leader of the Conservative Party and former President of Colombia (1950-53). These two political leaders signed a manifesto condemning the Rojas regime and

CS COPY

(CONTINUED)

- 2 - 6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[redacted]	UFGW-6130	25 AUG 1966
B-201-102576 201-102576	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-308736

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 - WH/C/RR/OS
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - 201-308736

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/C/RR/OS	03 W. [illegible]	at 22 Aug 66	2621

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/RR	23/8	03
WH/C/MO		R. Ortman (phone)
WH/C/CA/P		03 A. Gonzales (draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/C	23	Thomas J. Flores 03

4/BR

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

calling for the establishment of a coalition government in Colombia through bi-partisan efforts. From November 1956 to February 1957 LLERAS served as a United Nations Observer to investigate the Hungarian situation.

LLERAS is described as a champion of the Pan American cause and as being very friendly to the United States and a firm believer in the Western type democracy.

Although he did not complete his education and has no formal degree, he has long been addressed as "doctor" as a matter of courtesy. He does, however, have honorary dggrees from several Colombian universities as well as from the University of California. He speaks English and French, is married to the former Berta PUGA (daughter of a late President of Chile) and has four children.

On 24 February 1958 [an Operational Approval was granted for the utilization of LLERAS in supporting a special operation. However, before the operation was implemented], LLERAS was elected President of Colombia. [There has been no operational interest in him since.]

24

24

B. There are no Headquarters or LNERGO traces on the Hudson Institute per se, however, LNERGO files contain derogatory information on several members of the institute which LNERGO will furnish WOFACT if we specify which of the members are of interest. If JMWAVE wished this done, please advise on which of the members information is requested.

C. There are no identifiable traces on the other subjects of paragraph 5 of reference.

2. Headquarters defers to JMWAVE regarding AMRAZZ/1's future association with the institute.

HOWARD R. COLLEARY

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COS, JMWAVE

25 AUG 1966

25 Aug. 1966
201-308736

21BR

21 FEB 1962

S E C R E T

REQUEST FOR SECTION A

REQUEST FOR: (Check one) Pseudonym ______ Alias **XX** Crypto or Derivative ______

1. Pseudonym Assigned ______

   Alias Assigned [Catherine Marie STONE] 207

   Cryptonym Assigned ______

2. Project or Agent (give adequate description) If a project, please give description at bottom of page/Section B. **AELADLE**

3. Status (Staff Employee; Staff, Contract, or Field Agent; etc.) **N.A.**

4. SR/CI/P S.M. Harrison
   Branch/Staff Case Officer

5. **CI**
   (Type of Activity: FI, CA, CI, etc.)

6. To be used in cable traffic (Yes or No) **No**

NOTE: List any pseudonyms or cryptonyms previously assigned **NEAR**

SECTION B

True Name or Project Description AELADLE (Debriefing of Soviet intelligence defector)

SR/CI ______

Sections A and B are to be separated by RI/CS when completed.

S E C R E T

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/BR

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO
BOGT-14334, 31 January 1962

IDENTITY A is Mr. James Braun, a security officer on TDY from Headquarters.

KYBAT

~~SECRET~~

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ [illegible]RNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ~~☒ SECRET~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: SR/DC

NO. [EGOT-14004]

DATE 31 Jan 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. AC/SR	[illegible]	14/2/62	
2. SR/DCOP	2/15	2/15	
3. BK/COP	15 Feb 62		
4.			
5. C/SR/CI	18 FEB	21 FEB	
6. ACSR/CI/P			
7.			
8. DC/SR 8 MAR 1962			
9.			
10.			
11. CSR/CI			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

3-5: Please note last para of covering memo from [BENTHAM] Is this statement about Berlin true? G

5-6: It is not, and I have so informed Q.

5-8: I suggest [ ] might appreciate a word from you, possibly to the effect that we KYBAT knew they were doing a good job but are even more impressed by the details.

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O-[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: SR/DC

NO. EGOT-14004

DATE 31 Jan 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. AC/SR		14/2/62	
2. SR/COP	2/15	2/15	
3. BR/COP	15 Feb 62		
4.			
5. C/SR/CI	18 FEB	23 FEB	
6. ACSR/CI/P			
7.			
8. DC/SR 8 MAR 1962			
9.			
10.			
11. CSR/CI			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

3-5: Please note last para of covering memo from Bentham. Is this statement about Berlin true? Q

5-6: It is not, and I have so informed Q.

5-8: I suggest COS might appreciate a word from you, possibly to the effect that we knew they were doing a good job but are even more impressed by the details.

RYBAT

RETURN TO CI
Background Use Only
Do Not Reprod

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O-476131

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGOT-14604
TO	Chief, EE (ATTN: Matthew L. CARSON)	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
INFO	Chief, SR (ATTN: Thorman G. CUSICK) Chief, WE (ATTN: Leonard P. SACKETT)	
FROM	Chief of Station, Germany	DATE 31 January 1962
SUBJECT	ADMINISTRATIVE Handling of a Soviet Defector	RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	See below.	☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)		

1. I suggest that the story of AELADLE, from the moment he walked into the home of Martin K. HOODINE until he was safely under ALBAHA custody in the United States, deserves compiling, analysis, and publication in the form of an Operational Aid. It richly illustrates the many problems which must and can be surmounted, and could be highly instructive to Chiefs of Station in all countries where the next Soviet defector might appear.

2. Here is the Frankfurt contribution (written at my request) to such a compilation: a cliffhanger from start to finish, but also a commentary on the many types of problems which can arise, and the fact that it takes hard work and skillful improvisation to solve them. It was a cliffhanger both before and after the Frankfurt chapter (I nominate HOODINE for a medal for his part) and ought to make excellent reading.

02

3. The handling of defectors obviously is not a new responsibility to the German Station. The CANKZONE facility which exists primarily for the receipt, establishment of bona fides, debriefing, and resettlement of defectors has existed here for the last decade. Nor is the movement by black evacuation of operational personnel a unique task for us to perform. We have accomplished this many times by use of our own integrated ODUNIT facility and also by the furnishing of alias documentation to the person of interest and accomplishing the transport via scheduled MATS flights. The significant points which made the AELADLE case unique may never again in their entirety be duplicated but in part they may well be, and therefore should be enumerated:

a. A Soviet diplomat, and member of the RIS, stationed in a non-Satellite but politically sensitive country, which at the time of AELADLE's defection was under considerable Soviet pressure.

b. The fact that the actual circumstances concerning his act of defection were such that an immediate decision by the man on the scene had to be made to take advantage of the opportunity.

c. The fact that little alternative could be given, under the facts as described in (a) above, except to believe the defector's statements and acquiesce in his demands, i.e., he possessed information of a significant and perishable nature and would disclose it completely only upon arrival in the United States.

d. The fact that once the commitments in (c) above were made every reasonable effort had to be made to accommodate the defector's demand.

e. In order to accomplish all this an untried method of evacuation, i.e., black evacuation via commercial aircraft had to be accomplished in order to successfully proceed with the undertaking.

4. A retrospective analysis as to how this case commenced, and the unique factors connected with it as enumerated above, lead me to suggest for Headquarters study what I refer to as "findings" and "areas of study." What I have labeled as "findings" in effect represent facts which, if not present, quite probably would have deprived us in Germany of participating successfully in the movement of the AELADLE family. The "areas of study," on the other hand, represent either answerable questions or matters in areas wherein operational discussions may well take place to see if some type of school-book solution can be devised.

5. I will elaborate below, where appropriate, on some of these "findings" but will first record them:

COPY ROUTING

w/2 att

1/20

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T R Y B A T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGJT-1[illegible], 31 January 1962

a. The wisdom of ALDMARK maintaining in the European area at least one field installation having assigned to it personnel representing the many competencies necessary in the intelligence undertaking has been reconfirmed.

b. The wisdom of obtaining appropriate security clearances, and having Stations brief and make witting of at least an AIS contact, the resident senior United States citizen personnel of United States flag air carriers operating within any Station's area.

c. The fallacy of depending on marginal or obsolescent equipment to accomplish sensitive tasks of high priority. We here refer to 17-year C-54 aircraft.

d. A realization that a ratio exists between the number of people made aware of a given undertaking in relation to the obstacles encountered in successfully accomplishing that undertaking.

6. A few words of elaboration are in order on the four preceding points. Because the initial endeavor at black evacuation by ALDMARK aircraft aborted, we were given an opportunity to see with great clarity the application of these points. If the attempt to evacuate by ALDMARK-assigned aircraft had been successful, then knowledge of the defection could have been held to approximately six staff and assigned military personnel. Because that endeavor was unsuccessful, at least nine additional staff and military personnel became generally or specifically aware of the matter, plus the Consul General and one of his senior officers. Additionally one private United States citizen, the senior Pan American official in Frankfurt, became very much aware of this sensitive case. This increase in the number of individuals came about because of an immediate need late in the evening of Saturday, 16 December, to use two [illegible] staffers to assist in the safehousing function, a total of six [illegible]TOPAZ staffers (documentation, graphics, photographic) to prepare and issue fraudulent and alias passports, and an assigned enlisted man to act as a safehouse guard. The Consulate General had to affix visas to the fraudulent passports. The most crucial individual involved, however, was the Pan American official who to a certain degree put his position in jeopardy by being as cooperative on the matter as he was. Without previously having cleared and briefed this official (His counterpart in TWA is also so cleared and briefed) the whole undertaking would have been precluded. It would have been impossible to accomplish departure without documentation on a commercial aircraft without the connivance of the commercial airline involved. Indeed with such connivance it was difficult and risky enough. Finally, the point concerning obsolescent equipment speaks for itself. Headquarters is fully aware of the feelings of this Station concerning the inadequacy for our purposes of assigned aircraft. Suffice it to say that when defectors apparently of significant value refuse to ride such aircraft the matter merits thorough study.

7. The matter of "areas of study" appears to us to encompass at least the following:

a. Average time differences in transmitting high precedence electrical communications between and among representative groupings of Stations. The German Station is extremely fortunate in having KW-26 circuits with Headquarters. It affords us a facility for instantaneous communication. We can make certain rough estimates as to how long it might take appropriate Headquarters officials to answer our queries and we can then approximate the arrival time of answers to high precedence traffic. Other Stations, however, do not have KW-26 equipment, all do not have the same type of cryptological equipment, and there is a different pattern as to the type of circuitry, i.e., direct leased lines, twx, straight commercial service, etc. We believe there is merit in the appropriate Headquarters unit endeavoring to group geographically Stations and then based on the type of communications and cryptological equipment and the channel of transmission to come up with predictions as to the average length of time the transmission of a priority or operational immediate cable would take between and among the various representative groupings. In the case under study, which represented a rather fast-breaking situation, it was not possible for us to estimate the length of time it took to transmit an operational immediate cable between Stockholm and Frankfurt. It would have been of value to us to have had some idea on this matter.

b. Coordination between U.S. Air Attaches and COS. We believe it would be worthwhile to request each Chief of Station in a location where the Air

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T K Y B A T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EKOT-14004, 31 January 1962

Force or Navy has an assigned attache plane to establish procedures whereby the Air or Naval Attache will advise COS of any absence of the attache plane, the point of designation of the aircraft, and the duration of the absence. There have been previous defections where attache planes were used as the initial vehicle of black evacuation. In the evacuation plan of Stockholm for AELADLE they informed us by cable that they proposed to use the attache plane. We are of the opinion that when the statement was made Stockholm made the assumption the plane was immediately available. As was later discovered by us the particular plane in question was at Wiesbaden and not Stockholm. This, however, was some six hours after Stockholm stated its intent to use that aircraft. While in this particular case matters eventually worked out successfully the story might be otherwise in a different set of facts.

e. Priority furnishing of traces. When a Station is alerted to a request to render operational support to the movement of a defector and simultaneously answers a request in the negative if it can furnish traces, the following procedure is worthy of study. If Headquarters possesses, and time permits, we believe it worthwhile to forward an immediate summary to the Station rendering support if the background of the defector is such that it would be a matter of local interest. This would have been the case in AELADLE. As subsequent headquarters debriefing developed (and we assumed it would have been disclosed in Headquarters traces) AELADLE had previously been stationed in Berlin. Had such facts been known here, and had time allowed, certain debriefing on the Berlin period designed to elicit any matter of immediate concern could have been undertaken.

JDB

JOEL D. BENTHAM

Attachment
Memo dated 18 Dec 1961 h/w
Identities usc/tnp

Distribution
2 - EE w/atts
1 - SR w/atts
1 - WE w/atts

TO EGOT-14004, 31 Jan 1962

18 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT: Handling at German Station 16 and 17 December of Soviet Defector from Russian Embassy at Helsinki

1. This memorandum is designed to record, soon after the event, all facts pertaining to the handling within the German Station of the evacuation of a Soviet Vice Consul (and member of the RIS) from the Russian Embassy at Helsinki. At the time of this writing there is still lacking certain information to complete the entire story. However, it is felt worthwhile to record all events while the memory is still fresh. In the following paragraphs the defector is referred to as "subject" and pseudonyms and identities are used in all other cases.

2. At approximately 0730 hours Saturday, 16 December, Arnold J. LYACK (Chief, CABEZONE) contacted me at my home and asked me to proceed immediately to the residence of Joel D. BENTHAM (Chief of Station). Upon arrival at BENTHAM's residence, BENTHAM and LYACK briefed me on 14-3 the Stockholm cable which announced Stockholm's intent to endeavor to fly subject and family "black" from Stockholm to Frankfurt aboard the Air Attache aircraft. Cable also requested Frankfurt to have an aircraft available to receive immediately subject and family and take off forthwith to the United States. LYACK also mentioned an IN cable from DIR which requested Stockholm to move family soonest to CABEZONE in Frankfurt for establishment of bona fides. 02

3. We then adjourned to the office and awaited more word from either Stockholm, which would advise on the arrival time of the family at Frankfurt, or from Headquarters concurring in Stockholm's request for immediate departure of the family for the United States upon arrival at Frankfurt. EAOB was immediately alerted and they made arrangements to have a C-54 with augmented crew prepared to depart for the United States by 1200 hours. A compartment for the subject's family was put in the C-54 and the regularly assigned tail number was removed and a false number put on the aircraft. Conrad V. LAPOLLA (Acting Chief, COS/KUSODA) was contacted and asked to come to the office immediately. Discussions were then held with LYACK and Carl T. UPDILL as to the availability of a KUDOVE case officer with Russian language capability to act as escort.

RYBAT

SECRET

14-3

4. Having heard nothing from either Stockholm or Headquarters by 0945 hours OPIM traffic was sent in both directions telling them Germany was prepared to receive and effect immediate black evacuation of the family to the United States. In the meantime, it had been determined that IDENTITY A would be used as the security escort and Russel K. MUCHANE (AD/PI Staff) would be on standby to serve as a KUDOVE escort. This was a contingency arrangement because we lacked knowledge whether or not a KUDOVE officer from either Helsinki or 14-3 Stockholm was prepared to travel with subject all the way to Washington.

5. Around 1100 hours I asked Edward P. TOCHENSKY (Chief, EAOB) to establish contact with the Wiesbaden Air Base tower and lay on arrangements to monitor the flight of the 14-3 Stockholm Air Attache plane. This was done because we have had previous instances of "black" arrivals at Wiesbaden where the aircraft actually arrived before the EPA cable from 14-3 the Station dispatching the body. At about 1115 hours TOCHENSKY informed me by telephone that the 14-3 Stockholm Air Attache aircraft, a C-45, was and had been at the Wiesbaden Air Base since 12 December. At about 1130 we cabled this information to Stockholm 14-3 and DIR and also offered to dispatch an aircraft to Copenhagen to make the pickup if 14-3 Stockholm could move the body there. Because of technical difficulties involving air clearances and lengths of runways, we could not immediately get into any field north of Copenhagen.

6. At approximately 1145 hours a cable was received from Headquarters concurring in the immediate evacuation from Wiesbaden by EAOB aircraft of subject's family upon arrival. If such could not be arranged we were then requested to hold subject and family at CABEZONE. 02

14-3

7. Having heard nothing from Stockholm by approximately 1600 hours we again sent them OPIM traffic asking that they inform us immediately of their intentions. I had previously left the office about 1430 hours in order to get some lunch and take care of one or two personal items. I had called Nelson R. POLIAKOFF (Deputy for Administration Staff) in to cover for me and had briefed him on the then current situation. When I returned at 1600 hours MUCHANE had come into the office prepared for the trip. We then sent the above-mentioned cable and suggested that MUCHANE return to his quarters and await further developments. I phoned TOCHENSKY and suggested that he and his communicator return to their quarters. LAPOLLA, in the meantime, had gone to Rhein/Main Airport to meet an incoming staffer carrying classified material and get him through Customs. He then returned to his home. I left word with the Signal Center Watch Officer that any incoming traffic on subject's trip should be telephoned immediately to LAPOLLA who would come in, review the traffic and contact me. The

9/20

Watch Officer was also asked to immediately phone the Wiesbaden Communicator who in turn would contact TOCHENSKY and both of them would go to their office.

8. At approximately 1900 hours LAPOLLA contacted me at home from the Signal Center and informed me that an ETA and other information was in from [Stockholm]. I told him to stand by and I would immediately come in. Based on [Stockholm's] cabled statement that Martin K. ROODINE [(Chief of Station, Helsinki)] was escorting subject to the United States, I told LAPOLLA not to alert MUCHANE. I arrived at the office at 1930 hours and immediately dispatched the Guard Sergeant to buy certain types of foods and magazines that [Stockholm] asked to be put aboard the United States-bound aircraft. We contacted TOCHENSKY and ascertained that EAOB was in a state of immediate readiness. David R. MULFALL (COS/KUSODA Office) then arrived with IDENTITY A. IDENTITY A was given a general briefing on the mission and his responsibility following which he and LAPOLLA took off immediately for Wiesbaden. They took with them the purchases of the Guard Sergeant. 27, 14-1

9. I then proceeded to the home of Ronald M. CORBANE (COS Lawyer) where we were guests for dinner. At approximately 2200 hours I received a call from LAPOLLA that subject and family had arrived, the turnover was made, and that the EAOB aircraft was airborne at approximately 2150 hours. I telephoned this information to BENTHAM.

10. At approximately 2245 hours I received a call from the Signal Center Watch Officer who relayed to me the following message from the Wiesbaden Communicator. That message stated the EAOB aircraft was immediately returning to Wiesbaden because of a sick passenger. Immediately thereafter I received a call from LAPOLLA who was at the quarters of Arthur G. DREIBELBIS (EAOB) in Wiesbaden. LAPOLLA stated that he had gotten hold of the Air Base Flight Surgeon and was proceeding to the Air Base. He knew at that time no other details. I told him Chester E. FAGERLUND (COS Medical Officer) and myself would leave immediately for Wiesbaden Air Base.

11. FAGERLUND was in attendance at the same dinner party and we departed immediately for the Air Base. Upon arrival at approximately 2300 hours the EAOB aircraft had already landed and maximum security provisions were observed in the area. Air Police had the "Hangar 34 Area" blocked off two blocks in either direction.

12. TOCHENSKY met me outside the building and informed me that immediately after take-off subject's six-year-old daughter had become extremely airsick and suffered respiratory difficulties. She was administered oxygen. The mother became hysterical and the father demanded that the aircraft immediately be returned to its point of

4/90

departure. He further stated he would not agree to further travel to the United States except by commercial jet. We then entered the Operations Office of the 7405th Flight Squadron where I was introduced to ROODINE, who recited basically the same story as told by TOCHENBAY. We also ascertained that the Flight Surgeon had looked at the daughter and had found nothing organically wrong. We then asked ROODINE to bring FAGERLUND into the room where subject's family was staying and introduce him as an "American Intelligence Service Medical Officer" and have FAGERLUND examine the child. FAGERLUND's results were the same as the Flight Surgeon and no medication was given the child. A discussion of some fifteen minutes then took place as to how best to proceed with onward transportation arrangements. ROODINE took me aside and strenuously impressed me with the fact that subject was of the opinion that certain of his information on the matter of Soviet/Finnish relations was of great perishability and that subject deeply felt his necessity to arrive in Washington and state this information within the next 48 hours. ROODINE also stated he concurred in subject's feelings. All KUBARK representatives then on the scene again got together and the undersigned made the decision to abort the mission, arrange immediate safe-housing overnight for subject and his family, and attempt commercial transportation on Sunday.

13. Earlier in the day LYACK informed me that he had cleared out their Eschborn safe-house in case we should need it. I immediately tried to contact LYACK by phone but there was no answer. I then phoned Henry R. GARLINGAY (Deputy for Administration Staff) and asked him to do for me the following things:

a. Contact Stephen R. LACKLEN (CABEZONE) and tell him we had an immediate need to house a family of three, plus two KUBARK officers at Eschborn. To further tell LACKLEN to be standing by at Opel Circle opposite the Minneapolis Honeywell Building at 0100 hours and be prepared to escort another vehicle to Eschborn.

02

b. Phone BENTHAM and tell him we would drop by his house later that evening to brief him on any developments.

c. Phone LYACK and tell him we were using Eschborn.

14. All concerned departed Wiesbaden Air Base at approximately 0020 hours on 17 December and arrived at the meeting point at Opel Circle at exactly 0100 hours. Subject's family plus MULFALL, who had also gone immediately to Wiesbaden, followed LACKLEN's car to Eschborn. FAGERLUND, LAPOLLA, ROODINE, and myself went immediately to BENTHAM's house.

15. BENTHAM was then fully briefed on developments and HOODINE gave certain operational information of a sensitive nature from subject to BENTHAM. After necessary analysis and discussion the following decisions were reached:

a. We would endeavor to remove the family out of Frankfurt by commercial aircraft that day, i.e., Sunday, 17 December.

b. In the absence of the ability to accomplish this, we would endeavor to remove them on an Air Force Medical Evacuation Flight on Monday, 18 December.

c. Joseph Q. KLEMACK (Chief, COS/KURIOT) was contacted by phone from BENTHAM's residence and said he believed that his people could affix in the subject's passports a Federal Republic entry stamp. This was considered necessary in order to prevent embarrassing questions by German Immigration Authorities on Sunday when the family would depart by commercial air. The family had entered the Federal Republic "black" and accordingly there was no entry permit in their Soviet Diplomatic passports.

d. We would return LAPOLLA and HOODINE to the safe-house and I would also send out one enlisted guard with sidearm.

16. A cable to Headquarters was drafted on the basis of all this information and everyone departed the BENTHAM residence for their respective missions. I proceeded to the Signal Center and released the drafted cable.

17. I arrived back at my quarters about 0330 hours. At about 0410 hours I received a call from KLEMACK, wanting to get in touch with LAPOLLA on matters pertaining to the documentation work he was trying to accomplish. I gave him the telephone number of the Eschborn safe-house. It turned out that the cold weather had affected telephone communications to Eschborn and the phone was dead. KLEMACK then went out to Eschborn and discussed his problem with LAPOLLA and HOODINE. I am informed, but as yet do not know the technical reason why, that KURIOT could not put in the subject's passport the required German entry stamp. It was decided at the meeting at the Eschborn safe-house that KURIOT would try to make and have ready by the next morning Austrian passports for subject and his family.

11

18. At about 0600 hours I received a call from the Signal Center Watch Officer informing me that Headquarters "approved your plan." I immediately tried to contact the Eschborn safe-house by phone but to no avail. Around 0630 I contacted KLEMACK at the KURIOT installation and was then informed by him of his earlier visit to Eschborn around 0400. He told me during his phone conversation that LAPOLLA was going to get up about 0700 hours. I surmised that LAPOLLA would proceed immediately to the office and then did so myself.

19. LAPOLLA arrived at the office sometime shortly after 0800. We then discussed what our possibilities were, based on the situation as we then saw it. We had no guarantee that the [Austrian] passports would be finished by AURIOT in time to be used by an early afternoon United States flag commercial jet. We discussed again, as we had the previous evening, contacting Mr. William Naylor, the Pan American Senior Officer in Germany and a cleared and witting contact, as to whether or not he could arrange to board passengers without going through German Immigration, i.e., Passport Control. The question of the availability of seats was also involved. LAPOLLA suggested that we phone Naylor in his residence in Bad Homburg and explain to him we had a matter of serious urgency and ask him to come immediately to the I.G. Farben Building and discuss the matter with us. The phone call was made and Naylor agreed to do this. LAPOLLA then contacted the MATS Office at Rhein/Main to ascertain if MATS had any commercial jets chartered for departure that day. He discovered that they had no commercial jet chartered flights that day but at midnight on Sunday they were dispatching a C-135 configured to carry 66 passengers. He was further informed that 36 of these seats had been given to the Air Force and 30 to the Army to be used only by single military personnel departing to the States on Christmas leave. No families could be sent on the flight. Inasmuch as a C-135 is the military cargo version of a Boeing 707, LAPOLLA and myself discussed seriously the advisability of endeavoring to get military authority to fly this family out. We decided against such course of action for several reasons. We anticipated that there would be too much conversation among the single military personnel aboard the flight when they observed five civilians, three of whom were obviously a family, flying on the same plane. The fact that the six-year-old daughter spoke no English also contributed to the adverse situation we anticipated. Secondly, subject and family had already been aboard one cargo type aircraft and were reported by ROODINE to have made a series of uncomplimentary remarks of the type transportation that they were being afforded.

20. Naylor arrived at the office at about 1000 hours and was made generally aware of our problem. He was informed that the principal traveler involved was a defecting Russian diplomat, plus wife and child, and that we were under obligation to expeditiously and securely return them to the United States by jet aircraft. He was further informed that we lacked the proper documentation to board them on the commercial aircraft through normal clearance procedures and we had no guarantee that we would have the documentation by flight departure time of PAA No. 73 at 1315 hours. We then asked him what he considered to be the possibilities of working out a procedure to board the party "black" and to prevent any divulgence of their existence to the German Immigration Authorities. After considerable discussion it appeared that there

RYBAT

180

existed a very good possibility to get the passengers aboard the aircraft and successfully circumvent German passport controls. Naylor contacted his own assistant and the PAA Operations Officer assigned to Rhein/Main, both of whom are United States citizens, and asked that they proceed to the airport and stand by to assist him in the handling of some very important personages who were departing on PAA No. 73. He then ascertained that only three first class seats were available on this flight. He told his assistant to seat two passengers in the aircraft lounge and he would accept full responsibility for it. This is somewhat touchy in the airlines business as lounge seats have no safety belts. He also knew additional first class seats were available out of London.

21. In the meantime, KLEMACK and one of his men working on the documentation had returned to Eschborn to take pictures of subject and his family that would be necessary for the Austrian passports. The best reading we could get from the KURIOT people working on the documents was that they would not be ready on time. Inasmuch as decisions had been made, we decided to set the wheels in motion and started the family to the airport. LAPOLLA accordingly took off for Eschborn and a plan was agreed upon where he would arrive with the family in front of the Rhein/Main Departure Building at 1230 hours. Naylor would be standing by the entrance and take the family via a circuitous airport building route to the PAA Operations Office which is located on the second floor of the building beyond Passport Control. Naylor departed at about the same time as LAPOLLA and went directly to the airport.

22. Earlier in the morning I had asked BENTHAM if he could effect arrangements at the Consulate to have a Visa Officer standing by to put United States visitors' visas for subject's family in the Austrian passports. BENTHAM accomplished this and, at Naylor's suggestion, we asked if the Consulate Officer could go to the PAA Operations Office at Rhein/Main and stand by there to accomplish his visa work. By so doing we could save approximately 30 minutes time. I contacted Mr. Rollie White of the Consulate office and he agreed to meet us at the airport at 1245 hours.

23. I next phoned BENTHAM and made him aware of our situation. It did not look as if we would have any usable documentation to pass the family and would have to take the chance of circumventing the Passport Control. Our principal concern was that a German Immigration Officer would be standing by the aircraft departure area and would ask to see subject's passport. We could not get subject's family aboard the regular bus that goes from the departure building to the aircraft because there was no way we could get them to the bus loading area without going through Passport Control. BENTHAM asked how we evaluated an ability to withdraw gracefully at plane side if challenged by German

authorities. I told him the chances were better than even and that we would appeal to the fact that this was a VIP party being handled out of the regular airport procedures and that the passports had been left in the PAA office. We would then put the party back in the vehicle that took them out and just keep going. BENTHAM authorized us to proceed with the "black" evacuation.

24. I then made one last call to KURIOT and told them if they could not complete their work and get the passports to the airport by 1315 hours to forget it. With that MULFALL and myself left for Rhein/Main.

25. We arrived at Rhein/Main exactly at 1230 hours as subject's party was drawing up. The group was then taken by a circuitous route to the PAA Operations Office. It was ascertained that PAA No. 73 would arrive at 1245 hours, approximately thirty minutes late.

26. During our wait at the PAA Operations Office, ROODINE got me aside three or four times and kept me continuously aware of subject's fear that an attempt would be made to sabotage his plane. He had evidenced this concern ever since his arrival in Frankfurt. Subject told ROODINE he felt sure that Soviet agents would be found among some of the employees of the commercial airlines and the management of Rhein/Main Airport. He mentioned the section of the RIS that works specifically on assassinations and sabotage. He was fearful of any baggage being loaded very late or any "spare baggage" that might be found aboard the aircraft. I told ROODINE we were very sympathetic but we were not about to ask Naylor, who had now gone much further than one could be reasonably expected to on our behalf, to off-load the baggage of 184 passengers and search it.

27. Two events happened while we were waiting in the office to board the parties that were of some disturbance. The airplane Captain reported to the PAA Operations Officer that a gun was found aboard the plane. Upon investigation it was determined that this gun belonged to an Armed Forces courier who had carried classified material on the aircraft to Frankfurt. The airplane captain, upon being asked by Naylor if there had been any unusual activities on the part of the passengers, then described one party flying in the first-class compartment. This flight had originated in San Francisco and was flying around the world westbound. At New Delhi a United States citizen, a correspondent for an unknown newspaper, boarded the plane with his wife and a female nurse. The flight crew had been informed that he was an alcoholic and was being returned to the United States at the request of the United States Embassy at New Delhi. For part of the trip he had acted in somewhat of an obnoxious fashion and had insulted some of the other passengers. The Captain had investigated the situation and was of the opinion that the correspondent was now sufficiently drunk and lacked sufficient stamina

to insult anybody. I asked the Captain if there was a purser or a male attendant assigned to the first-class section. He stated on this particular flight all cabin service personnel were female. He stated, however, that another PAA Captain was flying dead-head on the trip, was a big burly sort of fellow, and if need be, could spend most of the trip in the lounge to watch the correspondent. IDENTITY A expressed grave reservation about now going forward with the trip because of the correspondent. It was my opinion, however, that between IDENTITY A, ROODINE, and the extra PAA Captain that if the correspondent again got obnoxious they could sufficiently cope with him. The regular Captain left the definite impression with me that the correspondent was sufficiently drunk, that he would either soon pass out or in any event would not represent a threat to subject's making the trip. It was, therefore, decided that the trip would proceed. IDENTITY A informed the Captain that he was a United States Government representative escorting a family aboard the plane and requested the Captain to keep the door of the flight deck locked from the inside during the length of the trip. To this the Captain agreed.

28. Subject's party, accompanied by Naylor and the PAA Operations Officer departed the office at 1325 hours, entered a PAA crew bus, drove immediately to the first-class ramp and successfully boarded the aircraft. At about 1335 KLEBACK arrived with subject's two original Russian passports. These were then put in a brown manila envelope and one of Naylor's United States citizen employees was asked to proceed immediately to the aircraft and give these to ROODINE.

29. At about 1300 hours we had phoned to KURIOT and told Ralph O. NASSBOCK that he had another thirty minutes to get the Austrian passports to the airport because of the aircraft's delayed departure. The Austrian passports arrived at approximately 1345 hours. Hollie White immediately started to enter in those passports the United States visitor's visas. At approximately 1355 the PAA Ground Crew Chief notified PAA Operations that Flight No. 73 was mechanically cleared for departure and completely loaded. At that time a PAA representative started to run from the Departure Building to the plane with a little piece of luggage. Naylor was coming back from the plane in the crew bus. He intercepted the PAA employee and took the bag and drove it back to the plane. He later told us he opened the bag, one of the flight bag variety, and on his own initiative examined the contents. It contained items of apparel used by ladies that will not be further identified.

30. At 1400 the Ground Crew Chief stated again the plane was ready for departure and asked why the plane was being held up. It was being held up because White had not finished all the entries on the passports. However, the PAA Operations Officer informed the Ground Crew Chief that

SECRET

2/90

the weight of the loaded plane had been questioned and they were recomputing total weight. At about 1405 the Austrian passports with United States visas were carried in a brown envelope by a PAA United States citizen employee and given to ROODIME. The plane was then cleared for departure and rolled out at 1414 hours.

34. The only other information known at the time of this writing is that the aircraft was diverted to Bermuda because of bad weather conditions in New York. Maylor telephoned me that information about 1000 hours on Monday morning, 18 December.

ROGER I. MCKEE

14-00000

SECRET

PF 10762
Germany

13 FEB 1952

S/C ATT B TO EGOT-14004, 31 Jan 52

TO: Chief, SR

ATTN: Sherman G. CUSICK

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

RYBAT

RYBAT

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DUQUE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

532
DATE : 15 FEB 61

TO : BELL
FROM : WAVE
ACTION : BELL 15
INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

ROUTING
1
2 C1 info
3
4
5
6

FEB 15 23472 61

PRIORITY

IN 0044

GR

PRITY BELL CITE WAVE 3691

JMZIP/AMDIP-3/AMHAZE

1. AMDIP-3 COURIER ARRIVED WAVE AREA FROM HAVA 14 FEB. INFORMED A-3 HE ON WANTED LIST AND DUE TO SECURITY INCIDENT HIS RADIO LINK TEMPORARILY CUT OFF.

2. SEVERAL DAYS AGO A-3 S/H RAIDED BY G2. HOUSE LOCATED NEAR 08 [13TH AVE AND 198 ST, BILTMORE, HABANA] AND OCCUPIED BY 06 [ADREA "LOUISA" GIQUEL] 06 [GIQUEL] PICKED UP AND DETAINED 48 HOURS. HOUSE CONTAINED ONE VIKING II RADIO, 2 HAND GENERATORS-GN58, A-3 CODES AND MSG FILES. NONE FOUND DURING SEARCH WHICH APPARENTLY ACCOUNTS FOR 06 [GIQUEL] RELEASE.

3. AGENT 2515 DISPATCHED TO HABANA LEGALLY ON 12 FEB WITH ORDERS TO CONTACT 06 [GIQUEL] ABOUT 14 OR 15 FEB AND JOIN A-3 MOVEMENT LINE TO ESCAMBRAY AS W/T OPR FOR OSVALDO RAMIREZ GROUP.

4. DUE 06 [GIQUEL] INCIDENT ZABOTH INSTRUCTED AGENT 2517, WHO DEPARTED WAVE LEGALLY FOR HABANA ON 14 FEB, TO CONTACT 2515 ON ARRIVAL AND WARN HIM AVOID CONTACT A-3 GROUP AND LAY LOW UNTIL HE GIVEN FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS BY S/W.

5. WAVE AND A-3 CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL ESTABLISH SECURE COMMO BETWEEN WAVE AND A-3 GROUPS. PROPOSE DISPATCH AMJAVA-4 BY BLACK, SEA INFILTRATION TO CUBA FOR THIS PURPOSE. INFILTRATION PLANNED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

6/90

BETWEEN 17-19 FEB. JAVA/2 AND 3 TO ACCOMPANY A-3 SOONEST SECURE RECEPTION ARRANGED.

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

23 DEC 60 SECRET

DIRECTOR

HAVANA

ION : C/BELL 13 (MR DROLLER, WH DIV NOTIFIED 1800 23 DEC)

DOP, COP, ADCP/A, WH 3, S/C 2

DEC 23 2232Z 60 DUQUE

PRIORITY

IN 21843

FRITY WAVE INFO PRITY DIR CITE HAVA 7288

JMZIP ~~RYBAT~~

1. ON 23 DEC ROBERT M. GEDDES (WHO WORKS WITH AMPAN-22) CONTACTED CO AFTER FAILURE TO MEET RALPH DIAZ HANSCOM AND ASKED CO DELIVER SPECIAL AIRDROP MAP TO MIAMI FOR "CLARENCE".

2. GEDDES EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD TALKED WITH "CLARENCE" IN MIAMI AND WAS TOLD THAT EARLIER DROP MAP BROUGHT BY VILLALON IS NOT SUITABLE. NEW MAP IS IN INDIA INK PREPARED BY ENGINEER CRESPO WHO HEAD PUBLIC WORKS DEPT IN CIENFUEGOS. CRESPO PASSED MAP TO MARIO BOLANO WHO GAVE TO GEDDES. GEDDES SAID AIR DROP SPECIAL FOR LIMAS. RAMIREZ. MONTIEL. AND PORTION FOR DUQUE. GEDDES SAID PRELIMINARY DROP SIGNALS WOULD CONSIST ONE RED LIGHT, ONE WHITE LIGHT, ONE RAD LIGHT ABOUT 15 FT DISTANCE APART. CLOCKWISE MOVEMENT OF LIGHTS INDICATE PREPARED TO RECEIVE. GROUP REQUESTING ARMS AND AMMUNITION FOR 400 MEN PLUS 100 PISTOLS. ALSO EXTRA AMMO FOR THOSE ALREADY IN PLACE.

3. MAP BEING SENT WAVE BY COURIER ARRIVING 24 DEC.

4. GEDDES SAID THAT HE WOULD CONTACT HECTOR FEBLES (FR 3-1982) ON ARRIVAL SINCE FEBLES HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH "CLARENCE".

FILED 23/1750Z

END OF MESSAGE

[Gonzalez Cruz] calls [Febles] a security risk due lack of discipline. HAVA 7286 27 Dec. (Gonzalez's file.)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

1/80

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ABC

HAVANA

5 (WH REGISTRY ISSUED TEMPO COPY 1612 15 NOV 60)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, CPO & S/C 2

See also Dir 12516 94375) (out 1970260

SWF

NOV 15 21:22 60

DUQUE Evelio

PRIORITY

IN 42921

PRITY DIR INFO PRITY WASH CITE HAVA 6905

JMNET JMCLEAR

REF DIR 13931 (out 91075)*

OUT 94375
DIR 12516

1. AMYUMS[1] REPORTED GOC PICKED UP FOLL: 20 PISTOLS, 6 SUBMACHINE GUNS AND ONE BAZOOKA. SURMISE ABOVE MAY HAVE BEEN CONTENTS ONE BUNDLE WHICH FELL ON TRINIDAD HIGHWAY.

2. REMAINDER CARGO BELIEVED IN HANDS ANTI CASTRO FORCES. SAID (FNU) PACHECO, LEADER UNIDEN GROUP, RECOVERED SIZABLE QUANTITY WHICH HE DIVIDED WITH (FNU) MESA WHO ALSO HAS SMALL INDEPENDENT GROUP. LATTER NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH NYINGO MESA 06 WHO BROTHER OF GUIDE USED IN AMPANIC-5[2] OP.

3. DESPITE ABORTIVE DROP AMYUMS[1] FEEL HAD GOOD MORALE EFFECT ON ESCAMBRAY FIGHTERS WHO SEE GENUINE EFFORT BEING MADE SUPPORT THEM. ESTIMATE PRESENT ANTI CASTRO ELEMENT ESCAMBRAY NUMBERS 2000 MEN. AMYUMS[1] ALSO REPORTED TWO SUCCESSFUL DROPS TO * EVELIO DUQUE FORCES (3 AND 11 NOV) BY AMHAWK[3] USING CESSNA AIRCRAFT. EACH DROP CONSISTED 60 SUBMACHINE GUNS. CAN HQS CONFIRM FOR INFO HAVA ONLY IF SUCH DROPS ACTUALLY MADE.

FILED 15/1410Z.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Headquarters has reliable information that at least half of bundles dropped on 6 November picked up by GOC.

[illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

1/90

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
201-191098 (Vol. I)

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1958-63

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM: [illegible]

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Third Agency Documents

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/14/78	3/17/78	BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf
3 MAY 78		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf
18 MAY 78		JOHANNA SMITH	Johanna Smith

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

14-00000

SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK, 201-191098 (VOL 1 of 4)

3rd AGENCY DOCUMENTS

① BUREAU FILE 100-339235
② NY FILE 100-42479
③ BUREAU FILE 100-401762
④ NY FILE 100-107383

FBI	NY	11/22/63	RE SUBJECT	NO FILE
FBI	NY	11/21/63	" "	" "
FBI	HQS	10/18/63	RE RICHARD C.	FILE (NI) 100-401762
FBI	NY	10/14/63	RE SUBJECT	FILES # 1 + 2
FBI	NY	10/8/63	RE RICHARD C.	NO FILE
FBI	NY	10/6/63	" " "	" "
FBI	NY	10/2/63	" " "	" "
FBI	HQS	9/23/63	RE SUBJECT	" "
FBI	NY	9/18/63	" "	" "
FBI	HQS	9/17/63	RE RICHARD C.	FILE # (NI) 100-401762
FBI	NY	9/12/63	RE SUBJECT	NO FILE
FBI	NY	9/12/63	" "	" "
FBI	NY	9/12/63	" "	" "
FBI	NY	9/10/63	" "	" "
FBI	NY	8/30/63	" "	" "
FBI	NY	7/2/63	" "	FF 42479
FBI	NY	6/26/63	RE RICHARD C.	FILES 3 + 4
FBI	NY	7/2/62	" " "	" 3 + 4
FBI	NY	7/2/62	" SUBJECT	FILES 1 + 2
FBI	NY	6/16/61	RE RICHARD C.	FILES 3 + 4
FBI	NY	6/16/61	RE SUBJECT	FILES 1 + 2
FBI	NY	11/25/60	" "	" "
FBI	NY	6/17/60	RE RICHARD C.	FILES 3 + 4
FBI	HQS	2/11/60	RE BOTH	FILES 1 + 3
FBI	HQS	1/26/60	RE SUBJECT	NO FILE
FBI	NY	11/25/59	" "	FILES 1 + 2
FBI	NY	6/19/59	RE RICHARD C.	FILES 3 + 4
FBI	NY	11/26/58	RE SUBJECT	FILES 1 + 2
FBI	NY	11/26/58	RE RICHARD C.	FILE # 3
FBI	NY	4/25/58	" " "	" 3 + 4
FBI	NY	11/7/55	RE SUBJECT	FILES # 1 + 2
FBI	NY	11/27/56	" "	" "
FBI	SAN FRAN.	7/14/55	RE FREDERICK FIELD	FILE # 100.2278 (BUREAU)
FBI	NY	1/7/55	" " "	" " "
FBI	NY	2/20/62	RE COMMITTEE FOR A DEMOCRATIC FAR EASTERN POLICY	100-3 [illegible]

FILE CONTENT LIST OF FILE NO. 201-0191098

REF CODE*	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT SYMB. AND NUM.	ABST. TYPE	ORIG. ROUTING	CS COPY FILED IN	SERIAL NUMBER AND/OR SUBJECT
A	/ /		IN			
A	10/07/57	DFB-87905	IN			
A	10/08/57	CFB-87904	IN			
A	26/11/58	CBF-14398	AO	IP		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK SECURITY MATTER-C
A	30/12/59	ESEA-08833	IN			
A	12/04/60	CBF-46377	IN	IP	100-008-017	TWO CONTINENTS COMMODITY CORPORATION.
C	02/07/62	CBA-14583	AO	CI		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	02/07/62	CBA-14582	IN	CI		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	26/06/63	CBA-44692	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK SECURITY MATTER-C
A	02/07/63	CBA-45538	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	30/08/63	DBA-52730	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	10/09/63	CBA-50303	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK, AKA SUSAN WARREN
A	12/09/63	CBA-50326	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CH
A	12/09/63	CBA-50385	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK AKA, SUSAN WARREN
A	12/09/63	CBA-51511	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA
A	17/09/63	CBA-51120	AO	CI/LS		3 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK-INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA
A	18/09/63	CBA-52729	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	23/09/63	CBA-51738	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CH
A	02/10/63	CBA-52667	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	06/10/63	CBA-53125	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	08/10/63	CBA-54007	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	14/10/63	CBA-54296	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK-INTERNAL SECURITY CHINA
A	19/10/63	CBA-54106	AO	CI/LS		3 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK-INTERNAL SECURITY CHINA
A	21/11/63	CBA-57428	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILINGMAN FRANK
A	22/11/63	CBA-57240	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	27/01/64	CBA-62478	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	26/02/64	CBA-65006	AO	CI/LS		1 YUNG KOON-MAN
A	03/03/64	CBA-65744	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	04/03/64	CBA-65510	AC	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	05/03/64	CSCI-3780320	AO	IP		1. CAIC
A	16/03/64	CBA-66277	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	18/03/64	CBA-68817	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	19/03/64	CBA-66206	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	19/03/64	CBA-65690	AO	CI/LS		3 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	26/03/64	CBA-66540	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	03/04/64	CBA-68370	AO	CI/LS		1 YUNG KOON-MAN
A	04/05/64	CBA-72041	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	20/05/64	CBA-71934	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	25/05/64	CBA-72034	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	09/06/64	CBA-74309	AO	CI/LS		1 IVAN GERALD SHAPIRO
C	11/06/64	DBA-74845	AC	IP	201-0001042	1-FREDERICK VANDERBILT FIELD
A	31/07/64	CBA-80360	AO	IP		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK WAS 100-500

*REF.
CODE:
A - RECORD COPY FILED
B - DUPLICATE COPY FILED
C - EXTRACT FILED
D - CROSS REFERENCED

DOCUMENT ABSTRACT TYPES:
AO - ABSTRACTED ONLY
AC - ABSTRACTED AND CROSS REFERENCED
IN - ABSTRACTED, INDEXED, AND POSSIBLY CROSS REFERENCED

NOTES:
IF THE FILE WAS OPEN PRIOR TO 1962. ADDITIONAL ABSTRACTS MAY BE AVAILABLE FROM THE MANUAL ABSTRACT COLLECTION. CALL EXT 4127. MACHINE ABSTRACTS ARE NOT KEPT FOR NON-RECORD COPY REFERENCES. CABLE SUBJECTS ARE RECORDED SINCE JULY 1970.

S-E-C-R-E-T

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981

FILE CONTENT LIST OF FILE NO. 201-0191098

REF CODE*	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT SYMB. AND NUM.	ABST. TYPE	ORIG. ROUTING	CS COPY FILED IN	SERIAL NUMBER AND/OR SUBJECT
A	10/09/64	CBA-82347 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	11/09/64	CBA-84176 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	22/09/64	CBA-84318 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	24/09/64	CBA-84546 ✓	AO	CI/LS		3 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	12/10/64	CSMW-09477 ✓	AC	IP		ODENVY REQUEST TO SHOW ULTIMATE SOURCE OF TDCS-314/02323-64 PHOTO OF POSS PBPRIME REP AT THE AUG PRO-CHICOM MEETING IN ALBANIA
A	13/10/64	316-0157864 ✓	AO	IP		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK, INTERNAL SECURITY CHINA
A	20/10/64	CBA-88516 ✓	AO	IP		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK WAS 201-278559
A	04/11/64	CBA-89646 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	25/11/64	MACR-02378 ✓	AO			
A	02/12/64	316-0233764 ✓	AO	IP/FI		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA WAS 201-019198
C	27/01/65	NYDC-00394 ✓	AC		200-120-087	
A	10/02/65	CBA-98698 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	12/02/65	CBA-98227 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	09/03/65	UNCW-00325	AO	IP		KOBIRO LCHARVEST
A	19/04/65	CIRW-23914 ✓	AO	IP		ODENVY REPORTS ON SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK AND RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	20/04/65	CIRA-40214 ✓	AO	WE/4		ODENVY REPORTS ON SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK AND RICHARD CYRIL FRANK WAS 201-040214
C	28/05/65	CBB-09540	AC	CI/LS	201-0017638	3 LEO HUBERMAN INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA.
C	08/06/65	CBB-11297 ✓	AC	CI/LS	201-0107029	1 IVAN GERALD SHAPIRO 201-107029.
A	16/06/65	CBB-11757 ✓	AO	CI/LS		0 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK RICHARD C. FRANK LEO HUBERMAN
A	25/06/65	CBB-13700 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRGNK
A	28/06/65	CBB-13658 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	01/12/65	CBB-32064 ✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	14/01/66	DBB-35009 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK-IS-CHINA
A	25/01/66	CBB-36631 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	03/02/66	CBB-37188 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	03/02/66	CBB-38170 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
C	18/02/66	CBB-39888 ✓	AC	CI/LS	201-0046209	MORRIS ROBERT WILLS.
A	08/03/66	316-0105966 ✓	AO	IP		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	28/03/66	DBB-43161 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	29/03/66	CBB-43444 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
C	09/05/66	CBB-47822 ✓	AC	CI/LS	201-0771141	RUTH SHULMAN
C	07/06/66	CBB-50389 ✓	AC	CI/LS	201-0107029	IVAN GERALD SHAPIRO
A	27/06/66	CBB-51514 ✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	19/07/66	CBB-54475 ✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	14/09/66	CBB-59986 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	29/09/66	CBB-60663 ✓	AO	CI/LS		PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY /PLP/
A	13/10/66	DBB-62355 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	13/12/66	CBB-65707 ✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD C. FRANK SUSAN H. FRANK
B	17/12/66	PARI-01051 ✓	AC		029-002-004	

*REF. CODE:
A - RECORD COPY FILED
B - DUPLICATE COPY FILED
C - EXTRACT FILED
D - CROSS REFERENCED

DOCUMENT ABSTRACT TYPES:
AO - ABSTRACTED ONLY
AC - ABSTRACTED AND CROSS REFERENCED
IN - ABSTRACTED, INDEXED, AND POSSIBLY CROSS REFERENCED

NOTES:
IF THE FILE WAS OPEN PRIOR TO 1962, ADDITIONAL ABSTRACTS
MAY BE AVAILABLE FROM THE MANUAL ABSTRACT COLLECTION.
CALL EXT 4127. MACHINE ABSTRACTS ARE NOT KEPT FOR NON-
RECORD COPY REFERENCES. CABLE SUBJECTS ARE RECORDED
SINCE JULY 1970.

S-E-C-R-E-T

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981

FILE CONTENT LIST OF FILE NO. 201-0191098

REF CODE*	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT SYMB. AND NUM.	ABST. TYPE	ORIG. ROUTING	CS COPY FILED IN	SERIAL NUMBER AND/OR SUBJECT
A	13/01/67	CBB-70124✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	27/01/67	DBB-71826✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA
C	10/03/67	CBB-76693✓	AC	CI/LS	201-0315837	NORMAN VICTOR SHULMAN
D	03/04/67	CBB-80250	AO	TSCO		TS-195669 I RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	04/08/67	DBB-89841✓	IN	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA
A	30/11/67	CBC-01102✓	AC	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	01/03/68	DBC-09794✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	03/04/68	CBC-12127✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
C	30/04/68	CBC-17078✓	AC	CIOP/D	201-0728979	MAUD MURIEL RUSSELL
C	04/06/68	CBC-12016✓	IN	TSCO	016-005-013	TS-197328 CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELL BIO DATA ALBUM
A	12/06/68	CBC-18988✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	01/07/68	CBC-20859✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	23/07/68	CBC-22931✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	01/08/68	CBC-24440✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	06/08/68	CBC-25112✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	19/02/69	CBC-44884✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK, RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	28/03/69	DBC-50149✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	23/08/69	CBC-60987✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	03/10/69	CBC-64586✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	16/04/70	CBC-73990✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	27/08/70	CBC-91971✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA
A	21/09/70	DBC-94819✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	17/11/70	CBC-99426✓	AC	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	09/09/71	DBD-22103✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
C	23/09/71	CBD-22955✓	AC	TSCO	201-0208523	TS-201555 JAMES LEE
A	08/10/71	CBC-23871✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	14/12/71	CCOA-16515✓	AC	CH/SECT		KOBIRD/CO SMABOVE-CONTACT WITH CHINESE EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN CANADA
A	22/12/71	DBC-29006✓	AC	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
B	14/01/72	CCOA-16612✓	AC	CH/SECT	014-008-008	KOBIRD/CO SMABOVE-SUSAN WARREN
A	21/01/72	CBC-30450✓	AC	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
C	17/03/72	CBD-33673✓	IN	CI/LS	201-0000993	TANG MING-CHAO /201-000993/
C	11/04/72	DBD-22961✓	AC	TSCO	201-0208523	TS-201596 ANN LEE
A	28/04/72	DBC-36558✓	AC	CI/LS		FRANK, RICHARD C
A	05/09/72	DBC-42084✓	AO	CI/LS		FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN
A	16/11/72	CBD-46438✓	AC	CI/LS		FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN
A	21/02/73	CBD-51366✓	AO	CI/LS		FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN
A	08/06/73	CBD-57181✓	AO	CI/LS		FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN NEE WARREN
C	20/07/73	DBD-60693✓	IN	OPS/LSN	100-300-091	COMMITTEE FOR UNIFICATION OF CHIN, AKA AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF CHIN 722 N. CAROLINA S.E., WASH, DC. THE WASHINGTON AND BALTIMORE COMMITTEE FOR UNIFICATION OF CHIN, COMMITTEE FOR CHIN REUNIFICATION
C	10/08/73	CCOA-17926✓	IN	CH/OCCR	016-120-041/01	CONTACTS WITH PRC OFFICIALS IN CANADA

*REF. CODE:
A - RECORD COPY FILED
B - DUPLICATE COPY FILED
C - EXTRACT FILED
D - CROSS REFERENCED

DOCUMENT ABSTRACT TYPES:
AO - ABSTRACTED ONLY
AC - ABSTRACTED AND CROSS REFERENCED
IN - ABSTRACTED, INDEXED, AND POSSIBLY CROSS REFERENCED

NOTES:
IF THE FILE WAS OPEN PRIOR TO 1962, ADDITIONAL ABSTRACTS
MAY BE AVAILABLE FROM THE MANUAL ABSTRACT COLLECTION.
CALL EXT 4127. MACHINE ABSTRACTS ARE NOT KEPT FOR NON-
RECORD COPY REFERENCES. CABLE SUBJECTS ARE RECORDED
SINCE JULY 1970.

S-E-C-R-E-T

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981

14-00000

FILE CONTENT LIST OF FILE NO. 201-C191098

REF CODE*	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT SYMB. AND NUM.	ABST. TYPE	ORIG. ROUTING	CS COPY FILED IN	SERIAL NUMBER AND/OR SUBJECT
C	14/08/73	CCOA-17953 ✓	IN	IP/FI	016-120-041/01	CONTACTS WITH PRC OFFICIALS IN CANADA
A	12/09/73	080-61748 ✓	AO	OPS/ITG		FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN

ABSTRACTS LISTED = 122

*REF.
CODE:
A - RECORD COPY FILED
B - DUPLICATE COPY FILED
C - EXTRACT FILED
D - CROSS REFERENCED

DOCUMENT ABSTRACT TYPES:
AO - ABSTRACTED ONLY
AC - ABSTRACTED AND CROSS REFERENCED
IN - ABSTRACTED, INDEXED, AND POSSIBLY CROSS REFERENCED

NOTES:
IF THE FILE WAS OPEN PRIOR TO 1962, ADDITIONAL ABSTRACTS
MAY BE AVAILABLE FROM THE MANUAL ABSTRACT COLLECTION.
CALL EXT 4127. MACHINE ABSTRACTS ARE NOT KEPT FOR NON-
RECORD COPY REFERENCES. CABLE SUBJECTS ARE RECORDED
SINCE JULY 1970.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981

S-E-C-R-E-T

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

SECRET

15 JAN 1976
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on FRANK, SUSAN (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ______________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☑ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed M C Hart (name) ______ (title) OPS/ITG (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ______ (initials) 19 JAN 1976 (date) 197__

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-191098

SECRET

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: SAS/CI/L Demos	GH43	EXTENSION 6471	NO.
			DATE 3 March 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. C/SAS/CI	3 Mar			
2.				
3. CI/LIAISON	4 MAR 1964			
4.				
5. RID/AN				
6. RID/MIS				
7. RID/FI				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

201-741098
DATE 5 MAR 1964

FORM 8-61 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

5 MAR 1964

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : I. CAIC

1. Reference is made to the Bureau's memorandum (NI) 100-401762 of 18 October 1963, subject: Richard Cyril FRANK, page 3 of the attachment.

2. The records of this Agency reveal no identifiable information on I. CAIC.

CSCI-3/780,320
3 March 1964
SAS/CI/LDemos:pap
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - RID
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A
1 - SAS/R
2 - SAS/CI

Based On: DBA-54106
DBA-54007
18 Oct 63

File No.: 201-191098

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-191098

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
Eugene J. Welch - EE/Switzerland

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EE/S	25	MAY 1960		
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. Fe/ch/P-	X-3622			
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. RID/DP				
15. EE/S				
16. RI/AN				
17. RI/FI				
18.				

COMMENTS

PERMANENT CHARGE
FOR YOUR RETENTION

RECORD COPY

FRANK, Susan

COORDINATING OFFICERS	
NAME	OFFICE

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER	
NAME	TITLE
Eugene J. Welch	EE/S

RELEASING OFFICER	
NAME	TITLE
Robert W. Crowell	C/EE/S

RID USE ONLY

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER
	INDEX	201-191098

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
	25 MAY 1960	EGBW 8468

R-1

DISPATCH

	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGBW 8468
TO Chief of Station, Bern INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-191098
FROM Chief, EE		DATE 25 MAY 1960
SUBJECT General - Operational/INK/LCHARVEST Specific - Susan and Richard FRANK		RE: "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
		☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
ACTION REQUIRED		☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)
EGBW 8273 dated 8 February 1960 (Information on FRANK travel plans plus background info)

1. The ODENVY approval for passage of information on Subjects to the INANITIONs was received in February, but, apparently through an inadvertence, was retained an inordinately long time in KUDESK. It has just now reached our hands.

2. ODENVY has approved the following for passage to the INANITIONs:

> "Susan FRANK, nee Heiligman, wife of Richard C. FRANK of New York City, has for several years been active in Communist front organizations in the United States, has taught courses in such schools as the Jefferson School of Social Science, which appears on the Attorney General's list, and her writings have appeared in such magazines as "Political Affairs", which has been listed in the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications", and described as an official Communist Party theoretical organ. Susan FRANK appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on 22 July 1959, and declined under "Privileges under the Fifth Amendment" to answer the Committee's questions as to whether or not she was a member of the Communist Party, had written an article which appeared in the November 1949 issue of "The Worker" entitled "No Peace for the Chinese People", had ever lectured on Chinese culture and Chinese civilization and had been an instructor at the Faculty of Social Sciences. Susan FRANK had used the name Susan Warren in her lectures and writings, most of which indicate her interest in Chinese affairs.
>
> "Richard C. FRANK, born 22 August 1922, has described his occupation as a free lance moving picture assistent director. He is known to have received Communist literature, is believed to have made financial contributions to the Communist Party in the U.S., and there is information to indicated Communist Party membership on his part as late as 1957."

3. ODENVY states that they have referred the case of the FRANKs to the Legal Attaches in London, Paris and Tokyo to alert appropriate security

CS COPY

201-191098

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. [illegible]

☒ CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. [illegible] 8468

services concerning possible travel of the FRANKs in England, France, and Japan. Should the [illegible]s be able to furnish any additional info concerning travel of Subjects, it is requested that you communicate it to the appropriate KUBARK station for passage to the Legal Attache, and into info Hqs. This is still pertinent for - although Subjects would by this time probably be in China if they did in fact intend to go there - they may possibly return to the U.S. via Prague, with a break of a month or so for travel in Western Europe. According to what is known of their plans, they do not intend to return to the U.S. before August or September.

[illegible]

[illegible] May 1960

Distribution:
3 - COS, Bern
2 - EE/S
1 - RI ✓

CS COPY

201-191098

[illegible] 8468

SECRET

WHEN FILLED IN

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

James B. Burson - EE/Switzerland

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. C/EE/S	FEB 1960	4	FEB 1960		
2.					
3. FE/CA/PERCE		FEB 1960	5 FEB 1960		Please Coordinate
4. CFE/CA			5 Feb		
5. [illegible] RI/DP		18 FEB 1960	FEB 1960		
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					
16. RI/AN				JL	
17. RI/FI					
18.					FRANK, SUSAN

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NAME	OFFICE
Crowell	CFE/CA/[redacted]

AUTHENICATING OFFICER

NAME	TITLE
James B. Burson James B. Burson	EE/S

RELEASING OFFICER

NAME	TITLE
Robert M. Crowell	C/EE/S

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT: INDEX

FILE NUMBER: 201-191098

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 8 FEB 1960

DOCUMENT NUMBER: ESBW 8273

14-00000

R1

DISPATCH

	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ESBW 8273
TO Chief of Station, Bern INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-191098
FROM Chief, EE		DATE 8 FEB 1960
SUBJECT General - Operational/LCHARVEST Specific - Susan and Richard Frank		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		

REFERENCE(S)

ESBA 8833 dated 30 December 1959

1. The information provided in reference was most timely in its arrival. Shortly after we had received it, ODENVY informed us that the Frank couple was traveling abroad, and that in view of Susan Frank's interest in Far Eastern affairs and Chinese history it was not unlikely she and her husband would attempt to travel to China before returning to the U.S. ODENVY asked for any information we might receive which would indicate Subjects had traveled to China. We have passed the gist of the information in reference to ODENVY. We shall appreciate receiving any additional information on the activities of Subjects which you may be able to uncover utilizing liaison as you see fit. FYI: Susan Frank has indicated she does not expect to return to the States until August or September, and most likely the latter month.

2. The material in Headquarters' file on the Franks, all of which was supplied by ODENVY, indicates they are active members of the Communist Party in the U.S. Upon receipt of ODENVY's approval to our request to pass a summary of this material to our official source of reference we shall forward the summary to you for passage to the IBANTYIONS. Meanwhile, the following, most of which was supplied by informants rated as having provided reliable information in the past, is forwarded for your information:

a. Susan Frank, nee Heiligmann, born 8 November 1913 of Russian parentage, resides with her second husband, Richard Cyril Frank, at 110 Christopher Street, New York City. There are reports as early as 1942 providing information on Susan Frank's activities in behalf of Communism, all of which refer to her as Susan or Sue Warren, the alias she has commonly used in her Communist activities and in articles she has written. One example of her activities in 1942 refers to an application for a permit to operate a public address system at street meetings in New York City. The application bore the signature of Sue Warren, and listed her as Chairman of the Communist Party at 132 East 26th Street, New York City. Since 1942 there have been numerous informant reports of Sue Warren's active participation in Communist affairs in the U.S., the most recent describing her as a member of the Greenwich Village Section, NY County CP as of October 1959. Frank has given her present occupation as writer and lecturer, and has taught at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Jefferson School of Social Sciences, conducting courses entitled, "The New China", "The Chinese Communes", "World of Socialism", "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions (Mao)", etc. The Faculty of Social Sciences was apparently established by Max Weiss, who was referred to in the April 1956 edition of the "Daily Worker" as "National Educational Director, Communist Party". The Jefferson School of Social Sciences has been designated by the Attorney General.

CS COPY

201-191098

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

On 22 July 1959 Susan Frank appeared before the House Committee on UN-American Activities, and refused under provisions of the Fifth Amendment to answer questions as to whether she had ever lectured on Chinese culture and Chinese civilization, had been an instructor at the Jefferson School of Social Sciences, was the author of an article in the 13 November 1949 issue of "The Worker" entitled, "No Peace for the Chinese People", and was "at this time" a member of the CP.

b. Richard Cyril Frank was born 22 August 1922 in Rochester, New York. He has given his profession as film technician and has worked in various directing and production jobs in television. Indications of Richard Frank's CP membership and activities in behalf of the CP are:

1. In June 1956 Sue Warren (Frank) stated at a Greenwich Village CP meeting that she could not contribute the $75.00 she had previously pledged because her husband (Richard Frank) had given $100.00 in "his club", and they had planned to contribute together only $150.00.

2. Frank was reported to have been seen on 1 February 1954 at a meeting of the New York Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions, which has been cited as a Communist front organization.

3. Frank has written letters in behalf of persons on trial for their Communist activities, has provided storage in the basement of his residence for cartons containing volumes of Communist literature, has received through the mail CP literature from Czechoslovakia, and has been a recipient through the mail of the "Daily Worker".

4. He has refused to speak to agents of ODENVY about his activities.

[illegible] O. [illegible]

3 February 1960

Distribution:
- 3 - COS, Bern
- 2 - EE/S
- 1 - RI ✓
- 1 - FE/CA/PENCE

CS COPY

[redacted] 8273

SECRET

2 FEB 1960

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Susan and Richard Frank

1. In response to your 22 December communication (File No: 100-339235, 100-401762) we wish to inform you that we have received the following from an official Swiss source:

> "Richard Frank (born 1922), U.S. citizen, film technician, resident of New York, arrived at the Hotel Savoy in Bern with his wife Susan on 10 December 1959; they stayed there until 12 December leaving for Zurich. Frank inquired for a flight ticket to Prague from Zurich. While in Bern, Frank had contact with the Chinese Communist Embassy on two occasions; he or Mrs. Frank having called at the Embassy. No information is available on the nature of these contacts, nor do we have more detailed personalia."

2. We have observed that persons desiring to travel to Communist China from Switzerland frequently fly via Prague.

3. The following summary has been drawn from material which you have provided us on Subjects (see NY 100-43479, NY 100-107383 and Bureau 100-339235). Please advise if we may pass this summary to our Swiss source, but without revealing that your organization supplied the information contained in it:

SECRET

Susan Frank, nee Heiligman, wife of Richard C. Frank of New York City, has for several years been active in Communist front organizations in the United States, has taught courses in such schools as the Jefferson School of Social Science, which appears on the Attorney General's list, and her writings have appeared in such magazines as, "Political Affairs", which has been listed in the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications", and described as an official Communist Party theoretical organ. Susan Frank ~~appeared before the House Committee on Un-American~~ Activities on 22 July 1959, and declined under "Privileges under the Fifth Amendment" to answer the Committee's questions as to whether or not she was a member of the Communist Party, had written an article which appeared in the November 1949 issue of "The Worker" entitled, "No Peace for the Chinese People", had ever lectured on Chinese culture and Chinese civilization, and had been an instructor at the Faculty of Social Sciences. Susan Frank has used the name Susan Warren in her lectures and writings most of which indicate her interest in Chinese affairs.

Richard C. Frank, born 22 August 1922, has described his occupation as a free lance moving picture assistant director. He is known to have received Communist literature, is believed to have made financial contributions to the Communist Party in the U.S., and there is evidence to indicate he is a member of this party.

CSCI-3/758,444

Distribution:
Orig &#1 - Addressee
1 - ~~[illegible]~~ /TID
1 - CI/LS
1 - CI/RAA
2 - EE/S ✓

EE/S:James B. Burson:jbs:26 January 1960

File 201- Frank, Susan

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: ESBA-8333

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 68-8-8

1P

TO: Chief, FE

XXX VIA: Chief, EE

FROM: Chief of Station, Bern

DATE: 30 December 1959

SUBJECT: LCHARVEST/Operations
FRANK, Richard (201-) (DOB 1922)

RE: "43-3" – (CHECK "X" ONE)

☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Trace request

REFERENCE(S):

1. The following report, dated 24 December 1959, was given to us by INANITION:

Trace Request CIT: USA

A N.Y., N.Y., USA

Richard *FRANK (born 1922), U.S. citizen, film technician, resident of New York, arrived at the Hotel Savoy in Bern with his wife Susan on 10 December 1959; they stayed there until 12 December, leaving for Zurich. FRANK inquired for a flight ticket to Prague from Zurich. While in Bern, FRANK had contact with the Chinese Communist Embassy on two occasions; he or Mrs. FRANK having called at the Embassy. No information is available on the nature of these contacts, nor do we have more detailed personalia.

Subject is the ~~Husband of~~ Hilligman Susan Frank (201-191098)

2. We would appreciate any available traces in Headquarters' files on FRANK.

MICROFILMED
AUG 13 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Hilda G. Vagionas
HILDA G. VAGIONAS

30 December 1959

Distribution:
- 2 - FE
- 2 - EE
- 2 - Bern

INDEX

CS COPY

CS COPY

201-191098
~~EE-500~~

ESBA-8833

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE

FROM: *Name* OFFICE ROOM PHONE TUBE ADDRESS

1. TYPE ACTION	☐	OPEN	2. FILE RESTRICTED	☐	YES	3. PERMANENT CHARGE	☐	YES
	☐	AMEND		☐	NO		☐	NO
	☐	CLOSE						

4. TRUE NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* [illegible] 01

5. 201 NO. [illegible] 02

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES *(see Instructions, item 6)*

TYPE	*(Last)*	*(First)*	*(Middle)*
02	[illegible]		
02	[illegible]		
02	[illegible]		
02	[illegible]		
02	[illegible]		
02	[illegible]		

7. SEX 01 M F

8. DATE OF BIRTH 01

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH 01

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH 01

11. CITIZENSHIP 01

12. OCCUPATION *(clear text)* J1 OCC. CODE J2

13. SWL 01

14. OI CODE 01

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER 01 DATE 01

16 RESIDENCE

17. COMMENTS *(text for Index cards)* 01

[illegible] ADDITIONAL NAME VARIANTS 01

[illegible] 01

01

01

01

01

01

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE 01

19. ACTION DESK CODE 01

20. SECONDARY DESK CODE 01

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES 01 & 01

22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO. [illegible]

FORM 8-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38-51)

14-00000

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE [illegible]

FROM: Name [illegible] OFFICE ROOM PHONE TUBE ADDRESS [illegible]

1. TYPE ACTION	☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE	2. FILE RESTRICTED	☐ YES ☐ NO	3. PERMANENT CHARGE	☐ YES ☐ NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
FRANK, Susan [illegible] 01

5. 201 NO. [illegible] 02

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE		(Last) (First) (Middle)
A	02	[illegible], Fred (Mrs.)
A	02	[illegible], Mildred M.
A	02	[illegible], Louis (Mrs.)
	02	
	02	
	02	

7. SEX F1 M F
8. DATE OF BIRTH F1
9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH G1
10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH G1
11. CITIZENSHIP H1
12. OCCUPATION (clear text) J1 OCC. CODE J2
13. SWL K1
14. OI CODE M1
15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER R1 DATE S1
16. RESIDENCE
17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards) N1 P1 Q1 S1 T1 U1 V1 W1
18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE B1
19. ACTION DESK CODE B1
20. SECONDARY DESK CODE B1
21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES B1 & C1
22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER
201 NO.

FORM 8-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(50-01)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] punch

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 29 Sept 1959	ACTION ☐ OPEN ☒ AMEND ☐ CLOSE	
FROM RID/201		ROOM NO. 1028 L	TELEPHONE 2231

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE ☒ NONSENSITIVE	201 NO. 1. 191098	SOURCE DOCUMENT DBF-32269

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): FRANK, RICHARD CYRIL (MRS.) SEX 3. ☐ M ☒ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)
PA	WARREN SUE
PA	FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN

COPY

DESTROYED UPON RECEIPT OF MACHINE LISTING

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
☐ YES ☒ NO	05 11 13	USA	MANHATTAN, NYC.	1. 58 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION HOUSEWIFE	OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.
USA	CI/ICD	UK	

COMMENTS: Cit: USA.
Husband: FRANK, RICHARD CYRIL DOB 22/08/22 POB: Rochester, N.Y.
Passport # 42431. Renewed Aug 58. Would not answer questions relating to past or present membership in C[illegible] Subject had been member of CP (NY) but denie[illegible] [illegible] husband's position with CBS TV program, "CONQUEST".
Apt 30, 110 Christopher St. N.Y.C.
Communist Party Member suspect

PUNCHED

VERIFIED

CS COPY

UK

201- 191098

PERMANENT CHARGE		RESTRICTED FILE		SIGNATURE
☐ YES	☐ NO	☐ YES	☐ NO	Nadeale

Form No. 1 Oct. 56 **831** Use previous editions. (88)

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 9 - AUG 1957	ACTION ☒ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM P Cuffee		ROOM NO. 1306K TELEPHONE 2015

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☒ NONSENSITIVE

201 NO. 1. 191098

SOURCE DOCUMENT DFB 87904

NAME (Last) FRANK (First) HEILIGMAN (Middle) SUSAN (Title)

SEX 3. ☐ M ☒ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)
A	WARREN	SUSAN	M	
A	FRANK	RICHARD	C	(MRU
M	HEILIGMAN	SUSAN	MILDRED	
A	KANE	ANNA	MAY	

PHOTO 4. ☐ YES ☒ NO	BIRTH DATE 5. D M Y	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. CA 2. 3.
OCCUPATION/POSITION				OCC/POS. CODE 9.

RECORD COPY

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. USA	ACTION DESK 11. CI	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS:

201- 191098

PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☒ NO	RESTRICTED FILE ☐ YES ☒ NO	SIGNATURE P Cuffee

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

PUNCHED

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

SE Punch H

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE: 13-03-59	ACTION: ☐ OPEN ☒ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM: RID/201	ROOM NO.: 1019 L	TELEPHONE: 2677

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ ☐	201 NO. 1. 191098	SOURCE DOCUMENT: DBF-19795

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): ✓ FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN — SEX 3.

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)
✓Y	BREITBERG,	MILDRED	H. ✗	
✓Y	BREITBERG,	LOUIS		/MRS./ ✗
✓Y	FRANK,	RICHARD	C.	/MRS./ ✗
✗Y	KANE,	ANNA	MAY ✗	
✗✓Y	WARREN,	SUSAN	M. ✗	
✗✓Y	WARREN,	BRETT		/MRS/ ✗

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
☐ YES ☐ NO	D 08 M 11 Y 13	USA	MANHATTAN, NYC.	1. CL 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION: Housewife	OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.
USA	CI/ICD		

COMMENTS:

CIT: USA
In contact with Communist party members in 1958
Residence Nov. 1958, 110 Christopher

CS COPY

201- 191098

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
☐ YES ☐ NO	☐ YES ☐ NO	LMR.

Form No. 831 1 Oct. 56 Use previous editions.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

VERIFIED ✓

(53)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE	ACTION ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM	ROOM NO.	TELEPHONE

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☐ NONSENSITIVE

201 NO. 1.

SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title) SEX 3. M F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)
M	HEILIGMAN,	SUSAN	MILDRED	
~~V~~	~~HELLIGMAN,~~	~~MILDRED~~	~~S.~~	

COPY TO BE DESTROYED UPON RECEIPT OF MACHINE LISTING

PHOTO 4. ☐ YES ☐ NO

BIRTH DATE 5. D M Y

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.

OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.

ACTION DESK 11.

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS:

PUNCHED

CS COPY

201- 191098

PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO

RESTRICTED FILE ☐ YES ☐ NO

SIGNATURE

VERIFIED

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 66

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(25) ✓

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: FRANK, SUSAN HELIGMAN
VOL. 4
201-191098

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

ATE RECEIVED	TE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
8		Shanna Smith	Smith

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

FRANK SUSAN 201-191048 (VOL. 4 of 4)

3rd AGENCY DOCUMENTS:

FBI NY 2/19/75 re CHANG, HSI-HSIEN (No File No.)
FBI NY 9/26/74 " PRC MISSION TO UN (" " ")
FBI HQS MEMO 9/12/73 re SUBJECT; FILE/SERIAL #100-401762-183
" " " 6/8/73 " " " " " " -182
" " " 2/21/73 " " " " #100-339235-416
FBI NY report 11/16/72 " " } BUFILES 100-339235, 100-401762
FBI NY " 8/11/72 " " } NYFILES 100-42479, 100-107383
FBI NY " 4/28/72 RE RICHARD C. FRANK (NO FILE No.)
FBI NY " 3/17/72 " TANG MING CHAO (" " ")
FBI CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 3/30/72 VOL II No. 6 PAGES 1+2
RE U.S.-CHINA PEOPLE'S FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION (USCPFA)
FBI CHICAGO 3/9/72 " " " " " " FILE #105-32924
FBI NY 1/21/72 RE SUBJECT (FILE NO.) 100-42479)
FBI NY 12/22/71 RE RICHARD CYRIL FRANK; FILE NOS. 100-107383 + 100-401762
STATE AIRGRAM A-342, 11/24/71 re TRAVEL OF AMERICAN CITIZENS TO/FROM PRC.
FBI NY 11/19/71 RE USCPFA; FF 105-115089
STATE TELEGRAM HONG KONG 5492, 8/19/71; WEEKLY REVIEW OF COMMUNIST CHINA (No. 33)
FBI HQS MEMO 9/9/71 RE SUBJECT; NO FILE NO.
FBI NY 11/12/71 RE CHINA DAILY NEWS; NO FILE NO.
FBI NY 10/28/71 " " " " FF 100-63825; BUFILE #100-196148
FBI WASH DC 10/8/71 " RICHARD C. FRANK; NO FILE No.
FBI NY 11/17/70 RE SUBJECT; FF 100-42479, BUFILE 100-339235
FBI NY 9/21/70 " RICHARD C.; FF 100-107383, " 100-401762
FBI NY 8/27/70 RE SUBJECT; NO FILE NOS.
FBI NY 4/16/70 " " FF 100-42479, BUFILE 100-339235
FBI NY 10/8/69 " " " "
FBI NY 8/29/69 RE RICHARD C.; FF 107383, BUFILE 100-401762
FBI NY 3/28/69 " SUBJECT; 42479 + 339235
FBI WASH 2/19/69 " " AND RICHARD C. (NO FILE NUMBERS)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

WARREN, SUSAN
201-191098
SEX F DOB ?
CIT ?
OCC ?
OF NEW YORK
RES. USA; IN CONTACT W/OFFICIALS OF PRC EMB, OTTAWA.

016-120-041/01
OCOA-17926A01
10 AUG 73
P5

647

R 7310160392

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) Frank, Susan	201- 191098			

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
8-60

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)



WARREN, SUSAN
201-191098
SEX F DOB ?
CIT ?
OCC ?
RES USA, NEW YORK.
IN CONTACT W/OFFICIALS OF PRC EMB OTTAWA.

016-120-041/01
OCOA-17933
14 AUG 73
P21

647

R 7310160561

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 191098

FORM 2-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(7-60)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)



WARREN, SUSAN M.
201-191098
SEX F DOB ?

100-300-091
DBD -60693
20 JUL 73
FBI

CIT ?
OCC ?
AKA SUSAN WARREN FRANK. CHAIRMAN USA-CHIN PEOPLES FRIENDSHIP ASSOC /USCPFA/ AND SUSPECTED CCOM AGENT.

R 7309120463

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

FRANK, Susan

201- 191098

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 8-60

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(7-40)

CI/SOLY —
file

Chief, F — X

Chief, WOMUSE/SO; Chief, EUR

Chief of Station, Ottawa

KOBIRD/CO SMABOVE - Susan Warren

Reference: OCOA-16222, 10 August 1971

1. SMABOVE advise that on 12 July 1971 Lo Yi-ching (New China News Agency) mentioned to a reliable source that Yao, Jen-liu (People's Republic of China Embassy, Ottawa) a suspected intelligence officer, requested the address of Susan Warren.

2. The foregoing information was also passed LNERGO.

Theodore D. HOLTHAM

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/FE
2 - C/WOMUSE/SO
2 - C/EUR

Susan FRANK 201

OCOA-16612 — 14 January 1972

SECRET — 14-8-8

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, F

INFO
Chief, WOMUSE/SO; Chief, EUR

FROM
Chief of Station, Ottawa

SUBJECT
KOBIRD/CO SMABOVE - Susan Warren

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OCOA-16222, 10 August 1971

1. SMABOVE advise that on 12 July 1971 Lo Yi-ching (New China News Agency) mentioned to a reliable source that Yao, Jen-liu (People's Republic of China Embassy, Ottawa) a suspected intelligence officer, requested the address of Susan Warren.

2. The foregoing information was also passed LNERGO.

Theodore D. HOLTHAM

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/FE
2 - C/WOMUSE/SO
2 - C/EUR

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 191098

CS COPY FILED IN 14-8-8

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OCOA-16612

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE
14 January 1972

HQS FILE NUMBER
14-8-8

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

HOSTIAK ELAINE GN-328
IP/AN GA50
EXT. 6955 TUBE GT7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK. IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Info sent E/BC/C, CI/SO

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CH/SECT				Gl
2. CH/CCS/EW	3 JAN 1972		3 Jan	
3.				
4.				
5. CH/OCOU		3 Jan 72		JE
6.				
7.				
8. CH/FCO/OT	[illegible] JAN 1972		[illegible]	AK
9.				
10.				
11. CI/SO-[illegible]	4 JAN 1972			✓
12. PG				
13. VR-#				
14.				
15.				
16. CI/SO/[illegible] L-4-file				
17. [illegible]				

A real beauty!!!

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JAN 03 1972
MICROFILMED

FILE TITLE: FRANK Susan

TRACE REQUEST
ABSTRACT
INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-191098

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 14 Dec 71

DOCUMENT NUMBER: OCOA 16515

149514

FORM 1-63 610e USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
	X	Attachment MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO
Chief, FE Division

INFO.
Chief, EUR; Chief, WOMUSE/SO

FROM
Chief of Station, Ottawa

SUBJECT
KOBIRD/CO SMABOVE -
Contact with Chinese Embassy Officials in Canada

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: F Y I

1. The attached is a blind memorandum and photo from SMABOVE which concerns a meeting in Ottawa between People's Republic of China Embassy officials and Richard C. Frank.

2. SMABOVE also provided LNERCO with attachment.

DEC 30 2 08 PM '71

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JAN 03 1972
MICROFILMED

Theodore D. Noltham
Theodore D. NOLTHAM

Attachment:
As Stated

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/FE att & photo h/w
2 - C/EUR att h/w wo/photo
2 - C/WOMUSE/SO att h/w wo/photo

CS COPY

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO D 14-8-8	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OCOA-16515	DATE 14 December 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER [redacted] 201-141098

SECRET 2P

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JAN 03 1972
MICROFILMED

ATTACHMENT TO: OCOA-16515

December 8, 1971

Subj. visited PRC embassy, Ottawa, 8 Dec 71.

201-191098

A reliable source advised that Richard Cyril FRANK arrived at the Ottawa Airport on September 17, 1971 via Eastern Airlines flight 177 from the United States.

On his arrival at 9:35 a.m. he deposited his three bags of luggage in a locker at the Airport, then travelled to the People's Republic of China Embassy, 100 Bronson Ave., Ottawa by taxi; he remained at the Embassy for five hours then returned to the Ottawa Airport.

FRANK arranged to be placed on stand-by for Air Canada flight no. 459 to Toronto and at 4:40 p.m. he departed on this flight.

While waiting at the Airport FRANK was overheard talking on a pay telephone. He mentioned to the person he called that he was phoning long distance and that he could be reached at 714-454-7126.

A photograph of FRANK taken on September 17, 1971 is attached.

SECRET

CS COPY

H/W ATT to OCOA-16515

201-191098.



Richard Cyril FRANK

CS COPY

201-171098

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16-Z

SECRET

OUTING AND/CR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3	C/TSC/4	7	
4		8	

RIG: R.E.BOWMAN:dh
NIT: CII/OCDU
XT: X7900
ATE: 18 NOV 1971

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y: 33 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

ONF: FE/CO 4 | INFO | FILE, VR, IP/AN FE 4 DO 4 CI/SO

Bs. (6)

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 19NOV71 22 19z CITE DIRECTOR 203394

TO DO BASE WASHINGTON

INFO: DO BASE NEW YORK, DO BASE LOS ANGELES, DO BASE SAN FRANCISCO

KOBIRD/CO DOMOPS WUPRECIS

REFS: A. DO BASE WASHINGTON 13616 (IN 468195)*

B. DO BASE NEW YORK 20364 (IN 471050)**

1. ONLY INFO AVAILABLE HQS ON US-CHINA PEOPLES FRIENDSHIP ASSN OF NEW YORK, IN ADDITION TO REFS, IS LNERGO REPORT CONCERNING A MEETING OF ABOVE ASSN IN NEW YORK AUG 71. SUSAN WARREN (201-191098) IS WELL KNOWN FOR EXTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH CHICOMS.

2. SIMILAR FRIENDSHIP ASSNS SAN FRANCISCO AND LOS ANGELES DOMINATED BY APOLOGISTS FOR CHICOM CAUSE AND SOME KNOWN MILITANT REVOLUTIONARIES.

3. IN VIEW SENSITIVITY SURROUNDING THESE ASSNS, REQUEST BASE NOT FOLLOW THROUGH ON ATTEMPTS GET BASE ASSETS INVOLVED. FURTHER, OPS USE OF STAFF MEMBERS, EMPLOYEES OR OFFICIALS OF PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGNS REQUIRE PRIOR CHIEF WOMACE APPROVAL. SUCH APPROVAL WOULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED

Susan Frank 201

/CONTINUED/

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG:
NIT:
XT:
ATE:

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

Y________PER________#________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

ONF: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 203394

PAGE TWO

ON BASIS OF DETAILED OPS PLAN.

4. FILE: 200-6-385/17.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested traces on US-China Peoples Friendship Assn, NY. and asked if Hqs had any candidates to organize Washington Chapter.

**Reported this Assn. welcomed incoming PRC delegates, giving Chairman's name as Susan Warren.

DCFE/CH________

CI/SO________

DO/I/B1________

DO/I/B2________

for SEYMOUR RUSSELL
C/DO

WILLIAM E. NELSON
C/FE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

secret

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

C/SOLY file

FORM W/L 10.

S.B.(A.5) LOWU BRIDGE INCOMING DAILY REPORT

DATE 31-10-1971. (5)

[illegible]	HAIN Alfred Unk. 25-7-20. Siegen.	(m)	Germany	Hong Kong Hotel	PP.NO.	0690543	Offenbach	2?-4-63.	[illegible]
	PALZ Werner Unk. 26-3-28. Berlin.	(m)	"	"	"	C1997707	Offenbach	17-7-63.	"
	HEIM Jens Erik Unk. 23-4-39. Hamburg.	(m)	"	Mandarin Hotel	"	C6253481	Hamburg	19-10-70.	"
44	SIEBERT Klaus Merchant 1-9-40. Germany.	(m)	"	Miramar Hotel	"	C5006358	Sydney	25-9-70.	"
45	REGENBOGEN Nochonic Merchant 3-6-07. Germany.	(m)	"	Nathan Hotel	"	C1634839	Germany	26-5-70.	"
46	TREIBER Gerhard Merchant 19-11-24. Germany.	(m)	"	Mandarin Hotel	"	B5585625	Mannheim	14-3-62.	"
47	MAYER Erwin Merchant 15-2-23. Nurtingen.	(m)	"	King'S Hotel	"	C3310485	Zisshausen	9-6-69.	"
48	GRAU Dietmar Merchant 6-3-43. Listsylt.	(m)	"	Golden Gate Hotel	"	C7617472	Germany	26-9-7.	"
49	COE Ruth Evans 25-11-19. U.S.A.	(f)	U.S.A.	"	"	T001039	Peking	9-7-71.	"
50	AVAKIAN Robert Bruce Unk. 7-3-43. U.S.A.	(m)	U.S.A.	"	"	K1066958	U.S.A.	22-7-66/	"

SUSAN FRANK 201

FORM W/L 10

S.B.(A.5) LOWU BRIDGE INCOMING DAILY REPORT

Date 31.10.71. (20)

191	FRANK Swan Warren Unk. 1.8.13. U.S.A.	(f)	U.S.A.	Transit-today	PP.No.	Z1652150	New York	8.8.70.	Unk.
192	GREENBERG Mary Louise Unk. 1.9.40. Canada	(m)	"	"	"	B1362312	S.F.	24.8.71.	"
193	GOLDBERG Miriam Unk. 20.7.20. U.S.A.	(f)	"	Golden Gate Hotel	"	Z737976	N.Y.	17.4.70.	"
194	WRIGHT Donald Herbert Unk. 9.3.36. U.S.A.	(m)	"	Transit-today	"	Z1148224	Chocago	4.7.71.	"
195	FESTINI Jean Estelle Unk. 11.8.17. U.S.A.	(f)	"	"	"	B1213164	Losangeles	5.10.67.	"
196	MONICK Douglas Robert Unk. 24.11.50. U.S.A.	(m)	"	"	"	B1864428	S.F.	30.8.71.	"
197	LEVY Chalom Charles Manager 5.9.28. Tanger, Morocco	(m)	Moroccan	Air France 195 to Paris on 31.10.71.	"	02228	Paris	5.4.66.	"
198	HAMAD Mohamed Elsheika Khogali Unk. 1921. Sudan	(m)	Sudanese	Shamrock Hotel	"	C14829	Khartum	17.9.69.	"
199	SAID Murtaza Mir Abdul Samad Unk. 1937. Kobul.	(m)	Afghan	Grand Hotel	"	123918	Kobul	21.8.71.	"
200	LEE Mon Choo Retired 24-3-1893. China.	(m)	Canada	1009, Canton Rd. 1/f.	"	KK137465	H.K.	12-10-70.	"

FORM W/L 10 **S.B.(A.5) LOWU BRIDGE INCOMING DAILY REPORT** **Date 31.10.71. (20)**

191	FRANK Swan Warren Unk. 1.8.13. U.S.A.	(f)	U.S.A.	Transit-today	PP.No.	A1652150	New York	8.8.70.	Unk.
192	GREENBERG Mary Louise Unk. 1.9.40. Canada	(m)	"	"	"	B1562312	S.F.	24.8.71.	"
193	GOLDBERG Miriam Unk. 20.7.20. U.S.A.	(f)	"	Golden Gate Hotel	"	A737976	N.Y.	17.4.70.	"
194	WRIGHT Donald Herbert Unk. 9.3.38. U.S.A.	(m)	"	Transit-today	"	A1148224	Chocago	4.7.71.	"
195	FESTANI Jean Estelle Unk. 11.8.17. U.S.A.	(f)	"	"	"	B121 [illegible] 64	Los Angeles	5.10.67.	"
196	MONICE Douglas Robert Unk. 24.11.50. U.S.A.	(m)	"	"	"	B1854428	S.F.	30.8.71.	"
197	LEVY Chalom Charles Manager 5.9.28. Tanger, Morocco	(m)	Morocan	Air France 195 to Paris on 31.10.71.	"	02228	Paris	5.4.66.	"
198	HAMAD Mohamed Elsheika Khogali Unk. 1921. Sudan	(m)	Sudanese	Shamrock Hotel	"	C14829	Khartum	17.9.69.	"
199	SAID Murtaza Mir Abdul Samad Unk. 1987. Kobul.	(m)	Afghan	Grand Hotel	"	123918	Kobul	21.8.71.	"
200	LEE Mon Choo Retired 24-3-1893. China.	(m)	Canada	1009, Canton Rd. 1/f.	"	HX137465	H.K.	12-10-70.	"

Susan Warren Frank

for 201.

FORM W/L 13 **S.B.(A 5) [illegible] INCOMING DAILY REPORT** Date: 22/10/1971 (15)

141	[illegible] William Director 7.?.1914 Africa	(m)	Irish	Mandarin Hotel	PP.No. P89780	Dublin	27.3.68.	Unk.
142	CRAIG Herbert Thomas Buyer 8.4.1937 Eire	(m)	"	Hilton Hotel	PP.No. P28473	"	20.8.68.	"
143	BELL Richard Anthony Manager 30.1.1944 Dublin	(m)	"	Mandarin Hotel	PP.No. G45924	"	30.4.71.	"
144	[illegible] Panagiotis Merchant 2?.3.1932 Greece	(m)	Greece	Grand Hotel	PP.No. T145926	Lagos	2.11.70.	"
145	[illegible] Richard Cyril Technician 2?.8.1922 U.S.A.	(m)	U.S.A.	Golden Gate Hotel	PP.No. B1942048	New York	8.9.71.	" Laos 201.
146	[illegible] Umar P.I.A. Service 1938 Pakistan	(m)	Pakistan	Farililes Co. H.K.	PP.No. AC422409	Rawalpindi	27.11.68.	"
147	[illegible] Aulis T. Director 4.8.1931	(m)	Finland	Ambassador Hotel	PP.No. 838846	Helsinki	4.6.70.	"
148	[illegible] Kurt Merchant 1.5.1930	(m)	Austria	Grand Hotel	PP.No.G0695771	Austraia	20.9.71.	"
149	O'[illegible] James Peter Merchant 30.1.1929 Chile	(m)	Chile	Hilton Hotel	PP.No. 006170	Santiago	7.5.68.	"
150	AL-[illegible] Abdul Adhim [illegible] 13.5.1944 Baghdad	(m)	Iraq	Astor Hotel	PP.No. B167375/4875	Baghdad	10.2.70.	"

Subj: Laos 201

14-00000

AMERICAN LEFTISTS FLOCKING TO PEKING: Communist China has instituted its own Open Door policy for American leftists, some of them with long-standing ties to Communist parties. A reception in Peking early this month provided intelligence agencies with a partial glimpse of who is welcome, and the relative pecking order. Turning out to be greeted by Premier Chou En-Lai and his two top assistants, Kuo Mo-jo and Keng Piao, were about 70 Americans, some permanent Peking residents and government employees. Radio Peking listed some by name, deliberately concealing the identity of others. Greeting Chou were "All members of the delegation of Revolutionary Union" (RU is a fanatically pro-Mao armed revolutionary group centered around Palo Alto and Richmond, Calif.), Pablo "Yoruba" Guzman, head of the Young Lords Party, Black Panther's Huey Newton, Elaine Brown and Robert Bay, and "16 American young people led by Mrs. Carmelita Hinton" (of Putney, Vt.). Also Mr. & Mrs. Max Granich (brother of the late Communist writer Mike Gold), William Epton (ex-member of Progressive Labor Party), Jack Belden (author of pro-Red China book), Mrs. Susan Warren (an old CP and PLP functionary), Dick Frank (Mrs. Warren's husband), Mr. & Mrs. Hoseah Williams (of Southern Christian Leadership Conference), Mr. & Mrs. John S. Service (ex-State Department employee, recently "rehabilitated" by liberal press in U.S.) Mr. & Mrs. William H. Hinton, Mr. & Mrs. Jack Schulman, Mr. & Mrs. Henry Wilcox, Dr. & Mrs. Samuel Rosen, Mr. & Mrs. Victor W. Sidel, and Geoffrey Collins.

Among Peking residents present were: Frank and Ruth Coe, Sol and Pat Adler (Frank Coe and Sol Adler were implicated in Soviet espionage in Washington in the '40s), Erwin Engst, Joan Hinton (his wife, and a developer of U.S. and probably Red Chinese atomic bombs), Bertha Sneck (ex-Mrs. Willian Hinton), Eleanor Chaidin, Julian Schuman (once indicted for treason in Korean War), Norman Schulman, Sidney Shapiro, Ione Kramer, Betty Chang, Alice E. Cheng, Lucille Stewart, Carmelita Hinton (the younger) and Fred Engst (same order undoubtedly is clue to rating).

File: Susan Warren Frank
201

[illegible]

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING

PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/GYROSE/KUWOLF
AMSPELL Underground Activities - November 1962

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action: For your information

Ref : UFGA-5897, dated 25 September 1962

1. Forwarded under separate cover as Attachment A is a copy of the original, and translation of a letter from the National Coordination Committee of AMSPELL in Cuba dated 28 November 1962. This letter was obtained through the AMBLEAK courier intercept channel prior to delivery to AMSPELL on 4 December 1962.

2. The communication is of interest since it contains the most recent report of AMSPELL underground activities and particularly claims commitment of a guerrilla warfare effort in two provinces. It also refers to the infiltration of AMHINT-58 as still feasible, and confirms the arrest of AMHINT-40, who is described as a prisoner in Block 9 at La Cabana Prison. 01

3. Attachment B is a report of underground financing for October 1962 and is the first detailed analysis of Cuban finances ever received by JMWAVE. This report was compiled by "Cuca" (National Coordinator for Civil Resistance identified in Para 5 of Reference). It should be noted that the total of $9,129.67 Cuban pesos as monthly maintenance is for the "Resistance" only and does not include the "National Military Committee" expenses for the month.

Distribution:
3 - C/TFW, w/att. ~~u/s/c~~

Attachments:
A and B, Under Separate Cover - attached

19-124-26/3

DATE TYPED
10 Dec 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
DEC 11 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-6857

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-19

2 Encls.

1/6R

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-6857

4. It should also be pointed out that the dire need for money expressed in Attachment A letter was soon thereafter satisfied when JMWAVE funded AMSPELL with $5,000 for exchange of $40,000 Cuban pesos and this was transmitted via local deposit and credit in Cuba.

END OF DISPATCH

19-124-26/3

14-00000

Attachment A to UFGA 6557 Havana, 28 Nov 62

Dear Brothers:

I hope from my call (LD telephone) yesterday you are aware of how desperate we are, financially. The week before last, I went to Las Villas and I want you to know that the DRE flag has now been raised in the Free Territory in Cuba. A small guerrilla (group) well supplied, is now representing us in the North Zone of Las Villas. And the guerrilla banda in Matanzas to whom we have offered some support will no doubt come into our organization if assured a little more help from the DRE.

We have been working on the total reorganization and if we cannot claim complete success it is because if our limited resources. Propaganda, although on a small scale, is functioning well, I am enclosing a copy of our last issue of Trinchera and examples of the seals we are producing in homes of Pre- University members. These are now appearing in public places. As you can see there is a willingness to work and with a little material support a great deal of effective work could be forthcoming.

I cannot understand yet, the delay in sending money. You remember how you witnessed our needs that day in Varadero, Luis? We only had a few centavos in capital? Well, that is the way we are now. We have asked a small local loan and after that must travel to Las Villas for a loan from the Provincial (Committee) there, since they seem to have money. I hope upon receipt of this (letter), if you have not sent money, you will do so immediately.

Concerning the travel of Angel (AMHINT-58 infiltration), advise me as soon as this can be arranged so that we can check the security aspects here. Our purpose is to be organized to facilitate the work

Encl A to UFGA 6557 19-124-26/3

of the infiltrees since it has been our unfortunate experience that if those infiltrating must move about, the exposure to arrest is greater.

Write at the first opportunity and advise me of the planning sq that we may work toward that end. Greetings from Marivi, Maggie, Pancho, Lazaro, etc. Rest assured we have not forgotten you.

(Signed) Ramon

01

P.S. Julio's mother has visited him and found he is well (AMHINT-40). Apparently all of them (prisoners) have been transferred to La Cabana. Luis, Julito is in the Cabana, Block 9 and tomorrow, Thurdday, is visiting day. They have not given me a copy of Trinchera as yet.

(Sigged) "Cuca"

VSR

La Habana 28-Nov 62

Queridos hermanos:

Espero por mi llamada de ayer se habrán dado cuenta de lo necesitados que estamos, económicamente hablando. La semana antepasada estuve en Las Villas, sepan que la bandera del D.R.E. ondea ya en Territorio Libre de Cuba. Una guerrilla pequeña, pero bien abastecida, nos representa en la zona Norte de Las Villas. Y los alzados de Matanzas a los que hemos hecho llegar varias cosas, de podérseles hacer llegar una ayuda más efectiva, no dudarían en pasar a las filas del D.R.E.

Se ha trabajado en la reorganización total de la organización y si no te digo aún que está totalmente organizada es porque la ~~escasez~~ escasez de recursos ~~no~~ se ha hecho sentir mucho. Propaganda, con lo poco que tenemos está funcionando bien. Con esta les va una copia del último Trinchera y una muestra de los sellitos, que con material casero han fabricado los muchachos de la Pre y que ya hoy se empiezan a ver en los lugares públicos. Como verás los deseos de trabajar son muchos y de tenerse los medios necesarios, el trabajo sería mucho más efectivo.

No comprendo aún la demora con el dinero, nos las hemos visto, como aquellos días de Varadero. ¿Te acuerdas, Luis? Cuando teníamos unos centavos por capital, bueno pues así estamos. Ahora pedí una pequeña cantidad prestada y como no podemos mantener más esta situación voy a las Villas a pedir un préstamo a la Provincial ya que son los únicos que tienen algún dinero. Espero si al recibo de esta aún no han enviado el dinero, lo hagan inmediatamente.

El viaje de Angel, avísenme tan pronto se pueda realizar, para comprobar aquí la seguridad. El propósito nuestro era organizarnos, para facilitar el trabajo a los que vengan ya que si después de estar aquí tienen que ponerse a organizar, iríamos a caer nuevamente en otra desgracia.

Tan pronto tengas una oportunidad escribe para saber que planes hay y organizarnos con vistas a eso. Recuerdos a todos, y salúdenme a Mariví, Maggie, Pinolo, Lugones etc. Tengan la certeza de que no los olvidamos.

Ramón

P.D. La madre vió a Julio y lo encontró muy bien físicamente. Al parecer ya lo pasaron a todo para la Habana

Luis. ya pidió [illegible] [illegible] Salce-
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Bogotá-
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] la [illegible] de [illegible]
[illegible]

FINANZAS - RESISTENCIA

Informe No. I (Oct. 31)

06

			OCT.	TOTAL
PROVINCIALES.-	CAMAGUEY	-(Ricardo)	500.00	
	MATANZAS	-(Armando)	200.00	
	LAS VILLAS	-	400.00	
	ORIENTE	-(Salas)	200.00	
	PINAR DEL RIO	-(JAIME)	200.00	
	HABANA	-(Aquiles)	60.00	
			$ 1,460.00	$ 1,460.00

06

NACIONALES .-	PRO-UNIVERSITARIA	-(Diego)	100.00	
	PROPAGANDA	-(Tony)	700.00	
	ORGANIZACION	-(Pepo)	100.00	
	OBRERO	-(Reno)	200.00	
	ABASTECIMIENTO	-(Alfredo)	150.00	
	INTELIGENCIA	-(Amado)	100.00	
	ACCION	-(Juan)	200.00	
			$ 1,550.00	$ 1,550.00

06

		Sept.	Oct.	Total	
LA CABAÑA .-	MAXIMO	50.00	25.00	75.00	
" "	RAFAEL	50.00	25.00	75.00	
" "	ORESTES	60.00	30.00	90.00	
" "	TONY RAMIREZ		50.00	50.00	
" "	CARLOS RUBIERA		50.00	50.00	
" "	R. VALDES D'WOLF		50.00	50.00	
SAN SEVERINO.-	SRA. DE RUIZ (Encargada)		500.00	500.00	
BONIATO ② .-	SRA. DE MONTOYA(Encargada)	1,050.00	525.00	1,575.00	
" ① .-	SRA. DE O'FARRILL		80.00	80.00	
ISLA DE PINOS.-	5 OTROS PRESOS		53.75	53.75	
" " " .-	A. MILLER (Tia para frutas)		50.00	50.00	
" " " .-	TONY FERNANDEZ		40.00	40.00	
" " " .-	4 OTROS FAM.		203.92	203.92	
③ ABOGADO .-	M. CALAS		250.00	250.00	
CLANDESTINOS.-	RODOLFO CABEZA	100.00	50.00	150.00	
" " .-	OQUENDO	60.00	30.00	90.00	
" " .-	SRA. DE J. GARCIA	40.00	20.00	60.00	
" " .-	CHANY Y FAM.	160.00	80.00	240.00	
④ " " .-	NERI, ESMERALDA Y ROGELIO	180.00	90.00	270.00	
" " .-	ROBERTO Y CARMENATE	80.00	40.00	120.00	
④ " " .-	ED. FERRER, TOMAS Y SERAFIN	120.00	60.00	180.00	
" " .-	ROGELIO ORTIZ		60.00	60.00	
" " .-	JORGE ULLOA		50.00	50.00	
" " .-	M. SABAS		150.00	150.00	
" " .-	SATAN		60.00	60.00	
" " .-	FERNANDO		50.00	50.00	
" " .-	MONGO (Arreglo carro)		97.00	97.00	
" " .-	MONGO		350.00	350.00	
⑥ .-	TRASPASO FIAT		1,000.00	1,000.00	
.-	Casa Chinas		50.00	50.00	
.-	FAM. DE ARNALDO SOCORROS		80.00	80.00	
.-	M. SANCHEZ		150.00	150.00	
⑦ .-	COJIN DE FLORES		10.00	10.00	
		$ 1,950.00	4,169.67	6,119.67	6,119.67
					$ 9,129.67

3/BR

Nov. 23 de 1962

La Habana, Noviembre 23 de 1962

Querido Bruno:

Adjunto enviamos el Estado de Cuentas desde el 19 de Octubre hasta el 23 de Noviembre. Te haremos algunas explicaciones:

1 .- Cuando recibimos los $10,000.00, pagamos el mes de Septiembre (el 19 de Octubre). Más tarde dimos la mitad de la ayuda correspondiente a Octubre.

2 .- La Sra. de Montoya y Ruiz* son las encargadas de repartir el dinero entre los familiares y presos de Boniato y San Severino respectivamente. Próximamente enviaremos un informe detallado de cada prisión y de cada giro.

3 .- Al Abogado, M. Calá* se le habían dado $100.00 y faltaban $250.00. Es el encargado de defender al grupo de Pinar del Río y Rafael, Máximo y Orestes.

4 .- Cuando veas tres nombres y $180.00 quiere decir $60.00 para cada uno.

5 .- Mongo ha firmado varios vales porque se está encargando de arreglar y recoger los carros.

6 .- El traspaso varía de precio según los papeles que se tengan. Casi todos tienen a los dueños presos o fuera del territorio Nacional, y para no perderlos hay que ir por trasmanos. No es verdaderamente un traspaso si no la inscripción para la nueva chapa y tiene que ser personalmente.

7 .- El cojín fué para la Sra. que vivía en la calle 6 que falleció y es donde duermen los muchachos cuando no tienen donde ir. Luis conoce el lugar, pues tuvimos allí una reunion.

8 .- El mes de Noviembre fué la ayuda familiar solamente de $20.00 pues no había más. Solo Oquendo recibió mas, $30.00, porque la Sra. tuvo un bebito muerto, nacido antes de tiempo y estaba ingresada delicada de salud.

9 .- Malanga y Fernando reciben el dinero quincenalmente, por eso es que aparecen dos veces en el mismo mes.

10.- Ninguna familia recibe la cantidad de la madre de Julito, pero esto es provisional, ya q que el padre está también preso y sin su firma Julia no puede cambiar cheques ni sacar dinero del banco.

11.- Juancho era el encargado de Finanzas y me entregó $409.00 que era lo que tenía en caja. Uno de los carros que estaba a su nombre lo tenía que entregar al gobierno porque se embarcaba y nos dió $500.00 por el, aunque nos tiene que dar más, ya que costó $2,400.00 ó $2,500.00, no me han informado aún.

12.- Yo no soy responsable de Finanzas, sólo he aceptado guardar y repartir el dinero provisionalmente hasta que se nombre a alguién definitivamente.

No tenemos que decirte la necesidad que hay de dinero. Ya Luis te habrá explicado como está el asunto de la comida, por ejemplo. Para comer hay que comprar en bolsa negra o si no morirse de hambre. El pollo está ya a $2.50 la libra en pie, y todo por el estilo. Esto no quiere decir que empecemos a comer pollo y no picadillo, pero el asunto es que se puede conseguir uno y no lo otro.

Te aseguramos que no malgastamos ni un centavo. Si quieres tener mas datos nos lo dejas saber que con mucho gusto te complaceremos. Hoy en día ni se consigue ni la gente tiene para hacer donativos. Acuérdate que ha habido un cambio "FUNESTO" y no hay muchas personas con efectivo.

Espero me escribas aunque sean dos líneas, ya que no me has mandado mas que recados con los muchachos. Dime si ya eres padre, pues nos gusta estar al tanto de los acontecimientos de nuestra GRAN FAMILIA.

Un abrazo para todos mis sobrinos en XTO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 19-124-20/7

SECRET

DATE : 665
8 NOV 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JUAN

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, DDP/SIT 3, CI, CI/OPS, FI, ISO 4, WE 4, WH 7, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RI Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 8 2343Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 15095

WAVE INFO DIR HAGU CITE SJAN 0835

GYROSE

REF HPSW 1362 (NOT SENT WAVE)

1. IN INITIAL DISCUSSION WITH IDEN A, HE INFORMED KARNLEY THAT HE IS IN CONTACT LOCALLY WITH DRE (FOR DIR: SEE PARA 1 REF). IDEN A SAID HIS CONTACT HAS BEEN WITH JOSE ARTECONA, BROTHER OF CARLOS "TRIPA" ARTECONA.

2. ARTECONA HAD SOUGHT IDEN A'S ASSISTANCE OBTAINING MINIATURE CAMERAS WHICH SAID HE WISHED TRANSMIT TO PBRUMEN THROUGH CHANNEL WHICH HIS ORGANIZATION HAS NOW ESTABLISHED WITH IDEN B. ACCORDING TO ARTECONA IDEN B COOPERATING AS COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL USING "DIPLOMATIC POUCH" AND HAS NOT ONLY TRANSMITTED MESSAGES BUT ON ONE OCCASION TRANSMITTED ONE UNIT SMALL ARMS.

3. WHEN QUERIED FURTHER IDEN A SAID ARTECONA HAS NEVER IDENTIFIED INDIVIDUAL WHO ACTUALLY IN CONTACT WITH IDEN B NOR INDICATED EXTENT IDEN B'S GOVT INVOLVED. WHOLE STORY FAIRLY LOOSE.

4. KARNLEY DECLINED IDEN A SUGGESTION THAT HE TALK DIRECTLY WITH ARTECONA. SUGGESTED INSTEAD THAT IDEN A ADVISE ARTECONA TO PRESENT HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO HIS KUBARK CONTACT,

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

PAGE 2

IN 15095 SJAN 0835

(ARTECONA HAD PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED DRE/KUBARK CONTACT) EXPRESSING OPINION THAT IF DRE HAD INDEED DEVELOPED SUCH CHANNEL TO PBRUMEN, KUBARK VERY LIKELY BE MUCH INTERESTED.

5. IDEN A HAS NOW MADE ABOVE SUGGESTION AND ARTECONA HAS SAID WILL PRESENT TO KUBARK CONTACT DURING VISIT MIAMI WHICH EXPECTS MAKE LATER THIS MONTH.

6. SJAN ELECTED HANDLE MATTER THIS WAY SO AS TO AVOID CROSSING WAVE CHANNEL TO DRE. IF CONSIDERED DESIRABLE HOWEVER BELIEVE SJAN CAN EASILY ESTABLISH CONTACT AND FOLLOW THIS UP FROM HERE.

7. ADVISE.

8. FOR HAGU: DRE IS DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL, PROMINENT CUBAN EXILE STUDENT GROUP WITH LONG STANDING KUBARK
ASSOCIATION
ASSOCIAN. HQS IS IN MIAMI WITH MARGINAL REPRESENTATION SAN JUAN.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 666 8 NOV 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JUAN

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DOP, DOP/SIT 3, CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSO 4, WE 3, WH 7, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ Name required ☑
Signature:

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 8 23432 62

ROUTINE

IN 15096

WAVE INFO DIR HAGU CITE SJAN 0836

GYROSE

REF SJAN 0835 (IN 15095)

IDEN A: COLLIN E. OSTRANDER, USIA REPRESENTATIVE, SAN JUAN.

IDEN B: WALDEMAR F. LEE, NETHERLANDS CONSUL, SAN JUAN.

04,11

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ROUTING	[illegible]
RID/AN	[illegible]
RID MIS	
TFC/FA FRE-A	
DESTROY	

DEC 10 2 PM

RID\MIS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

1/BR

104-10170-10051 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

28/5h

3/11/98

(29)

Date: 02/12/98
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10170-10051
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE
TO : CHIEF, TASK FORCE W
TITLE : AMSPELL PROGRESS REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1962
DATE : 10/09/62
PAGES : 73
SUBJECTS : AMSPELL
PROGRESS REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/07/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK64-25:F27 1998.02.07.11:28:56:590031: ATTACHMENTS INCLUDED

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

14-00000

5P ~ j.l. DEE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/GYROSE/KUWOLF
AMSPELL Progress Report for September 1962

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Action: For your information

Ref : A. UFGA-5728, dated 21 September 1962
B. UFGA-5897, dated 25 September 1962
C. UFGA-6065, dated 8 October 1962
D. CARA-7019, dated 25 September 1962
E. CARA-6994, dated 15 September 1962
F. WAVE-8311, dated 7 September 1962
G. WAVE-8356, dated 8 September 1962

1. The September Progress Report for AMSPELL, including AMHINT and AMBARB activities, is transmitted herewith:

A. AMSPELL

1) General:

01

a. On 21 September 1962, AMHINT-53 exfiltrated PBRUMEN in a refugee vessel and made his preliminary operational report on release from CAC on 22 September (Reference B). Subject was accompanied by the National Coordinator for Agricultural Affairs (actually an organizer for guerrilla warfare and resistance groups throughout the Island) Jose Angel LOZANO y Lozano. Briefly, AMHINT-53 and LOZANO rendered an optimistic operational report on

01

Continued

Distribution:
3 - C/TFW, w/att, ~~u/s/c~~

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Attachments:
Under Separate Cover

19-124-26/3

DATE TYPED
9 October 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
OCT 15 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-6140

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-19/1

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

21BR

14-00000

AMSPELL organization in PBRUMEN, including the situation in the underground, compartmentation, organization, communications control and intelligence structure. Subjects are undergoing intelligence debriefing on a continuing basis.

b. While AMHINT-53 01 was arranging his exfiltration and AMSPELL Psywar operations in PBRUMEN and the hemisphere were continued on their normal course, the AMHINTs were still smarting from the ODYOKE confiscation of their vessel, the JUANIN-I, as a consequence of the 24 August attack on Havana. AMHINT-2 went to 01 Caracas on 7 September for a meeting with President BETANCOURT (or his official representative) and a press conference where he released an AMSPELL statement, which in effect, served a notice on PBRUMEN and the USSR that any Communist shipping encountered in PBRUMEN territorial waters will be attacked on sight. (Reference F and G)

c. Behind the scenes, however, AMHINT-2 01 was reportedly (Reference D and E) negotiating with Venezuelan Naval Officials for surfacecraft and possibly a base from which to operate. What success he achieved in this quest, or to what extent President BETANCOURT is prepared to help AMSPELL, is still an unknown quantity. Judging from their attempts to raise funds in other spheres, allegedly for the purchase of a replacement vessel, they were not very successful in Caracas. (A PM Case Officer handling the CEDAR team has reported that one of the members complained of forfeiting a 20-percent "kick-back" in his AMSPELL salary. (For a breakdown of AMSPELL salary see Attachment B.)

d. AMHINT-2 01 returned from Caracas and as to be expected, gave no indication of the "secret negotiations" or their outcome. On 27 September, along with AMHINT-5, he requested a meeting with the JMWAVE officer for discussion of the AMBARB funding disagreement and the general AMSPELL situation (See Attachment C). Perhaps this session gave JMWAVE a bit more insight as to AMSPELL plans and intentions, but no real solution for the AMBARBs resulted. In short, AMSPELL policy is to mold PBPRIME public opinion and bring pressure to bear on ODYOKE and GPIDEAL for action in the PBRUMEN situation within the next four months.

e. To implement such a policy, AMSPELL has exploited the impact of their 24 August attack on PBPRIME news media, as well as their Caracas Declaration. Also, they have published a weekly news letter in English entitled "The Cuban Report" (Reference C) and about 1,000 copies are mailed out to ODYOKE officials and congressmen. Initiated in late August, the main theme of this publication has been the Soviet/Bloc materiel buildup in PBRUMEN. (See Attachment A)

2) Total AMSPELL Support for September 1962: $50,960.40

a. AMBARB Section:	Salaries	$12,240.00	
	Operations	7,700.00	
	Processing	1,020.40	$20,960.40
b. AMHINT Section:	Support	$ 5,000.00	
c. AMSPELL General:	Salaries	9,000.00	
	Overhead	2,100.00	
	Operations	13,900.00	$25,000.00

4/BR

3) Intelligence Production:

UFG-1572 - "Status of Equipment at the Nico Lopez Refinery & UK, Czech, and Soviet Assitance in its maintenance; Shipment of Gold Bullion from the Refinery to the USSR."

UFG-1585 - (As above)

UFG-1607 - (As above)

UFG-1622 - (As above)

UFG-1628 - (As above)

4) Development and Plans:

All planning phases of AMSPELL activities supported by JMWAVE at the present time are subject to the results of meetings with AMSPELL concerning increased control, and, the decisions of JMWAVE to continue a support relationship if an acceptable degree of KUBARK control can be established.

B. AMHINTS:

1) General:

a. As reported in Reference B, the most important AMHINT development during September was the exfiltration of AMHINT-53. 01 This was also significant for JMWAVE, since all negotiations with AMSPELL would be transferred from AMHINT-2 to 01 AMHINT-53. 01 Although AMHINT-53 01 will undoubtedly be fully briefed and re-indoctrinated by AMHINT leaders concerning AMSPELL present status and operational relationship with JMWAVE, AMHINT-53 01 is a mature and astute leader and can be expected to appreciate the broad scope of JMWAVE-AMSPELL operations.

b. In the Psywar field, the AMHINTs in PBRUMEN continue to produce "Trinchera" on a hand-operated mimeograph machine in Havana and distribute about 10,000 copies monthly. They are also committed to the collection and transmission of reports and photographs on the Soviet buildup, at least until the DAMSON intelligence operations are begun. This activity is in direct support of the AMSPELL policy cited in Paragraph A.1)e above. The AMSPELL propaganda section is divided into four departments to carry out this program: PBRUMEN, Latin American, PBRUMEN Exile Community and PBPRIME.

c. Diplomatic pouches 24 intercepted for JMWAVE by AMBLEAK-1 have revealed much of AMSPELL operational planning not heretofore reported. In a series of letters written by the AMSPELL national coordinators in exile to their opposite numbers in PBRUMEN on 20 September, it was indicated that:

i. Negotiations by AMHINT-2 01 in Caracas, Costa Rica and Panama are practically completed for an AMSPELL operations base. (Letter from Bernabe PENE to AMHINT-40)

ii. AMSPELL has levied intelligence requirements on AMHINTS in PBRUMEN for sending out information on PBRUMEN ports that can be attacked from the sea. (Intelligence Plans Numbers 5, 6 and 7, in a letter from AMHINT-39 to "Jesus", National Coordinator for Intelligence.)

iii. In the interim, reports on Mariel, Cabanas, Bahia Honda, La Habana, Matanzas and Cardenas are requested on a continuing basis.

24

d. Subsequently, in an incoming pouch and probably crossing with the foregoing communications, a series of letters from the National Coordinators in PBRUMEN reported a severe blow to AMSPELL clandestine organization. Jore MEDINA Bringier ("Mongo"), National Coordinator for Military Reception and Supply, reported that AMHINT-40 0 (PBRUMEN National Coordinator) had been missing. (Later reported as arrested and being held at G-2 Headquarters on Ave 5 in Miramar.) Also, "Juan" and "Miguel" were arrested in Havana. Several others were missing. MEDINA went on to describe security measures implemented and report on a re-organization of the National Coordinator Committee. He closed with a plea for a small shipment of small arms for defensive use, clothing and medicine, and a full-scale propaganda effort if AMHINT-40 should be sentenced to summary execution.

24

01 e. In this same pouch, the National Coordinator for Propaganda, Nicolas PEREZ Diez-Arguelles ("Jose Alfredo") rendered a detailed report on Agit/Prop assets in PBRUMEN. The printing and distribution of "Trinchera" has been moved up to every fortnight, and efforts to get it printed on a commercial printing press in Havana appear to be successful. Regular couriers are being trained for delivery of the newspaper to the provinces. PEREZ also reported their progress in mounting two clandestine radio transmitters for Agit/Prop purposes, one in Las Villas and one in Havana. These are powered by 110 volt generators usually found on a small farm. It is projected to transmit a regular program, probably entitled "Tele-periodico Trinchera". The report does not explain what counter measures will be taken to prevent GOC detection. Finally, PEREZ describes an Agit/Prop program already in progress: First a plan for printing and marking walls with their organization abbreviation, carried out in one operation, synchronizing municipal and borough teams for the job. As a follow-up phase, large cloth banners bearing the same letters will be raised or tended in congested areas and photographs taken for publication in "Trinchera". Also, with the aid of their Intelligence Section, AMHINTS have penetrated two radio stations in Havana and are identifying all Sov/Bloc personnel employed there, their security practices, addresses and routes for commuting.

2) Total AMHINT Support for September 1962: $5,000.00

(Included in AMSPELL General section of this report)

3) Intelligence Production:

(Reported in AMSPELL General Section.)

4) Development & Plans:

(See this section under AMSPELL General of this report)

C. AMBARB

01

During the reporting period no changes occurred in AMBARB personnel assignments. With the exfiltration of AMHINT-53 from PBRUMEN it is hoped that it will be possible to negotiate with AMBARB the still unsettled question of AMBARB funding. We will report further to Headquarters as soon as an agreement is reached with AMBARB on funding of AMBARB representatives in the field by local KUBARK Stations. For the present it can only be said that the AMBARB leaders are strenuously resisting any effort by JMWAVE to increase to more than eight the number of their people whom they will permit KUBARK to fund directly rather than through AMBARB Headquarters in Miami.

The inspection tour of AMBARB-16 to delegations in Latin America resulted in the general report forwarded for your information as Attachment D: in reading this report, it is useful for reference purposes to examine Attachment E a report which the AMBARB office has prepared on its general progress since inception

518R

of the AMBARB program. As Attachment F we forward a special report prepared by AMBARB-16 on AMBARB mailing operations capabilities.

Individual reports on the activities of AMBARB overseas delegations are forwarded in the following Attachments, which Headquarters may wish to bring to the attention of KUBARK Area Divisions or Stations as it deems best:

G. Bolivia
H. Brazil
I. Costa Rica
J. Chile
K. Colombia
L. Ecuador
M. Mexico
N. Panama
O. Peru
P. Uruguay
Q. Venezuela

The AMBARB salary schedule for September is forwarded as Attachment R.

END OF DISPATCH

B

DRE

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

SALARY - 1-30 September, 1962

DEPENDANTS ALLOWANCES:

Dependants	- Alberto Muller (In Isla de Pinos)	US$ 200.00
"	- Miguel Lasa (IT Intrusion)	200.00
"	- Rodolfo Vidal (Havana Ops.)	200.00
"	- Jorge de Armas (Two in Isla de Pinos)	225.00
		US$ 825.00

DRE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE:

Luis Fernandez Rocha	Sec. General	US$ 275.00
Jose M. Lasa	Sec. Propaganda	275.00
Fernando Garcia Chacon	Sec. Actas	250.00
Jose A. Gonzalez Lanuza	Sec. Relaciones Interiores	325.00
Elio Mas Hernandez	Sec. Planificacion	275.00
General Fatjo	Sec. Finnanzas	275.00
Raquel Lavilla (Cecilia)	Ast. Inteligecia y visas	180.00
Ronnie Ramos	Ast. Propaganda	200.00
Zoila Diaz	Ast. Propaganda	150.00
Teresa Valdos Hurtado	Ast. Archivo y Propaganda	150.00
Elvira Weiss	Ast. Rel. Internas	150.00
Mercedes Ramirez	Telephone	150.00
Luisita Esquiroz	Ast. Rel. Internas	110.00
Lula Santos	Ast. Propaganda	100.00
		US$2865.00

SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES FUTURE OPS:

Ana Diaz Silveira	Ast. Finanzas	US$ 200.00
Maria V. de los Reyes	Ast. Archivo y Prop.	120.00
Isabel Alonso	Ast. Informacion	170.00
Carlos Bravo	Ast. Propaganda	80.00
Angelica Martinez	Ast. Finanzas y visas waiver	100.00
Luis Gutierrez	Telegrafist	150.00
Carlos A. Muller	Ast. Propaganda	125.00
		US$ 945.00

./....

19-124-26/3

Att 3 to UFGA 6140

ATT "B"

DRE

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

MILITAR INFILTRATION OPS TRAINING:

Bernabe Pena	Militar Cord OPS	US$ 275.00
Gilberto Aleman	Trainee # 1	150.00
Francisco Calvet	Trainee # 2	175.00
Carlos DeQuesne	Trainee # 3	125.00
J. M. Fiol	Trainee # 4	325.00
Angel A. Fontanils	Trainee # 5	225.00
Francisco Garcia	Trainee # 6	120.00
Julio Jo	Trainee # 7	120.00
Carlos Obregon	Trainee # 8 (Tele)	170.00
Lesmes Ruiz	Trainee # 9	200.00
Arnaldo Santa Cruz	Trainee # 10	150.00
Ernesto Fernandez	Trainee # 11	200.00
Jhon Koch	Trainee # 12	250.00
Julian Gomez	Maritime - Militar	100.00
Lazaro Fariñas	Trainee # 13	100.00
Enrime Torres	Maritime - Militar	100.00
Juan M. Salvat	Sec. Asuntos Militares	375.00
Ignacio Arjona	Trainee # 14	100.00
Albor Ruiz	Resp. Asuntos Navales	200.00
Francisco Blanco	Trainee # 15	200.00
Luis Camps	Trainee # 16 (Naval)	150.00
Julio Hernandez Rojo	In Cuba (his family)	200.00
Raul de Cespedes	Ast. Militar	125.00
Maria ODoardo	Ast. Militar	130.00
Isidro Borja	Ast. Sec. Aasuntos Militares	100.00
		US$ 4365.00

Dependats Allowances	US$ 825.00
DRE Office and Executive	2865.00
Subistence Allowance	945.00
Militar Inf. Ops. Training	4365.00
	US$ 9000.00

Responsable de Finanzas DRE

R.

DRE
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

MIAMI 30 AUGUST 1962

INTERNATIONAL SECTION PAYROLL MONTH for Sept 62

MAIN OFFICE

1) Eduardo Muñiz Melo -------------Coordinator---------------$275.00- for Aug 62
2) Mario Pita Garcia -------------Sub-Coordinator-----------$325.00----
3) Evelio Ley Fernandez------------Contacts & Finance--------$250.00----
4) Aida Rodriguez Mendez-----------Secretary & Typist--------$200.00----
5) Margarita Esquiroz Martinez-----Translator----------------$170.00----

RADIO CENTRAL & SOUTH AMERICA

6) Pedro Ynterian Garcia ----------Sub-coordinator-----------$275.00----
7) Clara Alvarez Perez ------------Asst Secretary -------- --$120.00----

PHOTOGRAPHY DEPARTMENT

8) Jose I. Rodriguez Lombillo------Sub-Coordinator ----------$300.00- for Aug 62
9) Joaquin Martinez de Pinillos----Photo Tech----------------$250.00----
10) Antonio Abellà Calderin --------Photographer -------------$200.00----

ARGENTINA

11) Rogelio Helu Vital ------------Waiting Visa -------------$350.00----
12) Alejandro Portes Cortada--------Waiting for visa----------$300.00----

BOLIVIA

~~13) Amado Oscar [illegible] Rodriguez ----Sept 1961 ---------------$200.00----~~
~~14) Luis Benigno Gonzalez -----------December 1961--------------$206.00----~~
15) Jose Adolfo Barro Garcia--------Waiting to be approved----$200.00----

BRAZIL

16) Raul Gonzalez Simon ------------October 1961 -------------$[illegible]---- $150.
17) Carlos Valdesuso Rodriguez------January 1962---------------$200.00----
18) Jose Vega Rivera ---------------October 1961---------------$200.00----
19) Guillermo Asper Valdes ---------December 1961--------------$200.00----
20) Pedro Castello ----------May 1962 ------------------$200.00----
21) Benito Diaz Peret --------------June 1962------------------$200.00----
22) Jorge Guerra Guerra-------------December 1961--------------$350.00----
23) Carlos Bedias Vazquez ----------Waiting to be Approved----$250.00----

CHILE

~~24) Nelson Amaro Victoria ----------October 1961 --------------$230.00----~~
~~25) Rafael Espinosa Zarate ---------May 1962 ------------------$250.00----~~
~~26) Nolis Mesa Villeriño ------------June 1962 -----------------$375.00----~~
27) Luis Figueras Valdes -----------November 1961 -------------$200.00----

CH RZUFGA 6140

19-124-36/3

CONTINUATION

COSTA RICA

31 (28) Evelio Companioni Esteva ---------October 1961 -----------$200.00----
29) Jorge Hermida Arenas --------------October 1961 -----------$200.00----
30) Julian Osante Fernandez -----------July 1962 --------------$250.00----
31) Armando del Pozo ------------------October 1961------------$225.00----

COLOMBIA

32) Jose A. Guerra Rodriguez----------January 1962------------$275.00----
33) Andres de la Rosa------------------January 1962------------$200.00----
34) Nelson Federico Better Dotres-----May 1962 ---------------$200.00----
35) Rolando Castaño -------------------January 1962 -----------   ----

ECUADOR

~~36) Rafael Orlando [illegible] -----------November 196[illegible] -------------$200.00----~~
37) Francisco Haded Becalli------------January 1962 -----------$200.00----

HONDURAS

38) Fernando Arco Hernandez ----------Waiting to be approved--$225.00----
39) Eduardo Tomas Torres Ramos--------Waiting to be approved--$225.00----

MEXICO

~~40) Angel Gonzalez Fernandez ----------September 1962-----------$200.00----~~
41) Jorge Dorticos Arlegui -----------November 1961 ----------$300.00----
42) Martin Morua Arrechea -------------Waiting for visa -------$200.00----
43) Carlos Garcia Soler ---------------Waiting for visa -------$250.00----

PANAMA

44) Jorge Mendigutia Ramirez----------October 1961 -----------$200.00----
45) Jorge Marban Garcia ---------------May 1961 ---------------$275.00----

PERU

46) Rolando Fernandez Corredera ------October 1961------------$300.00----
47) Nestor Campaneria Angel------------October 1961------------$250.00----
48) Sixto Rubiales Ros ----------------Waiting for visa--------$200.00----
49) Ricardo Rubiales Ros---------------Waiting for visa--------$200.00----

REPUBLICA DOMINICANA

50) Pablo [illegible] ----------------------May 1962 ---------------$250.00----
51) Delio Gonzalez ---------------------Waiting for visa -------$250.00----

URUGUAY

52) Mario Garcia Gonzalez--------------July 1962---------------$250.00-----
53) Armando Frias Mesa ----------------July 1962---------------$250.00----
54) Rene Morato Fontana ---------------July 1962 --------------$225.00----

14-00000

D R E **DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL**

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

CONTINUATION

VENEZUELA

55) ⑤⑤)	Rafael Tremols Fresneda	September 1961	275.00
~~[illegible])~~	~~Joaquin Perez Rodriguez~~	~~May 1961~~	~~275.00~~
57)	Jose Gonzalez Llorente	November 1961	200.00
58)	Lorenzo Martin Rodriguez	November 1961	200.00
59)	Luis Boza Dominguez	June 1961	200.00
60)	Ricardo Rodriguez Jimenez	May 1961	200.00
61)	Ramon Calero Rivero	May 1962	200.00
62)	Roberto Prego Novo	May 1961	200.00

$12,240.00

TOTAL AMOUNT INTERNATIONAL PAYROLL, RECEIVED FIVE DAYS LATE

ON SEPTEMBER 1962................................

Mario Pits

MA[illegible]IO PU[illegible]
SUB-COORDINATOR

[illegible] JR.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

14-00000

F.

DRE
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
josé antonio echeverría con tus ideas en marcha

REPORT

During the recent trip I made through the DRE Delegations in Latin America, the results of the sending of propaganda by mail to Cuba were reported to me. For the better understanding of the agreements reached, we will now explain them within each Delegation visited.

VENEZUELA.-

The Delegation at Venezuela sent some months ago the propaganda we sent them to be mailed to Cuba. They used the lists of addresses given by Roger.

Venezuela has continued this system using the propaganda edited by the DRE and the propaganda prepared in Venezuela. An average of 1,700 letters was sent during May, June, and July, mailing them from Caracas one month, from Maracaibo another month, and from Barquisimeto another. All security means were studied (that they be sent by different persons with different handwriting, that regular, and not commemorative, stqmps be used, ordinary envelopes, and mailed in different post offices, etc.)

BRAZIL.-

The Delegation at Brazil also sent the propaganda given by Roger, but no reply was obtained from any person. We studied the security means and the conditions for the sending of the propaganda to Cuba. The Delegation remarked on the risk run with the mail and the violations to which it is subject in Brazil (they explained that the salaries of post office employees are so low that they take off the stamps from the letters when they have not been marked, to sell them, and then they destroy the letter.)

They sent 1,500 letters during May, June, and July.

URUGUAY.-

We did not send the propaganda to Uruguay because then we had no Delegation there.

CHILE.-

The Delegation at Chile sent the third propaganda given by Roger, which was the propaganda on the members of the 26th of July that are imprisoned or have been executed. They sent 1,000 letters.

att C to UFGA 6140

19-124-26/3

DRE

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

josé antonio echeverría con tus ideas en marcha

NOTE.- The list of addresses had to be previously checked up, because there were persons in it who are actually working in the underground, and the sending of propaganda addressed to them could, consequently, place them under great danger.

SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

[illegible]

3. While AMHINT-2 01 is now PBPRIME, he will determine AMSPELL policy as approved by the AMSPELL Executive Committee. However, the activities of the last four months wereplanned and controlled by AMHINT-2 01 and assisting him were AMHINT-3 and Bernabe PENA, who were present at this meeting. After the AMBARB discussion, the meeting turned into a long discussion of the International Communist situation, ODYOKE, KUBARK and AMSPELL policies as related to this situation. Some of the noteworthy items revealed:

a. AMSPELL had the 24 August Havana attack plan for six months, but had shelved it for the "right time" and a considered decision not to embark upon a course independent of KUBARK approval. The Sov/bloc buildup changed that decision.

b. AMSPELL analyzes the situation as hopeless for the PBRUMEN revolutionary movements after four months because:

1- The Soviets will be firmly established and ODYOKE policy as defined by GPIDEAL tends toward and will probably result in a hemisphere acceptance of PBRUMEN as a satellite.

2- After four months, the degree of police controls, repression and persecution will make any internal action in civic resistance and guerrilla warfare virtually impossible.

c. AMSPELL feels that ODYOKE policy on PBRUMEN cannot be influenced by the rising tide of public opinion and congressional action, partly because GPIDEAL is surrounded by a group of advisors who are "one step from being parlor pinks or worse". The list began with Chester BOWLES.

d. This situation ~~is not an original~~ AMSPELL 01 observation. During his European travel in August, AMHINT-2 went to the Vatican for a meeting (claimed to be high level) which had been arranged some time ago. His impression of thinking in the Vatican re World Communist advance, was that ODYOKE or PBPRIME was no longer calculated as an effective power for defending the world against total takeover. That the Catholic Church was beginning the long process of preparing their forces for a world dominated by Communism.

4. As a result of their observations and analysis, AMSPELL has assumed a "now or never" attitude and policy. They feel they must resort to tactics that mold PBPRIME public opinion and bring pressure to bear on ODYOKE and GPIDEAL for action in the PBRUMEN situation. Latin America must also be kept aware and urged to support an action. They would hope that such an AMSPELL policy and resultant activity would not be interpreted as opposition or hostility to KUBARK or ODYOKE, and that their KUBARK relationship would survive the critical months before them. They recognize that KUBARK is bound by policy and burdened by bureaucracy, and feel that the actions - although independent and uncontrolled - of AMSPELL might contribute to the formation of action policy in PBRUMEN, despite consternation in ZRMETAL.

BRM

5/BR

C.

AMHINT-2, S N [illegible] A   [illegible]

27 September 1962   1600-1830 hrs

Tip-Top Restaurant, Coral Gables.

Harold R. NOEMAYR

01

1. The meeting with AMHINT-2 was to clarify the continuing misunderstanding and disagreement over AMBARB funding. The original AMBARB policy meeting with AMHINT-2 was reviewed, and AMHINT-2 pointed out that it was not agreed that KUBARK station would pay all AMBARBS, but only the coverts. Without going over the entire evolution of the AMBARB project funding, it was pointed up to AMHINT-2 that the project was a two-way arrangement, of great mutual convenience, and we must find a functional "middle-ground" upon which to operate, although it may not be entirely satisfactory to either of the parties. AMHINT-2 agreed, and the following ground rules were arrived at as a workable funding plan:

a. AMBARBs assigned as overt AMSPELL representatives will be funded by AMSPELL from Miami on all future assignments. Those now being funded by station will remain status quo.

b. Covert AMBARBS for station contact will be assigned by individual processing, both parties agreed, and station will fund and control.

c. Re the four pending cases where stations have requested funding as soon as possible - a meeting is to be held where each case will be considered individually and decided upon.

2. While this arrangement is not entirely acceptable, it is believed that upon the return of AMHINT-53 to the operational control, a better arrangement can be made.

01

19-124-20/3

AT

(W) C6 UFGA 6140

6158

D.

DRE
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

REPORT

SUBJECT. Eduardo Muñiz' trip to Latin America.

This report is aimed on narrating briefly the results of Mr. Eduardo Muñiz' recent trip to several countries of Latin America carried through for the purpose of visiting the D.R.E. Delegations.

In order to make easier the understanding of its points, we will outline the impressions gathered throughout the different countries according to the order in which they were visited, and dividing them into the following aspects.

A.- Actual situation of the Delegation

B.- Deficiencies

C.- Future possibilities.

VENEZUELA

A.- Actual situation of the Delegation.

Undoubtedly, the D.R.E. Delegation at Venezuela is at present the best delegation the D.R.E. has in Latin America

There are many reasons for which this Delegation has reached to occupy the first place in the Latin American Plan of the D.R.E. Suming them up they are the following.

1.- It is identified with the nation's problems and national aims.

2.- Team-work coordination and unity in the accomplishment of labor

3.- A high sense of duty and a skilful plan of labor intelligently organized.

Consequently, the D.R,E. Delegation at Venezuela has succeeded in attaining a high prestige for the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil among the most representative elements and institutions of the Venezuelan people agreeing their ideals with ours. The central management of the D.R.E. Delegation at Venezuela is located in Caracas. It is a small office situated at a central city point.

att. D to UFGA 6140

19-124-26/3

It has two sub-delegations, one in Maracaibo, a northern city of Venezuela, under the direction of Roberto Prego, Ramon Calera, and Ricardo Rodriguez, and the other one in Barquisimeto.

At the central office of the D.R.E. Delegation in Venezuela under the direction of Rafael Tremols, General Delegate of the D.R.E. in Venezuela, Jose Miguel Gonzalez Llorente, Lorenzo Martin, Joaquin Perez, and Luis Roza are actually working. In Caracas, the D.R.E transmits a daily radio broadcast which lasts for 30 minutes. Also in Maracaibo the D.R.E. transmits a radio broadcast which holds great popularity. (It is interesting to point out as a proof for the advantageous effects of this broadcast that a group of action men of the communist party tried to burn with Molotov bombs the radio station which transmit the broadcast).

The labor accomplished by the D.R.E. in the student field is of vital importance. At present the Delegation has the possibility of moving enough forces in a definitive moment to counteract Communist action inside the University which is totally controlled by Communists.

We can ~~to~~ point out as highly important the so - called "personality - building courses" which were created by the members of the D.R.E. and which are carried through today due to intimate cooperation, among the D.R.E., the government, the Cristian Social Party and ecclesiastical hierarchy. Each of these courses last for approximately one week and has for approximately ~~one week~~ and are generally given in a farm. The attendants are almost always no more than 35 and are submitted during one week to strong military discipline and intensive indoctrination which lasts until night, ending the activities of the day with a General Assembly in which the results attained during the day are discussed. I had the opportunity to assist personally at one of these courses which was being given by Ricardo Rodriguez, member of the D.R.E. Delegation at Maracaibo, in a farm given by the Venezuelan government for such purpose. Up to the present 1,800 Venezuelan Students have received these courses and, certainly, their effects have influenced greatly in the consolidation of the democratic system in Venezuela.

We could now tell of the many other activities of the Delegation but would result unending. That is why we have only pointed out the most important.

B.- Deficiencies

Generally, we could assert that the balance maintained by the D.R.E. Delegation at Venezuela on this aspect cannot be more positive. Excepting the logical and natural deficiencies in the labor due greatly to the limitations, the D.R.E. Delegation at Venezuela does not have any deficiencies of importance. On the other hand, the Delegation at Venezuela presented to me a complaint which was also made by the rest of the Delegations, as I will explain further on. It is that the Delegation has been on several occasions under emotional pressures motivated by the large periods of time it has gone through with no visits by anyone of the Central Office of International Relations. In other words, the D.R.E. Delegation at Venezuela asked through all its members more frequent visits in order to avoid a feeling of forlorness during our common struggle.

C.- Future possibilities

The D.R.E. has huge future possibilities in Venezuela. The prestige it actually has among the people and inside government circles opens new fields for a near future in all the aspects. We will synthesize these possibilities in the following points.

1.- More "personality-building coursses" in order to double the number of Venezuelan students receiving them.

2.- Organization of brigades to encounter Communists and move them out from the Central University of Caracas in the elections next year.

3.- Increase in the propaganda

4.- Spreading of activity throughout all the States of the country.

D R E
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

BRAZIL.-

A.- Actual situation of the Delegation.

For the better understanding of the situation of the DRE in Brazil, we will first consider the situation of the DRE Delegation at Rio de Janeiro and then the labor of the Delegation at Sao Paolo.

As well as the Delegation in Caracas, the Delegation in Rio de Janeiro has succeeded in carrying through a labor which is worthy of all praise.

In spite of the idiosyncrasy of the Brazilian people and the seriousness of the interior situation of the nation, we believe that the Delegation at Brazil follows the Delegation at Venezuela in best functioning. We could point out as main reasons for this success the following.

1.- The members of the Delegation are fully identified with the reality and problems of the Brazilian nation. All the members of the Delegation speak Portuguese.

2.- As well as in Venezuela there is "team work" and unity in the accomplishment of labor.

Undoubtedly, the labor at Brazil is the hardest to be carried through, followed by Chile. The idiosyncrasy of the Brazilian people, which are in general somewhat ignorant about most serious problems the world is actually encountering, the powerful forces of extreme left, the desperate economic situation product of the growing depression which has more than once almost drawn the nation to civil war, are the reasons for which many times the Cuban problem has been placed in second level, generally giving it little importance even inside democratic sectors.

For approximately one year, the DRE Delegation at ~~the~~ Rio de Janeiro has been struggling against this real difficult situation, and the results obtained cannot be better.

1.- The Press which for long time had held an indifferent attitude towards the Cuban problem - most of the times it even refused to publish any communiques or news given by the DRE - has offered us its support for the first time and the name of the DRE appears frequently in its pages (at my arrival at Rio de Janeiro they interviewed me).

2.- In the student ground, the National Union of Students of Brazil (U.N.E.B.) has already experienced the labor the DRE is accomplishing. At the National Assembly recently held by the UNE, though the DRE Delegates were not permitted to speak, the support our movement has awakened among the Brazilian students was clearly displayed, when several State Student Unions protested for the measures taken against us. During the trip recently made Mr. Benito Diaz Faret to Santa Catarina he succeeded in attaining a resolution voted by that State Union and signed by [illegible],000 students soliciting the intervention in Cuba to move out the Russian troops which have been recently landed in the Island.

3.- The Delegation has already edited three pamphlets in Portuguese which have had great acceptance among the people "Que es el DRE" (What the DRE is) "Bases para una revolucion Latinoamericana" (Fundamental points for a Latin American revolution) "Cuba Socialista" (Socialist Cuba). Good relations are held with the Government of Carlos Lacerda. Useful trips to Recife, Minas Gerais, and Belo Horizonte, have been made and good contacts have been established.

B.- Deficiencies

In general terms, the deficiencies of the Delegation are very few, though the limitations are greater. The legal situation of Carlos Valdesuso and Willie [illegible] in the country is rather difficult due to the fact that Joao Goulart's Pro Communist government has obstructed them greatly in their staying at Brazil. Nevertheless, the solution of this problem is shortly expected. As well as in Venezuela the Delegation protested because of the "supposed" abandonment to which it is submitted (since January nobody has visited them). Undoubtedly, this visit encouraged them greatly and lifted up high their moral spirit.

The Delegation also complained about the lack of propaganda. For such purpose they solicited funds in order to reprint in Portuguese the most important propaganda the DRE edits.

C.- Future possibilities

It is important to point out that the Cuban Embassy at Brazil formally protest to the Brazilian government because of the presence of Eduardo Muñiz in the country, also other Communist Brazilian figures backed up the protest. However, new activities for the future were planned. They are.

1.- Continue editing pamphlets of guidance for the people on the Cuban problem.

2.- Send two Delegates to Recife for the next visit of President Kennedy to Brazil.

3.- Perform several trips throughout the country in order to establish groups of supporters in the different places of the nation.

4.- Attaining of a radio broadcast.

5.- Intensify the labor with the democratic student groups in order to continue the work to restore the U.N.E. to our democratic cause.

14-00000

D R E

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

SITUATION OF THE DRE DELEGATION AT SAO PAOLO

The case of the DRE Delegation at Sao Paolo which is composed by Raul Gonzalez Simon and Antonio Vega, can be considered as an exceptional case inside the Latin American plan. In Sao Paolo, I had the opportunity to hold deep conversations with Raul Gonzalez Simon, and we reached at the following conclusions.

1.- In one whole year the DRE Delegation at Sao Paolo HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH ANY EFFECTIVE LABOR, nothing has been published by the DRE, not one communique of the Delegation has appeared in the [illegible] Boletin held by the Delegation, not one of the campaigns and plans traced by the Section of International Relations has been carried through. Summing up the genuine words of the DRE Delegate at Sao Paolo, Raul Gonzalez Simon, together with the conversations held at my arrival at Miami with Antonio Vega, another member of the Delegation at Sao Paolo, we reached at the following conclusion.

a.- During one year no effective labor has been accomplished in the city of Sao Paolo on the Cuban problem.

b.- Time has been wasted uselessly to obtain only as a result a sounding failure.

The motives for this failure can be outlined as follows.

1.- The DRE Delegates in Sao Paolo have been submitted to the arbitrary direction of Mr. Vladimir Lydoskenky, director of the S.E.I. (Service of Inter American Studies) who during the whole year prohibited the Delegates to work in the name of the DRE, submitting them to a labor system which has nothing to do with the Cuban problem. It would be wise to point out that for the Chancellors ' Conference held at Punta del Este, special funds had been dedicated to the Cuban case. But Mr. Lydoskenki, did absolutely nothing about this, remaining this undoubtful the "handling" of such funds.

2.- The DRE Delegates did not take in time the decision of working independently in order to accomplish something useful, and consequently, continued submitted to an entirely discredited organism which is the S.E.I.

Future possibilities.

Both Mr. Raul Gonzalez Simon and Mr. Antonio Vega are unwilling to continue working with the S.E.I. For such end, Mr. Gonzalez Simon and Mr. Antonio Vega are preparing numerous and detailed reports which will openly disclose the attitute taken by Mr. Bladimir Lydoskenki, for what he has used the funds destined to the Cuban case, his repeated boycott to everything which holds the name of ~~the DRE~~, and the little labor accomplished throughout the year. In the report which is being made by Mr. Raul Gonzalez Simon, a plan of labor to be carried through in Sao Paolo will be presented. The DRE well engage to accomplish in 6 months a superior labor then that accomplished by the S.E.I. during one whole year on the Cuban problem. Good contacts and a well traced plan are arranged for such ends. The plan together with the reports will be presented as soon as they reach us.

D.R.E.

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

URUGUAY

A.- Actual situation of the Delegation

Though the DRE Delegates in Uruguay, Mario Garcia and Armando Frias, have been in Montevideo for scarcely one and a half month, they are beginning to carry through a very positive labor which promises to bear splendid fruits. We must have in mind that anti-Castrist propaganda has widely circulated throughout Uruguay. Up to the present a great number of public acts have been held and it results difficult to move public opinion on the Cuban problem, since it is somewhat exhausted. Nevertheless, the plans which have been worked out will strengthen public opinion on this aspect. During my stay at Uruguay, the voting campaign for the elections which will be held on next November was being carried through. Thus it was rather difficult to turn the attention of public opinion towards the Cuban problem. However, in order to reinitiate the labor, the Delegation has worked out a plan which will last for one month and end with a great public act. While I was there, 100,000 leaves of propaganda exhorting the people to express their protests for the presence of Russian troops in Cuba were distributed throughout the city. Also a manifestation which took place the 8th of September in front of the Cuban Embassy was organized. The Dele gation will shortly begin to edit a news bulletin which will be sent to the Press, Radio, TV, to political, civic, and religious leaders. Also a trip throughout the different cities of the country in order to strengthen the contacts we already had there is being planned.

In the student field, the Delegation is striving to work to achieve unity in the groups of opposition to the FEUU (Federation of University Students of Uruguay) by creating a common front and thus move out the Communists which control fully the leading position of the FEUU.

B.- Deficiencies

The deficiencies of the Delegation at Uruguay can be considered as little important due to the fact that it has been functioning for only a few weeks and this does not permit to see things clearly and judge them how they really are. In general, the Delegation is at present in a process of consolidation and self-securing, for which reason its deficiencies cannot be fully observed.

C.- Future possibilities

The DRE Delegation at Uruguay has huge possibilities which we believe will be determined during the next few days. In addition to the news bulletin and the trip through the different cities of the country, a one-hour radio broadcast and new public acts are being planned. Besides

D-R-E

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

the Delegation is working together with a group of students that are interested in creating the DREU (Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil of Uruguay).

D.R.E.
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

CHILE

A.- Actual situation of the Delegation

The DRE Delegation at Chile -which is composed by Nelson Amaro, Rafael Espinosa, and Nolis Mesa- is now accomplishing a rather hard labor. However, it is beginning to bear fruits. As we had stated before, the Delegation at Chile follows Brazil in a situation which implies great care in Latin America. The outstanding force of the FRAP in contrast to the weak position held by Christian Democracy towards the Cuban problem have enormously hindered the development of labor. Undoubtedly, however, the situation has greatly improved. During the last month, three different posters were printed and distributed throughout Santiago, short trips through the communities of the country were made and conferences on the Cuban problem were given, a half-hour radio broadcast is transmitted every Sunday (it is the only anti-Castrist radio broadcast in Chile). In the student field, the best relations are held with the Union of University Federation of Chile (UFUCH), maximum student organism of the nation.

B.- Deficiencies

On repeated occasions the Delegation has had to face the distrustful attitude taken by Demo-Christian leaders. As a consequence, the Delegates have sometimes felt disconcerted, in a situation of disorganization at work and lack of coordination. However, through repeated efforts the Delegation has succeeded in keeping itself functioning, and is actually fully working.

C.- Future possibilities

After glancing over the labor already accomplished, we reached at the following conclusions in several assemblies we held at Santiago. We determined what were to be the next steps to be taken in Chile.

a.- Strengthen the bonds which tie us with the UFUCH and with the youth of the Democrat Christian Party.
b.- Create a clashing force ready to be used at any moment.
c.- Begin the edition of a news bulletin which will be sent to all the radio stations, the press, TV, Senators, Representatives, and institutions of the nation.
d.- Attaining of a radio broadcast to be heard throughout the nation.
e.- Strengthen our activities inside the communities and the popular mass by means of giving conferences, public acts, etc.
f.- Plan the possibilities of carrying through an action with relation to the Cuban Embassy.

E.

D.R.E. DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

INTRODUCTION

This report is a general analysis on the labor performed by the Section of International Relations of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) and on its plans for the future. Hower, it would take much time to make a precise account on the labor accomplished in more than one year, so we will limit it to be a general outline, hoping that in the near future a more detailed one may be presented.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE LABOR ACCOMPLISHED

The DRE can firmly assert that the labor carried through by the Section of International Relations has been a definite triumph for the organisation, due to the importance of the ground of operation and the intensity with which it has been developed. It is not an easy task to organise in such a brief term an international field of operation like ours, which has already born fruits and, in only one year, has attained great renown, even outside the borders of our continent. If all the motives for which the DRE's Latin American Plan has attained such success were to be outlined, we would never finish. We are going to list those which we consider are the most important:

A.- There can be no doubt that the most important labor has been the one developed by teh DRE Delegates in Latin America. During many months, the economic support given to the Section of International Relations was so short that only with the voluntary sacrifices of our delegates in Latin America could the section be kept in function. We can name countless examples of generosity and self-sacrifice to our cause: There were Delegates who, for many months, slept in cots and even on the floor, others who lived surrounded by a wretched atmosphere, and others who even went hungry. Our delegates fought to undergo all difficulties and, many times against hostile atmospheres, equipped only with their enthusiasm and their ardent desire to carry our truth throught America. The merits of our enterprise belong solely to them.

B.- Maintain the DRE identified with the struggles of Latin America Students, with whom we have shared ideals and cooperation during this year.

C.- Mantaining the system of propaganda from Miami to the labor which has made the DRE known throughout the continent and has increased Delegations its prestige, in spite of the lack of information and economic means.

D.- Maintain the DRE identified with the representative movements in each country, its firm position fighting for the reconstruction of Cuba, crossing out Batista's abhorrent past and Castro's inhuman present, and holding an understanding posture towards the serious problems in Latin America, social injustice, oppression, militarism and ignorance. We have made also ours the longing for the ransoming of our continent. We have experienced all this surrounded by gigantic difficulties, limitations and, in many occasions, incomprehensions by those whom we had trusted. Moments of downheartedness have lived within us more than once , but our spirit has maintained its firmness still hoping that the

CH F 6 UFGA 6940 19-12-1963

people of the world towards our desperate calling may be some day achieved and that they may stretch their friendly hand to our patient, but erect, people. For the better understanding of the labor accomplished we will synthesise the main steps taken by this section in the develop ment of the mission the DRE has assigned it.

ORIGIN OF THE SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Section of International Relations was created by the National Executive of the DRE in the months of November-December 1960. Luis Bosa Bomingues, ex-President of the Faculty of Science of the University of Havana, was appointed for its direction on January 1961, Mr. Eduardo Munis was ordered to come to Miami and was assigned the coordination of the DRE's labor in Latin America. Mr Munis arrived on the 8th of February, 1961.

THE FIRST STEPS

Before Muniz's arrival at Miami, the DRE's activity in the international ground was so limited that it lacked importance, even thought had sent a Delegation to the Chancellars' assembly which was held on 1961 in the city of San Jose Costa, Rica, and had also sent a Delegation to Central America for the purpose of establishing contacts with student leaders in these countries. On the last days of February 1961, a DRE Commission composed by Ernesto Fernandez Travieso, Teresa Valdes Hurtado, and Eduardo Muniz was sent to Washington for the purpose of delivering a letter written by the DRE as genuine representation of Cuban Students to the President of the United States John F. Kennedy. This letter was handed to Mr. Richard Godwin (se ignore if it ever reached President Kennedy) It stated the basis and ideals which moved the DRE ta fight the Castro regime and the common inspirations which led it together with the rest of Latin American Students towards the achievement lf social justice for the people of our continent.

Despite all this - and for motives which have not yet been given to us - during February, March, and April 1961, we were entirely restrained in the development of our labor because of the poor admitance given to our plan. Our labor was reduce to the sending of some propaganda to Latin America, to the organising of files of contacts and organizations, and to the maintaining relations with them by mail. However, at the beginning of March 1961 the first three DRE Delegations in Latin America were stablished : Costa Rica, Venesuela , and Mexico. These Delegations peactically, received no economic support for more than five months (they subsisted almost only by their own means) and so its labor was reduced to the least.

GIRON INVASION; NEW OUTLOOKS

New possibilities in the Latin American ground were disclosed when, on the 17 th of April, the invasion through Playa Giron was defeated by the Communist forces, demonstrating thus the mistake which the administration of the United States had performed in not relying upon continental publick opinion which had been skillfully influenced by Castrist propaganda. An objective glance on the actual reality clearly made this known to us, continental opinion supported the Castro regime, Latin American youth beheld Fidel Castro as the legendary leader who would guide the Latin American people towards their total emancipation and development. Little or nothin had been done to face this skillful propaganda. The possibilities of opening a battle front against Castrism in the Latin American countries - the fundamental point of our plan - began to be taken into consideration. The first attempts were;

1.- In May 1961, our members Zoila Dias, Marta Elena Rosdrigues and Raul Gonzales Simon were sent to Sao Paolo, Brazil, and stayed there for one month carrying through labors of propaganda.

2.- Immediately after Alberto Muller, Secretary-General of the DRE, was caught, a Delegation composed by Jorge Dorticos, Rogelio Helu and Joaquin Perez Rodrigues, traveled through Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile working to avoid the execution of our Secretary-General by the Castro regime. The labor it accomplished together with the labor accomplished in other countries turned public opinion towards our cause. When the Deletation arrived at Montevideo, Uruguay, the " Congreso por la Libertad y la Democracia " was being held in that city, and the Delegation was invited to take part in it, holding an outstanding posture in its acting.

3.- Immediately after the trial of our Secretary-General, Alberto Muller, and other 32 prisoners with him, one of the strongest and most successful campaigns we have accomplished, was carried through. Four delegations were urgently sent to Latin America, organised as follows.

Brazil - Raul Gonzales Simon, Mario Garcia, Jose Basulto
Chile - Nelson Amaro, Alejandro Portes, Rafael Oller
Argentina- Rogelio Helu, Jorge Dorticos.
Uruguay - Eduardo Muniz, Rene Morato, Ramon Machado

At the same time, cables were sent from our main office at Miami to all the governments of the continent, Student Unions, and civic organizations, making use of the contacts we had made by mail from our beginnings. The results of the campaign were really astonishing. All the governments of the continent pleaded in favor of Muller and the other prisoners, almost all the Student Unions, countless civic organizations did the same, public manifestations were made in Mexico, Panama, Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru, stones were thrown at the Cuban Embassy at Bolivia all the Liceos (High Schools) in Montevideo, Uruguay, went on strike on the day of the trial, the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria(FEUH) in Honduras also went on strike for one day, through the streets of San Jose, Costa Rica, a great student manifestation was made, and the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEUCR) proposed to change Alberto Muller for one tractor.
The labor performed was so effective that traitor Ernesto Che Guevara, in his interview with President Janio Quadros during his stop at Brazilia returning from the Conferencia Interamericana Economica y Social (CIES), was asked from the Brazilian government to spare the lives of Muller and the other prisoners. We must point out that in speech pronounced by Guevara

in the city of Manzanillo in Oriente province, Cuba, he stated that in his trip through South America be had seen certain stirring in favor of a group af prisoners caugh in Cuba. (He was evidantly talking about the campaign in favor of Muller) . This Campaing clearly showed the great possibilities we had in Latin America and the urgent need to carry through all the nations the great truth of what was happening in Cuba.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN PLAN

In Agust, 1961, the fust conversations to achieve the economic support for our plan were held. They lasted for approximately one month because we were not in accordance on several points. It was decided that permanent delegations were to be established in Latin America and for such purpose we made a well-studied and detailed plan in which we exposed our opinion on how to develop the labor throughout the continent. Unfortunately, many of the points we exposed in the plan were not approved (time gave us after the reason for as labor was being developed it was necessary to enforce many of the points which had once been rejected) and we began to dovelop the plan through the limited means we passessed to achieve the objectives we had assigned ourselves. The main objective in the first plan of the DRE were:

A.- Make the DRE known through continental public opinion, principally the Students ' opinion.
B.- Make openly known the truth of what was happening in Cuba through all the means which could be useful.
C.- Stir public opinion in favor of our cause.

Delegation were established in less than three months in the following countries : Costa Rica, Venezuela , Mexico, Bolivia , Brazil (Sao Paolo) , Peru, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay. Later, Delegations were established in Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, Puert Rica and Santo Domingo and Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) The activity unfolded since then needs not be narrated, not only because it would take mucha time , but also because evident facts demostrate the importance and the dimension achieved by the labor in the plan of the DRE for Latin America. In general form we will list wome of the most important events during this period of time.

1.- 27th of November: day of duel for Latin American Students in memory of the Students executed in Cuba. At the IV Latin American Assembly of Students (CLAE) to which a DRE Delegation assisted and which we detail later on this report, it was decided to declare the 27th of November (date in whichi 8 students of Medicine were shot by the Spanish soldiers during the Cuban war of Independence) day of duel for Latin American students. This date was commemorated in almost all the Latin American countries, being this one of the first great blows we achieved coordinately throughout the continent. All the acts which were performed and the propaganda which was issued are filed in our office.

2.- Student manifestation in Costa Rica on the 17th of October. It was possibly the greatest student manifestation that has taken place in San Jose. More than 6.000 students asking the goverment to break relations with Castro were present at it.

3.- The campaign to save the life of Miguel Garcia Armengol. For this campaign, as well as for the campaign in favor of Muller, we appealed to every means possible, thus attaining the help from the Latin American governments and from almost all the Student Unions and civic organizations of the continents.

4.- The campaign to save the life of Hans Gengler and Juan Pereira (Juanin) As in the previous campaigns, we moved continental public opinion in favor of our just demands. Unfortunately, our dear Juan Pereira Varela was killed in the coast of Cuba, before the pleadings for mercy from all places of the continent reached Castro and before the Secretary of Foreign Relations af Brazil, San Thiago Dantas, could intersede for his life, as he had promised Jose I. Rodriguez, with whom he had held a private interview. The whole account on the labor we accomplished for this campaign and for the campaign in favor of Miguel Garcia Armengol, is filed in our offices.

5.- Help rendered to Latin American Student Unions. From the b Latin American outlook, this labor has probably been one of the most important labors carried through by our Delegations. During this year many of our Delegations have worked intimately with the democratic leaders of the Student Unionsof the continent in order to throuw the Communists out from the positions which they control and to attain success in student elections of simply maintain the actual positions held. Some efforts which deserve to be named are: The labor accomplishe by our Delegation in Panama due to which (according to the exact words of student leaders in Panama) the direction of the Union de Estudiantes Universitarios (UEU) which had follen in Communist control, was reconquered by the Democrats. The labor accomplished by our Delegation at Venezuela has been perhaps the mos important, through which student groups of the Partido Social Cristiano (COPEI) and the Partido Accion Democratica (AD) have stronly opposed in armedactions the Communist groups which control the University and have even received the compliments of President, Romulo Betancourt. The labor accomplished by our Delegation at Honduras, through which it has helped and guided the democratic administration af the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEUH) and also payed for the publication af the newspaper "Avance", official reporter of the FEUH. The account on the labor carried through by the DRE together with the Confederacion Universitaria de Bolivia , the Federacion Universitaria del Peru, with that of opposition of Uruguay , Argentina and Brazil and Santo Domingo is filed in our offices.

6.- The system of propaganda of the Section of International Relations. Our system of propaganda is probably one of the most strong in the student Latin American ground, in spite lf the limited means we possess. Our labor lf propaganda has been so intensive that we have practically had to use a larger place, to file the propaganda the Delegations have issued and sent us. We have maintained the best relations with Latin American press, which frequently publishes articles on the DREalso the international news agencies (UPI, AP, etc.) have published cables related to the DRE. For the better understanding of the labor developed we are going to divide it in written propaganda and propaganda by radio broadcasts.

a.- Written propaganda

Mexico.- The newspaper " Ataque ", official reporter of the Delegation, is published. Many pamphlets, as the one about the 27th of November, and tons of written propaganda have been edited.

Costa Rica.- Posters and great amounts of written propaganda have been printed and pamphlets edited by our main office at Miami have been printed again.

Venezuela .- "Trinchera", official reporter of the DRE Delegation at Maracaibo, is edited in Maracaibo. The Delegation at Caracas has printed the pamphlet, "Cuba, Misery and Hunger", propaganda which had been edited in Miami, as the pamphlet " Mire Ud como nos autodeterminamos ", Posters and tons of written psopaganda have been also printed .

Peru .-The Delegation aids the edition of the magazine "Clamor", though not in the name of the DRE. The series of pamphlets " Seguiremos Informando " are edited and also posters and lots of written propaganda.

Uruguay.- The DRE Delegation at Uruguay edited the pamphlet "Cuba Comunista" and has also edited a great amount of written propaganda.

Ecuador .-The Delegation has edited the pamphlet " Fidel Castro tridos a America", countless posters, and has printed again propaganda received from Miami,

Brazil .- The Delegation at Rio de Janeiro has edited the pamphlets "Bases para revolucion latinoamericana ", "Que es el DRE". The Delegation at Sao Paolo has also edited countless pamphlets with photograph illustrations.

Santo Domingo .- The Delegation has printed lots of propaganda sent by the main office at Miami.

Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, Panama, Honduras .- These Delegations has printed Propaganda edited by the main office at Miami, also posters and lots of propaganda, and have regularly written articles in the press.

b.- Propaganda by radio broadcasts

Honduras.- The Delegation broadcasts daily "Trinchera" by radio America,

Santo Domingo.- The Delegation broadcasts daily "Trinchera" which lasts 30 minutes by Radio Caribe.

Venezuela.- The Delegation broadcasts daily "Trinchera" which lasts 30 minutes, by radio "Libertad"

Costa Rica.- The Delegation broadcast " Trinchera Estudiantil Cubana" three times a week by " Voz de la Victor"

Panama.- The Delegation broadcasts "Trinchera" three times a week by radio Miramar .

Chile.- The Delegation broadcasts "Trinchera" once a week by radio Chile

Bolivia.- The Delegation broadcasts daily " Trinchera" by radio "Amauca"

Uruguay.- The Delegation broadcasts " Trinchera" three times a week by radio " Rural".

Colombia- The Delegation broadcasts daily "Trinchera" by radio "Santa Fe"

Peru, Ecuador, Puerto Rico, - broadcast weekly programs.

c.- Photographic propaganda.

There can be no doubt that the success attained in this fiel is of the greatest importance. The main office has been supplying photographic material to the Delegations for several months, so that they could use it for propaganda. A great blow was achieved with the photographs illustrating the events at the Ecuador Embassy in Cuba, when three Cubans, seeking political assile, tried to enter the Embassy and were shot by the militia being already inside Ecuatorian field. These photographs were distributed among all the Delegations and a day was appointed for their publication in all places of the continent. Thus, a great success was achieved. This same the photographs were published in almost all the Latin American newspapers, and, later, they were even published in extra-continental press.

It is of vital importance to point out the success achieved by the photograph exhibition, organized by the photograph department of the Section of International Relations. This exhibition was composed of 30 enlarged photographs to be shown at public squares and organizations and were sent to each Delegation. These exhibitions are still being shown in Latin America. Thousands of persons have visited them and the success achieved up-to-date has been great.

7.- Intelligence and Agitation. During one long year we have received through the Delegations many informations on Castrist activities throughout the continent, as well as on Communist activities in general. Stirring has neither been absent - Two libraries of the Communist Party were destroyed in Montevideo, a place were support for Fidel Castro was received was also destroyed in Montevideo, and students groups in Venezuela have been trained.

THE CHANCELLORS ' CONFERENCE

When the Chancellors' Conference was held inJanuary 1961, there was a plan to turn public opinion in favor of taking energetic steps against the Castro regime. For this purpose, the 25th of January was appointed as the day in which " La Marcha del Silencio" (The Silence March) was to be carried through in the principal Latin American cities, to give support to the Conference and protests for the crimes accomplished by the Castro Communist Regime. The results were truly astonishing. In Bolivia more than 20,000 people took part in " La Marcha del Silencio", they all carried lighted torches since it was at night fall. In Peru , more than 10,000 persons were assembled and in Guayaquil, Ecuador, around 5,000. Also smaller manifestations were made in Honduras, Panama, Mexico, and Colombia. The DRE Delegation sen to the Chancellors ' Conference visited several countries before arriving at Montevideo, so as to develop in them the labor of propaganda and organization previous to the events that would take place during the Conference. This Delegation was divided in two groups. The first one was composed by Juan M. Salvat, Fernando Garcia Chacon, Jose Maria Lasa, Ernesto Fernandez Travieso, and Mario Pita. This group visited Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and Argentina. The second group was composed only by Eduardo Muniz, who visited Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, and Brazil. During this trips, press conferences, interviews with secretaries of Foreign Relations, and with Presidents of the nations, were held. In Uruguay, the first photograph exhibition was shown in the Plaza Libertad, a gigantic meeting was held in Montevideo and four meetings were held in other cities of the country (San Carlos, Piriapolis, Minas, and Maldonado), pest bombs were placed at the Communist meeting in the University, press conferences were held, and radio programs were broadcasted, all during the Conference.

In a general form, we have explained some of the activities developed by the Section Of International Relations of the DRE. It would be impossible to describe them all completely.

INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ASSEMBLIES

We are going to narrate separately the labor accomplished by the Section of International Relations in the international student assemblies, for it results of great importance. The DRE has sent Delegations to three great student assemblies: IV CLAE (Congreso Latinoamericano de Estudiantes), III CEUCA (Congreso de Estudiantes Universitarios de Centro America) and X CIE (Conferencia Internacional De Estudiantes). A Delegation was also sent to travel through several countries of Africa (Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, Egipto, Marruecos, Nigeria, Argelia, and Tunez) in order to establish contacts with the Student Unions of Africa in preparation for the CIE.

a-. IV Congreso Latinoamericano de Estudiantes (IV CLAE)

The DRE sent a Delegation to the IV CLAE -the most important LatinAmerican student assembly- composed by: Luis Fernandez Rocha, Luis Boza Dominguez, Joaquin Perez, Jose I. Rodrigues Lombillo, Antonio B. Abella, and Eduardo Muniz.

The report on the labor accomplished by this Delegation in the IV CLAE -a Delegation from the FEU of Cuba was present at it also- has been already presented. But we will only list the following resolutions which were taken in the assembly due to our vigorous action.

Condemn the executions of students in Cuba.
Demand freedom for Alberto Muller and the other imprisoned students.
Proclaim the 27th. of November day of duel for Latin American students, in memory of the Cuban students that have been executed.
Ask the Comision de Estudios e Informacion (RIC), organism of the International Student Conference, to perform an investigation on the situation of Cuban students.

b-. Congreso de Estudiantes Universitarios De Centro America (III CEUCA)

The DRE sent a delegation to this assembly, held in San Jose, Costa Rica, led by Rogelio Helu and composed by delegates of the DRE in Costa Rica. The celebration of the III CEUCA did not finally take place because the Unions controlled by Communists asked that the Cuban Revolution be given a vote of confidence. Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras, opposed this petition. At this critical situation, the democratic delegation retired, finishing thus the Assembly and leaving the Communists unable to reach their objective.

c-. Conferencia Internacional de Estudiantes (X CIE)

In the X CIE just held at Quebec, Canada, the DRE Delegation obtained the greatest success ever in the assistance to a student assembly. This Delegation was composed by: Jose I. Rodriguez Lombillo, Rafael Tremols, Joaquin Perez, Lourdes Casals, Rogelio Helu, and Eduardo Muniz. Their assistance at the assembly turned out to be a great success owing to the efforts of the Delegation. The assembly condemned, with only one vote of opposition from India, the executions and imprisonments of Cuban students and the suspension of the publication of the newspapers of the University b y the Totalitarian State.

Copies of this resolution will be sent to all Student Unions of the world, to the United Nations, and to the government of Fidel Castro. The report on the X CIE will soon be delivered.

d-. The Delegation sent by the DRE to Africa

On the last days of May, 1962, the DRE sent a delegation to Africa composed by Jose I. Rodriguez Lombillo, Raul Gonzalez Simon, and Lourdes Casals. They traveled through these countries: Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt, Marruecos, Tunez, and Argelia. They established contacts with the leaders of Student Unions and distributed among them extensive informations on the actual situation of Cuban Students, translated to English and French. The leaders were greatly impressed by the pamphlet "The Perversion of a University". The positive results of this trip to Africa were clearly disclosed at the X CIE, where the Student Unions from Ghana, Nigeira and Kenya ardently defended us.

e-. Actually the DRE is planning to send a Delegation to the Festival Mundial de la Juventud whcih will be held this year at Helsinki, Finland.

DRE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

DEFICIENCIES AND DIFFICULTIES

During more than one year of vigorous working, the Section of International Relations has encountered countless deficiencies and difficulties, many of which have been already surpassed, though others still prevail. We will state bellow the main difficulties which we are actually facing and which we endeavor to surpass as soon as possible.

1.- Personnel

The problem on lack of personnel has been and is one of the main difficulties which the Section has encountered in its labor. Countless are the motives for this, among which we can list.

A.- Lack of capable personnel : Due to the importance of the labor developed in Latin America, the personnel with capacity for the work is not very abundant.

B.- Personal problems of the aspirants to Delegates : This is one of the most conflictive motives we are actually facing.
More than exile by the Cuban people, what is actually taking place is a massive exodus of our people. Consequently, being in the need of working to help their families, many Delegates have had to give up their labors and cooperation with us. In many cases, aspirants to Delegates have been forced to abondon the Plan remaining only a few days for their departure.

C.- Problems on obtaining visas: The difficulties in obtaining the visas for several countries (like Colombia, Mexico, El Salvador, Santo Domingo) has also , on many occasions, hindered the departure of the Delegates for Latin America. There is a specific example in Mexico, for which it has been absolutely impossible to obtain the visas; in spite of all the efforts made. Many delegates in these said conditions of inactivity have consequently abandoned the plan.

D.- Problems of Delegates in the respective countries: The problems the Delegates have had to face in the different countries have been so many that it results imposible to outline them all. We will try to point out those which we consider are the most important:

a.- Economic difficulties : The Delegates lacked operational funds to develop their plans for approximately one year. Their field of operation was logically reduced to the least. Actually the delegates do have these funds, though, evidently, many of the plans could not be carried through them.

b.- Problems with American officials in the different countries: Though in the majority of the countries our relations are the best, nevertheless, we have had to face problems in some. For example, in Honduras we have had to change the Delegate due to pressure of Batista supporters. In our Delegation at Sao Paolo, Brazil, our Delegates have even had to clean fields, just as simple workers, (they were not sent to Latin America for such purposes) and further more they have even been prohibited to use the name of the DRE.

C) Psychological pressures which influence on the Delegates. One ought to understand the situation which a DRE Delegate has to encounter in Latin America. Generally, they are young boys and the lonesome atmosphere in which they are, influences greatly upon them. In repeated occasions we have stated the need of making frequent trips to the Delegations, but up to the present, no heed has been paid to our demand. We consider this of vital importance and, once again, we state our demand of traveling to the Delegations in order to maintain high the moral of the Delegates and to avoid a feeling of forlornness and isolation in them.

We have briefly exposed some of the deficiencies and difficulties which we are actually facing. They have been written in the best spirit and not moved by any wrong motive, but for the only purpose of attaining a prompt solution for our problems.

M.

DRE
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

MEXICO.-

Due to the special situation of the DRE Delegation at Mexico, it fundamentally worked on the following points:

a) Denunciation of the presence of Russian troops and war equipment in Cuban soil. We enclose abundant material and the map the Delegation gave the press which published it throughout the world.

b) Demonstrating that Castro has weaknesses throuhg the shelling of Havana's seacoast.

c) Celebration of a Mass on the 8th of September at the Cathedral of Mexico, which resulted in a great success.

At the same time a great campaign for a declaration signed by the Mexican people backing up the Chancellors' Assembly is being carried through.

We enclose paper clippings, articles, maps, etc.

Att. n to UFGA 6140

19-124-26/3
9 OCT 62

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET	

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/4/Peru	[illegible] 62	
2	Rm/3B2631		
3			
4			
5			
6			

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks: Reports of AMBARB activities during Sept.

File: AMBARB Temp

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
TFW/CA-Prop 4679	11/1/62

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O—587282

O.

D R E
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

PERU.-

The Delegation at Peru performed the following activities:

A.- It gave out numerous press communiques denouncing the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba.

B.- Declarations about the attack to Havana's seacoast by members of the D.R.E were made and great support was obtained.

C.- An article appeared on the "Time" Magazine of September 7, 1962 was traslated and distributed in great amount. The article narrated the present and past actions of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil

[illegible]/35
[illegible] 1.
vol 2

Removed from Project: ~~Educational~~
CS Classification: 32-126-25/3
JCB ~~a-67-25-5-8~~
Box 16 Fold: 223

19 10/62
aHO to UFGA 6190

14-124-26/3

VBR

Bombardeo a Cuba fue militarmente premeditado - dicen jóvenes cubanos

300 mil son los exilados que luchan por liberar a Cuba de rojos

Que el último bombardeo a La Habana, por miembros del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, fue "militarmente premeditado", revelaron a LA CRONICA, Roberto Pérez San Roman y Rafael Quintero, miembros de la Brigada de Asalto 2506 que participaron en la invasión a la isla Cochinos y que actualmente visitan el Perú. El primero, tiene el cargo de Jefe de Artillería. En su visita a nuestro diario estuvieron acompañados de Rolando Fernández, delegado del DRE en el Perú.

Manifestaron también que esos ataques se estaban preparando desde hace tiempo y que en el momento del bombardeo al hotel ICAP, Fidel Castro se encontraba comiendo con los técnicos rusos. "De allí el bombardeo al hotel", dijeron.

Revelaron igualmente que el gobierno de Fidel Castro, va a fusilar a seis jóvenes, entre ellos estudiantes y líderes obreros y campesinos, [illegible] de ser autores de los bombardeos. Esto, sin juicio previo.

Como se sabe, el bombardeo a La Habana, se produjo en la noche del viernes 24 del presente, hecho que motivó que Cuba culpase a Estados Unidos de ser el autor intelectual.

Roberto Pérez San Román y Rafael Quintero manifestaron que en el bombardeo participaron dos lanchas con 23 hombres al mando del Secretario del DRE en Miami, Juan Manuel Salvat. Los 23 hombres no pasan de los 23 años.

El objetivo de estos dos exilados cubanos, miembros del Consejo Revolucionario Cubano, recorrer toda Latinoamérica, con el objeto de informar sobre la verdadera situación de Cuba. Ellos ya han visitado Caracas, Montevideo y Santiago, y posteriormente enrumbarán a Colombia y de allí a Centro América.

Dijeron también que visitaban Latinoamérica, para recabar toda ayuda que estos países podrían proporcionar y contribuir así a la liberación de la Cuba oprimida.

"Hay en Miami — manifestaron — más de 300,000 exilados cubanos que están haciendo esfuerzos desesperados por lograr la liberación de su [illegible]. Ellos — continuaron — prefieren morir luchando por la liberación que estar impasibles ante los fusilamientos impunes que se hacen en Cuba".

Revelaron que en la prisión de La Cabaña se encuentran Manuel Guillot, estudiante de la Universidad de La Habana, y Enrique Cepero, sobrino de un actual Ministro de Fidel Castro.

Los exilados cubanos que actualmente se encuentran en el país. De izquierda a derecha, Rolando Fernández, Delegado Oficial en el Perú del DRE, y Roberto Pérez San Ramón y Rafael Quintero, miembros de la Brigada de Asalto 2506.

DECLARACIONES DE ROLANDO FERNANDEZ

El Delegado en el Perú del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil de Cuba, Rolando M. Fernández, declaró "que la actual política de Estados Unidos con respecto de Cuba parece querer ingresar a una etapa de convivencia".

"Llegó a esta conclusión — expresó — luego de considerar las afirmaciones hechas por el Departamento de Justicia y el Encargado de Prensa del Departamento de Estado del país del Norte, referentes al bombardeo efectuado desde el mar contra una zona militar de La Habana, y la incautación por el gobierno estadounidense de las dos embarcaciones que tomaron parte en la citada acción naval".

"Me pregunto — dijo el Delegado cubano — ¿qué beneficios puede aportar a la democracia, a la lucha contra el comunismo amenazante una actitud como la que está adoptando Estados Unidos? Me pregunto, también, si es posible creer que vamos a fortalecer la democracia impidiendo actuar a los cubanos demócratas o si va a aumentar el prestigio del sistema occidental cristiano disponiéndose la incautación de los instrumentos que sirven a la lucha contra el comunismo ateo".

"Yo en particular, desearía equivocarme en la consideración de los propósitos norteamericanos, porque juzgo que una política de convivencia de la democracia continental o de la democracia estadounidense con Cuba comunista no arrastraría sino una secuela de perjuicios muy grandes para el sistema interamericano y el robustecimiento del comunismo en América. Lamentablemente, empiezo a dudar de las palabras del Presidente Kennedy, en el sentido de que "Cuba no será abandonada".

"El movimiento democrático de los cubanos en el exilio y de los cubanos de la resistencia en Cuba contra el régimen de Castro, reitero, o discrepa totalmente de toda actitud o política que pretenda dirigirse o se dirija a lograr una coexistencia con el comunismo que desgobierna a la república del Caribe. Estamos, por el contrario, de acuerdo con toda posición que no signifique daño para la democracia continental y sí, más bien, el debilitamiento y la destrucción del [illegible] en Cuba y sus [illegible] más que el [illegible]

écnicos" rusos comenzaron a fortifica

ES ESTARIAN INSTALANDO CERCA DE GUANTANAMO. — CRECE LA PREOCUPACION EN LO

rino
ocido
ombre
ıras

galpa. A- (UPI) — dos com- se dijo la mañana misterioso ino estuvo dose a fi- la pasada frente al insular de ganaja, en el rtamento de de la Pobla.

sucigalpa, A- 27 (AFP) — submarino de onalidad des- ocida fue a- ida ayer tarde nte al puerto Guanaja, en isla del mismo mbre, sobre el oral Atlántico Honduras

WASHINGTON. — PROTESTA DE REFUGIADOS CUBANOS. — Un policía contempla el paso de un piquete de refugiados cubanos los cuales llevan rótulos con las inscripciones: "Rusos, váyanse a Moscú" y "Rusos no metan sus narices en Cuba". La protesta se originó ante el anuncio de que tropas y técnicos soviéticos habían desembarcado en La Habana.

NUEVA YORK, 27 (UPI).—La fortificación de Cu gada de cantidades importantes de técnicos militares y del bloque soviético, se realiza mientras el Gobierno de E se diariamente que aviones norteamericanos de la base de y las aguas territoriales que puede existir entre [illegible] tenimo "violar" el espacio aéreo y la relación que norteamericanas están [illegible]

Aún no ha sido determinada la relación que entre el equipo [illegible] los hechos. Se sabe que autoridades norteamericanas [illegible] actualmente ante la posibilidad de lanzamiento [illegible] por ejemplo, [illegible] por la Unión Soviética haya proyectiles de Guantánamo, cubano-norteamericana con [illegible] la instalación de este equipo cerca de la tirantez el Primer Ministro Fidel Castro con- fía aumentar peligrosamente la bajo su control, según indicaron fuentes pecto a la inmensa base naval que fía en que eventualmente estará políticas.

En los dos últimos meses, el Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas de Cuba publica comunicados diarios en los que acusa a aviones, barcos y submarinos norteamericanos de "violar" territorio cubano. En su mayoría, las supuestas violaciones ocurrieron alrededor de la base de Guantánamo.

La más reciente de estas acusaciones, publicada ayer, dice que un avión norteamericano voló sobre varias poblaciones en la provincia de Matanzas durante una acción que duró 28 minutos después de la medianoche del viernes. El comunicado no indicó de qué manera pudo ser establecido el punto de origen del avión.

Según el comunicado, un avión bimotor voló el viernes sobre un barco cubano en aguas de Cuba, al noreste de Mariel.

El estilo, contenido y continuidad de estas acusaciones se asemejan mucho a las "advertencias" frecuentes que la radio de Pekín, en China Comunista, dirige a Estados Unidos, al acusar a embarcaciones y aviones norteamericanos de cometer "violaciones" territoriales.

Los comunicados cubanos frecuentemente contienen acusaciones de ataques armados de la Infantería de Marina norteamericana sobre cionales, "hacia Cuba" desde la base.

El anuncio hecho el viernes último por el Gobierno norteamericano sobre la llegada de refuerzos soviéticos a Cuba coincidió con las aseveraciones de exilados cubanos de que tropas rusas y de otros países del "bloque soviético" se encuentran en gran número en La Habana.

No obstante, funcionarios norteamericanos se refirieron a "técnicos militares" y no a soldados.

El anuncio fue hecho, además, pocas horas antes de que refugiados cubanos, en dos lanchas, lanzaran un ataque contra el litoral de La Habana, el viernes por la noche, utilizando un cañón de 20 milímetros.

Un grupo de estudiantes exilados en Miami se atribuyó la responsabilidad por el ataque. El Departamento de Justicia norteamericano dijo pocas horas después que investigaría el hecho para determinar si el grupo había violado la Ley de Neutralidad de Estados Unidos. Un vocero del Departamento dijo hoy que "la cuestión seguía siendo examinada".

El Gobierno de Fidel Castro publicó el sábado una declaración en que acusaba a Estados Unidos por el ataque. Dijo que había sido organizado por "el Gobierno norteamericano y los agentes mercenarios que ha reclutado" diciendo a los refugiados cubanos anticomunistas.

Castro agregó que su Gobierno había tomado "todas las medidas necesarias" para hacer frente al ataque norteamericano.

El Presidente de Cuba, Osvaldo Dorticós, pronunció ayer un discurso en el cual, al igual que Castro, aludió a los preparativos de defensa de Cuba.

Los diarios de Cuba anunciaron ayer que "ciudadanos norteamericanos" no identificados que viven en Cuba enviaron un cablegrama al Presidente John F. Kennedy, exigiendo que "ponga término a esta agresión y retire todas las embarcaciones norteamericanas en la costa de Cuba".

Los supuestos norteamericanos también enviaron un cable al Secretario General Interino de las Naciones Unidas, Thant, pidiendo la intervención de la organización internacional "ante estas provocaciones que conducirán a una guerra nuclear y a la destrucción de la humanidad", según la prensa castrista.

El Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, integrado por cubanos que residen en Miami, dijo que la acción contra el hotel de La Habana incluyó el cañoneo de un teatro de La Habana en el que se celebraba una reunión de "técnicos" —presumiblemente del bloque— No descartaron la posibilidad de que Fidel Castro hubiese es

Sólo promesas convertidas en hambre hizo Fidel Castro al pueblo de Cuba

MIAMI, Agosto 27 (UPI).— Hace hoy justamente un año que el Primer Ministro de Cuba, Fidel Castro, prometió al pueblo cubano que en unos meses "su cinturón estaría menos ceñido", y que serían resueltos los principales problemas de abastecimiento de la nación, según recordó un diplomático destacado en Cuba, de paso en esta ciudad.

Hace un año, tuvo lugar la primera reunión nacional de producción y el discurso central de ese acto fue dicho por Castro. El cuadro de promesas halagüeñas presentado por el Primer Ministro, afirmó el diplomático, fue el siguiente:

—En el mes de Diciembre de 1961, estaría resuelto plenamente el abastecimiento de aves en La Habana, y para el 1º de febrero del entrante año, en todos los mercados nacionales.

—A partir de Enero de 1962, la producción de viandas —tubérculos— superaría las necesidades del mercado nacional.

—En junio de 1962, la producción de pescado satisfaría la demanda del consumo.

—El 1º de Enero de 1963, quedaría abolido el racionamiento de grasas comestibles.

Sin embargo, apuntó el diplomático, en vez de la mejoría prometida, la situación se ha agudizado. Por primera vez en su historia, el pueblo cubano sufre los rigores e inconvenientes de la libreta de racionamiento para obtener alimentos.

Doce meses pues de aquella histórica reunión —agregó— la escasez de alimentos, ropas, zapatos y medicinas se hace más agobiadora.

Las futuras madres tienen que hacer largas colas, para obtener piezas de telas con qué hacer pañales. Ni siquiera pueden enviar a un familiar, pues para comprarlas tienen que exhibir su estado de gravidez.

En las tiendas de ropa interior de mujer o de hombre, sólo venden dos piezas por persona.

En las tiendas de calzado, para evitar que los escaparates se vean vacíos, se obliga a que sean llenados con cajas vacías.

En cuanto a los alimentos, el diplomático se remitió a las propias admisiones públicas de los gobernantes, durante el año actual, mucho después de las promesas de hace un año:

—El 24 de Marzo, el Presidente del poderoso Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, admitió que el "racionamiento y empieza a sembrar el descontento y la desconfianza en nuestro pueblo". de Marzo, Fidel Castro a- tenderemos q'

Canciller Unda de Guatemala, dice:

Presencia de tropas rojas en Cuba pondrá a prueba el Tratado de Río

GUATEMALA, agosto 27 (UPI).— El Canciller Jesús Unda Murillo declaró hoy que la presencia de tropas comunistas rusas checas y chinas en Cuba "justifica poner a prueba inmediatamente la efectividad de los artículos sexto y noveno del Tratado de Río de Janeiro que prevén el caso de agresiones armadas contra el Continente americano.

"Justificaría también una conferencia inmediata de Ministros de RR. EE. para tomar medidas en nuestra propia defensa, en lo que estimo que estarían de acuerdo muchos Gobiernos americanos" — agregó.

"La llegada de esas tropas a Cuba —explicó Unda Murillo— significa grave peligro para la América en general y especialmente para Centro América, considerada como el punto más vulnerable de la defensa del Continente.

"Ello es parte de la maniobra militar anunciada en Moscú hace tiempo, que persigue dividir al continente en dos fracciones, dejando aislados en esta forma a los Estados Unidos, que constituyen la fuerza militar más poderosa capaz de enfrentarse al comunismo soviético.

"Estos hechos —la llegada de tropas— pueden significar dos cosas: primero, que Castro ha perdido la confianza del propio pueblo y de las milicias populares y se ve obligado a recurrir a fuerzas mercenarias comunistas para sostenerse en el poder.

Cuba cree que EE.UU. invadirá la

CONSIDERAN QUE PRELUDIO ES GIRA DEL GENERAL TAYLOR Y MOVIMIENTO AER

PARIS, Agosto 27 (AFP).—"Los Estados Unidos preparan una acción directa contra Cuba". Tal es la opinión expresada en los círculos oficiales y en los diarios gubernamentales de Cuba después del ataque por mar lanzado el pasado viernes por la noche contra La Habana por contrarrevolucionarios cubanos.

Para establecer esta conjetura en La Habana se ha unido el ataque del viernes a cierto número de hechos "concordantes": la gira efectuada por el General Maxwell Taylor, Jefe del Estado Mayor Conjunto Norteamericano, a las tres bases [illegible] alrededor de Cuba, la presencia desde hace quince días frente a [illegible] costas norteñas de la Isla de un barco de observación estadounidense, el "Oxford", las "violaciones" del espacio aéreo cubano por aviones norteamericanos, sobre las cuales el Ministerio cubano de las Fuerzas Armadas lanzó ayer su 142 denuncia después del 1º de junio. Por otra parte, los exilados cubanos en Florida son presentados como "mercenarios al servicio de los Estados Unidos".

Por su lado, Lombardo Toledano, que dirige en México el Partido Popular Socialista, protestó ayer en la noche, lo mismo que otros movimientos de izquierda mexicanos, contra el ataque del pasado viernes, y declaró: "Si el Presidente Kennedy no condena esta acción y a sus autores, la responsabilidad de esta nueva violación de la soberanía cubana recaería sobre el Estados Unidos". Un portavoz del Departamento de [illegible] de su país en la [illegible] los guardacostas estadounidenses utilizados en este

Anuncian en México rebelión de mi

Che Guevara voló a

La HABANA, agosto 27 — (AFP). — El Comandante Ernesto Guevara, Ministro de Industrias, partió hacia Moscú ayer domingo según reveló el matutino semioficial "Revolución". Viaja acompañado por el Capitán Emilio Aragonés, miembro del Secretariado de las ORI (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas, es decir, la versión transitoria del Partido Unico Marxista Leninista). Guevara es el principal dirigente económico del gobierno cubano. El viaje no fue anunciado con antelación.

Según "Revolución", Guevara en Moscú sobre la futura [illegible] soviética

milicianos cuba- las sierras del contra el régi- fuerzas antica- el boletín del cionario Estu- ción de Méx- guardaban la de Bonilla, c- tañoso de Esc- juntarse con los sublevados encuentran c- mente con k- sembarcaron por la costa de Las Vil- dad de C- letín.

El Dire

DRE fue responsable dice Departamento de Estad

En declaración oficial expresan que no podían aprobar que se utilice territorio de E.U. como base de acción na

Kennedy examina Tensión en Cuba

HYANNIS PORT, MASSACHUSETTS, Agosto 25 (UPI). — El Pre lente John Kennedy, que pasa el fin le semana en Cape Cod examinó hoy odas las informaciones del Servicio e Inteligencia en relación con el aumento de la tirantez en Cuba.

En Washington, el gobierno negó ategóricamente la afirmación hecha or el Primer Ministro cubano Fidel astro, de que el bombardeo de la osta de La Habana "fue un ataque irecto Norteamericano".

El Jefe de Estado conferenció por teléfono con varios funcionarios. Dispuso que su principal asesor en cuestiones militares realice inmediatamente una inspección de las instalaciones norteamericanas que se verían directamente complicadas en caso de que el anunciado fortalecimiento del personal soviético en Cuba diera lugar a algún incidente.

El Ayudante Naval del Presidente, apitán Tazewell Shepard, conferenció con Kennedy y lo puso al tanto e la información recogida por el Servicio de Inteligencia. A pesar de que mas se ofrece información sobre el articular, se tiene entendido que la onferencia de hoy estuvo relacionada con la situación en Cuba.

Fuentes oficiales en la residencia el Presidente en Cape Cod descartaron totalmente la denuncia de Castro de que el ataque fue realizado r Estados Unidos.

BAN HOUEI SAI, Laos. — CONTRA EL ENEMIGO ROJO. — Estos pacíficos ciudadanos se ven obligados a abandonar sus hogares ante el continuo hostigamiento de las guerrillas comunistas. Las fuerzas gubernamentales controlan la situación, pero no faltan los alevosos ataques de parte de incondicionales rojos que traicionan a su patria con tal de servir los inconfesables designios del Kremlin.

WASHINGTON, agosto 25 — (UPI) El Departamento de Estado declaró hoy que tiene pruebas de que el Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) anticastrista de Miami fue "responsable" del ataque [illegible] al litoral del puerto de La Habana.

Un portavoz autorizado [illegible] el Servicio Guardacostas intenta el secuestro de los [illegible] involucrados.

El Departamento dijo que [illegible] "ataque inspirado en la excitación del momento" no puede realmente desmentir el [illegible] comunista Cuba.

Al mismo tiempo, el Departamento de Justicia a ció que está investigando si la Ley de Neutralidad los EE UU ha sido violada como consecuencia de egiasito.

"Aunque comprendemos los [illegible] sentimientos este grupo de estudiantes libres y su hostilidad hacia te régimen opresivo, no podemos aprobar que se ce el territorio norteamericano como base de semejante acción", dijo el Encargado de Prensa del Departamento de Estado, Robert J. McCloskey, hablando con los periodistas.

Los funcionarios dijeron que el ataque probablemente fue realizado con dos lanchas a motor privadas.

Añadieron, sin embargo, que aún no saben si las lanchas salieron realmente de aguas norteamericanas para llevar a cabo la expedición.

Se tiene entendido que los miembros del DRE anticastrista en Miami están siendo interrogados allí funcionarios norteamericanos.

La Ley de Neutralidad considera un delito organizar en suelo de los EE. UU. una invasión contra país.

El anuncio del Departamento de Estado dice: "Debemos informar a los participantes que toda petición de semejante acción por parte de cualquier grupo pudiera significar la aplicación de lo previsto la Ley de Neutralidad".

Posteriormente, empero, dichos funcionarios di que esto no quiere decir que el grupo estudiantil a recibir de las leyes de los EE. UU.

Previamente, durante el día, el Departamento Estado había negado firmemente que los Estados Un estuvieran "involucrados en forma alguna o tuvieran nocimiento del ataque a Cuba que se ha anunciado".

Los funcionarios aludidos dije que esa declaración es exacta, el Gobierno norteamericano no en ningún momento conocimiento plan.

En fuente norteamericana se que las dos embarcaciones involu das "presumiblemente están a en aguas de los EE UU." No se plió esta declaración. Previame los funcionarios aludidos insinu que a su juicio elementos de la mada Cubana fueran responsables ataque.

Agregaron que unidades nav cubanas estuvieron realizando niobras recientemente y que en e sado el DRE se ha atribuido cré por actos en los que no tuvo par pación.

WASHINGTON, agosto 25 — (U El Departamento de Justicia anu hoy que esta investigando para de minar si la Ley de Neutralidad de Estados Unidos fue violada en ción con el ataque al litoral de Habana ocurrido anoche, que se anunciado.

Entretanto, el Departamento de tado negó categóricamente que habido "involucración o conocin to por parte de los Estados Un respecto del incidente, en que se alegó el Primer Ministro cubano, del Castro, "buques armados" caron el litoral de La Habana fuego de cañones.

La Ley de Neutralidad hubie do afectada en el caso de que expedición de cubanos exilados hubiera salido de algún lugar de Estados Unidos para llevar a esa aventura en La Habana.

La ley prevé que semejantes ex diciones no pueden ser organiz en suelo de esta nación.

Un organismo anticastrista, el rectorio Revolucionario Estudi (DRE) se responsabilizó con el dente. Un portavoz del DRE dijo dos pequeñas embarcaciones de organismo participaron en el ata

Una persona asociada con el miento dijo que las embarcacio partieron de las Bahamas.

Desembarcos y alzamientos se anun

INAR DEL RIO, ESCAMBRAY, SIERRA CRISTAL Y LOS ORGANOS FOCOS DE REBELION

MEXICO, agosto 25 — (AFP) El bombardeo efectua anoche contra la costa Norte de la provincia de Habana, estuvo combinado con desembarcos de co indos del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil Cu no, en la Provincia de Pinar del Río, informaron hoy igentes de este Directorio, en México.

Refiriéndose a la operación efectuada anoche con la capital cubana, Angel González y Modesto Váz ez, que dirigen la sección de México del Directorio tudiantil, suministraron hoy los siguientes datos: embros del Directorio que están en exilio partieron oche desde bases secretas, en varias embarcaciones, ra bombardear la costa Norte de la Provincia de La bana. Las bombas lanzadas hicieron blanco en el Ho "Rosita Hornedo", y se escogió este lugar por ser nde se concentran los técnicos rusos y checoslovacos han llegado a Cuba últimamente.

Al mismo tiempo, otras unidades de miembros del ectorio desembarcaban en la Provincia de Pinar del , mientras estudiantes del Directorio en La Habana ma se sublevaban y se internaban en la Sierra del ambray, en la Cordillera de Los Organos y en la rra Cristal. Campesinos y obreros en número todavía no determinado se han unido a estos estudiantes en mismos montes.

González especificó que ha habido ya encuentros con fuerzas castristas y que se han registrado bajas por bos lados, pero sin suministrar cifras. Añadió que no den dar datos sobre las fuerzas que desembarcaron que "son bastante crecidas" y están al mando de uno los altos jefes del Directorio Estudiantil.

Seguidamente agregaron que según informaciones tenían fueron muertos muchos de los técnicos soviéticos que están en La Habana, pero sin concretarse a más detalles. "Esperamos que esta operación sirva o catalizador para que el pueblo cubano se subleve, estaba siendo esperado por los cubanos que tra n en la clandestinidad en el interior de Cuba y ha ificado algo así como un "grito de guerra" para el ntamiento contra Castro", prosiguió Vázquez.

Ninguno de los dos dirigentes quiso dar precisiones e las bases secretas de las cuales partieron las em aciones que efectuaron el bombardeo de La Ha , pero indicaron que las armas y los barcos que an a los cubanos que realizan tal operación son mu-

Delegado de los estudiantes anticastristas hace declaraciones sobre bombardeo a Cuba

El delegado Oficial en el Perú, del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, Rolando M. Fernández, declaró ayer "que las declaraciones formuladas por el Departamento de Justicia de los Estados Unidos son impropias e improcedentes, ya que lo que se ha violado no es la Ley de Neutralidad de ese país, sino el Tratado de Río celebrado por los cancilleres de la Organización de Estados Americanos, al permitir en este Continente en primer lugar el propio Gobierno de los Estados Unidos— que impunemente tengan acceso a la Isla del Caribe, barcos repletos de armas y hombres procedentes de una potencia extracontinental."

En relación con las declaraciones hechas por Robert Mac Closkey, encargado de Prensa del Departamento de Estado, Rolando M. Fernández dejó constancia, "Que la Delegación del DRE en el Perú es la que no comprende de cómo si el Departamento de Estado se da cuenta de la actual situación existente en ese Hemisferio— como consecuencia de la intervención comunista en Cuba— formula semejantes declaraciones".

Para nosotros los cubanos —afirmó el Delegado del DRE en el Perú— la Liberación de Cuba de las garras del comunismo que la oprime, ha estado y estará siempre por encima de cualquier otra consideración, y jamás estaremos dispuestos a entrar en una política de convivencia con los rojos.

Al conocerse la noticia del bombardeo a La Habana, el Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, por intermedio de su delegado en Lima, emitió el siguiente comunicado:

Como era de esperar, los últimos acontecimientos que se refieren al traslado a Cuba de soldados y material bélico comunista realizado por buques soviéticos ha provocado la reacción enérgica de las fuerzas contrarias al régimen de Castro.

Es, pues, la intervención militar comunista en Cuba la que ha originado el bombardeo de un hotel de La Habana en el que se hospedaban militares de países de detrás de la Cortina de Hierro y la que ha precipitado el alzamiento armado de un importante grupo de patriotas del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil de Cuba en la histórica Sierra del Escambray.

Como era lógico, también, que tenía que ocurrir, el Gobierno de Castro con el claro propósito de engañar a la opinión continental trata de desprestigiar la valiente acción armada iniciada por las fuerzas que se le oponen. Ha llegado a decir, incluso, en una maniobra netamente demagógica, que los disparos hechos contra el citado hotel habían puesto en peligro la vida de varios niños.

Reiteramos la transmisión radiofónica del DRE lanzada al aire desde el mismo suelo cubano, que hizo un dramático llamamiento a las naciones del Mundo Libre sobre la situación cubana y planteó la "lucha frontal contra el despotismo rojo", las declaraciones sobre cómo Cuba comunista vulnera impunemente los tratados de Defensa Continental como el de Río de Janeiro, la Carta de Bogotá y los acuerdos de Punta del Este y la política de "guerra total al precio que las circunstancias nos exijan". José Antonio Echevarría con sus ideas en marcha.

[illegible] "[illegible]", [illegible] 7 [illegible] 1962.-

P: 7

[illegible]

El estaba solo en la calle, su sombra era el otro único objeto que se movía. Violentamente iba de un lado a otro, como si no supiera adonde dirigirse. En la callada y calurosa tarde, su voz se escuchó perfectamente cuando gritó: "No ti-re más". Varios hombres situados en la [illegible] [illegible] levantar sus rifles. Los primeros tiros lo alcanzaron en la espalda. La víctima tropezó y cayó. Luego los hombres pasaron por encima de él, aplastándole la cabeza.-

- Ruby Hart Phillips,
en Cuba, Isla Paradójica.-

=.=.=.=.=.=.=.=.=

Este suceso parece un episodio ocurrido bajo el régimen comunista de Fidel Castro; o quizá bajo el de su predecesor, el Dictador Fulgencio Batista. En realidad este incidente ocurrió hace casi 30 años atrás, durante el régimen de otro tirano cubano, Gerardo Machado. La víctima era un estudiante, apresado por realizar actividades contra el gobierno, quien fué deliberadamente fusilado, mientras trató de escapar. La brutalidad no es nada nuevo en la Perla de las Antillas; tampoco lo es, el valor.-

El pequeño bombardeo en la Habana castrista, hace 15 días, fué obra de una nueva generación de estudiantes cubanos que no está de acuerdo con el gobierno. Estos estudiantes son miembros del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil.-

[illegible]:

El Directorio se formó durante los sangrientos días de Machado, contribuyó a derribar al Dictador en 1933, asesinando al Jefe de la Policía Secreta y al Presidente del Senado. (Uno de los pocos fracasos, lo constituyó el intento de asesinar el propio Machado, abriendo un túnel que iba a dar a un cementerio, donde Machado pronunciaría un discurso fúnebre). El Directorio también se opuso al ex-sargento Batista, cuando tomó el poder en 1952. Encabezado por un estudiante de derecho, llamado José Antonio Echeverría, el Directorio llevó a cabo una serie de actos contra el Dictador Batista, por toda la Isla, cooperando entonces con Castro, pero manteniendo su independencia.-

Su acción más espectacular tuvo lugar en la tarde del 13 de Marzo de 1957, en el Palacio de Batista, en La Habana. Un camión llegó al Palacio y de él saltaron 35 estudiantes, miembros del Directorio. Lanzando granadas de mano y ametrallando, tomaron de sorpresa a la Guardia del Palacio, tiraron abajo las puertas, y llegaron hasta el segundo piso, antes de que muriera el último de ellos. Batista, tembloroso y con pistola en mano, estaba en el tercer piso.

//..

Cerca de la Universidad, Echeverría tomó una emisora de radio para llamar a ¡Revolución!, pero fué capturado por la policía, y fusilado luego. Hacía sólo unas semanas que él había dado al Directorio su lema: "Los estudiantes cubanos no tememos la muerte". En otro acto, miembros del Directorio irrumpieron en la Boite Montmartre en La Habana, y mataron al Jefe del Servicio de Inteligencia Militar de Batista.-

BOMBAS CON CAPA DE CHOCOLATE:

Después de la huída de Batista, de Cuba, en 1959, los miembros del Directorio tuvieron divergencias con Castro. En el mes de febrero de 1960, estudiantes del Directorio, llevaron a cabo la primer demostración contra el régimen comunista de Castro, un motín en La Habana, durante la colocación de una corona al Primer Diputado Soviético, Premier Anastas Mikoyan, ante el Monumento a José Martí. Dirigidos por el estudiante de derecho, Alberto Müller, de 20 años; y el de sociología, Juan Manuel Salvat, de 19 años; un grupo de jóvenes estudiantes del Directorio, tomaron las armas nuevamente, cuando el viejo comunista cubano Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, ocupó una cátedra universitaria.-

Los jóvenes volaron plantas generadoras de electricidad (su herramienta favorita la constituía una bomba recubierta con chocolate, que era fácil de transportar en el bolsillo), tomaron parte en el incendio que destruyó la tienda "El Encanto", en La Habana; usaron durante 3 meses una estación transmisora clandestina, desde donde salían al aire en un programa de 15 minutos, tres veces por semana, utilizando la frecuencia de un canal de T.V. de La Habana, que se encontraba en desuso. El Directorio estuvo también envuelto en el plan relacionado con la invasión de Bahía de Cochinos, pero sufrió consecuencias desastrozas: Müller, con órdenes de abrir un frente guerrillero en Sierra Maestra, no vió ninguno de los prometidos abastecimientos que le enviarían por paracaídas; tampoco recibió la noticia de la invasión, por lo que él mismo bajó de la Sierra para averiguar. Fué capturado, y actualmente está preso en la Isla de Pinos, condenado a 20 años de prisión. Aún así tiene suerte, el Directorio dice que entre 170 y 200 de sus miembros han sido fusilados luchando contra Castro.-

"LAS [illegible]":

A pesar de sus víctimas, el Directorio es una de las pocas unidades efectivas, entre las 30 ó más, de grupos anticastristas que trabajan dentro y fuera de Cuba. El mes pasado, Salvat y tres miembros más del Directorio, viajaron a Helsinki para hostigar a la delegación castrista que se encontraba allí, participando en el Festival Mundial de la Juventud, patrocinado por los rojos. Salvat fué golpeado por 6 de sus compatriotas comunistas.-

///...

Hace dos semanas, Salvat y 7 hombres más, salieron en una lancha veloz, de 31 pies, con un viejo cañón alemán de 20 mm. (que ellos compraron por 300 dólares), sobre la cubierta.-
Luego Isidro Borja, un estudiante de ingeniería, de 26 años, que comandaba el ataque, contó lo que había ocurrido:

"A las 9 p.m. vimos las luces de La Habana. Nos dirigimos directamente al Castillo del Morro, y dimos vuelta a la derecha. Contábamos con el hecho de que el radar estaba más alto que nuestra lancha, por lo que podíamos pasar por debajo. Llegamos a 250 yardas de la costa, frente al Hotel Rosita de Hornedo (donde se alojaban técnicos del bloque comunista). Hicimos fuego durante 7 minutos, efectuamos alrededor de 24 descargas. Nuestros proyectiles atravesaron las ventanas y las luces se apagaron. Cuando comenzamos a escapar, huímos de verdad. Pusimos los motores a toda velocidad, durante más tiempo del que se debía, luego disminuímos. Nos besamos unos a otros. Todos llorábamos como niños. Acabamos sentándonos en el piso de la lancha, y lloramos".-

14-00000

H.

(P

DRE

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

Aug 62

BRAZIL.-

The main campaign carried through by the Delegation was to move public opinion against the buildup of Russian troops in Cuba.

A trip was made to Minas de Gerais accepting the invitation of the members of the University Faculty. Also a meeting was held and excellent relations with the Organizacion de Centros Culturales were established. This group has its branches througout Brazil.

Another trip was made to the State of Santa Catarina. Six conferences were given there and condemnations to the Cuban case were broadcasted through the radio.

During the trip we obtained the support of the Union Florianapolitana of Secondary Students and of the Secondary and University State Unions. We enclose paper clippings.

Other activities carried through by the Delegation were:

a) A Mass at the Cathedral of Rio de Janeiro to commemorate the 8th of September

Publication of:

b) The pamphlet "Cuba Socialista". (We enclose one copy)

c) A campaign in favor of the Cubans under political asylum at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana.

d) A strong campaign in protest for the execution of Manuel Guillot by the Castro regime.

Mario Pita

19-124-26/3

2H H 6 UFGA 6140.

Fundador
JAIRO CALLADO
Diretora
MARIA INA VAZ

A GAZETA

Jornal sem quaisquer ligações partidárias

ANO XXIX Florianopolis Domingo, 26 de Agôsto de 1962 **NUMERO 7.179**

Número avulso
Cr$ 10,00

"Fidel Castro traiciono la revolucion!" — declara o estudante cubano Benito Diaz

Convidado pela direção da União Catarinense dos Estudantes, encontra-se em nossa Capital, o estudante cubano Benito Diaz.

O acadêmico Rogério Duarte de Queiroz responsável pela secção "Notícias Universitárias" dêste matutino procurou ouví-lo a respeito da Revolução Cubana, bem como da situação atual do regime imposto por Fidel Castro, resultando no que se segue.

Quem é Benito Diaz

Benito Diaz nosso entrevistado, iniciou seus estudos superiores na Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Havana quando se viu forçado pelos acontecimentes a pedir e obter asilo na embaixada brasileira em Havana, lá permanecendo pelo espaço de três meses, após o que veio para nosso país no dia 28 de março dêste ano

Conta 20 anos de idade e continua atualmente seus estudos de Direito na Pontifícia Universidade Católica da Guanabara. Lutou ativamente contra o regime de Fulgêncio Batista participando da Frente Estudantil Nacional, que agrupava tanto estudantes secundários como universitários. Após a memorável vitória sobre Batista continuou apoiando a Revolução durante dois anos quando compreendeu que a mesma tinha sido traída em seus princípios. Daí em diante passou a lutar contra Fidel Castro principal traidor, filiando-se ao Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil — DRE —, usando de todos os meios necessários como guerrilhas, sabotagens constantes e atentados pessoais.

Cuba: Situação atual

Respondendo primeiramente, qual a situação atual de Cuba, declarou-nos Benito Diaz, que o racionamento de víveres e gêneros de primeira necessidade é constante, provocando com isso muitas desordens e descontentamento na população. Apesar da bem armada e terrível milícia, a luta contra Fidel continua progredindo. Comícios organizados contra o regime são sempre dissolvidos pelas armas sendo prêsos seus manifestantes .Contudo, é oportuno que se destaque — prossegue — que essas mesmas milícias viram-se contra Castro quando têm oportunidade de fazê-lo com êxito.

Quanto da chegada à Cuba de contingentes do exército russo disse que nada podia acrescentar além daquilo que tem lido através de jornais.

Frisou, porém, que quando de sua vinda ao Brasil, grande era o número de russos, tchecos e chineses que entravam diàriamente em Cuba com a finalidade de garantir o regime castro-comunista, mas, rotulados todos êles de técnicos, os quais vivem confortàvelmente instalados nas antigas mansões dos latifundiários inclusive com carros de luxo à disposição numa afronta ao bom povo de seu país.

O operário cubano

É lastimável as condições do operário cubano — declarou nosso entrevistado. Não possuem a mínima liberdade sindical sendo seus órgãos de classe dominados pelos comunistas, e seus legítimos líderes, como aconteceu com David Salvador secretário-geral da Confederação dos Trabalhadores de Cuba e dirigente máximo da clandestinagem operária contra Batista que foi condenado a 30 anos de prisão.

Além diso a classe operária cubana se viu privada do: direito de greve, direito de enfermagem por nove dias, e 13.o salário que vinha percebendo há cinco anos. O regime castrista, impôs ainda um desconto mensal obrigatório de 14% dos salários e quase que diàriamente fazem-se coletas voluntári para todos os fins chegando-se e tão a um desconto aproximado 25% ao mês.

Como são realizados os comícios

Os famosos comícios de Fid Castro, são de fato muito conc ridos, pois para tanto são convi

(Continua na 5.a pág.)

«Fidel Castro...

(Continuação da 1.a página)

dos todos os operários. Aquêle que não aceita tal convite é tido como contra-revolucionário sofrendo as consequências de seu ato. E claro que a grande maioria prefere ouvir as demagogias de seu falso líder a ter que enfrentar "el paredón!

Resultados positivos da Revolução

Indagado dos resultados positivos da Revolução Cubana respondeu que a mesma conseguiu despertar o povo latino-americano para seus problemas.

Disse que as desapropriações e nacionalizações das emprêsas e companhias americanas de nada resolveram, pois apenas trocaram de patrão, passando para os russos.

Sôbre o ataque de Playa Girón

"Grande êrro que não devia ter sido cometido, pois destruiu completamente a clandestinagem e mesmo porque, não era o momento propício. Mal preparados militarmente, não consideraram as tropas de Fidel. O próprio povo cubano foi colhido de surprêsa pela invasão, pois não esperava".

Afirmou Benito, que não se precisará de nova invasão, pois Fidel Castro não permanecerá por muito tempo no poder.

Diretório Revolucionario Estudantil

O que é DRE? Explicou-nos o estudante cubano: "O Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil — D.R.E. —, é o representante da opinião e do sentimento dos estudantes cubanos e por esta causa faz questão de levar ao conhecimento de todos os estudantes e povos da América Latina o que está acontecendo de verdade na minha terra. E mtodos os países de govêrno democrático de nosso continente temos representantes. No Brasil somos em seis quatro no Rio e dois em São Paulo".

Fez questão de acentuar que o DRE não é contra-revolucionário, mas, sim revolucionário contra a traição comunista!

Terminando suas declarações, pediu ao reporter que transmitisse aos estudantes e povo catarinenses o seu abraço cordial, e a confiança de melhores dias para Cuba!

O DRE de Cuba e o desembarque de tropas comunistas em Havana

"O Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil de Cuba denuncia perante o povo de Santa Catarina o desembarque de cêrca de 10 mil soldados do bloco comunista mandados chamar por Fidel Castro neste momento que os operários, os camponeses, e os estudantes estão lutando e pondo em perigo a continuidade do regime comunista do traidor Castro. Entre os dias 26 e 31 de julho desembarcaram no pôrto de Mariel, na costa norte de Pinar del Rio, de 2.500 a 3.000 "técnicos" com uniforme verde-escuro, casquete branco, mochilas, fuzil-metralhadora; 2 mil de aspecto asiático ou coreano entre 4 e 9 de agôsto no pôrto de Casilda, na costa sul de Las Villas. Chegaram em jipes e caminhões, trazendo canhões e ambulâncias-hospitais; entre 26 e 31 de julho aportaram em Banes na costa norte de Oriente, 500 homens, a 7 de agôsto no pôrto de Havana 2.000 russos.

Também em Matanzas ocorreu um desembarque sôbre o qual não há outros detalhes. As informações recebidas indicam que as tropas invasoras estão localizadas em Guatana, antigo campo de tiro entre os quilômetros 7 e 8 da estrada que vai de Pinar del Rio ao pôrto de La Coloma. Em San Julian, onde nem a entrada de Dermidio Escalona, chefe militar de Pinar del Rio é permitida; na Cordilheira dos Orgãos, perto de Cabana; na Costa norte de Pinar del Rio, entre os portos de Santa Lúcia e Esperanza e entre o de Santa Lúcia e Dimas, em Torrens e Limonar, nas provincias de Havana e Matanzas; em La Cayuga, no aeroporto subterrâneo de San Antônio de Los Banos em Havana. Com todos êstes desembarques de soldados estrangeiros a serviço do imperialismo soviético, que dirão os defensores da "auto determinação de Cuba"? Possivelmente calarão e não reconhecerão que neste momento a verdadeira auto determinação do povo de Cuba está em perigo. Não reconhecerão que o povo cubano continua lutando pela sua liberdade. Continua lutando contra o homem que traiu a revolução cubana, a verdadeira Revolução Cubana. E nêste momento a América Latina não pode permanecer calada ante a invasão de Cuba por soldados comunistas. O O D.R.E. de Cuba faz um apêlo ao povo de Santa Catarina, para que expresse ao conselho de segurança da OEA sua condenação. O D.R.E. faz um apêlo a juventude catarinense, a todo o povo de Santa Catarina para que não permita que Cuba seja uma nova Hungria, para não permitir que sejam afogados êsses gritos de revolta do povo cubano pela sua auto determinação.

De vocês depende nêste momento que Cuba seja Livre !

Benito Díaz, Delegado".

A GAZETA
Florianopolis, Quinta-Feira, 30 de Agôsto de 1962

14-00000

Brazil = 5

Os Estudantes Cubanos Morrem no Século XX Pela Liberdade

MANUEL GUILLOT, [illegible] estudante, [illegible] da Universidade [illegible]. Foi preso [illegible] [illegible] GUILLOT, [illegible] OUTRO [illegible] DA JUVENTUDE [illegible] SANGUE [illegible] HANS GENGLER [illegible]

GENGLER, [illegible] 21 anos, [illegible] Festival [illegible] a liberdade [illegible]

O [illegible] GENGLER [illegible] Diretório Estudantil [illegible] D.C.E. [illegible] de Janeiro e [illegible] JORNAL UNIVERSITÁRIO, [illegible] Castro, o qual [illegible]

Os [illegible] de F.C. [illegible] GENGLER a uma [illegible] na Hungria [illegible]

[illegible] a luta que [illegible] buscando a liberdade, a justiça, enfim a própria felicidade, [illegible] com a sua completa libertação do jugo do imperialismo que lhes foi imposto pelo traidor Fidel Castro. Os estudantes cubanos [illegible] em que diariamente derramam [illegible]

AUTODETERMINAÇÃO

[illegible] estudantes [illegible] não podemos [illegible] abandonar [illegible] que se apoderaram de Cuba. Não podemos deixar que Cuba, hoje, se transforme na Hungria de 1956. O estudante [illegible] e de todo o povo cubano está a exigir uma verdadeira autodeterminação para Cuba. [illegible] aquela terra, e não o [illegible] comunismo, que nos faz voltar aos tempos da barbárie. [illegible] ao povo brasileiro, para [illegible] do povo cubano [illegible] ram. Aquele [illegible] que está [illegible]

CONCHA ACÚSTICA NA PUC

Foi inaugurada, quinta-feira última, com a presença de várias autoridades, representantes de entidades estudantis e colégios da Guanabara, a primeira concha acústica do Rio.

A PUC, que foi a contemplada, por assim dizer, com esta peça indispensável às realizações artísticas e culturais da Universidade Católica, deu mostra do que serão as atividades neste setor nos próximos anos, convidando a magnífica orquestra sinfônica do Corpo de Bombeiros para a cerimônia de abertura.

Na foto, um aspecto dessa cerimônia quando, representando os doadores da Concha — Lions Internacional — falava o presidente dessa entidade no Brasil, [illegible]

[illegible] já em vários [illegible].

Apesar de [illegible], até hoje não conseguiram quebrar a vontade do líder democrático, embora se tenham esforçado para tal os satânicos [illegible] de Castro chegando a lhe causar uma lesão na coluna vertebral, que o tornou [illegible] das duas pernas.

A UNIÃO FLORIANOPOLITANA DE ESTUDANTES CONDENA A INVASÃO SOVIÉTICA A CUBA — MAIS DE 2 000 ASSINATURAS APOIAM A DECLARAÇÃO DOS ESTUDANTES BRASILEIROS — O MANIFESTO — «A União Florianopolitana de Estudantes, em vista das últimas informações referentes ao desembarque de tropas soviéticas em Cuba, não pode deixar de levar a todo o Brasil o seu brado de protesto ante esta [illegible] que estão praticando os comunistas, contra o povo e os estudantes cubanos [illegible] fazer calar a revolta de um povo traído em sua revolução [illegible]. Representantes que somos da classe estudantil secundária florianopolitana, é um dever de honra, manifestar [illegible]mente, como em 1958, desta vez contra inimigos mais perigosos, faz com que solicitemos imediatas e enérgicas medidas por parte da Organização dos Estados Americanos».

NOSSA BANDEIRA

«Conclamamos, nesta hora, todos os brasileiros para que se unam a este nosso protesto contra a violação do continente americano por tropas soviéticas. Aos estudantes, principalmente cabe uma resposta aos nossos irmãos cubanos que lutam por liberdade e por justiça dentro de sua própria pátria. A bandeira empunhada pelos estudantes democratas cubanos é também a nossa».

OUTRO PROTESTO

Assinado pelo sr. Arquimedes Naspolini Filho, presidente da União Catarinense de Estudantes Secundários, recebemos o seguinte telegrama: «Protestamos contra a intervenção extracontinental de soldados russos em Cuba e pedimos à Organização dos Estados Americanos que tome providências».

Entrevista Exclusiva Com Eduardo Muniz

X [illegible] Eduardo Muniz, ao lado de Carlos Valdes[illegible] delegado no Rio de Janeiro, no aeroporto do Galeão

— Qual o motivo de sua viagem por todos os países da América Latina?

— Coordenar ao máximo o trabalho que vêm realizando os delegados do Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil, ao lado dos estudantes latino-americanos, nesta etapa decisiva de nossa luta.

— Quais são os planos insurrecionais do DRE para derrubar a Tirania, e que importância teve a ação levada a cabo no dia 24?

— Primeiramente, dividimos nossa luta em dois campos de vital importância, dentro de Cuba e no estrangeiro; enquanto, no interior do país, preparam-se as circunstâncias propícias para o levante das massas, através ações de sabotagem nas cidades e incremento das guerrilhas nas montanhas, no estrangeiro levamos adiante uma campanha de esclarecimento, que contribui para que ganhemos adeptos, que nos auxiliem moral e materialmente. Assim sendo, o climax da luta só se produzirá quando tenhamos as condições necessárias. Lograremos o triunfo com o desembarque de fôrças expedicionárias, armadas na mesma proporção em que o estão as tropas de Castro. Este desembarque será efetuado em coordenação com os elementos da clandestinidade, que conduzirão o povo: as fôrças castristas se encontrarão entre dois fogos e êsse será o comêço do fim.

— Quais os resultados do ataque do dia 24 de agôsto ao litoral cubano?

— Em primeiro lugar, logrou que se produzisse, sem maiores dificuldades, o soerguimento de nossa resistência na Serra de Escambray, ao se distraírem os esbirros de Castro com o ataque marítimo; em segundo lugar, serviu para fazer lembrar ao tirano que os estudantes de Cuba não se conformarão diante da já consumada invasão soviética da nossa Ilha, e, se bem que a localização de Brigadas Internacionais em Cuba coloca a libertação em mãos de organismos internacionais, não será por isso que cruzaremos os braços, embora os esperemos que êles atuem; nossa luta é sem quartel, e nela deixaremos até o último gemido de nossa existência.

— E que nos pode dizer quanto à posição dos EE.UU. em relação a Cuba?

— Sinceramente, devo dizer que não estranhamos a atitude de coexistência pacífica por êles assumida com respeito a Cuba, pois que inúmeras vêzes sua posição foi errada para com muitos povos da América Latina; no entanto, confiamos em que modifiquem esta posição, e o mesmo dizemos de outros países da América Latina, que se mantêm em plano idêntico.

— Como é que vocês se intitulam — Revolucionários? O FC não é um Revolucionário?

— Esta pergunta, companheiro, é quase uma insinuação de que somos Contra-revolucionários; nada mais falso, já que os militantes do "Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil" são jovens que combateram a Tirania Batistiana, seguindo os ideais daquêle que foi então o líder do Diretório Revolucionário, o Mártir Universitário José Antônio Echevarría. Não somos sòmente revolucionários quanto à ação, mas também quanto à ação, mas também quanto à ideologia. Quando lutamos contra Batista, tínhamos ideais bem definidos, sabíamos claramente que era necessária uma mudança radical das estruturas existentes; víamos com ânsias a implantação de uma Reforma Agrária, que proporcionasse uma distribuição mais justa das terras, proscrevendo o latifúndio, tecnificando a produção agrícola e pecuária em todos os seus aspectos, inspirando aos camponêses a criação de cooperativas, para evitar que se produza o fenômeno do minifúndio por meio de uma educação bem orientada e intensiva, para que as ditas cooperativas sejam única e exclusivamente dirigidas pelos camponêses que a formem, sem intervenção estatal, a não ser uma ajuda desinteressada de tipo econômico e técnico. Bem assim as demais reformas: educacional, urbana, fiscal, reforma de Emprêsa, a instauração de um Salário Social de Rendimento. E quanto à política no exterior, uma de total independência em nossas decisões, reafirmando nossa soberania e repudiando todos os totalitarismos, desde o soviético até os dos Somoza, Stroessner, Salazar e Franco.

Como presidente [illegible] a PUC [illegible] os totalitários em demagogos da UNE, Walter Manuel é o candidato dos democratas [illegible] da Universidade Católica.

Manifesto da Aliança Democrática Universitária Aos Colegas da PUC RJ

[illegible] signatários do presente [illegible] universitários, alunos da PUC RJ, [illegible] para que a opinião pública [illegible] deste país e da Universidade [illegible] grupo [illegible] alunos da PUC RJ [illegible]

[illegible] nos domina a terra.

Reconhecemos como [illegible] a fórmula "educação para o desenvolvimento", [illegible] como mais acertada a fórmula "educação para o bem comum", já vimos com clara evidência, que a educação e a formação profissional são os principais fatores do desenvolvimento ou do bem comum.

[illegible]

ACABAR COM A UNE, CONQUISTÁ-LA OU CRIAR OUTRA ENTIDADE?

O movimento universitário brasileiro se apresenta na atual conjuntura dividido em três grandes correntes: acabar com a UNE, conquistá-la ou criar outra entidade.

O processo que muitos advogam para acabar com a UNE seria o desligamento em grande escala dos diretórios acadêmicos. Simplesmente passariam a ignorar a União Nacional dos Estudantes, por a considerarem nefasta à vida universitária do país. Já não vejam mais os [illegible].

Esta parcela da opinião estudantil, despolitizada, bem intencionada, mas sem compreender o mecanismo usado pelos totalitários para se perpetuarem no poder, comporta-se como crianças face a um aparelho indecifrável. A primeira reação é quebrá-lo ou deixá-lo de lado.

Outra coisa não querem os atuais dirigentes da UNE do que continuar a receber 1 bilhão e setecentos milhões que deve subir em 1962 para 2 bilhões e 400 milhões fora o financiamento do senhor Santos Vahlis via governador Brizola, sem apresentação de contas, e gastar o dinheiro do povo em viagens, gastar em propaganda política de entidades estudantis e sindicais dominadas pelos pelegos e comunistas, conforme revela o próprio relatório da UNE apresentado ao seu 1º Conselho Ordinário na gestão Aldo Arantes. Enfim, continuar com a vida que pediram ao bom deus totalitário. O estudante que se dane; o negócio é enriquecer com a política.

Os estudantes que defendem o extermínio puro e simples da UNE são tão inocentes e irresponsáveis que ignoram que a União Nacional dos Estudantes não é propriedade do atual grupo da UNE. Por mais que seja exibida como estandarte pelos totalitários que vivem de pomposas idéias como dinheiro, demagogia e agitação, pertence aos universitários.

É pela falta de participação dos democratas, que nem sequer comparecem às assembléias para eleger o presidente do seu diretório ou para impedir a [illegible] a paralisação da vida universitária, que o movimento estudantil, deturpado, se transformou na desonesta galinha dos ovos de ouro conhecida, em 1962, como UNE.

Os estudantes comodistas, que não comparecem às eleições do seu diretório, ou quando o fazem é sem critério de escolha, são os principais responsáveis pela utilização dos diretórios acadêmicos para finalidades puramente políticas [illegible] da sujeira e da desonestidade dos pelegos e dos ignorantes como Santos Vahlis, que põe em dúvida a capacidade dos nossos professores, como fez nesta semana com o ilustre professor e amigo dos estudantes, Aliomar Baleeiro. Espera que o Santos Vahlis não vá à Faculdade Nacional de Ciências Econômicas para ter uma idéia do conceito de que ali goza [illegible] atitudes, só servindo para conservar os atuais dirigentes da UNE no poder.

Conquistar novamente a União Nacional dos Estudantes para as verdadeiras causas da universalidade do homem e particularmente para ajudar decisivamente, através de uma aprimorada educação, o povo a livrar-se das garras do subdesenvolvimento e do totalitarismo que já nos ameaça claramente — êsse é o pensamento da grande maioria dos estudantes brasileiros, que atualmente sentem a vergonha de ver a UNE esbanjar [illegible] o sangue do povo ao visitar as suas [illegible], muitas vezes parcela do que [illegible] aos próprios filhos. Sentem a vergonha de ver a UNE se fazer representar com exclusividade para os círculos do poder nos conclaves totalitários, [illegible] como o pequeno Festival em Helsinque. Sentem a vergonha de ver a UNE deixar [illegible] os estudantes [illegible] no episódio o governador Brizola quando fazia [illegible] com a [illegible] estudantes, [illegible] [redacted] [illegible] a vergonha de ver a [illegible] presidente [illegible] ao [illegible] Sentem a vergonha de ver a UNE apoiar o pequeno colonialismo vermelho [illegible] pelos livres [illegible] Sentem a vergonha de ver a UNE [illegible] e só fazer [illegible] Ela [illegible] a UNE [illegible] do povo [illegible] mundo livre [illegible] aberta).

Esta é a vergonha estudantil brasileira. É contra êste pensamento que a grande maioria está disposta a lutar. Aos poucos, tomam consciência de que a operação se faz [illegible] e para isso começam a participar das atividades dos seus diretórios, a comparecer, a votar e a dedicar-se [illegible]. Os futuros médicos da Faculdade de Medicina já tomaram providências, os da Odontologia idem, os da Nacional de Ciências Econômicas fazem o orçamento dos estudos, os de Engenharia estudam cálculo para que nada falte.

[illegible] que [illegible] as [illegible] como [illegible] do homem presente [illegible] que, a [illegible] da [illegible] existência de Deus.

Não [illegible] o vocabulário formado pelos princípios da doutrina social do cristianismo, [illegible] que nos falta [illegible] experimental.

Não aceitamos os títulos de "direitista", "fascista", "reacionário" ou "entreguista" com que os dirigentes [illegible] os títulos.

[illegible] com [illegible] os estudantes [illegible] formulou em [illegible]

[illegible] uma grande maioria, muito mais numerosa do que parece, que tomou consciência viva e grave dos trágicos problemas dêste mundo que espera de nós sólida preparação profissional.

Como estudantes sabemos que nosso primeiro dever é urgente [illegible] essa preparação e [illegible] observadores dos [illegible] e dos problemas brasileiros [illegible] tomamos consciência do [illegible] da educação, da competência profissional, [illegible] problema do desenvolvimento [illegible] melhor [illegible]

[illegible] numa reforma universitária na linha de uma mobilização geral de todos os recursos do país para a educação, e que permita oportunidades iguais a todos no acesso à [illegible]

Em matéria de política, nossa experiência, alimentada pelas lições do cristianismo, nos levam a repelir tôdas formas de totalitarismo que são, essas sim, verdadeiras alienações. Temos como critério principal a especial nobreza da natureza humana e seus direitos fundamentais, que os totalitarismos desconhecem ou ferem.

Democracia, para nós, é a forma política que se coaduna com os direitos do homem e que, por imperativos de justiça, e não por uma lei mecânica, procura levar a todos os frutos do gênero humano e a melhor participação dos frutos da terra.

Finalizando, desejamos ardentemente a concórdia em nosso meio mas não podemos, de forma alguma, aceitar um falso compromisso, uma paz de conveniência, com sacrifício de nossas mais profundas e vitais convicções de brasileiros e cristãos.

E por isso, para preservar o que cremos nessa hora crítica para a PUC RJ, lançamos a ALIANÇA DEMOCRÁTICA UNIVERSITÁRIA, que será estrutura e ação para os que acreditam como nós, na democracia e na dignidade humana.

Eurico de Andrade Neves Borba, pela AIDL. — Walter Maciel Filho pela [illegible]

LEVANTE EM CUBA

O Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil em Caracas, Venezuela, informa que às 23,30, hora local, do dia 24 de agôsto, o Comando Marítimo do Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil, sediado em Cuba, bombardeou o Hotel Rosita Hornedo e o Teatro Blanquita, próximos ao mar, onde se encontravam os tchecos e russos chegados recentemente a Havana para reforçar as tropas fidelistas.

Ocorreu também um Levante dos Comandos de Resistência nas serras de Escambray.

Foi distribuído clandestinamente um manifesto concitando o povo à revolução.

[illegible] ria-paga e [illegible] de dinheiro.

Infelizmente muitos estudantes, bem intencionados, vivem situações normais em tempos anormais. Esquecem que nos dias que atravessamos, além de estudar, terão que lutar para continuar estudando. O duplo esfôrço é enorme, mas êsse é o preço da liberdade.

Êsse grupo simplesmente abandona a luta, apesar de vontade e vitalidade para lutar, considerando a UNE invencível, apesar de os estudantes livres da Alemanha comunista, no intervalo entre uma aula e outra, gastarem suas pedradas no muro da vergonha, e os portuguêses aliarem-se aos professôres também nos intervalos das aulas, para lutar pela democracia.

A segunda corrente advoga o desfiliamento dos diretórios acadêmicos para a posterior criação de uma entidade autênticamente democrática, capaz de fazer frente à União Nacional dos Estudantes, mesmo sem possuir 1 bilhão e quatrocentos milhões, para serem gastos da mesma forma que a do ano anterior, a não ser que o atual tesoureiro da UNE, [illegible], disposto, no entender de alguns, a preservar o conceito de honestidade de que goza entre os seus colegas de estado, independentemente de qualquer posição ideológica, fizer pé firme na prestação de contas que nunca foi feita e enfrentar as iras do Partido Comunista, negando-se a compactuar com êste acinte ao povo.

Esta corrente, quase tão despolitizada quanto a primeira, não explica como criar uma nova entidade, impedir a infiltração da mesma, participar do [illegible] movimento universitário. Falam em criar uma entidade sem saberem como mantê-la, arregimentar estudantes, politizá-los, impedir que a famosa minoria domine os diretórios acadêmicos e, o que é fundamental, acabar com a imoralidade existente na UNE em nome do estudante e em prejuízo da nação. Com a mesma boa intenção da primeira corrente, consideram a UNE propriedade dos que viajam enquanto o povo passa fome.

Esta parcela dos estudantes, os totalitários também não temem e sabem perfeitamente que a tentativa não dá em nada, muito menos em nova entidade. Não precisarão sequer utilizar a violência e o terrorismo, como aconteceu em Quitandinha, para derrotá-los. Afinal de contas sabem os da UNE que, se demora algum tempo para fabricar um totalitário com todos os apetrechos técnicamente necessários, demora muito mais educar um ser humano. Esta posição de criar outra entidade é, como a primeira, inútil e sem sentido para o movimento univer-

[illegible] se prepara [illegible] UNE, porque pretendem [illegible] fique boa na primeira tentativa, serão feitas a segunda, a terceira e quantas se fizerem necessárias.

Os [illegible] da UNE que estão ocorrendo em todo o país são o protesto contra a [illegible] que houve no XXV Congresso da UNE e a orientação dada à entidade nos últimos anos. A grande maioria dos estudantes, que não votaram no congresso da UNE, votam agora no desfiliamento, enquanto a UNE, totalitária, [illegible] compactuando com a corrupção e a desonestidade.

O desfiliamento dêstes estudantes da UNE não é uma fuga, não significa retirada, e sim participação política no seu diretório, onde acorrem [illegible] para decidir sôbre os destinos [illegible] do estudante e da Universidade brasileira.

Votem os democratas que [illegible] nos centros acadêmicos, [illegible] em 1963, em massa no Congresso da UNE, para pôr abaixo o [illegible] muro da vergonha [illegible] estudantil brasileiro, representado pelo [illegible] dos atuais detentores do poder na Praia do Flamengo, fiéis ao totalitarismo vermelho.

Não [illegible] da UNE, em [illegible] que não possuem coragem suficiente para enfrentar os prepotentes, e [illegible] intelectual. Êstes [illegible] estudantil são definidos ideològicamente [illegible] definição. Repudiam a [illegible] de muito que se dizem [illegible] e se calam. São democratas e [illegible] que o são. E são dispostos a [illegible] um dia se fôr necessário para salvar [illegible] ou ganhar a [illegible] acabar com o comodismo, principal fator da vitória das minorias, e, para isso, [illegible] mais democrático, a [illegible] diz não à UNE, não [illegible] e partem para a conquista daquilo que é de todos, dos estudantes, dos velhos, dos [illegible], do povo: a UNE. Estão dispostos a acabar com a falta de vergonha dos [illegible] do bem público e lutar por uma educação adequada à realidade brasileira juntamente com os seus professôres. Estão cansados dos [illegible], dos demagogos, dos que só querem poder para afirmar a personalidade, muitas vêzes perdida no próprio trabalho para infelicidade de todos.

Página [illegible] J. U. 26-8-1962

A FALSA F.E.U. DE CUBA CHEGOU

Este foi o distintivo que a delegação castrista levou a Helsinki, símbolo eloquente do espírito que a animava. A delegação castrista — como é cla-



Nos Bastidores

14-00000

D.
R.
E.
DE
CUBA

CR$ 30,00

Cuba Socialista

CUBA SOCIALISTA

"A palavra é para dizer a verdade, não para encobertá-la."
JOSÉ MARTI

INDICE

Palavras Iniciais
O primeiro Encontro Nacional de Produção
Mas o que sucedeu com as promessas?
Pior que os escravos da Colônia
Uma sentença "Econômica"
Tudo isso, Por Que?
A Economia, Talvez, mas a Liberdade, Não
O Profissional não tem Liberdade
O Estudante não tem Liberdade
O Camponês não tem Liberdade
O Operario não tem Liberdade
Em Cuba ninguém tem Liberdade
Conclusões Finais
Epilogo

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDANTIL DE CUBA
Rio de Janeiro, G. B. Caixa Postal 3926

a.5

PALAVRAS INICIAIS

Na primeira publicação feita por esta delegação do "Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil de Cuba" no Rio de Janeiro, G. B. (BASES PARA UMA REVOLUÇÃO LATINOAMERICANA), adotamos uma posição ideológica a respeito dos critérios que pretendem orientar o desenvolvimento econômico, social e político de nossos países. Já sendo conhecido nosso pensamento a êsse respeito pelos estudantes e pelo *povo* brasileiro, agora nos propomos a lhes trazer informações concretas sôbre o que ocorre presentemente em nossa pátria.

Foi implantado em Cuba um regime marxista-leninista, comumente chamado comunista. Isso não é novidade, porque todos o sabem. Seu líder máximo teve que mentir muito até chegar a tal ponto; teve que trair a todo um povo.

Não viemos aqui analisar a espécie de traição de que fomos vítimas; em outra ocasião, será analisada devidamente. Vamos demonstrar que o regime marxista-leninista introduzido em Cuba não conseguiu realizar a prosperidade e nem levar à liberdade, mas sim à miséria e ao terror.

Vamos citar palavras dos dirigentes comunistas cubanos e suas próprias leis. *Discursos* e leis estas que qualquer comunista tem... mas que não querem divulgar como o fazem ao propagar os ensinamentos de Marx e Lenine. Tão terrível é, portanto, o comunismo que nem as suas próprias doutrinas e realizações pode revelar.

Vamos esquematizar apenas tudo o que se passa em Cuba, apresentando somente a legislação revolucionária e os discursos de Fidel Castro, de Guevara, e outros.

VAMOS MOSTRAR O QUE REALMENTE SE PASSA NA "CUBA SOCIALISTA".

O Primeiro encontro Nacional de Produção

No sistema comunista implantado em Cuba por Fidel Castro e seus camaradas, seguem-se ao pé da letra as práticas dos partidos comunistas de todo o mundo. Uma delas consiste nas reuniões de autocrítica entre todos os membros participantes de uma determinada atividade do Estado comunista.

A baixa do nível da produção, o aumento dos preços, a qualidade inferior dos produtos, o aumento exorbitante dos custos da produção, o fechamento de indústrias e os deficits enormes das chamadas Indústrias Consolidadas — tudo isso, produto do plano de industrialização do Ministério de Indústrias, controlado por Ernesto Guevara — obrigou o estado maior comunista cubano a convocar uma reunião de todos os elementos que intervêm no processo de produção.

Entre os dias 26 e 27 de agôsto de 1961, com dois anos e nove meses de govêrno revolucionário, no Teatro Blanquita de Havana, localizado em Miramar, os "líderes da indústria cubana" estiveram reunidos, analisando o fracasso de seus planos e o êxito conseguido na destruição das principais fontes de riqueza de Cuba.

Os jornais, controlados pelo regime, reproduziram aspectos de tais reuniões, transmitidas pelo rádio e pela televisão, mas às quais quase ninguém prestaria atenção, por já estar acostumado demais a tais "shows". Ao ser publicada a matéria relativa a êsses encontros, evitou-se menção a todos os insultos e recriminações que os "camaradas" se fizeram ao tentar cada um sair mais "limpo", mas foram tantos os insultos que a censura não pôde policiar a todos.

As expressões de Fidel Castro e de "che" Guevara aqui vão citadas, (1) e delas se deduzem muito bem as "grandes" conquistas realizadas no processo da industrialização de nosso país, e que se constituem numa das bases da propaganda do regime para a América Latina.

---

(1) Diario "Revolución" 28 e 29 de Agosto 1961

EIS AS EXPRESSÕES PROFERIDAS POR ERNESTO GUEVARA, MINISTRO DAS INDÚSTRIAS :

"Não se realizou nenhuma das metas assinaladas para a produção. Apenas uma ou duas das quarenta Empresas Consolidadas conseguiram isso".

"Na Empresa Consolidada do Fósforo, êsse produto é uma das maiores vergonhas que temos a registrar no Ministério das Indústrias".

"A verdade é que os refrescos têm o sabor de algo que não se sabe muito bem o que é... A Coca-Cola, que era o mais tomado, tem um gôsto de xarope de tosse".

"Todos estamos enfrentando a falta de garrafas. Ela se faz sentir tanto para os refrescos como para os vidros utilizados nos laboratórios médicos e apresentou-se também para o leite, em alguns momentos".

"Isso quer dizer que havia uma série de indústrias que estavam se ressentindo da falta de vasilhames adequados e as fábricas de vidro permaneciam paradas, muito provàvelmente por falta de capacidade".

"Não é nada bom, por exemplo, haver sabão em Havana e não haver no campo, devendo ser o produto distribuído de tal forma que não haja falta em parte alguma".

"No caso da borracha, houve insuficiência nos comêços de ano. Houve ausência de papelão e de sacos de papel, em momento determinado. Há atualmente escassez de pastas para dentes. É necessário ser pontualizada a razão. Há quatro meses que se vem verificando paralização do fabrico e não se tomou ainda providência urgente, como seria de desejar".

"Se bem que não tenham sido muitas as indústrias paralisadas, o ritmo da produção tem sido mais lento do que era previsto".

"A escassez de sacos concentrados foi uma falta de previsão dos companheiros do INRA na planificação de sua produção dos sucos de laranja".

"A "Antillana de Aço" foi obrigada a parar".

"É verdade que o Ministério do Comércio Exterior cometeu êrros e que alguns dêles nos custaram paralizações, mas não é menos verdade que houve uma ausência total de previsão por parte da maioria dos diretores de emprêsas".

"O crescimento da produção poderia ter sido mais intenso e a distribuição mais eficiente, se se houvessem superado as falhas de organização postas em destaque no curso das exposições e discussões".

"NÃO PODEMOS CONVERTER NEM O IMPERIALISMO, NEM O AUMENTO DO CONSUMO EM "TOTI" (*) E PRETENDER QUE TUDO SEJA INCRIMINADO PELO AUMENTO DO CONSUMO, PORQUE NÃO É EXATO".

EXPRESSÕES DE FIDEL CASTRO NO PRIMEIRO ENCONTRO NACIONAL DE PRODUÇÃO.

"Cada um de nós se encontra ante a circunstância de fazer algo que jamais tinha feito antes, e daí tôda a atual situação do país, a reestruturação nacional, a sua administração terem caído entre mãos que não tinham experiência de tais trabalhos".

"No primeiro aniversário da Revolução havia abundância de tudo, nada faltava e os armazéns andavam abarrotados".

"Já existem muitas obras projetadas e falta cimento, faltam vergalhões de ferro e não há o material necessário para começá-las".

"Além de tudo, êsse primeiro encontro está cheio de deficiências de organização".

Ser mais claro não é possível. Aí está o desastre na bôca dos próprios líderes. Bem como a necessidade de consertar um pouco as coisas, com umas tantas promessas. Por isso Castro prometeu que em dezembro de 1961 estaria solucionado o problema do abastecimento de aves em Havana; a partir de janeiro de 1962, a produção de cereais superaria tôdas as necessidades do mercado nacional; em junho de 1962, a produção do pescado atingiria as necessidades do consumo; a 1.º de fevereiro de 1962, estaria abolido o racionamento de banha de porco, etc., etc.

Mais uma vez ficaria comprovado que o Socialismo Econômico é um "sistema de futuro"...

(*) Toti, pássaro tropical cubano.

"A culpa é do toti", frase popular cubana, usada para encerrar as discussões.

Mas o que sucedeu com as promessas?

A 12 de março de 1962 foi promulgada a lei n.º 1015, (2) que diz o seguinte:

"*Lei* sôbre a melhor distribuição do abastecimento".

Art. 1.º — Com o objetivo de conseguir melhor distribuição no abastecimento do consumo corrente, cria-se uma Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros.

Art. 2.º — A Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros será integrada de um representante do Instituto Nacional da Reforma Agrária, um representante do Ministério das Indústrias, um representante do Ministério do Comércio Exterior, um representante do Ministério do Trabalho, um representante do Comitê Executivo da Central dos Trabalhadores de Cuba, um representante dos Comitês de Defesa da Revolução e um representante da Federação das Mulheres Cubanas.

Art. 3.º — São atribuições da Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros: a) organizar, com prévia consulta ao Conselho de Ministros, a lista de artigos de consumo que, por motivos justificados, devem ser submetidos a um racionamento local ou nacional; b) determinar, com audiência prévia do Conselho de Ministros, o regime de racionamento que se deve adotar com relação a cada artigo, assim como as quantidades dos mesmos que devam ser distribuídas entre a população; c) determinar, com prévia consulta ao Conselho de Ministros, as retificações relativas que devam ser feitas no que diz respeito ao abastecimento da indústria privada (?) e estatal e do comércio de gêneros de primeira necessidade, privado e estatal, dos produtos submetidos ao racionamento; d) organizar, com prévia audiência do Conselho de Ministros, o sistema de racionamento e fiscalização de sua execução, assim como determinar os organismos estatais e populares (?) que devam participar da execução e fiscalização desse regime de racionamento; e) propor ao Conselho de Ministros quantas medidas ache oportunas para a melhor execução do racionamento.

Art. 4.º — Revogam-se as disposições legais e regulamentares em contrário com a presente lei, a qual começará a vigorar a partir de sua publicação na "Gazeta Oficial" da República.

---

(2) Diario "El Mundo" 13 de Março 1962

PORTANTO — Mando que se cumpra e execute a presente lei em tôdas as suas partes.

Palácio da Presidência, em Havana, a 12 de Março de 1962

Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado
Presidente
Fidel Castro Ruz
Primeiro Ministro
Máximo Berman Berman
Ministro do Comércio Interior

Nessa mesma noite, Fidel falou com amargura e anunciou o próximo racionamento. Disse que "a situação põe à prova a capacidade da Revolução e dos revolucionários. Nem tudo são rosas. Há também espinhos no caminho".

Enquanto a "Nova Classe" come e bebe...

Anunciou que se adotariam medidas drásticas contra os especuladores... "Se fôr necessário chegar ao paredão contra os especuladores, chegaremos ao paredão".

Disse também, como de costume, QUE A CULPA DE TUDO CABE AO IMPERIALISMO NORTEAMERICANO e que "é difícil construir o paraíso", mas "a grande tarefa revolucionária é construir para o futuro...".

No dia seguinte, entrava em vigor a primeira Resolução da Junta Nacional para Distribuição dos Gêneros, que é a seguinte:

POR QUANTO — O Conselho de Ministros baixou, com a data de 12 de março de 1962, a lei n.º 1015, criando a Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros, encarregando-a de propor ao mesmo Conselho de Ministros tôdas as medidas condizentes à melhor distribuição do abastecimentos dos artigos de consumo corrente;



MINISTERIO DE
COMERCIO INTERIOR

LIBRETA DE CONTROL
DE ABASTECIMIENTOS

PATRIA O
MUERTE
VENCEREMOS

CON LA GUARDIA
EN ALTO

... o povo passa fome.

POR QUANTO — Com a data de 13 de março de 1962, ficou devidamente constituída a Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros.

POR QUANTO — Cumpre por execução a lei n.º 1015, no que diz respeito à melhor distribuição do abastecimento.

POR TANTO — No uso das atribuições que lhe são conferidas pela lei n.º 1015, esta Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros, com prévia audiência ao Conselho de Ministros,

RESOLVE:

PRIMEIRO: — Declarar os seguintes artigos de consumo, sujeitos ao racionamento em todo o território nacional: a) banha de porco; b) azeite vegetal; c) arroz; d) feijões de todos os tipos.

SEGUNDO: — Declarar, além disso, os seguintes artigos sujeitos ao racionamento no território da Grande Havana, que compreende os municípios de Havana, Guanabacoa, Regla, Marianao, Santiago de las Vegas e Santa Maria del Rosario e as cidades de Pinar del Rio, Artemisa, San Antônio de los Baños, Bauta, Guines, Cardenas, Matanzas, Colón, Santa Clara, Sagua la Grande, Cienfuegos, Sancti-Spiritus, Caibarien, Trinidad, Camaguey, Ciego de Avila, Flórida, Morón, Santiago de Cuba, Holguin, Victoria de las Tunas, Bayamo, Manzanillo, Guantanamo e Palma Soriano: a) sabão de roupa; b) detergentes; c) sabão de banho; d) pasta para dentes.

TERCEIRO: — Declarar, por último, além dos artigos compreendidos nos parágrafos primeiros e segundo, os seguintes gêneros sujeitos ao racionamento no território da Grande Havana: a) carne de boi; b) frango; c) peixes; d) ovos; e) leite fresco de vaca, leite condensado e leite evaporado; f) banana da terra, batata doce, mandioca, aipim, cabaça, batata e inhame.

A QUANTIDADE DOS RACIONAMENTOS

QUARTO: — Os artigos acima relacionados serão distribuidos nas seguintes quantidades: a) 920 gramas de gordura comestível, azeite ou banha de porco, por pessoa, ao mês, em todo o território nacional; b) 2,760 gramas de arroz por pessoa, ao mês, em todo o território nacional; c) 6,210 gramas de feijão de qualquer tipo, grão-de-bico, ervilhas e lentilhas, por pessoa, nos próximos nove meses, em todo o território nacional, distribuidas mensalmente.

Para as mercadorias reguladas no território da Grande Havana e cidades acima relacionadas na segunda parte distribuir-se-á: a) uma barra de sabão de roupa, por pessoa, ao mês; b) uma porção média de detergente por pessoa, ao mês, ou uma porção grande para duas pessoas de cada família, ao mês; c) um pedaço de sabão de toilete por pessoa, ao mês; d) um tubo de pasta dentifrícia, para cada duas pessoas ao mês ou um tubo gigante, cada quatro pessoas ao mês.

Para os artigos racionados no território da Grande Havana: a) 3,450 gramas de carne de boi, por pessoa, por semana; b) 1 frango de 920 gramas por pessoa, ao mês; c) 230 gramas de pescado com escamas, lavado e em posta, por pessoa, cada 15 dias; d) 5 ovos para cada pessoa, ao mês; e) 1 litro de leite diário para cada criança menor de 7 anos, e 1 litro diário para cada 5 pessoas ou crianças maiores de 7 anos, ou o equivalente a 6 latas de leite condensado ou evaporada ao mês; f) 1,610 gramas de legumes por semana para 1 pessoa, distribuidas segundo as determinações desta Junta; g) 920 gramas adicionais de legumes semanais, para cada criança que não tenha completado os 7 anos de idade; e h) 0,125 gramas de manteiga por pessoa ao mês.

QUINTO: — No caso de pessoas que sofram de enfermidades que e exija, obedecer-se-á às disposições que ditará imediatamente esta Junta.

SEXTO: — Para a organização do racionamento, distribuir-se-á uma "Caderneta de Contrôle do Abastecimento", publicada pelo C. D. exijam imprescindivelmente uma dieta, ou cuja idade avançada também R. no ponto mais próximo ao local de sua residência. No caso de uma família não receber, no momento oportuno, a sua caderneta, deverá reclamá-la no distrito do C. D. R. correspondente à sua zona. A demarcação dos Distritos e a direção do órgão do C. D. R. serão divulgadas pela imprensa, no período da inscrição.

SÉTIMA: — Entender-se-á por responsável pela família a pessoa em cujo nome figura o recibo de casa na Reforma Urbana, ou fôr encarregada da mesma no caso de ser proprietário do imóvel.

OITAVO: — Para comprovar a sua condição de responsável pela família, apresentará tal pessoa ao respectivo Comitê de Defesa da Revolução o último recibo que tenha sido abonado pela Reforma Urbana ou pelo convênio de pagamentos firmado com a Reforma Urbana, ou o último recibo que tenha pago do respectivo imposto, no caso de ser o proprietário

NONO: — A pessoa que não possuir nenhum dêsses documentos comprobatórios fará constar êsse fato no distrito a que pertença o seu Comitê de Defesa, e êste entregar-lhe-á provisòriamente a Caderneta, notificando à Reforma Urbana sôbre a situação anormal da referida família.

DÉCIMA: — Nos casos das aldeias ou fazendas, assim como nos chamados bairros insalubres ("Las Yaguas", etc.), os distritos dos C.D.R. a que pertençam procederão a uma prévia e cuidadosa investigação na entrega das cadernetas de Abastecimento.

DÉCIMO PRIMEIRO: — Se houver numa casa mais de uma família, a pessoa identificada como responsável fará constar, sob juramento, o número de pessoas de que se compõe o seu núcleo familiar. Nesse caso, os C. D. R. procederão a entrega da Caderneta correspondente a cada família.

DÉCIMO SEGUNDO: — Cada responsável por família inscrever-se-á no estabelecimento (super-mercado, botequim, açougue, aviário, posto de fornecimento de legumes) que preferir, dentro de sua localização. A inscrição será limitada por uma área cobrindo 4 quadras em qualquer direção. Se a prática aconselhar, nos mercados ou supermercados e em outros estabelecimentos análogos, estabelecer-se-á uma zona mais ampla, determinando a Junta as normas necessárias.

DÉCIMO TERCEIRO: — Se em qualquer estabelecimento o número de responsáveis por famílias inscritos fôr notòriamente superior à capacidade de operação do mesmo, o Ministro do Comércio Interior poderá dispôr sôbre o limite do número de clientes, respeitando a ordem da inscrição. Nesses casos, o C. D. R. e o Ministério do Comércio Interior disporá sôbre a inscrição em qualquer outro estabelecimento, que acolherá o responsável por família dentro de sua zona de jurisdição.

DÉCIMO QUARTO: — Os hotéis, casas de pensão, restaurantes, clínica, colégios com internato, postos de fritas (*), etc. serão atendidos diretamente pelo Ministério do Comércio Interior. No caso dos hospitais e clínicas, o pessoal do mesmo não poderá consumir rações superiores às correspondentes ao resto da população, limitando-se os benefícios da alimentação suplementar aos enfêrmos neles internados.

DÉCIMO QUINTO: — Quanto à regulamentação relativa às cidades mencionadas no artigo segundo desta resolução, assim como para a melhor distribuição das gorduras, do arroz e de outros artigos de racionamento os C. D. R. e as delegacias provinciais do M.I.N.C.I.N deverão coordenar com os comitês provinciais das O.R.I. e com as J.U.C.E.I. provinciais, e êstes submeterão à decisão da Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros qualquer sugestão que dessas consultas resultar para o melhor funcionamento da distribuição.

DÉCIMO SEXTO: — A infração das disposições contidas nesta Resolução será sancionada com as penas previstas na lei.

Havana, 13 de Março de 1962, "ANO DA PLANIFICAÇÃO"

Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros

Pior que os escravos da Colônia

Estão os cubanos fazendo História. Em 1842, sob o domínio espanhol, os escravos tinham, garantidos por lei e tradição, ao menos 280 gramas ao dia de carne ou bacalhau, 2.240 gramas de legumes, 140 gramas de arroz e 420 gramas de banha de porco. (*)

Em 1962 sob a dominação comunista, os escravos — ou seja, qualquer cidadão que não pertença à classe dirigente... nem Fidel nem Dorticós vão entrar na "fila" — só tem direito por lei (o que também não quer significar que seja encontrado efetivamente nos estabelecimentos fornecedores) 59.5 gramas de carne e 17.5 gramas de peixe por dia, 112 gramas de arroz, 280 gramas de legumes e 35 gramas de banha de porco.

Tudo isso foi o que conseguiu quem afirmou que "sem a satisfação das necessidades do homem não há nem democracia nem liberdade possível"; "os homens são escravos de tôda espécie de misérias e por isso, reclamamos um regime que liberte o povo de todo gênero de privações e explorações..." (3)

Uma Sentença Econômica

No mês de abril de 1962, Castro condenou formalmente os frustrados invasores de Playa Girón a trabalhos forçados durante 30 anos, a menos que fossem resgatados por um total de 62 milhões de dólares.

(*) Postos de fritas: Pôsto de churrasquinhos, bolinhos de carne.

(*) Tomado do "Bando de 14 de novembro de 1843 do Governador Don Joaquim Ezpeleta e dos "Apuntos Autógrafos Inéditos" de José Antonio Saco".

(3) Palavras de F. Castro no CMQ-TV 21 de Maio 1959

Não nos interessa analizar aqui a parte moral ou jurídica da questão. (Basta dizer que tôdas as organizações revolucionárias cubanas rechaçaram tal proposta de negociação do Tirano):

É interessante frisar apenas a necessidade urgente que têm os comunistas cubanos de conseguir dólares.

Explicação? Muito sutil. A sua maior fonte de divisas é a indústria açucareira. Mas, a troca de compradores — U.S.A. pelo Bloco Socialista — teve resultados inteiramente negativos, apesar das declarações do atual Ministro das Indústrias, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, em março de 1960:

> "FALA-SE EM DIMINUIR A COTA DE AÇUCAR CUBANO E MESMO SUSPENDÊ-LA INTEIRAMENTE. QUANTO ANTES MELHOR; PARA CUBA ERA UM SÍMBOLO DO COLONIALISMO. NÓS NOS ARRUMAREMOS MELHOR SEM OS JUGOS IMPERIALISTAS".

Sirva como ilustração das consequências desta "libertação do imperialismo" o seguinte fato: em 1957, o total dos salários pagos aos trabalhadores agrícolas e industriais, no setor açucareiro, subiu a *327* milhões de pesos (dólares), cifra que representava quase 50% do valor total da produção dêsse ano, e que era o resultado das conquistas devidas à Federação Nacional dos Trabalhadores Açucareiros (Os outros fatores da produção eram: os colonos — empreiteiros agrícolas — e os fazendeiros — empresários industriais —).

O valor total da produção açucareira vendida ao Bloco Socialista, segundo o Convênio que serviu de base para regular a safra de 1961, elevou-se a $320 milhões de pêsos (4 milhões de toneladas a $ 0,04 as 460 gramas). Isso quer dizer que o total percebido pela safra vendida ao Bloco Socialista não chegou a cobrir o que era antes a participação de um só dos fatores da produção açucareira.

Além disso, essa quantidade paga-se, sobretudo, em mercadorias de má qualidade e não em dólares.

E como se isso fôsse pouco, a safra (como tôdas as demais atividades do país) foi bastante fraca. Em março de 62, afirmou "Che" Guevara, numa reunião de trabalhadores açucareiros: "A primeira afirmação a fazer é que a safra foi má".

E afirmou que a sêca afetou os canaviais, mas que a principal razão da baixa da produção foi o trabalho agrícola e industrial mal feitos.

Depois de revelar que sòmente três ou quatro das cento e sessenta usinas de açucar haviam conseguido as cotas previstas, acrescentou: "Trabalha-se com deficiência no cumprimento das metas pré-estabelecidas". Segundo Guevara, a produção dêste ano atingiu sòmente a 3 milhões de toneladas de açúcar bruto.

Por último, revelou que em muitos pontos do território também foram queimados muitos canaviais.

RESUMINDO:

— Não foram criadas novas indústrias.
— Algumas indústrias foram paralisadas.
— Diminuiu a produção.
— Caiu a qualidade dos produtos.
— Há necessidade urgente de divisas.
— O trabalho foi mal feito.
— Há sabotagem.

Tudo isso por que?

Os marxistas apresentam dois motivos: o primeiro, as agressões do imperialismo ianque; o segundo, as dificuldades inerentes ao começo de tôda Revolução.

Sôbre o primeiro, deve-se afirmar claramente, e de uma vez por tôdas, que foi Fidel Castro quem, deliberadamente, procurou o apoio do Bloco Socialista e a inimizade dos Estados Unidos. E assim procedeu com todo o cinismo, enquanto proclamava o contrário, fazendo-se de vítima.

A 17 de abril de 1959, em seu discurso perante a Associação Norte-Americana de Diretores de Jornais em Washington, Fidel Castro declarou (em inglês):

— Desejo explicar que não viemos aqui por dinheiro. É possível que muitos outros govêrnos tenham vindo aqui por dinheiro e muita gente crê que cada vez que um govêrno vem aqui vem por dinheiro.

Eu estava mais interessado na opinião pública do que no dinheiro. E não estava de acôrdo com que se confundisse a finalidade da viagem. (4)

O antigo ministro da Fazenda cubano Rufo López Fresquet declarou:

— Quando acompanhei Fidel a êste país em abril de 1959, o primeiro ministro me advertiu, quando saímos de Havana, para que não discutisse assuntos econômicos cubanos com as autoridades, banqueiros ou capitalistas do Norte. Em diversos ocasiões, durante a viagem, Castro repetiu a advertência. Esta é a razão por que, quando visitei o secretário do Tesouro, Robert B. Anderson, não respondi às indicações oficiais de que os Estados Unidos eram favoráveis a prestar ajuda ao nosso país. Também por esta razão, durante nossa permanência em Washington, quando troquei pontos de vista com o Subsecretário de Estado para Assuntos Latinoamericanos, Roy Rubottom, fingi uma indiferença cortês ante sua declaração concreta de que o govêrno dos Estados Unidos desejava saber como e de que forma poderia cooperar com o govêrno cubano na solução das necessidades econômicas mais urgentes. (5)

Outro dos peritos financeiros cubanos, o antigo presidente do Banco Nacional de Cuba, Felipe Pazos, falou da reunião a que assistiram o subsecretário Rubottom, funcionários do Departamento de Estado e do Departamento do Tesouro, o Ministro da Fazenda cubano López Fresquet, o Ministro cubano de Economia Regino Boti e o próprio. Os norte-americanos, que haviam tomado a iniciativa de convocar a reunião, pediram repetidas vêzes aos cubanos que dissessem o que os Estados Unidos podiam fazer para ajudá-los econômica e financeiramente. Atados pelas instruções de Castro, os cubanos só puderam responder que não necessitavam de ajuda e que não tinham nenhum pedido a fazer. Pazos passou pela mesma experiência no Fundo Monetário Internacional. O terceiro perito cubano, Dr. Ernesto Betancourt, fêz as mesmas revelações.

Isto não quer dizer que negociações financeiras ou econômicas entre os Estados Unidos e Cuba teriam tido necessàriamente um desfêcho feliz. Significa, sim, apesar de uma impressão contrária muito disseminada, que Castro nem sequer quis tentar a negociação. Poder-se-ia replicar que a revolução na qual pensava não podia ser apoiada pelos Estados Unidos, mas não é isso o que têm dito os propagandistas de Castro, que têm preferido a versão mais fantástica do Prof. Mills sôbre a "fria acolhida" dispensada, inclusive, a "pedidos de escassa importância".

Muito mais lúcido foi o "camarada" Ernesto "che" Guevara. Fidel demorou mais, porém já proclamou seu pensamento. E assim, a 13 de março de 1961, declarou pomposamente: "Por isso, vista a questão de fôrça contra fôrça, o poderio do imperialismo é um poderio decadente face ao da União Soviética, da Republica Popular da China e dos países socialistas".

A entrega de Cuba ao Bloco Socialista tem trazido fome e opressão ao povo cubano o que parece fazer rir a Fidel e Nikita, unidos em íntimo abraço.

E melhores ainda, mais cínicas e descaradas foram as declarações que circunstâncias internas levaram-no a expressar a 1.º de dezembro de 1961. (6) "Acredito no Marxismo? Sim, creio no Marxismo! Acreditava o 1.º de Janeiro? Sim, acreditava o 1.º de Janeiro (1959)! Acreditava o 26 de Julho? Sim acreditava o 26 de Julho (1953)!"

---

(4) Problemes of Journalism, Atas da Sociedade Norte-Americana de Diretores de Jornais 1959 pag. 82

(5) The Times of Havana, Miami 15 - 17 de Setembro 1961

(6) Palavras de F. Castro na CMQ-TV 1.º de Dezembro 1961

"Terei algumas dúvidas a respeito do Marxismo e entendo que algumas interpretações foram equivocadas, e será preciso revê-las? Não tenho a menor dúvida sôbre êle !".

"Algumas pessoas têm me indagado se eu pensava, quando do ataque ao Quartel Moncada (26-7-53) como penso hoje".

"Quem quer que leia o que dizíamos naquela ocasião verá... que se trata de um documento escrito com muita cautela. "Se o tivéssemos escrito sem cuidado, se houvéssemos lançado um programa mais radical... não teria conseguido a amplitude que teve e que tornou possível a vitória". "Não se poderá esquecer jamais, a meu crédito, os primeiros dias depois do triunfo,os visitantes que chegavam a minha casa". "... repugnava-me de verdade aquela procissão em tôrno de mim de tôda aquela gente naquele dia. Bem, mas, em primeiro lugar, que estarão acaso acreditando? E eu dizia: os que acreditam, melhor. Quanto maior número acreditar que poderá vir até cá e contar conosco, melhor! MAIOR SERA A SURPRESA QUE ÊLES TERAO"!

Ei-lo aí, em suas próprias palavras. Marxista há muito tempo, negou essa condição durante muitos anos e acredita que o bloco socialista está em ascenção do mundo e que a fôrça do "imperialismo" está em decadência com relação a êle.

Pois bem: o "poderoso" Bloco Socialista, liderado por um grande país, que conta com 45 anos de socialismo, não pôde salvar a economia cubana. Isso está sendo já demonstrado... com as leis e palavras dos próprios comunistas cubanos.

A Economia, Talvez, mas a Liberdade, Não.

Agora vamos proceder a concessões no campo da Lógica pura. E vamos conceder muito... Tanto como nem sequer Kruschov concederia... (E se não o acreditam, verifiquem seu discurso de março de 1962 — 45 anos de socialismo — sôbre a agricultura na URSS). Vamos conceder que o problema econômico possa vir a ser resolvido daqui a 100 ou 150 anos... Mas o que não se pode solucionar é a falta de liberdade; e com isso passamos ao segundo argumento.

As dificuldades inerentes ao início de tôda revolução — conseqüência da eliminação da oposição da Direita — não foram grandes.

Isso foi reconhecido pelo próprio Fidel Castro. (7)

"O Comunismo coloca a unidade de um setor e a guerra de classe. Nós queremos a união de todos os setôres e de tôdas as condições simplesmente porque devemos procurar colaboração em todos os setôres da vida social. E isso já o conseguimos, contando a Revolução entre 90 e 95% do povo, pois o priva de nada e nada lhe exige e sem dúvida adota leis profundamente revolucionárias".

O Povo, de fato, apoiou Castro em seu programa,

Encontram-se nas mais ínfimas condições. (note-se o lixo chão, e a falta de assistência médico).

Mas o Povo, logo depois, devido a sua traição, se opôs a Castro. E é por isso que se queimam casas comerciais, indústrias e canaviais. Por isso, o trabalho é mal feito. Por isso, as prisões estão cheias. Por isso, é grande o número de exilados. Por isso, fuzila-se continuamente.

---

(7) Palavras de F. Castro na CMQ-TV 21 de Maio 1959

Sirva como fato esclarecedor da oposição do povo o êxodo dos profissionais. Dos 5 mil médicos que havia em Cuba saíram do país 1300; dos 1800 farmacêuticos, 300; dos 700 engenheiros agrônomos, 320; dos 1800 contadores públicos, 1000; de 800 engenheiros civis, 350; de 530 engenheiros eletricistas, 200.

Por que? Porque ninguém quer ser escravo. Sim, tal como soa a palavra: ESCRAVO. Porque em Cuba...

O Profissional não tem Liberdade

QUE SE VAYAN
LOS COBARDES
Profesionales
de Enfermeria
QUINTA DE
DEPENDIENTES
Revolucionaria

Muitas Associações Profissionais foram tomadas à fôrça, sem subterfúgios legais de espécie alguma.

Exige-se um juramento de fidelidade ao regime. Torna-se difícil a saída do país, para o que se é obrigado a negar a profissão no passaporte, ou a refugiar-se numa embaixada estrangeira.

* * *

Milhares de profissionais dignos têm abandonado o país, colaborando desta maneira ao enfraquecimento do Regime.

Por fim, as Associações Profissionais foram transformadas em "Academias" e os fundos e abrigos, suspensos.

Se se acredita que os profissionais são os "menos mal" tratados pelo regime vigente, pela necessidade que tem dêles poder-se-á formar uma idéia de como terão sido tratados os setôres restantes do trabalho.

O Estudante não tem Liberdade

Nos centros oficiais, foram substituídas as Associações Estudantis pela "Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes", organização militar juvenil que teve a sua origem na "Juventud Socialista", generosamente dissolvida "em sacrifício da unidade revolucionária".

Brigadas Universitarias. Hoje em Cuba, o estudante só tem "o direito" de desfilar uniformizado.

Esta A.J.R. conseguiu precisamente o oposto da propaganda castrista: CONVERTER ESCOLAS EM QUARTÉIS, entronizando a coação física nos centros de estudos.

A A.J.R., além disso, serviu de trampolim. A 13 de março de 1962 Fidel Castro declarou que deveria mudar seu nome para "JUVENTUDE COMUNISTA". Como se pode verificar, da evolução dos nomes que lhe foram dados, foi ela muito significativa: "Juventude Socialista — Jóvenes Rebeldes (A máscara) — Juventude Comunista".

Para os centros privados, foi promulgada uma lei que permite a "intervenção" do Ministério da Educação em caso de desordens para garantir a normalidade funcional do curso escolar. E paralelamente se fomentou a criação de grupos de "Jovens revolucionários", para provocar tais desordens, ou seja: o pretexto da "intervenção". O primeiro centro a sofrer intervenção por êsse método foi a Escola Eletromecânica Belém, em Havana, em fevereiro de 1961.

Mas, a oposição firme dos estudantes provocou a radical ESTATIZAÇÃO DE TODOS OS CENTROS EDUCACIONAIS NA NAÇÃO, no mês de maio de 1961.

Na Universidade de Havana, a 15 de julho de 1960, em reunião realizada no anfiteatro da Faculdade de Filosofia e Letras, uma minoria de estudantes e alguns poucos catedráticos traidores concordaram em dissolver o Conselho Universitário e todas as Congregações de Professores e constituir uma Junta de Govêrno integrada por quatro estudantes e quatro professores para dirigir totalitariamente os destinos da Universidade. A Junta assim constituída — absolutamente ilegal — conclamou todos os professores a acatarem sua "autoridade" publicamente. Os professores que não atenderam ao "apêlo" — mais de 80% — foram "afastados" de suas cátedras. A 4 de agôsto, por meio da lei 859, o Govêrno legalizou a espúria "Junta de Govêrno".

Na Universidade de Oriente, chegou-se aos extremos de forçar, mediante uma campanha de calúnias, a renúncia do Reitor, fundador da mesma, Dr. Felipe Salcines e de expulsar um numeroso grupo de alunos pelo simples fato de terem assistido às festividades religiosas de "Santo Tomás de Aquino", no Dia do Estudante Católico.

O Reitor da Universidade de Las Villas, Dr. Pedro Oliver, e um grupo professores arriscaram suas vidas, fugindo numa embarcação, face à perseguição de que foram vítimas depois de protestar contra o fusilamento do Presidente da Federação Estudantil Universitária, Porfirio Ramirez, que foi capitão do Exército Rebelde na luta contra a Ditadura de Batista.

Completa êsse quadro da situação universitária o contrôle, por um organismo supra-universitário, composto de representantes das três Universidades, funcionários do Ministério da Educação e do I.N.R.A.; a ausência de eleições estudantis e a substituição do sistema de concurso para a entrada de catedráticos pela contratação.

Resumindo, ouçamos o próprio Castro: "Naturalmente, hoje o Ministério da Educação tem que estar também ao serviço da Revolução". E isto significa: 1) Os pais não podem ministrar a seus filhos a educação que desejarem; 2) Só os membros da "Juventude Comunista" podem ser dirigentes estudantis; 3) Só os professores incondicionais podem ser catedráticos; 4) Em todos os níveis e currículos deve-se estudar obrigatòriamente o Marxismo, ficando abolido o ensino de qualquer outro sistema filosófico.

O Camponês não tem Liberdade

A Lei de Reforma Agrária Cubana, baseada nos mesmos princípios da mexicana e da boliviana, pode ser sintetizada, enquanto promessa e texto, a êste fragmento da auto-defesa de Fidel Castro no processo pelo ataque ao Quartel Moncada: (8). "Um govêrno revolucionário depois de assegurar em suas colônias, com caráter de donos, aos cem mil pequenos agricultores que hoje pagam arrendamentos, solucionaria satisfatòriamente e de forma definitiva, o problema da terra. Primeiro: estabelecendo, como ordena a Constituição, um máximo de extensão para cada tipo de emprêsa agrícola e adquirindo o excesso, por meio da expropriação, reivindicando as terras usurpadas ao Estado, secando os pantanais e alagadiços, plantando grandes viveiros e reservando zonas para o replantio florestal; segundo: repartindo o restante disponível entre as famílias camponesas, de preferência as mais numerosas, fomentando cooperativas de agricultores para a utilização comum de equipamentos de grande custo, dos frigoríficos e de uma só direção profissional e técnica para as culturas e a criação e facilitando por fim, os recursos, equipamentos, proteção e conhecimentos úteis aos camponeses".

Na realidade, porém, que aconteceu?

- A formação de cooperativas — sobretudo nas terras dos latifúndios exploradores — já vem viciada desde a própria Lei. Diz o artigo

---

(8) Folheto "La Historia me Absolverá" por F. Castro 1953

43: "Sempre que seja possível, o Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agrária fomentará cooperativas agrárias. As cooperativas agrícolas organizadas pelo Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agrária nas terras de que disponha em virtude do determinado nesta Lei, estarão sob a sua direção, reservando-se o direito de designar os administradores das mesmas com o objetivo de assegurar o seu melhor desenvolvimento na etapa inicial dêsse tipo de organização econômica e social, até que se conceda por lei a sua mais ampla autonomia"

Como se vê, a Lei pretende organizar Granjas Estatais e o fato de se referir a uma "etapa inicial" não diminui tal juízo, já que não enumera os princípios cooperativos. Tudo fica nas mãos do I.N.R.A. que não procedeu a nenhuma regulamentação tendente à "mais ampla autonomia". E, além disso, não se "fomentou" senão que se "fez" isto é, não foi permitida a livre iniciativa do camponê.

Devido à resistência do camponês pelas imposições da Reforma Agrária Comunista, o Regime têm tido que obrigar as mulheres fazer trabalho de lavoura

• "A terra é de quem a trabalha", é o que pretende defender o artigo 18: "As terras de domínio privado cultivadas pelos colonos, subcolonos, arrendatários e subarrendatários, parceiros e biscatistas, serão adjudicadas gratuitamente a seus cultivadores, quando a sua extensão não exceda do "mínimo vital". (*) Quando tais agricultores cultivarem terras inferiores a êsse "mínimo vital", ser-lhe-ão acrescentadas gratuitamente as terras necessárias para completá-las, sempre que se possa dispor das mesmas e as condições *econômicas* e sociais da região o permitirem".

Se as terras cultivadas, nos casos que se mencionam no parágrafo anterior, excedem do "mínimo vital", sempre que não passam de 67,5 hectares o arrendatário, sub-arrendatário, colono, sub-colono, parceiro ou biscatista, receberá 27 hectares a título gratuito, depois de prévia expropriação feita pelo Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agrária, podendo adquirir do *proprietário*, mediante venda forçada, a parte de sua possessão que *exceda da* área adjudicada gratuitamente, até um limite de 67,5 hectares.

Mas aqui, como se vê, não se fala de propriedade. E na prática tem sido assim. Relativamente *foram* distribuídos poucos títulos de propriedade e *os* repartidos são "*papel* molhado" (**), pois só se pode vender a terra, ceder ou *explorar* com permissão do I.N.R.A. Raro tipo de propriedade na qual *o* uso depende da permissão de outra pessoa.

• Além de tudo isso, o artigo *46 põe* nas mãos do I.N.R.A. uma arma formulável: "Toda prática em contrário aos fins desta Lei, ou o abandono ou aproveitamento negligente das terras que em seu amparo se ortorgam, poderá ser sancionado *pelo* Instituto da Reforma Agrária, declarando rescindida a transação a título gratuito das mesmas e seu reingresso no fundo de reserva de terras. O Regulamento desta Lei regerá a aplicação dêsse artigo".

Mas aqui, como de costume, não foi feita a regulamentação.

• E ainda que existisse, o artigo 54 diz: "São criados os Tribunais da Terra, para julgamento dos *processos* judiciais que regem a aplicação desta Lei a dos demais relacionados com a contratação agrícola e a propriedade agrícola em geral. *O* Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agrária formulará, dentro do *prazo de* três meses, a partir da promulgação desta Lei, o projeto de Lei Orgânica dos referidos Tribunais".

(*). *Mínimo Vital*. Equivalente a 27 Hectares.

(**). "*Papel Molhado*". Significa em Cuba uma lei que não se cumpre.

Passados três meses, a Lei Orgânica ainda não apareceu. Quem resolve na verdade são os advogados do I.N.R.A. NÃO HÁ OUTRA ALTERNATIVA.

E o que é mais conclusivo: o completo contrôle do mercado, que converte o agricultor em vendedor forçoso do I.N.R.A., acaba de delinear a situação atual do agricultor cubano: usufrutuário das terras estatais, sob o seu contrôle completo.

O Operário não tem Liberdade



O operario Julián Montesinos assassinado pela Milicia Comunista enquanto procurava asilo na Embaixada do Equador.

O Govêrno Revolucionário promulgou acaso alguma lei que ponha as massas trabalhadoras em condições de dirigir a produção e distribuição de acôrdo com o interêsse de todos?

Não.

As indústrias, os comércios exterior e interior e os sindicatos estão nas mãos do Estado. O Estado — segundo a "Lógica" marxista — há de refletir as decisões do Partido, não as da sociedade. E por isso não se procurou que representantes livremente eleitos por unidades produtora, setor ou profissão, se constituíssem em assembléias planificadoras, mas os homens do Partido vêm ocupando a direção da vida econômica do país, para dirigi-lo como bem quiserem, sem responder perante o povo.

Os quatro passos principais para conseguir isto foram: as "intervenções", o "censo trabalhista", as "nacionalizações" e as "depurações".

1) A Lei 696, de 22 de janeiro de 1960, orgânica do Ministério do Trabalho, conferiu ao Ministro, no inciso j de seu artigo 7, a faculdade de "intervir em emprêsas patronais e organizações operárias, patronais e profissionais, quando as circunstâncias o exigirem, para manter em atividade os centros de produção ou o exercício dos direitos sindicais e sociais, sempre por motivo justificado ou com vistas à Lei, designando para isso os delegados interventores que achar adequados por sua capacidade". Estas "intervenções", sem regulamentação, na verdade, convertem o Ministério do Trabalho em patrão efetivo, equivalendo a "nacionalização".

2) A Lei 761, de 19 de março de 1960, dispõe sôbre a confecção do Primeiro Censo Trabalhista, convertendo o Ministro do Trabalho no empregador único, privando assim os sindicatos de tôdas as suas prerrogativas, posto que lhes nega até o direito de negociar com as emprêsas. Em seu artigo 1.º ela dispõe, de acôrdo com o estabelecido na Lei n.º 696, de 22 de janeiro de 1960, sôbre "a organização e realização do Primeiro Censo Trabalhista para efeito do qual o Ministério do Trabalho REGULAMENTE E CONTROLE o movimento do emprêgo em todo o país e se cumpram assim os fins que lhe forem impostos".

3) A 13 de outubro de 1960 foram "nacionalizadas" 381 emprêsas nacionais, por meio da Lei 890 e todos os bancos mediante a 891. Já no mês de junho haviam se nacionalizado (aí tem sentido a palavra nacionalização) as usinas de açúcar de propriedade norte-americana.

A 17 de outubro, Castro comentou tais leis pela televisão e de seu discurso se deduz, implícita, a definição socialista da Revolução. Disse êle: "O programa de Moncada foi cumprido". Mas os trabalhadores que tinham memória não poderiam acreditar. Disse Castro naquela ocasião: "A terceira lei revolucionária outorgava (no caso de ter triunfado o ataque ao Quartel Moncada) aos trabalhadores e empregados o direito de participarem de trinta por cento das utilidades em tôdas as grandes emprêsas industriais, mercantis e de mineração, incluindo as centrais açucareiras. Excetuavam-se as emprêsas meramente agrícolas, tendo em vista a implantação futura de outras leis agrárias".

Decididamente, o programa do Moncada não se havia cumprido.

4) A dominação dos sindicatos foi iniciada pelo Executivo da Confederação de Trabalhadores de Cuba, C.T.C., mediante a submissão, coação ou expulsão de seus integrantes. Face a isso, não foi difícil preparar eleições gerais com candidatura única e colunas em branco. Houve o caso de alguém que tomou a decisão de apresentar sua candidatura pela coluna em branco, em seu centro de trabalho; os milicianos do centro, um dia antes da eleição, deram-lhe a escolher: retirar o pedido ou ir para a prisão. Em outros lugares foi mais fácil: o aviso de ter-se encerrado o prazo da candidatura chegou no dia seguinte ao previsto.

Com tal esquema não é difícil compreender a "nova mentalidade proletária", tal como se expressa na revista "Cuba Socialista" (fevereiro de 1962, n.º 45): "... com antecedência ao XI Congresso Nacional, na totalidade dos Congressos das Indústrias se havia concordado, por unânimidade que, a partir de 1962, se renuncie a algunmas vantagens de ordem secundária que certos setôres operários haviam conseguido, em suas justas lutas contra os patrões. Entre essas se acha, por exemplo, o chamado 13.º mês de fim de ano.

Os milhões de pesos que se destinavam a este conceito, aumentariam os fundos do desenvolvimento industrial... Entre essas vantagens, encontra-se também o pagamento dos chamados nove dias por enfermidade, que em algumas indústrias era feito aos trabalhadores no fim do ano, mesmo sem ter estado doentes. Os Congressos Sindicais de comum acôrdo renunciaram a esta *prática viciosa que alimenta a falta ao trabalho...*

"O XI Congresso da CTC-R e os Congressos Sindicais das Indústrias... consideram a necessidade de revisão dos velhos contratos de trabalho, que não correspondem mais à nova situação... e dentro dos quais se encontram *cláusulas que freiam o processo produtivo.*

Um dos acôrdos feitos com êsse sentido é o que estabelece que em tôdas as indústrias e trabalhos, com exceção dos insalubres e perigosos, ou em que o trabalho resulte penoso e esgotante, *os trabalhadores trabalhem efetivamente o dia de oito horas.*

Com esta falta de liberdade é muito fácil mostrar ao mundo um país em que as classes trabalhadoras, "como estão no poder", não necessitam de recorrer a greves ou reclamações.

Em Cuba ninguém tem Liberdade

- Em Cuba não ha liberdade de expressão. Disse Castro a 10 de novembro de 1961. (9)

(As históricas declarações desse dia, ante os Instrutores Revolucionários das "Organizações Revolucionárias Integradas", tinham dois fins: livrar-se da responsabilidade pelas injustiças que citou e ir preparando o ambiente para a creação do Partido Unico com férrea disciplina): "Pois bem, todo êsse aparato (de informação e propaganda) está hoje nas nossas mãos e esteve pràticamente em parte considerável desde os primeiros meses da Revolução,", "... já tôdas as estações de rádio estão em mãos revolucionárias e sob a direção da Comissão de Orientação Revolucionária". "As 156 estações estão hoje ao serviço da Revolução, as duas estações nacionais de televisão e todos os jornais".

- Dentro de um esquema totalitário, como o existente em Cuba, é muito fácil usar a coação.

Igual método é usado para conseguir as "grandes concentrações".

"Porque em vez de fazer tantas coletas (Disse Castro) não travaremos uma batalha pela produtividade? Com o aproveitamento dos recursos humanos, em vez de coletar 500 mil miseráveis pesos, pela fôrça, coletaremos 50 milhões de pesos, honesta e revolucionàriamente. Não é muito melhor do que andar mendigando, pedindo e recolhendo tostões, e começar tôda a gente ver nos delegados e revolucionários uns "picaretas"? Interessa-nos que comprem uma revista que não se lê? Perde o país, com o papel que consome e perde o jornal porque, então, se procede a um desconto ao leitor, que não o lê, mas que lhe parece ter sido imposto. É muito melhor serem tirados 5 mil, 10 mil exemplares a menos e que todo o mundo o compre espontâneamente. Se causam dano ao jornal, se causam dano à Revolução, as coisas que implicam nesse tipo de *descontos obrigatórios*, isso está refletido na desconfiança de tôda a gente".

---

(9) Todos os trechos que seguem foram publicados no Diário "El Mundo" de 11 de Novembro de 1961.

"Quando me indagavam: bem, por que querem descontar o sindicato por assembléias? Porque de outra maneira não pagarão todos. Ou seja: no fundo há um *processo coercitivo* para obrigar a gente a pagar".

"Há momentos em que são mais psicológicos para falar ao pessoal que outros; talvez no momento em que todo mundo tem fome com vontade de ir logo para casa, se o detêm ali, detem-se a desgosto. Haverá muitos que para que não digam que não querem ouvir, ficam".

- Já mais diretamente, têm a seu cargo a vigilancia os "Comitês de Defesa da Revolução" e os agentes do "Departamento de Segurança do Estado".



Os membros dos C. D. R. são os instrumentos para coagir o povo.

Os "Comités" estão organizados por bairros e centros de trabalho e estão integrados pelos piores elementos populares. Uma idéia disso é-nos dada pelas próprias palavras de Fidel Castro: "... temos o paradoxo de que enquanto intervínhamos nas sociedades da burguesia e havíamos estabelecido nela um Comité de Defesa... Comité de Defesa que tinha êsses lugares num abandono espantoso, que mais parecia um "chiqueiro" que outra coisa".

- Sôbre os temíveis agentes do Departamento de Segurança do Estado ouçamos de nôvo a Castro: "Basta que qualquer companheiro numa granja, numa cooperativa, numa usina de açucar, venha a crer que é membro da Segurança... e que tem poderes omnímodos sôbre a liberdade das pessoas, qualquer trabalhador, qualquer camponês, qualquer cidadão pode se ver prêso durante 15 dias ou 20, sem ver a sua mulher, sem os filhos, sem ver ninguém, e isso é realmente uma iniquidade".

"Mas há algo que me preocupa mais: mencionar o nome do órgão de Segurança, com certo temor, como um aparato misterioso do qual poderia surgir a qualquer momento alguma arbitrariedade...".

"E não é fácil explicar o fato de que um cidadão possa ser vitima de uma arbitrariedade desse tipo. Como explicar que um cidadão esteja 40 dias preso, sem julgamento? Ou que outro fique 30 dias e depois o soltem? Que outro fique 35 e outro 60? E que, nesse interim, além da prisão, lhe tenham tomado o carro e o tenham arrebentado, se é que chegaram a devolve-lo? ... nossa luta face aos ladrões de automóveis, aos "ocupadores de carros livremente", que tinha levado o Govêrno Revolucionário a sancionar uma lei determinando prisão de dez anos a todo o membro das fôrças armadas, miliciano, membro da Segurança, que utilizasse por conta própria veículo de uma pessoa prêsa... lei que, infelizmente não foi aplicada uma só vez".

"E vou dizer com toda franqueza: grande número de cidadãos em nosso país podem ser perfeitamente vitimas inocentes da arbitrariedade de cem e provàvelmente de mil pessoas".

"...a Revolução é a primeira a lamentar que não possa conceder garantias individuais...".

"...propor as coisas como o prêço inevitável da Revolução".

• A essas palavras, que não precisam de comentário, há que se juntar a anulação do recurso de "habeas corpus" e a criação dos "Tribunais Revolucionários", cujas terríveis características são as seguintes:

1) Fazer parte da jurisdição militar, que indica em cada caso os soldados e oficiais do Exército Rebelde e das Milícias que deverão integrá-los; soldados e oficiais, iletrados na maioria das vêzes, que padecem das condições mínimas de imparcialidade, independência e capacidade necessárias à função de administrar a Justiça.

2) Têm faculdades para "definir o delito e suas circunstâncias", assim como para "determinar o grau e quantidade das penas". (*)

Em Cuba, antes, as Leis diziam que "ninguém podia ser julgado por um crime que não estivesse previsto no Código", nem se poderiam impor outras sanções que as estabelecidas nas leis penais". Do mesmo modo proibia-se a aplicação por analogia dos citados preceitos. Mas Castro eliminou tôdas as garantias do moderno Direito Penal.

3) Não há necessidade de provas para condenar um acusado; basta a acusação do agente do Departamento de Segurança do Estado.

4) Não há limite de tempo para a apresentação dos detidos ante as autoridades, nem para a realização dos julgamentos. O caráter irregular dêsses Tribunais tem levado a casos extremos, no Presídio Militar de la Cabaña, de Lázaro Reyes — convocando-se, de surpresa, para julgamento, sem se poder dispor de advogado e condenando à morte em 15 minutos — e Efrén Rodrigues Calo, fusilado após ter sido condenado à pena de 30 anos.

• Para resumir, bastam algumas palavras do magnífico analista do regime comunista, Milovan Djilas:

"O mecanismo do poder comunista é aliás o mais sutil que se possa conceber, ainda que leve à tirania refinada e à exploração mais brutal.

A sutileza desse mecanismo se deve a que um só partido, o Partido Comunista, constitui o fundamento de toda a atividade política, econômica e ideológica. Tôda a vida pública fica detida, avança, retrocede e dá voltas, de acordo com o que sucede nos centros do Partido.

(*) Lei 33 de 21 de Janeiro de 1959.

No sistema comunista a gente se dá conta em seguida do que se lhe permite e não se lhe permite fazer.

As leis e os regulamentos não tem importância mais especial para ela. Mas sim, as regras reais e não escritas, no que diz respeito às relações entre o Govêrno e seus súditos. Com independência das lêis todos sabem que o Govêrno está nas mãos dos comitês do Partido e da Polícia Secreta".

Conclusões Finais:

O Comunismo Internacional pretende apontar a Revolução Cubana como modêlo para a América Latina.

Sai de Cuba continuamente enorme quantidade de propaganda, absolutamente contrária ao que ali acontece e tem acontecido.

Os comunistas cubanos incitam à realização da Revolução Marxista-Leninista. Inclusive durante a crise brasileira de 1961, Fidel Castro conclamou o povo brasileiro à insurreição. Menos mal que êste povo é inteligente e não lhe fêz caso.

Pois os que fizeram caso do "máximo líder de Cuba Socialista" encontrarão para seus povos a Miséria e o terror.

Esperamos que a leitura dessas páginas ajude a que se compreenda isso.

Quizemos apenas citar fatos, cifras concretas.
Sejam suficientes, por fim, os seguintes:
Em três anos de Revolução:

2.245 fuzilados
93.500 presos
300.000 exilados
1.000.000 de vistos pedidos.

Eis o que é "Cuba Socialista". "Viva o Marxismo-Leninismo"!

EPILOGO

"Todo o poder que iria adquirindo a casta de funcionários, unidos pela necessidade de manter-se numa ocupação privilegiada e pingue, iria o povo perdendo, sem ter a mesma razão de cumplicidade com esperanças e proveitos, para fazer frente aos funcionários enlaçados por interesses comuns.

Como tôdas as suas necessidades públicas viriam a ser satisfeitas pelo Estado, adquiririam os funcionários então influência enorme que naturalmente advém aos que distribuem algum direito e benefício.

Aquêle que quer agora que o Estado cuide dele para não ter que cuidar de si, teria então que trabalhar na medida, por tempo e em tarefa que o Estado pudesse lhe assinalar, posto que êste, sôbre quem cairiam todos os deveres, se daria naturalmente tôdas as faculdades necessárias para conseguir os meios de cumprir aquilo. De ser o servo de si próprio, passaria o homem a ser escravo do Estado. De escravo dos capitalistas, como se diz agora, iria até ser escravo dos funcionários.

Escravo é todo aquele que trabalha para outro que tem domínio sôbre êle; e nesse sistema SOCIALISTA dominaria a comunidade ao homem, que à comunidade entregaria todo o seu trabalho.

E como os funcionários são seres humanos e portanto prevaricadores, soberbos e ambiciosos, e nessa organização teriam grande poder, apoiados por todos os que se aproveitassem ou esperassem se aproveitar dos abusos e por aquelas fôrças vis que sempre cumprem entre os oprimidos o terror, prestígio ou habilidade dos que mandam, êste sistema de distribuição oficial do trabalho comum conseguiria usufruir em pouco tempo brutalidades, violências, furtos e tergiversações que o espírito de individualidade, a autoridade e ousadia do gênio e da astúcia do vício originam pronta e fatalmente em toda organização humana. "Do mau elemento humano — diz Spencer — não se podem fazer boas instituições". A miséria pública será, pois, com semelhante Socialismo, palpável e grande. O funcionalismo autocrático abusará da plebe, cansada e trabalhadora. Lamentável será, e geral, a servidão".

JOSÉ MARTÍ



JOSÉ MARTÍ
[1853 - 1895] Apóstolo da Independencia de Cuba

Agosto 1962

24 SECRET

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: [illegible]

INFO: [illegible], ADDP, [illegible] 6, [illegible] 2, CA/PEG, CA PROP, CA/[illegible], CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, [illegible], FI/D, FI/INT 6, CI/PS, [illegible], WH 11, WH/SA 12, VR.

TDCS-3/[illegible]

S E C R E T 132200Z AUG 14 [illegible] 64 IN [illegible]35

DIR WAVE INFO PACY LANT CITE SDOM 3338 (SHRYOCK ACTING)

INTEL

SUPDATA [EM]GEM-1. [EM]GEM-1 HAD SAID ON 2 JULY 64
02 02

THAT FOLCH AND LUNE WERE AIDING CUBAN REBELS.

INDEX FOLCH, LUNA. FILED 132200Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM HOC [illegible]

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC/CUBA

SUBJ SUPPORT OF THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE AND NAVY FOR CUBAN [illegible] OPERATIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

DOI EARLY AUGUST 1964

PADA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SANTO DOMINGO (13 AUGUST 64)

APPR 3

IN COMMENT:

WH/REG	2	WH/SA	12
WH/[illegible]/PS	1		

TDCS
PAY SCIENCE

RELEASING [illegible] [illegible]]03
[illegible] OFFICER [illegible]

DATE DISTRIBUTED
14 AUGUST 1964
[illegible]

BASED ON [illegible]

LIAISON

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

3/PU

SECRET

TO:

FROM:

ACTION:

INFO:

PAGE 2

TDCS

SOURCE [DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL] 24
(F) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN MILITARY CIRCLES.

IN COMMENT:

TDCS
PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING INO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON

LIAISON

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

1/P/

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY DOMINICAN REPUBLIC / CUBA

TDCS [illegible]

DATE OF INFO. EARLY [illegible] 1964

DISTR [illegible]

SUBJECT

SUPPORT OF THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE AND NAVY FOR CUBAN EXILE CACHING OPERATIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

PLACE & DATE ACQ. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SANTO DOMINGO (13 AUGUST 1964)

REF

IN 35

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]

24

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [A DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (F)] WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN MILITARY CIRCLES.

APPRAISAL: 3

1. THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE AND THE DOMINICAN NAVY ARE ALLOWING CRAFT MANNED BY CUBAN EXILES TO CACHE ARMS AND OTHER SUPPLIES ON THE DOMINICAN COAST AT LAS PENAS AND PUNTA LUNA, SOUTH OF MONTE CRISTI. THE BOATS ARRIVE AND DEPART QUICKLY, WITH PERMISSION FROM THE DOMINICAN NAVY, TO CACHE THEIR CARGO. THE ARMS AND OTHER SUPPLIES ARE NOT OF DOMINICAN ORIGIN. THE CUBAN EXILES DO NOT REMAIN ASHORE, BUT LEAVE WITH THE CRAFT THAT BROUGHT THEM.

2. AIR FORCE COL. JUAN N. FOLCH PEREZ, COMMANDER

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

c/PV

OF THE AIR FORCE BASE IN SANTIAGO, IS IN CHARGE OF THIS OPERATION. (SOURCE COMMENT. IN EARLY JULY, FOLCH AND GEN. ATILA LUNA WERE REPORTEDLY AIDING CUBAN EXILES.) THE DOMINICAN ARMY IS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE CUBAN EXILE OPERATIONS.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE /HC

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Tour of Latin America

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFS:
A. WAVE 1448
B. HLBA 6911
C. BOGO 4332
D. QUIT 5867
E. HEGA 2900
F. SAGO 6577
G. SAGO 6595
H. LAPA 5550
I. HVCA 11,393

1. SUMMARY. The Reference A. AMSPELL exhibit toured six Latin American countries during a five-month period, February-June 1964. With the exception of Guayaquil and La Paz -- where excellent results were achieved -- the tour was only moderately successful, and must be classified a failure in Quito, Santiago and Montevideo. According to AMSPELL, the total number of persons who viewed the exhibit was 6,720. Another 2,792 persons reportedly attended conferences at which the AMSPELL team gave talks on the Reference A. exhibit and the dangers and weaknesses of Castro-Communism. Publicity was given the exhibit by 34 newspapers (47 items), 30 radio stations, and six television stations. AMSPELL estimated the TV audience at 1,300,000. Sample clippings are enclosed under separate cover. Reports from WH stations and the WAVE debriefing of the AMSPELL team lead us to conclude that the tour was a moderate success that could have been much better if if had been better organized and if the AMSPELL team had had more experience. (On balance) we believe the tour was well worth the approximately $12,000.00 KUBARK paid out. We do not, however, believe it should be repeated in the foreseeable future in view of the relative inexperience shown by the AMSPELL team on the recent tour and the many difficulties encountered in trying to organize the exhibit in the various cities.

/ CONTINUED /

CS COPY

Attachments: U/SC
A. AMSPELL Statistical Report
B. Misc. Press Clippings

19-124-26/3

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - DC/WH/SA, w/attachs, u/sc

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
23 July 64

DATE DISPATCHED
JUL 24 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-16,980

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26-/3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2. COLOMBIA.

a. Bogota. The AMSPELL team arrived in Bogota on 12 February 1964 but were unable to make contact with the local AMSPELL/AMBARB contact until the next day. They were unable to get adequate advance publicity and had trouble finding space for the exhibit. About 200 persons attended the exhibit, and AMSPELL conferences were attended by approximately 485 persons. HLBA-6911 reported GISNEAKER-9's observations 02 on the local reaction to the tour, which he judged to be indifferent. The AMSPELL team freely admitted to WAVE that the Bogota operation was something less than successful, but blamed the lack of advance preparations and the existence of an unfriendly press for their failure. It should also be noted that the AMSPELL team was not on the best of terms with some of the local Cubans, and this fact probably had a good deal to do with the poor showing.

b. Medellin. The showing in Medellin was better than in Bogota. The press was lukewarm but the director of the Caracol radio station gave them considerable publicity, and they were able to hold the exhibit in a central spot in the city. About 400 persons visited the exhibit over a period of three days, and 850 persons attended conferences given by the team.

c. Cali. The team received good advance press play in Cali, which was perhaps one reason for the fact that the local Communist party was also well prepared for their arrival. On the very first morning of the exhibit, a large crowd of Communists tried to enter the exhibit with the obvious intention of starting trouble, and when they were locked out began to throw rocks and "stinkbombs" into the exhibit hall. The incident provided considerable publicity for AMSPELL, as reported in BOGO 4332. A total of 100 persons attended the exhibit. The AMSPELL team claimed that the Communists were very strong in Cali and that working there was like swimming upstream.

3. ECUADOR.

a. Quito. The team arrived in Quito on 25 March, after spending several days in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain visas for Peru. QUIT 5867 reported the AMSPELL team's personality clashes with the local AMBARBs and the consequent poor performance by the AMSPELL team, who complained of the absence of police protection, adequate facilities for the exhibit, etc., and departed just two days later on the 27th. One member remained in Bogota to hold conferences, attended by 325 persons. While not accepting the blame for this fiasco, the AMSPELL team generally corroborated the above story in their debriefing by WAVE. After such incidents as reported in QUIT 5867, we are reluctant to recommend any future tours.

b. Guayaquil. The AMSPELL team considered Guayaquil their most successful operation, an opinion seconded by Guayaquil base who termed it a "resounding success." (See QUIT 5867 and HEGA 2900). The exhibit received front page coverage in "El Universo" and "El Telegrafo", and they were given a half hour on a major TV station. An estimated total of 1,200 persons visited the exhibit, and the team spoke before 40 members of a local group, Frente de Defensa Nacional.

4. Santiago, Chile.

The AMSPELL team arrived in Santiago on 5 March to coincide with the opening of the Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC). The Santiago operation was a complete loss because Chilean customs authorities would not release the exhibit during the congress and the AMSPELL team was unable to obtain space of any kind to hold conferences due to competition from the congress for space. (See SAGO 6577). The AMSPELL team had been counting on a contact in the Catholic University, Fernando SANHUESA, to facilitate their activities but SANHUESA told them that the LAYC was a failure from the Communist side and that the AMSPELL team could contribute more by remaining quiet than by actively propagandizing 04

CONTINUED /

3/PV

against (and thereby calling attention to) the congress. The end result was that the AMSPELL team did nothing. An amateurish plan to kidnap a Cuban delegate to the LAYC as hostage for political prisoners in Cuba was quickly scotched by the Station. (See SAGO 6595).

5. La Paz, Bolivia.

The AMSPELL team arrived in La Paz on 17 March, and after some difficulty in obtaining space were finally able to open the exhibit in Club La Paz on 21 March. As noted in LAPA 5550, exhibits and conferences were held in various locations in the city, with the closing performance on 25 March at the Scala Theater hosted by the Venezuelan ambassador. The exhibit received excellent coverage in all four of the leading La Paz newspapers and the three largest radio stations carried AMSPELL conferences. Despite the excellent publicity, a total of only 600 persons visited the exhibit in La Paz. According to AMSPELL, this was due to Bolivian preoccupation with such things as a national day to demand a passage to the sea for Bolivia which stopped all traffic and communication.

6. Argentina.

a. Buenos Aires. The AMSPELL team arrived in Buenos Aires on 27 March during Holy Week. In addition to the delay caused by Holy Week celebrations, the team had difficulty finding space for the exhibit. With the help of the Chamber of Commerce, the exhibit finally opened on 6 April in Chamber of Commerce offices on Leandro Allem street. An estimated 1,200 persons visited the exhibit during a four-day period, and good publicity was also obtained in the La Prensa and La Razon newspapers. The AMSPELL group also obtained 10 minutes on Panorama Mundial, Channel 7 TV, as part of a 30-minute program on Cuba and the overthrow of Goulart in Brazil. According to AMSPELL, the Panorama program is rated as having 500,000 viewers. The AMSPELL team also held four conferences before small groups of Rotarians and university students which were attended by a total of 400 persons.

b. Rosario. The AMSPELL team arrived in Rosario on 11 April and opened the exhibit on 15 April, after the customary difficulties of finding a site due to the lack of advance preparations. The local chamber of commerce finally came through with an excellent site, the "Galeria Libertad", in the center of town. A total of 2,000 persons visited the exhibit during the three days it was open. Local newspapers (La Cronica, La Tribuna, La Capital) gave good publicity to the tour. The local radio stations gave spot announcements of the exhibit but did not give any additional publicity.

c. Cordoba. The AMSPELL team made a hurried trip to Cordoba, where they were able to show the exhibit to an estimated 600 persons during a three-day stay, 20-23 April. The local chamber of commerce was again very helpful in arranging for space for the exhibit and obtaining local press publicity. Good press coverage was obtained in Los Principios and Cordoba.

7. Montevideo, Uruguay. The AMSPELL team reported that Montevideo was the worst performance of the entire tour, with only twenty persons attending the exhibit. They arrived on 26 April and after unsuccessfully attempting to obtain a site in a central location, felt obliged to accept space in the Catholic Club, considered a center of reaction by many Uruguayans and remote from the main thoroughfares. Despite the poor reception and the lack of good local contacts, a fair amount of publicity was obtained in the local press and the AMSPELL team had a one-hour show on the local TV channel 10.

/ CONTINUED /

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 16,980

8. Caracas, Venezuela. The AMSPELL team arrived in Caracas on 9 May, having cut Brazil from the tour because of visa problems. Their early arrival caught their local contacts unprepared and it was not until 16 May that the exhibit opened. Excellent support was provided by station assets and widespread publicity was given to the event. However, the exhibit was located in a relatively remote spot and only 300 persons attended the exhibit, according to AMSPELL. (The Station estimate was 400-500). Another 140 persons attended AMSPELL conferences. The station report (HVCA-11393) which has been corroborated by the WAVE debriefing of the AMSPELL team, describes the typical experience of the AMSPELL team throughout the tour with the exception that local support was not always as effective as in Caracas.

9. Enclosed under separate cover is an AMSPELL statistical summary of the tour and press clippings from the countries visited.

Bruce P. Vedder
for ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

CS COPY

SECRET

From: Habana Report No: [illegible] Local File No: 10-18

No. of Pages: 2 No. of Enclosures: None

Report Made By: Humphrey [illegible] /dat Approved By: Sherwood P. [illegible]

Distribution:
By copy to: 2 - Washington Orally to: None
2 - Files
1 - Santiago de Cuba
1- Embassy
1 - L A 1 - Naval, Army, Air Attachés

Source Cryptonym: References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Subject: Plans and Activities of the Directorio Revolucionario

Source: [Juan [illegible] Sanchez] 05

1. Part of the information in the attached report was forwarded by HAVA 831.

2. Source, whom [illegible] had previously met through a mutual acquaintance, sent word through another student contact of [illegible] that he wanted to talk to [illegible]. Since source is wanted by the Cuban authorities, he was met clandestinely. The information in the attached report was elicited from him during meetings on 9 and 10 March 1957.

Classification SECRET

②

[illegible] 19-8-31

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/90

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Cuba

SUBJECT: Plans and Activities of the Directorio Revolucionario

REPORT NO. [illegible]-1432

DATE OF INFO: October 1956 - 9 March 1957

DATE ACQUIRED: 9-10 March 1957

PLACE ACQUIRED: Habana

DATE OF REPORT: 11 March 1957

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT:

Source: Member of Directorio Revolucionario (F)

Appraisal of Content: 3

1. José Antonio ECHEVERRIA Bianchi[2] and Juan NUIRY Sánchez,[2] leaders of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (Revolutionary Student Directory) formed at the University of Habana, met in October 1956 in Miami, Florida, with two delegates of FIDEL CASTRO Ruz and with Carlos PRIO Socarras to plan the uprising against the BATISTA regime. The delegates of the three groups agreed on a plan which called for CASTRO's group to land in Oriente and the other two groups to go into action at the same time in support of CASTRO's landing and subsequent activities. Faustino PEREZ,[2] a physician, and Juan Manuel MARQUEZ,[2] who was killed in the Sierra Maestra fighting, were CASTRO's delegates. Carlos MARISTANY,[2] former Minister of Labor, accompanied Carlos PRIO.[2]

2. After the assassination of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico in late October 1956, ECHEVERRIA, NUIRY, and other members of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil had to go into hiding because they were accused by President Fulgencio BATISTA of having been the authors of BLANCO Rico's death. Since then they have been working clandestinely to organize, arm, and prepare their group to go into action. There are approximately 100 men hidden in the Habana area awaiting the signal to strike, and other groups are ready throughout the island. Considerable support is expected from Cuban Navy personnel, [illegible], as well as from many persons who have asked to join the group but have not been incorporated into the group for lack of proper arms. The Directorio has also been in contact with Army personnel and hopes that many of the troops will desert or go over to the Directorio's side when the fighting begins.[1]

3. The Directorio does not know or understand why the PRIO group, which is believed to be well-armed, has not gone into action as yet. The Directorio knows that PRIO has given instructions to his group leaders to remain quiet, but the reasons behind these instructions have not been determined.

(2)

SECRET

DI COPY 19-4-8-3

FORM NO. 51-53 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

[illegible] BEST OBTAINABLE
[illegible] SUBMITTED

124

03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : BRUCE MAC MAST
UNIT : SAS/MOB/PA-PROP
EXT : 6055
DATE : 12 JUNE 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

12 JUN 63 20 24z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO : SEE BELOW
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SAS 8
INFO : DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WH 7, S/C

RR Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RR Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

TO PRITY MEXI TEGU SJOS PACY INFO WAVE
CARA RIOD MONT BUEN
SAGO LIMA LAPA QUIT
BOGO

CITE DIR 46564

DYVOUR/AMBARB

REF: DIR 46562

IDENS: LUIS FERNANDEZ ROCHA RODRIGUEZ

MANUEL SALVAT-ROQUE

FELIX GUILLERMO OTHON PACHO

FERNANDO GARCIA-CHACON CHACON

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/MOB/Mr. Tilton
WH/1 (in draft)
WH/2 (in draft)
WH/3 (in draft)
WH/5 (in draft)
C/WH/CA/Mr. Sternfield (in draft)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
F	
RID/	
DESTROY	

RI COPY

W. Hood
C. KING

DESMOND FITZGERALD

19-124-26/4

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
X-2 Branch
REPORT

Report No: YKX- 894
Local File No: YKX-200

Office of Origin: KUNMING			
Report Made At: Kweiyang	Date: 23 February 1945	Period Covered:	Made By: BB/037 & BB/012
Subject: GERHARD NEUMANN			Status:
Classification: Persons 6			PENDING
Reference: Report YKX-890 dated 13 Jan. 1945 entitled NEUMANN(?)			

As requested by Kunming, the following was furnished by two members of Air Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff.

The first source, M/Sgt. Harry Hines states that Neumann's first name is GERHARD. He was born and educated in Germany. NEUMANN frequently mentioned the type of education he received under the Germans and also the methods of instructions. Sgt. HINES said that NEUMANN was a mechanic with the AVG prior to entering the U.S. Army. Due to his work with the AVG, NEUMANN is a close friend of General CHENNAULT. He is a quiet fellow and very seldom enters into conversation. He is bald due to typhus.

The second source, Mr. LAWRENCE WRIGHT, states that NEUMANN was exiled from Germany and has been in China for a long time. Prior to joining the AVG, he was an engineer. According to Mr. WRIGHT, Neumann never expressed any political sentiments. He is a quiet fellow and seldom engages anyone in conversation. This source also states that he never heard Neumann mention his family relations.

UNDEVELOPED LEADS:

At Kunming. This case is considered to be closed at Kweiyang. The Kunming office may obtain further information from other fellow soldiers of the Air Ground Forces Resource and Technical Staff.

Evaluation: A-1

Distribution:
- 2 - Washington, D.C.
- 1 - Meppo
- 1 - Det. 202
- 2 - Kunming
- 1 - Kweiyang

Prepared by:
Officer in Charge

SECRET

UEST FOR MANDATORY REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN CUSTODY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

1/8/76
Date of Request

Name of Depository: JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY
Address: 380 TRAPELO ROAD
WALTHAM, MA 02154
Phone #: 617-223-7250

I hereby request mandatory review of classified material (see attached list) in the records/document collecti of National Security Files
(record group or collection)

in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 11652, Section 5 (c).

Name of Requestor: Richard D. Mahoney
Address: 4019 S. Mill Ave.
Tempe, Ariz. 85282
Phone #:

14-00000

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
Washington, DC 20408

SECRET

In reply refer to:
NLK-76-260

APR 19 1976

E-76-124

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Under the provisions of Section 5(C), Executive Order 11652, a researcher has requested the mandatory classification review of the enclosed document(s) from the holdings of one of the Presidential libraries. Enclosed are copies of the researcher's request and a document list. The identification of the library file which contains the document(s) is given in the document list. If there is any question concerning this request, do not hesitate to contact us.

Please review the document(s) and if they may be declassified, mark them appropriately. If a document should remain classified in the interest of national security, please provide us with the applicable exemption category from Section 5(B) of the Executive order and with a date or event when automatic declassification may be accomplished. We would appreciate return of the document copies with your response.

Sincerely,

Edwin A. Thompson

EDWIN A. THOMPSON
Director
Records Declassification Division

Enclosures

APR 22 [illegible] '76

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURES

Keep Freedom in Your Future With U.S. Savings Bonds

26 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Information Review Committee

ATTENTION : Mr. H. G. Bean, Assistant for Information

SUBJECT : E.O. 11652--Richard D. Mahoney (E 76-124)

REFERENCES : A. Initial Request dated 8 January 1976.
B. GSA Referral Letter w/att. dated 19 April 1976.
C. IPS Reply dated 26 July 1976.
D. Appeal Letter dated 15 August 1976.

1. Summary of Recommendations: Sustain the initial determination to deny the document in toto under provision 5(B)(2) of E.O. 11652, as amended. Add provision 5(B)(3).

2. Background:

a. On 8 January 1976, Mr. Richard D. Mahoney requested a mandatory review of two classified CIA documents under provisions of Executive Order 11652 Section 5(C). The documents were in custody of the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) in the John F. Kennedy Library.

b. On 19 April 1976, the NARS referred Mr. Mahoney's request with copies of the documents to CIA. The Agency was asked to review the documents. If declassified, they were to be marked appropriately.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL When
Detached From
Attachments

SECRET

If they remained classified, the Agency was requested to cite the applicable exemption category from Section 5(B) of the E.O. and a date when automatic declassification may be accomplished. They requested that the copies of the documents be returned with the Agency's response.

c. On 26 July 1976, IPS wrote to the NARS and returned copies of the documents. Both documents were found to require continued classification under E.O. 11652 Section 5(B). However, a sanitized version of Item #1 was found possible and was enclosed. NARS could advise requester of his right to appeal directly to CIA.

d. On 15 August 1976, Mr. Mahoney wrote to the CIA and appealed the decision to withhold from declassification Item #2 of his request.

3. Recommendations:

a. Tab B-2 contains TDCSDB 3/657,851 dated 12 November 1963. During the initial review, the document was denied in toto to requester under provision 5(B)(2) of E.O. 11652, as amended. The document is based on ACL-1832 dated 10 November 1963. I recommend that the initial determination to deny the document to the requester in toto under provision 5(B)(2) of E.O. 11652, as amended, be sustained and that provision 5(B)(3) of E.O. 11652 now be applied. The information is from a sensitive source with unique access to a political leader. If released, the information could cause embarrassment to the United States Government and exacerbate relations with a friendly foreign government.

b. During the DDO appeals review, a classification review was conducted. The document is properly classified and properly marked in accordance with the provisions of E.O. 11652, as amended. Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, a meaningful sanitization cannot be made.

CONFIDENTIAL When
Detached From
Attachments

SECRET

4. OGC has not yet concurred in these recommendations.

Louis J. Dube
DDO Appeals Officer

Attachments:
Tab A - References A-D
Tab B - TDCSDB 3/657,851

COORDINATION:

	DATE
C/AF/PLANS	28 Jan 77

CONFIDENTIAL When
Detached From
Attachments

SECRET

14-00000

AUG 23 2 02 PM '76

August 19, 1976

Appeal
E 76-124

Information Review Committee
c/o Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Sir:

Under the provisions of Executive Order 11652, I would like to appeal your decision to withhold from declassification Document 2 of NLK-76-[illegible].

Since I do not have any idea what is contained in the TDCS document, I can only address myself to the general position that the change of regimes in Portugal and the relinquishment of its African territories may well reduce the sensitivity of this document. Could the document be released in sanitized form?

Thank you for your consideration. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Richard Doyle Mahoney

Richard Doyle Mahoney
John F. Kennedy Library
380 Trapelo Road
Waltham, Mass. 02154

SECRET

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
Washington, DC 20408

In reply refer to:
NLK-76-321

MAY 10 1976

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

E 76-150

LOG
E

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Under the provisions of Section 5(C), Executive Order 11652, a researcher has requested the mandatory classification review of the enclosed document(s) from the holdings of one of the Presidential libraries. Enclosed are copies of the researcher's request and a document list. The identification of the library file which contains the document(s) is given in the document list. If there is any question concerning this request, do not hesitate to contact us.

Please review the document(s) and if they may be declassified, mark them appropriately. If a document should remain classified in the interest of national security, please provide us with the applicable exemption category from Section 5(B) of the Executive order and with a date or event when automatic declassification may be accomplished. We would appreciate return of the document copies with your response.

Sincerely,

EDWIN A. THOMPSON
Director
Records Declassification Division

Enclosures

MAY 19 1 24 PM '76

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURES

FOR MANDATORY REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN CUSTODY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

1/8/76
Date of Request

Name of Depository: JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY
Address: 380 TRAPELO ROAD
WALTHAM, MA 02154
Phone #: 617-223-7250

I hereby request mandatory review of classified material (see attached list) in the records/document collections of

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES
(record group or collection)

in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 11652, Section 5 (c).

Name of Requestor: Richard Doyle Mahoney
Address: 4019 S. Mill Ave.
Tempe, Arizona 85282
Phone #:

om: CIA Case #: [illegible]

Summary	Documents	Pages
CONFIDENTIAL	1	5
SECRET	2	13
TOP SECRET		
Unmarked (but possibly classified)		
Total Classified	3	18
Unclassified Attachments (for information only)		

te	Description (identification, subject)	Pages	Classification
/13/63	SC No. 00609/63B: "Significance of EEC-African Association Agreement"	7	S
/10/63	TDCS DB-3/656,740: "Subject: Comments of French Officials on French Activities in Black Africa"	6	S
/25/63	OCI No. 2375/63: "Subject: African Reactions to US Positions in Security Council Debates on Portuguese Territories and South Africa"	5	C

For archivist: Documents from NSF:CO:Africa, 8/63-11/63, Box 3

7 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Information Review Committee

ATTENTION : Mr. H. G. Bean, Assistant for Information

SUBJECT : Executive Order 11652 Appeal--
Richard Doyle Mahoney (E 76-150)

REFERENCE : A. Initial Request from NARS dated 10 May 1976 with attachments.
B. IPS Reply to NARS dated 24 June 1976.
C. Appeal Letter, 22 September 1976.

1. Summary of Recommendations: Sustain the initial determination to deny in toto TDCSDB-3/656,740, an intelligence report originated by Paris Station dated 19 September 1963 under exemption 5(B)(2) of Executive Order (E.O.) 11652, and add the claim of 5(B)(3) of E.O. 11652.

2. Background:

a. Richard Doyle Mahoney, a member of the public who is identified as a researcher, initiated on 8 January 1976 through the John F. Kennedy Library a mandatory review of TDCSDB-3/656,740 in accordance with the provisions of E.O. 11652, Section 5(C). The request for review was forwarded to IPS via the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) on 10 May 1976.

b. IPS responded to NARS on 24 June 1976. Among other things, CIA denied in toto TDCSDB-3/656,740, which was Item 9a on the NARS request, on the ground of Section 5(B)(2) of E.O. 11652. The

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

reply stated that the document had to remain classified indefinitely in order to protect intelligence sources and methods, and stated that release of segregable portions was not feasible. This was based upon a classification review by a knowledgeable officer with experience in French-African affairs, dated 24 May 1976.

c. Mr. Richard Doyle Mahoney appealed this determination directly to IPS in a letter dated 22 September 1976. He specifically asked if it would not be possible to release a sanitized version of the document without jeopardizing national security.

3. Recommendations:

a. See the Appeals Review Forms for specific detailed recommendations.

b. A second classification review was requested by DDO/ISS/PICG. The second review was conducted on TDCSDB-3/656,740 on 22 December 1976 by Europe Division, which decided to retain the classification at Secret in accordance with E.O. 11652. Europe Division determined after review that there were foreign policy and liaison sensitivities which precluded downgrading TDCSDB-3/656,740, or sterilizing the document and releasing portions thereof, at this time. Specifically the report describes in a critical and subjective way various French governmental entities and French personalities living and dead. The knowledge by the current French government that this particular information, or general information of this same type, had been circulated at high levels of the U.S. government would be detrimental to current U.S./French foreign relations. Further, one of the individuals mentioned is a former French intelligence operative and cabinet officer. Relations with the French liaison services are presently reasonably good, and disclosure of information of this sort would undoubtedly have a detrimental effect on future U.S. relations with French liaison services, as well as a probable spill-over effect on U.S./French foreign relations.

CONFIDENTIAL When
Detached From
Attachments

c. Europe Division determined that it was also necessary to protect sources and methods: The source is currently active, and access to information in the document about the French security service was sufficiently limited that current disclosure of that information would in fact be likely to point the finger of suspicion at a relatively small group of potential sources, one of whom is source. Failure to protect this source would in turn jeopardize CIA relations with current and future sources.

d. The undersigned appeals and litigation Officer agrees with this position.

4. Mr. Lavery of OGC has not yet concurred in these recommendations.

Mack E. Wood, Jr.
Mack E. Wood, Jr.
DDO Appeals Officer

Attachments:
  Tab A = References A-C
  Tab B = Full Text of TDCSDB-3/656,7?0

COORDINATION: DATE

X EUR/EXO William W. Phelps 7 Jan 77

E-76-150
NLK 76-321

September 22, 1976

LOS/APPEAL
E 76-150

Information Review Committee
c/o Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Information Review Committee:

Under the provisions of Executive Order 11652, I would like to appeal the CIA's decision to exempt document 9a or any of its portions thereof from being declassified. NLK-76-321.

As the Agency has done with some many of my declassification requests, would it not be possible to release a sanitized version of the document without jeopardizing national security?

I look forward to receiving your reply and thank you for your consideration of this and previous appeals.

Sincerely,

Richard Doyle Mahoney
John F. Kennedy Library
380 Trapelo Road
Waltham, Mass. 02154

F-25331

[illegible]/78 14 Sept 61

D-[illegible] CONFIDENTIAL

ST LOUIS OFFICE [illegible]

FROM SUPPORT ([illegible])

SUBJECT: EE-7833

YOUR SL-61-735

WE HAVE CHECKED THE CUBAN DESK AND COVER GROUP, DD/P, THE OFFICE OF SECURITY AND [illegible] [illegible] REFERENCE. NONE OF THESE OFFICES HAS ANY INFORMATION ON THE AMERICAN VOLUNTEERS ORGANIZATION COUNCIL.

S-25331

9

CONFIDENTIAL

F-25331

SL-61-725
1 September 1961

Chief, Contact Division
Attn: Support

Chief, St. Louis Office

John Mavrakos - Contributions to American Volunteers Organization Council

USE-S-25331

A 25331 USE S-2533

1. Martin Webb, a St. Louis official of the Internal Revenue Service and an uncleared contact of this office, asked us for any information we might have on the American Volunteers Organization Council and, specifically, any information we might have concerning its reputation, bona fides, etc. This call was stimulated by an inquiry from John Mavrakos, 15 Fair Oaks, Clayton, Missouri, a wealthy St. Louis candy manufacturer with offices at 4711 Delmar Blvd., St. Louis, Mo. Mavrakos is of Greek extraction and is an uncleared and inactive source of this office.

S-3281

2. Mavrakos has apparently been asked to contribute charitable donations to the American Volunteers Organization Council, which in turn distributes funds in Greece for unknown purposes. Mavrakos attempted to locate the address of the American Volunteers Organization Council, which he had been told was in New York, without any success. He thereupon phoned the St. Louis Internal Revenue office about the matter.

3. Since this exercise resembles an Agency funding operation we checked our files immediately for correspondence on the subject but found none. It is also conceivable that this may be a DD/P operation that did not pass through our hands. Can you check on the matter?

LOUIS WERNER

LWerner/mr

COPY FILED IN JACKET #32815

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

76 007

31 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

SUBJECT : Elaine Fuller

REFERENCE : F75-4057

The FBI forwarded for our review two documents entitled "Cuban Travel Machine Listings." Release of these documents is denied under (b)(1)(b), (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6), FOIA. (CSCI-316/02690-70 undated and CSCI-316/00515 dated April 1971.)

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 001217

CON[illegible]

Administrative - Internal Use Only

4 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

SUBJECT: Elaine Fuller

REFERENCE: Request No. 75-4057

This Directorate does maintain an official file on Subject. A review of this file and other records of this Directorate reveal the following information identifiable with requester.

a. Seven documents originating with the FBI. Please forward these document descriptions to the FBI so they can correspond directly with the requester.

(1). Subject: Venceremos Brigade
Date: 7 January 1970
Origin of Report: Washington, D.C.
No Bureau File Number or Field File Number provided.

(2). Subject: Marian Elaine Fuller
Date: 10 June 1970
Origin: Washington, D.C.
No Bureau File Number of Field File Number provided.

(3). Subject: Committee of Returned Volunteers
Date: 12 June 1970
Origin: New York City
File Number: 100-447724

(4). Subject: Marian Elaine Fuller
Date: 30 September 1970
Origin: Washington, D.C.
No Bureau File Number or Field File Number provided.

(5). Subject: Marian Elaine Fuller
Date: 27 April 1971
Origin: Washington, D.C.
File Number: 100-47256

Administrative - Internal Use Only

(6). Subject: Marian Elaine Fuller
Date: 30 June 1972
Origin: Washington, D.C.
File Number: 100-47256

(7). Subject: Marian Elaine Fuller
Date: 12 October 1972
Origin: Washington, D.C.
No Bureau File Number or Field File Number provided.

b. One INS report entitled "Sugar Cane Cutters Returning from Cuba," dated 29 April 1970, originating in Portland, Maine. A copy of this document is attached for referral to the Immigration and Naturalization Service so they can correspond directly with the requester.

c. Three documents originating with this Agency, of which sanitized versions are attached. Further descriptions are as follows:

(1). Name Trace Request dated 12 November 1968, exempt per (b)(3)(a)(sources and methods), (b)(6)(privacy) and (b)(1)(properly classified) of the Freedom of Information Act, as amended.

(2). Memorandum dated 21 November 1968, exempt per (b)(3)(b)(CIA Act of 1949) and (b)(1) (properly classified) of the Freedom of Information Act, as amended.

(3). Cable dated 20 February 1970, exempt per (b)(3)(b)(CIA Act of 1949) and (b)(1)(properly classified) of the Freedom of Information Act, as amended.

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

JUL 28 7 27 AM '75

22 July, 1975

4401 Pine St.
Philadelphia, Pa. 19104

IRS 75-4057

Robert S. Young
Coordinator, Freedom of Information Act
CIA
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Robert Young

I am writing pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552, et seq., to request that you provide me with any and all records, documents, memoranda, letters and any information of any type or kind and in any form concerning me that is on file, in the possession of, accessible to, or maintained by your agency. If for any reason you decide not to forward to me any of the information that I have hereby requested, I further request that you identify the nature of the information withheld and the reasons for your action.

I presently reside at 4401 Pine St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104. I was born on 6 July, 1942. My social security number is 416-60-7822.

I ask you to waive any fees according to the Act which permits it when the request "is in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the public." I think this is the case.

As provided in the amended Act, I expect to receive a reply within 10 working days.

Sincerely,

Elaine Fuller

Elaine Fuller

17 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Information Review Committee
ATTENTION : Mr. H. G. Bean, Assistant for Information
SUBJECT : FOIA Appeal--Elaine Fuller (75-4057)
REFERENCES : A. Initial Request dated 22 July 1975.
B. IPS Reply dated 19 March 1976.
C. Appeal Letter Received 26 April 1976.

1. Summary of Recommendations:

a. Sustain initial determination to deny in toto to requester two DDO originated documents under exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6) of FOIA. Remove (b)(6) from one document; add exemption (b)(2) to both documents. (Tabs B-5 and B-6).

b. Release additional information in three DDO originated documents previously released in sanitized form--excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(6) of the FOIA, as appropriate. (Tabs B-1 thru B-3).

c. Correct the names of the deciding officials in the appeal response to requester.

d. Advise requester that document B-5 supercedes document B-6 and contains the exact same information.

e. IPS advise FBI that document B-5 supercedes document B-6 and that the latter should be destroyed to avoid duplicate referrals in the future.

f. Correct dates on documents B-5 and 6.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL When
Detached From
Attachments

2. Background:

a. On 22 July 1975, Ms. Elaine Fuller wrote to CIA and requested all and any information concerning her maintained by CIA under the FOIA. She provided some biographic information and asked that any fees be waived.

b. On 15 December 1975, IPS/DDA advised DDO that two documents concerning Ms. Fuller had been referred to CIA by the FBI.

c. On 19 March 1976, IPS wrote to Ms. Fuller and enclosed sanitized versions of four documents, three of which were DDO documents. Deletions had been made under (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6) of the FOIA. Two additional DDO documents (those referred by the FBI) were denied in toto under the same exemptions. The exemptions were explained, the denying officials were identified by name, and Ms. Fuller was advised of her right to appeal. Ms. Fuller was also advised that FBI and INS originated material was being referred to the FBI and INS for their direct response to her request. [N.B. When IPS listed the four documents they erroneously listed the Deputy Director of Security as denying document 1 and Chief, Services Staff as responsible for documents 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. In fact, the Deputy Director of Security was the denying official of document 4 and Chief, Services Staff for documents 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. OGC should point out and correct this error in their letter to requester].

d. In an undated letter received by CIA on 26 April 1976, Ms. Fuller appealed the decisions pursuant to subsection (a)(6) of the FOIA.

3. Recommendations:

a. Tabs B-1 thru B-3, B-5, and B-6 contain the documents constituting the DDO appeals review. Please refer to these tabs for my recommendations concerning individual documents.

CONFIDENTIAL When Detached From Attachments

b. As stated in Paragraph 2c above, I recommend that OGC, in their letter to requester, correct the previous error in identifying the deciding officials.

c. Document B-6 is a CSCI that transmits an accumulative machine listing to the FBI. This document is updated periodically and previous listings should be destroyed. Document B-5 is the updated and final machine listing for 1970 and superceded document B-6 which should have been destroyed. I recommend that OGC advise requester that document B-5 supercedes document B-6 and contained the exact same information. I further recommend that IPS draw this matter to the attention of the FBI so future duplicate referrals may be avoided.

d. A classification review of the five documents listed in Tab B has been conducted. The documents are properly marked and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 11652, as amended. All non-exempt information has been identified and recommended for release to requester.

e. The FBI and INS documents pertaining to Subject located in DDO files have been referred in writing to the respective agencies for their direct response to requester. (See Tab C).

4. Mr. Bill Ashbaugh of OGC has concurred in these recommendations.

Louis J. Dube
DDO Appeals Officer

Attachments:
- Tab A = References A-C
- Tab B = Documents B1,B2,B3,B5, and B6
- Tab C = NIS & FBI Referral Letters

Working Copy

Elaine Fuller
4401 Pine St.
Philadelphia, Pa. 19104

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Gene Wilson,

On 23 March, 1976 I received some material on myself from your files which only partially answered my request for information. Your letter indicated that an appeal should be directed to you. This letter consitutes that appeal pursuant to subsection (a) (6) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).

As provided for in the Act, I will expect to receive a reply within 20 working days.

Sincerely,

Elaine Fuller

Elaine Fuller

APR 26 7 55 AM '76

CONFIDENTIAL

18 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

FROM : Frederick C. Randall
Chief, ISS/Policy and Information
Coordination Group

SUBJECT : American Volunteer Group; American Voluntary Guerrillas; Alternate Voluntary Government; requested by Terry Catchpole

REFERENCE : Request No. F-77-147

Subject organizations have been checked with all components that might have an interest or a record. The search revealed no records in this Directorate pertaining to subject organizations.

Frederick C. Randall

JS

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 012126

F-77-147 JE (pls ack)

919 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611
312 649-0800

Log/F

cy sent A/DCI

March 7, 1977

DDO
OS
OCR?

Freedom of Information Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir,

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act as amended (5U.S.C. Section 552).

Briefly, my request is for information that may be in your files pertaining to a U.S. paramilitary organization known variously as the American Volunteer Group, American Voluntary Guerrillas or Alternate Voluntary Government (all AVG).

As you know, the amended Freedom of Information Act provides that if some parts of a file are exempt from release, "reasonably segregable" portions shall be provided. I therefore request that, if you determine that some of the requested information is exempt, you provide me immediately with the information that can be made available. Of course, I reserve my right to appeal any such decisions pertaining to "exempt" material.

I am prepared to pay reasonable costs for locating this information.

Cordially,

Terry Catchpole

Terry Catchpole,
Managing Editor

MAR 15 77

CONFIDENTIAL

10 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

FROM : Frederick C. Randall
Chief, Policy and Information Coordination Group

SUBJECT : Peter A. Schey Request - Ku Klux Klan, et al, at Camp Pendleton, California

REFERENCE : F 77-025

The files of this Directorate have been searched with regard to the listed organizations' connection with Camp Pendleton, California and the result is negative for each organization.

Frederick C. Randall

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

F-77-025 - EK
Pls acknowledge

cy sent A/DCI

LAW OFFICES OF
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO, INC.
SOUTHEAST OFFICE
3040 IMPERIAL AVENUE
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92102
(714) 239-9137

Ed K.:
Tell him that it
is most unlikely that
the CIA would
have any relevant
records, but,
if he persists in
his request, we'll
have to have
a fee deposit.

SPR

January 13, 1977.

Working Copy

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Fort George G. Meade
Md. 20755

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Washington D.C. 20350
Attn. OP-09B18

DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
Ds4A
Washington D.C. 20301

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Attn. Staff Secretary
Old Executive Office Building
Washington D.C. 20506

He had "my file" request 75-5938
EK

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
9th and Penn Ave. NW
Washington D.C. 20535

DIRECTOR
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Attn: SC (FOIA)
Washington D.C. 20301

JAN 17 4 35 PM '77

DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
Room 2C757. Pentagon,
Washington D.C. 20301

CIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COORDINATOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCY AGENCY
Washington D.C. 20505

RE: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act as amended (5 U.S.C. §552).

I am writing this letter on behalf of myself and Dr. Carlton Goodlett and Reporter Publications.

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, as amended by Pub. L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, we wish to obtain access to and the opportunity to copy the following documents:

1. All directives, memoranda, letters, orders, reports, investigations, studies or other records, including written memoranda of telephone conversations, which relate to the formation, existence, activities, operations, membership, size or presence of any of the following organizations at Camp Pendleton Marine Base, California:

✓ a. Ku Klux Klan;
✓ b. California Ku Klux Klan;
✓ c. United Klans;
✓ d. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan;
✓ e. United Klans of America;
✓ f. Southern Ku Klux Klan;
✓ g. White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan;
✓ h. White Brotherhood;
✓ i. United Klans of America Knights of the Ku Klux Klan;
✓ j. Minutemen;
✓ K. Secret Army Organization;
✓ l. Christian Crusade Church;
✓ m. American Rangers;
✓ n. Invisible Empire of the Ku Klux Klan;
✓ o. Christian Defense League;
✓ p. The National States Rights Party;
✓ q. California Anti-Communist League;
✓ r. Christian National Alliance;
✓ s. American Volunteers Group;
✓ t. Provisional National Government of the U.S.A.;
✓ u. American Nazi Party;
✓ v. National Socialist White Peoples Party;
✓ w. Leagion of Justice;
✓ x. Operation Unicorn-And other similar groups.

2. All directives, memoranda, letters, orders, reports, investigations, studies, or other records, including written memoranda of telephone conversations, which relate to the foundation, existence, activities, operations, size, membership or presence of any of the organizations named in No. 1 above in the United States Marine Corp.

3. All directives, letters, memoranda, orders, reports, investigations or other records which describe, analyze or otherwise relate to rascism at Camp Pendleton Marine Base.

Page 3 (continued)

4. All directives, letters, memoranda, orders, reports, investigations or other records which describe, analyze or otherwise relate to rascism in the United States Marine Corp.

Since none of the statutory exemptions from the Freedom of Information Act's mandatory disclosure provision applies, access to the requested records should be granted within ten (10) working days.

In the unlikely event, however, that access is denied to any part of the requested records, please describe the deleted material in detail and specify the statutory basis for the denial as well as your reasons for believing that the alleged statutory justification exists in this case. Please also state your reasons for not invoking your discretionary power to release the requested documents in the public interest.

We also request that you waive any applicable fees since disclosure will meet the statutory standard for such waiver in that it would clearly be "in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public". 5 U.S.C.A. §552(a)(4)(A).

Should any procedural problem arise as to this request, please call me (collect) at (714) 233-5463.

We await your prompt reply.

Peter A. Schey
Attorney at Law

TERESA ORTIZ
My Commission Exp. Oct. 7, 1978

PAS:pcn.

Subscribed and sworn to before me on January 14, 1977.

Teresa Ortiz
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

LAW OFFICES OF
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO, INC.
SOUTHEAST OFFICE
3040 IMPERIAL AVENUE
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92102
(714) 239-9137

January 13, 1977

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Fort George G. Meade
Md. 20755

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Washington D.C. 20350
Attn. OP-09B18

COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORP.
Department of the Navy
Washington D.C. 20350

DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
DS4A
Washington D.C. 20301

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Attn. Staff Secretary
Old Executive Office Building
Washington D.C. 20506

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
9th and Penn. Ave. NW
Washington D.C. 20535

DIRECTOR
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Attn: SC (FOIA)
Washington D.C. 20301

DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
Room 2C757, Pentagon,
Washington DC 20301

CIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COORDINATOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington D.C. 20505

RE: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This letter is written on behalf of the following persons and organizations:

William Bishop, 6202 Capestone, Dallas, Texas, Date of Birth, (DOB) September 4, 1953.
Gregory Coffee, 1521 Wellstone Place, St. Louis, Mo. (DOB) November 5, 1955.
Eddie Page, Jr., Bay Springs, Mississippi, (DOB) November 1, 1956.
D.R. Hunter, 2715 Drewry Lane, North Carolina, (DOB) September 13, 1954.
Ricky McGilvery, 6202 Capestone, Dallas, Texas, (DOB) February 28, 1957.
William Spencer, 511 Henry Place, High Point, N.C. (DOB) August 27, 1953.
H. Fletcher, 2222 Superior, Detroit, Mich., (DOB) April 19, 1953.
Clarence Capers, 209 Powder Mill Lane, Edgewater Park, Phil. (DOB) October 7, 1955.
Anthony Matthews, 3904 E. 155th, Cleveland, Ohio, (DOB) August 26, 1957.
Dr. Carlton Goodlett, President, National Newspaper Publishers Association - Black Press of America, 1366 Turk Street, San Francisco, CA 94115.
Reporter Publications, 1366 Turk Street, San Francisco, CA 94115.
Military Law Office, National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco, CA.

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, as amended by Pub. L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, they wish to obtain access to and the opportunity to copy the following documents:

I. All directives, memoranda, letters, orders, reports, investigations, studies or other records, including written memoranda of telephone conversations, which relate to the formation, existence, activities, operations, membership, size or presence of any of the following organizations at Camp Pendleton Marine Base, California:

a. Ku Klux Klan;
b. California Ku Klux Klan;
c. United Klans;
d. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan;
e. United Klans of America;
f. Southern Ku Klux Klan;
g. White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan;
h. White Brotherhood;
i. United Klans of America Knights of the Ku Klux Klan;
j. Minutemen;
k. Secret Army Organization;
l. Christian Crusade Church;
m. American Rangers;
n. Invisible Empire of the Ku Klux Klan;
o. Christian Defense League;

Page 3 (continued)

p. The National States Rights Party;
q. California Anti-Communist League;
r. Christian National Alliance;
s. American Volunteers Group;
t. Provisional National Government of the U.S.A.;
u. American Nazi Party;
v. National Socialist White Peoples Party;
w. Leagion of Justice;
x. Operation Unicorn-And other similar groups.

2. All directives, memoranda, letters, orders, reports, investigations, studies, or other records, including written memoranda of telephone conversations, which relate to the foundation, existence, activities, operations, size, membership or presence of any of the organizations named in No. 1 above in the United States Marine Corp.

3. All directives, letters, memoranda, orders, reports, investigations or other records which describe, analyze or otherwise relate to rascism at Camp Pendleton Marine Base.

4. All directives, letters, memoranda, orders, reports, investigations or other records which describe, analyze or otherwise relate to rascism in the United States Marine Corp.

Since none of the statutory exemptions from the Freedom of Information Act's mandatory disclosure provision applies, access to the requested records should be granted within ten (10) working days.

In the unlikely event, however, that access is denied to any part of the requested records, please describe the deleted material in detail and specify the statutory basis for the denial as well as your reasons for believing that the alleged statutory justification exists in this case. Please also state your reasons for not invoking your discretionary power to release the requested documents in the public interest.

We also request that you waive any applicable fees since disclosure will meet the statutory standard for such waiver in that it would clearly be "in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public". 5 U.S.C.A. §552(a)(4)(A).

Should any procedural problem arise as to this request, please call me (collect) at (714) 233-5463.

We await your prompt reply.

Peter A. Schey
Attorney at Law

10 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

SUBJECT: Andrew Scott Berman

REFERENCE: A. Request No. 75-4508
B. OS Referral dated 8 December 1975

1. This Directorate maintains a file on Andrew Scott Berman. The following paragraphs describe the results of a review of this file and the other record holdings of this Directorate.

2. There are six FBI documents identifiable to Mr. Berman. Attached is a list of the descriptive data for these documents that should be referred to the FBI for their determination.

3. The following documents may not be passed to Mr. Berman:

Document and Date	Exemption
Cable, 12 July 1970	(b)(1)(liaison), (b)(3), (b)(6)
Dispatch, 28 July 1970	" " " "
Dispatch, 6 August 1970	" " " "
Cable, 20 February 1970	" " " "
Dispatch, 18 May 1970	" " " "
Cable, 16 May 1972	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL

4. The document referred to this Directorate by the Office of Security should be returned to them for their review. The document concerned is a list of names of people who traveled to Cuba to cut sugar cane, dated 18 May 1973. For futher guidance on this list, please see DDO/PIC memorandum, dated 5 March 1976, Subject: Documents Relating to the Venceremos Brigade.

/s/ Charles A. Briggs

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

Attachment: A/S

cc: OPS/ITG
LA

2837 N. Cambridge
Chicago, Illinois 60657
August 2, 1975

AUG 6 3 01 PM '75

Robert S. Young
reedom of Information Coordinator
entral Intelligence Agency
shington DC 20505

IRS 75-4508

ear Mr. Young,

nder the provisions of 5 USC 552, the Freedom of Information Act,
request access to, and copies of all files and documents main-
ained by the CIA relating to myself.

he material I seek includes, but is not limited to, dossiers, card
iles, microfilm files, microfiche files, and all computerized data
nd references maintained by the CIA. This request also encompasses
ny photographs and fingerprint files which you may have.

f, perchance, you rule that portions of these files are "reasonably
egregable" I request copies of the remaining material and reserve
y right to appeal any such deletions.

f, perchance, this request is denied in whole or in part, please
nform me of the appropriate appeals procedure.

f deletions are made, please cite the statutory justification for
ach deleted item.

am submitting my full name, date and place of birth and Social
ecurity Number. I am prepared to pay a reasonable fee for the
reproduction of this material.

s required by 5 USC 552, I expect to hear from you within 10
orking days.

Sincerely yours,

Andrew Scott Berman

Andrew Scott Berman
SS# 059-36-7504
Born: Brooklyn, NY
March 17, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

5 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

SUBJECT: Documents ~~Relating~~ to the Venceremos Brigade

1. This Directorate is unable to locate or to acknowledge origin of the following reports contained in the files of the Office of Security:

a. The Venceremos Brigade - a Report - 31 May 1970.

b. List of names of People Who Traveled to Cuba to Cut Sugar Cane - dated 18 May 1963. We therefore decline to rule on the releaseability of these two documents on FOIA and PA requests, and ask that these documents not be referred to us for action.

2. From the portions forwarded in connection with specific requests, there would appear to be no reason for denying the information. We defer, however, to OS for a final judgement.

Frederick C. Randall
(signed)
Frederick C. Randall
DDO/PIC

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

P176

77

27 October 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff (U)

FROM : Robert E. Owen (U)
DDO Information Review Officer

SUBJECT : Anne Pitt (U)

REFERENCE : P-77-0140 (U)

(U) A search of the DDO records systems has produced nine documents whose recommended disposition is as follows:

a. (U) Six documents are denied in toto. (Tab A, Document Nos. 1-6).

b. (U) Document Nos. 7 and 8 should be referred to the FBI; and Document No. 9 should be referred to the Department of State. (Tab B)

Robert E. Owen (U)

Attachments: a/s
cc: ISS/IPG/SCB (U)

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
When Detached from Attachments

2 012170

SECRET

[illegible]

Log/P
C

F-P-77-0140/DM

Mungers Mill Road
Silver Springs, N.Y. 14550
January 4, 1977

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

JAN 27 [illegible]

Dear People at the C.I.A.,

My name is Ann Pitt. I live at Mungers Mill Road, Silver Springs New York, in Wyoming County. I was born on August 30, 1943, in Bronx County, New York. I am requesting under the Freedom of Information Act all information pertaining to me in your Agency files and records.

Yours truly,
Ann Pitt
Ann Pitt

I, Ann Pitt, affirm that all information provided above pertaining to myself is correct.

On this 4th day of January before me personally appeared Ann Pitt, to me known to be the individual mentioned in & who ~~[illegible]~~ signed the foregoing letter, & acknowledged to me she executed the same.

RICHARD IRELAND, Notary Public
State of New York, Wyoming County
Commission Expires March 30, 19[illegible]
Richard Ireland

CONFIDENTIAL

20 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

SUBJECT: A Quaker Action Group

REFERENCE: Request No. F 76-211

1. A review of the files of this Directorate revealed the documents discussed below concerning Subject.

2. Documents which may be released in their entirety consist of twenty-four overt items; copies attached. (Documents 1-24)

3. One document dated July 1971 may not be released; it is exempt under (b)(1) and (b)(3)(liaison), FOIA. (Document 25)

4. One memorandum dated 8 November ~~1976~~ 1967 (Document 26) consists entirely of a direct quote from an FBI report dated 30 May 1967, Washington, D. C.; Subject: Protest Activity in Washington, D. C., By A Quaker Action Group Beginning May 26, 1967; no file. This report should be referred to the FBI for release. — exceptions of this

5. In addition there are eighty-seven other FBI documents which are not being listed since your office has advised that the FBI also has a request on Subject. (Documents 27-114.)

[illegible] Briggs

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

Attachments: A/S

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL

Congressional Record for John Irvin Jr. [illegible] pleaded no contest [illegible]
about 23 minutes [illegible]

105 (F)

4401 Pine Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
March 22, 1976

Robert S. Young
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

F 76-211

MAR 29 9 13 AM '76

Dear Sir:

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, et. seq., on behalf of A Quaker Action Group (AQAG). We, the undersigned, were the authorized officers at the time of the dissolution of the organization.

We request that you provide us with any and all records, documents, memoranda, letters, or any other type of kind of information concerning our group that is currently on file, in possession of, or maintained by your agency.

The full name of the organization is A Quaker Action Group. It was also known by its initials, AQAG. The organization was established in 1966 and existed until 1971. The main office was maintained at 20 South 12th Street in Philadelphia, PA.

If for any reason you determine not to forward to us any of the information that we have hereby requested, we further request that you identify the nature of the information withheld and the reasons for your actions.

As you know, the amended Act permits you to reduce or waive the fees if that "is in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the public." We believe that this request plainly fits that category and ask you to waive any fees.

As provided for in the amended Act, we will expect to receive a reply within 10 days.

Sincerely,

Susan D. Levering
Susan D. Levering

George Willoughby

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

FROM : Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

SUBJECT : George Willoughby for "A Quaker Action Group"

REFERENCE : A. OS Referral
B. Request No. F 76-211

The dispatch dated 18 April 1968, referred to this Directorate by the Office of Security has been reviewed. Release of the document to Mr. Willoughby is denied under exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA.

/s/ Charles A. Briggs

Charles A. Briggs

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

SECRET

29 September 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Information Review Committee (U)

ATTENTION : Mr. H. G. Bean, Assistant for Information (U)

SUBJECT : FOIA Appeal - George Willoughby
(IPS F 76-211) (U)

REFERENCES : A. Initial Request Letter, 22 March 1976 (U)
B. IPS Response, 20 July 1976 (U)
C. Appeal Letter, 23 August 1976 (U)

1. (U) Summary of Recommendations:

a. Sustain initial denial in toto of two DDO documents under exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(6), as applicable. (Tabs 3 and 4).

b. Release portions of ten DDO documents found during the appeals review, citing exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(6), as applicable, for the deletions. (Tabs 5-14).

c. Deny in toto one DDO document located during the appeals review, citing exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(6) as the justification. (Tab 15).

d. Refer a list of 88 FBI Documents to the FBI for review and direct response. (Tab 16).

e. Refer one Department of the Army document to them for review and direct response. (Tab 17).

f. Five NSA-originated items have been referred to NSA for review. (Tab 18).

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012132

CONFIDENTIAL When
Detached From
Attachments

SECRET

2. (U) Background:

a. Subject submitted a request under FOIA, on 22 March 1976, for any and all information the Agency held on "A Quaker Action Group" also known as "AQAG." In the 20 July 1976 initial response, 24 newspaper clippings and one leaflet were released to him; two documents were denied.

b. On 23 August 1976 Subject appealed, requesting that further information be released to him on the group.

c. During the appeals review 11 additional documents were located and are included in the recommendations below. These documents were not considered during the initial review since they were not considered to meet the criteria for "records" extant at that time and they contained only incidental references to the subject of the request.

d. During the appeals review we were unable to identify any Air Force documents concerning the subject of this request. The requester should be told that this was apparently an error.

e. During the appeals review we were unable to identify any Department of State documents concerning A Quaker Action Group. Two State documents located, and possibly referred to in the initial response, do not concern A Quaker Action Group. The requestor should be informed that this was also apparently an error.

3. (C) Recommendations:

a. My specific recommendations are shown on the Appeals Review Form attached to each document. A classification review has been conducted and all documents are considered properly classified and marked in accordance with E.O. 11652, as amended.

b. I recommend that the two documents denied in toto under the initial review continue to be denied. One of them (Tab 3) could identify a still active and sensitive source. The other (Tab 4) was obtained through a sensitive operation conducted jointly by American and German authorities.

c. I recommend that portions of ten additional documents located during the appeals review be released. Exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(6) should be cited, as applicable, to the denied portions. Specific recommendations on each of these documents is reflected in the attached Appeals Review Forms. (Tabs 5-14).

d. One additional document located during the appeals review should be denied in toto, since it was received from a foreign liaison service. (Tab 15).

e. 88 FBI documents located during the initial review, but not referred to the FBI, should be referred to the FBI in writing for review and direct response. These documents are listed under Tab 16.

f. One Department of the Army document should be referred in writing to them for review and direct response. The title page and a description of the document are attached as Tab 17.

g. Five items from NSA have been referred to them by IPS for review. (Tab 18).

h. Several other documents turned up during both the initial review and the appeals review should be considered not responsive to the request since they refer to the generic term "Quakers" but not to "A Quaker Action Group" as specified in the request. (Tab 19).

4. (U) Mrs. Devine of OGC has concurred in the above recommendations.

Richard D. Wagner
Richard D. Wagner
DDO Appeals Officer (U)

Attachments:
  Tab A - Initial Letter
  Tab B - IPS Response
  Tab C - Appeal Letter
  Tabs 3-19 - See Review Forms

COORDINATION

DATE

EA/OEM/FOI [illegible]

ISS/IPG/SCR P. Haefner 30/9/77

EUR/EXO 3 oct 77

CONFIDENTIAL

DO/SS # [illegible]

16 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Staff

SUBJECT: Phillip A. Singerman

REFERENCE: Request No. 75-801

1. This Directorate maintains a personality dossier on Phillip A. Singerman. A review of this file and other records of this Directorate reveal the following information pertinent to Subject:

a. A few FBI documents, which are excluded under 1900.3 (g)(4) of the Federal Register. The office that maintains the information on Subject is unable to further identify these documents.

b. Overt information provided by a joint Department of the Army and foreign liaison operation abroad. This material is considered exempt under 5B (1) of E.O. 11652 and 1900.3 (g)(4) and (3) of the Federal Register.

c. Two Agency dispatches based on information from unilateral and liaison sources abroad concerned Subject's travel to Cuba. This material is considered exempt under (b)(3) of FOIA and 5B (1) of E.O. 11652.

d. One memorandum to the FBI reported Subject's travel as mentioned in paragraph 1.c. above. This material is considered exempt for reason stated in paragraph 1.c. above.

2. Form 3533 is attached.

/s/ Charles A. Briggs

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

Attachment:
Form 3533

CONFIDENTIAL

IRS 75-801

5 Hughes Place, H-9
New Haven, Conn. 06511
April 1, 1975

Freedom of Information Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Gentlemen:

The Office of the Deputy Attorney General referred me to you. I formally request to see any and all information the CIA has about me. My name is Phillip Allan Singerman; I was born on August 23, 1944 in Dade County, Florida; my social security number is 10734-3941.

Thank you

Phillip Singerman
Phillip A. Singerman

cc. Office of Congressman Toby Moffitt

APR 8 1 52 PM '75

SECRET

30 [illegible] 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Information Review Committee

ATTENTION: Mr. H.G. Bean, Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: FOIA Appeal - Philip A. Singerman

REFERENCES:
a. Request from Mr. Singerman dated 1 April 1975
b. OPS/ITG Memo dated 14 May 1975
c. DO/SS #75-340 dated 16 May 1975
d. IRS 75-801 dated 30 May 1975
e. Appeal from Mr. Singerman dated 26 June 1975
f. OPS/ITG Memo dated 15 July 1975

1. The initial request and subsequent appeal by Mr. Singerman, the Agency's correspondence to him, and the documents that pertain to Mr. Singerman have been reviewed and the documents involved are as follows:

a. B-561, 11 August 1969

b. HMMA-37509, 10 July 1969

c. HMMA-37416, 23 June 1969

d. Headquarters 876, 24 June 1969

e. MEXICO CITY 329, 23 June 1969

f. MEXICO CITY 330, 24 June 1969

g. EX-3663, 24 October 1969

h. TH-559888, 28 August 1969

2. Items a., b., and c. from the list in paragraph 1. were the basis of the initial response and denial to Mr. Singerman (Reference d.). Items d. and e. do not mention Mr. Singerman by name but are relative and are included for background information. The documents f., g. and h. did not become available until after the initial response to Mr. Singerman and therefore were not considered in that reply.

3. On the basis of our review, we believe items a., b. and c. were properly exempted in accord with (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA and 5B(1) of E.O. 11652. This was reported to Mr. Singerman in Reference d. on 30 May 1975.

[illegible]

Administrative-Internal Use Only
When Separated from Attachments

SECRET

Despite the detailed explanation provided Mr. Singerman, we note in his letter of appeal that he continues to seek a basis for the decision. With regard to these documents, we believe and agree that releasing them to Mr. Singerman would violate protection of sensitive sources and methods. The original denial is correct and should be upheld by the Information Review Committee.

4. Our review of the remaining three documents (items f., g. and h.) has resulted in the following recommendations.

a. TH-559683. A passenger list which the Agency apparently obtained through foreign liaison (Canadian). The nature of the information, the passenger manifest of a Cuban controlled ship, does not permit segregating and releasing parts of the list to Mr. Singerman. We believe the document is exempt under (b)(1), (b)(3) of the FOIA and 5B(1) of E.O. 11652.

b. MEXICO CITY 330. Provides the same information as HMMA-37509 and is, therefore, exempt under the same exemptions cited in the original denial, i.e., (b)(1), (b)(3) and 5B(1).

c. EX-3663. We believe certain parts of this 25-page document can be segregated and released to Mr. Singerman. We agree with ITG on the selected portions that should be extracted for release (see attached marked copy). The balance of the document, however, must be considered exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6) of the FOIA.

5. In summary, it is recommended that the appeal be denied and the exemptions upheld on all the related documents as listed above except in the case of EX-3663. The selected portions should be sanitized and provided to Mr. Singerman. This recommendation has been discussed with Mr. Makowka of the OGC and he concurs with our decision.

/s/

Michael L. Cleffi
DDO Appeals Officer

Attachments: a/s

ISG/EXEC/MLCleffi:tcf
30 July 1975

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - OGC (Mr. Makowka)
1 - C/IRS
2 - DDO/FIO
1 - ISG, w/o atts.
1 - Chrono, w/o atts.

15 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Freedom of Information Officer, DDO

SUBJECT: Phillip A. Singerman

REFERENCE: IRS 75-801 (Appeal)
Request for Agency documents

1. Attached are the three Agency documents listed in our memorandum of 14 May 1975:

a. Agency dispatch HMMA-37416, dated 23 June 1969. This covering dispatch does not mention Subject by name; Subject's photograph was forwarded as an attachment to this dispatch. Two other attachments listing Subject's name on two flight manifests are not available here, but the reference to his travel from Mexico city to Cuba had been incorporated into a Special Channel memorandum to the FBI, B-561, dated 11 August 1969 (paragraph 1d of our 14 May memorandum).

b. Agency dispatch HMMA-37509, dated 10 July 1969 listed requestor as a traveler to Cuba and listed his passport number. It also forwarded a copy of his passport in an attachment which is not available here.

c. Special Channel Memorandum B-561, dated 11 August 1969 (see paragraph 1a above).

2. We believe that the above mentioned documents have been properly exempted in our 14 May memorandum under (b)(1) 5(B)(1) (foreign liaison, in this case, two sections of Mexican liaison) and (b)(3). The material is not segregable for release, as the nature of the information and its format are such that the requester could determine that the information concerning him was obtained by the Agency through surreptitious access to airline manifests and clandestine photography of passports of U.S. citizens. Release would thus violate protection of sensitive sources and methods (Mexican liaison and a unilateral agent).

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. One more document (not indexed into the 201 file or any other records of this office) has become available: Transmittal Manifest 599888, dated 28 August 1969, forwarded by COS, Ottawa. This manifest lists Subject among passengers arriving in Canada from Cuba. No covering dispatch was used and no source is given, but the information may be presumed to have been provided by foreign liaison (Canadian). The material is thus probably exempt under (b)(1), 5(B)(1) (foreign liaison), and is certainly exempt under (b)(3) (intelligence methods). The format and the nature of the information do not make it feasible to segregate and release it to Subject without making it possible for him to adduce the Agency had access to the passenger manifest of a Cuban controlled ship.

4. Attached is a segregable portion of internal Agency memorandum EX-3663, dated 24 October 1969. This document is a 25 page paper on the Committee of Returned Volunteers, and refers briefly to requestor, repeating in part the reference to requestor's travel as reported in HMMA-37509 (paragraph 1b above), but also includes the fact that he served in the Peace Corps. The excised portion of the document is considered exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

5. Also attached are copies of three additional Agency cables. Mexico City 330, dated 24 June 1969, is referred to in HMMA-37509 (paragraph 1b above), and provides the same information (except for copies of passports). The reference cited in this cable, in turn, is Headquarters 876, dated 24 June 1969, which requested that names and passports of groups traveling to Cuba be cabled, as the information was urgently needed for a paper being prepared for the White House. This cable in turn refers to Mexico City 329, dated 23 June 1969, which explains the reason for the investigation of requestor's foreign travels. Although Headquarters 876 and Mexico City 329 do not mention requestor by name they are attached for background information.

Alan P. White
Chief, International Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Attachments: a/s

CONFIDENTIAL

JUL 1 8 53 PM '75

[illegible] 75-801

June [illegible], 1975
8 [illegible] Place, B-9
New Haven, Conn. 06511

Mr. Robert S. Young
CIA Information Review Committee
CIA
Washington, D.C. 203950

Dear Sir:

This is in response to your letter of May 30 denying release of three documents in your files about my foreign travel.

I hereby appeal this decision. I would like to know the basis for this decision. I wish to advise you that I am seeking the advice of counsel.

Sincerely,
Phillip A. Singerman
Phillip A. Singerman

cc. Congressman Toby Moffett

CONFIDENTIAL

12 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

SUBJECT: Carl Oglesby

REFERENCE: Request No. 75-1161

1. This Directorate maintains an official file on Subject. A review of this file and other records reveals the following information pertinent to Subject:

a. Twenty-nine FBI documents. See attached listing.

b. Five Agency documents (one cable and three dispatches) concerned Subject's travel and activities abroad and transmitted information from foreign liaison. One special channel (B) memorandum forwarded material provided by foreign liaison to the FBI. All of this material is considered exempt under FOIA, (b)(1), foreign liaison and (b)(3).

c. Five Agency documents (one cable, three dispatches, and one field information report) referred to Subject's travels and activities abroad. The nature of the information could identify the source if it were released. One RL memorandum, one special channel (B) memorandum and one CSCI memorandum forwarded this information to the FBI. One CSCI memorandum forwarded a report to the U. S. Intelligence Community. All of this material is considered exempt under (b)(3), sources and methods and (b)(1) properly classified.

d. One agency dispatch forwarded information on Subject's activities abroad provided by a U. S. military source. This material is exempt under FOIA (b)(1) properly classified and (b)(3), sources and methods.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL

e. Four internal office memoranda (EX) pertained to Subject's travels, contacts and activities. The source of three of these was information from the FBI; the source of one of these was the Department of State memorandum to CIA dated 1 February 1971. All of these are exempt under FOIA (b)(3), sources and methods, and (b)(1).

f. One internal office memorandum contains a listing of Subject's foreign travel. It was taken from a composite of all-source information, including foreign government liaison sources and is considered exempt under FOIA (b)(3) and (b)(1).

g. One internal office (EX) memorandum concerning Subject's background and activities, which included material from the FBI, an Agency field information report from a unilateral source and an Agency dispatch forwarding information provided by a foreign liaison service. This memorandum is considered exempt under FOIA (b)(3) and (b)(1).

2. The following documents with sterilized segregable portions attached are considered releaseable to Subject under the FOIA.

a. CSCI memorandum dated 17 May 1968: excised portions exempt under FOIA (b)(6), personal privacy, (b)(3) and (b)(1).

b. Internal office (EX) memorandum dated 14 July 1967: excised portions exempt under FOIA (b)(6), personal privacy, (b)(3) and (b)(1).

c. Internal office memorandum (EX) dated 26 April 1968: excised portions exempt under FOIA (b)(6) personal privacy, (b)(3) and (b)(1).

d. Internal office memorandum (EX) dated 10 July 1967: excised portions exempt under FOIA (b)(6), personal privacy, (b)(3) and (b)(1).

e. Attachment to a dispatch dated 23 November 1970: excised portions exempt under (b)(6), personal privacy and (b)(1). Dispatch exempt under (b)(3) sources and methods and (b)(1).

f. Dispatch dated 15 November 1965; excised portions exempt under FOIA (b)(1) and (b)(3).

5. Attached are copies of three documents which may be used in obtaining reviews by the originating agencies:

a. Department of Army - ACSI-DSCC Memorandum dated 8 July 1966, Subject: Transmittal of Summaries of Information.

b. Department of State telegram Copenhagen 2014 dated 21 November 1967, Subject: Russell Tribunal Denmark: Highlights

c. Department of State memorandum dated 1 February 1971 from Director, Passport Office regarding Subject.

d. FBI. Cable from Director, FBI, dated 6 November 1968, Subject: Washington Mobilization Committee to End War in Vietnam.

/s/ Charles A. Briggs

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

Attachments: A/S

cc: OPS/ITG

CONFIDENTIAL

Identification of FBI documents mentioning Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr., IRS 75-1161, 30 April 1975.

1. Report dated 28 June 1965, Detroit, Michigan; (no file numbers) Subject: Communist Infiltration of Students for a Democratic Society
2. Report dated 16 August 1965, Detroit, Michigan; Subject: Carl Oglesby (no Bufile file #, no FOF #)
3. Report dated 8 October 1965, Detroit, Michigan; File # 100-33032, Bufile 105-142056; Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr. - Security Matter - SDS
4. Report dated 6 December 1965, Washington, D.C.; File # (IS) 105-142056 (no Bufile #) Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby - Security Matter - C
5. Report dated 17 May 1966, Washington, D.C.; Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby (no file #)
6. Report dated 17 May 1966, Washington, D.C.; Subject: International Days of Protest, March 25-26, 1966 (no file #)
7. Report dated 20 May 1966, Detroit, Michigan; Re: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr. (no file #)
8. Report dated 30 June 1966, Detroit, Michigan; File # 100-33032, Bufile 105-142056; Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr. - Security Matter - SDS
9. Report dated 14 September 1966, Detroit, Michigan; Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr. (no file #s)
10. Report Dated 27 October 1966, Detroit, Michigan; Bufile 105-142056, Field office file 100-23032; Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr. - Security Matter - Students for a Democratic Society
11. Report dated 28 October 1966, Detroit, Michigan; Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr. (no Bufile, no FOF #)

①

CONFIDENTIAL

12. Report dated 8 June 1967, Cincinnati, Ohio; Field office file CI 100-13602; Bufile 100-438262. Subject: Larry Wolf Rubin

13. Report dated 7 July 1967, Detroit, Michigan; (no file #s) Subject: Students for a Democratic Society

14. Report dated 22 September 1967, Detroit, Michigan; File # 105-11627; Bufile 62-110030. Subject: Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy

15. Report dated 7 December 1967, Phoenix, Arizona; (no file #s) Subject: Anti-draft activities December 4-8, 1967; Demonstration at Selective Service Hqs, Tucson, Arizona, December 4, 1967

16. Report dated 14 December 1967, Portland, Oregon; (no file #s) Subject: Antidraft Activities, Portland, Oregon

17. Report dated 11 December 1967, Cincinnati, Ohio; Field office file CI 100-15928; Bufile 105-142056. Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr. - Security Matter - SDS

18. Report dated 31 January 1968, Washington, D.C.; (no file #s) Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr. - Internal Security - CU.

19. Report dated 24 June 1968, Cincinnati, Ohio; Field office file CI 100-15928, Bufile 105-142056. Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr.

20. Report dated 10 October 1968, Washington, D.C., (no file #s) Subject: Foreign Travel - New Left Groups

21. Report dated 18 November 1968, Jacksonville, Florida; Field office file 105-1613 (no Bufile #) Subject: Philip E. Sanford

22. Report dated 12 December 1968, New York, N.Y.; Field office file 100-148047 (no Bufile #) Subject: Students for a Democratic Society - IS - SDS

23. Report dated 6 January 1969, San Francisco, Calif.; (no file #s) Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr.

[illegible]

24. Report dated 9 January 1969, Cincinnati, Ohio; Field office file CI 100-15928; Bufile 105-142056. Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr.

25. Report dated 10 February 1969, Washington, D.C.; (no file #s) Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby

26. Report dated 14 April 1969, San Francisco, Calif.; Field office file 100-53497; Bufile 105-142056. Subject: Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr. - Security Matter - SDS

27. Report dated 6 February 1970, Atlanta, Georgia; Field office file 100-7808; Bufile 105-178431. Subject: Lynn Barbara Wells (Oglesby on pg. 7)

---

28. Report dated 28 January 1966, Detroit, Michigan, Bufile 97-5029 field file 105-11615, Subject: Committee to Aid the Vietnamese.

---

29. Report dated 14 January 1966, Washington, D. C. no file numbers, Subject: Demonstrations Protesting United States Intervention in Vietnam.

Mr. Robert S. Young
Freedom of Information Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington

Dear Mr. Young,

Thank you for your letter of April 24, 1975, acknowledging my Freedom-of-Information request.

Here is the additional information you ask for:

Place of birth: Akron, Ohio

Date of birth: July 30, 1935

The FBI, in a similar reply to a similar request, also wanted my Social Security number, which you may also need. It is:

299-30-5954

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Carl Oglesby

Carl Oglesby

APR 29 7 50 AM '75

[redacted]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CITIZEN

April 11, 1975

12 Arnold Circle
Cambridge, Mass. 02139

Mr. Robert S. Young
CIA Freedom of Information Coordinator
CIA Hdqtrs
Langley, Va.

Dear Mr. Young,

Pursuant to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, please make available to me any materials or files the CIA may have collected and kept on my activities.

Sincerely,

Carl Oglesby

Carl Oglesby
Past President (1965)
Students for a Democratic Society

APR 16 4 11 AM '75

02 December 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Information Review Committee (U)

ATTENTION : Mr. H. G. Bean, Assistant for Information (U)

SUBJECT : FOIA Appeal - Mr. Carl Oglesby (F-75-1161) (U)

REFERENCES : A. Original Request dated 11 April 1975 (U)
B. IPS Response dated 19 February 1976 (U)
C. Appeal Letter dated 24 February 1976 (U)

1. (U) Summary of Recommendations:

a. Release additional information from six DDO documents initially released in segregated versions.

b. Release portions of eight DDO documents initially denied in toto.

c. Sustain the denial in toto of 13 DDO documents.

d. Release in toto nine news items and seven DDO documents discovered during the appeals review.

e. Deny in toto 15 DDO documents discovered during the appeals review.

f. Release segregated versions of two DDO documents discovered during the appeals review.

2. (U) Background:

a. Mr. Carl Oglesby on 11 April 1975 requested "any material or files the CIA may have collected and kept on my activities." The original DDO search surfaced 27 DDO documents, 29 FBI files, one FBI cable and three other-agency documents. IPS responded on 19 February 1976 releasing six of the DDO documents in segregated versions and denying the remaining 21. IPS advised Mr. Oglesby that the non-DDO documents were being referred to the originating agencies for direct response to him.

b. Mr. Oglesby appealed on 24 February 1976 requesting full release of all withheld data, and this triggered an additional search with the following results:

(1) Nine press items, not considered under earlier guidelines were located.

(2) As a result of an exchange of referrals between the DDO and the O/S, DDO accepted responsibility for five documents not located during the initial review--i.e. those covered by Tabs 28, 30, 32, 33 and 34.

(3) As a result of a Privacy Act request levied by Mr. Oglesby on the FBI, the latter referred three DDO memoranda, per P 76-180. Two of these--CSCI 316/02677-67 and CSCI 316/05757-67--had not previously surfaced, but the third had been handled initially under Tab 19(H). We informed the FBI we would handle the former two in the appeal.

(4) In addition to the documents discovered per (2) and (3), 17 DDO documents were located through re-checking files and running down references. These additions have resulted in a total of 51 DDO documents being treated in this appeal, an increase of 24 since the IPS response, and nine press items.

(5) Four EX memoranda--895, 1070, 2187 and 3363--were referred to the FBI on 5 October 1976 for coordination regarding FBI information therein. The FBI replied on 28 October 1976 regarding portions to be withheld and exemptions to be applied.

(6) FJTA-48,789 dated 6 December 1965 (Tab 20) was referred to the US Air Force on 5 October 1976 for coordination regarding Air Force data therein. The Air Force responded on 29 October 1976 releasing its input.

(7) Three FBI files, in addition to those unearthed during the initial search, were discovered. DBC-02629 and DBB-89223 were referred to the FBI on 5 October 1976 for direct contact with the requester, and DBD-24857 was similarly forwarded on 26 April 1977.

(8) Three State Department documents were forwarded to the Bureau of Public Affairs on 1 October 1976. Two of these were State memoranda addressed to the CIA. Passport called on 26 October 1976 to advise that both had already been referred earlier. The third document--Tab 21(D)--was cleared for release by the same telephone call.

c. A classification review has been conducted on all DDO documents involved in this appeal, and all have been marked to reflect this review. In those cases where segregation of non-exempt data has been possible, such has been identified and recommended for release to Mr. Oglesby. In those cases where the documents have been denied in toto, meaningful segregation of non-exempt data pertaining to him has not been feasible.

3. (U) Recommendations: See Tabs 12-48.

4. (U) This memorandum has as yet not been coordinated with Mr. Ziebell of the Office of the General Counsel.

Winthrop W. Brown (C)
DDO Appeals Officer (U)

Attachments:
Tab R -- References
Tabs 12-48 -- As Stated

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA · CITIZEN ·

Appeal
IRS 75-161

12 Arnold Circle
Cambridge, Mass 02139
February 24, 1976

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

RE: FOIA Appeal

Dear Mr. Wilson,

By letter dated 11 and 26 April 1975, I asked for my file. By letter dated, 19 February 1976, you responded with some of the requested documents. However, some were censored and others were withheld altogether. I hereby appeal these deletions.

I look forward to hearing from you within 20 days, as required by law.

Sincerely,

Carl Oglesby

Carl Oglesby
(299-30-5954)

MAR 1 2 12 PM

CONFIDENTIAL

5-1169

29 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IPS

SUBJECT : Nancy Barnes and the Africa Research Group

REFERENCE : Request No. 75-4681

1. This Directorate maintains a file on Nancy Barnes and a soft file on the Africa Research Group. The following paragraphs describe the documents held by this Directorate which refer to her and her specific association with the Africa Research Group.

2. The documents listed below are from the FBI and are exempt per 1900.3(g)(4) of the Federal Register.

a. "Committee of Returned Volunteers, Nancy Barness", dated 7 July 1969, from Washington, D.C., no file number.

b. "Nancy E. Barness, also known as Nan Barnes, Sam Barnes - Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV)", dated 27 August 1969, from Washington, D.C., no file number.

c. "Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV) Nancy Ertel Barnes", dated 11 September 1969, from Washington, D.C., no file number.

d. "Nancy Ertel Barnes, Committee of Returned Volunteers", dated 24 September 1969, from New Haven, Connecticut, no file number.

e. "Susan Heiligman Frank & Richard Cyril Frank, SM-RU", dated 21 February 1973, from New York, N.Y., file number 100-339235-416.

f. "Committee of Returned Volunteers", dated 14 July 1970, from Chicago, Illinois, file number 100-45731.

3. There is one Department of State letter, which is a request from the Passport Office for information of a security nature pertinent to Nancy Ertel Barnes, dated 1 February 1971, no file number. Although this letter is excluded under 1900.3(g)(4) of the Federal Register, a copy is attached for referral to the State Department.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Nancy Barnes and the Africa Research Group

4. The following documents may not be passed to Ms. Barnes:

a. One Agency memorandum dated 11 August 1969 and one Agency cable dated 24 June 1969 which contain information from a foreign liaison source and are exempt per (b)(1), (b)(3)(a) and (b)(3)(b) of the FOIA and 5(b)(1) of E.O. 11652.

b. Two Agency dispatches dated 23 June 1969 and 10 July 1969 which contain information from the same source as in paragraph 4a above. The same exemptions apply.

5. The following three items may be passed to Ms. Barnes: copies are attached for each. In all cases, the excised portions are exempt per (b)(1), (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b) and (b)(6) of the FOIA.

a. One Agency memorandum dated 1 December 1971.

b. One Agency dispatch dated 6 December 1971.

c. One Agency dispatch dated 30 November 1971.

6. Form 3533 is also attached.

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

Attachment:
As Stated Above

14-00000

africa research group
8 Cedar St., Charlestown, MA 02129

AUG 11 3 32 PM '75

IRS 75-4681 August 7, 1975

LOG
SEARCH

Robert Young
Freedom of Information Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Young,

I understand that under the Freedom of Information Act that an organization can seek disclosure of any and all information and documents that the Central Intelligence Agency may have collected pertinent to its activities.

As the president of the now inactive , but still existant , Africa Research Group(formerly of PO Box 213, Cambridge, Mass 02138), I would like to request any information and documents that concern the organization.

Also, as an individual I would like to request any information cocerning my activities. My full name is Nancy E. Barnes, and I was born Oct. 21, 194 in Hartford Conn. Though my name is Nancy I have have been known as 'Sam" since the age of 5. I would appreciate any relevant information that you could send along.

I look forward to your reply in regards to the Africa Research Group and well as in regards to mayself.

Sincerely,

Nancy Barnes

Nancy Barnes

SECRET

19 September 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Information Review Committee (U)

ATTENTION : Mr. H. G. Bean, Assistant for Information (U)

SUBJECT : FOIA Appeal - Nancy Barnes (F-75-1681) (U)

REFERENCES : A. Initial Request dated 7 August 1975 (U)
B. CIA's Response dated 6 April 1976 (U)
C. Appeal Letter dated 5 May 1976 (U)

1. (U) Summary of Recommendations:

a. Release additional information from three documents initially released in segregated form. Deleted portions are exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(6) of FOIA.

b. Sustain initial denial in toto of four documents under exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) of the FOIA as applicable.

c. Release in segregated form twenty-one documents discovered in the appeal process. Deleted portions are exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) of the FOIA as applicable.

d. Deny in toto seven documents that were located in the appeal review. These documents are being denied under exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) of the FOIA.

OCO e. Pass in toto six overt documents located during the appeal review.

f. Refer to the FBI for their action an identification list of nine additional FBI reports that were located during the appeal review.

g. Refer one document located during the appeal review to the Department of the Army for their action.

CONFIDENTIAL When
Detached From
Attachments

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 012228

2. (U) Background:

a. On 7 August 1975, Ms. Nancy Barnes wrote the CIA requesting "...any information and documents that concern..." an organization called the African Research Group. Ms. Barnes explained that the African Research Group is "an inactive, but still existant" research group of which she is the president. Ms. Barnes also stated: "...as an individual I would like to request any information concerning my activities."

b. The 6 April 1976 response to Ms. Barnes stated seven DDO documents were being released in sanitized form. This memorandum also stated that FBI and State Department documents had been surfaced in our search and that these were being referred to the originating agency for action. Ms. Barnes was also informed of her right to appeal.

c. On 5 May 1976, Ms. Barnes appealed.

d. At the initial review, the search was limited to information about Ms. Barnes, including any association with the African Research Group. During the appeal review the search was broadened to include any information about the African Research Group, regardless of Ms. Barnes's association with it. This later search located additional documents which are included in this appeal package.

3. (U) Recommendations:

a. Tab A-1 contains nine overt documents that I recommend be released to Ms. Barnes in toto.

b. Tab B contains the DDO documents that were considered in this appeal case. The Appeal Review Form attached to each of the documents reflects my recommendations concerning the release of the information in the document. All meaningful, non-exempt information applicable to this request has been identified and is recommended for release. A classification review has been conducted on each of the DDO documents reviewed in this appeal case. A DDO officer with national security classification authority has asserted that each document is properly classified and marked in accordance with E.O. 11652, as amended.

c. Tab C contains the identification of nine FBI documents that were surfaced during the appeal search. I recommend this list be referred to the FBI for their action.

d. Tab D contains a document that originated with the Department of the Army. I recommend that it be returned to the Army for their action.

e. Tab E contains a copy of the document that was referred to the Department of State for their action, and a list of the FBI documents that were referred to the FBI for action on 10 March 1976. These documents were surfaced at the initial review search.

f. Tab F contains an FBI document that contained classified information furnished by the CIA. The FBI referred the document to the CIA for review. A full text copy and a copy as approved for release are attached. The two CIA documents that were surfaced by the FBI and forwarded to the CIA for action are included as documents 32 and 33.

4. (U) Mr. Strickland of OGC has not yet concurred in these recommendations.

Helen H. Stilson

Helen H. Stilson (U)
DDO Appeals Officer (U)

Attachments: (U)
- Tab A - References A through C
- Tab A-1 - Documents to be released in toto with appeal package
- Tab B - DDO documents reviewed at appeal level
- Tab C - Documents for referral to FBI
- Tab D - Document to be referred to Department of Army
- Tab E - Documents referred with initial review
- Tab F - FBI Referral

africa research group
8 Cedar St., Charlestown, MA 02129

LOG/APPEAL
IRC 75. 4621

May 5th

Gene F. Wilson
CIA Information Review Committee
CIA
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Wilson,

On August 7, 1975, I made a request to the CIA under the Freedom on Information Act for information, and documents pertaining to the Africam Research Group and Nancy (Sam) Barnes. By letter dated April 6, 1976, the agency agreed to release a newspaper clipping and three censored documents. The remainder of the requested documents were witheld.

I hereby appeal the agency's denial of my request for documents on the grounds that the exemptions relied upon do not apply to the requested documents.

In reviewing whether classified information pertaining the to the Africa Research Group is till properly classified and therefore excempted from disclosure under subsection (b) (1) , you should be aware that the ARG formally disbanded three years ago.

In addtion, I have reason to believe that the agency's initial reply is incomplete. In particular , the documents released by the agency c contain only one publication of the ARG. The documents already released indicate that the agency was at least aware of other ARG publications. I hereby request a copy of any catalogue , list or index of these publications.

As to any documents or portion of documents which are witheld after this appeal, I hereby request:

(a) specification as to whether the material pertains to Nancy (Sam) Barnes or to the AFrica Research Group
(b) as to material withled on the basis of exemption (b) (5), names of any other agency which initiated or received copies of inter-agency memoranda; and
(c) as to the material witheld on the basis of exemption (b) (7) the authority for the law enforcemnet activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the function of the investigation.

Sincerely,
Nancy Barnes
Nancy Barnes

MAY 11 2 43 PM '76

2 October 75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

SUBJECT: James G. Bruce

REFERENCE: Request No. 75-5742

This Directorate has no file on James G. Bruce. Two Agency documents, however, were surfaced. These documents are denied under (b)(1), as being properly classified under E.O. 11652 and (b)(3) (sources and methods) FOIA. Release of the portion concerning Subject would probably identify the source to him. Thus, these documents must be denied in full.

/s/ Charles A. Briggs
Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL

SEP 5 1 44 PM '75

IPS 75-5742

628 White Sands Bay
Roselle, Ill. 60172
September 1, 1975

LOG
SEARCH

Freedom of Information Act
Robert Young CIA Cordinator
CIA
Washington D. C. 20505

Dear Sirs;

I have reason to believe the CIA may have a record file on me.

In 1961 I was a member of an Anti-Castro group in the Florida Keys. And resided on No-Name Key in the Florida Keys for a time.

Since I was a devote anti-communist at the time and participated in a raid or two (that never accomplished anything), I'm courious to see if anything is in print regarding my so called 'wild oats' days and under the Freedom of Information Act I hearby respectfully request a copy of any possible files on me.

Respectfully,

Jim Bruce

Jim Bruce
Data - James G. Bruce
SS# - 056-30-5479
Birth - May 4, 1938

JB/cb

14-00000

SECRET

4 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Information Review Committee

ATTENTION: Mr. H. G. Bean, Assistant for Information/DDA

SUBJECT: FOIA Appeal - Jim Bruce (75-5742)

REFERENCES:
A. Original Request, dated 1 Sep 75
B. Reply to Subject, dated 29 Oct 75
C. Appeal letter, dated 10 Nov 75

1. Summary: It is recommended that the initial denial as stated in our reply of 29 Oct 75 be affirmed, based on Title 5, U.S.C. 552(b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(6) as applied to the specific documents mentioned herein.

2. Background:

a. Mr. Bruce's initial request was for a copy of any Agency file on him.

b. The original search revealed two documents referring to Mr. Bruce and Mr. Bruce was denied the document in toto.

c. Mr. Bruce's appeal states that he is perplexed at why the documents were denied him and requests the documents so that he can correct any possible misinformation in the record.

3. The two documents are:

a. Agency dispatch UFGA 2192, 23 Aug 61 from Miami Base based on AMCHEER/1 memo of conversation with Mr. Bruce and others who wished to volunteer to "fight in CUBA." This document is denied under (b)(1) properly classified, (b)(3) protection of sources and methods and (b)(6) protection of the privacy of others. A representative of LA Division does not wish to declassify this dispatch, and I concur.

b. Agency memorandum CSCI 3/767435 dated 4 Oct 61 is a memorandum to the FBI containing the information in UFGA 2192 plus file traces.

[illegible]

This document must be denied to protect the former deep cover asset, AMCHEER/1. This document is denied under (b)(1) proper classification, (b)(3) protection of sources and methods and (b)(6) protection of the privacy of others. A representative of LA Division does not wish to declassify this memorandum, and I concur.

4. Recommendation: It is recommended that the initial denial as stated in our reply of 29 Oct 75 be reaffirmed, based on Title 5, U.S.C. 552(b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(6) as stated above.

5. Mr. Lavery of OGC has concurred in the above.

Frederic McCann
DDO Appeals Officer

Attachments:
- A. References
- B. Agency dispatch UFGA 2192, 23 Aug 61
- C. Agency memo CSSI 3/767,435

F 116921

CAS NR [illegible] ROUTINE [illegible]

SECRET CS NR 1[illegible] TO NEW ORLEANS FI WASHINGTON

TO BIRKE FROM ASHCRAFT BY CIESIELSKI (SUPPORT) - CITE NA-[illegible]

A 116921

CASE 16633 RPT 16633. WE FORWARD THE FOLLOWING FROM NEW YORK:

~~S 27877~~

1. THE INTERESTED FI RPT FI AREA DIVISION WELCOMED YOUR DETAILED INVENTORY OF THE VERSON RPT VERSON MATERIAL. HAVANA FI RPT FI STATION HAS ADVISED THAT VERSON WAS IN TOUCH WITH AMERICAN EMBASSY IN PAST AND IS OF OPINION THAT IMPORTANT PART OF VERSON MATERIAL IS IN CIA POSSESSION. THIS LAST PROBABILITY - SUPPORTED BY YOUR DESCRIPTION AND OPINIONS - HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED DESIRE TO SECURE THE FOLDERS. THE NEED FOR INVOLVING CUSTOMS IN A SERIES OF DELIVERIES AND VERSON'S DESIRE TO HAVE THE FOLDERS RETURNED ARE FURTHER FACTORS COMPLICATING THE SITUATION. FINALLY FI/WH RPT FI/WH DIVISION STATES THAT THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY VERSON WARRANT A SUSPICION THAT THIS DEAL HAS BEEN DESIGNED FOR EXPLOITATION OF THE PRIO GROUP RPT PRIO GROUP IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS IN CUBA.

2. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT FORWARDED YOUR LETTER BUT SUBSTITUTED A DRAFT ALONG LINES SUGGESTED BY FI RPT FI. WE HAVE POUCHED YOU A COPY AND YOU WILL NOTE THAT IS IS VAGUE AND EVASIVE. THIS HAS BEEN DONE DELIBERATELY WITH THE HOPE THAT IT WILL AROUSE A REPLY; FOR OBVIOUS REASON THE WASHINGTON RETURN ADDRESS IS INDICATED. FI WILL RPT FI WILL CONTINUE TO PREPARE REPLIES UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE OFFER IS FINALLY REJECTED OR YOU ARE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANOTHER MEETING.

3. WE TRUST THE ARRANGEMENTS DESCRIBED ABOVE MEET WITH YOUR APPROVAL. IF THERE ARE ANY C E RPT C E ASPECTS YOU CAN CALL TO OUR ATTENTION, ADVISE AND THEY WILL BE USED TO ADJUST THE OPERATION.

[illegible] SEP CBS

14-00000

~~F-27817~~
F 11692

CBS WASH PRIORITY [illegible]

(PRIORITY) SECRET CN NR 132 TO NEW ORLEANS FROM WASHINGTON

TO BURKE FROM ASHCRAFT BY CIESIELSKI - CITE WA-9970

A 11692 ~~27817~~ S 27817

THIS IS NEW CASE [illegible] RPT [illegible] SUBJECT: MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS RPT CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS. RE CONVERSATION BURKE-CIESIELSKI ON 1 RPT 1 SEPTEMBER 54. ACCORDING TO FI/WH RPT FI/WH DIVISION, FRANK JACKSON RPT FRANK JACKSON OF MIAMI, FLORIDA APPROACHED PRESIDENTIAL AIDE SHERMAN ADAMS RPT SHERMAN ADAMS WITH A STORY THAT INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL CONCERNING SOVIET PLANS IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH CARLOS PRIO. IT APPEARS THAT SHERMAN ADAMS TOLD JACKSON THAT IT MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO CIA RPT CIA AND INDICATED THAT HE WOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION.

~~27817~~ A 11692

FRANK JACKSON IS REPORTED TO BE CONNECTED WITH AN ORGANIZATION KNOWN AS WORLD SURVEYS; HE ALSO SERVES AS PUBLIC RELATIONS REPRESENTATIVE FOR PRIO. IN SPITE OF THIS BUSINESS CONNECTION IT IS BELIEVED THAT JACKSON'S MOTIVATION IS CORRECT. THIS CONCLUSION IS BASED ON THE FACT THAT HE HAS HAD SERVICE WITH ONI RPT ONI AND THE SECRET SERVICE, AND IS PERSONALLY VOUCHED FOR BY A MEMBER OF THE CIA RPT CIA SECURITY OFFICE.

AS YOU KNOW, PRIO IS CURRENTLY INVOLVED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND SCHEDULED TO STAND TRIAL ON AN ARMS SMUGGLING CHARGE.

THE FI RPT FI AREA DIVISION HAS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS CURRENT PRIO OFFER IS A MANEUVER DESIGNED TO PLACE THE US RPT US GOVERNMENT IN AN AWKWARD POSITION. ON THE OTHER HAND, JACKSON STATES THAT THE PRIO GROUP IS MAKING THIS OFFER WITHOUT ANY THOUGHT OF FINANCIAL RETURN OR POLITICAL FAVORS.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS FURNISHED FOR BACKGROUND. WE HAVE ASKED SECURITY TO COORDINATE WITH FBI RPT FBI ON A CRASH BASIS AND WILL ASK YOU TO TAKE NO RPT NO ACTION UNTIL THIS COORDINATION IS EFFECTED AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL. PLEASE CONSIDER THIS WIRE AS AN ALERT AND ADVISE US OF YOUR ESTIMATED DEPARTURE TIME SO THAT WE CAN NOTIFY YOU BY TELEPHONE THAT THE NECESSARY COORDINATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED. AT MIAMI JACKSON CAN BE CONTACTED THROUGH THE FOLLOWING TELEPHONE NUMBER: 48-6650 RPT 48-6650, AND TOLD THAT YOU ARE IN MIAMI AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE MEETING HE HAD IN WASHINGTON WITH MR. HENRY THOMAS RPT MR. HENRY THOMAS (THOMAS IS THE SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE DESCRIBED ABOVE AS JACKSON'S FRIEND).

IT IS NOT RPT NOT KNOWN WHETHER PRIO WILL ATTEND PERSONALLY OR SEND REPRESENTATIVES. IT IS BELIEVED THAT A BI-LINGUAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE BROUGHT BY THE PRIO PEOPLE. AT THE MEETING YOU ARE ASKED TO DO THE FOLLOWING:

A. SECURE AS MUCH DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT THE OFFER OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PLANS AS POSSIBLE.

B. SECURE THE NAMES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES.

UNFORTUNATELY, YOU WILL BE IN NO RPT NO POSITION TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS AND THE PRIO REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE SO ADVISED BY

UNFORTUNATELY, YOU WILL BE IN NO RPT NO POSITION TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS AND THE PRIO REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE SO ADVISED BY YOU. YOU WILL ALSO ADVISE THOMAS ON THIS POINT AT YOUR FIRST MEETING WITH HIM. WE FEEL THAT IT WILL BE BEST IF YOU COULD LIMIT KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR CIA RPT CIA AFFILIATION TO JACKSON AND INTRODUCE YOURSELF TO THE PRIO MEN AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE US RPT US GOVERNMENT WHO IS VOUCHED FOR BY JACKSON.

31/2459Z SEP CRS

A-116921

Chief, Contact Division

22 September 1958

Chief, New Orleans Office

15-21377

Case 16603

1. Confirming and supplementing our several long-distance telephone conversations, I report herewith concerning my interview with Mr. Frank Jackson and two members of the Prio Socarras' group in Miami, Florida, on 17 and 19 September 1958. This portion of the report is concerned with the mechanics of the operation and the personalities involved. It would be, I presume, of little interest to FI. A supplemental section contains a description of the material offered by the Cuban refugees, which portion, I assume, you will turn over to FI/WH Division.

2. On arrival in Miami, I called at the office of the FBI with a view to informing that agency of my presence and of the general nature of the activities I proposed to engage in, so that the agents of the Bureau would not be unduly surpriced if they learned of my activities from other agents who were presumably keeping my proposed contacts under surveillance. The SAC was absent from the office. I accordingly talked with one of the Duty Officers, a Special Agent named Schilldecker, whom I had met before and who has frequently cooperated with our representative in Miami, John H. Dyer. Schilldecker was most pleasant and cooperative. I informed him that the matter on which I was engaged had been coordinated with FBI headquarters through Mr. Charles Bates and that the Bureau interposed no objections. I then told him, in general terms, about the activities of Mr. Frank Jackson in Washington. The agent said that he had known Jackson for about 10 years and that he considered Jackson to be an unreliable person and a complete opportunist. He said that Jackson had been in Naval Intelligence during World War II and that since the end of his tour of active duty he had held a number of jobs in none of which he had been able to make a success. These jobs included the agency for a wine manufacturer, the position of deputy sheriff in Miami Beach, the agency for a maker of concrete blocks and several other enterprises. In one of his jobs Jackson had been suspected of pilferage and had been discharged on that account, although no prosecution was instituted. Jackson is now, according to Schilldecker, operating a private detective agency and is also acting as public relations adviser to Prio and his group. He is believed to be the owner of a corporation known as "Enterprises Many, Inc," the exact operations of which are unknown.

3. Schilldecker said that Jackson claimed to have excellent sources of information on Cuba and that he particularly had referred to a Captain Salvador Diaz y Verson, a political refugee from Cuba, who had engaged quite intensively in anti-Communist activities. Schilldecker said that the "legal attache" (I assume that means an FBI representative) at the US Embassy in Havana had at one time written to the SAC in Miami about Verson and had said that the latter had once been in a position to obtain valuable information concerning the activities of the Communists in Cuba, but that, in his belief, Verson was given to flights of fancy.

4. Schilldecker pointed out that, although the criminal cases against Prio and Curti had been ended with pleas of nolo contendere and fines, cases were still pending against four other Cuban exiles who are allegedly engaged in the gun-running plot. He said that inasmuch as the cases were primarily the interest of the Customs Department, the FBI was not immediately interested. He voiced the opinion that Customs representatives were maintaining surveillance on the defendants in the various suits.

5. Returning from the FBI office, I telephoned Jackson, as arranged, at 3:00 p.m. and identified myself as directed in WA-9979. Jackson said that it would be impossible to arrange a meeting with the Cubans that afternoon, since the leader of the group would not be available. He said that a meeting could be arranged for the following morning, Sunday, 19 September, at 11:00 a.m., and I accordingly arranged to meet the group in a room at the Columbus Hotel which I had reserved for that purpose. I suggested a preliminary meeting with Jackson so as to obtain information about the persons I was to see, but he said that that would not be feasible on Saturday and that he would drop in on Sunday morning a few minutes ahead of the rest of the group.

6. Jackson arrived at the designated room on Sunday morning at 10:45 a.m. He did not request the exhibition of credentials and I did not exhibit them. He said that the meeting with the Cubans would have to be postponed until 4:00 o'clock Sunday afternoon, inasmuch as the leader of the group was at that time engaged in preparing a speech. He said he would bring two members of the group to the Columbus Hotel at 4:00 p.m., and I agreed to meet them at that time.

7. Jackson said that the two men he wanted me to talk to were Senor Carlos Hevia and a Captain Verson, whose full name Mr. Jackson did not know. He said that Carlos Hevia is a leading Cuban consulting engineer and is a graduate of the US Military Academy of the class of 1919. For a short time he was President of Cuba and was subsequently Ambassador to the US. He is a member of Prio's Authentico Party, but belongs to the conservative wing which is highly critical of some of Prio's actions. Hevia was exiled from Cuba when his name was found on an envelope in the possession of Sanchez Arango. He is under indictment in the US District Court but has pleaded not guilty to charges of gun-running growing out of the same incident concerning which Prio pleaded "nolo contendara."

8. Captain Verson, according to Jackson, is and has been for many years the president of the Anti-Communist League of Cuba. During a part of the terms of Grau San Martin and Prio, Verson held the rank of Captain in the Cuban army and was in charge of a counter-espionage section dealing with Cuban Communists. Verson, in his official capacity, was largely instrumental in having the Soviet Embassy in Havana closed. He was removed by Batista from his Army post in 1952 and, after spending some months in sanctuary in the Uruguayan Embassy in Havana, he came to Miami in June of 1954.

9. Jackson also wished me to meet Prio, Dr. Pedro Martinez Faraga and uis Ortega. Prio was currently in New York. Martinez was formerly Ambassador to he US and a delegate to the United Nations. He was described by Jackson as one f the most brilliant persons he had ever met and he said that I could obtain a

great deal of information from him concerning the present political and economic situation in Cuba. He was not immediately available and had no connection with the documents allegedly possessed by Verson. Ortega, a former newspaper columnist and member of Batista's Consultative Council, was also described by Jackson as a prolific source of information on Cuban political matters. He too was not immediately available and had no connection with the Verson documents. In the circumstances, I told Jackson that I would defer interviews with Martinez and Ortega until some future time.

10. At 4:00 p.m. on Sunday, 19 September, Jackson returned to the room in the Columbus Hotel, bringing with him Senor Hevia and Captain Verson. Jackson introduced me as Mr. Druton, a pseudonym I had supplied. He told them that I was a representative of the US Government and that we were interested in the documents in Verson's possession. He assured them that the information which they might give me would be treated as highly classified material, and he then left the meeting. It developed that Captain Verson could not speak any English (incidentally, Jackson does not speak Spanish), so that it was necessary to converse with him through Hevia, who acted as interpreter. Hevia is fluent in English and Spanish.

11. The substance of the information supplied by Verson concerning the documents in his possession is contained in the second part of this report. Verson appeared to attach a very high historical value to the contents of his documents and seemed anxious to make them available to US authorities. He disclaimed any desire for a fee and merely said that he wished to retain the originals, since he considered that they constituted an authentic account of the growth of the Communist movement in Cuba, but that we would be entirely welcome to photostat or otherwise copy the contents of his files.

12. At the conclusion of the interview, I thanked the two Cubans for their courtesy and cooperation and told Senor Hevia that I would get in touch with him later in the week either directly or through Mr. Jackson.

13. I enclose herewith a letter to Hevia confirming our interest in the Verson documents and asking him to notify me when it is expected that they will begin arriving, so that we may attempt to facilitate their entry. You will note that I have signed the letter with the name "Druton" which is how I was introduced to Hevia and Verson by Jackson. I think the letter should be mailed in Washington rather than in New Orleans, so as to allay any suspicions that Hevia may harbor that I am not actually a government representative. You will note that I have suggested that Hevia write to me in New Orleans in care of Miss Joan M. Eaton at Post Office Box 1016. He will, no doubt, assume that this is a letter-drop.

14. In view of the fact that I refer by implication to the Customs Department, I suggest that you hold the letter to Hevia until you or Cleveland have discussed the matter with Mr. Emerick, who is the superior of Mr. Wyatt, the Supervising Customs Agent in Miami. I suggest that the letter be sent air mail, unregistered. I have left the date blank and I request that you insert it before mailing. If you wish to change the letter in any way, please do so. Hevia does not, of course, know my handwriting, so that the letter can be signed by anyone.

William P. Burke

Burke:gm
Enclosure

SECRET
Security Information

F 116921

~~F-77877~~

26 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs All Field Offices

FROM : Chief, Contact Division (L/A)

SUBJECT : Case 14063

REFERENCE : 00-B-67546 (ARQS-3589)
00-A-20309 (NO-3094)

~~S-37777~~

A-40192

CUBA — Economic

1. For your information, the following requirements were submitted by OCI for action by FI.

A 116921

S-116921

2. Background

00-A-20309 states that Carlos Prio has been transferring funds from his Miami bank to his brother Francisco Prio, c/o Guaranty Trust Company, New York. 00-B-67546 states that there is a rumor that Carlos Prio has invested money in a chain of hotels in Switzerland.

A8

For some months past Carlos Prio has been suspected of preparing an invasion of Cuba to oust Batista; however, other reports indicate that Francisco Prio is engaged in handling transfers out of the US for Carlos "for investment abroad", i. e., for unspecified non-revolutionary purposes.

3. Requirements

a. Evidence that Carlos Prio has been investing in Swiss hotels and details of the transaction, e.g., date, price paid, intermediaries, etc.

b. Any information available of other foreign investments that he has made.

Harry a McCue
(E. M. ASHCRAFT

RHeller/th

Info: All Field Offices

FILE: Source of 00-B-67546
NO-Y-83.6

SECRET

~~F 27877~~
F 116921

[illegible], Office of Collection & Dissemination 8 September 1953

[illegible] Contact Division, 00 (L/A Branch)

[illegible] Transfer of Funds by Prio Socarras (~~00-A-5995, IR-946~~)

A 116921 ~~S 27877~~ S-116921

[illegible] US bank at which Carlos and Francisco Prio Socarras have accounts [illegible] neither Carlos nor Francisco has sought the bank's advice on [illegible] investments.

Francisco's account shows that in early June 1953 there was a balance [illegible], that the highest balance reached was US$14,841.72 on 19 June 1953, [illegible] July 1953 the account had fallen to US$1,434.38. There has been [illegible] since that date.

Carlos' account shows the following:

	Debits	Credits	Prev.Bal US$7,718.12
[illegible] May		50,000	57,718.12
[illegible] June	340.99		57,377.13
[illegible] June	150.00		57,227.13
[illegible] June	5,700.00		51,527.13
	40,000.00		11,527.13
	2,000.00		9,527.13
[illegible] June	2,800.00		6,727.13
[illegible] July		86,500	93,227.13
[illegible] July		15,000	108,227.13
[illegible] July	5,000.00		103,227.13
[illegible] August	100,000.00		3,227.13

[illegible] The deposit of US$86,500 on 3 July was in the form of a check drawn by [illegible] of Miami Beach, Fla.

S-8

The deposit of US$15,000 on 9 July was in the form of a check on the [illegible], New York, the drawer's signature illegible.

The withdrawal of 26 August was in cash. Carlos asked for one thousand [illegible] was given mostly one hundred dollar bills and a few five hundred [illegible]

During 1952, the most unusual activity of Carlos' account was the deposit [illegible] on 25 September, a US$150,000 deposit on 26 September, and a withdrawal [illegible] of US$140,000. Since the withdrawal was by check, which was [illegible] to the depositor after cancellation, the identity of the payee is not [illegible]

4. Mrs. Prio has a safety deposit at a branch of this bank and her husband

as access to it. We probably could learn the extent of the activity which has taken place with regard to this box if it would serve any good purpose.

3. During the week of 28 August-4 September 1953, Carlos presented one hundred thousand pesos in new bills at the bank, requesting dollars therefor. He was told the currency would have to be sent to the Banco Nacional de Cuba for examination and that the bank in all probability would want to know the identity of the person exchanging the pesos. Carlos reluctantly agreed to [illegible] but said he had previously sold a large sum of pesos to another bank [illegible] difficulty. Carlos said his reason for requesting the exchange was that he feared a devaluation of the Cuban peso because of the rapid depletion [illegible] gold reserves in the US.

4. The foregoing information was made available with the understanding that it would be for CIA internal use only. If there are inquiries concerning this data, please call Harry L. [illegible], extension [illegible].

R. M. [illegible]

[illegible]/bh A-8

[illegible] Guaranty Trust Co. of New York

14-00000

F 116921

SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR ~~LA~~ (MCCREA) FROM LEA--SECURITY INFORMATION--CITE NY-9115

CASE 14,063 RPT 14,063

FOR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY.

S-116921

~~27877~~

A-8

OUR CONTACT AT THE GUARANTY TRUST ADVISED THAT INSOFAR AS HE WAS ABLE TO LEARN NEITHER CARLOS NOR FRANCISCO PRIO HAS SOUGHT THE ADVICE OF ANY OFFICER OF THE BANK CONCERNING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS. BOTH CARLOS AND FRANCISCO HAVE ACCOUNTS AT THE GUARANTY TRUST.

THE ACCOUNT OF FRANCISCO SHOWS THAT IN EARLY JUNE 53, RPT 53, THERE WAS A BALANCE OF $4,841.72 RPT $4,841.72; THAT THE HIGHEST BALANCE REACHED WAS $14,841.72 RPT $14,841.72 ON 19 RPT 19 JUNE; AND THAT AS OF 30 RPT 30 JUL 53 RPT 53 THERE WAS A BALANCE IN THE ACCOUNT OF $1,434.38 RPT $1,434.38; THERE HAS BEEN NO ACTIVITY SINCE THAT DATE.

A TRABS RPT TRANSCRIPT OF CARLOS' ACCOUNT SHOWS THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITY IN 53 RPT 53:

~~S 27877~~

A 116921

CARLOS PRIO SOCARROS

04/1900Z

	DEBITS	CREDITS	
			PREV BAL 7,718.12
MAY 27		50,000.00	57,718.12
JUNE 1	340.89		57,377.13
12	150.00		57,227.13
17	5,700.00		51,527.13
	40,000.00		11,527.13
	2,000.00		9,527.13
18	2,800.00		6,727.13
JULY 3		86,500.00	93,227.13
9		15,000.00	108,227.13
29	5,000.00		103,227.13
AUG 26	100,000.00		3,227.13

THE DEPOSIT OF $86,00

BUST THIS PARA PLEASE. THANKS.

THE DEPOSIT OF $86,500 RPT $66,500 ON 3 RPT 3 JULY WAS IN THE FORM OF A CHECK DRAWN BY MARIA SOLEDAD ALBA RPT MARIA SOLEDAD ALBA, MIAMI BEACH, FLORD RPT FLORIDA.

55

THE DEPOSIT OF $15,000 RPT $15,000 ON 9 RPT 9 JULY WAS IN THE FORM OF A CHECK DRAWN ON THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, NEW YORK. THE DRAWER'S SIGNATURE WAS ILLEGIBLE.

THE DEBIT OF $100,000 RPT $100,000 ON 26 RPT 26 AUGUST WAS A WITHDRAWAL IN CASH MADE ON THAT DATE BY CARLOS WHO ASKED FOR BILLS OF ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR DENOMINATION BUT WAS GIVEN MOSTLY ALL ONE HUNDRED DOLLAR BILLS AND A FEW OF FIVE HUNDRED DOLLAR DENOMINATION.

THE MOST UNUSUAL ACTIVITY IN THE ACCOUNT OF CARLOS DURING 1952 RPT 1952 WAS THE DEPOSIT OF $45,000 RPT $45,000 ON 25 RPT 25 SEPTEMBER 1952 RPT 1952 AND A $150,000 RPT $150,000 DEPOSIT ON 29 RPT 29 SEPTEMBER 1952 RPT 1952, NEITHER OF WHICH CAN BE IDENTIFIED, AND A WITHDRAWAL IN OCTOBER 1952 RPT 1952 BY CHECK IN THE SUM OF $140,000 RPT $140,000. SINCE ALL CANCELLED CHECKS ARE RETURNED TO THE DEPOSITOR AT THE END OF EACH MONTH THIS CHECK IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION.

WE HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED THAT THERE IS A SAFETY DEPOSIT BOX IN THE NAME OF MRS. CARLOS PRIO AT THE BANK, TO WHICH HER HUSBAND HAS ACCESS. WE HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED TO FIND OUT THE EXTENT OF THE ACTIVITY WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS BOX BUT COULD POSSIBLY DO SO IF IT WOULD SERVE ANY GOOD PURPOSE.

WITHIN THE PAST WEEK CARLOS PRIO PRESENTED ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS TO THE BANK AND REQUESTED CASH IN EXCHANGE THEREFOR. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ENTIRE AMOUNT WAS IN NEW BILLS. HE WAS TOLD THAT THE CURRENCY WOULD HAVE TO BE SENT TO CUBA FOR EXAMINATION AND THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY THE BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA WOULD WANT TO KNOW THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON EXCHANGING THE PESOS. CARLOS SAID HE WOULD RATHER NOT HAVE HIS NAME DISCLOSED BUT CONSENTED TO BE NAMED IF THE BANK INSISTED UPON IT. AT THAT TIME, CARLOS TOLD THE BANK OFFICIALS THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SOLD A LARGE SUM OF PESOS TO ANOTHER BANK WITHOUT ANY DIFFICULTY.

APPARENTLY IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE EXCHANGE OF THE PESOS CARLOS REMARKED THAT HE FEARS A DEVALUATION OF THE CUBAN CURRENCY BECAUSE OF THE RAPID DEPLETION OF CUBAN GOLD RESERVES IN THIS COUNTRY, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A LARGE FINANCIAL LOSS TO HIM.

OUR CONTACT IS AT THE MAIN OFFICE OF THE GUARANTY TRUST AND THE ACCOUNT AND SAFETY BOX OF THE PRIO'S ARE LOCATED IN ONE OF THE BRANCHES. BECAUSE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE DEPOSITOR AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS NECESSARILY OBTAINED, OUR CONTACT HAS ASKED THAT THE DATA BE TREATED IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. ACCORDINGLY THIS INFORMATION MUST BE RESTRICTED TO CIA RPT CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY.

24/1900Z

F116921

~~F27877~~

Chief, Office of Collection & Dissemination 10 September 1953

Chief, Contact Division, OO (I/A Branch) ~~27877~~ A116921

Financial Activities of Carlos Prio Socarras ([illegible]-A-5595, IB-966)

1. On 2 September 1953, Carlos Prio Socarras converted 98,000 Cuban pesos to US currency at a US bank. The bank is not that referred to in our memorandum of 8 September 1953 on the same subject. In this second transaction, the bank kept a record of some of the bills issued to Prio.

2. If there are inquiries concerning this communication, please call Harry A. McCrea, extension [illegible].

E. M. ASHCRAFT

HAMcCrea/th

File: HO [illegible]-81.6

Orig filed in 35519

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO 19
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-26/3
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BLANCO

DISSEM BY 35/

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR EUR8, CI/OPS,

S E C R E T 2020[illegible] CITE JMWAVE 3725 WAVE

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF MADRID 9464 (IN 20553) *

1. NO ADDITIONAL PERTINENT TRACES SUBJ REF. 20 OCT 66 IN 22060

2. VIEW SUBJS CONNECTION AMHINTS, STATION WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING RESULTS SUBJS DEBRIEFING.

S E C R E T *REQUEST TRACES RENE BLANCO

BT

SECRET

19-124-26/3
20 Oct, 1966

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report, January through June 1966

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCES:
A. UFGT 16628
B. UFGT 15216

A. OPERATIONAL

1. During the period under review, financial support to the AMSPELL organization has been reduced significantly. As reported in references, the primary reason for the reduction was the inconsistencies of many AMSPELL activities with current WOFACT directives.

2. Cooperation between AMSPELL and the Station has been maintained through AMHINT-2, the principal agent of the AMSPELL operation. Although no longer being carried on a salaried basis, AMHINT-2 has continued to be responsive to Station guidance.

3. AMSPELL has continued its correspondence with various student groups and leaders throughout the free world, and especially in Latin America. AMSPELL has contacted various international student groups requesting passage money so that its delegates could be afforded the opportunity to attend upcoming international student conferences.

4. A campaign was launched to call attention to the plight of Pedro Luis BOITEL, a Cuban student leader who was unjustly imprisoned on the Isle of Pines by the CASTRO regime. A report/denunciation of the imprisonment of BOITEL was prepared and sent to AMSPELL's principal contacts in the Latin American student field seeking support for AMSPELL's demand that BOITEL be released.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(continued)

Attachment:
Prop Samples, USC

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - WH/C, w/att., USC

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
26 July 1966	JUL 29 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 25653

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

B. PRODUCTION

1. AMSPELL bi-monthly magazine (copy being forwarded under separate cover)

a. AMSPELL efforts during recent months have been mainly concentrated on the preparation of its new bi-monthly magazine. 8,000 copies of the magazine's first edition which was published in May 1966 were distributed as follows:

(1) 3,000 copies sent to Latin America
(2) 1,100 copies distributed by AMSPELL delegations
(3) 3,000 copies distributed among Cubans in the United States
(4) 100 copies were sent to AMSPELL contacts and student movements in Europe, Africa, Asia, Canada, etc.
(5) Members of the AMSPELL organization also received copies in which the AMSPELL internal bulletin was inserted. Each member was asked to promote the sale of subscriptions and advertising space as well as to seek persons who would collaborate with the magazine staff by contributing their talents.
(6) The remainder was distributed among the various embassies, official representations of governments and organizations, both in the United States and abroad, as well as among Cuban exile journalists and organizations.

2. AMSPELL Cuban mailing

Since March 1966, 1,000 envelopes containing AMSPELL propaganda have been mailed to Cuba on a monthly basis. This propaganda is directed particularly at students who support the regime (copies of the propaganda are being forwarded under separate cover).

3. Press

The majority of AMSPELL press releases have been in connection with the mistreatment of political prisoners by the Castro regime. Other releases concerned the aforementioned BOITEL campaign and a tribute to Cuban martyrs who gave their lives fighting against the BATISTA dictatorship in 1957. (Copies of the press releases are being forwarded under separate cover.)

C. FINANCIAL

1. Final payment of AMSPELL salaries and termination bonuses was made in February in line with the Station's reduction of financial support to AMSPELL. Under the present arrangement JMWAVE support is limited to $1,000 monthly, this includes the $200 monthly financial support payment to AMHINT-1's family, office overhead, and support for printing/distributing the bi-monthly publication.

2. The following amounts were expended by the Station in support of AMSPELL activities during the second half of FY 66:

Operational expenses	$ 9,929.74
Salaries and termination bonuses	6,200.00
Total expenditures	$16,129.74

D. FUTURE PLANS

It is anticipated that AMSPELL efforts in the near future will be directed at the upcoming CLAE meeting which is scheduled to be held in Havana 29 July to 9 August 1966.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

14-0000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report, November and December 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 23946, 24 November 1965

A. OPERATIONAL

1. General

During the period under review AMSPELL continued operations aimed at the student/youth target. AMSPELL sent a circular letter to students and youth in Cuba in an effort to establish a "dialogue" between these young people and AMSPELL. Other AMSPELL activities during this period are contained below.

2. Printed Propaganda.

a. Monthly AMSPELL Bulletin:

	November	December
To Cuba	4,800	4,800
To Latin America (Spanish)	2,900	2,900
To Latin America (French)	1,925	1,925
To Latin America (English)	1,925	1,925

b. The regular bulletin highlighted the following themes: The need for solidarity in the struggle for liberty for Cuban political prisoners; the new trend in Polish communism and its criticism toward the system; the attitude of Soviet students toward totalitarianism and the failure of Castro's plan to indoctrinate Cuban students. The December bulletin carried a special Christmas message. (Copies of the bulletin are being sent for Headquarters information under separate cover.)

3. Radio Propaganda

19-124-26/3

AMSPELL continued its regular weekly radio broadcast during

(Continued)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

Attachment :
Prop Samples, USC ATTD RIDIAN

CS COPY

Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/att. USC
-ATT-

DATE TYPED
17 Feb 66

DATE DISPATCHED
FEB 21 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 24575

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

November and December without interruption. Topics discussed on the program included: The war in Viet Nam; commentaries supporting work of student groups throughout the world in combating communism; news of student and youth activities in Cuba and Latin America; world news reports; and a special Christmas message in December.

4. Press Releases

During the period under review, AMSPELL press releases, themes of which are listed below, received replay as follows:

Diario las Americas: a. Tighter control over university councils in Cuba.

b. Activities of Cuban agents in Mexico.

c. The large number of relatives of high Cuban officials reported among refugees.

Bohemia Libre: a. Reports on the exodus.

b. Comments on Che Guevara's disappearance and his wife's condition.

AMHIM: a. AMSPELL comments on a Miami Herald article concerning statements by Cuban students regarding the incompatibility between Christianity and Communism.

b. Cuban agents reportedly responsible for demonstrations against Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Senator Robert Kennedy while on tours in Latin America.

c. Analysis of anti-Christian policies in Cuban universities.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

	November	December
Salaries:	$ 2,250.00	$ 2,250.00
Operational Expenses:	$ 3,850.00	$ 4,150.00

C. FUTURE ACTIVITIES

An overall review of AMSPELL operations is currently being made by the Station. When discussions between the Station and AMSPELL are concluded, it is anticipated that Station support of the AMSPELL organization will be considerably reduced.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational
AMBARB-54/AMSPELL

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

FYI

UFGA 23946 (Para. 4) Dated 30 November 1965

KULAMP contacted AMBARB-54 and in turn put in contact with Identity, which is a KULAMP operation located in New York. AMBARB-54 has not yet been placed on Identity's payroll but, according to KULAMP, will be employed when he has obtained some travel visas which will be necessary in his job assignment with Identity. His work will involve traveling to Latin America on a survey assignment for Identity.

Ernest A. LUSBY

Attachment:
1 - Iden - U/S/C/

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE with S/C/A

19-124-26/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-5726 CS COPY	4 DEC 1955
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-26/3

TYPED: *8Dec 65

Distribution:
1 - Subj File
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - PP/Chrono

WH/C/CS
ABSTRACT
INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/C/CA/PP	JOLL	nea	5518

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DC/WH/C/CA		C.T. Barrio
DODS		
WH/C/MO		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH	11	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATC

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UFGW-5726

DATE: ____________

IDENTITY: Freedom Fund

SECRET

19-132-26/3

DEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

22 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP—	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	¢
4	FI	8	X

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, CE, WE, CA2, CA/O4, CI/ICS, FI/D, FI/INT, WH/C2

11 Dec 65 IN 12973

SECRET 111828Z

DIR INFO ATHE MADR CITE WAVE 7852

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM *

REFS: A. DIR 64401*

B. ATHE 7970 (IN 11828)

1. SUBJECT DELEGATION DEPARTED WAVE 10 DEC AFTER RECEIVING ASSURANCE FROM TSIRIMOKOS SECRETARY THAT MEETING POSSIBLE. FIRST SCHEDULED FOR 11 DEC BUT CHANGED TO 12 DEC DUE URGENT UN MATTER. WILL ADVISE OUTCOME.

2. MEMBERS DELEGATION: AMWORD-3 (IDEN A), AMBLEAK-1 (IDEN B) AND IDEN C.

SECRET

CFN 7852 64401 7970 10 TSIPIMOKOS 11 12 AMWORD-3 A AMBLEAK-1 B C

BT

* REQUESTED WAVE COMPLY SEND DEL TO SEE GREEK DEPUTY MINISTER NY.

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING

[illegible]	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report, July-October 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 23069, 16 September 1965

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. General

During the period under review, AMHINT/2 visited Caracas and turned in a report on the university situation in that country which was submitted in Reference. In addition to the normal propaganda activities, the AMSPELL group waged a campaign for the release of political prisoners and has intensified this campaign since the announcement of the "open door" policy on 28 September 1965.

2. Propaganda Production (samples forwarded under separate cover)

a. 4,800 copies of the bulletin were mailed into PBRUMEN each month. Over 6,000 copies of the international edition were sent monthly to addressees in Latin America and Western Europe. Among the main issues treated in the bulletins were: internal problems of PBRUMEN communism as a result of Ben Bella's overthrow; communist atrocities in Viet Nam; testimony of Alberto Muller on the secret executions in Communist PBRUMEN; the comments of Identity A with respect to the PBRUMEN situation, the exodus and Che Guevara's disappearance.

b. Miscellaneous press clippings and press releases are also forwarded under separate cover. Included is an article by AMHINT/2 on the student discontent in PBRUMEN which appeared in Identity B. Other articles and press releases were used by Identities B, C and D and by AMHIM.

(continued)

19-124-26/3

Attachment: USC (att.)
1- Prop samples
2-Iden List
Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/att. usc

CS Copy

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
24 Nov 65

DATE DISPATCHED
NOV 30 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23946

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

2 att.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-23946

3. Radio Propaganda

AMSPELL continued its weekly radio programs and in addition prepared tapes for distribution to numerous Latin American radio stations. One such tape featured statements made by Alberto MULLER before his imprisonment. Local Spanish language stations also used AMSPELL tapes.

[illegible]

4. Other developments

In September, AMBARB/54 and two other members of AMSPELL resigned to seek other employment. The Station would appreciate current information regarding KULAMP's interest and possible employment of AMBARB/54 (per DIR 40414). He is an intelligent and capable individual and is currently investigating job possibilities in ZRMETAL with several international agencies.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

	July	August	September	October
Salaries	$3,000.00	$3,000.00	$4,100.00*	$2,250.00
Operational Expenses	4,009.70	3,850.00	3,850.00	3,850.00
Totals	$7,009.70	$6,850.00	$7,950.00	$6,100.00

*Includes one month's salary as severance pay.

C. FUTURE PLANS

AMSPELL will continue its political action and propaganda activities during the coming months and will engage in special campaigns and press releases as current developments dictate.

Philip G. ELMARD

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER Separate Cover Attachment #2;UFGA 23946

IDENTITY LIST

Identity A. Carlos Andres Perez, former Venezuelan Minister of Interior.

" B. Diario las Americas

" C. Miami Herald

" D. Time Magazine

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

INFO
FILE VR, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2,

MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

17 Nov 65 IN 96000

SECRET 162259Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7234 INGHURST ACTING

TYPIC MHSPAWN AMSPELL

REFS: A. DIR 52818

B. WAVE 7171 (IN 92601)

1. AMSPELL ISSUED 28 OCTOBER PRESS RELEASE TO EXPLOIT CHE GUEVARA DISAPPARANCE AND ALLEGED HOUSE ARREST GUEVARA'S WIFE. RELEASE REPORTS DOUBTS AND CONTROVERSY WITHIN OFFICIAL GOC CIRCLES OVER GUEVARA'S FATE AND CLAIMS GUEVARA'S WIFE PRACTICALLY UNDER HOUSE ARREST. POUCHING COPY PRESS RELEASE. AMSPELL USED SAME REPORT OVER RADIO. STATION HAS SEEN NO INDICATIONS REPORT PICKED UP BY PRESS.

5c

2. AMSPELL WILL CONTINE PLAY REPORTS ON GUEVARA AND FAMILY WHEN PEGS ARE AVAILABLE. HOWEVER STATION DOES NOT PLAN HAVE AMSPELL ENGAGE CAMPAIGN FOR RELEASE GUEVARA FAMILY AS THIS OUT OF CHARACTER FOR AMSPELL GROUP. ORIGINAL PROP PLAY INITIATED UNILATERALLY BY LIRCOK-1 WAS CLEVER ATTEMPT TO PUBLICIZE GUEVARA CASE BUT NO SERIOUS CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO AMSPELL CAMPAIGN.

3. IF AMOTS DEVELOP USEFUL INFO PER REF A SUGGESTION STATION WILL PURSUE FURTHER.

SECRET

14-00000

IN 96000
PAGE 2

CFN 7284 52318 7171 AMSPELL 28 CHE GUEVARA GOC NO INDICATIONS
NOT PLAN LIROOK-1 NO SERIOUS A
BT

AMOT TRYING LOCATE RELATIVE of GUEVARA.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL
Political Prisoners List

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

REFERENCE: WAVE 6425

Forwarded under separate cover is a list of political prisoners in Cuban jails. The list was compiled by the AMSPELL organization and contains the names and addresses of relatives who are living in the United States.

Philip G. Elmard

Attachments:
Political Prisoners List, usc ATT'D

Distribution:
3-WH/C, w/atts, usc

1 Atts.

Removed from Project Amspell
CS Classification: 19-124-26/3
JOB # 68-773/14
Box: 4 Fold: 4

CS COPY

19-124-26/3
~~19-124-26/4~~

DATE TYPED
1 Nov 65

DATE DISPATCHED
NOV 4 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23725

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUSA	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
A				
ALMOINA PEDLON, Carlos Francisco	Abril/61	218-61	30	Habana
ARMAS BLANCO Rene de	" "	127-61	5	Oriente
ARMAS BLANCO Carlos de		" "	5	"
ARENAS AMIGO, Alfredo Jesus	"	" "	3	"
ALBA MORRELL, Eugenio	"	" "	3	"
ALZUGARAY OLIVERA, Conrado	Dic-62	11-63	10	Matanzas
AMARO, Heriberto	"	" "	20	"
ARGUELLES-SOSA OROZCO, [illegible]	Dic-62	5-63	20	Sta. Clara
ANTON ASPIRI Evelio Severino	"	" "	20	"
ABAY GALINDO, Santiago Julian	"	" "	10	"
ALFONSO MARMOL, Ricardo Osmany	"	" "	10	"
ALONSO MORA, Elio	"	" "	10	"
AVILA ESTRADA, Maximo	Abril 62	56-63	30	Habana
ARENCIBIA RIOS, Felix	Dic-62	11-63	9	Habana
ADENGO MARENTE, Roque	"	" "		"
ALVAREZ GONZALEZ, Modesto Hilario	"	" "		"
ALVAREZ CABARGA, Raul				
B				
BORROLLA ROQUETA, Roberto	Abril/61	127-61	10	Oriente
BARRIENTOS FERNANDEZ, Alejandro	Mayo 61	[illegible]-61	20	Habana
BERMUDEZ, Aniceto	Sept.61	473-61	12	Habana
BACALLAO Nicasio				Matanzas
BETANCOURT ABREU, Luis				"
B ISAAC, Abraham	Dic-62	11-63	10	"
BARRERAS PEREZ, Celestino	Dic-62	11-63	9	Habana
BARREITO LORELLE, Josefina	"	" "	6	"
BALBUENA CORRAL, Felipe	"	" "	5	"
BLANCO SANJUAN, Mercedes	"	" "	3	"
BARRETO MASSON, Nicolas	"	" "	3	"
BEQUER DIAZ, Baldomero	"	" "	1	"
BASAVE GARRIGA, Martha	"	" "	1	"
BYRON , Miguel				
BASTIDA FERRER, Rafael	Feb-61	629-63		Sta. Clara
C				
COPADO FERNANDEZ, Antonio	Sept. 60	405-60		Habana
CAOS PEREZ, Jorge		829-60	20	Sta.Clara
CASUSO PEREZ, Enrique	Abril-61	127-61	20	Oriente
CABALLERO OROZ, Gustavo	"	" "	10	"
CASTILLO FERRAL, Patrocinio	"	" "	5	"
CARVAJAL RODRIGUEZ, Julio	"	" "	5	"
CACICEDO CABAL, Carlos	"	" "	5	"
CABEZAS CABEZAS, Miguel	"	" "	3	"
CISNEROS LIMA, Juan	Marzo 61	227-61	10	Matanzas
CAY GISPERT, Raoul	Sept-62	484-62	20	Habana
CAY HERNANDEZ, Raoul	" "	" "	9	"
CALVO FORTE, Jose Luis	Dic. 62	11-63	10	Matanzas
CERVERA ARANGO, Armando	"	" "	30	"
CASTRO GARCES, Rafael				

CS COPY

S/Att. #1 UFGA-23725

(sigue en Pag. 2) 19-124-26/3

~~19-124-26/4~~

NOMBRE	
A	
ALMOINA FEDLON, Carlos Francisco	
ARMAS BLANCO Rene de	Jorge de Armas (hermano)2448 S.W. 3 St.Miami
ARMAS BLANCO Carlos de	
~~[illegible]~~	
ALBA MORRELL, Eugenio	
ALZUGARAY OLIVERA, Rolando	Orlando Alzugaray(hermano)
AMARO, H eriberto	Berta Michelena 327 N.E. 1 Ave.,Miami room1014 Pacific House
ARGUELLES-ROSA OROZCO,	
ANTON ASPIRI Evelio Severino	
ABAY GALINDO, Santiago Julian	
ALFONSO MARMOL, Ricardo Osmany	
ALONSO MORA, Elio	
AVILA ESTRADA, Maximo	
ARENCIBIA RIOS, Felix	
ADENOO MARENTE, Roque	
ALVAREZ GONZALEZ, Modesto Hilario	
ALVAREZ CABARGA, Raul	
B	
BORBOLLA ROQUETA, Roberto	Aida Roqueta (tía) 209 NE Blvd.,Gainesville, Fla.
BARRIENTOS FERNANDEZ, Alejandro	
BERMUDEZ, Aniceto	
BACALLAO Nicasio	
BETANCOURT ABREU, Luis	
B ISAAC, Abraham	
BARRERAS PEREZ, Celestino	
BARRETO LO[illegible], J[illegible]	
BALBUENA CORREA, Felipe	Nilia Balbuena(hermana
BLANCO SANJUAN, Mercedes	Jorge de Armas Blanco(hijo)2448 S.W. 3 St.,Miami
BARRETO MASSON, Nicolas	
BEQUER DIAZ, Baldomero	
BASAVE GARRIGA, Martha	
BYRON , Miguel	
BASTIDA FERRER, Rafael	
C	
COPADO FERNANDEZ, Antonio	Virgilio Sanchez Ocejo-334 S.W. 8 Ave.,Miami (tío)
CAOS PEREZ. Jorge	
CA SUSO PEREZ.Enrique	Frank Casuso Pérez (hermano)c/o R.Ramos 1410 S.W.19Terr.Miami
CABALLERO OROZ, Gustavo	Mercedes Ramirez Manila 1053 Urb.Sta.Rita,RioPiedras,P.Rico
CASTILLO FERRAL, Patrocinio	
CARBAJAL RODRIGUEZ, Julio	
CAICEDO CABAL, Carlos	Manuel A.del Valle(padrasto?)1667 S.W. 10 St.,Miami
~~[illegible]~~	
CISNEROS LIMA, Juan	
GAY GISPERT, Raoul	Anita D. Silveira (prima) 1309 Brickell Ave. Miami
GAY HERNANDEZ, Raoul	" " " " " "
CALVO FORTE, Jos~~e~~ Luis	
CERVERA ARANGO, Armando	Mercedes Quintana 327 N.E. 1 Ave.Miami
CASTRO GARCES, Rafael	

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUSA	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
C (continuacion)	Dic-62	[illegible]-63	30	Sta. Clara
CEPERO LOPEZ, Pablo				"
CEPERO LOPEZ, Juan [illegible]	"	" "	30	"
CEPERO LOPEZ, Reinaldo	"	" "	30	"
CRESPO GARCIA, Regino	"	" "	10	"
CENTURION NORIEGA, [illegible] Manuel	Abril-62	300-63	15	Habana
CRIADO GARCIA, Abel	Dic. 62	33-63	20	Habana
CARDENTEY FACENDA, Omar	"	" "	9	"
CRISTO GONZALEZ, Heriberto del	"	" "	9	"
CRISPO GONZALEZ, Medardo del	"	" "	9	"
CASUSO CASUSO, Enrique	"	" "	6	"
CABRERA RAMIREZ, Ubaldo	"	" "	2	"
CAMIÑO CORRIPIO, Americo del Carmen	"	" "	3	"
CASAÑAS PEDROSOS Bruno Julio	"	" "	2	"
CARMENATE MIRANDA, Roberto	Abril-62	56- 63	30	Habana
CASTRO, Valentin				
CASTILLO VERDECIA, Raimundo				
CASTRO Vicente				
CERRALLO, Oscar				
D				
DOMINGUEZ DIAZ, Josee		300-6 3	12	Habana
DURAN GALLARDO, Faustino	Dic-62	33-63	9	Habana
DIEMKEME IR CORGUERA, Gonzalo F.		" "	5	"
DIAZ-A[illegible]MUELLER TARIO, Sara	"	" "	3	"
DIOS GONZALEZ, Claudio	Dic-62	11-63	5	Matanzas
DIEZ, Carmita	61		12	Cienfuegos-S.Clara
DIAZ, Hugo				
DIAZ VIDAL, Julio				
E				
ELIAS RIOS, Heriberto	Abril-61	127-61	3	Oriente
ESPINOSA VARONA, Rogelio J.E.	Dic.62	33-63	5	Habana
ESTRADA MICHELENA, Juan	"	" "		"
ESCARAMUZA PERRAMONT, Magdalena				
F				
FERNANDEZ MARTINEZ, [illegible] Bernabe	Abril		30	Habana
FERNANDEZ PLANA, Jose	Dic-59	51-6 1		Sta. Clara
FERNANDEZ PLANAS, Nicolas	Enero-61	2761-61		Habana
FONSECA PUIG Rafael	Abril-61	373-61	20	Habana
FERRER ORDONEZ, Juan	Abril-61	127-61	10	Oriente
FRAGELA RODRIGUEZ, Abilio	"	" "	5	"
FONSECA TORRES, Benito	"	" "	3	"
FERRERA ALEMAN Roberto	Dic-61	1108-61	12	Matanzas
FLEXAS GOMEZ, George Leon	Sept	478-62	12	Habana
FERNANDEZ FUENTES, Claudio	Dic.	58-62	30	Habana
FERNANDEZ GALIENES, Salvador	Dic-62	4-63		Sta.Clara
FERNANDEZ REYES, Francisco	Dic-62	33- 63	20	Habana
FE HERNANDEZ, Miguel de la	"	" "	9	"
FE DELGADO, Carlos de la	"	" "	9	"

(sigue pag. 3)

NOMBRE DE

C (continuacion)
CEPERO LOPEZ, Pablo
CEPERO LOPEZ, Juan Gualberto
CEPERO LOPEZ, Reinaldo
CRESPO GARCIA, Regino
CENTURION NORIEGA, Antonio Miguel
CRIADO GARCIA, Abel
CARDENTEY [illegible], Omar
CRISTO GONZALEZ, Heriberto del
CRISTO GONZALEZ, Melanio del
CASUSO CASUSO, Enrique Frank Casuso Pérez (hijo)c/o R.Ramos 1410 S.W.19 Terr.Miami
CABRERA RAMIREZ, Ubaldo
CANINO CORRIPIO, America del Carmen
CASANAS [illegible] Bruno Julio
CARNEVATE [illegible], Roberto
CASTRO, Valentin
CASTILLO VERDECIA, Raimundo
CASTRO Vicente
CERRALLO, Oscar

D

DOMINGUEZ DIAZ, [illegible]

DURAN GALLARDO, Faustino
DIERKSMEIER [illegible], Gonzalo Y.
DIAZ ARGUELLES MARIO, Gari
DIOS GONZALEZ, Claudio
DIEZ, Carmita
DIAZ, Hugo
DIAZ VIDAL, Julio

E
ELIAS RIOS, Heriberto
ESPINOSA [illegible], Rogelio J.B.
ESTRADA MICHELENA, Juan Berta Michelena(tía)327 N.E. 1 ave.rm1014 PacificHouse
Miami
ESCARAMUZA PERDOMO, Magdalena

F
Emilia Ma.,Lucía, y Lino Bernabé Fernández Luzarraga
FERNANDEZ MARTINEZ, Lino Bernabe 3 hijos 1101 N.W. 26 rd.Miami 633-1035
FERNANDEZ PLANA, Jose
FERNANDEZ PLANAS, Nicolas > Conchita Fdez.Plana,hermana, 1210 N.Taft St.apt.208
Arlington, Va.
FONSECA PUIG Rafael
FERRER ORDONEZ, Juan Francisco Muller, 241 N.E. 24 St., Miami
FRAGELA RODRIGUEZ, Abilio
FONSECA TORRES, Benito

FERRERA ALEMAN Roberto
FLEXAS GOMEZ, George [illegible]
FERNANDEZ FUENTES, Rolando
FERNANDEZ GALIENES, Salvador
FERNANDEZ REYES, Francisco
FE HERNANDEZ, Miguel de la
FE DELGADO, Carlos de la

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUSA	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
F (continuacion)				
FERNANDEZ GARAY, Antonio	Dic-62	11-63	9	Habana
FERNANDEZ GARCIA, Sixta J.	"	" "	3	"
FUENTES CORDOVES, Gregorio de la	"	" "	3	"
FERNANDEZ PUIG, Tomas		-61	30	Habana
FERNANDEZ, Jorge V.				
G				
GUERRA CABRERA, Jose	Dic.	629-60		Habana
GRILLO GONZALEZ, Reinaldo	Abril-61	127-61	30	Oriente
GONZALEZ BARROSO, Bernardo	" "	" "	3	" "
GONZALEZ LARA, Anselmo	Nov-61	1124-61	2	Matanzas
GARCIA HERNANDEZ, Orestes	Marzo-61	145-61	3	Habana
GARCIA ARMENGOL, Miguel	Abril-61	238-61	30	Habana
GOMEZ QUESADA, Osvaldo	Sept-62	478-62	20	Habana
GUERRA VIDAL, Ernesto	Dic-61	58-62	30	Habana
GONZALEZ MARCILIO, Luis P.	"	" "	30	"
GONZALEZ CASTILLO, Carmelo N.A.	"	" "	30	"
GARRIDO ARGUELLES, Walter	"	" "	30	"
GOMEZ BOQUET, Juan Maria	Dic-62	5-63	10	Sta.Clara
GONZALEZ GONZALEZ, Gilberto Jesus	"	" "	10	"
GARCIA AGRAMONTE, Armando	"	" "	10	"
GARRIDO GARRIDO, Renato	Dic-62	11-63	5	Matanzas
GARRIDO PERDOMO, Leonardo	"	" "	5	"
GIBART, Nelson	"	" "	5	"
GUERRERO, ROBERTO	"	" "	30	"
GENGLER EBNER, Hans Max Franz	Marzo-62	30 0-63	30	Habana
GOMEZ BARRUECO, Ramiro	61		20	Oriente
GARCIA ROSALES, Lester	Sept-62	484-62	9	Habana
GONZALEZ, Carmelo		11-63	12	Habana
GOMEZ FONSECA, Fernando	Dic-62	" "	12	"
GONZALEZ MONTERO, Alfredo	"	" "	12	"
GONZALEZ GONZALEZ, Bernardo	"	" "	9	"
GONZALEZ RODRIGUEZ, Andres	"	" "	9	"
GARCIA VALDES, Waldo	"	" "	9	"
GARCIA TORO, Mario	"	" "	9	"
GONZALEZ HERRERO, Clara Gladys	"	" "	6	"
GARCIA CARRERA, Orestes	"	" "	3	"
GRAVERAN MORENO, Nelida	"	" "	3	"
GARCIA FERNANDEZ, Celestino J.	"	" "	3	"
GARCIA ALONSO, Martha	"	" "	3	"
GRAU MENA, Rafael	"			
GRILLO GONZALEZ, Reinaldo				
GONZALEZ SILVA, Ibrahin				
GONZALEZ CURBELO, Manuel		51-61		Habana
GARCIA C., Antonio				
GONZALEZ BORROTO, Jose				
GUTIERREZ, Jose Ramon				
H				
HURTADO MARTINEZ, David	Abril-61	127-61	5	Oriente

(sigue en pag. 4)

NOMBRE

F (continuacion)

FERNANDEZ GARAY, Antonio
FERNANDEZ GARCIA, Silvio J.
FUENTE CORDOVES, Gregorio de la
FERNANDEZ Perez, [illegible] Corina Perez (madre) 229 N.E. 24 St. Miami
FERNANDEZ , Jorge V.

G

GUERRA CABRERA, Jose
GRILLO GONZALEZ, Reinaldo
GONZALEZ BARROSO, Bernardo
GONZALEZ LARA, Anselmo
~~GARCIA HERNANDEZ, Orestes~~
GARCIA ARMENGOL, Miguel Miguel y Digna García (padres) 2423 Biscayne Blvd. Miami
GOMEZ QUESADA, Osvaldo
GUERRA VIDAL, Ernesto Delia E. Guerra (esposa) 312 S.W. 31 Ave., Miami, Fla.
GONZALEZ NARCILIO, Luis P.
GONZALEZ CASTILLO, Carmelo [illegible] Olga Castillo (tía)
GARRIDO ARGUELLES, Walter
GOMEZ BOQUET, Juan Maria
GONZALEZ GONZALEZ, [illegible]
GARCIA AGRAMONTE, Armando
GARRIDO GARRIDO, Renato
[illegible] PERDOMO, Leonardo
GIBART , Nelson
GUERRERO, ROBERTO
[illegible], [illegible]
GOMEZ BARRUECO, Ramiro
GARCIA ROSALES, Lester Nelson García (hermano) St. Marys Jesuit H., St. Marys, Kansas
~~GONZALEZ , Orestes~~
GOMEZ FONSECA, Fernando
GONZALEZ MONTERO, Alfredo Hilda Balbuena
GONZALEZ GONZALEZ, Bernardo
GONZALEZ RODRIGUEZ, Andres
GARCIA VALDES, Waldo
GARCIA TORO, Mario
GONZALEZ HERRERO, [illegible]
GARCIA CABRERA, [illegible]
GRAVERAN MORENO, [illegible]
GARCIA FERNANDEZ, [illegible] J.
GARCIA ALONSO, Martha
GRAU MENA, Rafael
GRILLO GONZALEZ, Reinaldo
GONZALEZ SILVA, [illegible]
GONZALEZ CURBELO, Manuel
GARCIA [illegible], Antonio Eddy Crews
GONZALEZ BORROTO, Jose
GUTIERREZ , Jose [illegible]

H

HURTADO MARTINEZ, David

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUSA	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
H (continuacion)				
HERNANDEZ ROJO, Julio	Sept-62	484-62	30	Habana
HERNANDEZ PEREZ, Angel Manuel	Oct-62	508-62		Habana
HERNANDEZ MOREJON, Humberto	Dic-62	6-63	30	Sta. Clara
HURTADO LARA, Lazaro	"	" "	30	"
HEREDIA CASTANEDA, Manuel	Dic-62	13-63	5	Matanzas
HERNANDEZ PUJOL, Juan	"	" "		"
HACES DIAZ, Jose Antonio	Dic-62	33-63	1	Habana
HERNANDEZ, Othon				
I				
IBAGUIRRE, Alfredo				
J				
JANE ARGUDIN, Luis	Abril-62	127-61	5	Oriente
JIMENEZ ROBERTO				
JIMENEZ , Gertrudis	Dic-62	4-63	3	Sta. Clara
JAMIS BERNAL, Kemel	"	" "		"
JUNCO MARTINEZ, Guillermo Clemente	Dic-62	11-63	5	Matanzas
K				
KAY GISPERT, Paul				
L				
LOPEZ CASALES, Lazaro [illegible]	Abril-62	56-62	20	Habana
LOPEZ ARENCIBIA, Elio	Dic-62	33-63	9	Habana
LINARES RODRIGUEZ, Jose de [illegible]	"	" "	20	"
LUNAS CORTES, Miguel Angel	"	" "	20	"
LUNAS OLARIO, Miguel Angel	"	" "	3	"
LORENZO PORTOS, Jose	"	" "	3	"
LAMADRID JUVIER, Bernardo	Dic-62	4-63		Sta. Clara
LOPEZ ADAY , Juan	Dic-62	5-63	20	Sta. Clara
M				
MULLER QUINTANA, Juan Antonio	Sept-60	403-60		Habana
MULLER QUINTANA, Alberto	Abril-61	127-61	30	Oriente
MARTI [illegible], Isidro	"	" "	3	"
MIRO SOTO, Jaime	Marzo-61	227-61	10	Matanzas
MENDIOLA FERNANDEZ, Jose Manuel	Mayo-61	101-61	12	Habana
MENENDEZ FERNANDEZ, Luis	Nov.	116 0-61		Habana
MORETON, Addon	Nov-60		10	Camaguey
MEDINILLA RODRIGUEZ, Angel Fco.	Dic-62	5-63	20	Sta. Clara
MACHADO MACHADO, Andres Avelino	"	" "	10	"
MACHADO [illegible], Celestino	"	" "	10	"
MUGUERA PEREZ Martin	"	" "	10	"
MARTINEZ CALDERIN, Pedro	Dic-62	11-63	30	Matanzas
MIRABAL LOPEZ, Pedro	"	" "	30	"
MARTINEZ OSABA SOLIS, [illegible]	62	300-63	15	Habana
MORERA DEL CAMPO, Gerardo	Dic-62	33-63	20	Habana
MARROQUI [illegible], Julian	"	" "	12	"
MENENDEZ GONZALEZ, RAUL	"	" "	9	"

(sigue en pag. 5)

NOMBRE

H (continuacion)

HERNANDEZ ROJO, Julio Angel Hernandez Rojo (hermano) 1120 S.W. 5 St. Miami 379-6722
HERNANDEZ PEREZ, Angel Manuel c/o Nov. 30 de Nov. 631 S.W. Miami Ave.
HERNANDEZ MOREJON, Humberto
HURTADO LARA, Lazaro
HEREDIA CASTANEDA, Miguel
HERNANDEZ PUJOL, Juan
HACES DIAZ, Jose [illegible]
HERNANDEZ, Othon

I

IRAGUIRRE, Alfredo Rosa Riva (madre) 223 Menores Ave. Coral Gables

J

JANE ARGUDIN, Luis Julio Jané (hermano)
JIMENEZ ROBERTO
JIMENEZ, Gertrudis Monserrate Casademón de Gomez, hija, 1730 E Valley Ave. Birgmingham, Ala.
JAMIS BERNAL, Kemel
JUNCO MARTINEZ, Guillermo Clemente

K

[illegible]

L

LOPEZ CASALES, Lazaro [illegible]
LOPEZ ARENCIBIA, [illegible]
LINARES RODRIGUEZ, Jose [illegible]
LUNAS COBAS, Miguel Angel
LUNAS OLARIO, Miguel Angel
LORENZO PORTOS, Jose
LAMADRID JUVIER, Bernardo
LOPEZ ADAY, Juan

M

MULLER QUINTANA, Juan Antonio Francisco y Sara Muller (padres) 241 N.E. 24 St. Miami
MULLER QUINTANA, Alberto " " " " " "
MARTI URCHAGA, Isidro
MIRO SOTO, Jaime
MENDIOLA FERNANDEZ, Jose Manuel Dulce Mendiola (hermana) USA
MENENDEZ FERNANDEZ, Luis
MORETON, Addon
MEDINILLA RODRIGUEZ, Angel Fco.
MACHADO MACHADO, Andres [illegible]
MACHADO RISALTA, Celestino
MUQUERA PEREZ Martin
MARTINEZ CALDERIN, Pedro
MIRABAL LOPEZ, Pedro
MARTINEZ OSADA SOLIS, Eraiser
MORERA DEL CAMPO, Gerardo
MARROQUI TEJO, Julian
MENENDEZ GONZALEZ, PAUL

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUS	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
M (Continuacion)				
MARTINEZ SARDINAS, Luis A.	Dic-62	33-63	9	Habana
MILIAN RIVERO, Manuel ([illegible])	"	" "	9	"
MENENDEZ FONZALEZ, Rafael	"	" "	9	"
MAESTRI PEREZ, Raul	"	" "	6	"
MARTINEZ D,OSABA, Nelson	"	" "	6	"
MORENO CABRERA, Carlos M.	"	" "	5	"
MASPULEX LOPEZ, Antonio	"	" "	3	"
MORALES ALVAREZ, Enrique	"	" "	3	"
MARTINEZ RODRIGUEZ Celso				
MARTINEZ GARCIA, Eberto				
MARTI,JOSE				
MENENDEZ GONZALEZ, Pablo				
MONTES DE OCA, Ignacio				Matanzas
MARTINEZ, Juan Pedro				"
MARTINEZ JIMENEZ, Vicente		368-63	9	Habana
MELIAN CABALLERO, Angela	Dic-62	63	1	Camaguey
MENENDEZ,RICARDO	Enero-62		15	Habana
MORALES , Rene				
MORALES, Reinaldo				
MITRE Luis				
MARQUES, Rafael				
N				
NAUMAN UBEDA, Manuel	Dic-62	33-63		Habana
NUNEZ TRINCADO, Teresa	" "	" "		"
NICIOLINI, Pedro				Oriente
O				
O,FARRIL PEREZ, Agapito	Abril-61	127-61	3	Oriente
P				
PEREZ CARBONELL, Manuel	Abril-61	127-61	3	Oriente
PEREZ DIAZ-ARGUELLES Nicolas B.	Sept-62	484-62	20	Habana
PEQUENO VELO, Laureano	" "	" "	20	"
PENA FERNANDEZ, Roberto	" "	" "		"
PEDRAZA MARTI, Mario	Marzo-62	300-62	12	Habana
PERES DELGADILLO, Jose	Mayo-62	3-63	30	Habana
PARRA LEYVA, Diego	[illegible]-62	33-63	12	Habana
POLL VALDES, Wilfredo	"	" "	9	"
PEREZ HERNANDEZ, Benito	"	" "	6	"
PADRON CURBELO, Virgilio David	"	" "	6	"
PAZ VALDES, Martha de la	"	" "	3	"
PEREYO CARRERA, Jose Luis	Dic-62	11-63	30	Matanzas
PEREZ GONZALEZ, Leonel	"	" "		"
PINTADO,RAUL				
POVEDA PACHECO, Argimiro				Oriente
PENA,Oscar				
PENA, Jaime				Matanzas
PINEIRO MARINO, Julian				"

(sigue en pag- 6)

NOMBRE

M (Continuacion)
MARTINEZ SARDINAS, Luis A.
MILIAN RIVERO, Manuel
MENENDEZ GONZALEZ, Rafael
MAESTRI PEREZ, Raul   Angelina Pérez (tía) 534 N.E. 23 St.Apt.4,Miami
MARTINEZ D.OSABA, Nelson
MORENO CARRERA, Carlos M.
MASPULEX LOPEZ, Antonio
MORALES ALVAREZ, Enrique
MARTINEZ RODRIGUEZ Celso

MARTINEZ GARCIA, Eberto

MARTI,JOSE
MENENDEZ GONZALEZ, Pablo
MONTES DE OCA , Ignacio
MARTINEZ, Juan Pedro
MARTINEZ JIMENEZ, Vicente
MELIAN CABALLERO, Angel
MENENDEZ,RICARDO   Marta Hernández(novia)Manila 1053 Urb.Sta.Rita Rio Piedras Puerto Rico
MORALES , ene   Lilia García (prima) 1343 N.E. Miami Ct.Apt.10
MORALES, Reinaldo   Conrada Robres(tía)2783 S.W. 21 Terr.,Miami
MITRE Luis
MARQUES, Rafael   Hilda Tabares(prima)4046 S.W. 9 Terr.,Miami

N
NAUMAN UBEDA, Manuel
NUNEZ TRINCADO, Teresa
NICIOLINI, Pedro

O
O,FARRIL PEREZ, Agustin

P
PEREZ CARBONELL, Manuel
PEREZ DIAZ-ARGUELLES Nicolas R.   Benito Perez Diaz(hermano)
PEQUENO VELO, Laureano
PENA FERNANDEZ, Roberto
PEDRAZA MARTI, Mario
PERES DELGADILLO, Jose   Conchita Modarse
PARRA LEYVA, Diego
POLL VALDES, Wilfredo
PEREZ HERNANDEZ, Benito   Benito Perez (hijo)
PADRON CURBELO, Virgilio Raul
PAZ VALDES, Martha de la
PEREYO CARRERA, Jose Luis
PEREZ GONZALEZ, Leonel
PINTADO,RAUL   Jose M.Pintado(hermano) 10276 N.E. 12 Ave.Miami
POVEDA PACHECO, Argimiro
PENA,OScar
PENA, Jaime
PINEIRO MARINO, Julian

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUSA	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
Q				
QUINTAIROS SANTISO, Roberto Jose	Mayo-62	300-63	20	H abana
QUEIPO CADENAS, Alfredo				
QUESADA RIOSECO, Ruben				
R				
RODRIGUEZ LEYVA, Victor	Abril-61	127-61	5	Oriente
RUIZ GUERRA, Francisco	"	" "	3	"
RUIZ HERRERA, Ricardo	Abril-61	1169-61	5	Matanzas
ROJAS LORENZO, Rodolfo	Agosto-61	48-61	9	"
RODRIGUEZ SANCHEZ, Omar	Oct-61		30	Camagüey
RUIDIAZ LEDESMA, Orestes	Abril-62	300-63	20	Habana
REYES VALDES, Carlos	Sept-62	478-62	12	Habana
RUBIERA FEITO, Carlos	Sept-62	484-62	30	Habana
RODRIGUEZ SARMIENTO, Gerardo				
RODRIGUEZ TOIMIL, Rafael				
RODRIGUEZ GALDO MARTIN, Francisco	Dic-62	5-63	10	Sta. Clara
REYES GARCIA, Manuel	Mayo-62	[illegible]-63		H abana
ROBAU VIDAL, Mariano Mario	Dic-62	33-63	9	H abana
ROJAS LORENZO Nelie	"	" "	9	"
RAMIREZ, ANTOnio	Feb-62			Habana
RASPAL Carlos,				
ROJAS MOYA, Rodolfo	Dic-62	59-63	12	H abana
S				
SABORIT LEYVA, Mario	Abril-61	127-61	3	Oriente
SARABASA GARCIA VELEZ, Ricardo	"	372-61	9	H abana
SUAREZ PUIG, Juan Vicente	Sept-62	484-62	20	Habana
SOWERS GOMEZ, ALBerto	Mayo-62	[illegible]-63		H abana
SIMON FERRER, Jose [illegible],	Dic-62	11-63	5	Matanzas
SUAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Juan	"	" "	30	"
SANTOS, Felipe Armando de los	"	" "	10	"
SANTA CRUZ HECHAVARRIA, Bertha Maria	Mayo-62	300-63	6	H abana
SOWERS GOMEZ, Antonio Luis	"	" "	20	"
SUAREZ GONZALEZ, Rafael	"	" "	9	"
SAPAS NICOLADES, Manuel	Dic-62	33-63	30	Habana
SANTOS GOMEZ, Rene	"	" "	20	"
	"	" "	6	"
SALESSA LOPEZ, Mario	"	" "	6	"
SIERRA COTO, Justo Luis	"	" "	10(domicilio)	"
SOMEILLAN RIBALTA, Felicite				
SANCHEZ PRADO, Alberto				
SILVA, Roberto				
SANCHEZ GARCIA, Magardo				
T				
TORRE FERNANDEZ, Francisco de la	Dic-62	11-63		Matanzas
TEJERA OLITE, Rafael Antonio	Dic-62	5-63	10	Sta. Clara

(sigue en pag-7)

NOMBRE

Q

QUINTAIROS SANTISO, Roberto Jose   Antonio Quintairos(hermano) c/Sta. Rita, R. Pied P. Rio   Marta Hdez. Manila 105
QUEIPO CADENAS, Alfredo
QUESADA RIOSECO, Ruben

R

RODRIGUEZ LEYVA, Victor
RUIZ GUERRA, Francisco
RUIZ HERRERA, Ricardo   Lídice y Albor Ruiz(hijos) 2762 N.W. 15 St. Miami 634-6753
ROJAS LORENZO, Rodolfo
RODRIGUEZ SANCHEZ, Omar
RUIDIAZ LEDESMA, Orestes
REYES VALDES, Carlos
RUBIERA FEITO, Carlos   Vicente Rubiera 2 S.W. 17 Ave. Apt.203,Miami
RODRIGUEZ SARMIENTO, [illegible]
RODRIGUEZ POIMIL, [illegible]
RODRIGUEZ-GALDO NA[illegible], [illegible]
REYES GARCIA, Manuel

~~ROBAU VIDAL, [illegible]~~

ROJAS LORENZO Nelie

RAMIREZ,ANTOnio
RASPAL Carlos,
ROJAS MOYA, Rodolfo

S

SABORIT LEYVA, Mario
SARABASA GARCIA VELEZ, [illegible]   Ricardo Sarabasa (padre)Apdo Altamira   Caracas V.
SUAREZ PUIG, Juan Vicente
SOWERS GOMEZ,ALBerto   Guillermo Sowers(tío) 401 N.E. 29 St. Miami
SIMON FERRER, Jose ,
SUAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Juan
SANTOS, Felipe Armando de [illegible]
~~SANTA CRUZ-ECHEVARRIA, [illegible]~~
SOWERS GOMEZ, Antonio Luis   Guillermo Sowers(tío) 401 N.E. 29 St. Miami
SUAREZ GONZALEZ, [illegible]
SABAS NICOLADES, Manuel

SANTOS GOMEZ, Rene

SALESA LOPEZ, Mario
✓ SIERRA COTO, Justo Luis
SOMEILLAN RIBALTA, [illegible]
SANCHEZ PRADO, Alberto
SILVA, Roberto   Conrada Robles, 2783 N.W. 21 Terr., Miami
SANCHEZ GARCIA, Magardo

T

TORRE FERNANDEZ, Francisco de la
TEJERA OLITE, Rafael Antonio

NOMBRE

Q

QUINTAIROS SANTISO, Roberto Jose Antonio Quintairos(hermano) c/Sta. Rita, R. Pied P. Rico Marta Hdez. Manila 105
QUEIPO CADENAS, Alfredo
QUESADA RIOSECO, Ruben

R

RODRIGUEZ LEYVA, Victor
RUIZ GUERRA, Francisco
RUIZ HERRERA, Ricardo Lídice y Albor Ruiz(hijos) 2762 N.W. 15 St. Miami 634-6753
ROJAS LORENZO, Rodolfo
RODRIGUEZ SANCHEZ, Omar
RUIDIAZ LEDESMA, Orestes
REYES VALDES, Carlos
RUBIERA FEITO, Carlos Vicente Rubiera 2 S.W. 17 Ave. Apt.203, Miami
RODRIGUEZ SARMIENTO, [illegible]
RODRIGUEZ POIMIL, [illegible]
RODRIGUEZ-SALDO NAGIN, [illegible]
REYES GARCIA, Manuel

~~ROBAU VIDAL, [illegible]~~

ROJAS LORENZO Nelie

RAMIREZ, ANTOnio
RASPAL Carlos,
ROJAS MOYA, Rodolfo

S

SABORIT LEYVA, Mario
SARABASA GARCIA VELEZ, [illegible] Ricardo Sarabasa (padre)Apdo Altamira Caracas V.
SUAREZ PUIG, Juan Vicente
SOWERS GOMEZ, ALBerto Guillermo Sowers(tío) 401 N.E. 29 St. Miami
SIMON FERRER, Jose ,
SUAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Juan
SANTOS, Felipe Armando de los
~~SANTA CRUZ ECHEVARRIA, [illegible]~~
SOWERS GOMEZ, Antonio Luis Guillermo Sowers(tío) 401 N.E. 29 St. Miami
SUAREZ GONZALEZ, Manuel
SABAS NICOLADES, Manuel

SANTOS GOMEZ, Rene

SALESA LOPEZ, Mario
✓ SIERRA COTO, Justo Luis
SOMEILLAN RIBALTA, [illegible]
SANCHEZ PRADO, Alberto
SILVA, Roberto Conrada Robles, 2783 N.W. 21 Terr., Miami
SANCHEZ GARCIA, Magardo

T

TORRE FERNANDEZ, Francisco de la
TEJERA OLITE, Rafael Antonio

NOMBRE

T (continuacion)
TORRES MENA, Pablo de la
TORRES MENA, Angel
TORRES GARCIA, Raul
TARABELA, Francisco
TORRES, Raimundo

V
VILLANUEVA MARTINEZ, Manuel c/o Mov.30 de Nov. S.W. 12 Ave.

VARONA PRIMELLES, Jose [illegible]
VERDECIA CASTILLO, Lorenzo
VERDECIA CASTILLO, L[illegible]
VEGA URQUIZA, Mario Leonides Jose F. Azor,O'Neill 140,Hato Rey, Puerto Rico

VALDES CARRERA, Felix
VALDES D,WOLF, Rolando
VALDES DE ARMAS, Juan [illegible]
VELIZ CASTELLANOS, Clemente
VELIZ CASTELLANOS, Antonio
VARGAS CARBO, Mario
VILLAMIL SA[illegible]ORRES, Jose
VICENS VEGA, Francisco
VICENS VALDES, Raul
VALERO LLENES, Saturnino
VILLARQUIDES [illegible], [illegible]
VAZQUEZ RODRIGUEZ, Jose Manuel
VARGAS SARMIENTO, Pedro

Z
ZALDIVAR SERRANO, Clara Norma
ZALDIVAR, Armando María Zaldívar(tía)577 S.W. 5 St. Apt.1,Miami

CORUJO BLANCO de Perez,Hilda Lino Pérez Gomez(marido)Bldg.66 Opa-Laoka AirPort
Hernandez Loredo, Humberto Maria Hortensia Hernandez(hija) 3333 293St. Willowi en OHIO
DIAGO, Jorge Ma.Antonia Diago(hija)117 Rusell Ave.Buffalo N.Y.
PATINO GONZALEZ,Francisco J.-Marta Patino(hermana)3221 S.W. 5 St.,Miami
VILLARQUIDES,Agata Ma. - Tete Rodriguez,Unidad Revolucionaria,Miami

NOMBRE

T (continuacion)
TORRES MENA, Pablo de la
TORRES MENA, Angel
TORRES GARCIA, Raul
TARABELA, Francisco
TORRES, Raimundo

V
VILLANUEVA MARTINEZ, Manuel c/o Nov.30 de Nov. S.W. 12 ave.

VARONA PRIMELLES, Jose [illegible]
VERDECIA CASTILLO, Lorenzo
VERDECIA CASTILLO, L[illegible]
VEGA URQUIZA, Mario Leonides Jose F. Azor, O'Neill 140, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico

VALDES CARRERA, Felix
VALDES D,WOLF, Rolando
VALDES DE ARMAS, Juan [illegible]
VELIZ CASTELLANOS, Clemente
VELIZ CASTELLANOS, Antonio
VARGAS CARRO, Mario
VILLAMIL SA[illegible]ORRES, Jose
VICENS VEGA, Francisco
VICENS VALDES, Raul
VALERO LLENES, Saturnino
VILLARQUIDES [illegible], [illegible] M.
VAZQUEZ RODRIGUEZ, Jose Manuel
VARGAS SARMIENTO, Pedro

Z
ZALDIVAR SERRANO, Clara Norma
ZALDIVAR, Armando María Zaldívar(tía)577 S.W. 5 St. Apt.1,Miami

CORUJO BLANCO de Perez,Hilda Lino Pérez Gomez(marido)Bldg.66 Opa-Laoka AirPort
Hernandez Loredo, Humberto Maria Hortensia Hernandez(hija)3333 293St. Willowich OHIO
DIAGO, Jorge Ma.Antonia Diago(hija)117 Rusell Ave.Buffalo N.Y.
PATINO GONZALEZ,Francisco J.-Marta Patino(hermana)3221 S.W. 5 St.,Miami
VILLARQUIDES,Agata Ma. - Tete Rodriguez,Unidad Revolucionaria,Miami

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
COS, Caracas

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/PBRUMEN/AMSPELL/Operational
AMHINT-2 Trip to Caracas

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: FYI

1. Subject, Identity A, recently visited Caracas for the purpose of obtaining his residence visa and while there was in contact with the local AMSPELL delegation as well as with representatives of the major student political groups at the Central University in Caracas (UCV). AMHINT-2 was particularly interested in promoting a productive working relationship between AMSPELL in Caracas and Identity B, which appears to be a new Christian-oriented group organized to provide Liceo students with courses and seminars in fighting communism. A copy of the Identity B brochure is being forwarded under separate cover No. 1.

2. On his return, AMHINT-2 reported on the present composition of the local AMSPELL group. He indicated that Identity C, who first joined AMSPELL in 1960 in Cuba and who recently arrived in Venezuela from Santo Domingo, has replaced Identity D as leader of the group. A list containing the names of the other members of the delegation, as well as a brief description of their AMSPELL duties, is also forwarded under separate cover, Attachment No. 2.

3. At present, the AMSPELL group in Caracas is concentrating its efforts on working with Identity B and in maintaining good relations with the press in order to carry out propaganda at the least cost with such groups as the Jose Marti Patriotic Club and the UCE.

4. The AMSPELL delegation is in contact with a number of student political leaders not only at UCV but at several of the other universities. These contacts include Identities E, F, G, H and I.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

Attachments:
1. Brochure, u/sc
2. Description of Duties, u/sc } (3 att)
3. Identities, u/sc

DISTRIBUTION:
3-WH, w/3 attachments
2-WH/C, w/attachment Nos. 1&3
2-COS, Caracas, w/attach Nos 2&3

CS COPY

19-124-26/3

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
7 Sept 65	SEP 16 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 23,069

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

1 att.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	U/SC Attachment No. 3 UFGA 23,069

IDENTITIES:

A. Manuel Salvat Roque.

B. "OSEEM" - Oficina al Servicio del Estudiantado de Educacion Media.

C. Lazaro Farinas

D. Enrique Baloira.

E. Regulo Arias.

F. Guillermo Alvarez Bajcires.

G. Humberto Celi.

H. Carlos Artimani Gasperi, President of the FCU at the University of Zulia.

I. Oscar Yanez, Director of OSEEM.

Distribution:
3 - WH, u/sc
2 - WH/C, u/sc
2 - COS, Caracas,u/sc

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

PRINCIPIOS ESENCIALES
DEL
GREMIALISMO ESTUDIANTIL

Un Centro de Estudiantes, para considerarse ORGANISMO GREMIAL, debe distinguirse por su:

UNICIDAD:

— Debe ser único por eficacia, conveniencia económica, educación del estudiante en materia de solidaridad y fundamentos legales de representatividad de TODO el estudiantado.

— En muchos paises (el nuestro) no se da por la violenta división politica.

NEUTRALIDAD:

— No puede identificarse con intereses de grupo.

— Su formulación aparece en un articulo de los estatutos que señala la aconfesionalidad y el apartidismo del gremio.

— No significa desinterés por las actividades religiosas o politicas.

— Tampoco puede significar la neutralidad, que el gremio no puede pronunciarse frente a la realidad: contra el engaño y en favor de la verdad.

DEMOCRACIA INTERNA:

— Principio que tiende a promover y a garantizar la libre contribución de todos los estudiantes en todo lo que atañe a la vida misma del Gremio Estudiantil.

REPRESENTATIVIDAD:

— Un Centro de Estudiantes debe ser el UNICO gremio estudiantil de derecho y de hecho.

— La Unicidad y la Democracia Interna son bases de la Representatividad.

— Lo fundamental es el contenido: SERVICIO DEL BIEN COMUN ESTUDIANTIL.

HACIA UN GREMIALISMO ESTUDIANTIL VENEZOLANO

Graficas Alfer — Telf 55 52 02
10.000

OFICINA AL SERVICIO DEL ESTUDIANTADO DE EDUCACION MEDIA

DIRECCION PROVISIONAL:

QUINTA ARAGONESA - LOS CAOBOS
(FRENTE A LA ESTATUA DE C. COLON)
TELEFONO 55 54 01

ESTUDIANDO • JUGANDO • TRABAJANDO • LUCHANDO • HAGAMOS NUEVA PATRIA



Que es O. S. E. E. M.?	Que servicios presta O. S. E. E. M.?
OSEEM es una **Oficina al Servicio del Estudiante de Educación Media.**	
OSEEM es una **Oficina de Formación**	.. Ofrece al Estudiante una formación social, cultural, humana y espiritual.
OSEEM es una **Oficina de Orientación Gremialista**	Da al Estudiante los implementos indispensables para crear una conciencia gremial en su ambiente y despolitizar su institución educacional.
OSEEM es una **Oficina Relacionadora de los Estudiantes Cristianos**	..Crea en el Estudiante cristiano el "Espíritu de Unidad" .. Todos los cristianos construimos una comunidad, aspiramos los mismos ideales, deseamos una nueva Patria .. Aúna los esfuerzos de todos los cristianos.
OSEEM es una **Oficina al Servicio de todo el Estudiantado de Educación Media**	.Pretende colaborar y servir en la renovación de la Educación Media, estudiar los actuales problemas de Educación y colaborar en la transformación de sus estructuras para que cumplan lo mejor posible con su objeto.
OSEEM es una **Oficina Animadora de la vida Estudiantil**	...Pretende dinamizar la vida humana, social, cultural, deportivo, etc. del estudiantado de Educación Media, mediante servicios "ad hoc"...

OSEEM

nació para servir: al Movimiento Estudiantil Venezolano.

NO VINE A SER SERVIDO, SINO A SERVIR

En síntesis...

O. S. E. E. M. es

I.o Servicio de

FORMACION Y ACCION



OSEEM

Formación
- Religiosa
- Cívica
- Social
- Cultural

Acción
- Gremial
- Cívica

Servicios
- Culturales
- Religiosos
- Cívicos
- Económicos
- Recreativos
- Estudiantiles

IIo. Servicio de

COORDINACION



OSEEM

COORDINACION

Estudiantes Cristianos de Educación Media

I) DELEGACION DEL D.R.E.

Hasta nuestro viaje a Caracas el delegado era Enrique Baloira, quien fue sustituido debido a su decision de venir a seguir estudios en Estados Unidos. El nuevo delegado es Lazaro Fariñas, quien es miembro del D.R.E. desde 1960 en Cuba dentro de la Pre-Universitaria y luego en Accion y Sabotaje. En el exilio participo dentro de la seccion militar y mas tarde en Santo Domingo como delegado ocupado en resolver los asuntos pendientes despues de la paralizacion del plan militar. Lleva alrededor de un mes en Venezuela.

✓ Antonio Yaniz, miembro del DRE. desde Cuba en 1960. Actuo como Coordinador Provincial de Las Villas. Mas tarde vino al exilio y se infiltro a principios de 1961 clandestinamente en coordinacion con nuestros amigos para preparar ~~unxx~~ alzamiento en las Villas. En 1961 llega a Caracas incorporandose a la delegacion. Mas tarde trabaja con un grupo de venezolanos en actividades de Inteligencia en coordinacion con los "[illegible]". En la actualidad estudia Medicina en la Universidad Central donde [illegible] el trabajo de la delegacion.

Jose Miguel Gonzalez Llorente, acaba de terminar estudios de [illegible] en la Universidad Catolica en Caracas. Es encargado de Propaganda de la delegacion. Es necesario recalcar que el trabajo de Propaganda es [illegible] mucho mayor reducido despues de terminar las relaciones entre la delegacion y nuestros amigos, manifestandose unicamente en notas de prensa y relaciones personales con periodistas y organos de publicidad. En estos momentos Jose Miguel se encuentra fuera de Caracas pues fue enviado por unos meses a España por la compania donde trabaja en asuntos de publicidad

Lula Santos, iugalmente trabajo dentro del DRE desde 1960. En la actualidad estudia Psicologia en la Universidad Catolica donde desempena su labor del DRE. Su trabajo especial consiste en asuntos relacionados con la Secretaria de la Delegacion.

Guillermo Boza , estudia en la Universidad Catolica dentro de la Facultad de Sociologia. Ademas trabaja en el Instituto Venezolano de Accion Comunitaria(IVAC) ocupado en conferencias y charlas a campesinos para incorporarlos a un trabajo de desarrollo comunitario. En este campo desenvuelve actividades de la delegacion.

Sergio Gomez, Actualmente trabaja como Vice-Generente de la Empresa de Television "Vene-Vision". Es miembro del DRE. desde 1960 en Cuba. Su actividad dentro de la delegacion es de colaboracion en diversos asuntos pues carece de tiempo para algo especifico. La importancia basica es la influencia dentro de una estacion de Television, paralizando noticias que alienten o favorezcan el comunismo.

Pacifico Calera, estudia en la Universidad del Zulia junto con Aurelia Bussot. Viven en Maracaibo donde mantienen la delegacion especialmente en actividades de relaciones estudiantiles. Tienen una gran amistad con Carlos Artimani Gasperi(presidente de la Federacion de Centros Universitarios del Zulia) de inspiracion social-cristiana.

German Adolfos Maleiro, Venezolano que estudia derecho en la Universidad de Carabobo. Reside en Valencia. No es miembro de la delegacion pero realiza las actividades correspondientes en los campos de propaganda y relaciones. Tnabaja en el Rectorado de la Universidad teniendo acceso a las listas de estudiantes. En caracas se paso una lista de estudiantes comunistas de aquella Universidad brindada por este contacto. Al mismo tiempo se senalo la importancia de mantener relaciones con el a nuestros amigos.

PRINCIPIOS ESENCIALES
DEL
ORGANISMO ESTUDIANTIL

Un Centro de Estudiantes, para considerarse ORGANISMO [illegible], debe distinguirse por su:

[illegible]IDAD:

—Debe ser [illegible] por eficacia, conveniencia económica, [illegible] solidaridad y fun[illegible] de TODO el estu[illegible]

[illegible] (El [illegible]) no se [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] con [illegible]

[illegible] y [illegible]

[illegible] todo lo que [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] y de la [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ESTUDIANTIL [illegible]

OFICINA AL SERVICIO DEL [illegible]TADO DE [illegible] EDUCACION [illegible]

[illegible]

(u [illegible])

[illegible] 55 01

ESTUDIANDO... o JUGANDO... o TRABAJANDO... o [illegible]ANDO... [illegible]



[illegible] O.S.E.E.M.?

es una Ofici[illegible]

es una Ofici[illegible]

es una [illegible]

es una Oficina [illegible] de los [illegible] Cristianos

es una Ofici[illegible]

es una Ofici[illegible] la vida Estudiantil

OSEEM: ... nació para servir al Movimiento Estudiantil Venezolano.

¿Qué [illegible] puede O.S.E.E.M.?

...Ofrece al Estudiante una formación [illegible] humana y [illegible]

...Da al E[illegible]

...Crea en el Estudiante cristiano el "Espíritu de Unidad" ... Todos [illegible] construir [illegible], [illegible] remos [illegible] ideales, de [illegible] una nueva Patria ... Aúna [illegible] esfuerzos de todos los cristianos.

...Pretende [illegible] y servir en la renovación de [illegible] Educación. [illegible] los [illegible] problemas de Educación y col[illegible] en la transformación de sus estructuras para [illegible] su objeto.

...Pretende dinamizar la vida humana, social, cultural, deportiva, etc. del estudiantado de Educación Media, mediante servicios "ad hoc"...

NO VINE A SER SERVIDO, SINO A SERVIR

[illegible] O.S.E.E.M.

Le [illegible]



O.S.E.E.M.
Formación
Religiosa
Cívica
Social
Cultural
Acción
Cívica
Gremial
Servicios
Culturales
Religiosos
Cívicos
Académicos
Estudiantiles
Recreativos

IIo. Servicio de [illegible]

([illegible])



OSEEM
COORDINACION
Estudiantes Cristianos de Educación Media

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

49 SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	D
4		8	✗

UNIT	TIME	BY

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE VR, DO 4, DO/H 3, WH 8, CI/OA

12 SEPT,

50330

ACTION

SECRET 112038Z

DIR INFO DOST CITE WAVE 5664

TYPIC AMSPELL

REF: DIR 40414

1. ALTHO AMBARB-54 STILL CONNECTED WITH AMSPELL, AND CONSIDERED VALUABLE ASSET WITHIN AMSPELL, HE PLANS LEAVE AREA END OF SEPT TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT IN HQS AREA AT HIGHER SALARY WITH MORE CAREER POTENTIAL WITH PRIVATE FIRM OR INTERNATIONAL AGENCY. PRESENT AMSPELL SETUP AND SALARY PREVENT MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF AMBARB-54 WHOM WAVE ASSESSES AS INTELLIGENT CAPABLE AGENT.

2. IF AMBARB-54 IS NOT OF INTEREST OF DYVOUR IN SOME OTHER CAPACITY, WAVE HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO KULAMP CONTACT.

SECRET

CFN 5664 40414 AMBARB-54 AMSPELL SEPT HQS NOT OF NO OBJECTIONS

BT

SC

10

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLA...FIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

GROUP 1

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA

File
Amspell

S E C R E T 122323Z

12 JUL 65 IN 09903

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 3887

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF SDOM 5890 (IN 05918)

1. AMSPELL HAS 16MM BEFORE-AND-AFTER COMPARISON CONDITIONS PRRUMEN, ENTITLED "LA CUBA DE AYER." ALTHOUGH NOT HIGHEST PROFESSIONAL QUALITY, FILM CONSIDERED SATISFACCTRY FOR TV SHOWINGS (AS BEEN SHOWN IN WAVE AREA AT SPANISH-LANGUAGE MOVIE THEATERS AND AT ORGANIZATIONAL MEETINGS).

2. SUGGEST EMADLIB-1 WRITE AMSPELL (IDEN).

SECRET

S E C R E T

CFN 3887 5890 AMSPELL 16MM "LA CUBA DE AYER." NOT HIGHEST TV SPANISH EMADLIB-1

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM

JMWAVE

ACTION

WH 2

☑ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/C 2, CA 2, CA/PEG, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

SECRET 122334Z

12 JUL 65 IN 09904

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 3888

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF WAVE 3887 (IN 09905)

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

2893 NORTH WEST SEVENTH STREET

MIAMI, FLORIDA.

TELEPHONE: 633-3508.

SECRET

SECRET

CFN 3888 3887 DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL 2890 NORTH WEST SEVENTH STREET MIAMI FLORIDA 633-3508

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO File Amspell

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 78

17 SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP--	5	MMO
2		6	CA
3	FI-TG	7	D
4	RR	8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, FE6, CA/O4, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT

SECRET 061600Z 6 JUL 65 IN 05693

DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 3833

TYPIC AMSPELL [illegible]

1. AMSPELL INVITED BY JAPAN STUDENT ASSOCIATION SEND OBSERVER ATTEND INTERNATIONAL STUDENT CONFERENCE JAPAN 19 JULY 9 AUGUST. HOWEVER NO FUNDS OFFERED TO COVER TRAVEL EXPENSES. (Conservative Group)

2. PLS ADVISE IF AMSPELL ATTENDANCE DESIRED.

SECRET

CFN 3833 AMSPELL JAPAN 19 JULY 9 AUGUST NO FUNDS

BT

CHACONAS

HARRISON

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 4

34 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WHC 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO. VR FILE CA 2, CA/PROP,

S E C R E T 262012Z

DIR CITE WAVE 3333

TYPIC PSYCH

REF DIR 20523 *

26 JUN 65 IN 99758

AMSPELL WORKING ON PRESS RELEASE WITH IDEN FOLLOWING REF GUIDANCE, ATTRIBUTING BASIC STORY TO INSIDE UNIVERSITY SOURCES. EXPECT IDEN WIRE SERVICE ARTICLE 28 JUNE. WAVE RADIO ASSETS AND AMHIM WILL PICK UP FOR WIDER PLAY AND EDITORIALIZING.

S E C R E T

CFN

* RE. PROP EXPLOITATION OF N.Y TIMES AND WASH. POST ARTICLE

SECRET

4-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

3y SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR. CA 2, CA/PROP.

SECRET 262107

DIR CITE WAVE 3534

TYPIC PSYCH

REF WAVE 3533 IN 99758

IDEN: ADOLFO MERINO, UPI, REP.

SECRET

CFN

26 Jan 65 IN 99757

SECRET

14-00000

5

MESSAGE FORM 18

46 SECRET

ROUTING

1	P-	5	SS
2		6	
3	mo	7	D
4	CA	8	✗

ORIG: S. CHACONAS:car
UNIT: WH/C/CA/PP
EXT: 6678
DATE: 24 MAY 65

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

25 MAY 65 22 07z

SIG CEN

TO: JMWAVE SANTIAGO

File

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8

INFO: VR, FILE, WH 7, C/CA

TO WAVE INFO SAGO CITE DIR 13438

TYPIC AMSPELL FUBIAS

REF: WAVE 2106 (IN 73874)*

FUBIAS-5 PLACEMENT BEING DISCUSSED WITH OTHER KUBARK COMPONENTS. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

CHACONAS
HARRISON
OTT
GONZALEZ

WH/C Comment: *Suggests F-5 may be used elsewhere L.A.

C/WH/C/CA
C/WH/C/MO
WH/4 Michael C. Capraro (phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

25-21

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO 6
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-26
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

C[illegible]IFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 9

84 SECRET

BY ☑ REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 19-124-26

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO VR. FILE WH 7, CI/OA, PG 2

S E C R E T 222047Z

DIR INFO SAGO CITE WAVE 2136

22 MAY 65 IN 73874

TYPIC AMSPELL FUBIAS

REF A. DIR 12292 *

B. SAGO 5581 **

1. WAVE HAS NO PLANS USE FUBIAS-5 (201-288237) LOCALLY. AFTER HIS ARRIVAL WAVE AREA, STATION WILL DISCUSS HIS QUALIFICATIONS WITH AMHINT-2. HOWEVER, HE WILL BE PLACED AMSPELL PAYROLL ONLY IF AMSPELL NEEDS REPLACEMENT AS STATION DOES NOT INTEND INCREASE PAYROLL.

2. DEFER HQS RE USE ELSEWHERE LATIN AMERICA. REF B INDICATES FUBIAS-5 HAS STRONG SENSE LOYALTY TO AMSPELL. TO AVOID PROBLEMS DIVIDED LOYALTY, SUGGEST RECRUITMENT FOR LATIN AMERICAN ASSIGNMENT SHOULD BE SINGLETON BASIS WITH NO COVER OR OTHER RELATIONSHIP WITH AMSPELL.

* RE TERMINATION FUBIAS PROJECT

** CABLE OVER A YEAR OLD.

SECRET

S E C R E T

CFN

WH/C ES

19-124-26/3

22 May 65

MESSAGE FORM 21

24 SECRET

ORIG: J. LINTON/ems
UNIT: WH/4/CHILE
EXT: 6868
DATE: 20 MAY 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-26/3

ROUTING			
1	PP	5	SS
2		6	
3	mo	7	
4	CA	8	

TO: SANTIAGO INFO: JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-8 INFO: VR, FILE, WH/C-8, PG-2, CI/OA,

TO SAGO INFO WAVE CITE DIR

CHACONAS
[illegible]
OTT
GONZALEZ

12292

REFS: A. SAGO 9424 (IN 71039)*

B. WAVE 2014 (IN 71458)**

1. CONCUR IN TERMINATION FUBIAS PROJECT AS PROPOSED REF A.

2. NO OBJECTION TO TERMINATION FUBIAS-5. ASSUME F-5 ~~XXX~~ WOULD RESETTLE IN WAVE AREA.

3. FOR WAVE: DO YOU HAVE ANY INTEREST IN FUTURE EMPLOYMENT FUBIAS-5 LOCALLY OR IN OTHER ~~XXXX~~ DYVOUR AREA.

END OF MESSAGE

ABSTRACT

WH/C/ES

R I COPY

WH COMMENT: *Believe results FUBIAS Project not worth present costs and would like terminate, retaining FUBIAS-4 and FUBIAS-7 in other projects, unless DIR and WAVE have overriding reasons for continuing project in present form. FUBIAS-5 would be terminated but SAGO defers to Hqs re F-5's future employment and/or relocation.

**WAVE has no overriding reasons for continuation FUBIAS project.

19-124-26/3

21 May 65

C/WH/4/C

WH/C Mr. Chaconas (by phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOSEPH Y. KIYONAGA
C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report - March 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

REF: A. UFGA 20,729, 26 March 1965
B. UFGA 20,262, 9 March 1965

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. General

AMSPELL has continued its normal propaganda activities as outlined below. On 23 March 1965, AMHINT-2 agreed to the terms outlined in Reference B, including a substantial budget reduction, to become effective 1 April. AMSPELL's chief problem at the present time is to liquidate debts incurred as a result of the defunct AMSPELL paramilitary operation.

2. Propaganda

a. The March 1965 edition of the regular AMSPELL newspaper was mailed to Latin America and AMSPELL delegations in the U. S. (9,800 copies), attachment No. 1 under separate cover.

b. The March 1965 edition of the pony AMSPELL newspaper was mailed into Cuba (4,800 copies), attachment No. 2 under separate cover.

c. The AMSPELL international bulletin was mailed to its normal recipients during March 1965. Spanish edition — 2,900 copies, attachment No. 3. French edition — 1,925 copies, attachment No. 4. English edition — 1,925 copies, attachment No. 5.

/ CONTINUED /

Attachments:
1 thru 12, u/sc (att.)

Distribution:
3 - C/WH, w/attachs, u/sc

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 10 May 65	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 21,514	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-26/3	

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

d. In connection with the prisoners' campaign (paragraph 5(a) below), 10,000 copies of the Prisoners' Message were printed, attachment No. 6; 5,000 copies of a letter to Chilean President Eduardo Frei, attachment No. 7; 5,000 circular letters to Latin American Identity A organizations, attachment No. 8; and 5,000 copies of a circular letter to AMSPELL Delegates, attachment No. 9.

3. Radio Propaganda

AMSPELL continued its regular radio operations consisting of a 15-minute program Tuesdays through Saturdays on AMTHIGH, and a 15-minute program broadcast every Monday over WMIE and several Latin American stations.

4. Press Releases

Miscellaneous press releases are included as attachment No. 10, under separate cover.

5. Other Activities.

a. The prisoners' campaign got off to a slow start. The Identity B meeting in March, which was supposed to have been the kick-off of the campaign, did not produce the expected results. Identity C was on a Latin American tour and was unable to attend, and Identity D, who had promised to push the prisoners' cause at the meeting, limited himself to pleas for Cuban Identity E prisoners. The letter written to Chilean President Eduardo Frei (attachment No. 7) by AMSPELL members imprisoned on the Islo of Pines was forwarded to the AMSPELL delegation in Santiago for delivery to the President. The Chilean elections, followed by the earthquake complicated this plan and the delivery of the letter was delayed. (See paragraph 2-d above for information re propaganda printed by AMSPELL in connection with the campaign.)

b. In connection with the 13 March anniversary of the assault on the Cuban Presidential Palace, AMSPELL issued a press release (attachment No. 10), all publications contained appropriate editorials and, in addition to full coverage on the regular AMSPELL radio programs, additional radio coverage was obtained on JMHOPE and AMTHIGH with a special interview. The AMSPELL publication re the anniversary is attached under separate cover, No. 11.

c. The AMSPELL delegation in Mexico participated in the tribute to Venezuelan workers (CTV) organized by the Cubans residing in Mexico City. (See attachment No. 10 for pertinent press releases.) Activities of other AMSPELL Delegations including publications and press releases are included under attachment No. 12.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

Operational expenses	$ 10,224.46
Salaries	5,650.00
Additonal printing expense (prisoners' campaign)	2,100.00
TOTAL	$ 17,974.46

C. FUTURE PLANS

Implement the Reference B decisions.

Bruce P Vedder
for ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-26

RET. TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID ☐

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

INFO VR. FILE DDP WH 7

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

RI COPY

SECRET 011924Z

DIR INFO PACY CITE WAVE 0166

TYPIC AMSPELL AMBARB

REFS: A. DIR 97621

B. WAVE 0108 (IN 35201)

C. HZPA 14984

REF B REPLIED QUERIES REF C.

SECRET

CFN

1 Apr 65 IN 36082

U

SECRET

AN W [redacted] [redacted] WH/C/ES [redacted]

ABSTRACT

19-124-26

1 Apr 65

FORM 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

[redacted] RI COPY [redacted] RI COPY [redacted]

(35)

File 19-134,
Amspell

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

☒ COPY ☐ DUPE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MNO	7	D
4	RR-OS	8	L

FROM
JMWAVE
ACTION
WH/C 2
INFO
VR. FILE, DDP, WH 7, CI 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT

S E C R E T 312121Z

PACY INFO DIR CITE WAVE 8108

TYPIC AMSPELL AMBARB

REFS: A. HZPA 14800
B. HZPA 14984
C. HZPA 14737

31 Mar 65 IN 35201

1. FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH AMSPELL CHIEF AMHINT-2, BELIEVE AMSPELL MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED REF A ACTION BY AMBARB-43 BUT NOT IN EXAGGERATED FORM PUBLICIZED BY AMBARB-43. AMHINT-2 DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE REF B ACTION, SPECULATED AMBARB-43 TRYING IDENTIFY AMSPELL WITH AIMS PANAMANIAN STUDENTS. WAVE OPINION AMBARB-43 REF B ACTION PROBABLY COMPLETELY OWN INITIATIVE AS PERSONAL PIQUE AGAINST KUBARK. AMBARB-43 WAS POSSIBLY AWARE DETERIORATING AMSPELL WAVE RELATIONSHIP AND THIS COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED SOUR ATTITUDE.

2. FYI, FOR REASONS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED AMBARB-43 SITUATION, WAVE MADE DRASTIC CUT AMSPELL SUBSIDY EFFECTIVE 1 APRIL AND TOLD AMHINT-2 AMSPELL WOULD HAVE TO CEASE ANTI KUBARK ACTIVITY. AFTER RECEIPT REF B ATTACHMENT, AMHINT-2 WAS TOLD AMBARB-43 MUST BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL OR REMOVED FROM PANAMA.

3. PENDING OUTCOME CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH AMHINT-2 RE FUTURE

SECRET

IN 35201

[illegible], DO NOT WISH RECOMMEND REPLACEMENT FOR AMBARD-1 AS REQUESTED PARA 6 REF C. AT THIS MOMENT COULD NOT GUARANTEE AMBARD AGENT LOYALTY TO STATION. WILL ADVISE FURTHER AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH AMWHIP-2 ABOUT 3 APRIL.

SECRET

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☒ COPY ☐ RUBB

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 2

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

VR. FILE, DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/SI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT

S E C R E T 312121Z

PACY INFO DIR COTE WAVE 0108

TYPIC AMSPELL AMBARB

REFS: A. HZPA 14800

B. HZPA 14984

C. HZPA 14737

31 MAR 65 IN 35201

1. FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH AMSPELL CHIEF AMHINT-2, BELIEVE AMSPELL MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED REF A ACTION BY AMBARB-43 BUT NOT IN EXAGGERATED FORM PUBLICIZED BY AMBARB-43. AMHINT-2 DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE REF B ACTION, SPECULATED AMBARB-43 TRYING IDENTIFY AMSPELL WITH AIMS PANAMANIAN STUDENTS. WAVE OPINION AMBARB-43 REF B ACTION PROBABLY COMPLETELY OWN INITIATIVE AS PERSONAL PIQUE AGAINST KUBARK. AMBARB-43 WAS POSSIBLY AWARE DETERIORATING AMSPELL WAVE RELATIONSHIP AND THIS COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED SOUR ATTITUDE.

2. FYI, FOR REASONS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED AMBARB-43 SITUATION, WAVE MADE DRASTIC CUT AMSPELL SUBSIDY EFFECTIVE 1 APRIL AND TOLD AMHINT-2 AMSPELL WOULD HAVE TO CEASE ANTI KUBARK ACTIVITY. AFTER RECEIPT REF B ATTACHMENT, AMHINT-2 WAS TOLD AMBARB-43 MUST BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL OR REMOVED FROM PANAMA.

3. PENDING OUTCOME CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH AMHINT-2 RE FUTURE

SECRET

[illegible]
IN 35201

[illegible] DO NOT WISH RECOMMEND REPLACEMENT FOR AMBARD-[illegible] REQUESTED PARA 6 REF C. AT THE MOMENT COULD NOT GUARANTEE AMBARD AGENT LOYALTY TO STATION. WILL ADVISE FURTHER AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH AMHINT-2 ABOUT 9 APRIL.

SECRET

SECRET

4-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROC. POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report -- January and February 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI:

REF: UFGA 19,393, 18 January 1965

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES:

1. General.

AMSPELL operational activities during January and February were of a routine nature, details of which are noted in the paragraphs below. AMSPELL-KUBARK relations have continued to deteriorate since the collapse of the AMSPELL paramilitary effort in the fall of 1964, and at the end of February the Station decided to reduce the AMSPELL subsidy. This problem was discussed in UFGA 20,262, 9 March 1965. We shall start implementing this decision at the beginning of April.

2. Propaganda.

a. The January and February 1965 editions of the regular AMSPELL newspaper were mailed to Latin America and AMSPELL delegations in the U. S. (9,800 copies each), attachment No. 1 under separate cover. This represents a planned reduction from the previous 19,800 monthly figure.

b. The January and February 1965 editions of the pony AMSPELL newspaper were mailed into Cuba (4,800 copies each), attachment No. 2 under separate cover.

c. The AMSPELL international bulletin was mailed to its normal recipients during January and February 1965. Spanish editions--2,900 copies each, attachment No. 3. French edition--1,925 copies each, attachment No. 4. English edition--1,925 copies each, attachment No. 5.

/ CONTINUED /

19-124-26/3

Attachments:
1 thru 7, as stated, u/sc
8 Identity, u/sc

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA,w/attachs u/sc

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
23 Mar 65

DATE DISPATCHED
MAR 26 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 20,729

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	

d. 5,000 copies of the leaflet enclosed as attachment No. 6 were mailed to Cuba during January.

e. 10,000 copies of attachment No. 7 have been printed and will be distributed in Latin America in connection with the prisoners' campaign discussed in paragraph C below.

3. Radio Propaganda.

AMSPELL continued its regular radio operations consisting of a 15-minute program daily except Sunday on AMTHIGH, and a 15-minute program broadcast every Monday over WMIE and several Latin American stations.

4. Other Activities.

CARA 9922 and related traffic discussed problems with AMSPELL representatives in Caracas.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED:

	January	February
Operational Expenses	$ 10,078.	$ 10,040.
Salaries	5,650.	5,650.
Printing (10,000 pamphlets, attachment No. 6)	2,200.	- - -
Extra Mailing Expenses	-	900.
TOTAL	$ 17,928.	$ 16,590.

C. FUTURE PLANS:

AMSPELL is planning a publicity campaign in cooperation with Identity to publicize the situation of prisoners in Cuba. The major phase of this campaign will not be launched until the March executive-committee meeting of Identity. AMSPELL representatives in Santiago, Chile, who are local station assets, will also launch a related campaign regarding AMSPELL martyrs in prison (See WAVE 9497).

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.
	SECRET		2

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER Attachment No. 8, u/sc UFGA 20,729

IDENTITY: Inter-American Press Society (SIP).

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA, u/sc

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 19-124-26
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RI ☐ COPY ☐ DUM

FROM
SANTIAGO

ACTION
WH/C 8

INFO
VR, FILE DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI, FI, CI/IC 2

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

WH/SA/NP

S E C R E T 232057Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE SAGO 8956

TYPIC AMSPELL

REF: SAGO 8923 (IN 24230)

23 MAR 65 IN 29240

AMHINT LETTER ARVD SAGO 23 MARCH ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL PRISONER PROP. FUBIAS GROUP WILL ATTEMPT ARRANGE DIRECT INTERVIEW WITH FREI APPROX FIRST WEEK APRIL THRU FERNANDO SANHUEZA, PDC DEPUTY. F-5 WILL PRESENT LETTER TO FREI AND THEN REQUEST FREI ASSISTANCE. WILL ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE INTERVIEW JUST BEFORE SOLIDARITY WITH POL PRISONERS WEEK TO INCREASE PUBLICITY AND EFFECTIVENESS. IF FREI REFUSES MAKE ANY COMMENTS SAGO WILL REPLAY LETTER IN LOCAL PRESS INDICATING FREI RCVD ORIGINAL AND NOW STUDYING MATTER. ALSO PLAN FUBIAS PRESS RELEASE, RADIO AND PRESS REPLAY.

S E C R E T

CFN [illegible]

SECRET

19-124-26/3

23 Mar 65

File 19-124-27

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

34 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 13

1	PP -	5	mo
2		6	
3		7	D
4	CA	8	

FROM SANTIAGO

ACTION WHC 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CA/O 4, SI/CA, CI/OPS

SECRET 152155Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE SAGO 3923

16 MAR 65 IN 24230

TYPIC AMSPELL

REF: WAVE 9497 (IN 22[illegible])

NO NEED AMHINT-2 - Salvat TRAVEL SAGO. FUDIAS GROUP CAN ARRANGE APPROPRIATE PUBLICITY AND CAN PRESENT LETTER TO FREI THROUGH INFLUENCE PDC FRIENDS. IF FREI DESIRES PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH A-2 THEN FUDIAS GROUP CAN INFORM A-2. REQUEST MAIL MATERIAL TO FUDIAS GROUP.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

22 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP —	5	mmo
2		6	
3		7	D
4	CA	8	✗

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

INFO VR. FILE DDP, CA 2, CA/PROP, C/IO, DO 4, DD/H3

10 MAR 65 IN 20011

SECRET 101641Z

DIR CITE WAVE 9375 (INGHURST ACTING)

REFS A. UFGA 20262

B. DIR 89097

1. RE PARA 4 REF A PLS ADVISE AMCOUP-1 AMSPELL TIME ON AMTHIGH WILL BE REDUCED TO ONE FIFTEEN MINUTE PROGRAM WEEKLY EFFECTIVE ONE APRIL. AMCOUP-1 SHOULD NOT DISCUSS WITH AMSPELL AT THIS TIME.

2. WILL DISCUSS POSSIBLE USE PRESENT AMSPELL TIME FOR OTHER WAVE PROGRAMS AT REF B RADIO CONFERENCE.

SECRET

CFN

Ref A-1 —
what will he tell them?

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

T,/2, SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 3108

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	SS
2		6	
3	MO	7	D
4	CA	8	+

FROM CARACAS

ACTION WH/C 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

VR. FILE DDP, WH 7, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 042145Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE CARA 0081.

4 MAR 65 IN 16100

TYPIC CITUTOR

REF: CARA [illegible] (82543)

1. CITUTOR-1 RETURNED CARA 1 MARCH. SAID CITUTOR-2 REQUESTED HIS PRESENCE TO HELP STRAIGHTEN OUT AMSPELL-KUBARK RELATIONSHIP.

2. STA CASE OFFICER MET CITUTOR-1 3 MARCH AND EXPLAINED REASON FOR DISMISSING CITUTOR-2 AND CITUTOR-7. (CITUTOR-1 TOLD PROPAGANDA PERFORMED BY CITUTOR-2 AND CITUTOR-7 NO LONGER OF INTEREST TO STA.) CITUTOR-1 UNDERSTOOD BUT SAID AMSPELLS WERE PBRUMENS UNITED IN ONE CAUSE AND THAT DISMISSAL OF ONE WOULD RESULT RESIGNATION WHOLE GROUP. STA CASE OFFICER ACCEPTED RESIGNATIONS AND AT MEETING 4 MARCH PRESENTED CITUTOR-1 WITH LETTERS OF TERMINATION FOR EACH CITUTOR. CITUTOR-1 TOLD EACH MEMBER INCLUDING SELF WOULD RECEIVE TWO MONTHS SEVERANCE PAY AGAINST SIGNED QUIT CLAIM.

3. CITUTOR-1 REMINDED THAT KUBARK COULD NOT CONTINUE WORK WITH UNIT WHICH HAS SPLIT LOYALTIES. IT POINTED OUT TO CITUTOR-1 THAT HIS UNILATERAL DECISION REMAIN JMWAVE AREA CONSIDERED UNFRIENDLY ACT. BELIEVE ~~[illegible]~~ CITUTOR-1 GOT MESSAGE AND ALTHOUGH PARTS OF CONVERSATION 3

14-00000

IN 16100 PAGE .

S
TRAINED, MEETING ENDED ON FRIENDLY AND BUSINESSLIKE NOTE.

4. FOR WAVE: AT STA DISCRETION IT CAN BE POINTED OUT TO AMSPELLS THAT CARA DECISION ACCEPT RESIGNATIONS ESSENTIALLY REACHED ON PROFESSIONAL GROUNDS AND NOT MEANT TO DEROGATE FROM THEIR POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. HOWEVER THEIR CONDUCT (ESP CITUTOR-1'S BORDERING ON STUDIED CONTEMPT FOR KUBARK.

SECRET

CFN

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG. : E.I. HARRISON:cm
UNIT : WH/C/CA/PP
EXT : 6055
DATE : 2 MARCH 65

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

4 MAR 65 22 53z

TO : JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/C3

INFO: 3DP, VR, FILE

TO WAVE INFO. CITE DIR

89889

TYPIC AMWORLD AMSPELL PSYCH

REFS: [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] WAVE-8905 (IN 14149)*

1. NO RESPONSE YET FROM SMABET.

2. PARA 4 REF A.CASE OFFICER WILL QUERY AMBIDDY-1 AT NEXT MEETING.

3. WILL ADVISE SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *REQUESTED INFO REGARDING FATE AMYUM-1.

WH/C/MO

C/WH/C/CA

WH/C/CA/EA C. JENKINS

WH/C/RR

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER 4-23

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME | BY

INFO VR, FILE,

11 FEB 65 IN 73555

S E C R E T 111620Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE CARA 9922

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMSPELL

REF: WAVE 8082 (IN 77043)

1. SEE NO NEED CITUTOR-1 RETURN CARA.

2. FOR DIR: STATION INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITIES FOR REPLACEMENT CITUTOR-1. PREFER OUTSIDER, NON-AMSPELL TYPE, WHOSE LOYALTY WOULD BE WITH KUBARK AND NOT WITH TWO BOSSES. WILL ADVISE RE CHOICE.

S E C R E T

CFN

MCB INT ~~SB~~ SB
IOS PERS AR
~~FOB~~ RTTS LOG CA
~~CI~~ SI BF HH
SEC NS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/WIARES/Operational
C AMSPELL Propaganda on the Congo Situation

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES
FYI:

REFS: A. DIR 68739, 4 December 1964
B. DIR 72761, 23 December 1964

1. Attached under separate cover is AMSPELL production of printed propaganda on the Congo situation. Page two of the AMSPELL December bulletin carried a full-page spread with photographs, attributing the Congo atrocities to Communist intervention. Approximately 3,000 copies of the Spanish-language edition were sent to Latin America and Spain in December. Approximately 2,000 copies each of the English and French language editions are being sent overseas (Europe, Asia, and Africa) during January. (Attachment No. 1, under separate cover.) The French edition was not available as this dispatch was being written but will be mailed 15 January.

2. The pony edition of the AMSPELL newspaper for December carried a brief story with photographs concerning the death of missionary Paul Carlson. Approximately 5,000 copies were mailed into Cuba at the end of December and early January. (Attachment No. 2, under separate cover.) In addition to the printed propaganda AMSPELL also carried appropriate news bulletins regarding the Congo atrocities on its 10-minutes' AMTHIGH program, with editorial comment attacking Communist exploitation of the Congolese.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachments:
1. Bulletin (2 copies), u/sc
2. AMSPELL Newspaper and Translation (2 copies), u/sc

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA, w/attachs, u/sc

19-124-26/3

COPY

2 [illegible]

DATE TYPED
13 Jan 65

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible] 18 [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 19,424

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

U/SC -Attachment No. 1 to
UFGA 19,424
DC/WH/SA

DRE internacional

AÑO 1 DICIEMBRE 1964 BOLETIN INFORMATIVO DEL DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL No. 7

NUESTRA OPINION

MENSAJE DE NAVIDAD

Al finalizar un año más, encontramos ante nosotros el panorama de un Mundo Nuevo en muchos aspectos, pero estatico y quizás atrasado en otros sentidos de la vida. La humanidad cumplirá dentro de unos días un año más; ¿pero acaso no está el hombre de hoy buscando para sí al igual que hace siglos un camino que le ayude a encontrar el verdadero objetivo de su Ser?

Diciembre es un mes de meditación en la vida de los hombres. Finaliza un año y comienza otro. Es hora de análisis y planificación de vida. Pero más que todo esto representa el renacimiento de una idea y de un modo de vivir para la humanidad. Un orden nuevo y revolucionario que nació hace veinte siglos, vuelve cada año en este mes a tomar plena vigencia, porque nosotros no hemos olvidado en nuestro duro bregar de meses la verdad y la razón de nuestras vidas.

Cabe entonces en este momento hacer una pregunta: ¿Se ha logrado consolidar la Paz Mundial? Una respuesta semejante y definitiva aparece cada año. El Mundo de hoy no solamente vive alejado de la Paz sino que cada día escoje caminos más difíciles para su logro, llevándole al irremediable peligro de las guerras nacionales e internacionales.

Dos causas hay en la realidad de este Mundo, una de orden Moral, la otra de características sociales y políticas. Ambas se complementan entre si y son necesarias para lograr una estabilidad dentro de la sociedad que ha tocado vivir al hombre.

Se quiere por una parte lograr la Paz en el Mundo de hoy, mientras por otra se rompen las fuerzas de Paz interior que existen en cada hombre. El hombre, la familia y la sociedad; únicos elementos capaces de lograr para el Mundo una Paz real y positiva se encuentran totalmente divididos y dentro de cada uno de ellos se ha sembrado la desconfianza y el temor hacia los demás.

Se ha jugado demasiado con las doctrinas e ideologías y estas en vez de sembrar en el hombre confianza en su destino y a su función dentro de la sociedad han servido para acrecentar el odio entre pueblos y razas, y aún entre hombres dentro de una misma comunidad.

Razón Moral esta que se basa en el olvido de un mandato: "Amaos los unos a los otros como yo os he amado" y "Mi Paz os dejo, mi Paz os doy".

Razón Social aquella que parte de una realidad olvidada por conveniencias particulares o de gobiernos: "La Paz es solamente consecuencia del establecimiento en cada Nación y el Mundo de regimenes o sistemas de gobierno basados en la justicia y la libertad del hombre".

El Mundo de hoy no es muy propicio a una Paz verdadera. El colonialismo, el imperialismo y los regimenes totalitarios de izquierda y derecha, proliferan sobre el globo ahogando al hombre sus ansias de libertad y justicia.

Nosotros como jóvenes y cubanos tenemos un derecho y deber para con nuestra Patria y la Paz del Mundo. Creemos que solamente habrá Paz en nuestra Patria cuando devolvamos a nuestros hermanos su derecho a pensar y actuar libremente, haciendo desaparecer el régimen de injusticia y terror que hoy sojuzga indiscriminadamente a nuestro pueblo.

El Mundo tiene un camino semejante al nuestro pero en una mayor escala. Debe darse a cada hombre dentro de cada sistema la libertad y la justicia a las cuales tiene derecho todo ser humano.

Prometer y hablar de Paz es un crimen y una cobardía cuando no existen detrás una clara y noble decisión de luchar incansable y tenazmente por su establecimiento dentro de cada país o conglomerado de naciones.

La Paz como todas las cosas valederas tienen un alto precio y hay que luchar por ella. Los enemigos del hombre son sus principales enemigos. Los que matan y esclavizan los pueblos condenándoles a vivir en condiciones indignos también son sus enemigos. Los que niegan al hombre su personalidad calificándole como cosa animal y deshumanizada, están contra la Paz del Mundo porque siembran más que nadie el odio dentro de la sociedad.

Quien quiera la Paz declare la guerra a estos enemigos de la humanidad.

Que estos días de Navidad sirvan para hacernos tomar una decisión definitiva: El restablecimiento moral de nuestra sociedad y el imperio total de la justicia en el Mundo.

LOS SUCESOS DEL CONGO

UNA MUESTRA DE LO QUE ES EL COMUNISMO

Los hechos sucedidos recientemente en el Congo han estremecido con honda preocupación al mundo civilizado, ya que en ellos se han violado los más esenciales principios humanos en un alarde de crueldad y crimen.

Los movimientos de Liberación han tenido para nosotros la natural simpatía porque mejor que nadie conocemos lo significativo de esa lucha. Sin embargo, en el caso de las mal llamadas tropas de Liberación del Congo, no tenemos, al igual que el resto del mundo civilizado, que repudiar esa acción sanguinaria que constituye una contribución más del comunismo internacional en su lucha por llevar a las naciones el dolor y la esclavitud.

El movimiento de Liberación del Congo al igual que otros, ha sido infiltrado totalmente por los comunistas y en este como en todos los anteriores puede verse con claridad el verdadero fin de destrucción y muerte que persigue la Internacional.

La lucha de Africa ha sido para los jóvenes del mundo una lucha mirada con honda simpatía y el crecimiento del Continente negro en Repúblicas con gobiernos propios es un símbolo de la decisión incontravertible de llevar esos paises hacia un destino mejor.

Por ello es que cuando una nación dentro del Continente africano ha peleado por su liberación ha tenido siempre el apoyo de todas las naciones del mundo.

Hoy sin embargo nuestra actitud y la del mundo civilizado y libre es totalmente adversa. Los hechos del Congo no están inspirados en un ansia de justicia y libertad, sino que por el contrario son el reflejo de la política que quieren imponer desde Moscú y Pekín.

Si ha molestado el hecho de sangre con sus consecuencias de crímenes, violaciones y atrocidades mucho tiene que molestar la actitud de los paises del Bloque Comunista y de algunos que sirven a sus intereses consciente o inconscientemente.

Estos sin el menor escrupulo se han lanzado a acusar a los paises que participaron en la acción de rescate menospreciando totalmente el acto humanitario de salvar la vida a personas de nacionalidades pertenecientes a paises no beligerantes.

Esa actitud acompañada con las protestas organizadas de estudiantes dentro de los paises comunistas demuestran claramente la dirección e intervención que mantienen en la guerra del Congo que pudiera haber sido una guerra de liberación y que infortunadamente se ha convertido en una guerra de mercenarios dirigida y alentada por las potencias comunistas.

Ante los hechos a un funcionario soviético sólo se le ocurrió decir que se había avisado de la ejecución de los prisioneros si se intentaba rescatarles.

Nosotros queremos hacer una pregunta al mundo civilizado porque sabemos que los comunistas no contestan estas preguntas ya que carecen de sentido humanitario: ¿Desde cuándo y en que Código de Guerra es permitido asesinar masivamente a los prisioneros cuando se les trata de rescatar? ¿Desde cuándo se autoriza a un ejército perpetrar crímenes contra ancianos, mujeres religiosas y niñas indefensas como represalia? ¿Desde cuándo es permitido realizar actos racistas a un pueblo o raza, máxime cuando este ha sido defendido en múltiples ocasiones de la descriminación a que fueron sometidos por intereses colonialistas?

Los asesinatos masivos, las violaciones de religiosas, mujeres y niñas y el crimen del Congo no pueden tener justificación nada más que para los que siembran el odio y dividen los pueblos.

Los comunistas no ganaron esta batalla. Africa tiene que ser libre pero no condicionada a la política soviética o china. Los causantes de estos hechos vandálicos no son representativos del verdadero espiritu del pueblo congoleño y tienen el total repudio de Africa y el Mundo.

Africa se siente avergonzada de esta acción, pero ello servirá para comprender que existe otro enemigo tan peligroso o más que el colonialismo.

La accion criminal del comunismo en Africa sólo tiene una respuesta y se la darán los propios africanos: SU DESTRUCCION.



LA SITUACION UNIVERSITARIA

Antes del Comunismo

1.- Habian 8 Universidades en Cuba.

2.- En 1959 habian más de 30,000 estudiantes Universitarios en las 8 Universidades.

3.- La Constitución de 1940 estipulaba que el 1% del Presupuesto Nacional seria entregado a la Universidad de La Habana.

4.- La Carta Magna Cubana garantizaba la autonomia Universitaria lo que hacia que la enseñanza superior en Cuba no estuviera sometida a ningún gobierno.

5.- En nuestras Universidades existia el ejercicio libre de las ideas, no coartandose ningún pensamiento.

6.- Los estudiantes Universitarios eligian cada año sus representantes estudiantiles en libres elecciones, asistiendo los dirigentes a Congresos Internacionales de juventudes en representación de los jóvenes cubanos.

7.- Las Universidades como centro máximo de la Democracia servian de medio idóneo para plantear las mejoras que el pueblo cubano pedia.

8.- Era requisito para el ingreso en las Universidades el tener 17 años de edad y haber cursado el Bachillerato (enseñanza de estudio) o aprobar severos exámenes de ingreso.

9.- El 90% del profesorado Universitario actuante en junio de 1959, ha marchado al exilio o ha renunciado a sus catedras por no querer aceptar al comunismo o no quererse doblegar a su doctrina.

10.- Cientos de estudiantes Universitarios guardan prisión en las cárceles comunistas, por el solo delito de amar la libertad. Las listas de martires cubanos asesinados ante los pelotones de fusilamiento o muertos por sus gestos de rebeldía han aumentado con los nombres de estudiantes universitarios como, Juanin Pereira, Virgilio Campanería, Julio A. Yebra, Tapia Ruano, Porfirio Ramirez, y tantos otros que han sabido morir antes que claudicar frente al comunismo.

Con el Comunismo

1.- Hay tres Universidades.

2.- Actualmente no llegan a 20,000 los estudiantes Universitarios.

3.- Abolida la Constitución del 40 y según el Presupuesto Nacional del Gobierno Comunista, la Universidad de la Habana ha recibido una rebaja de un 75% de sus entradas.

4.- El gobierno comunista, pisoteó la Autonomía Universitaria, alegando que las Universidades deben marchar junto a la Revolución Roja, sirviendo los intereses del régimen.

5.- El régimen dictatorial de Fidel Castro impuso el marxismo-leninismo, como asignatura obligatoria en todas las carreras y proscribió la enseñanza de cualquier ideología contraria al comunismo.

6.- Desde octubre de 1959, no se han celebrado elecciones Estudiantiles, ya que la única vez que quisieron legalizar la representación universitaria, los comunistas celebraron una llamada Asamblea General, donde por "aclamación" se aligió la Nueva Directiva que después de 3 años sigue rigiendo, salvo contados casos.

7.- Actualmente las Universidades son organismos serviles al Gobierno comunista, controlados directamente por funcionarios de la Dictadura Roja.

8.- No hay requisitos de edad ni tampoco de haber cursado estudios secundarios. Dándose el caso que jóvenes de 14 años de edad realicen estudios universitarios sin estudios previos actualmente.

9.- No es requisito actualmente ser graduado universitario para ejercer de profesor en las Universidades comunistas de Cuba. Alumnos que han aprobado asignaturas del primer año y que cursan el segundo, son profesores de sus compañeros que inician sus estudios ese año, y así en la misma proporción los alumnos del 3er. curso con profesores del 2do. y los del 4to. el 3ro. etc.

10.- Mientras los verdaderos estudiantes dejan de estudiar en Cuba, guardan prisión, marchan al exilio o realizan la lucha contra el comunismo, el gobierno Rojo utiliza jóvenes que sin preparación previa asisten a las aulas universitarias con el solo próposito de servir de títeres a los comunistas en el Tablado Internacional.

Noticiero ESTUDIANTIL

CIEN ESTUDIANTES PANAMEÑOS A MOSCU – Según César Brugiatti, estudiante en la Universidad Patricio Lumumba de Moscú y dirigente de la Asociación de Estudiantes Panameños en la capital moscovita, treinta jóvenes de Panamá estudian actualmente allí; su número se elevará muy pronto al centenar. Los becados panameños se dirigen a Moscú vía México, La Habana y Praga.

EN EL FUTURO: UNION DE ESTUDIANTES UNIVERSITARIOS CENTROAMERICANOS – Dirigentes estudiantiles de las universidades de Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador y Panamá se hallan laborando - local y colectivamente - en pro del propósito de fundar una Unión de Estudiantes Universitarios Centroamericanos. La idea no es nueva, pero ahora gana fuerza y es probable que se convierta en realidad antes de que transcurran muchos meses.

EL PROGRAMA DE COOPERACION POPULAR, MOTIVO DE DISCORDIA EN PERU – Los partidos de oposición convienen en la utilidad del programa de Cooperación Popular - asistencia técnica para proyectos comunales - auspiciado por el presidente Belaunde e impulsado por los estudiantes en gran parte, pero se oponen a su centralización de control en las manos personales de aquél. La coalición oposicionista - encabezada por el APRA - reclama que Cooperación Popular sea "municipalizada" o sea que cada municipio reciba los fondos pertinentes y los utilice localmente como estime conveniente. "Así se evitará la infiltración de comunistas en el programa", alega el APRA.

PARA VISITAR ALEMANIA OCCIDENTAL, UN REQUISITO: NO SER JOVEN – Alemania del Este permite que sus ciudadanos de avanzada edad visiten a familiares en Alemania Occidental, pero no deja que los jóvenes den ese viaje. Excusa alegada: "Es más fácil que allá tomen represalias con los jóvenes y no con los viejos". Y agrega el periódico Neues Deutschland de Alemania Oriental, como quien pone un parche: "Nadie debe pensar que nuestro gobierno no tiene confianza en la juventud ..."

UN "NUEVO CAMINO" PARA LA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE CHILE – En conclave reciente, los estudiantes de la Universidad Católica analizaron "la necesidad de adaptar sus estudios y la Universidad a las exigencias sociales del mundo de hoy". Punto aprobado, entre otros: que la Universidad actúe "con mayor independencia frente a la jerarquía eclesiástica", imprimiéndosele a ese centro de altos estudios "el espíritu renovador de la Iglesia de Juan XXIII y de Paulo VI contenido en el actual Concilio Ecuménico.

ESTUDIANTES UNIVERSITARIOS GUATEMALTECOS EN CAMPAÑA DE ALFABETIZACION – Por boca de su presidente, la Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios de Guatemala se ha comprometido a emprender una campaña de alfabetización a escala nacional. Se espera que un buen número de alumnos de las dos universidades del país (la de Guatemala y la denominada Rafael Landívar) coopere con la Coordinación de Alfabetización AEU creada al efecto.

CHILE – Santiago: La Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Católica (FEUC) llevó a cabo su **SEXTA CONVENCION ORDINARIA DE ESTUDIANTES** del 30 de septiembre al 3 de octubre, en ella se abordaron temas de gran solidez como: "Idea de Universidad", "Naturaleza y Problemas Actuales de la Universidad"; "Evolución y Situación de la Universidad Latinoamericana", etc. Llegando a conclusiones que abren el camino de una Reforma Universitaria moderna y eficaz. La documentación base se halla condensada en el libro especialmente editado por FEUC: "La Universidad: Nuestra Tarea", única obra en su género en Latinoamérica.

Juanin Pereira Varela

Los hombres que alcanzan a comprender el sentido de la existencia no pueden orientarse a un mero subsistir. Sus vidas encuentran razón y objetivo sólo en el servicio. Servicio a Dios y al prójimo. Quizás estas palabras encierran la grandeza de todos los hombres que han podido ser recogidos por la historia y admirados por la humanidad por los frutos positivos que alcanzaron. El afán de servicio los llevó a construir nuevos órdenes para que el hombre alcanzara plenamente la satisfacción de sus necesidades y adquiriera conciencia acerca de sus fines más elevados. Quizás estas palabras sean las únicas que pudieran hacer comprender a todos los jóvenes del mundo el sentido profundo y absoluto del sacrificio de cientos de estudiantes cubanos y especialmente el sacrificio de Juanin Pereira Varela.

Su vida no contemplaba otros ideales que servir. Servir a Dios, servir a la Patria. Servir a todos los cubanos brindándoles una oportunidad de vivir en una tierra libre y justa. Su vida desde que se consideró como realidad el establecimiento de un régimen totalitario en Cuba, fue dedicada desde las filas del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, a combatir y a sembrar. Combatir el mal que rompía la armonía, quebraba la sonrisa, reducía a la impotencia los afanes permanentes de libertad y justicia de nuestro pueblo. Combatir al enemigo que impedía la creación de un Orden Cristiano y que ahogaba la felicidad de sus hermanos de tierra. Sembrar su sacrificio y sus ideas para que en el futuro pudiera existir ese Orden, esa felicidad y esa justicia. Sembrar, pues, su destino no era triunfar humanamente. Su destino era morir y que su sangre hiciera lo que sus manos no lograron. Que despertara las conciencias de su pueblo, resucitando los latidos apagados del patriotismo y de la nacionalidad. Que su sangre fuera riego de destinos que en el futuro se realizacen plenamente para felicidad de su pueblo y para ejemplo del Continente de las Esperanzas, que ya quiere ser continente de realidades humanas.

Esa fue la vida de Juanin Pereira. En su afán de combatir fue abatido por balas milicianas, entregadas por la Unión Soviética para dominar a aquellos que se oponían a su Imperio. Pero esa bala que pretendió cortar su vida en un 17 de diciembre de 1961, en aquella playa de sombras de la Provincia de Pinar del Río, hizo nacer la luz que aún ilumina. Pues esa bala que mataba al hombre hacía germinar la semilla. Semilla que crece oculta entre palmas en cada rincón de Cuba. Semilla que está gritando al mundo el afán de libertad de un pueblo mártir. Semilla que ya no está oculta entre tierras, que ya nace y crece y se levanta altiva para hacer patente que Cuba no se rinde, ni se somete, ni muere. Que Cuba, pese a la traición de algunos de sus hijos, pese a la invasión de elementos extranjeros a nuestra nacionalidad y principios, pese al oportunismo ciego de algunos gobiernos occidentales, se mantiene firme y segura en su victoria. Porque en Cuba aquella semilla regada de sangre que fue y es Juanin Pereira Varela, aún existe en nuestros aires que mantienen sus gritos seguros de victoria y radiantes de esperanza:

¡VIVA CUBA LIBRE! ¡VIVA CRISTO REY!

DRE international

YEAR 1 DECEMBER 1964 CUBAN STUDENT DIRECTORATE'S INFORMATION BULLETIN No.7

OUR OPINION

CHRISTMAS MESSAGE

As another year draws to its end, we find before a world new in many aspects but sadly stagnant if not actually retrogressive in some of life's most vital facets. Humanity is a year older but is it not still engaged in a relentless search for the true meaning of its being?

December is a thoughtful month in the lives of men. It is the hour of retrospect, of questioning, of reorganization and projection into the future. Above all, December is a yearly reminder of an idea and a way of life for men. A new and revolutionary order born twenty centuries ago, comes vigourously to the forefront for in the long months of toil we have not forgotten the cause and the goal of our existence.

No time is perhaps more adequate to ask this question: Have men achieved for the world a lasting peace? Each year the same unconditional, negative answer meets the question. Not only does mankind live far removed from peace but each new day embarks upon roads that can only lead farther and farther away from it into world of national and international wars.

Two causes exist in the reality of our world, one in the moral order, the other in the realm of social and political entities. Each complements the other and both are necessary to the attainment of stability in the society in which man must live.

Men would have peace in today's world but do nothing to preserve the forces of internal peace in each man. Man, the family, society: the elements capable of achieving for the world a real and positive peace are totally disunited and into each has been sown the seed of distrust and of fear.

There has been such juggling of doctrines and ideologies, instead of being a source of confidence and strength by which men may rule their lives, have served only as a source of fear and hatred among nations and races and even among men in the same community.

Morally, our world has chosen to forget the command: "Love one another as I have loved you".

Socially, convenience and self interest have made this world blind itself to the fact that, "Peace can only be the consequent to the establishment in each Nation and in the world of regimes or systems of government based on justice and the freedom of the individual.

Today world is not a very adequate breeding ground for peace. Colonialism, imperialism, rightist and leftist totalitarianism thrive throughout the world stiffling in man his longing for liberty and equity.

We as young men and as Cubans have a duty and right to our land and to the world. Our land, we firmly believe, will know peace only when we have returned to our brothers the right to think and to speak freely, abolishing the rule of terror and injustice that today shackles our people.

The world faces much our same task but on a vaster scale. Each man must be given the freedom of choice and the justice which are his right.

To promise and to speak of peace without the noble purpose and the firm decision of fighting tirelessly for its attainment is a cowardly crime.

Peace, as all worthwhile things, has a high price and its achievement entails a struggle. Those who would have peace must willingly take up the battle against those forces at work in our world which dehumanize man and make him a prey of fear. No season is as appropriate as Christmas to reaffirm in each of us the determination to carry on this struggle until true peace has been given to man.

THE EVENTS IN THE CONGO

A PROOF OF WHAT COMMUNISM IS

Recent happenings in the Congo have rocked the civilized world, leaving in their wake a deep preocupation in the hearts of all who believed in even the most basic principles of humanity and who see in these acts a vengeful boast of cruelty against the most elemental principles of kindness and respect.

Those who struggle for freedom have always found in us the sympathy and understanding that only those who know full well that this struggle entails can give. We find, however, that in the case of the utterly misnamend "Congolese Troops of Liberation" we must (along with all civilized men) denounce this new and bloody contribution of international communism to the oppression and suppression of all peoples.

This movement has been, as others have been before, throroughly infiltrated by communists; and in this, as in other cases, the true goal of destruction and death sought by the International can clearly be seen.

The hearts of youth throughout the world have echoed in sympathy the cries, the tears, and the pain of Africa's birth. The growth of the Black Continent into a continent of republics is a symbol of the inconstable right of this Continent to a great destiny.

That is why the sincere struggles for freedom of African nations have met with our support as with that of all freedomloving peoples.

It is this love of true freedom that necessarily places us in a position of adversity towards this movement. The happenings in the Congo find their motivation not in a zealous search for justice and liberty but in the international policies Moscow and Peking seek to enforce in Africa by any and all means.

In the deaths, the rapes, the insults have greived and enraged then how must the attitude of the nations of the Communist Bloc and of those who, conciously or not, serve their interest rankle.



Without the slightest trace of scruple these nations have hurtled themselves into acrimonious abuse of the nations which took part in the rescue mission, whose only purpose was the humanitarian one of saving the lives of non-belligerents.

The attitude of these nations and the "student demonstrations" staged in communist countries to show approval of the Congolese rebels clearly show the direction they would have the Congo's liberation take. Where the Congolese struggle might have been a war of liberation, it has become instead a senseless war run by mercenaries and abetted by the Communist Powers.



When faced with the crimes in the Congo one Soviet official glibly dismissed the violence by stating that the rescuing nations had been warned it would happen if rescue was attempted.

We would ask this question of civilized men: By what Code of war can the slaughter of non-belligerents because of attempts to rescue them be justified? Since when has it been found permisible for an army to do its own ugly will in regards to old men, to missionaries, to women, and to children? Has racism suddenly found a moral justification?

Mass murder and rape can only find justification in those whose creed is hatred and whose aim is to divide.

Fortunately the Communists have not won this battle. Africa will have freedom, and it will not have the mauled, caged communist version of it. Those responsible for so much ugly violence in the Congo do not represent the spirit of the Congolese people and have received the condemnation of Africa and of the whole world.

Africa feels ashamed of what has happened, but this act will help her understand she has to face an enemy as dangerous, or more so, than colonialism.

The criminal actions of communism in the Congo have only one answer and the Africans themselves will give it: ITS REPUDIATION.



UNIVERSITIES STATUS

Before Communism

1.- There were 8 universities in Cuba.

2.- In 1959 there were more than 30,000 students in the 8 universities.

3.- The Constitution of 1940 stipulated that 1% of the national budget would go to the University of Havana.

4.- The Great Charter of Cuba guaranteed autonomy to the Universities, freeing them from interference by the government.

5.- There was a free and open exchange of ideas in the classrooms.

6.- Every year the students elected their own representatives in free elections.

7.- The universities served as spokenmen for the wishes of the Cuban people.

8.- To enter the Universities it was necessary to be 17 years of age and to have graduated from a secondary school or to have taken rigorous tests to prove knowledge equivalent to a secondary school education.

9.- Ninety percent of the University proffessorate is in exile or has retire, unwilling to have communist doctrines emposed upon it.

10.- Hundreds of university students are held in communist prisons, only because of their love for liberty. The lists of cuban martyrs, murdered by firing squads or killed by its rebelion, had been increased by the names of Cuban universities students such as: Juanin Pereira, Virgilio Campaneria, Julio A. Yebra, Tapia Ruano, Porfirio Ramirez, and so many others that had preferred to die than to submit to communism.

With Communism

1.- There are three universities.

2.- There are no more than 20,000 university students presently.

3.- The Constitution of 1940 has been abolished and the Communist regime has cut by 75% the funds destined for the University of Havana.

4.- The regime subjects the Universities requiring them to follow its dictates in all matters.

5.- Marxism Leninism is a required subject for all students and all other ideologies are forbidden.

6.- There have been no election since September 1959. At one point when an effort was made to have them held, the Communists arranged a so called "general assembly" where by, "popular acclaim", those who have since held control, were "elected".

7. Today, they are servile instruments of the regime.

8.- No requisites concerning age or previous education are set. There have been cases of fourteen-year old with little previous education studying at the universities.

9.- It is no longer a requisite to be a college graduate in order to be able to teach at the university. Second year students teach freshmen; third year students teach second year ones, etc.

10.- While real students left their classes, are held in prison, went to exile or fight communism, the Red Government uses uneducated young people as university students, with the only purpose to serve communist International Scene.

STUDENT NEWS SHEET

GUATEMALA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS START A "LITERACY DRIVE". The Association of University Students of Guatemala has pledged itself to undertake an alphabetization campaign on a national scale. It is expected that a good number of students from the two universities in the country will cooperate in this effort to teach the illiterate.

CHILE. The Federation of Students of the Catholic University (FEUC) held its Sixth Ordinary Convention of Students from September 30th. to October 3th. Among the topics discussed were: "The Idea of a University", "the nature and the Problems of Today's University", "The Development and actual Position, of Latin American Universities". These discussions culminated in a series of proposals which open the way for a effective, modern University Reform. The basic documentation has been condensed in book from under the title, "The University, Our Task" this book, edited by the Federation, is unique in its kind in Latin America.

ONE HUNDRED PANAMANIAN STUDENTS TO MOSCOW: According to Cesar Brugiatti, a student at Moscow's Potrice Lumumba University and President of the Association of Panamanian Students in that capital, there are thirty young men from Panama studying there but the number will soon be raised to one hundred. These students go to Moscow by way Mexico, Havana, Prague.

IN PROSPECT: AN UNION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS: Student leaders from the Universities of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama are working - both locally and collectively - on plans to establish an Union of Central American University Students. Although the idea is not a new one it seems to have found a particularly favorable atmosphere at this time and it is highly probable that it will be carried out to completion.

THE PROGRAM OF POPULAR COOPERATION: A SOURCE OF DISCORD IN PERU. The opposition parties in Peru, while accepting as necessary the Popular Cooperation Program - technical asistance for communal projects promulgated by President Belaunde and backed in a mayor part by the students, are opposed to the centralization of its control entirely into the hands of the President.

The opposition coalition - headed by the APRA - asks that the Program be "municipalized" that is that each locality receive the necessary funds and administer them as it deems convenient. The APRA alleges that this would prevent communist infiltration to the program.

TO VISIT EAST GERMANY, ONE PREREQUISIT: AGE. In East Germany elderly people are allowed to visit their relatives in West Germany but young people are not permitted to make the trip. The excuse given by the government: "It is more likely that repressive measures will be taken in the West against the young". Then it adds, somewhat in the manner of a patch: "No one must think we do not trust our youth . . ."

A "NEW ROAD" FOR THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF CHILE
In a recent meeting, the students of the Catholic University analized "the necessity of adapting their studies and the University to the social demands of today's world".
Among the decisions approved: that the University act "with greater independence with regard to the ecclesiastical hierarchy" upon impressing that institution "the renovation spirit of the Church of John XXIII and Paul VI contained in the present Ecumenical Council".

Juanín Pereira Varela



Men who have attained a true understanding of the reason for their existence cannot be satisfied with mere subsistence. Their lives find meaning only in service. Service to God and to man. These words embody, to a large extent, the greatness of those men whom history has claimed for itself and whom huminity holds in admiration for the fruitful results of their endeavors. Their eagerness to service led to acheive for their fellows new horizons of material comfort, of intellectual satisfaction, of spiritual attainment. These same words are perhaps also the only ones which could make youths throughout the world visualize the profound meaning of the sacrifice of hundreds of Cuban Students and in particular of Juanin Pereira Varela.-

His life contemplated no ideal but to serve. To serve God, to serve his Land, to serve his countrymen by gining them an opportunity to live in a free and just land. His life from the moment the establishment of a dictatorial government in Cuba became an unquestionable reality, was dedicated to battle and to toil. From the ranks of the D.R.E., he struggled against the evil that had reduced to angry impotence the longigs for permanent peace and freedom in the hearts of our people. He fought the enemy that impeded the establishment of a Christian system and drowned the joy in the hearts of his countrymen. He toiled to ascertain that in the future that system, that joy, and that justice could exist.

His would not be the joy however of seing his labors bear fruit. It was his lot to die and by his death achieve what his hands could not.

His blood would reawaken in his countrymen the fervor of patriotism and he would stand as an example to the "Continent of Hopes" which more and more demands to be a continent of human realizations.

That was the life of Juanin Pereira. It was brought to an end by militiament's bullets given by the Soviet Union to strike down all who oppose the empire they seek to establish. But the bullet that struck him down on that October day of 1961 brought forth. A seed that now quietly germinates in every corner of his land, that cries out to the world that Cuba does not give up, does not submit, does not die. Inspite of some faithless sons, of foreign troops that tramp through our land, of opportunistic Western governments, the seed watered by Juanin Pereira's blood will bear fruit, it now grows and the land that holds it vibrates with its growth and the skies above it echo more loudly each day:

LONG LIVE CUBA! LONG LIVE CHRIST THE KING!

SECRET

"LIBERATED BY THE COMMUNISTS"

Graphic Evidence of Marxist Lies About the Actual Events in the Congo.

The missionary Paul Carlson lies dead with a card tied to his throat, assassinated by Congolese communists on a street in Stanleyville. Dr. Carlson, in long and difficult years full of sacrifice, brought a message of hope and encouragement to innumerable Congolese as well as help of all kinds and his personal collaboration. He was eliminated tragically, as shown in the photograph, because of the affection that the masses held for him, and because of his fame and prestige and the adverse influence that he signified for the Communists. He had committed the sin of doing whatever was necessary to help the sick and console the afflicted, and the Reds do not pardon such things. In their final orgy of blood the Communists respected neither women nor children. These were very dangerous "military spies" according to the Communists. These (photographs) are the facts that the propaganda of the (Castro) Government has suppressed in an attempt to present the assassins of missionaries, women and children as "heroes" and "champions of liberty".

SECRET

Translation of Attachment No. 2
UFGA 19,424

"Si nuestra tierra sufre, no hay mejor gesto que sufrir con ella. ¿Qué es morir, si en la tumba comienza la vida verdadera"
ALBERTO MULLER

TRINCHERA

[illegible]
Nueva York, Abril 1894

TRINCHERAS DE IDEAS VALEN MAS QUE TRINCHERAS DE PIEDRAS
ORGANO OFICIAL DEL DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
NUM. 4
Diciembre 27, 1964
AÑO 1º

CUBA: RAICES DE UNA CRISIS POLITICA

En sus últimos días ha cobrado más vigor que nunca la pugna interna que está teniendo lugar entre las esferas dirigentes del gobierno comunista cubano. Los antecedentes públicos de esta crisis política, comenzaron a desarrollarse con la expulsión de sus cargos dirigentes, del viejo comunista Aníbal Escalante, figura de gran importancia dentro del Partido. Más adelante, y con el juicio de Marcos Rodríguez Alfonso, fueron colocados en el banquillo de los acusados, otros dirigentes de la llamada "vieja guardia", en una maniobra de Fidel Castro para colocar al Partido en una posición desventajosa ante la opinión pública. A partir de ese momento se podía adelantar la sentencia sobre Joaquín Ordoqui.

No transcurrió mucho tiempo para que la decisión, que seguramente fue tomada desde el juicio de Marcos Rodríguez, fuese puesta en práctica. Joaquín Ordoqui era separado de su cargo dentro del Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas y además perdía su asiento dentro de la dirigencia del Partido Unico de la Revolución Socialista, organismo de máxima jerarquía dentro de Cuba comunista. A las pocas semanas se conocía la noticia del suicidio de Augusto Martínez Sánchez, Ministro del Trabajo y aparentemente un gran amigo de Fidel Castro. Decisión tomada, según las propias declaraciones del régimen, al conocer la noticia de que sería destituido de su cargo, pero con el agravante de que para privarse de la vida deben haber, en este caso, razones de mucho peso y gravedad, que no se resumen exclusivamente en la pérdida de un puesto administrativo.

Esta crisis política, que se está desarrollando en Cuba, tuvo su inicio en los primeros meses del régimen. Lo que está ocurriendo en estos momentos no es más, que la explosión violenta de una lucha por el poder, de divergencias estratégicas y hasta ideológicas, de malas relaciones con el campo internacional y de las posiciones personales de estos hombres. Son varias las causas que podemos señalar como fundamentos de esta crisis.

PUGNA NATURAL ENTRE LA VIEJA GUARDIA Y FIDEL CASTRO.

La participación de la vieja guardia del Partido Comunista en el derrocamiento de la dictadura de Batista fue nula. Los que llevaban el timón del carro triunfante de la Revolución, eran hombres nuevos, convertidos al comunismo por oportunismo, y guiados por un líder sumamente ambicioso que quiso vanamente convertirse en el redentor de América. Ya desde ese momento quedaban definidos los campos dentro de la dirigencia comunista. Uno disciplinado, tradicionalista y muy organizado. El otro, indisciplinado, nuevo, desorganizado, pero con las riendas del poder y el aparentemente apoyo popular en sus manos. Los orígenes del régimen, eran unos momentos muy poco oportunos para ninguna acción de la vieja guardia, mas sin embargo, ya comenzaba a trabajar la estructura del Partido, ocupando cargos de importancia dentro del nuevo gobierno.

Los hombres que ocupaban las principales responsabilidades, eran los comunistas del momento, las figuras representativas de la Revolución comunista, pero unos hombres que no lleva[illegible]

Pasa Página 3

LOS BECADOS: PARA QUE SERAN UTILIZADOS

Todo efecto tiene su causa. Ley física que [illegible] a todo. Siempre existe un [illegible] una finalidad, un objetivo en cualquier paso que cualquier criatura se atreve a [illegible]. En el caso de los cientos de jóvenes cubanos que gozan de becas para estudiar [illegible] encontrar una causa.

Actualmente existen en los mejores edificios de [illegible] cientos de jóvenes cubanos que tienen el privilegio de estudiar, de comer, de vivir sin preocuparse en absoluto por sus necesidades, pues todas absolutamente todas están cubiertas por el régimen que gobierna en Cuba.

Estos jóvenes se [illegible] en los [illegible] cual es la razón por la cual el gobierno invierte tal cantidad de dinero en su mantenimiento, y quizás piensen que todo consiste en la generosidad de una revolución "que se hizo para los humildes".

Para estos que aún se mantienen ciegos [illegible] algunas consideraciones.

1. El régimen de Cuba carece de recursos para mantener a su población.
2. El régimen de Cuba [illegible] gran cantidad de recursos para mantener a los estudiantes becados.
3. El régimen de Cuba no mantendría [illegible] únicamente en aquello que considera productivo para el mantenimiento presente y futuro de su régimen.
4. El régimen de Cuba tiene muchas razones para mantener a los becados.
   a. Estos becados sirvieron para [illegible] la situación en las Universidades cubanas llenas de elementos contrarios al comunismo y a la tiranía.
   b. Un régimen para mantenerse necesita hombres. Los cubanos formados y maduros que no fueron oportunistas o [illegible] no estaban dispuestos a mantener ese régimen. Su única posibilidad era [illegible] sus conceptos y [illegible] a la nueva generación de jóvenes cubanos.
   c. Estos jóvenes educados en la teoría y práctica del marxismo serán los elementos utilizables para mantener la opresión y el terror, [illegible] para tratar de contener, sirviendo de mártires, una invasión o una guerra civil, etc.
   d. Estos jóvenes educados en el culto a la personalidad de Fidel serán los mejores elementos con los que éste contará en caso de una pugna abierta con la vieja guardia comunista. Especialmen[illegible]

Pasa Página 3

La Situación de las Universidades

Para demostrar con datos concretos el fracaso comunista en el campo universitario, ofrecemos esta comparación de la situación de nuestra enseñanza de nivel superior antes del advenimiento de la dictadura roja y bajo la misma.

Antes del Comunismo	Con el Comunismo
1. Había 4 Universidades en Cuba.	1. Hay tres Universidades.
2. En 1959 había 30.000 estudiantes Universitarios en las 4 Universidades.	2. Actualmente no llegan a 20.000 los estudiantes Universitarios.
3. La Constitución de 1940, estipulaba que el 1% del Presupuesto Nacional sería entregado a la Universidad de la Habana, lo cual era el mínimo requerido para su desenvolvimiento.	3. Abolida la Constitución del 40 y según el Presupuesto Nacional del Gobierno Comunista, la Universidad de la Habana ha recibido una rebaja de un 25% de sus entradas.
4. La Carta Magna Cubana garantizaba la autonomía Universitaria lo que hacía que la enseñanza superior en Cuba no estuviera sometida a ningún gobierno.	4. El Gobierno comunista, abolió la Autonomía Universitaria alegando que las Universidades deben marchar junto a la Revolución Roja, siguiendo los intereses del régimen.
5. En nuestras Universidades existía el ejercicio libre de las ideas, no coartándose ningún pensamiento. Ello le valió de inmenso prestigio internacional constituyendo un verdadero ejemplo.	5. El régimen Dictatorial de Fidel Castro impuso el Marxismo-leninismo, como asignatura obligatoria en todas las carreras y proscribió la enseñanza de cualquier ideología contraria al comunismo.

Pasa Página 3

Venezuela Junto al Pueblo Cubano

Una vez más ha quedado demostrado el repudio del obrerismo mundial al comunismo y a su títere del Caribe. Esta vez han sido los trabajadores venezolanos, los que de una manera decidida y valiente, se han colocado [illegible] totalmente, [illegible] combaten por [illegible] justicia. Los [illegible] detalladamente [illegible] por el [illegible] del apoyo de los trabajadores venezolanos a la causa de Cuba. El [illegible] Congreso de la Confederación de trabajadores de [illegible]

Pasa Página 3

Editorial

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ubano:

[illegible] TODOS LOS LUNES

'RINCHERA,

[illegible]ENDO POR LA GRAN CADENA DE [illegible] LIBERTAD PARA NUESTRA PATRIA Y [illegible] EL CONTINENTE, DE MARTES A SA[illegible] POR LA [illegible], LLE[illegible] MENSAJE DE LIBERTAD QUE CU[illegible]

TRINCHERA

[illegible] oficial del Directorio Revolucionario Estu[illegible] se propone que [illegible] el ansia de Liber[illegible] el espíritu [illegible] del pueblo cubano que [illegible] su independencia.

NOTICIAS

EN EL TERCER ANIVERSARIO DE LA MUERTE DE JUANIN PEREIRA-VARELA

El [illegible] de Diciembre pasado fue el tercer aniversario de la muerte de Juanín Pereira Varela, Coordinador Nacional del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, quien fuera asesinado por fuerzas de la tiranía que oprime a nuestra Patria mientras se en-

[illegible] de [illegible] en la [illegible] de Dios.

[illegible]

●

INCIDENTE EN LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

[illegible] la sesión de la tarde del día [illegible] de diciembre, se registró en el recinto de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, una alteración del orden cuando un grupo de exiliados cubanos [illegible] desde la tribuna de los visitantes unos volantes en los que se [illegible] a los invasores [illegible] los que salieran de Cuba y que terminara dicha ocupación militar del país.

●

CONTINUAN LOS SABOTAJES

[illegible] del [illegible] de los [illegible] de [illegible], el gobierno [illegible] de trabajadores en Santiago de Cuba y [illegible] obligó a tomar el acuerdo de [illegible] a los elementos negativos que rompen y sabotean los equipos.

Se pronostica, sin embargo, que tales actos serán cada vez más frecuentes pues dicho resultado no representa el genuino sentimiento y disposición de la clase obrera.

●

MUEREN SIETE COMUNISTAS EN VENEZUELA DURANTE BOMBARDEO A UNA ZONA.

Siete guerrilleros resultaron muertos y varios soldados heridos recientemente en dos choques armados ocurridos en los montes de Santa Cruz de Bucaral y en los de Lara y Caburé. Un encuentro se registró poco después en las montañas de la jurisdicción de Boconó, estado Trujillo, zona que fue rápidamente bombardeada al día siguiente por efectivos regulares. Los guerrilleros muertos no fueron identificados.

●

INCLUYEN FECHA DE VENCIMIENTO DE PAGO EN LOS RECIBOS TELEFONICOS

A fin de evitar la actual caótica situación en los pagos y para tratar de combatir la resistencia y oposición del pueblo a cooperar con todo lo que sea del gobierno, la Empresa Nacional Telefónica 13 de Marzo ha dispuesto que en los recibos aparezca bien clara la fecha de vencimiento de las cuentas.

●

DESESPERADO ACTO REALIZE UNA JOVEN CUBANA PARA NO REGRESAR

[illegible] la cubierta del barco [illegible] "El [illegible]" que pasaba cerca de la costa de Palm Beach [illegible] desde el Caribe a Cuba, una joven cubana de 15 años, desesperada por tener que retornar a la isla se lanzó al agua cuando era observada por guardacostas americanos. Ana Olga Cosentino nadó hasta cerca de la embarcación del Servicio de Guardacostas que la recogió y la llevó hasta Palm Beach y allí pidió asilo como re-

fugiada que se le concedió en Miami. Según informó la joven Ana Olga, actuó por un impulso repentino cuando vio cerca al guardacostas, cayendo cerca de las hélices del barco cubano que por poco la destrozan y se decidió a todo porque prefería morir ahogada que retornar a Cuba. Uno de los tripulantes de la embarcación americana, expresó que estaban vigilando rutinariamente la nave cuando vieron a la joven saltar al agua. También, dice Ana Olga, la vieron saltar algunas de las personas que estaban en el barco cubano.

●

ROTUNDO EXITO EL VIAJE DE PAULO VI A LA INDIA

El recibimiento que más de dos millones y medio de indios le tributaron a Su Santidad el Papa Paulo VI en Bombay fue [illegible]

[illegible] que se le tributó [illegible] [illegible] Sus palabras [illegible] [illegible] de las fuerzas espirituales en el mundo de hoy ha quedado demostrado una vez más en la lucha que se sostiene contra el mayor enemigo de [illegible].

●

BREVES

Sufren los Vietcong 155 bajas a manos de las fuerzas de Vietnam del Sur. Se trataba de un escogido batallón del Vietcong que fue diezmado por las tropas anticomunistas, constituyendo una de las mayores victorias de las fuerzas gubernamentales en los últimos tiempos.

☆ ☆ ☆

Mientras la producción azucarera cubana se ha reducido a un mínimo en la pasada zafra y con perspectivas aún peores para la próxima, la producción azucarera mundial, en cambio ha ascendido a un total sin precedentes de 65,700.000 toneladas.

☆ ☆ ☆

Según la opinión de fuentes autorizadas y círculos diplomáticos, la división entre la China comunista y la Unión Soviética, lejos de disminuir, ha seguido aumentando.

☆ ☆ ☆

Por lo menos cuarenta y cuatro personas resultaron muertas cuando un avión de pasajeros DC4 fue derribado en el Congo por el fuego de los sublevados comunistas.

ESTUDIANTE CUBANO:

Tu, desde la patria esclavizada, puedes ayudar a la lucha de liberación.

Envía al P.O. Box 168 MIAMI 1, FLA., todo el material informativo que consideres útil, poniendo especial interés en noticias de las Universidades y demás centros de estudios, recortes de periódicos, etc.

ESTUDIANTE CUBANO: EL DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL, QUE NO CEJARA EN EL COMBATE HASTA QUE CUBA SEA LIBRE, TE NECESITA.

VENEZUELA JUNTO AL PUEBLO CUBANO... Continuación

Venezuela decidió aceptar las mociones presentadas por los trabajadores portuarios en las que se decreta el boycot a todos los barcos que comercian con Cuba, además de otras resoluciones. A continuación el texto de lo acordado:

EL V CONGRESO DE TRABAJADORES DE VENEZUELA

CONSIDERANDO:

Que en la reciente Reunión de Cancilleres de America, convocada por el Consejo General de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) se acordó decretar el rompimiento de Relaciones Diplomaticas y Comerciales con el regimen comunista de Fidel Castro, ante la agresión comprobada de dicho gobierno, contra el gobierno constitucional de Venezuela,

CONSIDERANDO

Que mientras los países de nuestro continente cumplen a cabalidad con dicha Resolución, varios países de Europa y Canadá, han intensificado su comercio con la Cuba comunista, la cual de esta manera trata de evitar el Boycot y las sanciones impuestas por el Consejo General de la OEA

CONSIDERANDO:

Que el comercio que se realiza con el regimen comunista de Fidel Castro, desde estos mencionados países, viene a fortalecer a ese gobierno, ya que de esta manera se burla, la sanción económica y moral impuesta por los Estados Americanos,

CONSIDERANDO:

Que la Federación de Trabajadores Portuarios de Venezuela, ha aprobado en sus Consejos Consultivos y en su reciente Convencion Nacional, decretar el Boycot contra todos los barcos embanderados de dichas naciones, que han intensificado su comercio con la Cuba de Fidel Castro,

CONSIDERANDO:

Que la Federacion de Trabajadores Portuarios, como filial de la Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela, se ha dirigido a este organismo para que apoye esta determinacion que redundará en defensa del sistema democratico americano,

ACUERDA:

Primero: Decretar el Boycot contra todos los barcos [illegible] [illegible] han intensificado su comercio con la Cuba comunista y los cuales están contribuyendo al fortalecimiento de ese sanguinario regimen,

Segundo: Solicitar la solidaridad del movimiento sindical democratico, para que haga extensivo este Boycot desde los puertos, donde se proceda al embarque de mercancia hacia la Cuba comunista,

Tercero. Dicho Boycot entrará en vigor cuando lo ordene la Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela, o su filial la Federacion de Trabajadores Portuarios de Venezuela, como muestra de solidaridad con el pueblo democratico de Cuba, que en estos instantes lucha por liberarse de sus opresores.

Cuarto. Darle publicidad al presente Acuerdo, enviárselo a todas las Centrales Obreras democraticas, para su conocimiento y fines.

Dado en la Ciudad Vacacional de Los Caracas, a los 26 dias del mes de noviembre de 1.964

LA COMISION DE ACUERDOS Y RESOLUCIONES

LOS BECADOS...

Continuación

te si esta pugna determina un desenlace violento de guerra civil.

e. Estos jóvenes serán los más dispuestos para combatir y morir en países extraños sirviendo los fines de subversión y dominación del comunismo.

f. Estos jóvenes becados significan la posibilidad de contar con fuerzas de fácil movilización para las tareas del corte de caña, la recogida del café etc.

En definitiva una conclusión. Los becados del comunismo son los instrumentos ciegos, los esclavos dóciles, los siervos disciplinados que sirven para cualquier cosa que necesiten los amos dirigentes. No existe ningún propósito humanitario, ni patriótico. Solamente llenan una necesidad mas del régimen comunista. Quizás tambien con la esperanza de que despues de la derrota servirán de elementos que mantengan la subversión y la anarquía en Cuba. Triste papel el de esa juventud. Y mas triste en cuanto no han tenido oportunidad de conocer otra cosa, otra situación, otra alternativa que no sea la que les imponen desde la mañana hasta la noche los monstruos comunistas.

JOVEN CUBANO: REBELATE CONTRA ESTE DESTINO QUE ATENTA CONTRA TU LIBERTAD Y CONTRA TU PROPIA VIDA, APROVECHA EL MOMENTO OPORTUNO PARA RENUNCIAR AL COMUNISMO: LUCHA POR HACERTE TU PROPIA VIDA EN UNA CUBA NUEVA EN QUE EXISTA LIBERTAD Y NUESTRA BANDERA NO SE MANCHE CON EL REFLEJO GROSERO DE LA HOZ Y EL MARTILLO.

CUBA: Raíces...

(Continuación)

ron a estos puestos por designio expreso de la Internacional comunista. Los personeros del Partido, los hombres que siempre fueron comunistas, que obedecían al Partido, tenían que replegarse momentáneamente y aceptar, como rectores a los seguidores de Fidel Castro. Pero ya quedaban fijados los campos.

LA LEGALIDAD O CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL REGIMEN COMUNISTA CUBANO.

Uno de los logros básicos a los que desea llegar la llamada "Vieja guardia" es la legalidad o constitucionalidad del régimen comunista cubano. Por ello se entiende la creación de una constitución comunista que imprima un carácter legal, al estilo comunista, al gobierno de Cuba. Con ello, estarían alcanzando los comunistas viejos, una ambición necesaria para el buen desenvolvimiento administrativo y político dentro de las filas del régimen. Con ello, estarían garantizando la continuidad del sistema comunista, pese a las desapariciones accidentales o forzadas, de distintos dirigentes del gobierno.

Por ello, podrían en definitiva, sustituir al Presidente o al Primer Ministro, sin que se viese afectada de manera vital la regencia del país. Algo parecido a lo que existe actualmente en la Unión Soviética y que funcionó claramente en la reciente destitución de Nikita Kruschev. Y la vieja guardia lucha encarnizadamente por esta realización, ya que en este caso se trata de Fidel Castro el Primer Ministro, y existen serias diferencias de orígenes, de disciplina y de estrategia con el máximo dirigente del fidelismo comunista. El fin que se persigue [illegible] por la vieja guardia, sería factible, apartar a Fidel Castro o a cualquier seguidor del mismo, mediante el empleo de esa legalidad, o de esa constitución.

PUGNA RUSO-CHINA.

Los fundamentos ideológicos, que han mantenido unidos a los comunistas de todo el mundo, ya no son mas que viejas expresiones o materias discursivas para los prohombres del mundo comunista. Lo que antes constituía una fuerza, aparentemente unida, hoy se ha debilitado por la pugna interna de poder, los Partidos comunistas, ya no siguen fielmente los dictados de la Internacional con sede en el Kremlin. Y por último, los dos colosos del comunismo, se entrentan en una pugna ideológica y estratégica que alcanza dimensiones incalculables.

Lo que está sucediendo en Cuba tiene sin lugar a dudas muchas raíces en esta situación internacional del comunismo. Ha quedado demostrado fehacientemente que Fidel Castro [illegible] seguir la línea dictada por Pekín [illegible] de Revolución y expansión. Por su parte, la vieja guardia es fiel seguidora de Moscú y de la línea trazada por ellos.

Pero ante esta situación de divergencia, entra a jugar un factor determinante que se levanta como un obstáculo contra Castro y no es mas que la situación económica. El asiento económico del regimen cubano está en la Unión Soviética y no en China. Cualquier movimiento político o estratégico adoptado por Fidel Castro puede significar la pérdida de la tan necesitada ayuda económica. Ello ha mitigado hasta cierto punto, este factor de pugna interna, mas sin embargo permanece vigente, pues son bien definidas la militancia internacional, tanto de Castro como la de la vieja guardia.

RUSIA ANTE EL FRACASO DE FIDEL CASTRO.

Es indiscutible que la Revolución comunista de Cuba ha fracasado. Ha fracasado dentro de Cuba y hoy más que nunca se hace mas grave la crisis económica y administrativa. Ha fracasado en America, donde la subversión ya no puede llegar a donde ellos quisieran. Ante ello, a Rusia y por consiguiente a la vieja guardia le quedan dos caminos: Uno, mantener el status quo, el otro, acabar definitivamente con Fidel Castro y entonces el fracaso no será [illegible] ta, y habrá suficientes [illegible] tos para demostrar qu[illegible] Castro no se ajustó a [illegible] plina y a los lineamien[illegible] Partido comunista. [illegible] cuál de los dos caminos [illegible] Rusia, pero en ambos [illegible] [illegible], pero para mantene[illegible] [illegible] falta [illegible] el gobierno, quita y po[illegible] bres, y a todo ello se o[illegible] del Castro, mientras el [illegible] el que dicte las medidas.

Estos factores que h[illegible] tentado analizar, aunq[illegible] sea de manera general, [illegible] tuyen los fundamentos d[illegible] su política que hoy con[illegible] régimen comunista. Po[illegible] raleza y por sus orígen[illegible] puede ser solucionada, [illegible] lamente mitigada, aun[illegible] últimos acontecimientos [illegible] que va en aumento. Sus [illegible] consecuencias son im[illegible] bles y solo puede deci[illegible] el momento que esta s[illegible] ha debilitado al regimen, [illegible] imagen reducida de lo [illegible] ocurriendo en el mundo c[illegible] ta y que lo conducirá [illegible] plazo a la muerte.

Tres hombres han sido [illegible] los máximos dirigentes [illegible] tido comunista cubano: [illegible] Ordoqui, Aníbal Esca[illegible] Blas Roca. Sólo queda [illegible] minar Blas Roca. Y an[illegible] tria quedan dos interro[illegible] una conclusión. El pri[illegible] caer será Blas Roca o [illegible] él caerán otros?

¿O caerá Fidel Castro [illegible] La conclusión no puede [illegible] que una: nunca ha sido [illegible] mento tan propicio para [illegible] derrumbamiento del régim[illegible]

Antes del Comunismo... (Continuación)	Con el Comunismo...
6. Los estudiantes Universitarios elegían cada año sus representantes estudiantiles en libres elecciones, asistiendo los dirigentes a Congresos Internacionales de Juventudes en representación de los jóvenes cubanos. Ello contribuía a crear un ambiente de libertad y democracia en donde el estudiantado podía alcanzar sus aspiraciones.	6. Desde Septiembre [illegible] 1959, no se han c[illegible] brado elecciones [illegible] tudiantiles, ya que [illegible] única vez que quis[illegible] ron legalizar la rep[illegible] sentación universi[illegible] ria, los comunis[illegible] celebraron una [illegible] da Asamblea Gene[illegible] donde por "acla[illegible] ción" se eligió la N[illegible] va Directiva que [illegible] pués de 3 años a[illegible] rigiendo, salvo cre[illegible] dos casos.
7. Las Universidades como centros máximos de la Democracia servían de medio idóneo para plantear las mejoras que el pueblo cubano pedía.	7. Actualmente las U[illegible] versidades son or[illegible] nismos serviles [illegible] Gobierno comunist[illegible] controlados direc[illegible] mente por funcio[illegible] rios de la Dictadu[illegible] Roja.
8. Era requisito para el ingreso en las Universidades el tener 17 años de edad y haber cursado el Bachillerato (enseñanza secundaria que requería 5 años de estudio) o aprobar severos exámenes de ingreso.	8. No hay requisitos [illegible] edad ni tampoco [illegible] haber cursado es[illegible] dios secundari[illegible] Dándose el caso d[illegible] jóvenes de 14 añ[illegible] de edad realicen [illegible] tudios universitar[illegible] sin estudios prev[illegible] actualmen[illegible]
9. El 90% del profesorado Universitario existente en junio de 1959, ha marchado al exilio o ha renunciado a sus cátedras por no querer aceptar el comunismo o no querer doblegarse a su doctrina. Los catedráticos Universitarios antes del comunismo eran escogidos por su aptitud académica y la inmensa mayoría contaba con una amplia y profunda preparación.	9. [illegible] ac[illegible] tualmente son grad[illegible] de universidades p[illegible] ejercer de profe[illegible] en las Universidad[illegible] comunistas de Cu[illegible] Alumnos que h[illegible] aprobado asignatur[illegible] del primer año y [illegible] cursan el segund[illegible] son profesores de [illegible] [illegible] que [illegible] [illegible] y así en la m[illegible] [illegible] alumnos del 1er. [illegible] son profesores [illegible] 2do. y los del 4to. [illegible] 3ro. etc.

"LIBERADOS" POR LOS COMUNISTAS

Pruebas graficas de las mentiras marxistas sobre los verdaderos sucesos del Congo

El misionero Paul Carlson yace muerto con una etiqueta amarrada al cuello, asesinado por los comunistas congoleses en plena calle de Stanleyville. El Dr. Carlson durante largos y penosos años de sacrificios, había llevado un mensaje de esperanza y aliento a innumerables congoleses a la par que ayuda de todo tipo y colaboración personal. Por las simpatías de que gozaba en la masa, por su fama y prestigio, por la influencia adversa que representaba para los comunistas, fue eliminado trágicamente como prueba la foto. Había cometido el pecado de ayudar al necesitado, de socorrer a los enfermos y de consolar a los afligidos y los rojos no perdonan estas cosas.

En su orgía [illegible] de sangre los comunistas no respetaron a mujeres ni niños. Estos eran "presos militares" muy peligrosos según los comunistas. Estas son las pruebas y estos son los hechos que la propaganda del gobierno ha silenciado en su empeño de presentar como "héroes" y "campeones de la libertad" a los asesinos de misioneros, mujeres y niños.

DORTICOS EN RIDICULO

Cuando se planeó el viaje de Dorticós a la reunión de países no alineados en el Cairo, Fidel consideró aprovechar esta oportunidad para que visitara Moscú, abrazara a Kruschev y tratara de conseguir apoyo económico que le ayudara a mantener la situación y apoyo político contra la reciente maniobra de la vieja guardia comunista.

Dorticós se marchó al Cairo con todos los consejos castristas en la cartera. Pero en el camino se tropezó con el hecho de que Kruschev había caído y en su lugar aparecían nuevas figuras con las cuales no existían compromisos previos. Su labor diplomática había agravado su importancia y dificultad.

Durante el viaje se dieron gran cantidad de abrazos y de besos al estilo soviético. Se dijeron palabras muy agradables que no significaban apoyo alguno. Pero se negaron rotundamente las cantidades requeridas para mantener la situación. Al contrario se habló de disminuir la cantidad estipulada para pagar el azúcar.

Pero allí no para el fracaso de Dorticós. Los nuevos entronados mandatarios soviéticos le hicieron firmar un documento en que apoyaba la coexistencia pacífica, la paz entre los pueblos, el desarme (aun el parcial que antes se había negado Fidel a firmar en el caso del tratado de prohibición de pruebas nucleares en la estratosfera), la unidad del campo socialista sobre las tesis de Moscú (lo que implica cierto apoyo a Rusia contra China), etc. No había promesas de ayudas económicas, ni militares, ni políticas. No había planteamientos de compromiso entre los nuevos amos y el presidente títere. No había nada de lo que convenía a Castro y sí todo lo que convenía a Rusia. Y por último no dejaron que Dorticós saludara al viejo Kruschev al que Fidel había llamado humano, inteligente, brillante, personalidad fascinante, etc. Un definitivo y un fracaso. En consecuencia un nuevo paso al total descrédito de Fidel y de su régimen.

Quizás la respuesta de Fidel a estos planteamientos fue la destitución de Ordoqui. Pero ninguna maniobra puede paralizar su destino. Los nuevos pasos que adopte solo servirán para lanzarlo más al abismo al que su maldad e incapacidad lo han llevado. Y mientras, la libertad de Cuba está tocando a las puertas de la Isla Mártir.

LA VISITA DEL "CHE" A LAS NACIONES UNIDAS



La visita del comunista argentino, Ernesto Che Guevara a las Naciones Unidas, y sus posteriores pronunciamientos en la conferencia televisada, ponen de manifiesto la deplorable situación, tanto política como económica en que se encuentra el régimen comunista de Cuba. Su aspiración a la mejoría de relaciones entre los Estados Unidos y Cuba y la solicitud de que se reanuden las relaciones comerciales, son una prueba de que la llamada "economía socialista" ha fracasado, y de que quizás, y lo que es lo más importante, Fidel Castro teme ser abandonado a su suerte en cualquier momento por sus aliados comunistas.

Todos los observadores y hasta los representantes de numerosas naciones europeas y latinoamericanas estuvieron de acuerdo en que los pronunciamientos hechos por el detestable Che Guevara, constituía una de las acostumbradas diatribas de los personeros comunistas cubanos y carecían de importancia y valor.

Por otra parte, jamás la ciudad de New York había tenido que emplear tanta fuerza policial y había tenido tanta "actividad" como la de los últimos días. El repudio de todos los hombres civilizados al comunismo y especialmente al argentino Guevara se hizo patente en todas las demostraciones realizadas en esta ciudad. EL DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL organizó una imponente manifestación y asimismo sus declaraciones fueron publicadas por numerosos e importantes órganos de prensa de la ciudad de New York y de otras partes de los Estados Unidos.

En una parte de las declaraciones del DRE quedaba claro, que un extranjero, comunista y asesino, no podría representar jamás al pueblo cubano, y que todos los pronunciamientos hechos por el Che Guevara no reflejaban los sentimientos de nuestro pueblo, sino de una minoría comunista que ha impuesto un régimen de terror y esclavitud a todo el pueblo de Cuba.

Mensaje de Navidad

Joven cubano: A ti van dirigidas estas palabras, motivadas por el más grande acontecimiento de la historia de la Humanidad, el nacimiento de Cristo Nuestro Señor.

Tú, quizás desviado por el constante adoctrinamiento comunista y por lo mismo, incapaz de comprender en toda su trascendencia este hecho, seguramente recuerdas, con un poco de escondida añoranza, las épocas pasadas en que reunida toda la familia, celebraba la Nochebuena feliz, alegre y dentro de un espíritu de amor.

Hoy, el odio, base y fundamento de la doctrina de marxista trata de anidar en tu pecho.

Pero tú, joven cubano, eres de naturaleza buena y sincera formada en las mejores tradiciones de cubanía que convirtieron a nuestra patria en ejemplo para todo el Continente. Tú, tendrás mañana en Cuba libre la oportunidad de conocer la verdad y darte cuenta de la magnitud del engaño en que hoy estás sumergido.

Joven cubano: En estas Navidades, tus hermanos que luchamos por rescatar la patria de manos del imperialismo soviético, te deseamos que muy pronto puedas volver a celebrar cristianamente esta fiesta. Que en cercanos días puedas oír la verdad y juzgar por ti mismo con plena libertad para decidir entre el amor y el odio, entre Cristo y Lenin.

Joven cubano: Cristo nació y murió por nosotros y ésta es la única verdad. Es este acto de infinito amor el que debe darte la pauta para tu futura conducta. En estos días navideños, medita en tu posición y disponte a encaminarte por los senderos de la verdad que serán los únicos que conducirán a la salvación de Cuba.

ESPERANDO SU TURNO...

*Aníbal Escalante primero, Marcos Rodríguez después, Joaquín Ordoqui prisionero, Augusto Martínez Sánchez "suicidado". ¿QUIEN LE SIGUE? QUIZAS BLAS ROCA

*Y Carlos Rafael Rodríguez de viaje por Rusia...
Fidel dijo que Suslov (uno de los mandatarios del Kremlin mejor situado) era un "teórico trasnochado"... Y Suslov hizo caer a Kruschev...

*El Partido Comunista de Italia y el de Francia se separan cada día más de la línea de Moscú... La quiebra de la Internacional aumenta.

*Dorticós en su viaje a Rusia llevaba como petición la de un nuevo empréstito. Y le fue negado rotundamente...

*Se espera el "suicidio" de Lechuga que también fue sustituido de su cargo en la ONU.

*[illegible] desesperado porque lo cambien de la FEU... Quizás tiene miedo a la responsabilidad del fracaso.

*Fidel quiere ir a Chile. ¿Quizás Joaquín Mas le haya contado sobre los saludables baños de Viña del Mar.

*Los becados son como el antiguo lechoncito de Navidad (antiguo porque ahora no hay ni lechones). Los ceban para sacrificarlos. Y si no, que le pregunten a los miles de milicianos (becados) que murieron en Girón.

*Fidel culpa a la burocracia del fracaso del régimen. Pero lo que no dice al pueblo es que el "jefe máximo de la burocracia se llama Fidel Castro. En vez de quitar a Ordoqui o de llevar al suicidio a Martínez Sánchez debería hacerse un juicio a sí mismo...

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE AKR

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report - December 1964

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI:

REF: UFGA 19,195, 28 December 1964

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. General.

AMSPELL has so far survived the internal crisis brought about by the collapse of its military activity noted in the previous progress report. However, AMSPELL is still faced with a severe financial problem resulting from the termination of the military activity. AMHINT-2 states that AMSPELL has $12,000.00 in short-term loans which must be met shortly, and $20,000.00 in loans being paid off at the rate of $1,300.00 per month. AMHINT-2 is trying to sell the AMSPELL boats in order to liquidate these debts. So far he has had little success. AMHINT-2 has said that he does not intend to give up the idea of active participation in the liberation of Cuba but that AMSPELL will not conduct new military operations in the future without ODYOKE assistance and concurrence. According to AMHINT-2 lack of funds and intelligence information together with pressure by ODYOKE on Dominican authorities frustrated the AMSPELL military operation, and he has no intention of going through a similar disastrous experience again.

2. Propaganda.

a. 19,800 copies of the regular AMSPELL newspaper were mailed to Latin America and AMSPELL delegations in the United States. (Attachment No. 1, under separate cover.)

/ CONTINUED /

Attachments: w/o
1 thru 6, As stated, u/sc

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA, w/attachs, u/sc

19-124-26/3

DATE TYPED
12 Jan 65

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 18 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 19,393

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

b. 4,800 copies of the pony AMSPELL newspaper were mailed into Cuba (Attachment No. 2, under separate cover.) Both the pony and regular editions stress the conflict between the old-guard and the "new-guard" communists, the boycott declared by the Venezuelan trade unions, the confession of failure made by Castro in his speech at the University of Havana, and an analysis of the situation at the Cuban universities before and after Castro.

c. 2,900 copies of the December issue of the Spanish-language edition of the AMSPELL bulletin were mailed to Latin American recipients (Attachment No. 3, under separate cover.) Of particular interest is the article on page 2 which discusses the recent Congo atrocities.

d. 1,925 copies each of the November issue of the French and English editions of the AMSPELL bulletin were mailed to overseas areas. (Attachment No. 4, under separate cover.)

3. Radio Propaganda.

AMSPELL continued its regular radio operations consisting of a 10-minute program daily except Sunday on AMTHIGH, and a 10-minute program broadcast every Monday over WMIE and several Latin America stations. Representative themes were: Congo atrocities inspired by Communists, Venezuelan student support of the Cuban cause; Argentine trade union support of world boycott against Red Cuba; economic crisis in Cuba; factional struggle of the Cuban regime; desperate measures undertaken by the regime to prevent a disaster in the sugar industry; statement of a Venezuelan student regarding the training in Cuba of 1,500 Latin American youth in terrorist activities; more on the Congolese situation; transportation in Castro's Cuba; factional struggle in the Cuban regime; Che Guevara's speech in the United Nations creates tense situation between Cuba and the USSR; and Blas Roca working for the downfall of Castro.

4. Press Releases.

Miscellaneous press releases are included as Attachment No. 5 under separate cover.

5. Other Activities.

a. WAVE 5843 dated 8 December 1964 forwarded a candidate for an AMSPELL position in the Dominican Republic.

b. AMSPELL requested that AMBARB-58 be sent to Ecuador to replace AMBARB-28 who was resigning. (WAVE 5842 dated 8 December 1964) The Quito station replied that AMBARB-28 functions had been taken over by ECPLY-2, and that AMBARB-58's services were not required (QUIT 6805 dated 11 December 1964).

c. Attachment No. 6 is a copy of an English-language bulletin produced by AMSPELL without direct KUBARK support which is sent to recipients in the U. S. Pressure will be brought to bear on AMHINT-2 to drop this publication entirely on the grounds that it is not the purpose of AMSPELL to propagandize U. S. citizens.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

1. Salaries	$ 5,650.00
2. Operational Expenses	10,903.03
TOTAL	$ 16,553.03

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 19,393

C. FUTURE PLANS

1. 10,000 pamphlets on AMHINT-1 will be distributed to Latin America and Cuba during January. AMSPELL is planning a hemisphere-wide campaign in an attempt to obtain the release of AMHINT-1 from prison. This campaign will probably not achieve its stated aim but should result in considerable publicity on the nature of the Castro regime.

2. AMSPELL is preparing a draft leaflet illustrating the internal and international failures of the Castro regime during 1964. It is planned to mail this leaflet to Cuba and Latin America.

3. The AMSPELL newspaper both in its pony and regular edition has greatly improved in the past few months. Nevertheless, the large edition will be cut to 10,000 copies a month as this is considered a more realistic figure for distribution.

Bruce Cheever
for ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

19-124-26/3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
SANTIAGO
ACTION
WH/SA 8
INFO
VR. FILE, DDP, WH 7, WE 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/IC 2

AN | RS | FI | INDEX ☒ | ABSTRACT | WH/SAMP | DESTROY

13 JAN 65 IN 59284

S E C R E T 132203Z

WAVE INFO DIR MADR CITE SAGO 3582

REF: WAVE 6969 (IN 56947)
TYPIC PSYCH AMSPELL

SAGO ABLE PRESENT AMHINT-1 LETTER DIRECTLY TO FREI THRU FUBIAS-7, EXILED PBRUMEN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT WHO HAS CONTACT CHILEAN PDC. OTHER POSSIBILITY EXIST F-7 CAN GIVE LETTER TO PDC CONTACT TO PASS FREI. HOWEVER SAGO REALIZES F-7 MAY LACK PULL AND WEIGHT ACHIEVE MAXIMUM ACTION FROM FREI. THEREFORE CAN WAVE RECOMMEND ANY HIGH LEVEL CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PBRUMEN EXILE, WHO WAVE ASSET, AND WHO COULD TRAVEL CHILE EXPRESSLY FOR PURPOSE PRESENTING LETTER TO FREI. SAGO BELIEVES THIS WOULD OBTAIN BETTER PUBLICITY.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

19-124-26/3
13 Jan 65

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

RI COPY RI COPY

14-00000

[redacted] [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] FORM 1-64 1389

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~19-124-26~~

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

MICROFILMED
JAN 22 1965

FROM Jmwave

ACTION WH/SA 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐

INFO

VR. FILE DDP, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2, WE 6

ABSTRACT ☐ INDEX ☒ DESTROY

SECRET 100030Z CSN HCS 19-124-26

DIR INFO MADR SAGO CITE WAVE 6969

TYPIC PSYCH AMSPELL

10 JAN 65 IN 56947

REF MADR 2750 (NOT SENT SAGO)

INDEXED AND CONTROL

cit Cuba ΔNew York USA occnews

1. GUILLERMO PARA ONE REF PROBABLY GUILLERMO (MARTINEX) MARQUEZ (Sr) EDITOR NEW YORK EXILE NEWSPAPER AHORA AND MEMBER ADVISORY COUNCIL OF INTERAMERICAN PRESS SOCIETY (SIP), FORMERLY PUBLISHER EL PAIS HAVANA

cit Cuba

MARINEZ SON, GUILLERMO MARTINEZ MARQUEZ (JUNIOR) CLOSE AMHINT-2 AND AMSPELL. MARTINEZ SENIOR EXPECTED WAVE AREA 12 JAN WITH LETTER RECEIVED FROM CUBA, PRESUMABLY REF DOCUMENT, TO DISCUSS WITH AMHINT-2 POSSIBILITE STARTING HEMISPHERE WIDE CAMPAIGN DESIGNED BRING PRESSURE CASTRO REGIME RELEASE AMHINT-1 AND OTHER PRISONERS.

2. AMHINT-2 HAS LETTER DATED SEPT 64, RECENTLY SMUGGLED FROM ISLE OF PINES PRISON, ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT EDUARDO FREI OF CHILE AND SIGNED BY AMHINT-1, AMHINT-3, AMHINT-4. AMHINT-4 REFERS TO PERSONAL INTERVIEW HE HAD WITH FREI 59, CONGRATULATES FREI FOR ELECTION VICTORY AND PREDICTS JUSTICE AND LIBERTY UNDER CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC GOVT, ASK CHILEAN GOVT AID LEGITIMATE FIGHT CUBAN PEOPLE AGAINST COMMUNIST OPPRESSION, EXPRESS WISH AMHINT'S PERSONAL FATE WILL SERVE AS EXAMPLE TO

19-124-26/3
~~19-124-26~~
10 Jan 1965

Removed from Project 19-124-26/3
CS Classification
JOB # 69-771
Box 1 Folder 3

JAN 21 8 52 AM '65

ALL LATIN AMERICA YOUTH IN FIGHT AGAINST TOTALITARIANISM AND FOR JUSTICE AND LIBERTY. AMHINT-2 NOW SEARCHING BEST CHANNEL PRESENT LETTER TO FREI OR CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS FOR MAXIMUM EFFECT, AT SAME TIME ASKING FREI INTERCEDE WITH CASTRO GOVT ON BEHALF PRISONERS.

3. SUPPORT ABOVE CAMPAIGN AMSPELL PRINTING 10,000 COPIES PAMPHLETS ON AMHINT-1, CONSISTING CHIEFLY HIS LETTERS TO FAMILY AND FRIENDS WHICH REFLECT AMHINT-1'S IDEALISM AND COURAGE. PAMPHLET EXPECTED FROM PRINTERS

.5 JAN.

4. FOR SAGO: REF REFERES TO PAGE 14 PAGE DOCUMENT DETAILING PRISON CONDITIONS AND DENOUNCING COMMUNIST REGIME SIGNED BY AMHINT-1 AND OTHERS

SMUGGLED OUT ISLE PINES PRISON. RE PARA TWO ABOVE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUGGESTIONS FOP GETTING LETTER PRESENTED FREI IN MANNER THAT WILL GET FREI'S FAVORABLE ATTENTION AND ACHIEVE MAXIMUM PUBLICITY. CAN SAGO RECOMMEND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT CLOSE FREI TO WHOM LETTER COULD BE PRESENTED.

5. INDEX MARTINEZ SENIOR AND JUNIOR.

SECRET

* MADR POUCHING PHOTOCOPY OF 14 PAGE DOCUMENT WRITTEN BY FOUR ISLE OF PINES PRISONER LEADERS FOR PROP EXPLOITATION.

CFN

14-126-24/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED PROD 10

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MADRID

ACTION WE 8

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

VR. FILE, DDP, WH/SA 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H, FI/SPG, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 081736Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MADR 2752

10 JAN 65 IN 56489

KEYWAY PBRUMEN

1. STATION POUCHING ADDEES 11 JANUARY PHOTOCOPY OF 14 PAGE DOCUMENT WRITTEN BY FOUR ISLE OF PINES PRISONER LEADERS, AMONG WHOM AMYUM 1 AND AMHINT 1. COVER LETTER SIGNED BY AMYUM 1 ADDRESSED ONLY TO "GUILLERMO" WHO UNIDENTIFIED, REQUESTING HE PRESENT IT TO INTERAMERICAN PRESS SOCIETY, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, OAS AND UN.

2. BELIEVE DOCUMENT CONTAINS EXTREMELY WELL WRITTEN, HIGHLY INFORMATIVE AND OBJECTIVE ACCOUNT OF PRISON CONDITIONS, REHABILITATION PLAN, MENTAL AND PHYSICAL PROBLEMS, ETC. ALSO STRESSES ITS INTENT "NOT A CALL FOR HELP, BUT A CRY OF DEFIANCE AGAINST COMMUNIST ENEMY". FEEL IT HAS CONSIDERABLE PROP POTENTIAL WORTHY OF HQS EXPLOITATION.

3. DOCUMENT PROVIDED BY QUGROWL 5 BORROWED FROM QUANTUM 51, WHO HANDCARRIED TO MADRID FROM CUBA.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

MOS	INT	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
COP	RPTS	LOS	CA
CA	SI	BF	HH
✓		SEC	NS

WE-5/Spain
Mr Wright
will call when
copies arrive

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operations
- AMSPELL Progress Report, May 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REF: UFGA 21738, 2 June 1965

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. General

During the month of May, AMSPELL carried on its normal propaganda activities. Major emphasis in AMSPELL propaganda was given to the Dominican crisis.

2. Propaganda Production

a. 4,800 copies of the small AMSPELL newspaper were mailed to Cuba. The main themes of the issue were the Ninth World Festival of Youth in Algeria, the Dominican crisis, and the conversion of Cuban universities into centers of communist indoctrination by the Castro regime. (Attachment No. 1, under separate cover.)

b. The AMSPELL international bulletin was mailed to its usual recipients during May. (Spanish edition -- 2,900 copies; French edition 1,925 copies; English edition 1,925 copies). (Attachment No. 2, under separate cover.)

c. Miscellaneous press clippings and press releases on the AMSPELL prisoners campaign are enclosed as Attachment No. 3, under separate cover.)

3. Radio Propaganda

AMSPELL continued its Monday programs on AMTHIGH and a local station. Major propaganda themes during the month were: The Dominican crisis with emphasis on Communist involvement; Cuban students in forced labor in the cane fields, differences among Communist student groups, the situation among foreign students in the Soviet Union.

CS COPY

/ Continued /

19-124-26/3

Attachments:
1.AMSPELL Newspaper, u/sc
2.Bulletin, u/sc
3.Press Material, u/sc

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - WH/C,w/attachs, u/sc

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
21 June 65

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 22,100

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

att-1

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA 22,100

4. Other Activities

a. An AMSPELL member attended May 20 celebrations in Paraguay sponsored by a local anti-Communist organization. The AMSPELL representative also visited other countries in Latin America on his return from Paraguay to promote the AMSPELL prisoners campaign and to try to influence local student organizations on the Dominican crisis.

b. Two AMSPELL members attended a UOHART seminar beginning May 31.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

Salaries	$ 3,000.00
Operational Expenses	4,500.00
TOTAL	$ 7,500.00

C. FUTURE PLANS

A circular letter to organizations participating in the Communist World Youth Festival in Algiers is being prepared. The letter will cover the situation of political prisoners in Cuba, the lack of basic freedoms in Cuba with emphasis on the recent purge of "homosexuals and degenerates" in the universities and the armed forces.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

CS COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE 349

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report, April 1965

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

FYI:

REF: UFGA 21,514, 20 May 1965

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. General.

During the month of April AMSPELL carried on its normal propaganda activities. AMSPELL was also busy adjusting to the new reduced budget which went into effect on 1 April. AMSPELL moved to less expensive office space in April and dropped 10 people from the AMSPELL payroll. AMTHIGH broadcasts were reduced to one broadcast a week, and the large AMSPELL newspaper was eliminated. The prisoners campaign began to gain momentum in April but the crisis in the Dominican Republic made it very difficult to obtain publicity or maintain sustained interest in the campaign.

2. Propaganda Production.

a. 4,800 copies of the small AMSPELL newspaper were mailed to Cuba. This issue was dedicated mainly to the situation of prisoners in Cuba. (Attachment No. 1, under separate cover.)

b. The AMSPELL international bulletin was mailed to its normal recipients during April. The Spanish edition was produced in 2,900 copies (Attachment No. 2, under separate cover.) The English and French editions were produced in 1,925 copies each (Attachment Nos. 3 and 4, under separate cover.)

/ CONTINUED /

Attachments:
1 thru 10, u/sc

Distribution:
3 - WH/C, w/attachs, u/sc

CS COPY

19-124-26/3

DATE TYPED
26 May 65

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 2 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 21,738

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

att-1

c. A document on political prisoners in Cuba was mailed to Latin American and other international addresses. The Spanish version was mailed in 10,000 copies and the English version in 5,000 copies (Attachment Nos. 5 and 6). An open letter to the President of Chile on the subject of political prisoners was disseminated in 5,000 copies (Attachment No. 7, under separate cover.) Press releases and news clips on the prisoners campaign are enclosed. (Attachment No. 8, under separate cover.)

d. Miscellaneous Press Releases and Clippings are enclosed. (Attachment No. 9, under separate cover.)

3. Radio Propaganda.

Beginning 12 April AMSPELL radio operations were reduced to a 15-minute program Monday on AMTHIGH and a local station. This program is also played on several Latin American stations.

4. Relations with Other Organizations.

AMSPELL received a number of letters from groups and individuals interested in information on Cuba. Some of the groups who wrote to AMSPELL were: Portuguese University Center, World Assembly of Youth, International Union of Young Christian Democrats, Bolivian Students Confederation, Union Civica Radical Youth of Argentina, Christian Social Democratic Party Youth of Colombia, International Institute of Social Studies (CLASC), Mexican Newsmen Association, National Union of Malaysian Students, and individual Mexican and Dominican Students. (Copies of these letters are forwarded in Attachment No. 10, under separate cover.)

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

Salaries	$ 3,250.00
Separation payments	2,700.00
Operational expenses	3,850.00
Extra WRUL payment	1,215.00
Extra mailing expense	903.08
TOTAL	$11,918.08

C. FUTURE PLANS

An AMSPELL member was invited by the Paraguayan group to visit them for May 20 celebrations.

AMSPELL was also invited by the International Student Association of Japan to participate at an International Students Conference to be held in Japan from July 12 to August 9, however, the station does not intend to encourage AMSPELL participation.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

CS COPY

INDEX ☐ YES
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-26/3
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

34 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM SANTIAGO

ACTION WHC 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE WH 7, CI/OA, CI/OPS, PCZ

S E C R E T 262157Z

DIR WAVE CITE SAGO 9475

TYPIC AMSPELL FUBIAS

26 MAY 65 IN 76722

REF A DIR 13438

B SAGO 9424 (IN 71039) *

FUBIAS-5 NOTIFIED HE BEING TERMINATED AS OF 30 JUNE. F-5 ACCEPTED NEWS CALMLY, SAID HE PLANNED REMAIN SAGO TO FINISH YEAR AND HALF REMAINING UNIVERSITY WORK TO RECEIVE DEGREE. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE ABILITY GET OUTSIDE JOB TO SUPPORT SELF THIS PERIOD. THUS REF ACTION TO PLACE HIM NOT NECESSARY. TERMINATION REPORT BEING PREPARED. POUCHING.

S E C R E T * RE FUBIAS PROJECT RENEWALS

SECRET

CFN

AN WH/C/ES

ABSTRACT

19-124-26/3

26 May 65

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Alpha 66 Doings in Los Angeles as of September 1970

FROM:
Chief, Los Angeles Office
(AMWatson/bas)

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE
29 September 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
DCS Message Center				
1. International Div.				Attached obtained from Johnny O'Donnell, free-lance reporter/writer, who has gained confidence of Alpha 66 members in Los Angeles. Is there any interest in this type of information, as noted in enclosures? Encls: Alpha 66 Notices of Meetings and Propaganda History of Alpha 66 Picture of Vicente Mendez Tape of Meeting/Interview with Los Angeles Leader Miguel Talleda/Press Interview with Andreas Nazario Sargent, Alpha 66 Secretary General in US. For retention.
2. R. Hiller	2 Oct	2 Oct		
3.				
4. OSS	1 Oct 70			
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				File: O'Donnell, Johnny
15.				21477

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED				DATE [illegible]
	☐	YES	☐	NO	LETTER NO.

TO: Los Angeles Field Office

ATTN: [illegible] Mrs.

FROM:
George [illegible] WH/Cuba/js - [illegible]

Subject: Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles Area

Reference: LA Routing and Record Sheet, with attachments, dated 29 Sep [illegible]

WH/Cuba Operations appreciates the information and attachments submitted under reference. They would be happy to receive any additional information which you may be able to collect in your routine contact with source. WH/Cuba is interested in any activity [illegible] by Cuban exile organizations particularly Alpha 66. Your source would have excellent potential for collection since Alpha 66 would be passing material to O'Connell who no doubt is happy to pass it to you for appropriate handling.

We thank you for [illegible] him.

FILE: [illegible]-21477

George [illegible]
SIGNATURE

REPLY	DATE

SIGNATURE

[illegible]

21477

ORIGINATOR'S SUSPENSE

FORM 5-61 1831

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Alpha 66 Doings in Los Angeles as of September 1970

FROM:
DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
Operational Support Staff, 900 Key
George S. Musulin - Ext. 2268 GSM

EXTENSION:

NO. DCS HH-21477

DATE 2 October 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. THRU: DO/DCSL	10/2	10/2	CC
2.			
3. WH/C/OP 3 D 30, Hqs.			
4.			
5. RR		8 Oct	J
6.			
7. SR - I plan to toss those portions of this in which I am not interested - any objections?			
8.			
9.		8 Oct	J
10. DO/DCSL	10/9	10/9	CC
11. DCS - 900 Key			
12. George Musulin	10/13/70		GSM
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

3. Attached obtained from Johnny O'Donnell, free-lance reporter/writer, who has gained confidence of Alpha 66 members in Los Angeles. Is there any interest in this type of information, as noted in enclosures?

Enclosures:

destroy Alpha 66 Notices of Meetings and Propaganda
History of Alpha 66 - filed in Alpha 66 file
Picture of Vicente Mendez
Tape of Meeting/Interview with Los Angeles Leader Miguel Talleda/Press Interview with Andreas Nazario Sargent, Alpha 66 Secretary General in US. filed in Alpha 66 file

Please advise.

– Some of these we have retained for our file -- per notes above. However, the [illegible] [illegible] here.

21477 FILE

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CUBANOS A LA GUERRA

EMPLEARE TODAS MIS ENERGIAS A FIN DE DESEMBARCAR EN TIEMPO PRUDENCIAL EN LA ISLA AMADA"

Capitan Vicente Mendez.-



VICENTE MENDEZ Y SUS HOMBRE
ESTAN PELEANDO EN CUBA

,a Promesa se ha Cumplido!

ALPHA 66 Convoca

al Magno acto de INFORMACION DE GUERRA a cargo de

ANDRES NAZARIO SARGEN

Secretario General de ALPHA 66

AGOSTO 30 • 1 p.m.

Embassy Auditorium

GRAND Ave. Y 9th STREET

GIL LOPEZ
PRESIDENT
Rome Interiors
ALFOMBRAS Y CORTINAS
COMPRE DIRECTAMENTE A LA FABRICA Y
!!! AHORRE DINERO!!!
PHONE: 748-5306
748-5307
1422 W. PICO BLVD.
LOS ANGELES, CA. 90015

Almacenes
Alamar
Fabricantes en Joyas Finas de Oro 18K.
Objetos para Regalos - Camaras - Proyectores
Efectos Electricos - Televisores - Radios
Discos Latinos.
CREDITO INMEDIATO
USTED COMPRA EN ALAMAR Y PAGA EN ALAMAR
TELFS.
484-0626
484-0636
[illegible] SUNSET BLVD.
LOS ANGELES, CAL. 90026

21477

Las informaciones que llegan de nuestra Patría aseguran un estado latente de rebeldía, actividades de sabotajes violentos y pasivos, inconformidad en los miembros de las fuerzas armadas, grandes preocupac   os en las esferas del gobierno y un malestar general en el pueblo cubano.

No hay dudas que el Plan de Alpha 66 contribuye en alguna proporción a estos fenómenos. Primero anunciamos el desembarco de Vicente Méndez antes del 31 de diciembre con otros hombres, apesar de las dificultades conocidas, se cumplió en gran medida la promesa. Murió en el hecho el Capitan Julio Cesar Ramirez. Sin esperar mucho tiempo, se produjo la gran conmoción Mundial el 17 de Abril con la presencia y los combatientes del Coronel Vicente Méndez y el mayor contingente que llego a tierras cubanas, despues de 1961.

En mayo, hombres del Alpha 66 hundieron 2 embarciones cubanas e hicieron 11 prisioneros comunistas, repitiendo otra conmoción Mundial que motivó el escandalo mayor escenificado por el traidor Fidel Castro y su mayor derreta moral de los últimos tiempos. El gran triunfo lo consigna el pueblo de Cuba en distintos informes que poseemos de nuestras células clandestinas.

Otros movimientos positivos de distintas índoles se produjeron, unos con éxito y otros frustados por las autoridades norteamericanas; pero en fin todos destinados a golpear duramente al tirano y alentar y respaldar a los hombres de las montañas y los grupos clandestinos que se juegan todos los días sus vidas en aras de la libertad.

Con estos antecedentes de gran valor y valides, amén de mas de 20 acciones comandos y de infiltraciones realizadas por nuestros mas destacados hombres y por una pleyade de patriotas que combatieron y combaten en todos los frentes de accion cubana, nos sentimos moralmente respaldados para promover un llamamiento en general a los cubanos de la Isla y a los cubanos del destierro, a la guerra libertadora. No pretendemos convertirnos en sectaristas, sino que cada cual que empuñe el arma que tenga, la actividad que sea compatible a sus posibilidades, la colaboración economica y el apoyo moral, a los que combaten y sobre todo, a los que en la Isla dan la pauta y llevan el mayor peso en la contienda. Sin demora tenemos que acometer acciones vitales para que éste gran momento historico cuaje en la liberación definitiva de Cuba.

Ademas de coordinar las cuestiones internas con otros grupos clandestinos, Alpha 66 esta distrubuyendo cientos de millares de pequeños panfleticos convidando a las milicias, al Ejercito Rebelde y al pueblo a participar de la contienda en contra del Castro-Comunismo. Todos los cubanos que deseen cooperar a este llamamiento pueden pasar por nuestras oficinas para entregarles el material que deben enviar a Cuba. Cada cubano puede servir de puente entre los de dentro y de fuera.

Por último, demandamos de todos los cubanos y de las organizaciones que pasemos de las palabras a los hechos. Que las disputas, las divisiones y las querellas infecundas se eliminen y se convierta cada uno en un esforzado militante de la causa cubana. Lo requieren los hombres y mujeres que en las carceles sostienen la gallarda rebeldía nacional, los combatientes de todos los frentes y el pueblo esclavizado. Pongamos la tragedia de nuestro pueblo por encima de mezquinos intereses y demos cada cubano un impulso y el apoyo moral y guerrero a la epopeya libertadora. De este modo podemos regresar a nuestra Patria con la frente limpia y el corazón henchido de orgullo porque supimos conquistar el derecho a ser libres.

Fd   EJECUTIVO NACIONAL "ALPHA 66"

21477

VICENTE MENDEZ
VIVO
EN CUBA

ALPHA 66 INFORMA:

Reportes que nos llegan desde nuestras células militantes dentro de Cuba, determinan, que las acciones iniciadas por nuestra Organización, que en una de sus etapas culminó con el desembarco del Coronel Vicente Méndez el 17 de Abril en Oriente, estan teniendo repercusión en otras provincias de la isla.

No es sólo en Oriente donde las fuerzas internas han respondido al estímulo exterior representado por las acciones de Alpha 66; en Camagüey, por ejemplo, se han producido reiterados brotes de rebeldía traducidos en sabotajes, resistencia y en algunos casos enfrentamiento directo con el régimen.

La situación en Oriente, desde luego, es la que revela con mayor claridad la decisión del pueblo cubano de sacudirse el yugo que lo oprime. A tal extremo que los propios medios de publicidad del Gobierno comunista de Cuba han tenido que informar sobre "grandes concentraciones de las Fuerzas Armadas", en ésos sectores se debe a "movilizaciones para incrementar la producción", cuando lo cierto es que la fracasada zafra de los 10 millones, ya prácticamente ha terminado.

Las movilizaciones no han tenido otro objeto, según los reportes que hemos recibido, que frenar la ola de deserciones que se han venido produciendo en las filas de las Fuerzas Armadas y cubrir territorios en los que actúan eficazmente los patriotas cubanos.

Que el régimen de Castro está consciente de la gravedad del momento lo demuestra entre otras cosas, la intensa purga que se está llevando a cabo en las más altas esferas del Gobierno, y que comenzaron con la cesantía fulminante de José Llanusa, como Ministro de Educación y Francisco Padron, como Ministro de la Industria Azucarera. Los desplazamientos de distintos elementos de los importantes cargos que venían ocupando continúan especialmente en los "Estados Mayores" de las Fuerzas Armadas. A tal extremo, de que se da por segura la destitución del Comandante Guillermo García Frías, Jefe del Partido Comunistra en la provincia de Oriente, quien ha caído en "Desgracia" debido a su importancia para contener a los invasores de Alpha 66 y a los elementos que en ésa provincia se han sumado a las acciones.

Este estado de cosas ha llegado a tal situación explosiva, que se esperan en el curso de lo que resta de éste mes importantes acontecimientos que daran un giro favorable a la rebeldía cubana frente al régimen despótico que ocupa el poder.

Esa es en síntesis, el resumen de los informes que hemos recibido donde figuran datos aún más concretos que de revelarse pormenorizadamente, pudieran acarrear graves peligros a elementos que actuan activamente en ésas dos provincias mencionadas.

Fdo. EJECUTIVO NACIONAL "ALPHA 66"

21477

[illegible]

BOLETIN MENSUAL

ORGANO OFICIAL DEL "CIRCULO CUBANO DE LOS ANGELES" CALIFORNIA, E. U. A.

"A NEW HOPE"

UNA NUEVA ESPERANZA

Por Esteban Fernandez Gomez

Captain Vicente Mendez Fernandez has publicly committed himself, and given his word that he will be fighting in Cuba in the next months to come. In a very emotive letter addressed to the National Council of Cubans Independence Veterans (in exile) he formally pledge himself to the nation and the people in exile by his honor to face all the responsibility of the war in Cuban soil. He goes on telling them in his letter full of courage, that he will face all the action in the just and necessary anti-Castro war in the next months. [illegible] counting on [illegible] in [illegible] from, they would [illegible] and valor [illegible] will never [illegible] question.

During this time he got to [illegible] the rank of [illegible] for his [illegible] killed in combat [illegible] his chief commander at the time. [illegible] the very sad "closing of the [illegible]". He [illegible] and his [illegible] took place in [illegible]

[illegible]

Vicente Mendez is only known in his fight against Castro but he has never been interested in seeing his name in the paper, or assuming the leadership of any group.

He has always chosen to be unknown, but being that so soon he will go back to Cuba, it is necessary that all Cubans who want to help for the freedom of Cuba know who this man is, and his merits and at least pray for his life.

Captain Vicente Mendez was the first man in the glorious Escambray [illegible] in fight against the tyranny of Fidel Castro. On July 5, 1960 he saw the first signs of Communism in the Revolution that he helped so much.

The Rebel Headquarters of Camajuani in Las Villas Province was taken by Vicente Mendez and his followers, taking all the [illegible] into the Escambray Mountains where they fought for eleven long months.

[illegible] Cuba, [illegible] the [illegible] Living [illegible] that Vicente [illegible] ready be so brave.

[illegible] Cuban farmer [illegible] for the [illegible] countries.

It is not [illegible] but [illegible] to make an [illegible] war.

All the Cubans have the [illegible] Vicente Mendez, [illegible] will help him, [illegible]

21477

Latin America Report

Offices : 721 National Press Building, F at 14th St. N.W. Washington D.C. 20004 Phone: 783-7507
Editorial: 301 Langford Building, 121 S.E. First Street Miami, Fla. 33131 Phone: 373-0631.

Editor: Paul D. Bethel

Vol. 8 - No. 7 - July, 19

Latins Want U.S. Help in Ousting Castro

At least six Latin countries seem eager to dump the Red tyrant, but are hampered by State's 'non-policy' toward Cu

By PAUL BETHEL



Coast Guard Exhibits Arms Taken From Alpha-66. Exiles Say They Were Intercepted In International Waters.

On April 17 (the anniversary of the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco) the Cuban exile military organization Alpha-66 landed 13 commandos on the east coast of Cuba. They allegedly were captured, but if so only after Fidel Castro threw an estimated 25,000 troops into the fray. Castro lost several men as well.

Then on May 6, Alpha-66 "naval units" sank, in Cuban waters, two of Castro's high-seas fishing trawlers (used, as well, for spying and infiltrating guerrillas into Latin America).

These two actions set off a chain of events in Washington that would have done credit to the LBJ and JFK Administrations. With Castro massing his mobs for a circus of protest, the State Department hit the panic button and on May 13 called together representatives of federal law enforcement agencies to figure out ways to protect Castro from further forays of this nature.

What really teed-off the State Department was a momentary aberration by Alpha-66 to trade 11 crew members of the fishing vessels for the freedom of survivors of the April 17 landing. They soon thought better of it and sent a telegram to the Red Cross giving the location of the men and asking that they be returned to Cuba.

'CIA Invasion'

Meanwhile, Castro staged a demonstration in front of the former U.S. Embassy in Havana, which is now being used by the Swiss government. He charged the Swiss, who represent U.S. interests in Cuba, with complicity in what he called a "CIA invasion" by mercenaries.

Two Swiss employes were prevented from leaving the embassy for two days. The strategy was to mount Swiss pressure on Washington to crack down on the Cuban exiles. It worked, obviously, and the State Department again danced to a Castro tune.

The demonstration was also used to "welcome" the returning fishermen, who were soon to land at the airport in Havana. But the fishermen were late in arriving.

They were late due to an unforeseen need to change clothing. When Alpha-66 rescued the crews from the sinking vessels (turned around, Castro would have had them shot as he has ordered the shooting of thousands seeking to leave his island in small boats), they found them literally in rags.

Shoes were patched with palm bark; shirts and trousers were in tatters. So, before setting them free, Alpha-66 provided the men with shoes and new clothing. When the men arrived at the air in Havana, they were divested of t new goodies and forced to don old w clothing. Some, we are told, protes vehemently.

The bearded dictator took the casion of the "welcome" extended fishermen to announce that the 10-r lion-ton sugar harvest was a fail Despite closing down factories, sch and offices and marching the peo out to the fields, the harvest on wh Castro had placed "the honor of Revolution" failed to materialize 1952, 350,000 *guajiros* cut and grou 7.3 million tons in 100 days; Castro had twice that many working and p duced about 8.5 million tons in days).

Back in Miami, federal agents act on State Department interpretation antiquated neutrality laws entered Alp 66 headquarters. The search warra alleged that there was evidence t 1) Alpha-66 had launched its attac from U.S. territory; 2) Cubans we

21477

Back in Miami, federal agents actin on State Department interpretation o antiquated neutrality laws entered Alpha-66 headquarters. The search warrant alleged that there was evidence that 1) Alpha-66 had launched its attacks from U.S. territory; 2) Cubans were raising funds illegally for bellicose purposes; and 3) all of this was being done to attack a nation with which the U.S is "at peace, to wit: Cuba."

Of the 37 items impounded, those of military significance were "one large carton filled with military-type web equipment...one military-type field pack...and one large cardboard carton filled with plastic military-type canteens." With such evidence, Army-Navy surplus stores could be indicted.

Greater attention was given to files containing the names of contributors. These held special interest because the wording in the warrant found "financial contributions and disbursements to obtain boats and other supplies" possibly prosecutable.

> **Can the State Department be serious? If this section of the law were applied impartially, how many Jews would today be under indictment for openly soliciting funds for the purchase of bellicose materials for a foreign nation—Israel?**

How many senators and congressmen would today have egg on their faces for participating in fund-raising funcions, publicly organized and propagandized, for that very purpose? That is how he Cuban community sees the matter.

This author has no particular objecion to fund-raising by Jewish groups in he United States. Cuban exiles certainly io not. Indeed, Cuban Jews in exile have ontributed substantially to Israel's war hest. They are furious when they, as Cubans, try to do the same for the liberaion of their country, only to find a double tandard raised against them. Nor are hey happy to see their contributions go own the drain when overzealous federal fficials seize equipment belonging to xile groups.

But what blew it for Miami's 350,000 Cubans was an "edict" read to them y the hapless State Department repreentative in Miami.

According to the heads of exile action roups called to his office, the repreentative stressed that "the spirit as ell as the law" will be upheld. He is id to have told them that fund-raising r a bellicose purpose is definitely outde the law and warned them not only ould they be prosecuted should they unch an attack from the U.S., but ould also be stopped from using anher Latin American country for that rpose.

The exact wording in the instruction from the State Department reads: "We would like to make it clear that if there is sufficient evidence of activity based in the U.S. for any such military expedition, then the fact that a third country is used as a staging area would not preclude the U.S. from proceeding to enforce its laws."

When the story of State Department policy hit the streets, the Cubans exploded. Cuban students from the University of Miami and Dade Junior College (Dade's 20,000 students comprise 8,000 Cuban students) marched on the Federal Building; 600 Cuban lawyers challenged the validity of the State Department position; doctors, dentists, educators, professional groups—57 of them—published a lengthy statement in the *Diario las Americas* newspaper. Part of that statement reads:

"Title 18, Section 960 of the U.S. Code [invoked against Alpha-66] prohibits certain actions from being taken against a nation with which the United States is at peace—'a friendly nation.' Clearly, Fidel Castro is not at peace with the United States or nations of the Western Hemisphere and, by breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba on Jan. 3, 1961, the United States recognized that Cuba is hardly a 'friendly nation.'"

REMINDER : We still have nearly 700 school libraries to go in filling our commitment to them for the fall. If you have not contributed in 1970, please do so now. Each of you have received a prepaid envelope. Place your contribution in it and mail today ! Time is getting short.

"We conclude," the signatories said, "that this part of the neutrality laws cannot be applied against Cubans who are fighting for freedom."

Sen. Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.) and Rep. William C. Cramer (R.-Fla.) strongly support the Cuban exiles in their interpretation of the law.

The most recent law outlining U.S. policy toward Cuba was promulgated and signed by President Kennedy on Oct. 3, 1962. It states that the United States is "to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination." Furthermore, the United States is signatory to four inter-American pacts and treaties which clearly are designed to combat Fidel Castro's Communist regime.

> **In any event, this most recent action by the Department of State finds relations between Cuban exiles and Washington at their lowest ebb since the Bay of Pigs failure nine years ago. Cubans are now thoroughly convinced that the State Department is out to "get" them and willing to employ any subterfuge to do so.**

One of these subterfuges, say the exiles, is a recent indictment against Andrés Nazario Sargén, head of Alpha-66. Sargén is charged with having "conspired" to purchase arms allegedly stolen from a U.S. arsenal in Connecticut. His bail was set at $100,000, then inexplicably reduced to a mere $2,500 and Sargén asked to plead guilty to be let off on a light sentence.

These shenanigans, say the Cubans, mean that lacking proof that Alpha-66 launched its attacks from U.S. soil, the government will use other means to intimidate exile action groups. Legal action taken against Sargén, they argue, is simply the eager-beaverism on the part of what they believe to be pro-Castro functionaries in the Department of State.

On the other hand, the Department of State has its case. Many officials are only slightly less enthusiastic than Cuban exiles to see the end of Castro's Communist regime. But they argue that the half measures taken by Cuban exile groups are not effective and merely serve to embarrass the United States. Others claim that the Alpha-66 attacks were merely ill-timed, providing Castro with an "excuse" to lay the failure of his sugar crop at the feet of "CIA operatives" based in the United States.

As to this latter claim, those who know Fidel Castro also know that he needs no excuse to gather the mobs and denounce the United States. The history of his 10 years in power bears full witness to the truth of this view.

No Viable Policy

What really comes through in all of this is that Washington has yet to come up with a viable policy toward Fidel Castro to put a stop to his subverting Latin America and even the United States. The only absolute factor in the conduct of foreign affairs is the premium placed on initiative. We don't have it; Castro does.

The State Department cannot merely "wish" Castro out of power, and its policy of "economic denial and diplo-

21477

gible demonstration of America's willingness to resolve international disputes peacefully if the following specific steps could be taken this year:

First, a review by the Secretary of State of all disputes to which the U.S. is a party to ascertain which ones, or portions of them, might lend themselves to arbitration or adjudication. When this review has been completed, we would urge that the United States move to take the disputes that are determined to be justiciable to the International Court of Justice or other appropriate international tribunals.

Second, the employment of the provision of Article 96 of the United Nations Charter to seek advisory opinions of the World Court by the United Nations and the U.N. Specialized Agencies on issues where such an opinion would help to clarify the legal aspects of a dispute.

Third, the instructing of U.S. negotiators to seek inclusion of a provision in future treaties and agreements which provides for the World Court's adjudication of disputes arising under those treaties and agreements.

We believe that these steps, modest though they seem, would be favorably received by the international community and lead to an enhanced regard for the rule of law throughout the world.

As Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, we have devoted considerable time and attention to this question and have sought the advice of skilled international lawyers outside the Congress.

We welcome your comments and reactions to these suggestions and would be pleased to discuss them in greater detail with you or with members of your Administration.

LIST OF SIGNERS

Senators Edward W. Brooke, Alan Cranston, Charles E. Goodell, Philip A. Hart, Mark O. Hatfield, Harold E. Hughes, Gale W. McGee, George S. McGovern, Lee Metcalf, Walter F. Mondale, Frank E. Moss, Robert W. Packwood, Claiborne Pell, Richard S. Schweiker, Joseph D. Tydings, Harrison A. Williams, Jr., and Stephen A. Young.

Congressmen Thomas L. Ashley, Jonathan B. Bingham, Edward P. Boland, Richard Bolling, John Brademas, George E. Brown, Jr., Daniel E. Button, Silvio O. Conte, John Conyers, Jr., James C. Corman, John R. Dellenback, Bob Eckhardt, Don Edwards, Joshua Eilberg, Paul Findley, Donald M. Fraser, Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, Cornelius E. Gallagher, Jacob H. Gilbert, William J. Green, Gilbert Gude, Seymour Halpern, Michael Harrington, William D. Hathaway, Augustus F. Hawkins, Henry Helstoski, Robert W. Kastenmeier, Hastings Keith, Edward I. Koch, Robert L. Leggett, Richard D. McCarthy, Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., Abner J. Mikva, Patsy T. Mink, William S. Moorhead, F. Bradford Morse, Charles A. Mosher, John E. Moss, Richard L. Ottinger, Claude Pepper, Bertram L. Podell, Thomas M. Rees, Ogden R. Reid, Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Edward R. Roybal, William F. Ryan, James H. Scheuer, William L. St. Onge, Louis Stokes, Frank Thompson, Jr., John V. Tunney, and Morris K. Udall.

CUBAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. WILLIAM C. CRAMER

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 20, 1970

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, May 20 is a very special day for Cubans and Americans. On that date in 1902, the Cuban flag was first raised at the city hall in Havana and at El Morro Castle. On that date Cuba became a free country.

Most Americans know about the sinking of the battle ship which made the cry "Remember the Maine" a part of our history. Most Americans know that this country intervened on behalf of the Cuban people battling for independence from foreign domination.

Unfortunately, however, most Americans are not totally aware of the valiant fight put up by the Cuban people, alone and unassisted, for nearly a century.

The Cubans fought a 10-year war from 1868 to 1878 against a powerful Spanish Army. They have consistently fought for freedom from oppression and their battle for independence from 1895 to 1898 found the United States fighting alongside of them.

But we cannot forget that the Cubans so loved liberty that the number of casualties in their two wars of independence mounted to a quarter of a million people. The total population of the island at that time was less that 2 million.

What this means is that one out of every four Cubans became casualties in their quest for liberty.

It is shameful to say that the United States seems to have turned its back on Cuba when it is suffering from the imposition of another foreign tyranny, international communism headed by the Soviet Union. Yet, State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey, a holdover bureaucrat, threatens freedom fighters who wish to return and help their brothers throw off the yoke of this tyranny.

My colleague, Senator Strom Thurmond, has already brought this to the attention of the Senate. It is my wish to bring it to the attention of my colleagues in the House of Representatives and the American public.

The amount of sabotage being committed by Cubans inside Cuba is in line with the tradition of its people. Just a few days ago, on May 15, the Castro regime announced the execution by firing squad of a campesino who burned down a sugar warehouse at Isabela de Sagua.

This patriot lived in Cuba and gave his life in exchange for the destruction of 2,000 tons of sugar.

From all over Cuba come official admissions that the Cuban people are in massive resistance to the Communist regime of Fidel Castro.

It is fair to say that today resistance to Castro and communism is many times greater than the resistance which brought him to power in 1959. Yet, Cuban freedom fighters in exile are persecuted when their only purpose is to help their fellow man regain the liberty for which 250,000 Cubans fought and were wounded or gave their lives.

I should like to ask this question: Is it not in our own national interest that Cuba be freed from domination by a country a thousand times more powerful than the Spaniards of the 19th century? Does not the presence of a fleet of Soviet Navy ships anchored in Cienfuegos Harbor pose a threat to our own national security?

Among those ships are a missile firing cruiser and an atomic submarine. What is the practical difference between land base missiles which brought on the crisis of 1962 and Soviet ships with missiles now anchored in Cuba?

It is no secret that our intelligence community fears that the Soviet Union is now prepared to establish a Caribbean fleet based in Cuba, and surely this fact must relate to our own security. I say that official efforts to protect Fidel Castro by harassing freedom fighters are dangerous and nonsensical.

True, the State Department apprehends Cuban exiles on the grounds that forays from the United States are in violation of our neutrality laws. But I would like to cite an interpretation of those neutrality laws as rendered by the late Robert Kennedy when he was Attorney General of the United States.

His ruling was that the neutrality laws were, and I quote:

> Among the oldest laws in our statutes books. They were not designed for the kind of situation which exists in the world today.

The late Attorney General continued and I quote from his April 20, 1961 ruling:

> The neutrality laws were never designed to prevent individuals from leaving the United States to fight for a cause in which they believe. There is nothing in the neutrality laws which prevents refugees from Cuba from returning to that country to engage in the fight for freedom, nor is an individual prohibited from the United States, with others of like belief, to join others in a second country for an expedition against a third country.

I believe that ruling not only is just but also was made in the cause of our own security. Unfortunately, it has been all but forgotten by our State Department which continues to harass Cuban exiles and even instructs the U.S. Coast Guard to apprehend freedom fighters on the high seas—a form of official piracy, I might add.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that Cuba is little more than a Soviet base dedicated to the destruction of our society and that of free men everywhere. I should like to emphasize that our freedom is inextricably interwoven with the freedom of the Cuban people. The ominous presence of the powerful Soviet fleet based just off our shores underscores this fact.

KSU STORY ONE-SIDED IN TV REPORTING

HON. DONALD E. LUKENS

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 20, 1970

Mr. LUKENS. Mr. Speaker, the events at Kent State are tragic enough without having emotions aroused and magnified by biased news coverage. Today I receive an article which appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 7, by Mr. Wil liam Hickey, which illustrates the ir responsible reporting of the deaths a Kent State.

Mr. Hickey, who is a TV and radi critic for the paper is well equipped t

21477

14-00000

Alpha 66 Doings in Los Angeles as of September 1970

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
Operational Support Staff, 900 Key
George S. Musulin - Ext. 2268

DCS HH-21477

2 October 1970

THRU: DO/DCSL

WH/C/OP
3 D 30, Hqs.

3. Attached obtain from Johnny O'Donnell, free-lance reporter/writer, who has gained confidence of Alpha 66 members in Los Angeles. Is there any interest in this type of information, as noted in enclosures?

Enclosures:

- Alpha 66 Notices of Meetings and Propaganda
- History of Alpha 66
- Picture of Vicente Mendez
- Tape of Meeting/Interview with Los Angeles Leader
- Miguel Talleda/Press Interview with Andreas Nazario Sargent, Alpha 66 Secretary General in US.

Please advise.

T. 9 Oct

21477

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-108

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

LA-677-70

TO : Director, DCS
for OSS (Musulin)

DATE: 16 October 1970

FROM : Chief, Los Angeles Office

SUBJECT: Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles Area

REF.: Your Speed Letter of 6 Oct 70, Same Subject

1. In a 13 Oct 70 interview with Johnny O'Donnell, free-lance reporter, he made the following information available regarding subject matter: The head man is Miguel Talleda, who is employed as an accountant at Hammer of California, Gardena. He has four daughters, two sons, and his wife baby-sits for neighbors in order to earn extra money. He receives about $1,000 a month. Talleda appears to be honest, hard-working, well disciplined and well organized, not overly emotional, strongly anti-Communist and anti-Castro. According to the Los Angeles Police Department, he has a P.O. Box in his name in Alhambra. The No. 2 man is Nextor Aranguren, also an accountant. He lives in Alhambra, and is believed to be the "bag man" who handles all money collected by the organization. It is the custom of Alpha 66 to inform their supporters how much money they receive. The rally in April 1970 at the Embassy Auditorium in Los Angeles netted them approximately $2,200.

2. One of the staunch supporters of Alpha 66 is a Dr. (fnu) DeCespedes, PhD, the granddaughter of Carlos Manuel DeCespedes, the Father of the Cuban independence who fought against the Spanish in 1868. She spoke at the Maywood American Legion Post Alpha 66 Rally in August 1970.

3. The following are Southern California city delegates: Eligio Vichot from Redondo Beach; Lorenzo Alfonso, from Fullerton, their most fiery speaker, who owns a janitorial service business; Pedro Sanchez from Culver City; Marcos Peralta, Huntington Park. Sanchez, Peralta, and Talleda flew to San Francisco with top man Andreas Nazario Sargeant of Miami when he visited Los Angeles in August 1970.

4. O'Donnell said the Alpha 66 training camp is somewhere in Mexico but they may move it to Central America as the Cubans are worried that the Mexicans might sell them out.

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

21477

SECRET

LA-677-70

16 October 1970

5. From what O'Donnell has been able to piece together from meetings and discussions with Alpha 66 members, he believes another raid attempt into Cuba will take place in about four-five months. He will continue to apprise us of what he learns.

John L. Schubert
JOHN L. SCHUBERT

A.M. Watson
AMWatson/sg

File: O'DONNELL, Johnny

SECRET

21477

SECRET

Chief, Los Angeles Field Office 23 October 1970

ATTN : A. M. Watson

Director, Domestic Contact Service (DCS)

New Case 55515 - Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles

REFERENCE: LA-677-70, dated 16 Oct 70

1. This is new case opened to your Office.

2. WH/Cuba/OPS has again expressed interest in referent activities and would appreciate any further elaboration and amplification of Paragraph four. Any possible additional data would be very helpful such as location of camps; how many men are involved in training; key personalities connected with training; funding channels; equipment or any other pertinent information would be most welcome.

JAMES R. MURPHY

GSMusulin/js
cc: Services Div. (Control)

SECRET

Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles Area

HM-21477

21 October 1970

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
Operational Support Staff, 900 Key
George S. Musulin - Ext. 2268

THRU: DO/DCSL

WH/COG
3 D 30 Hq.

Linda Jasper

3. Attached in line with your request to furnish additional coverage on Alpha 66 is copy of LA report (LA-677-70), for your retention. We will be glad to service any operational requirements which may be desired. Developments will be reported.

21477

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-108

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

LA 1024-70

TO : Director, DCS

ATTN : OSS (Musulin)

FROM : Chief, Los Angeles Office

DATE: 31 December 1970

SUBJECT: Case 55515 - Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles

REF : Your memo dtd 23 Oct 70, same subject

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
Operational Support Staff, 900 Key
George S. Musulin, Ext. 2263

1. Subsequent interviews with Johnny O'Donnell resulting from reference, disclosed he has had no personal contact with the Alpha 66 group in the last two months due to personal financial reasons. He said his funds are depleted and he has had to spend all of his time looking for publishers that will pay for his contributions. He was unable to answer the questions posed in reference at this time. As soon as he gets on his feet financially he will again make contact with the group and try to learn more. He feels he has the complete confidence of the group; they are looking to him for publicity, i.e., "to tell it like it is."

2. O'Donnell said as far as "funding channels" are concerned, Alpha 66 does its own fund raising, such as with rallies, dinners, and "nickel and dime" contributors. He does not know of any single big money contributor.

3. Any information regarding Alpha 66 that comes to the attention of Mr. O'Donnell, will be passed along to us by him.

Dale Zenis
for JOHN L. SCHUBERT

AMWatson/vla

File: Case 55515
Johnny O'Donnell

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-108

[illegible] see [illegible] LA

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

LA 288-71

TO : Director, DCS
ATTN : OSS (Musulin)
FROM : Chief, Los Angeles Office

DATE: 25 February 1971

SUBJECT: Case 55515 - Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles

1. Periodic checking with Johnny O'Donnell regarding his contacts with Alpha 66 people has proved negative. O'Donnell is hurting financially, as reported in LA 1024-70, and he is trying to earn a living by writing articles for various publications. He feels his first concern is to his family (a pregnant wife), so he is devoting his time to anything that will pay off. He is not bitter, and said if he does learn anything in the future regarding the activities of Alpha 66, he will certainly pass it along, but he will not go out to get it at this time.

2. It is our belief that nothing more from O'Donnell will be forthcoming. Please close. We know of no other sources.

?

John L. Schubert
JOHN L. SCHUBERT

AMWatson/vla

File: C-55515
Johnny O'Donnell

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY					FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)	RECEIVED MO DA YR (22-26)	REPORT NO. (27-33)	IUO (34-36)
XMIM				X	02121	0461871	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Counter-Revolutionary Organization, Alpha 66, and its Activities (Cuba)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)	RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40-44)
	/

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Raul GRANJA
1020 SW Fifth Street, Apt. #4
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

45 TYPE OO-E: S
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
[✓ 2]	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
WH

FIELD COMMENTS
Please direct to:
OSS (GSMusulin)

Copy passed to JMCOBRA locally.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
HJCubria/css	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mrs Thayne	1-21	[illegible]
2	Mr. Farrell	1/21 2/2	[illegible]
3	Internl Div.	2/9	JD
4	↓		
5	OSS ([illegible])		
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FILE in CASE

55515

→ ALTHAGE ACTIVITIES

IN LA.

If INT DIV. WANTS COPIES THEY CAN REPRODUCE REPORTS

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
M/C	

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

(40)

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions

SECRET
RYBAT

19 JUL 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Ramparts: John Garrett UNDERHILL Jr.,
Samuel George CUMMINGS, and
INTERARMCO

1. Ramparts of June 1967, Vol. 5, No. 12, pp. 28-29, contains the following passages about Subjects:

> "The day after the assassination, Gary Underhill left Washington in a hurry. Late in the evening he showed up at the home of friends in New Jersey. He was very agitated. A small clique within the CIA was responsible for the assassination, he confided, and he was afraid for his life and probably would have to leave the country. Less than six months later Underhill was found shot to death in his Washington apartment. The coroner ruled it suicide.
>
> "J. Garrett Underhill had been an intelligence agent during World War II and was a recognized authority on limited warfare and small arms. A researcher and writer on military affairs, he was on a first-name basis with many of the top brass in the Pentagon. He was also on intimate terms with a number of high-ranking CIA officials--he was one of the Agency's 'un-people' who perform special assignments. At one time he had been a friend of Samuel Cummings of Interarmco, the arms broker that numbers among its customers the CIA and, ironically, Klein's Sporting Goods of Chicago, from whence /sic/ the mail-order Carcano allegedly was purchased by Oswald.

SECRET
.BAT

GROUP 1
[illegible]

"The friends whom Underhill visited say he was sober but badly shook. They say he attributed the Kennedy murder to a CIA clique which was carrying on a lucrative racket in gun-running, narcotics and other contraband, and manipulating political intrigue to serve its own ends. Kennedy supposedly got wind that something was going on and was killed before he could 'blow the whistle on it'. Although the friends had always known Underhill to be perfectly rational and objective, they at first didn't take his account seriously. 'I think the main reason was,' explains the husband, 'that we couldn't believe that the CIA could contain a corrupt element every bit as ruthlesc--and more efficient--as the mafia.'

"The verdict of suicide in Underhill's death is by no means convincing. His body was found by a writing collaborator, Asher Brynes of the New Republic. He had been shot behind the left ear, and an automatic pistol was under his left side. Odd, says Brynes, because Underhill was right-handed. Brynes thinks the pistol was fitted with a silencer, and occupants of the apartment building could not recall hearing a shot. Underhill obviously had been dead several days.

"Garry Underhill's chilling story is hardly implausible. As a spy apparatus the CIA is honeycombed with self-contained cliques operating without any real central control...."

2. A check of Agency records has yielded the following information about John Garrett UNDERHILL Jr.

a. DPOB: 7 August 1915, Brooklyn.

b. Attended high school in Brooklyn and was graduated from Harvard in 1937.

c. Died 8 May 1964.

d. Was a pictorial journalist for Life, 1938-1942.

e. Ordered to active duty with MIS, Washington, as a second lieutenant, on 8 July 1943. Served with MIS for 2-1/2 years, working on technical and photographic headings for MIS publications, evaluation of intelligence, and enemy uniforms, insignia, weapons, etc. On 9 October 1945 received a War Department staff citation for superior work in military intelligence. Left active duty in May 1946.

f. CIA memoranda of February and October 1949 show that there was interest by the New York office of OO, Contacts Division, in using Subject as a contact for foreign intelligence. Name checks were conducted with various military members of the intelligence community, but these yielded insufficient information, and OO was advised that contact should be developed with caution, on a limited basis, and that Subject was not to receive information classified higher than confidential.

g. On 12 March 1957 national agency checks were again requested on Subject because of interest by the Office of Security.

h. A UP article of unknown date cites an article written by UNDERHILL for Esquire. The article described the U.S. Army as shockingly weak. The UP piece stated that UNDERHILL served in military intelligence in World War II and Korea. UNDERHILL said that he had served as a consultant /probably in 1956/ to an Army coordinating group.

i. A report of 6 August 1954 from the Office of Security, Department of State, concerns contacts between UNDERHILL and one Herman AXELBANK, who was trying to sell photographs of Soviet military subjects. UNDERHILL reported these contacts to the FBI and to CIA. In November 1949

UNDERHILL visited Washington to call the attention of CIA to certain AXELBANK pictures and was advised that Colliers might be interested in some of them for an article on Russia. UNDERHILL discussed AXELBANK with "Ricky" Haskins of CIA.

3. On the basis of the foregoing an inquiry was made of director, Domestic Contact Service, whose office provided the attached reply.

4. The following information about Samuel George CUMMINGS, 201-178343, was compiled from his 201 file and from information provided by the Office of Security and by C/CI/SPG.

a. His date and place of birth are 4 February 1927, Philadelphia.

b. He entered on duty with CIA as a staff employee in December 1950. He was then a GS-9 assigned to Ground Branch, Weapons and Equipment Division, OSI. In January 1952 he was transferred to the Office of Procurement and Supply. During 1952/1953 he travelled abroad extensively, buying foreign weapons.

c. He married a German national and consequently resigned in November 1953, when he became a career agent in Guatemala.

d. Cables of the 1951-1952 period state that CUMMINGS was then buying arms for CIA and that the arms were intended for resistance elements behind the Iron Curtain.

e. On 17 August 1954 CUMMINGS became the principal agent of the CIA-owned companies known as International Armament Corporation and Interarmco Lt., both incorporated in Canada, Switzerland, and the U.S. CUMMINGS engaged in sharp practises in his conduct of business and was also extremely difficult to control.

24

f. A 1957 cable states that a business man in Panama, an Agency source, knew CUMMINGS to be providing information to the FBI and also knew him to be "careful about keeping the appropriate U.S. Government agencies informed of his deals."

g. In early 1958 CUMMINGS assumed sole ownership of International Armament Corp. and of Interarmco. (An Agency audit established the net worth of these companies as $219,000.00.) 24 CUMMINGS bought them with a non-interest bearing promissory note in the amount of $100,000, payable in four annual installments of $25,000, and certain items of inventory which had a cost value of $67,000 and a market value of $250,000. [These items were to remain the property of CIA, and their cost was to be returned to the Agency after they were sold.] 24

h. On 28 June 1961 the West German publication Der Spiegel reported that CUMMINGS had been employed by CIA as an arms expert during the Korean War and that he had cooperated with CIA in "supplying arms to various trouble spots".

i. Shortly after CUMMINGS left his staff position for Interarmco, contact with him was established by the WH Division. This contact was taken over by C/CI/SPG in September 1954. (CUMMINGS knows him only by alias.) This contact is still maintained. Until recently the principal purpose was to dispose of arms, (and CIA made a sizeable profit on these transactions.) 24 The current contact is not operational. It is not based on a project, and no payments are made to CUMMINGS who volunteers information resulting from his extensive travels and high-level contacts. An operational clearance for CUMMINGS' use by the CI Staff as an informant was granted in March 1958.

3/21

j. On 4 January 1962 the Rome periodical Vie Nuove stated that CUMMINGS was hired by CIA as an expert in arms and ballistics.

k. In December 1962 the Office of Security recommended against his use by Domestic Contact Service as a source, and in December 1964 the CI Staff advised that it had no operational interest in Subject. (Comment: As was noted above, this statement is correct, because Subject's activity is not directed by the Agency. He volunteers information.)

l. An Interagency Source Register memo to ACSI, dated 1 June 1965, stated that at that time there was "no record of a current operational interest in Subject."

m. An Agency report of 24 February 1966 cited CUMMINGS as trying to procure military equipment from Communist Bloc countries on behalf of DIA.

n. Agency reports of February and May 1967 stated that CUMMINGS had been in close contact with the BND (West German foreign intelligence service) for a year or more, that he had been given requirements by the BND, and that these included lists of Soviet and Bloc arms for procurement. It was also reported that he showed a BND representative a copy of a purchase order for the procurement of a Soviet T-54 tank, the order having originated with DIA. BND officials have often stated that CUMMINGS is a CIA agent.

o. A form dated 1 June 1967 was directed to the Interagency Source Register by "DA", presumably Department of the Army.

5. Agency records contain numerous references to INTERARMCO.

6. It is noted that UNDERHILL, CUMMINGS, and INTERARMCO have not appeared to date in any press or classified reports of the Garrison investigation in New Orleans, with the tenuous exception of the Ramparts article cited at the outset of this memorandum.

SECRET

WH/COG # 67-234

9 JUL 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/CI/R&A

SUBJECT : Garrison Investigation
Emilio SANTANA Galindo 201-335856

REFERENCE : CI/R&A Memorandum, dated 22 June 1967, same subject.

1. In response to your request, Subject's file was reviewed and Station JMWAVE was asked to supplement the information in Headquarter's files with any additional information which would be of value in judging the effect on the Agency of Subjects' being investigated by Garrison and/or NBC.

2. Our review shows that Subject was recruited by the Agency in October 1962, not 1960 as was reported in an earlier memorandum. He was given limited training for use as an area guide on an infiltration operation in which he participated during the latter part of May 1963. Subject exfiltrated with his family about one week after being infiltrated and was subsequently terminated.

3. Listed below are the staff and agent personnel, in true name, who have been in contact with Subject and may be known to him by true name, alias or nickname.

A) STAFF

1. [Eugene E. Norwinski] 03
2. Robert G. L. Wall
3. [William R. Stegall] 03
4. [Vernon J. Goertz] 03
5. [Robert Clark Stevens Jr.] 03
6. [Robert Charles Bachmann] 03
7. [Donald D. Wevor] 03
8. [Dewey A. Stinson] 03

B) AGENTS

1.	201-291237	Jose Enrique DAUSA Alvarez
2.	201-315825	Jose NUNEZ Paez
3.	201-310132	Alicio NUNEZ Paez
4.	201-320029	Raul QUESADA Freiro
5.	201-294451	Otto GINER Alonso
6.	201-341236	Alberto RUIZ Falcon
7.	201-294671	Joaquin POWELL Rubio
8.	201-739710	Jose Luis FORNELL Jacinto

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

9.	201-284925	Luis Albert BELTRAN Nodarso
10.	201-290305	Juan Luis COSCULLUEIA Iduato
11.	201-333832	Manuel VIERA Rodriguez
12.	201-298076	Juan Carlos JIMENEZ Jimenez
13.	201-313135	Diego Mario GIMENEZ Cadenas
14.	201-328507	Heriberto SARDINA Del Campo

4. Neither Station JMWAVE nor Headquarters have any record of Subject's whereabouts and activities between October and December 1963.

03

Earl J. Williamson
AC/WH/COG

1/80

SECRET

5 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/CI/R&A

SUBJECT : William Wayne DALZELL (201-126265)

12-21

1. Your memorandum of 27 June requested Ethiopian desk and Addis Ababa Station traces on Subject, who was in Addis Ababa in 1956.

12-21

2. The Addis Ababa Station reports that its files, as presently constituted, contain no traces on Subject. Desk traces reveal no additional information to that contained in the attached 201 file on Subject.

Richard M. Long
AC/AF/6

Attachment

03

DDP/AF/6/TNHuse:dp(5 July 68)
Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee w/att
1 - CI/O/AF w/o att
1 - AF/6 w/o att

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

31BR

SECRET

27 JUN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/AF/6
6D0119A

SUBJECT : William Wayne DALZELL

1. Subject is of interest to this office because of his connection with the Garrison investigation of the John Kennedy Assassination.

2. Subject's 201 file, which is enclosed with this memorandum, indicates that he had contact with our station in Addis Ababa in 1956.

12-21

3. Request desk and station traces to obtain additional information. Field traces should not be made outside the station.

Donovan E. Pratt
DC/CI/R&A

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

11BR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

XXX		

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/GYROSE/KUDESK/KUWOLF/PM
G-2 Penetration Action Against AMSPELL Organization and "Other Groups" in PBRUMEN

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Action Required: FYI

References:
A. WAVE-3286, 14 January 1963
B. UFGA-7027, 28 December 1962 (RYBAT)
C. UFGA-7038, 20 December 1962
D. UFGA-7247, 12 January 1963 (RYBAT)
E. UFGA-7322, 17 January 1963
F. MEXI-2829, 13 December 1962

MICROFILMED
FEB 4 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. On 4 January 1963 AMHINT-27 met with QUANTUM-51 in New York City, and QUANTUM-51 advised him that Jorge *MEDINA Bringuier, the Secretary General of AMSPELL in PBRUMEN, is a G-2 agent. MEDINA and *AEDO (fnu), who was said by QUANTUM-51 to be on the AMSPELL National Executive, were actually G-2 penetrations. They planned to "roll up" the entire AMSPELL organization and "other groups" in one sweep and then escape by boat and contact AMHINT-53 in the JMWAVE area. MEDINA was in contact with AMHINT-53 while in PBRUMEN and planned to use AMHINT-53 to establish his bona fides with KUBARK.

2. QUANTUM-51 further advised that another mission of the two G-2 agents, MEDINA and AEDO, was to make contact with Iden A to determine what role it played in anti-CASTRO activities. The secretary of QUANTUM-51 had been a very close personal friend of AEDO's since childhood and AEDO feared she would be implicated, so he told her of his espionage mission. She informed QUANTUM-51 and then arranged a meeting between QUANTUM-51 and AEDO. AEDO told QUANTUM-51 of his mission and arrangements were then made to get all the AMSPELL leaders into asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy. On or about 10 December 1962 about 25 persons, including AEDO, went into asylum.

3. QUANTUM-51 further said that AEDO reportedly was arrested by G-2 a long time ago and then recruited to work for the PBRUMEN Government.

continued

Distribution:
③ - C/TFW w/atts

Attachments:
A. IDEN ~~usc~~ h/w
B. Misc. material h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 22 Jan 1963	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-7383	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-5-1-8 & 201-301693	

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

9/80

4. Reference C is a chronological summary of AMHINT-33's activities subsequent to his infiltration in PBRUMEN, and his contacts with Chelin, the brother of AMFRET-7. AMFRET-7's arrest was reported in Reference B. The AMFRET-7 Case Officer states that both AMFRET-7 and his brother were arrested, after shooting it out with G-2 and being wounded. As noted in Reference D, AMFRET-7's arrest was made after QUANTUM-55 and Blanca *MARTINEZ de Hoya, aka "Cuca," aka "Cuchi," brought MEDINA, AMSPELL's National Military Coordinator for Reception and Supply, to Iden A where MEDINA recognized AMHINT-33. AMHINT-33 said MEDINA was an old friend of his and had lived near him. RE G-2 PENETRATION AGAINST AMSPELL ORG

5. AMHINT-33 said further that his brother knows MEDINA, that MEDINA is the man whom AMHINT-33 used in 1961 to check up on *REBELLON (fnu), the FEU Secretary General in PBRUMEN. AMHINT-33 added in his S/W Message 11 of 10 December 1962 that "his friends" are still in jail.

6. Reference E transmitted a letter written by AMHINT-33 on 29 December 1962 in which he states that G-2 infiltration is so great that he considers it impossible to organize anything, and he indicates that some of the agents, as in this case, have been infiltrated for more than two years. He presumably means infiltrated into anti-CASTRO organizations and/or activities.

7. Relative to the "other groups" mentioned in para. 1 above, AMHINT-33's Case Officer believes that AMHINT-33 is probably referring to the MRR, the MRP, the MDC and the 30th of November groups. The "friends" mentioned in Para. 5 may be one Eduardo *BRINGAS, who is about 23 years of age, one *GOUMI (fnu), and others previously referred to but not identified by AMHINT-33; they may have worked for AMHINT-33. RE G-2 PENETRATION OF AMSPELL ORG JAN 63

8. JMWAVE traces on the individuals involved in this plot offer little concrete information.

a. It is noted that Jorge MEDINA Bringuier is listed on Page 13 of Attachment C to UFGA-4977 as an MRR member, with a listed aka of Carlos PRADO. JMWAVE tracing identifies one Carlos PRADO as "a brother of Raul, the head of G-2 in Las Villas Province," as reported in HAVA-6437, 5 October 1960; there is no further information on this Carlos PRADO. However, the original source of the information given in Attachment C of UFGA-4977 was a letter brought out of PBRUMEN by AMSTRUT-1 about early July 1962. Said letter contained a $25 money order, issued at Station No. 9, New Orleans, on 16 March 1962, for Jorge MEDINA Bringuier and purchased by Maria Teresa MEDINA. The envelope, addressed to Sra. Consuelo C. de RIVAS in Mexico City, bore the notation, "For Carlos PRADO," and contained a note, "This money order for $25 is for Carlos PRADO from his mother," in addition to the money order. There is one Carlos PRADO in Mexico. He is studying engineering and is the brother of Faustino PRADO Garcia, an engineer who works close to "Che" GUEVARA and is of current KUTUBE interest. Faustino PRADO is married to Clara ARTIME, a sister of Josefina ARTIME, who is a close friend of AMGLEN-9, and she is also of current KUTUBE interest. When AMSTRUT-2, who could have given this letter to AMSTRUT-1 to take out of PBRUMEN, was in Mexico City she called Carlos PRADO by telephone at 249769 and told him that she was a friend of his mother. This PRADO family is a large one, and includes another brother, Angel, who is in Spain, a sister who is a nun in Italy, and another brother who is a doctor in New York City. Additional data could be secured on this family from AMSTRUT-2 if desired. However, it seems probable that this money order may have been sold in Cuba by Jorge MEDINA and purchased, sooner or later, by the mother of the Carlos PRADO who is currently a student in Mexico. A copy of the material carried out by AMSTRUT-1 is being forwarded herewith. It will be noted that a part of the attachment was disseminated as UFG—1239, 13 July 1962.

201 — 356696 RR 201-337055

b. It is further noted that JMWAVE files show one "Mongo" listed on Page 14 of Attachment C to UFGA-4977 as captured and sentenced to 30 years in prison. This information came from UFG-779, 12 January 1962, which was based on an AMCUTLER-1 intercept of a report from the MRR Acting Internal Coordinator in PBRUMEN to Hipolito LAZARO, the MRR Internal Coordinator temporarily in PBPRIME, sent via the [Argentine Diplomatic Pouch.] There was no further identification of this "Mongo." 24

c. It is noted that Reference F identifies Jorge HAEDO as a former anti-Castrista who was tortured and doubled by the PBRUMEN Government; HAEDO appears to be the correct spelling.

d. "Cuca" or "Cuchi" MARTINEZ, who has held the position of AMSPELL National Coordinator for Civil Resistance, is a personal friend of AMCOG-3 and family. She is believed to have taken asylum in the Mexican Embassy. SW Message 12 from AMCOG-3, dated 8 December 1962 and received 12 December, reported that [QUANTUM-51] 01 advised "Cuca" to hide or be cautious because MEDINA had turned out to be a G-2 member. The message said that this was learned from AMSPELL prisoners and that, during interrogation, they were asked many questions about "Cuca" and AMCOG-2.

9. When the AMHINT-53 security review mentioned in Reference A is received, additional investigation as necessary will be made at JMWAVE.

END OF DISPATCH

SECRET

1P

MICROFILMED
FEB 4 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Under Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-7383, 22 January 1963

11, 10

IDEN A [Spanish Embassy] in PBRUMEN.

[illegible]

#1
Att to UFGA 7383

28 JAN 63
19-124-26/3

1/820

Attachment B: UFGA-7383

F..15

2 Jul

12 29

(13 Jul 1962)

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

ENVELOPE: Mrs. Consuelo C. de RIVAS
Xicotencalt #84
Coyoacan
Mexico, D.F.
(for Carlos PRADO)

This money order for $25.00 is for Carlos PRADO from his mother.

[One copy of money order for $25.00 for Jorge MEDINA Bringuier from Maria Teresa MEDINA]

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

98

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

MRR

28 JAN 63

19-124-26/3

cc: #2 to UFGA-7383

SECRET

ENVELOPE: Miss Maria Antonia LOPEZ
829 SW 11th Ave.
Miami, Fla.

/First page missing./

I am going to place the communication abroad in Sofi's hands; no one better. What I need is that you explain to us better how to make the contact from here over there, that is, how and where to see SARABIA, the contact which you said you had with him. Sofi knows him but doesn't know where she can see him. Remember that Sofi is already being checked because Esteban's wife knows her and asked about her. I am going to try to have the treasurer be a friend of Sofi's who knows where the money is. He is a fully trustworthy boy called Alejandro.

Tell Dr. LAZAGA that I don't write to him about the affair because it is easier for me to write to you, but that he and this boy should have relations, and I with Chichi and with you.

We give the support to LAZAGA together with the Executive, because it would be impossible to only one person, and for the case it was left in our hands. You see that the executive over there is fully answerable to us and that way there will be no problems.

We don't know anything about my namesake. So far all the contacts have failed. Let's see what we can clarify.

Tell Tomas that the news I sent him about Dos Rios was through a contact which I made with our brother-in-law D. He is willing to work and has people in his area, and also in the coast. I believe that a lot can be done up there. Besides, Soto left me a terrific contact also at that coast, whom we have to put in contact with D. Tell Tomas to let me work also in that area, which is mine and of my people, and that if he gives authorization that we can send a guerrilla band to work with that people. Of course, this guerrilla chosen by us to avoid their sending people of the Americans and have them take command away from us. You know how that is.

Write to our other brother-in-law in the embassy and find out when he leaves because I know that he is already leaving but to come back to me immediately. Let's see if he leaves, takes a fast training, and comes back. Have them get much map reading and man to man combat with bayonets which is very good at night and no one here knows anything about that.

You must explain the thing a bit to Soto so that he will gain enthusiasm. If he sees that the thing is serious and has real support he will come. The only thing that like Yayo, he needs support for his family. Explain everything to him and I think he will come. He leaves tomorrow and I gave him your phone. If he needs money for his

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

wife and for himself give it to him from mine. I authorized him to ask you for it.

If they would let me, in our province I would place 4 or 5 guerrillas with the contacts which I had before and have now, and we would fill that up for these people, that is, we would start a war in all the province, plains and everything.

Well, this letter is going with safe hands to Miami where it will be mailed, tomorrow. So the S.W. which I sent will arrive later if I can't get it taken with this one because I already gave it to have it mailed. Let's see if we can get it back in time to have it arrive soon.

I will write to Boba and Martha Elena another day with calm, and I don't have the details of your letters on hand.

Regards to all and you receive love from your brother,

Manolo.

SECRET

MINUTES

In the City of Havana, on 30 June 1962, the members of the NATIONAL EXECUTIVE of the "MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA" (M.R.R.), Rigoberto CASAS, Civilian National Coordinator, and Jose Antonio AGRAMONTE, Military National Coordinator, had a meeting and adopted the following agreements:

FIRST: That in view of the present situation of our movement andthe general situation of the country, we have decided to change the organization of the movement, which will now be composed as follows: (A) One Civilian National Coordinator, and (B) One Military National Coordinator. All previous Secretariats and denominations are annuled.

SECOND: To give full autonomy, with regard to functioning, to the Civilian and Military Coordinations. Thus, each will function separately.

THIRD: To give full support and recognition as GENERAL DELEGATE in exile of our movement, to Dr. Jose Ignacio LAZAGA and to the executive appointed by him with the authorization of the previous National Coordination.

FOURTH: As result of the SECOND agreement regarding autonomy in the functioning of the National Coordinations, we agree to accept the Hierarchy in the command of the full Executive of our Movement in exile, with the provision that the orders originating from this Executive will be complied with in accordance with our capabilities and taking into consideration that as we are in the National Territory we have better knowledge of the real situation which we are undergoing.

Signed by Rigoberto CASAS and Jose Antonio AGRAMONTE exclusively, as the rest of the members of the previous NATIONAL COORDINATION are in prison with the exception of Mr. [illegible], ex Coordinator of Civic Resistance who is in asylum.

/s/ Rigoberto CASAS
CIVILIAN NATIONAL COORDINATOR

/s/ Jose Antonio AGRAMONTE
MILITARY NATIONAL COORDINATOR

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

Sra Consuelo C. de Rivas
Xicotencatl #84
Coyoacán
México. D.F.

Carlos Prado

CORREO AEREO . VIA AIR MAIL

Este Money Order por $25⁰⁰ dls es para Carlos Prado de parte de su mamá —

United States Postal Money Order 11-47,272,045
MAXIMUM VALUE ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS

PAY Twenty five DOLLARS
AND CENTS AS SHOWN IN AMOUNT BLOCK 25 00

NOT VALID FOR MORE THAN [illegible] DOLLARS

PURCHASER-FILL IN INFORMATION BELOW

PAY TO
FROM
IF C.O.D.

PLEASE CASH PROMPTLY — VOID IF ALTERED
DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

NEW ORLEANS, LA.
MAR 15 1962
STA. NO. 9

Srta. María Antonia López
829 S.W. 11 Th Ave.
Miami, Fla.

CORREO AEREO - VIA AIR MAIL

comunicación al exterior la voy a poner en manos de Fi, nadie mejor que ella. Lo que yo necesito es que el contacto que tú me decías tener de Zarabia, te me expliques mejor como hacerlo de aquí para allá, o sea como y donde verlo a él. Sofi lo conoce, pero no sabe donde está. Recuerda que a Sofi ya la están chequeando pues la mujer de Esteban la conoce y preguntó por ella. El tesorero voy a tratar que sea un amigo de Sofi que sabe donde está el dinero. Es un muchacho de toda confianza llamado Alfonso.

Dile al Dr. Zayaga que no le escribo sobre el particular porque a ti me es más fácil, pero que este muchacho y él son los que deben tener relaciones, y yo con Chichi y contigo.

El apoyo se lo damos a Zayaga junto con el Ejecutivo porque a una sola persona sería imposible y para el caso se dejaba en nuestras manos. Uds. procuren que el ejecutivo en esa responda plenamente a nosotros y así no habrá problemas.

De mi tocayo no sabemos nada, todos los contactos nos han fallado hasta ahora. Vamos a ver que sacamos en claro.

Dile a Tomás que la noticia de Dos Ríos que le mandé fue por ese contacto que hice con nuestro cuñado J., este está dispuesto a trabajar y tiene gente en su zona, a más de por la costa. Creo que por allá arriba se puede hacer mucho, además Tito me dejó un contacto formidable por aquella costa también, el cual pienso poner en contacto con [redacted] Dile a Tomás que me permita trabajar también para esa zona, que

③

la mía, la de mi gente y que si él dá autorización se puede mandar una guerrilla a trabajar con esa gente. Desde luego esa guerrilla escogida por nosotros, no vaya a ser que manden gente de los americanos y nos quiten la jefatura, tú sabes como es eso.

Escríbele a nuestro otro cuñado en la embajada y averigua a ver cuando sale pues yo sé yá que él vá pero para volver conmigo enseguida. A ver si sale y coge un training rápido y vuelve. Que cojan mucho de lectura de mapas y lucha cuerpo a cuerpo con bayoneta que eso es una cosa buena de noche y aquí nadie sabe nada de eso.

A Beto le tienes que explicar la cosa un poco para que coja embullo, si él vé que es seria la cosa y con verdadero respaldo él viene, lo único que igual que Yoyo necesita ayuda familiar, aclárale todo que yo creo que él viene. Mañana sale y le dí tu teléfono, si le hace falta dinero para la señora y para él dáselo del mío, yo lo autorizo a pedírtelo.

Si me dejaran en nuestra prov. yo metía 4 ó 5 guerrillas con los contactos que yo tenía antes y ahora, y le aprobábamos aquello a esta gente, o sea le metíamos guerra en toda la provincia, llano y todo.

Bueno, esta vá en manos seguras hasta Miami donde la pondrán en el correo mañana así que el S.W que mandé llegará después que esta si no logro que lo lleven junto con esta pues lo dí yá para que lo echaran al correo, vamos a ver si se recupera a tiempo para que llegue pronto.

A Beba y Martha Elena les contesto otro día con calma y los pormenores de las cartas de Uds. que no las tengo a mano.

Recuerdos a todos, y Uds. reciban un abrazo de su hermano—

Manolo

14-00000

ACTA

En la ciudad de La Habana, a los 30 días del mes de Junio de 1962, reunidos los integrantes del EJECUTIVO NACIONAL del MOVIMIENTO de RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (M.R.R.), señores RIGOBERTO CASAS, Coordinador Nacional Civil y JOSE ANTONIO AGRAMONTE, Coordinador Nacional Militar, se procedió a discutir y llegar a los acuerdos que más abajo se expresan:

PRIMERO: Que debido a la situación actual por la que atraviesa nuestro movimiento, y la situación general del país, hemos acordado variar la estructuración del mismo, quedando compuesto de la manera siguiente: A) Un Coordinador Nacional Civil y B) Un Coordinador Nacional Militar, dejando sin efecto todas las anteriores Secretarías y demás denominaciones.

SEGUNDO: Acordamos darle plena autonomía en cuanto a su funcionamiento se refiere, a las Coordinaciones Civil y Militar, funcionando por lo tanto cada una por separado.

TERCERO: Darle pleno apoyo y reconocimiento como DELEGADO GENERAL en el exilio de nuestro movimiento, al Dr. JOSE IGNACIO LAZAGA así como al Ejecutivo por el nombrado, con la autorización de la anterior Coordinación Nacional.

CUARTO: Con motivo del acuerdo SEGUNDO en cuanto a la autonomía en el funcionamiento de las Coordinaciones Nacionales se refiere, acordamos aceptar la Jerarquía en el mando del Ejecutivo en pleno de nuestro Movimiento en el exilio, queriendo hacer la salvedad de que las órdenes emanadas de dicho Ejecutivo, serán efectuadas a la medida de nuestros esfuerzos y teniendo en consideración que por estar nosotros en Territorio Nacional conocemos mejor la realidad de la situación por que atravezamos.

Y para constancia se firma la presente por los señores RIGOBERTO CASAS y JOSE ANTONIO AGRAMONTE exclusivamente, debido a encontrarse el resto de los integrantes de la anterior COORDINACION NACIONAL presos excepto el señor BELLO, ex-COORDINADOR de RESISTENCIA CIVICA, que se encuentra asilado.--

Casas

RIGOBERTO CASAS
COORDINADOR NACIONAL CIVIL

José A. Agramonte

JOSE ANTONIO AGRAMONTE
COORDINADOR NACIONAL MILITAR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
[illegible]

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
GYROSE/Operational—Transmittal of CKA Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGA 3787, 16 April 1962

ACTION : For your information

Transmitted herewith are CKA reports, numbers 134 through 149, and 156. An index is attached.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments: (Herewith)
CKA-134 thru 149, 1 ea.
CKA-156 (1 copy)
CKA Index, in duplicate

Distribution:
3 - TF/W, w/atts. (h/w)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
16 Apr 62

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 20 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-3846/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-33

- 845-583

CYA - 157
12 April 1962

Chief, Task Force/W
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Operational/GYROSE
DRE, Santiago de Duba

ATTENTION REQUESTED: PW/KUCAGE/KUTUBE. 06

1. On 9 April 1962, [Jose Antonio Sadurni Casas (aka "Che")], born 11 April 1938, Santiago de Cuba; Miami address: [c/o Eliga Sadurni Casas,] 06 08 [1619 Meridian Ave., Apt. C-10] Miami Beach, telephone: [JE 2-2641,] 08 was interviewed.

2. Source said that during the revolution he was a member of the DR in the University of Habana. After the revolution he went to the University of Oriente, Santiago de Cuba, and eventually became the DRE chief for the city. In regard to his former DR association he had no operational leads, claiming that all contact with DR members terminated in 1959, and he knew no one who attained any stature in the Castro Government.

3. As DRE chief for Santiago, the source claimed that he had 50 members who he considered well organized and capable of any type of action. He said that there were, and are, other members, but he does not consider them in the same category with the 50 who are organized into cells. He said each cell has nine men. There are four cells in the University of Oriente and two in the high school.

4. He said that he left Santiago in March 1962 and turned the DRE over to his deputy. He then went to Habana and informed the DRE leadership that the second in command had taken over and he was told that Habana would initiate contact with the new leader. (Note: Since close relations are maintained by the JMWAVE Station and the DRE, no attempt was made to press the source for names and addresses, etc., as this information can be obtained in subsequent outside debriefings. The JMWAVS Officer responsible for the DRE operational matters was informed of the source's arrival and processing.)

5. Source said that at the time he left Santiago, the remnants of the Catholic student organization was trying to make contact with the DRE and he believes that by this time this contact has been made. He said that the DRE member who was following this matter, and who would follow through, was a blind person.

6. Listing the arms and supplies in the possession of the DRE in Santiago, the source said that it has about 5-6 pounds of plastic remaining out of a shipment of 20 pounds which was received from the DRE in Habana. He said the DRE in Santiago placed bombs in places where the explosion would not injure anyone. As far as arms are concerned the source said that the DRE in Santiago has ten 45 caliber pistols; five 38 caliber pistols; one M-3, and one Tommy gun.

7. The source furnished the following KUTUBE-type information:

4/90

a. He said that his father is in jail in Puerto Boniato, and that in order to try and get him free, the source went to see Major Belarmino "Anibal" Castilla, the chief of training for the Palma Soriano Military Encampment, whom he knew from their days in the Santiago High School. Source made his plea and "Anibal" told him that before he could act upon it, he would have to talk to the source for five hours in order to determine his political orientation. The source replied that he did not come to talk politics but to plead for his father. "Anibal" answered that he would think about it and call the source one way or another, but he never called. Source thought that this story adequately demonstrated the (Communist) political orientation of "Anibal."

b. The brother of "Anibal" (para 6a above) is "Bertico" Castilla, first name possibly Alberto. He resigned from the army and is now living in Santiago, but the source is not clear on "Bertico's" political orientation.

c. Electra Fernandez, the wife of Mendez Cominche (the Santiago G-2 chief), is no longer the civil head (comisionado) of Santiago. She is now the president of the Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas.

why didn't he bring with him

d. The source has given a complete military map of Oriente Province to the DRE member he left in charge of Santiago DRE (see para 4 above). Information is passed from Santiago to the DRE in Habana and the latter, in turn, is to forward the information to the States.

e. Source said that his contacts who work in Nicaro report that the Nicaro-Mayari Arriba area is restricted and that unknown types of military installations are being constructed.

f. The foreign instructors in the University of Oriente consist of Czechs and Chileans. The Czechs have started a new medical school in the university and the Chileans have taken over the Business Administration Courses.

N.L.R.
Nelson L. RAYNOCK

ATTACHMENT TO: UFGA-3846 Dated 16 April 62

CKA 134: Arturo Inta Rodriguez: A 12 895 737 (SEE UFGA - 3846)
CKA 135: Jorge Masforroll Gomez: A 12 895 806 (SEE UFGA - 3846/1)
CKA 136: Omelio Julian Garcia Gonzalez: A 12 895 817 (SEE UFGA - 3846/2)
CKA 137: Jose Antonio Sadurni Casas: A 12 895 903 (SEE UFGA - 3846/3)
CKA 138: Raul Sanchez Rodriguez: A 12 895 874 (SEE UFGA - 3846/4)
CKA 139: Justino Pelayo Buncio Perez Fogueras: A 12 895 872 (SEE UFGA-3846/5)
CKA 140: Ramon Alonso: A 12 895 941 (SEE UFGA - 3846/6)
CKA 141: Emilio Alejandro Arrascaeta: A 12 895 866 (SEE UFGA - 3846/7)
CKA 142: Hector de la Penaranda Puentes: A 12 490 361 (SEE UFGA - 3846/8)
CKA 143: Manuel Ojeda-Castillo: A 12 895 866 (SEE UFGA - 3846/9
CKA 144: Benigno Soriano-Hernandez: A 12 895 880 (SEE UFGA - 3846/10)
CKA 145: Antonio Tomas Gonzalez Crespo: A 12 895 929 (SEE UFGA - 3846/11
CKA 146: Alejandro Profirio Camacho Gonzalez: A 12 895 939 (SEE UFGA - 3846/12)
CKA 147: Joaquin Antonio Jimenez Jimenez: A 12 895 933 (SEE UFGA - 3846/13)
CKA 148: Antonio C. Samper Barrero: A 12 903 024 (SEE UFGA - 3846/14)
CKA 149: Donald Arrowsmith Boudet: A 12 903 013 (SEE UFGA - 3846/15)
CKA 156: Alberto Hernandez Dole: A 12 895 949 (SEE UFGA - 3846/16)

UFGA 3513/27
15 mar '62
per DRS

05,08

Source: Isidoro Esquerra Fernandez A1289162

Country Cuba

Subj (see below different reports)

Date of Info Prior to 7 Mar 62

Date place acq Prior to 7 Mar 62 Habana Cuba

~~Removed from Project~~ AMSPELL
~~CS Classification: 19-124-26/3~~
~~JOB # 64-18443~~
~~Box 11 Folder 1~~

Source descript. Cuban national who was student at the University of Habana

1. The student resistance organization in Habana is the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Student Revolutionary Directory). One of its leaders is 06 Lester Garcia Rosales who is the chief of finance for Habana Province. XXX 06 Roberto Quintairos Santiso is the general coordinator of the DRE. He has an external line of communication, running out of Cuba, through an official of the 11 Uruguayan Embassy in Habana. 06 Quintairos replaced 06 Ricardo XXXXXXXXXX Menendez, who is also known as 08 "El XXXX Chino" (the Chinaman). The latter was arrested by the Cuban security forces in January 1962 and is presently in prison.

2. The DRE has a clandestine propaganda newspaper called Trinchera, butxxxx it is publish on a very irregular basis.

3. In order to finance its activities the DRE sells bonds in one and five peso denominations. however, because of the security conditions in Cuba, one must be very careful in selling the bonds or else he may sell one to a government agent who are constantly trying to provoke oppositionists to show themselves.

4. During the latter part of February 1962 two bombs exploded in the University of Habana. It was said that the bombing was done by the DRE.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

NEW XX REPORT- SAME SOURCE

The section of Habana known as Alturas del Bosque (roughly, the Heights of the Woods) is being heavily fortified by the Cuban Government. This area is located on the north side of 23rd Street//// above the

17-120-19
~~19-120-19~~

718R

CS COPY

western shore of the Almendares River. It is said that important government officials also live in this area. Nevertheless, this section has a commanding view of the city of Habana.

NEW REPORT- SAME SOURCE

In all my time in Habana and until 6 March 1962, the date of my departure, I never saw more than 3 Cuban air force jet/ planes in the air at one time. I have talked to my friends, particularly one who lives near the airstrip at Campo Libertad, an no one has seen more than this number in the air at one time. This leaves us to believe that the air force does not have as many jets as they say they have.

19-120-19

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO MARKED	ACTION	MARKED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE UFG

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Base, JMBAR

SUBJECT
JMZIP/KUTUBE/KUDESK/KUSODA
DRE Internal Codes/Sources and Companion

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
A. BARR-0270
B. WAVE-1220 (not sent DIR)

MICROFILMED
OCT 21 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

1. Forwarded under separate cover per reference B request are Subject codes and related information. Please note that the second code does not contain the "ll" of the Spanish alphabet as does the first code. If accessable, sources should be contacted for code-check.

2. In submitting the information the three DRE representatives requested to be interviewed jointly. Spokesman for the group was Adolfo BARRO Garcia. 04 A fourth refugee, Rafael SANTANA Alvarez, entered PBPRIME with the DRE representatives. 04

[redacted]

✓ a. Adolfo BARRO Garcia aka TITO. 04,08 DPOB - 30 Sep 1943, Quemado de Cuines, Las Villas. Subject was a student until April 1961. He is a member of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) in Sagua la Grande, Las Villas and is the regional coordinator for the DRE in the area comprised of Corralillo, Rancho Veloz, Quemado de Cuines, Isabela de Sagua, Sitiesito, Sitio Grande, Cifuentes, Amaro, En Crusijada, Calabasete de Sagua. The DRE has approximately 1000 men in this area but they lack arms and other equipment. A sending and receiving set (radio) has been installed at Isabela de Sagua, Las Villas. Bernardo la MADRID aka FAUSTINO 04,08 is the present coordinator in Sagua la Grande, Las Villas. The purpose of their trip to PBPRIME is to contact Manuel SALVAT in Miami, Florida. They plan to return to Cuba.

All [illegible] to interview [illegible] DRE [illegible]

✓ b. Fernandez ARCO Hernandez aka ADAN. 04,08 DPOB - 21 Aug 1943, Sagua la Grande, Las Villas.

✓ c. Manuel Antonio ALZUGARAY Perez aka HECTOR. 04,08 DPOB - 18 Jan 1943, Santa Clara, Las Villas.

Attachments: 1 a/s, ~~u.s.c.~~ h/w

Distribution:
3 - JMWAVE w/1 att. ~~u.s.c.~~ h/w
3 - WHD w/1 att. u/s.c.

19-120-19

D 19-120-18

DATE TYPED 7 Feb 1962	DATE DISPATCHED 7 Feb 1962
CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY 19 - 120 - 18 19 - 120 - 33	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFKA-1
CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19 - 120 - 19

6/BR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

14-00000

SECRET

IP

- 2 -

04

d. *Rafael SANTANA Alvarez DPOB - 7 November 1932, Las Villas. Subject was a chauffeur (taxi-driver) and plans to be at 7750 Normandy Drive, Apt. 2, Miami, Florida, while in PBPRIME. He stated that he resided at Bernaza No. 210, Havana, Cuba. 08 Though he was not a member of any clandestine group, he assisted the MRR group in Caibarien and just recently assisted others to leave the country. Subject and the aforementioned persons departed Cuba on board the Cuban M/V BLANCA ESTRELLA owned by INRA 08 but operated by Subject's brother Israel SANTANA Alvarez, 06 who dropped them at Anguila and returned to Cuba to bring others out that were supposed to meet them, but they missed their connections. Subject's group departed from Isabela de Sagua, Las Villas 24 January 1962 at approximately 2400 hours. On 22 December 1961 a group of approximately twenty militiamen and men from the ORI were drinking in various bars and displaying the Communist flag. Anyone who appeared to be unsympathetic was beaten. They also went to the homes of some who were suspected of being anti-Castroites and would beat them also. They beat up approximately twenty persons. This took place in Caibarien, Las Villas. Subject was one of many arrested between 22 and 26 December. When they were taken to a restaurant across from the G-2 office, Subject managed to escape. The other three men that came with him on the boat managed to hide him until they made good their escape by boat. Subject lists the following as G-2 agents:

Antonio OBREGON Correa, Mayor of Caibarien, Las Villas
One TOYO (nickname) is the head of the G-2 in Caibarien
(fnu) VILLASON is the assistant to TOYO
Evaristo HERRERA, who also works on a boat transhipping sugar from Cayo Frances to Caibarien, Las Villas
Roberto ROJOS aka ESPONJON
Luciano BENTAJA, Juanito BENTAJA and four other brothers
Guillermo SANTANA, Andres SANTANA, Lorenzo SANTANA

Cuban G-2

Subject further stated that Pedro MONTERO, Alejo MONTERO and Eduardo MONTERO are active members of the MRR group in Caibarien, Las Villas. 06, 06, 06
06 Francisco ROBLE is the active coordinator for the MRP in this area. Andres and Guillermo GONZALEZ (fishermen) are informers for the G-2 in Caibarien. They will propose that they help Cubans get out of the country. When all preparations are set up, the fishermen inform on those wanting to leave. The same applies to Jose (Pepe) MIRO, Evalio GARCIA and Lado COPA, all of Caibarien, Las Villas. Subject also stated that the 381st and 382nd Battalion of militia are presently in Caibarien, Las Villas. Subject states he is willing to return to Cuba and work for the underground. (Source Comment: If this subject is to be used in any manner, please be reminded that he claims to have escaped from the G-2. He may be trying to infiltrate the groups here or he may be trying to find out how the DRE operates in the Las Villas zone.

Andres Gonzalez

End of Message

201 - CUBA
cc - Fishermen

Subj is an informer for G-2 in Caibarien

MICROFILMED
FEB 9 1962
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY
SECRET

7 Feb 62

6/BR

Att. 1 to UFKA-1

MICROFILMED
OCT 21 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

DRE INTERNAL CODES

~~MICROFILMED~~
~~[illegible] 1966~~
~~DOC. MICRO. SER.~~

4r

First Code they will use is the following:

Banda de 40 meters
7,500 kilocycles

Clave Leon
Agente - 13 (identified only as "Elidio"- radio technician)

Broadcast time: 8:30 a.m. or 8:30 p.m. Las Villas

The code name to be used when transmitting will be GUERRILLERO

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
PES	185	ARADO	000-70	DIA	LIBRE	LOMA	90	000-22	LUZ	00-14	CAIMAN

M	N	Ñ	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W
130-2	LUNA	0023	SAPO	CARRO	122-9	8-180	00-78	GATO	SILLON	51-3	614

X	Y	Z	LL
33-1	COTORRA	109-18	802-3

CODE FOR NUMBERS:

1. 345-20. 2. 893-104 3. CAÑON -00 4. 657-6 5. 00-2150 6. ALCATRAZ
7. SICLON 8. 2000-17 9. 56-00 0. 34-18

PUNTO ENTRE PALABRA Y PALABRA

Removed from ~~Project~~ Subj file
CS Classification: 19-120-19
JOB #66-604/61
Box: 11 Fold: 1

Second Code to be used---they will use one code one day and the other the next:

Same band
Same frequency
Same time

Code's name "FUEGO" to indicate which code is being used
Agente - 13
Las Villas

The same code name GUERRILLERO will be used when transmitting

A. 124
B. PEZ
C. LUNA-LLENA
D. CAIN
E. 172
F. BURRO
G. 840
H. PALOMA
I. 644
J. 35
K. 17-22
L. 43-4
M. 180-9
N. 14-63
Ñ. CIELO
O. RIO
P. 93.2
Q. 51-33
R. 125
S. CAMPO
T. 340-5
U. 419
V. 000-4
W. 00-61
X. 6790
Y. PIANO
Z. CAIMAN

PUNTO ENTRE PALABRA Y PALABRA

Att. 1 to UFKA-1
7 Feb. 1962

19-120-19

Places that they can deliver arms and equipment or other material:

CAYSAL - (ALACRAN)   ANGUILAS - (LUNA LLENA)   ROQUE KEY - (LOCOMOTORA)

Code for numbers:

1. TIBURON   2. 963   3. 1,500   4. 10,000   5. CAÑON   6. JOSE   7. FIERRO

8. RATON   9: MOTOR   0. 21

Whenever making any phone calls they will use the following code:

LLAMAR A SRA. MARGO - SALUDO A ISABELA DE SAGUA, LAS VILLAS DE PARTE DE JUAN ANTONIO ORTEGA EN MIAMI--AL HABLAR: RECUERDOS A NINOS Y PADRE.

ESTOY HABLANDO - CAYO SAL
PINTANDO - ROQUE KEY
RECIBI CARTAS TAL DIA - PARA RECOJER

SECRET

DRE INTERNAL CODES

First Code they will use is the following:

Banda de 40 meters
7,500 kilocycles

Clave Leon
Agente - 13 (identified only as "Elidio"-
radio technician)

Breadcast time: 8:30 a.m. or 8:30 p.m. Las Villas

The code name to be used when transmitting will be CUERRILLERO

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
PAZ	185	ARADO	000-70	DIA	LIBRE	LOMA	90	000-22	LUZ	00-14	CAIMAN

M	N	Ñ	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W
130-2	LUNA	0023	SAPO	CARRO	122-9	8-180	00-78	GATO	SILLON	51-3	614

X	Y	Z	LL
33-1	COTORRA	109-18	802-3

CODE FOR NUMBERS:

1. 345-20. 2. 893-104 3. CAÑON -00 4. 657-6 5. 00-2150 6. ALCATRAZ

7. SICLON 8. 2000-17 9. 56-00 0. 34-18

PUNTO ENTRE PALABRA Y PALABRA

Second Code to be used---they will use one code one day and the other the next:

Same band
Same frequency
Same time

Code's name "FUEGO" to indicate which code is being used
Agente - 13
Las Villas

The same code name CUERRILLERO will be used when transmitting

A. 124
B. PEZ
C. LUNA-LLENA
D. CAIN
E. 172
F. BURRO
G. 840

H. PALOMA
I. 654
J. 35
K. 17-22
L. 43-4
M. 180-9
N. 14-63

Ñ. CIELO
O. RIO
P. 93.2
Q. 51-33
R. 125
S. CAMPO
T. 340-5

U. 419
V. 000-4
W. 00-61
X. 6790
Y. PIANO
Z. CAIMAN

PUNTO ENTRE PALABRA Y PALABRA

Places that they can deliver arms and equipment or other material:

CAYSAL - (ALACRAN)   ANGUILAS - (LUNA LLENA)   ROQUE KEY - (LOCOMOTORA)

Code for numbers:

1. TIBURON 2. 963 3. 1,500 4. 10,000 5. CAÑON 6. JOSE 7. FIERRO

8. RATON 9. MOTOR 0. 21

Whenever making any phone calls they will use the following code:

LLAMAR A SRA. MARCO - SALADO A ISABELA DE SAGUA, LAS VILLAS DE PARTE DE JUAN ANTONIO ORTEGA EN MIAMI—AL HABLAR: RECUERDOS A NINOS Y PADRE.

ESTOY HABLANDO - CAYO SAL
PINTANDO - ROQUE KEY
RECIBI CARTAS TAL DIA - PARA RECOJER

19-120-19

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DRE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING

ACTION		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
JMZIP/Operational
Jose Maria LASA Urrutibeascoa 05

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
AR: FYI

1. During your recent TDY to Headquarters, 05 you requested all available
information regarding a young Cuban named LASA who talked to Identity 1.

2. Identity 2 met with 05 Jose Maria LASA Urrutibeascoa and Identity 1 on
2 October 1961. Identity 1, apparently, had been requested by Subject's uncle, a
Cuban official in Switzerland, to meet with LASA who had recently departed from
Cuba under a safe conduct agreement.

3. During the conversation 05 LASA 05 talked about his uncle, an old school friend
of Identity 1 and, also, Subject's father, a minor Cuban Government official also
stationed in Switzerland. Both the uncle and father were in disagreement with
the CASTRO Government and there was some indication that one or both were willing
to defect. Although this point was touched only obliquely, Identity 2 gathered
that Subject wanted to get his father into this country with some assurance of
support. The question was not asked directly and no commitments were made or
implied.

4. After this relatively short talk in Identity 1's office, Subject and
Identity 2 went into a conference room where he gave Identity 2 papers dealing
with the organization and purpose of the DRE (which were already available) and
said he would work with the students in the future. 05 LASA also expressed a wish
to go to Switzerland for the purpose of informing the International Red Cross
group there of the inhumane treatment of Cuban political prisoners.

5. In parting, Identity 2 had a distinct impression that Subject had not
really accomplished the primary objective of his visit, and as he was returning
to Miami, the foregoing was passed to Identity 3.

6. For further information on Subject refer to WAVE-8368, 9 Oct 61;
DIR-17475, 12 Oct 61; and DIR-23974, 14 Nov 61. Also, see copy of GNVA-1631
(Attachment 2).

Distribution:
2 - COS, JMWAVE, w/att. 1 (U.S.C.) and
w/att. 2 as stated para 6.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
29 Jan 1962	2 FEB 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-787

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-308133

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

6/PJ

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

20 July 1962

CK - 175

Chief of Station, JMWAVE 4K

Chief, Task Force W

GYROSE/PW
Activities of the DRE (Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil)

1. The source of the information contained in subsequent paragraphs is Jose Ricardo Rabel Ortega, A 12 821 451, Cuban national who is the oldest son of Jose Ricardo Rabel Nunez, the present national director of "Viviendas Campesinas" in Cuba. Source was a Navy cadet at the Mariel Academy from February 1960 to November 1961. As part of the curriculum source spent two weeks in Minas del Frio, Oriente Province, during the latter part of 1960. From February to 12 July 1962, source worked for Viviendas Campesinas as a general office clerk. He may be reached at the following address: c/o Manuel Gomez, 539 NE 70th Street, Miami, Florida, USA.

2. Source gave the following information which is repeated verbatim herein.

08, 06

"In a conversation on 13 July 1962 in Havana, my brother-in-law, Fernando Gomez Fonseca, told me that the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) in Cuba had received 14 tons of arms and munitions to be used in the near future against the Communist regime of Cuba. He also told me that experts in the handling of explosives were entering Cuba for sabotage of bridges and railroads.

08, 06

My brother-in-law, Fernando Gomez Fonseca, is in charge of the DRE in Havana Province. I also know Laureano ("Lino") Pequeno (Jr), who is one of the most important DRE leaders in Cuba. 06

In the conversation, I learned also that the DRE is expecting another ship with arms and ammunition in the near future and a yacht which is now in a Latin American country. The yacht is for use in activities against the Castro government.

The activities against the Castro government to be carried out by the DRE are expected to start within a month or two months at the latest.

Note: This information is confidential, and I want it to be kept in the greatest possible secrecy. I have spoken with no one else of this matter, which I consider very delicate. I want held in complete

CS COPY

19-120-19

31BR

C

CK - 175 20 Jul 62

08, 06

reserve the name of [my brother-in-law and that of Mr. Laureano ("Lino") Pequeno].

3. It is suggested that your Station may wish to establish contact with source for purposes of determining any operational potentialities that the source may have and/or to assess a possible breach of security.

Neil T. Pickworth

Neil T. PICKWORTH

1BR

1P

SECRET

MICROFILMED
AUG 1 1962
DOC. MICRO. SER.

16 July 1962

CK - 167

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Chief, Task Force W

Chief of Station, [redacted] 9KR

GYROSE/Operational
DRE/Guerrillas-Havana and Las Villas

ATTENTION REQUESTED: PM, KUTUBE all → CIT: CUBA

F

DYCB 1. On 14 July 1962, Juan *Rodriguez Jomolca, A 12 821 206, born 19 November 1934, Rancho Veloz, Las Villas, last address, Havana; US address: c/o Jose Deetjen, 4746 East 57th Street, Apartment 3, Maywood, Los Angeles, California, telephone 581-5569, was interviewed.

Re interv. fr. 14 July 62

2. Source said he formerly belonged to the DRE, but after Playa Giron it disintegrated. Nevertheless, he said, he was able to keep in contact with a few DRE people who are in Havana. He said details on the DRE could be obtained from Manuel Salvat, but he did state that he belonged to the DRE group headed by a brother of Diaz Lanz. This brother is still in Havana. He said this group wants to engage in political assassination, and has repeatedly requested that pistols with silencers be sent from the United States.

F 06

3. Source said that his cousin, Salvador *Jomolca, is a guerrilla leader in Las Villas Province, more specifically, operating between Matanzas and Corralillo. He said that his cousin is a lieutenant about 30 years old. He has a small group, few arms, and very little ammunition. He is trying to get outside help but there is no method of communicating with him.

06, 08

4. Source said that Salvador Jomolca is married to a daughter of "Campito", the elder. (Comment: A previous source reported that there are two "Campito"s, a father and his son. The son is the most reported upon guerrilla leader, the father apparently only accompanying the son.)

Nelson L. Raynock
Nelson L. RAYNOCK

INDEX-F

CS COPY
SECRET

19-120-19

21BR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

3P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/GYROSE/KUCAGE/AMHINT.
Debriefing of PBRUMEN Legal Travelers for PW Aspects

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Action: FYI and files

Ref : WAVE 3748

MICROFILMED
JUN 11 1962

1. On 15 May 1962, at about 1730 hours local, JMWAVE conducted a PW debriefing of the following legal travelers:

F 05 09 08

a. Raquel LA VILLA Gonzalez, PDOB: 10 Jan 1940, Havana. Avenue 19 No. 3614, Marianao, Havana. Employed as clerk in Ministerio Comercio Exterior, Department of "Empresas y Alimentos", Foreign Exchange Section. Subject has been militant in the DRE since late 1960, working as a messenger and confidant for contacts in their legal apparat (not the clandestine net). Subject arrived in Miami on PAA Flight 422 on 15 May 1962.

SEE F 05 09 08

b. Cecilia LA VILLA Gonzalez, PDOB: 18 June 1943, Havana. Avenue 19 No. 3614, Marianao, Havana. Unemployed. Student. Subject is sister of a. above and has assisted her in a similar capacity.

SEE F 05 09 08

c. Miriam BARO Esteva, PDOB: 26 Oct 1937, Palma Soriano, Oriente Province. Calle 27 No. 906, Vedado, Havana. In Miami;

Distribution:
3 - C/TFW

A: MIAMI, FLA O.T. CUBA

RE PW debriefing of Subject 1962

19-120-19
~~19-120-19~~

INDEX

CROSS REFERENCE TO

RS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
30 May 1962	JUN 9 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-4211

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-19/3

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

9/BR

220 NE 26th Terrace, Miami. Subject was employed as receptionest in the office of her brother Carlos BARO 06 a dentist in the L & 23rd Bldg, Vedado. Subject arrived in Miami on PAA Flight 422 on 8 May 1962.

08

2. Subjects a and b are sisters and were questioned together. On the topic of reception of radio programs in Cuba, both were agreed that the best reception was the "Voz de las Americas" which came in strong and clear with rarely any interference jamming. Program content was described as generally good, gave a morale boost to the audience and was becoming popular.

3. In commenting on Radio Las Americas, they pointed out that they had not heard it or attempted to tune in because they felt the quality was much the same as its predecessor, "Radio Swan" which lost its prestige prior to and during the April 1961 invasion attempt. Both declared this was a general opinion among their acquaintances.

4. Subjects commented very favorably on programs heard over station XEW, Mexico and WRUL, New York, describing reception and content as good and with large audiences in Cuba.

5. In referring to other programs, subjects reported that on 1 May, relatives in the Matanzas area telephoned them in Havana to tell them that the "students" (DRE) were on again (TV intrusion). Also, later in the day, friends in the Vedado area called to tell them to tune into Channel 2, that there was a program there(about 2115 hours local). Unfortunately, they had already sold their TV set since they were leaving soon. Both agreed that the system of announcing the TV intrusion broadcasts over CONTE Aguero's program on WRUL a few minutes prior to the intrusion was the key to large audiences. Almost all GOC oppositionists upon hearing this announcement, start telephoning their friends to tune into the TV channel announced.

6. Concerning the DRE internal organization, subjects reported that they had not been active recently and not witting to clandestine operations. They were aware, however, that the DRE internal net was waiting for the infiltration of AMHINT-53 or AMHINT-2 to brief them on the situation in exile and what support would be forthcoming. They reiterated the reports on two bombs set off in the university area by the DRE and burning of cane and henequen fields in Matanzas and Las Villas.

7. When queried on disturbances in Las Villas and/or Matanzas on or about 3 May, they replied that they heard the persistent rumor that a unit (company or regiment unknown) of militia had bolted and gone up into the Escambray Mountains. No further details were known.

8. When questioned on written propaganda such as flysheets or clandestine newsheets, both declared that the last propaganda seen was the clandestine issue on "Trinchera" (DRE organ), that no other propaganda sheets had been seen since before the April invasion.

9. When asked their impression on anti-CASTRO propaganda in general they felt that it was too negative: that while the exiles and opposition groups were busy tearing down the image of CASTRO, he was before the people with some proposal that was based either on truth, had a ring of truth in it, or at least appealed to the masses. That some of their contacts with young girls who served as "brigadistas" (rural tutors in the campaign for literacy) turned up interesting remarks. These girls claimed that many of the country folk would throw up their hands in dismay when Communism was mentioned to them, and [illegible]thing to do with communism, and yet

2188

10. Subjects also felt that propaganda should be directed more toward that sector of Cubans that are not fanatic Fidelistas or communists, and have not commited themselves to the opposition movement for such reasons as indolence, lack of courage, or economic docibility. Raquel remarked that our propaganda seemed to be divided into two broad categories, one directed at or attacking the hard-core Fidelistas and the other for opposition movement consumption.

11. Subject c above was debriefed for her report on reception of a FALCON broadcast in Havana on 1 May 1962. She stated that she was called by a friend at about 2100 hours on 1 May and told that the DRE Trinchera program was being broadcast over Channel 2 at that moment. Miriam turned on her TV and does not recall how high she had to turn up the volume, but to her recollection, not higher than normal. She heard very clearly, the monologue rebuttal of the CASTRO speech earlier that afternoon. She immediately called two of her friends and subsequently received calls from them and others on reception of the program. Her account of parts of the program and the times stated agree with WAVE' file copies of the program script.

END OF DISPATCH

11-120.19

(f.l. D.R.E)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
GYROSE/Operational—Transmittal of CAC Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION: For your information

Transmitted herewith are fourteen CKA reports and an index of same.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments: (Herewith)
14 CKA Reports, 1 cc.
CKA Index, in duplicate

Distribution:
3 - TF/W, w/atts. (h/w)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Removed from ~~Project~~ Subj file
CS Classification: 19-120-19
JOB #66-604/61
Box: 11 Fold: 2

Rio/ocD

C S FILE COPY

CS COPY

19-120-19

DATE TYPED
1 May 62

DATE DISPATCHED
MAY [illegible] 19[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-3938/3

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-33

1 att.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

Attachment to: UFGA-3930 dated 2 May 1962

(Number assigned: Subject: Source)

CKA 175: Office of the Secretary of the Presidency: A 12 903 388
(SEE UFGA - 3930)
CKA 176: Rescue at Sea: A 12 444 373
(SEE UFGA - 3930/1)
CKA 177: Clemente RODRIGUEZ Ramos: A 12 903 409
(SEE UFGA - 3930/2)
CKA 178: DRE/FOAC-Habana: A 12 903 419
(SEE UFGA - 3930/3)
CKA 179: Information on Bayamo, Oriente Province: A 12 903 404
(SEE UFGA - 3930/4)
CKA 180: UR/Habana to Guantanamo Navy Base: A 12 903 434
(SEE UFGA - 3930/5)
CKA 181: Legal Traveler: A 12 903 408
(SEE UFGA - 3930/6)
CKA 182: 30 November/Habana: A 12 903 426
(SEE UFGA - 3930/7)
CKA 183: Independent Operator/Miami to Matanzas: Jesus Gregorio PEREZ 04
(SEE UFGA - 3930/8)
CKA 184: List of Cubans Entering the U.S. with False Visas: Nelson L. RAYNOCK
(SEE UFGA - 3930/9)
CKA 186: OOA/Habana: A 12 903 501
(SEE UFGA - 3930/10)
CKA 187: Organizacion Autentico-Rescate/Matanzas: A 12 903 514
(SEE UFGA - 3930/11)
CKA 188: Beauty of Calabazar/Contact to Isle of Pines: A 12 903 509
(SEE UFGA - 3930/12)
CKA 194: List of Cubans Entering the U.S. with False Visas: Nelson L. RAYNOCK
(SEE UFGA - 3930/13)

SECRET

att. 1 UFGA-3930/3

19-120-19

1/BR

S-E-C-R-E-T

UFA - 179
26 April 1962

Chief, Task Force/W
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Operational/GYROSE
DRE/FOAC-Habana

ATTENTION REQUESTED: KUCAGE

1. On 24 April 1962, Ignacio Pla Martinez, A-12903419, born 10 December 1943, Habana; Miami address: 2015 SW 25th Street, was interviewed.

2. Source said that he was a member of the DRE and the FOAC in Habana. When asked what the FOAC is, he said that it is the Federacion y Organizacion Anticomunista Cubana. He explained that the DRE is trying to reorganize and that the FOAC, a large united organization, is trying to help the DRE. The FOAC, he said, is instructing the DRE in its reorganization.

06

08

3. Source said that his DRE contact is Manuel Somoza, Jr., living on Calle Milan number 330 entre Lourdes y Villoldo, Arroyo Apolo, Habana. He said that Somoza is in direct touch with an 06 FOAC coordinator and that his job is to organize student groups for passive resistance activities. This includes, he said, propagana work, distributing pamphlets and starting rumors.

4. Source said that the identity of FOAC members is kept quite secret, but he was aware that one Lazaro Hernandez is an 06 FOAC leader in Habana. He knew no other details.

Nelson L. Raynock Jr.
Nelson L. RAYNOCK

S-E-C-R-E-T

Removed from ~~Project~~ Indy. file
CS Classification: 19-120-19
JOB #66-004/61
Box: 11 Fold: 2

41BR

19-120-19

Save
for DRE fi

DRE

UFGA-3797/02.(CKA-123) 12 Apr 62, 19-9-9

05

One [Eduardo Tomas TORRES Ramos] said that the was (had been) Chief of Security for DRE in Sagua la Grande, and that for all practical purposes the resistance has been liquidadated in Sagua la Grande. As Chief of Security his job was to hide and exfiltrate people fleeing from Cuba which he said was the last remaining job that the resistance could do.

1/BR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2P -WE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	-
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Acting Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief, Task Force W

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT 02 [UNEB]/PBRUMEN
Resistance Activity in Cuba

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION: FYI

The following information was provided by Francisco Luis Rodrigues Gonzales (CC-1169), a Cuban refugee who arrived in Spain in early August 1962 and had been active in the Revolutionary Student Directorate, an anti-Government resistance group, while in Cuba.

a. Source has been opposed to the Castro regime ever since the defection of Díaz Lanz in May 1959, and was involvod in sabotage activity with the Revolutionary Student Directorate. His immediate supervisor was [Angel Fontanills] 06 known as "Charles" in clandestine circles. Alberto Muller, the leader of this group, arrived clandestinely in Cuba in October or November 1960 and began to organize the various groups of the Directorate to bring about an insurrection in the Sierra Maestra area, in Oriente Province. These groups were mainly from the provinces of Las Villas and Havana, and received orders to unite with Muller who was already in the Sierra Maestra. The men went there in small groups, and had the seminary in the Santuario del Cobre as their destination. Once in that spot, they received final instructions and military equipment. Source's group, which consisted of two carloads, entered the Sierra Maestra through Bayamo. Source was riding in the first car. When they arrived on the outskirts of Bayamo, source's car was stopped by the militia, but the car was allowed to pass without any check. A few minutes later they realized that they were being followed and tried to escape. An alarm and shots went up, and they were finally captured and taken prisoner. The second car, which was following close behind them and was warned by the shots, was able to escape.

b. The prisoners were taken first to G-2 Headquarters in Santiago de Cuba and later to the Boniato Prison, where they were interrogated by the G-2. There were two American prisoners there, and although source did not know their names, he said that they were from the Guantanamo Naval Base.

c. Muller was taken prisoner a few days later (shortly after the ill-fated invasion of Playa Giron). No arms were taken from him when he was arrested. Had this insurrection been successful, about 1,000 men would have risen up.

19-120-19

CS COPY

DATE TYPED 31 August '62	DATE DISPATCHED 31 August '62

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-14,272

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
23 [65]-6-38/4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

D 19-9-9

3/BR

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSLA-14,272

d. Of the Muller group, which was called the "127", about 60 prisoners were taken, five of whom, including source, were set free. One of these was an infiltrator called Flores, whom no one trusted since they knew that he was not "one of the group." Another of these was Rolando Valdés D'Wolf who is now in prison in the Fortaleza de la Cabaña serving a nine-year sentence. He was captured trying to escape in a car belonging to a militiaman and wearing a militia uniform. He defended himself bravely, but received five bullet wounds which incapacitated him. The other two who were released were Eduardo Díaz Lanz and Jorge Cruz Peña, a sergeant in the Rebel Army who was with Castro in the Sierra. The latter had actually not been involved in the group. Source thought that he (source) and Díaz Lanz were released so that they might be followed and lead the Government to other groups and individuals in Havana who might be involved in resistance activity. Source had been in prison six months before being released, and one thing which he could not explain was that on the paper that he was given which indicated his release, no mention was made of any sentence or penalty.

e. On several occasions, Muller had been subjected to false execution procedures, with the purpose of trying to make him talk, but he did not weaken. During the trial, "everyone remained firm," and source was told that Muller was very brave in his pronouncements against the Regime and, at every moment, abided by his principles. He presented a very brilliant self-defense.

f. When source was in the Boniato prison, he shared a cell with a Captain Aníbal Rodríguez, who belonged to the MRR. This officer, along with other rebel officers and soldiers, had staged an uprising in Imías, in Oriente Province. Later he was sentenced to death and shot.

g. During his last days in Cuba, source avoided all revolutionary activity, since he wanted to leave Cuba more than anything else. However he knew that the various resistance groups worked hard, carrying out a great deal of independent sabotage activity, although there was not much coordination among the various movements. One movement which had a large membership, especially in Oriente Province, was the M-30-II. This group was planning to launch an insurrection in Pinar del Río in January 1962, but they could not carry it out since the repression in the area was so great.

h. Hans, a member of the Revolutionary Student Directorate, was recently taken prisoner, and it seemed that he was tortured a great deal and talked. As a result of this, a house in Wajay, in Havana Province, was seized and arms and gelatina were found. The owners of the house and other persons were arrested.

Helen B. Caporla
Helen B. Caporla

PC18

Attachment: Spanish report - 1

Distribution:
2 - AC/WE, w/att.
2 - C/TFW

4/2D Addresses
MEXI

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

	028
DATE :	27 JAN 61
TO :	BELL
FROM :	MEXICO CITY
ACTION :	BELL 15
INFO :	COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

19-9-11/1

ROUTING

1	Emi	4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 28 0352Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 3066

PRITY BELL CITE MEXI 7200

JMZIP

REF BELL 0767 (cut 7114) - See also Bell Mexi 7114 7186

04,10

1. FIFTH PO BOX FOLLOWS: ANTONIO GOMEZ DURAN, APARTADO 29976, MEXICO 18, D.F.

2. TRYING OBTAIN THREE MORE PO BOXES 30 JAN 61. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS URGENTLY NEEDS ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS MEXI AREA FOR USE S/W AGENTS BEING DISPATCHED CUBA PRIOR 1 FEB.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

UBR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MD - addresses
15-9-11/1 Mexi

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 26 JAN 61
TO : BELL
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : BELL 15
INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 26 0722Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 2831

QR SW

PRITY BELL CITE MEXI 7184

JMZIP

REF: BELL 2767(our 7184)*

1. THREE ADDRESSES FOLLOW:

SW

A. [ARMANDO B. SANCHEZ, EL CENTRO COMMERCIAL, PALMA Y DONCELES], MEXICO, D.F. 04,10

B. [BERTA A. MARTINEZ, CALLE RHIN NO. 64], MEXICO, D.F. 04,10

C. [ANTONIO BUSTO, APARTADO POSTAL 13758], MEXICO 1, D.F. 04,10

2. WILL ADVISE REMAINING ADDRESSES SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS NEEDED ACCOMMODATION ADDRESSED MEXI AREA FOR USE S/W AGENTS.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

S/BR

FKD addresses...
19-9-111 MEXI

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 26 JAN 61

TO : BELL

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 26 0634Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 2830

CR Sw

PRITY BELL CITE MEXI 7156

[illegible]

REF A BELL 3767 (OUT 71531)* – attached

B MEXI 7164(**

04,10

FOURTH ADDRESS FOLLOWS: [AURELIO A. MARTINEZ, CALLE EDISON, NUMERO 11], MEXICO 1, D.F.

SW

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS: *NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 0415, 26 JAN.

**HQS NEEDED ACCOMMODATION ADDRESSES MEXI AREA FOR USE S/W AGENTS BEING DISPATCHED CUBA PRIOR 1 FEB.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

1/BR

NO. / / -// - // /

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

153
DATE : 6 OCT 60*

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 9

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
None required ☑
Signature:

FRD Mexi

OCT 8 1406Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 24498

TO DIR INFO WASH CITE MEXI 6502

1- (WARE ACTING)

JMNET

Loredo

1. PROBLEM OF ROBERTO DE VARONA[1] BECOMING ACUTE AS INDICATED FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

03 [Julian Arias Prado]

2. ORRISON[2] REPORTED INFO FROM LITAINT-5[3] 29 SEPT 60 THAT VARONA RENTED AND HANDLE AMHAWK[4] AFFAIRS. L-5[3] FURNISHED INDEPENDENT OFFICE ON CALLE INDEPENDENCIA SAID IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANYONE TO WORK WITH VARONA, EVEN AMHAWK[4] HIMSELF, WHICH IS WHY AMHAWK[4] FUNDS HIM 2000 DOLLARS PER MONTH MEXI. WITH THESE INDEPENDENT FUNDS LITTLE CAN BE DONE MEXI RESTRICT HIS INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION AMHAWK[4] ALTHOUGH THIS PLUS HIS REFUSAL ADHERE DEMARCATION WIPES WORK MEXI DELEGATES MAKES FOR CONTINUAL DISSENSION. RECOMMENDS TWICKER[5] FRANK DISCUSSION AMHAWK[4] THIS PROBLEM DETERMINE IF AMHAWK[4] WILL AGREE SENDING ROBERTO EXTENDED LATIN AMERICAN TRIP WITH AMHAWK[4] FUNDING AND LEAVING ROLANDO ROJAS MEXI AS HIS DELEGATE. STRONGLY FEEL CAN WELD MEXI DELEGATION INTO STRONG VEHICLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION AMCIGAR[6] OBJECTIVES IF ROBERTO REMOVED. IF HE REMAINS HERE, FEEL OVERALL EFFICIENCY MEXI DELEGATES WILL BE UNDERMINED BY DISSENSION.

06 [Jorge Antonio de Jesus Rodriguez Plata]

3. LITELL-1[7] HAS CONTINUALLY POINTED OUT PROBLEM OF VARONA BROTHERS AS EFFECTS MEXI DELEGATION. SAYS ROBERTO CONTINUALLY CUTS ACROSS LINES AND RUNS PRACTICALLY INDEPENDENT OPERATION.

4. ON 28 SEPT 60 ROBERTO VARONA TOLD LIMASK[8] THAT FRD BIG PLAN SHAPING

S-E-C-R-E-T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

PAGE 2

IN 24498 MEXI 6502

TO INFO CITE

PRINCIPALLY IN MIAMI INVOLVING 1500-2000 MEN INCLUDING ARTILLERY, PLANES, LANDING CRAFT TO TAKE PLACE IN NOV OR DEC. SAID AMHAWK 4 TO TAKE PART IN INVASION. SAID IN MEXI THAT FRD RECRUITING SCREENING CUBANS FOR TRAINING IN CAMPS MEXI. USING MARIA ALFARO ABC ALVARADO, NICARAGUAN, AND LIMASK 8 SET UP BEGIN MILITARY TRAINING SMALL GROUP CUBANS MEXI. CAMP AT NINCA EL PENON OF TOLUCA ROAD PROPERTY OWNED BY JOSE PUEBLA. ABC

06

5. ON 5 OCT SHYROCK 9 AND GESTETNER 10 DEBRIEFED MR. WILLIAM FELDER, AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN MEXI, RE CONTACTS WITH ROBERTO DE VARONA AND AMHAWK 4. ROBERTO TOLD FELDER 06 AND HUGH MONTAGUE, 06 APPARENTLY BRITISH FRIEND FELDER, 06 HE WANTED TRAINING BASE MEXI FOR CUBAN EXILES. ABC

6. ON 6 OCT COL JOSE MARIA REGO RUBIDO TOLD STATION CASE OFFICER AMHAWK 4 HAD SENT HIM WORD VIA AMHAWK'S 4 BROTHERS TO ASSEMBLE GROUP 75 OR MORE RECRUITS FOR TRAINING AND TO PREPARE LANDING PLAN FOR VICINITY SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR, INCLUDING TYPE NUMBER ARMS NECESSARY. 08

7. STATION COULD HAVE GOBERNACION AGENT ADVISE ROBERTO TO LEAVE COUNTRY OR WOULD BE SUBJECT ARREST AND DEPORTATION.

8, REQUEST HQS, MASH VIEWS.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

5/910

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: International Rescue and Relief Committee
[File no: A-00-55-64]
Volume 3

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: DCD/FIO/PAO
ROOM: 913 Key Bldg

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
11:00 16 AUG 78		BETH LICKENFELS	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

14-00000

5564

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED MO. DAY YR	D. CASE NUMBER	E. S
OO A: AB OO K CO-B OTHER	0 N - Y -	0 0 , 0 3 0	2 1 6 3		

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DAY YR	REPORT NO.
02 19 33	? 52418

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Suspicions Concerning Possible Castroite Mission in US for Salvador Rodriguez Santana

(Cuba)

USIR	IUO	EOE	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD	RELEASED MO. DAY YR
S				12 20 63

TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER — 45

NOT DISSEMINATED — 48

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
[✓ 9]	M	I	S

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	E	E	R
2	F	E	P
[✓ 3]	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number) A 27321
Charles Sternberg
International Rescue Committee
460 Park Avenue South
New York 16, N.Y.
5564 OK

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number) # 102321
Cuba Lecours
International Rescue Committee
Miami, Florida
5564 OK

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address) S 102 321
Manuel de Jesus Rodriguez
Cuban refugee
Miami, Fla.

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL
THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K" —>

J.	K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED	L. O.K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS	✓	1	5	9
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	✓	2	6	0
3. NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	✓	3	7	11
4. USIA	✓	4	8	12

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

FLEX PA
CASE
X-REF CD
FILES AA

C 14 A

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Sent to Sam Halpern
Ex-off SAS
4J-2708
Also to Jane Roman CI/LN
2C42

As WH 1119

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS):

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C/S	F. O. CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF
WLFreund/ln	JBLReeves		Suggest

FORM 4-60 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

2 (20-41)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY — SUGGESTED SERIES: OO-A, OO-K, OO-B, OTHER — A. FIELD OFFICE — B. REPORT NUMBER — C. FORWARDED MO. DAY YR. — D. CASE NUMBER — E. S.

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY — RECEIVED MO. DAY YR. — REPORT NO. A E C OTHER

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Four Photostats of Form 510 on CHIAN, Hui Chuen / [illegible]

China/Hong Kong

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)
CHIAN, Hui Chuen, / [illegible]
c/o International Rescue Committee
460 Park Avenue
New York 17, N.Y.

A110680
S5564L

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)
DOCUMENTARY

A 1276

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD — RELEASED MO. DAY YR. — TYPE OO-E — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER — NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT				AREA			
47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
O	E	C	O	1	F	E	R
1	S	C	I	2	F	E	P
2	P	O	L	3	L	A	
3	M	I	L	4	N	E	A
4	A	I	R	5	N	O	R
5	S	O	C	6	W	E	U
6	T	O	P	7	I	N	T
7	D	I	O				
8	N	U	C				
9	M	I	S				

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS
5. COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K"	K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED	L. O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS		1	5	9
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS		2	6	10
3. NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES		3	7	11
4. USIA		4	8	12

FIELD REMARKS
Source attended the True Light Middle School from 19[illegible] to 1954 and completed one year at the Kwangsai Medical College (1954-55). Her parents are also parolees but we are not submitting forms on them at this time. We are submitting a name check on source to Index.

ATTACH. NOT RETURNED
TO CONTROL WITH P.S.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

FLEX RR
CASE
X-F
FILE

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS
THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).
EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).
FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES NO

C S: RF11[illegible]:tbd
F. O. CHIEF: Jay B. L. Reeves
EDITOR
BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF

FORM 4-60 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

3 (20-41)

14-00000

5564

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES OO-A	OO-B	A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. FORWARDED NO. (11-12)	DAY (13-14)	YR (15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E.S. (21)
XX		B N Y	2 4 9 6 2	0 5	1 0	2		X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED NO.	DAY	YR	REPORT NO.	OTHER
0 5	1 1	2	A 3	24945

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Underground Student Movement in West Berlin to Aid Defecting East Berlin Students Escape

(East Germany/West Germany)

USIB	IUO	FUC	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD	RELEASED NO.	DAY	YR
34	35	36	37 38 39	40 41	42 43	44
				0	1 1	

TYPE OO-E 45 — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED 46

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Mr. William J. vanden Heuval
President, International Rescue Committee
New York, N.Y.

A101881

55564

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
[✓ 9]	[✓ M]	[✓ I]	[✓ S]

AREA

51	52	53	54
[✓ 1]	[✓ E]	[✓ E]	[✓ R]
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL
THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K"

	K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED	L. CHECK THIS SECTION IF RELEASABLE. O.K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S.D.	DELETE ENTIRE S.D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS		1	5	9
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS		2	6	10
3. NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES		3	7	11
4. USIA		4	8	12

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

For EE/USSR

FLEX EB
CASE
X-REF
FILES Arc

EDITORIAL COMMENT

CS ...
~~1~~
~~Stock ...~~
EE/G...
140A
AF/4
CA
1/14-83 RJ

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C/S CCMajor/ns

F.O. CHIEF Jay B. L. Reeves

EDITOR Walt

BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF

FORM 4-60 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

2 (20-41)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

F-56

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY	
SUGGESTED SERIES: OO-A / OO-K / OO-B / OTHER	XXX (OO-B)
A. FIELD OFFICE (1–5)	B N Y
B. REPORT NUMBER (6–10)	2 4 9 7 2
C. FORWARDED MO. DAY YR (11–15)	0 5 1 0 2
D. CASE NUMBER (16–20)	
E. S. (21)	X
FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY	
RECEIVED MO. DAY YR (22–26)	05 11 62
REPORT NO. (27–33)	4444 17

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Utilization of Medical Facilities Provided by Soviet Bloc to Win Sympathy of Angolan Refugees to MPLA/Poor Medical Facilities of UPA

Friends of the

(Angola/~~Belgium~~ Congo)

U.S.I.B. (34)	
I.U.O. (35)	
E.D.C. (36)	12 9A
EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37–39)	
RELEASED MO. DAY YR (40–44)	05 11 2
TYPE OO-E (45)	
NOT DISSEMINATED (46)	
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER	

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number) 1101381

William J. vanden Heuval,
President, International Rescue Committee
New York, N.Y.

55564 ok

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50	AREA 51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1	E	E	R
1	S	C	I	2	F	E	P
2	P	O	L	3	L	A	
3	M	I	L	4	N	E	A
4	A	I	R	5	N	O	R
5	S	O	C	6	W	E	U
6	T	O	P	7	I	N	T
7	D	I	O				
8	N	U	C				
9	M	I	S				

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS
5. COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K" →	K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED	L. O.K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S.D.	DELETE ENTIRE S.D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS		1	5	9
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS		2	6	10
3. NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES		3	7	11
4. USIP		4	8	12

CHECK THIS SECTION IF RELEASABLE

FIELD REMARKS

For: NS/A and Scientific

188

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Rec for Sci

This information is known; however, we are issuing an OO-K to OSI for its corroborative value.

[redacted]

6

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF
CCMajor/hs	Jay B. L. Reeves	JOHN F. LEE	

FORM 4-60 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

2 (20-41)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO-C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES OO-A	OO-B	A. FIELD OFFICE 1–5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6–10	C. FORWARDED NO. DAY YR 11–15	D. CASE NUMBER 16–20	E. S. 21
OO-D OTHER	00AS	B N Y	1 6 9 9 2	0 3 3 0 2	3 7 4 7 3	Y

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED NO. DAY YR 22–26	REPORT NO. A B C D OTHER 27–33
[illegible]	[illegible]

F. SUBJECT AND AREA A 54180 INACTIVE (REMAINS)

Radovan HORACH, International Rescue Committee, Rome, Italy

(International)

USIB 34	IUO 35	EDC 36	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37	38	39	RELEASED NO. 40	41	DAY 42	43	YR 44
S	Y					0	4	0	2	2

TYPE OO-E 45 | NOT DISSEMINATED 46

GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

International Rescue Committee
255 Park Avenue
New York 10, New York

5-5564 (OK)

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

A 87027

Mr. Charles Sternberg
International Rescue Committee
255 Park Avenue, New York 10, New York

5-5564

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
[✓ 7]	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	E	E	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
[✓ 6]	W	E	U
[✓ 7]	I	N	T

NOT DISSEMINATED

1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS
5. COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K" →	K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED	L. O.K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S.D.	DELETE ENTIRE S.D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS		1	5	9
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS		2	6	0
3. NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES		3	7	11
4. USIA		4	8	12

CHECK THIS SECTION IF RELEASABLE

FIELD REMARKS

For: Support (Travis)

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Fwd to WE/1/Sweden.

Copy of attach -
#54180.

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C/S CCMajor/hs

E/O CHIEF Jay B. L. Reeves

EDITOR

BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF

FORM 4-60 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

2 (20-41)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

55-64

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

Suggested series: OO-A: AS

A. Field office / B. Report number / C. Forwarded / D. Case number / E.S. (1–21): 3 - N - Y 4 7 5 9 0 1 2 0 9 0 3 3 8 3 6 X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

Received / Report no. (22–33): 1 2 0 6 0 3 1 7 3 5 6 4

USIB / IUO / EDC / Extra dissem. record / Released (34–44): 5 X 1 2 0 7 0

Type OO-E: Graphics, maps, publications, reports, other (45) / Not disseminated (46)

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Photographic Identification of Imre Nagy and His Entourage

(Hungary)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Charles Sternberg, Director
International Rescue Committee
255 Park Avenue
New York 10, New York

A-87027

5-5-5-64

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	2	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	8	I	O
8	N	U	C
[✓ 9]	[✓ N]	[✓ T]	[✓ Q]

AREA 51	52	53	54
[✓ 1]	[✓ E]	[✓ E]	[✓ E]
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	C	B
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K"	K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED	L. CHECK THIS SECTION IF RELEASABLE: O.K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S.D.	DELETE ENTIRE S.D.
1 APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS	X	1	5	9
2 APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	X	2	6	0
3 NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	X	3	7	11
4 USIA	X	4	8	12

FIELD REMARKS

This is supplemental to NY 4426-C.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Fwd to EE/H

Many thanks.

We are closing case

1110

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C/S: JIBalog:aek

F. O. CHIEF: Jay B.L. Reeves

EDITOR

BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF

FORM 4-60 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO-C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY						FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY	
SUGGESTED SERIES (OO-A / OO-E / OO-B / OTHER)	A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. FORWARDED NO. DAY YR. (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. S. (21)	RECEIVED NO. DAY YR. (22-26)	REPORT NO. B F R OTHER (27-33)
A	B-N-Y-1		061160	72455		111160	3166636

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Hungary
Comments of Hungarian Chargé d' Affairs on US-Hungarian Exchange [illegible] Possibilities/U-2 Incident/Status of Khrushchev

I A C (34)	I U O (35)	E D C (36)	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)	RELEASED NO. DAY YR. (40-44)
				061160

TYPE OO-E (45)	NOT DISSEMINATED (46)
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER	

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number) Y 66348

[illegible]
John Richardson, Pres.
International Rescue Committee 5-5564 (ER)

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Same as above

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT				AREA			
47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1	F	E	R
1	S	C	I	2	F	E	P
2	P	O	L	3	L	A	
3	M	I	L	4	N	E	A
4	A	I	R	5	N	O	R
5	S	O	C	6	W	E	U
6	T	O	P	7	I	N	T
7	B	I	O				
8	N	U	C				
9	M	I	S				

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1 APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	1	4	7
2 APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	2	5	8
3 NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	3	6	9

FIELD REMARKS

EDITORIAL COMMENT

To OCR

146

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS
THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C. S	F. O CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF

FORM 2-58 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

2 (20-41)

L

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED	D. CASE NUMBER	E.
XXX	BH-Y-	13290	05130	12655	X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED: 053002 [illegible] 5705

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Reaction of Officials to Increasing US-Hungarian Contacts/ ~~Criticism of US Official Attitude by Hungarian Political and~~/ Indication of Professor Germanus Sympathy with the West/ Interest of Dr. Vilman in Medical Exchanges and Aid/Visit to Children's Orphanage in Pot (Hungary, Poland)

RELEASED: 00236

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Mr. John Richardson, Jr., Pres.
International Rescue Committee
New York, New York

A. 66348 [illegible]

5564 [illegible]

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT: 0 ECS, 1 SCI, [✓ 2] POL, 3 MIL, 4 ATR, [✓ 5] SOC, 6 TOP, 7 BIO, 8 NUC, 9 MIS

AREA: [✓ 1] EER, 2 FEP, 3 LA, 4 NEA, 5 NOR, 6 WEU, 7 INT

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL — MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:

	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS ~~USIA~~	1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	3	6	9

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

TO: EE/USSR

mk

EDITORIAL COMMENT

no Eval

14

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY):

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS):

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C/S: CCMajor/mph

F. O. CHIEF: JBLReeves

EDITOR:

BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF:

FORM 2-58 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20-41)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED NO. DAY YR.	D. CASE NUMBER	E. S.
XXX	DN-Y-1779	0	05110	3-2655	X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED NO. DAY YR.	REPORT NO
05/30/58	242

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Political Situation Stabilized for Time Being/No Positive Public Support of Regime/Desire of Regime for International Acceptance/Suggestions for Increased Contact with Hungarian People

(Hungary)

IAC	IUO	EOC	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD	RELEASED NO. DAY YR.
		13		05 18 60

TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER — 45

NOT DISSEMINATED — 46

SUBJECT: [0] ECO, 1 BCI, [2] POL, 3 MIL, 4 AIR, [5] SOC, 6 FOP, 7 DIO, 8 NUC, 9 MIS

AREA: [1 EER], 2 FEP, 3 LA, 4 NEA, 5 NOR, 6 WEU, 7 INT

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

John Richardson, Jr., President
International Rescue Committee
New York, New York

H 66343 Gm

H 5564 ok

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL
MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO: USIA

1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES

O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1	4	7
2	5	8
3	6	9

NOT DISSEMINATED

1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

TO: EE/USSR - Advance copy to DD/I.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Advance copy to Mr.
Hamilton [illegible]
18 May

146

No Edit

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES NO

C/S. CCMajor/mph

F.O. CHIEF JJ Reeves

EDITOR

BRANCH, STAFF CHIEF

FORM 2-58 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

2 (20-41)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR 00/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES — A. FIELD OFFICE — B. REPORT NUMBER — C. FORWARDED (MO / DAY / YR) — D. CASE NUMBER — E. S.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

OOK B N - X - 1 4 6 4 0 0 4 1 9 0 3 2 1 9 5 X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED (MO / DAY / YR) — REPORT NO. (A / B / C / D / OTHER)

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

4 1 5 6

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Bio Data on Rumanian Jewish Emigres

(Rumania)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Charles Sternberg
International Rescue Committee
New York, New York

A⁴ 87027

C. 5564

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

I A C — I U D — E D C — EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD — RELEASED (MO / DAY / YR)

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

TYPE OO-E — 45 — NOT DISSEMINATED — 46

GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	D	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	C	E	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

NOT DISSEMINATED

1 ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2 TOO GENERAL.
3 TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4 OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5 COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL

MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO: USIA

1 APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS
2 APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS
3 NON IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES

O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1	4	7
2	5	8
3	6	9

FIELD REMARKS

TO: EE/USSR (SPILLMAN)

Sorry this is so late.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

1 8 MAY 1950

Case Closed
4-30

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE — YES — NO

C/S — CHIEF — EDITOR — BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF

CCMajor/mph — JBLReeves

3 (20-41)

FORM 2-58 — 25 — OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

5

CONN 733 otb/jc 3 Mar 58 5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR 00/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED NO. DAY YR.	D. CASE NUMBER	E. S.
00-B XX	B N H A V	- 9 1 5 8	0 3 0 3 8		X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED / REPORT NO.: A 020528 1 00028

F. SUBJECT AND AREA C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

International Society for Research on the Coagulation of Blood, Capillary Function and Practical Myology

(Hungary/UK)

RELEASED NO. DAY YR.: 03068

NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT: 47 (1) AREA: 51 (7)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

A-61504

Mrs. Steven Magyar
International Rescue Committee, Conn. Chapter
257 Church Street
New Haven, Connecticut

S-5564 OK

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

as above.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:

	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	✓ 1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	✓ 2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	✓ 3	6	9

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. [illegible]
2. TOO GENERAL
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. STALE/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. [illegible]

FIELD REMARKS

EDITORIAL COMMENT

To Scientific [illegible] FF/USSR
To Alien from [illegible]
To [illegible]

C/S ETBarnard/jc

F. O. CHIEF JAY B. L. REEVES

79C

EDITOR

BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF

FORM NO. 25 1 NOV 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

2 (20-41)

CONN 687 otb:jc 7 Jan 58 5364

PROCESS SHEET FOR 00/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES 00-A	00-A	A. FIELD OFFICE 1-5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6-10	C. FORWARDED MO. 11-12	DAY 13-14	YR. 15	D. CASE NUMBER 16-20	E. 21
00-B XX	OTHER	B H H A V	4 9 4 9 7	0 1	0 7	7		X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. 22-23	DAY 24-25	YR. 26	REPORT NO. 27-33
01	10	5	B 296022

I A C 34	I U O 35	E D C 36	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37-39	RELEASED MO. 40-41	DAY 42-43	YR. 44
				01	13	8

TYPE OO-E 45 — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED 46

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

S-E-C-R-E-T

Some Characteristics of Kosice

(Czechoslovakia)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Mrs. Steven Magyar
International Rescue Committee, Conn. Chapter
257 Church Street
New Haven, Connecticut

A-61504

S-5364 OK

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

as above

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	D	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA

51	52	53	54
1		E	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH 13

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O.K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S.D.	DELETE ENTIRE S.D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	✓ 1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	✓ 2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	✓ 3	6	9

FIELD REMARKS

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Route via 1. Map Lib.
2. Graphics Register

Map Library, please loan map to GR with photos

To EV

C/S ETBarnard:jc

F.O. CHIEF JAY B L REEVES

EDITOR

BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF

FORM NO. 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 NOV 56

2 (20-41)

CONN 662-C-1 etb:jc 21 Nov 57

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED OFFICES: OO-A XX

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5) B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10) C. FORWARDED MO. DAY YR. (11-15) D. CASE NUMBER (16-20) E. S. (21)

BHHAV44437112176--27K

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DAY YR. (22-26) REPORT NO. A S / I / A / OTHER (27-33) ✓

1122 [illegible] 277

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Questionable Medical Research Organization

(Hungary)

IAC (34) IUO (35) EDC (36) EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39) RELEASED MO. DAY YR. (40-44)

12137

TYPE OO-E (45) GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED (46)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

A-61504

Mrs. Steven Magyar
International Rescue Committee, Conn. State Chapter
257 Church Street
New Haven, Connecticut

B3-5564 ok

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

as above.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	S	C	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

J.

EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	— 1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	— 2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	— 3	6	9

NOT DISSEMINATED

1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

If Headquarters has any info on subject outfit, collector would appreciate receiving it.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Is Scientific from EE/USSR

To M/S1
560 Paul
BR (Marr)

Photostats to BR (ATTN: Marr)

C/S ETBarnard:jc

F. O. CHIEF JAY B L REEVES

EDITOR Robert L. [illegible]

BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF West

FORM NO. 25 1 NOV 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

2 (20-41)

CONN 660 etb:jc 21 Nov 57 5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO-C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED MO.	DAY	YR.	D. CASE NUMBER	E. S.
OO-A / OO-B / OO-D / OTHER	1-5	6-10	11-12	13-14	15	16-20	21
XX	B N H A V	4 4 4 2 7	1 1	2 1	7		X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO.	DAY	YR.	REPORT NO. A	B	C	K	OTHER
22-23	24-25	26	27	28	29	30	31-33
1 1	2 7	5 7	[illegible]	[✓ B]	9	[illegible]	2 7 3

F. SUBJECT AND AREA C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Presence of Soviet Fighter Aircraft

(Czechoslovakia)

I A C	I U O	E O C	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD	RELEASED MO.	DAY	YR.
34	35	36	37-39	40-41	42-43	44
				1 1	2 7	7

TYPE OO-E 45 NOT DISSEMINATED 46

GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

A61504

5-5564

Mrs. Steven Magyar
International Rescue Committee
Connecticut State Chapter
257 Church Street, New Haven, Connecticut

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

as above.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50	AREA 51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	[✓ 1]	E	E	R
1	S	C	I	2	F	E	P
2	P	O	L	3	L	A	
3	M	I	L	4	N	E	A
[✓ 4]		I	R	5	N	O	R
5	S	O	C	6	W	E	U
6	T	O	P	7	I	N	T
7	B	I	O				
8	N	U	C				
9	M	I	S				

NOT DISSEMINATED

1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	— 1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	— 2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	— 3	6	9

FIELD REMARKS

EDITORIAL COMMENT

No Eval

99C

C/S	F. O. CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH, STAFF CHIEF
ETBarnard:jc	JAY B L REEVES	Dorley	

FORM NO. 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 NOV 56

2 (20-41)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR 00/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED MO. DAY YR.	D. CASE NUMBER	E. S.
OOE	B N - Y -	3 1 7 8 7	0 8 1 9 7	2 5 3 2 9	X

22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
RECEIVED MO.		DAY		YR.			REPORT NO. X	A.	OTHER		
0	8	2	0	7	3	0	8	6	5	6	4

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

S-E-C-R-E-T

Richardson Contacts in Poland

(Poland)

IAC	IUO	EDC	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD			RELEASED MO.		DAY		YR.
34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44
						0	8	2	1	7

TYPE OO-E (GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER) 45: 0
NOT DISSEMINATED 46:

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number) NEW # A 66348

Mr. John Richardson
International Rescue Committee
New York, N. Y.

S-5564

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

DOCUMENTARY

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
[✓ 9]	M	I	S

AREA 51	52	53	54
[✓ 1]	E	E	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

J.

EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	3	6	9

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

TO: ~~Support (Crowley)~~

Mail addressed to the IRC Office at Bosendorferstrasse 9, Vienna 1 will reach Richardson until 29 August 57. Names starred arethe ones he considers most important.

TWX

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Dissem To EE/P

NYFO

9 SEP 1957

C/S CCMajor:dbp

F. O. CHIEF TJConnor:

EDITOR E T Crowley

BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF

FORM NO. 25 1 NOV 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

2 (20-41)

F-5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES		A. FIELD OFFICE					B. REPORT NUMBER					C. FORWARDED MO.		DAY		YR	D. CASE NUMBER						E. S.
OO-A	OO-B	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
OO-D	OTHER																						
X		S	N	-	Y	-	3	3	0	7	5	0	9	0	9	5	0	1	9	0	0	6	X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO.		DAY		YR	REPORT NO. SERIES: A. B. C.					
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
C	9	1	2	5	0	8	8	1	1	1

IAC	IUO	EDC	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD			RELEASED MO.		DAY		YR
34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Progress Toward Stability/Present Greatest Needs/
Growing Influence of Diem

(Vietnam)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Mr. Angier Biddle Duke
International Rescue Committee
New York, New York

A-[illegible]

A-5564

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

as above.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

TYPE OO-A	45	NOT DISSEMINATED	46
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER			

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	E	E	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

NOT DISSEMINATED 1

1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. CONVERTED TO

J.

EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	1	X 4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	2	X 5	8
3. NON – IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	3	X 6	9

FIELD REMARKS

source

MAJOR

EDITORIAL COMMENT

[illegible] 1955

C/S	F. O. CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF
CCH/mfd	CAL		

FORM NO. 25 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS
1 NOV 54 FORM MAY BE USED

3

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY 3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-5-30994

CD NO. 7616 Guide 40

COUNTRY Hungary/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Josef Sarospataky

DATE DISTR. 14 Apr 51

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U.S.C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Josef Sarospataky

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1 August 1899 in Szekszard, Hungary

PRESENT ADDRESS: Germany

NATIONALITY: Hungarian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife, 47, housewife, son, 23, student.

EDUCATION: Graduated in 1923 as mechanical engineer from Technical University, Budapest, Hungary.

EXPERIENCE: Telephone engineer with United Incandescent Lamp & Electric Co, Budapest, Hungary, from 1924 to 1925; manager of all telephone exchanges in Hungary for communications system of Hungarian Post Office in Budapest, from 1925 to 1945; interpreter and translator for US Military Government in Germany during 1945; interpreter and translator in Germany for Vatican Mission from 1945 to 1948; chief of follow-up section of Resettlement Division, IRO, in Frankfurt, Germany, from 1949 to present.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fluently. Knows Hungarian, German and French

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Sarospataky is conversant with modern up-to-date automatic telephonic devices.

- end -

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA

(S-46:2)
60-47:7

May 14 — 51

FPs
65-46:3

May 14 — 51

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION								
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI										

14-00000

SECRET [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

[illegible]
BR/CCD 5567

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CIA

REPORT NO.: OOB 30994

DATE OF DISTRIBUTION: 14 Aug 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No record of subject in E.R.
Report is of interest here
from biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE: B. Campbell
DIVISION: BAKD
DATE: 16 Aug 51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70—10
JUL 1950
UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

F. 5564/s

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00 -B-30993

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Hungary/Austria

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Denes Szentkuti

PLACE ACQUIRED Austria

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE --

DATE OF INFORMATION --

DATE DISTR. 14 Apr 51

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Denes Szentkuti

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 2 June 1921 at Kormand, Hungary

PRESENT ADDRESS: Austria

NATIONALITY: Hungarian

PROCESSED

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Graduated in 1939 from secondary school in Szombathely, Hungary; attended Technical University at Sopron, Hungary, from 1939 to 1943, graduated in the latter year, majored in metallurgical engineering.

EXPERIENCE: From 1943 to 1945, worked for Hungarian Wagon & Machine Factory Ltd in Gyor, Hungary, as an engineer specializing in problems of forging and hardening steel; engineer in ordnance service for American Military Government in Austria from 1945 to 1946; consultant in construction and operation of chemical plants for Donau-Chemie Ltd Aluminum Works Ltd at Linz, Austria, from 1946 to 1948; technical and engineering consultant for Austria Oil Ltd Refinery at Grundlsee, Austria, from 1943 to 1949; metallurgical and construction engineer for TEAS Company in Grundlsee, Austria, from 1950 to February 1951.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fairly well. Knows Hungarian, German and French.

- end -

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

						DISTRIBUTION							
STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB									
ARMY	X	AIR		FBI									

14-00000

SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL) RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEE.

BR/OCD [illegible]

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. [illegible] 30993	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION [illegible]

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No record of subject in BR.
Report is of interest here
from biographic standpoint

SIGNATURE B Campbell	DIVISION BR/CD	DATE 16 Apr 1951

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70--10
JUL 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED (CONFIDENTIAL) SECRET

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. OO -B-30992

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY USSR (Latvia)/Germany

DATE DISTR. 11 Apr 51

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Zanis Perkons

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

PROCESSED

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE --

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION --

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U.S.C. 31 AND 32 AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Zanis Perkons

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 21 May 1888 at Zemite, Latvia

PRESENT ADDRESS: Esslingen-Neckar, Pfaffstrasse 1, US Zone of Germany

NATIONALITY: Latvian

MARITAL STATUS: Married (Wife and mother-in-law will temporarily not go to the US.)

EDUCATION: Attended elementary school in Irlava, Grenci, Zemite from 1895 to 1899; attended high school in Tukums, Latvia from 1900 to 1904; attended Polytechnical Institute in Riga, Latvia, from 1908 to 1914, graduated in latter year, majored in engineering technology.

EXPERIENCE: Chief of technical and supply department, cooperative of Latvian dairies in Riga, Latvia from 1928 to 1937; consulting engineer for the Baltic States "Alfra-Astra" from 1937 to 1940; engineer and dispatcher for "Machine Builder" Trust in Riga, Latvia, from 1940 to June 1941; director of the Riga Screw & Nut Works at Riga, Latvia, from July 1941 to October 1944; engineer for the German Central Association of Milk, Fat and Eggs at Hamburg, Germany, from December 1944 to August 1945; teacher of mathematics at Latvian secondary school at DP Camp Oxford Alt-Garge, Dedelstorf, Germany, from February 1946 to August 1949; teacher at IRO vocational training center at Ludwigsburg, Germany, from September 1949 to February 1950; deputy resettlement officer for Lutheran World Federation at Ludwigsburg, Germany, from February 1950 to present.

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION					
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI							

[redacted]

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fairly well.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Perkons acted as consultant on dairies and refrigeration problems to the Ministry of Agriculture of Latvia, 1937-1940, and as consultant on heating problems to the Riga town administration during the same period. He has an impressive employment record covering over 30 years; fuller record is included in files. Personal and business references were received from people in Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Belgium.

- end -

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

[illegible] 9551
[illegible] R 5564

OFFICE OF ORIGIN 074	REPORT NO. 00-B-30992	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 14 Sept 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☐ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☑ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No previous data. Report of value from biographic viewpoint

SIGNATURE John W. [illegible]	DIVISION [illegible]	DATE 17 Sept 51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70-10
JUL 1950
UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

F 5564

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30991

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Hungary/Germany

DATE DISTR. 14 Apr 51

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Vilmos (William) Nerath

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

PROCESS

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C. 31 AND 32 AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Vilmos (William) Nerath

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1 May 1900 at Bilak, Hungary

PRESENT ADDRESS: Germany

NATIONALITY: Hungarian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife Elizabeth, age 29, daughter Catherine, age 6.

EDUCATION: Attended elementary school from 1906 to 1910 in Valaszut, Hungary; attended high school in Kolozsvar, Hungary from 1910 to 1918; attended Technical University in Budapest, Hungary from 1920 to 1928, graduated in latter year, majored in chemical engineering (inorganic chemistry).

EXPERIENCE: Assistant at Inorganic Chemical Institute, Hungarian Technical University, Budapest, Hungary, from 1928 to 1938; assistant professor and director of laboratory of Inorganic Chemical Institute, Hungarian Technical University, Budapest, from 1938 to 1944; assistant professor of electro-chemistry at Hungarian Technical University, Dresden, Germany, from 1944 to 1945; chemist and director of analysis, inorganic chemistry, at the analytical laboratory, USAF air base at Erding, Germany, from 1948 to present.

PUBLICATIONS: Co-author of two textbooks on chemistry.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Nerath has high recommendations from the USAF Chief of Materials Testing Department.

- end -

[illegible]
65-46:2
65-49:2 } [illegible]

Hungary-146

CP: -
65-46:3 ([illegible] 146)

TYPE 1ST-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE ARC
— 51 — —
— 51 — —

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI		

SECRET [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

PR/CD 5561

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. 00-B-30971	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 14 Apr 51

VALUE

- ☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE
- ☑ B OF VALUE
- ☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY
- ☐ D NO VALUE
- ☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN
- ☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT

EVALUATION OF CONTENT

- ☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
- ☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
- ☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
- ☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
- ☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
- ☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

COMMENTS: No record of this individual in I.R. Report is of interest here from biographic standpoint.

✓

SIGNATURE	DIVISION GR/CD	DATE 16 Apr '51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR CIA ~~OSO~~ LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70-10
APR. 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

[illegible]/S

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIAL ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30990

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY USSR/Germany

DATE DISTR. 14 Apr 51

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Constantino Molodetsky

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE --

PROCESSED

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION --

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Constantino Molodetsky

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1902 in Bychow, Ukraine

PRESENT ADDRESS: Pruefennigerstrasse, 27, Regensburg, US Zone of Germany

NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife Olga (nee Kamychow)

EDUCATION: Graduated in 1925 from University of Saratov, Saratov, USSR, majored in political economy and law; attended Krishanovsky Planning Institute in Moscow, USSR until 1938, "candidate" for economics; Ph D in economics in 1942 from Institute for Finance and Economics in Leningrad, USSR.

EXPERIENCE: Taught economic geography at secondary school from 1925 to 1929; lecturer and senior scientific advisor from 1930 to 1935 at the Institute of Air Transport Engineers in Leningrad, USSR; lecturer from 1935 to 1937 at Technological Institute in Leningrad, USSR; head of the economic section of the association for scientific research at Leningrad Institute for Study of the North from 1938 to 1941; professor and dean of engineering and economic faculty at Leningrad Institute of Water Transport Engineers from 1941 to 1942; technical worker in agricultural library of University of Berlin, Germany, from 1943 to 1944; instructor--Soviet Arctic, political economy of USSR, Russian language--for US Army at Regensburg, Germany, from 1948 to present.

PUBLICATIONS: Scientific papers, articles concerned with air transport, economics, etc, have appeared in various Russian scientific journals.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Molodetsky has gone on several expeditions to Siberia, the peninsula of Kola, Karolia and other parts of the Soviet Union.

TYPE ACT-DATE 1950-TFR-DATE AREA

- end -

[illegible] 65-4612

51

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION	
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI			

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

[illegible]
BR/OC D5567

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. OOK 30990	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 14 Apr 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☐ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☑ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

C2

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

Biographic data similar to that supplied previously by Molodchiky himself

SIGNATURE John Wilpers	DIVISION BR/CD	DATE 17 Jan 51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70—10 JUL 1950 UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. 00-B-30989

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Czechoslovakia/France

DATE DISTR. 17 Apr 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Frantisek Kovarna

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED France

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

PROCESSED

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE --

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION --

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C. 31 AND 32 AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Frantisek Kovarna

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 2 February 1905 in Krpy, Czechoslovakia

PRESENT ADDRESS: 11 bis, rue Jaques Coeur, Paris 4, France

NATIONALITY: Czech

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife Jarmila (nee Valeska), age 44; daughter Marie, age 15; son Jan, age 12.

EDUCATION: Attended Classical Lyceum in Prague, Czechoslovakia, from 1916 to 1924; attended Charles University from 1924 to 1930, graduated in latter year, majored in history and esthetics; received Ph D in art at Charles University in 1931.

EXPERIENCE: Assistant in Institute of History of Arts at Charles University from 1932 to 1935; held chair of lecturer in common esthetics, faculty of philosophy, at Charles University from 1935 to 1938; lectured on plastic esthetics, Faculty of Architecture, Czech High Institute of Tech., Prague, from 1938 to 1939; lectured on art and esthetics at Charles University from 1945 to 1947; professor of esthetics at Charles University from 1947 to 1948; lectured on history of Czech civilization at the Masaryk Adademy at Ludwigsburg, Germany during 1948; chairman of Committee of Free Czechoslovakia, Paris, France during 1949.

PUBLICATIONS: Has authored over 30 books on art and literature, including Contemporary Painting, published in 1932. Collaborated with Encyclopedia Italiana [illegible] branch of Czechoslovak plastics arts. Founded perio [illegible] Plans and Works to explain esthetics of production, [illegible] monthly review for esthetics of production, Tvar.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fairly well. Knows Czech, Italian, Russian, French and German.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Kovarna escaped in 1948 and crossed German border with family. He has been stripped of his posts and honors and sentenced to death by the Communist Government "for collaboration with American authorities".

- end -

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

						DISTRIBUTION					
STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB							
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI							

SECRET

ANALYSIS REPORT

NAME International Rescue Committee

INDEX NO. 5564

ADDRESS

TYPE OF DOCUMENT ooB 30989

DATED 4-17-51

FILED 5564

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

F.O.

SECONDARY NO.

ABSTRACT

Work Sheet

PROCESSED

SUBJECT	AREA	ACT.	DATE INFO.	TFR	DATE AREA
NATL's Outside Country – 65.46:2	CZECH-132	–	51	–	
DP's 65-46:3	FRANCE-138	-	61	-	-

FORM NO. 57-26
FEB 1950

SECRET

ECRET (CONFIDENTIAL) RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

BR/OC-D

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. [illegible]	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION [illegible]

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☒ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☐ B OF VALUE	☐ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☒ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

[illegible] -1 [illegible] 64

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

According to CIA 00-B-654-49, 31 Jan. 1949 Confidential, Doc. Dr. Frantisek KOVARNA was purged in 1948 for a provoking article in "Free Tomorrow - Svobodny Zitrek" where he defended the Bulgarian "traitor", PETKOV, and slandered the "peoples democratic constitution of the Bulgarian Republic." And purged "finally for a series of declarations defending traitorous policies".

According to Army SPER # 122 USFA 21 July 1950 Secret, University Professor Dr. KOVARNA is listed among Czech "traitors" residing in Western countries on a Cominform circular from Prague which instructs all the various sections of the Cominform in all countries to furnish all possible information on these "traitors".

According to State, Information Report No. LAD-A22 December 1948 Confidential, University Professor Dr. Frantisek KOVARNA was listed as living in exile in Paris as of 10 December 1948.

No further information is available in OCD/BR.

SIGNATURE	DIVISION	DATE

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70—10
JUL 1950 UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED (CONFIDENTIAL) SECRET

F-5564

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICI ONLY

S

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30988

CD NO.

COUNTRY Austria/France

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Antonin Hruby

PLACE ACQUIRED France

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 12 Apr 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Antonin Hruby

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: ? June 1920 at Vienna, Austria

PRESENT ADDRESS: Paris, France

NATIONALITY: Austrian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife, Sarka, age 30, chemical engineer and micro-analyst.

EDUCATION: Attended primary school in Vienna from 1926 to 1930; attended Vienna High School from 1930 to 1938; attended University of Prague, Czechoslovakia, from 1938 to 1946, received M A in German in 1942 and Ph D in Literature in 1946.

EXPERIENCE: Professor of German at secondary school in Prague from 1942 to 1945; manager of Borovy (publishers) during 1945 at Prague; professor in Institute of Slavic Studies and Faculty of Letters at Prague University from 1945 to 1948; director of Czech literature courses and German lecturer at Prague University from 1946 to 1948; director of Czech literature at Prague Technical High School during 1948; Professor of German at Colbert College in Paris from 1948 to 1949; Professor of German at Lycee of Clermont-Ferrand, Clermont-Ferrand, France, during 1949; broadcaster in Czech section of Radiofusion Francaise, Paris, from 1948 to 1949.

PUBLICATIONS: Regular contributor to literary magazines; Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der altesten deutschen Balladen published by Librairie Gyldendal, Copenhagen 1949; is preparing German grammar for foreigners and other works.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads, and writes some English.

W W education

80-484

Austria - end -

124

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA

51

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI		

SECRET [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

BR/OCD

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO 00B 30955	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 12 Apr 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☐ B OF VALUE	☐ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☑ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☑ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

77 4951-1
5564
2

COMMENTS:

No information available in BR files.

ib

SIGNATURE	DIVISION BR/OCD	DATE 27 April '51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70-10
APR. 1950 UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] SECRET

5561 S

CLASSIF TION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. 00-B-30987

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO. 7572

COUNTRY Hungary/Germany

DATE DISTR. Guido 56 13 Apr 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Eduard G Von Roka

NO OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Eduard G Von Roka

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 25 April 1922 in Budapest, Hungary

PRESENT ADDRESS: Gottingen, Germany

NATIONALITY: Hungarian

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Graduated from gymnasium in Budapest, Hungary in 1940, with honors. Attended Technische Hochschule in Berlin-Charlottenburg, Germany from 1940 to 1945, physicist.

EXPERIENCE: Experimental work in research, laboratory work, from 1943 to 1945 at the Institute of Professor Geiger; worked in thermodynamics for Dr Pascual Jordan, Mathematical Institute, Gottingen, Germany, from 1945 to 1946; worked as nuclear physicist for Max Planck, Institut für Physik at Gottingen, Germany, from 1946 to present.

PUBLICATIONS: Has published various articles on nuclear physics; also wrote popular articles on physics for magazines and periodicals.

SPECIAL HONOR: Received scholarship from Hungarian Government in 1940 to study in Germany from 1940 to 1945.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: In two letters of recommendation forwarded by Von Roka's last two employers, he was described as exceptionally able and talented.

- end -

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-ITR-DATE AREA

— 51 — —

— 51 — —

30 - 49:3 }
65 - 46:2 } area 146
65 - 46:3 ([illegible])

[illegible] - 146

[illegible] - 146

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION					
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI							

SECRET [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

797127

PR/OCD 5567

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CIA

REPORT NO: OCB 38787

DATE OF DISTRIBUTION: 13 Apr 51

VALUE

- ☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE
- ☑ B OF VALUE
- ☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY
- ☐ D NO VALUE
- ☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN
- ☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT

EVALUATION OF CONTENT

- ☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
- ☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
- ☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
- ☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
- ☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
- ☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

Sci

COMMENTS:

No record of this individual in BR. Report is of interest here for biographic data.

SIGNATURE: Campbell

DIVISION: CN/CD

DATE: 16 Apr '51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR CIA ~~[illegible]~~ LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO 70-10
APR. 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] SECRET

F-2-5-11 3

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00 -B-30986

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Czechoslovakia/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Jaroslav Charles Kuril

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE --

DATE OF INFORMATION --

DATE DISTR. 14 Apr 51

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

PROCESSED

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Jaroslav Charles Kuril

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 27 May 1896 at Kolin, Czechoslovakia

PRESENT ADDRESS: Bremen-Vegesack, IRO Camp Grohn, Germany

NATIONALITY: Czech

MARITAL STATUS: Divorced

EDUCATION: Attended primary school in Kolin, Czechoslovakia, from 1902 to 1907; gymnasium in Kolin and Prague from 1907 to 1914; Polytechnical College in Prague from 1914 to 1918, majored in chemical engineering.

EXPERIENCE: From 1916 to 1935, worked for sugar refineries, laboratories, chemical firms, etc. in Prague, Guadeloupe, France, Germany, etc. Worked both for Chinese government and private industry in Canton, China, from 1935 to 1939 as superintendent of sugar mills, refinery, alcohol distillery. Self employed as consulting engineer in Hong Kong China from 1939 to 1940. Chief engineer for Hong Kong Brewery & Distillery in Hong Kong, China, from 1 January 1941 to September 1945. Technical adviser to the Chinese government in Canton, China, in 1946. Engineer for the United Chemical & Metallurgical Works of Prague in Bad Sulzufeln, Germany, from August 1947 to September 1949. Barman for N.A.A.F.I. at Goslar, Harz, Germany from June to August 1950. Resettlement clerk for IRO at Munster, Germany, from 1 August to 31 October 1950.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes fluent English. Fluent in Czech, French and German. Has good command of Spanish, fair command of Russian.

- end -

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA

(65-46:2 [illegible] 132) [illegible] - 132 — 51

65-46:3 [illegible] -146 — 51

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

						DISTRIBUTION
STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI		

SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL) RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

[illegible]

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. [illegible] 3092-	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 14 Apr. 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No record of this individual in ER. Report is of interest here from biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE E Campbell	DIVISION BR/CD	DATE 16 Apr 51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70-10
JUL 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED (CONFIDENTIAL) SECRET

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30985

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY ~~Bulgaria/UK~~

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Nicolas Dolaptchieff

PLACE ACQUIRED UK

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 17 Apr 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

PROCESSED

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Nicolas Dolaptchieff

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1897 at Sliven, Bulgaria

PRESENT ADDRESS: 37 Clydesdale Avenue, Stanmore, Middlesex, England

NATIONALITY: Bulgarian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; son, 23, broadcasts for BBC

EDUCATION: Graduated from the University of Sofia (Bulgaria) in 1920, majored in law and social sciences and economics; attended the Universities of Berlin and Bonn (Germany) from 1923 to 1924, received degree Doctor Juris.

EXPERIENCE: University of Sofia, Bulgaria, as follows: assistant professor of law from 1921 to 1926; lecturer (law) from 1926 to 1929;. associate professor (law) from 1929 to 1931. On Fellowship, conducted research in criminal sociology and organization of juvenile courts from 1931 to 1932 for the Social Science Research Council, Rockefeller Foundation, in the US, UK, France, Italy, Germany, Austria and Belgium. Had private practice and was professor of law at the University of Sofia from 1933 to 1947. Representative of the Bulgarian Peasant Party in London, England, from 1947 to present.

PUBLICATIONS: Has written many scientific books and articles published in Bulgaria and abroad. Was editor-in-chief of the foremost Bulgarian journal on theory and practice of law, Judicial Thought. Is a regular correspondent of various foreign scientific periodicals in Germany, France and Italy.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes fluent English. Knows Russian, German and French.

- end -

13

35-4612

DPS 65-4613

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X NAVY	X NSRB		DISTRIBUTION	
ARMY	X AIR	X FBI			

ƆRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET. PR/OCD

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA

REPORT NO. [illegible]

DATE OF DISTRIBUTION [illegible]

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☑ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☐ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

NY 478-1
5564

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

Information previously received confirms the XXXXXX contents of attached report.

SIGNATURE [illegible]

DIVISION [illegible]

DATE 23 April 1951

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70—10
JUL 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

FORM NO. 51-4A
DEC. 1948

F-5564

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. 00-30984

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Latvia/Germany

DATE DISTR.

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Herrmann Buduls

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE --

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION --

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Herrmann Buduls

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 4 November 1882 at Pebalk, Latvia

PRESENT ADDRESS: Germany

NATIONALITY: Latvian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife is 63, biologist and chemist, graduated from Petersburg University in 1917.

EDUCATION: Attended Pebalk primary school (Latvia) from 1895 to 1898; Riga Town College, Riga, Latvia, from 1898 to 1905; Dorpat University in Estonia (Section of Nervous Diseases) from 1905 to 1911, received M.D. (Psychiatry); took three months course in psychiatry in Berlin Hospital, Berlin, Germany.

EXPERIENCE: Head physician at Minsk & Smolensk Army Mental Hospital in Russia from 1914 to 1918; head of Neurological Society at Riga, Latvia, Professor of Psychiatry, Dean of Medical Faculty of Riga University, private and hospital practice and research work during the period 1918 to 1944; was responsible for the care of concentration camp inmates and deportees at the Repatriation Hospital at Wildflecken, Rudolstadt, medical officer of camp with capacity of 15 thousand at Wurzburg, Germany (for US Military Government), and medical officer and psychiatrist for IRO mental hospital at Wiesloch, Germany during the period from July 1949 to present.

PUBLICATIONS: Has written 26 books on psychiatric subjects; one of the latest is "Healthy Life - Memoirs of a Physician".

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks and writes English fairly well, reads it fluently. Knows German, Russian, Latvian and French.

- end -

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA

57

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

S

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30682

CD NO.

COUNTRY Latvia/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Arthurs Kirulis

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 9 Apr 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

PROCESSED

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U.S.C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Arthurs Kirulis

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 7 January 1907 at Alukane, Latvia

PRESENT ADDRESS: Berchtesgaden Camp "Orlyk", Germany

NATIONALITY: Latvian

RELIGION: Evan. Lutheran

MARITAL STATUS: Divorced. One dependent, mother aged 75, name Illse-Emilija, housewife.

EDUCATION: Attended primary school in Aluksne, Latvia, from 1916 to 1922; attended secondary school in Valka, Latvia, from 1922 to 1926; attended Latvian University in Riga from 1926 to 1939. Majored in plant physiology, received M.S. in natural sciences.

EXPERIENCE: Was laboratory technician for phytopathology at the Agricultural Society at Riga, Latvia, from 1931 to 1936; assistant of department for phytopathology at Latvian University at Riga from 1936 to 1939; assistant professor of plant physiology and agricultural botany at the Latvian Agricultural Academy at Jelgava, Latvia, from 1939 to 1944, chairman of the Latvian National Committee in Hersbruck, Germany, from 1945 to 1949; administrative assistant for IRO at Bad-Reichenhall, Germany, from 1949 to 1950.

PUBLICATIONS: Published nine articles on plant physiology and plant diseases and more than 20 popular-scientific articles on same matter.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fairly well. Knows Latvian, German and Russian.

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TER-DATE [illegible]

- end -

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

							DISTRIBUTION						
STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB									
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI									

S

CLASS ATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIA ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30631

CD NO.

COUNTRY USSR (Latvia)/Germany

DATE DISTR. 5 Apr 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Ernest-Voldemars Dravnieks

NO. OF PAGES 2

PROCESSED

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U.S.C. 31 AND 32 AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Ernest-Voldemars Dravnieks

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 19 February 1892 at Riga, Latvia

PRESENT ADDRESS: 21-a Detmold/Lippe, 55-er Strassse No 2, British Zone of Germany (attached to DP Camp-Augustdorf b. Detmold)

NATIONALITY: Latvian

RELIGION: Lutheran

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Attended secondary school in Riga, Latvia, from 1901 to 1911, graduated that year; Attended Technical University at St. Petersburg, Russia, from 1911 to 1917, majored in civil engineering and railroad engineering; Attended Technical University at Brunswick, Germany until 1943 (entrance date not shown), studied railway shunting dynamics; Attended Baltic University at Hamburg, Pinneberg, from 1946 to 1949, majored in railway shunting dynamics.

EXPERIENCE: Employed by Latvian State Railways as follows: From 1925 to 1935 as District Engineer in Riga, Jelgava; from 1925 to 1940 as lecturer and professor of railroad engineering in Riga, Jelgava, from 1935 to 1940 as technical director and substitute for Director-General at Riga, Latvia. Did research in railway dynamic shunting at Riga/Brunswick from 1940 to 1944. Representative of Latvian Red Cross at Brunswick/Detmold from 1945 to present. Professor of Railroad Engineering at Baltic University, Hamburg/Pinneberg, from 1946 to 1949. Chief, IRO Trade Test Board, IRO, Field Office, Munster & Detmold, from 1949 to present.

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION					
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI							

PUBLICATIONS: "Essay on Theory of Car Collect Retarders on the Gravity Marshalling Yards"; "Prospects on the Automatic Car-Retarders on Classification Tracks of Marshalling Yards"; "Hand book for Motion-Dynamical Calculations of Shunting Plants, Resistance of Trains and Car-Cuts, Calculation of Car-Retarders, Design of Various Types of Shunting Yards Profile" etc (in process of completion); several short publications in different Latvian technical periodicals.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Subject speaks and reads English fluently, writes it fairly well. He is fluent in French, German and Russian.

- end -

Subj
65-4[illegible].2
[illegible] 66-47.5 } [illegible] 166
65-4613 ([illegible])

[illegible]
Latvia
166 33.3
Germany-140

TYPE	ACT-DATE	INFO-TFR-DATE	AREA
—	51	—	—
—	51	—	—

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

S

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. 00-B-30680

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY USSR/Germany

DATE DISTR. 5 Apr 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Eugen Diakowski

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

PROCESSED

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Eugen Diakowski

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 23 July 1891 at Kharkow, Ukraine

PRESENT ADDRESS: Muenchen 8, Kirchenstr. 13/0, US Zone of Germany

NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

RELIGION: Orthodox

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Graduated in 1909 from secondary school at Kharkow (Ukraine), Russia

Attended the Imperial University at Odessa, Russia from 1909 to 1913; received law diploma.

Attended Military Law Academy at Petersburg, Russia until 1917; received diploma in military law.

Attended college at Kiev from 1925 to 1929; received diploma in biology.

EXPERIENCE: Was lawyer on legal board in Odessa, Russia, from 1913 to 1914. Served as officer in army in Russia from 1915 to 1918. Taught public school from 1924 until 1929 in Kiev; taught biology at college at Mirotsk, USSR, from 1930 to 1934; Professor of Biology (Biochemistry) at Pedagogical College at Gluchow, USSR, from 1935 to 1936; Biochemist at TBC Institute at Kiev from 1936 to 1938; Biochemist at Veterinary Institute, Bacteriological Laboratory at Kiev from 1938 to 1943; Chemist (forced labor) at German sugar plant in Regensburg, Germany, from 1944 to 1945; DP in Germany from 1946 to 1948; self-employed in Munich, Germany, from 1948 to 1950.

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI		

PUBLICATIONS: Hand-book of Poultry Breeding; Hand-book for Breeding of Rabbits.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Subject speaks some English, reads and writes it fairly well. Knows Russian, Ukrainian and German.

- end -

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA

— 51 — —

65-4612 [illegible] — 166

[illegible] 50-44 166 [illegible] — 236

— 51 — —

65-4615 (Germany) [illegible] 110

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL, US OFFICIALS ONLY S

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30679

CD NO.

COUNTRY Czechoslovakia/Austria

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Otto Goebel

PLACE ACQUIRED Austria

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 5 Apr 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Otto Goebel

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 30 July 1922 at Kosice, Czechoslovakia.

PRESENT ADDRESS: Grundlsee/Styria, Austria

NATIONALITY: Czechoslovakian

RELIGION: Roman Catholic

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Graduated from secondary school at Kosice, Czechoslovakia in 1939; attended Technical University at Budapest, Hungary, from 1940 to 1944, diploma for mechanical engineering.

EXPERIENCE: Mechanical engineer, director of truck production from 1944 to 1946 for Manfred Weiss, Budapest, Hungary; employed by Kittel Engineering Buro at Gmunden, Austria, from 1946 to 1948 in the preparation of designs for sulphuric acid and nitrogen plants; did research for aluminum industry at Grundlsee, Austria, for Karl Asboth from 1948 to present; worked for Austria Mineralol G. at Grundlsee from 1948 to 1950 in the planning of petrochemical plants; from 1950 to present has worked for TEAS (Planning Buro) at Grundlsee as chemical engineer--planning of refineries, construction works for gasification of coal.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fairly well. Knows Hungarian, Slovak, German, French and Russian.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Subject's work background and personal references indicate his competence in his chosen fields.

- end -

TYPE ACI-DATE [illegible]

51

132

(32)

134

51

D. Pis.

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

						DISTRIBUTION
STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		
ARMY	X	OR	X	FBI		

CLAS ICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICI. ONLY S

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30673

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 9 Apr 1951

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

COUNTRY USSR/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Borys Boschenko

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

PROCESSED

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E. b	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Borys Boschenko

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: June 25, 1886 at Sonshki, Ukraine
PRESENT ADDRESS: Neu Ulm, Ludendorff Kaserne, Germany
NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

MARITAL STATUS: Married, wife's name not listed; son Swiatoslav is 21 years old, occupation, radio technician.

EDUCATION: Attended primary school until 1897.

Attended secondary school in Kiev, Ukraine, from 1897 to 1905, graduated in the latter year.

Attended Polytechnical Institute in Kiev, Ukraine from 1905 to 1911, graduated as Dr. of Agron. Science

EXPERIENCE: Employed from 1911 to 1917 at the Ministry of Agriculture, Province of Poltawa as head of Entomological Office.

Also at the Polytechnical Institute from 1911 to 1917 as laboratory instructor and lecturer (Kiev).

Professor of Applied Entomology at the Polytechnical Institute at Kiev from 1918 to 1920.

Imprisoned by NKVD in Middle Asia from 1920 to 1922.

Entomclogist at Government Plant Protection Station, Turkmenian Republic from 1922 to 1925.

Entomoligost for Kiev Sugar Trust from 1925 to 1926.

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

					DISTRIBUTION			
STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB				
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI				

00B-30678

Teacher of Natural History, Mathematics and Physics at the Alexandria Institute in Rowno, Poland, from 1926 to 1939.

Did laboratory work at a dairy cooperative in Janow, Poland, from 1939 to 1944.

Was at forced labor in Germany from 1944 to 1945.

Professor, Chair of Zoology in the Ukrainian Polytechnical Institute at Neu Ulm, Germany from 1945 to 1950.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Knows Russian, Ukrainian and Polish.

SOURCE'S COMMENTS: Subject has done extensive work in field of microphotography.

- end -

Sub
[illegible] 65-4612
[illegible]
[illegible] 50-49[illegible]

[illegible]
USSR-166
[illegible] 236

TYPE ACQ-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA
— 51 — —

Germany 140 — 51 —

2 P's
65-4613

14-00000

F-5564

COPY NO. 3

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO-B REPORTS

NOTE: [illegible]

FIELD OFFICE	NUMBER	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR.	CASE NUMBER	
6 H A B	E 0 2 B	B 7 0 3 2 2	- - - - - -	Y

SUBJECT AND AREA OF REPORT

Public Opinion/Refugee Problem (Germany)

CONTACT (NAME, TITLE, ORGANIZATION AND ADDRESS OR NUMBER)

Mr Henry Field A5320

SOURCE (NAME, TITLE, ORGANIZATION AND ADDRESS OR NUMBER) 025661

Mrs Dorothea Greene
Chairman, Voluntary Societies Div
IRO, Munich

A5564

IF REPORT IS IN RESPONSE TO A SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT WERE SOURCES RECOMMENDED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH CONTACTED? IF NOT, WHY NOT?

Not responsive to requirements

EDITORIAL COMMENTS

A Card

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE

RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. 22 11 51

OO-B NUMBER 178

REQUIREMENT NUMBER

RELEASED MO. DA. YR.

EDITOR

DELAYED

NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT

AREA

DELAYED
1. Clarification by F. O.
2. Reproduction
3. Translation
4. Other/miscellaneous

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. Already sufficiently well known
2. Too general
3. Type data supplied regularly by other agencies
4. Other/miscellaneous
5. Forwarded to FDO
6. Forwarded to FBI
7. Combined with ____________

FORM NO. 57-14 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED
APR 1950

F.5534

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

S

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-29448

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Poland/Italy

DATE DISTR. 19 Mar 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Henryk Boguslawski

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED Italy

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Henryk Boguslawski

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 5 May 1910 at Wilno, Poland

PRESENT ADDRESS: Via di Villa Buffo 31, Rome, Italy

NATIONALITY: Polish

RELIGION: Roman Catholic

MARITAL STATUS: Married to Halina Zawodzinska Boguslawski, age 40, occupation ceramic artist.

EDUCATION: Attended high school in Wilno, Poland, from 1921 to 1929, was graduated.

Attended Politechnika (Technical College) in Warsaw, Poland, from 1929 to 1935, obtained degree of Master of Sciences in Wireless.

EXPERIENCE: Employed as engineer and designer from 1935 to 1936 by the Polish Broadcasting Corp in Warsaw, and as technical manager for that company in Wilno from 1936 to 1939.

Was prisoner-of-war of Soviets from 1939 to 1942.

Served as Lieutenant in Polish Corps of British Army from 1942 to 1947 (Egypt, Italy).

Employed as collaborator with Italian National Council for Scientific Research from 1947 to 1948 in Rome.

Employed in Rome as Eligibility Officer with IRO from 1948 to 1950.

Is at present, and has been since 1950, employed at translation of technical magazines for the Italian Broadcasting Corp in Rome.

Subject is radio engineer and ceramic artist.

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION					
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI							

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Subject speaks, writes and reads English fluently. Knows French, Italian, German, Russian and Polish.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Subject is a man who can be expected to make an excellent adjustment. He has a good personality, speaks excellent English, and is very well integrated.

- end -

Displaced Persons: Italy: 148

65-46.2 (area 160)

65-46.3 (area 148) Poland: 160

TYPE	ACT-DATE	INFO-TFR-DATE	AREA
—	51	—	—
—	51	—	—

14-00000

CRET [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

[illegible] ACD/ER 5564

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CIA

REPORT NO.: [illegible] 29447

DATE OF DISTRIBUTION: 11 [illegible]

VALUE

☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE
☑ B OF VALUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY
☐ D NO VALUE
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT

EVALUATION OF CONTENT

☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

EE

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No record of subject in BR files. Report is of interest here from a biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE:

DIVISION: [illegible]

DATE: [illegible]

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70—10
JUL 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] SECRET

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

F-5564

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00 -B-29447

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Hungary/Austria

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Laszlo Beke

PLACE ACQUIRED Austria

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 14 Mar 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

PROCESSED

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X

SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Laszlo Beke

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1 November 1904 at Felsodobsza, Hungary

PRESENT ADDRESS: IRO Camp Asten-Linz, Post Heinrichsdorf, Austria

NATIONALITY: Hungarian

RELIGION: Calvinist

MARITAL STATUS: Married, four dependents: Wife, Maria, age 27, occupation hand-weaving; daughter, Maria, age 11; son, Attila, age 10; son, Andreas, age 7.

EDUCATION: Graduated with degree in Electrical Engineering from Technological School, Budapest, Hungary, in 1928.
Taking refresher courses in Electrical Engineering at present at Technical School in Linz, Austria.

EXPERIENCE: Was supervisor for Hungarian Railroads in Hungary from 1938 to 1940.
Was supervisor for Institute for Industrial Planning at Budapest, Hungary, from 1940 to 1941.
Was chief engineer at hydraulic power plant at Haidunanas, Hungary, from 1941 to 1944.
From 1945 to 1950 has been employed as draftsman, mechanic and engineer with the US Army, the British Army, and firms including Brown-Boveri Company.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes some English. Knows Hungarian and German.

- end -

D.P.S.
65-46.2 (Area 146)
65-46.3 (Area 124)

Austria:
124
Hungary:
146

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA
- 51 - -
- 51 - -

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI		

14-00000

SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL) RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

[illegible]

00 D/ER 5567

OFFICE OF ORIGIN C/7	REPORT NO. [illegible] C -9447	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 14 Mar 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

OE

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No record of subject in BR files. Report is of interest here from a biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE B. Campbell	DIVISION BR/ED	DATE 16 Mar 51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70-10
JUL 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED (CONFIDENTIAL) SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

S

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-29446

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Latvia/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Johan Bedrit

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

PROCESSED

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 19 Mar 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U.S.C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Johan Bedrit

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 30 August 1892 in Latvia.

PRESENT ADDRESS: Herzog Rudolfstr. 48 III, Munich, Germany

NATIONALITY: Latvian

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Attended secondary school until 1910.
Attended Polytechnical School in Riga, Latvia, from 1912 to 1914. Took degree in Constructive Engineering in 1915.
Attended Oscar von Miller Polytechnical School in Munich, Germany, from 1947 to 1948, obtained degree in Mechanical Engineering.

EXPERIENCE: Employed as draftsman from 1910 to 1912 at the Volmar-Hainash Office of Railway Construction Office.
Employed as engineering supervisor from 1916 to 1918 at the Railway Building District Office, Batum-Trapezund, Caucasus.
Employed by Latvian Railway from 1918 to 1944 as engineer in Technical Department.
Employed in 1944 by State Railways, Cottbus, Germany, as laborer.
Employed as workman by the US Military Administration of Anorgana, Gendorf, Germany, from May to October 1946.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Not indicated.

- end -

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-IFS-DATE AREA

Displaced Persons Germany — 51 — —
65-46.2 (a.w. 166) 140
65-46.3 (a.w. 141) Latvia:
166-33.3 — 51 — —

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB	DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI	

[✓ CONFIDENTIAL] RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

OCD/ER 5564

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. OOB 29416	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 14 Mar 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

BR has no record of this individual. Report is of interest here from biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE B Campbell	DIVISION BR/CD	DATE 16 Mar 51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70-10
JUL 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] SECRET

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. 00-B-29445

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY USSR/Germany

DATE DISTR. 14 Mar 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data : Olexa Antypiv

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

PROCESSED

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U.S.C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Olexa Antypiv

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 7 October 1895 at Kupiansk, Ukraine, USSR

PRESENT ADDRESS: Ludendorf Kaserne, Neu-Ulm, Germany

NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Attended primary school at Kupiansk, secondary technical school at Rostov-on-Don and industrial school at Kupiansk.
Attended the Ukrainian Husbandry Academy in Czechoslovakia from 1923 to 1928, graduated as engineer-hydrotechnician.

EXPERIENCE: Was in Officers' Training Corps of Russian Army from 1915 to 1917.
Lectured on topography from 1918 to 1923, Army of Ukrainian National Republic.
Employed as District Instructor of Melioration Work at the Government Husbandry Office at Kielce from 1928 to 1931.
Held Chair of Hydrotechnics at the Ukrainian Academy of Husbandry in Czechoslovakia from 1931 to 1936.
Lectured on hydrotechnics and descriptive geometry at the Ukrainian Technical University in Podebrady from 1936 to 1945, and at the Ukrainian Technical University in Neu-Ulm from 1945 to 1950.

PUBLICATIONS: Text book on Descriptive Geometry and Engine Building published in 1937, reissued in 1942.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Subject is now learning English. Knows Ukrainian, Russian, Czech, Polish and German.

- end -

Displaced Persons: Germany
65-46.2(a u a 166) 140
65-46.3(a u a 140) USSR
166

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA
— 51
— 51

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI		

[✓ CONFIDENTIAL] RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

CC D/ER 5567

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. 00B 59445	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 14 Mar 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

BR has no previous record of subject. Report is of interest here from a biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE C. Campbell	DIVISION BR/CD	DATE 16 Mar 51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70-10
JUL 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] SECRET

F-5564

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-29444

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY USSR/Germany

DATE DISTR. 14 Mar 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Boris Abramenko

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Boris Abramenko

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: June 22, 1907, at Krivy Rih, Ukraine, USSR

PRESENT ADDRESS: Buckenbergkaserne, Pforzheim, Germany

RELIGION: Orthodox

NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Attended elementary and high schools in Krivy Rih, Ukraine, in 1923.
Attended the Mining Institute at Yuzovka, USSR, from 1923 to 1927, graduated.
Attended the Scientific Institute at Yuzovka, USSR, from 1927 to 1929; majored in mathematics and mining, received degree of Doctor of Mathematics.

EXPERIENCE: Employed as research worker from 1927 to 1929 at the Yuzovka Scientific Research Institute, USSR.
Employed as mining engineer from 1929 to 1942 at the Donbas Mines in the USSR.
Employed at forced farm labor from 1944 to 1945 at Saalfeld, Germany.
Employed as a clerk in his own field by the US Army and IRO from 1945 to 1950 in Germany.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes fair English. Knows Ukrainian, Russian, German and Spanish.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Subject is an outstanding engineer and research worker.

- end -

(Info previously Indexed)

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

							DISTRIBUTION				
STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB							
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI							

14-00000

SECRET [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

CD/IER 55[illegible]

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: O/IA

REPORT NO.: OOB 27444

DATE OF DISTRIBUTION: 14 Mar 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

38

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

BR has no previous record of subject. Report is of interest here from a biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE:

DIVISION: BR/CD

DATE: 16 Mar 51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70-10
JUL 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] SECRET

COPY NO. 3

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO-B REPORTS

NOTE: Sections a through i to be completed by the Field Office originating report

(a) FIELD OFFICE					(b) REPORT NUMBER					(c) FORWARDED MO.		DA.		YR.	(d) CASE NUMBER						(e) X
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
N	Y	-	Y	-	2	6	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	0							Y

(f) SUBJECT AND AREA OF REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

PROCESSED

Political Observations (Germany (Western Zones))

(g) CONTACT (NAME, TITLE, ORGANIZATION AND ADDRESS; OR "Y" NUMBER)

David Martin A25203
International Rescue Committee A5564
103 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y.

(h) SOURCE (NAME, TITLE, ORGANIZATION AND ADDRESS; OR "Y" NUMBER)

As above

(i) IF REPORT IS IN RESPONSE TO A NUMBERED REQUIREMENT, WERE SOURCES RECOMMENDED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH CONTACTED? IF NOT, WHY NOT?

EDITORIAL COMMENTS

JAN 3

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE

RECEIVED MO.		DA.		YR.	OO-B NUMBER					
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
1	1	2	8	0	1	2	4	1	7	3

REQUIREMENT NUMBER

34	35	36	37	38	39

RELEASED MO.		DA.		YR.	EDITOR
40	41	42	43	44	

DELAYED	45	NOT DISSEMINATED	46

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	E	E	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

DELAYED
1. Clarification by F. O.
2. Reproduction
3. Translation
4. Other/miscellaneous

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. Already sufficiently well known
2. Too general
3. Type data supplied regularly by other agencies
4. Other/miscellaneous
5. Forwarded to FDD
6. Forwarded to FBI
7. Combined with ______

FORM NO. 57-14 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED
APR. 1950

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA Air

DISPATCH NO. OFPA-105

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 5 February 1953

FROM Chief of Station, Paris

DOC. MICRO SER.

SUBJECT GENERAL
SPECIFIC Fritz (aka Fred) [illegible]

Reference: State Dept Control Cable 1437, 14 Nov 52, from Bonn

1. On 11 June 52, the Press Attache of the Paris Embassy wrote us the following memorandum:

> According to French records, Fred [illegible] was born May 31, 1903 in Berlin. He was trained as a lawyer, left Germany in 1931, and appeared in France in 1933. In 1939, he enlisted in the Foreign Legion. Some time in 1940, he was demobilized in Morocco. He fled to Switzerland in 1942, and returned to Paris in May 1945. Since that time, he has worked for "Die Tat" in Zurich, "Libera Stampa," a Socialist daily in Lugano, and other papers. In 1949, he went to work for "Die Welt," the British-controlled newspaper in Hamburg. In February 1951, he was replaced on that paper by a German. At the present time, he works for "Radio Sarrebrucken," as well as for "Der Bund." He was naturalized French in 1947.
>
> Recently, he was cleared by SHAPE to see everything from the Pyrenees to the Elbe. He did so and made a report on the Atlantic Forces. His articles were considered OK by the French, and even were translated in the press review bulletin, "Documentation."
>
> Some time after the articles had appeared, however, a French official expressed astonishment that [illegible] had been given such wide accreditation. Though he had no proof to offer, this same official made the statement that [illegible] was known to the French as an agent of the Cominform. He gave no further derogatory information.

2. We searched our files, found no previous record of Subject, and informed the Press Attache accordingly.

05 Feb 53

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

201-04228-1

3. On 17 Nov 52, the Press Attache called our attention to State Dept. Control cable 1437, from Bonn, dated 14 Nov 52, a copy of which is attached hereto for your convenience. Basing our request on the information contained in para 1 above, and on the attached cable from Bonn, we submitted queries concerning Subject to both UNION and UNBOUND.

4. On 28 Jan 53, we received the following reply from UNBOUND:

Fritz (aka Fred) SILSCH, born 31 May 1903 in Berlin, of German origin, the son of Willy and Bertha TU[illegible], acquired French nationality by naturalization on 1 April 19[illegible]. On 19 October 1933 in Paris 18e, he married his compatriot Edith STRIEM, born 24 August 1905 in Berlin. They have one child, born 25 May 1937, of French nationality.

SILSCH joined the Foreign Legion in 1940 and was demobilized in February 1941. In August 1942, fearing lest he be interned in a camp in the unoccupied zone, he decided to go with his wife to Switzerland. Upon his arrival in Switzerland, he was arrested for clandestine border-crossing and interned in a camp at Martigny, (Valais). Later, he was transferred to a labor camp at Sierre. During his stay in Switzerland, he allegedly wrote several articles under the pseudonym "Bazal" in the Swiss socialist press, notably in the paper "Libera-Stampa."

In May 1945, he returned to France and settled at Montrouge (Seine), where he still resides at 211 Avenue Pierre Brossolette. Since 1945, he has had a legal office at 63 rue d'Hauteville, Paris 10e, where, according to a usually reliable source, he is reported to have held meetings with Konstantin [illegible] of the Soviet Commercial Mission (sic - see WPIA 11555) and with LUCCHINI of the Soviet Information Bureau. The activity of this legal office is, in fact, almost negligible.

Since 1945, he also has operated an office for the settlement of disputed claims for the International Rescue and Relief Committee (I.R.R.C.), 35 Bvd. des Capucines, Paris. He equally is administrator of the firm "Vaak and Sluit" of Antwerp, Belgium.

SIMSON devotes the greater part of his activity, however, to journalism. He is a correspondent of various French and foreign newspapers, notably the Swiss paper "Der Bund." He is accredited officially to the French Ministry of Information. He has obtained numerous visas for foreign countries in order to fulfill his professional obligations.

He has never attracted attention from the political point point of view, but we suspect him of being identical with an individual of the same name who belonged to the Swiss "Rote Kapelle" network.

SIMSON is in contact with a man named BURCHARDT (sic - see para 5 below), now a correspondent of "Der Bund" in Paris, and who also is suspected of being identical with an ex-agent of the "Rote Kapelle."

We are continuing our investigation of Fritz SIMSON.

5. With regard to the BURCKHARDT mentioned above by UNTOUND, we since have consulted with the Press Attache, who has been able to identify him as follows:

Hans BURCHARDT, born 9 September 1906 in Lahr, Germany, presently residing at 105 Bvd. Voltaire, Paris 11e, economic correspondent for "Der Bund," accredited as a journalist to the Presidence du Conseil on 10 February 1946, also works for the Vereinigten Wirtschafts Dienst of Frankfurt, is known as a serious journalist, but otherwise as a doubtful individual.

6. On 4 Feb 53, we received the following less complete reply from UNIOU:

Fritz (aka Fred) SIMSON, formerly a German lawyer, took refuge in France in 1933. He has opened a legal office in Paris and also occupies himself with journalism. Until now, no unfavorable information has been obtained concerning him.

7. We are making all of the above information available to both the Embassy Press Attache and to SHAPE. We would appreciate receiving all possible further derogatory information concerning SIMSON, his various contacts, and his activities. We would be interested to receive, in particular, any information to confirm UNDOUND's suspicion that SIMSON, and/or BURCKHARDT, used to belong to the "Rote Kapelle" network.

Distribution:
Wash: 3
Frank: 1
Berl: 1
Brus: 1
Bern: 1
Regis: 5

Lloyd D. Langer

201-24,225-1

D 2035

TURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

ACTION: [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

A [illegible]

INFO [illegible]

SENT [illegible]

[illegible] for [illegible]

I am informed that certain former German Army officers who are known to be friendly to the United States are concerned about military disclosures in book bearing title "Nicht [illegible] in [illegible] Verteidigen Europa" written by Fred Simson, Paris correspondent for Bern Bund, and to be released shortly by publisher Paul Haupt. Book according to my informant refers to Simson's observations of our military installations and activities in France and Germany.

[illegible]

17 FEB 1953

SECRET SECURITY INFO

201-24226-6

VIA AIR

DISPATCH NO. HBR-A-1704

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 18 October 1954

TO Chief, WHD
ATTN: Chief, FE/2
FROM Chief of Mission, Rio de Janeiro

INFO: São Paulo

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/[illegible]
SPECIFIC Interrogation of Russian Emigrants from China in Brazil

Transmitted herewith in triplicate is a memorandum prepared by William W. ABERNATHY concerning the interrogation of Russian emigrants from China in Brazil.

Merle O. Raffery

Attachment: 3-page memo, in triplicate

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters, w/att. as noted
2 - São Paulo, w/att. as noted
2 - Files, w/att.

[illegible]

REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

.TIAL

37

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES 29 October 1954

SUBJECT: Passing of RR reports to Brasilian Authorities.

REF. : HEP-A-519

1. On 18 October, Marcos BASTOS, ABERNATHY's colleague in the Brazilian Federal Political Police, informed him that on 15 October he had submitted to the Chief of Police a translation of the reports he had received from ABERNATHY. (BASTOS had been given by ABERNATHY sterilized versions of RR-1 to RR-15, inclusive, and RR-17 to RR-29, inclusive, along with the biographical information of the sources of these reports. RR-16 and RR-30 were not passed to BASTOS because they had been obtained from ALLOPATHY.)

2. On 27 October BASTOS informed ABERNATHY that the translation of the reports had been forwarded by the Chief of Police to Colonel [illegible], the present head of the Federal Political Police in Rio de Janeiro, who, in turn, had forwarded it to José PICCHELLI, head of the Political Division of the Political Police, for his recommendations. BASTOS stated that he believed PICCHELLI would recommend that the reports be forwarded to the Foreign Office and the War Ministry. BASTOS also intends to give a copy of the translations to Ribeiro de ANDRADE, head of the Servicio de Vigilancia of the Department of Political and Social Order (D.O.P.S.), São Paulo, who has indicated an interest in receiving it.

3. As an introduction to the translation of the reports, BASTOS described briefly Brazil's Stateless refugee immigration problem and the voluntary welfare organizations which assist the immigrants in gaining entry to, and settling in, Brazil. The translation of this introduction is as follows:

> "The current immigration of White Russians into Brazil began in 1948. It has diminished since June 1954 in the face of the decision taken by the National Institute of Colonization and Immigration (Instituto Nacional de Imigração Colonização) (N.I.I.C.) on 16 June 1954. On that date, the Directorate of the N.I.I.C. decided to request that the Ministry of Foreign Relations take the necessary steps to stop the issuance of visas for stateless persons for a period of sixty days.
>
> "On 30 June, Vicente RAO, then Foreign Minister, sent a circular to all the consulates ordering a stoppage in the issuance of visas until a final decision could be reached.
>
> "On 22 September, the Foreign Office issued to the consulates new instructions, according to which, generally speaking, stateless immigrants are permitted entry to Brazil only if they have in Brazil relatives in the direct line of descent whose economic situation is such that they can guarantee the subsistence of the immigrants.

DUCTION

"Nevertheless, it may be noted that there are various stateless persons in Hong Kong, with their respective passports in order, awaiting accommodations on one of the five ships of the Hong Kong-Buenos Aires line: the "BOISSEVAIN", "RUYS", "TJISADANE", "TEGELBERG", and "TJALENKA".(1)

"The difficulties which the international organizations encounter in obtaining complete and reliable information on the immigrants are due to a large extent to the fact that these immigrants always reside in areas far removed from the locales of the organizations' offices. One must also recognize the fact that included among the stateless immigrants is a large number of persons useful to Brazil, such as the following types of workers: mechanics, engineers, electricians, chemists, etc.

"There are twelve international organizations who are responsible for preparing the immigrants for the journey - or better, the exit - of these stateless refugees from China and various European countries. They are:

1. A.J.D.C. - American Joint Distribution Committee, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
2. E.O.I. - Entr'Aide Ouvrière Internationale (International Workers' Mutual Aid)
3. H.I.A.S. - Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
4. I.C.M.C. - International Catholic Migration Commission, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
5. I.S.S. - International Social Service, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
6. I.R.C. - International Rescue Committee. Has no representatives in Brazil.
7. L.W.F. - Lutheran World Federation, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
8. N.C.W.C. - National Catholic Welfare Conference, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
9. S.A.E. - Swiss Aid to Europe. Has no representation in Brazil.
10. T.F. - Tolstoi Foundation, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
11. U.U.A.R.C. - United Ukrainian American Relief Committee.
12. W.C.C. - World Council of Churches, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.

"Two of these organizations handle the largest number of arrivals. One is the W.C.C. whose office in Rio is located at Praia do Flamengo, 180, apt. 602; its office in São Paulo is at Rua D. Veridiana, 390. The São Paulo office is under the direction of Miss Rachel de CARVALHO.(2) The other organization is the N.C.W.C., whose office in Rio is at Avenida Churchill 60; its office in São Paulo is in the Church of Peace (Igreja da Paz) on Rua Glicerio. The São Paulo office is under the direction of Father Mario.(3)

"Since 25 April 1954, many stateless persons who have been unable to obtain a visa for Brazil, Canada or Australia have been repatriated to the U.S.S.R. As a result of this repatriation, it is possible, though not probable, that some elements may be sent from China to Brazil to engage in subversive activities here, while members of their families, who have been repatriated to Russia, are held as hostages there."

CARD REPRODUCTION

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] Comments:

1. RIOD-846 reported on 2 October 1954 that about 60 such stateless refugees with entry visas for Brazil issued prior to 30 June 1954 were in Hong Kong waiting for transportation to Brazil. [illegible]

2. The head of the W.C.C. office in Rio is André MOURAVIEFF, who is concurrently Delegate of W.C.C. for all Latin America and, in this capacity, is Miss CARVALHO's superior.

3. The head of the N.C.W.C. in Rio is Walter DUSHNYCK, who is the overall head of N.C.W.C. activities in Brazil, in which capacity he is Father Mario's superior. DUSHNYCK's chief assistant in Rio is Miss Adelaide da Costa AZEVEDO.

14-00000

3P

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

WFP 5929

FOR	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] France 1 cc [illegible] " [illegible]
[illegible]				[illegible]	
[illegible]				[illegible]	
[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	DISSEMINATED [illegible] FEB [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]				
[illegible]	[illegible]				
[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]				[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]				[illegible]	
☐					

NOT DISSEMINATE
CONFIDENTIAL [illegible] SUBMITTED

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

12 January 1952

From France, Paris
Report No. EWP 5929
Local File No.

No. of Pages one
No. of Enclosures.

Report Made By Gustav Peterson
Approved By David C. Talbot

Distribution
By copy to
FDM - 3
Files: EWP
UNNECESSARY
FCP - 007

Orally to

Source Cryptonym: UNNECESSARY
References.

Source, Operational Data, and Comments.

Subject: Joseph LEGRAND Reassigned

Comment: For traces on the individuals named in the attached see the following:
LEGRAND - EWPA-7016 (01), and others
GARY, Emile - EWC-9, EWC-418
ROCHI, Emile - EWC-418, EWC-518
DELVOCHE, Leon - EWC-411, EWC-408, EWC-515
MERVILLE (fnu) - EWC-1277 [illegible]
LEMOINE, Charles - EWPA-7968 and others

Classification SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

10 COPY

14. 7-1 159

FORM 53
FEB 1949 [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
CONTROL/US. OFFICIALS ONLY

Subject: Joseph LEGRAND
Report No: K/P 5929.
Date of Information: Current
Place Acquired: France, Paris
Date Acquired: 8 January 1952
Evaluation: C-3
Date of Report: 12 January 1952
Source: Through a fairly reliable source from an informant with PCF contacts.

1. Joseph LEGRAND, involved in the "Fromnior affair" and as a result expelled from the Central Committee of the PCF in the Spring of 1951, was recently re-assigned the position as Administrative Secretary of the Regional Miners Federation (CGT) in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais regions. Auguste LECOEUR was instrumental in securing this reassignment for LEGRAND, according to source.

2. [illegible] (Leon) and ROGER (Emile) who were in charge for two years of the reorganization of the Regional Federation have been placed under LEGRAND's orders and have been charged with "insufficient action".

3. LEGRAND has been given "full powers" to visit all syndicates and to eliminate those [illegible] elements judged unnecessary, reducing the directing organisms of the various syndicates. Source stated that LEGRAND's activities are partially dictated by financial necessity and that staffs will be reduced for economic reasons.

4. [illegible] (fnu), Secretary of the Miners' syndicate of Denain (Nord), has been charged with reorganizing the Valenciennes sector, in particular the [illegible]-sur-Escaut region, which "has fallen into lethargy as a result of the inertia of the traitor CANY (Emile)". According to source, CANY, former Secretary General of the miners CGT syndicate in Anzin, has for some time been in line for dismissal as a result of lack of discipline and incompetence in syndicate affairs. However, no one wanted to take the responsibility for dismissing him. The first act performed by LEGRAND in his new position was to fire him.

5. [illegible] recently declared that he also has been given full power to purge miners syndicates and that [illegible] (Charles) will not be a CGT candidate in the next elections for miners' delegates.

Classification SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

29-7-1-159

SIGNATURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

OFFICIAL DISPATCH 3P

VIA: Air

DISPATCH NO. OFPW-442 ([illegible])

CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief of Station, Paris DATE

FROM: Chief, WE

SUBJECT: GENERAL: Frederic SIMON
SPECIFIC: Fritz SIMON

REF: OFPA-[illegible], [illegible] February 1953

1. The following information on Frederic SIMON, believed to be identical with your subject, has been translated from a raw report in German received from a "well-placed source in the West German Government", and transmitted to headquarters in MGB-[illegible], [illegible] March 1952:

Name: SIMON, Frederic (Fred)
Born: 31 May 1[illegible] in Berlin
Address: Montrouge s/Seine, 111 Avenue [illegible]
Profession: Journalist, currently correspondent of the Swiss newspaper "Der Bund", the German daily "Die Welt", and of "Radio Stuttgart".

A politically doubtful person who received an entrance visa for West Germany valid for six months on [illegible] January 1952. According to information from the French Ministry of Interior (the S. R.), SIMON was working for the Communist paper "Die Zukunft" (Munzenberger) before the war and during the war for the Swiss Communist newspapers "Die Tat", "Volksstimme", and "Arbeiterzeitung". Allegedly not a Communist! At any rate so stated the present Press Attache of the Consul General (the German Consulate General, Paris) Alexander/[illegible], on his behalf when SIMON applied for a visa. On [illegible] January SIMON submitted a written invitation on behalf of the newspaper, "Die Welt", "Stuttgart" (Radio), Frankfurt a.M. Nationality: Formerly German. Emigrated (Jew) about 1934 to France where he acquired French citizenship. According to his own statement, ~~he was advised~~ by the West German Press Office in Bonn to apply again for German citizenship as he,

WE/3, Winslow
[illegible]/SIP
WE/[illegible]/Germany

RELEASING OFFICER
Paul Birdsall

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Francis [illegible] G. Coleman

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

[illegible]

afterall, was working for German newspapers. However, he declined, stating that he had a bad press in Bonn anyway. He further stated that he had serious differences of opinion with Paul [illegible], Adenauer's former press chief. When Adenauer was not yet Chancellor of West Germany, but only President of the Parliamentary Council, he was refused p permission to interview Adenauer during his Swiss conference. He had never forgiven him for this.

2. We note that there are several references to Alexander K. [illegible] (presumably, Alexander [illegible]) in [illegible]'s file (see [illegible], 12963, 12725, and [illegible]), and that [illegible] has been closely associated with William [illegible], Georg [illegible] and, probably, others of the [illegible] group. We are also interested in the fact that [illegible] was introduced to [illegible] by Alex [illegible] (see [illegible]). We wonder if Alex [illegible] (correct spelling probably [illegible]), is identical with Alexandre Alexandrovich [illegible], reported in [illegible]-5953 as a contact of Konstantin [illegible], Vice Consul at the Soviet Consulate in Paris, and a suspected [illegible] agent, and if [illegible] has been in contact with [illegible] as alleged.

3. The Hans BURCHARDT now in Paris as economic correspondent for "der Bund", probably is identical with the Hans BURCHARDT mentioned in the "Final EQUAL Report" ([illegible], Part III, Vol. I, p. [illegible], which states:

Name: Dr. Hans BURCHARDT
Address: Bern, 6 [illegible]
Nationality: German, born 9 September 1906 in [illegible]
Occupation: Journalist. 1926-1934 in Paris as representative of "Europa Presse" of Frankfurt-am-Main, and of "Presse Telegraphique Suisse" of Bern.
Espionage: Unknown, but contact of FOOTE (Alexander) during war.

Part III, Vol. II, P. 31 of the "Final EQUAL Report", of which you have a copy, lists a Charles [illegible], but there is no mention of Frederic (or Fritz) [illegible] in the report, or in [illegible]'s study on the Rote Kapelle.

4. We are unable to identify the (fnu) [illegible] of the Soviet Information Bureau with whom [illegible] and Konstantin [illegible] held meetings in 1945. The International Rescue (sic) and Relief Committee for which [illegible] operates an office, is the International Rescue and Relief Committee which has offices at 103 Park Avenue, New York City, and 33 Boulevard des Capucines, Paris. The organization is an outgrowth of the former International Relief Committee and the Emergency Relief Committee. It was formed originally to assist refugees from Nazi Germany. Since 1945 it has functioned as an anti-fascist organization assisting refugees without regard to nationalities. Although not ostensibly a Communist organization, several Communists have been affiliated with it (see [illegible]) and, therefore, membership in the I.R.R.C. should be viewed with some suspicion.

5. We shall be most interested in any further information on [illegible] and his associates you develop, and in any information on Alex [illegible] you may be able to obtain through appropriate sources. A copy of [illegible], which had not come to our attention previously, is attached. Only the reference to [illegible] has been translated as we were unable to have the entire document translated for prompt transmittal to you.

Paul Birdsall
Paul Birdsall
By: Ann Egerter
Ann Egerter

Attachment - 1 [illegible]

CC Frankfurt
CC Berlin
CC Bonn
CC Brussels

201-24225-6

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET /1231 26615 1231

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM
RI/AN

DOCUMENT NUMBER OFPA-26615.

DOCUMENT DATE 8 Jan 1957

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. 10 12-1600	T-4			
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13. CHARGED [illegible]				
14. RI/FI				

COMMENTS

NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files of the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.

FILE TITLE

[illegible] NCC

FILE NUMBER

200	124	3/17	45

ENCLOSURE

DATE PROCESSED 14 JAN 1957

FORM NO. 610a

SECRET

REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. OFPA 26615

[illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief, IO

DATE: JAN 8 1957

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris - LCPIPIT

INFO: Chief, WE

SUBJECT: GENERAL: Operational
SPECIFIC: DTJOUNCE

Forwarded herewith is a Foreign Service Despatch dealing with the IRC's program for Hungarian refugees. Your attention is called to the last sentence of the attachment to it.

Jan C Van Hook
JAN C. VAN HOOK

Enclosure: h/w
1 - Foreign Service Despatch (w/att.)

7 January 1957

Distribution:
✓ 3 - IO, w/encl.
1 - WE, w/o encl.
2 - Pipit, w/o encl.
1 - OPFA

200-124-3/17-45

RI COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

864.49/11-2?56

FROM: AMEMBASSY, VIENNA

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

November 2?, 195?

RL, ICA-10, EUR-5

67	E-4	[illegible], SCA-2, SCS-2, USIA
12/7		[illegible]-12, USIA-10, [illegible]-4, [illegible]-3

SUBJECT: International Rescue Committee's Program for Hungarian Refugees

During a recent luncheon conversation the Ambassador suggested to General Donovan and other officers of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) that this organization might investigate the advisability of devoting part of its funds and efforts to the student groups among the Hungarian refugees. General Donovan and other members of the Board of IRC have acted favorably upon this proposal. A memo of conversation attached as Enclosure 1 to this despatch indicates the general lines of action being followed by this organization.

General Donovan also discussed with Mr. R. R. Brown, OFC, Frankfurt, the question of [illegible] administrative support for IRC's [illegible] and student programs and was counseled to submit estimates of the costs prior to contract negotiations.

For the Ambassador:

Alfred Puhan
First Secretary of Embassy

Enc: Memorandum

COPY

200-124-8/17-05

REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

Page 2 of Encl. [illegible]
Copy [illegible]
From Vienna

[illegible]

[illegible]

To: The Ambassador
November 23, 1956

From: A. P. [illegible]

Claiborne Pell reports the aims of the International Rescue Committee to be as follows:

1. Care and maintenance of and counseling and other assistance to 1000 students (predominantly university rather than high school) for one year. Although I.C will take care of the students that they have assumed, whatever they may be, the Austrian Government has agreed to pay 18 shillings per day for all of those students who remain in Austria. I.C will endeavor to have some of its students qualify for scholarships offered by U.S. universities and others for 500 scholarships offered by the French Government, as well as any others which may be available. In the case of any student who obtains a full scholarship, I.C's assistance to him will consist primarily of counseling assistance and supplemental aid, if required.

This has been given up.

2. A hostel for 100 students is being established and will be operated near Paris by the French branch of I.C.

3. I.C is covering expenses of a student hostel in Vienna — estimated capacity 300 students.

4. I.C is covering the costs of a hostel for a reported 150 students on Wolfganggasse.

5. I.C has purchased a Volkswagen bus which starts operating as of today near Andau, shuttling refugees from the border to the collection station 6 kilometers away.

6. I.C will furnish 500 assurances under RRP for the U.S. 200 have already been covered. These assurances are not limited to students or intellectuals but the Committee would prefer to assist those types insofar as possible.

7. Some two weeks ago I.C offered the Ministry of Interior to cover the cost of 1000 beds. At the time no beds were available for purchase in Austria so the deal was called off by the Ministry. Since then the Ministry has not followed up I.C's proposal, (although I have personally suggested on occasion to Ministry officials that they should not let this opportunity drop) but I.C still stands ready to cover its commitment. ?

14-00000

OFPA-24615

Page 2
Enc 1
Desp 433
From Vienna

UNCLASSIFIED

Poll stated that he had passed along to New York your suggestion that the agency cover provision of clothing and [illegible] books in Camp Kilmer. However, he anticipates that most agencies will probably cover their own cases with regard to such needs and he does not expect IRC to undertake the entire burden. He did state, however, that the Committee was bringing in two or three more people to support the operation in Vienna. In France they are looking into the Free Europe University in Strasbourg but would prefer not to become associated with FEC because of its government connections.

.Flivinauck

UNCLASSIFIED

200-124-3/

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

Daily Telegraph & Morning Post. Saturday. September 2, 1950

REFUGEES MAY BE SENT TO U. S.

PROFESSIONAL MEN

By Our Diplomatic Correspondent

A thousand Eastern European anti-Communist refugees of the professional classes may be sent for employment to the United States by the International Rescue Committee. Mr. David Martin, the Committee's Executive Director, is in London on his way to Paris and other capitals to investigate the scheme's possibilities.

It is also proposed to establish, probably in London and Paris, European institutes for the study by refugee experts of every aspect of life in East Europe. Mr. Martin said yesterday:

"The time has come when the free nations must use this mass of human talent to record what is going on and to ensure there are groups available to revive culture in Eastern Europe when the time arrives. We are prepared to bring 1,000 intellectuals to the United States and could, I think, absorb 2,000 - 3,000.

000077

200-7-2-63

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

2P

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

27 Oct 1954

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS	TELEPHONE	NO. EGQA-51403 DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
1. EE/Reg	2070	2 NOV				PLASILOVA, Vera Maria
2.						
3. EE/E1/[illegible]/OC		18 [illegible] 1954				3406 Anything on Milly?
4.						
5. EE [illegible]		1954				
6. EE		NOV 2 [illegible] 1954				
7. EE [illegible]						
8. EE/FIG/CS		DEC [illegible] 1954	13 [illegible]			
9. [illegible]				RID		8-13: A 201 should be opened on subject.
10. S/L				[illegible]		Carded
11.						
12.						
13.						
14. RI/CD		PROCESSED THRU U/C JUN 13 1955				
15. RI FI						

[illegible] ILLY was [illegible] from Switz [illegible] 19 [illegible] PLASILOVA. [illegible] -A- [illegible]

[illegible] 2 Nov 54

RECLASSIFIED

INDEX

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 9	

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

FORM 51-10

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible]

[illegible] Vera [illegible]

[illegible] attached [illegible] received through our [illegible]

[illegible] (1 cy)

[illegible] copies

[illegible] 61-23A

SECRET

E000.5140.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OPERATIONS MISSION TO GERMANY

Office for Field Coordination
Escapee Program
c/o American Consulate General
Frankfurt/Main, Germany

October 18, 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]
Frankfurt

Dear Mr. [redacted]

In June of 1954 this office received a case from AFCR for a woman by the name of PLASILOVA, Vera Maria, who was born in Teplice, Czechoslovakia, on March 01, 1927. At the time her case was submitted to this office she was a student in Geneva residing at 3 Avenue Calas, and she was being processed for immigration to South America.

During a routine check conducted on this individual this office learned that Plasilova was associated with one Siegfried Killy, a suspected espionage agent in Switzerland. The information did not indicate that Plasilova was implicated in Killy's activities. On the other hand, it was indicated that an entry visa to France was cancelled by the French authorities. It was indicated that our sources in Geneva did not have direct access to police files on Plasilova which are alleged to be voluminous. No attempt was made on the part of American personnel to analyze the case at that time. However, it was the opinion of a competent American officer in Geneva that Plasilova should have been questioned in detail about her background and activities for the past seven years.

Based on the above information, Plasilova was denied USEP eligibility. On August 24 I wrote to the American Consulate in Geneva advising them that Plasilova had left Switzerland and immigrated to Mexico on July 3, 1954. Her transportation was covered by a Revolving Fund Loan from the International Rescue Committee because USEP eligibility had been denied. I advised the Consulate that it was my opinion that this information should be brought to the attention of proper American authorities in Geneva, in that Plasilova's presence in Mexico might not be in the best interests of the United States.

INDEX

CS COPY

ENCL 1

2 Nov 54

CONFIDENTIAL

☐ 201-82206

ABSTRACT CARD REPRODUCTIONS OBTAINABLE

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] - 2 -

On October 1, 1954, I received a letter from the Consulate in Geneva. This letter stated that "If you would indicate the particular authorities here to whom the fact that this woman has proceeded to Mexico might be of interest, I shall be glad to communicate with them."

This office does not feel that we should tell the Consulate in Geneva which American officers would be interested in the type of information set forth above. It is felt that you might wish to transmit this information.

Sincerely yours,

Paul E. Kelly
Screening Officer

2 Nov 54
201-92246
[illegible]-5-48-143

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

6 P

20 FEB 1954

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS

NO. EGCA - [illegible]

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. [illegible]	[illegible]		4 [illegible]	[illegible]	
2.					[illegible]
3. C/[illegible]				[illegible]	
4.					
5. [illegible]		[illegible] 1954		[illegible]	OB [illegible] Footnotes [illegible]
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13. RID		[illegible] APR 1954		[illegible]	
14. [illegible]				[illegible]	
15. RI/FI	6400 L				

10

ABSTRACT | INDEX

SE[illegible] 87

DATE 2 MAR 1954

FORM 51-10 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible] REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

VIA: AIR

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE

TO : Chief, EE
thru Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
FROM : Chief, Berlin Operations Base

SUBJECT: GENERAL— CADROIT/Operational

SPECIFIC— Identity 1

REF: A. DIR 26907
B. [illegible] 1067
C. EGBA 5040

1. Synopsis: In accordance with the request contained in Reference A, a summarized evaluation of the potentialities of Identity 1 was forwarded in Reference B. This dispatch is prepared to record in greater detail the information forwarded in Reference B and to report the latest developments concerning Identity 1.

2. Several weeks following the 17 June 1953 demonstrations, a group of East German refugees, who identified themselves as "strike leaders", were reported as forming Identity 1. From several sources, it was determined that the group was receiving behind the scenes moral support, momentum and guidance from such persons as Edward S. Von Rine, Paul V. Boudreau and others who allegedly wished to create a roof organization for West Berlin resistance-type groups. It was previously known that Von Rine was very active for over six months attempting to establish a central file for information concerning East Germany to which all West Berlin organizations would be required to submit information. Publicly, his reason for this was to simplify coordination activities among the Berlin groups, but it is known that his real reason was to establish a personal measure of control over all of these organizations. In the past, his efforts had been unsuccessful due to, among other factors, the absence of a convenient "carrier" organization. The continuing efforts upon the part of Von Rine to regain the position he had prior to his dismissal from DILBEN are a matter of record.

3. It appeared that the creation of Identity 1 as a separate entity would not add anything of constructive nature to the general "cold war" front, and further, that its existence under the behind scenes guidance of the persons mentioned above would merely complicate the already complicated West Berlin scene. The BOB position was, therefore, to attempt to prevent the formation of Identity 1 and to recruit the assets available among the "strike leaders" upon an individual basis. Reference C contains a description of the activities of DILBEN in this regard.

4. On 10 July 1953, prior to the initial meeting of Identity 1, CADROIT invited the "strike leaders" to visit the CADROIT establishment to be briefed of the manner in which CADROIT carries out its East German mission. During this visit, a number of the "strike leaders" discovered that the CADROIT East German program encompassed

Distribution:
3 - Chief, EE
3 - COM
1 - [illegible]
[illegible] 31-20A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

SEC

all of the points which were hoped to be obtained by the formation of Identity 1, and since this would constitute an obviously undesirable duplication of effort, approximately ten of the "strike leaders" indicated that they would give their support to CADROIT or other existing organisations rather than to the new group. (The German language report of the CADROIT meeting is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment "A")

5. On 21 July 1953, a special meeting of various West Berlin government and resistance group representatives was called to discuss the feasibility and desirability of encouraging the formation of Identity 1. With few exceptions, all of the major organisations expressed the view outlined in paragraph 3 above. The suggestion was officially voiced that the members of Identity 1 should lend their support to existing organisations. (A German language report of this meeting prepared by the CADROIT representative is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment "B")

6. On 12 August 1953, a meeting was called by HICOG-EAD of representatives of U.S. intelligence organizations in Berlin. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the possibility that the formation of Identity 1 might constitute a threat to the security of American forces in Berlin. HICOG had also received an erroneous report that DTLINEN and CADROIT were rendering Identity 1 financial support. The latter impression was corrected during the meeting, and it was determined that Identity 1 would probably not constitute a threat if it did not receive or develop financial backing. At the time of these discussions, it did not appear likely that Identity 1 would receive such support, and its assets would probably be absorbed in other West Berlin or West German organizations. There were indications that several of the "strike leaders," with the aid of ZRCODIFY, were gaining employment in the Federal Republic.

7. The only direct contact established by BOB with any of the "strike leaders" was with Identity 2, who was considered for employment with DTLINEN. The nature of this contact is essentially covered in the following correspondence: SERLN 0663, DIR 18181 and EGP-A 6120. Identity 2 was not hired by DTLINEN.

8. On 17 October 1953, the Chairman of Identity 1, Identity 3, informed Nelson O. Henard that he (Identity 3) intended to resign from Identity 1 since he was receiving insufficient support to make a living. He stated that although he was receiving some support from Identity 4, it was not enough to maintain his organization upon a working basis. Identity 3 said that he had made several radio appearances, and that as a result of these, Identity 1 had been receiving up to one hundred visitors a day. He reported that he had attempted to gain financial support from the West German Ministry for All German Affairs and other organizations, but had been unsuccessful. He then suggested to Henard that Identity 1 and CADROIT could establish a covert working agreement with the latter organization furnishing the funds. The offer had one attractive aspect, namely, that CADROIT could, through the assets and name of Identity 1, broaden its present mission and expand into other fields of psychological warfare. However, for the reasons outlined in paragraph 3 above, Henard was instructed to sever all contact with Identity 3. After he was informed that CADROIT would not endorse the suggested working arrangement, Identity 3 admitted to Henard that there were undesirable elements within Identity 1 who would have to be removed before the organization could function effectively.

A - 1140

9. In accordance with the request contained in Reference A that a study of Identity 1 be made, discussions have been held with Identity 5. He stated that he was well aware of the activities of Identity 1 and that they were closely associated with the development of the TPOCCULT Berlin office. Shortly following the Stockholm meeting of TPOCCULT, Grambo, Identity 6 and others met with Identity 5 in Berlin to discuss the advisability of increasing the activities of TPOCCULT in Eastern Germany. Identity 5 felt at the time that Grambo and Identity 6 appeared to be the force necessary to get TPOCCULT on its feet in West Berlin. It was decided that TPOCCULT would form a Berlin office which would be responsible exclusively for East German operations. Although the mission of this office was not initially established, discussion apparently centered about the formation of an underground trade union to oppose the East German FDGB. Identity 6 and Grambo indicated that funds in the amount of DMW 1,000,000 would be provisionally available.

10. Identity 7, an East German refugee who was an active labor leader and had worked with the SPD Ostbüro, was designated the chief of the new TPOCCULT office. He commenced work immediately, but it soon became apparent that he was not going to cooperate with either CADORA or ZRCODIFY Berlin, other than to use the latter's offices. Identity 5 states that efforts were made by West German and Belgian representatives of TPOCCULT to bring Identity 7 into closer harmony with CADORA, but these were fruitless. Identity 7 kept knowledge of his activities from ZRCODIFY members, and it also became apparent that he was not informing TPOCCULT of everything either. The latter has evidenced a growing distrust and dislike for Identity 7 which has almost approached the state of complete disassociation. (For recent evidence of TPOCCULT by-passing its own Berlin office, see EGD-A 11223 which describes a TPOCCULT overture to DTLINEN.)

11. Since the TPOCCULT Berlin office was more or less an outgrowth of the 17 June demonstrations, it was natural that Identity 1 would seek a close working association with that group. An attempt was made, but apparently Identity 7, as an individual, prevented the establishment of an effective working relationship. On the other hand, CADORA looked upon the TPOCCULT office under the leadership of Identity 7 as an increasingly undesirable element in the Berlin and East German scene. According to Identity 5, it was about this time that Boudreau began making overtures to CADORA, reportedly acting as an "unofficial" representative of Identity 1. Since then, CADORA apparently has considered Identity 1 as an activity to offset the undesirable operations of Identity 7 and has reportedly been funneling some funds (amount unknown) to Identity 1, possibly through Boudreau. Identity 5 is aware that CADORA speaks highly of Boudreau, an observation which has been reported by John H. Quintance also.

12. Identity 5 reported further that Boudreau has been quite active gaining publicity for Identity 1. He has, for example, coordinated with Identity 8 in the preparation of an article concerning 17 June for Identity 9. During the Fall of 1953, Identity 8 introduced Identity 5 to Boudreau, and since that time, the latter has frequently pressed Identity 5 for U.S. support of Identity 1. Identity 5 has always told Boudreau that Identity 1 is completely a labor matter and that proper liaison should be made with either TPOCCULT or ZRCODIFY. Identity 5 introduced Boudreau to an American representative of the AFL, but there was no indication of the amount of interest the latter organization showed in the affairs of Identity 1. Recently, Boudreau published a study of the events of 17 June (the source of funds for this venture is unknown, but Identity 5 suggested that they may have come from CADORA). Boudreau, giving credit to Identity 1 for the material in the report,

has mailed copies of the booklet to prominent public figures throughout West Berlin, among them Identity 5 and CADONA. About one week after Identity 5 received his copy, Boudreau telephoned him requesting comment concerning the publication and reiterating his former requests for U.S. support of Identity 1. (A copy of Boudreau's booklet was given John H. Quintance by CADONA. This copy is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment "C")

13. It was reported in Reference B that Identity 5 felt that a major portion of Identity 1's financial support stemmed from Identity 10 sources, however, he now feels that what little support Identity 1 is receiving comes from CADONA for the reasons outlined in paragraph 11 above. Identity 5 was aware that Identity 1 had received welfare items from Identity 4 for further distribution among the families of persons who had been arrested for taking part in the 17 June demonstrations. To his knowledge, however, no funds, as such, were ever given Identity 1 from this source.

14. Nelson G. Henard recently reported that Identity 3 has resigned from his position in Identity 1 and is now practicing law in Western Germany. Henard also stated that he has heard of no recent activity upon the part of Identity 1 and has heard of no replacement being named to fill the post vacated by Identity 3.

15. The membership list of Identity 1 as reported in EGMW-207 agrees in part with a list forwarded by Henard. For comparison purposes, the latter list is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment "D".

16. Since it appears that Identity 1, although reportedly not very active, has been receiving a small amount of financial support from CADONA, it is possible that a continued investigation of its activities may be warranted. If so, it is suggested that future queries be directed to John H. Quintance, the BOQUERT Case Officer who has direct contact with CADONA. Since the attachments are forwarded in single copies, it is requested that they be forwarded to the Home Office following perusal.

Marvin L. Larrison
MARVIN L. LARRISON

APPROVED
KENNETH J. [illegible]

[illegible] H. ROGALL

20 February 1954
Distribution:
3 - Chief, EE (Attn: Geoffrey B. Hageen) w/att. E (3)
3 - COB (Attn: Wallace R. Parlett) w/att. A thru D (1 ea); w/att. E (3)
1 - EOB/KUPIES w/o att.
Attachments: UNDERCOV
A thru D described above
E - Identity sheet

[illegible]

CARD REPRODUCTION

SECRET

Attachment E under separate cover to EGB-A-12002

Identity 1 is "The Committee for 17 June"

Identity 2 is Werner Gohlke

Identity 3 is Karlheinz Oehler

Identity 4 is International Rescue Committee

Identity 5 is Herbert Baker, Labor Officer, HICOG, Berlin

Identity 6 is Walter Reuther

Identity 7 is Shilling (fnu)

Identity 8 is Norbert Muhlen

Identity 9 is The New Leader publication, American

Identity 10 is "The League for Human Rights"

Distribution:
3 - Chief, EE (Attn: Geoffrey E. Magoon)
3 - COI (Attn: Wallace R. Parlett)
1 - EOB/KUFEKS

C/EE (Magoon) EGBA 12002 E

SECRET

RI COPY

32-124-1-40

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR

CLASSIFICATION

1 February, 1952

TO: Chief of Station, Paris

FROM: Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT: GENERAL "Synthese Concernant [illegible] Otto [illegible] Communist International"

SPECIFIC Louis FISCHER

Reference: [illegible]-9718, dated 31 October 1951

1. The files of this office reveal the following information concerning the subject:

(a) The name of Louis FISCHER appeared in connection with the Paul and Hede MASSING case. The FBI report on the interrogation of the MASSINGS dated 8 October 1947 stated that the MASSINGS have known Louis and Markoosha FISCHER over a period of many years. They first knew them very intimately in Moscow in the period [illegible]. At that time FISCHER, who was foreign correspondent for the magazine The Nation, was very pro-Soviet. During this period Hede took the two FISCHER boys to Germany where she kept them for almost 2 years and acted as their governess and teacher. This report further stated that in 1937 after the MASSINGS had returned from Moscow having broken with the Russians, they saw the FISCHERS quite often, and they found that the FISCHERS were also breaking with the Soviets. As of 1947 the MASSINGS were still friendly with both of the FISCHERS and saw them from time to time.

(b) In a report dated 5 August 1950 reviewing his activities in Russia during the 1920s and 1930s, it was stated that FISCHER was well known to have enjoyed unusually close contact with Soviet officials particularly in the Soviet Foreign Office. He sometimes had direct contact with Maxim LITVINOV, Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar, and was reputed to have something like a pipe-line to the Kremlin through the outstanding Bolshevik journalist, Karl RADEK. RADEK and most of FISCHER's well-placed contacts were liquidated in the Great Purge of 1937-38, and all this contributed, no doubt, to FISCHER's disillusionment and disenchantment with the Soviet Regime. In any event, he contrived with difficulty to get his Soviet-citizen wife and two sons, who had dual U.S.-Soviet citizenship, out of the USSR. Mrs. Eleanor ROOSEVELT was credited by FISCHER with having obtained the exit visas through personal intercession with Soviet Ambassador OUMANSKY in Washington for the Soviet authorities were well aware by this time of FISCHER's disaffection. This

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICER | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

report also stated that FISCHER was active during the Spanish Civil War in support of the Loyalists and was reputed to have had good contacts with the last Republican Prime Minister, NEGRIN, who was generally regarded as a Soviet stooge. However by this time FISCHER was regarded in Moscow as a "Trotskyist." The report continued by stating that FISCHER had been very active in supporting the Indian Nationalist cause and was on very good terms with Gandhi. At the same time he had become very critical of the USSR and Communists generally. During 1949 and 1950 he displayed some interest in the Russian emigres in Germany, those who were former Soviet citizens, and collaborated with Boris A. YAKOVLEV in publishing a book in the U.S. entitled Thirteen Who Fled which is a compilation of the reputed life stories of certain Russian emigres, mainly from the Vlasov movement.

In this report Markoosha or Berta FISCHER, wife of Louis FISCHER, who was born in Latvia, was said to have written some books under the name of Markoosha FISCHER. At one time she was a secretary of CHICHERIN, the early Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar, and Louis FISCHER met her while she was working for CHICHERIN at the Rapallo Conference in the early 1920s. Although she had been very strongly pro-Soviet in Moscow, she reportedly was very bitterly hostile in her present anti-Soviet expressions and writing. Since the war she spent some time in Munich as the representative of the International Rescue Committee of New York. She was reported to have left Germany [illegible] to go to Italy where she was supposed to have worked on a book said to be a work of fiction. This document stated that Markoosha FISCHER was currently living at a farm which she owns at Keller's Church, Pa., near Quakertown, Pa., but that she was seeking employment again in work aiding DPs.

Another section of this report was devoted to George FISCHER, son of Louis and Markoosha FISCHER, who is sometimes known by the Russian diminutive, Yuri. He was educated in both Germany and Moscow and came to the U.S. at 14 years of age with his mother. He was graduated from the University of Wisconsin. Serving as a captain in Air Force Intelligence during the war, he was used on missions in [illegible] where his knowledge of Russian proved very useful. This report stated that following the war George FISCHER was at Harvard for several years on a Lowell fellowship and had been working on his thesis for his doctorate. He has done considerable writing on the origins and history of the Vlasov Movement, his output being probably the best material available. To obtain material for articles appearing in a number of American magazines, he made several trips to the Munich area and other DP centers in Germany. His most recent trips were on behalf of the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, and he seemed to enjoy the confidence of Professors KARPOVICH and FAINSOD there. While in Germany in April, 1950, he was travelling on orders from the Air Force Intelligence. He is an officer of the Air

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

Force Reserve. This report further stated that in August 1950 he returned from another trip to Germany where he conducted negotiations for the Harvard Russian Research Center in connection with the establishment in Munich of a Russian Research Institute and also to arrange the details of the Harvard Russian Center's project of sending a group of students to Germany the autumn of 1950 to study the Russian emigration. He informed Professor FAINSOD that upon his return he was withdrawing from further work for the Harvard Russian Research Center in order to concentrate on his thesis. George FISCHER's principal contact in Germany was Boris YAKOVLEV, head of the Vlassovite group, Soiuz Borby za Osvobozhdenie Narodov Rossii (Militant Union for Liberation of Peoples of Russia), the SBONR. On earlier trips he had been in touch with Philip [illegible], chief of SBONR's security section, but since [illegible] was reported to be suffering from cancer and therefore not active, FISCHER's later contacts with him were second-hand. George FISCHER is reported to have talked with Col. POZDNYAKOV in connection with research which POZDNYAKOV was doing for Harvard, but FISCHER did not have close contacts with him.

(c) The FBI in an investigative report on Carol Denny BRANDT dated 4 January 1952 stated that an informant of known reliability advised that in October and December 1941 and also in January 1942 Louis FISCHER, who then resided at Hotel Duane, 237 Madison Avenue, New York City, was in contact with Carol HILL, literary agent, 22 East 40th Street, New York City. This report quoted a review of FISCHER's book Men and Politics in the 12 May 1941 issue of Time magazine. This review stated: "For 13 years Louis FISCHER was the journalistic delegate from New York's liberal Nation to the Russian Revolution. His two-volume The Soviets in World Affairs made FISCHER an authority on Russian foreign politics and brought him into close contact with Russian politicians." According to this review, while dispatches of their (Time's) correspondent in Russia were objective and full of hostility to Russia, FISCHER's reports were constantly favorable to Russia and he became the favorite Russian author of "Wishful Thinking U.S. Intellectuals." This report also stated that an informant of known reliability advised on 11 July 1941 that FISCHER, a well-known Communist writer, was leaving for England and that another informant of known reliability advised that in 1937 FISCHER was active with the Loyalist forces in Spain. In addition an informant of unknown reliability advised SA George J. [illegible] in February 1942 that he had no positive information but believed that FISCHER was working for the GPU.

(d) In an FBI report on Coleman A. [illegible] dated 21 February 1950, an informant of known reliability stated that he met [illegible], reportedly a member of the Soviet Intelligence organization in the U.S. engaged in industrial espionage, at the home of Louis and Markoosha FISCHER in Moscow in [illegible]. The report identified FISCHER as an anti-Communist writer, author of Gandhi and Men in Politics, who at that time was pro-Communist and was in Moscow for the magazine, The Nation.

(e) A CIC report on [illegible] and his wife dated 27 August 1950 included a list of names and addresses discreetly obtained from the subjects. The name of Louis FISCHER, 237 Madison Avenue, New York City 16, telephone no.: MU-3-9500 appeared several times and the date 15 December 1947 mentioned. The name of FISCHER also appeared on a list headed "Letters".

(f) In a document from a usually reliable source dated 29 September 1951, Louis FISCHER, an American citizen born in Philadelphia 29 February 1896, was reported as staying at the Hotel Inghilterra in Rome from 3 April to 23 April 1951. He was accompanied by his alleged wife, Berta FISCHER born in Latvia on 2 January 1890. He was in possession of passport No. 35133 dated 1 November 1950 and his wife, No. 157303 dated 13 February 1948, both issued in Washington. Berta was reported as departing for Florence on 7 April 1951 where it seemed she was joined by him. According to personnel of the hotel, FISCHER was a homosexual. He claimed to be a journalist, but there were some doubts as to this claim. When leaving Rome, he left his trunk with hotel personnel, and it was later picked up by an unidentified friend. In Rome FISCHER had contacts with fellow-Americans. The purpose of his trip to Italy was unknown.

(g) A report dated 18 September 1951 stated that one GRAZIANI and wife, and CALVASI and wife spent the holiday of Easter, 1951, at Formia (near Naples) together with the "well-known anti-Stalinist newspaperman, Louis FISCHER." This report also stated that GRAZIANI had Communist affiliation but that CALVASI gave no indication of being aware of this.

(h) In a report dated 22 December 1949 Louis FISCHER was included among delegates to a conference of the International Labor Organization to be held 19 December 1949 in Mysore, India. The report also stated that it was presumed that FISCHER was from France but that this was not definitely known.

(i) In a document dated 18 January 1951, Louis FISCHER was reported to have made contributions to the SBONR, a political organization composed of the activist remnants of the wartime Vlassov movement. SBONR carries on both overt and clandestine activities aimed at the eventual overthrow of the Soviet dictatorship. The activities of this organization have been financed mainly by dues, contributions, and indirectly by Harvard University through the Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union which is staffed wholly by SBONR personnel.

2. There is also a referen[illegible] Louis FISCHER in WFPA-8135 dated 28 May 1951.

3. In requesting information concerning subject, WFPA-9714 invited our attention to the following references: WFPA-6835 dated 14 December 1950, WFPA-[illegible] dated 23 December 1950, and B. C. Tyndall's memorandum of 5 January 1951. It is the opinion of Nicholas A. Renard, author of WFPA-6835, that Louis FISCHER described in these references is not identical with Louis FISCHER cited in the KATZ synthesis.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

4. We have no information concerning the present whereabouts and activities of subject; however, we have requested this information from the FBI and will advise you upon receiving their report.

5. The information contained in this dispatch is not to be distributed outside your office in full; however, you may give [illegible] a brief outline of our findings in paraphrased form, and you may tell him that we shall forward any additional information which we may obtain in the future. In so far as limiting the operation on subject is concerned, we feel that this decision should lie exclusively with [illegible]'s organization in view of the vacillating political attitudes assumed by FISCHER.

Winston M. Scott
Winston M. Scott
by/Ann Egerter
Ann Egerter

NOTE:
CIA- 45492.
21 February 1946,
contains info on
FISCHER which
may not be
distributed outside
Headquarters.

201 [illegible]-5

14-00000

20

Director, Central Intelligence 3 November 1950

Assistant Director for Operations

[illegible], Executive [illegible] of the [illegible] Rescue Committee

1. Subject spent two hours in my office on Thursday, 2 November 1950, pointing out various ways and means whereby [illegible] and the [illegible] could be of mutual benefit to each other. His proposals were that:

(a) IRC finds very valuable intelligence sources in Europe and that he should be able to contact CIA overseas personnel in order to pass this information and receive their aid in getting the sources to this country. I replied that this was impossible but that CIA's New York Field office, with which he has already been in contact, would be glad to forward any dossiers of candidates for admission under Section 8 of Public Law 110 to Washington for consideration.

(b) CIA intercede with the Department of Defense for IRC's use of some of its quota for entrance of DP's and refugees. I replied that I felt that he should deal directly with the Department of Defense on this.

(c) CIA should go to Congress and press for amendments to the McCarran Act in order to further its intelligence potential as well as assist in a mass defection movement. I replied that this was a policy matter for that Department to solve, that CIA in an effort to maintain anonymity was averse to getting into controversial public disputes but would undoubtedly state its position if called on by congressional committees to do so.

(d) CIA take up with [illegible] in Germany its inadequacy in the screening of DP's. I replied that this was none of CIA's business and that he should discuss this with HICOG on his next visit to Germany.

(e) CIA contribute to the support of a proposed [illegible] Institute in Paris, Germany, Austria and Turkey which would provide employment for displaced scientists, journalists, etc., and result in a source of excellent intelligence. I replied that CIA had no funds for financing

JUL 7 1973

3 Nov 50

1

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

CARD REPRODUCTION

such a project and suggested he discuss this problem with [illegible] [illegible] as to the political problems involved as well as support. He stated he had done this and had got nowhere and had similar results in trying to get France to put up counterpart funds for the project.

2. I believe I was successful in guiding Mr. Martin elsewhere in his efforts to gain support and it is possible that he may approach you through Gen. Carl Spaatz who is rumored to be the new [illegible] campaign chairman replacing Adm. Richard Byrd.

ROC/bjo
cc: AD/OIC
AD/[illegible]
Contact Division

INDEX

3 Nov 66

20

[illegible]Director, Central Intelligence 3 November 1950

Assistant Director for Operations

[illegible] Executive [illegible] for [illegible] Rescue

1. Subject spent two hours in my office on Thursday, 2 November 1950, pointing out various ways and means whereby CIA and the [illegible] could be of mutual benefit to each other. His proposals were that:

(a) [illegible] finds many valuable intelligence sources in Europe and that he should be able to contact CIA overseas personnel in order to pass them information and receive their aid in getting the sources to this country. I replied that this was impossible but that CIA's New York Field Office, with which he has already been in contact, would be glad to forward any dossiers of candidates for admission under Section [illegible] of Public Law 110 to Washington for consideration.

(b) CIA intercede with the Department of Defense for [illegible]'s use of some of its quota for entrance of DP's and refugees. I replied that I felt that he should deal directly with the Department of Defense on this.

(c) CIA should go to Congress and press for amendments to the McCarran Act in order to further its intelligence potential as well as assist in a mass defection movement. I replied that this was a policy matter for State Department to solve, that CIA in an effort to maintain anonymity was averse to getting into controversial public disputes but would undoubtedly state its position if called on by congressional committees to do so.

(d) CIA take up with CIC in Germany its inadequacy in the screening of DP's. I replied that this was none of CIA's business and that he should discuss this with [illegible] on his next visit to Germany.

(e) CIA contribute to the support of a proposed [illegible] Institute in Paris, Germany, Austria and Turkey which would provide employment for displaced scientists, journalists, etc., and result in a source of excellent intelligence. I replied that CIA had no funds for financing

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUL 17 1973
MICROFILMED

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

NO COPY

[illegible]

such a project and suggested he discuss this problem with State Department as to the political problems involved as well as support. He stated he had done this and had got nowhere and had similar results in trying to get France to put up counterpart funds for the project.

2. I believe I was successful in guiding Mr. Martin elsewhere in his efforts to gain support but it is possible that he may approach you through Gen. Carl Spaatz who he states is to be the new [illegible] campaign chairman replacing Adm. Richard Byrd.

GGC/bjs
cc: AD/OIC
AD/OSI ✓
Contact Division

INDEX

[illegible]

O.P.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 3 Mar 1954

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment [redacted] and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer [redacted] before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry [redacted]

FROM: RI/AN

NO. EGQA-36400

DATE 3 [illegible]

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. EE/Reg	2058		1954	Zg	
2.					
3. SR/3	2044	12 Mar	WAC WL	BL	— J.G. pls note
4. SR/PP		13 Mar		WG	— Suggest we pass to Mr Blood. See esp. par 7 of attachment.
5. PP/ICD		30 Mar	31 Mar	[illegible]	
6. SR/PP			13 Mar	WG	Note para 9 — How about a Kubarc man to back up this unit? Jg.
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11. RI/C.I					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. RI	1409C				

RECLASSIFIED
RI/AN
RI/MIS
RI/FILE

X REF FORM FILED IN: NS

5 — 6

PROCESSED [illegible]

See memo comments attached!

1952

				6-2
ABSTRACT		INDEX		
ENCL				
DATE 9 MAR 1954				

FORM 51-10

SECRET

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

VIA:

DISPATCH NO. EGFA-06400

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

MAR 3 1953

TO: Chief EE (Attn: Chief SR)

FROM: Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

[redacted]

INFO: CSOB

SUBJECT: GENERAL — REDSOX/AEPAWN

SPECIFIC — Assistance to Soviet Escapees Through USEP

RE: EGQA-30572

ROUTING
1
2
3
4

1. In a recent conversation with Mr. Richard R. Brown, CFCEP, Frankfurt, he read several portions of a letter which he had just received from his Washington headquarters directing some fairly strong criticism to the German country unit in its handling of the program. Needless to say, Brown was considerably upset since it appears that much of the criticism stemmed from KUBARK. It was his impression that our conversations of last November and December and the remedial action taken by CTC at that time relative to the USEP German unit's handling of the Soviet program had indicated his willingness to do anything possible to correct deficiencies and to forestall just such criticism. In paragraph 1 of the reference we indicated that satisfactory answers to our questions had been received. In this connection we enclose as Attachment A a copy of Brown's written answers to our specific questions. (Attachment B is a criteria for USEP assistance.)

2. In regard to the criticism levelled at Brown and the German unit by the former's KUBARK office, the following pertinent excerpts were passed to the undersigned:

> "At the third meeting a great deal of stress was laid on the question of the special interest cases of other Government agencies. I was able to dwell at some length on the special handling that we have given special interest cases, and to cite chapter and verse of our report to the OCB. Nonetheless, it was felt that we should very greatly intensify our efforts in this respect. It is clearly considered that the disposal of special interest cases on a very high priority basis warrants unusual effort, procedures, and expense on the part of the Program. Both Army and (KUBARK) attach very great importance to this, and some dissatisfaction was expressed with the manner in which the present procedures are being implemented by the Program. In Germany, specifically, it was felt that the Program has been reluctant to associate itself or its contractors with cases which might present insuperable difficulties in connection with the

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

RI COPY

201-43752

74-126-5

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

voluntary agencies, the Program should find other means through other contractors, or through its own offices, of arranging disposal on a top priority basis. I pointed out that the Program was better geared to such an effort than any other U.S. Government program, and that one of the most important yardsticks of its effectiveness must be its capacity to handle this type of case. In brief, the thought was expressed that we had perhaps been inelastic in our approach to this problem and predisposed to keep a stone-pure reputation at all costs.

......"I want to bring out one more point. At two of the three OCB meetings and from numerous other [illegible] in Washington recently, there have been severe criticisms of the manner in which eligibility criteria are being applied by the German country unit. Criticism has been received on three occasions from (KUBARK), and is also included in the State Department report to the OCB group. The charge is made that the German country unit has been "unnecessarily legalistic", has adopted overly restrictive measures, and has been hypertechnical. The statement was made in the OCB meeting that among the all-important Soviet escapees, cases had been turned down on the grounds of voluntary repatriation even though the escapees never got past Berlin. The statement was also made that among the Soviets, only diplomatic and military defectors had been granted eligibility."

3. We are assured by Brown and other USEP officials that the final charge made above relating to diplomatic and military defectors is entirely erroneous and this refutation is borne out by our own investigation. In the past, eligibility was withheld from certain "voluntary repatriates" who had in fact, got no further than Berlin on the trek back to the USSR and who later returned to West Germany. However, we are assured that this is no longer necessarily true and that each case is judged individually.

4. Finally, the German Mission feels that Brown's flat statement that any or all assistance can be rendered to any escapee without regard to past disqualification, provided KUBARK will designate those to receive such assistance, is evidence of his and his unit's desire to cooperate wholeheartedly. We wish to assure Headquarters that the field is now of the opinion that USEP is making a sincere and energetic effort to carry out a most difficult task. We have no complaints at the present time as to the handling of that part of the program which touches KUBARK interests. It will be appreciated if this can be made clear by the KUBARK official responsible for liaison with the Escapee Program in Washington.

2 att H/20

James W. Harlatt

Dist:
3 - SR, w/att (2)
1 - CSOB, w/o att

SECRET

N/S

2 Mar 54

However, EPD Germany has advised OFC that a form has been devised to determine this information and that this form was presented to the agencies, for their use, on December 7. They have been asked to report on all persons assisted.

(b) Question: What, if any, project exists to relieve TB incidence among this group?

Supplemental aid is primarily designed to help escapees maintain or recover their health. All agencies know that evidence of poor health, supported by advice of a doctor, authorizes special food supplements. USEP funds can and have been used to provide better living conditions also. The Tolstoy Foundation and AFRF have spent $7,550.45 on supplemental food, including additional food at the three special installations. No figures are available as to the exact number of TB Soviet escapees who have been assisted.

(c) Question: How many people have received jobs through the efforts of the agencies?

(1) Through the Kaiserslautern project, 40 Soviet escapees have been placed in jobs and private housing found for 17 of this number.

(2) During the recent review of agency cases, about 50 Soviet escapees proved to be employed. In some cases, agency participation was apparent; in others, not. The degree of agency aid in finding these jobs would be difficult to pinpoint.

(3) There is also evidence that 20 to 30 escapees have enlisted in Labor Service Companies as "other nationalities". Here again, agency participation is difficult to determine.

(d) Question: How many have been emigrated through efforts of the agencies?

According to the October reports, the Tolstoy Foundation has obtained 94 visas for escapees, in addition to 432 visas under Section 3(c) of the DP Act. For the rest of the fiscal year they estimate that they will obtain 118 more 3(c) visas and 53 others. AFRF, which has just started resettlement activities, expects to obtain 15 visas under Section 3(c) and 15 others.

(e) Question: Is there any vocational training or other educational program?

(1) There are three vocational training schools available for escapees, with unused space in all three, at Munich, Ingolstadt and Berlin. Training expenses plus complete care and maintenance are paid

for ...

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

for by the German Government and USEP. The Karlsfeld project, will, hopefully, attack the problem causing poor attendance, namely lack of interest and poor social adjustment.

(2) The World's YMCA conducts language training in Valka and Karlsfeld. Other classes were discontinued due to lack of attendance, but a campaign is now in progress to rebuild the program.

(f) Question: What housing projects have been projected?

No further housing projects are contemplated until:

(1) The agency counsellors visit each family and definitely determine the problems facing them, and

(2) The present 126 to 146 spaces are effectively utilized.

13. Question: What are future plans for the items listed in paragraph 12?

The fundamental shortcoming in the USEP program to assist Soviet escapees is the fact that the counselling program has not been completed. Once this has been done, EPD Germany and the voluntary agencies together will develop a comprehensive program for meeting all of the needs of the Soviet group. This plan will undoubtedly include inter alia:

1. Development, improvement and completion of the projects now in operation.

2. Increased supplemental aid as families are visited and their needs determined. Close supervision will be exercised to ensure that the agencies relate this aid to the solution of the families' problems, including health difficulties and housing.

3. All escapees will be registered for emigration, the employables among them will be trade-tested, and arrangements will be made to ensure that the proper vocational training is available to those requiring it. In addition, assistance will be extended in clearing up legal problems faced by escapees which might bar them from resettlement. The agencies will be required to submit special reports on their activities.

4. Special efforts are being made to revitalize the vocational training and language training programs. Past experience indicates that success in this endeavor will be limited. However, it is hoped that effective individual counselling will eventually induce the escapees to take proper training.

Copy 1 of 3 Copies

SECRET

However, EPI Germany has advised OPC that a form has been devised to determine this information and that this form was presented to the agencies, for their use, on December 7. They have been asked to report on all persons assisted.

(b) Question: What, if any, project exists to relieve TB incidence among this group?

Supplemental aid is primarily designed to help escapees maintain or recover their health. All agencies know that evidence of poor health, supported by advice of a doctor, authorizes special food supplements. USEP funds can and have been used to provide better living conditions also. The Tolstoy Foundation and AFRF have spent $7,550.45 on supplemental food, including additional food at the three special installations. No figures are available as to the exact number of TB Soviet escapees who have been assisted.

(c) Question: How many people have received jobs through the efforts of the agencies?

(1) Through the Kaiserslautern project, 40 Soviet escapees have been placed in jobs and private housing found for 17 of this number.

(2) During the recent review of agency cases, about 50 Soviet escapees proved to be employed. In some cases, agency participation was apparent; in others, not. The degree of agency aid in finding these jobs would be difficult to pinpoint.

(3) There is also evidence that 20 to 30 escapees have enlisted in Labor Service Companies as "other nationalities". Here again, agency participation is difficult to determine.

(d) Question: How many have been emigrated through efforts of the agencies?

According to the October reports, the Tolstoy Foundation has obtained 94 visas for escapees, in addition to 432 visas under Section 3(c) of the DP Act. For the rest of the fiscal year they estimate that they will obtain 118 more 3(c) visas and 53 others. AFRF, which has just started resettlement activities, expects to obtain 15 visas under Section 3(c) and 15 others.

(e) Question: Is there any vocational training or other educational program?

(1) There are three vocational training schools available for escapees, with unused space in all three, at Munich, Ingolstadt and Berlin. Training expenses plus complete care and maintenance are paid for ...

for by the German Government and USEP. The Karlsfeld project, will, hopefully, attack the problem causing poor attendance, namely lack of interest and poor social adjustment.

(2) The World's YMCA conducts language training in Valka and Karlsfeld. Other classes were discontinued due to lack of attendance, but a campaign is now in progress to rebuild the program.

(f) Question: What housing projects have been projected?

No further housing projects are contemplated until:

(1) The agency counsellors visit each family and definitely determine the problems facing them, and

(2) The present 126 to 146 spaces are effectively utilized.

13. Question: What are future plans for the items listed in paragraph 12?

The fundamental shortcoming in the USEP program to assist Soviet escapees is the fact that the counselling program has not been completed. Once this has been done, EPD Germany and the voluntary agencies together will develop a comprehensive program for meeting all of the needs of the Soviet group. This plan will undoubtedly include inter alia

1. Development, improvement and completion of the projects now in operation.

2. Increased supplemental aid as families are visited and their needs determined. Close supervision will be exercised to ensure that the agencies relate this aid to the solution of the families' problems, including health difficulties and housing.

3. All escapees will be registered for emigration, the employables among them will be trade-tested, and arrangements will be made to ensure that the proper vocational training is available to those requiring it. In addition, assistance will be extended in clearing up legal problems faced by escapees which might bar them from resettlement. The agencies will be required to submit special reports on their activities.

4. Special efforts are being made to revitalize the vocational training and language training programs. Past experience indicates that success in this endeavor will be limited. However, it is hoped that effective individual counselling will eventually induce the escapees to take proper training.

Copy 1 of 3 Copies

ORT Union, the World YMCA, and the Lutheran World Federation. Without exception, these agencies have strong and reputable American affiliates which are accredited and recognized by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. In the case of WCC, the American affiliate is the National Council of the Churches of Christ, whose welfare organization is the Church World Service; it is accredited by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid and is a member in good standing of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Incorporated. The specific requirements for qualification are not now available; however, it is believed that to be qualified for accreditation by the Advisory Committee, an agency must be supported by voluntary subscriptions, and humanitarian in character. It is believed that agencies wholly political are not eligible.

9. Question: What is the status of the proposal to form a Russian labor company which we understand has been approved in Washington?

General agreement on the formation by USAREUR of a Labor Service Unit comprised of Soviet escapees has been reached by US EUCOM and USAREUR. This project now only awaits final approval from the Department of Army as to certain details. (It is understood that the Army has already agreed to the proposal in principal.) It is anticipated that the project will be implemented in the near future.

The Unit, which will be assigned a guard mission, will comprise initially 100 officers and men. In addition, one man to act as staff adviser to USAREUR on matters affecting the Unit will probably be recruited. This position should have a field grade of perhaps a Lieutenant Colonel. The personnel ceiling of 100 may be raised to 200 should it appear desirable in the light of experience. In order to avoid the appearance of supporting Great Russian or minority national aspirations, the shoulder flash for members of the company would bear the name "ROSSISKIY" or Russian People, rather than "RUSSKIY" or Russians.

In the course of a recent discussion between representatives of CAS, U.S. EUCOM, and this office concerning this proposal, general agreement was reached on the following points:

a) Leadership in the company should be recruited from the more recent Soviet escapees or defectors, rather than from the older "emigre" group;

b) Efforts should be made to recruit the maximum possible number from the escapees registered with USEP; and

c) The TZOPE group should be strongly represented in the company.

10. Question: ...

10. Question: Have any steps been taken to get the Clemency Board of HICOG to pardon Soviet escapees sentenced for minor offenses committed in an attempt to survive, thus clearing their records? Do you want us to make any pitch on this?

In the past, petitions for clemency have only been presented to the Clemency Board of HICOG when a person was under active consideration for resettlement. The Clemency Board has usually acted swiftly with the best interest of the individual and of the U.S. Government in mind. Recently, however, steps were taken to initiate petitions for clemency on all cases of the types mentioned in Question 10. It is too early at the present time to foresee the result of this operation. However, it is believed that it is not yet necessary for CAS to approach the appropriate officials on this point.

11. Question: Is the USEP policy to reduce the numbers who can be helped under the Program? If true, what are the reasons for this policy which appears on the surface to be a step backward from solving the problem?

It is not the USEP policy to reduce the numbers who can be helped under the Escapee Program. As a matter of fact, the USEP caseload has continued to increase despite the fact that over 6,000 have been resettled, and many have been dropped for various reasons, including ineligibility, local integration, and death. It is true that the primary purpose of the Program is to resettle eligibles abroad, and to integrate locally those whose resettlement potential is low. This action, of and in itself, does tend to reduce the number of persons who can be subsequently helped under the Program. It is also the policy of the Program to create an atmosphere in which other programs which depend to a certain extent upon the psychological attitude existing in emigre circles can operate successfully. In furthering this particular objective, the Program has recently taken action to declare as eligible those persons who, although having records as minor criminals, are of interest to U.S. agencies, and have broadened the basis to accept any Soviet citizen as eligible if he has in any way been under discipline of the Soviet Government since January 1, 1945.

12. Question: What has the Escapee Program accomplished for Soviet escapees?

USEP's assistance to escapees is based primarily upon the needs of each individual registered with the Program. These needs are determined through a counselling program under which the voluntary agencies cooperating with USEP are supposed to send case workers to the field to interview each escapee family to determine their particular needs, background, problems, experience, ambitions, and general situation. Based upon this interview the agency is supposed to develop a specific

plan ...

plan of assistance for the family with the basic objective being their eventual resettlement in a country of immigration or, if this is not possible, re-establishment within the economy of their present country of residence. Although the Escapee Program Division of the U.S. Operations Mission for Germany has contracts with both Tolstoy Foundation and AFRF to carry out a counselling program for Soviet escapees, and has spent approximately $14,000 on each agency in this connection, to date the agencies have not completely counselled all of their caseloads. Accordingly, it is most difficult to make any kind of analysis of the amount of assistance rendered as compared to the extent of need. On December 7, representatives of both agencies were advised by the Escapee Program Division, that the counselling program must be completed in the near future, and that USEP will be in a much better position to evaluate the program of assistance to Soviet escapees.

Despite the admittedly unsatisfactory situation outlined in the previous paragraph, certain positive action has been taken by the EPD and the voluntary agencies to provide assistance to Soviet escapees. Reportedly, AFRF has distributed in the neighborhood of $13,000 in supplemental assistance in the form of food, clothing, lodging, etc., to escapees registered in their caseload. The Tolstoy Foundation has distributed in the neighborhood of $19,000. In addition, three special housing aid projects have been established in Germany: the Friendship House in Munich with a capacity of 10 persons, and the center in Kaiserslautern, with a capacity of 36 -- both sponsored by AFRF, and the Tolstoy home in Karlsfeld which has a capacity of 80 to 100. A word about each of the following installations:

The Friendship House in Munich is small and is always full. The length of stay varies per individual as its primary purpose is to furnish temporary housing for Russian escapees who come to Munich looking for work. In some cases these periods of residence have dragged out. At this home full care and maintenance is given, as the residents are mostly ineligible for relief grants in Bavaria.

The Karlsfeld house was opened on September 4 and has accepted 26 escapees to date. In addition to the fact that each applicant is screened by the agency and then by a consulate and USEP representative, the admission process is complicated by the need to transfer unemployment and relief benefits from other areas. While this installation is not meant to be a housing project of semi-permanent quarters, the type of aid needed by most persons selected will probably result in a fairly stable population, once the home is filled. The Kaiserslautern home reported, as of November 15:

19 current residents
11 persons moved to private quarters
3 persons moved to Labor Service Units
10 persons returned to former residence
5 dependents placed in jobs
48

SECRET

All ...

All these people, plus other dependents, passed through the center or were aided by the agency facilities there. (Dependents moved to Kaiserslautern only after private quarters were located.) Of the total, at least forty-three persons had, at one time or another, lived in the house. It must be emphasized that this installation is not regarded as permanent housing but was erected solely to house escapees temporarily for whom jobs had been found and who needed quarters until they could locate permanent billets. Therefore, escapees are referred here only when job opportunities exist and stay only until private housing is located. At one time, consideration was given to filling the house with employment potentials, but the agency demurred for fear the project would be ruined by insoluble morale problems and by the lack of available space to meet quickly employment requirements.

To summarize on the question of "housing projects", and apart from housing in the German economy, installations for special purposes were considered and these three subsidized: (1) the benefits derived from the Friendship House in Munich are being evaluated, and will be discussed at the forthcoming conference; (2) the Karlsfeld House has recently been opened and filling it is being delayed by a rather cumbersome screening process, but a process required to meet our security requirements and the requirements of the Munich Consulate General; and (3) the Kaiserslautern House has been rather effectively used, being limited by the numbers of job opportunities. Until we are convinced, however, that full or almost full benefits are being derived from these houses, USEP is reluctant to establish additional housing projects of a temporary nature and it is contrary to USEP policy to enter into long-term arrangements which would be entailed in provision of permanent housing.

Further, escapees generally are eligible for housing within the German economy. A search for this housing is made among that controlled by the Wohnungsamt or is earmarked in new refugee housing being built. Escapees are being included in a new FOA program of $15 million which is currently being discussed by FOA and the German Federal Republic (see DEPTEL to Bonn USFOTO 453, December 15, 1953.).

Additionally, 30 Soviet children were sent to Switzerland for rehabilitation and a vacation for eight weeks last summer at a cost of $3,987.

(a) Question: How many ex-Soviets have received what assistance and how much for Care & Maintenance?

As pointed out above, the incomplete and unsatisfactory status of the counselling projects of the agencies, plus inadequate or unavailable files, preclude the possibilities of determining how many Soviets have received what assistance and how much for Care & Maintenance.

However, ...

14-00000

Text of January 9, 1953, cable. (Confidential)

"Local Units are advised that effective immed Soviet defectors who escaped since Jan 1, 1945 may be considered eligible for complete program assistance. Units shld complete registration of this group in each area and advise OFC of numbers registered. Every effort shld be made to create maximum program impact on Sov escapees in each area. It is realized that extension of eligibility to this group may cause some repercussion among other nationality groups and the agcies supporting them. It is pointed out however that great majority Sov defectors are eligible under provisions para 6 & 7 of Provisional Guide 01. Moreover Units shld take all feasible measures to minimize repercussions by exercising utmost discretion in implementation of this instruction e.g. by discussing it primarily only with agcies interested in this group."

Text of January 20, 1953, cable: (Confidential)

"Soviet defectors referred to in Frankfurt tel sent Vienna 83, Rome 87, Athens 102, Trieste 39, Istanbul 43, Geneva 21 for Carson shld be generally interpreted as those Sov citizens or Sov Ukranians who left Military or Govt service since Jan 1945, or their dependents (para 6 of Prov Guide #1). Local Units may also extend assistance to such other post Jan 1945 Sov escapees who qualify under Para 7 of Guide #1, excepting hard core DP's or persons who have been in refugee status prior to World War II."

Text of instructions issued to all field units December 1953:

"Regardless of his country of origin, any Iron Curtain escapee who, during the period 1945 to the present time, was voluntarily or forcibly repatriated, but who proceeded no further than the Eastern Zones of Germany or Austria, and was detained in the Eastern Zones of Germany or Austria under the discipline of the Soviet occupation forces or was employed in an official, semi-official, or any other capacity, regardless of the nature of his employment, by or for the Soviet occupation forces, and who subsequently defected, fled, escaped, or otherwise returned to the West, for any reason. should be considered eligible for USEP assistance, provided he is otherwise eligible."

Your attention is again directed to Section 7 of Guide #1 which authorises you to make exceptions in any individual case, regardless of eligibility criteria.

SECRET

ATTACH. "A"

108

1. Question: Does USEP plan to exert tighter and constant management control over this project, as against the present system of hands-off until end-audit, or is this impossible because of regulations? If the latter is true, who has the power to change the regulations, and is it possible for them to be changed within the context of overall USEP policy?

Short of involving itself or its staff in the actual implementation of projects or in voluntary agency operations, USEP maintains a continuing scrutiny and review of every project and contract into which it has entered. Information developed by field officers in the course of this review is passed to the Chief of the Escapee Program Division concerned, who evaluates the material and discusses it, whenappropriate, with the local agency director. Subsequent to this evaluation and discussion with the agency, the material is forwarded to OFCEP which makes a second analysis and, if indicated, discusses it with the agency's European Director. There is no policy of hands-off until the end-audit is made. End-use-audits are an integral part of the review of projects in order to determine whether or not the supplies and services are reaching the escapees.

In the light of the preceding paragraph, the latter part of the question becomes academic; however, USEP policy in this respect is flexible and can be adapted to any situation warranting a modification of procedures.

2. Question: What is the interpretation of "local settlement"? If a man is earning a distinctly submarginal existence, which means an unhealthy and unhappy existence, is he automatically ruled out? Who calls the shots on this, USEP or the agencies?

Local settlement is not predicated solely on economic factors. Rather, local settlement depends upon a variety of conditions obtaining in the case of a particular family. Consideration must, of necessity, be given to the jobs of the principal wage-earners to determine whether or not they are working in an occupational area most suitable to their desires, background and ability; to their wages to determine whether or not their earnings are sufficient to meet the needs of their family; to their housing to determine if it is adequate; and other factors which must be considered in connection with a family's firm integration into the local community, including its own attitude toward such integration. It is not the policy of USEP to place a man or a family on an ineligible or inactive list as a locally settled case if he is earning a distinctly submarginal existence. The decision of local settlement is made by the Chief of the Escapee Program Division concerned and only after a careful analysis of the situation obtaining in each particular case. Usually the Division Chief's decision is based upon the recommendation of the voluntary agency as analyzed and evaluated by USEP officers in the field.

3. Question: ...

~~Copy~~ 1 of 8 Copies

SECRET

3. Question: What is planned to eliminate the duplication in caseload of the two agencies?

Duplication in caseload between the various voluntary agencies participating in the Escapee Program has been eliminated to an appreciable extent. It has existed principally in the case of two agencies in Germany dealing with the Soviet problem -- Tolstoy Foundation and American Friends of Russian Freedom. This, however, was resolved on December 7, 1953 at a meeting of the two agencies with the Chief, Escapee Program Division/USCMJ. At this meeting the Tolstoy Foundation was given principal responsibility for all cases which have a resettlement potential. AFRF was given all cases which had limited or no resettlement potential and must, of necessity, be settled locally in the German economy. The supplementary care and maintenance was divided after a thorough discussion with each agency by mutual agreement. This action resulted in establishing a caseload in Germany of 79 cases consisting of some 180 people for TF, and 102 cases with approximately 200 people for AFRF. New registrants by either agency will be referred to Escapee Program field representatives (in Germany, Munich) for a check against current card files. After a dossier has been fully developed on the case, a determination as to the appropriate agency will be made according to the case's resettlement potential.

4. Question: What are the criteria for accepting a Soviet escapee as a relief recipient and what office or regulations determine same?

There is enclosed the basic provisional guide concerning eligibility, together with subsequent clarifications issued to the field on the Soviets. This is the criteria under which a person is extended, and declared eligible for, Program assistance. These regulations were adapted from a general policy issued by the U.S. Department of State. Within the framework of these regulations, the Escapee Program conducts a security investigation which establishes a man's eligibility from a security point of view. Simultaneously the man is counselled in an effort to determine his needs from a sociological and economic angle. The results of these investigations determine the course of action upon which the Escapee Program proceeds. However, in the majority of cases, humanitarian assistance is extended to individuals pending the complete security investigation, or until material sufficiently derogatory to deny eligibility is discovered. (Attention should be directed to paragraph 7 of the eligibility guide, which enables USEP to confer eligibility on any individual or individuals of interest to other U.S. agencies, regardless of normal eligibility criteria.)

5. Question: What is the source of the policy which maintains that there must be a leaning-over-backward to avoid the risk of any political implication in applying the USEP program?

The Escapee ...

SECRET

The Escapee Program was originally outlined in DEPCIRTEL 676, January 29, 1952 (Top Secret) which indicated that the Program would be undertaken through contracts with voluntary agencies to provide certain supplies and services to escapees of recent date. Inasmuch as the largest and most important voluntary agencies operating in Europe are of religious nature and endeavor to stay clear of undertakings which have political implications, it was determined that the Escapee Program would suppress to the extent possible the political nature of its operations in order to secure and maintain the "good will" and cooperation of these agencies. In our relationships, however, with certain agencies of ethnic character (e.g. AFCR -- American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees), especially when these agencies are directed by individuals in whom USEP has complete confidence, little, if any, action has been taken to suppress or disguise USEP political implications. There is, however, a tendency on the part of USEP officials to suppress political implications of the Program in their arrangements with several agencies -- due to their lack of confidence in the leadership of these agencies. Mrs. Schaufuss, Tolstoy Foundation; Sheba Goodman, American Friends of Russian Freedom; Max Braude, Organisation for Rehabilitation through Training; Anna Matson, International Rescue Committee; and Michael Rodyk, United Ukrainian American Relief Committee; are examples of Directors in whom USEP has little confidence. This lack of confidence arises from the fact that these personalities apparently have their own axes to grind. USEP has revealed, however, and will continue to reveal to a limited extent, the political nature of the Escapee Program to certain selected persons in the voluntary agencies who are subject to the necessary degree of direction, and in whom confidence may be maintained. This course of action is motivated primarily by the fact that political overtones of the Program cannot be wholly hidden from an intelligent person, yet it is not in the Program's best interest to advise officially the religious bodies of the political aspects. Although the major religious agencies undoubtedly are aware of the political aspects of the Program, they choose to ignore them so long as they are not involved directly into any political operations, and so long as they are not advised officially of them. "

6. Question: Are there any means through which assistance to deserving members of TZOPE (already on the caseloads) can be speeded up?

USEP officials throughout the area are continually endeavoring to speed up Program benefits to the ultimate recipients. This is applicable to the entire caseload of all agencies and has not in the past been predicated upon membership in any organisation which may or may not be of interest to U.S. Government agencies. In this way, USEP endeavors to extend Program benefits to all those eligible without focussing unnecessary attention upon individual members of a particular organisation of interest to agencies of the U.S. Government. Further, USEP

officials ...

officials have no way of determining whether an escapee is or is not a member of TZOPS. However, if CAS desires to furnish USEP with a list of TZOPS membership, OPC will request the USEP Divisions in each country to confer eligibility on the individuals listed and to pay particular attention that such individuals may receive personal attention in the future.

7. Question: Is there any possibility of eliminating Tolstoy and AFRF altogether and doing this job through another agency or agencies?

In consideration of this question, USEP has reluctantly decided that it would not be possible to eliminate Tolstoy Foundation, since Tolstoy is an old, established agency with a name-known and respected within certain emigre circles. It may be possible, however, for CAS to undertake the elimination, although CAS relationships with TF and its Board of Directors are unknown to this office. Since AFRF is a relatively new organization, and the character of its European leadership is much more undesirable than that of Tolstoy, it is conceivable that AFRF could be eliminated from the Russian field considerably easier than Tolstoy. Moreover, as the Chairman of the Board of the AFRF is a retired U.S. Admiral, he would probably be inclined to go along with the wishes of Government officials if it could be shown that the elimination of AFRF was in the best interest of the U.S. Government. However, the elimination of ethnic type agencies in this respect would, perhaps, compel the Escapee Program to enter into relationships with a religious agency, e.g. the WCC, in their stead and the successful resolution of the Soviet problem would become automatically much more difficult.

8. Question: How does an agency qualify for a USEP contract? What are the requirements for qualification:

USEP currently has contractual arrangements with 22 voluntary societies representing the major religious bodies (i.e. Catholics, Jews, and Protestants) and the major ethnic groups represented in the population of the United States of America. To qualify for a USEP contract the agency, if it is wholly American in composition and incorporated under the laws of one of the 48 States, or the District of Columbia, must be accredited by what was known as the Department of State's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, and which is now a part of FOA. The Executive Director of this Committee is Mr. William H. McCahon, who is also a staff member in the Office of the Assistant Director for Refugees and Migration, FOA. In addition to those agencies which have been incorporated in the U.S., USEP also enters into relationships with other organisations which are international in character and composition -- such as the World Council of Churches, the World

ORT ...

ATTACH. 'B'

MICROFILMED
DOC. MICRO. SER.

78

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. 1   July 17, 1952

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

1. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 provides the basic legislative authority for the Escapee Program and thus establishes the elementary criteria for extending assistance.

Section 101 (a)(1) of that Act authorizes the expenditure of a sum not to exceed $100,000,000 "for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, or the Communist dominated or Communist occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes, when it is similarly determined by the President that such assistance will contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area and to the security of the United States".

2. Officials carrying out this program should not become involved in complex, time-consuming procedures in determining priority for assistance. It is expected that a positive approach toward priority will be taken and that criteria will remain as simple and broad as is consistent with U.S. interests. It follows that aid should be given immediately to persons who apparently meet the priority criteria outlined below and should be withdrawn only if reasonable evidence is brought forward which indicates that the person does not meet these criteria.

3. The intent and purpose of the program is to aid new escapees from communist oppression. Whatever the merits of aiding persons who were displaced before, during, or soon after World War II, such aid is not normally a proper concern of this program. Moreover, quite apart from any other considerations, the program does not have sufficient funds to assist many persons other than those who have recently escaped from behind the Iron Curtain. In the foregoing perspective, the following criteria will be utilized by the Missions in according priority for assistance.

4. Priority for assistance in resettlement and for supplementary care will be granted any person who escaped after January 1, 1948 from the USSR, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria or Albania.

5. Within the broad confines of the above, there will be certain persons whom the United States obviously will not desire to assist and there will be others whose status in their country of residence after flight is such that they possess the rights and obligations of nationality of the country in which they have taken asylum.

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

ATT 2 TO EGGW 36100

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. I (cont)

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Assistance will thus be denied to or withdrawn from any person who:

A. Is a Communist agent.
B. Is a former Nazi or Nazi collaborator seeking to escape just punishment for crimes committed during World War II against Allied personnel or against civil populations.
C. Is a common criminal.
D. Has unreasonably refused resettlement opportunities.
E. Is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he resides as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of citizenship of that country e.g. German refugees and expellees, persons of Turkish ethnic origin from Rumania and Bulgaria, are excluded from assistance under this paragraph.
F. Has been satisfactorily settled locally.

6. Assistance will be extended, however, to those persons otherwise eligible under the provisions of this circular who defect from diplomatic, other official or semi-official missions or delegations while abroad in the service of their country.

7. Missions are authorized to make individual exceptions, regardless of dateline, when such exceptions are in the interest of the U.S. or when such exceptions are requested by other U.S. Government agencies operating in related fields. When requested exceptions are not favorably considered by the Country Unit they must be referred to the Special Unit prior to final action.

8. A family group containing a person or persons who would not ordinarily be assisted due to nationality, e.g. Polish escapee and Austrian spouse and who are otherwise eligible should be considered eligible as a unit.

9. Basic responsibility for determination of eligibility will rest with the Local Units. However, it is expected that they will devise ways and means of utilizing local facilities and officials to a maximum extent in order to assist the Local Unit in discharging this responsibility. In the event the local unit requires further assistanse in reaching an eligibility decision, the Special Unit may be called upon by the Local Unit for information or advice.

RESTRICTED

14-00000

MICROFILMED
JUN 2 5 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RESTRICTED - SECURITY INFORMATION

ADDENDUM
To
PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. 1

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Text of tele-conference received from Department July 14, 1952 in amplification of criteria outlined under Provisional Guide #1:

"PEP Program is concerned with escapees from Soviet or Soviet dominated areas. In view fact PEP funds are limited and because of legislative history of program priority or preference must be given to more recent escapees such as those who escaped after January 1, 1948. Decisions as to application of fund must also be based on results which can be achieved in terms of basic objectives of program. In other words we are not distributing a limited relief fund equally among a designated number of people. We are more concerned with those who have escaped more recently than those who have been in the refugee state since World War I or those who were uprooted between September 1939 and January 1, 1948. The date January 1, 1948 is an administrative device which should not be rigidly applied unless later exhaustion of funds increasingly requires this action. Of equal concern to PEP are the results which can be achieved in terms of reestablishment, resettlement, better morale, etc., as between one project and another. We should seek self-liquidating, non-repetitive uses for PEP funds. Avoid to the extent possible acceptance of responsibilities which cannot readily be relinquished. As experience develops we shall make the foregoing more selective and specific."

RESTRICTED

Amendment No. 1

to

Provisional Guide No. I. (Cost)

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Sub paragraph E of unnumbered paragraph following paragraph five of Provisional Guide No. 1 is amended to read:

"E. Is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he resides or other country outside of the area of Soviet domination as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of citizenship of that country e.g. German refugees and expellees, persons of Turkish ethnic origin from Rumania and Bulgaria are excluded from assistance under this paragraph."

SECRET ATTACH. "A" 108

1. Question: Does USEP plan to exert tighter and constant management over this project, as against the present system of hands-off until end-audit, or is this impossible because of regulations? If the latter is true, who has the power to change the regulations, and is it possible for them to be changed within the context of overall USEP policy?

Instead of involving itself or its staff in the actual implementation of projects or in voluntary agency operations, USEP maintains a continuing scrutiny and review of every project and contract into which it has entered. Information developed by field officers in the course of this review is passed to the Chief of the Escapee Program Division concerned, who evaluates the material and discusses it, when appropriate, with the local agency director. Subsequent to this evaluation and discussion with the agency, the material is forwarded to CPCEP which makes a second analysis and, if indicated, discusses it with the agency's European Director. There is no policy of hands-off until the end-audit is made. End-use-audits are an integral part of the review of projects in order to determine whether or not the supplies and services are reaching the escapees.

In the light of the preceding paragraph, the latter part of the question becomes academic; however, USEP policy in this respect is flexible and can be adapted to any situation warranting a modification of procedures.

2. Question: ~~What is the interpretation~~ of "local settlement"? If a man is earning a distinctly submarginal existence, which means an unhealthy and unhappy existence, is he not naturally ruled out? Who calls the shots on this, USEP or the agencies?

Local settlement is not predicated solely on economic factors. Rather, local settlement depends upon a variety of conditions obtaining in the case of a particular family. Consideration must, of necessity, be given to the jobs of the principal wage-earners to determine whether or not they are working in an occupational area most suitable to their desires, background and ability; to their wages to determine whether or not their earnings are sufficient to meet the needs of their family; to their housing to determine if it is adequate; and other factors which must be considered in connection with a family's firm integration into the local community, including its own attitude toward such integration. It is not the policy of USEP to place a man or a family on an ineligible or inactive list as a locally settled case if he is earning a distinctly submarginal existence. The decision of local settlement is made by the Chief of the Escapee Program Division concerned and only after a careful analysis of the situation obtaining in each particular case. Usually the Division Chief's decision is based upon the recommendation of the voluntary agency as analyzed and evaluated by USEP officers in the field.

3. Question: ...

Copy 1 of 8 Copies

SECRET

3. Question: What is planned to eliminate the duplication in caseload of the two agencies?

Duplication in caseload between the various voluntary agencies participating in the Escapee Program has been eliminated to an appreciable extent. It has existed principally in the case of two agencies in Germany dealing with the Soviet problem -- Tolstoy Foundation and American Friends of Russian Freedom. This, however, was resolved on December [illegible] at a meeting of the two agencies with the Chief, Escapee Program Division, USCMG. At this meeting the Tolstoy Foundation was given principal responsibility for all cases which have a resettlement potential. AFRF was given all cases which had limited or no resettlement potential and must, of necessity, be settled locally in the German economy. The supplementary care and maintenance was divided after a thorough discussion with each agency by mutual agreement. This action resulted in establishing a caseload in Germany of 79 cases consisting of some 180 people for TF, and 102 cases with approximately 200 people for AFRF. New registrants by either agency will be referred to Escapee Program field representatives (in Germany, Munich) for a check against current card files. After a dossier has been fully developed on the case, a determination as to the appropriate agency will be made according to the case's resettlement potential.

4. Question: What are the criteria for accepting a Soviet escapee as a relief recipient and what office or regulations determine same?

There is enclosed the basic provisional guide concerning eligibility, together with subsequent clarifications issued to the field on the Soviets. This is the criteria under which a person is extended, and declared eligible for, Program assistance. These regulations were adapted from a general policy issued by the U.S. Department of State. Within the framework of these regulations, the Escapee Program conducts a security investigation which establishes a man's eligibility from a security point of view. Simultaneously the man is counselled in an effort to determine his needs from a sociological and economic angle. The results of these investigations determine the course of action upon which the Escapee Program proceeds. However, in the majority of cases, humanitarian assistance is extended to individuals pending the complete security investigation, or until material sufficiently derogatory to deny eligibility is discovered. (Attention should be directed to paragraph 7 of the eligibility guide, which enables USEP to confer eligibility on any individual or individuals of interest to other U.S. agencies, regardless of normal eligibility criteria.)

5. Question: What is the source of the policy which maintains that there must be a leaning-over-backward to avoid the risk of any political implication in applying the USEP program?

The Escapee ...

SECRET

The Escapee Program was originally outlined in DEPCIRTEL 676, January 29, 1952 (Top Secret, which indicated that the Program would be undertaken through contracts with voluntary agencies to provide certain supplies and services to escapees of recent date. Inasmuch as the largest and most important voluntary agencies operating in Europe are of religious nature and endeavor to stay clear of undertakings which have political implications, it was determined that the Escapee Program would suppress to the extent possible the political nature of its operations in order to secure and maintain the "good will" and cooperation of these agencies. In our relationships, however, with certain agencies of ethnic character (e.g. AFCR — American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees), especially when those agencies are directed by individuals in whom USEP has complete confidence, little, if any, action has been taken to suppress or disguise USEP political implications. There is, however, a tendency on the part of USEP officials to suppress political implications of the Program in their arrangements with several agencies — due to their lack of confidence in the leadership of these agencies. Mrs. Schaufuss, Tolstoy Foundation; Sheba Goodman, American Friends of Russian Freedom; Max Braude, Organisation for Rehabilitation through Training; Anna Matson, International Rescue Committee; and Michael Rodyk, United Ukrainian American Relief Committee; are examples of Directors in whom USEP has little confidence. This lack of confidence arises from the fact that those personalities apparently have their own axes to grind. USEP has revealed, however, and will continue to reveal to a limited extent, the political nature of the Escapee Program to certain selected persons in the voluntary agencies who are subject to the necessary degree of direction, and in whom confidence may be maintained. This course of action is motivated primarily by the fact that political overtones of the Program cannot be wholly hidden from an intelligent person, yet it is not in the Program's best interest to advise officially the religious bodies of the political aspects. Although the major religious agencies undoubtedly are aware of the political aspects of the Program, they choose to ignore them so long as they are not involved directly into any political operations, and so long as they are not advised officially of them.

6. Question: Are there any means through which assistance to deserving members of TZOPE (already on the caseloads) can be speeded up?

USEP officials throughout the area are continually endeavoring to speed up Program benefits to the ultimate recipients. This is applicable to the entire caseload of all agencies and has not in the past been predicated upon membership in any organisation which may or may not be of interest to U.S. Government agencies. In this way, USEP endeavors to extend Program benefits to all those eligible without focussing unnecessary attention upon individual members of a particular organisation of interest to agencies of the U.S. Government. Further, USEP

officials ...

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

officials have no way of determining whether an escapee is or is not a member of TZOPS. However, if CAS desires to furnish USEP with a list of TZOPE membership, CPC will request the USEP Divisions in each country to confer eligibility on the individuals listed and to pay particular attention that such individuals may receive personal attention in the future.

7. Question: Is there any possibility of eliminating Tolstoy and AFRF altogether and doing this job through another agency or agencies?

In consideration of this question, USEP has reluctantly decided that it would not be possible to eliminate Tolstoy Foundation, since Tolstoy is an old, established agency with a name known and respected within certain emigre circles. It may be possible, however, for CAS to undertake the elimination, although CAS relationships with TF and its Board of Directors are unknown to this office. Since AFRF is a relatively new organization, and the character of its European leadership is much more undesirable than that of Tolstoy, it is conceivable that AFRF could be eliminated from the Russian field considerably easier than Tolstoy. Moreover, as the Chairman of the Board of the AFRF is a retired U.S. Admiral, he would probably be inclined to go along with the wishes of Government officials if it could be shown that the elimination of AFRF was in the best interest of the U.S. Government. However, the elimination of ethnic type agencies in this respect would, perhaps, compel the Escapee Program to enter into relationships with a religious agency, e.g. the WCC, in their stead and the successful resolution of the Soviet problem would become automatically much more difficult.

8. Question: How does an agency qualify for a USEP contract? What are the requirements for qualification?

USEP currently has contractual arrangements with 22 voluntary societies representing the major religious bodies (i.e. Catholics, Jews, and Protestants) and the major ethnic groups represented in the population of the United States of America. To qualify for a USEP contract the agency, if it is wholly American in composition and incorporated under the laws of one of the 48 States, or the District of Columbia, must be accredited by what was known as the Department of State's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, and which is now a part of FOA. The Executive Director of this Committee is Mr. William H. McCahon, who is also a staff member in the Office of the Assistant Director for Refugees and Migration, FOA. In addition to those agencies which have been incorporated in the U.S., USEP also enters into relationships with other organizations which are international in character and composition -- such as the World Council of Churches, the World

ORT ...

[illegible] Union, the World YMCA, and the Lutheran World Federation. Without exception, these agencies have strong and reputable American affiliates which are accredited and recognised by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. In the case of WCC, the American affiliate is the National Council of the Churches of Christ, whose welfare organisation is the Church World Service; it is accredited by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid and is a member in good standing of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Incorporated. The specific requirements for qualification are not now available; however, it is believed that to be qualified for accreditation by the Advisory Committee, an agency must be supported by voluntary subscriptions, and humanitarian in character. It is believed that agencies wholly political are not eligible.

9. Question: What is the status of the proposal to form a Russian labor company which we understand has been approved in Washington?

General agreement on the formation by USAREUR of a Labor Service Unit comprised of Soviet escapees has been reached by US EUCOM and USAREUR. This project now only awaits final approval from the Department of Army as to certain details. (It is understood that the Army has already agreed to the proposal in principal.) It is anticipated that the project will be implemented in the near future.

The Unit, which will be assigned a guard mission, will comprise initially 100 officers and men. In addition, one man to act as staff adviser to USAREUR on matters affecting the Unit will probably be recruited. This position should have a field grade of perhaps a Lieutenant Colonel. The personnel ceiling of 100 may be raised to 200 should it appear desirable in the light of experience. In order to avoid the appearance of supporting Great Russian or minority national asperations, the shoulder flash for members of the company would bear the name "ROSSISKIY" or Russian People, rather than "RUSSKIY" or Russians.

In the course of a recent discussion between representatives of CAS, U.S. EUCOM, and this office concerning this proposal, general agreement was reached on the following points:

a) Leadership in the company should be recruited from the more recent Soviet escapees or defectors, rather than from the older "emigre" group;

b) Efforts should be made to recruit the maximum possible number from the escapees registered with USEP; and

c) The TSOPE group should be strongly represented in the company.

10. Question: ...

SECRET

10. Question: Have any steps been taken to get the Clemency Board of HICOG to pardon Soviet escapees sentenced for minor offenses committed in an attempt to survive, thus clearing their records? Do you want us to make any pitch on this?

In the past, petitions for clemency have only been presented to the Clemency Board of HICOG when a person was under active consideration for resettlement. The Clemency Board has usually acted swiftly with the best interest of the individual and of the U.S. Government in mind. Recently, however, steps were taken to initiate petitions for clemency on all cases of the types mentioned in Question 10. It is too early at the present time to foresee the result of this operation. However, it is believed that it is not yet necessary for CAS to approach the appropriate officials on this point.

11. Question: Is the USEP policy to reduce the numbers who can be helped under the Program? If true, what are the reasons for this policy which appears on the surface to be a step backward from solving the problem?

It is not the USEP policy to reduce the numbers who can be helped under the Escapee Program. As a matter of fact, the USEP caseload has continued to increase despite the fact that over 6,000 have been resettled, and many have been dropped for various reasons, including ineligibility, local integration, and death. It is true that the primary purpose of the Program is to resettle eligibles abroad and to integrate locally those whose resettlement potential is low. This action, of and in itself, does tend to reduce the number of persons who can be subsequently helped under the Program. It is also the policy of the Program to create an atmosphere in which other programs which depend to a certain extent upon the psychological attitude existing in emigre circles can operate successfully. In furthering this particular objective, the Program has recently taken action to declare as eligible those persons who, although having records as minor criminals, are of interest to U.S. agencies, and have broadened the basis to accept any Soviet citizen as eligible if he has in any way been under discipline of the Soviet Government since January 1, 1945.

12. Question: What has the Escapee Program accomplished for Soviet escapees?

USEP's assistance to escapees is based primarily upon the needs of each individual registered with the Program. These needs are determined through a counselling program under which the voluntary agencies cooperating with USEP are supposed to send case workers to the field to interview each escapee family to determine their particular needs, background, problems, experience, ambitions, and general situation. Based upon this interview the agency is supposed to develop a specific

plan ...

SECRET

plan of assistance for the family with the basic objective being their eventual resettlement in a country of immigration or, if this is not possible, re-establishment within the economy of their present country of residence. Although the Escapee Program Division of the U.S. Operations Mission for Germany has contracts with both Tolstoy Foundation and AFRP to carry out a counselling program for Soviet escapees, and has spent approximately $14,000 on each agency in this connection, to date the agencies have not completely counselled all of their caseloads. Accordingly, it is most difficult to make any kind of analysis of the amount of assistance rendered as compared to the extent of need. On December 7, representatives of both agencies were advised by the Escapee Program Division, that the counselling program must be completed in the near future, and that USEP will be in a much better position to evaluate the program of assistance to Soviet escapees.

Despite the admittedly unsatisfactory situation outlined in the previous paragraph, certain positive action has been taken by the EPD and the voluntary agencies to provide assistance to Soviet escapees. Reportedly, AFRP has distributed in the neighborhood of $13,000 in supplemental assistance in the form of food, clothing, lodging, etc., to escapees registered in their caseload. The Tolstoy Foundation has distributed in the neighborhood of $19,000. In addition, three special housing aid projects have been established in Germany: the Friendship House in Munich with a capacity of 10 persons, and the center in Kaiserslautern, with a capacity of 36 -- both sponsored by AFRP, and the Tolstoy home in Karlsfeld which has a capacity of 80 to 100. A word about each of the following installations:

The Friendship House in Munich is small and is always full. The length of stay varies per individual as its primary purpose is to furnish temporary housing for Russian escapees who come to Munich looking for work. In some cases these periods of residence have dragged out. At this home full care and maintenance is given, as the residents are mostly ineligible for relief grants in Bavaria.

The Karlsfeld house was opened on September 4 and has accepted 26 escapees to date. In addition to the fact that each applicant is screened by the agency and then by a consulate and USEP representative, the admission process is complicated by the need to transfer unemployment and relief benefits from other areas. While this installation is not meant to be a housing project of semi-permanent quarters, the type of aid needed by most persons selected will probably result in a fairly stable population, once the home is filled. The Kaiserslautern home reported, as of November 15:

19 current residents
11 persons moved to private quarters
3 persons moved to Labor Service Units
10 persons returned to former residence
5 dependents placed in jobs
48

All ...

All these people, plus other dependents, passed through the center or were aided by the agency facilities there. (Dependents moved to Kaiserslautern only after private quarters were located.) Of the total, at least forty-three persons had, at one time or another, lived in the house. It must be emphasized that this installation is not regarded as permanent housing but was erected solely to house escapees temporarily for whom jobs had been found and who needed quarters until they could locate permanent billets. Therefore, escapees are referred here only when job opportunities exist and stay only until private housing is located. At one time, consideration was given to filling the house with employment potentials, but the agency demurred for fear the project would be ruined by insoluable morale problems and by the lack of available space to meet quickly employment requirements.

To summarize on the question of "housing projects", and apart from housing in the German economy, installations for special purposes were considered and these three subsidized: (1) the benefits derived from the Friendship House in Munich are being evaluated, and will be discussed at the forthcoming conference; (2) the Karlsfeld House has recently been opened and filling it is being delayed by a rather cumbersome screening process, but a process required to meet our security requirements and the requirements of the Munich Consulate General; and (3) the Kaiserslautern House has been rather effectively used, being limited by the numbers of job opportunities. Until we are convinced, however, that full or almost full benefits are being derived from these homes, USEP is reluctant to establish additional housing projects of a temporary nature and it is contrary to USEP policy to enter into long-term arrangements which would be entailed in provision of permanent housing.

Further, escapees generally are eligible for housing within the German economy. A search for this housing is made among that controlled by the Wohnungsamt or is earmarked in new refugee housing being built. Escapees are being included in a new FOA program of $15 million which is currently being discussed by FOA and the German Federal Republic (see DEPTEL to Bonn USFOTO 453, December 15, 1953.).

Additionally, 30 Soviet children were sent to Switzerland for rehabilitation and a vacation for eight weeks last summer at a cost of $3,987.

(a) Question: How many ex-Soviets have received what assistance and how much for Care & Maintenance?

As pointed out above, the incomplete and unsatisfactory status of the counselling projects of the agencies, plus inadequate or unavailable files, preclude the possibilities of determining how many Soviets have received what assistance and how much for Care & Maintenance.

However, ...

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

Text of January 9, 1955, cable. (Confidential)

"Local Units are advised that effective immed Soviet defectors who escaped since Jan 1, 1945 may be considered eligible for complete program assistance. Units shld complete registration of this group in each area and advise CFC of numbers registered. Every effort shld be made to create maximum program impact on Sov escapees in each area. It is realized that extension of eligibility to this group may cause some repercussion among other nationality groups and the agcies supporting them. It is pointed out however that great majority Sov defectors are eligible under provisions para 6 & 7 of Provisional Guide 01. Moreover Units shld take all feasible measures to minimize repercussions by exercising utmost discretion in implementation of this instruction e.g. by discussing it primarily only with agcies interested in this group."

Text of January 20, 1955, cable: (Confidential)

"Soviet defectors referred to in Frankfurt tel sent Vienna 83, Rome 87, Athens 102, Trieste 39, Istanbul 43, Geneva 21 for Carson shld be generally interpreted as those Sov citizens or Sov Ukranians who left Military or Govt service since Jan 1945, or their dependents (para 6 of Prev Guide #1). Local Units may also extend assistance to such other post Jan 1945 Sov escapees who qualify under Para 7 of Guide #1, excepting hard core DP's or persons who have been in refugee status prior to World War II."

Text of instructions issued to all field units December 1953:

"Regardless of his country of origin, any Iron Curtain escapee who, during the period 1945 to the present time, was voluntarily or forcibly repatriated, but who proceeded no further than the Eastern Zones of Germany or Austria, and was detained in the Eastern Zones of Germany or Austria under the discipline of the Soviet occupation forces or was employed in an official, semi-official, or any other capacity, regardless of the nature of his employment, by or for the Soviet occupation forces, and who subsequently defected, fled, escaped, or otherwise returned to the West, for any reason, should be considered eligible for USEP assistance, provided he is otherwise eligible."

Your attention is again directed to Section 7 of Guide #1 which authorises you to make exceptions in any individual case, regardless of eligibility criteria.

SASID REPRODUCTIONS

1 C.P.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 3 Mar 1954

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comme[redacted] and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer [redacted] before further routing. This Routing and Record [redacted] be returned to Registry [redacted]

[redacted]

FROM: RI/AN

NO. EGQA-36400

DATE 3 [illegible]

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. EE/Reg	2058 J		14 1954	Zj	
2.					
3. SR/3	2044 J	[illegible]	WAE W1	BJ	J.G. pls note
4. SR/PP		13 [illegible]		[illegible]	Suggest we pass to [illegible]. See esp. par 7 of attachment.
5. PP/ICD		30/Mar	31/Mar	[illegible]	
6. SR/PP			13 [illegible]	WJ	Note par 9 — How about a Kubark man to develop this unit? Jgj -
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11. RI/CI					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. RI	1404				

RECLASSIFIED
RI/AN
RI/MIS
RI/FILE

X REF FORM FILED IN: ____________ N 5

5 — 6

PROCESSED THRU RI/CO

See memo comment attached!

1952

ABSTRACT		INDEX	
ENCL			
DATE	9 MAR 1954		

FORM NO. 51-10

SECRET

VIA: ______

DISPATCH NO. EGQA-36400

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

[illegible] 3 1954

TO : Chief EE (Attn: Chief SR) [redacted] DATE:

FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt INFO: CSOB

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AEPAW

SPECIFIC— Assistance to Soviet Escapees Through USEP

RE: EGQA-30972

ROUTING
1 SR/PP/3
2 SR
3 SR/PP/3
4

1. In a recent conversation with Mr. Richard R. Brown, OFCEP, Frankfurt, he read several portions of a letter which he had just received from his Washington headquarters directing some fairly strong criticism to the German country unit in its handling of the program. Needless to say, Brown was considerably upset since it appears that much of the criticism stemmed from KUBARK. It was his impression that our conversations of last November and December and the remedial action taken by OFC at that time relative to the USEP German unit's handling of the Soviet program had indicated his willingness to do anything possible to correct deficiencies and to forestall just such criticism. In paragraph 1 of the reference we indicated that satisfactory answers to our questions had been received. In this connection we enclose as Attachment A a copy of Brown's written answers to our specific questions. (Attachment B is a criteria for USEP assistance.)

2. In regard to the criticism levelled at Brown and the German unit by the former's home office, the following pertinent excerpts were passed to the undersigned:

"At the third meeting a great deal of stress was laid on the question of the special interest cases of other Government agencies. I was able to dwell at some length on the special handling that we have given special interest cases, and to cite chapter and verse of our report to the OCB. Nonetheless, it was felt that we should very greatly intensify our efforts in this respect. It is clearly considered that the disposal of special interest cases on a very high priority basis warrants unusual effort, procedures, and expense on the part of the Program. Both Army and (KUBARK) attach very great importance to this, and deep dissatisfaction was expressed with the manner in which the present procedures are being implemented by the Program. In Germany, specifically, it was felt that the Program has been reluctant to associate itself or its contractors with cases which might present insuperable difficulties in connection with the

DECLASSIFIED

CS/[illegible]

RI/UI3

201-43752

74-126-5-68

FORM 51-28A

SECRET

RI COPY

voluntary agencies, the Program should find other means through other contractors, or through its own offices, of arranging disposal on a top priority basis. It was brought out that the Program was better geared to such an effort than any other U.S. Government program, and that one of the most important yardsticks of its effectiveness must be its capacity to handle this type of case. In brief, the thought was expressed that we had perhaps been inelastic in our approach to this problem and predisposed to keep a simon-pure reputation at all costs.

......"I want to bring out one more point. At two of the three OCB meetings and from numerous other sources here in Washington recently, there has been severe criticism of the manner in which eligibility criteria are being applied by the German country unit. Criticism has been received on three occasions from (KUBARK), and is also included in the State Department report to the OCB group. The charge is made that the German country unit has been 'unnecessarily legalistic', has adopted overly restrictive measures, and has been hyper-technical. The statement was made in the OCB meeting that among the all-important Soviet escapees, cases had been turned down on the grounds of voluntary repatriation even though the escapees never got past Berlin. The statement was also made that among the Soviets, only diplomatic and military defectors had been granted eligibility."

3. We are assured by Brown and other USEP officials that the final charge made above relating to diplomatic and military defectors is entirely erroneous and this refutation is borne out by our own investigation. In the past, eligibility was withheld from certain "voluntary repatriates" who had in fact, got no further than Berlin on the trek back to the USSR and who later returned to West Germany. However, we are assured that this is no longer necessarily true and that each case is judged individually.

4. Finally, the German Mission feels that Brown's flat statement that any or all assistance can be rendered to any escapee without regard to past disqualification, provided KUBARK will designate them to receive such assistance, is evidence of his and his unit's desire to cooperate wholeheartedly. We wish to assure Headquarters that the field is now of the opinion that USEP is making a sincere and energetic effort to carry out a most difficult task. We have no complaints at the present time as to the handling of that part of the program which touches KUBARK interests. It will be appreciated if this can be made clear by the KUBARK official responsible for liaison with the Escapee Program in Washington.

2 att H/w

James N. Marlatt

Dist:
[illegible] SR, w/att (2)
1 - CSOB, w/o att

n/3

2 Mar 54

SECRET

ATTACH. "B"

78

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. 1 July 17, 1952

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

1. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 provides the basic legislative authority for the Escapee Program and thus establishes the elementary criteria for extending assistance.

Section 101 (a)(1) of that Act authorizes the expenditure of a sum not to exceed $100,000,000 "for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, or the Communist dominated or Communist occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes, when it is similarly determined by the President that such assistance will contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area and to the security of the United States".

2. Officials carrying out this program should not become involved in complex, time-consuming procedures in determining priority for assistance. It is expected that a positive approach toward priority will be taken and that criteria will remain as simple and broad as is consistent with U.S. interests. It follows that aid should be given immediately to persons who apparently meet the priority criteria outlined below and should be withdrawn only if reasonable evidence is brought forward which indicates that the person does not meet these criteria.

3. The intent and purpose of the program is to aid new escapees from communist oppression. Whatever the merits of aiding persons who were displaced before, during, or soon after World War II, such aid is not normally a proper concern of this program. Moreover, quite apart from any other considerations, the program does not have sufficient funds to assist many persons other than those who have recently escaped from behind the Iron Curtain. In the foregoing perspective, the following criteria will be utilized by the Missions in according priority for assistance.

4. Priority for assistance in resettlement and for supplementary care will be granted any person who escaped after January 1, 1948 from the USSR, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria or Albania.

5. Within the broad confines of the above, there will be certain persons whom the United States obviously will not desire to assist and there will be others whose status in their country of residence after flight is such that they possess the rights and obligations of nationality of the country in which they have taken asylum.

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

ATT 2 TO EGGA 31100

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. I (cont)

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Assistance will thus be denied to or withdrawn from any person who:

A. Is a Communist agent.
B. Is a former Nazi or Nazi collaborator seeking to escape just punishment for crimes committed during World War II against Allied personnel or against civil populations.
C. Is a common criminal.
D. Has unreasonably refused resettlement opportunities.
E. Is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he resides as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of citizenship of that country e.g. German refugees and expellees, persons of Turkish ethnic origin from Rumania and Bulgaria are excluded from assistance under this paragraph.
F. Has been satisfactorily settled locally.

6. Assistance will be extended, however, to those persons otherwise eligible under the provisions of this circular who defect from diplomatic, other official or semi-official missions or delegations while abroad in the service of their country.

7. Missions are authorized to make individual exceptions, regardless of dateline, when such exceptions are in the interest of the U.S. or when such exceptions are requested by other U.S. Government agencies operating in related fields. When requested exceptions are not favorably considered by the Country Unit they must be referred to the Special Unit prior to final action.

8. A family group containing a person or persons who would not ordinarily be assisted due to nationality, e.g. Polish escapee and Austrian spouse and who are otherwise eligible should be considered eligible as a unit.

9. Basic responsibility for determination of eligibility will rest with the Local Units. However, it is expected that they will devise ways and means of utilising local facilities and officials to a maximum extent in order to assist the Local Unit in discharging this responsibility. In the event the local unit requires further assistance in reaching an eligibility decision, the Special Unit may be called upon by the Local Unit for information or advice.

MICROFILMED
JAN 25 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RESTRICTED - SECURITY INFORMATION

ADDENDUM
To
PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. 1

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Text of tele-conference received from Department July 14, 1952 in amplification of criteria outlined under Provisional Guide #1:

"FEP Program is concerned with escapees from Soviet or Soviet dominated areas. In view fact FEP funds are limited and because of legislative history of program priority or preference must be given to more recent escapees such as those who escaped after January 1, 1948. Decisions as to application of fund must also be based on results which can be achieved in terms of basic objectives of program. In other words we are not distributing a limited relief fund equally among a designated number of people. We are more concerned with those who have escaped more recently than those who have been in the refugee state since World War I or those who were uprooted between September 1939 and January 1, 1948. The date January 1, 1948 is an administrative device which should not be rigidly applied unless later exhaustion of funds increasingly requires this action. Of equal concern to FEP are the results which can be achieved in terms of reestablishment, resettlement, better morale, etc., as between one project and another. We should seek self-liquidating, non-repetitive uses for FEP funds. Avoid to the extent possible acceptance of responsibilities which cannot readily be relinquished. As experience develops we shall make the foregoing more selective and specific.

RESTRICTED

Amendment No. 1

to

Provisional Guide No. I. (Cont)

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Sub paragraph E of unnumbered paragraph following paragraph five of Provisional Guide No. 1 is amended to read:

"E. Is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he resides or other country outside of the area of Soviet domination as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of citizenship of that country e.g. German refugees and expellees, persons of Turkish ethnic origin from Rumania and Bulgaria are excluded from assistance under this paragraph."

SECRET

A000-55-61

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE & RELIEF COMMITTEE

STATUS:

#2 jacket contains miscellaneous correspondence for 1949-1952 [redacted]

#3 jacket contains reports & Process Sheets for 1950-

SECRET
(When Filled In)

F-55

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE - ORGANIZATION INFORMATION SHEET

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF ORGANIZATION (If a Subsidiary or Component Indicate also the Name and Address of the Parent Organization)

International Rescue Committee, Inc 5-5564 06
386 Park Avenue
New York, New York

2. LIST YOUR PRINCIPAL CONTACTS, THEIR POSITIONS, DEGREE OF COOPERATION, SECURITY STATUS, ETC.

Charles Sternberg, Executive Director, very cooperative. Subject is in charge of the New York Office. Sternberg was Approved/SECRET in May 1971. (W. Freund of the NY Office has been in touch with subject for many years.)

Leo Cherne, Chairman. We have been in touch with Leo Cherne, but not in regard to IRC. Cherne is Executive Director of the Research Institute of America, Inc., 589 Fifth Avenue, New York, and was placed in Approved category in June 1967.

Mrs. Mary P. Lord, President, very cooperative, Approved/SECRET. She has provided valuable FPI regarding developments in Bangladesh where IRC is actively involved in relief operations.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

3. SUMMARIZE YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE VALUE OF THE ORGANIZATION AS A SOURCE OF FPI. INCLUDE THE TYPE OF BUSINESS (Sales, Research etc.) IN WHICH THE ORGANIZATION IS ENGAGED. THE SUBJECT AND COUNTRIES (or Areas) IT INVOLVES, AND ANY RESTRICTIONS ENCOUNTERED WITH REGARD TO ACCESS TO SOURCES (e.g., Through what method is policy toward our mission established within the organization)

This organization is not a source of FPI. It helps new immigrants to settle in the US. It is of value to us by helping us to locate East European and Soviet immigrants wanted for debriefing.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

4. RECEPTIVITY TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. LIST ANY INFLUENCING FACTORS (Restrictions, Policies, etc.)

Sternberg is likely to be receptive to operational requirements, but may not have the authority to commit the organization.

Mrs. Lord would probably be receptive to any reasonable operational requirements which would not jeopardize IRC's good name overseas. She has already been accused in "Communist New Age" of being a CIA operative.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

FIELD OFFICE NYFO	C/S Graber:dh	DATE 30 May 1973

FORM 12-67 2482a

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(11)

F-55-64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE - ORGANIZATION INFORMATION SHEET

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF ORGANIZATION (if a Subsidiary or Component Indicate also the Name and Address of the Parent Organization)

International Rescue Committee Inc.
386 Park Avenue
New York, New York

55564 OK

2. LIST YOUR PRINCIPAL CONTACTS, THEIR POSITIONS, DEGREE OF COOPERATION, SECURITY STATUS, ETC.

Charles Sternberg, Chief of Office in New York A87027
Very cooperative.
Approved SECRET in May 1971.

(Walter Freund of the New York Office has been a long-time contact of Charles Sternberg.)

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

3. SUMMARIZE YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE VALUE OF THE ORGANIZATION AS A SOURCE OF FPI. INCLUDE THE TYPE OF BUSINESS (sales, Research etc.) IN WHICH THE ORGANIZATION IS ENGAGED, THE SUBJECT AND COUNTRIES (or Areas) IT INVOLVES, AND ANY RESTRICTIONS ENCOUNTERED WITH REGARD TO ACCESS TO SOURCES (e.g., Through what method is policy toward our mission established within the organization)

The Organization has no value as a source of FPI. It helps new immigrants to settle in the U.S.
It is of value to us by helping us to locate East European immigrants wanted for debriefing.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

4. RECEPTIVITY TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. LIST ANY INFLUENCING FACTORS (Restrictions, Policies, etc.)

Sternberg is likely to be receptive to operational requirements, but may not have the authority to commit the organization.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

FIELD OFFICE New York	C/S Norman N. Graber/ewk	DATE 6 March 1972

SECRET

F. 5564

Chief, New York Office

4 August 1964

CASE

[illegible]

New Case #4048
Photos of Zanzibar

A 99520

1. [illegible] Mr. Gilbert Jonas [illegible]

2. [illegible]

Harold L. Oram Inc. A 33841

[illegible]

3. [illegible]

International Rescue and Relief Committee

5564

[illegible]

4. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Copies filed In A 33841 + 95520

/ 5564

RR ESG

DE ESE 134 24/1516Z

R 241500Z ZEA

BT

XXXXX ZEA

ZERO SIX FOUR NYOR

SEP 20 2 1 PM '62

S E C R E T TDTG 241500Z

NYOR CITE WA 61404

FROM ALIEN BRANCH (SIVESS)

116139 ~~5564~~

SUBJECT: CASE 41619 - JAROSLAV KREMEL

1. CASE NUMBER 41619 HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO THIS CASE.

2. NAGLE WAS MET AT AN ARRANGED RENDEZVOUS WITH NOT INCIDENT AND SUBJECT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSPORTED TO OUR FACILITY.

3. ARRANGEMENTS ARE UNDERWAY FOR SUBJECT TO UNDERGO A THORO GOING OVER. HE APPEARS PLEASANT AND OFFERS COOPERATION, SO AT THE MOMENT NO DIFFICULTIES ARE ANTICIPATED.

4 25[illegible]3

4. WE WOULD APPRECIATE THE I&NS TRANSCRIPT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

5. WE CANNOT VENTURE A DEPARTURE DATE. PLEASE ADVISE IF THERE IS NEED FOR HIS PRESENCE IN NEW YORK AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME.

6. THE INTERESTED PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT SUBJECT IS HERE TEMPORARILY, AND THAT IN DUE COURSE HE WILL BE RETURNED TO HIS SPONSORS, THE IRC. 5-5564

7. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY PERTINENT FACTS CONCERNING SUBJECT.

S E C R E T

CFN 61404 SIVESS 41619 JAROSLAV KREMEL 41619 NAGLE NOT INCIDENT A THORO NO DIFFICULTIES I&NS CANNOT VENTURE A NEW YORK IRC

BT

5564

[illegible] ESE

DE [illegible] 164 23/1955Z

P 231955Z ZEA

BT

XXXXX ZEA

CONFIDENTIAL TOTG 231955Z

[illegible] CITE [illegible] 2571

ALIEN ([illegible]) FROM [illegible]

A# 116139 ~~[illegible]~~

CASE 41,612 - JAROSLAV KRENEL

1. FROM SWORN STATEMENT TAKEN BY INS (ORIGINAL UNCLASSIFIED), USING INTERPRETER FOR GERMAN (NOT CZECH), SOME PERTINENT FACTS:

2. DR. JAROSLAV KRENEL, BORN 29 APRIL 1926 IN OSTRAVA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA; WIFE ZDENA NEE PUSCHEROVA; MARRIED 23 JULY 1955; ONE DAUGHTER, 2-1/2 YEARS; FATHER (DENTIST), DR. LUDVIK KRENEL; MOTHER MARIE NEE HRUBA; ALL RESIDING OSTRAVA, ZBOROVSKA 22. SISTER, MILENA KRENLOVA, SAME ADDRESS. NO RELATIVES IN FREE WORLD.

3. AT HOSPITAL OF STEEL AND IRON WORKS, VITKOVICE, OSTRAVA, WAS CHIEF ANESTHETIST, HAD NO STAFF. GAVE INSTRUCTION WHEREVER ANESTHESIA USED, WHETHER IN DEPARTMENT GYNECOLOGY, NOSE AND THROAT, OR OTHER. ANESTHESIA NOT SO WELL DEVELOPED CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS U.S., OFTEN ADMINISTERED BY NURSES RATHER THAN M.D. TOOK STATE EXAMINATION IN SURGERY JUNE 1956; STATE EXAMINATION IN ANESTHESIA FEBRUARY 1952. AFTER RECEIVING DEGREE MEDICINE AT CHARLES UNIVERSITY 1951, WAS CITY HOSPITAL OSTRAVA NO. 1 AS INTERN 1951-52, CAME TO PLANT HOSPITAL 1952, WHERE HE WAS RESIDENT; SURGEON OF FIRST DEGREE 1956-59; ANESTHETIST AT SECOND DEGREE AFTER 1959

4. SUBJECT [illegible] [illegible] COMMUNIST OR [illegible] PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, [illegible] [illegible] BECAUSE, [illegible] SCIENCE, WAS OPEN FOR NON-COMMUNISTS. TEN YEARS AGO, [illegible] ALSO FACED SOME [illegible] OF [illegible] [illegible].

5. TRANSCRIPT CONTAINS MANY USEFUL LEADS CONCERNING A FEW DOCUMENTS SUBJECT HAS (IDD), FATHER-IN-LAW (RETIRED CHIEF OF POLICE, OSTRAVA, DEDICATED COMMUNIST), ETC. DETAILS OF APPROACH TO "FRIENDS" IN NEW YORK ARE GIVEN. FRIEND IS PETER DANES, 2 HORATIO STREET, NEW YORK 14, N.Y. DANES EMIGRATED FROM CZECHO ABOUT 1945; SUBJECT WAS FRIENDLY WITH BROTHER OF DANES WHOSE NAME IS PAVEL TRENSKY (SIC), INSTRUCTOR OF SLAVONIC LITERATURE AT UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, WHO EMIGRATED MORE RECENTLY. MOTIVATION FOR DEFECTION EXPLAINED AS COMING FROM DARKNESS INTO LIGHT. FEELING TOWARD FAMILY NOT EXPLAINED IN ANY WAY.

52837

51399

Charles 55564

6. [illegible] OF IDD UNDOUBTEDLY CAN SUPPLY USEFUL BACKGROUND. WHAT MORE DO YOU NEED THIS POINT?

87607

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CEN PRITY [illegible] 0870 GIVES [illegible] AI 619 JAROSLAV KREMEL
IENS UNCLASSIFIED NOT CZECH DR JAROSLAV KREMEL 23 APRIL 1926
OSTRAVA ZDENA NEE PURCHERTOVA 23 JULY 1935 2-1/2 DR LUDVIK KREMEL
MARIE NEE MORAVSKA OSTRAVA ZABROVSKA 22 MILENA KREMLOVA
NO ADDRESS NO RELATIVES VITKOVICE NO STAFF NOT ED U S M D 1956
FEBRUARY 1952 CHARLES UNIVERSITY 1951 NO. 1 1951-52 1952 1956-59
1959 NEVER COMMUNIST NON-COMMUNISTS TEN ETC NEW YORK PETER DANES
2 HORATIO STREET 14 N Y CZECHO 1945 PAVEL TRENSKY SIC SLAVONIC
UNIVERSITY ILLINOIS NOT EXPLAINED STEPHENS IDD POINT?
BT

3C

Copy 87607
52837
1399

12/11/63

5564

CASE

10 July 63

Chief, Contact Division (FT/P Branch)

VIA : Chief, Houston Office
Resident Agent, Dallas

A-109939

Case 4 151 - Hong Kong Parolee Chu (Lee) Wong York Ling
(A-13-195-221)

REF : Headquarters Memorandum 7 June 63

1. The local office of the I&NS requested the file of Mrs. Chu from the Boston Office. This revealed the previously unreported information that Mrs. Chu's husband died in Hong Kong in 1958 where he had worked as Manager of the Pin Chong Food Company. The file further revealed that Mrs. Chu had come to the US under the auspices of the International Rescue Committee and was being sponsored by Manning [illegible] of 5131 Edmondson, Dallas, Texas.

5-5564

Use S-109939

2. Mrs. Chu was contacted at 4321 Travis Street where she is living with her six children. She corroborated much of the information contained in her I&NS file and advised that she was not in contact with anyone on the mainland of China but occasionally heard from friends in Hong Kong. She is looking for work and hopes to find a job as a waitress or possibly a filing clerk. She stated that she had left the mainland in 1949 and had no recent information on conditions in Communist China. Since her potential appeared extremely limited, she was not questioned on the checklist guides and it is suggested that this case be closed.

J. WALTON MOORE

JWM/rm

Copy filed in file #109939.

XXXXX ZEA

F-5564

SECRET TDTS 121640Z

DA CITE NYOP 8745

SUPPORT (STUNTS) FROM ELLIFF

GROUP ONE EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

CASE 35654 WILLIAM DONALD HARRIS 2/6/17

1. WE SPOKE BRIEFLY WITH HARRIS ON MONDAY, 8 APRIL. HE HAS MADE SEVERAL TRIPS TO CUBA, THE LATEST IN JANUARY 1963 FOR TWO WEEKS. HE VISITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE AREA WEST OF HAVANA. HIS OFFICIAL TITLE IS DIRECTOR, HISPANO-AMERICAN DEPARTMENT, BOARD OF NATIONAL MISSIONS (THE PRESBETRIAN WORK IN CUBA IS ADMINISTRATIVELY A PART OF THE NEW JERSEY PRESBYTERY). HE TOLD US THAT HE HAD COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, ENCOUNTERED NO DIFFICULTY ANYWHERE AND WAS NEVER STOPPED OR QUESTIONED BY THE AUTHORITIES. HE SAID HE WAS OFTEN TAKEN FOR A SOVIET OR EASTERN EUROPEAN, PROBABLY BECAUSE NO ONE EXPECTED TO SEE AN AMERICAN.

2. HIS PLANS FOR FUTURE VISITS TO CUBA ARE A BIT INDEFINITE. HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE NEXT VISIT WITH SEVERAL OTHER CHURCHMEN FROM OTHER DENOMINATIONS. THERE IS AN INTERDENOMINATIONAL SEMINARY AT MATANZAS, WHICH HAS MANY PROBLEMS THAT NEED TO BE DISCUSSED. THE SEMINARY WOULD PLAN A BOARD MEETING TO COINCIDE WITH THE VISIT OF THESE PEOPLE WHO ARE ON THE BOARD. THE GROUP THAT WOULD GO INCLUDES DR. 32-7-7-23 S-1327 STOCKWELL (METHODIST) BISHOP JOHN BENTLEY (EPISCOPAL), DR. LARSEN (BAPTIST) AND DR. F-5564 JOHN SINCLAIR (PRESBYTERIAN). THE ONLY MEMBER OF THIS GROUP KNOWN TO US IS BISHOP BENTLEY WHO HAS BEEN AN EXTREMELY COOPERATIVE CONTACT OF THIS OFFICE. THIS TRIP HOPEFULLY WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE BUT THERE ARE NO DEFINITE PLANS AT THIS TIME.

3. HARRIS HAD A PROBLEM HE THOUGHT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP WITH. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED PRES~~BYTERIAN~~ CHURCH IS TO TAKE

PLACE IN DES MOINES, IOWA FROM 15-[illegible] MAY. THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE DELEGATES FROM CUBA ATTEND, BUT THEY HAVE HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN GETTING THE NECESSARY PAPERS. THE ONLY POSSIBILITY SEEMS TO BE FOR THE DELEGATES TO GET THEMSELVES TO MEXICO CITY AND TAKE A CHANCE THAT THE US EMBASSY THERE WILL GRANT THEM PERMISSION TO COME INTO THE COUNTRY. THE NAMES OF THE PROPOSED DELEGATES ARE SERGIO MANEJIAS, PASTOR OF THE CHURCH IN CARDENAS, AND HIS WIFE, PRESIDENT OF THE PRESBYTERIAN WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION IN CARDENAS; ALSO DR. RENE CASTELLANOS, A LAYMAN FROM CARDENAS AND A FORMER UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR.

4. ON THE BASIS OF OUR RATHER SHORT VISIT WE CANNOT MAKE MUCH OF AN ASSESSMENT OF HARRIS. HE WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL, ENTIRELY SYMPATHETIC WITH OUR INTERESTS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME WANTING TO BE ASSURED THAT HIS CONTACT WITH US WOULD NOT BECOME KNOWN. HE SAID THAT NATURALLY MANY PEOPLE ASSUMED HE WAS CONNECTED WITH THE CIA BUT THAT IF THERE WERE ANY BASIS IN FACT FOR THIS ASSUMPTION HIS USEFULNESS WOULD BE AT AN END. THIS WOULD LEAD US TO THINK THAT HE WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO DO ANYTHING ON OUR BEHALF DURING FUTURE TRIPS TO CUBA. WE ALSO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS ENOUGH OF A REALIST THAT HE WOULD NOT BE UNDULY UPSET BY THE REQUEST AND THAT HE WOULD GIVE IT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. WHETHER HE WOULD BE MORE AMENABLE IF SOMETHING COULD BE DONE TO ENABLE THE CUBANS MENTIONED ABOVE TO COME TO DES MOINES, WE DON'T KNOW. WE THINK HE WOULD TURN DOWN ANY REQUEST TO HELP DURING HIS NEXT TRIP SINCE IT WOULD BE MADE IN THE COMPANY OF OTHER CHURCH PEOPLE.

5. WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT TO TALK WITH HARRIS AT GREAT LENGTH. COULD YOU GIVE US ANY IDEA OF WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES ARE OF HELPING HIS CUBAN FRIENDS AND WE COULD THEN TRANSMIT THAT INFORMATION TO HIM AT THAT TIME. THANK YOU.

SECRET

CFN NYOR 3748 STUNTZ ELLIFF 39654 WILLIAM DONALD HARRIS HARRIS MONDAY 8 APRIL JANUARY 1963 WEST HAVANA DIRECTOR, HISPANO-AMERICAN DEPARTMENT, BOARD OF NATIONAL MISSIONS A NEW JERSEY PRESBYTERY NO DIFFICULTY NEVER STOPPED A SOVIET EASTERN EUROPEAN NO ONE A INDEFINITE. HE MATANZAS A DR. STOCKWELL (METHODIST) JOHN BENTLEY (EPISCOPAL) DR. LARSEN (BAPTIST) DR. JOHN SINCLAIR (PRESBYTERIAN) BENTLEY NO DEFINITE HARRIS A GENERAL ASSEMBLY DES MOINES IOWA [illegible] MAY MEXICO CITY

F 5564

CONFIDENTIAL

A [illegible]

Chief, New York Field Office

CASE

[illegible] 1963

Chief, Contact Division (FE/P Branch)

37581 [illegible] 108779

A108779

New Case [illegible] — Thomas Ching Lee [illegible]/Thomas Li Ch[illegible]

[illegible] : Case 33,162

1. Subject case is opened for the exploitation of Thomas Ching Lee aka Thomas Li Ching-lun, a Chinese [illegible] who arrived in the US from Hong Kong in February 19[illegible] under President Kennedy's Emergency Program. Mr. Lee [illegible] 5,000th Chinese refugee to come to the US and is [illegible] by his wife and seven children.

5-5564

2. His contact is the Resettlement Department [illegible] International Rescue Committee, c/o [illegible] Park Avenue, [illegible], New York 16, New York.

3. Mr. Lee's arrival was given great publicity [illegible] San Francisco and New York Chinese communities. [illegible] formally welcomed at a dinner given shortly after [illegible] arrival in New York City by Mr. N. C. Lee, publisher of [illegible] Journal.

S108779

4. We have submitted namecheck and approval [illegible] forwarded when received from security.

5. Suggest using the Checklist for Initial [illegible]. According to the Chinese newspapers Lee was graduated [illegible] the Tientsin-Tsinghua College but did not state what field he specialized in. After checking the Fuller files [illegible] New York FO, it may be possible to further determine [illegible] potentials.

E. H. ASHCRAFT

DM:jed

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Case
1 - FE/P Chrono
1 - Index
1 - [illegible]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 5564

APR 13 9 37 AM '62

XXXXX 7EA

096 NYOR

SECRET

NYOR CITE VA 55582

MAJOR FROM SUPPORT (TRAVIS)

CASE 37473 55564

REUR NYOR 6069 AND INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE.

THE SWEDISH DESK WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO HAVE BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON BARBARA LISINSKI, THE SWEDISH GIRL WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE IRC OFFICE IN STOCKHOLM. 5564

COULD YOU PLEASE OBTAIN FROM IRC AS THE STATION MAY BE INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH HER. THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET

CFN VA 55582 MAJOR TRAVIS 37473 REUR NYOR 6069 SWEDISH BARBARA LISINSKI IRC STOCKHOLM IRC

BT

13/1435Z

XXXXX 7EA

096 NYOR

SECRET

NYOR CITE VA 55582

MAJOR FROM SUPPORT (TRAVIS)

CASE 37473

APR 13 9 37 AM '62

REUR NYOR 6069 AND INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE.

THE SWEDISH DESK WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO HAVE BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON BARBARA LISINSKI, THE SWEDISH GIRL WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE IRC OFFICE IN STOCKHOLM.

COULD YOU PLEASE OBTAIN FROM IRC AS THE STATION MAY BE INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH HER. THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET

CFN VA 55582 MAJOR TRAVIS 37473 REUR NYOR 6069 SWEDISH BARBARA LISINSKI

IRC STOCKHOLM IRC

ET

13/1435Z

1-5564

XXXXX 7EA

SECRET

WA CITE NYOR 5801

SUPPORT (TRAVIS) FROM MAJOR

CASE 37473

5-5564

OO-S-5564

SUBJECT - IRC REPRESENTATIVE IN SWEDEN

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE DOES NOT HAVE A PERMANENT RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE IN SWEDEN. DR. RADE KORACEX HAS REPRESENTED THEM THERE FOR THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF BUT DOES NOT LIVE THERE AND TRAVELS IN OUT AS REQUIRED. THE DR. IS A FORMER JUGOSLAV WHO HAS A PHD FROM ONE OF THE MID-WESTERN UNIVERSITIES. WE ARE OBTAINING FURTHER BIO INFORMATION AND WILL FORWARD. SINCE HE HAS BEEN REPRESENTING IRC FOR THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF HE IS FAR FROM NEW. WILL YOU PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS IS THE RIGHT PERSON. OUR CONTACT AT IRC KNOWS OF NO CHANGE TO TAKE PLACE. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN NYOR 5801 (TRAVIS) MAJOR 37473 IRC SWEDEN INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE NOT HAVE A DR. RADE KORACEK A NOT LIVE DR. A JUGOSLAV PHD BIO IRC A IRC NO CHANGE 37473

INITIALS

FLEX CHECKED

PROCESSED

F 5564

SEC

CASE

NOV 21 12 17 PM

VA CITE NYOR 4652

SUFFORT (CONNELL) FROM MAJOR

F 5564

CASE 28972 Y 28972

SUBJECT - MAREK HLASKO Y MAREK HLASKO TRIP SPONSORED BY INTERNATIONAL
RESCUE COMMITTEE.

S/18471

THROUGH MR. CHARLES STERNBERG Y CHARLES STERNBERG OF IRC Y IRC WE
HAVE LEARNED THAT THE MAN WHO WILL HAVE MOST TO DO WITH SUBJECT
WHILE HE IS IN THIS COUNTRY IS THE SECRETARY, A MR. MCALLISTER Y
MCALLISTER. SUBJECT WILL NOT X NOT BE ARRIVING THIS COUNTRY AS PLANNED
SINCE HE HAS BEEN ILL IN BERLIN Y BERLIN. HE WILL NOT Y NOT ATTEND
THE DINNER ON 25 NOV Y 25 NOV AND IF HE DOES COME, AND THIS HAS NOT X
NOT BEEN FIRMED UP, HE WILL BE COMING SOMETIME IN JANUARY 59 Y
JANUARY 59 FOR THE OPENING OF THE FILM BASED ON ONE OF HIS BOOKS.
INDIRECTLY WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THERE MAY BE SOME QUESTION
AS TO WHETHER THE FILM WILL ACTUALLY DISTRIBUTED IN THIS COUNTRY ON
ACCOUNT OF CENSORSHIP. EVIDENTLY IT IS LOADED WITH EROTICISM TO THE
POINT WHERE A BB FILM Y BB FILM WOULD LOOK LIKE A SUNDAY SCHOOL PICNIC.

S-5564

FILE - INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

Copy filed # 18471

SEC 6CV

CASE

NYCR CITE WA 37604

France

FROM SUPPORT (CONNELL)

58 NOV 2[illegible] 8 AM

THIS IS NEW CASE 28972 Y 28972

usc 5-5564

POLISH DESK IS REQUESTOR OF FOLLOWING: MAREK HLASKO Y MAREK HLASKO THE POLISH POET WHO DEFECTED TO WEST GERMANY LAST SPRING IS COMING TO THE US X US ON A VISITORS VISA AT THE INVITATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE S 5564 TO ATTEND AN IRC Y IRC DINNER ON 25 X 25 NOV. IT IS NOT X NOT KNOWN HOW LONG HE WILL STAY HERE BUT WHILE VISITING, HE WILL PRESUMABLY ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH E. P. DUTTON Y E. P. DUTTON, PUBLISHERS, WHO HAVE ALREADY PUBLISHED SOME OF HIS WORK. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF DD/P X DD/P INTEREST IN HLASKO, THEY HAVE BEEN IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH HIM IN BERLIN AND HE HAS REQUESTED AN "ADVISOR" WHILE HERE TO KEEP HIM OUT OF TROUBLE. (ON THE BASIS OF HIS REPUTATION THIS COULD BE EITHER VERBAL INDISCRECTION, DRUNKEDNESS OR TROUBLE WITH THE LADIES).

usc S-5552

HE WILL BE TOLD THAT HE WILL NOT BE GIVEN AN ADVISOR BUT THE POLISH DESK WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD CONTACT THE IRC Y IRC AND DETERMINE WHO WILL BE KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING HIS BEHAVIOR AND HIS WHEREABOUTS. THEN IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT IF ANYTHING DOES GO WRONG, WE WILL LEARN OF IT QUICKLY. ALSO, YOU CAN CALL EVERY WEEK OR SO TO SEE HOW THINGS ARE GOING.

NATURALLY IRC Y IRC SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE ABOVE. WE THINK YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE A NATURAL INTEREST IN HIS WELFARE WHILE HERE. PLEASE ADVISE WHOM YOU SEE. THANKS.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

F 5564

Acting Chief, Security Division, I&SO 13 April 1953

Chief, Contact Division, CO

~~[illegible]~~ ms-5-5564

WASSILIEW, Gisela - Concern About Physical Security Of

1. Enclosed is a copy of letter written by the subject which was transmitted by Mr. Abram J. Becker, (EE-8[illegible]-A) executive director of the International Rescue Committee, to a representative of this Division.

2. Subject has been the director of the Berlin office of the IRC for approximately three years. As you know, the IRC has been prominent for aid given to West Berlin and is currently in the midst of a campaign for aid to refugees arriving there in increasing numbers from the East. In her letter subject reports alleged attempts on the part of "the East" to kidnap her. In view of her activities and her connection with Rainer Hildebrandt's Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, Mr. Becker believes there may be some basis for her fears. He said he knows subject as a calm person not given to hysterics; he is therefore, concerned about subject's safety.

3. This information has been transmitted to Staff C, FI, for action.

4. Any inquiry concerning this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia L. Thorne, Extension 2202.

Security

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Enclosure

VThorne:ble

SECRET

alien C
247

SECRET
Security Information

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNM

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Chief, Index Branch (Thorne)
FROM : Chief, Pittsburgh Office

DATE: 11 Aug 52
[illegible] 52-698

SUBJECT: Case 10978 - Source Leads from [illegible] Files

REF : TWX WA-8910

1. The full names of aliens mentioned in our Memo of 1 Aug 52, [illegible] 52-672, are:

Tadeusz [illegible]
Tadeusz [illegible]
Josef [illegible]

2. Full names and biographic information concerning these men are contained in memo dated 18 Jul 52, Case 10978, by J S Littleford.

for B.K. Stewart Jr.
CHARLES B [illegible], JR

ND/aac

SECRET
Security Information

11 Aug 52
NY 52-698

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Chief, Index Branch (Thorne)
Chief, Pittsburgh Office

Case 10978 - Source Leads from IBC Files

REF : TTY WA-8910

1. The full names of aliens mentioned in our Memo of 1 Aug 52, NY 52-672, are:

Tadeusz Kmiecik
Tadeusz Kotas
Josef Loposzko

2. Full names and biographic information concerning these men are contained in memo dated 18 Jul 52, Case 10978, by J S. Littleford.

CHARLES B KAUFMANN, JR

ND/eac

SECRET
Security Information

INDEX
SECURITY

7 August 1952

W

x

VThorne:jmm

2202

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PITTSBURGH

TO KAUFMANN FROM ASHCRAFT BY INDEX (THORNE) WA______ CK NR______

REUR MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST, HP 52-672, ADDRESSED TO MR. CZAJKOWSKI, ALIEN BRANCH, RE CONTACT OF ALIENS KMIECIK, KOTAS AND LOPOSZKO, PLEASE FORWARD FULL NAMES FOR FILING PURPOSES.

IT WILL BE APPRECIATED IF, IN THE FUTURE, YOU WILL FORWARD NOTIFICATION OF CONTACT OF ALIENS PRIOR TO CLEARANCE TO INDEX. THANK YOU.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEX
SECURITY

7 August 1952

W

VThorne:jm 2202

CONFIDENTIAL

PITTSBURGH

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

TO KAUFMANN FROM ASHCRAFT BY INDEX (THORNE) WA_______ CK NR_______

REUR MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST, NF 52-672, ADDRESSED TO MR. CZAJKOWSKI, ALIEN BRANCH, RE CONTACT OF ALIENS KMIECIK, KOTAS AND LOPOSZKO, PLEASE FORWARD FULL NAMES FOR FILING PURPOSES.

IT WILL BE APPRECIATED IF, IN THE FUTURE, YOU WILL FORWARD NOTIFICATION OF CONTACT OF ALIENS PRIOR TO CLEARANCE TO INDEX. THANK YOU.

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

Alien Contact
24963

SECRET
Security Information

1 Aug 52
NF 52-672

ATTN :
Chief, Contact Division
Anthony F Czajkowski
Chief, Pittsburgh Office

Case 10978 - Source Leads from IRC Files

1. Contact with Hniecik, Kotas, and Loposzko on 31 Jul 52 indicates low foreign intelligence potential. They have been away from Poland for about ten years and get no pertinent information in letters from relatives remaining in Poland. They are better acquainted with persons and conditions around Bologna, Italy.

2. They are cooperative, but unless you have reason to believe that worthwhile requirements might result from a request, we do not intend to send in name checks.

CHARLES B KAUFMANN, JR

ND/eac

SECRET
Security Information

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

Alien
Contact
~~[illegible]~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

F [illegible] 64

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn. : Index
FROM : Chief, Detroit Office

DATE: 5 August 1952

SUBJECT: Visit to Alien: FRANK HARASIN - Polish National

1. Mr. Harasin was interviewed on 1 August at his place of business, The Pioneer Coffee Company, where he is employed as a business administrator. He is presently residing at 5334 McDougall, Detroit 11, Michigan.

2. Subject was born 1 December 1894 in Goczalkowice, Poland.

1923-28	Polish Ministry of Commerce, Warsaw, Poland. Civil servant.
1928-34	Managed own firm in the corn and food trade. This was a very small concern.
1934-39	Silesian Steel Foundries & Mills (Pilsudski Foundry), located in Chorzow, Poland (formerly Koenigshutte, Poland).
1939-45	Polish Army - Mr. Harasin was taken a prisoner of war by the Germans. He escaped and joined the Polish Army in exile. His family disappeared during the war. His son is believed to be held in a Russian concentration camp, if he is still alive.
1945-48	Resettlement and Welfare Officer, UNRRA and IRO, Germany and East Africa. While serving in this capacity, Mr. Harasin travelled in the East African region of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya. His purpose was to resettle Polish refugees in camps in these areas. Subject knows this area well and could answer specific questions regarding roads, airdromes, settlements and cities.
1948-51	Social work in England

24 July 1952 - Entered the US at New York City.

3. As a reserve captain in the Polish Army, Mr. Harasin worked for the Ministry of Reconstruction of Administration, Polish Government in exile. He explained his duties as consisting of assisting in the complete administration and reconstruction, and helping to place Polish nationals in jobs to which they would be best suited.

4. Harasin's wife refused to leave Poland with her husband and she is still residing there. He has not corresponded with her since 1945. He does, however, conduct a correspondence with cousins living in Chorzow and other cities in Silesian part of Poland. He received a letter from one of his cousins three months ago, but said that it contained only family information. He will gladly turn over all future letters, if so desired.

Wallace W. Konicki
fo PAUL W. ICKE

WWKonicki:jd

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

Alien Contact
24763

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

5-5-74

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn. : Index
FROM : Chief, Detroit Office

DATE: 5 August 1952

SUBJECT: Visit to Alien: Joachim KOWATSCHEFF - Bulgarian National

1. Mr. Kowatscheff was interviewed on 1 August 1952 at his place of employment, Syrne Doors Company, where he is working as a draftsman. He is presently residing at 1761 Seward Street, Apt. 105, Detroit 6, Michigan.

2. Subject was born 4 April 1923 in Nasalewzie, Bulgaria.

1939- 1940	Worked in an airplane factory in Sofia, Bulgaria, as an apprentice engineer.
1940- 1941	National Bulgarian Airplane Mfg. Plant, as an apprentice engineer.
1941 (8 mos.)	Attended a technical high school in Budapest, Hungary.
Dec 41 - Sep 44	Attended a technical university in Berlin, Germany, studying engineering and mechanics.
Sep 1944	Arrested by the Gestapo for refusing to enter military service. Was released in May 1945.
May 45 - 1948	US Military Police, Berlin Germany - Interpreter
1948 - Oct 51	US CID Div. of CIC - Subject was an investigator, and while serving in this capacity, he had the opportunity to interrogate about twelve Bulgarian delegates to the World ~~Peoples~~ Peace Conference held in the Soviet Zone of Berlin. He said he induced six of these delegates to escape, and they are still residing in Berlin. Their names and addresses may be obtained if so desired.
12 November 1951	- Arrived in New York City aboard the SS General Sturgis
Dec 1951-20 Jan 51	Turchon Follower Machine Co., Detroit, Michigan, as a draftsman.

3. Mr. Kowatscheff believes himself to be qualified to answer specific questions on certain Bulgarian economics and minor political questions. He could also describe in detail the city of Nasalweizie, Bulgaria, which is on the Yugoslavian border.

4. Subject conducts frequent correspondence with his family in Bulgaria through sources in the western and eastern zones of Berlin. The source in the Soviet zone is Mr. Kowatscheff's mother-in-law, from whom he last received a letter three months ago. He said it contained a description of the deplorable living conditions, but nothing else. He will turn over all future letters from Sov Zone of Berlin and Bulgaria for our scrutiny and retention.

5. We are submitting a name check for subject with the hope that requirements will be forthcoming based on the contents of this memo.

for Wallace W. Konicki
PAUL W. ICKE

WWKonicki:jd

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch [illegible]
DATE: 23 December 1957

FROM : Chief, New York Office

SUBJECT: Possible Covert [illegible]
REFERENCE : NY[illegible] 647 dated [illegible]

1. On 6 December 1957, [illegible], as a representative of the International Rescue Committee, talked with [illegible] Gailis, a Latvian now residing in London, who expressed the desire to [illegible] the Soviet Union to undertake anti-Communistic activity. Gailis came to the United States with two purposes in mind. He wanted to meet and receive financial backing for a net organization [illegible], which he and a friend developed. He also wanted to explore the possibility of making contact with US intelligence agents with [illegible] of getting some type of assistance or encouragement to fulfill his [illegible] to [illegible] the Soviet Union to destroy the Soviet system. [illegible] contact was through the Chairman of the International Rescue Committee [illegible] invited [illegible] representative of [illegible] to talk with the man. Gailis stated that he had made previous approaches to the US Embassy in London where he was rebuffed. The Embassy told him to either associate with British intelligence or [illegible], where he would, of course, find an organization receptive to his ideas. The initial approach to the Embassy was made in 1950. The last approach was made in November, 1956, at the time of the Hungarian revolution. The London Embassy [illegible] has a pretty good biographical account of him. His contact in London was a Mr. [illegible]. Gailis did not know the spelling of the man's name.

2. Gailis' strong anti-Communistic feelings result from the destruction of his family by the Soviets, as well as his intense nationalistic or Latvian feelings. The secondary purpose of his visit to the United States was contact with [illegible], who has also publicly [illegible] played a [illegible] in [illegible] from control in the [illegible]. Gailis wanted to talk to [illegible] in order to solicit [illegible] assistance. Gailis stated that he had met [illegible] in Minsk during November, 194[illegible]. Gailis was associated with a German army unit, which had the responsibility of rounding up Soviet partisans and [illegible] who were working against the German occupation forces. [illegible] was [illegible] at a [illegible] restaurant. The meeting was a very casual [illegible], and Gailis recalls having had a glass of beer with [illegible]. [illegible] was then at [illegible] the uniform of a German officer. Gailis [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible] 23 December 1977

3. Gallis also mentioned two other Latvians, now residing in Canada, who, he feels sure, would be [illegible] in [illegible] activities against the Soviet Union. These individuals are [illegible] and [illegible] Kinal. They were [illegible] of Gallis during the [illegible] German Army. Gallis does not have the addresses of these two individuals but has [illegible] in Latvian-language newspapers published in Canada [illegible] these two men [illegible] to Gallis in London. Valdemars Gallis currently resides at 11 Freegrove Road, London, N 7. He has resided at this address for about five years. He is employed as a [illegible] at an old age home known as "The Hillside", which is located at 127 [illegible], [illegible], N 19. This employment was obtained in July, 1977.

4. Valdemars Gallis was born in Petrograd, Russia, 27 July 1908. His family moved to Riga, Latvia in [illegible]. In Latvia, his principal occupation was that of a waiter at an officers' mess located in Riga. He held this employment from [illegible] to 1941. Initially, his employer was the Latvian Army. During this period he cooperated with Colonel Calnins, who was chief of the Information Office for the Latvian Army. In 1940, when the Russians took over Latvia, the Russian Army requested from Calnins the names of the individuals who cooperated with him. Rather than supply the information, Calnins went home and killed himself. Gallis continued as a waiter at the officers' mess, but for the Russians, until May, 1941. In May, 1941, a Russian, the mess cook, informed Gallis that Gallis, the head chef, and one other individual should escape, as the Russians were about to arrest them. Gallis went home to tell his wife and child to leave Riga and head for a sister's home in the hinterlands. Upon arrival at home, Gallis was told that the Russians had already been there looking for him. Gallis then left Riga and joined the partisans in [illegible]. When the German military forces entered Latvia, Gallis returned to Riga and learned that his wife and son had been deported by the Soviets on 13 June 1941. His wife had failed to head for the country but stayed in Riga, where she was arrested. He has not heard anything of either wife or son since then.

5. Gallis then returned to the Riga officers' mess as a waiter for the Germans. He was picked up by the German Army as a Russian interpreter on 4 November 1941 when he was sent to Leningrad for a few days. He then went to Minsk, where the supposed contact with [illegible] took place. Gallis was associated as an interpreter with the German anti-partisan group for about 2½ years. With the German Army he came to Germany on [illegible] October 1944. On 3 February 1945 he joined the [illegible] Army as an interpreter. On 22 May 1947 his associations with the [illegible] Army were terminated

SECRET

HH-379

SECRET

-3-

Possible Covert Prospect

in Hamburg, Germany. In 1949 Galiis went to [illegible] he has since remained. On 1[illegible] September 19[illegible] Galiis ma[illegible] Estonian girl in Germany. He has no children [illegible]. This marriage in no way diminishes [illegible] activities within the [illegible]. [illegible] wife who was forcibly taken from him in Latvia, and the Estonian girl is a necessity to satisfy the natural desire for companionship. The previously mentioned [illegible] invention, if [illegible] for the [illegible] of the [illegible], Galiis is [illegible] to undertake his anti-Soviet [illegible], [illegible] it may mean the loss of his life. Destruction [illegible] and the rebirth of Free Latvia is the prime motive [illegible] for his existence.

[illegible] was told that IRC has nothing to do with activities [illegible] Soviet Union; IRC deals only with escapees from [illegible] territories. Galiis stated that if it was at all p[illegible] IRC to convey his desires to the appropriate [illegible] authorities, he certainly wants them to do so. [illegible] was offered to the man, and he was told that IRC has no knowledge or association with the type of contacts with whom Galiis wants to meet.

Jay S. L. Reeves

JGE
[illegible]

SECRET

HA-3291

14-00000

HH 3689

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

HH 3689

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact [illegible]

FROM : Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]

ATTN: [illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible] Dr. [illegible]

4. [illegible]

5. [illegible]

3659

Chief, Contact Division [illegible]

1. [illegible] several [illegible] I have [illegible] to Mr. [illegible] the report [illegible] and [illegible] that I [illegible]

2. [illegible] of the [illegible] (1) [illegible] (2) [illegible] (3) [illegible] (4) [illegible] and (5) [illegible]

3. [illegible] loyalty [illegible] in question [illegible]

4. Enclosed for your [illegible] and you can [illegible] detailed information [illegible]

[illegible] D. [illegible]

Enclosure [illegible]
Attachment [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

1:11 2087

14-00000

HH 3791

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

HH-3791

55-64

CONFIDENTIAL 162115Z NOV 76 STAFF

NOV 17 9 47 AM '76

CITE DCD/NEW YORK 26449

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

ETF (JOHNSTON) FROM BURDICK

WNINTEL

SUBJ: CASE 61491, VALARIY VLADIMIROVICH MORDUKHOV A188624

REFS: A. HQS 17679, 5 NOV 76
B. HQS 17699, 8 NOV 76

A-5564

1. NEITHER HIAS NOR IRC IS ABLE TO FURNISH AN ADDRESS FOR A VALARIY VLADIMIROVICH MORDUKHOV. HE IS NOT LISTED IN ANY OF THE TELEPHONE BOOKS FOR NEW YORK CITY. A55403

2. WE ARE CHECKING THE LOCAL OFFICE OF ENERGO TO SEE IF THEY HAVE A CURRENT ADDRESS, AND WILL ADVISE YOU AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE A RESPONSE.

FILE: CASE 61491
E2 IMPDET CL BY 013344
CONFIDENTIAL

nc

55-64

C O N F I D E N T I A L 162123Z NOV 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/NEW YORK 26450

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

ETF (O'TOOLE) FROM BURDICK

WNINTEL

SUBJ: CASE 61491

REF: HES 17743, 10 NOV 76 A58403 A197472

1. OUR SOURCE AT HIAS INFORMS US THAT PAVEL GEIMAN IS NOW LIVING IN CLEVELAND AND CAN PROBABLY BE LOCATED THROUGH THE JEWISH FAMILY SERVICE, 2060 SOUTH TAYLOR ROAD, CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, OHIO, 44118.

A5564

2. NEITHER HIAS NOR IRC CAN FURNISH AN ADDRESS FOR SOFIYA ZUBAREVA. THE REFERENCE MESSAGE GAVE HER DATE OF ARRIVAL AS NOVEMBER 1976. WE ASKED OUR SOURCES TO CHECK UNDER BOTH 1975 AND 1976. WE WILL CHECK THE LOCAL OFFICE OF LNERGO TO SEE IF THEY CAN FURNISH AN ADDRESS.

3. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION, INCLUDING DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH IS HELPFUL IN SERVICING REQUESTS OF THIS TYPE.

FILE: CASE 61491
E2 IMPDET CL BY 013344
C O N F I D E N T I A L

[illegible] 17 8 [illegible] 1976

S E C R E T 282095Z SEP 76 STAFF

55-64

CITE DCD/NEW YORK 26155

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

OSS/ALIEN BRANCH (NIEMIEC) FROM BURDICK

WNINTEL

SUBJ: CASE 55372--CARLOS MANUEL /MOLINA/ ALVARAL

55-64

REF: AL-234-76, 22 SEP 76

1. A COOPERATIVE SOURCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE INFORMS US THAT CARLOS MANUEL /MOLINA/ ALVARAL CHOSE NOT TO REMAIN IN NEW YORK AND TRAVEL TO MIAMI AFTER ARRIVING IN THE US. OUR SOURCE IS NOT SURE OF HIS ADDRESS, BUT BELIEVES MOLINA IS PROBABLY LIVING IN THE CABANA MOTEL, PONCE DE LEON STREET, CORAL GABLES, WHICH IS NEXT TO THE CUBAN REFUGEE CENTER. IF HE IS NOT AT THIS ADDRESS, HIS LOCATION SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FROM REFUGEE ASSISTANCE AGENCIES IN MIAMI.

18-10-63

2. ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN MOLINA'S LOCATION THROUGH ROBERTO ALVAREZ WERE NEGATIVE SINCE THERE IS NO CITY CALLED CLIFFORD PARK, NJ. INFORMATION HAS NO LISTING FOR A ROBERTO ALVAREZ IN EITHER CLIFFSIDE PARK OR CLIFFWOOD PARK.

3. SORRY MOLINA GOT AWAY SO QUICKLY. WE WERE HOPING TO GIVE PEARL AUSTIN A CHANCE TO USE HER SPANISH. SHOULD WE CLOSE THIS CASE AND TRANSFER THE CORRESPONDENCE TO THE MIAMI FO?

FILE: CASE 55372
E2 IMPDET CL BY 013344
S E C R E T

1c

CONFIDENTIAL

9 April 1976 55-64

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
Office of the DCI

FROM : Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : International Rescue Committee, Inc.

1. The following information on the IRC is for background only.

2. In August 1950, Outline for Project QKGAUNT was approved for the purpose of acquiring biographic information on top-level defectors/emigres from an official of the IRC. The sum of $2,500 was to be provided by covert means. A partial payment of $1,250 was advanced on 30 August 1950 but was refused by the IRC representative, who stated he would supply as much of the information desired as possible without cost. The project was closed as of 31 August 1950.

3. In November 1950, David Martin, Executive Secretary of the IRC met with George Carey, Assistant Director for Operations, with as many as five proposals for collaboration between CIA and IRC. One proposal was for the support of a European Institute which would provide employment for displaced scientists, journalists, etc. He was informed that CIA had no funds for financing such a project.

Charles A. Briggs

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL

9 April 1976
DRAFT

Mr. Charles Sternberg
Executive Director
International Rescue Committee, Inc.
386 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10016

Dear Mr. Sternberg:

As you might surmise, your organization is well known to the Agency. Following the receipt of your letter of 31 March 1976, a more definitive search for information pertaining to your request was conducted. No information was located which would indicate that CIA has ever provided funds to the IRC either directly or indirectly. I trust this letter will allay any apprehensions your organization has had in this matter.

If I can be of further assistance, do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

14-00000

F-55-64

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L 151330Z JULY 74 STAFF

CITE DCD/NEW YORK 21018

DCD/WASHINGTON

TO: SUPPORT BRANCH/ALIEN SECTION (SPAGGY) FROM GRADER

SUBJECT: CASE 68117 - BORIS R[illegible]

REF: YOUR WA 93189

1. CHARLES STE[illegible] OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC) INF[illegible] ALRIGHT [illegible] VISIT [illegible] TO [illegible] WITH [illegible] ABOUT THREE [illegible]. WE WILL [illegible] THE APPOINTMENT THROUGH STERNBERG WHEN WE KNOW THE DATE SET FOR THE [illegible].

2. IRC HAS NOT YET RECEIVED THE MONEY FOR R[illegible] FROM JAPAN. WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT STERNBERG'S STATEMENT. WE DO NOT INTEND TO QUERY IRC ANY MORE ABOUT THE MONEY UNTIL WE ARE READY TO SET UP THE APPOINTMENT.

3. IRC HAS FOUND A JOB FOR R[illegible] AS A TRANSLATOR. THIS SHOULD MAKE IT THAT MUCH EASIER TO INTERVIEW HIM ONCE THE FBI GIVES US THE GO-AHEAD.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 01[illegible]

FILE: INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE
AND
CASE 68117

C O N F I D E N T I A L

14-00000

55-64

MAY 11 4 35 PM '73

CONFIDENTIAL 111925Z MAY 73 STAFF
CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 19090
CONTACTS/WASHINGTON
SUPPORT DIV/ALIEN STAFF (NIEMIEC) FROM CARROLL
SUBJECT: CASE 59431 - ALEXANDRE MIZYUK A-173350

WE WERE ADVISED BY A TELEPHONE RECEPTIONIST AT LOGOS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION THAT MIZYUK QUIT HIS JOB THERE ON 4 MAY 1973 AND LEFT NO FORWARDING ADDRESS. ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC) HE IS RELOCATING IN NEW YORK CITY. WE WILL OBTAIN MIZYUK'S ADDRESS DURING WEEK OF 14 MAY 1973. E2 IMPDET CL BY 073476

0
~~5564~~
55564
OK

FILE: CASE 59431
CONFIDENTIAL

55-64

A-5564

International Rescue Committee, Inc.

DCS/SD/Alien Staff
George Neagoy
Room 814, Key Building

2775

5 June 1973

CDC
2 D 40
Headquarters

The attached copy of NY-603-73, dated 31 May 1973, is for your information and retention.

You will recall CDC interest in IRC. We are getting full support from IRC but it is made up of some strange individuals, nevertheless.

Would like to discuss with you sometime next week.

GNeagoy:ro

((

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

NY #603-73

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

DATE: 31 May 1973

ATTN: Support Division/Alien Branch (Neagoy)

FROM : Acting Chief, New York Field Office

SUBJECT: International Rescue Committee, Inc.

A-87027

1. We met Charles Sternberg, Executive Director of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) on 10 May 1973. In the course of our conversation, Sternberg noted that we had shown quite a bit of interest in Soviet arrivals (defectors) recently and suggested that it would be of a great advantage to us if we were able to introduce ourselves as, for instance, representatives of a scientific institute rather than Agency employees.

2. We are quite certain that Sternberg meant well and had our benefit in mind when he made this suggestion. Sternberg has been cooperative and helpful to us over a number of years. His suggestion particularly aims to simplify our problem of making initial contact with USSR nationals. They are particularly sensitive and suspicious, and CIA has a very ominous meaning to them according to Sternberg.

3. We explained to Sternberg that we cannot do what he suggested, but in turn we suggested that in instances where a new arrival is ill at ease, we should wait a few weeks or months until the new arrival has settled down, found a place to live, and hopefully, a satisfactory place of employment.

4. We did, however, tell Sternberg that we will discuss his suggestion with our associates interested in this particular problem.

5. Do you have any advice or comment?

W. L. Freund
A/C WALTER L. FREUND

NNGraber:dh

FILE: International Rescue Committee

CONFIDENTIAL "E 2 IMPDET CL BY 004476"

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

53 64

NY #603-73
31 May 1973

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN: Support Division/Alien Branch (Neagoy)
Acting Chief, New York Field Office

5564 OK

International Rescue Committee, Inc.

A87027

1. We met Charles Sternberg, Executive Director of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) on 10 May 1973. In the course of our conversation, Sternberg noted that we had shown quite a bit of interest in Soviet arrivals (defectors) recently and suggested that it would be of a great advantage to us if we were able to introduce ourselves as, for instance, representatives of a scientific institute rather than Agency employees.

2. We are quite certain that Sternberg meant well and had our benefit in mind when he made this suggestion. Sternberg has been cooperative and helpful to us over a number of years. His suggestion particularly aims to simplify our problem of making initial contact with USSR nationals. They are particularly sensitive and suspicious, and CIA has a very ominous meaning to them according to Sternberg.

3. We explained to Sternberg that we cannot do what he suggested, but in turn we suggested that in instances where a new arrival is ill at ease, we should wait a few weeks or months until the new arrival has settled down, found a place to live, and hopefully, a satisfactory place of employment.

4. We did, however, tell Sternberg that we will discuss his suggestion with our associates interested in this particular problem.

5. Do you have any advice or comment?

A/C WALTER L. FREUND

NNGraber:dh

FILE: International Rescue Committee

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 004476"

Dop

CONFIDENTIAL

1C

55-64

MAY 11 2 55 PM '73

CONFIDENTIAL 111737Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 19085

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

SUPPORT DIV/ALIEN STAFF (SCHWEICH) FROM GRABER

SUBJECT: CASE 60138 - NIKOLAY RUDAKOV A-176258

REF: ALW-219-73

S-5564 OK

1. C/S GRABER MET RUDAKOV AT THE IRC (INTL RESCUE COMMITTEE) OFFICE ON 10 MAY 1973. RUDAKOV IS ABOUT TO GET A JOB AND LOOKING FOR A PLACE TO LIVE. HE WAS NOT ANXIOUS TO BE INTERVIEWED BY US, BUT WANTED TO GET SETTLED FIRST. HE PROMISED TO CALL US WEDNESDAY, 16 MAY, TO LET US KNOW IF HE FOUND A PLACE TO LIVE AND WHERE.

2. RUDAKOV TOLD US HIS FATHER WAS A WORKER IN THE SAME INSTITUTE WHERE HE WAS EMPLOYED AND NOT A FAMOUS PERSON AT ALL. HE DIED ABOUT FIVE YEARS AGO. WE COULD NOT GET ANY MORE DETAILS AT THE TIME. WHO IS THE FAMOUS RUDAKOV HE COULD HAVE BEEN RELATED TO?

3. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF ANY FURTHER PROGRESS. E2 IMPDET

CL BY 004476

FILE: CASE 60138; IRC

CONFIDENTIAL

55-64

JAN 15 3 21 PM '73

C O N F I D E N T I A L 151930Z JAN 73 STAFF

CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 10535

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

SUPPORT DIVISION/ALIEN STAFF ([illegible]) FROM GRABER

A17[illegible]

SUBJECT: CASE 59481 - ALEXANDR [illegible] 55564/OK

1. SUBJECT IS HANDLED BY THE INTL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC) IN NEW YORK. A87627

2. CHARLES STERNBERG, HEAD OF IRC IN NEW YORK TOLD US THAT THIS IS A VERY DIFFICULT CASE AND WE SHOULD WAIT FOR AT LEAST ONE MONTH BEFORE SERVICING REQUIREMENTS.

3. TO UNDERLINE THE DIFFICULT SITUATION, STERNBERG TOLD US THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO PUT UP SUBJECT IN A HOTEL AND PLACED HIM WITH AN EMPLOYEE OF HIS ORGANIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY.

4. WHEN SUBJECT CAN BE CONTACTED, JOE CARROLL OF THE NEW YORK OFFICE WILL HANDLE THIS CASE. -END- E2 IMPDET CL BY 054476

FILE: CASE 59481 INTL RESCUE COMMITTEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL

55-64

ALN-603-72
6 December 1972

Chief, Boston Office
ATTN: Ron E. Kelly

Director, DCS/Support Division/Alien Staff

Case 53450 - Anatoliy V. Tereshko

A 167499

REFERENCES: A. BOS-927-72, Same Subject, dated 29 November 1972
B. Niemiec-Kelly telecon, Same Subject, dated 5 December 1972.

1. This memo covers subjects discussed in references.

2. Since Tereshko came into this country as a refugee under the auspices of the International Rescue Committee in New York City we do not have any commitments to assist him in his resettlement problems whether they include job assistance or assistance in firming up his immigration status to this country. We, however, also realize that he has been a very cooperative and prolific reports producer for the intelligence components. We want to make clear that we have no commitments to help Tereshko.

3. Tereshko should find his own way to mail letters to Minsk through parties located in other cities. Subject mentioned that he has friends in New York City whom he could use for this purpose.

4. We contacted the office handling Tereshko's refund for his rubles and rupees and were informed that he will shortly receive a check for US$25.00 plus some gold rubles which could not be changed for him. When we receive the money in a week or two, we will forward it to you.

5. Apparently Tereshko feels an attraction to work for Radio Liberty in Munich, which was offered to him. This again is his own decision although he has a good position and a fine future with his present company.

6. We have found from experience that defectors generally blame us for decisions and actions which fail and credit their own astuteness for those developments which succeed. We would like, however, to point

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 004476

CONFIDENTIAL

1c

out that your handling of Tereshko has been excellent in serving requirements and in getting him to travel twice for debriefings in spite of his heavy work schedule with his company.

JAMES R. MURPHY

FJNiemiec/sa

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

NY-864-71

19 August 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact with Mrs. Mary Lord

1. Mrs. Mary Lord will make two trips abroad in the near future. From 19 August to 7 September she will be in the Far East. She will travel to Calcutta in her capacity as interim president of the International Rescue Committee, and will also go to Saigon and Hong Kong. She hopes to visit Laos, but this had not been settled when we spoke with her early in August. Her visit would be in response to an invitation extended by Souvanna Phouma last winter (see oo-B-33171-70). If successful, she would attempt to get more information related to the requirements of Case 54,162.

2. On 9 September Mrs. Lord leaves for Europe on a trip connected with her duties with the Atlantic Treaty Association. We do not know how long she will be gone, but if prior trips are any indication it probably will be no longer than two weeks. She may learn more about Georges Pompidou, although she has not been briefed for this particular trip. We received requirements against a similar trip in June (See oo-B-17055-71 in response to cases 54,162 and 56,660 and she may remember some of those and attempt to obtain further data. We would recommend that she be debriefed on both trips shortly after her return from Europe. We have given her Mr. Lohmann's name, should she wish to contact the NYFO before a representative calls on her.

3. In June Mrs. Lord loaned us two books on Pompidou. Upon instructions from Chief, NYFO, we returned these to Mrs. Lord on 18 August since we had received no reply to our queries to headquarters (NY-636-71 of 24 June 197, Form 610 of 19 July 1971 and NY 16766 of 3 August 1971.)

Ruth Elliff

R.E/ewk

File: Mrs. Mary Lord

cc: International (Rinkus) ✓

cc: International (McHugh)

55564

SECRET

NY-297-71

23 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

73 A158419

SUBJECT: Call from Jack Cogswell, 22 March 1971

B 55564

Cogswell telephoned to inform that the International Rescue Committee planned to hold a Press Conference on 24 March 1971 in New York to discuss prisoners in Cuban jails. Cogswell voiced the hope that the conference would not have any adverse effects on attempts underway to obtain the release of Lawrence Kirby Lunt from a Cuban prison. He explained that "Pancho" ("who is known to your people, I am sure") is on his way to Mexico City with $3,500. He will contact a woman there who apparently knows who to pay off to arrange Lunt's release. Cogswell indicated that "they" hoped to pay no more than $10,000.

R. P. B. LOHMANN

RPBL:br

File: Jack Cogswell

✓ cc: International Division (Heller)

SECRET

14-00000

55-64

MAR 4 10 32 AM '71

S E C R E T 041522Z MAR 71 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 16133

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ALIEN STAFF (KONICKI) FROM GRABER

SUBJECT: CASE 56974

REF: YOUR WA 58439 AND OUR NY 16132

B 5-5564 OK

1. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY CHECKED AND ARE CONTINUING TO CHECK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF MARININ. CHARLES STERNBERG, HEAD OF IRC, IS MAKING EFFORT TO LOCATE MARININ. WE ARE ALSO CHECKING WITH I&NS TO SEE WHETHER THE FILE HAS BEEN RETURNED FROM ROME, ITALY.

B 187027

2. ACCORDING TO STERNBERG, SEREGIN ON WHOM WE HAVE RECEIVED BIO DATA AND FORWARDED A NAME CHECK REQUEST TO HEADQUARTERS, DOES NOT KNOW MARININ'S WHEREABOUTS.

3. YOU HAVE A-NUMBERS. SUGGEST CENTRAL FILES OF I&NS WASHINGTON BE CHECKED.

4. YOU MIGHT CONSIDER QUERYING ROME STAION CONCERNING MARININ.

FILE: IRC AND

CASE 56974 RP-1

S E C R E T

F55-64

MAR 3 4 16 PM '71

SECRET 031900Z MAR 71 CITE CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 98439

CONTACTS/NEW YORK

SPARE FROM ALIEN STAFF (KONICKI)

SUBJECT: CASE 56074 - G.A. MARININ AND ALEKSANDR IVANOVICH SEREGIN

REF: TELECONS BETWEEN V. FREUND AND W.W. KONICKI ON 17 FEBRUARY 1971
AND 3 MARCH 1971

B

PLEASE TRY THROUGH YOUR CONTACTS AT INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE REGARDING WHEREABOUTS OF MARININ AND SEREGIN. ALSO TRY JANE AGAIN. GREAT PRESSURE HERE. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY LEADS INCLUDING IMMIGRATION FILE NUMBER, IF AVAILABLE. THANK YOU. CP-1

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

35 64

Memorandum

NY#399-69

DATE: 12 June 1969

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

ATTN: (Mr. Murphy)

FROM : Chief, New York Field Office

B S 4416 o/c

S 69-169 B

SUBJECT: Meeting with Edmund Cummings, Dept. of Immigration, US Catholic Conference.

Ref: Dept. of State memo of 12 May 69 from Wm. C. Trueheart, forwarded to NYFO on 16 May 69.

1. On 6 Jun 69 Deputy Chief, NYFO, accompanied by C/S Elliff, met with Edmund Cummings to discuss any aspects of the relationship between his office and the Agency that might be unsatisfactory to him. This appointment was requested by NYFO as a result of the comments made by Cummings in reference memo.

B 2 5544

2. When we opened the discussion with the statement that we had heard indirectly that the question of cooperation with the CIA had arisen at the ACVA meeting, Cummings immediately stated that this was indeed the case, and for his part, he wished to have no contact at all with our Agency. Invited to elaborate on his reasons, Cummings said it could be very "embarrassing" were it to become known that he had furnished information on Czechoslovak refugees to the CIA. He later stated that it could be extremely dangerous for refugees to have contact with the Agency, since if this fact were known, it could bring harm to themselves or to their families still in Eastern Europe. If he had furnished the information about the location of a refugee to whom harm later came, it would cause him great anguish. He knew, he said, of an instance in Connecticut in which a refugee who had cooperated with the Agency was beaten up by Communist agents. Cummings did not respond to our invitation to elaborate on this incident, which we said was unknown to us. Cummings said that not only was he concerned about CIA activities involving refugees, but that if cognizant, the US bishops would be unhappy about CIA involvement with organizations such as the US Catholic Conference. Again, Cummings declined to elaborate. Cummings suggested that we get our information from the I&NS to whom the US Catholic Conference furnishes data and he was unsympathetic to our desire to have this information on a more timely basis than was possible with reliance on I&NS records. He also suggested that arrangements to see refugees in the US be made with the refugee in Europe and that the refugee be given a telephone number to call after his arrival. Responding to our direct question, Cummings said he viewed cooperation with the FBI in a different light and would not deny its agents information they requested.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

6 C

3. We wish to emphasize that Cummings made none of the statements to us that he did in paragraph two of reference memo. On the contrary, in response to our direct question, Cummings said that his objections were those of principle rather than of manner of approach by the NYFO. At no time during our conversation with him did he make any objection to the procedure set up between him and C/S Elliff to facilitate the acquiring of the information we requested. We do not have any doubts that Cummings did indeed make the statements attributed to him in reference memo, but it is at least interesting that he specifically refuted them in our presence. After displaying nothing but hostility toward the Agency during our entire meeting, he invited us to call upon him in the future if he "could ever do anything for us personally." Obviously we do not expect to contact him on any basis in the future and we are certain that he does not anticipate further inquiries from this office.

4. C/S Elliff reports as follows on her contacts with Cummings and other officials of the Dept. of Immigration, US Catholic Conference:

> "The first contact with Cummings was on 11 Sept 68 and the results of that meeting are contained in NY#677-68 of 11 Sep 68. This was a straight-forward request for information on how the US Catholic Conference would handle the influx of refugees. As can be seen from the memo, Cummings was cooperative and, in fact, offered more assistance to us than we later requested. We spoke on the telephone with Cummings a few weeks later to say that, in all likelihood, we would only be needing to ask for address information on selected refugees occasionally. For this information, he referred us to Mrs. Irene Bilinski. On 12 Dec we saw Mrs. Bilinski who ~~was cooperative in~~ furnishing information on a specific Czechoslovak refugee. Upon our return from Washington in late January 1969, a number of requests had piled up and we tried to obtain the needed information through Mrs. Bilinski. She pleaded that they were very busy, extremely behind in their filing and asked that we call on her later.

B

B-69-169

NY#399-69
12 June 1969

S-5564

B

B

"Since it appeared in late March that Mrs. Bilinski would not be available in the foreseeable future, we called again on Cummings and explained the problem. We said we understood the problems involved for them in providing this information, in view of the fact that they were extremely busy, and said we would appreciate anything he could do to facilitate matters. There was one address we needed urgently and this Cummings obtained for us while we waited. We left with him about six three-by-five cards on other refugees, plus a stamped self-addressed envelope, and asked that he return the cards, with the address and employment data added, at his convenience. After that, we sent Cummings two letters requesting data on additional individuals and received replies in due course. After his receipt of the second letter, Cummings called Deputy Chief, NYFO (whose name he had obtained from Charles Sternberg of the International Rescue Committee) to check on Miss Elliff's bona fides. According to Deputy Chief, NYFO, Cummings was satisfied that our inquiries were legitimate and only expressed the hope that they could be kept to a minimum. We suggested the mail procedure agreed to by Cummings only in the interest of saving the time of an obviously overworked organization.

A-87027

"When the account of Cummings' complaints to the Department of State official reached us, we endeavored to set up an appointment for ourselves and Deputy Chief, NYFO, to see him. Our first call in this regard was on 19 May. He said it was a very busy week and asked us to call later. We called the following week and he again stated he was extremely busy. We said we did have one address to ask him about and asked if we might see him briefly. He invited us to write him for the information, and assured us that this would be entirely satisfactory. We wrote on 26 May and he replied the following day, much faster than he had previously. When we called him on 6 June, he invited us to meet with him that afternoon. We estimate that we have requested address and employment information on about 13 individuals. Since this is the only data requested from Cummings, we do not understand his statement in reference memo that he had "become concerned over the numbers and types of request." In addition to Cummings and Mrs. Bilinski, we have contacted Mrs. Olympia Boroni, whom we saw in 1967 in connection with Case 49,354. Although she could not furnish the current location of the individual in whom we were interested, she was extremely cooperative." B-69-167

(C)

W. L. Freund
JACKSON R. HORTON

WLF

WLFreund:kf

F 5564

C O N F I D E N T I A L 211400Z MAY 69 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK [illegible]

PRIORITY CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

SOVIET BLOC DIVISION (FARRELL) FROM FRIEND

RE CONTACTS/WASHINGTON [illegible]

A 5544

A

1. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR FOREIGN SERVICE, INC., 200 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NYC, IS NOT ITSELF A CONTACT OF THIS OFFICE, BUT SOME OF ITS MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS ARE. A MORE OR LESS COMPLETE LISTING OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOLLOWS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, ORGANIZATIONS ARE HEADQUARTERED IN NEW YORK. ASTERISK INDICATES CURRENT NYFO CONTACT. (E) FOLLOWING ORGANIZATION TITLE INDICATES EXACT ORGANIZATION NAME NOT ASCERTAINED.

X AMERICAN FUND FOR CZECHOSLOVAK REFUGEES A 5550
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, PHILADELPHIA
AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE A 8343
AMERICAN RELIEF FOR POLAND, CHICAGO 566664
BRETHREN SERVICE (E) — S-5557 OK
4 5577
X CHURCH WORLD SERVICE
S 5774
HADASSAH (THE WOMEN'S ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA)
F — X INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE 5 5564 OK
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SERVICE INC. S 593 IN

all

B

Copies F/ All Jackets!

PAGE 2 CONTACT/NEW YORK 1399 C O N F I D E N T I A L

LITHUANIAN RELIEF FUND OF AMERICA Inc B-69-127

LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION SERVICE ✓ use B-69-127

NEAR EAST FOUNDATION — A 833

POLISH AMERICAN IMMIGRATION & RELIEF COMMITTEE — A 32117

SALVATION ARMY # 1410 (EI)

SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS — A1356

X TOLSTOY FOUNDATION — A 5575

UNITARIAN (SC), BOSTON — A 2204

X UNITED HIAS SERVICE A 58403

UNITED UKRAINIAN AMERICAN RELIEF COMMITTEE (UUARC - A 5521 (EI)

WORLD UNIVERSITY SERVICE — A 5523

YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION. A 555

all B

2. ALTHOUGH NYFO HAS HAD CONTACT WITH SOME OF THE ORGANIZATIONS OTHER THAN THOSE GIVEN AN ASTERISK ABOVE, THIS WAS EITHER NOT RECENTLY OR DID NOT IN ANY WAY RELATE TO REFUGEES. INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SERVICE CAME TO OUR ATTENTION OVER A YEAR AGO IN CONNECTION WITH A COMPLAINT ARISING IN DETROIT, AND MR. MORTON DISCUSSED MATTER WITH ITS DIRECTOR; WE HAVE HAD NO RECENT CONTACT AND DOUBT ORGANIZATION'S INVOLVEMENT WITH CZECHOSLOVAK REFUGEES.

3. ALTHOUGH CHAIRMANSHIP OF ACVA THEORETICALLY ROTATES, IT HAS BEEN WITH THE REV. JOHN W. SCHAUER, JR., DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROGRAM, CHURCH WORLD SERVICE, FOR AN ESTIMATED THREE YEARS. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY A REGULAR ATTENDEE AT SUCH MEETINGS THATACVA DOES NOT FORMULATE POLICY FOR MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS. THUS, DISCUSSION APPARENTLY INTENDED FOR THE NEXT SCHEDULED MEETING BY OUR COMPLAINANT (WHICH CLEARLY HAS NOT COME TO ATTENTION OF SOME KEY MEMBERS, PRESUMABLY INCLUDING JOHN SCHAUER) WOULD BE IN NATURE OF INFORMAL CONSULTATION ONLY.

4. THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF THIS MATTER IN NYFO HAS NOT IDENTIFIED AN INCIDENT WHICH MIGHT HAVE LED TO THIS COMPLAINT. THERE IS, OF COURSE, THE POSSIBILITY THAT ANOTHER OFFICE WAS INVOLVED OR THAT LOCAL BASE OF [illegible] FAR, WHICH APPARENTLY IS IN TOUCH WITH REFUGEE ORGANIZATIONS HAS BEEN AGAIN MISTAKEN FOR CIA. CONVERSATION WITH TWO CLEARED AND THOROUGHLY SYMPATHETIC CONTACTS IN ACVA MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS INDICATES THAT THEY HAVE NOT HEARD OF THIS COMPLAINT AND THAT IF IT COMES UP IN DISCUSSION THERE WILL BE SOME FRIENDLY SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION. IT SEEMS TO US, HOWEVER, MOST DESIRABLE THAT IT NOT COME UP AND WE URGE, THEREFORE, THAT STATE BE ADVISED THAT THE COMPLAINAN

PAGE 4 CONTACTS/NEW YORK 1380 C O N F I D E N T I A L

(ASSUMING HE IS IN NEW YORK) SHOULD BRING HIS COMPLAINT DIRECTLY

TO THIS OFFICE FOR ANY DISCUSSION HE MAY WISH TO HOLD ON THE MATTER.

-END-

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CCC: PAGE 3. LINE FIVE BEGINNING OF LINE XXX THAT ACVA XXX VICE THA ACVA

ALSO PAGE EE E PAGE 3. PARA 4. LINE TEN WORD AFTER XXX THAT STATE BE
ADVISED XXX ETC VICE THAT STATE   XORRY EE E SORRY

NOTICE: ABOVE "X" MINUS QUOTES REFERS TO ASTERISK

CIA Requests to Refugee Organizations in New York

55-64

Soviet Bloc Division, DCS
Paul J. Leaden/amb

16 May 1969

Chief, New York Office

Jack,

Jim Murphy showed us the attached correspondence, which follow-up on his earlier discussion of the subject problem with you. He asked that we send you a copy, and would like your comments on it. Jim would be interested in the rational for going the mail route instead of personal visits by the CS's. As I mentioned during your brief visit on Wednesday, we are reviewing the entire DCS Czech refugee procedure, with an eye to cutting back our general effort.

cc: Director, DCS

B

A-5544

American Council of Voluntary Agencies

(ACVA)

Copies: NCC

SECRET

10 c

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Murphy, D/DCS		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE
☐					

Remarks:

Jim:

I received the attached correspondence from Bill Trueheart this morning.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Thomas H. Karamessines, DD/P	14 May 6

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions GPO : 1966 O - 297-542 (40)

SECRET

9-2072

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

May 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: CIA Requests to Voluntary Agencies in New York

With reference to our recent discussion of this subject, I am attaching a memorandum from Mr. Laugel of Ambassador Martin's staff on his meetings in New York with various representatives of the voluntary agencies. It would appear from his report that concern among the voluntary agencies over CIA approaches is more widespread than we had at first supposed.

Bill
William C. Trueheart
INR/DDC

Attachment:
As stated.

SECRET

14-00000

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : INR - Mr. William C. Trueheart

DATE: May 9, 1969

FROM : S/R:ORM - Raymond W. Laugel

SUBJECT: CIA Requests to Voluntary Agencies in New York

Mrc 6 69-169

Ambassador Graham Martin has asked me to inform you of conversations which were held in my presence by certain voluntary agency representatives with regard to CIA requests for information on Eastern European refugees (primarily Czechs) who have been arriving in the U.S. as a result of the Czechoslovak-USSR crisis. The following information was obtained on a confidential basis while I was in New York this week to work on an unrelated project:

A-22572 A-41194

(1) On May 5, after concluding my own business discussions, Dr. Jan Papanek, President of the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, Inc., expressed his deep concern over being asked to supply information on the whereabouts of his former countrymen. Dr. Papanek told me that the CIA is checking on a large number of Czech refugees, most of whom have no special experience or qualifications which would seem to be of particular interest to the United States. He knows that many of these people are being subjected to intensive interrogations which bewilder and frighten them. The procedure was initiated last October by a CIA man who identified himself as Norman N. Graber. Dr. Papanek receives his requests by letter (he showed me one sample) which simply lists the names and other basic data, either immigration number or date of birth. The return address used by the CIA is P.O. Box 1294 in Grand Central Station, to which Dr. Papanek is to send his reply that is, the latest U.S. address recorded in his files. Dr. Papanek did not mention a specific number of names or requests but he said they are growing and he is very uncomfortable about it; he does not want his good name or agency to become identified with the CIA. He indicated, in addition, that the method of operation seems heavy-handed in comparison to that of the FBI, whose agents present themselves in person, make their requests known

SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

and are serviced to the extent permitted by Dr. Papanek. If this information is essential to U.S. interests, Dr. Papanek cannot understand why it is not handled on an intra-governmental basis -- namely have the CIA obtain its information from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which is responsible for alien registration in the United States.

B 69-169

S 4416

(2) On May 6, after concluding my work with Mr. Edmund Cummings, Associate Director of the U.S. Catholic Conference, the question again came up. Mr. Cummings expressed his agitation over the seemingly amateurish and scattershot method by which the CIA is operating in this field. He also questioned the value of interrogating simple refugees who are not defectors with special qualifications or background. Mr. Cummings said the groundwork was laid sometime ago (no date mentioned) by a female officer of the CIA, and that he agreed to the exchange of mail procedure utilizing the P.O. Box at Grand Central. However, he has become concerned over the numbers and types of requests. He suggested, as did Dr. Papanek, that INS might be the proper contact point for CIA. Mr. Cummings also mentioned that the FBI agents appear in person and he indicated that their approach seems more professional.

S-5564 ok

(3) I was also informed by Mr. Cummings that the International Rescue Committee, Inc., whose Executive Director is Mr. Charles Sternberg, was somewhat alarmed by the same situation. I had previously consulted Mr. Sternberg on my own project but he did not raise the CIA matter with me.

A-87027

(4) On May 7 I attended (as an observer) a meeting of the Committee on Migration and Refugee Problems, American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., which was called to discuss refugee and related matters. The meeting was chaired by the Rev. John W. Schauer of the Church World Service; in addition to

Rec B 69-169

Council officers, representatives of seven voluntary agencies were present. Those in attendance were:

Mr. Eugene Shenefield and
Miss Etta Deutsch of the
American Council of Voluntary Agencies

Mr. Edmund E. Cummings and
Mr. John McCarthy of the
United States Catholic Conference

Mr. Donald E. Anderson of the
Lutheran Immigration Service

Mr. Gaynor Jacobson and
Mr. Harry Freedman of the
United HIAS Service

Mr. Charles Sternberg of the
International Rescue Committee

Dr. Jan Papanek of the
American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees

A 41194

Mr. Teymouraz Bagration of the
Tolstoy Foundation

Chairman Schauer also represented the
Church World Service

A 5559

At one point the meeting went off-the-record to hear from Mr. Cummings of USCC, who had been assigned to study the "CIA problem." But Chairman Schauer opened the discussion by announcing rather mysteriously that he had been in touch "with Washington" at the appropriate level -- implying that the Council should at least table the matter for the time being. Mr. Cummings then moved that (a) there would be no further discussion of it, and (b) each voluntary agency should deal with the CIA as it sees fit on an individual agency basis. His motion carried and the Council proceeded to other business.

The above information was volunteered to me. During the individual discussions I expressed no opinion but did mention my general interest in overall problems the voluntary agencies are facing. At the Council meeting I said nothing on this subject.

55-64

[illegible] CONTACTS/NEW YORK [illegible]

[illegible] CONT/CT./ [illegible]

SOVIET BLOC DIVISION ([illegible])

CASE 51,7[illegible] (OPENED BY PHONE ON 5 SEP)

1. FOLLOWING IS RESULT OF ACTIVITY OF SEVERAL CONTACT SPECIALISTS. CLEARLY, ISSUE OF REFUGEES IS CONCERN OF VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, NONE OF WHICH AS YET HAS WAY OF SIZING IT UP WITH ANY DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE. FURTHER DETAILS EXPECTED.

035923

2. COL HARRIS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NY DISTRICT OF I&NS, URGES MATTER BE TAKEN UP WITH I&NS CENTRAL OFFICE. IF EXECUTIVE ORDER IS ISSUED AUTHORIZING PAROLE ENTRY OF CZECHOSLOVAK REFUGEES, I&NS IS LIKELY TO DISPATCH PERSONNEL TO VIENNA FOR PRE-SCREENING. CIA COULD ARRANGE TO MONITOR FINDINGS OF SUCH A GROUP AND PERHAPS OBTAIN ALL ESSENTIAL DATA ON PROSPECTIVE PAROLEES. IF DIC DATA NOT AVAILABLE THROUGH THIS CHANNEL, ARRANGEMENTS COULD PRESUMABLY BE MADE WITH NY DISTRICT. HOWEVER, THIS EFFORT SHOULD HAVE CENTRAL OFFICE BLESSING BECAUSE IT WOULD CONSTITUTE DRAIN ON AVAILABLE SLIM NY DISTRICT MANPOWER. IN PRINCIPLE, NY DISTRICT STANDS READY TO ASSIST IF ITS HQ APPROVES. (THIS IS LOOKING TO FUTURE.)

3. CHURCH WORLD SERVICE SITUATION REPORTED IN 00-B-321/28161-68.

[illegible] S E C R E T

Msc B 68 250

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] SAID [illegible] ALLOCATED US 81 THOUSAND TO [illegible] OF REFUGEES [illegible]. [illegible] ESTIMATES THERE ARE 16 THOUSAND JEWS IN CZECH. [illegible] OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS THINKS 10-12 THOUSAND MORE CORRECT FIGURE. DR. JAN PAPANEK, HEAD OF AMERICAN FUND FOR CZECHOSLOVAK REFUGEES INC., WILL PARTICIPATE IN STATE DEPARTMENT MEETING ON ISSUE 6 SEP; HE WILL BACK IRC EFFORTS TO PERSUADE STATE RE PAROLEE HANDLING. V. JENACEK, PAPANEK'S EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HAS ASSURED US OF COOPERATION IN POINTING UP GOOD SOURCES ONCE REFUGEES ARRIVE. - CHARLES STERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, LEFT FOR VIENNA TODAY, 5 SEP, BEFORE WE COULD RECONTACT HIM. AARONSOHN IS JUST NOW INTER-VIEWING HIS BOSS, LEO CHERNE.

5-5564/0r

-END-

SECRET

CCC : PLEASA EEE E PLEASE IN PAGE ONE END OF PAGE US 3. DELETE THE "L"

ALSO IN PAGE TWO JUST BEFORE THE PAGE TWO E "PAGE TWO" DELETE THE WORD "-END-" MINUS QUOTES QUE E QUOTES SOARI AND TKS

A E TKS

TKS

TKS

2 - Copies Wall [illegible]

14-00000

SEP 3 11 28 AM '68

S E C R E T 031450Z SEP 68 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK [illegible]

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

SOVIET BLOC DIVISION (WELCH) FROM FREUND

SUBJECT: CASE 51,658 - CZECH CRISIS - NEW ASPECTS: [illegible]

1. INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC), HEADQUARTERED IN NY, WAS FIRST AND MAIN VOLUNTARY AGENCY TO MOVE DECISIVELY ON BEHALF OF HUNGARIAN REFUGEES IN 1956 AND AGAIN SEEMS TO BE IN VANGUARD REGARDING CZECHOSLOVAKS. TOP MAN, LEO CHERNE, HAS JUST RETURNED FROM VIENNA, WHERE HE STUDIED DIMENSIONS OF PROBLEM. AT PRESENT, CHARLES STERNBERG, RESETTLEMENT SUPERVISOR (NOT EXACT TITLE), IS HIMSELF OF CZECH JEWISH ORIGIN, SPEAKS CZECH.

2. AS OF LABOR DAY, SEVERAL THOUSAND CZECHOSLOVAKS IN AUSTRIA HAD INDICATED DESIRE TO SEEK PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT ABROAD. AS REPORTED IN PRESS, DEPARTURE FROM CSSR IS STILL LEGALLY POSSIBLE, AND UK EMBASSY HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO ADMIT APPLICANTS. SWITZERLAND ISSUES VISAS TO CZECHOSLOVAKS IN AUSTRIA (AND PERHAPS IN CSSR). CANADA ISEXPECTED TO ADMIT REFUGEES.

3. UP TO ONE-THIRD OF TOTAL OF [illegible] THOUSAND REFUGEES EXPECTED IN PIPELINE WITHIN ABOUT TWO WEEKS ARE EXPECTED TO OPT FOR EMIGRATION TO U.S. IRC WILL HANDLE MANY CASES, MAY BE CALLED UPON TO COOPERATE IN SCREENING LISTS FOR DESIRABLE INTELLIGENCE

PAGE 2 CONTACTS/NEW YORK 35[illegible]7 S E C R E T

SOURCES.

4. STERNBERG USED OCCASION TO URGE THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT SPEED

UP PROCEDURES FOR ISSUING VISAS. UNDUE DELAYS OF REFUGEES IN

AUSTRIA WOULD UNDERMINE MORALE BOTH OF THOSE ALREADY OUTSIDE CSSR

AND OF THOSE STILL INSIDE CONTEMPLATING FLIGHT.

5. WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH IRC AND PASS ALONG DEVELOPMENTS.

6. PLEASE COORDINATE WITH ALIEN STAFF; [illegible] IS BELIEVED VERY

FAMILIAR WITH IRC SET UP.

S E C R E T

89-17-6

F-5564

20 July 1964
MIM - 257-64

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : CAC Staff

Chief, Miami Field Office

Arrivals of Cuban Refugees via Spain

1. We have made arrangements to receive periodic listings of Cuban Refugees who arrive in the US via chartered flights from Spain. The first list we have obtained is appended. All local arrivals are being sent letters instructing them to report to Opa-Locka.

S-5564

2. The flights are organized by the International Refugee Committee. No further information is available locally on any of the refugees listed. We will attempt to locate those settling in Florida. Please handle balance as you see fit.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:sb

Attachment:
List of Cuban Refugees

5564

[illegible] CRE

[illegible] 43 [illegible]

[illegible] ZEA

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] EIGHT TWO [illegible]

S E C R E T [illegible]

[illegible] CITE NYOR 0752

[illegible] FROM [illegible] 187027 S5564

1. CHARLES [illegible] INTERNATIONAL [illegible] DIRECTED [illegible] TO CALL OUR ATTENTION [illegible] THE WRITER [illegible]

SL 11-4-76

VOJISLAV NIKOVIC [illegible] CITIZEN WHO APPARENTLY [illegible] SOUGHT ASYLUM AT THE [illegible]. NIKOVIC WAS A MEMBER [illegible] PARTY IN YUGOSLAVIA, [illegible], AND BECAME INCREASINGLY [illegible] IN RECENT YEARS. [illegible] MOVIE PRODUCER [illegible] HIS MOVIES [illegible] "THE MAGIC SWORD"), [illegible] OVERESTIMATED THE [illegible].

2. NIKOVIC MADE [illegible] IN U.S. [illegible] MONTHS AGO, BUT HAS [illegible] U.S. GOVERNMENT [illegible] KNOWLEDGE OF YUGO PARTY [illegible] EXPRESSED PUZZLEMENT [illegible] LACK OF U.S. INTEREST. [illegible] SOMETHING TO SAY TO [illegible].

3. WE CAN [illegible] CONTACT), BUT WOULD [illegible] OBVIOUSLY, [illegible] ALSO. [illegible] ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CFN NYOR 0792 [illegible]

NIKOVIC A YUGOS[illegible]

NOT [illegible]

BT

5564

SECRET

ANALYSIS REPORT

NAME Dr. Jaroslav Kremel

INDEX NO. S-5564

ADDRESS

TYPE OF DOCUMENT Process Sheet

DATED 10/22/63

DATE FILED 2/7/64

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

F.O.

SECONDARY NO.

ABSTRACT

SUBJECT & AREA:
Dr. Jaroslav Kremel's (S-5564) Defection and Redefection.

SOURCE & CONTACT:
W. L. Freund (S-43525)
New York City

See P/Sheet for OOA(S) - 3278987 filed in Jacket # 43525 (W. L. Freund)

SUBJECT	AREA	ACT.	DATE INFO.	TFR	DATE AREA

FORM NO. 339 REPLACES FORM 57-28
1 NOV 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(12)

14-00000

OC [illegible] 278, 987
NY 47583

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~F-4135-35~~
F 5564

DATE: [illegible] 3

TO : Chief, Contact Division

FOR: Alien Branch (Givens)

FROM : Chief, New York Office

S-5564

SUBJECT: Case: 41,039- Dr. Jaroslav Krema's Defection and Redefection.

1. Herewith is a summary of this case, as requested in WA-61595.

2. The case was opened to this office by a telephone call from George Mucalin in mid-morning on 20 Sep 63. The only information available to us at that point was an account in the New York Times of 19 September. Freund of NYFO was instructed to contact Mr. Joe Schmit (Assistant Special Agent in Charge), New York FBI: the FBI had notified CIA through Washington liaison that it would be ready to turn over subject to us for interrogation some time on this date, and the details were to be discussed with Schmit.

3. Schmit passed Freund along to the supervisor and special agent handling the case (both known to us), and we learned that the FBI had not seen the subject as yet because of unexpected delays at Immigration and Naturalization Services. The expected schedule was for subject to be fingerprinted and released by I&NS in the early p.m. The FBI estimated that its own interrogation could be accomplished within about 45 minutes. As envisaged, FBI interrogation would be carried out at International Rescue Committee office, where subject would be turned over to us at about 3 p.m.

4. Above information was phoned through to Alien Branch, which advised that two OSI representatives, Drs. Hopman and Huber, were to be dispatched to New York to conduct an interrogation that afternoon. Numerous telephone calls between this office and Alien Branch, the FBI, and IRC continued throughout the afternoon. The FBI very graciously agreed to make a staff translator of Czech descent available for our interrogation. Charles Sternberg of IRC agreed to stay in his office until we could take the subject off his hands when it became clear that the OSI representatives were late in arriving.

5. Dr. Hopman, OSI, and Dr. Huber, Medical Staff, in fact reached NYFO at 1,50. There was considerable misunderstanding between them and this office concerning the situation. They were unaware that subject had been interrogated until late the previous day by I&NS and was somewhat exhausted by interrogations and procedures on 20 Sep at I&NS and involving the FBI. They expected to operate under cover (to be furnished by FBI or this office), they expected to be provided with a secure interrogation facility wired for sound, they understood that Czechoslovak authorities had attempted to reach the subject. In the circumstances, they remained at NYFO in the care of the Field Office chief, while Freund proceeded to IRC.

6. Conversations at I&NS with Sternberg, the FBI translator and subject revealed the following: Subject had been led to expect two CIA men from Washington. He had been given Freund's true name, and he was not in the happiest mood after waiting for several hours. (Sternberg of INS had not made the above disclosures to subject.) Further discussion with Chief, NTPD, and with Sternberg led to the decision that subject was to remain in Sternberg's care over the weekend, that any interrogation in the circumstances would be unwise (particularly as the transcript of the exhaustive I&NS interrogation would be available early the following week), and that the suggestion of Alien Branch to bring him to its safe installation for detailed exploitation should be followed.

7. Freund took the FBI translator and subject out for supper and developed a few facts. Subject was overly optimistic about the results of de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia and the current [illegible], which he hoped would insure his family's joining him within one to two years. He was staying with his friend, Danes, and felt confident that neither the other 24 physicians in his exchange group nor Czechoslovak security could trace him to Danes. Subject was very willing to leave New York for interrogation elsewhere. He spoke about his political convictions- anti-communist, pro-[illegible] Czech- and his admiration for the US, although he did not particularly like New York. Freund thanked the FBI translator for his help, delivered subject to Danes' apartment (but did not enter it), notified Chief, IWO, of developments, and reported to Kuslin at the earliest opportunity (about 2250 hours).

8. On Monday morning, 23 September, we received word that Alien Branch was ready to accept subject to its safe facility later that day. George Nagle, using a registered pseudonym, drove subject to Washington in the afternoon. An agreement reached earlier with Sternberg was reconfirmed in front of subject at the time that Freund picked up subject: INS had assumed full responsibility for subject's welfare, under procedures and considerations affecting aliens as promulgated by the I&NS. During the period (expected to be somewhere in the neighborhood of one week) that we borrowed subject, we obviously had to share this responsibility. We wanted to make clear, however, that CIA was not in any way involved in this matter other than to avail itself of the opportunity to interview a source with recent experience in Czechoslovakia. Sternberg clearly understood this, and his subsequent behavior vis-a-vis us appeared to be beyond reproach. On our part, we did not become involved with living arrangements in New York, job opportunities, and the like.

9. The record shows that subject was returned by car (Rosenerook driving) to New York on 3 October and turned back to Sternberg by Freund at 1400 hours that day. He advised Sternberg of subject's interest in relocating in West Germany or Austria because of his expectation that he would be more readily admitted to medical practice in either country than in the US. Ultimately, he hoped to return to the US, with his family if wife and child could join him in the West.

Sternberg was [illegible] a profitable plan. We understood from Sternberg that he planned to place subject in a hotel and that subject was to use his proper name [illegible] without the title of "doctor". We were fearful of Czechoslovak efforts to reach him and expressed our fears to Sternberg, [illegible] to influence him. In retrospect, Sternberg might wish to have [illegible] more [illegible] based on his dealings with other refugees, he doubted whether the Czechoslovak authorities would try very hard to run subject down.

10. Our next [illegible] came when we called Sternberg during the early afternoon of [illegible] October. We were in receipt of [illegible], which urged us to ask subject some questions. When we learned from Sternberg that subject was due at IRC that afternoon, Sternberg promised to phone as soon as subject arrived there so that an appointment could be made. Since Major Pribram [illegible] had preliminary indications of job possibilities for subject, we mentioned this to Sternberg and found him appreciative. Later that afternoon, Sternberg phoned back, indicated subject had not shown up at IRC and that he (Sternberg) would go to subject's hotel (near IRC headquarters).

11. The following morning, Sternberg phoned and reluctantly indicated that something was amiss. He had not found subject in his room at the Hotel Le Marquis, 12 East 31st Street, (near IRC hq), on Monday afternoon; an IRC employee who had visited the hotel room on the morning of Tuesday, [illegible] October, established that subject had not been near his room at least since the day before. Subject's belongings, including the briefcase he took wherever he went, were in the room. Sternberg concluded that subject had left his hotel room Monday morning and had not returned since then. Sternberg invited us to inform the FBI. He had not expressed his suspicions to anybody but ourselves. We notified Sivess, who suggested Sternberg alert the FBI himself. We called Sternberg back and so advised him. Somewhat later, the FBI supervisor called us to pass the news to us. Around noon, Sternberg had a call from subject, who said he had chosen to return to Czechoslovakia. Subject answered in the affirmative when Sternberg inquired whether subject phoned from the Czechoslovak Mission to the U.N. The conversation was very short. Sternberg knew enough to inform INS and the FBI. He expressed the hope that the US Government would take steps to make sure that subject was exercising free choice. A number of telephone calls from INS and the FBI ensued, in which the latest developments were played back to us. This office notified Deputy Chief, Contact Division, by phone.

12. During the afternoon, INS advised that it had received an inquiry from the Hotel Le Marquis. Two Czechoslovak diplomats from the UN Mission were at the hotel and trying to claim subject's belongings. The hotel management wondered whether it should comply. INS already had checked with the FBI, which had expressed no interest. We thought that we might wish to go through his briefcase, but told the caller that we had to check with headquarters before giving him a reply. Our call reached [illegible], but the reply (negative) came from McConnell. After some 20 minutes, we therefore advised INS that CIA had no special wishes with regard to subject's belongings. Our advice was that the hotel management treat him exactly as any other John Doe.

13. Charles Sternberg phoned Fresni at the latter's home during the early evening hours. Sternberg expressed considerable concern about the possibility that a member of the Czechoslovak U.N. Mission had successfully approached subject and brought [illegible] pressure to bear on him, by giving him a letter from home or painting a black picture about his family's future if he remained in the West as a defector. Sternberg wanted assurances that the US Government mobilize all resources to protect subject from such coercion. Fresni pointed out that CIA was not involved in this aspect of the case and that Sternberg should deal with the appropriate Department of Justice agency, INS or FBI. He indicated that he had already called Mr. Esperdy, District Director of INS, but had not received very reassuring information. He indicated that the IRC had a responsibility first of all to subject and next to all refugees under its care to make sure that they receive proper US Government protection. He might therefore turn to some one "topside" in Washington. He also requested, however, that Fresni communicate this concern to higherups in CIA, which was promptly promised. A phone call to McDonnell at the latter's home (about 2000 hours on 9 October) took care of the matter.

14. There were no further developments on this case during that week. An inquiry from Sivess on [illegible] October (based on a vague report that subject had been offered $2,000 for a TV appearance in the US) led to a call to Sternberg on that day. Sternberg had not heard of any such offer and felt confident that it had not been extended to subject. He then commented on the second article concerning subject written by Peter Kihss of the New York Times. Since the Late City Edition carried a longer version than the City Edition (which is ordinarily sold in Washington), we are forwarding a clipping of this article (which appeared in the 11 October issue of the New York Times). Sternberg told us that subject's Czech emigre friends, Danes and Vesely, were responsible for the article. They had phoned the Czechoslovak U.N. Mission and asked to speak to subject. They had phoned the various airlines at Idlewild and established the departure via Air France. Finally, they had talked to Kihss about CIA involvement. All that IRC then could do was to issue the statement which was reprinted.

15. Sternberg used this occasion to retrace his own steps for us. On 8 and 9 October, he had been in touch with Van der Heuvel, who was then in Washington. He had talked to Mr. Noto at the Central Office, INS, twice on the morning of [illegible] October.

During the first conversation, Mr. [illegible] was not yet aware of subject's departure from the US. [illegible] said he would merely express the hope that subject was interviewed by a US Government official before his departure. It was academic now to worry about whether there had been any dirty tricks involved on the part of the Czechoslovak authorities in persuading subject to return. It was not completely impossible that subject himself took the initiative and called the Czechoslovak Mission to learn about his family.

for Jay [illegible]L. Reeves

WLFreund

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Chief, New York Office		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

[illegible] Brown sent a copy of the attached to me as a follow-up on our conversations in New York last week. Since Leo Cherne has been alerted, we recommend contact with him in the near future to discuss collection possibilities.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Deputy for Collection	23 Apr 63

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

(40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

F 5564

XXXXX 7EA

153 NYOR

SECRET

NYOR CITE WA 57685

FROM SUPPORT (STETSON)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

A 10188/ A 5564

SUBJECT: WILLIAM J. VANDEN HEUVEL, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

1. POLITICAL ACTION GROUP, COVERT ACTION STAFF HAS INITIATED A CLEARANCE REQUEST ON SUBJECT IN ORDER TO USE HIM AS A POLITICAL CONSULTANT. CA STAFF WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONCURRENCE IN THEIR CONTEMPLATED USE AND CONTACT WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL.

2. IN REPLY, PLEASE REFERENCE HH-8991.

SECRET

CFN WA 57685 STETSON 1 WILLIAM J. VANDEN HEUVEL A A CA HH-8991

Copy in jacket 10188/

F 3364

ZZZZZ PEA

S E C R E T

VIA CITE NYOR 6372

SUPPORT (TRAVIS) FROM MAJOR

CASE 37,473

S- 3364

MAR 11 1 28 PM '62

SUBJECT--BARBRO LISINSKI, NEE LARSSON-LAGERKVIST, BARBRO, HILMA, MARIA; INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE; STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN

AS PER REQUEST THE FOLLOWING IS BIO DATA ON SUBJECT.

DOB: 6 AUG 1918 POB: SURAHAMMAR, VASTMANLANDS LAN, SWEDEN

1925-29: ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, SURAHAMMAR, SWEDEN

1929-32: PRIVATE SECONDARY SCHOOL, SURAHAMMAR, SWEDEN

1932-36: HIGH SCHOOL "WHITLOCKSA SAMSKOLAN," STOCKHOLM

1936-39: PRACTICE AT DIFFERENT HOSPITALS, STOCKHOLM

1939-41: PRACTICE AS DENTIST ASSISTANT, STOCKHOLM

1941-43: "EASTMAN-INSTITUTET" SCHOOL FOR DENTIST ASSISTANTS, STOCKHOLM; DIPLOMA

1943-44: EMPLOYED AS DENTIST ASSISTANT, OSTERSUND

1944-46: "SOPHIAHEMMET" NURSERY-SCHOOL, STOCKHOLM

S- 32770

8 JUN 46 MARRIED DR. MICHAL LISINSKI, JOURNALIST, RADIO FREE EUROPE, STOCKHOLM

HOUSEWIFE WITH FOUR CHILDREN TO 1960.

JANUARY 1962 TO PRESENT, WITH INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, STOCKHOLM. HUSBAND IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF POLISH REFUGEE COUNCIL IN SWEDEN.

SUBJECT SPEAKS SWEDISH, ENGLISH, GERMAN AND SOME POLISH.

FILE-- CASE 37,473

S E C R E T

CFN 6372 SUPPORT (TRAVIS) MAJOR 37,473 BARBRO LISINSKI NEE LARSSON-LAGERKVIST BARBRO HILMA MARIA PER BIO DATA DOB 6 AUG 1918 POB SURAHAMMAR VASTMANLANDS LAN 1925-29 1929-32 1932-36 "WHITLOCKSA SAMSKOLAN 1936-39 1939-41 1941-43 "EASTMAN-INSTITUTET" 1943-44 OSTERSUND 1944-46 "SOPHIAHEMMET" 8 JUN 46 DR. MICHAL LISINSKI 1960 1962

37,473

32770

F5564

XXXXX 7EA

SECRET

PRITY VA CITE NYOR 6396

SUPPORT (FAUSEL) FROM MAJOR A101881

SUBJECT - HM-8582- WM. VANDEN HEUVAL

MAY 15 2 56 PM '62

SUBJECT NOT IN HIS OFFICE UNTIL 1600 BUT HAVE LEFT MESSAGE AS PER VA 55947. SHOULD THERE BE ANY CONFLICT WE WILL CALL YOU.

FILE- INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE S-5564

SECRET

CFN PRITY NYOR 6396 (FAUSEL) MAJOR HM-3582- WM. VANDEN HEUVAL NOT IN 1600 PER VA 55947 INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

BT

15/1844Z MAY ESG

1C

copy filed in
jacket #
101881

F-5564

ZZZZ TEA

CONFIDENTIAL

VA CITE NYCR 5947 A 48055

MCCONNELL AND CMB (YOUNG) FROM MAJOR 5-5564 A3702

SUBJECT - LEO CHERNE, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMM AND RESEARCH

INSTITUTE OF AMERICA.

INFEUR VA 55377 AND DENIAL OF FBIS WHITE BOOK TO SUBJECT.

IF YOU CAN'T SHIP THE WHITE BOOK SEND THE OTHER . SURELY THERE ARE AVAILABLE.

FILE - INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CFN NYCR 5947 MCCONNELL CMB (YOUNG) MAJOR LEO CHERNE COMM VA 55377 DENIAL OF FBIS CAN'T SHIP

copy filed - all jackets

F-5564

15 September 1961

Chief Contact Division
ATTN : Support/EE/USSR

Chief, Los Angeles Office

International Congress on Education of the Deaf

70479 S 70479

1. Dr. Edgar Lowell, a contact of ours at the John Tracy Clinic, 806 W. Adams Blvd., Los Angeles 7, California, where a great deal of electronic research is carried on concerning deafness, has advised us that he has been nominated as the Program Chairman for the International Congress on Education of the Deaf, which will be held in June 1963. The host for this Conference will be the Council on Education of the Deaf and the Congress will be held at Gallaudet College, Washington, D.C. The Coordinator for this International Congress will be Dr. Powrie V. Doctor of Gallaudet College, who will be working with the State Department on this particular Congress.

Case 5-5564

5-5564 A-100782

2. As Chairman of the Program Committee, Dr. Lowell will be required to go to Europe to attend a meeting of a similar European group planning their annual congress for about the same time, and will visit Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, England and Scandinavia to check on attendees. There is a possibility that he will also go to Yugoslavia at the same time.

3. As a side-line it is also possible that Dr. Lowell will go to Moscow where he will visit Prof. E.N. Sokolov, Institute of Defectology, Pogodina Str 8, Moscow G-117, USSR. Prof. Sokolov is well-known and has been active in previous Macey Conferences in which Dr. Aldrich and Jack Ford have been interested. We have reported through Dr. Lowell on both Sokolov and Prof. A. R. Luriya, and continuing correspondence between Sokolov and Dr. Lowell has also been reported.

4. The Soviets will be invited to this Congress and if the present cordial relationship still exists unaltered by world events, no doubt Sokolov and/or others will certainly be interested if not attend this meeting.

5. Enclosed is a rough outline of the program Dr. Lowell is responsible for which, of course, is still in the formative stage. Also a copy of the original letter sent out announcing the Congress is attached.

5. We would be interested in knowing your degree of interest in this particular matter, and entertain any suggestions you might have towards working with Dr. Lowell.

copy filed 70479, 100782

ERNST LEIBACHER

Attach: Outline of Program
Announcement letter
TBaldwin/bw

SECRET

1 5.56

Chief, Washington Office

14 Feb 62

Chief, Contact Division (Support)

New Case 37308

case 55564

A-100782

~~55564~~

1. EE/YA is interested in (FNU) Masovic, Yugoslav member of the World Federation of Deaf. They ask you contact your sources at Gallaudet College in Washington for any information they may have on Masovic, who according to a Los Angeles memorandum of 14 November 1961, is Yugoslav and well-known as a Mohammedan working in the area of the deaf. He was apparently co-chairman on a committee with Dr. Bernard Tervoort, a Jesuit priest, who is a PhD and a linguist, and a Dutch national. The two, Masovic and Dr. Tervoort met together in mid-October 1961 in Italy, at which time Masovic expressed a desire to defect.

S70479

2. To assist you in the assignment, we are attaching copy of the EE/YA memorandum of request and a copy of the Los Angeles memorandum of 14 November 1961, giving more details about the meeting between Dr. Tervoort and Masovic.

3. Gallaudet College will be host to the International Congress on Education of the Deaf and sources there may have information on the Masovic in question.

4. Many thanks in advance for your cooperation in this assignment. Please furnish information responsive by OO-A series reporting.

E. H. ASHCRAFT

ARichardson/rm
CC: Index
Attachments

Copy filed in
jacket #
70479, A. 782

SECRET

14-00000

F 5564

SEC

VA CITE NYOR 7719

SCIENTIFIC (WEST) FROM DANIELS

DEC 6 4 06 PM

5-5564

1. RE OUR TELECON WITH GUILL X GUILL,

A-74734

PETER COMANDURAS X PETER COMANDURAS, SECRETARY GENERAL, "MEDICO" X "MEDICO" (DIVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE) WILL CALL ON YOU NEXT WEEK.

2. REPEAT FOLLOWING POINTS

A. HE ONLY WANTS ADVICE WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN FUTURE COOPERATION WITH US.

B. HE HAS ALREADY TALKED WITH TRACY BARNES X TRACY BARNES ALONG GENERAL LINES.

C. UNWITTING TO HIM, ONE OF HIS MEN, TOM REAGAN X TOM REAGAN, MAY BE USED BY DD/P X DD/P IN LAOS X LAOS (SEE GRANT, SUPPORT X GRANT, SUPPORT), AND

D. TOM DOOLEY X TOM DOOLEY IS ONE OF THEIR ACE MONEY-GETTERS IN HIS LAOS OPERATION, AND IS DISSAPPROVED BY SO X SO (SEE CROWLEY X CROWLEY FOR FILL IN.) THESE ARE THE GAPS IN OUR CONVERSATION EARLIER TODAY.

1 C

Copy filed 74734

F 5564

CNF 703

NYOR CITE WA 40143

FROM EE/USSR (REAMS)

FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

S-5564 A 55548

FEB 24 3 [illegible] 63

ELLIOTT BEACH MACRAE X ELLIOTT BEACH MACRAE, PRESIDENT OF E. P. DUTTON X E. P. DUTTON WAS BRIEFED ON 20 X 20 FEBRUARY IN THE DD/I'S X DD/I'S OFFICE BY WALTER PFORZHEIMER X WALTER PFORZHEIMER, MESSRS. LOWERY AND KOEHNE OF OCI X MESSRS. LOWERY AND KOEHNE OF OCI, SHRYOCK OF ONE X SHRYOCK OF ONE, AND REAMS FOR 00/C X 00/C. DD/I WAS NOT X NOT PRESENT. BRIEFING WAS RESULT OF LETTER FROM MACRAE TO DCI IN WHICH HE NOTED HIS PLAN TO LEAVE 13 X 13 MARCH FOR BOOK-HUNTING TRIP TO LONDON AND PARIS. FOLLOWING THIS BUSINESS TRIP, HE WILL SPEND THREE OR FOUR DAYS EACH IN BELGRADE, SOFIA, BUDAPEST, AND BUCHAREST, "JUST FOR FUN." IN LETTER TO DCI, MACRAE APPARENTLY SOLICITED GUIDANCE SO BRIEFING WAS NOT X NOT REALLY AN INTELLIGENCE ONE BUT A MATTER OF PROVIDING ANSWERS TO SUCH QUESTIONS AS:

(A) CAN I TAKE A TRANSISTOR RADIO AND A CAMERA INTO BULGARIA WITHOUT HAVING THEM APPROPRIATED?

(B) SHOULD I HAVE A TYPHUS SHOT?

(C) IS WATER IN BULGARIA AND RUMANIA POTABLE?

(D) WHO IS THE "SHAKESPEARE" OF BULGARIA (A TOUGH ONE, THAT)?

(E) WHAT IS THE USUAL ATTITUDE OF BULGARIANS AND RUMANIANS

TO US VISITORS?

PFORZHEIMER DID TELL MACRAE THAT WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN INFO ON BULGARIAN AND RUMANIAN PUBLISHING BUSINESSES AND THEIR PERSONALITIES AND IN ANY POSTAL GUIDES OR BOOK CATALOGUES HE MIGHT COLLECT INSIDE IRON CURTAIN. AFTER MEETING, REAMS CANVASSED CONSUMERS RE INTEREST IN SUBMITTING REQUIREMENTS FOR PRESENTATION BY NYFO. IT WAS AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT NO Y NO INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING WAS INDICATED, ALTHOUGH A DEBRIEFING ON HIS RETURN WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

copy filed # 55546

SECRET

F-5564

Chief, Contact Division
For : Support Branch

15 October 1958

Chief, New York Office

Resident of Vienna, Austria - Possible DDP Lead

A source of ours suggested that a Paul Heber, Vienna, Bosendorfer Strasse 9, who works for the International Rescue Committee, could be helpful to us.

S5564

JAY B. L. REEVES

NHGraber:es

SECRET

F 5564

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief, Contact Division

Chief, Wilmington Office

Joseph Kovago, Ex-Mayor of Budapest

[redacted]

ATTN: EE/USSR Branch A66377

20 November 1957

NO: 57-402

1. Upon reading an article appearing in a Wilmington daily newspaper (copy attached), J. Jacobs visited ex-mayor of Budapest Joseph Kovago and got the following information:

A19216

2. "Ex-Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy was asked by the Free Europe Committee to form a new Hungarian Committee which will replace the two committees now in existence. The new committee is being formed because the Free Europe Committee wishes to economize and representation from several Hungarian political parties is wanted.

3. "Since I do not dare correspond with friends and relatives in Hungary and the US government is interested in current information on Hungary, I think I can give the name of an individual who is living in Vienna and is truly an 'operator.' His name is Dr. Thomas Pasztor. I believe he can be useful to the US because I recommended him for the purpose of gathering information on Hungary to Mr. David Martin of the International Rescue Committee. Most of the information gathered by Pasztor was used by IRC in reports on Hungary to the United Nations.

S-5564

4. "Pasztor's address is I. Jakobergasse 4.III.18, Vienna, Austria, telephone 522-0-455. I am able to give the following biographic data on Pasztor: aged 46, divorced, official of the Pfeiffer Party after he was kicked out of the Smallholders Party, arrested for anti-Communist activities in 1948 or 1949, He was convicted and sentensed to death which was later commuted to life imprisonment. He was in the same political prisons with me at Vac and the Gyuto prison in Budapest.

5. "While in prison he was a 'double-dealer' and most prisoners liked him but distrusted him. He seemed to be able to find out about all news both inside and outside the prison. He was released from prison during the destalinization period and escaped to the West during the revolution.

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy filed #19216 + 66377

6. "He has been sending typewritten news reports on Hungary to several individuals in the US and Europe. I have received copies in both Hungarian and English. I sent the English copy to Mr. David Martin, IRC in New York. He does not charge for the service, but I remember seeing some of his news items in Hungarian newspapers after receiving his report. Pasztor tells me that he is in financial straits and asked that I try to help him find someone who could use his service.

7. "The 15 June 1957 issue is titled 'Picture of the Hungarian Situation' and it covers information on (a) General Situation; (b) Internal Politics; (c) The Terror, Public Opinion, Resistance; (d) Military Situation; (e) Peoples Economy, Industry and Agriculture; and (f) Miscellaneous news.

8. "I cannot vouch for his sincerity or loyalty but I would say that about 95% of him is good and the remaining 5% of him is questionable."

9. Enclosed for your retention is the above-mentioned news issue and you can use it for what it is worth. We shall be glad to get more detailed information if you wish.

HUDSON D. DRAVO

JJacobs/lmc
Attachment: as above

CONFIDENTIAL

F 5564

COPY

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

255 Fourth Avenue

New York 10, N.Y.

5564

October 4, 1957

Mr. James MacCracken
Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.
989 Eighth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. MacCracken:

I thought you would like to know that the International Rescue Committee has organized a Commission of distinguished Americans who will visit Europe to investigate the refugee situation and issue a report on their return. We envision that the Commission's report would highlight the following factors.

1. The conditions and needs of those Forgotten Men who have been sitting in refugee camps for years or who are inadequately resettled outside of camps. A portion of the report will be devoted to the Hungarian refugees who are still in camps.

2. Make specific and general recommendations as to what can be done in the future to meet the needs of the "Forgotten Men".

Aside from highlighting the factors just mentioned, we feel that the Commission's report can serve, among others, the following constructive purposes.

1. By dramatizing and humanizing the problems of European Escapees, we believe that the Commission can help to create a climate of public opinion conducive to:

    a. More generous support for U.S. programs concerned with the refugees, both private and governmental.

    b. More flexible immigration legislation.

2. The report of the commission will, of course, incorporate information from the survey now being prepared by the UNHCR. Indeed, we feel that the Commission can be of great assistance to the UNHCR by bringing his report and the refugee situation in general to the attention of the American

public. We believe that the commission is especially qualified to fulfill this function since they are a group of private Americans talking to fellow Americans.

The Commission will leave for Europe on October 15th and return on October 31st. Enclosed you will find their tentative schedule and a list of Commission members as of this date. In addition to the observations of the Commission, their final report will, of course, also represent intensive research on the part of our staff.

We have asked our overseas representatives, in the countries which the Commission will be visiting, to provide at least one opportunity for representatives of your organization to meet with the Commission if they wish to do so. If your representatives desire to meet with the Commission to discuss some specific aspect of the refugee problem, I suggest that they contact our representative in the country where they are stationed.

I have not been in a position to write to you about the Commission before this since the Commission plans have just been finalized. If you desire further information, I am at your service.

Sincerely yours,

s/ Robert J. MacAlister
Executive Director

RJM:mim
Enc.

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION OF THE I. R. C.

Mr. Harold Zellerbach, Chairman
Chairman, Executive Committee, Crown Zellerbach Corporation

The Honorable Angier Biddle Duke, Co-Chairman
President of the International Rescue Committee
Former Ambassador to El Salvador

The Honorable Eugenia Anderson
Former United States Ambassador to Denmark

Mr. Irving Brown
European Representative of the A.F.of L. - C.I.O.

Dr. Jane C. Carey
Political Scientist; Authority on refugee affairs

Mrs. David Levy
Member of the New York State Youth Commission

Mr. Eugene Lyons
Senior Editor, Readers Digest

The Very Reverend James A. Pike, D.D.
Dean of the Cathedral of St. John The Divine, New York, N.Y.

Commission Staff:

Mr. John Alexander-Sinclair
European Director of the International Rescue Committee

Mr. David Martin
Rapporteur

14-00000

5584

FOR :	Chief, Contact Division Alien Branch (Stetson)	21 June 1957 NH-1119
BY :	Chief, New York Office New Haven Resident Agent	
REF :	Ferenc Zeliesz (A-10-971-658) 460816 Guide 220, Operation Goulash	

A61584

1. Our attention was invited by Mrs. Steven Magyar, vice president and program director of the International Rescue Committee (Connecticut) to the fact that subject individual acted as secretary (sic) of propaganda at the factory known as Elektromos Veszulekek es Meromuszerek Gyara, and that he is now living somewhere in the Hartford area. She added that when he first got to Austria he was so frightened lest he be refused entry to the US that when he was asked whether he had any Communist connections he said he did not. 5-5564

2. A check with I & NS in Hartford indicated that this man was born 24 March 1923, had been under investigation back in February, that the case was closed, that the file indicated he was again under investigation as of April and that the case was evidently still open. It was also indicated that he was in the New Haven area, but there was no local address available.

3. FYI Mrs. Magyar opined that Zelless might be deported, which indicates she knows he is being looked over. This information did not come from us.

CHARLES A. LEA

RTBarnard/jc

copy inabove jackets

2

14-00000

F5564

DATE 4/30/67

John Gates S-5564

SS

22870

14-00000

SECRET

F 5564

21 FEB 1957

Chief, New York Field Office

Chief, Contact Division (Alien)

4554

John Alexander-Sinclair - European Director for Hungarian Relief for the International Rescue Committee 5564 5-5

REF: Your memorandum dated 14 January 1957; Subject: International Rescue Committee

In response to your request in the memorandum cited above, we initiated a name check on subject with Records Integration Division (RI), DD/P, hoping that you could tell your source we had no derogatory information on subject. As you know, any positive information of this type obtained from the DD/P cannot be disseminated outside the Agency. Although the attached reply, for the most part, is not derogatory, we regret that you cannot pass it on to your source. However, it is forwarded for your information.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Enclosure:
As stated above

SStetson:bls

Distribution:
2 - Addressee (w/encl.)
1 - Chrono (Alien)
1 - M/C
1 - Index

FILE: Leo Cherne A 45058

SECRET

[redacted]

SUBJECT: ALEXANDER-SINCLAIR, John

1. Reference is made to the name check request from your office dated 28 January 1957, for information concerning John ALEXANDER-SINCLAIR. The files of this office and those of a predecessor organization contain considerable information concerning Subject, the major part of which is not derogatory. This information includes reports of Subject's personal views as of January 1943 on political and economic conditions in Shanghai, China, which could be made available to your office upon request. Following is information which may be deemed derogatory in one case and of intelligence interest in the other.

2. A usually reliable source reported in September 1951 that Subject, then the director of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and an official at the British Foreign Office, accompanied the High Commissioner to Italy on his first unofficial trip in July 1951. Source stated that Subject was not at all tactful in his dealings with Italian officials and thus he met passive resistance. Furthermore, acting on behalf of the Commissioner and very eager to put at once as many British agents as possible into positions under the Commissioner's cover, Subject appointed Manuel DE BEAR, Chairman of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) Review Board, to the position of representative in Italy. According to Source, this annoyed Prince DEL DRAGO, Italian envoy to IRO in Geneva, Switzerland, who stated that as long as IRO was functioning, there would be no other refugee representative working in Italy and that, after all, the Commissioner had to be first recognized by the Government. DE BEAR was said to be "persona non grata" to the Italians.

3. According to a report dated 7 January 1954 from a fairly reliable source, it had been reported by various sub-sources that John ALEXANDER, British, Delegate to Italy of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Refugees, was a person to be considered rather politically dubious. According to Source, on several occasions he had been excessively interested in favoring foreigners in Italy who had received expulsion notices as a result of their commercial activity and political contacts with Iron Curtain countries. Source stated that Subject was further reported to be on very friendly terms with Italians and non-Italians who were clearly oriented toward the parties of the extreme left.

CS CI-3743231

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

5564

CITE NYOR 6111

SUPPORT FROM SNITZER

CASE [illegible]

[illegible] MAY BE OF INTEREST:

A-11 55534 A52346

A SHORT TIME AGO SOCONY PLEDGED $.5,000 X $.5,000 TO ANGIER B. DUKE'S X ANGIER B. DUKE'S INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE FOR ASSISTANCE OF HUNGARIAN REFUGEES. AS A FOLLOW-UP THEY ADVISED THEIR AUSTRIAN AFFILIATE OF THE ACTION. THE REACTION FROM AUSTRIA WAS THAT THE PLEDGE SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN IMMEDIATELY OR IF THAT WAS NOT X NOT POSSIBLE, THE FACT SHOULD NOT X NOT BE PUBLICIZED. REASON FOR THIS WAS THE AN AD HAD APPEARED IN THE PARIS TRIBUNE SOLICITING FUNDS FOR THE IRC X IRC AND STATING THAT THE MONEY WAS TO BE USED FOR THE SUPPORT OF HUNGARIAN PARTISANS FIGHTING AGAINST THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT (NO X NO MENTION MADE THAT IT WAS FOR ASSISTANCE TO HUNGARIAN REFUGEES IN AUSTRIA). THE AUSTRIAN REACTION TO THIS AD WAS THAT WHILE SUCH A CONTRIBUTION MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA THEY DID NOT X NOT WANT TO BE ACCUSED BY THE SOVIETS OF ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE FIGHTING. SOCONY WITHDREW THE PLEDGE AND GAVE THE MONEY TO THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT FUND TO ASSIST THE REFUGEES.

SOCONY'S REACTION WAS THAT IRC X IRC SHOULD BE A LITTLE MORE ACCURATE IN THEIR SOLICITING CAMPAIGN.

2C

Cyrus in #11 & 53346

SECRET

F 5564

11 FEB 1957

TO: OO/C
Attention: Miss Shirley Stetson

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: ALEXANDER-SINCLAIR, John S-5564

1. Reference is made to the name check request from your office dated 28 January 1957, for information concerning John ALEXANDER-SINCLAIR. The files of this office and those of a predecessor organization contain considerable information concerning Subject, the major part of which is not derogatory. This information includes reports of Subject's personal views as of January 1943 on political and economic conditions in Shanghai, China, which could be made available to your office upon request. Following is information which may be deemed derogatory in one case and of intelligence interest in the other.

2. A usually reliable source reported in September 1951 that Subject, then the director of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and an official at the British Foreign Office, accompanied the High Commissioner to Italy on his first unofficial trip in July 1951. Source stated that Subject was not at all tactful in his dealings with Italian officials and thus he met passive resistance. Furthermore, acting on behalf of the Commissioner and very eager to put at once as many British agents as possible into positions under the Commissioner's cover, Subject appointed Marcel DE BEAR, Chairman of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) Review Board, to the position of representative in Italy. According to Source, this annoyed Prince DEL DRAGO, Italian envoy to IRO in Geneva, Switzerland, who stated that as long as IRO was functioning, there would be no other refugee representative working in Italy and that, after all, the Commissioner had to be first recognized by the Government. DE BEAR was said to be "persona non grata" to the Italians.

3. According to a report dated 7 January 1954 from a fairly reliable source, it had been reported by various sub-sources that John ALEXANDER, British, Delegate to Italy of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Refugees, was a person to be considered rather politically dubious. According to Source, on several occasions he had been excessively interested in favoring foreigners in Italy who had received expulsion notices as a result of their commercial activity and political contacts with Iron Curtain countries. Source stated that Subject was further reported to be on very friendly terms with Italians and non-Italians who were clearly oriented toward the parties of the extreme left.

CS CI-3743231

SECRET

-11

[illegible]

14-00000

25 January 1957

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : FS/P David Lu

Chief, New York Office

Case S-46083

S-5564

Herbert Partridge, 50 E. 56th Street, New York, N. Y.

46083

1. Peter White reports that subject has injected himself into the affairs of American Friends of Vietnam in a manner which he considers to be suspiciously like that of an intelligence agent. Since the subject is a former British subject but now a naturalized citizen, he poses the questions to whether he might not be a long-term British agent. Peter reports that subject is seeing Duc-Thonh regularly and is a close friend of Prince Buu-hoi. Subject was a friend of President Diem when he was in this country.

2. Subject has stated that he has money which he wants to invest in Vietnam His present occupation is that of button manufacturer with which he has had considerable success.

3. We admit that this is a little bit like seeing a bogey-man behind every bush but are a little curious as to the prospects for button manufacturing in Vietnam. We are only passing this on for what it is worth, which is probably not much.

Charles A. Lee

CCMajor:dy

1c copy filed # 46083

d. A publication entitled "Livre Noir". This is a Dai Viet black book against Diem, a copy of which, according to du Berrier, was given to Vice President Nixon during his last visit to Saigon. du Berrier says that there is a third portion of the book which he does not have.

e. Press release, 25 September 1956, distributed by Dai Viet Party from Paris.

3. It is our impression that du Berrier has little to say by way of analysis that differs from the standard Dai Viet statements. du Berrier makes no effort to hide his admiration for Hoan and his people. He says that in time, either Hoan or the Communists will win out in Vietnam and that if Hoan wins, he will need a couple of friends in the US. The implication seems plain that du Berrier plans on being one of those "friends".

4. It seems to us that the best course on handling this material is to send the whole batch to you in order to determine whether or not any of it is worth reporting or placing on file. We will furnish report elements for any of this material which is found reportable. If you find that copies of Hoan's letters might be desired, they could possibly be obtained from du Berrier at such times as he is in New York.

Charles A. Lea

GPRoss:mmk

Enclosures as stated

F-5564

Chief, Contact Division 25 January 1957

ATTN : McConnell

Chief, New York Office

A68C14

Clandestine Operations in New York by Agency Personnel

S-55741

1. Our contact in the Harold Oram Agency public relations office advises that a Mr. Rufus Phillips who is connected with psychological warfare activities of the Agency, has been in contact with Oram and his agency for the purpose of arranging distribution of a film which was made in Vietnam and is concerned with the communist methods of operating in an agrarian community. Phillips was formerly in Vietnam under cover.

2. Our contact further advises that one John Gates, a former member of CIA in the Saigon station, was used by Oram as the narrator for the movie at a recent private showing. This same John Gates is reported by our contact to be extremely indiscreet insofar as security matters are concerned. Our contact is somewhat concerned that Gates will inadvertently reveal that he (Peter White) was connected with CIA while he was in Vietnam. Peter's experience with Gates' indescretion dates back to his visit in Vietnam at which time Gates told his girl friend about what Peter was doing. (This has been previously reported.)

A-46153 S-5564

3. John Gates is now working part-time for the International Rescue Committee?

[illegible] - 5564

4. The film in question which now bears the title "The Fire and the Shadow" was in part or wholly financed by CIA. The Oram Agency has arranged distribution for showings in Formosa and Korea. The Oram Agency has had professional movie makers take a look at it for possible showing in the US. The professionals were highly critical and completely discouraged any attempt to have it distributed in the US.

5. We assume that Headquarters OO/C was not advised of this out of channels approach since the NYFO had not received any word of same. As you know Harold Oram and his Agency has been a contact of the NYFO for many years.

Charles A. Lea

CCMajor:mmk

[illegible]

F-5564

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Alien and Support Branches

14 January 1957

Chief, New York Office

International Rescue Committee -5564

A-48653

1. We have just recently received a letter from Mr. Leo Cherne of subject committee, advising us that their European Director, Mr. Joseph Buttinger, is returning from Austria and will no longer be in charge of the Hungarian Relief. He also advises that they have just appointed Mr. John Alexander-Sinclair as European Director for Hungarian Relief. Attached please find photostat of the resumé of Mr. Alexander's experience and background.

A-51202

A-45-5564

2. Will you please see that this information is made available to those persons in the Agency, who might be interested.

3. We quote one paragraph of Mr. Cherne's letter to us, and if it is within the realm of possibility, we would appreciate any advice you might have.

4. "Just as a matter of formality, however, and since the arrangement will be reviewed in a matter of months, I am anxious to know whether there may be any reason to feel that our haste was unfortunate. At the same time I do wish to advise you of his appointment and that his headquarters will be in Vienna. I am enclosing a copy of his summary of background and would appreciate hearing anything from you that seems relevant."

Charles A. Lea

CCMajor:dp
Enclosure

Copy in 80578 + 51202

2C

CONFIDENTIAL

F 5564

January 11, 1957

To: OO/C
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Mr. Carl Martin

Subject: Information on Defection of North Koreans in Hungary to the Side of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters

S-5564

The Department has received information from a source in the International Rescue Committee that some North Koreans resident in Hungary defected to and sided with the Hungarian Freedom Fighters. Three recent Hungarian refugees, reported eyewitnesses to these defections, are now resident in the United States, as follows:

A-16466

~~S-5564~~ 1. Thomas Orley, who can be contacted through the International Rescue Committee, New York

S-48505 2. James Ambory presently studying at Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York A-48505

S-48505 3. Ssaba Gall, presently studying at Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York ✓

The Department is very much interested in additional information on this subject, for example: Who were those who defected? (Students, industrial trainees, members of government missions, etc.) How many defected? How many are known not to have defected when given the opportunity? (In other words, how widespread were defections?) If defectors had any important positions, information on persons and positions is desired. What were the circumstances of the defection? What appeared to be the motivations for defection?

The Department would also be interested in information, if procurable, on the number and type of North Koreans in Hungary or other Satellites.

We would appreciate your handling this on a priority basis.

Stanley E. Smigel
Chief, CIA Liaison Branch
Division of Acquisition and Distribution

copy filed # 48505

CONFIDENTIAL

5770

F 5-5764

ESC NR17 PRIORITY 101759Z

PRIORITY

CONF 082

HOUS CITE WA 12868

HAYNES FROM DELANEY

RE HOUS 851 X 851

BEN, WE HAVE TO TAKE THE SAME POSITION ON THIS REQUEST AS WE DO WITH ANY REQUEST TO PASS DEROGATORY INFORMATION TO SOURCES. AS YOU KNOW WE CAN'T PASS ALONG ANY INFORMATION THAT WE WOULD GET FROM SECURITY FILES BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT MUCH OF IT COMES FROM THE SECURITY OFFICES OF OTHER AGENCIES. ALSO A LOT OF THE DOPE IN SECURITY OFFICE FILES IS COMPLETELY UNSUBSTANTIATED AND ITS USE IN A CASE LIKE THIS COULD CONCEIVABLY DO A DISSERVICE TO AN ORGANIZATION. I SUGGEST AS WE DO IN ALL OF THESE CASES THAT YOU REFER YOUR LOCAL GROUP TO THE LOCAL FBI X FBI. IN THIS WAY THEY CAN GET BETTER INFORMATION THAN WE COULD SUPPLY, EVEN IF WE WERE ALLOWED TO PASS IT ALONG.

10/1753Z

International Rescue Committee, Inc. 5-55-64

1-5564

[illegible]

SUBJECT: Hungarian and North Korean [illegible] Korean Students Participation in the Hungarian Revolution

The following three Hungarian students are reported to be able to furnish eye-witness information that North Korean students in Budapest joined the freedom fighters. USIA would appreciate any information that OO/C may be able to obtain from the students regarding this.

S-5564 ~~MS~~ S-5564 S-5564 (PK)

Thomas Gabor, in care of Mrs. [illegible] Fulton, International [illegible], New York City, or through Secretary to Dan Chorna, Bard

S-48505 A-48505 A 48038

James Amber, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson

S-48505

Csaba Gall, Bard College A-48505

These are not their real names but they will be recognized by IIC or Bard College by these names.

[illegible] 48565

[illegible] USIA, IOI/C [illegible]

H. A. Carroll
Chief, [illegible]
Liaison Division

14-00000

NC2

TO: MC[illegible] IPS WASH

FM: DAVY IPS NY

Ja 15 1 2 PM '57

///SCRIPT ASKED///

ORLEY INTVW

NEW YORK JANUARY 15--ONE OF HUNGARY'S LEADING ATHLETES WHO FOUGHT IN THE FREEDOM REVOLT SAYS NORTH KOREAN, COMMUNIST CHINESE AND VIET MINH STUDENTS WERE AMONG THE SYMPATHIZERS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SOVIET INTERVENTION LAST FALL.

IN AN INTERVIEW HERE TODAY, FORMER FENCING CHAMPION THOMAS ORLEY RECALLED THAT "PRACTICALLY EVERYONE NOT INVOLVED IN THE ACTUAL FIGHTING" LENT SUPPORT BEHIND THE SCENES TO THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS. HE COULD NOT RECALL SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THIS "PASSIVE RESISTANCE" BECAUSE AT THE TIME HE WAS "TOO BUSY FENDING OFF SOVIET TROOPS AND TANKS WITH SMALL ARMS." BUT ACCORDING TO THE 23-YEAR OLD REFUGEE ATHLETE AND STUDENT, THE TIDE WAS DEFINITELY FOR FREEDOM --ONLY THE OVERPOWERING FORCE OF SOVIET ARMOR AND ARTILLERY REINFORCEMENTS MANAGED TO HOLD UP THE COMMUNIST PUPPET REGIME.

WHEN THE FIRST WAVE OF THE REVOLT BROKE OUT IN BUDAPEST, ORLEY WAS ON LEAVE FROM THE UNIVERSITY AT AN OLYMPIC TRAINING CAMP IN TATA. HE SAID HE AND OTHER ATHLETES AT THE CAMP HEARD THE NEWS OF THE FIGHTING OVER WESTERN RADIO BROADCASTS. IT CAME JUST BEFORE THEIR SCHEDULED RETURN TO BUDAPEST. ORLEY AND SOME OF THE OTHER ATHLETES JOINED THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS AS SOON AS THEIR OLYMPIC TEAM BUSES RETURNED TO BUDAPEST. THE ATHLETES WERE RETURNED TO THE CAPITAL TO PREPARE FOR DEPARTURE TO THE AUSTRALIAN OLYMPIC GAMES.

THE YOUNG HUNGARIAN SAID BOTH THE STUDENTS AND WORKERS ANTICIPATED THE SECOND ONSLAUGHT OF THE SOVIET TROOPS IN EARLY NOVEMBER, DESPITE OFFICIAL CLAIMS THAT THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT WAS NEGOTIATING FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL.

THE STUDENTS PREPARED FOR THE SECOND ROUND OF FIGHTING WITH SMALL ARMS COLLECTED FROM THE MILITARY ARMORY AND THE FACTORIES IN BUDAPEST. ONE MAJOR SOURCE OF SUPPLY, ORLEY NOTED, WAS A "SO-CALLED LAMP FACTORY" FROM WHICH THE WORKERS THEMSELVES TOOK THE ARMS THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS NEEDED.

IN THOSE FEW DAYS BETWEEN NOVEMBER 4 AND 8, ORLEY RECALLED, THE SHEER MIGHT OF WELL OVER A THOUSAND SOVIET TANKS TURNED THE TIDE. HE SAID "NO FIGHTERS, NO MATTER HOW BRAVE CAN WIN OUT WITH SMALL ARMS AGAINST HEAVY ARMOR."

BY NOVEMBER 10, THE YOUNG FREEDOM FIGHTER AND HIS CLASSMATES DISCOVERED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN OVER MANY OF THE RAILROAD STATIONS. HE SAID LONG EXPERIENCE WITH THE COMMUNISTS CONVINCED THEM THAT DEPORTATIONS HAD BEGUN, AND HE AND A FRIEND DECIDED TO TRY TO ESCAPE.

ORLEY SAID THIS WAS A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR HIM BECAUSE OF HIS FAMILY. IT WAS ESPECIALLY HARD TO SAY GOODBYE TO HIS FATHER SINCE ORLEY'S TWO BROTHERS HAD ALSO FLED HUNGARY IN 1947--ONE TO BOLIVIA AND THE OTHER TO AUSTRALIA. THOMAS' FATHER WAS FORMERLY A WORLD CHAMPION SKEET SHOOTER, A PRE-WAR FIELD MARSHALL IN THE HUNGARIAN ARMY AND A LEADER IN THE NON-COMMUNIST FREEHOLDERS PARTY. BECAUSE OF HIS BACKGROUND, THE COMMUNISTS HAD FORCED HIM INTO A HARD FACTORY JOB DESPITE HIS ADVANCING YEARS.

NO MATTER WHAT HE DID AFTER THE REVOLT, THOMAS SAID, HE KNEW THE COMMUNISTS WOULD RETALIATE. DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF

REVOLT HE [illegible] A QUICK LOOK AT THE [illegible]AL RECORD COMMUNISTS HAD [illegible] ON HIM AT THE UNIVERSITY. THE YOUNG REFUGEE THE COMMUNISTS HAD FOUND "MANY BLACK MARKS" AGAINST HIM IN VEN-YEAR RECORD COVERING ALL PHASES OF HIS DAILY ACTIVITIES OM TRIPS ABROAD WITH THE FENCING TEAM TO CONVERSATIONS IN TAURANTS.

IN YOUNG ORLEY'S VIEW, IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE HE HAD WON THE WORLD ING CHAMPIONSHIP AT CREMONA, ITALY IN 1954 AND BECAUSE HAD KEPT UP HIS STUDIES AS A BADLY NEEDED STUDENT OF PHARMACY T ACTION HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN AGAINST HIM.

AT THE TIME ORLEY AND HIS FRIEND DECIDED TO HEAD FOR THE BORDER, SAID SOME 60,000 HUNGARIANS ALREADY HAD FLED TO AUSTRIA. THOSE O HAD LIVED NEAR ENOUGH TO THE BORDER KNEW THE LAND AND MADE EIR WAY TO FREEDOM WITH LITTLE OPPOSITION. BUT OTHERS HAD TO KE THEIR WAY FROM BUDAPEST.

ON NOVEMBER 10, THOMAS AND HIS FRIEND DRESSED IN WORKERS OTHING AND MANAGED TO BOARD A TRAIN--ONE OF THE FEW STILL ADING TO THE WEST. THEY TRAVELLED TO THE FIRST TOWN OUTSIDE DAPEST WITHOUT BEING STOPPED. THERE, THEY HITCHED A RIDE WITH TRUCK DRIVER WHO WAS HEADED FOR THE BORDER AND ASKED NO ESTIONS. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE STOPPED "SIX OR SEVEN TIMES" BY E SOVIET SOLDIERS THEY TRAVELLED WITH THE TRUCK TO WITHIN 30 ILES OF THE BORDER.

FOR THE FINAL STRETCH THE TWO ESCAPING STUDENTS WERE JOINED Y A YOUNG COUPLE. ALL FOUR OF THEM TRAVELLED BY FOOT FOR TWO AYS TO COVER THEIR LAST 30 MILES.

YOUNG ORLEY SAID THE MINES HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE BORDER, BUT BETWEEN THE WATCH TOWERS OF THE [illegible] AND THE [illegible]

THERE WAS A DANGEROUS OPEN STRETCH OF LAND WITHIN EASY RIFLE SHOT. AS THE FOUR DASHED ACROSS THE LAST OPEN STRETCH, SHOTS RANG OUT. THE YOUNG WOMAN IN THEIR PARTY NEVER REACHED THE AUSTRIAN SIDE. ORLEY SAID THEY TRIED TO FIND OUT WHETHER SHE HAD BEEN KILLED. BUT WHEN THE AUSTRIANS RELAYED THEIR QUERIES, THE COMMUNIST GUARDS DENIED THEY HAD FIRED A SINGLE SHOT.

ALL ALONG THEIR ESCAPE ROUTE, ORLEY RECALLED, FARMERS AND WORKERS, VIRTUALLY WITHOUT EXCEPTION, TOLD THEM WHICH ROADS WERE SAFEST AND WHERE THE SOVIET SOLDIERS WERE STANDING GUARD.

THE YOUNG ATHLETE "WILL NEVER FORGET HIS FEELING" ON REACHING AUSTRIA ALIVE. "IT WAS AS IF A GREAT ROCK HAD FALLEN FROM MY HEART AND EVERYONE COULD HEAR THE THUNDER," HE SAID.

ORLEY CONSIDERS HIMSELF "LUCKY" TO HAVE A CHANCE TO BUILD A NEW LIFE IN THE U.S. ON HIS TRIPS ABROAD WITH THE OLYMPIC TEAM, HE SAID, HE HAD HEARD MUCH ABOUT THE MODERN, PROGRESSIVE UNITED STATES. BUT WHAT HE DID NOT KNOW BEFOREHAND, HE EXPLAINED, WAS "THE WONDERFUL FREEDOM OF LIFE HERE." "I CAN SAY WHAT I CHOOSE AND WORK AT WHAT I CHOOSE," ORLEY POINTED OUT. "IF I WANT TO TRY TO BECOME A RICH MAN, I CAN DO IT, IF I PREFER TO LIVE A QUIET MODEST LIFE, I CAN DO THAT TOO."

THOMAS IS TEMPORARILY WORKING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE ON ITS HUNGARIAN REFUGEE RELIEF PROGRAM. IN FEBRUARY, HE HOPES TO BEGIN STUDYING CHEMISTRY AT THE CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. MEANWHILE, HE HAS CONTACTED THREE OTHER HUNGARIAN OLYMPIC ATHLETES WHO ARE IN THE U.S. TOGETHER, THEY PLAN TO FORM A NEW FENCING TEAM FOR WHICH SPORT RATHER THAN IDEOLOGY WILL BE THEIR INSPIRATION. ITEM

F 5564

ESE NR16 ROUTINE 1117452

CONF 384

'57 NOV 11 11 AM

HOUS CITE WA 12913

MOORE FROM DELANEY

S-5564

RE HOUS 851 X 851 FURTHER INVESTIGATION HERE IN HEADQUARTERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE DISCLOSED THAT THIS OUTFIT IS HEADED BY GENERAL WILLIAM DONOVAN X WILLIAM DONOVAN FORMER HEAD OF OSS X OSS AND HAS BEEN OF ASSISTANCE TO US IN SEVERAL RESETTLEMENT CASES. WHILE THIS DOES NOT X NOT ANSWER YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AND EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE NOT X NOT CLEARED THE OUTFIT PER SE IT DOES INDICATE THAT THE IRC X IRC IS A RESPONSIBLE GROUP WITH WHOM WE ARE DOING BUSINESS. DELANEY SHOULD HAVE MADE THE CHECKS WHICH DISCLOSED THE ABOVE BEFORE SENDING OUT HIS INITIAL RESPONSE TO YOUR HOUS 851 X 851.

A-4871

11/1841Z

copy filed #4871

F 5564

ESW NR08 PRIORITY GR71 101610Z HO DTG...101530Z

PRIORITY

SEC

JAN 10 11 [illegible] AM '57

VA CITE HOUS 851

CORIDEN FM HAYNES

5-5564

CAN YOU TELL US WHETHER OR NOT THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, INC. X INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, INC., 62 WEST 45 STREET X 62 WEST 45 STREET, NEW YORK, HAS EVER BEEN CITED FOR, OR SUSPECTED OF, LEFTIST LEANINGS? LOCAL GROUP CONCERNED WITH HUNGARIAN RESETTLEMENT WANTS ADVICE AS TO HOW TO REACT TO PROPOSALS OF THE COMMITTEE.

HO TOT: 10/1532Z

ESW TOT: 10/1612Z

CLR

Confidential

Memo to the files

Subject: State's memo of 11 Jan 57

Practically the same requirement that is contained in the attached memo had previously been received from OCR as an USIA requirement. On the latter we told OCR (Sturbits) that since the names of the people given were not their correct names we could not take action on the requirement since we need the right names to get an FBI clearance. USIA later told OCR to consider the requirement withdrawn and USIA would contact the tree people. I told Smigel's office of the USIA business and suggested that they contact USIA since it would look bad for all of us to be contacting the three people about the same thing. Smigel's office will do so. I told Carl Martin of the above developments and he took an autostat copy of State's memo to Camp Kilmer.

1/14/57
Talked to Simmons in Smigel's office. He agreed that we could forget requirement

To [illegible]
[illegible]

12/9/03

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

NAME (Last, first, m. i.)
TAPAK, Gustav use S-5564

COUNTRY OF ASYLUM
Germany

AGENCY
IRC S-5564

PRESENT ADDRESS
Labor Service Co. 4203, Bruchmuehlbach/Pfalz, Germany

PLACE OF BIRTH
Liesek, Czechoslovakia

DATE OF BIRTH
Feb. 4, 1928

COUNTRY FROM ESCAPE
Czechoslovakia

DATE OF ESCAPE
June 29, 1952

DATE OF DEPARTURE FOR RESETTLEMENT
Dec. 29, 1955
MSTS "GENERAL LANGFITT" ex Bremerhaven/

COMPLETE RESETTLEMENT ADDRESS
Belvedere House, 536 West 112 Street
New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SPONSOR
Laura Wood Roper, 34050 Street, N.W., Washington, U.S.A.
D.C.

LANGUAGE ABILITY Slovak, Czech, German
some English

OCCUPATION
Miller

DEPENDENTS
None

IS ESCAPEE PHOTOGENIC ? YES ☒ NO ☐

MAY STORY BE PUBLICIZED ? YES ☐ NO ☒

EDUCATION
Elementary school, professional school.

INFORMATION ON ESCAPEE BEING RESETTLED

Mr. Tapak's village was in the area which was completely destroyed during World War II by the Russian Army. His family lost the mill and the farm. At this time he was in the Czechoslovakian Army, because he did not want to be a farm worker at a "colchoz", so he decided in 1952 to escape. While he was on guard in a border battalion, he crossed the border and came to Bavaria.

Facsimile use HMP

SEC

A CITE NYOR 350[illegible]

SUPPORT (CONNELL) FROM MAJOR

A-46083

CASE 19830 X 19830 SUBJECT - PETER WHITE

SUBJECT ADVISES THAT ROBERT J. MCALLISTER IS LEAVING THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE COMMITTEE AND HAS BEEN GIVEN A FORD FOUNDATION GRANT. I.R.C. IS LOOKING FOR A REPLACEMENT. DOES GESSLER HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS?

5-5564

SUBJECT WAS ASKING THAT DAVE GESSLER RETURN THE LETTER HE LOANED TO HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SINCE HE HAS TO DELIVER IT. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE GESSLER TO RETURN THE TICKET STUB TO HIM AS SOON AS CONVENIENT AS HE HAS TO HAVE IT IN ORDER TO MAKE CLAIM FOR HIS TRANSPORTATION EXPENSE FROM THE VIETNAM GOVERNMENT.

A-4416

SUBJECT REPORTS THAT THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC WELFARE ORGANIZATION IS STEPPING UP THEIR RELIEF ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM BEGINNING NEXT QUARTER. THEY PLAN TO DO AS MUCH IN ONE QUARTER AS THEY HAD DONE IN ONE YEAR PREVIOUSLY. SUBJECT STATED THAT MONSIGNOR HARNETT TOLD HIM THAT RAPPORT BETWEEN THE U.S. OPERATIONS MISSION AND THE MINISTER FOR REFUGEES IN THE VIETNAM GOVERNMENT WAS VERY POOR INDEED. HARNETT IS RETURNING TO VIETNAM EITHER NEXT WEEK OR THE WEEK AFTER.

File

6 AUG 1956

ESE NRS 17-18 ROUTINE 162044Z

SEC 046

LANC CITE WA 7521

KELLY FROM SUPPORT (CONNELL)

~~0-2-14~~ 3-5564

REFERENCE YOUR 13 X 13 AUGUST MEMO RE POSSIBLE CONTACT WITH GEN. J.W O'DANIEL CHECK WAS MADE WITH THE RESPONSIBLE DD/P OFFICES. THEY APPRECIATE YOUR INTEREST BUT PREFER THAT YOU NOT DEBRIEF THE GENERAL ON HIS TRIP TO VIETNAM. THEY HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL GET A COMPLETE COPY OF HIS REPORT.

14-00000

F 5564

SEC

WA CITE NYOR 3810

ALIEN (MUSULIN) FROM RINKUS

RE CASE 19[illegible]89 X 19[illegible]89

THEATER GUILD, WHICH PUTS ON THE US STEEL HOUR, SEEMS TO HAVE AN INTEREST IN PRESENTING A ONE HOUR TV X TV PROGRAM ON THE TAUPSE SAILORS. THEY HAVE MADE PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES WITH CHURCH WORLD SERVICES. THE INQUIRIES WERE MADE BY DICK SALZMAN X DICK SALZMAN WHO IS ON THE IRC X IRC STAFF. SALZMAN STATED THAT AN IRC MEMBER WHO IS ALSO ON THE THEATER GUILD BOARD IS THE ORIGINATOR OF THE IDEA.

A-5559

5-5564

S-5564

THIS APPEARS TO BE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR PROPAGANDISTIC DEVELOPMENT. PERHAPS SOMEONE FROM THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE SCRIPT MATERIAL WHICH WOULD BOTH ABSOLVE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES AND PROVIDE THE PROPER PROPAGANDISTIC SLANT OF SHOWING WHAT HEELS THE SOVIETS ARE. GOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION MAY BE APPROPRIATE FROM ANOTHER ANGLE. IF THE IDEA IS ATTRACTIVE TO THEATER GUILD AND BEGINS TO SNOWBALL INTO A PROGRAM, NO X NO ONE WILL THEN BE ABLE TO STEER THEM. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD GET AS MUCH BENEFIT AS POSSIBLE FROM THE PROGRAM BY COOPERATION.

AT ANY RATE, LET'S MAKE PLANS AS TO HOW THE IDEA IS TO BE HANDLED IF IT IS FORMALLY PRESENTED TO US THROUGH CHURCH WORLD SERVICES. WE WILL HAVE TO HAVE QUICK ACTION IN ORDER TO KEEP UP WITH IRC X IRC AND THEATER GUILD WHEN THEY GET ROLLING.

10 Copy [illegible] A 5559

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

F5266

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 6 March 1956

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch
FROM : Chief, San Francisco Office
BY : Honolulu Resident Agent
SUBJECT: International Refugee Organization, (IRO) Shanghai

55664 A

The attached comments on the IRO in Shanghai may be of interest to the DD/P. They were addressed by Cecil Ewart, 159/3 Movming Lu(s), Shanghai, China, in a letter, dated 26 Feb 56, to his brother George Ewart, Kauai, T. H.

A55375

M. C. CHEEK

Attachment

FLDaniels/js

AR 1055375

considers, not to mention your fondness for new gadgets and nick-nacks. Have you grown out of ~~i~~ it? I always remember your weakness for them in the past. The I.R.O. will pay my passage to any part of the world if I can produce definite proof + documents enabling me to enter a country for resettlement, they don't care which or where, provided it is friendly and will accept me. I must tell you something about this quaint and powerful organization - The International Refugee Organization for Displaced People. I.R.O. for short is equipped + maintained for the support and resettlement of foreigners ~~&~~ who have fled their own country on account of aggression resulting from political differences. Those people (all gentiles the jews have a better and richer organization of their own) termed and classified as D.P. under I.R.O. are accorded every facilities, they have a hostel of their own, received a living allowance every month for every member of the family, plus an ~~ex~~ allowance extras for milk etc. for children. Free hospitalization, doctors + medicines. The organization supply all that and also do their best for them by securing entry visa in different countries for their resettlement. All these privileged people do is to sit back and occasionally get drunk to celebrate their good fortune. Most of them are resettled one way or the other now. there are only very few remaining. The I.R.O started in 1946. When I first came across the name in 1950, I thought it was a Godsend as I also consider myself as a square peg in a round hole. Their registration were still open then. I went and interviewed their director, applying for resettlement not relief. imagine my surprise when he told me that I cannot qualify for a D.P. He pointed out that

I am an unrecognized citizen of the U.S.A. and as either myself nor my forebears can claimed to have fled from any kind of aggression, I am clearly not eligible for their legal assistance, and must therefore apply to the American authorities myself for reinstatement. This fine point delivered with much dignity and profundity left me more dazed than enlightened when I left their office. Last year however by careful observation and quoting precedent I managed to elicit a promise from them to pay for my passage aboard, when I receive my visa, but not being D.P. and registered with them I must arrange to get my own entry or destination visa for resettlement. I must also consider the passage money as a loan to be refunded when I am fully settled in a new country. I have agreed to all that George it will lessened the burden I am already putting on you. but as I have said this organization will only start functioning for me when they received my destination visa for resettlement (damn that word and phrase) Once they have that in hand they will stand surety for me and my passage from Hong Kong, and the British Consulate here will issue me a transit visa for boarding a steamer in Hongkong. When I land in the colony, I will report to I.R.O. and apply for a change of destinati if they feel that I have a good case they will approve it and still pay my passage to my new destinai This has been done before and are still being done now. There are at present quite a number of people waiting in Hong Kong, being processed for entry into the U.S.A. Do you think it neccessary to mention in your application that I was internes

SECRET

F5564

6 March 1956

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch
Chief, San Francisco Office
BY : Honolulu Resident Agent
International Refugee Organization, (IRO) Shanghai

S-5564

The attached comments on the IRO in Shanghai may be of interest to the DD/P. They were addressed by Cecil Evart, 159/3 Movming Lu(s), Shanghai, China, in a letter, dated 26 Feb 56, to his brother George Evart, Kauai, T. H.

M. C. CHEEK

Attachment

FLDaniels/js

SECRET

14-00000

Contact

F 5564

Chief, San Francisco Office

9 September 1955

Chief, Washington Office

Alien Lead - Eva Kralovensky [illegible] 5-5564

1. The Washington Office has received a routine alien lead on Eva Kralovensky, age 23, born in Czechoslovakia, 5-5564 "housewife", endorsed for US immigration by the International Rescue Committee. The Washington Office contacted one of its sources and learned that Miss Kralovensky was a stewardess on one of the three Czech airplanes which flew into West Germany (possibly West Berlin) about four or five years ago. We were also informed that she had been an employee of Radio Free Europe.

2. The Washington Office contacted Alien Branch (Sivess) and asked if there was any reason to proceed further in locating Miss Kralovensky on the assumption that she was probably well-known in the intelligence community. Mr. Sivess checked and informed the Washington Office that there would be covert interest in Miss Kralovensky, and requested that her address be obtained and the appropriate field office be alerted for an alien contact.

3. The Washington source finally determined that Miss Kralovensky moved to California but at the end of two weeks finally settled in Reno, Nevado. She can be contacted at 521 W 6th Street, Reno, Nevada.

ANALYSIS

W. J. DuBose

CC: Chief, Contact Division
Alien Branch (Sivess)

McCann/l

Source: W. H. Roper
3405 O Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

[illegible] 5-5564

ATTN : Chief, Contact Division
FE/P Branch

5 August 1955

5564

Chief, San Francisco Office

Miss Lyuia DIMOVA — 5561

REFERENCE: SP-11362

1. The name of the young woman of USSR nationality referred to in SP-11362, paragraph 10, and employed by the National Resources Bureau is Miss Lydia DIMOVA, age 30 years. Her mother, presently residing in Harbin, is Mrs. Clavdia Dimova. The Dimova family is well known to the source for more than 30 years and therefore the source feels that any information passed on to her by the young woman employee of the bureau might well be considered as reliable.

2. Prior to the departure of the source from Peiping, Miss Dimova visited her and pleaded with the source to assist in an effort that they might eventually get out of China. She begged her to register her name and the name of her mother with the United Nations, International Relief Organization, through the Reverend Stumf of the Lutheran Church, World Federation of Churches at Granville Road in Hong Kong. Miss Dimova is desirous of setting up arrangements through IRO so that she and her mother may gain entry into Brazil. The source completed the necessary application on behalf of the Dimovas during her stay in Hong Kong.

5564

5567

Mrs. Kira Karpinsky 5291

5564

M. C. CHEEK

copy filed in 5567, 5291

JJWaldron:rc

SECRET

SECRET

F 5564

11 August 195[illegible]

Chief, FI/RQM/OIS

Chief, Contact Division, 00

HH-1785

Miss Lydia Dimova use S-5564

1. The attached preliminary copy of 00-B-87938 is forwarded as being of possible interest to your office.

2. The name of the young woman of USSR nationality referred to in paragraph 10 of the report is Miss Lydia Dimova, age 30 years. Her mother, presently residing in Harbin, is Mrs. Clavdia Dimova. The Dimova family is well known to the source for more than 30 years and therefore the source feels that any information passed on to her by the young woman employee of the bureau might well be considered as reliable.

3. Prior to the departure of the source from Peiping, Miss Dimova visited her and pleaded with source to assist in an effort that they might eventually get out of China. She begged her to register her name and the name of her mother with the United Nations, International Relief Organization, through the Reverend Stumf of the Lutheran Church, World Federation of Churches at Granville Road in Hong Kong. Miss Dimova is desirous of setting up arrangements through IRO so that she and her mother may gain entry into Brazil. The source completed the necessary application on behalf of the Dimovas during her stay in Hong Kong.

A 5564

4. The above is forwarded for your information and whatever action you may deem appropriate. If you have any questions, please call Mrs. Carstens, extension 2268.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

SECRET

Encl.: 1

RCarstens/wh
cc Index

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

F5564

DATE: 4 October 1954

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : Mr. Anthony Czajkowski, Alien Branch

FROM : Chief, Detroit Office

SUBJECT: Failure to Locate Source Leads

I have made numerous attempts to locate the following source leads you furnished this office some time ago and without any success:

Mr. Jan Kolar S-5564
22 Charlotte Street
Detroit, Michigan

Mr. Stanislav Rehak S-5564
1800 Wastenaw
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Wallace W. Konicki
JAMES R. MURPHY

WWKonicki/bn

File: Mr. Jan Kolar
Mr. Stanislav Rehak

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

F 5564

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : Mr. Anthony Czajkowski, Alien Branch

DATE: 4 October 1954

FROM : Chief, Detroit Office

SUBJECT: Source Leads - No Potential

I have contacted the following source leads, which were supplied by your office, and have found they do not have any intelligence potential:

Mr. Tadeusz Kowalsi S-5564
9035 Mc Clellan
Detroit, Michigan

Mr. Vainutis Vaitkevicius - S-5564
Grace Hospital
4160 John R.
Detroit, Michigan.

for Wallace W. Konicki
JAMES R. MURPHY

WWKonicki/bn

File: Mr. Tadeusz Kowaksi
Mr. Vainutis Vaitkevicius

source leads

CONFIDENTIAL

~~F 5564~~
~~F-62296~~
F5564

CBS NRS 35-36 ROUTINE 2614182

CONFIDENTIAL CK NR 454 TO SAN FRANCISCO FROM WASHINGTON

TO CHEEK FOR OSTLER FROM ASHCRAFT BY NE/A BRANCH (FOY) - CITE WA-7397

CASE 15688 RPT 15688 YOUR REPORT SLC-9312 RPT 9312 (00-B 76250 RPT 76250) PARAGRAPH 3 RPT 3 LAST SENTENCE. DOES SOURCE MEAN THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE DOES THE CHECKING FOR THE SYNDICATE OR ONLY THAT THE SYNDICATE IS TACTFUL IN THE WAY IN WHICH IT CHECKS? WE SUSPECT THE LATTER IS THE CASE, BUT OUR CONSUMERS ARE CERTAIN TO WONDER. THIS IS A GOOD REPORT AND SHOULD BE OF VALUE HERE.

FILE: FRANK CHRISTENSEN

A-62298
5564
S-5564

E-5564

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Thru : Acting Chief, Detroit Office
FROM : John T. Hazen, Cleveland Office
DATE: 7 Jan 54

5564

SUBJECT: Visit to Mr. Tadeusz Stefan Kucner, 2434 Tremont St., Cleveland, Ohio

1. On 6 Jan 54, a visit was made to Mr. Tadeusz Stefan Kucner, a Polish displaced person who arrived in the US on 11 Jul 51. His alien registration number is 8 059 181.

2. Mr. Kucner was born in Lwow 6 Feb 1905. He attended the Polytechnical Academy of Lwow from 1925 to 1932 when he received his degree in architectural engineering.

3. From 1933 to 1939 Mr. Kucner worked for the city administration of Poznan as a building construction inspector for the Poznan building construction board of control. This was similar to a city planning commission in the US.

4. In 1940, after the German occupation, subject was sent by the Germans to Warsaw. He worked in Warsaw as a representative of the inspector of building construction board of control until 1944.

5. When the Germans evacuated the city Mr. Kucner was transported by freight car to Leipzig where he remained until the end of the war.

6. Subject resided in several DP camps in Germany from 1945 until his departure for the US in 1951. He was employed by IRO as a technical examiner.

7. During his years in both Poznań and Warsaw, Mr. Kucner was concerned only with residential buildings and was unable to supply information on industrial installations in these cities.

8. Some comments made by subject, which are not worthy of OO-A dissemination, are being forwarded for any interest they may have.

9. Since Mr. Kucner's arrival in the US he has been employed as a laborer in a foundry.

10. Mr. Kucner will not be visited again, therefore no name check data is being submitted.

John T. Hazen
JOHN T. HAZEN

JTH/ns

CONFIDENTIAL
[illegible] ION

F-5564

Chief, New York Office

30 Sept 1953

Chief, San Francisco Office

A-~~35~~37422

American Committee for Emigre Scholars - Source Lead.

-55564

1. In the event that you are not already in touch with Otto Zoff of the American Committee for Emigre Scholars, Writers, and Artists, 62 West 48th Street, New York City, we believe that you may find him and/or his organization a useful contact. It has come to our attention that Zoff from time to time recommends Russian language instructors to the Army Language School at the Presidio of Monterey, California. It occurred to us that Zoff would be in a position to provide you with numerous source leads on well educated aliens in the US. These men would include engineers, scientists, and teachers. Not only should he be able to give you the names of DPs in your area, but also those who have moved to areas covered by our other field offices. We know nothing further in regard to the Committee for Emigre Scholars (its backing, orientation, reliability).

2. Incidentally, we have a verbal agreement with the Commandant of the Army Language School that we will not use our access to the files of his current language instructors as a means of "raiding" his faculty, i.e. offering CIA employment to them. Therefore, this memorandum is not meant as a source lead for potential employees! Also, we feel that it would be preferable that you do not indicate to Zoff that you know that he recommends personnel to the Presidio of Monterey.

[illegible] CHECK

lfw/VSounitza

cc: OO/C

Copy filed in #37422

[illegible] TION

THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

Since the start of the Cold War the International Rescue Committee has organized voluntary American assistance to aid refugees fleeing from Communist oppression.

When the tide of persons fleeing Soviet dominated countries into the free city of West Berlin reached more then 3,000 per day during the Spring of 1953, the Committee successfully marshalled more than $700,000 in gifts and donations of clothing, drugs and other necessities. This earned the commendation of President Eisenhower and leaders throughout America.

As the historic emergency increases, the Committee's work continues to uphold America's belief in the indivisibility of freedom.

THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

Leo Cherne, *Chairman*
Admiral Richard E. Byrd, *Honorary Chairman*
David F. Seiferheld, *Treasurer*

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

A. A. Berle, Jr.
Paul F. Brissenden
Joseph Buttinger
Henry Seidel Canby
William J. Casey
William J. Donovan
Christopher Emmet
H. William Fitelson
Samuel Goldwyn
A. E. Jolis
Justus Lawrence
David H. Marx
Joseph A. Neff
Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt
David Sher
George P. Skouras
General Carl Spaatz
Sterling D. Spero
Sheba Strunsky
Telford Taylor
Msgr. Bela Varga
Arthur K. Watson
L. Hollingsworth Wood
Admiral E. M. Zacharias
Charles S. Zimmerman

Abram G. Becker, *Executive Director*

Leo CHERNE, *Chairman*
International Rescue Committee
62 West 45th Street, New York 36, N. Y.

I am glad to add my contribution to help refugees from Communism.

Enclosed please find check for $ .... as my subscription for the continuance of this vital work.

Name ....

Address ....

City .... Zone .... State ....

Checks should be made payable to the International Rescue Committee

(All Contributions deductible from taxable income)

HE

stood between YOU and

THIS

The Turning Point

On June 17th, 1953 one of the most significant events of the 20th century took place. The inhabitants of the Soviet Zone of Germany rose in rebellion against their Communist overlords. For eight years they had been living under conditions of slavery and starvation.

The insurrection began in East Berlin on June 16th. It was begun initially by a few workers but within hours it had spread to every level of the population. By the 17th of June the uprising had spread throughout the East Zone — a completely unorganized, spontaneous revolt.

At 11:00 o'clock the morning of June 16th the workers in block 40, Stalin Allee, decided to organize a demonstration to protest the raising of the work norm by the regime. By 2:00 o'clock that same afternoon, the mob of people which had grown from 200 to over 20,000 became revolutionaries. Surging in front of the East Zone Government building in East Berlin, they demanded not only the lifting of the norms but free secret elections, the unification of Germany and the abdication of the East German goverment.

The stories contained here are the stories of a few of those brave men and women from East Germany who played leading roles in the revolt and had to flee to the West. They are representative of 4,000 leaders, many of whom have subsequently been sentenced to death by Communist courts. Some were intellectuals and professionals. Most of them were workmen. All are men who deserve the undying gratitude and support of free men everywhere.

Bare Fists Against Armed Might. Historical Proof of the Perennial, Inextinguishable Urge of the Human Heart for Freedom.

Stalin Allee Block 40 . . .

A CONSTRUCTION WORKER

(WOLFGANG THEURICH *was a building construction laborer working on Block 40, Stalin Allee.)*

"When the work norms were increased the men were furious. We began daily to gather in small groups before and after work. The fear that had made us so cautious gradually began to dissolve. There was, after all, little more to lose.

"By the morning of June 16 we were resolute. As always, we entered the building on which we were working and took our stations. But this day we sat down and refused to work. There was no organization, no leader, but each man knew what had to be done. The foreman dashed in gaping with disbelief. His eyes turned to the spot where the norm increase order had been posted. Two men walked in with a freshly painted sign—'The Work Norms Must Be Decreased.' The courage of these men inspired the rest of us to action.

"A concrete worker leaped onto a heap of stones. 'I leave it to you as individuals! Those who wish to demonstrate against the injustice of the norms, step to the right. Others go to the left.' All chose the right. One man was weeping with joy.

"Immediately we began to march in the street unafraid. We started out with 80 resolute men. By the time we arrived at the government building we were 6,000 strong. Over the tumult of the crowd, a man shouted into my ear, 'This is the most beautiful day of my life!'"

The "Free Youth" Revolt . . .

A 20-YEAR-OLD GIRL

*(*ELLA SABBE*, an instructress within the Communist Youth Movement [FDJ] is a dark haired girl of twenty with pert, intelligent eyes.)*

"As I stood in the crowd before the government building, a fellow instructor came up to me and told me to take careful note of the people sympathetic to the demonstration and give him a complete report that evening. I was embarrassed by his apparent hurry to leave the square and told him if he was so afraid for his life he had better jump on a tram in a hurry and get out.

"A few minutes later I forced my way through the crowd and jumped to the rostrum. Many people recognized me as a devoted member of the FDJ. They hooted and taunted me. Never before had I realized how hated the FDJ was. Infuriated by the refusal of the Communist leaders to appear and by the open cowardice of my male FDJ companion, I tore off my FDJ jacket and threw it to the ground. The jeers became cheers.

"I gathered my strength and shouted a warning to the crowd that members of the FDJ and SED were in the crowd and would not only try to dissuade them from the demonstration but also would report them. I shouted, 'Do not allow them to break you up! Stick together!' People began to examine their neighbors. Fist fights started as the hated Communists were spotted. I wanted to say more, but my strength was gone. A new life had begun for me."

The Revolt Spreads . . .

AN ENGINEER

(N.N., A Mechanical Engineer, Brandenburg.)

"There were only twenty in my group as we marched into the Brandenburg area. At that time we knew only that, according to a broadcast from West Berlin, the workers in East Berlin were on strike. Although we knew that strikes in the Communist Zone were considered political crimes and punishable by two years in prison, we marched on with a feeling of exhilaration. As we strode along we beckoned to the people on the pavement and in a few minutes our number had increased to about five hundred.

"As we approached a factory protected by high iron gates, we noticed employees shouting from the windows, 'We have been locked in. Come, help us. We will go with you.' A pile driver was found and we stormed the gates. The employees rushed out and embraced us.

"At this time, we still thought we were the only demonstrators in the city. As we neared the center of the city, we were amazed and overjoyed to find thousands of people converging from all directions. We had not fully realized that our people, constantly intimidated by spies and police controls, could rise up as one man without a strong central leadership, no weapons—nothing but determination and hope. We were overwhelmed at what we saw."

The Red Flag At Brandenburg Gate Comes Down . . .

A TRUCK DRIVER

*(*HORST BALLENTIN* is a 20-year-old truck driver of East Berlin.)*

"I looked down into the crowd and saw three Soviet officers looking helplessly upward as I climbed to the top of the tower and shinnied up the pole. I flung the flag to the ground with great contempt and watched the people tear it to pieces. They applauded and shouted in a way I had never heard before.

"Two hours later when I had the honor of installing the Bear Flag of West Berlin, the Russians had brought three tanks into the square. As I began pulling up the flag they began to fire. Somehow I was able to finish my task and jump to the ground. The flag of West Berlin was in its right place and, miraculously, I was safe."

At Magdeburg . . .

A BAND LEADER

(Hans Herzberg, *band leader at the city theatre, was the strike leader under whose guidance the FDJ [Communist Youth Movement] office, Communist Party Headquarters and the home of the Chief Commissioner of Police were stormed. No event of the day impressed Hans as much as the occurrence at Magdeburg station.)*

"After we disarmed the Vopos (People's Police) on duty at the station, we tore down the hated 'Passage of Interzone-Dispatching Sign.' As though this in itself could accomplish the task, the crowd began shouting, 'There are no borders anymore.'

"As the interzonal train arrived in the station, the frightened passengers locked the doors and windows, fearing an attack by Communist soldiers and police. As soon as they saw our sign 'The SED is beaten,' the windows and doors were opened and the people burst out, embracing each other, shouting, crying and some even giving away their possessions in celebration, assuming that the union of the East and West was an accomplished fact.

"We asked them to spread the word along on their way to Berlin. At this time we still thought that rebellions were taking place only in Magdeburg and Berlin. We were jubilant a few hours later when we learned from RIAS (Voice of America) and NWDR (West Berlin station) that uprisings were occurring all over East Germany.

"The next train to arrive contained a prisoner car. After a few tense moments we managed to gain control of the train and get the cells open. One of the prisoners was a 74-year-old farmer who was imprisoned a year before because he had not been able to meet his quota. He was speechless with fright and disbelief. When he was finally convinced that he was a free man, he broke down and wept, overcome with joy. I had to carry him away."

Prisoners Are Freed . . .

A LOCKSMITH

(Werner Mengelsdorf *is a locksmith. He led the heroic liberation of 80 political prisoners in Magdeburg.)*

"A mob 3,000 strong stormed into the courtyard of the prison in Magdeburg. The prisoners pressed their worn, pale faces against the bars. A woman in the crowd started to scream as she recognized her husband who had been arrested only two days before.

"The wooden doors of the prison splintered under the weight of the surging crowd. The guards fled. The metal door to the cell block was pried open. Mengelsdorf called for the locksmiths and together they opened the cell doors. Indescribable scenes followed. One prisoner cried, 'Freedom! Freedom!', then fell to the floor crying. A young man sentenced to 25 years for crimes against the state stepped out of his cell into the arms of the girl to whom he had been engaged. Neither knew the other was there until the doors opened. They embraced, wordless.

"Soviet tanks rumbled into the prison yard before all the prisoners could be released. Mangelsdorf himself barely escaped with his life. His only route of escape lay in swimming the Landwehrcanal which separates East and West Berlin at certain spots. He waited until dark and then made it, narrowly escaping death from Soviet bullets which peppered the water around him. He is today in one of the camps in West Berlin, destitute but resolved that one day will come when all of East Germany as well as the satellite countries will again be free."

Postage
Will be Paid
by
Addressee

No
Postage Stamp
Necessary
If Mailed in the
United States

BUSINESS REPLY ENVELOPE
First Class Permit No. 44779, Sec. 34.9, P.L. & R., New York, N. Y.

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE
62 WEST 45th STREET
NEW YORK 36, N. Y.

Suite 600

I am glad to add my contribution to help those suffering from Communist oppression.

Enclosed please find check for $..

as my subscription for this vital work.

Name ____

Address ____

City________________________ Zone______ State..............

(*Contributions are deductible from taxable income*) 220

5564

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE
INCORPORATED
62 WEST 45th STREET, NEW YORK 36, N. Y. • MUrray Hill 2-4672 • Cable Address: INTRESCUE

IRON CURTAIN REFUGEE CAMPAIGN
RESETTLEMENT CAMPAIGN FOR EXILED PROFESSIONALS

ADMIRAL RICHARD E. BYRD
Honorary Chairman

LEO CHERNE
Chairman

DAVID F. SEIFERHELD
Treasurer

Board of Directors
A. A. BERLE, JR.
PAUL F. BRISSENDEN
JOSEPH BUTTINGER
HENRY SEIDEL CANBY
WILLIAM J. CASEY
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
CHRISTOPHER EMMET
H. WILLIAM FITELSON
SAMUEL GOLDWYN
A. E. JOLIS
JUSTUS LAWRENCE
DAVID H. MARX
MRS. KERMIT ROOSEVELT
DAVID SHER
GEORGE P. SKOURAS
GENERAL CARL SPAATZ
STERLING D. SPERO
SHEBA STRUNSKY
TELFORD TAYLOR
MSGR. BELA VARGA
ARTHUR K. WATSON
L. HOLLINGSWORTH WOOD
ADMIRAL ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS
CHARLES S. ZIMMERMAN

ABRAM G. BECKER
Executive Director

September 22, 1953

Dear Mr. Fondiller:

I have just returned from Berlin. I am reporting to you as one of many observers who are agreed that the weaponless men and women of Eastern Germany stand as the first line of defense between us and the tyranny of Soviet Power. The entire world is now aware of what has been happening in East Berlin and East Germany since June 17, 1953.

But do you know why this most remarkable revolution occurred - how these people just like the young couple next door, the truck driver down the street, the band leader - have been able to rebel against overwhelming odds? It is not only out of sheer desperation because of the insufferable conditions under which they have been living. People in the other satellites are suffering. These are people who are desperately weary of tyrants of all political shades and colors. Through the window of West Berlin we gave them hope for a better world and they have become our allies. We cannot let them down. When we do we have lowered the first defense in the battle against tyranny over the minds, hearts and bodies of men.

The enclosed personal accounts of the June 17th rebellions are dramatic proof of man's invincible desire for freedom. The International Rescue Committee is doing everything possible to aid these brave men and women including some of the resistance leaders and proscribed members of their families. We need your help to continue this vital work.

We are asking you to send us your contribution so that we may continue to sustain the bodies of these brave men and women in whom the flame of freedom is burning. The aid we are extending to them is a message the whole world understands. A message which says that we believe in the dignity and goodness of people enough to help them survive their worst times so that they can fight for better times.

Sincerely, A 3707

Leo Cherne

Leo Cherne
Chairman

Contributions deductible from taxable income.
Programs and financial statements filed with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid of the Department of State

NEW YORK, N.Y.
SEP
1953

Mr Stanley Cieselski

~~Mr. William Fondiller~~
~~4801 Nebraska Ave., N. W.~~
~~Washington 16, D. C.~~

You may dispose of this.

ROOM 600
62 WEST 45th STREET • NEW YORK 36, N. Y.

I. R. O.
GENERAL HOSPITAL
AREA 7. MUNICH
SUB-AREA ROSENHEIM
Rosenheim, Marratier Straße 48
Telefon 451

„ 21th „ september 1949

Nr.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN.

5-5564 ✓ 11c2 5-5564

This is to certify that Dr. K o r n i l e v Mykola has been employed with IRO General Hospital Rosenheim as the Chief Doctor of TBC Control since 1st of October 1948 till to date to our great satisfaction.

Dr. K o r n i l e v Mykola has had a long practical experience, is very capable, and precise in his work.

He has a most pleasant manner at all times willing and well liked by patients and personnel.

Since Dr. K o r n i l e v wants to imigrate shortly we wish him all the best for his future work and life .

(Dr. med. W. JAVORSKY)
GENERAL HOSPITAL DIRECTOR

bb. Dr., R'helm, Rathausstr. 4

Security Information

File - NY League for the Hard of Hearing

17 July 1953

F 5-5564

Chief, Contact Division

Deputy Chief, Foreign Documents Division

Case 12843

REFER : Your memorandum to Chief, FDD dated 8 July 1953, Case 12843

1. We appreciate the information you sent us on this case. It was requested cancelled by telephone some time ago, but we should have followed it with a memorandum.

2. For your information if you have similar inquiry in the future, we have found that the finest instruction in lip reading is available at the Audiology and Speech Correction Center of Army operated under Walter Reed Hospital at Forest Glen, Md.

BENJAMIN B. CAIN

SECRET
Security Information

S
SECURITY INFORMATION

6 July 1953

Chief, Foreign Documents Division

Chief, Contact Division, 00

Case 12843

REFERENCE: 00/C 2 June 1953 memorandum, Case 12843, in reply to Mr. Cain's 19 March 1953 request.

S 5564

Are you interested in having us obtain additional details on the New York League for the Hard of Hearing or was the information contained in reference sufficient for your needs? We should appreciate your comments.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

S
SECURITY INFORMATION

AWebster/wh

cc Index

F-5564

SECURITY INFORMATION

Chief, Foreign Documents Division 2 June 1953

Chief, Contact Division, (O)

Case 12843

REFERENCE: Mr. Cain's 19 March 1953 conversation with Mr. Delaney

S5564

1. We made an informal query of the New York League for the Hard of Hearing to determine (a) whether it would be possible to teach a ~~hearing~~ person to lip-read efficiently, (b) whether it would be feasible to teach lip-reading to a person who is losing his hearing, and (c), if so, approximately how long it would take and how much such training would cost.

2. We have found that it is possible to teach both hearing persons and persons who are in the process of losing their hearing to lip-read proficiently. Without going into the problem more thoroughly the New York League could not tell us how long such training would take. We observed that simple phrases can be learned in a short time. Also, we found that the League has taught lip-reading to hearing persons in special cases which were described as "of a confidential nature". (We gather that the FBI has used agents as lip-readers in the past and it is possible that they were the "special cases").

3. As the New York League for the Hard of Hearing operates under the New York State Board of Education we were unable to determine the cost of lip-reading training in our informal inquiry. If we could have more details, we could try to obtain more definite information.

4. If you have any questions or comments, please contact Miss Webster on extension 226[illegible].

F. W. ASHCRAFT

S-5564

AWebster: mrh

cc: Index
Delaney
File: Misc. Services N.Y.
League for the Hard of Hearing

14-00000

SECRET TO QASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

File: 5564

TO ASHCRAFT FOR SS (WEBSTER) FROM LEA-SECURITY INFORMATION-CITE NY-7069

MAY 22 [illegible] 53

CASE 12843 RPT 12843

5564

SOURCE AT NY LEAGUE FOR THE HARD OF HEARING STATES THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO (A) TEACH A HEARING PERSON TO LIP-READ PROFICIENTLY AND (B) IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE TO TEACH A PERSON LIP-READING WHO IS IN THE PROCESS OF LOSING HIS HEARING. WITHOUT GOING INTO THE PROBLEM MORE DEEPLY SOURCE COULD NOT SPECIFY THE LENGTH OF TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO DEVELOP PROFICIENCY. LEARNING SIMPLE PHRASES SUCH AS A NURSE WOULD REQUIRE CAN BE DONE IN A SHORT TIME, HOWEVER. SOURCE SAID THAT THE LEAGUE HAD TAUGHT LIP READING TO HEARING PEOPLE IN SPECIAL CASES WHICH WERE OF A "CONFIDENTIAL" NATURE. AS THE LEAGUE OPERATES UNDER THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE AT THE COST OF SUCH A COURSE IN AN INFORMAL TELEPHONE INQUIRY. IF WE COULD HAVE MORE DETAILS WE COULD COME UP WITH MUCH MORE DEFINITE INFORMATION.

FILE: MRS. LEWIS, NY LEAGUE FOR HARD OF HEARING.

[illegible] 5564

CCCC: THIRD WORD OF HEADING SHOULD READ "WASHINGTON"

F-5564

SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR SS (WEBSTER) FROM LEA - SECURITY INFORMATION -

CITE NY-6147

CASE 12,843 RPT 12,843 - YOUR W-6388 RPT W-6388.

WOULD APPRECIATE IN THE FUTURE IF YOU WOULD REFER TO ONLY ONE CASE IN EACH DISPATCH. THIS WILL ASSIST US IMMENSELY IN LOGGING AND ROUTING OF MESSAGES. WE ARE SURE THAT YOU APPRECIATE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AT LEAST TWO C/S'S ARE WORKING ON THE TWO CASES REFERRED HEREIN. WE SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO SUGGEST TO YOU IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE THAT YOU ARRANGE TO SPEND A COUPLE OF DAYS IN THIS OFFICE TO COORDINATE WITH YOUR OPPOSITE NUMBER HERE AND TO SPIN A FEW OF THESE MINOR PROBLEMS. WE SUGGEST THAT YOU SHOW THIS TO STAN. MAY WE HAVE HIS REACTIONS TO THESE RECOMMENDATIONS?

FILE: NEW YORK LEAGUE FOR HEARING.

S-5564 R-126

SECRET CX NR 746 TO NEW YORK FM WASHINGTON

TO LEA FROM ASHCRAFT BY SS (WEBSTER) - SECURITY INFORMATION - CITE W-6388

NEW CASE 12343 RPT 12343: FDD HAS REQUESTED THAT WE ASK THE NEW YORK LEAGUE FOR THE HARD OF HEARING, 480 RPT 480 LEXINGTON AVENUE, NEW YORK, (A) WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO TEACH A HEARING PEARSON TO LIP-READ PROFICIENTLY; (B) WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO TEACH LIP-READING TO A PERSON WHO IS IN THE PROCESS OF LOSING HIS HEARING; (C) IF SO, APPROXIMATELY HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE AND HOW MUCH WOULD IT COST. FDD DOESN'T WANT YOU TO MAKE A BIG ISSUE OF THIS AND BELIEVES THAT INFORMAL TELEPHONE REQUEST MIGHT BE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED.

H-100782

BACKGROUND: QUERIES HERE AT GALLAUDET COLLEGE (FOR THE DEAF) RESULTED IN OPINION THERE THAT A HEARING PERSON WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECT FOR SUCH TRAINING. FYI, THIS CASE IS TIED IN WITH CASE 12453 RPT 12453.

NEW SUBJECT: CLOSED CASE 3314 RPT 3314, NY-9354 RPT NY-9354 STATES THAT YOU GAVE "ROBINSON OF OPC ADEQUATE INFORMATION ABOUT ERNEST TINSMITH". WE ARE TRYING TO TRACK DOWN ROBINSON (CAN YOU TELL US WHICH ONE HE WAS) TO SEE WHAT WAS DONE ABOUT TINSMITH. CAN YOU TELL US WHAT YOU TOLD ROBINSON ABOUT TINSMITH? PLEASE ADVISE.

3-5564

FILE: ERNEST TINSMITH, NY LEAGUE FOR THE HARD OF HEARING

GRR3

GR200

20/1355Z MAR AF3

Copy filed
100782

F-5564

6 MARCH 1953 I

W AFCas ~~[illegible]~~/eor 2775

SECRET
Security Information

NEW YORK

TO UFA FROM ASHCRAFT BY ALIEN W Callaha.

CASE 12,667. REUR NY-5913.

THANKS FOR THE ADDITIONAL INFO CONTAINED IN NY-5913. WE ARE CLOSING CASE AS SUCCESSFUL.

5564

cc: Index (Iron Curtain Refugee Comm.)

SECRET
Security Information

b

c/m filed # 37422

ECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR ALIEN FROM LEA -- SECURITY INFORMATION --

CITE NY 5913

CASE 12667.

FURTHER TO NY 5811 AND NY 5824 RPT NY 5811 AND NY 5824, (PRESUMABLY NOT RPT NOT OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST TO REQUESTOR), WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY BECKER RPT BECKER THAT DR. 133 REINHOLD NIEBUHR RPT DR. REINHOLD NIEBUHR HAD BEEN CHAIRMAN OF THE RESETTLEMENT CAMPAIGN FOR EXILED PROFESSIONALS, BUT THAT 264 THIS POST HAS BEEN "DORMANT" SINCE NIEBUHR'S WITHDRAWAL FROM IRC RPT IRC FOR HEALTH REASONS. BECAUSE OF SMALLER INFLUX OF DP'S RPT DP'S (AND PERHAPS ALSO BECAUSE OF SHORTAGE OF FUNDS) THERE HAS BEEN A DRASTIC DROP IN THE RESETTLEMENT CASE LOAD. A THIRD DEPARTMENT OF IRC (IN ADDITION TO ICRC RPT ICRC AND RESETTLEMENT CAMPAIGN) USED TO BE WHAT IS NOW AMERICAN C37472 COMMITTEE FOR EMIGRE SCHOLARS, WRITERS, AND ARTISTS, INC. THIS COMMITTEE, WHICH HAS A HISTORY SEPARATE FROM IRC, HAD BEEN MERGED WITH IRC BECAUSE THE COMBINED OPERATION WAS MORE LIK RPT LIKELY TO RECEIVE FORD FOUNDATION GRANTS THAN THE TWO COMMITTEES SEPARATELY A FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLAR GRANT BY THE FORD FOUNDATION WAS NOT FOLLOWED UP BY ADDITIONAL FUNDS, AS HAD BEEN EXPECTED, AND THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR EMIGRE SCHOLARS ETC. WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RE-ESTABLISHED AS A SEPARATE ORGANIZATION. A-39215 WITH ELSE STAUDINGER RPT ELSE STAUDINGER AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND case 37422 NELSON P. MEAD RPT NELSON P. MEAD AS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, THE LAST-NAMED OUTFIT CONTINUES TO OCCUPY FACILITIES ADJOINING IRC'S AND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH IRC. FYI: WE HAVE A CONTACT AT THE SCHOLARS COMMITTEE SEPARATE FROM IRC (SEE ALSO CASE 12832 RPT 12832).

CR-253

14-00000

SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR SS (WEBSTER) FROM LEA-SECURITY INFORMATION-CITE NY-6150

CLOSED CASE 8744 RPT 8749 (NOT 8814 RPT 8814) - REUR W-6388 RPT W-6388.

S-5564

S-5564

WE DON'T KNOW WHICH ROBINSON RPT ROBINSON FROM OPC WE SAW BUT WE DID TELL HIM THAT ERNEST TINSMITH RPT ERNEST TINSMITH LIVES AT 25-71 35TH STREET RPT 25-71 35TH STREET, ASTORIA, LONG ISLAND, USES THE ALIAS OF ERNEST TOPOLCZY RPT ERNEST TOPOLCZY, CLAIMS HIS ANCESTORS ARE ENGLISH, COMES FROM NORTHERN HUNGARY, IS A TEACHER OF DEAF MUTES AND WAS DIRECTOR OF A DEAF MUTE SCHOOL IN AUSTRIA, HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FOLLOW OUT HIS PROFESSION HERE.

WHAT WE DID NOT TELL ROBINSON, BECAUSE WE ONLY LEARNED OF IT YESTERDAY, IS THAT TINSMITH WAS RECENTLY M.C. AT A DINNER GIVEN BY GENERAL ZAKO'S RPT ZAKO'S MHBK RPT MHBK, AN EXTREME RIGHT-WING HUNGARIAN VETERANS' ORGANIZATION, AND THAT TINSMITH IS AN EXTREME RIGHT-WINGER.

577424

WE ASSUME YOU WERE REFERRING TO CASE 8744 RPT 8744 ON TINSMITH TO WHICH OUR NY-9854 RPT 9854 IS TIED. WE DON'T KNOW HOW YOU GOT CASE 8814 RPT 8814 MIXED INTO THIS CASE.

GR-162

H

14-00000

F-5561

Security Information

26 March 1953

Chief, Staff C, FI
Attn: Miss Jane Winslow

Chief, Contact Division, OO

5-5564

Concern about Physical Security of Gisela Wassiliew, IRC Representative in Berlin

1. A source of this division, who has been associated with Gisela Wassiliew in the IRC, has transmitted a letter, dated 23 Feb 53, written by her. She has been Director of the Berlin Office of the IRC for approximately three years. A copy of the letter is attached.

2. The source knows Wassiliew as a calm person not given to hysterics.

3. This information is being transmitted also to I&SO.

4. Any inquiry concerning this memorandum should be directed to Mr. A. F. Czajkowski, extension 2775.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Attachment

AFCzajkowski/cjg

cc: OO-1
Index-2
V. Thorne-1

APPROVED FOR TRANSMITTAL /s/ 30 Mar 53
Asst. Dir. for Operations

Copy filed 7-22790/F-Wassiliew

Security Information

F 5564

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
FOR : Alien Branch (Czajkowski) 537500 5-5564
FROM : Chief, New York Office

DATE: 27 February 1953

SUBJECT: Concern about Physical Security of 11-5564
Gisela Wassiliew, IRC Representative in Berlin
REF : Our TK NY-9780, dated 30 Nov 51 (to Alien Branch)

5564
5

1. In reference wire, David Martin recommended subject individual (whose name he spelled 'Wasiljew") for contact by this office. Martin described this German national, wife of a Russian DP then and now in the US, as"exceptionally capable, intelligent, with rare political understanding". She has been director of the Berlin office of the International Rescue Committee for some three years (perhaps longer). As you know, the IRC has been prominent for aid given to West Berlin and is currently in the midst of a campaign for aid to refugees arriving there in increasing numbers from the East.

2. Mr. Becker, present executive director of the IRC, has passed on to us a letter from Mrs. Wassiliew, dated 23 February 1953, in which she reports alleged attempts on the part of "the East" to kidnap her. In view of her activities and her connection with Rainer Hildebrandt's Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, there may be some basis for her fears. Mr. Becker, who knows her as a calm person not given to hysterics, is deeply concerned about her safety and has stated that he would have replaced her with a U.S. citizen if it were not so difficult to find a qualified successor. He has requested that we communicate with any U.S. agency or department in a position to provide physical security for persons representing U.S. interests in Berlin.

3. We have promised Mr. Becker to pass on his request to our superiors, but we told him that we were not aware of CIA facilities abroad or of CIA responsibility for coordinating action abroad with other appropriate US Government agencies. We therefore suggested that Mr. Becker himself communicate with such agencies to the best of his ability and did not commit CIA to any action upon his request.

4. If, in your judgment, the covert staffs might be interested in this problem or a justifiable representation to other agencies (e.g. Defense or State) can be made, we feel that such action would serve U.S. security interests and, incidentally, benefit IRC in a measurable way. We are attaching Mrs. Wasiliew's letter for whatever use you care to make of it.

5. This office has had no contact with Mr. or Mrs. Wassiliew, and these individuals are not aware of any possible CIA interest, to the best of our knowledge.

6. Please advise whether there is anything you can do, whether Mr. Becker should approach another Government agency (if he has not done so in the meantime), and what reaction, if any, we may pass on to Becker.

CAL
Charles A. Lea

W.L.F.
WLFreund:mfd
ATT:

SECRET
Security Information

Date: Feb 23, 1953

Memo to: ABE (cc: Munich, Frankfurt)

From: Gisela (Wassiliew)
(3. Emserstr., Berlin Wilmersdorf
Germany)

Dear Abe:

I am sorry that I must bother you with my personal problems, but since I don't
know what to do under the present circumstances I am begging you for understanding.

As you know I always had trouble with "the other side". If somebody works in this
field he must be endangered after a certain time. I believe I told you about the
calls in Russian and about the spies who are constantly around me since about 1951.
I am used always to be on the alert and to look around me carefully, this is the
only thing I can do. In addition to that I bought a dog in the summer of last year.

Since about four months the attempts of the East to get have increased. I had
several rencontres with them and have informed the police. But since we have so
many people here in Berlin who have good reasons to feel endangered they cannot
watch everybody constantly and the person in question is more or less left to
his own measures.

Last Wednesday night I ran into a situation which would have meant the end for me
if a friend of mine had not happened to be with me. This way they did not dare to
because they are accustomed to see me always walking alone; and cars and helpers
disappeared (not around). I have reported my situation again to the police, they
promised to do what they can, but it is so that I have to work out something
that makes it a little more difficult for them to complete their plan.

With friends who work in the same field and who know about these things I have
worked out the following: I must sell my dog and buy a sharper one. When I bought
him in July last year the situation was completely different. I did it merely as
a measure of precaution not because I had proofs of the danger I was living under.
For this purpose he is good but not for the purpose for which I need him now; he
is not sharp enough. They have already calculated my dog into the plan. I
absolutely need another much sharper one. But I must tell you frankly that even if
I sell my dog I would not be able to buy the new one, because they are terribly
expensive. Then I have decided that I cannot go to the office and come home alone
anymore. I can move from one of my friends to the other for a certain time but
not constantly. A friend of the Committee will pick me up every morning and bring me
home at night in his car. In the meantime I'll talk to Mrs. Wolff of Arbeiterwohlfahrt,
who has an office car and arrange with her that her driver pick me up. But this
will take some time until I have reached her and discussed the matter with her.

Please don't believe that I am hysterical, on the contrary. But now it is so that
I not only feel endangered but I have knowledge of their intentions and I am
sure I would not get out again, once they have had hold of me.

Cordially yours,

/s/ Gisela

PRIORITY SECRET TO WASHINGTON FM NEW CSE

TO ASHCRAFT FOR ALIEN FM LEA -- SECURITY INFORMATION

CITE - NY-[illegible]

[illegible]

F-5564

273423

CASE 12,667 RPT 12,667

B IRON CURTAIN REFUGEE CAMPAIGN OF INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE. RE- CZAJKOWSKI'S PHONE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ABRAM J. BECKER RPT ABRAM J. BECKER: (1) OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH BECKER: DAVID MARTIN RPT DAID RPT DAVID MARTIN, THEN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTRODUCED US TO BECKER - WHO HAD JOINED IRC RPT IRC STAFF IN APRIL 195) RPT APRIL 1951 - SOME TIME IN AUTUMN 195) RPT 1951 TO PROVIDE PROVIDE AN ALTERNATE (ANNEL WITH THE IRC IN HIS OWN ABSENCE

. WE DID NOT RPT NOT , HOWEV AVE AY RPT ANY DEALINGS WITH BECKER UNTIL HE SUCCEEDED MARTIN AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR IN JUNE 1952 RPT JUNE 1952. AT THAT TIME, HE ASSURED US OF HIS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH US TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE AND IMMEDIATELY SUPPLIED PROOF OF THIS BY FURNISHING DETAILED BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON 80 RPT 80 REFUGEES WHICH THE IRC BROUGHT TO THIS COUNTRY; HIS COOPERATION IN THIS PROJECT WAS SPLENDID. WE HAD PRACTICALLY NO RPT NO CONTACT I RPT WITH HIM SINCE SUMMER 1952 RPT SUMMER 1952 BECAUSE IASO PLACED HIM IN THE "DISAPPROVED" CATEGORY (ALTHOUGH A RE-EVALUATION IN DECEMBER 1952 RPT DECEMBER 1952 TRANSFERRED HIM TO "LIMITED" SECURITY STATUS). MR. BECKER HAS NEVER VOLUNTEERED INFORMTION RPT INFORMATION OF POTENTIAL INTEREST TO US, BUT THIS FACT MAY BE EXPLAINED BY (A) OUR OWN ATTITUDE OF ALOOFNESS TOWARD HIM AND (B) OUR FAILURE TO BRIEF HIM CONCERNING AREAS RPT AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. (2) OUR EVALUATION OF BECKER: IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WE HAVE ONLY A LIMITED BASIS FOR JUDGING HIM. 3 APP RPT HE APPEARS HONEST, STRAIGHTFORWARD, DISCREET, INTELLIGENT, MORE FAMILIAR WITH SOCIAL WELFARE PRACTICES BUT CONSIDERABLY LESS KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING THE DP RPT DP COMMUNITY THAN HIS PREDECESSOR; WE HAVE HAD NO REASON OF OUR OWN (AS DISTINGUISHED FROM IASO, WHOSE JUDGEMENT APPEARS O BE BASED ON INFORMATION UNKNOWN TO US) TO QUESTION HIS CHARACTER OR LOYALTY. HIS REPUTATION AMONG OTHER RESETTLEMENT AGENCIES APPEARS TO BE GOOD. IT SHOULD BE RE-EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT WE DO NOT RPT NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT EXPERIENCE I RPT WITH BECKER TO ARRIVE AT ANY CONCLUSIVE EVALUATION OF HIS PERSON.

CB-349

F-5564

27 FEB 1953
W

X
AFCzajkowski/acr 2775

SECRET
Security Information

NEW YORK

TO LEA FROM ASHCRAFT BY ALIEN W 6c 2-9.

SUBJECT: CASE 12,667. RE NY-5311 AND FREUND-CZAJKOWSKI TELEPHONE RE CONVERSATIONS, 26 AND 27 FEBRUARY 53.

THANK YOU FOR QUICK ACTION ON OUR TELEPHONIC REQUEST FOR INFO ON IRON CURTAIN REFUGEE COMMITTEE. YOUR INFO WAS TRANSMITTED TO DD/P'S OFFICE, WHICH NOW REQUESTS ADDITIONAL DATA ON AND YOUR EVALUATION OF ABRAM J. BECKER.

THIS HAS BEEN SET UP AS CASE 12,667.

5564

cc: Case 12,667
Index (Iron Curtain Refugee Comm.) ✓

SECRET
Security Information

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

Index
Iron Curtain
Refugee Comm.

Files

27 Feb 53

Alien Branch (AFCzajkowski/ecr)

F-5564.

Case 12,667

1. Info in Freund's TWX- NY-5811 was telephoned to Mr. Hulick in DD/P's office.

2. Hulick requested additional info concerning Abram J. Hecker and our relations with him.

3. Request was telephoned to Freund in New York.

Orig - Case 12,667
cc: Index ✓

SECRET
Security Information

Security Information

Files 26 Feb 1953

Alien Branch (AFCzajkowski/acr)

Iron Curtain Refugee Committee

1. On 26 Feb 53 Mr. Hulick in the DD/P's office requested information concerning the Iron Curtain Refugee Committee. Specifically he wished to learn:

1. What is relation between this & IRC?
2. Identity of new man who runs ICRC.
3. Do we have close relations?

2. Czajkowski telephoned New York Field Office and transmitted the request to Walter Freund.

3. This has been set up as Case 12,667.

Orig - Case 12,667
cc: Index ✓

Security Information

9 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Conversation between President Lopez Mateos of Mexico and Mr. Winston Scott, Chief of Station, Mexico

REFERENCE : MEXI 5693 (IN-49514), dated 8 June 60

1. This memorandum contains a suggestion, in Paragraph 3, for the consideration of the DCI.

2. On the night of 7 June, President Lopez Mateos requested Mr. Scott to inform "his good friend, President Eisenhower," of the following:

A. That the President is a friend of the United States, "not only because of necessity but of genuine desire and ideology".

B. That the invitation to President Dorticos of Cuba was extended two weeks after it was indicated that Dorticos was going to Mexico "on his own", through the Mexican Ambassador in Cuba.

C. That he will not invite Fidel Castro to Mexico even though Cuban Ambassador Jose Antonio Portuondo told President Lopez Mateos that Dorticos will request an invitation for Castro.

3. President Lopez Mateos also asked that President Eisenhower be informed that he is delighted that a decision has now been made to get rid of Castro. The DCI may wish to inform the President of the above. 24

4. President Lopez Mateos was indirectly informed of CIA intentions in regard to Castro through a conversation between Mr. Scott and Jose Lorenzo Cossio, Advisor to the Mexican President, who informed Mr. Scott that President Lopez Mateos would not invite Castro to visit Mexico, even though Dorticos is going to ask him to do so. Mr. Scott suggested that if the Mexican President helped CIA to achieve the overthrow of Castro, he would not have to deal with the problem of inviting Castro to Mexico. 0608 24

J. C. King
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: DDCI
DDP

3/PJ

S-E-C-R-E-T

PRIORITY
[illegible]-5906

Chief of Station, Mexico

19 - 9-11

Chief, WHD

Matters for Discussion with Anthony R. PONCHAY
on Move of AMCIGAR to Mexico

X

None

[illegible]

For PONCHAY

The following is in response to your request for a summary of points that need to be clarified in discussions between you and Station Mexico on the forthcoming move of AMCIGAR to Mexico City.

1. Political

A. The requirement that the "overt" office will consist of only three officials, the others being "covert", and the statement that "the presence of large AMCIGAR in Mexico should not become known and never admitted". Cf. MEXI-5904, 24 July. (Comment: It would appear impossible to comply with this requirement if there is to be an overt office and any AMRASP publicity in Mexico or elsewhere, since the identities and whereabouts of all AMCIGAR members will be a matter of public knowledge.)

B. The statement in para 3, MEXI-5904 that the Mexican Government will not be friendly unless AMRASP activities and "plotting to overthrow Cuban Government" remain covert. (Comment: Since there is to be an overt office and propaganda department and AMRASP has been, and will have to continue to be, described as a group organized for the purpose of removing the CASTRO government, their necessary propaganda activities toward this end cannot be covert. Could it be modified to apply only to agreement that no military invasion would be launched from Mexico?)

24

C. Clarification of the words "disavow" and "established" in the following statement by LITEMPO-2: "...may have to disavow AMRASP and the effort should it be established KUBARK in contact with AMRASP in Mexico". (Comment: Since there will be no overt LITEMPO-2 support AMRASP, the term disavow is ambiguous. What will constitute its being established that KUBARK is in contact with AMRASP? Certainly we can expect the charge will be made many times by the Soviets and Commies.)

24,01

01 z4

D. Possibility of LITEMPO-2 holding meeting to brief PRI leaders on Cuban subversive activities Mexico (para 5, MEXI-5953) before arrival AMCIGAR, which would undoubtedly be of assistance in obtaining popular and official sympathy for AMRASP activities.

2. Propaganda

We plan to have AMRASP propaganda department in Mexico, but it will be impossible for them to operate effectively, or indeed at all, if LITEMPO-2 continues to insist on AMRASP activities in Mexico "remaining covert and not becoming public or press issue". We feel a tremendous publicity drive should be made throughout Latin America at the time of arrival of AMCIGAR in Mexico. Station KUBARK assets will be needed to a large extent in improving the public and political climate to allow AMRASP people to work effectively. Also, it is hoped Station will be able to guide and support [illegible], who will arrive in Mexico soon to produce El Mundo in Exile, which will ostensibly be independent but actually will be pro-AMRASP. [illegible] will also make satirical, humorous radio tapes for broadcasting over Radio Swan.

of

24

GIN

3. PM

Requirements set forth DIR-40133, dated 15 July. If permission could be obtained for use this territory, even if only for 72 hours prior and during the main strike operation, the project would be advanced materially.

4. CI

A. We concur requirement that TWICKER contact with Station and with AMCIGAR be clandestine. Need Station's assistance in working out mechanics of these contacts.

24 B. Station's advice and assistance needed on following: (1) provision of unilateral telephone taps/mike installation operational data for AMCIGAR consumption; (2) protection (unilateral 24 goon squads) of AMCIGAR members against enemy agent executive actions; (3) unilateral agent surveillants to check on security and loyalty of overt/covert AMCIGAR members; (4) selection of secure safe sites for housing of AMCIGAR members, for overt office, and for covert meeting sites.

C. 24 Mexican Government capabilities in terms of protection of overt AMCIGAR members against enemy agent executive action operations.

D. Can Station communication facilities (pouch and cable) be used for secure AMRASP communications between members in Mexico and those in PBPRIME and elsewhere?

OLIVER G. GALBOND

Distribution:
3 - Mexico

3 August 1960

1 - Mexico Desk
1 - WH/4/Chrono

3. 4/4/M Thompson! Am tt

cf/pv

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

302
DATE : 9 JUL 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5 (MR 03 REYNOLDS WH DIV NOTIFIED 2050 9 JUL 60)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP
CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, IOD 4, S/C 2

JUL 10 00292 60

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 22641

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 5853

REF: A. DIR 38758 (OUT 94420) *

B. MEXI 5852 (IN 22332) **

1. LATE NIGHT 8 JULY LCOS HAD CONFERENCE PARA 7 REF B.**

2. 201 LITENSOR STATES DID NOT APPROVE EITHER IN GENERAL OR SPECIFIC TEXT SPEECH EMILIO SANCHEZ PIEDRAS NOR ITEMS TO BE TREATED SPEECH IN ADVANCE. SANCHEZ SPOKE AS INDIVIDUAL CONGRESSMAN DID NOT SPEAK FOR GOVERNMENT, NOR DID HE SPEAK FOR (WHOLE) PARTY (PRI). HE SAID SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN "AS IN U.S.A." SPEAK FREELY AND ON OWN.

3. 201 LITENSOR SAYS PORTION SPEECH REGARDING CUBA WAS "WIDELY MIS-QUOTED". HE SAID IN NO PLACE DID SANCHEZ MENTION CASTRO OR CUBAN GOVERNMENT. HE SAID SANCHEZ EXPRESSED FRIENDSHIP AND SYMPATHY FOR "CUBAN PEOPLE" AND HE POINTED OUT THIS HAD BEEN U.S. GOVT POLICY ALSO. REPORTERS (HE SAID) HAVE INTERPRETED THIS SPEECH TO MEAN CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND CASTRO REGIME, WHICH 201 LITENSOR STATES IS NOT MEXICAN POLICY. HE SAID "THE SOONER CASTRO AND TRUJILLO ARE GONE FROM THE CARIBBEAN THE SOONER THIS PORTION OF THE WORLD CAN RETURN TO PEACE AND NORMALCY".

4. 201 LITENSOR DID NOT RESPOND TO QUESTION OF WHETHER HE WILL MAKE CLARIFYING STATEMENT BUT BOTH 301 LIERGO AND 401 LIELEGANT SAY HE WILL MAKE NO SUCH STATEMENT.

5. 401 LIELEGANT BELIEVES 201 LITENSOR WILL BE WILLING IN NEAR FUTURE HAVE MEETING

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. 5

9|N

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE 2

IN 22641 MEXI 5853

TO INFO CITE

24
(PRI LEADERS) AND BRIEF THEM CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES MEXICO. (COS COMMENT: GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, WOULD BE A PRINCIPAL FIGURE AND SPOKESMAN IN THIS. 24 (BELIEVE CAN GET HIS AID))

6. BOTH 013 (LIERGO) AND 4 01 (LIELEGANT) STATE NO PRI SENATOR OR CONGRESSMAN "OF PRESTIGE" WILL STAND UP AND TAKE ISSUE WITH SANCHEZ. 4 01 (LIELEGANT) PRIVATELY STATED HE HAS ONE OR TWO PRI SENATOR FRIENDS WHO ARE OLD AND WITHOUT POLITICAL FUTURES WHO COULD LIKELY BE CONVINCED THEY SHOULD CLARIFY ISSUE, BUT THEY NOT "OF PRESTIGE". ALSO, SOME PARTIDO ACCION NACIONAL (PAN), CATHOLIC RIGHT WING CONGRESSMEN WOULD DO BUT THIS NOT CONSIDERED WORTH EFFORT BY 4 01 (LIELEGANT.) 24 (QUESTION OF PAYMENT HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED)

7. TO DATE HAVE FOUND SANCHEZ HIGHLY RESPECTED NOT PARTICULARLY TO LEFT NOR PARTICULARLY CLOSE LAZARO CARDENAS. WILL LOOK FOR "PERSONAL VULNERABILITIES".

8. FYI: AMB HILL HAD TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TELLO AND WITH CORONA DEL ROSAL (PRESIDENT OF PRI). SEE HIS EMBTEL WHICH COS HAS NOT SEEN YET.

9. WILL CONTINUE TO REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comment:

* Suggested operations for the field to attempt to carry out in an effort to get the (Mexican authorities) to take issue with Sanchez Piedra disclaiming the latter's recent statements. 24

** Stated that COS 1) would attempt to see 01 LI(TENSOR(2)) on 8 July.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

9/RV

16-7

From: [Panama City, Panama] Report No: 23 [illegible]764 Local File No:

No. of Pages: 3 No. of Enclosures:

Report Made By: Howard W. Antell Approved By:

Distribution: 10 Wash (2) ✓
By copy to: [Mexi] (1)
10 [Guat] (1)
Files (1)
Made available to the Embassy and G-2

Orally to: [illegible]

Source Cryptonym: Sources Identified References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments: [illegible]

23
[TNM-]415 indicated that the Headquarters of the Caribbean Legion were being transferred to Panama"where it could count on the aid of the ARIAS government", and that Julio LOPEZ Masegoza, active in the Caribbean Legion, would remain in Mexico dedicating himself to the purchase of gold and its clandestine exportation to Guatemala and Panama.

23
[TNM-K-]459 requested confirmation of the above information.

It is possible that the attached report may tend to confirm part of this information.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Classification

100-4-28 [illegible]

6/20

23

Subject: Gold Shipments

Report No: TZP-764

16-7

Date of Information: May-July 1950

Place Acquired: Panama City, Panama

Date Acquired: June-July 1950

Evaluation: B-C

Date of Report: 10 July 1950

Source:

1. G-2 reported that on 7 May 1950 a B-26 type bomber arrived in David, Panama, from Brownsville, Texas, due to a low gasoline supply. The plane was headed for Tocumen Airport in Panama City, and carried as a crew the following according to G-2:

Frank ORGEL, U.S. Citizen, Pilot
O. MARTINEZ, U.S. Citizen, Co-Pilot
Steve MURRAY, U.S. Citizen, Mechanic
Mauricio CASTRO, Panamanian, Passenger

05

(A tire blew out at David, and Mr. John LERCH, Civil Aeronautics technician at Tocumen Airport was instrumental in getting a spare tire to them,

05

2. Mr. LERCH ~~advised this office~~ that he had met Steve MURRAY in Havana in April 1950 in company with a fellow named ZORILLO, who claimed to have some connection with the Secret Police in Mexico. 05 LERCH described MURRAY as an adventurer who had been in the Philipines and the Far East and whom he suspected of gold smuggling activities. LERCH 05 said that MURRAY was pilot of the plane and he thought it was unusual that ~~so~~ fast a plane as this and as expensive to operate was being used when it had comparatively little cargo space. In May 1950, when MURRAY was in Panama, he told LERCH that he was buying orchid bulbs.

05

3. On 16 June 1950 the following information was received (from Civil Intelligence Section, Panama Canal,) regarding this matter:

(3)

"It has been reported that very frequently a B-26 airplane (N5546N - a Martin Marauder) makes trips between Tocumen and David, R.P. It is piloted by Steve MURRAY, and at least two other Americans ~~ride on the plane, which is~~ whom are sometimes met at Tocumen Airport by either Tito, Harmodito or Toni ARIAS. On landing at the airport it goes directly to a hangar, and allegedly the only ones who visit it are the ARIAS brothers, PASTOR Ponce, Chief of the airport, and one (fnu) LINARES, Chief of Customs at Tocumen.

"Informant stated that it was believed at first that the plane was engaged in arms contraband, but later it appeared more logical to assume that it was involved in another type of smuggling, possibly drugs.

"Virgilio RAMIREZ, then Chief of the Control Tower, is said to have stated that the plane comes and goes without being registered at the airport under orders of PONCE, Airport Manager; that the plane lands without signalling

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-60
FEB 1949

7/90

by radio or talking to anyone for fear of detection at Albrook Field, but that it is signaled by means of a light which indicates that the field is free for landing. According to [illegible], [illegible] and one Jimmy SMITH told stove that Panama's air agreement with the United States regarding landing rules was thereby being violated, and that these two men were afterwards removed from their jobs.

"Informant adds that the above plane landed at Tocumen from David on 11 May at 5:45 p.m., on 12 May at 6:51 p.m., on 14 May at 6:29 p.m. and on 16 May at 9:26 a.m.

"The above information was allegedly given to President ARIAS by the Minister of Government and Justice, and he apparently showed little interest in the subject, merely stating that the matter should be investigated to see what there is to it."

Upon receipt of this information it appeared that Virgilio RAMIREZ might have been the source, since he was fired from his post at Tocumen Airport and was disgruntled about it. It was ascertained that the information contained in the above paragraph, in which RAMIREZ is mentioned, was reported by RAMIREZ but the other information came from other Civil Intelligence sources.

CS in the plane mentioned above,

4. On 6 July Mr. LERCH advised that the ~~above plane and~~ Steve MURRAY had returned to Panama and that the Minister of Government had ordered that the plane be dismantled and searched, but he could not ascertain the basis for the search. LERCH had talked to the Manager of the airport, Rafael PASTOR Ponce, and with Toni ARIAS, Director General of Civil Aeronautics, and a nephew of President Arias, who indicated that they were aware of the Minister of Government's order but did not know what was behind it. Both felt that it was an extreme measure, which should not be carried out.

CS

5. On 8 July 1950 Mr. MURRAY called at the Embassy to obtain assistance in securing the release of his plane. Briefly he stated that he had departed from Mexico City via Managua and arrived at Tocumen at 7:30 p.m. 5 July. His passport reflected the following:

Name: Steven T. Murray
Passport No.: 1824
Issued: Manila, December 2, 1946
Renewed: Manila, December 27, 1948
Expires: December 1, 1950

(5)

He furnished the following additional information:

Type of Plane: Converted B-26
U.S. Registry: N 5546 N
Pilot and Owner: Steven T. Murray
Co-pilot: Frank Oergel, U.S. citizen
Flight Engineer: Cristobal Martinez, Mexican citizen
Passenger: Mauricio DE CASTRO, Panamanian citizen (bearer of official passport), passenger from Mexico City to Tocumen
Destination: Brownsville, Texas
Purpose of Trip: Business

2/90

Consequently.

He stated that he was in the export-import business and that he dealt in gold. He said that he had come to Panama to see a man by the name of SAS, a gold dealer from Buenos Aires, about gold shipments.

(6) 6. On 8 July, Minister of Government Alfredo ALEMAN reported the matter to the U.S. Ambassador stating that prior to arriving in Panama the plane had been signaled, that all was not well at the airport and that the crew had jettisoned cargo prior to arrival. (A check with the Air Force authorities does not confirm that any such message was sent and MURRAY denies that anything was jettisoned. He insisted that he was coming to Panama to discuss the gold business but that he had no cargo.) The Minister also advised the Ambassador that PASTOR Ponce had been ~~fired~~ removed as Head of the airport.

P leave out

05

(7) 7. In a conversation with PASTOR Ponce and MURRAY on the night of 8 July [LIROM] was advised that PASTOR Ponce had, in fact, been fired and that he was determined to bump off Toni ARIAS. Both MURRAY and PASTOR Ponce claimed that Toni ARIAS was behind it all but that PASTOR Ponce was the fall-guy.

8. The Mexican referred to, Cristobal MARTINEZ, and the Mexican, ZORILLO, are believed to be identical. SAS has been identified as Fernando SAS, a gold dealer, who operates in Buenos Aires and Montevideo. Civil Intelligence Section has advised that SAS was staying with Toni ARIAS and that SAS had departed from Panama hastily. ~~CIS also advised~~ that President ARIAS ~~at first~~ had given orders for the dismissal of both his nephew, Toni ARIAS, and PASTOR Ponce, but it was later agreed that Toni ARIAS would not be fired to avoid a public scandle involving the President's family.

P leave out

9. (The present status of the matter is that the plane has been searched with negative results, that the plane is still being held by the Panamanian authorities and that MURRAY and others are endeavoring by every means possible to secure the release of the plane. The head of the Tocumen Airport, PASTOR Ponce, has been dismissed and Toni ARIAS, the President's nephew, will probably be allowed to withdraw from his position gracefully.)

Distribution:

Wash (2)
10 Mexi (1)
Mana (1)
Files (1)

3/60

104-10172-10041

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

RID/

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			24 AUG 1959	
2.			28 Aug	mml
3. WH/III/Carib/RA				
4. Carib/FI				
5. PP				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10. CI/ICD			22 SEP 1959	
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. RID/AN		18 MAR 1970		
15. RID/ED1				
16.				
17.				
18.				
19. WH/III/Carib/			28	mml
20. RID/FI	1400L			

RECORD COPY

COMMENTS

[illegible]

reclassify.

Vivian G Daily
WH/COG/PP

reclassify to
201-251853
201-3/411,399

201-251853

(Economic [illegible] - Cuba)

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER
	INDEX	

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
	31 Aug 1959	HKH -02130

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 4-68

SECRET

(40)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

[redacted]

OPERATIONAL AND SOURCE COVER SHEET

FROM: Habana
REPORT NO.: HKH-2130
REPORT MADE BY: Nelson L. Raynock/pza
NUMBER PAGES: 2
REPORT APPROVED BY: Woodrow C. Olien
NUMBER ENCLOSURES: None
DATE OF REPORT: 21 August 1959
REFERENCES: None
DISTRIBUTION:
By copy to: 3 - Headquarters w/att
1 - Embassy (Economic Counselor)
Orally to: 1 - Legal Attaché
2 - Files

Field File No. 6-0-120

SOURCE CRYPTONYM: See Comments below
ID NO.:
IG NO.:
KRYPTON: ☐ Yes ☐ No

SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA, AND COMMENTS:

SUBJECT: Cuban Economic Crisis

OPERATIONAL COMMENTS: 05

08

[Source Alberto FERNANDEZ Hechavarria,] [the chief of the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Board who has the job of selling Cuba's sugar.] A former active member of the 26 of July Movement during the revolution, he is now disillusioned, and reportedly is not going to last much longer in his job. He is wealthy and his family have lost through CASTRO's economic reforms. He appears to know a lot about the government and also seems to have an insight into CASTRO. He regards CASTRO as some type of a UNIVAC machine, his mind automatically photostating details which he can and will use in the future. He says that CASTRO is ruthless, and that nothing can stop him in his determination to do something, i.e., agrarian reform, and that he will sacrifice his friends, his family, his money, and his fortune to accomplish his purpose.

Again illustrating the present situation in Cuba, the source said that he cannot publicly have contacts with American officials—refusing to let the writer use his telephone—and he said that a record is kept of all his calls and that his movements are periodically checked.

The advisor who warned CASTRO in paragraph one of the attached report was the source.

As a possible reference to this report and particularly to field comment number two, see HAVA-2526. TDCS-3/401,583

The second source referred to in Field Comment No. 2 was AMPACK-1 who obtained his information from the [president of the Banco Industrial de Cuba.]

08

[redacted]

HKH-2130

201-251853

FORM NO. 51-59 APR 1953 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

CS COPY

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE. A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT. 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary. Based on original document.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT C Cuban Economic Crisis

REPORT NO. HKH-2130

DATE OF REPORT 21 August 1959

NO. OF PAGES 2

REFERENCES None

DATE OF INFO. July-August 1959

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Cuba, Habana (20 August 1959)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Cuban Government Official (F).
Appraisal of Content: 3

1. Contrary to the reports which are issued by the Cuban Government, the financial status of the Cuban economy is rapidly deteriorating and becoming a serious problem. During July 1959 an advisor to Prime Minister Fidel CASTRO Ruz, warned him to proceed more slowly with the agrarian reform, because the Cuban treasury was running short of funds. It was pointed out that 57 sugar mills were bankrupt and had not paid the plantation owners for the 1959 sugar crop. CASTRO was told that if the reckless confiscation of agricultural properties continued, the Cuban Government would become obligated to assume even more debts in order to alleviate the hunger of farm workers.[1]

2. Another drain on the economy is government subsidies. For example, the Banco de Desarrollo Economico y Social (BANDES, Social and Economic Development Bank) controls about U. S. $400 million in properties and investments such as the Compañia Cubana de Aviacion (Cuban Airline Company). The companies have been caught in the present contraction of capital and cannot survive without government subsidies. The subsidies paid by BANDES amount to U. S. $8 million a month, and this is only one example of the many payments which are draining the Cuban treasury.[2]

Field Comments.

1. ~~From the reports which have been received~~ It appears that there is growing unemployment of farm workers. This is the "dead season"—the period between sugar cane harvests—but it is reported that most plantation owners and ranchers are fearful of confiscation of their properties for the agrarian-reform program, and consequently are doing very little in the way of maintenance work. The latter provided at least a marginal field of employment, and this is now denied to the agricultural workers. ~~However,~~ In spite of this warning, the agrarian-reform program has not been slowed. In fact, it seems to have been intensified.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DISTRIBUTION

201-25183

2. ~~The~~ Source thought that nothing could stop CASTRO in his determination to proceed with the agrarian reform program as fast as possible. Since the biggest obstacle to carrying out this program is the lack of money, the source was of the opinion that CASTRO would do anything to obtain this money and might even confiscate bank accounts and moneys and negotiable instruments held in safety deposit boxes. Carrying this one step further, ~~the~~ source thought such confiscatory tactics could only be a temporary saving device and that eventually it would be necessary for CASTRO to obtain a large loan from another country. He speculated that this would mean either the United States or the Soviet Union, and feared that if it were the latter, it would mean the end of friendly relations with the United States. In respect to CASTRO's possible need for a loan, another, fairly reliable, source reported on 18 August 1959 that CASTRO was trying to obtain a 30,000,000-peso loan from ~~local~~ Cuban banks.

201-251553

1-251553

201-251553

[illegible]251553

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible]

DATE : 458
23 MAR 61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, OC 6, BELL S/C

MAR 23 1522Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 4648

PRITY KOLA INFO BELL CITE WAVE 4795

JMZIP JEAN III

REF WAVE 4559 (IN 3731) *

1. WILL INFIL FOLL SEVEN INDIVIDUALS VIA OPN JEAN III NIGHT 23 MAR: 04,09

A) ALDO VERA SERAFIN, 25 FEB [illegible], CAIBARIEN, SANTA CLARA

04,09 B) BRAULIO CONTRERA MACOT, 26 MAR 34, MANZANILLO, ORIENTE

04,09 C) ANGEL POSADA GUTIERREZ, 21 OCT 31, HAVANA, CUBA

04,09 D) RINALDO HERNANDEZ BLANCO, 25 FEB 23, PINAR DEL RIO

04,09 E) RAFAEL GARCIA RUBIO (T) CESAR RUBIO GOMEZ (A) TRAINEE 2621

04,09 F) BENIGNO PEREZ (T) PEDRO RODRIGUEZ (A) TRAINEE 2563

04 G) PEDRO SERGIO CUELLAR ALONSO (T)

04,09 2. JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE, "LUCAS"; 13 MAY 15, SANTIAGO DE CUBA, RETURNED CUBA VIA COMMERCIAL AIR AFTERNOON 22 MARCH.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED APPROVAL RUN OPN JEAN III.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

[illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Cop

8/BR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADOP/A, WH 3, OC 6, BELL S/C

FEB 24 2313Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 1012

OPIM BELL RINM KOLA CITE WAVE 3959

JMZIP JEAN

REF WAVE 3515 (IN 4303)*

1. TEJANA DUE DEPART KEY WEST 251600Z RUN OPN JEAN.

2. WILL INFIL CARGO PER REF AND 4 PAX AS FOLLOWS:

TRAINEES 2521 [EMILIO MARTINEZ] 04 ALIAS [ERNESTO GUERRA VIDAL] 07
2634 [OLIVERIO TOMEU] 04 ALIAS [ANTONIO DEL MONTE CABALLERO] 07
2765 [RAFAEL ALVAREZ FERNANDEZ-GARRIDO] 04 ALIAS [MAXIMO ALONSO BERMUDEZ] 07
2585 [CARLOS POVEDA] 04 ALIAS [CALIXTO BERGNES BRAUDET] 07.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* PLAN RERUN OPN JEAN PER FORMAT WAVE 2174.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

8/BR

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: GUITART CAMPUZANO, AGUSTIN, DR.
C-727418

INCLUSIVE DATES: /

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/OA

ROOM: /

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4:00 10 AUG 78		PAT ORR	POrr

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

THIS FOLDER IS NOT TO BE RELEASED OUTSIDE OF CI/STAFF. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH THIS FOLDER MUST NOTIFY CI/OA(5077) IMMEDIATELY IF IT IS TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER GROUP WITHIN CI/STAFF SO THAT IT MAY BE RECHARGED TO THE PROPER PERSON, AND SO THAT THE FOLDER CAN BE READILY LOCATED AT ANY TIME AS NEEDED.

DATE

727418

14-00000

SECRET

CI PROJECTS CARD MADE

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

DATE SET UP 19 June 1963 Jew	TRUE NAME GUITART Campizano, Agustin, Dr.		DATE ... REC 18 June 1963
CP			
201 727418	VARIATIONS		
S.O.#	CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM	PROJECT JMATE
DATE OF BIRTH 25 April 1910	PLACE OF BIRTH Cardenas, Cuba		
CASE OFFICER Carl Trettin		DIVISION SAS/OS	EXTENSION 7646

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
P.O.A.		SASKIS	8 Jul 63	Records on Former German Agents Checked in CI/R&A, date: 19 June 1963 Results: NR 19 Nov 63 Nephew of 201-727417
O.A.				
C.N.C.				
OTHER APPROVALS				
PRO I	bio.			
PRO II				
138893 GREEN LIST	NPR	prc	26 June 63	
RI TRACES	NDI			
OPS & DIV. TRACES	NDI			
FIELD TRACES	Not Init: Subject residing in New Orleans			
S.O. INDICES	*	Coleman psc	27 June 63	* Subject of [illegible] to 00/E. Coordination must be effected. No other informat. in S.O. Files.
FBI INDICES	NIC - see memo			
ORAL NOTICE S.O. INVESTIGATION				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION				
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE: ~~13 Jan 1964~~ jo

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, SAS/OS

ATTENTION: Carl Trettin

C# 201-727418

The file on GUITART Campuzano, Agustin, Dr. is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 10 JAN 1964	CASE NO. 201- 727418

	SET UP FOR POA		EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE	
	SET UP FOR OA		SPECIAL INQUIRY		COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA		

USE

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE: ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*		REVIEW AT CI/OA: ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
X	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE, ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FIELD TRACES		NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
	REQUEST: ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

	POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.
X	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

13 JAN 1964

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

/s/ Edward P. Brown

Leonard W. Tate

SIGNATURE ☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
SAS/OS - C. Trettin

NUMBER
201 - 727418

SUBJECT
GUITART Campuzano, Agustin

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
18 June 1963 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	8 JUL 1963

S E C R E T

DATE: 3 July 1 63 crm

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C#
SO#
201 - 727418

THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY):

FBI from Jane Roman

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S E C R E T

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 8 JUL 1963

CASE NO. 727418

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
✓	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

26 1963

P.O.A.

18 June 1963

Operation Stateside No. 30

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Notification to the Federal Bureau of Investigation of CIA's Intent to Contact the Subject

Name : Dr. Agustin GUITART Campuzano

DPOB : 25 April 1910, Cardenas, Cuba

Based upon data submitted no identifiable information pertinent to your inquiry located FBI files. This is the result of a request for an FBI file check only [illegible]

(T27418)

SECRET

JUL 2 2 25 PM '63

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET

TO SAS/OS	ATTENTION Carl Trettin	ROOM 0 G 19	BLDG.

SUBJECT GUITART Campuzano, Agustin (Dr.)	CI/OA NUMBER C-201-727418	CCS FILE NO. 5-16 G	CCS CASE OFFICER Richard J. Biladeau

Central Cover Staff concurs in your proposal to use the above individual for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon Central Cover Staff to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise Central Cover Staff/Non-Official Cover promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject is in CCS/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCS/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

JUL 3 10 41 AM '63

✓	COPY TO CI/OA	DATE 26 JUN 1963	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, CCS/NC Thomas K Strange

FORM 12-62 1678 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. CCS CONCURRENCE SECRET (8)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
20 June 1963 cra

TO:
SAS/OS - C. Trettin

C NO.
201 - 727415

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

SUBJECT:
GUITART Carrizano, Agustin

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please coordinate with FBI.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

[illegible]

FORM 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 19 June 1963 jaw

PROJECT: JMATE

TO : Deputy Director of Security

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT : C 201-727418
NO.

1. TYPE OF REQUEST: ☒ POA ☐ CA ☐ SPEC. INQ. ☐ CSC

2. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY (Date)

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY
26 June 1963

4. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT
SAS/OS New Orleans, La.

5. USE OF SUBJECT
cut-out in FI operation.

6. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION	☒	☐
B. C.I.A. INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION	☐	☒
C. SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM	☒	☐
D. SUBJECT AWARE OF C.I.A. INTEREST IN HIM	☐	☒

E. LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

F. SUGGESTED "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

G. REASON FOR NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA (Explain fully)

7. RI TRACES
NDI

8. DIVISION TRACES
NDI

9. FIELD TRACES
Not Init: Subject residing in New Orleans

10. GREEN LIST INITIATED ☒ YES ☐ NO

11. ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ PART 1 ☒ PARTIAL BIO. ☐ OTHER:

12. REMARKS

P.O.A.
CI/OA [illegible]
Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

INITIALS

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 19 JUN 1963	CASE NO. 727418

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

✓	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE 26 June 63	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE : AREA :
☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

Area - ~~New Orleans~~ New Orleans, La.

use - cut-out in FI operation

To SAS:

Please coordinate with FBI

Edward P. Brown

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 18 Jun 63

TO:	XX	CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
		Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: Wendell Ullery
SAS/IOS
G G 14

SUBJECT: (True name) Dr. Agustin GUITART Campuzano AK

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

PROJECT: JMATE

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 727418

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

XX	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

New Orleans, La.

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

FI Asset - for use as cut-out to his uncle, Rene GUITART Rodriguez, (201-727417) who is residing in Cuba.

NOTE: OO/C has contacted Subject, but has no current interest.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 138893

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
X	NOT INITIATED (Explanation) Subject residing in New Orleans		

Jun 19 8 55 AM '63

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	
Carl Trettin	7646	[illegible]

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1-63

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

prq part I

NAME : Dr. Agustin GUITART Campuzano

DPOB : 25 April 1910, Cardenas, Cuba

RESIDENCE : 4009 Elba St., New Orleans 25, La.

OCCUPATION : Doctor of Science (Mathematics & Physics)

Presently teaching at Xavier University in New Orleans.

EMPLOYMENT HIST. : Formerly a Prof. at the Univ. of Havana

Served as Minister of Education during the early part of Carlos PRIO's tenure as head of the Cuban Gov't.

COURT RECORD : Was imprisoned on the Isle of Pines during MACHADO's term. (date unknown)

SPOUSE : Helena TORO

CHILDREN : Agustin, Jorge, Vilma Helena, William

CUBAN ADDRESS : Havana, Calle 64 No. 1502

NOTE : Subject arrived in the U.S.A. in Feb. 1962 thru Opa Locka, Fla. where he was debriefed by OO/C.

OO/C has no current interest in Subject.

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: GUITART CAMPUZANO, AGUSTIN
201-727418

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4:00 10 APR 78		PAT ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

GUITART Campuzano, Dr. Agustin

201

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side of form. Type or print. Guide for use of 201 system is contained in CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.

TO: RID/201 Section

TUBE STATION: DW6

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CANCEL ☐

FROM: NAME

BRANCH

ROOM NO.

PHONE

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO.

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

10. NAME VARIATIONS

TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

16. ORGANIZATION OR INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION

CODE

17. OCCUPATION (Clear text)

CODE

18. ACTION DESK

CODE

19. SECONDARY DESK

CODE

20. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE

21. COMMENTS

22. SIGNATURE

23. IDN-

201-

FORM 11-62 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

[illegible]

(38)

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

FROM:

RID:

AUSTIN BOX
IP/AN
EXT. 4239

CX-274
GA50
TUBE G77

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

1 FEB 1972 CCG

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Clark		1 FEB 1972		Cj
2.				
3. Marshall		3 Feb		R
4. Finch				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

73912

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-729418

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 10 Jan 72

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFAA 03735

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT: TYPIC/Dario Guitart Manday

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: UFAA-3718

1. As stated in the reference, AMGAME-1 claims that Guitart has relatives living in the U.S. The AMOTs were asked for any information they might be able to provide on such relatives. Forwarded herewith is a copy of OTA-3909 with information available to the AMOTs on the two individuals they believe to be Guitart's half brothers, Agustin Guitart Campuzano and Miguel Antonio Guitart Campuzano. Also included is information on Guitart's mistress, Mar Juarez Fernandoz. There are no Station traces on either of the brothers.

2. Station traces on Mar JUAREZ Fernandez indicate that she is the head of the Ichthyology Department of the Oceanographic Institute. In February 1967 a refugee source reported her to be the assistant to Guitart in the Plankton Department of the Oceanographic Institute of the Cuban Academy of Sciences, and one of the founders of the Institute of Oceanology. She had formerly been a professor of biological sciences at the University of Havana. In 1966 she was given a UNESCO scholarship to study in an unidentified European country but the Cuban Government did not give her permission to leave the island. In 1966 she was nominated to attend a convention in the USSR but again was not given permission to leave Cuba. She has been opposed to the regime since 1963 and was anxious to leave Cuba.

Ruth P. Judkovitz
Ruth P. JUDKOVITZ

Attachment:
OTA-3909, h/w
Summary of Information, h/w

Distribution:
3-C/WHD w/atts h/w

2 atts

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFAA-3736

DATE: TYPED: 10 January 1972

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: GUITART 201-727418

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Dario Guitart Manday

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: UFAA-3718

1. As stated in the reference, AMGAME-1 claims that Guitart has relatives living in the U.S. The AMOTs were asked for any information they might be able to provide on such relatives. Forwarded herewith is a copy of OTA-3909 with information available to the AMOTs on the two individuals they believe to be Guitart's half brothers, Agustin Guitart Campuzano and Miguel Antonio Guitart Campuzano. Also included is information on Guitart's mistress, Mar Juarez Fernandez. There are no Station traces on either of the brothers.

2. Station traces on Mar JUAREZ Fernandez indicate that she is the head of the Ichthyology Department of the Oceanographic Institute. In February 1967 a refugee source reported her to be the assistant to Guitart in the Plankton Department of the Oceanographic Institute of the Cuban Academy of Sciences, and one of the founders of the Institute of Oceanology. She had formerly been a professor of biological sciences at the University of Havana. In 1966 she was given a UNESCO scholarship to study in an unidentified European country but the Cuban Government did not give her permission to leave the island. In 1966 she was nominated to attend a convention in the USSR but again was not given permission to leave Cuba. She has been opposed to the regime since 1963 and was anxious to leave Cuba.

Ruth P. JUDKOVITZ

Attachment:
OTA-3909, h/w
Summary of Information, h/w

Distribution:
3-C/WHD w/atts h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAA-3736	TYPED: 10 January 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER GUITART 201-

0TAR009

VIA: RAI

FROM: J/IEO

TRANS: I-57

SUBJECT: Dario GUITART Manday

REF: OTS-1517, 3 Jan 72

1. In accordance with your request, we are forwarding traces on relatives of Dario GUITART Manday (or Mandey) who are residing in the U.S.:

a. GUITART Campuzano, Agustin:

Professor of physics at Xavier University, Dept. of Physics, New Orleans, Louisiana 70125, U.S., phone number 488-6646. Resides at 3605 Louisiana Ave., Pkwy, N.Orleans Louisiana 70125, phone number 821-1307. He is married to Helena TORO Abril and has the following children: Dr. Agustin Ramon GUITART Toro, married to Daisy FOX Padron; Jorge Miguel GUITART Toro (single); Vilma Helena GUITART Toro, married to Dr. Edmundo P. ROBAINA (identical with Dr. Edmundo P. ROBAINA Grasso, a lawyer); and William Clark GUITART Toro, married to Giselle MARTINEZ de la Torre. Source: Cuban Families Year Book, 1969-70, issued by Joaquin de POSADA.

Married to Dr. Elena TORO Abril. Has a degree in Physics-Mathematics and Physics-Chemistry. Professor at Havana University. Resides at 1502 64th St. at the corner of 15th Ave., Ampliacion de Almendares, Marianao, Havana Province, phone number 2-7571. Children: Agustin, Jorge, Vioma Helena and William Clark GUITART Toro. Member of the Club of Cuban Professionals. Source: Nuestra Sociedad social directory by Jose Manuel VALDES Cruz, 1958, published by "Diario Nacional," page 471.

CS COPY

att #1 to UFAA-3756

201-72741

A12 884 999. DPOB: 25 Apr 1910, Cardenas, Matanzas Province. U.S. address: 509 W 178th St., Miami, Fla. Address in Cuba: 1502 64th St., Marianao, Havana. Entered the U.S. at Miami on 16 Feb 1962 (PAA 422). Occupation in Cuba: Professor of physics. Visa waiver. PP-38810 valid until 28 Aug 63. 5'6" tall, 162 lbs. Married to Elena TORO Abril. Source: Immigration card.

Doctor. Member of the Revolutionary Teachers Directory. Resides at 4009 Elba St., New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S. Source: List of members of the New Orleans Delegation of the Revolutionary Teachers Directory, 20 Jul 63.

Professor of Physics at the School of Sciences of Havana University. Source: Cuban Personalities File No. III/57.

b. GUITART Campuzano, Miguel Antonio:

Professor of mathematics, Physics-Math Dept., Alabama College, Montevallo, Alabama 35115, U.S., telephone number 665-2521. Resides at 204 N Ashville Circle, Montevallo, Alabama 35115, U.S. phone number 665-2506. Married to Emma Rosalia TABARES Gutierrez. Children: Miguel Horacio GUITART Tabares, married to Berenice LANCIS Paz; and Emma Eloisa GUITART Tabares, married to Emilio CERICE Rivero. Source: Cuban Families Year Book, 1969-70, issued by Joaquin DE POSADA.

A12 496 264. DPOB: 11 Oct 1908, Toiupa, Mexico. U.S. address: 1250 SW Sixth St., Miami, Fla. Address in Cuba: 8408 187th Ave., Fontanar, Marianao, Havana. Entered the U.S. at Miami on 19 Oct 61 (BWA 414). Occupation in Cuba professor of mathematics at Havana University. PP-22512 issued on 22 Jul 55, valid until 22 Jul 63. Visa waiver. Married to Emma TAVARES Gutierrez (identical with Emma Eloisa TABARES Gutierrez) who resides at the same address. Source: Immigration card.

Resides at 204 N. Ashville Circle, Monteavallo, Alabama. Father of the refugee Miguel H. GUITART Tabares who arrived in the U.S. on 10 Apr 70. Ref: PIR C-080-056.

2. Please, note that Agustin and Miguel Antonio have the matronymic Campuzano while Subject's matronymic is Manday or Mandey. This makes us believe that they are half brothers (children of the same father). Also note that reports indicate that Subject was born around 1923 while Agustin and Miguel Antonio were born in 1910 and 1908 respectively. Their difference in age is around 13 years. Agustin and Miguel Antonio were reported as being brothers of Dario GUITART Mandey by Orlando JAMBU Fernandez (A17 362 397). On 20 May 1966, JAMBU provided data to prepare a Summary of Information on Dario GUITART Mandey. In this Summary (we are

attaching a copy in Spanish).. JAMBU identified Agustin and Miguel Antonio as Agustin and Miguel Antonio GUITART Mandey. He did so probably because he did not know that they are half brothers who have different matronymics. We are certain that the individuals reported by JAMBU are Agustin and Miguel Antonio GUITART Campuzano because they have the same occupations.

3. We are also forwarding a copy in Spanish of a Summary of Information on Mar JUAREZ Fernandez who has been identified as Dario's mistress and as head of the Department of Icthyology of the Institute of Oceanology.

4. In our opinion, Agustin and Miguel Antonio GUITART Campuzano could provide information on Dario and explain whether they are half brothers.

201-737418

14-00000

SECRETO

A : C-300.

DE : C-90. FECHA:

ASUNTO : Mar JUAREZ Fernandez.

Jefa del Departamento de Ictiologia del Instituto
de Oceanologia, de la Academia de Ciencias.

FUENTE : Dr. Orlando [illegible] Fernandez.
Conoce a la Sujeto desde 1948, aprox.

REFERENCIA :

1. Se acompaña un "Sumario de Informacion" sobre la Sujeto, de acuerdo con las informaciones suministradas por la Fuente, con fecha 20 Mayo 1966.

CS COPY

ca #2 [illegible] UFAA-5736

201-727418

SECRETO

SUMARIO DE INFORMACION

PRIMERA PARTE:

1. Nombre: Mar JUAREZ Fernandez.

2. Lugar y Fecha de Nacimiento: Camagüey, Prov. Camaguey, Cuba; 1923, aproximadamente.

3. Direccion:

   a. Actual: Vedado, La Habana, Cuba.
   b. Permanente: (La misma).

4. Estado Civil: Divorciada.

5. Otros nombres que usa: (Ninguno).

6. Puesto Actual: Jefa del Departamento de Ictiologia del Instituto de Oceanografia, de la Academia de Ciencias.

7. Parientes:

   a. Padres: Desconoce.

   b. Hermanos: 1) Luz JUAREZ Fernandez, hembra, nacida en Ca,aguey, Prov. Camaguey, 1940, aprox.; raza blanca; Profesora de Dibujo en la Escuela Normal para Maestros, de Camaguey, Prov. Camaguey. Ignora ideologia politica.

   2) Enrique JUAREZ Fernandez, nacido en Camaguey, Prov. Camaguey, medico. Ignora edad, ideologia y otros datos.

   3) Nor JUAREZ Fernandez, hembra, nacida en Ca,aguey, Prov. Camaguey, (ignora edad); Doctora en Pedagogia; integrada al regimen. Ignora otros datos.

   DUL
   4) (Hmb. desc.) JUAREZ Fernandez, varon, abogado; nacidoen Camaguey, Prov. Camaguey; ignora edad y otros datos.

   c. Esposo: Divorciada. Ignora nombre y generales del que fuera su esposo.

   d. Hijos: No tiene.

8. Idiomas:

   a. Nativo: Espanol.
   b. Extranjeros: Ingles (regular).
   Ruso (lo estudia).

9. Descripcion Fisica:

S E C R E T O

a. Raza: Blanca.
b. Edad que aparenta: 42 años, aprox.
c. Estatura: 5'5", aprox.
d. Peso: 125 libras, aprox.
e. Complexion: Mediana.
f. Pelo: Castaño oscuro, lacio.
g. Ojos: Pardos, grandes.
h. Tez: Trigueña.
i. Forma de la cara: Ovoide.
j. Apariencia general: Limpia; normal.
k. Ropa: Normal, sencilla.
l. Caracteristicas: Bien formada, fisicamente.
m. Marcas de Identificacion: Ninguna visible.

10. Personalidad, Caracter y Costumbres:

a. Personalidad: Mediocre; normal; no es muy tratable para con los demas.

b. Caracter: A veces extrovertida, pero sin llegar a ser afable normalmente.

c. Costumbres: Gusta usar collares y aretes de argollas.

11. Situacion Economica:

a. Antes del 1959: Devengaba un sueldo mensual de 90 pesos.

b. Posterior a 1959: Actualmente devenga un sueldo de 360 pesos, mensuales.

c. Propiedades: Desconoce.

12. Curriculum Vitae: (Resumo).

a. Estudios Cursados: Doctora en Ciencias Naturales, graduada en la Universidad de La Habana, en alrededores del 1950.

b. Historial de Empleos: Posee el cargo actual o en iguales funciones desde 1961.
1948-61: Fue Ayudante de Catedra de la Facultad de Ciencias de la Universidad de La Habana.

13. Actividades Politicas y Revolucionarias:

a. En el Instituto: Ninguna.
b, En la Universidad: Ninguna.
c. Hasta 1959: Ninguna.
d. Posterior a 1959: Al lado del regimen, debido a que su amante, Dario GUITART Mendez (adepto al regimen) esta con dicho regimen.
e. Actualmente: Con el regimen, siguiendo al amante antes mencionado.

14. Viajes al Extranjero: Desconoce.

15. Actividades de Inteligencia: Ninguna.

16. Contactos y Amigos: Desconoce.

17. Debilidades Personales: El amante, Dario GUITART Manday, Director del Instituto ~~[illegible]~~ de Oceanografia, de la Academia de Ciencias.

SEGUNDA PARTE:

18. Cuales son los lazos de amistad entre la Fuente y el Sujeto? Explique desde que fecha se conoce, que grado de amistad han tenido, etc.

Conoce a la Sujeto desde 1960, aprox.; siempre se llevaron bien, considerando la Sujeto que la Fuente era amiga del Sujeto.

19. Ha estado la Fuente en contacto con la Sujeto despues de que la Fuente abandono Cuba? Cuando fue la ultima que tuvo la Fuente contacto con la Sujeto?

Despues de que la Fuente abandono Cuba, no ha estado en contacto con la Sujeto. La ultima vez que la Fuente vio a la Sujeto fue el 15 Octubre 1965, en el Instituto de Oceanologia.

20. Cree la Fuente de que se pueda reclutar a la Sujeto? De razones amplias si es que si o que no. Si la Fuente cree que si en que se basa?

Estima la Fuente de que la Sujeto es una fiel seguidora de su amante, Dr. Dario GUITART Manday, adepto al regimen, por cuya razon la Sujeto es tambien adepta al regimen.

21. Si la Fuente no cree que la Sujeto pueda ser reclutada a base de ideologia politica, dinero, etc., conoce la Fuente a alguna persona o incidente o debilidad personal en el pasado de la Sujeto que pudiera servir para presionarla al reclutamiento? De detalles.

No.

22. Son las relaciones entre la Fuente y el Sujeto de tal tipo que permitan a la Fuente hacer contacto con la Sujeto para tratar de reclutarla? Si es asi, estaria la Fuente dispuesta a hacer contacto con la Sujeto, si se presentara la oportunidad, esto es, en caso de que la Sujeto saliera de Cuba y estuviera en posicion de poder hacer contacto?

No sabe la Fuente como pudiera reaccionar la Sujeto despues de su defeccion del sistema; estimando que hasta el 15 Octubre 1965, las relaciones entre ambas permitian cualquier contacto. Por su parte, la Fuente esta dispuesta a realizar cualquier contacto en cualquier momento, siguiendo nuestras instrucciones al respecto.

S E C R E T O

23. En caso de la Fuente crea que el no sea la persona apropiada para hacer contacto con la Sujeto, conoce la Fuente a alguna otra persona que pudiera ser utilizada para hacer contacto con la Sujeto para tratar de reclutarla? Si es asi, de una descripcion completa de este individuo e indique sus relaciones con el Sujeto.

No.

24. Conoce la Fuente a alguien en Cuba que este en posicion de hacer contacto con el Sujeto para tratar de reclutarle? De una descripcion completa de este sujeto e indique sus relaciones con el Sujeto a captar.

No.

TERCERA PARTE:

25. Datos biograficos de la Fuente:

a. Nombre: Orlando JAMEU Fernandez.
b. Parolee: A 17 342 297.
c. Lugar y Fecha de Nacimiento: Regla, Prov. Habana, Cuba; 24 Enero 1923.
d. Direccion en Cuba: Calle 36-A No. 118, Miramar, T.M. Marianao, Prov. Habana.

201-737418

GX 274 AUSTIN RO S-E-C-R-E-T
GUITART-CAMPUZANO, AGUSTIN
201-727418*
SEX M DOB 24 APR 10
POB CUBA, CARDENAS
TYPE NAME T
CIT CUBA
OCC CODE PROF
RES USA PROF, XAVIER UNIVERSITY, NEW ORLEANS, LA - - DOI JUN 63 100019000
REQ. NO. 543 QUERY NO. 050 S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

FORM G-325 A REV. 4-1-67

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

SEC. 1, PL 89-732

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 43-R436

(FAMILY NAME) GUITART	(FIRST NAME) WILLIAM	(MIDDLE NAME) CLARK	☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (MO-DAY-YR.) JUNE 26, 1944	NATIONALITY CUBAN	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (IF ANY) A12 496 261
ALL OTHER NAMES USED JUAN				CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH HAVANA, CUBA		SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (IF ANY) 433-66-6015

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	GUITART	AGUSTIN	APRIL 25, 1910 CARDENAS, CUBA	N.O., LA.
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)	TORO	HELENA	DEC 27, 1912 STGO DE CUBA, CUBA	

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
MARTINEZ	GISELLE	1-6-46	HAVANA CUBA	8-14-65	NEW ORLEANS LA.

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE) NONE

NP!!

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

17 Jul 68

JHD

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
5527 McKENNA ST	NEW ORLEANS	LOUISIANA	U.S.A.	AUG	65	PRESENT TIME	
2037 FERN ST	" " "	" " "	" " "	NOV	64	AUG	65
GEN. PERSHING	" " "	" " "	" " "	JULY	64	NOV	64
4009 ELBA ST	" " "	" " "	" " "	AUG	62	JULY	64

File In: 201-727418 (father)

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE. (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE.)

CALLE 64 Nº 1502	MARIANAO HAVANA	CUBA	JULY	45	OCT	61

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS. (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
WALK, HAYDEL & ASSOCIATES 762 BARONNE ST. NEW ORLEANS LA	DRAFTSMAN	3	66	PRESENT TIME	
GARY B. GAMBLE & ASSOCIATES 635 COMMERCIAL PL, N.O., LA	DRAFTSMAN	1	65	3	66

LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE. (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE.)

STUDENT

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
☒ OTHER (SPECIFY): RESIDENCY

IF YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IS IN OTHER THAN ROMAN LETTERS, WRITE YOUR NAME IN YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IN THIS SPACE:

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

6-10-68
DATE

CW Guitart
(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

14-00000

727418

NOL JUL 8

SEC. 1, PL 89-732

FORM G-325 A REV. 6-1-67

FORM APPROVED. BUDGET BUREAU NO. 43-R436.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

(FAMILY NAME) GUITART-TORO	(FIRST NAME) AGUSTIN	(MIDDLE NAME) RAMON	☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (MO-DAY-YR.) AUG-14-35	NATIONALITY CUBAN	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (IF ANY) 17364741
ALL OTHER NAMES USED NONE			CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH HAVANA, CUBA			SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (IF ANY) 436-32-4227

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	GUITART	AGUSTIN	APRIL 25, 1910 - CARDENAS CUBA -	[illegible] USA
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)	TORO	HELENA	- - - , CUBA	NEW ORLEANS LA. USA

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
FOX-PADRON	DAISY	2-9-36	Santiago de Cuba	DEC-23-60	MARIANAO CUBA

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE)

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
[illegible] Louisiana Ave Pkwy	New Orleans	Louisiana	USA	12	67	PRESENT TIME	
[illegible] Louisiana Ave Pkwy	New Orleans	Louisiana	USA	7	66	12	67
[illegible] Fern Street	New Orleans	Louisiana	USA	6	66	7	66
[illegible] 65th Street	Havana	Havana	CUBA	12	60	6	66

File In: 201-727418 (father)

NP11

17 Jul 68

JHP

[illegible]

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE. (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE.)

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS. (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
Pan American Life Ins Co 2400 Canal - New Orleans	[illegible]	8	67	PRESENT TIME	
[illegible] Corp 229 S Broad St New Orleans	CLERK	9	66	8	67
Latin American Distr 603 Canal St New Orleans	Assist Act	8	66	8	66
Private Practice of Law [illegible]	LAWYER	9	60	6	66
[illegible] Cuba	[illegible]	1	60	12	64

LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE.)

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
☒ OTHER (SPECIFY) PERMANENT RES. [illegible]

8 JUL 1968

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

IF YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IS IN OTHER THAN ROMAN LETTERS, WRITE YOUR NAME IN YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IN THIS SPACE:

June 25, 1968
DATE

Agustin R Guitart
(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

FORM G-325 A (REV. 9-1-64)

Form Approved
Budget Bureau No. 43-R435

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

(Family name) Guitart	(First name) Agustin	(Middle name)	☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (Mo.-Day-Yr.) 4-25-1910	NATIONALITY Cuban	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (If any) A 12884999
ALL OTHER NAMES USED			CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cardenas, Cuba			SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (If any) 4-33-66-5776

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (If known)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	Guitart	Miguel	1879 Cardenas Cuba	Deceased
MOTHER (Maiden name)	Campuzano	Eloisa	1888 Mexico City	"

SPOUSE (If none, so state) FAMILY NAME (For wife, give maiden name)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
Toro y Abril	Helena	12-22-1912	Santiago de Cuba	11-7-1934	Havana

FORMER SPOUSES (If none, so state)

FAMILY NAME (For wife, give maiden name)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
3605 Lo. Ave. Pkwy	New Orleans	Louisiana	U.S.A.	12	1967	PRESENT TIME	
2694 " " "	" "	"	"	7	1966	Nov.	1967
3037 Fern. Street	" "	"	"	11	1964	Jul	1966
1931 G. Pershing	" "	"	"	8	1964	Nov.	1964
4009 Elba	" "	"	"	9	1963	Aug.	1964
2036 Rousseau St.	" "	"	"	2	1962	Sep.	1963

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE. (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE.)

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS. (IF NONE, SO STATE.) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

JSA 13 JUN 1968

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
Xavier University; Palmetto & Pine Sts. New Orleans	Professor	Sep	1963	PRESENT TIME	
Loyola University; 6363 St. Charles New Orleans	"	May	"	Sep.	1963
File in 201-[illegible]					

LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE. (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE.)

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
☐ OTHER (SPECIFY): Permanent Residence

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER

DATE 6-14-1968

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

IF YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IS IN OTHER THAN ROMAN LETTERS, WRITE YOUR NAME IN YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IN THIS SPACE:

FE/B/Bryant

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE: 13 Jan 1964 js

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, SAS/OS

ATTENTION: Carl Trettin

Chile

C# 201-727418

The file on GUITART Campuzano, Agustin, Dr. is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

[illegible]

18 Jun 63

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

[illegible]

FORM 3-62 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

201-727418

COPY

Querido Dr. Guitart:

En mi carta del 24 del presente, se me olvido adjuntar el sobre para la carta que usted va a escribir a Rene. Este sobre adjunto a esta ha sido especialmente preparado y es esencial para la disposicion de comunicaciones que nosotros hemos discutido.

Le ruego, por favor use el sobre adjunto para mandarle a Rene las dos paginas que le mande a usted el 24 de Junio.

Otra ves, le agradesco muchisimo por su asistencia. Espero anciosamente mi proximo viaje a Nuevo Orleans para visitar con usted otra ves.

Sinceramente,

COPY

Querido Dr. Guitart:

En mi carta del 24 del presente, se me olvido adjuntar el sobre para la carta que usted va a escribir a Rene. Este sobre adjunto a esta ha sido especialmente preparado y es esencial para la disposicion de comunicaciones que nosotros hemos discutido.

Le ruego, por favor use el sobre adjunto para mandarle a Rene las dos paginas que le mande a usted el 24 de Junio.

Otra vez, le agradesco muchisimo por su asistencia. Espero anciosamente mi proximo viaje a Nuevo Orleans para visitar con usted otra vez.

Sinceramente,

GUITART [redacted]

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
If found please drop in any
U.S. Mail Box

BOX 1925
Washington 25, D. C.

(RANCH.) CAMAYD
HOLGUIN
apartado ~~187~~ 187
P.O. Box.
CA 50 years old
Farmer - cattle

Has a nice house on outskirts of Holguin. Is to send a report to Central about. BANES. Dr. G. will be thinking about how to contact

New Orleans, Sep. 23 de 1963

Sr. Ramon Camayd,
Holguin, Cuba.

Mi distinguido amigo:

No sabe Ud. bien cuanto le agradezco su carta y las noticias que me da de toda la familia. Yo la lei con algunos dias de retraso porque estuve de vacaciones durante casi tres semanas, fuera de esta Ciudad, y cuando regrese pase por la casa de la mama de Diana para recogerla.

Me gusta su estilo porque Ud. tiene facilidad para describir el caracter de las personas que lo rodean y tal me parece que estoy viendo a quienes Ud. describe y a quienes se refiere en sus cartas; cuando por cualquier tipo de circunstancias uno se ve lejos de la Patria, las cartas de los amigos y familiares representan o producen la mejor de las emociones que se pueden sentir. Por esa razon le agradeceria muy mucho que no perdiera la costumbre de escribirme cuando sus ocupaciones se lo permitan; puede seguir haciendolo a la direccion de la Mama de Diana, poniendo en el sobre "para Tin" que es como cariñosamente ellos me conocen. Resulta un verdadero placer conocer del progreso y del desenvolvimiento de la gente que uno estima y quiere, aunque sea por carta. Cuide de su salud pero no se preocupe mucho porque la enfermedad que Ud. padece es transitoria y dado el tratamiento que Ud. dice seguir, tengo la seguridad de que pronto se sentira se sentira bien del todo.

Un saludo afectuoso para toda su familia y Ud. sepa que le aprecia de veras su amigo,

Agustin.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 7 June 63

TO: John

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS

Guitart will write the cover letter + mail it.

Attached are copies of the first two letters.

FROM: [illegible]

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO 1957—O-439445 (47)

The ROYAL ORLEANS
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA • Telephone 529-5333

622-2815

Dr. Guitart

17 30

at Royal Orleans

HCA HOTEL CORPORATION OF AMERICA

NEW YORK, The Plaza, Hotel Roosevelt; WASHINGTON, D.C., The Mayflower; BOSTON, Hotel Kenmore; NEW ORLEANS, The Royal Orleans; HOUSTON, TEXAS, Hotel America*; HARTFORD, CONN., Hotel America*; SAN JUAN, P.R., El Miramar Charterhouse; WINNIPEG, CANADA, Charter House; LONDON, ENGLAND, The Carlton Tower; ANAHEIM, CALIF., Charter House; BERMUDA, The Carlton Beach; NASSAU, Balmoral Club; SWAMPSCOTT, MASS., The Colony and SUBURBAN CHARTER HOUSE HOTELS *(opening 1963)

August 5, 1963

Dear Dr. Guitart,

Please excuse my writing in English but I find myself short of time and it is quicker if I write in English.

I am returning herewith the papers you forwarded to me and am also enclosing a visa waiver for Daisy GUITART Fox. Visa waivers are of little value these days because of various restrictions that have arisen in connection with travel to the United States from Cuba via another country. This situation I will discuss with you when I am in New Orleans which I expect will be during the week of 12 August 1963.

You mentioned that your son, Jorge, might contact me. To date, he has not called so I trust that there has been no need on his part to see me.

Since I have received no word from you I suppose Rene has not yet answered your letter. Let us hope that we hear from him soon.

I would like to discuss with you the possibility of contacting your friend Sr. Camayo of Holguin. Perhaps by the time I arrive you will have had some good ideas on how best to carry this out. I'm looking forward to seeing you and will call you as soon as I arrive in order to make an appointment to see you.

Best regards,

Carl Teels

MSE UNO (1) QUERIDO AMIGO X ESTA TINTA QUIMICA ESPECIAL NOS PERMITE CORRESPONDER CON SEGURIDAD X LA ESCRITURA DESAPARESERA CUANDO EL PAPEL SE SECA CMA DE MANERA MOJA EL PAPEL OTRA VEZ CON TINTA DE ESCRIBIR PARA QUE EL MENSAJE SE RETENGA X TU CONOCIMIENTO E INTELLIGENCIA SE NECESESITA AHORA PARA OBTENER UN PANORAMA EXACTO DE ACONTECIMIENTOS EN SU AREA X EN CARTAS FUTURAS TE EXPLICARE LO QUE SE NECESESITA X SI LEES ESTE MENSAJE DEMUESTRA QUE NADIE MAS LO HA LEIDO X TODAS MIS CARTAS DEBEN SER DESAROLLADAS IGUAL QUE ESTA X LOS MENSAJES DEBEN SER NUMERADOS CONSECUTIVAMENTE X CONFIRMA RECIBO EN MENSAJE SECRETO DE TODAS LAS CARTAS MIAS X AHORA TE EXPLICARÉ COMO QUIERO QUE ME ESCRIBAS USANDO UN SISTEMA SIMPLE PERO SEGURO X EL SOBRE DE ESTA CARTA HA SIDO IMPREGNADO CON DISTINTAS SOLUCIONES QUIMICAS QUE LO HA CAMBIADO COMO PAPEL CARBON X ABRE EL SOBRE CUIDADOSAMENTE A LO LARGO DE TODAS LAS JUNTURAS CORTANDO LA ALETA QUE CONTIENE GOMA X EL RESTO DEL SOBRE SE USARA COMO PAPEL CARBON Y CUANDO TERMINES DE USARLO DEBE SER GUARDADO EN UN LUGAR SEGURO PORQUE ESTE CARBON SE PUEDE UTILIZAR MUCHAS VECES X PON EL CARBON (SOBRE) CON LA ESCRITURA BOCA ARRIBA SOBRE UN PAPEL EN BLANCO (PRIMERA HOJA) (SIMILAR A ESTE PAPEL) X PON OTRO PAPEL EN BLANCO (SEGUNDA HOJA) ENCIMA DEL PAPEL CARBON (SOBRE) X SOBRE EL ULTIMO PAPEL EN BLANCO (SEGUNDA HOJA) ESCRIBEME UN MENSAJE USANDO UN LAPIZ CON LA PUNTA DESGASTADA X NUMERA EL MENSAJE NUMERO UNO (1) USA EL MISMO PLAN DE ESTA X ESCRIBE (LETRA TIPO MOLDE) ENCIMA DE UNA SUPERFICIE DURA (COMO UN MESA CON TAPA DE VIDRIO O SIMILAR) PARA EVITAR IMPRESIONES EN LA PRIMERA HOJA X ROMPE EL PAPEL QUE CONTIENE EL MENSAJE VISIBLE (SEGUNDA HOJA) CMA ROMPELO Y BOTALO EN EL INODORO X ESCONDE EL PAPEL CARBON X LA ULTIMA HOJA (O SEA LA PRIMERA) CONTIENE EL MENSAJE X AL DORSO DEL PAPEL QUE CONTIENE EL MENSAJE ESCRIBE UNA CARTA INOCUA DE CHARLA AMISTUOSA A TU SOBRINA (SUPUESTA) LILLIAN MARTINEZ X 4517 (CUATRO CINCO UNO SIETE) WALMSLEY STREET X NEW ORLEANS 25 (DOS CINCO) LOUISIANA X NO REPITO NO ESCRIBAS EN EL LADO DEL MENSAJE X MANDA LA CARTA POR CORREO AEREO X USA UN NOMBRE FALSO Y DIRECCION AUTENTICA COMO REMITENTE X LILLIAN SABRÁ QUE LA CARTA ES PARA MI Y ME AVISARÁ CUANDO LA RECÍBA X USANDO ESTE PROCEDIMIENTO PUEDES ESCRIBIRME CUALQUIERA COSA QUE DESEAS SIN PELIGRO PORQUE EL PAPEL CARBON DEJA SEÑALES QUIMICAS INVISIBLES QUE SOLAMENTE PUEDEN SER DESAROLLADAS EN NUESTROS LABORATORIOS X EN TU PRIMER MENSAJE QUIERO QUE SOLAMENTE ACUSES RECIBO Y ENTENDIMIENTO DE ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES X HAS QUALQUIER PREGUNTA QUE TENGAS X EN MIS CARTAS SUBSECUENTES TE PIDIDRE QUE ME OBTENGAS INFORMES DE ASUNTOS EN PARTICULAR X MIS MEJORES RECUREDOS X FIN FIN FIN

MESSAGE ONE X DEAR FRIEND X THIS SPECIAL CHEMICAL INK WILL ALLOW US TO CORRESPOND SECURELY X IT WILL DISAPPEAR AS THE PAPER DRIES SO WET IT AGAIN WITH WRITING INK IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE MESSAGE X YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLIGENCE ARE NEEDED NOW TO OBTAIN AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF EVENTS IN YOUR AREA X IN FUTURE LETTERS I WILL EXPLAIN WHAT IS NEEDED X IF YOU ARE READING THIS LETTER YOU CAN BE SURE THAT NO ONE ELSE HAS READ IT X ALL MY LETTERS TO YOU SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AS THIS ONE HAS BEEN X THE MESSAGES WILL BE NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY X ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF EACH LETTER IN YOUR SECRET MESSAGES TO ME X NOW I WILL EXPLAIN HOW TO WRITE TO ME USING A SIMPLE BUT SECURE SYSTEM X THE ENVELOPE OF THIS LETTER HAS BEEN IMPREGNATED WITH CERTAIN CHEMICALS WHICH MAKE IT INTO A CHEMICAL CARBON PAPER X OPEN THE ENVELOPE ALONG ALL ITS FLAPS AND CUT OFF THE GLUED EDGES X WHAT REMAINS WILL BE USED AS A CARBON PAPER AND SHOULD BE KEPT IN A SAFE PLACE SINCE IT CAN BE USED MANY TIMES OVER X PLACE THE CARBON ADDRESS SIDE UP ON A SHEET OF BOND PAPER SIMILAR TO THIS PAPER X PLACE ANOTHER SHEET OF PAPER ON TOP OF THE CARBON X ON THE TOP SHEET PRINT A MESSAGE TO ME USING A BLUNTED PENCIL X NUMBER YOUR FIRST MESSAGE NUMBER ONE X USE A FORMAT SIMILAR TO THIS LETTER X PRINT ON A HARD SURFACE SUCH AS A GLASS TABLE TOP TO AVOID LEAVING IMPRESSIONS ON THE BOTTOM SHEET X DESTROY THE TOP SHEET BEARING THE VISIBLE MESSAGE X TEAR IT UP AND THROW IT IN THE TOILET X HIDE THE CARBON X THE BOTTOM SHEET NOW BEARS THE MESSAGE X ON THE BACK OF THE SHEET WITH THE MESSAGE WRITE A NORMAL FRIENDLY LETTER TO YOUR ASSUMED NIECE LILLIAN MARTINEZ X 4517 WALMSLEY STREET X NEW ORLEANS 25 LOUISIANA X DO NOT WRITE ON THE SIDE WITH THE SECRET MESSAGE X SEND THE LETTER AIR MAIL X USE A PHONY NAME AND REAL ADDRESS AS A RETURN ADDRESS ON THE ENVELOPE X LILLIAN WILL KNOW THE LETTER IS FOR ME AND WILL CALL ME WHEN IT ARRIVES X USING THIS PROCEDURE YOU CAN WRITE ME ANYTHING YOU WISH WITHOUT RISK FOR THE CARBON LEAVES INVISIBLE CHEMICAL TRACES WHICH CAN ONLY BE DEVELOPED IN OUR LABORATORIES X IN YOUR FIRST MESSAGE TO ME MERELY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT AND COMPREHENSION OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS X ASK ANY QUESTIONS YOU HAVE X IN SUBSEQUENT LETTER I WILL ASK YOU TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON PARTICULAR TOPICS X BEST REGARDS X END END END

New Orleans, Jun-25-63

Dear Mr. Tells:

Posiblemente mi hijo Jorge, que vive en Washington, solicitará una entrevista con V. y le consultará un problema que él tiene; me agradaría que V. pudiera ayudarlo. El sabe que V. y yo somos amigos y nada mas; con ésto quiero decirle que él no sabe cuál es el motivo de nuestra conexion.

Hoy recibí una carta de mi pariente en Santiago de Cuba y me dice que (su carta tiene fecha Junio 13) que la ultima que recibió de mi parte tiene fecha 25 de Marzo; ésto significa que las cartas de aquí para alla están demorando mas de los diez dias que suponíamos; es posible que las cartas que salen de esta ciudad vayan, primero, para Miami y de allí sean remitidas a Cuba vía Mexico; esta es una suposición mia ya que yo he escrito varias cartas para Santiago de Cuba con fechas posteriores al 25 de Marzo y anteriores a Junio 13 y no me explico el por qué de la demora. Si V. sabe de alguna forma para que la correspondencia vaya más rápidamente, podríamos utilizarla.

Como le decía en mi carta de ayer, aquí le incluyo las visas de mi hijo y de su familia; me refiero al hijo mio que vive en Cuba; en su última carta él me dice que ya solicitó el pasaporte de la mas pequeña de sus dos hijas, que nació el 13 de abril de este año y cuya visa waiver fué solicitada por mí hace cuestión de un mes, poco mas o menos.

Tengo informes acerca de que la Cruz Roja Internacional es la entidad que hace gestiones y que ha logrado el traslado de muchos refugiados cubanos desde la Habana; de no ser por conducto de esta organización sería necesario obtener del Departamento de Estado (Washington) una autorización para que mi hijo y su familia lograran que las visas waiver que poseen les sirvan para trasladarse desde México a los Estados Unidos. Con esta autorización, creo que sería fácil obtener de las autoridades mexicanas visas de transito por Mexico.

De todos modos le estaré muy agradecido por las gestiones que V. haga para lograr el traslado de mi hijo y su familia que esta compuesta de las siguientes personas:

Agustin Ramon Guitart Toro	
Daisy del Carmen Fox Padron	(Esposa)
Maria Elena Guitart Fox	(hija mayor : 17 meses de edad)
Daisy Guitart Fox	(hija menor : 2 " " "
Carlos Fox Meyol	(suegro o father-in-law)
Irma Fox Padron	(cuñada o sister " ")

Domicilio en la Habana: Calle 68 No. 1514 entre 15 y 17, Marianao, Habana, Cuba.
Telefono: 2-7533

Le saluda atentamente,

A. Guitart

Dr. Agustin Guitart

Visa Waiver returned
to Dr. Guitart.
5 Aug 63

Recd 25 June 63

New Orleans, Jun 24 de 1963

Dear Mr. Teels:

La segunda carta para Santiago de Cuba ya fué puesta en el correo y estoy esperando la respuesta de la primera.

A continuación le copio parte de una carta del amigo de Holguín, dirigida a un familiar redidente en esta Ciudad :

"El pais se está convirtiendo en una gigantesca base militar, mas allá de todo cálculo. Existe un frenético movimiento de armas de todas clases; miles de vehículos militares se meeven a todas horas del día y de la noche. Están estableciendo campamentos militares y aeropuertos en todas partes. Todas las lomas de piedra han sido perforadas para el almacenamiento de armas,a prueba de bombardeo. Miles de rusos han ocupado el país y se les puede ver por todas partes. La represión es salvaje y están preparados para enfrentarse a cualquiera invasión en gran escala. Las antiaereas (ametralladoras) conocidas por cuatro bocas han sido sustituidas por lanza cohetes. Palma Soriano, Songo y La Maya están fuertemente fortificadas. La Loma de las Piedras, entre Baire y Jiguaní tiene emplazamientos de cohetes. Las conocidas cuevas del Pepu, a cinco kilometros de Baire- hacia la Sierra Maestra- las han convertido en depósito de armas de todos los calibres".(Esta carta salió de la Habana,o Cuba, en la primera quincena de Mayo.)

La carta donde habla de la base de submarinos de Banes se le ha extraviado pero me ofreció buscarla . Mientras tanto,estoy escribiendo al amigo de Holguin invitándole para que me escriba con la mayor cantidad de información.

En sobre aparte le estoy enviando las copias de las waiver visas de la familia de mi hijo; la única que falta es la de la mas pequeña de las ninas,que nacio el 13 de Marzo; yo escribi al Departtamento de Estado solicitándola pero todavia no he obtenido respuesta; la carta la dirigí al Sr. Whitaker (Visa Offide).

Sin otro particular, Le saluda su amigo,

Dr. Agustin Guitart

POBox 7224
Apax Station
Washington, D.C.

23 June 63

Querido Dr. Guitart,

En mi carta del 24 del presente, se me olvido adjuntar el sobre para la carta que usted va a escribir a Rene. Este sobre, adjunto a esta ha sido especialmente preparado y es deencial para la disposicion de comunicaciones que nosotros hemos discutido.

Le ruego, por favor use el sobre adjunto para mandarle a Rene las dos pagina que le mande a usted el 24 de Junio.

Otra vez, le agradezco muchisimo por su asistencia. Espero anciosamente me proximo viaje a Nuevo Orleans para visitar con usted otra vez.

Sinceramente,

PO Box 7224
Apex Station
Washington 4, D.C.

24 June 1963

Dear Dr. Guitart,

Adjunto hay dos hojas de papel que contienen el mensaje especial para Rene. Usted se fijara que hay una letra "I" en lapiz en un lado de cada jun de las dos hojas. La carta que usted va a escribir para Rene debe ser escrita en el lado del papel que contiene la letra "I." No escriba en el otro lado del papel. Su carta debe ser escrita con maquina, lapiz or bolografo. No escriba con pluma y tinta comun.

Por favor, asegure que su carta sea normal y amistuosa. La carta no debe incluir algo que tenga doble sentido o que de sospecha que Usted esta tratando de impartir un mensaje ademas de lo que usted actualmente ha escrito en su carta. Siempre es mejor seguir con discusiones sobre asuntos familiares - hijos, parientes, planes de vacaciones y otras temas personales.

Siempre que la carta sea normal in apariencia ye el sobre dirigido en forma normal, todo estaba bien.

Estoy ancioso de tener noticias de Rene como lo se que Usted tambien. La carta le ruega que el escriba a su nueva "sobrina", Lillian Martines, 4517 Walmsley St, New Orleans. Soponco que Usted le advirtio a "Lillian" que espere una carta de Rene, que no va usar su propio nombre en la carta o como remitente. Por favor pidale a lillian que no habra la carta. Tambien, hagame el favor de remitir la carta a mi sin abrir. De esta manora muestro laboratorio podra hacer un examen si la carta fue molestado o no. Tan pronto que muestro laboratorio desarolle el Mensaje, le mandare copia de la carta y mis comentarios. Mientras tanto si Usted tiene algunas ideas sobre su amigo en Holguin por favor escribame de el para que yo, tambien, pueda empesar con mis planes. Dr. Guitart, ha sido un gran placer para mi por haberlo encontrado y tengo confianza que encontraremos muestra relacion mutuamente productiva. Al fin de todo, muestras metas son las mismas y podremo asistir uno al otro para llegar hacia ellas. Espero anciosamente muestro proximo encuentro y noticias de Rene. Otra vez, mi agradecimiento por toda su ayuda. Mis mejores recuerdos a Usted y a toda su familia.

Sinceramente,

TO

Dr Agustin Guitart
4009 Elba St.
New Orleans, 25, La.

MSE UNO (1) QUERIDO AMIGO X ESTA TINTA QUIMICA ESPECIAL NOS PERMITE CORRESPONDER CON SEGURIDAD X LA ESCRITURA DESAPARESERA CUANDO EL PAPEL SE SECA CMA DE MANERA MOJA EL PAPEL OTRA VEZ CON TINTA DE ESCRIBIR PARA QUE EL MENSAJE SE RETENGA X TU CONOCIMIENTO E INTELLIGENCIA SE NECESESITA AHORA PARA OBTENER UN PANORAMA EXACTO DE ACONTECIMIENTOS EN SU AREA X EN CARTAS FUTURAS TE EXPLICARE LO QUE SE NECESESITA X SI LEES ESTE MENSAJE DEMUESTRA QUE NADIE MAS LO HA LEIDO X TODAS MIS CARTAS DEBEN SER DESAROLLADAS IGUAL QUE ESTA X LOS MENSAJES DEBEN SER NUMERADOS CONSECUTIVAMENTE X CONFIRMA RECIBO EN MENSAJE SECRETO DE TODAS LAS CARTAS MIAS X AHORA TE EXPLICARÉ COMO QUIERO QUE ME ESCRIBAS USANDO UN SISTEMA SIMPLE PERO SEGURO X EL SOBRE DE ESTA CARTA HA SIDO IMPREGNADO CON DISTINTAS soluciones QUIMICAS QUE LO HA CAMBIADO COMO PAPEL CARBON X ABRE EL SOBRE CUIDADOSAMENTE A LO LARGO DE TODAS LAS JUNTURAS CORTANDO LA ALETA QUE CONTIENE GOMA X EL RESTO DEL SOBRE SE USARA COMO PAPEL CARBON Y CUANDO TERMINES DE USARLO DEBE SER GUARDADO EN UN LUGAR SEGURO PORQUE ESTE CARBON SE PUEDE UTILIZAR MUCHAS VECES X PON EL CARBON (SOBRE) CON LA ESCRITURA BOCA ARRIBA SOBRE UN PAPEL EN BLANCO (PRIMERA HOJA) (SIMILAR A ESTE PAPEL) X PON OTRO PAPEL EN BLANCO (SEGUNDA HOJA) ENCIMA DEL PAPEL CARBON (SOBRE) X SOBRE EL ULTIMO PAPEL EN BLANCO (SEGUNDA HOJA) ESCRIBEME UN MENSAJE USANDO UN LAPIZ CON LA PUNTA DESGASTADA X NUMERA EL MENSAJE NUMERO UNO (1) USA EL MISMO PLAN DE ESTA X ESCRIBE (LETRA TIPOMOLDE) ENCIMA DE UNA SUPERFICIE DURA (COMO UN MESA CON TAPA DE VIDRIO O SIMILAR) PARA EVITAR IMPRESIONES EN LA PRIMERA HOJA X ROMPE EL PAPEL QUE CONTIENE EL MENSAJE VISIBLE (SEGUNDA HOJA) CMA ROMPELO Y BOTALO EN EL INODORO X ESCONDE EL PAPEL CARBON X LA ULTIMA HOJA (O SEA LA PRIMERA) CONTIENE EL MENSAJE X AL DORSO DEL PAPEL QUE CONTIENE EL MENSAJE ESCRIBE UNA CARTA INOCUA DE CHARLA AMISTUOSA A TU SOBRINA (SUPUESTA) LILLIAN MARTINEZ X 4517 (CUATRO CINCO UNO SIETE) WALMSLEY STREET X NEW ORLEANS 25 (DOS CINCO) LOUISIANA X NO REPITO NO ESCRIBAS EN EL LADO DEL MENSAJE X MANDA LA CARTA POR CORREO AEREO X USA UN NOMBRE FALSO Y DIRECCION AUTENTICA COMO REMITENTE X LILLIAN SABRÁ QUE LA CARTA ES PARA MI Y ME AVISARÁ CUANDO LA RECIBA X USANDO ESTE PROCEDIMIENTO PUEDES ESCRIBIRME QUALQUIERA COSA QUE DESEAS SIN PELIGRO PORQUE EL PAPEL CARBON DEJA SENALES QUIMICAS INVISIBLES QUE SOLAMENTE PUEDEN SER DESAROLLADAS EN NUESTROS LABORATORIOS X EN TU PRIMER MENSAJE QUIERO QUE SOLAMENTE ACUSES RECIBO Y ENTENDIMIENTO DE ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES X HAS QUALQUIER PREGUNTA QUE TENGAS X EN MIS CARTAS SUBSECUENTES TE PIDIDRE QUE ME OBTENGAS INFORMES DE VOS EN PARTICULAR X MIS MEJORES RECUERDOS X FIN FIN FIN

N/Orleans Junio 13 de 1963

Querido Rene:

Como ahora estoy de vacaciones tengo más tiempo para cumplir con los familiares y amigos a quienes debo correspondencia; no tengo ninguna carta tuya a la que referirme; en mi última te decía que había recibido una tuya contándome del arribo feliz del par de boticas para tu nietecita; como sé por experiencia que al cabo de una semana cualquier zapato usado por un niño tiene o adquiere el olor característico de quien se orina en los pantalones, estoy esperando la plantilla o el número para comprar el otro par de zapaticos para ella.

Como te decia antes,ahora estoy de vacaciones y puedo dedicarme a leer otras cosas que no sean las materias que tengo que explicar; he comprado varias revistas y novelas; ahora estoy leyendo una muy interesante y muy humana cuyo título en inglés es un poco raro y que traducido al español no tiene nada que ver con el contenido de la novela pues seria algo así como "Humedece las cartas que recibas";quizás la traducción que hago del título sea un disparate a causa de mi deficiente conocimiento de esta lengua; sin embargo la entiendo perfectamente; aunque me gustaría que la leyeras no te ofrezco mandártela, si la encuentro en español, porque aquí,en el correo, se ponen un poco majaderos con los paquetes que no contengan ropa o medicinas.

La semana pasada tuvimos la casa convertida en un hotel pues coincidieron varias visitas: Jorge y Manolito vinieron de Washington a pasar una semana con nosotros; Miguel y Emma eligieron los mismos dias; Willy y su compañero de estudios, regresaron de la Universidad y estudiarán en esta ciudad durante el verano y, por último, un primo de Ed. su señora, la mamá y tres muchachos se hospedaron en casa. Tremenda concentración. Ahora la casa nos luce vacia.-

Espero noticias tuyas; no seas remolón para escribir pues las cartas de la familia nos hacen sentir mas cerca de nuestra tierra.-

Un abrazo,

COPY

New Orleans Jun. 19 de 1963

Mi querido tio:

Me ha extrañado mucho no tener carta tuya en esta semana; se me ocurrió pensar que quizas hubieran tenido que operar a Magdalena aunque tu me decias en una de tus cartas que se sentía mejor de su vesicula; cuando yo padecía de esa enfermedad estuve tomando durante muchos años una medicina llamada Metischool o algo parecido, que es la maravilla del siglo; si quieres yo creo que aquis es fácil conseguirla y te podría mandar un frasquito para que la probaran en Magda.-

Por casa todos estamos bien de salud; las nietas se ponen mas lindas cada dia; la segunda ya camina y anda hecho un bólido por toda la casa; la primera habla correctamente el español como si fuera un muchacho de siete años; lo mas simpático es que de vez en cuando intrd́uce en la conversacion algunas palabras en ingles, aprendidas con dos niñas de la familia que vive en los bajos de mi casa; se sabe algunas canciones en ingles y las canta con bastante buena pronunciacion; es asombrosa la facilidad que tienen los muchachos para aprender un idioma.

Ya termine de leer la novela de que te hablaba en mi carta anterior; si pudieras leerla te recomendaría que siguieras algunos de los consejos que la protagonista le hace a la figura masculina de la novela y desde el título hasta la última pagina contienen enseñanzas que se debían seguir al pie de la letra para poder convivir en familia; tu me dirás que estás muy viejo para cambiar pero sobre todo el título es una cosa maravillosa. A mi, con las novelas, me pasa lo mismo que con las peliculas: me identifico tanto con los personajes que llego a sentir las mismas emociones que el novelista describe de sus protagonistas.

Aquí estan haciendo unos calores insoportables; el clima de Santiago es como un invierno comparado con el verano que padecemos por aqui.

Espero tus noticas. Un abrazo de A.

no sé si entendiste la letra de mi carta del dia 13; apunto lo que
estaba en provisiones, la pluma que estaba usando era de
mala calidad y la tinta se corría fácilmente

Nueva Orleans Jun. 19 de 1963

Mi querido tio:

Me ha extrañado mucho no tener carta tuya en esta semana; se me ocurrió pensar que quizas hubieran tenido que operar a Magdalena aunque tu me decias en una de tus cartas que se sentía mejor de su vesicula; cuando yo padecía de esa enfermedad estuve tomando durante muchos años una medicina llamada Metischool o algo parecido, que es la maravilla del siglo; si quieres yo creo que aquis es fácil conseguirla y te podría mandar un frasquito para que la probaran en Magda.-

Por casa todos estamos bien de salud; las nietas se ponen mas lindas cada dia; la segunda ya camina y anda hecho un bólido por toda la casa; la primera habla correctamente el español como si fuera un muchacho de siete años; lo mas simpático es que de vez en cuando intróduce en la conversacion algunas palabras en ingles, aprendidas con dos niñas de la familia que vive en los bajos de mi casa; se sabe algunas canciones en ingles y las canta con bastante buena pronunciacion; es asombrosa la facilidad que tienen los muchachos para aprender un idioma.

Ya terminé de leer la novela de que te hablaba en mi carta anterior; si pudieras leerla te recomendaría que siguieras algunos de los consejos que la protagonista le hace a la figura masculina de la novela y desde el título hasta la última pagina contienen enseñanzas que se debían seguir al pie de la letra para poder convivir en familia; tu me dirás que estás muy viejo para cambiar pero sobre todo el título es una cosa maravillosa. A mi, con las novelas, me pasa lo mismo que con las peliculas: me identifico tanto con los personajes que llego a sentir las mismas emociones que el novelista describe de sus protagonistas.

Aquí estan haciendo unos calores insoportables; el clima de Santiago es como un invierno comparado con el verano que padecemos por aqui.

Espero tus noticas. Un abrazo de A.

no sé si entendiste la letra de mi carta del día 13; apuntado que
estaba un poco nervioso, la pluma que estaba usando era de
mala calidad y la tinta se corría fácilmente

A

New Orleans Nov. 27 de 1963

Dear Mr. Teels:

Le acompaño copia de la carta que recibí, antes de ayer de mi amigo de Holguín. Estimo que tiene algunos puntos muy interesantes, sobre todo en lo referente a los precios de las mercancías y alimentos mas necesarios así como al estado de opinión existente, en contra del Gobierno.

El me anuncia otra carta con detalles mas concretos e, inmediatamente, le enviaré copia cuando yo la reciba.

Del pariente de Santiago de Cuba no he tenido noticias y creo que la carta con el papel especial fue interceptada o se ha perdido. También es posible que él no haya entendido lo que se le pedía o que no haya querido exponerse a escribir. Creo conveniente no tocar ese punto por ahora, y esperar hasta que yo reciba carta de él.

Le saluda afectuosamente,

A. G.

Holgu[illegible] Nov. 8 - 1963

Muy estimado amigo:

Me complació mucho la llegada de su apreciada carta. Tenía ciertas dudas de que la anterior mía hubiera llegado a su poder. Su carta de los últimos días de Septiembre me llegó solo hace pocos dias. Hay demora en la correspondencia por razones obvias. Por su interés en mi estado de salud, le quedo muy agradecido y confio en que el plan que sigo me restablesca prontamente. A veces estoy muy pesimista y considero mi caso crónico y definitivamente incurable. (Se refiere a la situación en Cuba y a lo difícil que resulta el derrotar al régimen fidelo-comunista). Sus palabras de aliento son muy apreciadas por mí. Dadas mis posibilidades trataré de: haciendo uso de la autocritica autorizada por el partido, o tal vez la critica sin auto, trataré de describir la situacion aqui.

A principios de Octubre pasado tuvimos la visita de la Sra. Flora, terrible huracán que inició su ataque un viernes 3 y nos dejó el miércoles 8, dejando una estela de desolación y muerte. Azotó nuestra provincia y parte de Camaguey durante casi seis días, sin dejar de llover y con vientos de 100 kilometros por hora. Francamente, creíamos que se había iniciado el segundo diluvio universal. Gracias a Dios, nuestra familia y las de amigos y conocidos no sufrieron daños ostensibles, no así las zonas rurales que fueron barridas por las corrientes, como en Cauto, zonas de Mir, Mayarí, Sagua de Tánamo, Santiago de Cuba, Guantánamo y, en fin, toda la Provincia en sus zonas mas bajas. Dada la incapacidad del Observatorio Nacional, la alarma fue emitida demasiado tarde, ocasionando esta irresponsabilidad,por parte de las Autoridades, la pérdida de vidas y animales en sumas astronómicas; según las zonas que conozco y por informes veraces, calculo que sobre 50,000 cabezas de ganado vacuno y otra cantidad igual de porcino se perdieron. Las aves han desaparecido por completo. En vidas humanas me atrevo a a asegurar que son mas de tresmil. Jóvenes que habian sido llevados a las montañas a recoger cafe y para otras labores agrícolas, han perecido por centenares, por efecto de los derrumbes de picachos y árboles, así como por las corrientes de agua que bajaban como cataratas. Ahora son conducidos,hacia la Habana, en grandes rastras (big trucks) los despojos de estos infelices, como verdaderos parias, llenos de mugre y harapos, sin alimentos ni consideraciones humanas; sufren y callan pero son incapaces de rebelarse, toda vez que la represión mas que brutal es salvaje. Nadie puede imaginarse cómo es de monstruoso este sistema, que puede resumirse con tres palabras: falacia, propaganda y represión sin limites. Al final se aparecio el gran simulador (Fidel Castro) en varios carros anfibios, escenifico un show pre-fabricado y se hizo proclamar "heroe salvador de los campesinos".

Las tremendas inundaciones anegaron los depósitos subterraneos de armas y los túneles que han hecho en las lomas. El aeropuerto (se refiere al de Holguín) sufrio daños de consideración. Una caravana de mas de 200 camiones llegó a esta Ciudad anunciando que traían alimentos pero, en realidad, estaban cargados de armas para sustituir a las que fueron dañadas por el Ciclon; temían que se produjera un ataque de los enemigos de Castro, aprovechando las condiciones desastrosas en que se encontraba la Provincia.

Como Ud. sabe , han sido confiscadas las fincas mayores de 5 caballerias, pero lo cierto es que tambien han ocupado fincas mucho menores, expulsando a los propietarios sin permitirles que llevaran algunas de sus pertenencias. La confiscacion de las fincas pequeñas coincidió con el inicio del ciclon, y los ocupantes sin conocimiento de la topografía del terreno,no tomaron las medidas apropiadas para proteger los animales y las cosechas; muchos de estos imbéciles murieron ahogados, pagando con sus vidas su complicidad con los delitos del gobierno, si es que se puede llamar asi.

Estas fincas, antes de la confiscación, estaban produciendo bastante, pero ahora han quedado en manos de imbeciles analfabetos, de peones sin instruccion alguna, sin sentido minimo de sus cargos. Hasta hoy no han pagado los salarios de los trabajadores de esas fincas; también han cambiado el sistema de salarios; a los que ordeñan las vacas le pagan $0.35 por hora y como no trabajan mas de 4 horas, perciben salarios de hambre.- Ahora han impuesto el llamado "racionalismo" en los salarios y abonan al trabaja dor segun lo que produce, exigiendolo una gran produccion por un pequeño salario; asi por ejemplo un obrero de una fabrica de sapatos devenga $5.00 por cada $25.00; un albañil (obrero de la construcción) gana $5.00 por cada millar de ladrillos que coloque. (cinco "pesos" cubanos equivalen, ahora, a 50 contavos de dollar americano); es por eso que el mercado negro crece enormemente; los precios en el mercado negrp son: 1 huevo, vale $1.00; una libra de frijoles, $1.50; una de arros, $1.50; 1 libra de café, $6.00; una de filete, $10.00. La inflason es incontenible ni con la sancion de fusilamiento. Los sueldos iguales . y menores que antes y el racionamiento que es inadecuado no permiten una dieta suficiente en calorias diarias. El mercado negro lo sostienen, precisamente, los miembros de la "nueva clase" , que viven como principes, en grandes residencias, con varios criados pagados por el Estado y con grandes cantidades de dinero a su disposicion; los miembros de la nueva clase son los oportunistas de siempre, hipocritas, simuladores, ladrones y malvados y que son los puntales en que descansa el regimen mas abyecto y brutal que se pueda imaginar.

Esta gente son implacables con sus enemigos, y estos son todos aquellos que no se someten al comunismo. El gobierno de ese Pais (se refiere al Gobierno American) si no se dispone a asumir determinados riesgos jamás lograra erradicar este cancer que amenaza a la América entera; Rusia, ladina y astuta se aprovecha de la conducta honesta de los Estados Unidos, respetuosa de los convenios internacionales, en tanto que ella no los cumple. Tengo la firme conviccion de que los rusos no pelean y que usan solo la astucia y los rejuegos politicos para ir dominando al mundo, como lo han hecho en el caso de Cuba.

Algunos de los llamados "tecnicos rusos" han abandonado nuestra Patria, pero vienen otros y el control de las fuerzas armadas está todavia en sus manos.

Los rusos, cuando se les commina dan un paso atras pero antes han avanzado dos; el Mundo Occidental se mantiene en actitud defensiva y ellos lo saben; ellos saben que los Occidentales le temen a la responsabilidad de desencadenar una guerra y se aprovechan de ello; asi van minando gobiernos y pueblos; millones de democratas en el mundo entero opinan que esta aactitud defensiva debe ser cambiada por otra ofensiva, antes de que sea demasiado tarde.

Aqui en Cuba se apercibe un colapso enconómico; los desafectos al gobierno son el 90% de la poblacion; pero ésto no basta ; el gobierno se mantendrá hasta quemar las ultimas posibilidades y los rusos los ayudara minimamente pero lo ayudan, a pesar de que ahora Fidel Castro como leader nacionalista independiente negándose a firmar el tratado de proscripción de las pruebas nucleares y adscribiéndose al bloque chino.

En mi proxima carta le dare detalles sobre hechos concretos.

Le saluda muy afectuosamente,

C.

4009 Elba St.
New Orleans
La 70125

NEW ORLEANS, LA.
PM
1 DEC
1963

POSTAGE

Mr. Carl Teel.
P.O. Box 7224
Afox Station
Washington 4 D.C

Bill A. Butterfield New Orlea Sep. 9-1963

Dear Mr. Teels:

Desde Miami le escribi acerca de los informes del amigo que llego de Cuba en los ultimos dias de Julio o finales de Agosto; espero que le hayan sido utiles los informes suministrados por el.-

Ahora le trascribo la parte mas interesante de una carta recibida del amigo de Holguin que tiene fecha Agosto 21 y que me fue entregada ayer Sep. 8.-

La carta dice asi: "Comprendo su interes en conocer con detalles la situacion de Cuba. De acuerdo con mis pobres conocimientos trataré de complacerlo. Nuestra Patria, querido amigo, no existe; confio que un dia no lejano resurja de nuevo pues esta situación podrá sostenerse por un tiempo pero jamas por siempre. Considere a Cuba como una base sovietica; la vida normal de la Nacion ha desparecido; un movimiento continuo de fuerzas militares y de equipos ocupa todo el espacio y el tiempo; es como una peste "verde" que lo invade todo; tambien esta peste verde afecta la moral de la ciudadania (He says "peste verde" or green pest because all the soldiers were green uniforms -Russian and Cuban soldiers.) En el fondo todos detestan al régimen pero unos por cobardes, otros por estar convertidos en cómplices y muchos por miedo al hambre que impera, lucen como perfectos simuladores. La crueldad del sistema comunista ha destruido los principios de dignidad de gran parte de los Cubanos. La vida de un hombre hoy en nuestro Pais no vale nada, solo unas cuantas balas. Los soldados rojos infectan al Pais; No sabria decirle cuantas son las bases y cuantos los campamentos rusos que existen hoy en Cuba; alrededor de este Pueblo (Holguin) pueden contarse mas de diez; xxxx creo que el numero de soldados rusos en Cuba ha sido siempre sub-estimado pues estoy seguro que es tres o cuatro veces el numero que el Gobierno oficialmente declara.

En el antiguo aeropuerto de esta Ciudad han construido tal vez la mayor y mejor base aérea de Cuba con pistas de mas de 5 Kilometros de extension; es usada por varios tipos de cazas-sovieticos y está preparada para aterrizaje de bombarderos pesados; los aviones y arsenales de bombas los guardan en subterraneos; tienen grandes defensas antiaereas y rampas de cohetes de "tierra a aire" contra aviones. Todos los alrededores del aeropuerto están minados para evitar la aproximación por tierra; el aeropuerto esta asistido por mas de tres mil soldados rusos para cualquier contingencia y son expertos extranjeros quienes lo manejan. Diariamente hacen prácticas de bombardeos y ametrallamiento detras de la Loma de la Cruz, en las sabanas. La vigilancia en los zonas costeras del Norte de la Isla es constante e ininterrumpida aunque haya mal tiempo. Todas las lomas o cerros de sólida contextura están perforados para utilizarlos como almacenes de armas y alimentos; éste es un plan que afecta todos los lugares. Grandes rastras penetran en las entrañas de las lomas para descargar y cargar materiales de guerra; para ésto han construido carreteras alrededor de todos estos arsenales de las lomas. Todo el litoral, sobre todo en lugares de posibles desembarcos están minados de trincheras y perfectamente artillados. (He talks about the North Coast of the Province of Oriente and I suppose the situation is the same in all the Provinces).

Ahora han dispuesto la formacion de un Ejercito Cubano y todos los Mililicianos tienen que integrarse en el mismo; los que ingresan en este ejército estan imposibilitados de volver a la vida civil; me atrevo a calcular en mas de 250,000 hombres los que voluntaria u obligadamente forman parte de este ejército Cubano; todos poseen armas automáticas y morteros de gran calibre de fabricación sovietica o checa. Las armas americanas son utilizadas para introducirlas en los Paises de Centro y Sur-America. En Banes existe una Base Naval llamada de aprovisionamiento; alli fabrican los explosivos que conjuntamente con las armas americanas envían en embarcaciones pesqueras a los mares del Caribe; estas armas y explosivos son transbordadas a otras embarcaciones y las llevan como contrabando de mercancias a los Paises de Centro y SurAmerica. Es de suponer que ésto se hace con la complicidad de funcionarios de estos Paises latino Americanos.

Los Cubanos anti-comunistas y anti-Castristas no podemos ~~perder~~ la fe en el Presidente Kennedy pero a veces su politica nos parece indecisa y extemporanea. Por aqui no hay indicacion alguna acerca de que las fuerzas rusas sean evacuadas de la Isla pues en vez de disminuir han aumentado considerablemente desde el año pasado. Sabemos que ahora se ha intensificado el sabotaje por parte de patriotas importados y dedentro pero estas acciones tienen poca efectividad dado el tremendo poder militar que dispone el regimen comunista. La gran mayoria de los Cubanos deseamos tomar parte en una accion final contra el regimen de Castro pero la ausencia de una orientación positiva los contiene".

He suprimido de la carta de mi amigo de Holguin algunos parrafos que en mi opinion no tienen importancia; me parece muy interesante lo que el dice de la Base Naval de Banes cuya existencia parece ser cierta. Cómo Ud. sabe la Ciudad de Banes ésta muy cerca de Holguin y hay buena comunicacion por carretera entre estos dos Pueblos.

De mi tio de Santiago de Cuba no he tenido noticias positivas y desde Miami me fué imposible comunicarme con él por telefono.

En espera de sus noticias queda de V. atentamente su amigo,

AGuitart

A. Guitart

Bill

September 11, 1963

Dr. Agustin Guitart
4009 Elba Street
New Orleans 25, La.

Dear Dr. Guitart,

Thank you for your letter about the man who arrived from Cuba shortly before my last visit to New Orleans. I appreciate your having taken the trouble to write.

Since I have nothing from you concerning Rene, I assume that Rene has not written to the address provided him in "our" letter. Should you receive something, please call me collect immediately and forward the letter via Air Mail to me. My office telephone number is Washington, D.C. 356-9574.

Within three weeks of today, I expect to be in New Orleans and will call you soon after arriving to arrange a meeting at a convenient time.

Best regards,

Carl Teels

Westfall Associates
P.O. Box 7224
Apex Station
Washington, D.C., 20004

3- Last Saturday I took some children to Spanish classes which Mrs. Reinaldo Mora and Mrs. Agustin Guitart hold once a week. I met Sr. Guitart (L-49) there. Guitart did not look very friendly at the beginning. I presume that some comments I made about political groups in New Orleans got to his ears and he did not think much of them.

A few days before May 20 I was visiting at the Todos. A man called Jose Enrique Puente was there also. We were commenting about the fact that all of a sudden four or five guys who had been named New Orleans delegates by some Miami groups were trying to gain strength. Guitart was one of these men (he is supposed to be a close friend of Manuel

July 10,1963
L-21

Antonio de Varona and represent Varona's group here). I made the comment that if they were seriously considering forming groups here we could and should use Cruzada (the local exile publication) to stop them.

Well, I don't think this is very important anyway. It is possible that Guitart might have not been feeling well Saturday morning, and the rest is all my imagination.

AMLUFF-1

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Att'n : Support Branch (MSStunt)

DATE: 7 June 1963

FROM : Chief, New Orleans Office

SUBJECT: Appointments Made for Carl Teels with Augustine GUITART Campuzano, Elio VALDES, and Arturo FINLAY

Ref. : Cases 40706, 40391, and 40287/memorandum from MSStunt dated 4 Jun 63

1. In accordance with your request of 4 June 1963, we have arranged for Carl Teels to interview Dr. Augustine Guitart Campuzano, Elio Valdes, and Arturo Finlay in the New Orleans Field Office on Wednesday, 12 June 1963. The following are the hours set for these interviews:

a. 10 AM, Arturo Finlay

b. [illegible] PM, Dr. Augustine Guitart Campuzano

c. 5 PM, Elio Valdes.

Valdes and Guitart expressed the hope that the interviewer would speak Spanish. Finlay seems to understand a limited amount of English, but speaks it only haltingly.

2. We will arrange for Mr. Teels to call at the local FBI Office during his visit next week.

Lloyd A. Ray
LLOYD A. RAY

DABrandao/gn

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification



POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300

AUG 8 1963
NEW ORLEANS

INSTRUCTIONS: Fill in items below and complete #1 on other side, when applicable. Moisten gummed ends and attach to back of article. Print on front of article RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

RETURN TO

REGISTERED NO 7524
CERTIFIED NO
INSURED NO.

NAME OF SENDER
Westfall Associates
STREET AND NO. OR P. O. BOX
P.O. Box 7224 Apex Station
CITY, ZONE AND STATE
Washington, D.C. 20004

POD Form 3811 1960

C55—16—71548-1



#1-INSTRUCTIONS TO DELIVERING EMPLOYEE

☒ Deliver ONLY to addressee

☐ Show address where delivered

(Additional charges required for these services)

AUG 8 1963 LA.

RETURN RECEIPT

Received the numbered article described on other side.

SIGNATURE OR NAME OF ADDRESSEE (must always be filled in)

SIGNATURE OF ADDRESSEE'S AGENT, IF ANY

DATE DELIVERED

8-8-63

ADDRESS WHERE DELIVERED (only if requested in item #1)

C35—16—71543-6 GPO

SECRET

22 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact Report, Meeting with Dr. Agustin Guitart

DATE : 12 June 1963

PLACE : OO Office, New Orleans

PRESENT: Subject and Gerald R. Lapsley as Carl Teels

1. Dr. Guitart turned out to be an energetic little man with considerable background in revolutionary/political activities. During the reign of Machado he spent about 17 months in the Isle of Pines prison for his anti-government activities. He has also been active more recently in anti-Batista and anti-Castro activities. After explaining our present needs for current intelligence, Dr. Guitart suggested that we try to establish contact with his uncle, Rene Guitart. Rene is the youngest brother of his father and was always rather close to Dr. Guitart. Rene Guitart is a Santiago businessman. He formerly represented a number of Canadian firms and perhaps other firms as well but now has only one account that Dr. Guitart knows of. This is for the Pillsbury Flour Company of Canada. Rene had business agents in various cities of Oriente province and is very well acquainted with the entire area and, naturally, has a very wide circle of friends and acquaintances. Dr. Guitart said that he had, by indirection, asked Rene to provide him with information about military construction at the port of Banes. He expects to receive Rene's report on the subject in the near future and promised to send me a copy of it. Dr. Guitart felt sure that he could, by indirection, convey to Rene the means for developing the SW system number 99. These directions will be relayed in two letters to be dispatched at one week intervals. A third letter will carry the SW text.

2. Guitart said that he could receive the letters at the home of a friend using the name of one of his friend's daughters. The address is Lillian Martinez, 4517 Walmsley St., New Orleans 25, La.

3. Dr. Guitart wrote the first two letters that same evening and brought them to my hotel Friday evening. Since Dr. Guitart is an energetic man I believe our contact with him will produce more than one recruitment attempt. He spoke of another family that he knows in Holguin and said that he would try to determine their present address and think of ways to contact them.

GRL

GERALD R. LAPSLEY

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

SENDE   LL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BO   M

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	XX	CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	SAS/Security, Mr. Ladner		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

George - regarding our conversation about visa waivers. The man that requested the visa waiver was Dr. Agustin Guitart. He directed his request to Hugh N. Whitaker, Acting Chief, Public Inquiries Branch, Visa Office, Dept of State, Washington. Dr. GUITART requested the visa waiver for his grand child, Daisy GUITART Fox, born March 1963. Daisy's father, mother and sister already have the visa waivers.

If possible, I would like to obtain the waiver for Daisy GUITART as a friendly gesture to Dr. GUITART. I know it won't be worth much butwill be of some value in our dealings with Dr. GUITART anyway.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
SAS/EOB/DE/Trettin	15/7/63

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61
(40)

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—[illegible]

14-00000

Not necessary

NR of a
required

Does not
need
Visa

New Orleans, Jun 24 de 1963

Dear Mr. Tools:

La segunda carta para Santiago de Cuba ya fue puesta en el correo y estoy esperando la respuesta de la primera.

A continuacion le copio parte de una carta del amigo de Holguin, dirigida a un familiar residente en esta Ciudad :

"El pais se sta convirtiendo en una gigantesca base militar, mas alla de todo calculo. Existe un frenetico movimiento de armas de todas clases; miles de vehiculos militares se mueven a todas horas del dia y de la noche. Estan estableciendo campamentos militares y aeropuestos en todas partes. Todas las lomas de piedra han sido perforadas para el almacenamiento de armas, a prueba de bombardeo. Miles de rusos han ocupado el pais y se les pueda ver por todas partes. La represion es salvaje y estan preparados para enfrentarse a cualquiera invasion en gran escala. Las antiaereas (ametralladoras) conocidas por cuatro bocas han sido sustituidas por lansa cohetes. Palma Soriano, Songo y La Maya estan fuertemente fortificadas. La Loma de las Piedras, entre Baire y Jiguani tiene emplasamientos de cohetes. Las conocidas cuevas del Pepu, a cinco kilometros de Baire- hacia la Sierra Maestra- las han convertido en deposito de armas de todos los calibres". (Esta carta salio de la Habana, o Cuba, en la primera quincena de Mayo.)

La carta donde habla de la base de submarinos de Banes se le ha extraviado pero me ofrecio buscarla . Mientras tanto, estoy escribiendo al amigo de Holguin invitandole para que me escriba con la mayor cantidad de informacion.

En sobre aparte le estoy enviando las copias de las waiver visas de la familia de mi hijo; la unica que falta es la de la mas pequena de las niñas, que nacio el 13 de Marzo; yo escribi al Departtamento de Estado solicitandola pero todavia no he obtenido respuesta; la carta la dirigi al Sr. Whitaker (Visa Office).

Sin otro particular, le saluda su amigo,

Dr. Agustin Guitart

1. Jiguani SAM Site
2. Pepu/Baire U/G storage area

SECRET

DATE 24 June 1963

PREPARATION OF OUTGOING SW MESSAGES

TO: Carl Trettin x-7824 SAS/EOB/DE
(Field Units Use Pseudo) (Div. or Branch)

FROM: TSD/SWB
(Field Units Use Pseudo)

Transmitted herewith is an Outgoing SW Message prepared for:

Rene GUITART (Developmental Case)
(Cryptonym of Agent)

Message No.: 1

This message is located:

The message is located on the side opposite the small pencil " X " marks in the center of the page. (X on page one and XX on page two)

It is suggested that the cover letter be placed:

The cover letter should be placed on the side with the pencil " X " marks.

NOTE: PLEASE ERASE THE PENCIL MARKS WITH A SOFT PENCIL ERASER BEFORE MAILING.

O. W. Hertzog Jr.
(Field Units sign in Pseudo)

Form 60-1 (OUT)

SECRET

TRANSLATION

MESSAGE ONE X DEAR FRIEND X THIS SPECIAL CHEMICAL INK WILL ALLOW US TO CORRESPOND SECURELY X IT WILL DISAPPEAR AS THE PAPER DRIES SO WET IT AGAIN WITH WRITING INK IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE MESSAGE X YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLIGENCE ARE NEEDED NOW TO OBTAIN AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF EVENTS IN YOUR AREA X IN FUTURE LETTERS I WILL EXPLAIN WHAT IS NEEDED X IF YOU ARE READING THIS LETTER YOU CAN BE SURE THAT NO ONE ELSE HAS READ IT X ALL MY LETTERS TO YOU SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AS THIS ONE HAS BEEN X THE MESSAGES WILL BE NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY X ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF EACH LETTER IN YOUR SECRET MESSAGES TO ME X NOW I WILL EXPLAIN HOW TO WRITE TO ME USING A SIMPLE BUT SECURE SYSTEM X THE ENVELOPE OF THIS LETTER HAS BEEN IMPREGNATED WITH CERTAIN CHEMICALS WHICH MAKE IT INTO A CHEMICAL CARBON PAPER X OPEN THE ENVELOPE ALONG ALL ITS FLAPS AND CUT OFF THE GLUED EDGES X WHAT REMAINS WILL BE USED AS A CARBON PAPER AND SHOULD BE KEPT IN A SAFE PLACE SINCE IT CAN BE USED MANY TIMES OVER X PLACE THE CARBON ADDRESS SIDE UP ON A SHEET OF BOND PAPER SIMILAR TO THIS PAPER X PLACE ANOTHER SHEET OF PAPER ON TOP OF THE CARBON X ON THE TOP SHEET PRINT A MESSAGE TO ME USING A BLUNTED PENCIL X NUMBER YOUR FIRST MESSAGE NUMBER ONE X USE A FORMAT SIMILAR TO THIS LETTER X PRINT ON A HARD SURFACE SUCH AS A GLASS TABLE TOP TO AVOID LEAVING IMPRESSIONS ON THE BOTTOM SHEET X DESTROY THE TOP SHEET BEARING THE VISIBLE MESSAGE X TEAR IT UP AND THROW IT IN THE TOILET X HIDE THE CARBON X THE BOTTOM SHEET NOW BEARS THE MESSAGE X ON THE BACK OF THE SHEET WITH THE MESSAGE WRITE A NORMAL FRIENDLY LETTER TO YOUR ASSUMED NIECE LILLIAN MARTINEZ X 4517 WALMSLEY STREET X NEW ORLEANS 25 LOUISIANA X DO NOT WRITE ON THE SIDE WITH THE SECRET MESSAGE X SEND THE LETTER AIR MAIL X USE A PHONY NAME AND REAL ADDRESS AS A RETURN ADDRESS ON THE ENVELOPE X LILLIAN WILL KNOW THE LETTER IS FOR ME AND WILL CALL ME WHEN IT ARRIVES X USING THIS PROCEDURE YOU CAN WRITE ME ANYTHING YOU WISH WITHOUT RISK FOR THE CARBON LEAVES INVISIBLE CHEMICAL TRACES WHICH CAN ONLY BE DEVELOPED IN OUR LABORATORIES X IN YOUR FIRST MESSAGE TO ME MERELY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT AND COMPREHENSION OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS X ASK ANY QUESTIONS YOU HAVE X IN SUBSEQUENT LETTER I WILL ASK YOU TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON PARTICULAR TOPICS X BEST REGARDS X END END END

MSE UNO (1) QUERIDO AMIGO X ESTA TINTA QUIMICA ESPECIAL NOS PERMITE CORRESPONDER CON SEGURIDAD X LA ESCRITURA DESAPARESERA CUANDO EL PAPEL SE SECA CMA DE MANERA MOJA EL PAPEL OTRA VEZ CON TINTA DE ESCRIBIR PARA QUE EL MENSAJE SE RETENGA X TU CONOCIMIENTO E INTELLIGENCIA SE NECESESITA AHORA PARA OBTENER UN PANORAMA EXACTO DE ACONTECIMIENTOS EN SU AREA X EN CARTAS FUTURAS TE EXPLICARE LO QUE SE NECESESITA X SI LEES ESTE MENSAJE DEMUESTRA QUE NADIE MAS LO HA LEIDO X TODAS MIS CARTAS DEBEN SER DESAROLLADAS IGUAL QUE ESTA X LOS MENSAJES DEBEN SER NUMERADOS CONSECUTIVAMENTE X CONFIRMA RECIBO EN MENSAJE SECRETO DE TODAS LAS CARTAS MIAS X AHORA TE EXPLICARÉ COMO QUIERO QUE ME ESCRIBAS USANDO UN SISTEMA SIMPLE PERO SEGURO X EL SOBRE DE ESTA CARTA HA SIDO IMPREGNADO CON DISTINTAS SOLUCIONES QUIMICAS QUE LO HA CAMBIADO COMO PAPEL CARBON X ABRE EL SOBRE CUIDADOSAMENTE A LO LARGO DE TODAS LAS JUNTURAS CORTANDO LA ALETA QUE CONTIENE GOMA X EL RESTO DEL SOBRE SÉ USARA COMO PAPEL CARBON Y CUANDO TERMINES DE USARLO DEBE SER GUARDADO EN UN LUGAR SEGURO PORQUE ESTE CARBON SE PUEDE UTILIZAR MUCHAS VECES X PON EL CARBON (SOBRE) CON LA ESCRITURA BOCA ARRIBA SOBRE UN PAPEL EN BLANCO (PRIMERA HOJA) (SIMILAR A ESTE PAPEL) X PON OTRO PAPEL EN BLANCO (SEGUNDA HOJA) ENCIMA DEL PAPEL CARBON (SOBRE) X SOBRE EL ULTIMO PAPEL EN BLANCO (SEGUNDA HOJA) ESCRIBEME UN MENSAJE USANDO UN LAPIZ CON LA PUNTA DESGASTADA X NUMERA EL MENSAJE NUMERO UNO (1) USA EL MISMO PLAN DE ESTA X ESCRIBE (LETRA TIPO MOLDE) ENCIMA DE UNA SUPERFICIE DURO (COMO UN MESA CON TAPA DE VIDRIO O SIMILAR) PARA EVITAR IMPRESIONES EN LA PRIMERA HOJA X ROMPE EL PAPEL QUE CONTIENE EL MENSAJE VISIBLE (SEGUNDA HOJA) CMA ROMPELO Y BOTALO EN EL INODORO X ESCONDE EL PAPEL CARBON X LA ULTIMA HOJA (O SEA LA PRIMERA) CONTIENE EL MENSAJE X AL DORSO DEL PAPEL QUE CONTIENE EL MENSAJE ESCRIBE UNA CARTA INOCUA DE CHARLA AMISTUOSA A TU SOBRINA (SUPUESTA) LILLIAN MARTINEZ X 4517 (CUATRO CINCO UNO SIETE) WALMSLEY STREET X NEW ORLEANS 25 (DOS CINCO) LOUISIANA X NO REPITO NO ESCRIBAS EN EL LADO DEL MENSAJE X MANDA LA CARTA POR CORREO AEREO X USA UN NOMBRE FALSO Y DIRECCION AUTENTICA COMO REMITENTE X LILLIAN SABRÁ QUE LA CARTA ES PARA MI Y ME AVISARÁ CUANDO LA RECÍBA X USANDO ESTE PROCEDIMIENTO PUEDES ESCRIBIRME QUALQUIERA COSA QUE DESEAS SIN PELIGRO PORQUE EL PAPEL CARBON DEJA SEÑALES QUIMICAS INVISIBLES QUE SOLAMENTE PUEDEN SER DESAROLLADAS EN NUESTROS LABORATORIOS X EN TU PRIMER MENSAJE QUIERO QUE SOLAMENTE ACUSES RECIBO Y ENTENDIMIENTO DE ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES X HAS QUALQUIER PREGUNTA QUE TENGAS X EN MIS CARTAS SUBSECUENTES TE PIDIDRÉ QUE ME OBTENGAS INFORMES DE ASUNTOS EN PARTICULAR X MIS MEJORES RECUREDOS X FIN FIN FIN

Pg I

Pg II

A

MESSAGE ONE X DEAR FRIEND X THIS SPECIAL CHEMICAL INK WILL ALLOW US TO CORRESPOND SECRETLY X IT WILL DISAPPEAR AS THE PAPER DRIES SO WET IT AGAIN WITH WRITING INK IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE MESSAGE X YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLIGENCE ARE NEEDED NOW TO OBTAIN AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF EVENTS IN YOUR AREA X IN FUTURE LETTERS I WILL EXPLAIN WHAT IS NEEDED X IF YOU ARE READING THIS LETTER YOU CAN BE SURE THAT NO ONE ELSE HAS READ IT X ALL MY LETTERS TO YOU SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AS THIS ONE HAS BEEN X THE MESSAGES WILL BE NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY X ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF EACH LETTER IN YOUR SECRET MESSAGES TO ME X NOW I WILL EXPLAIN HOW TO WRITE TO ME USING A SIMPLE BUT SECURE SYSTEM X THE ENVELOPE OF THIS LETTER HAS BEEN IMPREGNATED WITH CERTAIN CHEMICALS WHICH MAKE IT INTO A CHEMICAL CARBON PAPER X OPEN THE ENVELOPE ALONG ALL ITS FLAPS AND CUT OFF THE GLUED EDGES X WHAT REMAINS WILL BE USED AS A CARBON PAPER AND SHOULD BE KEPT IN A SAFE PLACE SINCE IT CAN BE USED MANY TIMES OVER X PLACE THE CARBON ADDRESS SIDE UP ON A SHEET OF BOND PAPER SIMILAR TO THIS PAPER X PLACE ANOTHER SHEET OF PAPER ON TOP OF THE CARBON X ON THE TOP SHEET PRINT A MESSAGE TO ME USING A BLUNTED PENCIL X NUMBER YOUR FIRST MESSAGE NUMBER ONE X USE A FORMAT SIMILAR TO THIS LETTER X PRINT ON A HARD SURFACE SUCH AS A GLASS TABLE TOP TO AVOID LEAVING IMPRESSIONS ON THE BOTTOM SHEET X DESTROY THE TOP SHEET BEARING THE VISIBLE MESSAGE X TEAR IT UP AND THROW IT IN THE TOILET X HIDE THE CARBON X THE BOTTOM SHEET NOW BEARS THE MESSAGE X ON THE BACK OF THE SHEET WITH THE MESSAGE WRITE A NORMAL FRIENDLY LETTER TO YOUR ASSUMED [illegible] LILLIAN MARTINEZ X 4517 WALMSLEY STREET X NEW ORLEANS 25 LOUISIANA X DO NOT WRITE ON THE SIDE WITH THE SECRET MESSAGE X SEND THE LETTER AIR MAIL X USE A PHONY NAME AND REAL ADDRESS AS A RETURN ADDRESS ON THE ENVELOPE X LILLIAN WILL KNOW THE LETTER IS FOR ME AND WILL CALL ME WHEN IT ARRIVES X USING THIS PROCEDURE YOU CAN WRITE ME ANYTHING YOU WISH WITHOUT RISK FOR THE CARBON LEAVES INVISIBLE CHEMICAL TRACES WHICH CAN ONLY BE DEVELOPED IN OUR LABORATORIES X IN YOUR FIRST MESSAGE TO ME MERELY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT AND COMPREHENSION OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS X ASK ANY QUESTIONS YOU HAVE X IN SUBSEQUENT LETTER I WILL ASK YOU TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON PARTICULAR TOPICS X BEST REGARDS X END END END

17 JUN 1963

TO SAS/Ops Support
FR SAS/FCB/DE
SUBJ PDA request:
RENE P. GUITART RODRIGUEZ

Rene Guitart was born ca. 1900 in Cuba. He is a businessman and until recently represented a number of Canadian firms in Santiago, Cuba. At the present time he is still the representative of Pillsbury Flour of Canada. He is semi-retired and very well respected in Oriente province.

ADDRESS: Office: HEREDIA BAJA #7
SANTIAGO DE CUBA
also APARTADO 149
SANTIAGO DE CUBA

Guitart formerly had business representatives in a number of cities in Oriente province. It is our intention to recruit Guitart as a reporting source and as a reporting channel for sub-sources he may develop. The approach to Guitart will be thru his nephew, Dr. Agustin Guitart. Carl E. Jenkins

Dr. Guitart 12 June 63

~~[illegible]~~

RENE P. GUITART (RODRIGUEZ)
Was business representative ~~of~~ in Santiago of several Canadian firms

APARTADO ~~130 [illegible]~~ 149
SANTIAGO DE CUBA
Telephone:
Home Address:

OFFICE: HEREDIA ~~ALTA~~ BAJA #7
SANTIAGO DE CUBA

REPRESENTS:
1. PILLSBURY FLOUR OF CANADA

1. Dr Guitart writes to Rene
Telling him to wait the letter

2. Friend of Dr. Guitart will
allow use of his address as
an accommodation address.

(4517)
Wamsley
Walmsley

3. LILLIAN MARTINEZ
4517 WALMSLEY ST
NEW ORLEANS 25, LA

address of friend

DR. AGUSTIN GUITART
4009 ELBA ST
NEW ORLEANS 25 LA
822-2815.

Send letter of instruction
in Spanish.

14-00000

MESSAGE ONE

DEAR FRIEND THIS SPECIAL CHEMICAL INK WILL ALLOW US TO CORRESPOND SECURELY. YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLIGENCE ARE NEEDED NOW TO OBTAIN AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF EVENTS IN CUBA. IN FUTURE LETTERS TO YOU I WILL EXPLAIN WHAT IS NEEDED.

IF YOU ARE READING THIS LETTER YOU CAN BE SURE THAT NO ONE ELSE HAS READ IT. ALL MY LETTERS TO YOU SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AS THIS ONE HAS BEEN. THE MESSAGES WILL BE NUMBERED

Send Dr Ke Sw letter

14-00000

DO/Contacts

January 28,1963
9:30 P.M.
L- 49

Dear Carl:

This sounds funny but in order to keep the subjects in separate letters I am starting this one.I want to get this one out to give you a chance to look it over before you come.During my visit up north we talked about contacting some professors.I told you there were two or three in this area.I did not have a chance to get close to any of them until last Friday.Here it goes:

Last Friday night(Jan.25) my wife and I attended a meeting to commemorate the anniversary of the birth of Jose Marti.It was quite cold and not many people attended(the act was not well organized either).After the meeting one of the Cuban couples talked us into stopping at a bar before going home.It happened that Dr. Agustin Guitart(the university professor that looks more promising)had gone with them to the meeting.What luck ! I accepted with the condition that Dr. Guitart would come along too.He couldn't turned it down.I have been trying to get close to this man for some time and never had the opportunity before.I could not get as much information as I wanted but this is just a start.

Dr. Agustin Guitart was a well known professor of Physics in Havana. He was a professor at the Instituto de la Vibora(a very large public high school in Havana) for many years before becoming a professor at the University of Havana.Dr.Guitart is about 5' 5'' and slightly on the heavy side.He has a little bit of grayish hair and a small mustache.He looks to be about 50 years old.

His home address is(from the phone book): 4009 Elba St.,New Orleans,La. phone, 82 2-2815.I believe he lives there with his wife,daughter,son-in-law and grand-children.His son stays there some times.I believe he is going to school somewhere.His son-in-law is a Cuban lawyer called Edmundo Robaina.

Dr.Guitart is now teaching Physics at Xavier University of Louisiana, a colored university located at 7325 Palmetto St.,New Orleans,La., phone: HU-8-6646.

He looks very anxious to do something to help fight the Communists in Cuba.He gese has attended most of the meetings in New Orleans since his arrival here a few months ago.(By the way,he and two other university professors were sitting together at the meeting Friday night).He

He arrived in Miami from Cuba in February 1962.He spent one or more days at Opa Locka.I don't know what date he arrived in Miami but he mentioned he left Opa Locka on a Friday or a Saturday.

I believe Dr.Guitart's wife is a sister or very close relative of Sara del Toro.Sara and her husband Amador Odio are in prison in Cuba now.Amador Odio was a Carlos Prio man some years ago and was also anti-Batista.Amador and Sara were both close to the Castro family in 1959

January 28,1963
L - 49

and 1960.When one of Fidel's sisters got married,Sara gave her a party(I don't know how you call this type of party) before the wedding.The party took place at Sara's country home just outside Havana.Sometime in late 1960 or 1961 Sara and Amador were accused of conspiring against the government.Amador was sentenced to 30 years and Sara to 6 years.I believe Sara and Amador have nine children.They must all be in the U.S. by now.

Agustin's brother is Dr. Miguel Quitart. Miguel was a well known professor of Mathematics in Havana.I know he taught at the Instituto de la Vibora(the old rascal gave a rough time in my exams) for many years.I don't know if he ever taught at the University of Havana. Miguel is now teaching Mathematics at the University of Alabama.

Dr.Agustin Quitart is now making about $540.00 a month at Xavier.I believe he speaks broken English.

Regards

G

P.S. Let me know if you need any more information about any of the subjects you want to see.I might be able to find it by the time you get here.

P.S. THE BAR IS CALLED "LAS MARACAS" AND BENITO BORGES OWNS IT.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE: 3 Sept 63

TO: SAS/Intel

ROOM NO.

BUILDING: Paul [illegible]

REMARKS:
Paul – Would you please scan this report and tell me whether the info is basically accurate and whether it might be worth contacting the source for additional de-briefing.

FROM: [illegible] EOB/DE

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION: R - 8138

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.
GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE: 21 Aug 63

TO: Frank

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:
Could you please send me a resume of this letter.

Thanks,
Carl

FROM:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.
GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

Dr 4

Marcelino Melendreras - Left Cuba (Havana) 29 July via Mexico. He was in Mexico City 10 days and arrived in New Orleans Saturday, 10 August.

Prior to the communist government he worked in Productora de Superfosfatos (Superphosphates Factory) of Regla. When this factory was confiscated and included in the Consolidado de Fertilizantes (Fetiliser Consolidated) he performed the duties of Assistant to the Chief in the Technology Department. His services ended when he resigned a week before his trip. He informed me that the number of Russians has increased considerably and that when it was reported over short wave that a goodly part of them were returning to their country they were arriving in numbers larger than those who were leaving. Those which are seen in the streets of Havana are as many as the Cubans who also walk on them. All the buildings and houses of the district known as Habana del Este (East Havana) which was constructed and planned when the tunnel which crosses Havana Bay was built are inhabited by Russians and Czechs (the latter in lesser numbers than the Russians). This district was planned for well-to-do people and the houses are of the best quality.

In Havana Province, the Russian camps are located in the surrounding areas of the towns known as Wajay and El Cano. Cubans are forbidden to transit through these towns (and) were removed from living there in favor of the Russian officials. In the surroundings are located machine guns and antiaircraft guns in a large number.

It is well-known that the fishing terminal (near Havana) which was constructed in order to provide facilities to fishing vessels which operate on the North coast of Cuba has been converted into a base for Russian submarines. Mr Melendreras was in Santiago de Cuba and Holguin a few weeks before his trip but he did not hear anything said about the sub-base said to have been constructed in Banes Bay, a city situated on the North coast of Oriente province.

While going through Las Villas Province at the entrance to the city of Santa Clara he was able to observe a large camp of Russian soldiers in tents. The airport in this city is controlled by Russians.

In Santiago de Cuba and Holguin many groups of Russians are seen but in a smaller number than in Havana. He believes that the number of Russians has increased instead of decreased since the October crisis.

In what regards food, that which is most abundant is rice and macaroni. Meat, when it is available, is given every two weeks, one pound per person. When he left Cuba a month and a half ago there were no eggs or chickens. In short, food is scarce and of poor quality throughout the island.

Marcelino Melendreras.- Salió de Cuba (Habana) el 29 de Julio via Mexico. Estuvo 10 dias en la Ciudad de Mexico y llegó a New Orleans el sábado 10 de Agosto.-

Antes del Gobierno Comunista trabajaba en la Productora de Super-fosfatos de Regla; cuando esta fábrica fué confiscada e incluída en el Consolidado de Fertilizantes desempeñó el cargo de Auxiliar del Jefe en el Departamento de Tecnología; sus servicios terminaron cuando renunció, una semana antes de su viaje.-

Me informó que el número de rusos ha aumentado considerablemente y que cuando por radio de onda corta se decía que buena parte de ellos estaban regresando a su país, estuvieron llegando en número mayor de los que se iban. Los que se ven por las calles de la Habana son tantos como los Cubanos que transitan por ellas. Todos los edificios y casas del reparto llamado "Habana del Este" que fué construído y planeado cuando se construyó el Tunel que atraviesa la Bahia de la Habana, están habitados por rusos y checos (éstos ultimos en menor número que los rusos). Este Reparto fué planeado para gente de buena posición y las casas son de primera calidad.

En la Provincia de la Habana, los campamentos rusos están ubicados en los alrededores de los pueblos llamados Wajay y El Cano; para los cubanos está prohibido transitar por éstos pueblos que fueron desalojados para ubicar allí a la oficialidad rusa . En los alrededores están instaladas ametralladoras y cañones antiaereos en gran cantidad. (cerca de la Habana)

Es vox populi que la Terminal Pesquera que se construyó para dar facilidades a los barcos pesqueros que operan en la costa norte de Cuba, esta convertida en base de submarinos rusos. El Sr. Melendreras estuvo, semanas antes de su viaje, por Santiago de Cuba y Holguín pero nada oyo decir acerca de la base de submarinos que se dice han construido en la Bahia de Banes, Ciudad situada en la costa norte de la Provincia de Oriente.

Al pasar por la Provincia de las Villas, a la entrada de la Ciudad de Santa Clara pudo observar un gran campamento de soldados rusos en tiendas de campaña; el aeropuerto de esta Ciudad está controlado por rusos.

En Santiago de Cuba y Holguín se ven muchos grupos de rusos pero en menor número que en la Habana. El opina que el número de rusos ha aumentado en lugar de disminuir desde la crisis del mes de Octubre.

En lo que se refiere a abastecimientos, lo que mas abunda son arroz y macarrones. Carne, cuando la hay, entregan una libra por persona cada quince dias; cuando el salió de Cuba hacía mes y medio que no había huevos ni pollos. En resumen, la comida es escasa y de mala calidad en toda la Isla.

Miami, Agosto 20 de 1963

Dear Mr. Teels:

Tal como le ofreci en mi conversacion telefónica, aquí le incluyo un resumen de la informacion que me dió el amigo que llegó de Cuba el 29 de Julio. Se la hago en mi idioma por ser más fácil para mí el redactarla. Supongo que si Usted pudo hablar con él, habrá podido obtener otros detalles.

No ha sido posible para mí comunicarme con Santiago de Cuba desde esta Ciudad; espero hacerlo cuando regrese a New Orleans en los días finales de este mes y le escribiré enseguida que lo haga.-

Yo dejé instrucciones al Sr. Martinez para que le enviara a su oficina de Washington cualquier correspondencia que llegara de Cuba durante mi permanencia en esta Ciudad.

Sincerely yours,

Agustin Guitart

RETURN TO
A. Guitart
9250 S.W. 31 Terrace
MIAMI, Fla.

PM
22 AUG
1963

8¢ U.S. AIR MAIL

Mr. Carl Teels
P. O Box 7224
Apex Station
Washington D.C. 20004

CORREO AEREO
PAR AVION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUITART Campuzano, Agustin, Dr. 201-727418
19 June 1963 poa SAS/OS Carl Trettin 7646

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201

FORM 7-58 44 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK **Nº 138893**

DATE 18 Jun 63

TO CHIEF, FI/D

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Dr. Agustin GUITART Campuzano 201-727418

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CIC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
25 Apr 10, Cardenas, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Doctor of Science presently teaching at Xavier Univ. in New Orleans.

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Professor - Doctor of Science

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME Wendell Ullery
OFFICE DESIGNATION SAS/IOS
ROOM, BUILDING 0 G 14
EXTENSION 7646

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Prof. at the Univ. of Havana	Havana, Cuba	
Minister of Education	Havana, Cuba	

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Helena TORO

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
UNCLE: Rene P. GUITART (GL-138892)

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
All pertinent info.

JUN 25 2 16 PM '63

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-727418

14-00000

SECRET

TO: 25 June 1967
DATE

Wendell Ullery

FROM: FI/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
SAS/CS - C. Trettin

NUMBER
201 - 727417

SUBJECT
QUITART Rodriguez, Rene P.

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
18 June 1963 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE:
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	

FORM 7-58 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-727417

(8)

SECRET

w

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
SAS/OS - C. Trettin

NUMBER
201 - 727418

SUBJECT
GUITART Campuzano, Agustin

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
18 June 1963 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Reg- Trettin

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
TIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	3 JUL 1963

PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-727418

SECRET

TO SAS/CS	ATTENTION Carl Trettin	ROOM G G 19	BLDG.
SUBJECT GUITART Campuzano, Agustin (Dr.)	CI/OA NUMBER C-201-727418	CCS FILE NO. 5-16 G	CCS CASE OFFICER Richard J. Biladeau

Central Cover Staff concurs in your proposal to use the above individual for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon Central Cover Staff to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover ~~activity~~, you are specifically requested to advise Central Cover Staff/Non-Official Cover promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject is in CCS/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCS/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

	COPY TO CI/OA	DATE 26 JUN 1963	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, CCS/NC Thomas K Strange

FORM 12-62 1678 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CCS CONCURRENCE

201 — 727418

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET (9)

SEND WILL CHECK CLASSIFICA N TOP AND B M

☐ UNC SSIFIED ☐ CONF NTIAL ☐ CRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Augustin
1952 - to Min of Ed from
dir of Gen [illegible]
of Pub works
July 1951 - Sub Sec Tech
1948 education

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

(40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

former member of Student
Directorate of 1930. Former
revolutionary. Prof Physics
at U. of Havana.
Early supporter of Prio
Friend of [illegible] in Front
Ruben de Leon
& Prime Minister
Tony VARONA

17 Jan 63

TO SAS/[illegible] Support

FR SAS/FOB/DE

SUBJ Request for POA on
Dr. AGUSTIN GUITART CAMPUZANO

POA for contact, assessment and use as a cut-out to his uncle, Rene GUITART Rodriguez, who presently resides in Santiago Cuba, is requested on Dr. Agustin GUITART CAMPUZANO.

1. DOB: 25 April 1910
2. POB: Cuba (probably Santiago)
3. Occ: Doctor of Science (Mathematics + physics)

Presently teaching at Xavier University in New Orleans. Formerly a professor at the University of Havana. Has a history of political activity. Was imprisoned on the Isle of Pines in Machado time. Served as Minister of Education during the early part of Carlos Prio time as head of the Cuban government. Arrived in the U.S.A. in February 1962. Processed thru Opa Locka.

4. Wife: Helena TORO
5. Children: Agustin, Jorge, Vilma Helena, William
6. Former Address: Havana, Calle 19 No. 1502
7. Present Address: 4009 Elba St, New Orleans 25

Carl E. [illegible]

[illegible]

New Orleans
May 27, 1963

Dear Mr. Toole:

Following is some additional information as per our conversation during your last visit to New Orleans.

would be any interest

Cuban going back to Cuba.- Recently I heard through a third person that a Cuban is going back to Cuba. I have tried to find out details about this, but so far all I have learned is: it is a woman in her fifties whose husband is in Cuba. She has been living here with her daughter who is married to an American (Robert C. Baker, 538 Central Ave., Metairie, La.) She came to the U.S.A. to help her daughter and has been waiting for her husband and another daughter to join her here. Due to the fact that they haven't been able to come, she has decided to go back to be with them. She is anti-Castro. Her husband's last name is Vasquez and he was the director of the only Baptist school in the city of Holguín, Oriente province. (This is where they live) The school is intervened by the communist government. She has already received the cable from the Communist Cuban government stating she may return, but as far as I know, she hasn't left yet. This is all I have been able to find out.

#13- José Mata, in his forties.- 1501 Owens Blvd. (Apt. A) He was born in Santiago de Cuba, Oriente province. He was personnel manager in the First National Bank of Boston in Santiago de Cuba, presently employed by the Whitney Nat'l Bank here in New Orleans. Very honest person. He used to be enthusiastic but lately he has been very pessimistic. In conversations with him I have found that he cannot be of assistance.

#14- Carlos Mata, in his forties. Recently moved from 4421 Perlita St. to Duplessis St., but I don't know the number, and he will move again shortly. Brother of #13. Cuban lawyer, presently working with Standard Fruit Co. He is a very talented man . In Cuba he was the lawyer for the "Asociación de Cosecheros de Café". When he was living in Miami before coming to N.O. he was working with other cubans planning the new legislation to deal with coffee after Castro's overthrow. It is possible that he could be of assistance to you, but in conversations with him I haven't been able to find out whether he still maintains good connections in Cuba, which I think he must have.

#15- George Romagosa, 35 yrs. old. Born in Havana. He worked for the "Compañía Cubana de Electricidad" and with his father in an import-export business. He is presently working for the grain company that he used to represent in Havana. He is a loud and boisterous character, but in the surface only. He is always willing to help with Cruzada, and has done so in many ocassions. He told me he did a lot of sabotaging against Castro before coming to the USA. I asked him once if he maintained connections with friends in the company and he came up with a list of "chivatos" (informers), so I really can't say whether or not he could be of assistance to you.

#16- Francisco Menares, in his sixties. Cuban architect. Working at Avondale Shipping Yard, as an architect. 4316 Perlita St. (Apt. B) Father in law of #8. He was a hard worker before his son in law was released from prison, for the Cuban cause, but ever since the prisoners were released he has retired to his family life.

SECRET

27 April 1963
SAS 63-216

MEMORANDUM FOR: CO/Contact Division

SUBJECT: Dr. Augustin Guitart

Attached hereto is a report on Subject prepared by a New Orleans contact of ours. We are interested in determining whether Dr. Guitart has contacts in Cuba which could be of value to us. Please ask your New Orleans office to interview Dr. Guitart. From our standpoint, the purpose of the interview is to obtain another assessment of GUITART's character and to try to unobtrusively learn from him what contacts he still maintains with persons still in Cuba. Ostensible purpose of the interview could be to determine the present attitude of the staff of the University of Havana toward the Castro regime.

John H. Sherwood
C/SAS/EOB/DE

DDP/SAS/EDE:C.E.Trettin:smp (27 April 1963)

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - SAS/EDE
1 - SAS/ESEC

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Carl Trettin:

AI-8084

No content.

OO/C requested permission from FBI to talk to Subject. FBI had no objection in March 1962.

George [illegible]
19 April 63

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Traces, please, on Agustin GUITART.
RI, I&NS.

OPS-NR
RF+S-NR
RI-att

FROM: Trettin - SAS/EOB/DE

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 30-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO (47)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE 15 APR 1963

TO: SA~~S/EOB/T~~rettin

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

SAS/Security
see attached trace on Guitart. Please let me know the content of the O/S trace.
Trettin, FOB/DE
16 Apr 63

FROM: SA:/OS

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION 7646

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 30-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO (47)

DR AGUSTIN GUITART CAMPUZANO

WIFE: HELENA TORO

CHILDREN: AGUSTÍN
JORGE
VILMA HELENA
WILLIAM CLARK

Ops Support

January 28,1963
9:30 P.M.
L- 49

Dear Carl:

This sounds funny but in order to keep the subjects in separate letters I am starting this one.I want to get this one out to give you a chance to look it over before you come.During my visit up north we talked about contacting some professors.I told you there were two or three in this area.I did not have a chance to get close to any of them until last Friday.Here it goes:

Last Friday night(Jan.25) my wife and I attended a meeting to commemorate the anniversary of the birth of Jose Marti.It was quite cold and not many people attended(the act was not well organised either).After the meeting one of the Cuban couples talked us into stopping at a bar before going home.It happened that Dr. Agustin Guitart(the university professor that looks most promising)had gone with them to the meeting.What luck! I accepted with the condition that Dr. Guitart would come along too.He couldn't turned it down.I have been trying to get close to this man for some time and never had the opportunity before.I could not get as much information as I wanted but this is just a start.

Dr. Agustin Guitart was a well known professor of Physics in Havana. He was a professor at the Instituto de la Vibora(a very large public high school in Havana) for many years before becoming a professor at the University of Havana.Dr.Guitart is about 5' 5'' and slightly on the heavy side.He has a little bit of grayish hair and a small mustache.He looks to be about 50 years old.

His home address is(from the phone book): 4009 Elba St.,New Orleans,La. phone, 82 2-2815.I believe he lives there with his wife,daughter,son-in-law and grand-children.His son stays there some times.I believe he is going to school somewhere.His son-in-law is a Cuban lawyer called Edmundo Robaina.

Dr.Guitart is now teaching Physics at Xavier University of Louisiana, a colored university located at 7325 Palmetto St.,New Orleans,La., phone: HU-8-6646.

He looks very anxious to do something to help fight the Communists in Cuba.He geso has attended most of the meetings in New Orleans since his arrival here a few months ago.(By the way,he and two other university professors were sitting together at the meeting Friday night).He

He arrived in Miami from Cuba in February 1962.He spent one or more days at Opa Locka.I don't know what date he arrived in Miami but he mentioned he left Opa Locka on a Friday or a Saturday.

I believe Dr.Guitart's wife is a sister or very close relative of Sara del Toro.Sara and her husband Amador Odio are in prison in Cuba now.Amador Odio was a Carlos Prio man some years ago and was also anti-Batista.Amador and Sara were both close to the Castro family in 1959.

—IVER—

January 28, 1963
L - 49

and 1960. When one of Fidel's sisters got married, Sara gave her a party (I don't know how you call this type of party) before the wedding. The party took place at Sara's country home just outside Havana. Sometime in late 1960 or 1961 Sara and Amador were accused of conspiring against the government. Amador was sentenced to 30 years and Sara to 6 years. I believe Sara and Amador have nine children. They must all be in the U.S. by now.

Agustin's brother is Dr. Miguel Guitart. Miguel was a well known professor of Mathematics in Havana. I know he taught at the Instituto de la Vibora (the old rascal gave me a rough time in my exams) for many years. I don't know if he ever taught at the University of Havana. Miguel is now teaching Mathematics at the University of Alabama.

Dr. Agustin Guitart is now making about $340.00 a month at Xavier. I believe he speaks broken English.

Regards

G

P.S. Let me know if you need any more information about any of the subjects you want to see. I might be able to find it by the time you get here.

* THE BAR IS CALLED "LAS MARACAS" AND BENITO BORGES OWNS IT.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME CHECK, DOCUMENT SERVICE, AND PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

RID CONTROL NO. (Filled in by RID)

DATE (Submitted by requester) 9 April 63

FROM: (Requesters name) ① Don Treese

BRANCH SAS/OS

ROOM GG-14

EXTENSION 7566

TO	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS	CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
RID/INDEX 1	B 4003			55/-	ON THE HEAD
REQUESTER SAS	GG	14		②	
RID/FILES					
REQUESTER				③	
RID/DRS					
RID/201					
RID/ANALYSIS					
RID/MIS					
RID/INDEX					

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME / GIVEN NAMES: GUITART Campuzano, (Dr.) Agustin

SPELLING VARIATIONS

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, sex, CP membership, U. S. affiliations, etc.)
Male
Was a Professor of Physics in Havana, Cuba at Instatute de la Vibora before becoming a professor at the University of Havana.

Now is teaching Physics at Xavier University of New Orleans, La.

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: Cir 1913, Cuba

CITIZENSHIP: Cuba

RESIDENCE: 4009 Elba St, New Orleans, La.

RID/INDEX TO REQUESTER		COMMENTS
/	NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	
/	CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	

BE SURE ALL SUBJECT INFORMATION IS CORRECT

① Type or print all entries.
② On receipt of index card reproductions: draw a green diagonal line across items you don't want RID to obtain for you.
③ Edit (use green) the Copyflo listing to reflect: (a) Cards to be destroyed (green D). Examples: referenced document has been destroyed; less informative than a retained card leading to the same information; referenced information not significant. (b) Corrections and additions, including ∞ when card reflects all facts in document. (c) OK all cards that are correct as typed.

Could this trace be consolidated into an existing or new 201 file? ☐ yes ☐ no. (If yes, complete the following - no other form required.)

201 PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION

201 -

(201 number will be supplied by RID. If new 201 number has been obtained by desk, note it in this space.)

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED		FILE TO BE KEPT		ACCESS RESTRICTED		RESTRICTION (If any)
YES	NO	RID	DESK	NO	YES →	

ALWAYS RETURN THIS FORM WITH COPYFLO OF CARD REPRODUCTIONS. IF YOU HAVE REQUESTED A 201 PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION, ALSO RETURN PERTINENT DOCUMENTS.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

FORM 8-60 362 REPLACES FORM [illegible] WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

14-0-30



GUITART CAMPUZADO, AGUSTIN

SEX M DOB 25 APR 10
CARDENAS
CIT ?
CC ?
SEE SECURITY OFFICE FILES

AI-8084

OOC

Mar 62

FBI NO

0050884

25

SECRET

17 June 63

TO SAS/Ops Support

FR SAS/ICOB/DE

201-727418

GL-138893

SUBJ Request for PoA on:
Dr. AGUSTIN GUITART CAMPUZANO

PoA for contact, assessment and use as a cut-out to his uncle, Rene GUITART RODRIGUEZ, who presently resides in Santiago, Cuba, is requested on Dr. Agustin GUITART CAMPUZANO.

1. DOB: 25 APRIL 1910
2. POB: CUBA, CARDENAS ~~(probably Santiago)~~
3. OCC: DOCTOR OF SCIENCES (mathematics + physics)

Presently teaching at Xavier University in New Orleans. Formerly a professor at the University of Havana. Has a history of political activity. Was imprisoned on the Isle of Pines in Machado time. Served as Minister of Education during the early part of Carlos Prio term as head of the Cuban government. Arrived in the U.S.A. in February 1962. Processed thru Opa Locka.

4. WIFE: Helena TORO
5. CHILDREN: AGUSTIN, JORGE, VILMA HELENA, William
6. FORMER ADDRESS: HAVANA, CALLE 14 No 1502
7. PRESENT ADDRESS: 4009 ELBA ST, NEW ORLEANS 25

Carl E. Jenkins

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[illegible], Agustin (Dr.)

Under Secretary of Education, has tendered his resignation and is expected to be named to an administrative post in the Ministry of Public Works. Resignation is result of differences of opinion with the Education Minister, which has led to disruption of the normal operations of the Ministry.

FBIS - 16 Jul 59.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION
(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 18 Jun 63

TO:
- ☒ CI Operational Approval and Support Division
- ☒ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: Wendell Ullery
SAS/IOS
G G 14

SUBJECT: (True name) Dr. Agustin GUITART Campuzano

PROJECT: JMATE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 727418

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

New Orleans, La.

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

PI Asset - for use as cut-out to his uncle, Rene GUITART Rodriguez, (201-727417) who is residing in Cuba.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 138893

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
☒	NOT INITIATED (Explanation) Subject residing in New Orleans		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Carl Trettin	7646	Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 1-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

prq part I

NAME : Dr. Agustin GUITART Campuzano

DPOB : 25 April 1910, Cardenas, Cuba

RESIDENCE : 4009 Elba St., New Orleans 25, La.

OCCUPATION : Doctor of Science (Mathematics & Physics)

Presently teaching at Xavier University in New Orleans.

EMPLOYMENT HIST. : Formerly a Prof. at the Univ. of Havana

Served as Minister of Education during the early part of Carlos PRIO's tenure as head of the Cuban Gov't.

COURT RECORD : Was imprisoned on the Isle of Pines during MACHADO's term. (date unknown)

SPOUSE : Helena TORO

CHILDREN : Agustin, Jorge, Vilma Helena, William

CUBAN ADDRESS : Havana, Calle 64 No. 1502

NOTE : Subject arrived in the U.S.A. in Feb. 1962 thru Opa-Locka, Fla. where he was debriefed by OO/C.

OO/C has no current interest in Subject.

SECRET

SECRET

18 June 1963

Operation Stateside No.30

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Notification to the Federal Bureau of Investigation of CIA's Intent to Contact the Subject

Name : Dr. Agustin GUITART Campuzano

DPOB : 25 April 1910, Cardenas, Cuba

1 - SAS/IOS
1 - 201-727418

(727418)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF [illegible]

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: [illegible] 44:[illegible]
Vol. II
201-128561

INCLUSIVE DATES: Jan 57 – Dec 55

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/7/78	3/7/78	Betsy Wolf	Betsy Wolf
15 MAY	—	JOHANNA SMITH	Johanna Smith
23 MAY	23 MAY	"	"

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

LE

Vol II

DERIN Maurice Hyman 201-128561

FBI +
misc other
3rd Agency Docs

14-00000

SECRET

DCE-17437

Chief CI/SRS

22 September 1955

S. H. Johnson

James A. PERRY
#90178

James A. PERRY, Jr., mailed two letters from Washington, D. C., on 29 June 1955, one to his father, and another to Severino D. GOMEZ; however, in so doing, PERRY placed the letter to his father in the envelope addressed to GOMEZ, and the letter to GOMEZ in the envelope addressed to his father. When the letters were received by PERRY, Sr. and GOMEZ, both noting the error, they exchanged letters. However, GOMEZ considered the contents of the letter he had at first received important enough to turn over to his brother M. Leal GOMEZ, who in turn referred it to the Boston Office of the FBI.

The letter, in substance, indicated that while PERRY was serving in South America, under cover for this Agency, he had revealed his true status to his wife's father, Mr. GONSALVES, on a visit to South America, and who later had revealed this information to PERRY's father. In correspondence following PERRY's father having become knowledgeable of PERRY's true status, he indicates that therein he might have intimated that his work was not so hush-hush, and that on that basis PERRY's father "had dropped his guard" in effect, and had told others of PERRY's true status. This letter was a warning to PERRY's father that he should attempt to correct the indiscretion of revealing PERRY's status while he was in South America. The letter refers to other letters which PERRY indicates contained information revealed through indiscretion on his part, and which he asks his father to destroy.

According to our records, PERRY was granted an Operational Clearance on 22 May 1953, for use as a witting informant or as a contract agent on anti-Communist student activities. He was used as a contract agent from September 1953 to February 1955 in Brazil under IIS cover.

He is of Portuguese extraction, and he or his father had changed the family name from [illegible]A to PERRY; his wife's maiden name was GONSALVES. She was [illegible] married prior to attendance at Northwestern University.

He attended Northeastern University from 1947 to 1951 and received an AB Degree; Boston University from 1951 to 1952 where he received an MA Degree in Latin American Regional Studies; and at Vanderbilt University from 1952 to 1953 working toward a Ph.D. Degree.

[illegible] Boston University [illegible] under Professor [illegible]. His [illegible] described by most informants as no more than professor-student relationship; however Severino GOMEZ who received [illegible]

SECRET file in 201-138567

the letter intended for PERRY's father, advised the FBI that he, GOMEZ, had attended Boston University during the period PERRY was studying under HALPERIN. GOMEZ was of the opinion that the HALPERIN-PERRY relationship was more than just the professor-student type because PERRY saw HALPERIN during the evenings, but never told GOMEZ what he discussed with HALPERIN.

GOMEZ also advised that about June 1953, just before PERRY's departure for Rio de Janeiro, PERRY called HALPERIN on the telephone and at that time HALPERIN was under investigation. PERRY told GOMEZ that HALPERIN was in a predicament, and that he, PERRY, felt sorry for him. Earlier PERRY had told GOMEZ that HALPERIN had a lot of influence in Washington, and was going to get a job for PERRY.

201-125561

According to the FBI, the HALPERIN mentioned above, appears to be identical with Maurice Hyman HALPERIN, former employee of OSS, who was identified in November 1945 by Elizabeth BENTLEY as having furnished information for transmittal to the Soviets.

PERRY recently contacted this Agency requesting permission to state that he had worked for the Agency in his application for employment with USIA. WH Division, to whom this request was forwarded, was advised that PERRY was not to disclose his past employment with this Agency. WH Division, in turn, informed Security of their desires that USIA be informed of PERRY's past connections with this Agency.

Security, on the basis of the above request by WH Division, contacted the appropriate person in USIA and advised them on a controlled basis of PERRY's former affiliation with this Agency.

S. H. Johnson

SRS/SHJ:pml

201-125561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
American Communists in Mexico and Their Contacts	RI FILE NO.	50	6	120	30
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMM-1300			DATE 31 Oct 55	
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.		EVALUATION B-Doc	

ANALYST	DATE PROCESSED	DISSEMINATED IN	DATE
D Heron	13 Sept 57		

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

X	CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Report from Mexico City, Mexico
Source: LIFEAT/LITHOSPHERS
Date of Info: 12 Sept - 21 Oct 55

VERBATIM:

The following information concerning American Communists in Mexico and their contacts has been developed.

1. On 12 September a meeting was held of stockholders in the ice cream business which functions under the management of the American Communist, Robert STRAND. This business is believed actually to be owned by the leading American Communist, Frederick Vanderbilt FIELD. The meeting was held at the home of STRAND, and was attended by the American Communists Maurice HALPERIN and Noah SEBORER and possibly by other stockholders.

....

31 Oct 55
201-128561

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	~~201~~	~~185053~~		

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 MAY 58

SECRET

569

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

EXT : 2356
DATE : 19 July 1955

SECRET

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : CI

INFO : COP, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, WH 4, S/C 2

Foreign Communists - Mexico

DIR 14470 (OUT 57183) 1800Z 19 JUL 55 ROUTINE

Subj: Personalities connected with Trotsky

TO: MEXI CITE: DIR

HOLD FOR IDEN D DIR 14150 (OUT 56504)

JAMES LEIGH WHITE BORN 1914 VERMONT NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT AND AUTHOR SINCE 1939, IN MEXICO CITY JUNE-AUGUST 1940. WIFE MARIA CRUZ CARROCERA WHITE BORN 1911 SPAIN; SYLVIA AGELOFF, MISTRESS OF JACQUES MORNARD AND REPORTEDLY IN MEXICO CITY AT TIME TROTSKY MURDER; SISTERS HILDA AND RUBY; CONSTANCIA DE LA MORA ALLEGEDLY KILLED IN GUATEMALA; FERNANDO DE LOS RIOS BORN SPAIN 1897, SPANISH REPUBLICAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S. 1937-38, REPORTED RECENT YEARS REPRESENTATIVE SPANISH JUNTA OF LIBERATION MEXICO CITY; J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO BORN SPAIN 1891 WAS ACTIVE SPANISH REFUGEE ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK, SON JUAN IN LONDON WWII; JULIAN GORKIN PROMINENT TROTSKYITE IN U.S. AND SPAIN IN 40'S. WRITER CLOSE TO TROTSKY PRIOR TO MURDER; NANCY JOHNSTONE REPORTED KEY CP OFFICIAL IN MEXICO

19 Jul 55

201-128561

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM :

CONF :

INFO :

DIR 13470 (OUT 57188) 19 JUL 55 PAGE 2

1943 AND OPERATED HOTEL MEXICO CITY WITH HUSBAND ARCHIE JOHNSTONE WHO WAS FORMERLY WITH LONDON NEW CHRONICLE AND SAID TO BE IN RUSSIA AT PRESENT. EN MAXIM LEIBER ALIAS LIEBERMAN BORN 1897 WARSAW REPORTED LIVING CUERNAVACA, MEXICO IN 1951 WITH ALBERT MALTZ FORMERLY OF HOLLYWOOD, ACCUSED BY CHAMBERS OF SETTING UP SOVIET COVER COMPANY IN 1934, HAS HAD CONNECTIONS WITH ANNA SEGHERS AND BODO UHSE, FRANK JELLINEK AND HANS HOFFMAN WHO WAS REPORTEDLY TREATING LEIBER 1953 FOR PSYCHIATRIC DISTURBANCE. WIFE MINNA REPORTED TEACHING AMERICAN SCHOOL MEXICO CITY 1953. REPORTED IN CONTACT WITH MAURICE HALPERIN. WAS RECIPIENT [illegible] FROM POLISH BANK WARSAW 1953; VITTORIO VIDALI ALIAS CARLOS CONTRERAS HEAD OF CP TRIESTE. INTERMITTENTLY IN U.S. AND MEXICO DURING 1940'S. SUSPECTED DIRECTED MURDER TROTSKY; ROCHELLE MARIA [illegible] afey VILIACID (OR VILLIACID) ALLEGEDLY ONE OF CORRESPONDING SECRETARIES OF JUAN NEGRIN 1937-38. REPORTEDLY IN LONDON 1945

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM :

CONF :

INFO :

DIR 14470 (OUT 57183) 19 JUL 55 PAGE 3

AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN MEXICO. RELATIVES INCLUDE (1) ATAIME VILLACID, (2) QUIN VILLACID MARRIED TO FORMER SPANISH REPUBLICAN DIPLOMAT JOSE GARBACO; (3) PEPE VILLACID WHO XXX WAS REPORTED IN MEXICO CITY 1943; FRANK ELLINEK CORESPONDENT OVERSEAS NEWS AGENCY 1943 IN MEXICO.

(END OF MESSAGE)

DATE

CHIEF, WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

CHIEF, CI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : [illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : [illegible] 1954

TO : [illegible]

FROM : DIRECTOR, CIA

CONF : [illegible] 6

INFO : COP, DD/P-I&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, SR 3, FI/RI 2

DIR 26783 (OUT 95521) 25112 24 NOV 54 ROUTINE

TO: [illegible] CITE DIR

RE: [illegible] 4725 (IN 23635)

[illegible]

1. [illegible] NO OTHER RECORDS [illegible] INTO [illegible] OF PHILIP [illegible].

ONE [illegible] CANADA. VOLUMINOUS INFO [illegible] RUSSIAN MILITARY [illegible] CASE CANADA [illegible] [illegible] GOLD SMUGGLER [illegible] NO [illegible]

2. ALSO A [illegible] (US CITIZEN) [illegible] AS SOVIET AGENT.

3. [illegible]

4. [illegible] INTERESTED [illegible]. HOWEVER, [illegible] FULL DETAILS REGARDING [illegible] CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER WHICH [illegible]

[illegible]

5. [illegible]

24 Nov 54

201-125564

SECRET

[illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

FRANK A. HOLLAND
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS ~~MESSAGE~~

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
Noah SEBORER and Family	RI FILE NO.	201	66549		
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMM-1117			DATE 6 June 1955	
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM LITHOSPHERE	DATE OF INFO.		EVALUATION B-Doc	
ANALYST D Heron / DATE PROCESSED 9 Sept 57	DISSEMINATED IN		DATE		

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

x CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Report from Mexico City, Mexico
Date of Info: 12 Feb - 12 May 55

VERBATIM:

.....

II. Contacts

Set out below is a listing of contacts known to have been made by Noah and Anne SEBORER during the period covered in this report:

....

Maurice HALPERIN was dismissed from Boston University because of refusal to answer questions before a Congressional Committee. With him in Mexico are his son, David, his wife Edith and, at least during part of April, his or his wife's father. Noah SEBORER supplied Yiddish newspapers for the father to read. The HALPERINS dined at the SEBORERS 14 May 1955. HALPERIN is believed to be engaged in the trucking transportation business in connection with the firm E.A. OJeda at Isabel la Catolica 38-610.

....

6 June 55
201-128561

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ~~201~~ ~~185052~~

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 56
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-60)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HALPERIN, MAURICE HYMAN
201-128561
VOL, II

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
19 MAY	—	JOHANNA SMITH	Smith
23 MAY	23 MAY	"	"

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

201-1285

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS - 201-128561 (HALPERIN)

		Document Date
Vol. VI	FBI, New York Report on Jane Constance Kroll Rogers NY File #100-112730	8/3/55
	FBI, Boston Report on Maurice Hyman HALPERIN Bureau file #65-14303; BS 100-25501	17/3/59
	FBI, Washington Report on Halperin; File #65-14303	14/12/59
	FBI, Boston Report on Benjamin FASTOV; No file #	2/8/60
	FBI Report on David C. HALPERIN; No file #	6/2/60
	FBI Report on Halperin File #65-14303	7/8/60
	FBI report on Halperin	8/24/60
	FBI report on Halperin Boston #100-25501; &65-14303	2/8/61
	STATE, Amembassy Moscow Despatch #770, May 12, 1961 re Citizenship & Passports: Maurice HALPERIN	
	STATE, Amembassy Moscow Despatch #779, May 17, 1961	
	STATE Telegram fm Moscow (#12395, Aug 17, 1961	
	STATE Air	

To Microfilm
2 Mar 70

MEXI - 7055, 7 Jan 61 201-128561

DIR-18890, 30 Dec 60 201-128561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERN, MAURICE
201-128561
SEX M DOB ?

201-005239
HMMA-18311 A01
15 DEC 61

435166

PATR

CIT ?
OCC ?
Δ USSR
RE NOV 25, 61 LETTER TO SUBJ FROM ALBERT MALTZ WITH COMMENTS ON SUBJS WORK IN USSR AND APPREHENSION RE THE MCCARRAN ACT DEC 61.

```
000000000000000000000
11111_111111111111111
222222222222222222222
333333333333333333333
44__44444444444444444
_55555555555555555555
666666_66666666666666
_7777_777777777777777
8_8888888888888888888
9999999_9999999999999
```

15 Dec 61

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FEB. 60

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

FROM:

RID/

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH	C46	Barton	26 OCT 1961	
2. AC/WH/3				
3. WH/3/M Barton				
4. Grunwell				
5. O'Hara			22 Oct	RCH
6.				
7. ~~[illegible]~~ WH/CI/Sup/files			9/11	LCP
8. ~~C/LC [illegible]~~			~~15 NOV~~	
9. ~~10 H [illegible]~~		16 NOV 1961	21 NOV 1961	
10. C/SIG			14 III 63	
11.				
12. WH/3/M Barton				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16. RI/AN				
17. RID/FI				

COMMENTS

[illegible] & COPY DETACHED

Not a cy put in WKTS file.

RECLASSIFIED	
RI/AN	
RI/MIS	
RI/FILES	

8-16! This would be more usefully filed in HALPERIN's 201 (201-128561)

~~[illegible]~~

Please reindex into 201-128561

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-128561 ✓ ~~50-6-4/3~~

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
30 Oct 61

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HMMA 17988

410a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
	SECRET	HMM-A-17988
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-4-3/5
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 20 October 1961
SUBJECT 0 Leftist Publication		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED For your information		

REFERENCE(S)

SOURCE: LIFIER

Attached for your retention is a booklet published by the Universidad Obrera de Mexico (UOM - Workers' University of Mexico), which is controlled and operated by the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS - Popular Socialist Party), entitled Desarrollo Economico y Crisis en la America Latina (Economic Development and Crisis in Latin America). The booklet is written by Maurice Halperin, American Communist living in Moscow, and has an introduction by Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, secretary-general of the PPS.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment - 1, as noted

18 October 1961

DISTRIBUTION
~~3-WHD~~ w/attachment
2-Files

CS COPY

201-185561

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

MAURICE HALPERIN

DESARROLLO ECONOMICO Y CRISIS EN LA AMERICA LATINA

Ediciones de la Universidad Obrera de México
1961

CS COPY

201-12854

20 Oct 61

Encl To HMMA 17988

3

Presentación

El autor de este estudio, el Profesor Maurice Halperin, es uno de los investigadores y catedráticos más prominentes de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica. Nació en Boston en 1906. Obtuvo su bachillerato en la Universidad de Harvard en 1926 y la Licenciatura en Letras en la Universidad de Oklahoma en 1929. Dos años más tarde se doctoró en Letras y Ciencias Sociales en la Universidad de Paris y fue conferenciante en la Sorbona sobre la civilización de la América del Norte.

En los Estados Unidos fue catedrático de la Universidad de Oklahoma y Jefe del Departamento de Estudios Económicos y Geopolíticos Latinoamericanos en la Secretaría de Guerra y en la Secretaría de Estado en Washington, durante los años de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Como consejero técnico del Consejo Económico y Social de las Naciones Unidas trabajó durante tres años, de 1946 a 1949. Volvió a su Universidad de origen, la de Boston, como catedrático y Jefe del Departamento de Estudios Latinoamericanos en donde prestó sus servicios hasta 1953.

Interesado siempre en el estudio de los problemas de las naciones de la América Latina, fue a Brasil en 1952 y trabajó como conferenciante en la Universidad de San Pablo. Por su labor docente el gobierno del Brasil le otorgó la condecoración de "Oficial de la Orden do Cruzeiro do Sul". Posteriormente estuvo en México, siendo Profesor Extraordinario de la Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales de la Universidad Nacional de México, de 1954 a 1957. Cooperó también como Asesor Económico del Departamento de Promoción de la Nacional Financiera y en otras instituciones gubernamentales y privadas de nuestro país.

14-00000

Ha publicado numerosos estudios, entre otros el titulado "La América Latina en Transición", que editó la Universidad Nacional de México en 1956, así como ensayos acerca de la economía y el desarrollo social en los Estados Unidos Francia, Alemania, Chile, Brasil y México durante el último cuarto de siglo.

El Profesor Maurice Halperin actualmente es un Profesor Visitante en la Academia de Ciencias de la URSS en donde está dedicado a investigaciones de carácter económico.

El estudio que tiene este pequeño libro, no obstante su brevedad es uno de los más completos sobre el actual panorama económico de la América Latina. Tanto las cifras como las observaciones y las inferencias lógicas que contiene, son de un inapreciable valor para los estudios de los problemas de nuestro Continente. Por eso pienso que prestará un gran servicio a quienes se dedican al examen de los grandes problemas de nuestro tiempo en el vasto territorio de los países semicoloniales del Hemisferio Americano.

México, D. F., agosto de 1961

VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO

Introducción

La América Latina está atravezando actualmente su tercera gran crisis económica del siglo XX. En general, las dificultades actuales pueden ser atribuidas a la excesiva vulnerabilidad hacia factores externos de una economía que depende de la exportación de materias primas y de la importación de productos manufacturados. En este sentido es la clásica crisis del subdesarrollo neocolonial, como sucedió con el colapso del comercio internacional durante la guerra mundial de 1914 a 1918 —primera crisis— y con la depresión mundial al comienzo de la dácada del 30 —segunda crisis.

La disminución actual de la actividad económica asumió, sin lugar a dudas, proporciones de crisis a principios de 1958. Aunque en algunos aspectos aún no ha alcanzado la intensidad de la segunda crisis, persiste con tendencia a profundizarse al entrar en su cuarto año. Al mismo tiempo, algunos aspectos de la crisis actual la distinguen de las anteriores, imprimiéndole un sello especial.

En primer lugar, si bien como las crisis anteriores fue motivada por factores externos, esta crisis ha sido más sensible a los descensos y menos a las alzas de los movimientos cíclicos de las economías de los países capitalistas industrializados. El descenso de los precios de las exportaciones de Latinoamérica precedió a la recesión de 1957-58 en los Estados Unidos, y ésta condujo, a su vez, a nuevas mermas en las ganancias por concepto de exportaciones de América Latina. Sin embargo, la tendencia al descenso continuó después de la recuperación de los Estados Unidos (antes de la nueva recesión comenzada a finales de 1960) y a pesar del alto nivel constante de la actividad económica en los principales países industriados de Europa Occidental.

En segundo lugar, hay muy pocas perspectivas de que los mercados normales de Latinoamérica puedan proporcionar en un futuro próximo suficientes ganancias por concepto de exportaciones como para restablecer la economía al nivel anterior. Como después de un exhaustivo análisis a largo alcance, declara la CEPAL (excluyendo el factor de una depresión mayor en los Estados Unidos o en Europa Occidental): "La perspectiva de aumento de las exportaciones... es tan pequeña que apenas excede el crecimiento demográfico probable".[1] Este estudio prevé un ritmo de desarrollo que en el mejor de los casos sería un poco más de la mitad del registrado antes de la presente crisis y produciría extraordinarias presiones sobre la posibilidad de estructurar la economía y sus mecanismos de desarrollo.

En tercer lugar, el debilitamiento general de los sistemas mundiales coloniales y neocoloniales, combinado con la expansión económica del sistema mundial socialista, presenta nuevas oportunidades para contrarrestar las presiones externas, políticas y económicas, que se ejercen sobre Latinoamérica para impedirle tomar medidas en defensa de sus economías nacionales. De particular importancia es la disponibildad de mercados y recursos económicos en los países socialistas, los cuales pueden ser utilizados para lograr una efectiva solución de la crisis económica presente.

De aquí que mientras la primera y la segunda crisis económicas latinoamericanas crearon la necesidad y las condiciones para cambios económicos y político-sociales limitados dentro del sistema existente de dependencia neocolonial, la crisis presente parece estar desarrollándose bajo condiciones que requerirán y, al mismo tiempo, permitirán la eliminación de la propia dependencia en un período de tiempo relativamente corto. Los acontecimientos recientes en Cuba apoyan estas perspectivas y nosotros estimamos que los factores que causaron el rompimiento de Cuba con el sistema de dependencia neocolonial no constituyen una excepción. Esto puede demostrarse examinando los antecedentes de la presente crisis, por ejemplo, la actuación global de la economía latinoamericana en el pasado reciente.

1.— El "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía latinoamericana

Por más de una década después del fin de la segunda guerra mundial (en términos generales, de 1945 a 1957), la actividad económica de Latinoamérica en su conjunto mantuvo el mayor ritmo de expansión registrado en la región.

Para situar este periodo en su marco propio, deben formularse dos observaciones preliminares. La primera es que el nivel de partida del movimiento ascendente de la economía era relativamente elevado en la región y sustancialmente más alto que el nivel de desarrollo existente en las áreas dependientes de Asia y Africa. No solamente había tenido lugar una recuperación sustancial, después de la catástrofe de comienzos de la década del 30, sino que también en las repúblicas de Latinoamérica más desarrolladas y pobladas y con mayor capacidad productiva, se produjo un proceso considerable de sustitución de importaciones. Así, la industria de elaboración que antes de 1930 representaba una pequeña proporción en la producción global de Latinoamérica, alcanzó a fines de 1945 una equivalente al 65% de la contribución de la agricultura al producto bruto y fue, a su vez, considerablemente mayor que la contribución de la industria minera.

El segundo punto, que debe ser señalado, es que durante el período que consideramos prevalecieron condiciones externas excepcionalmente favorables. El impulso inicial para la expansión económica fue la acumulación de divisas registrada en Latinoamérica durante la segunda guerra mundial.[1] Sin embargo, el auge económico fue estimulado principalmente por los gastos de reconstrucción, rearme y satisfacción de demandas pospuestas en los principales países capitalistas al final de la guerra. Los medios externos mediante los cuales Latinoamérica hubiera podido mantener su ritmo de expansión, se restringieron fuertemente al terminar los reajustes de postguerra y, a partir de ese momento, comenzó a manifestarse la crisis actual.

Desde este punto de vista, es particularmente interesante la evaluación de la experiencia económica de este período. Dado el nivel relativamente elevado existente al inicio del mismo y las oportunidades excepcionales de que se dispusieron, el desarrollo alcanzado puede representar algo así como el "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía latinoamericana, funcionando de manera tradicional. Por tanto, la cuantía en que ese "florecimiento" de la economía dejó de satisfacer las necesidades de desarrollo de la región, nos permitirá estimar las dimensiones reales de la crisis actual.

De acuerdo con los datos recopilados por la CEPAL (ver el cuadro que sigue), el promedio acumulativo anual real de aumento del producto bruto de la región, fué de un 5% para el período de 12 años. Si excluimos los años de 1956 y 1957, durante los cuales la expansión de postguerra comenzó a ser menor, el índice fue de 5.2%. Para nuestros propósitos la diferencia no es importante: incluso el índice menor alcanza o excede los de un cierto número de países industrializados en Europa Occidental y ciertamente excede el de los Estados Unidos para el mismo período.

LATINOAMERICA: El producto bruto y otros datos, 1945-57 [3]

(miles de millones de dólares de 1950)
Cifras redondas.

Año	Producto Bruto	Consumo	Inversión fija bruta	Exportaciones bienes y servicios	Importaciones bienes y servicios	Población (millones)
1945	30.2	23.2	4.0	6.7	3.6	138.5
1946	32.8	25.1	5.0	7.4	4.8	141.6
1947	34.4	27.5	6.8	7.2	7.1	144.9
1948	36.4	28.7	6.8	7.5	6.6	148.2
1949	37.6	30.1	6.4	6.9	5.9	151.8
1950	39.8	32.1	6.6	7.2	6.1	155.4
1951	42.1	35.1	7.4	7.1	7.5	159.2
1952	43.0	35.5	7.6	6.7	7.0	163.0
1953	44.7	36.1	7.6	7.8	6.9	166.9
1954	47.3	39.1	8.2	7.7	7.8	170.9
1955	50.0	41.0	8.6	8.4	8.0	175.1
1956	51.4	41.4	9.1	9.2	8.2	179.4
1957	53.8	43.8	10.3	9.3	9.6	183.8

Es cierto que por haber aumentado la población de Latinoamérica a un promedio anual de 2.5%, el índice del aumento anual del producto bruto per capita fue de solamente 2.7% para la "década dorada" y de 2.5% para el período de doce años. Sin embargo, aún esta últims cifra es mayor que el histórico 2% de aumento anual del producto bruto per cápita en los Estados Unidos, aunque es a su vez varias veces menor que el de los países socialistas. [4]

Es más importante el hecho de que el 2.5% represente probablemente más del doble del promedio anual "histórico" de desarrolo en Latinoamérica. Aunque no existen datos suficientes para establecer esta última afirmación en cuanto al conjunto de la región, puede suponerse que de 1900 a 1929 ningún país de América Latina superó el ritmo de desarrollo de Argentina, pues se estimó, como promedio, en un 1.2% per cápita anual. [5] En el caso de México, por ejemplo, se cree que entre 1803 y 1934 no se registró prácticamente ningún incremento en los ingresos per cápita. [6]

De lo antes expuesto puede inferirse la conclusión de que para el conjunto de la región el período que estamos examinado fue un período de incremento poco corriente de la actividad económica, o, más precisamente, de un aumento poco habitual del PBN, concepto que, de acuerdo con los usos oficiales en Latinoamérica y en las Naciones Unidas, incluye la producción de bienes y la de servicios, cuyo ritmo de aumento es comúnmente definido como desarrollo. [7] Más adelante examinaremos hasta qué punto se puede confiar en este concepto para medir el desarrollo económico en Latinoamérica. Por el momento consideraremos los factores externos que estimularon durante este período la elevada producción de bienes y de servicios en esta región.

2.– Los estímulos externos en la expansión económica de Latinoamérica

El comercio exterior ha ejercido siempre una influencia predominante sobre las fluctuaciones cíclicas de la economía latinoamericana. Así en 1932, en el climax de la gran depresión, las exportaciones de la región disminuyeron en un 65% en relación con 1929, mientras las importacinoes disminuyeron en un 75%.[8] No obstante, una comparación entre el nivel del comerciò exterior en este año de crisis y el período que estamos analizando, mostraría una cuadro deformado de su importancia en la expansión económica de 1945-57. De ahí que los datos de 1934-38, cuando se había producido un grado de recuperación aceptable, nos darán una base mejor para establecer comparaciones. Durante este último período el promedio anual de exportaciones e importaciones en conjunto llegaron a 3,500 millones de dólares, cifras redondas, o 5,250 millones en dólares de 1950.[9]

Si consideramos nuestra tabla estadística, podemos ver que hacia 1947, cuando la tendencia a la expansión del comercio exterior en el período de la postguerra ya se había desarrollado completamente, el total de las exportaciones y de las importaciones llegó a poco más de 14,000 millones de dólares de 1950, o sea, un aumento de más del 170% sobre el promedio anual de 1934-38. Además, de 1945 a 1955, el poder adquisitivo de las exportaciones latinoamericanas aumentó en un promedio anual de 5.4%, o sea ligeramente más que el ritmo de crecimiento del producto bruto de la región.[10] Es evidente que habían llegado mejores tiempos para Latinoamérica.

Es necesario un análisis posterior sin embargo, para determinar el papel desempeñado por el comercio exterior en la experiencia económica de la región después de la segunda guerra mundial. Si retornamos al período relativamente preindustrial anterior a la gran depresión de 1925-29, nos encontramos con que el coeficiente de importaciones, es decir,

el valor de las importaciones en tantos por ciento del producto bruto nacional, se mantuvo en un 30.2%. En el período correspondiente de 4 años en la década siguiente, cuando el comercio exterior de Latinoamérica había vencido los efectos de la depresión, el coeficiente de importaciones no alcanzó su nivel anterior y se mantuvo en un 16.6%. Esta nueva relación, mejor incluso desde el punto de vista del desarrollo económico, entre el PBN y el comercio exterior, reflejaba el progreso alcanzado en la producción local de bienes de consumo, especialmente en los países más avanzados como Argentina, Brasil, México y Chile.

Cuando durante la segunda guerra mundial las importaciones fueron de nuevo drásticamente reducidas, se registró un impetu adicional para la expansión de la industria ligera. Como consecuencia, al comenzar el período de la postguerra la estructura de la economia era tal, que a pesar de la extraordinaria mejoría del comercio exterior, en comparación con el período de recuperación posterior a la depresión de 1930, la relación entre el PBN y las importaciones no volvió al nivel de 1925-29. En su lugar, como indican las cifras de nuestra tabla estadística, las importaciones fluctuaron alrededor del 16% del PBN, manteniéndose, por tanto, al mismo nivel relativo de 1934-39.

A primera vista ésto pudiera indicar una disminución de la importancia del comercio exterior en la provisión de los medios para la reciente expansión de la actividad económica en la América Latina. No obstante, un examen más detenido nos demuestra que lo cierto es justamente lo opuesto. La evidencia más palpable se advierte en la adquisición de maquinaria y equipos capaces de producir una expansión en las exportaciones de materias primas, así como de aumentar la producción de la industria de elaboración. En este sector de inversiones, obviamente estratégico, que representa aproximadamente el 25% de las inversiones totales, la producción local suministró menos del 10% de los productos obtenidos. El resto fue comprado en el extranjero y representó cerca del 33% del valor total de las importaciones.

Asi es claro que el cambio en la estructura de las importaciones de Latinoamérica devino un factor nuevo y crucial tendiente a perpetuar su dependencia del comercio exterior. Antes de 1914, por ejemplo, los textiles solamente constituían más de la mitad de las importaciones.[11] Durante los años 30, aunque se produjo un aumento notable en la proporción de bienes duraderos y de capital, la mayoría de los bienes importados eran todavía bienes de consumo y materiales de construcción. Sin embargo, después de 1945 el balance cambió definitivamente. Si a la maquinaria y a los equipos añadimos productos semielaborados y materias primas industriales, como varios tipos de acero, productos químicos, caucho, etc., y combustibles, nos encontramos con que para 1955, cerca de las dos terceras partes de las importaciones totales de la región, consistieron en medios de producción y suministros para los mismos.[12] En resumen, las exportaciones de Latinoamérica, que básicamente determinan su capacidad para importar, fueran indudablemente el elemento decisivo para momover la expansión económica de 1945 a 1957.[13]

El carácter único de la situación externa favorable que influyó en la actividad económica de este período, requiere algunos comentarios adicionales para ser bien comprendido. El gran aumento de la capacidad de importación de Latinoamérica no se debió solamente a la demanda excepcional de postguerra de que disfrutaron sus exportaciones, sino también a otro factor relacionado con ello, aunque menos corriente.

En común con todas las otras regiones dependientes, el comercio internacional de Latinoamérica ha sido adversamente afectado por la tendencia histórica hacia una creciente diferencia entre el pequeño aumento de precio de sus exportaciones de materias primas y el aumento mayor de los precios de los productos elaborados que importa. Como resultado, con fluctuaciones considerables de año en año y de un país a otro, dependiendo de los productos de exportación y de la fluctuación de la estructura de las importaciones, para la región en conjunto, a largo plazo, las condiciones del comercio exterior se han ido deteriorando.[14]

Sin embargo, un extraordinario cambio de esta tendencia tuvo lugar para el conjunto de la región y en todas las repúblicas consideradas por separado, menos Cuba y Argentina, en la década siguiente a la segunda guerra mundial. En ocho de las repúblicas, incluyendo Brasil, Colombia y Chile, los términos del comercio exterior durante los perídos de 1947-1949 y 1954-56, mejoraron de un 45% a un 100%.[15] Como resultado, más de la mitad del aumento del poder adquisitivo de las exportaciones de Latinoamérica se debió a los efectos de las mejores condiciones del comercio exterior y el resto

correspondió a un aumento en el volumen de las exportaciones.[16]

Saldría de los límites de esta discusión examinar en detalle las fluctuaciones y la complejidad de los factores que afectaron la evolución de los precios de las exportaciones y de las importaciones principales de la región. En el caso del café, por ejemplo, que para más de la tercera parte de las repúblicas es uno de los principales productos de exportación, una aguda, aunque pasajera disminución en la producción brasileña causada por condiciones atmosféricas adversas, elevó los precios y estimuló una serie de compras especulativas. Con respecto a las importaciones, la tendencia hacia la sustitución de bienes de consumo por bienes de capital jugó un papel importante, ya que los precios de estos últimos tendieron a aumentar más lentamente que los precios de los bienes de consumo.[17] Además, los precios de los productos elaborados de Europa Occidental tendieron a declinar durante cierto período debido a la devaluación de la libra esterlina y otras divisas y en algunos países tuvo lugar cierto cambio hacia fuentes de abastecimiento europeas.

No obstante, el factor principal en la mejoría de los términos del intercambio fue el aumento de precio de las exportaciones de Latinoamérica, motivado por la demanda extraordinaria causada por la situación de la postguerra a la cual nos hemos referido. De manera que fueron circunstancias especiales, en lugar de fuerzas económicas básicas, las que produjeron la variación en los términos del comercio y el mantenimiento de la tendencia durante un período tan largo. Cuando estas circunstancias desaparecieron, la tendencia histórica a la decadencia volvió a manifestarse[18] y llegó a su fin este período de "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía. En 1958 el aumento per cápita del PBN fue solamente de 0.5%, descendiendo a 0.3% y en 1959 y a un nivel probablemente aún más bajo en 1960.[19]

3.— Otras consideraciones acerca del tema principal

Examinando ahora la actividad económica propiamente dicha, recordemos que para Latinoamérica, en conjunto, el promedio anual de aumento del PBN per cápita, fue de 2.7% para la década posterior a la guerra y de 2.5% para los 12 años. Considerando las repúblicas por separado, la gran mayoría compartió esta expansión en un grado mayor o menor y relativamente se registraron pocas variaciones en los niveles comparativos de sus respectivos PBN per cápita, sin embargo debe examinarse la tendencia en algunos de los países más importantes.

El ritmo de desarrollo de México, aunque aminoró después de 1950, fue aproximadamente el mismo que el del conjunto de la región durante el período de 12 años. En 1957 el PBN per cápita de México alcanzó 280 dólares, siendo todavía menor que el nivel de 335 dólares registrado en ese año para el conjunto de la región.[10]

La marcha de la economía brasileña fue notablemente mejor que el promedio, con un incremento anual per cápita de cerca de 3.5%. Como resultado, durante los 12 años, el PBN per cápita relativamente bajo del Brasil mejoró suficientemente llegando a ser en 1957 aproximadamente igual al de México. El fenómeno brasileño refleja en parte la situación especiamente favorable de los países exportadores de café. Así, el aumento del per cápita de los países productores de café de Centroamérica y de Colombia fue mayor que el promedio de Latinoamérica. Esta última República, por ejemplo, registró un incremento anual per cápita de cerca del 3% entre 1945 y 1957.

En el caso de Argentina, se notó una desviación considerable del ritmo medio de desarrollo regional. Aunque de 1945 a 1948 se registró un extraordinario incremento anual per cápita de 6.4%, para el periodo de 12 años, el aumento promedio per cápita fue solamente de 1% anual. Un factor significativo de la decadencia posterior a 1948 fue la situación desfavorable de las exportaciones argentinas de carnes y granos. Como resultado se produjo un continuo empeoramiento en los términos del comercio exterior, tendencia excepcional en la América Latina, compartida solamente por Cuba como indicamos anteriormente. Sin embargo con un PBN per cápita de 525 dólares en 1957, el nivel argentino se mantuvo muy superior al promedio latinoamericano y solamente detrás de Venezuela, país del que trataremos posteriormente[11].

La desviación chilena de la norma regional fue aún mayor que la argentina. De 1945 a 1955 el PBN prácticamente se mantuvo, mientras que en los años siguientes disminuyó alrededor de un 8%. En realidad, a partir de 1953 el ritmo de desarrollo no logró mantenerse al nivel del aumento de población. Así el PBN per cápita chileno que en 1945 era bastante más elevado que el promedio latinoamericano, disminuyó a menos de 300 dólares en 1957.

La experiencia chilena también es excepcional desde otro punto de vista. La economía del país se mantuvo estancada, aunque disfrutó de una mejoría sustancial en las condiciones del comercio exterior. Este fenómeno refleja en parte el fracaso de las ganancias posteriores a la segunda guerra al no lograr recuperar lo perdido después de la debacle del cobre en la depresión del 30, pero más aún refleja la disipación improductiva de los recursos adquiridos durante el período de bonanza posterior a la guerra[12].

Finalmente, Cuba, duramente afectada por la caída del precio del azúcar después de la guerra de Corea y a pesar del alza de 1956-57, tampoco logró elevar su PBN per cápita durante el periodo de doce años. El PBN per cápita de Cuba, que era de 485 dólares en 1957, se mantuvo considerablemente más elevado que el promedio de Latinoamérica.

De aquí que el desarrollo extremadamente lento de la Argentina y el estancamiento de Chile y Cuba(que juntas constituyen aproximadamente el 17% de la población de América Latina) representan tendencias no comunes y, por consiguiente, su situación excepcional debe ser tenida en cuenta[13]. Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista global, el caso de estos países no invalida el significado, cualquiera que este sea, que pueda ser atribuido a los cálculos oficiales del desarrollo de Latinoamérica en conjunto.

14-00000

4.— Perspectivas de aumento aparente del PBN

Ha llegado el momento de preguntarnos, ¿cuál es el significado de los cálcuos oficiales mencionados anteriormente? ¿Qué desarrollo y que tipo de desarrollo fue el alcanzado durante este histórico "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía de Latinoamérica? Comenzaremos aceptando en su valor nominal la cifra de 2.5% como promedio anual de incremento per cápita del PBN de la región. Como ya vimos, el PBN alcanzó en 1957 su cifra más alta de todos los tiempos: 335 dólares. Si Latinoamérica pudiera recuperarse y mantener ininterrumpidamente su ritmo de desarrollo de 1945 a 1957, a partir del momento en que se produjera esta recuperación, tardaría alrededor de 55 años para alcanzar el PBN per cápita de Francia o Inglaterra en 1957 que fue de 1300 dólares. Alcanzar el PBN per cápita de los Estados Unidos en 1957, que era de 2600, dólares, demandaría cerca de 85 años.

Si consideramos las posibilidades hipotéticas de algunas de las repúblicas latinoamericanas por separado, el pronóstico no sería más alentador. Aunque Brasil, con su ritmo de desarrollo de 3.5% per cápita, estaría en condiciones más ventajosas que la mayoría de las otras repúblicas, desde el momento en que su economía se recuperara, le exigiría 45 y 65 años para alcanzar los niveles de 1957 antes mencionados. Argentina, con su ritmo de desarrollo menor que el promedio y a pesar de su base más alta, tardaría 90 años en alcanzar los niveles de 1957 de Francia o Inglaterra y 160 el de los Estados Unidos. Para alrededor de la mitad de las repúblicas, con un PBN per cápita inferior a 200 dólares y con un ritmo de desarrollo de 2.5% anual, el promedio sería de 80 y 110 años respectivamente.

Pero en este "alcanzar" a los países desarrollados debe considerarse otro aspecto. Mientras en 1940 el PBN per cápita de Latinoamérica era un sexto del norteamericano, en 1957 la proporción había descendido a un octavo. En el caso de Argentina, de la mitad descendió aproximadamente a un quinto del nivel de los Estados Unidos.

Así, desde el punto de vista de la satisfacción de las necesidades de desarrollo de Latinoamérica, al parecer la aceleración de la actividad económica del conjunto de la región alcanzada durante el período de 1945-57, deja algo que desear. Aun si el ritmo de desarrollo de este período pudiera ser revivido —lo que es el objetivo máximo propuesto por los economistas de la CEPAL[14], para unos pueblos donde las vastas mayorías no pueden satisfacer las necesidades mínimas de alimentación, vestido y alojamiento, sin hablar ya de las necesidades fundamentales de la vida civilizada, las pespectivas hipotéticas, sumamente difíciles de aceptar con ecuanimidad, aún en el más favorable de los casos, son de aplazar por medio siglo el logro del nivel de vida correspondiente a un PBN que represente solamente la mitad del actual de los Estados Unidos.

Todo esto se refiere al valor nominal del desarrollo alcanzado durante ese período de doce años. No obstante, las conclusiones reales que deben hacerse de este "florecimiento óptimo" son aún más desalentadoras. La razón es que el dispositivo convencional utilizado para medir el funcionamiento de la economía de Latinoamérica, es extraordinariamente engañoso. Exagera grandemente el nivel comparativo de desarrollo frente a los países altamente industrializados y el desarrollo real alcanzado en términos puramente regionales. Consideraremos ahora los dos aspectos engañosos en ese mismo orden.

5.— Comparación del Producto Bruto Nacional

Muchos economistas dedicados al problema del subdesarrollo, admiten que una comparación de la magnitud de los PBN de un país atrasado y de un país industrializado, es un cómputo sumamente inexacto de los niveles relativos de sus respectivas economías. No obstante, raramente se toman el trabajo de examinar cuán inexacto es este sistema. Consecuentemente, dejan de apreciar la diferencia real que los separa, que es significativamente mayor de lo que las estadísticas sobre el PBN indican.

En 1955, por ejemplo, el PBN per cápita de los Estados Unidos era ocho veces mayor que el de Latinoamérica, pero el consumo de acero per cápita, un indice básico del nivel de desarrollo económico, era dieciséis veces mayor en los Estados Unidos[25]. Una diferencia similar se observa comparando a Latinoamérica con otros paises desarrollados: El PBN per cápita de Inglaterra era cuatro veces mayor, mientras el consumo per cápita de acero era nueve veces mayor. En Francia las proporciones eran de cuatro y siete, en Austria de dos y cinco[26]. Otros indices significativos del desarrollo económico —el consumo per cápita de energía y de cobre— coinciden más o menos con el consumo de acero[27].

Ciertos economistas que pasan por alto este aspecto prefieren otro modo de tratar la cuestión. Afirman que la conversión de las unidades monetarias de los países subdesarrollados en dólares, exagera la diferencia real entre los niveles de las economías atrasadas y las economías desarrolladas. "Las cifras de los ingresos per cápita [el producto] de los países pobres, cuando son expresadas en dólares resultan demasiado bajas; ésto ayuda a explicar cómo algunas personas subsisten con un ingreso per cápita de 50 dólares al año..."[28]. Es indudablemente cierto que los individuos con ingresos de 50 dólares al año pagan menos alquiler y la ropa y la comida les cuestan menos, pero la razón es que probablemente estas personas viven en una choza hecha por ellos mismos, en terreno ajeno, sin agua y servicios sanitarios, estén subalimentadas, anden descalzas y sus únicas ropas sean los harapos que cubren sus espaldas. Por lo tanto, es un hecho que "subsiste" durante un período relativamente corto, ya que su cálculo de vida sería menos de la mitad del promedio para el habitante de los Estados Unidos.

La comparación del PBN de Latinoamérica y de los países desarrollados, también es afectada materialmente por el factor de las inversiones extranjeras. Las estadísticas de Venezuela ilustran muy bien este punto. Como lo expresa W. W. Rostow, sin darle gran importancia: "Venezuela ha sido por algún tiempo una "economía enquistada", con un índice alto de inversiones concentrado en un sector de exportación moderno, cuyó crecimiento no ha generado ningún impulso en la economía venezolana"[29]. Examinemos esta situación más detenidamente.

De acuerdo con las estadísticas publicadas, en 1957 el sector de la minería, que en la práctica quiere decir extracción extranjera del petróleo, representaba el 34% del PBN venezolano. La proporción real probablemente es aún mayor, pero es difícil determinar cuánto de lo que figura en los capítulos de construcción, transporte, comunicaciones y "otros", es una parte de las operaciones petroleras. Una prueba adicional de la importancia del petróleo la ofrece el hecho de que la agricultura y la industria de elaboración representen el 7% y el 11% respectivamente, en el PBN venezolano[30]. Simultáneamente, las compañías petroleras emplean menos del 2% de la mano de obra activa del país".

Las estadísticas sobre el desarrollo económico de Venezuela son de lo más impresionantes. En 1945-57 el aumento promedio del PBN per cápita fue de 4.5%, que con mucho fue el más alto de Latinoamérica. En 1957, el PBN per cápita en Venezuela era de aproximadamente 1,000 dólares, tres veces el de Latinoamérica en conjunto, incluyendo a Venezuela; dos veces el de la Argentina, que es el país más desarrollado de la región y considerablemente mayor que el de Italia. El consumo per cápita de acero de Venezuela era seis veces mayor que el promedio de Latinoamérica y aproximadamente igual al de Suiza. En 1958 el consumo per cápita de energía en Venezuela fue algo mayor que el de Francia[31].

Estas cifras reflejan, desde luego, las actividades de las compañías de petróleo estadounidenses y anglo-holandesas que operan en Venezuela, pero no nos dicen casi nada acerca de la economía nacional prepiamente dicha. Harvey O'Connor describe algunas de las realidades de esa economía:

"Antes del petróleo, Venezuela se alimentaba a si misma de algún modo. Hoy produce solamente la mitad del maíz, la mitad de la carne, una tercera parte de los vegetales y los granos y la mitad de la leche que consume. Hay menos ganado que en tiempos de la Revolución de 1812... La fantástica prosperidad que ha descendido sobre Caracas es tan irreal como algo salido de Hollywood... Todo eso es solamente motivo de curiosidad para las 9/10 partes del pueblo, que vive fuera del mundo encantado del petróleo. Ahuyentados por la enfermedad y disgregados por el hambre... por lo menos 200,000 venezolanos han abandonado los campos para dirigirse a la dorada Caracas, en donde viven bajo los puentes, a lo largo de las cañadas, o en las laderas de los cerros en los irónicamente llamados 'ranchos', construidos con los desperdicios de la ciudad"[32].

De hecho, "la economía enquistada" en Venezuela falsea seriamente las estadísticas del desarrollo de toda Latinoamérica. Por ejemplo, durante el período de cinco años de 1953-57, a las compañías extranjeras que operan en Venezuela correspondió el 23%. aproximadamente de todas las exportaciones de Latinoamérica. En el año 1957 la cifra llegó casi al 28%[33]. Con respecto a los cálculos del PBN, si quitamos a Venezuela, que representa un poco más del 3% de la población de Latinoamérica, el promedio de aumento del PBN per cápita de la región durante el periodo de 1950-57, se reduce aproximadamente en una cuarta parte[34].

Si bien es la más sobresaliente, Venezuela no es la única "economía enquistada" en Latinoamérica. Honduras, dominada por dos compañías bananeras extranjeras que, como Robert Alexander describe, "equivalen a estados dentro de otro estado"[35], es otro ejemplo típico Cuba, antes de la Revolución, también lo era en un grado apreciable, como declaró públicamente un reciente Embajador de los Estados Unidos en Cuba, "...hasta la llegada de Castro al poder... el embajador americano era la segunda figura de importancia en el país; algunas veces más importante aún que el Presidente"[36]. En realidad no hay prácticamente ninguna república latinoamericana en donde falte un "sector moderno de exportación" de propiedad extranjera; algunas constituyen "enquistamientos económicos" más o menos grandes pero en todos los casos sus contribuciones a los ingresos y al desarrollo económico "pertenecen más propiamente a los países en donde las campañías están domiciliadas", que a los países en dondé operan,,.

Unas cuantas cifras y hechos indicarán, de manera parcial, con qué estos "enquistamientos económicos" inflan el funcionamiento real de las economías nacionales de Latinoamérica. En 1957, por ejemplo, las empresas de inversión directa de Estados Unidos, que representan aproximadamente al 85% del total de las inversiones directas extranjeras, tuvieron una producción que ascendió a 8.000 millones de dólares dentro de la producción bruta de Latinoamérica, o sea más del 13% del PBN de 1957[37] y, sin duda, una proporción aún mayor en la producción de bienes materiales. Estas empresas exportaron fuera de Latinoamérica mercancías valoradas en casi 3.000 millones de dólares[38], o sea casi la mitad de todas las exportaciones de mercancías de Latinoamérica, sin incluir el comercio dentro de la región, y el 80% de las exportaciones de la región de los Estados Unidos[40].

Estas cifras, a su vez, indican un serio falseamiento de las ganacias reales de las economías nacionales, como resultado de los diversos tipos de utilidades extraídas por medio de las operaciones de las inversiones extranjeras. Muchas de estas remisiones de utilidades son difíciles de descubrir, pero podemos tener alguna idea de su importancia incluso si consideramos las remisiones de utilidades e intereses que se publican, por ejemplo, la salida de divisas, excluyendo amortizaciones, ascendió a 3,625 millones de dólares durante el periodo de 1955 a 1957, aparentemente una porción insignificante del PBN. Sin embargo, como constituyó un drenaje de divisas extranjeras, absorbió el 14% de las ganancias por concepto de exportaciones durante este período de tres años. Más aún, el promedio de absorción de divisas aumentó de manera continuada después de los años inmediatos a la guerra, cuando dicho promedio era del 10%. En términos absolutos, el drenaje se duplicó durante el período comprendido entre los años 1947 y 1957[41].

En vista de la decisiva importancia que la capacidad de importar tiene en la economía de América Latina, especialmente para adquirir los medios de producción, esta pérdida de medios económicos no es tan pequeña como parece. En 1957 equivalió aproximadamente al 70% del costo de toda la maquinaria industrial importada durante el año, solamente un poco menos del 70% de las inversiones de ese año en ese sector clave[42].

6.— Las realidades del desarrollo económico en Latinoamerica

Retornando al segundo aspecto de la disparidad entre las realizaciones aparentes y reales del desarrollo alcanzado por lo que hemos definido como el "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía latinoamericana, recordemos que el concepto oficialmente empleado para el PBN en la apreciación del desarrollo, incluye bienes y servicios. Sin discutir si es un concepto válido en el caso de un país altamente industrializado como los Estados Unidos, es sin lugar a dudas sumamente equívoco cuando se aplica a una economía subdesarrollada.

Por su misma definición, una economía tal es primaria y básicamente deficiente en producción, es decir, tanto en capacidad productiva como en la producción real de productos agrícolas e industriales, que combinados determinan la capacidad física de un país para mantener un determinado nivel de vida. Para una economía sudbesarrollada, sólo la producción de bienes materiales puede tener alguna significación en cuanto al desarrollo. Ciertamente, para una región como Latinoamérica, un aumento en el número de salones de belleza o cabarets o en la cuantía de la policía u otras actividades que se enmarcan como servicios —sin importar su contribución a las alegrías o las penas que proporcionen a uno u otro sector de la población— no puede representar desarrollo económico. En realidad, como Paul Baran sugiere con respecto a la mayoría de los países —y nosotros incluimos a Latinoamérica dentro de esos países— lo opuesto es lo indudablemente cierto. Los servicios absorben capital y otros recursos desesperadamente necesarios para la producción y de esa forma retardan el desarrollo económico".

El grado en que los servicios inflan el PBN de Latinoamérica se revela en un examen de sus componentes. En 1956-57, sus proporciones respectivas (en porcentajes redondeados) dentro del total fueron las siguientes:"

Agricultura	23.5	
Industria	20.0	
Construcción	3.5	
Minería	5.0	
(Sub-total de la producción)		52.0
Comercio y Finanzas	17.0	
Otros servicios	15.0	
Gobierno	7.5	
(Sub-total de servicios)		39.5
Transportes y Comunicaciones	8.5	8.5
	100.0	100.0

De manera que en números redondos, ligeramente más del 50% del PBN latinoamericano está claramente constituido por la producción de bienes materiales y alrededor del 40% por servicios. El resto —comunicaciones y transportes— está constituido por ambos y no puede ser clasificado sin un análisis más detallado. No obstante, para nuestro propósito no se requiere una apreciación más detallada. Es suficiente con hacer notar que los servicios problablemente constituyen casi la mitad del PBN de la región. Aún más, para toda la región y para la mayoría de las repúblicas por separado, durante 1945-57 hubo poca variación en la relación entre los servicios y la producción en el PBN". Los servicios per cápita aumentaron en un promedio anual prácticamente idéntico al del PBN. Consecuentemente, cerca de la mitad de la expansión económica de 1945-57 no contribuyó ni al desarrollo de Latinoamérica ni a su capacidad de desarrollo.

Volviendo a la producción de bienes materiales, se deduce que, en conjunto, también aumentó aproximadamente en el mismo nivel que el PBN. De aquí que pueda argumentarse que aunque el PBN exagera grandemente las dimensiones del desarrollo real en términos absolutos, en este sentido, indica de manera precisa los adelantos relativos en la producción material y, por tanto, es una apreciación razonable del índice real de desarrollo. Sin embargo, no solo el índice sigue siendo insatisfactorio, como ya hemos visto, sino que resulta mucho más inadecuado de lo que parece a primera vista.

Ello estriba en que la valoración del PBN en Latinoamérica, y en las regiones subdesarrolladas en general, es aún más complicada por el comportamiento desigual de los principales sectores de la producción y por consideraciones cualitativas especiales. Es fundamental saber no solamente cuánta producción, sino también qué clase de producción, para comprender el proceso de crecimiento de una economía débil y falseada. Por ejemplo, un aumento en la producción que refleje la expansión del monocultivo o la explotación extranjera de los recursos naturales o la elaboración de artículos de lujo para el consumo doméstico, figurarían siempre como contribuciones al desarrollo económico en cualquier cómputo estadístico. Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista de la única clase de desarrollo que tiene sentido para un país subdesarrollado, las resultantes principales de tal aumento pudieran muy bien ser desfavorables. Por esta razón debemos examinar algunos aspectos salientes del desarrollo en los principales sectores de la producción del PBN.

a. El sector agrícola.

El aumento promedio anual per cápita de la producción agrícola en Latinoamérica en 1945-57, fue solamente de 1.5%. El índice fundamental de desarrollo en este sector sería la producción de alimentos para el consumo, pero éste aumentó a un ritmo aún menor que los cultivos para la exportación. En todo caso, el promedio general de 1.5% no bastó para mantener el nivel per cápita de producción anterior a la guerra, tanto de la agricultura en su conjunto, como de la producción de alimentos considerada separadamente. La disminución per cápita de la producción fue sustancial durante la mayor parte del período. Solamente en 1956/57, el mejor año del período, el nivel se acercó al de 1933/34 — 1937/38.

Para una región en la que, como Preston James dice sin rodeos, "podemos afirmar que una gran parte de la población está sufriendo hambre", este record no representa desarrollo en ningún sentido. Es más bien una afirmación de la agravación de la crisis permanente basada en el sistema conocido y profundamente asentado del monopolio feudal y neo-feudal sobre la tierra. Todas las estadísticas disponibles apuntan hacia una concentración continuada y probablemente ascendente de la propiedad sobre la tierra en los años recientes. Un estudio de Moacyr Paixao demuestra que en el Brasil, poco más del 3% de los propietarios están en posesión de más del 62% de la tierra arable, mientras que el 85% de los campesinos posee menos del 17% de la tierra. La situación en Cuba, antes de 1959, era parecida: menos del 1.5% de las empresas agrícolas poseían el 47% de las

tierras, mientras el 70% de las propiedades ocupaban poco más del 11% de la tierra.

Aún en México, en donde una reforma agraria extensa; pero solamente efectiva en parte, había tenido lugar antes de 1940, un nuevo proceso de concentración de la tierra comenzó después de aquel año. De acuerdo con Luis Yáñez Pérez, hacia 1950 alrededor del 50% de las tierras cultivadas estaban en posesión del 13% de los cultivadores, mientras 708 grandes empresarios obtenían el 35% del total de los ingresos agrícolas de la república.

Hacia 1955, de acuerdo con un cálculo semiofical mexicano, el sector privado agrícola, en contraste con el sector comunal creado por la reforma agraria, se había expandido de tal manera que "podía ser aún mayor que las propiedades privadas en 1930", es decir, antes de que se distribuyeran la mayoría de las tierras como consecuencia de la reforma agraria. El hecho de que muchas de las nuevas grandes propiedades sean empresas capitalistas relativamente eficientes, no altera el significado de la "contra-reforma" ya que éstas se han dedicado casi exclusivamente a producir productos de exportación, emplean mucho menos obreros de los que de otra forma pudieran subsistir de la tierra y de ahí resulta que retardan la producción desesperadamente necesaria de comestibles para el mercado interno y agravan la seria situación de desempleo agrícola.

Para el conjunto de Latinoamérica, Otto Feinstein resume de manera conservadora la situación actual de la posesión de la tierra y su utilización como sigue: "la distribución de la tierra está hecha de tal manera que una proporción infinitesimal de los clasificados como propietarios legales de la tierra posee una vasta mayoría de la misma. Menos del 5% de los terratenientes posee usualmente más del 50% de la tierra. Esto no sólo significa concentración de la tierra en grandes propiedades, usualmente incapaces de financiar su modernización, sino también que casi todos los otros propietarios poseen usualmente parcelas demasiado pequeñas para una producción racional".

A esto hay que añadir solamente que sin una revolución agraria —no una mera reforma— que haga posible la asimilación de la técnica del siglo XX en la producción agrícola, cualquier florecimiento óptimo o de otro género de la economía latinoamericana, es incapaz, por su índole, de satisfacer las necesidades de desarrollo de la región.

b. El sector industrial.

Aunque el estancamiento de la agricultura y, en particular, de los productos alimenticios, reduce considerablemente la significación del aumento total en la producción de bienes materiales, el hecho de que la producción de la industria de elaboración aumentó a un promedio anual de 3.2% per cápita —más del doble del aumento de la agricultura— el hecho aportó algo sustancial, tanto cualitativa como cuantitativamente al desarrollo material alcanzado durante este período.[53] Un resultado es el cambio que se operó en la distribución por sectores del PBN de Latinoamérica. En 1945 la industria de elaboración y la construcción representaban el 17% del PBN y la agricultura el 26%, mientras que en 1957, como ya hemos indicado, la participación de la industria de elaboración y de la construcción juntas igualaron la de la agricultura, representando cada una el 23.5%[54].

Si consideramos los países separadamente, encontramos que los incrementos relativos en el sector de la industria de elaboración, fueron relativamente más pronunciados en las repúblicas menos industrializadas, aunque al mismo tiempo, al fin del período, la agricultura aún mantenía su posición predominante. Así, en Colombia, por ejemplo, el sector agrícola descendió del 45 al 31% del PBN, y aún esta proporción superaba la aportación de la industria de elaboración. El modelo en Brasil, —que en este aspecto representó una excepción entre los cuatro países de mayor producción industrial— fue el mismo que en Colombia: en 1957 el sector agrícola aún era el predominante. En cuanto a Argentina, Chile y México, donde la industria había sobrepasado ligeramente a la agricultura en 1945, el cambio registrado en la importancia relativa de dichos sectores fue insignificante[55].

Mientras que para las economías subdesarrolladas del conjunto de Latinoamérica la relativa industrialización indicada por los cambios operados en esos dos sectores del PBN, tiene algunas implicaciones de desarrollo positivo, el grado de desarrollo industrial alcanzado es exagerado por muchos de los resúmenes estadísticos. Por ejemplo, nos encontramos que una proporción sustancial de lo que es clasificado como actividad industrial —aún en las repúblicas más desarrolladas— continúa técnicamente al nivel de las operaciones de una herrería rural.

La situación en Perú, sobre la cual pueden hallarse estadísticas recientes y bastante numerosas, puede ser considerada típica para la mayor parte de Latinoamérica. Desde el punto de vista del desarrollo industrial en general, Perú tiene una situación ligeramente mejor que la media entre las 20 repúblicas y su PBN y su desarrollo industrial en los últimos años se acerca al promedio de la región. Además, Perú posee una moderna fundición de hierro y acero.

En 1955, ligeramente más del 80% de la mano de obra industrial, incluyendo artesanos, trabajaba en talleres que, con un promedio de menos de 14 obreros, y probablemente la mitad de ese número, producían el 40% de los productos elaborados del país. En el caso del Perú es difícil hablar de progresos serios industriales por otra razón: de 1945-55 hubo una disminución en la participación relativa de la industria local en los suministros totales de productos elaborados.[56]

Si consideramos ahora el aumento de la producción de bienes de capital en Latinoamérica[57], aparece que ha sido más sustancial de lo que realmente fue, debido en parte, a la base tan baja de que se partió. En vista de la complejidad de la producción industrial y de las diferencias en terminología y otros criterios estadísticos usados por las distintas repúblicas, es difícil determinar la relación entre la producción de bienes de capital y bienes de consumo, elemento de bastante importancia para apreciar el nivel de madurez industrial. No obstante, podemos obtener un cálculo aproximado en el realizado por las Naciones Unidas de 1954. De acuerdo con este cálculo, basado en estadísticas de 6 países —Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, Chile, México y Venezuela— que representan el grueso de la producción industrial de Latinoamérica, "las industrias de bienes de capital... representan no más del 15% de la producción industrial total de Latinoamérica".[58] Probablemente este porcentaje fue mayor en 1957, aunque quizá no mucho.

Al mismo tiempo, una considerable disipación improductiva de la producción de bienes de capital limita su importancia como índice del desarrollo económico básico. En 1945-57 —para toda la región y prácticamente todos los países por separado—, más de la mitad de las inversiones fijas de capital se orientaron hacia "edificaciones y construcciones", el mayor porcentaje del cual se concentro en "residencias" que en Latinoamérica son en abrumadora mayoría casas muy lujosas, una importante mercancía de la lucrativa especulación urbana.[59]

Entre las repúblicas más activas industrialmente, se ha prestado una justificada atención al Brasil. En Brasil la producción de lingotes de acero se quintuplicó en 10 años y el valor de la producción de bienes de capital aumentó con una rapidez que casi triplica a la de bienes de consumo. No obstante, considerando la producción industrial en conjunto, los cambios estructurales resultantes no han sido tan espectaculares como los acontecimientos parecen indicar.

Aunque el valor de la producción de bienes de capital se elevó de alrededor de un cuarto a un tercio del total de la producción de la industria de elaboración, en menos de una década, este éxito está seriamente afectado por el hecho de que la producción de maquinaria, en 1959, representó menos del 3% del valor total de la producción industrial.[40] Operando en una economía plagada de persistentes y agudas deficiencias de energía y transporte —característica prácticamente común a toda América Latina— sin capacidad reproductiva, produciendo exclusivamente para el mercado interior y dependiendo de las ganancias por concepto de exportaciones de café y de inversiones directas de capital extranjero, para obtener bienes de capital y varias materias primas, la industria brasileña ha aumentado la vulnerabilidad de la economía ante factores externos, sin lograr los medios para una industrialización básica.

La industria argentina, tradicionalmente la más fuerte de Latinoamérica en términos de producción per cápita, presenta características estructurales similares a las del Brasil. La producción de maquinarias y equipos aumentó en más del 300% entre 1937-38 y 1955, mientras su participación relativa en la producción industrial se elevó del 3.7 al 6.1%. Sin embargo, reparaciones y reposiciones de piezas representaron el 40% de este total, como resultado de lo cual sólo el 60% de la producción en este sector representó un incremento de las existencias de maquinaria y equipos, de lo cual, a su vez, el 60% se concentró en facilidades de transporte.[41]

La deficiencia fundamental del desarrollo industrial en Argentina y Brasil, prevalece sobre toda la región. Es resumida por el hecho, previamente señalado, de que al fin de un período de 12 años de intensificación de la actividad industrial —que culmina la fase moderna de un proceso que comenzó con la primera guerra mundial— Latinoamérica todavía dependía de las importaciones para más de 90% de sus necesidades en maquinarias y equipos.

Debe mencionarse también un factor adicional en relación con el problema de los "enquistamientos" que hemos abordado, pero que también complica la valoración del desarrollo de Latinoamérica. La gran mayoría de las empresas modernas de elaboración de la región son de propiedad extranjera. Las inversiones privadas directas de los Estados Unidos en este sector, más que se duplicaron durante el período 1945-57 y, en 1959, tenían un valor en contabilidad de aproximadamente 1.400 millones de dólares, mayor que la inversión en cualquier otro sector con excepción del petróleo, y representaban cerca de la sexta parte del total de las inversiones privadas directas de los Estados Unidos en Latinoamérica.

La mayor parte de estas inversiones se ha dirigido hacia la industria pesada y hacia la industria alimenticia, y el 70% se ha concentrado en Brasil, México y Argentina. Solamente Brasil ha recibido más del 30% del total.[42] Se estima que dentro de una persistente tendencia a la expansión, en 1957 la participación privada extranjera (Estados Unidos y Europa) en las inversiones en las industrias del Brasil, representó el 37% de total.[43]

El impacto de esta situación en el desarrollo industrial y económico de América Latina en términos generales es, por lo menos, contradictorio. De una parte, existe una producción nueva con sus correspondientes efectos multiplicadores. Al mismo tiempo, esto no se puede considerar completamente beneficioso ya que mucha de esta producción consiste meramente en el montaje de piezas importadas y también depende de materias primas del exterior.

De otra parte, la capacidad de expansión de las empresas extranjeras a través de la reinversión de los beneficios está limitada a largo plazo por las posibilidades de su remisión. De aquí que mientras mayor sea la expansión, mayor será la exportación eventual de capital e ipso facto la decapitalización creciente de las seriamente subcapitalizadas economías latinoamericanas. Como muy bien dice el economista brasileño Caio Prado (hijo), cualquiera que sea el estímulo inicial para el desarrollo provisto por las fábricas propiedad de extranjeros, "con el tiempo se transforma en una obstrucción".[44]

Una observación final puede ser hecha para confirmar las limitaciones del desarrollo industrial de Latinoamérica. Es bien conocido que en cualquier región subdesarrollada la capacidad de la industria para absorver mano de obra es de una importancia decisiva, tanto para la aceleración del desarrollo industrial como para el desarrollo económico en general. En este sentido anotemos que entre 1945 y 1955, la proporción de la mano de obra dedicada a la agricultura, decayó del 57.4 al 51.6%.[65] Esto representa una disminución apreciable en términos absolutos y un fenómeno asociado teóricamente con el desarrollo económico.

Para América Latina lo contrario es lo cierto. Como lo describió recientemente un funcionario de la Organización de Estados Americanos, es un círculo vicioso: la intensificación de la pobreza en los campos ha estimulado un éxodo creciente de la población rural hacia las ciudades; el nivel de la técnica agrícola ha sido demasiado bajo para compensar la péridida de mano de obra, y el desarrollo industrial muy lento para ofrecer empleo a los campesinos desplazados[66]. De este modo, la producción del total de trabajadores dedicados a la industria y a las construcciones aumentó solamente del 17 al 18.5% del total. Al mismo tiempo, la parte correspondiente al sector de los servicios aumentó del 23 al 27.4% o sea a más del doble del índice de la industria y la construcción.[67]

En otras palabras, el grueso de la mano de obra en éxodo de la agricultura, incrementó las filas de burócratas, limpiabotas, vendedores de periódicos, sirvientes domésticos y similares, para no mencionar los desempleados. Este fenómeno explica al mismo tiempo la disparidad entre el aumento sin precedente de la población en la América Latina y la industrialización de la región que avanza mucho más lentamente.

7.— Los ingresos personales durante el período de "florecimiento óptimo"

Para una apreciación general de la evolución de la economía de Latinoamérica, una última pregunta debe ser formulada: ¿Cómo fueron afectados los niveles de vida de las grandes masas de población? El primer punto en el que se debe hacer hincapié es el de que de 1945 a 1957 el consumo per cápita de la región en conjunto aumentó en un 40%, en comparación con un 31% para el PBN per cápita. Este fenómeno ha sido descrito como "alentador" por los economistas de la CEPAL.[68]

Sin embargo, un examen de la distribución de los ingresos creados por el PBN revela que el incremento del consumo privado —aldededor del 80% del consumo total— fue limitado estrictamente a una opulenta minoría y de ahí que, aparte de sus implicaciones sociales pueda ser caracterizado mejor como una deplorable disipación de la plus-valía. Aún aceptando que en el caso de Latinoamérica pueda ser justificado el debate entre teorizantes respecto de cuánto puede o debe ser "exprimida la población... a través de un aplazamiento de la elevación de los niveles de consumo... y utilizado para inversiones básicas, con el fin de... lograr un rápido aumento de la producción", como dice Gunnar Myrdal en otro texto,[69] existe muy poca justificación para este "exprimir el jugo" que tiene como consecuencia un superconsumo y una subinversión por parte de los que perciben las utilidades y que, consecuentemente, no ofrece ninguna persepectiva para un rápido aumento de la producción.

A pesar de que las estadísticas sobre ingresos personales están muy diseminadas y son relativamente poco exactas, todo evidencia que la significativa disparidad entre los ingresos de las clases poseedoras y la clase trabajadora en América Latina, se ha incrementado durante este período y, como resultado, los problemas materiales y sociales de la pobreza durante el periodo de bonanza han sido iguales, si no mayores, que antes.[70]

Esta situación la confirma la continua migración de campesinos desposeídos y la situacón de hambre a la cual ya nos hemos referido. Otros síntomas han sido las vastas luchas sociales y las salvajes represiones políticas que alcanzaron un grado de intensidad y una extensión geográfica probablemente inigualada en América Latina durante cualquier otro período de alto índice de actividad económica.

Un síntoma general es el agudo encarecimiento de la vida en la mayoría de los países, que aún de acuerdo con las cifras oficiales, alcanzó proporciones fenomenales en algunas repúblicas, a pesar de la subestimación habitual y notoria de los organismos que confeccionan las estadísticas en casi todos los gobiernos.[71] Los salarios normalmente se rezagaron y, aún en los casos en que las huelgas forzaron ajustes temporales más o menos correctos, el alza de los precios fue tan rápido, que siembre hubo un lapso de tiempo en el cual los ingresos reales de los asalariados disminuyeron.

Las tendencias fluctuaron en dependencia de los países y de los años. Lás estadísticas de Argentina indican que un alza real en los salarios y los sueldos industriales durante los primeros años de la postguerra, fue seguida por una tendencia a la disminución después de 1949[72]. El record no es tan claro en Brasil y en Colombia, en donde en cualquier caso "los salarios reales per cápita en la industria disminuyeron algo en los últimos años, a pesar de un aumento en la producción per cápita".[73] En general y a largo plazo, la clásica "redistribución de la riqueza" característica de la inflación prolongada y rápida, impuso su tributo a los asalariados de América Latina.

Son dignas de consideración las estadísticas chilenas sobre este punto, porque son más completas y merecedoras de confianza que la mayoría de las otras. De 1945 a 1957, la proporción relativa de los gastos totales nacionales de los consumidores, representados por los salarios y los sueldos de oficina, disminuyó en un 10%, mientras que el consumo derivado de utilidades, intereses y rentas, aumentó en cerca de un 15%. Al mismo tiempo, el hecho de que el consumo per cápita de artículos tales como carne, patatas y especialmente trigo, disminuyera sustancialmente durante el período, sugiere que la mayoría de los chilenos se empobreció, tanto en términos relativos como absolutos.[74]

Aparentemente, en Perú en donde una buena parte de los ingresos no se computan como salarios, las "características generales de la distribución de los ingresos no experimentó ninguna variación sustancial entre 1945 y 1955". Durante esta década, alrededor del 45% de la población total del Perú pudo satisfacer solamente las "necesidades mínimas para la subsistencia", lo cual convertido en términos monetarios, significa un consumo anual per cápita equivalente a no más de 50 dólares, menos de la tercera parte del per cápita promedio nacional.[75]

En Venezuela, la mayor parte de los datos conocidos señalan una mayor diferenciación entre los ingresos de las altas capas y los de la mayoría. De acuerdo con un análisis, alrededor de tres cuartas partes de la población venezolana percibe menos de un tercio del enormemente exagerado per cápita de ingresos nacionales.[76] En Cuba, una sola estadística nos dice lo suficiente acerca de la distribución de los ingresos; con anterioridad a la Revolución de 1959, el promedio anual de desocupados era de un 25%.[77]

Se puede argumentar que las estadísticas concernientes a Cuba, Chile e incluso a Argentina, carecen en cierto modo de relieve, ya que esas repúblicas experimentaron poco o ningún desarrollo en 1945-57. No se puede decir lo mismo sobre México, país sobre el cual recientemente se han publicado notables estadísticas acerca de la distribución de los ingresos.

De acuerdo con un análisis detallado y en general de orientación conservadora, de la economista mexicana Ifigenia de Navarrete, aparecen los siguientes datos reveladores:[78]

1º De 1940 a 1950, los ingresos personales de los empresarios se elevaron del 60% al 66% de los ingresos personales en la república, mientras los de los asalariados disminuyeron de la misma forma del 40 al 34% del total.

2º De 1950 a 1957 en términos de ingresos familiares, (a) el promedio de ingresos mensuales en las familias de las capas más humildes, que comprenden el 20% de la población mexicana, fue de 22.3 dólares en 1950 y de 19.8 en 1957 —computados en pesos de 1957 y convertidos en dólares de ese mismo año— representando una declinación relativa del 6% al 4.5% de los ingresos totales y una declinación absoluta del 11% (b) para la mitad de la población, incluyendo el 20% de las capas más humildes; el promedio de ingresos familiares reales fue aproximadamente el mismo en 1950 y en 1957, o sea alrededor de 28 dólares al mes —en dólares de 1957— lo cual representa, no obstante, una disminución relativa del 19 al 15.5% de los ingresos familiares totales; (c) mientras en 1950, el 70% de las familias recibieron el 31.5% de los ingresos familiares totales, en 1957 recibieron solamente el 28.5%.

Si existe alguna exageración en este estudio de la tendencia del ingreso de la mayoría de los mexicanos a permanecer estacionario o aún a disminuir, es en el sentido de subestimarla. Por ejemplo, de acuerdo con la profesora soviética M. V. Danilyevitch, los ingresos reales de los obreros industriales en México entre 1939 y 1952, mostraron una tendencia a la disminución después de 1940,[79] de donde se deduce la sospecha de que el empobrecimiento absoluto está más difundido de lo que demuestra el análisis de la economista mexicana. Esta sospecha es apoyada por las tendencias en el consumo de alimentos per cápita. De 1934-36 a 1952-56, de acuerdo con una encuestra de las Naciones Unidas, un análisis de la información obtenible "revela la existencia de varias tendencias importantes que se han reflejado en un descenso de los niveles de nutrición".[80]

En todo caso no hay probablemente ninguna exageración en la conclusión general propuesta por la señora Navarrete como resultado de su estudio, afirmando que del 65 al 70% de la población mexicana no tuvo ninguna participación en los "beneficios del desarrollo económico". No se pecaría de exageración si se afirmara que las privaciones sufridas durante este período de "florecimiento óptimo de la economía" por el grueso de la población mexicana, bajo las condiciones relativamente favorables de la economía de ese país, fueron más intensas en la gran mayoría de las otras repúblicas latinoamericanas.

8.— Conclusiones:

El camino hacia el desarrollo

Ciertamente muchos círculos se han percatado de la gravedad de la presente crisis en Latinoamérica, como un desastre económico y la agudización de los conflictos políticos y sociales. Tampoco han faltado los factores, reales o imaginarios, aducidos para explicar esta situación. Sin embargo, es muy frecuente la tendencia —aún entre especialistas de alguna competencia— a conceder verosimilitud a la noción de que el desarrollo económico ha sido "rápido" en Latinoamérica, o de que "el desarrollo de América Latina ha sido impresionante", o de que Latinoamérica "ha llegado a la edad de un desarrollo económico vigoroso".[81] Esto, como hemos tratado de demostrar, está lejos de ser cierto, de acuerdo con toda la evidencia obtenible. Lo que hemos llamado el "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía latinoamericana se ha confundido con un funcionamiento satisfactorio.

¿Cómo resumir la evidencia? Si existe una fórmula matemática para medir y apreciar el contenido del nodesarrollo y del antidesarrollo de las actividades económicas que hemos examinado y definir con precisión el FBN real de Latinoamérica, su magnitud relativa en una escala mundial y su índice temporal de variabilidad, el autor de este trabajo no la conoce ni tiene capacidad para inventar una. Pero quizás, pidiendo prestada una frase a Joan Robinson, "no tiene objeto encerrar algo en definiciones más precisas que el sujeto al cual se aplican".[82] Nosotros podemos añadir: más precisa que los datos estadísticos escasos e imperfectos con los cuales tenemos que trabajar.

De aquí que no intentemos formular más que una conclusión general: la de que el desarrollo, tal y como ha tenido lugar, ha sido sumamente exagerado y ha dejado de satisfacer en todos sentidos, sociales o económicos, las necesidades de desarrollo de la región. Para concretar, la característica decisiva de este desarrollo es que dejó de proporcionar o establecer las bases para un incremento suficiente y rápido en la capacidad productiva y reproductiva de las ramas de la economía cuyas deficiencias fundamentales son la causa principal de la perpetuación del subdesarrollo. Consecuentemente, la crisis actual de Latinoamérica no marca el fin de una era de progreso, sino la culminación de un proceso que agravó, en aspectos esenciales, los males crónicos internos y la vulnerabilidad externa de la economía subdesarrollada y dependendiente de la región.

Los factores que deforman la economía de Latinoamérica e impiden su desarrollo, están entrelazados tan estrechamente que no se pueden remediar por separado. Los problemas de la tenencia de la tierra y su utilización, de las industrias básicas y de la vulnerabilidad hacia factores externos, son facetas de un problema mayor: Las ramificaciones políticas y económicas de la función dominante en toda la región, que es la exportación de materias primas bajo términos y condiciones dictados desde el exterior.

El "florecimiento óptimo" que hemos estudiado y la crisis que engendró, indican con suficiente claridad que la economía latinoamericana ha llegado a la coyuntura donde la eliminación de la dependencia neocolonial debe ser situada en la agenda y con ello el abandono del tratamiento espontáneo del subdesarrollo. Sólo sobre esta base será posible adoptar los objetivos sociales y los métodos económicos racionales que requiere un ataque victorioso contra el subdesarrollo.[12]

Anotaciones

1.—**El Mercado Común Latinoamericano.** Naciones Unidas, 1959, pág. 51. Aparte del fin de la prosperidad de postguerra, otros factores son los cambios en la producción y en la técnica, que afectan el consumo de materias primas naturales, las distintas clases de discriminaciones y competencias en los países importadores de productos latinoamericanos, el Mercado Común Europeo, competencia africana, etc.

2.—Entre 1939 y 1945, la posesión de oro y valores extranjeros aumentó en cinco veces de acuerdo con **Post War Price Relations in Trade between Under-Developed and Industrialized Countries.** Naciones Unidas, 23 de febrero 1949, pág. 114.

3.—De **El Mercado Común Latinoamericano** pág. 46.

4.—A partir del 1955, en los Estados Unidos el ritmo de aumento medio anual del producto per cápita ha sido de alrededor del 1%. Para una mayor comprensión del ritmo de Latinoamérica, es interesante hacer notar que en el período que estamos considerando ha sido más elevado que en el conjunto de los países subdesarrollados del Sudeste de Asia; pero mucho menor que en los países socialistas del Este de Europa, en donde, según las apreciaciones más conservadoras, el aumento per cápita de los bienes materiales, con toda seguridad ha promediado más del 7% anual en todos los países y en algunos hasta el 10%. **Economic Survey of Europe, 1956.** Naciones Unidas, 1957, Capítulo II, pág. 2). De 1957 a 1959, cuando el desarrollo de Latinoamérica se paralizó, "el promedio anual del ritmo de desarrollo llegó al 17%" [15% per cápita] para todos los países socialistas y el 10% en la Unión Soviética [9% per cápita]" de acuerdo con un informe de N. S. Jruschov, **Kommunist,** No. 1, Enero de 1961, pág. 10.

5.—**Análisis y Proyecciones del Desarrollo Económico V. El Desarrollo Económico de la Argentina** Naciones Unidas, 1959, vol. 1, pág. 15. El ritmo de expansión global fue de 4.5% por año, pero la inmigración elevó el aumento de la población a 3.2% anual. Ritmos de desarrollo elevados, por supuesto, se registraron en algunos países de tiempo en tiempo, pero solamente por breves períodos.

6.—Ifigenia M. Navarrete, **La Distribución del Ingreso y el Desarrollo Económico de México,** México, D. F., 1960, pág. 11.

7.—El PBN a precios de mercado, es uno de los dos sistemas más comprensibles para apreciar la actividad económica; el otro es la renta nacional, que estima la producción expresada en términos de ganancias derivadas del PBN. La CEPAL de la cual hemos obtenido la mayor parte de nuestras estadisticas, considera que para Latinoamérica "los cambios en el producto bruto per cápita, expresado por los precios constantes de un año específico, es el método más satisfactorio y práctico para apreciar el ritmo del desarrollo económico". La CEPAL define el "ingreso bruto" para la región como "equivalente al producto bruto... más o menos las ganancias o las pérdidas netas resultantes de cambios en los términos del intercambio" y, por tanto, menos revelador del "éxito de los esfuerzos constructivos". **Economic Bulletin for Latin America**, United Nations, Vol. 1, No. 2, Septiembre 1956, pág. 30. De 1945 a 1955, el aumento promedio anual per cápita de los ingresos fue cerca del 22% mayor que el del PBN; de 1955-58 fue un 50% menor.

8.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1948**, Naciones Unidas, 1949, pág. 190.

9.—**Study of Inter-American Trade**, Naciones Unidas, 1957 págs. 19, 22; los ajustes en dólares, de acuerdo con **Statistical Abstracts of the United States**, Washington, 1959, pág. 829.

10.—**El Mercado Común Latinoamericano**, pág. 47.

11.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1948**, pág. 45.

12.—**Ibid**, pág. 58

13.—Las importaciones son también financiadas con inversiones y préstamos extranjeros, pero aún durante el período en que el flujo de capital extranjero pueda temporalmente exceder el reflujo, bajo la forma de utilidades, intereses y amortizaciones, las existencias de divisas resultantes representan solamente una fracción de las divisas acumuladas mediante las ganancias de las exportaciones. Así, en el período de tres años, de 1954 a 1956, cuando el flujo de capitales extranjeros posterior a la guerra alcanzó su nivel máximo en Latinoamérica —flujo neto de aproximadamente 2,000 millones de dólares— constituyó el 8% del valor total de las exportaciones, 24,000 millones de dólares en cifras redondas.

14.—"...de fines del siglo XIX a las vísperas de la segunda guerra mundial... como promedio, una determinada cantidad de bienes primarios exportados pagarían, al final del período, solamente el 60% de la cantidad de bienes elaborados que ellos hubieran podido pagar al comienzo del período". (**Post War Price Relations**, etc., pág. 6).

15.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1957**. Naciones Unidas 1959, pág. 72 (cuadro 69).

16.—**El Mercado Común Latinoamericano**, pág. 47. En los principales países exportadores del Sudeste de Asia, en

conjunto, las condiciones del intercambio por término medio mejoraron sólo ligeramente de 1948-54, después de lo cual se produjo una tendencia al empeoramiento (**Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1959**, Naciones Unidas, 1960, pág. 63).

17.—El nivel de precios de los bienes de capital refleja muy probablemente el hecho de que un número considerable de las importaciones correspondió a las empresas extranjeras que operan en Latinoamérica. "Los precios en las transacciones internas de las compañías no reflejan genuinamente los precios del mercado; el embarcador y el destinatario no tienen intereses opuestos. El único efecto de los débitos cargados a las subsidiarias que operan en el extranjero por concepto de equipos... embarcados a los mismos, es un débito en los libros de contabilidad; las utilidades se cambian entre la compañía matriz y sus subsidiarias en el extranjero... El lugar donde se percibe un balance ventajoso depende de... los índices relativos del impuesto de utilidades", derechos de importación, etc. (**Post-War Price Relations**, etc., pág. 126). Ya que las operaciones de las subsidiarias o ramas de compañías extranjeras de Latinoamérica están estadísticamente integradas en el conjunto de la actuación económica de la región, en este sentido, sus manipulaciones con los precios de las importaciones no alteran el significado de los términos fluctuales del intercambio. De otra parte, no se puede excluir el hecho de que en algunas de las repúblicas la mejoría de los términos del intercambio benefició más a los inversionistas extranjeros que a las empresas nacionales. Vea **Ibid**, pág. 111.

18.—Los índices siguientes, aplicados al conjunto de la región, muestran la evolución de los precios de las exportaciones y de las importaciones y las condiciones del intercambio (obtenidos dividendo los índices de los precios de las exportaciones entre los índices de los precios de las importaciones) de 1955-59:

1953=100

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	
exportaciones	101	102	101	95	90	(Oct.)
importaciones	100	104	107	106	107	(Sept.)
términos del intercambio	101	98	94	90	84	

Fuente: International Financial Statistics, Fondo Monetario Internacional, Marzo 1960, págs. 38-39.

19.—Para 1958, **Economic Survey of Latin America 1958**, Naciones Unidas, 1959, pág. 71; para 1959, los cálculos de la CEPAL publicados en Excélsior, México D. F., Julio 5, 1960; para 1960, cálculos preliminares de "South America Economic Review" y "Caribbean Economic Review", **New York Times**, Enero de 1961.

20.—De no indicarse lo contrario, las estadísticas concernientes a los países en particular, han sido tomadas o computadas de las ediciones anuales del **Economic Survey of Latin America** de las Naciones Unidas. Las cifras del PBN, convertidas por esta publicación en dólares de 1950, han sido reconvertidas en dólares de 1957, con un incremento del 14%. Todos los aumentos o disminuciones en los porcentajes del PBN han sido calculados sobre la base de dólares de valor constante.

21.—En 1957, en adición a la Argentina y Venezuela, PBN per cápita superiores al promedio de la región, se atribuyen a Uruguay, Cuba, Costa Rica y Panamá.

22.—Ver también la nota 17.

23.—Para los países más atrasados, como Haití, Bolivia y Paraguay, cuya población en conjunto es menos del 5% del total de Latinoamérica, irregularidades y deficiencias estadísticas hacen extremadamente difícil aún adivinar a cuanto asciende el PBN per cápita. En Bolivia, p. e., no se efectuó ningún censo entre 1900 y 1950. De acuerdo con el último, el PBN per cápita de Bolivia se estimó ligeramente superior a 80 dólares. Probablemente disminuyó algo durante los últimos siete años. Vea **Análisis y Proyecciones del Desarrollo Económico. IV. El Desarrollo Económico de Bolivia**. Naciones Unidas, 1958, pág. 17.

24.—Al proponer el Mercado Común Latinoamericano como una solución urgente a los problemas de desarrollo posteriores a 1957, el desarrollo para 1975 se proyecta sobre las bases de dos ritmos de aumento anual alternativos del PBN per cápita: 2% y 2.75%. Estos ritmos, así como el papel asignado al Mercado Común, cuando se constituya, para promover el desarrollo, parecen muy poco reales. Véase **El Mercado Común Latinoamericano**, Passim.

25.—La diferencia sería considerablemente mayor si las cifras de producción per cápita fueran comparadas. En 1955-56, la producción de acero en Latinoamérica fue un 40% menor que el consumo. Desde 1950, el consumo ha aumentado con mayor rapidez que la producción. (**Economic Survey of Latin America 1958**). Naciones Unidas 1959, pág. 81).

26.—**El Mercado Común Latinoamericano**, pág. 62. El PBN per cápita de todos los países ha sido convertido en dólares de 1955 cuando fue necesario.

27.—Durante 1955-57, el promedio anual per cápita del consumo de cobre en Latinoamérica fue de 0.4 kilogramos; la cifra comparable para los Estados Unidos fue de 7.0 kilogramos; para Inglaterra 9.0, para Francia 4.3 y para Austria 3.5 (ibid). El consumo per cápita de energía, en el equivalente de millones de toneladas métricas de hulla (redondeadas) fue como sigue: América Latina 600; Austria 1.900; Francia 2.400; Inglaterra 4.700; y los Estados Unidos, 7.600. (**United Nations Statisticals Year-book 1959**, pág. 366 y siguientes).

28.—**Worldwide and Domestic Economic Problems and Their Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States**, Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado de los Estados Unidos, Agosto de 1959, pág. 24.

29.—**The Stages of Economic Growth. Un Manifiesto No-Comunista**, Cambridge, Inglaterra, 1960, pág. 24.

30.—United Nations Statistical Yearbok, 1959, pág. 450 y siguientes.

31.—Cifras tomadas de las ediciones anuales de **Economic Survey of Latin America**, y las fuentes en las notas 26 y 27.

32.—**The Empire of Oil**. New York, 1955, pp. 266-67.

33.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1957**, pág. 48.

34.—Ibid, pág. 3.

35.—Citado por Preston James. **Latin America**, New York, 1959, pág. 690.

36.—Earl E. T. Smith, citado en "Monthly Review" New York, Diciembre 1960, pág. 432.

37.—Citado de una publicación de 1951 de la CEPAL sobre Venezuela, por Paul Baran en su libro **The Political Economy of Growth**. New York 1957, pág. 193.

38.—Survey of Current Bussneess, Departamento de Comercio de los Estados Unidos, Septiembre de 1960, pág. 22.

39.—Ibid.

40.—En 1957, las exportaciones totales de mercancías fueron de 7,918 millones de dólares, (**Economic Survey of Latin America 1958**, pág. 37); las exportaciones totales a los Estados Unidos fueron de 3,765 millones, (ibid. pág. 15).

41.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1957**, pág. 66. Para un país dado y en un año determinado, la pérdida pudiera ser proporcionalmente mucho mayor, como en el caso del Ecuador, p. e., donde en el año 1957, el drenaje representó más del 20% de las ganancias por concepto de exportaciones. (Ibid, pág 76).

42.—Las remisiones brutas de intereses y utilidades fueron de 1.345 millones de dólares (Ibid. p. 66); las importaciones de maquinaria industrial se estimaron en 1940 millones de dólares (Economic Survey of Latin America 1958, pág. 52); el porcentaje de las inversiones se calcula aproximadamente igual al de 1954-56, según cálculos del Mercado Común Latinoamericano, pág. 60.

43.—The Political Economy of Growth — op. cit. pág. 19. Baran también cita la siguiente observación provechosa de Economic Survey of Europe since the War. 1953, pág. 25, publicación de las Naciones Unidas: "En los países del Este de Europa, los servicios no conectados directamente con la producción y el transporte de mercancías no se consideran como productivos y su valor se excluye de los ingresos nacionales [el producto]. Para un país pobre que está tratando de desarrollar su industria y de reducir el subempleo común en las ocupaciones de servicio, la definición marxista de renta nacional [producto] tiene naturalmente algunas ventajas sobre el concepto más amplio adaptado a las economías ricas, industrializadas, y que actualmente se aplica de manera común a los países subdesarrollados.

44.—Economic Survey of Latin America 1957, pág. 85.

45.—Ibid, y Economic Survey of Latin America 1955, Naciones Unidas, 1956, pág. 9.

46.—Economic Survey of Latin America, 1957, op. cit. pág 85. Desde 1957 la producción per cápita ha disminuido de nuevo.

47.—Latin America, New York 1959. pág. 870.

48.—"Elementos da Questao Agrária", Revista Brasiliense Río de Janeiro, No. 24, 1959, pág. 38 y sig.

49.—Report on Cuba. Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento, Baltimore, 1951, pág. 88.

50.—Mecanización de la Agricultura Mexicana. México, D.F., 1957, págs. 108, 375.

51.—La Agricultura, Nacional Financiera, S. A., México-Buenos Aires, 1957, pág. 77.

52.—"A Changing Latin America and U. S. Foreing Policy". New University Thought, Chicago, Primavera de 1960, pág. 56.

53.—El sector minero, que es manejado casi exclusivamente por extranjeros, registró un incremento aún mayor que la elaboración, pero ello se debió casi exclusivamente a la extracción de petróleo crudo de Venezuela. Excluyendo el petróleo, el promedio de aumento per cápita sería menor que el incremento del PBN en conjunto (Economic Bulletin for Latin America, CEPAL, Santiago de Chile, vol. 4, No. 1, Marzo de 1959, pág. 49). Incluyendo el petróleo, la participación de la minería en el PBN de Latinoamérica se elevó aproximadamente del 3.5% en 1945 al 5% en 1957.

54.—Con propósitos de comparación, es interesante hacer notar que durante el mismo período aproximadamente, en los países menos desarrollados del campo socialista, la proporción del PBN (bienes materiales) representada por la producción industrial, aumentó más rápidamente y alcanzó en general más altos niveles. Hacia 1958-59, se leveó de 40.6 a 66.6% en Rumania; 24.8 a 70.6% en Bulgaria; 9.8 a 55.7% en Albania; 28 a 71% en la República Democrática Popular de Corea; 10 al 37.1% en la República Democrática de Viet-Nam (New Times, Moscú, Edición Inglesa, No. 51, 1960, pág. 6).

55.—Economic Bulletin for Latin America. vol. 3 No. 2, Octubre 1958, págs. 46-47.

56.—Analyses and Projections of Economic Development. VI. The Industrial Development of Peru. Naciones Unidas, 1959, págs., 9, 41, 53.

57.—De 1948-57, los textiles y alimentos-bebidas-tabaco, aumentaron en conjunto en un 45%, mientras los metales básicos al igual que la química, registraron un aumento de más del 80%. La producción de lingotes de acero, ácido sulfúrico, alcalís sódicos y cemento, alcanzaron un aumento superior al doble durante el período 1950-57 (Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. 4, No. 1, Marzo de 1959, págs. 51, 54).

58.—Estudio Económico de América Latina 1954. Naciones Unidas 1955, pág. 99.

59.—Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. 3 No. 2, Octubre 1958, págs. 48, 49.

60.—Estudio Económico de América Latina 1956. Naciones Unidas, 1957, pág. 86, y Anuário Estadístico do Brasil 1958, págs. 82, 94-95, 101.

61.—El Desarrollo Económico de la Argentina. vol. 2, págs. 165, 191, 225.

62.—Survey of Current Business, Departamento de Comercio de los Estados Unidos, Septiembre de 1960, págs., 20,22.

63.—Economic Survey of Latin America 1957, pág. 142.

64.—"Nacionalismo e Desenvolvimento", Revista Brasiliense. No. 24, 1959 pág. 15.

65.—Report on World Social Situation, Naciones Unidas, 1957, pág. 179.

66.—Armando Samper, según informó **Política**, México, D. F., Septiembre 1 de 1960, pág. 45.

67.—"A primera vista puede parecer que este incremento en los servicios personales es el mismo fenómeno que ocurre en los países más desarrollados, donde según aumentan los ingresos per cápita la demanda por servicios especializados altamente remunerados es muy elástica. Sin embargo, este no parece ser el caso de... [América Latina] donde los servicios personales pobremente remunerados prevalecen y el exceso de trabajadores que no puede ser absorbido por otras ocupaciones... se oculta de esta manera... En segundo lugar... la clase media, que no puede encontrar una ocupación productiva en actividades económicas privadas, ejerce una presión constante sobre el sector público, el cual evidentemente... debe cumplir una función de absorción de no poca significación social". (**Economic Survey of Latin America 1954**. Naciones Unidas 1955, págs, 26-27).

68.—**El mercado Común Latinoamericano**, pág. 45.

69.—**An International Economy**, New York, 1956, pág. 62. Como se indica en nuestro cuadro, de 1945 a 1957 el coeficiente de inversiones fijas brutas para el conjunto de Latinoamérica fluctuó alrededor de un promedio de un 17% del PBN. En algunos círculos se considera ésta una cifra respetable, especialmente cuando se compara con la gran mayoría de los países subdesarrollados del Sudeste de Asia, donde el coeficiente usualmente es menor del 10%: Esta comparación, sin embargo, lo que hace es señalar lo extremadamente bajo del promedio de formación de capitales en el Sudeste de Asia, en lugar de indicar que en América Latina es adecuado. En 1955, p. e., el coeficiente para ambos, los Estados Unidos y Latinoamérica, fue aproximadamente 17%. Esto significó un promedio de inversiones per cápita de 370 dólares en los Estados Unidos en comparación con 55 dólares en Latinoamérica, es decir, en proporción inversa a las necesidades relativas de desarrollo de las dos regiones. Debe notarse también que el coeficiente neto de inversiones en Latinoamérica ha sido de alrededor del 12%. Como sugiere Simon Kuznets (**Economic Growth: Brasil, India, Japan**, Durham, N. C., E. U. A. 1955, pág. 23)., en los países desarrollados la obsolescencia ejerce una gran función en el consumo de capitales, mientras el empeoramiento físico es el factor principal en los países subdesarrollados. De aquí... "que la comparación propia desde el punto de vista del desarrollo económico, puede establecerse entre la formación bruta de capitales en un país industrial desarrollado y la formación neta en un país subdesarrollado". Si consideramos también la dudosa contribución al desarrollo de Latinoamérica de las inversiones en actividades puramente extractivas y construcción de residencias de lujo, aparece claramente que el problema de formación de capitales en esta región es indudablemente formidable.

70.—Para una narración científica y al mismo tiempo vívida, de los aspectos materiales y humanos de estos problemas, consultar el tratado de Oscar Lewis, **Five Families, Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty**, New York, 1959.

71.—Indices (1950.100) de 1948-57; Argentina —61 a 326; Brasil— 90 a 329; Colombia —78 a 152; Chile— 73 a 1173; Bolivia—66 a 6,937. Del Cuadro 35, "**Cost of Living in Selected Countries**", **Economic Bulletin for Latin America**, vol. 3, Nº 2, Octubre de 1958, pág. 81. En la mayoría de los países, los índices han continuado en aumento. En Brasil, en Diciembre de 1960 el nivel fue más del doble del de 1957 (**Monde**, Febrero 2 de 1961).

72.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1957**. Cuadro 115, pág. 115.

73.—**Report on the World Social Situación (1957)**, pág. 182. De acuerdo con Cleantho da Paiva Leite, en el Estado de Piauí, típico exponente de la depresión crónica del Noreste del Brasil los ingresos anuales per cápita se han promediado en alrededor de 45 dólares, o menos del 13% del promedio del estado de Sao Paulo, el más importante productor de café de Brasil y su centro industrial. Alrededor de una tercera parte de la población brasileña vive en el Noreste ("Brasilian Development: One Problem and Two Banks", **Inter-American Economic Affairs**, vol. 14, Nº 1, Verano de 1960, pág. 4.

74.—**Economic Survey Latin America 1957**, págs. 199, 206.

75.—**The Industrial Development of Peru**, págs. 10, 11.

76.—Carl S. Shoup, Director (citado por Otto Feinstein, **The Fiscal System of Venezuela**, Baltimore, 1959, págs. 29-34.

77.—Leo Huberman y Paul M. Sweezy, **Cuba Anatomy of a Revolution**, New York, 1960, págs. 6-7. Los autores observan que este promedio era el mismo que "en el peor año de la peor depresión en la historia de los Estados Unidos", y refleja el hecho de que la economía cubana" se encontraba en un estado de crisis permanente".

78.—**La Distribución del Ingreso y El Desarrollo Económico en México**, México, D. F., 1960, págs. 65, 85.

79.—Rabotchii Klass V Osvoboditelnom Dvizhenii Narodov Latinskoy Ameriki. (La clase obrera en el Mvimiento de Liberación Nacional de América Latina). Disertación académica mecanografiada. Academia de Ciencias de la URSS, 1960, vol. I. pág. 233. La fecha de publicación no ha sido anunciada.

80.—Economic Survey of Latin Aerica 1957, pág. 292.

81.—Op. cit., pág. 90.

82.—En el orden citado: James (Op. cit., pág. 880); Feinstein. (op. cit., pág. 52) Navarrete (op. cit., pág. 11).

83.—The Acumulation of Capital, Londres, 1956, pág. 8.

84.—Otto Feinstein (op. cit., pág. 76) mantiene que América Latina "es la región subdesarrollada que ofrece mejores posibilidades al capitalismo". Aparte de perspectivas mundiales a largo plazo, las posibilidades no son brillantes en ninguna parte del mundo y son particularmente reducidas en América Latina. En las regiones que emergen de una dominación colonial directa, los poderes coloniales frecuentemente se ajustan al cambio manteniendo sus posiciones económicas principales bajo la forma de arreglos neocoloniales; este factor desalienta los experimentos no capitalistas. Además, dada la base económica extremadamente baja, puede operarse algún desarrollo inicial, aunque lento, a través de una combinación de capitalismo privado y capitalismo de Estado. En el conjunto de Latinoamérica el colonialismo directo pasó hace mucho y un desarrollo apreciable del capitalismo nativo, incluyendo el de Estado, se ha operado bajo condiciones neocoloniales. Sectores capitalistas decisivos en manos de inversionistas nacionales, como la banca y la gran industria, el comercio y el transporte, dependen en un grado significativo de las importaciones y del financiamiento extranjero. También dependen del aparato neocolonial de gobierno para defender sus intereses de clase frente a los asalariados. Sus prerrogativas económicas, políticas y sociales, aunque limitadas por el neo-colonialismo, se basan en el mismo. La crisis del neocolonialismo en Latinoamérica es también la crisis del capitalismo nacional y consecuentemente la eliminación del primero, especialmente si resiste tozudamente, como el caso de la experiencia cubana predice, produciría la eliminación del segundo, por lo menos en los sectores básicos de la producción. Tales perspectivas son, desde luego, alentadas por el hecho de que en la sexta década del siglo XX demasiadas personas en América Latina conocen que existe una alternativa mucho más expeditiva y rápida que el desarrollo capitalista.

CONTENIDO

Pág.

Introducción 5

Presentación 3

1.—*El "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía latinoamericana* 7

2.—*Los estímulos externos en la expansión económica de Latinoamérica* 10

3.—*Otras consideraciones acerca del tema principal* .. 14

4.—*Perspectivas de aumento aparente del PBN* 16

5.—*Comparación del Producto Bruto Nacional* 18

6.—*Las realidades del desarrollo económico en Latinoamérica* 22

7.—*Los ingresos personales durante el período de "florecimiento óptimo"* 31

8.—*Conclusiones: El camino hacia el desarrollo* 35

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

716336

PAGE

HALPERIN, MAURICE
201-128561
SEX M DOB ?

201-005239
HMMA-17609
18 AUG 61

CIT ?
OCC ?
Δ KUTULOBSKIY PR. D 13, APT. 127, MOSCOW
G-248
RE-CORRESPONDENCE OF ALBERT MALTZ /201-005239/
AUG 1961.

18 Aug 61

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 125 561

867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-61)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPE[illegible]AFR

HALPERIN, MAURICE

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
201-128561
PRESENTLY RESIDING IN MOSCOW
RE ACTIVITIES OF SON DAVID

201-280321
HMMA-16328
25 JAN 61

PAFR

25 Jan 61

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

	201	128	561

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

670

ORIG : LESLIE S. BATY
UNIT : WE-1/SWEDEN
EXT : 2619
DATE : 19 JANUARY 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO : STOCKHOLM

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF. WE 6

INFO : COP, C, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, FE 4, SR 4, WH 4, S/C 2

1		
2		5
3		6

SIG

20 JAN 61 00 03z

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	
☒	ROUTINE	SIG CEN
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 65055
OUT 65055

TO STOC INFO CITE DIR 21607 [redacted]
21607

[redacted]

REF STOC 1757 (IN 29212)*.

1. CAN NOT CONFIRM REPORT. KNOW INTERNATIONAL CP COMMITTEE FOR COOPERATION DISCUSSED AT MEETING BUT DROPPED. DOUBT REPORT FOUNDING PEIPING OFFICE BECAUSE WOULD INDICATE LARGE REPAIR CPSU AND CCP BREACH. WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER INFO SOURCE AND ACCESS INFO TO DETERMINE IF REPORT COULD BE PLANT.

2. MAURICE HALPERIN, FORMER OSS OFFICER LATIN AMER AFFAIRS SPECIALIST, AND MARTHA DODD STERN, FORMER RESIDENT MEXICO, BOTH PREVIOUSLY IMPLICATED SOV ESPIONAGE IN PBPRIME. BOTH NOW IN BLOC. POUCHING INFO HALPERIN AND STERN AND REPORT LONG HISTORY CHINESE INVOLVEMENT LATIN AMER AFFAIRS. PASS ABOVE TO TIERAB 8.

END OF MESSAGE

*WE COMMENT: REPORTED ORGANIZATIONS FOUNDED AT CP MEETING IN MOSCOW DEC 1960.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-012 8561
DO NOT DESTROY

[redacted]

C/WE/

CI/OA/[redacted] JOHN [illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

C/WE-1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

01/51
Halperin

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

Qo.c uf

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FEB 60

Dq 238

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

1 copy GE/G

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SR/3		30 JAN	30/1/61	
2.				
3. SR/3/CE				
4.				
5. CI/SIG		1.II.61		
6.				
7. [redacted]				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

1 cc. to CI/SIG for retention

Copy detached for 100-6-113

AN CC
AB X
IN
PS
BX
DBS NFD
FI
RI/FIP

NOTE: PLEASE INDICATE DISPOSITION
ATTACHED MATERIAL
☐ REMOVE FROM CS RECORDS
CONTROL
TO RID/DU: ☐ DESTROY
☐ FORWARD DOCUMENT
TO ____
FOR DESK WORKING FILE
APPROVED
☑ RETAIN-PLEASE SPECIFY
CS FILE NO.
201-128561

FILE TITLE
Maurice Halperin

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
~~201-128561~~
201-128561

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
RECORDED
DEFERRED
18 Jan. 1961

DOCUMENT NUMBER
EGBA 67119

FORM 12-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
EGBA 67119

TO
Chief, EE (ATTENTION: Chief, SR)
INFO
Chief of Station, Germany

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
Unknown
BOB File 1273

FROM
Chief of Base, Berlin

DATE
18 January 1961

SUBJECT
© REDWOOD REDSKIN LCIMPROVE
(Fnu) HALPERIN

RE: "43.3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
None. For your information.

REFERENCE(S)

1. In studying routine air travel reports, we have noted that, on 16 January 1961, a Mr. and Mrs. HALPERIN arrived in Berlin from Dusseldorf and proceeded on the same day to Warsaw via Lufthansa Ost. (The booking had been changed from 15 January).

2. It occurs to us that this may be the Latin American specialist HALPERIN who was the subject of recent publicity in connection with work in the Soviet Union, and that this item may be of interest to Headquarters and/or ODENVY.

Dorothy C. Glodeen
DOROTHY C. GLODEEN

APPROVED :
ARTHUR L. HOFSOOS

Distribution:
✓2 - SR
2 - COS, Germany
1 - EE

ehn

201-138561

CS COPY

~~DEFERRED~~

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ SECRET

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY USSR/CHINA

REPORT NO. TDCS 3/462,130

SUBJECT FOUNDING OF TWO NEW ORGANIZATIONS DURING MOSCOW NOVEMBER 1960 CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS

DATE DISTR. 13 JANUARY 1961

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1960

REFERENCES IN 29212

PLACE & DATE ACQ. SWEDEN, STOCKHOLM (10 JANUARY 1961)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL SWEDISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS USUALLY RELIABLE AND WHO IS A POLISH OFFICIAL WITH HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS.

TWO NEW ORGANIZATIONS WERE FOUNDED DURING THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST LEADERS, ONE OF WHICH IS TO BE AN OFFICE DEALING WITH COUNTRIES FORMERLY INCLUDED IN THE FRENCH COLONIAL SYSTEM. THE OTHER IS TO BE AN "OFFICE FOR PERMANENT STUDIES AND COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICAN PARTIES" AND IS TO BE ORGANIZED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND CUBA. IT WILL BE LOCATED IN PEIPING. THE HEAD OF THE OFFICE IS TO BE DR. [illegible] HALPERIN, FORMER UNIVERSITY OF BOSTON PROFESSOR AND IDENTIFIED SOVIET AGENT WHO LEFT THE US IN 1960 AND IS NOW IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR IS TO BE MRS. MARTHA DODD STERN, WHO IS UNDER INDICTMENT BY THE US GOVERNMENT FOR ESPIONAGE

201-128561

201-166598

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ SECRET

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	FBI

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

13 Jan 61

201-128561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, MAURICE

SEX M DOB ?

201-005239
HMMA-16269
13 JAN 61

PAFR

CIT ?
201-128561
Δ IN CARE OF M. MENDELSON USSR WRITER'S UNION
52 VORCVSKY ST., MOSCOW USSR
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING ALBERT MALTZ AND/OR
MBRS OF HIS FAMILY
NEW YEAR GREETINGS

13 Jan. 61

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

68-10594

181

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 11 JANUARY 1961

TO DIRECTOR

FROM STOCKHOLM

ACTION WE 6 — Bill [illegible] DC/WE

INFO DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PMG, IOC 4 CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2 IW 2, EE 4, FE 4, SR 4, WH 4, S/C 2 (SUSPENSE DD/I)

ROUTING

JAN 11

IN [illegible]

TO DIR INFO

CITE STOC 1757 N/R

62-2-5/3

LCHARVEST

1. TIEBAR[1] 8 MEMO PASSED TO STATION 13 JAN STATES USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE (IDENTIFIED ORALLY BY T[1] 8 AS POLICE OFFICIAL WITH HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS) REPORTS TWO NEW ORGANIZATIONS FOUNDED DURING COMMIE MEETING MOSCOW DEC 60. ONE IS OFFICE DEALING WITH COUNTRIES FORMERLY INCLUDED FRENCH COLONIAL SYSTEM. OTHER IS "OFFICE FOR PERMANENT STUDIES AND COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICAN PARTIES (PORTION MISSING BEING TRACED). LATTER TO BE ORGANIZED BY COMMIE PARTIES ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND CUBA, LOCATED PEIPING. HEAD OFFICE TO BE DR. M HALPERIN, ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR MRS. MARTA STERN. HALPERIN, FORMERLY UNIV PROF BOSTON, FORMERLY OSS EMPLOYEE, IS PRESUMED HAVE LEFT PBPRIME[2] 60. STERN ALSO PBPRIME[2] CITIZEN.

2. T[1] 8 STATED ONE MRS. STERN, PBPRIME[2] CITIZEN, WAS IN SWEDEN IN EARLY 50. NO STATION TRACES STERN OR HALPERIN.

3. T[1] 8 ANXIOUS HAVE REPORT CONFIRMED AS MEANS CHECKING SOURCE; WOULD LIKE HQS COMMENTS HALPERIN AND STERN INVOLVEMENT AND WHETHER LATTER WAS IN SWEDEN; BELIEVES IMPORTANT DETERMINE IF OFFICE ACTUALLY LOCATED PEIPING AND NOT MOSCOW, FOR TO HIM THIS WOULD MEAN MAJOR ALLOCATION RESPONSIBILITY.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-[illegible]
DO NOT DESTROY

CI SI file re Maurice HALPERIN

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 11 JANUARY 1961

TO

FROM

ACTION

INFO

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO

INFO

PAGE TWO

IN 29212
STOC 1757

CITE

4. PLS ADVISE INCLUDING BACKGROUND CHICOM LATIN AMERICAN ACTIVITY FOR T 18. PARA 1 ABOVE MAY BE DISSEMED IF WORTHWHILE.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE NO. 201-128561

DATE : 612
6 JAN 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/SI, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☑ None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 7 0220Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 27546

DIR CITE MEXI 7055

REF DIR 18890 (OUT 58500)

1P

1. DAVID HALPERIN, son of Maurice Hyman HALPERIN (201-128561) IN LIFEAT SEBORER TRAFFIC 22 DEC 60. ON 23 DEC LIFEAT INFORMED HE AT NUEVO HOTEL WALDORF in Mexico City WITH TWO UNNAMED CLASSMATES AND WIFE OF ONE CLASSMATE. PLANNED SEE ANNA SEBORER 23 DEC 60 AT LATTER'S HOME. RE: surveillance* subject

2. LIFEAT TAKE ABOVE DATES GIVEN LOCAL ODENVY 23 AND 27 DEC 60.

3. PER REF STATION ASKED LOCAL ODENVY IF PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE OR OTHER STATION SUPPORT DESIRED. ODENVY SAID NO. STATION OPINION ODENVY HAS SURVEILLANCE SUBJECT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *STATED ODENVY ENDEAVORING DEVELOP MORE INFO ON ITINERARY RE TRAVELS OF DAVID HALPERIN.

MICROFILMED
MAR 16 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	BR
RI/TY	BB
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

FORM 1389a

SECRET

7 Jan 61
201-128561 ✓

675

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE NO. 201-128561

ORIG: BIRCH D. O'NEAL
UNIT: CI/SI
EXT: 2356
DATE: 30 DECEMBER 1960

TO: MEXICO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CI/SI
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, WH 4, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☑ None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 30 DEC 60 23 29z
ROUTINE
PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT 58500
OUT58500

TO PRIORITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 18890

Halperin (201-128561)

1. ODENVY ADVISES DAVID HALPERIN SON OF MAURICE HAS SCHEDULED ARRIVE MEXICO CITY 29 DECEMBER BY CAR. IS ENROUTE EUROPE WHERE WILL MEET FATHER. ODENVY ENDEAVORING DEVELOP MORE ON INTINERARY AND HAS NOT AS YET MADE SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR COVERAGE.

Re surveillance

2. DESIRE YOU COORDINATE WITH LOCAL ODENVY REP AND OBTAIN ANY COVERAGE POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH ODENVY INTEREST.

END OF MESSAGE

12

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
~~[illegible]~~	
RI/FI	

30 Dec 60

201-128561

CHIEF, WH/3/MEXI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CHIEF, WH
RELEASING OFFICER

ACTING CHIEF, CI STAFF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

HALPERN

A# 03314

Maurice HALPERN (201-

American born expatriate, went to Moscow ca 1958-59. Writes propaganda articles for the Sovs. is economist. Father lives New York City.

Is his sister Leontina Rizhik? A# 27771
201-761675

HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman
Traveled to the USSR in
October 1958

Prepared by CI Staff
for State Nov. 60

The following is SECRET:

On 15 July 1960 Maurice Hyman HALPERIN and his wife, Edith Frisch HALPERIN applied at the United States Embassy in Moscow, USSR for a renewal of their passports. HALPERIN is reported to have stated that he had been in the USSR since December 1958 as a visiting professor of the Social Sciences Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences on a contract which expires in 1961. In 1948 Elisabeth BENTLEY, an admitted former Soviet espionage agent, stated that she had become acquainted with HALPERIN in the latter part of 1942 through arrangements made by Jacob GOLOS, a known Soviet espionage agent. She further stated that during the time HALPERIN was employed by the Office of Strategic Services in Washington, D. C., he supplied GOLOS with information to which he had access in his office. In late 1953 HALPERIN left the United States for Mexico after refusing on constitutional grounds to tell the U. S. Senate Internal Sub-Committee whether he was ever a member of the Communist Party. In 1958, following the efforts made by the Government of Mexico to deport a number of American Communists, HALPERIN and his wife went to the USSR where they now reside.

Nov 60

201-128561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, MAURICE /PROF./

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?

201-128561

CORRESPONDENCE FROM MARGARET MALTZ RE NEWS NOVY MIR TO PUBLISH SEVEN SHARES IN A GOLD MINE 20 SEP 60.

201-005239
HMMA-15870
28 OCT 60

570789

PAFR

```
000000000000000000000
11111_111111111111111
222222222222222222222
333333333333333333333
44 _44444444444444444
 55555555555555555555
666666_66666666666666
7777_7777777777777777
8 8888888888888888888
9999999_9999999999999
```

28 Oct 60

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

NEW AGGRESSION CH[illegible]--The Cubans consider as a new aggression against Cuba, by the United States, the measure taken by the Inter-American Defense Board preventing the Cuban delegate on the board to visit U.S. bases. (Ciudad Trujillo, Radio Caribe, Oct. 13, 1960, 10[illegible] GMT--P)

CUBAN-SOVIET COMMITTEE--In Moscow the Cuban-Soviet Committee was formed, which is sponsored by the Soviet Association for Friendship and Cooperation with the Latin American countries. Cuban Ambassador Faure Chaumon and several other Cubans attended the installation ceremony. (Ciudad Trujillo, Radio Caribe, Oct. 13, 1960, 1000 GMT--P) (UNCLASSIFIED)

BOGOTA POLITICAL CONFERENCE--Capt. Antonio Nunez Jimenez, director of the Cuban National Institute for Agrarian Reform, has been invited to attend the meeting of Latin American political leaders which will begin on Oct. 22 in Bogota, Colombia. So far 23 persons from nine Latin American countries have said they will attend the meeting. (Havana, PRENSA LATINA, Oct. 7, 1960, 1705 GMT--E)

STUDENTS TO GDR--Three Cuban students on scholarships will study economic sciences and medicine at the Leipzig and Karl Marx Universities in the GDR. The students, Angel N. Alfonso, Consuelo Mesa, and Juan P. Oliva, will leave for the GDR Oct. 14 to begin the university course which will last a year. (Havana, PRENSA LATINA, Oct. 13, 1960, 1558 GMT--E)

7-13 oct 60

201-128561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

[illegible]

HALPERIN, MAURICE

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
201-128561

201-005239
HMMA-15715
23 SEP 60
0P-974

PAFR

28 Sep 60

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201 128 561

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

6 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
(201-128561)

1. On 5 September 1960 an article appeared in The Washington Post and Times Herald in which Maurice Hyman HALPERIN was quoted as saying that the statement issued by the United States Department of State concerning his employment by the Soviet Government was a "deliberate and malicious distortion". HALPERIN was also quoted as saying that he was associated with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, working on a book on Latin American economics from 1945 to the "crisis" in 1958. HALPERIN added that he is "not working for the Soviet Government any more than Van Cliburn when he performed in a government owned concert hall".

2. According to Mr. Lloyd Frank JORDAN, Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), 2618 Barton Hall, extension 4201, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is directly subordinate to the USSR Council of Ministers and it receives broad directive for work to be undertaken by the Academy from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. Mr. JORDAN stated that anyone associated with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR would be in the employ of the Soviet Government. Mr. JORDAN said that there are two studies showing the relationship of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to the Soviet Government; one is OCI-5618/59 which is classified, and the other a study issued by the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations on "National Policy Machinery in the USSR" which is unclassified.

BIRCH D. O'NEAL
Chief, CI/SIG

cc: Chief, CI Staff

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - CI/SIG ci cent 50 9/7/60
1 - RID (201-128561)

SECRET

CI/SIG:AEgerter:rel

WASH DC STAR 5 Sept. 60

Halperin Denies Giving Reds Advice on Latins

MOSCOW, Sept. 5 (AP)—Maurice H. Halperin, former United States Government official who now lives in Moscow, yesterday accused the State Department of issuing a "deliberate and malicious distortion" about his status here.

In a typewritten statement, Mr. Halperin said:

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow . . . I am a visiting professor at the USSR Academy of Sciences and not the first American to be associated with it."

Last week Senator Keating, Republican of New York, read into the Congressional Record a State Department document which said Mr. Halperin is now in Moscow and is "working for the Soviet government."

Headed OSS Unit

The document said there were indications Mr. Halperin is giving the Soviet government advice on Latin-American affairs. During World War II, Mr. Halperin was head of the Latin American division of the United States Office of Strategic Services, an intelligence organization.

After the war, Mr. Halperin got a job with Boston University as a professor. He lost this job in 1953 because he refused to tell congressional investigators whether he ever had been a member of the American Communist Party.

The bald, mustached 54-year-old Mr. Halperin was located Sunday in a Moscow apartment house by a newsman and was asked to comment on the State Department's document.

Declines to Elaborate

(Moscow reported there were "technical difficulties" in moving the story until Monday. The newsman apparently was cut off while trying to telephone the story.)

Mr. Halperin first declined to admit the newsman into his apartment, but agreed to meet him later in the lobby of a nearby hotel where he promised to give a written statement.

Mr. Halperin appeared punctually at the agreed hour. He carried the following statement, on which he declined to elaborate:

"It seems to me that the State Department and Senator Keating are scraping the bottom of the barrel to come up with this stale red herring.

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow. Since my arrival I have filed two United States income tax returns, listing my salary and employer. I am not working for the Soviet government any more than Van Cliburn (an American pianist) when he performs in a government-owned concert hall.

"I am a visiting professor at the USSR Academy of Sciences and not the first American to be associated with it, as some of our leading scientists can testify. My appointment and my Soviet visa expires in July, 1961, as the United States Embassy here very well knows.

"My teaching and resource activities involve theoretical problems related to the economic growth of underdeveloped areas. For the State Department to say that I am 'advising the Russians on Latin-American affairs' is a deliberate and malicious distortion.

"Specifically, I am making a study of the Latin-American economy from 1945 to the crisis of 1958. When my book is published it will be available to the State Department and anybody else willing to purchase a copy."

The United States Embassy declined to comment on the statement or on Mr. Halperin's status. It did say he appeared at the embassy in July and asked to have his American passport renewed. The request was granted, an embassy official said.

Washington Post
5 Sept. 1960

Halperin Says Reds Not Not Employ Him

MOSCOW, Sept. 4 (UPI) Maurice H. Halperin today branded a reported State Department statement that he is working as an adviser to the Soviet government on Latin American affairs as a "deliberate and malicious distortion."

In a statement to reporters, Halperin said he is a professor associated with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, working on a book on Latin American economics, and, he explained, the American authorities know all about it.

(A State Department document in Washington last week said Halperin, a former Boston University professor and World War II intelligence specialist on Latin American affairs, was working for the Soviet government.

Sen. Kenneth B. Keating (R-N.Y.), had the document entered in the Congressional Record.)

"It seems to me that the State Department and Senator Keating are sweeping the bottom of the barrel to come up with this red herring," Halperin said.

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow. Since my arrival, I have filed two U. S. income tax returns, listing my salary and employer.

"I am not working for the Soviet government any more than Van Cliburn when he performed in a government-owned concert hall," he continued.

"I am a visiting professor in the USSR Academy of Sciences, and not the first American to be associated with it. For the State of Department to say that I am an adviser to the Russians on Latin-American affairs is a deliberate and malicious distortion.

"Specifically, I am making a study of the Latin American economy from 1945 to the crisis of 1958."

Washington Post

5-Sep 60

201-128561

File in 201

The New York Times
1 September 1960

FORMER U. S. AIDE AT WORK IN SOVIET

Ex-Boston U. Professor Was in O.S.S. in World War II

By JACK RAYMOND
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 31—The State Department has disclosed that a former United States Intelligence official is in Moscow working for the Soviet Government.

He is Dr. Maurice Halperin, a former Boston University professor who was head of the Latin American Division of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II.

Dr. Halperin was dismissed from Boston University in 1954 after he refused to say whether he was a Communist. He has been linked in testimony before Senate investigators to a Soviet spy ring.

The State Department's disclosure was contained in a memorandum in support of a proposed law to deny passports to persons supporting international communism.

The Supreme Court ruled in 1958 that passports could not be denied to Communists or others because of their political beliefs.

Dr. Halperin and his wife, Edith, were then in Mexico City, the State Department noted. They had been linked to the escape behind the Iron Curtain of Alfred K. and Martha Dodd Stern, who were under Federal indictment for espionage.

After the Supreme Court ruling, the Halperins applied to the United States Embassy in

Continued on Page 7, Column 1

FORMER U. S. AIDE AT WORK IN SOVIET

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

Mexico City for passports and left Mexico Oct. 13, 1958. At the time, the State Department noted, they were about to be deported from Mexico for Communist activities.

Reports that Dr. Halperin was working for the Soviet Government in Moscow were confirmed last July 15, the State Department memorandum went on, when he and his wife appeared at the embassy to renew their passports.

Embassy officials reported that they had been told by Dr. Halperin that he and his wife had been in the Soviet Union since December, 1958, and that he was working for the Soviet Academy of Sciences "doing research in the foreign field, especially relating to underdeveloped countries."

The State Department, recalling that Dr. Halperin was an authority on Latin-American affairs, added that "our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time."

State Department officials have repeatedly called attention to the Soviet trade and cultural offensive in Latin America.

Referring to Dr. Haleprin's employment by the Soviet Academy, the State Department observed that it was directly subordinate to the Soviet Council of Ministers.

Requested by Keating

The memorandum was prepared at the request of Senator Kenneth B. Keating, Republican of New York. He and Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, are sponsoring a bill that seeks to restore some of the State Department's authority to deny passports.

Senator Keating, who entered the memorandum in The Congressional Record of Aug. 16, expressed regret at the time that his bill was not likely to be passed in this session of Congress. President Eisenhower and State Department officials have backed the purpose of the measure.

Meanwhile, Representative Francis E. Walter, Democrat of Pennsylvania and chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activity, said he had ordered a month-long preliminary investigation into the case of two missing employes of the National Security Agency.

The two employes of the top-secret coding agency, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, are alleged to home taken valuable secrets to the Soviet Union.

Representative Walter said that he understood that one of the missing men had made enquiries in their agency about the U-2 reconnaissance plane flight over the Soviet Union before it took place on May 1.

Mr. Walter said that he was convinced that the Soviet had had advance knowledge of the flight. Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, was downed in the Soviet Union and subsequently sentenced to ten years detention.

Refused to Appear

BOSTON, Aug. 31—Dr. Halperin was officially dismissed from the faculty of Boston University on Jan. 6, 1954. He had refused a summons to appear before a university committee of review to discuss his case.

Dr. Harold C. Case, president of the university, telephoned Dr. Halperin in Mexico City offering to pay his expenses to Boston and return. But the professor declined. He had been chairman of the university's Latin-American regional studies.

201-128561

Washington Post
1 Sept. 1960

Thursday, Sept. 1, 1960 THE WASHINGTON POST

Halperin, U. S. Ex-Aide, Is Now a Soviet Official

Associated Press

The State Department says that Maurice H. Halperin, a former United States Government official linked by Senate investigators to Soviet espionage activities, apparently is serving now as a Latin-American adviser to the Russians.

Halperin was head of the Latin-American Division of the Office of Strategic Services during the latter part of World War II and later an associate professor at Boston University. Before the war, he had been on the faculty of the University of Oklahoma.

In 1954 he was dismissed by Boston University after Senate investigators received testimony linking him to a Soviet spy ring and he refused to answer a question as to whether he was a Communist.

The latest information on Halperin's whereabouts is contained in a report compiled by the State Department about persons to whom it has been compelled to issue passports under a 1958 decision of the Supreme Court.

The Court held that the Department lacks authority to deny passports to Communists or to other persons because of their political beliefs.

Associated Press

MAURICE H. HALPERIN
... believed Soviet employe

After the ruling, Halperin applied for a passport at the American Embassy in Mexico City, where he had gone after being dismissed by Boston University, and used it to leave Mexico on Oct. 13, 1958.

The State Department said that shortly after Halperin and his wife departed from Mexico it received information that he was employed in Moscow by the Soviet Union.

"This was confirmed on July 15, 1960, when the Halperins appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow and presented their U. S. passports for renewal," the Department's report said, adding:

"Halperin stated that he had been in the U.S.S.R. since December, 1958, and that he is employed by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences where he is doing research in the foreign field, specially, relating to undeveloped countries."

The Department recalled that Halperin was something of an authority on Latin-American affairs and said, "Our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time."

1 Sep 60
201-128561

14-00000

Ex-OSS Official Works For Reds in Moscow

By VICTOR LASKY
North American Newspaper Alliance

WASH DC STAR

31 Aug 60

MAURICE H. HALPERIN
—AP Photo

A former Boston University professor, who once was a high official in the OSS, has turned up in Moscow working for the Soviet government.

The professor, Dr. Maurice H. Halperin, fled this country seven years ago after an inquiry into his Communist background.

According to the State Department, he probably is advising Soviet officials on Latin American affairs, an area in which he is expert.

Prof. Halperin was suspended by Boston University in 1953 after he refused, on constitutional grounds, to tell a Senate subcommittee whether he had ever been a Communist Party member.

According to the State Department, he had previously been involved in Soviet espionage in wartime Washington. He had been named by Elizabeth Terril Bentley, admitted former spy courier, as one of her sources of supply among Government officials.

Intrigue in Mexico

And since 1953, Dr. Halperin has been involved in still more intrigue as an "exile" in Mexico. It was he, for example, who assisted two suspected spies in their flight from Mexico to Czechoslovakia to avoid United States extradition proceedings.

On July 15, 1960, Dr. Halperin and his wife, Edith, appeared at the United States Embassy in Moscow to present their United States passports for renewal.

All this was disclosed in a State Department memorandum prepared for Senator Keating, Republican of New York, who has been urging the passage of Eisenhower-supported legislation empowering the department to deny passports to active participants in Soviet skullduggery.

The memorandum, citing "cases where passports have had to be issued to known Communists," devoted considerable attention to the case of Dr. Halperin. It was obvious on the basis of the information contained in his dossier that the State Department had been keeping an eye on the former professor's movements for some time.

Fired in Oklahoma

From 1931 to 1941, Dr. Halperin—a Harvard University graduate—had been a professor at the University of Oklahoma. According to the record, it was in this period that he directed Communist activities in Oklahoma and, on repeated visits to Mexico, conferred with Mexican Red leaders. On one visit to Cuba in 1935, he and other leftwingers had been arrested by Cuban authorities and expelled from the country.

In 1941, much of this was disclosed in an investigation conducted by an Oklahoma State legislative committee. The committee, investigating subversive activities in Oklahoma, produced information that in 1940 Dr. Halperin had cashed a check for $436 drawn on the Bank of Foreign Trade in Moscow. As a result, Dr. Halperin was dismissed from the University of Oklahoma.

Despite this record, Dr. Halperin managed to enter Gov-

See HALPERIN, Page A-6

HALPERIN

Continued From First Page

ernment service. Employed as chief of the Latin American division of the Office of Strategic Services (the OSS was then the United States Civilian Intelligence-Gathering Agency), he later was transferred to the State Department. In both agencies, according to the Elizabeth Bentley testimony, he transmitted confidential documents to a Soviet spy ring.

Linked to Spy Ring

In 1949, he became head of the Latin American regional students section at Boston University's College of Liberal Arts.

A year later, he was first publicly identified as a member of a Soviet spy ring. This came about when Vice President Nixon, then a California Congressman, made known a top secret memorandum on espionage transmitted by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the White House on November 8, 1945.

In March, 1953, in Boston's Federal Building, Dr. Halperin repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment when—in a hearing conducted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee—he refused to reply to various questions concerning his alleged Communist activities.

In November, 1953, Dr. Halperin and his wife, without notifying the university, left their home in the middle of the night never to return. Turning up in Mexico, they became members of the American Communist group in Mexico.

Like most ACGM members, the Halperins did well. They invested in an ice cream company, dabbled in real estate, and obtained jobs. Dr. Halperin was employed by the Mexican government as a financial consultant and his wife taught in the American School Foundation.

They also became friendly with Alfred K. Stern and his wife, the former Martha Dodd, daughter of a former United States Ambassador to Germany. The fact the Sterns had been implicated in Soviet espionage came out with the arrest in New York of Jack Soble, a Soviet agent. To avoid being extradited to the United States to testify before a special grand jury on their associations with Soble and "the double agent Boris Morros," the Sterns fled to Czechoslovakia in July, 1957.

Dr. Halperin, described as being "intimately involved in their plans for escape," had obtained airline reservations for the Sterns under other names. As a result, the Mexican government was considering his case for deportation. On October 12, 1958, the Halperins left Mexico, having obtained plane reservations in the names of other persons.

In Russia Since 1958

The State Department memorandum concludes:

"We received information shortly after Halperin's departure from Mexico that he was employed in Moscow by the USSR. This was confirmed on July 15, 1960, when the Halperins appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow and presented their United States passports for renewal.

"Halperin stated that he had been in the USSR since December, 1958, and that he is employed by the Soviet Academy of Sciences where he is doing research . . . relating to underdeveloped countries.

"It will be recalled that Halperin is something of an authority on Latin American affairs. Our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time.

"The Soviet Academy of Sciences is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers."

31 Aug 60

201-128561

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
		2. RI FILE NO.		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, MAURICE

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
201-128561.
LETTER TO SR. SRA, ALBERT MALTZ /RE FAMILY MATTERS, COMMING VISIT OF HALPERIN CHILDREN, MALTZ VISIT.

201-005239
HMMA-15425
03 AUG 60
0P-974

PAFR

3 Aug 60

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
RID/An

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.				
2.				
3. 046 WHD BARTIN			13 APR 1960	
4.				
5. Hyn			16/IV	
6. King		18 Apr	18	mk
7. Hughes				EH
8.				
9. CI/SID/Goller		23.IV.60	29 APR 1960	aye
10.				
11. FS/SRS				BAP
12.				
13.				E
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				
18.				
19.				
20. RID/FI	1400L			

COMMENTS

credit

Copies detached

RECORD COPY

X REF 201-5239

Per OOF-45587, 24 Mar 60, Hqs not required to pass ~~his~~ these ltrs to FBI which were passed to FBI in Mex.C. mak

Copy filed 100-6-113

HALPERIN, MAURICE H.

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	X	FILE NUMBER 201-128561 AK
	INDEX		
DATE MICROFILMED		DOCUMENT DATE 5 APR [illegible]	DOCUMENT NUMBER HMMA-14789

FORM 6-60 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMM-A-14789
TO	Chief, WHD	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-128561 P-1115
INFO		
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico	DATE 8 April 1960
SUBJECT	Maurice H. HALPERIN	RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED	Information only	
REFERENCE(S)	SOURCE: LIEIGHT/LIMUD	

1. Attached for your information and retention are two items of correspondence sent from Moscow by Maurice H. HALPERIN and/or Edith HALPERIN to the Albert MALTZ(201-5239) family in Mexico.

2. Copies of this correspondence have been given to ODENVY locally for their information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments
1- negatives, 1 letter, 1 post card
2- prints 3 negatives

6 April 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS w/atts

8 Apr 60

CS COPY H-ENCL 201-128561

FORM 10-57 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

negatives, HMMA-14789

Att. 1 to HMMA-14789 (negatives)

8 Apr 60
201-128561

SUNDAY, JULY 1

HOLIDAY THRILLERS

PATRICK QUENTIN
his 'Shadow of Guilt'
'Enthrallingly readable'—S. Times

ELIZ. FENWICK
her 'A Long Way Down'
'Brilliant'—Western Mail

EDWIN LANHAM
his 'Double Jeopardy'
'A great climax'—L'pool Post

JEAN POTTS
her 'Blood Will Tell'
'First-rate'—Sphere

DESMOND O'NEILL
his 'Life Has No Price'
'Unusually good'—Spectator

"GOBBLING BILLY"
Dyneley James novel about a VETERAN CAR that they are calling "as good as Genevieve"

"7 SHARES IN A GOLD MINE"
This astonishing real-life crime story by Margaret Larkin has created an immediate sensation
"Fascinating, enthralling"

Mr. E. Halpern
Kutuzovsky Prospekt 13
Apt 127
Moscow G.245
U.S.S.R.

PAR AVION

МОСКВА

МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ

Mrs Margaret Maltz
Yarlo 14
San Angel
Mexico City

МЕКСИКА

201-128541

Att #2 to HMMA-14589

August 6, 1959.
Kutuzovsky Prospect 13
Apt 127
Moscow G 248.
U.S.S.R.

Dearest Margaret & family,

We missed all of you when you left. Even now we often look up at your window hoping you still may be there.

Thanks for thinking of David. He bought a guitar – has been playing folk tunes since.

We are well. It's hot and dusty here now, but we manage. Our apt's fine. Our trip of 7 days at Leningrad was most delightful. It's a real interesting city and the Hermitage comes real close to the Louvre.

David got notice to day he passed the first half 6 - all he took - of his National Medical Board Exams. He made 78 - 75's passing, we are pleased.

What's new with all of you. How's the weather? How did you enjoy Paris. We did get your book from London & gave it to the Doctor. Saw the clipping in a London paper. Congratulations!!

Love from all of us –

Edith.



ION

Leningrad
29/7/59

This is the view from our hotel window. You mustn't miss this town next time – it's a city in the grand tradition: palaces, parks and wonderful people.

Ella David [illegible]

Familia MALTZ
Yarto 14
México 20, D.F.
MEXICO

Монферран



14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
CI/SID

NO. CSCI-3/759,324

DATE 1 Apr 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WE/3				For Coordination
2.				
3. Chief, CI Staff			SHH	
4.				12856
5. CI/LSN	31 MAR 1960			
6.				
7. RID/AN		4/4		
8. RID/MIS				°HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman 201-128561 ✓ ~~201-[illegible]~~
9. RID/AN		7/4		ABSTRACT X INDEX DATE 1 APR 1960
10. RID/MIS				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15. RI/FI				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

1 APR 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT : Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
Espionage - R
Bureau File Number 65-14503

1. This office has learned through a sensitive source of known reliability that, for many years, Maurice Hyman HALPERIN has been acquainted with a Dr. Marc JAIMA who had an office at 55 bis rue de la Convention, Paris 15, France.

2. On 12 February 1960 we learned through a delicate source who has provided reliable information in the past that Marc JAIMA, M. D., a naturalized French citizen, born on 29 December 1906 in [illegible], Rumania, resides with his family at 55 bis rue de la Convention, Paris 15. His wife, Ernestine Monique JAIMA, nee SEGAL, was born in Paris on 30 January 1913. A son, Serge JAIMA, was born on 7 October 1940 in Charenton-le-Pont, Seine, France. This source had no derogatory information on JAIMA.

3. According to our records, a Dr. M. JAIMA, living at 55 bis rue de la Convention, Paris 15, was a member of the "Comite d'Initiative" (organizing committee) of MRAP (Le Mouvement Contre le Racisme, l'Anti-Semitisme et Pour la Paix - Movement Against Racism, Anti-Semitism and for Peace), a Communist front organization formed in 1949 to promote Communism among Jewish elements. However, our records fail to show any continued record of activity in this organization on the part of JAIMA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

Signed: S. H. Horton
JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-3/759,324

COPY FILED IN 201-272727

SECRET
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
CS COPY

201-128561
~~201-185653~~

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WE/3
1 - C/CI
3 - CI/SID
√1 - RID (201-272727 re JAIME)
1 - RID (201-185053 re HALPERIN)

Basic cys:
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/SMA

CI/SID ~~[illegible]~~ (28 March 1960)
[illegible]
Based on OFPA-50546, dated 12 February 1960, Source: UNRAVE

201-128561
~~201-185053~~

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)



HALPERIN, MAURICE
201-128561
SEX M DOB ?

201-271376
HMMA-14482
10 FEB 60

CIT ?
OCC ?

MEMBER OF AMERICAN COMMUNIST GROUP IN MEXICO. CONTACT OF ADOLFO RUDICH GOLDBERG 201-271376 10 FEB 57.

CORR CARD

R 7302220210

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 128561			

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 8-64

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
CI/SID

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Chief, CI				
2.				
3. CI/CPS/Evans		4	4	
4. SR/COP/CE	1959			
5. ~~Selme~~ WH/3		9 1959	9 1959	
6.				
7. D... Collins WE/3 Clarke				
8.				
9. Chief, WE/3			14 Nov	
10.				
11. RI				
12.				
13.				
14. RI/AN				
15. RI/FI				
16.				
17.				
18.				

COMMENTS

Halperin, Maurice
Hyman

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS NAME	OFFICE
J. Evans Jean Evans	CI/CPS
	WH/3
	WE/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER NAME	TITLE
J. Angleton James Angleton	Chief, CI Staff

RELEASING OFFICER NAME	TITLE
~~[illegible]~~	C/WE/3 ~~Chief, WE Division~~

ENCLOSURE:

ABSTRACT: X
INDEX

FILE NUMBER: 201-128561 ✓

DATE MICROFILMED:

DOCUMENT DATE:

DOCUMENT NUMBER: [illegible]

FORM 3-58 610b

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
NOFORN [illegible] CONTROL

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OFPW-26192

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-128561

FROM
Chief, WE Division

DATE
[illegible]

SUBJECT
General - LCMAYPOHL
Specific - Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
Born 3 March 1906, Boston, Mass.

ACTION REQUIRED
See Paragraph 3

REFERENCE(S)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

1. It has come to our attention through a sensitive source of known reliability that Maurice Hyman HALPERIN, a former member of our predecessor organization, apparently has known the following individual for a number of years:

Dr. Marc *JAINA
74 Avenue Gastob Boissier
Viroflay (Seine et Oise), France

Office address c 1945
55 bis rue de la Convention
Paris 15, France

2. HALPERIN, who is residing in the USSR at the present time, is of continuing interest to us because of his prior connection with our predecessor organization and the Department of State and because of his association with known Soviet agents including Martha Dodd STERN and her husband, Alfred K. STERN. In the summer of 1959 HALPERIN's son, Charles (Carlos) David *HALPERIN, who is generally known as David HALPERIN (born 5 May 1937, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), visited the JAINA family in Paris en route to and from the USSR to see his parents. It is believed that he was in Paris c 25-30 June 1959 and again in the latter part of August 1959.

3. We would appreciate having you attempt to obtain information on JAINA through your independent sources. We prefer not to disclose to your liaison services our knowledge of HALPERIN's connection with the JAINA family because of the sensitivity of our source. However, we would have no objection to your querying your liaison services for information on David HALPERIN based upon the attached newspaper clipping. David HALPERIN is now in Chicago, Illinois where he is studying medicine. Maurice HALPERIN attended the Universite de Paris c 1929-1931.

MORTIMER F. BINGHAM

Attachment

Distribution:
  Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att.
  1 - WE/3 w/att.
  1 - WH/3 w/att.
  1 - RID (201-128561) w/att.
  3 - CI/SID w/3 atts.

CI/SID:AEgerter:lac/2356

14 Dec 59
201-128561

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
NOFORN [illegible] CONTROL

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

The Washington Post
6 December 1958

6 Dec 58

Red Asylum in Mexico . . By Roscoe Drummond

Foreign Communists Find It a Safe Operating Base

MEXICO CITY—Foreign Communists continue to find Mexico an easy and valuable base from which to operate—and they are operating on a large scale today.

Drummond

Mexico provides not only a welcome haven when things get too hot at home—there are at least 100 Communist families from the United States here right now—but also a strategic post from which to mount subversive activities throughout the western hemisphere.

For years the Mexican government has given safe harbor for foreign Communists—as well as revolutionaries of the extreme right—on the theory that it was applying the respected and humane concept of asylum for those suffering political persecution.

Mexican leaders and intellectuals greatly pride themselves that their country offers asylum so freely and so unquestioningly and there is no evidence that the new government will change this policy in any important particular.

What Mexican leaders do not choose to recognize is that there is a vast difference between providing asylum for those who are persecuted and providing asylum for those who use this privilege to prepare persecution against others.

THIS IS the way the great [illegible] tradition of political asylum is being abused here today. The record is perfectly clear on that.

For five years Mexico harbored some 100 to 150 Venezuelan Communist leaders assembled under the direction of the Soviet Embassy. They carried on subversion against their country from within Mexico and the dangerous rise of communism in Venezuela came from services rendered while Mexico was making it safe for them to operate. They have now made their way back to Venezuela.

There is a group of at least 80 Guatemalan Communists who are doing the same thing and are waiting only the timely moment to return.

Occasionally a foreign Communist violates his "asylum" so blatantly that he runs afoul of the law here or elsewhere. This is what happened to Jose Manuel Fortuny, the Secretary General of the Communist Party in Guatemala, who has been operating freely here for some time. He obtained a false Mexican passport to go to Moscow a few weeks ago, but this became known and had to be discarded. He started his return trip by way of Rio de Janeiro and was picked up by the alert Brazilian police for presenting another false passport.

THE ADULT United States Communist population here hovers around 200 most of the time. Once in a while a U. S. Communist, as in the recent case of Gus Hall, is given over to U. S. authorities. But this is a rarity. When Communist Albert S. Stern whose wife is Communist Martha Dodd Stern, was wanted to testify in the Soble Soviet spy case, he was sheltered safely here. They both made off for Prague, where they were lately joined by Maurice Halperin, a former Boston University teacher who was also living here—and now all three are ready for future assignments.

Moscow maintains a busy and bulging embassy in Mexico City, one of its largest in the western hemisphere, to direct and energize subversive operations. There are 128 adults on the embassy list and 48 children. Wives do their embassy chores whether they are accredited or not.

The clandestine character of much of the Soviet embassy's role here is illustrated by its extremely tight operations. It does not permit itself to employ a single Mexican national to do even the most menial caretaking work. A Mexican isn't allowed even to polish the knob on the outside of the front door. It uses only ten non-Soviet employes and these are Communists imported from Spain. All ten speak Russian fluently.

Even the education of the children of the embassy staff is carried on inside the embassy walls and no Mexican teachers are employed.

The Soviet embassy has ten officers on its military staff among whom are three naval captains—this in a country whose navy is virtually nonexistent. This staff is obviously more concerned with what military secrets it can procure from the United States than from Mexico, particularly since the border is so easy to cross by agents who serve the Soviets here in Mexico.

Copyright 1958 New York Herald Tribune, Inc.

14-00000

201-128561

148

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

CSCI-3/757639

8 DEC 1959

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Albert MALTZ

REFERENCE: CSCI-3/755,300, dated 26 June 1959

Listed below are the names of persons or companies with whom Subject and/or his wife have been in correspondence during the period 17 August to 23 October 1959. For your information only, a photocopy of each item is attached. Since the following correspondence was obtained from a highly sensitive source, information contained herein should not be disseminated outside of your Bureau.

1. Correspondence with Ed MALTZ, 27 E. 72th Street, New York 21. (Attachment 1)

   a) In a short letter postmarked 14 September 1959 the writer asks Subject and his wife to send a note to "Aunt Marg", at Forest Hills Nursing Home, Yellowstone Blvd., Forest Hills, N.Y. Enclosed with the letter is a small newspaper clipping, apparently to point out that Paul NEWMAN will do *Exodus*.

   b) A personal letter from "Ed", with no return address, is postmarked New York City. Enclosed with the letter is a copy of the first page of the Sports Section from the 27 September 1959 issue of the *New York Times*.

   c) An unsigned personal letter, bearing no return address, is postmarked New York City and addressed to Miss Kathy MALTZ. Ed MALTZ is apparently planning to visit Mexico during December. He enclosed a newspaper clipping, concerning actors who are taking part in the film production of *Exodus*, for delivery to Subject.

Card as correspondent of Albert Maltz 201-5239

2. Correspondence with Maxim [illegible], Marszalkowska 10/16 m 71, Warsaw, Poland. (Attachment 2)

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

201-5239

8 Dec 59
201-128561

a) In a personal letter dated 17 August 1959, addressed to Margaret MALTZ and signed by "Maxim," one paragraph reads: "You may have been joking when you spoke of 'delirious crowds who greeted Nixon.' The fact, alas, is that the crowds were large and enthusiastic, DESPITE THE FACT THAT NEITHER THE NEWSPAPERS NOR THE RADIO ANNOUNCED THE HOUR OF THE ARRIVAL OR THE ROUTE TO BE TAKEN. The Poles still feel closer to the USA than to the USSR. After all, they have millions of kinsfolk in the States who send them food or clothing or money."

b) MALTZ forwarded a letter dated 14 September 1959, which had been addressed to [illegible], at Apartado 21378 in Mexico City, from Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., publishers, 750 Third Ave., New York. The letter, signed by Lisa M. MAYER, of the School Textbook Department, requests LIEBER's permission to reprint "A Shipment of Mute Fate" by Martin STORM, adapted for radio by Les CRUTCHFIELD.

c) A letter dated [illegible] September 1959 from "Maxim" is addressed to Subject's wife. LIEBER is glad to learn that Bart FLES, New York literary agent, has no objection to LIEBER's handling Seven [illegible] in a Cold [illegible] for possible Polish publication. LIEBER cannot understand why Subject's wife should wish to disguise herself by using the pen name "Eugenio [illegible]." "Unless in selecting a Russian pseudonym you wished in this subtle fashion to cast aspersion on the Russian character." LIEBER has just returned from Bulgaria, where he had spent fifteen days "on a perfectly glorious beach on the Black Sea .... we have little to complain about, especially since Khrushchev is strengthening the peace front." LIEBER had received a letter from Phil [presumably Philip STEVENSON] and also a card from "Jerry, who seems to be enjoying Moscow. His wife, Alice, returned to the states. Question: Will Jerry follow?" Toward the end of the letter LIEBER thanks his correspondent for the greetings from Salvador OCAMPO and Berta. "What, I wonder, is Salvador doing since the dismal failure of that bandit? It may interest you to know that Alice MILVY, the widow of the lawyer who had set up that scoundrel with a substantial sum, told us that her husband had also been victimised, and he had been one of [illegible]'s closest friends." LIEBER's letter also indicates that Margaret MALTZ stayed at the Grand Hotel while in Warsaw.

③

d) Note from Subject to LINNER, dated 7 October 1959. Subject has mailed a check to LINNER's account in [illegible] and will continue to transfer the interest, apparently on some investment, about every two months.

e) Letter from LINNER, addressed to Subject and dated 7 October 1959. LINNER will have a statement notarised by a [illegible] officer to indicate MALTZ is holding "[illegible] funds" for the LINNERs. LINNER mentions "the various reverential references to 'God' that Khrushchev has been making on his transcontinental tour. Rather incongruous for the kind of atheist K. insists he is. But I'm sure that a good part of the American people are favorably impressed ... I personally feel convinced that Khrushchev's visit to the U.S.A. is going to compel a relaxation of tensions." In this letter LINNER says he was down on the Black Sea coast in Bulgaria for the first twenty days of September. In expressing sorrow over the death of Dr. Ernesto AMANN, LINNER writes, "I even have a sense of guilt and complicity in his tragic and untimely end (Ursula [Dr. AMANN's wife], by the way, indicated that this wasn't normal, but of course this remains between us) because while he was still in Mexico Ernesto had written us to say how anxious he was to get to one of the people's democracies where he could make a contribution; and we pulled a number of wires here and in Berlin to achieve this for him."

3. Correspondence with Maurice HALPERIN, Kutusovsky Prospect, 13, Apartment 127, Moscow G-[illegible]. (Attachment 3)

[illegible] of Albert Maltz 74-52139

a) In a letter from HALPERIN, dated 26 September 1959, the writer emphasizes the importance of addressing his mail correctly, as captioned above. On 25 September HALPERIN received a letter dated 15 September from the MALTZes; however, pictures were not enclosed, and HALPERIN wonders whether this happened through error or pilferage. He is pleased with clippings Margaret has sent him and thanks Albert for the UN materials. HALPERIN is stunned by the death of Narciso BASSOLS, with whom he had had a "stimulating conversation" last February in Moscow. The HALPERINs expect to get a telephone soon; next week HALPERIN will have a full-time research assistant. In the postscript, he adds, "Any news about the little business matter of ours we asked you to handle?" He offers to see ROMANOVA about a Russian edition of Seven Shares ... [See references to Helen ROMANOVA under 4 - e, below]

③

b) Another letter from [illegible] dated 14 October 1959 acknowledges receipt of the UN "Ec Survey of LA 1957" and a registered package containing clippings.

4. Correspondence concerning Seven Shares in a Gold Mine. (Attachment 4)

a) Subject's wife, in several letters dated 23 September 1959, wrote persons listed below that she was asking her English publishers, Victor Gollancz, Ltd., to send each a copy of her book entitled Seven Shares in a Gold Mine, obviously to promote its sales and to seek its publication in Soviet✓ Satellite countries. In two of the letters, addressed to the first two persons listed below, she enclosed copies of a review of the book, written by Viola Brothers SHORE, which appeared in Mainstream, an American magazine.

Mr. Alexei KRASILNIKOV, Publishing House for Foreign Literature, 52 Novo Alexeyevskaya, Moscow, USSR

Mr. Miodrag STAMATOVIC, Jugoslovenska Autorska Agencija, Marsala Tita 16, Belgrade, Yugoslavia

Mr. Edmund SEMIL, Nowotki 25 m 363, Warsaw, Poland

Mr. Adam TARN, Sandomierska 21, Warsaw, Poland

Miss Raya [illegible], Foreign Literature, Piatnitskaya 41, Moscow, USSR

Miss Oksana [illegible], Foreign Commission of Union of Soviet Writers, 52 Ulitsa Vorovskogo, Moscow, USSR [see 4 - e, below]

Miss [illegible] [illegible], Literaturnaya Gazeta, Tsvetnoi Bulvar 30, Moscow, USSR

b) In another letter dated 23 September 1959, and addressed to Mr. Hilary [illegible], Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden, London, W.C. 2, Subject's wife requests that the names and addresses of SEMIL and TARN, two literary people in Poland, be added to the list she had sent the publishers a day or two ago.

③

c) A letter from Victor Gollancz Ltd., signed by Hilary RUBINSTEIN and dated 29 September, is in answer to an order placed by Subject's wife.

d) A letter from Dilia, Czechoslovak Theatrical and Literary Agency, Prague, dated 26 September 1959, acknowledges receipt of reviews of Seven Shares in a Gold Mine, which have been sent on to a publishing house for consideration.

e) A letter from Kasara [illegible]RSKAYA dated 21 October 1959 acknowledges receipt of book and letter, noted in 4 - a, above. [illegible] passes on greetings from Helen [illegible].

f) On 20 October 1959, a check, drawn on the Security First National Bank of Los Angeles and signed by Margaret MALTZ, is sent to Simon and Schuster, Inc., 136 West 52nd Street, New York 19, N.Y.

X A CIT Spain?

5. Correspondence with Pilar de AMANN, Tomas Breton 9, Madrid, Spain. (Attachment 5)

[illegible] Albert Maltz 201-5239

a) A handwritten letter in Spanish from "Pilar" to the MALTZes is dated 20 September 1959. Pilar has just received MALTZes' letter telling her of the death of Dr. Ernesto AMANN, her former husband, and now requests details as to the circumstances. She writes that their son Dickie had not heard from his father since September 1958, nor has the last letter AMANN had written his son via the MALTZes been received.

b) An answer to the foregoing, written in Spanish by Subject's wife, on 1 October 1959, reveals that a letter which Dr. AMANN had written on 27 July had been forwarded to Pilar de AMANN for delivery to their son Dickie. Although Subject's wife, at Dr. AMANN's request, had read the letter and had forwarded it to Pilar at the above address, she cannot understand why it was not received. Subject's wife relates what was in the letter to Dickie. Suffering from encephalitis, Dr. AMANN died in a German hospital after his return there for the third time. The MALTZes visited Dr. AMANN during their recent European trip.

6. Correspondence with Ben MARGOLIS, Attorney, 112 West 9th Street, Los Angeles 15, California. (Attachment 6)

③

201-5239

a) In a letter dated 16 September MARGOLIS asks MALTZ to give his preference for attorneys to consult with respect to the possibility of litigation against the Immigration Service.

b) Subject's answer to the foregoing is dated 23 September. Since Rabinowitz and Boudin had represented him previously, Subject writes, he would be reluctant to hire any other law firm unless there were a "solid reason" to do so.

7. Correspondence with Bernard SKAIRCH, Public Accountant, Business [illegible], [illegible] Box 1035, Studio City, California. (Attachment 7)

a) Four pieces of correspondence, dated early October 1959, concern Subject's finances.

b) A letter from SKAIRCH, dated 22 September 1959, deals with real estate investment opportunities as well as with Subject's finances.

c) With a letter dated 13 October 1959 SKAIRCH sends Subject a copy of Waldo FRANK's petition for a writ of certiorari to review an earlier judgment preventing his travel to China.

d) In an envelope postmarked 22 October 1959 SKAIRCH mailed Subject his check book analysis for September. ecI - U.S.

8. Correspondence with Philip and Janet STEVENSON, 2101 Stanley Hills Drive, Los Angeles 46, California. (Attachment 8) 201-5239

a) In an envelope postmarked 16 September 1959 Philip STEVENSON sends Subject a copy of a memorandum dated 14 September 1959 which STEVENSON had sent to Ry ANZEL. STEVENSON is sending ANZEL "the finished screen treatment of Albert MALTZ's novel, The Cross and the Arrow, under the working title of The Hill under Storm." The memorandum concerns financial agreement for this under contract.

b) A letter dated 13 September 1959 sets forth STEVENSON's ideas for writing a screenplay, presumably based on La Rosa Blanca. STEVENSON may go to Mexico for a few days on 25 September to discuss the book.

c) Personal thank-you note, dated 3 October 1959, from Janet STEVENSON to Margaret MALTZ, following Philip STEVENSON's return from a visit with the MALTZes.

3

d) A paper, presumably prepared by Subject, presents the factual errors in The Cross and the Arrow and is addressed to Philip [illegible].

e) A personal letter from STEVENSON to the MALTZes is dated 7 October 1959. With thanks, STEVENSON acknowledges receipt on 6 October of the material on The Cross and the Arrow. The writer is apparently working on a story, probably La Rosa Blanca, an outline of which he will send the MALTZes.

f) In a letter dated 29 October 1959 Subject writes his comments and criticism of STEVENSON's screenplay outline of La Rosa Blanca.

9. Correspondence with Mrs. Laurie BLANKFORT, 504 North Bedford Drive, Beverly Hills, California. (Attachment 9)

a) In a letter dated [illegible] September 1959 and addressed to Margaret MALTZ, Laurie BLANKFORT discusses plans for placing one [illegible], a Mexican girl, in the home of a certain PATTEN family in California.

b) Margaret MALTZ, in a personal letter dated 9 October 1959, acknowledges receipt of the foregoing letter by thanking Laurie for visiting Mrs. PATTEN. Subject's wife tells her correspondent that she (Margaret) is going to be interviewed on television in Spanish in a couple of weeks. As indicated in this letter, Mrs. BLANKFORT has visited Mexico.

10. Correspondence with 530 N. Fuller Avenue, Los Angeles 36, California. (Attachment 10)

a) A personal letter dated 24 September 1959 and signed "Miriam" is addressed to Subject's wife. The envelope bears the above return address.

b) In an unsigned letter bearing the above return address, dated 2 October 1959, the writer asks whether Subject has received the Merry Go Round renewal Assignment. (see paragraph 15 - 1)

11. Correspondence with Dr. Ada [illegible], Government Press Office, Tel Aviv, Israel. (Attachment 11)

③

a) In a letter dated 22 September 1959 FRENKEL acknowledges receipt of two letters, dated 31 August and 3 September, from Subject. The writer gives background information on the formation of the State of Israel, obviously at the request of MALTZ.

b) Apparently in answer to a request by letter dated 1[illegible] September from Subject, FRENKEL, in a letter dated 2[illegible] September, describes medical practices among the Druse. In a handwritten postscript the writer notes he will devote his time, as Subject requested, to PREMINGER while he is in Israel, only however if the writer is given notice of PREMINGER's arrival date well in advance.

c) A letter dated 9 October from FRENKEL acknowledges receipt of two cables from Subject and encloses a summary of security measures in Famagusta, Cyprus, during the Aliya-Beth era, presumably as background information for Subject's writings.

d) Three letters, dated 13, 15, and 19 October 1959, from Dr. Adia FRENKEL provide Subject with additional background information and research analyses. The letter dated 13 October includes photostats of identity cards issued in 1946, 1947, and 1948.

e) In a letter dated 20 October 1959 Subject poses to FRENKEL a series of questions concerning the Haganah leaders and Irgun members. Subject indicates that "Otto" [probably PREMINGER] was in Mexico the previous week, working with Subject on the story. "Otto" will be arriving at the Hotel Dan between November 15 and 18 for a five-week stay in Israel.

[In view of information contained in these letters, as well as in other pieces of correspondence noted herein, it would appear that Subject is working on a screenplay for the movie to be based on Leon URIS' best seller, Exodus. Otto PREMINGER, well-known Hollywood movie director, is scheduled to direct the film version of Exodus.]

12. Correspondence with Larry Edmunds Bookshop, 6658 Hollywood Boulevard, Hollywood 28, California. (Attachment 12)

a) A letter from the bookshop dated 23 September 1959 is signed "Milton." Milton sent Dr. AMANN "the Casserole Cooking" the day he received MALTZ's letter but neglected to bill Subject. Books for Subject have been ordered from England.

③

b) Subject's check payable to Larry Edmunds Bookshop is enclosed in an envelope addressed to the bookshop and postmarked 3 October 1959. Also enclosed is the letter listed above, on which MALTZ has added his comments, noting that AMANN has died and that Subject will await delivery of the books ordered.

c) Letter dated 28 October 1959, addressed to Subject's wife, is signed "Milton." Apparently in answer to a request made by Subject's wife, the letter lists works by CHEKHOV which the book shop has in stock.

13. Correspondence with Seven Seas Books, Glinkastrasse 13 - 15, Berlin, Germany. (Attachment 13)

a) A letter dated 22 September 1959 and signed by Kay PANKEY tells Subject that Seven Seas Publishers is sending him thirty copies of The Cross and the Arrow in care of Larry Edmunds Bookshop in Hollywood.

b) Letter from Seven Seas Books, dated 5 October 1959, is signed "Gertrude" (Gertrude GELBIN, chief editor). Gertrude has been and continues to be in poor health. She writes about what appears to be sales figures for a particular publication, perhaps one of Subject's books.

14. Correspondence with Dilia, Czechoslovak Theatrical and Literary Agency, Prague, Czechoslovakia. (Attachment 14)

a) Letter from Dilia, dated 24 September 1959, is signed by Dr. Vojtech STRNAD. Subject is requested to send another copy of his play Black Pit for the Slovak translation.

b) Letter from Dilia, dated 29 September 1959, is signed by "Barnum." The writer acknowledges receipt of signed copies of an agreement for the Czech edition of The Cross and the Arrow. The last paragraph of the letter concerns stories by one Mr. ROBERTS, Penitenciaria 469-8, Guadalajara, Jalisco, which Dilia has forwarded to publishers for consideration.

c) A letter from Dilia dated 9 October 1959 informs Subject that an advance on the Czech edition of The Journey of Simon McKeever, to be published by the State Publishing House of Political Literature of Prague, has been transferred to Subject's account with the Banco Nacional de Mexico.

③

15. Correspondence addressed to Subject at Yarto 14, San Angel, Mexico 20, D.F. (Attachment 15)

a) Letter from Kindler Verlag, Lucile-Grahn-Strasse 37, Munich 8, Germany, dated 15 September 1959 and signed by Dr. F. J. RADDATZ. RADDATZ acknowledges receipt of a letter dated 22 August from Subject. The writer has obtained a copy of The Cross and the Arrow and will inform MALTZ should he decide to publish a West German edition.

b) In a letter dated 17 September 1959 from Ingo PREMINGER, of Preminger/Stuart Agency, Inc., 8462 Boulevard, Hollywood 36, California, the writer discusses financing arrangements for a film production.

c) Letter from Adrian SCOTT, 13341 Wyandotte St., Van Nuys, California, dated 22 September 1959, in which the writer encloses a check, signed by Robert A. Scott for 350 dollars, for payment on a loan MALTZ made to the writer, apparently several years ago.

d) Letter from Jewish Currents, 22 East 17th Street, New York 3, N.Y., dated 23 September 1959 and signed by Morris U. SCHAPPES, editor. The writer acknowledges receipt of a contribution Subject had made while abroad. The editor suggests Subject might write for publication in Jewish Currents an article or travel letter about any one of the countries he visited recently.

e) Letter from Science & Society, 30 East 20th Street, New York 3, N.Y., dated 28 September 1959 and signed by T. E. [illegible], secretary. Swedish press cuttings will be held until the return of Henry MINS, who will be abroad until the middle of November.

f) Letter from Dr. Harold LEVINE, Room 1324 Karl Meyer Hall, Cook County Hospital, Chicago 12, Illinois, dated 1 October 1959. The writer makes reference to A Long Day in a Short Life and The Journey of Simon McKeever and suggests Subject may one day visit Cook County Hospital in Chicago, a place filled with "humanist literature."

g) Circular from the Committee to Secure Justice for Morton SOBELL, 940 Broadway, New York 10, N.Y., postmarked 7 October 1959 and entitled Toward Freedom for Morton Sobell, Next Steps in our Program.

h) Letter from Avraham [illegible], Ben-Shemen Youth-Village, Near Lod, Israel, dated 7 October 1959. The writer thanks Subject for his books and offers help in supplying material Subject may wish for his "book about Israel." [illegible] describes his work among the children, adding that he will leave Ben-Shemen during the summer of 1960 to complete his studies in the field of education for a year or two in either England or the United States.

i) Letter from the legal department of Universal Pictures Company, Inc., Universal City, California, dated 12 October 1959 and signed by Joseph S. DUBIN, chief studio counsel. Enclosed with the letter is an Assignment, giving exclusive motion picture rights for Merry Go Round, a play written by Subject (under pseudonym of Eric [illegible]) and George SKLAR, to Universal Pictures. Since Subject is in Mexico, the writer requests that the enclosed Assignment be executed by Subject before a consular officer or notary of the American Embassy.

Alias of Albert Maltz XI-5739

j) Another letter from Universal Pictures, dated 28 October 1959, encloses a second copy of the foregoing Assignment, to be executed in New York.

k) Although Camille (Mrs. Jean) PARIS, of 4 Francis Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts, writes on 13 October 1959 she would be happy to translate one of Subject's novels, she must first be certain a publisher wants it. She does not want to repeat the unfortunate experience of Black Pit, which she had translated into French only to find no one would produce it. The writer suggests that Subject send his "three books" to Miss Monique NATHAN, les Editions du Seuil, 27 rue Jacob, Paris 6, a house "open to progressive ideas." Mrs. PARIS is planning a trip to Mexico "either in spring or later on."

l) Personal letter dated 16 October 1959 from Alvah BESSIE, 6437 A Geary Boulevard, San Francisco 21, California.

m) Letter dated 18 October 1959 from Lawrence LYNTON, 3470 Cannon Place, New York 63, N.Y. The writer, an admirer of Subject's books, was recently graduated from the Manhattan School of Music. He asks Subject to consider writing the libretto for an opera LYNTON plans to compose on Uncle Tom's Cabin.

③

a) Note dated 10 October 1959 from Eberhard [illegible] ([illegible]), Wilhelm-Pieck-Str. 34, Leipzig N 22, deals with a contract and a letter dated 26 September which had been "erroneously sent through ordinary mail." [see 18 - d, below]

16. Correspondence addressed to Subject's wife, Margaret Larkin Maltz, at the same address. (Attachment 15)

a) Letter dated 11 September 1959 from Morris GOODMAN, 1119 No. Wexford Drive, Los Angeles 35, California. The writer thanks Subject's wife for a contribution she had made to a committee of which GOODMAN is chairman. GOODMAN has given a check on behalf of Mrs. MALTZ to Frank WILKINSON.

b) Letter with no return address, dated 28 September 1959 and signed "Charlie." The writer mentions a book which he hopes will be placed "east of West Berlin" and notes his regret over the death of Mr. AMANN. After expressing dissatisfaction over his present job, apparently with some magazine in New York City which also employs one Phil [illegible], the writer adds, "Nevertheless, the KHRUSHCHEV visit makes up for almost everything, and so on this bright note, I'll sign off." The writer, in a postscript, asks that his name not be put on the envelope, "just Mimi's, she knows it's for me."

c) Personal letter from Clarice CHAPMAN, 7728 Kraft Ave., North Hollywood, California, dated 28 September 1959.

d) Letter dated 4 October 1959 from Ray SPENCER, 6917 Pacific View Drive, Hollywood 28, California. The writer thanks Subject's wife for Seven Shares ..., which he and Helen enjoyed reading while in "Valle" [possibly Valle del Bravo, Mexico]. He is saddened by the death of Ernesto [AMANN] and adds the postscript: "Mr. K. was absolutely sensational... There is a definite change of atmosphere for the better, we believe."

e) Letter from Barthold Fles, Literary Agent, 507 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, New York, dated 6 October 1959 and signed "Bart." The writer is flying to Germany on 6 October and will ask Gollancz [Victor Gollancz Ltd., London] "for your statement when I come to England." Before returning to the United States in three weeks, the writer also intends to see Gertrude GELBIN and Stefan HEYM in Berlin.

201-5239

17. Correspondence addressed to Mr. and Mrs. Albert MALTZ. (Attachment 17)

a) Letter dated 23 September 1959 from Ethel ELLIS, 36 W. [illegible] Street, New York 24, New York. The writer thanks the MALTZes for a gift, apparently money, to help "Fred" with medical and nursing expenses. "Fred" is recovering from paralysis.

b) Personal bread-and-butter letter, postmarked 16 September 1959, Santa Monica, California, is signed "Frances." In the letter Frances writes that "Fernie" will take Kenneth MacKENNA's job at Metro after the first of the year, under a three-year contract.

c) Letter from Jane Farth [illegible], 11490 Laurel Crest Drive, Studio City, California, dated 27 September 1959. The writer discusses plans to visit Mexico, where she expects to arrive between mid-November and Christmas.

d) Envelope bearing return address of Jane ROGERS, 56 Seventh Ave., New York 11, New York, postmarked 6 October 1959, forwards an invitation and request for contribution to a birthday purse honoring the 85th birthday of A. A. HELLER of New York.

e) In a note postmarked 21 October 1959 Jane ROGERS and A. A. [HELLER] thank the MALTZes for their "donation," undoubtedly to the birthday purse listed above.

f) Personal letter dated 24 October 1959 from Max and Helen SHLAFROCK, 148-09 Ruxley Street, Rosedale 22, New York.

18. Letters from Albert MALTZ. (Attachment 18)

a) In a letter dated 23 September 1959 to Mr. John M. Calder, Messrs. John Calder, Ltd., 17 Sackville Street, Piccadilly, London W. 1, England, Subject orders twenty-five copies of the cheap edition of A Long Day in a Short Life.

b) Bill and check sent to Copley's, Pipe Purveyors and Smokers' Supplies, 5409 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles 36, California.

c) Letter dated 9 October 1959 is addressed to Mr. Harry Elmer BARNES, 31509 West Pacific Coast Highway, RFD 2, Malibu, California. Subject thanks Mr. BARNES for a letter he had written on 10 April, in which BARNES praised Subject's book and suggested he send a copy of it to Mr. Howard GILL. Subject, in addition, describes an investigation he had made of the Czech [illegible]

3

d) An envelope addressed to Dr. Eberhard BRUNING, Englisches Institut - Der Universitat Leipzig, Universitatstr. 3 - 5, Leipzig, C 1, encloses a document in the German language. The document concerns an amendment to a publishers' agreement, dated 15 May 1959, between Aufbau-Verlag, a publishing house in Berlin, and Albert MALTZ, for the printing of three of Subject's works. [see 15 - a, above]

CSCI-3/757,639

Attachments: 18 (as described above)

WH/3/Mexico/MAbdella:as

2 December 1959

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI (201-5239)
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/SID
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - WH/R
1 - WH/Hold

BASED ON:
HMMA-13705 (11 Sept 59)
HMMA-13790 (25 Sept 59)
HMMA-13864 (2 Oct 59)
HMMA-13892 (9 Oct 59)
HMMA-13909 (9 Oct 59)
HMMA-13957 (23 Oct 59)
HMMA-14064 (13 Nov 59)

PROJECT: LIBIGHT

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

③

201 - 5239

14-00000

201-128561

CSCI-3757704

SECRET

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE
MICROFILMED: 2 JUN 1960

4 DEC 1959

A MOSCOW

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT : Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
Espionage - R
Bureau File Number 65-14303

1. It has come to our attention through a sensitive source of known reliability that Maurice Hyman HALPERIN, who is residing in Moscow, USSR, is known to the following individuals:

Benjamin FASTOV, and wife, "Freddie" FASTOV

2. It is believed that Benjamin FASTOV is connected with the Colonial Brush Manufacturing Company, Inc., located at 170 Washington Street North, Boston, Massachusetts.

RID/CE TRACE REPLY Dated 4 Dec 1959

3. This office has no information identifiable with either Benjamin or "Freddie" FASTOV. We would appreciate being furnished any pertinent information on the FASTOVs that may be contained in your files.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-3/757,704

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI
1 - WH/3
1 - RID (201-128561)
3 - CI/SID
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A

CI/SID:AEgerter:lac (3 December 1959)

4 Dec 59

INDEX

CS COPY

SECRET

100-2-92

4 Dec 59

201-128561

S-E-C-R-E-T

Attached copy of letter taken from HMM-A-13957 dated 23 Oct 59 (has been CSCI'd to FBI)

source: LIBIGHT/LIMUD

Attachment gives address of HALPERIN as

Kutuzovsky Prospect, 13
Apt. 127
Moscow G-248

Letter dated 26 Sep 59 and addressed to Albert and Margaret MALTZ in Mexico.

Note: re first para of letter, LIBIGHT/LIMUD has not shown that any clippings or pictures were enclosed in earlier correspondence to HALPERIN

LCMAY (covl
Maurice)
(Halperin)
26 Sep 59
201-128561



Apt. 1[illegible]
Moscow I-24[illegible]

Sept. [illegible]

Dear Margaret and Albert,

First let me point out that your letter of Sept. 15 (delivered yesterday) was sans pics. The envelope did carry double postage. So what happened - error or pilferage? Sure would like to know and, of course, get the original or duplicate sets of pics for the Hermitage. Also, IMPORTANT - the envelope was not entirely correctly addressed (Apt. 13 instead of 127, an understandable slip). Please note simplified correct address above (house no. not required).

And now to tell you Edith and I were very happy to get your letter. We can see Granny-elect Margaret and Gramp-elect Albert knitting away at the sweaters and booties. We shall want to hear when the big events take place. Again, our best wishes to Peter and esposa.

I can't get too many slips, Margarita, so full speed ahead. And one tiny reminder - the date on each slip, please. Your score with respect to choice of slips is very high ---I'd say about 95% of what you send is of top interest.* An afterthought that troubles me ---I've reckoned up the postage spent and it's running mighty high.

Albert, many thanks re the UN materials. The 1957 Survey has not yet arrived, but I'll let you know. And I shall be on the look-out for 1958.

So much appreciate the Novedades supplement re [illegible]. Still feel stunned by his death. I had such a stimulating conversation with him here last February, and we were to continue on his next visit.....

Little by little, we're getting better organized. We are due a telephone shortly, which will improve living efficiency enormously. Also, next week I shall have a full time research assistant, at last! No need to tell you what that will mean. So, while we don't [illegible] move ahead at the pace of the moon rockets, we're not standing still either.

The music season is on - went to our first concert day-before-yesterday. This is one department that is on the level of [illegible] rocketry so far as quality is concerned. We've never had it so good before....

Wish you'll give our very best regards to all our good friends.

Muchos abrazos from Edith and

P.S. Any news about the little business matter of ours we asked you to handle? Any news about a Russian edition of "[illegible]"? I could see [illegible] — she still has my copy of the book.

* including, of course, the informa - what it [illegible] [illegible] is always as interesting as what I [illegible]. Also, who is [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of the PP [illegible] [illegible].

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, EDITH
DOB ?

201-000066
HMMA-13175
19 JUN 59

PSFR

CIT ?
201-128561

MOTHER OF DAVID HALPERIN. SUBJ AND HER HUSBAND ARE NOW LIVING IN USSR CONTACT OF INSTEREST OF THE SEBORERS.

CORRECTION CARD
FORMERLY 201-66459

19 Jun 59

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201 | 128 | 561

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

KMAZ 912

Memo No. 112/P

17 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Moscow Addresses Found in Pocket Notebook of
Anna Sparer SEBORER (201-66549*)

REF : OMHA-15692, 10 April 1959

1. The following Moscow addresses were found in the pocket notebook of Anna Sparer SEBORER; photocopies of Subject's effects were made on 8 April 1959 and were transmitted to headquarters under reference.

a. Prof. Maurice HALPERIN
Kutuzovskiy Prospekt 13
House #4, Apt 127
Moscow G-248

b. R. KATZIN
Furmannyy Pereulok
House 24, Apt. 21
Moscow; Tel. No. K 7-2663

c. Ana TELEPNEVA
Maslovka Verkhn. ulitsa 7
Apt. 53
Moscow
(Enrique de los RIOS)

A flagging request on the above individuals has been placed with SR/6/FOS for mail coverage, with the understanding the undersigned will be notified of any letter intercepts.

201-12851

2. The last known residence of Maurice HALPERIN (~~201-185053*~~) and his wife was Czechoslovakia. MEXI 3532 (IN 34979), 21 March 1959, Source: LIFEAT, reports that "on 18 March Anna told Mrs. Albert MALTZ that she had written Mrs. Maurice HALPERIN telling her not to bother answering but 'just to leave the information for me.' MALTZ had heard from HALPERIN and had 'the address' for Anna." This would indicate that Anna SEBORER planned to get in touch with the HALPERINs on her recent visit to Moscow, 24 March - 8 April 1959.

17 June 59
201-12851 ✓

3. There is no identifiable trace on R. KATZIN.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

XAAZ 912

4. Enrique de los RIOS may be identical with Enrique de los RIOS Lavin (201--109936a) of the ALTO Case. HMMA-12013, 28 January 1959, Source: LIFEAT, reports that de los RIOS "was apparently recently in the USSR."

5. For a possible trace on Ana TELEPHEVA see OSMA-6782, 21 May 1957 which refers to a Miss A. TELEPHEVA, resident of Moscow who had written to a Spanish repatriate, one Juan DIEZ. According to WE/5 a copy of this letter intercept was forwarded to SR/6. An attempt is currently being made to find this letter.

GERALDINE GARRITY
SR/CE/P

Distribution:
1 - CI/SID
1 - [illegible] SR/CE/P
1 - 201-66549 (Anna Sparer SEBORER)
1 - 201-185053 (Maurice HALPERIN)

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

17 June 59
201-128561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

PRER

HALPERIN, MAURICE
DOB ?

201-005239
HMMA-12965
29 MAY 59

PAFR

CIT ?
201-128561*

CONTACT OF MARGARET MALTZ AND ROBERT ROGERS, '59.

24 May 59

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201 128 561

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible]

RQ: [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

TO: ROME, FRANKFURT, BERLIN
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SID, FI, EE 4, SR 5, [illegible]

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

INITIALS
INITIALS

12 42 59

OUT 99321

ROME, FRAN, BRLN INFO CITE DIR 24356

LCIMPROVE/[illegible]/[illegible]

REF DIR 20532 (OUT 90668) (NOT SENT FRAN, BRLN)

(201-52[illegible]9)

1. ALBERT MALTZ, WRITER AND MEMBER OF AMERICAN COMMUNIST GROUP MEXICO CITY, ON TOUR OF EUROPE WITH WIFE TRAVELLING BEHIND IRON CURTAIN AND MAY CONTACT ALFRED KAUFMAN STERN AND HIS WIFE MARTHA DODD STERN AND MAURICE AND EDITH HALPERIN AMERICAN COMMIES WHO FLED BEHIND IRON CURTAIN DURING PAST TWO YEARS.

2. SUBJECTS ARRIVE ROME 3 MAY 1430 HRS FROM TEL AVIV, TWA FLT 741. LV FOR FRAN 3 MAY 1630 HRS ITALIAN AIRLINES FLT 416. ARRIVE FRAN 2115 HRS, LV FOR BRLN 4 MAY 1350 HRS, BRITISH EUROPEAN GIBRALTAR AIRLINES FLT 57. ARRIVE BERLIN 1510 HRS. BRLN TO PRAGUE 19 MAY POSSIBLY VIA RUSSIAN JET LINE.

3. IF POSSIBLE AND FEASIBLE, REQUEST LIAISON CONDUCT BAGGAGE SEARCH AND DISCREET SURVEILLANCE.

4. MALTZ BORN 28 DEC 1908 NEW YORK. IN 1954 DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: FIVE FEET SIX ONE HALF INCHES TALL, WEIGHT 155, STOCKY, BLACK HAIR, GREY EYES, DARK COMPLEXION.

30 apr 59

FILE IN 201-128561

w+/3/m+

ORIGINAL FILED IN

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT 99321

DIR 24356

PAGE TWO

INFO

CITE DIR

5. ROME: NOTE ITINERARY CHANGE FROM REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Stated MALTZ would be in ROME 4 days. Requested baggage search and surveillance.

EE/W7/MR. DUNWOODY (BY PHONE)

WE/ITALY

SR/CI/P/MR. POTOCKI (BY PHONE)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Robert E.

AC/WE

RELEASING OFFICER

J C King

C/WH

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

OMHA-15692, 10 Apr 59; [redacted]/SYMPATHIZER/LCMAYFOWL; Anna SEBORER - transmittal of photocopies of passport, pocket notebook, letters, photographs, etc.

The notebook belonging to Anna Sparer SEBORER was photographed as of 8 April 1959 and contained the following address:

Prof. Maurice Halperin
Kutuzovsky Prospect 13
House #4 Apt 127
Moscow G-248

10 Apr 59
201-128 561

14-00000

FILE No. 201-5237

201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : T.A. WOODS
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 2555
DATE : 6 APRIL 1959

TO : THE HAGUE, ROME
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SIS, FI, FI/INT, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

RE FILING (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☒ Name required ☐
Signature [illegible]

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	APR 7 19 04 Z 59 REC'D CABLE SECT.
X	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 50653

TO HAGU, ROME INFO MEXI CITE DIR 20532
LCDU ROVE
20532

1. ALBERT MALTZ, WRITER AND MEMBER OF AMERICAN COMMUNIST GROUP MEXICO CITY, ON TOUR OF EUROPE WITH WIFE TRAVELLING BEHIND IRON CURTAIN AND MAY CONTACT ALFRED KAUFMAN STERN AND HIS WIFE MARTHA DODD STERN AND MAURICE AND EDITH HALPERIN AMERICAN COMMIES WHO FLED BEHIND IRON CURTAIN DURING PAST TWO YEARS.

2. DEPARTING MONTREAL FOR AMSTERDAM 15 APRIL AND WILL REMAIN UNTIL 20 APRIL.

3. ON 3 MAY WILL ARRIVE ROME FROM TEL AVIV AND REMAIN UNTIL 7 MAY.

4. IF POSSIBLE AND FEASIBLE, REQUEST LIAISON CONDUCT BAGGAGE SEARCH AND SURVEILLANCE.

5. MALTZ BORN 28 DEC 1908 NEW YORK IN 1954 DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: FIVE FEET SIX ONE HALF INCHES TALL, WEIGHT 155, STOCKY, BLACK HAIR, GREY EYES, DARK COMPLEXION.

END OF MESSAGE

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
DESTROY	—
RI/FI	

COORDINATION:
WE/2 DT
WE/4
CI/SCV/SAT
SR/CO ✓ CE MR. KNOWLES (BY PHONE)
CI/[illegible]/[illegible] (BY PHONE)

C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

KING, C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 6-58 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

7 Apr 59
201-128561

WH/3/Mex

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. HALPEDIR PCFR

HALPERIN, MAURICE
DOB ? .

201-005239
DIR -20532
06 APR 59

PCFR

CIT USA
201-128561*

AMERICAN COMMIE.
MAY BE CONTACTED BY ALBERT MALTZ /201-5239/ WHO IS ON TOUR OF EUROPE WITH WIFE AND TRAVELLING BEHIND IRON CURTAIN.

6 Apr 59

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➪ 201 128 561

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
SECRET
(7-46)

MEXI 3532 (IN 34979), 21 MARCH 1959

On 18 March 1959, Anna Sparer SEBORER told Mrs. Albert MALTZ that she had written Mrs. Maurice HALPERIN telling her not to bother answering but "just to leave the information for me." MALTZ had heard from HALPERIN and had "the address" for Anna. SOURCE: LIFEAT (B), 23 Feb to 18 Mar. ODENVY dissem.

21 Mar 59
201-128561

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/R

NO. CSCI-3/753,[illegible]8

DATE 28 JAN 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/CRO			WG	° HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman
2. WH/3/Mexico/PNelson		21 Jan	pgr	
3. C/WH/3/Mexico			JB	
4. C/WH/3			JB	
5.				
6. WH/CE/Sims	22 Jan.	22	RBS	
7. CI/Brown			B	thermofax copy attached for your retention - S/D pgr
8. CI/LIA	27 JAN 1959		AAN	
9.				
10. RID/AN			ac	
11.	WH/3/mX 2/14 R.H			
12.				
13.				
14. RID/TY			Cm	
15. RID/FI				

28 JAN 1959

ABSTRACT	INDEX
201-128561 ✓	
DATE	

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 1 DEC 56 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956 O - 476731

[illegible]

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Mauricio Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our teletyped message of 24 November 1958 and to previous correspondence concerning Subject's travel with his wife from Mexico, through western Europe, to Prague, Czechoslovakia.

2. Enclosed for your information is a copy of a report, from an official Swiss source, of Subject's activities in Switzerland from 15 October 1958 to 10 November. Also enclosed are photocopies of letters from Subject and his wife to members of the family in the United States.

3. The David EFRON mentioned in both the official Swiss report and Subject's letters was described by a usually reliable source on 18 August 1947 as an Argentine citizen who was a Communist Party member of long standing; under cover of his International Labor Organization (ILO) assignments EFRON was touring Latin America to assess the Communist position and strength within the labor framework of each country visited. Another usually reliable source reported in February 1951 that EFRON had been a specialist in Latin American affairs for the ILO until the fall of 1947, and that he had been repeatedly reported as a Communist and closely associated with Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, president of the Confederacion de los Trabajadores de America Latina (CTAL) and secretary-general of the Partido Popular (PP - Marxist Party of Mexico). A David EFRON, mentioned in your reports of 23 June 1952 and 21 January 1952, appears to be identical with EFRON.

4. This information is from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated further.

CSCI-3/753,048

Enclosures:
1 - Report
2 - Photocopies of letters

201-127561

SECRET NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

Ref Wallison

WH/3/P. G. Nelson:as

14 January 1959

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
~~1~~ - RI w/att.
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/ICD
1 - RQM/RE
1 - CI/CIA
1 - WH/3/MEX
1 - WH/3/MEX/Subject

CI/SID

Based on: ESBA-7838
ESBA-7766
TPL-137 (Aug '47)
HSBW-2697 (Feb '51)

Project Cryptonym: INANITION

SECRET NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

Attachment to CSCI-3/753,048

As a supplement to bits of information hitherto orally transmitted here is a summarized account on the movements and activities of

HALPERIN Maurice, alias PASTOR Daniel,
born 3.3.1906, US citizen, economist,
married to Edith; domiciled Medellin 36-9,
Mexico 7, D.F.

during his sojourn in Switzerland from 9 October to 10 November 1958:

On 15 October subject and his wife arrived by air from LISBON at the Hotel "Schweizerhof" in ZURICH. On 18 October he and his wife took the 1320 H. train to GENEVA, where they stayed at the Hotel "Bernina". On 19 October, 1700 - 1900 H., he visited

EFRON David, born 1.9.1904, citizen of ARGENTINE,
Conseillor with the ILO in GENEVA, domiciled
Avenue Andre Gide 2, CHENE-BOUGERIES/GENEVA.

On 20 October at GENEVA he inquired at a local travel agency for the possibilities of a flight from ZURICH to PRAGUE. On that day the HALPERIN's traveled by train (leaving GENEVA at 1245 H) to ZURICH, where they occupied a room at the "Schweizerhof" again. At 1830 H. subject visited the information office of the Zurich main station to learn about train connections for PRAGUE and for LUGANO. On 21 October, in answer to a telephone call, he visited the Czech Consulate General in ZURICH, where he stayed from 0940 - 1115 H. At 1630 H. he went to consult the "Swissair" information desk at the main station. He stated that he possessed a flight-ticket Mexico-Lisbon-Zurich-Tel-Aviv, but had no definite booking so far and wanted his luggage to be stored at Kloten airport for the time being. He then mailed letters to

1) Mr. David C. HALPERIN, 5411 South University Ave., CHICAGO/ Ill.;
2) Mr. Theodore HALPERIN & family, 22, Kahler Ave., MILTON/ Mass.;
3) Rabbi & Mrs. Hillel CANTRAN, 4 de Kalb Place, MORRISTOWN/ New Jersey;
4) Mrs. Annie FRISCH, 17 Beach Road, LYNN/ Massachusettes;

Letters 1 - 3 are of similar contents. Photostat copies of Nr. 1 & 4 are attached.

At 1930 H. he inquired at the "Swissair" office for any communication that may have come in for him.

On 22 October Subject negotiated with the KLM airtravel office for cancelling of his 2 flight tickets to Tel-Aviv and refunding.

On 23 October at 0925 H. he inquired at the information office of the Federal Railways about train connections to PARIS and fares. At 1025 H. he entered the Czech Consulate General, but reappeared in the street 3 minutes later.

As of 23 October HALPERIN had made three telephone calls: one to [illegible], Arlesheim/Basel, [illegible]str. 14, one to Carlo IGELI A.G., Zurich, home in Kuesnacht; and one to SCHMID, Zurich. All of the above are either timber and lumber importers or dealers.

On 24 October the couple visited the Czech Consulate General at 1025 H. where they remained for 25 minutes. At 1110 H. they went to the snack bar of the Zurich University. HALPERIN then visited for 30 minutes the Seminary for social economics, commercial sciences and statistics. At 1515 H. HALPERIN went to a travel agency to cash a cheque of 50 $.

On 25 October HALPERIN inquired for trains departing for LUGANO and obtained various prospectus of this town. From 1025 - 1055 H. the couple called at the Czech Consulate General. On the way back they changed 200 $; at 1311 H. they left by train for LUGANO.

Up to this date the couple had not received any visitors and as far as could be ascertained had no suspicious telephone calls while staying in ZURICH. They ostensibly endeavored to cut down expenses to a minimum, taking meals in cheap restaurants or buying food to be eaten in their room at the hotel. The luggage deposited at Kloten airport was discreetly searched. The personal belongings were of rather poor quality. A list showed that they had sold furniture and household goods prior to their departure from Mexico. Amongst various articles there were also two pocket editions of dictionnaries in Chinese and Russian. All this and their demeanour seemed to indicate that the couple plan to settle definitely in the East.

At 1625 H. of 25 October the couple arrived at LUGANO, where they rented a room at the hotel garni "LUX" for 3 or 4 days.

On 26 October they went on an excursion to the Monte Bre. At 1730 H. of that day HALPERIN inquired at the main post office for the telephone number of a certain Alfred STERN in PRAGUE. No such extension was found in the directory, however.

On 27 October they made an outing to Cassarate and Campione and back to LUGANO.

On 28 October HALPERIN again went to the telephone exchange at 0915 H. where he asked to be connected with Lazaro PENA in PRAGUE, Nr. 67856. The partner in PRAGUE being absent, the call was postponed to the afternoon; it went through at 1640 H. and a certain Mr. STEIN answered the call on the number indicated. HALPERIN talked in Spanish, announcing himself as Professor Maurizio HALPERIN from Mexico. He explained that he was a friend of LOMBARDO, with whom they (the partners on the phone) had accidentally met last year at the shop of Dr. Berta ARENARES. At present he (HALPERIN) was staying in LUGANO and waiting for the visa to go to PRAGUE. There he would like to find his American friends, the STERN family, whom his partner should also know. He then wanted to know when LOMBARDO would arrive in PRAGUE from MEXICO.

(probable identities:
PENA, Lasaro: Trade Union Secretary of CTC: vice-president
of Cuban C.P. & member Executive Council of WFC.
LOMBARDO, Vincente, b. 16.7.1894, Mexican citizen, dom.
Mexico-City, Artistas, Villa Obregon 51;
Trade Union leader; member of WFC; member of presidium
Dr. ARELLANES, Berta: no record.)

On 29 October the HALPERIN's left LUGANO at 0904 H. by train for ZURICH. During their sojourn at LUGANO no contacts of the couple with strangers were made; they went for walks at random in town or in the vicinity, bought papers and periodicals by the dozen, but did not receive any mail or telephone calls.

At 1253 H. of 29 October they arrived in ZURICH, went to the Hotel "Schweizerhof" and later to the Czech Consulate General. At 1550 H. subject inquired at the KLM airline agency about refunding for the tickets to Tel-Aviv, but the agency had not received directions from Amsterdam yet.

On 30 October the couple again went to the Czech Consulate General at 1035 H. and remained there for 75 minutes. At 1215 H. HALPERIN inquired at the Kuoni Travel Agency about tourist visas to Prague and was given the necessary forms to fill in. These he returned to the agency at 1410 H. together with the passports. At 1715 H. he mailed two letters to

Mr. David C. HALPERIN, 5411 South University Ave., CHICAGO/ Ill.
Rabbi & Mrs. Hillel CANGRAN, 4 de Falb Place, MORRISTOWN/ N. J.

Photostat copies (numbered 5 & 6) of the contents are attached.

On 31 October the HALPERIN's moved from Hotel "Schweizerhof" to the cheaper hotel "Limmathof". On this day they finally received the requested refund by the KLM airline's office.

Monday, 10 November the requested tourist visas were issued to the HALPERIN's, valid for 6 days and including Hotel reservations for 5 days at Sw.Frs. 23. - per person. They immediately departed by train and left Switzerland via Buchs/rail at 1524 H. for Austria, traveling on 2nd. class tickets ZURICH-PRAGUE return.

In the period of 31 October to 10 November the couple did not make or receive any telephone calls and had no visitors, nor did they call on anybody.

19 November 1958.

23 Jan 59

201-128561

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/3

NO. CSCI-3/752,786

DATE ~~31 [illegible]~~ 14 Jan 59

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/CHO			WH	
2. WH/3/P.Nelson		6 Jan		
3. WH/CA				[illegible] HYMAN
4. ~~C/WH/3~~	7 JAN 19			
5.				
6. WH/FI/Sims	7 Jan.	7		
7. CI/Brown				
8. CI/Liaison 1028 J	12 JAN 1959			
9.				
10. RID/AN			dec	
11.				DrD 14 JAN 1959
12.				
13.				
14. RID/TY				ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX DATE
15. RID ~~/FI~~				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible] 1959

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S.J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/752,585, dated 16 December 1958, and to other correspondence concerning Subject, an American Communist who was living in Mexico, but who is, with his wife, now in Prague, Czechoslovakia.

2. Enclosed for your information are photocopies of the following correspondence sent to him at his home: Medellin 636, Apartment 9, Mexico, D.F.:

a. Letter, dated 5 August 1958, from Maurice H. SAVAL, of the Maurice H. SAVAL Insurance Company, 22 Batterymarch Street, Boston 9, Massachusetts, in which SAVAL renews what was evidently an old friendship.

b. Letter, postmarked 18 August 1958, from Subject's mother, in Boston, which contains family news.

c. Letter, postmarked 24 August 1958, from Ted HALPERIN, at 22 Kohler Avenue, Fulton 87, Massachusetts, in which he mentions family matters, his father's illness, and that Subject's son, David, will be visiting them soon.

d. Letter, postmarked 25 August 1958, from RABINOWITZ & BOUDIN, Attorneys at Law, 25 Broad Street, New York 4, New York, reducing Subject's fee due for professional services to $300.00. (It is probable that these professional services dealt with Subject's United States passport.)

e. Letter, postmarked 27 August 1958, from Paul BARAN, Stanford University, Stanford, California, commenting on an economic study of Latin America which Subject is preparing.

3. This correspondence was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau.

CSCI-3/752,786

5 Enclosures, as noted

[illegible]
WH/3/Mexico/P.Nelson: kc 31 December 1958

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI (201-128561)
1 - CI/LIA
1 - RQM/RE
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - WH/R
1 - WH/3/Mex/Subject

Based on: HMMA-11731 ✓

Project Cryptonym: LIBIGHT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT Maurice HALPERIN	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
	RI FILE NO.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. ESZA - [illegible]		DATE [illegible]	
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION	
ANALYST	DATE PROCESSED	DISSEMINATED IN	DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☐	CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	☐	TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Three memoranda re HALPERIN stay in Switz., dated
23 October 1958
27 October 1958
6 November 1958

ESZA-1611 classified to: 68-2-5/3

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 58 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

WH/3

NO. CSCI-3/752,587

DATE 16 December 1958

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/CRO				
2. WH/3/Mex/P.Nelson		9 Dec		
3. WH/CA				
4. ~~C/WH/3~~	10 DEC 1958			
5.				
6. WH/FI/Sims	10 Dec	10		
7. CI/Brown				
8. CI/Liaison 1028 J	15 DEC 1958			
9.				
10. RID/AN			dec	
11.				
12.				D.L. 16 DEC 1958
13.				201-128561
14. RID/TY			Cm	~~ABSTRACT~~ ~~DATE~~
15. RID/FI				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

[illegible] DEC 1958

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Jane Constance ROGERS

Correspondence From Jane Constance Rogers
To: Maurice Halperin

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/751,016, dated 12 August 1958, and to previous correspondence concerning Subject and her correspondence with American Communists living in Mexico.

2. Enclosed for your information are photocopies of an envelope from Subject, 56 Seventh Avenue, New York 11, New York, addressed to Maurice HALPERIN, Medellin 36-9, Mexico, D.F.; and a letter, contained in the envelope, bearing the salutation, "Dear Celia." ("Celia" is probably Celia OPPENHEIM, wife of Kurt Leopold OPPENHEIM, who, as was reported to your Bureau in our teletyped message of 12 September 1958, was hiding out in a hotel during the wave of arrests of American Communists living in Mexico.) The contents of the letter are summarized as follows:

> Subject mentions that she is glad that Celia saw "Tess and Bruno," and discussed with them the hardships and worry suffered "by you and all our friends." She says that A.A.'s main interest has to do with Sr. PONTON. ("A.A." probably refers to Abraham Aaron HELLER, who visited Mexico with Subject for three months during the winter of 1957-58. "Sr. PONTON" possibly refers to Luis SANCHEZ Ponton, a Mexican lawyer concerned with the Morton SOBELL case.)
>
> Subject also mentions that her planned trip to Mexico during the coming winter is not certain unless they (she would probably be traveling again with HELLER) could find an inexpensive apartment.

SECRET NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

8201-231257

201-128561

~~[illegible]~~

CS COPY

SECRET [illegible]
CONTINUED CONTROL

3. This correspondence was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau. Photocopies of this correspondence have been furnished the representative of your Bureau in Mexico City, with a request for any information available on "Tess and Bruno."

CSCI-3/752,587

Enclosures: 1 envelope containing photocopies of the envelope and letter, as described above

WH/3/Mexico/P. Nelson: kc   8 December 1958

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI
1 - CI/R&A
1 - RQM/RE
1 - CI/LIA
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - WH/R

Based on: HMMA-11627 — Can [illegible] [illegible] 19 Dec 75

Project cryptonym: LIBIGHT   NOT in 201-231257

SECRET [illegible]
CONTINUED CONTROL

201-128561
16 Dec 58

~~[illegible]~~

Addressed to [illegible]
Gen- Cabell

14 Oct 55

Dated: 14 Oct 55

Att CSCI-3752587

201-128561

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY WH/3/M ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/3

NO. CS CI-3/752,585

DATE 16 Dec 58 ~~December 1958~~

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/CRO				
2. WH/3/Mexico/PNelson		9 Dec		
3. C/WH/3/Mexico				
4. C/WH/3	10/	-/58		
5.				
6. WH/FI/Sims	10	Dec 10		
7. CI/Brown				
8. CI/Liaison 1028 J	15 DEC 1958			HALPERIN, MAURICE HYMAN.
9.				
10. RID/AN			dec	
11.				16 DEC 1958
12.				
13.				
14. RID/TY				
15. RID/FI				

201 | 129 | 561
ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX ☐
DATE 16 Dec 1958

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

with Continued Control

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

16 DEC 1958

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/752,072, dated 30 October 1958, and to other correspondence concerning Subject, an American Communist living at Medellin #36, Apartment 9, Mexico, D.F.

2. Enclosed for your information are photocopies of the following correspondence sent to him:

a. Letter, postmarked 29 September 1958, from Ted HALPERIN, at 22 Kohler Avenue, Fulton 87, Massachusetts, concerns family matters, including the illness of his father (Subject's brother), and mentions anticipation over the visit of Subject's son, David, in December.

b. Letter, postmarked 1 October 1958, from the Maurice H. Saval Insurance Company, at 22 Batterymarch Street, Boston 9, Massachusetts, concerns the renewal of Subject's life insurance policy #796864, of the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company.

3. This correspondence was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau. Photocopies of this

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

16 Dec 58
201-128561

correspondence have been furnished the representative of your Bureau in Mexico City.

CS CI-3/752,565

Enclosures: 2 letters, as described above

WH/3/PNelson: mif   8 December 1958

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - RI (201-128561)
1 - CI/R&A
1 - RQM/RE
1 - CI/LIA
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - WH/R
1 - WH/3/Subject

Based on: HMM-A-11553 ✓

Project Cryptonym: LIBIGHT

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-11731
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-128561
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 10 December 1958
SUBJECT American Communists in Mexico, Maurice HALPERIN		RE "43-1" — (CHECK "X" ONE) X MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		
REFERENCE(S)		

MICROFILMED
DEC 15 1961
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

1. Forwarded herewith to complete Headquarters and ODENVY records on subject are one photocopy each and film of the following letters addressed to him in Mexico City.

A. Ltr. of 25 Aug 58 from Leonard B. BOUDIN of RABINOWITZ & BOUDIN, New York attorneys, cutting HALPERIN's fee due for professional services to $300.00. (Comment: Professional services probably dealing with HALPERIN's U. S. passport.)

B. Ltr. of 27 Aug 58 from Paul BARAN, Stanford University, Calif., commenting on an economic study of Latin America which HALPERIN is preparing.

C. Ltr. of 5 Aug 58 from Maurice H. SAVAL, insurance man in Boston, Mass., who is apparently a long lost friend of Subject's. (No film)

D. Ltr. of 23 Aug 58 from Ted HALPERIN in Milton, Mass.

E. Ltr. of 18 Aug 58 from HALPERIN's mother and father in Massachusetts.

2. Source is LIBIGHT/LIMUD. No local dissemination.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

FID
FID/vps ASM
9 December 1958

Distribution
3 Headquarters

CSCI-3/752746

10 Dec 58
201-128561

1 Att.

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

10 Dec 58

Att. 1 To HMMA-11731 (NSM)

201-128561

Bureau de Peritajes S. de R. L.
Balderas No. 31-208
México 1, D. F.

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36-9
Mexico

PAR AVION CORREO AEREO VIA AIR MAIL





RABINOWITZ & BOUDIN
BROAD STREET
NEW YORK 4, N.Y.

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36 - 9
Mexico 7, D. F.
Mexico

RABINOWITZ & BOUDIN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
25 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK 4, N.Y.

August 25, [illegible]

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36-9
Mexico 7, D. F.
Mexico

Professional services	$300.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
[illegible] STREET
NEW YORK 4, N. Y.

August 25, 1958

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36 - 9
Mexico 7, D. F.

Dear Dr. Halperin:

In view of your general financial situation, I have revised downward my original estimate to you. Hence the enclosed bill. We shall ourselves pay out of this money the local counsel fee.

Sincerely yours,

Leonard B. Boudin

Bureau de Peritajes S. de R. L.
Balderas No. 31-209
México 1. D. F.

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36-9
Mexico

PAR AVION CORREO AEREO VIA AIR MAIL

Letter from Paul BARAN

Dr.Maurice Halperin,
Medellin 36 - 9
Mexico 7,D.F.

VIA AIR MAIL

Bureau de Peritajes S. de R. L.
Balderas No. 31-208
México 1, D. F.

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36 - Dp.to 9
Mexico

PAR AVION CORREO AEREO VIA AIR MAIL



Bureau de Peritajes S. de R. L.
Balderas No. 31-208
México 1, D. F.

Dr. M. Halperin
Medellin 36 9
México

PAR AVION CORREO AEREO VIA AIR MAIL



947 Mercedes Avenue,
Los Altos, California,

August 27th, 1958

[illegible],

I am sorry I [illegible] tardy in answering your letter of August [illegible]. I [illegible] only yesterday [illegible] returning from Lake Tahoe where I took [illegible] for a 10 days vacation.

[illegible] project looks to me [illegible] ible. To be sure, outlines give usually only a very tenuous idea of what eventually comes out, but with that reservation, I think, [illegible] outline promises a useful [illegible]. What would seem to me to be in order is [illegible] tightening up of the [illegible] cal framework. In the first place, I would [illegible] ought to be broken down [illegible] number of groups: those countries that experience a certain degree of [illegible] mic advancement (Venezuela, Argentina, Mexico, [illegible]); those that [illegible] kedly stagnant (Central America, Peru and [illegible]); those that have [illegible] bourgeois revolutions (Mexico); those that [illegible] form or another (Argentina, Venezuela?); [illegible] or entirely feudal state (Peru?), etc. etc. In [illegible] "ideal type" treatment which would [illegible] elucidate the stage of development reached by individual countries. The role of imperialism in all of them has to be clearly worked out: both economically, and politically. Secondly, when it comes to strictly economic analysis, I don't believe that much is gained by talking about "crisis-breeding printing press money" (V, p. [illegible]). This puts the critique of inflation on a wrong track, and relates to what I would consider "old-fashioned" economics. The trouble with inflation is not that it is intrinsically "crisis-breeding". After all, Soviet industrialization was financed to a considerable extent by inflation! The trouble with inflation is that it puts the burden of capital accumulation upon lower income groups; in capitalist countries, furthermore, it channels the accumulated capital into wrong, undesirable investments, creates opportunities for vast speculative profits, promotes luxury consumption, etc. etc. In other words, under capitalism, inflation tends to add [illegible] to injustice. If inflation, then at least it should promote useful capital [illegible] relatively modest inflation (a few % p.a. [illegible]) [illegible] inflation of the German 1920' variety. The [illegible] form which need not occupy us in the [illegible] low inflation (accompanied by devaluation) [illegible] tax" on the underlying populations, [illegible] results in lopsided development.

[illegible] impression that you should concentrate on assembling as much as possible material on the volume and mode of utilization of accumulated capital, and show how these accumulations are being misused. This would permit you to analyze both the domestic structure of the economies under consideration as well as to show the impact of capital outflows due to imperialism etc.

These are my first reactions. I will be glad to go into all of [illegible] once I have more stuff to look at. You are obviously most welcome to [illegible] (for what it's worth) as a reference. If the Committee chooses to consult me, I would suggest that the accent be placed on the empirical aspect of the [illegible] with the analytical part made subject to further discussion and clarification.

I will write to Bravo very soon; I was absolutely sn ed under by various and
sundry committments, and am struggling now to finish ings up before school starts
end of September. And then I have a book to finish (- th Sweezy) and deadlines
surround me on all sides.

With very best wishes,

Yours,

BOSTON
AUG 18
7:30 AM
1958
MASS. 21

SAVE THE EASY WAY
BUY U.S. BONDS ON
PAYROLL SAVINGS

Air Mail

Dr. M. Halperin
Medellin 3.6-9
Mexico 7, D. F.

[illegible] Dear [illegible]

[illegible] feeling fine now
and [illegible] thanks to
Ted and Ethel (The [illegible]
good to us) took us to [illegible]
Point.
I am not bailing sins we
[illegible] came [illegible] mission [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Thanks [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] again [illegible]
[illegible] guilty, [illegible]
the trouble I have [illegible] my
[illegible] know, [illegible]
Nick [illegible], Mother [illegible]
[illegible] Pa [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] much [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] from [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: ESBA-7838

TO: Chief, WH THRU: Chief, EE
INFO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.:

FROM: Chief of Station, Bern

DATE: 28 November 1958

SUBJECT: INK/INANITION/Operations
Maurice HALPERIN

RE: "ASJ" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
XX INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED:

REFERENCES:

MEXI-2596

Attached is the final summary report of the INANITIONS on the stay in Switzerland of Maurice HALPERIN and wife, who departed for Prag on 10 November 1958. Copies of letters written by HALPERIN while here are forwarded to Headquarters only.

GEORGE J. POMFRET

Enclosures:
A - INANITION Report
B - Letters written by HALPERIN

27 November 1958

Distribution:
3 - WH
2 - EE w/encls. A and B
2 - Mexico City w/encl. A
2 - Bern w/encl. A

C3CI-

28 Nov. 58
201-128561

Attachment "A" to EZBA-7538

Ad y/ memo & oral of 18 Oct.58 509/XI/58

As a supplement to bits of information hitherto orally transmitted here is a summarised account on the movements and activities of

HALPERIN Maurice, alias PASTOR Daniel,
born 3.3.1906, US citizen, economist,
married to Edith; domiciled Medellin 36-9,
Mexico 7, D.F.

during his sojourn in Switzerland from 15 October to 10 November 58:

On 15 October subject and his wife arrived by air from LISBON at the Hotel "Schweizerhof" in ZURICH. On 18 October he and his wife took the 1320 H. train to GENEVA, where they stayed at the Hotel "Bernina". On 19 October, 1700 - 1900 H., he visited

EFRON David, born 1.9.1904, citizen of ARGENTINE,
Conseller with the ILO in GENEVA, domiciled
Avenue André Gide 2, CHENE-BOUGERIES /GENEVA.

On 20 October at GENEVA he inquired at a local travel agency for the possibilities of a flight from ZURICH to PRAGUE. On that day the HALPERIN's traveled by train (leaving GENEVA at 1245 H) to ZURICH, where they occupied a room at the "Schweizerhof" again. At 1830 H. subject visited the information office of the Zurich main station to learn about train connections for PRAGUE and for LUGANO. On 21 October he visited the Czech Consulate General in ZURICH, where he stayed from 0940 - 1115 H. At 1630 H. he went to consult the "Swissair" information desk at the main station. He stated that he possessed a flight-ticket Mexico-Lisbon-Zurich-Tel-Aviv, but had no definite booking so far and wanted his luggage to be stored at Kloten airport for the time being. He then mailed letters to

1) Mr.David C. HALPERIN, 5411 South University Ave., CHICAGO /Ill.;
2) Mr. Theodore HALPERIN & family, 22, Kahler Ave., MILTON / Mass.;
3) Rabbi & Mrs. Hillel CANORAN, 4 De Kalb Place, MORRISTOWN /New Jersey;
4) Mrs. Annie FRISCH, 17 Beach Road, LYNN /Massachusettes;

./. Letters 1 - 3 are of similar contents. Photostat copies of Nr. 1 & 4 are attached.

At 1930 H. he inquires at the "Swissair" office for any communication that may have come in for him.

On 22 October subject negotiates with the KLM airtravel

./.

office for cancelling of his 2 flight tickets to Tel-Aviv and refunding.

On 23 October at 0925 H. he inquires at the information office of the Federal Railways about train connections to PARIS and fares. At 1025 H. he enters the Czech Consulate General, but reappears in the street 3 minutes later.

On 24 October the couple visit the Czech Consulate General at 1025 H, where they remain for 25 minutes. At 1110 H. they go to the snack bar of the Zurich University. HALPERIN then visits for 30 minutes the Seminary for social economics, commercial sciences and statistics. At 1515 H. HALPERIN goes to a travel agency to cash a cheque of 50 $.

On 25 October HALPERIN inquires for trains departing for LUGANO and obtains various prospectus of this town. From 1025 - 1055 H. the couple then calls at the Czech Consulate General. On the way back they changed 200 $; at 1311 H. they leave by train for LUGANO.

Up to this date the couple has not received any visitors and as far as could be ascertained had no suspicious telephone calls while staying in ZURICH. They ostensibly endeavored to cut down expenses to a minimum, taking meals in cheap restaurants or buying food to be eaten in their room at the hotel. The luggage deposited at Kloten airport was discreetly searched. The personal belongings were of rather poor quality. A list showed that they had sold furniture and household goods prior to their departure from Mexico. Amongst various articles there were also two pocket editions of dictionnaries in Chinese and Russian. All this and their demeanour seem to indicate that the couple plan to settle definitively in the East.

At 1625 H. of 25 October the couple arrived at LUGANO, where they rented a room at the hotel garni "LUX" for 3 or 4 days.

On 26 October they went on an excursion to the Monte Brè. At 1730 H. of that day HALPERIN inquired at the main post office for the telephone number of a certain Alfred [illegible] in PRAGUE. No such extension was found in the directory, however.

On 27 October they made an outing to Cassarate and Campione and back to LUGANO.

./.

On 28 October HALPERIN again went to the telephone exchange at 0915 H. where he asked to be connected with Lazaro PENA in PRAGUE, Nr. 67634. The partner in PRAGUE being absent, the call was postponed to the afternoon; it went through at 1640 H. and a certain Mr. STERN answered the call on the number indicated. HALPERIN talked in Spanish, announcing himself as Professor Mauricio HALPERIN from Mexico. He explained that he was a friend of LOMBARDO, with whom they (the partners on the phone) had accidentally met last year at the shop of Dr. Boris ARENARES. At present he (HALPERIN) was staying in LUGANO and waiting for the visa to go to PRAGUE. There he would like to find his friends, the STERN family, whom his partner should also know. He then wanted to know when LOMBARDO would arrive in PRAGUE from MEXICO?

(probable identities:
PENA Lazaro: Trade Union Secretary of CUBA; vice-president of Cuban C.P. & member Executive Council of WPC.
LOMBARDO Vicente, b. 16.7.1894, Mexican citizen, dom. Mexico-City, Artistas, Villa Obregon 51; Trade Union leader; member of WPC; member of presidium of Executive Committee & General Council of WFTU.
Dr. ARENARES Boris: no record.)

On 29 October the HALPERIN's left LUGANO at 0904 H. by train for ZURICH. During their sojourn at LUGANO no contacts of the couple with strangers were made; they went for walks at random in town or in the vicinity, bought papers and periodicals by the dozen, but did not receive any mail or telephone calls.

At 1253 H. of 29 October they arrived in ZURICH, went to the Hotel "Schweizerhof" and later to the Czech Consulate General. At 1550 H. subject inquired at the KLM airline agency about refunding for the tickets to Tel-Aviv, but the agency had not received directions from Amsterdam yet.

On 30 October the couple again went to the Czech Consulate General at 1035 H. and remained there for 75 minutes. At 1215 H. HALPERIN inquired at the Kuoni Travel Agency about tourist visas to Prague and was given the necessary forms to fill in. These he returned to the agency at 1410 H. together with the passports.

./.

[illegible] H. he mailed two letters to

Mr. David C. HALPERIN, 5411 South University Ave. CHICAGO/Ill.
Rabbi & Mrs. Hillel CANCRAB, 4 de Kalb Place, MORRISTOWN /N.J.

Photostat copies (numbered 5 & 6) of the contents are attached.

On 31 October the HALPERIN's moved from Hotel"Schweizerhof" to the cheaper hotel "Limmathof". On this day they finally received the requested refund by the KLM airline's office.

Monday, 10 November the requested tourist visas were issued to the HALPERIN'S, valid for 6 days and including Hotel reservation for 5 days at Sw.Frs. 23.- per person. They immediately departed by train and left Switzerland via Buchs/rail at 1824 H. for Austria, travelling on 2nd.class tickets ZURICH-PRAGUE return.

In the period of 31 October to 10November the couple did not make or receive any telephone calls and had no visitors, nor did they call on anybody.

13 November 1958.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

219/DLD/

DATE : 22 NOV 58

ROUTING

1	MEXICO	4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 22 1736Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 29931

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : VIENNA

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, WH 4, S/C 2

Copy

TO DIR INFO CITE VIEN 4104

GROOVY GRENGULF

1. GRENGULF REPORTS THAT A MORICE (SIC) HALPIN, DOB 3 MARCH 1[illegible]06 AND HIS WIFE EDITH, NEE FRISCH, DOB 6 JULY 1907, BOTH CARRYING U.S. PASSPORTS, ENTERED AUSTRIA FROM SUISSE ON 10 NOV 1958. PASSPORTS HAD CZECH VISAS. ACCORDING GRENGULF, THIS COUPLE REPORTEDLY BELONG TO CIRCLE OF ACQUAINTANCES OF ATOM SPY KLAUS FUCHS AND DURING THEIR STAY IN SUISSE WERE UNDER CLOSE SURVEILLANCE.

2. GRENGULF REPORT, SOMEWHAT CURIOUSLY WORDED, SAYS AUSTRIAN SURVEILLANCE OF COUPLE NOT CARRIED OUT HERE SINCE THEY CROSSED BORDER INTO CSR ON 11 NOV WITH U.S. PASSPORT NO. 118070, ISSUED MEXICO, IN NAME OF MAURICE AND EDITH HALPERIN, SAME BIRTH DATE AS ABOVE.

3. VIEN HAS NO TRACES, NO KNOWLEDGE THIS CASE. POSSTJTY (AS RECEIVED) ODENVY REQUESTED AUSTRIAN SURVEILLANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

X 2003
EE/P/S Nelson Pere

X8743

Out - 97882 to FBI
24 Nov 58
22 Nov 58
201-128561 ✓

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

16 MJ/SW/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 22 NOV 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : VIENNA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, EE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2	MEX	5	
3		6	

NOV 24 1851Z 58
ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

VIEN 4104 IN 29931 A

TO INFO CITE

GROOVY GRENGULF

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM EE TO WH BY MR CLARK JUNG, EE, EXT 8743, IN COORDINATION WITH MR. TOM OGDEN, WH, EXT 2555.

File:- Hesperia 15201

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

COLITHO - PRTD. BY MOORE BUSINESS FORMS, INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM: RI/ RI/AN

DOCUMENT NUMBER HMMA-11553

DOCUMENT DATE 19 Nov 58

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. WH	046 Barton		25 NOV 1958	
2. Mex/PS		16 Dec	28 Nov 16	pqu mk
3. Brady				JF
4.				
5.				
6. OS/FSS		12/23/58		NC
7. OS/SRS/Carrier			12/23/58	JMC
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. RI/FI	1400L			

COMMENTS

NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files at the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.

Copy Detached

RECORD COPY

CSCI- 3/752,585
to FBI

FILE TITLE
HALPERIN, MAURICE

FILE NUMBER
201 128561 ✓

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT X
0531

DATE PROCESSED 19 Nov 1958

INDEX

FORM NO. 610a
1 OCT. 55

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMM-A-11553

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-128561

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 19 November 1958

SUBJECT: American Communists in Mexico/Maurice HALPERIN

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☒ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

SOURCE: LIBIGHT/LIMUD

1. Attached are the negatives and one set of prints of each of two letters which were addressed to Maurice HALPERIN in Mexico.

2. One letter is from a "Ted HALPERIN" and appears to be a personal, family-type letter. The second letter is from Maurice H. SAVAL and concerns an insurance policy carried by HALPERIN.

3. ODENVY has been furnished copies of this correspondence locally.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

GFB/cps

Attachment - as stated above

17 November 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Hqs w/att
- 2 - Files

Att: [redacted] (negatives to 2 [illegible])

19 Nov 58

CS COPY

201-128561

53

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

14-00000

negatives

Att to HMMA-11553

CS COPY

19 JAN 58

201-128561

693 JW/WS

Halperin, 201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : M.King
UNIT : WH/3
EXT : 4456
DATE : 6 November 1958

693

TO : BUENOS AIRES, MEXICO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED NOV 6 23 32:58
X ROUTINE REC'D CABLE SECT.
PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT62043

TO BUEN INFO MEXI CITE DIR 49353

REF: BUEN-3666 (IN-22713) (NOT SENT MEXI)

DO NOT PASS TO BIOGENESIS INFO IN HABW-5114 THAT DORFMAN IN COMMUNICATION WITH HALPERIN.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED WHETHER FACT THAT DORFMAN IN COMMUNICATION HALPERIN COULD BE PASSED BIOGENESIS.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	✓
~~DESTROY~~	
~~RI/FI~~	

Return to 11/3M

for J. C. King, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/2/Arg:
COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~R. K. [illegible], C/WH/3~~
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
6 Nov 58

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORM 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : M 300 RLG/BM
1 NOV 58

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 2 0114Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 21415

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION: WH 5*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, SR 4, S/C 2 , WE 4

TO MEXI INFO DIR CITE BERN 3138

RE BERN 3096 (IN 17033) **
MAURICE HALPERIN + wiFE

1. SUBJECTS TRAVELLED ZURICH TO LUGANO 29 OCT, MADE PHONE CALL 28 OCT FROM LUGANO TO PRAG WHERE SPOKE IN SPANISH WITH FNU STEIN (PHON) AT TEL NUMBER LAZARO PENA 67856. NOT CLEAR IF PENA TEL EXCHANGE OR NAME SUBSCRIBER.

2. IN PHONE CONVERSATION IDENTIFIED SELF TO STEIN AS FRIEND OF PROB VLT LOMBARDO. SAID HAD MET STEIN IN SHOP OF DR. BERTA ARENARES prob identical w DR. BERTA ARENAL BASTAR DE OCAMPO. SAID HE WAITING IN SUISSE FOR CSR VISA, WISHED SEE STERNS IN PRAG. WHEN STEIN VAGUE ABOUT KNOWING STERNS, SUBJ ASKED IF HAD NOT SEEN THEM IN INTRAYA (PHON). THEN ASKED WHEN LOMBARDO WOULD ARRIVE PRAG, WAS TOLD HE STILL MEXICO. SUBJ PROMISED CONTACT STEIN ON ARRIVAL PRAG. ACCORDING INTERPRETERS NOTE ON PHONE TRANSCRIPT STEIN VERY GUARDED, NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PHONE CALL.

3. SUBJ RETURNED ZURICH 29 OCT, GOT PASSPORTS BACK FROM CSR CONSULATE WITHOUT VISA. NOW ATTEMPTING GET TOURIST VISAS THROUGH TRAVEL AGENCY. MOVED TO CHEAPER HOTEL, SPENDS MUCH TIME IN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. INANITIONS STATE SUBJECTS RUNNING LOW ON FUNDS, MANY INDICATIONS PLAN REMAIN CSR INDEFINITELY, BELIEVE LOMBARDO MENTIONED ON PHONE IDEN WITH VINCENTE TOLEDANO LOMBARDO.

4. WILL POUCH DETAILED REPORTS.

(END OF MESSAGE)

C/S COMMENT: * ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.
** ITINERARY MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS.

ORIG filed in 201-3704

2 Nov 58
201-128561

CI/ICD could not identify STEIN.

EE/[illegible] could not identify INTRAYA

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

CIT-40113 X. FBI [illegible] EE/5-72 mk

14-00000

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/751,683, dated 2 October 1958, and to other correspondence concerning Subject, an American Communist living at Medellin #36, Apartment 9, Mexico, D. F.

2. Enclosed for your information are photocopies of the following correspondence sent to Subject:

a. Letter, dated 10 August 1958, from Jane Constance ROGERS, at Mill Valley, California, mentions that she and Abraham Aaron HELLER have been at Mill Valley since 1 August. She also mentions that Albert MALTZ is in Los Angeles and that she and HELLER planned to travel through there in late August. She refers to two "youngish" lawyers from Los Angeles who came to San Francisco for a breath of "fresh air." She mentions Tim KELLY's kindness to her and HELLER at Mill Valley and that KELLY sends his love to Pablo [O'HIGGINS]. She also encloses six photographs of herself and HELLER. (CSCI-3/751,016, dated 12 August 1958, reported that ROGERS had asked HALPERIN to look for an apartment in Mexico City for her for the winter of 1958-59.)

b. Letter, dated 2 September 1958, from Martin Robert ROGERS, The Dell, Hume, Virginia, (son of Jane Constance ROGERS) queries HALPERIN about effects to be shipped when the ROGERS family goes to Mexico as immigrants. ROGERS mentions that he and his family hope to be in Mexico by 1 December "unless HASSAUSEN doesn't perform." ROGERS adds that "as a matter of fact,

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

CS COPY

we have to come anyway, and we'll enter as tourists if we can't get ready as immigrants." (Evidently a lawyer named HAMHAUSER is arranging the entrance of the ROGERS family to Mexico. There are two brothers named HAMHAUSER who are practicing lawyers in Mexico.)

c. Letter, dated 4 September 1958, from Martin Robert ROGERS, The Dell, Hume, Virginia, requests HALPERIN to open a box in the main post office in Mexico City for him effective 1 November.

3. This correspondence was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau. Photocopies of this correspondence have been furnished the representative of your Bureau in Mexico City.

CSCI-3/752,072

Enclosures: 3 letters, as described above

WH/3/Mexico/M.King: mk kc 24 October 1958

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressees
- x - RI (201-128561)
- 1 - CI/Lia
- 1 - RQM/RE
- 1 - CI/R&A
- 1 - WH/3/Mexico
- 1 - WH/R
- 1 - WH/3/Subj: HALPERIN
- 1 - WH/3/Subj: ROGERS

Based on: HMMA-11113 ✓

Project Cryptonym: LIBIGHT

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM: RI/

DOCUMENT NUMBER DBF -12369

DOCUMENT DATE 29 Oct 58

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI STAFF		31 OCT 1958		
2. DC/CI				
3. CI/SID				
4. WH/FI/CE		8 Dec	8	
5. Mexico		9 Dec	9	
6.				
7. SPS		11 DEC 1958		
8. WE/2		7 JAN 1959	9 Jan 59	
9. CI/ICD		JAN 8 1959	JAN 16 1959	
10. CI				
11.				
12.				
13. RI/AN			20 JAN 1959	
14. RI/FI	1400L			

COMMENTS

NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files at the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.

This document may be forwarded to other areas if desired.

RECORD COPY

DEFERRED

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT 8451

DATE PROCESSED

INDEX

FORM NO. 1 OCT. 55 610a

SECRET

DBF / 12369

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-424134

Date: October 28, 1958

To: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: EDITH FRISCH HALPERIN
SECURITY MATTER - C

Records of the Passport Division, Department of State, revealed that captioned individual was issued a passport in August, 1958, at the American Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico. Regarding her travel plans, she had previously stated she intended to depart from Mexico on July 12, 1958, for proposed travel to Europe and the Middle East for the purpose of business and pleasure. However, on August 27, 1958, the American Embassy advised the Department of State that at the time a passport was issued to the subject she refused to give specific travel data but stated she expected to travel to Israel, returning via Belgium to visit the World's Fair at Brussels and would probably stop at intervening points.

Information concerning Halperin has previously been furnished to the recipients of this letter. No investigation is requested since this matter is being handled through the appropriate Legal Attaches. It

DBF 12369

would be appreciated, however, if this Bureau is furnished any pertinent information concerning Halperin which may come to the attention of the Department of State or the Central Intelligence Agency while she is outside the United States.

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

14-00000

LASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	S	4	BO
2	C-B	5	
3		6	

DATE : 165 JB/SW/GT
22 OCT 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION: WH 5 *

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, NEA 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C2

OCT 22 1528Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 17033

TO (PRIORITY) MEXI INFO DIR TELA LISB CARA CITE BERN 3096

RE BERN 3089 (IN 16287) **

LIAISON REPORTS SUBJECTS RETURNED ZURICH 21 OCT. SPENT HOUR AND HALF CSR CONSULATE ZURICH; CANCELLED RESERVATIONS TO TEL AVIV, SCHEDULED LEAVE FOR PRAG VIA AUSTRIA BY RAIL 23 OCT. LIAISON PLANS EITHER SEARCH EFFECTS CLANDESTINELY IN HOTEL OR THROUGH CUSTOMS CHECK AT BORDER.

END OF MESSAGE

S/C COMMENT: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST OF FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISBON 15 OCT. TRAVELLED GENEVA 15-18 OCT. EXPECTED RETURN ZURICH 20 OCT. SUBJECTS UNDER DISCREET INANITION SURVEILLANCE.

To FBI as OUT-86967

22 Oct 58
201-128561 ✓

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

501/RLG/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : M.King
UNIT : WH/3/M
EXT : 4456
DATE : 21 October 1958

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FROM : ~~DIRECTOR~~ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE					
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 86432

TO INFO CITE DIR

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

FROM : PORTUGAL, LISBON; SWITZERLAND, BERN
DATE OF INFO: 15 - 20 OCTOBER 1958
SUBJECT : TRAVEL OF MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS
REFERENCE : OUR TELETYPE MESSAGE OF 18 OCTOBER 1958

1. THE PORTUGUESE INTERNATIONAL POLICE HAVE REPORTED THAT MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE, EDITH FRISCH HALPERIN, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING SOVIET AGENTS, LEFT LISBON FOR ZURICH ON 15 OCTOBER 1958 VIA SWISSAIR AND INDICATED THAT THEIR DESTINATION WAS TEL AVIV. HALPERIN CARRIED U.S. PASSPORT NO. 118071, WHICH WAS ISSUED IN MEXICO ON 26 AUGUST 1958.

2. AN OFFICIAL SWISS SOURCE REPORTED THAT HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE ARRIVED AT ZURICH FROM LISBON ON 15 OCTOBER AND STAYED AT THE HOTEL SCHWEIZERHOF UNTIL 18 OCTOBER, WHEN THEY TRAVELED TO GENEVA. THEY EXPECTED TO RETURN TO ZURICH ON 20 OCTOBER.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE

(END OF MESSAGE)

WE/Portugal (by telephone)
EE/Switzerland (by telephone)

22 Oct 58
201-128561

ABOVE INFO BASED ON:
LISB-1333 (IN-16129)
BERN-3089 (IN-16287)

CI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

WH/R/CE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

662 ER/.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : Charles W. [illegible]rson
UNIT : WH/FI
EXT : 3255
DATE : 21 October 1958 662

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 22 22 3[illegible] 58
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS. S/C 2

PRECEDENCE					
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT[illegible]97

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

46933

REFS MEXI 2592
MEXI 2596

1. PLEASE NOTE DEPARTURE OF KEY AMERICAN COMMUNIST HALPERIN RAISES QUESTION RE DATE OF PROCUREMENT OF INFORMATION.

2. TO MEET ANY POSSIBLE CRITICISM HERE PLEASE ADVISE WAS LOCAL ODENVY TARDY IN PROCESSING? WHY WAS LIFEAT CONTACT OF 29 SEPTEMBER NOT REPORTED PRIOR 17 OCTOBER?

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: * IN 15827, STATED THAT MAURICE HALPERIN WAS CONTACTING ANN SEBORER RE KLM FLT TO LISBOA VIA SAN JOSE, CURACAO, CARACAS. INTERESTED IN KNOWING IF RESERVATIONS COULD BE OBTAINED WITH SHORT NOTICE.
** IN 15475.

C/CI

22 Oct 58

WH/III/MEXICO

201-128561

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. King
J. C. KING, CWH
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, CWH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

000 ER/WSIM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 20 OCT 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION: WH 5*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

OCT 21 0338Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 16287

TO MEXI INFO DIR TELA LISB CARA CITE BERN 3089

RE MEXI 2596 (IN 15475)***

SUBJECTS ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISBON 15 OCT, STAYED ZURICH HOTEL SCHWEIZERHOF 15 TO 18 OCT, WHEN TRAVELLED GENEVA. EXPECTED RETURN ZURICH 20 OCT. THEY UNDER DISCREET INANITION SURVEILLANCE:

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS:

*ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DTVOUR USED.

**RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

***REQUESTED SURVEILLANCES WHERE POSSIBLE AND REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT WHO LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR CURACAO LISBON ON 13 OCT.

21 Oct 58
201-128561 ✓

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

293 DMCL/RCB/

DATE : 20 OCT 1958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LISBON

ACTION : [illegible] (MR. SULC WH DIV NOTIFIED 1900-20 OCT 58)

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 5,
SR 3, WE 4, S/C 2

PRIORITY

IN16129

TO DIR BERN TELA* INFO CARA MEXI CITE LISB 1333
ZURI

LCIMPROVE

REF: MEXI 2596 (IN 15475)**

MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, EDITH DEPARTED FOR ZURI FROM LISB 15 OCT. VIA SWISSAIR. INDICATED DESTINATION TEL AVIV. HALPERIN CARRYING AMERICAN PASSPORT 118071 ISSUED MEXI 26 AUGUST 58.

END OF MESSAGE

*WASH S/C NOTE: RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

C/S COMMENT: **HALPERINS ON WAITING LIST SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCT.

*ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

20 Oct 58

201-128561

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

Halperin Maurice

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

	ROUTING	
1	4	
2	5	
3	6	

DATE : 22 OCT 58

165 [illegible]

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION: WH 5 *

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, NEA 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C2

OCT 22 1528Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 17033

TO (PRIORITY) MEXI INFO DIR TELA LISB CARA CITE BERN 3096

RE BERN 3089 (IN 16287) **

LIAISON REPORTS SUBJECTS RETURNED ZURICH 21 OCT. SPENT HOUR AND HALF CSR CONSULATE ZURICH, CANCELLED RESERVATIONS TO TEL AVIV, SCHEDULED LEAVE FOR PRAG VIA AUSTRIA BY RAIL 23 OCT. LIAISON PLANS EITHER SEARCH EFFECTS CLANDESTINELY IN HOTEL OR THROUGH CUSTOMS CHECK AT BORDER.

END OF MESSAGE

S/C COMMENT: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST OF FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISBON 15 OCT. TRAVELLED GENEVA 15-18 OCT. EXPECTED RETURN ZURICH 20 OCT. SUBJECTS UNDER DISCREET INANITION SURVEILLANCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

HALPERIN, Maurice
22-13[illegible]

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : 22 October 1958

SDL

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM : XXXXXXXX CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, S/C 2
NEA 4, SR 4

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	
X ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	

OUT 86867

TO INFO CITE DIR

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

FROM : SWITZERLAND, BERN

DATE OF INFO : 21 OCTOBER 1958

SUBJECT : TRAVEL OF MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS

REFERENCE : OUR TELETYPE MESSAGE OF 21 OCTOBER 1958

AN OFFICIAL SWISS SOURCE HAS REPORTED THAT MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE, EDITH FRISCH HALPERIN, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING SOVIET AGENTS, RETURNED TO ZURICH FROM GENEVA ON 21 OCTOBER 1958, SPENT AN HOUR AND A HALF AT THE CZECH CONSULATE IN ZURICH, CANCELLED THEIR RESERVATIONS TO TEL AVIV, AND WERE SCHEDULED TO LEAVE ZURICH FOR PRAGUE VIA AUSTRIA BY RAIL ON 23 OCTOBER.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE

END OF MESSAGE

ABOVE INFO BASED ON: BERN-3096 (IN-17033)

C/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION [illegible]

Copy No

HALPERIN Maurice

592 SD/ATF/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

22-10-58

ORIG : STEPHEN MILLETT
UNIT : CI/SPD
EXT : 2831
DATE : ~~22 OCTOBER 1958~~ 592

TO : TEL AVIV
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/CI/SP 3
INFO : COP, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE

X	DEFERRED	OCT 22 21 00 Z 58
	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 86312

TO TELA INFO CITE DIR 46863

RYBAT ~~[illegible]~~

REF DIR 46607 (OUT 86097) *

21 OCT SUBJ CANCELLED RESERVATIONS TO TELA. NOW ~~[illegible]~~ SCHEDULED LEAVE FOR PRAGUE VIA AUSTRIA BY RAIL 23 OCT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HALPERIN HAD ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISB 15 OCT VIA SWISSAIR. INDICATED DESTINATION TELA.

Doensbye

Mary Finck
NE/3/SR

Stephen Millett
STEPHEN MILLETT, C/CI/SPD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

201/REG [illegible]

ORIG : M. King
UNIT : WH/3/M
EXT : 4456
DATE : 21 October 1958

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM : ~~DIRECTOR~~ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
☒	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 86432

TO INFO CITE DIR

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

FROM : PORTUGAL, LISBON; SWITZERLAND, BERN

DATE OF INFO: 15 - 20 OCTOBER 1958

SUBJECT : TRAVEL OF MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS

REFERENCE : OUR TELETYPE MESSAGE OF 18 OCTOBER 1958

1. THE PORTUGUESE INTERNATIONAL POLICE HAVE REPORTED THAT MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE, EDITH FRISCH HALPERIN, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING SOVIET AGENTS, LEFT LISBON FOR ZURICH ON 15 OCTOBER 1958 VIA SWISSAIR AND INDICATED THAT THEIR DESTINATION WAS TEL AVIV. HALPERIN CARRIED U.S. PASSPORT NO. 118071, WHICH WAS ISSUED IN MEXICO ON 26 AUGUST 1958.

2. AN OFFICIAL SWISS SOURCE REPORTED THAT HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE ARRIVED AT ZURICH FROM LISBON ON 15 OCTOBER AND STAYED AT THE HOTEL SCHWEIZERHOF UNTIL 18 OCTOBER, WHEN THEY TRAVELED TO GENEVA. THEY EXPECTED TO RETURN TO ZURICH ON 20 OCTOBER.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE

(END OF MESSAGE)

WE/Portugal (by telephone)
EE/Switzerland (by telephone)

ABOVE INFO BASED ON:
LISB-1333 (IN-16129)
BERN-3089 (IN-16287)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CI
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

WH/R/CE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

565 BD/ATF

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : STEPHEN M LLETT
UNIT : CI/SPD
EXT : 2331
DATE : 21 OCTOBER 1958

565

TO : COS TEL AVIV
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/CI/SP 3
INFO : COP, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

21 19 19 56
CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE				INITIALS
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT86097
OUT 86097

TO TELA INFO CITE DIR 46607

RYBAT RHYTON

REF DIR 46465 (OUT 85727) *

SCM SUBJ ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISB 15 OCT VIA SWISSAIR.
SCM INDICATED DESTINATION TELA. SUBJ CARRYING PBPRIME PASSPORT 118071 ISSUED MEXI 26 AUG 1958.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT:

*HQS FORWARDED INFO RE MOVEMENTS OF MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENTS.

NE/ISR

Stephen Millett
STEPHEN MILLETT, C/CI/SPD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. 2

Halperin, Maurice

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

000 ER/WS

DATE : 20 OCT 58

ROUTING			
1		4	21-10-58
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 21 0338Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 16287

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION: WH 5*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

TO MEXI INFO DIR TELA LISB CARA CITE BERN 3089

RE MEXI 2596 (IN 15475)***

SUBJECTS ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISBON 15 OCT, STAYED ZURICH HOTEL SCHWEIZERHOF 15 TO 18 OCT, WHEN TRAVELLED GENEVA. EXPECTED RETURN ZURICH 20 OCT. THEY UNDER DISCREET INANITION SURVEILLANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS:

*ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DTVOUR USED.

**RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

***REQUESTED SURVEILLANCES WHERE POSSIBLE AND REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT WHO LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR CURACAO LISBON ON 13 OCT.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No

Halperin, Maurice

293 DMCL/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		4	20-10-58
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 20 OCT 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LISBON

ACTION : WE 5 (MR. SULC WE DIV NOTIFIED 1900-20 OCT 58)

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 5, SR 5, WE 5, S/C 2

PRIORITY

IN16129

TO DIR BERN TELA* ZURI **INFO** CARA MEXI **CITE** LISB 1333

LCIMPROVE

REF: MEXI 2596 (IN 15475) **

MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, EDITH DEPARTED FOR ZURI FROM LISB 15 OCT. VIA SWISSAIR. INDICATED DESTINATION TEL AVIV. HALPERIN CARRYING AMERICAN PASSPORT 118071 ISSUED MEXI 26 AUGUST 58.

END OF MESSAGE

*WASH C/C NOTE: RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

C/S COMMENT: **HALPERINS ON WAITING LIST SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCT.

*ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

603 GD/ATP/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : STEPHEN MILLETT
UNIT : CI/SPD
EXT : 2831
DATE : 20 OCTOBER 1958

6.8

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : TEL AVIV
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/CI/SP 3
INFO : COP, S/C 2

Mary Boeck

NE /ISR

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	OCT 20 20 5 : 56	
	ROUTINE	RECD CABLE SECT.	
XX	~~PRIORITY~~	INITIALS	SCM
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT85727

TO TELA INFO CITE DIR 46465

RYBAT RHYTON

KKCOOT RJ-1340

1. MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT LEFT MEXICO CITY KLM FLIGHT 988 FOR CURACAO LISBON KLM FLIGHT 722 ON 13 OCT.

2. KLM ADVISES RESERVATIONS MADE IN NAME MR AND MRS DANIEL PASTOR AND LATE ON 11 OCT CALL FROM MEXI AMERICAN TRAVEL AGENCY ADVISES PASTORS HAD CANCELLED REQUESTED SUBSTITUTE MR AND MRS MAURICE HALPERIN.

3. HALPERINS ON WAITING LIST SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCT AND KLM ADVISES TELEPHONIC REQUEST BY "MR PASTOR" ASKED PRICE ROUND TRIP TICKET ZURICH TO TELA.

4. PROBABLY HALPERINS PLAN JOIN ALFRED ~~[illegible]~~ KAUFMAN Stern AND MARTHA DODD STERN IN PRAGUE. RESERVATION TECHNIQUE SAME AS HALPERIN USED WHEN HE MADE PLANS FOR STERNS FLEE TO SOVIET UNION.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. 3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : **TEL AVIV**
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PRECEDENCE

☐	DEFERRED	OCT 20 70 5 2:56
☐	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
☒	PRIORITY	INITIALS
☐	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

PAGE 2

DIR 46465
OUT 85727

TO
INFO
CITE DIR

5. REQUEST SURVEILLANCE AND REPORT IF SUBJ ARRIVES TEL AVIV.

END OF MESSAGE

Stephen Millett

STEPHEN MILLETT, C/CI/SPD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 7

025/ER/06

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE : 17 OCT 1958

25

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

(MR. BRADY AND MR OGDEN WH DIV NOTIFIED 0115 18 OCT 58)

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, NEA 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2, CI/SP

PRIORITY

IN 15475

TO PRITY DIR BERN INFO CITE MEXI 2596

* TELA LISB CARA ZURI

aka Pastor Daniel

Subject: Edith Frisell Halperin

1. MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT LEFT MEXICO CITY KLM FLIGHT 988 FOR CURACAO LISBON KLM FLIGHT 722 ON 13 OCT. in name of Daniel Pastor; then cancelled use of Pastor; inquiry made of trip Zurich to Tel Aviv;

2. KLM ADVISES RESERVATIONS MADE IN NAME MR AND MRS DANIEL PASTOR AND LATE ON 11 OCT CALL FROM MEXI AMERICA TRAVEL AGENCY ADVISES PASTORS HAD CANCELLED REQUESTED SUBSTITUTE MR AND MRS MAURICE HALPERIN.

prob. plan join

3. HALPERINS ON WAITING LIST SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCT AND KLM ADVISES TELEPHONIC REQUEST BY "MR PASTOR" ASKED PRICE ROUND TRIP TICKET ZURICH TO TELAVIV.

NC

Stern

4. FC. PROBABLE HALPERINS PLAN JOIN ALFRED KAUFMAN AND MARTHA DODD STERN IN PRAGUE. RESERVATION TECHNIQUE SAME AS HALPERIN USED WHEN HE MADE PLANS FOR STERNS FLEE TO SOVIET UNION.

NC

May be joined by Maurice Halperins in Prague

may be joined by Maurice Halperins in Prague

5. REQUEST SURVEILLANCES WHERE POSSIBLE, REPORTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

HALPERIN, Maurice
aka FASTOR, Daniel

SUBJECT FOLDER 201-128561

IN 15475, Mexi 2596, 18-10-58 (subj fldr) Subj & wife American Communists suspected Soviet Agent left Mexico City for Curacao Lisbon on 13 Oct in name of Daniel FASTOR; then cancelled use of PASTOR; inquiry made of trip Zurich to Tel Aviv; prob. plan join Alfred KAUFMAN and Mrthan Dodd STERN in Prague. Subj's wife's name - Edith Frish HALPERIN

HMMA-12338, 11-3-59 (MALTZ, Albert subj fldr)

OVER →

HALPERIN, Edith Frisch
aka HALPERIN, Maurice Mrs.

IN 15475, Mexi 2596, 18-10-58 (Maurice HALPERIN subj file) Subj is wife of Maurice HALPERIN

IN 34979, Mexi 3532, 21-3-59 (SEBORER, Max subj fldr)

RJ-1471, 27-3-59 (SEBORER, Max subj fldr)

NE/ISR desk cards

201-128561

542 LS ATF

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : JERRY C GLASS
UNIT : WH/3/GUATEMALA
EXT : 2860
DATE : 18 OCTOBER 1958. 542

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FROM : DIRECTOR , CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, SR 4. S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

35330

TO INFO CITE DIR

FROM : MEXICO, MEXICO CITY

DATE OF INFO: 13-15 OCTOBER 1958

SUBJECT : TRAVEL OF MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, COMMUNISTS

1. ACCORDING TO A PERSON WITH ACCESS TO TRAVEL RECORDS, WHO IS A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, MAURICE HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING SOVIET AGENTS, LEFT MEXICO CITY VIA KLM FLIGHT 988 FOR CURACAO, AND LISBON VIA KLM FLIGHT 722 ON 13 OCTOBER.

2. THE RESERVATIONS WERE MADE IN THE NAME OF MR. AND MRS. DANIEL PASTOR. ON 11 OCTOBER A CALL FROM THE MEXICO-AMERICA TRAVEL AGENCY ADVISED KLM THAT THE PASTORS HAD CANCELLED THEIR TRIP AND REQUESTED THAT KLM SUBSTITUTE MR. AND MRS. MAURICE HALPERIN.

3. THE HALPERINS ARE ON A WAITING LIST OF SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCTOBER. A TELEPHONIC REQUEST BY " MR. PASTOR" ASKED THE PRICE OF A ROUND TRIP TICKET FROM ZURICH TO TELAVIV. (FIELD COMMENT. PROBABLY THE HALPERINS PLAN TO JOIN ALFRED KAUFMAN AND MARTHA DODD STERN IN PRAGUE. THE RESERVATION TECHNIQUE IS THE SAME AS THE ONE HALPERIN USED WHEN HE MADE

19 Oct 58

201-128561 ✓

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO : FBI

FROM : DIRECTOR , CIA

CONF :

INFO :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 85330

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE 2

PLANS FOR THE STERN'S FLIGHT TO THE SOVIET UNION.)

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: LEGAL ATTACHE

END OF MESSAGE

ABOVE BASED ON MEXI 2596 IN 15475

CI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R. M. Dahlgren
WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-128561

546 LB/ATR/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Secret

546

ORIG : JERRY G CL[illegible]
UNIT : WH/3/Guatemala
EXT : 2060
DATE : 18 OCTOBER 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible]
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT85327
OUT 85327

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 46321

HQS PASSED MEXI 2596 IN 15475 TO ODENVY. PLEASE PASS ODENVY LOCALLY.

END OF MESSAGE

18 Oct 58
201-128561

Robert N. Dahlgren
for/ WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Robert N. Dahlgren
C/ WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3

345 WCJ/WC [illegible]/WCJ

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 17 OCTOBER 1958

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 19 18 19 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 15827

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2592

1. MAURICE HALPERIN CONTACTING ANN SEBORER RE KLM FLT TO LISBOA VIA SAN JOSE, CURACAO, CARACAS. INTERESTED IN KNOWING IF RESERVATIONS CAN BE OBTAINED WITH SHORT NOTICE. ANN SEBORER ALSO CHECKED FOR CANPAC WITHOUT STOP IN UNITED STATES FOR TRIP TO LISBOA. (LIFEAT 29 SEPT DOC).

2. ANN SEBORER TELLING FRIENDS OF FURNISHED APT ON CALLE MEDELLIN FOR RENT FOR 6 MONTHS-YEAR. FC: HALPERIN LIVES AT MEDELLIN 36 APT 9. ALSO TELLING OF GOOD BUY ON STUDEBAKER 50 VINTAGE AT 12,000 PESOS WHICH HAS HAD ONLY 1 DRIVER. FC: HALPERIN OWNS 50 STUDEBAKER. BOTH MAY BE MERE COINCIDENCE. SOURCE LIFEAT DOC.

3. HALPERIN SEEING ANN SEBORER PERSONALLY ON ARRANGEMENTS ALTHOUGH PHONING FOR APPOINTMENT WITH HER. LIFEAT 8 DOC.

4. HALPERIN STILL IN MEXI 8 OCT WHEN EDITH ASKED MGT MALTZ OVER FOR COFFEE. LIFEAT 8 DOC.

END OF MESSAGE

19 Oct 58

201-128561 ✓

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

025/ER/DE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE : 17 OCT 1958

25

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

(MR. BRADY AND MR OGDEN WH DIV NOTIFIED 0115 18 OCT 58)

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, NEA 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2, CI/SP

PRIORITY

IN 15475

TO PRITY DIR BERN INFO CITE MEXI 2596

* TELA LISS CARA ZURI

1. MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT LEFT MEXICO CITY KLM FLIGHT 936 FOR CURACAO LISBON KLM FLIGHT 722 ON 13 OCT.

2. KLM ADVISES RESERVATIONS MADE IN NAME MR AND MRS DANIEL PASTOR AND LATE ON 11 OCT CALL FROM MEXI AMERICA TRAVEL AGENCY ADVISES PASTORS HAD CANCELLED REQUESTED SUBSTITUTE MR AND MRS MAURICE HALPERIN.

3. HALPERINS ON WAITING LIST SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCT AND KLM ADVISES TELEPHONIC REQUEST BY "MR PASTOR" ASKED PRICE ROUND TRIP TICKET ZURICH TO TELAVIV.

4. FC. PROBABLE HALPERINS PLAN JOIN ALFRED KAUFMAN AND MARTHA DODD STERN IN PRAGUE. RESERVATION TECHNIQUE SAME AS HALPERIN USED WHEN HE MADE PLANS FOR STERNS FLEE TO SOVIET UNION.

5. REQUEST SURVEILLANCES WHERE POSSIBLE, REPORTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

[illegible]-95330 to FBI

18 Oct 58

201-128561 ✓

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

HALPERIN

SECRET
CONTINUED CONTROL

7 October 1958

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Woodrow Wilson BORAH

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/751,004, dated 14 August 1958, concerning Subject, former OSS employee and a contact of Maurice HALPERIN, American Communist in Mexico City. Subject is now employed at the University of California.

2. Forwarded for the information of your Bureau is a photographic copy of a letter, dated 6 June 1958, from Subject to HALPERIN, which mentions that the BORAH family planned to leave Berkeley on 30 June to go to Europe, via Washington D.C. and New York City. BORAH also says he has recommended HALPERIN to the Encyclopedia Britannica as an expert on Mexican statistics and economy.

3. The letter was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated further.

CSCI-3/751,777

Enclosure: One letter as described above

WH/3/Mexico/L.Washinko: kc   30 September 1958

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI (201-223839)
1 - CI/Lia
1 - RI/RI
1 - CI/RA
✓1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - WH/R

Based on: HMMA-10532

Project Cryptonym: LIHIGH

SECRET
CONTINUED CONTROL

7 Oct 58
201-128561
751,777

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/751,349, dated 4 September 1958, and to other correspondence concerning Subject, an American Communist in Mexico.

2. On 19 August 1958 an appointment HALPERIN had with Narciso BASSOLS, known Soviet agent, was changed from 21 to 22 August, since BASSOLS would not be in Mexico City on 21 August. On 22 August HALPERIN was informed that BASSOLS could not see him until 25 August.

3. The above information was passed to your representative in Mexico City. It was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated further.

CSCI-3/751,633

WH/3/LWashinko: mln

22 September 1958

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - RI (201-128561)
1 - CI/Lia
1 - RQM/FE
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - WH/R

Based on: HMM-3680

Project Cryptonym: LIFEAT

SE
CONTINUED CONTROL

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

2 OCT

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/751,165, dated 26 August 1958, and to other correspondence concerning Subject, an American Communist living at Medellin #36, Apartment 9, Mexico, D.F.

2. Enclosed for your information are photocopies of the following correspondence sent to Subject:

a) Letter, postmarked 28 April 1958, from David HALPERIN, Subject's son, a medical student in Chicago, Illinois, concerns David's studies and his health, and mentions that he was elected to the student government on the Student Representative Party ticket.

b) Note, dated 3 May 1958, from Subject's mother, at 824 Bluehill Avenue, Dorchester, Massachusetts, concerns purely family matters.

c) Letter, dated 9 May 1958, from Sadie F. BIRNBAUM, 8 Chase Street, Lynn, Massachusetts, gives news of friends and relatives of the HALPERINs, including one Elinor GOLSMAN.

d) Letter, postmarked 18 May 1958, from David HALPERIN, concerns his studies and living arrangements.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

2 Oct 58
201-128561

CS COPY

e) Letter, dated 29 April, from A. DORFMAN, in Santiago, Chile, indicates that HALPERIN may have asked the writer for help, possibly in finding a job. (A. DORFMAN is believed identical with Adolfo DORFMAN, a suspected Communist and former employee of the United Nations who is now in Argentina. DORFMAN and Fanny, his wife, were both born in the Soviet Union, but DORFMAN is believed to be a citizen of Argentina now.) The writer describes himself as a "well-known and uncompromising" supporter of (President) FRONDIZI (of Argentina) and says that since the latter's election triumph he (the writer) has been "practically snowed under with requests for assistance, advice, etc." (It is believed that DORFMAN did, in fact, accept a position as an adviser in the FRONDIZI government.) The letter also enclosed a hand-written note, signed "Fanny."

f) Letter, dated 9 May 1958, from Bob and Terry ROGERS (aka Martin Robert ROGERS and Teresa Soracco ROGERS), in Venice, Italy, describes the Italian part of the ROGERS' European tour. Two parts of the letter may be of significance. First, ROGERS' comments on the Italian elections: "The CP is campaigning vigorously and spending a lot of money. They and the Christian Democrats are the only ones you seem to feel. The local papers seem resigned to leftist gains, so the immediate future of Italy will depend in large part on the coalitions that NENNI may be willing to form." Second, his "few random notes": "Just as many cops as in Benito's (MUSSOLINI's) day. U.S. missile base straddles industrial Italy. U.S. army vehicles constantly on highways in this region (Turin-Milan-Venice)." The letter also mentions the fact that the ROGERS were going on to Austria and Brussels after completing their tour of Italy.

g) Letter, dated 14 May 1958, from Oscar LEWIS, at the University of Illinois, concerns some translations HALPERIN was doing for LEWIS. LEWIS says that he has overdrawn his research account and asks HALPERIN to take this into account when computing his bill for the translations. LEWIS also says that he is hoping to be able to visit Mexico the first two weeks in June.

3. This correspondence was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated further.

CSCI-3/751,683

Enclosures: 7 letters as described above

WH/3/Mexico/L.Washinko: kc 24 September 1958

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Addressee
  1 - RI (201-128561)
  1 - CI/Lia
  1 - CI/ICD
  1 - CI/R&A
  1 - WH/3/Mexico
  1 - WH/R

Based on: HMMA-10320
HMMA-10321 ✓

Project Cryptonym: LIBIGHT

201-128561

201-128561

DISPATCH

SECRET

HMM-A-11154

50-4-120-1

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 1 October 1958

SUBJECT American Communists in Mexico

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

MICROFILMED

☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

MEXI-2334
MEXI-2342

(Lifeat)

1. Following an order issued by the President of Mexico on 6 September 1958 for enforcement of Article 33 of the Constitution a round-up was made in Mexico City of American Communists and other foreigners, allegedly Communists, currently residing here both as tourists and inmigrantes or inmigrados.

2. Among the first Americans to be picked up and who were the only ones actually to leave due to this order were: Bernard BLASENHEIM, John BRIGHT and Allen LEWIS.

3. Bernard BLASENHEIM entered Mexico in 1950 with "Inmigrante" status and currently enjoyed status as an "Inmigrado" here. U. S. Ambassador Robert C. Hill received a call on 7 September 1958 from former Senator George BENDER of Ohio requesting that he intercede for Mr. BLASENHEIM who was being detained by Mexican authorities. According to local newspapers William O'DWYER, former U. S. Ambassador to Mexico, was requested by a phone call from New York to intercede for BLASENHEIM with local authorities. O'DWYER's office was unable to secure an "amparo" for BLASENHEIM. BLASENHEIM was deported from Mexico, arriving in San Antonio, Texas on American Airlines flt. 690 on 11 September 1958. (ODINCH) Ambassador Hill advised (former) Senator BENDER that he could not intercede that the procedure was completely legal (by Mexican law) and advised Mr. BENDER to check into BLASENHEIM's background. Mr. BENDER withdrew his request, said he did not know BLASENHEIM; had had a call from New York

201-12534

4. John BRIGHT, entered Mexico as a student immigrant originally but in March 1955 his status was changed to that of a "technical immigrant" retroactive to October 1954. BRIGHT had not yet attained "inmigrado" status. When picked up BRIGHT was incarcerated at Miguel Schulz 135 in solitary confinement (LIFEAT). He was deported from Mexico on the same flight as BLASENHEIM.

47457

5. (Dr) Allen LEWIS, who has been an instructor at the National University of Mexico, had "inmigrado" status in Mexico. He was picked up by persons claiming to come from Gobernacion during the night of 6 September 1958 and taken from his home in Coyoacan to the Detention Center at Miguel Schulz 135. Mrs. Brooke LEWIS, wife of Dr. LEWIS contacted the U. S. Embassy in an effort to ascertain the reason for his deportation on 9 September 1958. Dr. LEWIS called his wife from San Antonio on 9 September and stated that he and Mr. BLASENHEIM had been brought to San Antonio by the Mexican authorities. (Interview with Mrs. LEWIS by a U. S. Embassy official, 9 September 1958).

6. During the drive by Mexican authorities the following Americans were picked up, held and released after period varying from several hours to several days:

201-128561

A. Noah SEBORER - authorities went to his home on 7 September but were unable to locate him there. He appeared voluntarily for a check of his documents and was detained at the Detention Center on 8 September. As a naturalized citizen of the U. S. he could not be returned to the U. S. without documentation and no documentation other than his Mexican "red book" was provided to the Mexican authorities. He was released on 12 September 1958. (LIFEAT)

201-163487

B. Elizabeth Catlett de MORA - picked up but released after short detention. She is married to a Mexican citizen.

201-52557

C. Lan ADOMIAN - picked up on 9 September 1958 (LIFEAT). ADOMIAN is a Russian-born naturalized American who entered Mexico as a U. S. citizen but sought Immigration papers in Mexico as a Spaniard in view of his claim to Spanish citizenship, having been a member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade during the

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28 AND 51-28A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

50-4-120-1

1 Oct 58

CS COPY

201-128561

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-A-11154

TO

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-120-1

FROM

DATE: 1 October 1958

SUBJECT

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

X MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

Spanish Civil War. He enjoys immigrant status in Mexico.

201-2653

D. Martin *OVERGAARD, who was deported from the U. S. in 1950 as an undesirable alien, was another of the group who was picked up during this drive. He is listed by the Mexicans as a Dane.

7. It is interesting to note that Excelsior, a reputable Mexican newspaper, commented that the major portion of group being detained were "pro-Soviet U. S. citizens, Europeans now naturalized Americans and some from Central and South America."

8. LINEB-1 reported that as of 11 September 1958 the American Communists in Mexico expected the arrests to cease very shortly. From LIFEAT it was learned that consternation existed among the group and that they had scattered to various places, in and around Mexico, after the first onslaught by the local authorities.

9. According to various newspaper articles the following persons were marked for detention if they could be located:

A. Ralph *SCOTT, former Alfred K. *STERN chauffeur and currently handling the STERN residence in Cuernavaca (LIMOUSINE reported that SCOTT was in Cuernavaca on 21 September 1958. This station is not aware SCOTT a Communist but he is loyal to the STERNs - see various letters to and from Alfred K. and Martha Dodd STERN (in Prague)).

201-102553

B. Max *SHLAFROCK - he and his family are in New York City now and have been there for several months.

201-5557

C. Paul *STEVENSON (aka Pablo *O'HIGGINS), lover of Martha Dodd STERN and painter. Known to associate with members of the Satellite diplomatic installations as well as with the Soviets. Has been attempting to regularize his status in Mexico.

201-125767

D. Frederick Vanderbilt *FIELD - "inmigrado" in Mexico and presently married to Nieves *TILLETT (former wife of James TILLET) by whom he has a child born in summer 1958.

201-28561

E. Maurice *HALPERIN - he and his wife left their residence on first hearing of the pick-ups. His son, David and family remained in their residence however. (LIFEAT)

F. Gray Dayton *BEMIS - has small chicken farm in Ixtapalapa, suburb of Mexico City at last report. An American by birth and married to a Guatemalan Communist who was active in organizing canneries on West Coast of U. S. BEMIS reportedly is ill. Has been "inmigrante" since April 1955 in Mexico.

G. Albert *MALTZ, one of the "Hollywood Ten." Local authorities are aware that MALTZ and family are in the United States at this time but were afraid that subject should re-enter Mexico under an assumed name. MALTZ is an "inmigrado." The papers also mentioned that Helen *SOBELL, wife of Morton *SOBELL, of the Rosenberg case, who is now in the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia, had been staying at the MALTZ residence during the time she was in Mexico (She departed Mexico on 10 September 1958 voluntarily.)

H. John *HUCOCK (believed to be identical with Joseph *RASKOB, painter). "Inmigrante" in Mexico. If Joseph RASKOB is the one meant, he is believed to be in the U. S. A. exhibiting paintings. Reported as detained but no information that this was so.

FORM 53

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-A-11154

TO

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-4-120-1

FROM

DATE: 1 October 1958

SUBJECT

RE "43" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

201-44515

I. Lini Fuhr STOUMEN - reported to have been detained but this was never verified.

J. Felix SAUNDERS (husband of STOUMEN) - reported to have been detained but this never verified.

10. During all the time that the pick-ups were occurring Carmen CARRASCO Molino, who acted as intermediary for Helen SOBELL with Lic. Luis SANCHEZ Ponton was busy at the MALTZ residence making attempts to gather funds with which to force the Mexican authorities to rescind the pick-up orders and to help the American Communists as a group in efforts to solidify their status in Mexico.

11. Apparently the papers of the people who were deported as well as those who were picked up were correct so far as technicalities were concerned.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

GFB/cps

26 September 1958

Distribution:
3 - Hqs
5 - Files

50-4-20

1 Oct. 58

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HALPERIN, MAURICE HYMAN
201-128561
(VOL. VII)

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 JAN 62 — 76

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
19 MAY	—	JOHANNA SMITH	Johanna Smith
23 MAY	23 MAY	"	"

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman
201-128561

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS - 201-128561 (HALPERIN)

Vol. VII FBI (Boston) 2/6/62; File 100-25501 & 65-14303

FBI (Boston) 1/25/63; Files as above

FBI (Washington) 2/26/63; re HALPERIN

FBI (Washington) 2/26/63

FBI (Boston) 1/13/64; File #BS 100-25501 & 65-14303

FBI (Washington) 1/18/65

FBI (Boston) 3/25/66; File #100-31726 & 100-424134
re Edity Evelyn HALPERIN

FBI (Washington) 6/14/66; File # (S) 65-14303

FBI (Boston) 12/15/66

FBI (Washington) 10/10/67

FBI (Washington) 4/30/68

FBI (Boston) 7/14/72 re Maurice

FBI (Boston) 7/14/72 re Edith

HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman 0003944 ✓
DOB: 3 March 1906
POB: Boston, Massachusetts
Wife: Edith Frisch HALPERIN 225361

201-128561 (S)
[illegible] Case
LCHAYFOWL

Subject is a U.S. citizen and a former OSS employee. Subject has been closely associated with Martha Dodd and Alfred K. STERN in Mexico, and he handled some of the STERNs' business affairs. As of April 1959, Subj believed to be in Moscow. RIS INPUT NO. 53

SEE: SR/CI/B dossier (Also see LCHAYFOWL Case files.)
CSCI-3/772,[illegible] reported Subject's return address(received on a Christmas card(1962), as Apt C-2, Calle 12, no 1[illegible], Miramar, Habana, Cuba; first time that Subject has given a [illegible] address on a greeting card.

201-128561

OUTGOING MESSAGE

12-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPS	NRO	OCI
OMF 0	C	0	0	0	U	0

PAGE OF PAGES
1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
132130Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
683288

CONF: C/CI3 INFO: FILE DDO 3 ADO/DO OGC C/SS C/EUR3

0 INDEX DISSEN BY: 45
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER CI
0 IP FILES # 2 (E.O.)

EYES ONLY

TO: LONDON INFO OTTAWA.Y

RYBAT PLMHBLANKET Y

REF: LONDON 74209 |IN 971297| (RELAYED OTTAWA)Y

1. PER REFERENCE REQUEST FOR TRACES ON MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN (201-128561), WE ARE FORWARDING VIA TM FIVE 1960 NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS AND A RECENT ARTICLE FROM THE SIMON FRASSER UNIVERSITY, BRITISH COLUMBIA, ALUMNI MAGAZINE FOR PASSAGE TO JAGUAR. THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED PURSUANT TO OUR SERVICE TO SERVICE ARRANGEMENT FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON PERSONS OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INTEREST.Y

2. MAURICE HALPERIN HAS TWO CHILDREN: DAVID CARLOS BORN 5 MAY 1937 IN OKLAHOMA CITY AND JUDITH YVONNE BORN 1 SEPT 1931 IN BOSTON. (SOURCE: DBD-43144, 25 MAR 1966) LNERGO APPROVES PASSING TO JAGUAR. AGENCY RECORDS ON MORTON HALPERIN DO NOT REFLECT ANY RELATIONSHIP WITH MAURICE HALPERIN. HALPERIN IS A COMMON NAME.Y

3. PUBLICATIONS SINCE 1957: "GROWTH AND CRISIS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY: 1961, "CONFERENCIAS SOBRE GEOGRAFIA ECONOMICA" 1964, "HACIA UN NUEVO SISTEMA DE PLANIFICACION Y DIRECCION

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

P&L DISSEM
RYBAT
RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR 883288

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: #

ECONOMICAS EN LA UNION SOVIETICA" 1964, AND "THE RISE AND DECLINE OF FIDEL CASTRO - AN ESSAY IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY", UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS.Y

4. THE FOLLOWING IS FROM FHABOVE AND NEEDS THEIR CONCURRENCE TO PASS TO JAGUAR. MAURICE HALPERIN IS CURRENTLY TEACHING AT SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND EXPECTS THAT THE UNIVERSITY WILL EXTEND HIS TEACHING APPOINTMENT TO AUGUST 1977. HALPERIN TOLD FHABOVE THAT HE AND HIS WIFE TOURED ISRAEL, ITALY, GREECE, SPAIN, AND ENGLAND IN THE SUMMER OF 1975. HE IS CURRENTLY WORKING ON THE SECOND VOLUME OF HIS BOOK ON CUBA. HE LEFT THE IMPRESSION WITH FHABOVE THAT WHEN IT IS FINISHED HE WILL BEGIN WORK ON HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY. (SOURCE: OCOA-19102, 22 JAN 76)Y

5. FOR OTTAWA: JAGUAR HAS REQUESTED TRACES ON MAURICE HALPERIN. PLS NOTIFY LONDON IF FHABOVE APPROVES PASSING INFO FROM PARA FOUR ABOVE TO JAGUAR.Y

6. FILE: 73-6-46/3. E2 IMPDET.H

DDO/AGC - A. E. GOLDIN (IN DRAFT)

EUR/BC

E/FB/K

DATE: 12 JUL 76
ORIG: PATSY WOLF
UNIT: CI/OG
EXT: 1117

C/E/[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. Wall
AC/CI/OG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

Ex-OSS Official Works For Reds in Moscow

By VICTOR LASKY
North American Newspaper Alliance

A former Boston University professor, who once was a high official in the OSS, has turned up in Moscow working for the Soviet government.

The professor, Dr. Maurice H. Halperin, fled this country seven years ago after an inquiry into his Communist background.

According to the State Department, he probably is advising Soviet officials on Latin American affairs, an area in which he is expert.

Prof. Halperin was suspended by Boston University in 1953 after he refused, on constitutional grounds, to tell a Senate subcommittee whether he had ever been a Communist Party member.

MAURICE H. HALPERIN
—AP Photo

According to the State Department, he had previously been involved in Soviet espionage in wartime Washington. He had been named by Elizabeth Terril Bentley, admitted former spy courier, as one of her sources of supply among Government officials.

Intrigue in Mexico

And since 1953, Dr. Halperin has been involved in still more intrigue as an "exile" in Mexico. It was he, for example, who assisted two suspected spies in their flight from Mexico to Czechoslovakia to avoid United States extradition proceedings.

On July 15, 1960, Dr. Halperin and his wife, Edith, appeared at the United States Embassy in Moscow to present their United States passports for renewal.

All this was disclosed in a State Department memorandum prepared for Senator Keating, Republican of New York, who has been urging the passage of Eisenhower-supported legislation empowering the department to deny passports to active participants in Soviet skullduggery.

The memorandum, citing "cases where passports have had to be issued to known Communists," devoted considerable attention to the case of Dr. Halperin. It was obvious on the basis of the information contained in his dossier that the State Department had been keeping an eye on the former professor's movements for some time.

Fired in Oklahoma

From 1931 to 1941, Dr. Halperin—a Harvard University graduate—had been a professor at the University of Oklahoma. According to the record, it was in this period that he directed Communist activities in Oklahoma and, on repeated visits to Mexico, conferred with Mexican Red leaders. On one visit to Cuba in 1935, he and other leftwingers had been arrested by Cuban authorities and expelled from the country.

In 1941, much of this was disclosed in an investigation conducted by an Oklahoma State legislative committee. The committee, investigating subversive activities in Oklahoma, produced information that in 1940 Dr. Halperin had cashed a check for $436 drawn on the Bank of Foreign Trade in Moscow. As a result, Dr. Halperin was dismissed from the University of Oklahoma.

Despite this record, Dr. Halperin managed to enter Gov-

See HALPERIN, Page A-6

WASH DC
STAR
31 Aug 60

HALPERIN

Continued From First Page

ernment service. Employed as chief of the Latin American division of the Office of Strategic Services (the OSS was then the United States Civilian Intelligence-Gathering Agency), he later was transferred to the State Department. In both agencies, according to the Elizabeth Bentley testimony, he transmitted confidential documents to a Soviet spy ring.

Linked to Spy Ring

In 1949, he became head of the Latin American regional students section at Boston University's College of Liberal Arts.

A year later, he was first publicly identified as a member of a Soviet spy ring. This came about when Vice President Nixon, then a California Congressman, made known a top secret memorandum on espionage transmitted by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the White House on November 8, 1945.

In March, 1953, in Boston's Federal Building, Dr. Halperin repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment when—in a hearing conducted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee—he refused to reply to various questions concerning his alleged Communist activities.

In November, 1953, Dr. Halperin and his wife, without notifying the university, left their home in the middle of the night never to return. Turning up in Mexico, they became members of the American Communist group in Mexico.

Like most ACGM members, the Halperins did well. They invested in an ice cream company, dabbled in real estate, and obtained jobs. Dr. Halperin was employed by the Mexican government as a financial consultant and his wife taught in the American School Foundation.

They also became friendly with Alfred K. Stern and his wife, the former Martha Dodd, daughter of a former United States Ambassador to Germany. The fact the Sterns had been implicated in Soviet espionage came out with the arrest in New York of Jack Soble, a Soviet agent. To avoid being extradited to the United States to testify before a special grand jury on their associations with Soble and "the double agent Boris Morros," the Sterns fled to Czechoslovakia in July, 1957.

Dr. Halperin, described as being "intimately involved in their plans for escape," had obtained airline reservations for the Sterns under other names. As a result, the Mexican government was considering his case for deportation. On October 13, 1958, the Halperins left Mexico, having obtained plane reservations in the names of other persons.

In Russia Since 1958

The State Department memorandum concludes:

"We received information shortly after Halperin's departure from Mexico that he was employed in Moscow by the USSR. This was confirmed on July 15, 1960, when the Halperins appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow and presented their United States passports for renewal.

"Halperin stated that he had been in the USSR since December, 1958, and that he is employed by the Soviet Academy of Sciences where he is doing research . . . relating to underdeveloped countries.

"It will be recalled that Halperin is something of an authority on Latin American affairs. Our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time.

"The Soviet Academy of Sciences is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers."

14-00000

Washington Post
1 Sept. 1960

Thursday, Sept. 1, 1960 THE WASHINGTON POST

Halperin, U. S. Ex-Aide, Is Now a Soviet Official

Associated Press

The State Department says that Maurice H. Halperin, a former United States Government official linked by Senate investigators to Soviet espionage activities, apparently is serving now as a Latin-American adviser to the Russians.

Halperin was head of the Latin-American Division of the Office of Strategic Services during the latter part of World War II and later an associate professor at Boston University. Before the war, he had been on the faculty of the University of Oklahoma.

In 1954 he was dismissed by Boston University after Senate investigators received testimony linking him to a Soviet spy ring and he refused to answer a question as to whether he was a Communist.

The latest information on Halperin's whereabouts is contained in a report compiled by the State Department about persons to whom it has been compelled to issue passports under a 1958 decision of the Supreme Court.

The Court held that the Department lacks authority to deny passports to Communists or to other persons because of their political beliefs.

Associated Press

MAURICE H. HALPERIN

. . . believed Soviet employe

After the ruling, Halperin applied for a passport at the American Embassy in Mexico City, where he had gone after being dismissed by Boston University, and used it to leave Mexico on Oct. 13, 1958.

The State Department said that shortly after Halperin and his wife departed from Mexico it received information that he was employed in Moscow by the Soviet Union.

"This was confirmed on July 15, 1960, when the Halperins appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow and presented their U. S. passports for renewal," the Department's report said, adding:

"Halperin stated that he had been in the U.S.S.R. since December, 1958, and that he is employed by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences where he is doing research in the foreign field, specially, relating to undeveloped countries."

The Department recalled that Halperin was something of an authority on Latin-American affairs and said, "Our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time."

FORMER U. S. AIDE AT WORK IN SOVIET

Ex-Boston U. Professor Was in O.S.S. in World War II

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 31—The State Department has disclosed that a former United States Intelligence official is in Moscow working for the Soviet Government.

He is Dr. Maurice Halperin, a former Boston University professor who was head of the Latin American Division of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II.

Dr. Halperin was dismissed from Boston University in 1954 after he refused to say whether he was a Communist. He has been linked in testimony before Senate investigators to a Soviet spy ring.

The State Department's disclosure was contained in a memorandum in support of a proposed law to deny passports to persons supporting international communism.

The Supreme Court ruled in 1958 that passports could not be denied to Communists or others because of their political beliefs.

Dr. Halperin and his wife, Edith, were then in Mexico City, the State Department noted. They had been linked to the escape behind the Iron Curtain of Alfred K. and Martha Dodd Stern, who were under Federal indictment for espionage.

After the Supreme Court ruling, the Halperins applied to the United States Embassy in

Continued on Page 7, Column 1

NYT
1 Sept 60

FORMER U. S. AIDE AT WORK IN SOVIET

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

Mexico City for passports and left Mexico Oct. 13, 1958. At the time, the State Department noted, they were about to be deported from Mexico for Communist activities.

Reports that Dr. Halperin was working for the Soviet Government in Moscow were confirmed last July 15, the State Department memorandum went on, when he and his wife appeared at the embassy to renew their passports.

Embassy officials reported that they had been told by Dr. Halperin that he and his wife had been in the Soviet Union since December, 1958, and that he was working for the Soviet Academy of Sciences "doing research in the foreign field, especially relating to underdeveloped countries."

The State Department, recalling that Dr. Halperin was an authority on Latin-American affairs, added that "our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time."

State Department officials have repeatedly called attention to the Soviet trade and cultural offensive in Latin America.

Referring to Dr. Haleprin's employment by the Soviet Academy, the State Department observed that it was directly subordinate to the Soviet Council of Ministers.

Requested by Keating

The memorandum was prepared at the request of Senator Kenneth B. Keating, Republican of New York. He and Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, are sponsoring a bill that seeks to restore some of the State Department's authority to deny passports.

Senator Keating, who entered the memorandum in The Congressional Record of Aug. 16, expressed regret at the time that his bill was not likely to be passed in this session of Congress. President Eisenhower and State Department officials have backed the purpose of the measure.

Meanwhile, Representative Francis E. Walter, Democrat of Pennsylvania and chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activity, said he had ordered a month-long preliminary investigation into the case of two missing employes of the National Security Agency.

The two employes of the top secret coding agency, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, are alleged to have taken valuable secrets to the Soviet Union.

Representative Walter said that he understood that one of the missing men had made enquiries in their agency about the U-2 reconnaissance plane flight over the Soviet Union before it took place on May 1.

Mr. Walter said that he was convinced that the Soviet had had advance knowledge of the flight. Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, was downed in the Soviet Union and subsequently sentenced to ten years' detention.

Refused to Appear

BOSTON, Aug. 31—Dr. Halperin was officially dismissed from the faculty of Boston University on Jan. 6, 1954. He had refused a summons to appear before a university committee of review to discuss his case.

Dr. Harold C. Case, president of the university, telephoned Dr. Halperin in Mexico City offering to pay his expenses to Boston and return. But the professor declined. He had been chairman of the university's Latin-American regional studies.

STAR 5 Sept 60

Halperin Denies Giving Reds Advice on Latins

MOSCOW, Sept. 3 (AP) — Maurice H. Halperin, former United States Government official, who now lives in Moscow, yesterday accused the State Department of issuing a "deliberate and malicious distortion" about his status here.

In a typewritten statement, Mr. Halperin said:

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow . . . I am a visiting professor at the USSR Academy of Sciences and not the first American to be associated with it."

Last week Senator Keating, Republican of New York, read into the Congressional Record a State Department document which said Mr. Halperin is now in Moscow and is "working for the Soviet government."

Headed OSS Unit

The document said there were indications Mr. Halperin is giving the Soviet government advice on Latin-American affairs. During World War II, Mr. Halperin was head of the Latin American division of the United States Office of Strategic Services, an intelligence organization.

After the war, Mr. Halperin got a job with Boston University as a professor. He lost this job in 1953 because he refused to tell congressional investigators whether he ever had been a member of the American Communist Party.

The bald, mustached 54-year-old Mr. Halperin was located Sunday in a Moscow apartment house by a newsman and was asked to comment on the State Department's document.

Declines to Elaborate

(Moscow reported there were "technical difficulties" in moving the story until Monday. The newsman apparently was cut off while trying to telephone the story.)

Mr. Halperin first declined to admit the newsman into his apartment, but agreed to meet him later in the lobby of a nearby hotel where he promised to give a written statement.

Mr. Halperin appeared punctually at the agreed hour. He carried the following statement, on which he declined to elaborate:

"It seems to me that the State Department and Senator Keating are scraping the bottom of the barrel to come up with this stale red herring.

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow. Since my arrival I have filed two United States income tax returns listing my salary and employer. I am not working for the Soviet government any more than Van Cliburn (an American pianist) when he performs in a government-owned concert hall.

"I am a visiting professor at the USSR Academy of Sciences and not the first American to be associated with it, as some of our leading scientists can testify. My appointment and my Soviet visa expire in July, 1961, as the United States Embassy here very well knows.

"My teaching and research activities involve theoretical problems related to the economic growth of underdeveloped areas. For the State Department to say that I am 'advising the Russians on Latin-American affairs' is a deliberate and malicious distortion.

"Specifically, I am making a study of the Latin-American economy from 1945 to the crisis of 1958. When my book is published it will be available to the State Department and anybody else willing to purchase a copy."

The United States Embassy declined to comment on the statement or on Mr. Halperin's status. It did say he appeared at the embassy in July and asked to have his American passport renewed. The request was granted, an embassy official said.

Washington Po
5 Sept. 1961

Halperin Says Reds Not Not Employ Him

MOSCOW, Sept. 4 (UPI) Maurice H. Halperin today branded a reported State Department statement that he is working as an adviser to the Soviet government on Latin American affairs as a "deliberate and malicious distortion."

In a statement to reporters, Halperin said he is a professor associated with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, working on a book on Latin American economics, and, he explained, the American authorities know all about it.

(A State Department document in Washington last week said Halperin, a former Boston University professor and World War II intelligence specialist on Latin American affairs, was working for the Soviet government.

Sen. Kenneth B. Keating (R-N. Y.), had the document entered in the Congressional Record.)

"It seems to me that the State Department and Senator Keating are sweeping the bottom of the barrel to come up with this red herring," Halperin said.

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow. Since my arrival, I have filed two U. S. income tax returns, listing my salary and employer.

"I am not working for the Soviet government any more than Van Cliburn when he performed in a government-owned concert hall," he continued.

"I am a visiting professor in the USSR Academy of Sciences and not the first American to be associated with it. For the State of Department to say that I am an adviser to the Russians on Latin American affairs is a deliberate and malicious distortion.

"Specifically, I am making a study of the Latin American economy from 1945 to the crisis of 1958."

[illegible]

"COMMENT", Dec 75 issue
(alumni magazine of
Simon Fraser University
in British Colombia.)

By Nick Hyde

Fortune, or chance, has played a major role in Simon Fraser Political Science professor Dr. Maurice Halperin's nearly seventy years of life.

It was chance that compelled him to seek employment with the National University of Mexico. It was chance that earned him a three-year post in Moscow. It was chance that led him to a teaching stint in Cuba. And it was chance that brought him to Simon Fraser seven years ago.

In fact, fortune began wielding its capricious influence over his life even before Dr. Halperin was born.

"I might have been born in Canada," he says. "My father sailed from Liverpool to the New World at the turn of the century, with Montreal as his destination. However, he decided to move on to Boston."

This was a "rather fortunate circumstance over which I had no control," since Montreal at the time was still a provincial city while Boston was "a metropolis, a great centre of culture and learning and all its splendid facilities were available to me."

Among those facilities which he made use of were the Boston Latin School — a secondary school which boasts such luminaries as Benjamin Franklin and Ralph Waldo Emerson among its alumni — and Harvard University.

He completed his post-graduate work in Paris at the Sorbonne which, at that time, was the most prestigious university in the world and "the impact it had on my way of life and thinking was a permanent one."

While attending the Sorbonne, Dame Fortune stepped in and "I was appointed to the faculty as a Reader in North American Civilization. Even though I came from Harvard, the level of competence and sophistication of the French students was much higher and I had to work very hard to keep up with them."

After completing his doctorate, Dr. Halperin joined the faculty at the University of Oklahoma and found that midwestern state to be "like another country. Boston and Paris were much closely related than were Boston and Oklahoma."

However, chance intervened to rescue him from what could have been a number of indifferent years in a then small and remote university on the American Prairies, turning them into years spent in "an oasis of high culture."

Dr. Halperin explains:

"It was during the Depression and jobs were scarce, so the university attracted a number of bright teachers and researchers whose first choice might not have been Oklahoma.

"And when you have a group of people like that, in addition to the opportunity of understanding and learning to appreciate the virtues of middle America, well, it was something that stayed with me for the rest of my life."

The Second World War interrupted Dr. Halperin's sojourn at the University of Oklahoma and he joined the Office of Strategic Services, a special research and intelligence agency attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



Maurice Halperin, Simon Fraser's oldest professor, is a keen musician who has played with the New Westminster Symphony Orchestra.

"I had a front row seat in the planning of some of the most interesting operations of the war," he says. "I consider my experiences there were at least the equivalent of a second PhD because I was associated with a whole group of social scientists in different disciplines.

"Through this, I had the realization that we had practical matters to consider in the social sciences, as well as theoretical ones. And I learned the value of co-operative effort, the value of getting work done on time, and the value of efficiency in research.

"It helped me to see the relationship between the social sciences and practical problems. I became more oriented toward problem solving than I had been before."

Dame Fortune keeps popping up in life of SFU's oldest professor and has taken him to Mexico, Cuba, Moscow — and to 'best place of all'

After the war, Dr. Halperin worked with the United Nations for a couple of years and then joined the faculty of Boston University where he was involved in the establishment of an interdisciplinary department of Latin American studies.

During this period he visited Brazil twice, lecturing at the University of Sao Paulo and serving as a consultant to the state government of Sao Paulo. After his second visit, he was decorated by the Brazilian government with the Order of the Southern Cross.

It was then that chance interfered again, this time in a most malicious way.

"My stay at Boston coincided with the most intense period of McCarthyism and this raised problems for a great number of people at the time. In my own case, I was given the choice of co-operating with the Inquisition or, as it turned out, losing my job.

"Among other disagreeable aspects of co-operating, it would have turned me into an informer against people who, as far as I know, had committed no crime. I just couldn't think of facing my students with their knowledge that I was an informer."

Leaving Boston University, he went to the National University of Mexico City where he remained for six years. While working there, he did some consulting work for the Mexican government, thereby gaining further practical experience on the problems of underdevelopment in Latin America.

This experience led directly to his next position — a three-year appointment at the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. Halperin explains:

"At that time, the period when Kruschev was trying to loosen up some of the rigid controls of Stalin's dictatorship, there was a desire at the Academy to have some western expertise on Latin American developmental problems. In other words, my Mexican experience was a direct prerequisite for the Moscow invitation.

"It's strange how, in retrospect, what seemed to be a rather difficult choice in 1953 turned out to be very lucky. You never know. Something happens that can crush you or, on the contrary, can make you healthier and more robust than you've ever been before.

"And, when the invitation came from Moscow, I was footloose and free. My status in Mexico was always that of a visiting professor, so I had no problems of security — tenure or pension, for example — to tie me down when it came. I had nothing to lose and everything to gain."

Dr. Halperin spent three years at the Academy and found it to be an extraordinary experience. "I wasn't there as a tourist; neither was I there as an outside researcher. I was actually in the machine, with no permanent ties to it. I was working in the factory, rather than just studying it."

Fate once again intervened in his life, this time in the form of the celebrated Latin American guerrilla leader, Che Guevara.

"Late one night, there was a knock on my door and I opened it and there stood Che with a couple of his Cuban friends. He had been told about me by mutual friends in Mexico and they suggested that, in view of the need for competent educators and social scientists in Cuba, I might be interested in accepting an invitation to teach at the University of Havana."

As it happened, Dr. Halperin was interested. He spent the next six years in Cuba, and after leaving, produced a book on the country — *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary History*. It was published by the University of California Press and a second edition, in paperback, has recently appeared. (Incidentally, Dr. Halperin's published work spans 45 years and "several thousand pages.")

As with the Moscow appointment, it was the fact that he was freed of concerns about job security, since he had none, which allowed him to accept Guevara's offer.

Although Cuba was "a very pleasant country," Dr. Halperin found life there to be somewhat disconcerting since, "as a highly-paid foreign expert, I lived high off the hog and didn't share the austerity of the rest of the country.

"And it was troubling, you know, when neighbors would knock on our door to see if we could spare a thimbleful of salt or a tablespoon of cooking oil and there we were, sitting with everything at our disposal."

And a further quirk of fate, naturally, brought him to Simon Fraser in 1968. He'd met a Canadian while in Havana and one day, about a year later, he received a phone call "from a place called Burnaby." It was the same Canadian, inviting him to participate in a seminar on Latin America, with "all expenses paid."

When he received the invitation, in the spring of 1968, he had already resigned his position in Havana and was planning to return to the United States the following September. "When the invitation came, I thought, 'Two weeks? Why not?', so I accepted and came up here and, like the man who came to dinner, they couldn't get rid of me.

"I never dreamed I would end up in Canada. Three-quarters of a century after my father left it, but I now feel thoroughly assimilated to the Canadian environment." In fact, he's so well assimilated that he is now listed in the Canadian edition of *Who's Who*.

During his well-travelled life, Dr. Halperin has had the opportunity to teach at a number of reputable institutions in North America, Europe and Latin America but he says that he's "never been in a more congenial place than Simon Fraser, never in my life.

"It's the best place, all in all, that I've ever been. Students and faculty have it very good here and I'm not talking only about the splendid scenery and the mild climate. The facilities for learning, teaching, research and recreation [illegible] a steady customer at the swimming pool and the [illegible] you know — are magnificent."

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
LOND 74209	6 July 1976	73	6	46	/3

DOC. SUBJECT

PLMHBLANKET

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution. Dissem. No., etc., if applicable)

JAGUAR HAS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING:

[illegible] MAURICE HALPERIN. BORN BOSTON, MASS. 3 MAR 1906. WIFE EDITH NEE FRISCH, BORN 6 JULY 1907, WABASH, INDIANA. TWO CHILDREN BORN 1939 NAD 1934, NAMES UNKNOWN. SUBJ IS IDENTIFIED AS A COMMUNIST. FROM 1931 TO 1941, HE WAS PROFESSOR OF LANGUAGES AT UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA. 1941 HE WAS SOCIAL SCIENCE ANALYST, OFFICE OF COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION AND IN 1945 WAS IN THE RESEARCH SECTION OF OSS. IN 1953 HE LEFT THE USA FOR MEXICO. ON 10 NOV 1958 HE WENT TO AUSTRIA FROM SWITZERLAND WITH HIS WIFE AND CROSSED INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IN DEC 58 HE WAS BELIEVED TO BE IN MOSCOW. IN 1960 HE WAS IN MOSCOW WORKING FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS AN AUTHORITY ON LATIN AMERICA. IN 1962 SUBJ AND HIS WIFE WERE IN CUBA REPRESENTING "NATIONAL GUARDIAN". RIS CONNECTIONS: IN 1942 HE WAS EMPLOYED BY THE LATIN AMERICA BRANCH. HE PROVIDED OSS AND STATE DEPT REPORTS TO THE RIS THROUGH MARY PRICE AND ELIZABETH BENTLY. JAGUAR SAYS THEY HAVE ADDITIONAL ESPIONAGE INFO IN THEIR FILES.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.	201-128561			
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman	201- 128561			

FORM 12-72 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET. CL. BY: 007622

(7-46)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Incoming Pouch Message

FROM: CHAMBERS LUI
IP/ANSF
EXT. 9149

GC-596
4F01
TUBE BU3

NO. 00OH-19102

DATE 22 Jan 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SE/X/EU		u 8	vmc
2.			
3.			
4. SE/CI/X	6 FEB 1976		
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14. TL/Files			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

ACTION

201-128561

FORM 6-75 610A USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

CAUTION – THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS PROCESSING
☐ INDEXING REQUESTED
☐ NO INDEXING
☐ APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO
Chief, SE

INFO.
Chief, EUR Chief, LA Chief, WOMUSE

FROM
Chief of Station, Ottawa

SUBJECT
CKTOP FHABOVE KMSTONE/ FHABOVE Comments and Transmittal of Magazine Article on Soviet Agent Maurice Hyman HALPERIN (201-0128561)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action: FYI

1. FHABOVE reports that on 13 January 1976 it again spoke to Subject who, although remains approachable, declined to elaborate on previous comments concerning the 1940's. Concerning himself, Subject said that he and his wife toured Israel, Italy, Greece, Spain and England in the summer of 1975. Work on the second volume of his book on Cuba has fallen behind. HALPERIN left the impression that once the Cuba book is out of the way, he will commence his autobiography. He also expects that Simon Fraser University will extend his teaching appointment to August 1977.

2. Transmitted herewith as received from FHABOVE is an article on Subject taken from the December 1975 issue of "COMMENT", the alumni magazine of Simon Fraser University in British Columbia.

Adrian O. BAGHURST

Attachment:
As stated h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/SE w/att. h/w
2 - C/LA w/att. h/w (LA/C)
2 - C/WOMUSE w/att. h/w (CI/Reg)
2 - C/EUR w/att. h/w (E/BC/C)

E2, IMPDET

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OCOA-19102	DATE 22 January 1976
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-0128561

[illegible]

"COMMENT", Dec 75 issue
(alumni magazine of
Simon Fraser University
in British Colombia.)

By Rick Hyde

Fortune, or chance, has played a major role in Simon Fraser Political Science professor Dr. Maurice Halperin's nearly seventy years of life.

It was chance that compelled him to seek employment with the National University of Mexico. It was chance that earned him a three-year post in Moscow. It was chance that led him to a teaching stint in Cuba. And it was chance that brought him to Simon Fraser seven years ago.

In fact, fortune began wielding its capricious influence over his life even before Dr. Halperin was born.

"I might have been born in Canada," he says. "My father sailed from Liverpool to the New World at the turn of the century, with Montreal as his destination. However, he decided to move on to Boston."

This was a "rather fortunate circumstance over which I had no control," since Montreal at the time was still a provincial city while Boston was "a metropolis, a great centre of culture and learning and all its splendid facilities were available to me."

Among those facilities which he made use of were the Boston Latin School — a secondary school which boasts such luminaries as Benjamin Franklin and Ralph Waldo Emerson among its alumni — and Harvard University.

He completed his post-graduate work in Paris at the Sorbonne which, at that time, was the most prestigious university in the world and "the impact it had on my way of life and thinking was a permanent one."

While attending the Sorbonne, Dame Fortune stepped in and "I was appointed to the faculty as a Reader in North American Civilization. Even though I came from Harvard, the level of competence and sophistication of the French students was much higher and I had to work very hard to keep up with them."

After completing his doctorate, Dr. Halperin joined the faculty at the University of Oklahoma and found that mid-western state to be "like another country. Boston and Paris were much closely related than were Boston and Oklahoma."

However, chance intervened to rescue him from what could have been a number of indifferent years in a then small and remote university on the American Prairies, turning them into years spent in "an oasis of high culture."

Dr. Halperin explains:

"It was during the Depression and jobs were scarce, so the university attracted a number of bright teachers and researchers whose first choice might not have been Oklahoma.

"And when you have a group of people like that, in addition to the opportunity of understanding and learning to appreciate the virtues of middle America, well, it was something that stayed with me for the rest of my life."

The Second World War interrupted Dr. Halperin's sojourn at the University of Oklahoma and he joined the Office of Strategic Services, a special research and intelligence agency attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



Maurice Halperin, Simon Fraser's oldest professor, is a keen musician who has played with the New Westminster Symphony Orchestra.

"I had a front row seat in the planning of some of the most interesting operations of the war," he says. "I consider my experiences there were at least the equivalent of a second PhD because I was associated with a whole group of social scientists in different disciplines.

"Through this, I had the realization that we had practical matters to consider in the social sciences as well as theoretical ones. And I learned the value of co-operative effort, the value of getting work done on time, and the value of efficiency in research.

"It helped me to see the relationship between the social sciences and practical problems. I became more oriented toward problem solving than I had been before."

H|W [illegible] OCOA-19102

H/wat#1-OCOA-19102

201-128561

Dame Fortune keeps popping up in life of SFU's oldest professor and has taken him to Mexico, Cuba, Moscow — and to 'best place of all'

After the war, Dr. Halperin worked with the United Nations for a couple of years and then joined the faculty of Boston University where he was involved in the establishment of an interdisciplinary department of Latin American studies.

During this period he visited Brazil twice, lecturing at the University of Sao Paulo and serving as a consultant to the state government of Sao Paulo. After his second visit, he was decorated by the Brazilian government with the Order of the Southern Cross.

It was then that chance interfered again, this time in a most malicious way.

"My stay at Boston coincided with the most intense period of McCarthyism and this raised problems for a great number of people at the time. In my own case, I was given the choice of co-operating with the Inquisition or, as it turned out, losing my job.

"Among other disagreeable aspects of co-operating, it would have turned me into an informer against people who, as far as I knew, had committed no crime. I just couldn't think of facing my students with their knowledge that I was an informer."

Leaving Boston University, he went to the National University of Mexico City where he remained for six years. While working there, he did some consulting work for the Mexican government, thereby gaining further practical experience on the problems of underdevelopment in Latin America.

This experience led directly to his next position — a three-year appointment at the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. Halperin explains:

"At that time, the period when Kruschev was trying to loosen up some of the rigid controls of Stalin's dictatorship, there was a desire at the Academy to have some western expertise on Latin American developmental problems. In other words, my Mexican experience was a direct prerequisite for the Moscow invitation.

"It's strange how, in retrospect, what seemed to be a rather difficult choice in 1953 turned out to be very lucky. You never know. Something happens that can crush you or, on the contrary, can make you healthier and more robust than you've ever been before.

"And, when the invitation came from Moscow, I was footloose and free. My status in Mexico was always that of a visiting professor, so I had no problems of security — tenure or pension, for example — to tie me down when it came. I had nothing to lose and everything to gain."

Dr. Halperin spent three years at the Academy and found it to be an extraordinary experience. "I wasn't there as a tourist; neither was I there as an outside researcher. I was actually in the machine, with no permanent ties to it. I was working in the factory, rather than just studying it."

Fate once again intervened in his life, this time in the form of the celebrated Latin American guerrilla leader, Che Guevara.

"Late one night, there was a knock on my door and I opened it and there stood Che with a couple of his Cuban friends. He had been told about me by mutual friends in Mexico and they suggested that, in view of the need for competent educators and social scientists in Cuba, I might be interested in accepting an invitation to teach at the University of Havana."

As it happened, Dr. Halperin was interested. He spent the next six years in Cuba, and after leaving, produced a book on the country — *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary History*. It was published by the University of California Press and a second edition, in paperback, has recently appeared. (Incidentally, Dr. Halperin's published work spans 45 years and "several thousand pages.")

As with the Moscow appointment, it was the fact that he was freed of concerns about job security, since he had none, which allowed him to accept Guevara's offer.

Although Cuba was "a very pleasant country," Dr. Halperin found life there to be somewhat disconcerting since, "as a highly-paid foreign expert, I lived high off the hog and didn't share the austerity of the rest of the country.

"And it was troubling, you know, when neighbors would knock on our door to see if we could spare a thimbleful of salt or a tablespoon of cooking oil and there we were, sitting with everything at our disposal."

And a further quirk of fate, naturally, brought him to Simon Fraser in 1968. He'd met a Canadian while in Havana and one day, about a year later, he received a phone call "from a place called Burnaby." It was the same Canadian, inviting him to participate in a seminar on Latin America, with "all expenses paid."

When he received the invitation, in the spring of 1968, he had already resigned his position in Havana and was planning to return to the United States the following September. "When the invitation came, I thought, 'Two weeks? Why not?', so I accepted and came up here and, like the man who came to dinner, they couldn't get rid of me.

"I never dreamed I would end up in Canada. Three-quarters of a century after my father left it, but I now feel thoroughly assimilated to the Canadian environment." In fact, he's so well assimilated that he is now listed in the Canadian edition of *Who's Who*.

During his well-travelled life, Dr. Halperin has had the opportunity to teach at a number of reputable institutions in North America, Europe and Latin America but he says that he's "never been in a more congenial place than Simon Fraser, never in my life.

"It's the best place, all in all, that I've ever been. Students and faculty have it very good here and I'm not talking only about the splendid scenery and the mild climate. [illegible] facilities for learning, teaching, research and recreation [illegible] a steady customer at the swimming pool and the [illegible] you know — are magnificent."

201-128561

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

8 [illegible] 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on [illegible] (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ______ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☒ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

☐ **unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7.**

Signed [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
(name) (title) (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ______ ______ 197__
(initials) (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-______

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In
SECRET

-07

14 JAN 1975 197__

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on HALPERIN (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☒ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed J Carroll (name) Ops Officer (title) CIRA/CA (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ELL (initials) 24 1975 (date) 197__

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-0128561

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECRET

THE NEW REPUBLIC
10 MARCH 1973

Independence Entangled

The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro

by Maurice Halperin

(University of California Press; $12.95)

At the end of a passage describing the euphoric early days of the Cuban Revolution, Maurice Halperin laments: "Alas, it was destined to change." In effect, this attitude symbolizes his reaction and assessment of Castro and Cuba in this first volume of a two-part study of the revolution from the first days of Fidelismo to the present. A note of frustration which occasionally marks his narrative of the first five years of the revolution undoubtedly comes from his sense of the unfulfilled promise of the July 26th Movement. For a great many Western intellectuals (including Halperin), this has been a characteristic reaction. In the first exuberant months, it seemed as if Cuba might become the first Socialist revolution to rise spontaneously out of historical circumstances, not led by a rigid party structure, and the first to proclaim a "joyous socialism," rather than the tortuous necessities of work norms, ideological conformity and sacrifice. After several years of living in Cuba, through its best and bleakest moments, Halperin feels that this possibility is extinguished. One feels that he wanted very much for it to succeed. His book is an explanation of why the revolution failed.

Although the current volume only covers the first five years of the revolution, the author breaks into the chronology to keep the next years' events in mind. Everything about the revolution was in flux as he sees it, but at the same time Castro's bungling, bravado and adventurism made surrender to a rigid, bureaucratic socialism almost inevitable. Nothing, from Halperin's point of view, could be a sadder reflection of this devolution than the support Cuba lent to the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Halperin's basic argument is that Castro's "rise and decline" must be seen as an international event. For this reason he writes primarily about the foreign policy of the revolution (the only pictures in the book show Castro during his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union). If it is accurate to say that the revolution was pushed leftward and finally into an alliance with the Soviet Union by the inept and hostile policy of the United States, then it is also true that Cuba's fate has continued to depend upon the international struggle between the US and the Soviet Union. While Castro may have been committed to Cuban nationalism and social reform at home, he could, ironically, only achieve these goals by means of an aggressive foreign policy.

Castro remains a vague and blustery figure while Che Guevara figures hardly at all. By placing his emphasis elsewhere, Halperin tells the story of the revolution through the events which touched it from the outside, particularly those which effected its ties to the Communist world. Most important were the Sino-Soviet struggle, the world price of sugar, the internal bureaucratic struggle of the USSR, the changing American presidency, the role of the Cuban Communist Party, the CIA, and so on. Gathering his facts primarily from magazine and newspaper articles, plus his own first-hand knowledge of events, he pieces together a fascinating reading of Castro's speeches, policy changes and their context. The shifting and rather indecisive attitude of the revolutionary leadership toward artistic and intellectual liberty, for example, has stemmed from Castro's need to balance conflicting demands for orthodoxy by Cuban and Russian Communists, and for greater freedoms by Western intellectuals.

Castro's dilemma has always been to assert Cuban independence, and yet retain alignment with the USSR. Perhaps this contradictory policy was doomed, if for no other reason than Cuba's enormous dependence upon other nations to absorb her products and provide her with energy. In any case, when Castro opted to exploit the Cold War and let Khrushchev foot the bill, he created the crisis which Halperin pinpoints. He made the economic success of the revolution at home an absolute necessity, yet a necessity that could only be met with outside help. Castro's own impatience, inefficiency and indecision made matters worse. From the early attempts to industrialize to the abrupt and devastating decision to produce a mammoth sugar crop in 1970, the Cuban economy, the author argues, has continually sunk to lower levels. The result is Castro's dependence upon the Soviet Union, an admission of failure.

Halperin's emphasis on foreign affairs makes good sense, but leaves little room for discussion of the internal dynamics of the revolution and of the impact of social reforms on the population. It makes what Castro said and did, and the revolution itself, explicable only in a sort of code of international affairs. However, given the volatile nature of Cuban politics and the Cold War, it still seems too early to write off the revolution.

James Gilbert

201-128561

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 January 1973

Fidel Castro

Gifted demagogue

The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro — An Essay in Contemporary History, by Maurice Halperin. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. $12.95.

By Philip W. Bonsal

Maurice Halperin has been forced out of two teaching positions at American universities because of his political beliefs. He spent three years on the faculty of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, went to Cuba in 1962 at the invitation of Che Guevara and, though his relations with Guevara quickly deteriorated, spent six years at the University of Havana.

Though one might expect from such a background that dreary mix of the stuffy and the shrill so often associated with the polemics of the far left or right, Professor Halperin's book is a work of insight, wit and understanding.

In this book he concentrates on the first five years of Castro's rule, through 1964, with a sequel to come. However, this volume contains enough about the later years to warrant the use of the word "decline" in his title.

After stressing the pride and optimism of the revolution's fifth anniversary, he writes that none of those present at its celebration "could remotely imagine the disappointments and failures that lay ahead, and that on the tenth anniversary of the Revolution, there would be only bitter austerity and hard work — and the tarnished but unflinching charisma of Fidel — to arouse their enthusiasm."

Professor Halperin's account of Castro's first two years in power (when the author was not yet in Cuba) does not give due credit to the United States. After all, initially the United States did make efforts to find an accommodation with Castro, despite the latter's vicious anti-Americanism and his plundering of American properties in ways not even provided by Castro-dictated legislation.

Nor does he adequately explain how, after the policy of accommodation had been abandoned, injudicious American economic sanctions plus the Bay of Pigs failure left the presumably reluctant and sceptical Russians no choice other than massive support for Castro and Guevara.

But when Castro and Khrushchev had become masters of the Cuban people's destiny, Professor Halperin comes into his own. His description of the relations between those volatile and voluble rulers is a delight. The Chairman's surrender over the missiles in his October, 1962, confrontation with President Kennedy, without informing Castro first, much less consulting him, was deeply humiliating to his Cuban ally.

Yet by April of 1963 the sulks and strains of the previous fall had been banished. With uncontested rhetoric the two autocrats bemused their peoples and themselves into the spectacular euphoria that surrounded Castro's visit to Russia. How this was done is but one engaging example of Professor Halperin's analytic and narrative talents.

This exuberant reconciliation did not prove lasting. Khrushchev was overthrown — perhaps partly because of his unprofitable strategic involvement in Cuba. Castro's export of subversion and insurrection to other American republics was considered tactically undesirable by the Kremlin.

Guevara's fatal campaign in Bolivia and other setbacks, combined with the failure of grandiose but unsound schemes for industrialization and agricultural diversification at home, considerably diminished Castro's stature.

His downward curve was further accelerated by failure — after six years of preparations and exhortations — to produce ten million tons of sugar in 1970 and by the disruption of the Cuban economy that effort had caused. Castro's later reconciliations with his Russian patrons smacked more than a little of submissions.

Professor Halperin also describes the Washington-initiated exploration during the final weeks of President Kennedy's life, of a basis for discussions between the Cuban and American governments. He believes that if Kennedy had lived something constructive might have evolved from the effort. His conclusion is debatable, since nine years have now elapsed without any significant positive development.

During those nine years there has indeed been a cooling down of American attitudes toward Cuba.

But Castro's attitude toward the United States has not changed. His concept is still that his people, armed to the teeth and knowing only what he chooses to tell them, must remain blindly united around their Maximum Leader, ready to thwart the plots of the once defeated but still wickedly unrepentant imperialists.

This is unfortunate. Although a return to the old association between the two countries is neither desirable nor possible, the people of both would profit from a rational relationship. This will not be easy to establish even when both governments are truly ready to face the task. Meanwhile in the light of Professer Halperin's brilliant account of contemporary Cuba, it seems reasonable to speculate that increasing numbers of Castro's subjects are less willing now to entrust their lives to the phenomenally gifted orchestrator of mass emotions — politically often astute yet repeatedly incompetent in so many fields — who has been their absolute ruler since 1959.

Philip Bonsal was American Ambassador to Cuba, 1959-1960, the first two years of Castro's rule. He is the author of "Cuba, Castro, and the United States" (University of Pittsburgh Press).

Old "Fainting Phil."

201-128561.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 January 1973

Fidel Castro

Gifted demagogue

The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro – An Essay in Contemporary History, by Maurice Halperin. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. $12.95.

By Philip W. Bonsal

Maurice Halperin has been forced out of two teaching positions at American universities because of his political beliefs. He spent three years on the faculty of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, went to Cuba in 1962 at the invitation of Che Guevara and, though his relations with Guevara quickly deteriorated, spent six years at the University of Havana.

Though one might expect from such a background that dreary mix of the stuffy and the shrill so often associated with the polemics of the far left or right, Professor Halperin's book is a work of insight, wit and understanding.

In this book he concentrates on the first five years of Castro's rule, through 1964, with a sequel to come. However, this volume contains enough about the later years to warrant the use of the word "decline" in his title.

After stressing the pride and optimism of the revolution's fifth anniversary, he writes that none of those present at its celebration "could remotely imagine the disappointments and failures that lay ahead, and that on the tenth anniversary of the Revolution, there would be only bitter austerity and hard work – and the tarnished but unflinching charisma of Fidel – to arouse their enthusiasm."

Professor Halperin's account of Castro's first two years in power (when the author was not yet in Cuba) does not give due credit to the United States. After all, initially the United States did make efforts to find an accommodation with Castro, despite the latter's vicious anti-Americanism and his plundering of American properties in ways not even provided by Castro-dictated legislation.

Nor does he adequately explain how, after the policy of accommodation had been abandoned, injudicious American economic sanctions plus the Bay of Pigs failure left the presumably reluctant and sceptical Russians no choice other than massive support for Castro and Guevara.

But when Castro and Khrushchev had become masters of the Cuban people's destiny, Professor Halperin comes into his own. His description of the relations between those volatile and voluble rulers is a delight. The Chairman's surrender over the missiles in his October, 1962, confrontation with President Kennedy, without informing Castro first, much less consulting him, was deeply humiliating to his Cuban ally.

Yet by April of 1963 the sulks and strains of the previous fall had been banished. With uncontested rhetoric the two autocrats bemused their peoples and themselves into the spectacular euphoria that surrounded Castro's visit to Russia. How this was done is but one engaging example of Professor Halperin's analytic and narrative talents.

This exuberant reconciliation did not prove lasting. Khrushchev was overthrown – perhaps partly because of his unprofitable strategic involvement in Cuba. Castro's export of subversion and insurrection to other American republics was considered tactically undesirable by the Kremlin.

Guevara's fatal campaign in Bolivia and other setbacks, combined with the failure of grandiose but unsound schemes for industrialization and agricultural diversification at home, considerably diminished Castro's stature.

His downward curve was further accelerated by failure — after six years of preparations and exhortations – to produce ten million tons of sugar in 1970 and by the disruption of the Cuban economy that effort had caused. Castro's later reconciliations with his Russian patrons smacked more than a little of submissions.

Professor Halperin also describes the Washington-initiated exploration during the final weeks of President Kennedy's life, of a basis for discussions between the Cuban and American governments. He believes that if Kennedy had lived something constructive might have evolved from the effort. His conclusion is debatable, since nine years have now elapsed without any significant positive development.

During those nine years there has indeed been a cooling down of American attitudes toward Cuba.

But Castro's attitude toward the United States has not changed. His concept is still that his people, armed to the teeth and knowing only what he chooses to tell them, must remain blindly united around their Maximum-Leader, ready to thwart the plots of the once defeated but still wickedly unrepentant imperialists.

This is unfortunate. Although a return to the old association between the two countries is neither desirable nor possible, the people of both would profit from a rational relationship. This will not be easy to establish even when both governments are truly ready to face the task. Meanwhile in the light of Professor Halperin's brilliant account of contemporary Cuba, it seems reasonable to speculate that increasing numbers of Castro's subjects are less willing now to entrust their lives to the phenomenally gifted orchestrator of mass emotions – politically often astute yet repeatedly incompetent in so many fields – who has been their absolute ruler since 1959.

Philip Bonsal was American Ambassador to Cuba, 1959-1960, the first two years of Castro's rule. He is the author of "Cuba, Castro, and the United States" (University of Pittsburgh Press).

201-128561

CALIFORNIA
UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA PRESS
FALL BOOKS 1972

The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro

Maurice Halperin

The author of this unusual book was twice forced out of teaching positions at American universities because of his political beliefs. He spent three years on the faculty of the USSR Academy of Sciences and five years, from 1962 to 1968, at the University of Havana. He went to Cuba in 1962 on the invitation of Che Guevara, who had visited him in Moscow, and there gathered the materials for this intimate portrait of the Castro regime.

Mr. Halperin concentrates his attention on Castro's foreign policy, placing it in the context of domestic policy and conditions. Obviously skilled in reading the new socialist rhetoric, Professor Halperin guides the reader through the maze of documents, speeches, and propaganda which constitute the record of the Castro regime during the sensational events involving Kennedy, Khrushchev, missiles, and the CIA. Although the main narrative is concerned with the years 1959-1964—primarily the period of the rise of Fidel Castro—it contains digressions into events of the following years when, according to the author, Castro's great utopian dreams turned into nightmares. A second volume, carrying the story down to the present, is in preparation.

Maurice Halperin is Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, B.C.

"A brilliant contribution to the literature on contemporary Cuba and perhaps even more a remarkable series of insights into the new politics of mass society."
—*Woodrow Borah*

October *LC 77-182794* *ISBN 0-520-02182-7*
325 pages *6 x 9"*
LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES/POLITICAL SCIENCE/HISTORY
World *£4.95* *$10.95*

201-108561

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2-2 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XM
6
CI/SP 2

Dismantyl
Meny Pocock

CI/ICS 3 FILE VR C/CI NE/ISR

544

~~CTFS~~

S E C R E T 060935Z JUL 71 CITE TEL AVIV 16247

DIRECTOR

6 JUL 71 372102

372102

~~RYBAT RHYTON~~

T

NO. 2796

REF NFVW-2965

1. AFTER LENGTHY HIATUS KKCOMPOUND HAS PROVIDED A/544 DATED 24 JUN 1971 (RECEIVED 1 JULY) RE SUBJECT REF. REPORT NOTES FOLLOWING TWO PERSONS WHO MIGHT BE IDENTICAL WITH SUBJECT:

A. MORRIS H. ALPERN
FATHER'S NAME SOLOMON
BORN 1886, POLAND
HOLDER OF US PASSPORT NO. B-246607
VISITED ISRAEL FROM 20 MAY - 22 JUNE 64.

B. MORRIS HYMAN HALPERIN
FATHER'S NAME HENNY
BORN 1886, POLAND
HOLDER OF US PASSPORT NO. A-1735875
ENTERED ISRAEL ON 13 OCTOBER 70.

2. REPORT ASKS FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONAL DETAILS ON SUBJECT ESPECIALLY DATE OF BIRTH AND QUERIES IF EITHER OF

Talked to Al Kergel who says (a) it obvious that neither is our man and (b) since our original data gave date of birth, sees nothing to be done with this. Will check again with Kergel after receipt of A/544, if it contains more than this cable

SECRET

14-00000

Dick - has this been in your basket?

SECRET

16 JUL 1971

JX-53066

24th June 1971

A/544

from Israeli liaison

Dear RJ,

Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

Reference John W.'s memorandum to Joseph H. dated 4 November, 1969.

1. Unfortunately in your letter under reference you did not mention Subject's date of birth. Our inspection of Border Control lists show that two people have entered ISRAEL who might possibly be identical with Subject:

a. Morris H. ALPERN
Father's name Solomon
Born 1886, POLAND
Holder of United States passport no. B-246607
Visited ISRAEL from 20 May, 1964 - 22 June 1964.

b. Morris Hyman HALPERIN
Father's name: Henny
Born 1886, POLAND
Holder of United States passport no. A-1735875
Entered ISRAEL on 13 October, 1970.

2. Is Subject identical with either of the two above?

3. We should be most grateful for additional personal details on Subject.

SECRET

→ Cabled TEL Aviv 16247

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 70 [illegible] PER c/s? 2

ACTION C/CI/SI 2

☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR c/ci

#439

file HALPERIN

"eyes only"

SECRET 100826Z NOV 69 CITE TEL AVIV 4933 10 Nov 69 IN 82952

DIRECTOR

RYBAT RHYTON

NO. 1685

REF: NFVW-2965

Pls show me ref

1. KKCOLLAR STUDIED REF WITH GREAT INTEREST. REQUESTED ANY INFO THAT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE OR COULD BE OBTAINED ON POSSIBLE RELATIVES KKCOLLIER AND ASSOCIATION KKCOLLIER CULTURAL OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS IN WOLADY.

2. DIFFICULT FOR HIM FIND PEG ON WHICH TO HANG APPROACH WITHOUT SOME KKCOLLIER MOTIVATION WHICH BOTH KKCONCERTMASTER AND SUBJECT RJ-2365 HAVE EXHIBITED.

SECRET

~~will have fm SCH A who has originated [illegible] on file on Subject where no relatives (other than son & daughter) and no [illegible] in cultural a financial [illegible] organs [illegible] will have to be generated.~~

11 Nov. 69

Talked with Keighl.
He will query Bureau for any possible info re (1) relatives in Israel (2) any connection with Zionist organization.
RLP

Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
RLP ① Yes. Pls have Kenzel prepare.
Comments: ② Please send cable to effect that Hqs has no access to info on relatives other than son and daughter or on possible association with Zionist groups. We would hope they could come up with some.
③ Include anything Kenzel may have.

Mary Brook

NE/ISR

Cons HALPERIN

SECRET

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/CI	06 Oc	
2			
3			
4			
5	C/CI/SPG		
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
XX	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE	XX	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

File this w/
HQs copy

ok

J.

If they decide to go
ahead, then they might
want to coordinate
with the RCMP.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
John D. Hadden, C/CI/SPG	16 Oct

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions GPO : 1968 O - 297-543 (40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
THEODORE G. TOMAZIN

INFO

FROM
WARREN H. TIBBENHAM

SUBJECT
Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. It is requested that you take up the case of HALPERIN with KKCOWBELL. Attached for your information and background is some biographic data and information concerning his activities on behalf of Soviet Intelligence.

2. We would like you to explore with KKCOWBELL the possibility of sending one of his officers here to debrief HALPERIN along the lines of the Milton SCHWARTZ case. The fact that he has been unwilling to tell us anything and is yet now anti-Soviet indicates that a KKCOLLIER officer might have much better entree. Give KKCOWBELL as much of the attached information as he seems to need to make a decision.

3. Subject is probably still in British Columbia at the university mentioned, but in any case the KKCOLLIERs should be able to locate him precisely through Subject's son and/or daughter at the addresses given. It is known that he is quite close to his children.

4. In any event, we are interested in any comments or traces KKCONCOCTER may have concerning him.

John L. Hadden
Chief, CI/SPG

Attachment:
Bio sheet, h/w

Excluded [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
NFVW-2965

DATE
21 October 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

File: Subject

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
C/CI/SPG:JLHadden/dek			

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

EYES ONLY

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/CI		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

1[illegible] OCT 1969

15 OCT 1969

OK/ Pass to Hadden for his information

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☒	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: 1. Attached is a memorandum on Maurice HALPERIN for possible investigation along the lines of Milton SCHWARTZ case.

2. The RCMP interviewed HALPERIN in early 1969. He was friendly and indicated he is now anti-Soviet but was reluctant to talk about the past. He said he wants to write a book "setting all the past into proper perspective."

BY HAND

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
CI/SI/Kerzel	15 Oct '69

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 (40)

15 October 1969

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
DPOB: Boston, 3 March 1906

1. The source for the following information is a highly-sensitive, thoroughly-tested informant with knowledge of KGB activities in North America during the Second World War:

A. Source knew that Maurice Hyman HALPERIN, Chief of the Latin American Division of O.S.S., was a valuable KGB agent while he was in O.S.S.

B. Source knew three KGB officers who at various times during the Second World War were responsible for directing HALPERIN and other penetrations of the U. S. Government - Vasilij Mikhailovich ZUBILIN aka ZARUBIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in New York City; Pavel Panteleymonovich KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in New York and Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul in New York.

2. It is known from several other sources, including Elizabeth BENTLEY, that HALPERIN had been involved in communist activities since the late 1920's and had worked for the KGB during World War II.

3. HALPERIN refused to tell a U. S. Senate committee if he had been a CP member and in 1953 he fled from the U.S. to Mexico. In 1958 he went to the USSR and allegedly worked for the Academy of Science and Moscow University. In 1962 he left Moscow and went to Cuba. He aided Alfred Kaufman STERN and Martha Dodd STERN to escape from the U.S.A. to Czechoslovakia in 1957.

4. HALPERIN's career can be divided into the following periods:

1931-1941	Professor at the University of Oklahoma
1941-1945	C.O.I. - O.S.S.
1945-1946	Department of State
1946-1949	American-Jewish Conference, handling minority groups and acting as a liaison official with the U.N.
1949-1953	Boston University
1953-1958	Mexico
1958-1968	U.S.S.R. and Cuba
1968-1969	Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, British Columbia.

5. If HALPERIN agreed to cooperate, he would be an extremely valuable source on a number of topics, as is indicated by the outline of his career. One of the most important topics, and the one in which we are

in the best position to check the validity of his information, is that of KGB penetration of the U. S. Government, especially O.S.S. and the State Department.

6. HALPERIN has indicated that he is now anti-Soviet.

7. HALPERIN's son, Dr. David HALPERIN, lives at 5309 South Harper Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

8. HALPERIN's daughter, Judith GAMORON, and his son-in-law Rabbi Hillel GAMORON, reside at 617 North Witcomb Drive, Palatine, Illinois.

9. HALPERIN is quite deaf.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 6-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: Robert L. Pendley/dek
UNIT: DC/CI/SPG
EXT: 7992
DATE: 7 July 1971

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: [illegible] PER CI/SP = 2 (EU)

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: c/ci/sp 3 INFO FILE, VR, c/ci

~~[illegible]~~
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 7 Jul 71 20 23z CITE DIRECTOR 157797

TO TEL AVIV

RYBAT ~~RHYTON~~

NO. 2111

REF: TEL AVIV 16247 (IN 372102) Maurice HALPERIN

1. ATTACHMENT TO NFVA-2965 GAVE DPOB OF SUBJECT AS BOSTON, 3 MARCH 1906, AS WELL AS CONSIDERABLE BIO INFORMATION. SEEMS CLEAR THAT NEITHER MAN LISTED IN REF IS IDENTICAL WITH SUBJECT.

2. WILL AWAIT RECEIPT OF A/544 FOR FURTHER COMMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

Desensitize

Mary Pocock

NE/ISR

Robert L. Pendley

ROBERT L. PENDLEY
DEPUTY CHIEF, CI/SPG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG: irch D. O'Neal
UNIT: C/CI/SIG
EXT: 6331
DATE: 3 December 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 3

SECRET

20

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 15 PER #

CONF: CI/SI

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR. , A/I/AN, CI, CI/OPS.

SECRET (classification) EUR6, SB8 (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

05 16 39 Dec 68

CITE DIRECTOR

56296

TO OTTAWA

KEYWAY WOMUSE

REF: OCOA 13668

1. INTERPRETATION WHICH WE SHOULD PLACE ON THE LEAD PARA IN CONTEXT OF INFO PROVIDED BY WOFIRM LEAVES US IN DOUBT. HOWEVER, WOFIRM POSITION FOLLOWS:

A. OUR REF TO SUBJECT AS RIS AGENT IN SUMMARY OF TRACES (SEE PARA ONE DIR 87411) WAS BASED ON BENTLEY BOOK AS SUBSEQUENTLY POINTED OUT IN PARA ONE DIR 09956.

B. ALLEGATIONS IN BENTLEY BOOK AND INFO NEWSPAPER ITEMS ARE IN PUBLIC DOMAIN. WE, OF COURSE, HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SMABOVE USING IN ANY MANNER IT CHOOSES INFO APPEARING IN PUBLIC DOMAIN ALTHOUGH CALLED THEIR ATTENTION BY US. WE AGAIN EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, NO WOFIRM ATTRIBUTIONS AT ANY STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS.

C. PROPOSED "SOLEMN DECLARATION" THAT THE OFFICER IS "VERITABLY INFORMED" SUBJECT (1) "HAS BEEN AND (2) IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERED TO BE AN AGENT OF RIS", IF USED, WE FEEL SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS SPECIFICALLY AND FULLY

AN
AB
FI

5 Dec 68

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-128561

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

C/ E.E SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY _______ PER _______

RID/EDI

CONF:

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ,

SECRET
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 756296

TO

SUPPORTED BY WOFIRM DATA. WE DO FULLY ACCEPT ALLEGATION SUBJECT (1) HAS BEEN AN AGENT OF RIS, AND HAVE NO INFO WHICH WOULD INDICATE HE HAS HAD A BREAK IN FEALTY TO SOVIETS. NEVERTHELESS, WE MUST ADVISE WE HAVE NO CURRENT INFO FROM WHICH A SPECIFIC CONCLUSION COULD BE REACHED THAT HE IS (2) "CURRENTLY" ACTIVE AS AN AGENT OF RIS. SMABOVE IS BETTER QUALIFIED THAN WOFIRM TO COMMENT ON "CURRENT" RELATIONSHIP AS HE IN THEIR JURISDICTION.

2. SUGGEST INFORMAL RESPONSE TO SMABOVE CONSISTENT WITH ABOVE. HQS APPRECIATES THAT SMABOVE IS FACED WITH TOUGH PROBLEM IN SEEKING PROPER MEANS OF RESPONDING TO MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION DEPT ON MATTERS AFFECTING POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE SMABOVE INFO (INCLUDING INFO FROM SMABOVE "FRIENDLY LINKS"). HOWEVER, SMABOVE (AND STATION) SHOULD REALIZE THIS IS NOT GOOD "TEST CASE" OF WOFIRM ABILITY OR WILLINGNESS TO RELEASE INFO IN SUPPORT OF SMABOVE OBLIGATIONS VIS A VIS CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (IN THAT OVERT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

SECRET
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

SECRET
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 756296

TO

ATTRIBUTION IS POSSIBLE IN THIS INSTANCE). SMABOVE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT NORMALLY HQS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE ITS DEROG INFO AVAILABLE FOR PURPOSES OF PUBLIC USE BY IMMIGRATION DEPT.

END OF MESSAGE

E/BC/C
James Howley

EURBC
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CI/SIG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-128561

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

TO
Chief, European Division

INFO.
Chief, WOMUSE

FROM
Chief of Station, Ottawa

SUBJECT
KEYWAY/SMADOVE
Maurice HALPERIN (201-128561)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See below

References: A. OTTAWA 5447, 10 June 1968
B. DIRECTOR 09956, 20 June 1968

The following is a SMABOVE request for approval to disseminate WOFIRM derogatory information concerning Subject. SMABOVE/26 hand-carried the request to us and made the comment that SMABOVE hoped that WOFIRM would refuse the request since the derogatory information could have come only from one or two sources and SMABOVE is generally opposed to making public information that has been acquired by covert means. Although the following does not mention it, a similar request has been sent to LNERGO and SMORANGE:

1. "In order to acquaint you and your Agency with the reason for our request in paragraph 6 below, we would explain that recent changes in the regulations of the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the provisions of the Immigration Appeal Board Act have created certain problems.

2. "When a Special Inquiry is held by an Immigration Officer at a Canadian Port of Entry to enquire into a persons admissibility, if information is available to the SMABOVE prohibiting the immigrant's entry under the provisions of the Immigration Act, and this information cannot be released for security reasons, SMABOVE is required by Immigration Regulations to issue a "Solemn Declaration" for use at the Inquiry. Should such an Inquiry result unfavorably for the immigrant, he has the right of appeal.

3. "In issuing the first "Solemn Declaration", in order to provide protection for our sources, we only made a declaration that we were in possession of information making the subject ineligible for entry to Canada under Section 5 of the Immigration Act. However, the Immigration Appeal Board has since ruled that a "Solemn Declaration" should contain sufficient information to enable the individual, against whom action is being taken, to have a reasonable opportunity of knowing the nature of the allegations.

- continued -

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OCOA-13668

DATE
15 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-128561

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	SECRET	OCOA-13668

4. "Therefore, in consultation with our legal branch, we have drawn up the attached draft "Solemn Declaration" which we feel satisfies the conditions set out by the Board and which we propose to use in the case of Maurice Hyman HALPERIN. As you will note, we ha provided information which in the opinion of our legal branch will be the minimum requirement if our declaration is to be found valid.

5. "We would therefore request that you ascertain if consideration can be given to have your Agency authorize us to include the information contained in lines nine, ten and eleven of the attached draft "Solemn Declaration". The decision of your Agency should be made with the understandings that the declaration would be available to HALPERIN and his counsel at both the Immigration Special Inquiry and the Immigration Appeal Board Hearing.

6. "Our case against HALPERIN rests on whether or not we receive approval for the use of the information furnished by your Agency, since we have to show that HALPERIN was ineligible for admission at the time he entered Canada. We appreciate the problems inherent in a request of this nature and if after weighing all the considerations your Agency finds it impossible to authorize release, we intend to advise the Department of Manpower and Immigration that we are unable to issue the required "Solemn Declaration" and will study other ways and means of overcoming our problems in cases of this nature."

for Henry D. MC CLACKION

Attachment: H/W
As Stated

Distribution:
3 - Chief, EUR w/att h/w
2 - Chief, WOMUSE w/att h/w

SOLEMN DECLARATION

I, ____________, an officer of SMABOVE ____________, do solemnly declare,

THAT I am veritably informed that

Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
born March 3, 1906 at
Boston, Massachusetts,
United States of America,

last reported residing at 600 Smith Avenue, Apt. 131-H, Coquitlam, New Westminster, B.C. has been and is currently considered to be an agent of the Russian Intelligence Service. Based upon this information I believe that Maurice Hyman HALFERIN is a member of a class of persons described in Section 5, paragraph (n) of the Immigration Act, Chapter 325, R.S.C. 1952.

I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing it to be true, and knowing that it is of the same force and effect as if made under oath and by virtue of the Canada Evidence Act.

Declared before me)
at ____________)
this _____ day of)
__________, A.D. 19__)

(Sgd.) ____________

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BR

If file no. and title shown are no
insert proper file no. below an
document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/ AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDR

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. E/BC/C		20 NOV 1968			2cc w/att to
2. JH					Can we talk this a
3.					
4.					
5. CI/SIG					2-6: Would discuss this o you. Refs are J. Hou
6. Mr. Birch O'Neal					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11. CI/SIG		11 XI 68			For file
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					
16.					
17. RID/FI					

Input to [illegible]
24 Apr 70

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-128

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

15 NOV 1968

DOCUMENT

OCOA 1

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, European Division

INFO.
Chief, WOMUSE

FROM
Chief of Station, Ottawa

SUBJECT
KEYWAY/SMABOVE
Maurice HALPERIN (201-128561)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See below

References: A. OTTAWA 5447, 10 June 1968
B. DIRECTOR 09956, 20 June 1968

The following is a SMABOVE request for approval to disseminate WOFIRM derogatory information concerning Subject. SMABOVE/26 hand-carried the request to us and made the comment that SMABOVE hoped that WOFIRM would refuse the request since the derogatory information could have come only from one or two sources and SMABOVE is generally opposed to making public information that has been acquired by covert means. Although the following does not mention it, a similar request has been sent to LNERGO and SMORANGE:

1. "In order to acquaint you and your Agency with the reason for our request in paragraph 6 below, we would explain that recent changes in the regulations of the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the provisions of the Immigration Appeal Board Act have created certain problems.

2. "When a Special Inquiry is held by an Immigration Officer at a Canadian Port of Entry to enquire into a persons admissibility, if information is available to the SMABOVE prohibiting the immigrant's entry under the provisions of the Immigration Act, and this information cannot be released for security reasons, SMABOVE is required by Immigration Regulations to issue a "Solemn Declaration" for use at the Inquiry. Should such an Inquiry result unfavorably for the immigrant, he has the right of appeal.

3. "In issuing the first "Solemn Declaration", in order to provide protection for our sources, we only made a declaration that we were in possession of information making the subject ineligible for entry to Canada under Section 5 of the Immigration Act. However, the Immigration Appeal Board has since ruled that a "Solemn Declaration" should contain sufficient information to enable the individual, against whom action is being taken, to have a reasonable opportunity of knowing the nature of the allegations.

- continued -

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OCOA-13668	201-128561/ [illegible] 15 November 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-128561

4. "Therefore, in consultation with our legal branch, we have drawn up the attached draft "Solemn Declaration" which we feel satisfies the conditions set out by the Board and which we propose to use in the case of Maurice Hyman HALPERIN. As you will note, we hav provided information which in the opinion of our legal branch will be the minimum requirement if our declaration is to be found valid.

5. "We would therefore request that you ascertain if consideration can be given to have your Agency authorize us to include the information contained in lines nine, ten and eleven of the attached draft "Solemn Declaration". The decision of your Agency should be made with the understandings that the declaration would be available to HALPERIN and his counsel at both the Immigration Special Inquiry and the Immigration Appeal Board Hearing.

6. "Our case against HALPERIN rests on whether or not we receive approval for the use of the information furnished by your Agency, since we have to show that HALPERIN was ineligible for admission at the time he entered Canada. We appreciate the problems inherent in a request of this nature and if after weighing all the considerations your Agency finds it impossible to authorize release, we intend to advise the Department of Manpower and Immigration that we are unable to issue the required "Solemn Declaration" and will study other ways and means of overcoming our problems in cases of this nature."

Henry D. MC CLACKION

Attachment: H/W
As Stated

Distribution:
3 - Chief, EUR w/att h/w
2 - Chief, WOMUSE w/att h/w

SOLEMN DECLARATION

I, , an officer of SMABOVE

, do solemnly declare,

THAT I am veritably informed that

Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
born March 3, 1906 at
Boston, Massachusetts,
United States of America,

last reported residing at 600 Smith Avenue, Apt. 131-H, Coquitlam, New Westminster, B.C. has been and is currently considered to be an agent of the Russian Intelligence Service. Based upon this information I believe that Maurice Hyman HALPERIN is a member of a class of persons described in Section 5, paragraph (n) of the Immigration Act, Chapter 325, R.S.C. 1952.

I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing it to be true, and knowing that it is of the same force and effect as if made under oath and by virtue of the Canada Evidence Act.

Declared before me)
at ________)
this _____ day of)
________, A.D. 19__)

(Sgd.) ________

Input to US Defector
Machine Program
24 Apr 70 rrs

H/Wash 1-0004-13668

w CPY

201-128561

14-00000

[redacted]

118

RETURN TO: LYNCH
DATE: 9/16/68
File # 100-21511

NAME: HALPERIN, EDITH
NEE: FRISCH

Born: 7/6/07
Indiana

INS # AS 332 326

ADDRESS: Medellin, 36, Apt. 9, Col. Roma, Mexico

11/9/68

NAI to FBI info

11 OCT 1968

PP

201-128561

3P

SEP 1968

19 SEP 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET 34

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: James Hawley:cs
UNIT: E BC/C
EXT: R-1106
DATE: 19 June 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 PER Sp # 109

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF. EUR6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR w48; w4/0098. ci/ops. ci/ic2, ci/si. FI/INT2.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 2022 25z JUN 68 CITE DIRECTOR 09956

TO OTTAWA

KEYWAY WOMUSE

REF: A. OTTAWA 5447 (IN 27838)
B. DIRECTOR 87411

1. CONCUR PASSAGE PARA ONE REF B INFO AS PROPOSED REF A. BASIS FOR "RIS AGENT" IDENTIFICATION IS INFO FROM ELIZABETH BENTLEY AS REFLECTED IN HER BOOK "OUT OF BONDAGE," THE DEVIN-ADAIN COMPANY, NEW YORK 1951, PAGES 200, 210, 261 AND 263 THROUGH 266.

2. EMPHASIZE NO WOFIRM ATTRIBUTION.

3. FYI. LAUCHLIN CURRIE REFERRED TO ON PAGES 172 AND 263.

END OF MESSAGE

Birch D. O'Neal
CI/SIG

ACEUR(BC)

20 Jun 68 E/BC/C
201-128501

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET 61

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 4 PER

INDEX ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-1285[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, [illegible], EUR 6, CT/OPS, FI/INT 2, SB 8, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 101415Z JUN 68 CITE OTTAWA 5447

OTTA

10 JUN 68 IN 27838

IP

AN [illegible]	FI	
PS/2	[illegible]	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X	

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REF DIRECTOR 87411

201-0[illegible]54

1. PER RELIABLE AND DELICATE SMABOVE SOURCE, MAURICE HALPERIN (201-128561) HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY ASSURED AN APPOINTMENT AT SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY, VANCOUVER. LAUCHLIN BERNARD CURRIE (OCOA-12472) LOBBIED VERY HARD TO HAVE MAURICE HALPERIN (201-128561) ACCEPTED BY UNIVERSITY. CURRIE WAS AWARE OF HALPERIN'S BACKGROUND AND "WATERED IT DOWN" TO GET HIM POSITION.

FR 201-038657

2. SMABOVE WOULD LIKE TO BLOCK HALPERIN PERMANENT ADMISSION TO CANADA AND REQUESTS PERMISSION TO PASS DEROG INFO IN PARA ONE OF REF TO DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION AND PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE. WOFIRM WOULD NOT BE NAMED AS SOURCE. PLS ADVISE.

3. TAKE NO ACTION WHICH MIGHT COMPROMISE SOURCE OF PARA ONE ABOVE.

S E C R E T

BT

MICROFILMED
JUL 26 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

10 Jun 68
201-128561
10 ~~[illegible]~~ 1968

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 49 PER

ACTION EUR 8 ☒ RF COPY

MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-128561

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE VR. WH/COG 8, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

13402

25 APR 68 IN 97805

S E C R E T 250516Z APR 68 CITE MADRID 475[illegible]

PARIS INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

KEYWAY PBRUMEN MHAPRON

US CITIZEN MAURICE HALPERIN PP-TII-57 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVA 21 APRIL IBERIA FLT 942. PLEASE PASS INFO LNERGO.

S E C R E T

BT

AN:	~~PI~~	
FSP:	~~PSS~~	
ABSTRACT ✓		INDEX

A/P

ZZ

INDEXED 14 MAY 1968 R

MICROFILMED
MAY 21 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-128561
25 April 1968

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7 TOTAL COPIES 32 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-125561

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 15 PER

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2 MA 2

24 APR 68 IN 97272

S E C R E T 241247Z APR 68 CITE MADRID 4773

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC WATCHLIST

MAURICE HALPERIN PP-USA-TIT-37 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVA 21 APRIL IBERIA FLT 942.

S E C R E T

BT

AN FI

IBS DESB

APSTR

C

ZZ

ZZ PROCESSED 30 APR 1968 A

SECRET

201-125561
24 April 1968

MESSAGE FORM 40
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: WH COG/OPS
EXT: 5186
DATE: 28 MAR 68

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 / 6
2 7
3 8
4 9
5 10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ____ PER ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-128561

CONF: WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY
INFO: FILE VR, WH-8, EUR-8, CI/OPS, SB-8, CI/IC-2, FI/INT-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

87411

CITE DIRECTOR

AN	FI	
FS	DEST	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

TO OTTAWA

TYPIC

REF: OTTAWA-5310 (IN 77494)* 201-128561

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY HQS TRACES SUBJ REF:

MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN DPOB: 3 MAR 06 BOSTON, MASS. [illegible] ~~SUSPECTED~~ RIS AGENT. ~~EMPLOYED OSS [illegible] KNOWN [illegible] ACTIVITIES~~ LATE 1953 SUBJ LEFT US FOR MEXICO IN ORDER TO AVOID TESTIFYING BEFORE US SENATE INTERNAL SUB-COMMITTEE. IN 1958 MEXICAN GOVT BEGAN DEPORTING US COMMUNISTS AND SUBJ WENT USSR AS VISITING PROF UNDER USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. MOVED CUBA OCT 62 AS PROF OF ECONOMICS HAVANA UNIV. SUBJ TRAVELLED FROM CUBA TO CANADA 1964 AND AGAIN LATE 1966.

2. HQS FILES CONTAIN VOLUMINOUS LNERGO REPORTING ON SUBJ WHICH ASSUME THEY WILL PROVIDE.

3. POUCHING COPIES NEWSPAPER ARTICLES PROVIDING GOOD BACKGROUND DATA.

END OF MESSAGE

201-128561
[illegible]

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 4 '68

BY: PER #

CONF: RID/EDI ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO: 14 ... BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE VR

...DED RID/EDI

FORWARDE RID/EDI

PAGE 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 89411

TO

WH/COG COMMENT: *Requested derog traces on Maurice Hyman HALPERIN.

C/WH/COG Carl J. Williamson

E/BC/C

EUR/CUBA ✓

CI/SIG

AC/EUR/6

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 12 PER ______ #

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ NO COPY

MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 44

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO 201-[illegible]

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE. VR. WH 8 EUR 6, SB 8
CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

RID AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

[redacted]

K

S E C R E T 251515Z MAR 68 CITE ~~[illegible]~~ OTTAWA 5310

25 MAR 68 IN 77494

ANS	PI	
PS	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT	✓	~~INDEX~~

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC WATCHLIST

1. SENSITIVE SMABOVE SOURCE SAYS PROFESSOR MAURICE HALPERIN OF UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA IS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING TEACHING POSITION IN CANADA. PER SOURCE, SUBJ IS ABOUT 60 YEARS OLD, ORIGINALLY FROM U.S., AND FORMER MEMBER OSS.

2. SUB APPEARS IDENTICAL WITH MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN 201-128561 2.05-4 SS3,58:-) 285 .-745:3 6.-, -30348, BORN 3 MARCH 05 IN BOSTON, SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT.

3. REQUEST SUMMARY DEROG WOFIRM TRACES FOR SMABOVE. LNERGO ALSO BEING QUERIED.

SECRET

LLLBT

[redacted]

201-128561 ✓
[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

XAAZ
~~FE~~ - 27046
1 Oct 1967

201-125567

0 MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN [illegible] (AS)

Occupation: Professor of Economic Geography.
Home Address: Calle 12, No. 1012 Apt. C-2, Marianao, Cuba.
Office Address: Escuela De Geografía, Universidad De La Habana, Havana, Cuba.
Married: Edith Frisch (Univ. of Oklahoma '32), Sept. 5, 1926, Nahant, Mass.
Child: Judith Yvonne (Oberlin '53), Sept. 1, 1931.
  Married: Hillel Gamoran (Univ. of Cincinnati), June, 1953.
  Offspring: Adam, 1957; Saul, 1959; Reuben, 1961; Miriam, 1963.
Child: David Carlos (Universidad Nacional Autónoma De México '56), May 5, 1937.
  Married: Cecily Sharp (Chicago Art Inst. '60), 1963.
  Offspring: Joshua, 1965.
Publications Since 1957: *Growth and Crisis in the Latin/American Economy,'* Science and Society, N.Y., Vol. 25; No. 3, 1961; *Conferencias Sobre Geografía Económica*, Universidad De La Habana, 1964; *Hacia Un Nuevo Sistema De Planificación Y Dirección Económicas En La Unión Soviética*, Comercio Exterior, La Habana, No. 4, 1964.

AN	FI	
~~DS~~	~~DROT~~	
ABSTRACT X		~~INDEX~~

5

Pd [illegible] - 3331

SECRET

1 Oct 67
201-125567 ✓

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

DEC F'D 10 47 AM '65

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [illegible]	16	Dec 16 66		
2. WH/COG/CICS				
3. FA				
4. WH/COG/FI/TO		30 DEC 66	31 DEC 66	
5.				
6. WH/COG/RR				
7.				
8. WH/COG/CICS (P.T.)			9 JAN 66	PT
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER
JCCA 11338

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, [illegible]

INFO: Chief, European Division
Chief, [illegible]

FROM: Chief of Station, Ottawa

SUBJECT: TYPIC
[illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

FYI

REF: OCOA-11191, 6 October 1966

SHADOVE has furnished the following additional information regarding Subject.

1. On 5 July 1966, Maurice HALPERIN advised a reliable source that he and his wife were in Montreal to visit their children. HALPERIN stated he has a daughter residing in the United States but would not be entering that country. HALPERIN stated to source that they would remain in Montreal, Quebec, as he had to purchase a hearing aid and obtain additional medical attention. HALPERIN went on to state that he and his wife are American citizens and plan to eventually return to the United States. Maurice HALPERIN concluded by stating he is teaching economics at the University of Havana, Havana, Cuba.

2. The HALPERINS did not otherwise come to our attention during their stay in Canada.

3. The foregoing may be disseminated for official purposes, providing SHADOVE is not named as the source.

H. D. McClackion
Henry D. McCLACKION

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
3 - C/Eur
2 - C/JMWAVE

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OCOA-11733	8 December 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-128567

SECRET

4C2244

EX - 786
5 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: "American Defectors to the USSR"

1. The attached material was part of a soft file entitled "American Defectors to the USSR", which was set up by SR/6 (Support) around 1960 and maintained by various SR components until ca. 1963. The compilations were derived from a variety of sources, and contain both classified and overt data.

2. In the fall of 1966, the files were turned over to CI Staff. In most instances, basic information was then abstracted for the US Defector Machine Program. In all instances in which the material was unique, or represented a valuable collation effort, it has been incorporated into the appropriate 201 file, along with a copy of this memorandum.

3. It is suggested that any dissemination of this data should be coordinated with SB Division and with CI Staff (CI/MRO), in view of the frequently inadequate sourcing and of the fact that disseminations have already been made through the US Defector Machine Program.

JLBender

Orig - CI/MRO
1 - RID/FI
1 - SB/RMO
1 - CI/R&A/JLBender
1 - CI/R&A/chrono

Sent RIS
13/II/67

5 Dec 66
201-128561

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

HALPERIN Maurice Hyman, 201-125561
3 March 1906, Boston
Professor and long-time communist

A# 00394

1931. Already a Harvard graduate and communist, he became a professor at Oklahoma University. (OO files)

1935. He made a trip to Cuba, where he and other left-wingers were arrested and expelled. During this period he continued to direct communist activities in Oklahoma and made [illegible] many trips to Mexico to confer with Mexican communist leaders. (OO files)

1940. He cashed a check drawn on the Bank of Foreign Trade, Moscow. [This was not discovered until 1941; see next item.] (OO files)

1941. Congressional investigation of [illegible] subversive activities in Oklahoma uncovered the check-cashing, his 1935 visit to and expulsion from Cuba, association with leftist individuals, articles to left-wing publications, membership in left-wing groups like Civil Liberties Committee, etc. (SRS, memo from Herman Horton to Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, 10 August 1960)

8 September 1941. Dismissed from Oklahoma U. while on sabbatical. Reinstated 11 Feb 1942 but with understanding he would resign at termination of sabbatical. (SRS, Herman Horton memo)

1942. Late in the year, Elizabeth Bentley was introduced to him by Jacob GOLOS, according to her 1948 testimony. (CI/SIG, OO, SRS)

1943. As of this time he worked for OSS in Washington D.C., despite his known communist activities and sympathies. He was (or became before the end of the war) head of the OSS Latin American Division. (Washington Post, 1 Sept 1960, attached). According to Elizabeth Bentley's testimony and book ("Out of Bondage"), he supplied Golos and the communist apparat with information from his OSS office. (SIG,SRS)

1948. Elizabeth Bentley testified that she had met him in late 1942 through Jacob Golos (known Soviet agent) and that while Halperin was employed by the OSS in wartime Washington he gave information to Golos. (SIG)

Autumn 1949. He began teaching at Boston University. (SRS, Horton memo)

Late 1952 or early 1953. By this time he was director of Latin American Regional Studies at Boston University. He was summoned to testify before the Jenner Committee in Boston, since Bentley had named him as one of her sources. He refused to say whether he was a communist. (OO files)

Subject RIS 13/XI/67 BR

Later in 1953. He was suspended by certain B.U. authorities in disagreement with an impartial B.U. committee which had decided not to fire him for the time being. (OO files)

28 November 1953. The Halperins took off for Mexico. (SRS, Horton memo)

6 January 1954. He was formally dismissed from B.U. (SRS, Horton memo)

A# 06714

20 July 1957. Date of a State Department memo on the case of Martha Dodd and Alfred STERN. [illegible] The Sterns had just fled from Mexico to Czechoslovakia (to avoid extradition to the U.S. to testify before a grand jury

201-144555

A# 11097 201-003704 SECRET 201-125561

about their association with Jack Soble and Boris Morros. Halperin was very closely associated with them and instrumental in their getaway plans - he got their plane reservations without saying they were for the Sterns until the last minute, etc. (SRS; NY Herald Trib 1 Sept 60)

A# 25361

Later in 1957 or the first half of 1958. Public disclosure of his role in the Stern affair caused him and his wife (Edith nee Frisch) to lose their jobs. She was a teacher at the American School Foundation, while he worked in a Mexican Government bank and at the Mexico University National School of Political and Social Sciences. (SRS, Horton memo)

26 July 1958. They applied for US passports at the American Embassy in Mexico City. (SRS, Horton memo)

26 August 1958. Their passports were issued. (SRS, Horton memo). This followed a 1958 Supreme Court decision that the State Department could not deny a passport because of communist or other political beliefs. (Wash Post, 1 Sept 60)

25 September 1958. Their passports were visaed by the Mexican authorities "to travel in Mexico in the status of immigrants," valid till 25 Sept 59. (SRS, DBF-56611. By this time the Mexican Government had begun deporting US communists. (SRS, Horton memo)

13 October 1958. They departed Mexico. (Horton memo and Wash Post, 1 Sep 60)

✓ 11 November 1958. They arrived in Czechoslovakia. (SRS, DBF-56611)

3 December 1958. They arrived in the USSR on tourist visas to firm up tentative job offer (the Soviets wouldn't commit themselves before he actually in USSR.) Job was visiting professor under Social Sciences Division of USSR Academy of Sciences, on contract till July 1961; no teaching, but research and handling student theses. Salary unfavorable since in rubles, but he hoped to compensate by getting experience and material for book; also use rubles for grand tour of USSR before departure. (CI/SIG and SRS, DBF-56611)

13 December 1958. They in Moscow as of this date but must have gone to Leningrad soon after, since he said his job was there at first. They moved to Moscow some time before July 1960. (SRS, DBF-56611)

15 July 1960. He and wife appeared at the American Embassy Moscow to renew their passports. No excuse for not having reported in earlier. The passports were renewed for two years, to expire July 1962. They gave their legal address as Medellin 36, Mexico City, and their current address as Kutuzovski Prospekt 13, apt 127, Moscow. Halperin gave them the job information reported above under 3 December 1958 and indicated that they intended to leave the USSR upon expiration of the contract in July 1961. Both were frank about the shortcomings of Soviet life. When asked if they would return to the States in July 61, he said that their permanent address was Mexico. A daughter and her husband and children were visiting them until 3 July. (SRS, DBF-56611) 24 August 1960)

[illegible] and 5 Sept 60. [illegible]

October 1960. The American Embassy requested that he appear for an interview about just what his job was. He wrote on 30 October saying that they were just leaving on vacation and swearing that his job was not in conflict with his US citizenship. A certain Max Berger [not further identified] reported that Halperin was getting higher-than-usual salary and his passport should be revoked. (SRS, DBA-1753, 6 February 1962)

// November-December 1960. Halperin, "an identified Soviet agent who left the US in 1960 [sic] and is now in the Soviet Union," was to be head of one of the two new organizations founded during a Moscow conference of communist leaders: "office for permanent studies and cooperation with Latin American parties" to be organized by the Communist Parties of Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba, and to be located in Peiping. [This presumably never happened.] (SRS, TDCS-3/462,130, 13 January 1961, info Nov-Dec 60, from an official Swedish service from usually-reliable source who Polish official with high-level contacts)

✓ / As of February 1961. He was reported as a US national lecturing in economics at Moscow U. Helped gather data for Che Guevara's Punta del Este speech. The Halperin's son in US was planning visit them in 61 but canceled to their great disappointment. Halperin seemed to regret having gone to the USSR and said on several occasions he would like to return to the US; always "joking" about the unpleasant aspects of life in the SU. Had been offered job in Cuba and was trying decide whether accept. (SRS, CSCI-3/772,459, 7 Sept 1962, from Cuban refugee who was Economic Counselor at Cuban Embassy Moscow Oct 60 - Feb 61)

July 1962. Their passports would have expired, requiring issuance of new ones. (Only passports actually issued - not renewed - after September 1959 had the new three-year validity instead of the old two-year validity, according to Central Processing.) We have no record of ~~xx~~issue of new ones, but it seems to have been done, because at the end of 1962 Halperin spoke of keeping his US citisenship after moving to Cuba.

/ 1 October 1962. They moved to Cuba. He was already working in a textile factory and would start teaching at Havana University on 8 October. (SRS; copy of a glad-to-be-back, pro-Cuban propaganda-like ~~letter~~ personal letter written by Halperin). They got a big welcome in Cuba because they came from Moscow, but it soon wore off and the Cubans considered him cold and pedantic. (SRS, DBA-62084, 13 January 1964)

// 21 January 1963. Elizabeth Mora (long-time communist) returned to Mexico from a women's congress in Havana, where she had seen the Halperins. They had a mansion and servants because of his "important job," but he had aged greatly, looked old, had to do without such amenities as underwear and socks, was rationed to one tube of toothpaste every six months, etc. Wife said it was Soviet treatment that had broken him, not Cuban. They intended to stay in Cuba because of the friendlier climate and his feeling more useful there. She wanted to become a Cuban citizen so that she could visit her son and his family in Mexico, but he planned to keep his US citizenship. (SRS, DBA-34390, 26 Feb 63)

/ 17 June 1963. Date of VIEN 3538, IN 61623,: a VIEN case officer, JOANNESS, in touch with Halperin who in Vienna writing a book on the Castro impact on South America. Joanness rated him "sound non-communist leftist without party ties or extremist dogmatism" - ! (SRS)

! October or November 1963. Published article about damage to Cuba from hurricane Flora in October. He reportedly an economist employed by Cuban Government. (SRS, DBA-62084, 13 Jan 64)

14-00000

16 August 1960. On this date, according to NYT article of 5 Sept 60, he called on the US Emb for renewal of his American passport. (Reproduction of article is in with Martin and Mitchell material in Kay Grady's NSA file.) Renewal was apparently being delayed, possibly because of renewed attempts within the US Govt to deny passports to commie sympathizers.

5 Sept 60. The same NYT article reported just above said that he had just assailed a State Department report that he was working as an advisor to the Sov Govt on Latin American af~~fairs.~~ — Said he was professor associated with Academy of Sciences, writing book on Latin American economy 1945-58. "There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow. Since my arrival I have filed two US income tax returns, listing my salary and employer. I am not working for the Soviet Govt any more than Van Cliburn was when he performed in a Govt-owned concert hall. I am a visiting prof in the USSR AS and not the first American to be associated with it. My appointment and my Soviet visa espire in July 1961."

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

By 8

ACTION WH/C 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 221525Z CITE OTTAWA 3605

~~22 Aug 66~~ 80841

DIRECTOR

TYPIC WATCHLIST

1. MAURICE HALPERIN, DPOB 3 MARCH 06 IN BOSTON, AND WIFE, EDITH ERISOCH NEE FRISCH, DPOB 6 JULY 08 IN WABASH, INDIANA, ARRIVED MONTREAL 5 JULY ON CUBAN SHIP FRUCUBA. PLANNED STAY MONTREAL SIX WEEKS FOR VISIT WITH U.S. RELATIVES. SEE OCOA-11071.

2. WILL SEND SMABOVE COVERAGE OF VISIT, IF ANY.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

RID/Files
201 — 128561
22 Aug 66
201-128561

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ [illegible]NAL [illegible] ONLY ☐ CO[illegible]TIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

[illegible]

FROM:

[illegible]

[illegible]

EXTENSION

NO. CSCI-316/[illegible]-66

DATE 3 Jun 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Ann Egerter CI/SIG 2 B 14	1·VI·66			
2. Seymour Young CI/Ops/EUR 2 B 46	1 JUN 1966		3	
3. CI/Liaison 2 C 35		2 JUN 1966		
4. RIDIAN		4/6		
5. RID/MIS				
6. RID/FI				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

AB FI

~~[illegible]~~

X

201-128561 ✓

3 JUN 1966

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

3 JUN 1966

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : C Maurice Hyman HALPERIN and wife Edith Evelyn (nee FRISCH)

REFERENCES: A. Memorandum, dated 18 January 1965,
Subject: Maurice HALPERIN; Edith Erisoch HALPERIN

B. Report of Darrel B. CURRIE, Boston, Massachusetts,
Title: Edith Evelyn HALPERIN, dated 25 March 1966;
Field Office File 100-31726; Bureau File 100-424134

This Agency requests permission to discuss the contents of reference memorandum and report with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to elicit from the RCMP information concerning the HALPERINs' visit to Montreal, Canada in August-September 1964. This Agency is particularly interested in the HALPERINs' whereabouts and activities from 18 August to 26 September 1964 and the possibility of their having been in contact with Canadian Communists at that time.

CSCI - 316/02762-66

Distribution:
Original and 1 - FBI
1 - CI/SIG
1 - CI/Ops/EUR
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/R&A
1 - 201-128561
2 - E/BC/Canada

DDP-E/BC/Canada-RNJoyner:rnj 31 May 1966

SECRET

CS COPY

201-128561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, MAURICE
201-128561
SEX M DOB ?

201-000212
EX -00816
07 MAR 66

CIT USA
OCC ?
C USA
NAME MENTIONED IN CI STUDY ON NICULAS KAGAN /201-000212/. SEE INDEX FOR PAGE NUMBER.

R 6707251917

7 Mar 66

FILE IN 201-128561

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ROME

ACTION: WE 6

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/SI, FI, EE 4, SAS 8, RF 2

[illegible] 1/6 [illegible]

S E C R E T 081641Z

0 JUL 63 IN 75202

DIR INFO PARI BERN GNVA MADR HAGU CITE ROME 9612 [illegible] Kuba

KEYWAY PBRUMEN LCMAYFOWL

REF DIR 52321

IF ANY INDICATION SUBJ REF COMING ITALY REQUEST FULL DETAILS THIS CASE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *PRESUMED THAT HAGU AWARE (FNU) HALPERIN IS ID/W MAURICE HYMAN HOLPERIN KNOWN KGB AGENT INVOLVED LCMAYFAWL PENETRATION KUTWIN.

File CI/SIG + folder on HALPERIN

File in 201-128561

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ORIG : A. POTOCKI
UNIT : SAS/CI
EXT : 4422
DATE : 5 JULY 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

X INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
X FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-278371

ROUTING
4
5
6

TO : THE HAGUE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SAS 8
INFO : DOP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/SI, FI, RI/AN, EE 4, WE 4, SR 6, WH 7, RF

5 JUL 63 23 17z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO HAGU (PRTY) INFO PARI, BERN, GNVA, MADR, ROME (ROUTINE) CITE DIR 52321

KEYWAY PBRUMEN LCHAYFOWL

REF: A. HAGU-4136 (IN-71802)

B. HAGU-4038 (IN-62856) (NOT TO INFO ADDRESSEES)

1. PRESUME HAGU AWARE THAT (FNU) HALPERIN OF REF B PARA 6,B, IS ID/W MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN (201-128561) KNOWN KGB AGENT INVOLVED LCHAYFOWL XXXXX PENETRATION KUTWIN. HALPERIN AND WIFE ARRIVED HABANA FROM MOSCOW CA SPRING 1961 AFTER RECEIVING JOB OFFER FROM FAURE (CHOMON) MEDIAVILLA (201-270370) THEN CUBAN AMB. TO MOSCOW. HALPERIN REPORTED TOTALLY DEAF AND EMBITTERED RE EXPERIENCES USSR, WHICH DOES NOT WANT DISCUSS, PER INFO FROM ELIZABETH XXXXX CATLETT MORA (201-103989) WHO VISITED HIM AND WIFE JAN 63 IN HABA.

2. ED BORSTINE OF REF B PARA 6,B, ID/W EDUARDO BOORSTEIN aka EDDIE BURSZTYN (201-170429) US NATIONAL AND AIDE TO CHE GUEVARA. BOORSTEIN IS SUSPECT KGB AGENT AND OF CURRENT INTEREST ODENVY.

3. BALANCE OF SUBJ'S CONTACTS REPORTED REF B APPEAR OF SIMILAR ILK. THEREFORE SUGGEST HIS MOVEMENTS AND CONTACTS ON CURRENT TRIP BE CLOSELY MONITORED AND INFO DEVELOPED BE CABLED.

4. IN LIGHT FACT AS OF MAR 61 ODENVY HAD ESPIONAGE CASE

RELEASING OFFICER 5-17 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

File in 201-128561

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE 2.

TO INFO CITE DIR

RUNNING AGAINST SUBJ, SUGGEST HAGU MAY WISH BRIEF LEGAL ATTACHE BONN OR PARI ON DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE AND POSSIBLY TURN OVER TO LEGAL ATT FURTHER FOLLOW-UP, PARTICULARLY IF SUBJ GOES SUISSE.

END OF MESSAGE

for C/SAS/CI
C/SAS/EOB
for C/CI/SIG
for C/WE/2 - Walker
CI/OPS CW Tenney

Thomas F. Thiele
for W. O'RYAN
Chief, WE
RELEASING OFFICER

5-17

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Desmond Fitzgerald
Chief, SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3			

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : VIENNA

ACTION: CA/O 4

INFO : DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, EE 4, SAS 8, S/C 2

CA [illegible]

SIG-Egerton

S E C R E T 1716042

IN 51623

DIR INFO BERN CITE VIEN 3538

17 JUN 1963

DTDORIC QRMUSIC

Victor S

Ernst

Swiss National

VIEN OFFICERS INCLUDING JOANESS IN CONTACT HALPERIN REGARDED AS SOUND NON-COMMUNIST LEFTIST WITHOUT PARTY TIES OR EXTREMIST DOGMATISM. SUBJ WHILE IN VIEN WAS WRITING BOOK ON CASTRO IMPACT ON SOUTH AMERICA. ALSO TOLD JOANESS ABOUT VISIT TO HUNGARY 1962 AND UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS OBTAIN INTERVIEW NOEL FIELD. SUBJ OPEN AND FRANK IN HIS DISCUSSIONS. NO NEW INFORMATION VIEN FILES.

S E C R E T

Currently with Center of International Studies at MIT - Not writing in late 50s

Thomas POLGAR

Cy to S.P. 18.VI.63

File CI/SIG folder re HALPERIN

File 201-128561

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

4-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING

[illegible]	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Maurice Hyman Halperin

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached is a copy of DBA 34398, dated 26 February 1963, concerning Maurice Halperin and his activity in Cuba.

2. The Station's attention is drawn to page two which states that Subject's wife hopes to obtain Cuban citizenship so that she can come to Mexico to see her son and grandchildren. On the same page, there is an interesting, yet vague, reference to his treatment in the USSR.

3. Headquarters is still most interested in Subject, and the Station should be alert to any information it can gather on HALPERIN, or on his wife's travel to Mexico, which might be used for KUDESK or KUWOLF purposes.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City, W/Att
1 - RI W/XXXO Att
1 - Chrono

201-128561 ✓

DATE TYPED: 8 April 63

DATE DISPATCHED: 12 APR 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11472

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-128561

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	J
RID/[illegible]	X
~~RID/[illegible]~~	
RID/FI ~~RID/[illegible]~~	
~~C/WH/3~~	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mex/Charlotte Bustos		ds	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OPS/WH	8 April 63	E.W. Hughes

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WHD	9 APR 1963	Raford W. Herbert

FORM 6-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/772,459, Subject: "Contact with U.S. Defectors Abroad," dated 13 September 1962.

2. Sub-paragraph (c) of referenced CSCI reported that at sometime during the period October 1960—February 1961 Maurice HALPERIN had stated several times to a CIA source in Moscow that "he would like to come back to the U.S., and once asked the source if he should accept a position in Cuba which he had been offered by Faure CHOMON."

3. This office has received the following additional report concerning HALPERIN from the CIA office which contributed the original report:

a. "On 27 December 1962 another source of this office advised that he received a 1962 Christmas card from Maurice Halperin on which the return address was given as 'Apt C-2, Calle 12, no 103, Miramar, Habana, Cuba.' The only message on the card was one of Christmas greeting. Halperin and the source have known each other for a number of years and they always exchange Christmas cards, but this is the first time Halperin's greeting has borne a Cuban address."

b. "The last time that the source saw Halperin was in Moscow when source was visiting in the USSR during August—September 1961 as a member of an official U. S. delegation."

4. There is no record of the Habana return address in the intelligence files of this office.

CSCI-3/774,170

cc: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

CS COPY

RID/EIPCS

201-128561

201-128561

SECRET

CSCI-3/774,170
SR/CI/DML 3 January 1963
Source: WH-729 (OO-A/S/ 3,246,933 from OO/C
Distribution: orig & 1 - addressee
1 - State
1 - CI/LSN
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/OG/SS
1 - TFW/CI, Attn: Lois Frederickson, GH-5509
1 - SR/CI chrono
1 - RID/AN for 201-128561
1 - Comeback
Coordinated with: TFW/CI

201-128561

201-128[illegible]
3 Jan 63
201-128561

OOA(S) 3,246,933

27 December 1962

Subject: Current Address of Maurice Halperin

1. A source of this office has just advised us that he received a Christmas card (1962) from Maurice Halperin on which the return address was given as: "Apt C-2, Calle 12, no 103, Miramar, Habana, Cuba." The only message on the card was one of Christmas greetings. Halperin and our source have known each other for a number of years and they always exchange Christmas cards. This is the first one Halperin has sent with a Cuban address on it. The last time that our source saw Halperin was in Moscow when he (the former) was visiting in the USSR during August-September 1961 as part of an official US delegation.

2. In view of Halperin's past activities and associations, we are making this information known to you. Our source comments that Halperin always seems to show up wherever there is some sort of activity going on.

-end-

Disseminated:
CSCI-3/774,170
3 Jan 63

27 Dec 62
201-128561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, MAURICE
201-128561
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

201-005239
HMMA-20077
24 OCT 62
E01 P1

PAR 1210691

LETTER DATED 2 OCT 62 FROM SUBJ APT. C-2 CALLE 12, NO. 103 MIRAMAR, HAVANA TO MARGARET MALTZ.

1 210 691

24 Oct 62

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

FILE NO. 201-128561

201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : M. Patten
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 15 Oct 1962 1562

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

5 Oct 62 19 19 z

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : ~~DIRECTOR~~ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one): ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
[illegible] ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature: M. Patten

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT87268

TO INFO CITE DIR XAAZ-13491
~~15999~~

SUBJECT: MAURICE AND DAVID HALPERIN

1. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, ON 2 OCTOBER 1962 MAURICE HALPERIN WROTE MARGARET AND ALBERT MALTZ, GIVING HIS NEW ADDRESS AS APT C-2, CALLE 12, NO. 103, MIRAMAR, HABANA. HE WAS WORKING IN A TEXTILE FACTORY BUT PLANNED TO TEACH AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HABANA BEGINNING 8 OCTOBER.

2. HIS SON DAVID HAD A RESIDENCY IN SURGERY IN A VETERANS' HOSPITAL IN CHICAGO BUT WAS DISCHARGED LAST MONTH FOR "REASONS THAT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HIS COMPETENCE".

3. THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

Based on MEXI 2188 (IN 38214)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	L
RID/MIS	
[illegible]	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

J. Kennedy
CI/Liaison
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/3/Mexico
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/WH/R
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

5 Oct 62

FORM 6-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-128561 (33)

14-00000

039

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE NO. 201-128561
201-128561

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 11 OCT 62
TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : WH 8
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature: Martha Patton

OCT 12 0247Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 38214

DIR CITE MEXI 2188

1. MAURICE HALPERIN WROTE LETTER 2 OCT MARGARET AND ALBERT MALTZ GIVEING NEW ADDRESS APT C-2, CALLE 12, NO. 103, MIRAMAR, HABANA. WORKING IN TEXTILE FACTORY BUT PLANS TEACH AT UNIVERSITY HABANA BEGIN 8 OCT. SON DAVID HAD RESIDENCY SURGERY IN VETERANS HOSPITAL CHICAGO BUT FIRED LAST MONTH FOR "REASONS THAT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HIS COMPETENCE".

2. SOURCE: LIMUD. PASSED TO ODENVY MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	£
RID/MIS	W
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

12 Oct 62
201-128561 ✓

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/772,459, Subject: "Contact with U.S. Defectors Abroad," dated 13 September 1962.

2. Subparagraph (e) of referenced CSCI reported that at sometime during the period October 1960—February 1961 Maurice HALPERIN had stated several times to a CIA source in Moscow that "he would like to come back to the U.S., and once asked the source if he should accept a position in Cuba which he had been offered by Fauro [illegible]."

3. This office has received the following additional report concerning HALPERIN from the CIA office which contributed the original report:

a. "On 27 December 1962 another source of this office advised that he received a 1962 Christmas card from Maurice Halperin on which the return address was given as 'Apt C-2, Calle 11, No 103, Miramar, Havana, Cuba.' The only message on the card was one of Christmas greetings. Halperin and the source have known each other for a number of years and they always exchange Christmas cards, but this is the first time Halperin's greeting has borne a Cuban address."

b. "The last time that the source saw Halperin was in Moscow when source was visiting in the USSR during August—September 1961 as a member of an official U.S. delegation."

4. There is no record of the Habana return address in the intelligence files of this office.

CSCI-3/774,175

cc: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

13 Sep 62
201-128561

CSCI-3/774,170
SR/CI/RA 3 January 1963
Source: SR-729 (OO-B/ 3,246,933 from OO/C
Distribution: orig & 1 - addressee
1 - State
1 - CI/ISG
1 - CI/P&A
1 - CI/OG/OS
1 - TFW/CI, Attn: Lois Frederickson, GR-5509
1 - SR/CI chrono
1 - RID/AN for 201-126561
1 - Comeback
Coordinated with: TFW/CI - & SR/CI/Red/ [illegible]

cc: Joe Evans, SR/CI/P

cc: OO/C of record

201-128561

201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG. : C. Bustos

UNIT : WH/1/Mexico

EXT : 5940 1578

DATE : 2 Aug 1962 1578

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

3 AUG 62 19 25z

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF. : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐

☑ indicated

Branch copy filed as indicated ☐

RE Indexing (check one):

Marked ☐ None required ☑

Signature:

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 62026

OUT62026

TO INFO CITE DIR

SUBJECT: MAURICE AND EDITH HALPERIN

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

1. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, ON 25 JULY 1962 NOAH SEBORER WROTE ROBERT, ~~HER~~ HIS SON, IN CALIFORNIA THAT MAURICE AND EDITH WHO ARE IN EUROPE ARE PLANNING TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES SOON.

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MAURICE AND EDITH REFERRED TO ARE MAURICE AND EDITH HALPERIN.

3. THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

Based on MEXI 1569 (IN 37788)

classified to 201-075735

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	

3 Aug 62

201-128561

C.W. Tenney
RELEASING OFFICER
CI/Liaison

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
C/WH/R

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, MAURICE
201-128561
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE LIFE OF SUBJ IN USSR.

200-005-031
DCE -15041
03 JUL 62
00A-3217235
P1

628388

PAFR

```
00000000 00000 000000
11111_111_11111111111
2222222222222222_2222
33_333333333333333_33
4 444444444444444444
55_5555555555555555
666666_66666666_66666
7777_7777777777777777
8888888888888888_8
9999999_99_9999999999
```

019

0628388

0

3 Jul '62

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201- 128 561

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[illegible]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba [illegible]

SUBJECT Contact with Defectors

REPORT NO. [illegible]

DATE DISTR. [illegible] July 1962

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES C-303

DATE OF INFO 1962 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Moscow/1960-61

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, A 12 170 210, who arrived in the US in June 1962 as a political refugee.

Source is a graduate engineer who served for a year in the Ministry of Public Works following the advent of the Castro regime, and then was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Relations and went to the USSR as Economic Counselor. He was in the USSR from October 1960 to February 1961. Shortly after his return to Cuba he took asylum in the Argentine Embassy where he remained more than a year until his safe-conduct was arranged. This is one of several reports from source.

[This report emanated from the Caribbean Admission Center at Opa-Locka, Florida.]

1. From October 1960 to February 1961 I served as Economic Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in the USSR. During my stay I met and became fairly well acquainted with a number of defectors from the West, including Douglas McLean, who defected from the UK, and Maurice Halperin from the US. I did not meet Guy Burgess, because I was told that he is in bad physical condition due to excess drinking. McLean, who is now known as Frazier, likewise drinks heavily, and at a party the hostess cut down on his liquor saying, "If he drinks too much, he gets in bad shape."

2. McLean and his family are living in Soviet Government-furnished quarters in a new, but not elaborate, apartment building near the Ukraine Hotel. His wife made a number of remarks to my wife about how far it is necessary to walk to get food, or anything else, in the USSR. Otherwise she did not complain. McLean made numerous jokes about shortcomings of living in the USSR, including comments about the elevator in his apartment building never working. He also made some half-hearted jokes about the Soviets always spitting when they spoke.

3. At the time I knew him he was on the staff of an English language publication, "Economic Affairs."

4. Maurice Halperin was a US national, and I believe taught economics at a US university. He subsequently worked at the National Bank of Mexico, but was expelled about 1956 and went to the USSR. Halperin is now a lecturer in economics at Moscow University. Halperin assisted in gathering data used by "Che" Guevara in his speech at Punta del Este, and commented about it when the speech was published.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

201-128561
3 July 62
~~108-929~~

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC			

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN
LIMITED

NO DISSEM ABROAD

LIMITED

Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI, and within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echelons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA.

5. Halperin, I believe, is of English-Jewish background. He still has a son in the US and was happily anticipating a visit from the son in [illegible]. The son cancelled the trip for unspecified reasons, and Halperin became extremely depressed.

6. Halperin mentioned on a number of occasions that he would like to come back to the US, and at one time asked me if he should accept a position in Cuba which had been offered to him by [illegible]. I believe he has regretted his going to the USSR. He is always "joking" about unpleasant aspects of life in the Soviet Union.

-end-

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
CI/SIG Don

NO. CSCI-3/770,337

DATE 18 May 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CI	17 MAY 1962	18 MAY 62		OSI copy should be passed by Mr. Flynn, as the Air Force has an interest in the Rand
2.				

~~C/TFW~~

C/TFW/CI

5 June

1\.

in re attached, B. C, Neal said this is indeed a sensitive source. He said that no control ~~was~~ is held over it and no reqms could be levied. Halperin, former OSS, is now in the USSR and is known to be interested in Latin American affairs but it is not firmly known whether or not this includes Cuba. He is now a trusted member of the RIS. Note. There is more to this but I will have to tell you as further putting on paper was specifically denied me.

201-120561

2. in re the Rand Corporation, It is a West Coast Co. under contract to the Air Force. It is in fact a prporiety company conducting research on all manner of subjects, mostly scientific and mostly long range. Thaé material contained in the attached was verbally passed to the AF by Tony Flinn.

3 CIA contact with Rand Corp. is Ed. Giller who now works with Scoville. I have not as yet contacted him.

14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

[illegible] 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. [illegible] J. Papich

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
[illegible]
Bureau File No. 65-14,303

ROSENFIELD

1. From a sensitive source of known reliability, it has been learned that Mr. William [illegible], 71 [illegible] Little Road, Stamford, Connecticut, a cousin of Maurice HAL[illegible], on 3 March 1962, attended a seminar for high school students of the New England area ~~at the~~ Teacher's Meeting House, Stamford, Connecticut. ~~A discussion~~ about Latin America was led by Professor [illegible], a young, Italian-American professor from Wesleyan College. [illegible] allegedly stated that the professor was a liberal, extremely well-informed, and that he "thrilled" [illegible] with statements like: "More people are killed in violent outbreaks in Venezuela than in Cuba"; and "At least something is happening for good in Cuba; nothing in Venezuela."

EDUARDO

2. According to source, the previous week Professor [illegible] had lectured on Cuba for seven hours at Columbia University. Source further reported that Professor [illegible] is going to work for the RAND Corporation to help plan policy for Latin America. [illegible] is quoted as saying there are almost no experts on Latin America in the U. S. A., so, despite his youth (about 30), he is considered to be one.

3. According to source, Mr. ROSENFIELD is submitting his views on Professor [illegible] to Maurice HALPERIN in Moscow, USSR.

4. It is requested that information contained in this communication receive no further dissemination without prior coordination with this office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

Signed: James Angleton

James Angleton

CSCI-3/770,237

cc: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

Director of Special Investigations
Inspector General, USAF

CS COPY

SECRET

201-128561

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Department of State
1 - USAF
1 - C/CI
3 - CI/SIG
1 - CI/Merts
1 - WH/4
1 - RID (201-128561)
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/LIA

CI/SIG/RAEgerter:jm(17 May 1962)

CS COPY

201-128561

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
CI/SIG

NO. CSCI-3/769,721

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CI			/	
2.				
3. CI/LSN	7 MAR 1962			
4.				
5. RID/AN				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10. RID/MIS.				
11.				
12.				7 MAR 1962
13.				
14.				201-128521 ✓ ABSTRACT X INDEX DATE 7 March 62
15. RID/Filin				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

GPO 1961 O-593044

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN 201-128561
Espionage - R
Bureau File Number 65-14303

1. Reference is made to your report on Maurice Hyman HALPERIN made by Special Agent Edward J. Dann, Jr., at Boston, Massachusetts, on 6 February 1962. Your report indicates that HALPERIN, who is residing in Moscow, USSR, was preparing a book on Latin America.

2. In the event your Bureau has not obtained a copy of the publication Science & Society, Vol. XXV, No. 3, Summer 1961, we are enclosing a copy of this issue. It will be noted that this publication contains an article by HALPERIN entitled, "Growth and Crisis in the Latin American Economy", which is stated to be a chapter from his forthcoming book on Latin America.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

Signed: James Angleton
James Angleton

CSCI-3/769,721

Enclosure: a/s

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI
3 - CI/SIG
1 - WH/3
1 - RID
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A

CS COPY

201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3		6	[illegible]

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION: TFW 10
INFO : DOP, CI/OA, OC 8, S/C 2

JAN 16 0015Z 63

ROUTINE

DIR CITE WAVE 3341

IMMEDIATE ACTION

GYROSE COMMO AMDENIM

REF A. WAVE 3340. (IN 50541)

B WAVE 2246 (IN 32888)×

IN50537

SUBJ REF A IS RADOP CANDIDATE PROVIDED BY AMDENIM-1 FOR INFILTRATION INTO PBRUMEN. TO REPLACE SUBJ PARA B REF B WHO FAILED COMMO ASSESSMENT TEST.

END OF MESSAGE 04 ~~03~~

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED POA ON BENICIA (GONZALEZ) GOMEZ.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

/ AMDENIM 2

/ [illegible] 201

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 10 DEC 62
TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION: TFW 10
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, OC 8, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DEC 10 2352Z 62

ROUTINE

DIR CITE WAVE 2246 IN32888

GYROSE COMMO AMDENIM

REF: A. WAVE 2242 PARA 2 (IN 32911)
B. DIR 24518

REQUEST PRITY POAS ON FOLLOWING

A. [EDDA (HERNANDEZ) GONZALEZ] CUBAN BORN [31 AUGUST 32] LA VILLAS CUBA. LIVES [65 PUTNAM ST PATTERSON, NEW JERSEY]. SINGLE. FATHER [MIGUEL (HERNANDEZ) PEREZ] BORN [25 FEB 06] REMEDIOS, LA VILLAS, CUBA. MOTHER [ESTELVINA (GONZALEZ) ZAYAS] BORN [31 JULY 03] AREMEDIOS LA VILLAS. WAVE AND ODENVY TRACES ARE NEGATIVE.

B. [BENICIA (GONZALEZ) GOMEZ] CUBAN BORN [23 AUGUST 33] SAN FERNANDO DE LOS CAMARONES. LIVES [331 NE 24TH ST] MIAMI, FLORIDA. SINGLE. FATHER [DAMASO (GONZALEZ) FERNANDEZ] BORN [11 DEC 62] SAN FERNANDO DE LOS CAMARONES. MOTHER [SUSANA (GOMEZ) AQUAIO] BORN [11 AUGUST 11] CIENFUEGOS, CUBA. WAVE AND ODENVY TRACES NEGATIVE.

C. [ADELAIDA (MARTINEZ) ANDREADES] 201-320691. POA WAS FORMERLY GRANTED PER REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

1 - AMVENIN
3(1st [illegible] 201)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

15/20

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE qKR

SUBJECT GYROSE/Operational
AMDENIM-1 Progress Report - 13 August 1962

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: UFGA-4425 dated 19 June 1962

1. SUMMARY: In the period since ref progress report AMDENIM-1 has been primarily engaged in keeping his fences mended with the various exile groups in the area in anticipation of moving into a position in the AMBUD-1 organization in which he will be responsible for coordinating the selection of paramilitary candidates from these groups. In addition to this he has prepared a number of reports providing background information, ~~and~~ on current activities in the local PBRUMEN community and mounting Operation Antonico I, an effort to establish contact with PBRUMEN fishermen thru his own fisherman contacts. Details follow:

OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. In response to a Station request subject provided an estimate of the current situation in PBRUMEN. This report stressed the points that the farmers and the fishermen in PBRUMEN are the most willing and capable of providing support to resistance activities as a result of their having suffered the most at the hands of the current administration after being largely responsible for its obtaining power. He also provided a general strategic plan of Oriente Province in which he defined the main areas in which guerrilla elements can survive and how they can be reached from coastal resupply points. His ability to do this is based upon his being a native of the area and one who has been primarily interested in its geography due to his former large agriculture holdings there.

3. He has had one meeting with AMBUD-1 for the purpose of maintaining contact. His main question to AMBUD-1 was with regard to the latter's ability to actually control the people on his staff. He was disappointed by the reply which though positive could not be supported with an example of where AMBUD-1 had actually brought

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - Addressee

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
13 Aug. 62

DATE DISPATCHED
AUG [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-5212

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-251853
201-251853

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

about the dismissal of anyone who had proved to be ineffective. AMDENIM-1 is a good friend of AMBUD-1 as a result of his father's long standing relationship with him, but at this point has very little respect for him as a result of, as he says, AMBUD-1's failure to actually make his organization into an effective body and to engage in activities which actually detract from the success of the current PBRUMEN regime. It remains that he is willing to join AMBUD-1's organization and attempt to create unity among the military sections of the member groups at such time as KUBARK gives him the go ahead.

4. Following his belief that the most important job at hand is the development and maintenance of maritime reception points along the north coast of PBRUMEN, AMDENIM-1 has devoted considerable time to readying assets among his exiled fisherman friends to make contact with their former fisherman associates still based in PBRUMEN. The foundation for this activity is quite tenuous as a result of a variety of factors which make it difficult to arrange sea rendezvouses in the absence of radio contact. Several trips have been made to the Anguila Key area for this purpose, the last of which was supported by KUBARK and was called Operation Antonico I. This attempt was unsuccessful due to the failure of the inside contact to appear. It developed that the woman and child who were to be exfiltrated on this operation appeared in the JMWAVE area two days later, having obtained permission to leave PBRUMEN by air. They carried the message that someone had stolen the port chief's personal boat as a result of which the inside contact was unable to depart on schedule due to the implementation of temporary restrictions until the theft had been investigated. She said the next rendezvous was scheduled for 12 August, however imminent bad weather forestalled any chance of making this rendezvous. The effort to establish contact continues on the basis that, once a commo system can be set up, it will be comparatively easy to establish further rendezvouses and thus develop ratlines into the north coast.

5. Coincidentally with the above AMDENIM-1 is continuing his efforts to come up with radio operator candidates and to obtain candidates for infiltration. Based upon past experience this effort is being made more selective in that the need for more self sufficient personnel is greater than ever. The increasing difficulty of covering people inside makes it necessary to reduce the size of the infiltration parties and to have people who can withstand the rigors of existing on minimum supplies until they can establish themselves with natives who are willing to provide them with a base of operations. Most of the people who are willing to infiltrate at this point are of the type who want immediate action and are unwilling to take the time to establish a clandestine base from which they can methodically develop the assets in place who are essential to the growth and refinement of a resistance base. He has a number of people on tap who are qualified as candidates for small guerrilla teams, but who are not capable of maintaining themselves clandestinely until the time for guerrilla action arrives.

6. FUNDS EXPENDED:

04

a. $200. was given to Heriberto SARDINAS Campo as maintenance until his clearance comes through. It is intended that SARDINAS will be an investigator of operational leads and an assistant to AMDENIM-1 in the handling of his fishermen and operational candidates.

b. $300. was given to AMDENIM-1 for passage to the widow of AMGLAD-1. He is the channel for this payment until such time as HQs arrives at a settlement figure and this obligation can be disposed of.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-5212

c. $325. was given to AMDENIM-1 in support of Operation Antonico I, which operation is described under paragraph 4.

7. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: AMDENIM-1 has provided a number of memoranda on developments within the various exile groups in the JMWAVE area, none of which qualify as intelligence information but all of which contribute to the Station's better understanding of the local politics. Specifically, he has provided info on the political beliefs and background of most of the PBRUMEN exiled labor leaders and the activities of the Bequer group. He has also been helpful in clarifying the picture as to the movements within the UR at this time while the Station is trying to determine how best to organize this group in order to be able to take over its more worthwhile features without becoming unduly committed to giving it special prominence in the exile community. He is being counted on to help bring the UR into the AMBUD-1 organization as a means of creating the appearance of greater unity among the exile community.

8. COMMENTS AND PLANS: While no spectacular achievements are resulting from AMDENIM-1's efforts at this point he is steadily becoming more and more susceptible to KUBARK control and more professional in his efforts. A recent example is the critique he gave his fishermen for not realizing more information out of the refugees they met at Anguila Key while waiting for their inside contact. They had failed to adequately debrief two young men, who had succeeded in surviving in PBRUMEN for over two months on their own, on the basis that they were too young to be knowledgeable. As it turned out the two refugees had used the cover of sponge salesmen and had been able to travel from Havana to Santiago de Cuba without being stopped once. On learning of this, AMDENIM-1 was reminded of a good cover he has heard about, namely fighting cock fanciers, which activity seems to be on the increase as a result of the greater amount of spare time available to the people. The sport is actually becoming a year around proposition rather than being restricted to the winter months as in the past. It is planned to have AMDENIM-1 continue his present pursuits on the basis that he is free to move as the Station desires and can have an overall constructive effect on the AMBUD-1 organization at the time desired. He will continue his efforts with the fishermen and will provide candidates for infiltration as they become available and can be accepted by the Station. Operation Antonico III is scheduled for 27 August using a Magnolia (boat) to establish contact with fishermen living on a key in the Caibarien area. There is a possibility that he will journey to Jamaica to make contact with an old associate who is now a prominent member of the PBRUMEN government as a means of eliciting information on current regime policy and plans.

END OF DISPATCH

FORM 5-60 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

571
DATE : 24 NOV 61
TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMBAR
ACTION : BELL 10
INFO : ~~COP~~, WH 5, S/C 2

PA

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

NOV 25 0309Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 27533

DIR INFO WAVE CITE BARR 0184

IN27533

JMZIP KUSODA KUDESK

REF A. DIR 25431 (OUT 72120)*
B. BARR 0173 (IN 23609)

1. ONE OF [MRS GEDDES] ASSOCIATES PER REF B, ONE ANTONIO CUESTA, FORMER CREWMEMBER TEJANA III FRIEND OF AMDENIM-1.

2. SOURCE OF INFO REF B IS [GEORGE ROPPINO,] LOCAL BUSINESS CONTACT. BELIEVE VERY RELIABLE.

3. [MRS GEDDES] HAS NOT RETURNED HOWEVER CUESTA CONTINUES TO MAKE INQUIRIES RE BOAT.

4. FYI AMDENIM-4 REPORTS CUESTA MAY RETURN PBRUMEN SOON.

5. A-4 NOT AWARE BARR INTEREST [MRS GEDDES.]

06 05 06 06

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED FULLEST DETAILS RE AMBEND-2 CONTACTING BOAT DEALER AT BARR ON BEHALF TWO CUBANS IN ATTEMPT PURCHASE HIGH SPEED BOAT.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4/00

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) AELADLE

FROM: SR/CI/K -[Cuils]03

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 15 Nov 65

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI/R and A				For your retention.
2. TRHall	[illegible] 17		[illegible]	
3. RGRocca	17/11	17/11	2	
4.				
5. C/CI	18 NOV 1965			
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. CI/SIG	10 Jan		[illegible]	
10. Mrs. E____.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

201-99,788

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1/p/

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

02

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 1060
AELADLB

DOI : 1961 - 1963 or 1964

02

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. 02 AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. 02 AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

1. Source transited Helsinki in May 1961, at which time he obtained a visa at the Soviet Embassy from one KLIMOV. Beginning shortly after Christmas 1961 and continuing on and off for the next three months, Source was interrogated by the KGB in Moscow about his contacts with the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki. Source prepared a written report giving in detail the physical description of all KGB officers who had met him in Helsinki.

2. In 1963 or 1964 Source was told by the KGB that it was unlikely he would ever be assigned to the United States as a Soviet who had defected in Helsinki could personally identify Source.

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - AELADLB
1 - DC/SR/CI
1 - SR/CI/X
1 - SR/CI/I

03
SR/CI/I:HIMason:mjc

Frank,
After further research + lengthy discussions, AESTORAGE + AESAMSHU, PROTECT the "AE" Digraph only.
21 Apr 98

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISS

3/pv

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

7 SECRET

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : BONN
ACTION: C/EE 3
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/SR 3, S/C 2

(EYES ONLY)

S E C R E T 251550Z IN66996 25 JUN 1963

DIR INFO MUNI FRAN BRLN CITE BONN 4798

RYBAT 01 UPHILL 01 UJRANDON AELADLE

REF A DIR 48717 Being cabled

B EGOV 3194

RE PARA 3 REF A, SINCE 01 UPHILL ALREADY AWARE EXISTENCE THIS CASE THROUGH SUMMARY BASED ON REF B AND JOINTLY PASSED 01 UPHILL/CAVATA, SUGGEST IT MORE APPROPRIATE TO REFER 01 UPHILL DIRECT TO 01 CAVATA/ASBV ON BASIS LATTER 24 SERVICES INTERROGATED AELADLE IN DETAIL ON BACKGROUND. DO NOT FEEL KUBARK SHOULD MIDDLEMAN EXCHANGE OF INFO BETWEEN 11, 24 GERMAN SERVICES IN CASE AFFECTING GERMAN SECURITY AND INVOLVING INFORMATION OBTAINED BY 29 BFV FROM AELADLE.

S E C R E T

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

9/rd

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

MAY 31 4 15 PM '63

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. EE/G/CE	3E 19	5 JUN 1963	18/6	
2.				
3. C/CI/SIG			19 June	BDo
4. Evans			26	e
5. [illegible]			7. VII 63	
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

1. Xcopy to DC/CI; C/SR/CI, to initialed, on 4 June 63

MICROFILMED
JUN 4 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1-3: I understand you are collecting such items against the day we may have access to AELADLE again.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-99285

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

14-00000

1177-555/N-5?. 55?/FRAN EGNA 25831 FOLLOWS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM

TO CHIEF, EE

INFO COS/G, SR, FOB

FROM CHIEF OF BASE, BONN

SUBJECT REDCAP LCIMPROVE AELADLE
AELADLE LEAD

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
JUN 4 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. DURING A MEETING WITH 06 WEYDE ON 21 MAY 63 HE REFERRED TO HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO 06 DEBRIEF AELADLE. HE STATED THAT ON ONE OCCASION, WHILE HE AND DR. MEIER WERE RIDING IN A CAR WITH AELADLE, AELADLE CASUALLY REFERRED BY NAME TO A KGB OFFICER PRESENTLY ASSIGNED IN GERMANY, COMMENTING THAT HE KNEW THE INDIVIDUAL VERY WELL AND KNEW THAT HIS POLITICAL VIEWS WERE THE SAME AS HIS OWN, BUT THAT WESTERN INTELLIGENCE SHOULD LEAVE THE INDIVIDUAL ALONE AS HE WOULD PROBABLY ONE DAY MAKE THE SAME DECISION AS AELADLE ON HIS OWN.

2. BY THE TIME 06 WEYDE REALIZED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT AELADLE WAS SAYING THE NAME HAD SLIPPED BY AND NEITHER HE NOR 06 DR. MEIER WAS ABLE, OR FELT 06 HE 06 COULD, ASK FOR THE NAME AGAIN. AFTE LEAVING AELADLE BOTH WEYDE AND MEIER TRIED TO RECALL THE NAME OF TH INDIVIDUAL BUT COULD ONLY AGREE THAT THE NAME BEGAN WITH AN ''A''. IN REVIEWING THE PRESENT SOVIETS ASSIGNED IN THE GFR WHOSE NAMES BEGIN ~~WITH~~ ''A'' 06 WEYDE TENDS TO THINK THE NAME MENTIONED MIGHT HAVE BEEN AKHLUYEV (201-294348), ALTHOUGH HE IS FAR FROM CERTAIN ON THIS POINT.

3. WE HAVE VERY LIMITED INFORMATION IN OUR FILES ON AKHLUYEV AND NONE INDICATING KGB AFFILIATION. HE ARRIVED AT THE STM ON 16 FEBRUARY 61 ALONG WITH HIS WIFE, IS CARRIED BY THE BFV AS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE TRADE MISSION, AND RESIDES WITHIN THE 29 TRADE MISSION BUILDING.

4. THE ABOVE LEAD, ALTHOUGH VERY SKETCHY, APPEARS DEFINITELY WORTH PURSUING AND WE WONDER IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO QUERY AELADLE SOME MANNER. 06 WEYDE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT AELADLE DESIRED TO PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL FROM ANY INTELLIGENCE APPROACHES BASED ON HIS INFORMATI SO HE HAS PROBABLY NOT SUBMITTED ANY DETAILS. IT MAY, HOWEVER, PROVE PROFITABLE TO REVIEW WITH AELADLE AGAIN SOME OF THE SOVIETS ASSIGNED IN WEST GERMANY AND WORK IN ALL THE ''A'' NAMES. AELADLE MIGHT THUS GIVE SOME INFORMATION WHICH WOULD HELP US TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL HE MENTIONED IN THE CAR. PLS ADVISE IF THIS IS POSSIBLE

INDEX

Lester S. Redmiles
LESTER S. REDMILES

201-99733

DISTRIBUTION

3 EE
1 SR
2 COS/G
2 FOB
BY POUCH
1 EE

CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
24 MAY 63 TCR-	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
EGNA-25831

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

8/PV

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY 30-1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	212013Z	DIRECTOR	931493

CONF: SE 8 INFO: FILE 1/(RN) EUR 8, C14, 056, 056/IC2, SIA2, IS/EG2, C/OPS

14-3

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 27
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: [STOCKHOLM.Y]

UNINTEL CKTOP TIBLOCK Y

14-3

REF: [STOCKHOLM] 19576 [IN 067262] 03

1. WE HAVE BEGUN CHECKING WITH NOSENKO.[PD]IPPERS 19 AND 20. AND[PD]LADLE RE WALLENBERG AND WILL CABLE OR TELEPOUCH RESULTS AS RECEIVED. WE EXPECT TO BE FINISHED BY MID-NOVEMBER.Y

02

2. FILE: 201-5935. E2 IMPDET.H

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SE/CI/X
C/CI/RA/E
E/SC/S

C/IRA/I, OS

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-099788
DO NOT DESTROY

DATE: 20 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: [BARBARA BRYAN]EW
UNIT: SE/X/EU 03
EXT: 1049

DC/E/NW
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/SE/X/EU [R T Olen] 03
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

4/820

OUTGOING MESSAGE 30 1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

SECRET

STAFF 101620Z DIRECTOR 940966

0 DISSEM BY: 2

CONF: C-8 INFO: FILE , -8 OSG 0

0 PER

14-3 C-1, 2. OSG/ -2 0 #

TO: [STOCKHOLM] Y 2 ,

UNINTEL CKTOP TIBLOCK Y

REF: DIRECTOR 931493 Y

1. QUERIED [PD] DIPPERS 19 AND 20, [PD] LADLE AND [redacted] [PD] DONOR RE WALLENBERG WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS Y

02 02 02

2. FILE: 201-5925. E2 IMPDET H

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

03

SE/CI/X [Wm Howard]

DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1976 BAB
ORIG: [BARBARA BRYAN] EW
UNIT: SE/X/EU 03
EXT: 1749

C/CI/R&A/E

E/SC/S

DC/E/NW

CI/R&A/E CTS

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-099788
DO NOT DESTROY

[R J Allen] 03
C/SE/X/EU

7/80

OUTGOING MESSAGE

0 0 0 0 27-1 1 1

SECRET

STAFF 122026Z DIRECTOR 926355

CONF: SE8 INFO: FILE I-W EUR8 CI4 OS6/IC OSG [illegible]62 9B

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

14-3

TO: [STOCKHOLM]Y

ENINTEL TIBLOCK CKLEG Y

14-3

REF: [STOCKHOLM] 19480 |IN 052827|Y

1. AS BEST WE CAN DETERMINE, THERE NO BOOKS CURRENTLY IN THE MILL ON WALLENBERG CASE.Y

02

2. PER OUR RECORDS, [PD]LADLE AND NOSENKO HAVE NOT BEEN QUERIED RE WALLENBERG. THIS CAN BE DONE, IF YOU WISH.Y

3. FILE: 201-005925. E2 IMPDET.H

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SE/CI/X

CI/RA/E

E/SC/S

CI/RA/ICTS

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-099788
DO NOT DESTROY

DATE: 7 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: [BARBARA BRYAN:EU]
UNIT: SE/X/EU 03
EXT: 2049

DC/EUR/

C/SE/X/EU [ ] 03

5/80

OUTGOING MESSAGE 26-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TIME GROUP 092240Z CITE DIRECTOR MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 716714

CONF. C/OP 2 INFO: FILE IP/AN EUR 8 SE 8

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 53
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER

14-6

TO: PRIORITY [COPENHAGEN.Y]

CKTOP [NEFEATHER] Y 02

REF: A. [COPENHAGEN] 16539 (IN 628011) 14-6

B. DIRECTOR 274523

C. [COPENHAGEN] 11904 Y ~~(IN NUMBER FURNISHED ON REQUEST)~~ (625439) 14-6

1. THE SITUATION CONCERNING [PDLADLE] REMAINS THE SAME AS REF B. IT IS STILL NOT IN BKHERALD'S INTEREST TO PUBLISH MATERIAL FROM [PDLADLE] WHO HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN SURFACED. FYI, THERE IS ADDITIONAL FACTOR OF HIGH LEVEL BKHERALD LIAISON EQUITIES RE [PDLADLE] INPUT AS WELL AS HIS PERSONAL WISH REMAIN ANONYMOUS. THEREFORE, ARTICLE CONTAINED REF C OR ANY PORTION THEREOF SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE PUBLISHED.Y

2. DEFER TO STATION'S JUDGMENT RE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON OPERATIONAL CLIMATE OF PUBLICATION PARA 1 REF A [NEFEATHER] BACKGROUND PIECES. E2 IMPDET.d

RECORD COPY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

C/CIOG
SE/X/EU
SE/CI/X
SE/SA G E.Q. Myers 03
E/SC/D

9 JUL 75
201-99788

03

DATE: 9 JULY 1975
ORIG: E. TSIKERDANOS
UNIT: C/CIOG/SO
EXT: 1791

AC/EUR/
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CI STAFF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 008885

10/90

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

14 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CIA Defector Watch List
For The Secret Service

03 1. On 13 June 1973 at 1100 hours 03 a meeting attended by Mr. Jack Shaffer and Mr. Ernest Weidul, CDC; Mr. Jack Friedlander, SB; Mr. Negoy and Mr. Radulovich, DCS; Dr. Jerry Post, Psychiatric Staff and Mr. Tsikerdanos 03 of the CI Staff was held at the CDC offices to discuss and decide which of those defectors for whom we have a legal responsibility should be watched during the BREZHNEV visit.

2. The Psychiatric Staff, SB and CDC had prepared lists of those defectors and others whom they felt were unpredictable, unstable and/or violent. The following are the names of those submitted (including comments made and the agreed on position the Agency would take):

A. Antanas BUTKUS (AEMIGALE) 01 was the only defector listed by the KGB on their watch list. BUTKUS works for the RFE in 10 Alexandria. He is noted as being non-violent and not likely to cause trouble. His wife who is studying to be a medical assistant is bitter towards the Soviets but also unlikely to cause trouble. He is a publicized defector. It was decided to pass his name routinely to the Secret Service.

B. ZAVOROSKIY (AEGOLD) 01 who is in Seattle 10. He is the former sea captain who is a heavy drinker. He does not want to go to jail and therefore is likely to avoid trouble. It was decided to pass his name to the Secret Service.

[illegible] file

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

71BR

01

C. SAKHAROV (AECLUSTER) a reformed drunk who is now reformed. 10 He apparently was to begin school in Los Angeles on the 18th of June. He is passive. DCS will monitor him.

01 10

D. PETROV (AELENIS) Chicago. He also is a reformed drunk who is a straight A student. On the 16th of June (vacation) he will drive to Cape Cod to fish and relax. No problems.

10

E. CHALLY (Seattle) travels with an anti-Soviet crowd. He is unpredictable and has a bad temper. He shot a cab driver in Seattle last year. His name will be highlighted to the Secret Service.

01 10

F. TROFIMOV (AEFISSION) Bloomington, Indiana. He is also a drunk and a passer of bad checks. He is often in trouble. CA Staff apparently with the retirement of Jameson has no contact. When TROFIMOV is drunk he calls the Soviets at the UN Mission and talks of re-defection. He may possibly be in New York now living with two homosexual friends. Notify the Secret Service. 03

01 10

G. OGANESYAN (AEGAIN) Los Angeles. No passage. On 14 June 1973 Mr. Negoy notified me 01 that AEGAIN was being checked by the police in Los Angeles. This may be in connection with something else.

01

H. GOLENIEWSKI (AEVISION). He is a real nut who aspires to the Romanoff crown. Notify the Secret Service.

I. NOSENKO (AEDONOR). No passage to the Secret Service. Note that [redacted], DR Charles BOHRER, [redacted], recommended that NOSENKO be added to the watch list for the Secret Service (memo attached).

J. GOLITZYN (AELADLE). Note that Mr. Osborne and Dr. Charles Bohrer both agreed that AELADLE be added to the watch list (memos attached). Both Mr. Friedlander and I sharply disagreed with this viewpoint. Mr. Shaffer 03 requested that I check it out with Mr. Angleton. Mr. Angleton later emphatically concurred with withholding AELADLE's name from the list. I passed this to Mr. Shaffer later in the day. 03

10 K. BIMBLI (AEPLEBE) 03 an Albanian who lives in Chicago. He is very anti-CIA but not anti-Soviet. No passage.

L. VAGUINE (AECRUTCH) 01 phycisist, very stable who is doing well. No passage.

10 M. TEREKHOV (AESTUNT) 01 space scientist in Texas. Very stable. He has rich relatives in 10 Pittsburgh. No passage.

N. KOCHANSKI (BEGOOD) 01. 10 Polish who is in 10 Texas. He was recruited in Oslo. He works in the Dallas Medical Center. 08 He is vindictive and unpredictable. He has a son in Poland. 11 BEGOOD 01 recently wrote President Nixon about his son. He refuses to meet with CIA or the FBI. It was decided to add his name to the list for the Secret Service.

O. SEREGIN who CIA is in touch with came to the U.S. under the Refugee Act. CIA has no responsibility but we are in contact with him in New York. His wife is in Russia. His name will be passed.

P. MARININ also came into the U.S. under the Refugee Act. He has a wife in Bulgaria. CIA is in contact with him in Buffalo, New York. His name will be passed.

141BR

Q. TERESHOKOV who works for Radio Liberty. He is stable. No passage.

R. MYZYUK - An oceanographer who came into the U.S. through the IRC. He works for the Logos Development Company. He is anti-Agency but very stable and sober. No passage.

3. Mr. Friedlander and I were in agreement on all the cases. He backed me up on AELADLE, AEDONOR and those other defectors in whom we had invested large sums of money, time and effort to conceal.

4. Copies of this memo (with attachments) will be placed in the 201 files of AELADLE, AEDONOR, AELENIS (no attachments), AECLUSTER, AEGAIN and AESTUNT.

01 01 01 01

03

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
SA/C/CI/OPS

Attachments: As stated

51BR

1. Dr. Charles Bohrer recommends (subject to Howard Osborne's concurrence) that the two following defectors be added to the Brezhnev visit watch list:

a. Anatoliy GOLITZYN (AELADLE). Delusions of grandeur; expected much more from the U.S. Government than he in fact received in terms of personal recognition. Frustrated, reclusive. May take some action to "get even."

b. Yuri NOSSENKO (AEDONOR). Not seriously neurotic, but because of the way in which he was handled he has reason to be vengeful, and may take the Brezhnev visit as an opportunity to embarrass us.

1. Howard Osborn's recommendations for the Brezhnev "watch list":

   a. Delete NOSSENKO. He's happily rehabilitated, well disposed toward CIA and the USG, well adjusted. Not a threat.

   b. GOLENIEWSKI. Absolutely nutty. Put him at the top of the list. He hates the Soviet Government because it's depriving him of the Romanov crown jewels.

   c. Anatoliy GOLITZYN. Agree with Bohrer. Put him on the list.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

SBSR-843

23 February 1973

CI INFORMATION REPORT

SUBJECT: Anatoliy Mikhaylovich GOLITSYN

SOURCE: AESMASH

REFERENCE: SBSR-547

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS: Any further dissemination must be coordinated with C/SB/CI/P.

COMMENTS: Attached are SB requirements based on Reference, and a report containing Source's reply to those requirements.

ORIGINATOR: Frank McNulty, SB/CI/P

DISTRIBUTION: 23

2 - IP/AN/SB for 74-6-756/4
x-ref to ~~201-294855~~
2 - SB/CI/P 201-079755
1 - SB/CI/I
1 - SB/CI/X
1 - SB/CI/R
1 - SB/COPS
1 - C/CI/OPS
1 - SB/IO
1 - SB/I/USSR
1 - SB/XO
1 - SB/X/EUR
1 - SB/RIS
1 - EUR/SC

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622

CONTENTS CLASSIFIED BY 055348

2/BR

SECRET

Requirements on Remaining Source Reports

Anatoliy Mikhaylovich GOLITSYN @ KLIMOV

05

[TEPLYAKOVA] did not in fact meet GOLITSYNA as previously stated but only knew of her and GOLITSYN from her parents.

2. Source is quite clear about GOLUBEV's instructions and had not confused the names of GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. GOLUBEV had been sent a directive from Moscow setting out his main tasks. This was couched in somewhat rough, direct words in order to put him on the right lines. Source did not deduce from what was in this directive that the K.G.B. believed that either man was living in England. It certainly stated that NOSENKO had visited England after his defection and that GOLITSYN had visited England several times. Source knows only what GOLUBEV told him and what was in the directive; he has no idea why the K.G.B. believed that either of the two defectors had visited the U.K.

SECRET

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN

1/BR

Anatoliy Mikhaylovich GOLITSYN @ [illegible]

Para. [illegible] : It is stated here that Source's co[illegible], while visiting her parents in [Helsinki] 10, heard GOLITSYN's story (presumably this means his defection) and also met his wife. The word order implies that she met Mrs. GOLITSYN after hearing about the defection, but this could not be, since Mrs. GOLITSYN defected with her husband. Please clarify this and give details of the GOLITSYN story she heard. What were the dates of her visit to [Helsinki]? 10

Para. 3-b : The wording of this paragraph is almost identical to much of paragraph 3-b of Source's report on Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, regarding GOLUBEV's instructions, KGB belief that both defectors had visited England, KGB attempts to locate them, etc. The main difference as given in these reports is that NOSENKO is said to have been in the UK in 1965, and GOLITSYN "several times". Since NOSENKO did not visit the UK in 1965 but we understand that GOLITSYN did make several visits, we wonder (in view of the strong similarities in wording) if there may be a garble in Source's reporting. Does Source have any idea as to why the KGB believed either of the two defectors had visited the UK?

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WE

INFO
Chief, SR

FROM
Chief of Station, Helsinki 14-1

SUBJECT
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE/AELADLE - Tabe Maria Ingeborg SLIOOR (201-768030)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
19-1 HELS-3059, 2 June 65
REF: OPHA-7261, 4 June 65
22

ACTION: FYI

1. Subject was interviewed for an immigrant visa on 7 July 65. Unfortunately Clastonbury could not be present because of other business. The interviewing officer was briefed prior to the meeting and faced the applicant with a series of questions regarding her association with Soviets and any approaches that may have been made to her in light of her unusual life. In response to these questions, we are told that SLIOOR gave thoughtful consideration to each question and probably truthfully replied that although she has met several Soviet diplomats, no approaches for cooperation were made to her. She realized the full implication of the questions and made no attempts to be evasive. Subject was given her visa immediately after the interview.

2. Attachment 1 is a translation of the VALIMK traces on subject. 01 As noted in the traces SLIOOR was an acquaintance of Grigoriy GOLUB (201-150156) and Georgiy STENING born 29 June 1913 in Moscow (aka Georgi STEINING, 22 OPHA-1807, 30 July 56 and OPHW-1456, 9 October 56). These names were not used in the interview. 22

3. Attachment 2 is a thermofax copy of SLIOOR's visa; Attachment 3, birth record; Attachment 4, marriage certificate.

4. From subject's visa application her address in the U.S. is listed as Fort Hood, Texas.

WALTER R. CLASTONBURY

Attachments:
as stated

Distribution:
3 - WE w/atts
2 - SR w/atts
2 - Hela w/atts
14-1

Orig. copy filed 201-768030

201-150156

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	22 OPHA-7329	14 July 65
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
201-150156	SECRET	201-768030

818A

DISPATCH

TO
Chief, SR via Chief, [illegible]

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, [Helsinki] 14-1

SUBJECT
Ivan Yefimovich SERGEYEV (201-259447)
- Petr Nikitovich SAVELYEV (201-140400)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

22
REF: [OFHA]-4656, 18 June 1965

1. Appearing as part of Section 12 of the SPR on Mikhail Vasilyevich MURASHOV (201-205159), forwarded with reference, are the following entries. [Helsinki] Station would like to clarify some of the information previously reported by the Station which undoubtedly has led Headquarters to the conclusion contained in the second paragraph immediately below.

When told that Subject (Mikhail Vasilyevich MURASHOV 201-205159) has been posted to Finland, Source (a Soviet defector) commented that Subject (MURASHOV) would probably be responsible for penetrating the police.

(This speculation by Source is probably not correct since this responsibility belongs to Peter Nikitovich SAVELYEV, who arrived in Helsinki about the same time that Subject did, to replace Ivan Yefimovich SERGEYEV.)

2. Petr Nikitovich SAVELYEV (201-140400), Counsellor of Embassy and Head of the Press Section. SAVELYEV filled the Counseller slot vacated by Vasiliy [illegible]ovich SOLOMKO (201-142338) who dealt with trade. We do not recall the Chief of the Press Section prior to SAVELYEV's arrival. However, SAVELYEV was NOT the replacement for Ivan SERGEYEV (201-259447) as stated in [OFHA]-5447, 13 February 1962.

22 3. We doubt very much that SAVALYEV was involved in police penetration. His contacts in Finland (also in Norway) were for the most part with the press 22 ([OFHA]-6610, 22 May 1964, etc.) and he circulated freely in that media. SAVALYEV did not speak Finnish, despite the fact the [VALINKS] informed us he spoke fairly good Finnish ([OFHA]-5447) which was probably an initial assessment on their part. 22

4. Although a GRU suspect during his tour in Norway, his

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-259447

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
15 July 65

DATE DISPATCHED
15 July 65

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
22 [OFHA]-7331

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-140400

Galub Grigoriy Ye.

815R

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

activities in Helsinki at first appeared to be those of a KGB co-optee, and later more obviously those of a KGB officer in the CA field. Walter R. CLASPONBURY's contacts with SAVALYEV took place either in press circles or in the presence of Aleksey SHUMAKOV (201-203095) whom we suspect of being the deputy resident in Helsinki. Thus the milieu in which SAVALYEV operated, we tend to place him in the KGB category rather than GRU.

5. SAVALYEV, who left for home leave on 10 July 1964 and never returned, was replaced by KGB officer Albert AKULOV (201-232590), first secretary and press attache.

6. Concerning Ivan Yefimovich SERGEYEV (201-259447), SERGEYEV replaced KGB officer Grigoriy Ye. GOLUB (201-150156), Chief of the Consular Section. After the defection of AELADLE/1, this Section was in confusion and the exact slot-for-slot replacements are not known. In our best judgment, SERGEYEV was replaced by Anatoliy PAVLOV (201-331811) who departed 2 March 1963 because of ill health. PAVLOV was temporarily replaced by KGB officer Boris Vasilyevich PERELETOV ostensibly assigned to the Cultural Section (22 OFHA-6483, 6 March 1964) who departed 31 March 1964 also because of ill health. PERELETOV was replaced for consular responsibilities by KGB officer Feliks Dmitryevich KARASEV (201-736991).

OLIVIA R. CLEMICK

Distribution:
3 - WE
2 - SR

21BR

SECRET

17 June 1963

CONTACT REPORT: VASLOUCH/2, DI UBALDO, and DOREMOSE
DATES : 19 & 20 May 1963
PLACE : Sands Hotel
Miami Beach, Florida

1. DOREMOSE and DI UBALDO arrived by taxi at the Sands Hotel at approximately 2330 hours and in the lobby passed the Subject, her traveling companion, Mrs. DI SILVA (mother of Brazilian charge GAMBOA) and Mr. & Mrs. Kurt PLASTEREK (See Contact Report dated 3 May 1963) with whom they had spent the evening. While the two case officers were negotiating rooms with the desk clerk, VASLOUCH/2 made a point of asking for her key which indicated her room number and the case officers were therefore able to get rooms on the floor just below hers. (NOTE: Our contacts with VASLOUCH/2 were dependent upon the amount of time she could spend away from her unwitting traveling companion.) As previously arranged, DI UBALDO went to the Subject's hotel room at 0700 hours the next morning and brought her to his room where the debriefing took place. At the outset DOREMOSE was introduced as William Cline and it was explained that DI UBALDO was moving out of the operation. This initial meeting which lasted until 0900 hours was confined primarily to two topics; one, VASLOUCH/1's contact with and cultivation of Francisco SANCHEZ who is charged with some road building projects

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-285412

in Oriente Province and who is a close associate of Dr. Rene VALLEJO, a key advisor to CASTRO and two, the recent social cultivation of the VASLOUCHES by an officer of the Soviet Embassy. The facts developed on the second subject are as follows: For several years VASLOUCH/2 had been contacted at the Brasilian Embassy by Valentine S. LOGUINOV, an attache at the Soviet Embassy. These contacts took place every two or three months when LOGUINOV would bring visa requests from his Embassy. The last of these business contacts was in February of this year. On 27 April, while VASLOUCH/2 was in Mexico City, LOGUINOV phoned the Brasilian Embassy asking for VASLOUCH/2 and when informed that she was not in, requested her home phone number (unlisted) from the girl answering the phone, Hilda BOLIVAR (girl friend of SANCHEZ). The girl refused to give out the number. at 1000 on 1 May, LOGUINOV apparently having acquired the number from the consular list, called VASLOUCH/2 at her home only to be told that VASLOUCH/2 was working that morning at the Brasilian Embassy. He finally got VASLOUCH/2 on the telephone at 1600 hours and stated that the date was an important holiday for him and that he wished to visit the VASLOUCHES with his family to bring a small present for VASLOUCH/2. LOGUINOV and family arrived at VASLOUCH/2's home at 1800 hours and stayed until 2100 hours. The present was a bottle of "Red

X

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Moscow" perfume. The evening was confined to small talk. On 5 May, LOGUINOV again called and made a dinner date with VASLOUCH/2 and her husband for 10 May. LOGUINOV and wife picked up the VASLOUCHES in their private car and the evening (2130 - 0030) was spent at the Capri Restaurant. Because of the noise from the floor show, again little of note was discussed. The cost of the meal was approximately $10. At the restaurant, LOGUINOV invited the VASLOUCHES to attend a reception and showing of the Soviet passenger plane, TU-114, to be held at 12:30 on 14 May. VASLOUCH/2 did not attend because she was leaving for Miami. When VASLOUCH/1 telephoned VASLOUCH/2 in Miami on 17 May, he mentioned, in German, that Valentine had again dropped by. From these contacts with LOGUINOV the following had been observed by VASLOUCH/2. He is approximately 32 years old, speaks fluent Spanish with just a slight accent and a little English. He has been in Cuba three years and was fluent in Spanish when he arrived. He is approximately 6 feet tall, weighs about 185 lbs., strongly built, has blue eyes, blond wavy hair, concave forehead, good teeth, and dresses well with coat and necktie. He drives himself in an American car (Dodge?) with non-diplomatic plates. He smokes and drinks in moderation. He has a three and one-half year old son, an eleven year old daughter and his parents and his wife's parents are living in Moscow. His wife's name is Aleksandra, she is attractive and works in the consular office. Her Spanish is poor. He was aware that VASLOUCH/2 had visited Moscow recently and also knew that the VASLOUCHES daughter was with the Brazilian Embassy in

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

Moscow. Also that VASLOUCH/1 had recently been back to Finland. One thing that stayed in V/2's mind was that in conversation with LOGUINOV he referred on three occasions to the possibility that their daughter might very well marry a Russian, a point that might relate to any operational approach LOGUINOV may make to the VASLOUCHES. V/2 stated that LOGUINOV was the only one that had ever come to the Brazilian Embassy regarding visas. She also stated that over the past years she has called his office four or five times regarding visas and has never been able to reach him. V/2 also recalled that during their outing at the Capri Restaurant LOGUINOV stated that he was planning to rent a beach house and was looking forward to the VASLOUCHES spending time with him and his wife there during the summer months. V/1 inquired as to the whereabouts of the former PRAVDA correspondent, Borovsky, and was told he was in Moscow.

2. The Finnish Ambassador in Washington has been kept informed on LOGUINOV's advances toward the SLOUCHES. His only comment at this point was that "they are after something." V/2 has advised GAMBOA whose reaction has been to encourage the relationship in hopes of acquiring some political information from LOGUINOV. The Finnish Ambassador also ~~recalled/that/during their/outing/at/~~ stated in his telephone conversation with V/2 in Miami that he had requested that the SLOUCHES installation be elevated and given diplomatic status. He expressed surprise that a copy of his letter to the Cuban Foreign Ministry had not

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

been received by V/1 and promised a special delivery copy of it to V/2 in Miami. Relating to this, V/2 stated to the C/O that in one of V/1's meetings with CORONA of the Foreign Office, CORONA stated that he was requesting Helsinki to raise the status of its representation in Havana and to post a charge there. V/2 was told by the C/O that after checking with Headquarters concerning LOGUINOV's background, specific guidance on how to handle the relationship would be forthcoming.

3. From SANCHEZ, V/1 elicited road building information which he had put on an overlay which was passed by V/2 (sent to SAS Reports). SANCHEZ had invited V/1 to Oriente Province with him in the near future to see some of his projects. Reluctantly we instructed V/2 to tell V/1 to turn down the invitation on grounds of ill health but to leave the way open for a similar invitation in the future. It was thought that this was best until we could assess LOGUINOV's interest in the VASLOUCHES. V/2 also passed the war names V/1 had assigned to his principalcontacts and a diagram of the Brazilian Embassy including measurements of the out building which DI UBALDO had discussed with V/2 in Mexico City relating to its possible use as a dead drop. A pamphlet entitled, List of Exports and Imports of Cuban Foreign Trade Enterprises, also was passed. (Sent to SAS/Reports.) A list of names passed showed numbers and some other data on those passengers which had departed Cuba in two Cubana flights to Brazil for the purpose of picking up the Cuban sports team in Brazil (sent to SAS/RB).

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

4. On 19 May DI UBALDO returned to Washington. DORENOSE met with V/2 on 20 May, from 0700 - 0900 hours. At this meeting, V/2 was given the KEYWAY sterile phone number and told that all future contact should be made to Cline using this number. She was also given our initial assessment of the significance of LOGUINOV's approach (the traces from Headquarters had still not been received). In our opinion there were three possibilities and two of them were unlikely. First, LOGUINOV's approach could be an innocent one and be merely for the purpose of establishing a friendship, an extension of this thought would be the possibility of his interesting in defecting. Given the age difference in the two couples and weighing other factors, this was considered unlikely. The second possibility is that the Soviets have been alerted, possibly by V/1's open code cable to Finland, to the SLOUCHES possible involvement with the Americans. This also is unlikely for had this been the case the last thing the Soviets would wish to do would be to alert the SLOUCHES to the fact that they were under suspicion and therefore bring about a cut back in their activities. (COMMENT: LOGUINOV's sudden and fairly intensive cultivation effort has had just this effect.) The third and most likely possibility is that the Soviets are cultivating V/2 for use as a penetration of the Brazilian Embassy. V/2 accepted the case officer's

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

assessment as valid and in keeping with her own thoughts. She was told that final guidance on this matter would be given her at a subsequent meeting to be held in the afternoon after DORENOSE had received the Headquarters traces. The discussion then went to the communications.

6. When the Subject stated that her husband was unable to bring out either the pads or his instructions on how to use the pads which had been given him in New York, it was decided to issue two reduced size OTP's concealed in a shaving kit. S/W instructions on the use of the OTP would be passed by BARKER in Mexico City. She was told that BARKER would be in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel in Mexico City at 0730 on 23 May. When they have recognized each other she should follow him from the Hotel. If BARKER is unable to make the contact he is to telephone her later in the day using the name BETO. Subject was told that we were unable to come up, as yet, with an extended dual-earphone set which she had requested, but this would be available for the next contact later in the summer.

7. Toward the end of the meeting, Subject passed translations she had made of notes given her by V/1 which he believed to be of intelligence interest. (They are included as Attachment A). Unfortunately, DORENOSE was unable to review these reports with her but she was pursuaded to turn over Finnish language notes and the carbon copy of V/1's letter to his ambassador (a translation of which is Attachment B). The C/O requested the name of a person in Helsinki who would have reason to write to V/1 but who is not doing so at the present time. She gave

automatic
downgrading and
declassification

the name of V/1's aunt, Kaisa RAIKKONEN. She was told that some of the incoming S/W in the future would be written in Finnish, mailed in Helsinki, and ostensibly come from this person. Subject stated that she would depart Miami by Guest Airlines on 22 May 1963. The meeting was conducted hurriedly and necessarily ~~did~~ concluded at 0900 hours. Plans were made for the Subject to return for a brief contact with DORENOSE between 1430 and 1600 hours after finding some excuse to get away from her companion.

8. Subject was unable to break away from her companion in time to make the scheduled meeting and when she telephoned to so notify DORENOSE she was erroneously informed by the hotel desk that DORENOSE had checked out. After some difficulty, DORENOSE was able to contact her and a brief meeting was held at 2100 hours. It was at this meeting that instructions were given V/2 to tighten up on their security siting the dangers of audio-surveillance and the necessity for great care when mailing the letters out. For her benefit, KUBARK security in dealing with her case was emphasized. She was also instructed to react with disbelief combined with indignation if a recruitment pitch was made to either of them. She was also urged not to incourage further social contact with the LOGUINOV's in hopes that LOGUINOV would lose interest. She was advised that her daughter should be encouraged to leave Moscow if the

Brazilian Ambassador is transferred in late fall. If this does not come off, when V/2 visits her daughter in the fall she should attempt, under some pretext, to have her daughter leave Russia. The case officer was careful not to alarm V/2 and to convey the impression that her daughter's present plight had no relation to her intelligence involvement with ODYOKE. On the contrary, she was very fortunate to have us to advise her on how best to deal with her problem. V/2 was concerned about her daughter because her daughter had met socially with an ODACID officer in Moscow named Richard Jacobs who has since been png'd by the Soviets. When asked about other contacts of her daughter's in Moscow she stated that her daughter was in love with one of the UAR Embassy secretaries who had left Moscow and was presently assigned in Tokyo. She mentioned that another UAR secretary stationed in Moscow named SALAH and the Consular, Aziz Hamza were acquaintances. Also a secretary of the Mexican Embassy named Armando CANTU. She mentioned that during her scheduled fall visit to see her daughter she had promised to take her daughter to Tokyo to visit her boy friend. This was complicated however because this would infuriate V/1 who is strongly against the daughter marrying a Moslem. Subject was given $50. to off-set taxi fares, the cost of an antenna, and for good will. The meeting was concluded at 2107 when Mrs. DE SILVA was scheduled to get out of the bathtub. Two other names of possible interest were

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

raised by V/2 during the contact. Eila HONKARALA, a Finnish female student in Havana and a rabid Communist and John RETTI, an English national met by V/2 in Mexico City. RETTI, a writer for the "Economist" and an employee of the BBC was once married to a Finn. RETTI was being assigned in Havana. His address in Mexico City: P.O. 1642 Mexico City 1, Mexico. Telephone number, 14-52-25.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

Attachment [illegible]

SECRET

1. Source: Blanca Nogueras Figero (subsource not indicated). Spare parts from England are sent to Monterey (Mexico), then to Yucatan and after that to Isles Majeras and from there the Cuban fisherman take them to the Isle of Pines.

2. Source: Francisco Sanchez, Cuban road construction engineer - in discussing procurement of replacement parts for his equipment stated if the Americans have a subsidiary factory, for example Catapillar, with a factory in Europe, the spare parts are sent to East Germany and from there to Cuba.

3. Source: Blanca - The Headquarters of the Russians is in a tunnel at 36th Street, No. 62 on the corner of Street 39. It has two entrances, one from the river and the other from the house of M. J. Diaz.

4. Source: Blanca - There is a Ilushin 28 in San Antonio de los Panos.

5. Source: Blanca - A former National Assembly (CO Note: or Cuban equivalent) member, Diaz Madrazo, stated that the refugee ship that went to Florida on 29 Apr carried two government agents, Jose Diaz (el cojo) and his wife Yolanda Cisneros, whose address is No. 7414 Avenue 15.

6. Orlando Puente, the private secretary [illegible] of former President Prio, approached GANTOA's mother in Miami on 8 May stating that before she departed the country he would give her the name of a Cuban associate of Prio who is in much trouble and wants asylum in the Brazilian Embassy.

7. Source: VASLOUCH/1 - on 4 May Eduardo Corona, Chief of the Occidental European Countries Office stated to SLOUCH/1 that he planned in the near future to give a luncheon for the Northern European diplomats and at that luncheon he would purpose that the Northern countries put on an exposition in Cuba covering each countries cultural and economic achievements.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

u

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

23 December 1927 41 Yrs old Born Moscow

Stationed in Havana from September 1960 until September 1963. Attache. In 1961 he toured Latin America with the Soviet Soccer team as escort and interpreter (probably with security functions as well). He arrived August 1965 as Third Secretary. He replaced NECHIPORENKO. His Spanish has been described as fluent with hardly any accent. His English is fair and is studying it now.

In March 1966, XX LICOZY/5 was told he would be handled in the future by L.

In response to L's claim that a radio had been stolen from him, a policeman was sent to his aprtment and L. ended the conversation by recruiting the policeman at the rate of 5000 Pesos per month. The policeman reported the incident and the Metropolitan District Police sanctioned a D/A op. The first and only recorded requirement given the policeman by L was for some Bio data on a Venezuelan who spent time in USSR.

L is friendly with YATSKOV, replaced him (he claims) as Consul General, (1966)

Shortly after Arab-Israeli War L tacitly XXXXXXXX admitted he believed that Egypt's charges of U.S. involvement on Irael's XXXX side were false. contrad. p. to U.S. (ambassador) at.

Then there's the one about Miss Elizabeth Duncan Wilde. L told her that he was ready to "go to the other side". He stated that he was afraid because the phones in both U.S. and Soviet Embassies were bugged. He asked if she would go to U.S. Embassy with his story. She consented and reporting stops here. **UNRESOLVED**

Late

Paul Dillon observed L and BARANOV in the area of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX a hotel where a meeting with Uriy DRUSS was to have taken place one night ago, taking pictures with an 8mm camera. BARANOV is a Soviet tech.

L pursued AMSLOUCH/3, daughter of a Finnish agent, both in Havana and in Moscow. His intentions XXXXXX were unknown, but could have been romantically XXXXXXXX inclined rather than professional.

L is an aggressive personality. With his fellow workers he is dictatorial and disdainful. He has been known to XXXX return to the Embassy thoroughly gassed, yelling and shouting and resulting in an altercation with the guard on duty. Other times he won't finish one drink. He is chauvinistic XXXX to his own race and deprecatory to other nationalities. A sneering attitude, boisterous and arrogant at times. He can be gentle at othertimes, has frequently labeled intelligent, XXXXXXX He is definitely crafty, although not particulary subtle. works fast, doesn't appear to try hard at cloaking his true intentions, either in conversation with others or in a recruitment attempt. He is tough as nails. His build is athletic, his appearance is ruggedly handsome. He appears confident, self-assured in relations with non-Soviets.

201-285412

The file is very difficult to follow. Items appear with no further mention. AMOUR?

Salient feature of file is that LOGINOV was never the object of consistent concentrated attention by anyone. There is virtually no reporting on the LICOZY/5----LOGINOV relationship. What there is implies that L/5 is uncooperative and nearly refuses to work with L.

SUMMARY

SUSCEPTIBILITY: Nothing in the conventional sense. If he is trying to tell us anything he is obviously trying to get our attention via a CI ploy with the intention of bringing us to him. He moves with confidence and near-impunity--certainly not like one who might be in trouble.

PROFESSIOANLISM: Not smooth and subtle nor particularly secure. But crafty, fast on his feet, makes fast decisions and then acts on them. Aggressive and ubiquitous. Socially active. Woman-chaser.

PERSONALITY: See above.

Should be leaving before another year and one-half. Has been there for three and one-half years.

See other similar cases.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

~~SECRET~~ 32

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

INFO FILE VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SR8, CI/IC2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 071903Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5837

7 Jan 66 29099

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE LICANNY-1

REF A HMMW 12821 AUG 64 filed 201-257138

B MEXI 5372 NOV 65 (IN 99634) *

1. DURING ROUTINE CONTACTS WITH PBSWING OFFICER DURING JAN SUBJ ADVISED HE IN CONTACT PAVEL YATSKOV (201-120123) AND VALENTIN LOGINOV (201-285412), BOTH SUSPECT KGB. SOVS ASKED HIM PREPARE TRAVEL INFO ON TRAINS AND SHIPS BETWEEN MEXICO, NEW YORK AND EUROPE. LOGINOV APPEARS FRIENDLY AND TOLD SUBJ HE HOPES THEY WILL BE FRIENDS.

2. PBSWING OFFICER TURNED SUBJECT OVER TO SIATION OFFICER TO WHOM AGREED ACT AS ACCESS AGENT LOGINOV. REQUEST HQS REPROCESS HIS POA.

S E C R E T * REF., LAURICLE

CFN 5837 -1 HMMW-12821 65 5372 65 PBSWING PAVEL YTASKOV 20.-120123 VALENTIN LOGINOV 201-285412 KGB SOVS NEW YORK EUROPE LOGINOV PBSWING LOGINOV HQS POA

BT

~~SECRET~~

201-285412

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XX MICROFILM

TO Chief, SRD

INFO Chief, WHD

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDWOOD
Unidentified Visitor to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LICALLA and LILYRIC reported an unidentified visitor to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City between 29 November and 3 December 1965. The visitor appears to be a Soviet; however, LIFIRE has not reported any unaccounted for Soviet to have visited Mexico during this period, nor was the presence of a Soviet visitor reported to the Station by any other source. He has not been seen since 3 December 1965.

2. According to LICALLA, the visitor was principally in contact with the cook, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich MUKHIN (201-293944), administrative assistant Stanislav Sergeyevich SILNIKOV (201-271103), guard Nikolay Ivanovich ZAKHAROV, code clerk Aleksandr Petrovich PAVLOV (201-761265), Third Secretary and known KGB officer Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH (201-343894), First Secretary and known KGB officer Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379) and Press Attache and known KGB officer Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139).

3. According to LILYRIC, the visitor was seen leaving the Soviet Embassy with MUKHIN, and later with Third Secretary and suspect KGB officer Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) on 30 November 1965. On 1 December he was seen leaving with MUKHIN and his wife, Commercial Counselor Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (201-243602) and chauffeur Anatoliy Pavlovich PRASHCHUKIN (201-735052) in the car normally driven by Pravda correspondent Vladimir Agafonovich DOLGOV (201-763035). On 2 December he was seen leaving with MUKHIN and his wife, ZAKHAROV, visitor Ferdinand Robertovich GINNO and

(continued)

Attachment:
1. As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
2 - SRD w/att hw
1 - WHD w/o/att
2 - File

Orig filed 50-8-10

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28001

DATE
5 January 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-285412

201-4-64

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-23001

Attache and suspect KGB officer Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (201-744341) in KORMUSHKIN's car. On 3 December he was seen leaving with MAHIN and PRASHCHIKIN.

4. Attached is a photograph of the visitor taken by LILYRIC.

5. Station Mexico would appreciate it if the attached photograph could be circulated at Headquarters for possible identification.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO:
FROM: Chief, SR via Chief, WH
SUBJECT: REDWOOD
Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-13985, 16 September 1965

Forwarded herewith is paragraph 9 (PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS) of summary traces in SPR format on Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) as promised to you in the above reference.

BHG
BRUCE H. GINTALAS

ATTACHMENT:
Paragraph 9 as stated above.

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. & 2-Chief of Station, Mexico City (w/att)

201-285412
~~1 NOV 1965~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW 14087
CS COPY
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
DATE: 28 October 1965
CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T
HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-285412

1-RID (w/att)
1-SR/O/WH (wo/att)
WH/1 (wo/att)

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SR/O/PA	JOHN CARLSON	C vib	6213

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/O/WH	28 Oct 65	Wendell L. Lyon

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:

b. Height: 6' tall.

c. Build: strong build; ca. 185 lbs. in Havana.

d. Hair: blond wavy hair.

g. Shape of Face: concave forehead.

[illegible] A- 1[illegible]721 S 010107
DPOB: 2[illegible] [illegible] 27 [illegible] 201-285412 PFT
WIFE: [illegible] REF: [illegible]-20557 14 [illegible] 61



S010107



S010107

Att #1 - HMMW-14057 201-285412

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

XXX

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO Chief, SR Division

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - John STRATOS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LICOZY/5 reported that on 12 October 1965 Subject visited his place of business and said that he had been referred to LICOZY/5 by the Soviet Embassy. He said he was interested in a one-way ticket to the Soviet Union. Subject furnished the following information to LICOZY/5 : He was born on 19 August 1942 in Michigan. He is a student at U.C.L.A. and wanted to visit the USSR as a tourist. Subject held U. S. passport number C 530394 issued 29 August 1962. His permanent address was given as 19222 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, California. His tourist card showed that he entered Mexico by bus at Sonoita, Sonora on 9 October 1965. Subject paid for 15 days in the Soviet Union but said that he planned to stay longer.

2. He left Mexico via Air France flight 702 on 16 October (confirmed by flight manifests). His plans call for him to depart Paris for Moscow via Air France flight 724 on 17 October.

3. During a routine visit to the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy, Valentin S. LOGINOV thanked LICOZY/5 for "taking care" of Subject but, in the presence of both PRIKHODKO and Consular officer Vladimir S. KORMUSHKIN, LOGINOV admonished LICOZY/5 for asking for more biographic data than he needed to fill out the necessary papers. LICOZY/5 denied that he had asked for more information than he needed. (Subject apparently reported LICOZY/5's actions in obtaining the above biographic data (or was debriefed by LOGINOV, a suspect KGB officer).

4. It seems unusual for an American student to travel from the U. S. to Mexico in order to travel to the Soviet Union since he is automatically increasing the cost of his travel by a considerable amount. Since Subject crossed into Mexico on 9 October, only a week before his departure for the USSR, it would appear that he came to Mexico exclusively for this purpose. It thus appears that the purpose of travelling via Mexico was to conceal this trip from the U. S. authorities.

5. Local ODENVY not advised.

Irving A. Orlovsky for
Willard C. CURTIS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
1 - CWH
1 - CSR

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-111/9

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 27467

DATE
20 OCTOBER 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-51203 201-215712
FFN: P -2712

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD - Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

LIFIRE reported the arrival on 10 October 1965, via Sabena flight 555, of Subject's wife, Aleksandra Dmitriyevna, and his son Dmitriy. Travelling on the same flight were Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV (201-028975) and his wife returning to Mexico from home leave.

HMMA 27425

for/Willard C. CURTIS

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - C/SR
1 - C/WH

CS COPY

201-285412. ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-27420	14 October 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-285412

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, SR via Chief, WH

SUBJECT
REDWOOD
Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201 285412)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXI 4363, 7 August 1965

1. Forwarded herewith are summary traces in SPR format on Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, reflecting a digest of available information in Headquarters files.

2. Paragraph 9 of the above attachment (PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS) will be forwarded to you at a later date under separate dispatch as soon as the photos have been processed here at Headquarters.

3. Forwarded under separate cover is Paragraph 21 (IDENTITIES).

B H G

BRUCE H. GINTALAS

ATTACHMENTS: A. Summary traces in SPR format (h/w)
B. Paragraph 21 (IDENTITIES) (u/s/c)

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. & 2-Chief of Station, Mexico City (w/att A, h/w; w/att B, u/s/c)

1CCH

201-285412 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER CS COPY HMMW 13935	DATE 23 SEP 1965 16 September 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 285412

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1-RID (w/att A & B)
1-SR/O/WH (w/att A & B)
1-~~WH/1~~

ABSTRACT [illegible]

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/O/PA	JOHN CARLSON	vjb	6213

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/O/WH	20 Sept 65	Kendall G. Lyon
WH/1	9/21	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	9/21	

ATTACHMENT A TO h d 13985

SECRET

SUMMARY TRACES IN SPR FORMAT

PREPARED BY. BRUCE H. CINTALAS
DATE : 8 September 1965
201 NUMBER . 201 285412
A NUMBER : 18721

1. NAME: Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

2. DPOB: 23 December 1927, Moscow

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA:

   a. USSR citizen.

   b. Passport D016993, issued 24 August 1960.

   c. Passport D010264, issued 1965

6. CURRENT POSITION:

   Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Mexico City.

7. RELATIVES:

   c. Spouse: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna, born 20 August 1928, Moscow. Worked in the Consular Office in Havana. Speaks poor Spanish.

   d. Children: Son - Dmitriy Valentinovich, born 1959.
   Daughter - Irina Valentinovna, born ca. 1952.

8. LANGUAGES:

   Subject speaks fluent Spanish with a slight accent.
   Subject spoke some English while he was in Havana.

RIS INPUT NO. I

CS COPY

att. #1-HMMW-13985 SECRET 201-285412

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

A February 1960 Diplomatic List from Argentina lists Subject as a new Soviet Military Attache due to arrive in Buenos Aires in the near future. There is no indication that Subject ever filled that post.

From September 1960 to September 1963, Subject and family were in Havana where Subject served as an Attache at the Soviet Embassy. In December 1961, he accompanied the Soviet DYNAMO soccer team on a Latin American tour as their escort and interpreter.

Subject arrived in Mexico City on 3 August 1965 to replace known KGB officer Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201 305870), as a Third Secretary.

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION:

Subject is listed as probable RIS, probably KGB on the basis of his activities while stationed in Havana and by virtue of his replacing a known KGB officer in Mexico City. Per HMMA-28390, 3 Mar 66 Subject considered known KGB.

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

While Subject accompanied the DYNAMO soccer team through La Paz in December 1961, he became acquainted with KISHIN-1 (Identity 1), a KUBARK Bolivian security service penetration and later a low level Bolivian university-cell CP penetration. It is not recorded upon whose initiative the contacts were made. However, by KISHIN-1's admission he had several informal and friendly meetings with Subject during which Subject encouraged KISHIN-1 to accept a Cuban student grant. In fact he specifically expressed an eagerness to be of any assistance in helping KISHIN-1 to get to Cuba. .KISHIN-1 never went to Cuba, although he did

13. (CONTINUED)

correspond with Subject on the matter on at least one occasion. KISHIN-1 was terminated as an agent in July 1963 for security reasons and because it was believed that he was a fabricator. No further developments in his association with Subject were noted.

On the same trip through Latin America in December 1961, Subject was observed to have in his possession some $2,000 in United States currency. After sending the soccer team back to Moscow from Quito, Subject continued alone through Panama City, where he was seen in contact with a Mexican citizen with whom he flew on to Mexico City. In Mexico City Subject reported to known KGB officer Aleksey Ivanovich GARMASHOV (201 227418) at the Soviet Embassy. From a sensitive source it was learned that GARMASHOV had been instructed to look into the matter of Subject's four-day delay in returning to Havana from Quito and that Subject's superiors in Havana were concerned. It is not known what relationship, if any, these circumstances have to each other.

In Havana early in 1963, Subject befriended and apparently attempted to cultivate VASLOUCHs 1, 2, and 3 (Identities 2, 3, and 4). The association was discouraged by KUBARK because VASLOUCH-1 and 2 were performing important functions in connection with Cuban FI activities and contact with a possible RIS officer was not thought desireable.

In September 1962 at the invitation of Senhor Vazco Leitao de CUNHA, Brazilian Ambassador to Cuba and newly appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union, VASLOUCH-3 traveled to Moscow and accepted a clerical position at the Brazilian Embassy where she remained for approximately two years. A year later, in September 1963, Subject returned PCS to Moscow. Between December 1963 and February 1964, Subject made three attempts to see VASLOUCH-3. According to VASLOUCH-3, the contacts were by telephone only

13. (CONTINUED)

and she did not meet with Subject personally while in Moscow.

15. CONTACTS:

In December 1961 in La Paz, Bolivia, Subject was in contact with KISHIN-1. See paragraph 13 above and Identities.

Subject was in contact in Panama City and on a flight from Panama City to Mexico City in December 1961 with Edmundo Fausto ZORRILLA Martinez, a Mexican citizen who had been traveling around Latin America. The nature of this contact has not been determined.

Subject befriended and apparently attempted to develop in Havana VASLOUCHs 1, 2, and 3. See paragraph 13 above and Identities.

20. TRACES FOR LIAISON:

See first page following.

21. IDENTITIES:

See second page following.

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

DPOB: 23 December 1927, Moscow

PASSPORTS: D016993, issued 24 August 1960

D010264, issued 1965

POSITION: Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Mexico City.

WIFE: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna, born 20 August 1928, Moscow. Worked in the Consular Office of the Soviet Embassy in Havana. Speaks poor Spanish.

SON: Dmitriy Valentinovich, born 1959.

DAUGHTER: Irina Valentinovna, born ca. 1952.

LANGUAGES: Subject speaks fluent Spanish and poor English.

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: He is 6' tall, weighs 185 lbs., has a strong build, blond wavy hair, and a concave forehead.

TRAVEL: In 1960 Subject was designated to the Soviet Embassy in Argentina as a Military Attache, however, there is no record that Subject ever filled that post.

From September 1960 to September 1963, Subject and family were in Havana where Subject served as an Attache at the Soviet Embassy. In December 1961 he accompanied the Soviet DYNAMO Soccer team on a Latin American tour as their escort and interpreter.

UNDER SEPARATE COVER
ATTACHMENT B TO HMM 3955

SECRET

IDENTITIES

IDENTITY ONE	DELGADILLO Menacho, Adalid, formerly a Captain on the Bolivian Police Force. KUBARK agent from 1960 to 1963.
IDENTITY TWO	MATIKAINEN, Lauri Olavi, Honorary Finnish Counsel in Havana and KUBARK contact since 1962.
IDENTITY THREE	MATIKAINEN, Estrella, wife of IDENTITY TWO.
IDENTITY FOUR	MATIKAINEN, Anneli, daughter of IDENTITIES TWO and THREE.

SECRET

CSR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

XXXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
6 REDWOOD - Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXI 4363, 6 August 1965

Subject's arrival in Mexico was reported in Reference. Attached are copies of Subject's passport, obtained through LITEMPO, no. D-010264, issued 24 June 1965 in Moscow and valid for five years.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Copies of Passport

Distribution:
2 - CSR, w/att., as stated, H/W
1 - CWH, w/o att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

201-285412

1Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26881	12 AUGUST 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412 FFN · P-11712

14-00000



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 010264

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № [illegible]

Предъявитель сего, гражданин Союза Советских Социалистических Республик

ЛОГИНОВ Валентин Сергеевич,

Третий Секретарь Посольства СССР в Мексике

[illegible] по праву [illegible]

Министр Союза
Советских Социалистических Республик

[illegible]

[illegible]

25 июня 196[illegible] года



Le titulaire du présent passeport citoyen de l'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Valentin LOGUINOV,

Troisième Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS au Mexique,

[illegible] à l'étranger

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Passeport valable pour cinq ans

26 Juin [illegible]

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de l'URSS

[illegible]

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

до ___ 19__ г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au ___ 19__

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

до ___ 19__ г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au ___ 19__

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

до ___ 19__ г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au ___ 19__

— 7 —

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№ 512504

Москва

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до 04 [illegible] ноября 1965 г.

[illegible] пограничный пункт

— 8 —



ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

через любой пограничный пункт

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

через любой пограничный пункт

EMBAJADA DE MEXICO en la U.R.S.S.

Visa DIPLOMATICA No.

VALIDA por

Deberá utilizarse antes del día:

Moscú,

EMBAJADA DE MEXICO MOSCU U.R.S.S.

1601

VISA

18.07.1965

13 VIII 1965

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-285412 ✓

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. John P. Colson

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

24 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	SR/0/FA	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Mexico City

ACTION SR-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2, WH/C-8

AN ✓	FI	~~SR~~/CI/K
~~PS~~	~~Desk~~	~~SR/07/A~~
ABSTRACT		~~INDEX~~

S E C R E T 5 070010Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4363

REDWOOD

7 Aug 65 IN 27561

1. LIFIRE REPORTS ARRIVAL 3 AUG VIA SABENA FLIGHT 555 OF VALENTIN LOGINOV, AGE 38 PPT D-010264, NEW THIRD SECRETARY SOVIET EMB MEXICO.

2. PRESUMABLY IDEN VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV 201-285412. REQUEST SUMMARY TRACES.

3. BELIEVED REPLACING NECHIPORENKO 201-305870.

S E C R E T

CFN 4363 3 AUG VIA SABENA 555 VALENTIN LOGINOV 38 PPT D010264 IMI D-010264 SOVIET EMB MEXICO IDEN VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV 201-285412 NECHIPORENKO 201-305870

BT

SECRET

201-285412 ✓

7 Aug 65

201-285412

SR/CI/K

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG: ELISABETH GRISSO/pjk
UNIT: WH/C/FI/IO
EXT: 6172
DATE: 29 MARCH 1965

S E C R E T

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 28-6-33

TO: RIO DE JANEIRO INFO: JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR 71465

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FI, DDP, WH 7, SC 7, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

TO: RIOD INFO: WAVE CITE DIR 98920

TYPIC VASLOUCH

REF ~~WAVE~~ RIOD 7701 (IN 30193)

1. SUBJ REF (IDEN A) IS VASLOUCH-3, DAUGHTER V-1 (IDEN B) AND V-2, (IDEN C). V-1 AND V-2 CURRENTLY RESIDE PBRUMEN AND HAVE BEEN HQS REPORTING ASSETS SINCE FEB 63.

2. V-2 WORKED APPROX 12 YEARS BRAZILIAN EMBASSY PBRUMEN. WAS QUITE CLOSE TO ALSUPER AND FAMILY WHEN HE HAD EMB THERE AND TOURED FJSTEAL WITH HIM FOR MONTH IN 63. V-3 CLOSE FRIEND ALSUPER DAUGHTER.

LOGINOV

3. EARLY 63 LOCAL SOV KGB TYPE WHO HAD PREVIOUS BUSINESS CONTACTS WITH V-2 MADE SOCIAL CONTACT WITH V-1 AND V-2 IN RELATIVELY CLUMSY EFFORT DEVELOP THEM. V-1 AND V-2 WERE INSTRUCTED BY HQS TO AVOID FURTHER CONTACT. KGB OFFICER RETURNED PCS MOSCOW LATE AUG 63. BETWEEN DEC 63 AND FEB 64 HE MADE THREE MILD ATTEMPTS CONTACT V-3 IN MOSCOW. EFFORT CONTACT VASLOUCHES APPARENTLY DROPPED WITH NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. HQS HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFO TO CONFIRM OR DISPELL ALSURAHS SUSPICIONS V-3 SOVIET PENETRATION.

4. V-3 HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT WORRY TO PARENTS AND HQS THROUGHOUT OUR ASSOCIATION. PARENTS DESIRE SEE V-3 LOCATED SAFELY SOME WESTERN CITY WITH GOOD JOB AND SECURE INCOME MATCHES HQS WISH ELIMINATE HER

RELEASING OFFICER 27-30

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :
FROM DIRECTOR
CONF. INFO

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 96720

AS SOURCE CONCERN HER PARENTS.

5. REQUEST STA TAKE NO ACTION THIS MATTER AT THIS TIME. HQS CONCERN PRIMARILY THAT WORRY ABOUT V-3 NOT BE ALLOWED JEOPARDIZE FUNCTIONING V-1 AND V-2. V-3 MAY EVEN AGREE SOME FUTURE DATE ACT AS SW LINK BETWEEN V-1 AND HQS IF SUCH CHANNEL EVER NEEDED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/FI
C/WH/C/MO Walter Cini (in draft)
WH/5 Larry Sulk (by phone)
SR/CI/KGB Tom Ryan (by phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM 19

SECRET

ORIG. : ELISABETH GRISSO/pfg
UNIT : WH/C/FI/IO ☐ INDEX
EXT : 6172 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 29 MARCH 1965 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 28-6-33

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

29 MAR 65
2241Z

TO : RIO DE JANEIRO INFO: JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, WH 7, SR 7, C/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

TO : RIOD INFO: WAVE CITE DIR 96921

TYPIC VASLOUCH

REF DIR 96920

IDEN A: ANNELI MATIKAINEN
FORMER SECRETARY IN BRAZILIAN EMBS
HAVA AND MOSCOW. (IN MOSCOW SEPT 62 - SEPT 64)

IDEN B: LAURI MATIKAINEN
FINNISH BUSINESSMAN
HON. FINNISH CONSUL
IN HAVANA

IDEN C. ESTRELLA TOINI MATIKAINEN
FORMER SECRETARY IN
BRAZILIAN EMB HAVA

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/FI
C/WH/C/MO Walter Cini (in draft)
WH/5 Larry Sulk (by phone)
SR/CI/KGB Tom Ryan (by phone)

for
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

for
JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER 29-29

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET

☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED Mar 25 9 53 AM '65

FROM Rio de Janeiro

ACTION WH-8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/C-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SR-7

S E C R E T 241902Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE RIOD 7701 24 Mar 65 30193

REF HBRA 11170 25 JUNE 1963 (NOT SENT WAVE)

1. ON 23 MARCH MERCEDES MAGALHAES LIRIO, PERSONAL SECRETARY ALSUPER-2, INTRODUCED MYLKES TO ANNELI MATIKAINEN, WHO VISITING RIO FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH. MATIKAINEN SAID ALTHOUGH HER FUTURE PLANS INDEFINITE, SHE HAD NO INTENTION RETURNING PBRUMEN, WHERE HER PARENTS ASSIGNED. SAID SHE MIGHT ACCEPT EMPLOYMENT IN NEW YORK CITY OR WOULD RETURN TO EUROPE. HOWEVER, LIRIO IS ATTEMPTING TO INTEREST MATIKAINEN IN REMAINING RIO AND ASKED MYLKES IF MATIKAINEN DID STAY, COULD HE DIRECT HER TO SOME AMERICAN COMPANY OR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY FOR EMPLOYMENT. MYLKES LEFT MATTER OPEN SAYING HE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE MORE INFO ON MATIKAINEN'S QUALIFICATIONS.

2. ONLY INFO RIO STA RE MATIKAINEN CONTAINED IN REF SUPPLIED BY ALSURAH, WHO NOW ON TWO YEAR LEAVE FROM HIS SERVICE AND ONLY IN RIO ON INFREQUENT VISITS. WILL ATTEMPT TO ELICIT MORE DETAILS FROM ALSURAH AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

3. APPRECIATE HQS FORWARDING ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON MATIKAINEN WHICH WOULD TEND TO CONFIRM ALSURAHS DOUBTS ABOUT

SECRET

E FS
LL
KA
LS

201-350670

Action

John Sears lunches with Matikainen.

201 available.
1 copy filed ALSURAH 201.

201-285412

RID traces initiated 25 MAR 1965

IN 30193 Pg 2

SECRET

HER AS NOTED REF.

4. INFO WAVE: ALSURAH REPORTED IN REF HE SUSPECTED MATIKAINEN AS BEING SOVIET PENETRATION HIS EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. SHE ~~WAS~~ CURIOUS BEYOND NORMAL BOUNDS AND WANTED TO SEE EVERYTHING. SHE WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING AN AFFAIR WITH ONE OF THE BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW WHO HAD RAISED HER EMBASSY PAY TO $300 DOLLARS A MONTH. SHE HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED WITH ALSUPER-1 IN PBRUMEN

SECRET

CFN.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: DIRECTOR

20 JAN 1964

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, CSR 3, CE/H, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR

LL — (HOLD for Finney)

TDCS

SECRET 172002Z

IN 08922

DIR CITE WAVE [illegible]

INTEL

TYPIC

SUPDATA: PARA. 1: AMTAUP-5 FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED INFORMANT.

PARA. 2: AMTAUP-5. RID: NO INDEX. FILED 17/2002Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: CUBA/USSR

SUBJ: 1. PASSPORT ACTIVITY AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN HABANA

2. CONTINUED ABSENCE FROM CUBA OF SOVIET VICE CONSUL LOGUINOV

DOI: 20 DECEMBER 1963

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (14 JANUARY 1964)

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON.

LIAISON: SO1-2 85412

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO:

FROM:

ACTION:

INFO:

PAGE 2

IN 00925

TDCS

UFG-4450

SOURCE: A CUBAN UNIVERSITY GRADUATE AND PART OWNER OF A FARM IN CAMAGUEY. SOURCE TRAVELS OCCASIONALLY BETWEEN CAMAGUEY AND HABANA, AND HAS REPORTED MILITARY INFORMATION WHICH, FOR THE MOST PART, HAS BEEN ACQUIRED BY PERSONAL OBSERVATION. THE INFORMATION IN PARA. 1 WAS OBTAINED FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED INFORMANT AND THAT IN PARA. 2 FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATIION.

IW COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 00925

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. ON 20 DECEMBER 1963, THERE WAS A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE AT THE SOVIET CONSULATE AND EMBASSY IN THE VEDADO SECTION OF THE CITY OF HABANA WHO WERE APPARENTLY MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR DEPARTING FROM CUBA. SOME OF THESE INDIVIDUALS PRESENTED A BOOK WITH A RED COVER BEARING THE CYRILLIC LETTERS "CCCP RPT CCCP" IN GOLD AND RECEIVED A FORM TO FILL OUT AND RETURN. OTHERS RECEIVED A WHITE CARD WITH A PHOTOGRAPH. ONE SOVIET ASKED FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF HIS TRIP, SAYING THAT HE WAS MARRIED TO A CUBAN GIRL WHO WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAND THE COLD. A HIGH DIPLOMAT, WHO WORE GLASSES AND WHO WAS ABOUT 60 YEARS OLD, ANGRILY EXPRESSED HIMSELF TO THE CUBANS IN

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

SPANISH. (FIELD COMMET: NEITHER LOCATION NOR CIRCUMSTANCES RELATIVE TO THIS EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE HIGH DIPLOMAT AND THE CUBANS WERE REPORTED.)

2. AS OF 20 DECEMBER, SOVIET VICE CONSUL VALENTIN S. LOGUINOV HAD NOT RETURNED TO CUBA FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (MIAMI).

END OF MESSAGE

Embassy offices. LICALLA thinks that Subject left the Embassy at 1115, having put his luggage in the car with license plates 19-DA. (This is the car regularly driven by LOGINOV.) A LICALLA photograph of Subject is forwarded as Attachment B (Headquarters only).

4. From LIENVOY it appears that LOGINOV was principally responsible for Subject's travel arrangements. LOGINOV probably met Subject at the airport, since LIMITED reported that LOGINOV left the Soviet Embassy in 19-DA at 0535 and returned at 0658 on 20 March 1966, apparently having dropped Subject off at the Hotel Agnes. Subject's wife was not reported to have visited the Embassy.

5. The Station had not believed that Subject would be able to take the 21 March flight to Havana, since there had been no record of his having requested a Cuban visa; however, a LIONION photograph subsequently received showed that Soviet Vice Consul Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (201-744341) had visited the Cuban Embassy in person on 16 March 1966, at which time he probably arranged for Subject's visa.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE - Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Subject has been identified as a KGB officer based on the following incidents:

2. On 12 February 1966 Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379), KGB case officer, during a meeting with LICOZY-5, told LICOZY-5 that he would bring Subject to their next meeting and that Subject would be LICOZY-5's new case officer.

3. During January 1966 Cristobal * TORRES Ponce, chauffeur employed by the American Embassy in Mexico City, made several trips to the Soviet Embassy in regard to a Soviet visa for one of the American Embassy officials. TORRES spoke with Subject, who, after asking whether it would get TORRES in trouble if he went to dinner with Subject, ended up by inviting TORRES to dinner on 24 January 1966. TORRES did not meet Subject that date, and on 8 February 1966 Subject called TORRES at the American Embassy to ask why he had not shown up. TORRES replied that he had had to work. Subject asked whether TORRES had located a person who could teach him English. TORRES replied that one person whom he had asked had not been interested, and Subject asked him to keep looking for someone. Subject again called TORRES on 9 February 1966, but TORRES was out. (It is noted that Subject's calls to TORRES have not appeared on LIENVOY and were therefore presumably made from a pay station.)

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution: [illegible] with Valentin S L[illegible] 201-285412
2 - CSR
1 - CWH

MICROFILMED
MAR [illegible]
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 28390	3 MARCH 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412

14-00000

SECRET

☐ RID COPY

FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T [illegible] CITE MEXICO CITY [illegible] 3[illegible] 7532

DIRECTOR

REDBLOCK LCIMPROVE

1. PER LIENVOY 25 JUNE SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE AND KGB OFFICER NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV 201-[illegible] WAS TO BE IN MOSCOW BY 4 JULY FOR A CONFERENCE. VICE CONSUL VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV ALSO TOLD LICOZY-5 ON 24 JUNE THAT LEONOV HAD TO BE IN MOSCOW ON 4 JULY. SOVIETS TRIED SEVERAL AIRLINES TO GET RESERVATION FOR LEONOV, WHO NOW BELIEVED LEAVING VIA SABENA ON 29 JUNE.

2. FROM LIFEAT AND LIENVOY IT APPEARS THAT LEONOV WAS PREPARING TO LEAVE SOON PCS. HE NOW LEAVING WITHOUT FAMILY APPARENTLY ON SHORT NOTICE.

3. DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY INDICATIONS OF WHAT CONFERENCE LEONOV MAY BE ATTENDING?

4. HOWEVER LIREALM-1 REPORTED 25 JUNE THAT LEONOV HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE LEAVING 2 JULY AND WOULD ONLY STAY [illegible] DAYS. ALSO SAID HIS WIFE SO SICK THAT SHE COULD NOT ACCOMPANY HIM. REPORTING LIREALM-1/LEONOV RELATIONSHIP BY POUCH.

S E C R E T

BT

201-285412

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 30/1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CI	5	
②	WH	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB8, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI/INT2

S E C R E T 291945Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8081

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR 29 Jul 66 IN 66625

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

REF DIRECTOR 23746*

* REQUESTED TRACES ON NICOLAS JOHN BOSTROEN.

PLS INCLUDE LIAISON TRACES.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

NNNN

Logino

201-285412

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

[redacted]

ORIG: Bill Frederick/nd ☐ FILE RID
UNIT: WH/1 ☐ INDEX
EXT: 3654 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE: 28 JULY 1966 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	CI	5	SI
2	WH	6	RR
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 22 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE SBS, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/INT 2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

28 20 51Z CITE DIRECTOR

23746

TO CARACAS INFO MEXICO CITY

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

MEXICO CITY 8020 (IN 62261)* NOT SENT CARACAS

1. REQUEST STATION TRACES FOR MEXICO CITY ON:

A. NICOLAS JUAN BOSTROEN, BORN 1915 IN ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA, NOW VENEZUELAN CITIZEN. EMPLOYED AS "DIRECTOR OF PROJECT" BY STEPHENS-ADAMSON DE MEXICO. FORMERLY SERVED IN U. S. NAVY.

B. VALENTINA GRUSDOW DE BOSTROEN, BORN BRESLAU, GERMANY, 41 YEARS OLD, WENT TO USSR WHEN SMALL CHILD, WAS IN STALINGRAD IN 1942, WENT TO VENEZUELA POST WWII, NOW VENEZUELAN CITIZEN.

BOTH BOSTROEN'S NOW LIVE CALLE CHRISTIAN ANDERSON 419, MEXICO CITY.

2. FYI CARACAS: MEXICAN OFFICIAL ADVISED STATION THAT VALENTIN S. LOGINOV, KNOWN KGB STAFF OFFICER MEXICO CITY, APPARENTLY DEVELOPING POLICEMAN WHOM HE ASKED TO PROVIDE BOSTROEN HOME ADDRESS, HOME TELEPHONE AND PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT.

CONTINUED.../

201-285412

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

[redacted]

ORIG: W. F. Frederick
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

PAGE 2

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET
(DATE AND TIME FILED)
(REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 23746

TO

3. ~~FYI~~ MEXICO CITY: NO TRACES HQS. NOTIFY CARACAS IF LIAISON TRACES DESIRED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Reported LOGINOV recruitment pitch to unnamed LITEMPO-8 policeman to report on Nicolas Juan and Valentina Grusdow de Bostroen. Requested additional data these individuals to assist in providing LIRAMA info for PNG of LOGINOV.

WH/3/V/D. Venute (in draft)
SB/O/WH/T. Cormier (in draft)
SB/CI/K/T. Ryan (in draft)

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CW/H

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO Chief, SB Division

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - Information on Local Soviets passed to LIRAMA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY - 8020

1. Transmitted herewith are a list of Soviet intelligence personnel assigned to Mexico and a note on Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) which were given by Chief of Station on 22 July to LIENVOY-2 for passage to LITEMPO-8 and LIRAMA. The circumstances were explained in Reference.

2. Please note that the following items in the LOGINOV note are fictions of the Station:

a. that LOGINOV joined the KGB in 1955.
b. that he attended the KGB school from 1955 to 1957.
c. that he was an officer in KGB Headquarters from 1957 to August 1960
d. that the money found in his suitcase in Panama in December 1961 was for Latin American Communist Parties (it probably was).
e. that we have known LOGINOV as a KGB officer since 1958

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
List of Soviet intelligence personnel and note on LOGINOV

Distribution:
2 - CWH, w/att (1 copy), H/W
1 - CSB, w/att (1 copy), H/W

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1CC WITT TO SB/C/WH
1 HTT

CS COPY

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 29626	27 JULY 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412

SECRET

Att. 1: HMMA-29626
27 July 66

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

DOB: 23 December 1927
Position: Third Secretary in the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico D. F.

Residence: Ignacio Esteva 18-1, Colonia Tacubaya

Automobile: 1965 Chevrolet Impala, license 19 DA.

Languages: Fluent Spanish, fair English

Career:

1955: Joined the KGB
1955-57 Attended the KGB training school

1957 - August 1960: Officer in KGB Headquarters, Moscow

Sept 1960-Sept 1963: Attache in Havana, Cuba

December 1961: Travelled to Panama and Equador with a Soviet soccer team. On this trip he carried a large sum of money for the Communist Parties of Panama and Equador.

17 May 1962: Transited Mexico en route to the USSR for leave.

9 September 1963: Left Cuba to return to the USSR

September 1963 - July 1965: Officer in KGB Headquarters, Moscow.

3 August 1965: Arrived Mexico

In Mexico LOGINOV replaced Oleg M. NECHIPORENKO, another KGB officer and took over all of NECHIPORENKO's intelligence agents and duties. In January 1966 he attempted to cultivate and recruit a chauffeur at the American Embassy in Mexico. LOGINOV is an unusually active and capable intelligence officer. Since he has almost no overt duties he is able to spend about 95% of his time on intelligence activity. We have known that he is a KGB officer since 1958. His immediate KGB chief in Mexico is Pavel A. YATSKOV.

SECRET

ATT. 1

CS COPY

HMMA 29626

201-285412

SECRET

Soviet Intelligence Officers Stationed in Mexico

1. KGB (Committee for State Security)

Chief: Sergey S. KONSTANTINOV
Deputy Chief: Aleksandr V. PRIKHODKO

OFFICERS:

Yevgeniy I. BEDRIN
Ivan A. BEKETOV
Aleksandr M. BROVKIN
Vladimir A. DOLGOV
Yevgeniy N. GORLITSYN
Boris A. KAZANTSEV
Vladislav S. KORMUSHKIN
Valentin I. KUCHEROV
Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
Nikolay S. LEONOV
Valentin S. LOGINOV
Vasiliy S. MIROSHNIKOV
Leonid V. NIKIFOROV
Aleksandr A. NIKITIN
Vladimir N. RADVANSKIY
Vladimir I. SHPAKEVICH
Georgiy S. VISKO
Pavel A. YATSKOV
Yuriy ZHURIN
Boris S. ZOBNIN

2. GRU (Military Intelligence)

Chief: Vladimir N. SOKOLOV
Deputy Chief: Georgiy A. SHCHUCHKIN

OFFICERS:

Aleksandr M. DENISOV
Petr F. GORELOV
Vladimir P. GORODETS
Yuriy N. ISAYEV
Anatoliy V. KARABACH
Viktor L. KHUKHOREV
Yuriy A. MITROPOLSKIY
Valeriy V. SOKOLIN
Ruslan A. TUCHNIN
Konstantin F. VORONKOV

Ivan V. YELFIMOV

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LCGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

050-008-010
HMMA-29544
20 JUL 66
P1

R 6607281146

FILE IN 201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

CSB

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO Chief, SB Division

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - Edward WEBELMAN Preminger

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LICOZY-5 reported that on 24 June 1966 his KGB case officer, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412), stopped by his office on legitimate business, then said he had some (operational) business for him. LICOZY-5 demurred, but LOGINOV went ahead, took a piece of paper out and began reading from it, asking LICOZY-5 if he knew "Eduardo WEBELMAN." LICOZY-5 interrupted, saying he did not know the man and did not want to do anything about him. LOGINOV said he did not want LICOZY-5 to do anything, it was just that he did not know who he was. LICOZY-5 refused to discuss it further. When LOGINOV left LICOZY-5's office he left behind a piece of paper with the following written on it in Russian:

> Eduardo Vebelman, about 55 years old, Mexican of Jewish extraction, owner of a steel plant and a firm which sells photographic equipment. Came to Mexico during World War II. Lives in the Pedregal at Teololco 320. His son is Mauricio Vebelman.

2. Station files had no traces on anyone named WEBELMAN. The 1965 Mexico City Telephone Directory lists the following:

Arno WEBELMAN, Arts Fotograficos, Uruapan 7, tel. 11-44-77
Eduardo WEBELMAN, Teololco 320, tel. 48-57-17
WEBELMAN Hermanos, S.A., Paseo de la Reforma 308, 1st floor, tel. 11-41-90 and 11-43-79.

- CONTINUED -

Distribution:
2 - CWH
1 - CSB

cscopy To C/WH/1

Copy 50-6-111/9

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE 201-285412
	HMMA - 29477	14 JULY 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH HMMA - 29477

3. The Mexican Gobernacion file on Subject (apparently identical with LOGINOV's "Vebelman") was reviewed on 11 July 1966. It shows that Subject was born on 7 October 1917 in Warsaw, Poland, is Jewish, and came to Mexico on 8 December 1939 as a student. In 1942 he had received "Immigrante" status and was working for Adolfo *WEBELMAN Coskpe (?), manager of WEBELMAN y Cia., a firm then located at Aluminio 192 in Mexico, D. F. (Comment: Adolfo WEBELMAN is presumably a relative of Subject's but not his father, who is given as Szymon WEBELMAN.) The last entry in the file is dated 1944.

4. Headquarters traces on Subject are requested.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDLOCK/LCIMPROVE - Vitaliy *BOYAROV

D
CIT
OCC
Δ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-29196, 16 June 1966

1. Reference reported on the visit of Subject (probably identical with Vitaliy Konstantinovich BOYAROV, 201-355006) to Mexico from 27 May to 9 June 1966.

2. In regard to Para. 3 of Reference, [illegible], Jr., has now positively identified Subject's passport photograph as the "Viktor" whom he met fishing on 3-5 June 1966.

3. The following LILYRIC surveillance reports on Subject have subsequently been received:

31 May 0931 hrs: Subject left the Soviet Embassy alone.
1023 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet Embassy alone.
1411 hrs: Subject left the Soviet Embassy together with Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123) and Lyudmila Vasilyevna [illegible] (201-790795) in YATSKOV's car.

1 June 1037 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet Embassy alone.
1145 hrs: Subject left the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV and Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) in YATSKOV's car.
1606 hrs: Subject returned to the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV and LOGINOV.

2 June 1056 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet Embassy alone.
1437 hrs: Subject left the Soviet Embassy with Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV (201-101794) in the latter's car.

- CONTINUED -

Distribution:
2 - CSR
1 - CWH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 29523

DATE
30 June 1966

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

201-285412

3 June 1021 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV in the latter's car.

6 June 1040 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet Embassy alone.
1413 hrs: Subject left the Soviet Embassy with Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379) in the latter's car.
1551 hrs: Subject returned to the Soviet Embassy with PRIKHODKO.
1658 hrs: Subject left the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV in the latter's car. [illegible] 22 May to 9 June 1963

7 June 0932 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV in the latter's car. (Was not seen leaving.)
1033 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet ~~Embassy~~ with Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV (201-273046) in the latter's car. [illegible] 22 May to 9 June 1963)

8 June 0945 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV in the latter's car.

9 June 1130 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet Embassy with KONSTANTINOV and Semen Tarasevich BAZAROV (201-049257) in KONSTANTINOV's car.
1200 hrs: Subject left the Soviet Embassy with MIROSHNIKOV and KONSTANTINOV in the latter's car.
1356 hrs: Subject returned to the Soviet Embassy with MIROSHNIKOV and KONSTANTINOV.
1408 hrs: Subject again left the Soviet Embassy with MIROSHNIKOV and KONSTANTINOV.

4. The following information is available on the persons mentioned above as being with Subject :

a. KONSTANTINOV is known to be the KGB resident.

b. YATSKOV is a known KGB officer, probably in CI.

c. LOGINOV is a known KGB officer who works for YATSKOV.

d. PRIKHODKO is a known KGB officer and probably the deputy resident.

e. MIROSHNIKOV is probably the KGB chauffeur.

f. BAZAROV is the ambassador, no known intelligence affiliation.

g. SOKOLINA is the wife of an Assistant Military Attache.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

CSB

DISPATCH | SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - Ernesto CHAZARO Peregrino

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

file
Loginov

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7688

1. Transmitted herewith is the local ODENVY report on Subject which was promised.

2. ODENVY still has not been able to contact Subject in order to put him in touch with the Station but hopes to do so during the week of 4 July.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Enclosure:
ODENVY Report

Distribution:
2 - CWH, w/encl. (2 copies), H/W
1 - CSB, w/encl. (1 copy), H/W

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1cc w/att to C/WH/1

COPY

CS COPY FILED IN 201-800417

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 29325	30 JUNE 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER FFN: P-12818

FBI REPORT (ATTACHMENT TO HMMA 29325)

DATE: 27 JUNE 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: ERNESTO CHAZARO PEREGRINO
134-815 (6-27-66)

FROM MEXICO CITY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
SEX M DOB ?

201-355606
HMMA-29198
16 JUN 66
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
KNOWN KGB, IN CONTACT WITH V. BOYAROV,
201-355606 ?, 1 JUN 66, MEXICO CITY,
MEXICO.

R 6606240887

FILE IN 201- [illegible]

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SR Division

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE - KGB and GRU Residencies in Mexico City

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached are analyses of the KGB and GRU residencies in Mexico City. Included are only those officers who are probably or known to be intelligence officers. Of the 52 Soviets currently assigned to Mexico City, 22 are identified intelligence officers and 13 probably intelligence officers, i.e. roughly 67% of the total Soviet colony.

2. The case officers have not been divided into separate target groups, with the exception of KGB S & T, since the Station's information is too fragmentary for a realistic breakdown. With the exception of S. S. KONSTANTINOV, who is known to be the KGB resident, the positions of resident and deputy resident are unconfirmed, but represent the Station's best guess.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

LOGINOV

Attachment:
KGB and GRU Residencies

Distribution:
2 - CSR, w/att. (2 copies), h/w
1 - CWH, w/att. (1 copy), h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO

28 April 1966

201-285412

CROFILMED
MAY 4 1966
DOC MICRO SER.

SECRET

2P

ATTACHMENT TO HMMA - 28808
DATED 28 APRIL 1966

KGB Residency in Mexico City April 1966

Resident: S. S. KONSTANTINOV (known) [illegible] KGB

Deputy: A. V. PRIKHODKO (known) [illegible] KGB

CP Liaison: B. A. KAZANTSEV (known intelligence officer, possibly now responsible to CPSU rather than KGB). [illegible]

Case Officers: [illegible]

- V. I. ANDREYEV (suspect) [illegible]
- A. M. BROVKIN (suspect) [illegible]
- V. A. DOLGOV (suspect) [illegible]
- Y. N. GORLITSYN (suspect) [illegible]
- V. S. KORMUSHKIN (suspect) [illegible]
- V. I. KUCHEROV (suspect) [illegible]
- S. F. KUZNETSOV (known) [illegible]
- N. S. LEONOV (known) [illegible]
- V. S. ~~LOGINOV~~ (known) [illegible]
- L. V. NIKIFOROV (suspect) [illegible]
- V. I. SHPAKEVICH (known) [illegible]
- G. S. VISKO (known) [illegible]
- P. A. YATSKOV (known) [illegible]

S & T Case Officers

- A. A. NIKITIN (suspect)
- B. A. ZORNIN (known)

Referentura

- V. P. GULIN (suspect)
- V. N. RADVANSKIY (known)

Chauffeur

- V. S. MIROSHNIKOV (suspect)

Known KGB: 1
Suspect KGB 1

Diplomatic Cover:
Commercial Cover:
Press Cover:
Embassy Employee

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO HMMA - 28808

DATED 28 APRIL 1966

GRU Residency in Mexico City April 1966

Resident: V. N. SOKOLOV (known [illegible] - Resident GRU

Deputy: G. A. SHCHUCHKIN (known) [illegible] - Deputy GRU Resident

Case Officers: GRU, USSR Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico >

I. A. BEKETOV (suspect) [illegible]
A. M. DENISOV (known) [illegible]
P. F. GORELOV (known) [illegible]
Y. A. TSAYEV (known) [illegible]
A. V. KARABACH (suspect) [illegible]
V. L. KHUKHOREV (known) [illegible]
Y. A. MITROPOLSKIY (known) [illegible]
V. V. SOKOLIN (known) [illegible]
R. A. TUCHNIN (suspect) [illegible]
K. F. VORONKOV (known) [illegible]

Code Clerk:

I. V. YELFIMOV (known) [illegible]

Chauffeur:

V. P. GOROBETS (known)

Known GRU: 11
Suspect GRU: . . . .

Military Cover: . . . .
Diplomatic Cover: . . . .
Commercial Cover: . . . .
Press Cover: . . . .

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES

3/21 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	VH	5	S/
2	VH	6	S/
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
SR 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

SECRET 192250Z

Loginov

SJOS INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7025

20 APR 66 IN 00064

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF: DIR 95441

1. ACCORDING LIENVOY 18 APR, IVAN A. BEKETOV CITED REF, CONTACTED COSTA RICAN EMBASSY MEXI AND INQUIRED RE STATUS HIS VISA. HE TOLD CHECK LATER SINCE COSTA RICAN EMB STILL HAD NO WORD.

2. A FEW MINUTES LATER VALENTIN S. LOGINOV (201-285412) ALSO CALLED COSTA RICAN EMB AND SAID HE WANTED VISA FOR HIMSELF. WHEN ASKED IF HE HAD DIP OR OFFICIAL PASSPORT HE SAID HE HELD OFFICIAL PASSPORT. HE THEN TOLD TO BRING PASSPORT TO EMBASSY.

3. VISA PROBABLY FOR BEKETOV SINCE LOGINOV HOLDS DIP PASSPORT. LOGINOV VICE CONSUL AND SUSPECT KGB OFFICER.

SECRET

CFN 7025 95441 LIENVOY 18 APR IVAN A. BEKETOV REF COSTA RICAN E EMB NO WORD A VALENTIN S. LOGINOV (201-235412) EMZ DIP BEKETOV LOGINOV DIP KGB

BT

SECRET

201-285412

SECRET

Chief, SR Division

Chief, WH; COS, Montevideo

Chief of Station, Mexico City

REDWOOD - Rustem O. BAKHITOV (201-783564)

REFERENCES: A. MEXI-6621
B. BUEN-5339
C. CIR-90901

1. As reported in Reference A., Subject and his wife arrived in Mexico City at 0550 hours on 20 March 1966 via Canadian Pacific flight 421 from Buenos Aires. They departed Mexico City at 1300 hours on 21 March 1966 via Cubana flight 465 for Havana. Cf. also the mention of their departure from Mexico City in the newspaper clipping forwarded as Attachment A.

2. According to LIENVOY, on 19 March 1966 Soviet Vice Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412, known KGB) made reservations at the Hotel Agnes in Mexico City (frequently used by Soviets) for a couple with a child for the night of 20 March 1966. This reservation was undoubtedly for Subject; however, there has been no other mention of the child. At 0830 on 21 March 1966 [Subject] called the Soviet Embassy from the Hotel Agnes and said he would like to come over to pay [perhaps for the room and the Cubana tickets].

3. LICALLA reported seeing Subject at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City at 1015 hours on 21 March 1966. Subject was seen talking principally with Embassy Counselor Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV (201-028975), suspect CPSU representative), and also briefly with Second Secretary Aleksandr Mikhaylovich DENISOV (201-726491) known GRU), Ambassador Semen Tarasovich BAZAROV (201-049257) and Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123, known KGB). At 1040 Subject was seen entering the Embassy building with KAZANTSEV through the entrance which leads to the Referentura but also connects with other

- continued -

Attachments:
A. Newsclip
B. LICALLA photos

Distribution:
2 - CSR, w/att., as stated, H/W
1 - CWH, w/o atts.
1 - COS/Montevideo, w/o att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

file Loginov 201

X-ref sheets made for all Dons mentioned

HMMA - 28591

28 MARCH 1966

201-285412

200-4-64

SECRET

56

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - Ernesto CHAZARO Peregrino

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-14816, 25 August 1966

The Station's final report on Subject was forwarded in HMMA-29714, 9 August 1966.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
- 2 - CWH
- 1 - CSB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY TO WH/1

COPY

CS COPY FILED IN 201-800412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 29913	31 AUGUST 1966
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-800412

CSB

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - Ernesto CHAZARO Peregrino

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-29325, 30 June 1966

1. On 7 July 1966, Irving A. ORONSKY and a local representative of LNERGO interviewed Subject in Veracruz, Mexico. It became obvious at that time that Subject had fabricated most of his story as will be shown in the attached memorandum to local LNERGO.

2. The Station has no plans for using Subject in any capacity whatsoever.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Copy of Memo to LNERGO

Distribution:
2 - CWH, w/att (1 copy), H/W
1 - CSB, w/att (1 copy), H/W

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COPY [illegible] 201-800412

CS COPY TO WH/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 29714

DATE
9 AUGUST 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-255412

FFN: P-12818

SECRET

21 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Ernesto CHAZARO Peregrino

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 June 1966 and to the interview with Subject conducted in Veracruz on 7 July 1966 by of your office and a representative of this office. We wish to make the following observations regarding Subject's statements in connection with his encounters with Soviet Embassy Third Secretary, Valentin S. LOGINOV.

2. Regarding Subject's claim to have visited Mexico City on or about 16 May 1966 and to have contacted the Soviet Embassy on or about 18 May 1966, this office has established the fact that a contact as described by Subject did not take place at any time during the period 10 through 30 May 1966.

3. Subject made statements to the effect that he had met LOGINOV and a second Soviet at an unknown restaurant at 1800 hours on or about 18 May. He claimed to have talked to these two Soviets for approximately one hour (i.e. until about 1900 hours) after which they left the restaurant, walked to and entered LOGINOV's car, drove to an unknown apartment near the Soviet Embassy, parked the car and entered the apartment and then phoned three call-girls who arrived within 20 minutes. Following the arrival of the girls Subject excused himself and left the apartment about 1900 or 1930 hours. To our knowledge there is no precedent for the KGB using call-girls for the purpose and in the manner described by Subject.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

HMMA - 29714
9 Aug 66

SECRET

4. Subject stated that he believed that the automobile driven by LOGINOV, an automobile that he had seen several times, bore the license number "67." Our records show that no Soviet Embassy official or employee drives an automobile with the number 67 or 76. LOGINOV drives an automobile with Mexico City diplomatic license 19 DA.

5. Subject's statements to the effect that LOGINOV desposited 50,000.00 Mexican pesos to Subject's account in the Banco de Londres in Veracruz as a "gift . . . for nothing" and then took the money back when Subject refused it, is not in keeping with our experience with regard to KGB modus operandi. Also, information available to this office indicates that according to established Mexican banking practices it is not possible to set up a checking account without the presence of the owner of the account who must sign signature cards for comparison with the signatures on checks.

6. Subject's general vagueness as to dates, times, addresses and locations in connection with his encounters with LOGINOV, in addition to those points cited above, leads us to the conclusion that Subject has fabricated a large portion of what he has stated. This office has little doubt that he did meet LOGINOV in Veracruz during early May 1966 in connection with the missing Soviet sailor, but we consider his account of contacts with LOGINOV subsequent to this occasion as fabrication.

7. In view of the above and in view of Subject's statements on 7 July to the effect that he had absolutely no desire to become involved with personnel of either the Soviet or American Embassies and wished to remain completely "neutral," this office is not considering using Subject as an informant of any kind.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DSCE III BY 10/55

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	C/	5	BC
2	C/WH	6	RI
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, SB 8, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, CI/OA, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 230020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8020

2 Aug
~~22 Jul 66~~ IN 62261

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

1. EARLY MORNING 22 JULY LITEMPO-8 CALLED COS AT HOME AND IN EXCITED MANNER SAID HAD URGENT REQUEST. HE SENT LIENVOY-2 TO SEE COS TO ASK FOR INFO ON VALENTINS. LOGINOV PROVING HE A "SOVIET SPY" AND FOR LIST OF " ALL SOVIET SPIES IN MEXICO." LITEMPO-8 VIA LIENVOY -2 SAID REQUEST COMES FROM LIRAMA WHO PERSONALLY INTERESTED AND INTIMATED"WE MAY HAVE SAME SITUATION AS 1959" (WHEN GOM EXPELLED TWO SOVIETS FOR CONTACTS WITH LEADERS OF RAILROAD STRIKE).

Логинов

Loginov

2. SAME MORNING COS PASSED A PAPER " PROVING" LOGINOV IS ACTIVE AND DANGEROUS KGB OFFICER AND A LIST OF 35 SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS IN MEXI TO LIENVOY-2 FOR PASSAGE TO LITEMPO-8/LIRAMA. SEE HMMA 28390 OF 5 MARCH FOR REFERENCE TO LOGINOV APPROACH TO CHAUFFEUR.

SECRET

3. LATTER SAME DAY COS RECEIVED PERSONAL

201-285412

LETTER FROM LITEMPO-8 VIA LITEMPO-4 STATING LOGINOV HAD BEEN COMPLAINING FOR SOME TIME ON LACK OF POLICE ACTION ON RADIO ALLEGEDLY STOLEN FROM HIS (COMMENT: NO CONFIRMATION FROM OTHER STATION SOURCES). FINALLY CHIEF OF METROPOLITAN DISTRICT POLICE, GEN. LUIS CUETO RAMIREZ SENT OUT AN UNNAMED POLICEMAN TO INVESTIGATE. ON 19 JULY POLICEMAN CONTACTED LOGINOV WHO ENDED DISCUSSION BY OFFERING THE POLICEMAN 5,000 PESOS PER MONTH " TO WORK FOR HIM ON CERTAIN MATTERS." POLICEMAN TEMPORIZED AND ASKED HIS SUPERIORS FOR INSTRUCTIONS. MATTER CALLED TO LITEMPO-8 ATTENTION BY GEN. CUETO. LITEMPO-8 INSTRUCTED THE POLICEMAN TO GO AHEAD. ON 21 JULY POLICEMAN RECONTACTED LOGINOV AND RECEIVED FIRST "ASSIGNMENT:" TO DETERMINE HOME ADDRESS, HOME TELPHONE AND PLACE OF EMPLOYEMENT OF NICOLAS JUAN BOSTROEN AND WIFE VALENTINA GRUSDOW DE BOSTROEN, BOTH VENEZUELAN CITIZENS.

4. LITEMPO-4 OBTAINED FOLLOWING INFORMATION

SECRET

2861

ON BOSTROENS FROM GOBERNACION FILES:

A. NICOLAS JUAN BOSTROEN, 1915 IN ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA, VENEZUELAN CITIZEN. EMPLOYED AS " DIRECTOR OF PROJECTS" BY STEPHENS-ADAMSON DE MEXICO. FORMERLY SERVED IN US NAVY.

B. VALENTINA GRUSDOW DE BOSTROEN, BORN BRESLAU, GERMANY, FORMERLY WAS TRANSLATOR OR TEACHER OF RUSSIAN AT UN, NOW TEACHER OF RUSSIAN AT IBERO-AERICANO UNIVERSITY, MEXI, VENEZUELAN CITIZEN.

5. STATION TRACES:

ON 18 FEB 1965 DR. RICHARD L. POTTS, AMERICAN GENERAL PRACTICIONER MEXI AND STATION CONTACT WHO RECENTLY RETURNED US REPORTED FOLLOWING ON MRS. BOSTROEN WHO HIS PATIENT: MRS. VALENTINA BOESTROEM, 41 YEARS OLD, RESIDES CALLE CHRISTIAN ANDERSON 419, MEXI. WAS BORN VENEZUELA, WENT USSR WHEN SMALL CHILD, WAS IN STALINGRAD IN 1942. RETURNED VENEZUELA AFTER WW II, NOW VENEZUELAN CITIZEN, HAS RESIDED MEXI SEVERAL YEARS WITH

SECRET

HUSBAND JU WHO FORMER SOV CITIZEN NOW VENEZUELAN CITIZEN. COUPLE HAS TWO TEENAGE DAUGHTERS. HUSBAND WORKS FOR AMERICAN COMPANY MEXI. NEITHER HAS CONTACT WITH LOCAL RUSSIAN COLONY (SIC) SINCE DONT WANT JEOPARDIZE HUSBAND'S JOB. BOTH SPEAK SEVERAL LANGUAGES. WIFE APPEARS NEITHER PRO OR ANTI SOVIET. POTTS REPORTED ABOVE INFO BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT STRANGE DUE AGE DIFFERENCE AND NO OBVIOUS CONNECTION THAT MRS. BOESTROEM RECOMMENDED AS PATIENT BERTHA DAVILA MOLINA DE OSEGUEDA, AGE 64, WIFE OF DR. RAUL OSEGUEDA PELALA (201-88003).

6. REQUEST HQS TRACES ON BOSTROEN/BOESTROEM COUPLE, ESPECIALLY ANYTHING WHICH COS COULD USE TO ENCOURAGE LIRAMA TO EXPELL LOGINOV WHICH IMMEDIATE STATION OBJECTIVE.

S E C R E T

BT

①

SECRET

Date: November 24, 1965

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

From: Henry C. Johnson
Legal Attache

Subject: Travel of Soviet to Mazatlan
Your file #9808

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Reference is made to your memorandum dated November 2, 1965.

A reliable source at Mazatlan, Sinaloa, has informed that the Soviet scientific ship LIRA, of 2,435 tons and carrying a crew of 76, was at Mazatlan from October 23-28, 1965.

Another reliable source advised that a person believed to be from the Soviet Embassy, Mexico, D.F., visited this ship while it was in port; however, he was not identified.

cy to LOGINOV
P-11712

SECRET

File

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

200-1-79

P-11712

(1)

~~1. White~~
~~2. Dillon~~ (assistance ~~[illegible]~~ ?)
~~3. Joan~~
~~4. Scott~~
5. File

Reply?

(P-11712

005

25 October 1965

Valentin S. LOGINOV

In their reply to a request we sent them for traces of subject, our headquarters have replied as follows:-

"Valentin S. LOGINOV was Assistant Naval Attaché at the Soviet Embassy in BUENOS AIRES in 1960, and was listed as Attaché in HAVANA in 1961-63, where his exact duties were not known. If he now assumes NECHIPORENKO's post of Vice-Consul, his career appears to be an unusual one, and he must be presumed to be an intelligence officer".

2. Does this check with your own information?

Answered 2 Nov

Rec'd from Smith 27 Oct. 65
(Reply on sterile bond
w/ copy to 50-2-6.)

Copy to 50-2-6

P-11712

COPIES MADE

SECRET

5 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Henry C. Johnson, Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviets to Mazatlan

1. This office has received a report that two members of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV and Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN, planned to travel by air to Mazatlan on 2 November 1965. The length of their stay and the purpose of their travel was not reported, but it may well be connected with the docking of a Soviet ship.

2. This office would appreciate receiving any information available to you on the trip of these Soviets.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

9833

Distribution:
  Original - Addressee
  1 - 50-2-4/A
  ✓1 - P-11712
  1 - P-11163
  1 - Ruth Leach

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3 November 1965

4

Cys. 6

P-8451
P-8588
P-11767
P-11712

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: ORONSKY

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

Below is a summary of the noteworthy items from Subject during meetings with him in September and October.

1. During September the meeting site was changed to the streets between Merida and Morel on Puebla street in Colonia Roma. Subject walks along Puebla street and I pick him up in the car and drive elsewhere for the meeting. I attempted to change the time of the meeting as well but Subject does not close his store until just before 2100 hours each day and feels that it would appear odd if he were to close the store at various times of the evening on different days of the week. His wife is not always in the store and he would have to close the store in order to meet me. He closes at 1400 hours on Sundays. I also instructed him to change the speed of the recorder from 1 7/8ths to 3 3/4ths. We have no recorders in the Station that will take a large reel at 1 7/8ths and this extremely slow speed is not necessary.

2. During early September Subject commented that there is a new apartment building being constructed on the corner of Gelati and General de los Santos, across the street from the Soviet Embassy. (This is our new basehouse). I took considerable notes on this as though I had never heard of the

P-8764

P-8764

COPIES MADE

P-11712

place before and asked several questions about it. He said that the owner of the building is Sr. VILLAGRAN and that VILLAGRAN has the reputation of being an anti-Communist and a loyal Mexican citizen. He said that the building would probably be completed by March 1966 and that it will have about six floors. Several Soviets have mentioned to Subject that they would like to rent apartments in the building since it is so close to the Embassy.

3. Subject said that ISAYEV had been in his store about the last week in September. (As far as I can tell this is ISAYEV's first visit to Subject's store.) ISAYEV made a great many anti-U.S. remarks during his visit to the store and blamed the U.S. for most of the world's troubles. At one point he said that the Soviets made much better cars than the U.S. and that Soviet cars were built like "tanks". Subject laughed at this remark because the thought crossed his mind that only a soldier would like to drive a "tank" and from where Subject was standing at the time he could see the Soviet's new fleet of American Fords and Chevys.

4. I again asked Subject why the Soviets had not been visiting his store in the evenings as they had in the past and he insisted that it was because most of his "friends" at the Embassy had returned to the Soviet Union beginning in July and their replacements had not warmed up to him yet.

I asked him if a small fiesta might not help this situation and he said that he thought that it might help. I told him to make plans for a fiesta in honor of Mexican Independence Day and to invite as many of the new Soviets as possible. He said that he would probably give the party on Friday, 17 September. I suggested that he invite Yuriy ANDRIANOV (the GRU chauffeur) first and tell ANDRIANOV to invite several of his friends. At the next meeting with Subject he reported that NIKIFOROV, LOGINOV and KORMUSHKIN were the only Soviets who came to the fiesta on the 17th. They arrived, had a few drinks, danced to some Russian records which they had brought with them and then left. (All are KGB types). They told Subject that the other Soviets could not attend because they had to attend a Czech Embassy reception that same evening. / I can find no record of such a reception either at the Czech or Polish Embassies and there is no indication on the Soviet lines that they had anything planned for that evening. A Soviet from Cuba arrived on the 17th but we have no idea how many Soviets were at the airport to greet him. / I questioned Subject about the Soviets who had appeared at the fiesta and he gave me a little information about them. They visited his store several times in the next few weeks and I showed him photographs of the men and he expanded on his previous information. He had the following to say about them (he has previously reported on NIKIFOROV).

LOGINOV: Subject said that he believes LOGINOV replaced

NECHIPORENKO (correct). Subject calls him "the Bull" and described him as being vulgar, crude, ill-mannered, short tempered and a tyrant. He is a person who thinks that he is some sort of a "big shot" and when he sits down he spreads his legs and arms and takes up a space big enough for two men. His Spanish is very bad and he smokes "Fiesta" cigarettes. At the fiesta LOGINOV told him that he was from the northern part of the Soviet Union, is married and has children. He claimed to have served in the Red Army.

KORMUSHKIN: Subject likes KORMUSHKIN who is friendly, well mannered and outgoing. He speaks good Spanish and told Subject that his wife likes Mexico. Although KORMUSHKIN was wearing glasses in the photo shown to Subject, he commented that he often sees KORMUSHKIN without his glasses. He smokes "Record" cigarettes and Subject calls him "El Jovencito".

5. Subject said that ISAYEV had dropped by his store during the week of 18 October and spent some time making fun of the King and Queen who were visiting Mexico at the time. ISAYEV felt that the very existance of a King and Queen in 1965 was silly. He also claimed that the Soviets had discovered the Comet that was then in the sky. (The Comet had actually been discovered by two Japanese and bears their names.) He bragged about the great advances in the Soviet Union in all fields and told Subject with great pride that the ruble was worth more than the dollar. He commented

that the U.S. was a waring nation while the Soviet Union sought only peace and that the United States would change to something similar to the Soviet system in the near future.

6. The rest of the meeting and the next two, were spent discussing Stanislav SILNIKOV and his request that Subject act as "fiador" on an apartment for him as well as supply him with a prostitute. (see HMMA-27568 of 4 Nov.)

7. In addition, Subject said that ANDRIANOV had asked him to get Viktor KALININ some aphrodisiac pills. ANDRIANOV said that they were "for Viktor KALININ in Moscow" but Subject thinks they are "for Yuriy ANDRIANOV in Mexico". Subject said he hasn't the slightest idea where to buy such a thing.

8. I told Subject to test the recorder by speaking into the microphones both in the upstairs room as well as in the main part of the store and then to play back the tape. Although RESCIGNO has explained the workings of the recorder to Subject several times, he claimed that he did not know how to do this. I then instructed him to disconnect the recorder and to deliver it to me at 2100 hours on Friday, 5 November. I said that I would test the recorder myself. He asked why RESCIGNO could not come to the store and test it and I told him that RESCIGNO was away. He then asked if RESCIGNO was a Mexican or an American. He said that RESCIGNO speaks Spanish like a Mexican and looks like a Mexican but that he (Subject) is sure that he ~~was~~ is an American. I told him

that I really didn't know since I had never asked him. I changed the topic of conversation by saying that if he reported that SILNIKOV wanted a girl for this Sunday, I would return the machine to him on Saturday, 6 November. If not, he would get it back at the next regular meeting which I would set on Friday when I meet him.

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

2 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Henry C. Johnson,
Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviet to Mazatlan

1. This office has received a report that Soviet Vice-Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV planned to travel to Mazatlan from 26 to 28 October 1965 by plane. The purpose of the trip was to take mail to a Soviet ship which was in port in Mazatlan. The name of the ship is believed to be "Lira."

2. This office would appreciate any information available to you concerning LOGINOV's trip.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - 50-2-4/A
1 - P-11712
1 - Ruth Leach

9808

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

file copies

16 August 1965

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ [illegible]
16 August; [illegible] Restaurant

1. The C.O. resumed acquaintanceship with Subject, and in the immediate and sizable vacuum left by Gerald F. Costetner's departure, tried to establish a friendly rapport with Subject. For this reason the C.O. gave Subject a more "friendly" name to know him by, Mel Berger- it being explained to Subject that Mel was the C.O.'s true first name. Subject thought the choice of Berger was good, because he knows several people of that name, and it would occasion no surprise at his office. Subject will continue to use his normal manner of telephoning in, and asking for Monroy.

Leonov
P-11712

P-7442

2. Subject reported that he had come back to Mexico from a trip on 10 August. Nechiporenko was at the airport to greet him. Nechiporenko had visited his office previously, and brought along his replacement "Valentin", and at that time had found out when Subject was expected back. Nechiporenko was invited by Subject to visit him at his home for breakfast on 11 August. He showed up alone. The only business discussed was that Nechiporenko said that Subject would be contacted by "Sasha" (Alexander Prikhodko). Subject was not to contact the Soviet Embassy, or in any other way try to reach Sasha. Subject had a souvenir pistol which he had obtained from some Gauleiter (presumably during WWII), and Nechiporenko asked if he might have it. Subject gave it to him. Nechiporenko evidently asked Subject to arrange for a one day trip to Paris for him while he was en route to the Soviet Union from his stopover, Brussels. (Subject complied, and notified his agent abroad. Subject received a wire a few days ago that Nechiporenko was "no show" in Paris). Nechiporenko was not interested in Subject's observations of U.S. attitudes toward the Viet Nam and Dominican situations, although Subject had been asked to note such attitudes while he was on his trip. Nechiporenko mentioned, without Subject knowing why, that Catalina Torres, who had worked previously in Subject's office, who had attended the Mexican Soviet Cultural Institute, who had as boy friend the American who was giving English lessons to Nechiporenko (Gary Hodges ?), and who had married some Mexican and was now in Acapulco with her husband (works at Las Brisas)- would be able to contact Nechiporenko by mail to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

P-2570

will open new P.

3. Subject is to call in when he is contacted by Sasha. His line to the Sovs about the travel agency in New York will be that he hasn't the time to select

Nech volunteered this info out of thin air [illegible] completely out of context. Subject did not follow up. P-11712

P-11712

the manager or complete the study of the office's requirements, but that he is ~~having~~ going to have it done. On his personal affairs, Subject said he was going to move in December to the Lomas, to a condominium apartment.

PRM

Attention "Paul": the C.O. would appreciate knowing any collateral info about Nechiporenko's departure, the identity of "Valentin", and a brief precis of Subject's former associations with Prikhodko.

Cynthia - pull together what little we have on LOGINOV for passing to Marheim.

I will have Marheim review the entire Licozy-5 file and write a summary, evaluation and suggestions for further handling.

Cynthia - traces on Catalina Torres, please. Especially any association with Gary Hodges or any other [illegible].

LAVASOL
LAVAS



SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
SUBJECT: Ernesto Capuano del VECCHIO and Mario Manteforte Toledo LIENVOY Take	2. RI FILE NO. 201 068 248
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA 30432
	4. DATE 1 Nov 66
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM LIENVOY
	8. DATE OF INFO. 18-27 Oct 66
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST Millie R rodriguez	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 25 Nov 1966	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, Valentin Sergeyevich (201-285412)

Dr. Alfonso MARTINEZ ALVAREZ (a guatemalan) calls Soviet Consul LOGINOV to invited him to a cocktail party to be him at Martinez' hom. Martinez has invited some of the Russian athletes participating in some of the Pre-Olympic games and wishes Loginov to attend also, as well as the Ambassador.

(all the info found on Loginov in this document)

file 201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 285 412

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, SB Division
INFO Chief, WH Division
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT REDTOP/LCIMPROVE - Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123)
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LITEMPO reported the return of Subject, his wife and daughter Nataliya to Mexico on 21 September 1966 via Sabena flight 555 from Brussels (and Moscow). (Note that Subject's daughter Nina has remained in the USSR.) Subject and his wife were still travelling on the same passports used when they left Mexico in August 1966 (copies have been forwarded to Headquarters) and Subject is still listed as Second Secretary in his passport. The only addition to the passports is a Mexican entry visa valid for sixty days issued on 30 August 1966 in Moscow.

2. Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) has been reported telling LICOZY-5, LICOWL-1 and LICANNY-1 that he is now the Consul General, replacing Subject. When LICOZY-5 asked LOGINOV what he was then going to do with Subject, LOGINOV said that it was not his decision, but that Subject would probably be put in charge of some department in the Embassy as First Secretary. The Station will keep Headquarters advised of any indications of the nature of Subject's present duties and status within the KGB hierarchy.

3. During Subject's absence on home leave, LILYRIC reported that suspect KGB chauffeur Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV (201-273046) was seen driving Subject's car a few times. LICOWL-1 also reported that MIROSHNIKOV was driving a car with diplomatic plates 26-DA, which is Subject's car.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - CSB
1 - CWH

CS COPY FILED
IN 201-120123

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 30213	DATE 5 OCTOBER 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-120123

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; 1964 BLUE FORD
FAIRLANE, UTAH LICENSE AB 1966 AT
SOVIET EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY, MAR 30, 66

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SALT LAKE CITY)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
SEX M COB ?

201-773422
HMMA-29920
31 AUG 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
KNOWN KGB, SEEN DRIVING Y.N. GORLITSYNS
201-773422, CAR JUL 66

R 6609080479

FILE IN 201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

7. Mrs. MUELLER recently inherited some money from an uncle, VARROS said, and this is one of her ways of spending some of it.

8. MUELLER's daughter is studying (third-year of college) in Vienna. She is majoring in Russian language and Russian history there. That is where the "great interest" in Russia comes from, VARROS said. This daughter hopes to teach when she finishes school.

KUBARK ONLY

Distribution:
Orig: Charles G. MUELLER P-
~~1~~: Valentin LOGUINOV P-
1: 50-2-4/E

②

6 January 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

FROM: Oronsky

SUBJECT: LICANNY-1 (P-8415)

1. Subject is an official of Garza-Lopez Tours which is a representative for Inturist in Mexico City. We have had no contact with him since July 1964. At one time he had given the Station reports on various Soviet tourists and had been recruited prior to a trip to the Soviet Union in connection with Inturist. During the past few months he has been giving Don Lautz reports on various Soviet tourists such as the Soviet Orchestra which visited Mexico and Cuba recently. Lautz passed these reports on to me and Cynthia sent them home. Subject sees Lautz once or twice a week in connection with visa matters. He told Lautz that he had been contacted by KUBARK some years ago but that due to the pressure of his business he did not have time to write reports or to act as some sort of Double Agent. He said he was willing to pass along information on Soviet tourists but did not wish to become an agent for both the Americans and the Soviets. About a week ago Lautz told me that Subject had reported that Valentin LOGINOV, Vice-Consul at the Soviet Embassy, had asked Subject to supply him with information on boats and trains between Mexico and New York. Subject wanted to know what he should do. I asked Lautz if Subject wanted to talk to me and Don said that he did. I then arranged to meet him in Lautz's office at 1430 hours on 6 January.

cy to √P-885
P-11712

COPIES MADE

√P-8415

(P-11712)

2. Subject appears to be about 40-45 years old, 170 lbs., thinning redish hair, blue eyes, small brown mustache. He is well dressed and speaks native American English. I asked him about his contacts with the Soviets and he said that he had not had any extended contact with the Soviets for some time. During August 1965 he was approached by YATSKOV whom he knows as the Soviet Consul and was asked by him to prepare a chart of all commercial passenger ships operating between Veracruz and New York City "for the month of September". He also wanted the costs of travel and baggage. Subject has not given this report to YATSKOV. (A copy is attached.) During December he met LOGINOV for the first time at the airport while Subject was attending to the Soviet Orchestra. LOGINOV did not know Subject and was very cool toward him until YATSKOV came by and greeted Subject warmly. LOGINOV then became very friendly and asked Subject's name. LOGINOV subsequently visited Subject's place of business and told him that he was the replacement for Oleg NECHIPORENKO (KGB Officer) and that Oleg ~~ax~~ had sent regards to Subject. He said that he hoped that he and Subject would be as friendly as Subject had been with Oleg. (Subject commented that he had not been especially friendly with NECHIPORENKO.) Subject said that LOGINOV's Spanish is almost native and that he (Subject) was shocked to learn that he was a Soviet. LOGINOV referred to YATSKOV's request and added that he also wanted Subject to include rail travel in the chart and he was especially interested in the cost of "excess baggage" by rail. He also wanted to include sea travel from Veracruz to Europe.

3. Subject said that he did not want to become a D/A but that he would be willing to supply xxx whatever information he could concerning the Soviets he dealt with and the Soviet tourists. I asked if he would be ~~[illegible]~~ willing to supply personality data on LOGINOV including LOGINOV's background, education, family etc. He said that he would be glad to do this. He said that he would not be able to meet me on street corners or in restaurants and preferred to talk to me after he had finished his business with Don Lautz. I instructed him not to discuss his relationship with me with Don Lautz or with anyone else for that matter. axdxthak He said that he would call LOGINOV and arrange to give him the report and perhaps have lunch with him.

4. Subject will never be anything exceptional in the way of an Access agent but I have asked Headquarters to renew his POA.

CONFIDENTIAL

January 6, 1966

Mr. Boonstra
Minister-Counselor

A. Jay, C/VIS
Thru : A. Cortesimo, C.G.

Soviets desire for Travel Data.

LICANNY-1

A representative of Garza Lopez Tours, S.A. who has furnished reliable information in the past called on me today to report that Mr. Leguinov of the Soviet Embassy has requested his agency to provide data on train schedules from Mexico to New York City and boat schedules from New York City to Europe. The Soviets were particularly interested in the train baggage allowance and the cost for excess baggage, he said.

Leguinov is a replacement for Oleg Neciperenko who was recently transferred from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. My informant described him as tall, blond, blue-eyed, about thirty years of age, and as a person who speaks fluent Spanish without any accent.

cc: P/R

C/VIS:DCLautz:de

P-11712

CONFIDENTIAL

alice 3

notes

25 Nov

KADIDDLE might have been at Perla's Thanksgiving party. I know PRIKHODKO and KONSTANTINOV were invited, possibly KUCHEROV but I can't find the names of the others.

The description of the tall brunette sounds like LOGINOV. The other one sounds like PRIKHODKO I will get out photos to show DIDDLE.

ch

cy to Gonzalez P-11420
Andreyev P-8624
Loginov - P-11712
Prikhodko P-5510

29 Dec 1965

(1) Try to identify the two sons possibly Perla's [illegible] — C/O (2) EE Gonzalez Amlinger — Set pics for Stan

29 December

Contact Report: Meeting between Edgebrook and Kadiddle, 28 December

COS

On 28 December I called on Kadiddle at his residence, primarily for the purpose of setting up an elementary commo system ~~[illegible]~~, and to arrive at salary arrangemnets with him. Salary was fixed at £50 per month, (slightly above what Accra had suggested) ~~and~~ plus £100 allowance during the duration of his tour here as Ambassador. As he had previously requested, I returned to him his receipt for 35,000 pesos, which he instantly burnt in an ashtray, with obvious relief. He commented that he hoped he would never have to sign another, and it is clear that there may be some problem in working out a paid acknowledgement. I will leave it for later; will certify the 1 Jan payment, and try it on the following month. I asked him if he had been having problems with his conscience about taking money from the Americans, and he replied that he had not been able to sleep the night after our first payment, but after talking the whole matter over with his wife (the stronger personality of the two) he had finally resolved it in his mind: friends had to help one another, and if accepted the Americans as such - which he has always done - he should not be too proud to let them bail him out of a tight spot. "They were going to turn off the electricity, and there was only a thousand pesos left in our bank account".

For commo, we agreed to call in his wife and consult together. She was more than sensible about helping, recognized both the uses and dangers of the telephone, and made some useful suggestions. Personal contact, based on social relationship, is the basic arrangement, either at his house or mine. Telephone contact to be only between his wife and mine; if either of the two women call and suggest seeing one another at any hour between five and six, it means that either I am to call on Diddle at that time ~~hmmxx~~ or he on me, depending on the context of the conversation. Any other hour mentioned signifies social contact between the women themselves, who are, of course, available to pass written messages. Emergency contact

A-2270

can be made by Diddle himself, calling only from a pay telephone, never from his house or office.

In regard to CE affairs, Diddle made two comments which he suggested I might want to take up with Easby:

a. He asked me if I had met or talked with Noel Lindsay ~~at~~ (Vice President of Grant Advertising S A) at the dinner Diddle gave Christmas night, and on learning that I had, he commented that Lindsay's cultivation of him had been so assiduous that he was beginning to wonder if he was not dealing with someone who might be visualizing himself as his future British case officer. There was something about Lindsay, he said, that made him feel that he was assessing Diddle quite carefully. He asked if we could run a file check on Lindsay himself and on Grant Advertising. I said I would check.

b. Pearl Gonzalez has been pursuing him much too actively; asking him to her house out of turn, wanting to do a profile on him for the English language News, of which she is the Society Editor. What a perfect cover for acquiring bio data, he explained, and what odd friends she had for an American, (she is listed as a US national in the Anglo-American directory, and is, according to Diddld, either separated or divorced from a Mexican husband) newspaper woman or not. One evening a month or so ago, he had gone to dinner at her house, found most of the other guests sped on their way rather unceremoniously, and was left with only Mrs Gonzalez and two men, who~~m~~, he found to his surprise, were both Russians (names not recalled, and never very clearly given during the initial flurry of introductions). These two engaged him in serious conversation:

Russians: How do you feel about Communism?

Diddle: There is something to be said for many if not all the important systems under which various countries are governed; however my primary concerns is not with Communism in the abstract, but with the best way for Ghana to be governed. We must take the best of all, and fit ~~them~~ it to our country.

Russians: No, no, the question is what do you think personally about Communism? What are your own beliefs?

Diddle: (getting the wind up at this point) Primarily, I must be described as a nationalist.

LOGINOV One of the Russians was very tall, brunette, wavy thick hair, aged about 38 not obviously Russian in appearance, very good-looking. The

PRIKHODKO other was middle height, deep lines running from the corners of his nose vertically down his cheeks, not so handsome, age about 42. Diddle has not seen them since, although he has kept an eye out for them, cursing himself for not having their names. Conversation in English - which is about all Diddle has, other than Fani and some German. He believes he would be able to identify them from photographs.

Diddle's point in reviewing this ~~xx~~ was not to let me know that there were Russians looking him over-we both well aware of that - but to point up Mrs Gonzales's role as a spotter. He does not think that she could have been unwitting of the role she was playing, and has avoided her since.

Regarding Andreyev, he suggested that I cultivate him, and on being told that I planx a dinner on 8 Jan (to which Diddle invited) for about 18 people, he commented that it would be an excellent opportunity to ~~axk~~ ask Andreyev as well. Doubtful, of course, that he would accept, but no opportunity to continue his exposure to us should be overlooked. He made the usual comments concerning Andreyev's differences from his colleagues, adding only that A had told him that he was basically internationalist in outlook. As others, he senses something wrong in A's relationship with his wife. (Comment: I ~~did~~ do not, as yet. She did not appear comfortable in a large group of people she did not know, dancing to music she clearly did not like: twist, frug & cetera, but they seemed to be on good enough terms. He was pushing her join in, but not impatiently)

Diddle asked for EEI's on the tri-continental congress; a number of Ghanians will be transiting Mexico on their way to and from Havana; he ~~xxxxxx~~ specifically mentioned Dendorkenoo, whom he described as an anti-

Nkrumah Ghanian employed as a civil servant at the UN, and not someone he would have expected to be named as a delegate to the Conference, and John Tettegah, whom he said was a "crypto-democrat" at heart, and not the anti-westerner he is usually described as being. What Tettegah used to be, and what he really is at the present time are two quite different things. He has become a friend, says Kw-b, although he cannot appear as such.

I told him that Rattesey would be coming on the sixth, more or less, and that I would get him a list of requirements for the Conference.

Cys Musgrave
White
Dillon ✓
files: P- 11070

SECRET

Date: December 21, 1965

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

From: N. L. Ferris
Legal Attache

Subject: TRAVEL OF SOVIETS TO MAZATLAN
105-4900 (12/21/65)

Dillon
(file?)

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Ann E G

Reference is made to your memorandum dated November 5, 1965, your #9833, and my memorandum dated November 24, 1965.

A reliable source stated that Vice Consul VALENTIN S. LOGINOV, Third Secretary of the Russian Embassy, had been at Mazatlan, Sinaloa, Mexico, to bring mail to the Russian ship ISKATEL and had left Mazatlan on December 8, 1965, on CMA jet flight #911 at 3:45 p.m., en route to Mexico, D. F.

This same source stated that the above person had been at Mazatlan to visit a Russian ship, believed to have been the VENUSHTYELNYI, in November, 1965.

copy to CI

File

SECRET
Group I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: December 21, 1965

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

From: N. L. Ferris
Legal Attache

Subject: Russian Ship ISKATEL
105-4976 (12/21/65)

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its [illegible] disseminated [illegible] authorization.

A confidential source at Mazatlan, Sinaloa, Mexico, advised that the Russian ship ISKATEL arrived at Mazatlan on December 3, 1965, and departed on December 9, 1965. This ship was listed as being a scientific motor ship and carried a crew of 32.

The above source made available a copy of the crew list of this vessel, which is enclosed.

A second confidential source at Mazatlan stated that Vice Consul VALENTIN S. LOGINOV, Third Secretary of the Russian Embassy, had been at Mazatlan to bring mail to this ship and had left Mazatlan on December 8, 1965, on CMA jet flight #911 at 3:45 p.m., en route to Mexico, D. F.

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

14 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

FROM: Oronsky

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

1. I met Subject on Friday, 11 February at 1900 hours. The meeting was a very short one since I only wanted to determine if he had found a girl for SILNIKOV to "paint". He said he was still looking.

2. The boy who watches Subject's store at night did not show up on 7 February and Subject was forced to sleep above the store himself. At 0300 hours on Tuesday (8 February) he was awakened by the noise of a car horn and looked from the window to see Valentin S. LOGINOV and Vladislav S. KORMUSHKIN blowing the horn of their car in the driveway of the Embassy. Both Soviets were drunk and were yelling for the gate guard (who happened to be SILNIKOV) to open the gate for them. They were driving car 337-D (LEONOV's) or 336-D (KORMUSHKIN's). Subject returned to his bed and did not see them leave the Embassy.

3. Since both LOGINOV and KORMUSHKIN live in apartments outside the Embassy and since they would not willingly go to the Embassy at 3 a.m. while drunk, it is likely that they were working when they got drunk and therefore had no fear of being reprimanded for it. They may have returned to the Embassy to make a report or to secure some classified materials before going home. Both men replaced known KGB officers and both work under Pavel YATSKOV.

[illegible]

4. I set our next meeting 24 February.

COPIES MADE

P 11712

[illegible]

LIMITED, 7 Feb 1966

Man driving black Opel with plates 22-82-62 of DF was at Soviet Embassy 1707-1740 hours this date. LOGINOV saw him to the gate. (re visa???)

(Woman sat in car)



Placa Nº 22-82-62-Expediente Nº M/552/421521-Opel-170394385-Sedán modelo 1962 dado de alta en Marzo 10 de 1965 a nombre de CELIA BAYARDI TORRES con domicilio en las calles de Arquitectos Nº 46 de la colonia Escandón en Tacubaya D. F.

SECRET

3 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris,
Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviet

1. This office has received a report that the Soviet Vice-Consul in Mexico City, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, planned to fly to Mazatlan, Sinaloa on 1 February 1966 and remain there until 5 February 1966 in order to attend to the Soviet ship "Vnushitelnyy," which was scheduled to dock in Mazatlan at 0800 hours on 2 February 1966.

2. Any information available to you on LOGINOV's trip would be appreciated.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

10097

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - 50-2-4/A
1 - P-11712
1 - Ruth Leach

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AP

Amaral file

①

27 Jan 1966

MEMO FOR RECORD

FROM: Marvin A. Cibot

SUBJECT: Soviet Attendance at PRI Lecture.

1. On the evening of 26 Jan 1966 the following Soviet Embassy officers were identified as attending ~~xx~~ a lecture given by Prof. Jose VAZQUEZ Amaral on the subject of "The Experiences of a Mexican Professor in a University in the United States."; Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV and Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV. KUZNETSOV was seated on the dais behind the principal speaker. LOGINOV was seated in the rear portion of the audience. There were six U.S. Embassy officers present.

P-11712
P-8102

P-11712

SECRET

21 January 1966

White

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : COS

SUBJECT : Valentin LOGUINOV

1. On 21 January 1966 Mr. George VARROS, Security Officer, U.S. Embassy, allowed me to make copies of the attached documents.

2. VARROS said he would, unless we asked the contrary:

a. Tell Cristobal TORRES Ponce not to show up for the meeting on 24 January with LOGUINOV.

b. Ask TORRES Ponce to report any and all subsequent approaches.

Would the hand-writing specimen be sufficient to send to HQS for analysis. W—

Distribution:
Orig w/att: Valentin LOGUINOV P-
1 w/att: Cristobal TORRES Ponce P-
1 w/o : 50-2-4/E

On basis this contact we can now ~~Saf~~ Safely list LOGINOV as KGB

no, not sufficient

~~Scott~~

SECRET

Files P_11712

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Regional Security Officer

DATE: January 21, 1966

FROM : Francisco Díaz Gómez, Sr. Security Assistant

SUBJECT: Cristobal TORRES Ponce - Embassy Chauffeur

Yesterday noon Mr. TORRES came up to my office and reported that he was sent to the Russian Embassy in order to pick up Miss. MUELLER's passport and that he was approached by Valentin S. LOGUINOV, 3rd. Secretary, who asked him if he would like to go to Russia and that if he would like to receive Ressian magazines and that if the U.S. Embassy uses to send somebody to follow its employees when they go some place in town , and that this individual finally invited Mr. TORRES to have supper with him next Monday, January 24, 1966, and that they will meet one each other at the corner Insurgentes Sur with Baja California, under big advertisement "CANADA", at 1830 hours.

Mr. TORRES also commented that this individual told him that in order to get a Visa for Russia, takes time, because they have to call Russia in order to get authorization, same process the U.S. Embassy does when the Russian Embassy requests a visa for one of the members of its Staff.

fdg/-

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Valentin S. Loguinov

~ Lunes: 24 -

Insgtes y Baja California
Cineda
6 1/2 pm.

SECRET

17 January 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD KuBARK ONLY

FROM : COS

SUBJECT : Charles G. MUELLER, U.S. Embassy (Economics Section) Officer

1. Reference is made to LIENVOY (three conversations on 12 and 13 January 1966) reports of conversations of Subject with Valentin LOUGINOV, Soviet Embassy Officer, and conversations of Mrs. Edith STENSBY (Citizenship, U.S. Embassy) with Soviets concerning a proposed visit by Subject's wife and daughter to the USSR.

2. Paul Dillon and I advised Minister Boonstra (who was Acting Charge) on 14 January 1966 of this proposed visit and of the conversations we had learned about.

3. Mr. Boonstra had not previously heard of this proposed visit of Mrs. MUELLER to the USSR. He said he would (without divulging CAS as the source) look into this.

4. Later on 14 January 1966, Mr. George VARROS told me of the proposed trip. He said the Ambassador had personally approved it (Mr. Boonstra later also confirmed this).

5. VARROS also said he thought it "not good" for Mrs. MUELLER to make such a trip. He said (Confidentially) that she gets really drunk quite often and she talks about anything and everything she knows about. For example, she told at a party (when she was practically "blotto") about MUELLER's "taking pictures all over Mexico for CIA!"

6. VARROS will give Mrs. MUELLER a pre-briefing (defensive briefing) just prior to her departure. She will (and VARROS thinks this is wrong) be travelling on a diplomatic passport.

SECRET

P 1/7/2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	RI FILE NO.
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / DATE
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM / DATE OF INFO. / EVALUATION
ANALYST / DATE PROCESSED	DISSEMINATED IN / DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE | TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

LOGINOV, VALENTINE S.
201-285412
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
3RD SECY. VICE CONSUL.

050-008-010
HMMA-28372
24 FEB 66
A01 P1

R 6603082384

FILE IN 201-285412

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-285412

Wednesday, 6 April: SILNIKOV arrived about 1330 hrs and had a drink of tequila. While there, a high level Soviet came into the shop and after he had left SILNIKOV told him that the Soviet is studying Spanish in the Embassy. (This followed Subject's comment to SILNIKOV that the Soviet spoke very good Spanish). SILNIKOV said that each Wednesday all the Soviets must speak Spanish and those who refuse to do this must pay a fine. With the fine money they buy more Spanish booklets and records. SILNIKOV said that there are some Soviets who simply refuse to learn Spanish or Mexican customs and that these people will probably not be sent abroad again. Commented that this would be a shame since Mexico has such excellent beaches, weather and everything is so inexpensive here. He left the shop about 1430 hrs. Subject was about to close his shop at 2100 hrs when Valentin S. LOGINOV came into the store. He asked if he could use Subject's phone and then made a long distance call to Cuernavaca and spoke to someone in Spanish. Subject could not hear what was being said but got the phone number - Cuernavaca 2-30-65. (I told Subject to bring me the phone bill when it arrives so that I can double check the number.)

Source: LICOWL-1
Contact report 12 April 66

P-11,712

SECRET

25 March 1966

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Dr. Ernst GOEBEL

1. Subject called me on 23 March to report that he had learned a little which might interest me. We made an appointment to meet in his office at 1700 the same day. The meeting lasted for 20 minutes.

2. Subject stated that at 1200 hours on Sunday, 20 March, LOGINOV came to the French Club. He was accompanied by his wife whose salient features were redish hair which could be died and very generous proportions, "a typically stout Russian woman." Theye was also another Soviet couple with them. The man was described as very blond, boyish haircut with a part, not quite as tall as LOGINOV (ca 5'9"), with a solid muscular build, like a weight lifter. His apparent age was 25 to 35. His wife was dark haired, normal figure and also young. The two couples had three children with them all in the 4-6 bracket. Subject did not remember their sexes since he was concentrating on the adults. (COMMENT: I first thought that the second Soviet would be KORMUSHKIN but Subject insisted that he did not wear glasses (KORMUSHKIN always wears glasses). However, Subject's description fits GORLITSYN and wife perfectly. I will take pictures to the next meeting for confirmation.

3. Subject stated that upon arrival the two men went into the locker room and emerged in shorts. The women were already dressed in shorts. They had their own badminton rackets and repaired to a side lawn where they played badminton until Subject left at 1330. During the period 1200 to 1330 they did not contact anybody but simply played badminton among themselves.

4. Upon leaving Subject spotted LOGINOV's car in the parking lot noting the make, color and license plates.

5. Subject was apologetic about the paucity of his information but I encouraged him and told him it was a fine start. Subject said that he had briefed his wife on LOGINOV and she will be on the lookout for him during the week. Subject appeared to be very much interested in pursuing this subject for me and gave every indication that he will keep working on it.

Paul Dillon

File: P-12330
P-11712
P-11163

SECRET

SECRET

22 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris, Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Soviet Intelligence Services
65-465

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence concerning the captioned subject.

2. A sensitive and reliable source advised that on Tuesday, 1 March 1966 an unidentified young girl who appeared to be an American visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from 1202 to 1218 hours. Source advised that the girl spoke to Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, First Secretary of the Embassy and with Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, Third Secretary and Vice Consul of the Embassy. Both are KGB officers. While talking to these two Soviets she was seen to write something in a notebook which she carried inside a folder. Attached is a photograph of this girl.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

10263

Attachment: Photo
Distribution:
Original - Addressee, w/att.
1 - 50-2-4/A, w/att.
1 - 50-8-10/11, w/att.
1 - P-8102, w/o att.
1 - P-11712, w/o att.
1 - Memo Chron

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

LOGINOV w/o att.

File P-

18 March 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/LICOOKY-5
18 Mar 1730, Subj's office

[illegible] Copenhagen & Paris

1. Subj reported that on 16 Mar he was called at his office by Valentin Loginov, who said he just wanted to have lunch with Subj and talk. Loginov wanted to set the luncheon for 17 Mar, but Subj demurred and the meet was set for 18 Mar. They went to the Meson La Borda Restaurant on Bolivar Calle (incidentally, Loginov paid the check, being more prone to take the tab than his predecessor Aleksandr Prikhodko).

They talked for two hours, most of that time taken up by Loginov in a review of the world situation for Subj. Loginov intimated to Subj that he wanted Subj to be au courant and in the know on political events. He spoke of the Sino-Soviet split, mentioning the widely known reasons for the split but commenting specifically from the Soviet viewpoint on the Chinese hero-worship of Mao Tse Tung, the impulsiveness and belligerency of China as compared with the Soviet Union's genuine policy of seeking peace. He mentioned that China had had a break in the past two years by having abundant harvests. He said that hardly a Communist Party in the world now supports Red China, mentioning specifically as those that do the Australian, New Zealand and Viet Nam parties.

He commented at length on the Indonesian situation, blaming the Chinese for having reduced Communist strength in that country. He said that a hundred thousand Communists in Indonesia had been killed since last October.

In like vein he commented adversely against the Chinese in the recent overthrow of Nkruma in Ghana.

He spoke of the upcoming Congress of the CPSU at which he said would be announced a program for more consumer goods, lower prices, etc. for the Soviet people. In this connection he made certain comments about Khrushchev, stating that Khrushchev had done many good things for his country but that he was a man who relied too much on his fallible judgment.

He commented about France. He said nothing about the U.S. /Comment: The C.O. asked Subj to prepare a precis on the topics covered and the main points that Loginov made about them/.

2. Re operational matters Loginov asked Subj if he had prepared the answers about the personalities in the Foreign Office and the Registro Civil. Subj said he hadn't, and Loginov asked him to have them ready for their next meet.

COPIES MADE

cy to P-11712

CARDED

P-2712

P-11712

Subj told Loginov about an upcoming trip to Copenhagen, which he is to undertake in behalf of the Chief of Mexican Tourism, Agustin Salvat (see attached letter). Loginov asked Subj, if he were in Paris, to look up Ginette Palacci Porter, wife of the British NATO official. Subj said he wasn't sure of being in Paris, but he would try to see her if he goes there. /Comment: Subj plans to leave Mexico on 23 Mar, travel to Brussels and Amsterdam, be in Copenhagen for the Congress on Congress Organizations from 30 Mar to 2 Apr, continue on business to Vienna and Paris. There is no set date for his return/.

Loginov inquired if any of the employees of Subj's office spoke English, indicating that if they did they might be able to gain employment at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico. Subj volunteered nor ready information to Loginov about his employees.

Loginov said he would call Subj for their next meet.

3. The C.O. told Subj to prepare a superficial personality resumé on the persons wanted by Loginov (this for prior submission to the Station). Also, while in Paris, if it is not too much trouble, try to see Ginette Palacci for the purpose of having some little to report to Loginov (naturally pre-checked by the Station) and also for the Station's benefit to discern if the Soviets abroad had made any overtures to her.

4. Subj parenthetically remarked to the C.O., in a loosely defined manner of showing the activity of the Israeli Embassy in Mexico, that there was to be a Congress of Intellectuals in Mexico with about fifty participants from all over Latin America. The major theme of the Congress was to be The Situation of the Jews and Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, but the theme was being held under cover as far as all advance publicity was concerned. (Attached is the announcement card for the Congress). Subj's firm is handling the arrangements.

5. The C.O. will contact Subj on 22 Mar prior to his departure abroad.

CARDED

PSM

Addendum: Subj remarked to the C.O. after his long talk with Loginov that he regarded Loginov as a better intelligence official than Prikhodko, much more savvy, and that he must have been in the intelligence game longer than Prikhodko. Subj said that Loginov had told him that he would show Subj pictures of the places he had been in Latin America.

COPIES MADE

SECRET

16 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Dr. Ernst GOEBEL

1. Upon receipt of POA on Subject, I called him at his office (Auxiliar de la Construccion, SA, Holbein 168, tel: 43-31-36) on 11 March 1965 and made an appointment to see him at 1800 on 14 March at the office. Since I had met him socially in the fall of 1965, he remembered me which facilitated the contact.

2. I met with him from 1800 to 1835 at his office. He took me to a back office where we conducted the conversation. I stated my business briefly - that I knew LOGINOV was a member of the French Club and I desired information about his activities and contacts at the club. He was in immediate agreement to help me in any way he could. I have him LOGINOV's full name, physical description, type and license plate of his car and showed him pictures of LOGINOV and his wife.

3. Subject said that he had not seen LOGINOV at the club nor heard his name. He is sure that LOGINOV is not a tennis player which is Subject's only occupation at the club. Subject said he only goes there on Saturday afternoons and Sunday mornings to play tennis. However, his wife often goes during the week with the children. Subject agreed that both he and his wife would look out for LOGINOV. At my suggestion he agreed to make inquiries about LOGINOV from Club employees such as the manager or the bar tender who know everybody. He agreed to mask his interest by stating only he had heard that a Russian was a member and to express normal curiosity about this unusual fact.

4. Subject immediately agreed to my request that this subject be a matter of strictest confidence between himself, his wife and me (his wife is an American citizen whom I have met and on whom we also have a POA). As I was leaving and thanking him for his cooperation, he expressed his appreciation in the confidence that I had in him in a matter of this nature.

5. Towards the end of the conversation he asked if I worked with Al White at the Embassy. I said "no, but I know him." He answered, "of course, you would be with counter-

intelligence and he is in political work." I agreed with this. He did not appear to be the least suspicious about Allan. He said he knew him through their wives (cancer work) and the children and remarked that Allan speaks pretty good German. Other than his telling me that I work in counter-intelligence, he did not ask any questions about my position in the Embassy.

6. Subject made a very good impression; direct, businesslike and no nonsense. He said that he would call me in tow or three weeks to advise the results of his investigation.

Paul Dillon

(2

~~Scott~~ A.
Dillon Nos.?
~~[illegible]~~
WCB
Cynthia B

Rec'd: 9 march

SECRET

ABSTRACTED

Date: March 7, 1966

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

From: N. L. Ferris
Legal Attache

Subject: SOVIET SHIPS VISITING MEXICAN PORTS
105-5156 (3/7/66)

Reference is made to your memorandum entitled "Travel of Soviets," dated February 3, 1966, your number 10097.

Enclosed herewith for reference are copies of the crew list of the Soviet ship "Vnushitelnyi."

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the above ship arrived in the harbor at Mazatlan, Sinaloa, on February 2, 1966, and remained there until 3:30 P.M., on February 5, 1966.

According to this source, VALENTINE S. LOGINOV, a Third Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR, visited the ship, arriving by air from Mexico City and was staying at the Hotel Freeman in Mazatlan. According to this source, national intelligence operatives in Mazatlan reported LOGINOV had no contacts while in the city except with the ship's crew. No attempt was made by the Soviets to introduce propaganda material from the ship.

Enclosures (2)

Copy (11712

INDEX

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Files

SECRET
Group 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

ARDED

200-4-79

P-11712

③

SECRET

On February 21, 1966, PEDRO ZARATE MARMOLEJO, Commandant of the Customs Guard, Maritime Customs Office, Mazatlan, Sinaloa, advised that his men have been carefully watching the elements of the Soviet whaling fleet that are currently visiting Mazatlan. They have been alerted to the importation of any propaganda or contraband, but, as yet, nothing has transpired. When the flagship of the Soviet whaling fleet arrived recently, there was no one aboard who spoke Spanish or English, and the Captain seemed to be completely lacking in instructions about documents in order to enter the harbor. He did not have the necessary papers prepared. A Soviet Embassy official was sent from Mexico City in order to straighten matters out.

ZARATE said that the purpose of the visit of the whaling ships was to take on fresh water and supplies. The crews were also given liberty.

Also enclosed herewith for reference are copies of the crew list of the Soviet vessel "Iskatel" which visited Mazatlan on January 9, 1966.

In connection with the visit of the "Iskatel," it is noted that a Soviet Embassy car, believed to contain Soviet Commercial Consul GEORGIY STEPHANOVICH VISKO and USSR Embassy chauffeur VASILIY STEPHANOVICH MIROSHNIKOV, was observed on the highway leading to Mazatlan on January 11, 1966, and was subsequently observed on January 14, 1966, in Mazatlan.

This office is attempting to obtain the crew list of the Soviet whaling vessels that have visited Mazatlan during February, 1966, and will make them available when obtained.

1 cc - Naval Attache
(Enclosure 1)

P-6518

Copies to P file

P-8017

SECRET

CARDED

3 March 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/LICOZY-5
3 March 1700, Subject's office

1. Subj reported that on Tuesday, 22 Feb, he was visited by Valentin Loginov, his new case officer, who dropped in without prior notification to arrange flight accommodations for Nicolai Khlebnikov and for Prigova and daughter for [illegible]. Loginov wanted to talk, but Subj said he had to make an appointment and hastily arranged a luncheon meet for 23 Feb 1400 at the La Borda Restaurant on Bolivar Street. /Comment: Subj stated that he called in to the Station on 23 Feb after the luncheon. Had the C.O. ~~been apprised~~ of this call, the Station probably would have received the advance notice re Khlebnikov and his Soviet flight companions/

2. Loginov came to Subj's office on 23 Feb and together they went to the La Borda Restaurant.

Loginov repeated Aleksandr Prikhodko's interest in Subj's health and offered to send the report on Subj's condition from the Temple Clinic to Moscow. Subj asked Loginov why he wanted the report, and Loginov answered "we want to take care of your health." /Comment: Subj will not comply/.

Loginov startled Subj by asking what he knew about the super-secret Jewish organization "Pluga" /Comment: Subj explained to the C.O. that "Pluga" was formed all over Latin America after the arrest of Eichmann had caused Nazi-like anti-Semitic organizations to spring into being in the Latin countries. Jews formed "Pluga" (which is a Hebrew word meaning some kind of military unit) in order to receive military training. Subj knows about the organization through his contacts in the Israeli Embassy in Mexico although he is not a member. He gauges the Mexican contingent at about 25 to 30. The Israeli Govt sent an organizer and instructor to Mexico. Members have gone from Mexico to Israel for training (Subj knows because he handled their travel arrangements)./ Loginov stated that he would like to know about the members of "Pluga", because "it would be interesting if this organization could work for them (the Soviets)". Loginov was pleased with Subj's remark that the organization was militantly anti-Nazi. Subj indicated without too much enthusiasm that he would do what he could.

Loginov put another request to Subj in a rather desultory manner, asking Subj's cooperation if Subj " wants to, can or will" comply. Loginov remarked

COPIES MADE

P-11712

that "We know that you have friends among the French officials in the French Embassy" and wanted Subj to find out the reaction of these officials to a) De Gaulle's declaration against the U.S. in Viet Nam b) De Gaulle's views on French withdrawal from NATO and c) a third point that Subj could not recall. Subj said he would try. /Comment: Subj does know well the French Press Attache, but he didn't tell that to Loginov/.

Loginov told Subj that the Soviets were anxious to recruit someone in the Secretariat of Gobernación, some "small guy", and that Subj should spot the person for them. Subj said he would think about it.

Loginov requested information about the employees who worked for Subj. Subj named most of the employees in his office, and gave the briefest of details about them. Subj was nonplussed by the question, but he did not ask Loginov why he wanted the information. /Comment: Subj expressed to the C.O. his fear that the Soviets might try to recruit someone in his office, and for that reason thought it best for the C.O. to limit his personal calls to the office. The C.O. agreed on the need for caution on general principles, but thought it unlikely that Loginov would so blatantly advertise his intentions of subverting Subj's personnel. Nevertheless, the C.O. suggested to Subj that this might constitute a "sore point" in Subj's relations with Loginov and be exploited as an irritating factor for the future/. Loginov did not write down the names of the employees.

Loginov brought up the answers to Prikhodko's questions. Subj said they weren't ready. Loginov asked if Subj could have them by next time. Subj said he would try.

/Comment: For all the above requests the C.O. instructed Subj to do nothing, explaining that we were awaiting definitive word from Washington on the course of the operation. Subj is prepared for the eventuality that we may wish to break off his relation to the Soviets/.

3. Subj asked Loginov directly if this were his first job abroad. Loginov replied that he had been in Latin America for a couple of years, and mentioned specifically Panama, Colombia, Ecuador and Chile. When Subj remarked that the Soviets didn't have official representation in these countries, Loginov answered that he had been in commercial missions and other missions. Subj stated it as his impression, because Loginov mentioned having been in the jungles and in provincial towns, that Loginov had been on special missions of sabotage.

Subj [illegible] asked Loginov if he knew about "the [illegible]" (for the [illegible]). Loginov said he did, and that "we are [illegible] [illegible] in very near future to have a [illegible] [illegible] from home."

The C.O. asked Subj how he sized up Loginov. Subj said he wanted more time to formulate his impressions, but noted that Loginov is not "tonto", speaks slowly, and uses the soft approach.

4. Subj moved to his new condominio apartment on 26 February. The telephone is [illegible]-14-40. The address, already reported to the Station, is Av. Cumbres de Acultzingo 20 Dep. 602, Lomas Altas, Mexico 10 D.F.

5. Subj was annoyed that at his last call-in on 3 March to ext. 370 he was asked his name. He refused to give it, believing he was sufficiently identified by asking for Herb. The C.O. recommends that the latter be accepted to designate the caller in this instance.

[illegible]

COPIES MADE

(2)

P 11712

19 February 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOOKY-5
18 Feb 1230, Subject's office

1. At the time of delivering to Subj on the evening of 15 Feb a case of wine that he had requested, the C.O. permitted Subj, at the latter's suggestion, to make a "rush-in" show for his meet with Aleksandr Prikhodko on 16 Feb at Sanborns Restaurant, Insurgentes, at 0900.

2. Subj reported on 18 Feb the story of his brush-off meet with Sasha on 16 Feb. He told Sasha, whom he found standing to the side of the restaurant in Sanborns, that he was sick, and had got up out of a sick bed against his wife's instructions, just to show Sasha that he wasn't trying to avoid a meeting - but, he was too sick to stay. Sasha accompanied Subj outside and walked with him toward Subj's home. Sasha told Subj to submit to him the findings of the Temple Clinic on Subj's illness, and he would forward them to Moscow (for medical advice). /Comment: Subj has no intention of doing so/.

Subj told Sasha that he had spoken to Jacobo Zabludovsky about Sasha's questions on U.S. nuclear policy, and that Zabludovsky had just laughed at him for putting such naive, silly questions. Zabludovsky had said that everyone knows of U.S. interest in curbing the spread of nuclear power. Sasha laughed, and said that was only newspaper talk.

Subj expressed concern to Sasha as to why he had been turned over to Valentin Loginov. Sasha repeated his previous statement that Loginov had more opportunity for outside contact, even visits to Subj's office as part of his natural consular duties. Further, the changeover had been ordered by their superiors. Sasha said that Loginov would get in touch with Subj.

3. The C.O. found out that when Subj had mentioned Echeverria to Sasha at an earlier meet as being a seeker for the presidency of Mexico, Sasha had shown great interest.

The C.O. asked Subj if there were any activity on travel to the Soviet Union (for the purpose of discovering if Subj would bring up the name of Maria de la Paz Cervantes, a Sabena airline employee interested in travel to the Soviet Union). Subj replied that some members of the Jewish community in Mexico were inquiring about a trip to the Soviet Union.

4. Subj is to call in whenever he hears from Loginov about a meet.

PRM

Notes: Subj, in anticipation of his housewarming of his new apt, requests that by April (or during April) we procure for him 1 case of Scotch, 1 case of Cognac, a case of White Wine, and a case of Red - if it is possible. The C.O. suggests gradual accumulation of this lot over the next two months.

P-11712

15 February 1966

SUBJ: Contact Report/ [illegible]-5
8 Feb, Subj's office; 14 Feb, La Pergola Restaurant 2000

1. On 8 Feb the C.O. visited Subj's office briefly to advise him how to [illegible] with the next meet with Aleksandr Prikhodko, when the latter had initiated their meeting. Especially, Subj was to give Sasha a "hard time."

2. On 10 Feb in a telephonic double-talked conversation Subj advised the C.O. that Sasha had called his office on 9 Feb, asked if he were going to be brushed off further, and insisted on a meet for 11 Feb 0900 breakfast at Sanborns [illegible]. The C.O. told Subj to go ahead with the meet, and follow the line agreed upon.

3. On 14 Feb Subj reported to the C.O. the results of his meet with Sasha on 11 Feb at Sanborn's Restaurant. Subj found Valentin Loginov, the Soviet Consul, with Sasha. The latter told Subj that since he has little work that takes him outside of the SovEmb, he is turning Subj over to Valentin who will henceforth be Subj's contact. Subj, who had met Valentin once before at the SovEmb, jokingly replied that that was all right with him, Valentin was a nice guy- much better than Sasha. Sasha, however, carried the ball for most of the balance of the meet.

Sasha complained because Subj had not yet brought the answers to his questions. Subj replied by ripping into Sasha in turn with complaints of why he hadn't done the answers- his sickness, his visit to Temple, Texas clinic, the findings of the clinic, his business at the office, etc.

Subj followed this with the burden of his complaints about the Soviets, which was that while he was willing to do services for the Soviets, he was fed up with the "junk" assignments they were handing him; he wants to do what is concrete and important. Sasha started to soothe him in the same old way about how important the little things were, etc., but Subj cut him off. At about this time, Valentin chimed in by saying that he and Sasha just pass along to Subj the tasks they receive from higher up, and that it is up to Subj to tell them if he will or will not accomplish them. Subj agreed to that principle.

Sasha then startled Subj by asking directly why it was that Subj was working for the Soviet Union. Subj answered candidly that he didn't really know why- and said the Soviets knew he was not ideologically with them. Sasha seized on that to say that was just the way the Soviets wanted it- Subj was right not to

COPIES MADE

P-11712

show any enthusiasm for the Soviet Union or Communism, etc. Subj continued, however, to state that he felt a comradeship with the Soviets because of their past association during the toughest part of his life when they faced a common enemy (referring to his Partisan fighting days against the Germans). He said also that it looks as if the Soviets are going to win out in the future, and he wants to be on the side of the victors.

Sasha then went on to ask Subj to do certain things for him. He would like the answers to the questions at the next meeting. He asked Subj to check with his friend, Jacobo Zabludovsky, the newspaperman, why it is that the U.S. is supporting Mexico's stand on de-nuclearization, and why the U.S. is for control of nuclear power at Geneva. Also, he was to sound Zabludovsky out on who was lining up as candidate for the next President of Mexico. ~~XX~~ Re the latter, Subj told Sasha and Valentin the story he had already turned in to the Station: that Echeverria, of Gobernación, was trying to line up five Jews in the Jewish Community of Mexico to support his candidature for the presidency.

Sasha set the next meet for 15 Feb 0900 again at Sanborns Restaurant on Insurgentes, and said that Valentin would not be there because he was going to be in Veracruz on that date.

4. Subj told the C.O. that some time ago when Sasha agreed to get Cuban cigars for Subj he told Subj that Soviet couriers no longer transit Mexico to Havana, but that they go direct from Moscow. [illegible]

Subj also mentioned that Pavel Yatskov had booked passage at Subj's office last week for a trip to Mazatlan and Manzanillo.

5. The C.O. at first okayed the meet with Sasha set for 15 Feb, and instructed Subj not to bring the answers. Further, he was to throw the Zabludovsky bit right back at Sasha as being too ridiculous to put to a knowing newspaperman what was common knowledge about U.S. policy on nuclearization. Then, in Valentin's absence, Subj was to express concern to Sasha about being given a contact who probably didn't know what the score was on everything that had gone before in Subj's work, etc. Lastly, Subj could mention to Sasha that he was reading the Penkovskiy Papers, and he couldn't see how a Soviet so high up in Intelligence could turn sour.

COPIES MADE

After checking with Francis Coyne, it was decided to continue on the tack of annoying Sasha and therefore have Subj miss his next meeting. Subj was later apprised of the change in plans, and will not show up on 15 Feb or 16 Feb.

6. Subj advised the C.O. on 15 Feb that Sasha had called to find out why Subj had missed his meet, and put the screws on for 16 Feb. The C.O. told Subj to be no show on 16 Feb. Subsequently [illegible] meet.

PRL

Source: LICOWL-1
Contact Report 24 June 66

Monday, 6 June. Subject visited the Embassy twice this day but nothing of interest occured. LOGINOV came in and made a phone call and talked to someone about volleyball. LOGINOV spoke in Spanish and told the other party that he would be over to "the house" in half an hour. Subject saw him drive away in his car.

P-11,712

23 June 1966

35-71-30 is listed to Yolanda ALFARO Vda de CACERES Butrago
Chiapas 130-A

No Station traces on above name or on Gloria ALFARO.

ch

Request visa trace:

Yolanda ALFARO Vda de CACERES Butrago
(lives at Chiapas 130-A)
If possible, also Gloria ALFARO at same address.

C

NO RECORD
23 June 66

CARDED

index

index
MOP

668- Entrada.- 1319 hrs.- MF por LOGUINOV. KARZHIN dice que espere un momento. Despues MF señora ALFARO recuerda a LOGUINOV que ella lo conoció en la noche de la Navidad pasada en casa de la señora SOTO. LOGUINOV la recuerda, apesar de que ha pasado tiempo. ALFARO lo quiere invitar a una reunión el sabado próximo. LOGUINOV no podrá aceptar porque es dia que ellos organizan ... ... una velada dentro de la embajada entre los compañeros. ALFARO que es una lastima. LOGUINOV pregunta su nombre completo. MF que es GLORIA ALFARO y que ella quiere platicar al menos mañana por la mañana y poder saludarlo. LOGUINOV dice que podrá ser el viernes porque mañana tiene por la mañana sus clases de ingles; asi que podrá ser el viernes en algún lugar de la ciudad para tomar un café y en todo caso le puede llamar por teléfono para presisar mas tarde. GLORIA que es el 35-71-30 que es de su casa. LOGUINOV le llamará entonces despues para fijar una cita. GLORIA que ella trabaja doce horas al día pero casi nunca está en su casa; así que mejor le llamará mañana mismo. LOGUINOV que está bien y que si entonces mañana mismo él puede rechazar su clase de ingles y verla. GLORIA que no es necesario...

SE TERMINA EL ROLLO.- 808-

LIENVOY

Possibly identical with
Enf. Gloria CACERES
Pizaña, Secretary of
Technical Affairs of the
National Syndicate of
Social Security workers [illegible] 1959

See also two previous calls
to Loginov from Sra. Alfaro
on 5 Feb 66 and from Sra.
FLORES about their friend
Gloria on 15 Mar 66 both
probably pertain to Gloria Alfaro.

CACERES Pastrejo
Yolanda. Alfaro
Vda de
Chiapa Ben

15 60 55
22 JUN 1966

P-11712

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: AEGELATIN, Jr.

DATE OF MEETING: 16 June 1966

1. I had lunch with Subject at the Reforma Club from 1330 to 1500 on 16 June 1966.

2. Subject immediately identified the passport photo of BOYAROV as the "Viktor" he had met on 4 June.

3. He said that our picture of LOGINOV was not "Vasilio" whom he described as younger and not as heavy as LOGINOV's picture.

4. Subject reported that on 13 June ISAYEV called him at home and asked to come by that evening. (Confirmed by LIENVOY). ISAYEV arrived about 1930 and stayed to about 2030. Subject suggested that they have a Martini. ISAYEV said that he had never had one and was interested in the ingredients and how it was put together. However, after he had drunk half, Subject noted that he obviously did not like it. Therefore, Subject offered him a Cuba Libra which he accepted and drank. The result of this combination was the first time Subject has seen ISAYEV a bit tipsy.

5. ISAYEV said that he had heard that Subject had had a successful weekend fishing 3-5 June. Subject admitted this and then sounded off about how rude YATSKOV had been (drinking Vodka in front of Nick and his friend, refusing to come to Nick's for a drink or inviting Nick and his friend in, anger at Nick's success, etc). ISAYEV merely shrugged this off. Nick then mentioned that he had met the new man "Viktor," (BOYAROV), had spoken a few words of English with him and thought he was very nice. ISAYEV answered that although "Viktor" was not a fisherman, he had enjoydd seeing the Mexican countryside and particularly the scenery at Pucuato. They did not discuss the third Soviet, "Vasilio."

FILE: P-3776 P-8588 P-11712

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. ISAYEV asked what his fishing plans were. Nick said that he was so busy with his many problems at the new plant that he would not be going fishing during June. Nick then suggested that they go on the weekend of 1 July. However, he added "but just you and me. Don't bring any of your friends like that rude Pablo (YATSKOV)." ISAYEV answered "Not even Anatoliy (KARABACH?" Nick answered that Anatoliy was okay and he could come. This date is tentative and will be confirmed.

7. ISAYEV remarked that his wife and child were in Cuernavaca and that KARABACH's wife would go down on the weekend of 18 June leaving them both bachelors. Nick facetiously remarked that he would have to organize some women for them.

8. Nick asked ISAYEV about the Soviet volleyball team. ISAYEV said that he had been heavily engaged in working with them. He was with the team for each game, then went out with them to dinner, took them to the hotel, etc. and didn't get home nights until 1 am.

9. Nick brought up the point that ISAYEV had never invited him to his house. ISAYEV, definitely uncomfortable and searching for words, said that he hadn't invited them because his wife thought that there was too big a contrast between Nick's home and theirs. That Nick was "rich" with lots of beautiful things - that they lived very modestly having inherited undistinguished furniture from his predecessor, etc. Nick pooh-poohed this stating that friendship is what counts and the circumstances of one's home meant nothing. ISAYEV ended by saying rather lamely that he would invite Nick to his home. Nick said that from ISAYEV's words and discomfiture, it was obvious that he is ashamed to invite anyone to his house.

10. Finally, Nick said that it was his impression that ISAYEV had absolutely no immediate plans to return to the USSR and Nick feels that he will be here until November or December.

Paul Dillon

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Nick KOURCHENKO, Jr.

DATE OF MEETING: 7 June 1966

1. I met Nick at his apartment from 2030 to 2200 in order to debrief him on the fishing weekend of 3-5 June.

2. Nick reported that when he and his Mexican friend arrived at Pucuato at 1845 on Friday, 3 June, YATSKOV and two other Soviets were already there fishing in front of the cabins. They had come in ISAYEV's VW. Shortly thereafter the Soviets came to the cabins and Nick greeted YATSKOV and introduced his Mexican friend to him. YATSKOV did not introduce the other two Soviets by name but they all did shake hands. Nick invited them all into his room but only YATSKOV came. He accepted a drink and left with it. Later outside Nick asked one of the new Soviets his name and got the answer, "Vasilio." The other one then used an English word and Nick asked if he spoke English. This Soviet said his name was Viktor and that he spoke a little English. Nick then asked YATSKOV which of the other two was the newly arrived Soviet. YATSKOV said that it was Viktor. Nick then lent them his extra lantern and that ended things for the night.

3. The next day both groups fished separately at Sabanita. About noon YATSKOV came by and noticed that Nick was having luck so he brought the other two Sovs to a spot immediately adjacent. They stayed about an hour, didn't have any luck and left. They met again that evening at the cabins. Nick and his friend had caught 28 trout and the Soviets none. YATSKOV was upset, jealous and even angry. Nick then invited Viktor in for a drink. Viktor did the same as YATSKOV, took the drink with him. YATSKOV said that the Soviets would leave Sunday morning since they had no luck. Nick left early Sunday morning for fishing. He later learned from the owner that the Soviets had left fairly early Sunday morning.

FILE: P-3776 P-8588 P-885 P-11712

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

4. Although all the Soviets were pleasant and correct there was absolutely no socializing or extended conversation. They did not accept Nick's invitations to come in for a drink, except for the above noted occasions when they accepted a drink and left taking it with them.

5. "Viktor:" Nick described him as an older man, 36 to 42, medium height, 82-85 kilos, heavy but not fat build, roundish, boyish face, looked like an American in general appearance. Does not speak Spanish. Said he spoke a little English. However, their conversation was so limited that Nick couldn't determine his fluency. He obviously understood everything that Nick said but his answers and comments were short and simple. As noted above, YATSKOV said that he is the newly arrived Soviet. He did not do any fishing himself but simply watched YATSKOV and the other Soviet.

6. I showed Nick a picture of BOYAROV. Nick couldn't positively identify it. Our picture has sunglasses. During the day Viktor had on a white towel protecting his neck and a wide hat but no sunglasses. At night Nick saw very little of him and it was dark. However, Nick did say that our photo was not at all incompatible with Viktor. Also showed him a photo of GAZIYEV and he said that this was definitely not Viktor. (COMMENT: Since GAZIYEV and BOYAROV are the only new Soviets in town, and Viktor spoke English, he has to be BOYAROV. But why did he use the name Viktor when his name is Vitaliy?'

7. "Vasilio": About 28-32 years old, medium to dark blond curly hair, medium height, very good athletic build, tough and strong appearance, the all-American boy type. Speaks pretty good Spanish but not as well as ISAYEV or YATSKOV. There are only two Vasiliys at the Embassy, BUTSEV and MIROSHNIKOV, but neither comes any where near the above description. (COMMENT: Nick's description of"Vasilio" fits LOGINOV to a "T." However, his name is Valentin and not Vasiliy. I will show Nick pictures at the next meeting.)

8. Previously Nick has met 8 Soviets, all in true name (mostly by first name only). Thus it is strange that BOYAROV and LOGINOV should use phony names.

of 16 June memo)

Paul Dillon

not LOGINOV

7 June 1966

SUBJECT: Requirement for LIREALM

It is requested that the attached information on Soviets Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV and Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN be given to LIREALM. Both of the Soviets are known to frequent the French Club. It is requested that LIREALM report on any activities of the Soviets' at the Club, or any other Club members with whom they associate.

FJC

P-11185
P-11712
P-11163

Valentin S. LOGUINOV
Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy
Born in 1927
Wife Alexandra, born in 1928
Son Dmitry, born in 1959

+ photos

LOGUINOV is tall and has very curly, light brown hair. He speaks fluent Spanish and some English. He drives a green 1965 Impala with diplomatic tags 19-DA.

Contact Report of 3 June 66
Source: LICOWL-1

In the contact report of 12 April, Subject reported that LOGINOV had visited his store during the evening of 6 April and made a long distance phone call to Cuernavaca. At our meeting on 1 June he produced the phone bill with the phone number on it. According to the bill, the call was made to phone number 2-30-65 which agrees with the number given to us by Subject in April. Mike F. checked this number and found it listed to

Moises Gamero de la Fuente
Callejon H. Preciado Numero 4
Cuernavaca, Mor.

We have no traces of this man and are not sure that LOGINOV talked to him since people often take a phone in someone else's name. LOGINOV talked for 3 and a half minutes on 6 April.

P-11,712

14-00000

SECRET

31 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris,
Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviets

1. This office has received a report that Soviet Vice-Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV travelled to a Mexican port ca. 27 May 1966. He expected to be back in Mexico City ca. 1 June 1966. He is believed to have gone to Veracruz.

2. Any information available to you on LOGINOV's travel would be appreciated.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

# 10525

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - 50-2-4/A
1 - P-11712
1 - Memo Chron

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

② cc - LOGINOV
P-11712

12 May 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/LICOZY-5 - cc P-2712
11 May 1200, Subj's office

1. By telephone an attempt was made to line Subj up for an LCFLUTTER. But the time Subj was able to allot for "meeting the representative from Washington" was too limited for the operator, and thus the examination was postponed to some later date.

The C.O. wants to go on record, in any event, for believing that the timing was not appropriate for subjecting Subj to the LCFLUTTER. Subj had been led over a period of months up to the point where he carried out a break-off from the Soviets re clandestine work for them. Just the same day he had been scheduled for the examination, 3 May, he had a scene with his old Soviet case officer, Prikhodko, and no matter what aplomb Subj has (and he has plenty) Subj finds the break-off scenes emotionally wearing. Hence, to have sprung an LCFLUTTER on him at this time, he may have been inordinately sensitive to a feeling that we mistrusted him - coming as it did after our adamant stand that he cut loose from the Soviets. The risk of affronting Subj by an LCFLUTTER was not, in the C.O.'s opinion, worth it at this particular stage of relationships in the operation.

2. On 11 May Subj reported that on 10 May at about 1630 Valentin Loginov, P- came to his office. Loginov asked Subj if he knew anything about the Congress of Intellectuals that was going to take place in Mexico. Loginov said that the Congress, whose topic was Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, was really anti-Soviet. He brought Subj a pamphlet in Spanish "The Jews in the Soviet Union" (printed by the Soviet Embassy in Mexico) - (attached). Subj did some fast thinking, because he in reality had booked the hotel reservations for the group that was to attend the Congress. He told Loginov that he had handled the hotel reservations atx the Hotel Del Prado. When Loginov asked for the names of the delegates, Subj said he didn't know them.

Earlier that day Subj had seen Israeli Amb Arad, and the Congress had been a topic of discussion between them. Arad had said that some news media, specifically El Dia, Politica, and Siempre, had criticized the Congress as being anti-Soviet. The Israeli Embassy actually was supporting the Congress, but for policy reasons, had to remain in the background. An Israeli, named Tov, was in Mexico promoting the Congress, but he was not associated with the Israeli Embassy. Arad feared there might be leftist interruption of the Congress, scheduled to take place at

COPIES MADE P-2712

perhaps what MAGIDIN was working on - cy to P-203

P-11712

6

2.

the Hotel Del Prado on 13, 14 and 15 May, and he had asked Gobernación for Secret Service protection. Arad told Subj that eight persons had come to Mexico, brought by the Soviets. He didn't know where they came from or who they were. Arad was happy that some newspapers were defending the Congress.

[illegible]

After Loginov's visit Subj called Arad to advise him of the Soviet's interest in the Congress. Subj said that Arad would be dining at his home that evening (11 May).

3. Loginov also told Subj that he had been in Veracruz because of the seaman that had jumped ship there. He said that he had found the seaman, and returned him to his ship. There had been a fight aboard ship, the seaman who fled had fled-had hit a companion with a bottle and thought he had killed him. The man had not been killed.

4. Subj said he would be going to New York for five days on 15 May. He stays at the St. Regis Hotel.

PRM

COPIES MADE

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

DATE OF MEETING: 2 May 1966

SUBJECT: Ernst GOEBEL

1. On 2 May 1966 Subject called me and asked for a meeting which took place at his office from 1530 to 1600 the same day.

2. Subject reported that on Saturday, 16 April he saw LOGINOV with his wife and son leaving the French Club at ca 1500. He noticed that another car, 25 DA (GORLITSYN's) was parked next to LOGINOV's. A half an hour later 25 DA was still there, which meant that its owner had something to do with the Club independent of LOGINOV. I showed Subject pictures of GORLITSYN which he immediately identified as the Soviet who was with LOGINOV the first time Subject saw him at the Club. (comment: Since this makes two times that GORLITSYN has been at the Club, perhaps he is also a member.)

3. Subject reported that on Sunday, 24 April he and another member, Antonio SARMIENTO, were looking for a fourth to play doubles. Subject noticed LOGINOV standing beside the tennis court and asked SARMIENTO to invite LOGINOV to join them. However, LOGINOV declined and said that he was going to have a swim with SARMIENTO's wife. After lunch Subject saw LOGINOV and SARMIENTO playing chess together and overheard that they are on a first-name basis. From the above Subject commented that LOGINOV and the SARMIENTOs have a close social relationship.

4. Subject knows SARMIENTO casually as an occasional tennis companion. SARMIENTO owns a plastic factory which makes airline bags and similar items. He is about 35. His wife's name is Violeta and she is in her late 20s. Subject looked them up in the phone book and got the following listing: Violeta SARMIENTO, Manuel M. Ponce 143, Guadalupe Inn, tel: 24-21-58.

5. We have several LIFEAT traces on the SARMIENTOs in social contact with NECHIPORENKO at the French Club. Evidently LOGINOV took them over from him.

6. Now that Subject has found a link, I told him to try to engage LOGINOV in conversation, have a drink with him, etc. in order to establish a direct line to him.

FILE: 1 - P-12230 1 - P-11712
1 - P-11163 1 - P-12703

SECRET

P. Dillon

⑮

P 1.0724

LICALLA

Reporte de las Actividades en el Club, correspondiente a Abril de 1966

Sa.

Las actividades en el Club durante el mes de Abril, fueron normales en general, sin embargo observé que con mucha frecuencia estuvieron llegando al Club grupos de 4, 5 o 6 Hombres jovenes con tipo de estudiantes, estos en el Recibidor tuvieron a veces cortas entrevistas con algunos de los Hombres del del Club.

Creo que durante este mes dejó de ver en mayor cantidad con relación a otros meses, a varios sujetos del Club los cuales a continuación Cito:

8177 9774 D[illegible] y D[illegible]	dejó de verlos el	Domingo	3	volvieron el	Lunes	11
829 11712 9026 BROV, LOG y NIKI 2	" "	Jueves	7	" "	Miércoles	13
3329 MUK y MUKA	" " "	Miércoles	13	" "	Martes	19
D[illegible] y GO[illegible] 11163	" " "	Sábado	16	" "	Jueves	21
3102 880 8642 [illegible], KAL y CHIK	" " "	Lunes	18	" "	Viernes	22
2270 PRIK y DOG	" " "	Sábado	16	" "	Lunes	25 (PRIK)
					Viernes	29 (DOG)
10732 GOR y GORA	" " "	Domingo	17	" "		
3396 12009 TUCH y TEN	" " "	Miércoles	20	" "	Martes	26
12170 ZURB	" " "	Martes	26	" "	Sábado	30

NOTA No observé ningún cambio en las actividades, no obstante hay algunas mujeres que las dejo de ver en algunas ocasiones hasta 2 semanas, entre estas reporto a las siguientes: BROVA, GOATA (away) IZZYA, KARBA, LEONA, LUDA, MITA, PIGA, PRIKA. (away)

Los Hombres que reporté el Lunes 25 entre los cuales creo que venía MIK, los ví solamente 2 días. [illegible]

COPIES MADE

P-11712

SECRET

27 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris,
Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviets

1. This office has received a report that Soviet Vice Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV planned to travel to Guadalajara on 25 April 1966 in order to attend the Congress of Mexican Travel Agencies (AMAV) there. Also planning to attend the Congress are four visitors from the USSR: Viktor BOYCHENKO, Lev MIKHAYLOV, Lyudmila KUZNETSOVA and Asam AKHMEDOV.

2. Any information available to your office on the activities of the above Soviets in Guadalajara would be appreciated.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

10401

Distribution:
Original - Addressee

1 - 50-2-4/A
~~1 - P-11712~~
1 - Memo Chron
1 -

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

Brightwas
Byrn Ch

(2)

25 April 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOZY-5 - felip -
25 Apr 1000; entrance to Zoo below Arquimedes, in cars

1. Subj reported that he was at the airport the night of 23 Apr to receive the INTURIST delegation. AMAV representatives Ibarguien and Romero were also on hand. Boichenko was much put out because their arrival had been delayed over the matter of obtaining Mexican visas. He told Subj he would be in Mexico only for the first day of the AMAV conference in Guadalajara, because he was going on to Montreal on 28 Apr to inaugurate Soviet ship service direct between Montreal and Leningrad. The others would remain in Mexico for the conference.

2. The delegates were taken to the Hotel Reforma. Subj, who brought Lev Mikhailov to the Reforma, asked how it was that Mikhailov had left the Foreign Office to be in INTURIST. Mikhailov said he had a 15 year old daughter, in Moscow, and wanted to remain there. His card read "Director of International Organizations", INTURIST.

P-11712 P-8017

3. Subj had coffee at the airport with Valentin Loginov and Visko. Nothing was said of Subj's break-off from Loginov.

4. Subj will await overtures from the Soviets. He said he was not planning to be out of Mexico until 15 May.

PRM

COPIES MADE

P 2712

P-11712

SECRET

25 April 1966

SUBJECT: Hair color report of Soviets

SOURCE: LICALLA

LOGINOV	Brown	P-11712
Wife	Brown	
ZHEVTUN	Dyed brown	P-8954
MALAKHOVICH	Dark brown	P-9772
Wife	Brown	
MIROSHNIKOV	Brown with gray	P-6518
Wife	brown	
MITROPOLSKIY	Black	P-8770
Wife	Brown	
MUKHIN	Blond	P-7220
Wife	Platinum	
NIKIFOROV	Brown	P-9026
Wife	Dark brown	
SHPAKEVICH	Dark brown	P-8167
Wife	Dark brown	
PRYGOV	Brown	P-10011
Wife	Black	
PRIKHODKO	Brown & very gray	P-2270
Wife	Dyed dark brown	
RADVANSKIY	Blond & very thin	P-9289
Wife	Dark brown	
BEDRIN	Dark brown	P-9037
Wife	Blond	
STRIZHOV	Brown	P-11579
Wife	Dark brown	
ROMANCHENKO	Blond	P-8609
Wife	Platinum	
SILNIKOV	Brown	P-6414
Wife	Platinum	
SOKOLOV	Brown with gray	P-810
Wife	Platinum	

SECRET

~~Scott~~ White & Index ②
cc - LOGIN.
Paul
Cynthia
~~Bill~~ Jewell
alice

20 April 1966

↓ P-11712

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOZY-5
20 Apr, 1300, Subj's office

1. When the C.O. arrived at Subj's office, one of the male employees of Subj evidently advised him that "Mr. Ferger" was there. Subj came from his inner office to advise the C.O. that (Leonid Vasilyevich) Nikiforov was in his office making travel arrangements. /The C.O. remained in the outer office, but with his back to the passageway and his face buried in a magazine/. P-9026

Subsequently, Subj told the C.O. that Nikiforov was leaving for vacation to the Soviet Union on 21 Apr via Air France. He was due to return to Mexico on 24 May.

Subj also mentioned that the INTURIST delegation coming to the AMAV meeting in Guadalajara (27-30 Apr) had not arrived in Mexico as scheduled (on 19 Apr) because there had been a delay in their receiving Mexican visas. The delay was occasioned by Mexican demand for minimal biographic information in order to process the visas. The group of four has been re-scheduled to arrive in Mexico on 23 Apr via Sabena.

Confirmed by LIENVOY

The C.O. saw the exchange of telegrams re the information required for visa issuance, and noted~~xx~~ the following:

Viktor Boichenko, born 21 July 1925 in Aktyubinsk; president of INTURIST; Passport D 01155 B, issued 6 Oct 1965.

Lev Mikhailov, born 11 May 1924 in Moscow; chief of the International Department; Passport C 065257, issued 25 Sept 1965.

[illegible]
Assam Ahmedov (sic), born 24 June 1924 in Tashkent; chief of the Uzbekistan Tourism Directorate; Passport 069757, issued 24 Dec 1965.

Lyudmila Kuznetsova, born 5 Mar 1923 in Moscow; Latin American Department; Passport C 065784, issued 6 Oct 1965.

Subj mentioned that at the Copenhagen Congress on Congress Organizations that he attended 30 Mar to 2 Apr 1966, he met two Soviet "scientists" and the INTURIST rep for Denmark. The " representatives from the Academy of Sciences" were Gennadiy~~x~~ Andreyevich Mozhaev and Timur T. Timofeiev (cards attached).

COPIED

2. The C.O. who had heard from Subj on 19 Apr by telephone that he had had his confrontation with Valentin Loginov last week requested a full account of that meeting. Subj reported that Loginov had called him on 15 Apr requesting a meet somewhere outside; Subj insisted that Loginov come to his office.

CARDED

P-2712

P-11712

The following day, 14 Apr, Loginov came to Subj's office. He asked Subj how his trip (to Europe) had been and specifically asked if Subj had seen Ginette Palcoci Porter. Subj replied that he had found out that Ginette and her husband were vacationing in Italy.

Loginov asked what impressions Subj had received in Europe on France's backing out of NATO. Subj answered that he had spoken to some Frenchmen, including George Laguere of Air France, who considered in general that de Gaulle was not wrong, but that his way was too drastic, that he was annoying everyone, and that France could not be isolated.

Then Subj made his break-off announcement to Loginov, saying Dut- I'm sorry to tell you that I'm not going to be able to work with you any more. There are several reasons. Loginov asked if anything had happened. Subj replied he had reasons. Loginov asked what they were. Subj said he was tired; he had a lot to do; and frankly he was plain disappointed- there had been big deals planned, nothing happened, and he was doing just junk. Loginov asked if that was Subj's final decision. Subj said yes. The Soviet then asked if they could talk it over. Subj said certainly, any time. Thereupon it was agreed between them that they would meet half an hour before the expected arrival at Mexico Airport of the INTURIST group coming to Mexico. They would meet in the restaurant.

Subj told Loginov he had traveled with Amb Bazarov, and that they had become very friendly. And he asked Loginov if he minded that he saw the Amb again. Loginov said not at all- but not to call the Amb at the SovEmb or use the phone for any calls to the SovEmb.

As stated in para. 1 above, the INTURIST delegation did not arrive on 19 Apr, and Subj who knew of the postponement did not go to the airport, and consequently missed his meet with Loginov.

3. Subj, in his customary way asked "did I do right?" The C.O. said it was fine if Loginov got the no-nonsense idea that Subj was through. The C.O. told Subj to wait until the Sovs get in touch with him again, and to have their second meet, at which Subj again makes perfectly clear that he is through. He is to remain friendly though, and is free to do anything he wishes re establishing contact with the Soviet Ambassador. Subj said he would under any circumstances postpone his meet with Loginov until at least the night of 23 Apr when the INTURIST delegation is scheduled to arrive.

COPIES MADE

FUU:

SECRET

Dillard

cc LOGINOV

~~Sent~~

Mexico, D.F.
22 July, 1966

Re: VALENTIN S. LOGUINOV

Rec'd: 22 July 1966 (13:00 hrs)

Source: L/8 (via L/4) (FOR PERSONAL ATTENTION COS)

Date: 22 July, inst.

CARDED

Some time ago subject's radio was stolen from his home. He reported it to the police and nothing happened. He has continued to request police assistance in this matter, until the robbery and subject's complaining about lack of police attention was brought to the attention of Gen. COETO, who assigned, or requested that an agent be assigned to go out and calm down the irate Soviet. The agent went out on 19 July, last. Policeman ~~Who is agent?~~

Luis Cueto Ramirez

On 20 July, last, the agent reported back to Gen. COETO that he had talked to subject for some time about the stolen radio, but that following the discussion the subject had asked the agent "to work for him on certain matters", offering him 5,000.00 pesos per month. Agent requested instructions. Gen. COETO contacted L/8, discussed the matter and told the agent to accept the offer. Agent again saw subject on 21 July, last, and was given his first "assignment" by subject.

This was a request for agent to locate one NICOLAS JUAN BOSTROEN and latter's wife, VALENTINA GRUSDOW DE BOSTROEN, both described as Venequelan citizens, and to advise subject soonest as to street address and telphone number of residence, as well as place of employment.

cc: 50-6-91/4
P-12893

SECRET

File Valentin Loginov
(P) 11712

L/4 made a quick check of the Gobernación files on the BOSTROENs, with following results:

NICOLAS JUAN BOSTROEN: P/12893

Born St. Petersburg, Russia, in 1915. Indication that at one time he served in U.S. Navy. Presently employed as "Director of Projects" by Stephens-Adamson de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., Calle Norte 65 #1058, Z.P. 16, México, D.F.; tel. 47-67-89, 47-42-22. He is listed as Venezuelan citizen.

VALENTINA GRUSDOW DE BOSTROEN:

Born Breslau, Germany; worked as translator or teacher of Russian at U.N. Presently employed as teacher of Russian at the Ibero Americana University. Presently a Venezuelan citizen.

The Gen. Mgr. of Stephens-Adamson de Mexico is RICHARD SEYMOUR BAKER, a U.S. citizen.

L/8 suggests that we may desire to contact BAKER, to get a line on the BOSTROENs, and, if that source and others available to us give them a clear bill, that we may desire to contact them and start a little backfire. L/8 will cooperate fully with us. He would like to know your reaction. (He is personally intrigued by the case and will be anxious to hear from you via thesame route back.)

COPIES MADE

CARDED

JKB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-107

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

① [illegible] - RI

⑤

④ File

TO : The Files

FROM : WMS

DATE: 22 July 1966

SUBJECT: U.N.A.M.

1. At 08:00 hours I had a telephone call from the Secretary of Gobernacion, Lic. Luis Echevarria. He said that he had an urgent matter in which he needed my help. He added that this was a matter that President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz was personally very interested.

2. Echevarria sent Lienvoy/2 to see me and gave me the following information and aske d the following help of me.

a). President Diaz Ordaz is personally very "upset" by certain recent actions by some Soviets in Mexico. (Note: I believe, but do not know this, that some Soviet has tried to "recruit" a source close to the President and that this has "backfired").

b). Valentin LOGUINOV, Soviet (Known KGB) is of particular and urgent interest interest to the President. I was told by Echevarria on the telephone that the top name on the list he would send by Lienvov/2 would "probably get the same treatment that some others got in 1959". This refers to PNG actions taken in March 1959 against two Soviets caught with Demetrio VALLEJO Martinez and the Railroad Strikers. I was asked if I could send two things to Echevarria urgently: These are: A Summary of data on LOGUINOV, particularly saying what there was to show him a "Spy"; and, secondly, a list of know Spies in the Soviet Embassy. (Note: These requests were given to me orally and on a card by Lienvoy/2, when I saw him at 08:40 hours on 22 July 1966).

c). Data on two "Trouble-Makers": Felix ALVAHUANTE and Lenin ALVAHUANTE. These two are known and a file resume will be made and sent to Echevarria. This request was sent by a card from Echevarria which Lienvoy/2 gave me.

done 22 July 66

3. I asked Echevarria for his personal assistance in getting the data on Soviets which the Mexican Foreign Office has. I told him that this data, with photographs particularly, would help us. He promised to get this data for us; and I intend to push for it on a continuing basis.

Distribution : Valentin LOGUINOV (P 11712 ; 50-6-75-4; Soviet Embassy/Pers. (P-12888)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

cc: Liempo/8 (P - 5530 ; Lirama (P-3634); ALVAHUANTE (P - 2120)

20 July 66

[illegible] [illegible] :

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

1. [illegible] meetings with Subject on 11 and [illegible] lasted from 1930 to about 2045 hours. [illegible] introduced Francis J. COIGNE to Subject as Pablo [illegible]. The next meeting was set for Wednesday 27 July [illegible] at the corner of Puebla and Jalapa streets at [illegible]. Subject claimed that he had relatives in town and could not keep his notes up to date. He had very litte in [illegible] and was instructed to make every effort to keep his notes on a daily basis. During the meeting on [illegible] I told Subject that I was leaving and that Pablo would be meeting him in the future. Subject said absolutly [illegible] continued talking about another topic. I was not [illegible] he had understood me and repeated that I was leaving [illegible]. He said that he understood. My impression was [illegible] that I was leaving and his reaction to my bit of news was totally unexpected. (Or rather his lack of reaction). I might note that when Subject enters the car he begins talking at once. I felt this a very strange way to begin any kind of meeting and suspected that he might be repeating a prepared [illegible]. Once or twice I asked him the same question in [illegible] ways to see if he would give me the answer in the [illegible] he originally but he always changed it enough so [illegible] appeared that he was telling me something in his own words. Nevertheless, it was a point that always bothered me [illegible] to make it a matter of record.

[illegible] (from his written notes)

[illegible], 24 June. Subject saw the short American woman (previously reported as phoning from Subject's store to a tourist agency) leaving the Soviet Embassy about 1130 hours. He did not see her enter. She came into the shop to use Subject's phone but the phone was out of order. About the same time he saw two men who appeared to be Americans enter the Embassy. One was white and the other a negro. Subject went to pick up some bottles and heard them speak to each other in English. According to Subject, SILNIKOV told him that two Americans had visited the Embassy to obtain visas because they did not want to fight in Viet Nam. (We have not been able to identify the woman but the Americans are [illegible]. LICOWL said they left the Embassy at 1157 hours.) They [illegible] made two visits to the Embassy. Once in the morning [illegible] once in the early afternoon. Subject [illegible] that SILNIKOV told him that they wanted visas. [illegible] clear how SILNIKOV knew anything about these visitors since SILNIKOV is no longer on the main gate of the Embassy.

SILN

3. Later in the day SILNIKOV dropped by (and made the comments above). He also told Subject that Viktor KALYGIN had been placed on the main gate once more (confirmed by the basehouses) and that he (SIL) was "officially" the administrative officer. He said he can now find time to eat Mexican food with Subject and said he would be by the following day about 0900 hours.

SILNIKOV

Saturday, 25 June. SILNIKOV came in about 0900 hours and [illegible] wife, Carmelita, fixed him some special Mexican food in honor of her Saint's Day. He was there for about a half [illegible]. Valentin LOGINOV came in and ordered 75 pesos worth of [illegible] to be delivered that same day by 1500 hours. Subject [illegible] the drinks and at 1900 hours LOGINOV [illegible] [illegible] three more cases of coke. He [illegible] "[illegible] is already there" and asked Subject [illegible] to the Embassy. On his arrival at [illegible] noted that there were groups from all the [illegible] and that each had brought wine and food representative of their country. There was so much food and

SIL

LOGIN

14-00000

Print M
[illegible]

index

464. LIENVOY Entrada.- 1140 hrs.- MF por LOGUINOV. KARZHIN dice que espere un momento. Despues HF JOSE LUIS ALVAREZ GAYOU saluda a su amigo LOGUINOV. Este pregunta si se divertió y si descansó bien. JOSE LUIS dice que si y que ya despues le platicará y que solo le llama para avisarle que está de regreso y que tambien es para avisarle que no han tenido noticias de TUCHA o TYCHA y por eso quiere platicar por si LOGUINOV SE interesa en seguir las clases. LOGUINOV está de acuerdo y mañana a las once de la mañana pasará a visitarlo para platicar de eso.- 515-

possible traces att.

CARDED

15 60 55
12 JUL 1955

P-11713

ALVAREZ, Jose Luis
(Michoacan)

50-9-5/9(p. 64)
REPORT/ L A
30 Nov. 61

ALVAREZ, JOSE LUIS

SEX M DOB ?

050-004-034
HMMA-27516
27 OCT 65
A01

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
Δ MEXICO, MICHOACAN
ON A LIST OF NAMES OF ACTIVE MBRS OF THE NATL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN THE VARIOUS MEXICAN STATES.

ALVAREZ, JOSE LUIS (? de Jesus ?)

SEX M DOB ?

050-009-005/4
HMM -06018
17 NOV 61

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
Δ MEXICO, MICHOACAN
RE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT COMMITTEE NOV 61. SUBJ IS MBR OF MLN COMMITTEE WITH HEADQUARTERS IN MORELIA.

* HMY

FLD INDEX ONLY

ALVAREZ, Jose Luis

50-6-92/3
CONTACT REPORT/
LITE[illegible]-1(Attach)
28 June 61

(Attends IICMR Russian Language classes)

ALVAREZ, Jose Luis

Att to HMMA 27516
27 Oct 65
50-4-34
Page 20

Active member MLN, Michoacan

ALVAREZ, JOSE LUIS

SEX M DOB ?

050-008-004
HMMA-20810 A02
01 MAR 63
P1

CIT MEXICO?
OCC ?
SOME CONTACT WITH CZECH EMBASSY, MEXICO - NOV-DEC 62. WORKS ON PERIODICO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD AND VOZ DE LA UNIVERSIDAD. UNAM? KUBATA /201-04167/ PRAISED REPORTS SUBJ WROTE FOR THESE MAGAZINES AND SAID HE WOULD GIVE THEM MONEY AND MATERIAL TO HELP SUPPORT THE MAGAZINE, MEXI.

*

CARDED
1 417 889

June 66

Paul:

1. I have reviewed the entire LOGINOV file and have made copies of all pertinent LIENVOY clips for the following P files and have included a note to that effect in each of these files:

Miriam AVILA Katz	P-581
Socorro FLORES	P-12259
Salvador PAZ Plata	12775
Erika KAMMERMAN	P-12843

2. Attached hereto are copies of all the clips I found on the other people included on the list you gave me.

a. Besides the 11 April clip on Dr. Juan Luis ALVAREZ Gallou I found a 12 Jul 66 call from Jose Luis ALVAREZ Gayou, probably at least related if not the same person. This is the only name on which there are any other possibly identifiable traces:

(1) According to a 28 June 1961 LITEA Contact Report, Jose Luis ALVAREZ was one of the students in the Tuesday and Thursday, 7 to 8:30 p. m., Russian language classes at the IICMR during the months of February and March.

(2) HMM-6018, dated 17 November 1961, based on information from LIENVOY Unit C, reported that one Jose Luis ALVAREZ was a member of the MLN Committee of Michoacan.

(3) In a 30 November 1961 Legal Attache report one Jose Luis ALVAREZ of Morelia, Michoacan, was named as one who assisted the National Liberation Movement in Mexico.

(4) HMMA-20810, dated 1 March 1963, included the following information from LIBRIFORM: "One Jose Luis ALVAREZ (matronymic unknown) is putting items in the 'Voz de la Universidad' (Universidad Autonoma Nacional de Mexico) for the Czechs. KUBATA, the Charge d'Affaires in the Czech Embassy praised ALVAREZ for his reports and said 'we will give you money and material to help support the magazine'. ALVAREZ also works on the University's 'Periodico de la Universidad' (newspaper).

2/11/78

(5) HMMA-27516, dated 27 October 1965, provided an 11 October 1965 listing, again based on LIENVOY information, on

which the name of Jose Luis ALVAREZ was again included as an active member of the MLN and a member of the State Committee of Morelia, Michoacan, which had its general offices at Guillermo Prieto 35-10 in Morelia.

b. About Gloria ALFARO, I wonder if she may not be related to Ofelia ALFARO Lopez (P-11339), teacher at the UNAM Economics School and friend of Antonio SARMIENTO (P-12703) and his wife, Violeta. Both Ofelia ALFARO and LOGINOV attended a Christmas party at the SARMIENTO's last year (pertinent clips included with the Gloria ALFARO material attached). In the 22 June 66 conversation Gloria ALFARO had with LOGINOV she mentions having met him at Christmas time.

c. Copies of all of LOGINOV's contacts with the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, including the one which mentioned Senorita HARNANDEZ, are attached. Other people connected with that outfit are:

Lio KELSIN
Sarita lnu
Jacobo Chensinski

3. Besides the names on your list I also found two clips on Margaret (Magre) FEDOR who seems to be on quite familiar terms with LOGINOV. I have included copies of them also.

4. Note that all of the calls in question are incoming calls. Also to each of these people something is mentioned about classes.

/

~~Dallas~~ Cyn - extract [illegible] present

Reportable?

Indexing?

George - this is just routine propaganda so don't think it is worth reporting. Agree?

Reports

ASUNTO: CONFERENCIA EN EL [illegible] DE [illegible] [illegible] CULTURAL MEXICANO-RUSO.-

México, D. F. [illegible] de 1956.-

C. DIRECTOR [illegible] DE SEGURIDAD.
P R E S E N T E.

De las 20:15 a [illegible] horas, se llevó a efecto [illegible] de la fecha en el Auditorio [illegible] sito en [illegible] No. 275, de la Col. [illegible], una Conferencia [illegible] por el Sr. [illegible] 2o. Srio. de la [illegible] en México, bajo el tema del "[illegible] DE LA [illegible] EN LA U. R. S. S.".-

En [illegible] se encontraban la Conferencista y el Lic. [illegible], [illegible] de la [illegible], quien presentó además de la conferencista, a los siguientes funcionarios de la misma [illegible]: [illegible], [illegible] Comercial, [illegible] 2o. Srio., [illegible] 2o. Srio. y [illegible] 3er. Srio., ante [illegible] aproximada de 75 personas.

Dió principio la Conferencia que [illegible] por la conferencista y sus principales [illegible] fueron los siguientes:

Empezó diciendo, que el pueblo ruso cansado [illegible] por la explotación y la dictadura [illegible] del [illegible] de los terratenientes y [illegible], en [illegible] 1917, tomó las armas y se lanzó a la lucha, para [illegible] la [illegible] que [illegible] y [illegible] la nueva República bajo el sistema comunista. [illegible] triunfado la Revolución, se organizaron los [illegible], empleados, profesionistas así [illegible] los [illegible] en el campo, y las cooperativas de producción [illegible], poniendo las bases para el desarrollo [illegible], intelectual y social de la nueva República; [illegible] del pueblo y [illegible] las grandes masas del poder político, los [illegible] de producción y de consumo, con lo que [illegible] la explotación del hombre por el hombre y el enriquecimiento de [illegible] a costa de la explotación, de la [illegible] y del [illegible] el pueblo, como sucede en la actualidad en los países capitalistas, en donde se encuentran el poder y la riqueza, en manos de un reducido grupo de explotadores, y cada día acumulan más riquezas a costa de que las grandes masas populares cada día acumulan más pobreza.

Dijo a continuación, que en la actualidad en la [illegible] con 1,[illegible]00 diputados que proceden de las fábricas, de los [illegible], del campo, de los empleados, de los profesionales, [illegible] que en su carácter de Diputados y [illegible] del [illegible], tienen una [illegible] dentro de la [illegible], ya que en [illegible] de ellos, [illegible] y [illegible] por los intereses del sector que [illegible]

P - 11712

Index

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Ernst GOEBEL

DATE: 28 June 1966

1. I called Subject at his office on 28 June. He said that he hasn't seen or been able to do much lately because he has been travelling almost constantly. (COMMENT: I tried to get him twice during the last two weeks and he was out of town both times).

2. However Subject has seen LOGINOV with wife or child at the club two or three times. He was never with Antonio SARMIENTO. He has not seen GOLITSYN.

3. I will call Subject again in mid-July and see him at that time.

Paul Dillon

FILE: P-12703 P-11712 P-11163 P-12330

SECRET

f 11719

26 June 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOZY-5
25 June 1130-1215, Subj's office

1. In response to a call-in by Subj, the C.O. went to see Subj on Saturday morning 25 June.

2. Subj reported that Valentin Loginov had dropped in to the office on 24 June to make arrangements for a return trip to the Soviet Union for (Nicolai) Leonov, who, Loginov said, had to be in Moscow at the latest 4 July. Subj said he would try to handle. /Comment: Loginov said he would come by the office on 27 June with Leonov's passport, because there was the liklihood that Subj would attempt to get a KLM flight for Leonov via Houston (requiring a U.S. visa for Leonov). In any event, Subj told the C.O. that he was not going to the U.S. Embassy to request the visa, but would buck the whole problem to KLM who would have to make any visa arrangements that were required/.

3. Interestingly enough, Loginov took the opportunity to bring up operational matters again to Subj, and Subj used the ensuing discussion to make his stance utterly clear to Loginov. The conversation went more or less as follows: Loginov said: "You're mad at me." Subj said: "Why should I be mad at you?" Loginov said: "Because of Majestic" (referring to the fact that the Sovs had first given a travel request to Viajes Majestic to be serviced). You know we have to spread it around among friends." Subj shrugged this off. Then Loginov asked: "Are you still mad?"

Subj replied: "I'm not mad, and I never was. Look, Valentin- " (and then he made his first attempt at clarification, saying in effect that in normal friendly matters they were like brothers; Subj exaggerated as is his manner- mentioning intimate matters like "marriage" and "even unto death (hasta la muerte)" but saying that that was the culmination point- "anything else" was finished). Loginov said (without batting an eye): "I had some business for you." Subj cut him short: "Don't bring me anything- important or not important- you can keep it. You want to go for coffee; you want to go out with girls; - with much pleasure; anything up to that point. And I want you to understand that clearly. Don't force me; and let's be good friends." Loginov said: "You're getting difficult."

Subj replied: "No, I'm not difficult. And there's no damage. I made my decision - and your chiefs will understand my position."

CARDED P-2712

Loginov tried again: "A good friend of yours was appointed Chief of the U.S. Travel Service - Paul Giedro- he's a friend of yours?"

GUIDRY

Subj became a little heated in reply: " Yes, he's a good friend. I will always be close to him. But you get this very clear- any plans you have for Paul Giedro, forget about them, is that clear? I won't do a goddam thing. I hope you understand that. We're friends (you and I), but beside being friends- period!"

Loginov took out a piece of paper and started to read from it, asking Subj if he knew the man "Eduardo Vetelman- approximately 55 years old- a Mexican Jew." (Attached is a photocopy of the piece of paper Loginov had been reading, and which he left behind on Subj's desk apparently by mistake. It's in Russian, and Subj was not able to translate completely at first glance. Subj plans to return the original to Loginov when he comes by on 27 June.) While Loginov was reading, Subj said insistently: " I don't know the man, and I'm not going to do anything ..." LOginov replied: "I'm not asking you to do anything - it's just that I don't know (about him). About Paul Giedro, he's a good friend of yours..." Subj said: "Forget it."

4. Subj asked the C.O. - "did I do wrong?" The C.O. replied that Subj had done beautifully- but he has to expect that the Sovs will keep up all kinds of pressures- subtle, small, or even great, and not so subtle. But the way is clear- all he has to do is say "no."

Subj said that Loginov had brought him a box of "Punch" cigars (Cuban), and Subj as usual offered to pay, but Loginov pressed them on him. Subj then said to the C.O. he wanted an expression of policy on how he should handle that kind of thing from the Sovs- take the gifts, after offering to pay? refuse outright? The C.O. said we would give the guidance he needed for that situation.

5. The C.O. will drop around to Subj's office early next week.

Addendum: the C.O. told Subj that there was a rumor that Oleg Nechiporenko was seen around town. Subj said he knew of nothing on that score, but doubted it strongly- since he was sure Oleg would have contacted him. The C.O. underscored that Subj do nothing about the rumor.

PRM

[illegible]

Эдуардо Вейсман, около
55 лет, мексиканец еврейского
происхождения, является
владельцем стекольного
завода и фирмы по
продаже фотоматериалов.
Немецкий эмигрант во
время II мировой войны.
Проживает по адресу:
Calzada Tecoloco 320.
Сын – Маурисио Вейсман

CARDED

Eduardo Webelman about 55 years old Mexican of European descent. Owner of a steel plant and a firm which sells photo equipment. Came to Mexico during WW II. Lives in the Pedregal at Teoloco 320. His son is Mauricio WEBELMAN.

COPIES MADE

CARDED

P-11712

1963 phone book lists

Eduardo WHEELMAN
Teoloco 320
tel 48 57 17

No Station traces.

No Station traces Paul GIDDRE. GUIDRY

CARDED

14-00000

25 July 1966

SUBJECT: [illegible] Office

1. Subj reported that Valentin Loginov had dropped in at his office on 20 July. (Loginov had other business in the office too). Loginov told Subject that he had received a cable from Moscow pertaining to Subj- that "they" were very disappointed, because they had plans for Subj. and they had hopes that Subj would cooperate. Subj answered (in what must sound like a broken record by now) that he still was a friend to the Soviets, that he was on their side, he was their man - but he can't do anything for them. He hoped they wouldn't try to force him- because he just can't do anything for them. P-555

Loginov didn't give up: he told Subj that Pavel Yatskov was leaving for Moscow on 4 August (he was in Subj's office to make the arrangements)- and would be returning in a month. He asked what word Yatskov can bring back to Moscow. Subj said he had already told him: nothing- he can't do anything for them. Loginov then asked what Yatskov could bring back to Subj- and Subj said not a thing. He jokingly told Loginov if they can bring "Tamara" (a Soviet actress who had attended one of the [illegible] film festivals) that would be fine with him. Loginov appreciated the joke, and parted from Subj cordially.

/Comment: Loginov did not ask for the piece of paper he had left in Subj's office - re some man he had started to inquire about, and Subj left it at that- he didn't bring the subject up, although he has the piece of paper to return to Loginov/.

2. In response to the C.O.'s inquiry Subj mentioned the names of some applicants for travel to the Soviet Union.

Apparently for a Psychology Congress to take place in Moscow in August 1966 Loginov had referred several applicants to Subj's office: Julieta Fernandez de Cohen and her sister (Dr. Fernandez' card attached) and two friends. Dr. Fernandez made inquiries about travel arrangements. She has not come back yet.

Licenciado Luciano Lara had come to the office (?) on 21 July to arrange travel to the Soviet Union. Subj said that his employee, Miriam Avila Katz, who handles INTOURIST matters, had told him that ~~Lara~~ had been invited by the Soviet Ambassador and also that he was a close friend to the Mexican Amb to Moscow.

The Montfort Travel Agency in Tijuana had transferred a request to Subj to handle the travel to the Soviet Union as tourists for two "Señoras": Maria Jesus de Abakian and Estela Castro.

/Comment: the C.O. told Subj we wanted more info about these applicants/

Cy to P-555 P-11712 P-2712

P-11712

①

3. The C.O. reminded Subj that we would like additional information about the individuals who had left to attend the Microbiological Congress in Moscow. The C.O. suggested that Subj have someone in his office extract from the folder Subj has all extra information that can be adduced; such as, address, age, profession, etc. Subj said he would try to have it done before he leaves on his trip (on 31 July).

4. Subj asked if there was anything new about "Herb" (Gestetner). The C.O. said he had word from Washington about the ground rules in case he (Subj) were to go to ~~Santiago de~~ Chile. What he does about seeing Herb is his own affair - but if he does see Herb Subj is to omit reference to our "business" in Mexico as far as volunteering information is concerned. What Herb does vis a vis Subj is Herb's business.

5. The C.O. will get to see Subj before he leaved for Europe on 31 July.

PW

Copy 5 July
2

25 July 1966

~~Dillon~~
~~Watson~~ 2
~~Anne~~
~~Scott~~

Note: This is a translation (By Lienvoy) of the brief report we sent to Litempo/8 (via Lienvoy/2) for Lirama...... MS

Files: Valentin LOGUINOV (P -- 11712)

Done pd

We should send copy (in English) to Washington MS

Copy made for 50-6-75/3

VALENTIN SERGEYEVIC LOGINOV

Fecha de nacimiento: 23 diciembre 1927.

Empleo: Tercer Secretario en la Sección Consular de la Embajada Soviética en México.

Domicilio: Ignacio Esteva, 18-1 Col. Tacubaya.

Automóvil: Chevrolet Impala 1965, licencia 19 diplomática.

Idiomas que habla: español con fluidez y regular inglés.

Carrera:

En 1955 se unió a la KGB.
De 1955 a 1957 concurrió a una escuela de entrenamiento de la KGB.
De 1957 a agosto de 1960, funcionario en el Cuartel General de la KGB en Moscú.
De septiembre de 1960 a septiembre de 1963, Agregado en La Habana, Cuba.
Diciembre de 1961: Viajó a Panamá y Ecuador con el equipo soviético de Soccer. En este viaje llevó una gran suma de sinero para los Partidos Comunistas de Panamá y Ecuador.
17 mayo 1962: Pasó por México en tránsito para la URSS en uso de licencia.
9 septiembre 1963: Partió de Cuba para regresar a la URSS.
Septiembre 1963 a julio de 1965, estuvo como funcionario en el Cuartel General de la KGB en Moscú.
3 agosto 1965: Arribó a México.

En México LOGINOV reemplazó a OLEG M. NECHIPORENKO, otro elemento de la KGB, haciéndose cargo de todas sus funciones y de los agentes de inteligencia. En enero de 1966 intentó influenciar y reclutar a un chofer de la Embajada Norteamericana en México. LOGINOV es un agente de inteligencia muy capacitado y demasiado activo. Debido a que no tiene otras responsabilidades extras, puede dedicar el 95% de su tiempo a la actividad de inteligencia. Tenemos conocimiento de que es funcionario de inteligencia de la KGB desde 1958. Su jefe inmediato de este organismo, en México, es PAVEL A. YATSKOV.

SECRET

22 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Information on Local Soviets Passed to LIRAMA

In response to LITEMPO-8's urgent request for certain information on certain local Soviets, COS on 22 July passed the attached information to LIENVOY-2. LIENVOY-2 will translate it into Spanish and give it to LITEMPO-8 who will in turn pass it to LIRAMA:

Paul Dillon

Attachments

FILE: P - 3634
P - 11712
P - 885
P - 5530
P - 5683
50-6-72-2

SECRET

Drafted
Alice

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

DOB: 23 December 1927
Position: Third Secretary in the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico, D.F.

Residence: Ignacio Esteva 18-1, Colonia Tacubaya

Automobile: 1965 Chevrolet Impala, License 19 DA.

Languages: Fluent Spanish, Fair English

Career:

1955: Joined the KGB

1955-57: Attended the KGB Training School

1957-August 1960: Officer in KGB Headquarters, Moscow

Sept 1960-Sept 1963: Attache in Havana, Cuba

December 1961: Travelled to Panama and Ecuador with a Soviet soccer team. On this trip he carried a large sum of money for the Communist Parties of Panama and Ecuador.

17 May 1962: Transited Mexico en route to the USSR for leave.

9 September 1963: Left Cuba to return to the USSR.

September 1963-July 1965: Officer in KGB Headquarters, Moscow.

3 August 1965: Arrived Mexico.

In Mexico LOGINOV replaced Oleg M. NECHIPORENKO, another KGB officer and took over all of NECHIPORENKO's intelligence agents and duties. In January 1966 he attempted to cultivate and recruit a chauffeur at the American Embassy in Mexico. LOGINOV is an unusually active and capable intelligence officer. Since he has almost no overt duties he is able to spend about 95% of his time on intelligence activity. We have known that he is a KGB officer since 1958. His immediate KGB chief in Mexico is Pavel A. YATSKOV.

Dist
Orig: Litempo/14 (Because of his request) on 22 July (via [illegible])
~~ec: LOGINOV CP~~
ec: 50-6-91/2

Soviet Intelligence Officers Stationed in Mexico

1. KGB (Committee for State Security)

Chief: Sergey S. KONSTANTINOV
Deputy Chief: Aleksandr V. PRIKHODKO

OFFICERS:

Yevgeniy I. BEDRIN
Ivan A. BEKETOV
Aleksandr M. BROVKIN
Vladimir A. DOLGOV
Yevgeniy N. GORLITSYN
Boris A. KAZANTSEV
Vladislav S. KORMUSHKIN
Valentin I. KUCHEROV
Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
Nikolay S. LEONOV
Valentin S. LOGINOV
Vasiliy S. MIROSHNIKOV
Leonid V. NIKIFOROV
Aleksandr A. NIKITIN
Vladimir N. RADVANSKIY
Vladimir I. SHPAKEVICH
Georgiy S. VISKO
Pavel A. YATSKOV
Yuriy ZHURIN
Boris S. ZOBNIN

2. GRU (Military Intelligence)

Chief: Vladimir N. SOKOLOV
Deputy Chief: Georgiy A. SHCHUCHKIN

OFFICERS:

Aleksandr M. DENISOV
Petr F. GORELOV
Vladimir P. GOROBETS
Yuriy N. ISAYEV
Anatoliy V. KARABACH
Viktor L. KHUKHOREV
Yuriy A. MITROPOLSKIY
Valeriy V. SOKOLIN
Ruslan A. TUCHNIN
Konstantin F. VORONKOV

Ivan V. YELFIMOV

20 July 66

~~Scott~~ -

In discussing LOGINOV with LIRAMA you might wish to point out that the reason he can devote 85% of his time to intelligence work is that there are 3 KGB Consuls but no consular work:

✓ 4 hours a week office hours
✓ average 8 visas a month.
✓ USSR has less ~~con~~ consular work in Mexico than any other major country, most minor ones
✓ Consular work could be handled by 1/3 of the time of the most junior officer,

✓ etc.

Will do
S

Files: Valentin LOGINOV
(P-11712)

P.S. Same applies to the 7 intell officers whose cover is commercial, 4 whose cover is cultural and about 8 or 9 who don't even have nominal cover, ie specified duties.

But more interesting was that at 1730 Sr. Valentin "el Toro" (LOGINOV) came in to make a telephone call. Apparently it was with some Mexican woman since he was quite happy (contento). Among other things that I was able to hear was that he wanted to see her that night, that at night he dreams that she is in his arms and that tomorrow (Sunday) they could go swimming together. They talked for quite a while and he seemed quite gallant. He told her that he would take care of everything if she wanted to go to his country (USSR). I went outside the door of the store in order to afford him more liberty. When he finished talking, he wanted to justify himself to me by saying that he is a batchelor because his wife is in Cuernavaca.

Sunday, 21 August 1966

Today everything is normal since I know that my friends won't come to my house to eat. I had made my program for today, Sunday, that is to say to leave, to take my wife and grandchild to the country and eat outside the house.

But at 1330, which is the hour to close, my wife and grandchild were already there. Then SILNIKOV arrived to drink a beer. He was feeling pretty bad from last night's "drinking bout" at the fiesta celebrating the Ambassador's return. He told me that they were drinking all night. But at this time it was raining quite hard so that I couldn't close up and leave the store. My wife asked him why he had always thought differently (sic) in not coming to eat at our house. And on the moment he said that he would come. My wife shot me a questioning look and finally SILNIKOV broke the silence saying; "wait here, I will be back in a minute". Then he left in the rain which had abated a little. It then started to rain harder and a car left the Embassy driven by the Ambassador's chauffeur Sr. Viktor (STRYZHEV). He didn't park in front of the store but in Gelati, the street running parallel to the store. Then SILNIKOV came in to tell me he was ready. We shut up the store, got into the car and drove to my house. We parked the car in the street and entered my house. Once inside the first thing they did was to inspect the house in great detail even the "azotea". I think that the house pleased them. They made me show them everything including the bathroom and bedrooms. Then we sat at the table to drink tequila (la copa) and beer. My wife served barbecued chicken, una sopa, and a guisado which they ate with relish, or so it seemed to me since they ate everything served them accompanied by pleasant chatter. But he didn't even mention

Extract from Licowl/1 Notes
dated 26 Aug 66 attached
to Licowl Contact Report
dated 23 August 1966

4. I asked Subject if he had mentioned SILNIKOV's pornographic negative to the latter. At first Subject said no, then yes; that he had asked Silnikov about it but Silnikov said that the negative didn't belong to him but to Vasiliy who took it back to Moscow with him. Subject added that Vasiliy had returned to the USSR about two weeks ago. (Comment: This is most probably BUTSEV whom Subject calls Vasiliy and who returned to the USSR on 24 July.) (Second Comment: This is another example of one of Silnikov's vulnerabilities evaporating into thin air).

5. Concerning the item in the notes for Saturday, 30 July, in which Silnikov hid in the ballroom for twenty minutes because two other Soviets came in, Subject had the following to say about these two Soviets:

a. Valentin (El Torro), then follows a perfect description of LOGINOV.

b. Vladimir: here follows a good description of KORMUSHKIN including the fact that he replaced KOSTIKOV. Only KORMUSHKINS name is Vladislav, not Vladimir.

6. I asked Subject about the discrepancy in the 19 July meeting when he said that SILNIKOV and PRASHCHIKIN had come to the store on Saturday 16 July but his notes said that PRASHCHIKIN and his replacement had come. Subject said that he doesn't know who PRASHCHIKIN's replacement is. He also couldn't explain the discrepancy, stating that he couldn't remember the incident now.

7. I also asked him about his item of 21 July in which at the request of VALENTIN he had delivered two cases of refrescos to General Cano 32. (We have no Soviets at this address). He changed it to General Leon 32 (MIKITIN's home and the film office). The VALENTIN noted above is LOGINOV. When Subject delivered the two cases only a Soviet woman was at home. He described this address as a single house which is undergoing renovation inside.

8. In discussing SILNIKOV's recent work fixing up the Embassy I asked who actually did the work. Subject said that the Soviets do not like to deal with established firms for repairs to the Embassy because they charge too much. They prefer to deal with small independent people whom they can beat down on the price. Subject knows of two such individuals:

Licowl Contact Report, 17 August 1966

P-11712

14-00000

16 August 1966

There is no derogatory information on the BOSTROEM couple in the United States or Venezuela. However, we have obtained the following biographic information on them from Venezuela.

a. Nicholas Juan BOSTROEM Schreiber, born 23 January 1915 in St. Petersburg, Russia. Cedula #983566. Venezuelan Passport #207100. Travel: 17 December 1957 left Maiquetia for Miami; 30 October 1961 entered Venezuela from Mexico; 22 November 1961 left Venezuela for Mexico; 26 December 1961 entered Venezuela; 6 January 1962 left Venezuela for Mexico; 5 December 1964 entered Venezuela; 19 December 1964 left Venezuela for Mexico; 16 March 1966 left Venezuela for Mexico.

b. Valentine GRUSDOVLAVRIK de BOSTROEM, born 2 October 1923 in Breslau, Germany. Cedula #983567, Venezuelan Passport #151884. Travel: 3 March 1962 left Maiquetia for Mexico; 25 June 1965 left Venezuela for Mexico.

Distribution:
Orig: LITEMPO/8 via BENADUM on 17 Aug 66
1: v. LOGUINOV P-
1: 50-6-91/2
1: Nicholas Juan BOSTROEM Schreiber P-

P-11712

11 Aug 66

MEMO FOR RECORD

In his monthly report for August 1966, LICALLA said YATSKOV seemed to have taken PRIKHODKO's place. When I asked why he thought that, he answered:

PRIKHODKO is not here (he left 28 June on home leave). PRIKHODKO had been entering the Embassy through the main door and was seen working in window # 22. Now YATSKOV is entering through the main door and was seen working at this window. YATSKOV also had the same contact with NIKIFOROV which PRIKHODKO had previously had. Now that YATSKOV has also left (4 Aug), LICALLA thinks that LOGINOV is probably taking his place. (This last statement is not clear: whether LOGINOV is taking YATSKOV's place in YATSKOV's old job, which would be most logical. Or whether LICALLA thinks LOGINOV may now be in the PRIKHODKO job. In any case, PRIKHODKO himself should be back momentarily.)

oh

P-685
P-2270
P-9026
P-11712

Cyr 01

On Sunday 7 Aug 66 at 09:30 I saw Loginov's car, with several people in it enter the Cuota road for Cuernavaca. I couldn't identify any of the occupants

R/

30 July 1966

SUBJECT: [illegible]
[illegible] office
29 July, Loginov, Subj's office

1. On [illegible] Subj [illegible] the C.O. of the following Soviet travel arrangements: Sergey Konstantinov, [illegible] Konstantinova, and child, Nikita, confirmed on Sabena for 24 August, [illegible]/Brussels, Brussels/Moscow, 26 August.

Vladimir Goncharenko, [illegible] (wife), children, Marina and Vladimir, Sabena, 7 August. Brussels/Moscow, 9 August.

Re Licenciado Luciano Lara- dropped into Subj's office 28 July (?) and was very officious. When Subj did not have confirmed travel to Satellite countries (including Rumania and Czechoslovakia) ready, Lara fussed and said he would go to Moscow and make his arrangements from there. Plans stay in Moscow a month. Has free ticket on Aeronaves Mexico to Madrid. Subj booked him for travel from Madrid to Moscow, via Amsterdam, and return.

Valentin Loginov had dropped in to Subj's office on 27 July but Subj was too busy to see him. Loginov called Subj on 28 July and made an appointment to see Subj at 1200 on 29 July at the Flor de Mexico Restaurant near Subj's office.

The C.O. stressed to Subj that he continue to play the same tune with Loginov of friends, yes- work, no.

2. On 30 July the C.O. saw Subj briefly in his office; Subj's wife had accompanied him to the office because she will be managing it while Subj is away on his European trip starting 30 July. According to Subj, his wife is not witting of the C.O. except as a friend of Subj. With the wife Esther, arround, Subj was able to manage only a brief account of his meet with Loginov on 29 July. The expected power play by Loginov did not take place- he met with Subj just to confirm Pavel Yatskov's travel arrangements and to ask Subj again if they could bring Subj anything from Moscow. Yatskov dropped in to the Flor de Mexico too, but contributed nothing to the conversation. Subj said he didn't want anything from Moscow(he had given Prikhodko fifty dollars to bring him back two kilos of caviar).

For the promised additional information on the group who were going to the Microbiological Congress in Moscow (see previous Contact Report for complete list), Subj turned over to the C.O. the attached list which gives only telephone numbers of the professionals going to the Congress, and in some cases the positions.

The C.O. told Esther that he might drop in to the office, if he could do anything for her. Note: Subj not due back until the end of August.

Cy. to P-855 P-9137
P-11712 P-9311

CO:

P-2712

P 11712

[illegible] hard to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ich had to be sent that same day in a truck. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] permission to have a soft drink, since [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] I [illegible] watching to see what would come out [illegible], but I did not see anything. I think that [illegible] taken out what they had been preparing, because I noticed a pick-up truck from Servicio Publico going out with [illegible] about 150 cm long and 60 cm wide.

[illegible]

Today [illegible] friend Estanislao (SILNIKOV) came in at 1110 AM for a cup of "tea" and also asked me to give him some chicharron as every Saturday, since it goes with tequila, and out talk started. He told me that in his country (USSR) they have some very large museums where they have the carriages of the [illegible], also the crown and precious objects covred with jewels of incalculable value, as well as their fine robes. While the people ~~xx~~ are dying of hunger. Also they have a grain, small as a grain of rice, engraved with a message to the people saying that every difficulty can be overcome with a will and with calmness and finally you can win. He had a hard time explaining all this to me, since his Spanish is not very good, but I could understand, and what he meant for me to understand was that they would finally overcome all difficulties, and thus his value would be greater in the hour of triumph. These friends (Sovs) are very obedient to their superiors - they will even stay 20-25 minutes in the bathroom of my store so they would not be discovered by their superiors. This is what happened to my friend Estanislao (SILNIKOV) today and he ~~xxxxxxxx~~ came out (of the bathroom) at 1140 h because two friends (Sovs) came in and one of them is none other that the Second Secretary of the Ambassador, Although he (the Ambassador) is not in Mexico, ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~
still rebuke
~~xxxxxx~~ his secretaries ~~xxxxxx~~ have a lot of power to ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ those who do [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] discipline of the State.

Translation of
Licaul/1 notes
30 July 1966

very [illegible] something which had to be sent that same day in a truck. [illegible] been given permission to have a soft drink, since the [illegible]. Afterwards I was watching to see what would come out i.e. [illegible] , but I did not see anything. I think that at about [illegible] they must have taken out what they had been preparing, because I noticed a pick-up truck from Servicio Publico going out with some wooden boxes about 150 cm long and 60 cm wide.

Saturday 30 July [illegible]

Today [illegible] Estanislao (STLNIKOV) came in at 1110 AM for a cup of "tea" and also [illegible] to give him some chicharron as every Saturday, since it goes with [illegible], and our talk started. He told me that in his country (USSR) [illegible] very large museums where they have the carriages of the [illegible], also the crown and precious objects covered with jewels of incalculable value, as well as their fine robes. While the people are [illegible]. Also they have a grain, small as a grain of rice, engraved [illegible] to the people saying that every difficulty can be [illegible] with a will and with calmness and finally you can win. He [illegible] explaining all this to me, since his Spanish is not very good, [illegible] understand, and what he meant for me to understand was that [illegible] overcome all difficulties, and thus his value would be [illegible] in the hour of triumph. These friends (Sovs) are very [illegible] their superiors - they will even stay 20-25 minutes in the [illegible] so they would not be discovered by their superiors [illegible] happened to my friend Estanislao (STLNIKOV) today and he [illegible] came out (of the bathroom) at 1140 h because two friends (Sovs) [illegible] one of them is none other that the Second Secretary of the Ambassador, Although he (the Ambassador) is not in Mexico, [illegible] still [illegible] have a lot of power to rebuke those who do [illegible] submit to the discipline of the State.

Sil

[illegible] T [illegible]

LICOWL Notes

30 July 1966

3

copies made for [illegible] files

27 July 1966

CONTACT REPORT - ORONSKY

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

1. I met LICOWL-1 on 27 July at 1930 hours (COIGNE was sick). The meeting lasted until 2015 hours and I set the next meeting for COIGNE for the same time and location Wednesday, 10 August. Tell COIGNE he will owe LICOWL-1 $800 pesos for salary for the month of July and at the end of August he will owe him another 800 pesos for August. I always pay him at the end of the month.

2. He turned over two audio microphones and I gave them to Feldmann. The microphones were installed in his shop and we have taken the recorder out. The brown paper attached was found in LICOWL's notes (written) for the 25th of June. He said he did not recall how it had gotten there and did not know who had written and drawn on the paper - it's very odd since the word written on the piece of brown paper and the last entry in LICOWL's notes are the same - but the handwriting is definitely different. Only LICOWL should have access to his notes.

LICOWL's written notes from 27 July meeting (translated by WEENING:

SILNIKOV P

Wednesday, 20 July: Today my friend Estanislao (SILNIKOV) came to drink a Tecate beer at about 11 am, and I asked him about the photographs which he had told me he wanted me to make from a negative which he has. He answered that he was going to look for the negative and bring it to me. Then he told me that another one of his friends (i.e. Soviets) was leaving on 24 July and that now it was Vasiliv's turn (BUTSEV did leave on 24 July), since he has a son about 9 years old and now it is time to teach him how to be a good comrade," . . ."since for thoseof us who live in a free country, this life of this people seems bad to us because everything is different from what we do. They teach us to love our Progress (?), to live well with our neighbors, to help the poor, to give food to beggers. While they come to our country to create disorder and create distance within our families and in our work, and they infiltrate themselves everywhere in order to sow hatred. They show us everything which is produced in their country and how much they have. But they import things from our countries through their embassies. Daily, their sedition movements can be seen. In fact, a month ago a group of Mexicans (in name) obtained visas for Moscow and in the (Soviet) Embassy they were given a "blast" with as much vodka as they could drink. A good start in getting to know the country which so "foolishly" hopes to improve its mentally backward who cannot realize the evil they do in supporting those who sow desolation wherever they go. After seeing people come every day to the Embassy to get propaganda we can only think that their work is (valid).

?

LOGINOV P

Thursday, 21 July: Today at 1045 Sr. Valentin (LOGINOV or. KUCHEROV) came in to use the telephone and asked someone to wait for him at General Cano 32, and as he was about to hang up he ~~stressed~~ stressed that they be sure to wait for him at 7:30 pm. After talking to whoever it was, he asked me to send him, at the same address on General Cano, two cases of quinine water and gingerale by 7 pm. without fail. I delivered them in person and took them into the kitchen and I noticed that the house was being repaired and that they were getting ready for company, since there were several bottles of liquor there. (COMMENT: No Soviets live at General Cano 32. NIKITIN lives at General Leon 32 and,

[illegible] Gen 32

25 July 1966

~~Dillon~~
~~Watson~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~Scott~~

Note: These are traces from the Lienvoy Listening Post on Loguinov, who is of interest to Lirama and Litempo/S.

Files : Valentin LOGUINOV (P-11712)

X-Ref to Lienvoy/Production 50-6-~~74~~ 75/4

done

Nombre: VALENTIN S. LOGUINOV
Domicilio: Ignacio Esteva 10-1
Esposa: ALEXANDRA D. DE LOGUINOV
Acreditado como Tercer Secretario en funciones de Vice-Cónsul substituto de OLEG NITCHIPORENKO.
Auto Chevrolet Impala Mod.1965 placas D-335 (datos de Dic.1965)

3 Ago.65 De Sabena confirman su llegada procedente de Moscú en el vuelo de las 23:10 hrs.

7 Ago.65 JORGE ROJAS MENDOZA de Cubana de Aviación, pregunta por LOGUINOV porque quiere saber que hacer sobre la llegada del Ballet Ukraniano que actualmente están en Venezuela, pero llegan via La Habana el próximo dia 10.

10 Ago.65 ADELARDO CURBELO Cónsul Cubano, saluda a su colega LOGUINOV y comunica que el Ballet Ukraniano no va a necesitar de visas, ya que del vuelo de Viasa de Venezuela pasan al vuelo de Cubana, y aquí unicamente se harán bajo la presentacion de pasaportes.

6 Sep.65 VAN-DICK de Air France, le pide la documentación para el guatemalteco ROLANDO CASTILLO SEGURA y otros para que puedan llegar a Moscú a Estudiar en la Universidad Patricio Lumumba.

12 Sep.65 SOCORRO FLORES de Viajes Mex-América, solicita visas. (constantemente ésta mujer en forma familiar es atendida por LOGUINOV)

13 Sep.65 VAN-DICK avisa que tiene problemas con los señores PLUTARCO HERNANDEZ, BARRANTES y GONZALEZ que van a Moscú.

27 Sep.65 Es invitado a reunión-coctel del Cuerpo Consular para el próximo día 30.

6 Oct.65 JORGE ROJAS MENDOZA avisa la llegada de 40 deportistas rusos. LOGUINOV se encarga de atender dichos jugadores.

25 Oct.65	Hace reservaciones para ir al puerto de Mazatlán.
28 Oct.65	Es avisado por HEBERTO JORRIN de la Embajada Cubana, que en Yucatán se encuentran los barcos rusos "Zhafiro" y otro; en el que hay un lesionado por explosión de una caldera.
1o.Nov.65	Se reune con CARLOS BLANCO. JULIO PLATAS de la C.T.M., se pone a su disposición. Reserva por Mexicana de Aviación pasajes para él mismo y para EUGENIO GORLYTZINE.
4 Nov.65	MARIANO GARCIA Cónsul Cubano en Mérida, informa incidente del barco donde salió lesionado VICTOR MOROSHOV.
8 Nov. 65	MARIANO GARCIA nuevamente informa estado de salud del lesionado MOROSHOV, quién es transladado a la ciudad de México para ser atendido por los doctores CONCHA y CARDENAS de Mérida, y el Dr. EMILIANO SORIANO de México.
10 Nov.65	Reserva pasaje a Cuba para el lesionado MOROSHOV.
15 Nov.65	ALEXANDRO PRIJHODKO ofrece a EMILIA AROSAMENA Cónsul de Panamá, presentarle a LOGUINOV.
17 Nov.65	Frecuentemente del Club France le hacen cobros por adeudos.
19 Nov.65	Comenta con el Consejero de Panamá Ing. JOSE B. CALVO las buenas declaraciones de su Presidente publicadas hoy en Excelsior.
30 Nov.65	El Dr. EMILIANO SORIANO le informa la salud de un marinero ruso, a quien posteriormente operó de apendicitis.
13 Ene.66	CHARLES G.MUELLER de la Embajada de Estados Unidos, solicita la visa para su esposa ELAINE.
18 Ene.66	Reclama a su amiga SOBERRO FLORES que la otra ocasión que fué invitado a su fiesta asistieron unos norteamericanos. Esta se disculpa y lo invita solo.

21 Ene.66 EUGENIO BEDRIN pide a RITTER de Tecnica Electro-Mecánica cintas magnéticas para la grabadora DK-6 de LOGUINOV.

Es atendido por el Dr. SORIANO y operado el 1o. de febrero en la Central Quirurgica.

1o.Feb.66 Reserva pasajes a Mazatlán.

11 Feb.66 Avisa a GONZALEZ de Villasana y Compañia, que sale a Coatzacoalcos a vigilar la carga del barco y pide lo conecten con alguna persona de ese puerto.

21 Feb.66 ERICKA, Corresponsal de The News, se pone de acuerdo para hacer una reunión.

Por indicaciones de PRIJHODKO, llevará a SARITA ROSSENFIELD y PERLA GONZALEZ de The News invitaciones para la recepción del día 23 en la Embajada.

22 Feb.66 SANTIAGO RICO de Agencias Generales Marítimas, informa a LOGUINOV que los barcos rusos "Thulomalés" y Shelengalés" que en días pasados estuvieron cargando en Coatzacoalcos, donde estuvo LOGUINOV; regresarán en cuatro días más por lo que quiere saber si es posible que un barco que sale el día 18 con destino a La Habana regrese el 26..? a cargar 5,300 toneladas de maíz. LOGUINOV no comprende como sea posible eso y cree que sea otro barco el que venga a cargar. RICO ratifica que se trata del "Thulomalés" cuyo Capitán informó a STETLER de Dreyfus que regresaría para esa fecha, y quiere recordar que debe darse aviso a la Capitanía del Puerto con tres días de anticipación.

28 Feb.66 ERICKA lo invita a cenar a su domicilio y pregunta si ya tiene listos sus papeles para poder viajar.

1o.Mzo.66 SALVADOR PAZ de Representaciones Marítimas quien acompañó a LOGUINOV en su último viaje a Mazatlán, informa familiarmente la llegada de dos barcos rusos el "Ortlán" y el "Venusterly" que próximamente llegarán a Acapulco, pidiendo que una persona de la Embajada vaya a ese puerto para que sirva de interprete.

3 Mzo.66 SALVADOR PAZ nuevamente informa a LOGUINOV que de Acapulco el barco que llegó necesita para gastos 10,000 dolares, para combustible, gastos de puerto y provisiones. LOGUINOV informa que los dará hasta el lunes, cuando regrese el Consejero VISKO de Veracruz donde está atendiendo el barco "Thulomalés".

4 Mzo.66 ABELARDO CURBELO Cónsul Cubano, lo invita para el próximo lunes a la Feria del Hogar.

7 Mzo.66 De Mazatlán el Capitán del barco "Lyra" se comunica en ruso con LOGUINOV.

17 Mzo.66 Se reunirá mañana con MARGARET FEDOR para que le dé los documentos que LOGUINOV necesita.

23 Mzo.66 SALVADOR PAZ quiere mostrarle las disposiciones respecto al arribo de barcos mercantes a puertos nacionales y ver que opinión "tienen ustedes sobre eso y ver si ustedes como embajada pueden tomar cartas en el asunto".

11 Abr.66 El Dr. JOSE LUIS ALVAREZ GALLOU se reporta. LOGUINOV le reclama haberlo dejado plantado ayer en Cuernavaca. JOSE LUIS ofrece invitarlo para su cumpleaños el dia 21.

21 Abr.66 Se hace cargo de la reservaciones durante la permanencia en México del señor BOITCHENKO Vice-Presidente de Inturist en Moscú y demas acompañantes a la conferencia de Agencias de Viajes.

22 Abr.66 CURBELO lo invita al igual que a IATZKOV y MIROSHNIKOV y KORMUSHKIN a la recepción del dia 25 en la Embajada de Cuba en despedida del Lic. CARLOS GONZALEZ PARRODI y organizada por el Cuerpo Cónsular.

23 Abr.66 Convina con MERCEDES TREVIÑO de la Asociación Mexicana de Agencias de Viajes, sobre las actividades de los delegados rusos a la convención de turismo en Guadalajara.

26 Abr.66 Dr. AMARAL que dijo ser perseguido político de su país natal Brasil, pide a LOGUINOV asilo dentro de la embajada, porque en la de Cuba se lo han negado. LOGUINOV recuerda que hay un tratado

...

.. y recomienda vea la embajada de algún otro país Latino - Américano.

3 May.66 Se pone en contacto con el capitán del barco "Volchevik" en Veracruz y pregunta si ya apareció el marinero ruso. (Posteriormente se supo que dicho marinero había faltado a su barco por cuestiones de faldas)

10 May.66 El Dr. JUAN MANUEL FERNANDEZ RODRIGUEZ que dijo ser representante del Gobierno del Estado de México, le solicita visa. LOGUINOV lo invita a que pase mañana a la embajada.

11 May.66 ERICKA KAMERMAN insiste en tener sus documentos para poder aprovechar su viaje a Europa y visitar Moscú. LOGUINOV ofrece hablar con el embajador si es necesario " por la simpatía que siente por ella".

13 May.66 Llama la atención al gerente de la Agencia Vagon & Cook porque siempre que mandan pasaportes para sus visas no van bien requisitados.

20 May.66 Comisionado por KAZANTSEV, comunica al Lic. FERNANDO FLORES TEJEDA de Relaciones Exteriores el constante robo y extravió de placas en los autos diplomáticos.

24 May.66 DAVID ORNELAS de Mundos Tours, agradece el obsequio de folletos y revistas de la embajada.

26 May.66 SOCORRO FLORES suplica dé visa al pasaporte que no tiene fecha de vencimiento. LOGUINOV manifiesta que solamente dá visas a los pasaportes en regla y que no le importa que esa persona vaya en visita oficial.

30 may.66 Reserva pasajes para Veracruz.

1o.Jun.66 BERTA GONZALEZ PADILLA reclama el incumplimiento del contrato de arrendamiento de la casa en Cuernavaca para el personal de la embajada.

4 Jun.66 SALVADOR PAZ PLATA pide le ayude para obtener la representación de los barcos rusos que llegan al puerto de Veracruz, porque se recibió un telex en que dicen que Rusia va a importar un cargamento de tubería. LOGUINOV lo ayudará pero no lo pueden discutir por teléfono.

13 Jun.66 El Dr. JOSE LUIS ALVAREZ GALLOU del Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, le pide lleve el proyector de cine, "porque esos señores tienen deseos de ver sus peliculas".

22 Jun.66 GLORIA ALFARO quiere reunirse para platicar con algunos funcionarios de la embajada. LOGUINOV está de acuerdo en que sea el viernes "despues de las clases de ingles".

29 Jun. 66 La señorita HERNANDEZ del Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, le avisa que sus clases serán hasta la próxima semana porque SARITA sigue enferma.

5 Jul.66 De la agencia Morris Hermanos, informan sobre el cheque del auto Chevrolet Impala placas 19-DA y que robaron el radio. LOGUINOV tramitará lo del seguro en La Provincial.

6 Jul.66 ERICKA KAHERMAN a su regreso de Europa se reporta. LOGUINOV le reclama que no se despidió e informa que tiene mas de un mes con sus documentos para que pase a recogerlos.

7 Jul.66 MIRIAM de la Agencia Mundos Tours, despues de tratar sobre visas, reclama el mal humor de LOGUINOV el día que estuvo en su casa, pues hasta su familia se molestó. LOGUINOV recomienda lea mas novelas de amor que policiacas, porque le hace preguntas que no puede contestar.

13 Jul.66 Pregunta al Lic. MORA PLANCARTE Oficial Mayor de la Cámara de Diputados, el motivo del viaje a Rusia del Diputado JESUS SANCHEZ, para poderle otorgar la visa.

Gestiona visa para Estados Unidos a nombre de VLADIMIR SHELANYEV corresponsal ruso de Izvestia en La Habana, actualmente en México.

14 Jul.66 El Ing. MANUEL ANAYA de la Secretaria de Recursos Hidraulicos le solicita la visa, para asistir a un congreso.

15 Jul.66 El Embajador de Cuba HERNANDEZ ARMAS, pide se ayude a "un gran amigo nuestro" el Dr. ALFONSO MARTINEZ ALVAREZ quien desea asistir al Congreso de Microbiología en Moscú e inclusive está invitado para los festejos del 26 de Julio en La Habana.

19 Jul.66 El Ing. MANUEL ANAYA agradece la visa otorgada y a su regreso se reunirán para un cambio de impresiones. LOGUINOV lo espera.

21 Jul.66 El Lic. LARA FLORES informa haber recibido cable del Embajador JOSE ITURRIAGA en donde ratifica su invitación, por tal motivo solicita la visa, y poder platicar con los Agregados Cultural y Comercial rusos. LOGUINOV dará gustoso la visa y en la embajada los pondrá en contacto con esas personas.

NOTA: Frecuentemente es buscado LOGUINOV en la embajada rusa, sin que se encuentre éste.

Julio 22 de 1966.

14-00000

Dillon

P-2712 25 September 1966 4

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOOKY-5
20 Sept, evening, Subj's home
23 Sept, [illegible], Subj's office

1. The C/O and his wife went to Subj's home the evening of 20 Sept for dinner. We established a first name relationship with Subj's wife, thus avoiding use of the C/O's alias, Mr. [illegible]. No others were present beside us, and Subj and his wife. Subj's son did not join at the dinner table. A bright touch on the part of Subj was that we were served the caviar that Prikhodko had recently brought to Subj.

Subj's wife, Esther, is an intelligent and charming person. She spoke with great perception of her experiences in the Soviet Union, when she had accompanied her husband there a few years ago. Although Subj has told the C/O that his wife does not know of the Intelligence relationship between them, it appeared evident to the C/O that Subj's wife considers the C/O in some kind of special relationship to her husband.

During the evening Subj reported to the C/O something that Prikhodko had said at their meet on 7 Sept, which he had omitted in reporting their meet. In speaking about the Mexican travel agents attending the INTURIST conference in Moscow in October 1966, Prikhodko stated: "We are interested that as many travel agents as possible go to the convention. Maybe we could later on use one of them. But the problem with the Mexicans is this- they are very affable and simpatico- but when it reaches the point of a straight proposition, they are all "chicken.""

2. On 23 Sept Subj reported about the visit of Valentin Loginov to his office on 21 Sept. They went to the nearby Flor de Mexico for coffee. Subj, who had been instructed to probe further re Pavel Yatskov's probable assignment when he returns to Mexico, didn't have to. Loginov burst out to Subj: "You have to congratulate me - I am the Consul General." Subj asked who's going to be Loginov's assistant. Loginov answered, but Subj does not recall the name. Subj asked "What job are you planning to give Yatskov?" Loginov asked "Why me?" Subj said "You're a big shot". Loginov stated "He'll get a job. He will be some First Secretary of some Department."

The reason that Loginov came by to Subj is that he wants to investigate the shabby treatment that had been accorded the delegates to the Microbiological Congress in Moscow (Subj had told the C/O that the attendees to the Congress didn't even

Files:
cc. P-2270 P-11712 P-885 (p.1)
P-8415

COPIES MADE

P-11712

COPIES MADE

3

have hotel accommodations, but had to be put up in beds at Moscow University). Loginov was evidently investigating on complaint of the Mexicans who had attended. Subj asked if Loginov was going to write his report to INTURIST. Loginov said "No - higher - to the Ministry of Tourism."

Subj asked if there was any word about his trip (to the INTURIST convention- about which [illegible] was supposed to let him know if he could attend). Loginov answered "Not yet. [illegible] there's no problem."

Loginov said to Subj "You are unable to do anything now. Maybe you can recommend someone to us - maybe a Mexican that would be able later on to get a job in the American Embassy." /Comment: Despite the way Subj reported Loginov's phrasing of the question, Subj said he had the impression that Loginov was asking Subj to recommend someone who could take Subj's place. At any rate, Subj had the latter in mind when he answered Loginov/. Subj replied: "You have more contacts than I have- all kinds of people. It's not necessary for me to recommend anyone to you."

Subj changed the subject and asked: "What should I take to the "boys" (of INTURIST)?" Loginov said "Don't make the same mistake you made last time - you brought English suiting materials. That's not the custom in our country. Bring something Mexican- that doesn't cost more than two or three dollars." X

3. Subj also reported that on 22 Sept he had lunch with Fernanda and Juan Saldania. Subj told the C/O that at one time in the past when our office had asked Subj for recommendations of Mexicans in government, Subj had given Saldania's name. At that time in the Lopez Mateos administration Saldania had worked as assistant to Dr. [illegible] in Cultural Relations of the Secretariat of Public Education. Now Saldania is a private secretary in the Sub-Secretariat of Education. When Subj had gone to the Soviet Union, Saldania had been instrumental in getting him an official passport. Saldania's wife, Fernanda, works in the Pedagogic Museum of the Education Secretariat.

Who is this hers?

Fernanda arrived at Subj's office before her husband came (they were to proceed to Prendes Restaurant for lunch). Fernanda told Subj that maybe she would be going to Europe - to attend a "tribunal" being convoked by Bertrand Russell. They had tried to get the tribunal in France, but that was turned down by the French government. So, there are going to be two meetings, in November in Stockholm, and in March, probably in London. Then Fernanda showed Subj an article in Siempre "To the Soldiers in Viet Nam" which she said she had translated. She started talking about a group

[illegible] is a legal aide, NOT private secretary (was [illegible]) to Prof Federico Berrueto Ramon, [illegible] of Education.

Berrueto (Ramon.)

[illegible] should have his [illegible] in this!

3

called Mexican Youth for Vietnam, whose purpose it was to publish the truth about Vietnam and collect money to send to Vietnam via France. On weekends the group visits villages (colonias proletarias) and talks to the workers and peasants. Fernanda mentioned to Subj that there was a small similar group in the Jewish community, and she wanted to know about it so they could join forces. Subj said he knew of no such group in the Jewish community. Then Fernanda asked Subj to join the group and support it with money. Subj turned the proposition down. He said the Viet Cong weren't victims - they were dupes of the Communist Chinese and North Vietnam. In reply, Fernanda called Subj "a bourgeouis".

Subj said that although Juan was not present for the discussion, he knows of his wife's activities.

4. Subj also mentioned again that he had found out that ~~[illegible]~~ Edmundo Garza of Garza Touro and Rhino (phonetic) of Garza Lopez Tours were definitely going to attend the INTOURIST convention in Moscow. /Comment: If memory serves Rhino was LICA[illegible]Y-1/.

Rafael Rayn

P-8415

PMJ

COPIES MADE

4. I then asked him how the purchase of the watches was coming along. He told me that the morning after our last meeting (this would have been on 10 September, a Saturday) at about 0930 he went to the Trade Delegation building and asked for his good friend Yuriy (ISAYEV). ISAYEV said they are fresh out of watches but that they expect some more in 15 days at which time Subject should come back and ISAYEV will sell him all he wants. (COMMENT: In his notes for 12 September Subject says that SILNIKOV had come in to say that Subject's Soviet friends had wanted to give him a watch for his saints day on 11 September but that the Soviets are not out of them but that some would come in in fifteen days).

5. We then reviewed his notes. From now on I am not going to reproduce them in todo but only do certain items in brief form since they are tiresome, repetitious and now largely proven to be gross exaggerations plus fabrication.

6. General Notes:

11 September: STRIZHOV tells Subject that he has to drive the Ambassador every Sunday morning to play golf. Then follows Subject's account of the non-existent party.

12 Sept:

KOSTIKOV comes by at 1145 to offer regrets for not having come to yesterday's party and to say that Soviet cyclists will come to Mexico for the forthcoming winter olympics. Later three new Soviets who don't speak Spanish come in. SILNIKOV said that they will leave (Mexico) soon. (COMMENT: probably the two audio techs.)

13 Sept.

At 1145 STRIZHOV and GOROBETS come in to say that SILNIKOV had an accident in his car on Marina Nacional that morning. (COMMENT: Accident confirmed by LIENVOY)

14 Sept.

The three new Soviets came in and brought a supply of mejoral, alka seltzer, razor blades, etc. For this reason Subject thinks they are on TDY from Cuba and are stocking up for return to this paradise.

15 Sept.

Description of "atentado" described above.

16 Sept: Nothing

17 Sept:

LOGINOV tells him that he is now Consul in place of YATSKOV. Tells Subject he is looking for a 3 bedroom house with garden near the Embassy and not more than 4,000 MN per month. Asks Subject to look for one.

LICOWL Contact Report
21 September 1966

P-11712

SECRET

18 Sept:

Subject takes off on bicycle and finds a house at Avenue Chapultepec 180 with six bedrooms but renting at 5,000. Subject suspects that LOGINOV won't like the 5,000 rent nor the fact that there is a vacant lot next door.

19 Sept.

LOGINOV comes in at 0930 and Subject describes the house. LOGINOV will go by to look at it.

7. Special Notes on SILNIKOV

10 Sept (Saturday): SILNIKOV is alone from 1045 to 1110. Says he, STRIZHOV and ~~SHE~~ GOROBETS will come to party next day after seeing KALYGIN off at airport. (Both LILYRIC and LIMITED have him leaving at 1012 in car and not returning by 1400)

11 Sept (Day of party): SILNIKOV comes in from 1100 to 1120. Says Soviets will have to leave the party a little early since they have to show a film to the Soviet kids in the Embassy.that evening. KORMUSHKIN then comes in and says can't come. At 1428 SILNIKOV, GOROBETS and STRIZHOV come in and all go to party, etc.

12 Sept: 1020 to 1040 SILNIKOV, GOROBETS and STRIZHOV come in to thank Subject for the party. 1450 SILNIKOV comes in alone for a quick tequila. 1510 SILNIKOV and STRIZHOV drop by to make small purchases.

13 Sept: 1130 to 1200 SILNIKOV comes in. Is looking for empty 1/2 liter jars. 1510 comes in agains and tells about his car accident yesterday.

14 Sept: 1020 to 1100 - SILNIKOV comes in and explains the damage to his car. 1520 to 1535 was in again.

15 Sept: 1130 to 1205 SILNIKOV comes in. 1400 in again.

16 Sept: Nothing.

17 Sept: 1010 SILNIKOV and STRIZHOV come in. 1450 SILNIKOV in alone.

18 Sept: 1100 SILNIKOV and STRIZHOV come in. Subject invites them home for lunch. They can't because STRIZHOV had to drive Ambassador to a conference with Chilean Ambassador. 1400 SILNIKOV in alone.

19 Sept: SILNIKOV comes in 3 times: 1100 to 1122; 1420 to 1440; 1830 to 1900 with STRIZHOV to eat tacos.

20 Sept: 1400 SILNIKOV, STRIZHOV and GOROBETS drop in for a drink.

(COMMENT: As usual LILYRIC and LIMITED do not support these times).

Francis J. COIGNE

SECRET

The C/O reminded Subj of what he basically was in Soviet eyes - an Eastern European refugee and a Jew. And more, he had never professed to them any ideological sympathy to the Communist cause. The most he had done was to declare that the Soviets represented the wave of the future, and he wanted to be on the winning side. But he must recognize that such sentiment coming from a Jew could hardly have convinced the Soviets.

b) Next stage of approach to Soviets in Mexico:

The C/O suggested to Subj as an effective way to break off from the Soviets that he should drop completely all affirmations of "friendship" - cut out the "hasta la muerte" bit. Subj, in turning down any and all Soviet requests for information or assistance, should couple it with the open declaration that he has quit.

Subj agreed to follow this line, except for the qualification pertaining to his presence in Moscow.

11712

c) Clarify status of Loginov as "Consul":

Subj daid that during his meet with Prikhodko and Loginov on 8 September 1966 while they were talking about Pavel Yatskov, whom Prikhodko said he had seen in Moscow, Subj addressed the following question to Loginov: "When is your boss coming back?" Loginov replied: "You're talking now to the Consul."

3. The C/O wished to clarify or reaffirm his understanding of Subj's response to Prikhodko on 8 September when the Soviet asked about legalizing a tourist in Mexico(reported in paragraph 4 of the Contact Report of 8 September). First, the C/O paraphrased for Subj the way he had reported Subj's reasoning process about Prikhodko's question (see Comment in paragraph 4 of the Contact Report) - Subj said that it was essentially correct.

Then the C/O related the way he had reported Prikhodko's question and Subj's reply. Subj said that that was not exactly how the conversation had taken place. He restated the conversation as follows:

Prikhodko: "Which will be the best way to legalize (a tourist in Mexico)?
Subject : "You know the answers."
Prikhodko: "If you would have to put (a man in your office), would you be able to?"
Subjett : "It would be difficult- necessary to consult Gobernación, because the company had to have the required capitalization to place a foreigner

COPIES MADE

from LICOZY-5 Contact Report 16 Sept 66

orig filed: P-2712

files

Licalla

SEPTIEMBRE DE 1966

Liempty #9

OBSERVACION ESPECIAL.

Sa.

Martes - 13

Este día a las 1920 Hs. Yó transitaba por la Avenida Universidad, sobre esta calle y a la altura de Pilares, se encuentra un Café que lleva por nombre " IPOCAMPO ", en dicho lugar observé que en el interior se encontraba LOG platicando con una Mujer con tipo de latina, la filiación de la mujer mencionada, es aproximadamente la siguiente:

Edad 28 o 30 años, altura 1.58 m., complexión ligeramente gruesa, piel morena, cabello negro y rizado, cara redonda, ojos cafés, nariz ancha, boca regular de labios gruesos. Esta mujer vestía de color verde seco.

13 Si

P-11

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Ernst GOEBEL

DATE OF MEETING: 8 September 1966

1. I met with Subject at his office on 8 September 1966 from 1730 to 1800. Next meeting is in about two weeks to be arranged by phone.

2. Subject reported that LOGINOV still comes fairly regularly to the French Club on weekends. Occasionally he brings his wife. Once or twice he brought two young Soviet men in their early twenties. He has also brought a Soviet woman ca 25 who has played tennis with two other women (club members) whom Subject doesn't know. Subject hasn't seen GORLITSYN since our last meeting.

3. Since LOGINOV doesn't play tennis but only sits around outside or in the bar, Subject doesn't see him for sustained periods. Subject has seen LOGINOV talking to SARMIENTO or his wife two or three times. From observing him in the bar, Subject saw that LOGINOV is on speaking terms with several members.

4. I asked Subject if he knew Ofelia ALFARO Lopez (P-11339), a good friend of the SARMIENTOs and also in contact with the Soviets. He didn't recognize her name as a club member. When I told him that she teaches at the School of Economics, he remembered that at a dinner party at the home of Henry *SIEGMANN, an American and local head of Continental Oil Co., a Mexican woman was present who was a professor of Economics. She speaks excellent English and is in her thirties. He thinks this is ALFARO but is not sure. He will check his wife who is the name rememberer in the family.

5. Subject remarked that he found the above dinner strange for its odd mixture of solid business types and a few off-beat "beatnik" Mexican types including the female professor. He hastened to assure me that SIEGMANN was a sterling character.

6. For the next meeting Subject will attempt to confirm ALFARO's identity and also to spot likely club members who appear to be on close terms with the SARMIENTOs with the view of getting an assessment of the latter.

7. Subject is interested and willing. However, he does not appear to be very much interested in people. Thus he has played tennis with SARMIENTO for years and hasn't a thing to say about him except that he is a pleasant tennis companion. Similarly SARMIENTO's wife is good looking and a good tennis player.

8. I haven't had an opportunity to talk to Subject's wife yet because Subject says that she does not know the SARMIENTOs. I met his wife last fall and noted that she is much more alert, interested and lively in social relations than he is. Therefore I bet that she knows a lot more than he gives her credit for. I intend to invite them to dinner soon in order to talk with the wife and explore possibilities.

Paul Dillon

FILE: P-12330 P-11712 P-11163 P-11339 P-12703

~~Stor~~ Alice

8 September 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOZY-5 — P-2712
7 Sept, a few minutes, Sears Ejercito Nacional
8 Sept, 1100-1200, Subj's office

1. On 7 Sept at about 1100 the C/O made a routine call to Subj's office to determine if Subj would be available that day. Subj responded that he was glad that the C/O had called because he had to see him urgently. In characteristic manner Subj trying doubletalk told the C/O that he had received a telegram, that his old friend (Prikhodko) was back, and that he was going to see the "two of them" (Prikhodko and Loginov) at 1500 that day at the Flor de Mexico. The C/O was puzzled by the reference to the telegram, and asked incredulously if the telegram had anything to do with setting up the meeting with his friends. Subj's answer was ambiguous, and the C/O let it go at that because he arranged a brief meet with Subj for 1230 at Sears Restaurant, at Ejercito Nacional, where Subj was to be on his own business at that time.

2. Nevertheless, in considering the briefing instruction to give to Subj the C/O had to allow for the fact that there might have been special circumstances in the Soviets' arrangement for their meet with Subj. Further, this was Prikhodko's first meet with Subj after return from Moscow, where it is presumed he had taken up Subj's case with his superiors and the line ~~decided~~ on how to deal in the future with their flagging, non-cooperative "agent." A reasonable contingency expectation was that the Soviets might have a "hot" proposition to make to Subj, and the C/O decided to brief Subj to the extent that if the Soviets broached a really important operational assignment, which Subj was to judge, Subj would conduct himself so as to draw out the Soviets but stall on acceptance. If nothing of overriding importance came from the Soviets, Subj was to continue his "friends-yes; work-no" stance.

At 1230 the C/O saw Subj for just a few minutes, during which the telegram was explained: it was from Moscow, inviting Subj's travel agency to participate in a seminar in Moscow 24-29 Oct 1966, detailed letter to follow. Further, Subj had learned from Prikhodko when the latter had called earlier in the morning to make the appointment for the meet that afternoon that Prikhodko was aware of the invitation and would talk to Subj about it at their meet. The C/O imparted to Subj the briefing outlined above, stressing that Subj must judge whether the Soviets were proposing something that was so important that he couldn't dismiss it out of hand - in which case he was to be non-committal and stall on a decision.

Did he have telegram?
[illegible] see it?

3. The C/O had communicated to the Station the tack he was going to take, and was later informed by the Station to reverse the planning of Subj's attitude toward a contingency proposition of the Soviets to a flat, unconditional "no."

File in P-11712 P-2270 P-885 (p. 2) P-7442 (p. 2)

4

Accordingly, the C/O tried to reach Subj at his office. Subj was not there so the C/O left a message to be given to Subj if he should arrive before 1500. The message was: " En el negocio con sus amigos deberia usted decir "no" a todo." The message purported to come from "Señor Berger."

In a telephone call to Subj at 1800 that evening the C/O learned from Subj that nothing of transcending importance had occurred at his meet with the Soviets, and so the C/O arranged to meet with Subj the following day 8 September. Subj had not received the message in time.

4. On 8 Sept Subj reported that he had met Prikhodko and Loginov at 1500 the preceding day in the Flor de Mexico Restaurant. Prikhodko did most of the talking. He brought Subj the two kilos of caviar that Subj had requested (and paid for). He said he had had a good leave in the Soviet Union, and that the wedding (of his son) had gone off all right. He had spoken with Nechiporenko (Cle) (who is still in Moscow and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) who sent his regards to Subj and also four Russian records. He had seen Pavel Yatskov in Moscow who told him that he had met Subj in Paris. Yatskov would be returning to Mexico about 17 September 1966. Either Prikhodko or Loginov told Subj that Loginov was now the Soviet Consul in Mexico. Loginov told Subj that he would pass by Subj's office on Monday (12 Sept).

They discussed the invitation to the travel agents to come to Moscow. Prikhodko said that twelve INTURIST representatives in Mexico had been invited, that he had the telegram and that he was going to coordinate the arrangements for the travel agents to attend the conference. /Comment: The telegram sent to Subj in Spanish on 6 September 1966 said: "there will be a conference 24- 29 October in Moscow of travel agencies that collaborate with INTURIST dealing with international tourism; we invite your agency; a reduced price for the stay will be afforded; a detailed letter follows."/ Prikhodko asked Subj if he thought of attending the conference. Subj said he would like to go (and added with a twinkle) - "only from a business standpoint."

7

Prikhodko, for his part, in thin reference to Subj's uncooperative attitude said that Subj had put him into a hard spot with his superiors in Moscow. And now he would have to consult with Moscow to see whether Subj can attend the travel agent conference. Subj asked archly "By letter?" Prikhodko replied "You're crazy-everything goes by cable." Subj stated "You can refuse me a visa." Prikhodko dismissed that, saying that if Subj goes to Moscow he will ~~be~~ meet Prikhodko's colleagues, and that if Subj is in Moscow the doctors there would be happy to check into Subj's health (a matter mentioned previously with both Loginov and Prikhodko). Subj, responding somewhat mockingly to this expression of concern by the Soviets, said he was still their friend and one of them.

2

Prikhodko then remarked something to the effect that Subj now didn't want to do anything for them -what with his bad health and being tied up in business- but that maybe in the future..... and then got very much into the present by sliding easily into the old groove: he said " I talked/to you several times about a man coming tourist to Mexico - what is the best way to arrange legal residence- could it be done through your office - he could be attached to your office- he doesn't have to work there."

/Comment: Subj explained to the C/O that he sensed the trap immediately, recognizing that this was the old bent of the Soviets on which he had furnished a wealth of information in the past. Subj reasoned that if the Soviets were fishing with the old bait, he would not rise to it eagerly because in view of his recent non-cooperative behavior it would only confirm to the Soviets that he was being controlled (by the AIS). He would not reject the insinuation of his cooperation out of hand and categorically, because that would not be consistent with his posture of remaining on friendly terms with the Soviets. Therefore he took the middle road, that of being non-committal or uncommitted, where the initiative of compliance was always in his hands. Parenthetically, Subj told the C/O that if the "policy" is that of complete rejection of the Soviets he should not have even met them; but following the policy of "hasta la muerte- amigos; pero hacer nada" he felt he was doing the right thing in stringing them along a barren path. Thus, without batting an eye he simply repeated what he had already told them./ Subj said he would have to consult Gobernación- because he didn't know if his company had the required capitalization to place a foreigner in a job - but this being Mexico, anything could probably be done. /Comment: Subj remarked to the C/O at this point that the Soviets could not seriously consider using Subj's firm to "legalize" their man, because it would be a patent fraud to the employees in his firm, and he did not think the Soviets were stupid about such things/.

The C/O's summary comment to Subj's unspoken plea for criticism of his course of action was that under the concept of a "friends, yes; work, no" policy toward the Soviets he was doing a fine job of walking the tightrope.

5. The C/O asked Subj if there had been any travel arrangements for non-Soviets to the Soviet Union. Subj replied that Julio Rothenstreich, whom Subj characterized as a German Jew, and his wife, a Russian Jew, had left 5 Sept to New York en route to the Soviet Union. Subj said Rothenstreich had told him that he was friendly with the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico and represented "Russian firms" (sic). He was to remain in the Soviet Union 15 days and visit a few cities, Moscow, Kiev and Volgograd- and then some cities in Europe, Vienna and Paris. Subj said that Rothenstreich's

COPIES MADE

7

own firm was making the hotel reservations in the Soviet Union for him. Subj said he had met once before with Rothenstreich years ago, but didn't know anything about him.

Subj also mentioned a widower in his sixties, David Nosofsky, who left for the Soviet Union on 1 Sept - Nosofsky has a brother in Kiev.

6. The C/O had noticed a new face among Subj's employees and asked Subj who the girl was. Subj explained that he had taken on the new girl, Leticia Cisneros, the daughter of one of Subj's guides in Mexico, as possible replacement for Miriam Avila Katz, who has an offer to work for the Israeli Embassy in Mexico. Subj said he would not want to lose Miriam because, even though she is a slow worker, she is capable and also a nice girl. If Miriam should leave, Leticia would take over her work (which includes the responsibility for non-Soviet travel to the Soviet Union).

7. The C/O questioned Subj about his attitude toward attending the travel agent conference in Moscow. Subj said that from a business standpoint he would want to attend, or if not him personally someone from his firm, like Miriam. He was interested in INTURIST business, and felt that he should know what plans INTURIST will be formulating inasmuch as his competitors will be there. He is interested to know what percentage he gets of INTURIST business. He believed that INTURIST would foot 50% of the costs of staying in the Soviet Union during the conference. The C/O asked if Subj knew the other travel agencies that were to be invited. Of the twelve from Mexico Subj felt that the following were included: Garza, Garza Tours, De Carlo Tours, Viajes Melia, Cook's, MexAmerica, Pegaso, Excursiones y Viajes (EVISA), American Express, and possibly Autoviajes Internacionales. Subj knew the "jefes" of all these.

Subj plans to attend the International Congress and Convention Association meeting in Israel on 30 October 1966. He is considering the possibility of going to Moscow for the travel agent meeting 24-29 Oct and then going on to Israel.

The C/O told Subj to let him know Prikhodko's results re permission for Subj to attend the Moscow meeting.

8. Subj requested the C/O to obtain one case each of Red, White and Rosee French wine, the "best" available.

PRM

CARDED

COPIES MADE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LICOZY-5 Meeting with PRIKHODKO and LOGINOV on 7 September 1966

1. LICOZY-5 reported that he had a meeting with PRIKHODKO and LOGINOV at 1500 on 7 September at a Restaurant in town.

2. LILYRIC reports that on 7 September LOGINOV left the Embassy alone in his own car at 1405 going north on Tacubaya. PRIKHODKO left alone on foot to the east at 1416. They both returned together in LOGINOV's car at 1720.

3. Thus LOGINOV picked up PRIKHODKO somewhere and took him to the LICOZY-5 meeting. This is not only a good anti-surveillance device but also helps to prevent us associating the two.

Paul Dillon

FILE: P-2712 P-2270 P-11712

SECRET

14-00000

~~Copy~~
files



Valentin S. Loguinov
Tercer Secretario de la Embajada de la U.R.S.S.
Vice-Cónsul de la U.R.S.S.

Bob Shaw met Loginov at a Consular ~~Corp~~ Corps [illegible] luncheon on 6 Sept 1966 at the American club. They exchanged pleasantries & cards.

P-11712
Sept. 6, 1966

31 August 1966

SUBJECT: [illegible] office

1. [illegible] trip on 25 August. He said nothing [illegible] had occurred on his trip, except for his meeting Pavel Yatskov in [illegible] August. Before Subj had left for his trip he [illegible] Yatskov [illegible] to his agent in Paris for Yatskov to get some free [illegible] Paris. [illegible] mentioned to Yatskov that Subj had arrived in Paris. Yatskov contacted [illegible] and they had a short talk about inconsequential matters. [illegible] that Yatskov would be returning to Mexico.

2. The C/O asked Subj if there had been any Soviet travel booked through his office during his absence. Subj said there had, and called in his employee who took care of such matters, David Ornuelas. Ornuelas brought Subj the reservations for: [illegible] departing 1 Sept 1966 Mexico/Paris via Air France, [illegible] through to Moscow. Subj was about to ask Ornuelas [illegible] but the C/O told him to let it pass for the [illegible] Ornuelas to associate the C/O with requests concerning [illegible].

[illegible] reminding Subj that Loginov had asked at some previous time about the employees in Subj's office, and asked Subj if there had been any continuing interest by the Soviets in his employees. Subj said he knew of none. The C/O re-stated what he already knew: that Ornuelas handled Soviet travel, and Miriam Avila handled non-Soviet travel to the Soviet Union - and asked Subj if both were trustworthy employees. (Note: Subj has a file on Ornuelas, but none on Avila - the C/O [illegible] did not want at that time to call for Ornuela's file asked Subj just a few questions respecting both employees, and said we would want to [illegible] at a later date - giving as reason that we wanted file information on [illegible] dealing with the Soviets.) The facts adduced on each employee at this meeting were:

David Ornuelas [illegible] worked for Subj about 5 years; Subj acquired David from another travel agency because he was efficient in tariffs. Subj called him a bit mixed up because [illegible] he was "left" and other times "to the right."

Miriam Avila [illegible] (see Report this Subj 13 July 1966): worked for Subj about 2 years. Mother is American, family from Akron, Ohio. Miriam had worked for Aeronaves at the New York World Fair, after which she applied for a job to Subj. Subj commented that Miriam is very Jewish - minded, and intensely interested in Israel, to which she has traveled twice.

3. The C/O reminded Subj that if he is contacted by the Soviets he maintains his no-work stance with them. Subj nodded agreement.

PRM: P-2712

5. Concerning the big day, 21 August, Subject had the following to say in addition to the information in his notes. This information was in response to my questions :

a. They left the store at ca 1410 and stopped off to get barbecued chicken (COMMENT: they didn't actually arrive at LICOWL's until 1507.)

b. They went in a blue Station wagon (COMMENT: this is 17 DA).

c. The Soviets left at ca 1800 (COMMENT: correct).

d. Besides LICOWL and his wife and the two Soviets, only LICOWL's daughter and son-in-law were present.

6. Later on in the meeting Subject volunteered the information that SILNIKOV had told him that he had obtained permission to come to LICOWL's home (COMMENT: Strange conduct for someone who is playing the part of a case officer.) Subject also volunteered that he had told SILNIKOV that LOGINOV had called a girl from the store on Saturday (See Subject's notes for 20 August). SILNIKOV's reaction was one of approval, noting that LOGINOV was a bachelor now. I asked Subject if he didn't think his statement was a bit indiscreet since he could have burned LOGINOV, especially since SILNIKOV has now shown an interest in security measures. He said I was right but it was obvious that this aspect didn't bother him in the least either before or after my question.

7. I asked Subject what he thought about SILNIKOV's erratic behavior about wanting women, pornographic material, etc. in that he raises and drops the subject without any sense of continuity. Subject answered this by proposing that we send a girl under our control to visit his store and he would introduce her to SILNIKOV (COMMENT: Exactly what we are trying to do with LIRUSTIC-1). I pointed out that such a girl would have to live in the neighborhood or her presence in the store would be suspect. He then said that the girl could be invited to his home at a time when SILNIKOV was there. Subject would introduce her as a friend from Jalisco and let nature take its course. I told him that his idea has basic merit but could be quite difficult to implement in a secure manner. I remarked that it was a shame that he had been unable to come up with suitable candidates in his neighborhood. He said that he had many suitable friends in the neighborhood but that none were suitable since they weren't the types to whom he could suggest such an idea. I told him that he couldn't but we could, if he would spot suitable candidates.

Licowl Contact Report

23 August 1966

and that his "maybe" was just a way of joshing Loginov. Subj then asserted to the C/O that he felt strong in his capacity to deal with the Soviets, and that his joking remarks in now way vitiated that strength.

The C/O brought up the matter of Subj's having told Loginov he would supply his personal documents to Loginov, and (solely with the design of reaching for Subj's motive) stated that we thought it would be better if Subj did nothing to pass these documents to the Soviets and held them off indefinitely. Subj appeared a bit chagrined at the C/O's request, and told the C/O why: he wanted to give those "bastards" his documents to show them he had nothing to hide, and that he was not afraid of them; if he didn't give over his documents they might think they had something on him. Further he felt that he was buying insurance by handing them over openly, and gave as an example that he might be flying in Europe and might find himself diverted or force-landed in a place like Prague or Warsaw - and it would be a comfort to him to know that he had nothing to be afraid of concerning any irregularities in his past.

Therefore, Subj asked the C/O to check with his "bosses" to see if he could get the go-ahead on handing over his documents. Subj said if the answer is "no" he will comply, but his pleading to the C/O appeared as if Subj thought his was the wiser course. /Comment: Despite the C/O's method of challenging Subj on specifics, like the "maybe" and the passing of the documents, the C/O's own opinion is that Subj has achieved a very satisfactory status in his dealings with the Soviets, satisfactory in the sense that it is in accord with the Station's objectives in the case and equally important that it can be maintained because it is consistent with Subj's personality and outlook./

7. Subj expressed a desire for another get-together with the C/O and his wife. The C/O explained that his wife would be leaving Mexico by mid-January - and Subj, who doesn't need any pictures to be drawn for him, immediately hazarded the opinion that that meant that the C/O would be leaving not too long after. The C/O acknowledged this possibility, but said he had no idea of when it would take place. Subj wanted to know if there would be someone to take the C/O's place when the time came, and the C/O answered that of course there would.

The time for the get-together is left for some indefinite date before the C/O's wife departs.

PRM

COPIES MADE

SECRET

14 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Carlos BLANCO Solano (P-9328)

SOURCE: LITEMPO-12

1. Following is Source's report on Subject which wasgiven to COS on 13 December 1966 in response to the attached requirement.

2. "Carlos BLANCO works in the judicial police as a confidant of Carlos CASAMADRID (P-10968). Earlier he worked in the DFS and later worked with Carlos MADRAZO (P-5193) in the PRI. When MADRAZO left the PRI BLANCO continued as his aide. Later he went to work with CASAMADRID. In the DFS he never worked on investigations but was assigned to the security of visiteng foreigners. I met him last Saturday. (COMMENT: 10 December, evidentally in response to our requirement which Source received on 9 December). He said that he is a friend of (Vladimir) LOGINOV of the Soviet Embassy and he had one of LOGINOV's cards. Attached is BLANCO's card. I will submit a photo later. CASAMADRID's office number if 10-33-62. A Sr. SANTOS of the American Embassy."

3. Source submitted BLANCO's car. On the back is written Atenor Sala # 110-7, Col. Narvate (BLANCO's home address) and the telephone numbers 10-33-62 (CASAMADRID's office) and 28-57-40 (to leave messages). Evidently, BLANCO does not have a home phone.

4. The street, Atenor Sala is not in the 1965 plan of the Federal District.

Paul Dillon

FILE: P-9328 P-11712 P-8756 P-5193 P-10968

SECRET

Dillon id
~~Scott~~
~~White~~

Smith

Alice

13 December 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOZY-5 – P-2712
13 Dec 1930-2000, Hotel Reforma

1. The C/O arranged to deliver some liquor to Subj at the time he was hosting an Air France cocktail at the Hotel Reforma. After the liquor was transferred to Subj's car in a nearby parking lot, Subj recounted to the C/O the story of a visit he had had from Valentin Loginov that day.

2. Subj reported that Loginov came to his office unannounced and prevailed on Subj to step down to the street to have a coffee with him. Loginov presented Subj with four bottles of Vodka for Christmas, and then started to ask Subj some personal questions.

1) How had Subj left Poland (after WWII) for Paris– had his documentation been legal or illegal. Subj answered that it was legal.

2) How was he able to enter Paris– did he have a valid French visa. Subj said he did. How long did he stay in Paris. Subj said a few months.

3) Was he released from service with the (Polish) UB? Subj said yes. Were there any conditions to this release. Subj said no. ~~XXXX~~ Was he supposed to be contacted by the Poles. Subj said yes, and related the story of how he was contacted in Mexico (in March 1955) by a Polish diplomatic courier who brought a letter from Subj's old boss in the UB, Stanchuk (phonetic), and how Subj answered that letter. /Comment: Believe the story given in some detail in debriefing of Subj on his experiences in UB and WWII/. Loginov wanted to know if Subj's response to Poles had been positive or negative. Subj said it had been neutral. Asked why, Subj replied that he believed that eighty percent of the Poles were anti-Soviet. Loginov said "You are right."

4) Loginov asked Subj how he was getting along with the American airlines he deals with. Subj said "fine", and asked why. Loginov said that maybe, if Subj has the chance, he can learn the name of " the director of the CIA in Mexico". Subj told Loginov he was crazy, or couldn't be serious; he couldn't get that information. Loginov asked Subj if he could, would he tell the Soviets. Subj said "maybe."

Subj said to Loginov that he would show Loginov the documents that back up his answers to Loginov's questions, but that he was busy through Christmas, but could possibly see him after Christmas and before New Years.

3. The C/O asked Subj if he had inquired of Loginov why the latter was asking such questions. Subj said he did not, even though he was completely puzzled by this tack on the part of the Soviets. But Subj felt perfectly at ease in telling the truth to the Soviets, and had no hesitation in showing them his documentation.

The C/O told Subj that we would discuss this matter further.

File
cc. P-11712

LICOZY-5 is not [illegible]
to me [illegible]!

PRM

COPIES MADE

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

DATE OF MEETING: 13 December 1966

1. I met Subject on 13 December 1966 at the corner of Nazas and Melchor Ocampo at 1400. The meeting was held in my car and lasted until 1515. I paid him 800 MN salary for December and 800 MN Christmas bonus for 1966. Next meeting is for Tuesday, 3 January 1967 at 1500 at the same place.

2. Subject started out by showing me 4 pieces of paper he had picked up near the incinerator. They were worthless and I later told him not to attempt to pick up any more paper since it is not worth the risk.

3. I then reviewed the SGSWIRL examination with him. I told him that because of his lies and exaggerations, none of his previous information was considered valid and that rather than "being more useful to us" his material had meant a lot of work for nothing. I told him that I would give him another chance and that we were starting a new operation. Throughout my talk he was quite uncomfortable. He did not try to defend himself but simply agreed to whatever I said. Although he thanked me for the second chance he did not appear to be too contrite.

4. Following are the few interesting items from his notes :

a. On 12 December at ca 1700 KORMUSHKIN came in with another Soviet. KORMUSHKIN asked Subject when he was going to invite him to his home for a drink. Subject suggested Sunday, 18 December. They agreed to meet at the store at 1500. Subject described the other Soviet as a young diplomat ca 29-30 with a thin build who comes in only seldom. He was a friend of Oleg NECHIPORENKO (was already here when NECHIPORENKO was here) and went to the fiesta at Subject's home which was attended by NECHIPORENKO and KOSTIKOV and wives. (COMMENT: I remember a report on this fiesta but can't find it anywhere). Subject asked me for instructions, dinner, girls, etc? I told him to go along with it, have them to his house without other guests and offer them only liquor and snacks. Subject is to determine KORMUSHKIN's motive in asking himself to Subject's home. By the way whenever Subject has mentioned KORMUSHKIN in the last few months he has invariably remarked that he is a very heavy drinker.

b. On 6 December LOGINOV came in from 1230 to 1242. He had previously asked Subject about helping the Soviets to find a house for their school. This time he asked about the new (LILYRIC) building - how much an apartment costs (1500 MN), who lives there (chemical engineer in penthouse (LILYRIC), a German family on the second floor, etc. LOGINOV's questions were general and so were Subject's answers.

c. On Saturday 3 December 1966 SILNIKOV came in from 1412 to 1430. He asked for two receipts of ca 5 MN each for bread, saying that he had lost the real ones. Subject thinks he uses these small sums to buy beer and girlie magazines. SILNIKOV then leafed through a girlie magazine and then said he wants Subject to find him a girl for whose favors he is willing to pay 100 MN. (COMMENT: chiseling 10 MN in false receipts and in the next breath offering 100 MN for a girl?)

FILE: P-8764 P-11707 P-11712 P-6414

1. Concerning the telephone call of 6 December 1966 from Carlos BLANCO to Valentin S. LOGINOV at the Soviet Embassy in which BLANCO told LOGINOV that "El comandante Carlos" (Carlos CASAMADRID Miranda) wanted to see Pavel A. YATSKOV on an urgent matter, the following information may pertain to this discussion :

a. On 11 October 1965 at 2200 hours Pavel A. YATSKOV was seen having dinner with an unidentified Mexican male at the "La Tablita" Restaurant on the corner of Ejercito Nacional and Gutenberg. At the end of their meal the Mexican pushed a small object across the table towards YATSKOV. YATSKOV covered this object with his napkin and then put the object in his pocket. It was obvious that this object was passed in a clandestine manner. They then left the restaurant together and separated. The Mexican then went to a jeep with DF license 11-63 (1964-1965 issue) and drove off alone. This jeep had a seal reading "Procuraduria General de Justicia del Distrito y Territorios Federales - Policia Judicial." Thus, it can be assumed that the person is an employee of the Judicial Police.

b. The unidentified Mexican male was described as about 35 years old, about 170 cm tall, 70 kilos in weight, slight build, dark complexion, dark eyes, black moustache, and he was dressed in a conservative business suit.

2. It is noted that both Carlos CASAMADRID and Carlos BLANCO are similar in appearance to the above described person.

3. Carlos CASAMADRID Miranda called Oleg M. NECHIPORENKO at the Soviet Embassy on 10 March 1965 and on 16 March 1965. On 10 March 1965 CASAMADRID called to confirm a dinner with NECHIPORENKO on the same day. On 16 March 1965 NECHIPORENKO was not in.

4. Carlos BLANCO called Valentin S. LOGINOV on 1 November 1965 and 10 November 1966. In addition Graciela SOTO (a friend of BLANCO's) called LOGINOV on behalf of BLANCO on 8 September 1966 and 9 November 1966. All of the above calls were to arrange social meetings between BLANCO and LOGINOV.

5. All of the above named Soviets are KGB officers. LOGINOV took the place of NECHIPORENKO when NECHIPORENKO left Mexico. LOGINOV arrived in Mexico on 3 August 1965. According to the telephone conversation he was already a good friend of BLANCO's on 1 November 1965. Thus it would appear that LOGINOV

FILE: P-885 P-7442 P-10968 P-11712 P-3634 P-9328

50-6-75/2

Orig: Lirama (via Lienvoy), 9 Dec 1966

was put into contact with BLANCO by another Soviet, probably NECHIPORENKO or YATSKOV. It is interesting to note that, although CASAMADRID has been in contact with NECHIPORENKO and BLANCO has been in contact with LOGINOV, there is no pervious indication that either knew YATSKOV. YATSKOV is the KGB chief of both NECHIPORENKO and LOGINOV.

6. Attached is a copy of a memorandum concerning LOGINOV.

1. In July 1966 when you and George were discussing Carlos CASAMADRID as a possible choice for the person who had a secret meeting with Pavel YATSKOV at "La Tablita" Restaurant in October 1965, you told George that CASAMADRID's assistant or man of confidence, NU, fitted the description of the person even better than CASAMADRID did.

a. What is the name of this person and his official title?

b. What are his business and home addresses and telephones?

c. Can you provide us with a photo of him?

d. Can you give us a resume of his professional career and an evaluation of him as a person?

2. Do you know a C. C. fnu BLANCO who works with CASAMADRID. Details on him please as above.

Desk

Orig: Litempo/iv (9 Dec 1966)

cc: 50-6-91/4

cc: Carlos CASAMADRID (P-10968)

cc: Carlos BLANCO (P-9328)

cc: Pavel YATSKOV (P-885)

cc: LOGUINOV (P-11712

[illegible]

El Cónsul de Mónaco Ofreció una Recepción

LUDMELA VASILIEVA, Galia Soloviena, Ksenia Riaven kina y Galina Sokolova, Valentina S. Loguinov y el señor Barrelet, cónsul de Mónaco y su señora esposa. (Foto de Garza Noble)

En la residencia del cónsul de Mónaco, en las Lomas de Chapultepec, se ofreció un cóctel para celebrar su fiesta nacional. Gentil anfitriona fue la distinguida señora de Barrelet. Finos vinos y deliciosos bocadillos fueron servidos a los muchos invitados.

Entre los asistentes se encontraban Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz y señora, Carlos González Parrodi y señora, don Luis de Alva y Cejudo y señora, Gustavo Cosío Villegas, don Agustín Salvat y señora, los embajadores de Francia, Grecia, Haití, Holanda; URSS, el señor Abelardo Gurbelo, y los cónsules de Francia, Suiza, Ecuador, Estados Unidos, Grecia, Haití, Islandia, Marruecos, Nicara

SIGUE EN LA PAGINA DOS

Excelsior 22 Nov 66

f 11712

S E C R E T

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

DATE OF MEETING: 21 November 1966

1. I picked Subject up at the corner of Nilo and Melchor Ocampo at 1100 on 21 November 1966. The meeting was held in my car on a side street and lasted 50 minutes. I paid Subject 800 MN, his salary for November 1966. Next meeting is for 1100 on 1 December at the above place. Subject will be given an SGSWIRL examination at this meeting.

2. Subject didn't have a word to say about LOGINOV's attempt to recruit him. When I asked about it, he said he thinks that LOGINOV is out of town since he hasn't seen LOGINOV since his last meeting with me. His notes for 17 November say that at 1210 Yuriy (ISAYEV) came in with another "diplomat" and both bought cigarettes. ISAYEV told Subject (apparently out of the blue) that LOGINOV had been very busy and therefore hadn't been able to see Subject. ISAYEV then added Subject shouldn't forget about what LOGINOV had asked him. Subject answered that he didn't know what ISAYEV was talking about. ISAYEV simply answered, "Good, he will come to see you). I asked Subject why ISAYEV would be discussing LOGINOV's business with him. Subject had no idea, except that he thinks, because of this, that they are connected professionally. (COMMENT: GRU and KGB?)

P- 11712

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

DATE OF MEETING: 10 November 1966

1. I picked Subject up on the corner of Nazas and Melchor Ocampo at 1100 on 10 November. The meeting was held in my car and lasted an hour. Next meeting is for 21 November at 1100.

2. Subject started things out by saying that LOGINOV is trying to recruit him to report on LIEMPTY-6. Review of his notes and discussion revealed the following: On 5 November LOGINOV came in. Subject told him he had found a house on Juanacatlan. LOGINOV said that he's looking for one on the Chapultapec Park side of Talz. Tacubaya and for Subject to keep looking. Then LOGINOV said that he would like to rent an apartment at P.A. de los Santos 104. Subject told him they are all occupied. LOGINOV said Subject must know these apartments well. Subject admitted that he did and began to sketch them by LOGINOV didn't seem to be interested in his efforts. LOGINOV then asked how many apartments there were in the building. Subject answered, 16. LOGINOV then said that since Subject knows the apartments so well he must also know the people who live there. Subject admitted that he did. At this point some other Soviets came in and the conversation was terminated. On 6 November LOGINOV dropped by for some small talk and left some Soviet chocolate (which Subject showed me) for Subject's grandchild. On 9 November LOGINOV came in at 1230 and asked Subject to go to a restaurant with him. Subject countered by saying his wife was home sick and he had no one to leave the store with. Subject then invited LOGINOV to his house but LOGINOV insisted on a restaurant. Subject agreed to go on 12 or 13 November.

3. From the above Subject concludes that LOGINOV wants to recruit him to report on LIEMPTY-6 (who lives in P.A. de los Santos 104). I asked why LOGINOV would be interested in LIEMPTY-6 (there is nothing about him in the notes). Subject answered that he finds LIEMPTY-6 very suspicious because in the 5 years that he has known him, Subject doesn't know what he does for a living. He thinks he writes novels. In any case he is home all day long. In addition he lies. Example: He told Subject that he owns the new (LILYRIC) building. He is also eccentric. Besides his windows face on the Embassy. LIEMPTY-6 has apartment 17. The apartment directly below his, number 13, (probably old LILYRIC) is empty. Subject went to see the owner having LOGINOV in mind. The owner said that the apartment had been rented by LIEMPTY-6 which Subject also finds surprising. The whole theme was that he is suspicious of LIEMPTY-6 and that LOGINOV wants to recruit him to report on him. All of the above on LIEMPTY-6 and his apartment was verbal. There was not a word about him in his notes.

4. I told Subject that if LOGINOV tries to recruit him for any purpose, he is to cut him short and to indignantly refuse. He is also to tell LOGINOV that SILNIKOV had tried the same thing two months ago.

P-11712

money. He is 28-30 years old, married and has worked for Nicolas for 2 or 3 years. (COMMENT: Colonia Pensil is in the western part of Tacuba and is full of Lagos, but nothing anywhere near Lago Coni). I told Subject to go ahead and get me the information on Nicolas LNU anyway. His notes on this are in the entry for 26 October.

5. With this Subject ran out of volunteered information and we attacked his notes which contained the following items worthy of note :

a. On 11 October LOGINOV came in and asked Subject to keep looking for a house near the Embassy. He said they want it for a school to which the children can walk since driving them back and forth to the present school is proving cumbersome. He also suggested that Subject sign the rental contract since many people are unwilling to rent to Soviets. When I expressed surprise about Subject signing a contract for 5,000 pesos a month he said that he had done it before for a Soviet Colonel in 1953 (the year Stalin died). This house was at Chicontepec 70 and rented for 4,000 pesos. (COMMENT: That Subject could sign a contract for 5,000 pesos a month is ridiculous. That the Soviets are looking for a new school just after moving into the new one is strange).

P-11712

usual effervescent self, asked immediately if I had gotten the papers he left for me, stated that he had decided to go to Moscow, rattled off his schedule, gave me the names of the only other two travel agents he knew were going, repeated several times he'd be happy to give me a report when he returned, and asked, as if he hoped I didn't, if ~~there~~ was anything I wanted to tell him before he left. I got the floor about this time and proceeded to backtrack over some of the ground just covered. As for his schedule and itinerary, he plans to leave for Moscow on 23 October via Air France, stopping over briefly in Paris; to make a side trip to Kiev on 27 and 28 October; and to leave Moscow for Paris via Air France on 30 October. He will fly from Paris to Genoa for a day on travel business and then return to Mexico from Paris on Air France via New York, where he plans to pick up a couple of suits and take in "Superman" on Broadway. He will arrive back in Mexico on 3 ~~October~~ November.

COPIES MADE CARDED

3. Subject said that in addition to the other three agents whom he had mentioned last time as having been invited to the Intourist Conference--Moises SCHUSTER of Mundos Tours, Carlos IBARGUEN of De Carlo Tours, and Edmundo *GARZA ofGarza Travel Service--he had learned that Isaac BULAEVSKY of Jet Travel Agency had also received an invitation. Besides himself, however, only SCHUSTER and BULAEVSKY are going, the other two having decided against the trip for unknown reasons. Subject mentioned that SCHUSTER is going to take his son, who is in his early teens.

orig filed
P-8415

4. I asked Subject if he had been in touch with anyone at the Soviet Embassy about the trip or if anyone there seemed to be responsible for lining up pa_rticipants

LICOZY-1 Contact Report 18 Oct 66

1

for or to have any special interest in the Conference. Subject replied that he had been at the Soviet Embassy about the middle of September on visa business and had seen the Soviet he always deals with on visa matters, but that this individual seemed surprised to hear Subject had been invited to Moscow and claimed to know nothing--or at least none of the details--about the Intoruist Conference. Subject claimed not to be able to remember the Soviet's name, hunted around in his wallet unsuccessfully for the Soviet's card, and then said, well, in any case it was the individual he had mentioned last time as having just gotten a promotion to Consul. I finally asked him if he meant LOGINOV--whose name he had given me last time--and after thinking for a moment, he rolied that yes, that sounded right. I then asked him if LOGINOV had shown any more interest in him or in any way been more friendly toward him in the last couple of months or since he had received the Intourist invite. Subject replied that he had not.

COPIES MADE

CARDED

5. Subject seemed a little sensitive to this question, and I stated that I was sure he understood why I was asking, since I knew he had been thoroughly briefed by one of my predecessors prior to his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union on Soviet interest in visitors to the USSR. I explained that we had no intention to ask him to do what he had agreed to do on his last trip to the USSR (accept recruitment if offered) and that we did not want to burden him with any instructions on how to behave or respond while there. However, I said, we continued to feel he was of potential interest to the Soviets and wanted to make sure he was aware of this when he went over, had a healthy respect for the leverage the Soviets have on their home ground, and

Orig filed
P-8415

LICAVN-1 Contact Report 3 18 Oct 66

14-00000

CARDED 3

COPIES MADE

Files: P-11712 (without attachments)
P-885 (" ")
P-7442 (without attachments)

14 October 1966

Info. [illegible] [illegible]

SUBJECT: CONTACT Report/ LICOOKY-5 — P-2712
14 Oct 1200-1245, Subj's office

1. Subj reported that Valentin Loginov had dropped by the office during the week and went to have coffee with Subj (Subj remarked that Loginov doesn't seem to want to talk in the office). Loginov had brought along visa application forms for Subj, and Subj filled them out for himself and his son, Marcos, and turned them over to Loginov along with the passports (attached are copies of the visas- note: the visas are good for over 20 days in the Soviet Union, although the INTURIST conference is from 24 Oct to 29 Oct).

Loginov told Subj that Pavel Yatskov wanted to see him (presumably Yatskov has brought something back for Subj). Subj asked Loginov what Yatskov is doing. The Soviet replied that Yatskov has a job in the Embassy. Subj pressed: "What kind of a job. It's worthwhile that you gave him a good job." Loginov replied: "You want to know too much."

2. The C/O asked Subj what decided him to go to the Soviet Union. Subj replied that he had a commission from the Petroleum Congress (Subj is involved in organizing the Congress for Mexico for 2 to 8 April 1967), actually in behalf of KLM and his own interests, to persuade the Soviets that they use some other airline than Aeroflot to transport the Soviet delegates to Mexico. /Comment: the C/O saw a confidential letter from KLM which set out the probability that the Soviets would want to use Aeroflot but that they had not committed themselves as yet as to number of delegates that would attend or the means by which they would transport delegates; attached is a copy of a letter to Dr. N.S. Namotkin appointing Subj in his visit to Moscow to talk to Dr. Nemetkin - the letter states that "the future visit of Subj is exclusively connected to assist the National Committee" which is patently not the case since Subj is attending the INTURIST conference/.

At any rate Subj has decided to go to Moscow, and is taking his son along. Subj repeated his tactic in Moscow as far as contacts with the Soviets are concerned. He will not seek them out, not even Nechiporenko, and if contacted by them he will be affable and non-committal, and not put the sharp issue to them that he is through. He said the latter remains his position in Mexico, or anywhere else but in the Soviet Union.

3. The attached booklet of the World Petroleum Congress contains the names of the National Committees of the Iron Curtain countries. Attached are listings of the Czechoslovak delegates and a letter detailing the Hungarian delegates along with financial arrangements for them.

4. The C/O will see Subj before he leaves Mexico on 22 October.

Note. also attached is a letter appointing [illegible] as personal representative of [illegible] to 5th International Congress of [illegible] [illegible]

P-2712

7 October 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/LICOZY-5 — P-2712
7 Oct 1145-1230, Subj's office

1. Subj had been to Los Angeles, California for a few days and had returned to Mexico on 5 Oct. Evidently he had accompanied a Puebla delegation that visited Douglas and Lockheed aircraft factories in California. He mentioned that Aeronaves had purchased two DC-8's from Douglas, and ordered some DC-9's. At the Lockheed plant they saw the new super-sonic airplane.

2. Subj had received on 6 Oct a confirmatory telegram from INTURIST, for Subj and his son (copy attached), re attendance at the INTURIST conference in Moscow. Also, in the mail of 7 Oct Subj had received INTURIST releases on travel regulations for tourists to the Soviet Union, promotional plans, tours, etc. (Subj will make copies of these for turnover to the C/O).

Subj reported that Valentin Loginov came by the office on 29 Sept. Subj was with a friend, Peter Parr, of New York, so he went to have coffee with Loginov, taking along his friend. The discussion was innocuous, but Loginov asked Subj if he would be going to see his friends, which Subj took to mean that all was O.K. as far as Subj's attendance in Moscow for the INTURIST conference. Subj answered "yes". Loginov jokingly asked Subj whey Rusk had come to Mexico. Subj bantered a reply that the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs was going to serve some rare Champagne that Rusk liked. Loginov pressed Subj for the real reason. Subj said cagily that he knew, but he wasn't going to tell Loginov. /Comment: This banter is included in the report to demonstrate the type of relationship that exists between Subj and Loginov. Anything from Loginov that borders on a desire for information or involving Subj, the latter turns away with a joking answer. Loginov accepts this fending off good-naturedly, jokingly calling Subj "a son of a bitch" or worse./

3. Subj discussed with the C/O the prospect of his going to the Soviet Union. He was debating in his own mind the advisability of it. The C/O probed to see how Subj regarded it from a business standpoint, putting the question "if you shouldn't go, do you think it would hurt you from the standpoint of business." Subj said he just didn't know. The C/O asked if others went (Subj had just said that possibly Garza, Rhine and Akov (phonetic) would go- although they were not certain) did Subj think the Soviets might throw the bulk of the business their way. Again Subj said he didn't know. The C/O then said that unless there were some overriding business reason, Subj should take into account our view that there was a margin of hazard

COPIES MADE CARD

Files [illegible] P-2712

[illegible] Katz (Parry) P-581

to Subj's being inside the Soviet Union. Subj said that personally he had no great desire to go to the Soviet Union, on three counts: 1) the climate 2) "the pleasant atmosphere" (his way of saying that if he was out of grace with the Soviets they wouldn't put out the red carpet for him as they did previously) and 3) he was plain afraid.

The latter admission apparently touched some hidden spring in Subj. Heretofore Subj had limited himself to calling the Soviets "bastards" etc. and anti-semitic. Now, Subj chided himself for doing so little to alleviate the lot of the Jews in the Soviet Union. He declared that the Soviet Union was the worst offender against the Jews, because they were eliminating the race, not through physical extermination, but through forcing assimilation. His own view was that the Soviets were more dangerous to the Jews and Israel than were the Arabs, for instance Lebanon or Jordan, who if it weren't for fear of Nasser would make their peace with Israel.

The C/O tried to counter the self-recrimination of Subj by telling him that he had accomplished a superb job in the duel of the West with the Soviets through his cooperation with us. That, in view of his real feelings about the Soviets, his dealing with them had been masterful. Subj shook off the C/O's optimistic view of Subj's contribution to the "cause."

4. The C/O brought up the request to get full details on the travel of all non-Soviets to the Soviet Union - and suggested that Subj automatically have duplicates made of the visa requests for such people. Subj said that would be simple - and he would instruct "Miriam" (the employee who handles INTURIST travel) to make copies of all applications for visas./ Comment: the C/O asked Subj if Miriam (Avila Katz) p. 581 were going to remain in his employ, not taking a job at the Israeli Embassy - and Subj replied that she was going to stay on in Subj's firm/.

Subj had remarked that he was going to discuss the matter of making the Moscow trip with his wife. The C/O asked that Subj advise us as soon as he had come to a decision- either for or against going to the Soviet Union.

The C/O told Subj that he would pass by his office next week to pick up the copies of the INTURIST material.

CARDED

PRM

COPIES MADE Licozy-5 CR-P-3713
7 Oct 66

S E C R E T

LICOWL General Notes Turned in on 6 October 1966

22 September 1966 (Thursday)

(LOGINOV) came in for cigarettes. He said that there are 52 Mexicans studying at Lumumba. These students are going to be the directors in the schools of the Politechnico Nacional since one of them has come back well prepared in physics. (There follows a diatribe against those bad Mexicans who want to make Mexico another Cuba.)

23 September 1966 (Friday)

The"Spanish type" came in with a briefcase and bought Raleighs with filters. He had the same type of billfold as the other Soviets. He then went directly to the Embassy. (I asked if he had a moustache; he said, yes. This is probably GAZIYEV).

24 September 1966 (Saturday)

In the afternoon SILNIKOV was there when (ISAYEV) came in. I asked the latter about the watches and he said that they wouldn't arrive until the end of the year. SILNIKOV left at 1620.

25 September 1966 (Sunday)

Unimportant

26 September (Monday)

A useless blurb about an unnamed Soviet who came in and discoursed on MADRAZO, saying that he will set up a new party and an anti-Soviet blast.

27 September (Tuesday)

(DENISOV) came in at 1210 and made a phone call. I heard him mention Delicias and del Rio. Since these towns are near the border near San Diego, I think he was talking about smuggling arms to Guatemala (sic). Afterwards I asked after his wife. He said that she and their daughter are in Moscow and that he is a batchelor. I asked if he was able to find a girl. He answered, of course, but they all want a house. He left at 1230.

28 September 1966 (Wednesday)

An account from a friend that a Soviet will be PNGed for being involved with the Guatemalan arms smuggling.

Attachment to
LICOWL Contact
Report, 6 Oct 66

S E C R E T

P-11712

~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ I'd get info he offers in para 8 2

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICANNY-1 — P-8415

DATE OF MEETING: 28 September 1966

1. LICOZY-5 reported on 20 September that LICANNY-1 of Garza-Lopez Tours was one of those invited to attend the 24-29 Intourist Conference in Moscow. This was confirmed by LIENVOY on the same date. Since the Station had had no contact with Subject sine 6 January 1966, I contacted Don Lautz of the Visa Section on 27 September to see if Subject was still coming into the Embassy regularly ~~on~~ on visa business. Lautz said that Subject had for some time now been sending an agent to the Embassy rather than coming himself. Lautz readily agreed to give Subject a call, however, and reached him late that afternoon. He told Subject that the "people" at the Embassy whom he had introduced Subject to earlier were interested in talking with him and asked if he could drop into the Embassy in the next few days. Subject immediately recognized which "people" Lautz was referring to, said that as a matter of fact he had something to discuss with "them," commented that it probably in fact involved the same matter, and agreed to come to Lautz's office at 11:00 the next day. As he had done with Irving A. Oronsky, Lautz agreed to let me use his office to talk to Subject.

2. I went to Lautz's office at 11:00 on the 28th, but when Subject had not appeared by 11:15, Lautz agreed to call me in my office when Subject arrived. Lautz called about 11:30, and I went right down. By the time I got there, however, Subject had already explained to Lautz that he was sure I wanted to talk about his invitation to

Files: cc. P-2712 with attachment A only; P-11712 without attachments; P-11990 ([illegible]) without attachments the USSR and had given Lautz a list of three other invitees to the Intourist conference. Lautz introduced me by true name as Oronsky's replacement. Subject, in what Lautz had forewarned me was his usual over-enthusiastic manner, greeted me with a "believe me, it is my pleasure" salutation and, upon confirming that it was the Intourist conference I was interest in, took off from there. Without the slightest prompting, he rattled off the following:

a) He had received a telegram from Moscow on 6 September inviting him to an Intourist conference in Moscow from 24-29 October. He had immediately thought of informing the Embassy, but because of the pressure of business simply hadn't gotten around to it. When Lautz called him, he knew immediately what we were interested in.

b) He had prepared a Xerox copy of the telegram for us, which he gave to me. He has not yet definitely made up his mind about attending the conference, but thinks he probably will go. At the moment, he was still awaiting the detailed letter on the conference which, according to the telegram, was to follow. (LICOZY-5 has already received his letter.) In reply to my question as to whether he was sending enough people to the USSR to make the trip really worthwhile, he said that he had sent only five people there so far this year, but that he thought travel to the Soviet Union was definitely going to pick up. He said that LOGINOV , who has been the Soviet official he has been dealing with about visas,

7

to Moscow could consequently be made at relatively little additional expense.

c) Subject continued that if he did go to Moscow, he would be glad to submit a report on his trip when he got back, get (group) pictures, if we wanted them, of other travel agents who attended, and [illegible] his eyes open. However, he said, as he told Oronsky, he is not interested in working for us on a permanent basis, meeting clandestinely with us, or taking any money. He was willing to help, he explained, because he believed basically what we did about current world problems and, after all, had lived in the States for many years and regarded it as his "second home." He said he liked the arrangement of meeting in Lautz's office because it made clandestine meetings unnecessary and because he had a perfectly legitimate reason for being there.

d) Subject stated that he had already given Lautz the names of the other travel agents in Mexico whom he had heard had been invited to Moscow and said that once he received the Intourist letter giving the details on the conference he would begin calling around to see exactly who was going.

3. Since a) Subject had already volunteered to do primarily what I intended to ask him, b) had not yet definitely decided to make the trip, c) Lautz gave no indication of preparing to leave us alone, and d) I clearly could not get any farther with Subject on a personal level with Lautz present, I brought the meeting to an end with a request to see Subject again after he had received the Intourist letter, obtained the names of those of his colleagues who were going, and decided definitely whether or not he was going to go. Subject said he would be happy to talk with me again, get the

information I wanted, and, " if I liked," "be briefed" on the trip. It was agreed he would call Lautz to set up the meeting. (The situation was such that I do not blame Lautz for apparently thinking it unnecessary to leave us alone this time, but I made a special point of requesting that he leave us to ourselves next time. Lautz, who seems to be thoroughly friendly and accommodating, readily agreed.)

4. Subject impresses me as a very sharp, shrewd, cool-headed, but probably basically sincere individual. He had the situation figured perfectly when he arrived in Lautz's office, had decided precisely what he would be willing to do, knew exactly what he was going to say, and wasted no words in saying it. I plan to try to get to know him a little better next time, give him a defensive briefing as well as one on what to keep his eyes open for, and also explore his attitude toward a possible recruitment pitch from the Soviets. (Prior to his trip to the USSR in May 1963, Subject agreed to accept Soviet recruitment if approached and to serve as a DA. Upon his return, however, he reported that the Soviets made no approach to him.) I also want to ask him about LOGINOV, ~~Loginov;*~~ on whom he agreed to supply personality data to Oronsky, but evidently never did. Subject mentioned that LOGINOV had told him about ten days ago that he had been promoted to Consul. Subject did not say if he had been in touch with LOGINOV or anyone else at the Soviet Embassy about the Intourist conference. I will get this from him next time.

5. Subject told Lautz that the following individuals had been invited to the Intourist conference:

(a) Moises Schuster of Mundos Tours.

(b) Carlos IBARGUEN of De Carlo Tours (IBARGUEN is also the president of the Mexican Travel Agents' Assoc.).

(c) Someone from the Garza Travel Service.

Subject also gave me an Air France tourist pamphlet on the USSR in Spanish for my information.

6. Subject mentioned in passing that he would be glad to furnish us (presumably on a regular basis) with the names of those people who book travel to the Soviet Union through his Agency, but said Oronsky had previously shown disinterest in such information. In view of Oronsky's alleged disinterest, I let the subject pass without comment, but I see no reason not to take up his offer. Besides furnishing us with a few more names, it would give us a reason for continuing contact with Subject.

KRL
Keith R. Levenderis

LOGINOV, Valentin Sergeyevich
DOB 2? Dec 22
Wife: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna
Son: Dmitriy

?-11712
201-285412

Career:

Attache, Sovemb, Havana

?Aug 63- 70169 3rd Secy, Sovemb, Mexico (vice [illegible])

Residence:
Car:
Cvert duties:

RIS: [illegible]







LOGINOV - Photographs



14-00000

Valentin S. LOGINOV (P-11712) with Boris A. CHMYKHOV
(P-6235) SOURCE : LICALLA 2 August 1968.

P-11712

[illegible] 13 Sept 67

Valentin [illegible]
with Boris [illegible]

P 11712



[illegible] 11.2.67

[illegible]





VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV

P-11712

SOURCE: LILYRIC, 25 SEPT 1968



Valentin S. LOGUINOV
Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy
Born in 1927
Wife Alexandra, born in 1928
Son Dmitry, born in 1959

LOGUINOV is tall and has very curly, light brown hair. He speaks fluent Spanish and some English. He drives a green 1965 Impala with lomatic tags 19-DA.







Valentin S. Loguinov
Cónsul de la U.R.S.S.
Tercer Secretario de la Embajada de la U.R.S.S.

15-60-55



[illegible] 5 Aug [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
meeting ?



Chingkhan & Lagunon

C-11712

Kealla - 22 April 68

8

7-(2)

Contact reports, photos, etc., forwarded from the field.

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Prepared by
LIREALM-7

FORM 12-67 2825

SECRET

(4)

LOGINOV - P- 11,712

~~[illegible]~~

Feb 69

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

1. This is a new, experimental version of the Personality Assessment Questionnaire (sometimes informally called the PRQ III) which has been in use for several years. This new form is largely a checklist and thus requires far less essay-type reporting than the previous form.

2. For a number of years, our operational psychologists have been developing a system for indirect assessment of target personalities. The system employs—in lieu of psychological tests and interviews—observations of appearance, manner, and style of behavior. Such observations are used as if they were items in a psychological test, and like test items, are weighted and analyzed to yield a personality profile. Working from the profile, operational psychologists describe the target personality's basic aptitudes, attitudes, motives and susceptibilities. The goal of the assessment is to identify feasible means of influencing the target person.

3. Reliability is vastly increased when two or more observers complete this questionnaire independently. All items need not be completed; in fact, it is a rare case where contact is sufficient to complete it fully. You are encouraged to guess where complete information is lacking. Mark such items with a "G," instead of the customary check mark or "X." Thus, an observer with very limited contact can be expected to enter more "G's" than "X's."

4. Before completing the enclosed PAQ form, please provide the following information about *yourself*:

Age 39 Sex M Nationality US

Social-cultural background:

Middle-class

How often have you observed the target individual?

3 to 4 times per month over two years.

When did you last observe the target individual?

Last week. (week of 2 Feb 1969)

What is the nature of your contact? (direct acquaintance, embassy receptions/parties, informants, debriefing of others, etc.)

Tennis club.

5. Can you supply a specimen of the target individual's handwriting?

Yes ___ No X

6. Please supply the name(s) of any person you believe qualified to provide information about the target person, that is, anyone sufficiently knowledgeable to complete this form at least in part.

Gloria Pinto

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

I. DESCRIPTION

1. Overall Impression. (Check the most appropriate.)

1.01	Virile, athletic, practical, and socially facile ("Hail fellow")	
1.02	Virile, rugged, practical, but socially guarded (authoritarian)	X
1.03	Rather soft and sensuous but socially pleasant and appropriate (good guy)	
1.04	Rather soft and sensuous but socially guarded and moody (a possible whiner)	
1.05	Manly, clean-cut, professional, and socially smooth (executive type)	
1.06	Austere, precise, and businesslike (dedicated worker type)	
1.07	Cultured, neat, artistic, and socially smooth (diplomatic type)	
1.08	Sensitive, intense, and self-preoccupied (artistic or absent-minded professor type)	
1.09	None of these fit. I would describe him as:	

2. Dress. (Check the most appropriate.)

2.01	Well-groomed (natty)	
2.02	Neat (well-kept)	X
2.03	Fastidious (fussy)	
2.04	Overdressed (prissy)	
2.05	Nondescript (bland)	
2.06	Underdressed (informal)	
2.07	Casual (indifferent)	

4.01.04 Does he have a nickname: Yes ___ No X
If Yes, does he object to
being addressed by his nickname? Yes ___ No ___

4.01.05 Is he addressed by a diminutive? Yes X No ___
(Johnny, Jack, Hank, etc.)

4.01.06 Does he have any scars or other distinguishing
marks? Yes ___ No X
If so, please describe:

4.02 Hair:

4.02.01 Color Very light ___ Light ___ Medium X
Gray or white ___ Dark ___ Very dark ___

4.02.02 Waviness Curly X Average ___ Straight ___

4.02.03 Amount Thick ___ Average X Sparse ___
Balding ___ Bald ___

4.02.04 Grooming Well-groomed ___ Unruly ___
Average X Unkempt ___

4.02.05 Is there anything unusual about his hair or hair style? ___
If so, please describe:

4.03 Eyes:

4.03.01 Color Gray ___ Green ___ Blue ___
Yellowish ___ Hazel ___ Light brown ___
Brown ___

4.03.02 Wears eyeglasses
Always ___ To read ___ Never X

4.03.03 Eyeglass lens Thick ___ Average ___ Bifocal ___

4.03.04 Eyeglass style Heavy frame ___ Rimless ___
Average frame ___ Contact lens ___

4.03.05 Is there anything unusual about his eyes that requires special mention. If so, please describe: ___

4.03.06 Does he take off glasses when he speaks? Yes ___ No ___

4.03.07 Does he use glasses to gesture? Yes ___ No ___

4.03.08 Does he ever wear sunglasses indoors? Yes ___ No X

4.04 Complexion:

4.04.01 Coloring Ruddy ___ Dark ___ Tan ___
Light X Pale ___

4.04.02 Face (a) Scarred ___ Lined ___ Smooth ___
(b) Beard ___ Clean-shaven X
Mustache ___ Unshaved ___

4.04.03 Describe type of mustache or beard:

4.04.04 Body hair (arms, legs, chest)
Heavy ___ Medium ___ Light X

4.04.05 Hair visible on nose? ___

4.04.06 Hair visible on ears? ___

4.04.07 Is there anything unusual or striking about his skin or skin coloring? If so, please describe: ___

4.05 Face:

4.05.01 Expressiveness Expressive ___ Average X Inexpressive ___
Very expressive ___ Very inexpressive ___

4.05.02 If expressive, is face Natural ___ Tense ___

4.05.03 If inexpressive, is face Relaxed ___ Deadpan ___

4.05.04 In general, are facial responses Inappropriate ___ Appropriate X

4.05.05 Is there anything unusual or striking about his facial expressions? If so, please describe: when tense, he arches both eyebrows and tilts his head back.

4.06 Lips:

4.06.01 Type Protruding ___ Pursed ___ Thin X
Full ___ Loose ___

4.06.02 Smiles (a) Spontaneously ___ Tensely ___ Mechanically ___
(b) Very frequently ___ Frequently ___ Average X
Infrequently ___ Never ___

4.06.03 Have you ever seen him smile to himself? Yes X No ___

4.06.04 If you have seen him having his picture taken,
can he smile on command? Yes X No ___
Or is he wooden and rather ill-at-ease? Yes ___ No ___

4.06.05 If you have not seen him having his picture taken, what kind of a picture do you think he would prefer? Serious ___ Smiling ___

4.06.06 Is there anything about his lips or smile that is unusual or striking? If so, please describe:

4.07 Teeth

4.07.01 Shape — Regular X Average ___ Protruding ___ Unusual ___

4.07.02 Do you get the feeling he clenches his teeth? Yes ___ No X
If Yes, under what circumstances?

4.07.03 Does he have any gold teeth or unusual dental work? Yes ___ No X

4.07.04 When he smiles, does he
Show his teeth? Yes ___ No X
Purse his lips? Yes ___ No ___
Put hand over mouth? Yes ___ No ___

4.07.05 Does he put his hand over his mouth when talking? Never X Frequently ___ Occasionally ___ Always ___

4.07.06 Color of teeth — White X Dull ___ Stained ___

4.07.07 Is there anything unusual or striking about his teeth?
If so, please describe:

4.08 Posture:

4.08.01 Straightness — Round-shouldered ___ Slumped ___ Erect X Stiff ___

4.08.02 Is posture maintained? — Consistently X Variable ___

4.08.03 Shoulders — Broad-shouldered X Sloping ___ Average ___ Narrow ___

4.08.04 Body build Skinny ___ Average ___ Heavy X Obese ___

4.08.05 When conversing, in what direction does he primarily lean in relation to the other person?
Towards ___ Away X Neither ___

4.08.06 Does posture, when listening, differ from posture when talking? NO
If so, please describe:

4.08.07 Sitting Posture (a) Relaxed ___ Average ___ Stiff ___
(b) Erect X Average ___ Slumped ___

4.08.08 When in a group, is he inclined
To stand still X
Move about in one place ___
Lean against the wall ___
Sit down even though others are standing ___
Place his arms on others ___

4.08.09 If taller than average, does he bend over to come down to the group? Yes ___ No X

4.08.10 If shorter than average, does he stand up to the group?
Yes ___ No ___

4.08.11 When listening to a lecture (or watching a play or movie) does he
Sit still, stare at the speaker X
Move about, fidget, change position ___

4.08.12 Is there anything about his posture, carriage, or bearing that warrants special mention? If so, please describe: ___

4.09 Hands:

4.09.01 Dominance Right-handed ___ Left-handed X

4.09.02 Is he inclined to use his less dominant hand?
Frequently ___ Rarely ___
Sometimes ___ Never X

4.09.03 Size of hands Very large ____ Large X Average ____
Small ____ Very small ____

4.09.04 His use of his hands is Graceful ____ Average X Awkward ____

4.09.05 In normal situations, his arms hang Loose ____ Stiff ____
Average X

4.09.06 When standing (talking or listening) he has a tendency
To open and close his hands ____
Put hands in pocket ____
Run hand over face or hair ____

4.09.07 If he puts hands in pockets, he is more likely to put them in
Pants ____ Coat ____

4.09.08 Nails Clean, not manicured X Manicured ____ Average ____
Ragged ____ Dirty ____ Bitten ____

4.09.09 If nails are bitten, to what extent?
Barely ____ Average ____ Deeply ____

4.09.10 Are fingers Blunt ____ Average X Long ____

4.09.11 Are hands Callous ____ Rough ____ Average X
Smooth ____ Soft ____

4.09.12 In public, does he
Pull, rub, or pick nose ____
Rub back of neck ____
Run hand over face or mouth ____
Scratch any part of his body ____
Pull at his clothes ____
Never do any of these things X

4.09.13 Does he put his arms on the table? Often ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never ____

4.09.14 Does he put his elbows on the table? Often ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never ____

4.09.15 When sitting at a table or desk, does he talk ____ or listen ____ with his head in his hands?
Often ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never ____

4.09.16 When talking, does he tend to
Close his eyes ___
Put his hand over his eyes ___
Often ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely ___ Never X

4.09.17 If he closes or covers his eyes, is he more inclined to do it
When trying to make a particular point ___
When listening to someone else ___

4.09.18 Does he tap fingers on table?
Never ___ Occasionally ___ Often ___

4.09.19 Is he more inclined to do this when
Talking ___ Listening ___ Thinking ___

4.09.20 Does he
Rattle change in his pocket ___
Toy with some object ___
Often ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely ___ Never X

4.09.21 Is there anything unique about his hands or arms worthy of special mention? If so, please describe: ___

4.10 Feet:

4.10.01 Does he tend to show foot preference? Left ___ Right ___

4.10.02 Does he work to keep in step when walking with someone? Yes ___
No ___

4.10.03 Does he cross feet at ankles when seated?
Yes ___ No ___

4.10.04 If so, which foot is over the other? Left ___ Right ___

4.10.05 Does he cross legs
Only when he faces in a new direction ___
As soon as he sits down ___
Shortly after he sits down ___
Occasionally ___
Never ___

4.10.06 If he crosses legs, which leg is on top? Left ___ Right ___
Depends on how he is sitting ___

4.10.07 Does he change his crossed leg
Depends on how he is facing ___
Frequently ___ Occasionally ___ Never ___

4.10.08 Compared to most people, does he walk
Faster ___ Slower ___ Same speed ___

4.10.09 If he is out of step with you, does he notice it and get in step? Yes ___ No ___

4.10.10 In conversation when he becomes intense, does he
Uncross his legs and lean forward ___
Uncross his legs and lean backward ___
Cross his legs and sit upright ___
Shift to a more erect position X
Shift to a more relaxed position ___
Make little change in position ___

4.10.11 Are his feet Large ___ Average X Small ___

4.10.12 Are his shoes (a) Pointed ___ Average X Blunt ___
(b) Highly polished ___ Average X Not well kept ___

4.10.13 Is there anything about his feet or legs that warrants special mention? If so, please describe: ___

4.10.14 When his legs are crossed, does he
Sit quietly ___ Move his foot ___ Swing or wiggle his leg ___

4.10.15 Does he ever tap his foot? No ___ Yes ___

4.10.16 Does he swing back and forth on his feet when standing and talking in a group?
Often ___ Rarely ___
Sometimes ___ Never X

4.10.17 When walking, are his steps Long ___ Normal X Short ___

4.10.18 When he walks, do his arms
Hang loose ___
Swing with his stride X
Swing, but out of rhythm ___
Hang tense ___

4.10.19 When he walks, do his toes
Turn out ___ Stay straight X Turn in ___

4.11 Voice:

4.11.01 Is his voice pitched Low ___ Medium X High ___

4.11.02 Does he speak Quietly ___ Average X Loudly ___

4.11.03 In his native language, is his tone quality noticeably
Louder ___ Quieter ___ About the same X

4.11.04 Does he have a speech impediment? Yes ___ No X
If Yes, please describe:

4.12 Use of Language

4.12.01 Does his native language vocabulary seem Rich ___ Limited ___
Average X Poor ___

4.12.02 In his best language, other than native, is he
Fluent ___ Barely fluent ___
Moderately fluent X Poor ___

4.12.03 Does he pick up idioms Quickly ___ Slowly ___
Average X Not at all ___

4.12.04 Does he learn foreign languages easily Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, does he
Learn primarily by "feel" and by "trial and error" ___
Learn primarily from textbooks ___

4.12.05 In his best second language, can he switch from his native language
Smoothly with little hesitation X
Effectively with average hesitation ___
Slowly with considerable hesitation ___
Awkwardly with considerable embarrassment ___

4.12.06 When he misuses language, does he ordinarily appear
Oblivious of it ___
Aware of, but indifferent to it X
Aware of, and anxious about it ___
Very aware of it and quite embarrassed ___

4.12.07 In general, would you characterize him as
Laconic ____ Average X Garrulous ____

4.12.08 In ordinary conversation, does the content tend to be primarily
Personal ____ Impersonal ____
Interpersonal ____ Guarded ____

4.12.09 In ordinary conversation, is the content
Precise and to the point ____
Relevant ____
Average ____
To the point but rambling ____
Irrelevant ____

4.12.10 Does he
Often discuss personal problems ____
Rarely discuss personal problems X

4.12.11 Does he use profanity in his native language?
Occasionally ____ Frequently ____ Never X

4.12.12 Does he use profanity in an acquired language?
Occasionally ____ Frequently ____ Never X

4.12.13 Is there anything about his manner of speech or conversational style that is unusual. Yes ____ No ____
If Yes, please describe:

4.13 Gestures:

4.13.01 Does he gesture when he talks? Always ____ Sometimes ____
Never X

4.13.02 His most characteristic gesture is.
Pointing with finger ____
Waving one hand ____
Sweeping both hands ____
Chopping both hands ____

4.13.03 When he gestures, the motion is
Graceful ___ Average ___ Mechanical ___

4.13.04 When engaged in conversation, does he tense up
Often ___ Rarely ___
Sometimes X Never ___

4.13.05 It is relatively easy to tell when he is really interested in a subject
Always X Rarely ___
Sometimes ___ Never ___

4.13.06 His eyes are very expressive Always ___ Sometimes X Rarely ___

4.13.07 Most people would find his eyes Beautiful ___ Average X
Pleasant ___ Unpleasant ___
Sinister ___

4.13.08 He maintains eye contact Always ___ Frequently X
Sometimes ___ Rarely ___ Never ___

4.13.09 In a group, have you ever seen him stare repeatedly at a person who seemed to interest him? Often ___ Sometimes ___ Never X

4.13.10 When he admires (follows with eyes) an attractive girl, he is Obvious ___ Average ___ Subtle X
I have never seen him do it ___

Have you ever seen him blush? Yes X No ___
If Yes, describe the situation:
His political comments were successfully changed at a party. All present, including himself, were embarrassed by the confrontation

4.13.11 Is there anything particularly striking and worthy of further explanation about the movements he makes with his body, eyes, or head and the way he behaves in a group? If so, please describe: Yes

See 4.05.05

4.14 Sleep

4.14.01 Does he Enjoy sleep and fall off easily? Yes___ No___
Read or walk to prepare himself for sleep? Yes___ No___

4.14.02 Does he Rise easily? Yes___ No___
Prefer to remain abed until the last moment? Yes___ No___

4.14.03 Is he An early starter? ___
A late starter? ___

4.15 Impressions:

4.15.01 To the best of your knowledge, do you think most women would find him Charming___ Pleasant___ Average___
Unpleasant___ Very unpleasant___
Sexually attractive X

4.15.02 To the best of your knowledge, do you think most men would find him Charming___ Pleasant___ Average X
Unpleasant___ Very unpleasant___

4.15.03 Without prior knowledge, if you saw him on the street, would he impress you as Nondescript___ Average X Striking___

4.15.04 Without prior knowledge and on the basis of looks alone, which of the following do you think he might be?
Peasant___ Executive___
Worker X Professional___
Merchant___ Military Officer___
Artist of some type___

4.15.05 Is there anything particularly striking and worthy of further explanation about the overall impression he gives? Yes
If so, please describe:

Conspicuously athletic.
Looks like boxer.

II. BACKGROUND

5. General

5.01 Ethnic Background:

5.01.01 Please describe his ethnic background.

Slavic - blond

5.01.02 How does he compare with others of this background?
Like most X
A stereotype ____
Not like most ____
I would never guess his background ____

5.02 Cultural Background:

5.02.01 If he had his personal choice, do you think he is the kind of person who, living in a foreign culture would
Never change his accustomed way of living ____
Maintain his accustomed way of living but show some interest in the local culture ____
Show some interest in the local culture and adapt his ways X
Go native if he had his chance ____

5.02.02 Compared with his own group, he is just like all the rest of them X
Somewhat different than most of them ____
Unique ____

5.03 Educational Background:

5.03.01 What is his educational background? Please describe:

5.03.02 In your opinion, compared to most people in his culture with a similar background he

Is as well-educated ____

Is better informed ____

Appears better educated than he claims ____

Appears less educated than he claims X

I cannot conceive of him having the background he claims ____

If you doubt his background, please comment:

6. General Impression of Background (Check the most appropriate)

6.01 Strong and rugged (a man's man) X

6.02 Strong, rugged, but independent (a self-sufficient loner) ____

6.03 Compassionate, sensual and understanding (a woman's man) ____

6.04 Moody, emotional, and sometimes bitter (the "misunderstood" man) ____

6.05 Forthright, intelligent, and responsible (the professional man) ____

6.06 Proficient, intelligent, and intense (the technical man) ____

6.07 Sensitive, cultured, and sophisticated (the "Madison Avenue" man) ____

6.08 Sensitive, temperamental, and unconventional (the Bohemian man) ____

6.09 None of these. ____
I would describe him as:

III. SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

7. General Impression. (Check the most appropriate.)

7.01 The kind of a man who is usually punctual, inclined to greet everyone informally and who appears to be comfortable with himself when he enters a room. ___

7.02 The kind of a man who is always punctual, inclined to greet everyone somewhat awkwardly and who appears to be uncomfortable when he enters a room. X

7.03 The kind of man whose punctuality is unpredictable, who is inclined to be very warm and friendly with everyone he knows, and who appears confident when he enters a room. ___

7.04 The kind of man who is punctual when he makes a date, but who is inclined to cancel engagements rather often, inclined to greet only those people he has met before and is somewhat retiring or standoffish when he enters a room. ___

7.05 The kind of man who is inclined to keep you waiting but is gracious and attentive when he arrives, inclined to be precise and proper as he greets everyone and can be quite impressive when he enters a room. ___

7.06 The kind of man who is always punctual, inclined to be very formal in his greetings and is most often stiff and unbending when he enters a room. ___

7.07 The kind of man whose punctuality is unpredictable, who is inclined to be charming and sophisticated as he greets everyone and is quite socially poised when he enters a room. ___

7.08 The kind of man who is often quite late—and indifferent about it—inclined to be short and curt in his greetings and is sometimes awkward when he enters a room. ____

7.09 None of these. ____
I would describe him as:

8. Meeting People:

8.01 When he shakes hands
Does he move toward you ____
or Do you most often have to move toward him _X_

8.02 When he shakes hands, is his grip
Very firm ____ Average ____
Firm _X_ Weak ____
Limp ____

8.03 When he shakes hands, does he
Pump your hand ____
Squeeze your hand _X_
Let you do all the work ____

8.04 Is there anything about the way he shakes hands worthy of special mention? If so, please describe: ____

8.05 When he is first introduced, does he
Look the person in the eye to whom he is being introduced _X_
Cock his head toward the introducer but look at the person to whom he is being introduced ____
Cock his head and look at neither ____

8.06 When he first hears a name, he

Does nothing obvious to remember it ____

Repeats it as he acknowledges the introduction ____

Asks the introducer to repeat or verify it ____

Asks the person to whom he is being introduced to repeat the name ____

8.07 If calling cards are exchanged, does he

Read the card and carefully put it away X

Read it and stick it in his pocket ____

Carefully put it away without reading it ____

Stick it in his pocket without reading it ____

8.08 When introducing someone, does he do so

With ease and grace ____

With some slight embarrassment or hesitation X

With considerable awkwardness ____

8.09 To what extent is his manner different when he is being introduced to women? Not at all ____ Normal X Marked ____

8.10 If he shows a difference, which of the following describes it?

Uses both hands when he takes her hand ____

Moves in closer when acknowledging the introduction ____

Becomes more formal and distant ____

Becomes warm and effusive ____

Becomes warm and effusive only with pretty girls ____

Is very courteous and gracious to older women ____

Varies, depending on the woman ____

If so, please explain:

8.11 When introduced to a fair number of people at the same time, does he

Linger a bit with each person to whom he is introduced ___

Acknowledge the introduction quickly and wait for the next ___

Look toward the next person almost at the same time he is shaking hands with the person whom he has just met ___

8.12 In general, does he strike you as the kind of person who will:

Always remember a name ___

Remember names in an average manner _X_

Have difficulty remembering names ___

Be very poor at remembering names ___

8.13 Has he ever asked you to re-identify someone to whom you had previously introduced him? No ___ Yes _X_

9. Smoking and Eating:

9.01 Smoking:

9.01.01 Does he smoke?

Cigarettes	___	Cigars	___	Pipe	___
Regularly	___	Regularly	___	Regularly	___
Occasionally	___	Occasionally	___	Occasionally	___
Never	X	Never	X	Never	X

9.01.02 How much does he smoke? Heavy ___ Average ___ Light ___

9.01.03 Does he use his own Lighter ____ Matches ____

9.01.04 Is he the kind of person who
Is always asking for a light ____
Frequently asks for a light ____
Usually has his own light ____
Always has his own light ____

9.01.05 Does he use a holder?
Cigarette ____ Cigar ____
Always ____ Always ____
Sometimes ____ Sometimes ____
Never ____ Never ____

9.01.06 Does he clip cigars? Always ____ Sometimes ____ Bites off end ____

9.01.07 Does he care for his pipe? Fastidiously ____ Average ____
Neglects ____

9.01.08 When lighting a cigarette does he
Obviously duck his head and cup his hands ____
Light it casually while talking ____

9.01.09 Have you ever seen him hold an unlighted cigarette and wait for a pause in the conversation before lighting it? No ____ Yes ____

9.01.10 Have you ever seen him put a cigarette in his mouth and pause, match poised, waiting for the appropriate time to light it?
No ____ Yes ____

9.01.11 Have you ever seen him chew on an unlighted cigar, pipe, or cigarette? No ____ Yes ____

9.01.12 Is he a chain smoker who
Lights one cigarette from another ____
Smokes his cigarette down to the nub and then lights another ____
Always keeps a cigarette going even though he may not smoke it very much ____

9.01.13 Does he smoke
Only after meals ____
Only when offered a cigarette by someone ____
Between the entree and the dessert when others do ____

9.01.14 Is the presence of tobacco stain on his fingers
Very marked ____
Noticeable ____
Barely noticeable ____
No stain ____

9.01.15 When smoking, does he

(a)
Allow a long ash to accumulate on his cigarette ____
Flick off ashes in a normal manner ____
Become unusually preoccupied with the ashtray ____

(b)
Let ashes fall to the rug ____
Cup his hand under his cigarette ____
Always use an ashtray ____

9.01.16 Does he
Put out a cigarette with elaborate ashtray ritual ____
Seem to put out cigarettes in a normal manner ____
Seem careless about how he puts out a cigarette ____

9.01.17 Does he
Show obvious enjoyment when smoking ____
Show average satisfaction ____
Smoke perfunctorily and mechanically ____

9.01.18 Is he the kind of person who offers a light to others
Always ____ Seldom ____
Frequently ____ Never ____

9.01.19 Is he the kind of person who
Will walk across a room to offer a light to a lady ____
Is conventional in how he offers a light to a lady X
Will seldom offer a light to a lady ____

9.01.20 To your knowledge, has he given up smoking for reasons of health?
Yes ____ No ____

9.01.21 Have you ever heard him mention that he should give up smoking
But cannot ____
Has tried to stop but could not ____

9.01.22 Have you ever heard him mention that he is bothered by the smell of
Cigars ____ Pipes ____ Cigarettes ____
Never heard him mention any of these ____

9.01.23 Is there anything about his smoking habits that requires special mention or special description? If so, please describe:

9.02 Eating:

9.02.01 Is his mode of eating Typical of most of his colleagues X
Somewhat different than most of his colleagues ____
Markedly different than most of his colleagues ____

9.02.02 Is he a Hearty eater ____ Average eater X Light eater ____

9.02.03 Is the fact that he has marked food preferences Very noticeable ____
Not particularly noticeable ____
Not at all noticeable ____

9.02.04 Does he Eat with relish ____
Enjoy his food in a conventional manner ____
Seem indifferent to food X

9.02.05 Does he eat Quickly ____ Average X Slowly ____

9.02.06 Is he generally inclined To take second helpings ____
To take all he wants the first time around X
Often leaves some of his food untouched ____

9.02.07 Does he Dwell on how much he misses his native foods ____
Show conventional interest in local foods X
Indicate considerable interest in new and unusual foods ____

9.02.08 (a) He does not eat while Talking ____ Listening ____
(b) He does eat while Talking X Listening X

9.02.09 Does he show a tendency to adapt to the table etiquette of the people with whom he is dining? Marked ____ Average X
Maintains his familiar style of eating at all times ____

9.02.10 When given a chance, does he, for other than business reasons, suggest a preferred place to eat? Always ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely, if ever X

9.02.11 When eating out It is very difficult for him to select his meal ____
Waits to hear what his companion orders and orders same thing ____
Always knows what he wants very quickly ____

9.02.12 When eating out, he is
Somewhat extravagant when he knows you are paying ____
Very cost-conscious when he knows he is paying ____
Very cost-conscious no matter who is paying ____
Generally indifferent about cost no matter who is paying ____

9.02.13 Is he the sort of person who
Usually wants to check the bill regardless of who is paying ___
Is indifferent about the bill when someone else is paying ___

9.02.14 When he is paying, he checks the bill Unobtrusively ___
Very carefully (and rather obviously) ___

9.02.15 When he pays his check, does he Obviously count his change ___
Show indifference when accepting his change ___
Take his change in a normal manner ___

9.02.16 When he deals with headwaiters, is he Aggressive ___
Normal and conventional ___
Somewhat ingratiating ___
Brusque X

9.02.17 Is he prone to complain when service does not suit him?
To his companion ___ Directly ___ Not at all ___

9.02.18 He handles waiters In a conventional way
Over friendly ___ Unusually polite ___

9.02.19 Is there anything about his eating habits or manners that requires special mention ? If so, please describe:

9.03 Overall impression of eating and smoking behavior. (Check the most appropriate description.)

9.03.01 A hearty eater with well-defined preferences. He eats and smokes with considerable gusto but tends to be a little on the coarse and boorish side. It is rather easy to imagine him eating huge sandwiches and drinking beer with the boys at the neighborhood bar. ___

9.03.02 A heavy eater with limited preferences. He eats and smokes with gusto but his manners are definitely coarse and boorish. It is rather easy to imagine him becoming quite sharp with a waiter who serves him unfamiliar food or a dish prepared in an unfamiliar way. ___

9.03.03 A sensual eater who knows all the restaurants and their native specialties. He is very anxious to have others try dishes he has discovered. He eats with obvious pleasure, savors his smokes, and though rarely gauche, he is more aware of his food than his manners. It is easy to imagine him cooking and serving special dishes to his friends. ___

9.03.04 A sensual eater who tends to eat by himself when possible. He seems to eat all types of food and has something of the air of a glutton about him. He eats with obvious pleasure, savors his smokes and afterwards will linger alone at a table with self-satisfaction. It is easy to imagine him hovering alone over the buffet at a cocktail party savoring the tidbits. ____

9.03.05 A conventional eater who usually goes along with the crowd. He probably has food allergies that prevent him from eating certain foods. He gives the impression of enjoying smoking more than eating but his table manners are adapted to whatever situation he is in. It is easy to imagine him taking an indigestion pill in the privacy of his room. ____

9.03.06 A conventional eater who always goes along with the crowd. He eats with little relish and rarely mentions anything about his likes or dislikes. He smokes at every opportunity, but more mechanically than with pleasure. He usually tries to adapt his manners to the situation but may be a little awkward and obvious in doing so. It is easy to imagine him grabbing a bite at a sidewalk stand at any time of day. ____

9.03.07 A gourmet eater who has marked and varied sophisticated food tastes. Dining is quite a ritual with him, and atmosphere and service are almost as important as the food. He is graceful and cultured at table and smokes in the same manner. It is easy to imagine him dressing for dinner, enjoying fine wines and food by candlelight. ____

9.03.08 An unconventional eater, a man who "eats like a bird." He eats in a preoccupied way, obviously indifferent to his food and surroundings. It would not be surprising to learn he was a food faddist (vegetarian, health foods, etc.). ____

9.03.09 None of these descriptions really fit. ____
I would describe him as:

9.04 Drinking:

9.04.01 Does he drink? Not at all ___ Average X
A little ___ Heavily ___

9.04.02 Does he drink alone (solitary drinker) ___
with others mainly for sociableness ___
on formal occasions only ___
after work, at home ___

9.04.03 Does he appear to drink primarily for the taste ___
primarily for the effect ___
for both ___

9.04.04 His favorite drink is Beer ___ Wine ___ Whiskey ___
Vodka ___ Gin ___ No preference ___

9.04.05 He prefers Cocktails ___ Highballs ___ Short drinks ___
Straight shots ___

9.04.06 He drinks Slowly ___ Average X Quickly ___

9.04.07 Does he Gulp his drink ___ Sip his drink X

9.04.08 Does he Go out of his way to get a refill ___
Usually wait until asked ___
Always wait until asked X

9.04.09 Attitude toward wines? Very knowledgeable ___
Enjoys but not particularly knowledgeable ___
Indifferent about wines ___
Knows nothing, couldn't care less X

9.04.10 Does he Talk at length (and obviously get pleasure from talking) about his liquor preferences ___
Talk about his liquor preferences no more than anyone else ___
Never talk about his liquor preferences X

9.04.11 Is he openly proud of his native drinks and does he urge others to try them? Yes ___ No X
Is he conventionally aware of his native drinks and offer them when appropriate? Yes ___ No ___
Does he rarely mention his native drinks and not "push" them? Yes ___ No ___

9.04.12 Does he Pay little attention to the drinking needs of others ___
Serve drinks in a socially appropriate manner ___
Tend to force drinks on others ___

9.04.13 Compared with his colleagues, what are his drinking habits?
Markedly different ___ Very similar ___ Just the same ___
If markedly different, please explain:

9.04.14 When he has had a few drinks, his behavior shows
No noticeable change X
Some change ___
A definite change ___

If a definite change, please describe:

9.04.15 Does his manner of speaking change when he drinks?
Becomes quite slurred ___
Shows little change ___
Does not change at all X

9.04.16 When he drinks, his voice becomes
Louder ___ Quieter ___ No change X

9.04.17 Have you ever seen him truly drunk? No X Yes ___
If so, was he Socially active ___ Well-controlled ___
Boisterous ___ Poorly coordinated ___
Hostile ___ Depressed ___
Quiet, withdrawn ___ Sexually aroused ___

9.04.18 If you have not seen him drunk, would you predict that when drunk he would become
Very active___ Very passive___
Very unpleasant___ Rather pleasant___
Never become drunk X
I cannot imagine how he would act when drunk___

9.04.19 Have you ever seen him with a hang over? No___ Yes___
If Yes, is he the kind of purson who
Obviously looks hung over but functions fairly well___
Looks somewhat hung over but shows it mainly in his eyes and general manner___
Obviously looks hung over and is quite vocal about how bad he feels___
Does not look hung over in spite of what he says___

9.04.20 Is there anything special about his drinking habits that requires mention? If so, please describe:

9.05 Overall impression of drinking behavior: (Check the most appropriate)

9.05.01 A hearty, heavy drinker who holds his liquor well. He is always rather boisterous, and when he drinks, there is little change in behavior.___

9.05.02 A heavy drinker who often gives the impression he can drink others under the table. When he drinks, there is little change in behavior, but there is a hint that he could get quite mean if provoked.___

9.05.03 A steady drinker who obviously enjoys being "tight." In a way he can be somewhat charming when drunk and can get away with a bit of the "life of the party" routine.___

9.05.04 A steady drinker who becomes somewhat more maudlin when drunk or tight. Tends to tell people how much he likes them and sometimes asks others whether they like him. Gives an impression that he could become quite disgusting if he got very drunk.___

9.05.05 A steady drinker who holds his liquor very well. He always remains quite dignified and usually maintains his poise even though others are becoming quite drunk or tight. He still remains part of the crowd, however—that is, he gives few signs of being disgusted or bored. ____

9.05.06 A light drinker who paces his drinks. He seems to drink only because it is socially necessary. As a party progresses he tends to become aloof and distant. Is likely to continue to talk about his work even when it is inappropriate. ____

9.05.07 A light drinker who tapers off as the evening progresses. Usually manages to keep a sophisticated aloofness from others. Often singles out and associates with someone rather like himself. As the party progresses, he shows obvious distaste for anything he considers crude or boisterous. Often becomes quite sarcastic about others' behavior. ____

9.05.08 A very light drinker who either drinks only because he has to or refuses to drink at all. Is usually not really a part of the party and is obviously annoyed when others bring him in against his wishes. Tends to be solitary and sometimes will leave unobtrusively when the opportunity presents. X

9.05.09 None of these descriptions really fit.
I would describe him as:

10. Driving and Walking

10.01 Driving Behavior:

10.01.01 He drives a car in an

Unusually adept manner ____
Average or conventional manner ____
Unusually inept manner ____
He does not drive ____

10.01.02 He drives Very fast ___ Average ___ Very slow ___

10.01.03 When he drives and talks, you get the feeling
He pays little attention to his driving ___
He pays average attention to his driving ___
His driving is obviously more important than his conversation ___

10.01.04 Compared with his colleagues, his interest in foreign cars is
About the same ___ Definitely different ___

10.01.05 His interest in the care and maintenance of automobiles is
Unusual ___ Average ___ Little or none ___

10.01.06 His road courtesy is Equivalent to most of his colleagues' ___
Equivalent to the courtesy of most people I know ___
Unusual in that he is very courteous and cautious ___
Unusual in that he is rude and demanding ___

10.01.07 To the best of your knowledge, he is the kind of person who
Can learn how to get around a strange city very quickly ___
Can follow a road or city map with relative ease ___
Gets around by asking lots of questions ___
Almost always depends upon others to get him where he is going ___

10.01.08 When riding with someone else, is he the kind of person who is very much aware of the driving and responds with the driver—(goes through motions of braking, braces with changing traffic)?
No ___ Yes ___

10.01.09 When driving with someone else, is he the kind of person who seems to adapt to the style of driving in an average or appropriate manner?
No ___ Yes ___

10.01.10 When driving with someone else, is he the kind of person who is very relaxed and relatively indifferent to the driving?
No ____ Yes ____

10.01.11 Is he the kind of person who
Would never drive when drinking ____
Is inclined to be aware when he should not drive ____
Would always insist on driving, even when drunk ____

10.01.12 Will he offer someone a lift?
When it is appropriate ____
Almost always ____ Never ____

10.01.13 Is there anything about his manner of driving that requires special mention? If so, please describe:

10.02 Walking:

10.02.01 Is he the kind of person who
Does a great deal of walking ____
Walks an average amount ____
Never walks if he can help it ____

10.02.02 When he walks, his pace is Fast ____ Average ____ Slow ____

10.02.03 When you walk with him, he most often
Keeps pace with you ____
Forces you to keep up with him ____

10.02.04 When he walks, do his feet Swing to the right and left (outwards) ____
Maintain a fairly parallel motion ____
Swing inward ____

10.02.05 Does he walk
Erect with head up ____
Erect with head down ____
Bent forward but eyes up ____
Bent forward with eyes down ____
In a very stooped manner ____

10.02.06 When he is walking, he looks around
A great deal ____ Average ____ Never ____

10.02.07 When he greets someone he knows on the street, his face
Lights up ____
Shows average or appropriate expression ____
Rarely changes expression ____

10.02.08 Is there anything unusual or striking about his gait or manner of walking? If so, please describe:

10.03 Overall impression of driving and walking behavior: (Check the most appropriate description.)

10.03.01 An active, alert individual with a purposeful stride who appears to have a very practical mind. He enjoys "fixing things," appears to have sound knowledge of automobiles, and drives in a relaxed efficient manner.

10.03.02 An active individual who is somewhat standoffish (or negative) toward others. His stride is fast and intent. He appears to have a practical mind, is quite possessive and protective and is reluctant to share his possessions with others. He "fixes things" in a matter-of-fact way, appears to have good knowledge of automobiles, and drives in a determined (sometimes even hostile) but efficient manner.

10.03.03 An active, alert individual with a free-and-easy stride who appears most of the time to be in good humor. Seldom tries to fix things, but is often quite good at getting others to fix things for him. He appears to have little knowledge of automobiles but drives in a relaxed, efficient manner.

10.03.04 An active individual who has a cautious tinge to his walk as though he is easily embarrassed or easily startled. He appears rather helpless and awkward when he has to "fix things." He evidently has little knowledge of automobiles and drives in a careful (sometimes tense) but efficient manner.

10.03.05 A well-controlled and attentive individual who walks in something of a clipped, formal manner. Although generally practical, he seldom will do anything by "feel." He must read up and prepare himself when required to "fix things." He appears to have acquired considerable knowledge about automobiles but drives in a somewhat mechanical or highly controlled manner.

10.03.06 A well-controlled individual who is often somewhat preoccupied even in his walk. When he takes time to "fix things" he does so with intensity and precision. He is often very well read about automobiles and cares for his car or sees that it is cared for meticulously. However, when involved in conversation or otherwise preoccupied, he can sometimes be quite a dangerous driver. ___

10.03.07 A well-controlled individual who has a glide (or grace) in his walk. He has little or no interest in "fixing things" but usually knows the best places to get things done and is inclined to be quite particular in how things are done for him. He appears to have relatively little knowledge of the mechanics of an automobile, but appreciates and takes good care of a good automobile. He drives with confidence, but usually at a fast pace with not too much awareness of others. ___

10.03.08 A rather nervous and temperamental person who walks rapidly and rather awkwardly. He has little or no interest in "fixing things" and is inclined to ignore or throw away things that do not work. He appears to have little interest in or knowledge about automobiles and his driving shows it. It is sometimes frightening to ride with him. ___

10.03.09 None of these descriptions really fit.
I would describe him as:

10.04 Hobbies and Sports

10.04.01 Does he have any hobbies? Yes X No ___ Don't Know ___
If Yes, describe his hobbies:

Tennis

If No or Don't Know, what is your best guess on the hobby most likely to interest him?

Can't imagine him having any kind of hobby ___

Collecting (What does he collect? Guns, stamps, coins, books, butterflies, etc.)

____

As a collector, is he Avid ____ Moderately dedicated ____ Only casual ____

Artistic (painting, ceramics, etc.) ____
Mechanical (motors, hi-fi building, etc.) ____
Skill (woodworking, model building, etc.) ____
Intellectual (special periods in history, philosophy, etc.) ____
Active (group dancing, such light sports as ping pong, bowling or volleyball) ____
Outdoor (hunting, fishing, golf, etc.) ____
Social (chess, poker, bridge, etc.) ____
Vicarious (listening to music, attending plays, ball games, etc.) ____
Mental amusement (crossword puzzles, anagrams, cryptograms) ____

10.04.02 Has he ever mentioned having had hobbies in the past? Yes ____ No ____

If Yes, give details:

10.04.03 How well does he dance? unusually good ____ good ____ average ____ poor X does not dance ____ do not know if he dances ____

10.04.04 Describe the kind of dancing you have seen him do:

Foxtrot, cumbias

10.04.05 Does he play chess? Yes ✓ No ___
If Yes, do you know he is good ___ believe he is probably good ___
know he is an average player ___ believe he is probably average ___
know he is a poor player ___ believe he is probably a poor player X

10.04.06 If you are a poker player, describe the kind of poker player you think he would be:

Fair

10.04.07 Is he the kind of person with whom you would like to play poker?
Yes ___ No ___
If No, explain:

10.04.08 Have you heard him sing? Yes X No ___
If Yes, is his voice good ___ average ___ poor X

10.04.09 Does he seem to know many songs? Yes ___ No X

10.04.10 In group singing, does he often lead off with a song ___ sometimes lead off with a song ___ always follow someone else's lead X

10.04.11 Does he play a musical instrument? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, which instrument:

10.04.12 Has he ever mentioned having played an instrument? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, give details?

10.04.13 Does he participate in an active sports? Yes X No ___
If yes, describe:

Tennis, embassy volleyball

If No, what is your guess regarding the kind of sport that would interest him most:

He definitely is not the sports type ___
Body contact sports (football, rugby, soccer, etc.) ___
Skill sports (tennis, handball, volleyball, etc) ___
Individual skill sports (swimming, archery, skeet, etc.) ___
He is likely to be interested in all kinds of sports ___

10.04.14 Does he play golf? Yes___ No X

If Yes, does he take golf very seriously___ take golf in an average way___ take golf indifferently___

10.04.15 As a golfer, do you know he is good___ believe he is probably good___ know he is an average player___ believe he is probably average___ know he is a poor player___ believe he is probably a poor player___

10.04.16 If you are a golfer, is he the kind of person you would like to play with? Yes___ No___

If No, explain:

10.04.17 Does he: hunt a great deal___ fish a great deal___ do some hunting___ do some fishing___ never hunt___ never go fishing___

10.04.18 Do you have information on how seriously he takes hunting or fishing? Yes___ No___

If Yes, explain:

10.04.19 Has he ever mentioned participating in sports in the past? Yes X No___

If Yes, give details (include any mention he may have made of medals, trophies, team membership, etc.):

Boxing

10.04.20 Have you ever heard anyone describe him as an athlete? Yes_X_ No___
If Yes, give details:
everyone

10.04.21 Is he the kind of person who:
is very much preoccupied with keeping in shape _X_
works at keeping in shape to an average degree ___
shows little interest in keeping in shape ___

10.04.22 Has he ever indicated an interest in weight lifting? Yes___ No___
If Yes, explain:

10.04.23 He is best described as: a muscular, athletic type_X_ a strong, well-built type___ a somewhat flabby type___ a flabby, unathletic type___ an effeminate type___

10.04.24 Is he mechanically inclined? Yes___ No___
If Yes, does he
Prefer to follow instructions in books ___
Ignore instructions and try to figure it out for himself ___

10.04.25 If it were possible to provide American magazines or periodicals for him, which of the following do you think he would really enjoy:
The New York Times___ Saturday Review___ Newsweek___
Playboy_X_ Sports Illustrated_X_ Life___ Atlantic___
Field and Stream___ Popular Mechanics___ New Republic___
Better Homes and Gardens___ Readers Digest___
Kenyon Review___ Ramparts___ Scientific American___
Christian Science Monitor___

Can't imagine him reading an American magazine___

10.04.26 What books, if any, have you heard him mention as having read and enjoyed?

10.04.27 What movies, if any, have you heard him mention as having seen and enjoyed?

10.04.28 If he had his choice, would he most likely attend:
a movie ___ the theater ___ the ballet ___
a soccer match X a bull fight ___ a concert ___

10.05 Office Behavior

10.05.01 General Information (Check where applicable)

Informal ___
Formal ___
Follower of rules and regulations ___
An innovator ___
Doer ___
Practical ___
Procrastinator ___
Big memo writer ___

Delegates work ___
Can't delegate ___
Productive ___
Thinker type ___
Organized ___
Disorganized ___
Feels work is not appreciated ___

10.05.02 Reaction of Other Workers

Subordinates	Yes	No	Don't Know
Like him	___	___	___
Dislike him	___	___	___
He is courteous to them	___	___	___
Worries about them	___	___	___
Couldn't care less	___	___	___
They fear him	___	___	___
Believe he is just	___	___	___
He takes credit for their work	___	___	___
Gives credit where due	___	___	___
See him socially	___	___	___

Superiors			
Trust his judgment	___	___	___
Like him	___	___	___
Dislike him	___	___	___
Delegate responsibility to him	___	___	___
See him socially	___	___	___

IV. EMOTIONAL SET

11. Temperament and Humor

11.01 Temperament:

11.01.01 In his relations with others would you consider him

Shy ___
[✓ Guarded]
Conventional and correct ___
Outgoing ___
Warm ___

11.01.02 Is his conversational style

Awkward ___ Comfortable ___
[✓ Hesitant] Easy ___
Contrived ___ Conventional ___ Voluble ___

11.01.03 His manner of relating to women is

About the same as with men ___
More correct and controlled than with men ___
[✓ More warm and relaxed than with men]

11.01.04 In general, do you think he is a person who

Loses his temper easily ___
Has a quick temper but holds it well ___
[✓ Has a normal temper]
Has an even temper and is rarely ruffled ___
Has an unusual amount of tolerance and would almost never lose his temper ___

11.01.05 Have you ever seen him lose his temper? No ___ Yes ___
If Yes, give a short description of the incident, including how he reacted.

11.02 Humor:

11.02.01 Is he a person whom you
Have never seen tease anyone ___
Have frequently seen tease someone ___
Cannot imagine ever teasing anyone ___
[✓ Consider his tendency to tease like that of most people]

11.02.02 Is he a person
Who obviously cannot take teasing ___
Whom most people enjoy teasing ___
Whom most people would never consider teasing ___
Who obviously likes to be teased ___

11.02.03 His sense of humor is
About like that of most people ___
Notably absent ___ Clever ___ Subtle ___
Dry ___ [✓ Heavy] Crude ___

11.02.04 Does he tell jokes and anecdotes?
Never ___
Sometimes ___
[✓ Frequently]

11.02.05 As a story teller, he is Very good ___ Average ___ [✓ Poor]

11.02.06 Is he more inclined to tell a story
[✓ To a group of people]
Quietly to a friend or acquaintance ___
Only when encouraged ___

11.03 Overall impression of temperament and sense of humor:
(Check the most appropriate description.)

11.03.01 He is a hearty, hale fellow who laughs with gusto and pleasure. His humor is forthright, not subtle, and although he is sometimes loud, he is rarely unpleasant or objectionable. Most of the time, his good humor is contagious. ___

11.03.02 [✓ He is a hearty fellow who, when he laughs, does so with considerable gusto. However, he is frequently dour and sometimes intolerant and somewhat humorless. His humor is direct, even crude, and at times, inappropriate. He tends to be the kind of person who laughs more at people than with people.]

11.03.03 He is a good-humored fellow who sometimes can be considered jolly and carefree. His humor is clever and well timed. He is quite sensitive to the moods and feelings of others and often can do a good job appropriately livening up a party. Although something of a tease, he is never cruel or insensitive.

11.03.04 He is generally a rather quiet and somewhat complacent person who, at times, can be surprisingly gay and carefree. However, when gay, he sometimes overdoes it and causes some strain for those around him. His humor is often clever but he can be quite sarcastic and even biting on occasion.

11.03.05 He is an urbane fellow, generally quite conventional and appropriate. He does not necessarily appear to be a humorless person, but he seldom displays his sense of humor. It is sometimes difficult to tell whether he is in a good humor, because of the way he covers or controls his feelings. His humor is more studied than spontaneous yet it is never crude or inappropriate.

11.03.06 He is a dour and humorless person, always serious and intense. It is difficult to joke around him partly because he is not responsive and partly because he seems to disapprove.

11.03.07 He is a sensitive, sophisticated fellow with a subtle wit. He can be quite charming and amusing in the right sort of setting. However, there is something of an aristocratic quality to his sense of humor and he can be quite condescending towards people who do not understand or appreciate his sense of humor.

11.03.08 He is an arty, somewhat cynical person who can be quite flippant at times. His humor tends to be a bit far out. He seems to have private jokes he shares with intimates. It is sometimes difficult to tell whether he is being amusing or subtly hostile.

11.03.09 None of these fit. I would describe him as:

12. Sexual Attitudes

12.01 General:

12.01.01 Are his attitudes about sex

Very obscure ____
Difficult to determine ____
About average for his culture and background ____
Clearly uninterested ____
Indifferent ____
[✓ Clearly interested]

12.01.02 In the presence of women, he is

Stilted ____ Conventional ____
[✓ Flirtatious] Vulgar ____
Hostile ____ Indifferent ____

12.01.03 Does he go to "girlie" shows

Often ____ Never ____
Sometimes with a group ____
Can't imagine him ever going ____
I have no idea what he thinks of "girlie" shows ____

12.01.04 Does he, in the presence of male companions, talk about sex?

[✓ Often] Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never ____

12.01.05 Is there any change in his sexual behavior and/or attitudes after he has been drinking? Yes ____ No ____ Have no idea ____

If Yes, describe the change:

12.01.06 Do you have any idea how he feels about prostitutes?
Yes ____
No ____

12.01.07 If No, do you think he is the type who would go to a prostitute ____
Cannot imagine him visiting a prostitute ____
Have nothing to base an opinion on ____

12.01.08 If Yes, is he
Obviously negativistic toward prostitutes ____
Indifferent toward prostitutes ____
Interested in prostitutes ____

12.01.09 In his relations with women, does he
Generally act in accordance with his age and experience ____
Generally act somewhat immature and inappropriate for his age and experience ____
Show considerable facility and poise X
Show considerable uneasiness or awkwardness ____

12.01.10 In describing an attractive woman, is he most likely to mention
Her hair ____ Breasts ____
Eyes ____ Clothes ____
Figure X Personality ____
Legs ____ Have no idea ____

12.01.11 Have you ever heard him described in any way by a woman? Yes X
No ____
If Yes, what did she say?

athletic, virile, manly.

12.02 Overall impression: Which of the following best describes him?

12.02.01 He is an earthy, lusty man who shows little embarrassment about sex. He treats women appropriately, but makes little effort to conceal his admiration and attraction. He appears virile and self-confident with women, and most women seem to like it. X

12.02.02 He is an earthy, lusty man who on occasion can be crude or even vulgar. He treats women rather harshly, and can become quite pushy when attracted to a woman. He seems to be very proud of his virility. Many women would be offended or rebuffed by his aggressiveness, but this does not seem to bother him. ____

12.02.03 He is a somewhat sensual, rather soft man who is very considerate of women. He is prone to hold a woman's hand overly long when talking to her and frequently puts his arms around women he admires. He often uses flattery and compliments but does so rather graciously. Most women usually like his attentiveness.

12.02.04 He is a sensual person, but is embarrassed and insecure about it. He is a rather soft man who tries hard to be inoffensive. However, he will frequently follow attractive women with his eyes when he thinks no one is looking. He is also prone to brush against or touch women "accidentally" whenever he gets a chance.

12.02.05 He is a self-confident, rather polished person who is proper and conventional with either men or women. He is always considerate and polite with all women and it is difficult to ascertain what his sexual attitudes and interests might be. In a group, he always behaves according to protocol and usually can be quite efficient in doing so.

12.02.06 He is a self-confident and precise person who has something of the air of a professional man about him. He is polite, almost to a fault, and is inclined to go out of his way to light a woman's cigarette or see that she is properly taken care of. Nevertheless, he shows considerable distance in his relations with women. Sometimes his formality is out of place, but he will rarely, if ever, change his manners or procedures to fit the situation.

12.02.07 He is a charming, urbane person and both friendly and sophisticated. He deals with women in a cultured way but shows little sensuality or sexual inappropriateness. He is neat, even dapper, and can be quite fastidious. Most of his relations with women appear to be quite platonic. He is the kind of person who likely has several very close friends who are women.

12.02.08 He is a somewhat shy and indifferent person whom some people consider odd or unusual. He shows little or no interest in women in public. In general, he is a preoccupied person who only seeks out people with similar interests. There is an ascetic, asexual air about him most of the time.

12.02.09 None of these fit. I would describe him as:

14-00000

V. FAMILY SET

13. Marital Status

13.01 Is he married? Yes X No ____

13.01.01 Is his wife with him? Yes X No ____

13.01.02 Does his wife go out socially with him:
Never ____ Seldom X Average ____ Often ____

13.01.03 Is his wife: older than he ✓ about his age ____
younger than he ____ can't tell ____

13.01.04 Is his wife: unusually attractive ____ attractive to an average degree ✓
unusually unattractive ____

13.01.05 Generally speaking, is his wife: socially poised ____
socially adequate X
socially gauche ____

13.01.06 What languages other than her native language does his wife speak? Spanish

13.01.07 Is his wife: better educated than he X
educated about the same ____ less educated ____

13.01.08 Has he been married before: Yes ____ No ____
If yes, give details if known: Can't tell X

13.02 Does his wife seem to: have many friends ____ a few friends ____
almost no friends X

13.02.01 In public, is he: very attentive to his wife ____
appropriately attentive to his wife ____
indifferent towards his wife X

13.02.02 In public, is his wife: very attentive to him ____
appropriately attentive to him ____
indifferent to him X

13.02.03 Would you characterize his wife as:
aggressive ____ domineering ____ independent ____
complacent ____ submissive X dependent ____

13.02.04 In the area in which she lives, does she appear to be:
very satisfied____ normally satisfied X very dissatisfied____

13.03 Have you been to their home? Yes____ No X
If Yes, how often?

13.03.01 Are their living quarters: unusually nice for the area ____
typical of the area ____
unusually poor for the area ____

13.03.02 Are they, as a couple: unusually good hosts____ good hosts ____
adequate hosts____ somewhat inadequate hosts____
unusually poor hosts ____

13.03.03 Does the wife seem: very comfortable as a hostess____
adequate as a hostess____ somewhat tense as a hostess____
very uncomfortable as a hostess____

13.03.04 Are their living quarters: a reflection of his personality ____
a reflection of both their personalities ____
a reflection of neither of their personalities ____

13.03.05 In general, their furnishings are: unusually drab ____
conventional____ Unusually nice ____

13.03.06 Is his wife: obviously very interested in her home ____
about as interested in her home as most women in the area ____
obviously very uninterested in her home ____
cannot really tell whether she is interested or not ____

13.03.07 Is her social behavior at home:
about the same as when away from home ____
more comfortable than away from home ____
less comfortable ____

13.03.08 Under ordinary circumstances, are they:
the kind of people who entertain often and like it ____
the kind of people who meet their social obligations and rather enjoy it ____
the kind of people who enjoy entertaining only close friends ____
the kind of people who entertain only when they have to ____
the kind of people who really dislike to entertain ____

13.04 Does he ever criticize his wife: Yes____ No____
If so, what is he most likely to criticize:

13.04.01 In general, as a couple are they: obviously very compatible ______
as compatible as most ______ obviously not very compatible X

13.04.02 Is he inclined to: never appear jealous of her ______
rarely appear jealous of her X
often appear jealous of her ______

13.04.03 Is she inclined to: never appear jealous of him ______
rarely appear jealous of him X
often appear jealous of him ______

13.04.04 Is there anything about his wife that deserves special mention or description?

13.05 As a husband, he is best described as:

______ An outgoing man who obviously is the dominant partner in the marriage. He is protective of his wife and always includes her when possible in his social activities.

______ An active man who is authoritarian and dominant as a husband. He is possessive of his wife and tends to be demanding in their relationship.

______ An outgoing man who is quite dependent upon his wife. She tends to be the more dominant partner and he seems to like it and expect it.

______ An active but somewhat surly man who is obviously very dependent upon his wife but will rarely admit it. He may have some tendency to be jealous and possessive about his wife.

______ A conventional husband who treats his wife with respect. He rarely shows his feelings in public. It is difficult to tell how he really feels about her.

______ A conscientious husband who takes his marriage quite seriously. His wife is obviously part of the team and they both take family and social responsibilities seriously.

______ A socially active man who can be quite charming with the ladies even when his wife is present. They both seem to lead separate but quite compatible lives.

______ A quiet man who is obviously very dependent upon his wife. She looks after him rather unostentatiously but it is obvious that she has considerable influence on his behavior and attitudes.

X None of these fit, he is best described as:
dominant partner.. Independant of wife. Indifferent to here needs

13.06 Household:
Is he concerned about the appearance or functioning of the household? Yes ___ No ___
Does he make minor repairs himself? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, Fairly competently ___ Awkwardly ___

14. Children

14.01 Does he have any children. Yes X No ___

14.01.01 How many 2 What ages 10+18 Sex of children male + fem.

14.01.02 Are all the children with him? Yes ___ No X
If not, where are they?
girl / moscow

14.01.03 Does he:
pay unusual attention to his children ___
pay normal attention to his children X
pay little attention to his children ___

14.01.04 Is his wife:
an unusually attentive mother ___
an average mother X
an unusually unattentive mother ___

14.01.05 Are the children:
unusually well behaved ___
normally well behaved X
unusually rowdy or difficult ___

14.01.06 Does he:
never talk about his children ___
rarely talk about his children ___
talk about his children as normal and appropriate X
frequently talk about his children ___
seem quite preoccupied about his children ___

14.01.07 Are any of his children unusual in any way (frequent illness, allergies, mentally defective, crippled or deformed, unusually bright, etc.) Yes ___ No X

If yes, describe circumstances:

14.02 When his wife and family are away, he is:
obviously very lonely and at loose ends ____
unlikely to vary his routine ____
likely to become more active and socially aggressive X
have no idea ____

14.03 As a father, he is best described as:
____ An active, happy family man who is proud of his family.
____ An active family man who is inclined to be strict and demanding with his children.
____ An active family man who spends a great deal of time with his family. He tends to spoil his children.
____ An active but insecure family man who worries a good deal about his children.
____ An active, responsible father, but has a no-nonsense attitude. His work comes first and his family knows it.
____ A careful, responsible father who is conscientious about his family but not particularly warm or demonstrative.
X A carefree father who takes his family for granted. Most of the time they fend for themselves and do a pretty good job of it.
____ An indifferent father, who sometimes seems oblivious of his family.
____ None of these fit, he is best described as:

14.04 Does he carry pictures of his family ____ wife ____ children ____ himself ____

14.05 In his office or room, does he display pictures of his family ____ wife ____ children ____ himself ____

14.06 Is there anything about his relations with wife or family that requires special mention or description?

VI. IDEOLOGICAL SET

15. General

15.01 In general:

X He is a man with forthright and obvious opinions. He is capable of expressing these opinions with little apparent regard for the feelings and attitudes of others.

____ He is a man with many prejudices and dogmatic ideas. He can express them with heat and determination when necessary.

____ He is a man who is likely to turn aside controversial opinions with flippancy or humor. It is sometimes difficult to determine his opinions because it is hard to get him really serious.

____ He is a man who may have many strong opinions but it is difficult for him to show them. He is apologetic, diffident and often uncomfortable when an argument is in the offing.

____ He is a man whose true opinions are difficult to determine. He is usually diplomatic and conventional when controversial subjects or taboo subjects are discussed.

____ He is a man who is serious and determined to be proper and conventional. He has the manner of a well disciplined person who only says what he is supposed to say or expected to say.

____ He is a man who has quite sophisticated opinions. He is well read, capable of considerable articulate argument, but at times can be quite cynical or subtlely sarcastic.

____ He is a man who is shy or taciturn about his opinions. It is very hard to get him to open up on any subject, particularly if it is controversial.

____ None of these fit, he is best described as:

15.01.01 Is there any subject that tends to get his dander up? Yes____ No____
If so, what is it?

15.02 Is he a man whose patriotism:
[✓ is obvious and intense]
is like that of most of his colleagues ____
is guarded and not too intense ____
is difficult to determine ____

15.02.01 On general political issues, is he:
unusually well informed on his country's position and attitudes ____
[✓ as informed as most of his colleagues]
unusually poorly informed ____

VII. MEDICAL

16. State of Health:

16.01 To your knowledge, does he have any sort of health problem? Yes ____ No X

If Yes, please explain:

16.02 Does his wife or children have any sort of health problem? Yes X No ____

If Yes, please explain:

wife ?

16.03 Has he ever indicated that he had health problems in the past? Yes ____ No X

If Yes, please explain:

16.04 To your knowledge, does he regularly take pills or medication of any kind? Yes ____ No X

If Yes, please explain:

16.05 Is he the kind of person who: Never talks about his health or how he feels ____ Talks about his health and feelings to an average degree X Frequently talks about his health and feelings ____.

16.06 When he feels bad: It is obvious to others ____ It is obvious to an average degree ____ Most people would never know it X Have never known him to feel bad ____

16.07 In appearance, he looks Robust and healthy _X_ Essentially like most people his age ___ Unhealthy ___

16.08 Does he have A flushed face ___ A pot belly ___ A tendency to breathe hard with exertion ___ Cold clammy hands ___ A tendency to sweat to any unusual degree ___ Foul breath ___

16.09 To your knowledge, does he adhere to a special diet or health regimen? Yes ___ No ___

If Yes, please explain:

16.10 As an overall impression, does he strike you as a person who is

Highly energetic and tireless _X_
Energetic, but in spurts ___
Moderately energetic ___
Lethargic, listless ___

16.11 Is there anything about the state of his health or his family's health that warrants further comment?

1c(Sen


Gloria
Pinto
Valentin

Gloria Pinto + Valentin LOBIKOV

Source: LIREALM-1

File
P-11712 (photo file)



atalia de

de 1968

V. Loginov.

11.7.69.



julio de 1968

Consul V. Loginov.

11.7.69.

— 33 —

Valentin Loginov
Handwriting
Sample. Taken
from Passport.
Date of signature
is 11 July 1969
file SPR side
MF-11,712

[illegible] files

Valentin S. Loguinov
Tercer Secretario de la Embajada de la U.R.S.S.
Consul de la U.R.S.S.

15-60-55

Given to LICOWL-1 on ca 27 Dec 1966 by LOBINOV - Loginov was trying to get LICOWL-1's full name.

P-11712

~~Dillon~~ ~~Scott~~ ~~Whitten~~ Feldman [illegible] ~~Gyr~~ Alice ~~Index~~ P-2712

(5)

8 December 1966

SUBJECT: Contact/Report/ LICOZY-5
8 Dec 1900-1945, Subj's office

1. The C/O arrived at Subj's office while Subj was on his way down to the street to meet Valentin Loginov who had called by phone to ask Subj to step down to the street. It turned out that all Loginov was interested in was to give Subj two tickets for the Ballet for 9 December. Loginov jokingly asked Subj if he had gone to the meeting of the two presidents at the border- and Subj rejoined that he didn't make that meeting but would be on hand for the turning over of the Chamizal. /Comment: the C/O was not aware of any Soviet loitering about as he entered Subj's building/.

2. Subj reported that Alexandr Prikhodko had dropped in to the office unexpectedly on 9 Dec, but was prevented from talking to Subj because Subj's wife and son were there. Prikhodko asked when he could have lunch with Subj, and Subj told him to call next week, but that he was terribly busy during the Christmas rush.

The C/O took the opportunity to impress on Subj again that he was to do nothing, absolutely nothing, for the Soviets. Even if the Soviets only wanted to know about changed visa requirements for travel in Latin America - Subj was not to give them the time of day.

3. The C/O brought up the subject of Jacobo Zabludovsky's mention to Subj of Echeverria's interest in enlisting the support of influential Jews in his bid for the Presidency, and asked if Subj had heard anything further on this. Subj said "no."

Luis

But he related the story again for the C/O:

Back in October 1965 Echeverria was attending a conference at which Subj was present. Echeverria came down off the presidium directly to Subj's table and greeted him.

Subj related this to Zabludovsky, and it was then that Zabludovsky told Subj that Echeverria had spoken to him and said he feels he is a strong candidate for the Presidency, and would like to have a committee of five people in the Jewish community to coordinate with him. Zabludovsky told Subj he was intending to propose Subj. Zabludovsky did not name any others.

The C/O asked Subj who he thought some of the other likely Jewish leaders might be. Subj said it was hard to say, but he named two: Mickey* Feldman, a banker and Fernando* Jana, the head of B'nai B'rith.

The C/O asked Subj to check with Zabludovsky on the whole matter again, when he had the opportunity. Subj said he would do so.

Nothing [illegible] indicating [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

4. Subj is intending to take a two day trip to Colombia, either 9 or 10 Dec, in connection with the Petroleum Congress.

PRM

CARDED

File cc P-11712 P-2270 P-7924
P-5530

cc: P-5530

P-2712

④

Source: Lienvoy/2
Rec'd: 8 9 Dec. 1966.

Dillon:

This was sent to Lirama by Lienvoy/2. The last comment pertains to Casamadrid's (former) association with the Legal Attache's Office, possibly; but I don't know how Lienvoy/2 knew of this.

Interesting, no?

Win

~~Anne G.~~

~~White~~

~~Scott~~

in 1960-61 Blanco had something to do with embassy [illegible] with [illegible] cultivating [illegible]

Files: Carlos CASAMADRID (P - 10968

Pls send copies to

cc: Carlos BLANCO (P - 9320

cc: LOGUINOV (P - 11712 -

cc: 50-6-75/2

cc: 50-6-75/4

[illegible]

El 1o. de noviembre de 1966, CARLOS BLANCO reclama a su amigo el Vice-Cónsul LOGUINOV de la Embajada Rusa; que hace tiempo no se ven para platicar. LOGUINOV informa que acaba de regresar de un viaje a Mazatlán. BLANCO tiene a su esposa todavia un poco delicada y tambien estuvo fuera de la ciudad; pero el miercoles próximo por la noche tiene tiempo para verse y para ello le puede llamar al 47-26-01 que es un negocio de su hermano y allí puede dejar el recado o bien en su oficina que es el 35-11-27 ext.112. LOGUINOV ofrece llamarle el miercoles por la mañana.

(NOTA: El teléfono 47-26-01 corresponde a una tlapalería ubicada en la Calzada Nonoalco #338-D.
El teléfono 35-11-27 es el conmutador del edificio #110 de la avenida Morelos.)

El 6 de diciembre de 1966, CARLOS BLANCO saluda a LOGUINOV y dice que: "El comandante CARLOS, tiene urgencia por localizar a PAVEL YATZKOV". LOGUINOV informa que no está, pero que dejó dicho donde poderlo llamar. BLANCO que al 10-33-62 o a la Guardia de Agentes que son el 21-28-09 y 21-28-10 y que le diga que es urgente y que pueda llamar a la hora que guste, pues "vamos a estar de guardia". LOGUINOV se lo dirá para que les llame a las ocho y media de la noche. BLANCO está de acuerdo y pregunta: .. " que pasó..con el asunto ese de ceros de .l. Bellas Artes..?" LOGUINOV contesta: " si..! si.." BLANCO guarda silencio y despues dice: " ! okey.. entonces adios.."

(NOTA: Los teléfonos mencionados corresponden al Segundo Comandante y Guardia de Agentes de la Policia Judicial del Distrito Federal, respectivamente.)

This from Lienvoy covers
1 Nov 1966 + 6 Dec 1966

7 diciembre de 1966.

CARLOS BLANCO SOLANO puede ser la misma persona quien estuvo comisionado por la Dirección Federal de Seguridad junto con CARLOS CASAMADRID MIRANDA en un servicio en la Embajada de los Estados Unidos.

P-10968

Dilimit (~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] 4)

[illegible] Alice

P-2712

3

22 December 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/LICOZY-5
22 Dec 1155-1245, Subj's office

1. The C/O dropped by Subj's office on 22 Dec, after having delivered a Christmas gift of liquor to Subj's home the previous day.
Subj was very appreciative of the gift.

2. Subj showed the C/O the reservation card for travel of Soviet Georgi Visko and his family, Nina, Irina and Marina. They're booked for departure from Mexico for 25 Dec by Air France, for Paris. Paris to Brussels, where Visko has four days of business, and continuing flight Brussels to Moscow on 30 December.
Visko had visited Subj in company with another Soviet who Subj was told was Visko's successor: (from the latter's card) - Victor M. Ivanov, Consejero Comercial de la Embajada Sovietica.

3. Subj stated that he had received a letter (The invite was contained in a Season's Greetings card [illegible] in the form of a) from Sidney Weintraub, U.S. State Department official now in Chile, inviting Subj to visit him. /Comment: Weintraub formerly stationed in Mexico and later in Washington was the subject of interest by the Soviets in Mexico, who had Subj try to maintain contact on his Washington trips/. Please forward this information to Gerald F. Gestetner in Santiago. ([illegible])

4. Subj said he had received a firm invitation from Mr. Hawkins (phonetic), Mgr. of Air France in Mexico, to go on the inaugural flight of Air France to Red China, possibly in April 1967. Subj was completely neutral about his going, but asked the C/O if we had any interest in his taking the trip to Red China. The C/O said we would let him know about that.

5. The C/O asked Subj to have the door to his office closed, so that we might discuss a serious matter. The C/O said he wanted to explore frankly the status of Subj's relationship toward the Soviets. The C/O stated bluntly that there was a feeling "higher up" that Subj had not achieved a sufficient degree of cut-off from the Soviets, and that his posture of friendly compromise weakened his stance. In reply, Subj mentioned the two elements that went into his attitude toward the Soviets:
a) re the financial gain from associating with them, Subj said that had fallen to such an insignificant level that it had no effect in his dealings with the Soviets. And he said that level would sink even more when the Soviets inaugurate Aeroflot flights from Montreal and New York (the Soviets do not handle bookings on Aeroflot through agents).
b) his personality (the C/O had asked if it were possible for Subj to become cool or even unfriendly toward the Soviets); Subj said he could not change his personality. In the past year he had cooled off noticeably, having resisted all cooperation with them, avoided them, put difficulties in the way of meetings, etc. But it was against his grain to be unfriendly toward people with whom he might be thrown into association. He cited proudly that he was not beholden to the Soviets for anything, and never went out of his way to seek anything from them; for instance, he had been told that Pavel Yatskov had brought back caviar for Subj on his return from the Soviet Union - but Subj made no move to call Yatskov (when and if Yatskov calls him, he will see him and cannot understand how he could be unfriendly to Yatskov under such circumstances).

6. The C/O mentioned to Subj the latter's equivocal reply of "maybe" when Loginov had asked if Subj would report the name of the CIA chief in Mexico if he knew it. Subj replied that he had told Loginov that the latter was crazy

COPIES MADE

File: cc: P-8017 (p.1) P-11712 P-11668 (p.1)

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

LOGINOV, Valentin

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Lista del Cuerop Diplomatico, Abril 1963, (Cuban) Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Attache, Sovemb Havana-- Valentin S. LOGINOV (LOGUINOV)
Aleksandra LOGINOVA, wife (DE LOGUINOV)

Address: Havana-Vedado, Paseo # 309, apto 4-B

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

201-285412

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 7 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. ~~SECRET~~ (7-46)

SECRET

20 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt

1. I phoned Paul Burns, Special Assistant to the DDO, and said that we had some leads that could be followed by whoever has the action in the DDO in tracking down Hunt's activities during the fall of 1964, when he was alleged to have been engaged in surveillance activities of Barry Goldwater.

2. I said that our files showed Hunt was in DO Division (Burns was not familiar with that title, but recognized it as the predecessor of FR Division) and in August 1964 was assigned to the Washington field office. I suggested that Stan Gaines, who was Deputy Division Chief of DO Division and now DCOS Bonn, might be in a position to give a few groups on what Hunt was supposed to be doing then. I suggested that he be queried by cable. Burns said Gaines is staying on under contract for a while, so would continue to be available.

3. I said that Fig Coleman was on the Iberian desk when the Hunt assignment to Madrid was brought up in 1964 and when Hunt went to the field in 1965. He could give the background on the assignment, which seems to have been through Karamessines at Helms' direction. His recollection would give leads. I told him that Coleman became COS Madrid later, after Hunt left Spain, and could provide information on what Hunt did not do for the Agency during that period. I suggested that both Helms and Karamessines should be queried. I gave as a possible press treatment that Hunt was engaged in domestic operations (something Senator Baker is pursuing) and that his assignment to Spain after the election could be presented as giving him time to cool off. I thought we had to pursue the matter to be sure we know the facts.

4. I asked Burns to be sure that we are on information distribution of cables to the field on this, given our assigned responsibility for keeping files on Watergate. He said we are on the PLMHPLANK for messages to Helms. He would advise the action officer. I said we are available for any help we can give.

S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

SECRET

20 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt

1. I phoned Paul Burns, Special Assistant to the DDO, and said that we had some leads that could be followed by whoever has the action in the DDO in tracking down Hunt's activities during the fall of 1964, when he was alleged to have been engaged in surveillance activities of Barry Goldwater.

2. I said that our files showed Hunt was in DO Division (Burns was not familiar with that title, but recognized it as the predecessor of FR Division) and in August 1964 was assigned to the Washington field office. I suggested that Stan Gaines, who was Deputy Division Chief of DO Division and now DCOS Bonn, might be in a position to give a few groups on what Hunt was supposed to be doing then. I suggested that he be queried by cable. Burns said Gaines is staying on under contract for a while, so would continue to be available.

3. I said that Fig Coleman was on the Iberian desk when the Hunt assignment to Madrid was brought up in 1964 and when Hunt went to the field in 1965. He could give the background on the assignment, which seems to have been through Karamessines at Helms' direction. His recollection would give leads. I told him that Coleman became COS Madrid later, after Hunt left Spain, and could provide information on what Hunt did not do for the Agency during that period. I suggested that both Helms and Karamessines should be queried. I gave as a possible press treatment that Hunt was engaged in domestic operations (something Senator Baker is pursuing) and that his assignment to Spain after the election could be presented as giving him time to cool off. I thought we had to pursue the matter to be sure we know the facts.

4. I asked Burns to be sure that we are on information distribution of cables to the field on this, given our assigned responsibility for keeping files on Watergate. He said we are on the PLMHPLANK for messages to Helms. He would advise the action officer. I said we are available for any help we can give.

S. D. Breckinridge

SECRET

9 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: OPS/RMO

SUBJECT : Watergate File Research - Final Report

1. The files of the immediate office of the Chief, OPS/OSG have been checked for material relevant to the subject of this memorandum. The check included chronological files of communications of which I was the author while assigned to Madrid, Spain in the period July 1970 to July 1973. Nothing pertinent was found.

2. I have attempted to recollect any other details which conceivably could be pertinent and which relate to the period of my assignment to Madrid. The only points which I recall but on which I have no documentation are these:

a. There were occasional joshing inquiries made of me by American residents of Madrid about the reported presence in Spain of E. Howard Hunt in 1972. My standard reply was that I knew only what I had heard rumored. For the record, at no time did Hunt contact me, and I have never known of his having tried to contact any Station personnel in Spain during the period 1970-73. I made no effort personally to ascertain whether or not Hunt was in Spain, and I had no effort made by any Station member.

b. A Station officer, possibly Richard Ouderkirk, now assigned to Guatemala, was given some information by an informant in 1972 concerning reported activities in Spain by Robert Vesco. I suggested that the information be given informally to the Embassy's Economic Section chief, John Oliver. That officer was charged with keeping abreast of developments related to Vesco. The Station did not pursue that subject, as I recall, because it was not a topic of reportable interest, according to requirements of the period.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 056759

SECRET

SUBJECT: Watergate File Research - Final Report (cont'd)

3. There is no other employee assigned to my immediate office who has relevant personal knowledge of events and personalities.

Robert E. Owen

Robert E. Owen
Chief, OPS/OSG

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Director of Finance 1212 Key Building			EXTENSION	NO. DATE 27 February 1974
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Inspector General 2 E 24 HQS.	27 Feb '74		D	
2. Breckinridge				
3. Richards			R	
4. ~~[illegible]~~				
5. Sandy-Ariadel - W/file				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

27 FEB 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Howard Hunt

1. At the recent request of the Deputy Director for Management and Services, the Office of Finance has searched its records to determine if we could find any payment to Mr. Hunt in an amount of approximately $30,000 that required no accounting.

2. We have searched the following records:

a. The expense runs for the period July 1964 to June 1973 for the immediate Office of the DCI, the immediate Office of the DD/P, FI Staff, CI Staff, CA Staff and the Office of Security. We have checked various items that were reflected in these expense records but have identified nothing relating to Mr. Hunt.

b. The Madrid Station, JMWAVE and FR/Washington Office accountings to determine if there were funds passed by the Stations to Mr. Hunt during the year he served under non-official cover in Madrid. We could find no payment to Mr. Hunt either in his true name or his two identified pseudonyms.

c. Mr. Hunt's travel claims for the period 1960-1972 and have found nothing in these travel claims that were not consistent with normal travel expenses, i.e., transportation, per diem.

d. We made a specific analysis of Mr. Hunt's advance account for the period he was under non-official cover (July '65-Sept '66) and have

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 006567

SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

determined that $33,500 was advanced to him for travel and transportation of household goods to and from Madrid with one trip to Paris for he and his family to renew their Spanish visas. All of this advance was fully accounted for. However, in his accounting, one item appeared unusual. It was an expenditure of $1,600 for a sensitive operation which was approved for write-off by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald on 1 June 1966 without further accounting.

3. Also, we confirmed that no other Agency advance accounts were established for Mr. Hunt during this period.

4. At the beginning of his non-official cover tour, it was necessary to establish a bank account in his name. The EUR Division accordingly requested we open an account at the Chase Manhattan Bank in Mr. Hunt's name to receive all non-salary payments. (Mr. Hunt had an account at Riggs National Bank to receive his salary and allowance payments). The following deposits were made to the account during 1965 and 1966:

Account opened: 13 July 1965

13 July 1965	$10,000
22 July 1965	5,000
15 September 1965	5,000
6 October 1965	5,000
19 July 1966	5,000
	$30,000

All of the above have been accounted for by submission of travel and transportation accountings.

5. We feel at this time without specific guidelines that further searching would be somewhat fruitless. One strange aspect of the non-official cover assignment in Madrid is that all the costs were charged to the support allotment of the EUR Division which is not normal as non-official cover people are usually assigned to a project. It is unusual to have a case officer abroad for one year on an operational assignment without him incurring operational expenditures.

6. The Office of Finance has not found operational expenditures except for the $1,600 mentioned above. Therefore, it is suggested that Mr. Karamessines be questioned as to a project or projects to which Mr. Hunt's operational expenditures if incurred would have been charged.

7. Another possible course of action is to request the Director to approve my asking a cleared contact at Chase Manhattan Bank to provide a transcript of all entries into Mr. Hunt's Chase Manhattan Bank account.

8. We are currently reviewing records of all cashier's checks prepared and issued by Monetary to determine if any were payable to Mr. Hunt. Hopefully this effort will be finished by the end of the week.

Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance

CONFIDENTIAL

20 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt

1. I spoke with Fig Coleman about Hunt's assignment to Spain. I had spoken with him back in August when we were inquiring into reported activities involving Mrs. Hunt.

2. Coleman said that he got out of the War College in May 1964 (by which he fixed the time), and took over the Iberian desk. Bill Ryan was C/EUR (or was it WE Division at the time). In early autumn Ryan said that he had just been informed by the DDP (Karamessines) that Hunt was to be assigned to Madrid as DCOS, as a directed assignment by Helms. A memo was prepared and sent to the COS, Jim Noel (now retired). There was nothing further for about a month when Ryan called Coleman in and showed him a RYBAT letter from Noel stating that Ambassador Stanley J. Woodward would not have Hunt in the Embassy.

3. Woodward had been the Ambassador to Uruguay when Hunt was COS Montevideo. He had a low opinion of Hunt and was counting the days until Hunt left. The President of Uruguay visited President Eisenhower in the States, at which time he requested a personal favor--that Hunt be reassigned to Montevideo. So Hunt took another tour. Woodward was outraged, and had his revenge in 1964 when Hunt was to be sent as DCOS to Madrid.

4. After a couple of months--early 1965--Ryan called Coleman in and, observing that there was more than one way to skin a cat, told him that Hunt was going to Spain under nonofficial cover. This didn't require anything special, Ryan saying that he didn't know much about it. It came to him from Karamessines on Helms' order. Hunt was to have the telephone number of the COS, but he would do nothing for the station. Hunt was to submit administrative vouchers for reimbursement of his expenses and they were to be paid. Coleman said he never saw Hunt before he went out. He knows that there was no operational reporting, to indicate that Hunt was doing anything.

The vouchers were not large, although the documentation was poor. Coleman raised the question with Ryan about his signing off, and Ryan said he could talk to Karamessines if he wished. Because Coleman had a close personal association with Karamessines he did just that. He was told by Karamessines that he didn't know much about it either--"Helms said send him out." He was instructed to go ahead.

5. In early July 1966 (4 July) Coleman went to Madrid. He had a ten day turnover with Jim Noel. Hunt had already gone and he did not see him. Noel said he didn't know what Hunt did, but that Coleman need not worry because he was gone.

6. Several months ago Noel was at a seminar at which Ambassador Woodward was also present. At the time he asked about Hunt. Woodward said it might still be dragged into the press. Tad Szulc had been after Woodward about the Hunt assignment to Spain. Coleman observed that Szulc did have a long article on Hunt in the New York Times, and the Spain assignment was mentioned, but without any conclusions as to its significance.

7. Coleman said the RYBAT file of C/EUR may have something on the event, but not much. A letter out and the reply, but not much more.

S. D. Breckinridge

22 February 1974

26 Feb // Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt--Madrid Assignment

1. On 22 February 1974, Mr. Frederick N. Evans and the undersigned interviewed Mr. Edward Ryan, Chief, Staff D, Deputy Director for Operations, on the subject of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. During the period of Mr. Hunt's assignment as a Contract [illegible] A agent to Madrid between July 1965 and September 1966, Mr. Ryan had been the Deputy Chief of the Western European Division, Deputy Director for Plans. The purpose of the interview was to determine if Mr. Ryan had any information bearing on the matter of the operational assignment of Mr. Hunt during this period.

2. Mr. Ryan stated that the assignment of Mr. Hunt both to the European Division and to Madrid was handled without benefit of the routine processing procedures through the Western European Division. Mr. Hunt's assignment was coordinated and directed by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. With regard to operational duties, Mr. Ryan was unaware of any specific project or target for Mr. Hunt. Mr. Ryan made the specific observation that if Mr. Hunt produced positive intelligence on the Iberian target during this period the officials responsible for this effort within the Western European Division were totally unaware of it.

3. Mr. Ryan stated that most of his knowledge of Mr. Hunt's activity and the nature of his assignment during this period came more through hearsay than direct official knowledge. For example, he cited the comment made by a mutual acquaintance of his and Mr. Hunt's to the effect that Mr. Hunt stated that while in Madrid he was going to "play golf and write books." Mr. Ryan was asked specifically whether or not he was

under the impression that Mr. Hunt's writing activities were either being encouraged or subsidized directly by this Agency in any official effort. Mr. Ryan responded that he was personally not aware of any such arrangement. He added as an expression of personal opinion that Mr. Hunt had no operational function and was simply granted the opportunity to write books for his own personal gain at Government expense during this period.

Lawrence J. Howe

SENDER WILL CHECK CLAS TION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	FIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Howe		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	XX	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
O/IG/2E24 Hqs./5527	22 Feb 74

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

SECRET

26 Feb 10, Tab 32

22 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation ~~with Sam~~ Halpern

1. I met with Sam Halpern for about 20 minutes this morning in GG10, where he is cleaning up some details before he goes to his new assignment as DC/DCD. I told him generally about our attempt to reconstruct Howard Hunt's assignments and financial transactions, and asked him particularly for recollections he may have of Hunt's assignment in Spain in mid-1965 to the fall of 1966.

2. Halpern said that he has no recollection about such an assignment. In June 1965 he moved from WH Division with Des FitzGerald when he became the DD/P. At about that time Halpern's father died and he was in New York for the funeral and ten days of religious observations following that. He was back in mid-June and in and out from then on as he got ready to attend the National War College which began in August. He did not return to that office until the end of June 1966.

3. Halpern observed that during this period Karamessines was ADDP with Helms moving up to be DDCI. He thought it entirely possible that Helms and Karamessines could have handled this on their own.

4. Halpern said that Evan Parker had come into the office of the DD/P shortly before Helms became DDCI, and had returned from Honolulu for that purpose. He stayed on for FitzGerald until Halpern returned from the National War College. He suggested someone might talk to Evan Parker who may have known something about it (although he may not). He also suggested talking to Georgia.

/s/ S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 0:3/96

#6 File 12, Tab 54

21 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Watergate--Frank A. O'Malley

1. At 3 p.m. on the afternoon of 19 February 1974, Mr. Frederick N. Evans and Lawrence J. Howe interviewed Mr. Frank A. O'Malley at his residence, 6419 Lakeview Drive, Falls Church, Virginia. Mr. O'Malley retired from this Agency in June of 1972. Prior to retirement Mr. O'Malley was an officer in the External Employment Assistance Branch, Retirement Activities Division of the Office of Personnel. It was Mr. O'Malley's function to assist personnel retiring from this Agency in finding post-retirement employment. In this capacity Mr. O'Malley had been instrumental in the placement of Mr. E. Howard Hunt in the Robert R. Mullen public relations firm. The purpose of this interview was to attempt to determine if additional information could be developed from Mr. O'Malley with regard to the placement of Mr. Hunt with the Mullen Company.

2. Mr. O'Malley began the interview by recalling the nature of his past Agency associations both with Mr. Hunt and the Mullen Company. Mr. O'Malley stated that prior to assuming his responsibilities in the Office of Personnel he had served with Central Cover Staff in the area dealing with the funding of covert action projects. In this capacity he had become familiar with the activities of Mr. Hunt while Mr. Hunt functioned on the Covert Activities Staff primarily in the propaganda field. Mr. O'Malley stated that he first came in contact with the Mullen Company when he was attempting to find an organization to handle the public relations effort of a covert Agency activity known as the Free Cuba Committee. Mr. O'Malley related that he had arranged this cover through the Christianform Organization and that his duties involved all aspects of the funding of this activity. Mr. O'Malley described the nature of his working relationship

with Mr. Robert R. Mullen as being close and cordial. Mr. O'Malley stated that Mr. Mullen was in the habit of confiding to him information concerning other Mullen business contacts and projects. In response to a specific question, Mr. O'Malley stated that during the period of his contact with the Mullen Company dealing with the Free Cuba Committee, Mr. Mullen told him the Howard Hughes Organization was a client of the concern.

3. Mr. O'Malley reiterated his previous statements that Mr. Hunt was referred to his office for placement assistance through the Office of the Executive Director, then Colonel L. K. White. Mr. O'Malley stated that in view of Mr. Hunt's interests in the public relations field, it was thought advisable to put Mr. Hunt in touch with Mr. Robert Mullen for the purpose of gaining the benefit of Mr. Mullen's guidance. Mr. O'Malley recalled, after the initial meeting, Mr. Mullen mentioned having met Mr. Hunt some years previously in Paris, France. Mr. O'Malley's office arranged interviews with various organizations including Reader's Digest and the Kennecott Copper Company. Through the offices of the Mullen Company an interview was arranged with the General Foods Corporation, a Mullen client. Mr. O'Malley stated there was disappointment that Mr. Hunt had been unsuccessful in "selling himself" during any of these interviews and that no job offers had resulted. In response to a question as to whether or not executive level interest was still being shown in Mr. Hunt's post-employment placement, Mr. O'Malley recalled that Mr. Richard Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, was listed as a character reference on Mr. Hunt's resume and that Mr. Helms signed a letter of recommendation to the Kennecott Copper Company on Mr. Hunt's behalf. Mr. O'Malley recalled being contacted in the last month of Mr. Hunt's Agency service by Mr. Mullen, who stated that a decision had been made to expand their operations. In view of this expansion, Mr. Mullen had decided he would himself offer Mr. Hunt a job. Mr. Mullen had stated that he was interested in having Mr. Hunt begin work immediately. However, Mr. O'Malley recalled that Mr. Hunt completed retirement formalities and actually started work for the Mullen Company approximately a week to 10 days later.

4. Mr. O'Malley stated that contact was maintained with Mr. Hunt while at the Mullen Company on a continuing basis, because Mr. O'Malley was interested in Mr. Hunt for possible referral of other Agency retirees. Mr. O'Malley also understood that there was Cover and Commercial Staff interest in the Mullen Company, and that Mr. Hunt became instrumental in discussing several aspects of the cover operations in his capacity as an officer of the company. Mr. O'Malley recalled referring various Agency officers to Mr. Hunt for guidance when these individuals expressed an interest in entering the public relations field. Mr. O'Malley did recall disappointment in feeling Mr. Hunt had generally been less helpful on these occasions.

5. Mr. Hunt contacted Mr. O'Malley on several occasions requesting referral of retiring Agency employees with specific qualifications. These instances occurred apparently after Mr. Hunt had assumed his responsibilities with the White House. In one instance Mr. Hunt requested referral of a recently retired Agency secretary. As in previous memoranda and discussions, Mr. O'Malley was unable to recall the name of this individual. He did, however, state that he is quite certain Mr. Hunt turned down the individual whom he referred. As a point of clarification, Mr. O'Malley said that this individual had not previously been known to Mr. Hunt, nor had she previously worked for him in any capacity. Mr. O'Malley also recalled a request from Mr. Hunt for an individual having skills in the area of locks and surreptitious entry. A resume of Mr. Thomas C. Amato was provided to Mr. Hunt at that time. It is Mr. O'Malley's recollection that Mr. Hunt specifically stated that a person with Mr. Amato's qualifications was needed in connection with a requirement of the Howard Hughes Organization in Las Vegas, Nevada. Mr. O'Malley stated the opinion that it was his impression that the duties involved would include the monitoring of a listening device in an undisclosed location. Mr. O'Malley reiterated his understanding that Mr. Amato did not accept Mr. Hunt's offer of employment.

6. Mr. O'Malley then recalled request from Mr. Hunt for a recommendation of a security service organization to carry out an electronic countermeasures "sweep." Mr. O'Malley recommended the Wackenhut Corporation. Mr.

O'Malley recalled that Mr. Hunt expressed dissatisfaction with that suggestion in part because of what Mr. Hunt viewed as that firm's political orientation. Mr. O'Malley did not elaborate further on that remark. Mr. O'Malley then suggested the use of Anderson Security Consultants, Incorporated, a commercial cover entity of the Office of Security. Mr. O'Malley stated that insofar as this organization was advertised in the yellow pages and that Mr. Hunt could be assured of the reliability of the services, he felt this to be a reasonable suggestion. Mr. O'Malley stated that during a subsequent phone call when Mr. O'Malley asked how his suggestion had worked out, Mr. Hunt responded, "Yes, they had done a fine job." At this point Mr. O'Malley was asked whether or not from his associations with Mr. Hunt he felt Mr. Hunt was in the habit of making glib comments which were not necessarily accurate in order to pass over a subject. Mr. O'Malley stated that this was categorically so. He said he was sure that Mr. Hunt had lied to him on a number of occasions and that,therefore, he was in no position to be sure that Mr. Hunt had actually, in fact, used the services of Anderson Security Consultants. Mr. O'Malley volunteered the opinion that he suspected the electronic countermeasures "sweep" was to be carried out in the offices of the Committee to Re-elect the President.

7. In response to a question as to whether he had ever referred anyone to McCord Associates, Mr. O'Malley replied that he remembered having referred Walter Brayden. Mr. Brayden for a time acted as bodyguard to Mrs. Martha Mitchell. As an aside Mr. O'Malley mentioned that Mr. Brayden had refused to carry a firearm in spite of the fact that Mr. McCord told him he could do so on the authority of the Attorney General. Asked specifically if he had ever referred either William Shea or Teresa Shea to Mr. McCord, Mr. O'Malley stated that he did not recall specifically referring Teresa Shea and that he was sure that he had not referred William Shea to him. So, contrary to previous statements, it is now Mr. O'Malley's belief that in all probability Mrs. Shea was not referred by this Agency to Mr. McCord.

8. Returning to Mr. O'Malley's previous responsibilities in coordinating funding for the covert action activities of Mr. E. Howard Hunt, the issue was raised as to whether or not the funding of Mr. Hunt's projects continued between July 1965 and September 1966 while Mr. Hunt was a contract employee stationed at Madrid, Spain. Mr. O'Malley recalled that at the time of Mr. Hunt's assignment to Madrid the statement disseminated for consumption within the Agency was that Mr. Hunt was retiring. Mr. O'Malley stated that this was not generally believed. Mr. O'Malley was quite certain that during this period his office handled no project funding for Mr. Hunt. In response to specific question Mr. O'Malley stated that on Mr. Hunt's return to staff employment the projects and funding which stopped in July 1965 were again resumed. Mr. O'Malley was not aware of any project names or funding mechanisms or post-assignment accountings in connection with Mr. Hunt's activities in Madrid.

Frederick N. Evans

Lawrence J. Howe

SECRET SENSITIVE

21 February 1974

Indexed
IG #11
Vol #38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Office of Finance Records - E. Howard Hunt

1. On the instruction of Mr. Steven L. Kuhn, Chief of Operations, PSI, the undersigned made an appointment for the afternoon of 20 February 1974 to interview Mr. William Caufield, Chief, Certification and Liaison Division, Office of Finance, and Mr. Joseph Hudson of Finance on the subject of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. At the outset of the interview Mr. Caufield advised the undersigned that instruction had been received from the Director of the Office of Finance, Mr. Thomas Yale, that discussion on the subject of Mr. Hunt was to be carried out only with the Office of the Inspector General. Mr. Caufield stated that he had informed Mr. Yale of the requested interview and had received this instruction with the suggestion that the undersigned contact Mr. Yale directly with any inquiry.

2. Accompanied by Mr. Caufield, the undersigned briefed Mr. Yale on the nature of the request and identified the "Task Force" effort being undertaken by the Office of Security in concert with the Offices of the Inspector General and Legislative Counsel. Mr. Yale responded that he recognized the legitimacy of the inquiry. Mr. Yale explained that subsequent to initiation of the complete audit being undertaken by Mr. Quinn of the Audit Staff, the Deputy Director for Management and Services, Mr. Harold L. Brownman, had requested the Office of Finance to discontinue their investigation of Mr. Hunt to avoid duplication. Mr. Yale added parenthetically that it was the nature of Finance Officers not to leave a job half done and that an "informal" inquiry into Mr. Hunt's financial records had nevertheless continued at a more subdued pace.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 011696

SECRET SENSITIVE

3. A review of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Hunt's conversion to Contract Type A employment and assignment was then undertaken by Messrs. Yale, Caufield, Hudson and the undersigned. The contract and payroll files of Mr. Hunt were reviewed for possible indications of the nature of the operational activity undertaken in Madrid. A review of travel vouchers indicated that Mr. Hunt and his family made accountings indicating departure from Washington, D. C., on 5 August 1965 with an arrival in Madrid, Spain, on 16 August 1965. The costs of this travel were charged to the budget of the Western Hemisphere Division, Deputy Directorate for Plans, Madrid Station Support account. A subsequent accounting summarized PCS travel expenses and included a payment for apartment rental for 16, 17 and 18 August 1965 with a payment in the amount of $125 to Mr. F. Reid Buckley for this purpose.

4. It was determined that an allottee bank account in Mr. Hunt's name had been established at the Riggs National Bank of Washington. All salary and other non-operational reimbursements were made to Mr. Hunt through sterile check to this account. An operational account was established for Mr. Hunt with the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York City. A review of all payments made to Mr. Hunt through the Chase bank account through Mr. Hunt's operational advance subsidiary account, or 1442 account, had been made. There was no record of any operational accounts or advances being processed through this channel. Mr. Yale stated that this fact defined his concern. He felt that it was inconceivable that Mr. Hunt could have undertaken operational activity without some transfer of or accounting for funds. To date, no such records have been developed. No reference to a project or project digraph or operational FAN number has been located. Al expenses connected with Mr. Hunt identified to date were charged to the Madrid Station Support. A review made of Madrid Station records has not indicated any "Developmental and Target of Opportunity (D&TO)" funds or "Other Operational Activity (COA)" funds expended by or on behalf of Mr. Hunt. These two accounts would normally be the source of operational funding not charged against a specific project activity.

5. A review of all of the travel vouchers on record for Mr. Hunt during this period also failed to identify a project. In addition to the PCS and return vouchers, two other accountings are on record. One accounting covered a trip by the entire Hunt family to Paris "for the renewal of visas." A second voucher covered a TDY trip from Madrid to Washington with return to Madrid made by Mr. Hunt from 5 January to 3 January 1966. The voucher states in the space provided for the citation of the travel order number - "no travel order." The accounting was approved and signed by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director for Plans. No justification or statement of purpose for this TDY was given on the accounting.

6. Mr. Yale determined that further review of possible sources or identification of operational funding was in order. Mr. Yale gave instructions that the entire 1442 advance account of Mr. Hunt be reviewed for other possible channels of funding outside of the New York Chase account. After discussion, it was agreed that particular attention be taken to any items connected with publishing or book royalties. Mr. Yale noted that the royalty offset waiver provision ammended to Mr. Hunt's contract was, in his experience, somewhat unusual.

7. Mr. Yale was informed by the undersigned of the intention to interview Mr. Edward Ryan, currently Chief, Division D, who was at the time of Mr. Hunt's Madrid assignment, Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division. Mr. Yale suggested that Mr. Davis Powell also be interviewed. The undersigned informed Mr. Yale that this had been done and briefed Mr. Yale on the generally negative results of the interview. Mr. Yale then recommended that Mr. Sam Halpern be interviewed. Mr. Yale noted that Mr. Halpern had been an assistant to Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald when the latter was Chief, Western Hemisphere Division and had accompanied Mr. Fitzgerald when he became Deputy Director for Plans. Mr. Yale recalled that subsequent to Mr. Fitzgerald's passing that Mr. Halpern remained on the staff and acted as an Executive Officer for Mr. Thomas Karamessines. Mr. Yale stated that from his experience, Mr. Karamessines would have delegated all the arranging of "details" surrounding an assignment such as Mr. Hunt's to Mr. Halpern. Mr. Yale offered the parenthetical observation of his surprise at what he interpreted to be reticence to date to interview Mr. Halpern.

8. The undersigned assured Mr. Yale that he would be informed of any information identifying any possible project activity developed in subsequent investigation. Mr. Yale stated that any information in this area would greatly facilitate the job of checking computorized financial records.

Lawrence J. Howe

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK ACCOUNT

Check No.	Date	Payee	Amount
8	20 October, 1965	Unknown	$ 1,650.00
		(2 months rent as deposit plus 1 month in advance at $550 per month. Substantiated by lease)	
9	26 November, 1965	Casa Guggenbuhl	$ 69.34
		(for storage of trunks during 3 mos. temporary housing)	
10	10 December, 1965	Security Storage Co.	$ 1,070.82
		(final destination charges per attached invoice. Insurance charge of $1.00 is personal expense.)	

# # # # # #

Expenses

November 18, 1965	Flowers for Sra. de Max Borrell	Ptas. 150	#2
December 20, 1965	Dinner at House of Ming. Ex-Bolivian Ambassador and wife. (Per my letter of 21 December, 1965)	Ptas. 2250	3
			# 4

Howard Hunt
Howard Hunt

SERVICES OTHER THAN PERSONAL

Terence S. CRABANAC

DESCRIPTION OF EXPENDITURE - ATTACH RECEIPTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

		AMOUNT
18 Nov 1965	Flowers for Sra. de Max Borrell. Pesetas 150 @ 60/$1.00 - $2.50	
20 Dec 1965	Dinner at House of Ming. Ex-Bolivian Ambassador and wife. Pesetas 2250 @ 60/$1.00 - $37.50 *	40.00

* For operational security reasons a receipt was not obtained.

(Credit the 144.2 advance account.)

RTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY, OR EMERGENCY NATURE; THAT I HAVE NOT NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

(See true name attachment)
SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

REF. NO.	CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.
-2282	6136-1347 (code 3)
Feb 66	AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE Charles E. Slater WE/BF

APPROVED

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
15 Feb 66	ADDP

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER
2/25/66	

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ________ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF PAYEE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF AGENT

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS RECEIVED

PAYMENT RECEIVED IN THE AMOUNT OF $ ~~40.00~~ N/A

DATE	SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION - ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 / DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. SHIP. DOC. NO.	34-39 STATION CODE REC. RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXPENDED	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR COST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL	61-66 CK. NO. X REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS 68-70 OC OR DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT
ABANAC OPS ENT			88	2282		3	601.0	61361347		2551	37.50	
ABANAC OPS			88	2282		3	601.0	61361347		2555	2.50	
BANAC T.S.				136100			144.2		50	125		40.00

PREPARED BY
3/4 Mr E Doherty

DATE

REVIEWED BY
68-858

TOTALS 15 | 40.00 | 40.00

264 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET 312393

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

OVER

PCS to Madrid - Per diem/misc exp	$ 998.30	
Air fare (self & family)	2,257.50	
HHE, POV, etc	7,547.76	
TLA, quarters, etc	6,662.00	
Education allowance	1,440.00	$18,905.56
TDY Madrid/Paris - reentry visa Air fare only for self & family		384.61
PCS to Hqs - Per diem/misc exp	$ 178.82	
Air fare (self & family)	1,394.55	
HHE, POV, etc	10,731.97	
TLA	599.34	12,904.68
Operational entertainment - Madrid Nov 65		40.00
Approved expenditure - LKD - Madrid 1 July 1966		1,600.00
Total expenditures		$33,834.85
Less advances received (bank deposit, $30,000; cash $3,500)		33,500.00
Cash settlement to close A/C		$ 334.85

15 February 1974.

LG Feb 11 Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. Davis Powell
on the David St. John Novels

1. On the morning of 15 February 1974, the undersigned interviewed Mr. Davis Powell, currently a Budget Officer on the staff of the Deputy Director for Management and Services. Mr. Powell is located in Room 7C18. During 1965 Mr. Powell was Chief of Support of the then designated Western European Division. In July 1965 a contract was written authorizing salary and benefits to Mr. E. Howard Hunt for an assignment under non-official cover to Madrid, Spain. The purpose of this interview was to determine if Mr. Powell had any information on Mr. Hunt's activities during this period.

2. Mr. Powell responded that from his recollection it was Mr. Hunt's habit to deal only with the most senior officer available. In this case Mr. Hunt dealt directly with the then Chief of Western European Division, Mr. Rolf Kingsley. Mr. Powell states that, in his capacity as Chief of Support, any activity undertaken to support Mr. Hunt's assignment to Madrid was undertaken second and thirdhand on receipt of instructions from Mr. Kingsley's office. He further stated that he was never briefed on the purpose of Mr. Hunt's mission and could add little in terms of speculation. Mr. Powell recommended that Mr. Edward Ryan, who was then Deputy Chief of Western European Division, be contacted. Mr. Powell also suggested that Miss Martha Seville be interviewed. Miss Seville was the Executive Secretary in Western European Division during the time that Mr. Hunt's contract was written and Miss Seville subsequently served in Madrid herself. Mr. Powell understands that Miss Seville is currently assigned to the office of the Chief, European Division.

Lawrence J. Howe

15 February 1974

IG Feb 11, Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. Rogers Brooks on the David St. John Novels

1. At 0930 on the morning of 15 February 1974, the undersigned interviewed Mr. Rogers Brooks, Chief, Contract Personnel Division, Office of Personnel. The purpose of this interview was to determine if Mr. Brooks had any information not contained in the Contract Personnel file of Mr. E. Howard Hunt on the latter's activities while a Contract Type A employee.

2. Mr. Brooks summarized his recollections by saying that, although it was not common practice it was not entirely unusual for highly sensitive contracts to be administered without the contracting officer being made aware of the operational objective involved. Mr. Brooks stated that he recalls some of the controversy involved in preparing the contract dealing with the question of offset and housing allowance, but he was unable to recall any of the details. It was Mr. Brooks' suggestion that the Office of Finance be contacted and that their contract personnel records on Mr. Hunt be checked for information.

Lawrence J. Howe

14 February 1974

IG Feb, 11, Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Mr. Raymond A. Rocca on the David St. John Novels

1. On the morning of 14 February 1974 Messrs. Frederick Evans and Lawrence Howe interviewed Mr. Raymond A. Rocca, Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Operations. The purpose of the interview was to follow up on information contained in Office of Security files which stated the belief that individuals in the Counter Intelligence Operations office had knowledge of the writing activities of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. This belief was a matter of record in the files of the former Security Research Staff and was attributed to Mr. Paul Gaynor, now retired, and Mr. Edward Sayle.

2. During this interview Mr. Rocca was specifically asked whether or not he had knowledge of the existence of any form of official sponsorship or encouragement to Mr. E. Howard Hunt to write novels to improve the image of this Agency. Additionally, Mr. Rocca was asked whether or not any assistance was ever requested of the Counter Intelligence Operations office to be provided to Mr. Hunt or whether or not that staff had ever had any relationship with Mr. Hunt whatsoever. In response to these questions Mr. Rocca responded "on the record" that he has no knowledge of any such arrangements nor at any time was he party to any assistance or any requests for assistance to Mr. Hunt. Mr. Rocca stated that the particular section which he had been most actively concerned in the past years was responsible for handling a variety of tasks categorized under the area of "setting the record straight." In this sense, the "image" mission of the office was to counter misinformation currently in the media or otherwise believed to be part of an effort to discredit the Agency. Mr. Rocca feels that any assumption that Mr. Hunt was engaged in any form of Agency sponsored image activity would have probably lead to the conclusion that it was done under the Counter Intelligence Operations. However, Mr. Rocca emphatically stated that this was not the case.

3. Mr. Rocca was thoroughly candid and cooperative during the course of this interview. He was unable to suggest alternate means of attempting to determine if any official Agency sponsorship of Mr. Hunt did in fact exist. Mr. Rocca did venture the opinion that he felt that in all probability an official acquiescence on the part of senior officials might have been involved rather than an official sponsorship. It was agreed by all in this discussion that the nature of any informal support given to Mr. Hunt would be far more difficult to define in the absence of any formalized agreements.

Lawrence J. Howe

6 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Agency Sponsorship of the David St. John Novels

1. The details summarizing an interview on 4 February 1974 with Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, were set forth in a memorandum addressed to Mr. Steven L. Kuhn dated 6 February 1974. Mr. Kuhn was briefed by the undersigned on this information during the afternoon of 5 February 1974. Later the same afternoon, at Mr. Kuhn's direction, a conference was held with Messrs. Scott Breckenridge and John Richards of the Office of the Inspector General.

2. During this conference the speculation was entertained that Mr. E. Howard Hunt had, in fact, been under Agency sponsorship with the knowledge of Mr. Richard Helms in his preparation of a series of spy novels under the pseudonym, David St. John. If it can be accepted as a reasonable supposition that Mr. Hunt had some highly compartmented financial arrangement authorized by senior Agency officials to write these books, then it is likely that this relationship continued after Mr. Hunt officially retired. It is specifically noted that Mr. Hunt retired 30 April 1970. Subsequent to the retirement, a David St. John book appeared in print in 1971 and another in 1972. These manuscripts were apparently prepared during the time that Mr. Hunt was employed by the Robert R. Mullen Company.

3. Minutes from the Office of ~~General~~ Legislative Counsel make references to a concern of Senator Baker over an alleged financial relationship between Mr. Helms and Mr. Hunt which continued subsequent to Mr. Hunt's formal retirement. Senator Baker has reportedly made reference to a payment of some thirty thousand dollars with the parenthetical comment that Mr. Helms would not have that amount of money

to provide Mr. Hunt from his private funds. Mr. Richards of the Inspector General Staff opinioned that if the Agency had sponsored the St. John books, it was likely that Mr. Hunt had so informed Senator Baker.

4. Adding possible weight to this line of speculation is the fact that subsequent to publishing the last St. John novel, Mr. Hunt published a novel entitled, Eduardo, using his old Agency issued alias, Edward J. Hamilton. The suggestion is that this writing effort was done by Mr. Hunt free of any fiduciary relationship with the Agency involved in the use of the St. John pen name.

5. Mr. Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, was briefed on the above by the undersigned in the presence of Mr. Kuhn on the evening of 5 February 1974.

Lawrence J. Howe

14-00000

6 February 1974

IG-7
Tab 35

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Steven L. Kuhn

SUBJECT : The David St. John Novels

1. On 4 February 1974, Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, was interviewed by the undersigned concerning his knowledge of a series of novels written by Mr. E. Howard Hunt. This interview was undertaken at your request in an effort to determine if Mr. Hunt had acted in any capacity in cooperation with Counter Intelligence Operations. It has previously been alleged in Office of Security records that Messrs. Paul Gaynor and Edward Sayle of Security Research Staff, believed that Mr. Hunt had written novels at Agency request and that this effort had been known to Mr. James Angleton, Chief, CI Operations.

2. Mr. Pforzheimer provided a verbal summary of his knowledge of Mr. Hunt's fictional writings under the pen name, David St. John. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that when the first St. John book, On Hazardous Duty, appeared in 1965, he undertook to identify the true name of the author. Mr. Pforzheimer related that he checked with a source in the copyright office only to find out that the true name was not given on the copyright application. The mailing address given for the author was checked against a telephone cross reference directory. The address on the copyright application was identified with Mr. E. Howard Hunt. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that after making the identification, he called Mr. Thomas Karamessines and related his discovery. Mr. Pforzheimer recalled from the nature of Mr. Karamessines' reaction that he had uncovered a sensitive matter of senior officer concern. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that he then recommended to Mr. Karamessines that "if the Agency is involved in this thing why not see to it that Hunt leaves his address off the copyright applications in the future." Mr. Karamessines reportedly

accepted the suggestion and Mr. Pfortzheimer recalls that subsequent copyright applications were submitted without using the address. Within five minutes of the conversation with Mr. Karamessines, Mr. Pforzheimer recalls being called by Mr. Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Pforzheimer recalls the substance of the conversation as being, "for Christ sake Walter, this is the first book to come along and say something good about the Agency." "Why not leave the Goddamn thing alone."

3. The undersigned asked Mr. Pforzheimer, who to his knowledge, would be in a position to confirm or deny whether Mr. Hunt was under any form of Agency sponsorship in his writing of the David St. John novels. Mr. Pfortzheimer replied that he was never officially briefed on the matter and that only Mr. Helms or Mr. Karamessines could provide the answer. Mr. Pforzheimer was then asked if either Mr. Angleton or Mr. Rocca of Counter Intelligence Operations would have any knowledge of this activity. Mr. Pforzheimer replied that he doubted it seriously.

4. Mr. Pforzheimer went on to relate that he was occasionally tasked to do research for Mr. Hunt. He recalled on one occasion being asked to research the Indian religious rites involving use of funeral pyres. Mr. Pforzheimer remembered that this theme figures significantly in Mr. Hunt's subsequent novel Tower of Silence which appeared under the St. John pen name in 1966. Mr. Pforzheimer parenthetically pointed out the origin of the pen name as being the names of Mr. Hunt's two sons--David and St. John.

5. Tracing Mr. Hunt's career assignments, it is noted that he was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations then designated, the DDP/Operations Group, in February 1965. The first David St. John book was published during 1965. From June 1965 through September 1966, Mr. Hunt was assigned to Madrid, Spain as a Contract Agent. During 1966, three St. John books appeared in print, the highest output for any year. Mr. Hunt published one book under the St. John pseudonym in 1967, and one each in the years 1968, 1969, 1971 and 1972. Mr. Hunt officially retired as an Agency Staff Employee effective 30 April 1970.

6. A check of Office of Security records did not develop any indication that any of the David St. John manuscripts were ever submitted for review in accordance with Agency regulations. There is no documentary evidence currently available to the Office of Security to either confirm or deny possible Agency sponsorship of the books written by Mr. E. Howard Hunt under the pen name, David St. John.

Lawrence J. Howe

SECRET

Copy one of one copies

5 February 1974

IG Feb 9, Tab 23

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kuhn

SUBJECT: General Gaynor's Recollections

1. This date, at your instruction, I called Gen. Paul F. Gaynor to seek his recollections regarding his knowledge of the writings of Mr. Hunt and any official who might be aware of the circumstances of any Agency involvement in that effort.

2. Gen. Gaynor advised that his memory is not altogether clear on the matter, and that he was "reaching," but stated that has he reconstructs the matter:

a. He became aware that Hunt, while in WH, was accomplishing a steady flow of spy books, and that security approval was not being requested on the manuscripts before submission to publishers. (He stated that this activity continued later, as he recalls it, in CI Staff, and agreed with idea that the volume of writings was sufficient to indicate that a great of time was involved in Hunt's writing.) Gen. Gaynor advised that he raised the issue "up front" on several occasions. The reaction he recieved to his raising the issue was that "keep your stinking nose out of this business." He stated that he was lead to believe that Mr. Helms desired to improve the image of the intelligence profession and the Agency and that Hunt's books were a part of the program to do so. He stated that he was never told outright that this was the case, but the responses he recieved lead him to believe this was the case.

b. He suggested that two people might be able to assist in clearing the issue, Ray Rocca and Walter Pforzheimer, both of whom were involved in the "image" materials. He stated that Pforzheimer seemed to be aware of all the details - on an up to date basis - of Hunt's departure from the Agency to join the public relations firm, to the degree that Gen. Gaynor gained the belief that Hunt was merely moving his desk outside the building, but being paid by the same source as before. He also advised that he kept Miss Ethel Mendoza fairly current on what he was learning about Hunt's activities because she followed the case for him, and suggested that her recall about what he had learned and when and what resulted, might be better than his at this date. (He also mentioned an incident in which Morse Allen while on a TDY was told by a COS to ask Headquarters to remove Hunt from the Area because of his direct liaison with the president of the country, and other activities which were confounding station operations. Later, the COS told Morse to forget about relaying the message, with the implication that Hunt was being directed by higher authority in the Agency and the COS did not wish to get in the middle by complaining. He said Morse would probably

c. He also suggested that another person--definitely no friend of Hunt--who might have some recall or have picked up information about the book-writing matter might be Anita Potocki of CI Staff, formerly of Division D. (I gather that she did not have official knowledge, but because of her dislike for Hunt, she made it somewhat her business to follow his career.)

Edward F. Sayle

8 NOV 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT: Request for Exception to Provision of FR 45-105 — Terence S. CRABANAC (P)

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph 4 for the approval of the Deputy Director for Support.

2. Terence S. CRABANAC (P) is a Contract Employee assigned to the Madrid area in Spain in a sensitive assignment since his conversion from a Staff Employee on 4 July 1965. CRABANAC was a GS-15, step 7 ($19,880.00 per annum) and he is being paid at the same rate in his present contract status. His contract provides that he will be entitled to a living quarters allowance in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel.

3. The basic living quarters allowance for Class II officers in Madrid is $3,900 per annum. The house which CRABANAC has located, with a one year lease from 15 November 1965 to 14 November 1966, has an annual rent of $8,800.00 excluding utilities. Therefore, for rent alone, he will be $1,960.00 per year over the 160 percent maximum allowed under the provisions of FR 45-105. On a 75/25 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent over the quarters allowance, he would be out of pocket $2,395.00.

4. Due to the operational sensitivity of CRABANAC's assignment, his request for relief on his housing costs was handled by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP. On 15 September 1965, Mr. Karamessines, ADDP, approved his being reimbursed on a 75/25 percent basis for the excess allowable costs up to, but not to exceed, 60 percent above his quarters allowance. This authorization was included in a letter to CRABANAC from Mr. Karamessines. It is requested that the Deputy Director

for Support authorize the 75/25 percent sharing of the excess allowable costs up to 30 percent above his quarters allowance.

/S/

Edward Ryan
Acting Chief
Western Europe Division

Recommendation in paragraph 4
is authorized:

Charles N. Davis
Deputy Director for Support

9 NOV 1965
Date

DDP/WE/SS:DavisB.Powell/aj/5189 (8Nov65)

Distribution:
Orig. ___ - C/WE
2 - SSA-DD/S
1 - C/WE/SS
1 - WE/LO
1 - WE/PT
1 - WE/BP
1 - WE/5

SECRET

Chief, Western Europe Division
ATT : Support Staff

13 October 1965

Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

Duty Status Reports-Terence S. CRABANAC, Employee Number 179080

Reference : FHB 20-1000-1, paragraph 5.

1. To date there is no record of receipt of Form 764, Duty Status Reports, for Terence S. CRABANAC since his EOD 4 July 1965. These reports are required in order to maintain his leave account in accordance with the terms of paragraph 6(c) of his contract and to preclude action to withhold pay in accordance with requirements of the referenced handbook.

2. It is requested that this office be advised as to the reason for the delay in the submission of these Duty Status Reports.

LUCILE F. TWOGOOD
Chief,
Contract Employees Accounts Section
Agent Payroll Branch

TO: Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance
ATTENTION: Lucile F. Twogood
FROM: Chief of Support, WE Division

Per conversation with Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP, there will be no Duty Status Reports (Form 764) submitted on Terence S. CRABANAC. This should be used as the authority to continue his pay without these reports.

David S. Powell
Chief of Support
WE Division

5 NOV 1965

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : General - Terrence S. CRABANAC - Supplement
Specific - Paragraph Entitled "Offset"

REFERENCE : A. OGC Opinion 65-2476a, dated 12 August 1965

B. Our Memo, dated 8 July 1965, Same Subject

1. This office herein recommends an amendment to CRABANAC's Supplement dated 4 July 1965, to delete paragraph 7. entitled "Offset."

2. This office acknowledges the OGC opinion, Reference A, which determined CRABANAC may retain without Agency salary offset any future royalties earned as a result of his literary efforts based on the fact cover does not include role of a writer.

3. As Subject's cover "activities" have been officially clarified as being only a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer for which the Agency will be making all entitlement payments and actually he will receive no funds from any cover, this paragraph, which is misleading, has no meaning in Subject's contract and it is hereby recommended that it be deleted from CRABANAC's Supplement.

4. Further, in future cases when a cover is so light that Subject will not be receiving funds from cover it is recommended that no "Offset" paragraph be included in Supplements or Contracts.

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

Attachment
Ref. A and B

no action taken on
this memo.

OCC 65-2476a

12 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Terence S. CRABANAC - Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. You have requested the opinion of this Office in regard to the retention of future royalties which might be earned by Terence S. CRABANAC as a result of his literary efforts. We believe that he is entitled to retain such royalties without an offset against his Agency salary.

2. We have been advised by Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support, that CRABANAC's cover does not include the role of a writer; CRABANAC's cover for status will only be a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer. Therefore, paragraph 7 of his contract dated 4 July 1965 may remain as written. Royalties from the fictional works that he writes as a profitable hobby will not be emoluments received from or through his "cover activities."

Norman D. Block

NORMAN D. BLOCK
Office of General Counsel

cc: Chief, Covert Claims Branch
Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support

3 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : Norman Block

SUBJECT : Terence S. Crabanac -- Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation of 26 July 1965 between yourself and Rogers C. Brooks of this Office wherein background information relating to the assignment of Terence S. Crabanac was discussed.

2. Subject will apparently develop a cover as a writer, a field wherein he has an already demonstrated talent based upon several publications. The objective of the cover is to provide a basis of attribution for some of his income. At the time of the preparation of Mr. Crabanac's contract, the specific detail of his cover was unknown.

3. Request your opinion in regard to the retention of possible royalties earned by Crabanac as a result of his literary efforts or whether such income should be properly offset.

Joseph B. Ragan
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Attachments.

OP/CPD: RCBrooks/cw: 2 August 1965

Distribution:
Orig & 1 -- Addressee
2 -- CPD

14-00000

4 July 65

Mr. Terence S. Crabanac

Dear Mr. Crabanac:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a Contract Employee for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $19,830 per annum. In addition, you are herein authorized legislative salary adjustments, within-grade promotions and, if applicable, a post differential in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in an approved manner. Taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

2. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel. In the event you are furnished quarters by the Government you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost-of-living allowances in conformance with applicable regulations of this organization including, but not limited to, a post allowance, a transfer allowance and a home service transfer allowance.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped, in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick, annual and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives. All accrued but unused leave credited to your former account as an appointed employee of this organization will be transferred to the leave account established for you hereunder.

(d) As a Government employee under contract converted from staff status without a break in service, it is required that you continue to make contributions to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Such contributions (presently six and one/half per cent (6-1/2%)) will be deducted by the Government from the basic compensation due you hereunder, i.e., presently $19,880 per annum.

(e) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Contract Employees of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(f) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee in the line of duty while abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

7. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions.

8. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable law and regulations.

10. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

11. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

12. Term. This contract is effective as of 4 July 1965, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon sixty (60) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY DHL
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/S/

WITNESS:

/S/

APPROVED:

/S/

SECRET

NOTED
DTG
gcf.

20 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt

1. I phoned Paul Burns, Special Assistant to the DDO, and said that we had some leads that could be followed by whoever has the action in the DDO in tracking down Hunt's activities during the fall of 1964, when he was alleged to have been engaged in surveillance activities of Barry Goldwater.

2. I said that our files showed Hunt was in DO Division (Burns was not familiar with that title, but recognized it as the predecessor of FR Division) and in August 1964 was assigned to the Washington field office. I suggested that Stan Gaines, who was Deputy Division Chief of DO Division and now DCOS Bonn, might be in a position to give a few groups on what Hunt was supposed to be doing then. I suggested that he be queried by cable. Burns said Gaines is staying on under contract for a while, so would continue to be available.

3. I said that Fig Coleman was on the Iberian desk when the Hunt assignment to Madrid was brought up in 1964 and when Hunt went to the field in 1965. He could give the background on the assignment, which seems to have been through Karamessines at Helms' direction. His recollection would give leads. I told him that Coleman became COS Madrid later, after Hunt left Spain, and could provide information on what Hunt did not do for the Agency during that period. I suggested that both Helms and Karamessines should be queried. I gave as a possible press treatment that Hunt was engaged in domestic operations (something Senator Baker is pursuing) and that his assignment to Spain after the election could be presented as giving him time to cool off. I thought we had to pursue the matter to be sure we know the facts.

4. I asked Burns to be sure that we are on information distribution of cables to the field on this, given our assigned responsibility for keeping files on Watergate. He said we are on the PLMHPLANK for messages to Helms. He would advise the action officer. I said we are available for any help we can give.

S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

[illegible]

SECRET

9 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: OPS/RMO

SUBJECT : Watergate File Research - Final Report

1. The files of the immediate office of the Chief, OPS/OSG have been checked for material relevant to the subject of this memorandum. The check included chronological files of communications of which I was the author while assigned to Madrid, Spain in the period July 1970 to July 1973. Nothing pertinent was found.

2. I have attempted to recollect any other details which conceivably could be pertinent and which relate to the period of my assignment to Madrid. The only points which I recall but on which I have no documentation are these:

a. There were occasional joshing inquiries made of me by American residents of Madrid about the reported presence in Spain of E. Howard Hunt in 1972. My standard reply was that I knew only what I had heard rumored. For the record, at no time did Hunt contact me, and I have never known of his having tried to contact any Station personnel in Spain during the period 1970-73. I made no effort personally to ascertain whether or not Hunt was in Spain, and I had no effort made by any Station member.

b. A Station officer, possibly Richard Ouderkirk, now assigned to Guatemala, was given some information by an informant in 1972 concerning reported activities in Spain by Robert Vesco. I suggested that the information be given informally to the Embassy's Economic Section chief, John Oliver. That officer was charged with keeping abreast of developments related to Vesco. The Station did not pursue that subject, as I recall, because it was not a topic of reportable interest, according to requirements of the period.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 056759

SECRET

SUBJECT: Watergate File Research - Final Report (cont'd)

3. There is no other employee assigned to my immediate office who has relevant personal knowledge of events and personalities.

Robert E. Owen

Robert E. Owen
Chief, OPS/OSG

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Director of Finance
1212 Key Building

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE: 27 February 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Inspector General 2 E 24 HQS.	27 Feb '74		D	
2. Breckinridge				
3. Richards			R	
4. ~~[illegible] W/Scott~~				
5. Sandy-Aradel - W/file				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

27 FEB 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Howard Hunt

1. At the recent request of the Deputy Director for Management and Services, the Office of Finance has searched its records to determine if we could find any payment to Mr. Hunt in an amount of approximately $30,000 that required no accounting.

2. We have searched the following records:

a. The expense runs for the period July 1964 to June 1973 for the immediate Office of the DCI, the immediate Office of the DD/P, FI Staff, CI Staff, CA Staff and the Office of Security. We have checked various items that were reflected in these expense records but have identified nothing relating to Mr. Hunt.

b. The Madrid Station, JMWAVE and FR/Washington Office accountings to determine if there were funds passed by the Stations to Mr. Hunt during the year he served under non-official cover in Madrid. We could find no payment to Mr. Hunt either in his true name or his two identified pseudonyms.

c. Mr. Hunt's travel claims for the period 1960-1972 and have found nothing in these travel claims that were not consistent with normal travel expenses, i.e., transportation, per diem.

d. We made a specific analysis of Mr. Hunt's advance account for the period he was under non-official cover (July '65-Sept '66) and have

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 006567

determined that $33,500 was advanced to him for travel and transportation of household goods to and from Madrid with one trip to Paris for he and his family to renew their Spanish visas. All of this advance was fully accounted for. However, in his accounting, one item appeared unusual. It was an expenditure of $1,600 for a sensitive operation which was approved for write-off by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald on 1 June 1966 without further accounting.

3. Also, we confirmed that no other Agency advance accounts were established for Mr. Hunt during this period.

4. At the beginning of his non-official cover tour, it was necessary to establish a bank account in his name. The EUR Division accordingly requested we open an account at the Chase Manhattan Bank in Mr. Hunt's name to receive all non-salary payments. (Mr. Hunt had an account at Riggs National Bank to receive his salary and allowance payments). The following deposits were made to the account during 1965 and 1966:

Account opened: 13 July 1965

13 July 1965	$10,000
22 July 1965	5,000
15 September 1965	5,000
6 October 1965	5,000
19 July 1966	5,000
	$30,000

All of the above have been accounted for by submission of travel and transportation accountings.

5. We feel at this time without specific guidelines that further searching would be somewhat fruitless. One strange aspect of the non-official cover assignment in Madrid is that all the costs were charged to the support allotment of the EUR Division which is not normal as non-official cover people are usually assigned to a project. It is unusual to have a case officer abroad for one year on an operational assignment without him incurring operational expenditures.

SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

6. The Office of Finance has not found operational expenditures except for the $1,600 mentioned above. Therefore, it is suggested that Mr. Karamessines be questioned as to a project or projects to which Mr. Hunt's operational expenditures if incurred would have been charged.

7. Another possible course of action is to request the Director to approve my asking a cleared contact at Chase Manhattan Bank to provide a transcript of all entries into Mr. Hunt's Chase Manhattan Bank account.

8. We are currently reviewing records of all cashier's checks prepared and issued by Monetary to determine if any were payable to Mr. Hunt. Hopefully this effort will be finished by the end of the week.

Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance

CONFIDENTIAL

20 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt

1. I spoke with Fig Coleman about Hunt's assignment to Spain. I had spoken with him back in August when we were inquiring into reported activities involving Mrs. Hunt.

2. Coleman said that he got out of the War College in May 1964 (by which he fixed the time), and took over the Iberian desk. Bill Ryan was C/EUR (or was it WE Division at the time). In early autumn Ryan said that he had just been informed by the DDP (Karamessines) that Hunt was to be assigned to Madrid as DCOS, as a directed assignment by Helms. A memo was prepared and sent to the COS, Jim Noel (now retired). There was nothing further for about a month when Ryan called Coleman in and showed him a RYBAT letter from Noel stating that Ambassador Stanley J. Woodward would not have Hunt in the Embassy.

3. Woodward had been the Ambassador to Uruguay when Hunt was COS Montevideo. He had a low opinion of Hunt and was counting the days until Hunt left. The President of Uruguay visited President Eisenhower in the States, at which time he requested a personal favor--that Hunt be reassigned to Montevideo. So Hunt took another tour. Woodward was outraged, and had his revenge in 1964 when Hunt was to be sent as DCOS to Madrid.

4. After a couple of months--early 1965--Ryan called Coleman in and, observing that there was more than one way to skin a cat, told him that Hunt was going to Spain under nonofficial cover. This didn't require anything special, Ryan saying that he didn't know much about it. It came to him from Karamessines on Helms' order. Hunt was to have the telephone number of the COS, but he would do nothing for the station. Hunt was to submit administrative vouchers for reimbursement of his expenses and they were to be paid. Coleman said he never saw Hunt before he went out. He knows that there was no operational reporting, to indicate that Hunt was doing anything.

[illegible]

The vouchers were not large, although the documentation was poor. Coleman raised the question with Ryan about his signing off, and Ryan said he could talk to Karamessines if he wished. Because Coleman had a close personal association with Karamessines he did just that. He was told by Karamessines that he didn't know much about it either--"Helms said send him out." He was instructed to go ahead.

5. In early July 1966 (4 July) Coleman went to Madrid. He had a ten day turnover with Jim Noel. Hunt had already gone and he did not see him. Noel said he didn't know what Hunt did, but that Coleman need not worry because he was gone.

6. Several months ago Noel was at a seminar at which Ambassador Woodward was also present. At the time he asked about Hunt. Woodward said it might still be dragged into the press. Tad Szulc had been after Woodward about the Hunt assignment to Spain. Coleman observed that Szulc did have a long article on Hunt in the New York Times, and the Spain assignment was mentioned, but without any conclusions as to its significance.

7. Coleman said the RYBAT file of C/EUR may have something on the event, but not much. A letter out and the reply, but not much more.

S. D. Breckinridge

22 February 1974

IG File 11 Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt--Madrid Assignment

1. On 22 February 1974, Mr. Frederick N. Evans and the undersigned interviewed Mr. Edward Ryan, Chief, Staff D, Deputy Director for Operations, on the subject of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. During the period of Mr. Hunt's assignment as a Contract Type A agent to Madrid between July 1965 and September 1966, Mr. Ryan had been the Deputy Chief of the Western European Division, Deputy Director for Plans. The purpose of the interview was to determine if Mr. Ryan had any information bearing on the matter of the operational assignment of Mr. Hunt during this period.

2. Mr. Ryan stated that the assignment of Mr. Hunt both to the European Division and to Madrid was handled without benefit of the routine processing procedures through the Western European Division. Mr. Hunt's assignment was coordinated and directed by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. With regard to operational duties, Mr. Ryan was unaware of any specific project or target for Mr. Hunt. Mr. Ryan made the specific observation that if Mr. Hunt produced positive intelligence on the Iberian target during this period the officials responsible for this effort within the Western European Division were totally unaware of it.

3. Mr. Ryan stated that most of his knowledge of Mr. Hunt's activity and the nature of his assignment during this period came more through hearsay than direct official knowledge. For example, he cited the comment made by a mutual acquaintance of his and Mr. Hunt's to the effect that Mr. Hunt stated that while in Madrid he was going to "play golf and write books." Mr. Ryan was asked specifically whether or not he was

under the impression that Mr. Hunt's writing activities were either being encouraged or subsidized directly by this Agency in any official effort. Mr. Ryan responded that he was personally not aware of any such arrangement. He added as an expression of personal opinion that Mr. Hunt had no operational function and was simply granted the opportunity to write books for his own personal gain at Government expense during this period.

Lawrence J. Howe

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASS TION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	FIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Howe		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	XX	INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
O/IG/2E24 Hqs./5527	22 Feb 74

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

(40)

14-00000

CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

SECRET

26 Feb 10, Tab 32

22 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Sam Halpern

1. I met with Sam Halpern for about 20 minutes this morning in GG10, where he is cleaning up some details before he goes to his new assignment as DC/DCD. I told him generally about our attempt to reconstruct Howard Hunt's assignments and financial transactions, and asked him particularly for recollections he may have of Hunt's assignment in Spain in mid-1965 to the fall of 1966.

2. Halpern said that he has no recollection about such an assignment. In June 1965 he moved from WH Division with Des FitzGerald when he became the DD/P. At about that time Halpern's father died and he was in New York for the funeral and ten days of religious observations following that. He was back in mid-June and in and out from then on as he got ready to attend the National War College which began in August. He did not return to that office until the end of June 1966.

3. Halpern observed that during this period Karamessines was ADDP with Helms moving up to be DDCI. He thought it entirely possible that Helms and Karamessines could have handled this on their own.

4. Halpern said that Evan Parker had come into the office of the DD/P shortly before Helms became DDCI, and had returned from Honolulu for that purpose. He stayed on for FitzGerald until Halpern returned from the National War College. He suggested someone might talk to Evan Parker who may have known something about it (although he may not). He also suggested talking to Georgia.

/s/ S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

SECRET

2 IMPDET CL BY 0,3/56

26 Feb 12, Feb 54

21 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Watergate--Frank A. O'Malley

1. At 3 p.m. on the afternoon of 19 February 1974, Mr. Frederick N. Evans and Lawrence J. Howe interviewed Mr. Frank A. O'Malley at his residence, 6419 Lakeview Drive, Falls Church, Virginia. Mr. O'Malley retired from this Agency in June of 1972. Prior to retirement Mr. O'Malley was an officer in the External Employment Assistance Branch, Retirement Activities Division of the Office of Personnel. It was Mr. O'Malley's function to assist personnel retiring from this Agency in finding post-retirement employment. In this capacity Mr. O'Malley had been instrumental in the placement of Mr. E. Howard Hunt in the Robert R. Mullen public relations firm. The purpose of this interview was to attempt to determine if additional information could be developed from Mr. O'Malley with regard to the placement of Mr. Hunt with the Mullen Company.

2. Mr. O'Malley began the interview by recalling the nature of his past Agency associations both with Mr. Hunt and the Mullen Company. Mr. O'Malley stated that prior to assuming his responsibilities in the Office of Personnel he had served with Central Cover Staff in the area dealing with the funding of covert action projects. In this capacity he had become familiar with the activities of Mr. Hunt while Mr. Hunt functioned on the Covert Activities Staff primarily in the propaganda field. Mr. O'Malley stated that he first came in contact with the Mullen Company when he was attempting to find an organization to handle the public relations effort of a covert Agency activity known as the Free Cuba Committee. Mr. O'Malley related that he had arranged this cover through the Christianform Organization and that his duties involved all aspects of the funding of this activity. Mr. O'Malley described the nature of his working relationship

with Mr. Robert R. Mullen as being close and cordial. Mr. O'Malley stated that Mr. Mullen was in the habit of confiding to him information concerning other Mullen business contacts and projects. In response to a specific question, Mr. O'Malley stated that during the period of his contact with the Mullen Company dealing with the Free Cuba Committee, Mr. Mullen told him the Howard Hughes Organization was a client of the concern.

3. Mr. O'Malley reiterated his previous statements that Mr. Hunt was referred to his office for placement assistance through the Office of the Executive Director, then Colonel L. K. White. Mr. O'Malley stated that in view of Mr. Hunt's interests in the public relations field, it was thought advisable to put Mr. Hunt in touch with Mr. Robert Mullen for the purpose of gaining the benefit of Mr. Mullen's guidance. Mr. O'Malley recalled, after the initial meeting, Mr. Mullen mentioned having met Mr. Hunt some years previously in Paris, France. Mr. O'Malley's office arranged interviews with various organizations including Reader's Digest and the Kennecott Copper Company. Through the offices of the Mullen Company an interview was arranged with the General Foods Corporation, a Mullen client. Mr. O'Malley stated there was disappointment that Mr. Hunt had been unsuccessful in "selling himself" during any of these interviews and that no job offers had resulted. In response to a question as to whether or not executive level interest was still being shown in Mr. Hunt's post-employment placement, Mr. O'Malley recalled that Mr. Richard Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, was listed as a character reference on Mr. Hunt's resume and that Mr. Helms signed a letter of recommendation to the Kennecott Copper Company on Mr. Hunt's behalf. Mr. O'Malley recalled being contacted in the last month of Mr. Hunt's Agency service by Mr. Mullen, who stated that a decision had been made to expand their operations. In view of this expansion, Mr. Mullen had decided he would himself offer Mr. Hunt a job. Mr. Mullen had stated that he was interested in having Mr. Hunt begin work immediately. However, Mr. O'Malley recalled that Mr. Hunt completed retirement formalities and actually started work for the Mullen Company approximately a week to 10 days later.

4. Mr. O'Malley stated that contact was maintained with Mr. Hunt while at the Mullen Company on a continuing basis, because Mr. O'Malley was interested in Mr. Hunt for possible referral of other Agency retirees. Mr. O'Malley also understood that there was Cover and Commercial Staff interest in the Mullen Company, and that Mr. Hunt became instrumental in discussing several aspects of the cover operations in his capacity as an officer of the company. Mr. O'Malley recalled referring various Agency officers to Mr. Hunt for guidance when these individuals expressed an interest in entering the public relations field. Mr. O'Malley did recall disappointment in feeling Mr. Hunt had generally been less helpful on these occasions.

5. Mr. Hunt contacted Mr. O'Malley on several occasions requesting referral of retiring Agency employees with specific qualifications. These instances occurred apparently after Mr. Hunt had assumed his responsibilities with the White House. In one instance Mr. Hunt requested referral of a recently retired Agency secretary. As in previous memoranda and discussions, Mr. O'Malley was unable to recall the name of this individual. He did, however, state that he is quite certain Mr. Hunt turned down the individual whom he referred. As a point of clarification, Mr. O'Malley said that this individual had not previously been known to Mr. Hunt, nor had she previously worked for him in any capacity. Mr. O'Malley also recalled a request from Mr. Hunt for an individual having skills in the area of locks and surreptitious entry. A resume of Mr. Thomas C. Amato was provided to Mr. Hunt at that time. It is Mr. O'Malley's recollection that Mr. Hunt specifically stated that a person with Mr. Amato's qualifications was needed in connection with a requirement of the Howard Hughes Organization in Las Vegas, Nevada. Mr. O'Malley stated the opinion that it was his impression that the duties involved would include the monitoring of a listening device in an undisclosed location. Mr. O'Malley reiterated his understanding that Mr. Amato did not accept Mr. Hunt's offer of employment.

6. Mr. O'Malley then recalled request from Mr. Hunt for a recommendation of a security service organization to carry out an electronic countermeasures "sweep." Mr. O'Malley recommended the Wackenhut Corporation. Mr.

O'Malley recalled that Mr. Hunt expressed dissatisfaction with that suggestion in part because of what Mr. Hunt viewed as that firm's political orientation. Mr. O'Malley did not elaborate further on that remark. Mr. O'Malley then suggested the use of Anderson Security Consultants, Incorporated, a commercial cover entity of the Office of Security. Mr. O'Malley stated that insofar as this organization was advertised in the yellow pages and that Mr. Hunt could be assured of the reliability of the services, he felt this to be a reasonable suggestion. Mr. O'Malley stated that during a subsequent phone call when Mr. O'Malley asked how his suggestion had worked out, Mr. Hunt responded, "Yes, they had done a fine job." At this point Mr. O'Malley was asked whether or not from his associations with Mr. Hunt he felt Mr. Hunt was in the habit of making glib comments which were not necessarily accurate in order to pass over a subject. Mr. O'Malley stated that this was categorically so. He said he was sure that Mr. Hunt had lied to him on a number of occasions and that, therefore, he was in no position to be sure that Mr. Hunt had actually, in fact, used the services of Anderson Security Consultants. Mr. O'Malley volunteered the opinion that he suspected the electronic countermeasures "sweep" was to be carried out in the offices of the Committee to Re-elect the President.

7. In response to a question as to whether he had ever referred anyone to McCord Associates, Mr. O'Malley replied that he remembered having referred Walter Brayden. Mr. Brayden for a time acted as bodyguard to Mrs. Martha Mitchell. As an aside Mr. O'Malley mentioned that Mr. Brayden had refused to carry a firearm in spite of the fact that Mr. McCord told him he could do so on the authority of the Attorney General. Asked specifically if he had ever referred either William Shea or Teresa Shea to Mr. McCord, Mr. O'Malley stated that he did not recall specifically referring Teresa Shea and that he was sure that he had not referred William Shea to him. So, contrary to previous statements, it is now Mr. O'Malley's belief that in all probability Mrs. Shea was not referred by this Agency to Mr. McCord.

8. Returning to Mr. O'Malley's previous responsibilities in coordinating funding for the covert action activities of Mr. E. Howard Hunt, the issue was raised as to whether or not the funding of Mr. Hunt's projects continued between July 1965 and September 1966 while Mr. Hunt was a contract employee stationed at Madrid, Spain. Mr. O'Malley recalled that at the time of Mr. Hunt's assignment to Madrid the statement disseminated for consumption within the Agency was that Mr. Hunt was retiring. Mr. O'Malley stated that this was not generally believed. Mr. O'Malley was quite certain that during this period his office handled no project funding for Mr. Hunt. In response to specific question Mr. O'Malley stated that on Mr. Hunt's return to staff employment the projects and funding which stopped in July 1965 were again resumed. Mr. O'Malley was not aware of any project names or funding mechanisms or post-assignment accountings in connection with Mr. Hunt's activities in Madrid.

Frederick N. Evans

Lawrence J. Howe

14-00000

Indexed
IG #11
Sub #31

21 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Office of Finance Records - E. Howard Hunt

1. On the instruction of Mr. Steven L. Kuhn, Chief of Operations, PSI, the undersigned made an appointment for the afternoon of 20 February 1974 to interview Mr. William Caufield, Chief, Certification and Liaison Division, Office of Finance, and Mr. Joseph Hudson of Finance on the subject of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. At the outset of the interview Mr. Caufield advised the undersigned that instruction had been received from the Director of the Office of Finance, Mr. Thomas Yale, that discussion on the subject of Mr. Hunt was to be carried out only with the Office of the Inspector General. Mr. Caufield stated that he had informed Mr. Yale of the requested interview and had received this instruction with the suggestion that the undersigned contact Mr. Yale directly with any inquiry.

2. Accompanied by Mr. Caufield, the undersigned briefed Mr. Yale on the nature of the request and identified the "Task Force" effort being undertaken by the Office of Security in concert with the Offices of the Inspector General and Legislative Counsel. Mr. Yale responded that he recognized the legitimacy of the inquiry. Mr. Yale explained that subsequent to initiation of the complete audit being undertaken by Mr. Quinn of the Audit Staff, the Deputy Director for Management and Services, Mr. Harold L. Brownman, had requested the Office of Finance to discontinue their investigation of Mr. Hunt to avoid duplication. Mr. Yale added parenthetically that it was the nature of Finance Officers not to leave a job half done and that an "informal" inquiry into Mr. Hunt's financial records had nevertheless continued at a more subdued pace.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 011696

3. A review of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Hunt's conversion to Contract Type A employment and assignment was then undertaken by Messrs. Yale, Caufield, Hudson and the undersigned. The contract and payroll files of Mr. Hunt were reviewed for possible indications of the nature of the operational activity undertaken in Madrid. A review of travel vouchers indicated that Mr. Hunt and his family made accountings indicating departure from Washington, D. C., on 5 August 1965 with an arrival in Madrid, Spain, on 16 August 1965. The costs of this travel were charged to the budget of the Western Hemisphere Division, Deputy Directorate for Plans, Madrid Station Support account. A subsequent accounting summarized PCS travel expenses and included a payment for apartment rental for 16, 17 and 18 August 1965 with a payment in the amount of $125 to Mr. F. Reid Buckley for this purpose.

4. It was determined that an allottee bank account in Mr. Hunt's name had been established at the Riggs National Bank of Washington. All salary and other non-operational reimbursements were made to Mr. Hunt through sterile check to this account. An operational account was established for Mr. Hunt with the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York City. A review of all payments made to Mr. Hunt through the Chase bank account through Mr. Hunt's operational advance subsidiary account, or 1442 account, had been made. There was no record of any operational accounts or advances being processed through this channel. Mr. Yale stated that this fact defined his concern. He felt that it was inconceivable that Mr. Hunt could have undertaken operational activity without some transfer of or accounting for funds. To date, no such records have been developed. No reference to a project or project digraph or operational FAN number has been located. Al expenses connected with Mr. Hunt identified to date were charged to the Madrid Station Support. A review made of Madrid Station records has not indicated any "Developmental and Target of Opportunity (D&TO)" funds or "Other Operational Activity (OOA)" funds expended by or on behalf of Mr. Hunt. These two accounts would normally be the source of operational funding not charged against a specific project activity.

5. A review of all of the travel vouchers on record for Mr. Hunt during this period also failed to identify a project. In addition to the PCS and return vouchers, two other accountings are on record. One accounting covered a trip by the entire Hunt family to Paris "for the renewal of visas." A second voucher covered a TDY trip from Madrid to Washington with return to Madrid made by Mr. Hunt from 5 January to 8 January 1966. The voucher states in the space provided for the citation of the travel order number - "no travel order." The accounting was approved and signed by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director for Plans. No justification or statement of purpose for this TDY was given on the accounting.

6. Mr. Yale determined that further review of possible sources or identification of operational funding was in order. Mr. Yale gave instructions that the entire 1442 advance account of Mr. Hunt be reviewed for other possible channels of funding outside of the New York Chase account. After discussion, it was agreed that particular attention be taken to any items connected with publishing or book royalties. Mr. Yale noted that the royalty offset waiver provision ammended to Mr. Hunt's contract was, in his experience, somewhat unusual.

7. Mr. Yale was informed by the undersigned of the intention to interview Mr. Edward Ryan, currently Chief, Division D, who was at the time of Mr. Hunt's Madrid assignment, Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division. Mr. Yale suggested that Mr. Davis Powell also be interviewed. The undersigned informed Mr. Yale that this had been done and briefed Mr. Yale on the generally negative results of the interview. Mr. Yale then recommended that Mr. Sam Halpern be interviewed. Mr. Yale noted that Mr. Halpern had been an assistant to Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald when the latter was Chief, Western Hemisphere Division and had accompanied Mr. Fitzgerald when he became Deputy Director for Plans. Mr. Yale recalled that subsequent to Mr. Fitzgerald's passing that Mr. Halpern remained on the staff and acted as an Executive Officer for Mr. Thomas Karamessines. Mr. Yale stated that from his experience, Mr. Karamessines would have delegated all the arranging of "details" surrounding an assignment such as Mr. Hunt's to Mr. Halpern. Mr. Yale offered the parenthetical observation of his surprise at what he interpreted to be reticence to date to intervew Mr. Halpern.

8. The undersigned assured Mr. Yale that he would be informed of any information identifying any possible project activity developed in subsequent investigation. Mr. Yale stated that any information in this area would greatly facilitate the job of checking computorized financial records.

Lawrence J. Howe

1

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK ACCOUNT

Check No.	Date	Payee	Amount
8	20 October, 1965	Unknown (2 months rent as deposit plus 1 month in advance at $550 per month. Substantiated by lease)	$ 1,650.00
9	26 November, 1965	Casa Guggenbuhl (for storage of trunks during 3 mos. temporary housing)	$ 69.34
10	10 December, 1965	Security Storage Co. (final destination charges per attached invoice. Insurance charge of $1.00 is personal expense.)	$ 1,070.82

# # # # # #

Expenses

November 18, 1965	Flowers for Sra. de Max Borrell	Ptas. 150
December 20, 1965	Dinner at House of Ming. Ex-Bolivian Ambassador and wife. (Per my letter of 21 December, 1965)	Ptas. 2250

Howard Hunt

[illegible]
SERVICES OTHER THAN PERSONAL
36-[illegible]

Terence S. CRABANAC

[illegible]

DESCRIPTION OF EXPENDITURE - ATTACH RECEIPTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS	AMOUNT
18 Nov 1965 Flowers for Sra. de Max Borrell. Pesetas 150 @ 60/$1.00 - $2.50 20 Dec 1965 Dinner at House of Ming. Ex-Bolivian Ambassador and wife. Pesetas 2250 @ 60/$1.00 - $37.50 *	40.00

* For operational security reasons a receipt was not obtained.

(Credit the 144.2 advance account.)

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY, OR EMERGENCY NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

(See true name attachment)
SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ______ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE
SIGNATURE OF PAYEE

DATE
SIGNATURE OF AGENT

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

REF. NO.: 6-2282
CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.: 6136-1347 (code 3)
DATE: 14 Feb 66
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE: Charles E. Sates WE/BF

APPROVED

DATE: 15 Feb 66
SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: ADDP

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE: 2/25/66
SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER: David ...

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS RECEIVED

PAYMENT RECEIVED IN THE AMOUNT OF $ ~~40.00~~ N/A

DATE
SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION - ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 / DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. / SHIP. DOC. NO.	34-39 STATION CODE / REC. RPT. NO. / PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXPONEND	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. / ADVANCE ACCT. NO. / EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. / LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR COST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL	61-66 CK. NO. / S REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS / 68-70 CC OR DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	71-80 AMOUNT CREDIT
CRABANAC CCS ENT			88	2282		3	601.0	61361347		2551	37.50	
CRABANAC CCS			88	2282		3	601.0	61361347		2555	2.50	
CRABANAC T.S.				136100			144.2		50	125		40.00

DATE: 2/23/66
PREPARED BY: W. E. Doherty
DATE
REVIEWED BY: 68-858
TOTALS: 15 | 40.00 | 40.00

FORM 264 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET 313393

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(48)

OVER

PCS to Madrid - Per diem/misc exp	$ 998.30	
Air fare (self & family)	2,257.50	
HHE, POV, etc	7,547.76	
TLA, quarters, etc	6,662.00	
Education allowance	1,440.00	$18,905.56
TDY Madrid/Paris - reentry visa Air fare only for self & family		384.61
PCS to Hqs - Per diem/misc exp	$ 178.82	
Air fare (self & family)	1,394.55	
HHE, POV, etc	10,731.97	
TLA	599.34	12,904.68
Operational entertainment - Madrid Nov 65		40.00
Approved expenditure - LKD - Madrid 1 July 1966		1,600.00
Total expenditures		$33,834.85
Less advances received (bank deposit, $30,000; cash $3,500)		33,500.00
Cash settlement to close A/C		$ 334.85

15 February 1974

16 Feb ((Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. Davis Powell
on the David St. John Novels

1. On the morning of 15 February 1974, the undersigned interviewed Mr. Davis Powell, currently a Budget Officer on the staff of the Deputy Director for Management and Services. Mr. Powell is located in Room 7C18. During 1965 Mr. Powell was Chief of Support of the then designated Western European Division. In July 1965 a contract was written authorizing salary and benefits to Mr. E. Howard Hunt for an assignment under non-official cover to Madrid, Spain. The purpose of this interview was to determine if Mr. Powell had any information on Mr. Hunt's activities during this period.

2. Mr. Powell responded that from his recollection it was Mr. Hunt's habit to deal only with the most senior officer available. In this case Mr. Hunt dealt directly with the then Chief of Western European Division, Mr. Rolf Kingsley. Mr. Powell states that, in his capacity as Chief of Support, any activity undertaken to support Mr. Hunt's assignment to Madrid was undertaken second and thirdhand on receipt of instructions from Mr. Kingsley's office. He further stated that he was never briefed on the purpose of Mr. Hunt's mission and could add little in terms of speculation. Mr. Powell recommended that Mr. Edward Ryan, who was then Deputy Chief of Western European Division, be contacted. Mr. Powell also suggested that Miss Martha Seville be interviewed. Miss Seville was the Executive Secretary in Western European Division during the time that Mr. Hunt's contract was written and Miss Seville subsequently served in Madrid herself. Mr. Powell understands that Miss Seville is currently assigned to the office of the Chief, European Division.

Lawrence J. Howe

15 February 1974

IG File 11, Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. Rogers Brooks
on the David St. John Novels

1. At 0930 on the morning of 15 February 1974, the undersigned interviewed Mr. Rogers Brooks, Chief, Contract Personnel Division, Office of Personnel. The purpose of this interview was to determine if Mr. Brooks had any information not contained in the Contract Personnel file of Mr. E. Howard Hunt on the latter's activities while a Contract Type A employee.

2. Mr. Brooks summarized his recollections by saying that, although it was not common practice it was not entirely unusual for highly sensitive contracts to be administered without the contracting officer being made aware of the operational objective involved. Mr. Brooks stated that he recalls some of the controversy involved in preparing the contract dealing with the question of offset and housing allowance, but he was unable to recall any of the details. It was Mr. Brooks' suggestion that the Office of Finance be contacted and that their contract personnel records on Mr. Hunt be checked for information.

Lawrence J. Howe

14 February 1974

IG Feb, 11, Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Mr. Raymond A. Rocca on the David St. John Novels

1. On the morning of 14 February 1974 Messrs. Frederick Evans and Lawrence Howe interviewed Mr. Raymond A. Rocca, Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Operations. The purpose of the interview was to follow up on information contained in Office of Security files which stated the belief that individuals in the Counter Intelligence Operations office had knowledge of the writing activities of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. This belief was a matter of record in the files of the former Security Research Staff and was attributed to Mr. Paul Gaynor, now retired, and Mr. Edward Sayle.

2. During this interview Mr. Rocca was specifically asked whether or not he had knowledge of the existence of any form of official sponsorship or encouragement to Mr. E. Howard Hunt to write novels to improve the image of this Agency. Additionally, Mr. Rocca was asked whether or not any assistance was ever requested of the Counter Intelligence Operations office to be provided to Mr. Hunt or whether or not that staff had ever had any relationship with Mr. Hunt whatsoever. In response to these questions Mr. Rocca responded "on the record" that he has no knowledge of any such arrangements nor at any time was he party to any assistance or any requests for assistance to Mr. Hunt. Mr. Rocca stated that the particular section which he had been most actively concerned in the past years was responsible for handling a variety of tasks categorized under the area of "setting the record straight." In this sense, the "image" mission of the office was to counter misinformation currently in the media or otherwise believed to be part of an effort to discredit the Agency. Mr. Rocca feels that any assumption that Mr. Hunt was engaged in any form of Agency sponsored image activity would have probably lead to the conclusion that it was done under the Counter Intelligence Operations. However, Mr. Rocca emphatically stated that this was not the case.

3. Mr. Rocca was thoroughly candid and cooperative during the course of this interview. He was unable to suggest alternate means of attempting to determine if any official Agency sponsorship of Mr. Hunt did in fact exist. Mr. Rocca did venture the opinion that he felt that in all probability an official acquiescence on the part of senior officials might have been involved rather than an official sponsorship. It was agreed by all in this discussion that the nature of any informal support given to Mr. Hunt would be far more difficult to define in the absence of any formalized agreements.

Lawrence J. Howe

6 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Agency Sponsorship of the David St. John Novels

1. The details summarizing an interview on 4 February 1974 with Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, were set forth in a memorandum addressed to Mr. Steven L. Kuhn dated 6 February 1974. Mr. Kuhn was briefed by the undersigned on this information during the afternoon of 5 February 1974. Later the same afternoon, at Mr. Kuhn's direction, a conference was held with Messrs. Scott Breckenridge and John Richards of the Office of the Inspector General.

2. During this conference the speculation was entertained that Mr. E. Howard Hunt had, in fact, been under Agency sponsorship with the knowledge of Mr. Richard Helms in his preparation of a series of spy novels under the pseudonym, David St. John If it can be accepted as a reasonable supposition that Mr. Hunt had some highly compartmented financial arrangement authorized by senior Agency officials to write these books, then it is likely that this relationship continued after Mr. Hunt officially retired. It is specifically noted that Mr. Hunt retired 30 April 1970. Subsequent to the retirement, a David St. John book appeared in print in 1971 and another in 1972. These manuscripts were apparently prepared during the time that Mr. Hunt was employed by the Robert R. Mullen Company.

3. Minutes from the Office of ~~General~~ Legislative Counsel make references to a concern of Senator Baker over an alleged financial relationship between Mr. Helms and Mr. Hunt which continued subsequent to Mr. Hunt's formal retirement. Senator Baker has reportedly made reference to a payment of some thirty thousand dollars with the parenthetical comment that Mr. Helms would not have that amount of money

to provide Mr. Hunt from his private funds. Mr. Richards of the Inspector General Staff opinioned that if the Agency had sponsored the St. John books, it was likely that Mr. Hunt had so informed Senator Baker.

4. Adding possible weight to this line of speculation is the fact that subsequent to publishing the last St. John novel, Mr. Hunt published a novel entitled, Eduardo, using his old Agency issued alias, Edward J. Hamilton. The suggestion is that this writing effort was done by Mr. Hunt free of any fiduciary relationship with the Agency involved in the use of the St. John pen name.

5. Mr. Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, was briefed on the above by the undersigned in the presence of Mr. Kuhn on the evening of 5 February 1974.

Lawrence J. Howe

6 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Steven L. Kuhn

SUBJECT : The David St. John Novels

IG
Tab 35

1. On 4 February 1974, Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, was interviewed by the undersigned concerning his knowledge of a series of novels written by Mr. E. Howard Hunt. This interview was undertaken at your request in an effort to determine if Mr. Hunt had acted in any capacity in cooperation with Counter Intelligence Operations. It has previously been alleged in Office of Security records that Messrs. Paul Gaynor and Edward Sayle of Security Research Staff, believed that Mr. Hunt had written novels at Agency request and that this effort had been known to Mr. James Angleton, Chief, CI Operations.

2. Mr. Pforzheimer provided a verbal summary of his knowledge of Mr. Hunt's fictional writings under the pen name, David St. John. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that when the first St. John book, On Hazardous Duty, appeared in 1965, he undertook to identify the true name of the author. Mr. Pforzheimer related that he checked with a source in the copyright office only to find out that the true name was not given on the copyright application. The mailing address given for the author was checked against a telephone cross reference directory. The address on the copyright application was identified with Mr. E. Howard Hunt. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that after making the identification, he called Mr. Thomas Karamessines and related his discovery. Mr. Pforzheimer recalled from the nature of Mr. Karamessines' reaction that he had uncovered a sensitive matter of senior officer concern. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that he then recommended to Mr. Karamessines that "if the Agency is involved in this thing why not see to it that Hunt leaves his address off the copyright applications in the future." Mr. Karamessines reportedly

accepted the suggestion and Mr. Pfortzheimer recalls that subsequent copyright applications were submitted without [illegible] the address. Within five minutes of the conversation with Mr. Karamessines, Mr. Pforzheimer recalls being called by Mr. Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Pforzheimer recalls the substance of the conversation as being, "for Christ sake Walter, this is the first book to come along and say something good about the Agency." "Why not leave the Goddamn thing alone."

3. The undersigned asked Mr. Pforzheimer, who to his knowledge, would be in a position to confirm or deny whether Mr. Hunt was under any form of Agency sponsorship in his writing of the David St. John novels. Mr. Pfortzheimer replied that he was never officially briefed on the matter and that only Mr. Helms or Mr. Karamessines could provide the answer. Mr. Pforzheimer was then asked if either Mr. Angleton or Mr. Rocca of Counter Intelligence Operations would have any knowledge of this activity. Mr. Pforzheimer replied that he doubted it seriously.

4. Mr. Pforzheimer went on to relate that he was occasionally tasked to do research for Mr. Hunt. He recalled on one occasion being asked to research the Indian religious rites involving use of funeral pyres. Mr. Pforzheimer remembered that this theme figures significantly in Mr. Hunt's subsequent novel Tower of Silence which appeared under the St. John pen name in 1966. Mr. Pforzheimer parenthetically pointed out the origin of the pen name as being the names of Mr. Hunt's two sons--David and St. John.

5. Tracing Mr. Hunt's career assignments, it is noted that he was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations then designated, the DDP/Operations Group, in February 1965. The first David St. John book was published during 1965. From June 1965 through September 1966, Mr. Hunt was assigned to Madrid, Spain as a Contract Agent. During 1966, three St. John books appeared in print, the highest output for any year. Mr. Hunt published one book under the St. John pseudonym in 1967, and one each in the years 1968, 1969, 1971 and 1972. Mr. Hunt officially retired as an Agency Staff Employee effective 30 April 1970.

6. A check of Office of Security records did not develop any indication that any of the David St. John manuscripts were ever submitted for review in accordance with Agency regulations. There is no documentary evidence currently available to the Office of Security to either confirm or deny possible Agency sponsorship of the books written by Mr. E. Howard Hunt under the pen name, David St. John.

Lawrence J. Howe

SECRET Copy one of one copies

1 February 1974

26 Feb 9, Tab 35

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kuhn

SUBJECT: General Gaynor's Recollections

1. This date, at your instruction, I called Gen. Paul F. Gaynor to seek his recollections regarding his knowledge of the writings of Mr. Hunt and any official who might be aware of the circumstances of any Agency involvement in that effort.

2. Gen. Gaynor advised that his memory is not altogether clear on the matter, and that he was "reaching," but stated that has he reconstructs the matter:

a. He became aware that Hunt, while in WH, was accomplishing a steady flow of spy books, and that security approval was not being requested on the manuscripts before submission to publishers. (He stated that this activity continued later, as he recalls it, in CI Staff, and agreed with idea that the volume of writings was sufficient to indicate that a great of time was involved in Hunt's writing.) Gen. Gaynor advised that he raised the issue "up front" on several occasions. The reaction he recieved to his raising the issue was that "keep your stinking nose out of this business." He stated that he was lead to believe that Mr. Helms desired to improve the image of the intelligence profession and the Agency and that Hunt's books were a part of the program to do so. He stated that he was never told outright that this was the case, but the responses he recieved lead him to believe this was the case.

b. He suggested that two people might be able to assist in clearing the issue, Ray Rocca and Walter Pforzheimer, both of whom were involved in the "image" materials. He stated that Pforzheimer seemed to be aware of all the details - on an up to date basis - of Hunt's departure from the Agency to join the public relations firm, to the degree that Gen. Gaynor gained the belief that Hunt was merely moving his desk outside the building, but being paid by the same source as before. He also advised that he kept Miss Ethel Mendoza fairly current on what he was learning about Hunt's activities because she followed the case for him, and suggested that her recall about what he had learned and when and what resulted, might be better than his at this date. (He also mentioned an incident in which Morse Allen while on a TDY was told by a COS to ask Headquarters to remove Hunt from the Area because of his direct liaison with the president of the country, and other activities which were confounding station operations. Later, the COS told Morse to forget about relaying the message, with the implication that Hunt was being directed by higher authority in the Agency and the COS did not wish to get in the middle by complaining. He said Morse would probably

c. He also suggested that another person--definitely no friend of Hunt--who might have some recall or have picked up information about the book-writing matter might be Anita Potocki of CI Staff, formerly of Division D. (I gather that she did not have official knowledge, but because of her dislike for Hunt, she made it somewhat her business to follow his career.)

Edward F. Sayle

26 Feb 12, tab 2
19 Jun 72

EVERETTE HOWARD HUNT, JR.

1. Subject, a former GS-15 Operations Officer assigned to DDP/Europe, is 53 years of age and married. He served with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, and was employed by this Agency from November 1949 until his voluntary retirement on 30 April 1970. In 1971, Subject served as an advisor to President Nixon in relation to his trip to China. Subject is of current interest to the Central Cover Staff.

2. Subject graduated from Brown University in 1940. He served with the United States Navy from early 1941 until late 1942. After a year with Time, Incorporated, he entered the Air Force, where he was detailed to the Office of Strategic Services. He served in the Far East until January 1946. Subject engaged in writing, and then from May 1948 until February 1949 was employed by the Economic Cooperation Administration, serving in Paris, France, as an aide to Avarell Harriman.

3. A background investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in July 1949 revealed no indication of instability on Subject's part, but it was later learned that Subject had been refused an increase in salary with the Economic Cooperation Administration and had been permitted to resign. He was described as highly intelligent, but blindly selfish and egotistical.

4. Subject's wife, Dorothy Louise Goutiere Hunt, was investigated for Agency employment in 1948. Her former husband was described as a habitual drunkard, and Subject's wife was described as slightly unstable and not inclined to remain in one place for any length of time. She did not enter on duty, having accepted a position with the Economic Cooperation Administration in Paris. Our Paris sources later reported that Subject's wife was formerly his mistress and was openly flouted as such for several months. She was then described as an amoral and dangerous individual who underhandedly attacked those persons who incurred her enmity.

5. Subject entered on duty as an Intelligence Officer, GS-13, on 3 November 1949. In December 1950 he was assigned as Chief of Station, Mexico City, and then served as Chief of Mission there until August 1953. He served in Tokyo, Japan, from June 1954 until February 1957. He was then assigned as Chief of Station, Montevideo, Uruguay. Subject was Chief of Station in Montevideo until early 1960. There were indications that Subject attempted to use his personal influence with the President of Uruguay to have his assignment there extended, but he returned to the United States in June 1960 and was assigned to Mexico City on Project JMARC.

6. A cable from Montevideo, dated 6 November 1960, indicates that Subject had written former Uruguayan contacts commenting that he was working on the Cuban problem and publishing an anti-Castro newspaper in Miami. It was recommended that Subject be warned about such indiscreet remarks, but apparently no action was taken.

7. In November 1961, Subject was reassigned to the DDP/Covert Action Staff, and in January 1962 to the Office of the Chief of the same Staff. In July 1962 Subject was transferred to the DODS Research and Publications Section in Washington, and in July 1964 to the DODS Covert Action Staff. In February 1965 he moved to the Office of the DDP/Operations Group. From June 1965 to September 1966 Subject served as a Contract Agent in Madrid, Spain, after which he served in the DDP as Chief of European Covert Operations until his retirement on 30 April 1970.

8. On 26 January 1970 a source of the Office of Security learned that Subject was circulating through the publishing community "Give Us This Day," a manuscript written under his former operational alias and dealing with the events of the Bay of Pigs. Investigation disclosed that the manuscript had been in the possession of Tom Wallace, of Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc. as early as 9 July 1968 and that it was sent on that date to William F. Buckley, Jr., of the National Review. The manuscript was sent to the Arlington House and Walker and Company as well. Both rejected it as too controversial, as had Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

9. Subject was interviewed regarding the manuscript on 17 February 1970 by the DDP. He at first professed ignorance, but when told the title admitted he had written it for his own benefit as a historical record. Subject said he had shown the manuscript about two years ago to his agent, Max Wilkinson, and to William F. Buckley, Jr. He said he had only wanted an opinion from these gentlemen, and added that the manuscript had been returned to him. He had, he said, not wanted it published. Subject was instructed as to the danger of such a manuscript being published, and was to attempt to determine how many copies of it might be in circulation. He was not to contact Walker and Company, who were the source of the original information.

10. A reinvestigation of Subject was conducted by the Office of Security in July 1970. Subject and his wife were described by six neighbors acquainted with them for up to nine years, as excellent parents, good neighbors, and fine community citizens.

11. On 19 July 1971, Subject was reported by the Jersey City, New Jersey, Journal to have joined the White House Staff as a Consultant to President Nixon preparatory to the President's visit to the Peoples Republic of China.

12. On 6 November 1970, Subject was granted a Covert Security Approval for use by Central Cover Staff with Robert R. Mullen and Company, a Public Relations firm with offices at 1729 H Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C. Inquiry of the Central Cover Staff on 19 June 1972 revealed that this is a current relationship. Subject, as principal officer of Robert R. Mullen and Company, is witting of cover arrangements for two Agency assets, James Everett in Amsterdam, Netherlands; and Arthur Hochberg, in Singapore.

13. Subject's security file reflects that Subject has, in the past, been of operational interest to Mr. James Angleton, Chief, CI Staff/DDP, in connection with an operational matter. On 19 June 1972, Mr. Fred Hubbard, CI Staff, advised that he will provide information as to the nature of Mr. Angleton's utilization of Subject.

8 NOV 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT: Request for Exception to Provision of FR 45-10b — Terence S. CRABANAC (P)

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph 4 for the approval of the Deputy Director for Support.

2. Terence S. CRABANAC (P) is a Contract Employee assigned to the Madrid area in Spain in a sensitive assignment since his conversion from a Staff Employee on 4 July 1965. CRABANAC was a GS-15, step 7 ($19,330.00 per annum) and he is being paid at the same rate in his present contract status. His contract provides that he will be entitled to a living quarters allowance in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel.

3. The basic living quarters allowance for Class II officers in Madrid is $3,900 per annum. The house which CRABANAC has located, with a one year lease from 15 November 1965 to 14 November 1966, has an annual rent of $8,600.00 excluding utilities. Therefore, for rent alone, he will be $1,960.00 per year over the 160 percent maximum allowed under the provisions of FR 45-10b. On a 75/25 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent over the quarters allowance, he would be out of pocket $2,395.00.

4. Due to the operational sensitivity of CRABANAC's assignment, his request for relief on his housing costs was handled by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP. On 15 September 1965, Mr. Karamessines, ADDP, approved his being reimbursed on a 75/25 percent basis for the excess allowable costs up to, but not to exceed, 60 percent above his quarters allowance. This authorization was included in a letter to CRABANAC from Mr. Karamessines. It is requested that the Deputy Director

for Support authorize the 75/25 percent sharing of the excess allowable costs up to 80 percent above his quarters allowance.

/S/

Edward Ryan
Acting Chief
Western Europe Division

Recommendation in paragraph 4
is authorized:

Charles N. Davis
Deputy Director for Support

9 NOV 1965
Date

DDP/WE/SS:DavisB.Powell/aj/6189 (8Nov65)

Distribution:
Orig. - C/WE
2 - SSA-DD/S
1 - C/WE/SS
1 - WE/LO
1 - WE/PT
1 - WE/BF
1 - WE/5

SECRET

Chief, Western Europe Division 13 October 1965

ATT : Support Staff

Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

Duty Status Reports-Terence S. CRABANAC, Employee
Number 179080

Reference : FHB 20-1000-1, paragraph 5.

1. To date there is no record of receipt of Forms 784, Duty Status Reports, for Terence S. CRABANAC since his EOD 4 July 1965. These reports are required in order to maintain his leave account in accordance with the terms of paragraph 6(c) of his contract and to preclude action to withhold pay in accordance with requirements of the referenced handbook.

2. It is requested that this office be advised as to the reason for the delay in the submission of these Duty Status Reports.

LUCILE F. TWOGOOD
Chief,
Contract Employees Accounts Section
Agent Payroll Branch

TO: Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance
ATTENTION: Lucile F. Twogood
FROM: Chief of Support, WE Division

Per conversation with Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP, there will be no Duty Status Reports (Form 784) submitted on Terence S. CRABANAC. This should be used as the authority to continue his pay without these reports.

/s/
David B. Powell
Chief of Support
WE Division

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : General - Terrence S. CRABANAC - Supplement
Specific - Paragraph Entitled "Offset"

REFERENCE : A. OGC Opinion 65-2476a, dated 12 August 1965

B. Our Memo, dated 8 July 1965, Same Subject

1. This office herein recommends an ammendment to CRABANAC's Supplement dated 4 July 1965, to delete paragraph 7. entitled "Offset."

2. This office acknowledges the OGC opinion, Reference A, which determined CRABANAC may retain without Agency salary offset any future royalties earned as a result of his literary efforts based on the fact cover does not include role of a writer.

3. As Subject's cover "activities" have been officially clarified as being only a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer for which the Agency will be making all entitlement payments and actually he will receive no funds from any cover, this paragraph, which is misleading, has no meaning in Subject's contract and it is hereby recommended that it be deleted from CRABANAC's Supplement.

4. Further, in future cases when a cover is so light that Subject will not be receiving funds from cover it is recommended that no "Offset" paragraph be included in Supplements or Contracts.

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

Attachment
Ref. A and B

no action taken on
this memo.

OGC 65-2476a

22 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Terence S. CRABANAC - Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. You have requested the opinion of this Office in regard to the retention of future royalties which might be earned by Terence S. CRABANAC as a result of his literary efforts. We believe that he is entitled to retain such royalties without an offset against his Agency salary.

2. We have been advised by Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support, that CRABANAC's cover does not include the role of a writer; CRABANAC's cover for status will only be a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer. Therefore, paragraph 7 of his contract dated 4 July 1965 may remain as written. Royalties from the fictional works that he writes as a profitable hobby will not be emoluments received from or through his "cover activities."

Norman D. Block
NORMAN D. BLOCK
Office of General Counsel

cc: Chief, Covert Claims Branch
Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support

3 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : Norman Block

SUBJECT : Terence S. Crabanac -- Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation of 26 July 1965 between yourself and Rogers C. Brooks of this Office wherein background information relating to the assignment of Terence S. Crabanac was discussed.

2. Subject will apparently develop a cover as a writer, a field wherein he has an already demonstrated talent based upon several publications. The objective of the cover is to provide a basis of attribution for some of his income. At the time of the preparation of Mr. Crabanac's contract, the specific detail of his cover was unknown.

3. Request your opinion in regard to the retention of possible royalties earned by Crabanac as a result of his literary efforts or whether such income should be properly offset.

Joseph B. Ragan
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Attachments.

OP/CPD: RCBrooks/cw: 2 August 1965

Distribution:
Orig & 1 -- Addressee
2 -- CPD

4 July 65

Mr. Terence S. Crabanac

Dear Mr. Crabanac: :

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a Contract Employee for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $19,880 per annum. In addition, you are herein authorized legislative salary adjustments, within-grade promotions and, if applicable, a post differential in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in an approved manner. Taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

2. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel. In the event you are furnished quarters by the Government you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost-of-living allowances in conformance with applicable regulations of this organization including, but not limited to, a post allowance, a transfer allowance and a home service transfer allowance.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped, in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick, annual and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives. All accrued but unused leave credited to your former account as an appointed employee of this organization will be transferred to the leave account established for you hereunder.

(d) As a Government employee under contract converted from staff status without a break in service, it is required that you continue to make contributions to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Such contributions (presently six and one/half per cent (6-1/2%)) will be deducted by the Government from the basic compensation due you hereunder, i.e., presently $19,880 per annum.

(e) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Contract Employees of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(f) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee in the line of duty while abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

7. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions.

8. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable law and regulations.

10. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

11. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

12. Term. This contract is effective as of 4 July 1965 , and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon sixty (60) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY DHL
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/S/

WITNESS: /S/

APPROVED: /S/

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ISAACS, HAROLD
201-18446

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:[illegible] 15 AUG 78		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

SAACS, HAROLD ROBERT

LE

201 No. 18446

MATERIAL FILED IN THIS FOLDE
IS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDE

14-00000

SECRET

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

D

9 January 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on ISAACS (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ______ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☒ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Barbara Booth (name) CH/FCCI (title) (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed KAM (initials) 24 JAN 1975 (date) 197__

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-18446

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

SECRET

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET

XAAZ-35686

4 October 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Former Records of Ray Murphy

1. The attached documents are part of a large collection of records held by Ray Murphy during his tenure as an official of the Department of State. He transferred all of his records to CIA upon his retirement in the mid-1960's. The documents of that collection which did not meet the retention criteria of the DDO or the Office of Security were destroyed. While those which were of utility have been retained and accessioned as appropriate to the DDO records system.

2. The attached records concern Harold ISAACS who is the subject of 201-0018446 and should be classified to that file.

M. Paul Hartman

M. Paul Hartman
C/CIRA/RS

Attachment

4 Oct 74
201-18446

07 att # 11 W

RECORD COPY

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 006593

Copy: [illegible]
Class: [illegible]

g: [illegible] Isaacs, Harold

SOURCE: NEW MASSES, New York City,
October 22, 1936 - Page 12

EUROPE'S CRISIS; JAPAN PREPARES

By Hansu Chan

*** There are numerous American journalists of different political color and shades of opinion who are "cooperating" in this way with Japanese imperialism, but whoever has followed the writings of Harold Isaacs, Alexander Buchman, Frank Glass and Wilbur Burton in The China Press, The China Weekly Review, Asia, Pacific Affairs, New International, etc., realizes that these American Trotskyist journalists are the most vicious and most dangerous of the whole lot of reactionary journalists.

Hiding behind a barrage of Marxist phraseology (which none of them has yet learned to manipulate with facility), these people are energetically conducting a campaign of lies against the Communist International, the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet Union, the Chinese Soviets and the Chinese Red Army, a campaign which aims to undermine the confidence of the outside world in the Chinese Soviet movement and the Red Army.

***

RECORD COPY

Harold Isaacs
201-18446

H/W ATT ci To XAA2-35686

201-18446

FOR COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES FILES

Date Oct. 23, 1957

SOURCE: DAILY WORKER

File No. 9100 Isaacs

X 4202 China

TROTZKYITE BOOK MOURNS OVER CHINESE REVOLUTION

THE TRAGEDY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. By Harold D. Issacs. Stanford University Press. 352 pp. $5.

By ROBERT FRIEDMAN

The presses are spewing forth anti-Chinese books these days at a pace which bids to match the anti-Soviet torrent. All the 'old China hands' who served Western imperialism as banker, soldier, spy, or whatever in the Orient are now busy at the typewriter, engaged in profitable vilification of 450,000,000 people because they decided to take their fate in their own hands and build for themselves.

• • •

One book which deserves, even under the cynical and opportunist reign of capitalism, some special prize for adaptability is Harold D. Isaacs' "Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution."

Published first in 1938 as an avowedly Trotskyite tract (complete with introduction by Trotsky) calling the defeat of the Chinese workers in 1927 a "betrayal" by Stalin and the Chinese Communists, the same book emerges now, refurbished, to mourn the victory of the very same Chinese workers a generation later!

• • •

Filled with the murky intricacies of devious Trotskyite polemics, Isaacs book has been reissued, partly to cash in on the hate-China racket, and partly because any stick is useful to Big Business against the liberation - bound masses.

Isaacs now says he no longer loves Trotsky, whose introduction has been dropped as a liability. Instead, he is an open defender of imperialist intervention against the people of the Far East.

But typical of his Trotskyite weaseling is Isaacs' attack on the Chinese Communists of the 1920's, first because they supported Chiang Kai-shek despite the fact that he was to become the butcher of the Chinese revolution, and second because they allegedly cringed before Chiang when he turned on the workers in 1927.

• • •

This nonsense, which would rule out every political alliance in history on the chance that today's ally might be tomorrow's enemy, is ironic in view of the fact that Chiang sits today on Taiwan, a discredited gangster save only in the eyes of Isaacs' political mentors.

Meanwhile, the Chinese people will go about their business building socialism, unconcerned by Isaacs' tears for the tragedy of 1927 or 1951.

RECORDED

H/W ATT 02 TC XAA2-35856

201-15446

COPY: MK:SS
COMP. — -

Enclosure No. 1
To Despatch No. 3317

[illegible] - Isaacs, Harold of 1/30/35 KEM

1 Ta Yong Yi Ping Hutung
Peiping, China.
Oct. 5, 1934.

Mr. T. A. Bisson
136 Claremont Avenue
Mount Vernon, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Bisson:

I have seen the correspondence exchanged between Mr. Glass and yourself regarding the contributions you collected for the China Forum. A draft for the sum in full will be sent to you this week.

I do not know in the name of whom or what Miss Smedley speaks of the China Forum. Since she was not in China at the time the Forum Suspended, nor has she corresponded with me on the subject, I consider it necessary to place before you and the other contributors an account of the circumstances in which the Forum ceased publication. Since you apparently gathered the contributors together in a meeting to hear what Miss Smedley had to say, I would appreciate it deeply if you would gather them once more to hear my account. The enclosed is a copy of a letter sent by me last May to the Chinese Communist Party. It has been published in China in a Chinese translation and copies have been sent abroad but has not been published in English as far as I know. I do not know the names of the people who were good enough to contribute to the Forum but their interest in the matter warrants placing before them the story of what happened to the magazine. I trust, out of simple fairness to me, you will be good enough to give them this opportunity.

811.5034 China / Searchlight Pub. Co./58

I greatly regret any inconvenience or embarrassment to which you have been put in this matter. I do hope, however, that my letter will enlighten you and your friends and enable you to appreciate the difficulties which have arisen. I know of no project to revive the China Forum at the present time. Should such occur, the resultant publication would be of a considerably different character from the one I edited, as will be obvious from the facts given in my letter to the C. P. I think people who are interested in supporting the revolutionary movement here should know these facts.

Once again, I appreciate all the trouble you have gone to in this matter.

Did you ever, incidentally, receive the article "Fascism in China" and the newsletter which I mailed to July 13 last?

Yours sincerely,

encl.

(Harold R. Isaacs)

(Copied by RD)

RECORD C[illegible]

H/A ATT (3 To XAA2-35536

201-18446

C O P Y

Letter of H. R. Isaacs to the C.C.P. concerning the China Forum

To the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party:

The two-year period of my extra-organizational collaboration with the Chinese Communist Party has come to an end and the China Forum which I founded and edited during that time has been forced to suspend publication. In the interest of our whole movement as well as in my personal interest, I consider it necessary to record here and publish the history of the China Forum and the circumstances of its suspension. You refused me the opportunity to lay the matter before the membership of the party even when I offered to do so in your own organs and not through the columns of the Forum. When, wrongly, I permitted the Forum to go down in silence, you turned around and in your organs and near organs in China and abroad you proceeded with the usual slanders of "betrayer" and "counter-revolutionary". In so doing you didn't have the courage or the simple honesty to state that you presented the China Forum with an ultimatum and forced its suspension because in reply its editor raised questions which are being placed before the whole movement today by the International Left Opposition. Nor did you state that you deliberately smashed the Forum for this reason despite my repeated and extended offers to continue publication as before on a straight anti-Kuomintang, anti-imperialist basis, leaving these various problems to be thrashed out first privately among ourselves. In other words, you deliberately forced suspension of the China Forum despite the fact, on your own admission, that its loss was a serious blow to the revolutionary movement in China, that it meant the disappearance of an organ which for two years you had considered an extremely valuable instrument in the hands of the movement. Here, as in the broader issues which led to our differences, your blind adherence to false policies was once more demonstrative of your readiness to place your factional interests above the interests of the Chinese Revolution.

In going back over the history of the Forum, I think the vicious character of your action becomes even more evident when I start with the fact that from beginning to end I functioned not as a member of the party but as a willing sympathizer who was prepared to throw all his energies into a job he saw he could do - edit and publish an organ in China which could help mobilize the forces of this country for struggle against the Kuomintang and the imperialists by exposing the regime of terror and privation which they have in common imposed upon the masses of the Chinese people. Permit me to recall at this point that I never accepted any personal remuneration for time or labor. You gave the Forum financial aid but I never received a dollar from you that was not put into the paper. I refused your offers of compensation and earned my living elsewhere. Your only claim on me was my full-hearted loyalty to the Communist ideal and

RECORD C[illegible]

our

our common dedication to the struggle against a regime of hate and misery and oppression. In the end you forfeited this claim by ceasing any longer to be in my eyes honest or effective leaders of this struggle.

Although you helped the Forum financially, the part you played in building it up from the day it started in January, 1932, to the day of its last appearance in January 1934, was insignificant. My repeated requests for cooperation in matters of circulation and material for publication went largely unsatisfied throughout that time. You never supplied me with the reports I so frequently and urgently sought, particularly on trade unions, strike struggles, the Red Armies, the Red districts, etc. Everything the Forum did and became was the fruit of the work of a tiny group of devoted collaborators (the most important of whom had no connection with you whatever) and myself who had to depend almost entirely on our own resources for everything we did and published. At every crisis in the Forum's existence, when it was banned by the French authorities in Shanghai at the very outset; when it was hounded and persecuted by the American and Chinese authorities in the summer of 1933, when through British police pressure it was thrown out of every available printing ship in the city; when the pseudo-Fascist Blue Shirts again and again threatened the printing plant which I built up partially through personally contracted loans -- it was invariably through my own initiative, with the help of the little Forum staff, that we pulled ourselves up by the bootstraps every time and carried on to a point in January this year where the Forum was flourishing and growing daily in circulation, prestige, and influence despite the many formidable obstacles in its way. The formation of the China Forum Readers Association, which in the brief space of three months spread to eleven cities in five provinces, developing into a mighty potential weapon for the revolutionary movement, was the product of spontaneous action on the part of the Forum's readers, later sponsored and led by the paper itself. All these were the Forum's own achievements, not yours. By your arbitrary and criminal action you shattered them in the full stride of their growth. Because to my bitter disappointment I had not nor could I secure the resources to carry on myself - owing largely to the difficult conditions of work and the impossibility of getting revenue from the paper itself - all that had been achieved and was to be achieved was ground into the dust.

II.

From almost the very beginning of my active work - which I date from the time I began reporting events in China in a Communist way - a number of questions presented themselves to me in increasingly forcible form. These arose originally from my discovery of the gross distortions and exaggerations which I found to be characteristic of Communist propaganda in China and abroad. I define propaganda as the skilful, clear, accurate and wholly truthful reporting of the facts linked to an incisive,

purposive

purposive interpretation and a plan of action for dealing with the facts in a revolutionary way. I learned this from the life and work of Lenin and his Bolshevik comrades who taught us that the truth comes from the masses themselves and that only disaster can result from telling them lies. I have never learned to the contrary that it was my revolutionary duty to work in any other way although I soon found that the present day Communist Party press makes a practice of distinguishing between propaganda and truth.

Examples of exaggeration and distortion most striking to me were naturally those which applied to China, because here I could check allegations with known facts. I first wrote these down to the ignorance or incapacity of individuals. I felt that Communist editors abroad would publish accurate facts about China if they could get them. Accordingly with a friend I tried to set up an independent mail news service and sent weekly bulletins to papers all over the world giving brief, sharp, factual accounts of what was going on. This was in the fall of 1931 after my return from the area of the great Central China floods of that summer. I scarcely understood then why this service failed to secure any response from the Communist press abroad. After about three months I had to suspend it for lack of support. It simply didn't get published except in a few organs which were not official Communist Party papers, including the New York Militant.

It wasn't long before I began to perceive, with a deeper study of international events and the history of the Chinese Revolution, that a consistent thread ran through the distortions and exaggerations which I found not only in brief casual reports of current events but in the solemn pronunciamentoes made by delegates before plenums of the E.C.C.I. I discovered that these departures from the truth were made necessary by the official premise that ever since the catastrophe of 1927 a mighty, upsurging revolutionary movement has been marching forward in China to the very brink of seizure of power under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. I discovered that these exaggerations were necessary because the premise was false and along with it all the basic tenets of the policies being pursued by the Communist International and the Communist Party in China. I cannot begin here to give a summary of some of these distortions (which I verbally cited to you by the dozen) ranging from particular incidents (the wilfully false picture given of the cotton mill strike in Shanghai in January, 1932, even to the point of transposing it to February to heighten the impression given of the workers' role in the Shanghai war) to high flown generalizations like the statement recently made before the Plenum of the E.C.C.I. that the C.C.P. has won over the majority of the Chinese working class and the peasantry.

In denying the factual truth of this premise, whence flows the whole policy of the Communist Party in China, I deprecate not a whit the magnificent militancy and courage of Chinese workers, striking again and again and fighting

against

against terrific odds in defense of their very lives; nor the heroic struggles waged by peasants all over the country; nor the fight of the Red Armies against the Kuomintang, I merely respect the cold, indisputable fact that these struggles are defensive, not offensive, that they are isolated, desperate and unorganised. With very few exceptions - a few small strikes here and there and the larger exception of the Red Army - they are without organised revolutionary leadership. Moreover the development of this leadership, the task of the C.P., is proceeding at a tragically retarded pace owing to the false policies and inept tactics of the party.

In denying the presence of a mighty revolutionary upsurge (i.e., a vast, organised march toward the seizure of power) I respect facts made still clearer perhaps when compared to the facts and figures of the monster mass movements of the 1925-27 period. The tragic errors of the Communist leadership in 1927 were primarily responsible for the decapitation of that great movement and because no lessons have been drawn from those events to this very day, these errors, monstrously accumulated, are still responsible for the tragedies of today. But for the purpose of our comparison here, let us for example take the single fact that in 1926 in Greater Shanghai there were 257 strikes. In 1933 there were 82. Let us remember that on the eve of the workers' seizure of power in Shanghai in March, 1927, there were more than 800,000 workers, handicraftsmen and petty traders out on the streets fighting with arms in hands for demands of a far-reaching political character. A close check for the entire country in the latter half of 1933 showed me that less than one-thirtieth of that number were engaged in strikes and other disputes during any given month and that almost invariably the demands were defensive demands against wage cuts and lockouts. Moreover, the lack of cohesive leadership - often in departments of the same factory or in one or more of a group of factories - or even sometimes lack of even the most elementary organization - has in almost every case led to deadening failure and relatively easy betrayal by the yellow "labor leaders" and "mediators" of the Kuomintang. In 1925 the shooting of thirteen students by British police in Shanghai was the touch-off for a general strike which paralyzed the city and which was seconded by vast sympathy strikes which broke like a series of tidal waves over the entire country. In January, 1932, when the Japanese imperialists used the Shanghai International Settlement as a base for operations which cost the lives of tens of thousands of Chinese, not a single strike interrupted the normal course of the public or other services in that settlement. In the factories there were no strikes but a large scale lockout to which the overwhelming majority of Shanghai's workers submitted without protest.

The dogged, persistent struggle carried on by small sections of the rank and file workers in isolated instances in recent years is tribute to the magnificent fibre of

Chinese

Chinese workers. It is not evidence that a revolutionary seizure of power is on the order of the day. It is evidence, along with the heroic sacrifices of thousands who have lost lives and liberty in Chinese revolutionary struggle during the last seven years of Kuomintang reaction, that it is possible to fight the monstrous white terror which Chinese Communists frequently cite as a reason for the insufficiency of their work. Yet it is largely because this terror has not been fought effectively that the Kuomintang regime, despite the fact that it is rotting and crumbling, can still keep the lid down on the boiling, simmering hatred of the people it rules. Unless the martyrdom of thousands of China's finest workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals is to be in vain, we must turn resolutely away from the folly of calling to insurrection when what is needed is painstaking education, organization and the sponsorship of day-to-day struggles of the masses for democratic demands, the slow building up of a party and mass organizations and a movement which will be able to command the forces capable of carrying out an insurrection.

In the case of the widespread but isolated and individual cases of peasant uprisings, and this includes the Red Armies in Kiangsi, these struggles await the leadership of a strong working class movement before they can have a successful issue. The Red Armies in their restricted and surrounded areas and with their meagre resources have fought heroically against the Kuomintang attacks upon them. But until the Kuomintang is shaken from its bulwarks in the imperialist controlled working class centres, their prospect of revolutionary triumph remains necessarily dim. No revolutionary purpose is served by taking refuge in the fiction that these armies have proletarian leadership because individual workers, undoubtedly leaders of superior quality and courage, have been torn from their factories and their fellow-workers and sent down to occupy key positions in the Red Army districts and in the Red Armies themselves. Indeed, this common practice of extracting the most conscious and progressive working class elements from their working class environment and sending them down to the Red districts is a good index to the criminal transposition of emphasis which has helped paralyze the working class movement in the cities. If the White Terror doesn't carry off the workers' leaders as they arise, the C.P. does and has done so in hundreds of cases. This helps in no small part to explain why it has also been impossible to mobilize a genuine mass anti-Japanese movement in the fact of military aggression and why the White Terror of the Kuomintang has succeeded, by filling mass graves and innumerable prisons with the martyred dead and living, in downing the anti-imperialist movement or efforts toward the organization of such a movement and paving the way for the ever increasing encroachments of the imperialists. The party has not yet gripped and directed the deep and bitter and often inarticulate hatred of the masses of the people for their oppressors and this includes large sections of the lower petty bourgeoisie who could be won by successful mass pressure from below. This is because the

Party

Party has failed to translate the realities of everyday events into its program and tactics.

I cannot here go into the many-faceted problems and issues which flow from these facts with regard to the policies and tactics of the Chinese revolutionary movement. Nor extending to the international scene need I go into the terrific effects of the German catastrophe nor the storm of questions which has been directed at the C.I. leadership whose responsibility in the disaster has become nakedly clear to unnumbered Communists and Communist sympathizers the world over. Nor into the whole set of implications which arise from the policies of the C.I., with particular reference to the late developments in Soviet foreign policy, the Litvinov-Roosevelt agreement, the forthcoming mooted entrance of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations and in a smaller but equally characteristic way, the forthcoming association of the U.S.S.R. with the Institute of Pacific Relations which hopes to hold its next talkfest in Moscow. These problems, with their many specific links to the Chinese questions, were the basic questions over which I soon began to take issue with the official views of the Party and the International.

III.

But precisely because at all costs I desired to carry on the Forum's open struggle against the common enemy - against the Kuomintang and the imperialists - I sedulously avoided bringing these issues into the columns of the paper, increasingly against my better judgment. I leaned over far backward in this respect. This expressed itself in many of the current issues with which we had to deal.

I ask you to recall the whole uphill fight which the Forum waged on behalf of Paul and Gertrud Ruegg in the spring and summer of 1932 during which time I repeatedly warned against the emphasis which was being placed on the "legal" aspects of the case and the "negotiations" with the Kuomintang to the detriment of mass pressure and the capitalization of the case for political purposes. You paid lip service to the need for mass pressure - particularly here in China - but in fact the "legalities" and futile negotiations remained the major pillars of the defense. Until in the very end I finally rebelled, I wasn't even permitted to give Ruegg his honourable and rightful title - secretary of the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat. Yet, although I felt the struggle for the Rueggs was being seriously handicapped by the tactics being pursued, I carried on the fight with all the energy at my command and you will recall that it was I who created the local defense committee and was chiefly responsible for the widespread press propaganda and the considerable sympathy which we aroused. Yet the strictly non-political attitude which Ruegg was forced to assume at the trial (in contrast to the highly political attitude of his prosecutors) was in my opinion one of the major reasons

for

for the fate to which he and his wife were condemned.

I ask you to recall the whole period of the organization and activities of the China-League for Civil Rights, from December, 1932, to June, 1933, in which I took an active part. I gave full play to this hybrid League and its work without once publishing the basic criticisms which I often voiced to you and which in the end were wholly confirmed by what happened after the Kuomintang murdered Yang Chien in June that year.

I ask you to recall the views I set forth in August and September, 1933, on the subject of the "anti-War Congress" which at your specific request I did not publish. Instead, to my regret, I published the foul rot of Marley & Co., without freely giving play to the true facts about that farcical junket which had convinced me that the policies which gave it birth do not one single whit advance the international struggle against imperialist war.

On one occasion - and this at least I can take comfort in - I passively resisted when you requested me to write and publish a slanderous attack on Chen-Tu-hsiu when he was condemned to 13 years imprisonment by the Kuomintang. Your request was specific. I was not to deal with the issues which had brought Chen Tu-hsiu from being the leader of the C.P. in 1927 to being leader of the Chinese Opposition in 1933. I was only to string together a vile series of labels in an effort to explain why the Kuomintang even imprisoned the leader of the Left Opposition. As you know, that attack was never written or published.

Again in December, 1933, upon my return from Fukien, you specifically demanded that I set aside the results of my own personal investigations in Foochow in order to write on your behalf (but over my signature!) an utterly baseless and slanderous attack on the Left Opposition. You will recall that you charged at that time that the "Trotskyists" were prominently identified with the new government set up in Fukien by Chen Ming-shu and Tsai Ting-kai. You lumped the Left Opposition with the Third Party and the so-called Social Democrats among the petty bourgeois satellites of the Fukien militarists. It was as much to satisfy myself on this very point as to perform a mission for you that I went down to Foochow and spent two weeks there and learned through direct contact with dozens of people prominently concerned that the Left Opposition were stoutly and clearly opposed to the Foochow regime. I haven't place here to discuss the relations of the C.P. to the short-lived Fukien Government or the character of the "negotiations" which were going on down there. The important thing here is that on my return you demanded that I write slanders which flew in the face of everything I myself had learned. It is interesting, as a sidelight on your methods in factional strife as you conceive it, that your representative in Foochow sent back a report, through me, ironically enough, that one of the most prominent of the youthful pseudo-radicals in Foochow, Wu

Chi-yuen to be exact, was a leading "Trotskyist". It so happened that I had met and had several lengthy interviews with Wu and by the time I left Foochow I understood his position and his personality exceedingly well. He was as much a Trotskyist as Mei Lan-fang is! Yet you actually demanded that I ignore my own knowledge of the man and in my article on Fukien set him down as a "Trotskyist". I was faced on the one hand by your demands that I write falsehoods to suit your policies and on the other by my deep desire to set forth the actual facts about the Opposition's attitude towards the Fukien regime. But once more, to preserve the shreds of our relationship, I drove a middle course and did neither, leaving the whole question out of my article.

Despite the facts that these issues weighed more and more heavily upon me, despite the fact that events in China and abroad were pressing themselves more and more imperatively on the concerns of every sincere revolutionary, I still tried to keep the Forum balanced on its ribbon-like path, concentrating on the anti-Kuomintang, anti-imperialist struggle, and in so doing fulfilling at least a partial function as a revolutionary organ. I deeply felt, however, that I was betraying my readers by avoiding these issues. How could I write of Germany and avoid all the implications of that disaster? How could I write of America's recognition of the U.S.S.R. and still fail to say that the Communist International had virtually been murdered at Washington? How could I warn against the dangers of imperialist intervention in the U.S.S.R. and still not point out that Soviet foreign policy was in fact daily heightening the danger of such intervention? Yet I somehow did so and sought in whatever way possible to retain some basis for our continued collaboration.

IV.

Nevertheless, abruptly in January of this year you forced an ultimatum upon me and subsequently forced the break in our relationship because I could not and would not, at your demand, devote the China Forum to policies which I could not and do not believe compatible with the interests of the Chinese Revolution and the international proletarian revolution. I could not, at your demand, set aside the convictions to which I had literally been driven by the stinging lash of catastrophic events in China, Germany and the world over. Particularly my deep interest in Chinese events during the last three years made it impossible for me, finally, to give active support to policies and tactics whose disastrous effects were being a thousandfold confirmed for me by the tragic events of every swiftly-passing day. I could not ignore questions which strike at the roots of our work and the whole structure of our hopes for a revolutionary future.

Despite the fact that these questions are rocking the entire International today, you denied my right to

raise

raise them in print. You demanded more. You demanded that I attack anybody who did so - primarily the people you call "counter-revolutionary Trotskyists" - the only people who are facing these problems today in a fearless, revolutionary way. You demanded that the China Forum become a stereotype for the policies and vulgar factional slanders which I could neither then nor now be party to. In reply to my questions on China you simply quoted back to me the lies and half-lies I've been so used to reading in Inprecorr. You even declared: "For propaganda purposes a certain amount of exaggeration is necessary..." and went on amazingly to say: "but we know the true facts and we base our policies on them, not on these exaggerations!" A new slant on modern-day C.I. tactics! Facts, you said, are curious things. They have to be turned around and around and around and examined closely until their true nature becomes apparent. The trouble is you turn them so far and so quickly that they turn into something like a dizzily turning top of fancy - or at best wish - fulfilling misrepresentations.

To my questions on Germany you quoted Heckert, Piatnitsky, and the E.C.C.I.'s famous resolution declaring that the collapse of the German party and the slaughter of the German workers were based on the past, present and future correct policies of the C.P.G.! You declared I had no right to offer critical comment on the dangerously opportunistic foreign and domestic policies of the U.S.S.R., most notably on the entry of the U.S.S.R. on a straight nationalist basis into the disgusting corridors of imperialist intrigue. To the contrary, I was to lovingly fawningly fondle and hail the policies which have meant disaster in China, Germany and elsewhere and are rapidly leading the U.S.S.R. into the vacuum of nationalist isolation from the world wide proletarian movement. This I was to do, to begin with, by publishing Stalin's face on the front page and columns of the customary panegyrics to his infallibility. Above all and before all, I was to take up cudgels against "counter-revolutionary Trotskyism". That was to be the main point of my reformation - to raise no questions myself and slander anybody else who did so.

In reply to your demand that I submit to an editorial board in order that these editorial policies should be effectively put into practice, I offered (1) to continue publication strictly as before, meanwhile arguing out my differences with you in discussions on the side; (2) to throw the columns of the Forum open to a general discussion of all basic revolutionary question, with free play to unorthodox as well as orthodox views. If your views were correct, I argued, it would be a distinct advantage to you to have such an opportunity to display their brilliance alongside the puny efforts of your critics; (3) to publish orthodox news and views but to reserve for myself the right to comment and criticise.

These repeated offers you repeatedly refused. You offered to discuss these questions with me verbally __if__ in

the

the meanwhile I throw the Forum open to your editorial board. My other proposals were unthinkable! Give the Forum's readers a chance to hear "counter-revolutionary" viewpoints? Never that! I could only display my revolutionary purity by acceding to your demands. We would talk things over until Spring, then if all went well (i.e., if I showed a satisfactory adaptability to your viewpoint) I could pack up for an educational trip to the Soviet Union where I would certainly become convinced of the error of my ways. In other words you wanted my signature on a promissory note with the amount left blank for you to fill in. You put this in the form of an ultimatum and you told me that if I did anything but accept I would forthwith enter the camp of the "counter-revolution".

I had to refuse these terms. I had to refuse to lend myself to a slanderous and baseless struggle against the International Left Opposition. I had to refuse to lend space to the nauseatingly fawning praise of Stalin and uncritical reception of Stalinist policies which characterize the Communist Party press the world over. I had to refuse to take shelter in the cold and draughty empty spaces which stretch behind the impressive facade and early tradition of the Communist International. I would like to go to the Soviet Union for a vist someday - but I had to refuse your offer on your terms. I had to refuse, in short, to become a hack prostitute in the name of the Revolution.

In the end, too, I had to refuse to turn over to you the printing plant I had built up with so much pain and struggle because I considered it not your property but the property of the working class movement. Because I could not carry on the Forum myself, for lack of financial resources and because of heavy debts contracted, I disposed of the plant and turned every farthing of the proceeds over to where I now consider the true interests of our movement lie. It was with a deep and abiding bitterness that I had considered comrades, when for two years it had fought off all its many enemies on the outside.

Yet with it came the realization that we have to build anew over the ruins you have wrought. The revolution and the building of our future moves forward and when we trample down the defenses of our enemies we shall crush underfoot everything and everybody that stands in our way. No sycophantic, blind allegiance to a name, an empty facade, a torn and shredded prestige can lead us forward. Only unswerving fidelity to our goal and active struggle towards this end with the weapons of a correct and tested political line will lift us from defeat to ultimate victory. To this struggle I shall continue to dedicate all my energies.

Harold R. Isaacs.

Peiping, China
May 30, 1934.

(Copied by RD)

FOR COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES FILES SOURCE: DAILY WORKER

Date: July 6, 1950 File No. 9100 Isaacs

POST WRITER ADMITS ALL KOREA OPPOSES INVASION

The Korean people are united behind the Liberation Armies from the North and are hostile to the American troops sent there by Truman's interventionist order, the New York Post's Far East expert, Harold R. Isaacs, admitted yesterday.

Isaacs' article gave the lie to the Post's own editorial line of support to the police-state regime of Syngman Rhee and the Truman attack on Korea as an act to defend "democracy."

Isaacs declared that the U. S. has "much more reason to count on general Korean hostility than on heroic support." He admitted that "South Korean civilians have been infinitely harder hit by the American action so far" than by their fellow-Koreans from the north.

The South Korean government was an "unpopular one in the election held only four weeks ago," Isaacs said, "the regime of President Syngman Rhee was decisively repudiated."

Isaacs declared that the guerilla movements in South Korea "could have operated only with a considerable measure of popular support," and he acknowledged the "intense desire of all Koreans for reunification of their dismembered country."

To top this story, bristling with exposure of the imperialist nature of the Truman attack on Korea, and with evidence of the Korean people's awareness of their real enemy, the Post concocted the dishonest headline: "S. Koreans Don't Know Why Help Has Come."

(In late editions the Post indicated its own awareness of the phoniness of this headline by dropping it. The new one complained: "Weak S. Korean Regime Hampers GIs at Front.")

But Isaacs made clear that "if in China during the Japanese war the Americans had a friendly population on their side, this is by no means the case now in Korea."

He concludes: "Even if the war remains localized, even a victory won in due course will be a temporary one, and such a victory will not be easily won."

RECORD COPY

H/W ATT 05 To 35516

201-15446

14-00000

7100 - Isaacs, Harold

December 2, 1932.

No. 1480.
SECRET:

M E M O R A N D U M.

With reference to R.A. memorandum No. 1305 of December 4, 1931, regarding Harold ISAACS and his connection with Hilaire NOULENS, it has just been learned that one Viola ROBINSON arrived in Shanghai on August 28, 1932, by the C.P.R. s.s. EMPRESS OF ASIA. On August 29, Miss ROBINSON, together with Harold ISAACS of the CHINA FORUM, gave notice to the United States Consulate General of their intended marriage, which actually took place on the 14th September. In his marriage application, ISAACS particularly requested that no publicity be given to the forthcoming ceremony. It appears that Miss ROBINSON is a follower of the Suffragette, Lucy STONE, who, some fifteen or twenty years ago, advocated among American women the retention of the maiden name after marriage. According to officials of the United States Consulate General, Viola ROBINSON, therefore, will not be known as Mrs. ISAACS.

In connection with Viola ROBINSON's activities in China, in a letter, dated Szechuen, July 24, 1931, Harold ISAACS wrote to Viola ROBINSON as follows:

> "You are in the swim, Viola. I'm coming back to dive in and swim alongside. What do you think? It is all extremely fortuitous from our standpoint that I should have seen the light at last. Your work with HUCG and the future in it is far more important than anything you could do out here or anywhere else for that matter. I'll get back - no matter a possible delay - no matter how - there will be a job to be done and by our gods I'm going to get into it..."

Attention is called to the name HUCG mentioned in the above extract.

A TRUE COPY
OF THE SIGNED
ORIGINAL

RECORD COPY

1442 -

H/W ATT CC TO 35256

201-18446

No. 5019

9 M · Isaacs, Harold

Confidential.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, December 16, 1931.

Subject: Harold R. Isaacs.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that an American citizen named Harold R. Isaacs has been reported to this office by the police of the International Settlement as a communist suspect. The facts regarding Mr. Isaacs are briefly as follows:

[illegible]

Mr. Harold R. Isaacs called at this office in December, 1930, and stated that he would be for a few months in Shanghai; at that time he exhibited passport No. 177026, issued by the Department of State on March 17, 1930. He stated that he expected to leave Shanghai in June, 1931; that his home was in New York City and that his local address was in care of the American Express Company.

According to Police reports Isaacs arrived in Shanghai from Manila as a first-class passenger on the S. S. PRESIDENT JEFFERSON on December 17, 1930. He was employed by the SHANGHAI EVENING POST AND MERCURY and later by the CHINA PRESS but apparently lost both

positions.

H/W ATT 07 To XAA 2-35656

RIC

201-15446

positions. He has resided with a British subject named C. Frank Glass at 123 Weihaiwei Road and made a trip with Glass to Szechuen during June, 1931. The police file contains a copy of a letter written by him to a Miss Viola Robinson, care of the American Consulate, Dresden, Germany, dated July 24, 1931, at Chengtu, Szechuen. This letter, it is stated, was returned unopened to Shanghai from Dresden, addressed to Harold R. Isaacs in care of the American Express Company, Shanghai, and was opened by the Post Office Censor at the request of the Commissioner of Posts. The letter is very long and shows that Isaacs, although previously holding communistic views, only decided definitely to turn "Red" during July of this year. He states that he was influenced in this decision by certain conversations with C. Frank Glass, above referred to, during their trip to Szechuen.

In connection therewith it may be of interest to state that according to a police report dated October 17, 1931, information regarding this letter was given by the Shanghai Municipal Police to an officer of the local British Consulate General, who apparently cabled information regarding it to London. The police report states that a reply was subsequently receive the gist of which is as follows:

> "Viola Robinson arrived in the United States about the middle of September. The whole family are communists in touch with Isaacs' family."

The police state that Harold R. Isaacs in November, 1931, established a news agency under the name of the

"Far

"Far Eastern Press Correspondence," cable address Fenprecop, P. O. Box 1920. On October 8th Isaacs and C. Frank Glass moved from 128 Weihaiwei Road to House No. 6, Passage No. 177, Avenue Dubail. The police state that this address was formerly known as Number 25 Avenue Dubail and is the boarding house at which Agnes Smedley resided from May, 1929, to May 1930. The police report that Agnes Smedley frequently visits Isaacs and Glass at this address.

In my monthly political report for November, on page 15 it was stated that the bodies of numerous members of the family of a certain Kou had been murdered, allegedly by communists in retaliation for Kou's turning traitor to the communist cause. In connection with this matter Isaacs addressed an open letter to the various newspapers of Shanghai, under date of November 24, 1931, in which he scored them for branding these alleged murders as "horrible" and "dastardly," while at the same time they did not raise their editorial voices against the wholesale murders committed by Chiang Kai-shek, the Garrison Commander of Shanghai and other Chinese militarists. None of the papers saw fit to publish this letter but I 1/ have received a copy thereof, and copies are enclosed. I have also received a photostatic copy of the last page containing the signature of Mr. Isaacs.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

[illegible]

Enclosure:
1/- Copy of open letter from Harold R. Isaacs, dated November 24, 1931.

A true copy of the signed orig.

PHJ:MB
GCCB

In Quadruplicate

No Copy to Location.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 1019 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated December 16, 1931, on the subject: "Harold R. Isaacs."

COPY

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS OF SHANGHAI.

Your publication of the "ghastly" (Shanghai Times), "horrible" (China Press), "dastardly" (Evening Post and North China Daily News) murders allegedly committed by Chinese Communists in the French Concession brings forcibly to mind certain other aspects of the Chinese scene whose ghastliness and barbarity find their way into your columns only at rare intervals - and then only in brief cool paragraphs.

There can be no attempt to "justify" these alleged murders, if the tale be true. We all hate the guts of a traitor. But we cannot all condone a system of vendetta which exacts as the price of betrayal the innocent lives of a traitor's family. That, however, involves the question of differing social customs to which no abstract moral absolute can possibly be applied.

Betrayal has its price under any social norm, whether we turn the dirty work of vengeance over to the ineffable mercies of the Lord or employ the less aesthetic but more effective instruments of the gallows, electric chair, lethal chamber, the guillotine or the more refined weapons of social ostracism; whether we consider the traitor himself responsible for his actions - or exact retribution from his blood relations as well. (Jehovah, too, visits the sins of the father upon his children, yea, even unto the third and fourth generations!)

But you reporters, whose typewriters quivered with the horror of these alleged deeds of murder in Frenchtown can still without a qualm condone and even express satisfaction at mass murders a thousand times more revolting, a thousand times more barbarous - but less so in your journalistically judicious eyes only because officially perpetrated.

You city editors - at the moment sending your men out to run down the last threaded folds to this particular story - why don't you send them out to Lunghua some fine sunny morning? Why don't you give them an opportunity to witness the torture and murder of young men and women whose only crime is a realistic appreciation of the social and economic factors at work in the world and a demand for their readjustment?

You editors, who wield your editorial powers so self-righteously, why don't you consistently examine and logically expose a government that maintains itself largely by desperately slaughtering the flower of its protesting youth and the backbone of its peasant masses who attempt protest against its venality and corruption?

Only

Only when it is convenient for your foreign interests, however, do you find it politic to trot out some of your favorite blasts against the Nanking regime, attacks which are almost always immediately offset by the nauseating eulogies and blatant lies that follow.

Considered from your own point of view, Messrs. Editors, the murderers of these Frenchtown people should be brought to justice and made to pay for their crimes. But similarly from your own point of view, to what bar of justice should Chiang Kai Shek be brought, before what tribunals can we arraign the garrison commanders of Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, the warlords of Shantung, Szechuen, Kwangtung and Manchuria for the lives they have taken in the perpetual wars they have waged on the people of China? On any principles of abstract justice, is the mass murder of thousands by the machine gun, the bomber, the rifle, the sword, the axe any more just than the furtive strangulation of nine hopeless relatives of a self-branded yellow cur? This perpetual warfare has been waged on the pretext of suppressing "banditry." If this be so, we are confronted with the startling fact, vouched for and advertised by the government boasting the recognition of all foreign powers, that vast portions of the Chinese population are criminal! On this premise, Chiang Kai Shek & Co. backed by the cohorts of the Soong Menage swoop down on whole provinces, massacre thousands, take heavy tolls from the meagre life earnings of peasants and workers. And with all their guns and planes and hundreds of thousands of soldiers, they still fail to eradicate the "bandits."

Who are the bandits, the robbers, the murderers? Answer this question, Messrs. Editors - and answer it honestly if you dare!

Japan, in violation of so-called principles of justice, but in full accord with the lessons of history, is helping herself to a good slice of Continental Asia, allegedly part of the Nanking Government's domain. Lacking the courage, the ability, the inclination to turn its guns on the invader, the Kuomintang sits in solemn conclave at Nanking and discusses further measures which, it hopes, will permit the extermination of new portions of China's vast "criminal" population to progress more effectively.

Let us take some of the facts sporadically reported by your own and the Chinese press during May-December, 1930. You reported 4,749 executions. From other, more meticulous sources are derived statistics which show that no less than 96510 were executed during the last four months of 1930 alone! This figure sounds globular, doesn't it? Yet for every digit there is somewhere in China a rotting corpse.

During the period following the close of the so-called "military" period of the Kuomintang in 1928

to

to the opening of the Third Plenary Session of the Party in 1929 approximately 450,00 workers, peasants, and students met death at the hands of China's "revolutionary" armies. One Shanghai daily (Chinese) late the next year editorialized as follows:-

> "All China's problems could be satisfactorily settled if the good work of the past few months can be continued. From August to October (1930) alone 140,000 Communists were killed and 450,000 people starved to death in the famine regions."

And if the dimensions of these figures are not ghastly enough to move you, shall we engage in a bit of felicitous description of the tortures applied by these righteous saviors of China? Shall we speak of the burnings in oil, the burying alive (as were five young men and women at Lunghua on Feb. 7 last) the strangulations, the unspeakable mutilation of human bodies before death? These aren't wild nightmares. You have all seen and shuddered at the photographs which can still be bought here and there in Shanghai depicting these processes in all their grisliness.

And at these, Messrs. Editors, do you raise your editorial hands in saintly horror? Do you splash your columns with the adjectives "dastardly, horrible, ghastly?" Hardly. That would offend your Nanking friends. If you do not maintain silence that bespeaks contentment, you brazenly applaud. For this we can quote you chapter and verse from your own editorials.

There are no organs, no publications here that dare look these facts boldly in the face. Your mastheads all carry boasts of your impartiality. Here is at least one opportunity to invest them with some quality of verisimilitude.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Harold R. Isaacs
177 Avenue Dubail,
House 6.

November 24, 1931.

Copied by LB
Compared with MH

EE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES FILES [illegible]-Isaacs, Harold R.
FILE NO.

SOURCE: D.W.

DATE: 8-4-32

EDITOR OF CHINA PAPER IN DANGER

Threat to Turn Isaacs Over to Nanking

SHANGHAI, Aug. 2.—The Wall Street government, supporting its Nanking butcher agents, has threatened to turn over Harold R. Isaacs, American editor of the "China Forum," to the Nanking hangmen.

As editor of the "China Forum," Isaacs has committed the crime against imperialism of supporting the Chinese Revolution and ruthlessly exposing the mass murder of revolutionary Chinese workers and peasants by the Nanking regime and the United States and other imperialist brigands. He has exposed the shameful sell-out of the Chinese masses by the Nanking traitors to the Japanese, American and other imperialists.

The United States government has warned Isaacs that it will withdraw the protection of extra-territorial rights unless the "China Forum" changes its editorial and news policies. Under the extra-territoriality treaties imposed upon China by the imperialists, American and other citizens of the imperialist powers may not be tried in the Chinese courts. Because Isaacs is an American citizen the Nanking government has not been able to wreack its vengeance on him for his exposure of their bloody terror and betrayal of the Chinese masses. The Wall Street Government, which protects its business agents in looting China now proposes to throw Isaacs to its Nanking lackeys for trial in the Chinese courts on charges carrying life imprisonment or the death penalty.

Isaacs has categorically refused to concede to the demands of the United States government that he change the policies of the "China Forum." He is closely associated in the anti-imperialist, anti-Kuomintang fight with Madame Sun Yat-sen, who is chairman of the committee leading the fight to save Paul and Gertrude Rueggs from a death sentence in the Chinese courts.

American workers and intellectuals and their organizations should at once send vigorous protest to the State Department at Washington against its attempt to railroad Isaacs to death in the Nanking Courts.

RECORD COPY

[illegible]

[illegible]

Press Conference 7/30/32.

9550 Isaacs

direct to Paris for three or four days before proceeding to London. His visit to Paris is, therefore, strictly unofficial.

FRANCE

A correspondent asked if the French Government had asked the State Department for an agrément for a new Ambassador in Washington, M. Germaine-Martin. Mr. Rogers replied in the negative.

CHINA

A correspondent asked if Representative La Guardia of New York had asked the State Department to intervene in the case of an American named Harold Isaacs who is now editing a newspaper in China, which, according to press despatches, is a Communist organ. The correspondent continued by saying that according to stories the American diplomatic officers in China warned Mr. Isaacs that he would be likely to lose his extraterritorial status because of hisactivities. Furthermore, his father, who is in New York, wants the Department of State to get Mr. Harold Isaacs back and have him deported. In reply, Mr. Rogers said that he knew nothing of any communication from Mr. La Guardia on the subject. In regard to the story, it is not true that this Government has threatened to deprive Mr. Isaacs of his extraterritorial rights in Shanghai.

BOLIVIA-PARAGUAY

A correspondent asked if the State Department had received any reports to the effect that the Bolivians had captured two Paraguayan forts. In reply, Mr. Rogers said that he understood that Assistant Secretary White talked with the correspondents last night concerning the situation and that Mr. White might possibly be able to see the correspondents again today.

H/W ATT C9 To (442 - 3596

REC D COP

201-15446

FBI REPORT
DATE: 10 AUGUST 1953
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 - BUREAU
105-1247 - NEW YORK

Secret

ZOTOV, IVAN PAVLOVICH S211600/1970 WEST GERMANY 1970

19 MORDOVIAN REPUBLIC ASSR



~~[illegible]~~

201-254377

25 Jan 19

MD

018446

201-018446

Secret

FBI REPORT
DATE: 6 AUG 1952
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 (BUREAU)
105-1247 (NEW YORK)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ISAACS, HAROLD R.
201-018446
SEX M DOB 13 SEP 10
USA, NY, NYC
CIT USA
OCC JOURNALIST
ə LO, SEN
NEWSWEEK CORRESPONDENT IN SHANHAI IN 30S.
INVOLVED IN CP FRONT ACTIVITIES. CONTACT
OF SMEDLEY AND NOULENS. POSS IDEN W/ALIAS
JACOB, A MBR OF SORGE GRU RING IN SHANGHAI.

201-000415
XAAZ-24958
13 APR 67
P4

R 6707240926

FILE IN 201-018446

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 5-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, DO

INFO.

FROM

WOMACE Representative, Boston

SUBJECT ISOLOG/WUSPARROW/Operational
Dr. Harold R. ISAACS, Professor of Political Science at M.I.T.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 12 July 1967, WUSPARROW/1 renewed his old friendship with Subject at the MIT Faculty Club. Subject is now a senior research associate at MIT's Center for International Studies and has recently been named a Professor.

2. For the past few years Subject has been working on an international study series involving minority racial groups. His reports have been published in the New Yorker magazine and as books, The New World of Negro Americans and India's Untouchables. Subject plans to publish in August 1967 a book on the American Jews in Israel and is working on another on the Philippines.

3. WUSPARROW/1 first met Subject in 1946 after he had just completed a long and friendly interview with Ho Chi Minh as Far East correspondent for Newsweek. At that time, Subject felt that the United States was making a mistake in not accepting Ho as the leader of a united Vietnam, feeling that Ho was independent enough of China to make him at worst a sort of Tito.

4. Subject presently is despairing of United States foreign relations in that our people from Washington, or elsewhere, seldom seem to establish a deep rapport with Asian or African nationals. Subject feels that such relations as do exist never reach more than an ineffective superficial level.

5. Subject first went to the Far East about 1930 when he was a crew member of the Matson Line's Malolo and disembarked at Honolulu to work for the Honolulu Advertiser. (WUSPARROW/1 went to work for the same paper two years later.) Subject went next to the Philippines where he worked on a Manila daily. While in Manila he was offered the editorship of the Bangkok Royal Mail, to fill in for St. Clair McELWAY, now of the New Yorker.

CONTINUED . . .

Distribution:
2 - C/DO

CS Copy filed 200-6-360/3 File in 201-12446

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UTBA - 543	DATE 11 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-6-360/3

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UTBA - 543

6. Subject's mind was set on China and in late 1931 he went to Shanghai and joined The China Press, working alongside Tiliman DURDIN, now of the New York Times. Subject lost his job with The China Press after a flare-up with Hollington TONG, part-owner of the paper. Subject then joined the Newsweek foreign staff. Subject was in and out of Bangkok after World War II and WUSPARROW/1 became friendly with him. According to WUSPARROW/1, many people regard Subject's Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution as a significant work and a recent writer on China, Dennis BLOODWORTH, holds a good view of Subject's Scratches on the Mind.

7. Subject now seems permanently settled with MIT, having bought a home at 96 Farlow Road, Newton. Subject hosts there at pool-side "seminars" on Saturday afternoons, with MIT faculty friends and journalist friends such as Bob SHAPLEN coming by. Subject invited WUSPARROW/1 to participate as well.

8. However, as WUSPARROW/1 ascertained, Subject has little contact with foreign students save for an occasional adult foreign graduate student. We hope, considering Subject's background, that he will prove with WUSPARROW/1's guidance to be a profitable unwitting spotter and assessor of foreign graduate students.

LOUIS K. ROLLOFIER

14-00000

N/C Traces
1-6347
DW-7

US

SECRET

2nd tracer

Priority Urgent

RECEIVED

Telephone Request for Name Check

For Use of RI Name Check Control Office

FROM PSB/FBI DATE 24 NOV 1965

TAKEN BY Gerry F. CHECKED BY ______ REPLY ______

ROBINSON, Viola
NAME
ALIAS AND SPELLING VARIATIONS

U.S. 6/20/10
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA

REFERENCES NA1 to CSCI 316/04352-65
dated 26 Oct. 65
subject: ISAACS, Harold Robert
per Trace by Diann
on 10 Nov. 65

24/11/65

26 NOV 1965 IN 201-18446

Special

eJI

HSC

RETURN TO: Tainor
10/14/65 caw
FILE #151-1423
PC
BUDED: 11/11a

NAME: ISAACS, HAROLD ROBERT

See CSC #5.22.66.2153
+ [illegible] Rep 10-13-65

BORN: Sept. 19, 1910, NYC, NY

MS: married Viola Robinson, dob June 20, 1910, NYC, NY
married Shanghai, Sept. 14, 1932
Isaacs

ADDRESSES:
Aug., 1965 to present, 96 Farlow Rd., Newton, Mass.
July, 1953 to Aug., 1965 Mass.
Feb., 1944 to July, 1953, 333 Central Pk. West, NYC, NY
Sept., 1941 to Feb., 1944, 4938 Newport Ave., Friendship Hts., Md.
1940 to Sept., 1941, 72 Pk. Terrace West, NYC, NY
1937 to 1940, 40 Monroe St., NYC, NY

EDUCATION
George Washington H. S., NYC, 1923 to 1926

SSN: 082-03-4029

EMPLOYMENT:
1953 , Mass. Inst. of Technology, Camb, Mass., academic, research
1943 to 1950, Newsweek, WDC, CBI, Pacific, SE Asia, NYC, reporter, war corres. assoc. editor
1943, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., WDC, radio writer,
1940 to 1943, Columbia Broadcasting Co., NYC, WDC, writer
1934 to 1935, self employed, Peking, China, writer
1932 to 1934, Havas News Agency, Shanghai, China, news editor
1931 to 1932, China Press, Shanghai, China, city editor
1930 to 1931, Shai Evening Post, Shanghai, China, reporter
1930, Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu, reporter

FOREIGN TRAVEL:
China, 1930 to 1935, Travel, work, writing
China, Burma, India, 1944, to 1945, war corres. Newsweek
PI, India, Indonesia, 1949 to 1949, Newsweek assignment
Phillippines, 1950 to 1950, cover Baguo conference
Europe Mainly UK, 1957 to 1957, travel, visit university
Czech., Israel, India, 1960 to 1960, academic research project
Malaya, PI., etc., 1963 to 1964,

R65

1/11/65 MD.

RELATIVES:
Father, I. Robert Isaacs, deceased
Mother, Sophie Dorlin, deceased
Wife, Viola Robinson Isaacs, dob 1910, same

FILE IN 201 - 18446
(husband's 201)

REFERENCE:
Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps., WDC, known 17 yrs.

NAI to information forwarded in
~~[illegible] 1965~~ - possible souf
OSCI-316/04352-65 dated 26 October 1965
subject: ISAACS, Harold Robert. 10 NOV 1965 DMS - 1 NOV 1965

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/CE US UNITED STATES

EXTENSION:

NO. CSCI 316/04352-65

DATE 25 October 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI STAFF 2C 35	26 OCT 1965			
2.				
3. RID/CE GA-10 Attn: Sarah Marmaduke	26 OCT 1965			
4. [illegible]				
5. RID/AN GA 50				
6.				
7. RI/TY				TO: PSB/FBI
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				FILE TITLE
12.				
13.				FILE NUMBER 201 194 46
14.				ENCLOSURE ABSTRACT X
15. RID/FI 1B 4003				DOCUMENT DATE 26 OCT 1965 INDEX

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

26 OCT 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
ATTN: Special Agent in Charge of
Washington Field Office

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: ISAACS, Harold Robert

Reference is made to the request dated 14 October 1965 concerning Subject. Attached for your retention is a copy of our CSCI-316/04169-65, dated 13 October 1965, subject: ISAACS, Harold Robert. It is noted that a portion of the information appearing in said CSCI was previously forwarded to you in our SODB 20568, dated 2 December 1949, subject: Harold Robert ISAACS.

CSCI-316/04352-65

Encl. 1 name check
1 attachment as stated above

RID/CE: JMA/CPL/ell

Based on: CSCI-316/04169-65

CS COPY

201-18446

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

IN 201-18446

OCT 15

Special

RETURN TO: Tainor
10/14/65 caw
FILE #151-1423
PC
BUDED: 11/11a

NAME: ISAACS, HAROLD ROBERT

BORN: Sept. 13, 1910, NYC, NY

MS: married Viola Robinson, dob June 20, 1910, NYC, NY
married Shanghai, Sept. 14, 1932

ADDRESSES:
Aug., 1965 to present, 96 Farlow Rd., Newton, Mass.
July, 1953 to Aug., 1965 Mass.
Feb., 1944 to July, 1953, 333 Central Pk. West, NYC, NY
Sept., 1941 to Feb., 1944, 4938 Newport Ave., Friendship Hts., Md.
1940 to Sept., 1941, 72 Pk. Terrace West, NYC, NY
1937 to 1940, 40 Monroe St., NYC, NY

EDUCATION
George Washington H. S., NYC, 1923 to 1926

SSN: 082-03-4029

EMPLOYMENT:
1953 , Mass. Inst. of Technology, Camb, Mass., academic, research
1943 to 1950, Newsweek, WDC, CBI, Pacific, SE Asia, NYC, reporter, war corres. assoc. editor
1943, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., WDC, radio writer,
1940 to 1943, Columbia Broadcasting Co., NYC, WDC, writer
1934 to 1935, self employed, Peking, China, writer
1932 to 1934, Havas News Agency, Shanghai, China, news editor
1931 to 1932, China Press, Shanghai, China, city editor
1930 to 1931, Shai [illegible], China, reporter
1930, Honolulu Advert[illegible] reporter

JH 10/18/65

FOREIGN TRAVEL:
China, 1930 to 1935, travel, work, writing
China, Burma, India, [illegible] to 1945, war corres. Newsweek
PI, India, Indonesia, 1949 to 1949, Newsweek assignment
Phillippines, 1950 to 1950, cover Baguo conference
Europe Mainly UK, 195[illegible] to 1957, travel, visit university
Czech., Israel, India, [illegible] to 1960, academicX research project
Malaya, PI., etc., 19[illegible] to 1964,

[illegible] COORDINATION
Date 22 OCT 1965 INITIALS
RI ANALYST
BRANCH

RELATIVES:
Father, I. Robert Issacs, deceased
Mother, Sophie Dorlin, deceased
Wife, Viola Robinson Isaacs, dob 1910, same

FILE IN 201- [illegible]

REFERENCE: ICE 20 ICA
Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps., WDC, known 17 yrs.

CS COPY

18 OCT 1965

RETURN TO: Talsor
10/14/65 caw
FILE #151-1423
FC
CODED: 11/~~XIa~~

C.A.

OCT 21

NAME: ISAACS, HAROLD ROBERT

BORN: Sept. 13, 1910, NYC, NY

MS: married Viola Robinson, ~~Isaacs~~ dob June 20, 1910, NYC, NY
married Shanghai, Sept. 14, 1932

ADDRESSES:
Aug., 1965 to present, 96 Farlow Rd., Newton, Mass.
July, 1953 to Aug., 1965 Mass.
Feb., 1944 to July, 1953, 333 Central Pk. West, NYC, NY
Sept., 1941 to Feb., 1944, 4933 Newport Ave., Friendship Hts., Md.
1940 to Sept., 1941, 72 Pk. Terrace West, NYC, NY
1937 to 1940, 40 Monroe St., NYC, NY

EDUCATION
George Washington H. S., NYC, 1923 to 1926

SSN: 082-03-4020

EMPLOYMENT: 1935-1940 HAVAS News Agency
1950-1953 Self employed - writer NYC
1953 , Mass. Inst. of Technology, Camb, Mass., academic, research
1943 to 1950, Newsweek, WDC, CBI, Pacific, SE Asia, NYC, reporter, war corres. assoc. editor
1943, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., WDC, radio writor,
1940 to 1943, Columbia Broadcasting Co., NYC, WDC, writer
1934 to 1935, self employed, Peking, China, writer
1932 to 1934, Havas News Agency, Shanghai, China, news editor
1931 to 1932, China Press, Shanghai, China, city editor (CHINA FORUM)
1930 to 1931, Shai Evening Post, Shanghai, China, reporter
1930, Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu, reporter
1928-1930 New York Times - Reporter

FOREIGN TRAVEL:
China, 1930 to 1935, Travel, work, writing
China, Burma, India, 1944, to 1945, war corres. Newsweek
PI, India, Indonesia, 1949 to 1949, Newsweek assignment
Phillippines, 1950 to 1950, cover Baguo conference
Europe Mainly UK, 1957 to 1957, travel, visit university
Czech., Israel, India, 1960 to 1960, academicX research project
Malaya, PI., etc., 1963 to 1964,

RELATIVES:
Father, I. Robert Isaacs, deceased
Mother, Sophie Berlin, deceased
Wife, Viola Robinson Isaacs, dob 1910, same

REFERENCE:
Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps., WDC, known 17 yrs.

22/10/65

FILE IN 201-12446
(husband's 201)

possible Soif

22 OCT 1955

NAI to information forwarded in CSCI-316/04352-65, dated 26 October 1965, subject: ISAACS, Harold Robert.

DMS

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/CE US

EXTENSION

NO. CSCI 316/ 04169-65

DATE 11 October 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI STAFF 2C 35	12 OCT 1965		C6	
2.				
3. RID/CE GA-10 Attn: Sarah Marmaduke	13 OCT 1965		EK	
4.				
5. RID/AN GA 50				
6.				
7. RID/MIS			M	
8.				TO: PSB/CSC
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15. RID/FI 1B 4003				

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER: 201-18 446

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT X

DOCUMENT DATE 13 OCT 1965

INDEX

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OP-58 9-64 ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

13 OCT 1965

TO: United States Civil Service Commission
Attention: Mr. Joseph G. Campbell

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: ISAACS, Harold Robert

1. Reference is made to your request dated 14 September 1965. The files of this office contain considerable information concerning Subject, the salient elements of which are summarized below.

2. According to undated information from a reliable source, Subject born 13 September 1910 in New York City, arrived in Shanghai, China, from Manila, Philippine Islands, in December 1930. First employed in Shanghai by the English language daily, Evening Post and Mercury, Subject became associated a few weeks later with the China Press, with which he remained until May 1931. In June 1931 Subject traveled up the Yangtze River with the British Communist, Cecil Frank GLASS, a suspected agent for the Third International in China. Also in 1931, Subject became the Shanghai secretary of the Comite Internationale Pour la Defense de Paul et Gertrude RUEGG (NOULENS), a committee, with Headquarters in Berlin, formed to aid the defense of the NOULENS against charges of espionage perferred by the Chinese Government. Subject was in correspondence with Willi MUENZENBERG, President of the Committee and an active agent in Germany for the Third International. Subject was also known to be in contact with Agnes SMEDLEY in Shanghai during the same period. On 14 September 1932 in Shanghai, Subject married Viola ROBINSON, an American citizen born 10 June 1910 in New York City. Miss ROBINSON was believed to have been connected with Communist activities in the United States and in China. Correspondence between her and Subject prior to their marriage indicated that they were both sympathetic to activities being conducted by the Communists in China.

FILE IN 201-18446

CS COPY

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-18446

3. According to predecessor organization information, Subject was also employed as a staff writer for the Havas News Agency in Shanghai during the period 1930-1935 and was a member of the Society of Friends of the USSR and of the China League for Civil Rights.

4. An undated report from an unknown source indicated that Subject had turned against the Stalinist Government of the USSR, and had become a Trotskyite (probably during the mid-1930's). Friends of Subject stated that even during the height of his Trotskyist career he never accepted money from any group, that he was open and above board, and that he never engaged in any conspiracies to overthrow established government. They also indicated that Subject was attracted to communism by sheer idealism. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Subject broke with the Trotskyite group as he had broken with the Communists and began writing propaganda for the United States Government.

5. According to Source of paragraph 2, Subject was a war correspondent in China during World War II for Newsweek. In July 1945 he was refused entry into China by Chinese Nationalist authorities, presumably as a result of anti-Nationalist articles he wrote for Newsweek. In 1949 Subject was Special Features Editor for that magazine, at 152 West 42nd Street, New York City. He was the author of several books, including No Peace in Asia and The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution.

6. Subject's present political beliefs are unknown to this office.

CSCI-316/04169-65

Encl. 1 name check

RID/CE: JMA/DS/lpm

Based on: SODB-20568
CSCI-3/778,850

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

#451

14 SEP 1965

HUNT 9-14-65

H.R. H

ISAACS, Harled Robert 9-13-10

NewYork

ISACKS N

ISAAKS N

N USA

11/9/65

Mass

possible 50 ref 52473

DD 10-5

MEMORANDUM C…		
Date 05 Oct 65 T		
RI ANALYST		DMS
DIV.	BRANCH	
FE /	COOS	
FE /	JKOJO	
RI EDITOR		
RI TYPIST		

FILE IN 201-18446*

15 SEP 1965

201-18446

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
Suspected Soviet Agents domiciled in Shahghai

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. CHINA-CI AOP-L

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMP-D 4718 Box 193

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST JEP

6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 1963

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXX 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. Interested parties in the subjcet of HAROLD ISAACKS ~~are~~ referred to this document The bulky nature of this document plus numerous refs to other individuals and the poor quality of paper this makes it necessary to leave the file in its present classification.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201- 18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

27 Nov 63

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
RID/CE FE Japan

NO. CSCI-3/ 778,850

DATE 22 November 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI STAFF 2C 35	[illegible]	[illegible]	
2.			
3.			
4.			
5. RID/AN GA 50			
6. Rid/MIS			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. RID/FI 1B 4003			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

TO: ACSI (Telephonic)

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER
201- 18446

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT ☒

DOCUMENT DATE 27 NOV 1963

INDEX

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OP-56 5-62

☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

27 NOV 1963

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Attention: Chief, Counterintelligence
Branch Security Division

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: ISAACS, Harold Robert

1. Reference is made to the request received on 14 October 1963 from Lt. Whipple concerning Subject. With respect to the specific questions posed in the request, Subject is the author of a number of books, including No Peace in Asia, Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction, and The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. The files contain no information concerning Subject's teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; however they do contain the following summary of unevaluated information based on several predecessor organization reports. Additional information concerning Subject is contained in our SODB 20568, dated 2 December 1949, subject: Harold Robert ISACCS, a copy of which is attached for your retention.

a. Subject was employed as a staff writer for the Havas News Agency in Shanghai from 1930-1935. He was also editor and publisher of the China Forum, a communist periodical, from January 1932 to an unspecified date. In July 1932 ISAACS wrote and published the above-cited Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction, a 136-page illustrated book of Communist nature. While in Shanghai he was a member of The Society of Friends of the USSR (Shanghai Branch) and The China League for Civil Rights.

b. In 1933 Shanghai authorities listed Subject's wife, Viola ROBINSON, as a suspect Soviet agent residing in Shanghai. Prior to their marriage on 14 September 1932, ISAACS stated in a letter to Miss ROBINSON that he had definitely turned "Red." All the members of the ROBINSON family were described as Communists.

201-18446

1 Encl

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FILE IN 201-18446

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

c. In July 1933 the Nanking Government ordered the Municipality of Greater Shanghai to take drastic measures to stop the propaganda appearing in a number of publications including the China Forum, published by Subject. Subject's magazine allegedly published Communist propaganda; in this connection a protest was to be lodged against him with the American Consulate.

d. Subject was described as a "self-confessed Communist" in 1933. The following year he wrote an article entitled "I Break With The Chinese Stalinists" which appeared in the September-October 1934 edition of The New International, a Communist propaganda organ published in New York.

2. An undated report from an unknown source indicated that Subject had turned against the Stalinist Government of the USSR, becoming a Trotskyite(probably during the mid-1930's). Friends of Subject stated that even during the height of his Trotskyist career he never accepted money from any group, that he was open and above board, and that he never engaged in any conspiracies to overthrow established government. They also stated that Subject was attracted to Communism by "sheer idealism." Immediately after Pearl Harbor, ISAACS broke with the Trotskyite group as he had broken with the Communists and began writing propaganda for the United States Government.

3. According to a report dated 25 June 1951 from a fairly reliable source, Subject served at that time as a Ford Foundation advisor on Far Eastern Projects.

4. For additional information concerning Subject you are referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the Department of the Navy (no documentation available).

CSCI-3/778,880

Encl: 1 attachment as stated above.

RID/CE: JHA/MI/dcl

Based on: FE/1, 201-18446*
CHINA CIA OP 1, SMPD 2713, 10-11-32
CHINA CIA OP 1, SMPD 4606, 16-5-33
CHINA CIA OP 1, SMPD 4718
CHINA CIA OP1, SMPD 4685 & 4685/C
CHINA CIA OP 1, SMPD 5454-8,21-12-33
CHINA CIA OP 1, SMPD 6628
FDZ, 201-488-8
SO for NAVY referal.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CS CO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CSCI-3/778,850

DW 7

A404
A404

16633

S E C R E T

FE

FILE IN 201

TELEPHONE REQUEST FOR NAME CHECK. FOR USE OF RI NAME CHECK CONTROL OFFICE.

FROM ACSI - Lt. Whipple via Jane Roman DATE 14 Oct 63

TAKEN BY Moran Checked By Reply

ISAACS, Harold Robert
NAME ALIAS AND SPELLING VARIATIONS

born 1910
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA

REFERENCES

Author of many books on China - S. E. Asia

Harold R.Isaacs authority on China

Harold R. Isaacs teaches at MIT

are all the names the same person?

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION		
Cy 9 NOV 1963		INITIALS
RI ANALYST		mz
DIV.	BRANCH	
FE	China	mw
FE	Japan	cd
RI EDITOR		
RI TYPIST		

Summary of [illegible]

Reproduction, Rec.

Endt #1

15/10/63

337N5067

201-18446

CS COPY

Cy

FILE IN 201 18446 *

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST
U

6. DATE ~~PROCESSED~~
10 Sep 58

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/CA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER CI 5237

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 - 18 446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
Dutch Consul General Reports, Shanghai	2. RI FILE NO. 16-5-16		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. ONHA-12913		4. DATE 6 Jan 58
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM [illegible]	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JA 6. DATE PROCESSED 20 OCT 1965	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

H. R. ISAACS

American Communist, Suspected of working for the Komintern and the RIS.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

175

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. J0 - 5237	SOURCE CI/OA	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
SUBJECT ISAACS, HAROLD R. Born - 1910 - nationality - American			DATE 26 JUN 1956

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD IN RI/AR FILE, WASH-CIA-PERS-4.

	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM		1	[illegible]	

FORM NO. 137 REPLACES FORM 38-34
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(35)

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL **SECRET**

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 5 May 1956

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS

TELEPHONE:

NO. NPK-A-4384

DATE:

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE
1. NE	1109	7 MAY 1956		[illegible]	
2.					
3. RI/S		18 [illegible]		[illegible]	
4. CTK				CTK	
5. PP				[illegible]	
6.					
7.					
8.					
9. [illegible]		20 AUG 1956			[illegible]
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. RI/FI	1409 L				

COMMENTS

Geo. Gps. Mtrs. - Pakistan

Nehru

[illegible] as requested
[illegible] Subj requested
from Barbara Wendt
on 28 May 56 [illegible]

CARDED BY
[illegible]

70	6	7-	97
ABSTRACT	☒	INDEX	✓
DATE	14 MAY 1956		

FORM NO. 610 1 APR 55 REPLACES FORM 51-10 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HPK-A-4284

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, NEA

DATE 5 May 1956

FROM Chief of Station, Karachi WB

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/INTEL
SPECIFIC Far Eastern Association 8th Annual Meeting, Request for Background and Operational Information

1. The program of the 8th Annual Meeting of the Far Eastern Association, held in Philadelphia 3 - 5 April 1956, has just arrived here. It indicates that the association has already taken decided steps towards its announced expansion into the South Asian field. The station assumes that Headquarters covered the meeting and can get access now or later to copies of monographs, notes on proceedings, and so on.

2. The following items, keyed to the program, would seem to be of interest to this station if Headquarters can get them:

A. On 3 April, Zakye Eglar: "The World View of the Punjabi Villager".
(Note: This is quite likely the East Punjabi, but it should have some validity for Lahore as well as for Delhi.)

B. On the same day, a Pakistan Studies Organization Meeting was held at 1700. It would be useful to know who is interested in Pakistan studies (both individuals and organizations) and what lines they are thinking of working on.

C. On 5 April, all the items of a "South Asian Miscellany" should be of considerable interest, particularly Stanley Maron's "The Future of East Bengal". Hydecker has some early drafts of the Harold Isaacs study, but they are too early to provide any useful material; this project (at CENIS, MIT) is one that Headquarters should monitor closely, however.

NEIL R. HYDECKER

2 May 1956
NRH/wrg

Distribution:
5 - NEA
2 - Karachi

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

51-28A

RI COPY 78-62-21

TOP SECRET

DEC 5, 1955

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Fernando SEGUERRA, also known as Fernando [illegible] ROCES

1. Reference is made to a communication from this Agency dated 30 August 1955, captioned as above, our reference CS CI-2542.

2. Attached for your information is a copy of a letter written by subject and addressed to the post office box mentioned in the referenced memorandum. The letter was signed by subject as [illegible], his feminine pseudonym. It should also be explained that English is not subject's native language; therefore, the grammar and spelling used by subject in his letters are to be expected.

3. This office interprets subject's letter as follows:

a. Aunt Josephine is Jose LANSANG, with whom subject has been in contact the past several months and who has been indoctrinating subject with leftist ideology. LANSANG has not admitted to subject that he is a Communist, although in his conversations with subject he sticks very close to the current line of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP).

b. Harold ISAACS (FBI File No. 100-286243) is well known to the Bureau.

c. Uncle MANUEL is probably the late Philippine President Manuel QUEZON, who sponsored Jose LANSANG's entry into the United States in 1937 when LANSANG studied at Columbia University. William CARTER, Jr. has not yet been identified by this office.

d. PAELILIO, fnu is probably Dr. Filadelfo PAELILIO, former Associate Professor of Mechanics at the University of the Philippines. PAELILIO received his BSME from the University of the Philippines and his M.S. and Ph.D. at the University of Michigan.

[illegible] COPY OF [illegible] COPIES

TOP SECRET

201-18446

TOP SECRET

According to a usually reliable source of this Agency, PANLILIO was never able to completely readjust to Philippine life after having lived in the United States. He is known for his strong pro-American views and according to source probably his greatest desire is to reside permanently in the United States. Although it is known that PANLILIO was on friendly terms with Jose LANSANG there is no record that he shared LANSANG's political views.

e. Fr. [illegible] is probably Father DELANEY, Jesuit Chaplain at the University of the Philippines.

f. Cypros or Cyprus University may possibly be Syracuse University.

g. [illegible] is probably Ricardo LABEZ, Philippine newspaperman who was allegedly associated with Harry BRIDGES in the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) in Honolulu. LABEZ was born on 3 April 1915 in Manila; however, most of his life has been spent in Hawaii. He was naturalized a U.S. citizen in 1948 and returned to the Philippines in 1949, where he lost his U.S. citizenship in 1952. There is no information in the files of this office which indicates that LABEZ has returned to Hawaii. For additional information concerning LABEZ, reference is made to a memorandum to the Bureau, dated 23 November 1949, subject: "Ricardo LABEZ (aka Ricardo LAVEZ)", our reference SO DB-20307.

h. Uncle NOR is Nor CUYUGAN, Uncle BENTING is Baltazar CUYUGAN with whom the Bureau is familiar as a result of previous correspondence concerning his daughter, Carmen Jane CUYUGAN (FBI File No. 105-52561). From the wording of subject's letter this office assumes that Baltazar CUYUGAN is aware that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is investigating Nor CUYUGAN. It also appears that Baltazar CUYUGAN gave subject a letter to deliver personally to his brother Nor CUYUGAN, possibly to avoid a mail intercept by the Bureau. It should be noted that subject stated that he mailed the letter instead.

4. In view of the sensitiveness of the source of the above information, it is requested that no further dissemination be made of the information without prior clearance with this Agency.

CS CI-2768
[illegible] (CUT-[illegible]715), [illegible] September 1955
Attachment - A copy of a letter (To Addressee only)
[illegible] September 1955
[illegible]
Distribution:
[illegible]

[illegible] COPY OF 7 [illegible]

TOP SECRET

201-18446

FBI DOCUMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

DATE: 26 MAY 1955
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 (BUREAU)

DATE: 19 MAR 1954
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 (BUREAU

~~DATE: 27 JAN 54~~

DATE: 27 JAN 54
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: LIU TSUN-CH'I (M) AKA
T.C. LIU, LAU CHIN-KI
FBI FILE #: 100-365280 (BUREAU)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT x LIU TSUN-CH'I	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 201-41745 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DFB--30147 4. DATE 24 Sept.53 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JP 6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 63	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE XXXX

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Comments made by Francis McCracken Fisher

Fisher also recalled that sometime after the subject had gone ovor the Communists after 1950, he Fisher, met Harold Isaacs, a writer who formerly was a Trotskyte in His views, at which time Isaacs advised Fisher thaht he had known that subject was a Communist as early as the 1930's in Peking, China. Isaacs stated that the subjcet had worked for the Tass News Agency in Peking after having graduated form coleege and had evern bbeen sent to jaol due to his communist activies.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI DOCUMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

DATE: 26 MAY 1953
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAAC
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 9 (BUREAU)

DATE: 18 FEB 53
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 (BUREAU)

DATE: 12 NOVE 52
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 (BUREAU)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT: General Willoughby's Files - Documents Pertaining to Sorge, and the Shanghai Municipal Police Files

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.: 200-7-212-1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.: RI Encl. 25

4. DATE: 31 Oct 52

5. ANALYST: Diane Chenevier

6. DATE PROCESSED: 29 Sept 65

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM:

8. DATE OF INFO.:

9. EVALUATION:

10. DISSEMINATED IN:

11. DATE:

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS-REFERRED TO THIS FILE:

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.:

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

Shanghai MP, Special Branch, S-2, report of interception of propaganda-type letter to Harold R. ISAACS and of Volume 3, No. 18, 31 Oct 32 Issue of "The Chinese Worker's Correspondence" addressed to the China Forum.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-812446*

FORM 8-51 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
General Willoughby's Files — Documents Pertaining to Richard Sorge and the Shanghai Municipal Police Files	2. RI FILE NO. 200-7-212-1
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. RI Encl. 23
	4. DATE 31 Oct 52
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST Eleanor [illegible]	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 29 Dec 65	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. Photo copy of Special edition of China Forum called "Five years of Kuomintang Reaction" plus correspondence concerning it.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
General Willoughby's Files — Documents Pertaining to Richard Sorge, and the Shanghai Municipal Police Files

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 200- 7- 212 -1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. RI. Encl. 18

4. DATE 31 Oct 52

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST Diann Sherwin

6. DATE PROCESSED 29 Sept 65

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. ~~Shanghai Municipal Police Report.~~
Report by D.I. Ross 19 April 34.
CWC, Vol. 4, No. 13, 13.4.34
Addressed: Mr. H.R. ISAACS, Embankment Building, North Soochow Road, Local

forwarded extracts of Chinese Workers Correspondence relating to labour disputes in Shanghai during March 1934 —

The publication which was obtained from a confidential source was delivered through the post, addressed to ISAACS as above.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI REPORT
DATE: 6 OCTOBER 1952
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: JOHN KING FAIRBANK
FBI FILE #: 77-24341 (BUREAU)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
General Willoughby's Files - Documents Pertaining to Richard Sorge and the Shanghai Municipal Police Files	1. RI FILE NO. 200-7-212-1
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. RI Encl. 8
	4. DATE 31 Oct 52
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST Diane Chemin	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 29 Sept 65	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. Photographic copies of letters from Willi MUENZENBERG to ISAACS regarding International Committee for defense of Paul + Gertrude RUEGG.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI REPORT
DATE: 26 MAY 1952
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJ: GEORGE HERRING, WAS:
RING, PAUL RUEGG
FBI FILE #: 100-344906 (BUREAU)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Gunther Bruno Oswald STEIN	2. RI FILE NO. 201-391-57
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HKB-17243
	4. DATE 15 apr. 52
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM encl. 1
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST jib	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 2 Oct 65	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

H.R. ISAACS, and others, among American newspaper correspondents in Shanghai around 1930 to 1932.

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT Agnes Smedley, was.	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 201-414		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DFB-16151		4. DATE 5 Mar. 52
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST jep	6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov. 63	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. XXX CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

h

According to cojfidential informant T-17, of unkomwn reliability, Agnes smedley attempted to ovtain from the American Express Co. in Shahghai certain mail addressed to Harold R. Isaacs while Isaacs was avsent from the city. One of the return addresses on this mail was Smith and Isaacs, 344 East 149th Streed Bonnx , New York. Harold R. Isaacs, mention above, was identified by T 17 as an American Journalist of Communist sympathies who resised in Shahghai in the Early thirties.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
AGNES SMEDLEY,	2. RI FILE NO. 201-414
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DFB-16129
	4. DATE 14 Feb. 52
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JEP	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 63	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

xxxx	12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Subject of the document is mentioned as having visited the residence of Harold R. ~~XXXXXXX~~ Isaacs and C. ?R Frmank Glass, two notorious local Communits sympathisers.

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-18446.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI REPORT
DATE: 31 JAN. 52
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJ: TILLMAN, DURDIN
FBI FILE #: 105-15218 (BUREAU)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
IDA FRANCES TREAT BERGERET

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
2. RI FILE NO. 201-XXXXX 6209
3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DFB-24411
4. DATE 12 Feb. 52
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
8. DATE OF INFO.
9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JEP
6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 63
10. DISSEMINATED IN
11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION
XXXX 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION
14.
Subject remembers meetint HAROLD R. ISAACS, an American Jounnalist, at a party at the home of Madame SUN YAT SEN.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
SECRET
(7-46)

CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED FREE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS.—Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO. DCE 4385

DATE

TO—	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. ete	1603			U.	[illegible]
2.					
3. FE/50				J	
4. China			29 Feb	JJJ	rounded
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9. STC/SIB		MAR 10 1952			
10.					
11. STC/ICB				M	
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. F.I					

CONSOLIDATION EFFECTED BY [illegible]

REC
16 7 [illegible] 109
FEB 12 1952

FORM 51-9 FREE RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL

10—00413-1

see 4355

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, St [illegible], OSO
Attn: Mr. [illegible] [illegible]low

DATE: 7 February 1952

FROM : Chief, Contact Division, OO

SUBJECT: CS Information—Pro-Communist Sentiment of US Nationals in China

1. Enclosed is a copy of an article prepared for publication in the Christian Science Monitor by a former editor of the Shanghai English-language newspaper. It has not yet been published and probably will not be published because of its length.

for
E. H. [illegible]

ENCLOSURE (A) as listed above.

INDEX

[illegible] COPY

[illegible]-7-[illegible]-1[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL ACE 4385

SECURITY INFORMATION

1. A happy ending has been written in the case of Morris L. Appelman, former Communist who is now secretary of the General Rose Memorial Hospital of Denver. He has been praised in Washington for "disclosing his Communist past", and his board of directors has voted confidence in him and continued him in his job.

2. No doubt all this is fitting and proper but it doesn't answer the question of why nobody in Denver seems to have known anything about Appelman's Red-tinged past, or why there was anything sensational about his revelation of it in Washington. While the police state is rightly anathema to American citizens, it seems remarkable that official records should not be in existence and reasonably accessable to people with reason to check up on such a point as past Communist service.

3. The point about Appelman is not that he did anything particularly reprehensible, but that what he did was quite in the open. According to the Washington testimony he served the Communist party, apparently without special concealment, in Russia, Germany and other points in Europe, going around the world between 1924 and 1938. He sought to relieve Max and Grace Granich in the editorship of a Shanghai English-language Communist magazine, "The Voice of China", in 1937, he testified, but didn't get off his ship in Shanghai because of the hostilities there at the time.

4. This sheds something of a light on the supposedly fearless and ruthless Communist operations throughout the world. I was in Shanghai when fighting broke out there between Japan and China on Aug. 13, 1937, and can testify that we had three months of ding-dong warfare before the campaign moved inland. During that period a good many people left for obvious reasons, but some came in, and it might be presumed that an accredited agent of international Communism would at least have paused in nearby Kobe or Hongkong till things calmed down a little. Possibly the Communists are as subject to qualms about personal safety as anyone else—or more so.

5. About "The Voice of China" there could hardly be any illusion in the mind of anyone who had cared to pay the slightest attention to it. Each issue bore a virtual advertisement of its Communist allegiance on its front cover, to those familiar with methods of converting Chinese into English. The name "Voice of China" appeared in both English and Chinese, and in the Chinese a peculiar Soviet-originated system of Romanization was used so that what is ordinarily, by conventional Wade system, written "Chung Hwa" for China was spelled "Chung Xua"— an extraordinary effect frankly explaining the publication's ownership.

6. But what was more, Harold Isaacs, the editor who preceded the Granichs, had done considerably more than was conveyed by press dispatches from the Washington hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee. These said he was "believed to have deviated from Communist policy" whereas in fact he challenged with the Chinese Communists and their Moscow patrons

CONFIDENTIAL

completely with an article headed "I Break With Stalinism." This gave a candid elucidation of the Communist financial backing of the "Voice of China" and if anyone either in or out of official life had previously suffered any illusions as to its nature, Isaacs' article—published elsewhere than in the "Voice", of course—certainly should have dispelled them.

7. The Granichs seem to have lived quietly in Shanghai and were little known, which under the circumstances was hardly surprising since they were running an obviously Communist organ. Chiang Kai-shek's forces could not meddle with them openly, for at that time Shanghai was an international city operated under extraterritoriality. But the Nationalist secret police did create some trouble for the "Voice" and then Consul-General Clarence E. Gauss was allegedly reprimanded by the State Department in 1937 for not doing more to help them as Americans. Technically they were entitled to full American protection but Gauss, now with the Import-Export Bank in Washington, D. C., was a sort of Old Curmudgeon of the Shanghai American community and it seems that he thought it his moral obligation to let them fry in any trouble they might get into as Communist agents. Gauss can't have suffered greatly for this in the eyes of his superiors, for he was later promoted to ambassador both to China and to Australia.

8. This background has some present importance since an American magazine is being operated today in Communist Shanghai, which tolerates no criticism or opposition. Originally pro-Nationalist under the late J. B. Powell, it has been friendly toward the Communists under his son, John William Powell, and it stayed on after most other American enterprises—including the daily Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, edited by myself—had shut down and American officials had left Red China.

9. Before they departed, these officials had reason to compile an extensive file on what is now the China Monthly Review. One incident which is known to have irked them was the Review's treatment of the case of William Olive, American consular official, in the summer of 1949 soon after the Communists had taken over. Olive blundered into a traffic conflict with the Communist police, was taken to first one and then a second police station, and in the course of several days' imprisonment he was severely beaten with fists and gunbutts, kicked and otherwise maltreated. Powell's Review blandly professed to have little information on the matter but gave an account unfavorable to Olive. When consular officials asked Powell to come to the consulate and look Olive over and get the full story, he failed to show up. This and other matters were recorded in some detail but in view of the background of American intelligence operation, one may question whether these details will ever be hauled out of the files.

10. More recently, copies of the Review have been slanted strongly against the Americans and the United Nations cause in Korea and one issue editorially spoke of the United States as "the enemy." It should not be difficult to preserve continuity in following such a case of American pro-Communist activity abroad, though nothing could be done to Powell unless

CONFIDENTIAL DCE 4385
SECURITY INFORMATION

or until he decided to return to his own country—and even then, the complex nature of American laws on this general subject make it hard to tell what could be done aside from perhaps denying another passport to go abroad again.

11. The important thing, as shown by a long list of cases gravely investigated by congressional committees, is to have the postwar Central Intelligence Agency or some comparable group such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation keep track of the wealth of information available. Too much waste effort goes into the many duplications of inquiry.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible] - 107

CONFIDENTIAL

DCE 4355

SECURITY INFORMATION

Chief, St ff C, OSO
Attn: Miss Jane Winslow
Chief, Contact Division, OO

7 February 1952

OS Information—Pro-Communist Sentiment of US Nationals in China

1. Enclosed is a copy of an article prepared for publication in the Christian Science Monitor by a former editor of the Shanghai English-language newspapers. It has not yet been published and probably will not be published because of its length.

R. M. ASHCRAFT

ENCLOSURES (A) as listed above.

COPY

[illegible]-109

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DISPATCH NO. LJW-

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 6 February 1952

TO : Chief of Mission, FEU/FES

FROM : Chief, FE

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Counter-espionage
SPECIFIC- Transmittal of CE Study on "The NOULENS Case"

Attachments: (1) Subject CE Study (4 copies)

The attached study entitled "The NOULENS Case", compiled by our CE office, is forwarded for your information and for retention in your CE files.

COPY

BERNHARD VON AMMON

Originator: John L. Witzleben

RELEASING OFFICER
LLOYD GEORGE
Chief, FE

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
John Chrislaw
FE/B/SO

CLASSIFICATION

17891

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

ZCS 1811, Shanghai Muncipal Files, filed 16-4-2-37

ISAACS, Harold Robert

Born 13 Sept 1910, NYC
Nat'l American

DESCRIPTION
Height 5'9"
Build medium
Hair black, wavy, brushed back
Eyes brown

DOCUMENTATION
In 30s was traveling on passport # 177026

Arrived in China from Manila on 10 Dec 1930
Upon his arrival joined the editorial staff of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury.

Was a secretary of the NOULENS Defense Comitee and a member of the Society of Friends of the USSR

to Szechwan acc to FBI

On 12 June 1931, ISAACS and his friend GLASS took a trip up the Yangtse. During this trip ISAACS wrote his fiancee, Viola ROBINSON, that he had decided to turn " Red" as a result of conversations with GLASS.

The two returned to Shanghai in Aug 1931 and took up residence at # 128 Weihaiwei Road.

ISAACS later started and became the editor and publisher of the " China Forum" which at first was job-printed but from Oct 1932 on was printed by the Level Publishing Co. INC., # 33, Lane 478 Tiendong Road, Shanghai. ISAACS openedly stated he was manager of the printing co and owned 40% of its shares.

On 7 Aug 1933, ISAACS and his wife Viola ROBINSON whom he had married in Sept 1932 left Shanghai for Japan on the SS Nagasaki Maru; On 16 Aug, they proceeded to Japan, returning to Shanghai on Aug 26th.

Inaddition to his other activities, ISAACS was also employed with the Havas News Agency. He severed connection with this Agency around Dec 1933.

In Dec 1933, ISAACS was in Foochow to gather 1st hand info re the newly formed "Peolple's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China."

In the spring of 1934, ISAACS and his wife left for Tientsin en route to Peking at which city he resided at # 2 T'ung Fu Chia Tao, East City. Peking mailing address was % Mr. UHLMANN, Grand Hotel.

On 3 January 1934, ISAACS visited Mr and Mrs. NOULENS while they were on a hunger strike in prison

On 14 January 1934, the parents of ISAACS, Mr and Mrs I.H. ISAACS arrived in Shanghai from Los Angeles. During their stay in Shanghai they resided at the Metropol Hotel Annex. On 20 February they left Shanghai for Port Said en route to Marseilles on the SS Rawalpindi.

On 4 April 1936, ISAACS under the pen name of Lo Sen had an article published in the New Militant, the organ of the NY District Worker's Party. The article was an attack on Stalin and was entitled " Stalintern ready to embrace Chian Kai Shek. [illegible] Officer Chinese Red Army in return for resurrection of disasterous 1927 bloc!"
At this same time, ISAACS was also lecturing on Japan, China, and the USSR and the War Crisis in the Far East.

5 Jul 49

GLASS

1 Shanghai Muni Polic e Files, filed, 16-4-2- 37, p 2

In Shanghai GLASS made the acquaintance of one Damaree C.BASS, American from Kansas City, born 1893.This was some time after April 1932.

Name C.F. GLASS = Cecil Frank GLASS
Born 25 March 1901, Birmingham,England

Passport British passport, # 94153, issued 5 Jan 1931 in Pretoria,South Africa
Pol Affiliation-Member of the CP
Overt Profession-Journalist

Believed to have left England in the early 1920s for South Africa where he resided at Johannesburg for many years.

Arrived in Shanghai from Durban May 1931

On 12 June 1931 made a trip ~~through~~ up the ~~Yangstoe~~ Yangtsze with Harold ISAACS American Communist and ~~writer for the~~ editor of the China Forum. A letter written by ISAACS to his fiancee, Miss Viola ROBINSON, during this trip contained information that ISAACS had decided to turn " Red" as a result of his conversation with GLASS.

In Sept 1931, GLASS became a member of the "NOULENS Defense Committee" and two months later was appointed Shanghai Representative of the Anglo-Asiatic Telegraph Agency(Angasta) a news agency with HQ in Harbin, which position he held until 1933.

In Aug1933, he was living in Room 510,# 1276,North Szechuen Road,Shanghai

CCS 1811; Shanghai Municipal Files, file: 16-4-2-37

ROBINSON, Viola
@ MRS. H.R. ISAACS

Born 10 July 1910, NYC
Nat'l American

Description
Height 5'5"
Build slim
Complx fair

Documentation
In 1932 holder of US passport # 382046 issued NYC 14 May 1931

History
In 1931 known to have visited Germany

Known Communist and follower of Lucy STONE

Arrived in Shanghai on 23 Aug 1932

14 Sept 1932 married Harold Robert ISAACS. She had been engaged to ISAACS for some years before her arrival in China, and it has been stated that the letters between the two indicated ~~that~~ Communist sympathies on the part of both and of ISAACS' intention of joining the CP

After her arrival in China was employed at the Dah Chung Middle School, Shanghai as a teacher.

She lived in the Embankment Building Bldg, North Soochow Road

On 7 August 1933, the ISAACS left Shanghai for Japan and on 16 Aug 1933 proceeded to Dairen, returning to Shanghai by rail on 26 August 1933.

In Nov 1933, info was received to the effect that Miss ROBINSON was a teacher at the Comparative Law School, Shanghai.

13

AUG 14 1951

Harold Robert ISAACS with aliases

LO SAN (penname used in China)

Harold Robert ISAACS was born in New York City on 13 September 1910 of American parents. His father has been reported as " decidedly of the commercial type." ISAACS has been described as intelligent, critical, ~~nervous~~ and nervously organized.

Little is known concerning the activities of ISAACS prior to his arrival in China from Manila on 10 December 1930; however, Mr. I. H. ISAACS who visited ISAACS ~~[illegible]~~ in [illegible] [illegible] date in Shanghai, is reported to have embarrassed his son in the presence of friends by " kidding" the latter about trying to make money on real estate while in Los Angeles before going to China.

met?

The actual date when Cecil Frank GLASS and Harold ISAACS met is not known, but it must have been shortly after the arrival of GLASS in Shanghai in May 1931, for in June 1931, ISAACS and GLASS made a trip up the Yangtsze together.

It has been stated that ISAACS became interested in Communism with specific relation to China, but it has been stated that letters written by ISAACS to his fiancee, Viola ROBINSON, ~~[illegible] stated to~~ on his trip with GLASS, ~~are stated to indicate~~

It has been stated that ISAACS became interested in Communism with ~~in~~ specific relation to China; it has also been stated that letters between ISAACS and his fiance, Viola ROBINSON, which were written during the Yangtsze trip indicated Communist sympathies on the part of both, and one of the letters contained the information that ISAACS had decided to turn " Red" as a result of his conversations with GLASS. As you are aware, ISAACS and GLASS returned to Shanghai in August 1931 and took up residence at 128 Weihaiwei Road. In September 1931, both men are reported to have become members of the NOULENS Defense Committee, ISAACS being the Secretary.

ISAACS is also reported to have been a member of the Society of Friends of the USSR.

Upon his arrival in China, ISAACS joined the editorial staff of the Shanghai Evening Post and the Mercury. ISAACS was also employed with the Havas News Agency, which connection he is reported to have severed around December 1933.

ISAACS also started and later became editor and published of the " China Forum." It is believed to have been ~~It was~~ a monthly English language paper issued at first as a commercial job from the Mercury Press. From October 1932 on it was printed by the Level Publishing Company Inc., 33, Lane 478, Tiendong Road. ISAACS is reported to have openly stated that he was manager of the pringting company, owing 40% of the shares.

It has been stated that those who knew ISAACS in Shanghai found no reason to think he was a " pay off" man for American Communists, and that during the first part of his stay in China, he was not a follower of Trotsky. However, he is reported to have finally become convinced that the tatics of the Chinese Communists were wrong and that Trotsky was right in criticising them, and the Soviet Government under Stalin. He therefore wrote an article entitled, " I Break with ~~Stalin~~ the Stalinists," in which among other things, he is reported to have stated that the expense of publishing the magazine had been borned by the Chinese Communists. He is then reported to have discontinued the magazine and to have sold the printing equipment, the sum being realized from the sale not being turned back to the Chinese Communists but to have been given to the Trotsky cause.

ISAACS had been engaged for several years to Viola ROBINSON who arrived in Shanghai on 28 August 1932. On 14 September 1932, she and ISAACS were married and took up residence in ~~the~~ Apt 204, the Embankment Building on North Soochow Road. Prior to the fall of 1933, Irene WEITMEYER or WEIDEMEYER ~~of the~~ a subject in the SORGE Case is reported to have lived in the Embankment Building with one Renee HOLZEL. Bold AUDOUARD and his wife who have been reported as Soviet sympathizers and ~~were~~ who were known to have been in close contact with E E KISCH when the latter was in China also lived in this building in the early 1930s in Apartment 509.

After her arrival in China, Viola ROBINSON ISAACS was employed at the Deh Chung Middle School, and by November 1933 was reported as a teacher at the Comparative Law School in Shanghai.

On 7 August 1933, the ISAACS left Shanghai for Japan, and on 16 August 1933 proceeded to Dairen, returning to Shanghai by rail on 26 August 1933. In ~~November~~ December 1933 ISAACS left Shanghai for Foochow to gather first hand information on the newly formed "People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China." [redacted]

In January 1934, ISAACS is reported to have visited Mr. and Mrs. NOULENS while they were on a hunger strike in prison. In the spring of 1934, ISAACS and his wife left for Tientsin en route to Peking at which city, they resided at 2 T'ung Fu Chia Tao, East City. His mailing address was c/o of one Mr. UEBMANN, Grand Hotel, Peking.

As has been set out heretofore, ISAACS is reported to have turned against the Stalinist Government of the USSR, becoming a Trotskyite. During this period he wrote the "Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution," allegedly as a single gesture of interpretation and protest to show how, in his opinion, both the Kuomintang and the Communists had gone wrong in China. Also in April 1936, under the pen name of Lo Sen, ISAACS had an article published in the "New Militant," the organ of the NY District Worker's Party. The article ~~is~~ was reportedly an attack on Stalin and was entitled, "Stalintern ready to embrace Chiang Kai Shek. . . Officer Chinese Red Army in Return for resurrection of disasterous 1927 bloc."

It has been stated by friends of ISAACS even during the height of his Trotskyist career, he never accepted money from any group; that he was open and above board; and that he never engaged in any conspiracies to overthrow established government. They are also reported to have stated that ISAACS was attracted to Communism by Shaheer idealism."

It has been further reported that immediately after Pearl Harbor, ISAACS broke with the Trotskyite group as he had broken with the Communists", and began writing propaganda for the United States Government.

Sometime in the late 1930s, ISAACS returned to the United States. ~~By the fall~~ Until the fall of France, he was employed by the Havas News Agency. In October 1943, of 1943, he was working for Newsweek Magazine in Washington, D.C. His address at that time was Friendship Heights, Newport Ave., 4938.

By late 1944 or early 1945, ISAACS was in Chungking as a representative of Newsweek. During this period, he had a great deal of trouble about censorship, and reportedly was deined permission to visit Communist areas. It has been stated that actually he was merely unfortunate in that he applied just after the government had restored its ban on journalistic travel in that direction. At the time he ~~had~~ was denied permission, "Teddy" WHITE of Time had just been allowed to go, and ISAACS felt that he was being discriminated against. It has been stated that WHITE, upon his return gave such a good account of administration in the Red areas that this, added to othe similar experiences, solidified the government's determination no to let any more American newspapermen " go up and become Communist converts." In March 1945, ISAACS was reported as about to leave Chungking permanently.

The following descriptions of Harold and Viola ISAACS are set out for your information.

	Harold ISAACS	Viola R. ISAACS
Born	10 July 1910, NYC	13 Sept., 1910, NYC
Nat'l	American	American
Height	5'9"	5'5"
Build	medium	slim
Hair	black, wavy, brushed back	
Eyes	brown	
Complx		fair
Passports in early 1930s	US Passport # 177026	U.S passport # 382046, issued NYC 14 May 1931

In addition to Agnes SMEDLEY and Frank GLASS, ISAACS is known to have been in contact with the following while in China:

William DURDIN. For a time during his stay in China, ISAACS is reported to have lived with DURDIN, then correspondent of the NY Times and ~~mene~~ at one time, managing editor of "China Press."

John K. MURRAY, Shanghai representative of the Pacific News Agency in Vancouver. MURRAY is also known to have been in contact with E.E. KISCH, Agnes SMEDLEY, Irene WEITEMEYER or WEIDEMEYER and one W. ROVER during his stay in China.

AUG 14 19[illegible]

INTEGRATION SECTION

132

ISAACS **PUBLICATIONS**

Wrote an article entitled " I Break with the Stalinists" which allegedly among in
other things, that the expenses of publishing a magazine which he was putting out
had been borned by the Chinese Communists.

At one time, ISAACS published a monthly English language magazine, issued first
as a commercial joy(sic) from the Mercury Press and later printed from a small printing
outfit purchased by ISAACS. It has been stated that after publishing the article "I
Break with the Stalinists," ISAACS discontinued the magazine and sold its printing
equipment. It has been stated that the small sum realised from the sale was not turned
back to the Chinese Communists but was turned over to the Trotsky Cause.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
Irene Emma Ada WEITEMEYER

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 201-18446-1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. LCB-14423

4. DATE 20 Dec 51

5. ANALYST MS

6. DATE PROCESSED 20 Oct 65

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 19.5

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.
In Sept. 1931 it was reported that an 'Aid Committee to the Secretary of the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (Noulens) had been formed in Shanghai, and that in addition to WEITEMEYER its members included HAROLD ISAACS and others, - all well known local radical journalists.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT: Alexander Hassler Buchman

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.: 201-6783

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.: SODB-45339

4. DATE: d 5 Dec. 51

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM:

8. DATE OF INFO.:

9. EVALUATION:

5. ANALYST: James . Plaugher

6. DATE PROCESSED: 3 Dec. 63

10. DISSEMINATED IN:

11. DATE:

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXX 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence concerning the captiondd subject and in particular to your communication of 10 July 51, your file number 105—11929 in which it was requested that Tilman Durdin be interviewed regarding his knowledge of the backgound, beliefs and ~~mm~~ activities of the individuals named below. Durdin, who travels continously and extensively in the Far East, was finally located in Djakarta Indonesia, and on 14 Nov. 51 was interviewed, in accordance eith your request, and the following information elicited.

2. Durdin stated he knew nothing definite regarding the present activities and alleded communist connection of Frans Joseph WEISBLATT, Harold ISAACS, Frans GLASS, ALEXANDER BASSLER BUCHMAN and George Alexander Kennedy, and that he could furnish info on their early activities only.

~~3XXXDURDINXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXC~~

3. DURDIN said that he knows Harold Isaacs well and that he last saw him at the conference in Baguido in the Philippines, which was held in November 1947. He stated that ~~Isaaxs~~ ISAACS was formerly with NEWSWEEK but that he now believes he is a gree lance lecturer and writer. He gave his opinion that Isaaxs, althought left wing, is not necessarily a communist.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FBI REPORT
DATE: 5 DEC. 51
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJ: PAUL RUEGG, WAS: HILAIRE NOULENS,
AND OTHERS
FBI FILE #: 100-344906 (BUREAU)

14-00000

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

From: [illegible]

To: [illegible] 15 NOV 51

Action: [illegible] IN 40810

Information: [illegible]

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51(1) of [illegible]

JAKA-528

[illegible]

RE: [illegible] (OUT 31393).

1. SUBJECT VISITED [illegible] OFFICE [illegible]

ACCORDING APPROACH PREVIOUSLY AGREED UPON. SUBJECT QUITE [illegible]

[illegible] ABOUT THESE PERSONS EARLY ACTIVITIES [illegible]

[illegible] THEIR PRESENT ACTIVITIES AND [illegible]

[illegible]

2. HAD ONLY HAZY RECOLLECTION MEETING WEISBLATT [illegible]

ABOUT 193 (AS RECEIVED). DID NOT LIVE WITH WEISBLATT ALTHO POSSIBLY

OCCUPIED SAME BACHELORS MESS SHORT PERIOD. NO INFO PRESENT [illegible]

[illegible]. SUBJECT KNOWS ISAACS WELL. SAW HIM LAST [illegible]

1950, POSSIBLY WITH NEWSWEEK BUT BELIEVES ISAACS NOW [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

[illegible] YEAR OLD [illegible] [illegible] LATE 30'S [illegible] LOS ANGELES. [illegible] INVESTIGATORS. SUBJECT BELIEVES [illegible] SYMPATHIES [illegible] HAVE HAD [illegible] YALE UNIVERSITY AS [illegible] PEKING ABOUT 1948. [illegible] SHANGHAI DURING 30'S BUT SUBJECT KNOWS NOTHING HIS POLITICAL IDEOLOGY.

[illegible] SECRET

14-00000

COPY

SECRET

7 November 1951

Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Attention: Security Officer
Chief, Special Security Division

Harold R. Isaacs

1. Reference is made to a memorandum from your office dated 3 July 1951 in which you requested that a Special Inquiry be conducted to resolve information concerning an allegation that Subject is sympathetic to and/or connected with Communist activities.

2. On 31 August 1951, Mr. Kenneth Patrum of the Security Office was advised that partial results have been received as a result of inquiries at several national agencies. The partial information reflected that Subject had been connected with at least two factions of the Communist Party while living in the Far East. It was suggested that extreme caution be used in contacting or associating with the Subject.

3. This office has completed the investigation of the Subject, which includes a check of records of the appropriate Federal agencies. As a result of this investigation, the files of this office contain a great deal of information concerning Subject's association with questionable organizations and individuals. Although Subject has denied any current activities with the Communist Party, his associations and activities are highly questionable and his political sympathy has not been unqualifiedly resolved at the present time.

4. In view of the information as set forth above, it is recommended that extreme caution be exercised in dealing with the Subject. Under no circumstances should Subject be contacted with regard to possible use by this agency prior to receiving a final security determination by this office.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

SECRET

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR

DISPATCH NO. [illegible] 1100

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 25 September 1951

TO: [redacted] Chief of Station, Hong Kong

FROM: Chief, Foreign Division B

SUBJECT: GENERAL — [illegible] Information

SPECIFIC — Request for Interview [redacted] Tillman Durdin.

1. In connection with a current investigation, ZASERAN has requested that Tillman Durdin be interviewed along the lines set out below. It is requested that if Durdin is not now in Hong Kong or is not expected to be there for some time you advise headquarters so that a copy of this dispatch can be sent to the proper station. It is not deemed desirable for you or any member of your staff to undertake this interview personally. It is suggested, therefore, that a precis of this dispatch be made available to a suitable [illegible] officer (a representative of the [illegible] Security Office, if one is available), and that he interview Durdin and inform you of the results.

2. A reliable [illegible] informant has stated that in 1933 Durdin was in Shanghai, acting as city editor of the "China Press." At that time he was said to have shared an apartment with Frank Joseph [illegible], who is described as an American citizen then in China as a news reporter. According to the informant, [illegible] was at that time a close associate of Harold ISAACS, who was said to have been employed in Shanghai in 1933 as editor of the "China Forum", considered as a Communist publication. A ZASERAN source of unknown reliability has stated that in 1933 ISAACS was a "notorious radical sympathizer" and was suspected of being an agent for the Third International.

3. In 1949, ZASERAN representatives interviewed one Morris Louis APPLEMAN in Denver, Colorado. APPLEMAN admitted having been a CP member from 1924 to 1937. He stated that in 1933 and 1934 he knew Durdin in Shanghai, and that during that period, he, Harold ISAACS, Frank GLASS and Alexander BUCHMAN, frequently held meetings at the home of Tillman Durdin in Shanghai. Frank GLASS is a British subject presently living in Los Angeles. BUCHMAN is an American who also lives in Los Angeles. APPLEMAN described ISAACS and GLASS as Trotskyites in 1933-34, and described BUCHMAN as a former member of the Communist Youth League in the U.S. A ZASERAN informant of unknown reliability has reported that during that period GLASS and ISAACS were suspected of being

RELEASING OFFICER
LLOYD GEORGE
CHIEF, FDB

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
GEORGE W. MALLORY

CLASSIFICATION

agents for the Third International in Shanghai.

4. In addition to the above individuals, Durdin is also reported to have been an acquaintance in Shanghai about 1932-33 of George Alexander KENNEDY, who is presently employed at Yale University. KENNEDY was an acquaintance of ISAACS and was also reported to have been associated with "Left-wing groups" [illegible] Shanghai at that time.

5. In view of the above ZASSHAFT desires that Durdin be interviewed as soon as possible relative to the [illegible] acquaintance and association with: WEISBLATT, ISAACS, GLASS, BUCH[illegible] KENNEDY. Durdin is requested to comment particularly concerning any act[illegible] these individuals on behalf of the CP or the Third International, [illegible] any may have been engaged in espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union, either during the early 1930's in China, or at any subsequent period.

GEORGE W. MALLORY

14-00000

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

In reply, please refer to
File No. 105-15219

CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

DF B-11880
201-6556
Sept 14 1951

Date: September 11, 1951

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Major General W. G. Wyman
Office of Special Operations

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: TILLMAN DURDIN
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

In connection with an official investigation being conducted by this Bureau, we are desirous of obtaining certain information from Mr. Tillman Durdin, who is presently located c/o Hong Kong, Tiger Standard, 108 Windsor House, Victoria, Hong Kong. It would be appreciated if you would have one of your representatives interview Mr. Durdin in Hong Kong along the lines set out below.

For your information, Durdin is a foreign correspondent for the New York Times newspaper. He is an American citizen born March 30, 1907, at Elkhart, Texas, and has been employed as a foreign correspondent for the New York Times for many years, possibly since at least the early 1930's.

A reliable informant has advised that in 1939 Durdin was in Shanghai, China, acting as City Editor of the newspaper "China Press." At that time Durdin was said to be sharing an apartment with Franz Joseph Weisblatt, described as an American citizen then in China as a newspaper reporter.

According to our informant, Weisblatt was at that time a close associate of one Harold Isaacs. Isaacs, an American citizen presently living in New York City, was said by our informant to have been employed

[redacted]

in Shanghai in 1933 as Editor of the "China Forum," described as a Communist publication. A source of unknown reliability has stated that in 1933 Isaacs was a "notorious radical sympathizer" and was suspected of being an agent of the Third International. Isaacs was said to have organized the Shanghai Committee for the Defense of the Rueggs. Paul and Gertrude Ruegg were convicted in China in 1932 for Russian espionage activities.

In March, 1949 [redacted] this Bureau interviewed one Morris Louis Appleman, an American citizen presently living in Denver, Colorado, and Appleman admitted having been a member of the Communist Party from 1924 to 1937. Appleman stated that in 1933 and 1934 he knew Durdin in Shanghai, and that during that period, he, Appleman, Harold Isaacs, Frank Glass and Alexander Buchman, frequently held meetings at the home of Tillman Durdin in Shanghai.

Frank Glass is a British citizen presently living in Los Angeles, California. Buchman is an American citizen also presently living in Los Angeles. Morris Appleman described Isaacs and Glass as Trotskyites in 1933-34, and described Buchman as a former member of the Communist Youth League in the United States. An informant of unknown reliability has also reported that during that period Glass and Isaacs were suspected of being agents for the Third International in Shanghai.

In addition to the above individuals, Durdin is also reported to have been an acquaintance in Shanghai in about 1932-33 of George Alexander Kennedy, an American citizen presently employed at Yale University. Kennedy was an acquaintance of Harold Isaacs at that time, and was also reported to have been associated with "left-wing groups" in Shanghai at that time.

In view of the information indicating that Mr. Durdin was acquainted with these individuals during the early 1930's, it is desired that he be interviewed relative to the extent of his acquaintance and association with the following: Franz Joseph Weinblatt, Harold Isaacs, Frank Glass, Alexander Buchman, and George Alexander Kennedy.

It is requested that Durdin be questioned particularly as to any information he may possess concerning any activities of these individuals on behalf of the Communist Party or the Third International. Durdin should also be asked whether he has any information indicating any of these individuals may have engaged in espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union, either during the early 1930's in China or at any subsequent period. It is desired that full details be obtained from

Mr. Durlin relative to any information he may furnish concerning possible subversive activities on the part of any of these individuals.

It would be appreciated if you would endeavor to have Mr. Durlin interviewed at the earliest possible date.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 2 Aug 51

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: IR	NO. 2FH-89
	DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. FDZ	2006	[illegible] 51		J	Logged
2. REPORTS			[illegible]	JR	COPY RETAINED FDZ/BR.2
3. Br.2				JC	
4. Connell		7 Aug	7 Aug	J	
5.					
6.					
7. W. Morris				wtm	No Dissem - inaccurate Paris queried re recent whereabout Figuères.
8.					
9.					
10.					Xref filed 1a-4-21-6
11.					
12.					201-18446
13.					
14.					
15. IR	1409				

INTELLIGENCE
Pl 16 Aug 51
RECORDS

ABSTRACT — INDEX

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

SECRET

From: Hanoi

No. of pages: 1

Report Made by Walter J. Ingold

Distribution: None

Source Cryptonym: Tunic-2

Report No.: ZFH-89

Enclosures: None

Approved by James M. Lanier

Reference: HANO 242 and WASH 01125

Remarks:

1. In our last message to Tunic-2 on 30 July we used the discrepancy concerning Leo Figueres' visit to NVN as an example in a gentle lecture on the virtues of accurate reporting. By 1 August Tunic-2 answered back. The man obviously takes pride in his work.
2. An ops comment relating to this report will be sent in another pouch or via cable.

SECRET

[illegible]-1177-3

HQ COPY

SECRET

Subject: Leo Figueres

Report No.: ZFH-89

Date of Info: as indicated

Place Acquired: Viet Nam, Hanoi

Date Acquired: 1 August 51

Evaluation: B-3

Date of Report: 2 August 51

Source:

1. According to Hoang Hui, who works in the Viet Minh Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leo Figueres was in Saigon in early 1950. The French did not allow him to remain in Saigon and he was forced to return to France. Figueres later went to Hong Kong in late August 1950, and then proceeded to the Viet Bac via the Hoa Nam (F.C.: South China ?) road to attend the Third Congress of the PCI held in early October 1950.

2. There had been several previous cases of individuals who were unable to reach Viet Minh territory from Saigon because of French interference. In July 1949 Mr. A. Roth, Editor of the Sunday Tribune, arrived in Saigon and obtained all necessary papers; the French did not allow him to proceed because of his pro-Communist articles. Others were Walter Briggs of the Christian Science Monitor, Harold Isaacs from Newsweek, and S. J. Perelman (because he criticized Bao Dai in Westward, Ho!).

SECRET

FBI REPORT
DATE: JULY 51
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJ: UNKNOWN
FBI FILE #: 100-68282 (NEW YORK)

SECRET

John, Pls. make a file & index only on this

25 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: PI/CS

SUBJECT : Harold R. Isaacs, Request for an information namecheck on.

1. It is requested that a namecheck for information be conducted on Subject for the purpose of determining the validity of charges that Subject is sympathetic to and/or connected with Communist activities.

2. We have been informed unofficially that Subject is currently employed by the Ford Foundation as an adviser on Far East projects. When one of our covert agents was recently called upon by the Ford Foundation to present some suggestions for a Far East program, the agent found that Subject was interested in and was to be closely connected with this program. It is planned that the Ford Foundation remains unaware of the CIA connection with this covert agent.

3. When the report is completed, the information should be routed to J. Bruce Amstutz, FE-1/OPC.

DOUGLAS D. PIRNIE
Deputy Chief, FE-1

FE-1/JBA/ph

Dist: Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - Registry
1 - FE-1 files ✓

SECRET

SECRET

NAME: Harold R. Isaacs

ADDRESS (last known - '48): 333 Central Park West, N.Y.C.

DATE OF BIRTH: 1910

NATIONALITY: American

BUSINESS CAREER: (a) Staff writer for Havas News Agency (1930-1935)

(b) Editor of China Forum

(c) City Editor for China Press, Shanghai, China

(d) Far Eastern War Correspondent for Newsweek - (1944-1945)

(e) Special Projects Editor for Newsweek (1947 - ?)

(f) Advisor to Ford Foundation

PUBLICATIONS:

1. Contributed to Harper's Magazine and Toronto Star Weekly.
2. Books: (see attached)

SECRET

SECRET

1. Two-Thirds of the World; Problems of a new approach to the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin-America. - 1950

2. New Cycle in Asia; Selected documents on Major International developments in Far East. 1943 and 1947 - notes and introduction 1947.

3. No Peace for Asia - 1947

4. Tragedy of Chinese Revolution - 1938

5. Five Years of Kuo Min Tang Reaction - 1932

6. Whither France - 1936 - Leon Trotsky wrote the book and Isaacs translated it.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT Sorge Espoonage Case	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 200-6-7-55 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DAR-137 4. DATE 28 Dec. 1950 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION 10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE
5. ANALYST James E. Plaugher 6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov. 1963	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE XX
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. 1. Inclosed is Consecutive Exhibit No. 32 in the documentation of the Sorge Espionage Case. This Exhibit consists of two related parts: I and II. The second part is divided into two sections, A and B, because of its bulk. Part I is an index of each personality and organization listed in Part II. Part II consist of a resume of the contents of each Shanghai Municipal Police file, followed by a aabular listing of the contents of the files, with page references.

Page 24.

	G-2 Doc. #	Page
Isaacs, Harold Robert:	59	30-32
Anti-War Congress report, mentioned in	10	8-9
Burton report, mentioned in	65	1
"China Forum"editor of		
"Chinese Workers' Correspondence":	32	4
Investigation re	94	1-2
Received by	45	6
Envelope addressed to	65	1
"Fiev Yaars of Kuomintang Reaction"	4	107
Granich, "Evidently another Isaacs"		
"I Break with the Chinses Staalinists"	16	2-7
author of		

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

SECRET

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT AGNES SMEDLEY, WAS.	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION	
	2. RI FILE NO.	201-4[illegible]
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. [illegible]-1461	4. DATE 28 apr.50
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST JEP	6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov. 1963	
	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
~~xxxxx~~

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

page 69

The July 30, 1932 issue of the "New York Times", under a Shahghai Dateline of Jule 29, 1932 , sàates that Harold R. Isaacs, an American citizen., was warned by the U. S. consul in Shahghai that the U. S . may with draw ~~ixx ixx~~ its extra territirial rights and allow him to be tried in a Chinese Court. Isaacs, then editor of the "China Forum", had violently attacked Chiang Kai-Shek, calling him among other things, a butcher. The article further stated that issacs was as associate of Agnes Smedley, a correspondedt for American newspapers.

page 73. The Marrch 7, 1946 issue of the New York Times reflects an article captioned "Group of Americans, including writers and journalists announced that they had sent aletter to Chaing Kai Shek concerning the death of Yang Chao, OWI employee, who was arrested by the Naticnalists and ided in prison. The sighers were critical of the treatment recieved by CHAO. THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS signed the letter: Maxwell S. stewart. Elizabeth Ames, Maroline Slade, Alfred Kazin , Eric Severeid, Richard Watts, jr. H. R. Isaacs, Agnes Smedley and Theordore White.

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
AGNES SMEDLEY was. Ayoo, Yahoo

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
2. RI FILE NO. 201-414
3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. EEDFB--854
4. DATE 24 Jan 1950
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
8. DATE OF INFO.
9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JEP
6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 1963
10. DISSEMINATED IN
11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE xxxx
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION
14.

Passport files of State Dept. also indicate passport renewal application dated June 23, 1932 in which the subject listed as identifying witnesses ----subject mentioned Harold R. Isaacs , who according to information possessed by T--1 as 'RED'

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201- 13446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET

2P

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ADSO SODB-20568

DEC 2 1949 via ADSO 2 DEC 49

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Attention: Mr. Ross N. Ingersoll

Subject: Harold Robert ISAACS

MICROFILMED
FEB 3 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. This is in reply to Mr. Jack D. Neal's request for information concerning Harold Robert ISAACS, made by telephone on 29 November 1949.

201-18446

2. According to information obtained from a source considered reliable, Harold Robert ISAACS was born in New York City on 13 September 1910. He arrived in Shanghai from Manila in December 1930 and was in possession of American passport 177026. ISAACS was first employed in Shanghai by the Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury, an English language daily published in Shanghai. After a few weeks, he became associated with the China Press, another English-language daily published in Shanghai, and was with this paper until May 1931. In June of the same year ISAACS made a trip up the Yangtze River with Cecil Frank GLASS, a British subject and member of the British Communist Party, suspected of being an agent for the Third International in China.

3. On 15 June 1931, Hilaire NOULENS, with aliases, was arrested by the Shanghai Municipal Police on charges of espionage in behalf of the Third International. ISAACS became the Shanghai secretary of the Comité Internationale Pour la Défense de Paul et Gertrude Ruegg (NOULENS), a committee formed to aid the NOULENSs in their defense against charges of espionage preferred by the Chinese government. Our files reflect that ISAACS was in correspondence with Willi MUENZENBERG, the President of the Committee with headquarters in Berlin. MUENZENBERG was an active agent in Germany for the Third International. ISAACS is also known to have been in contact with Agnes SMEDLEY in Shanghai at this time.

MÜNZENBERG

(MRS) HAROLD R. ISAACS

SAFE CIT: USA OCC: COMMUNIST AGENT ? WIFE OF HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS (201-18446)

DPOB

Δ CHINA

4. On 29 August 1932, ISAACS gave notice to the American Consulate General in Shanghai of his intended marriage to (Miss) Viola ROBINSON, an American citizen born 10 June 1910 in New York City. Miss ROBINSON arrived in Shanghai on 26 August 1932 from Vancouver, Canada, aboard the S.S. "Empress of Asia", and was in possession of American passport 382046 issued in New York on 14 May 1931. The wedding was held on 14 September 1932 at the American Consulate General. Miss ROBINSON was believed to

REF

201-18446

SECRET

have been connected with Communist activities in the United States and China. Correspondence between ISAACS and Miss ROBINSON prior to their marriage, indicates that they were both sympathetic to activities being conducted by the Communists in China. On 2[illegible] November 1932, Miss ROBINSON was entrusted by Mr. Jacob [illegible], the NOULENS defense attorney, with teaching the English language to Jimmy NOULENS, the four-year old son of Hilaire and Gertrude NOULENS.

5. On 4 April 1936, ISAACS, under the pseudonym of LO SEN, published an article in the New Militant, organ of the Socialist Workers' Party in New York, entitled "Stalintern Ready to Embrace Chiang Kai-shek --- Offer Red Army in Return for Resurrection of the Disastrous 1927 Bloc." It is believed that ISAACS later joined the Fourth International, organized by Trotsky subsequent to the latter's exile from Russia.

6. During World War II ISAACS was a war correspondent for Newsweek in China. In July 1949 he was refused entry into China by Chinese Nationalist authorities, presumably as a result of anti-Nationalist articles written by ISAACS for Newsweek.

7. Harold Robert ISAACS is currently Special Features Editor for Newsweek, 152 West 42nd Street, New York, New York. He is the author of several books, including No Peace In Asia and The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. ISAACS' current political beliefs are unknown to this Agency.

8. Should ISAACS leave this country, this Agency would appreciate being advised of his intended destination, date of departure and any other pertinent details.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director

SO DB-20568

cc Federal Bureau of Investigation

PF
bdo

REGISTRY COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Shanghai Municipal Police Files. American Citizesns Suspected of Commie Connections.	2. RI FILE NO. 16-7-24-7y 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. ZCSA-746 4. DATE 24 Feb. 49 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST James Y E. Plaugher 6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov. 1963	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE [illegible]	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Para. 17

Harold Robert Isaacs was born in New York City on 3 Sept. 1910 and held USA passport 177026. He was the editor and Publisher of the China Forum. a Shanghai Communist periodical first published in 1932: the secretary of the Nuolens Defense Committee; a member of the Shahghai branch of society of Friends of the USSR and of China League for Civil Rights. He arrived in Shanghai from Manila in Dec. 1930 and worked for Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, swithing after a few weeks to the China Press ehere he was employed until 1931 (May). In June 1931 Isaacs took a trip up the Yangtze with . Frank Glass, a Brigish Communist and suspected Third International agent. A letter wiritten by Isaacs to his fiance, Viola Robinson stated that he was turning "Red" as a result of conversations with GLASS. Ather atatements indicated athat Miss Robinson an American then in Germany, was an active member of the communits Party. Isaacs used the pseddonym of Lo Sen and published in the New Militant organ of the New York Dist. Workers Party, an attack on Stalin entitled Stalintern Ready to Embrace Chiang Kai shek. In 1949 Isaacs was in the employ of the ?American magazine NEWSWEEK, New York City, as special projects editor.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-184496

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

X-2 BRANCH
REPORT

ZCS-1811

Report No.	Date	Period Covered	[illegible]

Subject

Status

Classification

References

Source:

Details: [illegible]

REGISTRY COPY

30750

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, DETACHMENT 404-A
STRATEGIC SERVICE UNIT
BATAVIA, JAVA

SN: ZM2477

REPORT NO: ZB-10
REPORT DATE: 8 Dec 45
TO : CAPT. BLUECHELL, ATTN: LT BARKETTE
INFO DATE : 7 Dec 45
FROM : GRABILL
NO. PAGES : 2

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW BETWEEN MR. HAROLD ISAACS, MR. CHARLES TAMBU, AND MR. DIAH.

SOURCES: Mr. Harold Isaacs, correspondent for Newsweek magazine.
Mr. Charles Tambu, Malaya born Tamil, formerly employed on Singapore newspapers, newscaster for Singapore radio, English-speaking announcer on Batavia Radio during occupation, and presently editor of newspaper Independent.
Mr. Diah, editor of Merdeka, nationalist newspaper, Batavia.

EVALUATION: B-3, except as noted.

The subject interview was held at the request of Mr. Isaacs in line with his desire to talk with leading figures of Indonesian nationalist movement who held no official government position.

CIRCULATION OF MERDEKA

Asked about present circulation of MERDEKA, Mr. Diah replied with the following; MERDEKA is the largest Indonesian newspaper on the island of Java. At present it is printed only in Batavia, with a daily total circulation of about 18,000 copies. Of this number, approximately 6,000 copies are sent out of the city by train to Bandoeng, Soerakarta, and Djokjakarta, leaving a Batavia circulation of between 10,000 and 14,000 copies. Source expressed the opinion that while the Indonesian population of Batavia is in the neighborhood of 500,000 persons, the literacy rate is perhaps only twenty percent of this figure. Thus, he admitted, MERDEKA is probably reaching less than four percent of the total Indonesian population of Batavia, despite the fact that Batavia is probably the most literate area on the island of Java because of concentration here of all the governmental functions, prewar and present.

When questioned as to why his circulation was so inconsistent with the potential reading population, source replied that he was handicapped by lack of paper. He expressed the opinion that a circulation of 50,000 would be assured, and a circulation of as high as 100,000 possible, were sufficient paper available. At the present rate of consumption, he estimates that sufficient paper is on hand from prewar stocks to continue publication of MERDEKA for one year.

Wash-Reg Intel -102
ZM2477

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THE INDEPENDENT

On December 7, 1945, the MERDEKA press commenced publication of a daily English language newspaper entitled INDEPENDENT. The masthead of this paper states also that it incorporates the INDONESIAN NEWS BULLETIN, a former English language newspaper published by ANTARA news agency.

The INDEPENDENT is at present being edited by Mr. Tambu, with some assistance from Mr. Diah, and using the paper and facilities of MERDEKA.

The first issue of INDEPENDENT was remarkable only for its avoidance of any discussion of local affairs, only two articles having anything whatsoever to do with Java. Questioned about this, Tambu admitted that, while his ultimate ambition was to reach foreign and troop (British) readers, he was hesitant about entering headlong into discussion of local affairs and the Nationalist cause, because, (C-3), the British are unfavorably disposed towards MERDEKA already, and would use his venture as an excuse to confiscate the entire printing plant, were he too openly partisan in his early issues. Within a week or two he hopes to be secure enough in his position to start laying more stress on local news and editorials.

The first issue of INDEPENDENT was printed in 400 copies, most of which were given away, although the stated price is 1 Japanese guilder the copy.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 March 1945

To: Lieutenant Colonel ROGER A. PFAFF

From: John I. Coddington

Subject: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS

Mr. GEORGE N. KATES of OSS, R&A, has just returned to the United States from Chungking. He reached Washington yesterday. He claims to have known HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS quite well in Chungking, and has the following observations to make concerning Mr. ISAACS:

HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS is about 35 years of age. He attended Columbia University, and received the degree of A.B. there in 1930. He is the son of an orthodox Jewish merchant, who is very wealthy, and who has always supported HAROLD, even though he did not approve of the radical views that HAROLD expressed in the 1930's.

HAROLD went to China immediately after graduation from Columbia, partly, atleast, out of a desire to see strange parts of the world and to experience "adventure." He went out by way of Hawaii, and stowed away for part of the voyage -- either between San Francisco and Honolulu, or between Honolulu and Shanghai -- Mr. KATES does not remember which. Anyway, this was part of the "adventure."

In China, HAROLD met a South African named FRANK GLASS, who was an "intellectual" and a very interesting person. GLASS was a Leftist, but not at all a Communist. HAROLD took a trip up the Yangtse with GLASS in 1930 or 1931. At about this time, HAROLD became a convert to Trotskyism, partly, at least, under GLASS's influence. He felt that "suffering humanity" required a "revolution" to set things straight. Communism was too organized, and HAROLD was a complete individualist, and reacted strongly against the organizational set-up of Communism, and so espoused Trotskyism.

He returned to Shanghai from the western part of China, and went to work for

THE HAVAS News Agency. Shortly after this, in Shangghai, he married VIOLA ROBINSON, who was, like HAROLD, a wide-eyed intellectual. This marriage probably took place in 1932. VIOLA was a great friend of AGNES SMEDLEY, the author of the Battle Hymn of China and of other books dealing with the Chinese Revolution.

An organization called the China League for Civil Rights was formed about 1932. YANG CH'IEN was the head of this for Central China, and Dr. HU SHIH (later Chinese Ambassador to Washington) was the head of it for North China. YANG was at that time Secretary-General of the Academia Sinica. YANG was soon assassinated by the Blue Shirts (at that time CHIANG KAI-SHEK's bodyguard). HAROLD ISAACS had been an enthusiastic member of the China League for Civil Rights, and in the atmosphere of turmoil, after the killing of YANG, when all leftists were under attack by the Kuomintang, HAROLD became the editor and publisher of the China Forum, a magazine that published a number of controversial articles. The magazine was protected by the fact that the editor was an American, and therefore had extra-territorial rights. Yet the magazine was regarded as a "thorn in the flesh" by Mr. CUNNINGHAM, who was at that time American Consul-General in Shanghai. There were various controversies -- the printing shop was broken up by Kuomintang strong-arm men; the mails were refused to the magazine; but he continued publication for some time, and smuggled the copies out to the subscribers.

In 1933 or 1934, ISAACS had a fight with AGNES SMEDLEY. It was an ideological fight, and therefore especially bitter. ISAACS and his wife left Shanghai after this, and moved to Peking. There he acquired a Chinese translator named LIU, and there he settled down to write his book, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. This book "nails the Stalinists to the mast" and shows that they were messing around with a situation in China which they did not understand. Very many people who have read the book consider it excellent.

The book was completed, and ISAACS and his wife returned to the United States about April or May 1935. Immediately after this, ISAACS made a rapid trip to Oslo, Norway, to see his hero, LEON TROTSKY, who was living there at that time. It was on this occasion that he must have undertaken to translate TROTSKY's book, Whither France ? ISAACS then returned to New York, and went to work for the HAVAS News Agency once more.

At some time in the late 1930's, he became interedtod in New York politics, and he worked hard for NORMAN THOMAS.

By 1940, however, he became disgusted with New York politics, and became interested in the war, and in "bourgeois life." He and his wife had a baby at about this time (their first), and ISAACS found he could write radio scripts and get good money for them. Up to 1940, he had been living chiefly off his father, but from 1940 on, he began to make money. In 1942, he did a "Report to the Nation" for CBS.

Soon after this, he joined the Staff of News-Week, and in 1944 was sent to Chungking by that magazine. There must have been a certain amount of trouble in convincing the Chinese Central Government that ISAACS had really changed since the old days in Shanghai; but this convication was evidently accomplished, or ISAACS would not have received permission from the Chinese Government to go to China.

ISAACS is a very smart man indeed. He knows a lot about China, and he knows a lot about people in general. Moreover, he is a great deal "smoother" and more diplomatic now than he was ten years ago.

13 March 1945

To: Lieutenant Colonel ROGER A. PFAFF
From: John I. Coddington J.I.C.
Subject: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS

ISAACS, Harold Robert

HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS is now the correspondent of Newsweek magazine in China. His headquarters are in Chungking, but he evidently travels to Kunming, Kweiyang, and other places in the course of his duties. He seems to have arrived in China in his present capacity during the summer of 1944, probably in July.

Subject was born in 1910, and is a member of a wealthy family. He became a firmly convinced Trotskyist in his youth, and remained one till the time of PearlHarbor. He is now regarded as a renegade by his former Trotskyist colleagues, because he has disavowed the principles of world revolution, turned away from Trotsky's teachings, and since 1939 has been writing patriotic propaganda for the United States Government.

He went to China about 1930, and wrote two books dealing with Chinese politics, Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction (1932), and The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (1938). Both of these volumes expressed the author's Trotskyist point of view. The first was published in Shanghai, and the second in London. Neither was ever published in the United States, and ISAACS said that the Stalinist Communists were so powerful in this country that they were able to prevent the publication of the Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution here. This book received high praise from many serious students of Far Eastern affairs, including G.F. Hudson, Fellow of All Souls College at Oxford, and author of The Far East in World Politics, who said that ISAACS' book was the best one ever written on the Chinese Revolution. Hudson is now an official of the British Ministry of Information.

ISAACS' non-Communist and non-Trotskyist friends say that even during the

201-18446

height of his Trotskyist career, ISAACS never accepted money from the group. He was always open and above-board, and never engaged in any conspiracies to overthrow established government. He was attracted to the movement, they say, by sheer idealism.

For a time in China, ISAACS lived with Tillman DURDIN, the China correspondent of the New York Times, who was then the managing editor of the China Press. ISAACS returned to the United States in the late 1930's, and was for a time employed by the havas News Agency, until the fall of France in 1940. In 1943, he was employed by Newsweek magazine in Washington, D.C., and resided at 4938 Newport Avenue, Freiddship Heights.

Publications

(a) Books

Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction (Shanghai, China Forum Publishing Co., 1932), 136 pp. Library of Congress Call No.: DS 777.47.C45

The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (London, Secker & Warburg, 1938) 501 pp. Library of Congress Call No.: DS 774.I7

(b) Translations

Lev Trotskii (Leon Trotsky), Whither France, translated by John G. Wright and Harold R. Isaacs (New York, Pioneer Publishers, 1936). Library of Congress Call No.: DC 398.T7

(c) Articles in Periodicals

"Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution: a Marxist View," Pacific Affairs, vol. 8, pp. 269-283, Sept. 1935.

"Job by Experts," Newsweek, p. 30, 7 Aug. 1944.

"Surprising the Japs," Newsweek, pp. 35-36, 7 Aug. 1944.

"Blowing the Top," Newsweek, pp. 45-6, 4 Sept. 1944.

"Last night in Kweilin," Newsweek, pp. 31-32, 25 Sept. 1944.

HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS, continued

"One Man's Fight against Corruption: the Story behind the Stilwell Incident," Newsweek, p. 44, 13 Nov. 1944

"Troupers of the CBI," Newsweek, p. 100, 13 Nov. 1944

"Ignorant Men and Modern Weapons: Inside Story of the Chinese Army," Newsweek, p. 44, 20 Nov. 1944

"Death for Kweiyang," Newsweek, p. 36, 18 Dec. 1944

"Dorn of the Salween," Newsweek, pp. 26-27, 1 Jan. 1945

"First Truck to Kunming," Newsweek, p. 34, 29 Jan. 1945

"Ting Hao: Shouts of Welcome met First Convoy to Kunming," Newsweek, pp. 35-36, 12 Feb. 1945

Bibliography

SI Files #25,443: 6 October 1943

Books and Periodicals in Library of Congress

CONFIDENTIAL
16 402
[illegible] H1

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

10 March 1945

#78324

To Major General William J Donovan

From John C Hughes

Subject Harold R Isaacs

Pursuant to our telephone conversation, I asked Mr DeVecchi of this office to check with Alan Grover, Vice President of "Time and Life". One of the men with whom Grover works very closely knows Isaacs intimately. In this man's opinion, Isaacs is a very solid and substantial citizen, knowledgable, hard working and an able correspondent of good character. He states that he has recently had occasion to communicate with Isaacs and that his address is:

Harold R Isaacs
War Correspondent
U.S.F. CT
APO 627
c/o Postmaster, New York

JCH
J C Hughes

[illegible] 221
[illegible]

~~[illegible] 221~~
201-18446

Hughes

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

March 9, 1945

File
X78278

MEMORANDUM

TO: MR. SPENCER PHENIX

FROM: ROBERT DeVECCHI

Alan Grover, Vice-President of TIME, LIFE, at my request checked with one of the men in his organization who knows Harold R. Isaacs personally.

He told Mr. Grover that Mr. Isaacs, in his opinion, is a very solid and substantial citizen, knowledgable, hard working, good character, and an able correspondent.

Mr. Isaacs can be reached at the following address:

HAROLD R. ISAACS
War Correspondent
U.S.F. CT
APO 627
c/o Postmaster New York, N.Y.

NY-SI-Pers-3
f/4 Box 1

201-18446

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Various reports and newspapers clippings relacing to operations.	2. RI FILE NO. China CLA-OP-1
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMP-D-5760 "Box 203
	4. DATE 26 Aug. 35
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JEP	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov. 63	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

xxxx 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THE NORTH-CHINA Daily NEWS Saturday 6 July 35

~~Mr. Harold R. Isaacs~~, an American and Publisher of the communist Publication "China Forum. YUAN Hsueh editor of the chinese section. of the "China Forum.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
VICTOR MUSSIK's visit to AMOY.	3. RI FILE NO. CHINA CIA OP-1			
	4. IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. D 1129		6. DATE 26 Jan. 34	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST JEP	6. DATE PROCESSED 23 Dec. 63	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXXX	12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

The Japanese Consular Authorities at Amoy are of the belief that H. R. Isaacs went Amoy between Dec. 24 xx1933 and Jan 3, 1934, under the name of Victor Mussik, the local Jananese authorities, therefore, request for infc regarding the movements of Victor Mussik during the afore mentioned period to ascertain if He actually visited amoy during this period

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18448

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT: Attack on Bookstores

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. China-cia-op-1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMP--5454-8 box 200

4. DATE 21 Dec 33

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST JAMES E. Plaugher

6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov. 63

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE XXXXX

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

The second incidenh was seen in the entry by persons unknown on the night of November 14 of premises of the Lev el Printing Co., incorporated in New York printers and publisher of the "China Forum" a bi-lingual magazine under the ~~at~~ editorship of an American named Harold R. Isaacs, which has dicided communistic sympathies.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT DISTRICH KUOMINTANG ISSUES SECRET ORDER FOR ANTI JAPANESE MOVEMENT.	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. CHINA-CIN-OP-1 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMPD 4685&SMPD 4685c Box 193 4. DATE 22 July 33 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JAMES. E. Plaugher 6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 63	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXX 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

The transportation of the China Rorum has already been prohibited by the Nanking Govt. because the magazine had been publishing propaganda for the reds as well as attacks on the National bovt, that the publisher being an American citized named Isaac the measures taken against the peper had no effect. This time a strong protest will be lodged with the American Consulate against Isaac.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-60)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT List of correspondents in Shanghai	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. CIHINA-CIA CP 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMPD 4528 4. DATE 23 Feb. 33 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JFE 6. DATE PROCESSED #3 Dec. 263	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXXX 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

among the correspondents listed one H.R. ISAACS (American)address 509 Embankment Apartments. Repr. of the HAVAS News Agency.

13. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

Copy of report by D. S. PITTS
Copy of China Workers' Correspondence,
Addressed to Harold R. Isaacs

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. CHINA CIA OP1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMPD 2713 BOX-179

4. DATE 10 Nov. 32

5. ANALYST JEP

6. DATE PROCESSED 23 Dec. 63

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE XXX

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

This document contains numerous references to Harold R. Isaacs and his wife. For further information the interested parties are requested to see the document itself due to bulky nature the poor quality of paper reporduction is virtually impossible.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-15446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT NEW YORK"NATION"	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. CHINA-CIA-OP-1 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMPD 4014 4. DATE 17 Sept 32 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JAMES E. Flaigher 6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 63	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXXX 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

In contimuation of a previous report on the subject of the New York "Nation", I have to state that further efforts to pu rchase this publication have proved successful, and I attach herewith three copies, respectively dated July 6, Aug. 10 and Aug. 24,1932.

From a cusory perusual of these editions, the "Nation"s political policy appears to bd a socialistic nature, openly professing oppositon to the Republican and Democratic doctrines prevailing throughout the United States, and advocating support for the Cocialist Party's candidate--Norman Thomas at the forth coming Presidetial elections.

Further articles appearing in these editions are nothing more nor less that scurrilous attacks on the Republican President of The USA.-Herbert Hoover.

Harold R. Isaacs mailing list has been carefully persudd, but no mention is made of the "Nation" or any of the Poeple connected with it.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
John M. Murray	2. RI FILE NO. CHINA-CIA op 1
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMP-D 3703
	4. DATE 2 June 32
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JEP	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 63	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE xxxxx

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

During the Summer of 1932 Murray is known to have been associated with the following local communist sympathizers: H.R. ISAACS.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

D-6628

[illegible] POLICE
File No. S.B. REGISTRY.
6[illegible]

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE.

Special Branch S.5. D ~~[illegible]~~

REPORT

Date April 4, 1935.

Subject The New International - Extract.

~~[illegible]-OP-1~~
SMPD-6628

Made by and Forwarded by D.S.I. Golder.

Magazine detached by D.I. [illegible] returned to [illegible] [illegible]

I forward herewith as directed by the D. C. Special Branch 12 copies of an extract from "The New International", a Communist propaganda organ published in New York, U.S.A.

Em Golder
D. S. I.

D. C. (Special Branch).

S2,

Please let me know what has happened to *Isaacs. Is he still detained by the Chinese Police at Peking?

D.S. Larson

4/4/35.

*See File D 2713/36

205-7-212-1

18446

4

EXTRACT FROM THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER 1934
(PUBLISHED IN NEW YORK).

I Break with the Chinese Stalinists

To the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party:
The two-year period of my extra-organizational collaboration with the Chinese Communist party has come to an end and the China Forum which I founded and edited during that time has been forced to suspend publication. In the interest of our whole movement as well as in my personal interest, I consider it necessary to record here and publish the history of the China Forum and the circumstances of its suspension.....

xxxxx

From almost the very beginning of my active work - which I date from the time I began reporting events in China in a communist way - a number of questions presented themselves to me in increasingly forcible form. These arose originally from my discovery of the gross distortions and exaggerations which I found to be characteristic of communist propaganda in China and abroad. I define propaganda as the skillful, clear, accurate and wholly truthful reporting of the facts linked to an incisive, purposive interpretation and a plan of action for dealing with the facts in a revolutionary way. I learned this from the life and work of Lenin and his Bolshevik comrades who taught us that the truth comes from the masses themselves and that only disaster can result from telling them lies. I have never learned to the contrary that it was my revolutionary duty to work in any other way, although I soon found that the present-day Communist party press makes a practise of distinguishing between propaganda and truth.

Examples of exaggeration and distortion most striking to me were naturally those which applied to China, because here I could check allegations with known facts. I first wrote these down to the ignorance or incapacity of individuals. I felt that communist editors abroad would publish accurate facts about China if they could get them. Accordingly with a friend I tried to set up an independent mail news service and sent weekly bulletins to papers all over the world giving brief, sharp, factual accounts of what was going on. This was in the fall of 1931 after my return from the area of the great Central China floods of that summer. I scarcely understood then why this service failed to secure any response from the communist press abroad. After about three months I had to suspend it for lack of support. It simply didn't get published except in a few organs which were not official Communist party papers, including the New York Militant.

It wasn't long before I began to perceive, with a deeper study of international events and the history of the Chinese revolution, that a consistent thread ran through the distortions and exaggerations which I found not only in brief casual reports of current events but in the solemn pronunciamentoes made by delegates before plenums of the E.C.C.I. I discovered that these departures from the truth were made necessary by the official premise that ever since the catastrophe of 1927 a mighty, upsurging revolutionary movement has been marching forward in China to the very brink of seizure of power under the leadership of the Chinese Communist party. I discovered that these exaggerations were necessary because the premise was false and along with it all the basic tenets of the politics being pursued by the Communist International and the Communist party in China. I cannot begin here to give a summary of some of these distortions (which I verbally cited to you by the dozen), ranging from particular incidents (the wilfully false picture given of the cotton mill strike in Shanghai in January 1932, even to the point of transposing it to February to heighten the impression given of the workers' role in the Shanghai war) to high-flown generalizations like the statement recently made before the plenum of the E.C.C.I. that the C.C.P. has "won over the majority of the Chinese working class and the peasantry".....

In denying the presence of a mighty revolutionary upsurge (i.e., a vast organized march toward the seizure of power), I respect facts made still clearer perhaps when compared to the facts and figures of the monster mass movements of the 1925-27 period. The tragic errors of the communist leadership in 1927 were primarily responsible for the decapitation of that great movement and because no lessons have been drawn from these events to this very day, these errors, monstrously accumulated, are still responsible for the tragedies of today. But for the purposes of our comparison here, let us take for example the single fact that in 1926 in Greater Shanghai there were 257 strikes. In 1932 there were 82. Let us remember that on the eve of the workers' seizure of power in Shanghai in March, 1927, there were more than 800,000 workers, handicraftsmen and petty traders out on the streets fighting with arms in hands for demands of a far-reaching political character. A close check for the entire country in the latter half of 1933 showed me that less than one-thirtieth of that number were engaged in strikes and other disputes during any given month and that almost invariably the demands were defensive demands against wage cuts and lockouts. Moreover, the lack of cohesive leadership - often in departments of the same factory or in one or more of a group of factories - or even sometimes lack of even the most elementary organization - has in almost every case led to deadening failure and relatively easy betrayal by the yellow "labor leaders" and "mediators" of the Kuo Min Tang. In 1925 the shooting of thirteen students by British police in Shanghai was the touch-off for a general strike which paralyzed the city and which was seconded by vast sympathy strikes which broke like a series of tidal waves over the entire country. In January 1932, when the Japanese imperialists used the Shanghai International Settlement as a base for operations which cost the lives of tens of thousands of Chinese, not a single strike interrupted the normal course of the public or other services in that settlement. In the factories there were no strikes but a large scale lockout to which the overwhelming majority of Shanghai's workers submitted without protest....

In the case of the widespread but isolated and individual cases of peasant uprisings, and this includes the Red armies in Kiangsi, these struggles await the leadership of a strong working class movement before they can have a successful issue. The Red armies in their restricted and surrounded areas and with their meagre resources have fought heroically against the Kuomintang attacks upon them. But until the Kuo Min Tang is shaken from its bulwarks in the imperialist-controlled working class centers, their prospect of revolutionary triumph remains necessarily dim. No revolutionary purpose is served by taking refuge in the fiction that these armies have proletarian leadership because individual workers, undoubtedly leaders of superior quality and courage, have been torn from their factories and from their fellow workers and sent down to occupy key positions in the Red army districts and in the Red armies themselves. Indeed, this common practise of extracting the most conscious and progressive working class elements from their working class environment and sending them down to the Red districts is a good index to the criminal transposition of emphasis which has helped paralyze the working class movement in the cities. If the White Terror doesn't carry off the workers' leaders as they arise, the C.P. does and has done so in hundreds of cases. This helps in no small part to explain why it has also been impossible to mobilize a genuine mass anti-Japanese movement in the face of military aggression and why the White Terror of the Kuo Min Tang has succeeded, by filling mass graves and innumerable prisons with the martyred dead and living, in downing the anti-imperialist movement or efforts toward the organization of such a movement and paving the way for the ever-increasing encroachments of the imperialists. The party has not yet gripped and directed the deep and bitter and often inarticulate hatred of the masses of the people for their oppressors and this includes large sections of the lower petty bourgeoisie who could be won by successful mass pressure from below. This is because they party has failed to translate the realities of everyday events into its program and tactics.....

x x x x x

But precisely because at all costs I desired to carry on the Forum's open struggle against the common enemy - against the Kuo Min Tang and the imperialists - I sedulously avoided bringing these issues into the columns of the paper, increasingly against my better judgment. I leaned over far backward in this respect. This expressed itself in many of the current issues with which we had to deal.

I ask you to recall the whole uphill fight which the Forum waged on behalf of Paul and Gerturd Ruegg in the spring and summer of 1932 during which time I repeatedly warned against the emphasis which was being placed on the "legal" aspects of the case and the "negotiations" with the Kuo Min Tang to the detriment of mass pressure and the capitalization of the case for political purposes. You paid lip service to the need for mass pressure - particularly here in China - but in fact the "legalities" and futile negotiations remained the major pillars of the defense. Until in the very end I finally rebelled, I wasn't even permitted to give Ruegg his honorable and rightful title - secretary of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat! Yet although I felt the struggle for the Rueggs was being seriously handicapped by the tactics being pursued, I carried on the fight with all the energy at my command and you will recall that it was I who created the local defense committee and was chiefly responsible for the widespread press propaganda campaign and the considerable sympathy which we aroused. Yet the strictly non-political attitude which Ruegg was forced to assume at the trial (in contrast to the highly political attitude of his prosecutors!) was in my opinion one of the major reasons for the fate to which he and his wife were condemned.

I ask you to recall the whole period of the organization and activities of the China League for Civil Rights, from December 1932 to June 1933, in which I took an active part. I gave full play to this hybrid League and its work without once publishing the basic criticisms which I often voiced to you and which in the end were wholly confirmed by what happened after the Kuo Min Tang murdered Yang Chien in June that year. I ask you to recall the views I set forth in August and September 1933, on the subject of the "Anti-War Congress" which at your specific request I did not publish. Instead, to my regret, I published the foul rot of Marley & Co. without freely giving play to the true facts about that farcical junket which had convinced me that the policies which gave it birth do not one single whit advance the international struggle against imperialist war.

On one occasion - and this at least I can take comfort in - I passively resisted when you requested me to write and publish a slanderous attack on Chen Du Hsiu when he was condemned to 13 years imprisonment by the Kuo Min Tang. Your request was specific. I was not to deal with the issues which had brought Chen Du Hsiu from being the leader of the C.P. in 1927 to being leader of the Chinese Opposition in 1933. I was only to string together a vile series of labels in an effort to explain why the Kuo Min Tang even imprisoned the leader of the Left Opposition. As you know, that attack was never written or published.

Again in December 1933, upon my return from Fukien, you specifically demanded that I set aside the results of my own personal investigations in Foochow in order to write on your behalf (but over my signature!) an utterly baseless and slanderous attack on the Left Opposition. You will recall that you charged at that time that the "Trotskyists" were prominently identified with the new government set up in Fukien by Chen Ming-shu and Tsai Ting-kai. You lumped the Left Opposition with the Third Party and the socalled Social Democrats among the petty bourgeois satellites of the Fukien militarists. It was as much to satisfy myself on this very point as to perform a mission for you, that I went down to Foochow and spent two weeks there and learned through direct contact with dozens of people prominently concerned that the Left Opposition was stoutly and clearly opposed to the Foochow regime. I haven't place here to discuss the relations of the C.P. to the short-lived Fukien government or the character of the "negotiations" which were going on down there. The important thing here is that on my return you demanded that I write slanders which flew in the face of everything I myself had learned. It is interesting, as a sidelight on your methods in factional strife as you conceive it, that your representative in Foochow sent back a report, through me, ironically enough, that one of the most prominent of the youthful pseudo-radicals in Foochow, Wu Cui-yuen to be exact, was a leading "Trotskyist". It so happened that I had met and had several lengthy interviews with Wu and by the time I left Foochow I understood his position and his personality exceedingly well. He was as much a Trotskyist as Mei Lan-fang is! Yet you actually demanded that I ignore my own knowledge of the man and in my article on Fukien set him down as a "Trotskyist". I was faced on the one hand by your demands that I write falsehoods to suit your policies and on the other by my deep desire to set forth the actual facts about the Opposition's attitude toward the Fukien regime. But once more, to preserve the shreds of our relationship, I drove a middle course and did neither, leaving the whole question out of my article.

Nevertheless, abruptly in January of this year you forced an ultimatum upon me and subsequently forced the break in our relationship because I could not and would not, at your demand, devote the China Forum to policies which I could not and do not believe compatible with the interests of the Chinese revolution and the international proletarian revolution. I could not, at your demand, set aside the convictions to which I had literally been driven by the stinging lash of catastrophic events in China, Germany and the world over. Particularly my deep interest in Chinese events during the last three years made it impossible for me, finally, to give active support to policies and tactics whose disastrous effects were being a thousandfold confirmed for me by the tragic events of every swiftly-passing day. I could not ignore questions which strike at the roots of our work and the whole structure of our hopes for a revolutionary future.

Despite the fact that these questions are rocking the entire International today, you denied my right to raise them in print. You demanded more. You demanded that I attack anybody who did so - primarily the people you call "counter-revolutionary Trotskyists" - the only people who are facing these problems today in a fearless, revolutionary way ! You demanded that the China Forum become a stereotype for the policies and vulgar factional slanders which I could neither then nor now be party to. In reply to my questions on China you simply quoted back at me the lies and half-lies I've been so used to reading in Inprecorr. You even declared: "For propaganda purposes a certain amount of exaggeration is necessary...." and went on amazingly to say: "but we know the true facts and we base our policies on them, not on these exaggerations!" A new slant on modern-day C.I. tactics! Facts, you say, are curious things. They have to be turned around and around and around, and examined closely until their true nature becomes apparent. The trouble is you turn them so far and so quickly that they turn into something like a dizzily turning top of fancy - or at best wish-fulfilling misrepresentations.

To my questions on Germany you quoted Heckert, Piatnitsky and the E.C.C.I.'s famous resolution declaring that the collapse of the German party and the slaughter of the German workers were based on the past, present and future correct policies of the C.P.G.! You declared I had no right to offer critical comment on the dangerously opportunistic foreign and domestic policies of the U.S.S.R. most notably on the entry of the U.S.S.R. on a straight nationalist basis into the disgusting corridors of imperialist intrigue. To the contrary, I was livingly, fawningly to fondle and hail the policies which have meant disaster in China, Germany and elsewhere and are rapidly leading the U.S.S.R. into the vacuum of nationalist isolation from the world-wide proletarian movement. This I was to do, to begin with, by publishing Stalin's face on the front page and columns of the customary penegyrics to his infallibility. Above all and before all, I was to take up cudgels against "counter-revolutionary Trotskyism". That was to be the main point of my reformation - to raise no questions myself and slander anybody else who did so.

In reply to your demand that I submit to an editorial board in order that these editorial policies should be effectively put into practise, I offered (1) to continue publication strictly as before, meanwhile arguing out my differences with you in discussions on the side: (2) to throw the columns of the Forum open to a general discussion of all basic revolutionary questions, with free play to unorthodox as well as orthodox views. If your views were correct, I argued, it would be a distinct advantage to you to have such an opportunity to display their brilliance alongside the puny efforts of your critics; (3) to publish orthodox news and views but to reserve for myself the right to comment and criticise.

These repeated offers you repeatedly refused. You offered to discuss these questions with me verbally if in the meanwhile I threw the Forum open to your editorial board. My other proposals were unthinkable! Give the Forum's readers a chance to hear "counter-revolutionary" viewpoints ? Never that ! I could only display my revolutionary purity by acceding to your demands. We would talk things over until spring, when if all went well (i.e. if I showed a satisfactory adaptation to your viewpoint) I could pack up for an educational trip to the Soviet Union where I would certainly become convinced of the error of my ways. In other words, you wanted my signature on a promissory note with the amount left blank for you to fill in. You put this in the form of an ultimatum and you told me that if I did anything but accept I would fortwith enter the camp of the "counter-revolution".

I had to refuse these terms. I had to refuse to lend myself to a slanderous and baseless struggle against the International Left Opposition. I had to refuse to land space to the nauseatingly fawning praise of Stalin and uncritical reception of Stalinist policies which characterize the Communist party press the world over. I had to refuse to take shelter in the cold and draughty empty spaces which stretch behind the impressive facade and early traditions of the Communist International. I would like to go to the Soviet Union for a visit one day - but I had to refuse your offer on your terms. I had to refuse, in short, to become a hack prostitute in the name of the revolution.

In the end, too, I had to refuse to turn over to you the printing plant I had built up with so much pain and struggle because I considered it not your property but the property of the working class movement. Because I could not carry on the Forum myself, for lack of financial resources and because of heavy debts contracted, I disposed of the plant and turned every farthing of the proceeds over to where I now consider the true interests of our movement lie. It was with a deep and abiding bitterness that I had to see the Forum go down under the blows of those whom I had considered comrades, when for two years it had fought off all its many enemies on the outside.

Yet with it came the realization that we have to build anew over the ruins you have wrought. The revolution and the building of our future moves forward and when we trample down the defenses of our enemies we shall crush underfoot everything and everybody that stands in our way. No sycophantic, blind allegiance to a name, an empty facade, a torn and shredded prestige can lead us forward. Only unswerving fidelity to our goal and active struggle toward this end with the weapons of a correct and tested political line will lift us from defeat to ultimate victory. To this struggle I shall continue to dedicate all my energies.

Peiping, China, May 20, 1934.

Harold R. ISAACS.

ISAACS COUNTRIES

1931-1936 China(DFB 7864)

1954 Harold Robert Isaacs working MIT, Center for Internat'l Studies. (dossier)

"Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction", a 13[illegible] page pamphlet published in 1932 at Shanghai, lists ISAACS as Editor. The pamphlet consists of reprints of articles which appeared in the "China Forum" by "anonymous authors and collaborators". The pamphlet denounces the Kuomintang and CHIANG Kai-shek for alleged massacre of its political opponents, chiefly Communists, in order "that the bourgeoisie might continue to rule and the imperialists to draw their tribute from the capitalization of human misery". Chinese Communists are seen as the hope of the future. ISAACS continues to reside at 333 Central Park West, NYC, and is employed as free lance journalist, as of 12 May 53. DFB-27426.

ISAACS REFERENCES

Dossier
201-18446

Shanghai Municipal Police Files, SCS 138, Photo # 177. File 16-4-2-y5

DFB 1461, 11 May 1950. Agnes Smedley file, 201-414

DFB 7864, 28 Feb 1951. Enclosing info re Richard SORGE gathered from FBI interview with ISAACS in April 1950.

DFB 11880, 11 Sept 51, 201-6556-1 Presently living in NYC

DFB-15017, 15 Jan. 52; 201-6556-4; no new info.

DFB-14423, 20 Dec 1951, 201-[illegible]-1, Subj member of an Aid Committee to the Secy. of the Pan Pacific Trades Union Secretariat (NOULENS) in Shanghai along with Agnes SMEDLEY, Irene [illegible], J. POWELL, Edgar SNOW, Frank GLASS.

Shanghai Municipal Police Files, SCS-1811, 16-4-2-37, 5 Feb 49.

DFB-[illegible], 14 August [illegible], 201-[illegible]-1

DFB-14747, 8 Jan 1952, 201-[illegible]-1 re APPLEMAN, Morris Louis

DFB-27426- 12 June 53, 201-18446-4.

ISAACS, H
Probably Harold ROBERT

@ JACOB. FBI think that there is a possibility that the JACOB, an unidentified young Amer journalist in Shanghai in 1931, 32 who was a member of the SORGE network in China might possibly be identical with ISAACS. ISAACS himself has advised that he does not believe that he could have been the indiv to whom SORGE gave the covername JACOB (DFB 7864)

171

Addresses: May 1953 - 333 Central Park West, NYC.
DFB-27426.

(265-1611, 10-4-2-37, 5 Feb 59: Shanghai Municipal Pol Files.)

(over)

(over)

show anything on the guy so that [illegible] can — to them. — Collins called [illegible] again to see if I&S would release this info now. He will see [illegible] tomorrow.

11 Sept 51 - Collins has talked to Brewer about this some time. Brewer said Collins couldn't get at House Records. Collins said Brewer promised him report & he now wants it. Asked Brewer & found he hadn't seen file in ISS

ISAACS

The July 30 1932 issue of the NY Times under a Shanghai dateline of 29 July 1932, states that Harold R ISAACS, an American citizen was warned by the US Consul General in Shanghai that the US may withdraw its extra-Territorial rights and allow him to be tried in a Chinese court. ISAACS then the editor of the " China Forum," had violently attacked Chiang Kai Shek, calling him, among other things, " a butcher." The article further stated that ISAACS was an associate of Agnes SMEDLEY, a correspondent for American newspapers(DFB 1461)

Preceded the GRANICHES, as editor of"The Voice of China". Wrote an article "I Break With Stalinism".-which gave a candid elucidation of the Comm. financial backing of the "Voice of China". DCE-4385, 7 Feb. 52

One Harold Robert ISAACS was born 13 Sept 1910 ; 5'9" tall, med build, br eyes, & blach wavy hair brushed back. Born in NYC, Amc citizen. Editor & publisher of the China Forum. Was secy of NOULENS Defense Committee & member of Society of Freinds of USSR Arrived in China from Manila on 10 Dec 30 & joined editorial staff of Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. On 12 June 31, took trip on Yangtsze with C.F.GLASS, susp Sov agent, & wrote his fiancee he decided to turn "Red" as a result of talking with GLASS. The 2 returned in Aug & took up residence at #12S Weihaiwei Road. Started printing Forum later. Manager of Level Printing C., Inc in NY State & owned 40% of its shares. Employed with Havas News Agency. ISAACS married Miss Viola ROBINSON Sept 32. Lived in Apt 204, Embankment Bldg., Shanghai. In 3 Jan 34 Subj visited NOULENS who were on hunger strike in prison. Subj's parents arrived in Shanghai 14 Jan 34 & left 20 Feb for Marseilles. Subj. published art in New Militant, organ of NY Districts Worker's Party attacking STALIN. ISAACS was also lecturing on Japan, China, and USSR & War Crisis in Far East. (ZCS-1811, 16-4-2-37, 5 Feb 59: Shanghai Municipal Pol Files.)

(C&SP)

show anything on the guy so that [illegible] can [illegible] I&S would release to them. — Collins called Russell again to see if [illegible] this info now. He will see Russell tomorrow.

11 Sept 51 - Collins has talked to Brewer about this some years. Brewer said Collins couldn't get at House Records. Collins said Brewer promised him report & he now wants it. Asked Brewer & found he hadn't seen file in I&S

Confid Informant advised that Subj [illegible] in China in [illegible] as a correspondent for the [illegible]
[illegible] and was expelled [illegible] because of his bitter attacks on the [illegible] alist Govt
of China in the [illegible]. According to Informant Subj thereafter traveled
to French Indochina and [illegible]
of the French Colonial Govt in Indochina. Informant also reported that Subj was ardent supporter
of an independent movement [illegible] HO CHI MINH, a former Comintern agent; this group desired
only the freedom of Indochina from the French and was non-Communist, according to [illegible],
but it received a great deal of help from local Communist forces and from Chinese Reds. Informant
further stated that in US Subj was member of Viet Nam-American Friendship Association which
Informant characterized as a propaganda outlet in US for the Viet Minh Movement. Subj has
advised that he was acquainted with Walter [illegible], NY TIMES correspondent, in MOSCOW in early
1930s. Subj has advised that he is presently employed as a free lance writer.
DWP-[illegible]

According to APPELMAN, Subj is author of "The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution" and
APPELMAN met Subj thru Alexander BUCHMAN; Subj was the first editor of the CCP paper of which
APPELMAN later was to become editor. DFB-14747
[illegible]//
The book "New Cycle In Asia" by ISAACS, pub in 1947 by the Institute of Pacific Relations as a collection of the official texts of various treaties and agreements among South Asian and Western powers during the perild of WW II and later. ISAACS supplies a brief editorial introduction to these texts which is apparently non-political in nature. His article "kKorea and American World Policy" appears in the August 7, 1950 issue of the "New Republic". The article advocates withdrawal of US support from French colonial forces in Indochina and recognition of Red China in hope of driving a wedge between Russia and Chinese Communists. DFB 25069, 12 March 1953,
201-18446-3.

ISAACS, HAROLD O.G. 5237 ~~[illegible]~~ **FE-1 Amstutz**

File in "Name Check" file

26 June 1951 - Memo dated 25 June to PT/CS requesting informational namecheck on subj. for the purpose of determining the validity of charges that Subj. is sympathetic to and/or connected with Communist activities. See file for rest of memo.

14 Aug 51 - ~~Carroll~~ Brown (PT/CS) advised he may have poor info. on [illegible]. Keep away for time being. Amstutz not in. Notified F. Collins who is quite anxious to know. Wants to try to get Subj. and [illegible] where he is.

29 Aug 51 - Found Collins had been talking to Carroll & also been up to I&S. Carroll said had info. Dorje Ring, Smedley et al. DO NOT TOUCH. - Notified Collins who said this isn't what he wants. Wants to get these [illegible] out in [illegible] without betraying OPC interest.: Needs to know if House Records (Ofc) show anything on the guy so that [illegible] can be referred to them. - Collins called Carroll again to see if I&S would release this info now. He will see Carroll tomorrow.

11 Sept 51 - Collins has talked to Brewer about this some time. Brewer said Collins couldn't get at House Records. Collins said Brewer promised him report & he now wants it. Asked Brewer & found he hadn't seen file in I&S

ISAACS, HAROLD   0 [illegible] 5237   FE-1 Amstutz

File in "Name Check" File

26 June 1951 - Memo dated 25 June to PT/CS requesting informational namecheck on subj. for the purpose of determining the validity of charges that Subj. is sympathetic to and/or connected with Communist activities. See file for rest of memo.

14 Aug 51 - [illegible] (PT/CS) advised he may have poor info. on [illegible]. Keep away for time being. Amstutz not in. Notified F. Collins who is quite anxious to know; Wants to try to get Subj. and [illegible] where he is.

29 Aug 51 - Found Collins had been talking to Carroll & also been up to I&S. Carroll said bad info. [illegible] King, Smedley et al. Do NOT TOUCH. - Notified Collins who said this isn't what he wants. Wants to get these eased out of foundation, without betraying OPC interest. ∴ Needs to know if House Records (Cox) show anything on the guy so that foundation can be referred to them. - Collins called Carroll again to see if I&S would release this info now. He will see Carroll tomorrow.

11 Sept 51 - Collins has talked to Brewer about this some more. Brewer said Collins couldn't get at House Records. Collins said Brewer promised him report & he now wants it. Asked Brewer & found he didn't have file in I&SS

Confid Informant advised that Subj was in China in [illegible] as a correspondent for the [illegible] and was expelled from China because of his bitter attacks on the Nationalist Govt of China in the [illegible]. According to informant Subj thereafter traveled to French Indochina [illegible] severe criticism of the French Colonial Govt in Indochina. Informant also reported that Subj was ardent supporter of an independent movement led by the HO CHI MINH, a former Comintern agent; this group desired only the indep of Indochina from the French and was non-Communist, according to propaganda, but it recd a great deal of help from local Communist forces and from Chinese Reds. Informant further stated that in US Subj was member of Viet Nam-American Friendship Association which informant characterized as a propaganda outlet in US for the Viet Minh Movement. Subj has advised that he was acquainted with Walter [illegible] A TY, NY TIMES correspondent, in MOSCOW in early 1930s. Subj has advised that he is presently employed as a free lance writer. DFB-[illegible]3

According to APPELMAN, Subj is author of "The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution" and APPELMAN met Subj thru Alexander BUCHMAN; Subj was the first editor of the CCP paper of which APPELMAN lter was to become editor. DFB-14747

~~New Cycle in Asia~~ //

The book "New Cycle in Asia" by ISAACS, pub in 1947 by the Institute of Pacific Relations as a collection of the official texts of various treaties and agreements among South Asian and Western powers during the perild of WW II and later. ISAACS supplies a brief editorial introduction to these texts which is apparently non-political in nature. His article "kKorea and American World Policy" appears in the August 7, 1950 issue of the "New Republic". The article advocates withdrawal of US support from French colonial forces in Indochina and recognition of Red China in hope of driving a wedge between Russia and Chinese Communists. DFB 25069, 12 March 1953, 201-18446-3.

to these texts which is apparently non-political in nature. His article "Korea and American World Policy" appears in the August 7, 1950 issue of the "New Republic". The article advocates withdrawal of US support from French colonial forces in Indochina and recognition of Red China in hope of driving a wedge between Russia and Chinese Communists. DIB 25069, 12 March 1953, 201-18446-3.

yet, called Collins to come up to OO/SP/SEO. to discuss, but he wasn't there. Brewer say cannot give info out if it is going to be passed on. If high level man involved in passing info., Col. Edwards Office will have to give it out. Collins called Brewer & they made some arrangement.

13 Sept. - Brewer, Collins & I talked over case. Brewer told Collins that House files don't contain particularly derog. info. It is in other files tho, & Brewer refused to divulge info to Collins. Said that any contact with Ford Foundation must be made by high-level CIA man (like [illegible]) and that Collins' men — (Clearly) could not tell Ford Foundation anything about Subj. - Collins agreed & the case is considered CLOSED.

13 November 1951 - ~~Undated~~ 7 Nov. 51 memo from OO/OP advising that "under no circumstances should Subject be contacted with regard to possible use by this agency prior to receiving a final security determination by this office." Copy to FG-1 Collins.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 26 Aug. 57	ACTION X OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM FE/2/CE	ROOM NO. 2507-J	TELEPHONE 8574

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
X NONSENSITIVE

201 NO. 1. 18446

SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): ISAACS, Harold Robert

SEX 3. M

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2. (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4. ☐ YES X NO

BIRTH DATE 5. D M Y 10

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.

OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION: Correspondent of Newsweek magazine in China (1945)

OCC/POS. CODE 9. NEWS

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. CHIN ~~(1945)~~

ACTION DESK 11. FE/2/CE

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS:

PUNCHED

201- 18446

PERMANENT CHARGE: X YES ☐ NO

RESTRICTED FILE: X YES ☐ NO

SIGNATURE: Shirley D. Gundlach

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

ISAACS, Harold Robert — Westerners connected with the Far East — 201-18446 — 201-18446 — [illegible] — [illegible] 8 July 1948

√ – ISAACS, Harold

American war correspondent for Newsweek; arrived in New Delhi en route to China after 2 months vacation in USA, on Army orders to return to CBI theatre; applied to [illegible] in China for permission to return to Chungking but was refused by Chungking government. (Darrel [illegible], UP correspondent and news editor of New York Post also refused two weeks previously). In USA ISAACS wrote articles calling [illegible] government "govt in exile." Apparently new policy of blacklisting foreign journalists who write unfavorably to CHIANG govt.

_____ jc

See also dossier: A [illegible] L. [illegible], memo to Col. [illegible] and [illegible].
dossier: [illegible] - [illegible], [illegible] (now in [illegible] dossier).

Moscow agent; USA; Jewish; arrived in Shanghai Dec 1930, worked for Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, later for China Press (qv); as journalist often visited communist districts of China, actually as Communist agent (with Cecil GLASS, qv); active member of [illegible] (sic) Defense Committee; in close contact with Agnes SMEDLEY, other Soviet representatives; later married Lucy [illegible] (qv). See dossier: [illegible] AGENTS IN CHINA (1). — [illegible] London 16 Dec 1948 no eval.

_____ pfh

US citizen; born 1910; came to Shanghai from Manila Dec 1930, joined Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury few weeks later, worked for China Press, till May 1931 traveled up Yangtze with Frank GLASS, lived with him Sept 1931 friendly with [illegible] and Agnes SMEDLEY; became editor of China Forum and worked with GLASS; — [illegible] Shanghai 9 Oct 1947 C-3

over

---

2. ISAACS, Harold Robert (continued)

Viola

1932 married Violet [illegible], reported active member of [illegible]; also reported to have married Lucy [illegible] in 1933 (probably confusion of names in reports).

_____ fh

Classed as suspected comintern agent. See SMP Files, [illegible]-XCI-23, rpt of 20 May 1933

_____ wen

Has been in this country since 1947. Now (Feb 49) Special Features editor for Newsweek magazine. After communist phase in 20's and early 30's wrote a bitter and brilliant critique of Moscow direction of the Chinese Communist Party from 1926-28 (The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, London, 1938) from a Trotskyite viewpoint. Now claims to be completely disillusioned with the communist movement (Stalin or Trotsky branch). Lives in New York with wife and two children. wen

_____ wen

Carried on SAF suspect list of foreign agents; see [illegible]-1811 in dossier: S.M.P. [illegible]; see also [illegible]-766, same dossier, for details.

For connection with Hilaire NOULENS, was, and the III rd International, Agnes SMEDLEY, et al, see following files: [illegible] — S.M.P. [illegible]
S.M.P. [illegible] ASSOCIATES — D-2527/34 and D-2527/40

See memo to FBI, prepared 25 August 49, subj.: Cecil Frank GLASS, was, in dossier: FBI CORRESPONDENCE — Cecil Frank GLASS.

In response to State Dept. name check, see memo to State and copy to FBI, prepared [illegible] Nov 49, in file CORRESPONDENCE with DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (continued)

---

3 ISAACS, Harold Robert (continued) WESTERNERS CONNECTED WITH THE FAR EAST

See DB-6962, dated 15 December 1947 in Dossier: MISCELLANEOUS-OUTGOING.

See SO DB-14928, 31 May 1950, in Doss.: THIRD (COMMUNIST) INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL.

_____ bde

See DFD-7864, FBI investigative report, 28 Feb. 1951 (IID).

_____ bde

A Leading Trotskyite in Shanghai area in 1938 Doc in Reg. — DFB 10004 10 July 51 201-6783-1

_____ bde

Mentioned as having publicly broken with Communist backing of the "Voice of China" publication and having denounced [illegible] backing [illegible]; as former editor of Shanghai newspaper in article for the Christian Science Monitor. — DCT 4338 From Contacts Division; 7 Feb. 52 Doc in Reg.

_____ dr

Subject alleged to have been expelled from China in 1945 for attacking Nationalist Govt, and to have been an active propagandist for the Viet Minh Movement in Indochina. Alleged to have been on membership list of Viet Nam-American Friendship Association. Text of article by subject attacking French rule in Indochina set forth. Subject advised that he was acquainted with Walter DURANTY, "New York Times" correspondent in Moscow during early 1930s. List of persons and organizations corresponding with subject set forth. See ref. doc. in RI. — DFB-20343 14 Aug. 1952

_____ rdb

(over)

---

4. ISAACS, Harold Robert (cont'd)

Author of "The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution" whom Morris L. APPELMAN (qv) met through Alex BUCHMAN (qv) in Shanghai. Believed to be foreign correspondent for "News Week". First editor of CCP paper of which APPELMAN later was to become editor. See ref. doc. in RI. — DFB-14787 8 Jan. 1952

_____ boj

Patrick J. HURLEY advised that subject told him that John King FAIRBANKS (qv) is a Trotzkyite Communist. See ref. doc. in RI-201-19678. — DFB-21896 20 Oct. 1952

_____ rdb

Subject's book, "No Peace for Asia", published 1947, summarized. See ref. doc. in RI 201-18446-2. — DFB-22751 26 Nov. 1952

_____ boj

See DFB-24411, 11 Feb. 1953, subject: Ida TREAT (qv) (RI 201-6205-7).

_____ boj

"New Cycle in Asia" by subject published in 1947 by the Institute of Pacific Relations as a collection of the official texts of various treaties & agreements among South Asian and western powers during the period of World War II and later. Subj. supplies a brief editorial introduction to these texts which is apparently non-political in nature. His article "Korea & American World Policy" appears in the Aug. 7, 1950 issue of "New Republic". See doc. in (RI). — DFB-25069 12 March 53

_____ lms

---

5. ISAACS, Harold Robert (continued) WESTERNERS CONNECTED WITH THE FAR EAST

Editor of New Cycle in Asia; selected documents on major international developments in the Far East, 1943-1947. (1947). In dossier: CHINA BIBLIOGRAPHY-1947 List.

_____ wc

Author of No Peace for Asia (1947). In dossier: CHINA BIBLIOGRAPHY-1947 List.

_____ wc

Author of The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, Rev. ed. In dossier: CHINA BIBLIOGRAPHY-1951 List.

_____ wc

"Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction", a 136 page pamphlet published in 1932 at Shanghai, lists subject as editor. The pamphlet consists of reprints of articles which appeared in the "China Forum" by "anonymous authors and collaborators". The pamphlet denounces the Kuomintang and CHIANG Kai-shek for alleged massacre of its political opponents, chiefly Communists, in order "that the bourgeoisie might continue to rule and the imperialists to draw their tribute from the capitalization of human misery". Subject continues to reside at 333 Central Park West, NY, and is employed as a free lance journalist. See ref. doc. (RI). — DFB-27[illegible] 12 June 53

_____ lms

Subject's book "The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution", first published 1938 in Great Britain, issued in a revised edition 1951 by Stanford Univ. Press. Thesis of book is that revolution in China, 1925-1927, could have resulted in a democratic socialist state, but was perverted to serve the needs of Russian diplomacy. In revised edition subject stated his opinions have changed in intervening yrs and that the base of his work can be described as "democratic socialist. See doc. in (RI 201-18446-5). — DFB-29131 21 Aug 53

---

6. ISAACS, Harold Robert

Subj is a writer and former Trotskyite. Stated that LIU, Tsun-ch'i (0491/1415/2759) was a Communist as early as 1933 in Peking, China and had worked for Tass New Agency in Peking after graduating from college and had even been sent to jail because of his communist activities.

An article by ISAACS "The Dimensions of the Crisis" in the "Saturday Review", 4 August 1951, states, "The Asian crisis is not created by Russian totalitarianism, but is exploited by it" and makes the point that revolt of colonial peoples in Asia is essentially nationalistic, that the U.S. should "move along with" and help guide these revolutions into democratic channels. His article "The Blind Alley of Totalitarianism" in "Annals of the American Academy", July 1951, states that past activities of the Western nations in Orient bred fear and hatred, were mainly responsible for rise of totalitarianism. In the "Saturday Review of Literature" of 14 July 1952, ISAACS reviewed "Journey to the Far Pacific" by Gov. Thomas E. DEWEY. Criticized book for superficiality and for recommending only military solutions to problems of Orient. See DFB-30868 dated 2 November 1953 in RI (201-18446).

Subject presently resides at 92 Varick Road, Waban, Mass., and is employed as a full time Research Associate in the Center for International Studies, Mass. Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. Subj. does not have access to any classified information. — DFB-33[illegible] 6 Apr 54 201-18446

_____ jal

201-0018446

Joey's Coun

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LOGANOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
VOL. II

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
18 JULY		JIM KELLY	James P. Kelly

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412

2

Contact Reports, etc., forwarded from the field.

3

C/SB
~~[illegible]~~ RYE
~~[illegible]~~ VPE
SR/[illegible]
SR/Sec

Index (p.5)

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LIROCKET-1 — P-12,244

DATE OF MEETING: 27 June 1967

1. I met Subject from 1300-1430 on 27 June at the Capistrano Restaurant. I paid him $2,000 M.N. as his salary for May and June. The next meeting is set for 25 July at 1300 at the Capistrano.

2. Subject conducted 14 classes at the Soviet Embassy during the reporting period:

1 June

1530-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO. Subject asked if KAZANTSEV had gone out of town, as he had told Subject he would probably do. BEDRIN replied without hesitation that KAZANTSEV had gone to Moscow and wouldn't be back until about 15 June.

6 June

1530-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO. Toward the end of class, BEDRIN said there were two men who wanted to speak with Subject after class. Following class, two men Subject didn't recognize came in and GONCHARENKO and ROMANCHENKO left. The two men were introduced as Vladimir SOKOLOV and Pavel KOVALEV. BEDRIN explained briefly that they also were interested in taking English lessons, and thereupon left with the comment that he didn't believe he was needed. SOKOLOV was the first of the twosome to speak, repeated that he and KOVALEV wished to take lessons, and then turned things over to KOVALEV, who, he said, spoke better English than he. KOVALEV proceeded to state that he had served in Washington, D.C. for three years, had served an earlier tour in Mexico, and had been back in Mexico for about a month. (KAZANTSEV later said he and KOVALEV had served in

P-11712 (p. 6)

Files: Copies
P-9037 (pp. 1-4)
P-9379 (pp. 1-4)
P-8607 (pp. 1-4)
P-830
P-3171
P-810 (pp. 1-4)

4

Washington at the same time.) At one point KOVALEV referred to SOKOLOV as his "chief." SOKOLOV interjected that he was leaving Mexico "sometime this year" and wanted to brush up on his English in preparation for the 4th year English proficiency test he would have to take when he returned to the USSR. Subject said that on the whole, he got the impression that KOVALEV was replacing SOKOLOV. A schedule of two classes a week, from 1800-1930 on Tuesdays and Thursdays, was agreed upon. One of the two Soviets mentioned that the funds for their lessons would come out of the military department.

1715-1830 -- SOKOLOV and KOVALEV asked when Subject would suggest they have their first lesson, and Subject replied that since KAZANTSEV was away, they might as well begin immediately. The Soviets readily agreed. Subject described KOVALEV's English as good. His grammar is a little better than KAZANTSEV's, but he is not quite as fluent as KAZANTSEV. SOKOLOV's English is [illegible] fair, but he is decidedly behind KOVALEV and KAZANTSEV in both grammar and fluency. Nevertheless, Subject feels SOKOLOV is good enough to be in the same class as KOVALEV.

8 June

1530-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO.

1700-1830 -- KOVALEV and SOKOLOV.

13 June

1530-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO.

1700-1830 -- KOVALEV and SOKOLOV.

15 June

1520-1700 -- Subject arrived at the Embassy early. BEDRIN came into the Reception Room about 1520 and took Subject to the classroom (in which there has always been a TV set). Three of the guards were sitting around the TV watching the Salazar fight when Subject and BEDRIN entered. GONCHARENKO

5

came in about 1530 and ROMANCHENKO about 1540. All watched the fight until it ended about 1550, after which the class began.

1700-1830 -- KOVALEV and SOKOLOV.

20 June

1530-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO.

1700-1800 -- KAZANTSEV. KAZANTSEV began talking about his trip on his own initiative. He said he left Mexico City on 30 May and arrived in Moscow on 3 June. (He did not say when he returned to Mexico.) He gave no reason for the trip, but said he had "several conferences and meetings" in Moscow. Subject interjected that he thought the trip might have had something to do with the Middle East crisis, since it broke out just about the time KAZANTSEV left. KAZANTSEV laughed spontaneously at this idea and replied that what he knew about the Middle East wouldn't do anyone any good. He then went on to say he had spent his first weekend in Moscow with his son, who shortly thereafter left for his summer job in "Siberia." He said he spent the second weekend (10-11 June) with his daughter. The daughter, according to KAZANTSEV, had planned to go "south" for a 2-3 week vacation in early June, but postponed the vacation when she learned her father was coming. (The implication, according to Subject, was that KAZANTSEV's trip came about fairly suddenly.) What KAZANTSEV was most interested in talking about, however, was the fact he had unexpectedly had had to take his English proficiency test in Moscow. He consequently set aside the last three days of his stay for the test, which can often take that long. The first day is taken up by an oral test, and if one passes that, he goes on to the written test, which can take up to two days. KAZANTSEV, however, did so well on the oral test that he was exempted from the written test. He said his examiners gave him a "4" (on a 1-5 scale) and would have given him a "5" except for the fact he hadn't read any books in English since his last test. One is supposed to read four or five books a year in English, according

6

to KAZANTSEV. In any event, KAZANTSEV was very happy with the outcome and with Subject's work in preparing him for the test. In fact, he said that although he had originally started taking lessons from Subject only to prepare for the test, he was so satisfied with his progress that he intended to stay on with Subject despite the fact the test was behind him.

1800-1930 -- KOVALEV and SOKOLOV.

22 June

1530-1700 -- KAZANTSEV took the first hour and a half. He merely said BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, and ROMANCHENKO would not attend class that day.

1700-1830 -- KOVALEV and SOKOLIN.

3. KOVALEV and SOKOLOV. SOKOLOV is the more simpatico of the two. While KOVALEV can be very pleasant, he seems to have an antagonistic strain and occasionally challenges Subject's teaching with: "That isn't the way we do it in our courses," etc. Sometimes, in fact, the disputes on methods, points of grammar, etc. have become rather heated. On these occasions, SOKOLOV has usually stepped in more or less on Subject's side and cooled things off. At their second meeting, KOVALEV asked Subject directly what his views were on the Middle East crisis. Subject turned the question back on KOVALEV by saying he would frankly be more interested in KOVALEV's ideas, as he was sure KOVALEV was much better informed about the situation than he. KOVALEV backed away this time, claiming he didn't have much information either, but at a later class both he and SOKOLOV parroted the Soviet line about the crisis--Israel was the aggressor, etc. On another occasion when the Middle East was again the topic, Subject referred to (what he recalled as) President Truman's post-World War II proposal to internationalize both the Suez and Panama canals. KOVALEV immediately objected to this idea, although he gave no indication of ever having thought about it before.

7

4. KOVALEV. Subject said he mentioned KOVALEV and SOKOLOV to his wife, and she immediately recalled KOVALEV as one of her students at the Mexican-North American Institute back in the late 50's or early 60's. She told Subject that he had been friendly with a number of people at the Institute (students and teachers). One of these, she recalled, was Bill *CASTELAZO, a U.S. citizen who then and still teaches English and Spanish at the Institute. CASTELAZO is about 35. He was among 20-25 persons who 7 or 8 years ago studied Russian at the Institute when it was taught for a brief time by a Russian woman. Subject's wife told Subject that KOVALEV and CASTELAZO had been very friendly and that KOVALEV had invited him to the Soviet Embassy at least twice. CASTELAZO told Subject's wife that after one of his visits to the Soviet Embassy, he was approached by someone from the American Embassy and asked to inform on the Soviets. CASTALAZO said he was repelled by the idea of being a n informer and implied that he hadn't cooperated with the American. Subject said he had not known about CASTELAZO's acquaintance with KOVALEV, but had known that CASTELAZO had studied Russian and had had him to his apartment along with ROMANCHENKO, BEDRIN, and GONCHARENKO for his 1 July 1966 Dominion Day party.

no record of CASTELAZO in KOVALEV file

5. Subject subsequently mentioned to KOVALEV that his wife remembered having him as a student during his previous tour. Subject also remarked that his wife had mentioned that KOVALEV and his (Subject's) friend CASTELAZO had been friends. KOVALEV replied without any embarrassment that he didn't remember Subject's wife, but did remember CASTELAZO. KOVALEV asked Subject to give CASTELAZO his regards the next time he saw him.

6. Other than a 1960 reference to "Guillermo CASTELAZO" as a 30-33 year old teacher at the Mexican-North American Institute and an author of one of the Institute's text books, there are no Station traces on

8

the CASTELAZO in question. (See 50-6-55/3, CR of 13 Sept. 1960.)

7. LOGINOV. When Subject was leaving the Embassy on 15 June (about 1835), he met LOGINOV in front of the Reception Room. They talked, chiefly about sports, for about 15 minutes. LOGINOV said skiing and speed skating were two of his favorite sports, and that his greatest sporting interest in Mexico was playing tennis. Subject said that LOGINOV seemed to be an avid sportsman. LOGINOV said that he was going to Moscow on vacation toward the end of July. No reference was made to Subject teaching LOGINOV's son English when the LOGINOVS return from vacation, but Subject assumes this is still LOGINOV's wish.

8. Subject to [illegible] Make Tapes At Embassy Prior to Class. At one of their classes after KAZANTSEV's return from Moscow, Subject and KAZANTSEV discussed Subject's making tapes for use in connection with his three Embassy classes. It was agreed that Subject would come to the Embassy half an hour or so early once a week to make the tapes. He was to begin on 27 June (the day of our meeting). Subject did not yet know where he was to do the recording, whether he would be left alone, etc.

9. Subject said he was considering having another Dominion Day Party on 1 July to which he would invite his Soviet students. I encouraged the idea and told him I'd pick up the tab.

10. The week of 19 June the wife of President DIAZ Ordaz called the Director of the Instituto Irlandes and asked if he could recommend a tutor for a nephew of hers. The director replied that the Instituto had a good English teacher and that although he was very busy, he would ask him if he would be willing to take on the nephew. The director communicated the above to Subject, and Subject gave the Director a list of the few hours he had free. The director told Subject he would call Mrs. DIAZ Ordaz back and would inform Subject if any of the hours were suitable. As of 27 June, Subject hadn't heard further from the Director. SB/L 1.

9

~~5003~~ ~~C/SB~~ 7 L

①

27 June 1967

MEMO OF CONVERSATION

Leila BELAVAL, Visa Officer of U.S. Embassy

Int to P-11712

1. I talked to Leila today about her contact with the Soviet who brought BAZAROV's passport in for a visa yesterday. She identified the Soviet from a photograph as Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, and said that he is always the one who comes to the U.S. Embassy for visas. She did not recognize the photograph of Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN, the Vice Consul. Actually, Leila believed that LOGINOV was a Vice Consul, said she always asks for him as such when she has to call the Soviet Embassy.

2. Apparently yesterday was not the first time that LOGINOV has tried to make a date with Leila. She says that he always asks her what she does in her free time, and that she has put him off by saying that she is very busy. Once ~~shexx~~ he asked her whether she spent her free time with other people ~~ax~~ from the Embassy and was surprised to hear that she usually spends her off hours with non-Embassy friends. Yesterday LOGINOV again asked her what she did in the evenings, and she said she was especially busy now because she has started taking guitar lessons. He mentioned some Soviet dance group that was coming to Mexico in a month or so and said he would like to invite her to go to see them with him. He also told her he was not married. Leila said she did not refuse the invitation outright but said that she did not know whether she would be free when they came or not.

3. I told Leila a few of the facts of Soviet life: that all Soviets have to be married in order to go overseas, that LOGINOV is a KGB officer and was obviously trying to get his foot in the door of the U.S. Embassy through her, that he was undoubtedly disappointed to hear that she did not spend all her free time with other Embassy people, etc. Leila has evidently been unsure about how to react to LOGINOV's advances, has not wanted to be rude to him, and seemed relieved when I suggested that she simply decline his invitations by always being busy. She says she does not like his slick manner at all, and I gather that she has felt uneasy in having to deal with him, but now that someone has told her how to react she will have no problem.

4. Leila mentioned that LOGINOV knows English but is reluctant to use it. He once read off the visa stamped in a passport in perfect English, and he also read a copy of the new visa regulations in English (to himself, but evidently understanding it all). According to the new regulations, Soviets no longer need visas for continuous transit of the U.S. (i.e., on the same flight), but LOGINOV insisted on getting a visa for BAZAROV in spite of this. (This is confirmed in LIENVOY.)

J.L. WEENING

COPIES MADE

cc: Semion BAZAROV (P-7759)

(Loginov)

Files: P-11712

LOGINOV handwriting sample, received 16 June 1967, from LIRENO

Valentín Loguinov
15-60-55
Consul

P-11712

11

S E C R E T

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOZY-5

DATE OF MEETING: 15 June 1967

1. I met with Subject at the Del Paseo from 0900 to 1000. The next meeting is for 18 July at 0830 at the same place.

2. On 8 June LOGINOV dropped by Subject's office to leave two tickets for the Bolshoy Ballet performance on 11 June. Subject invited LOGINOV and his wife for dinner and LOGINOV accepted for 13 June. (COMMENT: LIENVOY reports their confirming this date on 12 June). Subject said the tickets were used by his wife and son.

3. The guests on 13 June were LOGINOV and wife, William de Mier (P-5552), manager of KLM in Mexico and Gustavo ORTIZ Hernan (P-10971). ORTIZ was Mexico's first Ambassador to Israel and is very pro-Israel. He recently retired from the Mexican Foreign Service. His last job was Ambassador to Chile. He is 57 years old and apparently a good friend of Subject's. Subject invited ORTIZ because he knew that LOGINOV has been interested in public opinion in Mexico about the recent Israel-Arab war. Subject had been only able to give LOGINOV the opinions of Mexican Jews and he wanted LOGINOV to talk to a real Mexican. The deck was slightly loaded since Subject knew that ORTIZ is an Israeli partisan. Subject purposely avoided the subject but it was not long before ORTIZ asked LOGINOV about the Soviet position on the matter. LOGINOV answered with a banality about the USSR only wanting peace. ORTIZ then unloaded on LOGINOV for about half an hour. He told him that he had been in Israel as ambassador and had seen both sides. If the Soviets were interested in peace, why didn't they help the miserable and diseased Arabs with medicine, hospitals, job training, agricultural aid, etc? This is what they need, not tanks and jets. The Soviets are the real aggressors by arming the Arabs and egging them on. And what fools the Sovs are since the Arabs will never learn to operate any equipment, much less sophisticated stuff. Soviet hypocrisy is obvious to everybody. FEDORENKO's performance at the UN was shameful, etc. LOGINOV never answered a word. Subject later reported the above to the Israeli Ambassador who was pleased since ORTIZ is not a Jew and he is sure the above would be reported to Moscow.

4. LOGINOV said he will leave on 23 July for vacation in the USSR. Subject saw Mrs. LOGINOV for the second time. Since her Spanish is extremely limited, she did not participate in general conversation. However, she handled herself well and did not seem in the least ill at ease. In a side conversation she told Subject that they have a fifteen year old daughter who is living with her mother. She said that she has known LOGINOV since the age of six as neighbors in Moscow. Finally, she said that she is a chemical engineer.

5. I asked if Subject had talked to Miriam AVILA Katz (P-581) again about her contacts with our Embassy. He said he hadn't. I asked what advice he had given her. He said that he had told her to be truthful with the Americans and to be careful with LOGINOV.

Francis J. COIGNE

FILE: P-2712 P-11712 P-5552 P-10971 P-581

12

(1)

Dinliow

LITENSE-1

14 JUN 67

On the 9 May I went with my wife to the reception given by the ambassador of Checoslovaquia on the occasion of ~~htier~~ their National Day. The party took place in the garden where there were a couple of tables seating about ten persons each. Most of the people seating at the tables were from embassies behind the Iron curtain, or local supporters of the extreme left such as Cordero Amador, the painter Marin-Busqued, the art critic Margarita Nelken, Ruth Rivera etc. The Soviets were there headed by ~~ambassador~~ Bazarov and Kazanteev, present also by the name of Boris Tchmikov, Valentin Loguinov, Tchmikov is a young man, about thirty five, speaks very good Spanish and has a rather nice wife. He invited us to attend the exhibition of a film, a russian film at the embassy the next day, he also when ~~whenwe~~ we were leaving said that we had to go to his house soon and have a real russian dinner. This kind of invitation is most unusual. I do not remember any other sovietico suggesting such a thing.

In the party there were the usual diplomatic crowd which attends parties of representations behind the Iron Curtain, Max Wery, the Belgian ambassador and his wife, the French ambassador and his wife, the French Counsellor la Tour du Pin and his wife, the architect Lopez Malo who is one of the directors of the Comité Organizador de los Juegos Olimpicos, the italian ambassador and one of his daughters, the Uruguayan ambassador, the Chilean ambassador and Enrique Cobo del Campo the couesllor of the same embassy, the cuban ambassador Joaquin Hernandez Armas with whom we talked about Venezuela and told me that it was an stupid thing to accuse a country of trying to invade another country with half a dozen men. The chechs had plenty of beer brought from checoslova-

P-1630

COPIES MADE

cy to P-6335

two

quia but mixed it with just as much mexican beer if you were not careful. The Brazilian ambassador was there, Guillermo Gimenez Ramirez the charge of Costa Rica, Gonzalo Almeida Urrutia, the ambassador from Ecuador, from the Foreign Office, Muñoz Zapata and Flores Tejada. I do not remember seing anybody from the US, but I arrived somewhat late, Kai Somerto the ambassador from Finland was present and so was the mayor general Natahn Aferi from Ghana, the ambassador was most friendly as well as Jan Hant the commercial counsellor and Jiri ~~Swsxtram~~ Svestka the second secretary in charge o the consulat.

Next day we went to the Soviet embassy for the exhibition of a film whose title I think was the Father of the Soldier, a rather childish film but that brought tears to the eyes of some of the embassy wives who attended. There was an small group of people, including tonse army officers from the Secretary de la Defensa, and Amiral Azanar Cetina, subsecretario de marina, and amiral Otal Briceño, who after a long illness has now some new post in Marina. All the Soviet staff was present, there were two or three cuban including Curvello. There was a change, the doors of the embassy were wide open and there was no question by the people at the ~~xmmxm~~ outside door, inside Frygov and other fellow received the visitors. There was as usual plenty of ~~xxxx~~ vodka, ~~xxxxxx~~ small eats but no caviar, both thing were served before and after the exhibition of the ~~film~~ film.

On the 17th of may we went to a reception for the National day of Noruega. They have a beautiful house in Monte Cárpatos which had been built for the embassy along their norweigian style; the new ambassador is a tall gaunt, strange man, there were not many people because there was a diplomatic lunch at Relaciones and

14

white film of the Opympics to Ram rez Vasquez. No Indian around. No Greek neither. Chacha Valdes, formerly de Lanz Duret, with her new husband, licenciado Lozano. She if the owner of Universal. He was nobody until he married, now he is a well known jurist. Francisco Agüera Cenarro, the director of Revista Internacional, trying to impress the French ambassador with the fact that he had printed an editorial on Israel if his magazine. Revista Internacional has a ~~or~~ ciculation of about fivehundred copies, but gives Agüera a good ten thousand pesos a month.

It was a fairly good party as far as diplomatic parties go, but sterile in results. Nobody appeared to ~~hmmwrxm~~ worry very much about the war in the East, and some people ~~epple~~ like the Paraguayn and the Tobias Eguizabal had the idea that everything had been prepared in advance by the United States and the URSS.

That there had been a meeting in which the question had been settled ~~atteled~~.

Loguinov called me to the office to tell me he had tickets for me and my wife for the Bolshoi ballet for Sunday night. We had been unable to secure anything at the office.

13

five

On Sunday 11 June, Valentin Loguinov was able to obtain for us two good tickets for the Ballet Bolshoi at Bellas Artes and afterwards we went to have something to eat at Lady Baltimore in Madero Street. Very few people were there, which is not surprising in view of the bad quality of their food and poor service. But it was the nearest spot for a quick bite.

Loguinov was very much interested in knowing what my US friends thought about the situation in the Middle East and what they would do about it. He was insistent about the possible help that the US would give to Israel, he said that the US had already given Israel a considerable amount of ammunition and planes, and specially money, the URSS had to give some help to the arabs in view of the help given to Israel. According to him there was not the slighest doubt that Israel had been the agressor. The URSS would never consent to any territorial gains by Israel.

During our conversation about food, specially about seafood he let it be know/that he had been in Mazatlán several times.

He said that everything which had taken place in the Middle East had been plotted in advance by the US and Israel.

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOZY-5

DATE OF MEETING: 3 June 1967

1. After a long hiatus, I called Subject on ca 14 May and learned he was out of the country. I called him again on 6 June and we made a date for 8 June. The meeting was in the breakfast room of the Del Paseo Hotel from 0810 to 0915. The next meeting is at the same place at 0830 on 15 June.

2. Subject was all excited about the Israel/Arab conflict and we spent the best part of the meeting discussing it.

3. He said that LOGINOV called him on 5 June and pressed for a luncheon date the same day. Subject put him off until 8 June. LOGINOV wanted news on the local Jewish reaction, was everybody behind the Jews, was money being contributed, etc. Subject who was madder than hell about Soviet support of the Arabs gave him hell and to direct questions got the admissions from LOGINOV that the Israelis were acting in self-defense and that the Americans and British were not providing the Israelis air cover. LOGINOV mentioned that he would go to the USSR on home leave in July.

4. On 6 June Miriam AVILA Katz, who is also very excited about the war and who told Subject that she had gone to the Israeli Embassy to volunteer to serve in Israel, told Subject that when she returned home on the evening of 5 June, LOGINOV was waiting for her on the street. His purpose was the same as wanting to see Subject, to pump her on local reactions to the war. She also gave LOGINOV hell.

5. She then told Subject that in Holy Week she had been called to the American Embassy and had been asked about her contact with LOGINOV. She said that she had seen the same American (no name given) about two weeks ago. She then told Subject that LOGINOV had asked her to introduce him to "one of her progressive friends" or "someone in the U.S. Embassy" as a return for the favor of issuing a visa to Dr. Yuriy KUTLER.

6. The above is a capsule account of her relationship with LEVENDERIS. I played innocent until I got the whole story but finally admitted that we had talked to her when he asked, "if it wasn't you, who?" I told him that AVILA had notidea that Subject was in contact with us and had in fact worried that her activities (future) might hurt him which she was definitely against.

7. It appears that AVILA told Subject about us because of LOGINOV's appearance on 5 June and her emotional state about the war. I will discuss this further with Subject at the next meeting, particularly what advice he has or will give her about cooperating with us.

Francis J. COIGNE

FILE: P-2712 P-11712 P-581

SECRET

DOI 14 June 1967

SOURCE: LIHABIT

LOGINOV (P-11712) visited the Czech Embassy this 14 June 67 day. He was driving diplomatic license plate car 19 DA. He was there from 1214 to 1238 hours.

gbf

file P-11712

18

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact with BESABER, 24 May 1967

1. Operational - Per telcon arranged meet at BESABER's hotel room at Del Paseo (204). Met from 1830-2030, 24 May. BESABER will call 30 May or 1 June to arrange next meet.

2. Finances - Replenished BESABER's revolving fund.

3. Substance

a. Re SGSWIRL - As requested at last meet BESABER turned in bio data on girlfriend he had talked to SGSWIRL operator about. (See attached note from operator). No traces. He will turn in at next meet his version of what he told her. He is most upset by this matter, particularly since I had told him that Headquarters wanted to drop him. I reiterated that he was on probation.

b. CHMYKHOV and LOGINOV
(P-6235) (P-11712) -

1). On 20 May CHMYKHOV and LOGINOV arrived at BESABER's plant at about 1400. L was driving a brownish Chevy Impala, 34-DA. L was interested in seeing the house that BESABER had located for the Soviets. He said they wanted a house for three, possibly four months (starting 1 June) and could easily spend up to $6,000 MN per month.

2). BESABER could not leave the plant, but put them in touch with a Sra. LARA who took them around to seven houses, one of which they liked. They returned to BESABER's plant at about 1700, sat around for about an hour, leaving because they said the couriers were coming in that night and they had a lot of work to do. (Couriers did arrive that night).

3). CHMYKHOV drank heavily (scotch) but did not show any effect; LOGINOV didn't even finish one Scotch and water.

4). L said he would probably return to Cuernavaca in a few days to sign the lease on the house and would look BESABER up. BESABER told L that he had a friend with a tennis court and in a few weeks when the friend returned to Mexico he (BESABER) would arrange a day of tennis.

5). L did most of the talking although C was pleasant, told a number of good jokes (in poor Spanish) and generally impressed BESABER as beinga pleasant type, not "pesado," as he assesses L.

c. Re COIGNE's request and as a follow-up to LIKAYAK/2's report of 28 April 1967 re Lorenzo CARDENAS (P-5409), I asked BESABER if he knew of a house of prostitution at Dr. Manuel Ugarte 103 A. He did not, but will check it out through the doormen of several hotels.

COPIES MADE

Phineas F. SLINKARD

FILE: P-8777 P-5409 1 - SB

LOGINOV P — 11712

S E C R E T

cc: CHMYKOV P — 6235

19

Index

Gloria *PINTO
Contact and apparently good
friend of g XXXXXXXX LOGINOV
of Soviet Embassy.

CARDED

/NT

75- Entrada.- 1231 hrs.- MF GLORIA PINTO pregunta por LOGUINOV. HD dice que no está. GLORIA pide le digan que le llame al 23-62-85.- 93-

93- Salida al 23-62-85.- 1239 hrs.- LOGUINOV saluda a GLORIA PINTO. Esta dice que lo llamaba hace rato para darle las gracias de parte de su cuñada por la visa que le dió. LOGUINOV que está bien. GLORIA tambien le llama porque RUTH va a ir a fin de semana a Valle de Bravo y lo invitan a ir. LOGUINOV no puede porque el domingo sale un compañero a Moscú y lo tiene que ir a despedir, pero puede ser para la otra semana. GLORIA que para el día 27 es la Copa Davis, y tal vez no puedan ir. LOGUINOV que entonces ya será despues. GLORIA comenta que ALFONSO va a estar a las cinco en el café "El Jujuy". LOGUINOV va a tratar de estar allí un rato para saludarlos. - GLORIA pide pase por ella y de allí se van juntos. LOGUINOV no tiene mucho tiempo porque está haciendo las 50 visas de .. .. la Selección Mexicana de Futbol, pero va a tratar de estar a las cinco en el café. GLORIA que está bien.-144-

LIENVOY

156055
17 MAYO 1967

P- 11712

14-00000

20

C/SB/Sec

SB/Sec

①

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Miriam AVILA Katz — P-581

DATE OF MEETING: 11 May 1967

1. My last meeting with Subject was on 23 March, at which time she agreed to provide information on LOGINOV obtained during their normal business contact and any further social contact initiated by him. She was to call me after their next date or any other significant contact she had with him. Since I had not heard from her, I called her at her apartment about 2115 on 11 May. I apologized for calling so late, but said I had just got out of work and had a package for her I had brought back from the States which I wanted to deliver before the contents got stale. Could I drop over that night or perhaps another evening. Subject immediately recognized the "package" as the Benson and Hedges cigarettes I had promised her, gently protested, and then told me she was not feeling well, but the doctor had told her she had to eat, and it so happened she was just going out for a bite when I called. I consequently suggested we have dinner together, which we did from 2145-1215 at the Gondola. Afterwards, we went around the corner to her apartment for a nightcap until 0200.

2. Subject had lost 8 or 10 pounds and looked a bit thin and not as attractive as I had remembered her. She told me she was simply working too hard and not eating and sleeping properly. I had some fear that she might have had some second

Files cc: P-11712 P-1573 (pp. 2-4) P-2712 (pp. 4-5)

21

(2)

thoughts in the seven weeks since she had agreed to cooperate, but it proved unfounded. She this time was relaxed from the start, was very friendly, and seemed to enjoy the opportunity to get out. (She later told me in her apartment that she didn't go out much, liked to spend her evenings at home ~~reading~~, listening to records, tending to her dwarf trees, etc.) She made it clear from the start that she hadn't changed her mind by warning me half-seriously and half-playfully that I shouldn't think I could "buy" her with gifts. "You've bought me up here," she said, tapping her head with her forefinger. "That's the only way you'll get anywhere with me." Most of the evening was spent in general and (especially back at her apartment) increasingly fuzzy discussion of Israel, the Jews, her job, the Russians "as people," her very humanistic philosophy about life, and I don't exactly remember what else. She is definitely a smart girl, but I think less profound and sophisticated than she tries to appear. Otherwise, she seems to be a very sincere person, and she has given me no reason to doubt or suspect anything she has told me.

3. Contact with LOGINOV. Subject said she hadn't been out with LOGINOV since our last meeting and had had only one face-to-face contact with him. She said this was a little over a month ago (early April) and was occasioned by her efforts to help a client by the name of Dr. Yury KUTTLER get a Soviet visa. She said KUTTLER is a dentist and definitely a Communist sympathizer, if not a Communist. (KUTTLER has P-File 1573.) KUTTLER evidently thought he was liked by the

Russians in return, as he initially told Subject he was expecting an official Soviet invitation to visit the USSR. As it turned out, however, he had a hard time even getting a Soviet visa. Subject finally called LOGINOV herself to try to push things along, but LOGINOV showed no willingness to facilitate things. (LIENVOY has Subject on the phone to LOGINOV on 5 April. After discussing KUTTLER's case, Subject remarked to LOGINOV that she understood that "you (ustedes) must have some reason not to want to give him (KUTTLER) the visa." LOGINOV replied that there were "reasons enough.")

4. A day or two after her telephone conversation with LOGINOV, Subject said she went over to the Soviet Embassy personally to see if she could get anywhere with LOGINOV. LOGINOV received her cordially, and for the first time asked her into his office (she said it was the first office off the outside Reception Room). She again asked LOGINOV to try to [illegible] speed up the granting of KUTTLER's visa. LOGINOV hemmed and hawed, indicating that he wasn't even sure the visa would be granted. He finally told Subject that look, he had gone to KUTTLER for dental work once, and KUTTLER had charged him much too much. Consequently, he said, he wasn't going to give him a visa. Subject said she could not tell if the destist bill was the real reason for LOGINOV's negative attitude, but when she persisted, LOGINOV finally relented and the following exchange ensued:

23

3

LOGINOV: "All right, Miriam, I'll do it for you (i.e., give KUTTLER the visa). But you know, a favor must be repaid by a favor."

Subject: "All right....in that case, let me in the name of the company invite you to dinner."

LOGINOV: "No, Miriam, I don't mean that."

LOGINOV then went on to say that as he had mentioned to her before, he would like her to introduce him to "someone who would be sympathetic to us" (i.e., to the Soviets). LOGINOV emphasized that he realized Subject might not agree with this "someone's" ideas, but stated that he knew Subject was the type of person who "had respect for other people's views." Subject said that she replied in a casual, almost flippant manner that "well, sure, if she met such a person, she'd introduce them." With this the subject was dropped and Subject left.

5. LICOZY-5. Subject on her own initiative began telling me what a terrific guy her boss is. He according to her, has one of the most winning personalities of anyone she has ever met. At the same time he is extremely intelligent and shrewd. "If he can't get what he wants through charm, he does it by pure shrewdness." This is why he is such a successful businessman. In reply to a question about LICOZY-5's background, Subject said he had been born in Poland, was imprisoned by either the Poles or Germans just before or during World War II (she was rather vague on this point, and I confined myself to listening), somehow got out and joined the Russians, taking part in the Soviet invasion of Germany. Somehow he had survived all this, made his way to Mexico, where he arrived penniless, and now

24

(9)

must have a small fortune in the bank. He vividly remembers his former hardships, however, is a very generous and humane person, and every year sends clothes to people in Poland and Russia. He also has a very strong feeling for Israel. Obviously he couldn't have survived a life like this if he weren't shrewd. He has no love for the Russians, but was not above joining them to assure his own survival in World War II and can be agreeable enough toward them to retain their travel business. Subject gave absolutely no indication that she had said anything to LICOZY-5 about me.

6. The conversation was the most relaxed as well as the fuzziest back at Subject's apartment, where we finished a bottle of vodka LOGINOV had given LICOZY-5 and LICOZY-5 had given her. Back on the subject of LOGINOV, Subject said she "supposed" he had tried to cultivate a lot of girls like herself..."hadn't her?" (I had told Subject at our last meeting that young women were among LOGINOV's favorite targets, but hadn't been able to tell what effect this "revelation" had on her. Now it appeared that it had hit home and that it had wounded her pride to think he not only had had ulterior motives in dating her, but had dated other girls the same way.) I didn't reply directly, but said something about LOGINOV being as smooth as they come. Subject wasn't satisfied with this, however, and pressed me: "He has tried the same thing with other girls, hasn't he?" "Yes, Miriam, several," I finally said. This seemed to satisfy her.

7. Shortly thereafter, I asked Subject if LOGINOV were

25

Checked ✓

Indexed

NT - Wiltshire

No Traces on Wiltshire or variants Welcher

Douglas H. WILTSHIRE
SERVISA Travel Agency
in Am Directory
~~[illegible]~~, [illegible]

(norteamericano)

480- Entrada.- ~~HP WELCHER~~ (?) pregunta por LOGUINOV para si puede pasar a verlo, pues se trata de la agencia de vi Servisa. VALA dice que espere. Despues WELCHER comenta co LOGUINOV que el estuvo en el año de 1945 cuando la caida Berlín y conoce un poco la historia de la victoria rusa s los nazi-fascistas. LOGUINOV cambia de tema y pregunta si tiene algunas visas pendientes. WELCHER dice que tiene alg pasaportes que pasar a recoger y sirve que lo invita a su LOGUINOV le espera.- 521-

LIENVOY

480: Subject (giving name as WILSHER), an American, asks for LOGINOV and tells him that he just wanted to be sure that LOGINOV would be in as he had called yesterday (9 May) and he had not been in. LOGINOV tells WILSHER that 9 May is a Holiday and commemorates the Russian Victory in Berlin, Germany on 9 May 1945. WILSHER says he remembers that as he was in the war in that area at the time and remembers that. WILSHER wants to go by to see LOGINOV to pick up some passports. WILSHER also would like to invite LOGINOV out to his house. LOGINOV says he can come by to pick up the visas.

~~[illegible]~~ works for Lima Tours
Wiltcher

150055
10 [illegible] 1967

P-11712

26

ASUNTO: EMBAJADA SOVIETICA EN MEXICO.

México, D.F., 3 de mayo de 1967.

C. DIRECTOR FEDERAL DE SEGURIDAD
Presente.

A las 10.45 horas del día de la fecha se presentó en la Cruz Roja Central el Sr. [illegible] Consejero Comercial de la Embajada Soviética en México a bordo del automóvil Chevrolet modelo 1965 placas [illegible] en el cual viajaba además el [illegible] Sr. [illegible], llevando consigo al menor [illegible] y solicitando se le proporcionara atención médica en virtud de que el menor viajando a bordo de una bicicleta se estrelló en la parte posterior del vehículo diplomático antes citado causándose algunas lesiones que según el parte médico sanarán en 5 días aproximadamente.

(?)

Los funcionarios mencionados se hicieron cargo ante el Agente del Ministerio Público en turno y la madre del menor de sufragar cualquier gasto extraordinario que ocasionara la atención del lesionado.

Se hace notar que el accidente antes descrito se registró frente a la Embajada de Cuba.

Respetuosamente.

CAPT. [illegible]

C.C. P-11712

P-9026

(Portillo?)

P-11712

14-00000

27

3 May 67

COS

LIHEAIM's account of his first two meetings with LOGUINOV. It appears to me that at the second meeting, 26 April, he moved in a lot faster than is customary with the Sovs. For this reason I wonder if possibly the Soviets are deliberately trying to get a look at him independent from LEONOV, who may well have been reporting regularly his meetings with LIHEAIM.

He understands he is not to be dangled in front of Sovs, and I told him that after today's tennis match, he is to make himself unavailable for two or three weeks for tennis (or the movies) and see what kind of initiative L is prepared to take.

This would, however, allow us to plant an American girl at the French Club if we wished and play her into L's hands. Will discuss with Paul when he returns.

rle

I agree

DCOS

Did show to Paul + Cynthia

File LOGUINOV (P- [illegible]

cc:

28

VALENTIN S. LOGUINOV

1. Contact. First met April 22, 1967. He asked my wife and I if he and an American born Mexican friend could join us in doubles. Saturdays the tennis courts are filled. I was reluctant at first until I recognized his accent and suspected that he was one of two persons for whom I have pictures on file.

me

2. Utility. Consul of the USSR embassy.

3. Susceptibility. Eager to visit the U.S. Possibly interested in the material things of life, possibly overly interested in girls. Seems convinced of the value of Marxism.

4. Personality. Very friendly and direct. Wishes his embassy enjoyed club priveleges such as the U.S. at the Reforma Club. He likes caviar, vodka, and drinks several beers quickly. He is a little demonstrative in gestures of head and hands. It is too early to equate his gestures with his attitudes or the topics being discussed.

5. English. He is eager to improve his English, which he speaks rather poorly. His son Dmitry speaks only Russian, no Spanish or English.

6. Bio-data. His daughter, 14, is in an English school in Moscow.

7. Chess. Plays, but not a fan.

8. Athletics. He plays excellent tennis for someone who claims he has played less than a year and never more than once a week. He has the face, build, and carriage of a trained athlete. He has the brutish look of a boxer or wrestler. He has the grace of a natural athlete. I would guess him to be unusually strong. He boxed when younger, plays basketball and volleyball.

9. Spanish. Speaks good Spanish. Studied for one year in Moscow.

+ 3 years in Cuba!

10. Desire for contact. Val proposed that we meet regularly for tennis at 1600 hours every Wednesday. He asked if it bothered me to be seen with a Soviet. He said many U.S. diplomats seemed to shun him. He also suggested that we not limit our contacts to tennis but that we go to a movie sometime with our wives.

29

11. Bio-data. Apparently has limited income. He has no servant, no TV, no telephone.

12. Leonovs. Val seemed somewhat cool about the Leonovs. Naturally he knows them, but doesn't seem to consider them friends.

13. Personality. Does not smoke. he did before

14. U.S. Trip. Val is going to Moscow in July. He wants to spend 2 to 3 days in New York. He said he had read much about New York but wanted to see it for himself.

April 23, 1967, P.M.

1. Contact. Upon leaving the club, we saw and greeted Val at poolside watching his son swim. He reminded me about our Wednesday date.

April 26, 1967, 1600 hours

1. Contact. Our tennis date.

2. Information.

A. My access? Val asked if I had occasion to go to the U.S. embassy and if I knew anyone in the embassy. I answered no to both.

B. FBI. Val was still concerned about my innocence and lack of fear in being seen with a Soviet. I joked about not seeing any FBI in the area. He blushed and said he really knew that there were very many FBI agents here.

C. Embassy telephone. Val requested that I not use his embassy phone number on his calling card. He explained that he is all over the embassy and that it is difficult to locate him.

D. American girls. Val asked me if I knew any American girls here. He suggested I bring two for our tennis date. He wants to meet U.S. girls to practice his English. He said that in one year here he has failed

[illegible] of having [illegible] U.S. [illegible] to make a friend of any U.S. girls. He did pay one girl to give him lessons, but he felt she lacked background in grammar. I kidded him and implied that he was looking for something more than English lessons and that Mexican girls struck me as being far sexier. He accepted the innuendo that his interests in girls was more broad than just language training, but he insisted on U.S. girls.

E. Svetlana defection. Val said that the Svetlana defection bothered him. He feels the U.S. bought Svetlana, that she is crazy and that her defection will hurt U.S.- USSR. relations. I offered to be bought by the USSR to balance the defections. He said I wasn't worth anything to the USSR.

F. Trips. Val is going out of town this weekend. He was in Acapulco recently.

G. Known at club. Many people greeted Val at the club.

H. Embassy holidays. Val said the embassy would be closed May 1-4 and that no receptions were planned. This contradicts Nick.

3. Susceptibility. ~~Nick~~ Val is anti-Viet-Nam. He believes that U.S. politics are in the hands of 16 men, the Rockefellers, etc. These men make fortunes off military armaments and want the war to continue. He claimed that Viet-Nam is a civil war fostered by the U.S. The U.S. cannot win because the U.S. has formed an artificial barrier dividing one people. I suggested that it was not unlike Germany which is ~~xx~~ one people divided. He seemed annoyed at the comparison and tried to explain it in complex terms which I chose not to debate. I told him politics discouraged me since I know from history that the actions of today are governed by secret agreements which we will not be priveleged to learn of for another 50 or 100 years. Val hastened to say that he did not insist on talking about politics. If at any time I should like to discuss politics he is at my disposal, but is willing to discuss anything at all.

4. Houston. Val has always wanted to visit Houston. He regrets the U.S. restrictions on travel there. He supposes the U.S. has many secrets there to hide. I said that he was obviously a dangerous person.

5. Girl-friend. Val spoke of his girl-friend in Moscow whose sister is dying of cancer. He used the word "girl-friend", but his English might be weak here. He might have meant a female acquaintance of his wife and him.

6. "Dialectics". Dialectics is the law, according to Val, which proves that the U.S. cannot win in Viet-Nam--a people defending its own land against invaders.

5. Personality. Val plays better tennis than I. He drank three beers after our tennis. It was he who insisted that we go to the bar after tennis. He told several jokes, some mildy dirty, some fairly good. He will get me a copy of Soviet Life which discusses Soviet tennis. He paid for the ball-boys and for the drinks. His investment was about 16 pesos.

6. Bio-data. His wifes name is Alexandra. She is bothered by the altitude. He drives a green Chevy, 19 [illegible] His wife speaks little Spanish or English, and some French. He is third secretary in charge of visas to the USSR.

COMMENTS

1. Trying to recruit U.S. secretary. I would guess that Val is trying to state the requirements for his U.S. girl-friend in such a way as to exclude all but secretaries at the U.S. embassy. He wants someone with culture, good knowledge of the language. He did not deny, nor confirm, that his interests might be amorous, but he rejected the idea of anyone but a U.S. type.

April 27, 1967. Telephone

1. Movies cancelled. Val had suggested that we go to the movies together. When he learned that my wife enjoys Soviet movies, I cited several we had seen, he suggested that we all see the movie now at the Versaille. We agreed. He then called saying his wife was sick. Suggested we wait until next week. Reminded me of our tennis date next Wednesday.

May 2, 1967.

1. Contact. I played tennis with a client. My wife played with an instructor. She mentioned to me that while we were still playing she saw Val who had dropped off his wife, another woman and Dmitry. Val was very friendly, but neglected to introduce his wife or her friend. The wife nodded. On leaving the club Val was returning. we spoke for several seconds confirming our date for Wednesday. He made no effort to introduce the man with him.

14-00000

32

SECRET

Date: April 26, 1967

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

From: Nathan L. Ferris
Legal Attache

Subject: BORIS ALEKSANDROVICH KAZANTSEV; ET AL
105-407 (4-26-67)

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Reference is made to your memorandum dated February 28, 1967, # 11,513, captioned "Travel of Soviets".

No specific information has been received concerning the travel of the individuals mentioned in referenced letter.

Reliable sources, including Vice Consul Richard Booth, American Consulate, Veracruz, have advised that Mexican authorities are exercising strict control over visits to Soviet vessels and trips ashore by members of the crews. Loginov recently met Booth at Lopez Hermanos, shipping agents, and asked Booth if he could do something about the refusal of Mexican officials to permit crew members to come ashore.

You will be advised when additional information is received concerning this matter.

cc (P — 11718

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1-1880

SECRET

LILYRIC, 18 April 1967, 1018 hours this woman entered SovEmb, came out with LOGINOV at 1036 hours and they walked off together.

P-11712

34

photo

14-00000

35

Photo

14-00000

36

Not sure



37

40

LICOOL C/R — P-8764

17 April 67

PAGES 37+38 DUP PAGE

4. AEKITE: Subject reported that AEKITE was in the store from 1200 to 1215 on 14 April. AEKITE told him that he would come to Subject's home on Sunday, 23 April, for dinner. AEQUALITY came in later and Subject related the above to him. AEQUALITY suggested that Subject call AEKITE at the Embassy on 22 April to confirm the dinner so that Subject would not waste money by preparing a dinner to which AEKITE did not come. I told Subject to call AEKITE on 21 April since 22 April is a Saturday and AEKITE might not be at work. (COMMENT: There was no call on LIENVOY).

5. On 12 April 1967 at ca 1130 4 young Mexican males arrived in a new VW with temporary permit 1091021. They entered the Embassy and talked to LOGINOV.

6. Subject's notes for the period 31 March to 13 April 1967 are attached.

Francis J. COIGNE

S E C R E T

P-11712

38

LICALL C/O – P-8764
17 April 67

4. AEKITE: Subject reported that AEKITE was in the store from 1200 to 1215 on 14 April. AEKITE told him that he would come to Subject's home on Sunday, 23 April, for dinner. AEQUALITY came in later and Subject related the above to him. AEQUALITY suggested that Subject call AEKITE at the Embassy on 22 April to confirm the dinner so that Subject would not waste money by preparing a dinner to which AEKITE did not come. I told Subject to call AEKITE on 21 April since 22 April is a Saturday and AEKITE might not be at work. (COMMENT: There was no call on LIENVOY).

5. On 12 April 1967 at ca 1150 4 young Mexican males arrived in a new VW with temporary permit 1091021. They entored the Embassy and talked to LOGINOV.

6. Subject's notes for the period 31 March to 13 April 1967 are attached.

Francis J. COIGNE

S E C R E T

P-11712

④ CARD

Kodak to give English lessons. It was agreed they'd discuss the matter further when Subject (not to be left out of a good thing) visited TROCONIS at Kodak to take advantage of that 30-40% discount. Subject even wanted to get me some film at these fabulous prices, but I said I didn't need any at the moment. I did say, however, that any relationship that developed between TROCONIS and the Soviets would naturally be of interest to us and I'd like to have Subject remain alert to anything he heard from either the Soviets or TROCONIS. Subject said he would.

COPIES MADE

4. LOGINOV. As previously reported, Subject has seen LOGINOV on numerous occasions on the Embassy grounds and in the first office off the Reception Room. They usually exchange greetings in English. On 30 March, LOGINOV came up to Subject in the Reception Room and said that he'd like to speak to Subject about English lessons for his 8-year-old son. Subject said fine, and it was agreed Subject would drop into LOGINOV's office (i.e., off the Reception Room) when he was through with his classes that afternoon. When Subject returned about 1830, however, LOGINOV was just getting ready to leave and it was agreed they'd try to get together another time. They finally did so on 11 April. Subject went to LOGINOV's office about 1830 and stayed 15 or 20 minutes. LOGINOV in a very relaxed and casual manner, explained that he had an 8 year old son whom he wanted to learn English. He said the boy knew no English and very little Spanish. He stated that they were going to Moscow on vacation in July and would be back in August, and he consequently didn't want to begin the

LI ROCKET C/R (P 12244)
13 april 67

P-11712

40

b ② CARDED

lessons until they returned, but he wanted to tentatively explore the matter with Subject now. He stated--in English--that he would like Subject "to go to teach" the boy, the implication being, according to Subject, that the lessons were to be given at LOGINOV's home. If Subject couldn't give the boy lessons when it came time, LOGINOV said he hoped Subject would be able to recommend someone else. Subject said he'd be happy to teach the boy if he had time, but that it was of course too early to know whether he would be able to fit him into his schedule in August. LOGINOV said he understood and they could talk in specifics in August. LOGINOV added only that he planned to pick up a special text (or set of texts) for teaching children English when he was in Moscow.

COPIES MADE

5. Subject said that LOGINOV had a pile of perhaps 30-35 passports on his desk on 11 April. Subject commented on LOGINOV's apparently heavy work load, and LOGINOV replied casually: "Well, you know there are a lot of people who want to visit the Soviet Union." He continued that most of the passports on his desk were Mexican, but "several" were American. He then began shuffling through the pile until he came to one belonging to an American girl. He opened the passport to her picture and showed it to Subject as an illustration. Subject said he couldn't make out the name, but the picture was of a good-looking, blondish girl who appeared to be 23 or 24 years old. This was the only passport LOGINOV showed Subject, and the ~~conversat~~ topic was thereupon dropped. At the end of the conversation, LOGINOV stated that he certainly would appreciate it if Subject could teach his son and he'd

41

10 (6) CARDED

get together again with Subject in August.

6. I asked Subject if he thought he would have time to teach the boy. Subject said it was impossible to tell, but he could probably make time if we considered it important enough. I told Subject there was a good chance we would and in any case not to give LOGINOV a negative answer before consulting me. I explained that LOGINOV was KGB and one of the most able men in the Embassy, and warned Subject to be on his toes in his relations with him.

7. Subject conducted 11 classes at the Soviet Embassy during the reporting period.

COPIES MADE

28 March

1545-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO

1700-1815 -- KAZANTSEV. BAZAROV and his wife were supposed to have their first class from 1700-1830, but KAZANTSEV said the Ambassador was too busy. No mention was made of his wife. (The BAZAROVS' classes are scheduled for Tuesdays and Fridays from 1700-1830. Classes for KAZANTSEV, BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, and ROMANCHENKO are scheduled for Tuesdays and Thursdays.)

30 March

1545-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO

1700-1800 -- KAZANTSEV. KAZANTSEV said that BAZAROV expected to be tied up with the Soviet Petroleum Congress delegation and probably would not be able to make his 1700-1830 class on Friday, the 31st. If not, KAZANTSEV said, GONCHARENKO would use the time, since he was somewhat behind BEDRIN and ROMANCHENKO.

42

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Ernst GOEBEL

DATE OF MEETING: 10 April 1967

1. I met Subject at his office from 1845 to 1915 on 10 April 1967. My purpose was to see if he knew Herbert Adolf PELKA (P-). Subject said that he didn't know either PELKA or the two German witnesses to his marriage. However he does have a friend, a secretary at Telefunken where PELKA works. He will check this girl and elicit information on PELKA.

2. Subject reported that he had noticed that Ralph WIEGANDT has become quite friendly at the French Club as a tennis partner of LOGINOV. (COMMENT: Per LIENVOY WIEGANDT and wife invited LOGINOV to dinner in March 1967). WIEGANDT is a German who came to Mexico after WW II. He formerly worked for Rieboldt Chemical in Germany. His wife is from a well-known German-Mexican family from Guadalajara, nee BAHNSEN. His father is a Dr. of chemistry from Stuttgart who recently came to Mexico. WIEGANDT owns or has a controlling interest in Barnices Aislantes, S.A., located at Avenida Tolteca 176. This company manufactures plastic foam insulating materials. He lives in Coyoacan in a house which he recently had built, Europa 26. Subject dislikes WIEGANDT whom he describes as a pushy, ambitious businessman. The implication is that he is unscrupulous and would do anything for a buck. Subject doesn't know anything about his politics. Subject will obtain more background information on him.

Paul Dillon

FILE: P-12330 P-11712 New P for PELKA

New P for WIEGANDT

SECRET

43

TDY index
Source: LIFIRE

MEXICO D.F. A 9 DE ABRIL DE 1967.

AL SR. ADOLFO BUCIO Guzmán LO CONOCIMOS EN EL DEPARTAMENTO DE TRAFICO DE LA CIA. LINEAS AEREAS BELGAS EN EL PUERTO CENTRAL AEREO EN EL AÑO DE 1959. DONDE OCUPABA EL CARGO DE EMPLEADO DE MOSTRADOR.

EN EL AÑO DE 1963 LO TRASLADARON A LAS OFICINAS DE SABENA EN EL CENTRO EN LAS CALLES DE , PASEO DE LA REFORMA # 52 OCUPANDO EL CARGO DE EMPLEADO DE VENTAS. EN EL AÑO DE 1964 FUE NOMBRADO JEFE DE DICHO DEPARTAMENTO. EN ENERO DE 1966 RENUNCIO A LA CIA.

EL SR. ADOLFO BUCIO TRABAJA ACTUALMENTE EN LA CIA. DE AVIACION " AIR INDIA" EN LAS CALLES DE PASEO DE LA REFORMA # 116 CON TELEFONO 46-67-69 EN EL DEPARTAMENTO DE VENTAS.

EL SR. BUCUI ESTA CASADO CON UNA SEÑORA DE NACIONALIDAD FRANCESA MAESTRA EN DECORACION DE CASAS Y MODISTA. TIENEN SU DOMICILIO PARTICULAR EN LAS CALLES DE BAHIA DE DESCANSO # 10 COL. VERONICA ANZURES.

EN EL TIEMPO QUR TRATAMOS AL SR. BUCIO EN EL PEURTO CENTAL AEREO NUNCA HABLO DE POLITICA DESCONOCIENDO SU IDEOLIGIA.

EL SR. BUCIO HABLA INGLES ESPAÑOL ITALIANO Y ACTUALMETE ESTUDIA FRANCES.

used to be quite friendly with LOGINOV — less contact since B. moved to Air India.

CARDED

P-11712

SECRET

30 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris, Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Unidentified Visitor to the Soviet Embassy

1. Reference is made to our memorandum on the same subject, dated 17 March 1967.

2. Attached are two photographs of the man who visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on 9 March 1967 driving a car with Florida tags # 10-W-7776.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

11617

Attachment:
  Photos
Distribution:
  Original - Addressee, w/att., H/W
  1 - 50-2-4/A, w/o
  1 - 50-8-10/11, w/att.
  1 - P-11712, w/o
  1 - Memo Chron, w/o
  2 - Wash pouch, w/att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Jonathan L. WEENING/fkm
30 March 1967

SECRET

14-00000

45

~~Dillon's~~ Cyn—cj
~~Whitts to~~ Alice

COPIES MADE

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Miriam AVILA Katz — P-531

DATE OF MEETING: 23 March 1967 (La Pergola Restaurant, 1400-1615)

1. Subject works at Mundos Tours, where she is in charge of travel to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In this job, she deals with LOGINOV on visa matters. However, as far back as June 1966, LIENVOY indicated the existence of something more than simply a business relationship between them. Then in January 1967, Paul Dillon elicited from LICOZY-5 the information that Subject definitely had a social relationship with LOGINOV, as well as some basic biographic data: she was about 25 or 26 years old, a Mexican citizen with a Mexican father and "Jewish" mother, intelligent, definitely not pro-Soviet, and had gone to college for two years in the United States. The problem in arranging a meeting with her was to do so in such a way that she would be either disinclined or unable to say anything to LICOZY-5 or anyone else about the meeting before it took place. It was hoped that at the meeting she could be persuaded to keep the contact to herself.

2. Learning on 23 March that Mundos Tours was closed that day and that LICOZY-5 was out of town, I called Subject at her apartment that morning about 1115. I identified myself as an officer at the American Embassy, stated there was a matter on which I thought she might be able to be of some help to the Embassy, and asked if she by any chance were free to have lunch with me that day, or, if not, ~~if we couldn't arrange to the~~

Copies: P-11712 P-2712

COPIES MADE

if we could arrange something else. Subject professed dismay that the American Embassy even knew she existed, let alone that she could possibly be of any help to the Embassy. She then became very defensive and only reluctantly agreed to meet me for lunch at the Pergola Restaurant at 1400. The Pergola is just a few blocks from her apartment.

3. Subject was waiting for me in front of the restaurant when I arrived a couple of minutes before the hour. I found a trim, stylishly dressed young woman with glasses and long, dark hair pulled straight back from her forehead. The glasses, exposed forehead, and hair style gave her a sophisticated look which turned out to perfectly express her personality. She did not at first strike me as particularly attractive, but this was probably because she was tensed up to the point that she was pale and expressionless and actually trembled slightly when we first spoke. I later found her, especially when she took off her glasses, to be quite attractive, and it is reasonable to assume that LOGINOV is attracted by more than her personality.

4. The first 15 minutes were tough going. Subject was defensive to the point of hostility and totally unresponsive to efforts to break through to her on a personal level. Fortunately, she agreed to a drink before asking flatly what it was I wanted. I replied directly but in a friendly manner that through routine investigation, it had come to our attention that she had a social relationship with Valentin LOGINOV. I continued that while her personal life normally wouldn't be of any concern to the American Embassy, the fact was that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was a major base for espionage and subversion against both

47

COPIES MADE

②

Mexico and the United States and that LOGINOV was one of the Soviets' most able and active intelligence officers. One of the areas where he was most active, I continued, was in establishing relationships with young women like herself. For this purpose, I said, he used various lines, alternatively telling girls he was unmarried, divorced, or that his wife was in the Soviet Union. (This brought the first expression of any kind from Subject, who smiled faintly when I mentioned his using the line that his wife was in the USSR. According to LICOZY-5, this is what LOGINOV had told Subject.) Encouraged by the fact that Subject was at least listening, I went further into the seriousness of the Soviet presence in Mexico, hitting hard the fact that the Soviets treatened the security of both the U.S. and Mexico, individually and collectively. When I finished, I told Subject that I was telling her all this both so that she would know whom she was dealing with in LOGINOV and because I frankly hoped that understanding the situation, she would be willing to discuss LOGINOV with me.

5. To my disappointment, Subject replied with undiminished defensiveness that all right, she had gone out with LOGINOV a few times. Because of her job as head of East European travel at Mundos Tours, she had met and had to deal with LOGINOV on visa matters. One day he had casually asked if she were free that night and had invited her out. He had always been helpful to her and she felt it was good business to accept the invitation. In all, she had gone out with him "three or four times"--usually to dinner, the movies, a coffee nightcap, and then "always

COPIES MADE

straight home." She admittedly enjoyed his company. She considered herself "an intelligent person," and wouldn't go out with just anybody. He too had to be intelligent and had to be an enjoyable companion. LOGINOV fit this bill. He was "extremely intelligent," very considerate, an interesting conversationalist, completely unlike the usual ill-mannered, boorish Soviet. But that's all there was to their relationship. That's absolutely all there was to it. They never discussed politics, and even if LOGINOV wanted to do so, she'd refuse, because she had absolutely no interest in politics. She had her own life to lead, and what one side said made no more dent in her than what the other side said. Reflecting for a moment on the above, Subject then added almost disgustedly that when she began seeing LOGINOV she had more or lessed expected that her name would wind up in the American Embassy's files.

6. Subject said all of the above as though she were on the stand and showed no intention of volunteering any more. I consequently felt there was not much more I could do with her and that I had foreclosed any possibilities there might have been with the wrong approach, whatever the right one may have been. Moreover, at this moment, a well-dressed Mexican who looked to be in his early 30's came up to the table, greeted Subject, and invited himself to sit down. Subject, apparently as surprised as I, introduced him as Alejandro ALVAREZ (no Station traces) of ALVAREZ AUTOMOTRIZ, a local firm which makes springs for Volkswagens. Subject told me later that his father owns the business. Alejandro, according to Subject, had once been her professor in an accounting course at business school

49

COPIES MADE ②

here in Mexico City. Subject also said that Alejandro and his firm were good customers of Mundos Tours, and that Alejandro had in fact just recently returned from a three week trip to Germany. He spoke some English.

7. The appearance of ALVAREZ, who by now was ordering his first of two martinis, seemed to end any remaining chances of getting anywhere with the girl. As it worked out, however, his appearance had just the opposite effect, because it provided more than an hour of conversation on an increasingly friendly and personal level. By her second drink, Subject was even managing a few laughs. Eventually we got onto the subject of Israel, which, thanks to the information supplied by LICOZY-5, I knew she had visited and had become romantically involved with, she herself being half Jewish. I expressed considerable interest in her trip and Israel in general, and she seemed delighted to tell me about both. It then turned out that her mother--who Subject said is a U.S. citizen--had lived in Moldavia, had told her daughter vivid stories of pogroms carried out by the Russians against the Jews, and had fled Rumania before the invading Russians (evidently during World War II.) The fact that I had been in Rumania and Moldavia was good for another ten minutes of conversation and seemed to impress Subject far beyond its worth. In any event, by the time ALVAREZ left, Subject and I were on a first name basis and she was telling me how glad she was she had met me--all of which I attribute to luck (ALVAREZ, who even quietly paid the check when leaving) and dubonnet cocktails.

50

COPIES MADE ②

8. During the above conversation, we also discussed the United States, including President Kennedy, whom both Subject and ALVAREZ claimed greatly to have admired, and Subject's experience in the U.S., where she attended Kent State University in Ohio. She stated at this time that she regarded the U.S. as a second home. She also expressed love for Mexico and together with ALVAREZ, took pride in pointing to Mexico's progress.

9. Following ALVAREZ's departure, Subject looked at me as though I were a bad dog or something and asked in a scolding tone how I could have ever suspected her of cooperating with LOGINOV. No, she just couldn't understand it. I replied that I hadn't suspected her and reminded her that I hadn't said I did. I then said more seriously that there was one thing that bothered me, however. On the one hand, she told me she loved Mexico and regarded the U.S. as her second country; yet on the other, she claimed to be totally apolitical. The Soviets in Mexico, I repeated, were working to undermine both countries, and proceeded to go over again much of what I had said earlier. I stated that it was incredible to me that Soviet activities in Mexico didn't make any difference to her. I had contacted her, I said, not because I had any suspicion of her, but because from the little I knew of her I had hoped she'd cooperate in helping us learn more about LOGINOV and his activities in Mexico. Subject thereupon protested that there was nothing more she could tell me. She had told me everything worth telling about their association. Moreover, she hadn't seen him since Christmas time. LOGINOV was smart, never talked about anything sensitive, and could probably never be induced to do so. The only thing

51

COPIES MADE ②

he had ever asked her of an even remotely suspicious or interesting nature was whether she had any friends at the American Embassy. She said she had replied tartly that she had friends everywhere, and that LOGINOV hadn't bothered her with such questions since. In short, she didn't see how she could be of any help. I replied that since it was I who need the help, this was for me to ~~decide, that~~ whether she liked it or not she was in contact with an important Soviet intelligence officer who was of great interest to the United States, and that now that I knew her better, I was confident she had the intelligence and judgment to help us. I did not want to interfere in any way in her personal life. Nor did I really want her to do anything in the sense that she would have to go out of her way. All I wanted was that she be as observant as possible during her normal contacts and dates with LOGINOV, to try to see into the man, what made him tick, what his problems were, whether he was satisfied with his work, how he liked to relax, what did he enjoy, what did he want, etc. Then after each substantial contact, most probably a date, I'd like to have the opportunity to sit down with her over lunch or wherever it be and discuss her observations. This was all I was asking. All right, if that's all I wanted, she'd do it.

10. There was, I said, one thing I wanted to impress on her: if we were to obtain any worthwhile results, one thing was essential... Subject nodded at this point and interrupted: "I know...keep quiet." I emphasized that this meant with everyone, indluding her family, her friends, her boss and her co-workers. Subject assured me that she could be relied upon.

52

COPIES MADE (2)

11. Contact Arrangements. Subject agreed to call me to set up a luncheon date after her next date with LOGINOV. We will meet at the entrance to the Pergola at the time and date specified. I gave her the 870 extension and asked that she use the name "Mary" when calling.

12. There are clearly two essentials if Subject is to develop into a worthwhile asset. First she is going to have to come up with more interesting observations than simply that LOGINOV is smart. She may be able to do this by becoming a more diligent and careful observer--which I think she is capable of--or it may require an effort on her part to develop a closer relationship with LOGINOV. One possibility in the latter direction is to prevail upon her to become more intimate with LOGINOV than she now appears to be. On the basis of LICOZY-5's opinion that she probably sleeps around, this might be possible, although it is much too early to say. Second, Subject must prove cooperative. She strikes me as a very independent and strong-willed person, and there is no guarantee she won't change ~~[illegible]~~ her mind or do only what she feels like doing. It is also possible that in a moment of reconsideration, she might confide in LICOZY-5, in which case her credibility would become tangled with his.

RS
Robert Steele

53

SECRET

17 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris, Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Unidentified Visitor to Soviet Embassy

1. A sensitive, reliable source has reported that on 9 March 1967 a man who appeared to be an American stopped at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to talk with Soviet Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV. The man did not enter the Soviet Embassy. He was driving what appeared to be a late model Buick Electra with Florida tags # 10-W-7776.

2. A photograph of the above man will be furnished to your office when prints are available.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

11581

P-11712

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - 50-2-4/A
1 - 50-8-10/11
1 - Memo Chron
1 - Wash pouch
1 - P-11712

Jonathan L. WEENING/fkm
17 March 1967

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Raymond PATUEL
Francis L. PATUEL, nee Smith.

Citizenship check, please

paul d.

RECORDED

attached

R. L.

15 Mar 67

P-11,712

55

From Citizenship Office - 15 March 1967

Ramon PATUEL

DPOB: 28 July 1926, Madrid, Spain

Date of Naturalization - 11 April 1956, Supreme Court of N. Y. at Rochester, N.Y.

Naturalization Certificate #7457155

Emergency Addressee and Address: Mrs. Frances L. Patuel, wife, same add in Mex.

Local Address: Sierra Grande 907, Lomas, Mexico 10, D. F.

Address in U. S. - 23 River Meadow Drive, Rochester 23, N.Y.

Occupation - Manager

Full name of father, date and place of his birth: Enrique PATUEL,

Valencia, Spain Nationality - Spanish

Mother: Eulalia Sanchez de Molina Patuel, Madrid, Spain - Spanish

Name of Spouse: Frances L. Patuel, Madrid, Spain, 4 Dec. 1922 (US father) US Cit

Date and place of marriage - 18 March 1950

Wife native born

Date of last arrival in country - 20 Feb. 1961

Pp #524029 issued 15 May 1957, Wash.

Names of children, dates and places of birth:

Raymond J. 13 February 1951, Rochester, N. Y.

U.S. Residence since Natz.		Residence outside U.S. since Natz.		
From	To	Country	From	To
1956	1957	Spain	1957	1959
1959	1961	Mexico	2-20-61	Present

Date card initially typed - 1 March 1962

Action taken:

1 Mar 61 Appl for ppt & reg

3 Mar 61 Ppt #Z042590 iss valid to 3-2-64 reg. to same date. Wife included in reg only

27 Feb 64 Ppt Z042990 iss 3 Mar 61 ren to full validity

25 Feb 66 Issued Ppt Z522118 valid to 24 Feb 69, reg. Prev. ppt. can. & ret.

56

Frances L. PATUEL   4 Dec. 1922, Madrid, Spain

Father - XXXXX Austin Rodger Smith, Rochester, N. Y. 8 Aug. 1892   Cit: USA

Mother - Mercedes Semprun Smith, Valladolid, Spain

Father native born

Date of last arrival in country - 20 Feb 61

Ppt #524029 iss 15 May 57, Wash. (incl. in husband's ppt.)

Action taken:

3 Mar 61 - Ppt #Z042588 iss valid to 3-2-64 reg. to same date

27 Feb 64 Ppt #Z042588 ren to full validity

25 Feb 66 Issued Ppt #Z522119 valid to 26 Feb 69, Reg. Prev. ppt. can. & ret.

Date card initially typed - 1 Mar 62

There is also a card on the son, Raymond J. PATUEL, born 13 Feb 51, Rochester,N.Y. with same info as above.

57

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: BESABER

DATE OF MEETING: 7 March 1967

1. Operational: Met BESABER at his hotel room in Del Paseo for breakfast. Meet lasted from 0800-0920. Next meet will be after Easter.

2. Substance

a. BEWEEP: BEWEEP phoned BESABER on Friday, 3 March 1967 to invite himself, his wife and the RZADZINSKI couple down for the day on 5 March. They arrived on 5 March at about 1100, stayed until 1700.

b. BESABER reported that Mrs. RZADZINSKA is three months pregnant (by her admission) and that he, BESABER, thinks that BEWEEP is the father. He cited the following as evidence :

(1) The RZADZINSKIs admitted they they had been married for over five years, yet this is her first pregnancy.

(2) Mr. RZADZINSKI was totally unattentive to Mrs. R. BESABER and his wife assume that after so many years of waiting for a child, Mr. R. should have shown more concern for and interest in his wife.

(3) Likewise, Mr. R. was totally disinterested in the fact that he is about to become a father.

(4) BEWEEP, on the other hand, showed concern for Mrs. R. when she went to sleep in the sun. Twice he suggested that Mr. R. wake her up so she would not get burned. He didn't.

(5) Mrs. R. appeared interested in BEWEEP. When he went swimming Mrs. R followed, proceeded to jump on him and frolic in the water. Mr~~s~~. R. paid no attention at all.

(6) Mrs. R. sat next to BEWEEP at lunch (on purpose), kept looking at BEWEEP lovingly.

(7) BEWEEP, possibly embarrassed by all the attention Mrs. R. was showing him, made some very complimentary remarks about his wife. Mrs. BEWEEP, who apparently was completely oblivious to what BESABER and his wife thought was so obvious in the BEWEEP/Mrs. R. relationship, was obviously very pleased

[illegible]

FILE: P-8777 P-9097 P-453 P-11712 P-5183

P-11712

SECRET

58

but surprised, to hear her husband speaking about her in such a complimentary way. She asked incredulously whether he really meant what he said and when BEWEEP reiterated with some embarrassment that he thought she was the best wife in the world, Mrs. BEWEEP, covered with confusion but happy said that this was the first time he had ever said such kind things about hter, the first time she had been aware that he really did think she was a good wife.

(8) BEWEEP seemed relaxed enough, but different. On several occasions when political matters came up, usually raised by Mr. R., he changed the subject, once asked Mr. R. almost rudely, "Don't you have anything better than politics to talk about."

(9) Mrs. BEWEEP said that the two couples had been in the habit of going off on weekends together. BESABER supposed that BEWEEP may have done the deed during one of their outings.

c. In private conversation with BESABER, Mrs. BEWEEP asked if BESABERhad heard from BESETON. When BESABER said he had not, Mrs. BEWEEP said that her husband had told her BESETON was in Colombia (SLINKARD had told BEWEEP this). She then went on to say that BESETON was the nicest man in the world. "I don't know what he is, but he's the nicest man in the world." "He introduced us to another American (obviously SLINKARD) whom we see often, but it's not the same."

d. Mrs. BEWEEP, still alone with BESABER, was very complimentary towards the U. S. She said the U. S. was made for women, the merchandise, the packaging, the stores, etc. Moreover, the people are all nice.

e. Joined by BEWEEP, Mrs. BEWEEP got off on the Russians. She explained that it was difficult to understand the Russians since she, as a Pole, belonging to the Western Cultural traditions, held so many different views about life in general. She was apparently particularly thinking of the sense of distrust in the Russian mentality. She said that the Russians here in the Embassy simply could not believe that the two daughters of the former Polish Ambassador, Jerzy GRUDZINSKI, had been permitted to stay on in Mexico after their ~~XXXXXX~~ father's recall last year.

f. Mrs. BEWEEP told Mrs. BESABER that she was not teaching geography at the Embassy to the children of the officials.

g. BEWEEP told BESABER that he thought he would remain in Mexico until the first few months of 1969, but certainly until after the Olympics of the fall of 1968.

h. Tenon RZADZINSKI and wife - In addition to the information above noted regarding R. and his wife, the BESABERs picked up the following :

(1) RZADZINSKI was previously stationed in Vietnam as a member of the ICC (interpreter). He speaks good English and his Spanish, although not as good, is understandable.

(2) R. doesn't understand why the Americans are carrying out the war the~~y~~ way they are. Without in any way criticizing the American position, he did say that he found it unbelievable that they did not destroy the port of Haiphang.

(3) R. had contact with Amercans in Vietnam. ~~XX~~ He spent one month at the Danang air base, apparently anjoyed it.

(4) R. did not get off on politics, possibly because BEWEEP apparently did not want to talk about such subjects.

3. Comments

We have no information to substantiate the BESABERs supposition that BEWEEP is the father of Mrs. R's expected child. I told BESABER this. It may be true, but to have any operational significance, we would almost have to prove it.

4. Plans

a. I asked BESABER to arrange a lunch with BEWEEP in the near future to try to see if there was anything more to the above supposition. (Lunch now set up for 4 April).

b. Tentatively, BESABER will invite LOGINOV to Cuernavaca for 8 or 9 April to look at houses (for Sov Embassy retreat) and play tennis at Colonel Higgins (whom I will brief as soon as I can get hold of him).

Phineas F. SLINKARD

60

~~Pepper~~ files? ~~50-8~~ ck

~~Dalton~~ files? ①

CFS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Amconsul VERACRUZ

February 28, 1967

OCEAN SHIPPING: Communist Ships

C-RAA-50783; Veracruz A-35, 2/15/67, same subject

1. EAST GERMAN SHIPS AT VERACRUZ.

The HEINRICH HEINE (11 photos enclosed) arrived as expected on February 15, (see referenced airgram, pgh. 1) direct from Le Havre, and left for Habana February 21 in ballast. The ship had planned to take a Canadian passenger (Alexander John BLANCHARD; ppt # BE-602204, issued Toronto, 12/10/64; age: 35, professor, address: 250 Glen Manor Drive, Toronto 13), but he disappeared at the last minute. Blanchard planned to return to Mexico City from Cuba via the CMA flight, and then come back down to Veracruz to get his wife Mary Ann, who was to remain here. The Mexican tourist cards of Mr. & Mrs. Blanchard expired February 12, 1967. The local agent for the East German line stated that, recently, the honorary Consul of West Germany (a rival shipping agent) has been going aboard each East German ship to offer all possible assistance; on looking into this, said the agent, he discovered that West Germany's representatives throughout the world, wherever East Germany is not represented, have been ordered to act discreetly in represent-ation of East German interests as well as West German interests.

did not sail

cc:
ARA/MEX
AMEMEXICO
P
E
CCA
NAVY
~~[illegible]~~
P/R
+ legal

2. RUSSIAN SHIPS AT VERACRUZ.

The KOMSOMOLETS TADJIKISTANA (see referenced airgram, pgh.2) sailed February 21, saying she was bound for Hamburg. The oceanographic

Enclosures: 1. 11 photos of the HEINE
2. 3 photos of the M. LOMONOSOV
3. Crew lists of the LOMONOSOV, VETLUGALES and KIROVSK

CONFIDENTIAL

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MAR 0 1 1967
REC'D IN CR/F
MEXICO, D. F.
MEXICO

RTBooth: mdb 2/28/67

Index

cy to P-11712

file 200-4-79

P-11,712

61

0

research vessel MIKHAIL LOMONOSOV (5 photos enclosed) arrived February 24, giving Cristobal as her last port, and is expected to leave late February 28. On February 25, the merchant vessels VITLUGALIS and KIROVSK arrived in ballast from Nuevitas, Cuba, and Habana, respectively. The former is to load an estimated 5,000 metric tons of corn and the latter an estimated 11,000. Crew lists of the three ships last mentioned are enclosed. Mexican authorities mounted a guard around the LOMONOSOV and refused to let anyone on or off. Soviet Consul and Third Secretary Valentin L. LOGUINOV, in town in connection with the visiting Russian ships, called the Consulate on February 27, wanting to talk to the Consul, who was out of town, but showed no interest in talking to the Vice Consul. On February 28, a local shipping agent introduced Loguinov to the Vice Consul. Loguinov complained of the lack of hospitality shown to the Soviet scientific ship by Mexican authorities, comparing this with the magnificent reception the ship had received in San Francisco; he even asked if the American Consulate didn't have some relationship with Mexican Immigration authorities, implying that we might be able to help them. Loguinov, who was very cordial, said he had been in Mexico City a year and half and lived there with his family. He seemed about six feet tall, with short, reddish-blond hair, and spoke fluent Spanish with Russian accent.

3. COATZACOALCOS.

No Communist ships are known to have entered Coatzacoalcos harbor since those mentioned in pgh. 3 of the referenced airgram. Further information is not yet available on those ships.

BOOTH

62

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact with BESABER

DATES OF MEETINGS: 23 and 28 February 1967

A. Operational

1. As arranged by phone CO met BESABER in latter's room at the Hotel Del Paseo, dates 23 and 28 February. Mrs. BESABER was present at the second meet. BESABER plans to be in Mexico City on 9 March and will call to arrange meet.

B. Finances

1. CO picked up BESABER's accounting for revolving fund. I'll reimburse him at next meet.

C. Substance

1. Soviets - At about 1000 on 18 February Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH (P-8167) phoned BESABER from Cuernavaca. BESABER had never met him before. S explained he friend of Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (P-11712), that L unable to make it because some people had arrived in town. S showed interest in buying some of BESABER's products, therefore BESABER asked him to come to factory. S arrived with wife and young girl who works in the Embassy (18-19 years old, tall, good figure, dark brown hair, spoke Spanish, she wore kerchief) - this probably Tatyana MARKINA (P-12945).

2. S brought almost 2000 pesos worth of stuff including two large screens. BESABER opines that this was not personal purchase, but rather either for the Embassy or operational expense deal. S also insisted that purchases be delivered to Embassy, not his house.

3. S invited BESABER and wife to Army Day reception at the Soviet Embassy (28 Feb 1967), saying that he had forgotten to bring written invitation but that it would be at the gate of the Embassy (BESABER was reluctant to go and I thought it better for him to not appear overly eager so he did not go.)

4. Before leaving (they stayed about 45 minutes) S told BESABER that ~~he~~ LOGINOV would probably come to Cuernavaca the following day, Sunday about noon. (he didn't.)

FILE: P-8777 P-8167 P-11712 P-5183 P-12019 P-885

P-9772

S E C R E T

63

5. After S, XXX wife and M had left BESABER picked up a girl and drove to the Arosena (phonetic) hotel in downtown Cuernavaca. Sitting in the garden of the hotel at about 1300 he spotted S(with his shirt off) sitting at another table conversing with a man who looked Russian, apparent age 25, thin, wavy dark brown hair. S's wife also present, but M not. BESABER left after about 15 minutes without talking to S although S must have seen him.

6. Per CO instructions BESABER phoned L on 24 February to apologize for not making it to the reception. During this conversation (LIENVOY intercepted) L said he would come to BESABER's house for lunch on Saturday, 25 February with about five other people. He showed up at about 1545, stayed until 1830 with :

Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN (P-829) and wife
Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH (P-9772) and wife
Mrs. Pavel YATSKOV (P-885)
Mrs. LOGINOV (P-11712)
8 assorted children of above.

7. They arrived in two cars, BROVKIN driving a 2-year old light blue Ford Falcon, LOGINOV a blue-gray Chevrolet, license plates 19-DA. (BESABER may be color blind - our records show both cars as being green.)

8. The conversation was characterized by a lot of propaganda on BROVKIN's and LOGINOV's part. Although Vietnam was not mentioned, L boasted several times that the Soviets would get to the moon first, complained about the Kennedy murder scandal, and generally spoke in an anti-American vein. BESABER and his wife tried to laugh them out of this theme, but with little success.

9. At one point BESABER mentioned an article he had recently read in Business Week about the Soviet car industry. When he told LOGINOV that the article purported to be based on CIA information, L would not leave him alone until he found the article and gave it to him.

10. LOGINOV was obviously the superior of the three men. Neither MALAKHOVICH nor his wife said a word. BROVKIN, after a few drinks (but not drunk) started moaning about the problems of life, mentioned that the only thing that kept him going was his good wife and children. At this point LOGINOV walked up behind BROVKIN's XXXXXXXX chair, practically lifted BROVKIN, chair and all, and said, "We must go."

64

S E C R E T

11. As far as the BESABERs could make out the only purpose of the visit (other than to get a free meal) was to invite the BESABERs to come to the Embassy to see Soviet films. Not knowing how he should react BESABER was non-committal, although he couldn't resist asking BROVKIN if they had any Westerns in color. (I told BESABER he should not go to movies and if the subject came up again to tell the Sovs that while he liked them as people, he didn't want to hear their propaganda either orally or from the sound track of some lousy movie).

12. BESABER is less impressed by LOGINOV's intelligence than heretofore. Between L's and B's heavy-handed propagandizing (especially in the capitalistic "ambiente" of the BESABERS) BESABER was less than impressed with their tact.

13. Mrs. BESABER reported that of the three women Mrs. YATSKOV was by the far the most presentable. She learned that the YATSKOVs were on their second tour in Mexico, that they liked Mexico (Mrs. BESABER is Mexican). Mrs. BROVKIN related that they had one daughter (age 14) in Moscow besides the two children with them in Mexico.

14. Plans for future get-togethers include only LOGINOV. Mrs. BESABER will look for some housing for the Sovs in Cuernavaca; XXXXXXXX when she has found something, they'll invite LOGINOV down to have a look at them. There is also the possibility of tennis, although both BESABERs are loathe to take any Sovs to Mrs. BESABER's tennis club, practically all the members of which are Americans. I agree.

15. The BESABERs proposed and I second the motion that I contact Laurence Higgins, a long-time Station contact and personal friendof the BESABERs and tell them that the BESABERs are cultivating Sovs in our behalf, ask him to let BESABERs bring LOGINOV,XX and possibly others to Higgin's court in Cuernavaca.

16. Attached are signatures of the Sovs who visited BESABER.

17. Raul Morales Montoya - At 23 Feb meet BESABER handed over the attached postcard from RMM, dated 14 Feb from Colima. At the 28 Feb meet BESABER reported that RMM had phoned him from Colima on 24 Feb, reporting among other things that he would be in Colima for another month or so. He said he was working in the office of Secretaria Particular of the Governor of Colima (tel: 2-04-11) and staying at the Motel Costeno (tel: 2-00-35).

Phineas F. SLINKARD

S E C R E T

Can't tell who signed what.

65

[illegible]

[illegible] 1 Feb 67

On Saturday 28 I went to a party at the house of the Greek Consul General Leander Vourvoulias, and I saw there Vladimir Loguinov engaged in a heated discussion with an american consul whose name is Sherry. Sherry was arguing that there were a lot of Chinese in North Viet Nam, and Loguinov was saying that it was a pity that such a big nation as the US should be fighting an small and poor nation like Viet Nam.

I had a talk with Loguinov, who I think now is in charge of consular affairs and he told me that he thought that negociations for the cultural agreement with Mexico were still going on, but that those boys who had been awarded the fellowships had already gone. But according to what he said there were quite a few more then ten.

Loguinov was with his wife and talking about the Bolshoi ballet he told me that I should have rang him up and he would have taken us, me and my wife, to see the ballet and to see the dancers behind the stage. He said that the ballet was coming to Canada for the fair and probably would come again to México.

The Russians will give a party for the consuls, film and drinks, sometime during February.

Loguinov asked me if I thought that some consuls would not show up at the Russian embassy as they did when they were invited by the Cubans. I told him that the position was entirely different because most countries had diplomatic and consular relations with the URRS.

LOGINOV P-File

P-11712

66

Martes 3 LICALLA	A las 1114 Hs. llegó al Club una mujer de poco más de 50 años, misma que pasó al interior del Recibidor en el cual tuvo contacto con LOO, dicha mujer se fué a las 1242 Hs. photos in Y-2174 (no car)

I thought this might be Tatiana RAKOFF de MARCHAND, but she must be older.

ch

3 Jan 67

P-11712

6.7

LICRIC 9 Jan 57
in: 1112 R out ~~1344~~ R



photo!



photo!

14-00000

70

SECRET

7 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris, Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Dr. R. W. JUDD

1. Reference is made to your memorandum on Subject dated 27 February 1967.

2. This office has photographs of three American-looking people who visited the Soviet Embassy from 1320 to 1336 hours on 26 January 1967, and who are probably identical with Subject, his wife and associate, Clyde WHITWELL. They were driving a Tourism car from Zacatecas, license plates 8133-H.

3. It is believed that the Soviet who talked to Subject was the Consul, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

11547

CARDED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
  Original - Addressee
  1 - 50-2-4/A
  1 - 50-8-10/11
  ① - P-11712
  1 - Memo Chron
  2 - Wash pouch (HMMA-31524, 7 March 1967)
Jonathan L. WEENING/fkm
7 March 1967

SECRET

71

(4)

recently rejoined RAY'S firm after previously leaving it and working for another firm in Mexico City. (The man is undoubtedly John G. *PAGE, who is listed in the 1966-67 Anglo-American Directory as Sales Manager for Tele-Revista, S.A. The 1961-62 Anglo lists a John G. PAGE as being with Richard K. TOMPKINS y Assoc.--i.e., clearly the predecessor of "TOMPKINS, RAY, MARTEL.") According to Subject, Mrs. PAGE's mother is Dr. Anita BRENNER, an American and the editor of "Mexico This Month." Mr. PAGE looks to be 35-40 years old and his wife about 30. PAGE is half Jewish and one of his parents was born in Russia. PAGE consequently speaks some Russian and spoke a little with KUCHEROV. LIROBBIN-1 saw RAY a few days after the film showing, and RAY mentioned that PAGE had told him that KUCHEROV had made a definite effort to make friends with him (PAGE), but that he (PAGE) had no interest in making friends with Communists.

CARDED

4. As it turned out, Gulliver's Travels wasn't shown after all, as the film turned out to be in very poor condition and kept breaking when run on the projector. In its place, the Soviets showed a Soviet film about a poor young woman in 19th or early 20th century Russia who marries a wealthy old man and is corrupted by her new found riches. The kids and everyone else were disappointed, but Subject found some consolation in the fact that the flick at least was clean.

5. 15 February. On this date Subject and LIROBBIN-1 attended an evening reception at the Indian Embassy at the invitation of their friend K.D. *PARASHAR, the Indian Consul. LOGINOV and SOKOLOV were also there, both without wives. Subject at first

LIROBBIN-2 Contact Report, 28 Feb 1967 Orig filed: P-11665

P-11712

(4) COPIES MADE

LIROBBIN-2 Contact Report, 23 Feb 1967 Orig filed: P-11665

and unfortunately really didn't know of any. LOGINOV said that he probably really ought to take English lessons from a Britisher. He added that he had once taken a few lessons from a "girl from Texas," but he had had to stop because of her "Texas accent." LOGINOV finally said that well, look, he was having " a little party" the next evening and would like Subject and her husband (whom he eventually met in the course of the evening) to attend, as he would like to have her become acquainted with the Soviet Embassy, too (i.e., in addition to the Indian Embassy). LOGINOV added that perhaps she could even put something in THE NEWS about the affair. Subject accepted the invitation, although without LIROBBIN-1, who was about to leave for the States, and said ~~he~~ she'd see if she could get a photographer to the Embassy.

6. 16 February. On this date Subject attended the Consular Corps gathering at the Soviet Embassy. She went with the PARASHARS. LOGINOV was the first Soviet to greet her, but within a few moments PRIKHODKO and KUCHEROV came hustling up. Subject said that LOGINOV seemed genuinely surprised that his colleagues already knew her, but he did not ask for an explanation of how. On their parts, PRIKHODKO and KUCHEROV seemed equally surprised, but also avoided asking any questions. In the course of the evening, Subject talked with PRIKHODKO, KUCHEROV, DOLGOV, Mrs. PRIKHODKO, and Mrs. SOKOLOV. LOGINOV made no effort to search her out, and she did not talk with him again until leaving, at which time she thanked him for the invitation and apologized that the NEWS photographer she had asked to come to the Embassy had not shown up. However, she said she'd try ~~to put something~~ in "Around the Town."

CARDED

73

(5) COPIES MADE

gone and spend and/or make some time with her. She said she actually felt sorry for KUCHEROV, because he just wasn't cut out for the role and she thought he probably dreaded it.

8. 23 February. On this date Subject attended the Soviet Army Day reception at the Soviet Embassy. She went with Pearl GONZALEZ and an American named Bill SOLEMNE, whom Pearl brought along as her escort. (KUCHEROV left an invitation for Pearl with Subject on 17 February.) According to Subject, SOLEMNE is about 35 and is in "publicity" work here. (According to the A-A Directory, William A. *SOLEMNE is an executive in the International Department of Walter Thompson de Mexico.) Subject did not notice any other Americans at the reception. She talked with PRIKHODKO, Mrs. PRIKHODKO, KUCHEROV, DOLGOV, and, briefly, LOGINOV. DOLGOV said he had been with PRAVDA for six years. Subject had put a blurb about the 16 February Consular function in THE NEWS on 19 February and brough along a clipping for LOGINOV. LOGINOV said he hadn't seen it, seemed pleased, and thanked her. He then asked if she were going on the Consular Corps tour of the Mexican Home Show on 3 March. Well, no, Subject replied, why would she be, she wasn't a consul or married to one, and consequently hadn't been invited. LOGINOV replied that he thought she should go and therefore he was making her an honorary Soviet consul. Subject said that was fine with her and she'd see him at the Home Show. (I told Subject on 28 February to be careful with LOGINOV, because he was an experienced KGB officer and one of the most able men in the Soviet Embassy. This seemed to delight as much as concern Subject.)

CARDED

LIROBBUB-2 Contact Report, 23 Feb 1967 Orig Filed: P-11665

14-00000

74

③ COPIES MADE

9. 3 March. Subject did not at first see LOGINOV on the Home Show tour, but mid-way through the tour she felt a tap on her shoulder, turned and saw LOGINOV. They then walked along together for the last 25 minutes ~~of~~ or so of the tour. Subject said that nothing of interest was said and they parted without any specific mention of getting together again. Subject said LOGINOV spent most of the time criticizing the U.S. on everything from its foreign policy to its treatment of the American Indian.

10. Pearl GONZALEZ. Subject told me on 8 March that Pearl had just received permission ~~for this~~ from the Cuban Government to visit Cuba as a journalist. Subject said U.S. foreign correspondents in Mexico had applied for permission to visit Cuba many times in the past, but had all been turned down. Pearl and Harold JONES of the Copley News Service, according to Subject, were the two most recent American applicants. JONES, according to Subject, was turned down. Subject said she thought Pearl was probably given permission because the Cubans believe they can lead her a round by the hand and get some useful publicity out of her. Subject noted that Pearl believes Castro has done a lot of good for Cuba and that he has been unfairly treated by the U.S. press. Moroever, Subject observed, Pearl is by no means a full-fledged or experienced newspaper woman, as her only experience consists of writing society articles in THE NEWS for the last year. Subject said Pearl planned to visit the American Embassy on 8 March in order to get permission from the State Department to make the trip.

CARD

11. Antonio * HALIK. I asked Subject if she knew HALIK, who according to the Foreign Correspondents' Assoc. handbook, is a

[illegible]-3 Contact Report, 23 Feb 1967 Orig filed: D-11663

75

SECRET

28 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris, Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviets

1. A sensitive, reliable source has reported that Soviet Minister Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV went to Veracruz on 25 February 1967, and that Soviet Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV and Soviet Commercial Counselor Viktor Mikhaylovich IVANOV planned to go on 26 February 1967 in order to attend to three Soviet ships there in port. It has also been reported that Soviet Cultural Attache Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV planned to be in Queretaro on 27 February 1967 to attend a ceremony at the university there.

2. Any information available to your office on the activities of these Soviets in Veracruz and Queretaro would be appreciated.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

11513

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - 50-2-4/A
✓1 - P-11712
1 - P-1612
1 - P-8102
1 - P-880
1 - Memo Chron

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Jonathan L. WEENING/fkm
28 February 1967

SECRET

76

S E C R E T

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOZY-5

DATE OF MEETING: 22 February 1967

1. I had breakfast with Subject at the Hotel Del Paseo from 0900 to 1000 on 22 February 1967. Next meeting is at the same place at 0900 on 8 March 1967.

2. Subject reported that he had had lunch with LOGINOV as planned. LOGINOV brought up the following topics :

a. LOGINOV brought up the Ramparts article about CIA. Subject hadn't read or heard of it. LOGINOV then said this proved that CIA was very active and said they were active in Mexico. He again asked Subject if he had any friends at the American Embassy. Subject for the nth time told LOGINOV that he hadn't been in the American Embassy and that an office boy takes care of visas, etc. at the Embassy.

b. LOGINOV then said that he was going to explain to Subject the line of the CC of the CPUSSR on China. Then followed an harangue against the Chinese which Subject stated contained nothing that hasn't been in the newspapers.

c. LOGINOV said that he has a Mexican girl whom he didn't identify and asked if Subject would give her a job or find her a job. Subject asked about her qualifications, English, typing, etc. LOGINOV answered that he didn't know. Subject said to send her around and he would see. To date she has not appeared. (COMMENT: Subject said he has no intention of hiring her, if she comes, but thought we would be interested in her identify. I told him to find out as much about her as possible. However since LOGINOV didn't say what kind of a job she wanted or what she could do, I will be surprised if she comes.)

d. LOGINOV went into some detail explaining to Subject about the party he was giving at the Soviet Embassy on 16 February for the Consular Corps. He then invited Subject.

S E C R E T

P-11712

S E C R E T

e. LOGINOV said that Aeroflot service would be inaugurated between New York and Moscow in May. Once it is instituted local Soviets will fly to New York and catch Aeroflot there. Subject asked about U.S. visas which the Soviets have always complained about in the past. LOGINOV said that the Soviets will be travelling from Mexico to New York on Air France and Air France has agreed to handle the matter of transit visas with the U.S. Embassy. LOGINOV added that the local Soviets are looking forward to the stop off in New York which is much more interesting than Montreal. (COMMENT: If this works out we will have good advance notice of Soviet travel from Mexico and excellent passport photos).

3. Subject went to the party on 16 February 1967 with his secretary and his friend, Sinai Rome, First Secretary and Consul at the Israeli Embassy. He saw PRIKHODKO briefly and PRIKHODKO's wife attached herself to him and took care of him for the evening. He noted that YATSKOV wasn't at the party.

4. Rome introduced Subject to Jan JAKOWIEC. The minute JAKOWIEC heard Subject's name, he asked if he were from Mundus Tours. They then conversed in Polish. JAKOWIEC told Subject that the Polish delegation to the Olympics will come on the Batory and that the Poles are building a ship twice the size of the Batory which will be put on the Poland-New York City run next year. JAKOWIEC suggested that they get together for lunch and Subject agreed. JAKOWIEC said he would call Subject in about a week. Subject remarked that he is a sharp guy and speaks very good Russian. I told Subject that JAKOWIEC is the UB resident and instructed him not to go beyond a social relationship in any manner. Subject agreed.

5. Subject still has not heard anything on the ZABLUDOWSKIY-ECHEVARRIA dinner.

6. Subject is travelling to Los Angeles on business for two days on 24 February. On 27 April he will go to Israel for 10 days to conduct a group of Mexicans who are going to the opening of the Mexican Pavillion at a university which was paid for by Mexican Jews.

7. Per LIENVOY, NIKIFOROV called Subject on 20 February 1967 and made an appointment to come to Subject's office at 1100 on 21 February. Subject did not mention this to me. I will bring up the Subject of NIKIFOROV in an innocuous way at the next meeting.

Francis J. COIGNE

S E C R E T

78

COPIES MADE

(12)

LIROCKET-1 Contact Report, 16 & 18 Feb 67, filed: P-12244

(d) LOGINOV -- Subject has frequently seen LOGINOV in the first office off the Reception Room. LOGINOV has received the majority of the 8-10 visitors who have come into the Reception Room while Subject has been there during the last year.

(e) STRIZHOV-- Subject has frequently seen STRIZHOV jockeying cars around. He has also seen STRIZHOV go in and out of the gatehouse on numerous occasions.

(f) SILNIKOV-- Up to several months ago, SILNIKOV used to occasionally be on guard duty when Subject entered and exited the Embassy. He has also seen him jockeying cars around.

(g) SOLOMATIN -- Since Subject has been holding afternoon classes at the Embassy (since mid-January 1967), he has seen SOLOMATIN on guard duty every Tuesday and Thursday afternoon. He saw SOLOMATIN on duty only once in a while before this.

(h) TUCHNIN -- Subject has seen TUCHNIN in the second office of the Reception Room two or three times. He has never seen him receive a visitor.

(i) YATSKOV -- Subject has frequently seen YATSKOV in both the first and second offices off the Reception Room. He has seen YATSKOV receive visitors on a couple of occasions. YATSKOV has been ~~on duty~~ present with about half the frequency as LOGINOV.

(j) ZAKHAROV -- ZAKHAROV used to be frequenly on ~~duty~~ guard duty in the morning.

CARDED

3. Subject conducted 13 classes at the Soviet Embassy durigg the reporting period.

17 January

1545-1630 -- KAZANTSEV suggested that Subject give NIKITIN a call to check on ~~whether or~~ whether or not he planned to resume classes. KAZANTSEV implied he had no idea what NIKITIN's plans

P-11712

79

17 FEBRERO DE 1961 Licalla

NOTAS.

Viernes 17	A las 1242 Hs. entró al Club por la reja principal, una mujer extranjera (al parecer norteamericana) afuera de la Portería habló un momento con SOLO y pasó al interior del Recibidor en el cual a las 1250 Hs. tuvo contacto con LOO, se fué del Club a las 1303 Hs. La mujer mencionada vestía un traje de 2 piezas de color azul claro, era rubia, alta y delgada, usa lentes (cristales transparentes).

LILYRIC 17 Feb 1967

in 1241, out 1303



P-11712

14-00000

Zacubaza 204

2/14/63

82

filio

rec'd 17 Feb 67

P-11712

CUERPO CONSULAR EN MEXICO
MEXICO, D. F.

40 CORREOS

Honorable
Valentin Longuinov, Secretario
Embajada de la U.R.S.S.
Calzada de Tacubaya No.204
Mexico, D.F.

14-00000

83

BOLETIN CONSULAR

Organo del Cuerpo Consular de México
Plaza de la República # 9-105 México, D. F.

No. 1 Enero 1967 Vol. I

Fiesta Típica Griega. Hemos recibido numerosas felicitaciones por la fiesta ofrecida por el Hon. Consul General de Grecia y Pres. del Cuerpo Consular, en honor de los miembros de esta organización que ha sido atendida por más de cien personas. Desde temprano, el día 28 de enero, la residencia de nuestro Presidente en Paseo de la Reforma No. 2485, Lomas, lugar de tan agradable reunión, ha sido colmada de gentes que han venido a gozar de los platillos griegos y de los bailes y música típicas de este país hermano que fueron presentados por un grupo de jovenes del Club Juvenil Heleno-Mexicano de esta ciudad. Hubo derroche de alegría y buen humor. Se sirvieron "bourekakia", "dolmadakia", "kioftedakia", "spanakoita", "kourabiedes" y varias otras especialidades griegas y se sirvió "ouzo", "Metaxa brandy" y otras bebidas internacionales para el deleite de los presentes entre los cuales citemos al Sr. Director General del Servicio Consular Exmo. Sr. Luis Alva Cojudo y su distinguida señora, y al Sr. Sub-Director del mismo servicio Consular Lic. Raúl Valensuela y señora, además de numeros Consules con sus consortes y Agregados y Secretarios de las Embajadas Extranjeras en este país. La casa y jardín del Presidente señor Vourvolias, debidamente iluminados para esta ocasión, presentaban un panorama muy bello, así como las caras alegres y felices de sus invitados que con su entusiasmo y alegría contribuyeron al éxito de esta reunión.

Fiesta Típica Rusa. Nuestro Honorable Colega Don Valentín Longuinov, Secretario de la Embajada de la U.R.S.S., nos informa que se está organisando una fiesta típica Rusa para el día 16 de febrero próximo, de las 19 a las 21 horas, en la cual tendremos la oportunidad de admirar los conocidos bailes y bebidas de origen Ruso. Se está preparando un nutrido programa en esta ocasión y esperamos que un gran número de nuestros asociados y sus señoras podrán atender a la invitación del Colega Longuinov, que será recibida por ellos oportunamente. Damos las gracias de antemano a nuestro querido compañero Longuinov por su gentileza e interés en la organización de este acto que seguramente será uno de los más interesantes de la temporada.

14-00000

84

Visita a la Planta Seagram's. Debido a nuestro programa de actividades en el mes de febrero, ésta visita a la muy importante Fábrica de Licores "Seagram's", se ha nuevamente aplazado hasta el 17 del próximo marzo, día en que esperamos será posible que un mayor número de Cónsules podrán hacer honor a la invitación que nos ha extendido la Dirección de esta Empresa.- La visita será con señoras y nos será servido un suculento ambigú por los anfitriones.

Cuota Trimestral 1967. Los recibos para el primer ~~se~~trimestre de este año, valor $ 150.00, se están presentando para su cobro. En caso de que nuestro Cobrador no le encuentre en su despacho, le rogamos se sirva dejar con su Secretaria un cheque por este valor, o enviarlo al Sr. Tesorero Honorable François Barrolet, Cónsul de Mónaco, cuya dirección es: Paseo de la Reforma No. 156, 16o. Piso, México D.F., Mil Gracias.

85

IV CONVENCION CONSULAR INTERAMERICANA (Abril 11 - 15 en Panamá,Rep.Panamá)

Nuestro estimado Colega, Honorable Emilia Arosemena, Consul General de Panamá en México, ha recibido una comunicación del del Honorable Sr. Andrés H. Ordaz G. Consul de Venezuela en Colón, Panamá, quien a la vez es Presidente del Comité Organizador de la IV Convención Consular Interamericana, invitando a los miembros de nuestro Cuerpo a estar presentes en esta Convención Consular Interamericana que tendrá lugar en la ciudad de Panamá los días 11 al 15 de Abril próximo.

Se ha preparado un interesantísimo programa que abarca además de las recepciones oficiales, actos culturales y sociales en éste maravilloso país, de manera que esperamos poder informar al Sr. Presidente del Comité Organizador que un buen número de nuestros asociados y sus dignas señoras podrán asistir a esta evento.

Serán tratados varios temas de gran interes y se sugiere que cada uno de nuestros Consules someta al estudio de ésta Directiva, la ponencia o ponencias que desea presentar, sobre temas de interes común. Favor de indicarnos a la vez si Usted y su señora va a asistir, para hacer las reservaciones del caso.

Oportunamente avisaremos a cada uno de los miembros de éste Cuerpo del Costo de pasaje y del Hotel. La cuota del registro se ha fijado en $25.00, Moneda Americana, por persona (la señora no paga). Hijos menores a razón de $10.00 M.A. Hijos y personas mayores a razón de $25.00 M.A., cada uno.

Favor dirigir cualquier pregunta sobre el anterior al suscrito (Tel. 35-70-15) o al Sr. Rafael Fusoni, (Tel. 46-50-80), quien ha sido nombrado Secretario para ésta Convención.

Leander P. Vourvoulias
Presidente.

86

S E C R E T

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOZY-5

DATE OF MEETING: 15 February 1967

1. I met and had breakfast with Subject at the Hotel Del Paseo from 0900 to 0950 on 15 February 1967. The next meeting is at the Del Paseo on 22 February at 0830.

2. Subject reported that after a hiatus of no contact with any Soviet since the end of December, LOGINOV called him on 13 February and asked him for lunch on the 14th. Subject was busy on the 14th but agreed to meet him on the 15th at the Cafe Escla, near Subject's place of work. Subject chose a cafe rather than a restaurant in order to keep the meeting brief. He assured me that, other than being pleasant, he wouldn't accept any assignments or requests for information.

3. Subject said that the private dinner for influential Jews to talk to ECHEVARRIA at Jacobo ZABLUDOWSKI's house had not taken place. Subject will check with ZABLUDOWSKI. He said he also intends to make a courtesy call on ECHEVARRIA soon since he is a very influential man, may become President and it wouldn't harm Subject to keep his oar in.

4. Subject heard from Pedro Ferriz, a partner of ZABLUDOWSKI on TV, that USIA in Mexico had payed for the TV transmission time of the recent KOSYGIN interview from London. Asked why, Ferriz answered that USIA wanted the Mexican public to know the Soviet position on Vietnam and China.

5. Subject reported that the Air France inaugural flight to Red China had been cancelled due to the situation in China. I told Subject that Headquarters had expressed no interest in any case.

6. I asked Subject for the details on being representative for LUEXINSHE, the Red Chinese equivalent of Intourist. He said that in 1960 he attended the American Society of Travel Agents convention in Honolulu. On the way back he took a tour of the FE and NE with a group of travel agents. In Hong Kong the Hong Kong Tourist Board had a cocktail party for them. A representative of LUEXINSHE was at the party and invited the group for lunch. At this lunch he offered to make them agents for his company. Everybody signed up since there was no contract involved; they were just appointed. Since then he has been on

FILE: P-2712 P-11712

S E C R E T

87

SECRET

their mailing list. He never has processed a traveller to China. He thinks that Cooks is also an agent but is not sure.

7. Subject said he is processing several people as tourists to the USSR in the spring and summer. No visas have been issued yet. He promised me thermofax copies of all visas.

Francis J. COIGNE

SECRET

88

SECRET

30 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cocktail Party with Official Bloc Representatives

1. At a party given by the local head of the Consular Corp Association on 28 June, the undersigned met and again chatted with Valentin S. LOGINOV of the Soviet Embassy. He also met for the first time Jan Jakowiec of the Polish Embassy who was introduced to undersigned by LOGINOV.

2. As usual LOGINOV spent most of the time conversing with undersigned provocating him on a number of issues. The undersigned answered, making a few similar comments about the Chinese Civil War. When LOGINOV mentioned Vietnam, undersigned felt it would be nice if the Soviets helped the U. S. to bring peace to that area so they could concentrate more on the Chinese Communist danger. At one point in the conversation undersigned jokingly asked LOGINOV if there were Soviet nationals in North Vietnam. The latter said, "sure, we have many advisors there." The undersidnged said, "no, what he meant was behind guns or in the seats of airplanes." LOGINOV said absolutely not. It also seems that LOGINOV has been keeping track of the people he sees undersigned talking with at cocktail parties. For example, LOGINOV was curious to know if undersigned has seen "his Haitian friends." Undersigned asked which one - the black one or the white one. LOGINOV said the ~~white~~ one, referring to the Haitian Vice Consul whom undersigned occasionally talks to. Undersigned said he had seen the Haitian at the Haitian National Day about a month ago but noted that the only Soviet present at that party was ANDREYEV, not LOGINOV. The latter, incidentally, corners the Haitians anytime he has a chance to, although he officially poo poos the Haitian regime. LOGINOV once more asked undersigned when he would come play tennis with him (this is about the fourth or fifth time). Undersigned told him he would do so after he gets invited by LOGINOV as the latter has often promised to do. One of the topics that LOGINOV mentioned was the Protection Section of the Embassy. "Protection against whom," he asked. The undersigned gave him the usual lowdown on the number of tourists to Mexico and their problems. LOGINOV must have been interested in the section as he mentioned that a U. S. Vice-Consul working in that section whom he had met recently will be transferring to another post.

FILES: P-11712 P-9097

SECRET

89

SECRET

3. JAKOWIEC appears to be a man who likes to talk. His Spanish is quasi bi-lingual and JAKOWIEC says, by the way, that he learned it in Brazil. His wife is a plump, very Polish-looking woman. Her ~~initial~~ conversation was to laugh at some of the exchanges between LOGINOV and the undersigned. Both Mr. and Mrs. JAKOWIEC appear to speak fluent Russian. At one point in the conversation undersigned mentioned there is hardly a Pole in Poland who does not have a relative in the United States; JAKOWIEC agreed and commented that while the Poles are close to Americans in many things they are not so pleased at other things that the U. S. does. Undersigned deferred this discussion ~~of~~ this point for another meeting. As many of the Consular Corps members know that undersigned served many years in Vietnam, the latter felt that he should not hide this fact to the official bloc representatives as they would find out about it anyway. This came out for the first time on the occasion of this cocktail party when JAKOWIEC somehow mentioned Vietnam and the efforts of the Polish members of the Armistice Commission there. The undersigned, who has known a number of these people quite well, told JAKOWIEC that they speak French better than Polish as they were sons of Polish emigrants to France who returned to Poland after Gomulka took power. When JAKOWIEC started to imply that this indicates how wonderful things were in Poland, undersigned pointed out that the parents of the returnees, many of whom worked under very difficult conditions in France in the coal mines, preferred their hard work to the chance of working in Communist Poland.

[illegible]

4. The next cocktail party held by the Consular Assn. will probably be held at the Soviet Embassy. The President of the Association told undersigned that LOGINOV had asked him for his agreement to hold the next party at his Embassy. A large attendance of official bloc representatives can therefore be expected at the next get-together.

Francis Sherry

SECRET

14-00000

90

P-2712

January 1967

SUBJECT: Progress Report/LICOO[illegible]-5 (1 November 1966 - 15 January 19[illegible])

REFERENCE: H[illegible], 1 December 1966

1. The last Progress Report (see Reference) reported developments in [illegible] operation through 31 October 1966; but not included were Subject's activities at [illegible] Conference in [illegible] to which Subject traveled on 22 October 1966. [illegible] will be reported [illegible].

2. Contacts

A. Subject and [illegible] Case Officers

[illegible] from Subject's frequent visits in Moscow during October 1966 [illegible] former KGB case officer in Mexico, Oleg Nechiporenko, Subject since his return to Mexico from his [illegible] and Israel trip in mid-November has seen KGB [illegible] on four occasions [illegible] total time of less than an hour.

In Moscow, where Subject was attending the [illegible]RIST Conference, Subject was visited briefly every day in his room at the Hotel National by Nechiporenko, from 24 October through 28 October.

First contact by the Soviets on Subject's return to Mexico was effected by KGB case officer Aleksandr Vladimirovich Prikhodko (201-202379) on 3 December in Subject's office for a few minutes. On 8 December, Valentin Sergeyevich Loginov (201-[illegible]), Subject's regular KGB case officer, called Subject down to the street outside Subject's office to present him with Bolshoi Ballet tickets. On 18 December, Loginov visited Subject's office and spent no more than half an hour there. And on 30 or 31 December, Subject was paid a brief visit by [illegible], KGB officer ([illegible] possible candidate for resident) (201-120123) at Subject's office.

B. Subject and Mexico City Station Case Officer

In the two months since Subject's return from Europe in mid-November [illegible] C/O, [illegible], has seen Subject six times for an approximate [illegible] nine hours.

The C/O met Subject at his office on 22 November for two hours.

In December, the C/O met Subject three times, on 8 December at his office for almost two hours, on 13 December at the Hotel Reforma for a half-hour, and on 22 December at Subject's office for an hour.

On 7 January 1967, the C/O and his wife took Subject [illegible] for dinner at the [illegible] Room of the Hotel Continental Hilton, to [illegible] for a former invitation to Subject's home. On 12 January, the C/O met Subject at the latter's office for one hour.

3. Operational Developments

A. Subject/KGB

Subject arrived in Moscow on 23 October 1966 to attend the INTURIST Conference

Filed in P-7442 P-2270 (gr. FF3) 1-3 P-11712 P 8[illegible] to which travel agents on a world-wide basis had been invited. On Subject's arrival in Moscow, Oleg Nechiporenko, Subject's former Soviet C/O in Mexico, came to visit him at the Hotel National. Subject deliberately kept his son at his side so that Nechiporenko would find it difficult to have private words with him. However, Nechiporenko came to visit Subject every day thereafter until Subject's departure, bringing gifts of records, caviar, etc. When Nechiporenko found the opportunity the first thing he told Subject was that he heard Subject had been a "rebel" and had been difficult in Mexico. Subject, in his half-serious manner, pooh-poohed the idea that he was a rebel and told Nechiporenko earnestly that he didn't have the time, effort or inclination to indulge in the cooperation that was expected of him. He gave Nechiporenko the old line about friends "hasta la muerte" but that he couldn't and wouldn't put out the old effort. Nechiporenko said that was too bad, because he had wanted to present Subject to his chief- and now there was no point to it. Subject shrugged this off. Nechiporenko asked Subject if he would be willing to use his office as a letter-drop. Subject said, reprovingly, that that was not a very smart idea- since agents writing to his firm and to him would then know of Subject's connection with the Soviets and he would thus be exposed. Nevertheless, Nechiporenko told Subject to think it over and talk to Valentin (Loginov) in Mexico about it. Also, Nechiporenko told Subject that they hadn't forgotten about the "branch office" and that Subject shouldn't feel bad about the delay in setting it up. Subject ridiculed that idea, saying that it was the Soviets who should feel bad; as for him, he couldn't be bothered in the future with the trips and time involved. Nechiporenko, still not chastened, asked if Subject would provide information on all changes in visa regulations for travel in Central and South America. Subject ~~xx~~ said he had given this information to the Soviets in the past. Nechiporenko then asked Subject to continue to give such information to Valentin.

Subject elicited from Nechiporenko that he was working in the Latin American Section of the Foreign Ministry, and that he was allowed to come and go as he pleased to visit Subject. In the context of telling Subject that he saw that Subject was not getting along with his Soviet friends, Nechiporenko said that he would be coming back to Mexico next year.

One day while Nechiporenko was in the hotel room, the phone rang and Subject picked up the phone. A female voice asked for "Givy." Subject banteringly replied in Russian that "Givy" wasn't around, but wouldn't he do. In the ensuing conversation Subject found out that the caller was a 25 year old student, her address and telephone number, and made a date to meet her the following day at the Lenin Station exit of the Metro. Nechiporenko was all in favor of Subject making the date, and as a matter of fact came the next day to take Subject's son to the circus so that Subject would be free. /Comment: Subject said that he never did go to meet the ~~xxx~~ girl, but told Nechiporenko that he had gone and the girl had not shown up. Subject was of the opinion this was not a provocation by the Soviets, but he shied away because he did not want to be involved in anything indiscreet./

When Aleksandr Prikhodko dropped in unexpectedly at Subject's office on 8 December, while Subject's wife and son were present, the Soviet asked when he could have lunch with Subject, and the latter put him off telling Prikhodko to call next week. /Comment: Prikhodko did not call/.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

On 8 December, Valentin Loginov, who had called Subject's office by phone to have Subject come down to the street, saw Subject for just a minute to present him with two tickets to the Bolshoi Ballet for 9 December. /Comment: Subject attended./

92

On 13 December, Loginov came unannounced to Subject's office and prevailed on him to have coffee with him nearby. The Soviet presented Subject with four bottles of [illegible] for Christmas, and began to ask Subject a series of personal questions:
1) How had Subject left Poland for Paris after WWII – had his documentation been legal or illegal? Subject answered that it was legal.
2) How was he able to enter Paris – did he have a valid French visa? Subject said he did. How long did he stay in Paris? Subject said a few months.
3) Was he released from service with the Polish UB? Subject said yes. Were there any conditions to this release? Subject said no. Was he supposed to be contacted by the Poles? Subject said yes, and related the story of how he was contacted in Mexico (in March 19[illegible]) by a Polish diplomatic courier who brought a letter from Subject's old [illegible] in the UB, and how Subject answered that letter. Had Subject's response to the Poles been positive or negative? Subject said neutral. Asked why, Subject replied that he believed that eighty percent of the Poles were anti-Soviet. Loginov said "You are right."

Loginov asked how Subject was getting along with the American airlines he deals with. Subject said fine, and asked why. Loginov said that maybe, if Subject has the chance, he can learn the name of "the director of the CIA in Mexico." Subject told Loginov he was crazy to think Subject could get that information. When Loginov persisted in knowing whether Subject would tell the Soviets if he did [illegible] information, Subject dismissed the topic with a coy "maybe."

Subject promised to show Loginov the documents that backed up his [illegible] to Loginov's questions.

On either 20 or 21 December, Pavel Yatskov dropped by Subject's office to give him some gifts he had brought back from Moscow. /Comment: Subject had done Yatskov a favor during the Soviet's travel to Moscow by arranging for Subject's travel [illegible] in Paris to assist Yatskov./ Yatskov expressed gratefulness to Subject and presented him with a bottle of Caucasian wine, some vodka, a decorative [illegible] and [illegible] of caviar. Yatskov (who no longer holds the post of Soviet Consul in Mexico, and is a possible candidate for KGB resident) told Subject that he is also grateful for what Subject has done for "them", and he is sure that Subject will not leave "them" alone in the realization of their common ideals. And Yatskov further stated that he and Subject have very much in common, and that they should meet. It was left that Yatskov would call Subject.

F. Subject/Mexico City Station

The C/O met Subject at his office on 22 November 1966 to debrief him on the results of his trip to Moscow (see paragraph 3 A. above). In addition to providing information on his contacts with Nechiporenko, Subject gave incidental information concerning a female Soviet Jew he met, and the anti-American attitude of a [illegible] agent from Chile.

On 8 December, in Subject's office, Subject reported to the C/O [illegible] contacts he had had with Prikhodko and Loginov on 3 and 8 December. [illegible] in response to [illegible] request, re-opened with Subject the topic of [illegible] community support that Secretary of Gobernación Echeverria is [illegible] in his candidacy for next president of Mexico. Subject related [illegible] how Jacobo Zabludovsky had come to mention the matter to Subject. [illegible] the fact that Subject was being proposed as one of the five influential members of the Jewish community for Echeverria's approval (Zabludovsky did not mention any others). The C/O requested that Subject check further with Zabludovsky when he [illegible] opportunity.

93

On [illegible] Subject reported to the C/O about Leginov's personal questions asked of Subject [illegible] same day (see paragraph 3 A. above). The C/O [illegible] Subject if he had [illegible] of Leginov why the latter was asking such questions. Subject said he had not, even though he was completely puzzled by this tack on the part of the Soviets. But Subject said he felt perfectly at ease in telling the truth to the Soviets, and had no hesitation in showing them his documentation.

The C/O dropped by Subject's office on 22 December, after having delivered a Christmas gift of liquor to Subject's home the previous day. Subject reported:
1) on Soviet travel for Georgi Visko, and said he had met Visko's replacement- Victor N. Ivanov.
2) Subject reported that he had received a holiday-season letter from [illegible] [illegible], U.S. State Department official now in Chile. /Comment: [illegible] had been a target of the Soviets in Mexico through Subject. Nothing ever came of it./
3) Subject reported that he had received a firm invitation from the [illegible] Air France in [illegible] to go on the inaugural flight of Air France to [illegible] [illegible] in April 1967, to which Subject had replied that he "would love to go." To the C/O Subject expressed himself as neutral about his going, but asked the C/O if [illegible] had any interest in his taking the trip. The C/O replied that Subject would be advised.

The C/O then discussed seriously with Subject the question of how complete his break-off from the Soviets really was, inasmuch as there was some scepticism about his conduct ([illegible] told Subject that the scepticism came from [illegible], which incidentally [illegible] did not share). The C/O asked Subject to [illegible] equivocal [illegible] Leginov's request to report the number of [illegible] and [illegible] turn his personal documentation over [illegible] rarely called [illegible]: he was convinced that [illegible] because he [illegible] the control to deny the Soviets [illegible] (the Station's [illegible]); even though he might jokingly string them along, being friendly was consistent with his personality. He explained his willingness, even more his desire, to pass his documentation to the Soviets, because he [illegible] to show those "bastards" he wasn't afraid of them. Subject asked the C/O [illegible] "his bosses" to see if he could get the go-ahead on passing the documentation if the Soviets came after it.

On 1[illegible] January 1967, the C/O (having received the Station's expression of interest in having Subject follow up the invitation from Air France) asked Subject for more details concerning the invitation from Air France, and gave him the go-ahead to pursue the matter.

4. The current C/O, Prentice R. [illegible]arheine, will turn Subject over to [illegible] Coigne before [illegible]'s departure from Mexico the end of January 1967.

94

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X (Attachment)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM 1P

TO
Chief, SB

INFO
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP/Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
CI-CK

REFERENCE: HMMW-13985, 16 September 1965

Attached in draft form is an SPR on Subject, which is supplemented by information in the Reference concerning Subject's activities before coming to Mexico.

Jonathan L. Lee...
for/Willard C. CURTIS

~~MICROFILMED~~
~~DOC. MICRO. SER.~~

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 4 1971
MICROFILMED

S/C ATT'D
4 Sept. 67

Attachments:
- A. Draft SPR, herewith
- B. Photographs, herewith
- C. Sections 16 and 19 of Draft SPR, under separate cover

RIS INPUT NO. 92

Distribution:
~~1~~2 - C/SB, w/atts.
2 - C/WH, w/o/atts.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

att 1 NSM
att 2+3 HW

CS COPY

201-285412 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-32872	DATE 24 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412

95

SPR PREPARED BY: Jonathan L. WEENING

DATE: 14 August 1967

1. NAME: Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (3, 5).

2. DPOB: 23 December 1927 in Moscow (28).

Subject has stated that he ~~came~~ comes from Moscow (1), and his wife said they grew up together in Moscow (6). He once told another source, however, that he came from the northern part of the USSR (8), but this source is not known for accurate reporting.

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA:

Soviet Diplomatic Passport # 16993, issued 24 Aug 1960 (3).

Soviet Diplomatic Passport # 010264, issued 24 Jun 1965 (5), used currently (4).

4. ETHNIC ORIGIN: Unknown.

5. OTHER NAMES USED: Unknown.

6. CURRENT POSITION: Third Secretary and Consul General at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, ~~sissx~~ (1).

7. RELATIVES:

Wife: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna LOGINOVA (~~20~~= (28). Known as "Shura" (1).

DPOB: 20 Aug 1928 in Moscow (28).

Passports: D-16094, used in 1962 (4).

D-~~10x~~ 010265, issued 24 Jun 1955, currently used (4).

Description: Plump, has reddish hair (15). Photographs are attached.

Languages: LOGINOVA has been studying Spanish with Carmen ROURE Canosa, a local employee of the Soviets, since at least June 1966 through May 1967 (1), but her Spanish is still said to be very limited (6, 25). She is said to speak a little English (25), and claimed she had studied English in Moscow (1). She is also said to speak some French (25).

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

ATT #1 to HMMA 32872

CS COPY

(wife, cont.)

Miscellaneous: LOGINOVA has said that she has known her husband since age six as neighbors in Moscow (6). She claims to be a chemical engineer (6). During Subject's tour in Havana, 1960-63, LOGINOVA worked in the Soviet Consulate (28). She arrived in Mexico on 10 Oct 1965, two months after her husband (4). Since Feb 1966 she had been reported as chairman of the zhenkom (Soviet women's organization), and as such has had to persuade the Soviet women to do various administrative chores, as well as being involved with running the dacha that the Soviets have had in Cuernavaca in the summers of 1966 and 1967 (1).

Family: In June 1967 LOGINOVA asked the wife of Commercial Counselor Viktor Mikhaylovich IVANOV (201-245651) to call her mother when she got to Moscow, saying that her family lived at the Botanical Gardens (1).

Daughter: Irina, born ca. 1952 (28).

In June 1967 ~~LOGINOVxsaidxhax~~ Subject said he had a fifteen-year-old daughter, who was living with LOGINOVA's mother (in Moscow) (6). In April 1967 LOGINOVA said her daughter was in an English school in Moscow (25 Irina was reportedly with her parents in Havana, 1960-63 (28); however, she did not travel with them from Havana to Moscow on 11 May 1962 ~~and~~ (4) and therefore may have been in Havana for only a part of Subject's tour. She has not been in Mexico.

Son: Dmitriy (4).

DOB: 1959 (28), birthday probably 6 August (1).

Dmitriy was with his ~~paxxxxx~~ parents in Havana, 1960-63 (28), and ~~haxxbox~~ arrived in Mexico City with his mother on 10 Oct 1965 (4). Subject has expressed interest in having his son take English lessons when the family returns from home leave in August 1967 (21).

8. LANGUAGES:

Spanish: Subject speaks fluent Spanish with very little accent (11, 24).

English: Since 1966 Subject has been reported taking English lessons, apparently at the Instituto de Traductores e Interpretes in Mexico City (1). In April 1967 he said that he had been paying a girl American for lessons in English, but that she did not have enough background in grammar (25). (Comment: Subject was probably more interested in meeting American girls than in studying English in this case.) Subject's English is believed to be fair at present.

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:

One source described Subject as tall, blond and blue-eyed (11). Another source said that he was six feet tall and had short, reddish-blond hair (24). Photographs are attached.

#

14-00000

98

10. PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, HABITS:

All sources agree in describing Subject as smooth and completely self-controlled. He is an aggressive conversationalist. One source described him as vulgar, crude, ill-mannered, short-tempered and a tyrant, who thinks he is a big shot (8).

Subject seems to have made a play for every girl he has met. In at least one instance he has claimed to be unmarried when inviting a girl out (27). When his wife was staying at the dacha in Cuernavaca he reportedly ~~called~~ made dates with other women (8). On ~~18~~ 13 Sep 1966 he was seen in a cafe with a Mexican-looking woman (18).

Subject is interested in sports and is good at them. In Sep 1966 it was reported that he did not play tennis (15), and by Apr 1967 he was said to be a good tennis player, claimed that he had been playing for less than a year and never played more than once a week (25). He is said to have the build of a trained athlete, the brutish look of a boxer or wrestler, and the grace of a natural athlete (25). He has said that he boxed when he was younger, and that he plays basketball and volleyball (25), also that his favorite sports are skiing and speed skating (21). He also plays chess but is not an addict (25). He has belonged to the French Club in Mexico City since ca. November 1965 (1) and has been seen there frequently on weekends, sometimes with his wife and child (15). One Sunday (20 Mar 1966) Subject and Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN were seen playing badminton with their wives at the French Club (15).

One source reported that Subject smoked "Fiesta" cigarettes (8), and another source reported in Apr 1967 that Subject did not smoke (25). One source has reported that Subject downs several beers after playing tennis (25), but another source reported that on a social occasion Subject did not even ~~fix~~ finish one Scotch and water (19). On ~~one occasion~~ 8 Feb 1966 Subject and Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN reportedly drove into the Soviet Embassy at 0300 hours roaring drunk (8), which may or may not be accurate reporting.

99

Subject has apparently been taking English lessons since early 1966 at the ~~Int~~ Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, which is located at Tiber 113 very near the U.S. Embassy. He seems to have made friends with a number of people through these classes. (1). (Cf. under Contacts.)

In February 1966 it was reported that Subject's wife had bought a tape recorder (1). In June 1967 Subject ~~himself~~ xx ordered a Grundig tape recorder (1).

Subject was reported having an operation on 1 Feb 1966 (17); no further details are available.

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

Subject claims that he has served in the Red Army (8).

(Subject's name was reportedly listed in Feb 1960 as about to be assigned to Buenos Aires as Soviet Military Attache; it would appear that either this was another person with the same name, or that Subject was being considered for assignment there as diplomatic attache.)

14 Sep 1960 xSepx1962	Subject and his family arrived in Havana, where Subject was assigned as Attache at the Soviet Embassy (3, 28).
December 1961	Subject toured Latin America as escort and interpreter for the Dynamo soccer team (28).
Sepx1962x 11 May 1962	Subject, his wife and son transitted Mexico City travelling from Havana enroute to Montreal (4), presumably on their way to Moscow on home leave.
Sep 1963	Subject and his family left Havana PCS (28).
3 Aug 1965	Subject arrived PCS in Mxxxx Mexico as Third Secretary assigned to the Soviet Embassy (4). Subject replaced Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO as Vice Consul (1).

100

10 Oct 1965	Subject's wife and son arrived in Mexico (4).
August 1966	Subject was apparently promoted to Consul General after Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV left Mexico on 4 Aug 1966 for home leave. In Sep 1966 Subject was telling everyone in town that he was now the Consul (1, 6, etc.)
16 Jul 1967	Subject, accompanied by his wife and son, left Mexico for Moscow via Paris (4). Also travelling with them on LOGINOVA's passport was Tatyana, the daughter of Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH (4). Subject has told several people that this is home leave and that he will be returning to Mexico (1, 6, 21, 22).

SR TRAVEL INPUT PROGRAM

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION: Known KGB, based on his having taken over an agent previously handled by known KGB officers Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO 01-OK (201-305870) and Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379) 01-OK, as well as his other intelligence activities given below.

101

13. ~~12.~~ INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

(Cf. also information under Contacts, below. Subject has undoubtedly been developing contacts, particularly with American girls, with a view toward intelligence possibilities.)

In December 1961 while travelling with the Dynamo soccer team, Subject met a Bolivian security/service official in La Paz, Bolivia and reportedly tried to persuade him to study in Cuba. The source, however, is believed to be a fabricator. (28).

After Subject saw the soccer team off, he continued to Panama, where he met with a Mexican citizen, Edmundo Fausto ZORRILLA Martinez (P-2818) on 16 Dec 1961. ~~and~~ On 17 Dec 1961 Subject and ZORRILLA travelled to Mexico City on the same plane. Subject ~~(US) $2,000~~ had ca. (US) $ 2,000 with him in Panama. (29).

On 14 Feb 1966 KGB officer Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379) turned an agent over to Subject. (The agent had previously been handled by Subject's predecessor, Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO.) On 14 Apr 1966 the agent attempted to break his intelligence relationship with the Soviets, although he has remained in business and social contact with them. Subject, occasionally joined by PRIKHODKO, has continued to give intelligence requirements to the agent, ~~and~~ who questioned him particularly about his access to the U.S. Embassy and tried to persuade him to continue cooperating with the KGB. On 24 Jun 1966 Subject asked the agent for information on Eduardo WEBELMAN and his son Mauricio. On 13 Dec 1966 Subject asked the agent to try to find out who the WOFACT chief in Mexico was. (6). (Comment: Mauricio WEBELMAN was subsequently reported to be a friend of suspect KGB officer Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN's.) CI/CI 201-773422

[illegible]

102

(~~12~~13: cont.)

On 20 Jan 1966 Cristobal TORRES Ponce, chauffeur employed by the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, was sent to the Soviet Embassy to pick up the passport of the wife of a U.S. Embassy official who was planning a trip to the USSR. Subject talked to TORRES, asked him if he would like to visit the USSR or receive Soviet magazines,~~and~~ if he knew anyone who would be ~~xxxxx~~ willing to give him English lessons, and finally made a dinner date with TORRES for 24 Jan 1966. When TORRES did not keep the date, Subject called~~xxx8~~ him on 8 and 9 Feb 1966 in an attempt to keep the contact alive. (12, 14).

Subject dealt with the Federal District police several times in July 1966 in regard to a radio that had been stolen from his car. On 20 Jul 1966 the policeman (LNU) who had been handling the radio case reported to his superior, General Luis CUETO Ramirez, that Subject had offered him 5,000 pesos (40 4,000 dollars) a month if he would work for him. After consulting with the Minister of Interior, CUETO told the policeman to accept Subject's offer, which he reportedly did ~~as~~ on 21 Jul 1966. Subject's first assignment to the policeman was to locate Venezuelan citizens Nicolas Juan BOSTROEM and his wife. (16). (Comment: Nothing further has been learned about this case. BOSTROEM is a native Russian employed by Stephens-Adamson de Mexico, his wife teaches Russian at the Ibero-American University.)

12.50 = 1.00

US 400

Subject has occasionally been reported visiting the small general store located across the street from the Soviet Embassy. On 5 Nov 1966 Subject reportedly questioned the store owner about occupants of one apartment building in the same block as the store, and on 6 Dec 1966 he asked general questions about the new apartment building at the end of the block. (8). (Comment: Both of these buildings contain base houses for the fixed surveillance of the Soviet Embassy.)

103

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

In Mexico, Subject has consistently been reported performing consular duties. He issues visas and sees visitors to the Soviet Embassy in one of the reception rooms (21). He makes travel reservations for PCS and visiting Soviets. He is responsible when either PCS or visiting Soviets become ill and have to be sent to a hospital. He has often attended to the needs of Soviet ships in Mexican ports. He has done considerable house-hunting for the Soviets, such as looking for a new school building and for houses in Cuernavaca that would be suitable as a dacha. Subject had to sign the dacha xxxxx contract in both 1966 and 1967. Subject also regularly attends the mcctkx functions of the Consular Corps Association, and on 16 Feb 1967 he had the Association to the Soviet Embassy for a Russian evening. (1). In Sep 1966 Subject was reported as having become the Consul General (6, 8, 1, 11), having replaced Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV, who left Mexico for home leave on 4 Aug 1966. On 21 Feb 1967 Subject tried to get Panamanian visas for himself and Soveksportfilm representative Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (known KGB) to attend a Consular Congress to be held in Panama 11-15 Apr 1967 (1). The visas were refused.

01-0K

On 26 Jan 1967x 1966 Subject attended a lecture given by a Mexican who was an exchange professor at a U.S. university. The lecture was sponsored by the PRI. Soviet Cultural Attache Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV waxx also attended the lecture and sat on the platform, whereas Subject sat at the back of the room. (13).

Subject is reported to have taken the following trips in Mexico:

26-28 Oct 1965	To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship)1).
2-4 Nov 1965	To Mazatlan xxxxxxx with Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN to attend to Soviet ship (1).
4-8 Dec 1965	To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship (1, 9).
2-5 Feb 1966	To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship (1).

13-20 Feb 1966	To Coatzacoalcos to attend to Soviet ships. Soviet Embassy chauffeur Anatoliy Pavlovich PRASHCHIKIN went with Subject but returned to Mexico City earlier. (1).
25-28 Apr 1966	Possibly to Guadalajara with Soviet Inturist visitors attending a travel conference there (1).
4-9 May 1966	To Veracruz to attend to the matter of a missing Soviet sailor (1).
27-30 May 1966	To Veracruz to attend to Soviet ship (1).
26 Feb - 2 Mar 196~~6~~7	To Veracruz with Soviet Commercial Counselor Viktor Mikhaylovich IVANOV to attend to Soviet ships(1) While in Veracruz, Subject asked the U.S. Vice Consul, Richard BOOTH, if he would intercede with the Mexican authorities to get shore leave for the Soviet crew (24).

105

15. CONTACTS.

a. Soviet Contacts:

Subject has been seen coming and going at the Soviet Embassy most frequently with Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV 01-OK (201-120123, known KGB), whom Subject replaced as Consul. Since Subject's departure ~~on~~ for home leave on 16 Jul 1967, YATSKOV has been ~~usix~~ regularly using Subject's car. Subject has also been observed leaving the Soviet Embassy fairly often with Ivan Konstantinovich BARANOV 01-OK (201-~~27783~~ 277838, known KGB sweeper) and Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH 01-OK (201-767974, suspect KGB technician). ~~(7)~~ Subject has also borrowed the cars of YATSKOV and known KGB chauffeur Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV 01-OK (201-273046). (7).

In May 1966 Subject reportedly gave the wife of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (201-784917, known KGB) 01-OK a hard time when she wanted to send her son to the USSR with another Soviet wife. NIKITIN then complained to Aleksandr ~~Aleksandrovich~~ ~~Vladim~~ Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO 01-OK (201-202379, known KGB), who reportedly ordered Subject to get a ticket for the NIKITIN child. (1). Cf. also above, where PRIKHODKO seems to be the senior case officer for an agent currently being handled by Subject.

In May 1967 LOGINOVA mentioned that she had known Boris Aleksandrovich CHMYKHOV 01-OK (201-268115, known GRU) for years. (1). (Comment: CHMYKHOV was stationed in Havana 1960-62, at the same time that Subject was there.) Cf. below for report of Subject's having taken CHMYKHOV with him to Cuernavaca to meet ZAREBSKI.

Subject has also been reported in contact with the following Soviets not stationed in Mexico:

Vitaliy Konstantinovich BOYAROV 01-OK (201-355606, known KGB), visited Mexico 27 May - 9 Jun 1966. On 1 Jun 1966 Subject and P. A. YATSKOV were absent ~~BOYAROV~~ from the Soviet Embassy for four hours with BOYAROV (7).

Vasiliy Vasilyevich GRIGORYEV, member of petroleum delegation that visited Mexico 31 Mar - 14 Apr 1967. While GIRGORYEV was in Mexico he was reported in contact with Subject several times, once making plans to go to the movies together, also to ask Subject whether he should attend a French reception and to report the illness of one of the other Soviet delegates. (1).

01-OK

Boris Semenovich IVANOV (201-078078, known KGB), visited Mexico 8 - 22 Feb 1967. Subject made reservations for IVANOV in Mexico City and probably saw him off at the airport (1).

Yuriy Vladimirovich LEBEDEV (201-213261), Minister Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Havana. On 7 Feb 1966 Subject was reported sending something to LEBEDEV with a Soviet professor who was travelling back to Moscow via Havana (1).

15.b. Non-Soviet Contacts:

1). Alonso AGUILAR Monteverde (P-2152, 201-334259), active Marxist intellectual.

On 28 Jun 1967 AGUILAR reminded Subject that they and their wives were invited for Saturday evening to the home of Alberto PENICHE (1). (Alberto PENICHE Blanco, P-12294, manager of ~~Rk~~ centrist newspaper El Heraldo de Mexico ~~and reported as minor~~ contributor to the PCM in 1964.)

2). (Mrs.) Gloria *ALFARO, no other traces.
[illegible] [illegible]

On 5 Feb 1966 Mrs. fnu ALFARO (~~probably~~ possibly Gloria) wanted to talk to
[illegible] 201-285412
Subject to congratulate him on a Soviet moon probe (1). On 22 Jun 1966 Gloria ALFARO reminded Subject that they had met at thehouse of Mrs. SOTO (~~probably~~ possibly Graciela, q.v.) on Christmas Eve 1965 and invited Subject to a party. Subject was unable to go but said he would call Gloria for coffee. Gloria gave her telephone as 35-71-30 (listed in 1964 to Yolanda ~~ALGARIO~~ ALFARO Vda de CACERES Buitrago, Chiapas 130-A, current telephone 25-10-24). (1). ~~Qx~~ Also on 22 Jun 1966 Gloria ALFARO told Subject she would like to talk with some of the Soviets, and Subject suggested getting together on Friday "after English class" (17). (Comment: ~~x~~ ALFARO may have been studying English with Subject at the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores.) On 3 Aug 1966 Gloria and Subject tried to agree on a date to get together, and she said she would like for him to meet a friend (female) of hers who was visiting Mexico from Central America (1).

3). Ofelia ALFARO Lopez (P-11339), professor of economics at UNAM, good friend of the wife of Antonio SARMIENTO (q.v.), social contact with several Soviets.

On 30 Aug 1965 ALFARO invited Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV to her ~~also~~ house and included Subject and Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV (1).

4). (Dr.) Juan Luis *ALVAREZ Gayou, teacher at UNAM and Deputy Director
[illegible]
of Instituto de Interpeetes y Traductores.

Subject presumably met ALVAREZ at the Instituto, where Subject is believed to have studied English. The first reported contact was on 11 Apr 1966, when they spoke to eachother, using the familiar form of address, about having missed eachother in Cuernavaca. Subject was invited to ALVAREZ' birthday party. Subject said he would see ALVAREZ the following day when he was going to have class with a new teacher. (1). On 13 Jun 1966 Professor fnu ALVAREZ, Juan Luis' father, asked Subject if he would bring the projector to the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, and Subject said he would. On 12 Jul 1966 ALVAREZ, who had been out of town, asked Subject if he wanted to continue taking lessons, and Subject said yes, he would go there the following day. On 19 Nov 1966 ALVAREZ left a message for Subject to call him at 35-68-96 (listed to Natividad GAMERO de la Fuente, Hamburgo 25). On 22 May 1967 ALVAREZ asked Subject for help in typing a letter in Russian (cf. VIDIELLA). (1).

5). (Ing.) Manuel *ANAYA S., employee of Mexican Ministry of Hydraulic [illegible] Resources, visited the USSR in summer 1966.

On 19 Jul 1966 ANAYA thanked Subject for his visa and said he would get together with Subject when he got back in order to discuss his trip ~~(1)~~(17).

6). Emilia AROSAMENA Vallarina (P-10933, 201-771073), Panamanian Consul General in Mexico, in contact with several Soviets.

On 15 Nov 1965 Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO said he wanted to introduce Subject to AROSAMENA, because Subject had some questions to ask her. Presumably related is a report that the Panamanian Counselor, Jose B. CALVO, told Subject on 19 Nov 1965 that he had no answer for Subject yet. (1).

7). Miriam AVILA Katz (P-581, 201-814144), employee of Mundus Tours travel agency, about to leave Mexico to marry an American and live in New York.

109

Subject was first reported in contact with AVILA in April 1966 in connection with travel booking Subject made (1). On 2 Jun 1966 Subject flirted with her, and said he would invite her to a volleyball game (1). During the rest of 1966 Subject invited her out a few times, told her he was married but that his wife was not in Mexico, asked her ~~if she would~~ to introduce him to some of her friends and especially wanted to know, if she knew anyone in the U.S. Embassy. In April 1967 Subject reluctantly agreed to issue a visa to Dr. KUTTLER (q.v.), whose travel AVILA was arranging, and asked as a return favor that she introduce him to some of her friends. (26). In June 1967 Subject reportedly stopped AVILA coming out of work to ask her about the Israeli War (6).

8). Celia BAYARDI Torres, no traces.

On 7 Feb 1966 an unidentified man visited Subject at the Soviet Embassy. This man came to the Embassy in a car driven by a woman, who remained in the car, with license plates registered to Celia BAYARDI Torres, Arquitector 46, Colonia Escandon, telephone 15-34-02. The phone is listed to Francisca TORRES Vda de BAYARDI. (7).

9). Leila S. BELAVAL, visa officer at U.S. Embassy.

In June 1967 BELAVAL reported that she had been in contact with Subject over visa matters, that Subject had asked her what she did in the evenings, whether she spent her off hours with other U.S. Embassy employees, and had said that he was unmarried. In June 1967 he offered to take her to the Ukrainian Ballet when it came to Mexico. She has refused his invitations. (27).

10). Carlos BLANCO Solano (P-9328), former Federal Security (DFS) agent, now with Judicial Police. In 1960-61 BLANCO invited several U.S. Embassy girls out and offered his services to the U.S. Embassy. BLANCO works for Carlos CASAMADRID Miranda, who is suspected of having a clandestine relationship with KGB officer Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV.

14-00000

110

On 1 Nov 1965 BLANCO called Subject at the Soviet Embassy and remarked that they had not seen eachother for a long time. Subject said he would call BLANCO to get together ~~the~~ the following Wednesday. (1). On 8 Sep 1966 Graciela [illegible] (q.v.), who described herself as BLANCO's friend, invited Subject to the baptism of her son Rafael's child and mentioned that BLANCO's wife Magdalena was going (1). On 10 Nov 1966 BLANCO invited Subject to a party for BLANCO's daughter, said they would first go to the church near Graciela's house on Tamaulipas. ~~On~~ (1). On 6 Dec 1966 BLANCO told Subject that "Comandante Carlos" (presumably CASAMADRID) urgently wanted to see YATSKOV (1), and Subject said he would have YATSKOV call him (1).

11). Lubomir BLAZIK (P-1730, 201-206043), former Czech Second Secretary and Consul in Mexico.

On 28 Dec 1965 P. A. YATSKOV left a message for BLAZIK that Subject's wife was sick and could not attend the dinner to which the BLAZIKs had invited her (1). 201

12). Rosa Martha BRACHO Sanchez (P-12038), left in November 1965 on [illegible] a scholarship to study ballet in the USSR.

On 21 and 22 Sep 1966 Rosa's mother (fnu) was in contact with Subject in order to talk to him about visa problems of her two daughters who were ~~both studying dance in the~~ USSR (1). (Name of other daughter is unknown.)

insert

13. ~~EV~~ Erica CAMERMAN ~~Erika KAMMERMANN~~ (P-12843), said to be a reporter with The News (17), but this seems unlikely, no other traces.

On 21 Feb 1966 CAMERMAN ~~KAMMERMANN~~ told Subject that she was going out of town the next day but when she got back she wanted to invited Subject and his wife to her house. Subject said he had no word on her papers yet. On 28 Feb 1966 she said she had been in Cozumel. Subject said he still had no word on her papers. She invited Subject to dinner with his wife, and he said he

111

would call her back. On 10 May 1966 she tried to call Subject, who was out, saying that she wanted to know about the arrival of a man from Russia. On ~~Ip~~ 11 May 1966 Subject told her he still had no answer on her papers. She said she planned to take a business trip to Brussels and Paris in June and mentioned that Elke (LNU) was in Paris visiting her son. On 10 Jun 1966 Subject asked for CAMERMAN KAMMERMANN at 18-65-61 and was told she was in Europe for a month (phone listed to importing firm Incomex, S.A. at Isabel la Catolica 45-914). On 6 Jul 1966 Subject called her at 12-78-32 (listed to the Banco de Mexico at Cinco de Mayo 2) and told her he had a document for her. On 11 Jul 1966 she told Subject that she needed his signature on the document, also sent regards to Subject's wife and children. (1).

~~CAMERMAN~~ 14. ~~15~~. ZR Ernesto CHAZARO Peregrino (P-12818, 201-800412), assistant security chief of Astilleros de Veracruz, S.A., a shipyard in Veracruz. Said to be the adverturer-type, once worked for the Federal Security Police but was fired because of involvement in arms contraband.

CHAZARO probably did meet Subject on 5 May 1966 in Veracruz. CHAZARO undoubtedly fabricated his story that VALENTIN LOGINOV (2V-285412) Subject tried to recruit him after that and set up a 50,000 peso bank account in CHAZARO's name. (30).

14-00000

112

15. (Lic.) Jacobo *CHENCINSKY, director of the Instituto de Interpretes
CIT MEXICO \ A MEXICO [illegible] PROF
y Traductores, located at Tiber 113.

Subject's ~~pr~~ contact with CHENCINSKY has presumably been connected with Subject's taking English at the Instituto. On 24 Mar 1966 CHENCINSKY tried unsuccessfully to reach Subject. On 4 Jul 1966 CHENCINSKY told Subject that Janet (LNU, apparently Subject's teacher) had been unable to fix her working papers and had had to leave Mexico and asked if Subject's classes could be postponed. Subject agreed and said he would like to talk to CHENCINSKY. (1).

16. David F. COOLBAUGH (P-12579, 201-796142). American employed with United Nations in Mexico, co-director of geological project that two Soviets were also assigned to.

In 1966 Subject was in contact with COOLBAUGH several times in regard to documenting the two Soviets working on the UN project (1).

7. Ana Maria *ESCOBAR (P-11858). In 1965 reported to be a student and
[illegible] OCCUPATION \ A MEXICO
also working as private secretary to the PRI chief for the Federal District.

On 11 Oct 1965 ESCOBAR tried unsuccessfully to reach ~~xx~~ Subject. On 12 Oct 1965 she told Subject she had wanted to invite him to the theater the previous day because she had been given free tickets. She sent regards to Pablo (presumably Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV). (1).

NO 201
8. Margaret (aka Magre) FEDOR (P-12967), no other traces.
SEX F CIT MEXICO \ A MEXICO

On 17 Mar 1966 FEDOR invited Subject to go on a Sunday outing with a group of friends whom Subject also knew. She mentioned that she was studying French in the evenings and was about to begin Russian classes at the United Nations. Subject said he would call her at home later. On 28 Mar 1966 Subject told FEDOR that he had stopped by her house with theater tickets but she had been out. Rebeca (LNU) had told FEDOR that the play was good. FEDOR told Subject that on Saturday there would be a discussion with Jose *CORNEJO (no identifiable traces), who had been in South America,
CIT MEXICO \ A MEXICO
and Subject said he would go. On 8 Jun 1966 FEDOR told Subject that she

113

was going to go to the U.S. on vacation and mentioned that Daniel *SEIN F [illegible] MARGARET FLORES (no traces) had asked about Subject. Subject said he would call her later. On 24 Aug 1966 FEDOR told Subject that there would be a discussion about India at her house on 26 Aug, and Subject said he would try to go. ~~Sxx~~ Subject asked her whether she knew the Soviets working on a United Nations project, but she said she did not. (1). (Comment: FEDOR may work at the United Nations in Mexico City.)

19.). fnu FLORES, man employed at Mex-American travel agency.

On 15 Mar 1966 FLORES, who described himself as a friend of Gloria's and the others', asked Subject for visa information (1). (Gloria might be Gloria PINTO, cf. below.) [illegible]

20.) Socorro FLORES (P-12259), formerly employed at Mex-Americana de Viajes travel agency, no other traces.

Subject was first reported in contact with FLORES in Sep 1965 in connection with travel reservations, and for about a year Subject continued to discuss travel arrangements and at the same time flirt with FLORES and also send regards to Susana LNU, who worked with her. ~~On 8 Sep 1966 Subject arranged to meet FLORES in front of a movie theater~~ On 18 Jan 1966 FLORES invited Subject to dinner with some of her friends. Subject was very interested in knowing who the friends were, but FLORES said they were not the Americans, because she hadn't seen them. On 8 Sep 1966 Subject arranged to meet FLORES in front of a movie theater. Then there was no report of contact between them, until on 13 Jun 1967 FLORES told Subject that she had a new job and asked him to call her at 27-85-50, extension 18 (no Station listing of this number). She mentioned that she had not seen him for a while. (1).

21.). Rafael *FUSONI Alordi (P-5119, 201-237904), Argentine diplomat, former KGB agent, in occasional social contact with Soviets, primarily through diplomatic functions.

Subject met FUSONI at a consular corps function in January 1967 and again at a Czech Embassy reception in May 1967. Subject later called FUSONI and offered him tickets to a Bolshoy Ballet performance, and on 11 Jun 1967 they attended the Bolshoy performance together and went to supper afterwards. (23).

22.). Moises *GAMERO de la Fuente, no other traces.

On 6 Apr 1966 Subject reportedly called telephone number 2-30-65 in Cuernavaca from a pay phone (8). (This number is listed to GAMERO.)

23.). Pearl GONZALEZ (P-11420), society editor for The News, Mexico City English language newspaper, in social contact with several Soviets.

On 25 Nov 1965 GONZALEZ gave a party and invited several Soviets. Subject was one of those who attended. (10).

24.). Alfonso *GUZMAN and Carlos *SANDOVAL, of Servicio Diplomatico in the Mexican Foreign Ministry.

Since Aug 1966 (i.e. when Subject became Consul General), Subject has been reported dealing with GUZMAN and SANDOVAL in regard to Soviet visas. In Oct 1966 Subject had tickets for GUZMAN to a sports event, but GUZMAN was unable to go. Subject also invited GUZMAN to the Soviet Embassy reception on 7 Nov 1966. (1).

25.). Abdel Rahman *HASSAN Abdel-Rahman, ~~First Secretary and~~ Consul at the UAR Embassy in Mexico.

On 1 Jun 1967 Subject and HASSAN discussed consular affairs and also talked about getting together for tennis the following week (1).

26.). (Miss) fnu HERNANDEZ, SECRETARY AT of the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, probably identical with Gabriela *HERNANDEZ Elizalde, who in 1967 was the secretary at this Institute.

14-00000

115

On 29 Jun 1966 HERNANDEZ told Subject that his class would be postponed for a week because Sarita (LNU) was sick (1).

27). Lee *HIGGINS, male, no traces.

On 19 May 1966 HIGGINS tried unsuccessfully to call Subject (1).

28). Vincent *HODGINS, British citizen, sales manager of Canadian Pacific Airlines in Mexico City.

On 28 Oct 1966 HODGINS contacted Subject, saying that BRADLEY (J. E. Ralph *BRADLEY, regional sales manager of Canadian Pacific) had met Subject the night before, and HODGINS wanted to discuss business with Subject. ~~HODGINS~~ Subject offered to visit HODGINS in his office. (1). (Comment: The Soviets began flying with Canadian Pacific when a new Aeroflot flight was put in service to Canada.) On 3 Nov 1966 HODGINS ~~gave~~ gave Subject information on flights and Subject said he would stop by his office the next week. On 24 Feb 1967 Subject was reported to have an appointment with HODGINS. (1).

29). Jan ~~JAKOQIEC~~ JAKOWIEC (P-9097, 201-250618), Polish Second Secretary and Consul in Mexico.

Subject and JAKOWIEC seem to be good friends, in addition to being in contact with eachother through consular duties (1, 19).

30). Karen *JOFFER, no other traces.

On 16 Aug 1966 Subject apologized to JOFFER that he had been busy the week before but said he could see her at 1630 hours that day (1). (Comment: This could well be a routine visa request.)

116

31). (Dr.) Yury K- TTLER (P-1573), dentist, Sov contact, Communist sympathizer.

In Apr 1966 Subject was reported making a dental appointment with KUTTLER (1). In Apr 1967 when the tourist agency representative, Miriam AVILA Katz, was trying to get a visa for KUTTLER, Subject spoke scathingly of him and said he would not give him a visa unless he fulfilled all the requirements (1). Subject explained that he had once gone to KUTTLER to have some dental work done and that KUTTLER had charged him too much, and that this was why he did not want to issue him the visa (26).

32). Jacques *LEMAIRE, represent~~ative of French steamship~~ company in [illegible] A MEXICO Mexico, scheduled to leave Mexico soon, member of French Club, where he probably met Subject.

On 14 Jul 1967 LEMAIRE invited Subject to the French Embassy reception that day, but Subject was unable to go. LEMAIRE sent regards to Subject's wife. (1).

33). Yuliya *LIPOVSKAYA, probably identical with the Julia *YASCHIN [illegible] listed in the telephone book as living at Mexicali 175, phone 15-35-47, presumably the wife of ~~Sak~~ Solomon (aka Julio) YASCHIN. PROBABLY IDENT WITH YULIYA LIPOVSKAYA

117

On 30 Nov 1965 LIPOVSKAYA contacted Subject and told him a long, rambling story about her relatives. Subject was evidently interested, urged her to visit the USSR and suggested she come to the Soviet Embassy to talk to him. On 24 Dec 1965 LIPOVSKAYA tried to call Subject but was referred by mistake to another Valentin. On 8 and 20 Jan 1966 she asked Subject if he had heard from her relative, the soccer player Lev YASCHIN, but Subject still had no news for her. (1).

201-558505

34). Tatiana RAKOFF Vda de MARCHAND (P-370), widow of Rene MARCHAND Boissclet, former professor at UNAM and director of the Jugoslav Cultural Institute. She is evidently a native Russian, but French citizen.

Tatiana was seen visiting Subject at the Soviet Embassy on 3 Jan and 18 Apr 1967; Subject seemed very friendly with her, and on 18 Apr 1967 left the Embassy together with her. (7). On 9 Jan 1967 it appeared that she had asked Subject for a visa. She also told him she had the information on the man who had been consul, but Subject cut her off and said that it would be better for them to get together to discuss it. On 25 Feb 1965 she told Subject she would help him join a club. On 16 May 1967 she asked Subject if he had called the Poles, but he said he had forgotten and would do it right away. (1).

35). (Dr.) Alfonso MARTINEZ Alvarez (P-1799), Guatemalan leftist doctor, has house at Lake Tequesquitengo to which he often invites groups of Soviets.

MARTINEZ was reported in contact with Subject in fall 1966 and January 1967 inviting Subject and other Soviets to his house on the lake. Subject was also in contact with his son, Eduardo *MARTINEZ (no identifiable traces) (1).

36). (General) Raul MENDIOLEA Cerecero (P-5700), deputy chief of the Federal District Police.

On 27 Oct 1966 Subject called the police to ask what MENDIOLEA's rank was (1).

37). William de MIER (P-5552), British citizen, general manager of KLM airline in Mexico.

In May 1967 Subject was reportedly discussing Soviet travel via KLM with de MIER ~~(6)~~ (1, 6).

38). ~~xxx~~ (Lic.) Oscar *OBREGON, Jr., not further identified.
A MEXICO

On 2 Jun 1967 OBREGON, who appeared to be a friend of Subject's, told Subject he would like to invite the Bolshoy troups to his house, but Subject said they would have little time in Mexico City. OBREGON also asked Subject if he could get him some caviar, and Subject said he would bring him some back from Moscow after his vacation. (1).

39). David *ORNELAS, of Mundus Tours.
CIT MEXICO? A MEXICO CIT RUSSIA?

ORNELAS has been Subject's principal contact at Mundus Tours in regard to making travel bookings. There has been no indication of anything more than a business relationship between them, except that in June 1966 Subject gave ORNELAS some magazines. (1).

40). Salvador PAZ Plata (P-12775), shipping agent with Representaciones Maritimas, Soviet commercial contact.

On 1 Mar 1966 it was reported that Subject had met PAZ in Mazatlan, and they used the familiar form of address with eachother. During 1966 they were occasionally reported making luncheon dates or planning to get together after work. There has been no record of recent contact. (1).

41). Gloria *PINTO, located at telephone 23-62-85, listed to (Dr.) Jose Maria
[illegible] CITIZEN? A MEXICO
*PINTO Ancira, Tajin 592, no traces on either name.
CIT MEXICO [illegible] A M[illegible]

On 17 May 1967 Gloria thanked Subject for giving a visa to her sister-in-law. She said that Ruth (LNU) was going to Valle de Bravo on the weekend, but Subject said he would not be able to go. She added that Alfonso (LNU) would be at the Cafe Jujuy that afternoon at 1700, and Subject said he would try to go and would see Gloria there. On 13 Jun 1967 Gloria told Subject that her daughter did not want to work for Ralph (LNU) any more, because they wanted to send her to Pittsburgh. Subject said he could not go to the party Saturday that was to be held at the home of Ernesto *ACEVEDO (no ~~xxxxxx~~ identifiable traces). On 12 Jul 1967 Gloria told Subject that she had everything
CIT MEXICO? A MEXICO

111

ready and that she would stop by the Embassy to say goodbye (perhaps going to the USSR). (1).

42). (Miss) Mercedes PINTO, no identifiable traces.

On 2 Mar 1967 Mercedes PINTO called Subject, who was out of town (1). ~~(Mercdex~~ (Comment: Mercedes could be the sister-in-law of Gloria PINTO mentioned above.)

43). Julio PLATAS Urbina (P-6948, 201-300319) claims to be a Soviet courier, has been in contact with the KGB, may be a provocation agent.

On 29 Oct 1965 PLATAS called, but Subject was out. On 1 Nov 1965 PLATA told Subject he had changed jobs, HE SAID HE no longer worked for Mex Hogar but was now with the Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (labor union). Subject said he would call him. (1).

44). Rafael Alfredo RAYN (P-8415, 201-357138), manager of Garza Lopez Tours.

Subject has been in contact with RAYN in 1966-67 on routine travel matters. In Aug 1965 Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV asked RAYN for a chart of all commercial passenger ships operating between Veracruz and New York for the month of September 1965, including the cost of travel and baggage. In December 1965 Subject reminded RAYN of YATSKOV's request and asked him to include rail travel to New York and sea travel to Europe on the chart. RAYN never provided the chart. (11).

45). Sara ROSENFIELD and husband Loyd ROSENFIELD (P-11665, 201-789388), both writers for The News.

Both ROSENFIELDs met Subject at a reception at the Indian Embassy given by the Indian Consul, K.D. PARASHAR. Subject invited them to Soviet Embassy receptions of 16 Feb and 23 Feb 1967, and invited Sara to attend the Home Show with the consular corps, which she did. On 11 Jul 1967 ~~Saxax~~ they again met briefly at an Indian Embassy reception. (22).

120

46). Fernando ~~SALOMON~~ Jose F *SALOMON Vallecillo, from Nicaragua.

On 24 Oct 1966 SALOMON told Subject that he had a letter from the Socialist Party of Nicaragua addressed to the Soviet Consul and that he had come specially from Nicaragua to deliver it. Subject said he would talk to SALOMON the next day at the Soviet Embassy. (1). (SALOMON also made an appointment ~~to see the Cuban Ambassador the~~ same day.)

47). Antonio SARMIENTO de la Barrera (P-12703), businessman who belongs to the ~~French Club and has been~~ reported friendly with several Soviets, particularly Subject's predecessor, Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO, and currently Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV.

On 24 Apr 1966 Subject was seen playing chess at the French Club with SARMIENTO and then went swimming with his wife. As of Sep 1966 Subject was reported still very friendly with the SARMIENTOs at the French Club. (15). ~~48)~~xx On 17 Dec 1965 Mrs. SARMIENTO invited NIKIFOROV to a Christmas party and said to bring Subject and Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV along (1).

48). Francis S. SHERRY, consular officer of the U.S. Embassy.

Subject has met SHERRY at consular corps functions. On 28 Jan 1967 they discussed playing tennis together. (20).

49). (Dr.) Emiliano SORIANO Artz (P-6741), doctor frequently consulted by the Soviets in Mexico.

In Nov 1965 Subject took a sick Soviet sailor to be treated by SORIANO. In Dec 1965 and Jan 1966 Subject himself was being treated by SORIANO. (1).

50). Graciela F *SOTO, no traces.

On 8 Sep 1966 Graciela, who described herself as Carlos BLANCO's friend (q. v.), invited Subject to the baptism of her son Rafael's child, also mentioned Rosita, who may be Rafael's wife (no traces on Rafael or Rosita SOTO). On 9 Nov 1966 Graciela called Subject, started to chat about having a toothache and that she had tried to call him before, but Subject cut her off and said he would call her the next day and to say hello to everyone. On 10

Nov 1966 Carlos BLANCO invited Subject to a party and said they would first go to the church near Graciela's house on Tamaulipas. (1). (One Alfredo SOTO, no traces, is listed at Tamaulipas 115.)

51). ZK Jiri SVESTKA (P-7111, 201-285441). Czech Second Secretary and Consul, suspect Intelligence officer.

Subject and SVESTKA seem to be quite friendly, plan dinner together as well as discussing consular business (1).

52). Leopoldo F *VAN DYCK, employee of Air France, said to be a homosexual, [illegible] has been friendly with other Soviet consular officers.

On 6 and ~~12~~ 13 Sep 1965 Subject was reported in contact with VAN DYCK in regard to visas for Air France passengers (17). On 5 Jul 1966 Subject told David ORNELAS of Mundus Tours to give VAN DYCK his regards, adding that VAN DYCK would know what kind of regards they were. (1).

53). Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz (P-4805, 201-238943), came to Mexico in 1956 with his mother, Lucia RUIZ Garcia (P-4413), who lived in Moscow for 17 years and taught Spanish there - KGB officer Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN was reportedly one of her students. In 1958-59 Rafael translated for the Soviet TASS correspondent in Mexico, in 1961 he was teaching Russian at the IICMR (Soviet Cultural Institute), and he is currently teaching at the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores. His current address is Romero de Terreros 922-1, telephone 43-80-16.

On 19 May 1967 VIDIELLA's wife tried to call Subject, saying that she was calling on behalf of the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores and that her husband had written a letter in Russian about some tourists and she [illegible] wanted a Russian typewriter to have it typed up on. (1).

54). (Col. and Lic.) Rafael *VILLAURRUTIA Lopez, also reported in [illegible] contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

On 30 Jan 1967 VILLAURRUTIA said that he had to go out of town and could not keep his appointment with Subject (1).

55). Ralph WIEGANDT (P-2254). German who came to Mexico in 1955 and has paint factory, member of French Club.

On 13 Mar 1967 Mrs. Ruth WIEGANDT, using the familiar form of address with Subject, invited Subject and his wife to Sunday dinner (1). In April 1967 it was reported that Subject was quite friendly with the WIEGANDTs at the Franch Club (15).

56). Douglas H. F *WILTSHIRE, American employed with SERVISA Travel [illegible] Agency.

On 10 May 1967 WILTSHIRE planned to pick up some passports from Subject at the Soviet Embassy and mentioned that he would like to invite Subject to his house (1).

57). Maxx Michael ZAREBSKI (P-8777, 201-744856), businessman from Cuernavaca, Canadian citizen.

On 11 Oct 1966 Subject reminded the Polish Consul, JAKOWIEC, that ZAREBSKI was going to sell ~~toxxxxx~~ some of his items to the Soviets. On 13 Oct 1966 JAKOWIEC said he could introduce Subject to ZAREBSKI, or Subject could call him directly. (1). Subject had originally met ZAREBSKI at a Polish Embassy reception on 14 Dec 1965, and ~~theyxfinallyxdidxgetxtogether~~ at another on 4 Oct 1966, and they finally did get together on 12 Jan 1967. Subject asked ZAREBSKI to help the Soviets find a house for a dacha in Cuernavaca, which he eventually did. On 24 Feb 1967 Subject and several other Soviets visited ZAREBSKI's factory and had lunch with him in Cuernavaca. On 20 May 1967 Subject and Boris Aleksandrovich CHMYKHOV visited ZAREBSKI in connection with the dacha, and on 15 Jul 1967 Subject and CHMYKHOV visited the factory. (19). (Comment: Subject and CHMYKHOV had known eachother before in Cuba, and both had mestkom responsibilities for the dacha, so their going to Cuernavaca together is not remarkable, although CHMYKHOV is a GRU officer.)

~~16~~ 17. OPERATIONAL PLANNING DATA:

a. Current Residence: Ignacio Esteva 18-1 (has lived at this address during his whole tour in Mexico) (1).

b. Telephone: None at home.

c. Car: 1965 green Impala, diplomatic tags 19-DA (7).

d. Office: Soviet Embassy, Tacubaya 204, telephone 15-60-55 (1). Often uses one of the reception rooms near the gate (21).

e. Handwriting samples attached (the one in Russian was in Subject's possession, but it is ~~kxx~~ not known whether he himself actually wrote it).

124

18. OPERATIONAL STEPS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN NEXT YEAR:

The Station is reviewing all of Subject's known contacts in a search for access agents. The case of Edmundo Fausto ZORRILLA Martinez is currently being investigated as a possible Illegals lead.

LOGINOV handwriting sample, received 16 June 1967, from LIRENO

Valentin Loginov
15-60-55
Consul.

126

Эдуардо Вебельман, около 5 лет, мексиканец еврейского происхождения, является владельцем стекольного завода и фирмы по продаже стройматериалов. В Мексику приехал во время II мировой войны. Проживает по адресу: Calzada Teoloba 320. Сын – Маурисио Вебельман

Source (6).

CARDED

127

- Lunes: 24 -

Insgtes y Baja California
Comida
6½ pm.

Source (12)

14-00000

128

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 4 1971
MICROFILMED

ca 2- HMMA- 32132

CS COPY

14-00000

129

MICROFILM
[illegible]
DOC. MICRO. SER.

X5C
3P

16. PAST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AGAINST SUBJECT:

In addition to routine coverage of Subject's activities in Mexico, the following has been done:

a. Surveillance of Subject in Panama in Dec 1961.

b. In July 1966 information was passed to LITEMPO-8 "proving" that Subject was a dangerous KGB officer in an attempt to have him declared PNG, without success.

c. LICOZY-5 continues to be debriefed on his contacts with Subject, although LICOZY-5 has told Subject he will no longer act as an agent for the Soviets.

d. Briefing of U.S. Embassy chauffeur whom Subject ~~xx~~ tried to develop.

e. Debriefing of LICOWL-1 on his contacts with Subject.

f. Station Panama City helped block visas for Subject and A.A. NIKITIN in Feb 1967.

g. ~~Rxxx~~ Recruitment of Subject of 201-814144, whom Subject was cultivating. Contact now dead.

h. Briefing of U.S. Embassy visa officer whom Subject tried to develop.

i. Debriefing of Subject of 201-800412, who claimed Subject had tried to recruit him but who appears to be a fabricator.

j. Debriefing of LITEASE-1 on his contacts with Subject.

k. Debriefing of LIROBBIN-1 and 2 on their contacts with Subject.

l. Briefing of LIROAN-1 as access to Subject's friends at the club he belongs to.

m. Direction of BESABER in his contacts with Subject.

n. debriefing of LIREALM-1 on his contacts with Subject.

o. debriefing of LIROCKET-1.

p. debriefing of ~~x~~ LICANNY-1.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 4 1971
MICROFILMED

CS COPY

CC ATT 24. HMMA-[illegible]

130

USC

19. SOURCES.

1. LIENVOY, passim.
2. PACY-7280, Dec 1961
3. HZPA-11914, 11 Jan 1962, passport photographs
4. LIFIRE travel reports.
5. HMMA-26881, 12 Aug 65, LITEMPO passport photographs.
6. LICOZY-5 case file, passim.
7. LILYRIC + LIMITED surveillance.
8. LICOWL-1 case file, passim.
9. LNERGO report, 21 Dec 1965.
10. Contact report of meeting with KADIDDLE, 28 Dec 1965
11. LICANNY-1 case file, passim.
12. LNPURE memorandum, 21 Jan 1966
13. Station memorandum, 27 Jan 1966
14. LNPURE memorandum, 11 Feb 1966
15. LIROAN-1 information.
16. Station memorandum, information from LITEMPO-8, 22 Jul 1966.
17. Summary on Subject prepared by LIENVOY, 22 July 1966.
18. LICALLA surveillance, passim.
19. BESABER information.
20. Station memorandum, 30 Jan 1967.
21. LIROCKET-1 information.
22. LIROBBIN-2 information.
23. LITEASE-1 information.

24. LNPURE memorandum, 28 Feb 1967
25. LIREALM information.
26. Info from ~~[illegible]~~ Subject of 201-814144.
27. Station memo of 27 Jun 1967, info from LNPURE officer.
28. HMMW-13980, 16 Sep 1965, Hqs traces on Subject.
29. HZPA-11859, 22 Dec 1961.
30. Information from Subj of 201-800412.

132

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP
Personality Assessment Questionnaire on Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

(201-285412)

1. Forwarded herewith is a Personality Assessment Questionnaire on LOGINOV prepared by LIREALM-1 in February 1969.

2. By virtue of membership in the same club in which they are both active participants in the same activity, LIREALM-1 has known LOGINOV for a little over two years. In this club they have several mutual contacts. As a result LIREALM-1 has met LOGINOV several times at social activities in the homes of these contacts. Although LOGINOV has never been a formal target for LIREALM-1, the relationship has been close enough and of sufficient duration for LIREALM-1 to fill out a meaningful Personality Assessment Questionnaire.

Francis J. Coyne
for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Personality Assessment Questionnaire h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att h/w
2 - C/WH w/o att

1 Att (h/w)

CS COPY

201-285412 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-36581

DATE
25 February 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 201-285412

SECRET

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

FORM 12-67 2825

SECRET

(4)

CS COPY

w att# 1 to HMMA-36581

201-285412

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

1. This is a new, experimental version of the Personality Assessment Questionnaire (sometimes informally called the PRQ III) which has been in use for several years. This new form is largely a checklist and thus requires far less essay-type reporting than the previous form.

2. For a number of years, our operational psychologists have been developing a system for indirect assessment of target personalities. The system employs—in lieu of psychological tests and interviews—observations of appearance, manner, and style of behavior. Such observations are used as if they were items in a psychological test, and like test items, are weighted and analyzed to yield a personality profile. Working from the profile, operational psychologists describe the target personality's basic aptitudes, attitudes, motives and susceptibilities. The goal of the assessment is to identify feasible means of influencing the target person.

3. Reliability is vastly increased when two or more observers complete this questionnaire independently. All items need not be completed; in fact, it is a rare case where contact is sufficient to complete it fully. You are encouraged to guess where complete information is lacking. Mark such items with a "G," instead of the customary check mark or "X." Thus, an observer with very limited contact can be expected to enter more "G's" than "X's."

4. Before completing the enclosed PAQ form, please provide the following information about *yourself:*

Age 39 Sex M Nationality US

Social-cultural background:

Middle-class

How often have you observed the target individual?

3 to 4 times per month over two years.

When did you last observe the target individual?

Last week. (week of 2 Feb 1969)

What is the nature of your contact? (direct acquaintance, embassy receptions/parties, informants, debriefing of others, etc.)

Tennis club.

5. Can you supply a specimen of the target individual's handwriting?

Yes____ No X

6. Please supply the name(s) of any person you believe qualified to provide information about the target person, that is, anyone sufficiently knowledgeable to complete this form at least in part.

Gloria Pinto

136

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

I. DESCRIPTION

1. Overall Impression. (Check the most appropriate.)

1.01	Virile, athletic, practical, and socially facile ("Hail fellow")	
1.02	Virile, rugged, practical, but socially guarded (authoritarian)	X
1.03	Rather soft and sensuous but socially pleasant and appropriate (good guy)	
1.04	Rather soft and sensuous but socially guarded and moody (a possible whiner)	
1.05	Manly, clean-cut, professional, and socially smooth (executive type)	
1.06	Austere, precise, and businesslike (dedicated worker type)	
1.07	Cultured, neat, artistic, and socially smooth (diplomatic type)	
1.08	Sensitive, intense, and self-preoccupied (artistic or absent-minded professor type)	
1.09	None of these fit. I would describe him as:	

2. Dress. (Check the most appropriate.)

2.01	Well-groomed (natty)	
2.02	Neat (well-kept)	X
2.03	Fastidious (fussy)	
2.04	Overdressed (prissy)	
2.05	Nondescript (bland)	
2.06	Underdressed (informal)	
2.07	Casual (indifferent)	

137

2.08 Sloppy (poorly kept) ___
2.09 Unkempt (bizarre) ___
2.10 Style of dress

2.10.01 Conventional for his culture
2.10.02 Cosmopolitan ___
2.10.03 Outdated ___
2.10.04 Extreme or unique ___

3. Head Characteristics.

3.01 Skull measurements:

3.01.01	Side to side	Wide	___	Average	X	Narrow	___
	Front to back	Wide	___	Average	X	Narrow	___
3.02	Forehead:	High	___	Average	X	Low	___
3.03	Eyes:	Wide-set	___	Average	X	Close-set	___
3.04	Eyebrows: (a)	Arched	___	Average	X	Straight	___
	(b)	Bushy	___	Average	X	Sparse	___
	(c)	High	___	Average	X	Low	___

3.05 Is there anything about his head or head structure that requires special mention?

—

4. General Characteristics.

4.01 Age, weight, height:

4.01.01 How old is he? ~~40 ± 2~~ 40 ±2

4.01.02 His apparent age is Much younger ___ Younger ___
About the same X Older ___
Much older ___

4.01.03 How tall is he? ~~5'10"~~ 5' 10"

138

4.01.04 Does he have a nickname: Yes____ No X
If Yes, does he object to being addressed by his nickname? Yes____ No____

4.01.05 Is he addressed by a diminutive? (Johnny, Jack, Hank, etc.) Yes X No____

4.01.06 Does he have any scars or other distinguishing marks? Yes____ No X
If so, please describe:

4.02 Hair:

4.02.01 Color Very light____ Light____ Medium X
Gray or white____ Dark____ Very dark____

4.02.02 Waviness Curly X Average____ Straight____

4.02.03 Amount Thick____ Average X Sparse____
Balding____ Bald____

4.02.04 Grooming Well-groomed____ Unruly____
Average X Unkempt____

4.02.05 Is there anything unusual about his hair or hair style?____
If so, please describe:

4.03 Eyes:

4.03.01 Color Gray____ Green____ Blue____
Yellowish____ Hazel____ Light brown____
Brown____

4.03.02 Wears eyeglasses
Always____ To read____ Never X

139

4.03.03 Eyeglass lens — Thick ____ Average ____ Bifocal ____

4.03.04 Eyeglass style — Heavy frame ____ Rimless ____ Average frame ____ Contact lens ____

4.03.05 Is there anything unusual about his eyes that requires special mention. If so, please describe: ____

4.03.06 Does he take off glasses when he speaks? Yes ____ No ____

4.03.07 Does he use glasses to gesture? Yes ____ No ____

4.03.08 Does he ever wear sunglasses indoors? Yes ____ No X

4.04 Complexion:

4.04.01 Coloring — Ruddy ____ Dark ____ Tan ____ Light X Pale ____

4.04.02 Face (a) Scarred ____ Lined ____ Smooth ____
(b) Beard ____ Clean-shaven X
Mustache ____ Unshaved ____

4.04.03 Describe type of mustache or beard:

4.04.04 Body hair (arms, legs, chest)
Heavy ____ Medium ____ Light X

4.04.05 Hair visible on nose? ____

4.04.06 Hair visible on ears? ____

4.04.07 Is there anything unusual or striking about his skin or skin coloring? If so, please describe: ____

140

4.05 Face:

4.05.01 Expressiveness Expressive ___ Average X Inexpressive ___
Very expressive ___ Very inexpressive ___

4.05.02 If expressive, is face Natural ___ Tense ___

4.05.03 If inexpressive, is face Relaxed ___ Deadpan ___

4.05.04 In general, are facial responses Inappropriate ___ Appropriate X

4.05.05 Is there anything unusual or striking about his facial expressions? If so, please describe: when tense, he arches both eyebrows and tilts his head back.

4.06 Lips:

4.06.01 Type Protruding ___ Pursed ___ Thin X
Full ___ Loose ___

4.06.02 Smiles (a) Spontaneously ___ Tensely ___ Mechanically ___
(b) Very frequently ___ Frequently ___ Average X
Infrequently ___ Never ___

4.06.03 Have you ever seen him smile to himself? Yes X No ___

4.06.04 If you have seen him having his picture taken, can he smile on command? Yes X No ___
Or is he wooden and rather ill-at-ease? Yes ___ No ___

4.06.05 If you have not seen him having his picture taken, what kind of a picture do you think he would prefer? Serious ___ Smiling ___

4.06.06 Is there anything about his lips or smile that is unusual or striking? If so, please describe:

141

4.07 Teeth

4.07.01 Shape [✓ Regular] Average ___ Protruding ___ Unusual ___

4.07.02 Do you get the feeling he clenches his teeth? Yes ___ [✓ No]
If Yes, under what circumstances?

4.07.03 Does he have any gold teeth or unusual dental work?
Yes ___ [✓ No]

4.07.04 When he smiles, does he
Show his teeth? Yes ___ [✓ No]
Purse his lips? Yes ___ No ___
Put hand over mouth? Yes ___ No ___

4.07.05 Does he put his hand over his mouth when talking?
[✓ Never] Frequently ___
Occasionally ___ Always ___

4.07.06 Color of teeth [✓ White] Dull ___ Stained ___

4.07.07 Is there anything unusual or striking about his teeth?
If so, please describe:

4.08 Posture:

4.08.01 Straightness Round-shouldered ___ Slumped ___ [✓ Erect] Stiff ___

4.08.02 Is posture maintained? [✓ Consistently] Variable ___

4.08.03 Shoulders [✓ Broad-shouldered] Sloping ___ Average ___ Narrow ___

4.08.04 Body build Skinny ___ Average ___ Heavy X Obese ___

4.08.05 When conversing, in what direction does he primarily lean in relation to the other person?
Towards ___ Away X Neither ___

4.08.06 Does posture, when listening, differ from posture when talking? NO
If so, please describe:

4.08.07 Sitting Posture (a) Relaxed ___ Average ___ Stiff ___
(b) Erect X Average ___ Slumped ___

4.08.08 When in a group, is he inclined
To stand still X
Move about in one place ___
Lean against the wall ___
Sit down even though others are standing ___
Place his arms on others ___

4.08.09 If taller than average, does he bend over to come down to the group? Yes ___ No X

4.08.10 If shorter than average, does he stand up to the group? Yes ___ No ___

4.08.11 When listening to a lecture (or watching a play or movie) does he
Sit still, stare at the speaker X
Move about, fidget, change position ___

4.08.12 Is there anything about his posture, carriage, or bearing that warrants special mention? If so, please describe: ___

4.09 Hands:

4.09.01 Dominance Right-handed ___ Left-handed X

4.09.02 Is he inclined to use his less dominant hand?
Frequently ___ Rarely ___
Sometimes ___ Never X

4.09.03 Size of hands Very large ___ [✓ Large] Average ___
Small ___ Very small ___

4.09.04 His use of his hands is Graceful ___ [✓ Average] Awkward ___

4.09.05 In normal situations, his arms hang Loose ___ Stiff ___
[✓ Average]

4.09.06 When standing (talking or listening) he has a tendency
To open and close his hands ___
Put hands in pocket ___
Run hand over face or hair ___

4.09.07 If he puts hands in pockets, he is more likely to put them in
Pants ___ Coat ___

4.09.08 Nails [✓ Clean, not manicured] Manicured ___ Average ___
Ragged ___ Dirty ___ Bitten ___

4.09.09 If nails are bitten, to what extent?
Barely ___ Average ___ Deeply ___

4.09.10 Are fingers Blunt ___ [✓ Average] Long ___

4.09.11 Are hands Callous ___ Rough ___ [✓ Average]
Smooth ___ Soft ___

4.09.12 In public, does he
Pull, rub, or pick nose ___
Rub back of neck ___
Run hand over face or mouth ___
Scratch any part of his body ___
Pull at his clothes ___
[✓ Never do any of these things]

4.09.13 Does he put his arms on the table? Often ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely ___ Never ___

4.09.14 Does he put his elbows on the table? Often ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely ___ Never ___

4.09.15 When sitting at a table or desk, does he talk ___ or listen ___ with his head in his hands?
Often ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely ___ Never ___

4.09.16 When talking, does he tend to
Close his eyes ____
Put his hand over his eyes ____
Often ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never X

4.09.17 If he closes or covers his eyes, is he more inclined to do it
When trying to make a particular point ____
When listening to someone else ____

4.09.18 Does he tap fingers on table?
Never ____ Occasionally ____ Often ____

4.09.19 Is he more inclined to do this when
Talking ____ Listening ____ Thinking ____

4.09.20 Does he
Rattle change in his pocket ____
Toy with some object ____
Often ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never X

4.09.21 Is there anything unique about his hands or arms worthy of special mention? If so, please describe: ____

4.10 Feet:

4.10.01 Does he tend to show foot preference? Left ____ Right ____

4.10.02 Does he work to keep in step when walking with someone? Yes ____ No ____

4.10.03 Does he cross feet at ankles when seated?
Yes ____ No ____

4.10.04 If so, which foot is over the other? Left ____ Right ____

4.10.05 Does he cross legs
Only when he faces in a new direction ____
As soon as he sits down ____
Shortly after he sits down ____
Occasionally ____
Never ____

4.10.06 If he crosses legs, which leg is on top? Left ____ Right ____
Depends on how he is sitting ____

4.10.07 Does he change his crossed leg Depends on how he is facing ____
Frequently ____ Occasionally ____ Never ____

4.10.08 Compared to most people, does he walk

Faster ___ Slower ___ Same speed ___

4.10.09 If he is out of step with you, does he notice it and get in step? Yes ___ No ___

4.10.10 In conversation when he becomes intense, does he

Uncross ~~his legs~~ and lean forward ___

Uncross his legs and lean backward ___

Cross his legs and sit upright ___

Shift to a more erect position X

Shift to a more relaxed position ___

Make little change in position ___

4.10.11 Are his feet Large ___ Average X Small ___

4.10.12 Are his shoes (a) Pointed ___ Average X Blunt ___

(b) Highly polished ___ Average X Not well kept ___

4.10.13 Is there anything about his feet or legs that warrants special mention? If so, please describe: ___

4.10.14 When his legs are crossed, does he

Sit quietly ___ Move his foot ___ Swing or wiggle his leg ___

4.10.15 Does he ever tap his foot? No ___ Yes ___

4.10.16 Does he swing back and forth on his feet when standing and talking in a group?

Often ___ Rarely ___

Sometimes ___ Never X

4.10.17 When walking, are his steps Long ___ Normal X Short ___

4.10.18 When he walks, do his arms

Hang loose ___

Swing with his stride X

Swing, but out of rhythm ___

Hang tense ___

4.10.19 When he walks, do his toes

Turn out ___ Stay straight X Turn in ___

4.11 Voice:

4.11.01 Is his voice pitched — Low ___ Medium X High ___

4.11.02 Does he speak — Quietly ___ Average X Loudly ___

4.11.03 In his native language, is his tone quality noticeably
Louder ___ Quieter ___ About the same X

4.11.04 Does he have a speech impediment? Yes ___ No X
If Yes, please describe:

4.12 Use of Language

4.12.01 Does his native language vocabulary seem
Rich ___ Limited ___
Average X Poor ___

4.12.02 In his best language, other than native, is he
Fluent ___ Barely fluent ___
Moderately fluent X Poor ___

4.12.03 Does he pick up idioms
Quickly ___ Slowly ___
Average X Not at all ___

4.12.04 Does he learn foreign languages easily Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, does he
Learn primarily by "feel" and by "trial and error" ___
Learn primarily from textbooks ___

4.12.05 In his best second language, can he switch from his native language
Smoothly with little hesitation X
Effectively with average hesitation ___
Slowly with considerable hesitation ___
Awkwardly with considerable embarrassment ___

4.12.06 When he misuses language, does he ordinarily appear
Oblivious of it ___
Aware of, but indifferent to it X
Aware of, and anxious about it ___
Very aware of it and quite embarrassed ___

147

4.12.07 In general, would you characterize him as
Laconic ___ Average X Garrulous ___

4.12.08 In ordinary conversation, does the content tend to be primarily
Personal ___ Impersonal ___
Interpersonal ___ Guarded ___

4.12.09 In ordinary conversation, is the content
Precise and to the point ___
Relevant ___
Average ___
To the point but rambling ___
Irrelevant ___

4.12.10 Does he
Often discuss personal problems ___
Rarely discuss personal problems X

4.12.11 Does he use profanity in his native language?
Occasionally ___ Frequently ___ Never X

4.12.12 Does he use profanity in an acquired language?
Occasionally ___ Frequently ___ Never X

4.12.13 Is there anything about his manner of speech or conversational style that is unusual. Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, please describe:

4.13 Gestures:

4.13.01 Does he gesture when he talks? Always ___ Sometimes ___
Never X

4.13.02 His most characteristic gesture is
Pointing with finger ___
Waving one hand ___
Sweeping both hands ___
Chopping both hands ___

4.13.03 When he gestures, the motion is
Graceful ___ Average ___ Mechanical ___

4.13.04 When engaged in conversation, does he tense up
Often ___ Rarely ___
Sometimes X Never ___

4.13.05 It is relatively easy to tell when he is really interested in a subject
Always X Rarely ___
Sometimes ___ Never ___

4.13.06 His eyes are very expressive Always ___ Sometimes X Rarely ___

4.13.07 Most people would find his eyes Beautiful ___ Average X
Pleasant ___ Unpleasant ___
Sinister ___

4.13.08 He maintains eye contact Always ___ Frequently X
Sometimes ___ Rarely ___ Never ___

4.13.09 In a group, have you ever seen him stare repeatedly at a person who seemed to interest him? Often ___ Sometimes ___ Never X

4.13.10 When he admires (follows with eyes) an attractive girl, he is Obvious ___ Average ___ Subtle X
I have never seen him do it ___
Have you ever seen him blush? Yes X No ___
If Yes, describe the situation:

His political comments were successfully changed at a party. All present, including himself, were embarrassed by the confrontation.

4.13.11 Is there anything particularly striking and worthy of further explanation about the movements he makes with his body, eyes, or head and the way he behaves in a group? If so, please describe: Yes

See 4.05.05

149

4.14 **Sleep**

4.14.01 Does he Enjoy sleep and fall off easily? Yes___ No___
Read or walk to prepare himself for sleep? Yes___ No___

4.14.02 Does he Rise easily? Yes___ No___
Prefer to remain abed until the last moment? Yes___ No___

4.14.03 Is he An early starter? ___
A late starter? ___

4.15 **Impressions:**

4.15.01 To the best of your knowledge, do you think most women would find him Charming___ Pleasant___ Average___
Unpleasant___ Very unpleasant___
Sexually attractive X

4.15.02 To the best of your knowledge, do you think most men would find him Charming___ Pleasant___ Average X
Unpleasant___ Very unpleasant___

4.15.03 Without prior knowledge, if you saw him on the street, would he impress you as Nondescript___ Average X Striking___

4.15.04 Without prior knowledge and on the basis of looks alone, which of the following do you think he might be?
Peasant___ Executive___
Worker X Professional___
Merchant___ Military Officer___
Artist of some type___

4.15.05 Is there anything particularly striking and worthy of further explanation about the overall impression he gives? Yes
If so, please describe:

Conspicuously athletic.
Looks like boxer.

II. BACKGROUND

5. General

5.01 Ethnic Background:

5.01.01 Please describe his ethnic background.

Slavic - blond

5.01.02 How does he compare with others of this background?
Like most X
A stereotype ____
Not like most ____
I would never guess his background ____

5.02 Cultural Background:

5.02.01 If he had his personal choice, do you think he is the kind of person who, living in a foreign culture would.
Never change his accustomed way of living ____
Maintain his accustomed way of living but show some interest in the local culture ____
Show some interest in the local culture and adapt his ways X
Go native if he had his chance ____

5.02.02 Compared with his own group, he is just like all the rest of them X
Somewhat different than most of them ____
Unique ____

5.03 Educational Background:

5.03.01 What is his educational background? Please describe:

5.03.02 In your opinion, compared to most people in his culture with a similar background he

Is as well-educated ____

Is better informed ____

Appears better educated than he claims ____

Appears less educated than he claims X

I cannot conceive of him having the background he claims ____

If you doubt his background, please comment:

6.	General Impression of Background (Check the most appropriate)	
6.01	Strong and rugged (a man's man)	X
6.02	Strong, rugged, but independent (a self-sufficient loner)	
6.03	Compassionate, sensual and understanding (a woman's man)	
6.04	Moody, emotional, and sometimes bitter (the "misunderstood" man)	
6.05	Forthright, intelligent, and responsible (the professional man)	
6.06	Proficient, intelligent, and intense (the technical man)	
6.07	Sensitive, cultured, and sophisticated (the "Madison Avenue" man)	
6.08	Sensitive, temperamental, and unconventional (the Bohemian man)	
6.09	None of these. I would describe him as:	

152

III. SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

7. General Impression. (Check the most appropriate.)

7.01 The kind of a man who is usually punctual, inclined to greet everyone informally and who appears to be comfortable with himself when he enters a room. ___

7.02 The kind of a man who is always punctual, inclined to greet everyone somewhat awkwardly and who appears to be uncomfortable when he enters a room. X

7.03 The kind of man whose punctuality is unpredictable, who is inclined to be very warm and friendly with everyone he knows, and who appears confident when he enters a room. ___

7.04 The kind of man who is punctual when he makes a date, but who is inclined to cancel engagements rather often, inclined to greet only those people he has met before and is somewhat retiring or standoffish when he enters a room. ___

7.05 The kind of man who is inclined to keep you waiting but is gracious and attentive when he arrives, inclined to be precise and proper as he greets everyone and can be quite impressive when he enters a room. ___

7.06 The kind of man who is always punctual, inclined to be very formal in his greetings and is most often stiff and unbending when he enters a room. ___

7.07 The kind of man whose punctuality is unpredictable, who is inclined to be charming and sophisticated as he greets everyone and is quite socially poised when he enters a room. ___

7.08 The kind of man who is often quite late—and indifferent about it—inclined to be short and curt in his greetings and is sometimes awkward when he enters a room. ____

7.09 None of these. ____
I would describe him as:

8. Meeting People:

8.01 When he shakes hands
Does he move toward you ____
or Do you most often have to move toward him X

8.02 When he shakes hands, is his grip
Very firm ____
Firm X
Average ____
Weak ____
Limp ____

8.03 When he shakes hands, does he
Pump your hand ____
Squeeze your hand X
Let you do all the work ____

8.04 Is there anything about the way he shakes hands worthy of special mention? If so, please describe: ____

8.05 When he is first introduced, does he
Look the person in the eye to whom he is being introduced X
Cock his head toward the introducer but look at the person to whom he is being introduced ____
Cock his head and look at neither ____

8.06 When he first hears a name, he
Does nothing obvious to remember it ____
Repeats it as he acknowledges the introduction ____
Asks the introducer to repeat or verify it ____
Asks the person to whom he is being introduced to repeat the name ____

8.07 If calling cards are exchanged, does he
Read the card and carefully put it away __X__
Read it and stick it in his pocket ____
Carefully put it away without reading it ____
Stick it in his pocket without reading it ____

8.08 When introducing someone, does he do so
With ease and grace ____
With some slight embarrassment or hesitation __X__
With considerable awkwardness ____

8.09 To what extent is his manner different when he is being introduced to women? Not at all ____ Normal __X__ Marked ____

8.10 If he shows a difference, which of the following describes it?
Uses both hands when he takes her hand ____
Moves in closer when acknowledging the introduction ____
Becomes more formal and distant ____
Becomes warm and effusive ____
Becomes warm and effusive only with pretty girls ____
Is very courteous and gracious to older women ____
Varies, depending on the woman ____
If so, please explain:

155

8.11 When introduced to a fair number of people at the same time, does he
Linger a bit with each person to whom he is introduced ____
Acknowledge the introduction quickly and wait for the next ____
Look toward the next person almost at the same time he is shaking hands with the person whom he has just met ____

8.12 In general, does he strike you as the kind of person who will
Always remember a name ____
Remember names in an average manner X
Have difficulty remembering names ____
Be very poor at remembering names ____

8.13 Has he ever asked you to re-identify someone to whom you had previously introduced him? No ____ Yes X

9. Smoking and Eating:

9.01 Smoking:

9.01.01 Does he smoke?

Cigarettes ____	Cigars ____	Pipe ____
Regularly ____	Regularly ____	Regularly ____
Occasionally ____	Occasionally ____	Occasionally ____
Never X	Never X	Never X

9.01.02 How much does he smoke? Heavy ____ Average ____
Light ____

9.01.03 Does he use his own Lighter ____ Matches ____

9.01.04 Is he the kind of person who
Is always asking for a light ____
Frequently asks for a light ____
Usually has his own light ____
Always has his own light ____

9.01.05 Does he use a holder?

Cigarette ____	Cigar ____
Always ____	Always ____
Sometimes ____	Sometimes ____
Never ____	Never ____

9.01.06 Does he clip cigars? Always ____ Sometimes ____ Bites off end ____

9.01.07 Does he care for his pipe? Fastidiously ____ Average ____
Neglects ____

9.01.08 When lighting a cigarette does he
Obviously duck his head and cup his hands ____
Light it casually while talking ____

9.01.09 Have you ever seen him hold an unlighted cigarette and wait for a pause in the conversation before lighting it? No ____ Yes ____

9.01.10 Have you ever seen him put a cigarette in his mouth and pause, match poised, waiting for the appropriate time to light it?
No ____ Yes ____

9.01.11 Have you ever seen him chew on an unlighted cigar, pipe, or cigarette? No ____ Yes ____

9.01.12 Is he a chain smoker who
Lights one cigarette from another ____
Smokes his cigarette down to the nub and then lights another ____
Always keeps a cigarette going even though he may not smoke it very much ____

9.01.13 Does he smoke Only after meals ____
Only when offered a cigarette by someone ____
Between the entree and the dessert when others do ____

9.01.14 Is the presence of tobacco stain on his fingers Very marked ____
Noticeable ____
Barely noticeable ____
No stain ____

9.01.15 When smoking, does he

(a)

Allow a long ash to accumulate on his cigarette ____
Flick off ashes in a normal manner ____
Become unusually preoccupied with the ashtray ____

(b)

Let ashes fall to the rug ____
Cup his hand under his cigarette ____
Always use an ashtray ____

9.01.16 Does he

Put out a cigarette with elaborate ashtray ritual ____
Seem to put out cigarettes in a normal manner ____
Seem careless about how he puts out a cigarette ____

9.01.17 Does he

Show obvious enjoyment when smoking ____
Show average satisfaction ____
Smoke perfunctorily and mechanically ____

9.01.18 Is he the kind of person who offers a light to others

Always ____ Seldom ____
Frequently ____ Never ____

9.01.19 Is he the kind of person who

Will walk across a room to offer a light to a lady ____
Is conventional in how he offers a light to a lady X
Will seldom offer a light to a lady ____

9.01.20 To your knowledge, has he given up smoking for reasons of health?

Yes ____ No ____

9.01.21 Have you ever heard him mention that he should give up smoking

but cannot ____
Has tried to stop but could not ____

9.01.22 Have you ever heard him mention that he is bothered by the smell of Cigars ____ Pipes ____ Cigarettes ____

Never heard him mention any of these ____

9.01.23 Is there anything about his smoking habits that requires special mention or special description? If so, please describe:

9.02 Eating:

9.02.01 Is his mode of eating
Typical of most of his colleagues X
Somewhat different than most of his colleagues ___
Markedly different than most of his colleagues ___

9.02.02 Is he a Hearty eater ___ Average eater X Light eater ___

9.02.03 Is the fact that he has marked food preferences
Very noticeable ___
Not particularly noticeable ___
Not at all noticeable ___

9.02.04 Does he
Eat with relish ___
Enjoy his food in a conventional manner ___
Seem indifferent to food X

9.02.05 Does he eat Quickly ___ Average X Slowly ___

9.02.06 Is he generally inclined
To take second helpings ___
To take all he wants the first time around X
Often leaves some of his food untouched ___

9.02.07 Does he
Dwell on how much he misses his native foods ___
Show conventional interest in local foods X
Indicate considerable interest in new and unusual foods ___

9.02.08 (a) He does not eat while Talking ___ Listening ___

(b) He does eat while Talking X Listening X

9.02.09 Does he show a tendency to adapt to the table etiquette of the people with whom he is dining? Marked ___ Average X
Maintains his familiar style of eating at all times ___

9.02.10 When given a chance, does he, for other than business reasons, suggest a preferred place to eat? Always ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely, if ever X

9.02.11 When eating out
It is very difficult for him to select his meal ___
Waits to hear what his companion orders and orders same thing ___
Always knows what he wants very quickly ___

9.02.12 When eating out, he is
Somewhat extravagant when he knows you are paying ___
Very cost-conscious when he knows he is paying ___
Very cost-conscious no matter who is paying ___
Generally indifferent about cost no matter who is paying ___

9.02.13 Is he the sort of person who
Usually wants to check the bill regardless of who is paying ____
Is indifferent about the bill when someone else is paying ____

9.02.14 When he is paying, he checks the bill Unobtrusively ____
Very carefully (and rather obviously) ____

9.02.15 When he pays his check, does he Obviously count his change ____
Show indifference when accepting his change ____
Take his change in a normal manner ____

9.02.16 When he deals with headwaiters, is he Aggressive ____
Normal and conventional ____
Somewhat ingratiating ____
Brusque X

9.02.17 Is he prone to complain when service does not suit him?
To his companion ____ Directly ____ Not at all ____

9.02.18 He handles waiters In a conventional way
Over friendly ____ Unusually polite ____

9.02.19 Is there anything about his eating habits or manners that requires special mention ? If so, please describe:

9.03 Overall impression of eating and smoking behavior. (Check the most appropriate description.)

9.03.01 A hearty eater with well-defined preferences. He eats and smokes with considerable gusto but tends to be a little on the coarse and boorish side. It is rather easy to imagine him eating huge sandwiches and drinking beer with the boys at the neighborhood bar. ____

9.03.02 A heavy eater with limited preferences. He eats and smokes with gusto but his manners are definitely coarse and boorish. It is rather easy to imagine him becoming quite sharp with a waiter who serves him unfamiliar food or a dish prepared in an unfamiliar way. ____

9.03.03 A sensual eater who knows all the restaurants and their native specialties. He is very anxious to have others try dishes he has discovered. He eats with obvious pleasure, savors his smokes, and though rarely gauche, he is more aware of his food than his manners. It is easy to imagine him cooking and serving special dishes to his friends. ____

9.03.04 A sensual eater who tends to eat by himself when possible. He seems to eat all types of food and has something of the ~~air of a~~ glutton about him. He eats with obvious pleasure, savors his smokes and afterwards will linger alone at a table with self-satisfaction. It is easy to imagine him hovering alone over the buffet at a cocktail party savoring the tidbits.

9.03.05 A conventional eater who usually goes along with the crowd. He probably has food allergies that prevent him from eating certain foods. He gives the impression of enjoying smoking more than eating but his table manners are adapted to whatever situation he is in. It is easy to imagine him taking an indigestion pill in the privacy of his room.

9.03.06 A conventional eater who always goes along with the crowd. He eats with little relish and rarely mentions anything about his likes or dislikes. He smokes at every opportunity, but more mechanically than with pleasure. He usually tries to adapt his manners to the situation but may be a little awkward and obvious in doing so. It is easy to imagine him grabbing a bite at a sidewalk stand at any time of day.

9.03.07 A gourmet eater who has marked and varied sophisticated food tastes. Dining is quite a ritual with him, and atmosphere and service are almost as important as the food. He is graceful and cultured at table and smokes in the same manner. It is easy to imagine him dressing for dinner, enjoying fine wines and food by candlelight.

9.03.08 An unconventional eater, a man who "eats like a bird." He eats in a preoccupied way, obviously indifferent to his food and surroundings. It would not be surprising to learn he was a food faddist (vegetarian, health foods, etc.).

9.03.09 None of these descriptions really fit.
I would describe him as:

161

9.04 Drinking:

9.04.01 Does he drink? Not at all ___ Average X
A little ___ Heavily ___

9.04.02 Does he drink alone (solitary drinker) ___
with others mainly for sociableness ___
on formal occasions only ___
after work, at home ___

9.04.03 Does he appear to drink primarily for the taste ___
primarily for the effect ___
for both ___

9.04.04 His favorite drink is Beer ___ Wine ___ Whiskey ___
Vodka ___ Gin ___ No preference ___

9.04.05 He prefers Cocktails ___ Highballs ___ Short drinks ___
Straight shots ___

9.04.06 He drinks Slowly ___ Average X Quickly ___

9.04.07 Does he Gulp his drink ___ Sip his drink X

9.04.08 Does he Go out of his way to get a refill ___
Usually wait until asked ___
Always wait until asked X

9.04.09 Attitude toward wines? Very knowledgeable ___
Enjoys but not particularly knowledgeable ___
Indifferent about wines ___
Knows nothing, couldn't care less X

9.04.10 Does he Talk at length (and obviously get pleasure from talking) about his liquor preferences ___
Talk about his liquor preferences no more than anyone else ___
Never talk about his liquor preferences X

9.04.11 Is he openly proud of his native drinks and does he urge others to try them? Yes ___ No X
Is he conventionally aware of his native drinks and offer them when appropriate? Yes ___ No ___
Does he rarely mention his native drinks and not "push" them? Yes ___ No ___

162

9.04.12 Does he Pay little attention to the drinking needs of others ____
Serve drinks in a socially appropriate manner ____
Tend to force drinks on others ____

9.04.13 Compared with his colleagues, what are his drinking habits?
Markedly different ____ Very similar ____ Just the same ____
If markedly different, please explain:

9.04.14 When he has had a few drinks, his behavior shows
No noticeable change X
Some change ____
A definite change ____

If a definite change, please describe:

9.04.15 Does his manner of speaking change when he drinks?
Becomes quite slurred ____
Shows little change ____
Does not change at all X

9.04.16 When he drinks, his voice becomes
Louder ____ Quieter ____ No change X

9.04.17 Have you ever seen him truly drunk? No X Yes ____
If so, was he Socially active ____ Well-controlled ____
Boisterous ____ Poorly coordinated ____
Hostile ____ Depressed ____
Quiet, withdrawn ____ Sexually aroused ____

9.04.18 If you have not seen him drunk, would you predict that when drunk he would become
Very active ____ Very passive ____
Very unpleasant ____ Rather pleasant ____
Never become drunk X
I cannot imagine how he would act when drunk ____

9.04.19 Have you ever seen him with a hang over? No ____ Yes ____
If Yes, is he the kind of person who
Obviously looks hung over but functions fairly well ____
Looks somewhat hung over but shows it mainly in his eyes and general manner ____
Obviously looks hung over and is quite vocal about how bad he feels ____
Does not look hung over in spite of what he says ____

9.04.20 Is there anything special about his drinking habits that requires mention? If so, please describe: ____________________

9.05 Overall impression of drinking behavior: (Check the most appropriate)

9.05.01 A hearty, heavy drinker who holds his liquor well. He is always rather boisterous, and when he drinks, there is little change in behavior. ____

9.05.02 A heavy drinker who often gives the impression he can drink others under the table: When he drinks, there is little change in behavior, but there is a hint that he could get quite mean if provoked. ____

9.05.03 A steady drinker who obviously enjoys being "tight." In a way he can be somewhat charming when drunk and can get away with a bit of the "life of the party" routine. ____

9.05.04 A steady drinker who becomes somewhat more maudlin when drunk or tight. Tends to tell people how much he likes them and sometimes asks others whether they like him. Gives an impression that he could become quite disgusting if he got very drunk. ____

9.05.05 A steady drinker who holds his liquor very well. He always remains quite dignified and usually maintains his poise even though others are becoming quite drunk or tight. He still remains part of the crowd, however—that is, he gives few signs of being disgusted or bored. ____

9.05.06 A light drinker who paces his drinks. He seems to drink only because it is socially necessary. As a party progresses he tends to become aloof and distant. Is likely to continue to talk about his work even when it is inappropriate. ____

9.05.07 A light drinker who tapers off as the evening progresses. Usually manages to keep a sophisticated aloofness from others. Often singles out and associates with someone rather like himself. As the party progresses, he shows obvious distaste for anything he considers crude or boisterous. Often becomes quite sarcastic about others' behavior. ____

9.05.08 A very light drinker who either drinks only because he has to or refuses to drink at all. Is usually not really a part of the party and is obviously annoyed when others bring him in against his wishes. Tends to be solitary and sometimes will leave unobtrusively when the opportunity presents. X

9.05.09 None of these descriptions really fit.
I would describe him as:

10. Driving and Walking

10.01 Driving Behavior:

10.01.01 He drives a car in an

Unusually adept manner ____
Average or conventional manner ____
Unusually inept manner ____
He does not drive ____

10.01.02 He drives Very fast ___ Average ___ Very slow ___

10.01.03 When he drives and talks, you get the feeling
He pays little attention to his driving ___
He pays average attention to his driving ___
His driving is obviously more important than his conversation ___

10.01.04 Compared with his colleagues, his interest in foreign cars is
About the same ___ Definitely different ___

10.01.05 His interest in the care and maintenance of automobiles is
Unusual ___ Average ___ Little or none ___

10.01.06 His road courtesy is Equivalent to most of his colleagues' ___
Equivalent to the courtesy of most people I know ___
Unusual in that he is very courteous and cautious ___
Unusual in that he is rude and demanding ___

10.01.07 To the best of your knowledge, he is the kind of person who
Can learn how to get around a strange city very quickly ___
Can follow a road or city map with relative ease ___
Gets around by asking lots of questions ___
Almost always depends upon others to get him where he is going ___

10.01.08 When riding with someone else, is he the kind of person who is very much aware of the driving and responds with the driver—(goes through motions of braking, braces with changing traffic)?
No ___ Yes ___

10.01.09 When driving with someone else, is he the kind of person who seems to adapt to the style of driving in an average or appropriate manner?
No ___ Yes ___

166

10.01.10 When driving with someone else, is he the kind of person who is very relaxed and relatively indifferent to the driving?
No ____ Yes ____

10.01.11 Is he the kind of person who
Would never drive when drinking ____
Is inclined to be aware when he should not drive ____
Would always insist on driving, even when drunk ____

10.01.12 Will he offer someone a lift?
When it is appropriate ____
Almost always ____ Never ____

10.01.13 Is there anything about his manner of driving that requires special mention? If so, please describe:

10.02 Walking:

10.02.01 Is he the kind of person who
Does a great deal of walking ____
Walks an average amount ____
Never walks if he can help it ____

10.02.02 When he walks, his pace is Fast ____ Average ____ Slow ____

10.02.03 When you walk with him, he most often
Keeps pace with you ____
Forces you to keep up with him ____

10.02.04 When he walks, do his feet
Swing to the right and left (outwards) ____
Maintain a fairly parallel motion ____
Swing inward ____

10.02.05 Does he walk
Erect with head up ____
Erect with head down ____
Bent forward but eyes up ____
Bent forward with eyes down ____
In a very stooped manner ____

10.02.06 When he is walking, he looks around
A great deal ____ Average ____ Never ____

10.02.07 When he greets someone he knows on the street, his face
Lights up ____
Shows average or appropriate expression ____
Rarely changes expression ____

10.02.08 Is there anything unusual or striking about his gait or manner of walking? If so, please describe: ____

10.03 Overall impression of driving and walking behavior: (Check the most appropriate description.)

10.03.01 An active, alert individual with a purposeful stride who appears to have a very practical mind. He enjoys "fixing things," appears to have sound knowledge of automobiles, and drives in a relaxed efficient manner. ____

10.03.02 An active individual who is somewhat standoffish (or negative) toward others. His stride is fast and intent. He appears to have a practical mind, is quite possessive and protective and is reluctant to share his possessions with others. He "fixes things" in a matter-of-fact way, appears to have good knowledge of automobiles, and drives in a determined (sometimes even hostile) but efficient manner. ____

10.03.03 An active, alert individual with a free-and-easy stride who appears most of the time to be in good humor. Seldom tries to fix things, but is often quite good at getting others to fix things for him. He appears to have little knowledge of automobiles but drives in a relaxed, efficient manner. ____

10.03.04 An active individual who has a cautious tinge to his walk as though he is easily embarrassed or easily startled. He appears rather helpless and awkward when he has to "fix things." He evidently has little knowledge of automobiles and drives in a careful (sometimes tense) but efficient manner. ____

10.03.05 A well-controlled and attentive individual who walks in something of a clipped, formal manner. Although generally practical, he seldom will do anything by "feel." He must read up and prepare himself when required to "fix things." He appears to have acquired considerable knowledge about automobiles but drives in a somewhat mechanical or highly controlled manner. ____

10.03.06 A well-controlled individual who is often somewhat preoccupied even in his walk. When he takes time to "fix things" he does so with intensity and precision. He is often very well read about automobiles and cares for his car or sees that it is cared for meticulously. However, when involved in conver-

168

sation or otherwise preoccupied, he can sometimes be quite a dangerous driver. ____

10.03.07 A well-controlled individual who has a glide (or grace) in his walk. He has little or no interest in "fixing things" but usually knows the best places to get things done and is inclined to be quite particular in how things are done for him. He appears to have relatively little knowledge of the mechanics of an automobile, but appreciates and takes good care of a good automobile. He drives with confidence, but usually at a fast pace with not too much awareness of others. ____

10.03.08 A rather nervous and temperamental person who walks rapidly and rather awkwardly. He has little or no interest in "fixing things" and is inclined to ignore or throw away things that do not work. He appears to have little interest in or knowledge about automobiles and his driving shows it. It is sometimes frightening to ride with him. ____

10.03.09 None of these descriptions really fit.
I would describe him as:

10.04 Hobbies and Sports

10.04.01 Does he have any hobbies? Yes X No ____ Don't Know ____
If Yes, describe his hobbies:

Tennis

If No or Don't Know, what is your best guess on the hobby most likely to interest him?

Can't imagine him having any kind of hobby____

Collecting (What does he collect? Guns, stamps, coins, books, butterflies, etc.)

As a collector, is he Avid ___ Moderately dedicated ___ Only casual ___

Artistic (painting, ceramics, etc.) ___

Mechanical (motors, hi-fi building, etc.) ___

Skill (woodworking, model building, etc.) ___

Intellectual (special periods in history, philosophy, etc.) ___

Active (group dancing, such light sports as ping pong, bowling or volleyball) ___

Outdoor (hunting, fishing, golf, etc.) ___

Social (chess, poker, bridge, etc.) ___

Vicarious (listening to music, attending plays, ball games, etc.) ___

Mental amusement (crossword puzzles, anagrams, cryptograms) ___

10.04.02 Has he ever mentioned having had hobbies in the past? Yes ___ No ___

If Yes, give details:

10.04.03 How well does he dance? unusually good ___ good ___ average ___ poor X does not dance ___ do not know if he dances ___

10.04.04 Describe the kind of dancing you have seen him do:

Foxtrot, cumbias

10.04.05 Does he play chess? Yes ✓ No ____
If Yes, do you know he is good ____ believe he is probably good ____
know he is an average player ____ believe he is probably average ____
know he is a poor player ____ believe he is probably a poor player X

10.04.06 If you are a poker player, describe the kind of poker player you think he would be:

Fair

10.04.07 Is he the kind of person with whom you would like to play poker? Yes ____ No ____
If No, explain:

10.04.08 Have you heard him sing? Yes X No ____
If Yes, is his voice good ____ average ____ poor X

10.04.09 Does he seem to know many songs? Yes ____ No X

10.04.10 In group singing, does he often lead off with a song ____ sometimes lead off with a song ____ always follow someone else's lead X

10.04.11 Does he play a musical instrument? Yes ____ No ____
If Yes, which instrument:

10.04.12 Has he ever mentioned having played an instrument? Yes ____ No ____
If Yes, give details?

10.04.13 Does he participate in an active sports? Yes X No ____
If yes, describe:

Tennis, embassy volleyball

171

If No, what is your guess regarding the kind of sport that would interest him most:

He definitely is not the sports type ___
Body contact sports (football, rugby, soccer, etc.) ___
Skill sports (tennis, handball, volleyball, etc) ___
Individual skill sports (swimming, archery, skeet, etc.) ___
He is likely to be interested in all kinds of sports ___

10.04.14 Does he play golf? Yes___ No X
If Yes, does he take golf very seriously___ take golf in an average way___ take golf indifferently___

10.04.15 As a golfer, do you know he is good___ believe he is probably good___
know he is an average player___ believe he is probably average___
know he is a poor player___ believe he is probably a poor player___

10.04.16 If you are a golfer, is he the kind of person you would like to play with?
Yes___ No___

If No, explain:

10.04.17 Does he: hunt a great deal___ fish a great deal___ do some hunting___
do some fishing___ never hunt___ never go fishing___

10.04.18 Do you have information on how seriously he takes hunting or fishing?
Yes___ No___

If Yes, explain:

10.04.19 Has he ever mentioned participating in sports in the past? Yes X No___
If Yes, give details (include any mention he may have made of medals, trophies, team membership, etc.):

Boxing

10.04.20 Have you ever heard anyone describe him as an athlete? Yes_X_ No___
If Yes, give details:
everyone

10.04.21 Is he the kind of person who:
is very much preoccupied with keeping in shape _X_
works at keeping in shape to an average degree ___
shows little interest in keeping in shape ___

10.04.22 Has he ever indicated an interest in weight lifting? Yes___ No___
If Yes, explain:

10.04.23 He is best described as:
a muscular, athletic type_X_ a strong, well-built type___ a somewhat flabby type___ a flabby, unathletic type___ an effeminate type___

10.04.24 Is he mechanically inclined? Yes___ No___
If Yes, does he
Prefer to follow instructions in books ___
Ignore instructions and try to figure it out for himself ___

10.04.25 If it were possible to provide American magazines or periodicals for him, which of the following do you think he would really enjoy:
The New York Times___ Saturday Review___ Newsweek___
Playboy_X_ Sports Illustrated_X_ Life___ Atlantic___
Field and Stream___ Popular Mechanics___ New Republic___
Better Homes and Gardens___ Readers Digest___
Kenyon Review___ Ramparts___ Scientific American___
Christian Science Monitor___

Can't imagine him reading an American magazine___

10.04.26 What books, if any, have you heard him mention as having read and enjoyed?

10.04.27 What movies, if any, have you heard him mention as having seen and enjoyed?

10.04.28 If he had his choice, would he most likely attend:
a movie ___ the theater ___ the ballet ___
a soccer match _X_ a bull fight ___ a concert ___

10.05 Office Behavior

10.05.01 General Information (Check where applicable)

Informal ___
Formal ___
Follower of rules and regulations ___
An innovator ___
Doer ___
Practical ___
Procrastinator ___
Big memo writer ___

Delegates work ___
Can't delegate ___
Productive ___
Thinker type ___
Organized ___
Disorganized ___
Feels work is not appreciated ___

10.05.02 Reaction of Other Workers

Subordinates	Yes	No	Don't Know
Like him	___	___	___
Dislike him	___	___	___
He is courteous to them	___	___	___
Worries about them	___	___	___
Couldn't care less	___	___	___
They fear him	___	___	___
Believe he is just	___	___	___
He takes credit for their work			
Gives credit where due	___	___	___
See him socially	___	___	___

174

Superiors			
Trust his judgment	___	___	___
Like him	___	___	___
Dislike him	___	___	___
Delegate responsibility to him	___	___	___
See him socially	___	___	___

IV. EMOTIONAL SET

11. Temperament and Humor

11.01 Temperament:

11.01.01 In his relations with others would you consider him
Shy ___
Guarded X
Conventional and correct ___
Outgoing ___
Warm ___

11.01.02 Is his conversational style
Awkward ___ Comfortable ___
Hesitant X Easy ___
Contrived ___ Conventional ___ Voluble ___

11.01.03 His manner of relating to women is
About the same as with men ___
More correct and controlled than with men ___
More warm and relaxed than with men X

11.01.04 In general, do you think he is a person who
Loses his temper easily ___
Has a quick temper but holds it well ___
Has a normal temper X
Has an even temper and is rarely ruffled ___
Has an unusual amount of tolerance and would almost never lose his temper ___

11.01.05 Have you ever seen him lose his temper? No ___ Yes ___
If Yes, give a short description of the incident, including how he reacted.

175

11.02 **Humor:**

11.02.01 Is he a person whom you
Have never seen tease anyone ____
Have frequently seen tease someone ____
Cannot imagine ever teasing anyone ____
Consider his tendency to tease like that of most people X

11.02.02 Is he a person
Who obviously cannot take teasing ____
Whom most people enjoy teasing ____
Whom most people would never consider teasing ____
Who obviously likes to be teased ____

11.02.03 His sense of humor is
About like that of most people ____
Notably absent ____ Clever ____ Subtle ____
Dry ____ Heavy X Crude ____

11.02.04 Does he tell jokes and anecdotes?
Never ____
Sometimes ____
Frequently X

11.02.05 As a story teller, he is Very good ____ Average ____ Poor X

11.02.06 Is he more inclined to tell a story
To a group of people X
Quietly to a friend or acquaintance ____
Only when encouraged ____

11.03 Overall impression of temperament and sense of humor:
(Check the most appropriate description.)

11.03.01 He is a hearty, hale fellow who laughs with gusto and pleasure. His humor is forthright, not subtle, and although he is sometimes loud, he is rarely unpleasant or objectionable. Most of the time, his good humor is contagious. ____

11.03.02 He is a hearty fellow who, when he laughs, does so with considerable gusto. However, he is frequently dour and sometimes intolerant and somewhat humorless. His humor is direct, even crude, and at times, inappropriate. He tends to be the kind of person who laughs more at people than with people. X

11.03.03 He is a good-humored fellow who sometimes can be considered jolly and carefree. His humor is clever and well timed. He is quite sensitive to the moods and feelings of others and often can do a good job appropriately livening up a party. Although something of a tease, he is never cruel or insensitive. ___

11.03.04 He is generally a rather quiet and somewhat complacent person who, at times, can be surprisingly gay and carefree. However, when gay, he sometimes overdoes it and causes some strain for those around him. His humor is often clever but he can be quite sarcastic and even biting on occasion.

11.03.05 He is an urbane fellow, generally quite conventional and appropriate. He does not necessarily appear to be a humorless person, but he seldom displays his sense of humor. It is sometimes difficult to tell whether he is in a good humor, because of the way he covers or controls his feelings. His humor is more studied than spontaneous yet it is never crude or inappropriate. ___

11.03.06 He is a dour and humorless person, always serious and intense. It is difficult to joke around him partly because he is not responsive and partly because he seems to disapprove. ___

11.03.07 He is a sensitive, sophisticated fellow with a subtle wit. He can be quite charming and amusing in the right sort of setting. However, there is something of an aristocratic quality to his sense of humor and he can be quite condescending towards people who do not understand or appreciate his sense of humor. ___

11.03.08 He is an arty, somewhat cynical person who can be quite flippant at times. His humor tends to be a bit far out. He seems to have private jokes he shares with intimates. It is sometimes difficult to tell whether he is being amusing or subtly hostile. ___

11.03.09 None of these fit. I would describe him as:

177

12. Sexual Attitudes

12.01 General:

12.01.01 Are his attitudes about sex

Very obscure ___
Difficult to determine ___
About average for his culture and background ___
Clearly uninterested ___
Indifferent ___
Clearly interested X

12.01.02 In the presence of women, he is

Stilted ___ Conventional ___
Flirtatious X Vulgar ___
Hostile ___ Indifferent ___

12.01.03 Does he go to "girlie" shows

Often ___ Never ___
Sometimes with a group ___
Can't imagine him ever going ___
I have no idea what he thinks of "girlie" shows ___

12.01.04 Does he, in the presence of male companions, talk about sex?

Often X Sometimes ___
Rarely ___ Never ___

12.01.05 Is there any change in his sexual behavior and/or attitudes after he has been drinking? Yes ___ No ___ Have no idea ___

If Yes, describe the change:

12.01.06 Do you have any idea how he feels about prostitutes?
Yes ___
No ___

12.01.07 If No, do you think he is the type who would go to a prostitute ___
Cannot imagine him visiting a prostitute ___
Have nothing to base an opinion on ___

12.01.08 If Yes, is he
Obviously negativistic toward prostitutes ___
Indifferent toward prostitutes ___
Interested in prostitutes ___

12.01.09 In his relations with women, does he
Generally act in accordance with his age and experience ___
Generally act somewhat immature and inappropriate for his age and experience ___
Show considerable facility and poise X
Show considerable uneasiness or awkwardness ___

12.01.10 In describing an attractive woman, is he most likely to mention
Her hair ___ Breasts ___
Eyes ___ Clothes ___
Figure X Personality ___
Legs ___ Have no idea ___

12.01.11 Have you ever heard him described in any way by a woman? Yes X
If Yes, what did she say? No ___

athletic, virile, manly.

12.02 Overall impression: Which of the following best describes him?

12.02.01 He is an earthy, lusty man who shows little embarrassment about sex. He treats women appropriately, but makes little effort to conceal his admiration and attraction. He appears virile and self-confident with women, and most women seem to like it. X

12.02.02 He is an earthy, lusty man who on occasion can be crude or even vulgar. He treats women rather harshly, and can become quite pushy when attracted to a woman. He seems to be very proud of his virility. Many women would be offended or rebuffed by his aggressiveness, but this does not seem to bother him. ___

12.02.03 He is a somewhat sensual, rather soft man who is very considerate of women. He is prone to hold a woman's hand overly long when talking to her and frequently puts his arms around women he admires. He often uses flattery and compliments but does so rather graciously. Most women usually like his attentiveness.

12.02.04 He is a sensual person, but is embarrassed and insecure about it. He is a rather soft man who tries hard to be inoffensive. However, he will frequently follow attractive women with his eyes when he thinks no one is looking. He is also prone to brush against or touch women "accidentally" whenever he gets a chance.

12.02.05 He is a self-confident, rather polished person who is proper and conventional with either men or women. He is always considerate and polite with all women and it is difficult to ascertain what his sexual attitudes and interests might be. In a group, he always behaves according to protocol and usually can be quite efficient in doing so.

12.02.06 He is a self-confident and precise person who has something of the air of a professional man about him. He is polite, almost to a fault, and is inclined to go out of his way to light a woman's cigarette or see that she is properly taken care of. Nevertheless, he shows considerable distance in his relations with women. Sometimes his formality is out of place, but he will rarely, if ever, change his manners or procedures to fit the situation.

12.02.07 He is a charming, urbane person and both friendly and sophisticated. He deals with women in a cultured way but shows little sensuality or sexual inappropriateness. He is neat, even dapper, and can be quite fastidious. Most of his relations with women appear to be quite platonic. He is the kind of person who likely has several very close friends who are women.

12.02.08 He is a somewhat shy and indifferent person whom some people consider odd or unusual. He shows little or no interest in women in public. In general, he is a preoccupied person who only seeks out people with similar interests. There is an ascetic, asexual air about him most of the time.

12.02.09 None of these fit. I would describe him as:

180

V. FAMILY SET

13. Marital Status

13.01 Is he married? [✓ Yes] No

13.01.01 Is his wife with him? [✓ Yes] No

13.01.02 Does his wife go out socially with him:
Never [✓ Seldom] Average Often

13.01.03 Is his wife: [✓ older than he] about his age
younger than he can't tell

13.01.04 Is his wife: unusually attractive [✓ attractive to an average degree]
unusually unattractive

13.01.05 Generally speaking, is his wife: socially poised
[✓ socially adequate]
socially gauche

13.01.06 What languages other than her native language does his wife speak? Spanish

13.01.07 Is his wife: [✓ better educated than he]
educated about the same less educated

13.01.08 Has he been married before: Yes No
If yes, give details if known: [✓ Can't tell]

13.02 Does his wife seem to: have many friends a few friends
[✓ almost no friends]

13.02.01 In public, is he: very attentive to his wife
appropriately attentive to his wife
[✓ indifferent towards his wife]

13.02.02 In public, is his wife: very attentive to him
appropriately attentive to him
[✓ indifferent to him]

13.02.03 Would you characterize his wife as:
aggressive domineering independent
complacent [✓ submissive] dependent

13.02.04 In the area in which she lives, does she appear to be:
very satisfied____ normally satisfied _X_ very dissatisfied____

13.03 Have you been to their home? Yes____ No _X_
If Yes, how often?

13.03.01 Are their living quarters: unusually nice for the area ____
typical of the area ____
unusually poor for the area ____

13.03.02 Are they, as a couple: unusually good hosts____ good hosts ____
adequate hosts____ somewhat inadequate hosts____
unusually poor hosts ____

13.03.03 Does the wife seem: very comfortable as a hostess____
adequate as a hostess____ somewhat tense as a hostess____
very uncomfortable as a hostess____

13.03.04 Are their living quarters: a reflection of his personality ____
a reflection of both their personalities ____
a reflection of neither of their personalities ____

13.03.05 In general, their furnishings are: unusually drab ____
conventional____ Unusually nice ____

13.03.06 Is his wife: obviously very interested in her home ____
about as interested in her home as most women in the area ____
obviously very uninterested in her home ____
cannot really tell whether she is interested or not ____

13.03.07 Is her social behavior at home:
about the same as when away from home ____
more comfortable than away from home ____
less comfortable ____

13.03.08 Under ordinary circumstances, are they:
the kind of people who entertain often and like it ____
the kind of people who meet their social obligations and rather enjoy it ____
the kind of people who enjoy entertaining only close friends ____
the kind of people who entertain only when they have to ____
the kind of people who really dislike to entertain ____

13.04 Does he ever criticize his wife: Yes____ No____
If so, what is he most likely to criticize:

182

13.04.01 In general, as a couple are they: obviously very compatible ____
as compatible as most ____ obviously not very compatible __X__

13.04.02 Is he inclined to: never appear jealous of her ____
rarely appear jealous of her __X__
often appear jealous of her ____

13.04.03 Is she inclined to: never appear jealous of him ____
rarely appear jealous of him __X__
often appear jealous of him ____

13.04.04 Is there anything about his wife that deserves special mention or description?

13.05 As a husband, he is best described as:

____ An outgoing man who obviously is the dominant partner in the marriage. He is protective of his wife and always includes her when possible in his social activities.

____ An active man who is authoritarian and dominant as a husband. He is possessive of his wife and tends to be demanding in their relationship.

____ An outgoing man who is quite dependent upon his wife. She tends to be the more dominant partner and he seems to like it and expect it.

____ An active but somewhat surly man who is obviously very dependent upon his wife but will rarely admit it. He may have some tendency to be jealous and possessive about his wife.

____ A conventional husband who treats his wife with respect. He rarely shows his feelings in public. It is difficult to tell how he really feels about her.

____ A conscientious husband who takes his marriage quite seriously. His wife is obviously part of the team and they both take family and social responsibilities seriously.

____ A socially active man who can be quite charming with the ladies even when his wife is present. They both seem to lead separate but quite compatible lives.

____ A quiet man who is obviously very dependent upon his wife. She looks after him rather unostentatiously but it is obvious that she has considerable influence on his behavior and attitudes.

__X__ None of these fit, he is best described as:
dominant partner. Independent of wife. Indifferent to here needs

13.06 **Household:**
Is he concerned about the appearance or functioning of the household? Yes___ No___
Does he make minor repairs himself? Yes___ No___
If Yes, Fairly competently___ Awkwardly___

14. Children

14.01 Does he have any children. Yes_X_ No___

14.01.01 How many _2_ What ages _10+18_ Sex of children _male + fem._

14.01.02 Are all the children with him? Yes___ No_X_
If not, where are they?
Girl / Moscow

14.01.03 Does he: pay unusual attention to his children ___
pay normal attention to his children _X_
pay little attention to his children ___

14.01.04 Is his wife: an unusually attentive mother ___
an average mother _X_
an unusually unattentive mother ___

14.01.05 Are the children: unusually well behaved ___
normally well behaved _X_
unusually rowdy or difficult ___

14.01.06 Does he: never talk about his children ___ rarely talk about his children ___
talk about his children as normal and appropriate _X_
frequently talk about his children ___
seem quite preoccupied about his children ___

14.01.07 Are any of his children unusual in any way (frequent illness, allergies, mentally defective, crippled or deformed, unusually bright, etc.)
Yes___ No_X_
If yes, describe circumstances:

14.02 When his wife and family are away, he is:
obviously very lonely and at loose ends ____
unlikely to vary his routine ____
likely to become more active and socially aggressive __X__
have no idea ____

14.03 As a father, he is best described as:
____ An active, happy family man who is proud of his family.
____ An active family man who is inclined to be strict and demanding with his children.
____ An active family man who spends a great deal of time with his family. He tends to spoil his children.
____ An active but insecure family man who worries a good deal about his children.
____ An active, responsible father, but has a no-nonsense attitude. His work comes first and his family knows it.
____ A careful, responsible father who is conscientious about his family but not particularly warm or demonstrative.
__X__ A carefree father who takes his family for granted. Most of the time they fend for themselves and do a pretty good job of it.
____ An indifferent father, who sometimes seems oblivious of his family.
____ None of these fit, he is best described as:

14.04 Does he carry pictures of his family____ wife____ children____ himself____

14.05 In his office or room, does he display pictures of his family____ wife____ children____ himself____

14.06 Is there anything about his relations with wife or family that requires special mention or description?

VI. IDEOLOGICAL SET

15. General

15.01 In general:

X He is a man with forthright and obvious opinions. He is capable of expressing these opinions with little apparent regard for the feelings and attitudes of others.

____ He is a man with many prejudices and dogmatic ideas. He can express them with heat and determination when necessary.

____ He is a man who is likely to turn aside controversial opinions with flippancy or humor. It is sometimes difficult to determine his opinions because it is hard to get him really serious.

____ He is a man who may have many strong opinions but it is difficult for him to show them. He is apologetic, diffident and often uncomfortable when an argument is in the offing.

____ He is a man whose true opinions are difficult to determine. He is usually diplomatic and conventional when controversial subjects or taboo subjects are discussed.

____ He is a man who is serious and determined to be proper and conventional. He has the manner of a well disciplined person who only says what he is supposed to say or expected to say.

____ He is a man who has quite sophisticated opinions. He is well read, capable of considerable articulate argument, but at times can be quite cynical or subtlely sarcastic.

____ He is a man who is shy or taciturn about his opinions. It is very hard to get him to open up on any subject, particularly if it is controversial.

____ Noneof these fit, he is best described as:

15.01.01 Is there any subject that tends to get his dander up? Yes____ No____
If so, what is it?

15.02 Is he a man whose patriotism:
- [✓ is obvious and intense]
- is like that of most of his colleagues ____
- is guarded and not too intense ____
- is difficult to determine ____

15.02.01 On general political issues, is he:
- unusually well informed on his country's position and attitudes ____
- [✓ as informed as most of his colleagues]
- unusually poorly informed ____

187

VII. MEDICAL

16. State of Health:

16.01 To your knowledge, does he have any sort of health problem?
Yes___ No X

If Yes, please explain:

16.02 Does his wife or children have any sort of health problem?
Yes X No___

If Yes, please explain:

wife = ?

16.03 Has he ever indicated that he had health problems in the past?
Yes___ No X

If Yes, please explain:

16.04 To your knowledge, does he regularly take pills or medication of any kind?
Yes___ No X

If Yes, please explain:

16.05 Is he the kind of person who: Never talks about his health or how he feels ___ Talks about his health and feelings to an average degree X Frequently talks about his health and feelings ___

16.06 When he feels bad: It is obvious to others ___ It is obvious to an average degree ___ Most people would never know it X Have never known him to feel bad ___

16.07 In appearance, he looks Robust and healthy __X__ Essentially like most people his age ____ Unhealthy ____

16.08 Does he have A flushed face ____ A pot belly ____ A tendency to breathe hard with exertion ____ Cold clammy hands ____ A tendency to sweat to any unusual degree ____ Foul breath ____

16.09 To your knowledge, does he adhere to a special diet or health regimen?
Yes____ No____
If Yes, please explain:

16.10 As an overall impression, does he strike you as a person who is
Highly energetic and tireless __X__
Energetic, but in spurts ____
Moderately energetic ____
Lethargic, listless ____

16.11 Is there anything about the state of his health or his family's health that warrants further comment?

14-00000

189

DISPATCH	SECRET	HMMA-36439

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO : Chief, SB Division

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

REDCOAT

SUBJECT: Subject of 201-238943

References: A. MEXICO CITY 8281
B. MEXICO CITY 8545

1. On 29 January 1969, Samuel J. KARTASUK met with Subject to deliver the recruitment pitch as advised by Refs. Subject initially refused to cooperate on the grounds that he does not want to get involved in this type of business and that he had given the same answer to "the other side." He readily admitted that he has been under intensive development by Valentin LOGINOV (201-285412) to spot Mexican students who eventually may go to WOLADY; he denied, however, that he has ever accepted the money LOGINOV continually offers him. Subject volunteered that Yuriy CHERNYSH (201-825743) is currently developing one of Subject's students (which we knew), and that Subject would like to foil CHERNYSH's attempt.

2. In spite of Subject's expressions of reluctance to be recruit- he answered a number of questions put to him by KARTASUK and he agreed to a follow-up meeting on 7 February. At that meeting, he submitted to more intensive questioning about his background, family, and his association with the FJSTEAL community. There were no attempts at evasion and many of his answers were corroborated by information that was already known from other sources. Subject agreed to continue meeting clandestinely with KARTASUK and to provide additional information on his contacts with LOGINOV and other members of the KGB.

3. Subject's activities immediately following the pitch were monitored closely by LIEMBRACE and by LIFEAT for the week between the two meetings. The second meeting was counter-surveilled with negative results. Although the recruitment is still tenuous, we believe that it can be firmly cemented and that Subject is committed whether or not he is ready to admit it to himself at this point.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
2 - C/SB

CS COPY

201-285412
201-825743

HMMA-36439

12 February 1969

SECRET

201-238943

201-285412

190

Valeri V.Kostikov, I have met him but I do not know him much.

Valentin Longuinov, in charge of consular affairs, his wife Alexandra has been an skating star, both and friendly very nice, speak very good Spanis. and fair English. Their daughter Kirina, sixteen years old, very sophisticated, came here for a holiday. The only child of that age we have ever seen here. They have another child, who is in Moscow. Both have been at our house for a party. In general soviet people come alone, leaving thw wives behind. Longuinov with an exception.

Dmitri Prygov, wife Natalia, have an small child born here, he has been writing a book on the Mexican revolution. We are fairly good friends. He was introduced to me by Boris Kazantsev who invited me for lunch for the ocasion. When we go to the Soviet embassy both he and Tchmykhov are always very attentive.

I know several other people from the Soviet embassy but really I could not place them together with their names.

Extract from HMMA-36436, 12/2/69 (Redtop Ops)

201-285412

14-00000

191

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 3 PER

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

478

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 125

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

TING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 300030Z JAN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 8912

DIRECTOR

REDTOP

30 JAN 69 IN 82257
M

REF: DIRECTOR 69779

1. RAISA KISELNIKOVA WORKS AND LIVES AT THE SOVIET COMMERCIAL OFFICE WHICH IS ALSO THE RESIDENCE OF THE COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR, VIKTOR M. IVANOV. PER LILYRIC SHE ONLY VISITS THE SOVEMB ABOUT ONCE A WEEK DURING WORKING HOURS. HOWEVER, SEVEN TIMES SINCE HER ARRIVAL SHE HAS COME TO THE EMBASSY DRIVING THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE'S DUTY VEHICLE, NORMALLY DRIVEN BY THE MEXICAN CHAUFFEUR. WE CONSIDER IT MOST UNUSUAL FOR A SECRETARY TO DRIVE.

2. SHE SPEAKS GOOD SPANISH AND INVARIABLY KNOWS MEXICAN CALLERS AND THEIR BUSINESS AT THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE. SHE USUALLY HAS IMMEDIATE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS INCLUDING ADDRESSES OF VARIOUS SOVIET TRADE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE USSR. WITH SOVIETS SHE IS USUALLY PLEASANT BUT IS CURT AND SHARP WITH ANYONE ~~WH~~ WHO ~~X5XIROXPXCXXX~~ TRYS TO PUSH HER AROUND. TWO MEXICAN CONTACTS OF THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE HAVE ASKED HER ~~STO PUSHE~~ ~~XXXXXXX~~ FOR DATES. SHE REFUSED THEM BOTH. ONE PERSISTED WITH SEVERAL CALLS. SHE FINALLY ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ TOLD HIM SHE PREFERRED TO SPEND HER TIME WITH HER SOVIET FRIENDS. A FEW OF THE SOVIET MALES, PARTICULARLY VALENTIN S. LOGINOV, FLIRT

SECRET 201-585412

14-00000

192

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8912 SECRET

WITH HER WHEN CALLING FOR OTHER PURPOSES. SHE IS PLEASANT BUT UNENCOURAGING. SHE DOES NOT TALK WITH THE OTHER FEMALE SECRETARY, LYUDMILLA SHAPOVALOVA WHICH IS UNUSUAL SINCE THE TWO FEMALE SECRETARIES HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN FRIENDS. SHAPOVALOVA WAS VERY FRIENDLY WITH KISELNIKOV'S PREDECESSOR. HER ONLY CONVERSATION WITH ANOTHER SOVIET, OTHER THAN ROUTINE ADMINSTRATIVE MATTERS, WAS TO MAKE A DATE WITH THE WIFE OF THE COOK, ALEKSEY M. KUZNETSOV, TO GO TO THE MOVIES ONCE. THERE IS NO GOSSIP ABOUT HER AMONGST SOVIET WIVES. SOURCE: LIENVOY AND LIFEAT.

3. SHE IS FAIRLY ATTRACTIVE WITH A STATUESQUE FIGURE WHICH EXPLAINS WHY MEXICANS WOULD WANT DATES AND LOGINOV FLIRTS WITH HER.

4. PER CURRENT INFO ONLY ACCESS TO HER WOULD BE LEGITIMATE CONTINUOUS VISITOR TO COMMERCIAL OFFICE WHICH IS NOT ENCOURAGING SINCE TWO HAVE ALREADY STRUCK OUT. SINCE CURRENT ASSETS TELL US NOTHING ABOUT HER CONTACTS OR PERSONAL LIFE, STATION WILL PUT SPORADIC LIEMBRACE COVERAGE ON COMMERCIAL OFFICE AFTER WORKING HOURS IN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE HER ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE WORK. HOWEVER, SINCE OFFICE IS ON QUIET STREET WITH SOVIET SCHOOL NEXT DOOR AND SEVERAL SOVIET FAMILIES IN NEIGHBORHOOD, LIEMBRACE COVERAGE CANNOT BE CONTINUOUS.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE VR.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 8912 SECRET

5. FILE: 201-835670.

SECRET — svc'd for possible missing portion.

NANANBXENZXX

SECRET

14-00000

194

ORIG: Chas. V. Holt/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 31 December 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 WH
2 CI
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 26 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA
CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 31 22 30 DEC 68 CITE DIRECTOR 62610

TO MEXICO CITY

REDCOAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 8545 (IN 61160)*

1. SUBJECT'S LONG RESIDENCE IN SOVIET UNION AND CLOSE CONTACT WITH SOVIET OFFICIAL CONSTITUTES UNRESOLVED DEROGATORY INFORMATION AND IS DISQUALIFYING FOR ~~CLEARANCE~~ POA PURPOSES.

2. IT IS REQUESTED THAT DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJECT BE CONTINUED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF CSI-F 10-5, PARA 18, WHICH PROVIDES FOR USE AS HOSTILE UNTIL BONA FIDES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED THROUGH FURTHER ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE. REQUEST PROGRESS REPORTING ON DEVELOPMENTS ON THESE ASPECTS.

3. SUGGEST ~~THERE~~ THESE CONSIDERATIONS BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FUTURE AS STATION PURSUES ITS PROGRAM OF EXPANSION OF ACCESS AGENTS

4. FILE: 201-238943 AND 201-285412.

END OF MESSAGE

201-285412

WH COMMENT: *Priority POA requested in order to permit continued development toward recruitment. Subject is being considered for use as access agent to Valentin LOGINOV, Soviet Embassy Officer and known member of KGB.

CI/OA
CI/OPS/WH F. [illegible]
SB/X/WH L. [illegible]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

W. J. KAUFM
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY

Loginov

14-00000

195

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION C IFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2 R NG AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY _______ AT _______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO _______

X-REF TO FILE NO _______

DISSEM BY 33 PER _______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB 8, CI/OA,

#968

S E C R E T 262202Z DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8545

DIRECTOR

26 DEC 68 IN 61160

REDCOAT

REFS A. HMMA 35717

B. MEXICO CITY 3281 (IN 46766)

C. HMMA 36050

1. REQUEST HQS EXPEDITE PRIORITY POA FOR SUBJECT 201-238943 PER REFS A AND B.

2. LIOVAL-1 ADVISES SUBJECT RAPIDLY APPROACHING MARTIAL CRISIS REPORTED REF C. STATION WOULD LIKE TO REINTRODUCE SAMUEL J. KARTASUK FOR RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT BEFORE HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT COOLS AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE PSYCHOLOGICAL LOW POINT WHICH SHOULD APPEAR ON LIFEAT.

3. FILE: 201-238943 AND 201-285412.

S E C R E T

201-285412

SECRET

196

re LOGINOV -

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO. Chief, SB Division

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz (201-238943)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
References: A. MEXICO CITY 8281
B. HMMA-35717, 28 October 1968

Summary

1. As reported by Ref A, Samuel J. KARTASUK succeeded in meeting with Subject in Acapulco and in spending nearly a full week with him for the purpose of establishing rapport and assessing him for possible recruitment per Ref B. Assessment by both KARTASUK and LIOVAL-1 indicates that Subject is essentially apolitical with attitudes as pro-West as pro-Soviet. KARTASUK believes, however, that he could be recruited to work against FJSTEAL intelligence if he were made to believe that he is not working against the FJSTEAL people.

2. Recent LIFEAT reveals that Subject is having marital problems and that he consented to see a psychiatrist after his wife made good her threats to leave. According to Subject, he was diagnosed as "psychopathic" with problems stemming from his mother's possessive attitude. The character assessment by KARTASUK agrees with that of LIOVAL-1 but neither has called Subject "psychopathic."

3. While we recognize possible problems, we feel that a recruitment attempt should be made by KARTASUK. Following the recruitment we plan to have KARTASUK sever further relationship with Subject and to handle the case from inside where it can be monitored more closely.

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
2 - C/SB

LOGINOV

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-36050

DATE
17 December 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-136/3 201-285412
201-238943

197

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-36060

Meeting

4. As reported previously, KARTASUK went to Acapulco in early November and succeeded in meeting Subject, whose plans for a vacation there with his family were confirmed by LIFEAT. The "chance meeting" came about naturally in the hotel lobby when Subject's precocious four year old daughter approached KARTASUK on the morning of 5 November.

5. KARTASUK used an alias and played the role of a successful public relations man from WOLADY who was recently widowed. He had come to Mexico as a long-term tourist to help piece together his shattered world. There was instant rapport between KARTASUK and both Subject and his wife which permitted him to spend almost the entire week alone with them. As a result, KARTASUK got to know them intimately and to probe naturally into Subject's character, politics, and family relationship.

Assessment

6. To both KARTASUK and LIOVAL-1, Subject appears to be essentially apolitical or, at least, politically naive. He expresses simultaneously admiration for both FJSTEAL, where he lived for 17 years, and for WOLADY, where he would like to live. He believes that the political system in each is right for each and that neither system would work for the other. He feels that both the FJSTEAL and WOLADY citizens want peace and are basically good but that both are victims of their political systems. Although Subject wanted at one time to return to FJSTEAL, he knows that he has a better life in Mexico.

7. Subject is an easy-going, extremely pleasant extrovert with a wide circle of friends whom he sees frequently. He has few scruples in regard to marital fidelity and, while his wife isnot happy with his affairs, they have apparently arrived at some sort of working agreement on the subject.

8. Subject has told both KARTASUK and LIOVAL-1 that he earns about $4000 (MN) per month and is, therefore, forced to live on a modest scale. While he would like to live better, he is not ambitious and does not let work interfere with pleasure. LIOVAL-1 feels that Subject would find easy money a great temptation, that Subject could be influenced fairly easily, and that principles would not stand in his way.

9. With KARTASUK, Subject spoke of his mother on several occasions. He accuses her ofpossessiveness and claims that it is for this reason that he rebels against anyone's possessing him, including his wife. This problem is apparently genuine as confirmed by LIFEAT in recent take. Subject consented to psychiatric treatment when his wife made good her threat to leave him (though she returned after several days). Per LIFEAT, Subject said that he has been diagnosed as psychopathic and that the psychiatrist lays the blame at his mother's feet.

Conclusions

10. LIOVAL-1 has assessed Subject since early March 1968 and KARTASUK assessed him during a week of uninterrupted close association. Both assessments are virtually identical in all major respects. There is little doubt that Subject does, indeed, have some personality adjustment problems and that, if he is recruited, he will require firm handling. Neither KARTASUK nor LIOVAL-1, however, describes Subject as "psychopathic."

7198

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-36050

11. KARTASUK believes there is a reasonably good possibility that Subject would consent to recruitment, if the approach were made in such a way as to make him believe that he is working against PJSTEAL intelligence meddling and not against the PJSTEAL people and system. Additionally, we believe it may be possible to introduce stability into Subject's life, to give him firm direction and goals, and to turn some of his liabilities into assets.

12. Following successful recruitment by KARTASUK, the case will be handled by an inside case officer so that developments can be monitored more closely through other assets and the risk reduced.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

199

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 76 ______ PER ______

LASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 78

S **SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2	Wt	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB 8, CI/IC 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2

MT 128

S E C R E T 032345Z DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8281

DIRECTOR

4 DEC 68 IN 46766

20

REDCOAT

REF: HMMA-35717

1. DURING WEEK OF 3 NOVEMBER, SAMUEL J. KARTASUK ARRANGED CHANCE MEETING IN ACAPULCO WITH SUBJECT OF REF WHOSE VACATION PLANS WERE CONFIRMED BY LIFEAT. USING ALIAS AND PLAYING ROLE OF LONG TERM WOLADY TOURIST WITH SIMILAR SPANISH BACKGROUND. KARTASUK SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING SOLID FRIENDSHIP AND OBTAINED FAVORABLE PERSONAL ASSESSMENT DURING NEARLY FULL WEEK WITH SUBJECT AND WIFE.

2. PLAN HAVE KARTASU ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT SUBJECT AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO REPORT ON SUBJECT OF 201-285412, HIS OTHER FJSTEAL CONTACTS AND SPANISH COMMUNIST COMMUNITY IN MEXICO. FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL RECRUITMENT, CASE WILL BE HANDLED BY INSIDE CASE OFFICER.

LOGINOV

3. REQUEST STATUS OF POA FOR SUBJECT REF AND THAT IT BE HANDLED ON PRIORITY BASIS WITH CABLE NOTIFICATION TO STATION.

4. FILE: 201-238943 AND 201-285412.

S E C R E T

201-285412
Loginov

SECRET

14-00000

200

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION	
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP AEKICK - Valentin S. LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith is a report prepared by Keith R. LEVENDERIS which details how LOGINOV used Erast G. GAZIYEV (201-795374) to spot and set up a meeting for assessment purposes with Jorge *ARIAS Buerba, a teacher at the Mexican North American Cultural Institute in Mexico City. The Soviets have long had an interest in the Institute and its personnel because most of newly arrived Americans study Spanish there. GAZIYEV has attended the Institute since his arrival in Mexico, first studying Spanish and then English.

2. We are forwarding this report because it is a typical illustration of LOGINOV's modus operandi and because it clearly shows that GAZIYEV at least has the status of a KGB cooptee.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Report

Distribution:
2 - C/SB, w/att.
2 - C/WH, w/att.

MICROFILMED
FEB 25 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

~~MICROFILMED~~
~~DEC 3 1968~~
~~DOC. MICRO. SER.~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1 Att (h/w)

CS COPY

201-285412 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
B 201-795374 w/att.	HMMA-35846	18 November 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-285412

201

C/SB
~~COS~~
~~DCOS~~

DC
SB/F
SB/Sec

MICROFILMED
FEB 25 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Index

13/P

12 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

CARDED

SUBJECT: Jorge ARIAS Buerba

NO 201

DOB 42 CIT MEXICO B MEXICO, MEXICO City

1. Subject is a ~~26~~ year old Mexican citizen (although he looks to be in his 30's). He is a occ Spanish teacher at the Mexican-North American Institute and since the fall of 1967 has held a second job as the director of the Community Services Program at the American School. In April 1967 he married an American citizen from the Chicago area named Donna WEINTHALLER (phonetic). They live at Juanacatlan 15, which is just around the corner from the Soviet Embassy. Home phone is 15-28-49.

teaches at the Mexican

2. Subject was recommended as a Spanish tutor in August 1966 by Enrique GUTIERREZ Martinez (P-12667), who was then C/SB's Spanish tutor. GUTIERREZ was subsequently recruited by C/SB as a utility agent, but has since been dropped because he is related to other Station assets. On GUTIERREZ's recommendation, I began taking private Spanish lessons from Subject in August 1966. I found Subject an excellent teacher and continued taking lessons from him until December 1966. In March 1967, my wife and I had Subject as a teacher in Spanish courses we took at the Mexican-North American Institute. I have maintained intermittent social contact with Subject since March 1967, and my wife has become friendly with Subject's wife, having visited her at her apartment two or three times and having had her to our home during the day an equal number of times. I have also

MICROFILMED
1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Files: P-12671 P-11762 P-12667

COPIES MADE

H/watt #1 to HMMA-35846 CS COPY 201-285412

202

kept informed to some extent about Subject through his younger brother, Javier ARIAS Buerba, from whom I have been taking Spanish lessons since July 1967.

3. Subject was a casual contact of Station officer Olivia C. RAGNITY in 1965 and 1966. Other than a file card noting this contact, there are no Station traces on either Jorge or Javier ARIAS Buerba.

4. Subject and I from the beginning have had a very friendly and informal relationship. He is an intelligent person with a friendly, open personality and a good sense of humor. Politically, he is pro-American to the point that he magnifies our strengths and positive qualities and tends to minimize or overlook negative factors in our society. Subject knows I am with the Political Section of the Embassy and that I have been in the Soviet Union. We have consequently gotten onto the topic of Russians and Communism several times, and he has always come out a strong anti-Communist. He has one brother and two sisters living in the United States. The brother is married to an American and lives in Virginia, where he is in the construction business. One of the sisters is also married to an American and lives in California (I believe San Francisco). The second sister is married to a Polish immigrant and lives with him in Chicago. The sister in California is a naturalized American citizen. The brother and the sister in Chicago are not.

5. On 24 April 1967, LIENVOY reported the following call from GAZIYEV to LOGINOV:

GAZ: "I saw him, he arrived yesterday."

203

LOG: "Excellent. Then I'd like to see you to discuss certain things."

GAZ: "Then I can come there tomorrow?"

LOG: "No, better Wednesday."

GAZ: "All right. He usually comes there at 6 o'clock. He got married and came here with his wife. Now they look for an apartment. I'll go there on the 10th, because I want to attend courses in English. This week I'll be busy."

LOG: "OK, until the next then."

6. From this conversation, it appeared that GAZIYEV was probably talking about Subject, since:

(a) GAZIYEV had been taking Spanish at the Mexican-North American Institute and I knew from Subject that Subject had had GAZIYEV in one of his classes, that Subject occasionally chatted with GAZIYEV after class, and that GAZIYEV had once given Subject an invitation to a Consular night at the Soviet Embassy (although Subject told me he had not gone).

(b) Subject had gotten married that month.

(c) Subject had just returned to Mexico with his bride.

(d) Subject and his wife were looking for an apartment.

(e) Subject normally arrived at the Institute at 1800 to teach evening Spanish classes.

7. Prior to this reported telephone conversation, I had considered using Subject as an access agent against GAZIYEV, but had decided not to approach Subject on the matter unless there was evidence that his relationship with GAZIYEV was developing into something more than occasional chats between classes. I did not see much potential in approaching Subject before this with ~~theiss~~ the idea of having him deliberately cultivate a friendship with GAZIYEV, as I felt Subject was living

such a busy and hectic life that I would get very little out of him. Prior to his marriage, he was keeping such a hectic schedule between his Institute and private classes that he wasn't sleeping or eating properly and was having increasing problems with his health. If anything, his pace and health problems increased after his marriage and his taking of the job with the American School (although he gave up most of his private classes).

8. Since the GAZIYEV-LOGINOV conversation made Subject's relations with the Soviets look much more interesting, I attempted to find out what I could about them from Subject. For a number of reasons, however--including my going to the States in June--we were not able to get together until 11 July. On that date I took Subject to a belated "bachelor's lunch" at a little Spanish restaurant downtown.

9. The lunch was disappointing and, for me, misleading. I was certain that if given the opportunity, Subject would voluntarily tell me if his relationship with GAZIYEV had developed any further. When I casually brought the conversation around to GAZIYEV, however, Subject simply told me that GAZIYEV was still studying at the Institute and that he still occasionally chatted with him in the halls or over a cup of coffee in one of the near-by coffee shops during the 20-minute break between the two evening classes. Subject commented that he enjoyed talking with GAZIYEV, as he was a simpatico, interesting guy, as well as an outstanding Spanish student. He also added that they never talked politics. In reply to an offhand question about whether he had met any other Soviets through GAZIYEV, Subject

205

said that he had not. My inclination was to believe Subject, and I went away thinking that either GAZIYEV and LOGINOV had been talking about someone else over the phone or that they had never gone beyond the stage of simply talking about Subject.

10. On 1 November 1967, I ran into Subject and his brother Javier in Sanborns-Insurgentes. They were about to have a quick lunch and insisted that I join them for a cup of coffee. As soon as we sat down, Subject told me he had a problem and would like my advice. He said GAZIYEV had given him an invitation to the 7 November celebration of the Revolution at the Soviet Embassy, and although he would like to go for the experience, he was very concerned that his name would be put on "the black list" at the U.S. Embassy if he went. He said that he had tried to call me at the Embassy after he got the invitation to ask my advice, but had been told I was out of town. (I was in El Paso from 25-29 October.) He stated that if he had not been able to reach me in the next day or two, he was going to simply walk into the Embassy and ask to see someone from the "security department" about his predicament. What did I think he should do?

11. I told Subject to relax and forget about going to the U.S. Embassy, as the Embassy would not give him any advice other than to tell him that it was entirely his own business whether he went to the Soviet reception or not. Besides, I asked, what made Subject think his name would be put on a "black list" if he went. Subject replied that he didn't know how the U.S. Embassy did it, but "everyone knew" the U.S. Embassy obtained the names of everyone who went in and out of

201-285412

the Soviet Embassy. Moreover, he said, even if the U.S. Embassy refused to give him any advice, at least it would make a record of his visit and anyone who was ever interested would know his heart was in the right place. He simply did not want and couldn't afford to get into any trouble with the U.S. Embassy, he said. After all, he had an American wife, he might want to go to the States to study sometime, and they might even want to go to the States to live someday. Seeing that Subject was indeed very serious, I became more serious myself and told him that just so he wouldn't worry, I'd write a memo to the proper Embassy department stating for the sake of the record that Subject had told me he planned to attend a Soviet Embassy reception, but wished the U.S. Embassy to know he was doing it solely out of curiosity and was in no way in sympathy with the Soviet Union. Subject seemed greatly relieved and thanked me very much.

12. Seizing of the fact that GAZIYEV had given Subject the invitation, I asked if Subject saw much of him anymore. Subject replied that yes, he still saw him occasionally, as GAZIYEV was now studying English at the Institute. Subject added, on his own initiative, that he had also been to GAZIYEV's apartment twice and had met another Soviet there on one occasion. He said that the first time he went to GAZIEV's was shortly before he (Subject) got married (Subject was married about mid-April 1967) and the second time was shortly after his marriage, as he and his wife had gone to dinner at the GAZIYEVS'. Subject finished eating about this time, and since he was in a hurry and had his brother with him, I didn't try to question him any further, but decided to wait and have a second go at him alone another

207

time.

13. My wife and I entertained Subject and his wife at our home on 27 November, but the evening was not meant to and did not afford an opportunity to discuss the Soviets any further. Subject did tell me, however, that he had not gone to the 7 November Soviet reception afterall, because, despite by assurances that there was no reason for him not to go, he felt it was simply safer to stay away from the Soviet Embassy altogether. At my suggestion, we agreed to get together for lunch sometime in the near future.

14. For various reasons, including the poor state of Subject's health when I called him one day in January, we did not get together for the lunch until 7 March. This time, I played it straight with Subject, told him that I was interested in anything he could tell me about GAZIYEV and the otherSoviet he had met, and questioned him closely regarding the details. Subject was completely cooperative, and I am satisfied he answered my questions to the best of his ability. It seemed to me, and still does, that there was only one possible reason why Subject had not told me on 11 July what he subsequently told me on 1 November (i.e., that he had been to GAZIYEV's home twice and on one occasion had met another Soviet there). This was that he felt somewhat guilty about going to GAZIYEV's and meeting the other Soviet there, and as long as I didn't push him too hard (which I didn't on 11 July), he felt more comfortable ignoring it. The reason he so readily mentioned the two visits and the other Soviet on 1 November was, I think, that he was genuinely concerned not to "get into any trouble" with the U.S.

208

Embassy over attending the Soviet Embassy reception, wished to impress me with his sincerity about whose side he was on, and felt obliged to completely clear the record by mentioning the visits to GAZIYEV's home and meeting the other Soviet there.

15. Subject stated that GAZIYEV had invited him to his apartment for dinner about a month before he (Subject) went to Chicago to get married. This means that the dinner took place about mid-March 1967. Subject said he had expected to find only GAZIYEV and his wife in the apartment, but that a third person was there when Subject arrived. Subject said GAZIYEV introduced the third person as Valentin "something." When I asked if the last name were LOGINOV, Subject immediately reacted and said he was almost positive that was it. Subject's description of the Soviet also fit LOGINOV. GAZIYEV stated that LOGINOV was with the Embassy (Subject couldn't remember in what capacity) and described LOGINOV as a good friend. Subject said that the evening started off very casually, with LOGINOV expressing interest in the Spanish courses at the Mexican-North American Institute. LOGINOV, who Subject noted spoke almost as good Spanish as most of the Spanish teachers at the Institute, said he'd like to get a certificate in Spanish from the Institute and asked Subject if he could help him enroll, choose the best course for him to start with, etc. Subject replied that he'd be happy to, although it didn't seem to him that LOGINOV needed much instruction in Spanish. LOGINOV simply laughed this off, and it was agreed LOGINOV would drop around to the Institute sometime soon. LOGINOV, who took the lead in the conversation most of the evening, then began to ask Subject questions which left Subject

209

with "no doubt" that he (LOGINOV) was trying to feel Subject out on his political views. Subject said that he couldn't remember most of LOGINOV's questions, but he did recall that LOGINOV began the feeling-out procedure by asking Subject if he didn't find that the Americans were much poorer at learning Spanish than other nationalities. He also made various derogatory remarks about the extent of American influence in Mexico. Subject said that after about ten minutes, LOGINOV's purpose became so blatantly obvious, that he (Subject) stopped the conversation and told LOGINOV that before they went any farther, he thought LOGINOV should know that he was talking to someone who was "100% capitalist," completely pro-American, and had absolutely no sympathy with Communism. (While this sounds awfully blunt and Subject was unquestionably trying to make himself look good in my eyes, the fact of the matter is that Subject does tend to be [illegible] a bit blunt at times, and knowing his ideological leanings, I would not put it past him to have said exactly this.) Subject said that LOGINOV tried to backtrack a bit after this, but the conversation heated up again a few minutes later when Subject commented that he had a pretty good idea of what the Soviets were up to in Mexico. When LOGINOV asked what Subject meant, Subject related the story he once told me about having been in Veracruz a few years ago when a Soviet ship was actually or virtually put under arrest there. Subject told LOGINOV that "everyone knew the ship was loaded with Communist propaganda."

16. After about twenty minutes, according to Subject, politics were dropped and the conversation turned to more innocuous topics.

210

Subject said that LOGINOV seemed somewhat irritated with him, but on the whole kept his composure very well and treated Subject politely for the two hours or less Subject remained. As Subject was leaving, LOGINOV again said he'd come by the Institute to see Subject in the near future, but he never did. One day in late 1967 Subject saw LOGINOV at the gas station on the corner of Tacubaya and Juanacatlan, and LOGINOV greeted Subject by name. However, they did not converse with each other.

17. Subject said that GAZIYEV left most of the politically related part of the conversation to LOGINOV and never referred to the evening again. However, a few weeks after Subject returned to Mexico with his bride, GAZIYEV had Subject and his wife over to dinner (this would place the second dinner in about mid-May). This time GAZIYEV and his wife were the only others present, and the evening passed without any reference to politics. Subject stated that he still occasionally goes across the street for a cup of coffee with GAZIYEV betweem evening classes at the Institute, but that he has not been to GAZIYEV's apartment again and has never had GAZIYEV to his home.

18. Although Subject was very aware that LOGINOV's purpose in meeting him was to assess his exploitability, he did not seem to fully appreciate that GAZIYEV had both fingered him for LOGINOV and set up the situation for LOGINOV to meet him. I spelled this out for Subject and also informed him that LOGINOV was an exceptionally capable Soviet intelligence officer. I also explained that it was very possible GAZIYEV was using the Institute to spot other candidates for interviews with Soviet

201-285412

211

intelligence officers, and questioned Subject about GAZIYEV's activities and contacts at the Institute. However, Subject said that as far as he could tell GAZIYEV pretty much stuck to himself at the Institute and did not have any particular friends there whom Subject knew about. Subject said he would keep his eyes open for the type of thing I was looking for, however, and would let me know if he came onto anything interesting. Subject also offered to "play up to" GAZIYEV and/or LOGINOV under my guidance if I wished, but I declined the offer with appropriate expressions of appreciation.

19. The question that remains unanswered after all this is, of course, why LOGINOV and GAZIYEV were talking about Subject over the phone on 24 April 1967. According to Subject, the dinner which LOGINOV attended took place in March 1967, while LOGINOV did not attend GAZIYEV's second dinner, which took place about mid-May. Since I am satisfied Subject told me the truth, it would appear that the "certain things" which LOGINOV told GAZIYEV on 24 April he wished to discuss with GAZIYEV concerned how to handle Subject in the light of the LOGINOV-Subject encounter in March. Whatever LOGINOV had in mind on 24 April, it would appear that it was finally decided that GAZIYEV and his wife should simply have Subject and his wife over to a peaceful dinner in order to at least partially erase the memory of the first dinner.

L
SB/L

212

THE AMERICAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION A. C.

JORGE ARIAS BUERBA

COMMUNITY SERVICES PROGRAM

PROGRAMA DE EDUCACION PARA ADULTOS

CALLE SUR [illegible] NUM. [illegible]
TACUBAYA 18, D. F.

15-76-14

2. [illegible]

[illegible] GUTIERREZ [illegible]

[illegible] Spanish tutor. GUTIERREZ [illegible]

[illegible] a utility agent, but has [illegible]

[illegible] to other Mexican agents. [illegible]

[illegible] taking private Spanish lessons [illegible]

[illegible] 1955. I found [illegible] an excellent [illegible]

[illegible] lessons from him until [illegible]

[illegible] and I had [illegible] in [illegible]

[illegible] at the Mexican-North American [illegible]

[illegible] social contact with [illegible]

[illegible] friendly with [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

201-285412

14-00000

213

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 23

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 30 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

C/K

ACTION: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR R/AN SB/P FI 2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2

(19)

S E C R E T 080010Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7994

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

IN30215

8 Nov 68 IN 30215

M

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 7965 (IN 28451)

B. DIRECTOR 48427

1. REVIEW OF LIENVOY TAPES REVEAL NAME OF SUBJECT CALLING PROVOROV IS DOUG~~AL~~LAS PATILLO. PATILLO SPEAKS GOOD SPANISH WITH DEFINITE AMERICAN ACCENT. CONVERSATIONS ARE IN SPANISH. ON 5 NOVEMBER PATILLO CALLED PROVOROV AT SOVIET EMBASYY TO ASK WHY PROVOROV HAD NOT GONE TO SEE HIM EVENING 4 NOVEMBER PROVOROV STATED HE WOULD GO EVENING 5 NOVEMBER 68.

2. LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE DOUGALS PATILLO INITIATED MORNING 6 NOVEMBER. HE IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS PATILLO TO LIEMBRACE TEAM MEMBER WHO KNOCKED ON HIS DOOR LOOKING FOR SOMEONE ESLE. ON AFTERNOON 6 NOVEMBER LIEMBRACES FOLLOWED PATILLO TO SOVIET EMBASSY. PATILLO WALKED UP TO SOVIET EMBASSY AND SPOKE TO THREE SOVIETS AT GATE, ONE OF WHOM WAS VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV (KNOWN KGB). PATILLO SHOWED LOGINOV SOME PAPERS HE HAD IN HIS SUIT JACKET THEN ENTERED SOVIET EMBASSY GROUNDS AT 1311 HOURS. HE EXITED THE SOVIET EMBASSY AT 1351

201-285412

SECRET

Loginov ✓

Provorov

14-00000

214

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7994 SECRET

HOURS. SUBJECT THEN WALKED BACK TO THE HOTEL. VERYY SURVEILLANCE CONSCIOUS IN AREA OF EMBASSY COMING AND GOING.

3. IN 5 NOVEMBER CONVERSATION WITH PROVOROV, SUBJECT STATED THAT PERHAPS HE WAS GOING TO OAXACA (CITY IN STATE OF OAZACA ABOUT 300 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF MEXICO CITY) AFTERNOON OR EVEING 6 NOVEMBER, THAT HE HAS TO LEAVE MEXICO CITY FOR LOS ANGELES ON MORING OF SATURDAY, 9 NOVEMBER.

4. LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE WILL CONTINUE UNTIL SUJBECT LEAVES MEXICO. LIEMBRACE PHOTOS AS WELL AS RESUEM OF SURVEILLANCE WILL BE POUCHED HQS.

5. LILYRIC PHOTOS WILL BE CHECKED FOR SOVIET EMBASSY VISIORS ON 6 NOVEMBER. LIENVOY TAPE WILL BE POUCHED HEADQUARTERS.

6. IF LNERGO UNABLE TO RESOLVE ADDRESS REPORTED PARA 2 RE (A) SUGGEST LNERGO COPER ALL FLIGHTS ARRIVING LOS ANGELES FROM MEXICO CITY ON 9 NOV, DATE PATILLO SAYS HE HAS TO RETURN TO LOS ANGELS. STATION WILL CABLE IMMEDIATE, IF ABLE LEARN TRAVEL PLANS IN ADVANCE.

7. PATILLO DESCRIPTION FROM LIEMBRACES CA 30 YEARS OLD, CA 18 CM, CA 176 LBS, REDDISH BLOND HAIR, PALE COMPLEXION,

SECRET

215

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 MEXIO CITY 7994 SECRET

WEARING SUN GLASSES IN PHOTOS.

8. FILE: 50-8-21

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

216

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, SB via Chief, WH Division
REDTOP AEKICK
Vladimir Ivanovich Silantyev (201-770128)

Reference: Mexico City 6054 (IN 39508)

Forwarded under separate cover is a LNERGO report concerning Subject. Persons mentioned by surname on page six of the report are identified at Headquarters as the subjects of 201-205304, 201-132139, 201-763035 and 201-285412 respectively. Can the Station identify any of the other persons mentioned on pages five and six?

Ambrose T. SIBARICH

Attachment:
as stated u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City
w/attachments w/
u/s/c

201-132139, 201-205304, 201-763035, 201-285412

HMMW-16779

16 October 1968

SECRET

201-770128

Internal Dist:
1 - 201-770128
1 - 201-205304
1 - 201-132139
1 - 201-763035
1 - 201-285412
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - SB/CI/K
1 - C/WH/1

SB/CI/K F. Walters rah 6991

C/SB/CI

SB/X/WH

C/WH/1

Lopez
201-285412

14-00000

217

DESENSITIZED

DISPATCH

SECRET
RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: LPSUITCASE/LIREALM-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Headquarters has carefully considered the case of LIREALM-1 from the standpoint of ramifications of the compromise of January 1968 and of his operational utilization by the Station. With regard to the compromise, Headquarters tends to believe that the damage done by that occurrence is somewhat greater than the Station estimates. It is obvious, however, that no one now or probably even in the future can arrive at a hard estimate of the degree to which LIREALM-1 was blown. We can all agree and must assume that he has been compromised to some degree. The minimum degree of compromise would presumably be a listing of LIREALM-1's name in local Soviet files, and presumably also in the Moscow headquarters central registry, as "possible A. I. S." While such a label is unfortunate, could affect future assignments, and will limit his sphere of activity in Mexico, there remains a wide area of operations in which he can be employed. The Mexican authorities are, to the best of our knowledge, unaware of LIREALM-1's activities and sponsorship. Given the improved operational security patterns and overall professional handling which must accompany LIREALM-1's future use in the light of the unfortunate flap, we feel that he can continue to be of service at his present post. In spite of the obvious special need for a more careful weighing of operational risk versus gain factors (even more important here than in the case of the usual presumably "clean" non-official agent), we feel that neither the flap nor his LPGLOBE status should inhibit the Station in the energetic use of his not inconsiderable talents. Headquarters can appreciate the necessarily slow pace of the developmental activity to which he has been assigned, as well as the required alterations of his targets - both of which factors have been largely beyond Station control.

(continued)

Distribution:
Original and one - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

RI
CHRONO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-16197

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT DESENSITIZED

DATE: 22 July 1968

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-285412
201-773337

ORIGINATING

OFFICE / OFFICER / TYPIST: WH/1/Nancy Perkins/lq

EXT.: 6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/FI	16 JUL 1968	
CCS/LPGLOBE	17 JUL 1968	
CCS/DPS	17 JUL 1968	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	15 July 68	W. J. Kaufman

2-158

2. In a written report on his visit to Mexico in December 1967, the visiting LIGLOBE case officer recapitulated the Station's Operational Plan for LIREALM-1 which included the following points:

a. "Penetration, monitoring, analysis and study of the PRI are to be LIREALM-1's first objective".....

b. (FRADYER) "urged LIREALM to spot and assess potential legal travellers to Cuba."

c. "A strong tertiary target is the (HBFAIRY) Embassy."

d. "Indonesians, Egyptians and Soviets have been discarded as targets."

When talking to members of the Branch, Lewis W. BEAUCHAMP confirmed the above and said that the Station was considering giving LIREALM-1 a going Cuban operation to handle. Has he yet been assigned any contacts which bear on the Cuban target? LIREALM-1 was quoted as saying that he feels he can handle a heavier operational load, and so we are hoping that you have or will soon be able to turn over to him one or more established operations from which he can see tangible return, thus broadening his experience and increasing his self-confidence. Since LIRELIC-1 has been terminated we assume Subject is exploring new areas against the LIOGLE/LIRELIC target and we would appreciate advice on this.

3. We recognize that very often one-time tasks, spotting, and research are performed by agents in the field without Headquarters' specific knowledge. Increased reporting on this kind of activity, which is valuable and necessary even though much of it may lead to dead ends, would give us a better understanding than we now have of the contribution which LIREALM-1 is making to the Station. Headquarters appreciates the operational reporting which the Station has been providing on LIREALM-1 and urges that it be continued on the same frequent basis.

Thomas W. LUND

14-00000

219

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB

INFO.
Chief, WH
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMSLOUCH
AMSLOUCH/1 Debriefing on Soviet Officials

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. During the April 1968 debriefing of AMSLOUCH/1 in the JMWAVE area, AMSLOUCH/1 provided the following information on Soviet officials with whom he is, or has been, acquainted:

a. Valentin LOGINOV (201-285412): Assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Havana several years ago. He pursued AMSLOUCH/3 (daughter of AMSLOUCHes 1 and 2) when stationed in Havana, and later in Moscow. AMSLOUCH/1 described LOGINOV as a rough peasant type. AMSLOUCH/1 when in Mexico about a year ago was looking at the Mexico Diplomatic List and noticed that a LOGINOV was assigned to Mexico. AMSLOUCH/1 asked a girl working at a foreign consulate in Mexico (identity) if this was the same LOGINOV who had been stationed in Cuba. The girl replied in the affirmative, and stated the LOGINOV worked in the Soviet Consulate handling business dealings between her consulate and the Soviet Consulate. The girl described LOGINOV as "a very nice fellow."

b. Colonel Fedor V. DREMOV: Military Attache, Soviet Embassy, Havana. AMSLOUCH/1 reported that he has conversed with DREMOV on several occasions, the last one being when Cosmonaut GUGARIN was killed. AMSLOUCH/1 described DREMOV as alert, smart, speaks good Spanish, charming and very proud that he is the son of a Cossak. DREMOV told AMSLOUCH/1 during one of their conversations that he had been a member

Attachment:
Identity (USC)

CONTINUED. . . . .

Distribution:
3 - C/SB w/att.
2 - WH/COG w/att.
2 - COS, Mexico City w/att.
2 - C/WH w/att.

file in 201-255412

JUN 11 1968

CS filed in 355911

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-30172

DATE
7 June 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
28-6-33/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-30172

of a Soviet PW camp where German soldiers were held during World War II, during which time he claimed to have learned the German language.

2. A photograph of DREMOV, provided by AMSLOUCH/1, was sent to Headquarters in UFGA-29721, 13 March 1968.

Hilda G. VAGIONAS

221

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-30172

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME LOGINOV, Valentin	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201- 285412
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION Soviet Consulate, Mexico		RESIDENCE Mexico

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Havana.

2

SURNAME DREMOV, Fedor V. (Colonel)	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION Military Attache (Soviet Embassy Havana)		RESIDENCE Havana

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

3

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

4

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED

14-00000

222

SECRET

Under Separate Cover

Attachment to:

UFGA-30172

IDENTITY: Lisa HAGELBERG, employee of Finnish Consulate, Mexico City

SECRET

co filed 201-355911

file in 201-285412

223

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, LPGLOBE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/LPSUITCASE/LIREALM-1
Progress Report - 20 October 1967 to 1 May 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References : A. HMMA-33516, 17 November 1967
B. HMMW-15670, 1 August 1967
C. HMMA-34538, 26 April 1968
D. HMMA-34398, 3 April 1968
E. HMMA-34570, 30 April 1968

1. As reported in reference A, LIREALM-1 joined the PBRUMEN Section of this Station on 20 October 1967. It was decided that LIREALM-1 should drop further efforts against the Soviet, U.A.R., and Indonesian targets. The decision to discontinue efforts to develop contacts among Mexicans, also made at that time, was later amended and LIREALM-1 was entrusted with the handling of LIRELIC-1 along the lines of the recommendation made in reference B. Thus, by November 1967 LIREALM-1 had two main responsibilities: a) the French target, against which he already had devoted considerable time and effort, and b) the handling of LIRELIC-1.

Continued......................

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD
2 - C/LPGLOBE

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 34668

DATE
15 May 1968.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET DESENSITIZED

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-285412
201-773337

224

2. LIREALM-1's efforts against the local French target have produced some notable results. First, through detailed analysis of personality and other data provided by LIREALM-1, the Station selected an access agent to the official French community who was later successfully contacted and was offered a contract (see reference C). The Station is already at work on what appears to be a good lead provided by the access agent spotted and developed by LIREALM-1. It should be emphasized that LIREALM-1 was in no way connected with the approach made to the French access agent. The second item on which LIREALM-1 has made progress has been the development of a Mexican ~~employee of~~ the French Embassy who is used as a general courier inside the Embassy. This development, for security reasons, has been slow. LIREALM-1's "line" has been that a person with "the ability" of the courier can and should expect a better paying job than the one he currently holds. The courier ended up taking that line as his own to "protect" him (as he probably would have some trouble if the Embassy discovered he was looking for another job). LIREALM-1 started meeting the Mexican courier outside the French Embassy. This gave LIREALM-1 the opportunity to talk to his prospect at some length without attracting the attention of the members of the Embassy. This is as far as the Station will allow LIREALM-1 to go in this case, which is currently being reviewed to decide who will continue the development of the Embassy courier and how. LIREALM-1 will not, in any case, have any connection with the person selected for this task. He will continue to maintain contact with the courier but will start to see him less often and will admit, in the end, that finding a job for him turned out to be more difficult than expected.

3. LIREALM-1 meanwhile is continuing to cultivate a number of selected members of the French Embassy and reports on their activities as a matter of routine. He has also maintained contact for some months with a wealthy Mexican businessman who is a good friend of DEVOSJOLY, the ex-French intelligence officer who provided the material for Leon URIS' best seller Topaz. LIREALM-1, in fact, had established DEVOSJOLY's identity as coauthor of the book long before this became known publicly. He was shown by DEVOSJOLY's friend a safe at the latter's house in Mexico City full of documents probably belonging to DEVOSJOLY. This information was reported to Headquarters via "special" channels.

4. LIREALM-1's handling of LIRELIC-1 encompasses two targets. By far the more important one is LIOGLE. The goal here is hopefully to turn LIRELIC-1 into a penetration of LIOGLE using several good contacts he has in this organization as a stepping stone. Some steps have been taken in this direction. LIRELIC-1 has addressed personal requests for assistance to current key LIOGLE personalities. He has also submitted his curriculum vitae in the hope of landing a job in LIOGLE. This has so far failed to produce any concrete LIOGLE job offer. LIRELIC-1 realizes, of course, that he is of no value to LNHARP unless he obtains a job giving him access to hard information on LIOGLE plans and activities. The promise of a regular salary, as a matter of fact, is completely dependent on LIRELIC-1's ability to penetrate LIOGLE. In an effort to maintain interim contact, however, and help LIRELIC-1 liquidate some personal debts, the Station, via LIREALM-1, made him a loan of 3,000 pesos. Further details on the LIOGLE aspects of the LIRELIC-1 operation will be covered in the forthcoming LIOGLE/LIRELIC progress report. In addition to

the above, the Station made an effort to explore the possibility of using a contact which LIRELIC-1 had with a PBRUMEN citizen in Acapulco to gain another window into LIRING. This PBRUMEN citizen owns a small hotel in the Mexican resort occasionally visited by LIRING personnel. Although LIRELIC-1 himself once delivered a package sent by his Acapulco friend and managed to have one or two meetings with representatives of the LIRING Commercial Section (to discuss the possibility of "trading" with PBRUMEN), it was decided in the end that LIRELIC-1's access to LIRING was too superficial to be of any great benefit. This decision was bolstered by the departure for PBRUMEN in April 1968 of LIRELIC-1's PBRUMEN friend, who left for what appears to be an extended visit to try to solve complicated personal problems. Thus, with the "shelving" of possible operational activities against LIRING, LIOGLE became LIRELIC-1's only target in April of this year.

5. Unlike his contacts with the French, LIREALM-1's dealings with LIRELIC-1 have been completely clandestine. LIREALM-1 meets LIRELIC-1 under alias in out of the way restaurants and other public places. A drop constituted by a P. O. box rented by LIRELIC-1 under alias (to which both he and LIREALM-1 have keys) was set up for LIREALM-1 to receive operational messages.

6. References D and E reviewed an incident which occurred on 16 January and had a direct bearing on LIREALM-1's security. It is the opinion of this Station that the person who saw LIREALM-1 talk with Raymond A. FRADYER and Wallace B. ROWTON did not positively identify either of them. References stated that this person could not have been Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, who claimed to have observed the meeting. Reference E pointed out that before joining the PBRUMEN Section in October 1967 LIREALM-1 had for some time interested himself in the activities of the Soviets at Station request. He first made contact with LOGINOV, for example, in April 1967 and met with him on the average of once a week until October 1967. Reference E also pointed out that LIREALM-1 only had four meetings with the Soviet from October 1967 to January 1968. The Station wants to emphasize once more that these were all at LOGINOV's initiative. LIREALM-1 had discontinued his efforts to maintain contact with the Soviet at Station's directive. As pointed out above, one of the main targets now handled by LIREALM-1 is the French. One of the best places to meet Frenchmen is the French Club. Station would be very reluctant to have LIREALM-1, a long-time member of that club, terminate his membership. Neither does the Station want him to be too obvious in giving the cold shoulder to the Soviet. The Station does not believe, knowing what it knows of LOGINOV, that serious and permanent damage has been done to LIREALM-1's security and believes that he can continue to provide valuable services to this Station.

Raymond A. Fradyer
for Willard C. CURTIS

226

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, LPGLOBE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Operational/LPSUITCASE/LIREALM-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References : A. HMMA-34398, 3 April 1968
B. HMMW-16364, 25 April 1968

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to provide Headquarters with additional information requested in reference B in the hope that it will assist the interested components in formulating a clearer picture of the reference A incident. The Station has consulted at length with Wallace B. ROWTON on the details that are provided below as well as, of course, with LIREALM-1 himself.

2. First, with regard to paragraph 2b of reference B, a fuller account of the FRADYER/ROWTON/LIREALM-1 meeting at Sanborns will, it is felt, shed more light on the impressions that Headquarters had formed of the probable identification of ROWTON as LIREALM-1's "boss." The following chronological account has been prepared by ROWTON from his reports and memory in consultation with LIREALM-1 (the numbers in the left margin refer to the time at which the events mentioned below took place):

1610 (January 16) LIREALM-1 met with ROWTON at the latter's home as planned. ROWTON informed LIREALM-1, much to the latter's disappointment, that unfortunately he had not as yet received the reimbursement for operational expenses ($2,357.35 MN) requested by LIREALM-1 on 10 January 1968, nor had he received from the

Continued.......................

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD
2 - C/LPGLOBE

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 34570	30 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET DESENSITIZED	201-285412 201-773337

227

Station any contract or other document that LIREALM-1 might present to LIRELIC-1 as he had proposed. ROWTON explained to LIREALM-1 that he had hoped to be able to see Raymond A. FRADYER before his meeting with LIREALM-1, but that this had been impossible.

[illegible] VR's [illegible]!

1620 ROWTON then telephoned FRADYER's office (in alias, open code, and double talk) and this time managed to reach FRADYER himself. FRADYER told ROWTON that he had the money and could pass it to ROWTON that same afternoon if he felt it necessary. ROWTON replied that he preferred to pick it up as soon as convenient for FRADYER and made a date for 1630 in the corridor outside the Koala Restaurant, about three or four minutes by foot from Sanborns. ROWTON then asked LIREALM-1 to wait for him in the downstairs bar of Sanborns, where he would join him with the money. LIREALM-1 left ROWTON's home alone, and ROWTON followed about five minutes later and proceeded (by taxi) to the Koala Restaurant. ROWTON distinctly recalls waiting for FRADYER for some 15 minutes.

1645 ROWTON spoke with FRADYER for about two minutes in the corridor after receiving the envelope containing the money. In reply to FRADYER's queries, ROWTON stated that LIREALM-1 was somewhat disappointed that he could not provide him with some sort of written contract for LIRELIC-1 and also because of the delay in reimbursing him for operational expenses (some of which had been disallowed). ROWTON then revealed to FRADYER that LIREALM-1 was waiting for him at the Sanborns bar so that he could pass him the money without further delay. FRADYER then regretted that he had been unable to see LIREALM-1 personally to explain the disallowance of some of the expenses. ROWTON suggested that FRADYER might take this opportunity to say a few words to LIREALM-1, especially since the latter knew that ROWTON and FRADYER were meeting at that moment somewhere nearby. FRADYER agreed but said that he preferred the gift section of Sanborns to the bar.

1655 ROWTON then proceeded alone to the downstairs bar of Sanborns and found LIREALM-1 waiting. ROWTON explained that he was late because of a last-minute arrangement with FRADYER for a brief meeting in the gift shop. LIREALM-1 then paid the bill and accompanied ROWTON up the stairs in the rear to the gift section, where they found FRADYER looking over the silver display in the shop.

1700 An apparently casual conversation then took place, with FRADYER and LIREALM-1 doing most of the talking and with ROWTON occasionally examining the silverware on display.

1720 When the conversation ended, ROWTON and LIREALM-1 moved to the men's room, where LIREALM-1 was able to check the amount of money for him and sign the enclosed receipt.

3. It will be noted from the above that the ROWTON/LIREALM-1 meeting with FRADYER was not planned in advance (as pointed out in reference A), but was a hasty recommendation made to FRADYER by ROWTON and an equally hasty decision taken by FRADYER on the spot. ROWTON and LIREALM-1 had met previously only in ROWTON's home, except on two occasions when ROWTON picked up LIREALM-1 in his car in the Ciudad Deportes (near the main Mexico City bull ring) between regular meetings to pass him funds. ROWTON had never met with LIREALM-1 at Sanborns or in any other public place prior to this meeting.

4. LIREALM-1 also amplified his written report subsequently in one significant detail. In reference to the remark of LOGINOV to the effect that he had seen him with his boss at Sanborns two Wednesdays previously when "you had a drink in the bar and then talked to your boss," LIREALM-1 told ROWTON on reflection that LOGINOV had also stated that "you were having a drink at the bar and a man came up to you and brought you to your boss." This indicates that FRADYER was meant as the person described as LIREALM-1's boss.

5. With regard to where and how often ROWTON and LIREALM-1 have had operational meetings in the past, as requested in paragraph 3 of reference B, Station files show that between 20 October 1967 and 16 January 1968 ROWTON met with LIREALM-1 at his home ten times. Besides these meetings with LIREALM-1 at his home, ROWTON recalls only two other meetings with LIREALM-1, when he picked up LIREALM-1 in his car for brief meetings to pass him funds. Since the LOGINOV/LIREALM-1 episode, ROWTON has met with LIREALM-1 at obscure bars to avoid possible positive identification of ROWTON in the event LIREALM-1 was under surveillance. LIREALM-1 has passed his reports to ROWTON between their weekly meetings via a P.O. letter drop taken out previously by LIREALM-1 under alias. The only telephone contact that has existed between them has been brief calls to ROWTON's home by LIREALM-1 alerting ROWTON, in double talk, that he has left an envelope at the drop.

6. With regard to the frequency of LIREALM-1's meetings with LOGINOV, mentioned in paragraph 4 of reference B, LIREALM-1's contact reports list only four meetings during the same period, all of which occurred at the French Club, and one of which, on 2 November 1967, was a casual encounter at which very few words were exchanged. It is significant to note, however, that at the 12 November 1967 meeting, while LIREALM-1 and LOGINOV were chatting in the showers after the match, the latter "joked that (LIREALM-1) should bring some of his friends from the Embassy" to join them in playing tennis. LOGINOV added, also apparently with a slight grin, "all of them are WOFIRM." FRADYER, to whom this remark was promptly reported, did not consider it to have any special meaning since he knew from personal and direct experience that LOGINOV is a born provocateur who cannot resist needling people (Mexicans and foreigners) with whom he comes into contact. WOFIRM often comes up in LOGINOV conversations, not only with FRADYER, but with persons of other nationalities. It was decided, however, to again warn LIREALM-1 at his next meeting with ROWTON on 16 November, when LIREALM-1 submitted his report, not to involve himself with LOGINOV. LIREALM-1 assured ROWTON that

229

his continuing contacts with LOGINOV were at the latter's initiative and that LIREALM-1 would not make any attempt to follow up or show any unusual interest. LIREALM-1 did not report seeing LOGINOV again until 13 January 1968 (two months later), this time, as usual, on the tennis court.

7. Headquarters will recall that the LIREALM-1 relationship with the Soviets dates back many months prior to the date ROWTON took over his handling. The file reveals that LIREALM-1 first met LOGINOV on 22 April 1967, and that at that time LOGINOV proposed to LIREALM-1 that they meet regularly, every Wednesday, for tennis and occasionally take in a movie with their wives. This leaves no doubt that the pace was set by LOGINOV himself since he undoubtedly saw in LIREALM-1 a potential target. The situation was further complicated by the character and modus operandi of LOGINOV, as well as the limitations of LIREALM-1's cover situation at the time.

8. A principal dilemma facing the Case Officer with regard to LIREALM-1's exposure to the Soviets has been his regular attendance at the French Club. Since the French target has been one of the main ones left to LIREALM-1 after the elimination of the Soviet, Indonesian, and UAR operations, it was considered necessary for LIREALM-1 to continue his normal contacts with the French. He could have dropped his membership in the club to avoid further involvement with the Soviets, but this would have broken a long-established pattern and deprived him of his principal access at that time. It was therefore ruled out as counterproductive.

9. Subsequent developments appear to confirm the Station's view that LOGINOV based his provocative remark on a hunch or, at most, on a strong suspicion concerning LIREALM-1. As mentioned in paragraph 4 of reference B, such prolonged social contact between an American and a Soviet "is almost inevitably construed on both sides to have intelligence connotations." The Station wishes to emphasize, however, that whatever suspicions were aroused in the mind of LOGINOV concerning LIREALM-1 were already generated months before he joined the PBRUMEN Section in late October 1967.

10. In conclusion, the Station feels that nothing has been noted in the subsequent operational activity of FRADYER or ROWTON to indicate that either of them has been identified as an intelligence operative. ROWTON has had no contact of any kind with Soviets in this area, nor has he detected any surveillance, either physical or technical, of his person or home. Both he and FRADYER, however, will continue to maintain maximum security to avoid any further exposure to such persons as LOGINOV. LIREALM-1, on his part, has been able to improve his cover by opening an office and making his overt activity as plausibly commercial as possible.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

230

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Operational/LPSUITCASE/LIREALM/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-34393, 3 April 1968

1. Reference caused deep concern in Headquarters -- concern which we know you share. To hold any agent meetings in that particular Sanborn Cafeteria is unorthodox enough, but to meet there with someone in the category of LIREALM/1, whose cover is of special importance, suggests an unawareness or disdain of basic operational security which merits reprimand.

2. We appreciate your candid account of the LIREALM/1-LOGINOV episode, and have several comments to make:

a. Why LOGINOV would have said, "I saw you talking with your boss the other day" we do not know, but the fact that he made such a banal remark with a slight grin certainly implies that he did not have ordinary commercial business in mind.

b. In the context of the dispatch it sounds rather as though LOGINOV was referring to a meeting between LIREALM/1 and one other man, not two, in which case it was probably ROWTON and not FRADYER whom he identified as the boss. (We assume that ROWTON and LIREALM/1 had been together in the downstairs cafeteria before the brush meeting with FRADYER took place, but this may be incorrect.)

3. In order to shed some additional light on the matter, we would like to know even more about this particular Wednesday meeting and the pattern of meetings which have preceded and followed it. Were ROWTON and LIREALM/1 meeting together in the bar or cafeteria? What was the appearance of the later three-way, fifteen-minute conversation upstairs in the silver shop (i.e., casual, serious, intense, sotto-voce, conspiratorial? Was any pretense made of "shopping"?) Our feeling is that ROWTON is as much compromised as

Distribution:
2 - COS/Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-16364	DATE 25 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET DESENSITIZED	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-773337 201-285412

① - 201-773337
1 - WH/1 Chrono
1 - CCS

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	NPerkins	jmw	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1		W. J. Kaufman
CCS/Milligan		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH		W. J. Kaufman for William V. Broe

231

LIREALM/1, but in ROWTON's case the loss is less because of accepted risks in his style of operating and since we have always assumed that his cover was thin . . . what is important to know in this case is where and how often ROWTON and LIREALM/1 have had operational meetings in the past. Considering this we had assumed the ROWTON-LIREALM/1 meetings were truly clandestine.

4. Another point to be resolved is the frequency of LIREALM/1's meetings with LOGINOV -- from the Reference we infer that the tennis games were a frequent occurrence, although LIREALM/1 had been told almost a year ago to break contact. Even if these meetings could not have been avoided as the Station claims, why were they not reported? The issue takes on even added significance as we understood the Station and Headquarters had been in agreement for some time that LIREALM/1 was to avoid any continuing contact with Soviets. Hindsight in this case certainly proves the correctness of the earlier judgment. (Experience shows that prolonged social contact between an American and a Soviet is almost inevitably construed on both sides, and with reason, to have an intelligence connotation.)

5. The fact that LOGINOV did not mention the Sanborn's meeting to FRADYER can hardly be read to mean that LIREALM/1 is clean in LOGINOV's eyes, although FRADYER would naturally have been anxious to see what, if anything, would happen when he next saw LOGINOV face to face. It is true that we have no evidence that LIREALM/1 has been "definitely branded as a WOFIRM operator" but if he is even highly suspect there is still cause for deep concern.

6. Various levels and components at Headquarters are trying to evaluate and debate this episode, and we would like to have your recommendations as an aid to our decision. From the few facts that we have we believe we must proceed under the assumption that LIREALM/1 is suspect or possibly compromised in the eyes of the Soviets. Accepting this, do you consider LIREALM/1 has further utility in Mexico? If so, we would like your views as to his proposed targets and handling procedures. After receiving further details as requested in paragraph 3 and your recommendations, Headquarters will advise you its decision.

7. We recognize the Station is as disturbed about this breach of basic operational judgment as Headquarters and do not wish to belabor the point. We trust however that this experience will be a lesson well learned and that in the future the Station's clandestine operational procedures will be truly clandestine and professional in style for all of the Station activities, not just LIREALM/1.

Ernest A. LUSBY

232

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, LPGLOBE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Operational/LIREALM-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. Since joining the staff of the PBRUMEN Section of this Station in October 1967, LIREALM-1 has been handled by Wallace B. ROWTON under the over-all supervision of the undersigned. His three main activities have been 1) to handle LIRELIC-1, an asset who we hope will turn into a penetration of the Mexican PRI, 2) to continue to develop rapport with and report on the local official French community, and 3) to determine the degree to which LIRELIC-1 can develop access to LIRING and its personnel. LIREALM-1 has continued to see a number of contacts he had developed before joining the PBRUMEN Section, either at Station directive or by social encounter. One of these contacts has long been Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy and known KGB officer whom LIREALM-1 first ran into while playing tennis at the French Club, where both LIREALM-1 and LOGINOV are members. Station several times asked LIREALM-1 to break contact with LOGINOV, but this has not been possible since LIREALM-1's continued membership at the French Club is desired for operational reasons and LOGINOV, who probably joined the club for similar reasons, has continued to be one of its active members.

Continued......................

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD
2 - C/LPGLOBE

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 34398

DATE: 3 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET DESENSITIZED

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-335412
201-~~773337~~

233

2. In January 1968 LIREALM-1 presented an accounting for reimbursement by the Station to which the Station took exception. Some of the entertainment of marginal assets involved totals which the Station found to be excessive. The result of this was that after some deliberation LIREALM-1 had to pay for part of these expenses out of his pocket. On 17 January 1968 ROWTON called the undersigned to ask about reimbursement of those expenses allowed by the Station. A brush contact was arranged for this purpose in the passageway leading to the Koala Restaurant, as ROWTON indicated that LIREALM-1 needed the money as soon as possible. At the agreed time the undersigned passed an envelope to ROWTON, who informed the undersigned that LIREALM-1 was waiting in the downstairs cafeteria of the Sanborns building. The undersigned, who had not seen LIREALM-1 at Christmas time and genuinely regretted the fact that the latter had to pay for operational expenses out of his pocket, agreed to see LIREALM-1 for a few minutes. When the undersigned refused to go to the downstairs Sanborns cafeteria, ROWTON suggested that he fetch LIREALM-1 and bring him to the silver shop upstairs in the same building. A 15-minute meeting (longer than expected) ensued between ROWTON, LIREALM-1, and the undersigned in a corner of the Sanborns silver shop. The meeting started a few minutes before 1700 hours.

3. On 28 January LIREALM-1 saw LOGINOV at the French Club. The following is a verbatim extract of the report written by LIREALM-1 on this meeting.

> I had joined Val and my wife on her side of the court for small talk with Val. He apologized for interrupting our game and suggested we go back to playing and he would watch us. We had made a date for tennis Wednesday. He would call me if his leg still bothered him or for any other reason he was unable to play. Now he said he wanted to study my game so that he could beat me Wednesday. Val walked with me as far as the net where he stopped me and the following conversation took place.
>
> "I saw you talking with your boss the other day," Val said with a slight grin.
>
> "My boss?" I asked. I suspected nothing and seriously considered the question. I began to search back in my mind if my cover boss had ever met Val. I recalled that I had once pointed Val out to him. The conversation proceeded too rapidly for me to answer my own question. The fact is that Val has never met my cover boss.
>
> "Yes. At Sanborns two Wednesdays ago. You had a drink in the bar and then talked to your boss."
>
> "Two Wednesdays ago... At Sanborns? No. You're mistaken. My boss left about six weeks ago--almost two months ago. No. I don't think I was at Sanborns." I answered Val honestly confused. I began to wonder who I had been with. I've often met people in the various Sanborns. I was trying to think who Val was confusing with my boss.
>
> "Yes. Your boss. You and your boss were talking together at the Sanborns next to your embassy."
>
> "No Val. My boss left at least two months ago. I can't recall the particular meeting at Sanborns that you are referring to, but I'll drink with anyone, anywhere, anytime." Val and I laughed. Until this moment I was answering him honestly and sincerely and might have been very convincing.

234

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET DESENSITIZED	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 34398

> As it began to dawn on me what Val was driving at I turned my back and started for the baseline. It was then that I felt weak and my face would have betrayed me if I had still been facing Val. By the time I reached the baseline I was composed. We spoke no further except to comment on good shots by me or my wife during the next five or ten minutes that he stood watching us.

4. The undersigned reported the above to his superiors as soon as he received LIREALM-1's report. A check of the LIEMPTY log for 17 January showed that LOGINOV had left the Soviet Embassy at 1404 and had returned at 1708 hours. This made his presence at Sanborns at the time of the meeting between LIREALM-1, ROWTON, and the undersigned impossible, as it would have given him about 10 minutes to leave the site of the meeting, get into his car, and drive to the Soviet Embassy, an impossible feat even in light traffic. It is clear then that LOGINOV was not present at the time of the meeting but was told that LIREALM-1 met with two Americans. It was and still is the undersigned's conviction that whoever saw LIREALM-1 was unable to positively identify ROWTON or the undersigned. The undersigned reasons that had LOGINOV known that he, the undersigned, had talked to LIREALM-1, LOGINOV would have mentioned his name after failing to obtain any reaction from LIREALM-1 from mentioning the latter's "boss." The undersigned believes that LOGINOV, who is not completely stupid, would have either said nothing or would have gone all the way in his statements to LIREALM-1 had he known the undersigned's name. By the same token it appears that LOGINOV failed to identify ROWTON. The undersigned had only met with one other Soviet besides LOGINOV at the time of the meeting, and that only once; and that Soviet was no longer in Mexico City when the meeting with LIREALM-1 took place. ROWTON has never had any contact, social or otherwise, with any of the Soviets.

5. The undersigned is the first to recognize that meeting with LIREALM-1 at the Sanborns silver shop was a thoroughly unwise move. He wishes to emphasize that this was the only meeting at the time that he had held with LIREALM-1 outside of a safehouse. All meetings between the undersigned and LIREALM-1 have since been held under the most secure conditions on the edge of the Federal District and, in one case, beyond. While this does not make this decision any wiser, he also wants to emphasize the fact that it was made on the spur of the moment, to quote the old cliche, because the undersigned "felt sorry" for LIREALM-1 because of the latter's financial difficulties with the Station over his last accounting. The undersigned unwisely put LIREALM-1's morale for a brief moment over basic security considerations. He is not in the habit of doing this as a matter of course. The day before his next scheduled tennis meeting with LIREALM-1 the following Wednesday, LOGINOV called LIREALM-1 and asked to be excused as his leg had worsened. The week after that LOGINOV showed up for his regular tennis game with LIREALM-1 but made no mention of his previous conversation with him two weeks before. The undersigned waited to complete a review of this case until he met LOGINOV face to face at one of the Consular Association functions. Because of the visits of Soviet athletes and artists which kept LOGINOV busy, however, this meeting did not materialize until 28 March. Although the undersigned and LOGINOV talked to each other off and on for more than two hours on this occasion during a visit to the local Home Fair, LOGINOV never mentioned anything about the Sanborns meeting. He has never brought LIREALM-1's name to the attention of the undersigned.

235

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET DESENSITIZED	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 34398

6. During a recent visit to the Station, a representative of the LPGLOBE staff at Headquarters was given the complete details of the above incident by LIREALM-1. He also reviewed the same incident with the undersigned and the Deputy Chief of Station. The LPGLOBE representative mentioned on this occasion that in his opinion the above incident should have been reported by cable. The undersigned stated then and wants to repeat now that this was not done because 1) it would have served no purpose to alert Headquarters without giving all the facts, which were not known at the time, and 2) the Station wanted to review all elements of this case to report the incident objectively, fairly, and completely. The undersigned told the LPGLOBE representative that he would consider documentation of this case complete after having the opportunity of meeting LOGINOV face to face again. As pointed out above, this did not occur until 28 March. Nothing in the operations conducted by the undersigned, LIREALM-1, or ROWTON has indicated that the Soviets positively identified either the undersigned or ROWTON so as to definitely brand LIREALM-1 as a WOFIRM operator.

Raymond A. Frady

for Willard C. CURTIS

236

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP LCIMPROVE - Identification of KGB Officers Who Participated In Counter-Surveillance of 201-827966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: (A) HMMW-16090, 15 January 1968
(B) MEXICO CITY 4777, 9 March 1968
(C) HMMA-34264, 11 March 1968

1. On 8 March 1968 after 201-827966 failed to show for two scheduled meetings (on the previous evening he had agreed to submit to a debriefing), the area of his hotel was checked by the undersigned. On a main street near the hotel the undersigned almost bumped into Valentin S. LOGINOV (201-~~[illegible]~~). A few minutes later Ivan K. BARANOV (201-277838) was observed photographing the area (including the undersigned) with an 8mm movie camera. LOGINOV was standing near BARANOV observing the undersigned. LILYRIC reports that LOGINOV and BARANOV were absent together from the Soviet Embassy during the period in question.

2. Another meet with 201-827966 was arranged by telephone for 12:30 on 9 March. From 12:28 to 12:48 the entrance to the hotel where the meeting took place was staked out by BARANOV and Vladimir A. DOLGOV (201-763035). BARANOV was carrying a 35mm camera with a larger telephoto lens. Visual identification of DOLGOV was tenative. However in view of LILYRIC reports that DOLGOV was absent from the Soviet Embassy for the period in question and that all other possible candidates were accounted for, the identification has been confirmed. In addition we have photos of DOLGOV wearing sunglasses identical to the ones he wore during the counter-surveillance.

3. Although we have had previous indications that DOLGOV is probably a KGB officer the Station feels that his participation in this counter-surveillance is sufficient to list him as known KGB.

4. We can also add photographer to BARANOV's technical duties.

Francis J. Coyne
for/Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
~~2~~ - C/SB
2 - C/WH

MICROFILMED
MAR 20 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

[illegible]

201-763035

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-277838 201-763035	HMMA-34271	12 March 1968
201-285412 B-201-827966 D-50-5-3	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-5-3 201-285412

14-00000

237

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, SB via Chief, WH

SUBJECT
REDTOP
Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REFERENCE: HMMA-32872, 24 August 1967

Enclosed is a finished copy of the SPR on Subject forwarded in draft under Reference dispatch.

Monroe B. DIFFENDAL

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City w/atts

CS COPY

201-285412 ✓

Attachments: A 1 - 15 and 17 and 18 herewith
B 16 and 19 Under Separate Cover

15 FEB 1968

1 att/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-16150	DATE 8 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412

1-SB/O/WH w/atts
1-SB/CI/K w/atts
1-WH/1 w/o atts
1-RID w/atts

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SB/O/WH	Jonathan Hanke	law	6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SB/O/WH		
C/SB/CI/K	08 Feb	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		

WWD

AN	20	SB/O/WH
~~PE~~		
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

1401

DISPATCH

238

S E C R E T

SPR PREPARED BY: JONATHAN L. WEENING
DATE : 14 August 1967
201 NUMBER : 201-285412
A-NUMBER :

1. NAME: Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (3, 5)

2. DPOB: 23 December 1927 in Moscow. (28)

Subject has stated that he comes from Moscow (1), and his wife said they grew up together in Moscow. (6) He once told another source, however, that he came from the northern part of the USSR (8), but this source is not known for accurate reporting.

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA:

a. Soviet Diplomatic Passport # 16993, issued 24 August 1960. (3)

b. Soviet Diplomatic Passport # 010264, issued 24 June 1965 (5), used currently. (4)

4. ETHNIC ORIGIN: Unknown

5. OTHER NAMES USED: Unknown.

6. CURRENT POSITION:

Third Secretary and Consul General at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. (1)

7. RELATIVES:

c. Wife: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna LOGINOVA. (28) Known as "Shura". (1)

DPOB: 20 August 1928 in Moscow. (28)

Passports: D-16094, used in 1962. (4)
D-010265, issued 24 June 1955, currently used. (4)

Description: Plump, has reddish hair. (15) Photographs are attached.

Languages: LOGINOVA has been studying Spanish with Carmen ROURE Canosa, a local employee of the Soviets, since at least June 1966 through May 1967 (1), but her Spanish is still said to be very limited. (6, 25) She is said to speak a little English (25), and claimed she had studied English in Moscow. (1) She is also said to speak some French. (25)

Miscellaneous: LOGINOVA has said that she has known her husband since age six as neighbors in Moscow. (6) She claims to be a chemical engineer. (6) During Subject's tour in Havana, 1960-63, LOGINOVA worked in the Soviet Consulate. (28) She arrived in Mexico on 10 October 1965, two months after her husband. (4) Since February 1966 she had been reported as chairman of the Zhenkom (Soviet Women's Organization), and as such has had to persuade the Soviet women to do various administrative chores, as well as being involved with running the dacha that the Soviets have had in Cuernavaca in the summers of 1966 and 1967. (1)

239

7. RELATIVES: Continued

d. Family: In June 1967 LOGINOVA asked the wife of Commercial Counselor Viktor Mikhaylovich IVANOV (201-245651) to call her mother when she got to Moscow, saying that her family lived at the Botanical Gardens. (1)

e. Children:

1) Daughter: Irina, born ca 1952. (28)

In June 1967 Subject said he had a fifteen-year-old daughter, who was living with LOGINOVA's mother (in Moscow). (6) In April 1967 LOGINOVA said her daughter was in an English school in Moscow. (25) Irina was reportedly with her parents in Havana, 1960-63 (28); however, she did not travel with them from Havana to Moscow on 11 May 1962 (4) and therefore may have been in Havana for only a part of Subject's tour. She has not been in Mexico.

2) Son: Dmitriy. (4)

DOB: 1959 (28), birthday probably 6 August. (1)

Dmitriy was with his parents in Havana, 1960-63 (28), and arrived in Mexico City with his mother on 10 October 1965. (4) Subject has expressed interest in having his son take English lessons when the family returns from home leave in August 1967. (21)

8. LANGUAGES:

a. Spanish:

Subject speaks fluent Spanish with very little accent. (11, 24)

b. English:

Since 1966 Subject has been reported taking English lessons, apparently at the Instituto Interpretes Traductores in Mexico City. (1) In April 1967 he said that he had been paying a girl (American) for lessons in English, but that she did not have enough background in grammar. (25) (COMMENT: Subject was probably more interested in meeting American girls than in studying English in this case.) Subject's English is believed to be fair at present.

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:

One source described Subject as tall, blond and blue-eyed. (11) Another source said that he was six feet and had short, reddish-blond hair. (24) Photographs are attached.



[illegible]

10. PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, HABITS:

a. All sources agree in describing Subject as smooth and completely self-controlled. He is an aggressive conversationalist. One source described him as vulgar, crude, ill-mannered, short-tempered and a tyrant, who thinks he is a big shot. (8)

b. Subject seems to have made a play for every girl he has met. In at least one instance he has claimed to be unmarried when inviting a girl out. (27) When his wife was staying in the dacha in Cuernavaca he reportedly made dates with other women. (8) On 13 September 1966 he was seen in a cafe with a Mexican-looking woman. (18)

c. Subject is interested in sports and is good at them. In September 1966 it was reported that he did not play tennis, (15) and by April 1967 he was said to be a good tennis player, claimed that he had been playing for less than a year and never played more than once a week. (25) He is said to have the build of a trained athlete, the brutish look of a boxer or wrestler, and the grace of a natural athlete. (25) He has said that he boxed when he was younger, and that he plays basketball and volleyball (25), also that his favorite sports are skiing and speed skating. (21). He also plays chess but is not an addict. (25) He has belonged to the French Club in Mexico City since ca. November 1965 (1) and has been seen there frequently on weekends, sometimes with his wife and child. (15) One Sunday (20 March 1966) Subject and Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN were seen playing badminton with their wives at the French Club. (15)

d. One source reported that Subject smoked "Fiesta" cigarettes (8), and another source reported in April 1967 that Subject did not smoke. (25) One source reported that Subject downs several beers after playing tennis (25), but another source reported that on a social occasion Subject did not even finish one Scotch and water. (19) On 8 February 1966 Subject and Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN reportedly drove into the Soviet Embassy at 0300 hours roaring drunk (8), which may or may not be accurate reporting.

e. Subject has apparently been taking English lessons since early 1966 at the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, which is located at Tiber 113 very near the U.S. Embassy. He seems to have made friends with a number of people through these classes. (1) (Cf. under Contacts)

f. In February 1966 it was reported that Subject's wife had bought a tape recorder. (1) In June 1967 Subject himself ordered a Grundig tape recorder. (1)

g. Subject was reported having an operation on 1 February 1966 (17); no further details are available.

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

Subject claims that he has served in the Red Army. (8)

(Subject's name was reportedly listed in February 1960 as about to be assigned to Buenos Aires as Soviet Military Attache; it would appear that either this was another person with the same name, or that Subject was being considered for assignment there as D diplomatic attache.)

14 September 1960: Subject and his family arrived in Havana, where Subject was assigned as Attache at the Soviet Embassy. (3, 28)

December 1961: Subject toured Latin America as escort and interpreter for the Dynamo soccer team. (28)

11. CURRICULUM VITAE: Continued

11 May 1962: Subject, his wife and son transited Mexico City travelling from Havana enroute to Montreal (4), presumably on their way to Moscow on home leave.

September 1963: Subject and his family left Havana PCS. (28)

3 August 1965: Subject arrived PCS in Mexico as Third Secretary assigned to the Soviet Embassy. (4) Subject replaced Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO as Vice Consul. (1)

10 October 1965: Subject's wife and son arrived in Mexico. (4)

August 1966: Subject was apparently promoted to Consul General after Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV left Mexico on 4 August 1966 for home leave. In September 1966 Subject was telling everyone in town that he is now the Consul. (1, 6, etc.)

16 July 1967: Subject, accompanied by his wife and son, left Mexico for Moscow via Paris. (4) Also travelling with them on LOGINOVA's passport was Tatyana, the daughter of Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH. (4) Subject has told several people that this is home leave and that he will be returning to Mexico (1, 6, 21, 22).

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION: Known KGB, based on his having taken over an agent previously handled by known KGB officers Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870) and Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379), as well as his other intelligence activities given below.

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

(Cf. also information under Contacts, below. Subject has undoubtedly been developing contacts, particularly with American girls, with a view toward intelligence possibilities.)

a. In December 1961 while travelling with the Dynamo soccer team, Subject met a Bolivian security service official in La Paz, Bolivia and reportedly tried to persuade him to study in Cuba. The source, however, is believed to be a fabricator. (28)

b. After Subject saw the soccer team off, he continued to Panama, where he met with a Mexican citizen, Edmundo Fausto ZORRILLA Martinez (P-2818) on 16 December 1961. On 17 December 1961 Subject and ZORRILLA travelled to Mexico City on the same plane. Subject had ca. (US) $2000 with him in Panama. (29)

c. On 14 February 1966 KGB officer Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODO (201-202379) turned an agent over to Subject. (The agent had previously been handled by Subject's predecessor, Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO.) On 14 April 1966 the agent attempted to break his intelligence relationship with the Soviets, although he has remained in business and social contact with them. Subject, occasionally joined by PRIKHODKO, has continued to give intelligence requirements to the agent, who has questioned him particularly about his access to the U.S. Embassy and tried to persuade him to continue cooperating with the KGB. On 24 June 1966 Subject asked the agent for information on Eduardo WEBELMAN and his son Mauricio. On 13 December 1966 Subject asked the agent to try to find out who the WOFIRM chief in Mexico was. (6). (COMMENT: Mauricio WEBELMAN was subsequently reported to be a friend of suspect KGB officer Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN's, 201-773422).

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: Continued

d. On 20 January 1966 Cristobal TORRES Ponce, chauffeur employed by the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, was sent to the Soviet Embassy to pick up the passport of the wife of a U.S. Embassy official who was planning a trip to the USSR. Subject talked to TORRES, asking him if he would like to visit the USSR or receive Soviet magazines, if he knew anyone who would be willing to give him English lessons, and finally made a dinner date with TORRES for 24 January 1966. When TORRES did not keep the date, Subject called him on 8 and 9 February 1966 in an attempt to keep the contact alive. (12, 14)

e. Subject dealth with the Federal District police several times in July 1966 in regard to a radio that had been stolen from his car. On 20 July 1966 the police an (LNU) who had been handling the radio case reported to his superior, General Luis CUETO Ramirez, that Subject had offered him 5,000 pesos (4,000 dollars) a month if he would work for him. After consulting with the Minister of Interior, CUETO told the policeman to accept Subject's offer, which he reportedly did on 21 July 1966. Subject's first assignment to the policeman was to locate Venezuelan citizens Nicolas Juan BOSTROEM and wife. (16) (COMMENT: Nothing further has been learned about this case. BOSTROEM is a native Russian employed by Stephens-Adamson de Mexico, his wife teaches Russian at the Ibero-American University.)

f. Subject has occasionally been reported visiting the small general store located across the street from the Soviet Embassy. On 5 November 1966 Subject reportedly questioned the store owner about the occupants of one apartment building in the same block as the store, and on 6 December 1966 he asked general questions about the new apartment building at the end of the block. (8) (COMMENT: Both of these buildings contain base houses for the fixed surveillance of the Soviet Embassy.)

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

a. In Mexico, Subject has consistently been reported performing consular duties. He issues visas and sees visitors to the Soviet Embassy in one of the reception rooms. (21) He makes travel reservations for PCS and visiting Soviets. He is responsible when either PCS or visiting Soviets become ill and have to be sent to a hospital. He has often attended to the needs of Soviet ships in Mexican ports. He has done considerable house-hunting for the Soviets, such as looking for a new school building and for houses in Cuernavaca that would be suitable as a dacha. Subject had to sign the dacha contract in both 1966 and 1967. Subject also regularly attends the functions of the Consular Corps Association, and on 16 February 1967 he had the Association to the Soviet Embassy for a Russian evening. (1) In September 1966 Subject was reported as having become the Consul General (6, 8, 1, 11), having replaced Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV, who left Mexico for home leave on 4 August 1966. On 21 February 1967 Subject tried to get Panamanian visas for himself and Soveksportfilm representative Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (known KGB) to attend a Consular Congress to be held in Panama 11-15 April 1967. (1) The visas were refused.

b. On 26 January 1966 Subject attended a lecture given by a Mexican who was an exchange professor at a U.S. university. The lecture was sponsored by the PRI. Soviet Cultural Attache Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV also attended the lecture and set on the platform, whereas Subject sat at the back of the room. (13)

c. Subject is reported to have taken the following trips to Mexico:

26-28 October 1965: To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship. (1)

2-4 November 1965: To Mazatlan with Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN to attend to Soviet ship. (1)

244

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: Continued

4-8 December 1965: To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship. (1, 9)

2-5 February 1966: To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship. (1)

13-20 February 1966: To Coatzacoalcos to attend to Soviet ships. Soviet Embassy chauffeur Anatoliy Pavlovich PRASHCHIKIN went with Subject but returned to Mexico City earlier. (1)

25-28 April 1966: Possibly to Guadalajara with Soviet Inturist visitors attending a travel conference there. (1)

4-9 May 1966: To Veracruz to attend to the matter of a missing Soviet sailor. (1)

27-30 May 1966: To Veracruz to attend to Soviet ship. (1)

26 February-2 March 1967: To Veracruz with Soviet Commercial Counselor Viktor Mikhaylovich IVANOV to attend to Soviet ships. (1) While in Veracruz, Subject asked the U.S. Vice Consul, Richard BOOTH, if he would intercede with the Mexican authorities to get shore leave for the Soviet crew. (24)

15. CONTACTS:

a. Soviet:

1) Subject has been seen coming and going at the Soviet Embassy most frequently with Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123, known KGB), whom Subject replaced as Consul. Since Subject's departure for home leave on 16 July 1967, YATSKOV has been regularly using Subject's car. Subject has also been observed leaving the Soviet Embassy fairly often with Ivan Konstantinovich BARANOV (201-277838, known KGB sweeper) and Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH (201-767974, suspect KGB technician). Subject has also borrowed the cars of YATSKOV and known KGB chauffeur Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV (201-273046). (7)

2) In May 1966 Subject reportedly gave the wife of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (201-784917, known KGB) a hard time when she wanted to send her son to the USSR with another Soviet wife. NIKITIN then complained to Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379, known KGB), who reportedly ordered Subject to get a ticket for the NIKITIN child. (1) Cf. also above, where PRIKHODKO seems to be the senior case officer for an agent currently being handled by Subject.

3) In May 1967 LOGINOVA mentioned that she had known Boris Aleksandrovich CHMYKOV (201-268115, known GRU) for years. (1) (COMMENT: CHMYKHOV was stationed in Havana 1960-62, at the same time that Subject was there.) Cf. below for report of Subject's having taken CHMYKHOV with him to Cuernavaca to meet ZAREBSKI.

Subject has also been reported in contact with the following Soviets not stationed in Mexico:

4) Vitaliy Konstantinovich BOYAROV (201-355606, known KGB), visited Mexico 27 May - 9 June 1966. On 1 June 1966 Subject and P.A. YATSKOV were absent from the Soviet Embassy for four hours with BOYAROV. (7)

5) Vasiliy Vasilyevich GRIGORYEV, member of petroleum delegation that visited Mexico 31 March-14 April 1967. While GRIGORYEV was in Mexico he was reported in contact with Subject several times, once making plans to go to the movies together, also to ask Subject whether he should attend a French reception and to report the illness of one of the other Soviet delegates. (1)

245

15. CONTACTS: Continued

a. Soviet:

6) Boris Semenovich IVANOV (201-078078, known KGB), visited Mexico 8-22 February 1967. Subject made reservations for IVANOV in Mexico City and probably saw him off at the airport. (1)

7) Yuriy Vladimirovich LEBEDEV (201-213261), Minister Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Havana. On 7 February 1966 Subject was reported sending something to LEBEDEV with a Soviet professor who was travelling back to Moscow via Havana. (1)

b. Non-Soviet:

1) Alonso AGUILAR Monteverede (P-2152, 201-334259), active Marxist intellectural.

On 28 June 1967 AGUILAR reminded Subject that they and their wives were invited for Saturday evening to the home of Alberto PENICHE. (1) (Alberto PENICHE Blanco, P-12294, manager of centrist newspaper El Heraldo de Mexico and reported as minor contributor to the PCM in 1964.)

2) (Mrs.) Gloria *ALFARO, no other traces.

On 5 February 1966 Mrs. fnu ALFARO (Possibly Gloria) wanted to talk to Subject to congratulate him on a Soviet moon probe. (1) On 22 June 1966 Gloria ALFARO reminded Subject that they had met at the house of Mrs. SOTO (possibly Graciala, q.v.) on Christmas Eve 1965 and invited Subject to a party. Subject was unable to go but said he would call Gloria for coffee. Gloria gave her telephone as 35-71-30 (listed in 1964 to Yolanda ALFARO Vda de CACERES Buitrago, Chiapas 130-A, current telephone 25-10-24). (1) Also on 22 June 1966 Gloria ALFARO told Subject she would like to talk with some of the Soviets, and Subject suggested getting together on Friday "after English class". (17) (COMMENT: ALFARO may have been studying English with Subject at the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores.) On 3 August 1966 Gloria and Subject tried to agree on a date to get together, and she said she would like for him to meet a friend (female) of hers who was visiting Mexico from Central America. (1)

3) Ofelia ALFARO Lopez (P-11339), professor of economics at UNAM, good friend of the wife of Antonio SARMIENTO (q.v), social contact with several Soviets.

On 30 August 1965 ALFARO invited Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOVI to her house and included Subject and Leonid Vasilyevich KNIKIFOROV. (1)

4) (Dr.) Juan Luis ALVAREZ Gayou, teacher at UNAM and Deputy Director of Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores.

Subject presumably met ALVAREZ at the Instituto, where Subject is believe to have studied English. The first reported contact was on 11 April 1966, when they spoke to each other, using the familiar form of address, about having missed each other in Cuernavaca. Subject was invited to ALVAREZ' birthday party. Subject said he would see ALVAREZ the following day when he was going to have class with a new teacher. On 13 June 1966 Professor fnu ALVAREZ, Juan Luis' father, asked Subject if he would bring the projector to the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, and Subject said he would. On 12 July 1966 ALVAREZ, who had been out of town, asked Subject if he wanted to continue taking lessons, and Subject said yes, he would go there the following day. On 19 November 1966 ALVAREZ left a message for Subject to call him at 35-68-96 (listed to Natividad GAMERO de la Fuente, Hamburger 25). On 22

246

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

5) (Ing.) Manuel ANAYA S., employee of Mexican Ministry of Hydraulic Resources, visited the USSR in summer 1965.

On 19 July 1966 ANAYA thanked Subject for his visa and said he would get together with Subject when he got back in order to discuss his trip. (17)

6) Emilia AROSAMENA Vallarina (P-10933, 201-771073), Panamanian Consul General in Mexico, in contact with several Soviets.

On 15 November 1965 Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO said he wanted to introduce Subject to AROSAMENA, because Subject had some questions to ask her. Presumably related is a report that the Panamanian Counselor Jose B. CALVO, told Subject on 19 November 1965 that he had no answer for Subject yet. (1)

7) Miriam AVILA Katz (P-581, 201-814144), employee of Mundus Tours travel agency, about to leave Mexico to marry an American and live in New York.

Subject was first reported in contact with AVILA in April 1966 in connection with travel bookings Subject made. (1) On 2 June 1966 Subject flirted with her, and said he would invited her to a volleyball game. (1) During the rest of 1966 Subject invited her out a few times, told her he was married but that his wife was not in Mexico, asked her to introduce him to some of her friends and especially wanted to know, if she knew anyone in the U.S. Embassy. In April 1967 Subject reluctantly agreed to issue a visa to Dr. KUTTLER (q.v.), whose travel AVILA was arranging, and asked as a return favor that she introduce him to some of her friends. (6) In June 1967 Subject reportedly stopped AVILA coming out of work to ask her about the Israeli War. (6)

8) Celia BAYARDI Torres, no traces.

On 7 February 1966 an unidentified man visited Subject at the Soviet Embassy. This man came to the Embassy in a car driven by a woman, who remained in the car, with license plates registered to Celia BAYARDI Torres, Arquitector 46, Colonia Escandon, telephone 15-34-02. The phone is listed to Francisa TORRES Vda de BAYARDI. (7)

9) Leila S. BELAVAL, visa officer at U.S. Embassy.

In June 1967 BELAVAL reported that she had been in contact with Subject over visa matters, that Subject had asked her what she did in the evenings, whether she spent her off hours with other U.S. Embassy employees, and had said that he was unmarried. In June 1967 he offered to take her to the Ukrainian Ballet when it came to Mexico. She refused his invitations. (27)

10) Carlos BLANCO Solano (P-9328), former Federal Security (DFS) agent, now with Judicial Police. In 1960-61 BLANCO invited several U.S. Embassy girls out and offered his services to the U.S. Embassy. BLANCO works for Carlos CASAMADRID Miranda, who is suspected of having a clandestine relationship with KGB officer Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV.

On 1 November 1965 BLANCO called Subject at the Soviet Embassy and remarked that they had not seen each other for a long time. Subject said he would call BLANCO to get together the following Wednesday. (1) On 8 September 1966 Graciela SOTO (q.v), who described herself

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

10) Carlos BLANCO Soloano Continued

as BLANCO's friend, invited Subject to the baptism of her son Rafael's child and mentioned that BLANCO's wife Magdalena was going. (1) On 10 November 1966 BLANCO invited Subject to a party for BLANCO's daughter, said they would first go to the church near Graciela's house on Tamaulipas. (1) On 6 December 1966 BLANCO told Subject that "Comandante Carlos" (Presumably CASAMADRID) urgently wanted to see YATSKOV, and Subject said he would have YATSKOV call him. (1)

11) Lubomir BLAZIK (P-1730, 201-206043), former Czech Second Secretary and Consul in Mexico.

On 28 December 1965 P.A. YATSKOV left a message for BLAZIK, that Subject's wife was sick and could not attend the dinner to which the BLAZIKs had invited her. (1)

12) Rosa Martha BRACHO Sanchez (P-12038), left in November 1965 on a scholarship to study ballet in the USSR.

On 21 and 22 September 1966 Rosa's mother (fnu) was in contact with Subject in order to talk to him about visa problems of her two daughters who were both studying dance in the USSR. (1) (Name of other daughter is unknown.)

13) Erica CAMERMAN (P-12843), said to be a reporter with The News (17), but this seems unlikely, no other traces.

On 21 February 1966 CAMERMAN told Subject that she was going out of town the next day but when she got back she wanted to invite Subject and his wife to her house. Subject said he had no word on her papers yet. On 28 February 1966 she said he had been in Cozumel. Subject said he still had no word on her papers. She invited Subject to dinner with his wife, and he said he would call her back. On 10 May 1966 she tried to call Subject, who was out, saying that she wanted to know about the arrival of a man from Russia. On 11 May 1966 Subject told her he still had no answer on her papers. She said she planned to take a business trip to Brussels and Paris in June and mentioned that Elke (LNU) was in Paris visiting her son. On 10 June 1966 Subject asked for CAMERMAN at 18-65-61 and was told she was in Europe for a month (phone listed to importing firm Incomex, S.A. at Isabel la Catolica 45-914). On 6 July 1966 Subject called her at 12-78-32 (listed to the banco de Mexico at Cinco de Mayo 2) and told her he had a document for her. On 11 July 1966 she told Subject that she needed his signature on the document, also sent regards to Subject's wife and children. (1)

14) Ernesto CHAZARO Peregrino (P-12818, 201-800142), assistant security chief of Astilleros de Veracruz, S.A. a shipyard in Veracruz. Said to be the adverturer-type, once worked for the Federal Security Police but was fired because of involvement in arms contraband.

CHAZARO Probably did meet Subject on 5 May 1966 in Veracruz. CHAZARO undoubtedly fabricated his story that Subject tried to recruit him after that and set up a 50,00 peso bank account in CHAZARO's name. (30)

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

15) (Lic.) Jacobo CHENCINSKY, director of the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, located at Tiber 113.

Subject's contact with CHENCINSKY was presumably been connected with Subject's taking English at the Instituto. On 24 March 1966 CHENCINSKY tried unsuccessfully to reach Subject. On 4 July 1966 CHENCINSKY told Subject that Janet (LNU, apparently Subject's teacher) had been unable to fix her working papers and had had to leave Mexico and asked if Subject's classes could be postponed. Subject agreed and said he would like to talk to CHENCINSKY. (1)

16) David F. COOLBAUGH (P-12579, 201-796142), American employed with United Nations in Mexico, co-director of geological project that two Soviets were also assigned to.

In 1966 Subject was in contact with COOLBAUGH several times in regard to documenting the two Soviets working on the UN project. (1)

17) Ana Maria ESCOBAR (P-11858), in 1965 reported to be a student and also working as private secretary to the PRI chief for the Federal District.

On 11 October 1965 ESCOBAR tried unsuccessfully to reach Subject. On 12 October 1965 she told Subject she had wanted to invite him to the theater the previous day because she had been given free tickets. She sent regards to Pablo (presumably Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV). (1)

18) Margaret (aka Magre) FEDOR (P-12967), no other traces.

On 17 March 1966 FEDOR invited Subject to go on a Sunday outing with a group of friends whom Subject also knew. She mentioned that she was studying French in the evenings and was about to begin Russian classes at the United Nations. Subject said he would call her at home later. On 28 March 1966 Subject told FEDOR that he had stopped by her house with theater tickets but she had been out. Rebeca (LNU) had told FEDOR that the play was good. FEDOR told Subject that on Saturday there would be a discussion with Jose CORNEJO (no identifiable traces), who had been in South America, and Subject said he would go. On 8 June 1966 FEDOR told Subject that she was going to go to the U.S. on vacation and mentioned that Daniel SEIN (no traces) had asked about Subject. Subject said he would call her later. On 24 August 1966 FEDOR told Subject that there would be a discussion about India at her house on 26 August, and Subject said he would try to go. Subject asked her whether she knew the Soviets working on a United Nations project, but she said she did not. (1) (COMMENT: FEDOR may work at the United Nations in Mexico City.)

19) Fnu FLORES, man employed at Mex-American travel agency.

On 15 March 1966 FLORES, who described himself as a friend of Gloria's and others', asked Subject for visa information. (1) (Gloria might be Gloria PINTO, cf. below.)

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

20) Socorro FLORES (P-12259), formerly employed at Mex-Americana de Viajes travel agency, no other traces.

> Subject was first reported in contact with FLORES in September 1965 in connection with travel reservations and for about a year Subject continued to discuss travel arrangements and at the same time flirt with FLORES and also send regards to Susana LNU, who worked with her. FLORES invited Subject to dinner with some of her friends. Subject was very interested in knowing who the friends were, but FLORES said they were not the Americans, because she hadn't seen them. On 8 September 1966 Subject arranged to meet FLORES in front of a movie theater. Then there was no report of contact between them until on 13 June 1967 FLORES told Subject that she had a new job and asked him to call her at 27-85-50, extension 18 (no Station listing of this number). She mentioned that she had not seen him for a while.

21) Rafael FUSONI Alordi (P-5119, 201-237904), Argentine diplomat, former KGB agent, in occasional social contact with Soviets, primarily through diplomatic functions.

> Subject met FUSONI at a consular corps function in January 1967 and again at a Czech Embassy reception in May 1967. Subject later called FUSONI and offered him tickets to a Bolshoy Ballet performance and on 11 June 1967 they attended the Bolshoy performance together and went to supper afterwards. (23)

22) Moises GAMERO de la Fuente, no other traces.

> On 6 April 1966 Subject reportedly called telephone number 2-30-65 in Cuernavaca from a pay phone. (8) (This number is listed to GAMERO.)

23) Pearl GONZALEZ (P-11420), society editor for The News, Mexico City English language newspaper, in social contact with several Soviets.

> On 25 November 1965 GONZALEZ gave a party and invited several Soviets. Subject was one of those who attended. (10)

24) Alfonso GUZMAN and Carlos SANDOVAL, of Servicio Diplomatico in the Mexican Foreign Ministry.

> Since August 1966 (i.e. when Subject became Consul General), Subject has been reported dealing with GUZMAN and SANDOVAL in regard to Soviet visas. In October 1966 Subject had tickets for GUZMAN to a sports event, but GUZMAN was unable to go. Subject also invited GUZMAN to the Soviet Embassy reception on 7 November 1966. (1)

25) Abdel Rahman HASSAN Abdel-Rahman, First Secretary and Consul at the UAR Embassy in Mexico.

> On 1 June 1967 Subject and HASSAN discussed consular affairs and also talked about getting together for tennis the following week. (1)

26) (Miss) fnu HERNANDEZ, of the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, probably identical with Gabriela HERNANDEZ Elizalde, who in 1967 was the secretary at this institute.

> On 29 June 1966 HERNANDEZ told Subject that his class would be postponed for a week because Sarita (LNU) was sick. (1)

27) Lee HIGGINS, male, no traces

> On 19 May 1966 HIGGINS tried unsuccessfully to call Subject. (1)

250

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

28) Vincent HODGINS, British citizen, sales manager of Canadian Pacific Airlines in Mexico City.

On 28 October 1966 HODGINS contacted Subject, saying that BRADLEY (J.E. Ralph BRADLEY, regional sales manager of Canadian Pacific) had met Subject the night before, and HODGINS wanted to discuss business with Subject. Subject offered to visit HODGINS in his office. (1) (COMMENT: The Soviets began flying with Canadian Pacific when a new Aeroflot flight was put in service to Canada.) On 3 November 1966 HODGINS gave Subject information on flights and Subject said he would stop by his office next week. On 24 February 1967 Subject was reported to have an appointment with HODGINS. (1)

29) Jan JAKOWIEC (P-9097, 201-250618), Polish Second Secretary and Consul in Mexico.

Subject and JAKOWIEC seem to be good friends, in addition to being in contact with each other through consular duties. (19)

30) Karen JOFFER, no other traces.

On 16 August 1966 Subject apologized to JOFFER that he had been busy the week before but said he could see her at 1630 hours that day. (1) (COMMENT: This could well be a routine visa request.)

31) (Dr.) Yury KUTTLER (P-1573), dentist, Soviet contact, Communist sympathizer.

In April 1966 Subject was reported making a dental appointment with KUTTLER. (1) In April 1967 when the tourist agency representative, Miriam AVILA Katz, was trying to get a visa for KUTTLER, Subject spoke scathingly of him and said he would not give him a visa unless he fulfilled all the requirements. (1) Subject explained that he had once gone to KUTTLER to have some dental work done and that KUTTLER had charged him too much, and that this was why he did not want to issue him a visa. (26)

32) Jacques LEMAIRE, representative of French steamship company in Mexico, scheduled to leave Mexico soon, member of French Club, where he probably met Subject.

On 14 July 1967 LEMAIRE invited Subject to the French Embassy reception that day, but Subject was unable to go. LEMAIRE sent regards to Subject's wife. (1)

33) Yuliya LIPOVSKAYA, probably identical with the Julia YASCHIN listed in the telephone book as living in Mexicali 175, phone 15-35-47, presumably the wife of Solomon (aka Julio) YASCHIN.

On 30 November 1965 LIPOVSKAYA contacted Subject and told him a long rambling story about her relatives. Subject was evidently interested, urged her to visit the USSR and suggested she come to the Soviet Embassy to talk to him. On 24 December 1965 LIPOVSKAYA tried to call Subject but was referred by mistake to another Valentin. On 8 and 20 January 1966 she asked Subject if he had heard from her relative, the soccer player Lev YASCHIN, but Subject still had no news for her. (1)

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

34) Tatiana RAKOFF Vda de MARCHAND (P-370), widow of Rene MARCHAND Boisselet, former professor at UNAM and director of the Jugoslav Cultural Institute. She is evidently a native Russian, but French citizen.

> Tatiana was seen visiting Subject at the Soviet Embassy on 3 January and 15 April 1967; Subject seemed very friendly with her, and on 18 April 1967 left the Embassy together with her. (7) On 9 January 1967 it appeared that she had asked Subject for a visa. She also told him she had the information on the man who had been consul, but Subject cut her off and said that it would be better for them to get together to discuss it. On 25 February 1965 she told Subject she would help him join a club. On 16 May 1967 she asked Subject if he had called the poles, but he said he had forgotten and would do it right away. (1)

35) (Dr.) Alfonso MARTINEZ Alvarez (P-1799), Guatemalan leftist doctor, has house at Lake Tequesquitengo to which he often invites groups of Soviets.

> MARTINEZ was reported in contact with Subject in fall 1966 and in January 1967 inviting Subject and other Soviets to his house on the lake. Subject was also in contact with his son, Eduardo MARTINEZ (no identifable traces). (1)

36) (General) Raul MENDIOLEA Cerecero (P-5700) deputy chief of the Federal District Police.

> On 27 October 1966 Subject called the police to ask what MENDIOLEA's rank was. (1)

37) William de MIER (P-5552), British citizen, general manager of KLM airline in Mexico.

> In May 1967 Subject was reportedly discussing Soviet travel via KLM with de MIER. (1, 6)

38) (Lic.) Oscar OBREGON, Jr., not further identified.

> On 2 June 1967 OBREGON, who appeared to be a friend of Subject's, told Subject he would like to invite the Bolshoy troups to his house, but Subject said they would have little time in Mexico City. OBREGON also asked Subject if he could get him some caviar, and Subject said he would bring him some back from Moscow after his vacation. (1)

39) David ORNELAS, of Mundus Tours.

> ORNELAS has been Subject's principal contact at Mundus Tours in regard to making travel bookings. There has been no indication of anything more than a business relationship between them, except that in June 1966 Subject gave ORNELAS some magazines. (1)

40) Salvador PAZ Plata (P-12775), shipping agent with Representaciones Maritimas, Soviet Commercial contact.

> On 1 March 1966 it was reported that Subject had met PAZ in Mazatlan, and they used the familiar form of address with each other. During 1966 they were occasionally reported making luncheons dates or planning to get together after work. There has been no record of recent contact. (1)

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

41) Gloria PINTO, located at telephone 23-62-85, listed to Dr. Jose Maria PINTO Ancira, Tajin 592, no other traces on either name.

On 17 May 1967 Gloria thanked Subject for giving a visa to her sister-in-law. She said that Ruth (LNU) was going to Valle de Bravo on the weekend, but Subject said he would not be able to go. She added that Alfonso (LNU) would be at the Cafe Jujuy that afternoon at 1700, and Subject said he would try to go and would see Gloria there. On 13 June 1967 Gloria told Subject that her daughter did not want to work for Ralph (LNU) any more, because they wanted to send her to Pittsburgh. Subject said he could not go to the party Saturday that was to be held at the home of Ernesto ACEVEDO (no identifable traces). On 12 July 1967 Gloria told Subject that she had everything ready and that she would stop by the Embassy to say goodbye (perhaps going to the USSR). (1)

42) (Miss) Mercedes PINTO, no identifiable traces.

On 2 March 1967 Mercedes PINTO called Subject, who was out of town. (1) (COMMENT: Mercedes could be the sister-in-law of Gloria PINTO mentioned above.)

43) Julio PLATAS Urbina (P-6948, 201-300319), claims to be a Soviet courier, has been in contact with the KGB, may be a provocation agent.

On 29 October 1965 PLATAS called, but Subject was out. On 1 November 1965 PLATA told Subject he had changed jobs, no longer worked for Mex Hogar but was now with the Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (labor union). Subject said he would call him. (1)

44) Rafael Alfredo RAYN (P-8415, 201-357138), manager of Garza Lopez Tours.

Subject has been in contact with RAYN in 1966-67 on routine travel matters. In August 1965 Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV asked RAYN for a chart of all commercial passenger ships operating between Veracruz and New York for the month of Sepetember 1965, including the cost of travel and baggage. In December 1965 Subject reminded RAYN of YATSKOV's request and asked him to include rail travel to New York and sea travel to Europe on the chart. RAYN never provided the chart. (1)

45) Sara ROSENFIELD and husband Loyd ROSENFIELD (P-11665, 201-789388), both writers for The News.

Both ROSENFIELDs met Subject at a reception at the Indian Embassy given by the Indian Consul K. D. PARASHAR. Subject invited them to Soviet Embassy receptions of 16 February and 23 February 1967, and invited Sara to attend the Home Show with the consular corps, which she did. On 11 July 1967 they again met briefly at an Indian Embassy reception. (22)

46) Fernando Jose SALOMON Vallecillo, from Nicaragua.

On 24 October 1966 SALOMON told Subject that he had a letter from the Socialist Party of Nicaragua addressed to the Soviet Consul and that he had come specially from Nicaragua to deliver it. Subject said he would talk to SALOMON the next day at the Soviet Embassy. (1) (SALOMON also made an appointment to see the Cuban Ambassador the same day.)

253

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

47) Antonio SARMIENTO de la Barrera (P-12703), businessman who belongs to the French Club and has been reported friendly with several Soviets particulary Subject's predecessor, Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO, and currently Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV.

On 24 April 1966 Subject was seen playing chess at the French Club with SARMIENTO and then went swimming with his wife. As of September 1966 Subject was reportedly still very friendly with the SARMIENTOs at the French Club. (15) On 17 December 1965 Mrs. SARMIENTO invited NIKIFOROV to a Christmas party and said to bring Subject and Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV along. (1)

48) Francis S. SHERRY, consular officer of the U.S. Embassy.

Subject has met SHERRY at consular corps functions. On 28 January 1967 they discussed playing tennis together. (20)

49) (Dr.) Emiliano SORIANO Ariz (P-6741), doctor frequently consulted by the Soviets in Mexico.

In November 1965 Subject took a sick Soviet sailor to be treated by SORIANO. In December 1965 and January 1966 Subject himself was being treated by SORIANO. (1)

50) Graciela SOTO, no traces.

On 8 September 1966 Graciela, who described herself as Carlos BLANCO's friend (q.v.), invited Subject to the baptism of her son Rafael's child, also mentioned Rosita, who may be Rafael's wife (no traces on Rafael or Rosita SOTO). On 9 November 1966 Graciela called Subject, started to chat about having a toothache and that she had tried to call him before, but Subject cut her off and said he would call her the next day and to say hello to everyone. On 10 November 1966 Carlos BLANCO invited Subject to a party and said they would first go to the church near Graciela's house on Tamaulipas. (1) (One Alfredo SOTO, no traces, is listed at Tamaulipas 115.)

51) Jiri SVESTKA (P-7111, 201-285441), Czech Second Secretary and Consul, suspect intelligence officer.

Subject and SVESTKA seem to be quite friendly, han dinner together as well as discussing consular business. (1)

52) Leopoldo VAN DYCK, employee of Air France, said to be a homosexual, has been friendly with other Soviet consular officers.

On 6 and 13 September 1965 Subject was reported in contact with VAN DYCK in regard to visas for Air France passengers. (17) On 5 July 1966 Subject told David ORNELAS of Mundus Tours to give VAN DYCK his regards, adding that VAN DYCK would know what kind of regards they were. (1)

53) Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz (P-4805, 201-238943), came to Mexico in 1956 with his mother, Lucia RUIZ Garcia (P-4413), who lived in Moscow for 17 years and taught Spanish there - KGB officer Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN was reportedly one of her students. In 1958-59 Rafael translated for the Soviet TASS correspondent in Mexico, in 1961 he was teaching Russian at the IICMR (Soviet Cultural Institute), and he is currently teaching at the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores. His current address is Romero de Terreros 922-1, telephone 43-80-16.

254

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

53) Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz (P-4805, 201-238943) Continued

On 19 May 1967 VIDIELLA's wife tried to call Subject, saying that she was calling on behalf of the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, and that her husband had written a letter in Russian about some tourists and she wanted a Russian typewriter to have it typed up on. (1)

54) (Col. and Lic.) Rafael VILLAURRUTIA Lopez, also reported in contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

On 30 January 1967 VILLAURRUTIA said that he had to go out of town and could not keep his appointment with Subject. (1)

55) Ralph WIEGANDT (P-2254), German who came to Mexico in 1955 and has paint factory, member of French Club.

On 13 March 1967 Mrs. Ruth WIEGANDT, using the familiar form of address with Subject, invited Subject and his wife to Sunday dinner. (1) In April 1967 it was reported that Subject was quite friendly with the WIEGANDTs at the French Club. (15)

56) Douglas H. WILTSHIRE, American employed with SERVISA Travel Agency.

On 10 May 1967 WILTSHIRE planned to pick up some passports from Subject at the Soviet Embassy and mentioned that he would like to invited Subject to his house. (1)

57) Michael ZAREBSKI (P-8777, 201-744856), businessman from Cuernavaca, Canadian citizen.

On 11 October 1966 Subject reminded the Polish Consul, JAKOWIEC, that ZAREBSKI was going to sell some of his items to the Soviets. On 13 October 1966 JAKOWIEC said he could introduce Subject to ZAREBSKI, or Subject could call him directly. (1) Subject had originally met ZAREBSKI at a Polish Embassy recepiton on 14 December 1965, and at another on 4 October 1966, and they finally did get together on 12 January 1967. Subject asked ZAREBSKI to help the Soviets find a house for a dacha in Cuernavaca, which he eventually did. On 24 February 1967 Subject and several other Soviets visited ZAREBSKI's factory and had lunch with him in Cuernavaca. On 20 May 1967 Subject and Boris Aleksandrovich CHMYKHOV visited ZAREBSKI in connection with the dacha, and on 15 July 1967 Subject and CHMYKHOV visited the factory. (19) (COMMENT: Subject and CHMYKHOV had known each other before in Cuba, and both had mestkom responsibilities for the dacha, so their going to Cuernavaca together is not remarkable, although CHMYKHOV is a GRU officer.)

16. PAST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AGAINST SUBJECT:

Under Separate Cover

255

17. OPERATIONAL PLANNING DATA:

a. Current Residence: Ignacio Esteva 18-1 (has lived at this address during his whole tour in Mexico). (1)

b. Telephone: None at home.

c. Car: 1965 green Impala, diplomatic tags 19-DA. (7)

d. Office: Soviet Embassy, Tacubaya 204, telephone 15-60-55. (1) Often uses one of the reception rooms near the gate. (21)

e. Handwriting samples attached (the one in Russian was in Subject's possession, but is not known whether he himself actually wrote it.

18. OPERATIONAL STEPS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN NEXT YEAR:

The Station is reviewing all of Subject's known contacts in a search for access agents. The case of Edmundo Fausto ZORRILLA Martinez is currently being investigated as a possible Illegals lead.

19. SOURCES: Under Separate Cover.

256

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: HMMW-

16. PAST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AGAINST SUBJECT:

In addition to routine coverage of Subject's activities in Mexico, the following has been done:

a. Surveillance of Subject in Panama in December 1961.

b. In July 1966 information was passed to LITEMPO-8 "proving" that Subject was a dangerous KGB officer in an attempt to have him declared PNG, without success.

c. LICOZY-5 continues to be debriefed on his contacts with Subject, although LICOZY-5 has told Subject he will no longer act as an agent for the Soviets.

d. Briefing of U.S. Embassy chauffeur whom Subject tried to develop.

e. Debriefing of LICOWL-1 on his contacts with Subject.

f. Station Panama City helped block visas for Subject and A.A. NIKITIN in February 1967.

g. Recrutiment of Subject of 201-814144, whom Subject was cultivating. Contact now dead.

h. Briefing of U.S. Embassy visa officer whom Subject tried to develop.

i. Debriefing of Subject of 201-800412, who claimed Subject had tried to recruit him but who appears to be a fabricator.

j. Debriefing of LITEASE-1 on his contacts with Subject.

k. Debriefing of LIROBBIN-1 and 2 on their contacts with Subject.

l. Briefing of LIROAN-1 as access to Subject's friends at the club he belongs to.

m. Direction of BESABER in his contacts with Subject.

n. Debriefing of LIREALM-1 on his contacts with Subject.

o. Debriefing of LIROCKET-1.

p. Debriefing of LICANNY-1

SECRET

14-00000

257

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HMMW-

19. SOURCES:

1) LIENVOY, passim.
2) PACY-7280, December 1961
3) HZPA-11914, 11 January 1962, passport photographs
4) LIFIRE travel reports
5) HMMA-26881, 12 August 1965, LITEMP passport photographs.
6) LICOZY-5 case file, passim.
7) LILYRIC & LIMITED surveillance
8) LICOWL-1 case file, passim.
9) LNERGO report, 21 December 1965
10) Contact Report, of meeting with KADIDDLE, 28 December 1965
11) LICANNY-1 case file, passim.
12) LNPURE memorandum, 21 January 1966
13) Station memorandum, 27 January 1966
14) LNPURE memorandum, 11 February 1966
15) LIROAN-1 information
16) Station memorandum, information from LITEMPO-8, 22 July 1966.
17) Summary on Subject prepared by LIENVOY, 22 July 1966.
18) LICALLA survellance, passim
19) BESABER information.
20) Station memorandum, 30 January 1967
21) LIROCKET-1 information
22) LIROBBIN-2 information
23) LITEASE-1 information
24) LNPURE memorandu, 28 February 1967
25) LIREALM Information
26) Info from Subject of 201-814144,
27) Station memo of 27 June 1967, info from LNPURE officer
28) HMMW-13985, 16 September 1965, Hqs traces on Subject.
29) HZPA-11859, 22 December 1961
30) Information from Subject of 201-880412.

SECRET

258

Эдуардо Вебельман, около
55 лет, мексиканец еврейского
происхождения, является
владельцем сталелитейного
завода и фирмы по
продаже фотоматериалов.
В Мексику приехал во
время II мировой войны.
Проживает по адресу:
Pedregal Teololco 320.
Сын — Маурисио Вебельман

Source (6).

CARDED

LOGINOV handwriting sample, received 16 June 1967, from LIRENO

Valentin Loguinov
15.6.0-55
Consul.

260

- Lunes: 24 -

Insgtes y Baja California

Gaviota

6 1/2 pm.

Source (12)

261

S E C R E T

Chief, WH Division

Chief, SB Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

REDCOAT/Termination of Contact with Subject of Reference

REFERENCE: HMMW-15980, 7 December 1967

1. A draft dispatch on Subject of Reference was prepared in August, but through an oversight, was never typed and sent out. As stated in that draft, Mexico City Station no longer has any operational interest in Subject and does not plan to seek an Operational Approval for her. We regret this delay in reporting. The text of the draft dispatch follows.

2. Subject advised on 2 August 1967 that she planned to leave for the United States within the next two weeks to marry an American citizen and would thereafter settle in New York City. She identified her fiance as:

Marty HARRIS
Age 35
152 E. 35th St.
New York, N.Y.
Tel. 686-0544

She said he is a textile engineer, but that she did not know the name of the firm he worked for. HARRIS, according to Subject, is Jewish. She said they will be married in early September in a

......continued

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
2 - C/SB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-285412

201-285412

HMMA-33769

29 December 1967

CS copy filed in

201-814144

201-51203

S E C R E T

262

synagogue in Philadelphia, which is HARRIS's parents' home. They will thereafter take up residence at HARRIS's current New York address.

3. Subject said that she had originally met HARRIS while he was vacationing in Mexico and had maintained a correspondence with him. In July of this year, he called her from New York and asked her to meet him in Cozumel the week of 24 July. During a week together in Cozumel, they decided to get married. Subject said she thought that one day she would like to return to Mexico with her husband to live, but that their present plans were to remain in New York indefinitely.

4. In view of Subject's plans to leave Mexico indefinitely, we no longer have any operational interest in her and do not plan to seek an Operational Approval for her.

5. Subject stated she had had no social contact with Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-255412) since December 1966, although she had seen him several times on business since then. She reported on 11 May that her only noteworthy encounter with him since December took place in April in connection with efforts on her part to secure a Soviet visa for a leftist client of hers. LOGINOV balked at granting the visa because of alleged personal dislike of the applicant, but finally gave in as a "personal favor" to Subject. He stated bluntly, however, that Subject should realize "a favor must be repaid by a favor" and renewed in much more direct terms a prior request that Subject introduce him to someone among her friends who was or was inclined to be sympathetic toward the Soviet Union. Subject replied somewhat flippantly that she'd keep the request in mind in case she met or thought of anyone in this category. (Subject had earlier reported that LOGINOV had once specifically asked her if she had any friends in LNPURE, but that she had dodged the question and he had not pursued it.)

6. LICOZY-5 told Francis J. COIGNE in June 1967 that on 5 June LOGINOV had pressed him for information on the local Jewish reaction to the Arab-Israeli war. LICOZY-5 also stated that on 6 June Subject, who was very excited about the war and had even gone to the Israeli Embassy to volunteer to serve in Israel, had told him that when she returned home from work on the evening of 5 June, LOGINOV was waiting for her on the street and tried to pump her for information on local Jewish reactions to the war. LICOZY-5 stated that Subject told him she gave LOGINOV hell for the Soviets' support of the Arabs.

7. LICOZY-5 stated that Subject told him that in March she had been called to LNPURE and had been asked about her contact with LOGINOV. She added, according to LICOZY-5, that she had seen the same LNPURE officer (no name given, according to LICOZY-5) a couple weeks earlier. LICOZY-5 said that she also told him that LOGINOV had asked her to introduce him to "one of her progressive friends" or "someone in LNPURE."

8. The above represented a capsule account of Subject's relationship with her case officer, Keith R. LEVENDERIS. COIGNE played innocent until he got the whole story, but finally admitted that we had talked to the girl. COIGNE told LICOZY-5 that Subject had no idea that he was in contact with us and had in fact worried that her activities in our behalf might create trouble for him. Asked by COIGNE what advice he had given Subject, LICOZY-5 said that he had told her to be truthful with the LNPURE officer and to be careful with LOGINOV.

9. On 2 August, during a very friendly "farewell" lunch, LEVENDERIS asked Subject both about her most recent contacts with LOGINOV and whether anyone knew of her contact with LNPURE. (She had previously given the strongest assurances that she could be counted on to keep this contact confidential.) With respect to

263

the first question, she stated that LOGINOV had come to her office a couple of times on visa and Soviet travel business, but that she otherwise had not seen him. Although given ample opportunity, she said nothing about LOGINOV having waited for her in front of her apartment or about his questioning her about local reaction to the Israeli-Arab war. As for the second question, she assured LEVENDERIS that she had told no one of her contact with him or LNPURE.

10. We are inclined to believe that Subject lied about not telling anyone of her contact with us because it would have been extremely embarrassing for her to admit that she had failed both to follow instructions and to keep her promise. While it is uncertain exactly why she did tell LICOZY-5, the apparent timing (the second day of the Israeli-Arab war) suggests it was the result of her agitated state of mind, her anger at the Soviets for their support of the Arabs, her possible imminent departure for Israel and the uncertainty of her fate, and her warm regard and respect for LICOZY-5 as a fellow pro-Zionist. (Subject, whose mother is Jewish and who became romantically involved with Israel and Zionism after visiting Israel a couple of years ago, told LEVENDERIS on 2 August that she had indeed gone to the Israeli Embassy to volunteer to serve in Israel and had been immediately accepted because she had had training in nursing. She said she had been told to stand by for transportation to Israel and had expected to be called literally at any minute. She said that the brevity of the war had made her services unnecessary, however.)

11. While it is clear Subject lied about not having revealed her contact with LNPURE to anyone, we are inclined to believe that LICOZY-5 made up the story of LOGINOV waiting for Subject in front of her apartment and questioning her about local reaction to the war. Knowing LICOZY-5, it seems very possible that he invented the story in order to explain why Subject confided in him - i.e., she was already emotionally upset about the war and when LOGINOV contacted her she understandably told Subject, which led to her revealing the whole story. In any event, we consider the case closed and do not intend to pursue the question of who is telling the truth with LICOZY-5.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

264

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
KAPOK REDTOP LCIMPROVE - Elizabeth Duncan WILDE (201-)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 3524, 17 November 1967

1. Transmitted herewith is the debriefing of Subject on her contacts with Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412).

2. The Station intends to recontact Subject upon her return to Mexico in order to assess her short-term possibilities against LOGINOV.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 - C/SB, w/att.
2 - C/WH, w/att.

COPY ROUTING
[illegible]
B [illegible]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C.S. Copy Filed 201-828021

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-285412	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-33764	DATE 28 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET KAPOK	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-

14-00000

265

Att. to:
HMMA-33764

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT : Elizabeth Duncan WILDE

DATE OF MEETING : 12 December 1967

1. A Headquarters officer made arrangements by telephone for me to interview Subject on 12 December. She was told that I would arrive at Toledo at 10:30 and call her. However, my plane developed mechanical trouble and I called her from Pittsburg to advise that I would be 3 hours late. I arrived at Toledo at 13:30 and called her. We agreed that I would come to her mother's apartment at 14:30. The interview lasted from 14:30 to 18:30. During the last hour we were joined by her mother but, since she is senile and hard of hearing, we were able to continue talking without interruption.

2. I introduced myself as Peter Clark from the Embassy in Mexico. Subject accepted me without question and immediately began telling her story which was about the same as we had received from the political officer. The telling took only 10 minutes. I had considerable difficulty in taking her through a chronological account and holding her to one subject. It became obvious that she is a very self-centered person who is not interested in others unless they make a strong impression on her which LOGINOV obviously did. She is impossible on names, dates or times, asking me at least three times during the interview to repeat my name. On the other hand she was completely cooperative and did not appear to be withholding or distorting information.

3. The following account of her contacts are pieced together from her chaotic account and, thus, is by no means perfect:

a. She was in Mexico about 10 days on her most recent trip and met LOGINOV about a week before she left (ca 10 November). She met him at a party given by a Spanish couple (names forgotten) at their home in the southern part of the city to which her host, Dr. Frederico MARIN (see below) had been invited. It was a large party which included Mexicans, foreigners and diplomats. She met LOGINOV through a German man whom she had just met (van Henrichs or Kendrichs, no meaningful traces.) She talked to LOGINOV on and off for an hour. After an exchange of amenities she remarked that he spoke good English. He said it needed improvement and asked if she would be willing to give him lessons. She would like to but must leave in a week. He asked if she had any American friends who could teach him. She explained that she had friends when she lived in Mexico from 1954 to

201-285412

1956 but they are all gone now. However she offered to make inquiries and suggested that he go to the American Embassy to find a teacher. He answered that both the American Embassy and his own would frown on the idea and would not think well of it. Later she asked what he would do with his English once he had learned it. He answered that he would like to go to the United States. What would your government think of that? He answered, "Well we all have to better ourselves". During this discussion he got the story of her life including the fact that she has written a book which is still in manuscript (see below). He expressed interest and asked to read it. She said she had a copy and he asked her to drop it off at his embassy. He also said that he doesn't like Mexicans but prefers the company of Americans who are more like Russians. Upon parting it was agreed that she would drop by his embassy to give him the manuscript.

b. Two days later she dropped by his embassy and he talked to her in the outside reception area. She left him the manuscript and told him that he could keep it until she returned to Mexico. He gave her his card. He told her that she shouldn't call him because his phone was always tapped (she assumed he meant it was tapped by his own people). He added that he supposed the same thing happened at the American Embassy and asked, if she went there often. She answered that she had only been there twice in her life. He again inquired about her American friends in Mexico and she answered that she had no current ones. He again said he would like to meet Americans and asked her again to look for an American who could teach him English. On parting he said he would call her before she left (he knew that she was leaving in a few days to take care of her sick mother).

c. He called a day or so later and came over at ca 10:00 to Dr. MARIN's house where she was staying (not on LIENVOY). He asked when she would be back and how could he contact her in the United States. She gave him her mailing address and promised to answer if he wrote. He again asked her to find him an English teacher. She asked him, if he ever thought of going to the United States. Smiling, he answered, "Yes, who doesn't dream of going." He added that he can't go anywhere until he learns the language. She asked, if he would like to make a change. He answered that he has to be careful because he has a mother and family in the USSR. (From this Subject inferred that he would like to change and is only afraid of penalizing his family). He left on the note that she would try to find him a teacher and would contact him upon her return to Mexico.

d. Subject and Dr. MARIN agreed that LOGINOV was a fine person and they should help him get a teacher. Dr. MARIN suggested that Subject go to the American Embassy since they give English classes.

267

(Comment: Mexicans still commonly believe that the Mexican - North American Cultural Institute is part of the Embassy). Therefore Subject went to the Embassy on the morning of 16 December and was referred to a Mexican girl on the second floor (USIS). Subject told this girl her story and received the names of several teachers at the Institute. As she was leaving she thought that the Embassy would be interested in her story and thus fell into the hands of the political officer. She then went back to the Soviet Embassy but LOGINOV was not in so she left the list of teachers with the guard for him. She left Mexico the next day, 17 December.

4. LILYRIC photo coverage shows that Subject was at the Soviet Embassy from 13:35 to 13:42 on 16 November (after leaving the American Embassy). She arrived and departed in a taxi. LILYRIC also reports that LOGINOV was out from 13:14 to 13:52 on that date which confirms Subject's statement that he was not there. LILYRIC photo coverage also shows that Subject visited the Soviet Embassy from 11:20 to 11:54 on 10 November 1967, arriving and departing by taxi, (her first visit to the Embassy). Again, LILYRIC has LOGINOV in the Embassy from 09:07 to 13:45 on that date, thus confirming that Subject actually did see him. Thus her first meeting with LOGINOV at the party was probably on 6 or 8 November 1967. On 7 November LOGINOV was at the reception in the Embassy. LIENVOY has no information on a social engagement for LOGINOV at this time.

5. From her account it was obvious that she was extremely impressed with LOGINOV both physically ("he is such a handsome man") and as a person. From her conversations she concluded that he liked Americans and was interested in meeting them, that he is really interested in learning English so that he can go to the United States and that, somehow, he didn't want his own people to know about these interests and intentions. In fact, LOGINOV, did a fine job in debriefing her and in keeping the contact open. This type of activity has become standard for him in Mexico.

6. Although the subject of his marital status never came up, Subject assumes that LOGINOV is single. "He acts like a single man". He loves parties and dancing and sports. (Again, standard behavior for him.)

7. BIOGRAPHIC DATA:

Elizabeth Duncan WILDE was born Elizabeth DUNCAN on 28 December 1918 in Tallahasse, Florida. Her parents were prosperous farmers outside Tallahassee who lost everything in the depression. They then moved to Toledo where her father and brothers gradually built up a successful construction business. Her father died about 10 years ago. Her mother is 81 and is expected to live two or three months. In 1942 she married Elliot H. JACKSON in Dallas, Texas.

268

They were divorced 4 years later. In 1946 she married William P. STORY III in California. They divorced in 1948. In 1954 she came to Mexico and opened the Scientific Institute for the Correction of Obesity located at Reforma 376. At this time she met and became friends of Dr. MARIN and his wife. On 11 December 1956 she married Russel H. WILDE in Norwalk, Conn. They have been separated for seven years. WILDE who is 15 years her senior was for 37 years a member of the New York law firm, Paul, Weiss, Rifkin, Wharton and Garrison. He left this firm 4 years ago and now is associated with the firm Shelleck, at 485 Madison Ave. He lives at the Yale Club in NYC. In 1957 she sold her institute to her employers. She has been in and out of Mexico ever since, always staying with Dr. MARIN. She also travels regularly to Europe. Her current address is 2024 New Bedford Rd., Spring Lake, N.J. Telephone 449-4230 (unlisted). She is currently living with and caring for her mother at 2829 North Kendale Dr., Apt. 101, Toledo, Ohio. Telephone 419-474-0348. She has no children. She has a generous allowance from her current husband.

8. ASSESSMENT:

Subject was obviously a very handsome woman who appears to have spent her better years running through a series of wealthy husbands and lovers. As noted above, she is extremely self-centered and is uninterested in other people as people. Thus she is a poor observer and reporter. She has a "bug" on Jews and Negroes. She went into great detail on how American "ZIONISTS" control all the information media in the United States and even influence government policy. This is a "conspiracy" which is currently engaged in supporting the Negro movement, especially moving into white housing. This is the subject of her book, noted above. She has also had 4 accidents in the last four years (two fires in her home and two automobile accidents) which she considers a plot against her. She suspects an old, vindictive lover from whom she broke when she discovered that he was a Jew. Although Subject is not nearly as bad as the above distillation would suggest, she is slightly unstable. She is very much interested in helping us against LOGINOV and stated several times that she would cooperate completely. She is clearly not suitable for a long-term or complicated relationship with LOGINOV but could be used on a short term basis to introduce another person or to be an instrument in a provocation.

9. At the conclusion of the interview, Subject was told that, although she had every reason to interpret events as she did, LOGINOV specializes in contacting and developing Americans as he did her. From her story, there was no reason to believe that he was displaying vulnerabilities. Therefore we have no reason for her to attempt to prolong the relationship or cultivate him. On the other hand she has to contact him in order to get back her manuscript. She is not to suggest further contact but is to report to us any further contact

269

initiated by LOGINOV. Obviously disappointed, Subject agreed to obey instructions. After she has reobtained the manuscript she is to call the Station (x870, Betty calling for Bill Smith) and set a time for the meeting "at the house" (Dr. MARIN's) or at "the Cafe" (Cafe Mississippi). Subject expects to return to Mexico sometime in the spring of 1968.

10. Dr. Frederico MARIN is Subject's host in Mexico. He is a pediatrician who owns a hospital or sanitorium (name and location unknown) in Mexico City. He served as a medical officer with the U.S. Army in World War II. Subject first met him and his wife in 1954 when she opened her institute. They have been close friends ever since. His wife died a year ago. She gave his address as Rio Duero 54, telephone 11-63-60 (no Station traces but checks out in the telephone book). She made me promise that I would not contact him because, as a Mexican, he wouldn't want to get involved between Soviets and Americans. However, when Subject returns we intend to meet him through her to investigate his possible usefulness and as a means of further assessment of Subject.

11. **PLANS**:

Debrief Subject after her next contact with LOGINOV and meet and assess Dr. MARIN for possible use.

Francis J. COIGNE

14-00000

270

6

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO
Chief, SB

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDCOAT
LIROCKET-1 Progress Report, 1 August - 8 December 1967

Tono

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-32760, 10 August 1967

Monroe H. Reidemann took over the handling of LIROCKET-1 from Keith H. Levenderis on 25 July 1967. There has been no change in the objectives of the operation, and meetings with LIROCKET-1 have continued to be devoted largely to debriefing him on his sessions with the Soviets. Forwarded herewith is Reidemann's progress report for the period 1 August through 8 December 1967.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Progress Report

Distribution:
2 - C/WH, w/att.
2 - C/SB, w/att.

~~[illegible]~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS copy filed in 201-788767.

LOGINOV

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-33739	26 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-788767

501-285412.

271

SECRET

PROGRESS REPORT

1. This report covers the activities of LIROCKET-1 in the period 1 August to 8 December 1957. During this period, with the exception of a summer break, LIROCKET-1 maintained his role as a teacher at the Soviet Embassy. In an effort to summarize the more salient occurrences during this period, we have endeavored to present it, as far as possible, in a chronological manner under the name of the individual to whom the material is related.

2. Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV (201-038975). On 1 August, KAZANTSEV verbally admonished Vladimir Maksimovich GONCHARENKO (201-760865) for arriving at the class some 15 minutes late and for having neglected to pay LIROCKET-1 on this date. KAZANTSEV, quipped to LIROCKET-1 that "these young men are becoming more irresponsible." Pavel Fedorovich KOVALEV told LIROCKET-1 that he was preparing invitations for the departure of one of LIROCKET-1's previous students and that he would put one aside for LIROCKET-1. KAZANTSEV interrupted and stated, "I'm inviting the teacher and I will give him the invitation." KOVALEV made no further comment on the subject. Later, when alone, KAZANTSEV told LIROCKET-1 that he was the "number two man in the Soviet Embassy" even though he holds the number three position. He referred to himself as the Charge d'Affaires. This was the first time that KAZANTSEV had ever spoken of his rank or position to LIROCKET-1.

3. On 17 August KAZANTSEV studied for one hour with LIROCKET-1. LIROCKET-1 commented that KAZANTSEV's level of fluency exceeded all of his other students. According to KAZANTSEV, upon his return home in June, he was required to take his English language examination and scored a final mark of 4.5 out of a possible 5. KAZANTSEV lost the 1/2 point only because he had not read any English language books during the previous months.

4. On 24 August, KAZANTSEV stated that his wife had been having stomach trouble of a undisclosed origin. She had just returned from the hospital where she underwent tests to determine the nature of her illness.

5. During the class of 29 August, KAZANTSEV read an article in the English language newspaper, The News, pertaining to the diminuition of the male sex drive among heavy smokers. This triggered a long monologue by KAZANTSEV on the evils of pornographic literature. KAZANTSEV found this aspect of western society distasteful and serving no useful purpose.

[illegible] SECURITY [illegible]LATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

6. On 31 August, KAZANTSEV told LIROCKET-1 that Semen Tarasovich BAZAROV (201-049257) was again interested in taking English lessons from LIROCKET-1. LIROCKET-1 commented that he might be able to accomodate BAZAROV only from mid-September to the end of November. KAZANTSEV left the room and contacted BAZAROV. Upon returning KAZANTSEV stated that BAZAROV would have pressing obligations in connection with the forthcoming anniversary and Olympics and could not begin classes until sometime thereafter.

7. On September, KAZANTSEV commented that he would like to continue studying English because he expected to return PCS to his country at the end of 1967 or early 1968. KAZANTSEV acknowledged that he might be asked to stay on during the Olympics. However, he indicated that this was unlikely to prevent him from returning. KAZANTSEV reiterated his desire to depart Mexico in the near future.

8. On 10 October, KAZANTSEV received several pocket books in English which he had requested LIROCKET-1 to pick out for him. LIROCKET-1 selected them from his own library. KAZANTSEV stated that he did not care what subjects were chosen; he wanted them only to improve his reading ability. He did mention, however, that he preferred not to read books which had either violence or pornography as their central theme. LIROCKET-1 brought a book on science fiction which did not particularly interest KAZANTSEV, a book on ballet, and a book on the FBI in which KAZANTSEV seemed very interested. KAZANTSEV stated that he would have to discontinue all of his classes from 10 October to 16 November as he was scheduled for vacation during this period.

9. On 16 November, KAZANTSEV interrupted a class containing Vladimir Maksimovich GONCHARENKO (201-760865) and Yevgeniy Ivanovich BEDRIN (201-760220) to announce that he would not study that day. Immediately, BEDRIN wheeled around and told KAZANTSEV very explicitly that he should remain and study. To this KAZANTSEV replied in English, "See the pressure my chief puts on me". It was quite apparent to LIROCKET-1 that BEDRIN was in charge of the language lessons and that KAZANTSEV was seemingly very hesitant to defy BEDRIN's challenge. KAZANTSEV stated that he had wanted to take a weeks leave, but in deference to BEDRIN's wishes, KAZANTSEV remained during the rest of the class, although his presence was somewhat of a disruptive factor. Later during the class, LIROCKET-1 had KAZANTSEV and BEDRIN ask each other questions in English - an exercise which KAZANTSEV enjoyed in that his English is superior to BEDRIN's. However, BEDRIN rose to the occasion, comported himself in a fine manner, and there ensued a lively exchange of questions and answers on non-controversial topics.

10. GONCHARENKO was absent from class from 10 August to 19 September. During this period he was on home leave.

11. On 19 September GONCHARENKO returned to class and LIROCKET-1 complimented him on his improved English facility. GONCHARENKO stated that he had worked diligently on his English during this summer vacation. During the period 19 September to 7 December, GONCHARENKO did not attend classes regularly.

273

12. BEDRIN was absent from class from 10 August to 19 September. During this period he was on home leave.

13. On 19 September, BEDRIN returned to class and commented that he had not looked at his English lessons since August. BEDRIN related that he had spent most of his vacation in the Leningrad area which is his home as well as his wife's.

14. On 21 September the subject of conversation turned to alcoholic beverages. BEDRIN stated that he couldn't drink vodka like he used to as it gives him too much of a hangover the following day. BEDRIN stated that he preferred whisky (Canadian Club and Seagrams) to any other drink.

15. During the classroom discussion of books on 10 October, LIROCKET-1 noted that BEDRIN has somewhat of an obsession with books of a pornographic nature. BEDRIN had previously remarked to LIROCKET-1 that he enjoys a good spicy story and that during a 1966 layover in Brussels, he sought out and enjoyed viewing a number of sex movies.

16. On 12 October, LIROCKET-1 commented that he might visit the States during the last of October. BEDRIN, privately, asked LIROCKET-1 to purchase for him two 7 inch reel recording tapes and two 5 inch reel tapes. BEDRIN said that "another friend" had brought him some tapes in the past. This was the first time BEDRIN had ever requested LIROCKET-1 to perform any personal favor. On 31 October BEDRIN canceled the order relating that he did not need the requested tapes inasmuch as a "friend" had purchased some Grundig tapes for him while in the US.

17. On 16 November, BEDRIN strongly advised KAZANTSEV to remain for his class rather than skipping it. (See KAZANTSEV, 16 November incident).

18. Valentin Mikhaylovich KORNYUKHIN (201-374727) began classes on 21 November, in the company of KAZANTSEV. KORNYUKHIN possesses good, fluent English although his grammar is somewhat unpolished. He speaks with a decidedly British accent. KORNYUKHIN stated that he had been in Mexico for approximately five months and had served previously in Burma from approximately 1962-65. After his assignment in Burma, KORNYUKHIN had worked in Moscow (1965-67). KORNYUKHIN appears to be between 35 and 40 years of age, blonde hair, trim, athletic appearing approximately 6 feet tall and weighing between 165-170 pounds.

19. On 23 November, KAZANTSEV and KORNYUKHIN studied together. During the lesson a slight difference of opinion arose between the two over what their government's position was during the 1964 Cyprus crisis. The exchange reflected the obdurate, somewhat dogmatic character of KORNYUKHIN. LIROCKET-1 characterized KORNYUKHIN as

274

possessing very strong and fixed ideas. KORNYUKHIN did not appear to be awed by KAZANTSEV's official position and spoke openly and forcefully to him.

20. On 29 November, during the course of a discussion, KAZANTSEV and KORNYUKHIN again became embroiled in an animated debate. KORNYUKHIN debated KAZANTSEV in an effective and energetic manner seemingly unafraid of correcting or disputing KAZANTSEV. The argument was not personal nor was there any apparent evidence of rancor between the two.

21. On 7 December, KORNYUKHIN studied along with LIROCKET-1. LIROCKET-1 soon discovered that KORNYUKHIN was somewhat of a chameleon in his personality in that he was completely difference without the presence of KAZANTSEV. KORNYUKHIN manifested a friendly, affable, and responsive manner, gratefully accepting any criticism from LIROCKET-1 regarding his use of the language and giving up all pretensions of being a hard-nosed personality. LIROCKET-1 garnered the impression that KORNYUKHIN wants to be liked and that his character ambivalence may be a front in order to impress KAZANTSEV. During their conversation, KORNYUKHIN commented that he was having some difficulty in adjusting to Mexico and its weather. In discussing India, KORNYUKHIN stated that India was better off than China, but that the Indians were unmanageable, unorganized, and uncontrollable. KORNYUKHIN stated that he was more impressed with Burma than either India or Mexico.

MISCELLANEOUS

22. During the 28 September class, LIROCKET-1 was sought out by Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN (201-773422) who began talking to LIROCKET-1 in fairly adequate English, capable of making a conversation. GORLITSYN commented that he preferred to study his English along rather than in a class with a tutor. GORLITSYN also stated that he would be required to take his English exam in the near future and that he would hermetically seal himself off for one week while he prepared for it. GORLITSYN stated that he wanted "to maintain his 20% bonus" by passing the English exam. LIROCKET-1 views GORLITSYN as somewhat of a bumpkin; not particularly intelligent, but a plodder. He appears to be a loner in his relationships with others of the same nationality.

23. During this same class, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) spoke briefly with LIROCKET-1. LOGINOV asked LIROCKET-1 if he would have time to teach English to his eight year old son. LIROCKET-1 stated that the hours requested by LOGINOV for lessons would be impossible to accommodate. LOGINOV then began talking of his love for sports and his background as a former judge in Olympic skiing as well as refering to various other sports including tennis. LOGINOV's English is good, although not as fluent as KAZANTSEV's. LOGINOV's problem seems to be a lack of practice. LIROCKET-1 characterized LOGINOV as a highly perceptive individual with a keen sense of intelligence.

275

FUTURE PLANNING

24. Future planning: LIROCKET-1 will continue to teach at the Soviet Embassy, Mexico two days per week for a total of five hours. His work appears to be quite satisfactory and he is apparently well regarded as a teacher by the Soviet Embassy. LIROCKET-1 assesses KORNYUKHIN as the most interesting pupil with whom he is in contact and, accordingly, intends to concentrate his efforts toward establishing a social rapport with KORNYUKHIN which will lead to an exchange of visits. LIROCKET-1 has been given several Personality Assessment Questionnaires for use in recording observable behavioral patterns in his students.

GROUP EXCLUDED [illegible]ATION
[illegible]

14-00000

276

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

25

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ✓ TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	WH	5	
2	13/1/C1	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, C/WH/COG-3, 1/SBS, C/CI, C/FI 2,

S E C R E T 202330Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3872

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

DESENSITIZED

2 Dec 67 18898

REF MEXICO CITY 3785 (IN 11828) —

1. LIENVOY COVERAGE SOVIET EMBASSY PRODUCED SEVERAL ITEMS IN LAST FEW MONTHS SHOWING THAT EMPLOYEE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTRY LATER IDENTIFIED AS CARLOS SANDOVAL Y NUCINO WHO TOOK CARE OF MEXICAN VISAS FOR COMMUNIST NATIONALS WAS ON VERY FRIENDLY PERSONAL TERMS WITH SOVIET DIPLOMATS PAVEL A YATSKOV AND VALENTIN S LOGINOV BOTH KGB. ALTHOUGH SANDOVAL MUST HAVE DEALT WITH CUBANS, THERE NO INDICATION HE DEVELOPED FRIENDSHIP WITH LOCAL CUBAN OFFICIALS.

2. STATION WAS BECOMING INTERESTED IN SANDOVAL AS POSSIBLE ASSET AGAINST LOCAL SOVIETS WHEN SANDOVAL, PER LIENVOY, INFORMED LOGINOV 24 NOV HE WAS BEING TRANSFERRED TO MEXICAN EMBASSY, HAVANA. LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE ON LIRING-2 SPOTTED LATTER AT CHURCH CEREMONY (HE STOOD OUTSIDE) AND RECEPTION SANDOVAL'S WEDDING 5 DEC TO LUCIA BLAKELEY. SOVIETS, HOWEVER, DID NOT APPEAR IN ATTENDANCE. SANDOVAL LEFT FOR HAVANA WITH WIFE 11 DEC.

3. STATION SOMEWHAT PUZZLED AT SUDDEN APPEARANCE LIRING-2 AND ABSENCE OF SOVIETS AT SANDOVAL WEDDING. LIFEAT COVERAGE

SECRET

201-285412

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 3872 S E C R E T

SANDOVAL HOME 4 TO 14 DEC SHOWED HIS PARENTS VERY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND THOROUGHLY UNHAPPY AT SON'S CUBAN ASSIGNMENT, HOPING HE WILL NOT BRING BACK "THOSE CUBAN IDEAS."

4. BECAUSE OF LISAGA OPERATION, STATION WILL MAKE NO EFFORT ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH SANDOVAL FOR POSSIBLE UNILATERAL EXPLOITATION. AS IT POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT SANDOVAL WAS BEING DEVELOPED OPERATIONALLY BY SOVIETS, WHO MAY CONTINUE DEVELOP HIM IN CUBA, PLAN BRIEF LISAGA ON SANDOVAL AFTER CHECKING WITH LIELEGANT.

SECRET

14-00000

278

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-285412

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

21 SB 1

..IED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	WH	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/SB 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2 "EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 171740Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3524 17 Nov 67 IN 55634

DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED OP AERONAUT LCIMPROVE

1. SUBJECT IS ELIZABETH DUNCAN WILDE, LATE FORTIES, PO BOX 425, SPRING LAKE, NEW JERSEY. NO STATION OR EMBASSY TRACES.

2. ON 16 NOV SUBJECT WALKED INTO EMBASSY AND WAS INTERVIEWED BY POLITICAL OFFICER. SUBJECT SAID SHE IN CONTACT VALENTIN LOGINOV (201-285412) WHOM SHE MET DURING LAST 3 OR 4 WEEKS FOR FIRST TIME. SAID SHE MET HIM SOCIALLY THROUGH A FRIEND WHO SHE SAID WAS GERMAN WRITER AND REFUSED ~~RXO~~ TO NAME HIM. LOGINOV SAID HE WANTED TO TAKE ENGLISH LESSONS FROM SUBJECT (A STANDARD PLOY WITH HIM WHEN MEETING AMERICANS). LATER LOGINOV TOLD HER HE WANTS TO "GO OVER TO THE OTHER SIDE". SHE SUGGESTED HE CONTACT THE EMBASSY. HE ANSWERED HE AFRAID TO AND DOESN'T KNOW HOW. SHE ASKED ~~TOM~~ HIM IF HE WANTED HER TO CONTACT EMBASSY FOR HIM. HE SAID YES, IF SHE COULD DO IT TACTFULLY. SHE CLAIMS SHE WALKED IN WITH HIS KNOWLEDGE. HE ALSO MENTIONED HAS A PROBLEM WITH HIS MOTHER AND SISTER IN THE USSR. SUBJECT SAID SHE LEAVING MEXICO

SECRET

201-285412

279

17 NOV BY AIR FOR SAN ANTONIO TO PICK-UP HER CAR AND PROCEED TO NEW YORK. SAID SHE WAS IN SAN FRANCISCO ONE MONTH AGO AND UPON RETURNING LEFT CAR IN SAN ANTONIO AND FLEW TO MEXICO. SHE SAW LOGINOV LAST AT PARTY ON 15 NOV. DOESN'T KNOW IF WILL CONTACT LOGINOV BEFORE LEAVING. ALTHOUGH SHE HAD HIS CARD WITH EMBASSY PHONE NUMBER, SHE SAID LOGINOV TOLD HER NOT TO CALL HIM THERE SINCE BOTH AMERICAN AND SOVIET EMBASSY PHONES ARE BUGGED. HE ADDED THAT SOVIET EMBASSY BUGS ITS OWN PHONES. THUS CONTACT TO LOGINOV HAS TO BE THROUGH MUTUAL FRIENDS. SHE STATED SHE RETURNING MEXICO 13 DEC AND PROMISED TO RECONTACT THE POLITICAL OFFICER.

3. SUBJECT WAS RELUCTANT TO START TALKING ABOUT LOGINOV, REFUSED TO NAME GERMAN AND OTHER MUTUAL FRIENDS BECAUSE THEY ARE MEXICAN LEFTISTS AND DIDN'T WANT TO RAT ON THEM. SHE REFUSED TO STAY LONG ENOUGH FOR POLITICAL OFFICER TO CONTACT STATION. SHE APPEARS TO BE CONVINCED THAT LOGINOV IS SERIOUS ABOUT DEFECTING. POLITICAL OFFICER DESCRIBED HER AS RATIONAL PERSON.

4. ABOUT HERSELF SUBJECT SAID SHE LIVED IN MEXICO FOR TWO YEARS (NO DATES) WHEN SHE RAN A CLINIC FOR OBESE PEOPLE

280

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 3524 SECRET

WHICH FOLDED. THEN RETURNED US WHERE MARRIED FOR SECOND TIME. SHE COMES TO MEXICO OFTEN AND ALWAYS STAYS WITH A MEXICAN DOCTOR, NAME FORGOTTEN BY POLITICAL OFFICER. THUS NO WAY TO CONTACT HER HERE. THIS DOCTOR IS WIDOWER AND OWNS A HOSPITAL. POLITICAL OFFICER SUSPECTS THEY LIVE TOGETHER. SHE INTIMATED SHE IS WEALTHY AND LOOKS AND ACTS LIKE SHE IS.

5. LOGINOV'S ONLY GERMAN CONTACT KNOWN TO STATION IS RALPH WIEGANDT, 19 MARCH 1931 IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, GERMAN CITIZEN. WORKED RIEBOLT CHEMICAL IN GERMANY PRIOR TO ENTERING MEXICO IN MAY 55. NOW MANAGER AND AT LEAST PART OWNER OF FIRM MANUFACTURING PLASTIC FOAM INSULATING MATERIAL. CONTACT APPEARS TO BE SOCIAL AND BEGAN AT SPORTS CLUB WHERE BOTH MEMBERS. SOURCES LIROAN-1, LIENVOY AND GOBERNACION FILE.

6. STATION HAS ARRANGEMENTS WITH POLITICAL OFFICER TO INTERVIEW SUBJECT AS SOON AS SHE REAPPEARS. ALTHOUGH ABOVE SKETCHY AND VERY INCOMPLETE AND LOGINOV IS ONE OF LAST LOCAL SOVIETS STATION WOULD EXPECT TO DEFECT, STILL SOVIETS IN TROUBLE HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO TAKE MORE UNORTHODOX STEPS. WOULD ALSO NOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY THIS IS PROVOCATION ON

281

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 3524 S E C R E T

LOGINOV'S PART. WHATEVER HIS MOTIVE, IF SUBJECT'S STORY HOLDS WATER, FEEL CONTROL OVER HER ASAP MOST DESIRABLE. SINCE THERE ARE SEVERAL FLIGHTS TO SAN ANTONIO A DAY, IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCOMPANY HER FROM MEXICO AND FEEL IT UNADVISABLE TO TRY TO INTERCEPT AND DEBRIEF HER AT AIRPORT. THEREFORE HQS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER CONTACTING AND DEBRIEFING HER AT HER HOME. SHE SAID WILL DRIVE FROM SAN ANTONIO TO NEW YORK. PLS ADVISE.

7. REQUEST TRACES ON SUBJECT AND WIEGANDT.

SECRET

14-00000

282

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	WH	5	
2	CI/E	6	RI
3		7	RB/RAN
4		8	

FROM WH

ACTION SB-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT 3 TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/IC-2

S E C R E T 192043Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3201 19 Oct 67 IN 75783

DIRECTOR

REDTOP LCIMPROVE

1. PER LIENVOY ON 17 OCT FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL TOLD LOGINOV HE RECEIVED A CABLE FROM MEXEMB IN MOSCOW ASKING FOR VISA FOR OLEG M. NECHIPORENKO (201-305370) WHO IS REPLACING YATSKOV. LOGINOV ASKED HIM TO EXPEDITE VISA SINCE "WE HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR IT FOR SEVERAL DAYS". OFFICIAL ASKS WHEN YATSKOV IS LEAVING. LOGINOV ANSWERS HE CAN'T LEAVE UNTIL AFTER NECHIPORENKO ARRIVES.

2. BOTH LOGINOV AND PRIKHODKO ON RETURN FROM RESPECTIVE HOME LEAVES TOLD LICOZY-5 THAT NECHIPORENKO WOULD RETURN TO MEXICO IN OCTOBER. BOTH SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT RETURN TO CONSULAR WORK BUT WOULD BE GIVEN OTHER WORK IN THE EMBASSY. NOTE THAT YATSKOV ON RETURN FROM HOME LEAVE IN SEPT 66 QUIT HIS CONSULAR JOB AND "WAS GIVEN OTHER WORK IN THE EMBASSY" PER LOGINOV TO LICOZY-5.

3. IN VIEW ABOVE AND ABSENCE OTHER CANDIDATES, IT APPEARS NECHIPORENKO WILL TAKE OVER YATSKOV'S KGB JOB.

S E C R E T

201-285412

14-00000

283

SECRET X

Chief, SB Division

Chief, WH Division; COS, Caracas

Chief of Station, Mexico City
REDTOP
Nikolay Dmitriyevich *CHERNYSHEV, Repatriate from Venezuela

1. According to LIENVOY on 4 September 1967, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412), Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City placed a call to Havana, Cuba stating that he had in Mexico a family of 5 persons that had to be sent from Cuba to Odessa by boat. LOGINOV said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had ordered that their passage be paid to the border of the USSR. The family name was given as CHERNYSHEV. According to LOGINOV the family had been given permission to live in Groznyy in the USSR by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. On 7 September 1967, LICOZY-5 reported that LOGINOV had booked passage to Cuba for a Russian emigre, Nikolay CHERNYSHEV and his family. CHERNYSEV's wife was born in Italy and his three children Igor, Nataliya and Sergey were all born in Venezuela. LOGINOV also stated to LICOZY-5 that the CHERNYSHEVs were repatriates from Venezuela.

3. Plans to send the CHERNYSHEV family to the USSR via Cuba were apparently changed because LIFIRE reported their departure for the USSR via Montreal via Canadian Pacific Airlines Flight 582 on 25 September 1967. The following information on the CHERNYSHEV family was available from the LIFIRE report:

......continued

Distribution:
- 2 - C/SB
- 2 - C/WH
- 2 - COS, Caracas

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HMMA-33265 11 October 1967

201-285412

SECRET 200-4-64

284

Nikolay Dmitriyevich °CHERNYSHEV Nikolayov, Age given as 48. Venezuelan Citizen since 1958. Born in Yusaburgo, Estonia. His occupation was given as Mechanic. His address in Caracas, Venezuela was given as La Costanera Caraballeda. He travelled on Venezuelan Passport 287722. He and his family had been issued Mexican visas (valid for 180 days) in Caracas, Venezuela on 6 September 1967.

Laura °FERRARA Striazi Chernyshev, wife of Subject. Age given as 42. Citizenship given as Italian and apparently travelling on Italian Passport 1091.

Igor Nikolayevich °CHERNYSHEV, son, 12 years old, travelling on his father's passport.

Nataliya Nikolayevna CHERNYSHEV, daughter, 11 years old, travelling on father's passport.

Sergey Nikolayevich CHERNYSHEV, son, 8 years old, travelling on father's passport.

Citizenship for all three children was given as Venezuelan.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

285

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP
Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-32616, 25 July 1967

Subject and his family returned to Mexico City from home leave in the USSR on KLM Flight 684 arriving 27 August 1967 (Source LIFIRE). The LOGINOV family travelled on the same flight as the Mikhail Mikhaylovich DYAKONOV (201-793094) family and Lyudmila Aleksandrovna KARABACH (wife of 201-787785). Subject travelled on Soviet Diplomatic Passport D-010264 and his wife, Aleksandra Dmitriyevna and son, Dmitriy travelled on Soviet Diplomatic D-010265. Per reference the LOGINOV family departed Mexico on home leave 16 July 1967.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

SB TRAVEL INPUT PROGRAM

Distribution:
~~1~~2 - C/SB
2 - C/WH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-33028	11 September 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-285412

286

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

SECRET

ORIG: D. Novak
UNIT: SB/CI/P
EXT: 6508
DATE: 11 September 1957

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ___ # ___

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 74-126-60/3

CONF: SR 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR WHP, DDP, ADDP, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI/IC2, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET Sep 12 17 00 Z CITE DIRECTOR 34784

TO RIO DE JANEIRO INFO: BUENOS AIRES

REDTOP AEASSAULT

REF: DIRECTOR 34352*

1. INITIAL PRESS RELEASE NAMES VICTOR VIZGUNOV AS KGB OFFICER WHO MET LOGINOV (SUBJ OF REF) WHILE LATTER CAIRO. AIRMAILING CLIPS TO RONALD WARNER SOON AS RECD FROM PRETORIA.

2. IF STATION CONCURS, SUGGEST HINT TO ALAGORAS SINCE VIZGUNOV EXPOSED, WOULD BE EFFECTIVE PROP PLAY. IF THEY WOULD CONTACT ALMITTEN 1 ~~DE SAMPAIO~~ AND SUGGEST HE "REVEAL TO PRESS" HIS EXPERIENCE WITH VIZGUNOV WHILE IN CAIRO.

3. RIO DE JANEIRO: ABOVE SUGGESTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN TERMS ~~DEPENDENT WHAT~~ EFFECT STATION FEELS SUCH EXPOSE MIGHT ~~WOULD~~ HAVE ON CURRENT WOFACT RELATIONSHIP ALMITTEN 1. ~~DE SAMPAIO~~.

END OF MESSAGE

*Spy story broke in So African press 9 Sep 67.

C/SB/CI/P: T THIELE
SB/CI/K:
SB/O/WH:
WH/5:
WH/4:

SB/CI/I

201-285412

WH/COPS ~~COPS~~ FI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SB/C OPS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 2076 COPY NO.

287

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
SEP 13 1967

TO Chief, SB

INFO. Chief, WH

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDTOP
Character Sketches of Three Soviet Consular Officers

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are character sketches prepared by Douglas J. FEINGLASS on the following Soviet consular officers stationed in Mexico City:

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)
Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (201-744341)
Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH (201-343894)

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
Sketches

Distribution:
2 - C/SB, w/atts.
2 - C/WH, w/o/atts.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1nH(Wa)

CS COPY

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
B-201-744341	HMMA-32958 2	31 August 1967
B-201-343894	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412 201-744341 201-343894

288

MICROFILMED
SEP 12 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9P

THE CONSULAR SECTION OF THE USSR EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY

The consular section consists of three persons:

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV - consul (third secretary) [redacted] 201-285412

Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN - vice consul (Attache) [redacted] 201-144341

Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH - vice consul (third secretary) 201-[illegible]

With such a seeming-scarcity of work for the Consulate, it would be sufficient to have only one man for it. But the Soviet Embassy has to have three men handling consular duties. The Consulate is open to visitors twice a week and only two hours a day. Even that is too much for an occasional person who desires a visa for visiting the USSR. However, in addition to their regular duties, the consuls have to arrange various matters relating to visiting Soviet cargo vessels, artistic and cultural groups, etc. On several occasions, they had to do xxx errands outside of their overt field of activity. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why, in many instances, they cannot be reached on the telephone. All three of them speak fluent Spanish and have no difficulty in getting around and acquiring Mexican friends. Given below are their respective character sketches.

[redacted]

Consul LOGINOV is a rather recent arrival (two years in Mexico) and not very experienced in his job. However, he is learning the ropes quite rapidly and carries a lot of weight among the Embassy staff. LOGINOV is the one who orders cars

CS COPY

to be sent for any visiting dignitary or a performer. He, apparently, scrutinizes and approves the names of doctors and dentists patronized by the Embassy personnel. Recently a Man on Duty said over the phone that LOGINOV had forbidden to be given out the address of a German dentist, whom the Soviets visited quite frequently before.

LOGINOV is also in charge of making up a duty roster for appointing a Man on Duty who would be responsible for anything that took place at the Embassy on that particular day. No one, except the ambassador, seems to be exempt from that duty. On a few occasions LOGINOV encountered hostility to his arbitrary manner of making up the duty roster. Thus, when a Man on Duty called Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, Press Attache and a (former?) Cultural Officer, and told him that LOGINOV put his name down as the responsible Man on Duty for the Embassy for that day, LEONOV said that he was very busy and let LOGINOV do it himself.

Obviously LOGINOV had made a number of secret enemies with his dictatorial manners and his disdainful, monotonous, and slow way of talking. His medium- to high-pitched voice sounds as if he is extremely bored with the world and does his inter-locutor a favor just be talking to him.

His physical appearance seems to confirm that impression A few newspaper photos show him as a youngish and rather good-looking individual with curly light-brown hair and with

290

a contemptuous smile on his lips. Unquestionably, his type of charm appeals to elderly ladies and LOGINOV is quite aware that he is attractive to the other sex. Without a doubt, he tries to capitalize on it and with his fluent Spanish probably tries to ensnare Mexican females. There is no indication that LOGINOV has tried anything of the sort with the Soviet wives. One of the reasons may be that he would not like his wife, Aleksandra Dmitriyeva, a very formidable woman indeed, to get wind of it. On the other hand, the Mexican women may seem to be more exotic and attractive to LOGINOV than his own countrywomen, in especial his wife, who is a large unattractive female.

Nevertheless, LOGINOVA seems to be quite pleasant, with a nice cultured voice, and gets along with her husband well thanks to her good humour and social activity. She has been quite prominent in Mestkom work and in the children's summer camp. ~~Sgh~~ Shortly after their arrival, LOGINOV bought a tape-recorder for his wife for 115 dollars. Whether it was to be used for music, or other purposes, has not been determined.

Once in a while, LOGINOV goes on drunken sprees. Thus, on 12 ~~[illegible]~~ February 1966, he and KORMUSHKIN drove up to the Embassy gate at three a.m., pounded on the gate, blew their horn and had altercations with Stanislav Sergeyevich SILANOV, who was on duty at that time.

Another very prominent trait of LOGINOV'S character is his extreme chauvinism, bordering on jingoism. In reference to other nationalities, LOGINOV uses such deprecatory epi-~~xxxx~~ thets as: "Amerikashki", "Zhidovka", "Nemchura", etc.

It is doubtful if LOGINOV has any true friends. His sneering attitude is probably the reason for it. Although he made several errors in judgement in his work and social behaviour, LOGINOV by no means is a fool and should be kept in mind for any possible developments.

(201-[illegible])

~~E~~Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN, vice consul (Attache), is a young man about thirty-three years of age, ~~xxxxxx~~ rather stocky, with blond wavy hair over a high forehead. A pair of heavy-rimmed glasses gives him the appearance of a very intellectual person. On the whole, KORMUSHKIN has the air of an easy-going fellow, who can make friends almost overnight. KORMUSHKIN and his wife are exceptionally close friends with Anatoliy Vladimirovich KARABACH, employee of the Commercial Office, and his wife. Both families visit each other quite frequently.

Besides occasional drinking bouts, KORMUSHKIN has not been known to practice any skirt-chasing, since his wife, Inna Nikolayevna, is not a bad-looking woman herself, and both seem to be getting along smoothly. KORMUSHKINA is a practicing physician at the Embassy and is quite in demand whenever any of the Soviets or his family is ill. KORMUSHKIN is also quite active in consular affairs and does most of the leg work for LOGINOV. He is also very active in Mestkom functions, where he is in charge of the Children's section. KORMUSHKIN is quite an energetic and pushy individual and can be quite rude and nasty at times. Undoubtedly, he is looking forward to being a full-fledged consul in time to come. The impression of KORMUSHKIN'S ambition and pushy trait in his character is intensified by the sound of his rapid and energetic but pleasant baritone voice.

A curious fact should be cited here. Shortly after his arrival, KORMUSHKIN purchased a tape-recorder for 185 dollars or 70 dollars more than the one bought by his "boss" LOGINOV. Why?

It seems that in the future, KORMUSHKIN may slow down somewhat, but his inner drive and energy will nevertheless make him a more adroit and skillful individual. His further progress should be watched with interest and caution.

(201-[illegible])

Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH, vice-consul (third secretary) seems to be able to handle any job that comes along. Previously he was mentioned as an assistant Cultural Attache, then substituted for the Press Attache, while that position remained vacant, and quite recently, while the two consuls are on leave, he has started calling himself "consul".

293

SHPAKEVICH is of very ordinary appearance, of slight build and dark complexion and is unmarked by any outstanding features, with the exception of a noticeably receding hairline. He wears glasses sometimes. His voice is even plainer than his looks. It has the unusual chameleonic peculiarity of sounding like someone else's. Even SHPAKEVICH'S closest friends cannot recognize his voice at times and he delights in taking advantage of it. Occasionally SHPAKEVICH would call a friend on the phone and start talking in rapid Spanish. When the friend is duly confused and does not know what to say, SHPAKEVICH breaks into an explosive guffaw that somehow lacks true merriment. Since SHPAKEVICH repeats this crude joke time after time it is obvious that his sense of humour is quite rudimentary.

Ordinarily SHPAKEVICH is a cautious individual who dislikes making decisions of importance. He said that he was getting clobbered whenever a decision was wrong. However, SHPAKEVICH can be quite importunate at the wrong moment and with the wrong person. Thus, when attached to the dancer, PLISETSKAYA'S group as an interpreter in Puebla, SHPAKEVICH called the Embassy about some trivial matter and wanted to talk to ambassador BAZAROV. A Man on Duty told him that BAZAROV was taking his mid-afternoon rest and was not to be bothered. But SHPAKEVICH persisted in his desire to talk to BAZAROV. Finally BAZAROV took the phone and when he

2941

found out what SHPAKEVICH wanted to tell him, BAZAROV gave him a verbal lashing that actually sizzled. Nevertheless, later SHPAKEVICH called again and asked for the ambassador. The Man on Duty, Ivan Fedorovich SOLOMATIN, told SHPAKEVICH, "Aha, he roasted you and me before for [illegible] disturbing his rest and now you want some more of it?" But SHPAKEVICH was not to be put off and SOLOMATIN with a sigh buzzed BAZAROV again. At first BAZAROV was angry but later calmed down and discussed with SHPAKEVICH the well-being of PLISETSKAYA and her group. The above incidnet may chatacterize SHPAKEVICH in American vernacular as a "pest" and a "jerk". Both expressions describe his true nature quite well.

It is doubtful if this one-time assistant of the cultural attache had any extensive schooling. Such inadmissible expressions as, for instande, "Ya khochu dolozhitsya" is a clear indication of his low educational level.

But with all his shortcomings, SHPAKEVICH is probably well liked by the majority of the Soviets. He is easy to get along with, especially with his friends. His closest friends are the families of the Soviet correspondents, the KUCHEROVS and the DOLGOVS, and he is also very intimate with Leonid Vasilyevich (Losnka) NIKIFOROV, Intourist representative. [illegible] On a few occasions both of them got together with the aim of draining a bottle of cognac. However, there was

295

no indication that SHPAKEVICH was ever riotous or dead drunk. He is neither a skirt-chaser, although with his fluent Spanish and a human tank for a wife, SHPAKEVICH would be justified in investigating greener pastures among the Mexican women. But he is decidedly devoid of any imagination.

Despite her great bulk, SHPAKEVICH'S wife, Tatyana Ivanovna, seems to be a very amiable person and all the Soviet wives agree that she is very "nice". Tatyana is two years SHPAKEVICH'S junior, but she acts like a protective mother-hen towards him. She has high blood pressure and that was probably why she left for Moscow over a month ago. Consequently SHPAKEVICH is here all by himself for the present and some of his friends, who refer to him simply as "SHPAK", invite him occasionally for dinner or lunch.

Yet SHAPKEVICH can also hurt some people's feelings with his callous indifference. Once, when Nina Atanasyevna NIKITINA, wife of the films representative, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, begged SHPAKEVICH to drive her home from the Embassy, since she was dead tired after running errands for the Mestkom, SHPAKEVICH told her in an indifferent manner that he had no desire to do so and walked away. NIKITINA was so hurt by SHPAKEVICH'S attitude that she cried in the street on her way home. Acts of this nature cannot endear him to some people and by all indications, SHPAKEVICH does not seem

296

to be a very bright individual. Thus, he is being used for any conceivable job that presents itself, but only in the capacity of a temporary stop-gap, as an interpreter, or even as an errand-boy.

CS COPY

201-285412

S E C R E T

Chief, WH Division

Chief, SB Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE/LIROBBIN
LIROBBIN-1 and -2 Progress Report, November 1966 - July 1967

1. The Station continued to maintain contact with the LIROBBINs during the reporting period for the dual purpose of monitoring their relations with the Soviets and using them as sources of information on their heterogeneous social circle. Dwindling contact between the Soviets and the LIROBBINs since March suggests, however, that the Soviets may have lost their earlier interest in the couple.

2. LIROBBIN-1 and -2 had the following contact with the Soviets during the reporting period:

7 November: LIROBBIN-1 and -2 attended the 7 November Soviet Embassy celebration at the invitation of Aleksandr V. PRIKHODKO (201-202739).

20 November: LIROBBIN-1 and -2 attended a Soviet film showing at the Foreign Press Club put on by PRIKHODKO and Vladimir A. DOLGOV (201-763035).

24 November: LIROBBIN-1 and -2 and PRIKHODKO were among the guests at a Thanksgiving dinner given by Pearl GONZALEZ.

.......continued

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
2 - C/SB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-285412

HMMA-32761

10 August 1967

201-789387
201-789388

S E C R E T

298

1 December: LIROBBIN-1 bumped into PRIKHODKO in a coffee shop in the vicinity of several boys' schools. PRIKHODKO appeared to be deeply engaged in conversation with an unidentified Mexican boy who appeared to be about 20 years old and a student. PRIKHODKO greeted LIROBBIN-1, but neither introduced the boy nor asked LIROBBIN-1 to join them. PRIKHODKO was still talking with the boy when LIROBBIN-1 left.

Early December: At the invitation of PRIKHODKO and Valentin I. KUCHEROV (201-758017), LIROBBIN-1 and -2 attended a reception in honor of the Bolshoi Ballet at the Soviet Embassy.

2 February: LIROBBIN-1 and -2 and their daughter attended a dinner and film showing at the Soviet films office along with another American couple the LIROBBINS had introduced to PRIKHODKO. PRIKHODKO and KUCHEROV were the hosts.

15 February: LIROBBIN-1 and -2 met Valentin S. LOGINOV (201-285412), for the first time, at an Indian Embassy reception.

16 February: At LOGINOV's invitation, LIROBBIN-2 attended a Consular Corps gathering at the Soviet Embassy. LIROBBIN-1 had left for the United States that morning. PRIKHODKO and KUCHEROV both appeared genuinely surprised at seeing LIROBBIN-2 and learning that she knew LOGINOV. LOGINOV, for his part, also seemed surprised that PRIKHODKO and KUCHEROV knew LIROBBIN-2.

17 February: KUCHEROV came over to LIROBBIN-2's apartment during the afternoon with an invitation to the Soviet Army Day reception which he had promised on 16 February to deliver personally. As KUCHEROV knew, LIROBBIN-1 had left for the U.S. KUCHEROV invited himself in for several drinks and stayed for two hours talking about nothing. At one point he noticed a scratch on LIROBBIN-2's knee and used the opportunity to administer a sympathetic caress which wound up going down the length of her leg. He did not attempt to follow up this amorous gambit, however, and finally left with nothing more than a good-by bear hug.

23 February: LIROBBIN-2 attended the Soviet Army Day Reception at the Soviet Embassy, where she talked primarily with PRIKHODKO, KUCHEROV, and DOLGOV. She also spoke briefly with LOGINOV, who invited her to go along on a Consular Corps tour of the Mexican Home Show.

3 March: LIROBBIN-2 went on the tour of the Home Show, during which she talked with LOGINOV for about 25 minutes.

14-00000

299

S E C R E T HMMA-32761

31 March: LIROBBIN-2 telephoned PRIKHODKO about a week in advance and invited him to dinner on this date. He accepted, but failed to show up and never called to apologize.

12 July: LIROBBIN-2 met LOGINOV at an Indian Embassy reception. During a brief conversation with him he told her he was about to leave for the USSR on vacation and that PRIKHODKO would be doing the same later in the month.

3. As can be seen from the above run down, none of the LIROBBINs' Soviet contacts have made any effort to see them since early March, and PRIKHODKO even missed a dinner party without so much as calling to apologize. It therefore appears that the LIROBBINs have at least temporarily been put on the shelf by the Soviets, if not dropped altogether. We expect to get a more definite reading in the fall, when the large number of Soviets now on vacation, including PRIKHODKO and LOGINOV, have returned and the Soviets have resumed their normal routines.

4. In the course of the reporting period, the LIROBBINs also provided information on 14 non-Soviet acquaintances of interest to the Station.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

300

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

[illegible] 1967

TO
Chief, SB

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
O REDTOP/Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

A 18721

23 Dec 27 20 Aug 28

1. LIFIRE reports the departure for Moscow via New York and Paris of Subject, his wife, Aleksandra Dmitriyevna and their son, Dmitriy, 59 aboard Air France Flight 700 on 16 July 1967. Subject traveled on Diplomatic Passport D-010264. Subject's wife and son travelled on Diplomatic Passport D-010265. Also travelling with the LOGINOV family was Tatyana Borisovna MALAKHOVICH, 8 eight-year-old daughter of Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH (201-767974), Employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, who travelled on LOGINOVA's Diplomatic Passport D-010265.

2. Sources indicate that the LOGINOVs departed on home leave. On 12 July 1967 LIROBBIN-2 reported that LOGINOV mentioned that he was going on vacation in the USSR on 16 July. On 15 June 1967, LICOZY-5 reported that LOGINOV had also mentioned to him that he was going on vacation in the USSR in July. LIENVOY indicated that Subject and his wife were leaving on 16 July 1967 with a three-day stopover in Paris, France.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

SR TRAVEL INPUT PROGRAM

03 AU[illegible]

03 AU[illegible]

1967

Distribution:
~~1~~2 - C/SB
1 - C/WH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
B201-767974	HMMA-32616	25 July 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412

14-00000

301

Selected Xerox
[illegible]

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

Chief, WH Division

REDCOAT/POA for Subject of Reference

Action Required: Submission of PRQ Parts I and II

Reference : MEXICO CITY-1638, 3 June 1967

A Provisional Operational Approval was granted for use of Subject of reference as an access agent to the Subject of 201-285412 (KGB Officer in Mexico City). Please submit PRQ Parts I and II in order that a full Operational Approval can be requested.

Laura J. UTSTINE

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

13 JUL 1967

201-285412

JUL 1967

HMMW - 15623

10 July 1967

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-314144

WH/1 J. Zerance jkf 4167

1 - RI
1 - Chrono
1 - SB/O/WH

SB/O/WH

Subject of ref: Miriam
AVILA-Katz

C/WH/1 W. J. Kaufman

302

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO [illegible]		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO [illegible]		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM [illegible]		MICROFILM

SUBJECT [illegible]
Travel of Bulgarian Nationals to Mexico, April - [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LIFIRE reported the travel to Mexico of the following Bulgarian nationals:

*DIVITRO V-G/A [illegible], Dimitr, born 19[illegible], Ppt. [illegible], [illegible].

*[illegible]NA-[illegible]VA, Sonja, born 19[illegible], [illegible].

[illegible] arrived on [illegible] April via [illegible] from Havana, with [illegible]-day official Mexican visas, and returned to Havana on [illegible] April 1967. Visit to Mexico apparently connection with 7th World Petroleum Congress.

*R[illegible]SLAVA, Cvetana, born 19[illegible], Ppt. [illegible], arrived 1[illegible] April 1967 via CUBANA.

*KOZOVSKI, Angel [illegible], born 19[illegible], Dipl. Ppt. [illegible], Cultural Attache/[illegible] Sec, Bulgarian Embassy.

*KOZOVSKA, Mira, born 19[illegible], Dipl. Ppt. [illegible]78, wife of Angel KOZOVSKI in Havana. Arrived and departed via CUBANA, to and from Havana, 14-21 April 1967.

(NOTE: Per LIEMPTY/[illegible] April [illegible], KOZOVSKI contacted the Soviet [illegible] office, identified himself, and indicated he wanted to get in touch with Vladimir [illegible], [illegible], and Valentin LAGIN[illegible], [illegible], whose names he had been given in Havana, adding that his wife is Russian; he left his hotel number and room number, asking that the Embassy officers contact him that evening). Forwarded herewith is a photocopy of the passports of KOZOVSKI and his wife, photographed by the LIT[illegible] airport camera.

........continued

CS COPY

Attachment:
A - LIFIRE reports, [illegible], h/w
B - Photocopy of KOZOVSKI passport, h/w

Distribution:
[illegible] 2 - SB, w/att.; 1 - [illegible], w/att.; [illegible] files

CROSS REFERENCE TO [illegible]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [illegible]	DATE 1[illegible] June 19[illegible]
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER [illegible]

201-285412

303

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

2. [illegible] reported the arrival on 7 May 19[illegible] via [illegible] from Havana of:

[illegible], Carmela, Professor, no passport number recorded; local address: Malintzin 37, Mexico, D.F.

For/Willard C. CURTIS

304

[illegible]

Nombre (s) ATTCHEVA (a/p [illegible]) Edad Nacionalidad Pasaporte

3P

alias aparecía como
Dimitri DIMITROV — Ingeniero, Ppte. 3529
GUEORGUIEV

Llegada Aerolinea

JUN 30 1967

Salida Aerolinea Punto de Desembarque

14 ~~Ab~~ April 1967 Cubana 465 Havana

Visa Mexicana Expedida en:

[illegible] 1967.

"Transito"

c/o Congreso del Petroleo

CS COPY

[illegible] HMMA 32280

305

Nombre (s) | Edad | Nacionalidad | Pasaporte

Llegada | Aerolinea

Salida | Aerolinea | Punto de Desembarque

Visa Mexicana Expedida en:

306

PRECEDENC

HMM-11.179
TDCS-314/08252-67

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	WH	6	
2	CA/C [illegible]	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION
IW (ACD)

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D CS/DO
FI/INT 6, SOD 4, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, CI/SP, FI/SPG, RI/AN, CS/SGO, NE 12, WH 8,
SB/MC 6, SB/S/RR 3, DO 5, SB/C 5.

S E C R E T 081940Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1707

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY PANAMA CITY, MONTERREY (POUCH)

INTEL

8 JUN 67 IN 85325

SUPDATA: SOURCE RAYMOND A FRADYER FROM SUBJECTS DURING CONSULAR OFFICERS MEETING 7 JUNE. NO LIASON. RI INDEX. REF DIRECTOR 07730.

FILED: 081940Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

Logenor

201-285412

14-00000

307

PRIORITY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN-85325

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR CIA/NMCC NIC USIA NSA ONE OCR ORR SDO DCS AID CGS

FBI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 082205Z

CITE TDCS-314/08252-67

DIST 8 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY: USSR/CZECHOSLOVAKIA/EGYPT/ISRAEL

DOI: 7 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT: DISBELIEF EVIDENCED BY SOVIET AND CZECH OFFICIALS OF EGYPTIAN CHARGES OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN NEAR EAST CRISIS

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (7 JUNE 67) REPORT NO. HMM-11,179

SOURCE: COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE CONVERSATION WITH THE COMMUNIST OFFICIALS IN QUESTION.

1. DURING INFORMAL CONVERSATION ABOUT THE NEAR EAST CRISIS ON 7 JUNE 1967 VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV, SOVIET CONSUL IN MEXICO CITY AND KNOWN KGB MEMBER, AND JIRI SVESTKA, CZECH CONSUL AND IDENTIFIED MEMBER OF THE CZECH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, EXHIBITED EVERY INDICATION OF DISBELIEF OF EGYPTIAN CHARGES THAT UNITED STATES' AIRCRAFT HAVE PROVIDED SUPPORT TO ISRAELI FORCES. IN WHAT CAN BE INTERPRETED AS TACIT ADMISSION OF THE FALSITY OF EGYPT'S CHARGES, SVESTKA SAID, "WELL, ANYTHING GOES DURING WAR."

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO.

REPORT CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

308

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

XXX

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AETARGET/LIROCKET-1 - Gatehouse and Outside Reception Room and Offices at Soviet Embassy/Control of Routine Visitors to the Embassy during Business Hours

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-30795, 8 December 1966

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of (a) a sketch of the interior of the gatehouse just inside the front gate of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and (b) a sketch of the interior of the Reception Room and offices adjoining the gatehouse. Both sketches were prepared by LIROCKET-1 and are current as of May 1967. LIROCKET-1 has been in the Reception Room approximately 55 times, the gatehouse about 15 times, and the first office twice.

2. Control of Routine Visitors to the Embassy during Business Hours. According to LIROCKET-1, traffic through the front foot gate is essentially controlled by a single guard who operates the gate latch electronically by means of a release button inside the gatehouse. In the course of approximately 125 visits to the Soviet Embassy from January 1966 to the present, LIROCKET-1 on occasion has seen as many as three guards in the gatehouse at one time, but there has usually been only one guard present when he has entered and exited the gate (usually about 0915 and 1145, respectively, on Mondays and Fridays prior to mid-January 1967, and about 1530 and 1800 on Tuesdays and Thursdays from mid-January to mid-May 1967). Even when more than one guard has been present, it has appeared that only one of the guards has actually been on duty and that the others have simply been lounging in the gatehouse for want of anything better to do. LIROCKET-1 has never seen any of the guards carry arms and has never seen weapons of any kind in the gatehouse. He has seen the following five persons on guard

- CONTINUED -

Attachments:
(a) Sketch - Interior gatehouse
(b) Sketch - Interior Reception Room

Distribution:
2 - CSB, w/atts., H/W
1 - CWH, w/atts., H/W

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 32172	7 JUN 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	50-8-10/3

201-285412

14-00000

309

duty (identified from mug shots): Ivan Petrovich KARCHIN (201-782164), Valentina Georgiyevna MUKHINA, wife of Anatoliy Aleksandrovich MUKHIN (201-293944), Stanislav Sergeyevich SILNIKOV (201-271103), Ivan Fedorovich SOLOMATIN (201-307933), and Nikolay Ivanovich ZAKHAROV (201-779285).

3. To gain entry through the foot gate, the would-be visitor presses the white doorbell button to the left of the foot gate. This button rings a buzzer inside the gatehouse. The guard on duty promptly looks through the observation window which directly faces the footgate. If, presumably, the guard is satisfied that the caller or callers do not look dangerous or suspicious, he disengages the gate latch electronically by pressing one of the two release buttons inside the gatehouse. After the gate latch disengages, it is up to the caller to push (or, when the caller is leaving, pull) the gate open and then close it behind him. The gate locks automatically when closed. According to LIROCKET-1, there is a keyhole on the inside of the gate, but there definitely is no keyhole on the outside. LIROCKET-1 has never seen anyone open the gate with a key.

4. LIROCKET-1 has been present in only about five instances when non-Soviets in vehicles have sought admittance through the vehicle gate, which is adjacent to the foot gate. In each of the five instances, the callers have been delivery men whose trucks have apparently been recognized by the guard. In each instance, the truck has pulled up with its nose to the vehicle gate and the guard has walked to the gate and opened it manually. The vehicle gate consists of two doors which open inward. It is secured by one dead bolt from one door to the other. LIROCKET-1 has never noticed a padlock on the gate. After being admitted to the Embassy grounds, the trucks in each case have driven unaccompanied to and parked under the portecochere on the north side of the main Embassy building. After closing the gate, the guard has returned to the gatehouse, where - although LIROCKET-1 has never actually observed a guard doing so - he has evidently telephoned someone inside the main building to give notification of the truck's arrival.

5. LIROCKET-1 has been present perhaps 25 times when pedestrian callers (delivery men, students, persons on visa business) have rung the foot gate buzzer, and in each instance the guard has routinely let them in without going to the gate to question them or observe them more closely. On one occasion, as many as four young Mexican males who appeared to be university students rang the buzzer while LIROCKET-1 was inside the gatehouse, and the guard let them in in the routine manner.

6. Once inside the gate, the pedestrian caller is expected to present himself at the gatehouse door, which is usually left open, and state his business. The guard then either goes next door to summon an Embassy official from one of the two offices oft the Reception Room, or, as in Subject's case, uses the interphone to call someone inside the main building. (In LIROCKET-1's case, the guard calls one of his Soviet students.) If instructed to have the caller wait, the guard shows him into the Reception Room. LIROCKET-1 himself has been asked to wait in the Reception Room about 55 times. On approximately 15 occasions, he has been invited into the gatehouse by the guard on duty to chat. On the latter occasions, he has either remained in the gatehouse until one of his Soviet students has appeared to escort him into the main building or has left the gatehouse after a few minutes and gone to the Reception Room to continue waiting for one of his students to arrive. On approximately 60 of LIROCKET-1's visits to the Embassy,

310

the guard has been instructed by the person on the other end of the interphone to show LIROCKET-1 to the classroom. (Except for two occasions, the Soviets have always used the first room on the left just inside the main entrance to the main building for Subject's classes.) When the guard does show LIROCKET-1 into the classroom, he leaves the gatehouse for between 1 and 3 minutes (depending on whether he opens the classroom windows). The guard has been alone in the gatehouse about half of the 60 times he has shown Subject into the classroom, and has consequently left the gatehouse unattended for 1-3 minutes on approximately 30 occasions.

7. Offices Off the Reception Room. There are two offices off the Reception Room. The first office is known from other sources to be used for visa interviews. The second office is presumably used for the same purpose. The first office opens directly into the Reception Room. The second office is at the back of the first office and is entered either through the first office or through an outside door. (LIROCKET-1 has never seen the outside door used, however.) One or both of the offices were occupied by Soviets about 20 of the roughly 40 times LIROCKET-1 was in the Reception Room prior to mid-January 1967 (usually on Monday and Friday mornings between 0915 and 0930). The Soviets frequently left the door to the first office, and somewhat less frequently to the second office, open when they were present. The first door or both doors were sometimes also left open when no Soviet was present. When the door to the first office or the doors to both offices were open and LIROCKET-1 sat opposite the door to the first office he could see about a quarter of the interior of the first office and a small part of the interior of the second office. Although official Soviet visa hours are only on Tuesdays and Fridays (from 1100-1300), LIROCKET-1 saw Soviets in both offices with about equal frequency on Monday and Friday mornings. From what LIROCKET-1 could see, the Soviets rarely seemed to be busy with desk work, but confined themselves to looking over newspapers, opening mail, chatting with each other, etc. Frequently Soviets went into one of the offices for just a moment and then left. Since LIROCKET-1 has begun going to the Embassy about 1530 on Tuesdays and Thursdays, however, he has always found the door to the first office shut and both offices evidently empty. (COMMENT: This is probably explained by the fact that the Embassy lunch break is from 1400-1600).

8. LIROCKET-1 recently had occasion to visit Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412), the Soviet Consul, in the first office from approximately 1830-1900 on a Thursday. At this time he found LOGINOV doing paper work and a stack of 30-35 passports on his desk. LIROCKET-1 also recently stepped into the first office to see LOGINOV at 1830 on a Tuesday, but LOGINOV was just leaving and LIROCKET-1 did not stay. LIROCKET-1 has never been inside the second office. His sketch of the second office is based on what he has been able to see from the Reception Room and the first office. In order not to seem curious, he purposely did not look around the first office when he was in it and consequently does not know what kind of furnishings, if any, are on the far side of the first office.

9. From January 1966 to January 1967, LIROCKET-1 was in the Reception Room on 8-10 occasions when other non-Soviet visitors came in. The Soviet interviewer ushered the visitors into one of the offices and closed the door to the first office on about four of these occasions. On two occasions, the Soviet interviewer ushered the visitor into the first office and did not bother to close the door. On four or five occasions, the Soviet interviewer came out into the Reception Room to talk with the visitor in LIROCKET-1's presence. In each of the six or seven cases in which Subject was able to hear the conversation, the Soviet and the visitor were discussing visa matters.

311

10. LIROCKET-1 estimated that while he was present in the Reception Room between January 1966 and January 1967, he observed Soviets in the first office about four times as often as in the second office. From mug shots, he identified the following Soviets as having been the primary users of the two offices during the times he was present:

(a) LOGINOV, one of the two Soviet Vice-Consuls until he became Consul in September 1966. LOGINOV is known KGB. LIROCKET-1 frequently saw him in the first office and saw him receive several visitors.

(b) Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123), Second Secretary and the Consul until September 1966. YATSKOV is known KGB. LIROCKET-1 saw YATSKOV with about half the frequency of LOGINOV. YATSKOV used both offices. LIROCKET-1 also saw YATSKOV receive visitors.

(c) Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (201-744341), Vice-Consul and probably KGB. LIROCKET-1 saw him walk in and out of the first office several times, but never saw him receive visitors.

(d) Ruslan Aleksandrovich TUCHNIN (201-205304), the Radio and TV correspondent and suspect GRU. LIROCKET-1 saw him in the second office two or three times, but never saw him receive a visitor.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

CS COPY

14-00000

312

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

25

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	WH	5	
2	CI	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB8, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

S E C R E T 081600Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1036 8 APR 67 [illegible]

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

REF DIRECTOR 90320

APOLOGIES FOR MISTAKE IN LILYRIC LOG. ACTUAL LILYRIC PHOTO SHOWS CAR HAD FLORIDA 66 TAGS 10-W-6776.

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-285412

14-00000

313

N. Perkins
WH/1
6954
6 April 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	WH	6	
2	CI	7	
3	C	8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 86 ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR SB8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 7 00 05Z CITE DIRECTOR 90320

MEXICO CITY

REF: MEXICO CITY 0699 (IN 22585)*

FLORIDA 66 TAGS 10-W-7776 ISSUED TO NEGRO LABORER FOR 59 OLDSMOBILE. VIEW DISCREPANCY, CAN YOU PROVIDE YEAR OR COLOR OF TAGS MENTIONED REF.

END OF MESSAGE

*Man in late model Buick Electra with Florida tags 10-W-7776 stopped at Soviet Embassy.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
201-285412
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

314

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM
23

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	WH	5	BI
2	CI	6	AC
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, SB 8 CI/OPS, CI/OA

4 APR 67 IN 37176

S E C R E T 041925Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0972

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT Loginov

REF: DIRECTOR 11WW0

1. STATION OFFICER HAD LUNCH WITH SUBJECT REF 23 MARCH. AFTER INITIAL RELUCTANCE, SHE AGREED REPORT PERSONALITY DATA AND OTHER INFORMATION RE LOGINOV ACQUIRED DURING NORMAL BUSINESS AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH HIM. STATED SHE HAD GONE OUT WITH HIM SEVERAL TIMES, USUALLY TO DINNER, MOVIES, COFFEE NIGHTCAP AND THEN "ALWADI STRIGHT HOME." DESCRIBED LOGINOV AS VERY INTELLIGENT AND INTERESTING, UNLIKE USUAL BOORISH SOVIET. SAID HE ONE ASKED HER IF SHE HAD ANY FRIENDS IN LNPURE, BUT THAT SHE HAD AVOIDED QUESTION AND LOGINOV HAD NOT PURSUED MATTER. STATED THEIR CONVERSATION OTHERWISE STRICTLY SOCIAL.

2. SUBJECT IMPRESSED AS INTELLIGENT, SOCIABLE, ATTRACTIVE AND ON SOPHISTICATED SIDE. ALTHOUGH INDEPENDENT-MINDED, APPEARED RATIONAL AND PRO-WOLADY. SITUATION NOT OPPORTUNE TO GET BIO REQUESTED REF, BUT SUBJECT AND LNPURE CITIZENSHIP SECTION PROVIDED FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO:

A. SUBJECT H155,935/13,5 5-53 7,8;64056 8, 9-39.

SECRET

301-285412

315

SECRET

B. MOTHER IS SARA LOUISE KATZ DE AVILA, U.S. CITIZEN BORN 26 NOVEMBER 1914 TOLEDO, OHIO. MOTHER HAS RESIDED MEXICO SINCE CA 1939. NO STATION TRACES.

3. SUBJECT TO CONTACT C/O AFTER NEXT DATE WITH LOGINOV. WILL GET SUBJECT'S DPOB AND DATA ON MEXICAN FATHER AT THAT TIME.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

316

Loginov

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING/ACTION

		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE/LICANNY-1 -- Status Report on LICANNY-1

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: A. HMMA-30292, 11 October 1966
B. HMMW-14988, 4 November 1966

1. Subject was recruited in May 1963 to accept Soviet recruitment if approached during a visit to the USSR in May-June 1963. Following his return to Mexico, he reported that no effort had been made to recruit or, to his knowledge, cultivate or compromise him. The Station maintained sporadic contact with Subject between June 1963 and August 1964, during which time he furnished limited information on Soviet travelers to and from Mexico and on Soviet interest in increasing tourist traffic between Mexico and the USSR.

2. The Station was notified in August 1964 that Subject's POA had been cancelled. There was then no further contact with him until January 1966, although during the latter part of 1965, Subject on his own initiative gave the LNPURE officer with whom he regularly dealt on visa matters information on Soviet visitors to Mexico, as well as on the visit of the Moscow Symphony to Mexico. The LNPURE officer passed this information on to the Station. In January 1966, Subject advised the LNPURE officer that he was in contact with Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123) and Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412), both of whom had asked him for information on sea and rail travel between Mexico, New York, and Europe. At this time, the LNPURE officer turned Subject over to a new Station case officer who debriefed Subject and obtained his agreement to supply personality information on LOGINOV. Subject stipulated at this time, however, that he did not want to become involved in clandestine meetings or take money, and expressed the desire to meet the case officer in the LNPURE officer's office following the conclusion of Subject's visa business.

(CONTINUED)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/WH
1 - C/SB

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-31572	15 March 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-285412 201-357138

317

The LNPURE officer also informed the case officer that Subject had previously mentioned that he had once been "approached" to supply information on Soviet travelers on a regular basis and had refused to do so. Subject evidently did not specifically say that he had been approached by WOFACT, but this was clearly the implication. Subject told the LNPURE officer that he was willing to supply information he considered unusual or especially interesting, but was not willing to supply information on a routine basis.

3. The Station had no contact with Subject between 6 January and 28 September 1966. On 20 September, the Station learned from LICOZY-5 that Subject had been invited along with several other Mexican travel agents to attend an Intourist conference in Moscow from 24-29 October. A meeting was consequently arranged with Subject for 28 September through the LNPURE officer.

4. Subject told the Station officer who met him that he had been meaning to contact the Station about his forthcoming trip, which, he said, he assumed was what the case officer wanted to talk about. He gave the case officer a copy of his invitation to the Intourist conference and on his own initiative offered to provide the Station with a full report of the conference when he returned. However, he stated that he was not interested in working for the Station on a permanent, "agent" basis, in meeting under clandestine circumstances, or taking money. He was willing to help to the extent he was, he explained, because he believed basically what we did about current world problems and, after all, had lived in WOLADY for many years and regarded it as his "second home". On the basis of this interview and a review of Subject's file, Subject impressed the case officer as a somewhat disingenuous egoist who, despite a genuine sympathy for WOLADY, regarded his cooperation with the Station primarily as a means of insuring his business contacts with LNPURE and as something which had to be kept to a minimum lest it limit his independence or detract him in any way from his business and personal interests. This impression served as the basis for the evaluation of Subject contained in Reference A.

5. The case officer's impression of Subject changed considerably with the next meeting, which was held on 18 October. At this meeting, the case officer gave Subject a defensive briefing for his trip and went over general reporting requirements. Subject surprised the case officer with his friendliness and cooperativeness, and went to great pains to explain that he was more than willing to cooperate with the Station as long as he did not become so deeply involved in intelligence work that his business or personal life was adversely affected. The case officer was impressed by Subject's apparent sincerity and got the definite impression that ever since receiving the Intourist invitation, Subject had been fearful he was again going to be asked to accept a double agent role which, if it materialized, would require him to become far more deeply involved in intelligence work than he wished. Sensing both Subject's relief at not being asked to undertake a more demanding assignment and his concern to make it clear that his heart was nevertheless in the right place, the case officer used the opportunity to again pose the question of whether Subject would be willing to report on a routine basis on persons who booked travel through his agency to the USSR. The case officer told Subject that this information could be forwarded to the Station through the LNPURE officer and assured him that his cooperation in supplying information would not involve him in a series of escalating intelligence assignments. Evidently satisfied that his role would remain a limited one, Subject agreed to report the desired information on a regular basis. Moreover, he volunteered to check with other travel agencies in order to fulfill specific requirements for information on travelers to the Soviet Union who did not book their travel through his agency.

318

6. Subject was thoroughly debriefed upon his return from the USSR in early November 1966, at which time he continued to exhibit the same friendliness and cooperativeness noted in paragraph five. He reported that he was aware of no effort to assess, cultivate, or compromise him in the USSR. He provided information both on the formal proceedings of the conference and on individual Soviet and foreign participants, as well as on a Spanish businessman he met in Moscow. This information resulted in three Field Information Reports (HMM-10,870, 30 November 1966, HMM-10,871, 30 November 1966, HMM-10,875, 30 November 1966), one dispatch to Madrid (HMMA-30725, 1 December 1966), and a second to Santiago (HMMA-30749, 2 December 1966). Since furnishing information on his trip to the USSR, Subject has provided information on the travel of the Bolshoi Ballet in Mexico, on a Mexican traveler to the USSR, and on a Soviet student group which was slated to visit Mexico, but which for unknown reasons failed to arrive at the last minute.

7. The only Soviet Subject has recently been in contact with is LOGINOV, whom he occasionally sees on visa matters. According to Subject, their relationship during the past year has been strictly of a business nature and LOGINOV has shown no interest in extending it beyond this. Subject consequently appears to have little to offer in the way of an access agent to the Soviets in the foreseeable future. However, as the manager of one of five Mexican travel agencies representing Intourist and because of his apparently excellent contacts with key personnel of the other four travel agencies, he promises to be a useful referent on persons who book travel in Mexico to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

8. Despite the regularization of our relationship with Subject and his increased cooperativeness, we do not feel we are currently in a position to ask him to undergo an SGSWIRL interview. The relationship between the case officer and Subject at this time is essentially one of equals in which Subject is voluntarily assisting LNFORT out of ideological motivation. It is true that his strong business interest in maintaining friendly relations with LNFORT and LNPURE provides us with a degree of control, but we feel that at present it is better left as a form of tacit control than brandished even subtly. It is our opinion that Subject would regard an SGSWIRL interview as an effort both to increase our control over him and to draw him deeper into the intelligence business. Such a reaction would in all probability undo much of our recent progress with Subject. Consequently, we would prefer to postpone an SGSWIRL interview until either we further solidify our relationship with Subject or we wish to use him in more sensitive work.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

39

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM 24

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	WH	5	101
2	CI	6	AC
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 152330Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0699 15 MAR 67 22585

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

1. PER LILYRIC ON 9 MARCH A MAN DRIVING WHAT APPEARS TO BE LATE MODEL BUICK ELECTRA WITH FLORIDA TAGS 10-W-7776 STOPPED AT SOVIET EMBASSY AND TALKED WITH CONSUL VALENTIN S. LOGINOV. MAN DID NOT ENTER EMBASSY.

2. INFORMING
~~U-E2C RIEFORMI~~NG LOCAL LNERGO.

SECRET

BT

Loginov

SECRET

201-285412

320

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	CWH	6	
2	[illegible]	7	
3	C	8	
4		9	
5	JFC	10	

ORIG: C. Bustos/pem
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167
DATE: 14 March 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 60 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR . SB 8, C/OA, C/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET [illegible] 23 [illegible] CITE DIRECTOR 83389

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: MEXICO CITY 0653 (IN 20404) *

REDCOAT

NO HQS TRACES MISS MIRIAM AVILA KATZ. UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY, WILL INITIATE POA.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH Cormier (phone)

William V. Broe
C/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

201-385412

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

321

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	WH	5	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	6	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	7	
4	[illegible]	8	

~~FROM~~ 15

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, SB8, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 131810Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0653

13 MAR 67 IN 20404

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

1. REQUEST HQS TRACES ON MISS MIRIAM AVILA KATZ, MEXICAN CITIZEN BORN CA 1941. ATTENDED COLLEGE IN OHIO FOR TWO YEARS, PROBABLY ABOUT 1959-1960. CURRENTLY EMPLOYED MUNDOSHTOURS TRAVEL AGENCY, MEXICO CITY.

2. PER LIENVOY AND LICOZY-5, SUBJECT IS IN SOCIAL CONTACT WITH VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV, 201-285412. ACCORDING LICOZY-5, SUBJECT IS INTELLIGENT AND DEFINITELY NOT PRO-SOVIET.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-285412

14-00000

322

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, VALINTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
CONSUL, KNOWN KGB.
IN CONTACT WITH BORIS SEMENOVICH IVANOV
/201-078078/.

201-078078
HMMA-31474
02 MAR 67
PI

R 6703080821

FILE IN 201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

201-285412

323

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
092 - 5C [illegible] AT 1502 [illegible]
By 53 [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CI	5	[illegible]
2	WA	6	[illegible]
3		7	RC
4		8	

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/IC-2, CA-2, CA/Prop, CA/O-4 - ADDED: SB 8, VR

S E C R E T 231725Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0469

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

23 Feb 67 IN 07314

REF: A. HMMA 31376

B. MEXICO CITY 8463 (IN [illegible])

C. PANAMA CITY 0983 (IN 95834)

D. EZP 8730

1. PER LIENVOY VALENTIN S. LOGINOV 201-285412 TOLD PRESIDENT OF ASSOCIATION HE WANTS TO GO TO REF A CONVENTION AND BRING FRIEND ALEKSANDR A. NIKITIN, SOVEXPORT FILM REP "WHO WENT TO FILM FESTIVAL IN PANAMA LAST YEAR." LOGINOV ASKED PRESIDENT TO ARRANGE VISAS FOR BOTH "IN ORDER TO AVOID DIFFICULTIES." PRESIDENT CONTACTED LOGINOV LATER AND SAID HE HAD CHECKED WITH PANAMANIAN CONSUL IN MEXICO, EMILIA AROSEMENA, WHO TOLD HIM THERE NO PROBLEM IN VISA FOR LOGINOV AS CONSUL ATTENDING CONVENTION BUT THAT NIKITIN MUST MAKE FORMAL VISA APPLICATION WHICH SHE MUST SUBMIT TO HER GOVERNMENT.

Nikitin

Loginov

2. PLEASE ATTEMPT BLOCK NIKITIN'S VISA. YOU MAY TELL LIAISON HE IS KGB OFFICER WHO AS SOVEXPORTFILM REP

SECRET

201-285412

324

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0469 S E C R E T SECRET

HAS NO CONSULAR OR DIPLOMATIC STATUS, AND THUS DOES NOT HAVE LEGITIMATE REASON TO ATTEND CONVENTION. S BLOCKING LOGINOV'S VISA MAY BE AWKWARD SUGGEST YOU INFORM LIAISON HE IS NOTORIOUS KGB OFFICER. PER PACY 7280, 19 DEC 61 LOGINOV TRANSITED PANAMA 16 AND 17 DEC 61 ESCORTING SOVIET FOOTBALL TEAM. HYPOTHESIS COVERT BAGGAGE SEARCH REVEALED ENVELOPE CONTAINING LARGE SUM AMERICAN BILLS. IF THIS INFO USABLE LOCALLY SUGGEST YOU SAY MONEY UNDOUBTEDLY WAS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO A LA COMMUNIST PARTY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

325

SECRET
(When Filled In)

p.f. 6
Loginov

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412 050-005-000
SEX M DOB ? HMMA-31376
14 FEB 67
CIT USSR P1
OCC ?

< MEXICO REF FACT THAT CUBAN AND SOVIET MBRS OF MEXICO CONSULAR ASSOCIATION MAY SEIZE OPPORTUNITY GIVEN THEM BY INVITATION TO ATTEND FOURTH INTERAMERICAN CONSULAR ASSO TO SEEK PANAMANIAN VISAS.

HZP R 6702280348

FILE IN 201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
8-57

SECRET

(7-46)

201-285412

326

DISPATCH

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM: Chief, SB via Chief, WH

SUBJECT: REDTOP BESABER contact with Soviet Officials

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HMMW-15222, 1 February 1967

B. MEXICO CITY 0117 (IN 87362)

1. In accordance with Reference B, Russell K. MUCHANE (alias Ted KELLY) joined Willard B. ABSALOM for a meeting with BESABER on 28 January (see Reference A) and met the latter alone for 45 minutes on 2 February.

2. After determining that BESABER has had social contact with Subject of 201-285412 (Iden A), Subject of 201-116900 (Iden B), and AEJUNGLE, the discussions with respect to Soviet officials in Mexico were limited to these three officials. In the course of the conversations we told BESABER that Iden A is a known KGB officer and Iden B a known GRU officer, but that we have no hard evidence to identify AEJUNGLE as an intelligence officer. He was told that our principal objective in his contact with Soviet officials is to obtain personality data and operational information for use against such Soviets to effect their ~~defection~~ [illegible] in place or outright. Since BESABER has been working with us extensively on the Polish target for over two years, none of the above was new to him.

3. Subject had the following to say about each of the Soviets mentioned above:

a. Iden A--This Soviet is just learning to handle himself well in the social situations demanded by his position in the Embassy. BESABER believes he can be brought into a social relationship and could be induced to "let his hair down" under a given situation sufficiently permissive. He would be an easy target for a reasonably pretty and well dressed female. During the one social function (at the Polish Embassy) at which BESABER had an opportunity to observe this Soviet show deference to AEJUNGLE, whether because of the latter's social grace and high diplomatic standing or because of possible intelligence affinity between the two could not be determined.

(Continued)

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 201-285412
201-116900

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-[illegible]

DATE: [illegible] February 1967

HQS FILE NUMBER: [illegible]

[illegible]

201-285412

327

b. [illegible] he had been [illegible] with [illegible] on only [illegible] occasions in the last two years, [illegible] said that [illegible] "has some kind of problem; something is bothering him". After some thought, BESADER said that he believed [illegible] may be homosexual, basing this statement on nothing more than "feel". Later in the conversation, BESADER said that he would be able to test his belief eventually by use of his New York designer (Iden C-- Headquarters traces to be forwarded) who is known to BESADER as a homosexual. BESADER believes that time and patience will provide the opportunity. It was suggested that [illegible]'s penchant for tennis (of which BESADER was earlier advised) might provide the entree since BESADER's wife is an avid tennis player. Aside from the above, BESADER's assessment of [illegible] emphasized everything we already know concerning the latter's talents, abilities, social charm, etc.

c. [illegible]--BESADER emphasized this man's military bearing, whether in or out of uniform, and his ability to remain cool and in control of every social relationship in which he finds himself. BESADER said [illegible] and Iden [illegible] are very close, even intimate, friends. BESADER speculates that the two are close friends from the days when [illegible] was in the Soviet Army. (Since this statement concerning [illegible]'s background was new to Headquarters, Station comment would be appreciated. We did not indicate to BESADER that we were not aware of [illegible]'s service in the Soviet Army.)

4. BESADER was given the following requirements with respect to the above Soviets and asked to discuss them with [illegible] (alias [illegible]) in Mexico City after his return:

a. [illegible]--Develop a social relationship and attempt to [illegible] Subject involved in local (non-official) social activities, including involvement with women. To look for an opportunity to force Subject to extend an invitation for BESADER (with or without wife) to visit him at his apartment (this to give BESADER an opportunity to see every side of Subject's life in Mexico). Be alert to determine whether Subject's deference to [illegible] is personal/[illegible] or possibly in connection with mutual [illegible] responsibilities.

b. [illegible]--Be alert to any possibility of establishing a social relationship and of furthering his belief that [illegible] may be homosexual. Plans for the use of Iden [illegible] or any other individual in this regard are to be discussed with [illegible] and handled under [illegible]'s close guidance.

5. [illegible] BESADER [illegible] to [illegible] Subject on with respect to the [illegible] Soviets. [illegible] is clearly [illegible] [illegible] only drawback seems to be that [illegible] overly-enthusiastic, but [illegible] sufficient [illegible] and training [illegible] potential in anything he may do. We have requested that [illegible] be broadened to include assessment of [illegible] and other [illegible] officials as well as Poles since the present [illegible] is [illegible] too narrow for us to take advantage of his obvious [illegible], ability, and willingness to do more. It seemed rather clear from our conversation with [illegible]

14-00000

328

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

that [illegible] (a [illegible] his theoretical financial wizardry, business acumen, and future business potential) is considerably worried about his lack of working capital. His suggestion that, with our help, he could expand his business into several countries and, thus, provide us with extensive cover possibilities (even in Warsaw) and the image of a man aware of a potential financial coup but hesitant to take the risk without assurance that his losses, should they occur, will be completely covered through his association with us.

Russell K. MUCHARE

Distribution: 3 - COS, Mexico City w/atts/USC

Attachment:
Identity Sheet

IDENTITY SHEET

IDENTITY A Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

IDENTITY B Col. Vladimir Nikolayevich SOKOLOV

IDENTITY C Mr. Tom TARAN

14-00000

330

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dissem by 24

ACTION SB-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI/OA

S E C R E T 270350Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0117 27 JAN 67 87362

DIRECTOR

REDTOP REDOX

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 9937 (IN 78030)

B. DIRECTOR 69153

1. FOLLOWING ARE CHANGES TO PLAN MEET BESABER WASH:

A. BESABER BOOKED AT SHERATON PARK HOTEL, 2660 WOODLEY ROAD N.W., NOT SHOREHAM AS STATED REF A.

B. DUE ETA (VIA AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 53) BESABER WILL STAND BY IN HOTEL FOR CALL PER REF B BETWEEN 2000 AND 2130, 28 JAN.

2. DURING RECENT TDY MEXICO MUCHANE TOLD STATION HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO BESABER RE SOVIET MATTERS, LOGINOV IN PARTICULAR.

S E C R E T

BT

201-285412

14-00000

331

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO	Chief, WH Division	XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO	Chief, SB; Chief, WOMUSE	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City	MICROFILM
SUBJECT	REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE/LICOZY-5	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-30722, 1 December 1966

1. Transmitted herewith is a Progress Report on LICOZY-5 for the period 1 November 1966-15 January 1967.

2. We are having LICOZY-5 check further into the details of and his own prospects for making the Air France inaugural flight to Shanghai referred to in paragraph 3 B. According to the local Air France manager who suggested that LICOZY-5 participate in the flight, the flight is scheduled for late April or early May 1967. According to the Air France manager, although the Air France Route to Shanghai has been operative since the fall of 1966, it is customary to have an official inaugural flight in which specially invited travel agents take part.

3. In view of LICOZY-5's long-time double agent role and his poor reporting in the past, we doubt there is much to be gained from having him make the proposed trip. Consequently, unless FE Division has particular interest in LICOZY-5 making the trip, we plan to tell him that we have no interest in his doing so. Please advise us by 20 February of any FE interest.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Progress Report

Distribution:
2 - CWH, w/att., H/W
1 - CSB, w/att., H/W
1 - C/WOMUSE, w/o att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 31167	25 JANUARY 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-301303 61-285412

33a

January 1967

SUBJECT: Progress Report/ LICOZY-5 (1 November 1966 - 15 January 1967)

REFERENCE: HMMA-30723, 1 December 1966

1. The last Progress Report (see Reference) reported developments in the operation through 31 October 1966; but not included were Subject's activities at the INTURIST Conference in Moscow to which Subject traveled on 22 October 1966. These activities will be reported below.

2. Contacts

A. Subject and KGB Case Officers

(201-305670)

Apart from Subject's frequent visits in Moscow during October 1966 from a former KGB case officer in Mexico, Oleg Nechiporenko, Subject since his return to Mexico from his European and Israel trip in mid-November has seen KGB officers on four occasions for a total time of less than an hour.

In Moscow, where Subject was attending the INTURIST Conference, Subject was visited briefly every day in his room at the Hotel National by Nechiporenko, from 24 October through 28 October.

First contact by the Soviets on Subject's return to Mexico was effected by KGB case officer Aleksandr Vladimirovich Prikhodko (201-202879) on 3 December in Subject's office for a few minutes. On 8 December, Valentin Sergeyevich Loginov (201-285412), Subject's regular KGB case officer, called Subject down to the street outside Subject's office to present him with Bolshoi Ballet tickets. On 13 December, Loginov visited Subject's office and spent no more than half an hour there. And on 30 or 31 December, Subject was paid a brief visit by Pavel Yatskov, KGB officer (and possible candidate for resident) (201-120129) at Subject's office.

B. Subject and Mexico City Station Case Officer

In the two months since Subject's return from Europe in mid-November 1966, the C/O, Prentice R. Marheine, has seen Subject six times for an approximate total of nine hours.

The C/O met Subject at his office on 22 November for two hours.

In December, the C/O met Subject three times, on [illegible] December at his office for almost two hours, on 13 December at the Hotel Reforma for a half-hour, and on 22 December at Subject's office for an hour.

On 7 January 1967, the C/O and his wife took Subject and his wife out for dinner at the Belvedere Room of the Hotel Continental Hilton, to reciprocate for a former invitation to Subject's home. On 12 January, the C/O met Subject at the latter's office for one hour.

3. Operational Developments

A. Subject/ KGB

Subject arrived in Moscow on 23 October 1966 to attend the INTURIST Conference

333

to which travel agents on a world-wide basis had been invited. On Subject's second day in Moscow, Oleg Nechiporenko, Subject's former Soviet C/O in Mexico, came to visit him at the Hotel National. Subject deliberately kept his son by his side so that Nechiporenko would find it difficult to have private words with him. However, Nechiporenko came to visit Subject every day thereafter until Subject's departure, bringing gifts of records, caviar, etc. When Nechiporenko found the opportunity the first thing he told Subject was that he heard Subject had been a "rebel" and had been difficult in Mexico. Subject, in his half-serious manner, poohpoohed the idea that he was a rebel and told Nechiporenko earnestly that he didn't have the time, effort or inclination to indulge in the cooperation that was expected of him. He gave Nechiporenko the old line about friends "hasta la muerte" but that he couldn't and wouldn't put out the old effort. Nechiporenko said that was too bad, because he had wanted to present Subject to his chief — and now there was no point to it. Subject shrugged this off. Nechiporenko asked Subject if he would be willing to use his office as a letter-drop. Subject said, reprovingly that that was not a very smart idea — since agents writing to his firm and to him would then know of Subject's connection with the Soviets and he would thus be exposed. Nevertheless, Nechiporenko told Subject to think it over and talk to Valentin (Loginov) in Mexico about it. Also, Nechiporenko told Subject that they hadn't forgotten about the "branch office" and that Subject shouldn't feel bad about the delay in setting it up. Subject ridiculed that idea, saying that it was the Soviets who should feel bad; as for him, he couldn't be bothered in the future with the trips and time involved. Nechiporenko, still not chastened, asked if Subject would provide information on all changes in visa regulations for travel in Central and South America. Subject said he had given this information to the Soviets in the past. Nechiporenko then asked Subject to continue to give such information to Valentin.

Subject elicited from Nechiporenko that he was working in the Latin American Section of the Foreign Ministry, and that he was allowed to come and go as he pleased to visit Subject. In the context of telling Subject that he saw that Subject was not getting along with his Soviet friends, Nechiporenko said that he would be coming back to Mexico next year.

One day while Nechiporenko was in the hotel room, the phone rang and Subject picked up the phone. A female voice asked for "Oleg." Subject banteringly replied in Russian that "Oleg" wasn't around, but wouldn't he do. In the ensuing conversation Subject found out that the caller was a 25 year old student, her address and telephone number, and made a date to meet her the following day at the Lenin Station exit of the Metro. Nechiporenko was all in favor of Subject making the date, and as a matter of fact came the next day to take Subject's son to the circus so that Subject would be free. /Comment: Subject said that he never did go to meet the girl, but told Nechiporenko that he had gone and the girl had not shown up. Subject was of the opinion this was not a provocation by the Soviets, but he shied away because he did not want to be involved in anything indiscreet./

When Aleksandr Prikhodko dropped in unexpectedly at Subject's office on 3 December, while Subject's wife and son were present, the Soviet asked when he could have lunch with Subject, and the latter put him off telling Prikhodko to call next week. /Comment: Prikhodko did not call/.

[illegible]

On 8 December, Valentin Loginov, who had called Subject's office by phone to have Subject come down to the street, saw Subject for just a minute to present him with two tickets to the Bolshoi Ballet for 9 December. /Comment: Subject attended./

334

On 23 December, Loginov came unannounced to Subject's office and prevailed on him to have coffee with him nearby. The Soviet presented Subject with four bottles of vodka for Christmas, and began to ask Subject a series of personal questions:
1) How had Subject left Poland for Paris after WWII - had his documentation been legal or illegal? Subject answered that it was legal.
2) How was he able to enter Paris - did he have a valid French visa? Subject said he did. How long did he stay in Paris? Subject said a few months.
3) Was he released from service with the Polish UB? Subject said yes. Were there any conditions to this release? Subject said no. Was he supposed to be contacted by the Poles? Subject said yes, and related the story of how he was contacted in Mexico (in March 19[illegible]) by a Polish diplomatic courier who brought a letter from Subject's old boss in the UB, and how Subject answered that letter. Had Subject's response to the Poles been positive or negative? Subject said neutral. Asked why, Subject replied that he believed that eighty percent of the Poles were anti-Soviet. Loginov said "you are right."

WOFACT

Loginov asked how Subject was getting along with the American airlines he deals with. Subject said fine, and asked why. Loginov said that maybe, if Subject has the chance, he can learn the name of " the director of in Mexico." Subject told Loginov he was crazy to think Subject could get that information. When Loginov persisted in knowing whether Subject would tell the Soviets if he did get that information, Subject dismissed the topic with a coy "maybe."

Subject promised to show Loginov the documents that backed up his answers to Loginov's questions.

On either 30 or 31 December, Pavel Yatskov dropped by Subject's office to give him some gifts he had brought back from Moscow. /Comment: Subject had done Yatskov a favor during the Soviet's travel to Moscow by arranging for Subject's travel agent in Paris to assist Yatskov./. Yatskov expressed gratefulness to Subject and presented him with a bottle of Caucasian wine, some vodka, a decorative box and 150 grams of caviar. Yatskov (who no longer holds the post of Soviet Consul in Mexico, and is a possible candidate for KGB resident) told Subject that he is also grateful for what Subject has done for "them", and he is sure that Subject will not leave "them" alone in the realization of their common ideals. And Yatskov further stated that he and Subject have very much in common, and that they should meet. It was left that Yatskov would call Subject.

B. Subject/Mexico City Station

The C/O met Subject at his office on 22 November 1966 to debrief him on the results of his trip to Moscow (see paragraph 3 A. above). In addition to providing information on his contacts with Nechiporenko, Subject gave incidental information concerning a female Soviet Jew he met, and the anti-American attitude of a travel agent from Chile.

On 8 December, in Subject's office, Subject reported to the C/O about the brief contacts he has had with Prikhodko and Loginov on 2 and 8 December. The C/O, in response to a Station request, re-opened with Subject the topic of the Jewish community support that Secretary of Gobernación Echeverría is alleged to have sought in his candidacy for next president of Mexico. Subject related again the story of how Jacobo Zabludovsky had come to mention the matter to Subject, including the fact that Subject was being proposed as one of the five influential members of the Jewish community for Echeverría's approval (Zabludovsky did not mention the others). The C/O requested that Subject check further with Zabludovsky when he had the opportunity.

335

On 13 December Subject reported to the C/O about Loginov's personal questions asked of Subject that same day (see paragraph 3 A. above). The C/O asked Subject if he had inquired of Loginov why the latter was asking such questions. Subject said he had not, and though he was completely puzzled by this tack on the part of the Soviets. But Subject said he felt perfectly at ease in telling the truth to the Soviets, and had no hesitation in showing them his documentation.

The C/O dropped by Subject's office on 22 December, after having delivered a Christmas gift of liquor to Subject's home the previous day. Subject reported 1) on Soviet travel for Georgi Visko, and said he had met Visko's replacement—Victor M. Ivanov.

Dit 66

2) Subject mentioned that he had received a holiday-season letter from Sidney Weintraub, U.S. State Department official now in Chile. /Comment: Weintraub had been a target of the Soviets in Mexico through Subject. Nothing ever came of it./

3) Subject remarked that he had received a firm invitation from the manager of Air France in Mexico to go on the inaugural flight of Air France to Red China (Shanghai) possibly in April 1967, to which Subject had replied that he "would love to go." To the C/O Subject expressed himself as neutral about his going, but asked the C/O if "we" had any interest in his taking the trip. The C/O replied that Subject would be advised.

The C/O then discussed seriously with Subject the question of how complete his break-off from the Soviets really was, inasmuch as there was some scepticism about his conduct (the C/O told Subject that the scepticism came from "higher up", which incidentally the C/O did not share). The C/O asked Subject to explain his equivocal "maybe" to Loginov's request to report the name of the [illegible] chief in Mexico, and his willingness to turn his personal documentation over to the Soviets. Subject's reply boiled down to this: he was convinced that his break-off was more than adequate because he had achieved the control to deny the Soviets anything and everything (the Station's objective), even though he might jokingly stall them. Being friendly was consistent with his personality. He explained his willingness, even more his desire, to pass his documentation to the Soviets, because he wanted to show those "bastards" he wasn't afraid of them. Subject asked the C/O to check with "his bosses" to see if he could get the go-ahead on passing the documentation if the Soviets came after it.

On 12 January 1967, the C/O (having received the Station's expression of interest in having Subject follow up the invitation from Air France) asked Subject for more details concerning the invitation from Air France, and gave him the go-ahead to pursue the matter.

The current C/O, Prentice R. Marheine, will turn Subject over to Francis J. Coigne before Marheine's departure from Mexico the end of January 1967.

PRI

336

94

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP/Operational
BESABER contact with Valentin S. LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY-9930.

1. BESABER first met LOGINOV casually on 14 December 1965 at a Polish Embassy reception for a visiting Parliamentary delegation. No plans were made for recontact, although cards were exchanged and BESABER reported that LOGINOV was quite friendly.

2. It was not until 4 October 1966, almost a year later, that BESABER again ran into LOGINOV at another Polish Embassy reception, this one in honor of the departing Polish Ambassador. On that occasion LOGINOV expressed an interest in buying some of the mosaics that BESABER produces. When LOGINOV found out that Mrs. BESABER was an avid tennis player, he let it be known that he was too, and would enjoy getting together for a game. (Parenthetically, he mentioned that he played regularly at the French Club, but that he did not enjoy the atmosphere there because there were too many Germans.) Finally, when BESABER mentioned that he very much liked Russian vodka, LOGINOV said he would sell him some at Embassy discount prices.

3. On 13 October 1966 LOGINOV tried unsuccessfully to contact BESABER by phone to purchase some mosaics for the Russian athletes who were in town in connection with the "Little Olympics." BESABER unfortunately never got the message that LOGINOV left (although we picked it up on LIENVOY).

4. The Station decided at this point to have BESABER wait for LOGINOV to make the next move, but when by 15 December

- CONTINUED -

Distribution:
2 - CSB
1 - CWH

CS COPY FILED IN 201-744856

[illegible]

File in 201-285912

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-285412	HMMA - 31099	17 JANUARY 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-744856

there had not been any signs of action, BESABER was instructed to try to get in touch with LOGINOV regarding the purchase of vodka (for Christmas). When Christmas passed without any luck in contacting LOGINOV (BESABER was extremely busy during this period) we decided to change tactics a bit.

5. Per Station instructions BESABER phoned LOGINOV on 12 January 1967 and made arrangements to drop by the Embassy the following morning to show LOGINOV the catalogs of his mosaic-ware. BESABER was instructed to take advnatage of this meet to try to establish some kind of reason for continuing the relationship (tennis and vodka buying were suggested.). As it turned out LOGINOV gave BESABER the necessary opening. After a cursory, but polite look at BESABER's catalogs he LOGINOV dismissed this subject by saying that he was not in the immediate market for any of BESABER's merchandise, but might be in the future. He then changed the subject, mentioned that he was in charge of looking for a house in Cuernavaca to be used by Embassy personnel (LIENVOY confirms that LOGINOV has the responsibility for renting a house in Cuernavaca as a summer retreat for wives and children.) LOGINOV told BESABER that he was prepared to pay 5,000 MN ($400.00 U.S.) per month for June, July and August 1967. He wants a four-bedroom (or more) house with a heated swimming pool and garden. LOGINOV mentioned that in 1966 the Embassy had rented a house on Calle Humboldt, that they had liked it, but that he was not sure they could get a lease again this year. He several times asked BESABER, who lives in Cuernavaca, to help him in locating a suitable house. BESABER of course said he would be delighted to assist LOGINOV and promised to phone him as soon as he found something. On this note the meeting ended.

6. BESABER will be out of town for two weeks (on vacation in Acapulco and in the U. S., as set forth in reference.) In the meantime, he will get one of his employees to look for housing for LOGINOV in Cuernavaca. Shortly after his return to Mexico (about 6 February) he will contact LOGINOV with a suggestion that he come down to look at whatever housing leads have been developed and/or to play tennis and enjoy a day in Cuernavaca.

7. The purpose of this exercise is to establish a familiar social relationship between BESABER and LOGINOV, one that will permit the Station to further assess LOGINOV. To date BESABER's first impressions were not particularly enlightening other than his feeling that LOGINOV is susceptible to further social development. The Station will encourage this activity with BESABER and it will be helpful if Headquarters personnel, if they see BESABER during reference trip, also encourage him.

8. One further matter for the record; BESABER was first introduced to LOGINOV by BEWEEP. They again were together at the Polish Embassy on 4 October 1966. Although BESABER has not told BEWEEP of his meet with LOGINOV on 13 January it is only because BESABER has not seen BEWEEP since before Christmas. BESABER has been instructed to be perfectly open with BEWEEP about having seen LOGINOV and in fact it may turn out that LOGINOV and BEWEEP will visit BESABER together. (LOGINOV referred to the possibility in his 13 January meet with BESABER).

9. The Station sees no reason why BESABER cannot handle the development of BEWKEP and LOGINOV at the same time. Where possible we will try to have BESABER arrange to cultivate them separately, but since the two targets are personal friends and see each other quite frequently, we plan to have BESABER be quite candid in admitting his relationship with one to the other.

10. Finally, we are well aware that since BESABER may well be compromised to the Poles, his relationship with LOGINOV will have to be considered in this light. On the other hand there seems little to be lost, and possibly a great deal to be gained by having BESABER continue to try to develop a close relationship with this Soviet target.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

379

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~GROUP~~ PER
DISSEM BY 33/M RYBAT

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/S3 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/DO 7, C/WH 6, C/CI

SECRET 140045Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9930

DIRECTOR 14 J[illegible] 78000

REDTOP BEDOX DYVOUR BESABER

1. BESABER FLYING WASHINGTON AT OWN EXPENSE TO ATTEND CONVENTION OF SOCIETY OF PLASTIC INDUSTRIES, PLASTICS DIVISION. WILL ARRIVE 28 JAN, STAY SHOREHAM HOTEL. CONVENTION STARTS 31 JAN, ENDS 3 FEB, AT WHICH TIME BESABER PLANS GO NEW YORK FOR FEW DAYS, THEN RETURN MEXICO.

2. STATION BELIEVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HQS PERSONNEL INTERESTED IN CASES OUTLINED PARA 3, BELOW, TO MEET BESABER FOR DISCUSSIONS. IT WOULD ALSO BE GREATLY APPRECIATED IF HE WERE TAKEN OUT FOR AT LEAST ONE MEAL AND GIVEN PAT ON BACK FOR HIS EFFORTS WOFACT'S BEHALF.

3. CASES IN WHICH BESABER ACTIVELY ENGAGED AT PRESENT ARE:

A. REWEEP.

B. SUBJ MEXICO CITY 9820 (IN 71243)

C. SUBJ 201-285412. STATION WILL PROVIDE DETAILS THIS RECENT LEAD BEFORE BESABER'S ARRIVAL WASH.

4. BESABER HAS BEEN TENTAVELY INSTRUCTED STANDBY HIS

SECRET

LOGINOV 201-285412

14-00000

310

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG : J. CARLSON JC
UNIT : S3/O/WH
EXT : 6412
DATE : 11 JAN 67

☐ FILE RID
☒ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	WH	5	CI
2	WH	6	CA
3	C	7	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	8	

DISSEM BY 36 PER ____ # ____
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SA8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WH8, C/OPS, C/IC2, CA2, CA/PROP, FI/INT2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

[redacted] SECRET [redacted] 12 00 12 Z CITE DIRECTOR 65831

TO PRIORITY SAN JOSE INFO: ROUTINE MEXICO CITY, SANTIAGO,
BOGOTA

AN	[illegible]
AB	X
IN	
~~CS~~	
EX	
[illegible]	
FI	

REDTOP

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 9862 (IN74189) NOT SENT BOGOTA
B. SAN JOSE 9061 (IN 75041) NOT SENT BOGOTA
C. SAN JOSE 9063 (IN75195) NOT SENT BOGOTA
D. DIRECTOR 64371 (BEING RELAYED SAN JOSE)

1. SEE PARA C REF D FOR TRACES KACHATUROV. ALL INFO ON SUBJ AND TRACES JC OTHER TWO SOVS IF APPROPRIATE MAY BE PASSED LIAISON.

2. LIAISON MAY ALSO BE TOLD VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV (201-285412) OF REFS A AND B IS KNOWN KGB.

3. STATION MAY WISH USE ABOVE TO BLOCK ISSUANCE OF VISA AND, OR IF TOO LATE, ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT SUBJ AND NOVOSTI (IN VIEW REF C) THRU CONTROLLED STATION PRESS ASSET. FOR THIS PURPOSE POUCHING MATERAL ON NOVOSTI UNDER TM 964310. ALSO HQS [redacted] PLANS DISCUSS MATTER [redacted] WITH JC HUEDGE-2 DURING HIS VISIT.

4. REQUEST STATION POUCH ANY POSSIBLE COVERAGE SUBJ ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS SAN JOSE AS HQS INTERESTED EXPLOITING SOV INTELL USE OF PRESS COVER.

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

12 Jan 67

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CS COPY

201-285412

14-00000

347

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ # ____
SEP 10 4 06 PM 66

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: RID/EDI INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 35831

TO

5. FOR BOGOTA: KACHATUROV HAS APPLIED COSTA RICAN VISA FOR PRESS EXCHANGE NEGOTIATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH ____
SB/CA/S T. THIELE IN DRAFT
SB/CI/K ____
WH/1 ____
WH/3 ____
WH/4B ____
WH/2/CR PHYLLIS EDWARDS IN DRAFT
C/WH/2 ____

C/WH Thomas Polgar
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

ADC/SB/AO ____
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

King, Martin Luther (SE)

201-760966

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KING, MARTIN LUTHER, JR.
201-760966

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
20 APR 78	20 Apr 78	ROBIN LINDLEY	
22 Sept 78	22 Sept 78	William A. Webb	
2:20 22 Sept 78	22 Sept 78	Kenneth S. McHargh	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOCUMENT RECEIPT

NOTICE TO RECIPIENT
and Return as Shown on Reverse Side

COURIER

DATE SENT

SENDER OF DOCUMENT(S): Deputy Director for Plans

ROOM

BLDG.

DATE DOCUMENT(S) SENT

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT(S) SENT

CIA NO.	DOCUMENT DATE	COPIES	DOCUMENT TITLE	ATTACHMENTS	CLASS
	2 MAY 1968	0 & 1	CSCI 316/01702-68	3	S

RECIPIENT

ADDRESS OF RECIPIENT:
S.J. Papich
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 845, Riddell Bldg.
1730 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

SIGNATURE (ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF ABOVE DOCUMENT(S)): /s/ SJ Papich

OFFICE

DATE OF RECEIPT: 2 MAY 1968

FORM 615 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (33)

SECRET

2 MAY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : Dr. Martin Luther KING, Jr.

1. Reference is made to this Agency's out message number 94270 dated 25 April 1968 concerning the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther KING, Jr.

2. On 16 April Roderick Claflin BROWN, a Panamanian national born 1 July 1917 in British Honduras, voluntarily appeared at the Department of National Investigations (DENI) of the Republic of Panama and signed a deposition, the highlights of which are as follows:

(1) On 26 October 1962 he served as cook/seaman aboard the Texaco S.S. Southhampton which docked at Mobile, Alabama.

(2) While on a shore visit to the Mobile airport on the morning of 26 October 1962 in the company of two fellow Panamanian seamen, he was approached by Marvin P. LITTRELL, owner of LITTRELL Motor Co., 921-25 South Clinton Street, Athens, Alabama, who after ascertaining BROWN was a Panamanian seaman, asked if he knew of Dr. Martin Luther KING, Jr.

(3) LITTRELL inquired whether BROWN was interested in employment, the details of which were unspecified. He went on to describe Dr. KING as "Our greatest problem who is causing us much trouble." He gave BROWN a business card to use in the event he was interested in pursuing the employment offer.

(4) On 28 January 1963 BROWN wrote LITTRELL from New York City, stating he was interested in a job and

SECRET

requested $75 for travel from New York City to Mobile. On 2 February 1963 BROWN received a reply from LITTRELL, restating that he had a job waiting for BROWN in Alabama, but questioning why $75 was needed since the fare was less than $40 by bus.

(5) After discussions with a relative and friends in New York City, BROWN suspected that the LITTRELL job offer was related with assassination plans for Dr. KING. Therefore he did not respond to the LITTRELL letter and dismissed the incident until the death of Dr. KING in April 1968. BROWN returned to Panama in 1964. ✓

3. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the LITTRELL letter and the Spanish language deposition made by BROWN, as well as an English translation of the deposition as described in paragraph 2 of the referenced out message.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

Signed: James R. Hunt

JAMES ANGLETON

WH/2
CSCI-316/01702-68

3 Enclosures

WH/2/Panama/G. Hodges:cib 2 May 1968

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee, w/atts
- 1 - CI/R&A (Dummy)
- 1 - CI/LIA (Dummy)
- 2 - CI/OPS/DO, w/atts ✓
- 1 - WH/2/Panama

Based on: PANAMA CITY 6180 (IN 97566)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/AN

KGB

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REGC		15 APR 1968	15 APR 1968	[illegible]
2. C/WH/C OG		15 APR		[illegible]
3.				
4. WH/C/PP				[illegible]
5.				
6. WH/COG/EXO				[illegible]
7.				
8. [illegible]			15 Apr	[illegible]
9.				
10. CI/OPS/IC (Ms. Hice)		16 APR 1968	APR	[illegible]
11.				
12. RI/AN/[illegible]		23 APR 1968		[illegible]
13. RID/EDI CLOP/DO				[illegible]
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

2 cc to CI/TROP
3 cc to C/WH

ABSTRACT
INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILMING

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

8-6 - 1 cc routed
to C/WH/FI for retention
1 cc retained for WH/COG file

Pls reclassify into
201-760966 and
X-ref into 19-4-105.

AN	RI	
PS	DEST	[illegible]
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~	

Reclassify
19-4-105

FILE TITLE 019-004-105
~~[illegible]~~

TRACE REQUEST

✓ ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) [illegible]

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

3P

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-29884

FILE NO - NONE

DATE - 11 QQ APRIL 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF, WH DIVISION

INFO - CHIEF, WH/COG - CHIEF, WOLIME

FROM - COS, JMWAVE

SUBJECT 0 SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 8-9 IAO APRIL 1968

REFERENCE - UFGA-29877

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IN ADDITION TO THE SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION TRANSMITTED IN REFERENCE, THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY FOR 8-9 APRIL HAS BEEN FURNISHED BY THE AMOTS -

QM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE ONE - JJMOBILIZATION OF 55,000 TROOPS TO REPRESS THE NEGROES'' A THE ARTICLE REPORTED ALL THE DISTURBANCES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

WM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJWITH THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING THE IDEOLOGY OF NON-VIOLENCE HAS DIED'' A AN INTERVIEW WITH FLOYD MCKISSICK, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/. JJTHIS SIMPLY MEANS THAT NON-VIOLENCE HAS CEASED AS A MEANS OF FIGHTING. THE PEOPLE CANNOT BE TAUGHT TO BE NON-VIOLENT WHILE WE ARE INVOLVED IN A VIOLENT WAR IN VIETNAM. NON-VIOLENCE CANNOT BE PREACHED TO THE BLACK PEOPLE WHO HAVE TO FACE VIOLENCE EVERY DAY ON THE STREETS OF THIS COUNTRY.'' THIS WAS SAID IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RADIO HABANA AND FLOYD MCKISSICK. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSASSINATION OF KING, MCKISSICK REPLIED - JJI REPEAT THAT WE ARE MAKING NO PREDICTIONS, BUT THE

19-4-105

AMERICAN NEGRO IS NOT WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE IMPASSIBLY THE ASSASSINATION OF OUR LEADERS, OUR HEROES, AND OUR PEOPLE.''

EM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A ARTICLE BY JUAN MARRERO ENTITLED, JJTHE AMERICAN NEGROES ARE WRITING THEIR FINEST PAGE OF HEROISM.'' JJAGAINST ALL THAT AND MUCH MORE, THE NEGROES ROSE UP TODAY IN MORE THAN SIXTY CITIES. AND IT IS LOGICAL TO EXPECT NEW PAGES OF HEROISM. STOKELY CARMICHAEL, THE NEGRO LEADER, GAVE THIS WARNING ONE DAY AFTER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING - JWHAT HAPPENED ON THE NIGHT WE LEARNED OF THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING IS NOTHING COMPARED TO WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN.' JJ

RM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJTHE WIDOW OF LUTHER KING HEADS THE MARCH IN MEMPHIS.'' THE ARTICLE TELLS ABOUT THE MARCH AND SHOWS PHOTOGRAPHS OF IT.

TM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /755 A.M./ A JJA TENSE CALM REIGNS IN THE U.S. BUT IT IS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS EVENTS. NATIONAL MOURNING DECREED BY LYNDON JOHNSON FOR YESTERDAY, U APRIL, MARKS A LESSENING OF DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO START UP AGAIN AT ANY MOMENT.''

YM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /955 A.M./ A JJ JFORWARD WITH BLACK POWER UNTIL CAPITALIST MISERY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF HUMAN INJUSTICE, IS OVERTHROWN' SAID THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF CHILE IN A CABLEGRAM SENT TO THE AMERICAN NEGRO LEADER, STOKELY CARMICHAEL, ON THE OCCASION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.''

UM RADIO LIBERACION, I APRIL /1230 P.M./ A THIS NEWSCAST REFERS TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH 200 LATIN AMERICAN, ASIAN, AND AFRICAN STUDENTS WERE SAID TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN WARSAW, POLAND, AS A PROTEST OVER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

MARK F. EFFIELD

DISTRIBUTION

SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29884 PAGE THREE

VIA TELEPOUCH

3 A C/WHD

2 A C/WH/COG

2 A C/WOLIME

SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29884 PAGE THREE

BT

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/AN

KAB

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

2 cc to CA/PROP
3 cc to C/WH
[illegible]

IP/ION	X	TRACE PROGRAM
		ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/FIS		MICRO/DOC FILING
IP/FI		FILE
IP/DCC		[illegible] (2, 3, 4)
		[illegible]
		BACK CON (11)
		[illegible] (9)
IP/FILES		[illegible]

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REGC		15 APR 1968	APR 1968	
2. ~~C/WH/COG~~				
3.				
4. WH/C/PP				
5.				
6. WH/COG/EYO				
7.				
8. Nancye Fritz		18 april		
9.				
10. CI/OPS/DO (Mr [illegible])		~~16 APR 1968~~ 29 APR 1968		
11.				
12. CI/DN/Mr [illegible]		23 APR 1968		J.E.
13. IO/EDI CIOP/DO				
14.				
15. ~~IP/Files~~				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

8-6 - 1 cc routed to C/WH/FI for retention
1 cc retained for WH/COG file

12. Pls reclassify into 201-760966 and X-ref into 19-4-105.

Reclassify 19-4-105

AN	FI	
PS	~~[illegible]~~	
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

FILE TITLE 019-004-105
~~201-760966~~

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
~~19-4-105~~

14-00000

57

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-29877

FILE NO - NONE

DATE - ~~QQ~~ 11 APRIL 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF, WH DIVISION

INFO - CHIEF, WH/COG - CHIEF, WOLIKE

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE AMOTS-

~~QM~~ 1. GRANMA /HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA/, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE - ''LAST MINUTE NEWS - MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS, LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE.''

~~WM~~ 2. GRANMA, ~~X~~ 8 APRIL, FRONT PAGE - ''TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHINGTON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED. SNIPERS CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE UNDER HEAVY GUARD.'' /FULL INFORMATION GIVEN./

~~EM~~ 3 GRANMA, ~~I~~ [illegible] APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ''/WASHINGTON, ~~U~~ 7 APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS - AFP, FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AMX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING, URGING THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ~~//~~ ''THE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTORCADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY.''

019-004-105

4. GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ARTICLE ENTITLED ''PRINCIPAL NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.'', BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS - THE VIOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE - CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/, BLACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT PATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE DEACONS, AND ''THE U.S.''. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE MENTIONED AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE - NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE /NAACP/, NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE /SCLC/.

~~IM~~ 5. GRANMA, ~~I~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~ ''ATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO BLAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.''

~~YM~~ 6. GRANMA, ~~I~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~ ''RACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO AND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.''

~~UM~~ 7. GRANMA, ~~I~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~ ''THE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE.''

~~IM~~ 8. GRANMA, ~~I~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO STRUGGLE.''

~~OM~~ 9. RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO /HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/, 6 APRIL, ~~UWP~~ 7:10 A.M. AND 12 NOON - ''THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER KING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST MARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS OF THE UNITED STATES.'' ''THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN HAVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING, ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS,

AND THAT THESE FLAMES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE OPPRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HINDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.''

10. ~~QPM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, 5 ~~7~~ APRIL, REP P.M. - " ~~44~~STOKELY CARMICHAEL, LEADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID - 'WE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH RIFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION.' CARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS A RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S DEATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN CITIES.''

11. ~~QQM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 ~~7~~ APRIL, 5 ~~7~~ P.M. — ~~A JJ~~ "HIS /KING'S/ DEATH SHOWS ONCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY VIOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.''

12. ~~QWM~~ RADIO PROGRESO, 5 ~~7~~ APRIL, 550 ~~7X7~~ P.M. — ~~A JJ~~ "CARMICHAEL SAID DURING A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT 'A SERIOUS MISTAKE HAS BEEN MADE IN ASSASSINATING DR. KING BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF A MOVEMENT WHICH URGED THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BURN THE CITIES, NOT TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO START AN ALL-OUT REVOLUTION.' CARMICHAEL ADDED - 'SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 35 CITIES WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN FIRES, SHOOTING, FIGHTING, AND DEATHS AS A RESULT OF THE CRIME COMMITTED AGAINST DR. KING. NATURALLY, OTHER SIMILAR THINGS WILL TAKE PLACE. GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGH THE CITIES BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT WE CANNOT OPENLY REBEL AGAINST THE POLICE.' STOKELY CARMICHAEL ENDED THE INTERVIEW BY SENDING AFFECTIONATE REGARDS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADER, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.''

13. RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. - "JUAN /MARI/ BRAS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO RICO, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE INTERVIEW - 'DR. LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRECIPITATE THE REBELLION OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ALL THE ABUSES OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT.' "

~~QRM~~ 14. RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. - "THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OF THE ASIAN, AFRICAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION /AALAPSO/ SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE SNCC ON THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING." "THE AALAPSO'S MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PACIFIST ORGANIZATION ENDS AS FOLLOWS A 'WE BEG YOU TO EXPRESS TO THE FAMILY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING AND TO ALL AFRO-AMERICANS OUR DEEPEST SORROW OVER HIS DEATH, OUR DECISION TO SUPPORT YOUR STRUGGLE, AND OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT THIS TERRIBLE CRIME--WHICH SHOWS US THAT ARMED REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IS THE ONLY WAY OF ACHIEVING GENUINE LIBERATION--WILL HELP STRENGTHEN THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFRO-AMERICAN PEOPLE WHICH IS ALREADY AIMED IN THE DIRECTION OF A TOTAL CONFRONTATION.' "

~~QTM~~ 15. RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. - "AGUSTIN /GONZALEZ/ MARTINEZ, BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF CUBA, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - 'MAY THE TRAGIC DISAPPEARANCE OF THIS GREAT LEADER AT LEAST HELP TO SPEED UP THE ARRIVAL OF THE DAY WHEN EVERY MAN IN HIS NATION AND IN ALL OTHER NATIONS WILL BE TREATED WITH THE RESPECT WHICH IS DUE TO THEM AS HUMAN BEINGS.' "

~~QXM~~ 16 RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. - "REVEREND RAFAEL PASTOR, OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN LUYANO, HAVANA, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - 'HIS BROTHERS, THE AMERICAN NEGROES, WILL LEARN MUCH FROM HIS DEATH. WE CAN ALMOST ASSURE THAT THEY, THE AMERICAN NEGROES WHOSE DIGNITY AND DECORUM HAS BEEN CRUSHED, WILL COME BACK TO LIFE AFTER CENTURIES OF LETHARGY AND

WILL RISE FROM THEIR GRAVES AND FORM AN INVINCIBLE ARMY.' ~~JJ~~ ''

17. ~~QUM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL, ~~Y~~ 6 P.M. ~~X~~ – EDITORIAL COMMENTS CRITICIZING THE NON-VIOLENT LINE WHICH WAS ADVOCATED BY LUTHER KING, SAYING THAT THIS LINE WAS INOPERATIVE. ~~JJ~~ ''MARTIN LUTHER KING DID NOT PREACH VIOLENCE BUT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE. HE DID NOT UNLEASH VIOLENCE BUT VIOLENCE MOWED HIM DOWN.''

18. ~~QIN~~ RADIO HABANA, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL 68, ~~XXY~~ 530 P.M. ~~X~~ – ''JOHNSON POSTPONED HIS TRIP. HE CALLED THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS--WHO WERE MORE OR LESS UNDER CONTROL--TO GO TO THE WHITE HOUSE. JOHNSON APPEARED ON TELEVISION. HE EXPRESSED HIS ANGUISH AND HIS SORROW. HE MADE INSPIRED COMMENTS ABOUT MARTIN LUTHER KING. THESE ACTIONS AND THESE WORDS HIDE FEAR OVER THE WAVE OF JUST VIOLENCE WHICH IS STARTING TO SPREAD THROUGH THE UNITED STATES.'' ~~JJ~~ ''AT A TIME WHEN COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE UNDERWAY, UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS, THIS NEW CRIME WIDENS THE CHASM WHICH DIVIDES THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND INCITES THE PEOPLE TO PROMOTE DISTURBANCES WHOSE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS ARE HARD TO PREDICT.'' ~~JJ~~ ''THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING CONFIRMS THAT THE VIOLENCE OF IMPERIALIST RACISTS IS ONLY ANSWERED EFFECTIVELY WITH THE VIOLENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE.''

MARK F. EFFIELD

DISTRIBUTION
VIA TELEPOUCH
3 A C/WHD
2 A C/WH/COG
2 A C/WOLINE

BT

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/~~AN~~ CR

FROM:

RID/ CR

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/Reg		16 APR 1968		
2. C/WH/7/DR		16 APR 1968		
3. C/WH/7	OC C			
4. Steve				
5. Bill				
6. Vetter				
7. Rudy				
8.				
9. CI/OPS/DC				
10. TWK				
11. BK				
12.				
13. file McKing				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/~~FI~~				

CHRONO DETACHED

IP/ABI	X	TARGET PROGRAM
		RECORDED
		INDEX
IP/RS		PREPARE FOR FILING
IP/FB		FILM
RCI/CC		CODE NO. (2, 3, 4)
		SYSAT REC.
		R/D (8)
IP/FILES		CONTINUE

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Pat:
Please route on separate Routing slip to Dick Ober CI Staff after everyone has read.

22-4-16
022-004-016

FILE TITLE
~~201-960966~~

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
~~22-4-16~~

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER
DCA 07012

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/~~[illegible]~~

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo SKP

SUBJECT
Communist Comments on the Death of Martin Luther King/
Reference to "Black Power" Concept

ACTION REQUIRED, REFERENCES

1. Attached for Headquarters retention are one copy each of statements on the death of Martin Luther King by the Dominican Communist Party (PCD), the Communist 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-1J4), and various trade unions. All appeared in the 7 April 1968 issue of El Nacional.

2. The text of the PCD statement makes reference to the visit of Stokely Carmichael to the Latin American Solidarity Organization Conference (LASO), quotes a statement by Fidel Castro on Carmichael and the concept of "Black Power," and expresses the solidarity of the PCD with the struggle of North American Negroes. The MR-1J4 statement, only available in gist, says that King's death reveals the profound crisis existing within US society and shows that for the "racist forces," violence is the only law and is applied to internal and external enemies alike.

3. Neither statement issues a call to violence on the part of US Negroes.

for Stewart R. PATAKER

ATTACHMENT:
As Stated Herewith

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - Chief, WH Division w/att h/w
3 - Files w/att

RECORD OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: desensitized
Signed: Elizabeth W. [illegible]
WH

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

22-4-16

1 ATT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D 22-4-13

~~[illegible]~~
SECRET

DATE TYPED
10 Apr 68

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HDCA 7012

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
~~20-[illegible]~~
22-4-16

Condenan Asesinato De Martin Luther King

Dos organizaciones izquierdistas condenaron hoy la muerte del reverendo Martín Luther King.

En comunicados separados el Partido Comunista Dominicano y el Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio dicen solidarizarse con el movimiento negro de los Estados Unidos.

El PCD señala que el asesinato del líder pacifista ha tenido "justa respuesta" en la violencia desatada en las ciudades más importantes de los Estados Unidos que ha obligado a que el presidente Johnson cancelara su viaje al exterior para conversaciones de paz en Vietnam.

Dice respaldar la rebelión, y los pronunciamientos del líder negro Stokely Carmichael "ya que él único camino en los Estados Unidos para librarse de la violencia de los males que padece ese pueblo es la violencia revolucionaria que derrumbará el sistema imperialista".

El PCD demandó de las organizaciones políticas y sindicales desarrollar actividades en apoyo a la lucha de los negros norteamericanos.

Por su parte el 14 de Junio consideró que el asesinato del Premio Nóbel de la Paz revela la profunda crisis en que ha entrado la sociedad norteamericana.

Demuestra, según el 14 de Junio, que para las fuerzas racistas la única ley es la violencia y que ésta es aplicada a todo enemigo interno o externo" que se revele contra el imperio brutal".

Entiende la organización política que la muerte del reverendo Luther King es una gran enseñanza para los de su raza que sufren la opresión racista.

PARTIDO COMUNISTA DOMINICANO (PCD)

¡Nuestra solidaridad plena con la lucha de los negros norteamericanos, como parte que es de la lucha de todos los oprimidos de la tierra!

El régimen de los monopolios imperialistas norteamericanos se conmueve por la acción de los pueblos desde fuera con Vietnam al frente, y desde dentro con el gran movimiento por los derechos civiles y por la paz. El asesinato de Luther King, será presentado como la obra de la mano fanática de un racista; pero queda clara la responsabilidad de los interesados en liquidar la acción civil por la violencia, de los interesados en imponer la mordaza a los reclamos del pueblo que cada vez más lucha organizadamente y que comprende los objetivos de esa lucha, de los monopolios imperialistas.

La violencia engendra violencia. Muchos siglos de explotación y de represión han pasado hasta que en los últimos años el negro norteameric[illegible] comienza a organizar su resistencia; y en ello el papel de [illegible]her King es innegable, de los más altos meritos, de la más encomiable abnegación, aunque su prédica de paz no haya sido comprensible por todos los oprimidos ni la más apropiada como lo demuestra su su propia muerte.

Los negros constit[illegible]n en los Estados Unidos el sector más explotado de la clase obrera en el nivel de sueldos, en la discriminación social que asume formas raciales, en la proporción de los que participan en el ejército, en los planes de seguros sociales; por lo que la discriminación y su respuesta en la lucha por los derechos civiles tiene características esencialmente clasistas aunque asuma formas raciales, y por lo que crecientemente este fenómeno es comprendido por las propias masas blancas que apoyan los reclamos civiles de la población de raza africana marginada de la sociedad.

Creen Disturbios Influiran en Dolar

'ARIS, 6 de abril. (AFP).. El allido de los disturbios raciales Estados Unidos, cuya primera al ha sido el asesinato del pas. Martin Luther King, repercu. l en una nueva crisis del dólar, iman hoy aquí los observado.

n efecto, el desencadenamiento la violencia va a obstaculizar saneamiento presupuestario,

También se comprueba ese retraso en las escuelas y centros sociales, así como la estrecha correlación que existe entre el subempleo de una inmensa masa juvenil y su disponibilidad para los disturbios raciales, agrega el ex ministro francés.

Por ello, Washigton proyecta hacer adoptar rápidamente un proyecto de ley al que Martin Luther

---

Fidel Castro dijo en la clausura de la Conferencia de la Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad, donde Stokely Carmichael representaba a los norteamericanos organizados en el 'Poder Negro'.

' ...Y es que de ese sector negro, por ser el sector más explotado y reprimido, más brutalmente maltratado en Estados Unidos, surgirá la vanguardia revolucionaria en el seno de los Estados Unidos; y alrededor de ese movimiento revolucionario, que no surge en ese sector por problemas de raza, sino que surge por el problema social, por problema de explotación y opresión, y porque constituye ese sector el más sufrido, por la ley de la historia igual que en todas las épocas de la historia: como ocurrió con los plebeyos en Roma, con los siervos de la gleba en la Edad Media, con los obreros y los campesinos en los tiempos contemporáneos:, en la sociedad americana, de ese sector oprimido surgirá el movimiento revolucionario'.

Tan só o unos días han pasado desde el momento en que Johnson anunciara el retiro de su candidatura presidencial, para fomentar la ilusión de que los políticos llamados liberales llegarían al poder en los próximos meses con su programa de Paz en Vietnam y de respeto a los derechos civiles, cuando la bala disparada contra Luther King colocara su silbido de violencia como la tónica de la política norteamericana inmediata; Los que tienen el poder, los monopolios armamentistas, no lo dejarán pacíficamente, no permitirán la suspensión y la derrota en la guerra de Vietnam sin resistir por todos los medios, sin plantear su propia salida de violencia a todas las masas del mundo.

La muerte de Luther King no es la obra de un fanático, sino que significa la política de un grupo social poderoso, La muerte de Kennedy en poco tiempo se indentificó con una nueva política. La muerte de King es un rasgo más de la inminencia de nuevas y más feroces acciones del imperialismo, de un entronizamiento de la violencia en el poder estatal, que sólo será vencida con el triunfo de los pueblos; y en esa lucha el pueblo negro norteamericano tendrá un importante papel que jugar, juega ya un importante papel, del lado de todos los pueblos del mundo.

¡Nuestra solidaridad plena con la lucha de los negros norteamericanos, como parte que es de la lucha de todos los oprimidos de la tierra!.

Secretariado del Comité Central del Partido
Comunista Dominicano.

Santo Domingo, 6 de abril de 1968.

(ESPACIO PAGADO)

(ESPACIO PAGADO)

¡PROTESTAMOS POR EL ASESINATO DE MARTIN LUTHER KING!

¡SOLIDARIDAD CON LOS NEGROS EN LUCHA!

Martin Luther King, líder pacifista del movimiento negro norteamericano, Premio Nóbel de la Paz, ha sido asesinado por los opresores de su pueblo y de todos los pueblos explotados del Mundo.

SU DELITO: Luchar por la liberación de los negros, contra la discriminación racial, contra las vejaciones y la explotación que sufren sus hermanos de raza en los Estados Unidos. Es el "delito" que le cargan quienes gobiernan para el mal a todos aquellos que se rebelan, que luchan por la libertad.

La muerte de King ha conmovido al Mundo porque evidencia en forma alarmante hasta dónde pueden llegar los ricachones racistas que controlan el poder en los Estados Unidos.

La violenta rebeldía de los negros y de todos los demócratas comienza de nuevo a estremecer la sociedad norteamericana.

La solidaridad internacional con su causa se expresa en múltiples formas.

Y nosotros, los obreros dominicanos, elevamos nuestra voz de protesta y llamamos a la solidaridad activa con toda manifestación de lucha, que dentro y fuera de los Estados Unidos, exprese el repudio a ese hecho bochornoso.

Adoptamos esta actitud conscientes de que al sumarnos a la protesta mundial nos colocamos junto al sector más oprimido y vejado de la clase obrera norteamericana: los trabajadores negros. Y de que nos situamos de frente a los poderosos que con hipocresía unos y con cinismo otros, dicen lamentar la muerte del líder negro, mientras preparan las bayonetas para tratar de aplastar la lucha desencadenada.

Nada han hecho los gobernantes y oligarcas de nuestra tierra en protesta por el asesinato de Luther King. Duelos interminables hubieran realizado si la acción justiciera de los pueblos hubiera terminado con la vida de Johnson o de otro magnate de la explotación imperialista. Pero Luther King era un representante de los negros explotados, un luchador por los derechos civiles de los negros que a su entender no merecía homenaje alguno.

Sin embargo, Luther King tiene en nosotros a sus representantes dominicanos, a los que encarnamos en esta tierra los intereses del trabajo y del progreso de toda la humanidad. Y por eso, en esta ocasión, también damos un paso al frente:

Llamamos a todos los hombres honestos de nuestra Patria a manifestar su solidaridad con la causa de los negros norteamericanos.

Llamamos a las demás organizaciones de trabajadores a repudiar el asesinato de Luther King y a solidarizarse con la lucha de los negros norteamericanos.

Llamamos a la Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo y a los ayuntamientos democráticos del país, para que, amparados en su autonomía, declaren tres días de duelo por el asesinato de Luther King.

Que en las fábricas, en las escuelas, en las oficinas y en todos los centros de trabajo se rinda homenaje al líder asesinado y se exprese nuestro apoyo al pueblo negro de los Estados Unidos que es criminalmente colocado en la primera línea de fuego en Viet-Nam, al mismo tiempo que en su propio país se le somete a la más cruel explotación.

¡MANTENGAMOS LA SOLIDARIDAD ACTIVA HASTA QUE NUESTROS HERMANOS NEGROS DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS CONQUISTEN TODOS SUS DERECHOS!

FEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES REVOLUCIONARIOS UNIDOS DEL DISTRITO NACIONAL (FETRUDISNA)
FEDERACION NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES PORTUARIOS
FEDERACION NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA DE LA CONSTRUCCION Y SUS AFINES (FENATRAICA)
SINDICATO PORTUARIO DE LOS MOLINOS DOMINICANOS
SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES PORTUARIOS DE ARRIMO (POASI)
SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LOS MOLINOS DOMINICANOS
SINDICATO DE LA SOCIEDAD INDUSTRIAL DOMINICANA (MANICERA)
ASOCIACION DE CHOFERES INDEPENDIENTES (ASOCHOIN)
ASOCIACION DE EMPLEADOS DE LA UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE SANTO DOMINGO
SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES TELEFONICOS
SINDICATO DE COBRADORES DE AUTOBUSES DE SANTO DOMINGO
SINDICATO DE OPERARIOS SASTRES DEL DISTRITO NACIONAL
SINDICATO DE OBREROS Y EMPLEADOS DEL AYUNTAMIENTO DEL DISTRITO NACIONAL
SINDICATO DE LA PAPELERA INDUSTRIAL
SINDICATO NACIONAL DE CARPINTEROS

022-004-016

022-004-016

El Nacional
7 April 1968

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KING, MARTIN LUTHER
201-760966
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
INFO RE PLANS FOR A MASSIVE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE DEMONSTRATION IN THE NATIONS CAPITAL THIS SPRING

201-811911
DBC -09700
11 MAR 68
FBI

R 6803140388

FILE IN 201-260966

201 811911
PCS/ITG
GB0704
1758 ES2

I FILE NO.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

RYBAT SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief/Kusoda

INFO.
Chief/WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

33467

SUBJECT RYBAT/FJDUST/PBRUMEN/AMFRISK
Surveillance on IDEN C

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

15 July '66

1. IDEN A, a cleared and witting contact, provided the following information which was obtained during a surveillance of IDEN C. The surveillance was a joint effort of IDEN A and local ODENVY. ODENVY is not aware that IDEN A has passed the information to JMWAVE.

2. On Thursday, 19 May 1966, a surveillance was instituted from Room 618 of IDEN B on adjoining Room 620, which was occupied by IDEN C and his aide IDEN D. The surveillance was initiated at 11:00 a.m. and terminated at 5:15 p.m. During the conversation between IDENS C and D and another unknown Negro male, believed to be IDEN E, references were made to the Florida Gubernatorial Race; a trip to Bimini; and several miscellaneous sex experiences.

3. On 20 May 1966 a search was made of rooms 620 and 622 after IDENS C and D moved out. Forwarded under separate cover are copies of items found in the waste baskets and dressers; a hotel bill, and a list of telephone numbers which were called on 18 - 19 May 1966.

4. Of special interest among these items was a note which stated, IDEN F, please call Long Distance Operator IDEN G. IDEN H, according to IDEN A, is an identified member of the Communist Party. Also, an envelope of IDEN B with the name IDEN I. This person may have been one of the occupants of the room who remained in the company of IDENS C and D overnight.

5. JMWAVE traces were negative on all personalities mentioned above as well as those names appearing in the date forwarded under separate cover. JMWAVE has carded only those personalities who reside in the JMWAVE area.

Attachment:
A. IDENS A-I u/s/c
B. ITEMS u/s/c

PHILIP G. ELMARD

DISTRIBUTION:
③- Chief/KUSODA w/att
1 - Chief, WH Division w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

[illegible]

DATE TYPED
15 July 1966

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT - 16828

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

RYBAT CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGT - 16828

Separate Cover Attachment A to UFGT - 16828

IDEN A	Lt. Leslie J. Van Buskirk Chief, Criminal Intelligence Dade County Public Safety (Metro) Miami, Florida
IDEN B	Miami International Airport
IDEN C	Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr Carded
IDEN D	Bernard Lee Carded → This no doubt is Bernard S. Lee, SCLC [illegible] [illegible] Assistant To [illegible] [illegible] 5/27/68
IDEN E	Dr. Brown
IDEN F	Dr. King, Jr.
IDEN G	#71, Hemstead, N.Y. Telephone # 487-5199 Mr. Harry Wachtell and signed Lillian
IDEN H	Mr. Harry Wachtell
IDEN I	Miss Maxine Thurston

Distribution:
(3)-
1 - Chief, WH Division

ROBERT S. BROWNE, ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY
RESIDENCE: 214 TRYON AVE., TEANECK, N. J.
TELEPHONE: 201 - TE 3-1716

Robert S. Browne

PHONE: 880-0411
"JURIS

MICHAEL ANTHONY GLEAN
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW

LLOP & LONG
ATTORNEYS

100 MITCHELL STREET, S. W.
LEGAL ARTS BUILDING
COURTHOUSE SQUARE
ATLANTA, GA 30303

Separ Corr Attac to UFGT-

Motto: "God First, Others Second, Ourselves Last"

Rev. Wm. Lee Lambert, B.Th., D.D.
PASTOR, GREATER MOUNT HOPE BAPTIST CHURCH
6334-40 S. Princeton Ave. - HYde Park 3-4708
Pres., Interdenominational Ministers Civic League of Ill.
Chairman, Exec. Board, Good Citizenship Org.
Chicago, Ill. 60621

Res. 5676 Normal Blvd. HUdson 7-1185

PHONE RADCLIFFE 3-6798
OR 224-3710

St. Stephen's Evangelical Lutheran Church

HARRY S. ANDERSEN
PASTOR

8500 MARYLAND AVENUE
CHICAGO 19, ILLINOIS

PHONE MO 5-5116 DAY OR NIGHT

Noah Sarvis
PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR

1951 S.W. 64 COURT
MIAMI 55, FLORIDA

INSURANCE
INVESTIGATOR

홍 용 기
외신부장
중앙일보사

Hong, Yong Ki
FOREIGN EDITOR
JOONG-ANG ILBO
SEOUL, KOREA
NEWS COMMENTATOR FOR:
JOONG-ANG RADIO-TV (JBS)
KOREAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM (KBS)

THE TEACHERS VOICE
36th YEAR OF SERVICE
GTA

MEMBERSHIP
CARD AND
DUES RECEIPT
1965-1966

NAME Ronald R. Young

№ 4273

Pat L. Tornillo, Jr.
PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Rx 9-4000
4/4 7 & 6

RUTH V. WASHINGTON
REFEREE

STATE OF NEW YORK
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BOARD

50 PARK PLACE
NEW YORK CITY

Au 1-7123

Separate Corr att to UGFT-16828

FRONT

GP23164

A41100
339714

(Ouida Stewart)
[illegible]-08146

[illegible] Dr. Martin 665-5116
Luther King
call this number
tomorrow.
Very important!

Bill + Elaine Calloway
40 W 135th ST
NY, NY
Office AU69593
Home TO29861

CORRECTED ADDRESS

Pr. [illegible]
PL 77971
Please Call

If and when your address and/or school changes after joining CTA, please correct on post card or phone CTA (373-7535). This will insure services.

32 W. 55 St
Advisor to the
Governor for
Women's Special
Events

BACK SIDE of CARDS.

Carolla

FRIDAY

MAR. 1966						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

29

APR. 1966

MAY 1966						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

-APPOINTMENTS-

8:00
8:30
9:00 Dr King Jr.
9:30
10:00 Please Call
10:30
11:00 Long Distance
11:30
12:00 Operator 71
1:00
1:30 Hemstead New York
2:00 487-5199
2:30
3:00 Mr. Harry Wachtell
3:30
4:00
4:30 Lillian
5:00
5:30

Called

Airport Men's Shop, Inc.

MIAMI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

NILS KRUPP
JERRY GALINDO

MIAMI 59, FLORIDA
PHONE NEWTON 5-6[illegible]

AIRLINE UNIFORMS & ACCESSORIES • LUGGAGE • SHOES

Customer's Order No. Phone No. Date 5-20 1966

Sold To

Address

Sold by [illegible] | Cash | C.O.D. | Charge | On Acct | Mdse. Ret. | Pd. Out

QUAN.	DESCRIPTION	PRICE	AMOUNT
	Cabana Set		1[illegible].95
	Socks		2.[illegible]
	[illegible]		5.95
	SW Trunks		6.95
	[illegible]		2.[illegible]
	[illegible]		3.00
			31.35
			3.10
			[illegible]
		TOTAL	[illegible]

THANK YOU
Please keep this copy for reference

No. 122912 Rec'd by [illegible]

UARCO INCORPORATED

NO. | FILE NO. | TYPE | REFERENCE DOCUMENT | PAGE | ANALYSIS OR CHARGEOUT

(when filled in)

MEMORANDUM

To: MARTIN L. KING JR
From:
Subject: PHONE CALLS -
Date:

5/18/66

? 696-8521 ||| - (*) CORA M. KINSEY 1405 NW 51 ST. ✓
" NE-4-4842 - (*) ALICE FRANCIS - 4731 NW 15 Ave "
" 758-7650 ||| - MAXINE THURSTON - 2 line Rotary phone.
NE-5-1275 (*) GEORGE A. MILLER 2535 N. RIVER DR., MIA.
NE-5-2058 (*) PATRICIA D. REEVES (*) GOLDIE JACKSON 5001 N.W. 12 AVE, M.
NE-5-4949 (*) MRS. MARY J. McCOY 4950 N.W. 15 COURT, MIA. MIA
888-5211 SEE OTHER SIDE
NE-3-3311 NATIONAL AIRLINES

5/19/66

661-2511 U. OF MIAMI / ASHE MEMORIAL BLDG.
MO7-0006 | (*) W. IVAN HOY, 5881 S.W. 52 TER. ✓
? 377-3681 GREATER MIA. URBAN League
758-7659 (*) MAXINE THURSTON, 1302 N.W. 81 TERR. ✓
374-4212 | CHALKS FLYING SERVICE, MACARTHUR CAUSEWAY
377-9445 MACKEY AIRLINES, FORT LAUD.
635-1275 SEE (*) GEORGE A. MILLER - ABOVE ✓
751-6692 | WCKT TELEVISION STATION
? 691-3311 - NAT. AIRLINES
NE-4-4842 (*) ALICE FRANCIS 4731 NW 15 AVE

Canceled

888-5211

AIRWAYS HOTEL
" MOTEL
~~LENNIE~~
LENNYS HIDE A WAY
L.A. WIEN INVESTMENTS
MIAMI AIRWAYS HOTEL
MIAMI AIRWAYS MOTEL

5055 N.W. 36 ST.



CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT - SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR EXPENSE RECORD

Diners' CLUB
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE
NEW YORK N. Y. 10019

CARDHOLDER: [illegible]03 7906 9 NOV68
DR MARTIN L KING JR

ESTABLISHMENT: [illegible] CLUB
[illegible] 011 [illegible]
[illegible]

DATE: 12/23/65

THE AMOUNT OF THE CHARGES RECORDED HEREON WERE INCURRED BY ME AND I PROMISE TO PAY SUCH AMOUNT TO THE DINERS' CLUB, INC. ONLY.

CARDHOLDER'S SIGNATURE X Martin L. King Jr

SERVICES OTHER THAN RESTAURANTS, HOTELS & MOTELS USE SPACE BELOW FOR CREDIT APPROVAL, LICENSE & SA NUMBERS, WHEN APPLICABLE.

CHECK OR BILL NO. 17027

RECORD OF CHARGE		
17	00	AMT FOR PURCHASE OF SERVICE OR MDSE
	51	TAXES
2	75	TIPS AND MISC.
20	26	TOTAL

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
REMIT ONLY TO THE DINERS' CLUB.

FORM DC 200 MADE IN U.S.A.



CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT - SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR EXPENSE RECORD

DINERS CLUB
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019

CARDHOLDER: DC2203 7906 9 NOV68
DR MARTIN L KING JR

ESTABLISHMENT:
THE DINERS CLUB
3212113884
SHERATON CHICAGO HOTEL
CHICAGO ILL

DATE

THE AMOUNT OF THE CHARGES RECORDED HEREON WERE INCURRED BY ME AND I PROMISE TO PAY SUCH AMOUNT TO THE DINERS CLUB, INC. ONLY.

CARDHOLDER'S SIGNATURE

SERVICES OTHER THAN RESTAURANTS, HOTELS & MOTELS USE SPACE BELOW FOR CREDIT APPROVAL, LICENSE & SA NUMBERS, WHEN APPLICABLE.

CHECK OR BILL NO.

RECORD OF CHARGE		
18	[illegible]	AMT FOR PURCHASE OF SERVICE OR MDSE
[illegible]	72	TAXES
		TIPS AND MISC.
[illegible]	[illegible]	TOTAL

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
REMIT ONLY TO THE DINERS CLUB.

FORM DC 200 REV. 9/65 MADE IN U.S.A.

S. Nelson
2345044

Harry
7239125

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR EXPENSE RECORD

The Diners' Club
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE
NEW YORK N. Y. 10019

CARDHOLDER	EXPIRES
[illegible]2203 7906 9 NOV66	
DR [illegible] L KING JR	
ESTABLISHMENT	
[illegible] CLUB	
101 C11 [illegible]	
DATE 12/23/65	THE AMOUNT OF THE CHARGES RECORDED HEREON WERE INCURRED BY ME AND I PROMISE TO PAY SUCH AMOUNT TO THE DINERS CLUB, INC. ONLY.
CARDHOLDER'S SIGNATURE X [illegible]	
[illegible] 11027	
CHECK OR BILL NO.	

RECORD OF CHARGE	
17 00	AMT. FOR PURCHASE OF SERVICE OR MDSE
51	TAXES
2 75	TIPS AND MISC.
20 26	TOTAL

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
REMIT ONLY TO THE DINERS' CLUB

FORM DC 200 [illegible] MADE IN U.S.A.

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT - SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR EXPENSE RECORD

DINERS CLUB
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019

CARDHOLDER	EXPIRES
DC2203 7906 9 NOV66	
DR MARTIN L KING JR	
ESTABLISHMENT	
THE DINERS CLUB 3212113884 SHERATON CHICAGO HOTEL CHICAGO ILL	
DATE	THE AMOUNT OF THE CHARGES RECORDED HEREON WERE INCURRED BY ME AND I PROMISE TO PAY SUCH AMOUNT TO THE DINERS CLUB, INC. ONLY.
CARDHOLDER'S SIGNATURE X	
CHECK OR BILL NO.	

RECORD OF CHARGE		
18	[illegible]	AMT. FOR PURCHASE OF SERVICE OR MDSE.
[illegible]	72	TAXES
		TIPS AND MISC.
[illegible]	[illegible]	TOTAL

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
REMIT ONLY TO THE DINERS CLUB.

FORM DC 200 REV. 9/65 MADE IN U.S.A.

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT

J. Nelson
234-5044

3267 N. [illegible]
[illegible]
2349

Mar Lu King

Thursday

8:30 P. M.

Univ. of Miami

Oscar Hines —

8:30

at 1 Milley Dr.

by girls Dorm.

MIAMI International
AIRPORT HOTEL
DIRECTLY ATOP THE NEW MIAMI AIRPORT TERMINAL
P. O. BOX 2094 MIAMI, FLORIDA 33159

Miss Maxine Thurston

Jug

THE Diamond MENS SHOP

AMERICANA HOTEL
7th Ave. & 53rd St.

NEW YORK CITY
LT 1-7200

Customer's Order No. 231541 Date 3/16 1966

M. Dr. King

Address Room 2225

SOLD BY	CASH	C.O.D.	CHARGE	ON ACCT.	MDSE. RETD.	PAID OUT

QUAN.	DESCRIPTION	PRICE	AMOUNT
2	Ties		20.—
2	Hankies 1.50		6.—
			26.—
			1.30
	Room Chg		27.30
	# 2264		

ALL claims and returned goods MUST be accompanied by this bill

37471

Rec'd by

TAX

TOT.

SHELBY BUSINESS FORMS INC. SHELBY OHIO

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT - SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR EXPENSE RECORD

The Diners' CLUB
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019

CARDHOLDER: J C. 22203-7906-9
Dr Martin L. King Jr

EXPIRES: NOV 66

ESTABLISHMENT: 310-910-102-6
AIRPORT MENS SHOP
MIAMI 59, FLA.

DATE 3/20/66

THE AMOUNT OF THE CHARGES RECORDED HEREON WERE INCURRED BY ME AND I PROMISE TO PAY SUCH AMOUNT TO THE DINERS CLUB INC ONLY.

CARDHOLDER'S SIGNATURE
X

RECORD OF CHARGE

16.95	AMT. FOR PURCHASE OF SERVICE OR MDSE
.51	TAXES
	TIPS AND MISC.
17.46	TOTAL

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT

FORM DC MADE IN U.S.A.

CHECK OR BILL NO.

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
REMIT ONLY TO THE DINERS' CLUB

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

APR 7 1 12 PM '66

FROM:
RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO: Pn

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

WE/1 CHRONO - DESTROYED

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WE/1/L			12/4	mj
2.				
3.				
4. WE/1/CE			12/4	
5.				
6. WE/BC E. Bellen		13 APR 1966	13 APR 1966	
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

WE/COM	☒	REPT'L PROGRAM
		DESTROY
		SEND
WE/[illegible]		RE FILE FOR FILING
WE/PM		[illegible]
ISO/DCD		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
WE/FILES		[illegible]

FBI Request

Reclassify
100-2-18

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT INDEX	FILE TITLE: 100-002-018
		FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): ~~201-760966~~
DATE MICROFILMED:	DOCUMENT DATE: 30 MAR 66	DOCUMENT NUMBER: OWOA 19623

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, London

INFO Chief, WE

FROM Chief of Station, Oslo

SUBJECT Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache, London

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

Leon S. TOZALL

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr. 201-760466

Distribution:
2 - COS, London w/att
2 - Chief, WE w/att

CS COPY

100-003-018
~~201-760466~~

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OWOA-19623

DATE
30 March 1966

HQS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a rally in Oslo to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge of a future visit of KING to Norway.

Any future information which becomes available will be forwarded to you. We have also taken due note of your desire that the Norwegian authorities not know of your interest in Subject's activities.

CS COPY

100-002-018

~~201-260466~~

att #1 to OWKA 19623

SECRET

att to OWCA-1962[illegible]

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

30 NOV 1964

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Martin Luther KING, Jr.

1. Reference is made to a communication from your Bureau dated 28 August 1964 concerning proposed travel to Western Europe of Martin Luther KING, Jr. Reference noted that subject planned to visit Rome, Italy, on 18 and 19 September 1964.

2. This Agency has received the following information on subject from a source who is considered unreliable. Dr. Martin Luther KING met with various leaders of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) on 18 September 1964 in Rome. He discussed with these Italian politicians the program of demonstrations against segregation in the United States which are to be organized in Italy during the months immediately ahead. Dr. KING reportedly conferred with PCI Senators Velio SPANO and Ugo BARTESAGHI, with PSI Senator Paolo VITTORELLI, and with Deputy Lucio LUZZATO of the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP).

3. This Agency is unable to evaluate the above report.

4. The information in paragraph two has been made available to your Bureau's representative in Rome.

CSCI-316/02051-64

WE/4/CE/ R. Brockmeyer: ams (24 November 1964)

100-2-4

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI
1 - CI/R&A
1 - RI (201-760966)
2 - WE/4/CE

Based on: OIRT-6733 dated 20 October 1964

100-2-4

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CS COPY

201 760 966
30 Nov 1964

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: [illegible]

EXTENSION

NO. [illegible]

DATE 23 NOV 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/Support			RC	23 NOV 1964 orig to WE/4 WAT
2.				
3. WE/4	25 NOV 1964			1. CHRONO
4. Gore		27/11		
5. Thoenen			dt	
6. Bizzetti				
7. CE		30 Nov 64		
8. DC/WE/4				
9.				Fed Roth 201-760966 used last destroying Rinascita Kings page of
10. CI/ICG/[illegible]		[illegible]		Could you please forward the correct file for this, or other disposition. Thank you WE/4/CE/[illegible] x1794
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15. RI/FI				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

VIA COURIER POUCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE Attn: Chief, WE/4

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Rome

SUBJECT
KEYWAY/Support
PCI Publication of Articles by Martin Luther KING

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OIRT-6733, 20 October 1964

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information.

Forwarded herewith is a memorandum prepared for PRESLAND's information concerning an article attributed to Martin Luther KING that appeared in the 22 October issue of the PCI organ, Vie Nuove. Also forwarded is a copy of the 24 October issue of Rinascita which reprints on its last page an article by KING that, according to an editorial note, was originally published in The Nation.

Kenneth L. Pettijohn
KENNETH L. PETTIJOHN

Attachments: as stated.

Distribution:
3-C/WE, w/atts.

NOV 17 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

DATE TYPED
16 Nov 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OIRT-06783

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
100-3-4

Attachment to: OIRT-06783
16 Nov 64

SECRET

SUBJECT: Article by Martin Luther King in Vie Nuove, 22 October 1964.

1. The article entitled "What We Negroes Ask of the President" and attributed to Martin Luther King, published on pages 15 and 17 of the 22 October 1964 issue of the Italian Communist Party organ Vie Nuove, is a straightforward expression of the hopes and aspirations of the American Negro population and of its determination to continue the struggle by non-violent means until full social and economic equality has been obtained. The article does not contain anything which could be considered as typical communist propaganda nor anything that seems to be directed specifically to a communist audience. The article, under King's byline, would be perfectly proper for any American publication.

2. At the beginning of the article, Vie Nuove includes the following editorial comment:

> The racial problem is one of the subjects that most divides the American states in this presidential election. This article, by Martin Luther King, that we published exclusively, illuminates its most dramatic aspects and expresses the requests that the colored population advances to the entire nation. It is a denunciation of the inequality of rights that goes beyond the secular racial question. The "you must respect my person" is a request that the problem of Democracy poses for everyone.

3. Despite the date of its publication the article appears to have been written some months ago. This is evident from King's reference in the article to the fact that the Civil Rights Bill was before Congress at the time he was writing the article. The Bill, it will be recalled, was enacted into law on 2 July 1964. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the article's appearance in Vie Nuove or at least, its composition by King, is not the direct result of any contacts that King may have had with PCI officials during his visit to Rome in mid-September.

SECRET

attachment to –
OIRT-06783
16 Nov 64

pag. 3 Rinascita

100-3-4

Rinascita

Settimanale fondato da Palmiro Togliatti

N. 42 - anno 21 Sabato 24 ottobre 1964 L. 100

Lotta
di classe
riunificazione
olitica

Interviste con
ecchietti
ombardi

La politica del Ventesimo

Le decisioni di Mosca, per l'importanza dell'avvenimento, per il peso che esso è chiamato ad avere nelle prospettive della vita sovietica e del movimento operaio internazionale, non potevano non suscitare interrogativi, non diventare argomento di riflessione e di dibattito ben oltre le frontiere dell'Unione Sovietica. La procedura di quelle decisioni e il modo contraddittorio, tale da lasciare ancora vaste zone d'ombra, col quale sono state comunicate, hanno certo determinato [illegible] è che l'affanno della crisi del centro-sinistra e del naufragio delle sue prospettive politiche impedisce a certi democratici e a taluni socialisti di guardare al di là dei voti delle prossime elezioni municipali, anche quando si tratta della prospettiva mondiale. Con il risultato, crediamo, di non veder chiaro nè quello che può accadere nel mondo, nè quello che accadrà nel municipio.

A noi spetta ribadire, anche in questa occasione, una [illegible] che ci pare fondamentale [illegible]

Carri armati a Jackson

di Martin Luther King

Martin Luther King jr., leader del movimento integrazionista antirazziale è stato insignito del premio Nobel della pace. Dall'ultimo dei suoi rapporti annuali sullo stato della lotta delle popolazioni americane di colore, pubblicato su The Nation *stralciamo la parte centrale in cui vengono affrontati i problemi di tattica e strategia della battaglia ancora in corso. Anche i disegni che illustrano la pagina sono ripresi da* The Nation.



Per molti anni, nel passato, la lotta per i diritti dei negri è stata ostacolata da una confusa molteplicità di tattiche. Nel primo periodo del governo Kennedy si è sostenuto che l'azione governativa era uno strumento più efficace di quella legislativa; si affermò che le leggi esistevano ma non erano applicate, e che pertanto un più energico intervento governativo sarebbe bastato a determinare profondi cambiamenti.

Prima ancora che il movimento per i diritti civili impostasse una seria campagna in quella direzione, l'emergenza di un movimento rivoluzionario di massa concentrò di nuovo l'attenzione sull'iniziativa legislativa; e da allora l'istanza fondamentale cui l'opinione pubblica guarda è il Congresso.

Gli atti legislativi, come le sentenze dei tribunali, affermano un diritto, ma non lo attuano automaticamente: in ultima analisi, sarà l'azione governativa a determinare l'effetto pratico delle leggi. Quanto possano essere illusori gli effetti benefici dei provvedimenti legislativi è esemplificato dal fatto che, da molti anni, una legge federale ha autorizzato la creazione di uffici elettorali federali per l'iscrizione degli elettori in quelle zone in cui il diritto di voto è violato: eppure, ancor oggi nessuno di quegli uffici ha iscritto un solo elettore negro. Un esempio ancor più clamoroso di carenza governativa, come ha messo in rilievo il dottor Howard Zinn, è che nemmeno la legislazione sui diritti civili approvata nel 1866 è stata mai applicata nel Sud. Il codice penale americano, al titolo 10, sezioni 241 e 242, stabilisce che un funzionario il quale neghi a un cittadino l'esercizio dei suoi diritti costituzionali, o chiunque agisca con questo obiettivo, commette un delitto, ma le violazioni di questo articolo sono ben più numerose dei rari casi in cui il ministero della Giustizia ne ha invocato l'applicazione.

Il fatto è che la legislazione federale è violata nel Sud in modo così massiccio che non è esagerazione affermare che l'unità federale del paese è poco più di un'illusione. Per il negro del Sud è solo un tragico mito: è stato sfruttato, imprigionato e assassinato, e sebbene la legge federale avrebbe potuto raggiungere i colpevoli non è stato fatto nulla per diminuire l'oppressione di cui il negro è vittima.

Le violazioni più tragiche e frequenti si verificano nelle zone in cui la brutalità della polizia non ha un freno, e in cui sono in vigore leggi statali chiaramente illegali contro i negri. Molti americani bianchi del Nord non si rendono conto di quanto sia brutale il comportamento della polizia, e di quanto questo stato di cose sia generalizzato. Il Comitato per i diritti civili, dopo aver compiuto uno studio molto attento e scrupoloso, ha dichiarato che questo è [illegible] avverte questa realtà solo quando si svolgono manifestazioni negre non violente, e quindi è convinta di aver assistito a un episodio sporadico di repressione eccessiva: non si rende conto, invece, che quel tipo di comportamento da parte della polizia è abituale, e non eccezionale.

La brutalità poliziesca con la connivenza o, nel migliore dei casi, tra l'indifferenza della comunità, è una esperienza quotidiana dei negri in troppe zone del Sud. I negri vivono in uno stato di polizia che, paradossalmente, prospera in seno a una repubblica democratica. In tale situazione, un'occasionale denuncia del governo federale, seguita da un processo che si trascinerà per anni, non può essere certo ritenuta un freno efficace e anzi, spesso, è ancor peggio della rinuncia ad agire, perchè dimostra la futilità e la debolezza del potere federale.

Molti si domandano come mai le dimostrazioni e le lotte nel Sud tendono a estinguersi rapidamente dopo un avvio vigoroso e una somma di eroici sacrifici: la risposta è che i negri sono stati sconfitti dalla forza bruta. Un apparato statale abituato da generazioni ad agire nella più assoluta impunità, può ricorrere all'impiego di qualsiasi strumento di potere incontrollato: un'azione legale federale, o le sporadiche e spesso inutili crisi di coscienza federali, non aiutano i negri in questa impari battaglia più di un amichevole colpetto sulla spalla.

I negri hanno trovato nell'azione diretta non violenta uno strumento miracoloso ~~contro~~ l'impiego della forza bruta, ma non è uno strumento risolutivo. Quando la luce di migliaia di riflettori è puntata sulle violenze della polizia del Sud, pistole e manganelli vengono temporaneamente rinfoderati, ma l'impudenza del costume imperante nel Sud è tale che, nonostante sia osservata dagli occhi di milioni di testimoni, la polizia continua a impiegare contro i negri strumenti barbarici come i bastoni elettrificati per il bestiame e gli idranti ad alta pressione. E quando il delitto può essere compiuto con il favore della notte, la criminalità tocca il fondo, come testimonia la uccisione con una bomba di quattro bambini di una scuola domenicale. Assassinii, mutilazioni, fustigazioni e lancio di bombe sono altre testimonianze eloquenti.

Quando i *carri armati della polizia di Birmingham apparvero alla ribalta, sembrò una manifestazione grottesca ma rara di furia poliziesca* locale. Nelle settimane scorse, il sindaco di Jackson, Mississippi, si è vantato delle ingenti forze armate preparate per la prossima estate: un carro armato « Thompson » di 13.000 *pound*, con dodici uomini a bordo armati di fucili, mitragliatori e bombe lacrimogene, tre autocarri per il trasporto di truppe, tre autoblindo con riflettori, tre autocarri pesanti con rimorchio e circa 500 uomini, oltre a una forza di riserva di truppe statali, di impiegati dell'amministrazione comunale e di pattuglie di civili. Questo esercito locale attende le manifestazioni non violente con evidente ostilità e con la consueta facilità a far uso delle armi.

Non si può non concludere che i negri, i quali hanno dimostrato un coraggio eccezionale nella loro azione diretta non violenta, sono stati abbandonati dal più potente governo del mondo. Hanno subito la violenza per rivelare quanto profondo sia il loro dramma e per elevare la loro protesta: il governo non ha saputo invece venire in loro aiuto che con il minimo di coraggio e di decisione.

Questa contraddizione deve essere assolutamente risolta. Leggi e comitati inter-razziali non possono trasformare una comunità quando coloro i quali detengono il potere locale sanno di poter ricorrere all'uso della forza mentre il potere centrale temporeggia. Nel mondo esistono governi i quali non sono in grado di controllare alcune zone del paese, così come il governo americano di cent'anni or sono non controllava le zone abitate dalle tribù indiane. Oggi siamo vicini all'anno 2000, e la nostra potenza nazionale è quasi senza limiti: eppure, il governo non è in grado di far applicare la legge nemmeno in un piccolo, polveroso villaggio del Sud.

Il governo non ha oramai altra alternativa che affrontare in modo del tutto nuovo il problema. Il vigore del movimento per i diritti civili non è destinato a estinguersi, perchè i negri conoscono ora la loro forza reale e non rinunceranno [illegible]



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/DEP
[illegible]

EXTENSION

NO. OIRT-6733

DATE 29 OCT 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. We/Support			ae
2.			
3.			
4. WE14	29 OCT 1964		
5. yore			[illegible]
6. ~~CE~~ CE		2 nov 64	
7. C/WE/4/RE	8 NOV 1964		
8. C/WE/4/CE			[illegible]
9. WE/4/CE/rb		1 Dec 64	rb
10.			
11. CI/OPS/WE	6	6	CG
12.			
13. WE/4/CE		30 nov 64	rb
14.			
15. RID/ ~~[illegible]~~ Files			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

29 OCT 1964

orig +1 - WE14

ch

T CHRONO

5-6: We should anticipate FBI wanting to know more about the content of these reported meetings? It makes a world of difference in interpretation.

Info in attached OIRT-6733 being forwarded to FBI in CSCI-316/02051-64,

drafted 6 nov 64.
rt

Please file in ~~[illegible]~~ 100-2-4

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

VIA COURIER POUCH

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING		
		PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
TO: Chiof, WE Attn: Chief, WE/4			MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
FROM: Chief of Station, Rome Dn/PHD		▨	ABSTRACT	
		▨	MICROFILM	

SUBJECT: KEYWAY
Meeting of Dr. Martin Luther KING with Italian Leftist Personalities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For Your Information.

1. Following is a translation of a report on the subject: "The Mission of Luther KING with the Italian Left", dated 28 September 1964 and attributed to DEPLENARY/7, from Luigi PINTOR, from information coming into the editorial offices of L'UNITA. The Station received the report on 1 October 1964. PSIUP

"Luther KING, noted Protestant negro Pastor and 'leader' of the anti-racist movement in the United States, met with various leaders of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) on 18 September in Rome. In particular, KING conferred with PCI Senators Velio SPANO and Ugo BARTESAGHI, with PSI Deputy Lucio LUZZATO, and with Senator Paolo VITTORELLI ~~of the Italian Socialist Party of~~ ? PSI Proletarian Unity. KING discussed with the above-named politicians the program of demonstrations against segregation in the United States, which are to be organized in Italy during the months immediately ahead."

2. The same report was also received from DEDICATOR/4 who has access to the DEPLENARY establishment and thus it is not considered as confirming the DEPLENARY/7 information.

• (Continued)

Attachment: h/w.
Copy of a report passed to local ODENVY rep.

Distribution:
3-C/WE, w/att.

OCT 20 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
	16 Oct 64	
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OIRT - 06733	
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 100-2-4 ~~201-760966~~	

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OIRT - 06733

3. Given the source of the above report, we view it with some reserve. In this connection, we noted the 19 September issue of L'UNITA, which reflected an article on KING's private audience with Pope Paul held the preceding day. According to L'UNITA, immediately after the audience, in St. Peter's Square, KING stated that "Pope Paul was most clear on the fact that both he, personally, and the Catholic Church support the cause of civil rights". The article also states that in a press conference held at Fiumicino Airport after the audience KING said, "The Pope will shortly make a public statement on racial segregation". We have no other information at this time.

4. Attached is a copy of the report which we have passed to the local ODENVY representative.

RANDOLPH A. MEDFORD

attachment to OIRT-06733
16 Oct 1964

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Italy/USA

REPORT NO. CS

SUBJECT Meeting of Dr. Martin Luther King with Italian Leftist Personalities

DATE DISTR

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 28 September 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Italy, Rome (1 October 1964)

FIELD REPORT NO. OIRT-06733

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: An unwitting leftist oriented journalist (F) with contacts in Italian Communist Party (PCI) circles in Rome from information that was available to editorial offices of L'Unita, the PCI daily newspaper. Reports from this source over the past few years have varied from mediocre and below in quality and in accuracy. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Luther King, noted Protestant negro Pastor and "leader" of the anti-racist movement in the United States, met with various leaders of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) on 18 September in Rome. In particular, King conferred with PCI Senators Velio Spano and Ugo Bartesaghi, with ~~PSI~~ Deputy Lucio Luzzato, and with Senator Paolo Vittorelli of the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). King discussed with the above-named politicians the program of demonstrations against segregation in the United States, which are to be organized in Italy during the months immediately ahead.

Field Comment: Given the source of the above report, we view it with some reserve. In this connection, we noted the 19 September issue of L'Unita, which reflected an article on King's private audience with Pope Paul held the preceding day. According to L'Unita, immediately after the audience, in St. Peter's Square, King stated that "Pope Paul was most clear on the fact that both he, personally and the Catholic Church support the cause of civil rights". The article also states that in a press conference held at Fiumicino Airport after the audience King said, "The Pope will shortly make a public staterent on racial segregation". We have no other information at this time.

5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "•".)

TOTALS

LIAISON

COORDINATING RELEASING

Attachment to ORT-6733
16 Oct 64

Prilland
Pettyjohn
Medford

S. DUDICATOR/4

recd 15/10/64 evening

Luther King, noto pastore protestante negro, e leader del movimento antirazzista degli Stati Uniti, si è incontrato il 18 settembre u.s. a Roma con diversi esponenti del PCI e del PSI. In modo particolare egli ha conferito coll'on Velio Spano, del PCI, coll'on Ugo Bartesaghi (PCI), coll'on Lucio Luzzatto del PSIUP e col senatore Paolo Vittorelli del PSI. Il Pastore King ha discusso con loro le manifestazioni contro il segregazionismo negli Stati Uniti, che si dovrebbero organizzare nei prossimi mesi in Italia.

Attachment to - DIRT-6733
16 Oct 64

SEGRETO
28 SET. 1964

OGGETTO: La missione di Luther King presso le sinistre italiane
VALUTAZIONE: Ottima
FONTE: Attendibile/UU

S: Deplenary 17
R: 1 Oct 64

Luther King, noto pastore protestante negro, è "leader" del movimento antirazzista degli Stati Uniti, si è incontrato il 18 settembre u.s. a Roma con diversi esponenti del P.C.I. e del P.SI.

In modo particolare il King ha conferito con il Sen. Velio Spano, della vice presidenza della Commissione Centrale di Controllo del P.C.I., con l'On. Ugo Bartesaghi (P.C.I.), con l'On. Lucio M. Luzzatto del P.S.I.U.P. e con il Sen. Paolo Vittorelli del P.S.I.

Il pastore King ha discusso con i predetti unmini politici il programma di manifestazioni contro il segregazionismo negli Stati Uniti, che si dovrebbero organizzare nei prossimi mesi in Italia.

Riferita da Luigi Pintor. Notizie affluite alla redazione de "l'Unità".

100 - 2 - 4

27 Nov 57

SECRET

7P

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM: RI/AN

DOCUMENT NUMBER HKHA-04072

DOCUMENT DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REG	BARTON			
2. A Br 3		3 Dec	3 Dec	
3. C/Carib			4 Dec	R
Carib/RO		12/3	12/3	RB
5. WH/Mexico		17 Dec	17	
[illegible]				
6. WE/[illegible]	6		10/12	
WE/[illegible]	3-[illegible]		[illegible]-6	
7. WE/[illegible]			[illegible]	
8. [illegible]				
9. [illegible]				
CI/ICD/[illegible]				
10. [illegible]				
11. Carib/[illegible]			6 Mar 1958	
12. RI/AN	2642 I-53			
13. RI/FI				
14. RI/FI	1403L			

COMMENTS

NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files of the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.

3-4: Let's make available to the interested desks the names & addresses reported here. (pages 1-3)

4 to 4 — Good, card persons on page 5 + info para 4 re Soto's position [illegible]

WHA 28 Feb 57

HPSW-1248 [illegible] Rios

~~[illegible]~~

FILE TITLE
SOTO PRIETO, LIONEL
GUILLERMO

FILE NUMBER
201 55332

ENCLOSURES

DATE [illegible] 27 Nov 57

FORM 610a SECRET

FILE IN 201-209258

14-00000

POOR QUALITY REPRODUCTION
"UNAVOIDABLE"

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-1072

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

(201-055332)
Field File No. 30-256-35

TO : Chief, WHD
ATTN : EUDKX/ICD - Cedric B. Papat
FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE: 27 November 1957

SUBJECT GENERAL— Communist Matters

SPECIFIC— Lienal Guillermo SOTO Prieto

1. When Subject was arrested on 24 September 1957, a number of scraps of paper containing incomplete notes were found in his possession. The following names were legible:

Eduardo GARCIA, Juventud Obrera Catolica, Vedado.

No previous record in Station files.

(Dr.) Salvador MASSIP, Avenida 9 No. 8402, Tel. B9-1388.

Files show him to be a professor at the University of Habana and father of Salvador MASSIP Valdes who has a long record of Communist activities.

Argeliers LEON, Calle 20 No. 272-2, Tel. F-4988.

Files show he is an active member of Nuestro Tiempo, Communist cultural organization, Cuba

Agusto CALLAT, Calle Cuba 165, Apt. 12-bajos. No previous file record.

Gilberto LEON, Calle Infanta 113.

Files list one Gilberto LEON as a Communist who was active in labor matters in Jimenez, Cuba; also, a Gilberto LEON [illegible] who received a [illegible] scholarship in 1955 to study agronomy in Mexico.

R. D. CALDERON, Calle N, Cosme 16.

This person may be identical with Ruben Dario [illegible], with aliases, who is the [illegible] Secretary General of the [illegible]. [illegible] trained in the Soviet Union for three years. He was [illegible] of the National Executive Committee of the [illegible], and the [illegible] of the Party.

Koster Laboratories, Calle A y 1a, Regla.

No previous record in files.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

[illegible], 61-23A

[illegible] COPY

201-55332

SECRET

Otto VILCHES, Calle Estrella 209, Habana.

Files reflect that he was a Communist sympathiser at the University of Habana during 1955. He was a member of the Committee for the Defense of Guatemala in 1954.

Max LESNICK, Calle E No. 205 y Linea, Habana.

He is a leader of the youth section of the Ortodoxo Party. Cuba An unevaluated report dated 15 July 1951 from a fairly reliable source stated that LESNICK is a Communist sympathiser and a very good friend of Lionel SOTO. In a recent interview in connection with his application for U. S. visa, LESNICK admitted knowing SOTO but said he did not share SOTO's views.

Baldomero A. RIOS, Calle Industria 512, Tel. W-2965 (Susana).

SOTO's notes contained the name Baldomero A. RIOS, and directly beneath it in parenthesis the name "Susana." RIOS was a Puerto Rican student at the University of Habana. He was anti-[illegible] but claimed to be anti-Communist. "Susana" is unidentified.

Puerto Rico

Marquesa de TIERRA, Tel. F-4474, Calle F No. 410, ent. 17 y 19, Vedado, Habana.

The Marquesa de TIERRA is not identifiable from Station files. Her husband, the Marques de TIERRA was a Spanish monarchist who is believed to have died in 1953.

Spain

Dr. Luis PAVON, Bufete Tamayo, Calle Narciso Lopez 70.

No pertinent information in Files.

Odisha PORTOTO Silega, Tels. U-3409 and W-8291.

Wife of Lionel SOTO. In 1955 she was vice-treasurer of Nuestro Tiempo, a Communist-front cultural organization.

Omar FRANCIS, Calle Valle 102, 2nd floor; his girlfriend (name unknown) is at Calle S. Francisco 402, 2nd floor.

In 1956 FRANCIS was a law student at the University of Habana and attended [illegible] Student Congress in Prague in 1956. He returned to Cuba and became active in Juventud Socialista.

Dr. Alberto [illegible], Calle Campanario 306, Tel. A-2658.

No previous record.

Luis ALONSO, Tel. U-3896.

He is a painter and was active in 1949 in Pro-Peace Movement in Cuba.

SECRET

SECRET

Manolo (no last name given), Tel. F-0-4848 (Alicia Alonso Ballet School).

Unidentified.

Santiago CUBAS, Calle Lamparilla 65, Habana.

No previous record.

René ANTILLAS (Capote), Calle J y 25, Apt. 21, Habana.

Files show that in 1955 he was a student at the University of Habana and President of the Student Federation (School of Law). At the same time he was known as a leader of the Youth Group of the Ortodoxo Party.

Dr. Alejandro GOMEZ, Clinica Motsu, Calle Concepcion y 8th, Vibora, Habana.

No previous record.

Rigoberto LOPEZ, Publicidad Siboney, Calle 26 No. 1004, 5th Floor, Kohly, Habana.

Member of executive council of Nuestro Tiempo. Cuba

2. The following addresses are located outside of Cuba:

L. A. Research Bureau
799 Broadway, New York City.

(Ref: THH-1610, 28 May 1952) Reported to have mailed publication to Anibal ESCALANTE, PSP representative in Cuban Congress in 1952. Publication was described as anti-U.S. and supporting Communist line.

USELL
299 East 57th Street
Brooklyn 3, New York

No record.

Maria Teresa GARCIA (a note: "cartas" o "cortes")
Pilca 205
Colonia Sta. Maria
Mexico, D. F.

Files show a Maria Teresa GARCIA as member in Habana of National Council for Defense of Infancy in December 1952.

Andrea REVUELTA (a note: "Emergencia")
Morelia 59, Dep. 11
Mexico, D. F.

No previous file record.

SECRET

POOR QUALITY REPRODUCTION
"UNAVOIDABLE"

SECRET

HKH-1-4072, Page 4
27 November 1957

Mexico

Graciela AYALA (a note: "Materiales")
Isabel La Catolica 807
Mexico, D. F.

No previous file record.

Alicia [illegible]
16 of September 710
Mexico, D. F.
No previous file record.

England

B. V. F. C.
A Camdens Hight Street
London NW I
No previous file record.

France

J. VERGER
61 Rue de Cherche
Paris
No previous file record.

Leo LAREDI
40 Rue d'Argent
Paris II
No previous file record.

J. REVIS or REVES
15 Rue Pierre - Jolie
Argenteuil (So. France)
No previous file record.

Ecuador

Rafael FLORES
Casilla 1192
Quito
No previous file record.

Argentina

Isidro GILBERT
Dr. Luis BELAUSTEGUI 535
B. A.
No previous file record.

Portugal

Julia ALVAREZ
Rua Duque de Saldanha No. 440
Porto
No previous file record.

Costa Rica

Carlos ALVARADO
150 Varas al norte de Hotel Holanda
Cartago, C. R.
Possibly identical with pro-Communist Guatemalan newspaperman named Carlos ALVARADO Jares.

Agosto CONDE (or CONDE)
Viale Marconi 19
R (para Bruxe or Bueno)
No previous file record.

Bandolio ALEGRIA
Plaza Buena Vista 2 - 312
(no city named)
No previous file record.

Portugal

Estela LOAIZA
Portugal 1116
Santiago
No previous file record.

SECRET

POOR QUALITY REPRODUCTION
"UNAVOIDABLE"

SECRET

HKH-A-6072, Page 5
27 November 1957

3. There were numerous telephone numbers with no indication to whom they belonged. AMBADGER traced the numbers, but only the following were of persons with Communist connections. (Telephone numbers are not conclusive in view of the custom in Cuba to sell the telephone and number to anyone willing to pay the price. The buyer may have no other relationship to the previous owner of the phone.)

A-5-8741
Rosario JIMENEZ de la Osa
Calle Aguila 404 bajos
esq. San Martin y San Rafael
Habana

She is the mother of Antonio NUÑEZ Jimenes, who was a friend of SOTO's when they were both students at the University of Habana. He is now in Santa Clara, Cuba.

A-5-6751
Herminio Maria FUENTES Dasa
and Herminio Maria FUENTES Rojo
Calle Sitios 229, ent. Lealtad y Campanario

Rojo is the father of SOTO's former wife, Gloria Maria FUENTES Dasa. Herminio Maria FUENTES Dasa is her brother.

B-3667
Dr. José A. SOLIS Linares, M. D.
Avenida 17 No. [illegible]10, ent. 34 y 36,
Marianao, Habana.

No previous record.

F-3136
Salomon L. [illegible], Calle J No. 302, Esq. a 15,
Vedado, Habana.

Possibly identical with a former consul of the Dutch Consulate in Habana. He is travelling outside of Cuba at present but will return in a month or two.

X-6857
Javier [illegible] Pinus
Calle O. [illegible] No. 126, ent. 2 y 3,
Vibora, Habana.

He is the father of Amelia IGLESIAS Fernandez (HKH-958) [illegible] mail drop. Cuba Under interrogation by SIM (1958), she admitted knowing Lionel SOTO.

X-1783
Sherwin-Williams Company of Cuba
Calle F No. 212, ent. Linea Habana Central y 12,
Reparto Batista,

It is not known whom SOTO might be calling there; however, Sherwin-Williams has had labor trouble with the Communists in the past.

SECRET

SECRET

HKH-A-4072, Page 8
27 November 1957

4. SOTO was sentenced to six year's imprisonment on 3 November 1957. He is confined at El Principe Prison, but should be transferred, to the prison on the Isle of Pines soon.

Shelby L. Overstreet
Shelby L. Overstreet

Distribution:
4 - Washington
2 - Files.

SLO/gm

25 November 1957

SECRET

201-55232

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

JTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer desig "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under ment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet shoul removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM: RI/AN

DOCUMENT NUMBER HKHA-04002

DOCUMENT DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REG	BARTON		5 NOV 1957	EB
2. Br 3				
3. Carib/Chief		6 NOV 1957	12 Nov.	
4. Carib/FI				MC
5. Carib/PP				
6. WH/FI		21 NOV 1957		
7. WH/SS/Sens		25 Nov	25	NBS
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12. RI/AN RITY		27 NOV 1957		
13. Carib/Sec			17 Nov	WM
14. RI/FI	1400L			

COMMENTS

NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files at the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.

COPY DETACHED - 1 Chrono
1 Sub.

RECORD COPY

copy made for JMKEEL file.

~~DEFERRED~~

12-1 PB ret w/SEO's for 201

201 FILE OPENED ON THE
BASIS OF THIS DOCUMENT

FILE TITLE
LESNICK, MENDEL
[illegible]

4 NOV 1957

FILE NUMBER
201 229258

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT
0601

DATE PROCESSED 31 Oct 57

INDEX

FORM NO. 610a
1 SEP. 56
USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-1002
(201-)
Local File No.
27-22-10

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 31 October 1957

FROM : ~~Acting~~ Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/JMKEEL

SPECIFIC— Subject of Reference

Reference: DIR 38898, 8 October 1957

Action Required: None, information only.

1. In accordance with reference, there follow details of Subject's case. Attachment A is a memorandum furnished to the local ODACID which reviewed the derogatory information in Station files on Subject. Attachment B is a paraphrased copy of the ODACID cable to Washington recommending a favorable decision in his non-immigrant visa case.

2. By virtue of Subject's youth, his record to date, and his promising future, he was listed as a JMKEEL target in June 1957. Contact was established with him in about August 1957 as a consequence of his non-immigrant visa application, and about six meetings have been held with him since that time, ostensibly for the purpose of fully clarifying his visa status. When and if Subject obtains his visa, PRQ Part I will be forwarded according to established JMKEEL procedure.

3. For Headquarters information, the fabricated information mentioned in paragraph 2B of Attachment A is that reported in HKH-954, 5 January 1955, and HKH-943, 28 December 1954. AMPUTEE admitted to Humphrey I. EBERWEIN on 26 August 1957 that this information was fabricated.

Andrew F. Merton
Andrew F. Merton

Attachments: U/S/C
A-Memo, Subject: (Subject of Reference) 4 pages in triplicate U/S/C
B-ODACID Cable No. 200, 1 page in triplicate, dated 2 October 1957 U/S/C

Distribution:
3 - Washington w/attachs. U/S/C
2 - Files w/attachs.

25 October 1957

AFM/mfm

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

201-209258

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Sloatt A.

FROM:
RI/AN

NO. HKWA- 6002

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
WH 046 Barton		12 NOV 957		
2. Drn3				
3. Carib/71			Mcc	
4. Carib/Cuba/R				
5.				
6.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-289258 31 Oct 57

POUCH MATERIAL
SEPARATE COVER ENCLOSURE
EXPEDITE

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Separate Cover Attachment to HMM-A-1002, 31 October 1957

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET, ATTACH A
Separate Cover Attachment to HHH-A1002
31 October 1957

Visa Section 29 August 1957

Attaché

Max Edgardo LESNICK Menendes

The following information is furnished as of interest to you in determining Subject's security status:

1. A. A report from an official source described as reliable, dated 28 December 1954 and evaluated as possibly true, stated that groups from the Ortodoxo party led by Subject reportedly collaborated with the Partido Socialista Popular in the planning of the protest campaign against the Cuban Government's plan to build the "Via Cuba" canal. The report went on to state that on 14 December 1954 the Cuban press published an article concerning a call made by Subject in the name of the national executive committee of the Ortodoxo Youth, to all youth organisations, including the Juventud Socialista (JS, Cuban Communist youth organisation) and other organized centers of public opinion to attend a meeting at radio station C.O.C.O. on 15 December 1954 in order to join in the protest. Approximately 85 persons were reported to have answered the call, of whom 75 were described as Communists and the remainder as Ortodoxos many of whom had had close ties with the Communists in the past.

B. Several subsequent investigations failed to confirm that there was any collaboration between the PSP and other opposition groups in the protest against the Canal Via Cuba. All indications were that the legitimate opposition groups seized this excuse to attack the Government and thus found themselves accused of "collaborating" with the Communists, a favorite tactic of the Government. Subject's version of the incident was that only one Communist, Raul VALDES Vivo, showed up at the meeting and was promptly asked by Subject to leave, which he did.

2. A. Another report from the source mentioned in paragraph 1 above dated 5 January 1955 and evaluated as possibly true, stated that a pact between certain Ortodoxo leaders and the PSP had been concluded for the purpose of combatting the Batista regime. Subject, Mario RIVADULLA, both Ortodoxo youth leaders, Francisco [illegible], Ortodoxo, Jose ECHEVARRIA, FEU president, Amalio FIALLO, Catholic Youth member and PRIO follower, and Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ and Gregorio ORTEGA Suarez, both Communists, were said to have attended one of the meetings leading up to this pact. Anti-Batista propaganda issued by the "Frente Unido Ortodoxo Comunista" was said to have been found on the person of an Ortodoxo leader from Oriente Province detained by SIM on 3 January 1954.

open file 13-

SECRET

201-204258

B. On 26 August 1957, a source within SIM, considered usually reliable, when queried concerning the reports from official sources of Ortodoxo-Communist collaboration and specifically concerning the pact with the Communists involving Subject and others mentioned in paragraph 2A above, said that these reports were false (paquete) and had been fabricated to denigrate the most active and caustic opponents of the BATISTA regime. Subject denied that the Ortodoxos ever connected with the Communists. He claimed that he has never met Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ or, for that matter, any of the top Communist leaders except Lazaro PENA, who was once pointed out to him in Mexico City.

3. A. An unevaluated report dated 16 July 1951 from a source whose reliability was described as fair stated that Max LESNICK is a Communist sympathizer and a very good friend of Lionel SOTO, editor of Vanguardia Cubana and Communist leader in the University of Habana. The report concerned LESNICK's candidacy for the office of Secretary General of Juventud Ortodoxo.

B. Subject, when asked if he knew Lionel SOTO, said that he knew him but that he did not share his views. It is noted that the same report mentioned that it was very doubtful if the Juventud Ortodoxo was going to send a delegation to the Youth Congress (Communist) in Berlin, a statement hard to reconcile with the presence of a Communist sympathiser as a candidate for Secretary General of that organisation.

4. A. An article in Hoy of 17 September 1952 reported a protest against a SIM raid on the Casa de la Cultura. Included in the list of persons signing the protest were names of many prominent Communists as well as that of Subject.

B. Subject admitted signing this protest and stated for the record that he signed in good faith as an anti-Francoist and not as a Communist sympathiser.

5. A. An article in Prensa Libre of 12 March 1954 reported declarations of the Cuban Committee for Guatemala against the aggression against that country. Subject's name was listed among the signers of the declaration as a member of the Committee.

B. Subject stated that he signed the declaration in the sincere belief that Guatemala was a democratic country and that democratic forces had to defend that country against forces which would maintain it in economic subjection and political backwardness. He said that many non-Communists of like belief also signed the declaration. He added that when ARBENZ went behind the Iron Curtain it became clear that Guatemala really had been in danger of becoming a Communist beachhead.

6. A. An article in Hoy of 28 January 1953 reported that Subject was a member for the Juventud Ortodoxo of the presidium of the Congreso Martiano por los Derechos de la Juventud and published a photograph showing Subject at the speakers' table.* Another article in Hoy of 3 March 1953 reported that Subject and several other youth leaders appeared at Hoy offices with a declaration signed by the Consejo Permanente of the Congreso Martiano. The Congreso was described as Communist-dominated by the writer of the memorandum to the Visa Section dated 9 November 1955.

B. Subject described the Congreso as an opposition maneuver against the Government in which many Cuban youth institutions participated, including the Communists. He said that he, himself, participated in the Congreso strictly as a representative of the Juventud Ortodoxo in opposition to the Government and in no sense as a collaborator or sympathizer with the Communists. Regarding the visit to Hoy offices, Subject said that the group in question visited many newspaper offices, not just that of Hoy.

7. Subject prefaced his remarks by stating that he had recognised the Communist danger as early as 1950. He brought several documents purporting to show his attacks on Communism. The documents are attached, and pertinent extracts therefrom are set forth below in translation. Subject requested that the documents be returned when need for them no longer existed.

A. Extracts from "El Pensamiento Politico o Ideologico De La Juventud Cubana", dated 1 July 1950, signed by Max LESNICK Menendez, Ciro PUMARIEGA Diaz, Oscar CRUZ Mir, Salvador LEW, Omar BORGES, Jose SALAZAR and Joaquin SALOMON:

(1) (page 13, criticising BATISTA's collaboration with the Communists) "Around the middle of 1937, the Communist Party, alleging as a public pretext that BATISTA has ceased to be the center of the most reactionary forces not only is returning to legality but also is lending to the regime in power all its political backing and is mobilizing the working masses in his support."

(2) (page 14, more criticism of BATISTA and his collaboration with the Communists) "The first general elections held following the promulgation of the new Constitution, to which BATISTA went as presidential candidate of the old political forces and of the Communist Party, served only to 'civilise' in its exterior aspects the power which that man had been exercising over the country for more than five years...."

* AN EXAMINATION OF THE PHOTOGRAPH DOES NOT SHOW SUBJECT.
~~THE~~ HOY; STMT THAT HE ATTENDED WAS DENIED AS FALSE BY SUBJECT.
Gm.

SECRET

(3) (page 15, analyzing Communist Party tactics of the time) "The Communist Party, which a short time before under the German-Russian pact had unleashed an active campaign for Cuban neutrality 'in the face of a war of imperialism', but which later, following the Nazi attack on Russia, was defending the most active belligerency of Cuba in the struggle 'to defeat the Axis', converted itself into the strongest proponent of 'national unity'...."

(4) (page 33, summarizing political sentiments), "These democratic convictions mean that we are radically opposed to the 'totalitarianism' that is the most outstanding characteristic of the regime imposed by Stalin in Russia."

(5) (page 35, clarifying his anti-imperialist stand), "On the other hand it is fitting to clarify that we shall not adjust the anti-imperialistic stand of the Cuban revolutionary movement to suit the foreign policy of any country, as is the manner of procedure of the Communist Parties closely linked to Russia and its current government."

B. A copy of an undated, unidentified newspaper clipping reported an act of the Juventud Ortodoxa in honor of Julio Antonio MELLA, in rebuttal to Communist attempts to identify MELLA as a Communist, and specifically in reply to an article by Juan MARINELLO entitled "MELLA Es Nuestro." A picture of Subject speaking at this act is attached.

C. An extract from the article "Cuba Frente Al Canal" by Subject, published in Bohemia of 15 January 1955, page 48, in which he accuses the Government of being Communist: "The arbitrary violation of University autonomy, the repeated coaction of the Judicial Power, the subjection of the Tribunal de Cuentas and other similar acts, characterized the conduct of the Marxists in the first three years of its government...."

Andrew F. Merton

Andrew F. Merton

Distribution:
 1 - Visa Section
 2 - Files

29 August 1957

AFM/mfm

201-208258

ATTACHMENT B
Separate Cover Attachment to HKH-A-L002
31 October 1957

COPY

ODACID Cable WIROM 200, 2 October 1957

1. Subject is Max LESNICK y Menendez, non-immigrant visa applicant born 8 September 1930 in Vueltas, Las Villas, Cuba. Profession, salesman. President of Juventud Ortodoxa and Orthodoxo party leader in opposition to BATISTA. He is currently in hiding from police until the heat is off. In 1954, he signed the Comite Cubano declaration in favor of Guatemala. He was referred to as a Communist sympathizer through collaboration between Ortodoxos and Communists and friendship well-known Cuban Communists possibly embracing Section 212 (a) (27) and (28).

2. Security checks show no indications of collaboration with Communists. Latter at times tried to get on the bandwagon of all opposition groups including the Ortodoxo. Specific information from Cuban Government sources regarding Ortodoxo-Communist pacts were later admitted to the local CAS as fabrications. LESNICK states that he signed the Pro-Guatemala declaration against big foreign business domination of Latin American affairs as did many other Cubans. He states that he is only acquainted with student Communist leaders at the University of Habana. He denies that he collaborated with the Communists during the past or present and brings published articles dating back to 1950 which indicate his anti-Communist stand. His name appears in the Soundex for questioning.

3. The local CAS is especially interested in the case. A favorable decision is recommended by the visa officers.

4. LESNICK plans attend Inter-American Press Association meeting to be held 12 October in Washington, entering New York 12 October at 1:35 p.m. via Cubana airline.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 OCT 19

TO: The Secretary of State
Attention: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey
Director, Office of Security

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: LESNICK y MENENDEZ, Max 201-209258

1. Reference is made to your SY memorandum WO/765, dated 7 October 1957, subject as above, whose name you desired checked against the files of this office. The files contain information concerning Max LESNICK which has been already disseminated to the Department of State as indicated below:

a. CSDB 18971 dated 8 April 1954, subject: Character Assassination of Dr. Ramiro ARANGO Alsinas.

b. CS 53861 dated 17 March 1955, subject: Communist Influence in the FEU Habana University.

c. CS 77501 dated 7 November 1955, subject: Status of the Political Opposition.

d. CS 87280 dated 14 March 1956, subject: Activities and Plans of Cuban Revolutionaries.

e. CS 3,318,636 dated 11 June 1957, subject: Political Opinions of Rafael GARCIA Barcena, Opposition Leader.

2. In addition, you are referred to the following Department of State despatches:

a. Despatch 486, dated 22 June 1949, from Habana, Cuba, subject: Proposed Cuban National Congress for Peace and Democracy.

AN RC
✓
PS
FD

1-Encl

CONFIDENTIAL

RI COPY

201-209258
~~[illegible]~~

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Despatch 100, dated 23 July 1954, from Habana, Cuba, subject: Organized Individuals in Cuba that Identified Themselves with Arbenz Administration.

c. Despatch 1232, dated 28 January 1952, from Habana, Cuba, subject: New National Executive Committee of Partido Del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo).

CSCI-3747019

Encl. 1 name check

RI/CE: AJL/DW/lc

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

201-209258

~~100-2-12~~

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 - 977727

FORM DS 939
12-1-51

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF SECURITY

REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION

TELEPHONE.
URGENT

To: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLANS (CIA)	From: VO	Date: 10/4/57

DO NOT WRITE ABOVE THIS LINE

I NAME *(If married woman include maiden name)* Max LESNICK y MENENDEZ	DATE OF BIRTH Sept. 8, 1930	PLACE OF BIRTH Vueltas, Las Villas, Cuba

ALIASES AND NICKNAMES	SEX M	MARITAL STATUS	CITIZENSHIP Cuban

ADDRESS Cuba	OCCUPATION AND NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER President Juventud Ortodoxa, and Ortodoxo Party leader.

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA

CONTROL: THIS REQUEST PLACED WITH THE DIVISION OF SECURITY BY:

DIVISION OR AGENCY VISA OFFICE-Security Branch	REASON FOR REQUEST, OR TYPE OF PROGRAM VISA - Security Case URGENT To attend inter-American press association, October 12, 1957 Washington, D.C., via New York.
DATE 10/4/57	
NAME OR REQUESTING OFFICER RBastianello:tmd	

II RESULTS OF THIS REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION:

☐ NO RECORD
☐ NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION
☐ SECURITY INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐ OTHER *(Use reverse side for reporting)*

Referred D. 100 dated 1957

CHECKED BY	DATE D.S.V.

III FOR USE OF DIVISION OF SECURITY:

MEMORANDUM [illegible]
DATE 10 Oct 57 [illegible]
RI ANALYST D.W.

DIV.	BRANCH	
RI EDITOR		[illegible]
RETURN		[illegible]

VISA OFFICE
SECURITY BRANCH
OCT 4 1957
DEPT. OF STATE

V00765022
(Date)

Encl-1

RI COPY

201-[illegible]
~~[illegible]~~

14-00000

15

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 456 SE/MK/BM
08 OCT 1957

ROUTING	
	4
2	5
3	6

Oct 9 01 10:57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 19889

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

LESNICK [illegible] MAX [illegible]

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 037

REF: A. DIR 38898 (OUT 98169)*
B. HKHA 3653

SUBJ PROMINENT ORTHODOX YOUTH LEADER, JMREEL CONTACT (SEE REF B) PAST TWO MONTHS. FURNISHED DOC INFO PROVE ANTI-COMMIE STAND. STATION REVIEWED DEROG INFO PER ODACID CABLE 200, CLEARED SATISFACTION CONSULAR OFFICER HANDLING CASE. WILL POUCH DETAILS. URGE ODACID EXPEDITE FAVORABLE DECISION AND CLEARANCE INS IDLEWILD.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT:* REQUESTED CLARIFICATION STATIONS INTEREST ISSUANCE VISA TO MAX LESNICK REPORTED IN ODACID CABLE NO. 200 2 OCT.

ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE 8 Oct 57

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

4P

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET /0600 01544 0600

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM:
RI/AN

DOCUMENT NUMBER HKH -01543.

DOCUMENT DATE 20 AUG 1957

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [illegible] PAS Horton				[illegible]
2. WH/Cuba/C		20 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
3. Cuba/RO		[illegible]	[illegible]	FRO
4. Cuba/R			[illegible]	
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13. Cuba/[illegible]			3 [illegible] 1957	[illegible]
14. RI/FI				

COMMENTS

NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment below. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files of the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.

COPY DETACHED /Chrono
/Subject

DISSEMINATED IN OCS-3,322,418
NOT DISSEMINATED FOR FOLLOWING

FILE [illegible]

"Political Activities, Cuba"

FILE NUMBER

019	009	005	

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT X

DATE [illegible] 30 AUG 1957

INDEX ✓

FORM NO. 610a

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Habana
Report No: HKH-1844
Local File No:
No. of Pages: 2
No. of Enclosures: None
Report Made By: James E. Palinger/efm
Approved By: Sherwood P. Foxhen

Distribution: 3 - Wash w/mat
By copy to: 1 - Santiago de Cuba
1 - Embassy, Legal Attaché
2 - Files
Orally to: None

Source Cryptonym: See comments.
References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

SUBJECT: Mario Daniel RIVADULLA y Carcedo

Comments: (Dr) Jose Antonio CHELALA Aguilera arranged an introduction to RIVADULLA on 8 July, and he has since been seen by Palinger on several occasions.

The 5 January 1955 report was from AMPLECT (HKH-954); the 6 November 1952 report from AMBLU (HKH-27); both were appraised as 3. RIVADULLA, who was denied a visitor's visa in November, 1955 largely on the strength of those two reports from the Station, is still interested in obtaining the visa and willing to clarify his status *vis-a-vis* the JS and PSP with the local ODACID.

It is believed this report will assist in answering that portion of the latest periodic requirements list, forwarded under HKH-W-2378, [illegible] concerning RIVADULLA.

CONFIDENTIAL

RI COPY

19-9-5

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY Habana

SUBJECT Mario Daniel RIVADULLA y Carcedo

REPORT NO. HKH-1544

DATE OF REPORT 20 August 1957

NO. OF PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 8 July 1957

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Habana, prior to 8 July 1957

[illegible] APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE [illegible]

SOURCE: Qualified American Observer (B). Appraisal of Content: 2.

In a private conversation on 8 July 1957, Mario Daniel RIVADULLA y Carcedo, a national leader in the youth sector of the Inscribed Orthodox Party, made the following comments:

1. There is no Communist penetration of the Orthodox Party youth organization, even although there are probably a few "fellow travelers" or Communist-oriented persons in that organization; if so, however, they have no influence. No pact or agreement between the Orthodox youth organization and the Juventud Socialista (JS, Cuban Communist Youth Organization) now exists or ever has existed. Since the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, Cuban Communist Party) and the JS were outlawed in Cuba, however, all of the opposition parties and their youth sectors participated with Communist representatives in opposition meetings and shared a platform with them. This procedure on the part of the other oppositionists had nothing to do with the Cuban Communists' [illegible], but was carried on for strictly tactical purposes by each opposition group. It is a Communist practice to use without authorization the names of members of other opposition groups in their manifestos and declarations at times. In fact, RIVADULLA's name was so used by the Communists on a number of occasions without his knowledge, and he had recently to issue a statement to the press to clarify that he is not a Communist, and never has been either a Communist, a sympathizer or fellow traveler. He has been active in Orthodox Party affairs since age [illegible]. RIVADULLA believes that Communist ideology and economic theory is not applicable to the Cuban situation and that it holds nothing of value for Cuban politicians.

2. At the time of the 1954 general elections, the combined numerical strength of the Orthodox Party youth was between 70,000 and 80,000. Since that time, however, the Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario (PNR, Nationalist Revolutionary Party) led by Jose PARDO Llada, and the 26 of July Movement under the leadership of Dr. Fidel CASTRO Ruz, have drawn to them a considerable number of Orthodox youth, so that the latter group is at present considerably smaller. RIVADULLA will shortly resign from the Orthodox youth organization and affiliate himself with the PNR. He is a great admirer of Jose PARDO Llada who he believes has a bright political future in Cuba. On the other hand Emilio ("MILLO") OCHOA Ochoa, a national leader of the Inscribed Orthodox Party, does not have the [illegible] of PARDO Llada nor the latter's appeal to Cuban youth. It appears impossible to RIVADULLA that the several independent sectors of the original Orthodox Party could now unite for any [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

3 - Washington w/att
1 - Santiago de Cuba
1 - Embassy, Legal Attaché
2 - Files

[illegible]

Field Comments:

1. Several previous reports from this office, dated 6 November 1952, and 5 January 1955, from independent sources, and whose contents were appraised as possibly true, said that a pact had been made between certain leaders of the PSP and JS on one hand, and the Orthodox youth on the other hand, whose purpose was support of PSP activities. RIVADULLA, [illegible] and Omar BORGES, national leaders of the Orthodox youth, were named as being either Communists or sympathizers of the PSP within the Orthodox youth and principals in the pact. This office has not been able to confirm the existence of the reported pact.

2. The newspaper El Mundo, 13 December 1956, carries a statement to the press made by RIVADULLA and Omar BORGES, in the capacity of Orthodox youth leaders, in which they deny authorization to the JS to use their names upon a document signed by Cuban Communists, that asked for guarantees for 26 of July Movement personnel in the Sierra Maestra and a cease-fire. RIVADULLA and BORGES state that while they fully support the message of the document, they refuse to join in signing it with those (i.e., the Cuban Communists) who do not make the same petition for the Hungarian revolutionaries who died by the thousands in Budapest. They conclude by saying that their press statement clarifies their support of guarantees for the 26 of July Movement, their desire for a just solution to Cuba's political problem, and their sentiments against those (i.e., the Cuban Communists) who still have not satisfactorily explained the Soviet crime committed in Hungary.

3. The newspapers Avance, 30 April 1957, and Informacion, 5 May 1957, contain a statement to the press from RIVADULLA, in which he says that during a recent television round-table program his name was included with others in remarks made by a member of the Autentico Party, as being accused as Communists by the [illegible]. That labor leader Eusebio MUJAL Barniol, a participant in the round-table, replied that he didn't know about the others mentioned, but he did not believe RIVADULLA was a Communist, but would investigate the matter. After ridiculing MUJAL in the role of private detective, RIVADULLA says that he doesn't have to reiterate his democratic convictions or his anti-BATISTA record, nor repeat that he is not, nor has ever been, a Communist or anything like one. He concludes by challenging MUJAL to find any Communist antecedent in his record.

4. RIVADULLA announced his new PSP affiliation in the local press during the last week of July 1957.

14-00000

TO: [illegible] DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

TO : Chief, [illegible] DATE: 6 June 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT: [illegible] - Operational/[illegible]
[illegible] - Progress Report

REF: [illegible], 10 January 1957

Action Required: None - Information only

1. Set forth below are the names of several men chosen by the Station as potential J[illegible] agents. We should like, however, to [illegible] for the time being the required PRQ's Part 1, and the one-page J[illegible] [illegible] statements, pending more thorough assessment of [illegible] has been possible to date.

2. Following are the J[illegible] candidates:

Name	Comments
Military	
([illegible]) [illegible] Fariolo	Head of Cadet Schools, [illegible] [illegible]
(Cadet or 2nd Lt.) Gerardo [illegible]	No. 1 in class, [illegible] described as [illegible]
Civilian	
José [illegible] Sánchez	Secretary-General [illegible]
Luis de [illegible] ([illegible]) y Lemos,	Former Director of C[illegible] [illegible].

200-6-41
Gen Ops Matters
for WH

SECRET

HKH-A-2653, Page 2
6 June 1957

Name	Comments
Professional and Businessmen	
Antonio [illegible]	Lawyer
Miguel [illegible]	Economic counsellor, investment broker
Antonio [illegible]	Businessman, works with Hedges Textile interests.
Politicians	
Max [illegible]	
Mario [illegible]	
José PARDO Llada	
Amalio FIALLO	
Andres VALDESPINO	
Eduardo [illegible] Navarro	
Diego Vicente [illegible]	PRC (A) leader in Matanzas Province age - 40

Theodore K. [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - Washington
2 - Files

5 June 1957
[illegible]

SECRET

- 6 -

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION: WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/RI 2, 100 4, S/C 2

MAY 29 [illegible] 57

ROUTINE

IN 48971

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 937

RE: [illegible] 46-57

1. LOCAL COMMIE: SR JOSE MASSIP YSALGUE, SOCIEDAD CULTURAL NUESTRO TIEMPO, CALLE 23 NO 965, VEDADO, HAVA.

2. LOCAL YOUTH ADDRESSEES ALL IN HAVANA: EL PRESIDENTE, SECCION JUVENIL PARTIDO DE PUEBLO CUBANO, PLAZA DE MARTI NO 109. EL PRESIDENTE, FEDERACION ESTUDIANTIL UNIVERSITARIA, UNIVERSIDAD DE LA HABANA. EL PRESIDENTE, SECCION JUVENIL PARTIDO NACIONALISTA REVOLUTIONARIA, SR JOSE PARDO LLADA, RADIO COCO, AVENIDA S BOLIVAR 314. SR EDUARDO BORRELL NAVARRO, SUB-SECRETARIO DE EDUCACION, MINISTERIO DE EDUCACION, OFICIOS Y MURALLA. SR MAX LESNIK, DIARIO NACIONAL, CONSULADO 252. SR ULISES CARBO, PRENSA LIBRE, MANRIQUE 553. SR LUIS ORTEGA ORTEGA, CAMARA DE REPRESENTANTES, CONGRESSO NACIONAL. SR RODOLFO RIESGO, DIRECTOR "JUVENTUD OBRERA", 19 NO 406, VEDADO. SR FRANCISCO ROJAS CHAVEZ, MOVIMIENTO JUVENIL DE LA CTC, AVENIDA 51 NO 14019, MARIANAO. COMMENT: MAIL SENT FROM IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES MAY BE INTERCEPTED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

291419Z. END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

19-4-118-71

10 May 57
3.P

From: Habana | Report No: [illegible] | Local File No:

No. of Pages: 2 | No. of Enclosures: None

Report Made By: [illegible] | Approved By: [illegible]

Distribution: 3 - Washington (1 to ICD)
By copy to: 1 - Santiago de Cuba
1 - Embassy, Legal Attaché
2 - Files

Orally to: None

Source Cryptonym: [illegible] | References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

SUBJECT: Felipe Antonio Cecilio MARTINEZ Ortega

Classification SECRET

(3) AP

FORM NO. 51-28
FEB 1948

FI COPY

201-177666

SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Cuba

REPORT NO. HKH-1482

SUBJECT: Felipe Antonio Cecilio MARTINEZ Ortega

DATE OF INFO: 27 April 1957

DATE ACQUIRED: 2 May 1957

PLACE ACQUIRED: Habana

DATE OF REPORT: 10 May 1957

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Cuban government official with contacts in Cuban security agencies (B) Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. On orders from (Colonel) Conrado CARRATALA Ugalde, Chief of the Direction Department of the Cuban National Police, Subject[1] was arrested on 27 April 1957 and confined in the 13th Precinct Station in Habana. At the time of his arrest, Subject had in his possession copies of Fundamentos, [illegible], Cuba and the [illegible], Cuadernos de Arte y Ciencia, Nuestro Tiempo, and works by [illegible] ROCA, Juan MARINELLO, Henri BARBUSSE, Gerardo [illegible], MARX and Mauricio [illegible], among other Communist materials. A subsequent investigation of MARTINEZ by an agent of the Buró para la Represión de Actividades Comunistas (BRAC, Bureau for Repression of Communist Activities) revealed the following information.

2. MARTINEZ was born in Habana on 23 August 1927, his father being Cecilio MARTINEZ González and his mother Amelia ORTEGA Corro. He resides with his parents at Calle Calzada de Managua No. 25, ground floor, in Mantilla. He is single and a student in the final year at the Commercial Sciences School of the University of Habana. For the past year and a half he has also been employed in the Lighting Department of the Electro Sales Company, Inc., Oficios 204, Habana. Subject has a sister named Carmen Elena MARTINEZ Ortega, aged 32 years, married to Roberto [illegible], who is employed as cashier in the Arechabala Company store, Habana. His sister is a graduate of the Normal School but is not presently working. He did not recall his sister's address. MARTINEZ stated that both he and his parents are registered in the Central Habana Municipal Electoral Junta; he is a member of the Orthodox Party and his father a Liberal Party member; he was a member of the Catholic Youth (Juventud Católica) from 1943 until 1951. He declared that on several occasions Raul VALDES Vivo had approached him to join the Juventud Socialista (JS, Cuban Communist Youth Organization) but that he had not done so.

3. Under interrogation, MARTINEZ said he was not a member of the Cuban Communist Party but sympathized with Communist doctrine. He is a member of Nuestro Tiempo[3] and was formerly a member of the Asociación Latino-América Libre (ALAL, Free Latin America Association).[2] In 1951 he was second vice-president of the Commercial Sciences Student Association at the University of Habana.

(3)

SECRET

SECRET

Report No: HKH-1452, Page 2
Date 10 May 1957

In 1953 he attended the Fourth World Youth Festival held in Warsaw, Poland. MARTINEZ stated he left Cuba by air for the United States, where he remained for several days visiting a number of universities; he departed from the United States for France via sea and, upon his arrival in France, took a train direct to Warsaw. While attending the Festival, he was invited by members of the Chinese delegation present to visit Communist China. MARTINEZ accepted, traveling across the USSR to China, where he remained for a short period of time. He returned to Cuba via Czechoslovakia, Austria, France, and Spain. His complete trip lasted approximately six months.

Field Comments:

1. Office files reflect that MARTINEZ was one of three Cuban delegates of the Cuban University Students' Federation to the Fifth National Student Congress of the U.S. National Student Association (USNSA) held in Bloomington, Indiana, in August 1952. The Cuban delegates denounced dictatorship in general and succeeded in having the Congress pass a resolution condemning the BATISTA dictatorship specifically. Hoy, 3 March 1953, contains an article showing Subject active with [illegible], Raul VALDES Vivo, and Aramis TABOADA, among others, in organizing a "Congreso Martiano por los Derechos de la Juventud." El Mundo, 10 June 1954, contains an invitation to the public issued by the Pro-Guatemala University Students Committee, to attend a meeting. Subject is shown as a member of this Committee, together with student Communists VALDES, Celia SANCHEZ Agramonte, and Amparo CHAPLE Trujillo, among others. A report dated 5 August 1955, from a source whose reliability had not been determined, indicated MARTINEZ was an active Cuban Communist Party leader who had traveled to Communist China and the USSR.

2. VALDES, who until recently was a prominent Communist student leader at the University of Habana, has been the subject of numerous reports in the past.

3. "Nuestro Tiempo" is a Cuban Communist cultural front organization.

4. According to office files, Subject signed a statement by the Free Latin America Association distributed in October 1956 together with Cuban Communists Celia and Aurelio SANCHEZ Agramonte, (Dr.) Sarah PASCUAL, and reported sympathizers. The Association is a Cuban Communist-front organization.

3

SECRET 201-172666

6 MAY 57

SECRET

3P

From: Habana   Report No: HKH-1477 Local File No:

No. of Pages: Two   No. of Enclosures: None

Report Made By: Shelby L. Overstreet   Approved By: Sherwood P. Rochon SPR

Distribution:
By copy to: ~~1~~2-Washington
1-Embassy
2-Files

Orally to: None

Source Cryptonym: References: HKH-1442, 27 March 1957

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Subject: Views of Rafael GARCIA Bárcena on Cuban Political Situation.

Comments: OVERSTREET was interested in meeting Rafael GARCIA Bárcena because of the report that Subject was instrumental in influencing the political thinking of Ra[illegible] [illegible]QUIN, former Cuban Military Attaché in Washington, now serving a six-year term in prison for conspiracy to overthrow the Cuban Government. The introduction was made by No[illegible]RTY, a law student at the University who had known Subject when he was a professor. OVERSTREET and Subject have become friends because of their mutual friendship for BARQUIN.

CS-3/318636

FILE IN 201-209258

INDEX

Classification: SECRET

FORM NO. 51-29
FEB 1948

RI COPY

19-9-5-9

SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Cuba

REPORT NO. HKH-1377

SUBJECT: Views of Rafael GARCIA Bárcena on Cuban Political Situation

DATE OF INFO: 6 May 1957

DATE ACQUIRED: 6 May 1957

PLACE ACQUIRED: Habana

DATE OF REPORT: 6 May 1957

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT:

Source: Qualified American Observer (A) from an Opposition Political Leader (F).

Appraisal of Content: 3

1. Rafael GARCIA Bárcena said that recently he had been in conference with Roberto AGRAMONTE, leader of one of the three factions of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) and that he had been asked to try to bring together the three factions of the Ortodoxo Party: the groups of AGRAMONTE, Emilio OCHOA, and Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling.

2. GARCIA Bárcena would like to maneuver himself into the position of being the Ortodoxo candidate for President of Cuba in the 1958 elections. He said that it is too soon to attempt a reconciliation in the Party and that his own tactic is to maintain contact with all the opposition political leaders in the hope that at a propitious time he will be the one person about whom no faction would have any strong objections. Subject said there was no first-class political party in Cuba but that the Ortodoxos were the least objectionable and the name of the party had not been tarnished as was true of the Auténticos, nor was it a party of petty politicians seeking power. Of the three factions in the Ortodoxos, OCHOA controls the party political machinery, AGRAMONTE controls the excitable and revolutionary group in which youth and students are prominent, and MARQUEZ Sterling leads only a small segment of the party. He said that the Ortodoxo Youth will not present a difficult problem within the party once they can be convinced that the way to power is not through violence but through participation in the 1958 elections. The Youth are strong enough to veto a presidential candidate but probably will not take a leading part in selecting one. He did not feel that Max LESNICK or Francisco CARONE had a great deal of influence among the Youth at present and said that Mario RIVADULLA was the most respected of the Youth leaders. This group eschews violent revolutionary action.

3. GARCIA Bárcena pictures himself as the person who can influence the Ortodoxo Youth to abandon revolutionary methods, and toward this end he is writing a series of articles for such widely-read magazines as Bohemia in which he points out to the Youth that times have changed since he (GARCIA Bárcena) led the Youth in the assault on Camp Columbia. He said that his complete reversal of policy is going to confuse Cuban youth, but he feels it is the only way to bring unity to the party and prepare for the elections of 1958. He fears that May will be a month of increased violence in Habana; but, once the revolutionaries realize that they have

③

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-58 1 NOV 55 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

RI COPY

-9,

not accomplished anything, they will be more amenable to suggestions to prepare for the elections in 1958.

4. GARCIA Bárcena feels that the Ortodoxo Party has only about a 25 per cent chance of winning a Presidential election -- not because it could not command enough votes, but because the current regime of terrorism would not dare permit an opposition party to come into power. They have gone too far on the road to government by assassination, imprisonment, and robbery to give up their power, he said. Nevertheless, in his opinion there is no alternative to an election. He feels that, even if the Ortodoxos cannot elect a President, they may elect a number of Senators and Representatives in Congress. He will propose that Ramon BARQUIN be run as a candidate for the Senate even if BARQUIN is still in prison at the time of the elections. He did not believe that there were any legal obstacles.

5. Regarding Fidel CASTRO Ruz, he said that CASTRO was an impetuous and perhaps even an irresponsible leader, but one who could not be ignored in any new government because to the youth of the country he represents an ideal and for this reason no stable government could be formed without him. He said he differed with CASTRO on the matter of military principles. He does not believe that CASTRO will be able to attract any significant defections or support from the Army. He said that CASTRO originally believed that, if he could only establish a beachhead in Oriente, show strength in that area, while at the same time show the Army that he had supporters in Habana by agitating here, he would be able to find support in the Army itself, particularly in Camp Columbia. This was CASTRO's big mistake, according to GARCIA Bárcena. Since CASTRO cannot take Camp Columbia, he is isolated. GARCIA Bárcena did not believe that CASTRO was ultra-nationalistic but that apparently some of his followers were from the tone of some of the propaganda of the 26th of July Movement. GARCIA Bárcena, because of his previous influence among Cuban youth, apparently sees himself as the person to offset or balance the impulsiveness of CASTRO if his group ever comes to power.

Field Comment:

Rafael GARCIA Bárcena was one of the founders of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) but separated from it because of differences of opinion with the leaders Roberto AGRAMONTE and José PARDO Llada. He had been a University professor and instructor of military psychology at the Cabaña Fortress and at one time had considerable following among Cuban youth and many friends in the Cuban Army. In April 1953 he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for conspiracy against the BATISTA Government but was released by amnesty in June 1954. Since then he has refrained from revolutionary activities and has been occupied with writing mildly anti-Government articles for various publications and maintaining contact with the principal leaders of the opposition parties. In a forthcoming article to appear in Bohemia, he will exhort the youth of Cuba to give up their violent revolutionary activities and to seek power through elections in 1958.

③

22 Aug. 56

SECRET

From: Habana, Cuba
Report No: HKH-1332
Local File No:

No. of Pages: 2
No. of Enclosures:

Report Made By: James R. Palin[illegible]/lsa
Approved By: Wallace A. Growery

Distribution: ✓3 - Headquarters (1 to ICD)
By copy to: 1 - Santiago de Cuba
1 - Embassy
2 - Files

Orally to: None

Source Cryptonym: See below
References: HKH-1295

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

SUBJECT: Activities of the Juventud Socialista

SOURCE: Para. 1 : AMPHODARCH-1
Paras. 2-3: AMBIVALENT-5
Para. 4 : AMPHODARCH-10

INDEX

Classification

FORM NO. 51-59
FEB 1949

SECRET

RI COPY 19-4-113-[illegible]

SECRET

Subject: Activities of the Juventud Socialista

Report No: HKH-1332

Date of Information: 7 July - 13 August 1956

Place Acquired: Habana, Cuba

Date Acquired: 8 July - 14 August 1956

Evaluation: Para. 1: 2
Paras. 2-3: Documentary

Date of Report: 22 August 1956

Source: Para. 4: 3

Para. 1: Cuban with close contacts in university student circles (B).
Paras. 2-3: Member of the Cuban Communist Youth Organization (C).
Para. 4: Person close to Communist University students (F).

1. On 6 August 1956 Antonio CARCEDO Ferrer, student Communist leader, was seen at the University of Habana distributing a fly-sheet of the Juventud Socialista (JS, Cuban Communist Youth Organization) titled [illegible] Path of Cuban Youth. He had a bundle of approximately 500 copies of this document. On 10 August CARCEDO and Iran PRAT, student Communist, also distributed a sizeable quantity of Mella, official JS bi-weekly publication, at the University.

Communist Press Cuba

2. The above fly-sheet also appeared as a page insert in the 1 August issue of Mella. The fly-sheet consists of a letter, dated 2 August 1956 at Habana, from the JS National Executive Committee to Cuban youth. After setting out the Cuban Communist line against partial elections and for revolutionary action on 12 August against the BATISTA Government, the letter states the Executive Committee has decided to appeal to the national leadership of all opposition youth organizations and other "institutions of the new generation" to join in immediate acts of protest against that Government. The letter states the Committee has approved a new letter to Cuban working rural and student youth, which will shortly be circulated. Mention is made of an "exemplary" assembly of youth organizations, convened in Santiago de Cuba on 18 July by the Ortodoxo Party Youth in their meeting hall in that city. Among others, it is said, leaders of the following groups attended:

Ortodoxo Party Youth
Auténtico Party Youth (both GRAU and PRIO sections)
Juventud Socialista
National Federation of Secondary School Students
Student Federation of Santiago de Cuba
Nationalist Revolutionary Party Youth

Classification

14-00000

26 of July Movement Youth
Certain working youths

3. The letter lists the following agreements arrived at at this meeting:

1) Publish a manifesto repudiating partial elections and calling for mass action against the BATISTA Government.

2) Name a youth commission to contact leaders of each political party demanding that they repudiate partial elections.

3) Send a letter to the Federación Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU, University Students' Federation) in Habana demanding that they declare a traitor any ex-FEU member supporting partial elections.

4) Create "fighting committees" (comites de lucha) in every youth center regardless of politics.

5) Carry out a commemorative march on 12 August.

The letter closes by indicating that the Committee agrees wholeheartedly with the results of the 18 July meeting in Oriente Province and invites all youth groups to unite in support of the above agreements.

4. Source states that, as a result of the 18 July convention in Santiago de Cuba, the JS is promoting a similar youth meeting for Habana.

Field Comment. Prensa Libre, 8 July 1956, published an agreement of the National Executive of the Ortodoxo Youth, over the signatures of [illegible] SALAS, Joaquin SALCEDO, [illegible] PIMENTEL, Omar BORGES, Marcos BRAVO and others, rejecting the proposed partial elections. Avance, 7 July 1956, carried an article stating that interim FEU President José PUENTES announced the FEU opposed the partial elections and would pass judgment upon such of its ex-members as had accepted the Government's electoral plans in their present capacity of opposition party leaders. Among such ex-members were named Enrique HUERTAS, now Secretary General of the Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario (PNR, Nationalist Revolutionary Party), and Danilo BAEZA, PNR political chief in Oriente Province. Información, 9 August, said in an article that the secondary school association in Santiago de Cuba had met and agreed to a united front against partial elections. FEU official Juan NUIRY participated as a delegate, and it was agreed to conduct a civic march in the city on 12 August. The local press of 12 August reported that NUIRY and 22 students were arrested in Santiago on 11 - 12 August in connection with public manifestations against the Government.

19-4-116-54

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL 5P **SECRET**

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 14 Feb. 56

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS	TELEPHONE	NO. HKH-1216	
		DATE	

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECD	DATE FWDD	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
1. WH	04E		28 [illegible] 1956	[illegible]		rpts - Cuba
2. [illegible]	BARTON HALL			[illegible]		COPY DETACHED
3. [illegible]				M		CS-87280
4. Offenbacher		29 Feb		RE0		
5. Lyons		1 Mar		[illegible]		
6. WH/Bram		23 MAR 1956	27 MAR 1956	[illegible]		
7. CI/ICI			MAR 1956	[illegible]		
8.						
9.						
10.						DISSEMINATED
11.						
12. WH/III Cuba/ Montag			[illegible] 1956	LJM		
13.						
14.						
15. RI/FI	1409 L					

19	4	10	36
ABSTRACT	☒	INDEX	☒
DATE 24 FEB			

FORM NO. 610 REPLACES FORM ... WHICH MAY BE USED. **SECRET** CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

FILE IN 201-209258

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

From:	Habana	Report No:	HHB-1216 Local File No:
No. of Pages:	2	No. of Enclosures:	None
Report Made By:	[illegible] P. [illegible]ton/ew	Approved By:	Sherwood P. [illegible] SPF

Distribution:
By copy to: 2 - Washington
1 - Emb, LA
1 - MA
1 - NA
1 - AA
2 - Files

Orally to: None

Source Cryptonym: Para 1 - AMGER
Para 2 - AMBIVALENT

References: HHB-1212

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Subject: Revolutionary Activities

Comments:

1. A copy of the letter summarized in Paragraph 1 is on file at this Station.

2. The information contained in Paragraph 2 was obtained by AMBIVALENT from Juan PUERTAS Yero and Roberto LEON Lemus.

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

19-4-110 36

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Revolutionary Activities
Report No: HKH-1216
Date of Information: 12-13 February 1956
Place Acquired: Habana
Date Acquired: 14 February 1956
Evaluation:
Date of Report: 14 February 1956

Source: Para. 1 - Cuban Government Official (B)
Para. 2 - Cuban with good contacts in opposition circles (B) from revolutionary plotters (F)

Appraisal of Content: Para. 1 - Doc.
Para. 2 - 3

1. There follows a summary of a confidential letter sent on 12 February 1956 by the Chief of the Department of Direction of the Cuban National Police to the Chief of the Department of Investigation concerning revolutionary plans by Communists and oppositionists to create disturbances on 13 February, the anniversary of the death of student Rubén BATISTA, and on the Cuban national holiday, 24 February 1956:

"The leader appears to be Fidel CASTRO, who from abroad is directing over 50,000 youths throughout the island. Other leaders are:

José "ECHEVARRIA of the Federación Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU; University Students' Federation).

"Amparo CHAPLE Trujillo, FEU leader, national director of the Juventud Socialista (JS, Communist Youth group), who has just been elected president by the School of Philosophy and Letters.

"Gustavo MARIN of the Movimiento de la Nación, who is closely connected with the Communists of the University.

"Omar BORGES.

"Max LESNICK of the Juventud Ortodoxa Insurreccional.

"Dr. ~~Eduardo~~ CORONA, long-time Marxist but pseudo Orthodox director of insurrectional line.

"As a prelude to the commemoration of the fall of student BATISTA, they will again mobilize national opinion, this time in a united front of struggle with the sugar, port, and transportation workers, whom they say they have on their side.

"Communist and oppositionist youths are spreading defeatist rumors to the effect that the year 1956 will be tragic in national history, the political situation is very dangerous, a feeling of insecurity reigns. The Communist and oppositionist student brigades of the so-called Popular Front of Guido GARCIA Inclán and others are painting

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

19-4-110 36

on the walls of houses Marxist mottoes such as 'Abajo BATISTA' and '26 de Julio' and waging a campaign of proselytism in favor of the so-called 'Revolutionary Emigrés,' this is, the mobilization of Fidel CASTRO."

2. The source of a previous report on plans for a revolutionary coup on 26 February 1956 has furnished the following additional information:

> "The conspiracy is continuing to develop feverishly, and there is a danger that the revolution may break out any time before 26 February.
>
> "Among the revolutionary leaders are Juan PUERTAS Yero and Roberto LEON Lemus. Also involved is Eufemio FERNANDEZ Ortega, who has returned to Cuba. Almost all the revolutionary leaders who were in exile are now in Cuba. It is possible that Dr. Aurelio SANCHEZ Arango may also be back here.
>
> "The meetings held at the farm of Fidel CASTRO's cousin near Güira de Malena have been attended by officers and enlisted men of the Army and the National Police. Last week important meetings were held on Thursday and Saturday, attended by Fidel CASTRO, his brother, and his sister.
>
> "The preparation for the revolution has started with the placing of bombs and petards. The person who placed the petard in the National Capitol last Friday was Juan RODRIGUEZ.
>
> "The revolutionary plotters include in their violent plans the elimination of different persons connected with the BATISTA regime. One of the first to be eliminated is General Rafael SALAS Cañizares, Chief of the National Police, who it is expected will be eliminated by police officers connected with the conspiracy. Another possible victim is Eusebio MUJAL.
>
> "Since 1 February a group of revolutionaries from Habana have been in Camagüey, including one man from Calabazar, Habana Province, who is to eliminate three persons from Camagüey. The revolutionary leader in Camagüey is Midelino ALVAREZ, who suffered imprisonment and torture during the dictatorship of MACHADO.
>
> "Groups of revolutionaries from Habana are in all the capitals of the provinces, working with the local groups. The revolutionaries predict that there will be much bloodshed."

CONFIDENTIAL

POOR QUALITY REPRODUCTION
"UNAVOIDABLE"

CONFIDENTIAL

Report No: [illegible]-1216, Page 3
Date 14 February 1956

Field Comments.

1. "The confidential letter to the Cuban BI is considered to be an obvious attempt to put the major blame on Communist elements for recent anti-Government demonstrations as evidenced by the reference to paintings on the walls of houses such as "Abajo Batista" and "26 de Julio" as Marxist mottoes." Recent reports also indicate that the FEU is opposed to the acceptance of Communist support in its demonstrations and refused permission to [illegible] and other [illegible] members to participate in the 10 January event honoring MELLA. The contents of the confidential letter are therefore evaluated as "doubtful."

2. No information is available to confirm the reported presence in Cuba of Eufemio FERNANDEZ Ortega, Fidel CASTRO or Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango.

CONFIDENTIAL

19-4-110 36

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1955

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN

[illegible]IED CONFIDENTIAL 6.P SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

11 Oct 55

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS

TELEPHONE:

NO. HKH-1123

DATE:

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE
1. WH [illegible]	0[illegible]	24 OCT 1955		[illegible]	
2. [illegible]		OCT 25 1955		[illegible]	
3. [illegible]		26 Oct 55		RO	
4. [illegible]			[illegible]		
5.					
6. WH Mexico		23 Nov		[illegible]	
7. WH/[illegible]			15 NOV 1955	B	
8. CI/ICD	6	[illegible] 28	[illegible]	[illegible]	
9.		[illegible]	[illegible]	RH	
10.					
11. [illegible] WHB/Cuba		6 Dec 55		[illegible]	
12.					
13.					
14.					

COMMENTS

Political Activities Cuba

[illegible] DETA[illegible]

CS-77501

DISSEMINATED IN [illegible] [illegible]ING
[illegible]
REASONS

[illegible]

NO [illegible]

P 3

19	7	7	244

ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX ☒

DATE 17 OCT 1955

[illegible]D FROM [illegible]

FORM 610 [illegible] SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Habana Report No: HKH 1131 Local File No:

No. of Pages: 4 No. of Enclosures: None

Report Made By: [illegible] Approved By: Sherwood P. Pashan

Distribution:
By copy to: 2 Wash Orally to: None
1 Emb/LA
2 Files

Source Cryptonym: AMELU References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

AMELU furnished the information in the attached report at our request. Although a considerable amount of it is background, it does tend to answer some of the questions raised in HKH-W-1334 and is therefore being forwarded.

AMELU claims that he obtained the information in the report from direct conversations with Carlos PRIO Socarrás and his secretary Dr. Luis Gustavo FERNANDEZ; Rolando MASFERRER; Jose PARDO Llada; Enrique PIZZI de Porras, Chief of Publicity for the Presidential Palace; and Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling.

INDEX

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 51-60
[illegible]

11-7-1-244

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Political Opposition to Batista Government

Report No: HCH-113

Date of Information: Current

Place Acquired: Habana

Date Acquired: 5 October 1955

Evaluation:

Date of Report: 11 October 1955

Source: Cuban active in political opposition (B)

Appraisal of Content: 3.

The following report was received from an active member of the political opposition:

"a. As a result of differences which arose between Carlos PRIO Socarras and Dr. Ramon GRAU San Martin after PRIO succeeded GRAU as President in 1948, the PRC(A) is now split into two groups, one headed by PRIO known as "Autenticos Abstencionistas" and the other headed by GRAU known as "Autenticos Electoralistas". After the break between PRIO and GRAU, GRAU endeavored to form the "Partido de la Cubanidad" to enter the 1952 elections. However, with BATISTA's coup d'état on 10 March 1952 and PRIO's exile in the U.S., GRAU remained in Cuba speaking in the name of the Auténticos. When BATISTA announced elections for November 1954, GRAU reorganized and registered the Partido Auténtico, of which he was actually no longer a member, and declared that he would oppose BATISTA as presidential candidate in the national election. GRAU's move left PRIO's group, represented in Cuba by the official party cadres under the direction of Antonio VARONA, without legality.

PRIO, VARONA and other PRC leaders therefore declared themselves against GRAU and his supporters and refused to support them during the campaign. PRIO has also since refused to recognize any of the Auténticos elected to public office in the November 1954 elections.

Among PRIO's principal supporters are the following:

Oscar [illegible]VARADO
Nestor [illegible]NEL
Segundo CURTI
Lomberto DIAZ
Luis Gustavo [illegible]
Carlos HEVIA
Félix LANCIS
Carlos MARISTANY
Sergio MEJIAS
Menelao MORA Morales

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 51-60

Fernando NOEL del Pino
Antonio SANTIAGO
Diego Vicente TEJERA
Teodoro TAJIDA Retien
Antonio VARONA.

b. The Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo), founded by Eduardo CHIBAS, was organized by dissident members of the PRC(A) as a political party to oppose PRIO's organization. It was undoubtedly the majority party in Cuba in 1952 and until CHIBAS' death remained a strong political force drawing its strength from the masses. However, with CHIBAS' death and PRIO's exile it faded in importance and today is small and divided.

Dr. Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling, who has presidential ambitions, attempted to take over control of the party after CHIBAS' death but was unsuccessful in holding it intact. Raul CHIBAS, brother of Eduardo, now heads one faction of the Party. Another faction, "Ortodoxia Libre" has been formed by Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling. Dr. Antonio MARTINEZ Fraga, who was denied membership in the original Ortodoxo party, has a leading roll in the "Ortodoxia Libre". Still another faction of the original group is headed by Roberto AGRAMONTE, who also has presidential ambitions, while another group of followers of the original Ortodoxo Party remain loyal to Emilio OCHOA, a member of the Directive Council of the Party. OCHOA has refused to accept the guarantees of the BATISTA government and return to Cuba from Miami and thus does not participate directly in Ortodoxo activities at present. Still another group of Ortodoxo members either are favorable or sympathetic to the insurrectional thesis introduced by Fidel CASTRO and his followers. At a recent meeting of the party at Teatro Marti, AGRAMONTE and other leaders were hissed, and there was considerable talk of promoting armed revolt against the present regime. Fidel CASTRO, who is now in Mexico, has appointed José Manuel MARQUEZ as so-called "Chief of the Commandos" of Marianao. MARQUEZ, a young Ortodoxo, is at present in Veracruz negotiating an arms shipment for Cuba which reportedly will be brought in by a group of fishermen via La Coloma, Pinar del Rio.

[Comment. In order to clear up the confusion created by source concerning the PRC(O), it is pointed out that the original Unity Charter drawn up by the Ortodoxos on 23 March 1955 was signed by AGRAMONTE, OCHOA, MARQUEZ Sterling, Pelayo CUERVO, Antonio NAVARRO, Francisco CARONE, and others with independent tendencies. The president of this, the "Unified" Ortodoxos, is Raul CHIBAS. Recently MARQUEZ Sterling split from the "Unified" Ortodoxos and formed the Ortodoxia-Libre. Another group known as the Registered Ortodoxos is under the leadership of Federico FERNANDEZ Casas. Apparently source, in commenting on the various "groups" headed by AGRAMONTE, Raul CHIBAS and OCHOA, is referring to the popular following these individuals have within the "Unified" Ortodoxos. They do not as such represent a separate segment of the Ortodoxo party.]

c. Probably the most politically active and strongest segment of the Ortodoxo party is the youth branch, the Juventud Ortodoxo (JO). It has representation in just about every town in the Republic and is particularly active at the University of Habana. Dr. Francisco CARONE, University professor and member of the Directive Council of the Ortodoxo Party, is adviser of the JO. CARONE is well known for his leftist leanings. Actually, when the Partido Ortodoxo was in the original stages of organization, Communists at Habana University prepared and assisted in organizing the JO. The JO frequently attacks the U.S. with slogans that dictatorships exist in Latin America because their anti-communism pleases the U.S. On 27 September, for example, Dr. Pelayo CUERVO, a well-known Ortodoxo prominent in JO activities, stated on a television question-and-answer program that the dictatorship of BATISTA subsists because the Department of State is flattered by BATISTA's anti-Communism, which is not anti-Communism but anti-democratism. The following are some of the more prominent pro-Communists who influence the Juventud Ortodoxo:

Omar BORGES, director of the Juventud Ortodoxo, was Secretary of the Congreso Derechos de la Juventud, organized by the Communists, and has signed numerous Marxist manifestos.

Max LESNICK, [redacted] who was an active Communist propagandist in the University, has signed all Marxist manifestoes issued at the University and has been seen on different occasions with Alfredo GUEVARA and Raúl VALDES Vivo, (well-known Communists), close friends of his.

Salvador LEW, Juventud director, has a Communist background and is a member of the same University group.

Mario RIVADULLA, pro-Communist, has signed manifestoes in favor of Guatemala and against the 1953 anti-Communist legislation. He is a member of the same University group.

d. The Movimiento de Liberación Radical is a move to form public opinion and not a political party. It is built around the worldwide movement of "Catholic Social Doctrine" with branches in Cuba in the Juventud de Accion Católica, Juventud Estudiantil Católica, Juventud Obrera Católica, and Juventud Universitaria Católica. These organizations are forbidden by the Church to take part as such in national politics. However, Amalio FIALLO and Andrés VALDESPINO and other members of the organizations have gotten together with other intellectuals and formed the Movimiento de Liberación Radical to oppose the present regime. This movement, which is purely ideological, has no Communist influence up to the present time.

e. The Movimiento de la Nación, which is also not a political party but rather a movement to arouse public interest, has gained little strength to date. Its chief spokesman, José PARDO Llada, manages to keep it alive with propaganda; but there is little likelihood that it by itself will reach a position of any importance on the local political scene.

As independent movements, neither the Movimiento de Liberación Radical nor the Movimiento de la Nación has little or any chance of becoming strong enough to register as a political entity. Their strength, if any, will be in the number of followers they can count on to join one of the registered opposition parties in the next election and the amount of influence they can therefore assert on the party's policy."

19-7-7-244

ARH-890

TO					COMMENTS
[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	Anti U.S. activities and organization on Cuba
3/[illegible]		[illegible]			copy attached
[illegible]		4/[illegible]/55		[illegible]	
[illegible]		13 [illegible] 55		[illegible]	DISSEMINATED IN CS-61356 NOT DISSEMINATED FOR FOLLOWING REASON(S)
					CS-55861 CS-55256 CS-55922 CS-55357 CS-57951 CS-57178
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	S	
CI/ECO		9/5		[illegible]	DISSEMINATED
73			[illegible]	[illegible]	
					APR 28 1955
					X REF FORM FILED IN 19-4-110
					19 | 7 | 2 | [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]			F.C.	

FORM [illegible] 610

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Habana, Cuba **Report No.:** HKH-979 **Local File No.:**

Number of Pages: 1 **Number of Enclosures:** None

Report Made by: Stephen H. Farmany/cbd **Approved by:** Henry T. Duschmer

Distribution:
By copy to: 2 - Wash
1 - Embassy and LA
1 - Service Attachés
2 - File (document attached)

Orally to: None

Source Cryptonym: AMTHODARCH/I **References:**

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

③

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 51-60

COPY

19-7-2-[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: - Anti-Nixon Propaganda Issued by the FEU

Report No: [illegible]-999

Date of Information: 9 February 1955

Place Acquired: Habana, Cuba

Date Acquired: 12 February 1955

Evaluation: Para 1 - C-2
Para 2,3 - Doc.

Date of Report: 23 February 1955

Source: Controlled American

1. A one page mimeographed sheet entitled "A Que Viene Mr. Nixon" was written and edited in the offices of the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU) at the University of Habana. At least several hundred copies were run off on the mimeograph machine owned by the Faculty of Commercial Sciences and were distributed throughout the university grounds by Armando [illegible]. There was some street distribution in the near vicinity of the University. This sheet was about the only real result of the FEU planning which took place during the week preceding the Nixon visit. These abortive plans included a street demonstration against the visit.

2. The mimeographed sheet asks the question, "Why did you come Mr. Nixon?... To back the usurpation of power by Batista?...To applaud the official action of giving away our natural resources to United States monopolies?...To approve the treason of Batista against Guatemala and proclaim him one of the Caribbean dictators?... With regard to the above, the undersigned youths protest this visit which interferes in our internal affairs and which insults our dignity even more than the defiling of the statues of our heroes by the Yankee sailors and of Cuban women.

Alvaro Barba Machado	[illegible] Vernik	Flavio Bravo
Jose Hidalgo Peraza	[illegible] Esquivel	Pedro [illegible]
R. Santiesteban	Rafael Duran	Temistocles Fuentes
Raul Valdes Vivo	Henry Reyes	etc.

The sheet then concludes with the note: "The press, radio and television under the orders of Batista and the North American Embassy have repressed these declarations."

Field Comments,

1. The clandestine communist publication Carta Semanal of 16 February 1955 asserts 7000 copies of the sheet were distributed.

2. The clandestine communist mimeographed newsletter Prensa Continental of 15 February 1955 quotes in extenso the FEU sheet.

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

③

19-7-2-105

FORM NO. [illegible]

2 Feb 55

SECRET

From: Habana, Cuba

Report No.: HKH-951

Local File No.: 10-18

Number of Pages: 1

Number of Enclosures: None

Report Made by: Stephen H. Karmany/cbd

Approved by: Henry T. Buechner

Distribution:

By copy to:
2 - Wash
1 - Embassy and LA
1 - File

Orally to: None

Source Cryptonym: AMPHODARCH/I via AMPHODARCH/II

References: HKH-961, 13 January 1955

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Evaluation "B" of source is for attribution to AMPHODARCH/II.

CS 58861

FILE IN 201-209258

INDEX

Classification SECRET

FORM NO. 51-59 FEB 1949

1 pary

19-7-110 18

SECRET

Subject: Communist Influence in the FEU, University of Habana

Report No: HKH-981

Date of Information: 10-20 January 1955

Place Acquired: Habana, Cuba

Date Acquired: 28 January 1955

Evaluation: B-3

Date of Report: 2 February 1955

Source: Controlled American

1. Communist activities in the University, particularly in connection with Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU, Federation of University Students) affairs, have increased during the last few weeks. Almost daily informal meetings are being held by Raul VALDES Vivo, Carlos SANCHEZ, Leonel SANCHEZ, A. MARCHENA, and Luis BONNE Ramirez. Usually these conversations concern election campaigns in the various student organizations, and facilities for the preparation and distribution of propaganda.

2. Indicative of FEU attitude toward the communists, students Roberto FUENTE and Federico SAINZ de la Maza commented, "the present and former regimes of the FEU have been obliged to work with the red elements since these elements were better disciplined for combat against the government".

3. On 10 January 1955 a crowd of a hundred or so students took part in a ceremony on the campus in honor of the Twenty Sixth Anniversary of the death of Communist youth leader Julio Antonio Mella. Prominent in the ceremony were: Jesus DUARTE, Andres LNU, Leonel ALONSO, Alberto POLAND, Raul VALDES Vivo, Rene ANILLO, Jose A. ECHAVARRIA, and Max Laspick.

4. At the ceremony there was distributed a 19 page pamphlet entitled, "Trinchera de Ideas", purportedly written by Julio Antonio Mella. Although mildly against the Batista government, the bulk of the articles in the pamphlet are Anti-United States, and anti-capitalist, and in short typical communist propaganda.

Source Comment. Paragraph 2 is more true than the FEU leaders themselves would like to believe. The FEU, unflavored with the "red sauce" has long been notorious for empty, loud-mouthed sessions and propaganda. The reds simply inject a little more organization and intellectual reality and thus create more student appeal. All Latin students have a streak (large or small) of anti-U.S. sentiment, but not all will follow any empty-headed jerk who gets up to scream about "imperialists". A large percentage will respond to a subtle intellectual "realism", particularly where if pinned down for their participation they can easily squirm out with the "intellectual autonomy" explanation.

Mission Comment. Diario Nacional on 11 January 1955 contains a photograph of the ceremony mentioned in paragraph 3.

Classification SECRET

③

19-4-110-18

SECRET 3P 5 Jan 55

From: Habana, Cuba
Report No: HKH-954 Local File No:

No. of Pages: 2
No. of Enclosures: none

Report Made By: [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]anski/cbh
Approved By: Henry T. Dischauer

Distribution:
By copy to: 2-Wash
1-Embassy
1-Legal Attaché
2-Files
Orally to: No one

Source Cryptonym: [illegible]
References: HKH-943, HAVA 112 [illegible]

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

The attached report is based on information extracted from a secret report submitted by [illegible] to the chief of [illegible], with the exception of paragraph 3. Information in that paragraph was received verbally from [illegible].

63-55912

INDEX

Classification SECRET

FORM NO. 51-59
FEB 1949

19-6-132-2

SECRET

Subject: Pact between Cuban Communists and Ortodoxo Party Leaders

Report No: [redacted]-954

Date of Information: 31 December 1954

Place Acquired: Habana, Cuba

Date Acquired: 3 January 1955

Evaluation: B-3

Date of Report: 5 January 1955

Source: Controlled American

1. A pact has been completed between leaders of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, Cuban Communist Party) and certain leaders of the Ortodoxo Party for the purpose of combatting the Batista regime. Among those present at the meetings which led to this pact and which were held in the law offices of Ing. Eduardo CORONA, located at Calle O'Reilly No. 407, were Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ, Communist, Gregorio ORTEGA Suarez, Communist, Francisco [illegible] Ortodoxo, Mario RIVADULLA and [illegible], leaders of the Ortodoxo youth, Jose ECHEVARRIA, president of the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria, Amalio FIALLO, member of the Catholic Youth and a follower of former president Carlos PRIO. Other meetings were held in the law offices of Communist lawyers, located in the Manzana de Gomez, Habana, and in the locales of radio stations C.O.C.O., Radio Progreso, and Union Radio. The slogan for all these meetings was "CONTRA BATISTA."

2. Behind this pact is the desire of the Ortodoxo leaders involved to seize control of the leadership of the Ortodoxo Party and realization by the PSP that it needs to stir up its cadres with some strong action and to prove to the Cuban people that its charges against president-elect Fulgencio BATISTA have been legitimate ones. The pact calls for a two-phase attack on the Government, the first phase being the propaganda campaign against the proposed "Via Cuba" canal, to convince the masses that BATISTA is a traitor, and the second phase being one of aggressive action. The latter action would have as its objective the sabotage of the national economy and would be accomplished, mainly, by interference with the sugar harvesting (zafra) and the shipping activities. Included in this action are setting fire to sugar plantations on a large scale, agitation among the sugar workers over salary and dismissal questions, a "brazos caidos" (sit-down strike) movement in the port workers sector over the question of bulk shipment of sugar which would pave the way for the union of the port workers and sugar workers, and the intensification of strikes and the support of strikers' demands in all industries. The final step would be the launching of another propaganda campaign, begun by members of student, industrial workers, and professional men's organizations, prior to the assumption of the presidency by BATISTA.

③

Classification SECRET

FORM NO. 51-90
FEB 1949

SECRET

Cuba – Propaganda

HKH-554
page 2

3. The Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) is reported to have seized anti-Batista propaganda issued by the "Frente Unido Ortodoxo Comunista." The propaganda was found on the person of an Ortodoxo leader from Oriente Province, who was detained by SIM on 3 January 1954.

Field Comments:

1. Information was received by the Legal Attaché on 27 December 1954 from a source active in the revolutionary underground in Cuba that Cuban Communists were directing a plan to set fire to sugar cane fields in order to sabotage the Cuban sugar crop. Participating in the plan were revolutionaries opposed to the present Cuban administration.

2. Communist role in the anti-Government campaign on the subject of the "Via Cuba" canal was previously reported.

③

SECRET

19-4-129-2

28 Dec 54

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Habana, Cuba Report No: HKH-943 Local File No: 4-6

No. of Pages: 2 No. of Enclosures: none

Report Made By: Sh[illegible] A. L[illegible]/obh Approved By: Henry T. Buchaier #118

Distribution:
By copy to: 2-Wash
1-Emb & LA, NA
2-Files

Orally to: none

Source Cryptonym: [illegible] References: HKH-924 - [illegible] 117 6

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Subject: Communist Activity Against Proposed "Via Cuba" Canal

68-55397

INDEX

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

FORM NO.
FEB 1949 51-59

19-4-117-7

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Communist Activity Against Proposed "Via Cuba" Canal

Report No: HKH-913

Date of Information: 10-20 December 1954

Place Acquired: Habana, Cuba

Date Acquired: 10-20 December 1954

Evaluation: B-3

Date of Report: 28 December 1954

Source: Controlled American

1. On 9 December 1954 the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM, Cuban Military Intelligence Service) received information that the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, Cuban Communist Party) had plans to launch a strong anti-Government campaign based on the subject of the proposed "Via Cuba" canal. The PSP planned to remain behind the scenes and to use as many elements of the opposition as it could to sponsor its propaganda line that the present Government had sold out to the United States and that the proposed canal was merely an extension of the Panama Canal. Groups from the Ortodoxo Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo)), led by Max LESNIK, reportedly collaborated with the PSP in the planning of the protest campaign against the canal. Cuban intellectuals and professional men, sympathetic to Communism or connected in one way or another with the PSP, were to be the ones who would launch the campaign, stressing the selling-out-of-sovereignty theme and the need for a popular referendum before any Cuban government made any treaty or agreement affecting the territorial integrity of the nation.

2. On 14 December 1954 the Cuban press published an article concerning a call made by Max LESNIK, in the name of the national executive committee of the Ortodoxo Youth, to all youth organizations, including the Juventud Socialista (JS, Cuban Communist youth organization) and other organized centers of public opinion to attend a meeting at radio station C.O.C.O. on 16 December 1954 in order to join in the protest against the Government's plan to build the "Via Cuba" canal. On 16 December 1954, at nine o'clock in the evening, approximately 85 persons met at radio station C.O.C.O. in answer to LESNIK's call or in accordance with instructions from the PSP. About 75 of these persons were Communists, representing "barrio" (ward) committees of the PSP or the JS in Habana or Communist labor syndicates, and the remainder were Ortodoxo members, many of whom had had close ties with the Communists in the past. Among the latter were LESNIK, Francisco [illegible], Javier LEZCANO, and Mario RIVADULLA. Present also was Juan AMADOR Rodriguez, owner of the radio station and recently elected representative on the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (A) ticket, who advised a SIM officer at the meeting that he had not permitted the meeting to go on the air after learning of the Communist infiltration and had only allowed the participants the use of the station's hall because José PARDO Llada, radio commentator and journalist, had made such a commitment to LESNIK and he could not let PARDO Llada down.

Classification

FORM NO. [illegible]
FEB. 1949

3

3. The evening's program included speeches by four persons, representing the Ortodoxo party and Cuban youth, who attacked the economic, labor, and social policies of the Government, the absorption of Cuban soil by "Yankee imperialists," the interference of the United States government in the affairs of the Latin American nations and its support of those which were dictatorships, as well as the proposed plan of the Cuban government to build a canal which would involve the ceding of more Cuban territory to foreign interests (i.e., the United States). The meeting closed with the creation of committees charged with fomenting public protest throughout Cuba against the present regime and against "Yankee imperialism."

4. In addition to the role it played in organizing the meeting at radio station C.O.C.O. on 16 December 1954, the PSP has also succeeded in arousing popular sentiment against the proposed canal among the university students, members of labor unions, and members of educational, cultural, and civic institutions. It has been stressing in its propaganda that the canal will constitute a principal military target and place the country in the danger zone of atomic-nuclear bomb warfare. The PSP leaders consider this anti-canal movement as a rallying point for all anti-Batista elements which can possibly be converted into the long-sought "National Democratic Front." Jose PARDO Llada who championed the "Voto Negativo" (vote against BATISTA) prior to the general elections of 1954 has also seized on the matter of the proposed canal to attack the present government by calling for a "total union of the masses in defense of the national integrity and the complete liquidation of the present regime" during his television program on 17 December 1954. Another vehicle being used by the PSP to spread its anti-canal propaganda is the Asociacion Latino-America Libre, a cultural organization reported to be a Communist front, whose board of officers includes a Communist leader and a Communist youth leader of national standing, Jara PASCUAL and Gregorio M. ORTEGA Suarez, respectively.

Field Comments:

1. Carta Semanal (clandestine Communist publication), No. 69, dated 8 December 1954, contained an article which denounced, in very strong language, the plan to build the "Via Cuba Canal." Approximately a week later the overt Cuban press took up this subject, presenting the pros as well as the cons, and was still carrying articles on it as late as 26 December 1954.

2. President-elect Fulgencio BATISTA and the present chief of the Cuban Navy, Contralmirante Jose RODRIGUEZ Calderon, have issued public statements defending the plan to build the canal and blaming the Communists for launching "an insidious campaign against a project as nationalist as the Canal Via-Cuba would be" and censuring the opposition elements who have taken advantage of that campaign to attack the present government. Despite these statements and others by other government officials, the defense of the proposed project has been so weak, both technically and politically, that public sentiment against the project has apparently increased considerably since mid-December 1954.

(3)

SECRET 4P

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

9 Mar 54

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI

NO. HKH-737

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. WH	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Dr. Ramiro ARANGO alzina
2. [illegible]		MAR 29	MAR 29	CB	
3. [illegible]		15 APR	15 APR	M	Copy Detached
4. [illegible]		15 APR	15 APR	RB	
5.					DISSEMINATED IN SO NOT DISSEMINATED FOR FOLLOWING REASONS
6.					
7. FI/Plans	[illegible]		30	[illegible]	7 Should go to Paris?
8.	[illegible]		1 Aug 56	[illegible]	7-8/12 pls detach copy for Paris & note date dispatch
9. DDP				[illegible]	
10. RI/DA					
11. B+C					[illegible]
12. SPC/ICA			14/5	[illegible]	Detached by
13. SPC/SIB	[illegible]	18		[illegible]	1 copy detached & provided B file 13 May 1955
14.					
15.					
16.					
17. RI/FI	1409				

	201	53902	
ABSTRACT	☒	INDEX	☒

DATE 25 MAR 1954

SECRET CONTROL

FILE IN 201-209258

SECRET

~~CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

HKH - 737

From: Habana, Cuba — Report No: [illegible]-737 — Local File No: 10-30

No. of Pages: 2 — No. of Enclosures: 1

Report Made By: [illegible] — Approved By: Franklin D. Mallek

Distribution: ~~2~~ Wash

By copy to: 1 Paris, via Wash — Orally to: Embassy, MA

1 File

Source Cryptonym: AMPUTEE — References: HKH-338 (memo to Embassy 19 May 1953)

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. AMPUTEE advised GROWERY on 7 March 1954 that he had been instructed by his chief to prepare a "paquete" (frame-up) of subject, and as directed, he had prepared a false report emphasizing subject's communist connections and activities. He made available the original draft of h's memorandum which is identical to a memorandum received by Ambassador GARDNER from the head of the Cuban Army on 8 March. Also included with the memorandum to the Ambassador was a copy of a letter allegedly sent from Paris by subject to Fidel CASTRO, leader of the attempted uprising in Santiago de Cuba in July 1953, and presently serving a sentence at the Isle of Pines penitentiary.

2. It is not known at this time whether the letter included with the memorandum sent to Ambassador GARDNER is a copy of a legitimate piece of correspondence, or whether this also has been fabricated by the SIM to give added strength to their character assassination effort. We will endeavor to clarify this point at a future meeting with AMPUTEE. Copies of the letter to CASTRO are forwarded herewith to Headquarters and Paris.

INDEX

OC

Classification CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

9 March 1954

FORM NO. FEB 1953 51-30

SECRET RI COPY 201-53702

CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET

Subject: Dr. Ramiro ARANGO Alsina

Report No: HKH-737

Date of Information: 1950-date

Place Acquired: Habana, Cuba

Date Acquired: 8 March 1954

Evaluation: as indicated

Date of Report: 9 March 1954

Source: Controlled American

1. The Cuban Government, to further discredit subject, has prepared a memorandum containing a series of false charges concerning his communist connections and activities. The memorandum was prepared by the Cuban Servicio de Inteligencia Militar for forwarding to the United States Government with the intention that action would then be taken by the United States to remove subject's wife from her present employment with the United States Army in Paris.

2. There follows an English translation of the points covered by the SIM in the memorandum of false accusations:

Dr. Ramiro ARANGO Alsina, an attorney, is a relative of ex-President Ramón GRAU San Martín. During GRAU's regime, ARANGO was appointed Chancellor of the Cuban Embassy in Oslo, Norway, but was relieved of this post after he was detained by the Norwegian authorities for possession of a shipment of contraband nylon hose. Upon his return to Cuba, he was detained by the Bureau of Investigations when a sample case of precious stones was found among his personal effects.

ARANGO is an affiliate of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo), and a member of the Committee of Attorneys for that party.

ARANGO is a member of the revolutionary group which includes Dr. Pelayo CUERVO, M[illegible] LEDUICK, Francisco CARONE, Eloy ROCA, and Aníbal ESCALANTE, and was under indictment for participation in the [illegible] at Cuartel Moncada, Santiago de Cuba, in the summer of 1953. He is a close friend of Fidel CASTRO (long-time militant of the Juventud Socialista) and his brother, Raúl CASTRO, also a communist, both of whom are presently in prison for participation in the communist-sponsored Santiago uprising. ARANGO attended the meeting of Cuban oppositionists in Montreal in June 1953, and along with Isidro FIGUEROA Bonterpo, a communist, and José PARDO Llada, who was a member of the communist party in the barrio of Pueblo Nuevo, represented the Frente Unico de los Partidos Comunista-Ortodoxo-Priista. ARANGO is reported to have represented the communist interests, although he was charged with defense of the Ortodoxo policy, and was known to have been in contact with communist leaders. He has been cited on several occasions as a "comunista de segunda fila", and as such has permitted the Cuban communist party to infiltrate various elements which were formerly

Classification

CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET

CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET

HKH - 737

hostile to the communists. ARANGO is believed to belong to the secret cadres of the Partido Socialista Popular, although his activities have been carried on behind an Ortodoxo front, such as in the case of Max LESNICK, Vicentina ANTUÑA, et al.

At present, ARANGO and his wife are in Paris, having left Cuba on 10 December 1953 in the company of Lionel [illegible] Perez, who had sought asylum in the Haitian Embassy in Habana, and both individuals are reported to be in contact with the revolutionary Ortodoxo-Communist-Prifista elements, through a clandestine world-wide communist communications system. The wife of ARANGO, who is reported to be a member of the Swedish royal family, is presently employed in the offices of the United States Army in Paris.

Field Comments Files of this office indicate the following concerning subject, in addition to the information set out in our memorandum of 19 May 1953:

A Legal Attaché report of 3 April 1947 states that Ramiro ARANGO Alsina was appointed Chancellor of the Cuban Legation in Moscow at the age of 27, on the recommendation of Juan MARINELLO, President of the Partido Socialista Popular, Dr. Rafael P. GONZALEZ Muñoz, and Dr. Oscar CALL. He was not known to have engaged in communist activities, but was reported as "inclined toward socialistic theories". At the time of this appointment, ARANGO had no diplomatic experience.

In August 1952 subject was arrested by the SIM for activities against the regime.

On 16 September 1953, subject was arrested for activities against the government, and taken to La Cabaña. At this time a considerable number of known oppositionists were arrested, including the PSP leaders Lázaro PEÑA and Joaquin ORDOQUI.

CF CSDB-6123

9 March 1954

201-53702

SECRET

CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET 4P

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

21

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: Allan

NO. HKH-A-634

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. WH	Quarters Eye	3 Feb 54		[illegible]	Revolutionary activities in the Caribbean Detached ~~[illegible]~~ file Gen op. C. II CS-DB-16609 to OCI in ans. to RD-A-5692 FILED [illegible]
2. 13 3/ [illegible]		FEB 15 1954	FEB 19 1954	CB	
3. Malcolm		4 FEB 1954	4 FEB 1954	RM	
4. Sinclair		4 FEB 1954	4 FEB 1954	RL	
5. Condon		4 FEB 1954	4 FEB 1954	MJC	
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. RI/S	2 VX[illegible]				

200	7	38	[illegible]
ABSTRACT	☒	INDEX	☒
DATE	8 FEB 1954		

FORM NO. 51-10

SECRET

FILE IN 201-209258

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-634

TO : Chief, WH

DATE 21 ENE 1954

FROM : Chief of Mission, Habana.

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Report of Revolutionary Preparations in Central America Against Cuban Government

REF: HKH-W-525

1. No additional information concerning alleged plans of the Caribbean Legion to attack the Batista government has been received by the Mission. The latest available information regarding revolutionary activities against that government is contained in HKH-678.

2. Reports received in the past concerning the Caribbean Legion's attempts to enlist BATISTA's support for Legion revolutionary activities have been given a low evaluation (as to content), as indicated in the pertinent portions of HKH-467 and HKH-397. To date the Mission has received no information which would warrant changing such an evaluation.

3. Indications here are that the Batista regime is too preoccupied with a possible revolt attempt originating within the country to permit planning for any offensive action against any other country in the Caribbean. Recent friendly overtures by BATISTA, in the form of decorations bestowed on Hector TRUJILLO of the Dominican Republic and PEREZ Jimenez of Venezuela, also serve to indicate that the present Cuban government is not contemplating any action against those countries.

4. As to a possible attack on the Batista regime from outside Cuba, the Cuban Armed Forces and security agencies have long been alerted to a possible air attack on key installations in Habana as well as multiple assaults from the sea. Mexico, Costa Rica, and Guatemala have been mentioned as possible take-off points for the planes to be used in the air attack.

5. The Mission has no information to confirm the allegations made in the attachment to the Department of State Instruction cited in the referenced disptach

concerning the/

RI COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A

200-7-38-E91

POOR QUALITY REPRODUCTION
"UNAVOIDABLE"

SECRET

- 2 -

[illegible]-A-6[illegible]

concerning the concentration of arms in the hands of Cuban youth leaders. Jose [illegible], and Pedro [illegible] are well-known leaders of the [illegible] Ortodoxa (Ortodox Youth) and as such have participated in overt opposition activities against the Batista government, demanding the restoration of the Constitution of 1940 and the holding of general elections. There is no record of Bernardo BLANCO Goudin in the [illegible] files.

Wallace A. Growery
Wallace A. Growery

Distribution:
3 - Wash
1 - File

[illegible]:SAL:cbd
20 January 1954

SECRET

200-7-38-1391

SECRET

Cuba -16609

Evaluation of Report of Revolutionary Preparations in Central America Against Cuban Government 16 Feb. 1954

1

21 January 1954 -A-5692

Cuba, Habana

1. No additional information concerning alleged plans of the Caribbean Legion to attack the BATISTA government have been received in Habana, Cuba. Reports received there in the past concerning the Caribbean Legion's attempts to enlist BATISTA's support for legion revolutionary activities have been given a low evaluation. To date the Habana Mission has received no information which would warrant changing such an evaluation.

2. Indications in Cuba are that the BATISTA regime is too preoccupied with a possible revolt attempt originating within the country to permit planning for any offensive action against any other country in the Caribbean area. Recent friendly overtures by BATISTA, in the form of decorations bestowed on Hector TRUJILLO of the Dominican Republic and PEREZ Jimenez of Venezuela, also serve to indicate that the present Cuban Government is not contemplating any action against those countries.

3. As to a possible attack on the BATISTA regime from outside Cuba, the Cuban armed forces and security agencies have long been alerted for a possible air attack on key installations in Habana as well as multiple assaults from the sea. Mexico, Costa Rica, and Guatemala have been mentioned as possible take-off points for planes to be used in the air attack.

201 7-54-1271

4. There has been no information received which would confirm the allegations concerning the concentration of arms in the hands of Cuban youth leaders. Jose IGLESIAS, Max LESNICK, and Pedro GUZMAN are well-known leaders of the Juventud Ortodoxo (Orthodox Youth) and as such have participated in covert opposition activities against the BATISTA government, demanding the restoration of the Constitution of 1940 and the holding of general elections.

FEB 19

Distribution: OCI DSO:LO:RC:eb RI WH
HKH-A-634 RC WH/MID/Cuba
12 Feb. 54 RQM/RQ

SECRET

VIA: ~~Air Pouch~~ DISPATCH NO. HPLA-273

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WD DATE: 21 January 1954

FROM : Acting Chief of Station, Lima, Peru

SUBJECT: GENERAL-
SPECIFIC- Douglas Hedden ALLEN

Director of Commerce Export [illegible]

Action required by Headquarters: For information and such action as is deemed necessary.

1. Douglas Hedden ALLEN is President of the Astoria Importing & Manufacturing Company, Inc. in Iquitos, Peru, and a director of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. He is personally acquainted with Ambassador Harold H. TITTMANN.

2. On 18 September 1953, Subject called at this Station to see Winthrop T. HEGMAN, who was out of Lima at that time. He talked with Jane C. BURREAT and at her suggestion that he talk with the Chief of the Political Section stated that he wanted to talk only with HEGMAN, that he had confidential information on Rafael PAVLETICH Trujillo, Prefect of Iquitos (and brother of former Communist functionary Esteban PAVLETICH Trujillo) and some Communist literature which had come into his possession. Subject returned to the United States on 2 October 1953 without trying to contact HEGMAN again.

3. Former agent DUFTERDAR, who has made a nuisance of himself by calling sporadically at this Station, told HEGMAN on 1 October 1953 that he was planning to apply for an immigration visa to the United States and that Subject had tried to contact HEGMAN on DUFTERDAR's behalf in connection with the anticipated application. DUFTERDAR further claimed that Subject has a close friend who is a senior official of ODENVY from whom he had gotten DUFTERDAR's name, and that Subject had shown DUFTERDAR a picture of a Peruvian Communist which DUFTERDAR remembered having submitted to this Station five or six years ago. It seems quite likely that DUFTERDAR gave Subject HEGMAN's name.

4. In connection with another matter (LIMA-0340), HEGMAN contacted the subject of HPIN-949, who, in the course of conversation, told of having received a letter (encl. 1.) through

TLA-W-433
John WHEELER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY
58-6-4 200

FORM NO. 51-28
MAR 1949

p. 3

FILE IN 201-209258

SECRET

HPIA-478
Page 2

his New York office from Subject. This letter forwarded a report (believed to be encl. 2.) to Ernesto NICOLINI. Subject of HPLW-929 also told of having cocktails on several occasions in New York City several months ago with Subject and Ambassador TITTMANN. During one of these get-togethers Subject stated that a report (believed to be encl. 2) had been made available to KUBARK.

5. On 18 January 1954 DUFTERDAR volunteered a copy of enclosure 2 with the explanation that NICOLINI had sent it by him especially for HEGMAN but that NICOLINI wanted it back. When questioned as to the source of the document DUFTERDAR said that he did not know the identity of the source but that it had come from an English aviator. The document provided by DUFTERDAR has not been shown to Subject of HPLW-929.

6. HPIA-38 and references, and LIMA-0240 suggest that Augusto ROMERO Lovo, Minister of Government and Police; Mariano TUR Aljoven, a confidential investigator on President ODRIA's staff; Ernesto NICOLINI, a prominent and wealthy Peruvian businessman; DUFTERDAR, employee of Ernesto NICOLINI; and Luis QUEIROLO Nicolini, nephew and employee of Ernesto NICOLINI, are associated in some sort of intelligence work, which is separate from the intelligence activities of Alejandro ESPARZA Zanartu, Director of Government and Municipalities, who is immediately inferior to ROMERO Lovo in the Ministry of Government. On the basis of the foregoing data and references, it appears that Subject is involved with intelligence operatives of the Peruvian Government on one hand, and is in contact with KUBARK and other U.S. Government officials on the other hand.

7. It is noted that enclosures 1 and 2 both have the initials "MOD", presumably the initials of Subject's secretary.

Winthrop T. Hegman
Winthrop T. Hegman

Enclosures:
1. Ltr dtd 25 Nov 53, in trip
2. Rpt copied 18 Nov 53, in trip

21 January 1954

Distribution:
3 - Hqs, w/encls as noted
2 - Files, w/encls (2 copies)

2 acc. 1/12

SECRET

58-6-4

SECRET

COPY

3P

Early in April of 1952, about a month after the Coup de Etat of General Fulgencio Batista, the deposed president, Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras entrusted to his ex-minister of Education and State, Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango the responsibility of organizing a vast subversive movement, created to depose in turn Batista, and return to power the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano) if this were at all possible. The first steps taken by Dr. Sanchez Arango were to give a political form to the movement, and to create favorable conditions for an uprising (putsch) at the precisely opportune moment, to be called "the zero hour." Immediately after Batista took over, the PRC found itself destitute of any kind of influence, since all former officials were dismissed by Batista. Hence Dr. Sanchez Arango began to reconstruct the PRC, placing in the positions of command some of the most sincere members of the party, most of whom had formerly been in secondary status in party affairs, and in Government affairs.

While Dr. Antonio de Varona was again made President, men such as Dr. Aracelio Acui, Dr. Armando Hernandez and a few others, became the most prominent figures of the Party. Immediately, the PRC began a campaign of passive legal opposition to the administration of the Batista Government, whose every step received the condemnation and adverse criticism of the Propaganda Committee of the Party. In addition, three times a week in the newspaper, Free Press (Prensa Libre), articles by Dr. Aracelio Acui and Dr. Rene Fiallo pictured the present Government as a "do nothing" one, with policies, or lack of policies, contrary to the public interest. At the same time the articles were designed to restore to the Party the faith which formerly it had enjoyed from the Cuban masses.

In the meantime, Dr. Sanchez Arango initiated the opposition by force in the Central American countries. Almost immediately he found out that the reconstructed PRC was gaining no ground with the people and that he would have to create a new political formula to draw to the side of the opposition of insurrection, the general populace, by now disgusted not only with the Batista Government, but with the PRC as well. It was proposed that Dr. Roberto Agramonte, head of the Peoples Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano), have an interview with Dr. Prio in Miami, but the former declined on the ground that his party wanted to remain neutral in the whole affair. However, Emilio M. Ochoa opposed openly the ideas of his chief (Dr. Agramonte) advocating an alliance of the two parties to make the opposition more effective. To this end, he went to Guatemala to see Dr. Sanchez Arango. While there, conferences were held in the home of Dr. Raul Osegueda, then Ambassador of Guatemala in Cuba, and now Foreign Minister of the Government of Colonel Arbenz. There warlike aspects of the movement were discussed, also the merging of the two parties. On the return of Sr. Ochoa to Cuba, eventually the amalgamation was effected with equal administration on the part of both of the parties. This end was hastened by a surreptitious visit of Dr. Arango (Sanchez) to his native soil (he was then a political refugee in Guatemala).

ooooooooo

From the moment Batista took over the power in Cuba, Guatemala placed itself unconditionally on the side of Dr. Prio and served as a base for the military preparation of the conspiracy. Immediately the Caribbean League (legion) at the time reduced to impotency, began to function again, to take a preponderant

COPY

Att. 2 to HPLA-275 SECRET

58-6-4 = 200

part in Latin American relations. In the latter part of 1952, the military plan was drawn up by Sanchez Arango with the aid of Foreign Minister Raul Osegueda and often in the conferences the presidential candidate (Costa Rica) Jose Figueres took an active part, promising the support of Costa Rica should he be elected president. Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo participated as well, to the extent of using his influence with the Guatemalan Army officials that they might join the movement later. On the Caribbean coast of Guatemala is a place called Livingston. To the West, there is a road which leads to a little native village (indigena) name for the moment forgotten by this agent. To the southwest of this place, there is a very bad road which ends in a little valley at the end of which there is a series of low hills. Back of these hills is situated a camp of the Caribbean Legion. Here is established the General Headquarters of Aureliano Sanchez Arango. There exists here a force of 4,000 men regularly trained, quartered and fed. War practice is held daily under the direction of General Abelardo Cuadra, veteran of the Spanish Civil War and one of the organizers of the movement of Cayo Confitres.

The force situated here is divided into two battalions, one named Battalion #4, PABLO DE LA TORRIENTE BRAU; the other Battalion #5, IGNACIO AGRAMONTE. The force is divided into small groups and taught to use machine guns (tripod type), also hand type Garand Rifles, automatic repeating rifles M-1. Nearly all the officers are veterans of the Spanish Civil War. In addition to the military practice, the officers get together once a week for conferences over historical and political matters as expounded by Juan Jose Arevalo, Romulo Betancourt, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, etc.

Near Livingston there is a little gulf on which is situated Puerto Barrios. South of this port, there is a tiny port not marked on the map, named Montegua. In this place with landing craft, practice is held with the idea of disembarking in Cuba. From Montegua, several shipments of arms have been made to Cuba. The other large concentration of men and arms is in Costa Rica.

Northwest of Puerto Limon on the Caribbean coast of Costa Rica, there is a place known as La Virgen. Back of this reached by a small country road, back of some low hills, is found the camp. Here are 2,000 men or more divided into three battalions, #1 Augusto Cesar Sandino, #2 Morazan, #3 Antonio Maceo. A little north of this camp, there is a kind of landing field which contains four (English) Lancaster Bombers, acquired from Canada by Ingeniero Carlos Hevia in Canada. The men in this camp carry English Repeating rifles, but they also have Thompson machine guns and Mendoza machine guns with plenty of ammunition. The men in Guatemala also have this additional arm.

The plan is that on landing in Cuba of the "patriots" these arms will be given to all the civilians who are sympathetic with the cause. Cubans generally are more familiar with this type of arm than the English repeating rifle, whose use is not easy to learn in a few minutes. The crews of the planes are English. The leader of the outfit is a Canadian named Chrisholm, who was a Captain RAF during the war, flying Lancaster Bombers. He is a personal friend of Carlos Rica Monegro. This camp did not amount to much when Otilio Ulate was President of Costa Rica, but the minute Figueres came to power, the arms and men began to

COPY

Secret

flow in, in quantity, from Guatemala, which has been the great center for the accumulation of arms. From a place in British Honduras named Middlesex, many rifles were secured with the connivance of British officers stationed there, then passed across the border.

The plan of invasion is as follows: When the zero hour comes, planes from Costa Rica and Guatemala will arrive at Habana prepared to drop bombs over the most important military posts in Cuba. As stated before, the crews of these planes are English "mercenaries" who, for money have agreed to take part in this adventure, regardless of their politics. Coincidentally, the men from the camps in Central America will be landed in various parts of the Island. At the same time there will appear in the streets members of both parties, well-armed, to battle the local police, capture them, take over the civilian authority. While all this fighting is going on, leaders of the political parties under the direction of Eufemio Fernandez and Jesus Gonzalez Cartas will capture the personages most prominent of the actual administration, who, once the revolution is successful, will be put in jail under the charge of murder. With this action, it is expected that most of the citizens will come over to the side of the conspirators. Judging from things heard by this agent in an interview held in a Mexico Hotel between Juan Jose Arevalo and Ex-Colonel Martin Elena, the battle is set to take place before the general sale of the next sugar crop, about January of next year. While not within the province of this agent, he has learned that General Peron is favorable to the conspiracy, sending arms of Argentine manufacture to the Central American camps.

[illegible]

On various occasions, cargoes of arms of different makes and kinds have been introduced into the Island, a procedure now made very difficult because of the vigilance of the Cuban airforce, who constantly patrol the seas between Cuba and Central America. This agent knows about the following concentrations: in the hands of "Cuban orthodox youth," headed by Jose Iglesias, [redacted] (Cuba) and Bernardo Blanco Goudin, there are more than 600 machine guns [illegible], 10,000 grenades (hand type) all of Mexican manufacture. The arms are hidden in the "finca" of the son of Jose Manuel Cortina, in Pinar del Rio. In the hands of Pedro Guzman, head of the youth movement in Marianao, are about 100 machine guns, 50 grenades and 10 or 12 rifles M-1. The arms are hidden in a house situated near the "Central Toledo" property of the secretary general of the workers of that central.

ooooooooo

RED 11/18/53

COPY

KP-1-4

14-00000

20726-52

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

30-1
10-29
10-23

5P

From: Habana, Cuba		Report No: TKH-1520	Local File No:
No. of Pages: three		No. of Enclosures: one	
Report Made By: [illegible]		Approved By: Walter C. Collins	
Distribution: By copy to: 3-Wash 3-Files 1-Emb	~~AUG 31 1961~~	None	
Source Cryptonym: AMBIVALENT		References: TKH-1036, TKH-1448, TKH-1483	

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

COMMENTS

The fact that the Communist Party of Cuba would take the measures described in the attached report is not considered surprising. As can be seen from a study of Embassy dispatches and from our past reports on this subject, the PSP is finding itself in an increasingly worse position, politically, financially, and psychologically. The greatest strength of the PSP comes from ignorant laborers who are, by US standards, at least, exploited. ~~The government reported recently that there are half a million unemployed in Cuba.~~ It is only logical, therefore, that communist strength remains, at present, in the field where Marxist ideology has always been used to the best advantage, that of the ignorant workers. It is probably that the PSP, as a political party, will no longer carry the weight and respect it has in the past, at least until economic conditions in Cuba grow much worse, or until the present East-West tension diminishes considerably. Until recently, two possible solutions to the PSP's present predicament lay in its uniting with the Ortodoxo Party or with the PAU. Concerning the Ortodoxo Party, it is known that the leftist groups within that party (Vicentina ANTUNA, PARDO LLADA, [illegible], and others) are militating for a pact with the communists (See copy of memorandum from E. T. CRAIN to the Ambassador, dated January 28, 1952, copy of which is attached), but, so far, have been checked by the anti-communist elements within the Ortodoxo Party. Until recently, conservative anti-BATISTA elements in Cuba stated with conviction that BATISTA would join with the communists in a selfish attempt to gain the Presidency. However, BATISTA, in two articles appearing in Carteles, December 2 and 13, 1951, closed the door on rumors of this kind by stating the only way the PSP and the PAU could unite would be if the PSP would publicly state that, in case of an international conflict, the PSP would side with the United Nations and against Russia. An interesting sequel to this statement, and possibly connected with it, was a leaflet distributed in the streets of Habana in early January entitled, "To the Workers of the PAU and to the People of Cuba", signed by Obdulio FERNANDEZ VELIZ (Mayari), leader of the Bloque Obrero del PAU, which is know for its leftist and pro-communist sympathies. In the leaflet, FERNANDEZ claimed that BATISTA had tried to destroy him and expell him from the Bloque Obrero, purportedly, because FERNANDEZ had tried to defend "the interest of the working classes and of the Bloque Obrero within the PAU, a real and decided opposition line to the government, and is determined that a united oppositionist front be formed to defend

Classification [illegible]

1362

FORM NO.
FEB 1949 51-30

INDEX

97

20-1
10-2[illegible]

From: Habana, Cuba **Report No:** T[illegible]-1510 **Local File No:** 10-25

No. of Pages: **No. of Enclosures:**

Report Made By: **Approved By:**

Distribution:
By copy to: **Orally to:**--

Source Cryptonym: **References:**

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

- 2 -

the government in the next elections". The pamphlet went on to say that "the action of BATISTA is a direct aid to the very government we are fighting, a government which uses the fascist system to destroy the leaders of the workers by putting gangsters and thieves at the head of the syndicates, attacking the union halls and serving the ends of the exploiting magnates and oppressing and pursuing the true workers".

It is felt that the value of the attached information is primarily to point out a possible new force in the Cuban political scene, composed of labor groups, within the PAU and the Ortodoxo Party, who are dissatisfied with their own national party leadership and who can and probably will join with similar groups in the PSP in an attempt to get power for themselves.

Classification

FORM NO.
FEB 19[illegible] 51-59

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

Subject: Recent Communist Advances Within the Anti-Government Labor Movement

Report No: TKH-1510

Date of Information: February 13, 1952

Place Acquired: Habana, Cuba

Date Acquired: February 13, 1952

Evaluation: C-3

Date of Report: February 20, 1952

Source: Controlled American

1. The two main centers of communist penetration and sympathy in the Cuban syndical movement are found in the Bloque Obrero del Partido Accion Unitaria and in the Comision Obrera Ortodoxa of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo). These groups have shown dislike for anti-communist labor leaders who have tried to join them despite the fact that these labor leaders are well-known for their honesty, ability and good intentions in furthering the labor movement in Cuba. In the past few months, and more particularly within the past few weeks, the collaboration between these groups and the Partido Socialista Popular syndical elements has become so close that it has alarmed the anti-communist Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba.

COMMENT: As has been previously reported, the present political, as well as financial condition of the Cuban Communist Party is extremely serious. It would appear that the stigma of a pact with the communists is sure political death for other political parties in the coming elections of June 1952. This has forced the PSP into an isolated position from which there does not appear to be any escape through aligning itself with another political party.

2. The communists have been and are now carrying on a campaign in these syndicates to penetrate and undermine the anti-government labor factions in an effort to gain control of these groups at a later date. This campaign was waged in three stages.

a. The first stage was the communists' penetration of the anti-communist syndicates, paying up their union dues and using their voice and vote in the union meetings to propose and elect their candidates for committee positions.

b. The second stage was to sow seeds of doubt among the members of these groups in joining with any of the anti-communist labor federations or with the government CTC by accusing the CTC leaders of having sold themselves out to the employers and to the government which are depicted as the enemies of the laboring mass. The communists have always tried to exploit the anti-government feeling in these labor groups - particularly within the Bloque Obrero del PAU - in an effort to destroy the anti-communist labor leaders in the various syndicates.

Classification

③

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 51-[illegible]

97

Report No: TKH-1510
Date February 20, 1952

c. The third stage, which seems to be going on now, is the ever increasing number of rapprochments between the Ortodoxo and PAU labor leaders and the communists. This is the result of a and b (above), and is perhaps hastened by the strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the PRIO regime combined with their desire to vote this regime out of power in the forthcoming elections.

3. As an example of the success of this campaign, source supplies the following. In the Sindicato Provincial de Obreros de la Goma de La Habana, elections for a new executive committee were held January 17, 1952. The anti-communist syndicate led by Romulo LIMA won by more than 100 votes receiving 352 votes in all. However, the Ortodoxo candidates within the syndicate, supported by the communists and members of the Bloque Obrero del PAU, obtained 247 votes. In the Sindicato Textilero de San Antonio de los Baños, elections were also held recently. Again, the Ortodoxos, communists, and members of the PAU united against the anti-communist candidates. In this case, the anti-communist candidates won by only 16 votes, the anti-communists obtaining 141 and the opposition obtaining 125 votes.

4. In the Sindicato de Obreros y Empleados de Crusellas, S. A., the leadership is held by the Ortodoxos, Emilio LLENIN and Tomas [illegible]. Up until recently, these leaders were in sympathy with the anti-communist CTC. However, they have recently permitted the entry of communists into their syndicate without requiring them to pay up their back dues. These leaders have also become friendly with the communist leader, Angel TORRES, who is a member of the PSP Executive Committee of the Cerro district, and two other communists, one an (fnu) VEGA and another who goes by the name "Traga-niquel".

COMMENT: We have no traces on Angel TORRES. His name does not appear as a delegate to the Habana PSP Municipal Assembly from the Cerro district.

These communists and the two Ortodoxo leaders of the Crusellas Sindicato are often seen together in the Club Candado which is opposite the Crusellas plant. At the present time, there is a good deal of labor unrest in this plant because the owners are attempting to reduce the labor force. Some of the workers are proposing that the syndicate join with the government CTC so that the latter body will take action and prevent them from losing their jobs. In answer to this, the Ortodoxo leaders in the plant are saying that the Crusellas workers will have to solve this problem by themselves as the government CTC is only the "tool of the employers and of PRIO who has sold out to the big industrialists". The workers are tired, demoralized and discouraged and are saying, "And was this the reason the communists were expelled from the CTC? It was a thousand times better under Lazaro PENA!" A desire to join any group which might help them in their present plight - including the communists - is now becoming stronger.

97

Report No: TCH-1510
Date: February 20, 1952

SOURCE COMMENT: The owners of the Crusellas plant are in the process of reducing the labor force by 50-60% and hope to maintain the same production rate as before. The dismissed workers will be transferred to a new plant in the process of construction where the detergent, "FAB", is to be manufactured. The workers are discouraged because they claim that the work performed in the Crusellas plant requires all of the present labor force and the company should hire additional men to work in the FAB plant. The attempt of the Crusellas owners to reduce the labor force in this manner is against standing labor laws of the country, but the Crusellas syndicate led by the Ortodoxo labor leaders who are being advised by their communist friends, is taking advantage of the present situation in furthering their own interests.

14-00000

2P

Attachment to [illegible]-1510

CONFIDENTIAL
~~SECURITY~~ INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM

January 28, 1952

To: The Ambassador

From: E. T. Crain

Subject: Dr. Portell Vila warns Embassy that Ortodoxo left-wingers are trying to bring Communists into the party.

Dr. Portell Vila called today at the Embassy and during the course of the conversation spoke of his grave preoccupation regarding the efforts of Ortodoxo left-wingers to bring Communists into the party.

He stated that Pardo Llada, Eduardo Corona, Vicentina Antuña, Max Lesnik and others were trying to get Communists into the Ortodoxo party. He said that, specifically, they were trying to get the notorious Communist, Salvador García Aguero, not only into the Ortodoxo party but to run as an Ortodoxo candidate for senator. He said that a group of Ortodoxos approached him on the matter to learn his views and he told them he would resist such a move with all his strength.

Portell Vila said he considered the matter so urgent that he at once wrote an article entitled "[illegible]" which he was going to try to get into El Mundo of January 29 instead of Wednesday the 30th which is the day of the week when his column usually appears. He said this would be an extension of his article published January 20 in El Mundo.

I told Portell Vila that while the Embassy maintained a strict neutral attitude in the matter of Cuban politics, it would have a very deep interest in anything pertaining to the Communists whom we considered an enemy common to all free countries and free national political parties. I congratulated him on his efforts to keep Communists out of his own Ortodoxo party and wished him every success in this undertaking. I said I assumed that if the party announced notorious Communists as Ortodoxo candidates for office that the party would presumably lose a lot of support from persons who did not wish to be associated with Communists. I added that I hoped my assumption was not mere wishful thinking. He stated that it was definitely not wishful thinking. He stated that it was definitely not wishful thinking and that is exactly what would happen. He said that he would nevertheless oppose the efforts of Pardo Llada and company with all the strength at his command, regardless of whether an association with Communists won or lost votes for the Ortodoxo party.

3

9/

Dr. Portell Vila indicated that he would try to keep me informed of developments within the Ortodoxo party in so far as they related to the Communists. I thanked him, reiterating that my sole interest in the matter was the common threat of Communism to all free nations and particularly Communist success or failure in infiltrating into democratic political parties.

ETCrain: op

22 JAN 51

CONFIDENTIAL

6P

From: Habana, Cuba.
Report No: TIH-1365
Local File No: 30-248.

No. of Pages: 5
No. of Enclosures: None.

Report Made By: Jay S. Gatsby/ajm
Approved By: George H. Somerville GHS

Distribution:
By copy to: Wash 3
File 1
No other distribution.
Orally to:

Source Cryptonym: Amlikar.
References: ID-972; TIH-1266.

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

MICROFILMED:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

COMMENTS

Our TIH-1266 tried to answer as fully as possible ID-972 but it was realized at that time that more complete information on the Juventud Socialista would be appreciated by Headquarters. Amlikar, therefore, was requested to supply us with information which we felt Ambivalent had not supplied previously. The attached report confirms partial information previously supplied by Ambivalent and supplies additional information of interest.

INDEXED

Classification

IID COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO.
FEB 1948 51-59

CHANGED FROM [illegible]

19-4-5-

FILE IN 201-209258 *

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Further Information on the Juventud Socialista.

Report No. ZCH-1365.

Date of Information: 2 Jan 51.

Place Acquired: Habana, Cuba.

Date Acquired: 4 Jan 51.

Evaluation: F-3.

Date of Report: 22 Jan 51.

Source: Controlled American.

1. The PSP (Partido Socialista Popular, Cuban Communist Party) high command maintains continued interest to a very large degree in the Juventud Socialista organization. One of the principal tasks of the communist party is to maintain the direction of a strong communist youth movement which will respond only to the ideological foundation of the communist party. In the PSP the most insistent voice of this communist principle is that of BLAS ROCA who takes a personal interest in the direction of the Juventud Socialista and constantly watches over its activities through trusted lieutenants. Many of the present leaders of the PSP were formerly leaders of the Juventud Comunista, the former Juventud Socialista. Men of this type are Severo AGUIRRE, Aggeo SUAREZ, and Osvaldo SANCHEZ, prominent PSP member in Camagüey Province. On its own part, the Juventud Socialista maintains a close liaison with the National Executive Committee of the PSP through its leader, Flavio BRAVO, who attends the weekly meetings of the National Committee.

2. The caliber of the Juventud Socialista direction is high. Its leaders are militant communists and many members of the Juventud Socialista National and Provincial Committees have been political candidates for various government offices in past elections. Second to Flavio BRAVO in the leadership of the group is Luis MAS MARTIN; both of these men were political candidates in recent elections and have attended various conferences abroad. Other leaders of note are: Lionel SOTO, President of the School of Philosophy, Habana University; Bienvenido ADAM and his wife, Yolanda LOPEZ PEREZ; Federico, Rita, and Georgina VILAR, all children of the well-known communist leader, César VILAR, who were dducated in Russia; Julio MACHADO; Bienvenido SUAREZ, Raúl VALDES VIVO; Ramón CALCINES, Juventud Socialista member from Las Villas Province; Fidel DOMENECH of Oriente Province; and PAEZ (fnu) of the printing section of the Juventud Socialista. Other youth leaders not members of the Juventud Socialista but closdly tied up with their activities are: Alfredo GUEVARA; Enrique OVARES; Aramís TABOADA, Max LESNICK of the Ortodoxo Perty, and Humberto L. MACHADO, President of the Juventud of the PAU (Partido Acción Unitaria) and Director of the newspaper, Vanguardia Unitaria.

CONFIDENTIAL
HQ COPY

19-1-5-11

CONFIDENTIAL Report No: TCH-1365.
Date 22 January 1951.

3. The structure of the Juventud Socialista is like that of the PSP. It has committees in all the districts (barrios) of the City of Habana and in the larger cities of the interior. Up until now the Juventud Socialista has not had, according to source, clandestine leaders to take the place of the present overt leaders in case the party is outlawed, nor does it now have these clandestine leaders. However, source feels that there are many secondary and less well-known leaders within the Juventud Socialista who would be able to assume the direction of a clandestine communist youth organization if the PSP decided such an organization should be set up. Source supplies the following names as possible clandestine leaders of such an organization: Julio MACHADO, "responsable juvenil" (youth representative) of the CTC (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba)(Communist) a few years ago; Bienvenido SUAREZ, who is the "responsable juvenil" of the CTC (Communist) at present; Federico, Rita, and Georgina VILAR; Walterio CARBONELL, law school student, Habana University; and Hector CARBONELL, communist youth leader at the Ariguanabo textile plant, in Bauta, Habana Province.

4. The PRIO Administrative's anti-communist attitude over the past six months has not visibly affected unfavorably the unity of the Juventud Socialista, according to source. Source gives as a reason for this the fact that the ranks of the Juventud Socialista are composed of proven communist militant youths. Source claims he knows of only one case of defection from the Juventud Socialista ranks, that of a youth named Elio CAPESTANY, Juventud Socialista leader in the Escuela de Artes y Oficios, who has joined the Juventud del PAU.

Comment: As is well known, in other communist parties under similar circumstances and as we have previously reported, some communists have been instructed to infiltrate other political parties. It is difficult to understand how source can conclude positively that the CAPESTANY case was one of defection from the Juventud Socialista.

5. It is true, however, that the PSP has examined very carefully the ranks of the Juventud Socialista for signs of bourgeois weakness. The barrio committees of the PSP established similar committees of the Juventud Socialista with the purpose

CONFIDENTIAL

19-4-5-11

Report No: T.H-1365.
Date 22 January 1951.

in mind of gaining new members for the party as a whole. The methods by which they tried to attract new members for the Juventud Socialista were made up of sewing clubs for girls, English classes, parlor games, and, from time to time, dances. This method had good results as far as getting the youth to draw closer to the Juventud Socialista; however, racial feeling militated against the complete success of this method for many white girls found that they were expected to mix and dance with negroes, which was against their personal convictions. As a result of this racial prejudice, the majority of negro girls among the Juventud Socialista ranks is noticeable. The PSP has now managed to purify the ranks of the Juventud Socialista in preparation for a harder life ahead. The former sewing circles, parlor games, and dances have disappeared and in their place entertainment less conducive to stirring up racial prejudice, such as excursions into the country, etc., are taking place. Today, the Juventud Socialista ranks can more or less be counted upon to act in a united fashion for the good of the PSP and to follow the orders of their leaders.

6. Although there are no official figures on the membership of the Juventud Socialista, source uses as a yardstick the fact that on one occasion Flavio BRAVO stated that there were more than 15,000 socialist youths in the nation and that of these more than 10,000 were in the City of Habana. Source believes that there is probably an overlap between a member of the Juventud Socialista who is of voting age and also affiliates with the PSP during elections. Taking into account this duplication of membership, source believes that the 15,000 figure is correct.

7. The present activities of the Juventud Socialista are listed as follows:

A. The most important job of the Juventud Socialista is its support of the peace partisans' movement. This consists of street demonstrations, making signs for various parades, collecting signatures, etc.

B. The Juventud Socialista constantly tries to maintain good relations with other political youth organizations, such as the Juventud del PAU, of the Ortodoxos, and of the Auténticos libres. The Juventud Socialista also tries to influence

19-4-5-11

and keep friends with the FEU (Federación Estudiantil Universitaria) of Habana University, the Masonic youth known as the AJEF, and various schools and universities throughout the island.

C. They carried out certain demonstrations or propaganda in support of the communist "Plan Cubano contra la Crisis" and the "Conferencia en Defensa de la Economía Nacional."

8. In a national committee meeting of the PSP in June 1950 the directors of the party recommended that the Juventud Socialista spend its energy on the following assignments:

A. To work through peasant associations - or organize such associations where they did not exist - in an effort to get such groups to support the partisans of peace movement.

B. Make similar efforts among the negroes, intelligentsia, factories, schools, etc.

C. To explain to these masses that the USSR is standing for peace along with the popular democracies and China and to demonstrate that the imperialist US stands for war.

D. Unite the peasants to the fight of the working-class movement against the PRIO Government and imperialism. The Juventud Socialista should understand that the most important task of all is to perpetuate and further the partisans of peace movement.

9. Recent activities of the Juventud Socialista have been concerned with objections to the UN's entering into the Korean problem and the printing and distribution of their new teen-age magazine, Cascabel. The Juventud Socialista has participated in the past and now participates in worker activities, distributing manifestoes, attending parades, etc. Sometimes they have fought with the Movimiento Juvenil de la CTC (Government) or with elements of the Acción Revolucionaria Guiteras (ARG) in certain parades or to protect their propaganda signs, etc.

10. Flavio BRAVO in his position as leader of the Juventud Socialista maintains constant contact with youth leaders of the Ortodoxos, PAU, Auténticos Libres, AJEF, various student leaders, and protestant religious youth groups. Apart from this, source

CONFIDENTIAL

Report No: TKH-1365.
Date 22 January 1951.

does not supply any indication that BRAVO carries on clandestine liaison with or penetration activities into other youth groups.

11. The Comisión Juvenil of the CTC (Communist) is the same type of organization as the Juventud Socialista but with a different name. The only difference between these two is that the Juventud Socialista is a well-organized unit with a definite membership, whereas the Comisión Juvenil is under the direction of the CTC (Communist) and its membership is mainly made up of Juventud Socialista members with non-communist youths forming the balance. The head of the Comisión Juvenil of the CTC (Communist) is Bienvenido SUAREZ, negro, with his deputies, Hector CARBONELL and Julio MACHADO, also negroes. The official statements and acts of these men are guided and directed by Carlos FERNANDEZ R., one of the communist leaders of the CTC. The activities of the Comisión Juvenil are limited mainly to parades and demonstrations of the CTC itself and they do not have an organized existence in the same manner as the Juventud Socialista. Membership of the Comisión Juvenil is on a much more-reduced scale than that of the Juventud Socialista.

CONFIDENTIAL

19-4-51

STATE DEPT DOCUMENT

DATE: 22 JUNE 1949

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: PROPOSED CUBAN NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

STATE FILE NO: NO. 486, AMERICAN EMBASSY, HAVANA, CUBA

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE [illegible]	ACTION ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM [illegible]	ROOM NO. 1502K	TELEPHONE 5917

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE ☒ NONSENSITIVE	201 NO 209258	SOURCE DOCUMENT [illegible]

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): LESNICK - MENENDEZ MAX EDGARDO

SEX 3. ☐ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4	BIRTH DATE 5	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
☐ YES ☐ NO	D M Y			1 CMP 2 3

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC. POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.
CUBA	WH/SA 4		

COMMENTS:

JS/ CUBAN COMMUNIST (...[illegible])
[illegible]

PUNCHED

201- 209258

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
☐ YES ☐ NO	☐ YES ☐ NO	

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1973

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: MAX LESNICK, AKA MAX EDGARDO LESNICK-MENENDEZ

FBI FILE NO: 105-3492 (MIAMI)

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LESNCK, MAX
201-0209258
SEX M

201-0733547
LX-03890
12 DEC 73

COMMENTS OF SUBJ 201-0733547 FROM REVIEW OF 3 VOLUMES MUG BOOK AUG 73

AMFREE-1 (classified as good source with retentive memory, / was in Cuba from 59-64 (free) and in prison from 64-mid-73, charged with illegally attempting to leave the country - got 9 yrs. He 54 yrs old, Am. cit., turned over to FBI Nov 73.

Src said LESNICK was an officer with Fidel and as of 2 Aug 73 was in Miami working for magazine Replica - src described Lesnick as "red as a beet". When he returned Miami from Cuba, he contacted by Lesnick who wanted to write an article for magazine - src later got anonymous phone call telling him Lesnick dangerous and not to go to interview - he didn't.

dan

DATE 10 JAN 74

09050053

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

201-209258

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20202 (MIAMI)

DATE: 8 NOVEMBER 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 103-20202 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 26 JUNE 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 27 APRIL 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 25 SEPTEMBER 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ROLANDO ARCADIO MASFERRER ROJAS
FBI FILE NO: 2-156 (MIAMI)

DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT, AKA, COMMITTEE OF CUBANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITY OF THE EXILE
FBI FILE NO: 105-16515 (MIAMI)

14-00000

Form G-135a
Agency Name Check
(Rev. 10-1-65)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Office ADDI (INM)
Miami, Florida 33130
File No. A12 542 416
Date OCT 1, 1968

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Attention: DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Please furnish any derogatory information that may be contained in your files concerning the following person.

X

FBI Ident. Number None

(LAST NAME) (FIRST NAME) (MIDDLE NAME) LESNICK - MENENDEZ, Max Edgardo	DATE OF BIRTH September 8, 1930	PRESENT NATIONALITY CUBA
OTHER NAMES USED (Maiden name, names by former marriages, former names changed legally or otherwise, aliases, nicknames, etc. Specify which, and show dates used) "POLACO"; "MAXIM"; "CESAR"	PLACE OF BIRTH San Antonio de las Vueltas, Las Villas, CUBA ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	MARITAL STATUS ☐ SINGLE ☐ WIDOWED ☒ MARRIED ☐ DIVORCED

HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COLOR EYES	COLOR HAIR	IDENTIFYING MARKS

IF MARRIED, WIDOWED, OR DIVORCED, GIVE FULL NAME AND DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH OF SPOUSE OR FORMER SPOUSE. INCLUDE WIFE'S MAIDEN NAME. GIVE DATES AND PLACES OF ALL MARRIAGES OR DIVORCES

Miriam Alvarez-Digat; dpob March 26, 1932 Havana, Cuba; married December 29, 1955 Havana, Cuba; same address.

PARENTS' NAMES (Last name) (First name) DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If known) ADDRESS

Father Lesnick, Samuel; 7-23-03 Polonia; res. Santo Domingo, Dom. Rep.

Mother Menendez, Maria Teresa; 2-23-10 Las Villas, Cuba; res. Miami, Florida

ORGANIZATIONS (Include any societies, clubs, etc., with which now or previously affiliated) Federation Estudiantil Univ., Havana, Cuba, 1948-55; Ortodoxo Party; Director, Juventud Ortodoxo 1951, 1947-60; Segundo Frente de la Sierra del Escambray, Natl. Secy 1959-60, 1959-60.

RESIDENCE LAST (5) (7) YEARS (Street & No., RFD, etc.) (City, state and country)	FROM	TO
2122 SW 22nd Terrace, Miami, Florida	Feb 1967	Present
1236 SW 22nd Ave., Miami, Florida	Dec 1961	Feb 1967
960 SW 10th Court, Miami, Fla.	Sep 1961	Dec 1961
16th Ave., 2-3 Sts. Miami, Fla.	July 1961	Sep 1961
1332 NW 2nd Street, Miami, Fla.	Jun 1961	July 1961
Banos 205, Vedado, Havana, Cuba		Jan 1961

RCI

DHC 10-3-68

EMPLOYMENT LAST (5) (7) YEARS (Employer's name) (Number, street, city, state)	FROM	TO
Unemployed, Miami, Florida		Present
Self employed, WMIE Radio Station, NewsComentator, Miami	Feb 1965	Apr 1967
Cadena Oriental de Radio, and Radio Periodico El Nacional, Diario Nacional, Havana, Cuba	Feb 1959	Sep 1960

LAST ADMISSION TO U.S. (Date, port and status) 01-26-61 KEY; 212(d)(5)

X

PRIOR ENTRIES AND DEPARTURES (Dates and ports or if numerous, list years when previously in U.S.)

U.S. PASSPORT NO. (If known)

SOCIAL SECURITY # 261-72-9903

REASON FOR REQUEST Perm. Res; Investigation

☐ DEPORTATION ☒ ADM. TO U.S. ☐ BENEF. PB #
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJ. OF STATUS ☐ SPONSOR PB #
☐ APPLICANT FOR CONDITIONAL ENTRY FOR RELIEF OF

ARMED FORCES SERIAL # AND BRANCH OF SERVICE

(Reports 105-11510 Mia 10-5-66; 8-24-64; 9-21-61 Mia 105-3492; 105-64869; 105-2124; 64869 SanAntonio 3-30-61.)

RETURN TO
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
119 D St., N.E.
Washington, D. C. 20536

Assistant Commissioner
Investigations

FOR AGENCY REPLY

NAI to CSCI-3/764,464 dated 27 March 1961
subject: LESNIK Menendez, Max.

8 OCT 1968

8 Oct 68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (3)

FO[illegible] 1-67
BIOGRAPHIC
INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 43-R436

NH

(FAMILY NAME) LESNICK	(FIRST NAME) MAX	(MIDDLE NAME) EDGARDO	☐ MALE ☐ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (MO.-DAY-YR.) 09/08/30	NATIONALITY Cuban	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (IF ANY)
ALL OTHER NAMES USED				CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH VUELTAS LAS VILLAS		SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (IF ANY) [illegible]

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	LESNICK	[illegible]	1923 - [illegible]	
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE)

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

ZN

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	YEAR	TO MONTH	YEAR
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	PRESENT TIME	
[illegible]				[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]							
		NAI TO CSCI	3/764,464				
			27 MAR. 61				

LESNICK-MENENDEZ MAX EDGARDO
SUB AS ABOVE

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	YEAR	TO MONTH	YEAR
16 AUG 67				PRESENT TIME	
74	[illegible]				
NAI [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
201-209255	LAWS				

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE) CITY	COUNTRY	FROM (MONTH) (YEAR)	TO (MONTH) (YEAR)	LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE) CITY	COUNTRY	FROM (MONTH) (YEAR)	TO (MONTH) (YEAR)
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]				

31 JUL 1967

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY): ____

DATE	(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)	PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.
[illegible]		

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 18 AUGUST 1960

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: PARTIDO DE LA REVOLUCION (PR)

FBI FILE NO: 105-10748 (MIAMI)

201-209258 ✓

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. SCF

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 50

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO TIME 2320 BY DO

INFO FILE VR, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, DO 4, DO/H 3

AN IC FI

ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 210226Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 6730

NO NIACT

TYPIC

1. FOLL INITIAL INFO RE MAX LESNIK ROLE IN SURFACING OF CUBAN DELEGATION TO UN PRESS RELEASE RE TEXT 12 OCT CUBAN GOVT NOTE TO U.S. GOVT. PRIMARY SOURCE IS AMBLINK 1. SOME CONFIRMATORY DATA FROM AMOT.

2. MORNING 19 OCT MAX LESNIK MENENDEZ 201-209258 WAS IN OFFICES SEGUNDO FRENTE NACIONAL DE ESCAMBRAY (SFNE) WHEN MAIL RECEIVED. INCLUDED WAS PLAIN MANILA ENVELOPE SENT AIRMAIL, NO ADDRESS SENDER, ADDRESSED ONLY TO STREET ADDRESS, WITH SNFE NAME NOT APPEARING. DIEGO MEDINA OPENED ENVELOPE WHICH CONTAINED COPIES OLD CASTRO AND GUEVARA SPEECHES PLUS MIMEO COPY OF TYPED "PRESS RELEASE" ON FORM HEADED CUBA MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, THREE-PAGE SPANISH LANGUAGE TEXT.

3. LESNIK BEGAN TRY DETERMINE IF OTHER EXILE GROUPS OR AMERICAN PRESS ELEMENTS HAD RECEIVED COPIES RELEASE. CHECKS WITH USIA, AP, TIME WERE NEGATIVE. BASED LESNIK QUERY JORGE VOLSKY OF USIA (WHO NOW HAS CHANGED HIS STRINGER ALLEGIANCE FROM NEW YORK TIMES TO NEW YORK HERALD

201-209258
21 Oct 65

SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2
IN 77125

TRIBUNE PHONED MIAMI COORDINATOR CUBAN AFFAIRS WHO REPLIED HAD NO KNOWLEDGE MATTER. VOLSKY THEN PHONED BARNARD COLLIER NYHT LATIN AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT WHO CHECKED BY PHONE WITH CUBAN UN DELEGATION. PERSON WHO ANSWERED PHONE, APPARENTLY A SECRETARY, CONFIRMED EXISTENCE OF PRESS RELEASE BUT WAS VAGUE RE POSSIBLE DISTRIBUTION. LESNIK READ FROM RELEASE AND COMMENTED ON CONTENTS DURING HIS RADIO PROGRAM NIGHT 19 OCT. COLLIER BROKE STORY IN NYHT MORNING 20 OCT.

4. CUBAN EXILE CIRCLES SPECULATE THAT PERSON WITHIN OR HAVING CONTACT WITH CUBAN UN MISSION STOLE COPY OF RELEASE AND SENT IT ANONYMOUSLY TO SFNE. NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS OR ANY OTHER THEORY

SECRET

CFN 6730 MAX LESNIK UN 12 U.E. AMSLINK 1 AMOT 19 201-209258 SEGUNDO FRENTE NACIONAL DE ESCAMBRAY SFNE SNFE NOT APPEARING DIEGO MEDINA CASTRO GUEVARA D SPANISH USIA AP TIME JORGE VOLSKY USIA NEW YORK TIMES NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE MIAMI NO KNOWLEDGE VOLSKY BARNARD COLLIER NYHT LATIN AMERICAN CUBAN UN 19 OCT COLLIER NYHT 20 OCT UN SFNE NO EVIDENCE

BT

SECRET

OCT 26 1 15 11 PM '66

14-00000

201-209258 ✓ 00001.2.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO. B 201-352252

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS, C/WH, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/4, CI/IC 2

FI

ABSTRACT

MICROFILMED
AUG 26 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

19 Aug 65 IN 35072

3 D

S E C R E T 190001Z

DIR CITE WAVE 5089

TYPIC AMKNOB AMRAZZ AMOT

REF DIR 31065

1. AMRAZZ/1 DISCREETLY SOUNDED EXILE COMMUNITY WAVE AREA ON REF RQMS WITH FOLLOWING RESULTS:

A. IDEN A TOLD AMRAZZ/1 ON 7 AUG 65 THAT AMJAG/7 (201-209258) HAD RECENTLY SAID THAT CONFLICTING REPORTS (NATURE AND MEDIUM NOT SPECIFIED) ISSUED BY KUBARK AND ODBEAT RE DOMINICAN CRISIS RESULTED IN DOWNGRADING KUBARK, AND SINCE CRISIS IT RUMORED (NOT SPECIFIED BY WHOM) ODBEAT WOULD BE SUBSTITUTED ANY MOMENT FOR KUBARK IN HANDLING PBRUMEN PROBLEM. IDEN A ADDED HE SURE AMJAG/7 EMPLOYED BY KUBARK AND ASSUMED HE GOT INFO FROM HIS KUBARK CONTACT. (WAVE COMMENT: IN BOTH DAILY RADIO PROGRAM (IDEN B) AND NEWSPAPER (IDEN C) HE RUNS, IDEN A HAS CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED ANTI KUBARK LINE SET BY AMBANG/1 INCLUDING HINTS THAT KUBARK BEING EASED OUT OF PBRUMEN OPS. IN MEET WITH AMRAZZ/1, IDEN A PRESUMABLY USED AMJAG/7 NAME WHO HIGHLY RESPECTED ORDER LEND CREDENCE TO RUMOR AND THREW AMJAG/7-KUBARK TIE FOR MORE WEIGHT. AMJAG/7 CONSIDERED VERY

SECRET

201-209258
19 aug 65

B 201-352252

SECRET

[illegible]
35072

(SCREET, BELIEVED NOT KNOWN IN EXILE COMMUNITY AS HAVING ANY KUBARK TIES.)

B. AMTRUNK/1 (201-352252) TOLD AMRAZZ/1 10 AUG OF [illegible] UNSPECIFIED RUMORS IN EXILE COMMUNITY RE POSSIBLE ODBEAT TAKEOVER OF ANTI PBRUMEN ACTIVITIES. TIME AND EXTENT ODBEAT TAKEOVER NOT KNOWN. AMTRUNK/1 SEES NO DRASTIC CHANGE EVEN IF RUMOR TRUE BUT SAID HE NOTICED GRADUAL DECREASE KUBARK PERSONNEL IN AREA SINCE FALL AMBIDDY/1 AND CORRESPONDING INCREASE ODBEAT AGENTS. ADDED HE PERSONALLY KNEW PBRUMENS IN AREA EMPLOYED BY ODBEAT BUT DECLINED PROVIDE NAMES. (WAVE COMMENTS: MANY MEMBERS AMWORLD ALLUDED TO RO CLAIMED KUBARK STATUS. DECREASE THESE TYPES SINCE DISBANDMENT AMWORLD COULD ACCOUNT FOR ALLEGED REDUCTION NUMBER KUBARK AGENTS WAVE AREA.)

2. WAVE FEELS RUMORS GENERATED SOME EXTENT BY AX-GRINDERS LIKE IDEN A AND BY OPPORTUNISTS HOPING FOR OVERALL CHANGE WHICH MIGHT ENABLE THEM GAIN ODYOKE SUPPORT FOR OWN PERSONAL AIMS. NEWSPAPER IDEN D CONTRIBUTED TO START OF RUMORS BY PLAYING UP ODENVY "INVESTIGATION" KUBARK ACTIVITIES SANTO DOMINGO AND HINTING NEW CHIEF KUBARK INDICATED PHASE OUT CIVILIAN CONTROL ANTI PBRUMEN OPS.

SECRET

CFN 5089 31065 AMRAZZ/1 RQMS A AMRAZZ/1 7 65 AMJAG/7 201-209258

NOT SPECIFIED KUBARK ODBEAT RE DOMINICAN NOT SPECIFIED PBRUMEN

SECRET

SECRET

A AMJAG/7 B C A ANTI AMBANG/1 OPS AMRAZZ/1 A AMJAG/7 AMJAG/7
NOT KNOWN AMTRUNK/1 201-352252 AMRAZZ/1 10 NOT KNOWN AMTRUNK/1
NO DRASTIC AMFIDDY/1 AMWORLD AMWORLD AX-GRINDERS A ODYOKE D
ODENVY SANTO DOMINGO OPS
BT

SECRET

14-00000

201-209258 ✓ 17
25

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. B

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-352252 31

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. 50

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/PEG, [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

AN/CC FI

~~INDEX~~ ABSTRACT

MICROFILMED
AUG 26 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

19 Aug 65 IN 35070

SECRET 190001Z

DIR CITE WAVE 5090

TYPIC AMKNOB AMRAZZ AMOT

REF WAVE 5089 (IN 35072)

IDEN A: MAX EDGARDO LESNIK MENENDEZ (201-209258).

IDEN B: "REPLICA" PROGRAM DAILY 1845-1900 HRS, WMIE.

IDEN C: REPLICA NEWSPAPER

IDEN D: PATRIA NEWSPAPER, BATISTIANO WEEKLY.

SECRET

CFN 5090 5089 A MAX EDGARDO LESNIK MENENDEZ 201-209258 B "REPLICA" 1845-1900 HRS WMIE C REPLICA D PATRIA BATISTIANO WEEKLY

BT

SECRET

B201-352252

201-209258
19 aug 65

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: SECOND NATIONAL FRONT OF ESCAMBRAY (SNFE)

FBI FILE NO: 105-6243 (MIAMI)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LESNICK MAX
201-209258
VOL. II

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENT

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:05 9 AUG 78	12:10 8/7/78	BETSY PALMER	Betsy Palmer (will read anothertime
2:50 11 AUG 78		PAT ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

LESNICK, MAX

201-209258

/46/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION: OG/PCD-7 (850) INFO: ODPD-D, RF, FILE, DORECORD, (10/W)

79 1972436 PAGE 001 1972436
TOR: 091842Z FEB 79 SDOM 20190

S E C R E T 091748Z FEB 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 20190

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: LA/COG INFO LA/CARIB.

SUBJECT: WNINTEL FGI EMPYREX TRACE

1. EMPYREX (LIAISON) REQUESTS TRACESON MAX LESNICK E. MENENDEZ; BORN 8 SEPT 1930, HAVANA, CUBA; JOURNALIST WHO IS REQUESTING VISA TRAVEL DOM REP FOR BUSINESS TRIP. SUBJECT APPEARS TO BE IDENTICAL WITH MAX EDGARDO LESNICK MENDEZ (201-209258), CUIS PRINTOUT NO. 151438. STATION TRACES CONTAINED UFG-01709, 20 OCT 62 AND UFG-03590, 10 SEPT 63, INDICATE LESNICK ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILE BROADCASTER AND STATION IS PERPLEXED SUBJECT'S INCLUSION IN CUIS.

2. INDEX: LESNICK. FILE: 201-209258. RVW 9 FEB 09, DRV 0981.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LESNIK, MAX	
201-0209258	200-006-495/18
SEX M	DTR-01586
	18 JAN 78
	TREA
	P3

DIRECTOR AND PUBLISER OF REPLICA, A SPANISH MAGAZINE PRINTED IN MIAMI.
ATTENDED MEETING FOR PURPOSE OF ORGANIZING A SECRET ANTI-CASTRO GROUP.

DATE 06 FEB 78 09577279

201-209258

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

CABLES FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1977
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN
THE U.S.; FCI - CUBA

DATE: 6 AUGUST 1977
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: WILD STALLION; INTERNAL SECURITY -
CUBA-PANAMA

14-00000

FORM G-325A (REV. 10-1-74) Y

Form A:
OMB No. 4

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

(Family name) LESNICK	(First name) Max	(Middle name) Menendez	☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (Mo.-Day-Yr.) 9/2/30	NATIONALITY Cuban	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (If any) A12 542 41
ALL OTHER NAMES USED (including names by previous marriages)			CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH Vueltas, Cuba			SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (If any) 261-72-990

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (If known)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	Lesnick	Samuel	Poland 1903	Santo Domingo, D. Reublic
MOTHER (Maiden name)	Menéndez	Teresa	Cuba, 1910	Miami, Fla

HUSBAND (If none, so state) OR WIFE — FAMILY NAME (For wife, give maiden name)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
Alvarez	Miriam	3/26/32	Havana, Cuba	12/29/55	Havana, Cub

FORMER HUSBANDS OR WIVES (If none, so state) none

FAMILY NAME (For wife, give maiden name)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

				FROM		TO	
STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	MONTH	YEAR	MONTH	YEAR
5530 Sardina	C. Gables	Fla	U.S.A.	Jan	75	PRESENT TIME	
1730 Pizarro	C. Gables	Fla.	U.S.A.	Jan	73	Jan.	75
2122 S.W. 22 Terr.	Miami	Fla.	U.S.A.	March	66	Jan.	73

APPLICANT'S LAST ADDRESS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR

				FROM		TO	
STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	MONTH	YEAR	MONTH	YEAR
Banos 205	Havana	Havana	Cuba		56	Jan	61

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST

		FROM		TO	
FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION (SPECIFY)	MONTH	YEAR	MONTH	YEAR
2994 N.W. 7 St. Miami, Fla. 33125 Replica Publishing, Inc.	President	Oct.	67	PRESENT TIME	

NAI TO CSCI-3/764/464 DATED 27 MARCH 1961, SUBJECT: LESNIK--MENENDEZ, MAX PREVIOUSLY SENT TO YOUR SERVICE. ALSO REFER TO THE FBI. 12 May 1977

Show below last occupation abroad if not shown above. (Include all information requested above.) RFB

Cadena Oriental de Radio, Havana, Cuba	commentator		59	Aug	60

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR
☐ NATURALIZATION ☒ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER DATE

Are all copies legible? ☒ Yes

IF YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IS IN OTHER THAN ROMAN LETTERS, WRITE YOUR NAME IN YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IN THIS SPACE:

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

APPLICANT: BE SURE TO PUT YOUR NAME AND ALIEN REGISTRATION NUMBER IN THE BOX OUTLINED BY HEAVY BORDER BELOW.

COMPLETE THIS BOX (Family name)	(Given name)	(Middle name)	(Alien registration number)
LESNICK-Menendez,	Max		A12 542 416

(OTHER AGENCY USE)

INS USE (Office of Origin)

OFFICE CODE: I-485A
TYPE OF CASE: Dec. 1. C.
DATE: RM1418

MIA
T.C.

APR 2 8 1977

201-209258

14-00000

A ← ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX.   TYPE THE WORD "ALIGN" TO REGISTER HERE →

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

15-4

SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR   DATE-TIME GROUP   CITE   MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF   012J17Z   DIRECTOR   936139

CONF: 9CA5   INFO: FILE 9 [illegible] 9CI4 9DS/IT64

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO   PER 58
0 IP FILES   # 186

X

LA/PNC/P

TO: PRIORITY PANAMA CITY INFO LA/MIAMI.Y

WNINTEL RYBAT PBRAMPART MHSPIKE Y

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 934495

B. DIRECTOR 933847

C. PANAMA CITY 38750 (IN 076237) .Y

1. THE FOLLOWING C INFORMATION (LESS 201'S) MAY BE PASSED TO THE 470TH FOR ITS INTERNAL INFO ONLY:

A. ALDO INOCENCIO VERA SERAFIN (201-0326634) DPOB 28 JULY 1928, CAIBARIEN, LAS VILLAS, CUBA. FORMER UNDERGROUND LEADER AGAINST BATISTA 1955-59 AND PROMINENT MEMBER IN 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT. HELD SEVERAL POSITIONS IN CASTRO'S EARLY REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT INCLUDING THAT OF CHIEF OF THE TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT (DTI), THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE ORGAN OF THE CUBAN NATIONAL POLICE. ARRIVED IN U.S. WITH WIFE AND BABY AS A REFUGEE ON 13 MARCH 1961. ISSUED PERMANENT U.S. ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. A-12-486-223 IN JUNE 1965. IN 1972 MOVED TO PUERTO RICO. VERA WAS VERY ACTIVE IN ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILE GROUPS UP UNTIL THE TIME HE WAS KILLED BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS ON 25 OCTOBER 1976 IN SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

B 201-326634

RECORD COPY

201-209258
1 Nov 76

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION   REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: ------

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 2

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

CITE: DIRECTOR 936139

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO   PER
0 IP FILES   #

B. MAX EDGARDO LESNICK (201-0209258) DPOB 8 SEPT 1930, VUELTAS, LAS VILLAS, CUBA. FLED TO U.S. IN JANUARY 1961. [illegible] ISSUED PERMANENT U.S. ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. A-12-542-416 IN JANUARY 1961. HAS BEEN THE PUBLISHER OF THE SMALL EXILE NEWSPAPER "REPLICA" IN MIAMI SINCE 1963 AND A COMMENTATOR FOR A DAILY NEWS PROGRAM "RADIO REPLICA" SINCE 1964. INVOLVED WITH SEVERAL ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILE GROUPS.

2. ADDEE (INTERNAL) INFO ONLY:

A. THERE ARE NUMEROUS FBI REPORTS ON VERA AND HIS ACTIVITIES WHILE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS EXILE GROUPS AND ESPECIALLY CONCERNING VERA'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE GROUP ACCION CUBANA (AC), WHICH IS A SMALL CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST GROUP HEADED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA AND WHICH HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR A NUMBER OF BOMBINGS AGAINST CUBAN EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES. BKHERALD HAS HAD CONTACT WITH VERA OFF-AND-ON SINCE 1964. BESIDES THE CONTACT DESCRIBED IN REF B VERA WAS BEING CONSIDERED IN 1964 FOR THE AMWORLD PROGRAM, BUT THIS DID NOT MATERIALIZE. AN INTERESTING NOTE IS FACT THAT VERA WAS REGISTERED BY THE ARMY WITH ISR FOR THE PERIODS JANUARY - JULY 1964 AND AUGUST 1964- APRIL 1966, BOTH TIMES BEING DROPPED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR 936139

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

B. CONCERNING LESNICK, SEVERAL FBI REPORTS INDICATE LESNICK WAS ASSOCIATED WITH ORLANDO BOSCH AND WAS INVOLVED IN AND SUPPORTED A NUMBER OF CUBAN EXILE REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS' TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. ANOTHER FBI REPORT INDICATED THAT LESNICK RECEIVED MONEY FROM PANAMA IN CONNECTION WITH NARCOTICS TRAFFIC AND ALLEGEDLY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ARREST IN PANAMA OF GABRIEL GREGORIO RODRIGUEZ, WHO WAS SUSPECTED OF PLOTTING AGAINST THE TORRIJOS GOVERNMENT IN PANAMA. THE LATEST FBI INFO ON LESNICK RECEIVED IN SEPTEMBER 1974 REPORTED THAT LESNICK AND ORLANDO BOSCH WERE NO LONGER COOPERATING BECAUSE OF AN ARGUMENT OVER MONEY. LESNICK WAS ONCE CONTACTED BY THE HAVANA STATION IN AUGUST 1957 AS PART OF THAT STATION'S LONG RANGE DEVELOPMENT OF OPS ASSETS. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF ANY FURTHER OPERATIONAL INTEREST.Y

4. FILE: 201-0209258, 201-0326634. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: A. INDICATED TRACES ON VERA AND LESNICK WOULD FOLLOW SEPARATELY.

B. INFORMED ADDEES OF ASSASSINATION OF VERA ON 25 OCTOBER 1976 AND GAVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF AGENCY CONTACT WITH VERA

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

S E C R E T
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR 936139

CONF: INFO: FILE

☐ INDEX DISSEM BY:
☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO PER
☐ IP FILES #

C. REQUESTED TRACES ON VERA AND LESNICK AND ASKED HQS INDICATE WHAT INFO COULD BE PASSED TO THE 470TH.

DC/LA/COG W. MURRAY (IN DRAFT)

C/LA/CAR

AC/CI/OG/AT Harry Archer

AGC/DDO

PCS/LSN/MIL

PCS/ITG

DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: LESLIE BRUDZINSKI/PAULETTE DANCY:MEH
UNIT: LA/PNC/PA
EXT: 1454

L. Lason for
C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 007255

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

37-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 281947Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 934495

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/IIAN, C/LSN/ID, C/LSN/NIL, DDO 3, DDO/DO, C/OPS/NARC, C/OPS/ITG 4, C/CI 4, C/PS6, AGC/DDO, SIA 2, C/OPS, C/PS/EG 2, C/NE 6

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 27

CHRONO

TO: PRIORITY PANAMA CITY INFO LA/MIAMI.Y

UNINTEL RYBAT HYEPOCH MHSPIKE Y

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 38780 |IN 078745|

B. PANAMA CITY 38750 |IN 076237|

C. DIRECTOR 931692 Y

1. HEADQUARTERS IN PROCESS OF NOTIFYING DEA OF FBI REQUEST DESCRIBED REF C. FURTHERMORE, WE RECOMMENDING TO DEA THAT SINCE ALDEREGUIA IS A REGISTERED DEA CI THEY MAY WISH INFORM FBI OF THEIR INTEREST, IF THEY HAVE NOT DONE SO ALREADY.Y

2. NO HEADQUARTERS TRACES ON OCHOA AND MAYO. TRACES ON ALDO VERA (201-0326634) AND MAX LESNICK (201-0209258) FOLLOW SEPARATELY BUT WILL BE MOSTLY FOR STATION USE ONLY. A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INFO IS FROM FBI AND MAY NOT BE PASSED TO 470TH WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF FBI. BECAUSE OF NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION INVOLVED IT WOULD BE BETTER IF 470TH MADE OWN QUERY TO FBI FOR THIS INFORMATION. BELIEVE IN FUTURE THAT ANY SUCH REQUESTS FROM 470TH FOR INFORMATION SHOULD BE DIRECTED THROUGH THEIR OWN COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS TO THE FBI SINCE WE ARE NOT AT LIBERTY TO DIVULGE TO ONE AGENCY INFORMATION

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

LESNICK 201

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR 934495

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

FROM ANOTHER. MOREOVER, SINCE INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED REF B ARE U.S. PERSONS, DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE 470TH AND THE FBI PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE.Y

6

3. FILE: 201-281197, 56-2-4, 56-8-11. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: A. STATION ASKS IF FBI HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT ALDEREGUIA IBS REGISTERED IN ISR AS SOURCE OF DEA.

B. REQUESTS TRACES ON CUBAN EXILES CONNIE OCHOA, ALDO VERA, MAX LESNICH, AND FNU MAYO.

C. NOTIFIES ADDEES THAT IN RESPONSE TO HEADQUARTERS MEMO TO FBI ON ACTIVITIES OF ALDEREGUIA FBI WISHES INITIATE DISCREET INVESTIGATION OF ALDEREGUIA'S ACTIVITIES IN U.S. ADVISES HEADQUARTERS GIVING SUCH CONCURRENCE.

DC/LA/COG	W. MURRAY	{IN DRAFT}
PCS/LSN/ID	C. ENRIGHT	{IN DRAFT}
PCS/LSN/MIL	FRANTZ	{IN DRAFT}
PCS/NC	N. DAVIS	{IN DRAFT}
~~BBBBBB~~PCS/ITC	P. PLUMB	{IN DRAFT}
AC/CI/OG/AT	H. ARCHER	{IN DRAFT}
AGC/DDO	A.E. GOLDIN	{IN DRAFT}
C/LA/CAR		

DATE: 28 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: LESLIE BRUDZINSKI:MEH
UNIT: LA/PNC/PA
EXT: 1454

C/LA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LA/PNC

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

STAFF

AA3

C/LA/PAN, C/CI-4, C/EUR-2,
C/OSG, C/SIA-2, C/OS/INT-2,
SUSPENSE C/LA, CDO, CSRF, DCI(FALK), DDO 3, DDI/DO, C/SS-3,

T 303338 EIA461 PAGE 01 IN 007362

TOR:262223Z OCT 76 C/IID, C/OS/IIG 4 PACY 38795

S E C R E T 262132Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 38795

TO: DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI, CARACAS.

WNINTEL RYBAT HYEPOCH INTEL

1. ON 26 OCTOBER HYEPOCH-2 PASSED STATION COPY OF REPORT ON ALLEGED CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ACTIVITY FROM AN APPARENTLY NEW SOURCE OF GN/G-2 IN MIAMI. REPORT IS NOT DATED BUT GN/G-2 DATE STAMP INDICATES THEY RECEIVED REPORT ON 22 OCTOBER. EVEN THOUGH WRITER IS NOT IDENTIFIED IN HANDWRITTEN DOCUMENT, IT PROVIDES ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBERS IN MIAMI AREA, WHICH SHOULD MAKE HIS IDENTIFICATION FEASIBLE. WRITER APPEARS TO BE PROPRIETOR OF "PASCO'S SEA FOOD", 1230 W. TWENTY-THIRD STREET, HIALEAH, WITH PHONES 665-7344 (OFFICE); 886-2267 (HOME) AND ADDITIONAL PHONE 854-4231 FOLLOWED BY NOTATION (MY HOUSE). WE HAVE NO IDEA HOW DOCUMENT REACHED GN/G-2 BUT WE SPECULATE HYLEMMA-1 COULD HAVE BROUGHT IT FROM MIAMI. THE WRITER IS ASKING [illegible] (US) FOR HIS SERVICES.

2. PRESUMABLY TO ESTABLISH HIS BONA FIDES AND SUBSTANTIATE HIS ACCESS TO INFO OF VALUE TO PANAMANIANS, WRITER SUBMITTED LENGTHY REPORT ON ALLEGED RECENT CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITY ACCOMPANIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

STAFF

RF FILE VR

BY LONG LIST OF CUBAN EXILE ACTIVISTS. DOCUMENT CONTAINS FAMILIAR ALLEGATION OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN THIS ACTIVITY. DOCUMENT STATES THAT ORLANDO BOSCH IS UNDER ARREST IN VENEZUELA TOGETHER WITH LUIS POSADA CARRILES ALIAS "EL BAMBI". BOSCH WAS TRAVELING ON COSTA RICAN PASSPORT AND ALSO HAD NICARAGUAN, DOMINICAN AND CHILEAN PASSPORTS.

3. REPORT LISTS BOSCH'S CONTACTS AS MANUEL BORRO IN NICARAGUA (DESCRIBED AS CLOSE TO GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA); ORLANDO NUNEZ IN COSTA RICA; AND MARIO RIVADILLA IN SANTO DOMINGO. POSADA IS DESCRIBED AS EX-U.S. ARMY RANGER, WHO WORKED FOR VENEZUELA'S DIGEPOL FOR EIGHT YEARS AND THEN ORGANIZED PRIVATE DETECTIVE AGENCY WHICH EMPLOYS OVER 1,200 MEN. POSADA, ACCORDING TO THE WRITER, DIRECTED ALL VIOLENT ACTIONS IN VENEZUELA AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS. HIS ALIAS WAS "INSPECTOR BASILIO" AND ALSO "EL CALICHE". THE RECENT OPERATION AGAINST THE CUBANA PLANE WAS MOUNTED BY POSADA, ASSISTED BY ALDO VERA. THE WRITER CONTINUES BY STATING THAT BOSCH'S RECENT TRIP TO VENEZUELA WAS AN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN "ALDO'S GROUP" AND CORU. BOSCH'S MISSION WAS SUCCESSFUL AS IT APPEARS CORU AND ALDO'S GROUP WILL UNITE. ALDO VERA IS REPORTEDLY IN PUERTO RICO. THE WRITER ADDS THAT ALDO'S GROUP WILL ENTER

S E C R E T

STAFF

T 332335 814461 PAGE 03-03 IN 282362

TOR:262223Z OCT 76 PACY 38795

VENEZUELA IN NOVEMBER 75 TO MOUNT A SERIES OF ATTACKS AGAINST CUBAN EMBASSIES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA.

4. IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR FROM TEXT BUT IT APPEARS WRITER IS REQUESTING THAT VIVIAN FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO, FORMERLY JAILED IN CUBA, BE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL TO PANAMA SINCE SHE HAS ALREADY SERVED HER SENTENCE. FERNANDEZ WOULD THEN TRAVEL FROM PANAMA TO MIAMI WHERE SHE WOULD BE OF SERVICE TO THE WRITER.

5. THE WRITER CLAIMS THAT ARNULFO ARIAS WAS ALL SET TO GO TO PANAMA DURING THE RECENT UNREST THERE. ARIAS WAS TO HAVE BEEN FLOWN BY JOE MEROLA, AN AMERICAN WHO IS WELL KNOWN TO CUBAN GOVERNMENT. JOE MEROLA AND ROLANDO MARTINEZ, WHO ARE IN CONTACT WITH CIA, WILL INTRODUCE THE WRITER TO ARIAS THUS IMPROVING WRITER'S ACCESS TO ARIAS WHO IS OF INTEREST TO PANAMANIANS.

6. STATION POUCHING COPY OF ALLEGED CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITIES TO ADDRESSEES.

7. FILE: 50-2-2/3. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

STAFF

T 320052 E1A460 PAGE 01 IN 076237

TOR:2112392 OCT 76 PACY 38750

S E C R E T 211217Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 38750

TO: PRIORITY LA/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PBRAMPART

REF: PANAMA CITY 38685 (IN [illegible])

1. 470TH MIGP SUCCEEDED IN HOLDING OPS MEETING WITH SOURCE 301 NIGHT OF 19 OCT. IN COURSE OF THAT DEBRIEFING, 301 REPORTED FOLLOWING:

A. HE WAS SENT ALONE TO MIAMI BY GN G-2, LTC. NORIEGA, ON 14 OCT, RETURNED TO PANAMA NIGHT 15 OCT. HIS MISSION WAS TO CONTACT SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA TO OBTAIN INFO ON CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH SABOTAGE OF CUBANA AIRLINER OFF BARBADOS.

B. 301 REACHED ALDEREGUIA THROUGH CUBAN EXILE FEMALE NAMED CONNIE OCHOA, WHO FUNCTIONS AS MISTRESS TO BOTH 301 AND ALDEREGUIA. ALDEREGUIA NAMED CUBAN EXILES ALDO VERA AND (FNU) MAYOR, A VETERINARIAN, AS HAVING HAD ROLE IN SABOTAGE OPERATION, BUT SAID PRINCIPAL FIGURE WAS ORLANDO BOSCH. ALDEREGUIA SAID THAT BOSCH HAD GONE TO NICARAGUA WHERE ANASTASIO SOMOZA GAVE HIM UNSPECIFIED AMOUNT OF MONEY TO MOUNT OPERATION. BOSCH PROCEEDED

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

INFO	RF FILE VP	1 4
		2 5
		3 6

T 320252 EIA480 PAGE 02 IN 076237

TOR:211239Z OCT 76 PACY 38752

TO CARACAS TO CARRY IT OUT. ALDEREGUIA ALSO NAMED CUBAN EXILE MAX LESNICH AS BEING IMPLICATED IN OPERATION.

C. AFTER 301 RETURNED TO PANAMA, HE WAS INVITED TO DINNER AT HOME OF AMADO PADRON, KNOWN CUBAN INTEL OFFICER IN CUBAN EMBASSY PANAMA CITY, NIGHT 18 OCT. CUBAN AMBASSADOR GARCIA WAS ALSO PRESENT. GARCIA PRAISED 301 EFFUSIVELY FOR PREVIOUS INFO 301 HAD PROVIDED TO CUBANS FROM MIAMI EXILE CONTACTS. GARCIA SAID THAT FIDEL CASTRO USED IT EXTENSIVELY IN PREPARING HIS 15 OCT SPEECH.

D. 301 WILL BE ASKED BY NORIEGA TO GO TO MIAMI AGAIN IN NEAR FUTURE, PROBABLY FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ON SAME SUBJECT.

2. IF 301 GOES TO MIAMI AGAIN 470TH WILL SEND STUDLEY TO MEET HIM THERE TO MONITOR HIS CONTACTS WITH EXILE COMMUNITY. CONTACT WITH 301 IS MUCH EASIER IN MIAMI THAN IN PANAMA. 470TH WILL INFORM FBI AS REQUIRED BY COORDINATION RULES. WOULD APPRECIATE MIAMI STATION ASSISTANCE TO STUDLEY IF REQUIRED. MIGHT BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL IF MIAMI CAN PROVIDE RAPID LOCAL TRACES ON NAMES THAT HE GETS FROM 301.

3. STATION TRACES ON OCHOA AND MAYO NEGATIVE. NAME ALDO VERA IS ON CURRENT ON G-2 WATCHLIST, IDENTIFIED AS PUERTO RICAN RESIDENT AND "DANGEROUS". DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS IDENTICAL TO SAME NAME

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 320052 EIA482 PAGE 03-03 IN 076237

TOR:211239Z OCT 76 PACY 38750

IN PARA 2B ABOVE BUT BELIEVE IT LIKELY. MAX LESNICH IS ALMOST CERTAINLY EDITOR OF "REPLICA" MAGAZINE IN 1974 AND SUBJECT OF LENGTHY MIAMI FBI REPORT DATED 25 SEPT 74 (FBI FILE NO. 105-3492) DEALING WITH ENMITIES WITHIN MIAMI EXILE COMMUNITY.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEE TRACES ON OCHOA, VERA, MAYO AND LESNICK. PLEASE INDICATE WHAT INFO MAY BE PASSED TO 470TH.

5. FILE: 56-2-4, 201-0933215. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

ACTION UNIT C/LA5

ACTION #

	INFO	RF FILE VR C/LA...	STAFF
			1 4
			2 5
			3 6

T 320643 EIA257 PAGE 01-01 IN 076521

TOR:211554Z OCT 76 LMIM 25518

SECRET 211546Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 25518

TO: PRIORITY PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PBRAMPART

REF: PANAMA CITY 38750 (IN 076237)

1. ONLY STATION TRACES ON SUBJECTS REF ARE ON ALDO VERA SERAFIN, WHO INVOLVED WITH HAITIAN/CUBAN EXILE GROUPS PLANNING INVASION OF HAITI IN 1966. (MAY PASS 470TH).

2. WISH REMIND PANAMA CITY, LA/MIAMI STATION RECORDS AND FILES ON CUBAN EXILES ARE VERY LIMITED AND THEREFORE ANY ASSISTANCE WE PROVIDE 470TH REPS WOULD NOT BE AS MEANINGRUL AS HQS TRACES.

3. FILE: 56-2-4, 201-0933215. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

SEX M DOB 08 5[redacted]30 | 100-009-014
CUBA, LAS VILLAS, VUELTAS | UFG -0800U[redacted]
CIT CUBA | 08 MAR 66
OCC ? | P2

EMIGRE IN MIAMI. CHARTER MBR, AND MBR OF FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OF CCEP.

[redacted] [redacted]

FILE INDEX ONLY | UFG 050
LESNICK, MAX
201-0209253
SEX M

019-300-025
WMIN-21546
17 APR 74

MENTIONED AS ONE OF LEADERS OF FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA.

[redacted] [redacted]

R24 DATE 14 MAY 74 | 09108246

[redacted]

L[illegible]S[illegible]CK, M[illegible]X
201-0[illegible]
SEX [illegible]

201-0733[illegible]7
LX-038[illegible]0
1[illegible] DEC 7[illegible]

[illegible] 201-0733547 FROM REVIEW OF [illegible] 73

[redacted]

[illegible] 74 | [illegible]

LESNIK, Max

CUBA

Subj reportedly in SNTO working on anti-Castro Radio program broadcast over Radio Caribe, but doubt seriously he is being considered as Director, especially in view of his Cuban nationality.
(SNTO-1366, 18 Mar 63, IN-88859)

[redacted]

LUSNICK, MAX

SEX [illegible] ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

OFO-300-003
UFG-01(0)
20 OCT 62
WAVE-00110
P1

PLAYED A SHORTWAVE BROADCAST OF RECENT ALPHA ATTACK FROM SANTO DOMINGO ON 12 OCT 62. SOURCE OF AMOT-119.

[illegible] DOC

FLD INDEX ONLY 306 553

LUSNICK Fernandez, Max Eduardo [illegible] University in past [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and has been seen on various occasions with alleged [illegible] GUZMAN and [illegible] [illegible] Vivo, well-known Communists who are close friends of his. [illegible] Has great deal of influence over Juventud Ortodoxa group (JO). — [illegible]

Promised to sup[port] anti CASTILLO agitation proposed by JS. — [illegible] 10 Aug 56 CJ.

[illegible] Ortodoxo Youth
Member of [illegible] Committee of Ortodoxo Youth — [illegible] Aug 56

Oppositionist [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] followers and leaders, also of the Juventud Ortodoxa Insurreccional. — [illegible] 1956 [illegible]

DOB 4 Sept. 1930 in Yuelitas, Las Villas, Cuba. Salesman, pres. Juventud Ortodoxa, anti [illegible] Party leader, BATISTA [illegible] [illegible] currently hiding from police until heat is off. Security check reveals no indications of collaboration with Communists. Subj. claimed to be only acquainted with [illegible] leaders who were students at Habana University. Denies present or past collaboration with Commies, and is currently publishing articles indicating anti-Commie stand since 1950. Subject plans to attend inter-american press association [illegible] 12 October 1957 in Washington, entering NYC at 1:35 p.m. on 12 Oct. 57. (Filed [illegible] Folder). — [illegible] TEL. NO. [illegible] Habana, Cuba 3 Oct. 57

LUSNICK y Fernandez, Max

Card 2a.

[illegible] candidate. Young Cuban political leader. See document in [illegible] folder. — HAVA [illegible] 6 June 1957

Approximately same info as above. Filed [illegible]. — HAVA 077 [illegible] 6 Oct. 57

Subject's name and address Calle 8 No. 205 y Linea, Habana, found in papers confiscated from Lionel SOTO Prieto, prominent Cuban Communist, when latter was arrested by Cuban Police in October 1957. (Field states: In 1951 a fairly reliable source described LUSNICK as a very good friend of SOTO, and a Commie sympathiser. Recently when subject applied for a U.S. entry visa, he admitted knowing SOTO, but claimed he did not share SOTO's views). — HKHA-4072 27 Nov. 57

Subj is commander at SFNE Hqs and chief of SFNE rear guard. — HAVA-811 SAC[illegible] TDCS-3/[illegible] 3 Jan 59

[illegible] of subj and [illegible] have noontime daily hour-long radio program which denounces "American imperialists and monopolists." — Wash Post 31 Jan 60

[illegible]

14-00000



[illegible] Menendez, [illegible]

Subj reportedly [illegible] against regime of Fidel Castro. [illegible] Miami, Fla. area [illegible] contacted [illegible] anti-Castro, [illegible] Castro. (Source: [illegible] 21 Sept 61 (File [illegible])

[illegible] Menendez, Max (also spelled L[illegible]NICK)

Secretary-general of the Ortodoxo youth group and [illegible]. [illegible]-1577 10 July 1952

[illegible]

Led Ortodoxo Party group in collaborating with PSP on protest against Trans-Cuba canal. Appealed thru press 14 Dec 54 for meeting 16 Dec 54 protesting canal. Meeting held at COCO. More info on people.

Has participated in meetings of PSP and Ortodoxo leaders at Dr. Eduardo [illegible]'s office, aim to combat BATISTA regime. 21 Dec 54

English translation of news commentary by Subject 21 Dec 54 over C[illegible] of Santiago de Cuba, "Cadena Oriental de Radio," on Trans-Cube Canal. Havana Report [illegible] 30 Dec 54

Summary of talk by youth leader Max LESNICK Menendez. CORG Santiago de Cuba 1 April [illegible]

LESNICK MENENDEZ, MAX
019-300-003
UFG-[illegible]
27 MAR 64
P2

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA ?
OCC NEWSMAN
A USA, FLA., MIAMI
EDITOR OF THE NEWSPAPER /REPLICA/ IS BELIEVED TO SERVE AS THE LIAISON BETWEEN MANOLO RAY RIVERO.
Manuel

FLD INDEX ONLY
[illegible]

LESNICK MENENDEZ, MAX
201-352252
UFGA-17110 A01
24 AUG 64
P11

SEX M DOB ?
CUBA ?
CIT CUBA ?
OCC ?
Δ USA
CONTACT OF JORGE VOLSKY /201-352252/
EDITOR OF REPLICA NEWSPAPER.

FLD INDEX ONLY
[illegible]

LESNICK MENEN[illegible], MAX EDGARDO
201-209258
SEX M DOB 08 SEP 30
CUBA, LAS VUELTAS
CIT CUBA ?
OCC EDITOR
Δ USA
REF UFGA-12336, 13 NOV 63
ARR USA KEY WEST, FLA. 26 JAN 61 REQUESTING POL. ASYLUM. FORMER RADIO COMMENTATOR CUBA. STATES NOT COMMIE OR SYMPATHIZER. PUBLISHER AND EDITOR OF REPLICA NEWSPAPER. DOI NOV 63.

CORR CARD WAS LESNICK, MAX MENENDEZ
#UFG

1 794 260

LESNICK, MAX
201-209258
SEX M DOB ?

CIT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
OCC ?
Δ DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

019-300-004
UFG -03590
10 SEP 63
P4

SUBJ HAD MEETING W/SUBJ OF 201-239298, AND SUBJ COMMITTED HIMSELF OFFICIALLY TO JURE. SUBJ WOULD BROADCAST WEEKLY ON BEHALF OF JURE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

#HDC

1 706

Lesnick, Max

Subject who is on editorial staff of newspaper said that within one week the first edition of Replica, a four-page newspaper, will be available in 5,000 copies within the Cuban exile community. Its format will be almost in tabloid form and it may appear three times a month. The printing cost for each issue will be $200.

CSDB-3/657,39[illegible] 22 Oct 63

LESNICK, MAX
201-209258
SEX M DOB ?

019-300-004
UFG -03849
15 OCT 63

CIT USA ?
OCC ?
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEWSPAPER REPLICA TO COUNTERACT PRO-BATISTA PROPAGANDA IN THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNIST, THE SUBJECT IS AN EDITOR.

LESNIK, Ma Cuba

Subj., Cuban national, recently rumored made Chief Radio CARIBE.

(WAVE-5865, (IN-87544), 16 Mar 63)

REC NO	NAME	CITZ	DOB	OCC	TL NO	FROM	TO	A/D	DAT	DOC REF
[illegible]	LESME MANFESA RAFAEL	CUBA	000027	TSEA		CUBA	SPAN		270367	ZZM 6076
J257625	LESMES AGUIRRE GUADALUPA	CUBA			F702214	CUBA	EGEL		011074	ZZM [illegible]
G101699	LESMES AGUIRRE GUADALUPE	CUBA			F702214	CUBA	CAN		[illegible]	ZZM [illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

REC NO	N-A-M-E	CITZ	DOB	OCC	TL NO	FROM	TO	A/D	DAT	DOC REF
E422307	LESMES MANFESA RAFAEL	CUBA	141126	TSEA		CAN	CUBA		[illegible]	ZZM 8846
F226699	LESMES MANFESA RAFAEL	CUBA	141126	TSEA		PANA	JAP		040770	HZPA 18322
F226700	LESMES MANFESA RAFAEL	CUBA	141126	TSEA		CUBA	PANA		060770	HZPA 18322
G001089	LESMES MANFESA RAFAEL	CUBA	141126	TSEA		USSR	PANA		151070	HZPA 13561
G001090	LESMES MANFESA RAFAEL	CUBA	141126	TSEA		PANA	CUBA		151070	HZPA 13551
G347278	LESMES MANFESA RAFAEL	CUBA	141126	TSEA		CUBA	CAN		160971	ZZM 10395
I171326	LESMES MANFESA RAFAEL	CUBA			03918	SPAN	CUBA	A	270273	ZZM 11257
J310170	LESMES MANFESA RAFAEL	CUBA	141126	TSEA		PZON	JAP	D	131274	ZZM 12943
K240513	LESMES MANRESA RAFAEL	CUBA	141126		0003912	CUBA	JAP	A	310175	ZZM 14113
K075676	LESMES MANRESA RAFAEL	CUBA	141126	TSEA	0003918	JAP	CUBA	D	180275	ZZM 13371
K240514	LESMES MANFESA RAFAEL	CUBA	141126		0003912	JAP		I	180275	ZZM 14113
I171327	LESMES MANFESA RAFAEL/CART/	CUBA	141126	TSEA	3918		NETH	P	100772	ONHT06097
J257626	LESMES MANROSA R	CUBA	141126	TSEA		JAP	PZON	A	080974	ZZM 12515
E786837	LESMES MANROCA RAFAEL	CUBA	000027	TSEA	23270	CUBA	SPAN		140367	ZZM 6020
I263427	LESMES RAFAEL	CUBA	230543	TSEA	03918		NETH	A	000273	ONHT6381
I263428	LESMES RAFAEL	CUBA	230543	TSEA	03918	NETH	BELG	D	170273	ONHT6381
J257627	LESMES RAMOS FRANCISCO R	CUBA	000049	STU	F691415	USSR	CUBA	D	000774	ZZM 12517
K175406	LESMO HERNANDEZ SIMON	CUBA			0002975	CUBA	SPAN	A	300775	ZZM 13710
F563633	LESMO OREGON IDALIA B	CUBA			3432	CUBA	SPAN		260170	ZZM 8846
B786839	LESNICK OBERSTEIN MAX	CUBA	030232		66696	NETH	ITAL	D	300966	ONHA33099
B786838	LESNICK OBERSTEIN MAX	CUBA	030232	STU	66696	FRAN	NETH	A	081065	ONHA33239
B786840	LESNIK MAX	CUBA					DOMR	F	000565	IN 22050
B786841	LESNIK OBERSTEIN CHAJA	CUBA	300508				NETH		000664	ONHA29096
B786842	LESNIK OBERSTEIN MAX	CUBA	030232		66696	NETH	SUIS		100364	01RA37384
B786843	LESNIK OBERSTEIN MAX	CUBA	030232		66696	SUIS	ITAL		130364	01RA37384
B786844	LESNIK Y YOSIM ISAK	CUBA	200507	BUS			NETH	I	000664	ONHA29096
J154134	LESGANO JOSE JAVIER	CUBA	030312	DIP		USSR	FRAN	A	250574	ZZM 12280
K197366	LESGAV GONZALEZ MAXIMO	CUBA	271270	TSEA	000305	JAP	CUBA	D	210775	ZZM 13873
B786845	LESPONA GONZALEZ MARIA	CUBA			2223	CUBA	MEX		070166	ZZM 2027
I515843	LESTA ALONSO ARMANDO	CUBA			03416	CUBA	SPAN	D	221173	ZZM 11995
J008625	LESTA ALONSO ARMANDO	CUBA				CUBA	SPAN	A	221173	OSMA29049
F624772	LESTAPI CEJAS EDDY	CUBA			[illegible]	AZOR	SPAN		070570	ZZM 8993
F624773	LESTAPI CEJAS EDDY	CUBA			[illegible]	FAIN	AZOR		070570	ZZM 8993
F624776	LESTAPI CEJAS EDDY	CUBA			[illegible]	CUBA	FAIN		070570	ZZM 8993
F640125	LESTAPI CEJAS EDDY	CUBA			[illegible]	CUBA	SPAN		[illegible]	MADR 1119
I421270	LESTAPI THOMAS JESUS	CUBA			[illegible]	CUBA	USSR	D	[illegible]	ZZM 11873
B786846	LESTAYO MANUEL AUGUSTIN	CUBA				USA	EIRE		0563	OELA38682
B786847	LESTAYO MANUEL AUGUSTIN	CUBA				EIRE	CUBA		0563	OELA38682
B786848	LESTAYO MTNEZ MANUEL	CUBA			[illegible]	EIRE	USA		0463	OELA38469
B786849	LESTAYO MTNEZ MANUEL	CUBA			[illegible]	CUBA	EIRE		0463	OELA38469
K006985	LESTEGAS CARRERAS RAFAEL	CUBA			E746286	CUBA	MEX	A	[illegible]	ZZM 13056
K006986	LESTEVGAS RAFEL	CUBA			E746286	MEX	CUBA	D	231274	ZZM 13052
I019247	LESTON GARCIA LAZARO	CUBA				SPAN	USA	D	[illegible]	ZZM 06104
B786850	LESTON LOPEZ ALEJANDRO	CUBA			[illegible]	CUBA	MEX		280667	ZZM 6428
I422368	LESTON RIVADENEIRA JOSE	CUBA				SPAN	USA	D	020363	ZZM 06773
B786851	LESTON RIVADENEIRA JOSE R	CUBA			[illegible]	CUBA	MEX		260465	HHHT05418
B786852	LESTON RODRIGUEZ MAGALY	CUBA			E647656	CUBA	USSR		[illegible]	AIRM17
B786853	LESTON RODRIGUEZ MAGALY	CUBA				CAN	CUBA		070866	ZZM 03464

14-00000

```
   A 99A01 C  CUBA HAVANA              SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGA17 APR 37          M
   A 99A01 D   CUBA
     00A01 O                                                                  MB/01304
     00A01 U  MUGBOOK FILE
   A 99A01 U  MUGBOOK FILE

   A 99A01 B  PEREZ
   A 99A01 C  CUBA
   A 99A01 D   CUBA                                                           MB/01227
     62A01 O
     62A01 G  REPRESENTATIVE
     62A01 H  CUBANA AIRLINES
     62A01 N   CUBA                                                           OPEN
     62A01 U  MUGBOOK FILE                                                    16 MAY 76
   A 99A01 U  MUGBOOK FILE                                                    16 MAY 76
 ******************************************************************************
     00A00 A 151437
     00A00 B  SIERRA                      GILDA ROSA          ALVAREZ         F
     00A00 C
     00A00 D   CUBA
   A 99A01 B  SIERRA                      GILDA ROSA          ALVAREZ         F
   A 99A01 C
   A 99A01 D   CUBA                                                           MB/01225
     00A01 O                                                                  14 MAY 76
     00A01 U  MUGBOOK FILE                                                    14 MAY 76
   A 99A01 U  MUGBOOK FILE
 ******************************************************************************
     00A00 A 151438                     201-0209258
     00A00 B  LESNICK                     MAX EDGARDO         MENENDEZ        T
     00A00 C  CUBA LAS VILLAS             LAS VUELTAS         08 SEP 30       M
     00A00 D   CUBA
     00A00 O   KIN WIFE MIRIAM ALVAREZ DIGAT
   A 99A01 B  LESNICK                     MAX EDGARDO         MENENDEZ        T
   A 99A01 C  CUBA LAS VILLAS             LAS VUELTAS         08 SEP 30       M
   A 99A01 D   CUBA
     61A01 E  BLA/DK                      MEDIUM/5.06         150
     61A01 F  BRO/LT                      CAUCASIAN
     61A01 I   KIN DAUG MIRIAM LESNICK ALVAREZ
     61A01 O   KIN DAUG VIVIAN LESNICK ALVAREZ                                MB/01/198
     61A02 I
   A 99A01 O   KIN WIFE MIRIAM ALVAREZ DIGAT
     59A01 G  COMMENTATOR                                                     NEWS
     59A01 H  CADENA ORIENTAL DE RADIO
     61A01 G  PRESS AND PROPAGANDA SECRETARY
     61A01 H  2ND NATL FRONT OF THE ESCAMBRAY                                 NEWS
     61A02 G  EDITOR
     61A02 H  REPUBLICA NEWSPAPER
     59A01 L  "STATED HE WAS ANTI-COMMIE-LOST [illegible] FROM G-2
     59A01 N   CUBA                                           FR 59           61
     61A02 N   USA FLORIDA                MIAMI               61              OPEN
     59A01 V   FBI                        DBF 72799                           30 MAR 61
     61A01 V   FBI                        DBF 72799                           30 MAR 61
     61A02 V   FBI                        DBD 81252                           25 SEP 74
   A 99A01 U                                                                  30 MAR 61
   A 99A01 V   FBI                        DBF 72799
 ******************************************************************************
     00A00 A 151439                     201-0759517
     00A00 B  HERNANDEZ                   HECTOR CANDIDO      OSES            T
     00A00 C  CUBA LAS VILLAS             SANCTI SPIRITUS     CA 28           M
     00A00 D   CUBA

 30/09/76   PAGE      7901                          151439
                              SECRET/NOFORN LA GICS FILE     E2 IMPDET CL BY 063729
```

photo in mugbook

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 1 JUNE 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES - INTERNAL
SECURITY - CUBA

SBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN
(CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

Bob Fant

Victim: The corpse of Luciano Nieves



Cuban roots: Anti-Castro marchers

trouble is brewing. Last week, NEWSWEEK's Miami bureau chief, William Schmidt, filed this report:

The strong, sweet smell of Cuban coffee forms an invisible but pungent border around a 600-block section of downtown Miami known as "Little Havana." There the refugees from Castro's Cuba are prospering amid a profusion of their own restaurants, shops, pharmacies, factories, construction firms and banks. The exiles have become so visible and so successful that last year the Dade County Commission passed a resolution proclaiming Metropolitan Miami officially bilingual and bicultural. "The Cubans," says Bernardo Benes, the Cuban-born vice president of a local bank, "fit in perfectly with the stories you Americans like so much—the stories of Horatio Alger."



Reboso: Joining the mainstream

But not everyone in the Miami area appreciates the Cubans' accomplishments. In fact, the refugees are beginning to encounter an anti-Cuban backlash. The friction between Cubans and their "Anglo" neighbors is different from the problems faced by most minority groups in the nation, if only because here the Cubans have become the majority—52 per cent of the population in Miami, 55 per cent in suburban Hialeah. But their numbers and their success are the heart of the problem. "I've never seen anti-Cuban feeling so bad," says Rafael Villaverde, a Bay of Pigs veteran turned community organizer in Little Havana. "Before, the Cubans were competing for low-level jobs. Now they're competing for the job of bank president, corporation executive, even mayor. We are starting to step on toes."

The Cubans are themselves divided over the issue of U.S. detente with Castro's Cuba. More and more exiles are grudgingly giving up the notion of liberating Cuba any time soon—but there are those who refuse to concede defeat. Last month, that difference of opinion apparently led to a killing in Miami and the threat of more violence to come.

Scuffle: Much of the Anglo-Cuban rancor has been erupting in changing neighborhoods. In one southwest Miami community, Cuban and Anglo families have been feuding for months; in January, a shot was fired during one scuffle. "There is a real bitterness now in many middle-class white communities," says Miami attorney William Colson, "especially among people who grew up here and whose neighborhoods have become mostly Cuban." Late last year, the mayor of Hialeah, Dale Bennett, publicly bemoaned the fact that "hundreds of old-timers . . . have moved out because of the Cubans." Warned Bennett: "The people who have come in from Cuba would like to take over the State of Florida and turn it into Cuba. But unfortunately [for them] this is America." Mrs. Mary Orwick, a longtime Miami resident, agrees. "I don't even know what the store signs say," she complains, "and the people refuse to speak anything but Spanish. This is *our* country. Why should I have to learn Spanish?"

That is one of the non-Latins' most persistent complaints. A particular target of their outrage has been a bilingual education program requiring thousands of English-speaking children in eight elementary schools to learn Spanish while Latin students are learning English. Last November, the Anglo community rose up to elect to the school board a vehement opponent of such programs, replacing the board's only Cuban-American member. So far, he has had no luck in getting the program curtailed, and the resentment persists.

Killing: Many Cubans these days do not cling as tenaciously as they once did to the notion of going back to a liberated Cuba. "Morally, we are still at war with Castro," says Max Lesnick, Cuban publisher of the Spanish-language magazine Replica. "But realistically we know the situation is different. We have been in Miami for a long time. We pay taxes here; our children go to school here. This is where we live." The diehards, however, are not so realistic. Two weeks ago, Luciano Nieves, 43, a former captain in Castro's army, was shot to death in a Miami parking lot only a few days after Replica quoted him as advocating peaceful coexistence with Cuba. The killing, police believe, was the work of anti-Castro terrorists who may have been responsible for as many as 50 bombings during the past year. A few days after the murder, a "hit list" was issued targeting a dozen other prominent exiles.

Despite their fraternal struggles and their fierce ethnic pride, the Cuban-Americans are steadily moving into the American mainstream. What they need now is political power. "We were economically successful years ago," says Miami city commissioner Manolo Reboso, who in 1973 became the first Cuban-American to be elected to office in Florida. "Political power did not seem important at the time." Currently, Cubans account for only 16 per cent of the registered voters in Miami and 25 per cent in Hialeah. But they are beginning to sign up for U.S. citizenship in record numbers and to demand jobs as civil servants, policemen and teachers. The Cubans may never jump into the melting pot, but they have what it takes to claim a place by the fire.

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 25 SEPTEMBER 1974

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: MAX LESNICK

FBI FILE NO: 105-3492 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: UNION MUNDIAL ANTICOMUNISTA (UMA)
FBI FILE NO: 105-22159 (MIAMI)

DATE: 20 AUGUST 1974
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
SUBJECT: RUBEN DARIO MASCUNANA CORREA
FBI FILE NO: 105-21878 (MIAMI)

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LESNIK, MAX
201-0209258
SEX M

CIT CUBA

201-0889544
HVCA-19960
13 AUG 74

RES USA, FLA, MIAMI. HAD INTERVIEW IN HIS MIAMI OFFICE W/ ALFONSO JIMENEZ RAMOS /201-0889544/ 12 JUN 74 PHOTO ATTACHED

DATE 21 AUG 74 09158870

201-209258

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 31 JULY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-21947 (MIAMI)
(COPY AVAILABLE IN FILE OF
~~orlandoxbzzzhxavila~~ ORLANDO BOSCH
AVILA - NO. 4 OF THIS TRACE)

(Cross reference sheet)

DATE: 29 JULY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: ORLANDO GARCIA BENITEZ
FBI FILE NO: 105-21901 (MIAMI)

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 32 PER TOTAL COPIES 19-3 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/WH8 ACTION	INFO	RF FILE VR C/IP/AN, C/SS3, C/PS/EG3	1 2 3 4 5 6 ✓

T 287122 EIA387 PAGE 01 IN 314921

TOR:231945Z JUL 74 WMIM 22190

SECRET 231916Z JUL 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 22190 (ENNIS ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 577760

1. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM EXCERPT FROM JULY 23 MIAMI NEWS COLUMN "MIAMI AL DIA" BY HILDA INCLAN:

"WHO IS THE AGGRESSOR AND WHO IS THE VICTIM IS THE QUESTION IN THE LATEST OF CUBAN EXILE SQUABBLES.

"PEDRO MARTINEZ, A FIGURE IN VARIOUS EXILE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS, SAYS MAX LESNIK, EDITOR AND OWNER OF REPLICA MAGAZINE AND NEWSPAPER, AND STAFFER MIGUEL ALVAREZ POINTED GUNS AT HIM AND ORDERED HIM OUT OF DADE COUNTY JUNE 26, OUTSIDE MARTINEZ' HOME, 1800 NW. 24TH AVE.

"MARTINEZ FILED CHARGES AGAINST BOTH MEN WITH THE STATE ATTORNEY AND RETAINED ATTORNEY ELLIS RUBIN TO FIGHT THE CASE FOR HIM.

"LESNIK SAYS IT WAS MARTINEZ WHO FIRST THREATENED HIM AND ONE OF HIS PHOTOGRAPHERS, ESTEBAN MARTIN.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______	TOTAL COPIES	RUN BY	REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE
PERSON, UNIT NOTIFIED ______	SECRET		
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED	BY AT Z		STAFF
ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR.	1 2 3 4 5 6
ACTION #			

T 287122 EIA387 PAGE 02 IN 314921

TOR:231945Z JUL 74 WMIN 22190

LESNIK SAYS HE AND ALVAREZ THEN SET UP A MEETING WITH MARTINEZ AND TALKED TO HIM, BUT NEVER POINTED GUNS AT HIM, OR THREATENED TO KILL HIM. NO SHOTS WERE FIRED AND NO ONE WAS HURT.

"I ONLY TOLD HIM THAT IF HE DIDN'T SHAPE UP SOMEBODY WOULD TAKE HIM OUTSIDE THE COUNTY TO CHATTAHOOCHEE, LESNIK SAYS. "HIS LATEST FAD IS TO SAY I'M HIS ENEMY".

"HE SPECULATED MARTINEZ COULD BE CONNECTED WITH A NEW GROUP CALLING ITSELF (UMA), THE SPANISH INITIALS FOR WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST UNION. UMA HAS TAKEN CREDIT FOR VANDALISM AGAINST CUBAN STORES WHICH SELL REPLICA. UMA SAYS THE MAGAZINE IS COMMUNISTIC.

"BOTH MEN HAVE AGREED TO HAVE THEIR VERSION OF THE STORY TESTED BY A LIE DETECTOR. LESNIK ALREADY GAVE HIS VERSION AS SWORN TESTIMONY TO THE STATE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. ATTORNEY RUBIN WROTE A LETTER TO THE STATE ATTORNEY CHARGING A 'WATERGATE TYPE COVERUP' IN THE CASE AND DEMANDING WARRANTS BE ISSUED OR INFORMATIONS (SIC) FILED AGAINST LESNIK AND ALVAREZ WITHIN 24 HOURS.

"I THINK BOTH RUBIN AND MARTINEZ ARE TWO PUBLICITY

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 287122 EIA387 PAGE 03-03 IN 314921

TOR:231945Z JUL 74 WMIM 22190

SEEKERS, KEEPING EACH OTHER COMPANY, LESNIK SAYS."

2. FILE: 56-9-20, E2, IMPDET

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 23 JULY 1974

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: UNION MUNDIAL ANTICOMUNISTA (UMA)

FBI FILE NO: 105-22159 (MIAMI)

RECEIVED BY IP/FILES

SECRET

BLACK TAPE DOCUMENT

TO: RID/Files, GC-52

FROM: ~~WH~~ LA /RMO, ~~3D57~~ 3C34, 1906 red
(Rm. #) (Ext.)

To Be Opened By Personnel Of ~~wh/a/p~~ LA/PA ONLY:
(CSN 5-50 Designation)

I certify that the enclosed document is the CS Copy, has been properly input to the CS Records System, and that its Dennison Tickets and back-flap (where applicable) are stapled to the outside of this envelope, together with a completed Form 2021, to restrict the file (Form 2021 required only for document classified to a 201 file).

(Signature of RMO)

Doc. Symbol and Number DIR-570490

Date of Document 3 July 74

Doc. is cross referenced Classified to RID File No. 201-209258

FORM 4-71 3299A

SECRET

The enclosed is a cross-ref'd document –

(7-29)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DOC MICRO. SER.
JUL 18 1974
MICROFILMED

8

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF: 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF 1

SECRET

STAFF 031611Z DIRECTOR 570490

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE C/ICAN, OGC 2, LSN/ID, C/OPS

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO MEXICO CITY.

RYBAT KMSTONE HYEPOCHY

REF: PANAMA CITY 23450 (IN-294192)

1. FYI ONLY: LESNICK INVOLVED AS DEFENSE WITNESS IN ONGOING COURT CASE IN WASHINGTON. LESNICK POSSIBLY CUIS AGENT, OR AT VERY LEAST HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL MEMBER OF CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY, possibly INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. DUE SENSITIVITY COURT CASE, ADVISABILITY APPROACHING FBI HQS ABOUT INVESTIGATION OF LESNICK AND/OR MASCUNANA JR. WILL REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. WILL ADVISE.

2. WILL POUCH TO PANAMA CITY COPIES OF PREVIOUS FBI REPORTS ON LESNICK; AMONG APPARENT CONCERNS OF FBI IS ACTIVITY LESNICK AS UNREGISTERED AGENT PANANANIAN GOVT, INCLUDING ALLEGATION THAT HE SOURCE OF INFO RESULTING IN ARREST IN PANAMA OF GABRIEL GREGORIO RODRIGUEZ. (THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH COURT CASE OF PARA 1 ABOVE.) TO JUDGE FROM FBI REPORTING, MASCUNANA WAS IN MIAMI JAN 74 ACTING AS CASE OFFICER FOR LESNICK AND AN EMPLOYEE OF LESNICK'S NAMED MARIO CABRERA. TRACES FOLLOW BY DISPATCH.

3. ANY FURTHER INFO MCNERTNEY MIGHT COME ACROSS WOULD BE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

B - [illegible] - 209258

201 - 771919
3 July 74

RECORD COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 034047

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE 570490

DISSEM BY:

PER #

APPRECIATED.

4. FILE: 201-770319, 201-209258 (LESNICK). E2 IMPDET.

WH COMMENT: *REF REQUESTED HQS DETERMINE NATURE OF FBI INTEREST IN SUBJECT RUBEN DARIO MASCUNANA CORREA OF PANAMANIAN G-2.

CGC ED DIETEL (PHONE)

C/WH/COG

DATE: 2 JUL 74

ORIG: D.NICKERSON/J. MALLETT

UNIT: LA/2/P

EXT: 1764

C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/1

DC/WH/1

C/WH/2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO...

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 054047

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR [illegible]

STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

T 227120 EIA245 PAGE 01 IN 294192

TOR:122972 52 JUN 74 PACY 28953

S E C R E T 282121Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 28950

TO: DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA.

KMSTONE HYEPOCH

REFS A. MANAGUA 01218 (in 292441) - Ruben Dario Mascunana Gonzalez is still Panamanian Consul in Managua, residing at De la Iglesia Santa Ana 3 1/2 Cuadras al Oeste No 2101.

B. MEXICO CITY 28479 (in 293035) - Info para 1 PACY-28924 passed per Mexico w/ request for addl identifying data if avail. FOI subsequently informed Sta that full name Ruben Dario Mascunana Gonzalez had been verified by report dev received from mil Intell Gp of Canal Zone.

1. FLOYD R. MCNERTNEY (NOC) HAS BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE SUBJECTS OF REFERENCES AS FATHER (MASCUNANA GONZALEZ) AND SON (MASCUNANA CORREA) THRU NATIONAL GUARD FILES. MCNERTNEY REPORTS THAT SON IS NOW WORKING NEARLY FULL TIME AS NATIONAL GUARD LIAISON WITH THE THREE CUIS OFFICERS STATIONED IN PANAMA. HE FURTHER IS OF THE OPINION THAT SON, BECAUSE OF ATTITUDE, REPEATED TRIPS TO CUBA, AND EXTENSIVE ASSOCIATION WITH CUBANS BOTH ON AND OFF DUTY, HAS BEEN RECRUITED BY CUIS. BASED ON HIS KNOWLEDGE OF MAX LESNICK, MCNERTNEY FURTHER SUSPECTS THAT ANY RELATION BETWEEN THESE TWO INVOLVES ONE OR BOTH OF TWO THINGS. ONE, GOP MAY BE USING LESNICK AND MAGAZINE "REPLICA" AS ANTI-U.S. PROP MECHANISM ON CANAL ZONE ISSUE AND/OR FOR INVESTIGATIVE COVERAGE OF PANAMANIAN EXILE ACTIVITIES IN MIAMI WITH

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 227120 EIA045 PAGE 02-02 IN 294192

[illegible] JUL 74 PACY 289[illegible]8

MASCUNANA, JR, AS THE CHANNEL. TWO, DGI MAY BE USING MASCUNANA, JR, AND LESNICK TO COVER CUBAN EXILES IN MIAMI. BECAUSE OF THE VERY OVERT NATURE OF MASCUNANA - CUIS RELATIONSHIP WE SUSPECT THE FORMER.

2. IN ANY CASE, MASCUNANA CORREA IS EX-ASSET OF OURS WHO CAN IDENTIFY HIS THREE FORMER CASE OFFICERS (VEAUSELL, SOLLIDAY, AND LYNAM) AND PROBABLY ALL STATION LIAISON OFFICERS SINCE 1970. HE FURTHER REPORTEDLY HEAVILY INVOLVED IN DRUG TRAFFIC AT PRESENT TIME. WE CONCERNED THAT IF ANY WORD OF THIS INVESTIGATION GETS BACK TO HYGRUFF-1 HE IS GOING TO BLAME US. TO PROTECT OUR EQUITIES, REQUEST HEADQUARTERS CONTACT FBI AND DETERMINE REASON FOR, AND DETAILS OF, FBI INVESTIGATION. FURTHER REQUEST THAT ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF SUBJ BE COORDINATED WITH STATION.

3. REQUEST TRACES LESNICK.

4. INDEX AND FILE: 201-0772319. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LESNICK, MAX	
201-0209258	201-0770319
SEX M	PACY-28950
	28 JUN 74

GOP MAY BE USING SUBJ AND MAGAZINE REPLICA AS ANTI-U.S. PROP MECHANISM OF CANAL ZONE ISSUE AND/OR FOR INVESTIGATIVE COVERAGE OF PANAMANIAN EXILE ACTIVITIES IN MIAMI WITH MASCUNANA, JR 201-0770319 AS THE CHANNEL

DATE 27 AUG 74 09162006

201- 209258

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 28 JUNE 1974

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: MAX LESNICK

FBI FILE NO: 105-3492 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENT (CROSS REFERENCE SHEET)

DATE: 25 JUNE 1974

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: "ZERO" (AN ORGANIZATION)

FBI FILE NO: 105-22094; 9-2690 (MIAMI

DOCUMENT AVAILABLE IN IP/CFS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 21-2 RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION

INFO RF FILE VR ielaw, esslc, ssulio, oeslwt, ocs2, cmclwoc4,

T 220557 EIA658 PAGE 01 IN 291830

TOR:262151Z JUN 74 PACY 28924

S E C R E T 262118Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 28924

TO: MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR.

1. STATION IN RECEIPT OF REQUEST FROM FBI MEXICO CITY VIA CONSUL FOR ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON RUBEN DARIO MASCUNANA, 2ND LT NATIONAL GUARD. SUBJ MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH RUBEN DARIO MASCUNANA CORREA ([illegible]1-772319) PANAMANIAN G-2 OFFICER IN OFFICIAL LIAISON WITH CUBAN INTEL OFFICERS STATIONED IN PANAMA. MAY ALSO BE IDENTICAL WITH SUBJ OF SAME NAME, MATRONYMIC UNKNOWN, WHO REPORTED AS MEMBER OF PANAMANIAN CONSULAR CORP STATIONED MANAGUA AS OF OCTOBER 73. FBI GIVES THEIR SUBJECT'S DOB AS PANAMA CITY, 13 MAY 41 AND RESIDENCE AS VILLA ESPANA 4565, PANAMA CITY. MASCUNANA CORREA'S DPOB IS PANAMA CITY, 1[illegible] APRIL 42, LAST KNOWN ADDRESS CALLE 8 AND AVENIDA B.

2. BUREAU REQUEST STATES THAT MASCUNANA (FBI #105-10990) IS SUBJ OF INVESTIGATION BECAUSE OF CONTACT WITH MAX LESNICK, EDITOR OF "REPLICA" MAGAZINE, MIAMI WHO IN OWN SUBJ OF FBI SECURITY INVESTIGATION. FLOYD H. MC[illegible]ERTNEY ([illegible]OC) IS IN DAILY CONTACT WITH FIRST MASCUNANA ABOVE AND ALS

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

TAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	4
ACTION #			5
			6

T 220557 EIA659 PAGE 02-02 IN 291830

TOR:2621-Z JUN 74 PACY 20924

KNOWS LESNICK AS PRO-CASTRO LEFTIST.

3. BECAUSE OF OUR OPS INTEREST STATION HAS ADVISED CONSUL THAT WE WILL REPLY TO FBI REQUEST THRU OUR CHANNELS.

4. FOR MANAGUA: CAN YOU PROVIDE MATRONYMIC AND CURRENT LOCATION OF MASCUNANA THE CONSUL?

5. FOR MEXICO CITY: PARA ONE MAY BE PASSED FBI. CAN YOU OBTAIN ANY FURTHER IDENTIFYING INFO FROM FBI?

6. INDEX ALL. FILE: 201-7703.9. X-REF 56-9-1. E2

IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LESNICK, MAX
201-0209258
SEX M

201-0770319
PACY-28924
26 JUN 74

CIT CUBA
OCC NEWS

RES USA, MIAMI. EDITOR REPLICA MAGAZINE PRO-CASTRO LEFTIST SUBJ OF SECURITY IN INVESTIAGATION IN CONTACT WITH RUBEN DARIO MASCUNANA

DATE 07 AUG 74   09151106

201- 209258

SECRET   E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LESNICK, MAX
201-0209258 019-300-026
SEX M WHIM-21546
17 APR 74

MENTIONED AS ONE OF LEADERS OF FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA.

DATE 16 MAY 74 09108246

201-209258

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 27 MARCH 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: 105-1742 (MIAMI)

DATE: 14 MARCH 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: REVOLUTIONARY MEDICAL UNION
DR. HUMBERTO LUIS FONTANA MENENDEZ
FBI FILE NO: 105-71604 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 14 MARCH 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-21947 (MIAMI)

DATE: 28 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MAX LESNICK
FBI FILE NO: 105-3492 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ALFREDO SANTIAGO SOLER ALVAREZ
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20208 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 11 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: JOSE ANTONIO CALATAYUD RIVERO
FBI FILE NO: 105-21599 (MIAMI)

DATE: 16 JANUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856

[illegible]

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 15 JANUARY 1974

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: FRENTE CUBANA DE LIBERACION

FBI FILE NO: 105-21892

SECRET

10 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Payment to Edward G. Tichborn (P)

1. On 9 May this office received a telegram (in the file) from Tichborn (P) dated 5 May 1960 in which he stated that he had not yet received his check for $650.00 from Ashmead, Hanniford 24 Associates.

2. The undersigned contacted Mr. Thomas Strange, Cover Division, to find out the reason for this delay. After following up this request he informed me that said check had cleared Tichborn's (P) California bank on 27 April, the Federal Reserve on 29 April and is now in Cover Division as a cancelled check.

3. I tried to phone Tichborn (P) late Monday afternoon (9 May) but he was not in his office. I reached him this morning and advised him that the money had been deposited in his bank on the date noted above. Tichborn (P) said he had not checked with the bank but would do so.

Evalena S. Vidal
Political Action Division

SECRET

08
(253203)

2nd

SECRET

DOCUMENT

Box Number: JFK64-10
Source Number: 104-10174-10031
CADRE Ref ID: C00556281
Pub Date: 05/05/1960
Pages: 1

C00556281

104-10174-10031

SECRET

CLASS OF SERVICE
This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION
TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS
DL = Day Letter
NL = Night Letter
LT = International Letter Telegram

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

LLF429 OB154 LA610

[illegible] MAY 5 PM 6 02

L LLJ201 PD LOS ANGELES CALIF 5 250P PDT

HENRY DARKIN
PO BOX 8105 SOUTHWEST STATION WASHDC

NO WORD FROM (ASHMEAD) YET. PLEASE CHECK. MAY HAVE MISMAILED.
24
BEST REGARDS
(HENRY LOPEZ.)
05

201 (253203)
08

3|pd

SECRET

25 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Payment to Bivard G. Tichborn (P)

Tichborn's (P) accountings for the advance given him in connection with his Cuban trip were processed and found in order. The remaining half of his salary ($650.00) which was to be paid upon the completion of his assignment was then processed through the appropriate Finance and Cover channels (hand-carried). The check, drawn on (Ashmead, Haniford Associates) in the amount of $650.00 was cleared and left with Cover Division late Friday afternoon 22 April 1960. Cover Division said it would be forwarded that day to (Ashmead, Haniford Associates in Philadelphia) who would then mail it to Tichborn's (P) California bank, on the following Monday - 25 April 1960.

Evalena S. Vidal

Orig. - Subject File
1 - Chrono

SECRET

201-(253203)
08

5|N

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with 05 Henry P. Lopez at Carleton Hotel. PP/PA representatives were Horace Davis and Eveline Vidal. WH representatives were 03 Robert Reynolds (Fletcher) and 03 Philip Toomey (Thompson). The meeting took place 15 January 1960 1200 hours to 1540 hours.

He read the PP staff report on opposition groups (sanitized) and the report (sanitized) on the 24 Indian political action operation.

05 Lopez was briefed by Mr. 03 Reynolds on the current situation in Cuba. He was given a check for $1300 and instructions to call Benjamin Evans at the Embassy and use the name Fred Morse.

Mr. 05 Lopez stated that he foresaw no problems in getting around in Cuba. He mentioned that one of his friends in the Harvard Graduate School, Regino Boti Leon, was now in the 06 Castro Cabinet and that he and 06 Boti had dated the same girl who was now in New York. He intended to phone the girl on his stop-over in New York to renew acquaintance. 08, 06

05 Lopez was told about security precautions and that Mr. Evans would brief him further on contacts to be made. Mr. Davis asked when he would be back here and 05 Lopez said about the second of February. Davis said that we would tape his remarks at that time. 05 Lopez was asked to keep accurate account of his arrivals and departures for accounting purposes.

03
P. TOOMEY
WH/4/PP

201 (253303)
08

(5/pd

SECRET

1 February 1960

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Henry P. Lopez at the Statler-Hilton Hotel on 1 February 1960 from 1000 hours to 1530 hours.

1. Those present were Mrs. Vidal PP/PA, Alexander Hunter (Williams) PP/EAD, Charles Penney (Twiss) WH/PW, and Philip Toomey (Thompson) WH/4/PP.

2. Mr. Lopez gave a report of his contacts in Cuba after receiving his notes which were brought up by Mr. Noel and given to Mr. Lopez by Mr. Toomey. Mr. Lopez said that he had given biographical sketches of Echevarria, Rasco, Laureano Batista, Martinez Fraga, Ruben de Leon and Sanchez Arango to the Station representative. He had also turned over a report of Martinez Fraga on the aims of the Recuperacion de la Revolucion.

3. Mr. Lopez' report was taped and a transcript will be forwarded to WH by PP/PA.

4. Specific recommendations made by Mr. Lopez included having Herbert Matthews go to Havana and try to influence Castro. Matthews has a good reputation throughout the 26th of July Movement and could help in an approach to Castro. A visit by Ed Murrow to do a broadcast on Cuba was also recommended. Mr. Lopez feels that Castro will be in power for a long time to come and that we should try to influence him. He is seriously affected by any defections and these might be encouraged. Castro can be hit by defections of overworked and countermanded officials. Two men who were mentioned as ripe for defection are Rufo in Hacienda and Cepero in Comercio. Mr. Lopez also recommended contact with Padre Alberto de Castro in Caracas. This padre was formerly Fidel's instructor. When Fidel was in Caracas he was scolded by Padre Castro whom Fidel treated with great respect according to Bosco. The Padre and Fidel spent about one and one half hours alone together at this time. This priest should be checked as a possible influence on Fidel. The possibility of a split between Fidel and Raul should be exploited. Raul is cold and mean and the fact that he is Fidel's brother does not carry too much weight.

P. TOOMEY
WH/4/PP

SECRET

08

14/PN

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DRAFT

2 February 196^

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Debriefing of Edward G. Tichborn(P)

1. Edward G.Tichborn(P) arrived in Washington from his trip to Cuba during the night of 31 January 1960/. He was debriefed at the Hotel Statler from about 1000 to 1530 hours on 1 February. Those present at the debriefing were Messrs. 03 (Phil Toomey) and Charles Penney from WH Division, Mr. 03 (Alexander Hunter) PP/EAD, and the Undersigned. This debriefing was very interesting and resulted inx a good deal of pertinent information. The three and a half reels of tape derived fxxxx therefrom are now being transcribed bx this office. Some of the more salient points are noted below.

XX

2. Some of the operational information and suggestions offered by Tichborn are the following:

a. There appears to be little chance of a coalition of the opposition groups at this time or in the near future since they are not well organized and each group xxxx would want to be the leader of such an effort. Also, according to the mmmbers of the opposition to whom Tichborn talked, it is the general consensus of opinion that Fidel Castro is in no danger of loosing his grip or the devotion of his followersx for some time to come.

b. Fidel Castro seems to become most xt upset and almost paniced by defections. Possessing a "Messiah-type complex" he cannot bear the thought of someone leaving the fold. Rather than to let such defections pass on unnoticed, he feels compelled to give reasons and make excuses. This then blows the matter up perhaps out of proportion and quickly becomes a matter of public knowledge. Tichborn feels that the inducement of defections could perhaps have more effect on Castro than any other single, rational action we might undertake.

c. There appears to be a relatively long-standing schism between the brothers Fidel and Raoul Castro. Raoul is the more cold individual. As an example, Fidel once ordered some 400 prisoners to be returned safely to their homes, but Raoul had a number of them killed. The general feeling in Cuba is that Fidel is not a Communist, but that Raoul is undoubtedly at least a fellow-traveller. Developing or exploiting this schism could therefore, be operationally advantageous. (The fact that they are brothers would probably have little effect on Fidel who has already reduced hisxxxx the land holdings of his mother and another brother in conformity with the agrarian reform program and who jailed his sister, and fired a Minister, over a shake-down on an insurance deal.)

3. Of special operational interest were several individuals Tichborn mentioned who might have some influence on Fidel Castro and hence might be of

(53-2-3)
08

3/PV

operational interest. They are:

a. Father(Padre) Alberto de Castro: he is a Jesuit priest presently located in Caracas, Venezuela, who had been a teacher of Fidel Castro during his youth. Castro was in Venezuela and saw Father de Castro there during which time the latter criticized Fidel for some of his actions. In spite of the fazt that this remonstration occured in front of some of Fidel's men, the latter treated him with great respect. It was felt by Tichborn's source of this information, and by Tizhborn, that Father de Castro undoubted has some influence over Castro. Tichborn suggested that it would be of value to determine whether or not Fidel has any regular contact with Father de Castro and if so, what operational potential he might have.

and they later chatted alone for an hour.

b. Herb Mathews: he is a journalist with the N.Y.Times and was the only American newspaperman covering the Castro story prior to his final success. While Tichborn was in Cuba, a front page article ~~xx~~ appeared in Revolucion (the regime's press spokesman) on Mathews. It was a sort of editorial and praised Mathews as a "real man" and one who understood the revolution and its aims. Tichborn feels that it might be to our advantage to get into contact with Mathews since he appears to have the confidence of the administration.

c. Professor José Rosco: Subject is on the faculty of the Universidad de Villanueva and is a contemporary of Fidel Castro. They were classmates and both were debators although according to Rosco, Castro did not make the Debating Society of which he(Rosco) was the presidentOnce after the revolution, Rosco attended a speech Castro made and after the oration, the latter asked Rosco what he thought of it. Upon hearing some criticism, he wanted to know how it could have been improved. Since Castro was leaving for Venezuela and the United States he asked Rosco to accompany him in order that they could discuss the matter further. Tichborn feels that Rosco (a member of the opposition) ~~xxx~~ probably has more influence on Castro than Rosco realizes and that this possibility would be worth looking into.

[illegible]

d. Edward R.Murrow: he produced a TV program on Castro and Tichborn feels that he might have established a rapport with Castro during this period.

4. One of the contacts Tichborn made in Cuba (the Director of Tourism) asked him if he knew of anyone who would be interested in coming to Cuba on an all-expenses-paid visit in order to write articles (or other similar propaganda) on present day Cuba. Tichborn mentioned Clete Roberts, a popular radio and TV commentator in Los Angeles as a possible candidate. (Tichborn also discussed this matter with Horace W. Davis.) Tichborn will mention this possibility to Roberts upon his return to California.

5. While in Cuba, Tichborn accidently met a young lady who later revealed to him that she was "an agent for the State Department". He felt that this was a security matter and that it should be brought to our attention for that purpose. Mr. (Toomey) did not recognize the name; it is being further checked out with WH Division. The incident and the details will be made the subject of a separate memorandum for CI Staff.

1PJ

6. On the administrative side, Mr. Tichborn will forward by mail his financial accounting, one copy to the cover company and the other to Henry W. Darkin(P). The cover letter which was provided him ihw the event that he came to the attention of the Cuban authorities was returned to us and is now in his file. (There was no necessity for its use.) Tichborn inquired as to the possibility of receiving reimbursement for medical expenses which will undoubtedly be incurred upon his return to California due to a possible hernia which developed in New York on his return trip en route to Washington. This is being checked out by this office. Tichborn departed for Los Angeles (having been taken to Friendship International Airport by ~~Henry W. Darkin~~) at about 1800 hours on 1 February 1960.

Evalena S. Vidal

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Edward G. Tichborn's bank is as follows:

08

Bank of America
Wilshire-Sweetzer Branch,
6507 Wilshire Blvd.,
Los Angeles 48, California

The check for the $2,000 operational advance was drawn on a check of the cover company. It was mailed from Washington with an accompanying letter written by Tichborn stating that it should be deposited to his Commercial Account. Date of writing and forwarding was 15 January 1960.

The $650 check for ½ of his total salary, should be mailed to the same bank and credited to his Commercial Account.

E.S.V.
19 Jan 60

(53223)
08

2/PV

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

The following is set forth as clarification of your present mission, and the procedures which will be followed in the conduct of it. Please indicate your agreement by signing below.

A. Operational

1. You will be briefed generally on some aspects of the Cuban situation while in Washington on this date.

2. The major briefing to be given you concerning the local political situation, security precautions, and more detailed instructions on your present mission will be undertaken upon your arrival in Havana.

3. Upon arrival in Havana a tourist card will be issued by the Cuban Immigration authorities. You will give your true name and occupation in the United States and state that you are in that area as a "tourist".

4. Your initial contact in Havana will be with IDEN A (name and telephone number attached hereto). When making this call, you will identify yourself as Fred Morse.

5. IDEN A will then give you the briefing mentioned in paragraph 2 above.

6. IDEN A will also arrange to put you in contact with about two individuals for the purpose of starting you on your assignment. It is anticipated that other leads and contacts will result from these introductions, both in Havana and the interior.

7. When talking to any local contacts you make while in Cuba, your cover story will be the following: that you are talking to them on the behalf of some (unnamed) American businessmen and investors in order to assess discreetly their position and legal resources as concerns the revolutionary laws and to determine the possibility for future financial development and investments.

201-(263203)
08

8. We are providing you with a letter from a cover company (attached hereto) which you will use only in the case of extreme emergency in the event that you come to the attention of the Cuban authorities. This letter states that you are there on a vacation and that this company has asked you to get some first-hand information on the subjects mentioned in paragraph 7 above while there if you are so inclined. This will provide you with a plausible excuse for being both a tourist and one interested in talking with local personalities.

9. Your mission generally is to talk with as many knowledgeable persons as possible regarding the political situation in Cuba, with special emphasis on the opposition, its strengths, weaknesses, plans and programs. Of particular interest is the possibility or feasibility of a coalescence of these opposition groups.

B. Administrative

1. While on your present assignment you will keep a record of your expenses which will enable you to submit the required accounting for funds upon your return. In keeping the accounts you should note times of arrival and departure, detailed notation of expenses incurred, and the rate of exchange obtained when exchanging U. S. dollars into local currency.

2. Upon your return you will submit two accountings. One will include your salary under "services rendered", and also your expenses and will be in true name to the following company:

Ashmead, Haniford Associates
1615 Spruce Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 24

3. The second accounting will also include salary and operational expenses and will be submitted in pseudonym to:

Henry W. Darkin
P. O. Box 8105
Southwest Station
Washington, D. C.

signature

[illegible] 15, 1960
date

1/RV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

27 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Strange (x-8264)

SUBJECT: (Henry P. Lopez)
05

03

1. To confirm your conversation with (Barnes Sprague) on 26 October 1959 we request that backstopping facilities be provided for Subject by the following organization:

Ashmead, Hanford Associates
1615 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
24

2. Subject will send a true name copy of his expenses to this organization and at the same time he will submit to PP/PAD, via a post office box address, a detailed accounting in accordance with Agency regulations.

3. For your information Subject's address is:

6505 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California
08

4. Subject's pseudonym is forwarded under separate cover.

Horace W. Davis
Acting Chief
Political Action Division

BS:bjl
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - addressee
1 - chrono
1 - Subject file

8

TICHBORN file

SECRET

No. 201-253203

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, E/IB/S, Richard Long

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of LOPEZ, Henry P.
____________________, for the purpose specified in your request
dated as follows.

1. Operational Approval is granted for the use of Subject in Spain (a) to identify, cultivate, and acquire intelligence from those individuals and groups within Spain who now play, and can be expected to play in the post-Franco period, a significant role in determining Spanish domestic and foreign policy, and (b) to spot and assess individuals within the above group for possible recruitment by other Station assets, specifically as set forth in paragraph 3 of the memorandum dated 3 June 1968 addressed to CI/OA by AC/E/IB. No other use authorized.

2. It is understood that Subject himself will not attempt recruitments nor will he be required to break his cover.

3. In view of his background, it is recommended that caution be exercised in dealing with Subject.

4. This cancels and supersedes all previous approvals.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 19 August 1968 ajp

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

201-253203

FORM 1-67 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(9)

1 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief/E/IB/S

SUBJECT: Project WUBRINY - Possible Operational Support of Madrid Station Objectives by Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

REFERENCE: OSMA 23,350 Dated 11 January 1968

1. Per Mr. Long's request, the undersigned on 30 January 1968 discussed with Edward G. TICHBORN (P) possible support of Madrid Station objectives as raised in ref. It was confirmed that:

a. WUSALINE/Iberia can be used as an information collection mechanism in cases where information requirements can be couched in plausible economic and commercial terms for contractual surveys.

b. TICHBORN can assess and develop selected Spanish contacts of Madrid Station who may be visiting New York and who desire introductions in US commercial circles.

c. TICHBORN can develop Spaniards in New York as may be of operational interest to the Madrid Station. TICHBORN has not made an effort to develop Spaniards in New York but is willing and able to do so for any designated as operational targets. If desired, TICHBORN thinks he can meet the Spanish Ambassador to the U.S. through a friend, Senator José Montoya of New Mexico.

d. TICHBORN feels that he could write an article concerning leading Spanish industrialists and bankers for publishing in a prominent publication, such as "Life International." TICHBORN believes that he has excellent bonafides for such a task because he previously published in "Life International" a four-page spread on birth control in Latin America. This article was favorably reviewed. TICHBORN suggested a related article on the population explosion in Europe and its effect on business as a possible topic for interviewing leading Spanish businessmen. TICHBORN, as a result of journalistic collaboration with Katherine Anne Porter, is represented in New York by a top literary agent, Monica McCall. TICHBORN thinks that it would take him two to three weeks in Spain interviewing top Spanish industrialists and bankers. He would send letters in advance to these targets informing them of his proposed itinerary, the purpose of his trip, and enclosing copies of his previous articles with favorable reviewer comments. He could be essentially a free lance journalist or have a business purpose as well. In the latter connection, it is of interest that following TICHBORN's trip to Spain, WUBRINY/1 sent a geologist to WUSALINE/Iberia to look into acquisition of silver properties in Spain. This purely commercial development appears to be a direct result of TICHBORN's trip and thus enhances TICHBORN's commercial bonafides.

2. It is understood that E/IB/S has a copy of TICHBORN's report for dispatch to the Madrid Station per ref.

3. Personnel concerned with Project WUBRINY will be glad to work with E/IB/S in any follow-up to the possibilities noted above.

Gale Allen

Gale Allen
DO/CO

SECRET

1 NOV 1966

DO 66-264
DOCO 774-66

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EUR Division

ATTENTION : Chief, E/IB

SUBJECT : Possible Exploitation of ICAP Iberia, S.A.

1. Reference is made to the meeting on subject with Mr. Osborne Day, DCOS/Madrid, Mr. Stephen Munger, DC/E/IB, and Mr. Gale Allen of DOCO just prior to Mr. Day's departure for Madrid. It is recalled that Mr. Allen agreed to pass the most recent information on ICAP Iberia, S.A. to E/IB for transmittal to Mr. Day in Madrid. Mr. Day would review this information together with that known to the station and determine if the firm has an operational potential for the Madrid Station. In the event of an affirmative determination, Mr. Day indicated that he would be interested in the assignment to ICAP Iberia of a DO career commercial operations officer who would be carried on the DO t/o but would be assigned operational tasks by the Madrid Station.

2. ICAP Iberia, S.A. (see brochure attached as Tab A) is a joint venture company formed by a DO proprietary company, ICAP Corporation, New York, and the Spanish Corporation Banif S.A. It is domiciled in the Banif offices at Juan Bravo 2, Madrid, Spain, and currently has no staff. Two of the Banif Directors, Miguel Echegaray and Juan Antonio Ruiz de Alda, concern themselves with ICAP matters on a day to day basis when required. ICAP Iberia serves mainly as the clearing house for Banif business requiring support by ICAP New York and for ICAP business requiring support by Banif in Spain. Recently in a letter dated 4 October 1966 the President of Banif, Juan A. Ruiz de Alda, suggested to the President of ICAP Corporation that a man and secretary be assigned to ICAP Iberia to "keep issues alive, look for new ones, and obtain the backing of our organizations for the completion of the work to to be done." The stage thus appears to be set if WOFACT should desire to assign an officer to ICAP Iberia, S.A.

SECRET

SECRET

3. The operational potential of ICAP Iberia, S.A., other than non-official commercial cover, must necessarily depend upon the activities, personnel, and contacts of Banif. As may be noted in the descriptive note on Banif attached as Tab B, the activities of Banif include research, consulting, securities, new business, underwriting, and investment. These activities cut across most aspects of economic and political life in Spain. Banif's personnel have impressive backgrounds and its clients and references are of a very high level.

4. Attached as Tab C are three additional pamphlets on Banif covering its research and study department, its financial services, and its investment bulletin.

5. DO would appreciate your comments on assigning a WOFACT officer to ICAP Iberia, S.A. Normally, when a DO commercial mechanism provides a cover opportunity, the Area Division supplies the officer to be assigned. DO would, of course, welcome such an assignment in this case. DO, in coordination with EUR, would also be willing to consider a suitable career trainee for assignment to DO and thence to ICAP Iberia, S.A. as part of DO's development of career commercial operations officers. Mr. Allen of DOCO, Code 11, Extention 62888, may be contacted for further information on this matter.

C. Tracy Barnes

C. Tracy Barnes
Chief, DO

Attachments:
Tab A
Tab B
Tab C

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

D.C./co
1750 Pa. Av.

TO : Mr. Cale Allen DATE: 8 November 1966

FROM : Chief, DO Division

SUBJECT: Information about Spain (and Portugal)

1. I have a request which seems to me to be right up the alley of your friend, WUBRINY/1. I would hope, therefore, that he will try to do us a fairly rapid and yet analytic job.

2. The request is for as accurate information as possible on the following questions:

a. What or who, or both, represent the most significant power elements in the economic or commercial field in Spain today? Wherever possible, even in the cases where potent companies have been named, specific individuals having the positions of authority should be identified. In addition, wherever possible, relationships between these individuals and American interests whether a company or another individual should be specified.

b. What American interests, corporate or personal, have major investments or holdings in Spain? What are the nature of their investments or holdings and who are the individuals basically responsible?

c. To the extent possible, provide the same answers as requested above for Portugal. Since Spain is of greater interest, this question should only be answered to the extent possible without too great an expenditure of time. If on the other hand it is felt that good answers can be provided with regard to Portugal given extra time, I would suggest that the Spanish answers be submitted as soon as possible and the Portuguese information given at a later date.

3. I would appreciate it if you could let me know as soon as possible WUBRINY/1's reaction to the above requests - can he get the answers; will they be in considerable detail and how long does he think that it will take?

need more info on use of B & other info in B itself

P.S. It is assumed that, if it is possible to do it at all, the above request can be carried out without stirring a lot of curiosity and consequent inquiry.

6 - [illegible] tool being used in place

need, security access

What are normal circles, personal contacts or relationships,

which could establish [illegible] power structure

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 007 WCJ
29 DEC 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C

RI Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ___
RI file this copy as indicated ✓
Branch copy filed as indicated ___

RI Indexing (check one):
Marked ___ None required ✓

Signature: ___

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 29 0500Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 44356

DIR CITE MEXI 9745

ODURGE HAS REQUESTED ROUTINE NAME CHECK ON EDWARD G TICHBORN (PS). ODURGE TOLD LOCALLY THAT STATION FILES DO NOT REFLECT ANY DEROGATORY INFORMATION PERTINENT TO SUBJECT.

ARI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	D.K.
RI/TY	3
~~RI/~~	
RI/FI	

[illegible]

SECRET

201-253203

FORM 1389 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SFB
FEC 60.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

25 [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/

RI/AN

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

LOGGED & COPY DETAC

3-4 What is the station trying to tell us, - that TICHBORN is being had? Discuss with Lee Smith

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. WH 046 Barton			3 JA. 1964	
2. C/WH/3				
3. WH/3/Mex	[illegible]		5/1	
4. Grunwell		5 Jan. 9		
5. WH/CA/F				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE
TICHBORN, EDWARD G. (8)

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-253263 ✓

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HMMA 16348

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-18348

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 22 December 1961

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN 201-253203
Transmittal of Mexican Press Clip

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐	MARKED FOR INDEXING
xx	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: your information

REFERENCES:

Attached under separate cover is a press clip of a front-page editorial which appeared in Newspaper B on 18 December 1961. According to TICHBORN, the "press interview" was arranged on 15 December through a telephone conversation initiated by an assistant staff writer of Newspaper B. At that time, TICHBORN was requested to prepare a written commentary on the topic as presented in the press clip, and on the evening of 15 December, TICHBORN's drafted commentary was submitted to a minor staff writer of Newspaper B. While the subject press article was presented as a personal "interview" with by-line authorship given to the writer as indicated, TICHBORN reports that he and the credited author have never been in contact with each other. Subject clip is being forwarded for Headquarters information and interest.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

20 December 1961

Distribution:
- 3 - WHD, w/att. u/s/c
- 2 - Files

14-00000

Encuesta Mundial

Henry P. López o la Votación Mexicana en los Estados Unidos

Por CARLOS DENEGRI

VII.—LOS ANGELES

¿Que decir de la influencia de México y de su cultura en los Estados Unidos?

"Por favor —dice el abogado Henry P. López—, note usted la acertada sensibilidad politica del Presidente Kennedy, y tendremos una primera respuesta a su pregunta. Kennedy ha escogido a un mexicano de origen, ciudadano norteamericano, claro está, Ramón Tellez, ex alcalde de El Paso, como embajador de los Estados Unidos en Costa Rica... Otro mexicano, de origen, ha sido designado para dirigir el juzgado de distrito del Sur de Texas. El caso de Enrique González, abogado de San Antonio, es un ejemplo más..."

Pero, ¿quién es Henry P. Lopez...? Nos lo presenta J. Carlos McCormick, ayudante especial del subsecretario auxiliar adjunto de Asuntos Interamericanos, del Departamento de Estado, en Washington: "De ascendencia mexicana, el abogado estadunidense Henry P. López ha logrado una brillante carrera como internacionalista y miembro prominente del Partido Demócrata de California. Graduado en Harvard, miembro de la eminente fraternidad "Phi Beta Kappa", fue el triunfador en el concurso nacional de oratoria de 1942. Candidato de su partido, en 1958, para el cargo de secretario de Estado del Gobierno de California, obtuvo una de las más altas votaciones estatales

Henry P. López

SIGUE EN LA PAGINA CATORCE

española que nos dieron su voto en Estados claves: ant donde la lucha fue más intensa".

Declaración histórica.

"...En California, por ejemplo, el voto potencial del Estado —me refiero al de filiación mexicana de origen—, es de un millón trescientos mil. En Texas, de doscientos cincuenta mil. En Nuevo Mexico, cerca del cincuenta por ciento del electorado es de origen mexicano".

La mayoría de estos votantes son demócratas. Interés, pues, del Partido en el poder, en Estados Unidos, es el de cuidar de cerca, alentar y encauzar a esos millones de hispanoamericanos, como los llaman en el vecino país.

"Por eso fue que en la campaña de 1960, por primera vez en la historia, se crearon batallones especiales de mexicanos de origen que, al grito de "Viva Kennedy!", asaltaron cívicamente las casillas electorales, dando el triunfo al de Nueva Inglaterra".

Nuestro intermediario, McCormick, fue precisamente el capitán en jefe de esos "batallones" de paisanos...

mente, la influencia cultural de nuestro país...

He aquí lo que nos dice López, maestro de Harvard:

"Huelga confirmar, una vez más, que, en todos los órdenes, y desde hace décadas, la influencia mexicana, nativa o inmigrante, en el seno de nosotros, ha sido siempre destacada y visible. Visible y destacada en todos los campos de la cultura; ya no sólo de la vida cívica.

"Baste haber viajado por la parte sur del país, para que hasta el más superficial observador reconozca, de inmediato, la influencia de México. En la arquitectura, en la música, en la alimentación, en los nombres españoles de las ciudades; en la misma composición étnica del pueblo".

El abogado Henry P. López, enumera, en seguida, los diversos capítulos de lo que él considera la influencia mexicana en los Estados Unidos.

"Lo que respecta a la arquitectura. México ha fijado la imagen de su pasado colonial en incontables edificios, plazas, santuarios y hasta en poblados enteros de Texas, California, Nuevo México, Colorado. Y aun en la misma ciudad imperial de Nueva York. Hay lugares como Santa Bárbara y Monterrey, en California, capaces de evocar tan exquisito sabor hispánico, que nadie puede substraerse a la nostalgia que todo ello produce. Pero no toda la influencia arquitectural de Mexico en los Estados Unidos es colonial. La moderna arquitectura, también tiene toques de mexicanidad. Ahí está, si no, la admirable fachada del edificio "Felix Candela".

Este excelente arquitecto, ejerce una extraordinaria influencia en la arquitectura moderna de Estados Unidos, y en general, en todas las manifestaciones artísticas y estéticas. Acaba de ser llamado a ocupar la cátedra de poesía en la Universidad de Harvard, donde, en estupendas conferencias, ha desarrollado interesantes teorías sobre el dinamismo poético del moderno dibujo estructural.

Su genio se revela en numerosos edificios construidos en diversas partes del país vecino.

* * *

Lopez añade:

"En lo que respecta a las artes plásticas, México ha tenido un persistente impacto en la mentalidad norteamericana. En millares de hogares se pueden ver reproducciones de cuadros de Diego Rivera, José Clemente

SIGUE EN LA PAG. DIECISEIS

ıudad Cientos de
;a de EXCELSIOR



como: "M
de extrao
(En l
elogio al
camarógr
"Y po
sonrisa—,
tinflas", q
más impo
"Roland". (



Nuevos mod
Navidad. Eli

ENCUESTA MUNDI

Sigue de la página anterior

Orozco o David Alfaro Siqueiros. Esto no sólo en el Sur, sino en todo el país, del uno al otro confín..."

"Y en más reciente manifestación artística, tenemos a Rufino Tamayo y a José Luis Cuevas. Estos ejercen influencia de vanguardia entre los artistas norteamericanos contemporáneos".

Prosigue López:

"Los autores mexicanos, escritores y poetas, no han tenido aun la abundante publicidad que ha acogido a los pintores. Pero, sin embargo, recientemente han recibido aceptación dos jóvenes escritores: Luis Spota y Carlos Fuentes..."

¿Nada más?

"Es triste deplorar que muchos norteamericanos se ven aún privados del placer de leer a Mariano Azuela, Carlos González Peña, José Vasconcelos y otros titanes de las letras mexicanas. Sin embargo, puede advertirse un reciente y súbito interés por las novelas y cuentos de Juan Jose Arreola y Juan Rulfo".

"Si pasamos al arte cinematográfico, de máximo interés moderno, México puede convertirse en el centro de una de las más grandes producciones artísticas del mundo. Los más refinados y exigentes expectadores de Nueva York, Los Angeles, Chicago y otras ciudades, se han impresionado grandemente con películas tales como: "Macario", "Raíces", "Los Olvidados" y otras más de extraordinaria factura".

(En los círculos cinematográficos se menciona con elogio al mexicano Gabriel Figueroa, como a uno de los camarógrafos más grandes del mundo)...

"Y por supuesto —comenta López con una amplia sonrisa—, ni qué hablar de nuestro extraordinario "Cantinflas", que se ha convertido en la atracción de taquilla más importante, a la altura de Anthony Quinn, Gilbert Roland".

En el campo profesional, un número considerable de brillantes profesionistas mexico-americanos, se han distinguido en sus respectivas actividades.

Mencionemos, por ejemplo, el gran abogado Raúl Magaña, de Los Angeles, que es considerado como el mejor litigante al oeste del Mississippi.

"En derecho procesal, en medicina legal y en recursos judiciales, Magaña es autoridad en todo Estados Unidos. Ha dictado conferencias ante la Barra Nacional y en numerosas universidades. Magaña es hijo de un funcionario mexicano que fue por muchos años cónsul en San Francisco. Nació en México y siempre ha mantenido estrecho contacto con su país de origen.

"En resumen, México está presente en Estados Unidos y seguirá estando. Esto significa una nueva fuerza social, política y cultural en ese país vecino de ustedes, y del cual soy ciudadano, orgulloso de mi origen mexicano y latino... Dos pueblos, México y Estados Unidos, que tienen un sentido común
no debe tener fronteras de
perturben prejuicios de raza

Lo que nos lleva a un
esta encuesta; el más importa

¿Pueden coexistir, sin de
dos formas de una misma ex
presión latina y la expresión s

---

de San Antonio, para ocupar una curul en la Cámara de Representantes de Washington, ha hecho resaltar la creciente importancia de la población mexicoamericana de los Estados Unidos".

¿Tanto así? ¿Una elección local?

"El propio Presidente Kennedy, consciente de este hecho y de las grandes proyecciones políticas de su contenido, no vaciló en intervenir personalmente en apoyo de la candidatura de González. Es más: envió al vicepresidente Johnson a San Antonio para que luchase codo con codo. El mismo Mario Moreno "Cantinflas" cooperó con el Partido Demócrata. La victoria de González fue arrolladora".

Normalmente, es insólito que un Presidente comprometa su personalidad en una campaña política local.

"Esta vez, la actitud de Kennedy no sorprendió a los políticos. Era esperada. Formaba parte de la Nueva Frontera. Hace mucho tiempo que sabemos que el voto de los mexicanos de origen es decisivo. Sobre todo en los Estados de Texas, California, Arizona, Nuevo México y Colorado".

López nos recuerda que el propio hermano del actual mandatario estadunidense, y jefe de su campaña electoral, Robert Kennedy, a raíz del triunfo demócrata, declaró con toda sinceridad, y frente a los reporteros del mundo entero: "es muy probable que nuestra victoria se deba en gran parte a los norteamericanos de habla

mente, la influencia cultural de nuestro país...

He aquí lo que nos dice López, maestro de Harvard:

"Huelga confirmar, una vez más, que, en todos los órdenes, y desde hace décadas, la influencia mexicana, nativa o inmigrante, en el seno de nosotros, ha sido siempre destacada y visible. Visible y destacada en todos los campos de la cultura; ya no sólo de la vida cívica.

"Baste haber viajado por la parte sur del país, para que hasta el más superficial observador reconozca, de inmediato, la influencia de México. En la arquitectura, en la música, en la alimentación, en los nombres españoles de las ciudades; en la misma composición étnica del pueblo".

El abogado Henry P. López, enumera, en seguida, los diversos capítulos de lo que él considera la influencia mexicana en los Estados Unidos.

"Lo que respecta a la arquitectura. México ha fijado la imagen de su pasado colonial en incontables edificios, plazas, santuarios y hasta en poblados enteros de Texas, California, Nuevo México, Colorado. Y aun en la misma ciudad imperial de Nueva York. Hay lugares como Santa Bárbara y Monterrey, en California, capaces de evocar tan exquisito sabor hispánico, que nadie puede substraerse a la nostalgia que todo ello produce.

[illegible] de México en

22 Dec 1961
S/C ATT MMMA 18348



EL AGUINALDO SIEMPRE ESPERADO

Primero en simpatía...

Steelco

ENCUESTA MUNDIAL

Sigue de la primera plana

que registra la historia del Partido Demócrata: dos millones y medio de sufragios".

Además, es amigo personal del Presidente Kennedy. Fue su coordinador en la campaña que llevó al de Massachussetts a la Presidencia. Idea suya fue el famoso botón amarillo con el sombrero de charro y el "¡Viva Kennedy!", así, en español, que llevaron en la solapa millones de norteamericanos de origen mexicano.

Entre otros muchos cargos, Henry P. López es presidente de la Juventud Demócrata de California. Quien dice California, quien dice Texas, quien dice Colorado, ya toca un poco las fronteras humanas de México.

Esas fronteras que se extienden hasta donde quiera que exista un hogar mexicano.

★ ★ ★

¿Enrique González?

"La elección reciente de Enrique González, abogado de San Antonio, para ocupar una curul en la Cámara de Representantes de Washington, ha hecho resaltar la creciente importancia de la población mexicoamericana de los Estados Unidos".

¿Tanto así? ¿Una elección local?

"El propio Presidente Kennedy, consciente de este hecho y de las grandes proyecciones políticas de su contenido, no vaciló en intervenir personalmente en apoyo de la candidatura de González. Es más: envió al vicepresidente Johnson a San Antonio para que luchase codo con codo. El mismb Mario Moreno "Cantinflas" cooperó con el Partido Demócrata. La victoria de González fue arrolladora".

Normalmente, es insólito que un Presidente comprometa su personalidad en una campaña política local.

"Esta vez, la actitud de Kennedy no sorprendió a los políticos. Era esperada. Formaba parte de la Nueva Frontera. Hace mucho tiempo que sabemos que el voto de los mexicanos de origen es decisivo. Sobre todo en los Estados de Texas, California, Arizona, Nuevo México y Colorado".

López nos recuerda que el propio hermano del actual mandatario estadunidense, y jefe de su campaña electoral, Robert Kennedy, a raíz del triunfo demócrata, declaró, con toda sinceridad, y frente a los reporteros del mundo entero: "es muy probable que nuestra victoria se deba en gran parte a los norteamericanos de habla española que nos dieron su voto en Estados claves: ahí donde la lucha fue más intensa".

Declaración histórica.

"...En California, por ejemplo, el voto potencial del Estado —me refiero al de filiación mexicana de origen—, es de un millón trescientos mil. En Texas, de doscientos cincuenta mil. En Nuevo México, cerca del cincuenta por ciento del electorado es de origen mexicano".

La mayoría de estos votantes son demócratas. Interés, pues, del Partido en el poder, en Estados Unidos, es el de cuidar de cerca, alentar y encauzar a esos millones de hispanoamericanos, como los llaman en el vecino país.

"Por eso fue que en la campaña de 1960, por primera vez en la historia, se crearon batallones especiales de mexicanos de origen que, al grito de "¡Viva Kennedy!", asaltaron cívicamente las casillas electorales, dando el triunfo al de Nueva Inglaterra".

Nuestro intermediario, McCormick, fue precisamente el capitán en jefe de esos "batallones" de paisanos...

Bueno, pero... Nosotros sabemos que se trata de mexicanos de origen. Ese origen, ¿también opera en el ánimo, la moral, la profesión, la sensibilidad de quienes representan "a la raza" en los asuntos públicos de los Estados Unidos?

Pregunta necesaria, no impertinente.

"Conozco a González, ahora representante en Washington. Siempre se ha sentido orgulloso de su ascendencia mexicana. En muchos de sus discursos exhorta "a sus paisanos" a que visiten México; a que perfeccionen su español; a que no olviden sus tradiciones, magníficas y ejemplares. Este mismo orgullo de su origen, se advierte en el senador Dennis Chávez; en el diputado José Montoya; y en políticos de la talla de Eduardo Roybal, Alberto Peña y otros más".

★ ★ ★

Insistimos. Nos interesa, ciertamente, la sensibilidad política del actual momento nacional de los Estados Unidos. Pero nos interesa también, y muy particularmente, la influencia cultural de nuestro país...

He aquí lo que nos dice López, maestro de Harvard:

"Huelga confirmar, una vez más, que, en todos los órdenes, y desde hace décadas, la influencia mexicana, nativa o inmigrante, en el seno de nosotros, ha sido siempre destacada y visible. Visible y destacada en todos los campos de la cultura; ya no sólo de la vida cívica.

"Baste haber viajado por la parte sur del país, para que hasta el más superficial observador reconozca, de inmediato, la influencia de México. En la arquitectura, en la música, en la alimentación, en los nombres españoles de las ciudades; en la misma composición étnica del pueblo".

El abogado Henry P. López, enumera, en seguida, los diversos capítulos de lo que él considera la influencia mexicana en los Estados Unidos.

"Lo que respecta a la arquitectura. México ha fijado la imagen de su pasado colonial en incontables edificios, plazas, santuarios y hasta en poblados enteros de Texas, California, Nuevo México, Colorado. Y aun en la misma ciudad imperial de Nueva York. Hay lugares como Santa Bárbara y Monterrey, en California, capaces de evocar tan exquisito sabor hispánico, que nadie puede substraerse a la nostalgia que todo ello produce. Pero no toda la influencia arquitectural de México en los Estados Unidos es colonial. La moderna arquitectura, también tiene toques de mexicanidad. Ahí está, si no, la admirable fachada del edificio "Félix Candela".

Este excelente arquitecto, ejerce una extraordinaria influencia en la arquitectura moderna de Estados Unidos, y en general, en todas las manifestaciones artísticas y estéticas. Acaba de ser llamado a ocupar la cátedra de poesía en la Universidad de Harvard, donde, en estupendas conferencias, ha desarrollado interesantes teorías sobre el dinamismo poético del moderno dibujo estructural.

Su genio se revela en numerosos edificios construidos en diversas partes del país vecino.

★ ★ ★

López añade:

"En lo que respecta a las artes plásticas, México ha tenido un persistente impacto en la mentalidad norteamericana. En millares de hogares se pueden ver reproducciones de cuadros de Diego Rivera, José Clemente

SIGUE EN LA PAG. [illegible]

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

610
FEB 63

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

27 NOV

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:
RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

6-71 File cc in folder "Federacion Universitaria de Sociedades de Alumnes"
cc detached as requested

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.				
2. WH 46	BARTON			EB
3. C/WH/3				
4. DC/WH/3				
5. WH/3/m / Hegr			6	
6. Grunwell		7 Dec. 7		
7. Secy				
8. WH/CA/Lu Santa				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE ✓

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-253023

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
24 Nov [illegible]

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HMMA 10166

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-18186

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
24 November 1961

SUBJECT
110 201
Edward G. TICHBORN

RE: "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information

REFERENCE(S)

1. Subject has recently solved his foremost personal problem: the shipment of his personal furniture into Mexico. The cost of the shipment was considerably less than the amount authorized by Headquarters.

2. Subject shows signs of being a valuable asset to the Station. He will be assigned to take over as a temporary replacement for RIKON when the latter is on home leave over the holidays. He very probably will maintain contact with the new student president on RIKON's return so that the Station will be able to utilize TICHBORN's knowledge of election techniques in the next student elections at National University.

3. Generally, TICHBORN will be used by the Station as outside case officer for operations in the intellectual field. He has already made contacts in the theatre, ballet, film, writing and student spheres. In order to increase his ability to meet and cultivate assets, the Station is authorizing TICHBORN the rental of a small apartment, to be sparsely furnished in a bohemian manner. Subject is posing as a left-of-center Mexican-American, and will provide the Station with regular reports on personalities and activities in the intellectual field, as well as run operations at Station direction.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

22 November 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

CS COPY

201-253203

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Edward G. Tichborn (p) and JMWOOL

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: Book Dispatch No. 2866, 23 October 1961

1. The Station will recall that part of Edward G. Tichborn's cover is provided by DTEMBARGO. Before leaving for Mexico, he met Staff Agent Michael J. Skirman (p) and was told to develop a relationship with DTEMBARGO and Skirman through correspondence. It was suggested that he might submit an occasional article for consideration by JMWOOL (Identity 6 of reference).

2. Tichborn has submitted his first article. While possibly suitable for publication in certain kinds of magazines ("The New Leader", "The Reporter", or "The Saturday Review"), it is not suitable for JMWOOL since it is a journalistic think-piece and not a scholarly effort and it is by and large critical of The Alianza para el Progreso and the United States role in The Alianza and in Latin America in general.

3. It is therefore requested that Station explain to Tichborn, if he brings this matter up, that JMWOOL is designed to support and foster United States policies in Latin America and not gratuitously to criticize them, regardless of the purpose of the criticism.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2-Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 10 Nov 61

DATE DISPATCHED: 15 NOV 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-10239

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-2[illegible]3203

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/CA/P
OFFICER: W. C. Smith
TYPIST: ss
EXT.: 3504

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/CA		Robert
WH/3/Mexico	14/XI/61	John G. Ryan
[illegible]		

Hqs:
1-RI/AN
1-Tichborn file
1-JMWOOL
1-WH/MR
1-PI
1-WH/PO/B

RI/FI INITIAL

D.K.

RELEASING

C/WHD

L. Smith
[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 381
8 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : COP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CCG 2, FI
IOD 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 8 1716Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 19486

DIR CITE MEXI 9353 (WARE ACTING)

REF DIR 21982 (Out 66289)*

1. FUSA IS OVERALL GOVERNING UNAM STUDENT DIRECTORATE, COMPOSED OF FIVE EXISTING FEUS IN UNIFIED BODY, REPRESENTING TOTAL 70,000 UNAM STUDENTS. WHILE FUSA IS NEWLY CREATED AND DEGREE OF INFLUENCE AND AMOUNT OUTSIDE POLITICAL/GOVT SUPPORT NOT YET KNOWN, ROQUE, IN ACCORDANCE HIS ELECTORAL PLATFORM, DESIRES OBTAIN FUNDS INITIATE STUDENT NEWSPAPER, ESTABLISH STUDENT HOUSE (S), IMPROVE UNAM EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS AND STUDENT FACILITIES SUCH AS TEXT BOOKS, LIBRARY SOURCE MATERIAL, ETC. SINCE ROQUE ALREADY/SIGNED OPERATIONAL RECEIPTS FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM ZRAFRAID FOR HIS ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, IT APPEARS FEASIBLE SAME "ANONYMOUS LOCAL BUSINESSMEN/GROUP" COVER SPONSORSHIP AND OP CONTROL AS UTILIZED LILISP C THRU RIKON, DE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-253213

INTRODUCED ROQUE. RIKON OR TICHBORN IS BEST POSITION THRU ZRAFRAID LEADERS BE INTRODUCED AND ESTABLISH ROQUE OP RELATIONSHIP.

2. IN VIEW RIKON APPROX THREE MONTH HOME LEAVE AND RETURN BEGINNING EARLY DEC 61 AND NEED MAINTAIN ZRAFRAID OP CONTACTS AND DEVELOP FUSA

RELATIONSHIP DURING THAT PERIOD, STA PLANS INTRODUCE TICHBORN AS "FELLOW BUSINESSMAN IN ANONYMOUS GROUP" AS RIKON TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT IN LILISP C. TICHBORN NOW PROCURING SMALL APARTMENT VICINITY UNAM CAMPUS UNDER ASSUMED NAME FOR LILISP C/STUDENT CONTACTS.

3. UNTIL DIRECT OP CONTACT WITH ROQUE (USING SAME COVER/CONTROL AS LILISP C) ESTABLISHED BY RIKON OR TICHBORN, AND ROQUE'S SPECIFIC STUDENT PROGRAMS AND FINANCIAL NEEDS FOR FUSA KNOWN, STA WILL CONTINUE CHANNEL FUNDS AND POSSIBLE GUIDANCE TO ROQUE THRU ZRAFRAID LEADERSHIP. STA WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *STATED INCREASED KUBARK BACKING FOR ROQUE AND FUSA PROGRAM APPROVED IN PRINICPLE-REQUESTED ADDITIONAL INFO.

October 30, 1961

Dear Bob,

I agree with you that our friend's contribution on the *Alianza para el Progreso* is not for us. It's much more a "New Leader" or "Reporter" place, although I'm not sure it's original enough for either. You might, in turning it down, suggest he send it to them.

I see no reason why, in turning this article down, you can't suggest he do something a little more scholarly on the political implications of the Alianza. This could be a fairly interesting exercise, provided it doesn't paint the United States too darkly.

Meanwhile, I shall get word off to our friend through other channels clarifying the purposes of our publication.

Best,

201-253203

TICHBORN

Although the sweet sound of 20 billion dollars created a momentary euphoria at the Punta del Este conference several weeks ago, it is now obvious that President Kennedy's prodigious "Alianza para el Progreso" faces a difficult uncertain future.

The delegates had scarcely returned home when the Goulart-Brazilian crisis erupted and thereby threatened the very beginnings of Kennedy's hopeful proposal. And certainly no seasoned observer of Latin American politics can assume that the Brazilian crisis has been resolved by the quickly-devised modus operandi which permitted João Goulart to assume the presidency. Goulart insisted the constitutional amendment limiting his powers be submitted to Brazilian voters in a referendum, clearly indicating he will not be content with a mere figurehead status. With the conservative militarists still adamant in their opposition to a fully-powered Goulart, a civil war (a prolonged and bloody one) may be in the offing. Meanwhile, the creators of the Alliance for Progress find themselves in a watchful, hopeful dither.

But, aside from the Brazilian problem, the Alianza already had and still has a number of formidable obstacles which were readily observable from the outset. Fully granting the immense possibilities offered by this economic Magna Carta for the Americas, it would be foolish to overlook or to minimize those basic harsh realities of which dreams are not made.

Among the toughest realities facing the Alliance is the Congress of the United States, which has always been reluctant to approve long-range foreign aid. Even before the U. S. delegation had returned to Washington, Senator Thruston Morton grumpily informed the press that the Republican Party would have no part of Dillon's "wild schemes." Then, in a week of now-you-have-it-now-you-don't bickering in the House and Senate, the Alliance spenders were given to understand that the *carte* is not quite so *blanche* as they might hope.

Even assuming a more generous Congressional attitude toward long-range financing rather than year-to-year appropriations, some observers were inclined to skepticism in re Treasury Secretary Dillon's implied promise of 20 billion dollars over a ten-year period. Answering the skeptics, Dillon assured the Punta del Este delegates that a large share of the 20 billion would come from such already-established and soon-to-be-expanded agencies as the Export-Import Bank, Development Loan Fund, the World Bank, the International Cooperation Administration, International Finance Corporation and the Inter-American Development Bank. He also expects increased investment by private entities. But, notwithstanding such assurances, certain financial experts view Dillon's figures as overly optimistic. They point out, for example, that Dillon's expectation of 300 million dollars from the World Bank is unrealistic in view of the fact that it extended only 148 million dollars in credits to Latin America in 1960.

As for Secretary Dillon's expectations for increased investments and loans from *private sources*, the skeptics would appear to have even greater reason for gloom. On August 22nd of this year the U.S. Department of Commerce published a report indicating a sharp unprecedented drop in private U.S. investments in Latin America. Whereas in 1959 said investments totaled 218 million dollars, the total catapulted to a mere 95 million in 1960, a loss of more than 50 per cent in one year. Much of the blame for this sudden fear can be traced to the Cuban revolution and the sudden upsurge of revolutionary fervor elsewhere in the hemisphere. However, fiscal experts are quick to point out two other factors: (1) the termination of heretofore accelerated expansion of mining operations and (2) the sudden deceleration of activity in the petroleum industry in Venezuela. In the latter case one cannot dismiss the impact of Castro's expropriation policies as reflected in neighboring republics.

Traveling through the U.S. (reading and hearing press and television commentaries and talking with certain members of Congress), one gets the impression that the Alianza's primary problems will be of an *economic* nature. But, here in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America, one has the feeling that the *political* obstacles will be equally if not more troublesome.

For President Kennedy and his aides the *sine qua non* of the Alianza is a program of structural reforms -- administrative, fiscal, agrarian, etc. -- by all or most of the participating countries. Perhaps too late, the U. S. has realized that the Castroism it so vehemently abhors and fears has its most effective base where squalor and disease and social injustice abound in the presence of arrogant wealth and power. Whereas Uncle Sam once supported and coddled the Trujillos, [illegible] ~~Somozas~~, Jimenes, et al., it now espouses political and social reforms of a fundamental nature. But it is this very insistence on reform (Kennedy has indeed reiterated the phrase "revolution"), this penchant for social change, which has evoked the most skepticism in Latin America.

In solemn heraldic language the 21 nations of the hemisphere promised in writing that the needed reforms would be accomplished, but there must have been many a crossed finger guiding the pens that signed the final document. Will El Salvador's powerful well-entrenched "fourteen families" stand idly by while an agrarian program snatches away their vast coffee plantations? And what about the land-rich hacendados of Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil and other hemisphere republics? For all the vague illusory promises of basic reforms at Punta del Este, one cannot ignore this unavoidable truth: most of Kennedy's hoped-for reforms will seriously affect the personal economic fortunes of the governing cliques in the countries involved. One seriously doubts that these gentlemen shall willingly preside over the liquidation of their personal empires. This in spite of the fact that all of them are fully (or at least partially) aware that, unless voluntary drastic reforms are accomplished, their vast holdings will be taken from them forcibly by some emerging local Fidel Castro. And it may well be that their stubborn resistance to change is buttressed by the millions of dollars they have providentially stashed away in Swiss and American banks during the past few years. In short, they may be engaging in a prolonged "holding action" in the sure knowledge that their days are numbered.

In any event, the promised agrarian or fiscal reforms may paradoxically lead to either of two extremes, both of which would frustrate the stated intentions of the Alliance. On the one hand, Government X might place its program in the hands of timid conservatives who interpret "evolution" as "status quo with minimal changes." Or the whole matter might be referred to do-nothing, what's - in - it - for - me congressional bodies, with little or no prodding from the executive branch of government. On the other hand, Government X might indulge in hasty improvised measures born of public clamor and political flaccidity, all of which could produce one of those nightmare *fracasos* which embarrass even the most ardent revolutionary. Most of Latin America considers itself decades behind in the socio-economic development of the West, and the urge to move quickly and drastically is everywhere evident.

Now a word about Mr. Dillon's expectations in the realm of private investments as part of the *Alianza para el Progreso*. According to reports in some of the business journals, prospective investors from Europe, Japan and the United States have certain misgivings about the program.

First of all, these businessmen feel that the Alliance offers only minimal encouragement for *private* investment in Latin America. Indeed, some are quick to point out that in his initial speech at Punta del Este, Secretary Dillon did not once mention private enterprise -- nor in any of his subsequent comments before the committee on labor. They feel, therefore, that the Alliance is oriented toward government-to-government loans and public works projects on massive scales beyond the scope of the individual entrepreneur.

Secondly, there's considerable doubt as to the real intentions of Latin American governments in re fiscal reform. It will be exceedingly difficult, they say, to alter the long-standing pattern of heavy reliance on import duties and stiff taxes for foreign corporations. Income taxes are comparatively low and tax collection notoriously lax and subject to easy evasion by individuals, merchants and local corporations alike.

Thirdly, these foreign investors are especially dubious about the agrarian aspects of the Alianza. They are predictably apprehensive about expropriation of their immense landholdings for distribution in small parcels among the landless *campesinos*. (In his state of the union speech on September 1st, Mexico's President Lopez Mateos reported the recent government acquisition of three huge *latifundios* heretofore owned by Americans.) But aside from a disinclination to see themselves "done in", certain foreign businessmen contend that small farms (or *ejidos*) are not nearly as productive acre-per-acre as the larger estates -- that even the "cooperatives" of the Fidel Castro type will prove "uneconomic." Rather than expropriate and divide the existing highly productive *latifundios*, these gentlemen propose immediate and widespread colonization of unused lands. This, they argue, would be cheaper because there would be no cost of indemnification for expropriated properties nor a dislocation of productive capacity. For this reason they far prefer the colonization measures of Peru and Brazil to the more drastic style of Mexico and Bolivia.

However, all of the aforementioned uncertainties are of less concern than the omnipresent X factor: the impact of Fidel Castro on all of Latin America. How, why, and to what extent can Fidelismo affect the *Alianza para el Progreso*? Some observers feel that Castro is indeed the real (if not *de jure*) father of the Alliance; that without his cataclysmic emergence, the United States would have continued to ignore the poor-cousin republics of the south. (In the 1950's only 3% of our foreign aid went to the 21 nations which comprise Latin America. Laos alone received more aid than all of these countries combined.) But, more importantly, the Cuban premier has aroused the expectations of the heretofore sullen masses throughout the hemisphere, and their respective leaders have become acutely aware of the rumbling discontent. Some of these *politicos* would no doubt welcome a sudden disposal of the Castro annoyance, but none of them would have participated in a move to openly chastise Cuba at the Punta del Este conference. As a matter of fact, "Che" Guevara managed to accomplish a few minor triumphs despite the cool reception he got from most of the delegates. His post-conference meetings with President Frondizi of Argentina and ex-President Quadros of Brasil are not to be taken lightly.

Although the United States managed to obtain all of the desired signatures on the final declaration at Uruguay, it would be naive for us to suppose that we can once again count on the heretofore solid backing of Latin America. There is, in fact, an increased spirit of neutralism or independence (call it what you will) throughout the hemisphere. Note, for example, that during the conference the then vice-president (now president) of Brazil was on an economic mission to Red China. Bolivia, too, had sent a mission to Russia. And shortly after the conference, President Lopez Mateos told an opening session of the Mexican congress that his country has been and will continue to follow an independent course, free of any adherence to either of the great powers.

It would appear, therefore, that the Alliance for Progress faces a tougher and more devious course than the Good Neighbor policy of Franklin Roosevelt. And it is equally apparent that unless the plan does succeed, there will be a prolonged period of unrest, bloodshed and misery -- perhaps oblivion.

IX/1961

cy- GUZMAN/Nava fil

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: [illegible]

TO: Chief, WH

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: ([illegible])

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 1 September 1961

SUBJECT: [illegible]/Report of Assessment - Dr. Julian [illegible] and Ralph (GUZMAN)

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Routine information.

REFERENCES:

[illegible], 20 August 1961

Transmitted herewith is Edward G. [illegible]'s report of assessment referred to in reference.

Willard C. Curtis

Attachment: As stated above, h/w

29 August 1961

Distribution:
- 3 - Hqs, w/att
- 2 - Files

REPORT RE PROSPECTS

1. **Dr. Julian NAVA**

NAVA seems to me to be a good prospect. I gave a small cocktail party for mutual friends (both political and social) so that I could observe NAVA's reactions to a variety of problems concerning Latin America. It would appear from his lengthy comments and reactions to comments from others that he would be helpful to us.

NAVA received his Ph.D. in political science at Harvard University, having done undergraduate work at Pomona College. He's traveled widely in Latin America, and spent ten days in Havana last year. In speeches in Latin America subsequently he characterized CASTRO as a "paranoid megalomaniac".

NAVA is articulate, bilingual and resourceful. Assistant Professor at San Fernando State College and lives in Encino.

He has, of course, no inkling of my role so do not mention my name in any way if he's contacted. His name is in the valley directory (the brown one) of the Los Angeles area. It's a Dickens number.

2. **Manuel ARAGON**

Appears to be definitely anti-KUBARK due to the Cuban invasion fiasco. He's a very able person, but I doubt that he would be interested in helping us.

3. **Ralph GUZMAN**

Having drawn blank re ARAGON, I arranged a casual meeting with GUZMAN re Latin American political picture. He's doing Ph.D. thesis at UCLA on Mexican American voters. Bright, resourceful, articulate and bilingual. I would judge that he might be willing to do some work for us.

He lives near UCLA campus and can be reached through graduate school (political science division).

NOTE:

None of these men knows or even remotely suspects my role. I would suggest contacting them no sooner than three weeks from now, so that they could draw no inference of coincidence.

/s/ Edward G. TICHBORN

File [illegible]
(copy)

August 22, 1961.

Dear Lew:

As scheduled, I arrived back in Gainesville on the morning of Satuday, August 19, ready to return to work on Monday.

In regard to my Mexican friend, I sent the letter of which you have a copy and re-inforced it with a telegram to confirm a date for a visit as we wanted to be in Oaxaca for the weekend. There was no reply and inasmuch as the visit was one called for only by the courtesy of a friend, I made no effort to reach him otherwise. Felicity told me on my return that she believed that the Saturday and Sunday dates were the only ones he had availab

Our Mexican editor was also out of town so that I could leave cards for h at his office but otherwise could do nothing.

I saw a Mexican author important for us--Dr. Edmundo Flores and consulted with him regarding the review of his book for the ~~[illegible]~~ Journal. This is the only direct business I could do on my vacation other than obtaining certain leads for authors of articles from the newspapers and magazines.

I am told that you will be down here this week or next. I amm very glad of this as there are a number of mateers in which our affairs require immediate attention. All of them have been discussed before but the final arrangements have not yet been made. I believe we especially need to talk about the Centro and the Academy.

I am enclosing a statement by my assistant regarding some sick leave during my absence. This will be the only addition to reports previously made.

I wpuld be glad to make reservations for you if you will let me know the details of your arrival.

With best wishes,

Eichhorn file

201-253203

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : LEE SMITH
UNIT : WH/CA/F
EXT : 3504
DATE : 18 AUGUST 1961 1563

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : CA 2, CA/PRG, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, SR 6, S/C 2

21 AUG 61 20 00z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT87819

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 07160

RE: A. MEXI 8672 (IN 14393)*
B. DIR 05355 (OUT 84591)
C. DIR 47917 (OUT 71102)

1. TICHBORN TOLD FINAL DECISION ON ANY APPROACH FUENTES RESTED WITH STATION AS STATED REF B. IDEA SOUNDED INTERESTING PRECISELY BECAUSE OF CHARACTER AND BACKGROUND FUENTES. ASSUME TICHBORN CAN PROVIDE NAME MUTUAL FRIEND.

2. HQS REGRETS FAILURE CABLE STATION REQUEST FOR ASSESSMENT, NOT RPT NOT RECRUITMENT, NAVA AND ARAGON. TA ADVANCE HQS PER REF C.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *Commented on Tichborn operational suggestion and requested future Hqs advice on ops assignments given agent.

WH/3/Mexi

C/WH/CA

R.W. HERBERT
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

4

201-253203

13 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division
Attention: Contract Agent Section

VIA: Central Cover Division
Attention: Mr. Mullen

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (p): Method of Payment

1. It is requested that Finance Division pay Contract Agent Edward G. TICHBORN (p) through Central Cover Division's mechanism Ashmead, Hanniford Associates. TICHBORN's new contract became effective 19 May 1961.

2. It is requested that salary due TICHBORN since the effective date of his contract be paid as soon as possible.

3. Attached hereto are forms 281 and 313a (top section). The bottom section of 313a is distributed separately.

J. C. King
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

201-233203

SECRET

EMPLOYEE'S WITHHOLDING EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE AND QUESTIONNAIRE

PRINT NAME (*Pseudonym*)

TICHBORN, Edward O.

WITHHOLDING EXEMPTIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

1. **NUMBER OF EXEMPTIONS.**--Do not claim more than the correct number of exemptions. However, if you expect to owe more income tax for the year than will be withheld if you claim every exemption to which you are entitled, you may increase the withholding by claiming a smaller number of exemptions.

2. **CHANGES IN EXEMPTIONS.**--You may file a new certificate at any time if the number of your exemptions INCREASES.

You must file a new certificate within 10 days if the number of exemptions previously claimed by you DECREASES for any of the following reasons:

(a) Your wife (or husband) for whom you have been claiming exemption is divorced or legally separated, or claims her (or his) own exemption on a separate certificate.

(b) The support of a dependent for whom you claimed exemption is taken over by someone else, so that you no longer expect to furnish more than half the support for the year.

(c) You find that a dependent for whom you claimed exemption will receive $600 or more of income of his own during the year (except your child who is a student or who is under 19 years of age).

OTHER DECREASES in exemption, such as the death of a wife or a dependent, do not affect your withholding until the next year, but require the filing of a new certificate by December 1 of the year in which they occur.

For further information about changes in exemption status resulting from marriage, divorce, legal separation, birth, death, new dependents, multiple-support agreements, old age, blindness, etc., consult your local District Director of Internal Revenue or your employer.

3. **DEPENDENTS.**--To qualify as your dependent (line 4 below), a person (a) must receive more than one-half of his or her support from you for the year, and (b) must have less than $600 gross income during the year (except your child who is a student or who is under 19 years of age), and (c) must not be claimed as an exemption by such person's husband or wife, and (d) must be a citizen or resident of the United States or a resident of Canada, Mexico, the Republic of Panama or the Canal Zone, and (e) must (1) have your home as his principal residence and be a member of your household for the entire year, or (2) be related to you as follows:

- Your son or daughter (including legally adopted children), grandchild, stepson, stepdaughter, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law;
- Your father, mother, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, father-in-law, or mother-in-law;
- Your brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, half brother, half sister, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law;
- Your uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece (but only if related by blood).

4. **PENALTIES.**--Penalties are imposed for willfully supplying false information or willful failure to supply information which would reduce the withholding exemption.

1. If SINGLE, and you claim an exemption, write the figure "1" . . . . ____
2. If MARRIED, one exemption each for husband and wife if not claimed on another certificate.
   (a) If you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2"
   (b) If you claim one of these exemptions, write the figure "1" 2
   (c) If you claim neither of these exemptions, write "0"
3. Exemptions for age and blindness (applicable only to you and your wife but not to dependents):
   (a) If you or your wife will be 65 years of age or older at the end of the year, and you claim this exemption, write the figure "1"; if both will be 65 or older, and you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2". ____
   (b) If you or your wife are blind, and you claim this exemption, write the figure "1"; if both are blind, and you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2" . . . . ____
4. If you claim exemptions for one or more dependents, write the number of such exemptions. (Do not claim exemption for a dependent unless you are qualified under instruction 3 above.) 3
5. Add the number of exemptions which you have claimed above and write the total. 5

SOURCES OF INCOME

INDICATE SOURCE(S) OF INCOME ☐ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☒ COVER FACILITY

IF COVER FACILITY, INDICATE HOW MUCH PER YEAR $ 6,000

TAXES WITHHELD FROM ABOVE COVER INCOME ☐ YES ☒ NO

INDICATE TYPE(S) OF TAXES AND AMOUNT(S) WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD U.S. TAXES $ FOREIGN TAXES $ NONE

INDICATE COVER PAY PERIOD ☐ WEEKLY ☐ BIWEEKLY ☐ SEMIMONTHLY ☒ MONTHLY

DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX FILED ☒ YES ☐ NO

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that the number of withholding exemptions claimed on this form does not exceed the number to which I am entitled, and that the information relative to sources of income shown hereon is correct.

DATE

SIGNED (*Pseudonym*)

FORM NO. 313
1 OCT 58

SECRET

(30)

14-00000

SECRET

COVERT AGREEMENT SUPPL NT - INCOME AND FEDERAL TAX DA.

TYPE OF PRINT: ☐ ORIGINAL ☐ CORRECTION

1. PSEUDONYM TICHBORN, Edwa rd G.

2. 3723

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS *(Check as appropriate)*

☐ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☒ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY

TOTAL AMOUNT *(Per annum)* $8,000

AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX $

EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED *(Allowances, etc.)*

PAYMENTS TO BEGIN *(Date)*

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY

☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☒ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID

INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD

☒ NONE THIS COUNTRY $ FOREIGN $

IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☐ YES ☐ NO

NAME OF COUNTRY

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS *(See item 16 below)*

☐ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

COVER FACILITY *(Cryptonym)*

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS *(See item 16 below)*

☒ COVERT *(If covert only, omit rest of this item.)* ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX *(Check one)*

☒ HAS BEEN FILED ☐ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☐ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY. N.A.

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 *(Or equivalent)* ATTACHED

13. MARITAL STATUS *(Complete as appropriate)*

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED

DATE OF MARRIAGE 5 April 1 954

DATE OF DEATH

DATE OF DECREE

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE

RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE *(Country)*

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE *(Omit self and spouse)*

RELATIONSHIP *(No names)*	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
Son	1952	U.S.	Mexico
Son	1955	U.S.	Mexico
Daughter	1957	U.S.	Mexico

15. REMARKS

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

The employer's names and methods for reporting compensation shown in Items 8, and/or 9, above are approved.

DATE

SIGNATURE AND TITLE

17. FORM PREPARED BY wlo ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☐ OFFICIAL

PART I CERTIFIED CORRECT

DATE 13 July'61

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL W. Lehman Smith

PART II CERTIFIED CORRECT *(Explain when not signed)*

DATE

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL *(Pseudonym)* (not available)

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

SECRET

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (30)

THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED: SECRET

RESPONSE TO GREEN LIST REQUEST № 111621

DATE OF REQUEST 7 July 1961

1. SUBJECT (NAME, IN ROMAN LETTERS AND IN NORMAL ORDER)
H enry P. Lopez C-77119

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.
Enrique Preciliano Lopez

3. BIRTH DATE
28 May 1920

4. BIRTH PLACE
Denver, Colorado

5. CITIZENSHIP
USA

6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Representative of Producciones Mark IV?
Melchor Ocampo 463, Mexico D/F, Mexico

7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Lawyer; politician
Graduate of Univ. of Denver (1944) and Harvard La w School (194 8); attended Graduate School of Econ at Harvard (1944-45) and Universidad Nacional de Mexico (1955)

REQUEST FROM
NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER W.L. Smith
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/PO/B
ROOM, BUILDING 107 Barton Hall
EXTENSION 3503

14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED? X YES ___ NO

15. TYPE OF REQUEST
X FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
___ ADDITIONAL DATA
___ COVER

16. INTEREST IN SUBJECT
___ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
X OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
___ OTHER

17. INFORMATION REQUIRED
Derogatory

8. MILITARY SERVICE

SERVICE, ARM, COUNTRY	SPECIALTY	LOCATION	DATES
Army, United States	Medical Corps		1942-44

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Self-employed attorney	Los Angeles, Cal.	1953-61
Attorney (R.D. Magna)	"	1948-53
Attorney (National Labor Relations Board)	"	1948
Psychiatric Interviewer (Harvard Medical School)	Boston, Mass.	1944-46

10. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5'10"	175	Brown	Black	White	

11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Mildred Jean McGregor

12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND ASSOCIATES
Children - Chapman Joaquin Lopez (9); Gregory Harold Lopez (6); Drusilla Lopez(4).
Parents - Jose P. Lopez (69); Herminia Lopez (62).
Associate - John Nicolls Manson III (Owner Producciones Mark IV)

13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC) ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED
Active in California State Democrat Party

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI-10-7

FORM 11-60 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-253203

SECRET

TO: WH/PO/B W. L. SMITH

17 Jul 61
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO ~~XXXXXX~~ INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF A CONTINUING SEARCH WAS REQUESTED IN SECTION 14, INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : BEN EVANS
UNIT : WH/3/BR&H
EXT : 3054
DATE : 9 JUNE 1961

ROUTING			
1	~~BA~~	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : CIUDAD TRUJILLO (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE) INFO: MEXICO CITY (ROUTINE)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 5

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

9 JUN 61 15 48z

DEFERRED CEN
ROUTINE

OUT64603

TO TRUJ (OPIM) INFO MEXI (ROUTINE) CITE DIR 44408

REF: MEXI 8186 (IN 21801)*

LOPEZ DUE TO ARRIVE TRUJ 405 PM PANAM FLIGHT 431. WILL PROBABLY STAY AT EMBAJADOR HOTEL AND HAS BEEN TOLD CONTACT RAYNOCK UPON ARRIVAL. LOPEZ CAN ONLY REMAIN TRUJ THREE DAYS, BUT WILL PROBABLY BE ABLE RETURN SHORTLY AFTER 18 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Comment: *Discussed efforts LOPEZ obtain visa and observed time inadequate for full assessment situation. (LOPEZ and RAYNOCK well acquainted from previous contact in Havana.)

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

NED P. HOLMAN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

File no. 01 — 253203

DATE : 099
6 JUN 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN SALVADOR

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PRG, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUN 7 0652Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 21305

DIR CITE SALV 3791

REF HSSS-325

1. REQUEST AUTHORITY SHOW TICHBORN REPORT TO AMB WILLIAMS ONLY, WHO HAS ASKED IF ANY SUCH REPORT AVAILABLE.

2. AMB FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WITH TICHBORN AND STATION FEELS TICHBORN VIEWS AND EVALUATIONS SIMILAR TO AMB'S AND WOULD BE OF INTERREST TO AMB.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	BR
RI/TY	G
DESTR	
RI/FI	

201-253203

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

File Tichborn File

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : JUNE 1961

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2 (TEMPO COPY ISSUED MR. SMITH WH 1935, 6 JUNE)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

JUN 6 2254Z 1961

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 21119

OPIM DIR CITE MEXI 8172

REF: DIR 43275 (OUT 62337)**

1. LOPEZ PRESENCE LOS ANGELES REQUIRED 14 TO 18 JUNE.

2. HIS INQUIRY DEVELOPS NO VISAS TO CUBANS OR DOMINICANS FROM MEXICO. VISAS FOR AMERICANS FROM MEXICO VIEWED EXTREME SUSPICION.

3. LOPEZ SUGGESTS BETTER HE TRAVEL FROM LA TO CJ AFTER 18 JUNE USING PRETEXT REPRESENTATION AMERICAN INVESTMENT INTERESTS BUYING UP FRIGHTENED CAPITAL.

4. PARAS 1, 2, 3 NOTWITHSTANDING SHOULD HQS WISH, LOPEZ WILLING DEPART MEXI IMMEDIATELY FOR MIAMI, ATTEMPT OBTAIN VISA FROM MIAMI TO CJ.

5. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT :* DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

** REQUESTED STATION CONTACT MR HENRY LOPEZ INSTRUCTING HIM GO CIUDAD TRUJILLO TO FILL OUTLINED REQUIREMENTS.

201-253203

TICHBORN

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

23 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Group

ATTENTION : Mr. John W. Mullen
Building T-4, Room 2-1005

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN (p)

REFERENCE : Memorandum from Chief, WHD to Chief, Central Cover Group, Same Subject, dated 22 May 1961

1. Subject will be employed as legal counsel by John Nicolls Manson, III, a United States citizen who is the owner of Producciones Marc IV, S.A., Melchor Ocampo 463, Mexico, D.F., Mexico. Security clearances are being initiated on Manson, who will be unwitting.

2. Subject will also be provided with a backstopping letter from DTEMBARGO, a WHD foundation.

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

201 253203

SECRET

22 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Division

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. Edward G. TICHBORN (P) has been reassigned from the CA Staff to WH Division. For the past couple of years Subject has been using the notional cover firm, Ashmead, Haniford Assoc. Philadelphia, Pa. as a backstop for services performed for the Agency.

2. WH Division will require a cover firm for backstopping purposes under TICHBORN's new contract; and may therefore request continuing use of Ashmead, Haniford Assoc.

Thomas F. McCoy
Acting Chief
Political Action Group
Covert Action Staff

WCMICHAEL

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - CCD/NC
1 - WH/CA
1 - Chrono

SECRET

201-253923

SECRET

22 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Payroll Division

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. Please cancel Edward G. TICHBORN's present contract effective as of 19 May 1961.

2. A new contract for Subject will be requested by the WH Division in the immediate future.

Thomas F. McCoy
Acting Chief
Political Action Group
Covert Action Staff

SECRET

27 23503

22 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Final Arrangements for Edward G. Tichborn's (P) Contract Status in Mexico.

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Record, dated 17 May 1961

1. When I talked with Tichborn (P) on Wednesday, 17 May, to arrange a meeting with him for Messrs. Collins and McCoy, he stated that he was most anxious to leave on Saturday for Mexico City and wanted to know if final details could be taken care of at our arranged meeting on the 19th in order that he could depart on Saturday, the 20th. As I told Tichborn, I was somewhat surprised that he planned to leave so soon although I did know he was anxious to get settled as soon as possible. I said I would do everything possible to make the final arrangements so that he could leave as he planned.

2. As a result, Mr. Charles Penney, WH/CA, Mr. Michael and the undersigned of CA/PAG, and Tichborn met Friday the 19th at the Roger Smith Hotel to talk about the terms of Subject's contract, to brief him on operational details, Station contact, etc. Mr. Penney had also arranged that one of their agents connected with the Pan American Institute of the University of Florida meet Tichborn during the briefing. This individual did attend the meeting briefly and it is anticipated that perhaps at a later date, this organization might be useful as cover for Tichborn in some of his endeavors and might also be used as a vehicle for bringing promising

201-253203

students to the US. Tichborn (P) was told that he should write a letter to this individual upon his arrival in Mexico City alerting him that he had arrived.

3. Most of the time was taken up with talking about terms of the contract. Briefly, Tichborn will have a two-year contract covering 50% of his time, and will be paid a salary of $8,000 per annum. In addition, for any trips made outside Mexico in connection with his assignment, he will receive travel and operational expenses plus per diem. He will also receive mileage for his automobile when it is used in the course of duty and will be reimbursed for any fees related to his registering (probably as an auditor) at the University of Mexico, Poletecnico, etc. in connection with his assignment. He will paid on a monthly basis, probably sending a check to his bank in Los Angeles. Details need to be worked out on the cover firm to be used in making such deposits and this is being taken care of by both PAG and WHD (it might be possible to use the same firm as in the past, Ashmead, Haniford Associates). Tichborn was also advised as to some items which cannot be claimed under "operational expenses" such as air flight insurance, purchase of personal clothing, parking of automobile while on TDY, broken eye-glasses, etc. He was also told that any questionable items should be checked out with his Station contact and all vouchers and submission of accounting would be made to that person.

4. Tichborn was told that he would be contacted on 29 May (he plans to drive to Mexico City and arrive there on about 25 May) by someone from the Station using an assumed name which was provided him. Tichborn will be staying at the Hotel Montejo on avenida Reforma; he can also be reached by leaving a message at Wells Fargo, Reforma 6. He will also be legitimately employed as legal representative by Mr. John Manson, owner of Producciones Marc IV, Melchor Ocampo 463-8, Mexico City 5. A clearance is being obtained by WH on Manson although it is not planned to make him witting of Tichborn's activities.

5. Tichborn (P) is to concentrate on spotting students with political potential, who would then hopefully be brought to the U.S. for study. It is also anticipated that he would be used from time to time to assess the general political situation in various Latin American countries, as he has done in the past, and perhaps also to act as advisor in election operations when such need arises. Subject brought up the subject of Mexican politics and stated that during his conversation with Messrs. Collins and McCoy they had stated that it would be helpful if he could make contacts with Mexican politicians in order to report on the political situation as a whole and on the split in the PRI party particularly. (I checked this out today with Mr. McCoy and he said that Subject had exaggerated a bit and that this was only discussed in general terms, and that they had specifically told Tichborn that his operational instructions would come from the Station.) Mr. Penney told Tichborn in this connection that he should only concentrate on student affairs for the time being and that it would not be to his advantage to begin working in a field which is already being covered by the Embassy and the Station. It is thought that he will eventually be eased into this type of activity, but he should not engage in such activities until he receives a go-ahead from his contact. Subject understood and agreed.

6. WHD is now writing up the contract and it will be sent to the Station for Tichborn's signature. It will be dated 25 May 1961. Mr. Penney has agreed to show this contract to CA/PAG prior to forwarding it to the Station. Other than clarifying cover arrangements for his monthly salary deposits, there are no outstanding matters to be settled in connection with Tichborn's contract status.

Evalena S. Vidal
Political Action Group

ESVidal:ma

Distribution:
Orig - WH/Planning file
1 - Chrono
1 - WH Div. (Tichborn file)
1 - Vidal file

22 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : New Contract for Edward G. TICHBORN (p)
C-77119

Preparation of a new contract for Subject is requested, to be drawn up on the basis of the attached Contract Information Check List.

H.R.W.H.
J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER Wm. Lee

DIVISION WHD

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION

DATE

SECTION I GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
CHBORN, Edward C.
77119

2A. PROJECT
JMPOPLAR-10

2B. PERMANENT STATION

3. ALLOTMENT NO.

4. SLOT NO.

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)
Contract Agent (Independent Contractor) Contract signed Oct 1959. Basic salary $50.00 per day.

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date)

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☐ YES ☐ NO X

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.)
Contract Agent

SECTION II PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP
United States

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN NA ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE
41

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
28 May 1920

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country)
Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, California

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country)

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
2 Sons - Sven 9, and Gregory 6 years old;
1 Daughter - Griselda 3 years old.

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE

21. VETERAN
Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE
U Army, Medical Corps

24. RANK OR GRADE
Staff Sergeant

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES X ☐ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED NA CIA ☐ YES NO

SECTION IV COMPENSATION

27. BASIC
,000.00 per yr.

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL
N.A.

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any)
N.A.

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY
☐ COVER
☐ CIA
NOT WITHHELD X

SECTION V ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS
N.A.

32. POST
N.A.

33. OTHER

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any)
Commercial

SECTION VI TRAVEL

35. TYPES
☐ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED X ☐ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL N.A. ☐ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

1 Oct 1959 will be [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

42. PURPOSE OF INFORMATION

43. [illegible]

Cov

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: *SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.*

CASE OFFICER:

DIVISION:

TELEPHONE EXTENSION:

DATE:

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 25-230 or successor regulations.)*

N.A.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)*: PROPOSED / ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE *(Check)*: PROPRIETARY / SUBSIDIZED / CULTURAL / EDUCATIONAL / COMMERCIAL / MILITARY / TOURIST / OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

N.A.

☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)*

☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ____ MONTHS 2 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 May 1961

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*: 30 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(FI, PP, other)*

C.A.

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Subject will spot and assess student leaders in relation to ZREAGER Program. Subject will travel throughout the Hemisphere in political action missions as directed by WHD.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Subject has carried out several high-level political action assignments for KUBARK in Latin America and other areas. He is particularly experienced in advising on political techniques.

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐	GRADE SCHOOL	☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐	BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE		
☐	COLLEGE (No degree)	X	COLLEGE DEGREE	LLB	POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK FLUENT	SPEAK AVERAGE	SPEAK POOR	WRITE FLUENT	WRITE AVERAGE	WRITE POOR	READ FLUENT	READ AVERAGE	READ POOR
Spanish	X			X			X		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: United States

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE: Mexico; Latin America.

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

Subject is in private law practice.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

Subject will be authorized to audit courses of instruction in universities in Mexico City on a reimbursable basis, in fulfillment of objectives under the ZREAGER Program.

☐ MORE

APPROVAL

DATE | TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER | DATE | TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

File Tichborn File

ORIG C.C. [illegible]
UNIT WH/PO/B
EXT 3503
DATE ~~[illegible]~~ 22 MAY 1961 1667

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

22 MAY 61 23 04z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : CA 2, CA/PRG, CI/OA, OP 2, S/C 2

910 C[illegible]

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 5859 OUT58552

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 41303
41303

1. EDWARD G. TICHBORN IDEN A DEPARTED WASH 20 MAY FOR MEXI WHERE HE WILL BE EMPLOYED AS LEGAL COUNSEL TO IDEN B.

2. TICHBORN HAS BEEN USED BY KUBARK AS POLITICAL ADVISOR ON ELECTION OPS. PRIOR DEPARTURE HQS DISCUSSED CONTRACT POSSIBILITIES WITH HIM AND AGREED PREPARE CONTRACT WHICH WILL BE SENT MEXI NEAR FUTURE FOR SIGNATURE.

3. HQS ANTICIPATES USING TICHBORN AS ROVING POLITICAL ADVISOR PROVIDING VARIOUS FIELD STATIONS WITH GUIDANCE ON ELECTION OPS. WILL ALSO USE HIM TO DEVELOP [illegible] CANDIDATES VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND MAY APPOINT HIM FIELD REP FOR DTEMBARGO.

4. TICHBORN WILL HAVE NO OPS RESPONSIBILITIES MEXI UNLESS STATION SO DESIRES. HOWEVER HE WOULD REQUIRE SOME COMMO AND ADMIN SUPPORT WHEN OVERT CHANNELS UNSUITABLE.

5. POUCHING PROPOSED CONTRACT AND MORE DETAILS RE POSSIBLE USE IN NEAR FUTURE. REQUEST STATION OFFICER USING NAME "FRANK NELSON" CALL TICHBORN AT HOTEL MONTEJO, REFORMA ON 29 MAY TO ESTABLISH INITIAL CONTACT. ATTEMPTING HAVE CONTRACT MEXI BY THAT TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

R. W. Herbert
~~J. C. KING~~
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/PO/B Robert
COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible]
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-353203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG: C.O.PERSKY
UNIT: WH/PO/B
EXT: 3503
DATE: 22 MAY 1961

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO: CA 2, CA/PRG, CI/CA, OP 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

22MAY61 23 04z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT58553

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 41304

41304

RFE DIR 41303 OUT 5-85-5 2

IDEN A - HENRY LOPEZ, CALIF LAWYER
AND POLITICAL PERSONALITY

IDEN B - PRODUCCIONES MARO IV, S.A.
MELCHOR OCAMPO 463, MEXICO, D.F.
HEADED BY JOHN NICHOLS MANSCH

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/PO/B Ebert
COORDINATING OFFICERS

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

10

17 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CA/PAG Arrangements for Contract Employment of
Edward G. Tichborn (P) by WHD or IOD.

1. Prior to leaving for TDY Mr. Davis asked me to arrange interviews for Edward G. Tichborn (P) with both WHD and IOD for the purpose of trying to arrange Agency contract employment for him in addition to his legitimate occupation. Tichborn (P) has been expecting a political appointment from the new administration and in April of this year left Los Angeles and brought his family to Washington in this connection. He has been sent on two TDY missions in the WH area during the past two years and was very successful in both. He feels that he could be of great assistance to the Agency in the future in the Latin American area, and we agree. Accordingly, two interviews were arranged for him in order to set up something of this nature.

2. Prior to going into the details of these interviews, it might be useful to comment on what job possibilities are available to Tichborn (P) outside the Agency. According to him, a position as "special assistant" to the Director of Latin American Affairs in USIA has been created for him. Tichborn (P) is not, however, anxious to accept this position since a "deputy" already exists and frictions would undoubtedly arise and also he would be based in Washington. Secondly, there is a possibility of being assigned as "deputy director" of the ICA mission in a Latin country such as Chile. Tichborn(P) is not interested in this position either since there would appear to be little chance of advancement and he has also been advised

21-253203

by some Congressional friends that such an assignment would be somewhat equal to "going off to Siberia" career-wise. The other two job potentials are non governmental and are private in nature. The first, but perhaps least desirable of these (since he would have to put up some of his own funds) is to assist some contacts in New York in establishing an investment concern in Latin America. the main advantage of this would be that he would be traveling throughout the area on an exploratory basis. The second of these non governmental positions, and the one which is at present most to Tichborn's (P) liking is legal representative for a TV film dubbing and distribution firm located in Mexico City. The American owner of this firm is a personal friend, in addition, this type of position would provide good cover for travel throughout Latin America and would at the same time leave him free to devote a considerable amount of time to operational activities. the main draw-back is that the salary (unspecified) apparently is not adequate or commensurate to the income Tichborn (P) has derived from his law practice in the past.

3. As to Tichborn's (P) present situation, he is anxious to get settled as soon as possible and is waiting to determine our actual interest in using him before he makes a decision as to which job offer to accept. He is not working in this interim, although he has left someone in his law office on the West Coast and does derive some income therefrom, which is another factor in his hoping to obtain an answer from us as soon as possible. Also, he is temporarily renting a home in Arlington and would like very much to get his family more or less permanently settled and his children in school.

4. This future use of Tichborn (P) was suggested to WHD and IOD in general terms a few weeks ago and both appeared interested, and WHD especially so. Consequently, an appointment was set up with WHD for 5 May, but this meeting was cancelled due to other meetings which arose within WHD. Meeting were then arranged and held with Mr. McLaughlin of 10/6 on 6 May and with Mr. Penney of WH/CA on 9 May, both of which were held at the Marriott Motor Hotel, Key Bridge. The conversations were very rewarding to all concerned and IO/6 expressed an interest in Tichborn's working in

the student field in the WH area, but felt that it would take a minimum of six months to arrange, which would not be the best solution to the current issue at hand. WH is also interested in having Tichborn (P) work in this field and Subject is most enthused about this possibility.

5. Tichborn (P) has several operational ideas which should be of interest to the clandestine services. One about which he feels very strongly and which he stressed when talking to IO/6 (Students) was that he feels a great deal remains to be done in the student and professor fields. Among other related suggestions, he feels that more politically promising students should be brought to the U.S. for study. In order to accomplish the objective of enlisting such potential leaders to our cause, he feels a thorough spotting program should be undertaken and that the criteria for selection of such individuals should be based on this potential rather than on past academic records per se which is the current basis for selection in current exchange programs. He feels, and rightly so, that good grades not necessarily synonymous with leadership qualities. In Latin universities some students spend more time on their political activities than they do on their academic work, and it is among this group that the potential political leaders are found, hence, a new set of criteria are necessary in order to satisfy our requirements and interests. Tichborn (P) also feels that professors could be recruited to assist in such spotting and also that there should be an expanded exchange of such individuals in the U.S. Our efforts along these lines would not conflict with those exchange programs already in effect since our objectives would be different and the type of student or professor involved would be of a different calibre and nature. IO/6 felt that Tichborn (P) has much potential along these lines and was very much interested in his idea per se. The only difficulty they foresaw for the present is that they have no organization in existence under which such an activity would be undertaken and hence, if it were agreed to follow up on this, some kind of a private institution or organization would have to be established and this would require at least six months.

6. The meeting with Mr. Penney of WH was most fruitful. Mr. Penney felt that Tichborn (P) has some very interesting operational ideas and that due to his background, appearance, language, experience and native abilities, etc he would be of definite value to WHD (Mr. Oberst, WH/C/CA had also previously expressed this same view, although he had not personally met Subject). Mr. Penney was told of Subject's ideas on student-professor activities noted in paragraph 5 above, and felt that it would be of definite interest to

the Division. In addition, the possibility was discussed in general terms of utilizing Tichborn (P) in another capacity within the Division; this was in connection with a Hemisphere-wide going program of setting up anti-Castro groups throughout the area. This, however, was only mentioned as a secondary idea. If Subject were utilized in the student professor field, he would perhaps also be called upon from time to time to assist in political matters (such as assessing the political scene as he has done in the past, assisting in election activities, etc.) throughout Latin America on a more or less one-time basis. Employment by WHD of Tichborn (P) in the student field would be on a half time basis and Tichborn (P) would accept the job offer with the TV film company in Mexico City mentioned in paragraph 2 above as legitimate employment which would also serve as cover.

7. Mr. Collins, C/CA, suggested that we might also consider him in connection with a new political grouping of liberal, democratic, anti Communist political parties throughout Latin America which is presently under consideration. Mr. Collins felt, and rightly so, that this operation would permit the full utilization of Tichborn's (P) talents in the political field. Consequently, I checked out this possibility with Mr. Peavy who agreed that he would be an excellent choice for such an assignment. He suggested that I talk about this possible project in more detail with Mr. Harlow Duffin of WH/1, which I did. Mr. Duffin stated that this operation is still in the preparatory stage and that a project must be approved, etc which would take a minimum of 10 days to two weeks. (This idea was recently suggested by Adolfe Berle to C/WH and a feeler was sent to all WH field stations. The question of whether such a group would be under the control of State or CIA was resolved on 12 May and is under our jurisdiction.) Once this project is set up, the position for which Tichborn (P) would qualify (sort of a liaison between the various parties comprising this grouping) would be full-time and would probably be based in Caracas. The scheduling for this project is still vague at the moment and it has also not been determined whether this slot would be filled by a staff employee or by a contract agent. In other words, the timetable and details are still uncertain. Nevertheless, with the consent of WHD, I suggested this job possibility to Tichborn (P) in vague terms (that it would be full-time, would be on a higher-level, would be more in the strictly political field and that he would probably be based in Caracas if he were accepted in this connection).

Tichborn (P) thought it over and called me on 15 May stating that due to the high cost of living there he would need a salary of between $22-25,000 per annum; also he would prefer ~~half-time employment with us to full time since it would prefer~~ half-time employment with us to full time since it would allow him mobility of action in his own profession. I then checked with Mr. Duffin to determine what salary payment they were considering for this position, and he stated that including a living allowance, it would probably amount to between $20-25,000, although he was not sure of the exact figure. On 16 May I relayed this information to Tichborn (P) plus the fact that nothing definite on the whole project would be known for at least ten days.

8. Tichborn's (P) personal decision on these possibilities as he relayed them to me by phone on 16 May was the following: since WHD had stated after talking to him that it is definitely interested in his working in the student-professor field throughout Latin America from his "base" in Mexico City with the film company, and since he had confirmed by phoning Mexico City that that job offer was still open, since he prefers half-time Agency employment and since he is anxious to be settled as soon as possible, he would prefer to accept this particular assignment. Since Mr. Penney had informed me that they would be ready to discuss terms and sign a contract at any time, I said that I would arrange for such a meeting. (In this connection, Mr. Davis had mentioned to Subject in general terms that for half-time employment he might receive approximately $10,000 salary, I had checked this out with WH and they said that their going rate for such employment is $8,000, with only a very slight, if any, possibility of a $10,000 figure. Hence, I relayed this information to Tichborn (P) who said that he would like to talk this over, but more or less implied that the $8-10,000 range would be acceptable.) Tichborn (P) added that if an Institute for student activities as discussed with IO/6 is set up at a later date, he would also be interested in working with it.

9. In the meantime, on 17 May, IO/3 called me to say that they also had two job possibilities for Tichborn (P) since they had been informed of him through Mr. McLaughlin of IO/6. I talked to Mr. Cramer about one possibility which I felt would not be of interest to Subject and so advised them. This involved the need for someone with a legal background to talk with Cuban exiles wherever they might be in the U.S. or Latin America and to obtain affidavits from them concerning legal travesties of justice which have, and are, occurring in Cuba; this information will then be published in booklet form. This assignment would last probably not longer than three months, and so would not be of interest to Tichborn (P) who is very anxious to be permanently settled. The

other job possibility was presented to me by Leo Williams and concerned the grouping of liberal, democratic parties as mentioned in paragraph 7 above. This idea was also impractical. IO/3 apparently feels that this grouping is already in existence through the Institute of Political Education in San Jose, Costa Rica, however, as stated above, to my knowledge the related project is in the hands of WHD. I suggested that it would be unrealistic to suggest that Tichborn (P) be employed by IO for this purpose until the two Divisions had gotten together to see where such jurisdiction lay--if indeed there were any question. Then Mr. Williams suggested that perhaps Tichborn (P) could be utilized in connection with the Institute and some of its expanded activities. The timetable for this was rather vague. I informed them that Subject had quite positively already decided on an assignment with WHD, but that we certainly appreciated their interest and would let them know what his reaction might be. (When I spoke by phone to Tichborn (P) that same morning, I told him that two other possibilities might exist, but that I did not yet know the details of what they might be. He said that insofar as he was concerned I need not bother to check them out as he was most interested in the WHD assignment.) Since the first offer is for a limited time, since the second is a jurisdictional matter and Subject has already stated he would not be interested in that assignment, and since the third is vague as to timetable, I feel Tichborn (P) would not be interested in any of these possibilities.

10. Future meetings with Tichborn (P) have been arranged as follows. Mr. Collins had expressed to me an interest in meeting Subject and a meeting has therefore been arranged for Mr. Collins and Mr. McCoy to meet with him on 17 May at 6 p.m. at the Shoreham. The purpose of this meeting is to get acquainted with Tichborn (P) and to discuss some of his ideas and feelings about the Latin American situation in general. In order to make concrete arrangements as soon as possible for bringing Tichborn (P) on board in a contract status, I have arranged a meeting with Mr. Penney, Subject and myself on 18 May at 3 p.m. at the Roger Smith. At this meeting, financial terms, operational details and related subjects will be defined in order that a contract may be written as soon as possible. Results of this meeting will be the subject of a separate memorandum.

Evalena S. Vidal
Political Action Group

ESVidal:ma
Distribution:
Orig - Subject file 1 - C/[illegible]
1 - Chrono

20 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Debriefing of Edward G. Tichborn (P) upon Return from El Salvador

REFERENCE: Memo for the Record, "Plans for Debriefing of Edward G. Tichborn (P) in Washington," dated 8 March 1961

1. Edward G. Tichborn (P) arrived in Washington from California on 12 March and was debriefed on 13 and 14 March 1961. The debriefing was held in Subject's room at the Statler Hotel and was tape recorded. Those participating in this debriefing were Messrs. Paul Paxton and Brendon Burns of WHD and the undersigned. Tichborn (P) related the contacts he had made, their impressions of the local political scene, his own assessment of the situation, personal comments on the economy and government obtained from "slumming" among the local lower classes, etc. Tichborn (P) also pointed out areas in which we could make a positive contribution and gave a number of over-all recommendations concerning the political and economic fields.

2. The WHD representatives were very favorably impressed with Tichborn (P) personally and with his activities while in El Salvador on the related TDY mission.

3. The American Ambassador to El Salvador had met Tichborn (P) while there and was sufficiently impressed with him that he sent a telegram to Mr. Thomas Mann of the Department suggesting that the

201-253283

latter might find it very profitable to contact Tichborn (P) and discuss the Salvadoran situation with him (see SALV 3630, IN 16568, dated 10 March 61). As a result, Tichborn (P) was apprised upon his arrival that if he did meet with Mr. Mann that he should not conceal the fact that he had gone to El Salvador on behalf of CIA. (In the meantime, Mr. Mann was being informed of this relationship by WHD in order to avoid any possible embarassing situations.) Tichborn (P) was anxious to talk with Mr. Mann and Mr. Paxton was attempting to set up an appointment with him. However, Mr. Mann was occupied on other matters and Mr. Paxton therefore suggested to Mr. Devine that he might meet with Tichborn (P). A meeting was suggested by Mr. Devine for 2:30 Thursday the 16th, but Tichborn (P) stated that since he had an appointment at the White House at 3 pm that it would not be possible. Mr. Paxton asked Tichborn (P) to call Mr. Devine on this and that maybe they could work out another time. No more was heard from Tichborn (P) by Mr. Paxton or by CA/PAG. We had, however, talked with Tichborn (P) Wednesday morning when he called for Mr. Paxton's number and I asked him if we could be of any more assistance and he replied in the negative.

4. Administratively, Tichborn's (P) salary ($1,000) was paid him in cash as he requested on 14 March. Expense money for his transportation to, and his stay in, El Salvador were advanced to him by the Station and the related accounting was taken care of there. The only funds which are now due Tichborn (P) are his expenses while in Washington for the debriefing. He stated that he would forward his hotel bill, airplane tickets, and other receipts upon his return to California. He was cautioned to mail the true name receipts (plane tickets, hotel bills, etc.) in one envelope and his accounting sheet, signed in pseudonym, in a separate one.

5. WHD is transcribing the tapes of Tichborn's (P) debriefing and we will receive a copy thereof when completed.

Evalena Vidal
Evalena S. Vidal
Political Action Group

ESVidal:ma

Distribution:
1 - Addressee
1 - Chrono
1 - Subject file

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3

S-E-C-R-E-T

123 • 33

DATE : 08 MARCH 1961

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN SALVADOR

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CCG 2, CA 2, CA/PRG, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 10 10 19 61

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 16568

TO DIR INFO CITE SALV 3630

REF: A. DIR 26522 (OUT 76527*)

B. SALV 3596 (IN 47219)

C. DIR 26346 (OUT 76088)

D. SALV 3623 (IN 14611)

1. DUE PERSONAL BUSINESS IN USA TICHBORN HAD ONLY 7 DAYS IN SALV BUT DID OUTSTANDING JOB OF LEARNING MUCH IN SHORT TIME.

2. WITH HELP OF JUEGGPLANT, JUVAN 1, STATION, AND ALSO ON OWN, TICHBORN MADE MANY CONTACTS IN NEARLY ALL SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SECTORS AND LEVELS OF POPULATION. SOME CONTACTS PRIVATE, SOME SOCIAL, SOME BOTH. CONTACTS INCLUDED: LEADERS IN VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES; COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL LEADERS; UNIVERSITY FACULTIES; DIRECTORATE MEMBER RODRIGUEZ PORTH (2 HOURS AT JUVAN'S HOME); AT LEAST 2 CABINET MINISTERS; MILITARY LEADERS; LOWER AND MIDDLE CLASSES; MEMBERS AND ASSOCIATES OF SO-CALLED "14 FAMILIES"; ALSO OTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH ROBERTO PARKER, JUBATE, JUVAN 1 JUEGGPLANT, JUEBB, JUBILARIAN, DR GALINDO POHL, U.S. AMBASSADOR, AND OTHERS. JUEGGPLANT AND JUVAN 1 VERY HELPFUL MANY INSTANCES.

201-253203

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE :	08 MARCH 1961	ROUTING	
TO :		1	4
FROM :		2	5
ACTION:		3	6
INFO :			

PAGE TWO

IN 16568
SALV 3630

TO INFO CITE

3. WITH EXCEPTIONS JUEGGPLANT, JUVAN 1, AMB, AND JUBATE, TICHBORN USED COVER AND ELICITATION TO AVOID CONTACTS TAILORING THEIR INFO AND OPINIONS TO SUIT A PBPRIME INVESTIGATOR.

4. AS PREDICTED IN REF B ASSESSMENT NECESSARILY LIMITED BY TIME. TICHBORN SAID HIS "MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS AT THIS TIME WOULD BE PRECOCIOUS". STATION CONCURS VIEW TIME ELEMENT. HE PREFERS GATHER THOUGHTS AND NOTES DURING FEW DAYS AWAY FROM SCENE, THEN WRITE ASSESSMENT. SUGGEST HIS BEST VALUE TO DATE WILL BE IN CONVERSATIONS AT HQS DURING EXPECTED TRIP TO WASH NEXT FEW WEEKS, UNLESS HQS DESIRES INTERVIEW HIM AT LOS ANGELES.

5. PER REF C AMB WAS REQUESTED USE OUR CHANNELS. HOW EVER AFTER INITIAL INTERVIEW WITH TICHBORN AMB ALSO INVITED TICHBORN TO LUNCH AND LATER SENT BRIEF BUT HIGHLY COMPLIMENTARY NOTE DATED 2 MARCH THRU STATE CHANNELS TO MR TOM MANN, SUGGESTING IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR MANN HAVE TALK WITH TICHBORN. AMB'S NOTE STATED "I DOUBT THAT ANY ONE WHO HAS BEEN HERE IN RECENT MONTHS COULD GIVE YOU AS GOOD A PICTURE OF THE PRESENT AMBIENTE" NOTE IDENTIFIED TICHBORN AS LAWYER FROM LOS ANGELES.

S-E-C-R-E-T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-CR-E-T

DATE :	
TO :	
FROM :	
ACTION:	
INFO :	

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE THREE

IN 16568 SALV 3630

TO INFO CITE

TICHBORN HAS COPY AND APPEARED PLEASED WITH NOTE.

6. NO KNOWN SECURITY PROBLEMS BUT TICHBORN MAY NEED STRENGHTEN OR CHANGE COVER FOR ANY FUTURE TRIP TO SALV. HE AWARE OF THIS.

7. IF HQS DESIRES SALV CAN FURNISH FURTHER NAMES OF PERSONS CONNECTED BUT TICHBORN HAS ADDITIONAL NAMES AND ALL PRESUMABLY WILL BE INCLUDED IN HIS REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *HQS STATED SUBJECT NOT BROUGHT TO HQS FOR BRIEFING PRIOR DEPARTURE SALV. HE ONLY ADVISED IN MOST GENERAL TERMS THIS MISSION AND BAREST BRIEFING ON POLITICAL SITUATION. ASSUMED STA WOULD PROVIDE NECESSARY BRIEFING.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET

8 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Plans for Debriefing of Edward G. Tichborn (P)
in Washington

1. On 6 March Edward G. Tichborn (P) telephoned C/PAG to inform him that he had returned from his TDY assignment to El Salvador. He felt that his trip has been a successful one and that he would have a meaty report to submit. He also suggested that he felt it would be useful if he were debriefed by the interested parties at Headquarters.

2. C/PAG and I agreed that this would be the most useful manner for obtaining all of the details of his activities while in El Salvador, as well as providing an opportunity for WH officers to pose any questions they might have. Consequently I contacted Messrs. Holman and Marshall of WHD and suggested that Tichborn (P) come to Washington on Sunday, 12 March and be debriefed on 13 and 14 March. They agreed this would be an excellent idea.

3. Mr. Marshall wanted to check on the financial aspect of Tichborn's (P) trip East. He asked if he would receive an additional salary for that time period. I suggested (as C/PAG had discussed with me) that we would recommend to Tichborn (P) that this debriefing be included in the salary he was informed he would receive for this assignment. (This figure would be $500 per week, or $1,000 for two weeks.) Expenses covering this projected trip to Washington would, however, be separate. I also mentioned to Mr. Holman that this would be suggested to Tichborn and that I felt he would be amenable since this would bring the total time he was on assignment for WH to two weeks. Mr. Holman agreed that I should call Tichborn (P) and ask him

201 253203

to come East next Sunday since he felt it extremely important that they talk with him first-hand. (Mr. Holman did not seem to be particularly concerned about the question of salary in this case.)

4. As a result of this go-ahead from Ned Holman, I called Tichborn (P) on 7 March, mentioned the question of salary as best I could in double-talk, and he said he understood. He also said that he had informed C/PAG that he could not be away from the U.S. for more than a ten-day period at one time, but that he could then come on to Washington at a later date. (He left for El Salvador on 22 February and returned to the U.S. on 5 March). Tichborn (P) said he would fly out on Sunday and call me first thing Monday morning, 13 March; he will be staying at the Statler Hotel. I told him I would meet him there and bring some "friends" along. (On this subject, Mr. Holman said he felt Mr. Herbert, DC/WHD, might want to attend the debriefing.)

5. During the time that Tichborn (P) is in Washington, he will also sign the amendment to his contact and the outstanding financial matters will be taken care of.

Evalena S. Vidal

Evalena S. Vidal
Political Action Group

ESVidal:ma

Distribution:
Orig - WH/Planning file
1 - Chrono
1 - Subject file

14-00000

SECRET

28 February 1961
3-13 A (Mullen)

Gave Lopez his 1099 in person

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA Staff

ATTENTION : Personnel Office

SUBJECT : Henry P. Lopez (T)

1. Finance Division has provided this office with a U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, Form 1099 which reflects payment of $1,300.00 to subject in 1960. In accordance with your instructions to Finance Division, this Form 1099 shows the source of these funds to be a backstopped notional organization provided by this office.

2. It is requested that you advise Central Cover Division, Nonofficial Cover (CCD/NC) at the earliest date possible whether you wish to pass this Form 1099 to subject personally or if you desire it to be mailed to him from the address of the ostensible source of the income.

3. In the event you wish it transmitted through cover channels, we request that you advise this office in writing that subject has been alerted to expect receipt of these forms.

4. If further information is required, please contact Mr. John W. Mullen, x8266, Room 2-1005 - T-4.

for

JOHN G. SOUTHARD
CHIEF, CCD/NC

SECRET

201-253203

SECRET

27 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: TDY Assignment of Edward G. Tichborn (P) to El Salvador

REFERENCES: A. Memorandum for the Record, 18 January 1961

B. Memorandum for the Record, 23 January 1961

1. In early January we had suggested to WH/Salvador that they might find the services of a political consultant of value in their area. The Division checked this out with the Station who agreed that it was an idea worth looking into and asked for additional details. This information was forwarded to the field and in reply, the Station requested that we send the individual concerned to El Salvador to assess the political situation and to give them any related assistance possible.

2. As a consequence, Mr. Davis contacted Edward G. Tichborn (P) by telephone and told him of our interest. Due to the Station's request which we wanted to fill promptly, and also to Tichborn's (P) personal schedule (and the possibility that he might receive an appointment within the Administration in the near future) we wanted to get him to Salvador as soon as possible. After consultation with Tichborn (P) and with the Desk, it was decided that he would leave California on 23 February and arrive in Salvador the following morning.

3. In his telephone conversation, Mr. Davis was forced to rely on the system of "double talking" for the purpose of security; however, the possibility that his services might be required had

SECRET

201-253203

already been mentioned to Tichborn (P) when he was in Washington on personal matters in January (see Ref. B). Mr. Davis also attempted to "second guess" Tichborn's (P) feelings on this assignment when arranging the details with WHD. The fact that he might receive an appointment was the major factor under consideration, especially in the sense that first, we did not want to expose Tichborn (P) as a KUBARK agent and secondly, we did not want in any way to present Tichborn (P) with any problems in relation to his possible appointment.

4. Mr. Davis told Tichborn (P) in guarded language which was apparently well understood by him that the COS ("our senior partner") and the Ambassador ("the senior partner of our cousin firm) would be witting as to his KUBARK connections and that undoubtedly JUEGGPIANT (an American cut-out and contact of the Station) and the latter's brother-in-law JUVAN-1 (a Salvadoran businessman and Station contact with whom he would be working) would also be witting. However, as agreed with WH, the locals other than JUVAN-1 would be unwitting as to his KUBARK connections. Tichborn (P) was informed that he would be "visiting" Salvador and his "old friend" JUEGGPIANT and this cover story was to be cited to the local Salvadorans.

5. Mr. Davis especially pointed out to Tichborn (P) that since WH felt he should talk with the Ambassador, we wanted him to be aware of this in the event that this possibility arose at the Station's request. Mr. Davis added that of course we would not want the Ambassador to take umbrage, etc. at Tichborn's (P) visit or activities and that we had been assured by someone (Paul Paxton) who knows Ambassador Murat Williams, that the latter could be counted upon for his cooperation and discretion. Tichborn (P) then asked specifically whether he would definitely talk with the Ambassador and Mr. Davis informed him that this would depend upon the Station's judgment. (WH had informed us that this was a possibility since Williams is new to his post and the Station is trying to work closely with him from the beginning; WH felt that if Williams later learned that Tichborn (P) had been in the area without his knowledge, he might take offense.) In this event, the Station was advised to request the Ambassador to use our channels for any communications to the Department concerning Tichborn (P).

6. WH had also told us that they might have to inform the Department of Tichborn's (P) trip to El Salvador and then decided that this would not be necessary. However, on 23 February, a final decision was made that this would have to be done and since C/WH works so closely with State. PAG did agree to this but requested that this information be in general terms only and that Tichborn's (P) name not be given. WH agreed that it could be done in this way. WH also stated that this information will be passed to Mr. Devine and would be limited to him and Mr. Mann.

7. Tichborn's (P) instructions were that he would be met at the airport if possible by JUEGGPIANT (whose true name and description were provided); if he did not appear, Tichborn (P) was to go to the Intercontinental Hotel and wait there to be contacted by either JUEGGPIANT (Jerry Caughlin) or the COS, Ben Stotts. Upon meeting Tichborn (P) JUEGGPIANT, as a recognition signal, would say "I am a friend of Horace".

8. Tichborn (P) asked if some expense money could be provided him in El Salvador and he was assured that this would be arranged. Since time (and the airlines strike) did not permit his coming to Washington for a detailed briefing on the political situation in Salvador and on his specific mission, these matters plus the funds for expenses will be handled by the Station.

9. Two cables were sent to the field concerning the subject of Tichborn's (P) arrival in El Salvador (DIR 26346, OUT 76088 and DIR 26522, OUT 76527). These cables spelled out Tichborn's (P) cover, the need for special discretion on the part of those individuals who are witting of his relationship with KUBARK, the meeting or contact arrangements, the fact that detailed briefings by the Station would be necessary since it had not been possible to undertake this at Headquarters, his pseudonym and approval for the Station's providing him with certain funds.

10. In summary, PAG's interest was to arrange for Tichborn's (P) arrival in Salvador as soon as possible and at the same time to

protect his KUBARK status and assure that this present mission would not in any way interfere with his possible appointment to a post in the Administration.

Evalena S Vidal
Evalena S. Vidal
Political Action Group

ESVidal:ma

Distribution
  Orig - WH/Planning file
     1 - Chrono
     1 - Subject file
     1 - Vidal

Post Office Box 8105
Washington, D. C.
March 9, 1960

Mr. Henry F. Lopez
6505 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, California

Dear Henry,

Enclosed is a thermofax copy of the original expense sheet you forwarded to me. Since the regulations require that this accounting be quite specific (much more so than the one for the company) there are a few additions I would appreciate your making. These are marked on the enclosed copy and suggestions for more specific details are keyed thereto below:

1. For all major transportation expenses (plane, train) please add the approximate hours of arrival and/or departure.
2. Please include names of the contacts included in these expenses.
3. Indicate briefly the nature of phone calls.
4. Add something here about "blending in with local color", etc.
5. Make some indication that the books, magazines and newspapers were for background information, etc., related to your trip.
6. A notation that this trip was for operational purposes.

I'm sorry that this is a somewhat bothersome procedure. However, I do want to be able to settle these financial matters for you as quickly as possible after I receive the receipts (or bills) and this will be of valuable assistance in that procedure.

Hope all goes well - let me know the results of your operation and the expenses involved, I shall try to do something about them.

Sincerely,

Henry W. Darkin

[illegible] 253203

SECRET

Post Office Box 8109
Washington, D. C.

February 12, 1960

Mr. Henry P. Lopez
6505 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, California

Dear Hank,

Your detailed letter arrived in yesterday's mail. However, in order to process it I also need all receipts relative to those expenses. This would include all possible ticket stubs for all transportation, car rentals, hotel bills, doctor bills, telephone charges, and other supporting receipts.

The balance of your fee will be deposited after this accounting has been reconciled.

In the future, in any other communications directed to me, please use your true name in the return address. Continue to sign accounts directed to me as Tichborn.

Thanking you for your cooperation and hoping to hear from you soon, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Henry W. Darkin

SECRET

201 253203

SECRET

9 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Edward G. Tichborn (P) - Hernia

1. On 1 February Edward G. Tichborn advised me that in lifting his bag out of a taxi on his return trip from Cuba, he suddenly felt a pain in the groin and was afraid that he had a hernia.

2. On the way to the airport he asked me if there would be any chance of the Government picking up his medical expenses in the event that he actually had a hernia which required any substantial treatment. I told him at that time that I did not know what the Government's position would be, but that I would check into the matter and let him know.

3. On 2 February, I contacted Mr. Vernon Turner, SSA/DDS, and explained the circumstances to him. At that time, I also pointed out that as far as the provisions of his contract were concerned, it was stated that he was not an employee of the U. S. Government and while it did not make specific reference to medical payments while he was working for us, it did not specifically preclude such payments. Mr. Turner opined that although the contract stated he was not an employee of the U. S. Government, in actual fact during the period he was doing our bidding, he was. I went on further to explain to Mr. Turner that in all probability we will call on Tichborn to do future services for us and that while he was being paid, it was doubtful that this reimbursement from us equaled what he would make in his regular law practice. Mr. Turner stated that there were a number of ways that we could alleviate his situation should it become necessary.

SECRET

201-253203

4. The conclusion reached between me and Mr. Turner was that I should point out to Tichborn that we were under no obligation to recompense him for his injury; however, that upon the completion of treatment if he would submit a claim, we should be glad to review it sympathetically.

5. I passed the gist of the above on to Tichborn on 3 February.

Horace W. Davis
Chief
Political Action Division

HWD:bjl
Distribution:
Orig. - subj. file
1 - SSA/DDS
1 - chrono

SECRET

8 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT: C-77119

1. The Security information on Subject has been reviewed by a representative of this Division. We believe that this information is not sufficiently derogatory to preclude our using Subject for the purposes outlined in our clearance request. Therefore, we would appreciate receiving an operational approval by 15 October.

2. Attached is Subject's PRQ, Part II.

Horace W. Davis
Acting Chief
Political Action Division

Attachment: PRQ, Part II

BS:bjl
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - addressee
1 - Subject file (Lopez)
1 - chrono

SECRET

201-233203

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

Horace W. Davis

TELEPHONE EXTENSION 2117

AC/PP/PAD

7 October 1959

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE: Edward G. Tichborn
2A. PROJECT: SOLACTEAL
2B. PERMANENT STATION:
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 9-2100-91-999
4. SLOT NO.:
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: NA
6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): POA, 11 May 1959 – OA pending
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☐ YES ☒ NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Contract agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: US
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN NA ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. AGE: 39
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 28 May 1920
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Los Angeles, California
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Los Angeles, California
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
2 sons, 7 and 4 years old.
1 daughter, 1 year old.
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE:
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army Med. Corps
24. RANK OR GRADE: Staff Sgt.
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $50.00 per day
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: ———
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): ———
30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY ☐ COVER ☐ CIA ☒ NOT WITHHELD

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: NA
32. POST: NA
33. OTHER:
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any):

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☒ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO
37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☒ NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION:
43. ENTERTAINMENT:
44. OTHER: Subject will be reimbursed for all expenses and in addition will receive $50.00 per day when working, not to exceed $[illegible] per week.
45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☐ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

FORM — USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

CASE OFFICER

TELEPHONE EXTENSION

DIVISION

DATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-230 or successor regulations.)*

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check) ☒ PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check) ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

NA ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)* ☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION ___ DAYS ☐ MONTHS ☐ YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE 15 October 1959

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)* 30 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☐ YES ☐ NO NA

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(FI, PP, other)* PP

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Subject will consult and advice on political techniques.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Active in Southern California politics, particularly Los Angeles area.

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ COLLEGE *(No degree)* ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☒ POST GRADUATE LLB ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK FLUENT	SPEAK AVERAGE	SPEAK POOR	WRITE FLUENT	WRITE AVERAGE	WRITE POOR	READ FLUENT	READ AVERAGE	READ POOR
Spanish	X			X			X		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Mexico; Latin America

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

Subject is in private law practice.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

NA

☐ MORE

APPROVAL

14-00000

2 OCT 1959

P.O. Box 8105
Southwest Station
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Henry P. Lopez
6505 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, California

Dear Mr. Lopes:

Things are developing faster than I had anticipated when I last saw you. In view of this I would appreciate it very much if you would complete the biographical form and the questionnaire that I left with you and forward it as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

Henry W. Darkin

201-253203

25 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Edward G. Tichborn (P)

1. On the morning of 14 September I called Tichborn and arranged to meet him at his office at 1230. As an attachment to this memo I have outlined the standard approach which was followed in Tichborn's instance; therefore, I will not go further into it.

2. Tichborn struck me as being extremely quick, intelligent, very sympathetic to my suggestions and anxious to cooperate. He is of Mexican descent, speaks Mexican/Spanish fluently and according to him can easily pass as a Mexican. Tichborn has spent considerable time over the years in Mexico as well as attending the University of Mexico for a year or two. He has also traveled to Cuba and is a friend of John Manson, head of Screen Gem, Inc. which is the Columbia Pictures outlet for Mexico. Mr. Manson is personally known to me and might, at sometime, be of use to us. I shall not delve into Tichborn's political history as that will be outlined in his PRQ, Part I when it arrives. He is presently being urged to run for Congress from the Los Angeles district; however, he has not as yet made up his mind what he will do.

3. In the period of three hours that I was with Tichborn, I was extremely impressed by him and feel sure that he would do an excellent job of briefing any individuals that we might desire him to brief. I am also sure that if he was sent out on a TDY he would acquit himself in superior fashion. Tichborn is called upon from time to time to give advice on the handling of Mexican/American problems and show the great appreciation of the difficulties of dealing with Latin Americans, their great sense of political amorality, their inferiority complex and of their unfound, but nevertheless anti-gringo feelings. Tichborn was particularly interested in the situation in Cuba and asked my opinion of it. My comment in essence was that

201-253203

it seemed pretty obvious that Castro was extremely emotional and tended towards being a demigod who had won the war but was losing the peace. Tichborn concurred in this opinion, adding to it that he felt that Castro was not cognizance of the dangers of Communism.

4. Tichborn knows me as Mr. Darkin. Should there be need for his services, I am sure he will do his best to accommodate us.

Horace W. Davis
Acting Chief
Political Action Division

Attachment as stated.
HWD:bjl
Orig. - Subject file
1 - chrono

Routine followed in Recruiting Prospective Campaign Managers

1. I explained to them that I was not investigating anyone but that I was seeking their cooperation on a confidential basis. I asked that they give me their word that they would keep the subject of our conversations forever confidential and told them that I had a secrecy agreement for them to sign. Upon receiving their assent I pointed out to them that we were interested in getting the cooperation of people with grass roots political experience who would be willing from time to time to give briefing sessions in political organization to foreigners visiting this country under our aegis. I explained that the briefing should be all inclusive from the conception of an idea, the organization of a political grouping to the actual mounting and holding of an election. I pointed out to them that from time to time they might also be asked to do this for people who are working on our staff but were planning to go abroad. If they proved receptive to the idea, and all contacted did, I then suggested that on occasion we found it necessary to ask our consultants to go abroad to do much the same type of thing on the scene.

2. Their reactions were extremely favorable. They all had the same questions, etc that have arisen in previous recruitments.

3. I made a great point of stressing to them the extreme delicacy of this type of operation; pointing out to them that whereas all governments expected people to be engaged in espionage and made very little fuss over what went on, merely PNGing diplomats, or in cases where the culprit did not have diplomatic immunity, imprisoning them for a short time. The fact that we were actively aiding in the building up of political organizations was considered much more delicate and for this reason they should take very seriously my injunction against speaking of their association with me or the subject of our conversations to anyone.

4. I then went on to point out that we were approaching a number of people of different races, creeds and language qualifications as I felt that it was necessary to be prepared for a number of eventualities. I pointed out that if, after talking to me, the individual changed his mind or did not desire to participate in my program that I would understand and that there would be no hard feelings as long as our conversations were kept secret. I also pointed out that if in the future the individual was called upon to serve it was fully appreciated by me that other commitments might preclude cooperation at that time and that the situation would be fully understood.

5. As far as the pay was concerned I told the individuals that a regular contract would be provided for them to serve as consultants to the government and that they would be paid in accordance with a standard contract which provided for $50 per day not to exceed $250 per week, plus all expenses. If and when they were called upon to go outside the US, a

special contract would be drawn up or an amendment to their regular contract made which would take into account the length of time they would probably be away, their financial position, etc.. Following this, I gave them their pseudo card (which in view of the difficulty of contacting them in California I presented at this time) to sign as well as a secrecy agreement. I also gave them a PRQ, Part I to fill out as well as the additional questions concerning their political background along with a card bearing their pseudonym, Harry B. Martin's address and the office's sterile telephone number. Immediately prior to terminating the interview, I once again ran through the security aspects and pointed out to them that they might or might not hear from me in the near future but in the latter case they were not to take umbrage, that it was merely because no situation had arisen which called for their particular talents.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

1. I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency, by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures.

2. I agree not to inform anyone that I have been contacted by a member of the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. I agree not to disclose the subject of the conversation held with the Central Intelligence Agency without specific approval of an Agency representative.

4. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my association with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Henry P. Lopez
signature

September 14 1959
date

201-253203

Henry P. Lopez -

From Memo to CI/OA from Deputy Director of Security (I+S) — dated 10 Sept. 59

1. Three developed informants commented favorably re Subj's character, reputation + loyalty; one informant stated Subj. had been married 3 times + his present marriage almost ended in divorce recently

2. Subj. was fined #45 for a 1954 traffic violation + his subsequent failure to appear at the hearing. One informant advised Subj had recently been object of inquiries by local police officers. Believed to have resulted from unpd parking ticket — (!)

→ 3. Subject's name appears numerous times in subversive files on the West Coast. These items contain info. re his activities in the Democratic Minority Conference + list his professional associates. In 1949 he was listed as a member of the Bar Committee against loyalty oaths for lawyers. He was shown as a close associate of Vario SPENCER, described by the files as a leftist + his activities were primarily concerned with local minority groups. These activities were extensively reported in the Communist "Daily People's World."

4. Mrs. Vario SPENCER represented Tassia FREED, a non-cooperative (uncooperative-?) witness before the HCUA. Tassia FREED is wife of Emil FREED, an admitted Communist Py member + who has been active in front activities thru the years.

5. Subject reportedly assisted Ralph H. NUTTER during trial of Anthony D. RIOS + Alfred ULLOA, members of Community Service Organization. NUTTER, (see last sentence, item 8) according to Security files, is close pers. friend of Harrison SCOTT BROWN, security disapproved in 1955, + favorably recommended him. NUTTER is also member of L.A. County Conference on Committee Relations (LACCR) as of Oct. 1953. This organization, although not regarded as Communist dominated, sticks close to Comm. line + has

spoken out against L.A. Police Dept. brutality, teacher firing, loyalty oaths, book-burning + witch-hunting by HCUA, Thought Control + UNESCO. NUTTER was also member of Community Service Organiz, which was regarded as infiltrated by CP in 54-55 + is influenced but not dominated by the CP at the present time.

6. In Jan. '59, OSI interviewed Subject re his association with Reinhold Joshua WULF, re latter's alleged Comm. activities. Subj. stated he had known WULF since 1938, had not seen WULF during 42-55 + since 55 had seen WULF occasionally. He recommended WULF for a security position + claimed no knowledge of subject's political organization or affiliations. WULF himself later interviewed + denied all allegations. Security office files contain no record, WULF.

→ Security Office recommends serious consideration given utilizing Subject + they be notified of our decision.

1. LOPEZ: a) His file absolutely bulges with references, recommendations etc. gathered by the FBI, in the course of their investigation, which, in a word, are TERRIFIC — there is repeated use of the words "smart, able, loyal, energetic, headed to the top", etc. etc. Is held up as "Exhibit A" to present undergrads at Colorado. Is credited with giving new direction and significance to the Harvard Law School Forum, thus leading to its success today. (In fact, according to his advisor at law school, he spent so much time on Forum & other activities, that his grades did not reflect his true abilities)

b) He evidently "falls down" in the matter of paying debts, tho' all cited are small ones; he still owes the student loan fund of his high school $\$50^{00}$ which he was loaned to start a college fund.

c) Any "guilt", if such exists, in the eyes of Security, seems to me to come from association, + these loaned to start a college fund.

c) Any "guilt", if such exists, in the eyes of Security, seems to me to come from association, + this mainly indirect. I feel it is more than countered by the wealth of positive, favorable info. He is characterized as a great "liberal" + certainly "progressive" as against conservative, + if this is his bent, it is not surprising if he has run into more leftist types than Security believes acceptable. Those who stated he was liberal, etc. also said, without exception, that there was no question of his being a loyal and patriotic American.

201-

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, PP/PAD

Attn: H. W. Davis

NUMBER C-77119

SUBJECT Henry P. LOPEZ

REFERENCE: YOUR MEMORANDUM DATED 10 April 1959

Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as requested in referenced memorandum.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as an agent as the authority granted in an Operational Approval. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is complete.

An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed. To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	11 May 1959 jd

FORM 125 [illegible]

SECRET

THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED:

SECRET

16 APR 1959

1. SUBJECT (NAME, IN ROMAN LETTERS AND IN NORMAL ORDER)
Henry P. LOPEZ 71119

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

P.C.A.
EXPEDITE

3. BIRTH DATE
May 28, 1920

4. BIRTH PLACE
Denver, Colorado

5. CITIZENSHIP
American

6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Attorney, Los Angeles, California

7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
LLB, Harvard Law School, 1948
Graduate School of Economics, Harvard, 1944-45
B.A., University of Denver, 1944
Grad. study, Universidad Nacional de Mexico, 19

RESPONSE TO GREEN LIST REQUEST NO. 077822

DATE OF REQUEST 13 April 1959

REQUEST FROM

NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER H.W. Davis
OFFICE DESIGNATOR PP/PAD
ROOM, BUILDING 1028 K Bldg.
EXTENSION 4941

14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED? X YES ___ NO

15. TYPE OF REQUEST
X FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
___ ADDITIONAL DATA
___ COVER NAME

16. INTEREST IN SUBJECT
___ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
X OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
___ OTHER

17. INFORMATION REQUIRED
Derogatory?

8. MILITARY SERVICE

SERVICE ARM, COUNTRY	SPECIALTY	LOCATION	DATES
U.S. Army, Staff sergeant	Medical Corps		1942-43

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Psychiatric Interviewer, Mass. General Hospital	Boston, Mass.	1945-46
Legal Consultant, Nat'l. Labor Relations Board	Los Angeles, Calif.	1948
Attorney, specialising in trial work,	Los Angeles, Calif.	1949-present

Subject active in California state politics (Democrat); ran unsuccessfully for Secretary of State, 1958.

10. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Mildred LOPEZ (maiden name unknown); born Lexington, Ky.

12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND ASSOCIATES
Three minor children, two sons and a daughter.

13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC)
(See above)

ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/STD.

SEE CSI-10-7

FORM NO. 501 REPLACES FORM [illegible] WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

SECRET

TO: H. W. Davis

22 April 1959
DATE

FROM: FI/STD

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/STD BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, STD IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

4/27/59

D. ☒ FI/STD HAS NO XXXXXXXXX INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF A CONTINUING SEARCH WAS REQUESTED IN SECTION 14, INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/STD.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/STD THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/STD'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/STD

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATION (Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)	DATE 10 April 1959
TO: ☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division ☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security	FROM: PP/PAD/HM Davis
SUBJECT: (True name) Henry P. Lopez	PROJECT SOLACTEAL
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES	CI/OA FILE NO.
	RI 201 FILE NO.
	SO FILE NO.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

World-wide

FULL DETAILS OF USE

Subject will act in an advisory capacity of foreign contacts of the agency, explaining to them American political techniques, advising on the conduct of political campaigns, etc. Subject will probably be detailed abroad occasionally for similar purposes.

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☐	YES	☒	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☐	YES	☒	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☒	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 077832

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☒	NOT INITIATED (Explanation) N.A.
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

X	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER 1028 K	EXTENSION 4241	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF 201-253203

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

Henry P. Lopez

Birthdate: May 28, 1920

Birthplace: Denver, Colorado

Education: A) B.A., University of Denver, 1944

B) Graduate School of Economics, Harvard University, 1944-45

C) LLB, Harvard Law School, 1948

D) Graduate study, Universidad Nacional de Mexico, 1955

Residence: 4553 August, Los Angeles, California

Family: Wife, Mildred and three minor children.

Employment: A) Psychiatric Interviewer, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, Mass. 1945-46

B) Legal Consultant, National Labor Relations Board, Los Angeles, California 1948

C) Attorney, specialising in trial work, Los Angeles 1949-present

Veteran: U.S. Army Medical Corps, staff sergeant 1942-43

Political and Organizational Activities:

A) Committee on Federal Rules, Los Angeles Bar Association 1953

B) Panel for Indigent Defendants, U.S. District Court 1950-57

C) President, Los Angeles Young Democrats 1950-51

D) Southern California Chairman for James Roosevelt - Helen Douglas Campaign

E) Dollars for Democrats Chairman, 63rd Assembly District

F) President, Council of Mexican-American Affairs; Board of Districts G.I. Forum, Member of Urban League and NAACP

G) Legal Counsel, Community Service Organization

H) Unsuccessful candidate (Democrat) for Secretary of State, California, 1958

Miscellaneous:

A) Subject won numerous scholastic honors, i.e. Phi Beta Kappa, president of Harvard Law School Forum, 1947-48 etc.

B) Author of several published articles on subjects of law and labor.

To date!

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Utilization of Harpers for Nominal Cover

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for your approval in paragraph six.

2. Santo Domingo Station has requested that Edward G. TICHBORN, an American Contract Agent of Mexican extraction who is presently assigned to Mexico Station, be temporarily assigned to the Dominican Republic to assist Santo Domingo in the period immediately preceding the 1 June presidential election. Mexico Station and TICHBORN have agreed to this assignment and it is proposed that TICHBORN go to Santo Domingo in the immediate future to read in on the operations and then return to Santo Domingo on approximately 1 May to carry out whatever operational duties Santo Domingo Station may assign him. It is presumed that he would return to Mexico City shortly after 1 June 1966.

3. TICHBORN, 46, is bilingual and has a wide range of business and social contacts throughout Latin America. Following graduation from Harvard Law School in 1948, TICHBORN became affiliated with a law firm in Los Angeles which represented many Latin American corporations with California business connections. In the mid-1950's he became active in California state politics and served in various capacities in Democratic Party state and national organizations. He participated actively in the California gubernatorial campaign of James Roosevelt, the senatorial campaign of Helen Gahagan Douglas and both the 1952 and 1956 Stevenson campaigns for President. He has been President of the Southern California Young Democrats, a member of the California Democratic State Central Committee, a member of the Host Committee for the 1956 Democratic National Convention and a member of the Board of Directors of the National Democratic Minority Conference. In 1960 he served as Los Angeles coordinator of the Kennedy Movement for Americans of Mexican Extraction which, it is reported, contributed substantially to the success of the Kennedy campaign in Southern California. His only try for elective office was in 1958 when he was defeated in his bid for the position of California Secretary of State.

4. In late 1959, TICHBORN was hired by the Agency as a political action advisor for Agency-sponsored election operations throughout Latin America. In 1961 he became a full-time contract agent and was assigned to Mexico City, under personal cover, to establish a degree of security and mobility which would permit him to travel readily on third country political action assignments. Since the beginning of his relationship with the Agency, he has participated in Agency sponsored operations in Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, the Dominican Republic and, most recently, in the 1964 election in Chile. At present, he is engaged full-time in managing a Mexico Station funded left wing intellectual publication, Dialogos. His cover in Mexico now is nominal and he attributes his presence and interests primarily to his activities in the legal field for his former Los Angeles law firm employer. He devotes most of his time to his position as editor of Dialogos.

5. TICHBORN has contributed stories, articles and interviews to United States and Latin American publications. His major accomplishment in this field has been the publication of an interview with Catherine Anne Porter in a recent issue of Harpers magazine. TICHBORN suggests that he might be able to arrange viable cover for his temporary assignment in the Dominican Republic by writing to Harpers and querying their interest in his preparation of an article concerning the Dominican Republic political situation and the forthcoming election. There is no reason to believe that Harpers would turn down such a proposal and, in fact, it is believed they would welcome it.

6. Recommendation. The Western Hemisphere Division recommends that approval be given for TICHBORN's approach to Harpers to advise them of his planned trip to the Dominican Republic and request of the magazine an expression of interest in an article on the present situation in the Dominican Republic. This will be done specifically as a cover for his travel to Santo Domingo. In the event Harpers should commission him to do such an article, TICHBORN will present his manuscript for Agency approval prior to forwarding it to

Harpers. In the event that WH Division or Santo Domingo Station should wish to utilize such a TICHBORN-prepared article to surface a specific theme of interest to the Agency, a request for approval of such action will be referred to your office prior to taking any action.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

The recommendation contained in paragraph 6 is approved:

Deputy Director for Plans

Date ______________________

cc: ADDP

14-00000

(TISHBORN)

[illegible] to NW Pres. OK for $12,000 for one year contract

N.B.

Name (T) : Henry P. Lopez

DPOB : 28 May 1920; Denver, Colorado

Education: University of Denver, 1942-45, BA Pol. Sc.
Harvard University, 1945-46, MA Economics
Harvard Law School, 1946-48, LLB

Experience: Private law practice in Los Angeles, 1948-59; Democratic Party politician, activist, and candidate for public office (unsuccessful) in State of California 1948-59; active in state and national politics of the Democratic campaigns of 1952, 1956, 1958, and 1960.

Agency Experience: Hired in 1959 on contract basis to provide expertise in political campaigns. He has participated in Agency political operations in Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, and the Dominican Republic.

Present Status : Contract Agency, salary of $12,000 per year with $3,000 housing allowance while he was assigned to Mexico Station. He departed Mexico City on 1 August, at his own request and is now establishing himself and family in New York City. Present gross income from Agency is $12,000, (OR $15000 DEPENDING HOW ONE VIEWS THOSE FIGURES). He considers he is worth $20,000.

Proposed Cover : Investigation of suitable cover for utilization of Lopez as a political action agent was successful in that DODS indicated an interest in Lopez' background (Economics and Law) as a possible Latin American specialist for the International Capital Corporation (ICAP). ICAP is an Agency proprietary corporation, which was established by John P. C. Train, a contract employee of the Agency, who owns and manages the Park Avenue firm of Train, Cabot & Associates, a bona fide investment management firm which has the ICAP as one of its subsidiary companies. ICAP does not presently have any contracts in Latin America but has concentrated its activities in Africa and the Far East. Train desires to expand the operations of ICAP into Latin America and was looking about for a Latin American specialist at just the time that WH Division offered Lopez. It appears to be a fortuitous meeting of the minds, i.e., Lopez apparently has many of the attributes and some of the background necessary for the position and Train needs a man. He will be trained by Train and presumably will devote a good deal of his time to ICAP activities. However, he will be made available on short notice for any assignment the Agency may have for him.

Questions to be resolved :

1. What is extent of the possible utilization of Lopez over the period of the next year and in the future? (I HAVE SOME MAKE WORK IDEAS)
2. Based upon the above, what would be an equitable contract arrangement, i.e., how much money is Lopez worth to WH Division when most of his time will be spent working for ICAP and DODS? DODS indicates that after he begins to make a contribution to ICAP (Probably six months to a year) they would be willing to pick up a portion of the contract costs but they see no justification for such an action at present. I THINK T. WILL ACCEPT $17 000.

Silver Resources Corporation
375 Park Avenue, New York

Cover org.

201-253263

Silver Resources Corporation

Silver Resources Corporation (Silverco) is a New York corporation organized by a group of mining and financial companies to invest in silver in all its forms: silver mines, mining claims, shares of other silver companies and bullion.

Silver Resources controls, with Mexican associates, Minas Huruapa, S. A., which is arranging production for a fully developed medium-grade silver deposit in Chihuahua, and in addition controls Palmarejo and Mexican Goldfields, Ltd. (listed on the London Stock Exchange), owner of a residual interest in the same orebody. It also has a minority interest in Minas Suriana, S. A., which operates a high-grade silver mine in Morelos under the management of New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Company.

Silverco holds silver claims in Colorado and is developing a limestone property in Gallatia County, Illinois.

The company also holds investments in securities of silver companies.

Silverco is interested in providing financing for silver properties seeking development funds. It is also interested in the purchase for investment of producing and nonproducing silver properties in the United States and abroad.

The original investors of Silverco include:

- Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd.
- Industrial Minerals Exploration Company
- New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Company
- Northfield Mines, Inc
- Train, Cabot & Associates

DIRECTORS

John P. C. Train *(Chairman of the Board)*
Partner, Train, Cabot & Associates
Director, Sariaga Gold Mines, Ltd.

John L. Carroll
Economic Geologist

Robert A. Koch
Gasperini, Koch & Savage
Formerly Assistant General Counsel, American Smelting & Refining Company

R. Carter Nicholas
Trustee

George W. Tower
Formerly President, La Luz Mines, General Manager of Hochschild Interests in Latin America, and Director and Vice President of Ventures, Ltd.

OFFICERS

George W. Tower, *President*

John L. Carroll, *Executive Vice President*

John P. C. Train, *Treasurer*

Robert A. Koch, *Secretary*

Richard H. O'Neill, *Controller*

John J. Trask, Jr., *Assistant Secretary-Treasurer*

201-253265

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATES

Lambert Ralph, *Representative in Mexico*
President, Minas Huruapa, S. A.

Joseph Porter, *Consultant*
Manager, Ste. Genevieve Limestone Division

Henry P. Lopez, *Consultant*
Attorney at Law

E. T. Knight, *Consultant*
Mining Engineer

BANK

The Bank of New York, New York

COUNSEL

Gasperini, Koch & Savage, New York

Creel y Ogarrio, Mexico

AUDITORS

Arthur Andersen & Co., New York and Mexico

Telephone: 751 1944, New York
Cables: PETROVEST NEWYORK
Telex: 420050, New York

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 33223A DATE

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE) Henry P. Lopez

Heary P. Lopez
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS:

SECRET

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 33223B DATE

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) Edward G. Tichborn

Edward G. Tichborn
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS:

SECRET

ICAP CORPORATION

HENRY P. LOPEZ

EDUCATION

L.L.B., Harvard Law School, 1948
Graduate School of Economics, Harvard University 1944-45
B.A. University of Denver, 1944 (summa cum laude)
Graduate Study, Universidad Nacional de Mexico, 1955.

SCHOLASTIC HONORS

Phi Beta Kappa, 1942
President, Harvard Law School Forum 1947-48
National Fellowship, Harvard University, 1944-47
Editor, University of Denver, Clarion, 1942
Winner, National Intercollegiate Speech Contest, 1942.

PUBLICATIONS

"Some People and a Country I Love" by Katherine Anne Porter and Hank Lopez, *Harper's Magazine*, September 1965
"The Late-Late Lovers" *The Atlantic Monthly*, Winter 1966
"Back to Bachimba" *Horizon*, Winter 1966
"Use of Interpreters" *California Procedure during Trial*, University of California Press, 1960
"Forums as Adjunct to Legal Study" *Journal of American Bar Association*, 1[illegible]7
"Dead Ringer" short story, *Chicago Jewish Forum*, 1955
"Migratory Labor: A Mexican Dilemma" *Frontier Magazine*, 1955 Republished in Mexico, 1961
"Cross Examination of Medical Witnesses" *NAACA Legal Journal*, 1952
"The Language Curtain" *Frontier Magazine*, 1964
Editor-Publisher of Dialogos, Mexican literary magazine

WORK FXPERIENCE

Guest Lecturer on Trial Procedure, University of California Law School, Lecture series for "Continuing Education of the Bar" 1960
Attorney, Johnson, Lopez & Wolfe, Los Angeles, California - 1948-60
Attorney, specializing in international law: Moheno & Lopez, address: Mexico City (Insurgentes Sur 594-302)
Actor-Lawyer, "The Verdict is Yours", CBS Television network drama (Acted in 94 half-hour shows, 1961-63)
Legal Consultant, National Labor Relations Board, Los Angeles, California 1948
Psychiatric Interviewer, Massachusetts General Hospital, 1945-46
Field Representative, Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Denver Office, 1944

201-253203

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Democratic Nominee for Secretary of State of California, 1958
Received 2,500,000 votes in first try for elective office.

National Field Coordinator, VIVA KENNEDY CLUBS, Washington, D.C.
Democratic National Headquarters.

HAVE LECTURED AT:

Harvard University (Center for Latin American Studies)
Stanford University (Seminar on Political ethics)
University of California (re Mexican-American in politics)
U.C.L.A. (Continuing Education of the Bar series)
Occidental College (Political Science division)
University of Denver (Foundation for Adv. of Sco. Sci.)
East Los Angeles Junior College (Sociology Dept.)
Mexico City College (Economics Dept. 1955)
Los Angeles State College (Sociology Dept.)
University of Southern California (night Law School)

ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Committee on Federal Rules, Los Angeles Bar Association, 1953
Panel for Indigent Defendents, U.S. District Court, 1950-57
President, Council for Mexican-American Affairs, 1956-58
Member Bd. of Dir., West Coast Div. of National Urban League, 1956-60

TRAVEL IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Have traveled extensively (mostly on business) in the following countries: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Haiti, Cuba, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.

NOTE: Have been completely bilingual since childhood.

ICAP CORPORATION
375 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y.

INVESTMENTS
FINANCIAL CONSULTING
ECONOMIC AND MARKET RESEARCH

201-253203

ICAP Corporation is an international consulting and financial organization, specializing in the developing countries, which offers three principal services to its clients:

- *Financial and industrial studies, particularly feasibility reports and market research*
- *Negotiation of international joint ventures*
- *Investments and financing*

ICAP's professional services are primarily intended for the industrial investor or financial institution interested in entering a foreign country. If the initial feasibility and market studies are favorable, ICAP can advise on the most appropriate way of entering the new market: whether through a licensing or distribution agreement, contract manufacturing, a joint venture, or a partially or wholly owned subsidiary.

The local ICAP affiliate can guide the investor through the entire course of such an undertaking, from the initial exploration of the prospects to the selection of the local partner, the raising of local capital, and, if appropriate, the eventual listing of the shares of the resulting enterprise on the local stock exchange.

ICAP is as concerned with enabling a client company to recognize as early as possible the fact that it should not undertake a major commitment in a foreign country as it is with giving effective assistance to companies who determine to go forward.

It brings to these tasks a full range of professional skills which have performed to the standards of governments, major banks, and industrial companies of international standing.

It brings to the service of its clients close relationships on all levels of local government, banking and industry. Thus, in addition to analyzing such questions as product demand, industrial technology, financing, site selection and the like, ICAP can counsel the prospective investor on the governmental attitudes he will face, and help him make friendly contact with those in the business and official communities with whom he should deal.

DIRECTORS OF ICAP CORPORATION

Julian Allen
Formerly Vice President, European Branches, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company

Hoyt Ammidon
Chairman, United States Trust Company

Charles D. Hilles, Jr.
Director and former Executive Vice President, International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation

R. Carter Nicholas
Trustee

Michael V. Forrestal
Partner, Shearman & Sterling

John P. C. Train
President

OFFICERS

John P. C. Train, *President*

George E. Economakis, *Vice President*

R. Carter Nicholas, *Treasurer*

Edward H. Tuck, *Secretary*

Peter Forrestal, *Investment Officer*

John J. Trask, Jr., *Investment Officer*

Edwin L. Gasperini, *Assistant Secretary-Treasurer*

Telephone: PL 1-1944
Cables: INTRATRUST NEWYORK
Telex: INVEST 420093

201-253203

AFFILIATED COMPANIES

ICAP Hellas, Ltd., 54A Queen Sophia Ave., Athens 6'2, Greece

Chairman: Christopher S. Stratos, Former Minister of Communications and Minister of Education, Vice-Chairman, Hellenic Association of Manufacturers

Co-Chairman: John P. C. Train, President, ICAP Corporation, New York

Managing Director: George E. Economakis, Formerly Managing Director, Investment Bank of Egypt

ICAP Benelux, S.A., 21, Rue des Drapiers, Brussels 5, Belgium

Chairman and Managing Director: Willy de Fraipont, Managing Director, SOBELED (Associated group of Belgian banks and industrial companies)

ICAP Iberia, S.A., Juan Bravo, 2, Madrid 6, Spain

Chairman: Gustaf Jansson, Stockholms Enskilda Bank

Managing Director: Miguel Echegaray, Director, Banif, S.A.; Formerly, International Finance Corporation

Director: George F. Train, Formerly Chief of Marshall Plan in Spain and Portugal

ICAP Italia, Galleria Passarella, 2, Milan, Italy

Chairman: Conte Ing. Pietro Antonelli, Managing Director, Caboto, S.p.A.

Managing Director: Dott. Giovanni Manes, Formerly Director, Italian Frozen Foods Institute

INFICO, Marshall House, Hanuman Road, New Delhi, India

President: Sardar Mohan Singh, Formerly Deputy General Manager, Punjab National Bank

Director: Dan Singh Bawa, Proprietor, D.S. Bawa & Co., Chairman, Northern India Plywoods (Pvt.) Ltd.

For Secretary of State

HANK LOPEZ

OFFICIALLY ENDORSED DEMOCRAT

Henry P. Lopez was born on May 28, 1920 in Denver, Colorado. He is the father of Sven, 6, Gregory, 3, and Drusilla, 6 months. His wife, Mildred, is from Lexington, Kentucky; and they live in Los Angeles, California.

Address: home 4553 August
office 1505 Wilshire

THE FACTS...

Education:

- (a) L. L. B., Harvard Law School, 1948
- (b) Graduate School of Economics, Harvard University 1944-45
- (c) B. A., University of Denver, 1944
- (d) Graduate study, Universidad Nacional de Mexico, 1955

Scholastic Honors:

- (a) Phi Beta Kappa, 1942
- (b) President, Harvard Law School Forum, 1947-48
- (c) National Fellowship, Harvard University, 1944-47
- (d) Editor, University of Denver, Clarion, 1942
- (e) Winner, National Intercollegiate Speech Contest, 1942

Writer and Lecturer:

- (a) "Forums as Adjunct to Legal Study," *Journal of American Bar Association*, 1947
- (b) "Dead Ringer," short story, *Chicago Jewish Forum*, 1955
- (c) "Migratory Labor: a Mexican Dilemma," *Frontier Magazine*, 1955 Republished in Mexico
- (d) "Cross Examination of Medical Witnesses," *NACCA Legal Journal*, 1952.

Wide Experience:

- (a) Attorney, specializing in trial work, 1949-1957
  Address: 453 So. Spring St., Los Angeles, California
- (b) Legal Consultant, National Labor Relations Board, Los Angeles, California, 1948
- (c) Psychiatric Interviewer, Massachusetts General Hospital, 1945-46

Veteran:

- (a) U. S. Army Medical Corps, 1942-43; staff sergeant

Political and Organizational Activities:

- (a) Committee on Federal Rules, Los Angeles Bar Assn., 1953
- (b) Panel for Indigent Defendants, U. S. District Court, 1950-57
- (c) President, Los Angeles Young Democrats, 1950-51
- (d) Southern California Chairman of Speakers for James Roosevelt-Helen Douglas Campaign
- (e) Dollars for Democrats Chairman, 63rd Assembly District
- (f) President, Council of Mexican-American Affairs; Board of Directors G. I. Forum, Member of Urban League and NAACP
- (g) Legal Counsel, Community Service Organization

401 S. Vermont Ave.
Los Angeles, Calif.
DU. 4-4310 · VA. 1609

Honorary Chairman
ANTHONY QUINN

256 Sutter St.
San Francisco, Calif.
EX. 2-5785

Henry P. Lopez

Born: 1920, Denver

Education

BA University of Denver (Summa Cum Laude) 1944
LL.B. Harvard Law 1948

Experience

Wide range of experience as attorney, lecturer, writer, politician, social worker, and business consultant

Agency Connections

Hired 1959 on contract for political action. Worked in Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, Dominican Republic, and Mexico, finishing in August 1966.

Following Mexico assignment, WH turned Lopez over to DO, who put him under ICAP cover in New York City. Here he does many chores for John Train, who pays part of his $17,000 salary.

In June 1967, Lopez went to Spain on an operational survey. His trip was considered very successful by COS, Madrid.

To date

INTERVIEW TECHNIQUES, COVER, ETC.

At the first meeting and the one the next day before I made the main trip, my principal local political contact presented a possible cost of operations in the coming election. I asked him if it were a realistic figure and whether his analysis were realistic. He admitted that it really wasn't and I told him to go back and sharpen his pencil and sit down and talk sense. It was therefore agreed that when I came back from my trip we would sit down and go over it district by district, and problem by problem. He and his political cohort tried to lay out an itinerary for me and they recommended the people I would see in each town. Our boy there dutifully wrote down all these names for me and then we very dutifully threw the list away when it was all over and we started making up our own list. Some of the people you gave me I included in the list and saw. Also, our boy had a number of people. We both agreed that this trip would have to be played by ear, since after you arrive you have a better idea of what you are doing. The only strategy that we really agreed on was that I would take a plane and fly from the south up.

I did exactly that. I flew over to the south and then went on, smelling around. I used three methods: (1) street interview, shop interview and in other words, people of no significance, (2) the Rotary Club routine and (3) talks with lawyers.

Using the first method, I would go into a little shop and would inquire about how much an article would cost. If the shop keeper could speak English we then got into a conversation, and then I would make a purchase. If he couldn't speak English, then I would go to another shop where they could. I bought all sorts of odds and ends — a pencil, a little notebook, a pair of slippers. I bought a pair of sandals which I didn't wear because I took the advice of the people and remained American all the way. I wore shoes, socks, shirt and so forth. Whenever a great number of people were attracted to us, I considered this a good opportunity for an interview. As you know, you talk to one native and there are five standing around you — they will surround you. If they speak your language they will participate. They won't interrupt when someone else is talking, but when he is finished each one will get into the act; this is wonderful.

And then I did the Rotary Club routine; there are Rotary Clubs all over the damned place. I was taken to one meeting which happened to be taking place in a town where I was. In the hotel where I was staying they had the Rotary International. I looked it over very carefully to make sure

201-253203

that they didn't have a list of members, since I didn't want to claim to be one and then have them find out that I wasn't on the list! There was no membership list, but they did have the names of the officers. From that I picked the name of a guy who lived near Detroit and for the occasion he became a very intimate friend. He was a doctor and he lived in the suburbs or some place outside of Detroit. I introduced myself as a member and said that I had a very good friend also in the organization; they could have checked it out in their book. Unfortunately, one didn't always run into one of their meetings and luncheons.

The third method concerned courts, lawyers and Bar Associations. In any town where there was a court, be it a magistrate court or a district court, you always found that there was a courthouse and that in it was a part called the Bar Association, which was a room where those lawyers met and someone would serve tea or coffee. If you walked in you would usually find at least one lawyer there. I introduced myself in the following manner: I am so-and-so from Detroit, a member of the Bar. I have been practising for thirty-odd years and am interested in the judicial system and processes of your country. In no time, you have half of the Bar Association sitting at the table serving you tea and coffee (I guess it was tea because I hate their coffee; I hate coffee and theirs is even worse). I would then start talking about my trip, my interest in the local national situation, and then start asking questions which I already knew the answers to. For example, "how do you discipline a lawyer, who gets off base?" and they would explain their methods of appeal, high court and how the judges are appointed. I had that explained to me a million times. And every time they would explain their system to me, I would tell them how it is done in our country. I was actually giving them a lecture on American jurisprudence. I was surprised to hear those lawyers tell me with great pride how able, honest and fair their judges are, because I had discovered that officialdom there is as corrupt as all hell. They explained to me why their judges were appointed and about their careers, and this gave me a base of operations. I explained how in my state, we elect judges and that this system has been in existence since the 1800's and we finally decided that that was a hell of a system and that we have tried to change our constitution so that we could now have the same kind of system that this little country has. I pointed out that there are things they can learn from us and others that we can learn from them. That was the technique. They were very happy that I could see something about them which we want to copy. As I said before, you know that the local individual is hungry for praise, to get recognition and to have someone say something nice about him. He will take it if you can give it to him with a shovel; he will believe anything you tell him if it is nice. I'll give you an example: my technique was to talk with lawyers. In each town which had a newspaper I would somehow arrange to get an introduction through a local person to the publisher or editor, or maybe both, of the newspapers (be it a Communist one, one of a Political Party, or an independent paper — I saw them all). I went with this explanation: I was a widower, my wife died a few years ago and I was a little emotionally upset (which is true and wasn't hard to say) and that I was told that one possible cure was to get away on a long trip and my son insisted that I take this trip. It is interesting at first since you see so many museums, rooms and art galleries, but it gets boring and I was getting sick and tired of things and was about ready to go home, when I ran into a situation that really interests me - politics. Here is something that is after your own heart, this local situation. I became Goddamned curious. Here was the opportunity to tour this country and to put my trip on a profit basis by preparing articles on what has happened there, what might happen in the future and so forth. I made it logical enough. At first I trimmed it pretty well with a lot of stuff about how I love these people (and that is true too). My experience with them has been pretty much limited to students. My experience with them has always been wonderful and I love them. They were fine young men and women, I still find them to be interesting young men and women and that I have a natural affinity for them. They liked that. I said also that I had a sympathy for their men, their problems and their traditions.

In my contacts throughout the area I maintained the same story. I was lucky to hit on the right formula in the beginning and found that it worked. With very few variations, I stuck to the main theme.

Very often I would fall into a good interview. For example, I was looking for a small businessman with a factory. I asked a man where to find him and was led to a lawyer's office. This was a very fortunate mistake; a couple of times they turned out to my advantage. This lawyer turned out to be a fella who was very well informed and who had previously been in politics. He was also close to the Roman Catholic hierarchy. And he gave me an interview which summarized the informed opinion that I had run into in that area. (He also took me to the university and introduced me to the priest who was the head of the school. There I had a chance to interview students who showed an unwillingness to admit that they don't understand and don't know; that paid off for me.) He characterized the typical interview I got from the typical informed person. In these interviews I tried to be objective and find out, rather than inspire answers.

Very frequently, I would run into some person who had a bright boy going into prep school wanting to go to college. I suggested that he might apply for collect and for a scholarship. I said that I wasn't an official and didn't know the answers, or pretend to, but I created the impression that there was a possibility of applying for scholarships to the schools, or even to the U. S. Government. (I actually do intend to find out about these things and follow it through since they were very helpful to me and I am very grateful.) There was some truth to what I said to them and I wasn't making up stories out of whole cloth. There was a basis for everything I said to them although there might have been some exaggeration. However, in the main, I could tell the story with great consistency for basically it is a fairly truthful story.

I went to major cities along the way. Off to the side I went up to a sanctuary nearby since everyone said that if you didn't go up you weren't a tourist and since I ~~wanted everything~~ to look on the level, I made the visit. I stopped at every village. If I could speak English there I would; if not, I used this young fellow which was sometimes satisfactory. But you see, sometimes the villager or the shopkeeper could speak English, or some kid could and would translate and they were much more faithful to the meaning. The driver got to thinking that he knew what answers I wanted and that ruined his usefulness. I kept saying that I wanted to know what they were saying, not what I would like to have them say; that how can I write a good story if I don't know the truth. He got to the point where he was trying to figure out what I was after and was going to give me the right answers. Hence I banded him right in the beginning. But I ran into some kids about 13 or 14 years old and used them as interpreters; they were good. I saw at least a dozen or more of the newspaper publishers and correspondents, two of the editors of two different Communist newspapers, and I talked with four or five of the Communist leaders. I also talked to about five of the secondary people inaa political party and one of the more important people in the latter. I talked to the Town Chairman (mayor) in about half a dozen towns. I also talked with a local official and to some other old-timers who are not active now, but will be in the campaign. I feel that as a result of my survey I can give a fairly authoritative opinion on what the situation is, why and what the future is. I am confident that my reactions are sound and that my conclusions will be accurate.

Question: Did you experience any controls; anyone asking your name, etc. in the airport? Answer: Only in the hotels, or when I entered and left the country. At the hotels you make a full police report. When the others whom I engaged in conversation (and told them what I was trying to learn) asked where I was going next, I would ask them what they suggested how far it is, what was a good hotel, etc. I would trick them into it. Thus I tried to be a little naive. I was only concerned once.

Question: Did you ever talk voluntarily or involuntarily to anyone who you knew to be a policeman? Answer: I talked voluntarily to uniformed cops and asked questions and directions. I chose my questions with great care. Although it looked very informal, I had it pretty well planned. Since each question suggested another, it formed a pattern and was very logical. I was a very happy person and found a lot of things to laugh about and a lot of things to praise (this is one thing that I had suggested). Keeping in mind that I was a tourist, I went out of my way to find and see things and I went to many places which I felt were ridiculous. (Subject talks here about personal experiences in hotels, plumbing, etc.)

Question: Did you know that you were an object of undue suspicion? Answer: I presumed that I was. I was an unusual stranger since tourism is not a usual thing in that part of the country. Hence I set about to remove any suspicion. I acted very much American, being all over the place and being curious; but I gave purpose to my curiosity and explained it in each place. Everywhere I engaged people in conversation and gathered other people, explaining my purpose, interests and why I had such interests. I think that in each instance I logically explained my presence and worked into the questions that I asked. I think the idea of going to the Communists accomplished my purpose. I was not a subject of interest to the newspapers, which I might well have been had they had suspicions. I worked out in the open. In dining rooms I would find some excuse to say "do you speak English?" and usually someone did. "Could you explain something to me — how is this prepared? We don't have it in the U. S., etc." Pretty soon we were sitting together, ordering a drink and invariably the owner of the hotel would come and sit with us and tell me he would write a note to a particular newspaper editor, etc. As a result, I found that about half of the time I was directed to people. I never felt that I was suspect, except by Americans, and I think they thought that I was checking up on them since they tried to avoid me.

Question: Did you ever find, or have the feeling, that you were followed from the airport, etc.? Answer: I had that feeling once, but I wasn't being followed. For example, I had the feeling that I had seen the same man in several places, but dismissed it because I didn't see him again. Also, so many of those people look alike, that I may have been confused. In the airports I engaged people in conversation, always playing the role of the curious American, but primarily one who is happy with their country.

4-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

10 [illegible]

FROM: CA/PAG

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CA		10 MAY 1961		Per your request.
2. CA/ [illegible]				1-2 I briefed Tracy on this. Per Cammack at staff meeting, [illegible] try to get this fellow in a position to use his political talents.
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				Biog Info
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Henry Preston Lopez

__Biographic Information:__

Born: May 28, 1920; Denver, Colorado

Education: B.A., University of Denver, 1944; Graduate School of Economics, Harvard University, 1944-45; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1948; Graduate Study, Universidad Nacional de Mexico, 1955

Veteran: U.S. Army Medical Corps, staff sergeant, 1942-43

Employment: Psychiatric Interviewer, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, Mass., 1945-46; Legal Consultant, National Labor Relations Board, Los Angeles, California, 1948; Attorney, specializing in trail work, Los Angeles, 1949-April 61; now in Washington arranging for new employment.

Political and Organizational Activities: Committee on Federal Rules, Los Angeles Bar Association, 1953; Panel for Indigent Defendants, U.S. District Court, 1950-57; President, Los Angeles Young Democrats, 1950-51; Southern California Chairman for James Roosevelt-Helen Douglas Campaign; Dollars for Democrats Chairman, 63rd Assembly District; President, Council of Mexican-American Affairs; Board of Districts G.I. Forum, Member of Urban League and NAACP; Legal Counsel, Community Service Organization; Unsuccessful candidate (Democrat) for Secretary of State, California, 1958.

Family: Wife, Mildred and three minor children

Residence: Los Angeles, California until about April 1961 at which time he and his family moved to Washington, D.C.

__Operational Activities:__

1. Subject went to Cuba at the suggestion of CA Staff and with the concurrence of WHD and the Cuba Station in early 1960 (15 January-31 January). The primary purpose of Subject's mission to Cuba was to obtain an objective view of the political situation within that country and to contact and size-up the existing opposition to Castro. Subject was able to make innumerable contacts with leading opposition figures and others, primarily through his own ingenuity. As a result he

obtained a good deal of useful information on these persons, their philosophies, plans, etc. as well as information of a derogatory nature on Fidel Castro (which was later exploited in the propaganda field). Subject also provided several operational leads and suggestions upon his return from Cuba. During this assignment, Subject traveled as a tourist, but at the same time, in order to give him added stature for conversations, stated that he represented American businessmen and investors who were anxious to assess legal recourses re revolutionary laws and to determine the possibilities for future development and investments. WH was very impressed with Subject's ability and operational maneuverability.

2. From 23 February-3 March 1961 Subject was in El Salvador again at the suggestion of CA Staff and with the approval of WHD and the Station. Again, Subject's mission was to provide an over-all estimate of the fluid political situation. While in that area, he made numerous political and social contacts of operational interest and subsequently made a number of operational suggestions during his debriefing at Headquarters. Subject's cover for this mission was tourist travel. Headquarters, the Station and the U.S. Ambassador in El Salvador were all extremely impressed by Subject's ability to assess the local political situation and to make the necessary contacts with a minimum of Station assistance. (Detailed reports on both of these missions are available in CA/PAG files.)

Current Status and Future Operational Potential:

Subject brought his family from California to Washington, D.C. where he is expecting to receive a political appointment probably in the field of Latin American affairs. He has suggested that if possible he would like to be operationally active for KUBARK at the same time. Since he will undoubtedly be assigned to Latin America (possibly Mexico), and will have some freedom of action, he feels he could perform worthwhile clandestine services throughout the Latin American area. We agree. CA/PAG is, therefore, arranging meetings for Subject with WHD and IOD, both of whom have expressed an interest in this possibility. (More details will be forthcoming on this.)

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

FILE NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA".
3. Attach signed pages, if additional space is needed.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) HENRY (Middle) PRESTON (Last) LOPEZ (Var)

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: Henry P. Lopez

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.): Enrique Preciliano Lopez

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

None. "Henry Preston" is anglicized version of Enrique Preciliano

5. DATE OF BIRTH: May 28 1920.

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Denver, Colorado

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

Social drinking only

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

None

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

9a. SEX M X F	9b. AGE 39	9c. APPARENT AGE 39	9d. HEIGHT FT. 5 IN. 10	9e. WEIGHT 175	9f. COMPLEXION tan	9g. FACE (Shape) oblong
9h. COLOR OF HAIR black	9i. COLOR OF EYES Brown	9j. TEETH regular		9k. BUILD medium	9l. POSTURE fair	

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

small scar on left forearm

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

I'm told I look like a professor

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

Wear horn rim glasses

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

(Copy made + forwarded CI/OA, CCCT. [illegible])

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE.

FORM NO. 1050 REPLACES FORM 51-95a
1 JUL 56 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(4-20)

SECTION II — **CITIZENSHIP**

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: American

2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 1.): NA

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant): 4616 August Street Apartment #1 Tenant

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 3.): NA

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED: NA

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)

Mexico 1953-54-55-56 vacationing, studying, lecturing and writing a novel

Cuba summer of 1955 vacationing

SECTION III — **OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA**

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION: Attorney

2. TITLE: self-employed

3. SALARY (Per annum): varies

4. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)

Earn about $15,000 to $20,000 per year

SECTION IV — **ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS**

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

None, but I was reared as a Catholic

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Bar associations
Harvard Club
Many Democratic organizations (see attached sheet)
G.I. ~~Fore~~ Forum (Veterans group)

SECTION V — **EDUCATIONAL DATA**

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
University of Denver	Political Science	1939	1944	B.A.
Harvard University	Graduate School Economics	1944	1945	
Harvard Law School	Law	1945	1948	L.L.B
University of Mexico	Anthropology	1954		

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	\		\		\		\	

SECTION VI — **SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

(a) "Forums as Adjunct to Legal Study", Journal of American Bar Association, 1947
(b) "Dead Ringer", short story, Chicago Jewish Forum, 1955
(c) "Migratory Labor: a Mexican Dilemma," Frontier Mag, 1955
(d) "Cross Examination of Medical Witnesses," NACCA Legal Journal, 1952

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

SECTION VII — **MILITARY SERVICE**

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
United States	1942	1944	U.S. Army Medical Corps	Staff Sgt.	Assistant First Sgt

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

I was given medical discharge in 1944 after it was discovered that my eyesight was below minimum requirements. I had memorized the eye chart at induction medical exam in order to pass minimum requirement of 20-200. Actually, I have never had any difficulty since my sight is corrected to 20-20 with glasses.

SECTION VIII — **EMPLOYMENT HISTORY**

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDS ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

1
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1944 to 1946
2. EMPLOYER Harvard Medical School
3. ADDRESS Boston, Mass. Massachusetts General Hospital
4. TYPE OF WORK psychiatric interviewer
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS PER $5 per hour.
6. REASON FOR LEAVING Pressure of law studies

2
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1948
2. EMPLOYER Nat'l Labor Relat'l Board.
3. ADDRESS 111 W. Seventh St. Los Angeles, Calif.
4. TYPE OF WORK Attorney
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 125.00 PER wk.
6. REASON FOR LEAVING To enter private practice

3
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1948-1953
2. EMPLOYER R.D. Magana (associate)
3. ADDRESS 1250 Wilshire Blvd.
4. TYPE OF WORK Attorney
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 15,000 PER year
6. REASON FOR LEAVING To practice on my own.

4
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1953- present
2. EMPLOYER self employed
3. ADDRESS 6505 Wilshire Blvd. Los Angeles
4. TYPE OF WORK Attorney
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ Varies PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING Still here

5
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

Married to Dotty Grant. Divorced Colo Springs, Colo. 1948, incompatibilt;
Married to Ruth Chapman Divorced Mexico, 1953. incompatibility

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) Mildred (Middle) Jean (Nee) McGregor (Last) Lopez

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: April 5, 1954

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Mexico City, Mexico

6. DATE OF BIRTH: May 28, 1933

7. PLACE OF BIRTH: Lexington, Kentucky

8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: American

9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS: none

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased): 4816 August Street, Los Angeles

SECTION X CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Chapman Joaquin Lopez	x		1952	Los Angeles, Calif.	American
Gregory Harold Lopez	X		1955	Mexico City	dual Mexican-American
Drusilla Lopez		x	1957	Los Angeles, Calif.	American

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI FATHER

1. FULL NAME: Jose P. Lopez

2. YEAR OF BIRTH: 1892

3. PLACE OF BIRTH: Chihuahua, Chih. Mexico

4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Mexican

5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS: American

6. OCCUPATION: retired laborer

7. PRESENT RESIDENCE: 5216 Budlong St. Los Angeles

SECTION XII MOTHER

1. FULL NAME: Herminia M. Lopez

2. YEAR OF BIRTH: 1899

3. PLACE OF BIRTH: Chihuahua, Chih. Mexico

4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Mexican

5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS: American

6. OCCUPATION: housewife

7. PRESENT RESIDENCE: 5216 Budlong St. Los Angeles

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Alfred A. Lopez	X		1916	Chihuahua, Mexico	Mexican
Joseph P. Lopez	X		1919	El Paso, Texas	American
Mrs. Beatrice Gonzalez		X	1922	Denver, Colorado	American

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

Alfred Lopez became American citizen in 1943.

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

None.

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

None

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

Parents were naturalized in 1951.

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

None

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Sander Johnson, close friend. 1236 Westwood Blvd., Los Angeles
Lloyd Wolf, close friend. 1236 Westwood Blvd. Los Angeles

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE: October 3 1954

SIGNATURE: Henry P. Lopez

HENRY P. LOPEZ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
6505 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
LOS ANGELES 48
OLIVE 3-6703

1. I entered politics in Los Angeles in 1949.

2. Democratic nominee for Secretary of State of California, 1958.

   Elected president of Los Angeles Young Democrats, 1950-51 *

3. I was chairman of Speakers Bureau for James Roosevelt,
   candidate for Governor of California, 1950

   I was chairman of Speakers Bureau for Helen Gahagan Douglas
   candidate for U.S. Senator, 1950

   Member of Minorities Committee for Adlai Stevenson for President
   1952 and 1956. Also on speakers bureau.

   Have participated in numerous other local campaigns.

4. Present activities:
   (a) Member, Democratic State Central Comm.
   (b) Member, Host Committee, Demo Nat'l Conv.
   (c) Board of Directors, Democratic Minority Conference
   (d) Executive Comm., 63rd Assembly Dist.

5. I have remained active. And it's quite possible that I may run for Congress in 1960 or 1962, depending on the political climate.

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM

2. PSEUDONYM

Edward G. Tichborn

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Subject was first contacted by Horace W. Davis in Los Angeles, California, on 14 September 1959. His name had previously been given to PAD by another PAD consultant.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject can be turned over to any responsible case officer by Horace W. Davis.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

N. A.

201-253203

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is a loyal American interested in world affairs and is willing to work for the J. S. Government.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

American citizenship, Member of the Bar, political aspirations

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Case officer used the alias Henry W. Darkin.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

N. A.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

CIA

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject ~~does~~ is not believedto have had past or present connections with intelligence services .

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

No one

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

N. A.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Because of his Mexican antecedence, might conceivably cooperate with Mexico. This is highly unlikely, however.

SECRET

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Never contacted before

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

N. A.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

N. A.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

N. A.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject will be used in political action operations.

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

N. A.

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

N. A.

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject will be given a standard consultent contract which as necessity demands will be amended for foreign TDY's. This consultent contract will call for $50 a day plus expenses and the remuneration for his TDY amendment is subject to negotiation. Subject only knows Horace W. Davis.

SECRET

SECTION IX

QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Native fluency in Mexican-Spanish.

SECTION X

COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

N. A.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

None

SECTION XI

CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Subject holds Headquarters POA.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

N. A.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED. Yes C-77119	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED 11 May 1959

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject appeared to understand the necessity for security. His character and reliability have been well attested to. From limited observation they would appear to be ~~[illegible].~~ good.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

None known.

SECTION XII

SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Socially

SECTION XIII — AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Unknown

SECTION XIV — GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Mexican-Speaks the language with native fluency. Looks like one.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Part I was provided by subject; Part II from observation.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

N. A.

SECTION XV — EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject will have to be recontacted by Horace W. Davis or someone else provided with a letter from Horace W. Davis as well as subject/s signed secrecy agreement.

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

DATE [illegible] ~~25 SEP [illegible]~~	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

[redacted]

LOPEZ, Henry P. | was C-77115 | [illegible]
201-253203

29 Jan. 1965 poa cs WH/1 F. Araijo 4523

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

FORM 11-58 645c OR OBSOLETE [redacted] ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 | 25 | 32 | 03

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-48)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO: RID/201 Section

DATE: 17/-/71

ACTION: ☒ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

FROM: CI/SA

ROOM NO.

TELEPHONE

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☐ NON-SENSITIVE

1. 201 NO. 353203

SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) LOPEZ (First) [illegible] R. (Middle) (Title)

3. SEX ☒ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

2. TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

4. PHOTO ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. BIRTH DATE D [illegible] M [illegible] Y 20

6. COUNTRY OF BIRTH USA

7. CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP USA

OTHER IDENTIFICATION

8. OTHER IDEN CODE 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

9. OCC/POS CODE

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

10. COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE

11. PRIMARY DESK INTEREST PP/PAD

12. 2ND COUNTRY INTEREST

12A. 3RD COUNTRY INTEREST

COMMENTS

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/SA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

[illegible] 77119

201- [illegible]

PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO

RESTRICTED FILE ☐ YES ☐ NO

SIGNATURE

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LOGANOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:20 28 JULY 78	[illegible] 10:55	JIM KELLY	James P. Kelly

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

LOGANOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH 201-285412

2

Dup

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LAGANOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:20 28 July 78	10:55	JIM KELLY	James P. Kelly

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

3

Joey Count
Soft

SECRET

22 July 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SB

VIA : Chief of Station

SUBJECT : Celebration of Polish National Day, 22 July 1969

1. The undersigned attended the celebration of the Polish national day at the Polish Residence on Insurgentes Sur on 22 July 1969. The following points were the most significant:

a. The only Soviet the undersigned could identify was Col. Konstantin Nikandrovich BOGATYREV, the Soviet Military Attache. Someone the undersigned's wife talked to mentioned the presence of the Soviet Consul, but this certainly was neither Valentin LOGINOV nor Yuriy CHERNYSH, and the undersigned did not meet that person.

b. Whether the Cubans were invited or not, they were not in attendance.

c. Jiri SVESTKA, of the Czech Embassy, was there. Per SB Section briefing, the undersigned mentioned his departure and told SVESTKA that at least he would remain in Mexico. SVESTKA said that this would not be the case, that he is scheduled to leave within 15 days for Czechoslovakia. The undersigned then mentioned a conversation with his Czech friend in which the latter told him that he expected to stay in Mexico for quite a while longer. SVESTKA denied ever having said this, pointing out that he was glad to return home. The undersigned made no further comments.

SECRET

P-11712

4

d. The ex-Haitian Ambassador, Julio Jean PIERRE-AUDAIN, was seen by the undersigned but left before he could talk to him. In view of the fact that PIERRE-AUDAIN ceased to be Ambassador of Haiti a long time ago, the undersigned feels that his presence at the Polish national day celebrations has some significance. He remembers that PIERRE-AUDAIN was also present at the celebration of the Czech national day this year. In other words, the Communists have made it a point to maintain contact with him, probably in view of the fact that PIERRE-AUDAIN may return to Haiti if something happens to DUVALIER and may secure a position of some importance in his country.

2. The President of the Consular Association, VOURVOULIAS, told the undersigned that he would contact LOGINOV at the Soviet Embassy to see whether the latter would agree to a joint celebration of both the undersigned's and LOGINOV's departures in a party to be held for both of them at the same time. LOGINOV is not scheduled to leave Mexico until September 1969, a departure postponed from the original schedule of late July or early August.

Raymond A. FRADYER

Distribution:
Orig - 7 (Consular Corps)
① - P-11712 (LOGINOV)
1 - P-7111 (SVESTKA)
1 - P-5407 (PIERRE-AUDAIN)

RAF:lmp

5

SECRET

22 July 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SB

VIA : Chief of Station

SUBJECT : Celebration of Polish National Day, 22 July 1969

1. The undersigned attended the celebration of the Polish national day at the Polish Residence on Insurgentes Sur on 22 July 1969. The following points were the most significant:

a. The only Soviet the undersigned could identify was Col. Konstantin Nikandrovich BOGATYREV, the Soviet Military Attache. Someone the undersigned's wife talked to mentioned the presence of the Soviet Consul, but this certainly was neither Valentin LOGINOV nor Yuriy CHERNYSH, and the undersigned did not meet that person.

b. Whether the Cubans were invited or not, they were not in attendance.

c. Jiri SVESTKA, of the Czech Embassy, was there. Per SB Section briefing, the undersigned mentioned his departure and told SVESTKA that at least he would remain in Mexico. SVESTKA said that this would not be the case, that he is scheduled to leave within 15 days for Czechoslovakia. The undersigned then mentioned a conversation with his Czech friend in which the latter told him that he expected to stay in Mexico for quite a while longer. SVESTKA denied ever having said this, pointing out that he was glad to return home. The undersigned made no further comments.

SECRET

6

d. The ex-Haitian Ambassador, Julio Jean PIERRE-AUDAIN, was seen by the undersigned but left before he could talk to him. In view of the fact that PIERRE-AUDAIN ceased to be Ambassador of Haiti a long time ago, the undersigned feels that his presence at the Polish national day celebrations has some significance. He remembers that PIERRE-AUDAIN was also present at the celebration of the Czech national day this year. In other words, the Communists have made it a point to maintain contact with him, probably in view of the fact that PIERRE-AUDAIN may return to Haiti if something happens to DUVALIER and may secure a position of some importance in his country.

2. The President of the Consular Association, VOURVOULIAS, told the undersigned that he would contact LOGINOV at the Soviet Embassy to see whether the latter would agree to a joint celebration of both the undersigned's and LOGINOV's departures in a party to be held for both of them at the same time. LOGINOV is not scheduled to leave Mexico until September 1969, a departure postponed from the original schedule of late July or early August.

Raymond A. FRADYER

Distribution:
Orig - 7 (Consular Corps)
1 - P-11712 (LOGINOV)
1 - P-7111 (SVESTKA)
1 - P-5407 (PIERRE-AUDAIN)

RAF:lmp

7

~~S/2~~

~~SOT~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~

SD/Sec - Ccalw f Leguer

July 18, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: LIOVAL-1 (P-8903)
Date of meet: July 17 at Hoyo 19 at 1430 hrs

1. Prearranged meet which lasted 90 minutes.
Next meet: August 17 at the same place.

2. On Friday July 11 LIBACON-1 gave a regular language class to L-1 and L-1 stated his interest to meet the Sov girl at LIBACON-1's house. ~~and~~ In the course of conv L-1 explained to LIBACON-1 why he believed this was important to him or in other words he gave him the cover story about which we spoke at our previous meet. LIBACON-1 assured L-1 that he would bring the Sov girl (Alla [illegible]) to his house.

3. On July 16 at 1000 hrs, i.e. at their next class LIBACON-1 told L-1 that he ~~[illegible]~~ went to the Sov Emb to visit LOGINOV and he found him this time. In the course of conv with LOG he (LIBACON-1) told him about meeting Alla and his plans to invite her to his home and show her around. LOG told him that Alla was his secretary and that he should not dare to get close to her.

4. L-1 felt defeated with this development, because he believed that he was on the way/ developing something for us. I told L-1 that there was no reason of feeling bad about this fact, especially, because LOG was leaving relatively soon and the girl would remain here.

5. L-1 told me that on July 11 LIBACON-1 had taken an old ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] in which there was an advertising showing LOG again in a shaky Tequila and he asked L-1 can he give to LOG if he wanted it. Apparently, LIBACON-1 showed the magazine to LOG and wanted to joke with the picture but LOG became very angry about the fact "that international figures" are used for cheap ads. L-1 suspected that LOG might had asked from where [illegible] LIBACON-1 stated his name.

6. L-1 plans taking about 2 weeks vacation starting the second week of August.

Ferrald

STATT Sty [illegible] -13,
[illegible] P-11712
[illegible] SECRET
GROUP 1 Cons. Corps - (referring to Sistone)

Memo for the Record:

SUBJECT: First Sistone and Ferelum Cover J0b Outing with Consular Corps; Brief Initial Exposure to Soviets Loginov and Golouzev

1. Terence D. Sistone and Ferelum , both under Consular cover, accompanied (with wives) Fralyer on an outing of the "Cuerpo Consular en Mexico", a social club open to all consular officers (regardless of nationality) to new Ford factory in Cuautitlan, lunch and excusion of Span. col. Convent at Tepotzotlan from1100 to 1900hrs. on 17 July 1969. Consular Corps is creature of Amer. cit and ex-Consul Gen. of Greece, Leander P. Vourvoulias, who led excursion. In addition to helping the two new Sta. officers work into consular cover and make contacts, the purpose of the outing in part was to see at first hand the Sov, Bloc and Cubans who belong to the CC. Three Sovs showed, no identified Bloc and no Cubs. ~~XXXX~~ No other particularly interesting cons. types but door opened to meet people at future CC meets.~~xxx~~

2. Three Sovs who showed were Valentin Loginov, well-known to Sta. as KGB under cons. cover, and two men of Commercial Sec. of Sov. Emb. Both Sistone and Ferelum independently identified Lev Nikolayevich Golouzev as one of two commercial types from mug book-were unable identify the other, who was quiet and hardly taked as he tagged along. Golouzev was also quiet but was engaged twice by Sistone in conversation. One one occasion G said he had been in Mexico short time, was there as result recent Sov-Mex trade aggreement, just happened to be around and invited with colleague to Ford outing. On other occasion G said Tepotzotlan/church gold leaf and general art more ornate and impressive than Byzantine church-monuments he familiar with in Moscow. spoke Span. with heavy accent and didn't talk much but was quite fluent nevertheless. ~~XXXXXX~~ Sistone also talked briefly to Loginov and introduced by Fralyer as Fralyer replacement. However conversation innocuous and uninteresting compared to constant verbal sparring betw. Fralyer and Loginov which Sistone will defer to Fralyer to report if he sees fit.

(P - 11712)

SECRET

9

C/CA
C/SB
~~SR/J kda~~
~~SB/F~~

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

SUB Meeting of Cuerpo Consular de Mexico, 17 July 69 CS/Sec-file

FR G A FERMLEN

1. On 17 July 69 FERMLEN and wife attended their first Consular Corps meeting with two other station Officers and wives. FERMLEN was introduced to Lev GOLOVZOV, 201-850177, P-13,766 and Valentin LOGINOV, 201-285412, P-11712 of the Soviet Embassy and to another Russian, unidentified, who appeared very reluctant to talk. GOLOVZOV was very civil but/appeared a bit less expansive than his colleague, LOGINOV, who engaged in a constant verbal bantering with FRADYER. LOGINOV and FRADYIR have established a solid rapport which enables them to engage in the aforementioned antics without ~~xaper~~ repercussions. LOGINOV was accompanied by his wife, a very charming, quite woman, who speaks acceptable spanish. She manifested a real interest in the chemical department of the plant, to the point of explaining certain charts and symbols to LOGINOV. She probably has had some chemical training. LOGINOV himself appeared self-assured, sophisticated and able. He appeared not the slightest concerned over the verbal battle with FRADYIR, and held his own during the exchanges. He looks strong physically, especially his hands, which could pass for a [illegible]. He has a [illegible] charming smile which he uses to his advantage, i.e. whenever he was at a loss for words, out came the smile. At one time during the afternoon, LOGINOV was separated into a small group with FERMLEN, F[illegible] and SISTONE [illegible] [illegible] his [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] numbered, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] [illegible].

FILE: P-13,766
P-11,712

2. GOLOVKOV was, as previously stated, more reserved. He stayed in the background and accompained the unidentified Russian during most of the tour. FERALEZ was introduced to him but little conversation passed between them. He appeared a little stiff, more the Russian sterootype of the reserved, social-ill-at-ease person. But this was justx an impression as FERALEZ had nox chance for an indepth conversation. GOLOVKOV seemed to possess decent spanish. He stated he was from the comercial section. Hopefully subject will attend other Corps meetings and FERALEZ will have an opportunity to speak to him at greater length.

G A Feralez

G A FERALEZ

14-00000

11

515/F SX [illegible] 201-[illegible]-13,
[illegible] P-11712
[illegible] SECRET
C/EUB — [illegible] Cons. Corps [illegible] (returning to Sistone)

Memo for the Record:

SUBJECT: First Sistone and Fenlon Cover Job Outing with Consular Corps:
Brief Initial Exposure to Soviets Loginov and Golouzev

1. Terence D. Sistone and Fenlon , both under Consular cover, accompanied (with wives) Fradyer on an outing of the "Cuerpo Consular en Mexico", a social club open to all consular officers (regardless of nationality) to new Ford factory in Cuautitlan, lunch and excursion of Span. col. Convent at Tepotzotlan from 1100 to 1900hrs. on 17 July 1969. Consular Corps is creature of Amer. cit and ex-Consul Gen. of Greece, Leander P. Vourvoulias, who led excursion. In addition to helping the two new Sta. officers work into consular cover and make contacts, the purpose of the outing in part was to see at first hand the Sov, Bloc and Cubans who belong to the CC. Three Sovs showed, no identified Bloc and no Cubs. No other particularly interesting cons. types out door opened to meet people at future CC meets.

2. Three Sovs who showed were Valentin Loginov, well-known to Sta. as KGB under cons. cover, and two men of Commercial Sec. of Sov. Emb. Both Sistone and Fenlon independently identified Lev Nikolayevich Golouzev as one of two commercial types from mug book-were unable identify the other, who was quiet and hardly talked as he tagged along. Golouzev was also quiet but was engaged twice by Sistone in conversation. On one occasion G said he had been in Mexico short time, was there as result recent Sov-Mex trade aggreement, just happened to be around and invited with colleague to Ford outing. On other occasion G said Tpotzotlan/church gold leaf and general art more ornate and impressive than Byzantine church-monuments he familiar with in Moscow. Spoke Span. with heavy accent and didn't talk much but was quite fluent nevertheless. Sistone also talked briefly to Loginov and introduced by Fradyer as Fradyer replacement. However conversation innocuous and uninteresting compared to constant verbal sparring betw. Fradyer and Loginov which Sistone will defer to Fradyer to report if he sees fit.

[illegible] 17 July 69
P-11712

SECRET

12

SISTF Sry
SIS/Sec Gaccone-13, P-11,712
Loginov SECRET
C/203 — Cons. Corp file — (returning to Sistone)

17 Jul 69

Memo for the Record:

SUBJECT: First Sistone and Ferlem Cover J0b Outing with Consular Corps;
Brief Initial Exposure to Soviets Loginov and Golenzev

1. Terence D. Sistone and Ferelem , both under Consular cover, accompanied (with wives) Fralyer on an outing of the "Cuerpo Consular en Mexico", a social club open to all consular officers (regardless of nationality) to new Ford factory in Cuautitlan, lunch and excusion of Span. col. Convent at Tepotzotlan from 1100 to 1900hrs. on 17 July 1969. Consular Corps is creature of Amer. cit and ex-Consul Gen. of Greece, Leander P. Vourvoulias, who led excursion. In addition to helping the two new Sta. officers work into consular cover and make contacts, the purpose of the outing in part was to see at first hand the Sov, Bloc and Cubans who belong to the CC. Three Sovs showed, no identified Bloc and no Cubs. ~~xxxx~~ No other particularly interesting cons. types but door opened to meet people at future CC meets.~~xxx~~

2. Three Sovs who showed were Valentin Loginov, well-known to Sta. as KGB under cons. cover, and two men of Commercial Sec. of Sov. Emb. Both Sistone and Fereleм independently identified Lev Nikolayevich Golenzev as one of two commercial types from mug book-were unable identify the other, who was quiet and hardly talked as he tagged along. Golenzev was also quiet but was engaged twice by Sistone in conversation. Ons one occasion G said he had been in Mexico short time, was there as result recent Sov-Mex trade aggreement, just happened to be around and invited with colleague to Ford outing. On other occasion G said Tpotzotlan/church gold leaf and general art more ornate and impressive than Byzantine church-monuments he familiar with in Moscow. spoke Span. with heavy accent and didn't talk much but was quite fluent nevertheless. ~~xxxxx~~ Sistone also talked briefly to Loginov and introduced by Fralyer as Fralyer replacement. However conversation innocuous and uninteresting compared to constant verbal sparring betw. Fralyer and Loginov which Sistone will defer to Fralyer to report if he sees fit.

SECRET

13

P-11,712

July 10, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: LIRACON-1 (P-4805)
Date of Meet: July 9 at Farenze Restaurant-Bar (Newton) at 1630

1. Prearranged meet; L-1 came on time; the meet lasted 2 hours and 30 minutes.

Next meet: Wed July 16 at 1630 at pick up place in Escobedo
with Gutenberg

2. On July 9 at 0915 hrs L-1 went to the Sov Embassy to look for LOGINOV (P-11,712). A Sov girl receptionist told him that LOG was not in and told him that he could wait in the reception roon or wait for him in the waiting room of LOG's office. L-1 prefered to remain with the receptionist(girl). He left after 55 minutes without seeing LOG.

3. When L-1 came to the receptionist and asked for LOG she in turn asked him was he not L-1 (by first name only), son of their language teacher. L-1 answered affirmatively and in turn asked her what was her name and how does she know him. She stated that her name was Alla LNU and that she recognized L-1 by his voice from calling for LOG. (NOTE: L-1 feels positive that at least 4 months have passed since a woman answered the phone when he asked for LOG).

4. In the beginning of the conv L-1 found out that the girl was from Mosow which certainly pleased L-1 because he had what to talk about. She complimented L-1 for speaking Russian without an accent, which was not the case with L-1's mother, the language teacher at the Sov Emb.

5. Results of this conversation:

a. Alla LNU is in Mexico city less than a year. She is bored to death here and is looking forward to returning to Moscow as soon as she will be allowed.

b. She said that Mexico had a pleasant climate, but all she knows about Mexico is Cuautla and even when she is invited there she has no company of her own (sic).

c. With regard to her schooling: after she finished

14

high school she went to a school for mechanical technicians where she studied about a year and gave it up because she did not like it. She competed to enter the school of modern languages at the university but she failed. Then, she entered the M.I.M.O. (L-1 does not know what it stands for) and after 5 months she had to go to Mexico.

d. L-1 told her that he would look her up occasinally and she appeared to be pleased with the idea.

e. Description: apparent age 25 - 26; hight about 5 ft 3 in (possibly less); hair light brown; very nice eyes (L-1 does not remember the color); buildt rather stout; face rather long; in general: pleasant appearance.

6. Before leaving L-1 left with her a note for LOG in which he stated that he can still be reached at the Institute between 1500 and 1600 hrs and at home and added his phone numbers and concluded that if he did not hear from LOG it would prove he had a friend who turned out to be no good.

7. During L-1s waiting in the reception room Yuriy CHERNISH passed by and they exchanged few unconsequential words. L-1 asked YO did he give LOG the message he sent to LOG from that party (at Andres's CATANO) and he said that he did it with pleasure and added few words of his own. When YO left L-1 asked Alla when was LOG leaving and she said LOG would leave in October '69.

8. At 1510 hrs of the same day LOG phoned to L-1 in the Institute and after some verbage they agreed to meet on Monday July 14 at the Marinera restaurant at 1300 hrs (AV Chapultepec with or near Liverpool). Both of them stated that they would be there without fail.

9. With regard to the meet LOG - L-1 I repeated my previous instruction to L-1 concerning his attitude if LOG comes out again with the request to meet LIOVAL-1.

10. With regard to L-1s acquaintance with Alla I suggested L-1 to ask his mother about her. There is a possibility of finding out her full

name and whether she is married or not. L-1 should also mention to LOG the fact that he met Alla while waiting for him. Depending on the findings L-1 should consider inviting Alla to his house for lunch one Sat or Sun and take her with his wife and child to the Parque Asturiano to spend the afternoon. I told L-1 that I would pay for the expenses for lunch and possible entertainment. L-1 will discuss the matter with me before doing anything.

11. L-1 reported that he had a 90 minutes talk with Karel WENDEL (see Attachment) and I debriefed him on the same. There were very few facts which were not covered in the previous report on WENDEL.

12. As it became obvious that the working part of the meet was over L-1 stated that he would really feel bad and blow off his top ~~hm~~ if he did not see KARTASUK until the end of the month. I told him that KARTASUK had put a long period of work in the States and consequently his leave was extended for the same amount of time and X can spend that time where he pleased. L-1 commented that in that case he would extend the deadline of becoming nasty to Aug 20. I laughed. L-1 commented that probably I was not able to understand how much he was attached to KARTASUK.

RHFernald

16

~~SB/Chief~~ memo
~~SB/F~~ file Snf
~~SB/F~~ - pls see notes
SB/Sec - file (both)

July 9, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: Jimmy SABORI P-13,830
Date of meet: July 7 in Subject's car and Insurgentes Sanborns Bar

1. A meet was prearranged with Subject for July 7 at Del Paseo at 1400 hrs. Subject phoned to our office in the course of the morning to ~~xxx~~ confirm the arrangement. (FERNALD was trying to reach Subject to change the place of meet, but he was not able to reach him). Subject did not show up at the Del Paseo and after waiting 40 minutes F went home (his office). At 1535 hrs F was infoed by the office that Subject called several times and his latest statement was that he would be in front of the Cine Latino (across the Reforma from our Embassy). F came there on time but Subject was not around. Due to heavy rain F was bound to stay there and at 1630 hrs Subject showed up in an impressive Pontiac Boneville, blue with light top, plates MBD 755, Texas, 1968 Hemisfair (black). Subject waved to F to get in the car.

SB/F pls check plates
Requesting HQ check

Next meet: Friday July 11 at Bonaparte at 1400 hrs

In the car Subject stated to F that he goofed, because he went to the restaurant where we met twice previously and after some waiting and phoning he looked at his notebook and realized that he was at the wrong place. He apologized. Then, Subject stated that he had to return the Boneville and take another car and he asked F to have a ride with him. Subject took the car to Leibnitz and parked it in front of the apt building at 297. He excused himself for few minutes took newspapers,~~xxx~~ a small bundle and 2 miniature bottles of some liquor and entered the apt. About 5 minutes later he returned and we entered an old, beaten up Valiant without license plates and the age is hard to tell.

SB/F, any need? [illegible]

2. During the first ride Subject tolf F that LOG phoned him on Friday July 4 and told him that they would have to postponed their meet scheduled for the next day because he (LOG) would be out of town on Sat and Sun. LOG wanted to meet with Subject on Mon or Tue

P-11,710

17

and Subject told him that he would be taken and working with 2 American businessmen who would arrive on Sunday. Subject added that they would bring a tennis hat for LOG (they did). LOG said that he would want to visit Josephine ALCAYAGA, probably on Thursday July 10, but would phone him to arrange for a meet before coming to his (and Josephine's) apt. LOG also reminded Subject ~~x~~ to prepare him for that meet a written report on the opinion of Mexcican government officials about the Interamerican Economic Conference at Port of Spain.

7 July

10 July

Stlf - check for call No need

4. After returning from the apt Subject told F that LOG had phoned to Josephine and told her that he would visit them on Thur a little after 2000 hrs and that he would bring to Josephine 2 bottles of Votka.

5. Then, Subject asked F when should he arrange for a meet with LOG, because in front of Josephine they do not speak about politics. F told Subject that the logical thing to do would be to take advantage "of the social gathering" with LOG to make arrangements for their next meet. Subject agreed and asked F whether our security people decided to give or not to give the directory to him for passing it LOG. F told Subject that he messed the matter by bringing into the picture a nonexisting Patricia which we were not able to produce. Therefore, the first step is getting rid of Patricia, which means to get to the point of F's first instruction: Subject really has no close friend or contact in the U.S. Embassy and is willing to develop one if LOG insists on getting the directory; Subject is willing to follow LOG's instruction regarding how to go about it. With regard to "Patricia" Subject will have to state that she did not return from her leave and he does not know why.

JL

6. At that point ~~xx~~ Subject and F were alrady at the Diana Circle and Subject suggested that they stop for a drink in Insugentes at Samborns which is only a couple of blocks from his office and F agreed. They remained there about 50 minutes.

7. Subject stated that the directory has become a problem. F

18

commented that the existing problem was created by Subject and his not compliance with the instruction; the only way out of it now is to do what F told him in the car.

8. In reply to F's question Subject stated that the 2 Americans who arrived here on Sunday July 6 were interested in investing capital in a ~~[illegible]~~ a housing project for people of low income. He added that one of them is owner of a mining corporation and the otherone is from the Beneficiary (if rembered correctly) Insurance Co. He belives that they were satisfied with the findingsm but it will take about a month before the deal materializes, because the approval of appropriate board was needed.

SSIF- [illegible] [illegible] No trace at all

9. Subject showed to F a calling card of Mr. C. Lester McGee (or MacGee), President of Moon Valley Mining Corporation, 3113 Oakland Ave (or Street), Dallas, Texas. There were at least two other addresses listed which F did not remember. Subject went on to say that Mr. MacGee was interested in buying platinum, but Subject told him that Mexico had no platinum and that once the Sovs were trying to sell a quantity in Mexico. Mr. MacGee told Subject to look into the matter and explained him the mechanics of the deal. Sovs would have to make a firm offer to a Swiss Company which is controlled by a Canadian company which is in fact a subsidiary of an American company: ultimate destination of the platinum is the U.S. Reportedly, the deal is all the way through a clean legal commercial transaction and terms of payment would be Irrevocable, Confirmed Letter of Credit, cash on delivery in Switzerland. The intial purchase would be 5,000 ounces but there is will to buy up to 1 million Dollars worth of platinum. Subject asked F should he ask LCG are the Sovs interested in the deal.

10. F told Subject he should tell about it to LCG if there is a commission for the person who facilitates the deal. According to Subject there is a US$1.- commission per ounce if he can provide the goods. F told Subject he should express the desire that LCG obtain the info himself and if the answer is favorable and the price right then LCG can introduce Subject to the Sov official who will

69

be authorized to close the deal. Subject agreed to emphasize the attractiveness of the commission and the advantage of the fact that the deal is handled in Switzerland and consequently the commission is also paid there. F told Subject that he wanted to know in detail LOGs reaction concerning the commission. Subject should also play around with the theme that it would be ideal if LOG could travel to Switzerland to introduce him to the right person (Sov) and similar.

11. Subject commented that the buyer is serious and it remains to be seen are the Sov willing to sell at a convenient for them but still fair price. Subject went on to say that if the deal was to go well he would have to go to Switzerland, and this arises another problem, i.e. how long would it take for him to get an American Passport, because he id presently documented by his Birth Certificate. F told him to start thinking about passing that bridge when he comes to it.

12. Subject appeared to be satisfied with Fs attitude in the above conversation and he commented that with this matter showing up plus the tennis hat and the written report there should be enough for a meet with LOG. F told Subject that he wanted a carbon copy of the report he would hand to LOG and Subject promise to make one.

13. Then, Subject observed that in order to place the business for talk with LOG in the right prospective he would have to see LOG before Mr. McGee and his companion leave, which means the latest on Wed noon. F told him to go ahead and make arrangements which would be normal if he was trying to push the platinum deal, but if he gets to see LOG before Thur at his (Josephines) apt, he should advise F by phone, i.e. leave a message for F to ring him up.

14. Comment by Fernald:

b. Even if nothing comes out of the platinum deal, which is quite likely, conversation about it and the associated commission, should give us some reading on LOG on one hand and on the other shed more light on the personal relation between Subject and LOG.

agree

b. The so called social relation between Josephine and LOG is interesting, to say the least.

E.Fernald

20

ATTACHMENT
July 9, 1969

Subject: Valentin LOGINOV (P-11,712)

Source: Jimmy SABORI

1. According to Source LOG phoned him on Friday July 4 at 1100 hrs and told that he would be out of town on July 5 and 6 and, consequently, would want to reschedule their meet arranged for Jyly 5. LOG proposed Monday or Tuesday and Source told him that he would be busy ~~m~~ with some American businesemen . LOG concluded that he wanted to visit Josephine ALCAYAGA Segues ~~this~~ next week and will do it probably on Thursday (July 10), but will phone earlier.

2. According to Source LOG does not miss a week to give a ring to Josephine ALOAYAGA just to say Hello.

3. During the phone conversation mentioned in para l1 above LOG reminded Source that he was interested in having next week in writing what Mexican officials thought about the American promises made at the Interamerican Economic Conference in Port of Spain.

4. The following are LOG's statements made to Source some of their previous meets:

a. LOG has a Life Insurance for 1 million Pesos with Monterrey Comania de Seguros, S.A. in Mexico City.

b. LOG told Source that it was good to have a friend "on the other side", meaning American side, because one can never tell what might happen.

c. LOG brags about having money of his own.

RHFernald

21

SB/Se

July 5, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: LIBACON-1 (P-4805)
Date of Meet: July 2 at Paris-Mexico Restaurant at 1640 hrs.

1. Prearranged meet to which Subject came on time and seeing me he drove around several blocks and returned to the prearranged place 6 minutes later.

I paid L-1 MN 1,000- salary for June '69.

Next meet: July 9 with the pick up at the same place at 1615 hrs.

2. L-1 told me about the evening he spend with LIOVAL-1 at the Sov show. He reported the matter exactly as LIOVAL-1 did and added that in spite of his intention to meet with some members of the Sov group he did not find time to do it.

3. With regard to the visit he promised to make to LOGINOV L- stated that he was not able to make up his mind in doing it, because he feared that LOG might suspect him for showing so much interest in him now and previously he was avoiding him. I repeated my request that he go and see LOGINOV before we meet next week. He said he would do it on Friday July 4 at 1015 hrs.

4. I told L-1 that I wanted him to do more writing for us in accordance with our previous agreement. He promised to do it, and I believe that while he is with me he seriously means what he says.

5. As the Attacgment will show L-1 spoke about his talk with Karel WENTEL and he was instructed to obtain more info, especially, factual info.

6. I gave Subject ~~his~~ a copy of the First Circle in Russian and he was pleased to get the book.

7. L-1 is still living harmoniously with his wife and L-1 is convincing himself that he wants to live with his wife and does not want to give ~~his~~ her a reason for quarreling.

8. I talked to L-1 about the need that he associate with Sov.

HEFernald

212

22

July 5, 1969.

Subject: Valention LOGINOV - Bio Sketch by LIBACON-1

Remarks:

1. Concerning the problems which Log has with his colleagues LIBACON-1 was not able to offer specific examples. In at least 3 instances LOG spoke to L-1 that the psychological atmospher within the Sov Embassy is horrible and depressing. LOG stated that there was not a single person in the Embassy in which one can confide; everybody is ready to cut otherones throat just to advance; if there is nothing the colleagues can pin against a person they start intriguing hoping that one might lose his temper and commit something stupid which would be sufficient to harm the person involved; if ones asks for advise he would in no time find out that he was considered incompetent.

In Fall 1968 L-1 invited LOG to attend a party and told him that Yuriy CHERNISH (P-13,042) would be there. LOG stated that he would not come, because it would mean or getting himself in trouble or getting CHERNISH in trouble; to keep away from Sov collegues is the only of keeping out of troubles, concluded LOG.

2. With regard to the statement that LOG was commiting errors by exterting pressure on other people L-1 stated that he reported LOG's renewed attempt to recruit Miguel Angel. In doing so LOG abandoned his tact and ignored the sensitivity of the other person; LOG talk to L-1 in Cuautla took place in less than a month from LOG's pitch to Miguel Angel; the way LOG spoke to L-1 made it evident that LOG disregarded ops security rules. Such things did not happen before and L-1 concluded that LOG went all out to achieve some success before he leaves PCS "cost what it may".

3. When L-1 stated that he believed that LOG would be a good person under normal conditions, he meant that he believed that LOG is basically a good person and would be acting and behaving as a good preson in his normal environment, i.e.. if he remained as a muzik on the farm, or he was a tractor driver or a truck driver and similer, because in such conditions LOG would do a good job and would not have to depend on mental capability which he does not have.

23

4. L-1 does not know why LOG expresses such a great love and admiration for Spain and Spaniards. L-1 feels positive that LOG was never in Spain; he has no reason to believe that LOG did any extensive reading about Spain; in fact L-1 believes that LOG knows about Spain what he heard from Spaniards who live in the USSR and, apparently, he was associating with a number of them in Moscow.

BHFernald.

Valentin LOGINOV

Edad aproximada de 43-45 años, aunque aparenta menos. Fisicamente de complexión atlética, alto. Juega muy bién al tenis. Recientemente quedó en segundo lugar en el campeonato del D.F. que tuvo lugar en el Club Francia, donde practica este deporte. Cuida muchisimo su condición fisica y más que nada su apariencia. En este sentido es muy vanidoso. Muy pocos amigos saben que tiene una hija de 16-17 años. Cuando le preguntan si tiene hijos hable solo de su hijo de 11 años de edad. Le da pena presentar a su mujer, que es muy amable y buena, porque se ve de más edad que él. No fuma, toma muy poco, aunque cuando la ocasión requiere de tomar mucho ~~agüenta~~ aguanta y siempre se le ve sereno. Es muy amable en el trato. Nunca trata de imponer sus ideas, pero siempre pendiente de convencer por las buenas a sus contrincantes. (who take opposite point of view) Cuando ve que no puede hacer lo último, rompe diplomaticamente los relaciones amistosas con el sujeto.
En sus ideas es de la escuela estalinista: solo cuenta lo Unión Soviética y la última linea a seguir del Partido. Eso quiere decir que no tiene ideas propias. Sigue fidelisimamente la "linea" porque sabe muy bién que es la única forma rápida y eficaz de escalar en su carrera. Le gusta muchisimo la vida buena, tipo occidental, aunque antes se dejaria cortar un brazo que confesárselo así mismo. Es muy ambicioso y se ve que tiene problemas con sus compañeros de trabajo. Habla despectivamente de ellos. No le gusta nada la idea de tener que permanecer en Moscú los dos años que vienen. ~~En~~ Me dijo que haria lo posible que al transcurrir esos años lo mandaran de preferencia otra vez a México. Su ilusión más grande es trabajar en España. Adora a los españoles. La forma de ser de los mejicanos no le gusta. Por eso si quiere regresar, quiere decir que prefiere cualquier lugar donde vivir, menos Rusia. Creo que precisamente

14-00000

23

porque ya tiene que partir en julio, es por lo que ultimamente está cometiendo errores. Quiere hacer méritos a como de lugar, presionando a la gente de [illegible] que antes jamás hacía. El día 3 de mayo lo vi en Cuautla ~~Cuaulatla~~, y sabiendo que yo no quiero trabajar para él, me insistió, llegando al extremo ~~colegio~~ de preguntar si podíamos abordar a mi alumno John, sin siquiera preguntar por la personalidad y forma de pensar de John! En los 15 minutos que estuvimos juntos no habló más que de eso. Cuando yo le dije que ya le había dicho antes que no me gustaba esa clase de trabajo, me contestó que él creía que lo que me pasaba es que tenía miedo. La forma más inocente de hacerme picar! A continuación, me invitó a comer el día 8 para seguir hablando de lo mismo! En el fondo creo que todo eso revela cierta inocencia y muchas ganas de progresar, para llevar una vida muy diferente a lo que llevan los ciudadanos soviéticos. Creo que quiere dejar una grand impresión a sus jefes para no quedar trabajando indefinidamente en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Moscú. No sé hasta que punto sus ambiciones puedan guiarlo a progresar incluso por medio de atropellar victimas. Como persona y en condiciones normales me parece bueno, generoso y fiel amigo. Sin embargo la verdad es que nunca lo llegué a conocer muy bien, en parte posiblemente porque casi desde el principio sentía instintivamente que quería algo de mí, muy aparte de nuestra amistad y en parte porque con todo y la confianza que llego a tener conmigo jamás se descubrió por completo, ni mucho menos. Es extremadamente cauteloso.

Resumiendo: Mi impresión es que es una buena persona, de buenos sentimientos, pero que una vez metido en "ese trabajo," por razones que desconocemos, hace todo lo posible por destacas.

2b

Valentín Ligarte

Edad aproximada de 43-45 años, aunque aparenta menos. Físicamente de complexión atlética, alto. Juega muy bien al tenis. Recientemente quedó en segundo lugar en el campeonato del D. F. que tuvo lugar en el Club France, donde practica este deporte. Cuida muchísimo su condición física y se ve que cuida su apariencia. En este sentido es muy vanidoso. Muy pocos amigos saben que tiene una hija de 16-17 años. Cuando le preguntan si tiene hijos habla sólo de su hijo de 11 años de edad. Le da pena presentar a su mujer, que es muy amable y buena, porque se ve de más edad que él. No fuma, toma muy poco, aunque cuando la ocasión requiere de tomar mucho aguanta y siempre se le ve sereno. Es muy amable en el trato. Nunca trata de imponer sus ideas, pero siempre pendiente de convencer por las buenas a sus contrincantes. Cuando ve que no puede hacer lo último, siempre acepta naturalmente la situación [illegible] con el sujeto.

En sus ideas es de la [illegible] [illegible]: sólo acepta la Unión Soviética y la última línea se separa del Partido. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] en '51 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] en su carrera [illegible] muchísimo [illegible] [illegible] tipo occidental, aunque [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] que [illegible] [illegible] misma. Es muy [illegible] y [illegible] que tiene problemas con sus compañeros de trabajo. Habla despectivamente de ellos. No le gusta nada la idea de tener que permanecer en Moscú los 2 años que vienen. Me dijo que había la posible que al terminarse su año lo mandaran de preferencia otra vez a México. Le [illegible] más grande su trabajo en España. Adora a los españoles. La forma de ser de los mexicanos no le gusta. Por eso si quiere escoger, quiere decir que prefiere cualquier lugar donde vivir, menos Rusia. Creo que precisamente porque ya tiene que partir el [illegible] julio, es por lo que últimamente está cometiendo errores. Quiere hacer méritos a costa de lo que sea, presionando a la gente de forma que antes jamás hacía. El día 3 de mayo lo vi en Consulado y sabiendo que yo no quiero trabajar para él, me mintió, llegando al colmo de preguntar si podía ver a abordar a mi alumno John, ¡sin siquiera preguntar por la personalidad y forma de pensar de John! En los 15 minutos que estuvimos juntos me habló más que de su Ucrania. Yo le dije que ya le había dicho antes que no me gustaba ese tipo de trabajo, me contestó ~~[illegible]~~ que él creía que lo que me pasaba es que tenía miedo. ¡Sin tomar en cuenta [illegible] mis razones! ¡Y [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] hablando de la misma! En el final [illegible] todo [illegible] de Relaciones Exteriores de México

28

No se hasta qué punto sus actividades podrían guiarlo a propugnar cambios por medio de atropellos violentos. Como persona y en condiciones normales me parece ~~un~~ bueno, generoso y fiel amigo. Sin embargo, la verdad es que nunca lo llegué a conocer muy bien, en parte posiblemente porque desde el principio sentía constantemente que quería algo de mí, muy aparte de nuestra amistad y en parte porque, con todo y la confianza que llegó a tener conmigo ~~[illegible]~~ pienso ~~[illegible]~~ se descubría por completo, ni mucho menos. ~~[illegible]~~ Es extremadamente cauteloso.

Resumiendo: mi impresión es que es una buena persona de buenos sentimientos, pero que ~~[illegible]~~ una vez metido en "ese trabajo", por razones que desconocemos, hace todo lo posible por destacar.

29

[illegible]
~~[illegible]~~
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] files [illegible]
(cc of everything for Loginov)

July 4, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: Jimmy SABORI
Date of Meet: July 1 at Seps-Paris at 1900 hrs

1. This meet was held in lieu of the one scheduled for June 30 at 1400 hrs. Subj requested the postponment of the meet by phone on grounds that LOGINOV did not show up for the meet on June 25 and another meet with him was arranged by phone and will take place on June 30 at 1400 hrs. FERNALD phoned to Subject the same day of his call and arranged to see him at Seps-Paris restaurant at 1900 hrs. F who came to the meet place 5 minutes earlier found Subject there waiting for him. The meet lasted 5 hours in spite of the fact that F paid the bill 2 hours before Subject decided to leave.

Next meet: Monday July 7 at the Del Paseo at 1400 hrs. Note: F. will change the meet place to a more modest restaurant.

[illegible]

2. Subject immediately asked what was the decision concerning the Emb directory which LOGINOV was asking for. F told Subject that the directory was his last worry and that he would like to hear how did the things go with LOGINOV. Subject started speaking about the meet (see separate Attach.) By the time Subject was through with his description of the meet, F obtained a more convenient table and as ~~xx~~ they moved to it. F requested Subject to write additional date to his PRQ-I which he did promptly. Then F asked him to write the chrono sequence of his contacts with LOGINOV which Subject did by looking in his agenda and he did it without hesitation.

3. At this point Subject told F that he had seen him in the vicinity of the place where he met with LOGINOV. F stated that he was there and that the purpose of being there was that Subject see him. He asked did F also see LOG and F stated that when he saw LOG coming he moved in the direction from which Subject was coming. F concluded by saying that the fact that F was there himself should be sufficient to assure Subject that we keep operational matters restricted to a minimum of persons for reasons of security.

4. F looked at what Subject wrote concerning his meets with LOG

(a P-11712) P-13,830

30

and told Subject that according to the phone message he left for F it appeared that LOG did not come to the meet scheduled for June 25 and not as he put it on paper. Subject repeated what he wrote and confirmed that on June 20 LOG ~~Subject~~ did not show up and on June 25 LOG ~~didxxx~~ came and Subject did not show up (LIEMBRACE surveillance confirmed the latter statement). F observed that on his first meet with Subject on June 23 Subject said that he had a meet with LOG on June 25 and told him that he had no time to try to get the directory. Subject showed no embarrassment and he told F that he must have misundertood Subject's statement.

? [illegible] misunderstood

5. F told Subject that he did not follow F's instruction in speaking to LOG about the directory, specifically, by bringing up a name of Patricia which created a problem without which he would be much better off. The fact is that Subject knows nobody in the U.S. Embassy. Subject was of the opinion that we can always introduce him to a person in the Emb who can play the role of being his acquaintance. F told Subject that we were not exactly ~~carre~~ pulling rabbits out of a hat and all our actions were conducted within limits of security. What Subject was suggesting was a complete disregard for our as well his own security and the best thing he can tell LOG on their next meet was that "Patricia" did not show up as yet.

right

6. It may be noted that F's attempt to debrief Subject on what transpired at each of his meets with LOG did not bear desired results. Subject stated the facts he mentioned to F on their first meet and started repeating himself as he was going on. Therefore, F decided to get as detailed as possible description of the last meet and Subject was cooperative. Although, Subject spoke about the last meet at the begining of our meet he did not mind trying putting it in sequence as it took place. From what Subject stated about previous meets it may be worthwhile noting that Subject had a party at his apt on June 10 and he asked LOG to come to the party. LOG explained Subject that he did not like to be seen in large groups and he sent Subject 2 bottles of Votka for the party. Subject also stated that in 2 - 3 instences he promised LOG to bring him a tennis hat from the U.S. Actually, LOG would like to have 2 tennis hats, one with a visor and the other type with a rim around, size large. Subject had an opurtunity of doing it, but at the proper moment he forgot about it. LOG still brings up the fact that Subject forgot about him and

31

his hats. Subject asked F was it possible to get those hats for him. F said he did not know if it can be done.

7. Subject asked F what type of a reception will be given on the 4th of July by the Emb and was there something arranged that any American could drop in, as signing the book at the Emb. F promised to phone to Subject in case there was something like that.

nothing!

8. After covering the ground as contained in the 3 attachments F asked Subject was he willing to back his statements with a polygraph test (F used the expression 'lie detector test'). Subject reacted by asking when did we want him to take the test. F commented that he did not say that Subject would be given one, he only asked would he be willing to take one, if we asked him to do it. Subject stated that he was willing to take the test at any time. Then, he started asking questions about the test, especially, who usually gets it and how it works. With regard to who gets F stated that anyone involved in matters having bearing on the security of the U.S. and as to how it works, there is nothing to it: it registers when a person says a lie as the stomach digests automatically anything a persons eats.

we should set this up as interim measure

9. Comments by FERNALD:

a. This meet enables us to have a better insight of Subject's personality.

b. There are valid indications that Subject is not withholding important info concerning his personal history nor his activity.

c. His claim to have numerous and to an extention influential contacts appears to be acceptable.

d. He also appears to be cooperative, but has a tendency to deviate from the instruction given to him concerning his attitude toward LCIMPROVE. It is possible that this is due to his conviction that he knows LCI better than we do and that we are too dogmatic and not enough flexible. At the same time this may be due to the fact that he loves clandestine activity for the sake of pleasure he gets out of the game as such on one hand and on the other, he might fear that our proposed course of action may alienate LCI from him, in which case he would be left without a game he likes.

e. It appears quite obvious that Subject's financial conditions are not rosy, but, apparently, he has a shelter, is well dressed and does not have to worry about being hungry. Therefore there is left enough room for him to lead the life he pleases.

EHFernald

32 [illegible]

②

③

④

Torneo Mixto de Tenis en el Club France

El Tercer Torneo Mixto de Tenis 1969 "AMISTAD", que concluyó en días pasados, estuvo muy animado.

El organizador de este evento deportivo, fue Adrián Aguilar, para despedir a Valentín Longuinov, quien próximamente partirá al extranjero.

Resultaron triunfadores: Hans Kasparek y Beatriz de Bacon; Valentín Longinov y Meche Pinto; Ralph Wiegandt y Gloria de Pinto, quienes obtuvieron el primero, segundo y tercer lugares, respectivamente.

Por la noche, los esposos Pinto, José y Gloria ofrecieron una fiesta en su residencia, donde fueron entregados los trofeos. Aquí las fotos...

1: Hans Kasparek, Beatriz Bacon y Vicky Aguilar. 2: En este grupo... el doctor Luis Correa, Silvia de Correa, Bill Bacon, Ruben Rosas, Gloria de Pinto, Adrián Aguilar, Valentín Longuinov y Ruth Wiegandt. 3: Los ganadores del Torneo: Hans Kasparek, Beatriz Bacon, Valentín Longuinov, Meche Pinto.

14-00000

33

CARD

June 23, 1969

P- 13,830

cc P-11,712

Contact Report

Subject: James SABORI

Date of Meet: June 23 at Subjects Apt at Bahia de Sta Barbara 20/308

1. Arrangements for this meet were made through the office and the fact that the phone which Subject left with our office was out of order made it necessary that FERNALD call on Subject at his apt. It may be noted that Subject is in the process of moving and the only furniture in the living room of the above mentioned apt consisted of two beaten up easy chairs w/o arm rest and a sort of an end table loaded with papers and a telephone; another phone was on the floor in the corner of the room. There was so much dust on the floor that it is difficult to believe that the apt was in any use during the last 10 days.

2. Subjects NEW ADDRESS: Leibnitz 297 apt 7 phone 31-53-93
Office: Fraccionadora de Bajio, Insurgentes Sur 429 office 12 (first floor), phone 64-63-47.

Subject can be reached home until 0930 in the morning and in the office between 1100 and 1400 hrs and in the afternoon between 1700 and 2000 hrs. Subject stated that it would be rather difficult to find him in his office because of his frequent "in and out" work.

3. COMMO with us: Subject was told that once he was placed in contact with the "proper people" he should use from now on the extention 870. He will identify himself as Sr. ARVIZO (allegedly his mother's family name) and will asks for Sr. Virgil (BALDINI) FERNALDs alias.

4. FERNALD showed Subject his official looking credentials under th alias of Virgil B. BALDINI and after he read them quite carefully, [illegible] stated that now Subject knew that he was speaking to the right person an Subject commented that he was satisfied with Fs bona fide.

5. F first asked Subject few personal questions; the phone is out of order because he requested that it be transfered to his new apt and on Saturday (June 21 when he saw that the phone was not in operation he called "his friend Carlos TROUYET" to put pressure on the Telephone C but nothing could be done in view of the week-end; the elevator in the

building is often out of order, because there are too many children in the building; Subject is married and has 2 children, but he is presently separated from his wife; as the children finished the High School his wife wanted them to continue their schooling in the U.S.; Subject avoided specifying what school his children attended here and called the school "the American High School"; Subject has been in Mexico 4 years and his wife only 2 years; as much as he loves Mexico so much his wife did not get used to Mexico and did not want to remain any longer here; the fact that he did not want to leave Mexico resulted in their physical separation; according to Subject it is only a matter of days that his family left for San Jose, California, which Subject called his home town; Subject claims that his family (paternal side) comes from Milan, Italy; his great grand father came to New York, NY, and followed the gold rush to California where he apparently did well; for reasons unknown to Subject his grand father moved from California to Arizona and then to Mexico (Sinaloa) where Subject's father was born; in the same breath Subject stated that he, too, was born in Mexico and when F commented that it would be logical that he have a dual citizenship, Subject did quite bit of talking to confuse the the previous statement; during the revolution all the records were burned and he has only the certificate of baptism issued by a Mexican church and in fact it was possible that he was born on the U.S. side of the border; Subject claims he could not care less about the possibility of claiming Mexican citizenship, he is an American and it suits him well to live in this country as a TOURIST; in the Fraccionadora de Pajio he works with a partner, who entered the company as owner of 2 large chunks of land; Subject had no money but he is the person who through his connections obtained from a Mexican bank a decision that the bank would mortgage up to 90 per cent every structure he and his partner complete; now he is in the stage of obtaining American investment capital to carry out the construction of low income housing (F does not recall the location Subject mentioned); of course Subject went through financial difficulties and is still facing some of them, but nothing serious; He has a car of his own; he is moving out of this apt and will sub-let it and make few hundred pesos per month on the difference of present price and what he is paying; this type of transactions cannot get him in troubles, because Mexicans do not care about such things; he has a friend in the Gobernacion

35

who once showed him that the Gobernacion had more than a foot high file on him and Subject told him they should not bother trying to do something against him because they cannot even kick him out of the country: he has a friend to whom he is authorised to turn if he is in any kind of trouble and he asked his Gobernacion friend to dial the phone which he gave him and the phone was answered by CISNEROS of the Presidency; Subject claims that he has influencial friends in practically every ministry (Secretaria) of the Federal government; Subject also prides himself with women friends he has and they are also influencial.

6. In answer to F's quetion Subject stated that he called on Mr. [illegible] at the U.S. Embassy because he had a fairly close relation with Valentin LOGINOV (P-11,712) of the Soviet Embassy and he would not want to be judged wrongly if the WOFIRM people get to know about his friendly relation with LOGINOV.

7. F commented that he hoped that Subject realized that the title on his credentials really spells Counter Intelligence, which, for example, means that if F saw Subject robbing a bank he could not care less because that would be the matter concerning the criminal police, or if was charged for having a child out of wedlock, because that would be a matter for the judiciary authority, but when it comes to spies then that is a matter which concerns F and the service he is working for. In view of the well established fact that LOGINOV is a spy and Subject is his friend (sic) this matter is of concern for the American Counter Intelligence. Therefore, would appreciate if Subject stated clearly what was the purpose of his visit to the U.S. Embassy. Subject answered without hesitation nor embarrassment that he believed that he made himself clear even at the Embassy that he wanted to cooperate with the U.S. Service and be of help as much as it stood in his power. F commented that he would probably ask Subject does he still want to help the U.S. Counter Intelligence before we close our meet today.

8. In reply to F's questions Subject stated:

a. He met LOGINOV in February 1969 at a social party in the house of Dr. Frederico MARIN, who is as is commonly known a Communist by his ideology. He does not know were there other Soviet officials at the party. LOGINOV first

36

spx

spoke to Subject in a heavy accented broken English and was delighted when Subject suggested that they speak Spanish. LOGINOVs general line of conv was that the essential thing in the life is understanding and to be able to understand others one must get to know them; this in turn calls for having as many friends as possible. The same applies to countries and nations. Before leaving the party LOGINOV stated that he would like to become friendly with Subject and asked him would he be willing to meet with him. Subject agreed and they met next Friday at the Tecali Restaurant.

b. The conv at the Tecali was to an extent dealing with the theme of friendship and understanding with an added emphasis that if there was understanding and, consequently, friendship between the U.S. and Soviet Union we would be living in a much better world. Subject stated his agreement with LOGs views. In a further part of the conv LOGINOV was interested in knowing whether Subject had many friends in Mexico. Subject claims to have stated that he had many good friends here. (NOTE: It is quite likely that he bragged about the number of influential friends he had here). At the end LOGINOV told Subject that he would like to see him again and Subject asked him to come to his house. According to Subject, LOGINOV asked would not the fact of receiving a Sov official compromise Subject or lead him into some kind of troubles. Subject assured him that the receiving of a Sov or any foreign official could not affect him in no way. Then, LOGINOV asked Subject would they be alone and Subject answered affirmatively. (Note: At this point Subject indicated that he received LOGINOV at the apt at the Leibnitz 297). Finally, LOGINOV agreed to come to Subject's apt.

c. In the apt LOGINOV did not feel at ease for some time. Intially, he did not drink from the Votka which

37

Subject poured and he drank only after Subject took a sip out of LOG's glass (Remark: This certainly sounds exaggerated). During the evening LOG was repeatedly speaking about his need to have friends, make new new friendships and was pointing out that Subject was able to help in that respect. Subject stated to P that he offered to LOG to introduce him to any friend of his he wished. In the course of conv LOG was asking Subject various questions concerning politics, economy and trade in Mexico and Subject was answering with a degree of familiarity with topics. Log felt that Subject was well informed and he asked him how come that he was so well informed, is he perhaps a WOFIRM man. Subject laughed at the question and added that in fact he hated WOFIRM and everything associated with it. LOG gave Subject his phone (apparently the calling card) and told Subject that he should not be phoning to him and that it was better if they agreed in advance when and where they would meet next.

d. From this point Subject gave up describing chronologically the developments. He stated that there were about 10 additional meets with LOG. The place they used most extensively was the La Cava. They usually were meeting at 2000 hrs, i.e. the time when the restaurants have the minimum of guests. Subject believes that LOG started using La Cava more frequently for their meet because of the fact that the Tecali closed.

e. Subject stated that out of pure curiosity he observed LOG coming to their meeting place: LOG leaves his car 5 - 7 blocks way from the place, boards a bus, gets out a block beyond the meeting place and comes walking slowly and making occasional stops to observe whether he was followed. When they get in a restaurant together LOG gives a good look to every person in the restaurant and remains especially watchful if he sees two men together.

f. Subject stated that the leitmotif of LOG during those meets was "helpme and I will be able to help you", "get me (or provide me with) the info I need and I will provide you with info you might need". Among the most saught info by LOG was personality info on Mexican politicians and, especially, indications as to who will be the next President of Mexico. LOG is very much interested does ECHEVARRIA stand a better chance to become the next President than CARRILLO FLORES. Later it became an obsession to find out what was REAL reason for Rockefeller's trip to LA countries. LOG discounted the fact-finding as any reason, because, according to him the U.S. embassies and the CIA in those countries know everything that is to be known . Consequently, LOG is convinced that there must an important reason for ROCKY's trip. Subject added that there very many other minor questions concerning the Mexican scene which interested LOG and to a fair extent he was able to get the answers. Nevertheless, LOG started asking Subject did he have friends in the U.S. Embassy here. Subject was answering casually with an "of course". On the meet Subject had with LOG on June 9 at la Cava LOG told him that he needed an Embassy phone directory and he asked Subject can he get him one. Subject promised to try. LOG brought to Subject's attention that he needed the NEW directory because the Embassy changes the directory every six months.

g. In reply to FS question Subject stated that LOG told him that he needed all the info he was asking for to advance politically in his career on one hand and on the other to dispell misunderstanding to which the lack of info may easily lead.

h. With regard to LOG Subject described him as a likeable person with quite liberal view on international politics; he passionately hates Khrushchov and is

39

deeply concerned over the danger Red China represents to the world; he advocates that the U.S and Sov Union Shouldsign a mutual defense pact and liquidate the China until there is still time; he believes that Sov Union and the U.S. are entitled to act in defense of their own interests and "to hell with what the rest of the world says"; he admires the determination and dynamism of Americans.

9. After getting through this portion F told Subject does he still feel that he should get and give LOG the Emb Phone Directory. He stated that he was willing to do what we tell him to do, but he believed that if he came to the meet with LOG on June 25 without the directory, LOG would consider him as worthless, since was not able to obtain something which he can get in some other way. When F commented that the diredory was a tightly controled matter and to get one would practically mean to swipe one from somebody's desk, Subject stated that he was convinced that LOG would not care for a directory which he stole, because he is interested in Subject having a friend in the embassy through whom he would have access to info, and presenting the directory would be an indication that Subject had a friend there.

10. When Subject replied negatively to a theoretical possibility of obtaining a directory "legally", F told him that he must necessarily be aware of the fact that LOG would not be satisfied with a statement that he obtained the directory from a woman or man friend; LOG would insist in knowing the name and the address of the person who is his friend. Subject pretended not to be convinced about this but did not try to argue about it.

11. Then F told Subject that whether he admits/it to himself or not what he was trying to maneuvre himself into was a double agent role which is by no means an envious role. A person who is offering his cooperation to the U.S. under such conditions should be aware that every piece of info passed to the opposition, in this case LOG, must be cleared and approved by an U.S. officer which, if nothing else, is a time consuming proposition. Subject smiling said "time is money". F commented that only productively used time is money.

40

12. In a heavy and serious tone F stated that he must ask now Subject whether after the explanation he gave he is still willing to cooperate with the U.S. Service under the condition that he would follow ours instruction and guidance without any reserve. Subject answered YES and added that he was ready and willing to do whatever we tell him to do.

13. F asked Subject did LOG tell him when he was leaving Mexico. Subject stated that LOG did not mention his departure and Subject felt certain that there was no immediate departure in sight.

14. F told Subject that he would want think this matter over and discuss it with some of his colleagues and, therefore, would like to see him tomorrow. Subject stated that he would buisy in the morning and when F asked him what about the afternoon, Subject asked what about having a lunch together. F agreed and picked up SEP-Paris as the place and it was agreed that they would meet in the restaurant at 1400 hrs.

15. F feels that Subject is a sort of a Soldier of Fortune, a pleasant and long talker; among his Mexican contacts not mentioned ~~by~~ the above are D.Siqueira and Augustin BARRIOS Gomez. To impress F with closeness of his relations with BARRIOS Gomez, Subject showed F ABG's annual pass for all the movie houses in town and added that ABG gave him the pass. This fact might be interesting but it does not dispell the temptation to consider Subject to be a name dropper.

Bruce H. Fernald

P.S. Subject mentioned that LOG gave him some caviar and votka. F commented that Subject should not be surprised if F told him that we knew about it.

In speaking about the directory F told Subject that he, and LOG as well, should realize that "No son todos que estan y no estan todos que son"* in paraphrasis: All those listed do not necessarily belong (to the embassy) and all those who do belong are not listed.

* Inscription on a Jalapa Madhouse.

BHF

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

41

June 22, 1969.

Contact Report
Subject: LIBACON-1 (P-4305)
Date of Meet: June 21 at the Cafeteria JET at 1100 hrs.

1. This meet was held in lieu of the prearranged meet for June 18 which L-1 cancelled by phone. Due to the peculiarities of L-1's working habits I was not able to reach him by phone until June 20 at 1600 hrs when this meet was arranged.

Next meet: Wednesday July 2 at 1615 hrs at the previous pick up place.

2. On June 18 L-1 was without car and he felt obliged to cancel the meet. He stated that he felt happy to have made up with his wife and to be living again home. He told me about his arrangement to go to the Russian show with LIOVAL-1 and wife. He described me the developements as LIOVAL-1 reported them to me.

~~with~~
3. With regard to his 2 "contact" with LOGINOV which he hinted by phone, there was nothing to it. L-1 was at a party given by Andrea CATAÑO (P-13,545) on June 14 at her house and YURIY CHERNISH (P-13,042) was there and they exchanged few words about LOGINOV (see the attachment). L-1 stated that he was not with LOGINOV since the encounter in Cuautla and did not speak to him since the attempt to reschedule the lunch which was missed on May 8. Therefore, the story L-1 gave to LIOVAL-1 on June 13 about LOGINOV being disappointed with the fact that he had to return home, etc, has, quite likely, no connection with any recent developments. Further, it is quite obvious that L-1 did not know then about the fact that LOGINOV's departure was postponed 3 - 4 months.

4. L-1 stated that A. CATAÑO and her mother told him that they had expected BOGATYREV (P-11,381) to attend their party, but he neither came nor excused himself by phone. L-1 did not know how it came to the point that BOGATYREV was invited to the party. L-1 considered it as a significant fact that CHERNISH came to that party with his wife. L-1 interpreted this fact to the effect that CHERNISH gave up the idea of having a romance with ANDREA CATAÑO, but wanted to preserve and maintain friendship with her and her family. According to L-1 it is quite certain

P-11,712

42

ATTACHMENT
June 22, 1969

Subject: LOGINOV (P-11,712)

Source: LIBACON-1 (P-4805)

1. On June 14 Yuriy CHERNISH (P-13,042) told Source that LOGINOV's departure from Mexico was postponed to October or November (L-1 does not remember which month YC stated).

2. L-1 requested CHERNISH to tell LOGINOV that L-1 was disappointed with LOG's attitude toward him: he promised to call him and he never did.

3. CHERNISH promised to relay the message and commented that LOG should have more time for his friends now that he does not have the work which every departure and moving bring with them.

Commet: L-1 was told he should try to contact LOG himself ~~and~~ instead of using other persons as messangers. Once more he promised to do it in a matter of days.

BHF.

43

20 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: James SABORI

1. At 1300 hours on 20 June Subject, on the recommendation of Bob JOHNSON (formerly with LNERGO in Guadalajara), came to the Embassy and contacted COS. Subject apparently has known JOHNSON and had asked JOHNSON to whom he could talk in the Embassy about a delicate matter. JOHNSON had recommended COS, identifying him only as a First Secretary.

2. Subject identified himself as an insurance salesman who is in Mexico as a tourist and who apparently hopes to do some business here. He is of Italian origin and apparently has lived in Texas and California. At the present time, he is living at Bahia de Santa Barbara #20, apartment 308. Telephone number is 31-53-93.

3. Subject's story was that he has been in contact with Valentin LOGINOV (P-11,712) (he showed COS LOGINOV's card) and, as a matter of fact, has had no less than 12 contacts with him. He is scheduled to have dinner with LOGINOV tonight (20 June) at 2000 hours but he would not say where as he was afraid that COS would contact the CIA people and surveil him. He is also scheduled to have dinner with LOGINOV on 25 June. In the past, they have had dinner at such places as La Cava and the other Tecali Restaurant.

4. Subject refused to say very much about the nature of his contact with LOGINOV. His reason for contacting COS was to get a copy of the latest Embassy phone directory, which LOGINOV had asked him for. He wanted to bring it to LOGINOV so that LOGINOV would do things for him. He did not say exactly what LOGINOV could do for him except that LOGINOV had invited him to visit the Soviet Union. LOGINOV has also given him several bottles of vodka. He was not worried about what LOGINOV could get out of him because, after all, he was just an insurance salesman. In other words, he seemed to be enjoying playing games with LOGINOV and was not particularly ready to cooperate with us. COS said that he would have to contact the "proper people" to see about the phone book. Subject asked COS to do that and said that he would call COS at 1800 hours on 20 June to get the answer. He also said that if the "proper people" were interested, they could contact him at the address and phone number given above.

5. When Subject calls at 1800 hours, he will be told that COS has gotten in touch with the "proper people" and that a representative of these people will call Subject on 23 June. As for the phone book, COS will say that this is entirely out of his hands and that the man who contacts Subject on 23 June will presumably deal with that.

6. My plan at present is to have Bruce H. FERNALD (P) call Subject on 23 June and attempt to get as much of a debriefing as possible without being hostile or aggressive. I am looking at the long-range possibilities here because, unless there are unexpected developments, it is probably too late to use this against LOGINOV. However, if Subject has really been cultivated so assiduously by LOGINOV, the chances are that LOGINOV will turn him over to his successor, assuming that Subject continues to show the promise that he has apparently shown thus far. I want FERNALD to get as much as he can out of Subject without either frightening Subject away from LOGINOV or ruining the possibility of future cooperation against LOGINOV's successor. As for the phone book, I have no intention of passing it, at least without knowing a lot more about what is going on. Subject can be told and can pass on to LOGINOV that this is a tightly controlled publication and that it will not be very easy to come by (that is, unless he manages to steal one on his own). Also, if Subject (who is, at least to our current knowledge, unwitting of COS' affiliation) mentions COS' name to LOGINOV, LOGINOV's appetite may be greatly wetted to find out that his new contact has gone right to the top.

7. There are no Station traces on Subject.

8. Subject called at 1800 hours 20 June. He was given the message in paragraph 5 and agreed to await a call from "the proper people" at 0900 hours on 23 June. He also agreed to stall on the phone book.

Vincent P. RIZZUTO

File: P-11,712

14-00000

45

SB/T - Any idea who new Sov might be? If so, give Jim some photo to show to LIREALM

SECRET

17 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LIREALM-1 CONTACT WITH AEDIEHARD

1. The attached report from LIREALM-1 was received on 16 June 1969. LIREALM-1 verbally added the following comments to the information in the report:

a. Although they have not attended any social functions together since their last encounter, it is LIREALM-1's opinion that AEDIEHARD is generally avoiding direct contact with him. Only once since LIREALM-1 told AEDIEHARD that he was insulted by AEDIEHARD's request that LIREALM-1 work for him has AEDIEHARD asked LIREALM-1 to play tennis. LIREALM-1 has seen AEDIEHARD on various occasions at the French Club, but neither have made any effort to speak to the other.

b. AEDIEHARD requested permission to bring a Mexican couple to the 21 June awards dinner. This was a strange request since the party was intended to include only those who had participated in the tennis tournament at the Club. Permission was granted, however, and LIREALM-1 will attempt to determine the identity of the Mexican couple at the party.

c. Both LIREALM-1 and his wife are convinced that AEDIEHARD is avoiding introducing his Soviet friend to the friends of LIREALM-1's wife. She has placed herself in a position, on a couple of occasions, where AEDIEHARD had to be almost impolite in not introducing his friend to LIREALM-1's wife, but he has chosen not to do so.

2. Based on the instructions given LIREALM-1 after the last incident between him and AEDIEHARD, he has not gone out of his way to engage AEDIEHARD in conversation or cultivate him socially. This might explain AEDIEHARD's standoffishness and/or his apparent unwillingness to introduce his new friend. More information on this subject will be available after the 21 June dinner.

Andrew E. PELLEMENT

Distribution:
1 cy to C/SB
1 cy P-11185

P11,712

SECRET

SUBJECT: NEW SOVIET AT FRENCH CLUB
DATE OF INFO.: 28 MAY 69
SOURCE: MRS. JOHN FRANCIS

VALENTIN WAS SEEN PLAYING WITH A SOVIET. THE SOVIET IS NEW TO THE CLUB AND A BEGINNER AT TENNIS.

HE HAS A MUSTACHE, DARK HAIR, IS SOMEWHAT SHORTER AND THINNER THAN VAL.

ONE MIGHT ASSUME THAT THIS IS VAL'S REPLACEMENT OBSERVER AT THE FRENCH CLUB, IF THIS WAS VAL'S ASSIGNMENT.

(4 JUN w/o VAL)

SUBJECT HAS BEEN SEEN OCCASIONALLY AT THE CLUB SINCE THE ABOVE REPORT, BUT WITH NO REGULAR PATTERN. VAL HAS MADE NO ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE HIM.

SATURDAY, 21 JUNE. THIS WILL BE A COMBINATION FAREWELL PARTY FOR VAL AND THE AWARD DINNER FOR OUR TENNIS GROUP. VAL WILL RECEIVE A CUP FOR WINNING THIRD PLACE IN OUR MIXED DOUBLES TOURNAMENT. THE PARTY WILL BE AT THE HOME OF THE PINTOS

J.F.

47

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT : LICOWL-1 (P-

DATE OF MEETING : 11 June 1969

COPIES MADE

1. As arranged last month, I picked Subject up on the corner of Nilo and Melchor Ocampo lateral at 1100. We drove to the Tastee Freeze in Polanco for coffee and met until 1300. Next meeting will be on 9 July at 1100, same pick-up place.

2. Subject seems like a real diamond in the rough with earthy and sensible philosophy. I was surprised at his promptness and the fact that he doesn't forget meeting dates, even though they're arranged a month ahead and there's no confirmation. He told me that he frequently gives away candy and stuff to the little Sov kids who come in, feeling that they'll remember it years from now when they're fed a line of propaganda about the West and that this will make an impression and help offset all the bad things they hear.

3. I brought with me the Soviet mug flash cards to have Subject identify those who come into his store frequently and whom he refers to by his own personal crypts (since he usually doesn't know their names). Following is the key to identifications:

"The Professor": ASTAKHOFF
"Boris" : PODLESNOY
"Pablo" : KOVALEV
"Tipo Espanol" : SHEVCHENKO
"Valentin" : LOGINOV
"Administrator": KHARITONOV

"Colorado" : DAVIDOVSKIY
"Juan" : SOLOMATIN
"Vladimir" : KORMUSHKIN
"Oleg" : NECHIPORENKO
"Alex" : [illegible]

There are also other who come to the store but who have no fixed

14-00000

48

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT : LICOWL-1 (P-

DATE OF MEETING : 11 June 1969

designations.

4. Subject had the following comments and observations to make as we went through the cards:

SOLOMATIN (P-7452): departing PCS on 28 June 1969. He's suffering with an ulcer. He takes sleeping pills constantly and has been complaining about the great amount of work he has. Said his mother in the USSR (who neither smokes nor drinks) is very religious. She keeps a picture of Christ hidden at home and many of her women friends come to pray in front of it. SOLOMATIN did not come to Subject's house for dinner on 1 June as planned because he couldn't get permission. SOLOMATIN's wife will have 3 months off when they return to the USSR in order to rest up from her work here, but SOLOMATIN will have only 22 days off. He's going to take charge of some wood working shops with lathes and other machinery.

PODL[illegible] (P- 1368): amicable, speaks very little Spanish.

[illegible] (P-[illegible]): speaks very good Spanish. Very aggressive and not very pleasant.

[illegible] (P- 820): strikes Subject as effeminate.

[illegible] (P-13517): about to leave, replacement not known.

[illegible]IN (P-11 [illegible]): his wife is a doctor.

[illegible] (P-13 [illegible]): nice guy; speaks good Spanish; [illegible] diplomatic and [illegible] type.

[illegible]V (P-11 [illegible]): very rough guy. Makes obscene gestures.

[illegible] (P-7[illegible]): his wife is a member of the secret police.

New Arrivals: on 19 May, two new arrivals came into the store. One spoke very good Spanish, asked Subject to recommend a [illegible] brand

~~C/SB~~
~~SB/H~~
SB/J
SB/OC
file

THE NEWS, Mexico City,
Thursday, June 5, 1969

Diplomatic World

US Embassy Wives' Meet Set for Monday

By MARIA SOCORRO PEREZ GARCIA

The next meeting of the U.S. Embassy Wives Group will be at 10 a.m. Monday in the chancery of the embassy, Reforma 305, featuring a talk on Mexican archaeology and art. The new staff of the group is: honorary chairman, Mrs. Henry Dearborn; chairman, Mrs. George Rylance; and vice chairman, Mrs. Morris Rothenberg.

* * *

Members of the Consular Corps headed by Leander P. Vourvoulias will give a farewell party for U.S. consul Antonio Certosimo and Russian consul Valentin S. Loguinov at 8 p.m. today in the American Club, Guadalquivir 106. The Soviet Union and U.S. consuls have completed their duties here and will return to their countries soon.

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT : LIROCKET-1

DATE OF MEETING: 29 May 1969 at Paris en Mexico
Next meeting is 26 June same place at 1300 hours

1. Subject had little to report. His notes on two sessions with KAZANTSEV are attached. KAZANTSEV said that he had no news on his departure and now thinks he will probably have to stay in Mexico until a new ambassador is appointed.

2. Subject called NIKITIN once and was not able to get ahold of him. He has not tried again but I asked him to keep at this. I showed Subject photos of most of the Soviet officials. He recognized a good many of them by fact if not by name and made the following comments on some of them:

a. PRIKHODKO (P-2270) - Speaks English and was going to take lessons from Subject but never got around to it.

b. TUCHNIN (P-3396) - Sees him occasionally; not very friendly.

c. GORDEYEV (P-13,691) (Subject knew his name) - Speaks English quite well; wanted to take lessons from Subject but could not get Embassy to pay for the lessons.

d. CHMYKHOV (P-6235) - Has seen him fairly frequently but does not know him. Appears unfriendly.

e. BOLSHAKOV (P-13,430) - Subject says he is the new guard.

f. BOGATYREV (P-11,381) - Every time Subject sees him he is carrying a camera. For a long time, Subject thought he was a tourist.

g. KARCHIN (P-11,829) - One of the guards at the gate and due to return to Moscow soon.

h. SOLOMATIN (P-7452) - Another guard at the gate.

i. KORMUSHKIN (P-11,707) - Subject sees him often. He is a driver.

j. LOGINOV (P-11,712) - He is a tennis player. He wanted Subject to teach his children English. LOGINOV's son is presently studying with the Embassy's female English teacher. LIROCKET-1 says he is a nice guy.

14-00000

51

SB/A - [illegible]
SB/J - pls watch for call to LOGINOV
SB/sec - cc for LOG, WENDL etc.

May 22, 1969.

Contact Report
Subject: LIBACON-1 (P-4805)
Date of Meet: May 21 at the Paris-Mexico Restaurant

(A 37-[illegible])

1. This meet was held in lieu of the one scheduled for May 14 which L-1 postponed by phone. L-1 was at the pick up place 10 minutes before the scheduled time but I was there still earlier and I observed nothing suspicious in terms of stakeouts or surveillance. The meet lasted 75 min. NEXT MEET: Wednesday May 28 at the same pick up place.

2. As we met L-1 stated that he cancelled the last week meet because he was seized by one of his nervous crisis of hysteria followed by depression (sic). He immediately added that he prepared for me nothing because in his condition he was not able to do any work.

3. In the restaurant he kept on describing what effect the nervous crisis has on him and he added that he still felt depressed. During his description he did not indulge in dramatizing the matter.

4. I asked him what happened to the lunch he was supposed to have with LOGINOV and he repeated what he told me by phone on May 8 and added that LOGINOV was to call him but did not do it. He added that if LOGINOV had called during the past 8 days the phone would be answered only if his wife was home. I told him that this fact was a reason for him to ring up LOGINOV, because, as we discussed and agreed on the last meet, it would serve no good purpose to L-1 if LOGINOV would characterize him as a not desirable person from the Sov point of view. He commented that he believed LOGINOV was a friend of his to the extent that he would not do such a thing to him. I countered by stating that he insisted in considering LOGINOV to be his friend, but what ever LOGINOV asked from him he turned him down with a NO; to preserve good will of a person it is necessary to meet some of his requests and the best is to do it when it does no harm to anybody and at the same time does not get L-1 involved in any of LOGINOVs schemes. He agreed with my reasoning, as he did at the last meet, but it is to be seen what will he do about it.

5. To change the subject I asked L-1 abt Karel WENDL (P-) return. He said

52

he knew nothing about VENDEL, except, that his wife gave a birth to a child during his absence and he added that if VENDEL had returned he would had heard about it.

6. Speaking about Karel he recalled the fact that Carola HIRSH, an Ecuadorian girl of 22 approx. returned to Mexico and she will be taking an intesive course of Russian from L-1. He stated that he spoke to KARTASUK about this girl: she was here and worked with the Olympic committee as an interpreter; after the Olympics she went to Ecuador and now she returned here; she came with her mother who found her an apartment in Rio Elba where they had a house worming up party on Friday May 9; her father is a well to do phisician in Quito, Ecuador; she has no permit to work in Mexico which means that her father will pay the expenses of her stay here; in view of his nervous crisis he did not keep in touch with her, but he believes that her mother had returned to Quito by now: LOGINOV knows her from some of the parties L-1 and his friends were giving during the Olympics or briefly after them.

7. He forgot to tell me that he was with Andrea CATANO (P-13,546) after she returned from her trip to the US and Canada and she told him that she definitely broke with CHERNISH (P-13,042) by telling him that she had a boy friend about whom she is serious and who is a jealous type; he (C) is wellcome to come to her (parents) home when he wishes, but she is in no position to meet with him out.

8. I asked L-1 was it possible that LOGINOV, who according to him was driving hard to ~~obtain~~ achieve some success before he leaves, might have attempted to recruit Juan Luis ALVARES, director of the language school on Tiber, during the past 2 months. L-1 stated that he doubted that JLA would even want to see LOGINOV because LOG in many instances ignored JLA's requests through L-1 to pass by the school. L-1 went on to say that if by incident LOG got hold of JLA and made an attempt to enlist his services, L-1 was positive that JLA would had turned him down. (NOTE: This leaves unsolved what was L-1 speaking about when he spoke to LIOVAL-1 about the good time LOGINOV and JLA had together at unknown date).

9. I tried to explain to L-1 that he should do some writing for us along the lines of our previous agreement. He promised.

53

10. As much as L-1 is a compulsory talker, during this meet he was rather on the quiet side, i.e., he spoke when he was asked something. He had only 2 drinks and he tokk some food with them. He was interested in leaving on time which was pleasant news to me.

11. On the way to his car I asked L-1 what he thought about the death of 16 Sov Generals in 15 weeks. He commented to the effect that a publisized purge of big wheels is intended to silence to opposition and this may be necessary in view of the fact that a number of soldiers will start returning from Czechoslovakia and their stories would be the opposite what the government used as excuse for invading Czecho.

EHFernald

54

SB/A
SB/J file
SB/Sec - file LIOVAL
cc LIBACON
cc LOGINOV

May 15, 1969.

Turnover Report
Subject: LIOVAL-1
Date of Meet: May 13

1. On May 13 at 1930 hrs COIGNE met with FERNALD and briefed him on LIOVAL-1's past and present operational activity as well as gave an outline for future handling of LIOVAL-1. At 2030 hrs C and F met with LIOVAL-1 at HOYO 19 restaurant where in the course of a farewell dinner the turnover was effected.

Next F - L-1 meet: May 21 at 1330 hrs at the same restaurant.

2. Commo:

a. During the next two month F and L-1 will hold personal meets twice a month.

b. L-1 can be reached during woeking days on phone 23-99-34 from 0800-1410 hrs at his school; on phone 75-10-03 at home except Wednesdays when he wêll be home from 1600-1700 hrs.

SB/Sec
cc pls

c. L-1 can use the extention 870 to leave a message for F (whom he knows under the alias of Victor Brandon). L-1 will usually state~~d~~ that he wants to see F on given day and time, which means that he will be waiting for F at a restaurant which will be sellected as their meet site on their next meet.

3. Security:

a. Standard security practices will be applied to F - L-1 personal meets and other operational activity.

b. On their next meet a new meet sight will be selected.

c. For internal use only: C instructed F that with regard to what can be said to L-1 there was no use of getting into the security for the sake of security: if it would serve any useful purpose of telling L-1 that

55

we recruited LIBACON-1, then he should be told about it.

4. Admin & Finance:

a. L-1 considers it probable that he owes LIBACON-1 payment for several lessons. He will ascertain the amount and F will pay it on the next meet.

b. C infoed L-1 about the status of the order of a Folboat and was tild that when it come F will deliver it to him.

c. With regard to ops expenses former agreement remains in power.

5. Operational:

a. L-1 reported on LIBACON-Is statements to him about LOGINOV on May 2 (reported seperately). This provided a taylor made opennening for operational directives.

b. L-1 will continues his contact with LIBACON-1 through language classes, because LIBACON-1 is still a person of interest to us.

c. We received from other sources info that LOGINOV would leave PCS in July. In view of the fact that Sov IS officers are judged home by the mecanical computation of their activity abroad, our experience shows that a good number of them try to embelish their record in the last 2-3 months before their departure by establishing contacts and making recruitment attempts with disregard for security rules and sound operation-practices. We have sufficient indications that LOGINOV falls in this category of Sov IS officers without trying to determine whether LIBACON-1s statements to L-1 may be an additional indication to that effect. As far as we know LOGINOV it would be in line with his recent behavior if he approached L-1.

d. If L-1 is approached by LOGINOV or another Sov official he will act friendly and speak about his frienship with Pavel YATSKOV. L-1 will make a remark to the effect that PY failed to keep his promise and send him his Moscow address.

e. If LOGINOV, or whoever it may be, disclaims knowledge about L-1 - YATSKOV friendly relation, L-1 will speak in terms that this fact ought to be a common knowledge in the Sov Embassy.

f. If the person making the approach accuses L-1 for trying to buy a Sov official (PY), L-1 pretend that the approacher is grossly mistaken and will open a barrage of questions to determine what was known here about the PY case. If the correct sum involved in that case is mentioned, or place the pitch was made or other detail(s) indicating that the approacher is cognisant of this specific case, L-1 will politely ask what the approacher wanted from him and will not hesitate to tell him that the same offer applies to the approacher.

g. If LOGINOV makes the approach under the pretext of wishing to maintain friendly relation with L-1 and admits knowing PY and having heard about PYs friendship with L-1 he will be treated friendly and L-1 will invite him to a dinner and let him talk. In such a case it would be obvious that LOGINOV would want to pass L-1 to somebody else.

h. When, whoever it be, would attempt to recruit L-1 he will stick to his guns of being an American patriot and will turn him down by stating that he was able to make a better offer to the recruiter.

BHFernald

57

ATTACHMENT to TURNOVER Report
May 15, 1969.

Subject: Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz (P-4805)
Valentin LOGINOV (P-11,712)✓

Source: LIOVAL-1 (P-)

1. ON May 2 Rafael gave a language lesson to LIOVAL-1 and on that occasion he stated that LOGINOV had taken Juan Luis, Director of the language school on Tiber, for a day of having fun. It was not clear whether Juan Luis and LOGINOV had a night on the town or they went out of town for a whole day "to have some fun".

2. Rafael told L-1 that he did not understand such an attitude of LOGINOV, because he considered LOGINOV to be a good friend of his; he was surprized that LOGINOV did not invite him together with Juan Luis, in fact, he could not explain to himself how something like that could happen.

3. Rafael went speaking about LOGINOV for some time about how good he is basically as a man; how pleasant companion he is and what a good friend he is.

4. L-1 pointed out that there was nothing factual nor significant in what he said about LOGINOV, but L-1 was puzzled by the fact that "out of the blue sky" Rafael was speaking about LOGINOV and kept on speaking and speaking.

5. L-1 believed that Rafael's pride was hurt ~~that~~ by the fact that LOGINOV ignored him, especially, when there was a chance of having some fun. Therefore, L-1 told Rafael that it was possible that LOGINOV wanted to invite him too, but was not able to reach him by phone, which would not be unusual in view of the fact that Rafael is practically never home.

6. On this same occasion Rafael asked LIOVAL-1 if he would be kind to pay him the lessons which he owed him. In view of the irregularity of Rafael's appearances to give lessons L-1 was not certain whether he owed anything or not. Rafael corroborated his request by stating that

his wife writes down every payment Rafael receives and the book shows that no payment was received since Jan or Feb 27 (RHP does not remember which month was mentioned). L-1 stated that if it so, then, Rafael must be right. Because he was short of cash he paid him MN 150.- and stated that he would pay the remainder the next time, i.e. the next lesson, which was scheduled for Wed May 7 at 1700 hrs. (NOTE: Rafael had a meet with RHP on the same day at 1620 hrs, and it was him to pick up this day and time. Rafael came to this meet on time).

7. The fact that Rafael did not show up for the lesson was no surprise to L-1. Nevertheless, about 1830 Rafael's wife phoned to L-1 and asked to speak to her husband. When L-1 stated that he was not there she commented that he was supposed to be there at 1800 hrs. About an hour later she called again and L-1 had to state that he did not come at all. Then, she requested L-1 to give to Rafael the sweater of her daughter which was accidently left at L-1's place. Of course nothing happened, but since that moment L-1 did not hear from Rafael nor his wife. L-1 pointed out that this was unusual, because if Rafael skipps a lesson he calls the next day and never later than the third day to apologize. Further, the sweater which Rafael was to pick up from L-1, according to the wife's statement, was a part of their daughters kindergarden uniform. L-1 concluded that he was inclined to believe that Rafael got angry with him or because he questioned the correctness of the claim for payment or because he placed him on a spot by telling his wife that he did not show up at L-1's place.

8. L-1 was told not to take the matter so seriously since there was still a chance that Rafael and his wife were on a war path and they had no time for anything else. L-1 was requested to try to contact Rafael or his wife as soon as possible. L-1 considered that May 15 (Teachers Day) would be the best time to do it and there was no objection on his choise of date since it offered a better chance of finding Rafael home.

9. L-1 was also requested to bring to Rafael's attention that the irregularity of lessons inconvenients him quite bit on one hand and on the other Rafael loses the money........

10. Comment by RHP: The fact that L-1 pointed out that Rafael's talking about LOGINOV does not mean that anything happened recently, still calls

59

SECRET

12 May 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris
Legal Attache

FROM : Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT : CHEN (fnu)
CTC #7115
WANG (fnu)
CTC #3769
(105-6578)

1. Reference is made to your memoranda dated 18 January 1968 and 25 April 1969. Reference is also made to our memorandum dated 29 January 1968, #12,525.

2. In order to assist you in the investigation being carried our by your Headquarters, attached herewith for your retention are two copies each of those handwriting specimens available on persons assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in December 1967. There are no fingerprint specimens available. Listed below are the names of those Soviets whose handwriting specimens are being forwarded herewith.

a. Nikolay Ivanovich KUZNETSOV, Employee (MK Representative), Soviet Commercial Office. Possibly KGB.

b. Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, was Second Secretary, Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy. Known KGB. Departed PCS December 1968.

c. Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, Third Secretary, Consul, Soviet Embassy. Known KGB.

d. Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV, was Employee (Chauffeur), Soviet Embassy. Known KGB. Departed PCS September 1968.

e. Boris Nikolayevich VOSKOBOYNIKOV, Second Secretary, Cultural Attache, Soviet Embassy. Probably KGB.

f. Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV, was Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy. Known KGB. Departed PCS 6 December 1967.

3. There is no other information available locally on Subject case.

Attachment: h/w

SECRET #13,776

11,713

60

SECRET

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

Grace H. FARMILANT:mes

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att h/w
1 - 50-8-8 w/o att
1 - P-1512 w/att already in file
1 - P-992 w/att already in file
1 - P-11,712 w/att already in file
1 - P-6518 w/att already in file
1 - P-2280 w/att already in file
1 - 885 w/att already in file
1 - 50-2-4/A w/o att
1 - Memo chrono w/o att
2 - Headquarters pouch (return to FARMILANT)

SECRET

61

SB/B -
SB/Sec - cc for LIOVAL, WENDEL, LOCIMIV w/attch as necessary

May 8, 1969.

LIBACON-1
Briefs on Meet Held May 7 from 1630 to 2035 hrs.

When came I asked till what hour he can be with me. He said 1830. At 1815 I paid the bill, but he insisted that we stay a little longer and for the the rest he would pay the bill: he had 2 additional drinks while I had my third coffee and a drink.

As we got together he told me that he was on May 3 with his wife at Cuautla and as he was enetring the pool area LOGINOV was leaving. LOG cornered him for a 15 minutes talk which consisted of pressurising LIBACON into making some arrangements that LOG would be able to meet LIOVAL-1. When LIBACON turned him down LOG insisted that they have a lunch on Thur. May 8 at the restaurant El Perro Andaluso (or similar) at the Copenhagen about 1230 hrs . LIBACON accepted.

LIBACON brought me a bio sketch on LOGINOV, which was an interesting paper. We discussed the paper which enabled me to obtain explanations and facts on which LIBACON based his general statements.

LIBACON readily gave me info on Prof. M. LUBAN. There was not much, but sufficient to ascertain that he did not attempt to withhold info from us. (This was test – no further details needed)

He also gave me some info on KAREL WENDEL who is presently conducting a tour of Mexicans through Europe and was in Prague with the group a day before Dubcek was kicked out...

Re teachers of Spanish at the Sov Emb other than his mother LIBACON did not know anything but promised to ask his mother on Sat when she will be at his home.

It took me some time to explain to LIBACON what attitude to take toward LOG during the lunch.

Detailed report will be prepared. Now handing in notes on my instruction to LIBACON concerning how to handle the lunch with LOG. Also handed in is the Bio sketch on LOG.

cualquier lugar donde viva, [illegible]

p-11,412

14-00000

62

ATTACHMENT
May 8, 1969

Valentin LOGINOV (P-11,712)

Source: LIBACON-1 (P-4805)

1. On May 3 Source went with his family to Cuautla to spend a day out of town. There, as he arrived he bumped into LOGINOV who was leaving. They talked 15 minutes.

2. LOGINOV asked Source was he still giving language lessons to that American(LIOVAL-1). As Source answered afirmatively LOG told Source that he would like to meet LIOVAL-1. SOURCE stated that LIOVAL was not only a student who pays his lessons but was also a good friend of Source. Then LOGINOV became quite blunt and agressive : he outright demanded that LIBACON introduce him to LIOVAL. LIBACON tried to reason out with LOGINOV that by meeting LIOVAL he would achieve nothing because LIOVAL was a good family man, a person conscious of his responsibility for 4 children, liberal in his way of thinking but definitely a patriot and a person who is attached to his way of life and could not care less about Socialism. LOGINOV then insisted that he and LIBACON have a lunch together "next" week to talk this matter over. LIBACON agreed to lunch with him on May 8, i.e., a day after he meets with me.

3. LIBACON told me that he would stick to his guns and refuse LOGINOVs request to introduce him to LIOVAL. One of special reasons for doing so, in addition to his desire of not getting involved with that gang (KGB), was that he considered LIOVAL to be a friend of his and would not want to do anything which could make LIOVAL suspect that LIBACON was a KGB collaborator.

4. Other, than the fact that LIOVAL exists I know nothing about him, but the sole fact that he is an agent of our forced me to assume that he was picked up for a good reason and that we must have an objective for holding him. Therefore, I felt that it would not be wise to let LIBACON shut the door to a possibility ([illegible] as much remote as it may be) that we counted on the possibility that LIOVAL be approached orcontacted by a Sov official. Further, I kept in mind that we would not want LIBACON to slip into a double agent role. Therefore, I instructed LIBACON:

63

a. He wishes to be on friendly terms with LOGINOV, but certainly it is not a friendly attitude af LOGINOV asks him something impossible. (Try to get LOG to do explanaing).

d. Repeat description of LIOVAL's personality as he did in Cuautla and ask what can LOGINOV possibly achieve by meeting LIOVAL. It is anticipated that LOGINOV may be brief and say that this would be his problem and that all ~~EILIED~~ LIBACON had to do is to arrange for an introduction.

c. LIBACON will insistx that he does not want to get involved "in that kind of business", especially, because it was clear to him that even if LOGINOV achieves nothing, he lost nothing, but LIBACON is a sure loser because he would lose a friend and possibly get tagged as a Sov spy.

d. If LOGINOV does not break off his insisting at this point, LIBACON will state that he would agree on a plan, if LOGINOV had one, by which LIOVAL would be in LIBACON's company, but no introduction of LOGINOV as a friend of LIBACON would be made. We played it back and forth discussing various possibilities, but important was that LOGINOV should come up with a plan and that LIOVAL be given a possibility of saying to LIBACON that he did not want to come.

e. After the lunch LIBACON will go to his institute and I would phone him there to find out at which point the conv with LOGINOV ENDED.

14-00000

69

ATTACHMENT
May 8, 1969.

(P-11,712)
Subject: Postponment of Valentin LOGINOV - LIBACON-1 Lunch.

Source: LIBACON-1 (P-4805)

1. In accordance with the prearrangements I phoned to LIBACON-1 to the language institute at 1455 hrs to hear how did the scheduled lunch go.

2. LIBACON-1 stated that a ~~pu~~ student of his postponed his lesson for a half of an hour and that he phoned to LOGINOV to come to the restaurant they were to lunch about 45 minutes later than they had agreed to meet there. LOGINOV told LIBACON that in that case he prefered to postpone the lunch to the beginning of the next week and that LOGINOV would phone to LIBACON-1 to set the date and time.

3. According to LIBACON-1, LOGINOV sounded friendly on the phone.

RHP

65

Valentin LOGINOV

Edad aproximada de 43-45 años, aunque aparenta menos. Fisicamente de complexión atlética, alto. Juega muy bién al tenis. Recientemente quedó en segundo lugar en el campeonato del D.F. que tuvo lugar en el Club Francia, donde practica este deporte. Cuida muchisimo su condición fisica y más que nada su apariencia. En este sentido es muy vanidoso. Muy pocos amigos saben que tiene una hija de 16-17 años. Cuando le preguntan si tiene hijos hable solo de su hijo de 11 años de edad. Le da pena presentar a su mujer, que es muy amable y buena, porque se ve de más edad que él. No fuma, toma muy poco, aunque cuando la ocasión requiere de tomar mucho ~~agüenta~~ aguanta y siempre se le ve sereno. Es muy amable en el trato. Nunca trata de imponer sus ideas, pero siempre pendiente de convencer por las buenas a sus contrincantes. Cuando ve que no puede hacer lo último, rompe diplomaticamente los relaciones amistosas con el sujeto. En sus ideas es de la escuela estalinista: solo cuenta lo Unión Soviética y la última linea a seguir del Partido. Eso quiere decir que no tiene ideas propias. Sigue fidelisimamente la "linea" porque sabe muy bién que es la única forma rápida y eficaz de escalar en su carrera. Le gusta muchisimo la vida buena, tipo occidental, aunque antes se dejaria cortar un brazo que confesárselo asi mismo. Es muy ambicioso y se ve que tiene problemas con sus compañeros de trabajo. Habla despectivamente de ellos. No le gusta nada la idea de tener que permanecer en Moscú los dos años que vienen. ~~Un~~ Me dijo que haria lo posible que al transcurrir esos años lo mandaran de preferencia otra vez a México. Su ilusión más grande es trabajar en España. Adora a los españoles. La forma de ser de los mejicanos no le gusta. Por eso si quiere regresar, quiere decir que prefiero cualquier lugar donde vivir, menos Rusia. Creo que precisamente

66

porque ya tiene que partir en julio, es por lo que ultimamente está cometiendo errores. Quiere hacer méritos a como de lugar, presionando a la gente de manera que antes jamás hacía. El dia 3 de mayo lo vi en Cuautla Cuaulatla, y sabiendo que yo no quiero trabajar para él, me insistió, llegando al extremo ~~colecio~~ de preguntar si podíamos abordar a mi alumno John, sin siquiera preguntar por la personalidad y forma de pensar de John! En los 15 minutos que estuvimos juntos no habló más que de eso. Cuando yo le dije que ya le había dicho antes que no me gustaba esa clase de trabajo, me contestó que él creía que lo que me pasaba es que tenía miedo. La forma más inocente de hacerme picar! A continuación, me invitó a comer el día 8 para seguir hablando de lo mismo! En el fondo creo que todo eso revela cierta inocencia y muchas ganas de progresar, para llevar una vida muy diferente a lo que llevan los ciudadanos soviéticos. Creo que quiere dejar una grand impresión a sus jefes para no quedar trabajando indefinidamente en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Moscú. No sé hasta que punto sus ambiciones puedan guiarlo. a progresar incluso por medio de atropellar victimas. Como persona y en condiciones normales me parece bueno, generoso y fiel amigo. Sin embargo la verdad es que nunca lo llegué a conocer muy bien, en parte posiblemente porque casi desde el principio sentía instintivamente que quería algo de mí, muy aparte de nuestra amistad y en parte porque con todo y la confianza que llego a tener conmigo jamás se descubrió por completo, ni mucho menos. Es extreniadamente cauteloso.

Resumiendo: Mi impresión es que es una buena persona, de buenos sentimientos, pero que una vez metido en "ese trabajo," por razones que desconocemos, hace todo lo posible por destacas.

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT : BESABER (P-8777)

DATE OF MEETING : 10 April 1969

1. In response to BESABER's phone call, I met him at his hotel room in the Aristos from 1430 until 1545. Next meeting will be on Tuesday evening, 15 April at home.

2. Subject had nothing new to report on contacts with BEDOXers, but said that he is now raring to go on any requirements I might levy. He said that all of his financial problems are now solved (as I surmised they would). Essentially, he has sold 50% of his business (INZA) to a syndicate-group that is paying off Subject's debts. They will construct a big new factory complex in Cuernavaca to bring all of Subject's manufacturing enterprises under one roof and double capacity. They're also going to open up offices and a showroom on Insurgentes Sur. Subject figures he will probably stay active for a couple of years more and then sell his remaining 50% for about a half million dollars.

3. I told Subject again that I am now anxious for him to establish a social relationship with SPYRA (P-6601) and that I am no longer interested in his developing MAJCHCHRZAK per se. I suggested that he might use MAJ simply as an entree to meeting SPYRA, ostensibly to work out a cultural program of Subject's grandfather's music as mentioned previously. Subject said that he would get on it right away and would try to call the Ambassador on Tuesday when Subject is back in town.

cc: P-6601 cc: P-6235 cc: P-11,712 File: P8777

68

4. I also asked Subject to get back in touch with Boris CHMYKOV (P-6235) and Valentin LOGINOV (P-11,712) to warm up the relationship. I pointed out that we should be prepared to have Subject in a position to give them gifts in the event Headquarters approves the plan to bug some of Subject's Trojan horses. Unless therd is some reasonably good contact established in advance, his presenting gifts will appear too contrived. Subject agreed and said that he would give them a phone call soon to try to get together for drinks. Judging from past history, CHMYKOV will be ready to see Subject for a night on the town in August.

5. I paid Subject $3000 (MN) constituting half of his retainer for three months (Jan., Feb. and March) and agreed to have the balance of $3000 for him on Tuesday. He gave me a pile of hotel bills and other expenses which will be charged against the $3000 revolving fund he has outstanding. He asked me if I could get him a case of champagne, a couple of bottles of cognac, a bottle of gin. I told him that I'd see if these are available and that, if they are, I would charge them against either his salary or fund rather than as outright gifts as in the past.

2

Timothy M. ARCHBOLD

SUBJECT: Valentin Loguinov
DATE OF INFORMATION: 30 March 1969. 1155-1157 hours.
PLACE ACQUIRED: Tennis courts of the French Club
REPORT BY: John Francis

Val apparently waiting for me to make first move. I saw that Val was not playing, but looking for a partner while talking to Meche Pinto and an other girl. He was two courts away from me. I finished playing with my opponent. I couldn't see walking over to Val and invite him to play. He knew I was finished. He also owed me an opology for the cancelled luncheon date.

I shouted loudly to a ball-boy to find my favorite trainer. Val dashed over to say he would like to play.

Excuse for missed lunch. I "What happened to our luncheon date", I asked with no smile. Val said that Dimi had been bitten badly by a dog. I told Val that I had already heard that story and that Dimi had been bitten nearly a week before our date. Once again I did not smile and gave him little opporltunity for a gradious acceptance of a poor excuse. It was clear that I was annoyed. I could see from Val's expression that he was embarrassed and off-balance. He has a peculiar facial expression when he has been put at a disadvantage.

Val admitted that the bite had been much earlier, but he explained that the wound had become inflamed and he had to take Dimi to a doctor. I saw Dimi and he had one of the smaller Bandaids on his arm. He seemed to be having no discomfort.

I accepted Val's excuse tacitly.

We played. Unfortunately Val won 6-3, 6-1. I remind you that I switched to my left arm some time ago and am still at a disadvantage. I still apologize for letting the barbarian win. I had to leave at 1145. Immediately threeother men invited Val to make a fourth for doubles. I had hoped to talk to him when we finished.

Conversation. I finally had to interupt Val while the men were still warming up and take him to a corner of the court.

I told Val that I had hoped to tell him something at the lunch and on several other occasions but was always interupted. Now I wanted to tell him what I had in mind. I wanted him to understand that his political jokes had embarrassed me. That I did not want to create a scene and had never commented on them. But I would not tolerate them in the future.

70

I said that his offer to give me money to work for his government had embarrassed me in front of our mutual friends. Further, my polite refusal to make an issue of his approach could have been interpreted as tacit accepkance of his offer to pay me for treaon against my country.

Val interrupted and said it was all a joke and that he thought I appreciated that it was nothing more than a joke.

I said I knew it was a joke, but could not speak for our audience. My position as a businessman here could be jeopardized if someone thought we were serious.

I told Val that in any case, joking or not, I do not discuss politics or religion with my friends, particularly here in Mexico.

He acted very surprised and amused.

I pointed out that I consider myself a guest in a very hospitalbe but foreign country. "These people are my hosts. You are a diplomat. You can, you must discuss politics. It is your job. I cannot. I actually am not interested in politics. I am not well versedx in politics. But if you must talk politics with me, let us go some where in private, without an audience. If you want to discuss business, fine! I know that subject and I like it, and I am even better with an audience, particularly Mexican!

Val had his transparently disturbed, distressed and disadvantaged look. He promised never to discuss politics with me again. He apologized. He said he understood what I meant.

F--- him!

71

SUBJECT: Gloria Pinto
DATE OF INFORMATION: 26 March 1969. 1300-1355 hours.
PLACE ACQUIRED: Office of John Francis
REPORT BY: John Francis

Telephone call to myoffice. Gloria called to say she was having some trouble finding clients for my business. She asked when she could see me. I suggested immediately and she arrived about one hour later.

Personal chat prior to business. Gloria followed good Mexican custom in chatting lightly before getting to the matter about which the meeting was called.

Meche and San Luis Potosi. I asked Gloria if she were going to San Duis Potosi this year for the Holy Week tennis tournaments. She said that she had planned to do so but was unable to find some one to go with her at the last moment. Pepe did not want to go, and would not let her go by herself unless accompanied by several other women or by Meche. Meche refused to go saying she would have no fun if with her mother and planned to go to Corpus Christi by herself.

Pepe to Europe again. Gloria volunteered that she was annoyed with Pepe. She deplores his Latin attitude about the double standard. She has been prohibitted to take several brief trips to various cities in Mexico to see friends and family. She is not welcome to accompany Pepe on his trips. Yet he will soon take another month off to travel either to Europe or to South America. Gloria said that she has been waiting all these years for her children to grow up so that she could go with Pepe on his trips. Now that they are grown up, she finds that she still is expectedc to stay home.

Gloria watched carefully. Gloria must account for her time very carefully to Pepe during the day. And under no circumstances can she stay out after dark. Pepe apparently disapproves of Gloria working for me. He does not like the idea that she will be visiting businessmen throughout the city both in their offices and homes. He has expressed his disapproval, but Gloria has chosen to ignore it.

Wants to send Meche to U.S. Gloria wants to fight the attitude of superiority over women that Latin men have, but on behalf of her daughter, not herself. Gloria feels that she will never be able to enjoy anything close to equal treatment and consideration with Pepe. But she feels that her daughter should escape from this Latin degradation. Two or three years working in New York or San Francisco is Gloria's dream for Meche.

cc made for P-11712 and P-13223

No luck with business. Gloria seems very enthusiastic about working for me. Not so much to help me, but to give herself an excuse to get out and do something. Further, she wants to determine whether she can actually do something other than raise children. She was married when very young and has never worked. She hopes eventually to start some business of her own. She probably wants to have a shopw of some kind. Working for me is a trial for herself. She hopes to prove to herself that she can succeed in business and meeting people.

The approach she has been taking with my business has been unsaccessful so far. I have given her the one which is most time-consuming and one which I would not have been able to do by my self. There are other apporaches, but I have not outlined these to her as yet.

We discussed her approach and some modifications of it. We agreed to review her sales approach after the Holy Week and decide whether to proceed along different lines.

LOGINOV. P-11712

Discussion of Val. Having completed our business I raised the matter of Val. I reminded her that I had explained to her some time ago that I was annoyed with Val's treatment of me in public, namely his flagrant attempts to recruit me in the presence of mutual friends. I told her that I still hadn't had a chance to talk to Val in private. I repeated that all I wanted to do was make it clear to him that I held him in great esteem as a person, valued his friendship, was not interested in assisting his government, and wanted him to stop jeopardizing our fitendship with his offensive approaches, whether subtle and implied or direct and coarse.

I told Gloria that I had planned to have lunch with Val today. I enjoy Val's company; rarely have a chance to chat quitely; don't like to eat lunch by myself; and looked forward to explaining to Val my position before he completely destroyed any chance for us to continue as friends.

Not aware of accident to Dmitri. I told Gloria that Val had excused himself from our lunch date due to an accident to his son. She did not know of any accident other than the dog bite the previous week.

Gloria said that his declining my invitation might have been an afterthought. That he did not want to hurt my by being seen with me in a public place.

73

Avoids "hurting" his friends. Gloria then told me that Val never accepted an invitation to have coffee with her or Pepe or to dine out. He explained to her that it could hurt her to be seen with him. She gave an example of when she was invited to the ballet with Val and a group of friends.

After the ballet, Pepe and Gloria invited Val to join them for dinner. Val declined. Pepe and Gloria went to the Hoyo 19. Shortly after they arrived, Val and a large number of embassy officers also arrived. Val steered them away from Pepe and Gloria. Shortly afterwards a man arrived, sat at a remote table and took notes while watching the Soviets.

Val works mornings only. Gloria mentioned that Val is in the embassy only in the morning. This was in response to my statement that I had tried to call the embassy and talk to Val to find out what had happened to Dmitri, but since he was out, I would call in the afternoon. She added that he of course works in the afternoon, but outside the embassy. I said "trying to buy gringos". She said "trying to convince Mexicans".

COMMENTS

It seems to me highly unlikely that Val is really concerned about the welfare of his friends seen with him. It seems quite clear that he considers Gloria and Pepe, and perhaps me, as potential assets. He does not want to be seen with us because we would lose our value to him. He told Gloria that they should confine their contacts to the French Club. This seems to confirm the suspicion that he believes that this is a secure place to meet people.

It is possible that he checked with his colleagues and they were of the opinion that my choice of the Llave de Oro for lunch was too public, exposed us to too many Americans.

I feel that Gloria has served a very useful purpose in this matter. If she is working for Val, which I doubt, she is in a position to see that my business is indeed legitimate, time-consuming, and with considerable financial potential. Further, she is in a position to relay to Val my unwillingness to cooperate with him and his governemtn and my threat to take the matter to the embassy if his harrassment continues.

74

26 March 1969

page 2 P-[illegible]
page 3 P-13546
page 4 P-11[illegible]
P-4413

CONTACT REPORT

FROM : Samuel J. KARTASUK

SUBJECT : Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz

1. A meeting was held from 1300 to 1445, 25 March 1969 in the Chalupas Resturant located on Reforma, one block East of Prado Norte Next meeting is scheduled for 1630, 26 March 1969 at VIPS Restaurant on the Periferico, North of Ejercito Nacional.

2 I parked my car three blocks from the meeting site and arrived in the area at 1255. Subject was already seated at a table waiting. We had lunch and remained there talking until 1445. He mentioned how much he appreciated the two books (in Russian) which I loaned him and said that he was nearly through with the last one. He said he would turn them over to VICTOR. (I had already informed him that he would be meeting a man named VICTOR during my absence). He asked if we could obtain for him the three other books written by the same author who wrote "Cancer Ward". He said "Cancer Ward" was the second book written by the author. The 1st book was "First Circle", the 2nd was Cancer Ward, the 3rd was "_____ Ivans", and the last was "Easter _____". He commented on how favorably impressed he was by the 2nd book. I said I would give VICTOR this information and I thought we could probably turn up with some of them.

2. INFORMATION CONCERNING LOGINOV (P-11,712):

Subject said that he has not (definitely) talked to LOGINOV in over two months. He thought it very strenge that LOGINOV has not called him at all. At the last meeting with loginov, LOGINOV told Subject that he was going back to Russia in July 1969, and that he would remain there for at least two (2) years. LOGINOV said that he would probably then go to some other country but had no idea where. Subject did not call LOGINOV and invite him to ANDREAS party on 1 March.

Subject said that if LOGINOV received an invitation to ANDREAS party, that it might have come from CHERNYSH (P-13,042). During his conversations with ANDREA, she never mentioned the fact that LOGINOV went to the party. She never told Subject exactly who went.

3. Concerning ANDREA CATANO: (P-13546)

About ten days ago ANDREA went to Commercial Mexicana to do the weekly grocery shopping. Subject dropped by her house while she was gone. Shortly after arriving at her house, she called home and he talked to her on the phone. She said that she had some problems at the store and asked if he could come down and bring some money. He went with her brother, and on arriving at the store found her in custody of two managers and a Policeman. They had caught her trying to walk out with a stolen jar of face cream (she admited it) and she did not have the money to pay for it. Subject talked to the managers, telling them that she was just a young girl, etc., and convinced them to do nothing about it Rafael paid for the face cream and they took her home. (Rafael thinks this is a very unusal side of her character that he has never seen before).

ANDREA has not mentioned CHERNYSH to Subject since my last report. Rafael said that he will begin to pump ANDREA for some further information (in a discreet way). As far as he knows, she has not seen CHERNYSH lately. (perhaps since the party on 1 March).

Lucia RUIZ Garcia (P-9413)

4. Concerning Rafaels MOTHER AND HER WORK AT THE EMBASSY:

(I asked Subject several questions about his mother, but he dodged them. He seemed unwilling to discuss her, and after several tries I stopped pushing). Rafael said that his Mother has one particular student in Spanish (at the Embassy) who has repeatedly expressed the desire to meet and become friends with Rafael. His Mother likes the man (her student) and said that she will shortly invite him home for dinner so that he and Rafael can become acquainted. (Rafael by now is suspicious of any Embassy official who wants to become friends). The man is

76

V. LOGUINOV

Alto, de figura atlética, muy bien parecido. Un tipo físico muy ruso.

Expresión de cara muy seria, pero bondadosa. Esté solo o en companía, siempre está pendiente de su compostura. Se nota que le preocupa muchísimo la impresión que pueda causar en los de más. En la conversación cuida mucho sus palabras, tratando de parecer ingenio y sobre todo muy sencillo. Cariciendo de inteligencia sobresaliente, trata de explotar su supuesta sencillez e ingenuidad para convencer a los demás de lo que dice, piensa o siente.

Jamás se pone violento en una discusión, si no puede contestar como es debido los argumentos inteligentes de su interlocutor pone una cara ingenuscuente triste o alegrumente sencilla. Así jamás pierde un amigo por muy differentes opiniones o idiología que éste tenga.

P-11712

77

SUBJECT: Script for meeting with Valentin
DATE OF REPORT: March 24, 1969

Reason for meeting. I find it very difficult to talk on the tennis court. Last Saturday was no exception. We are either playing tennis or surrounded by a group of our friends. There is something I've wanted to say to you, to make clear, for several weeks, and the only way I could be sure of having your undivided attention, in private, was this lunch.

Dr. Gomez' luncheon, your offer of money. Several weeks ago, at Luis Gomez' house, you offered to give me a large sum of money if I could help you and your embassy. You made this offer in front of a number of our mutual friends.

I realize that your offer was not entirely serious--but not entirely in jest. The more I thought about your offer, the more it bothered me, the madder I got. What you did was put me in a very embarrassing position. You suggested that I commit treason against my country, and you made the offer in front of our friends. The fact that I chose not to create a scene could have been interpreted by our audience as possible interest in your offer.

Not interested in your offer. In the event that you have any doubts, let me make it clear that I am not interested in your offer. I find the offer offensive and provocative.

Affection for Val. Both my wife and I like you and Alexandra. And my boys like Dmitri. We would like to maintain your friendship with you. But you are seriously jeopardizing tha t friendship.

Uninterested in politics. I am not interested in politics. I realize that this is your business. Well, that's your problem, not mine. I am a business man and devote all my time to business. Even so, I don't have time to learn all there is and all I need to know about doing business. Any spare time I have I will devote to learning more about business. I cannot aford the time to prepare myself for political discussions with you or anyone else.

Avoid religion and politics. Even when a discussion touches upon something about which I think I know enough to comment, I will not discuss politics or religion with friends. I do not believe it is possible to pursue those topics without upsetting someone. There are too many other things about which one can talk safely, tennis, geography, girls, etc. Furthermore, I am a guest in a foreign country. I am grateful for the hospitality of this country. It is a wonderful place to live--a wonderful place to work. I will be even more careful not to upset my gracious hosts.

Political opinions. Just for the record, let me make a few statements which I would never make in front of our friends--to avoid embarrassing you, to avoid creating a scene, to honor my resolution not to discuss politics.

1. Soviet imperialism, unjustified. I believe that your country is characterized by totalitarian imperialism--a system far more destructive than constructive--a system which is expert in taking away and destroying what others have created, but is incapable of producing creative ideas of its own.

2. UNITEDS STATES SYSTEM. I believe that the United States has produced the greatest political-economic system, the most (almost too) democratic system that man has ever seen.

3. Soviet responsibility for Viet Nam. The USSR is our enemy in Viet Nam. You supply 90% of the arms and money needed by the North Vietnamese. It is not a question of our withdrawing or ceasing the war; it is up to you to do so. The USSR is continuing the war. You know it and I know it.

4. SOVIET anti-semitism. The Soviets, you by your own confession, are antij-semites. Your role of support of the continued troubled state in the near east is unjustifiable and micanthropic.

5. BERLIN WALL. Unjustified and embarrassing to you.

6. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Unjustified and embarrassing to you.

7. HUNGARY.

8. PERU.

9. C-Minus mentality. You are like the student in a class who receives a near-failing grade. When questioned by his father, he answered that everone else got D's. Your country ~~xx~~ has been getting near-failing grades in internal economics and external policies. You hope to see everone else fail so that you don't look so bad.

This is just a sampling of some of my opinions. I am sure that you can argue many of these points. But I am sure that if I had the time I could document my opinions--you historically never can.

79

I repeat, I am not interested in discussing politics with you or anyone else. I value your friendship too much to risk it that way. But there is something else at stake.

Risk to American businessman. Your provocative statements to me in public can make it difficult for me to do business here. I think there is a great opportunity here to do business, and I want to take advantage of it. You are jeopardizing this. I have studiously avoided political involvement here. You make such involvement inevitable.

Threat to go to embassy. If you continue to harrass me, I will go to the US Embassy and report your harrassment to the Security Officer. I will even ask to see someone in the CIA. And if I don't get satisfaction there, I'll go to the Mexican Foreign Office and tell them my story. I'll ask them to see that the harrassment is stopped and that I be protected from further provocations.

Would prefer not to do so. There are several reasons why I would rather not do all that.

1. First. It would probably put you on the spot. This would serve no real purpose since someone else would simply take over your assingments. And I consider you a personal friend, and would not want to see you in turn harrassed by the Foreign Service or denied entry to the United States. I would hope some day you might be assigned to the United States and see it first hand.

2. Second. I have had very little contact with the embassy. I have very little confidence in civil servants. They usually are working for the government because they could never survive in private business. This may or may not be the case in your own embassy. The exception that proves the rule is our economic section which I have found helpful on various occasions.

   If I were to report you to the embassy, I would probably be harrassed by all the little functionaries far more that you have been able to do.

   If the CIA knew that I had a Soviet for a friend, I am sure that they would have all sorts of ideas about what I should say to you. This is one of the reasons I have never invited you to my home-- and probably never will. I do not want the CIA to know of our friendship and to try to use it.

80

__Unwilling to help CIA.__ I would not be willing to cooperate with the CIA for several reasons.

1. First. I don't think you people are really accomplishing anything of value. If the same amount of money that is now spent on espionage were diverted to competitive free enterprise, the standard of living of both countries would rise to levels where no one would have the time for the present suicidal foreign involvements.

   As a businessman I know that if you can't measure an activity in dollar profits, it should either be revised or discontinued.

2. Second. The end-result of doing business with the CIA would be to get you to defect to our side.

   From what I know of you, and of life in the United States, you would not be happy in our country.

   Oh, if you get in trouble somehow with your own peopl, by all means, offer your services to the CIA, but, please, leave me out of it.

   But just for money, don't come to the US. They would probably offer you a fortune for your little secrets. The government has no idea of how to place a value on things and are delighted to spend the taxpayers money--fortunately I no longer pay US taxes--Mexican taxes are high enough. But don't do it. You wouldn't be happy. It's a great country. We have wonderful people. They'd probably do everything possible to make you comfortable, but you would never be happy.

   If a CIA man ever offers you money to defect or to give up your few secrets, tell him to STICK IT UP HIS ASS. And that's what I'm telling you to do! STICK IT UP YOUR ASS!

__DON'T WISH HIM LUCK.__ I realize that if you keep trying, someday you'll succeed. That nothing ventured, nothing gained. Someday you will find an American who will be willing to work for you. There is nothing you could ever give him that would make him really happy. For his sake, I don't wish you any luck.

81

SUBJECT: Valentin Loginov
DATE OF INFORMATION: March 24, 1969, 1202-1205 hours.
PLACE ACQUIRED: Telephone call to my office.

Telephone call. Val called me at my office. I assume the call was from a public telephone booth, since there was considerable background noise of traffic. He would not identify himself to my secretary, but said that he was a friend.

Invited me to drink. Val asked if it would be convenient for me to get together this afternoon for a drink. I checked my schedule and said that today would not be a good day. Instead I suggested that he be my guest for lunch on Wednesday.

Luncheon date. I told him to meet me Wednesday at 1400 hours at the Llave de Oro.

There was much discussion about how to find the Llave de Oro. He was not familiar with the restaurant, nor with the passage with its restaurants and shops. I had to explain that it was bordered by Liverpool, Genova, Londres and Insurgentes.

Camera not the reason. I assumed that Val's call was going to be attributed to his interest in selling his camera through me. Therefore, I referred to his camera and reminded him not to forget it. He said that this was not the reason he called and that he really wasn't in a big hurry to sell it. He said he wanted to chat with me.

I told him to bring the camera anyway since I had just this morning spoken to my friend who owns a camera store and was sure I could dispose of his camera for him. He did perk up then and show some interest in the camera.

P-11712

82

SUBJECT: Valentin Loguinov
DATE OF INFORMATION: March 22, 1969
PLACE ACQUIRED: French Club

Tennis: Val had come, probably thinking that my partner and I would complete our match with Val and Meche. My partner, however, was out of town this weekend. Meche went her separate way. Val and Gloria Pinto (the mother of Meche) were playing singles when I arrived. I had a singles tournament myself and did not join them until an hour later. We then formed a doubles group. I played with Pepe Pinto, and Val played with Gloria against us.

As is always the case, there is very little oportunity for conversation during a tennis match. Val did make a few stupid comments of apolitical nature, but entirely harmless, such as, addressed to me, haven't you any control over your friends the ~~Chinxx~~ Chinese?

I did not get a chance to confront Valentin about his porvocative comments and how they jeopardized our friendship.

Val asked me if I had given any thought to his request the previous week. I could not believe that he was going to open the matter about his offering me money for "secrets". Therefore, I was genuinely stupid about what request. He reminded me that he had spoken of a movie camera he wanted to sell and which I had stated that I thought I could dispose of it for him through friend s of mine, on consignment. I told him to bring me the camera and I would see what I could do.

I then told Val that there was something I had wanted to talk to him about anyway, land hoped we could get together sometime soon to do so. He stated that he would not come to the club tomorrow. He offered to take me to lunch sometime during the week.

This is not exactly what I had in mind for an informal and not too pleasant statement of my position about his apporach to me. But I feel it can be used and will achieve the desired effect. Unfortunately, he might spend the next few days wondering if I am about to accept his approach.

~~[illegible]~~
~~DmitXX~~ Confirmed by [illegible]

Dmitri bitten by dog. The main topic of converstaion during the brief moments available between games or sets of tennis was Dmitri. Dmitri was bitten by the dog belonging to the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy. Apparently the bite was fairly deep in his right forearm and severed a large vein, hence there was much bleeding, probably an asset under the circumstances. The dog has been impounded to be watched for ten days, to determine whtether Dmitri should undergo rabies shots or not. Val said that the dog had bitten four or five children already and that he, Val, would shoot the dog when the ten days are up.

It is conceivable that this is a point of friction now for Val between his Counselor and him.

14-00000

183

SUBJECT: Ruth Wiegandt
DATE OF INFORMATION: March 13, 1969. 1300 hours
PLACE ACQUIRED: Home of Ana Zuracusa (spelling?)

My wife and Ruth Wiegandt were present at a luncheon of women tennis players. In the course of their conversation they discussed the other mixed doubles group to which they both belong, including Valentin Loguinov. My wife told Ruth that she was looking forward to having her turn of having the entire group at our home for lunch. But that we were wating for Val to leave for Moscow. My wife said that she thought it illadvised for an American ho entertain a Soviet. Ruth agreed.

CI P-2357

P-11712

84

SUBJECT: GLORIA [illegible]
DATE OF CONTACT: March 12, 1969. 1400-[illegible] hours.
PLACE OCCURRED: Llave de Oro.
DATE OF REPORT: March 24, 1969

Commission agent. Gloria and I have been talking for some time about what she might do to keep herself busy and make a little money. I offered to discuss the matter with her months ago ~~xx~~ either to hire her myself or find a job for her. This luncheon date was to explain to her what jbb I had for her.

Discussion of job. The first hour was ~~xxxxx~~ spent discussing the job I could offer her. This would involve her following up on a list of Americans and Englishmen in the D.F. to whom I sent some promotional literature recently. These are potential clients for one of the services of my business.

I gave Gloria a looseleaf notebook with copies of all my promotional literature to date, including Spanish translations of the pertinent literature. I also gave her a couple dozen envelopes with a complete set each of literature and contracts.

She is eager to start. She wants to test her ability to deal with people. Once she has built up her self-confidence she might leave me to start her own business. We agreed that this would be best for her, but in the meantime I was certain (and am certain!) that she would be able to find some clients for my business.

Confidential. Gloria asked me if I had told anyone, including my wife, about her possibly working for me. I said that I had not. She prefers not to tell anyone until she knows if she is qualified or not.

Since that time, in recent days, it appears that she has not only told her family, but has been kidded about the job. Pepa even scolded her, saying that married women should not work. Gloria said she was simply ignoring his Latin attitude.

Mention of Val. Gloria mentioned Val first in an offhand comment about his departure soon for Moscow.

My comment about Val. I told Gloria that Val had annoyed me the last time I saw him, two Sundays ago. I said I didn't know whether he was serious or just kidding. But the more I thought about it, the more it bothered me. I finally decided that he might have been seriously offering me money for secrets betraying my country.

I told Gloria that I seriously considered reporting Val to the embassy. She said that reporting [illegible] she have been worth the trouble. She said that [illegible]

85

of the things that she doesnot like about Val--his Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde behavior. Most of the time he is a very likeable guy, and suddenly he must say or do something provocative.

GLORIA aware of intelligence activities of Val. Though she spoke in euphemisms and figures of speech, Gloria did state that she is aware of Val's role as an intelligence officer. She seemed much more alert to this role than I had expected. I guess I really expected her to be naive about Val's intelligence activities. I even think I expected her to deny such activities had I been the first to mention or suggest them. Such was not the case. She refered to his activities and those of his friend Tchernich.

I was particularly surprised at her sophisticated attitude about Tchernych. I personally could have doubted his intelligence activities if I hadn't personally seen him conducting a clandestine meeting on a dark street corner in San Angel late at night.

I chose this opportunity to manifest a certain naiveté on my part. I challenged her statement about Tchernych. I further stated that I doubted very much that the published reports were true that 70 percent of the Soviet embassy personnel were intelligence officers.

I said that Val was not the first Soviet that I had met. I said that I used to play chess with a Soviet quite regularly and that I knew he was not "one of those". Neither of us (Gloria and I) ever used any overt term such as"spy" or"intelligence officer", etc.

Gloria said that Val had offered her a lot of money to work for the Soviet embassy. She said she feels Val is miscast, that Moscow has made a very bad choice--"he is too human, not cold enough for that kind of work."

Dr. Alfonso Martinez. Dr. Martinez is a communist and a school chum of Pepe's. Gloria introduced Val and Martinez some two years ago. After this meeting they have been very close friends. He loans Val and the embassy his house in Tequesquitengo for weekend parties. His property includes a swimming pool, launches, dancing area, picnic area, house with several bedrooms, etc. Gloria was invited to this house this Sunday, March 30th.

Alexandra, better agent. Gloria said that she felt Alexandra had a better personality for their work--able diplomat, colder, mature. Val is a little boy.

86

12 March 1969

CONTACT REPORT

FROM : Samuel J. KARTASUK

SUBJECT : Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz (P-4505)

A meeting was held from 1130 to 1430, 11 March 1969, in Chalupas Restaurant on Ave. Reforma, one block West of Reforma and Prado Norte. The date and hour of the ~~next meeting~~ will be established by telephone. Subject will pick up Kartasuk on Reforma, in front of the Anthropology Museum at a specified time.

1. I parked my car three blocks North of the Chalupas and walked to the meeting site arriving there at 1125. Subject was waiting at a table reading one of the Russian books I had previously given him. We met, talked, and conducted our meeting over a period of three hours and then parted company.

2. The initial conversation was general. He at first commented on how well he liked the two books he had received from me, and made some statements on the truth of their context. We ordered some breakfast and I then asked him if he would mind filling out the questionaire (PRQ) I had with me, explaining that it was merely routine. He readily agreed and I gave it to him and helped him fill it out. (PRQ submitted on 12 March). After completing the form I brought out a list of questins I wanted to ask and began going through them. He answered all of those he could, providing the following information:

Index A. (FNU) MARTINEZ, OWNER OF THE PLAZA HOTEL:

Rafael does not remember MARTINEZ full name but promised to obtain it at the first opportunity. MARTINEZ has a wife and son. The wife originally comes from Santander, Spain. His son (no name remembered) is about 18 or 19 years of age, (8 years ago, now about 26) and at times was helping around the desk of the hotel when Rafael was teaching his father Russian. (1960-1961). Rafael gave MARTINEZ Russian for about 6 months, during which time MARTINEZ learned to speak, and understand fairly well. MARTINEZ never discussed why he wanted to learn Russian with Rafael, nor did they talk poletics, either Russian or American.

87

When Rafael met PRIKHODKO (P-2270) at the Plaza Hotel, PRIKHODKO later mentioned that he had some business with MARTINEZ concerning Tourists and Tourism, but did not expound on the Subject. MARTINEZ never discussed his association with PRIKHODKO and Subject did not ask. During the latter part of 1962 Rafael went to the hotel and by chance saw four or five Soviets in MARTINEZ office. He heard them talking, but did not go into the office. He thinks he has seen one of these Russians since but does not know the name of any of them. Martinez never mentioned them or their business with him. In September 1968, just prior to the Olympics, Rafael went to see Martinez, trying to drum up some more private Russian lessons. MARTINEZ told him that he was not ready to take any more Russian lessons, but that he was very interested in learning German as soon as possible. Martinez said that he was currently (then) taking lessons, but that he did not like his teacher, (Did not say who his teacher was). Rafael offered to bring a teacher from his Institute. Martinez mentioned that the German Olympic team would be staying at his hotel. Shortly after Rafael brought a girl from the Institute named Gerda (LNU) to see Martinez. While there they were invited to lunch and met three Mexican men and a tall German who said he was a representative of the german team. They had lunch, conversed about general things, and Rafael and the girl left. The girl later said that Martinez had continued taking Germ lessons from his old teacher. This was the last time Rafael saw MARTINEZ. Rafael could supply no biographical data on Martinez, or any further informatio on any connections with Soviets. Subject has not heard any other Soviet mention either Martinez or the Plaza Hotel.

East? West!

B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOGINOV (P-11712) AND JUAN LUIS, DIRECTOR OF THE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE ON TIBER:

In about 1965 or 1966, LOGINOV went to the Institute to take English lessons. He took lessons for about 6 to 8 months. The lessons were private, but given at the Institute by an American girl named Janet (LNU - Rafael does not remember her last name, and she is no longer there). It was in this manner that JUAN LUIS met LOGINOV.

JUAN LUIS mentioned to Rafael that he liked LOGINOV, and they seemed fairly friendly. It was at the end of this period that Rafael was introduced to LOGINOV by JUAN LUIS. When LOGINOV terminated his lessons he no longer visited the Institute. JUAN LUIS often sent his regards to LOGINOV via Rafael, and asked that LOGINOV come to see him. This was mentioned by Rafael, but LOGINOV continually told Rafael to "forget it", but did ask Rafael to return the regards. Rafael never questioned LOGINOV on why he did not go back to the Institute, but as far as Subject knows, LOGINOV has not been back. Rafael has had many discussions with JUAN LUIS but he has never mentioned any other Soviets in Mexico. As far as his politics go, JUAN LUIS is a confirmed Leftist in ideas but Rafael would not call him a Communist. Rafael believes that Juan Luis was merely a friend to LOGINOV and had no direct relations with him other than their association through lessons.

C. Andrea CATANO (P-13,546):

Andrea has mentioned to Rafael that she met CHERNYSH (P-13,042) at the Space Exhibit while she was working there. She also met several other Soviets there. She became friends with them and invited them to her house for a dinner party on two occasions. Rafael, invited by her, went on both occasions. On the first occasions there was a Russian woman, blond, about 36 years old named VALENTINA (LNU) who spoke very good spanish; a man named MISHA (LNU), supposedly an Electrical Tech from DUBNO Space Center near Moscow, about 37 years old and tall, who spoke excellent Spanish and who later wrote a letter to one of Andreas girlfriends in Mexico City (Not named); and BORIS (LNU), about 37 years old, thin, nervous but with a lot of vitality and personality. Boris spoke excellent Spanish also, and Rafael thought it very unusual that he drank American Whiskey and Coca-cola. (Rafael says this is unusual for Russians). Rafael thought MISHA a little suspicious, that he might be KGB (he knows that in cases such as this, no one is allowed to go anywhere with being accompanied by the KGB) because MISHA spoke excellent Spanish and seemed to be the only one who did not really fit.

The other Soviet was named VLADIMIR (LNU), about 57 years old, and did not speak any Spanish at all, but was very nice. According to Rafael, he was the only true Scientist there. (Also from Dubno).

At the second party the Russian woman did not come. Andreas American boss from the Exhibit came however with a Mexican man, (Rafael does not remember his name). Rafael says he was a nice guy. He was about 43 years old, tall and smoked a cigar. He joked with the Russians and told them to be careful because Andrea was his spy. They all laughed. He came with two dark Mexicans and left shortly after dinner. Rafael said he drank a considerable amount and left drunk. CHERNYSH did not attend either of these parties. Andrea however invited him over on other occasions. On one occasion CHERNYSH brought another Soviet to Andreas whom he said was a Military man. (No name mentioned by Andrea). Andrea said that this one was a pain in the ass because he was so serious it through the group (her mother also) into a depressed state. After the Exhibit CHERNYSH started calling Andrea at home and inviting her to meet him in various cafes, which she did. He cautioned her to never call him at the Embassy. He was invited to her house many times and often sat and discussed his politics (any all other topics) with her and her mother. Her mother took issue with his pol Her mother liked CHERNYSH but does not know that Andrea is seeing him on the sl She would not approve of Andrea going out with CHERNYSH at all. CHERNYSH began making amorous advances to Andrea and tried to talk her into going to bed with him. Andrea told Rafaol that he is a very nice guy, she liked him, but was a She said that he almost convinced her to go to bed, and that it is her decision that she is no longer going to see CHERNYSH for fear of doing so. Rafael had cautioned her about what she had to lose if she did. She continues to like CHERNYSH however.

Andrea had a party on 1 March and asked Rafael to invite LOGINOV. CHERNYSH went to this party. Rafael did not bother to ask LOGINOV at all.

90

Andrea has often extended an invitation to LOGINOV through Rafael, but when Rafael mentiones this to LOGINOV, LOGINOV has told him to forget it because other people from his Embassy are seeing her and LOGINOV does not want to appear there and cause trouble. LOGINOV did not expound and Rafael did not ask further explanation. Rafael thinks that CHERNYSH really wants to take Andrea to bed, but he also thinks that CHERNYSH is up to other things also. He has no idea what, but just suspects.

3. The meeting with Rafael, after three hours, was cut short at this time because he had some obligations. His general daily schedule is as follows:

Monday:	1500-1600	Classes at the Institute, general.
	1630-1730	Private classes at the Institute.
Tuesday:	1000-1100	Private lessons for ADRIANA at Institute.
	1130-1230	" " " MUNOZ " "
	1500-1600	Classes at Institute, general.
	1600-1730	Classes at Institute, Private.
Wednesday	1500-1600	Classes at Institute
	1830-1930	Private lessons on Palmas to CHRISTINA
	2000-2100	Private lessons, John BLANKNEGAL
Thursday	1500-1600	Classes at Institute
	1630-1730	Classes at Institute
	1830-1930	Private lessons, Maria LUZ
	2000-2100	Private Lessons, John BLANKNEGAL
Friday	1500-1600	Lessons at Institute
	1600-1730	Lessons at Institute.

At the end of the meeting I gave him an envelope with 1,000.00 pesos in cash in it. He accepted it graciously and said that that would last him about 24 hours considering the debts he had to pay. We laughed. I brought out a receipt and asked him if he would mind signing it for me. I said it was for accounting purposes (he did not ask). He said "Sure" and signed it immediately. We left the restaurant, walked to his car, and said goodbye until next meeting.

4-00000

91

We stood by the car talking for about three minutes, and I promised to call him during the afternoon of Friday, 14 March. On departing he grinned and said to say hello to all of his associates that he does'nt know. I said "Sure will" and walked away.

Samuel J. Kartasuk
Samuel J. Kartasuk

Note: I asked him to furnish me with a complete written personality and character sketch on [illegible]. He agreed further to do same on all those he has had contact with.
S.J.K.

Seems to be coming along very nicely - JPR

92

337. Salida a: (651153).-1350.-Valentín y Meche quedan deverse el sábado a las 1000h.en el club para jugar y Valentín pide le avise a Bill. Meche acepta.- 371.----------------

LIENVOY

file P-11712

Gloria Pinto cc P-13,223

cc Lucalm-1 P

COPIES MADE

110960
-5 MAR 1963

93

5 March, 1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIREALM/1
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1200, 5/3/69; Reforma Hotel D/R.
3. Next Meeting: 1200, 12/3/69; Camino Real Hotel.
4. Reports/Information Given by Agent:

LIREALM/1 gave Rowton four pages for insertion into the HDFAIRY target notebook which he had previously prepared and turned over to the Station.

LIREALM/1 also gave Rowton a memo on his recommendations with regard to the oustanding balanace of the loan to LIRELIC (1,000.00 pesos), in which LIREALM/1 propses to see LIRELIC once more and to obtain from him a receipt acknowledging the outstanding balance of the original loan.

A third report given to Rowton reveals what appears to have been an IS approach made to LIREALM/1 by Valentin Loguinov on 2 February, 1969, at the home of a mutual friend, Luis Gomez. Loguinov again made reference to his previous allegations concerning LIREALM/1's affiliation with WOFACT but this time said that he was prepared to pay "a lot " of money for any information LIREALM/1 might obtain for him. L/1 reported to Rowton that he finessed as best he could alleging that the only person he was close to in the WOLADY complex was an official in the economic section. LIREALM/1 commented to Rowton that he felt certain at this point that Loguinov was bluffing concerning his having actually seen L/1 with WOFACT officers "several times" in Sanborns, and that this was a prelude to an approach to LIREALM/1 that Loguinov had been planning for some time.

5. Administrative:

LIREALM/1 gave Rowton an accounting for his 1,500 peso revolving fund which showed a total of disbursements of 12,078.75. L/1 exblained that this sudden increase in his expenditures was due to his new operations against the PBRUMEN target. He stated that he expected the following recurring expenses every month:

LIR.CF/4 salary	-	1,500.00
[illegible]/4 L/P rental	-	1,500.00
[illegible]/6 salary	-	2,000.00
[illegible]/6 L/P rental	-	1,500.00
S/H rental for ops meetings with WOFACTers	-	1,500.00
Miscellaneous	-	1,000.00

p-11712

94

Since these recurring expenses would be a minimum of 12,000.00 pesos per month, LIREALM/1 requested that his revolving fund be increased from 1,500.00 to 12,000.00, and that Rowton, in addition to reimbursing him for the 9,078.75 he spent in excess of his last advance, give him an additional 12,000.00 pesos as his new revolving fund so that he would be able to pay the operational expenses required.

6. Guidance/Information Given to Agent:

Rowton agreed with LIREALM/1 concerning the approach of Loguinov and promised to give L/1 Station guidance on his future relationship with Loguinov. Rowton asked L/1 to move very cautiously with regard to implicating the WOLADY economics officer before receiving specific guidance from the Station.
Rowton promised to refer the request for an increased revolving fund to the Station in the hope of having the necessary money at the next meeting.

Wallace B. Rowton

95

SUBJECT: Valentin Loguinov
DATE OF INFORMATION: February 2, 1969
PLACE ACQUIRED: Party at the home of Dr. Luis Gomez.

Our tennis group meets occassionally at each others homes, for lunch, dinner, or just drinks. Luis Gomez invited us this time to his home in Pedregal for lunch.

After I had made a point of not sitting near Val, several women wanted to change places and Val and another person changed places putting Val next to me.

He opened the old issue by saying that he assumed I was working for the company. He said that he had seen me personally"several times" at Sanborns with American intelligence officers. I asked who he saw me with. He avoided the question. I then volunteered that it must have been Bill Spruce, with whom I frequently have lunch, He asked what section Spruce was in. I answered the economic. He seemed disgusted, and said Spruce wasn't worth anything.

Val then said that he wanted me to know that he was prepared to pay a lot of money for any information I might obtain for him. I said I'd talk to Spruce about it and see if he had anything to sell so that I could take my commission. I added that Spruce would probably faint or tremble with terror--this pleased Val greatly.

I then asked Val if the Americans had ever offered him any money for his information. He averted my eyes and answered "not yet".

COMMENTS

Val is an ass!!

"Several times" is, of course, inaccurate and shows that he is guessing. It seems very unlikely that he saw me even the one time.

Val probably regrets that we have not approached him. But he is not so stupid that he does not realize that we know he has no trade, profession, skills, or talents which would make life for him anywhere outside of Russia and government service possible. Val is doing the only thing he knows how, and he knows it, and he must realize that we know it. Hence, defection for him is out of the question. He would only make a short-term profit in doing so.

I have invited Bill Spruce to lunch this week. I will develop him as my excuse and answer for any further provocations by Val. Spruce, incidentally, is a very clever and helpful person. My last meeting with him was two years ago and I am still benefitting from his advice. He has since transferred to the finance section, but this should not affect his value to me and my cover.

96

SUBJECT: VAlentin Loguinov
DATE OF INFORMATION: February 1, 1969. 1200 hours.
PLACE ACQUIRED: French Club

Interest in American School. Val asked me if I could recall the address of the American school. He will call me for ~~it~~ it. He wants to have his son Dmitri participate in some activities with the children at the school in order to learn English. Dmitri finishes school at the Russian embassy at 1400 hours. Val hopes that maybe there are some afterschool activities such as football for Dmitri.

COMMENT

This may be just Val's inate stupidity. Maybe he really couldn't find the American School in the telephone directory.

Perhaps Val already knows of some after-school activity of which I am unaware. Maybe he already knows that someone's child is there, someone he wants to meet. Perhaps he wants an excuse to wander about the school, meeting people.

Perhaps Val couldn't care less about the school. Perhaps he is hoping for an excuse to call me, suggesting our children practice English together. Perhaps he is preparing the ground ~~for~~ to go to someone else he already has in mind to explain that there is no convenient program of after-school activities for Dmitir. He might ask that person to agree to have Dmitri play with his children.

It just occured to me that for the first time in many months Valentin spoke Russian to me. While I was playing tennis he shouted to me in Russian, "You really are playing with your left now". And later, "You look tired". When I answered that I was and that I had a head-ache, He looked particularly pleased. Normally he doesn't even answer my Good Morning in Russian. Perhaps he is preparing the ~~xxxyx~~ way for me to suggest an exchange in language lessons: he helps me with my Russian and ~~Ixdxx~~ my boys play with Dimi in English.

P-11712
P-11155

97

SECRET

s/c in
~~info~~
K/sec
under
file

3 FEBRUARY 1969

COPIES MADE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Valentin Sergeevich LOGINOV (P-11712)

Attached are five LIEMBRACE Soviet Target of Opportunity reports which cover the period 12 December 1968 which was the first surveillance to four follow-up surveillance reports on the first one. On 12 December 1968 the LIEMBRACE team picked up LOGINOV in Colonia Buenos Aires in the company of an unidentified Mexican man. The LIEMBRACE team followed the Mexican man , who got into a Renault Dauphine with placas 330 HS. A LIKAYAK check revealed that the placas were listed to

He has P-13,698 check P for more details

Indef

Ignacio VALLINA Barros and Susana de VALLINA Fabre

Address: was Adolfo Prieto 1302, Mexico 12, D.F. now Sierra de Cabuna 60 Lomas, Barrilaco

A further LIKAYAK check revealed that the VALLINAs did not live at this Adolfo Prieto address and no further action was planned.

On Thursday, 2 January 1969, LIEMBRACE-5 went into Sears Department Store on Ejercito Nacional and thought that the store detective was identical to the man spotted with LOGINOV on 12 December 1968. LIEMBRACE-14 said that although the store detective looked alot like the man seen with LOGINOV, he wasnot identical. Photos of this store detective are attached.

On Friday, 3 January 1969 the LIEMBRACE team went to Sears Store on Ejercito Nacional to check out this store detective. The people at Sears said that if a name were given to them, they would cooperate.

On Thursday, 9 January 1969, the LIEMBRACE team picked up the store detective as he was leaving work. The store detective went to a house at Lago Chiem 142-A. Prior to that he went to an address at Avenida Claveria 64-1.

On Friday 10 January 1969 the LIEMBRACE team gave us the result of a check at these addresses. They are the following:

file P-11712

98

Name of the store detective: Jaime LOZANO Sanchez
Lago Chiem 142-A, apartment 12-A

Name and address of his "girlfriend": Avenida Claveria 84-1
Leonora LEAL widow de MEDICIS.

This information is for the file. No concrete results of the LIEMBRACE check xxxx were obtained, as the man who got into the Renault with placas 380 HS does not appear to be identifiable with the Sears store detective.

GMFarmilant
Grace M. FARMILANT







Photos of Jesus
[illegible] defection
taken by Surveillance Team
on Thursday
2 January 1969

100

6/HCh
~~[illegible]~~
10/F

SOURCE: LIEMBRACE

DATE: Viernes 10 de enero de 1969.

FILE:

SUBJECT: Investigación del detective de la tienda Sears Roebuck, Ejército Nacional.

Nombre: Jaime Losano Sánchez

Dirección: Lago Chiem No. 142-A, interior 12-A.

Domicilio de su amiga, tal vez su amante: Av. Clavería No. 84-1. Su nombre es Leonora Leal Vda. de Medicis.

COPIES MADE

101

C/11C
~~[illegible]~~
K/F

Check [illegible]

SOURCE: LIEMBRACE

DATE: Jueves 9 de enero de 1969.

PARTICIPANTS: 1,2,4,5,10,14.

FILE:

SUBJECT: Surveillance of Suspect contact of Soviet LEGINOV

1830 Presentes en Sears Roebuck de México, S.A., Ejército Nacional.

1947 Sale el sujeto por la puerta de empleados. Lleva una bolsa grande de papel de la tienda.

1949 Sube a un plymouth , 1949, color azul, placas No. 768 GA que estaba dentro del estacionamiento de Sears y se va.

2005 Se estaciona frente a un edificio de deptos. que esta en la Av. Claveria No. 84 Z.P 16. Antes de llegar aquí dió varias vueltas innecesarias, como checándose.

2008 Se baja del carro con la bolsa de papel. Entra al edificio y entra al depto. No. 1 en la planta baja.

2010 Sale del edificio. Parece que no le abrieron. Sube al carro y permanede ahí.

2015 Sale una mujer del edificio. Se acerca al carro y habla con el sujeto y éste se baja del carro con la bolsa y entra con la mujer al depto. No. 1. La mujer abre con llave.

2120 Sale el sujeto solo. Sube a su carro y se va.

2128 Entra a una vencindad que está en Lago Chiem No. 142-A y abre con llave a la vivienda No. 12 o 13, no se pudo ver bien porque estaba muy oscuro.

2145 Cancelamos.

NOTA: No pudimos preguntar por él en Sears, porque no estaba la empleada de Personal.-

COPIES MADE

102

c/ci

~~[illegible]~~

C/Supp

SOURCE:

DATE: Viernes 3 de enero de 1969.

FILE:

SUBJECT: Investigación sobre el detective de Sears Roebuck, Ejército Nacional.

En las oficinas de personal nos dijeron que tenían 10 detectives y que no nos podían proporcionar los nombres de todos; que si nosotros si les dábamos el nombre de la persona que nos interesaba, ellos nos darían los datos que solicitamos.

This appears to be somewhat a shot in the dark but if you wish I will give L-1 the name Ignacio VELLINA Barros - to whom plates 380 HS are registered?

Why not?

Si!

COPIES MADE

103

C/CI
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
C/Support

SOURCE: LIEMBRACE

DATE: Jueves 2 de Enero de 1969.

PARTICIPANTS: 1,5,14.

FILE:

SUBJECT: Surveillance of T/P Suspect Soviet contact

En un reporte del dia 12 de Diciembre de 1968, en el que 5 y 14 vieron a LOGINOV acompañado de un hombre tipo mexicano caminando por un puente de peatones del viaducto Miguel Aleman que está a la altura de la calle Eje Dos. Y que despues este último se fué en un Renault negro placas No.390 HS. y lo perdieron entrando al viaducto.

? 5 fué el martes 31 a la tienda Sears de Ejercito Nacional y le pareció que el detective de está tienda es el mismo que se vió con LOGINOV. Llevamos a 14 para que también lo identificara. Dice 14 que se parece mucho, pero que no es. 5 dice que está seguro que si es.

En la descripción que dieron ellos ese dia dijeron que en la cara se le veía como que había tenido acné, y este no tiene ninguna marca de esas. De todas maneras lo fotografiamos. Buscamos el Renault en el estacionamiento y no estaba.

COPIES MADE

14-00000

104

14F - follow-up
gnf / [illegible]
fr

[illegible]
~~Defects~~
IC/F

SOURCE: LIEMBRACE

DATE: Jueves 12 de dic. de 1968.

PARTICIPANTS: 5,14.

FILE:

SUBJECT: Surveillance of Soviet target of opportunity

1356 Se localiza en el puente de peatones del Viaducto Miguel Alemán, a la altura de la calle Eje-2, Col. Buenos Aires, a LOGINOV atravesando el puente a pie acompañado de un hombre tipo mexicano, como de 35 a 40 años, 1.75 m. de estatura, 80 kgs., pelo negro ondulado, con entradas grandes a los lados, cejas gruesas, tez morena, cutis lleno de cicatrices de acné, vestido con traje completo café claro y corbata.

1401 Se despiden en Concepción Méndez y Dr. Andrade. Se cancela a Loginov.

1412 El sujeto llega al restaurante Amanecer Tapatío de Niño Perdido y Obrero Mundial. Recorre el restaurante, como buscando a alguien.

1415 Sale y espera en la puerta.

1500 Entra nuevamente al restaurante y habla por teléfono. No se pudo ver el número ni escuchar nada por que había música de mariachis dentro del restaurante.

1508 Termina de hablar por teléfono y sale y se va caminando.

// 1511 Sube a un Renoult Dauphine, 1961, negro, maltratado, placas 380 HS, que estaba estacionado en las calles de Esparta y Bolívar. Se va. IC/F - check plate

1516 Se pierde en la entrada al Viaducto, rumbo al Oriente. No se pudo alcanzar porque detrás de él entraron tres carros lentamente y ya no se pudo localizar.

COPIES MADE

Recheck requested
17 Dec 68
gnf

380 HS belongs to
Ignacio Valdivia Barros
Susana de Valdivia [illegible]
address:
Adolfo Prieto 1302
[illegible], D F

Check by [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

26 FEBRUARY 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: New Soviet Embassy Car

LILYRIC reported that Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (P-11712) entered the Soviet Embassy on 23 February 1969 in a 1969 Chevrolet Chevelle. LOGINOV, according to LIENVOY was scheduled to go to the border the week of 16 Feb 1969 to pick up his new car.

ghfarmilant

FILES: 50-8-10/7
cc: P-11712

SECRET

106

He was very much in favor of the writers who have been suppressed in Russia. Subject said that when he first arrived in Mexico his major desire was to visit a book store. When he managed to visit one he was amazed at the variety of literature for sale which was absolutely banned to Russians. He could not help feeling nervous while in the bookstore, and later cried when he got home. (Due to the emotions he felt). At the first opportunity he began buying and reading all of the books he could afford. It took him a long time in order to be able to sit in a public area and openly read a book without feeling some kind of fear.

As regards to Cuba he has heard conflicting stories. He believes that Castro has done some good for the Cubans, (by raising their standard education level), but that from stories he has heard, the Cubans had a much higher economic standard of living (than Mexico) prior to the Castro regime. He has often discussed these polotics with LOGINOV. P 11,912 In a crowd LOGINOV tends to say good things about Castro and the Cuban regime, but when alone with Subject LOGINOV sneers at Castro and condemns the regime. This attitude leads Subject to believe that the non official Soviet attitude (real attitude) towards Cuba is one of disgust. During discussions in a group, LOGINOV has stated that they (Soviets) are not in favor of Guerillas operating in Central and S. America. He has repeated this while privately talking with Subject.

During part of the conversation I began telling him about the standards of living in the U.S. and what it might be like living there. We discussed different parts of the U.S. in terms of Geography and what it had to offer. Subject repeated that his wife always thought that it would be devine living in the U.S. and that he still had hopes of going there in the future to live.

Contact report
from : [illegible]
Subject : Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz
date : [illegible] February 64

P 11,9[illegible]

107

During about 1947 or 1948 (not sure) a [illegible] in Russia offering Spaniards living there a Soviet passport. His father [illegible] the Russian Passport. Every three months they had to go (individually) to an office with initials O.V.I.R. (Department of Visas and Registry for Foreigners) to pick up a slip of paper from the head, who was an old Russian Colonel. They then took this slip of paper back to the apartment where they lived and presented it to the person in charge of the apartment. The person then wrote on the slip that they had permission to live there for three months. They returned to the OVIR where the Colonel stamped it and put his initials. This had to be done every three months. Whenever they traveled they had to take this slip with them. Subject thinks that their travel was limited to 300 or 600 kilometers, but is not sure. He said the Colonel became a good friend of his and later advised him not to get a Soviet passport since it might limit his traveling in the free world. Prior to leaving Russia he was not interviewed by anyone or offered any deals.

He has known LOGINOV about 3 years. He was introduced to LOGINOV three years ago by JUAN LUIS, the director of the Language Institute (where Subject now works). After the introduction they went to the Directors apartment on Hamburgo for drinks and he became friendly with LOGINOV. Prior to about 6 months ago LOGINOV had merely been a friend, but had insinuated that Subject offer information on his students. In the past six months LOGINOV has made about three direct offers, outlining that Subject prepare and give him personal information on his students, especially those who might be in a position to go to the States. (He wants the usual personal information, including their attitude towards Americans). Subject has refused LOGINOV on each occasion. He said that he did not attend the meeting arranged for Saturday, 1 February because he slept late and was not interested. He had previously said that the meeting was on the corners of PRAGA and REFORMA, but during this meeting he said he was in error, the meeting was supposed to be on the corners of PRAGA and CHAPULTEPEC.

R-11/72

Contact report
from : KARTASOX
subject : Rafael VIDIELLA Roig
date : 8 February 1969

4-00000

108

He said that LOGINOV had told him several times never to call him or visit him at the Embassy. LOGINOV usually calls Subject when he wants to meet him.

During the first year after their arrival in Mexico, he accompanied his mother to the Soviet Embassy, and while there met a (FNU) BROVKIN who was an old friend who had met his mother in Russia. While talking to BROVKIN, they asked if he had any jobs for Subject, or knew of anyone who might employ Subject. BROVKIN said No, but later introduced Subject to CHICHKOV, who gave him a job.

P-8?

P-2270

Subject met PRIKHODKO in the Plaza Hotel (See previous Contact Report). PRIKHODKO was there to meet the owner, and after they (He and PRIKHODKO met) talked by the phone booth they went to the bar to meet the owner. The owner did not show up and they then went to PRIKHODKOS apartment where Subject stayed for dinner. While there he met CHIRNYSH. Subject said that CHIRNYSH did not ever try to recruit him for anything (He said that I must have mis-understood him during the previous meeting. CHIRNYSH is playing around with ANDREA, who can go to the U. S. anytime she wants. He said I must have mistaken him). CHIRNYSH is about 37 years old and ANDREA just turned 17. ANDREA has told Subject that she has kissed CHIRNYSH on several occasions and really likes him. Subject is very angry about this and says that CHIRNYSH has no business picking in ANDREA, and he knows that CHIRNYSH (Suspects) is up to no good. Subject would like to put a stop to this but does not know how. (I used this as an arguement but to no avail).

P.

P-13546

CATINO

PRIKHODKO is a friend of Engineer (FNU) MARTINEZ, a Mexican who owns the hotel PLAZA and the HACIENDA VISTA HERMOSA. MARTINEZ is now about 65 years old. Subject taught MARTINEZ Russian about 8 years ago and has not seen him since. During this time he also taught a man named Miguel MORA, a Mexican [illegible], who has since visited China and Russia. MORA is like a brother to MARTINEZ. (Subject is not aware of the connections between the three).

Subjects father lives in Budapest (as resident) and writes to the family (both he and his mother in one letter) about once a month or less. Subject thinks his father [illegible] of the [illegible] in Budapest writes political articles, and

SUBJECT: Gloria Pinto
DATE OF INFORMATION: January 31, 1958. 2100-0200 hours.
PLACE ACQUIRED: Restaurant Normandia, Mex.

A group of ten of us celebrated New Year's Eve together.

Business at Soviet embassy. Gloria wants to purchase a Persian Lamb coat. Alexandra Loguinov has one she would be willing to sell, but Gloria believes it would be too hot for Mexico, having been lined for Moscow weather. Gloria thinks that the commercial counselor of the Soviet embassy would be interested, willing, and able to help her in obtaining a Soviet coat.

Gloria also wants to open a shop. She thought that maybe she could handle imported Soviet goods. Her children are now old enough to take care of themselves. She feels unneeded, hence the interest in opening a shop. She has checked with the Camino Real and learned that shop space rents for 12000 pesos per month. She would probably work for someone else for a while to learn the problems involved, before opening her own shop. She admits to very little education. She has never worked in her life.

Wants help from me. The last time I saw Gloria she reminded me that on New Years Eve I promised to give her problem some thought. Frankly, there is something she could do for my cover business. I need someone who is attractive, mature, but not necessarily very intelligent, and not necessarily very experienced, to contact potential clients, to sell a service. I think Gloria could fit this requirement. I had in mind a commission agent: someone who would recieve no salary, but would receive a ~~[illegible]~~ percentage each month (20%) of the income due to clients she obtained. Let's say she would bring me 100 clients over a period of two or three years. Let's say further that each client would represent an income of $250 pesos per month. She would receive .20 x 250 x 100 = 5000 pesos per month as long as those clients continued, and whether she continued to work for me or not. She could work as little or as much as she wanted, though I would probably set a quota of one new client per week. She would end up the year making 2600 pesos per month, averaging 1300 pesos per month over the year. She has her own car. I would probably reimburse her for gasoline and entertainment expenses.

I mention this in some detail because I think it really would suit Gloria and would help my business. If I used her, it would probably preclude her use wittingly against the Soviets. Further, before using her, some thought ought to be given to the possibility that she might already be working for the Soviets (which I doubt) and could be targetted against me.

Soviets interest in Gloria. I would not attempt to explain why the Soviets might be interested in Gloria as a target. My guesses would be a waste of time considering that the Soviet section has probably given this sort of thing a great deal of experienced thought. I do believe that Valentin and Gloria might be having an affair for strictly personal and non-operational reasons. I further believe that Valentin might actually be paying his own way at the French Club to pursue a sport he is fairly good at and enjoys--and not as an excuse to go to the French Club to find potential recruits.

[illegible]

Our interest in Gloria. I can see a possible use of Gloria if recruited by false Mexican secret service. The scenario would go something like this:

> We (the Mexican secret service) have observed that she (Gloria) has been seen in the company of Valentin. We know Valentin to be a very dangerous and destructive person to Mexico.
>
> Would she be willing to report on Valentin, his personality, his views, his activities as far as she is aware of them.
>
> (Later) Would she be willing to make comments which would encourage Valentin to try to recruit her. Such comments would be that she has met diplomats from various embassy, knows students who are anarchists and communists, is growing more and more disappointed with the U.S. foreign policy, especially since that imperialist Nixon has taken over, etc.
>
> Ultimate use. The eventual value of Gloria would be:
>
> 1. Report vulnerabilities of Val.
> 2. Report the moment when Val [illegible] disgruntled, critical of his [illegible], ready to defect.

3. Report what at least some of the targets of the Soviets might be--namely her assignments from Val.

112

3. Report what at least some of the targets of the Soviets might be--namely her assignments from Val.

113

30 January 1969

CONTACT REPORT

FROM : Samuel J. KARTASUK

SUBJECT : Rafael VIDILLA Ruiz; contact with, on 29 January 1969.

1. KARTASUK left his car in a parking lot in the Zona Rosa and walked to the vicinity of Sanborns on Reforma and Tiber. At 1455 I called the Language school where Subject teaches and was told that he had not yet arrived for class. I called again at 1505 and was informed that he was already in class. At 1545 I began waiting in front of the Language school for Subject to come out. He came out at 1610 and we walked towards Sanborns. I invited him to go to La Mansion Restaurant on Insurgentes Sur but he said that he had a class scheduled from 1630 to 1800. We went to the Sanborns bar and had a drink. I told him that I thought that two girls I had previously met were going to meet me at the La Mansion at 1700 and that I wanted him to go with me. After some discussion he decided that he could postpone the class until Friday, but would have to wait until 1630 for the pupil to arrive, in order to inform her. We left the Bar at 1630 and encountered the student by the magazine stand. Subject made his excuses, and we started walking to his car. (Subject had not wanted to miss his class, and after some discussion in the bar, he offered me his car in order that I might go to La Mansion and get the girls. I told him that I also wanted to eat, and that there was a possibility that the girls would'nt show up. He finally consented after some consideration).

We arrived at La Mansion shortly before 1700 and went inside, leaving the car parked in the Restaurant lot. After sitting down and ordering drinks and a steak, I told him that I would like to discuss a few important items that had a lot do to with his future. (I had mentioned during the previous meeting that I had some business to talk to him about). I began by telling him that in our relationship I had neglected to mention something important. I told him that my meeting him in Acapulco was not an accident. I had gone there for the express purpose of meeting him after considerable planning. Subject just sat there with a calm amused look on his face, and asked me if I were the F.B.I.

114

or the Police, or something. I said "No. I'm an Intelligence Officer for the U. S. Government", and showed him my I. D. card. He looked at it, raised his eyebrows, but never changed the expression on his face. (From the look on his face, one might think he was watching a Bugs Bunny cartoon). I said that our files show that for some years he has had considerable contact with members of the Soviet KGB. Before I could go any further he stated that he was not a member of the KGB, nor did he ever work for them. I said that that was what we believed, and that was also why I wanted to talk to him. I had a proposition to make to him. Before I could continue, he said that he had often been approached (Currently and in the past) by the KGB to work for them. At present he is being hounded by Valentin (LOGINOV) to report on his Mexican friends. He considers the KGB to be a bunch of Bastards (Cabrones) and that he does not believe in all of this under the table spying, nor does he believe in what the KGB are trying to do, and if I'm involved in this work, and I am asking him the same thing, then I'm the same kind of bastard that the KGB are. He said for some time now, LOGINOV has called him, met him, and asked that he (Subject) spot Mexicans (students) who are either going to the U.S. or look like they might be promising in that respect, and that he (Subject) prepare biographical data and other details about their current life, and arrange for them to meet LOGINOV at parties, etc. LOGINOV, during each meeting with Subject, brings an envelope with 500 pesos in cash in it, and continually offers this to Subject. Subject says that he does'nt say yes or no, but that to date he has not furnished any information and has not accepted any money. He likes his friends and students, and any cooperation with LOGINOV (along these lines) would make him feel like a Judas. Besides, these students are young, and nice people, and the KGB bastards should keep their hands off them. He said that he appreciated the fact that I immediately showed him an official I.D. card and declared myself, because LOGINOV did not even have the decency to do that. LOGINOV has never showed him anything at all (in I.D.)

By whom? When?
Currently

115

Did Subj. ever ask L. why he wanted this info?

and never even extended the courtesy of telling him why he wanted the information on Mexican students, but Subject knows LOGINOV is KGB and doesn't appreciate the approach by LOGINOV. If LOGINOV had approached him honestly, showed him I.D. and talked about the idealism involved in what he wanted, Subject might have paid more attention, but he (Subject) did not like the dishonest way LONGINOV went about it, offering money and trying to con him. Subject said, granted, he needs money, and the 500 pesos always looks good, but that if he started doing what LOGINOV wanted, the sight of the money would make him sick afterwards. I told him that we were not interested in his students, but that we wanted to stop the KGB in their efforts to undermine other nations and direct sabotage against the U.S. He might not like the idea of under-the-table dealing, but it was a real fact of life. If it were not for the current under-the-table conflict, the world would probably be rushed into a nuclear war, and he knew what that meant. What was going on in the espionage field was actually a deterrant, and that the people involved were composed of the best minds of two worlds. I recalled his (Subject) two world powers opinions (previously expressed by him) and asked him what he planned to do. He could'nt return to Russia; his current future prospects in Mexico were not too promising, and he had previously mentioned that he wanted to go to the U.S. If it's true that there are only two important powers in the world, then he had better seriously consider where he wants to place his marbles. Opportunity does'nt knock every day, and he was talking to a representative of the U.S. Government at the moment, who was making a proposition directly to him (Subject). Subject said that that was all true; he at first wanted to return to Russia but after seeing some things in Mexico he realized that he could never be happy in Russia again because of the oppressive regime and the lack of freedom. (He cited the recent Russian invasion of the Checks and said that it made him sick to see the Russians do this). He said that he was not happy in Mexico but that he could live here O.K.

He had previously tried to go to the U.S. but had been turned down. In any case, he had made friends here, and this was his life, and he has no intention of either screwing his friends or being an informer, either for the KGB or for their U.S. equivalent. The first person he has to live with is himself, and the realization that he is a spy against his own friends would be enough to mentally ruin him, regardless of any money received. I told him that one of our efforts is trying to block the KGB when they go after people that turn out to be his friends. He can think that he (Subject) is not involved, but that is far from the truth. He may not work for the KGB, but his associations with them have been known for some time and that a thick file already exists on him. I know him personally now, and like him, and if he refuses to work with me I'm obligated to write it up that way. My superiors will later sit down with me and ask the results, and I'll tell them that Rafael is a nice guy, honest, sincere, and I firmly believe that he is completely honest w/me. This however will not answer the question why he will not cooperate, and when it is put on paper it will just be a cold report lacking personality, and the paper will indicate that he might be working for the KGB regardless of any opinions tacked on to the bottom. In a case like this, protocol between the U.S. and Mexican Governments require that we eventually turn over to them any reports on people in their country who might be involved with the Russians in efforts against Mexico. In his case, his file would be turned over to the Mexicans and then he can imagine what could happen. By the time the Secret Service stopped harrassing him, or he wound up in jail, he would be living a miserable life. All this just for being innocent. For this reason, and for reasons involving the fact that as a real person in a real world he can't afford just to sit on the middle of the fence, he should seriously consider my proposition.

117

Subject said that what I mentioned sounded like a threat, and that if it was, it still would'nt make any difference; he would rather go to jail or be harrassed by the police than to cooperate, either with us or the KGB. I told him that what I said was not a threat but a reality, and that he should appreciate the fact that I'm being frank with him instead of trying to do what LOGINOV did, to con him. I was only asking. I was a friend regardless what his decision was, and that if its "No", then I'll do everything in my power to see that he remains untouched and un-bothered, but that I can't garuntee anything because a bureaucratic structure was involved and I did'nt have the final say. I told him that unless everything he had told me during our previous association was complete B.S., then he had a duty to at least consider what I was asking. (By now we had been at this from 1700 to about 1930). Finally he asked me what I would want of him. I said that I wanted him to work with me directly against the KGB and that I had no interest in his friends or students at all. If he was concerned about the KGB bastards bothering his friends, this was his chance to help me do something about it. We can't operate alone. He has the intelligence, the ability and the opportunity to do a great deal and he should involve himself, if only for the ideals that he has previously expressed. (He thought about it for a few moments and began to talk about Yuriy CHERNYSH). He said that for instance CHERNYSH was another KGB man who had approached him to report on Americans. LOGINOV had told him that he (LOGINOV) could'nt get along with Americans and consequently was only interested in working with Mexicans, but CHERNYSH tried to recruit Subject to work against Americans. Subject refused. CHERNYSH however was trying to work on ANDREA (CHANG) (Subjects friend) and this made him damned mad. The girl ANDREA was only about 16 or 17, and a sweet little girl, and they (KGB) had no business trying to pick on her. Subject said that he was in the Plaza hotel one day waiting to make a phone call, and that he heard the man in the phone booth speaking fluent Russian. When the man got through Subject asked him in Russian if he was from the Embassy. The man gave his name and said that he was the 1st Secretary and asked Subject if his name was [illegible]

[illegible]

P-13042
Get details

P-13546
Get details

118

The 1st Secretary said that he recognized Rafael because he had seen his picture. During the conversation the Secretary asked Rafael over to dinner that night and he accepted. When Rafael arrived, he was introduced to CHERNYSH who made overtures of friendship which later led to the attempted recruitment. In the meantime Rafael had introduced CHERNYSH to ANDREA and now regretted it. (This led into further conversation about the KGB and I asked him about CHICHKOV). He said that he has worked for CHICHKOV but that he had no idea that CHICKOV was KGB. CHICHKOV had never made any attempt to recruit him for anything. He later mentioned that he might know VOSKOBOYNIKOV by first name. but could not be sure of the last name. (I did'nt try to describe him). Subject mentioned other Soviets who are KGB during a fast moving conversation but I did not take notes. My aim was the recruitment and I tried to keep the conversation channeled towards that end. During the conversation Subject said that at one time his mother had confided in him that they had tried to recruit her several times in Moscow to work against Spaniards and Latin Americans who visited. The KGB had once threatened her but when she complained that she would consult her husband, they told her to forget it. He said that she had known many members of the NVD. NKVD and now KGB, but that she still refuses to work for them in their business.

After considerable more discussion along the same lines, Subject finally thought a bit, and said that he would agree to work with me on one condition only. The condition was that I would not ask him to inform on, or work against, any of his friends or students, including CEIL, VINTURA or ANDREA in particular, and that if any thing should happen to him as a result of his work for me, that I would promise to take care of his wife and child. I agreed to his condition, restating that my only concern was the KGB. I said however that in the future if I could prove to him, or convince him, that any of his local acquaintences were directly involved with the KGB then I would expect him to help me.

119

He said that was fair enough. He said that today, 30 January, he had a Restaurant date with LOGINOV at 1930. He was to meet LOGINOV at a Mariscos Restaurant on the corner of Ave REFORMA and PRAGA. He wanted to know what he should do with LOGINOV. I told him to be very careful that he doesn't change his attitude one bit, and to continue for the time being with LOGINOV just as if nothing at all had happened. I said that the Soviets do have a department... at this he interrupted and said "SMERSH" and grinned. I said yes, they do operate now and then, and that the Soviets would not be very happy to discover that their friend had anything at all to do with us. I said that even though we treat each other as gentlemen, they are capable of being tough at times. He said not to worry, that he was an excellent actor, and LOGINOV would never suspect a thing.

During the time I was trying to convince him, he said that I was forgetting one thing. He assured me that he was 80% Socialist and 20% capitalist, and he firmly believed that Socialism was good for some countries, including Russia. He said that because of that he did'nt see how I could ever have any confidence in him. I answered by saying that everyone was entitled to their ideals, and I too believed in certain forms of Socialism. The encouraging thing was that he believed in something, and that was his right as an individual. We in the U.S are entitled to our beliefs, and are not restricted in our reading matter or what we said on street corners. If he wanted to, he could stand on the steps of the Lincoln monument and give a speach on socialism and no one would bother him provided he did'nt cause a riot, disturb the peach or break some local law. We have Socialists who are still good citizens. He then talked a little about the restrictions in Russia in reading matter and talking, but saw my point.

By 2115 we were in agreement on his cooperation with me involving the above mentioned conditions. I asked him to meet me on Wednesday, 5 February, at 1030 at CHALUPAS Restaurant on Reforma (just across the Periferico). He knew where it was and agreed to meet me. I cautioned him again to be very careful in his dealings with LOGINOV and to take precautions when he came to the meeting.

120

Just prior to leaving the restaurant he said that after this he was going out and get drunk. (I don't remember where he said he was going, but it might have been CELLS). In cautioning him, he has said that he would not say a word, even to his mother or wife. We left the restaurant at 2115. He wanted to give me a ride, or have me go get drunk with him, but I said that even though I would'nt mind it, that three of my associates were waiting about three blocks away for my report, and that I had to tell them what happened...they were very anxious about this. We parted in the doorway and he drove off as I walked in the other direction. I later caught a cab to town and left it in the vicinity of my car.

REMARKS:

During the conversation Subject mentioned the names of various Soviets, but I was not taking notes and preferred to channel the conversation back to the recruitment pitch. I thought the details could be obtained later if he was recruited.

Right

During the pitch the only one who was nervous was me. Subject displayed a "cool" which was amazing. When I presented my credentials and the pitch he never batted an eyelash...just continued slightly smiling. I noted no reaction at all. It could be that he still thought I was kidding, or playing some game. In any case, either he works for the other side, or he is indeed cool to an admirable point.

We (I) talked from 1700 to about 2030 without making any headway. Up until that time I had gotten an emphatic "NO". I almost gave up before another approach produced a little result. I think that prior assessments which state that he will do anything for money is entirely false. At the moment the recuitment is still on thin ice, and subject is serious about involving his friends. Perhaps after he gets his feet wet (if it lasts that long) and has some experience he can be brought around to do almost anything.

121

[illegible] the meanwhile however I would be very careful not to cast any reflections on his friends, (left or not) the Russian people, Republican Spaniards in general, or anything else that he has expressed a definite opinion on. If all of the foregoing is really legitimate, the success of the recruitment so far has been due to friendship and my willingness to see just about everything his way. This will take time to change.

Samuel J. Kartasuk

This looks like a really good job done, [illegible] [illegible] Rafael [illegible] [illegible] fully cooperative 12/17

I agree - Well done VPK

agree - [illegible]

(1) What did he [illegible] [illegible]

(2) Details When, where, how long did he see Loginov on 30 Jan.?

(3) What did he tell Loginov?

(4) Who were the KGB officers who tried to recruit? When? Details

(5) Any contact with the KGB in USSR? Any government [illegible] upon leaving USSR? Interviews?

(6) When, where did he apply to go to US? Details.

(7) Details on approach by [illegible]

(8) Details on KGB contact in [illegible] — CATANO, he learnt that they took an [illegible] in the [illegible] Spanish exhibit — she had parties with Spanish Sovs + local Sovs in her home.

⑨ Query of [illegible] - did [illegible] him - what Sovs are in contact with him (e.g. [illegible] is in contact with none)?

⑩ Concerning not reporting on friends - cite Carolina [illegible] as good example - they out to ruin her - we can prevent this - need her help, etc.

124

SECRET

30 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/Cuba

FROM : C/IC

SUBJECT : LIREALM-1's Soviet Contacts at the French Club

1. Without encouraging any further contact between LIREALM-1 and the Soviets but simply taking advantage of the fact that he does continue to see them, I would appreciate continuing information on the following points:

a. Anything new learned about the activities of LOGINOV and CHERNISH, even the fact that they were at the club for certain hours on certain dates, with whom they played tennis or talked, etc.

b. Any indications that either LOGINOV or CHERNISH have any interest in anyone at the club.

c. Continuing assessment and biographic data on Gloria PINTO and her husband with the view of approaching both or either.

2. I would also appreciate a detailed assessment of LOGINOV based on the relationship to date. The same for CHERNISH.

3. As KGB officers both are of priority interest.

P-11712

14-00000

125

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT : BESABER (P-8777)

DATE OF MEETING : 22 January 1969

1. Following a phone call from Subject, I met him at his hotel room for lunch. The meeting lasted from 1435 until around 1600. The next meeting will be arranged by phone when Subject is back in Mexico City.

2. During the past month, Subject was ill with flue and, following recovery, spent all of his time on business matters rather than on subjects of operational interest. As usual, he is up to his ears in financial woes, though he just discovered that his position is not nearly as bad as he thought.

Tommy's Smoking.

P-217

3. Subject said he thinks Polish Ambassador MAJCHRZAK may come to visit him in Cuernavaca this Sunday, though plans are not definite. I urged him again to get busy courting MAJ. a bit more aggressively and not to let the relationship grow cold. Subject said that the reason he has not been more active lately is that Lolita is in the early months of pregnancy and has not been feeling up to any large-scale entertaining.

P-11712

4. Yesterday afternoon, 21 January, Subject ran into Valentin LOGINOV at Florencia and Hamburgo. They exchanged brief greetings and LOGINOV commented "We have had a very good beginning of the year." (whatever that means).

P-9197

5. Subject recently received a post card from BEWEEP advising that BEWEEP has seen Subject's sister in Warsaw. Nothing more than this other than routine greetings.

6. Subject said that his secretary has been looking for an

File: P-8777

P-11,712

14-0000

126

attch
~~[illegible]~~
K/Sec

SECRET

10 JANUARY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (P-11712)

On 16 December 1968 LICALLA reported that a light-complexioned woman had entered the Soviet Embassy grounds at 1106 that day. She was seen exiting at 1122 hours. While inside the Soviet Embassy grounds, this woman had contact with Subject (LOGINOV).

LILYRIC reported that on that same date, 16 December 1968, an unidentified light-complexioned woman had entered the Soviet Embassy at 1106 hours. She was exiting at 1122 hours. She was driving a car with D.F. plates 964 FC. LIKAYAK reported on 7 January 1969 that these plates were registered to:

Raquel*URTULER de*DALLAL
Residence: Rio Po 95 - 1
Mexico 5, D.F.

Index

They are registered to a 1965 Opel Sedan.

There are no Station Traces on the woman cited above.
Attached are photographs of the woman seen in contact with LOGINOV, as well as the LIKAYAK placa check results.

Grace H. FARMILANT

You sure it's not Raquel Welch?

CARDED

SECRET

file
P-11,712

LILYRIC- Y-2926 — 11 Dec 68

THIS WOMAN WAS SEEN ENTERING CLUB ST 1105 HOURS. SHE ARRIVED IN A CAR WITH D.F. PLACAS 964 FC (being checked). ACCORDING TO LICALLA, A BLONDE WOMAN WHO WAS SEEN ENTERING AT SAME TIME HAD CONTACT WITH VALENTIN S. LOGINOV (P-11712), KNOWN KGB OFFICER. ACCORDING TO LOCALLA THIS WOMAN EXITED AT 1122 HOURS, WHICH IS SAME TIME LILYRIC HAS HER EXITING.





129

Kelyne

14 December 1965

131

Source: Likay 2

México D. F. a 7 de Enero de 1969.

Index

ASUNTO. PLACAS

A quien corresponda

PRESENTE:

Me permito informar el resultado de la investigación de las placas que enseguida especifico.

SA/F

Placa Nº 964-PC-Pertenece a un coche Opel sedán particular modelo 1965 motor IIEXI652121 con canje de placas en 1963 a nombre de RAQUEL URTULER DE DALLAL con domicilio en las calles de Rio Poo Nº 95 interior 1 de la zona postal 5 D. F.

[illegible]

Mexico 5, D.F.

132

~~6/16-(?)~~ .pk
~~DC HQ 7883~~ cc/sec file
~~RCP A7~~
c/F

17 Licalla

17 DICIEMBRE DE 1968

NOTAS

11.

Miércoles 11 Al parecer arribó al Club un matrimonio nuevo, mismo que clasifico como ?-1, aparece entre otras fotos en las Nº 1,2,11,12,22,23 y 24 del R-C-2313 tiene contacto con: Kaz,Nip,Por,Pora,Kov,Gor y Kol y Kola, principalmente con estos 2 últimos, posiblemente se quede en lugar de ellos.

Elce Shevchenko

replacing Peti Gorelov

Viernes 13 Hoy empezaron 6 trabajadores a reparar y pintar algunos salones del interior del Edificio.

He seguido viendo a 2 HOMBRES que se encuentran en México desde el mes de Octubre, estos sujetos entre otras fotos aparecen en las Nº 30 y 31 del Rollo: C - 2313.

Expedition types Gorelkov + Kuznetsov

Lunes 16 A las 1100 Hs. un Hombre y 2 Mujeres al parecer extranjeros, salieron del Club por la reja principal, en el Recibidor tuvieron contacto con: Gont.

Poss. photos attached No ser

A las 1122 Hs. una Mujer rubia y que vestía de color verde y mallas negras caladas, salió del Club por la reja principal, la Mujer mencionada entró a las 1106 Hs. y en el Recibidor tuvo contacto con: Lo.

Lilique photos attached

am getting plate check

Martes 17 Este día en un camión de las "Mudanzas Cevallos" sacaron varios muebles usados que posiblemente sean para la casa que va habitar el HOMBRE ?-1 y su familia.

files Shevchenko 1213,693 Elce Shevchenko

~~cc P-11163~~
cc P-11712

17 December 1968
Simon Licalla

P 11,712

14-00000

133

[illegible]

P-11665

P-11712

P-13125

CONTACT REPORT:

SUBJECT: LIROBIN/1 and 2

DATE OF MEETING: 4 December 1968

1. The undersigned met with LIROBIN/1 and 2 at the LIROBIN apartment on 4 December from 1215 to 1300 hours. The next meeting will occur when one of the LIROBIN's contacts REIDEMANN via telephone.

2. LIROBIN/2 reported that both of the LIROBINS attended a cocktail party at the home of the Indian Embassy ~~Counsellor~~ Consul (?), FNU PARASHAR, at which they met the LOGINOV's (P-11712). LOGINOV again refused to carry on any of the conversation in English even though English was the common language used by the guests. At one point during the evening, Mrs. PARASHAR addressed LOGINOV in front of all the guests and chided him for not using his English remarking that "everyone here knows that you speak English". LOGINOV stared at her icily, but did not comment in either Spanish or English. LOGINOV spoke briefly with L/1 inquiring what L/1's duties were with the newspaper and gave every indication that he was unaware of L/1's column. Mrs. LOGINOV was quite cordial and inquired if L/2 had been to the film festival in Acapulco. L/2 replied that she had not to which Mrs. LOGINOV countered by remarking that she had seen L/2's friends - the SARATOVS (P-13125)- at Acapulco. L/2 stated that no effort was made to involve the LOGINOV's in polemics during the evening and that LOGINOV did not appear to know the majority of the approximate 16 guests who represented almost every nationality. The LIROBIN's were the only Americans with the exception of Edward KENNEDY and his Mexican wife. LOGINOV did not spend an inordinate time with any particular individual nor did they remain late.

3. Additional information was obtained re Arnold BILGORN which REIDEMANN will fashion into a report. The REIDEMANN's are invited to dinner at the LIROBIN's on 6 December together with the BILGORN's and others.

[illegible] REIDEMANN

14-00000

134

LIREALM-1

[illegible] : Gloria and Pepe Pinto
DATE OF [illegible] : December 2, [illegible]

GLORIA'S INTEREST IN [illegible]. There seems to be no firm evidence that Gloria is interested in Val other than socially and for tennis.

Gloria is a very attractive and vivacious woman of 40 or 45 years. She is the center of gravity of a group of tennis enthusiasts, ranging in age from Meche, Gloria's daughter of 19 or 20 to Licerciado Preciado (a deputy from PAN) of perhaps 65 years or more. It is doubtful that Gloria would encourage an affair with Valentin. Her interest in Val is probably that of everyone else's, as a Soviet, he is a novelty. He is also probably attractive to women who like brutish men. Gloria, ~~xx~~ however, is married to a very soft-spoken and considerate person.

EXTENT OF SOCIAL CONCOURSE. It seems likely that Val and Gloria and their families have come together socially at intervals. It is doubtful that they are intimate friends, but likely that they (the Pintos) are the closest friends that Val has among the Mexicans.

VAL'S INTEREST IN GLORIA. Val's interest in Gloria is probably more complex than her interest in him. First, he probably has entertained the possibility of an affair with Gloria. Val has spoken frequently of his interest in girls. Gloria could easily be a sexual target for Val--self-appointed, of course.

Further, Gloria organizes tennis groups and informal tournaments. Through her Val is likely to meet a number of Mexicans.

It seems highly unlikely that Val would try to recruit either Gloria or Pepe. They enjoy a fairly luxurious life, Pepe being a fairly successful physician. Neither Pepe or Gloria take life seriously enough to become intellectual communists. Philosophy is certainly not their reading of choice during idle hours. Gloria is primarily interested in sports. She was national champion of water-skiing several years in a row. Now she is devoting herself to tennis which she plays reasonably well. Dancing is probably her next great interest. In my opinion she does not have sufficient time left to devote to marxism or economics or politics. She seems particularly ill-informed ~~xx~~ about politics.

PEPE RETURNS. Pepe returned from four weeks in Europe last Tuesday, November 26th. Their son, Pepito, travelled with him.

COPIES MADE

P-11712

P-13223

14-00000

#135

INVITATION FOR DINNER FOR GLORIA. It would be perfectly natural for us to invite the Pintos to dinner. We have maintained contact with them through tennis at least twice a week. There have been occasional dinners among our clique.

We could also invite Valentin with or without the Pintos. Valentin has done us at least one favor which we have not reciprocated, an invitation to the Moscow Circus.

GLORIA'S FEELING ABOUT THE US. I believe that Gloria is less anti-American than the average middle-class Mexicanl. She has travelled to the US many times for vacations and shopping. She knows the US rather well, but she does not seem pro-US.

RECRUITABILITY OF GLORIA. I am convinced that she would never agree to work for the US. She might consider working for a false-flage "Mexican" if she were told that Val had been observed participating in some heinous espionage act, supplying arms and money to the communist student agitators, for example. Her ultimate objectives are not clear in my mind. I doubt that she could ever hope to recruit Valentin to defect to Mexico. I am sure she could never recruit him as an agent of Mexico. It does seem possible that she might be able to get him to reveal his disappointments and grievances--information which might be of value to us.

PRQ-I and II. Xn At the moment I have insufficient information about the Pintos to prepare a complete PRQ I or II. If it is deemed of intereest, we could exchange invitations during the next few weeks in order to obtain the necessary information.

SUBJECT: [illegible] Gloria Pinto
DATE OF INFORMATION: December 21, 1968. 1100 hours
PLACE ACQUIRED: French Club

I saw Gloria talking to Iouri Tchernych. I joined them. Gloria was turning on all of her not inconsiderable charm. Invited Iouri to her posada. Then asked whom she should see at the Soviet embassy about a business deal she had. Was told this would be Ivanov. Gloria said she knew him and described him as big and corpulent. Apparently this was correct--according to Iouri's reaction.

Gloria asked Iouri where he worked and was told with Valentin. He added that this is the department you must come to if you want to visit the Soviet Union.

Later I saw Iouri with his wife and son. She is rather attractive, tall. Pavel, is about three years old, and a very handsome little boy.

DATE OF INFORMATION: December 23, 1968. 2000 - 0200 hours.
PLACE ACQUIRED: Posada at Gloria's

Val and his wife and Iouri and his wife and about 40 to 50 other people were present. Val's wife brought pirojki--delicious.

Gloria invited us to spend next weekend with them and 3 or 4 other couples at Valle de Bravo. Valentin and his wife will be there. We accepted.

[illegible]

137

CUB/SEC ~~[illegible]~~ fm ROWTON, hold
back TO ROWTON hold.

Index

Gloria*Pinto, tennis companion of Valentin LOGINOV.

1. A resume of their relationship. His attitude towards her, hers to him. Any indications of sexual involvement?

2. Bio data on Pinto, marital relations, assessment of her, could she be approached to talk about her relationship with LOGINOV, how, through whom?

Does Loginov still go to French Club? How often. With whom does he associate. In short a report on his current activities + contacts at French Club.

I'll query LIREALM/1 at next mtg 26/11/68

Done. See LIREALM/1 report mid-December 68 WBN

No, I got photos but no report from LIREALM-1 on above

P-11185
NP-11712

LIREAM/1 has been asked for above answers
WPM. 20/1/69

138

LIREALM-1 file

9

C/Cub

IC/F

Traces on Tony or Antonio VALERO.

Pls ask LIREALM for detailed bio data assessment and any further info on contacts with or interest in LOGINOV

Jm

copy made

R 11712

P-11185

#139

LIREALM-1

SUBJECT: Tony Valero
DATE OF TRANSMISSION: November 20, 1963

TRACES REQUESTED. For various reasons, I would like to know if there is any information in the files on Tony.

INTEREST IN RUSSIAN. Tony has shown an unusual interest in Valentin Loguinov. He recently made a date with Val to play tennis at the French Club. Tony admitted to making quite an effort to keep his date, despite other committments which had come up. Val, however, did not show and did not call Tony. Tony seemed far more annoyed than would be normal under the circumstances.

TONY'S FATHER, AMERICAN. Tony has a large family here and in the US. His father is an American and Tony speaks excellent English. He is very friendly, well-liked, pro-US!!, excellent tennis player.

Antonio VALERO

P-11712

140

14-00000

~~[illegible]~~ 1C/Sa - [illegible] file
~~[illegible]~~
[illegible]

CONTACT REPORT:

SUBJECT: LIROBBINS/1 P-11665

DATE OF MEETING: 14 November 1968

1. The undersigned met with LIROBBINS/1 at his apartment on 14 November from 1500 to 1630 hours. LIROBBINS/2 was ill in bed (flu) and was unable to participate in this meeting. The LIROBBINS daughter, Lisa, was present in the house during the meeting which prompted REIDEMANN to inquire of L/1 if the daughter was XXXXX aware of the type of relationship which the LIROBBINS had with REIDEMANN. L/1 replied that "they" had told their daughter inasmuch as she had come to suspect such a relationship over the past year or so. REIDEMANN felt that it would be of little purpose, at this time, to admonish the LIROBBINS and dropped the subject. REIDEMANN has found the LIROBBINS to be woefully lacking in general security principles and has strived, in a tactful manner, to point out past shortcomings and possible security hazards - especially with regard to telephone conversations.

2. In response to REIDEMANN's question regarding attendance at the 7 November reception, L/1 stated that they had both attended. L/1 commented that there appeared to be fewer people this year than last. As a matter of fact, L/1 could identify only two people in the entire throng that he had previously known. They were: the Indian Embassy Counsellor (?), FNU PARASHAR and an American couple, Lulu Vargas-Vila de LEE (wife), who is the correspondent for La Union (Valparaiso); La Prensa (Buenos Aires); El Tiempo (Bogota) and resides at Platon 445 - 2nd floor, Tel: 20-10-23. The LIROBBINS spoke briefly with both of the above parties as well as SARATOV (P-13125), SYCHEV (P-11113), LOGINOV (P-11712) and PRIKHODKO (P-2270). The conversation adhered to generalities such as the Olympics, food, etc. L/1 noted that the majority of the guests

P-11665

P-13125 (P), P-11113 (P), P-11712 (P) & P-2270 (P)

141

appeared to be Mexicans - a large number of them clad in their everyday clothes. There was also a sprinkling of Mexican student-appearing types. For the record, L/1 reported that his automobile is a 1965 blue, two-door, Oldsmobile bearing Oklahoma license plates, ZS-8546 (1968 plates).

3. With reference to SARATOV's party on the evening of 13 November, L/1 commented that he and L/2 arrived at the party at approximately 2000 remaining until ca. 0030, 14 November. The LIROBBINS were the last to leave although they departed only minutes after the rest of the guests. The guest list included: The LIROBBINS, Arnold Bilgore and wife JoAnne, Roger CUDNEY (Radio VIP) and wife, and the Saratovs. English was the common language spoken and L/1 noted that both the Saratovs handled the language with ease although as the evening progressed and SARATOV's liquor consumption increased his fluency and articulation became more labored. L/1 stated that SARATOV pushed liquor very hard the entire evening starting out with two pre-dinner drinks andthen serving vodka in accompaniement to the borsch. Wine was served with the main course, Chinese beef, prepared by Nataliya SARATOVA. Dessert was accompanied with brandy and the evening progressed with long drinks after dinner. L/1 stated that SARATOV drank with the group although L/1 doubted that SARATOV matched the men drink for drink. Mrs. SARATOVA appeared at ease and seemed to enjoy the conversation. L/1 assessed her as a woman who complemented her husband and made a charming and vivacious appearance. L/1 seemed to be struck with SARATOV's apparent"sincerity" in ~~is~~ his enjoyment of the evening and his "candor" in the discussions. For the most part, the conversation edged away from any controversial subjects; seemingly all were content to dwell upon "Old Mexico" of 20 years ago and the joys of simple living in the city. During a discussion of the style of night life in Mexico, SARATOV remarked that he enjoyed

a good strip-tease performance now and then relating that he had seen a number of them when he was in the States. SARATOV spoke nostalgically of his life in the States admitting that he missed many aspects of his life there. L/1 remarked that the conversation was largely centered around comments by the BILGORES and L/1 and L/2 inasmuch as the CUDNEYS were very reserved and seldom expressed themselves to any degree. L/1 commented that to the best of his knowledge the CUDNEY's and SARATOV's had first met and the dinner party held by the LIROBBINS. L/1 expressed some surprise in that the CUDNEY's were invited as they are rather shy and inexpressive. Toward the end of the evening, L/1 was able to raise the question of the Soviet invasion of the CSSR. SARATOV staunchly defended the Soviet and Warsaw Pact occupation claiming that it was a necessary move because of the increasing aggressiveness of the West Germans and that the avowed purpose of West German truculence was to put pressure on both the CSSR and East Germany in hopes of reunifying Germany. SARATOV did not become emotional over his defense, but left little doubt that he wholeheartedly approved of the Soviet move into the CSSR. Neither the BILGORE's or the LIROBBINS pursued the issue although L/1 commented to SARATOV that he was not convinced by SARATOV's defense of Soviet actions. In short, L/1 felt that the evening went off smoothly and as the LIROBBINS departed SARATOV walked them down the steps and solicitously inquired of L/1 as to whether they (SARATOV's) had entertained properly and if all had been satisfied with the SARATOV's production. L/1 found this vaguely out of keeping with SARATOV's personality and somewhat gauche. L/1 noted that the SARATOV apartment was modern and well-kept giving every evidence of having been lived in. The SARATOV's possess a large European make combination phono-radio set which was tuned to light FM music for background. SARATOV stated that he had inherited this from his prodecessor. SARATOV's one child (age 9) was in bed when the guests arrived. Upon departing, SARATOV inquired of the LIROBBINS if they planned to attend the forthcoming Acapulco film festival. L/1 stated that he was not sure if he would journey there and SARATOV stated that he and his wife planned to attend.

4. LIROBBIN/1 stated that during a recent conversation which he had with Stratford JONES (US citizen representing AP in Mexico), JONES commented that he knew both SARATOV and SYCHEV. JONES remarked that he had been to a party at SYCHEV's during the Olympics. ~~XXXX~~ Furthermore, JONES related that he knew the KUCHEROV's (TASS) and that Mrs. ~~XXXXXXX~~ KUCHEROV had been sent home before the departure of KUCHEROV. JONES strongly implied that security reasons were behind the rather abrupt departure of Mrs. KUCHEROV. L/1 did not press the issue any further.

5. LIROBBIN/1 also reported that the Foreign Press Club in in a chaotic state in that the president, Jose QUIROGA, has accused the club director, Katherine MANJARREZ, of embezzling funds. The truth of the matter, however, seems to be that QUIROGA is engaged in either shady dealing or is guilty of sloppy administration of finances. At any rate, L/1 commented that all members must pay cash for all services and that the club's creditors are pushing for cash payments of all services. The "scandal" seems to have shaken the Club and many members are staying away until the financial situation is corrected.

6. The undersigned inquired of L/1 as to whether he knew of any US citizens who might be looking for an apartment. L/1 stated that ~~XX~~ he was currently unaware of anyone desiring housing but that he would keep his ears open and make a few discreet inquiries without revealing that he knows of any vacancies.

MONROE N. REIDEMANN

144

SECRET

13 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/IC/SB

VIA : Chief of Station
C/IC

SUBJECT : Consular Corps Visit to Veracruz

1. The undersigned visited Veracruz on 9 and 10 November together with other members of the Consular Corps on an official visit to that city. Although the Cubans were scheduled to attend and official diplomas proclaiming them guests of the City of Veracruz were prepared, none of them showed up, including Lino SALAZAR Chia, who is stationed in Veracruz. The Czechs, East Germans, and Poles for a number of reasons also failed to go on this trip. Thus, the only Communist representative was Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, with whom the undersigned had plenty of opportunity to talk. It seems that LOGINOV, at least for public consumption, considers the undersigned "his friend." LOGINOV was accompanied by his wife.

2. The following were the main points of interest discussed by LOGINOV:

a. The Soviet appeared very anxious to get the undersigned's opinion on a subject to which he kept going back time and again during the visit: the position of the Richard M. NIXON administration vis-a-vis Communist China. Specifically, what LOGINOV wanted to know was what the chances are that the NIXON administration might attempt to bring about a rapprochement between Communist China and the United States. LOGINOV approached this topic from various directions, and the undersigned had the distinct impression that he had received a specific query on this subject. At one point, LOGINOV stressed the importance of Communist China to his country, indicating that his government is becoming increasingly concerned with developments there.

SECRET

[illegible]

P-11712

145

b. Connected with the above was LOGINOV's concern for peace in Vietnam. For the first time that the undersigned can remeber, a Soviet stated that the United States and his country had "a common interest of utmost importance" in bringing peace to Vietnam. That the Soviet interest may be connected with their concern about Communist China was indicated by LOGINOV when the latter indicated that peace should be obtained in Vietnam as a way to keep out the Chinese Communists. This did not prevent LOGINOV from making the usual noises in favor of the National Liberation Front and the Vietcong, blasting away at South Vietnamese militarism.

c. While talking about the Middle East, LOGINOV said that the Soviet Union was in the Mediterranean to stay and fully intended to give such support to the Arab nations in that area as to someday "get rid of Israel." LOGINOV specifically stated, "The Jews have it coming to them, and the day of reckoning is coming." The undersigned was curious to know whether this was prompted on LOGINOV's part by a dislike of the Israelis or an anti-Semitic feeling. LOGINOV was quite blunt and categorically stated that he for one "hated all Jews," and did not hide his profound anti-Semitism. LOGINOV added that Jews are parasites who have little nationalism other than that generated by the Zionist cause. He implied that those Jews left in the Soviet Union are foreigners who have done little to help the Soviet cause. The undersigned pointed out that anti-Semitism has been a long Russian tradition, dating back to before the Revolution, and deplored this obvious discrimination. He added that this reminded him of the anti-Semitism of the party which not so long ago made mass murder of Jews a matter of national policy.

d. It took LOGINOV about one day to bring up the Sucesos para Todos article. The undersigned jokingly asked him whether this was a Soviet or Cuban sponsored joke, saying that rumor had it that Sucesos was financed by both the Soviets and the

146

Cubans. LOGINOV denied this, saying that the staff of Sucesos could not be put by any stretch of the imagination into the category of "Communists." He then point-blank asked the undersigned whether he belonged to the organization mentioned in the article. The undersigned laughingly answered that if such trashy publications as Sucesos were believed by anyone "of course he belonged to that organization." LOGINOV laughed and made a few more noises about how Sucesos obtained the undersigned's name. The latter replied that his name was probably selected at random from stolen pages of the Embassy directory or other such document. He added that if LOGINOV had wanted his phone number he would have been glad to have given it to him rather than see it appear in Sucesos.

e. The discussion the undersigned had with LOGINOV in Guadalajara about the KGB was apparently not forgotten by the Soviet, for the latter pulled out of his purse a copy of the stamp commemorating some KGB anniversary that the undersigned had mentioned to him. The undersigned has no idea of the reasons for this gesture. One of the topics which seems to embarrass LOGINOV the most is the number of visas he signs at the Soviet Embassy. Whenever LOGINOV gets a little too pointed in his provocations, the undersigned raises this subject, with LOGINOV invariably giving a little laugh and no answer.

f. LOGINOV indicated that he was aware that the undersigned had met with Jiri SVESTKA at the time of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and asked for his opinion of SVESTKA. The undersigned made no bones about the fact that he had a long lunch with the Czech. He said he had found him to be "muy de la izquierda," adding that unfortunately SVESTKA belonged to the very small minority of his country which had welcomed Soviet intervention. The undersigned predicted that the Soviets would have considerable trouble with Czechoslovakia and pointed out that this serious error had tarnished the cause

147

of the Soviet Union. He said, for example, that the Soviet intervention was very unpopular in Mexico. This seemed to draw a little blood from LOGINOV, as he abruptly interrupted the undersigned and asked, "Where is it popular?"

Raymond A. FRADYER

Distribution:
Orig - 7 (Consular Corps)
① - P-11712 (LOGINOV)
1 - P-7111 (SVESTKA)

RAF:lmp

14-00000

148

[illegible]
[illegible]
11/52-8[illegible]

CONTACT REPORT:

SUBJECT: LIROBBINS/1 and 2.

DATE OF MEETING: 15 October 1968

1. The undersigned met with LIROBBINS/1 and 2 at their apartment on 15 October from 1600 to 1730 hours. The LIROBBINS were informed that REIDEMANN would be out of the country for the next two weeks and, accordingly, were requested to contact [illegible] should they obtain information which they deem perishable and of urgency. The ROBBINS will contact [illegible] either at [illegible] the Station or at home via telephone. A supplementary report on the activities of Pearl GONZALEZ is attached to this Contact Report as a Memorandum for the Record (separate).

2. LIROBBIN/2 reported that on 2 October Aleksandr PRIKHODKO (P-2270) delivered an invitation to the LIROBBINS to attend a reception at the Soviet Embassy for the Soviet Olympic team. PRIKHODKO did not come in and visit with the LIROBBINS but merely made out an invitation for the LIROBBINS to attend. Both the LIROBBINS attended the function arriving at approximately 1930 and departing about 2130. The reception was rather poorly organized and there were few people in attendance from the Mexico City community. The LIROBBINS stated that they were the only American journalists and recognized no other guests with the exception of a Mexican movie star/director, Amilio FERNANDEZ ("El Indo") and wife. During the reception, LIROBBIN/2 saw SARATOV (P-13125) who approached the LIROBBINS and apologized for the fact that he had not been able to hold his party. SARATOV said that he had been extremely busy with the Olympics which occasioned him to go out to the airport every day as well as doing the work of others who he implied had been shirking their duties. SARATOV repeated his regret that he had not been able to organize the promised party, but assured the LIROBBINS that as soon as the Olympics were over

[illegible]

he would invite the LIROBBINS (and others) to a special party. The LIROBBINS noted that SUCHEV (P-11113) was not in attendance at this reception. The LIROBBINS also passed a few light remarks with LOGINOV (P-11712) regarding the [illegible] reception and the Olympics. L/1 noted that LOGINOV spoke to them in fluent English although he had previously denied to L/1 and L/2 that he spoke or understood English.

MONROE N. REIDEMANN.

Attached letter received anonymously by LIROBBIN

150

4, Oct. 1968

Mr. Loyd Rosenfield
THE NEWS
Balderas 87
Mexico, D.F.

Dear Loyd Rosenfield of the SIDELINES Dept.;

My father was a government official in Greece - We are now here in Mexico. We know for sure that the C.I.A. of the United States engineered the military take-over of the Greek government and the errection of the present police state that exists there.

In Peru, I suspect a similar course of events has taken place.

We would like to stay here in Mexico: Do you think that the militarists of Mexico are planning to take over the government of Mexico? Doesn't it make sense that if the militarists are able to create a state of civil disorder that they will be granted more power, to the extent that they will become the acting government of Mexico, like the governments which have recently come into being in Greece and Peru? Couldn't the terrorist groups like the "Murro" and the so-called "Communists" be in actuality employees of the militarist institutions of this country whose purpose it is to frustrate a situation which only the military-police state could control?

And lastly, I know you have no way of responding to this last question but I will ask it anyway: Don't you think that the American C.I.A. is at least as influential here in Mexico and Latin America as it has been in my country?

Excuse me for not signing my name. Respectfully yours, LILYRIC (Y-2844) 24 Sept 68 - Two unidentified Mexicans entered the Soviet Embassy at 1025. They were seen talking to LOGINOV, and left at 1038.



T2 11712

SOURCE: LILYRIC

DATE : 24 Sept 1968

two Mexicans met with Valentin Loginoa at 10:38

154

SECRET

17 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telecon with LICOZY-5 on 12 September 1968

1. LICOZY-5 reported that Henryk SOBIESKI recently called him and identified himself as the replacement for Jan JAKOWIEC. He said that JAKOWIEC will leave in about a month, as soon as the Olympics are completed. He also invited LICOZY-5 for lunch on 17 September stating that he had greetings from an old friend. I told LICOZY-5 to listen to what SOBIESKI says but to turn him down flat, if a pitch is attempted.

2. LICOZY-5 also reported that BAKULIN and his wife left on 10 September with the daughters of KAZANTSEV, LOGINOV and DYAKONOV (confirmed by LICALLA).

Francis J. COIGNE

file P-11712

cc P-12496

COPIES MADE

SECRET

155

SECRET

21 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Soviet Travel

SOURCE : LICOZY-5

On 21 August 1968 Subject reported that he has made reservations for the following air travel from Mexico to the USSR for 10 September 1968:

a. Valentin and Vera BAKULIN (P-6059). Source does not know if this is PCS or TDY.

b. The daughter of Valentin LOGINOV (P-11712). She is 16 years old and is returning to the USSR after spending the summer with her parents.

Francis J. COIGNE

Files:

P-2712 P-6059 P-11712

SECRET

156

SUBJECT: Julio PLATAS Urbina, born 10 October 1941 in Empalme,
Sonora

1. It has come to our attention that Julio PLATAS Urbina, an agent of the Soviet KGB, is presently living in Bacobampo, Sonora. PLATAS has been known to us since 1961, when he was in contact with Aleksander BROVKIN, a KGB officer who was then and still is attached to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City as a Third Secretary. In 1965, PLATAS was in contact with Valentin LOGINOV, a KGB officer who is a Third Secretary and Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

2. The exact nature of PLATAS's KGB assignments is unknown to us, but he is believed to be a courier, carrying both money and drugs in behalf of the KGB. His courier duties are also believed to have brought him in contact with the Communist Party of Mexico.

3. PLATAS is believed to have traveled considerably throughout Latin America, and is known to have been in Argentina and Great Britain in 1967. According to our information, he has just received a new assignment, a courier mission which may begin as early as 1 August 1968.

4. We would appreciate receiving the results of your interrogation of PLATAS particularly since he is alleged to have knowledge of Soviet attempts to recruit personnel of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico.

V.P.RIZZUTO:wgp (26 July 1968)

Distribution:
Orig - LITEMPO-8
1 - P-6948
1 - P-1890
1 - P-11712

1-50-6-91/4

157

~~DC/SB~~

TMA

~~DDC/SB~~ (A)

~~DDDC/SB~~ (F)

SB/Sec

Una Recepción de Valentín Loguinov



DOCTOR LAURIDO y Candia, Valentín S. Loguinov, Antonio Certosimo y Jiri Svestka, durante la recepción. (Foto de Jaime González)

El señor Valentín S. Loguinov, jefe de la sección consular de la embajada de la URSS, y su esposa Alexandra D. de Loguinov, ofrecieron una elegante recepción el miércoles por la noche, en la embajada rusa.

La reunión fué en honor de un grupo de amistades y miembros del cuerpo consular, del que el señor Loguinov es socio activo e integrante de la mesa directiva.

También para darle la bienvenida a su hija, joven de 15 años, quien acaba de

EXCELSIOR

SECCION B

Viernes 12 de Julio de 1968

Una Recepción de Valentín Loguinov

Sigue de la Primera Plana

llegar procedente de Rusia para disfrutar de una temporada de vacaciones en nuestro país.

El señor Loguinov hizo la presentación de varios de los artistas estrellas del Circo Ruso, entre ellos al gran mago Emil Kio.

Se sirvió un exquisito ambigú con platillos típicos de la cocina rusa, vinos internacionales y el imprescindible vodka.

Asistieron: el licenciado Luis Alba Cejudo y señora, Antonio Certosimo y Ema Soto de Certosimo, Francois Barreiet y señora, David Wiarley y su esposa Jane, Jan Jarowicz y su esposa Marta, D. N. Parashar, su esposa Kenahoulia e hijo Rabi; Jiri Svestka y Anna, Marta Fonseca de Jiménez, ingeniero Alfonso Sibaja y Helmida Kusulas de Sibaja; doctor Jaime Lourido y Candia, Enrique Picard, Abelardo Currbelo, Rafael Mirabal Fernández, Gustavo Díaz Vargas, Liza Habelberg, Guillermo Galesio y muchas otras personas.

P. 11712

158

DC/SB

~~RIGGS~~

VPR

8 JULY 1968

I ran traces on the people mentioned in the LITEMPO report attached. Only identifiable traces were on Higinio GOMEZ (Jr.) . These are attached.

FROM

SB/BEANBALL

159

COS 1'
~~C/SB~~
8M
~~C/~~
Riggs
~~Luke~~

México, D.F.
2 July, 1968

Re: CALLE NEBRASKA 160

Source: L/3
Date: 1 July, 1968
Ref.: Station request, 25 June, last.

Attached, for our retention, is a report on the inhabitants of the Apt. bldg. at captiored address.

CARDED

Indef

Valentin Loginov
P- 11712
Rene Marchand.

cc P- 370

cc 50-6-91/4

14-00000

160

RELACION DE INQUILINOS QUE VIVEN EN EL EDIFICIO No. 160 DE LAS CALLES DE NEBRASKA.

N.T.

DEPTO. No. 1.- HARRY G. FLETCHER, D NACIONALIDAD INGLESA NO TIENE OCUPACION FIJA PERO CONCURRE MUCO A LA DEFENSA NACIONAL DONDE ES MUY CONOCIDO. TIENE UN AUTOMOVIL PACKARD VIEJO.

DEPTO. No. 2.- PENDIENTE NO HAY QUIEN DE DATOS.

four N.T.

DEPTO . No. 3.- SRA. WALRAVEN SU MARIDO TIENE POCO DE HABER MUERTO Y VIVE SOLA NO TIENE NINGUNA OCUPACION NI VEHICULO.

No iden trace

DEPTO. No. 4.- ING. JOSE ENRIQUE ORTEGA ESPINOSA, TRABAJA EN LA COMISION NACIONAL DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR EN EL KM. 33 DE LA CARRETERA - MEXICO TOLUCA, TIENE UN AUTOMOVIL JAGUAR PLACAS 691-EU Y - UN VALIANT MODELO 1965 PLACAS 690-EU.

DEPTO. No. 5.- SR. RAFAEL GONZALES NO HAY QUIEN DE DATOS DE EL.

N.T.

DEPTO. No. 6.- LIC. ARTURO LARIOS RODRIGUEZ TIENE SU DESPACHO EN AVE. 16 DE SEPTIEMBRE No. 76-401 TIENE UN AUTOMOVIL PLYMOUTH X MOD 1966.

Pers traces attached

DEPTO. No. 7.- HIGINIO GOMEZ SERRANO, DUEÑO DE LA CASA D PUBLICIDAD FOUM MALS. LA ESPOSA NO SABE LA DIRECCION Y NO APARECE EN EL DI XXXXXXXX TELEFONICO TIENE UN AUTOMOVIL MARCA PACKARD MOD 1956.

N.T.

DEPTO. No. 8.- JOSE V. WHALEY GERENTE DE VENTAS DE LA CIA. GARDNER-DENVER ~~GARNER DENVER~~- SU ESPOSA NO SABE LA DIRECCION Y TAMPOCO APARECE EN EL DIRECTORIO TELEFONICO TIENE UN AUTOMOVIL FORD 200.

DEPTO. No. 9.- SRA. MARSHAM ES MASAJISTA A DOMICILIO NO TIENE AUTOMOVIL.

Tatyana Marchand - wife of [illegible] Marchand
8-370

1° de Julio de 1968.

161

GOMEZ, HIGINIO (Spaniard)

4-2-0-26
8-2-3-5 p.3

GOMEZ, Higinio (Jr.)

MEMO
4 Apr 66
P 12591

Employed by the Weyerhauser Paper Company in Mexico

copy of the memo attached

162

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

The Consul General

April 4, 1966

C/PRO - T. Frank Crigler

White

Watson

Manuscripts of "General" Norton SLONE

Just after 5:00 PM last Friday, Sr. Higinio Gómez Jr., previously unknown to me but whose calling card indicates that he is employed by the Weyerhauser Paper Company here, brought to the Protection and Welfare Office a blue canvas bag containing two book-length manuscripts. Sr. Gómez stated that he had found the bag containing the manuscripts in the elevator of the office building in which he works, at Reforma No. 308, opposite the Embassy. He said that he was ignorant as to the identity of their author, as well as who it might have been who had left them in the elevator. He had examined them briefly, he said, and then decided that they ought immediately to be brought to the Embassy.

The cardboard cover sheets of both manuscripts identified the author as Norton Slone, and one of these showed his address to be "General" Norton Slone, c/o Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chief of the F.B.I., Pa. Ave. at 9th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. The books were entitled "Swords along the Shore," and "Komotan - Folklore of the Incas." A cursory examination of the former revealed a clumsy hate theme, charging minority groups in the United States with selling out to the communists. The latter was apparently a romantic treatment in novel form of Pizarro's conquest of Peru.

Traces

N.R.

As you are aware, the manuscripts were delivered to you on the same day for storage and subsequent disposition.

7 April 66 8

Memo from SKB - 31 Mar 66 8

C/PRO:TCrigler/rk

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

File
Morton SLONE
P-12591

RECORDED

CARDED

14-00000

163

~~Sal 1/55/-974~~
El Herald. 26 Jun 68

20/See file

PAG. 2 C


1

2

Fiesta Nacional de Islandia

David N. Wiesley, cónsul general honorario de la embajada de Islandia y su esposa, Gene Galt de Wiesley ofrecieron una recepción el lunes último, en la residencia del consulado con motivo del aniversario número 24 de la independencia de ese país... Islandia se constituyó en república el año de 1944, dejando de ser posesión de Dinamarca a la que había pertenecido desde 1397.

Los invitados esa noche fueron el licenciado Eigil Nyegaard, embajador de Noruega y señora; Hans von Haffner, embajador de Dinamarca y señora; Tord Goransson, embajador de Suecia, y señora; Joaquín Hernández Armas, embajador de Cuba, y señora; Valentín S. Loguinov y señora; Bok Hyung Lee y señora, Marta Fonseca Guardia de Jiménez Rafael Mirabal Fernández y señora, Thomas Te-Ken Kao y señora.

1: Con el anfitrión, señor David Wiesley, tercero a la izquierda, Bok Hyung Lee, L.P. Vourvoulias Jiri Svestka y Antonio Certosimo. 2: Minalini Sarabhai, Rabindranath Parashar y Minnal Nahadevma. 3: ...Kappyo Lee y Zeli Rafelson. 4: Norland B. Felson y Nils Oskar Dietz. 5: En este grupo Valentín Loguinov, Betty Wiesley, Yuri Charnish y Alexandra de Loguinov.

EL HERALDO
26 June 68
file # 11712

3

4



164

25 June 1968

SUBJECT: Nebraska 160

Please give this address to Mike and ask him to get us the names of the tenants in this building and where they work. It's an apartment building.

Orig to JKB on 26 June 68
1-P 370
1-P LOGINOV P11712
1-SC-6-91/4

14-00000

165

[illegible] SB/Sec

~~[illegible]~~

C[illegible]

Index

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: RESABER P-8777

DATE OF MEETING: 3 June 1968

1. I met Subject in his room at the Del Paseo from 1430 to 1615. The next meeting will be arranged by telephone.

2. LOGINOV. Not hearing from LOGINOV after their telephone conversation on 10 May, Subject called him on 30 or 31 May. Subject told LOGINOV he couldn't remember who was supposed to call whom about setting a date for the LOGINOVS' visit to Subject's home, and he just wanted to check to see that they hadn't gotten their signal crossed. LOGINOV said that it wasn't that he was waiting for Subject to call, but simply that a free date hadn't opened up yet. LOGINOV said that it didn't look as though~~t~~ he was going to be able to get to Subject's home for the next couple of weeks, but that he ~~be~~ definitely wanted to take Subject up on his invitation and would call him just as soon as he definitely knew he would have a free Saturday or Sunday when he could come.

3. I instructed Subject to leave the initiative for the next contact to LOGINOV.

4. Pedro DALMA. DALMA is the general manager of "MEXAMA" in Cuernavaca. The firm deals in citric acid. To the best of Subject's knowledge, DALMA was born in Hungary and came to Mexico about 10 or 15 years ago. He is a member of the "Industrial Club" in Cuernavaca, and Subject occasionally meets

cc: P-11712

166

him there. Subject said that DALMA has tried to be friendly with him for several years and has many times invited Subject and his wife to his home. Subject said he has never liked DALMA, however, and has always found a way out of the invitations. One reason he didn't like DALMA, Subject said, was that he always seemed to have something good to say about Communist Hungary. About nine months ago, DALMA took a trip to Hungary, and whenever Subject has seen him since then, he has made a point of telling Subject how good conditions are in Hungary and how happy everyone is there. Subject said he thought we should therefore have the fellow's name in our files.

5. BESABER'S PERSONAL LIFE. In late March, Subject told me about a woman he had met on a business trip to New York earlier in the month. Her name is Velia *SANCHEZ Belmont, Mexican citizen, age approximately 33. Subject happened to sit next to her on the flight to New York, struck up a conversation, and ultimately spent a few nights with her in New York.

6. Subject told me that Velia was once married to an American singer, but had been divorced and subsequently become the mistress of Julian *RODRIGUEZ Adame, a former Mexican Secretary of Agriculture (under LOPEZ Mateos) and currently the President of the International Cotton Association. Subject said that through RODRIGUEZ Adame, Velia had gotten to know many of the top people in the PRI and had become particularly friendly with the wife of Alfonso *MARTINEZ Dominguez, the new head of the PRI. Subject said that Velia had become fairly wealthy as the result of her influential contacts and now owned an apartment

167

in New York City, a house in Mexico City, and a second house in Acapulco, where she also had a sizable piece of undeveloped land. Subject described Velia as both extremely intelligent and a tremendous sexual partner, and speculated that because of her excellent political contacts, she might from time to time be able to provide some interesting information on the Mexican political scene.

7. I was in Acapulco on 6 and 7 April, and at Subject's invitation spent the afternoon of 7 April with him and Velia on the beach at the Pierre Marques Hotel. Subject introduced me (by phony name) as a business contact from the States, and I had the opportunity to talk with Velia at intervals throughout the afternoon. As Subject told me, she is attractive, well-built, intelligent, polished, very sharp, and evidently very shrewd. She also speaks very good English. She told me she had just returned two days ago from a shopping trip to New York with the wife of MARTINEZ Dominguez. She said the señora is really just a country woman and had asked her to go with her to New York to help her pick out a new wardrobe, which she needed for her new role as the wife of the leader of the PRI. We later drove to Velia's house for a drink, and from its size and location (overlooking the bay between the zocalo and the Caleta Hotel, it would indeed appear she had a considerable amount of money.

8. On 3 June, Subject told me that his romance with Velia had gotten out of hand, as she was extremely demanding and possessive and wanted him to divorce his wife and marry her. The problem, Subject said, was that he felt just strongly enough

about her that he couldn't just dismiss the idea. Moreover, his wife had learned about Velia, and although she was accustomed to Subject's philandering, she recognized that Velia was a little different from Subject's other girl friends and was extremely upset. Subject asked my opinion and advice, and for what it was worth, I told him I thought he was crazy to even think of breaking up his family and his marriage with a woman whom he claimed to still love and who was tolerant to the point that Subject was able to have both her and all the routine extra-curricular activity he wanted at the same time. I pointed out that this certainly wouldn't be the case with Velia, who would probably poison him if he even looked at another woman. After batting this around for some time, Subject finally said he agreed with me and that if he couldn't simply keep Velia on the string, he'd have no choice but to drop her. This is hardly to say, however, that this is what Subject will do, and I suspect Velia will continue to disrupt Subject's personal life for some time to come.

9. As for our possible use of Velia--and she does seem to have the credentials to be one of the great female spies--there are clearly two considerations which should be mentioned. First, any attempt to use Subject in her exploitation (at least at this point) would further complicate his relations with her and presumably further disrupt his personal life. Second, based on what I know about her from Subject and from personal contact, I am afraid that if we did succeed in recruiting her for whatever

169

purpose, we would sooner or later find that we had a genuine Mexican tigra by the tail.

L
SB/L

SB/A- I agree with above, but you might check with BESABER some time to see what has become of the lady. VPRezzech

170

Def/[illegible] VPR-

SB/Sec - for copies and filing

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LIOVAL-1 P-8903

DATE OF MEETING: 31 May 1968

1. COIGNE and I met with Subject at the Dairy Queen on San Antonio from 1600 to 1635 hours. Subject will call if anything of interest develops during COIGNE's home leave, and I will meet him at the Dairy Queen at the time specified over the phone.

2. Subject said he had a good friend by the name of Donald BRIGGS who was planning to visit him in Mexico for about three weeks beginning the first or second week of June. BRIGGS, according to Subject, teaches Spanish at Florida State and speaks some Russian. Subject said he mentioned BRIGGS's upcoming visit and the fact BRIGGS knows some Russian to VIDIELLA at class on 27 May. VIDIELLA perked up at this and suggested that he, Subject, BRIGGS , and his (VIDIELLA's) good friend Valentin (LOGINOV)--as a group of Russian speakers--all get together for an evening. VIDIELLA suggested that they go to his Frendh girl friend's apartment and have a blast replete with girls and booze. VIDIELLA then asked if Subject thought BRIGGS would mind if a Soviet Embassy official came along. Subject said he was sure BRIGGS wouldn't mind, and they agreed to make definite plans at a later date.

3. Subject said that VIDIELLA mentioned that his mother had taught Spanish to Valentin in Moscow.

File: cc: P-11712 P-4805

COPIES MADE SB/1

971

S E C R E T

27 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

VIA : Chief, SB
Chief of Station

SUBJECT : Consular Corps Visit to Guadalajara, 17 and 18 May 1968

1. Among the 30 odd members of the Mexico City Consular Association who traveled to Guadalajara for a semiofficial visit to that city on 17 and 18 May 1968 were Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV and Yuriy CHERNYSH, representing the Soviets; Jiri SVESTKA, representing the Czechs; and Enrique CICARD Labrada and Lino SALAZAR Chia, representing the Cubans. SALAZAR was a surprise to everybody since he is stationed in Veracruz. It must be said, however, that at least one other representative of the Veracruz Consular Association (a Guatemalan or Dominican) also traveled with the group. Travel to and from Guadalajara was by train, giving ample opportunity for a variety of conversations. The undersigned also found himself seated on several occasions next to the Soviets and the Cubans, with whom he also conversed while visiting points of interest listed in the official program of the visit.

2. CICARD certainly made an effort to be as sociable as possible in his dealings with the undersigned. By the end of the visit, as a matter of fact, and in spite of several rather pointed discussions, CICARD appeared to have become the undersigned's good friend, walking about with his arm around the undersigned's shoulder and calling him by his first name. The undersigned found CICARD far more reasonable than his colleague, SALAZAR, and he learned that he could have a fairly frank discussion with him without CICARD's showing irritation or anger. This was important since on several occasions the undersigned made the Soviets laugh at the expense of the Cubans. While on an official visit to the Guadalajara cardinal, in a receiving room adjacent to the cathedral the undersigned asked CICARD what his religion was. CICARD said he was a Communist. The undersigned then pointed out that for a Communist country, Cuba certainly got along splendidly

S E C R E T

P-11712

#172

with the Vatican, to the point where it had an Ambassador to the Vatican and had celebrated some months ago some distinction accorded by the Pope to the Papal Nuncio in Havana by lighting up the churches at government expense. CICARD readily admitted that there were many "good Communists" in Cuba who were also good Catholics, even, he said, among people fairly high up in the government. He, CICARD, was a dedicated revolutionary, however, who did not give any part of his loyalty to the regime to any type of religion. CICARD went on to emphasize that the close CASTRO relations with the Vatican were a demonstration of the democratic nature of Fidel's regime. On several instances the undersigned joked about Raul CASTRO's recent speech which brought about the nationalization of every last small enterprise and further rationing in Cuba of such things as beer and soft drinks. On one occasion he also told CICARD that the latter's country was at the end of its rope economically, with hard currency reserves at an all-time low since the CASTRO revolution. CICARD agreed that the "economic situation of his country was bad," particularly as far as hard currency reserves were concerned. He naturally attributed this in part to the so-called American blockade and in other part to the efforts that had previously been made by the government to buy as much machinery as possible to go on with its plan of industrial expansion. When the undersigned mentioned shortages of meat, fruit, et cetera, CICARD readily admitted these were being sold to purchase badly needed equipment. As far as the sugar crop was concerned, he also admitted that the one of this year would not match that of last year, but he would not agree that it would not go over 5,000,000 tons. He and his colleague, however, repeated time and again that they were convinced, as Fidel has promised them, that by 1970 Cuba would have a 10,000,000 ton harvest of sugar. As a matter of fact, the date 1970 came up in the conversation about other matters, as if that date were that from which Cuba would have no more economic problems. Someone in the group mentioned to CICARD that there had been rumors in the press of rapprochement between Cuba and the United States. CICARD said he did not think so because, he said, relations between the two countries were at present "very bad." The undersigned jokingly asked CICARD about Cyrus EATON's visit and the purpose of it. All CICARD would say was that EATON had a meeting with Fidel (photographs of EATON and CASTRO appeared in the local newspapers). As to the reason for the trip, CICARD rather

173

sarcastically pointed out that that was up to the Ministry of Information and claimed to know nothing about it. On the return trip to Mexico City CICARD broached the topic of the eight beatniks who had recently been arrested by the Mexican police as they were about to board the plane for Cuba and deported to the United States. The undersigned kept a straight face throughout this and told him he knew nothing about it. CICARD protested that news of the arrests and deportation had reached the press. The undersigned told him that he had seen nothing of the sort. CICARD then went on to blame the incident on the American Embassy, which, he said, was behind the arrests and deportation. The undersigned pointed out that the Embassy had other things to do than to concern itself with, according to CICARD's own description, beatnik-type students. This was, in any case, a Mexican matter and it was not surprising that the people were arrested and deported, as the Mexicans had arrested and deported many other beatniks of all nationalities. During a rather heated exchange the previous night in which Yuriy S. CHERNYSH and Jiri SVESTKA were also present, CICARD boasted that Puerto Rico would soon find its freedom. The undersigned really opened up on him and blandly told him that the United States had held a referendum in Puerto Rico, during which it had offered statehood or independence, but the Puerto Ricans preferred to maintain the status which they now enjoy with the United States. He also told CICARD that the two or three bombs that had blown up on the island in recent months and were no doubt the work of the Cubans were probably one of the worst pieces of stupidity that the regime had committed. The undersigned went on to blast CICARD in front of his Communist friends for the policy of aggression pursued by Cuba in Latin America, even against the advice of the Soviets and other foreign Communists. He said he could not imagine how Cuba could continue with such a program after the rout it suffered in Bolivia and Peru. CHERNYSH and SVESTKA, who were listening to this, remained silent during this exchange. CICARD, with a sarcastic laugh, said that Bolivia and Peru were one thing, but what about Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala? The undersigned told him that these so-called revolutionary movements had badly suffered in the last few months. The control the Cubans claimed to exercise over these movements was also doubtful, as some of these movements had openly criticized the Cubans. The previous day during a visit

14[illegible]0000

174

to the Center for International Friendship in Guadalajara, CICARD also boasted of the moral necessity for the Cubans to help free Latin Americans from the drudge of misery and oppression. When the undersigned jokingly asked whether this included Mexico, CICARD said that the Cubans had to watch themselves in that country and would do nothing there. The undersigned, by way of conclusion, warned him that any effort in Mexico was doomed, as the Cubans would get nowhere in that country even if they tried. At another point of the visit both CICARD and SALAZAR denied vehemently that Cuba had supported any opposition movement in Mexico or that it had backed guerrilla movements in Guerrero and elsewhere. Both CICARD and SALAZAR several times joked in the presence of their Soviet friends that any American aggression against Cuba would probably mean Russian reprisals against the United States, but that Cuba in any case was ready for any alternative. While at the Hilton Hotel, where the group stayed in Guadalajara, the undersigned, who was looking out a window overlooking the garden in the back of the hotel where the pool is, spotted CICARD, SALAZAR, and CHERNYSH late on the evening of 18 May, just prior to leaving for the railroad station, engaged in an animated conversation. While CICARD looked over his shoulder, SALAZAR scribbled something on the paper which he handed CHERNYSH. The same day, about half an hour before going to the Station, Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez and his wife arrived at the Hilton, where they were eventually introduced to the undersigned by CICARD as "our First Secretary." The undersigned later asked CICARD what CEPEDA was doing there since he was not part of the group and since the Cubans have no consulate in Guadalajara. With a broad smile CICARD said he was on "vacation." At one point of the visit, the bus used by the group left without the undersigned, the Cubans, and the representative of Ecuador and his wife. It was agreed to proceed to the banquet which was to be held at Chapala, some 55 kilometers away, by taxi, if the taxi could not first locate the bus in the city. The bus was not located, and the little group proceeded to Chapala, where to the undersigned's amazement CICARD paid for the entire taxi trip and refused money from the others.

3. Lino SALAZAR is undoubtedly one of the most uncouth, vulgar, and all-around uneducated men the undersigned has ever met. A light mulatto, SALAZAR speaks with such a heavy

175

Negro-type accent that it is almost impossible to understand him. As a matter of fact, both LOGINOV and CHERNYSH told the undersigned that the latter seemed to understand SALAZAR far better than they did. At every possible moment he could squeeze in some Communist propaganda SALAZAR threw in a CASTROist tirade, whether it was relevant to the conversation and the moment or not. He tried to embarrass the wife of the South Korean representative who was with the group by asking her whether every Korean woman had a wart over her lip as she did. Fortunately, the wife of the Korean representative speaks very little Spanish and hardly any English, and the undersigned just would not translate. He also, in her presence, launched into a tirade about South Korea, which the undersigned cut off by telling him that he did not know what he was talking about and that North Korea was the bottom of the barrel as far as nations were concerned. SALAZAR said that in Veracruz the Americans avoided him, but that this was all right with him since he had no business with them. He boasted that he was at the battle of the Bay of Pigs, which, he said, was one of the most tremendous battles of modern times. Since the Russians were listening to this the undersigned turned towards them and asked how many men had died in Stalingrad. LOGINOV said about a million and a half. The undersigned then turned to SALAZAR to say that if a thousand men had been hurt at the Bay of Pigs he would be very surprised. Both SALAZAR and CICARD on several occasions blasted Cuban exiles in the United States, saying that they were men without honor and social responsibility who were afraid to work. The undersigned maintained that on the contrary the exiles, who arrived without a dime, had given a very good accounting of themselves in the work department, as most of them had started new and successful commercial enterprises in the United States. SALAZAR and CICARD said this might be so, but that in any case they had no courage, as if they did not agree with the CASTRO regime they should be in Cuba fighting it. SALAZAR has the manners of an arrogant dog, whistles at the table during dinner, uses obscene language in front of ladies, and, as pointed out above, never fails to give out with strong "patria o muerto" music. During the banquet at Chapala on 18 May SALAZAR, who had come with an expensive camera as did CICARD, took pictures of each member of the group so obviously that the undersigned walked up to him and asked him if he did not want his signature as well, to the great amusement of the Soviets [illegible] overheard

14-00000

176

this. LIRENO-1, incidentally, has pointed out in his reports that SALAZAR is extremely active in Veracruz and that he has the ear of someone important in the city council as well as others. The general commanding the area, who is a source of LIRENO-1, has been looking for a chance to have SALAZAR deported. This Section will see what it can do to oblige him.

4. There was no doubt from LOGINOV's statements to the undersigned that the Soviet had made at least some mental notes before he went on the trip about subjects he should raise with the undersigned. Vietnam, of course, was profusely discussed, but LOGINOV also wanted to know about the state of the election campaigns in the United States and about the March of the Poor on Washington. One afternoon that LOGINOV was with CHERNYSH, the undersigned told him that he could not imagine how the Soviets could favor the candidacy of Bobby KENNEDY, an aristocrat and millionnaire who had never worked with his hands and was liberally spending the family fortune to influence people's minds, when Hubert HUMPHREY, for example, was far more to the left in the American political spectrum and obviously had the support of the labor unions. No matter what the undersigned said, the Soviets found something good to say about KENNEDY, who appears to be the candidate the Soviet Union would most like to see as the next President. The two Soviets laughingly remarked that the undersigned's apparent dislike for KENNEDY might one day cost him his job. The undersigned said that fortunately the American Government was not at the mercy of the prevailing winds as were the governments of "other countries." The manner in which LOGINOV went about collecting his "information" was interesting and amusing. For example, on the way to Guadalajara, when the undersigned and LOGINOV were alone in the corridor of their coach, LOGINOV mentioned the armistice negotiations in Vietnam. The undersigned, as he has done many times in the past, emphasized that this opportunity to find an adequate peace should not be thrown away, as a backdown in negotiations might increase the tempo of the war to the point where a much larger conflict could result. LOGINOV agreed that no one, including his country, wanted such a conflict and indeed a maximum effort should be made to find peace in Vietnam. The undersigned reiterated that much depended on the Soviets, as the latter obviously had some influence over the North Vietnamese Government. He then said that peace was possible providing that

two main conditions were met. At that point someone came by and interrupted the conversation for a good two or three minutes. Rather than renew the argument he could see LOGINOV wanted to develop, the undersigned started to talk about the cattle in the fields, Mexican agriculture, et cetera. LOGINOV listened to this for one or two minutes and then reminded the undersigned he had said something about conditions for the armistice. The undersigned said that the primary condition for peace was for North Vietnam to pull out all of its troops from South Vietnam. Before he could mention the second condition, someone again interrupted the conversation, handed the undersigned and LOGINOV drinks, and remained for a good five minutes. After his departure, the undersigned again talked about something else, but again LOGINOV, after one or two minutes, doggedly went back to the original discussion and wanted to know what the second condition was. The undersigned then told him that this condition was that really free elections be held in South Vietnam. About half an hour later, LOGINOV opened up on the March of the Poor, whereupon the undersigned referred him to a recent article in the U.S. News and World Report listing the salaries of various workers in the United States. Electricians, for example, are listed as making $7.50 an hour. In short, the undersigned pointed out, to be really poor in the United States takes a lot of doing, or rather, a lack of doing. He said he wished the United States could do as the Soviets do and send people without a desire to work or the will to assume responsibility to re-education camps in Siberia and elsewhere. LOGINOV confirmed, in fact, that that was what the Soviet government was doing. LOGINOV also touched upon the search for the assassin of Martin Luther KING, whereupon the undersigned told him that the United States lacked the regimentation of the Soviet Union and the heavy state controls over the population so that it was difficult at times to find a man in that nation of more than 200,000,000 people in one or two days. He also told LOGINOV that it remained to be seen who put the assassin up to his act. The undersigned, of course, mentioned that the assassination was an abominable deed, as KING was probably the most reasonable of the black leaders. He said that had the white extremists, as LOGINOV called them, been behind the assassination, it is probable that Stokeley CARMICHAEL or Rap BROWN would have been shot. During the ride on the bus and out of the clear blue, LOGINOV asked the undersigned

178

whether he had met J. Edgar HOOVER. The undersigned said he had not. LOGINOV then said that he was a bachelor. The undersigned said that if he was it was probably because in his 40 years as head of the FBI he had had an awfully lot to do. The undersigned then pointed out that the FBI was a thoroughly respected organization in the United States which had the support of the people. LOGINOV then switched to the CIA, but the undersigned told him that unlike the FBI, on which quite a bit was known to the American people, very little filtered out about the CIA. LOGINOV made one more crack about the periodic changes at the helm of the CIA and dropped the subject. A somewhat similar conversation occurred a little later between the undersigned, LOGINOV, and CHERNYSH when unexpectedly LOGINOV mentioned something about the KGB and its dedication to the protection of the Soviet people and the Constitution. The undersigned asked LOGINOV for a sample of the stamp commemorating the 50th anniversary of the KGB. Neither CHERNYSH nor LOGINOV seemed to know that such a stamp existed but launched into praise of the service which assured the protection of the Soviet people with such a light hand. The undersigned returned that the KGB was an organization with a terrible reputation overseas, where, contrary to what the Soviets had just told him, they appeared to maintain numerous stations. LOGINOV then pointed out that the United States police did not have a light hand and, as he put it, cracked heads any time they had a chance. The undersigned said that, on the contrary, when a firm hand had to be used, the police had a very bad time of it during everyday life, as recent decisions of the Supreme Court made law enforcement a very difficult business because of the emphasis given by the Court to the respect and protection of human rights. Surprisingly enough, neither the Soviets, nor the Czechs, nor the Cubans had much to say about recent race riots in the United States other than to confirm for themselves that quite a lot of damage had been done. The undersigned had the opportunity to talk to LOGINOV alone about the recent speech of Raul CASTRO and the following nationalization of businesses and restrictions imposed on the Cuban people. LOGINOV, who, incidentally, made no bones about the fact that his country is much opposed to CASTRO's policy of expansion of terrorist activities in Latin America, said that the complete nationalization of private business in Cuba was an action with which he "did not agree." He said that the Cuban Communist state

179

was a young one and on occasion claimed to know more than those who have been purifying Communism for 50 years and more. The undersigned joked about the fact that the Soviet Union would have to give the Cubans petroleum free if the sugar crop this year was as bad as it appeared to be. LOGINOV had a good chuckle over this but did not comment.

3. The undersigned, who has already had the feeling that Jiri SVESTKA apes the Soviets, copies their line, and mimics their comportment, had confirmation of all this during the trip. SVESTKA was one of the first to raise the topic of Vietnam and pour oil over the fire. During dinner in the dining car on the way to Guadalajara, where he sat with the undersigned and the two Soviets, the topic of the Red army came up. The undersigned, who had previously told the Russians that he served for a brief time with that army, said that he had great admiration for the military feats of the Russians. This led SVESTKA to say that the Red army was never beaten. The undersigned then gave SVESTKA a short refresher course in what had happened in Warsaw in 1920 or 1921, when a Franco-Prussian army led by Gen. Maxime WEYGAND and Gen. Jozef PILSUDSKI beat an invading Soviet army, which had, among other things, Joseph STALIN as its commissar. SVESTKA tried to dispute the fact that this took place, whereupon the undersigned offered to buy him a history book. That seemed to prevent SVESTKA from making any other expeditions into history during the remainder of the trip. Most of the discussions with the Czech, Soviets, and Cubans were on extremely friendly terms, in spite of their pointedness at times. During the night of 18 May, during the train trip back to Mexico City, a particularly heated discussion took place in a compartment where CHERNYSH, SVESTKA, and CICARD were present. This discussion will be reviewed in the next paragraph. Suffice it to say that at one point SVESTKA intervened in the defense of CHERNYSH to say something about how indebted Czechoslovakia was to the Soviets. The undersigned then told him that if it had not been the decision of President Franklin D. ROOSEVELT, at the urging, apparently, of STALIN, to stop the advance of the United States army into Czechoslovakia to allow the Russians to liberate Prague, the armistice would not have found Soviet troops occupying Czechoslovakia, and "things might have been completely different for the Czech nation." When SVESTKA claimed to be bewildered by this statement, the

undersigned even more blandly asked him if he meant to say that Czechoslovakia would have become a Communist power had the Soviet armies not occupied the country by the end of the War. SVESTKA said that there was no doubt about this, that the coming of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia had been inevitable because of the historical and social background of the Czechs. The undersigned expressed horror at a statement like this, which did not take into consideration the fact that such anti-Communists as Jan MASARYK and Eduard BENES were the fathers of the Czech state. SVESTKA then went on to say that indeed neither MASARYK nor BENES had been Communist, but that neither had any deep knowledge of the inborn desires of the Czech people. The undersigned told him that this was enough to make both MASARYK and BENES turn over in their graves. He pointed out that there had been a violent exchange, according to the Mexican press, between the Czech and Soviet papers over MASARYK, with the Russians saying that MASARYK had participated in an attempt to kill Nikolai LENIN. CHERNYSH said that this was a pack of lies, that he had reviewed the Soviet press for that period and found nothing about MASARYK. This was quickly endorsed by SVESTKA. When the undersigned once more stated his belief that people who had known better would take the first opportunity to overthrow Communism, both CHERNYSH and SVESTKA started speaking at the same time. The undersigned pointed out that the Russian people had never known anything other than a curb on personal freedom and very strong central government, but the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarians, and others had known differently. Such people were thirsty for personal freedoms and direct control over their destiny. When CHERNYSH said he doubted this, the undersigned reminded him that it was Russian tanks that had crushed the students and workers' revolt in Hungary in 1956. He also pointed to the recent quiet but radical revolution which had taken place in Czechoslovakia, saying that, for example, the day after the right to strike had been re-established practically all workers struck to protest 20 years of mismanagement, poor housing, and lack of freedom. From that point on SVESTKA remained silent, apparently having been shaken up. The undersigned allowed himself to think that in several years at least the Czechs, like the Rumanians before them, would be governing themselves without having first to check with Moscow. This discussion ended about 1:30 in the morning. At 9:00 the undersigned saw LOGINOV, with whom he had a chat about various things. He inquired about SVESTKA. LOGINOV said he had briefly seen him on his way to the dining car, but commented that SVESTKA looked mighty unhappy about something. It was obvious to the undersigned that, as mentioned above, the previous night's discussion had really shaken up the Czech, who was worrying about how things would turn out in Czechoslovakia and about his future. SVESTKA, as a matter of fact, mentioned to the undersigned when he saw him a few minutes later that he had felt that part of the previous night's discussion had been conducted in what he phrased as a rather cool atmosphere. This feeling was obviously not shared by CHERNYSH, despite the heat of the discussion, who warmly greeted the undersigned the next morning, and unless the undersigned is very much mistaken, appeared to have a sort of liking for him.

8. The undersigned finds CHERNYSH a fairly easy man to talk to. Not that CHERNYSH is not a dedicated Communist, but he seems to enjoy a good discussion, probably because he finds this a good opportunity to pass on typical Communist views. Before the discussion the night of 18 May mentioned above, during which CHERNYSH was one of the main participants, the Ukrainian and the undersigned had previously discussed such things as Western-style elections and the right to strike. On both topics CHERNYSH obviously was not on the same wave length as the undersigned. He appeared to believe his statements to the effect that a strike was unnecessary in a society dedicated to the well-being of the workers. It would only cripple an economy struggling hard to meet local demands. On the subject of elections CHERNYSH was even further away from the Western view. He pointed out that some Americans, and perhaps the undersigned, did not have any particular liking for any of the candidates for presidential elections. This made the element of choice a very marginal benefit, if benefit it was. The picking of a president and a political leader inside the government where these men could be thoroughly tested and screened was a much better prospect. The undersigned naturally explained at length that, according to the old cliche, "variety is the spice of life," and that choice is a born right. The undersigned said that he would never be able to live in a place where he could not pick his close friends, his family companions, or the people scheduled to represent him in the republic. That seemed to make no dent

in all of CHERNYSH's arguments. The undersigned scored a little more during the previously mentioned discussion during the night of 18 May. He then had a better chance to compare the American Constitution with the Soviet one, underscoring the elements of centralism and curbs on personal choice. The discussion of the role of the Russians in World War II permitted his question of whether the Russians had fought for their country or for their regime. The undersigned told CHERNYSH that his contact with Soviet soldiers during the War had left no doubt in his mind that the latter had fought for their country and families first, and much later to back up their regime. Both SVESTKA and CHERNYSH naturally argued with this view, particularly SVESTKA, who at times can be more pro-Soviet than the Soviets. As pointed out above, CHERNYSH seems to like the undersigned's company, and the farewell between him and the undersigned at the station in Mexico City appeared to be particularly warm. This, of course, is not viewed by the Cubans or SVESTKA with a particularly good eye.

Raymond A. FRADYER

Distribution:
Orig - 7 (Consular Corps - Mexico City)
1 - P-13042 (CHERNYSH)
① - P-11712 (LOGINOV)
1 - P-7111 (SVESTKA)
1 - P-10758 (SALAZAR)
1 - P-1861 (CICARD)
1 - P-10757 (CEPEDA)

RAF:lmp

183

SECRET

17 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

VIA : Chief, SB
Chief of Station

SUBJECT : Celebration of the Czech National Day, 9 May

1. The celebration of the Czech national day on 9 May was held at the residence of the Czech Ambassador, Karel HANUS, in Polanco, where the undersigned estimated that the crowd numbered at least 150 people. The only other Americans present were Mr. Wallace W. STUART, head of the Political Section, and Mr. David N. WIESLEY, Honorary Consul of Iceland. The undersigned was a little bit surprised to see Rodolphe BABOUN, the new Haitian Acting Ambassador, in attendance with a colored Haitian. BABOUN, as a matter of fact, spoke briefly to the Cuban Ambassador, Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas.

2. The undersigned had several little discussions with Jiri SVESTKA, Czech Consul and known intelligence officer. When he casually reminded SVESTKA that Czechoslovakia was an industrial power before World War I and that Czech products flooded Western Europe, SVESTKA sharply commented that his country was still an industrial power. When the undersigned mentioned that MASARYK was very popular in the United States, SVESTKA countered that that was no doubt because he had lived as an exile in the United States. SVESTKA cut short a remark by the undersigned about the effort currently being made to throw light on MASARYK's death by saying, "There is no doubt that he committed suicide." SVESTKA showed himself on this occasion a rival of LOGINOV as far as provocations are concerned. After the undersigned answered comments on the Negro problem and forthcoming urban terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the United States, SVESTKA mentioned the "overt letter" to the American Ambassador which appeared in various local newspapers. He hinted that the incident "described"

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic [illegible]
[illegible]

P-11712

184

in the open letter was not only a blunder on the part of Ambassador FREEMAN, but also indicative of the superiority complex of the United States. At one point, when Valentin LOGINOV had joined in the discussion, the undersigned retorted that the man who had written the article was a fourth-class writer without a dime who somehow had found the thousands of pesos necessary to place his editorial. When the Czech and the Russian laughed, the undersigned continued that if the Soviet Union wanted to give money to the Mexican Communist Party to engage in such shenanigans to amuse the local members of socialist countries, it was fine with the Americans, as this is just about all it could hope to achieve. SVESTKA and LOGINOV naturally denied that their countries had anything to do with the Mexican Communist Party, not to speak of the overt letter on the Ambassador. The undersigned, tongue in cheek, then pointed out that he was glad to tell them for their information that a Communist Party did exist in Mexico. Perhaps the most interesting reaction of SVESTKA came towards the end of the party just before the undersigned left. During a discussion which included SVESTKA, LOGINOV, one of the Soviet military attaches (a tall colonel with white hair), another Russian, and a youngish, short, and chubby member of the Mexican Foreign Ministry the undersigned expressed a thought that the two systems of government, the capitalist and the soviet, were gradually inching closer together. When SVESTKA allowed himself to doubt it with a nasty little laugh the undersigned naturally could not resist telling him to have a look at what was going on in his country. The reaction of SVESTKA was both immediate and noticeable. He sort of straightened out, jerked his head back, opened his mouth, dropped the ashes of his cigar on the floor, and obviously bit his tongue as he said nothing. From the above and from the fact that SVESTKA plans to drive to the next Consular Association meeting in Guadalajara with his Soviet colleagues, the undersigned feels that SVESTKA is not only a lackey of the ex-NOVOTNY regime, but very probably in the employ of the Soviet KGB. He seems to be inseparable from LOGINOV and has lately mouthed the same provocations in the same techniques, showing himself more and more aggressive, a thing which he was not a year ago.

3. Among other nasty little remarks made by LOGINOV, including references to the open letter against the Ambassador, the war in Vietnam, the Negro problem, the difficult financial position of the dollar, et cetera, was a reference to this Station. LOGINOV at one point asked the undersigned where he worked (not the first time he ~~has asked~~ this). The undersigned told him that he worked in the Consular General's Office. LOGINOV then said, "What about the fifth floor?" The undersigned told him that the fifth floor comprised both the Ambassador's Office and the Political Section. LOGINOV went on to say something like, "I know about the Ambassador, but what about the other offices, those occupied by WOFIRM?" The undersigned let that one go by as LOGINOV had obviously found it very funny. He proceeded to pay back the Soviets a little later by counting on his fingers the number of visas issued at the Soviet Embassy each year, the number of cultural exchanges handled by the Embassy staff, and "all the work done for trade promotion with Mexico." The undersigned felt that the Soviets probably issued some five visas a month, if that many, had about ten cultural exchanges a year, and had practically no trade with the Mexicans. What, then, he asked, were the 40 odd "diplomats" in the Soviet Embassy doing in Mexico? LOGINOV laughed, but he laughed green and promptly broke off this conversation.

4. The undersigned had no opportunity to talk at any length with Ambassador HANUS, who was very busy at the reception. The Ambassador, however, greeted him warmly and gave him a prolonged bear hug as he left. The undersigned had no talk with the Cubans except a few words which he exchanged with Sergio MARTINEZ, whom he had not met before.

Raymond A. FRADYER

Distribution:
Orig - 7
1 - P-8691 (Hanus)
1 - P-5510 (Wiesley
1 - P-12397 (Baboun)
1 - P-7111 (Svestka)
①- P-11712 (Loginov)

RAF:lmp

186

DC/SB Spec 5th/Sec

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: BESABER P-8777

DATE OF MEETING: 16 May 1968

1. I met Subject in his room in the Del Paseo Hotel from 1415-1630. The next meeting will be arranged by telephone.

2. LOGINOV. Subject reported that LOGINOV called him at his factory in Cuernavaca on Friday, 3 May. LOGINOV said he had some visitors who would like to buy a few things to take back with them to Russia and asked if it would be convenient if he brought them down to Subject's factory on Saturday afternoon, 4 May. Subject said fine and invited LOGINOV and the visitors to come back to his house for a few drinks after they finished shopping. LOGINOV gratefully accepted and said they would be there at 1330. (Per LIENVOY--see attached transcript--LOGINOV called BEWEEP on 3 May to ask for Subject's telephone number.)

3. LOGINOV arrived (in 19 DA, a dark blue Chevy) at the factory at 1345 with three other persons:

(a) A big, fat, plain, peasant-looking woman by the name of "IGOROVA," "IGANOVA," or something similar. LOGINOV introduced her as a commercial representative, but did not elaborate.

(b) A second Russian woman whose name Subject couldn't remember. She looked to be 33-35 years old and wore glasses. LOGINOV did not mention her profession, and she seemed simply to be a friend of the first woman.

cc: P-9097 P-11712

187

(c) The son of one of the above two women. He appeared to be about 12 years old.

4. LOGINOV and his three companions shopped for about an hour while Subject worked in his office, and in the end bought 450-500 pesos worth of merchandise (at wholesale prices, of course). Subject and the four Russians then left together, got into their respective cars, and drove to Subject's home with Subject leading the way. When they were driving into Subject's driveway, Subject, in view of his wife and two children and the four Russians, accidentally ran over and broke the back of one of the BESABERS' beloved dachshunds. Chaos reigned for the next ten minutes as Subject went into the house, got his pistol, and returned and shot the dog while the children screamed, Mrs. BESABER tried to suppress her own tears and shoo away the children at the same time, and the four Russians sat aghast in their car and watched. LOGINOV acted extremely sorry and did his best to console Mrs. BESABER and Subject. Mrs. BESABER recovered quickly, however, and soon had all the adults seated in the living room. Subject served the first round of drinks, and within a half hour everyone was at least reasonably relaxed again.

5. LOGINOV was the only one who did not take an alcoholic drink. He wore dark sunglasses all afternoon and explained that he had to stay away from liquor because he was taking antibiotics for an eye infection. Despite this ailment and inability to take a drink, LOGINOV was nevertheless more sociable and friendly than Subject had ever seen him. He also struck Subject as being

188

more relaxed than in the past. He brought the BESABERS two bottles of vodka and two cans of caviar, asked why Subject hadn't called or visited him at the Embassy, addressed Subject only as "tu" (where he had formerly mixed "tus" and "usteds" with Subject), enthusiastically toured the BESABERS' new house, and patiently translated for the two Russian women, neither of whom spoke Spanish or English. The conversation was generally dull, however, and nothing even mildly controversial was discussed. The Russians finally left about 1700.

6. In the course of the conversation, Mrs. BESABER asked LOGINOV when they were ever going to get together to play tennis. (Mrs. BESABER had of course previously invited LOGINOV to play tennis with her sometime at the home of a retired American gentleman in Cuernavaca (i.e., Col. Lawrence HIGGINS) who was a good friend and who had an exceptionally good court.) LOGINOV replied that he still wanted very much to play, but that it was always a question of time for him. "Why didn't LOGINOV come down to Cuernavaca next Saturday morning (11 May)?" Subject interjected. He (LOGINOV) and Mrs. BESABER could play tennis in the morning while Subject was working, and then they could all spend the afternoon at home relaxing. LOGINOV replied that that sounded great, but asked what he was going to do with his wife and child. Mrs. BESABER answered that of course they expected him to bring Mrs. LOGINOV and the child with him. LOGINOV said that would be very nice and he'd like to accept the invitation right at that moment, but he was afraid that his schedule was such that he was going to have to hold off on a definite answer until later in the week. OK, said Subject, "will you call me, or shall I

call you?" Well, replied LOGINOV, why didn't they leave it that if he didn't hear from Subject, he would call Subject, and vice versa. Subject agreed.

7. Subject said he waited until Friday morning, 10 May, to hear from LOGINOV, and when LOGINOV didn't call, he called LOGINOV (confirmed by LIENVOY). LOGINOV, according to Subject, said he was afraid he was not going to be able to make it, after all, because the Mayor of Moscow was visiting Mexico and he would be tied up with the Mayor on Saturday. Subject said he suggested that perhaps they could make it for the following Saturday, then. LOGINOV replied that he thought he might be able to make it then, but, again, he couldn't say for sure just then. "But anyway," LOGINOV added, "we're going to be seeing each other more often because we've (i.e., the Soviet Embassy) taken a house on Calle Umbolt (in Cuernavaca) for the summer, and I'll be coming down to Cuernavaca every weekend." Subject expressed pleasure at this and said that he'd expect to hear from LOGINOV sometime soon then. LOGINOV assured Subject he would.

8. BEWEEP. BEWEEP called Subject in Cuernavaca about 1400 on 10 May. He said he wanted to tell Subject that a Polish musical group was about to open at Bellas Artes and would be playing some of Subject's grandfather's music. (Subject's paternal grandfather was a pupil of Franz Liszt and, according to Subject, is generally regarded in Poland as the second greatest Polish composer next to Chopin.) BEWEEP asked if Subject was going to be in Mexico City the following week and if he'd have time to accompany BEWEEP to Bellas Artes for a performance. Subject said that unfortunately, he wouldn't be able to go, but suggested that

190

BEWEEP bring the musicians to his home in Cuernavaca for an afternoon. BEWEEP said he wasn't sure if they could work it into their schedule, but he'd check and let Subject know if they could come. (Neither Subject nor BEWEEP said anything about the "vacation trip" they discussed on 10 April.)

L
SB/L

191

,IAN EMBASSY. 15-61-55

3 May 68

L35-M22-T1151

C854 - 1406

274. Out at 1350. LOGINOV talks to YAKOVETS and tells him that LOG would like to go to Cuernavaca tomorrow to see SYRETSKIY ZARETSKI. SO can YAK give him the phone No of SYR, because several comrades are going on home leave and would like to buy few things. OK, minute. LOG will have to call early in the morning to ~~the fac-~~ tory and go there after 2 PM. His phone No is 2-09-15, his name is MISHEL ZARETSKIY and the factory is on Call e 7X00 Taxco. OK. Thanks.

BESABER
P-8771
SB/C
SB/R

s.

14-00000

192

[illegible]
[illegible]
copy ✓ file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SOURCE: LILYRIC 3 MAY 1968

SUBJECT: VISIT TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY OF UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN-LOOKING COUPLE.

Lilyric

3 de Mayo de 1968.
FRIDAY

16:07 Sr y Srita entran Sur (Norteamericanos)
16:37 Los mismos salen Norte

Estuvieron con Log.

El hombre como de 25 años aprox., güero, con ropa sport.
La mujer como de 23 años aprox.

Photos attached

FILE· E 50-8-10/11
cc P-~~[illegible]~~11762

-00000

193













194

SECRET

3 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: (fnu) LAMBERT, British Subject

1. At 0945 hours 2 April 1968, Subject called for Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV and left a message that he was the person who was going to give LOGINOV English lessons. He also left his telephone number: 11-02-88. (This is listed in the reverse directory for Maya Internacional SA de CV; it does not appear however in the current telephone directory.)

2. At 1208 hours on 2 April, Sra. Cora (lnu) tells LOGINOV that the teacher she recommends for him is 21 years of age, studying for his doctorate in literature in Mexico, and prior to returning to England is willing to give lessons; he is presently giving classes for other PhD's.

3. At 1320 hours, LAMBERT tells LOGINOV that Sra. Cora told him to get in touch with LOGINOV regarding English lessons. LAMBERT would like to talk about it. LOGINOV agrees, but says he is very busy right now and will call LAMBERT at the end of the week to make arrangements.

4. Source: LIENVOY 2 April 1968, all on 15-60-55.

Wanda L. VERMILYE

File:
P-11712

Note: memo to SMICA on 2 May 68

SECRET

4-00000

195

SECRET

3 May 1968

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT : LIOVAL-1

DATE OF MEETING : 30 April 1968

1. Subject called me on 29 April and we agreed to meet at the restaurant "Bocana". The meeting lasted from 14:30 to 15:40. I advanced Subject 500 MN for his Russian lessons. Next meeting is at the Bocana at 13:45 on 17 May.

2. Subject reported that he had gone by the IICMR to inquire about Russian lessons but was totally unimpressed. He gave his name and talked to the Director of Courses whose name he didn't get. He will write up the details for the next meeting.

3. He then contacted VIDIELLA at the latter's Institute and invited him out to discuss Russian lessons. Since it wasn't a personal matter VIDIELLA suggested that they bring along a couple of the students. Odile MORISSET, a French teacher also came along. They went to Sanborn's cocktail lounge. While talking Sra. MORISSET (she is divorced) invited Subject to her home for a party and said he could spend the night with her if he came. She gave her address as, Paris 7, Apt. 5. Subject described her as ca. 40 years old. Later VIDIELLA told Subject that MORISSET will sleep with anybody and that he usually shacks up with her on Fridays.

4. Subject told VIDIELLA that he had gone to the IICMR but it looked poor. VIDIELLA agreed, saying the teachers are no good. He did not say that he is or was connected with the IICMR. VIDIELLA suggested that Subject take private lessons from him. Subject protested that he would need accreditation which he could use for further formal study. VIDIELLA said Subject could study with him and then take exams at the Institute which would give him a certificate for that level. He said the Director would be glad to do this. So they agreed. VIDIELLA will give Subject private classes at Subject's afternoon school twice a week from 19:00 to 20:00 on Mondays and Wednesdays. Price will be 50 MN per lesson. Subject paid him 400 MN in advance. The first lesson was on 29 April. Since 1 May is a holiday Subject will go to VIDIELLA's apt. He gave his address as Romero de Terreros 1153 apt. 1 (we had #922, apt. 1) and telephone 43-60-16.

SECRET

File: P-8903
P-4805
P-11712

196

SECRET

5. In the presence of all VIDIELLA boasted about his great Soviet Friend, Valentino, the consul (this is obviously LOGINOV). The two students and MORISSET all seemed to know LOGINOV personally. One of the students asked VIDIELLA if he had been invited to the Soviet 1 May celebration. He said that he hadn't. He then asked Subject, if he knew any Soviets. Subject answered as casually as he could that he had known one casually with whom he used to go fishing and changed the subject. Subject didn't feel that VIDIELLA was fishing for information but I am not so sure.

6. I briefed Subject on what to look for in his lessons with VIDIELLA, to take short notes, and to have a written report for our next meeting.

Francis J. COIGNE

SECRET

197

SECRET

May 2, 1968
No. 080

SUBJECT: Soviet Cultivation of British Subjects

1. It has come to our attention that the Soviets, specifically KGB officers, have been looking around for English language instructors. One KGB officer, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, is notorious for using this tactic to assess contacts who may be of use to him.

2. Among the persons in whom LOGINOV is reported to have shown interest are two British subjects:

a. A young student, (fnu) LAMBERT, who is studying for a doctorate in literature in Mexico and who prior to returning to Britain is giving English lessons.

b. Walter James PLUMB, Director of the Anglo-Mexican Institute.

3. It is suggested that you might wish to contact these individuals to determine if the Soviets are indeed cultivating them. I would appreciate receiving the results of such interviews.

W.L.VERMILYE:wgp

Distribution:
Orig - SMICA
1- 50-2-6
1- P-11712

RET

198

LICALLA - 26 APRIL 1968

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN WHO SEEN INSIDE SOV EMBASSY AT 1040 HOURS.

ENTERED RECEPTION ROOM WITH LOGINOV, LEFT SOV EMBASSY AT 1052 HOURS.

FILE P-11712





200

62

CARDED

③

.O. P.
ip

~~COS~~

I believe we should index all names connected w/Fr. KURGUS.

Agree? Yes.

T.M. Dilesky

23 Apr 68

Index card attached

Re: Nicolas KURGUZ
(P-13,262)

23 Apr 68

14-00000

201



3



5

6

7

El Padre Kurgus (...y no es comunista) se Lleva Muchos Cuicl a Rusia

¡FELIZ VIAJE!

Por ANA María Lonngi.

Con un coctel celebrado el miércoles último por la noche en conocido hotel fueron despedidos los numerosos pasajeros mexicanos quienes el domingo 28 del actual saldrán por vía aérea, con destino a la Unión Soviética en un viaje recreativo y cultural.

13,262

El itinerario que comprende, 7 días en Moscú, 5 en Leningrado, 3 en Kiev, 3 en Roma y 3 en París; fue auspiciado por el reverendo padre Pedro Nicolás Kurgus O.P., director de Proyectos Intelectuales y Sociales, A.C., después de que el reverendo, estrechó cordialísimas relaciones con el señor Valentín Loguinov, Consul de la U.R.S.S.

114712

El padre Kurgus, unió además el asunto con conocidas agencias de viajes: representadas por los señores José Antonio Salazar, Armando Quintero y Joseph A. Rubenak, anfitriones en esta ocasión del mencionado coctel.

A la reunión, asistió como invitada de honor, la señora Ludmila A. Kuznetsova directora de Turismo con países de América Latina, quien fue además, portadora —en representación del señor Loguinov— de unas proyecciones de "[illegible]", en los cuales los futuros turistas pudieron [illegible] de las ciudades que visitarán próximamente.

Entre los asistentes: Gastón Mendoza Ruí, Josefina [illegible] Laura [illegible] Camargo, [illegible] Sierra [illegible] Romero, María [illegible] Pablo [illegible] y señora [illegible] Alvarez Colina de [illegible] y muchos otros asistentes, en su mayoría, pasajeros.

¿Más detalles sobre el viaje? ... Harry, Ortega, Juri Chernov y [illegible] en el coctel ofrecido por el reverendo padre Kurgus ja, ja, ja, jo, jo, jo [illegible] Abril y [illegible] Saldaña [illegible] que viajarán [illegible] María Eugenia [illegible] [illegible] Proyectos Intelectuales y Sociales, [illegible] de su ojo [illegible]



8

9



10



11

14-00000

202

fyi
SB/F
gnf

29 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. On the occasion of the visit of the local Consular Association to the "Home Fair" on 28 March the undersigned conversed on and off with Jiri SVESTKA (P-7111), Second Secretary of the Czechoslovak Embassy and known member of the Czech Intelligence Service. The undersigned asked SVESTKA what was going on in his country. The Czech launched into an explanation which sounded like a recitation. The essence of his comments was that when leaders have lost touch with the people, they should be replaced. The recent changes in Czechoslovakia would ensure more democracy for the people and would more closely represent their views and take care of their needs. Fifteen years in power, he said, is a long time for a leader. The undersigned pointed out that the recent changes in Czechoslovakia might not please "everybody", SVESTKA agreed that this was bound to happen, but that his country had the right to do what it wanted without worrying too much about the opinion of some of its neighbors. The undersigned then went one step further and pointed out that ULBRICH from East Germany for one seemed to be worried about possible repercussion of the Czech reforms on his regime. SVESTKA said he did not care what ULBRICH said or did and repeated that the Czechs are masters of their country. When the undersigned pointed out that the new president was not a member of the Communist Party but had headed a Czech Division that fought with the Russians SVESTKA agreed that this was a good choice that should please a lot of people. Throughout his talk with the undersigned, however, SVESTKA tried to play down the degree to which things are going to change in his country as a result of recent reforms.

2. Just to test SVESTKA a little further, the undersigned asked him what he thought of the U.S. elections. With a broad grin SVESTKA stated that Senator KENNEDY would undoubtedly be the next president. When the undersigned replied that he hoped not, SVESTKA said, "If I were an American I would vote for him." Valentin LOGINOV of the Soviet Embassy joined the conversation at this point. The two went on to say that KENNEDY was the only candidate for peace and social justice, that he had their moral support and sympathy (this given reports for an intel. report) etc. SVESTKA added that the war in Vietnam was good for the U.S. economy. The undersigned told him that the USSR manufactured more rockets than bathtubs and more machine guns than cars.

Raymond S. FRADYER

Loginov
P- 11712

.203

C/SB
~~COS~~
~~DCOS~~
[illegible]
SB/Sec

Index

12 March 1968

CARDED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Jorge ARIAS Buerba

1. Subject is a 26 year old Mexican citizen (although he looks to be in his 30's). He is a Spanish teacher at the Mexican-North American Institute and since the fall of 1967 has held a second job as the director of the Community Services Program at the American School. In April 1967 he married an American citizen from the Chicago area named Donna WEINTHALLER (phonetic). They live at Juanacatlan 15, which is just around the corner from the Soviet Embassy. Home phone is 15-28-49.

2. Subject was recommended as a Spanish tutor in August 1966 by Enrique GUTIERREZ Martinez (P-12667), who was then C/SB's Spanish tutor. GUTIERREZ was subsequently recruited by C/SB as a utility agent, but has since been dropped because he is related to other Station assets. On GUTIERREZ's recommendation, I began taking private Spanish lessons from Subject in August 1966. I found Subject an excellent teacher and continued taking lessons from him until December 1966. In March 1967, my wife and I had Subject as a teacher in Spanish courses we took at the Mexican-North American Institute. I have maintained intermittent social contact with Subject since March 1967, and my wife has become friendly with Subject's wife, having visited her at her apartment two or three times and having had her to our home during the day an equal number of times. I have also

Files: P-12671 P-117[illegible]

COPIES MADE

P-11712

204

kept informed to some extent about Subject through his younger brother, Javier ARIAS Buerba, from whom I have been taking Spanish lessons since July 1967.

3. Subject was a casual contact of Station officer Olivia C. RAGNITY in 1965 and 1966. Other than a file card noting this contact, there are no station traces on either Jorge or Javier ARIAS Buerba.

4. Subject and I from the beginning have had a very friendly and informal relationship. He is an intelligent person with a friendly, open personality and a good sense of humor. Politically, he is pro-American to the point that he magnifies our strengths and positive qualities and tends to minimize or overlook negative factors in our society. Subject knows I am with the Political Section of the Embassy and that I have been in the Soviet Union. We have consequently gotten onto the topic of Russians and Communism several times, and he has always come out a strong anti-Communist. He has one brother and two sisters living in the United States. The brother is married to an American and lives in Virginia, where he is in the construction business. One of the sisters is also married to an American and lives in California (I believe San Francisco). The second sister is married to a Polish immigrant and lives with him in Chicago. The sister in California is a naturalized American citizen. The brother and the sister in Chicago are not.

5. On 24 April 1967, LIENVOY reported the following call from GAZIYEV to LOGINOV:

GAZ: "I saw him, he arrived yesterday."

LOG: "Excellent. Then I'd like to see you to discuss certain things."

GAZ: "Then I can come there tomorrow?"

LOG: "No, better Wednesday."

GAZ: "All right. He usually comes there at 6 o'clock. He got married and came here with his wife. Now they look for an apartment. I'll go there on the 10th, because I want to attend courses in English. This week I'll be busy."

LOG: "OK, until the next then."

6. From this conversation, it appeared that GAZIYEV was probably talking about Subject, since:

(a) GAZIYEV had been taking Spanish at the Mexican-North American Institute and I knew from Subject that Subject had had GAZIYEV in one of his classes, that Subject occasionally chatted with GAZIYEV after class, and that GAZIYEV had once given Subject an invitation to a Consular night at the Soviet Embassy (although Subject told me he had not gone).

(b) Subject had gotten married that month.

(c) Subject had just returned to Mexico with his bride.

(d) Subject and his wife were looking for an apartment.

(e) Subject normally arrived at the Institute at 1800 to teach evening Spanish classes.

7. Prior to this reported telephone conversation, I had considered using Subject as an access agent against GAZIYEV, but had decided not to approach Subject on the matter unless there was evidence that his relationship with GAZIYEV was developing into something more than occasional chats between classes. I did not see much potential in approaching Subject before this with [illegible] the idea of having him deliberately cultivate a friendship with GAZIYEV, as I felt Subject was living

such a busy and hectic life that I would get very little out of him. Prior to his marriage, he was keeping such a hectic schedule between his Institute and private classes that he wasn't sleeping or eating properly and was having increasing problems with his health. If anything, his pace and health problems increased after his marriage and his taking of the job with the American School (although he gave up most of his private classes).

8. Since the GAZIYEV-LOGINOV conversation made Subject's relations with the Soviets look much more interesting, I attempted to find out what I could about them from Subject. For a number of reasons, however--including my going to the States in June--we were not able to get together until 11 July. On that date I took Subject to a belated "bachelor's lunch" at a little Spanish restaurant downtown.

9. The lunch was disappointing and, for me, misleading. I was certain that if given the opportunity, Subject would voluntarily tell me if his relationship with GAZIYEV had developed any further. When I casually brought the conversation around to GAZIYEV, however, Subject simply told me that GAZIYEV was still studying at the Institute and that he still occasionally chatted with him in the halls or over a cup of coffee in one of the near-by coffee shops during the 20-minute break between the two evening classes. Subject commented that he enjoyed talking with GAZIYEV, as he was a simpatico, interesting guy, as well as an outstanding Spanish student. He also added that they never talked politics. In reply to an offhand question about whether he had met any other Soviets through GAZIYEV, Subject

207

said that he had not. My inclination was to believe Subject, and I went away thinking that either GAZIYEV and LOGINOV had been talking about someone else over the phone or that they had never gone beyond the stage of simply talking about Subject.

10. On 1 November 1967, I ran into Subject and his brother Javier in Sanborns-Insurgentes. They were about to have a quick lunch and insisted that I join them for a cup of coffee. As soon as we sat down, Subject told me he had a problem and would like my advice. He said GAZIYEV had given him an invitation to the 7 November celebration of the Revolution at the Soviet Embassy, and although he would like to go for the experience, he was very concerned that his name would be put on "the black list" at the U.S. Embassy if he went. He said that he had tried to call me at the Embassy after he got the invitation to ask my advice, but had been told I was out of town. (I was in El Paso from 25-29 October.) He stated that if he had not been able to reach me in the next day or two, he was going to simply walk into the Embassy and ask to see someone from the "security department" about his predicament. What did I think he should do?

11. I told Subject to relax and forget about going to the U.S. Embassy, as the Embassy would not give him any advice other than to tell him that it was entirely his own business whether he went to the Soviet reception or not. Besides, I asked, what made Subject think his name would be put on a "black list" if he went. Subject replied that he didn't know how the U.S. Embassy did it, but "everyone knew" the U.S. Embassy obtained the names of everyone who went in and out of

the Soviet Embassy. Moreover, he said, even if the U.S. Embassy refused to give him any advice, at least it would make a record of his visit and anyone who was ever interested would his heart was in the right place. He simply did not want and couldn't afford to get into any trouble with the U.S. Embassy, he said. After all, he had an American wife, he might want to go to the States to study sometime, and they might even want to go to the States to live someday. Seeing that Subject was indeed very serious, I became more serious myself and told him that just so he wouldn't worry, I'd write a memo to the proper Embassy department stating for the sake of the record that Subject had told me he planned to attend a Soviet Embassy reception, but wished the U.S. Embassy to know he was doing it solely out of curiosity and was in no way in sympathy with the Soviet Union. Subject seemed greatly relieved and thanked me very much.

12. Seizing of the fact that GAZIYEV had given Subject the invitation, I asked if Subject saw much of him anymore. Subject replied that yes, he still saw him occasionally, as GAZIYEV was now studying English at the Institute. Subject added, on his own initiative, that he had also been to GAZIYEV's apartment twice and had met another Soviet there on one occasion. He said that the first time he went to GAZIEV's was shortly before he (Subject) got married (Subject ~~ma~~ was married about mid-April 1967) and the second time was shortly after his marriage, as he and his wife had gone to dinner at the GAZIYEVS'. Subject finished eating about this time, and since he was in a hurry and had his brother with him, I didn't try to question him any further, but decided to wait and have a second go at him alone another

209

time.

13. My wife and I entertained Subject and his wife at our home on 27 November, but the evening was not meant to and did not afford an opportunity to discuss the Soviets any further. Subject did tell me, however, that he had not gone to the 7 November Soviet reception afterall, because, despite by assurances that there was no reason for him not to go, he felt it was simply safer to stay away from the Soviet Embassy altogether. At my suggestion, we agreed to get together for lunch sometime in the near future.

14. For various reasons, including the poor state of Subject's health when I called him one day in January, we did not get together for the lunch until 7 March. This time, I played it straight with Subject, told him that I was interested in anything he could tell me about GAZIYEV and the otherSoviet he had met, and questioned him closely regarding the details. Subject was completely cooperative, and I am satisfied he answered my questions to the best of his ability. It seemed to me, and still does, that there was only one possible reason why Subject had not told me on 11 July what he subsequently told me on 1 November (i.e., that he had been to GAZIYEV's home twice and on one occasion had met another Soviet there). This was that he felt somewhat guilty about going to GAZIYEV's and meeting the other Soviet there, and as long as I didn't push him too hard (which I didn't on 11 July), he felt more comfortable ignoring it. The reason he so readily mentioned the two visits and the other Soviet on 1 November was, I think, that he was genuinely concerned not to "get into any trouble" with the U.S.

14-00000

210

Embassy over attending the Soviet Embassy reception, wished to impress me with his sincerity about whose side he was on, and felt obliged to completely clear the record by mentioning the visits to GAZIYEV's home and meeting the other Soviet there.

15. Subject stated that GAZIYEV had invited him to his apartment for dinner about a month before he (Subject) went to Chicago to get married. This means that the dinner took place about mid-March 1967. Subject said he had expected to find only GAZIYEV and his wife in the apartment, but that a third person was there when Subject arrived. Subject said GAZIYEV introduced the third person as Valentin "something." When I asked if the last name were LOGINOV, Subject immediately reacted and said he was almost positive that was it. Subject's description of the Soviet also fit LOGINOV. GAZIYEV stated that LOGINOV was with the Embassy (Subject couldn't remember in what capacity) and described LOGINOV as a good friend. Subject said that the evening started off very casually, with LOGINOV expressing interest in the Spanish courses at the Mexican-North American Institute. LOGINOV, who Subject noted spoke almost as good Spanish as most of the Spanish teachers at the Institute, said he'd like to get a certificate in Spanish from the Institute and asked Subject if he could help him enroll, choose the best course for him to start with, etc. Subject replied that he'd be happy to, although it didn't seem to him that LOGINOV needed much instruction in Spanish. LOGINOV simply laughed this off, and it was agreed LOGINOV would drop around to the Institute sometime soon. LOGINOV, who took the lead in the conversation most of the evening, then began to ask Subject questions which left Subject

211

with "no doubt" that he (LOGINOV) was trying to feel Subject out on his political views. Subject said that he couldn't remember most of LOGINOV's questions, but he did recall that LOGINOV began the feeling-out procedure by asking Subject if he didn't find that the Americans were much poorer at learning Spanish than other nationalities. He also made various derogatory remarks about the extent of American influence in Mexico. Subject said that after about ten minutes, LOGINOV's purpose became so blatantly obvious, that he (Subject) stopped the conversation and told LOGINOV that before they went any farther, he thought LOGINOV should know that he was talking to someone who was "100% capitalist," completely pro-American, and had absolutely no sympathy with Communism. (While this sounds awfully blunt and Subject was unquestionably trying to make himself look good in my eyes, the fact of the matter is that Subject does tend to be ~~ab~~ a bit blunt at times, and knowing his ideological leanings, I would not put it past him to have said exactly this.) Subject said that LOGINOV tried to backtrack a bit after this, but the conversation heated up again a few minutes later when Subject commented that he had a pretty good idea of what the Soviets were up to in Mexico. When LOGINOV asked what Subject meant, Subject related the story he once told me about having been in Veracruz a few years ago when a Soviet ship was actually or virtually put under arrest there. Subject told LOGINOV that "everyone knew the ship was loaded with Communist propaganda."

16. After about twenty minutes, according to Subject, politics were dropped and the conversation turned to more innocuous topics.

212

Subject said that LOGINOV seemed somewhat irritated with him, but on the whole kept his composure very well and treated Subject politely for the two hours or less Subject remained. As Subject was leaving, LOGINOV again said he'd come by the Institute to see Subject in the near future, but he never did. One day in late 1967 Subject saw LOGINOV at the gas station on the corner of Tacubaya and Juanacatlan, and LOGINOV greeted Subject by name. However, they did not converse with each other.

17. Subject said that GAZIYEV left most of the politically related part of the conversation to LOGINOV and never referred to the evening again. However, a few weeks after Subject returned to Mexico with his bride, GAZIYEV had Subject and his wife over to dinner (this would place the second dinner in about mid-May). This time GAZIYEV and his wife were the only others present, and the evening passed without any reference to politics. Subject stated that he still occasionally goes across the street for a cup of coffee with GAZIYEV between evening classes at the Institute, but that he has not been to GAZIYEV's apartment again and has never had GAZIYEV to his home.

18. Although Subject was very aware that LOGINOV's purpose in meeting him was to assess his exploitability, he did not seem to fully appreciate that GAZIYEV had both fingered him for LOGINOV and set up the situation for LOGINOV to meet him. I spelled this out for Subject and also informed him that LOGINOV was an exceptionally capable Soviet intelligence officer. I also explained that it was very possible GAZIYEV was using the Institute to spot other candidates for interviews with Soviet

213

intelligence officers, and questioned Subject about GAZIYEV's activities and contacts at the Institute. However, Subject said that as far as he could tell GAZIYEV pretty much stuck to himself at the Institute and did not have any particular friends there whom Subject knew about. Subject said he would keep his eyes open for the type of thing I was looking for, however, and would let me know if he came onto anything interesting. Subject also offered to "play up to" GAZIYEV and/or LOGINOV under my guidance if I wished, but I declined the offer with appropriate expressions of appreciation.

19. The question that remains unanswered after all this is, of course, why LOGINOV and GAZIYEV were talking about Subject over the phone on 24 April 1967. According to Subject, the dinner which LOGINOV attended took place in March 1967, while LOGINOV did not attend GAZIYEV's second dinner, which took place about mid-May. Since I am satisfied Subject told me the truth, it would appear that the "certain things" which LOGINOV told GAZIYEV on 24 April he wished to discuss with GAZIYEV concerned how to handle Subject in the light of the LOGINOV-Subject encounter in March. Whatever LOGINOV had in mind on 24 April, it would appear that it was finally decided that GAZIYEV and his wife should simply have Subject and his wife over to a peaceful dinner in order to at least partially erase the memory of the first dinner.

SB/L

1-1266/(p.1)

P14



THE AMERICAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION A. C.

JORGE ARIAS BUERBA

COMMUNITY SERVICES PROGRAM

PROGRAMA DE EDUCACION PARA ADULTOS

CALLE SUR 136 NUM. 135

TACUBAYA 18, D. F.

15-78-14

[illegible] Spanish tutors. [illegible]

[illegible] a utility agent, [illegible]

[illegible] I had no other [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] wife and I had [illegible]

[illegible]

4-00000

215

013.
LOGUINOV, Mrs. Valentin

November 7, 1967. 1100 hours.
Source: My wife.

French Club. My wife talked to Loguinov at the French Club. There seemed to be considerable doubt about their communication. Loguinov might have said that she had just played tennis, or was about to play tennis, or plays tennis occasionally. It seems likely that she did not play and was not about to play. She probably came to the club for the steam bath. She was in a hurry, possibly to leave the club.

B-1103

Mrs. Charles Small. (Wife of American communist with jewelery shop on Niza). Soon for the first time at the French Club. She was practicing alone with a ball boy. She had no partner.

COMMENT

It is possible that Mrs. Loguinov and Mrs. Small are part of a communications channel. Loguinov's haste might have been due to the unexpected appearance of my wife and the risk that Small might arrive while my wife was still in the vicinity.

Source
Keralm-1.

26

notes made

26 Oct 1967

Extracts from LIREALM-1 contact reports

10 May 1067

LOGINOV played tennis at Mundet with S.S. Abdel Rahman Hassan Abdel-RAHMAN, 1st Secretary and Consul at UAR Embassy. This was the first time they had played together. (played doubles with LIREALM and his wife).

14 May 1967

LIREALM played tennis at Mundet with LOGINOV. LOGINOV's son Dmitriy was there, speaks absolutely no Spanish or English. Also played with Jacques LEMAIRE. LOGINOV said his wife had had several heart attacks in Mexico and cannot play tennis. LOGINOV said he wanted Dmitriy to learn English, like his sister in Moscow. LOGINOV said he knew Jean BINEAU, when asked if he knew any French diplomats. LOGINOV claimed to have been in Soviet Navy, then immediately entered the Foreign Service Institute and straight into foreign service after that.

met for first time

17 May 1967

LOGINOV plays tennis left-handed. An instructor commented that he was convinced LOGINOV had played much more than the one year he admits to. The instructor said he had never seen LOGINOV play with an instructor.

20 May 1967

LIREALM saw LOGINOV at Mundet but did not play with him.

25 Jun 1967

LOGINOVA said she was a chemist, but did not say whether she had ever worked in that profession. The LOGINOVs never eat any food at the club, but LOGINOV drinks beer there. The week before LOGINOV played in mixed doubles match with 16 year old girl and ~~woo~~ won a small silver cup. LOGINOV had a Russian movie camera with him and took pictures of people at the Club. LOGINOV talked to a Mexican named Jose Manuel LNU, connected with some Mexican ministry that assists SovEmb personnel; LOGINOVA said Jose Manuel was very sympathetic to them; LOGINOV said they had met at the Canadian or French Embassy.

10 Jun 1067

LOGINOVA seems intelligent, educated, quiet but friendly. Her Spanish is not as bad as LOGINOV had indicated.

P-11712

LOGINOV

SOVIETS

Valentin's friends, June 30, 1967.

Contact. My lawyer celebrated his 40th birthday on June 30. Jim and Connie Pollack offered their home at Calero 76 in San Angel for a party for my lawyer. Of the 12 to 14 people at the party the following are part of a group who have organized a Great Books type club. At least once, and possibly twice or three times they have invited Valentin Loguinov.

Doug Wiltshire
Timmie Davis
Alexander "Sandy" Reed
Werner Thurau

Doug Wiltshire, about Masri. Doug claimed that Masri, his partner is pro-U.S. and anti-Nasser. He believes that Masri's wife is the secretary to the ambassador.

Werner Thurau. The Anglo-American directory lists Werner as British. My lawyer states that he is actually Danish. He previously lived in San Angel THEN MOVED to the Lomas address now shown in the directory. He since has moved back to Aida in San Angel and lives one or two doors from Timmie Davis. He is listed as vice-president of Jeffrey Manufacturing. He is reported to have studied at Oxford.

My lawyer, who is one of the more brilliant humorous-type intellectuals in Mexico has described Werner as the most brilliant person he has met in Mexico. Werner's friends are agreed, behind his back, that Werner is "ill-employed", that he is earning far less than he deserves. His standard of living stikes his friends as austere.

Sheila O'Sullivan Mabbo Thurau. Sheila AN OXFORD GRADUATE! is the wife of Werner and was not at the party due to illness. She is an actress, attractive, extreme extrovert, and the sometime mistress of Jim Tierney (spelling ?) the former head of the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, now at the home office in New York. I have often run across Sheila, but this was the first time I saw Werner.

Werner Thurau, about Valentin. As Werner was introduced to me he acted very surprised. He explained that he thought I was someone else, a friend of his, Valentin Loguinov. He claimed that we

218

could be twin brothers. My wife overheard this performance and felt it was highly overplayed. My opinion was that this was a conversation starter, nothing more. Werner expected me to show interest in his having met a Russian. I did. Werner then told me about the book group. I had heard of it before through my lawyer and through Valentin. I had never before realized they were ~~on~~ one and the same group. Werner spoke of only one occasion when Valentin was there--he did not say there were not other occasions. Valentin spoke of several occasions. Werner described Valentin as good-natured, narrow intellectually and curious.

I did not acknowledge knowing Valentin but avoided the issue. I do not know who knew Valentin and first invited him to the group. I do not know how often the group meets or where.

Comments

I found Werner to be very interesting and charming. I have held the same opinion about his wife for some time. I believe I could develop him if it were of interest.

Werner deserves to be checked. Everyone seems agreed that there is something amiss here

I would not mind belonging to a book group--I have in the past. This one should be real swinging and might have Val as a permanent visitor.

14-00000

219

SECRET

11 October 1967

CONTACT REPORT :

SUBJECT : LICOZY-5

DATE OF MEETING : 10 October 1967

1. I met with Subject at the restaurant of the Del Paseo from 09:15 to 10:00. Next meeting to be arranged by phone. Subject will take a months vacation with his family from 28 October to 25 November. He will go to South Africa and other countries in Africa.

2. During the week of 2 September, PRIKHODKO came to Subject's office to announce that he was back from home leave. Subject asked him about the status of the proposed Soviet tourist office. PRIKHODKO said that the Mexican Government had turned it down. Specifically SALVAT had told the Soviets that the tourist exchange between the Soviet Union and Mexico was so insignificant that it did not justify a reciprocal exchange of tourist offices (Comment: Evidentally the Mexicans used the reciprocity issue to deny the Soviet request.)

3. PRIKHODKO also said that Oleg NECHIPORENKO (P-7442) would arrive in Mexico in October and that he would have a job in the Embassy, not in the consulate.

4. While PRIKHODKO was in Subject's office, Senador ECHEVARRIA, the brother of the Secretary of Gobernacion came in and Subject introduced them.

5. Finally, PRIKHODKO mentioned that YATSKOV would be leaving soon PCS (Comment: As I mentioned earlier, I'll bet that NECHIPORENKO replaces YATSKOV).

6. The next day LOGINOV called Subject and asked him to come to a cafe near Subject's office. LOGINOV started off by calling Subject a son-of-a-bitch. He said, "Look at all the contacts you have in Mexico, even ECHEVARRIA's brother". He then went on to berate Subject for refusing to continue to work for the Soviets. He became quite heated at times. Subject repeated all the arguments he had used earlier about willing to be friends but refusing to help the Soviets in a clandestine capacity. During the discussion LOGINOV asked if Subject knew the "legal counsellor" of the US Embassy.

SECRET

FILE: P-11712

220

SECRET

By this he meant the Embassy's lawyer, not the legal attache. Subject just laughed at him.

7. On 7 October Miguel ALEMAN Jr. came to Subject and said that he and Jacobo ZABLUDOWSKY had just seen Ambassador BAZAROV. They wanted BAZAROV to make arrangements to get them to the USSR for television coverage of the 50th Anniversary celebrations. BAZAROV had told them that things were very tight but if they went to Subject and he could arrange accomodations, BAZAROV would see that they got to the USSR. (Comment: From LIENVOY we know that the two had an appointment with BAZAROV on 9 October and thay they had been agitating for permits for about a week. I feel that by sending them to Subject, BAZAROV was giving them the brush off. If the Soviets were really interested in seeing them go, they would handle it differently.)

Francis J. COIGNE

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: BESABER P-3777

DATE OF MEETING: 28 September 1967

1. I met Subject in his room at the Del Paseo from 1415-1530. Subject will call me a day in advance to set the date of the next meeting, which as usual will be in the Del Paseo.

2. Subject had not seen or talked with CHMYKHOV or any other Soviet since he and CHMYKHOV were out together on the evening of 4 August. At that time, CHMYKHOV suggested that he and Subject have dinner together the next time Subject was in Mexico City. Subject agreed and told CHMYKHOV he'd call him the next time he was in town. Due to Subject's tight schedules on his visits to Mexico City, however, it wasn't until 28 September that he called CHMYKHOV. When Subject called the Embassy, however, he was told CHMYKHOV wasn't in. He therefore asked for LOGINOV, who proved to be in. LOGINOV immediately recognized Subject's voice and sounded very pleased to hear from him. He stated that he had had a wonderful holiday in the USSR (he returned on 27 August), but was now swamped with work. He added that he had planned to call Subject as soon as he got things under control. Subject thereupon said that he was actually calling for CHMYKHOV, because he didn't think LOGINOV had returned to Mexico yet. LOGINOV replied that CHMYKHOV wasn't in just then, but they'd both very much like to visit Subject in Cuernavaca. Subject said that he'd like to have them, but suggested they hold off for a week or so until the weather got better. LOGINOV agreed and said he'd talk to CHMYKHOV

File cc: P-6235 P-11712

222

about a time. In any case, LOGINOV said, they wouldn't just drop in on Subject, but would call ahead of time.

L
SB/L

223

SECRET

P-12843
cc-(P-11712)
LOGINOV

13 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Erika Cammerman

SOURCE : LICOZY-5

1. On 7 September 1967 I asked Source about Subject. He knows her well.

2. The Cammerman's are Rumanian Jews who came to Mexico about 15 years ago. Eugene was a brilliant man who started with nothing and ended up very wealthy. Several years ago he attempted to negotiate trade between Mexico and Rumania but without results. He died of a heart attack about two years ago.

3. Erika is a charming, intelligent, cultured west-European type. She is not a leftist. She owns and runs INCOMEX at Isabella la Catolica 45 (telephone 18-65-61) and (12-88-32), a wine and cheese importing company. On ca. 1 September she left Mexico to some "bad" in Austria for a month. At Source's suggestion she added 2 weeks in Israel to view the conquest.

4. They have a daughter, Marina, who is stunningly i.e. Bahls beautiful. Marina met and married a German Gentile in New York for which her mother and family ostracized her. Source does not know where Marina is at present.

5. Although I did not mention my reason for interest, Source stated that if Erika is in touch with Soviets it would only be to get their business. She would not find Soviets either ideologically or personally attractive.

? one man's opinion

Francis J. COIGNE

Erika Cammerman

SECRET

2241

-- -RET

13 September 1967

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT : LICOZY-5

DATE OF MEETING: 7 September 1967

1. I had breakfast with Subject at the Del Paseo from 0900 to 1000. Next meeting will be arranged by phone. Subject will go to Montreal for a conference on tourism to Israel from 23 to 26 September.

2. Subject had lunch with LOGINOV on 31 August. LOGINOV brought him caviar which Subject had requested and paid for. The following Subjects came up:

a. LOGINOV volunteered that NECHIPORENKO (P-7442) will return to Mexico in the fall. Subject asked if NECHIPORENKO would return to Consular work. LOGINOV said that he would not but would have other work in the Embassy. (Comment: I will bet that he replaces YATSKOV).

b. The larger part of the lunch was devoted to LOGINOV asking Subject about his trip to Israel and Subject's gleeful lists of captured Soviet equipment.

c. LOGINOV said he has reports that Mexican right wing youth groups are planning to sabotage the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Revolution and asked Subject for information. Subject said he had no information on, or, contacts with groups of that nature.

3. The following Mexicans have booked travel to the USSR with Subject. They are all local Jews with relatives in the USSR:

a. Mr. & Mrs. Samuel KASOVICH
b. Abraham YANOFSKY to Moscow and Tashkent
c. Pedro BRAILOVSKY to Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad.

4. Subject has booked passage to Cuba for a Russian emigre, Nikolay CHERNESHOV and his family; wife born in Italy and children, Igor, Natalia and Sergio all born in Venezuela. LOGINOV told Subject that they are repatriates from Venezuela and that they will go from Cuba to the USSR on a Soviet cargo ship.

P-11712

-- -RET

225

5. Subject has checked with Adolfo de la Huerta of Salvat's office about the Soviet application for a tourist office. De la Huerta had heard about it but said it was not their affair and would be handled by Gobernacion.

6. David KLEINMAN, ca 55 yrs. old, born in Russia recently made reservations to go to Moscow during the celebration of the 50th anniversary. He will go in a private capacity as a tourist. Subject described him as an orthodox Communist and was particularly galled that KLEINMAN, a Jew called Israel an aggressor.

Francis J. COIGNE

14-00000

226

R-11712

Prepared by FEINGLASS, Aug 67

THE CONSULAR SECTION OF THE USSR EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY

The consular section consists of three persons: 285412 201- [redacted]

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV - consul (third secretary) 144341 201- [redacted]

Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN - vice consul (Attache)

Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH - vice consul (third secretary) 201-343847

With such a seeming-scarcity of work for the Consulate, it would be sufficient to have only one man for it. But the Soviet Embassy has to have three men handling consular duties. The Consulate is open to visitors twice a week and only two hours a day. Even that is too much for an occasional person who desires a visa for visiting the USSR. However, in addition to their regular duties, the consuls have to arrange various matters relating to visiting Soviet cargo vessels, artistic and cultural groups, etc. On several occasions, they had to do ~~xxx~~ errands outside of their overt field of activity. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why, in many instances, they cannot be reached on the telephone. All three of them speak fluent Spanish and have no difficulty in getting around and acquiring Mexican friends. Given below are their respective character sketches.

Consul LOGINOV is a rather recent arrival (two years in Mexico) and not very experienced in his job. However, he is learning the ropes quite rapidly and carries a lot of weight among the Embassy staff. LOGINOV is the one who orders [illegible]

227

to be sent for any visiting dignitary or a performer. He, apparently, scrutinizes and approves the names of doctors and dentists patronized by the Embassy personnel. Recently a Man on Duty said over the phone that LOGINOV had forbidden to be given out the address of a German dentist, whom the Soviets visited quite frequently before.

LOGINOV is also in charge of making up a duty roster for appointing a Man on Duty who would be responsible for anything that took place at the Embassy on that particular day. No one, except the ambassador, seems to be exempt from that duty. On a few occssions LOGINOV encountered hostility to his arbitrary manner of making up the duty roster. Thus, when a Man on Duty called Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, Press Attache and a (former?) Cultural Officer, and told him that LOGINOV put his name down as the responsible Man on Duty for the Embassy for that day, LEONOV said that he was very busy and let LOGINOV do it himself.

Obviously LOGINOV had made a number of secret enemies with his dictatorial manners and his disdainful, monotonous, and slow way of talking. His medium- to high-pitched voice sounds as if he is extremely bored with the world and does his interlocutor a favor just be talking to him.

His physical appearance seems to confirm that impression. A few newspaper photos show him as a youngish and rather good-looking individual with curly light-brown hair and with

228

a contemptuous smile on his lips. Unquestionably, his type of charm appeals to elderly ladies and LOGINOV is quite aware that he is attractive to the other sex. Without a doubt, he tries to capitalize on it and with his fluent Spanish probably tries to ensnare Mexican females. There is no indication that LOGINOV has tried anything of the sort with the Soviet wives. One of the reasons may be that he would not like his wife, Aleksandra Dmitriyeva, a very formidable woman indeed, to get wind of it. On the other hand, the Mexican women may seem to be more exotic and attractive to LOGINOV than his own countrywomen, in especial his wife, who is a large unattractive female.

Nevertheless, LOGINOVA seems to be quite pleasant, with a nice cultured voice, and gets along with her husband well thanks to her good humour and social activity. She has been quite prominent in Mestkom work and in the children's summer camp. Shortly after their arrival, LOGINOV bought a tape-recorder for his wife for 115 dollars. Whether it was to be used for music, or other purposes, has not been determined.

Once in a while, LOGINOV goes on drunken sprees. Thus, on 12 February 1966, he and [illegible] drove up to the Embassy gate at three a.m., pounded on the gate, blew their horn and had altercations with Stanislav Sergeyevich [illegible], who was on duty at that time.

14-00000

229

-4-

Another very prominent trait of LOGINOV'S character is his extreme chauvinism, bordering on jingoism. In reference to other nationalities, LOGINOV uses such deprecatory epithets as: "Amerikashki", "Zhidovka", "Nemchura", etc.

It is doubtful if LOGINOV has any true friends. His sneering attitude is probably the reason for it. Although he made several errors in judgement in his work and social behaviour, LOGINOV by no means is a fool and should be kept in mind for any possible developments.

(201-11[illegible])

Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN, vice consul (Attache), is a young man about thirty-three years of age, rather stocky, with blond wavy hair over a high forehead. A pair of heavy-rimmed glasses gives him the appearance of a very intellectual person. On the whole, KORMUSHKIN has the air of an easy-going fellow, who can make friends almost overnight. KORMUSHKIN and his wife are exceptionally close friends with Anatoliy Vladimirovich KARABACH, employee of the Commercial Office, and his wife. Both families visit each other quite frequently.

Besides occasional drinking bouts, KORMUSHKIN has not been known to practice any skirt-chasing, since his wife, Inna Nikolayevna, is not a bad-looking woman herself, and both seem to be getting along smoothly. KORMUSHKIN is a practicing physician at the Embassy and is quite in demand

230

whenever any of the Soviets or his family is ill. KORMUSHKIN is also quite active in consular affairs and does most of the leg work for LOGINOV. He is also very active in Mestkom functions, where he is in charge of the Children's section. KORMUSHKIN is quite an energetic and pushy individual and can be quite rude and nasty at times. Undoubtedly, he is looking forward to being a full-fledged consul in time to come. The impression of KORMUSHKIN'S ambition and pushy trait in his character is intensified by the sound of his rapid and energetic but pleasant baritone voice.

A curious fact should be cited here. Shortly after his arrival, KORMUSHKIN purchased a tape-recorder for 185 dollars or 70 dollars more than the one bought by his "boss" LOGINOV. Why?

It seems that in the future, KORMUSHKIN may slow down somewhat, but his inner drive and energy will nevertheless make him a more adroit and skillful individual. His further progress should be watched with interest and caution.

Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH, vice-consul (third secretary) seems to be able to handle any job that comes along. Previously he was mentioned as an assistant Cultural Attache, then substituted for the Press Attache, while that position remained vacant, and quite recently, while the [illegible] [illegible].

14-00000

231

[illegible]

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: BESABER 25177

DATE OF MEETING: 27 July 1967

1. I met Subject from 1520-1645 on 27 July in his room at the Del Paseo Hotel. The next meeting is scheduled for 4 August at 1400 at the Del Paseo. Subject will call on the 3d or 4th to give me his room number.

2. Display of Subject's Products. Subject will hold a private exhibition of his factory's latest lines of furniture and artifacts at the Hotel Presidente from 2-4 August, between 1000 and 2000. Sanborns' buyers will get a sneak preview on Tuesday, 1 August. Subject will consequently be in Mexico City from 31 July thru 4 August. He said he planned to send out invitations to all the Embassys, but had not yet done so.

3. Soliman GOHARY. Subject had neither seen nor heard from GOHARY.

4. Col. Laurence HIGGINS. Subject's wife learned from Mrs. HIGGINS that the Colonel is due back in Mexico on 12 or 14 August.

5. [illegible]. CHMYKHOV dropped in on Subject at Subject's home in Cuernavaca about 1800 on Wednesday, 26 July. After hemming and hawing around for a few minutes, CHMYKHOV finally said that look, they were friends now and he wanted to ask Subject's advice on a matter. The doctor whom Subject had recommended for CHMYKHOV's son, CHMYKHOV said, had diagnosed the boy's stomach trouble as an advanced case of one of the worst strains of amoebas and had advised that the child be kept in bed and under observation. CHMYKHOV said the child was consequently being kept in bed at home in Mexico City. The doctor, according to CHMYKHOV, had also expressed concern that the amoebas

[illegible] cc: P-[illegible] (p. 1) P-11712 (p. 3)
P-5733 (p. 1) P-3624 (p. 3 + [illegible] B)
P-6435 P-880 (p. 3 + [illegible])
P-877

COPIES MADE

Subject by the time I saw him to lead him to decide to tell CHUYKHOV, when he called him at the Embassy, to come to the Del Paseo (Subject's hotel) rather than the Presidente, where clients and acquaintances might frown at all his Soviet friends. I told Subject to handle it the way he wanted, but just not to bring me a restaurant bill for six ballerinas and their escorts. I told Subject that his near-term objective should be simply to establish as much rapport with CHUYKHOV as possible, with the view to finding out what kind of person he is and what he has on his mind. I said he should consider CHUYKHOV his main target for the present time and urged him to take advantage of any opportunity to get together with him alone.

7. Subject apologized for his [illegible] story about his encounter with CHUYKHOV being a bit spotty, but he said he had a hard time understanding CHUYKHOV and wasn't able to follow everything he said. Subject said CHUYKHOV's Spanish is not good, he speaks very fast, and continually jumps from one subject to another. On the whole, Subject said, he had the impression CHUYKHOV was a rather nervous person and much less sure of himself than, for example, LOGINOV. Subject said that whereas he always felt he had to be on his guard with LOGINOV, he felt completely relaxed with CHUYKHOV and felt he dominated their relationship.

8. Invitation to ANDREYEV Farewell Party. Subject gave me an invitation he had received in the mail to a despedida for ANDREYEV on the evening of 31 July. (The invitation was formally issued by KAZANTSEV. See attachment B.) Subject said that although he was going to be in Mexico City on the 31st, he expected to be completely tied up with preparations for the opening of his exhibit the next day and unless I had a special reason for wanting him to go to the reception, he was going to have to skip it. I told him that in view of the circumstances there was no need for him to go.

~~DC/SB~~ DC/SB/VIII SB/W ~~SB/~~ SB/Sec.

CARDED

Index

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: BESABER P-8777

Gohary is P-10056 but we already put cy in his file. RPE

DATES OF MEETINGS: 13 and 19 July 1967

1. I met Subject at the Del Paseo Hotel from 1350 to 1410 on 13 July and from 1345 to 1530 on 19 July. The next meeting is scheduled for the Del Paseo on 26 July. Subject will call in to arrange the time.

2. Soliman GOHARY. On 13 July Subject reported that he still hadn't been able to get through to GOHARY at the UAR Embassy, as the number GOHARY had given him was always busy. I gave Subject three additional numbers from the Diario Oficial and he tried all of them in my presence. He got through on the last one, managed to reach GOHARY, and spoke with him for about three minutes in English. The tone of the conversation tended to confirm BESABER's claim that he is on very close and informal terms with GOHARY. Subject asked why GOHARY hadn't come to his home the previous two weekends. GOHARY excused himself by saying he had simply been too busy, but wanted very much to see Subject. Subject replied that he was in town at the Del Paseo and why didn't GOHARY come up to his hotel room that evening. GOHARY readily agreed to come about 2030.

3. Subject reported on 19 July that GOHARY had arrived at the hotel room about 2050 on 13 July and stayed for two hours. At the conclusion of their meeting, Subject invited GOHARY to come to his home in Cuernavaca with his fiancee on Sunday, 16 July. GOHARY agreed and visited Subject in Cuernavaca from [illegible]-1700 on the 16th, but without his fiancee, who he said was ill. The hotel meeting on 13 July was by far the most profitable, as it gave Subject an opportunity to talk with GOHARY alone and at length over several drinks. The presence of Subject's wife on the 16th inhibited the conversation. Subject submitted the attached report (original given DCOS) describing the

orig P-8777

New P has been requested for GOHARY (pp. 1-3) P-10056

P-5303 (pp. 1-3)

P-11712 (pp. 3-4

P-6235 (pp. 3-4)

P-9283 (pp. 4-

P-5024 (pp. 3-4)

COPIES MADE

14-00000

234

help him. His positive reaction to the idea of talking to "the older" American would seem to be confirmation of this.

e. (p. 6) While no future meeting was scheduled, Subject and GOHARY parted on the 16th with the mutual understanding that Subject would get in touch with GOHARY either to discuss further GOHARY's business future or to arrange a meeting with Subject's American friend.

f. (p. 5) Subject said it was his wife's understanding from Mrs. HIGGINS that Mr. HIGGINS would return to Mexico sometime during the week of 31 July.

g. Subject said that he thought a sizable amount of money--such as $1,200 U.S. per month, would be a vital, although not the primary, factor in recruiting GOHARY to remain in place. The prime incentive, in Subject's view, would obviously be the opportunity to help Egypt .

4. Contact with the Soviets. CHUYKHOV called Subject at home about 1000 on Sunday morning, 16 July. CHUYKHOV said he was at the Soviet dacha in Cuernavaca and that he and LOGINOV had gone to Subject's factory about 1700 on Saturday, the 15th, in order to present Subject with three bottles of vodka, but the guard had told them Subject had left. (Subject said he left the factory about 1630.) CHUYKHOV said that LOGINOV had left Cuernavaca because he was leaving for the USSR on vacation, but he (CHUYKHOV) was still around and could Subject come over to the dacha. And oh, yes, CHUYKHOV's child was sick with some form of dysentery and could Subject recommend a pediatrician? Subject said that despite the uncivilized hour, he got dressed and went over to the dacha about 1100. CHUYKHOV was overflowing with friendship, kept urging everyone from the smallest child to the oldest woman to go up and say hello to Mr. [illegible], and meekly presented Subject with one bottle of vodka.

14-00000

235

He explained that they had drunk the other two bottles. About 1115 or so, Soviets began arriving at the dacha in droves; Subject estimated 20 men and 15 women arrived in all. One of the newcomers to walk in was ANDREYEV, who seemed to be greatly surprised to see Subject and to learn that Subject and CHUYKHOV knew each other. Subject stayed for about 40 minutes in all. CHUYKHOV stayed with him the entire time and talked incessantly--mostly about nothing and often so rapidly that Subject had a hard time understanding his faulty Spanish.

5. In speaking of LOGINOV, CHUYKHOV did say that LOGINOV is responsible for "matters inside Mexico," while he (CHUYKHOV) "supervised Latin American countries outside Mexico." CHUYKHOV did not elaborate on or give any hint as to what kind of "matters" he was talking about. As Subject was leaving, CHUYKHOV urged him to come to the Embassy the next time he was in Mexico City and they would have a few drinks. CHUYKHOV then said that as a matter of fact he was coming back to Cuernavaca the next weekend and would like to see Subject then. Subject said to give him a call. (NOTE: Subject is unusually busy right now because of his approaching trip to the U.S.--in about two weeks, but told me he would try to get together with CHUYKHOV for a drink. I urged him to do this.) In all, Subject said he had the impression from CHUYKHOV's general deportment that LOGINOV had told him to look after Subject while he (LOGINOV) was gone.

6. Communist Activity in the State of Morelos. Subject said that Cesar *MIER, the Jefe de Investigaciones of the Policia Judicial in Cuernavaca came by his home on the evening of 17 July to ask about a room-divider screen made of the turquoise mosaic material that Subject's factory specializes in. MIER told Subject that he'd prefer "not to pay too much for it," and Subject being Subject and also hoping we might make it up to him, obliged by offering him one way below cost. Delighted, MIER stayed on awhile and

14-00000

236

C/SB/L ~~DC/SB~~ VP ~~SB/CO~~ B/L

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telecon with LIROBBIN-2 on 12 July 1967 P-11665

1. LIROBBIN-2 called the Station at 1345 on 12 July and left a message for me to call her. I reached her about an hour later. She said she had met LOGINOV at a party at the Indian Embassy on the evening of 11 July. During a brief conversation with him, he told her he was going to the Soviet Union on vacation on 16 July. He also said that PRIKHODKO was going to the USSR on vacation on 26 July. A minute later, he said PRIKHODKO was leaving on 29 July.

2. Subject said he had had no other contact with any of the Soviets since March. (It will be recalled that she invited PRIKHODKO to dinner on 31 March, but he did not come.) Subject said she would call PRIKHODKO in a few days, mention that LOGINOV had said he was going on vacation, and invite him over before he left. She will let me know what happens.

L
SB/L

Files cc: P-11712
P-2270

COPIES MADE

237

[illegible] 9/18/67

Aygenon (P 11712)
Chmyklon (P 6238)
Kolomyakon (P 499)



238



[illegible]

Chmukhian

+ Sagenon

21712

246



25 [illegible] 62

[illegible]

247

UICALLA
19 Oct 65

21

LOGINOV + PRIKHODKO

P-11712

Valentin Sergeyevich Loginov
P-11712
Taken at 9 May 1967 National Day
Reception at Czech Embassy
Source: Lifire

UICALLA
18 Nov 66

Valentin Sergeyevich
Loginov (P-11712)
Taken at 9 May 1967 National
Day Reception at Czech Embassy
Source: Lifire

Alexsandra Dmitriyevna
LOGINOVA

243

~~SB/FE~~ gmf

Interesting - pls
return if you
can identify the girl n/a

DC/~~SB~~-DM No Sta trace
✓ I checked repeat on
Vidella + she doesn't
appear. Am checking
with Charlotte's husband
gmf

P- 11/7/2
see P-4805
SB/See file

14-00000

244

8Nf

Tennis: Lieralm-1

JF/March 17, 1968
SUBJECT: VALENTIN LOGUINOV P-11712

SB/Sec

Music Hall de Moscow

Valentin invited our tennis group to be his guests at the final performace of the Ballets Ruso at the Arena Mexico. The total group was about 15 persons.

Alexandra not present. Val's wife, Alexandra, was not among the group. Val made no comment about why she was not there. No one else asked, that I know of.

Czechs. Three Czechs were among the group. The introductions were badly handled and I wasunable to learnthe identity of the Czechs. Val and they spoke Spanish, not Russian or Czech.

SVESTKA was probably one

Odile Mauricee. (Spelling not certain for last name). Odile was invited by Val. She is Canadian, about 35, not unattractive, but careless in her dress. She struck me as being slightly masculine. She is a teacher of French in the mornings at the University of the Americas. In the afternoons she teaches at an Institute for Translators and Interpreters on Rio Tiber.

Who?

Index

CARD

We were waiting for a mutual friend of Odile and Val, a Rafael. He never arrived. I asked Odile who Rafael was. She explained that he was a teacher and her drinking buddy. Every afternoon around 4 -5 she and Rafael can be found in the bar across the street from the institute.

VIDELLA, noident

Prob Rafael Vidella Ruiz cc P-4805

Odile had been drinking beer, probably quite a bit, prior to joining us that evening. She has lived in Mexico for 15 years. Her French, English and Spanish are fluent. She seemed to prefer French, though I felt her English was better.

She dressed oddly with white bobby socks. She did not fit in with the rest of the group. And I'm sure she didn't care. She seems to go to all Soviet embassy functions.

She might possibly be an intimate friend of Val's, if not a mistress, at least an occasional bed-partner. She commented (within the context of tennis, which was the topic of conversation at the moment) that one night Val told her he had to go home early (11 PM) because he was going to play in a tennis tournament the following day.

COPIES MADE

Index all underlined

Tennis
Lieralon-1
cc P-4805
to P-11712

245

SECRET

11 March 1968

STAKE-OUT REPORT

DATE: 8 March 1968

1. I checked the Hotel Prince from 09:45 to 09:50 and noticed nothing unusual. I was outside the Hotel Alfer from 09:50 to 10:30 - nothing unusual. I then checked the Prince again at 10:40 for 5 minutes and noticed nothing.

2. I checked the Hotel Prince at 16:50 and saw two women and two men (Soviets) talking in the lobby. Then at the Hotel Alfer from 16:55 to 17:40. Nothing except a man at 17:30 who looked very European. This man looked into the lobby of the hotel, then into the adjacent garage, then back to the hotel then out of the area. He definitely was not a local Soviet.

3. At 17:40 I went back to the Hotel Prince to see if the entertainers were there. At 17:50 two men left who could be Soviets. I followed them to see if they were speaking Russian. I turned the corner from Luis Moya onto Juarez going east, I almost bumped into LOGINOV who was coming west on Juarez. I recognized him immediately and I felt that he recognized me. I continued along Juarez for a bit and then came back to see where LOGINOV went. I then stood on the other corner of Juarez and Luis Moya for 3 or 4 minutes. At this time I noticed a Soviet across Juarez (at the west side of the Juarez monument). He looked like KOLOMYAKOV but with too much hair. This Soviet was taking panoramic shots across Juarez. As his camera approached me, I stepped behind a kiosk. However, in the minutes before I noticed him, he could have been photographing me. A moment later I noticed LOGINOV about 10 yards from the Soviet. Both saw that I had spotted them. The Soviet with the camera then drifted west, photographed the Juarez monument and went further west. LOGINOV then went off in the same direction. I then went to report the above to CLASTONBURY at the Hotel Alfer after checking that I was not followed. I got there at 18:02.

4. The Soviet had a small camera which appeared to be 8 mm. Thus I doubt if he got identifiable pictures of me.

R-1172

SECRET

5. We checked out of the hotel at 18:30. At 18:40 we saw LOGINOV's car ahead of us on the Reforma headed toward the Soviet Embassy. Two men were in it whom I did not recognize.

6. LILYRIC has LOGINOV and BARANOV leaving the Soviet Embassy in LOGINOV's car at 15:36 on 8 March. Neither were back by 18:30 when LILYRIC secured. I instantly recognized BARANOV's photos as the Soviet with the camera.

7. Also per LILYRIC, LOGINOV left the Embassy in his car at 09:41 and returned on foot at 10:51. This was the period we were waiting for Subject. However he could not have seen me at the Hotel Prince since I left there at 09:50 the first time and at 10:40 the second time.

Francis J. COIGNE

247

15 Feb 68 Please check

Rollo: C - 2199
Fecha: Febrero 13 (MARTES) de 1968
Tiempo de Vigilancia: 0800 - 1500

Día: Claro
CAMARA
Velocidad: 1/150
Diafragma: 3.5
Distancia: 2.5

see attachment for registration of car 464 AF

Sujetos	Nº Foto	Hora	OBSERVACIONES.	Vehículos.
Goat	20	0902	que poco antes hablaba con Chern en el cuarto nuevo, se dirige al sur del Edificio.	
onoha y Kola	21	0907	que venían de la reja principal, platicando pasan por la terraza yendose al sur del Edificio.	
Klim	22	0931	venía de hablar con Solo en la Portería, pasa por la terraza y se va al sur del Edificio	
Shil	23	0958	y unos trabajadores, pasan afuera del cuarto nuevo y se van al garage. 1015 Hs. se dirigen a la puerta principal del Edificio.	
Zobn	24	0959	que poco antes llegaron al Club, salen del cuarto nuevo y se dirigen a la reja principal por la cual salen del Club	
		1014	Zobn regresa al Club y vuelve asomarse al cuarto nuevo al parecer busca a alguien, después sale del Club	
un y Kaz	25	1003	venían de la Portería, platicando pasan por la terraza y se van al sur del Edificio.	
l y Tuch	26	1042	que platicaban frente al Recibidor, pasan por la terraza hacia el sur del Edificio.	
	27	1121	entra al Club un Dodge Negro placas antiguas 464-AF, en dicho vehículo venían 2 Hombres y una Mujer (mexicanos) los recibe Log y juntos entran al Recibidor.	
Log	28	1122	y los sujetos mencionados en la foto 27, platicando se dirigen al recibidor, al parecer son agentes de seguros. 1225 Hs. se van del Club	
Korm y Rine	29	1200	que venían del Recibidor, pasan por la terraza hacia el sur del Edificio.	

file P 11712

Licalla C-2197
13 February 1968
Loginov & ? in black Dodge



Unidentified people who were
in black Dodge 464 AF

250

Placa No 464-AP - Coche Dodge Particular - modelo 1966 dado de alta en Mayo de 1966 a nombre de IGNACIO MARTINEZ CARPINTEIRO con domicilio en las calles de Pirineos Nº 128 colonia Portales, zona postal 13 D. F. motor 603334 sedán.

Atentamente K-10

251

12 February, 1968 [illegible]

SF/sec

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIREALM/1
2. Date and Site of Meeting: 12/2/68, Tecali Bar, Mariano Escobedo, 1700.
3. Date and Site of Next Meeting: Same place, same time, 19/2/68.
4. Administrative: No administrative matters discussed.
5. Information/Instructions Passed to Agent:

Rowton advised LIREALM/1 to continue his same line with his friend Valentin Loguinov. He agreed with LIREALM/1 that since Loguinov did not bring up the matter of his "boss" since his first reference to it at 27/1/68 at the French Club, Loguinov probably has not given further thought to the matter. (Loguinov had two opportunities to bring the matter up again with LIREALM/1 and did not do so).

Rowton also advised LIREALM/1 to continue to push LIRELIC/1 into the PRI but agreed that in the light of the current uncertainty as to whom might emerge as the future leader, LIRELIC/1 should not attach himself too firmly to any one individual, but rather await the outcome of the 27/2/68 convention.

6. Information/Reports Given to Case Officer by Agent:

LIREALM/1 gave Rowton his reports 050/JF and 051/JF, attached herewith, together with the latest LIRELIC/1 report passed to LIREALM/1 through the drop.

Wallace B Rowton

Source
Lirealm-1

Index
Page 2

COPIES MADE

cc [illegible] 13,223 - 11712

14-00000

252

050/JF
VALENTIN LOGUNOV

February 7, 1963, 1645-1845 hours.
French Club

Late for tennis. Val was 45 minutes late for our tennis match. I take this as meaning that he no longer suspects me of working for the company. Or at least his suspicions have been sufficiently allayed to permit him to risk missing a contact with me. He obviously was satisfied with my answers to his earlier provocation.

I am no longer a target. When we talk now, I have the definite feeling that he has neither thought at all about our meeting in advance, nor has he been briefed in advance by his people. Our conversation is spontaneous, inane, and frequently bogs down.

p. 13, 223

Negative about Gloria Pinto. Val seemed genuinely bored about Gloria. She is not young, but definitely attractive, athletic, sympathetic, and has organized several tennis groups, always careful to include Val. He seems completely unappreciative of her efforts in his behalf.

Not provocative. Val asked no leading questions and made no provocative remarks about our foreign policy.

Index C

Curious about personnel cuts at U.S. embassy. Val asked if it is true that 10 percent of the personnel would return to the U.S. He asked if I knew anyone personally who would be affected. I stated that the only person I really knew at all was Ruth Ortega. I added that the embassy couldn't possibly due without her. Val showed considerable interest in Ortega and suggested that I bring her along for tennis some day. I explained that my contact with Ortega was for business not, social, and that she probably was a little too old for tennis.

cit. Mexican
works in
Economics Section
of U.S. Embassy.
Business
acquaintance
of Liwalm.1.

Girls. Val was still on the girl phase. He hoped I could recommend some American girls to him. He asked me if I was interested in girls. I admitted that I was but didn't like to mix them with other activities. I said I liked tennis here, chess there, and girls there, but not mixing them. I then quoted an postwar Russian song: "Piervoe dieloe, piervoe dieloe, samaleti, i devushki potom."

Laura Liwalm

14-00000

253

050-2/JF

February 10, 1968. 2100-0200 hours
Home of Gloria and Pepe Pinto

Tennis dinner. Gloria has organized a tournament. Prior to the first match she invited all the participants to a cocktail-dinner in her home.

Val late. Val was late, explaining that his wife had a doctors appoint-ment. He also said that he had spent the day at a party in honor of the ambassador who soon will leave.

Val might leave. Val was asked by a provocative German if he too would soon be leaving. Val explained how most people leave after three years, or when the ambassador they have been serving leaves. He said there was a possibility that he might leave, but he refused to express his opinion about such a likelihood.

Party rough on Val. Everyone at the party seemed to want to kid Val, or, in the case of the German, come as close as possible to insulting him. I refrained from this attack. I asked Val if he were always treated as~~tx~~ sort of a novelty at parties, with people attacking him. He said no, but that most parties were diplomats or his own Soviet community. He explained the Germans behaviour as typical of the shortsighted, illinformed and vulgar Germans.

Alexandra. Alexandra spoke little during the evening and needed help from Val frequently to explain what was said in Spanish. However, she seems very intelligent and very calm.

254

SECRET

1 February 1968

TO : Chief, Cuba

FROM : C/SB

SUBJECT: Valentin LOGINOV (P-11712)

1. LIMITED reports that on 18 January 1968 LOGINOV entered the Soviet Embassy at 17:11 in his own car (19 DA). He was still in the Embassy at 19:00 when LIMITED went off duty.

2. LILYRIC was not working on 18 January.

Francis J. COIGNE

SECRET

P 11712

14-00000

D55

~~SR/F~~ 201
SR/T ✓ – pls charge Cuts; check reverse directory for other tenants
none

January 24, 1968.

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV P-11712

Source : BHFernald

1. A check at the building confirms that Subject lives at Ignacio Esteva 21 - apt. 2. Near the door bell at the main entrance in the slot corresponding to apt . 2 Subject's name appears : V.S.LOGINOV.

2. The building is quite new and it has 3 floors. The 1st (ground) floor houses the Instituto de cronometrologia, and ~~at~~ on the 2nd 3rd floor there are 2 apt per floor. The building has no garage.

3. Apparently there is no portero in the building because there is no bell for the portero. The "interphone" enables tenants to identify visitors and open the door electrically.

P-11712

p 1712

Loginov ordered
Pas for
Ignacio Esteva
21/2

257

[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] SB/Sec

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: BESABER P-8777

DATES OF MEETINGS: 11 and 19 January 1968

1. I met Subject in his room at the Del Paseo Hotel from 1415-1545 on 11 January and from 1415-1515 on 19 January. The next meeting will be arranged by telephone.

2. The Soviets. As of 19 January, Subject had not seen or talked with any of the Soviets since his telephone conversation with LOGINOV on 28 September. Subject did, however, receive a Christmas card from LOGINOV. With my agreement, Subject sent inexpensive gifts along with Christmas cards to LOGINOV and CHEYKHOV, but they weren't delivered until the week of 15 January. Subject explained that before Christmas, he assigned his salesman the job of delivering a score of Christmas gifts, including LOGINOV'S and CHEYKHOV'S, around town, but shortly after Christmas, found that the salesman had not delivered any of them. This discovery caused Subject to fire the salesman, who had been increasingly derelict in performing his job over the past few months and who, Subject had recently learned, had begun taking dope. Subject consequently wrote "better-late-than-never" notes on the cards accompanying the undelivered gifts and had his new salesman deliver them. I have instructed Subject to leave the initiative for the next contact up to the Soviets.

3. Soliman GOHARY. Subject ran into GOHARY on the street one day during the first week of January. GOHARY seemed delighted

File cc: P-6235 (p.1) P-10,056 (pp.1-2
P-11712 (p.1) , P-9097

COPIES MADE

P-11712

14-00000

258

SUBJECT: Policeman recruited by LOGINOV

1. This case started about fifteen months ago and the only info we know of is the ROESTROM couple that LOGINOV asked the policeman to check on. Is the case active? What requirements are being given to the policeman by LOGINOV? Are any Americans involved? Have any other Soviets been involved? LOGINOV specializes in US operations. He may be giving ~~the~~ policeman assignments in support of his US operations.

2. Please check this with 12 and 4 and let us know what the status is. Tks.

17 Jan 68

Orig to JKB (fr LITEMPO-8)
1-50-6-91/4
P file on LOGINOV P-11712

SECRET

17 Jan 68
~~2 Aug 67~~
P-11712

Nicolas Juan Bitrovem
Venezuelan cit
Native Russ employed Stephens-
Adamson de Mejico.
Wife teaches Russ at Ibero-
Amer Univ.

260

DBR 17 January 1968

Please try again (via [illegible]) Thanks 3 Nov 1967

Letempt will get "answers" for us — from Letempts.

He knows a little of case; believes is "dead"

COS

C/SB

I held this because we ~~ask~~ sent LITEMPO-8 a memo on new tourist office and didn't want to make too much of a good thing.

262

SECRET

24 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : COS

FROM : C/SB

SUBJECT : Policeman Recruited by LOGINOV

1. In reviewing LOGINOV's SPR which WEENING has just completed, I note that LOGINOV recruited this policeman 15 ~~13~~ months ago and that his first requirement was on the BOESTROM couple. At that time we gave LITEMPO-8 traces on LOGINOV saying that he was a dangerous KGB officer. LITEMPO-8 subsequently mentioned that the case was continued and that he, himself, was directing it.

2. If you think that LITEMPO-8 will cooperate, I would like to know the following about this case:

(a) Is it still active?

(b) Did the policeman pass info to LOGINOV on the BOESTROM couple? If so, what? Was there any follow-up?

(c) What type of requirements has LOGINOV given to the policeman? Are any Americans involved?

(d) Have any other Soviets been involved with this case?

(e) Who was ~~is~~ handling him while LOGINOV was ~~is~~ in the USSR on vacation (he left Mexico on 16 July ~~?~~ and returned on 5 Aug.)?

3. As a basis for discussing this case you could mention that we are especially concerned about LOGINOV because he specializes in US operations. He tried to recruit a chauffeur at the Embassy and tried to develop a female Foreign Service Officer (true). You might also say he is running a sensitive case into the US (false). Thus many of his requests to the policeman may be in support of American operations although this would not necessarily be apparent. Therefore we would like to know what he is asking for. Our traces would help both ourselves and LITEMPO-8, etc.

SECRET

263

4. Depending on LITEMPO-8's reaction, you might even suggest that LITEMPO-8 take advantage of LOGINOV's absence from Mexico in the USSR to request Relacciones not to give him a new visa because of his intelligence activity as detailed by LITEMPO-8.

he has been back for a month or more

Francis J. COIGNE

Distribution:
1 - P-11712
1 - 5Q-6-91/2

264

STATE DEPT DOCUMENT

MEMO FROM LEGAL ATTACHE [redacted]

DATE: 10 JANUARY 1968

SUBJECT: INSTITUTO DE INTERCAMBIO CULTURAL
MEXICANO-RUSO, MORELIA (MEXICAN-
RUSSIAN INSTITUTE OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE,
MORELIA) (105-1016 - 1/10/68)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Copy

③

XXXX GHF note: BIRTHDAY COULD BE EITHER KOLOMYAKOV's OR MIROSHNIKOV'S. I HAVE DIFFERENT DATES OF BIRTH IN JAN 1926 FOR BOTH THOUGH. VLADIMIR KLIMOV KORNYUKHIN AND SOLOMATIN WERE ALSO BORN 1928 (DAY AND MONTH UNKNOWN). ANYONE'S GUESS IS AS GOOD AS MINE.

GHF

DOB

560. Out to 11-09-60 at 1155. LOGINOVA asks MALYSHEVA for IVANOVA and asks her when did they come back. Last night. Well, they are gathering tomorrow evening at the Embassy to celebrate /someone's 40th birthday and there will be a lot of people and they have to present him with a gift. Let's make a collection and buy him a silver pitcher and two glasses. /long discussion/. Alright, but let's keep NATASHA as a teacher of English for the kids. Fine.

Wenroy

P-11712
P-1612
P-499
P-6518

156055
11 ENE. 1968

265

SECRET

11 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Visit of Unidentified Woman to Soviet Embassy grounds

1. LICALLA reported that at 1203 hours on Tuesday 9 January 1968, an unidentified woman, described by LICALLA as a "Northamerican type" entered the Soviet Embassy. This woman entered the receiving room and came out into the courtyard of the Soviet Embassy grounds at 1206 hours. While in the garden (courtyard) she spoke to Yuriy S. CHERNYSH (P-13042), Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (P-11707) and to Vladimir Agafonovich DOLGOV (P-9774). From 1215 hours until 1226 hours, when she again entered the reception room in the company of Valentin S. LOGINOV (P-11712), she spoke in the countyard to DOLGOV. LICALLA reported that this unidentified woman departed the Soviet Embassy at 1252 hours.

2. Attached for Vladimir A. DOLGUV's (P-9774) file are LICALLA photos of this woman taken with DOLGOV. (FOR WOFIRM USE ONLY).

Grace H. FARMILANT
SB

FILES

P-9774 w/att

P- 13042 w/o/att

P- 11707 w/o/att

P- 11712 w/o/att

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT : LICOZY-5

DATE OF MEETING : 5 January 1968

1. I met Subject at the Koala from 09:15 to 09:50. I will call him in the week of 15 January to arrange delivery of his liquor.

2. Subject gave me the travel info on IVANOV which has already been forwarded to San Jose.

3. Subject reported that LOGINOV visited him a few days before Christmas bearing 6 bottles of Vodka, red and black caviar and a lacquered box. He mentioned that NIKOFOROV and KORMUSHKIN had had a car accident. Also that NECHIPORENKO had arrived but that either he or someone in his family had been sick ever since arrival.

4. LOGINOV used the occasion to renew the old pitch. He said that with the celebration of the 50th anniversary everybody is contributing. What would LICOZY-5 contribute? Subject then gave LOGINOV a pair of sun glasses with a built in transistor radio (as a Christmas gift). LOGINOV said he meant not personal favors but something for the cause. He then asked Subject to spot a Mexican employee of the American Embassy. Subject laughed at him and repeated all the old arguments about not working for the Scvs. He told LOGINOV that, if he wanted to be friends, then stop bringing up these old requests.

Francis J. COIGNE

Distribution:
Orig - P-2712
1 - P-11712

P-11712

267

SECRET

5 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Berta *NAVARRO, Member of Fuersas Armadas de America Latina (FALA)

SOURCE : LICOZY-5

1. Source stated that Subject is the sister-in-law of his old friend Lic. Juan *SALDAÑA who used to be in Relacciones and is now Sub Director General of Accion Social of the Departamento del D.F. Subject is the sister of SALDAÑA's wife, Fernanda and is 24 years old.

2. A few weeks ago SALDAÑA brought Subject to Source asking the latter to give Subject a job. Subject told Source that she had formerly worked at UNAM and had been arrested in a group which had bombed the Bolivian Embassy in Mexico. She was held and interrogated but because of SALDAÑA's influence, she was released after 2 months without charges. However, the police refused to let her work at UNAM and told her that they would have to approve any job she undertook. She still has to report to the police every 3 days. Subject told Source her story because she knew that the police would check with him.

3. Subject told Source the following about herself and the FALA:

a. The FALA has 76,000 members.

b. Her superiors told her that the PCM tipped off the Mexican authorities about those involved in the bomb throwing. The PCM did this because terrorism is against their line and harms the peacful diffusion of Communism.

c. The FALA works on the cell basis so that each member knows only a few people. However, she worked as liaison between Mexico and Poza Rica and knows more members there. The FALA members in Poza Rica are Pemex workers.

d. The FALA is financed by the Cuban Embassy.

T-11712

288

SECRET

4. Valentin S. LOGINOV (P-11721) came into the office a few days after Subject started work and asked about her (she is replacing Miriam AVILA Katz). Source gave LOGINOV a brief resume of the above. LOGINOV's only comment was "they are nuts."

5. There are no traces on Subject, but there are several cards on SALDAÑA.

Francis J. COIGNE

File:
Orig - 50-9-8
1 - P-2712
1 - P-11712

SECRET

269

CARDED

CONFIDENTIAL

C/S

SB/V

Date: November 28, 1967

To: Mr. Henry Dearborn
Deputy Chief of Mission

Mr. Wallace W. Stuart
Counselor for Political Affairs

From: Nathan L. Ferris
Legal Attache

Subject: INSTITUTO DE INTERCAMBIO CULTURAL MEXICANO-RUSO
(MEXICAN-RUSSIAN INSTITUTE OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE),
GUADALAJARA, JALISCO
105-367 (11-28-67)

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Enclosed are two memoranda, dated and captioned as above, which may be of interest to you.

Enclosures (2)

CC: Mr. Winston M. Scott (Encs.-2)

Army Attache (Encs.-8)

American Consulate General, Guadalajara (Encs.-2)
(Through Counselor for Consular Affairs)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

File
IICMR
Guadalajara
50-4-29/4

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

270

(U)

CONFIDENTIAL

IICMR, GUADALAJARA

Source: T-1 August 8, 1957

Members of the IICMR at Guadalajara held a picnic for visitors at the II Soviet Cultural Week at Chapala, Jalisco, on August 8, 1957, lasting from 9:00 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. Noted among the visitors were the following:

Professor ADELINA ZENDEJAS -283
BORIS KAZANTSEV P-880
VALENTIN LONGINOV P-11712
STELLA INDA ✓
BORIS BOSKOLNIKOV P-2280
VLADEMIR ANCHEIV ✓
Professor ANDRIANA LOMBARDO -462
STANISLAV CHYCHEV. P-11113

cc to P files

The II Soviet Cultural Week at Guadalajara, Jalisco, began on August 7, 1957, with a reception at the IICMR office with about 700 persons present. Noted among the persons present were the following: BORIS BOSSOLNIKOV, BORIS KAZANTSEV, VLADEMIR ANCHEIV, Professor ADELINA ZENDEJAS, STANISLAV CHYCHEV, STELLA INDA, and VALENTIN LONGINOV. A cocktail party was held after the inauguration ceremonies, and many Russian and other Iron Curtain country magazines were given the public.

Source: T-1 August 12, 1957

On the night of August 10, 1957, Russian documental type movies were shown to about 110 persons at the Social Security Theatre at Guadalajara. These movies were sponsored by the IICMR.

Source: T-1 August 21, 1957

On the night of August 11, 1957, about 65 persons were entertained by ERNESTO TARRAGO and LAURA LOCA playing the violin and the piano. This event was sponsored by the IICMR as part of the II Soviet Cultural Week.

CONFIDENTIAL

4-00000

271

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ?

CONTACT REPORT: 50/50 [illegible]

SUBJECT: Operational Meeting with LIROCKET/1 (P-1241) [illegible]

DATE OF MEETING: 24 November 1967

1. The undersigned met with LIROCKET/1 on 24 November from 1200 hours to 1545 hours at an in-town safe house. From 1205 to 1245 the meeting was conducted in L/1's car inasmuch as the safe house was occupied during this period. The next meeting is scheduled for the same safe house on 8 December at 1500 hours.

2. The following meetings between L/1 and the below named Soviets occurred during the months of October and November:

a. Classes of 3 October: BEDRIN (P-9037) and GONCHARENKO (P-9379) studied on this day from 1530 to 1700. KAZANTSEV (P-880) studied from 1700 to 1800.

b. Classes of 5 October: In the morning of this day, an unidentified Soviet phoned Mrs. ROCKET (L/1 was out of the house) and requested her to inform L/1 that there would be no classes that day. No reason was given, either then or subsequently, for this cancellation.

c. Classes of 10 October: BEDRIN & Goncharenko studied from 1530 to 1700. KAZANTSEV came at 1610, interrupting class, to pick up several pocket books which he had previously asked L/1 to procure for him. L/1 selected them from his own library. KAZANTSEV stated that he did not care what subjects were chosen; he wanted them only to improve his reading ability. He did mention, however, that he preferred not to read books which had either violence or pornography as their central theme. L/1 brought a book on science fiction (Kaz. was not particularly interested in this), a book on ballet, and a book on the FBI in which KAZANTSEV seemed very interested. KAZANTSEV said that he would not be taking class today and that they would all discontinue classes after 12 Oct. KAZANTSEV stated that he was supposed to take his vacation between now and 15 November. & [illegible] BEDRIN

P-1241 - P-9037 P-9379, P-880 [illegible] P-11712

P-11712

COPIES MADE

14-00000

272

and GONCHARENKO remarked that they would be too busy with the upcoming Olympics and 50th anniversary. L/1 noted that although BEDRIN was not especially interested in the books given KAZANTSEV, he was interested in obtaining books of a pornographic nature. BEDRIN has previously remarked that he liked a good spicy story and that during a 1966 layover in Brussels, he (BEDRIN) sought out and enjoyed seeing some sex movies there.

d. Classes of 12 October: (Last class until 14 November). BEDRIN and GONCHARENKO studied from 1530 to 1700. KAZANTSEV did not study. BEDRIN told L/1 to come to the Embassy near the end of October in order to pick up his invitations for the 7 November anniversary. L/1 mentioned that he might be going to the States during the last of October. BEDRIN asked L/1 to bring him two 7 inch recording tapes and two 5 inch reel tapes. BEDRIN commented that "another friend" had previously brought him some tapes. This was the frist time BEDRIN had ever requested L/1 to perform any personal favor.

3. On 31 October L/1 drove to the Embassy to pick up his inviations. L/1 met by BEDRIN who gave him two inviations. L/1 commented that he was not now planning to motor to US. BEDRIN stated that he did not need the requested tapes inasmuch as a "friend" had purchased some Grundig tapes for him while in the States.

4. On 7 November L/1 attended the Soviet celebration. L/1 was not accompanied by his wife since he had to teach classes that evening and therefore stayed only from 1700 to 1830 hours. By his own testimony, L/1 consumed some 14 shots of vodka during this period, yet managed to teach two classes that evening. L/1 agreed that the classes were conducted in a voluble spirit. L/1 was met at the gate by GORLITSYN (P-1167) who then passed him on to LOGINOV (P-11[illegible]). LOGINOV commented that he was still interested in possibly hiring Enrique GUTIERREZ as an English language teacher for his son. In the reception line L/1 met KAZANTSEV and wife, who introduced him to the new military attache (name forgotten by L/1) with whom he had an animated

[illegible]

4-00000

273

conversation in Spanish. The military attache spoke very good Spanish and indicated to L/1 that he would probably begin to study English within the next few months. The mil. attache's English was very poor. L/1 then met BEDRIN & GONCHARENKO and had the usual cocktail chatter with them. BEDRIN and GONCHARENKO, in turn, introduced L/1 to FNU GOLOVCO, allegedly a representative of the "Ministry of Culture" of the USSR who, in that capacity, was accompanying the Soviet Ballet on Ice troupe. GOLOVCO spoke in fluent English with L/1 commenting that he had studied English in the USSR. His home is Kiyev. L/1's impression of GOLOVCO was that GOLOVCO did not appear to be the "cultural type". GOLOVCO was very imprecise as to his actual role and duties with the Ice Ballet. GOLOVCO's dress was somewhat hap-hazard and he impressed L/1 as somewhat unrefined and a heavy. GOLOVCO, according to L/1, is about 40-45 years of age, 6'1" in height, 160-165 pounds, grey hair and thin-faced (angular). L/1, emboldened by a few vodkas, requested two tickets for the Ice Ballet from GOLOVCO. GOLOVCO politely acquiesced and said he would get two of the best seats. L/1 was then introduced to the assistant director and the director of the orchestra by GOLOVCO who translated in a seemingly suave manner. With this show of friendliness on the part of the Soviets, L/1 XXX decided to invite them all to his house for a buffet supper within the next few weeks. GOLOVCO and his associates were visibly pleased and L/1 also extended the invitation to BEDRIN. BEDRIN said he would try and make all the arrangements and a tentative date of 9 or 10 December was agreed upon. L/1 was then introduced to the Ethiopian Ambassador, Gaitachew BEKELE, with whom he conversed in English. BEKELE has good English facility. BEKELE appeared to be on good terms with a number of Soviets and know BEDRIN quite well. BEKELE is tall and thin, pronounced negroid features, and possesses a strong, forceful, dynamic personality. L/1 and BEKELE had a friendly talk and when parting XXXXXXXX left open

274

the possibility of meeting together socially. As L/1 was leaving the Embassy, the Soviet Ambassador spotted him, broke from the group he was conversing with, and walked over to L/1 with whom he proposed a toast and they drank to the USSR.

5. Beginning with 14 November, the following classes were held:

a. Classes of 14 November: GONCHARENKO arrived 10 minutes late for classes at 1540. He informed L/1 that neither KAZANTSEV or BEDRIN would be available for classes that day. Then, apparently as an after-thought, GONCHARENKO commented that he would not attend classes either.

b. Classes of 16 November: L/1 met GOLOVCO who gave him two tickets for the Ice Ballet. BEDRIN and GONCHARENKO entered at 1530. At 1620 KAZANTSEV entered and interrupted the class to announce that he would not study that day. Immediately BEDRIN wheeled around and told KAZANTSEV very explicitly that he should remain and study. To this KAZANTSEV replied in English, "See the pressure my Chief puts on me!" It was quite apparent that BEDRIN was in charge of the language lessons and that KAZANTSEV was seemingly very hesitant to defy BEDRIN's challenge. (C.O. note: This may signify that BEDRIN's rank is considerable more than a Second Secretary within the internal organization of the Embassy). KAZANTSEV stated that he wanted to take a week's leave, but in deference to BEDRIN's wishes KAZANTSEV finally remained during the rest of the class, although his presence was a somewhat disruptive factor. GONCHARENKO, who had remained silent for the most part, became somewhat bored and dispirited by KAZANTSEV's antics and therefore exited the class at 1640 - some 20 minutes before the end of the lessons. BEDRIN and KAZANTSEV remained and L/1 had them ask each other questions in English - an exercise which KAZANTSEV enjoyed in that his English is superior to BEDRIN's. However, BEDRIN rose to the occasion, comported himself in a fine manner, and there ensued a lively exchange of answers and questions on non-controversial topics.

275

Upon departing KAZANTSEV stated that beginning 21 November a new pupil would join the class. He identified the new pupil as KORNYUKHIN, V-M-, (Valentin Mikhaylovich), a second secretary in the Embassy.

c. Classes of 21 November: Bedrin and GONCHARENKO studied from 1530 to 1700. At 1700 KAZANTSEV entered together with KORNYUKHIN. KORNYUKHIN possesses good, fluent English although his grammar is quite rough. He speaks with a decidedly British accent. KORNYUKHIN commented that he had served in Burma (approximately from 1962-65) and more recently (1965-67) had been working in Moscow. KORNYUKHIN is married and stated that he had been in Mexico some four months. KORNYUKHIN appears to be between 35-40 years of age, blonde hair, trim, athletic appearing, approx. 6 feet tall and weighing between 165-170 pounds.

d. Classes of 23 November: BEDRIN and GONCHARENKO studied from 1530 to 1700. GONCHARENKO commented that his wife and two children were ill with the flu. KAZANTSEV and KORNYUKHIN arrived at 1700 and studied until 1800. During the lesson a slight argument or difference of opinion arose between KORNYUKHIN and KAZANTSEV over what the official Soviet position was during the 1964 Cyprus crisis. (I/1 could not recall the substance over what they differed on). I/1 then queried them as to what the official position was on the present crisis. They both replied that they didn't know as yet what the position of the USSR was on the current Cyprus dispute. The exchange reflected the obdurate, somewhat dogmatic, character of KORNYUKHIN. I/1 characterized KORNYUKHIN as possesing very strong and fixed ideas. KORNYUKHIN did not appear to be awed by KAZANTSEV's position and spoke openly and forcefully to him. Upon departing I/1 spoke with LOGINOV regarding the possible employment of an English teacher for LOGINOV's children. LOGINOV commented that a Soviet English-speaking teacher/employee was now teaching his son. I/1 had recently met a MRS JOHNSON through William (?) PENN, Director of the British Institute.

14-00000

276

JOHNSON, a British citizen, is [illegible] in securing the position. Although L/1 does not know JOHNSON well, he was introduced to him during the first meeting and passed on to LOGINOV a strong recommendation as to JOHNSON's credentials. (JOHNSON is a lawyer by profession and is unmarried). LOGINOV became more interested in JOHNSON and told L/1 that he might be able to use his services in two or three months. The undersigned instructed L/1 to obtain more bio information (full name, etc.) on JOHNSON and to monitor the progress ~~of JOHNSON~~ in attempting to obtain a teaching position at the Embassy.

all this confirmed by LIENVOY — M

MONROE N. REIDEMANN

14-00000

277

[illegible] nobody.

[illegible]: [illegible] and GONCHARENKO told L/1 they were not able to attend classes this date as they were busy with upcoming 50th anniversary arrangements and Olympics. Requested that they be given lessons following day. This was not possible for L/1. GORLITSYN (P-11163) came into classroom after departure [illegible] & GONCHARENKO and began talking to L/1 in English. L/1 assessed GORLITSYN's English as being fairly good and capable of carrying a conversation. GORLITSYN said that he preferred to study English alone rather than in a class or with a tutor. GORLITSYN commented that he would be required to take his English exam in Moscow in the near future (time not specified) and that he would closet himself off for one week while he prepared for it. GORLITSYN stated that he wanted to "maintain his 20% bonus" by passing this English exam. L/1 views GORLITSYN as somewhat of a bumpkin; not particularly intelligent, but a plodder; and a loner in his relationships with others - as far as L/1 can discern. KAZANTSEV was not able to attend classes as he was to accompany a group from the international diplomatic community on a special tour to the Yucatan. LOGINOV (P-11712) also spoke briefly with L/1. LOGINOV asked L/1 if he would have time to teach his son (8 or 9 years old) English, in the company of another Soviet boy, between the hours of 1700 and 1800 any day of the week. L/1 stated that these hours were impossible for him, but might be able to arrange another time. LOGINOV said that he would give this consideration. LOGINOV then began talking of his love for sports and his background as a former judge in Olympic Skiing as well as Refereeing various other sports including tennis. This was all discussed against the backdrop of the Olympics. LOGINOV's English is good, although not as fluent as KAZANTSEV's. LOGINOV's only problem seems to be a lack

[illegible] 11712

278

INFORME NO.1[illegible].-

NOV.1[illegible]/67.-

ASUNTO: (DOCUMENTOS ENTREGADOS POR S-1-)

LUGAR: VERACRUZ, VER.-

FECHA: NOV.11/67.-

1.- Dos Manifiestos de entrada del barco Aleman Occidental "LUDWIGSHAFEN" que entro al Puerto de Veracruz, el dia 3 de Nov./67., procedente de Alemania Occidental y salio de este Puerto el dia 7 de Nov./67.- Habiendo dejado una grabadora para el Sr. Valentin Loginov, de la Embajada Rusa en Mexico, D.F.- Una caja de efectos personales, para el Sr. Dimitri D. Prygov, de la Embajada Rusa en Mexico, D.F.-

2.- Tres copias fotostaticas del cable puesto desde La Habana, Cuba a Lopez y Hnos., S.A., avisandole de la llegada del barco cubano UVERO al Puerto de Progreso, para que sean atendidos, este barco entro el dia 7 de Nov./67 a Progreso, Yucatan.
Esta informacion se le paso por telefono al Sr. Miguel, el dia 8 de Nov/67., a las 8 y 45 p.m., por haberseme pasado el dato directamente desde Veracruz.-

3.- Manifiesto de Consiganataria de Buques Mambisas. diciendo que el barco de nacionalidad Ruso "LENINSKY KOMSOMOL", salio el dia 4 de Nov./67., del Puerto del Mariel, Provincia de Pinar del Rio, Cuba, en lastre. Habiendo llegado al Puerto de Veracruz, a cargar maiz el dia 8 de Nov. de 1967.-

4.- Lista de tripulantes del barco ruso "LENINSKY KOMSOMOL" que entro el dia 8 de Nov./67., procedente del Mariel, Cuba.-

200-4-64

copies mailed

Pico.

279

Orig.
SB/Sec file

File France/Sov

Source
[illegible]-1

009
LOGUINOV, Valentin P-11712

November 2, 1967. 1130 hours.

Casual contact. Loguinov was entering the French Club as I was leaving. He asked me to stay long enough to play a couple of sets of tennis with him. I had to decline due to previous committments. We both agreed to look for each other for tennis some day after the 50th anniversary celebrations next week.

November 11, 1967. 1100-1200 hours.
Source: Direct. At French Club.

Tennis. Loguinov and I played doubles with two women. Everyone seemd to permit themselves to tease Loguinov about the embassy's celebration of the 50th anniverrary and about the numerous requests that everyone seemed to have made for gifts and souvenirs from Russia. Val has singed up for a tournament of mixed doubles which begins tomorrow. I too have been invited and accepted.

Attitude. Loguinov seemed very friendly and anxious to continue our friendship. His motives, however, seem strictly for tennis.

Companion. Earlier I saw Loguinov playing tennis with a rather tall and heavy-set person who left when Loguinov approached my wife and me. Later, when dressed, this person passed by to say goodbye to Loguinov, in Russian. He is obviously an embassy type.

November 12, 1967.
Source: Direct. At French Club.

copy Page 2 for P-1103

Loguinov played tennis with still another member of his embassy. We did not have an opportunity to talk on the courts. We did see each other in the showers. He showed great interest in playing soon and said he would call me to arrange the date and time. He joked that I should bring some of my friends from the embassy, all of whom are CIA. We could have an international tournament. I told him that none of my friends played tennis. He misunderstood and thought I said that I knew no-one at the embassy—he looked disappointed. I corrected him and said that I did indeed know embassy people, but that none played tennis and that I doubted very much if my friends were CIA, FBI or anything else.

[illegible]

[illegible]-1
P-11712

14-00000

280

LICALLA- 2 DECEMBER 1967

ANOTHER INTERESTING KGB TRIO:

XXXXXXXXX Valentin LOGINOV, Oleg NECHIPORENKO (arrived PCS 29 NOV 1967), and Pavel YATSKOV, whom NECH is replacing.

File: P-11712



281

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP/ADB. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

FROM:

IP/

JUHKENTRAAL JAAK
IP/AN
EXT. 5178

GN-330
GA50
TUBE GT7

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

It is the responsibility of the SSXO area desk to screen Field Files for duplication and incorporate in CS Headquarters Files, per Chief, SS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SB/X/WH		24-8-72		
2.				
3.				
4. SB/BIC		24 AUG 1972	24 Aug 72	DER
5.				
6. SB/RIS			31 AUG 1972	
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. IP/FI				

FILE TITLE

ABSTRACT

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-[illegible]

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

HMMA 42261

282

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City 85

SUBJECT
O Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are the Station's Personality File on Subject for inclusion into his Headquarters 201-File. The File has been purged of all Headquarters correspondence.

Felix C. Pesaturo
Felix C. PESATURO

Distribution:
2cys - C/SBD w/atts h/w.
1cy - C/WHD w/o/atts.
Bulky att. forwarded directly to SB/X/WH by IP/AN/SB on 22 Aug 72.

O
IMPDET

1 att. (3 vol. field 201-file)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-42261	16 August 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412

283

X-REF. SHEET S-E-C-R-E-T DATE 21/03/78

X-REF.	SYMB. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-0285412	HMMA-38637	16 MAR 70	201-0789963

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT(S) ARE CROSS-REFERENCED TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN. FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF THE FILE CONTAINING THE RECORD COPY DOCUMENT, CALL FILES SECTION, EXTENSION 4127.

S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FILE IN 201-0285412

SB/1
SB/Sec -
+ files

21 August 196[illegible]

CONTACT REPORT
SUBJECT: LIBACCH/1
PLACE, DATE, TIME: FIRENZE REST., 20 Aug., 1615 - 1800

1. Subject was fifteen minutes late for the meeting scheduled for 1600 hours, claiming a terrific hangover and exhaustion, having spent most of the previous night with REX, drinking etc. (Strangely his eyes were very clear, but then he is quite young.) I am quite sure that immediately upon his arrival and after making his explanation for being late he added that his car was in the shop for repairs, but at the end of the unproductive meeting he walked to his car parked only half a block away from the cafe. I walked with him and commented on his earlier remark regarding repairs but he denied saying anything about it.

+ this week 2. Subject had not yet seen LUBAN but said that he planned to attend a party allegedly to be given by Ludmila (not Sergio's wife,) at which time he will attempt to elicit info re LUBAN's recent trip. Incidentally, Subj. stated that ~~Sergio OLMOVICH~~ had returned to Mexico 3 or 4 months ago. (It had been my understanding that Sergio was still in Moscow.) Subject had not seen either of the OLMOVICHs' for several months.

P 5325

3. We chatted at great length about many innocuous topics, Russian literature, Mexican food, etc. At one point I attempted to have him work on LO[illegible]'s Pad, but he begged off, referring again to his exhaustion, etc. However, we scheduled a 1000 hour meeting at the JEF cafe for Monday 25 August, Subj promising to be in good condition enabling him to tackle the Pad at that time. (Personally, I am not in favor of doing this sort of work in a restaurant.)

4. During our discussion of Russian literature Subj. asked me if I could get him a copy of SOLZHENITSYN's "GULAG ISLANDS", xxxxxxx in Russ, I said I would try.

5. Subject is going to try to get away for a short vacation in Acapulco sometime in Sept. and he hopes that I can join him. I made no commitment.

6. While waiting for Subj I was reading "Sports Afield" which I threw on a chair when Subject arrived. About half way through the meeting Subj asked me if I were interested in hunting and fishing and when I replied in the affirmative he quickly came up with a "brilliant" idea. He said he has a student American friend, who is studying Russian, and a rabid fisherman. He thought it would be a terrific idea for him to introduce this man, John [illegible], to me so we could hunt and/or fish together. I told him I ~~was not ready~~ for this sort of thing yet, perhaps later.

Leave

7. Subj has not seen LOI lately but has a date with him at the [illegible] Bros., Calle Liverpool, on the 29th of August. Apparently this was arranged by LOI. Subj [illegible] that he is very interested in the type of work we are asking him to do, but hopes he can become more active in this respect. He said: "I am ready to go to Moscow, or any other part of ~~xxxxx~~ Latin America to do your spying." I told him he was far from ready for that type of assignment and not to think about it at this time, that even if he were to be considered for such a job he would require much and painful training. He laughed good naturedly saying he understood perfectly.

ready for

8. COMMENTS. Subject is a strange cookie, vague, with a tendency to wander off into unrelated topics in the middle of a conversation. He seems to love everyone and he is certainly a friendly type, easy to talk to, and usually quite agreeable. He must be taken out of the cafe atmosphere into ~~more serious~~ duller surroundings and given a serious briefing as to what this is all about. It is too early for me to tell whether he can be brought

285

down out of the clouds to face reality and I imagine a rather dull daily existence. I think he would like to be, and maybe is, an avid reader of literature. Perhaps he entertains thoughts of becoming a writer someday. He apparently enjoys putting away a good deal of alcoholic beverages.

Douglas F. DICKINSON

286

August 6, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: Jimmy SABORI (P-13,830)
Date of Meet: Aug 5 at Continental Rest from 2000 to 2330 hrs.

1. The meet was prearranged and S came on time. The purpose of the meet was to debrief S on his meet with LOG which took place the previous evening and proceed with the filling of the PAQ as well as to give necessary ops instruction. The purpose was achieved.

Next meet: August 19 at the same time and place.

2. The fact that LOG started the meet with a talk about books appeared to S to be curious. No doubt that LOG was peddling some Communist ideological tid bits, especially, justification of Sov international policy. Briefly, too much freedom is not good; Americans and their foreign policy is naive: they worry more about the world opinion than about their national interest; if they want to do something they consult everybody and everything to find out an ages old fact that noby can satisfy everybody; Nixons trip to Rumania was outright a provocation aimed at Sov Union, except, if it was a product of naiveness.

3. S was really surprised to hear LOG giving up so eaily on the matter of the US Emb phone directory, but he was outright disappointed when LOG stated that he nor any of Sov Emb officials would want to meet with TANG. Further, S was shaken up when he directly told that he was to be Sov agent assigned to collect info about Red China and Nat Chinese policy concerning Sov - Red Chinese conflict from a Chinese Emb official. Although, he did not mention it to [illegible], it was obvious that S did not like at all the idea that big money was spoken but there was NO mention of money right now, i.e. during the period "S will be working on winning TANGs confidence".

4. P reminded S what he told him at their previous meet concerning his involvement with the Chinese and added that if it was not clear then what P meant LOG spelled it out in clear terms. S contended that he did not want to go to see TANG before speaking to P, because he wanted to follow our instruction. This was said to please P on one hand and on the

14-00000

287

other to appease his (S) own fear from the mere possibility that something might go wrong and he would have nowhere to turn to. F told him that going to TANG ONLY in connection with the matter of publishing the article could do him no harm; denying having contact with LOC recently is not sufficient; TANG could bring up the question for an ostensive purpose of wanting to send a message to S Sov friend and the fact of not seeing each other during the past 2 - 3 weeks means nothing ~~means nothing~~, because S is supposed to be able to reach a friend; S must be ready to meet any question by TANG not by denying previous statements but by emphasizing that he was thinking carefully about what he told TANG and he reached the conclusion that that would ~~getxxx~~ him in a situation he was never before in and, consequently, knows nothing about possible consequences; therefore, he decided to keep out a field he is ignorant in.

[illegible]

5. As far as the other requirements concerning the chinese are concerned, F told S to do nothing for the time being and, especially, to keep away from trying to ascertain the names of Mexicans working in the chinese Emb. S should claim that he was spending his time on trying to get the name of the next Presidential candidate before the President sends the name of the candidate to PRI for approval. Further, S can always be in no more hurry than LOC was to get him an answer on the platinum deal.

6. In spite of his reactions concerning the business part of the meet, S was flattered with LOC invitation to spend a day with him and his family in Cuautla "to celebrate his birthday together". S asked F would it be appropriate if he and Josephine took a present to Mrs. LOC, as for example, a silver broach or something similar. F told him that the maximum he could take for Mrs. LOC and the boy was a box of chocolatte candies in the value of MN 40.- and F did not imply that he would pay for it.

7. S read through the remainder of the PAQ and it was true that he was able to give very few answers if he did not have an opportunity to observe LOC in the circle of his family and in conditions less formal than they usually meet. It may be noted that S read the questionnaire 2 - 3 times to be aware of what he had to pay attention. S also requested that F bring him back the portion he already filled out because he was now

288

give additional info and correct some of the given answers.

8. At the end of the meet S stated that he did not have his car this evening because Josephine needed it. F told him that he was willing to pay him a taxi, but he was not able to give him a ride. F is quite sure that the car which S uses is Josephines and that it is on S' disposal only when she does not needed. Further, if S ever wanted to identify F's car it is extremely doubtful that he would had ventured into setting excuses in an evening with such lousy weather as it was last night.

9. Byproduct of the talk about the car was that we learned Josephines age: she is 49. According to S nobody would believe that she was more than 40.

F.R.Fernald

289

ATTACHMENT
August 6, 1969

Subject: Jimmy TABORI (P-13830) Report on His
Meet with LOGINOV (P-11,712) on Aug 4 at Samborns-San Angel
at 2000 hrs.

1. The meet was prearranged and it lasted 2 hours and 15 minutes. As in all previous cases S and LOG met in front of the restaurant. LOG came 3 minutes earlier.

THEIR NEXT MEET: On Aug 16 S and Josephine are to come to Cuautla at the "Banos" about 1000 hrs to be guests of LOG and his family (to celebrate S birthday which is on Aug 13).
On Aug 25 at Samborns-San Angel at 2000 hrs a business meet will be held.

2. LOG and S 2 Vodka cocktails, club sandwitch and a beer. LOG claimed that he had already eaten something and S felt a stomach disconfort.

3. LOG asked S did he finish reading the book (in English) about Rasputin which he gave him about a month ago. S answered affirmatively andthey spoke about the book. LOG promised to give S another book, witten a a British , titled "USSR 1941-45" or similar. LOG wants S to be familiar with the suffering of Sov people during the WW II.

4. Then, LOG asked S what was the situation with the US Embassy Phone Directory. S stated that the fictitious girl Patricia showed up for few day and returned to the States for family reasons. He brought up in a conv with her the Directory and she told him that it was tightly controled. S left it at that point and he told LOG that he would have to start working on the matter from scratch if LOG wanted the Directory but S would appreciate LOGs suggestions as to how to go about it. LOG told S to forget it because he know that the directory was well controled.

5. The next question by LOG was what progress did S make with Mr. TANG. S told him about his meet with TANG on Aug 1 (See FERNALD's TABORI Contact Report dated Aug 5,'69). LOG listened to the story without interrupting and then he told S that he was not certain that

290

TANG was a member of the Chinese Emb staff here, because he did not find his name in the diplomatic list. Further, he told S that he was doing a good job, which he appreciated, but he must be very cautious because the Chinese are clever people and extremely suspicious.

6. In reply to S' question LOG stated that he nor anyone of them (Sov Emb official)would meet with TANG, because that it too dangerous. S queried what was dangerous about it and LOG stated that there was always a chance that they (TANG and LOG or another Sov) might be seen together and that would be very bad. S went on to tell S that it would be his job to develop friendly relations with TANG ot possibly another Chinese official and slowly obtain from him the info LOG and his embassy needed; LOG will guide him as to how to go about it and if they show confidence in S he will have it made and Sovs (LOG used the expression: WE) would pay him very well for that job. S commented that he had believed that what he was doing he did out of personal friendship with LOG and not for money. LOG smiled at S' statement and added that in addition to money they (Sovs) enable S to travel to Sov Union and have a vacation on the Black Sea.

7. While S was thinking whether to say something or keep quiet, LOG told him that the next time he went to TANG he should limit his conv to the publishing of the article about Nat China and if needed deny that he had any contact with his Sov friend (LOG) since he met TANG; S' job is to win TANGs confidence and that is a slow process with the Chinese. Then, in answer to LOGs question S stated that there were to Mexicans (a woman and a man) working at the Chinese Emb. LOG told him to get their names and addresses. S commented that this was not as simple as it sounded, because one cannot just ask a person what was his name and address. LOG commented that even this was a matter which cannot be rushed; first get their names and later obtain the address.

8. There was another thing S should do: find out how many Chinese live in Mexico City and determined whichones were the influentialone and among the latterones determine which are the most influential; he can start working on this by dropping in a better Chinese restaurant and trying to develop some acquaintances; it can be assumed that those who go to restaurants are people who have money and those who have money are

291

usuallu influential. S agreed with LOG and expected LOG to tell him that he would pay for the visiting of Chinese restaurants, but LOG kept quiet.

9. S had no intention to skip the talk about money and he told him that the publishing of the article about Nat China may end in a blind alley if TANG does not supply at least a half a page of advertising. LOG did not want that to happen and he told S that he (LOG) would give him MN 1,000.- if the printing of the article should be held because of lack of advertising. S brought to LOG's attention that half of page of advertising brings to Pierre (RUDIAN) 1,500.- pesos. LOG felt that he would pay that money as a price of keeping the door open to the Chinese Emb for S. To put some coating on the pill S added that he would try to obtain an add or two from Chinese restaurants, but he daoubted that the owners would be interested in advertising in a magazine which is far from being well known. Just the idea that S conteplated going to Chinese restaurants pleased LOG's ear.

10. LOG was interested in the status of the Presidential race and S told him that it narrowed down to four candidates and that all the indications were in the direction that ECHEVARRIA was to be the official PRI candidate. S believed that by Aug 20 he would know the name of the candidate. In reply to LOG's question S stated that the candidate will be publically known Sept 15-20.

11. LOG wanted to give more time to be positive of the name of the Presidential candidate and he decided that their next (business) meet would be on Aug 25 at the same rime and place. LOG immediately added that he did not forget that S birthday was on Aug 15 and that he believed that it would be the best if they celebrated together in Cuautla on ~~Ema~~ Aug 16. LOG added that on that day his wife and son would be with him in Cuautla and S should bring along Josephine; Log will bring a bottle of "Russian" champaign and pic-nic style food; there will be bottle of Vodka for Jisephine and a bottleof (P does not remember what) for S plus the book he previously mentioned. LOG added some more description about what a wonderful day they would have together. They are to meet in Cuautla about 1000 hrs at the "Banoes". LOG will be there without fail because he will pick up his son who is now attending the "Russian School"

292

in Cuernavaca; the son speaks only Russian and English and LOG is looking forward to the fact that his son will be obliged to speak english all day; LOG's wife speaks a little Spanish and there will be no problem for her and Josephine to understand each other. S promised to be there.

12. Last moment assignment for S: LOG hold an info that TANG speaks Russian. If S succeeds to verify this fact LOG would like to know where did TANG learn Russian.

BHFernald

293

SECRET

Section Chief: C/SB
COS :
DCOS :
C/IC :
EXEC. ASST. :
~~RI/FILE~~: SB/SEC P-2712
P-7442
DATE: 4 Aug 69 P-11,712
P-1612
P-2270

1. Agent/Subject: LICOZY-5

2. Case Officer Vincent P. RIZZUTO

3. Date and site of contact: 4 Aug 69 at Restaurant Parque

4. Date and site of next meeting: Subject will call--see below

5. Administrative (salaries, accountings, etc.)

Subject mentioned near the close of the meeting that he owed me $600 (US) for the TV set which COIGNE had obtained for him. I said that I thought this was a gift but Subject said no, he insisted on paying for it and would do so shortly. Meanwhile, a part has burned out and he can not obtain a replacement in Mexico because this particular model is not made in Mexico. He will call in with the details and I will try to get it for him.

6. Information/Instructions passed agent:

None

7. Report/Information received from agent: (use back if necessary)

Subject had been in Europe and Israel for several weeks since our last meeting. Nothing of particular interest developed on this trip.

Before he left, Subject was invited by NECHIPORENKO (P-7442) to celebrate the latter's birthday (which happens to be 4 July). Subject tried to beg off but NECHIPORENKO refused to take no for an answer and actually came to Subject's apartment with KOSTIKOV to bring Subject to NECHIPORENKO's apartment. Since NECHIPORENKO's wife was away, three girls from the Pianitsky Chorus were awaiting the three men. Considerable drinking was done and Subject said it was obvious why they had asked him since the third girl needed a partner. Her name was Nina BUCHAROVA. Subject said that all of the girls were quite attractive and "available for anything." Subject said that he understood that most of the girls in the Chorus fit this category and that they would simply wait until their housemother was asleep before going out and getting some action.

Subject and NECHIPORENKO actually have a good personal relationship. (see attached sheet) page 2

8. Security:

None

9. Miscellaneous:

Subject solved a mystery of where GESTETNER was during his recent visit. Subject had met GESTETNER at the airport and had wined and dined his family during most of the time that GESTETNER was here. No wonder GESTETNER had no time for LIEMPTY-5 or anybody else.

294

#7 continued

Subject believes that NECHIPORENKO is very intelligent. He speaks the best Spanish of any of the Soviets known to Subject and due to this facility as well as his looks, can pass for a Mexican. Subject believes that NECHIPORENKO was given the task of cultivating and attempting to re-recruite him after LOGINOV failed. Subject had some interesting comments about LOGINOV (P-11,712) which seem to jive with other comments which have been made about him. LOGINOV had apparently originally been given the task of re-recruiting Subject. When he failed, he felt rebuffed and has since been very cool towards Subject. Subject believes that LOGINOV either has or thinks he has been given bad marks by his superiors for having failed with Subject. LOGINOV is probably jealous or NECHIPORENKO who has at least managed to retain Subject's friendship. Subject says that LOGINOV is not dumb and that he uses his good looks to great advantage particularly with women.

Subject has recently had some dealings with IVANOV (P-1612) who is furious for the following reason: Formerly Soviets leaving Mexico would take KLM or Sabena to Europe where they would pick up Aeroflot the following day. KLM and Sabena would pay overnight hotel costs. Now, however, the Soviets are picking up Aeroflot in New York. Because of scheduling, however, they still must spend at least one night in New York. The airlines will not pay this and IVANOV wanted Subject to cover it. Subject refused for the very sound reason that it did not make sense for him to pay $20 for selling a $127 ticket from which his profit was only $9. IVANOV became furious and Subject yielded by agreeing to pay for IVANOV's accommodations and he said he would do it for those becoming as friendly, such as NECHIPORENKO, but he would not do it as a general rule. While Subject was away, however, his wife went overboard and got IVANOV four rooms (for two people). Now Subject is furious.

On 31 July Subject was visited by PRIKHODKO (P-2270) who came in carrying a copy of Pravda or Izvestiya. Subject quoted the old saw, "There is no truth in Pravda and no news in Izvestiya," and PRIKHODKO got mad claiming Subject was acting very unfriendly by making anti-Soviet propaganda. PRIKHODKO was very serious. This is probably as good and as accurate a thumbnail sketch on PRIKHODKO that we are likely to get. PRIKHODKO, who said that he was leaving in September, had visited Subject to find out what Subject knew about a congress of Jewish intellectuals which is to be held in mid-September in Bogota to discuss the Jewish problem in the Soviet Union. PRIKHODKO wanted to know who was going from Mexico. Subject told PRIKHODKO that he had not heard of the congress but would check into it. He did check with someonw at the Israeliac Embassy who was horrified to learn that word had gotten out since at this time knowledge of the congress is confidential. Subject told me that he would tell PRIKHODKO that he had been unable to learn anything, reasoning that to tell him about it would get him involved with further requirements and would be working against the best interests of the Jews. I told Subject that I agreed completely.

Subject said that the Sputnik group which was due in June never did get Mexican visas and their trip has been cancelled. On the other hand, a delegation of about a dozen Soviets is due in August for a Congress of eye, ear, nose, and throat specialists, and still another group of a dozen is due in September for a congress of soil mechanics. Since these are official delegates as opposed to the sputnik group who were tourists, they will have no trouble getting Mexican visas.

Subject himself will be going to Budapest from 1 to 7 November for the IICA congress. Subject is world chairman of this group which apparently is the International Convention Organization.

Subject has received several letters from the Sputnik translator he met on his recent trip to the Soviet Union. She had received the dictionary that he had sent her from Rome and the art books he had sent her from Mexico but not a pair of glasses he had sent her by KLM. Subject will look into this. He is obviously quite fond of this girl and appeared to be seeking my reassurance that she was not a KGB provocation. I repeated that I had said before which is that the possibility she is should be considered but that under the

295

August 2, 1969

Contact Report

P-11,712

Subject: Jimmy SABORI (P-13,830)

Date of Meet: August 1 at Restaurant INN Le Club and Bonaparte Bar
from 2000 to 2340 hrs

1. The meet was prearranged and S came on time. The main purpose of the meet was to have S fill the PAQ on LOGINOV (P-11,712), which was accomplished to a satisfactory degree, i.e. 26 pages out of 53. Further, FERNALD wanted to check what S has done or prepared for his next meet with LOG which is scheduled for Monday Aug 4 at 2000 hrs (this will be covered in the following paras).

Next meet: Tuesday August 5 at the Restaurant-Bar Continetal
at 2000 hrs.

2. On Friday Aug 1 at 1400 hrs S called on CHIN-HSIEN TANG, Minister Counseler of the Nat Chinese Emb at his office. The purpose of the call was to explain that the magazine La Mision goes to press the latest on the 18th of the month and it was too late to have anything published on Nat. China. In accordance with the instruction S received from Pierre RUDIAN, S told TANG that in publishing such articles the magazine writes them according to the wishes of the embassy of the country about which they are written. Because embassies pay only the subscription, they usually see to it that at least a half of page of advertising is included in the same issue.

3. TANG expressed understanding for such a practice and stated that he was interested in having published an article on the Republic of China and probably one on Chian-Kay-Shek and that he would see to it that a proper amount of ads be purchased.

4. TANG went on to ask which embassies are subscribers of the magazine and which use it for publishing articles. S stated that practically all embassies are subscribers and almost all of them had their articles published at one time or the other. TANG, apparently, was not satisfied with this answer and he asked point blanc was the Sov Embassy a subscriber.

5. When S answered affirmatively, TANG asked S did he know anybody

296

in the Sov Embassy. S stated that he was on friendly terms with an official of the Sov Embassy. TANG commented that this was unusual, because Sovs make frends with nobody. S stated again that he had no other way of calling his relation with the Sov official than a personal friendship. In reply to TANG's question S stated that he prefered not to mention the name of his Sov friend and TANG asked what position did S's Sov friend have. S replied that as far as he knew the Sov official was quite high up (sic). TANG continued his questioning: what was the nature of S' relationship with the Sov, was it a business type relationship; how often did they see each other; where did they meet. S stated that he never transacted any business with the Sov and they meet about twice a month for a dinner or lunch in various restaurants. S added that the Sov plays tennis every week-end and that he (S) sometime goes to watch him playing (Note: the latter statement is not true). TANG asked did S play tennis and he answered negatively.

6. At this point S asked was he interested in meeting his Sov friend and TANG stated that he was. Then, S asked ~~take~~ TANG what should he say to his Sov friend. TANG commented that this was a good question and he told S that he would think about it. Consequently, he asked S could he pass by on Monday or Tuesday (Aug 4 or 5) and S said he would.

7. In reply to P's question S stated that he intended to tell LOG exactly what tranpired on his meet with TANG and that he planned visiting TANG on Monaday so that he would be able to tell LOG did TANG decide to meet LOG.

8. P told S that he was going too far in pleasing LOG and was getting in a deeper and deeper mess by getting involved with the Nat Chinese; it was obvious from the attitued of Mr. TANG that he read him through and was taking his time to find, at could he benifit something out of the whole scheme. Therefore, S should also take it easy and not rush to see TANG on Monday, i.e. before seeing LOG; further, he should stick to his previous decision that it was rather dangerous to be meeting with LOG often.

9. S felt that LOG would press for a meet with S as soon as possible once he got to know that TANG had opened the possiblity of wanting to meet with LOG. P considered this to be possible and impressed on S that

14-00000

297

it was up to him to stall.

10. At this point S asked F would we help him out if he got in troubles on account of his association with LOG. F replied that he was trying to instruct him how to keep out of troubles and it appeared that S did not care much about what F was telling him. S reacted quite strongly to F' statement by saying that F was wrong, or at least incorrectly interpreted S' attitude; as far as he (S) is concerned he is willing to discontinue meeting with LOG immediately, if we tell him to do so. F answered that if we wanted him to drop LOG we would had told him to do it. Nevertheless, S as an American is certainly aware of the fact that the US Service and, consequently, the US security is getting nothing out of S' collaboration with LOG; in view of the fact that LOG will remain here only about 2 months more we felt it would be the best to leave the matter take its normal course and find its natural end; we were and continue to be interested in keeping him out of trouble, but to achieve this the most important thing was that he carry out our instruction as he received it; we badly need that S fullheartedly comply with our instruction; if S' association with the KGB (sic) continues after the departure of LOG we would probably be willing to continue our relationship with S only if we were able to count on his sincerety and complete complying with every instruction he may receive from us. S stated that it was clear to him that he could not count on any help from us if he got himself in trouble by acting on his own . F left it at that.

11. As the working part of the meet ended about 1040 hrs S stated that he was broke and did not anticipate to be in a better financial condition for two additional months. S turned this theme one way and the other until he came out with the request for about 50.- Dollars. F answered that he would look into the matter and we left the INN Le Club and started walking. S, ~~was~~ obviously fearing that the meet would break up and he would go home without any money, ~~and S~~ complained that the place (the INN) was good for writing purposes but the food was lousy (true) and no drinks were served and that if he was not broke he would had invited F to a brandy. F reacted by offering a brandy. Once at the bar S asked F could he give him some money this evening. F felt it would serve no purpose if he stalled more and he gave S MN500.- and obtained a receipt for the same.

2018

~~[illegible]~~

SC/[illegible] pls [illegible] Ramu
[illegible] [illegible] Gibson
who is [illegible]??
SC/[illegible] - files

August 1, 1969.

Contact Report
Subject: LIBACOH-1 (P-4805)
Date of Meet July 30 at Restaurant Firenze at 1630

1. Prearranged meet to which L-1 came 10 min early. The meet lasted 2 hours and 30 min.

Next meet: Wednesday Aug 6 at the same place at 1630 hrs.

2. L-1 came to this meet in much better shape than he was last time in spite of the fact that he complained of being tired. He wanted to eat something, but he did not feel ~~kas~~ having a full meal. He had 4 drinks (Rum and soda).

3. L-1 handed me a personality sketch which he prepared on BROVKIN which is not much by itself, but it could be useful for personality assessment of B.

4. I questioned L-1, as much as I was able without tipping my hand, about his visit to the Sov Emb on July 9. I detected no indication of deception nor withholding of info on his side.

[illegible]

5. In the course of debriefing L-1 on his meet with LCG I made my comments and gave him necessary instruction, which are covered in the following paras.

6. As L-1 mentioned LCGs questioning about LIOVAL-1 he immediately pointed out that the whole thing made no sense to him after LCGs repeated statements at the last meet that he was not interested in LIOVAL-1. I told L-1 that it made little sense to me, except, if LCG wanted to ascertain was L-1 telling him the truth. Then I added that I wished LIOVAL-1 had made some statement which L-1 could relay to LCG to see what would be his reaction. L-1 commented that once in the past he told LCG that LIOVAL-1 told him that he used to know a Sov diplomat here whom he considered to be his friend and was disappointed when the Sov diplomat tried to recruit him, because it was obvious that the friendship was a pretence. When LCG heard this he laughed and said that this was one of the old clumsy methods which are no longer used. (NOTE: I did not know about

[illegible]

OC this Page P-885

SC P-11712

14-00000

299

this fact and would appreciate whether it is contained in the files)

7. With regard to Victor I. RAMOS P. (or R) there is little to be said which was not mentioned in the Attachment # 1. His calling card had the following phones printed: 46-77-17; 46-15-78 and on the back was writeen 32-08-95. I am not inclined to take at the face value LOG's statement that he knew nothing about RAMOS, especially, in view of the fact that RAMOS ought to be attending the IICRM for some time to be able to speak some Russian and prounced well. L-1 is willing to make the translation RAMOS wants if he finds no difficulty in handling the terminology.

8. LCG's reaction on MUNOZ' plan to show the Sov film at the CP center at Versailles appears to be interesting.

9. L-1 was again puzzled with LOG's hints that L-1 should do something for the Socialist cause genuinely dislikes the idea of getting involved in the KGB work. I told him that I also did not want him to get involved in spying for KGB but I did not want him to be cast aside by Sov officials; there will be things L-1 can do to show the good will and what he does don amount to nothing as is the case with the showing of the Sov film: the most important is that he does nothing without checking with me.

10. According to L-1, LCG never before revealed his political way of thinking as much as he did in his statements concerning the excessive freedom in the USSR and other Socialist countries.

11. In answer to my question L-1 stated that he brought up the question of not being invited by LCG to his apt, because on the previous meet I asked him whether he was ever in LCG's house. This correct and I asked L-1 this question having in mind the filling out of the PAQ. I saw in L-1's agenda under Aug 8 LCG's address plus 1900 hrs. I told L-1 that if he is received by LCGs as a friend that it will be necessary that he (L-1) give a farewall dinner for LCG at his place. As a matter of fact before breaking up the evening L-1 should ask LCG and his wife which date in Sept they would be able to come to L-1's house; he will add that he would appreciate if LCG brought along one or two Sov couples. If LCG asks who else would be there L-1 will state he did not plan having anyone else, but if LCG wishes so he was willing to invite anyone LCG suggested.

14-00000

300

Purpose of this suggestion from the point of our interest is quite obvious.

12. After the debriefing I asked I-1 to start filling out the IAQ and it 10 pages were completed. The work was going slower than I anticipated because it is not only a matter of translating but also explaining the questions.

BHFernald

#301

ATTACHMENT # 1
July 31, 1969.

Subject: LIBACON-1 (P-4805) - LOGINOV (P-11,712) Meet at Restaurant Fonda del Retiro on July 28 at 1300 hrs

1. The meet was prearranged and L-1 was in front of the restaurant 4 min before LOG. The meet lasted about 90 minutes.

THEIR NEXT MEET: Friday August 8 at LOG's Apt at Ignacio Esteva 21/2 at 1900 hours.

2. No cocktails were taken before the meal and with the meal beer was drank. LOG lead off with questions concerning L-1's family, health, work and entertainment.

3. Ammong questions concerning L-1's work there were also questions concerning LIOVAL-1: was L-1 giving him classes regularly; was LIOVAL-1 asking L-1 questions about the USSR or Sov officials; did LIOVAL-1 make any statements which would show "how he treates politically"(sic). L-1 gave routine answer pointing out that LIOVAL-1 does not hesitate to speak about his family matters and work, but he never asks questions of any kind; he takes his language classes regularly ; there were no statements concerning political matters.

4. L-1 told LOG that July 24 or 25 a young man Victor I RAMOS called on him in the evening at home and told him that he needed a translation of about 20 pages of Russian text into to Spanish and that he was sent by LOG and he asked him who was the person. LOG stated that he did not know the person and since it was a matter of translation he (LOG) sent him to L-1 hoping that he may earn some money by making the translation L-1 asked LOG did he know that RAMOS spoke some Russian which he learned at the IIORM. LOG stated that he was not aware of that fact. L-1 will make the traslation if he can handle the terminology dealing with economy.

5. L-1 told LOG that he spoke to E. MUNOZ about the Sov film and that MUNOZ was pleased with the offer. Due to the fact that MUNOZ is presently undergoing a treatment he was not able to make arrangements for showing of the film. In reply to LOG's question L-1 stated that MUNOZ wanted to show the film in the Communist Party Centro (sic) at [illegible]

Versailles, LOG exclaimed that for Heavens sake he did not anything like that; he wanted this to be entirely on private and personal basis without political elements involved; to show the film at Versailles would be stupid, it would just enable the imperialists to blast in the papers that the Sovs were getting involved in internal political matters of Mexico; in view of the coming Presidential elections this could be blown up into a scandal. L-1 remarked that he saw no difference in showing the film in the OPCentro or in the Centro Asturiano as LOG wanted originally. LOG explained at length the difference and L-1 promised to have another talk with MUNOZ.

6. L-1 told ~~that~~ LOG that quite recently he saw in the press something written to the effect that there are presently in the USSR 4 types of detention (concentration) camps and he wondered whether that was an indication that the freedom in the USSR was being trimmed again. LOG stated that "this was pure imperialist propaganda". He went on to say that in the USSR the cafes are full of people and that one can hear them even critisizing the government. He added that in his opinion there is too much (demasiado mucho) freedon in the USSR and other Socialist countries If Stalin was alive it could not happen that while the people in America are openly protesting against the war in Vietnam and against imperialism a Socialist country as Czecho rizes its people in favor of American and West Gernam empirialism. "Too much freedom in the USSR results with still more freedom in other Socialist countries; this is no longer freedom, it is a shameful betraial of Socialism; I hope that it will be realised soon that Stalin was right", said LOG.

7. At this point LOG worked in a hint to L-1 that he should do something for the Socialist cause. L-1 sounded his old tune saying that he saw nothing he could do and added that now when LOG opened him the door to the American Intelligence Service through Victor RAMOS (actually working for The Economist Intelligence Unit, S.A., Reforma 116 - 801 B) he would find out would they pay him well and if they would he would work for them, because anyway the Sovs never gave him anything. When LOG asked him what the hell he was speaking about, L-1 stated that he was ~~km~~ joking and LOG commented that L-1 had never done anything to help the Sov effort and consequently, they were not able to pay him anything.

8. L-1 asked LOG how was his wife doing, etc and added that he (LOG)

never invited him to his house, while at the time he had met BROVKIN he was invited to Bs house after they met the second or third time. LOG told L-1 he had no intention of keeping L-1 away from his house, but he wanted him to know that since the time BROVKIN was here certain things had changed: previously the Sov Embassy was paying the rent for the apts of their officials and now the officials have to pay the rent from their salary. Consequently, LOG lives in a small, modest apt and he does not feel that it is adequate for receiving people. L-1 commented that LOGs statement made him feel bad because he believed that they were friends and that formalities were not necessary among them. LOG counteracted by saying that L-1 and his wife were invited to his apt on Wed July 30, but he did not want L-1 to be surprized to see in what kind of apt a Sov Dipl officials was living. L-1 thanked for the invitation and stated that it was impossible to him to come before 2030 hrs on Wed because he had late classes. LOG felt that 2030 was rather late and they agreed that L-1 and his wife would come to LOGs for dinner on Friday Aug 8.

BHFernald

304

July 24, 1969.

Contact Report
Subject: Jimmy SAPORI (P-13,830)
Date of July 22 at the Raffaello from 2000 to 2325 hours.

1. This meet was held in lieu of the one scheduled for the previous evening to which S did not come. In the course of the morning of July 22 I tried to reach S by phone at his office but he did not come there. In the afternoon he phoned to our office and left the message to call him home. I called about 1625 when I returned from another ops meet, but S was not in. Josephine told me that he would be back in 30 minutes. When I called at 1700 hrs Josephine told me that S called from out and told her that he was going to the airport and that I should call about 1800 hrs. At 1815 hrs a maid answered the phone and told that S was out but would return home soon. At 1900 hrs the maid gave me the same answer. At 1930 hrs Josephine answered and passed the phone to S. We arranged this meet.

Next meet: August 1 at the Chez Le Club at 2000 hrs.

2. S did not go through much of trouble to explain the reason he did not come to the meet the previous day. He said that he did not write in his notebook the time of the meet and he went to the Raffaello at 1400 hrs just to see whether I was there; in the evening he went to movies with Josephine "because, anyway he was not sure when we were supposed to meet. I listened to his explanation without comment.

3. Inevitably, the moon landing was the first topic. S spoke about his excitement while watching the TV on July 20 in the evening and he concluded that LCG congratulated him on the great American success and explained the failure of the Luna 15 by saying that it must have landed on a rock and toppled down. At this point I asked S when did he see LCG and he answered that they had their meet on Friday July 18. Willy-nilly I had to ask S how could LCG congratulate him on the successful moon landing which took place two days later. It took a second or two until S told me that LCG extended his congratulations by phone. NOTE: It is possible that S' meet with LCG took place as was scheduled and there was no talk about the moon landing but S' emotional description of the feat carried to the statement about LCG's congratulations. It is also

P 11, 712.

305

that S met with LOG on Mon evening (July 21), i.e. at the time S was supposed to meet with me and he did not have the guts to tell me that he left me waiting and he went to meet with LOG.

4. I went to the debriefing of S on his meet with LOG. Most of the aspects of that meet are self explanatory. Nevertheless, there are new interesting factors concerning S' future meets with LOG. It may be noted that S requested less frequent meet on basis of suggestion I made to him during the brief meet of July 18. Another factor is the rattling of big money.

5. There are facts which are naive and contradictory as far as LOG is concerned. LOG will work out a plan which is to provide security to their personal meets on one hand and on the other he invited S to come to the French Club..... LOG did not appear a serious operator if he felt that S was able to lead TANG in convs about military strength of Red China.

6. The previously heralded friendship between LOG and AUDAIN ~~[illegible]~~ boils down to a buble. On the other hand my attempt to debrief S on the activity of AUDAIN was just a little better than nothing. (Will prepare a separate Attachment).

7. As the attachment # 1 shows I discussed in detail the question of S' phone calls to LOG on July 10.

8. I also showed to S 10 pages of the PRQ and he felt confident to be able to answer them and similar ones. In fact, the restaurant Raffaello does not lend itself to the excercise of doing any writing there. Therefore we agreed to meet on Aug 1 mainly for the purpose of filling out the PRQ.

9. I asked him did he receive any answer on his application (sic) meaning the PRQ. I told him that I would had advised him if I had anything in that respect. To me it looked that the question indirectly meant did we intend to give him some money.

That [illegible] to [illegible]

RHB:mh 1d

306

Jimmy SAFORI (I-13,330)

ATTACHMENT # 1
July 24, 1969.

Re: Phone call to LCC on July 10

1. JS stated without hesitation that he phoned to LCC on July 10, i.e. the day their meet took place.

2. JS believes that he made his first phone call (NB: the one recorded by LIENVOY) about 1100 hrs. He was told to call in an hour and he DID CALL more or less an hour later. Then, he was told that LOC was still busy and that he should call in 30 minutes. JS CALLED AS HE WAS TOLD and after quite bit of waiting LCC came to the phone. Consequently, JS made THREE calls to the same phone number.

J. believes him, means LIENVOY missed 2 calls: including Comments with him

3. All THREE calls which JS made were answered by the same male voice. There was no indication that the male answering the phone recognized JS' voice in any of his two back calls.

4. JS recalls that when he made his second call and stated that it was "Vladimir calling" the operator understood that "calling" was the second name and he asked JS how to spell it, which required some explaining.

5. JS is positive that at no time during his 3 calls he mentioned any kind of second name.

6. English was spoken at the request of the operator.

[illegible]

Comment: Apart of the fact that the meet did take place, which should justify the assumption that at least one back call was made, there were no indications that JS tried to deceive us on this matter. Is it possible that the electricity was cut off at the [illegible] site between the first call and back calls?

[illegible]

ATTACHMENT # 2
July 24, 1969

Subject: Jimmy SABORI (P-13,830) Report on
Meet with LOGINOV (P-11,712) on July 18 at SEPs-Paris

1. The meet was prearranged and it lasted about two hours. The previously used procedure was followed: S and LOG met in front of the restaurant and they entered it together. As usually, LOG was sharp in appearing on the spot.

THEIR NEXT MEET: On Aug 4 at Samborns Insurgentes-Tasquena at 2000 hrs.

2. Course of the Meet.

LOG asked S why he did not come "to play tennis with him" at the French Club on July 12. S explained that he was not feeling well and that he did not recover completely from the flu which he had all week. S added that only for the reason of keeping the word given to a friend (LOG) he came to this meet. Nice words by LOG who concluded that he brought S 2 bottles of Votka which can be used as " a medicine" for colds and similar disconforts.

3. As it could be expected after such an opening of the meet LOG was interested was S able to accomplish something for him. S told him that he had done what he promised and gave LOG the written report which LOG read. When he finished the reading LOG remarked that S did not sign the report. When S said that he was willing to do it right there, LOG said that it was not necessary and that he was only joking.

4. LOG spent considerable amount of time in questioning S about the reasons, consequences which the cancellation of PEMEX contract(s) with some US oil companies. At certain point the questions lacked clarity and S asked LOG point blanc what was he driving at. LOG stated that S should realize that the USSR is the second largest producer of oil in the world (sic) and that he was interested in finding out was it possible for the USSR to step in where the Americans kicked out (sic). S told LOG that it was difficult to go more wrong than LOG was in his thinking, because if Mexicans did not want Americans involved in their oil business it was positively certain that they wanted no foreigner, re-

gardless of who they may be, to have anything to do with Mexican oil industry.

5. LOG commented that the USSR was very much interested in establishing strong economic interchange, especially trade, with Mexico and they were not finding the right atmosphere nor proper response in Mexico. He asked S what, in his opinion, could or should be done to overcome this situation. S answered that he believed that the Sovs ought to change their mentality if they wanted to trade with Mexico, namely, in the field of trade they should forget about Socialism and adapt the Capitalistic mentality: to trade with Mexico Sovs would have to establish industrial plants here and to do it Mexicans must have 51 per cent share in each case, which means the controling stock; in reality this does not mean that Mexicans would invest 51 per cent of the value........

6. LOG went to the other item of the written report and he asked S how he went about in contacting Chin-Hsien TANG, counselor of the Nat Chinese Emb. S told him about posing as a reporter for the magazine La Mision and going there on reccommendation of Pierre RUDIAN (See FERNALD's previous contact report). S added that in the Sept issue of the magazine there would be an article dealing with Nat China and the Peiking - Moscow coflict and if needed another artoicle on Ching-Kai Shek would be published. LOG told S that he was pleased with the manner in which S handled the task he gave him. LOG did not discuss the contents of this part of S's report and he questioned S about CHTANG: he wanted to know was S in a position to keep this acquaintance alive and develop it in to a sort of friendly informal relationship; he (LOG) knew TANG from some formal diplomatic gatherings and he liked the person. S believed that he was able to keep alive the established acquaintance and was not able to guess as to how far he would be able to develop it. LOG suggested that S do not allow too much time to pass until his next visit to TANG. S said that he could call on TANG on Fri July 25 to explain him that he did not succeed in getting the article in the Aug issue of the magazine and will publish it in Sept issue; at the same time S will make it known that he was interested in getting the material for an article on Chiang-kai Shek which should keep the doors open for another visit.... S was in his element when he was describing this and LOG was not finding enough word to praise S and at the same time to encourage him to all he can

to bring his relationship with TANG to a point that LOG could meet TANG in a friendly unofficial manner. LOG concluded that for such a job he was willing to pay S in terms of thousands of Dollars. After the dust of verbage settled LOG told S that he should try to feel out TANG was he willing to speak about the military stregth of Red China. LOG explained to S that presently the Sovs were completely in dark as to the military strength and operational organisation of the Red Chinese army; they have no way of acquiring the info because even if they had friends in Red China none of them dared to maintain contact with Sov officials nor officials of other Socialist countries which are known to be on the Sov side; Nat China has many spies in Red China and they are well infoed on all aspects of developments in Red China; it is possible that TANG would be willing to make arrangements with his government for exchange of info, especially, military info between the USSR and the Rep. of China and this would be beneficiary to the USSR and the USA. LOG went on to tell S that he should think in terms of using RUDIAN for getting to meet TANG out of his embassy; be that a party or whatever might be needed, the expenses will taken care of by LOG, because money is no problem.

7. Then, LOG stated that S should arrange something to enable LOG to meet RUDIAN in a small, family type, circle. S was cought by surprize and told LOG that he told him that he and RUDIAN were quite often seeing each other. LOG stated that he knew RUDIAN well and was in may instances with RUDIAN at receptions and other formal social functions, but he never had an oportunity to be with RUDIAN in friendly and unformal circumstances. S commented that the only problem he found in trying to make such an arrangement was in the fact that RUDIAN often, sometime even twice in a week, drops in to see S at his (Josephine's) apt but he never announces his visits in advance more than an hour or two before he comes.

8. LOG asked S what happened to the US Emb phone directory; did the girl (friend of S) return. S answered that he did not have the slightest idea what was going on, "because in his condition (of health) he did even go to check did the girl return".

9. LOG was proposing that they meet in the course of the next week but S told him that he felt that they were meeting too often and in view

310

of his status of a tourist it may be assumbed that the Gobernacion carry out spot checks on him; if he was to be seen by the Gebernacion or Security agents in company of LOG it is prety certain that they would take him in and interrogate him; he thinks that this can be avoided if they do not see each other so often.

10. LOG agreed with S' reasoning and added that he himself realised that they were getting together too often and he also cannot be 100 per cent sure that he is not tailed some-time. Therefore, he will out a plan by which they will be able to see each other whenever it is needed and will limit their regular personal meets to twice per month. He went on to tell S that he would pick up an apropriate spot on which S will place a chalk sign when he needs to se LOG urgently; LOG will pass by the place every morning and if he see the sign he will erase it which will assure S that he und rstood his request and they would then meet the same evening at a place (restaurant) which they would select only for this purpose. LOG concluded by stating that this was the general idea and that he would work out the details which he will explain to S on their next meet which they would hold in two weeks, i.e. August 4.

11. S commented that the plan looked good and if LOG was sure that it would work then there was no need for them to meet more than one a month. LOG stated that 2 meets per month were needed in spite of the fact that he was positive that his system was dependable.

12. S told LOG that he did not spend any of the MN 400.- he gave him for the purpose of establishing contact with an official of the Nat Chinese Emb and consequently wanted to return the money. LOG told him to keep it for himself and that he would give him money, as much as needed, if he had an oportunity to entertain TANG.

13. There was some unconsequential talk and LOG told S to come to the French Club any Saturday and that he would teach him to play tennis. LOG explained that he was going to the club every Saturday about 1000 hrs: S will be allowed to enter if he says that LOG was waiting for him.

BHFernald

311

SB/[illegible]
SB/[illegible]
SB/[illegible]

July 23, 1969.

CARDED

Contact Report
Subject: Jimmy SABORI (P-13,830)
Date of Meet: July 18, at Melchor Ocampo & Leibnitz Coffee Shop
at 1500 hrs.

1. The meet was arranged by phone. On July 17 S phoned to our office and requested that FERNALD ring him up the next morning. After numerous fruitless attempts F finally reached S at his house at 1330 hrs. S told F that he was with a Chinese the previous day and would see him again on that afternoon at 1400 hrs. S concluded that on the basis of his first encounter with the Chinese he prepared a report for his friend (LOGINOV) whom he would see the same evening at 2000 hrs. F told S that he would want to see what he wrote before he gives it to LOG and a meet was arranged at the above indicated location.

2. F asked S how did he manage to see Mr. Chin-Hsien Tang (Counselor of Chinese Embassy) and where did he see him. S stated that Pierre ~~A[illegible]~~ Audiah helped him: PA phoned to the Nat China Emb and said that S, a collaborator in the La Mision (magazine), would like to visit the Emb and talk to a person who would be able to give him some info for an article he was preparing for La Mision. On July 17 about 1300 hrs S went to the Emb and after saying that he was coming from Pierre Audiah's he was received by TANG, Counselor of the Emb. S stated that he was interested in preparing an article concerning Chino - Sov ideological conflict, Mao's territorial claims and repeated border clashes; S would want have some views of Nat China government on these problems. TANG stated that he, nor his government, had any interest in the ideological conflict between Peiking and Moscow; with regard to Mao's territorial claims there was no doubt that they were legitimate; the fact that Mao was bring up this claims tends to indicate that Mao's position was weak within the country and his ruling party, and therefore, Mao had to seek an issue which would unite the leaders and people around him: such a political play may lead to war. S claims that he asked TANG on which side would Nat. China be in case of war between Red China and the USSR and TANG told him that such a decision would be made by a special top level Department of their government. On S' remark that Nat China cannot

312

count on American assistance to return to the mainland, TANG stated that Nat China Government was aware of the fact that the USA cannot help them in that matter without getting involved in war with Mao's forces, which Nat China understands and considers that such a war would serve no purpose.

3. According to S after 10 - 15 min of talking TANG gave S some material and told him to return the next day to pick up additional material which he could use for his article. Therefore, S went to the Nat China Emb on July 18 at 1400 hrs and got some of their publications in English. To keep the door open for additional visit S requested some material on Chian-kai Shek and TANG told him that it would take some time to get it. TANG also asked did S or La Mision have connections with Sovs here and S stated they did not, but the Sovs were subscribers to the magazine. Reportedly, this visit lasted about 20 minutes.

Julian

brother of [illegible] Flores

4. After reading the paper (report) which S prepared for LOG F asked S was the Julian CARRILLO FLORES the same person whom he mentioned previously to me to his source on the Port of Spain ~~xmat~~ Conference and refered to him as Eduardo. S claims that he knew of no Eduardo CARRILLO FLORES, and if he had stated that it was Eduardo it must have been a slip of tongue. As for Julian, he is a a Department (unknown which) Chief in PEMEX.

5. In reply to F's question S stated that the US companies affected by the PEMEX decision were Continental Oil, Gulf Gas (or oil) and Kelly Oil from California.

6. In reply to F's question S stated that he did not go to the French Club on Saturday July 12 with LOG because he was not feeling well. He added that because of his condition (flu) he was keeping himself away from his office; he was still not well (remark: true) but he felt much better.

6. S asked F what he thought about the development of S's relationship with LOG. F said there was not much to think about, because LOG was getting all he wanted and it was obvious that we had no possibility of getting anything from S because he brought us in the picture at the time it would make no sence to try to change anything. S commented that it

313

was not his intention to cut us short, but to the contrary, he wanted to be of help to us. F calmly stated that S was still able to do that if he timely reports acquaintance with any other Sov official and follows our instruction for every further step he makes in relationship with such an official. S said that we could count on him.

7. S stated after some thinking that he had connections in practically every branch of the Mexican government, but definitely had none in the Seguridad de Estado. F commented that this was understandable because the Security keeps itself separated from politicking which enables this organization to carry out it duties without interference of politicans. F added that the Security people ~~are~~ were excellently trained and were amazingly efficient in their work. It was evident that F's statements left S worried. F took advantage of the silence and added as an after thought that in his opinion it would be wise if S thinned his meets with LOG to 2, maximum 3, per month.

8. F changed his previously prearranged meet with S from Sat July 19 to Monday July 21 at 2000 hrs. S did not have his notebook with him and he assured F that he would not forget it. This meet lasted 30 min.

BHFernald

P.S. S did not show up on July 21 meet.

BHF

314

Gas Natural de México, S. A.

BAHIA DE SANTA BARBARA 20-303
MEXICO 17, D. F.

TELEFONOS: 31-53-90 31-53-93
CABLE GANAMEX

Copy

Valentin Luguinov July 15, 1969 2nd Report

PETROLEOS MEXICANOS

Platicando con el señor Julian Carrillo Flores, hermano del Sec. de Relaciones Exteriores, Lic. Antonio Carrillo Flores, sobre la cancelación de todos los contratos de extranjeros que efectuaban con Petroleos Méxicanos, fué por iniciativa del director actual- Ing. Reyes Heroles y no de la presidencia.

Desde luego, lleva la aprobación del señor Presidente Diaz Ordaz de que ninguna mano extranjera tenga nada que ver con el petroleos de la nacion. No fué iniciativa de la Presidencia sino todo se preparo dentro de Petroleos Mexicanos especialmente El señor- Reyes Heroles, Lic. Sergio Benhumea y el Lic. Carlos Zorrilla, De La Garza Evia, sub-director de Finanzas. El Lic. Jesus Reyes -- Heroles y el Lic. Carlos Zorrilla De La Garza son los principales responsables y se inclinan mucho hacia la Méxicanización de - todo en Petroleos Mexicanos.

Embajada de la República de China

Ministro Plenipotenciario - Consejero del Embajador,
Chin-Hsion Tang:

Plátique con el sr. Tang sobre el problema de Russo-Chino en la- frontera del rio Ussuri isla de Damansei llamada en Chino Txenpao.

El cree que Mao Tse-tung en realidad necesita tanto una diversion de sus problemas internos como consolidar el Ejercito Rojo un enemigo para unir al pueblo. Ya que los Estados Unidos es un cuento viejo y que no amenazan sus fronteras, el más logico es la Union Sovietica. Los terrenos que reclama son realmente Chinos pues en el añõ 1847 Zar Nicolás I logró anexar a Rusia la cuenta del - rio Amur y en el año 1853 arrancaron a China la margen norte del- mismo rio. Mao Tse-tung ya se fué mas allá de lo que pensaba y para el ya no hay retorno. Si se regresa, pierde tanto al Ejercito Rojo así como la union del pueblo. Ahora tiene que seguir adelante y solo que el camino que induce a la guerra. En el trato de San Petesburgo Rusia echo mano de otro 70 mil kilómetros cuadrados de la China occidental de la provincia de Sinkiang. Asi que en realidad el problema de la isla de Chenpao no está circunscrita a ella, que en si no vale la pena.

Le pregunte a que lado estan ellos en este problema y el me respondio," al lado que más nos convenga". Le dije que al lado de Maono tiene un aliado y con el jamas volveren a China. Ellos tiene - un departamento estratejico que estudia con quiene y cuando es el- mejor tiempo de regresar y con quiene más les conviene.

Los Terrenos que Pide Mao Tse-tung de Rusia

Nocolás Muraviev, en representación de Zar Nicolás I

1840-47 Anexa hasta el rio Amur.

1858 anexan la margen norte del rio.

(La superficie de la cuenca es de uno 400 mil kilómetros cuadrados.) Incluye el puerto de Vladivostok, el mar de Japón y al oeste, el propio río Ussuri.

1864 anexan 440 mil kilómetros cuadrados de la China occidental.

1881, anexan 70 mil kilómetros cuadrados del trato de San Petesburgo. (Provincia China de Sinkiang)

Despues de la Primera Guerra Muddial Rusia se echa sobre Mongolia y se posesiona de la parte de Manchuria.

1954 Mao Tse-tung pide al gobierno Ruso, Nikita ~~Kruche~~ Kruschev que regresen los terrenos que les prometio Lenin regresar.

Rusia se niega ! He aqui la furia de Mao Tse-tung.

316

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LOGINOV, VALENTIN
201-0285412

750-610-001
DIR-921311
30 SEP 76

REPLACED OLEG MARSIMOVICH NECHIPORENDO AT SOVIET EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY AUG 65

DATE 06 DEC 76 09456506

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

201-285412

357

SB/Xc
cc fn Log [illegible]

August 26, 1969.

Contact Report
Subject: Jimmy SABORI (P-13,830).
Date of Meet: August 26 at Chez Rene at 1400 hrs

1. The meet was prearranged and S came on time. The meet lasted two hours and 30 minutes.

NEXT MEET: Sept 8 at the same place at 1400 hrs.

2. S apologized for not bringing the copy of the report he gave to AEDIEHARD: he did not think of it this morning when he left the house.

3. I told S that the fact that AEDIEHARD would remain here at least five additional month did not please me, becuase I was not able to let the things go the way they were going until now and be just an observer. In reply to my questions S stated he was ready and determined to anything we tell him to do: he is willing to drop the association with AEDIEHARD; he is equally ready to do or tell AEDIEHARD anything we instruct him even if it was certain that AEDIEHARD would drop him; he is willing to go through any doings we consider necessary. I believe S was sincere in his statements.

4. I told S not to call A under any circumstances before their next meet (Sept 10); keep away from the Chinese Emb; if he gets the add from Luau Restaurant S can advise WONG by phone; take proof of the article as was promised but avoid any conv watsoever; if Josephine feels like going to the French Club on Sat (Aug 30) S can go with her, but I see no point in him going along alone. S stated that he understood what he was told and he would not do a move without checking with me.

5. S asked in a matter of fact tone that he would like to know where he stood with us; did we want him to carry out the work we request for patriotic reasons; do we intend give him a salary or make a worthwhile present. I told him that he can rest sure that we realized that he was not in a financial position to be able to work out of patriotic feelings, and consequently he would be paid for his work as much as it is worth to us.

6. Re next President: According to the statement of Dr Enrique BOLAÑOS Cacho, cousin of GDO with whom GDO plays domino every Tuesday

P-11,712

318

at Los Pinos, L.ECHEVARRIA is the man; the race narrowed to 2 persons, Echevarria and Ortiz Mena; Mena is out because of reasons of health. The statement was made Sunday to ING. ESPEJOS and S got it from BARRIOS Gomez Monday afternoon. (Note I phoned to S Monday morning and he did have any news on this topic).

BHFernald

319

ATTACHMENT
August 26, 1969

Subject: Jimmy SANORI (P-13,830) Report on His Meet
with AEDIBHARD (P-11,712) on Aug 25 at Samborns-San Angel at 2000 hr

] The m.

1. The meet was prearranged and it lasted 90 minutes. No changes in the pattern of meeting and A came on time.

THEIR NEXT MEET: Sept 10 at the same place at 2000 hrs.
S was invited to come on Sat at 1030 hrs to the French Club with Josephine. S not sure he will go.

2. A apologized for not going to Cuautla on Aug 16. Lots of nice words about thinking about S and Hosephine all day that rainy day.

3. A had a suprise for S: few days ago he received orders to remain in Mexico at least 5 months more (sic). When S aked was he ~~not~~ pleased with the order, A stated that he was practically packed up and he had made plans regarding the places he wanted to visit and it was no pleasure in unpacking and so much less he liked the idea of cancelling his plans. S asked several questions about A's wife and A was giving normal answers. At no time did A belittle his wide and he stated that she was 40 years old.

4. S handed to A a written report on what he accomplished with the Chinese. A thanked for the same and told S to get the article published by all the means; do all possible to get the ad from the Luau Restaurant; keep in touch with WONG or TANG but make sure there is a bona fide reason to go to see them, example, to tell them that the ad was obtained, show them the script of the article before it is published and similar; be very careful because Chinese are highly suspicious people.

5. Then, A asked S why TANG was not listed in the Dip List. S stated that it was evident from TANG's calling card that he just recently arrived here. A accepted the explantion and told S that WONG was listed in the Dip List as a counselor and that he (A) had confused TANG with WONG and that it was WONG who spoke Russian.

6. At this point A handed to S an envelope containing MN 500.- and he told S he wanted him to have that money for accidental expenses

320

while collecting info for A. S pretended he was hesitant to receive money but did not drag the story long (from fear that A might change his mind).

7. After the brief "ceremony" about giving and accepting the money A asked S did he have any news about the US Embassy Phone Directory. S reminded A that he told at their last meet that he had no way of getting it. A asked S did he know anybody working in the USIS. When S answered that he did not think so A told him there was a number of girls working for USIS, they work on the 3rd floor (of the Emb building) and several of them live in the Hotel Geneve; they carry out some propaganda; A is not sure "how far" can one get with them (in terms of having good time), but there is no problem of getting them (although, the interest is limited to one girl) to go out for dinner and dancing. This is something S should look into. S commented to the effect did A have an idea how much it ~~takes~~ costs to take a chick like those for an evening of good time; such a bill runs about MN 700.- . A replied that money was no problem; if S lines up something it is enough if he phones him a day earlier and he will bring him the money.

8. At this point A gave S the following instruction: If S ever needs something from A, as money, or he has something for A he should call the Emb and state that he wants to speak to Vladimir of the Consulate and stress that it was Vladimir calling. If A is in his office he will take the phone and there will be "just mucho gusto de saludarle" from both sides. If A is not there he(S) is to request to give the message that Vladimir called. The call should be made in the morning if possible. Regardless, whether S gets to speak to A or not he is to go the same evening at 2000 hrs to their meet place at Samborns-San Angel.

9. S said he would see what could be done and asked A was it possible that he was not able to do anything about the platinum. A apologized that it skipped his memory to tell S that he spoke to their Commercial Counselor Viktor IVANOV (full name mentioned by A) about the matter and that VI wanted first to know through which Swiss bank would the transaction be carried out; terms of the deal the buyers propose and be advised that Sovs were not interest in any deals which would be less than 1 million US Dollars. As soon as S submits the info, S and IVANOV will start working on the deal: if IVANOV leaves before the deal is closed it will not

affect the deal becquse IVANOV will be able to back it in Moscow. S commented that it sounded good and that both of them will make a nice sum of ~~many~~ money. With a smile on his face A told S that he did not want any money because he had all the money he wanted. A commented that this was the case which makes it evident that they were in position to help each other : A facilitates the platinum deal for S and S get hold of a girl who can bring out the phone directory for couple of hours.

10. A asked the regular question as to who will be the next President of Mexico. S told him it will be Luis ECHEVARRIA, but this is still not positive. A did not ask for the source of info.

11. S asked A who was the girl in the restaurant he waved to and she waved back. S stated it was the girl with whom he quite regularly played tennis.

12. S was not able to recall one more thing A asked him to do or find info about.

13. The meet ended with a talk about birthdays. A has his on Dec 25 and his wife earlier. A made it known that his wife would accept with pleasure a birthday present as a bracelet.

BHFernald

322

[illegible]
[illegible] Nov 4, 1970

Subject: Valentin SOKOLOV (P-13,927)

Source: [illegible]-1 (P-4805)

1. In accordence with arrangements made in ~~xx~~ the presence of [illegible] during the previous meet with Source, Engineer Manuel RESTORI an his wife Ann invited Subject and his wife LYUDMILA SOKOLOV for a drink to their house on Sunday Nov 1 at 1900 hrs. Source and wife were also invited. This get-together lasted 3 - 3½ hours.

2. The party was pleasant and Subject appeared satisfied to be able to have somebody with whom he could speak his language. He was quite talkative, while his wife was rather reserved. Nevertheless, when Source stated that on Nov 3 will be 13 years since he arrived in Mexico and wanted to celebrate the occasion with a dinner at his place and have the same company together, Subject and his wife commented that the celebration would have to be postponed, because Ann de RESTORI and ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ Sokolov will be on a business trip. They both accept the invitation for the dinner to take place a day or 2 after Ann RESTORI and SOKOLOV return to town.

COPIES MADE

3. It was interesting to note that Subject and his wife Lyudmila stated that AEBIEHARD lived in Moscow in the same building or the same complex of buildings and that they were very close friends. Lyudmila went on to say that AEBIEHARDS daughter was now 18 of age and that she was outright a beauty. AEBIEHARD was proud about the fact that his daughter was admited to the Institute (Source believes: of Technology) in Moscow. Subject and his wife also stated that AEBIEHARD was doing fine back home, but no details were mentioned as to what was he doing.

cc: P-4805

cc. P-11,712

P-13,927

323

4. Subject spoke about the place he was living in here and added that there were several Sov families living in the same building. He started the listing with [illegible] and Source interrupted by stating that he knew KOL and explained how he got to know him. Source went on to say that in connection with the same job he got to know KARALACH. Subject and wife commented that KARALACH had left PCS some time ago. Source said he did not know it, because he believed that KARALACH would remain here until he completed a 4-year stay and he did not believe that the 4 years already passed. Subject and wife said they did not know how long he was here but were positive that he left PCS.

5. Subject asked Source whom else did he know in the Sov Emb. Source stated that he presently knew very few because a number of his friend left. He mentioned he knew CHERNISH, whom he liked as a person. There were no comments from Subject and his wife. When source stated that he also knew NECHIPORENKO but found it difficult to get closer in relationship with him "because he is a dry person", Subject started smiling and nodding his head in sign of approval, but Subjects wife remained motionless and looked reproachingly at her husband.

6. Subjects wife spoke that the fact ~~x~~ of having their own car here was of great advantage for her, because "the Embassy has strongly reccommended to wives of Sov officials never to use taxis which obliges them to wait for their husbands or embassy chauffeurs to take them around ~~to~~ for shopping or social visits".

7. Source considers Subject to be a simple man, quite bit a peasant, talkative, deeply attached to the region Siberia from which

he comes, inclined to stick to propaganda exaggerations about the progress in the USSR, but in the field of personal matters sincere. His wife acts as an aristocrat, dresses according to fashion (not Sov) and feels self important. No doubt she has her eye on luxury.

8. Except for the fact that they mentioned they had a 12year old son Sergey, there was no mention of other children nor any problems in connection with children.

HHFernald

P.S. Attached is
Subject's address and phone
as he personally wrote it for Source.

already filed as handwriting sample.

14-00000

325

SECRET

Soviet Operational Contacts:

AEMIDRIFF made the following comments concerning what appeared to her to be operational contacts and/or modus operandi of Soviet intelligence officers in Mexico:

Debriefing conducted 25-26 April 1970:

LOGINOV - During the affair between AEMIDRIFF and LOGINOV, they went to the movies once or twice a week, the Futurama and Cine Mod being the theaters most frequently attended. LOGINOV always made some sort of contact during these outings, according to AEMIDRIFF. She stated that he usually left his seat about 2300 hours and went out to the lobby for some time. She did not know where the contacts were actually made. Once she and LOGINOV encountered, apparently accidentally, outside the Cine Mod theater, a Mexican Army Colonel, who was introduced to her by LOGINOV as "Col. Sergio." In this instance LOGINOV did not excuse himself to have a private conversation with the Mexican. "Col. Sergio" was described by AEMIDRIFF as about 40, tall, no moustache or glasses, thick, curly hair, appeared to be of Spanish descent. The woman with "Col. Sergio" appeared to be about 25 years old and was introduced as his wife (which AEMIDRIFF doubted because, as she put it, he didn't treat her as one would a wife, but rather as a mistress). AEMIDRIFF knew nothing more about this Mexican and never saw him again.

On another occasion, LOGINOV and AEMIDRIFF met an American in front of the Futurama theater. LOGINOV introduced him to her as "Col. Michael." AEMIDRIFF stated that he was dressed in civilian clothes. He

SECRET

326

had blond hair, was of medium height, no glasses, large grey eyes (AEMIDRIFF thought him quite attractive). LOGINOV told "Michael" that he would call him the next day on urgent business. "Michael" was alone. AEMIDRIFF commented that they did not have a private conversation. She esimated this encounter took place about September 1959.

GOLOUZOV - AEMIDRIFF stated that GOLOUZOV used her in the same manner, i.e., took her about 3 times in all to Cine Chapultepec, then left her during the movie to make some sort of contact.

Debriefing conducted 12-16 May 1970:

Concerning Soviet Contacts in the Mexican Police: AEMIDRIFF stated that she overheard GOLOUZOV and DYOMIN talk about many contacts which they had in the police here. She said she had also overheard KOLOMYAKOV, BAKULIN, AND CHUYKHOV talk about how many good police contacts the Soviets have. However, each specific example which AEMIDRIFF could give concerned some non-operational favor which the Soviets could get taken care of, e.g., when the Soviets wanted to get something through Aduana; when some Soviet was missing and police cooperation was needed; getting advance notice when some demonstration hostile to the Soviets was about to take place, etc. She was not able to recall any hints that Soviets had operational contacts in the police; agents reporting on what the police were doing; assets who assisted Soviets operationally in some way. However, AEMIDRIFF thought the Soviets probably have such assets.

Concerning Soviet contacts in West German Police: AEMIDRIFF recalled that when she went to Germany as interpreter for Soviet surgeon and textbook writer, Pablo ANASOV, in January 1969 (they went to Cologne

327

West Germany on Commercial Ministry business), the Soviet Ambassador in West Germany stated that the Embassy had some paid agents within the West German police who helped them to protect the Soviets (in context that it was dangerous there; some Soviet official could be kidnapped by the enemy, etc.) AEMIDRIFF noted that AMASOV was quite old and very pro-regime.

Miscellaneous operational notes - AEMIDRIFF had no knowledge of Soviet safe houses or safe apartments. She stated that many Soviet visitors stayed at the Hotel Virreyes or in two other hotels near the Soviet Embassy (she couldn't remember names). She did not know whether the Soviets had any sort of special arrangement or contacts in these hotels.

AEMIDRIFF stated that she had attended several parties at which Mexicans also were present (she recalled specifically parties at the homes of KOLOMYAKOV, BAKULIN, LOGINOV) and in each instance the Soviet officer, at some point during the evening, had a private conversation with a Mexican guest. (Unfortunately, AEMIDRIFF was unable to recall the names of any of the Mexicans she met on these occasions, and of course there is no way of knowing whether such private conversations were operational meetings.) AEMIDRIFF commented that at purely Soviet parties, husbands always went off together and talked business, and if wives approached, they stopped their conversation.

Debriefing conducted 1-6 June 1970:

KORMUSHKIN - AEMIDRIFF commented that she thought KORMUSHKIN made operational meetings in the Bremen Bar, since she often saw him sitting in that bar, wearing dark glasses and trying to look inconspicuous.

328

SECRET

(AEMIDRIFF sometimes passed by this bar and would look inside, although she never went in.)

KUPLYAKOV - Possible PCM Contact - AEMIDRIFF stated that she was told by Daniel Montiel (Daniel MENDEZ Montiel, 201-258951), the Soviet's chauffeur, that his brother, who is a Central Committee member of the PCM and who worked on the PCM publication "La Voz de Mexico," was in contact with KUPLYAKOV. In addition, AEMIDRIFF stated that she believed that Armando VERDUGO (iden with Armando MARTINEZ Verdugo, 201-851726) had an uncle, also named Armando VERDUGO, who is First Secretary of the PCM and who is in contact with KUPLYAKOV. At least this was strongly inferred by Montiel, according to AEMIDRIFF. (Editor note: Arnoldo MARTINEZ Verdugo, 201-054254, who is brother of Armando, is First Secretary of PCM). AEMIDRIFF stated that KUPLYAKOV always seemed to be very interested in and knowledgeable of what appeared in "La Voz de Mexico" and in the PCM publication "La Epoca." She stated that, in general, KUPLYAKOV paid so much attention to local politics and seemed to be so well informed on PCM matters that she felt certain he had something to do with the PCM.

AEMIDRIFF stated that KUPLYAKOV's wife was a good friend of Salvador GONZALEZ Marin, head of the Fondo de Cultura Popular. GONZALEZ' wife works in the Museum of Anthropology. GONZALEZ sold a lot of Soviet books, according to AEMIDRIFF, and for that reason was in contact with KUPLYAKOV, but she commented that GONZALEZ may also have been utilized by KUPLYAKOV in some other operational way. Most of KUPLYAKOV's contacts seem to be journalists. (These were the people AEMIDRIFF saw talking to him at receptions, etc.).

SECRET

329

AEMIDRIFF stated that Leopoldo ARENAL, whose wife is the daughter of David Alfaro SIQUEIROS, is another Soviet asset who is handled by KUPLYAKOV (she heard VANOVSKIY talk about this). AEMIDRIFF said that ARENAL works with Eduardo ARAUJO (economic consultant for "Minera Continental, S.A.", mentioned in Commercial Office). She also stated she knew that ARENAL went at times to the Embassy to see KUPLYAKOV. AEMIDRIFF said that ARENAL goes to Moscow every year or so. (ARENAL identical with Leopoldo ARENAL Bastar, 201-117959).

330

Soviet Involvement in Student Disorders of 1968:

Debriefing conducted 23-25 April 1970: AEMIDRIFF stated that LOGINOV went out at nights often during this period and told her it was to make "contacts." LOGINOV also stated that his work during this period was some of the most dangerous he had ever done. AEMIDRIFF was certain that these "contacts" involved in student riots. AEMIDRIFF related that once at Auto Cine, LOGINOV made a meeting with a group of youths who came in another car (Falcon). Another time, some 2 or 3 days later, LOGINOV had MITOPOLSKI give him some shotguns which MITOPOLSKI had charge of. LOGINOV got the guns about 2200 or 2300; the guns were returned the next morning. Others who seemed to be going out all the time at night during the student riots (and talking about their meetings in general the next morning) were BOLSHAKOV, KORMOUSHKIN, NIKIFOROV. AEMIDRIFF never heard mention of money being passed during this period (i.e., to Soviet assets involved in riots) nor any mention of any names or positions of assets (This not in agreement with some of Dan James info). CHUYKOV seemed to be involved also.

Debriefing conducted 12-16 May 1970: AEMIDRIFF was again questioned on her knowledge of Soviet activities during the 1968 student disorders. She reported that all she really knew was that the Soviets were very busy during this period; that LOGINOV told her he was going out every night to make "contacts;" that she overheard Soviet case officers talking at various times during this period to effect that they very busy, making many contacts; that the situation was potentially explosive and a dangerous time for them to be making such contacts. AEMIDRIFF twice was with LOGINOV when he met with some "youths" in private conversations. However, AEMIDRIFF stated she did not ever hear any mention of any names of Soviet contacts in relation with the student disorders, any mention of the level of involvement of these contacts in the student organizations, any mention of Soviet guidance to the student movement, financing of the student movement, or the like. She really doesn't know that the Soviets had any contacts with direct access to information to these activities, but she strongly assumes that they did, based on their level of activity and the strong tenor that LOGINOV and other case officers gave to the idea that the contacts they were making were dangerous ones for them to be seen with during this period.

Debriefing conducted 1-6 June 1970: AEMIDRIFF questioned re 1968 student disorders again, for clarification previously reported details. She stated that the Soviets had some different types of rifles in the Commercial Office which served as samples of guns which they were trying to sell commercially in Mexico. One night about 11 o'clock, during the period of student riots, LOGINOV came to the Commercial Office with MITOPOSSKI (AEMIDRIFF was there watching TV). They got "some" rifles - AEMIDRIFF could not see how many or what kind. They took them out in some sort of bags. The next morning "some" rifles were returned to the Commercial Office, but AEMIDRIFF doesn't know whether all of them were brought back. She doesn't know whether or not LOGINOV might have been duty officer for the Embassy for that night.

AEMIDRIFF stated that NECHIPORENKO's trip back to the USSR during the 1968 riots may well have been to report on the riots. However, she didn't know that this was the case and noone specifically told her so.

332

H

Files: P-13,042
P-13,623
P-13,223
~~P-11,712~~

I got Rylance agreement to use Elly to extent possible.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Ed ELLY with USIS

DATE : 3 December 1969

1. On 3 December 1969 I had a brief conversation with Ed ELLY to find out if he knew any of the Soviets at the French Club and to brief him on these individuals. He did not know neither CHERNYSH (P-13,042) or SHEVCHENKO (P-13,623) by name and when I showed him pictures, he said that he did not recognize them by sight either. Since he is a relatively good player and they are relatively poor, it is not likely that they would play together. He said, however, that he would keep his eyes open for them and would try to identify some of the contacts they appear to be making at the French Club. I explained to him who the two Soviets were and why we were interested in them, and he said that he would be only to happy to do what he could.

2. I also asked him about Gloria PINTO (P-13,223) and showed him a picture of her, but while he thinks he may have seen her, he does not know her. He will check with his wife who may very well know her since she is a regular player and probably more or less in the same league with Gloria. I told ELLY that Gloria had been very close to LOGINOV (P-11,712) and that I was interested to find out if she would now, since he has departed, transfer her attention to one of the other Soviets. (I was specifically interested in finding out whether or not Gloria and CHERNYSH had met on the morning of 29 November as indicated by LIENVOY, but ELLY had not been at the French Club that morning.)

3. ELLY commented that he had found it hard to make contacts at sports clubs in Mexico than in other countries. Mexicans were particularly difficult to become friendly with and it was not at all uncommon to have a tennis match with no personal contact whatsoever. He said, however, that he thought the French Club was better than most in Mexico City. Even though the people at the French club were rather clanish, it was easier to get to know them there than, for example, at Chapultepec.

VPR

Vincent P. RIZZUTO

SECRET

333

1 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Recruitment of Dianne de la VEGA, [illegible] 31 Oct 69

ρ-11,712

say about anything, ~~whkk~~ whether it be American or Russian. He is only interested in booze and women. I would say this is a pretty accurate description of TUCHIN (who is now gone--replaced by EMFLUTE's friend PERFILIYEV).

5. Subject has also met LOGINOV, for whom she did not have too much ~~xxxxx~~ respect. She didn't think him very smart, and he was constantly saying foolish things against the United States. ~~Shaxxxxxr saxxhim~~ I asked if LOGINOV had ever made a pass at her. She said no, but then she never saw him when his wife was not along. (Again, she has come up with a pretty accurate thumbnail description.)

6. Getting back to SARATOV, they have remained good friends since the Olyppics, and the friendship extends to SARATOV's wife. Subject and Natasha are very friendly, and I would like to keep it this way, for several reasons. I don't think there has been any sex between Subject and SARATOV (although I could be wrong, and I will ask, and In think get the truth). Subject is well aware of the friction between SARATOV and wife, and as a matter of fact Natasha has said quite openly that she intends to leave SARATOV in about a year. They have an 11-year-old son to whom she is very attached, and since he must return to the USSR to complete his schooling, she is going to return with him. In effect, she has chosen her son over her husband. Subject doesx not know whether Natasha's overly close attachment to her son (she won't go out in the evening until he is in bed, etc.) is the result of SARATOV's playing around, or vice-versa, but it is a fact, and it irritates the hell out of SARATOV. On the other hand, Natasha is attractive, intelligent, and if anything more firmly attached to the Soviet Union than SARATOV himself. Recently she offered to give Subject Russian lessons. Since Subject is the type of person that would easily do something like that even though it has [illegible] practical use,

14-00000

334

AEDIEHARD (P-11712) October 7, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: Jimmy SABORI (P-13,830)
Date/Place of Meet: Oct 7 at Chez Rene Rest at 1414 hrs.

1. The meet was arranged by phone and S came about 14 min late.
NEXT MEET: Oct 10 (Friday) Insurgentes Sus & Extremadura
at 1100 hrs.

2. According to S his last meet with AEDIEHARD was on Aug 25. A had arranged a meet with S for Sept 10, but A did not come to that meet. Two days later, i.e. after he did not come to the scheduled meet A phoned to S' apt in the afternoon when he was not home and after exchange of nice words with Josephine he told her that he was not able to keep his appointment with S two days ago and he wanted to apologize for not showing up and that he would ring up S in a day or two. Because there were no calls from A for few days (sic), S decided to give him a ring and advise him that he had something for him, namely, S had in his possession a duplicated copy of an "Agreement" concerning the Platinum deal. As it is evident from the mentioned copy of the Agreement the same was signed and the Buyer's Agent signature was legalised by the U.S. Consul in Mexico City on Sept 25.

3. Although, this story lacks accuracy in terms ~~x~~ of dates, it is substantially different from the one S gave to FERNALD on Sept 12, the date of their last personal meet. Inspite of the vagueness concerning the dates and absence of details, this story appears to be much closer to truth, than the version of Sept 12.

4. S gave me for copying a technical copy of the above mentioned Agreement concerning the Platinum transaction. As is evident from the wording of the Agreement S would have nothing to do with Buyer or Buyer's Agent. The Agreement places S on the Sellers side or at the best makes him middle man between the actual Seller and Buyer's Agent. F did not read the Agreement in the restaurant (during the meet) and he made no comments with regard to the Platinum transaction as such.

5. S asked F should he ring up A from the restaurant to ask for a meet with him. F told S that A had left or was about to take off the same afternoon. Instead of commenting on the fact tha A left without even indicating to S that he might leave, S stated that this situation was giving him an opportunity to find out for us who was A's replacement. F told him that it was a common knowledge as to who was A's replacement and that the only thing to ascertain positively was whether A had dropped him (S) or the developments prevented A from meeting with S.

6. Therefore, F suggested to S to phone to the Sov Emb by using the duple talk (code) which A gave him and see what happens. If another person tells him that A left Mexico, S should ask how was he to go about a transaction he intiated with A. If the answering person insists in knowing what was it about, which is doubtful, S should limit himself to the statement that it is a commercial matter involving large amount of money, and it reached the stage that an action should be taken.

7. S promised to phone to the Sov Emb on Oct 8 about 1000 hrs and F told him that he would give him a ring about 1500 hrs.

88 F told S that he intended to discuss a serious matter with him but did not have all the facts on hand as yet. F added that he would have all the facts the latest Thursday Oct 9 and he asked S to come on Friday Oct 10 to the place mentioned in para 1 above at 1100 hrs and that they would go to an adequate place for such a conversation. S offered that the conv could be held in his apt and F tolf that it would be against our practices.

9. As far as his present activity was concerned, S stated that he was doing a lots of running in connection with his attempt to sell the unfinished hotel on the Caleta Beach in Acapulco.

BHFernald

336

COUNTRY OF MEXICO)
CITY OF MEXICO, D.F.)

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made as of the date of the signatures hereto, by and between the undersigned SELLER'S AGENT, as agent for an undisclosed Foreign Principal, hereinafter referred to as SELLER, and the undersigned BUYER'S AGENT, as agent for another undisclosed Foreign Principal, hereinafter referred to as BUYER;

WHEREAS, Seller's Agent represents, as authorized agent, a Foreign Principal or entity, who are the owners of certain amounts of Platinum and also represents that Seller's Agent, being an American citizen, has no rights, title or interest, either legal or equitable in and to said Platinum, and is acting as Agent solely for a commission; and

WHEREAS, Buyer's Agent represents that his principal desires to purchase Platinum from a Foreign Principal or entity, being a domestic American company, has no rights, title or interest, either legal or equitable in and to said Platinum, and is acting as Agent solely for a commission;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, covenants and conditions hereinafter contained, it is mutually agreed by and between the parties as follows:

(a) Seller's Agent agrees to sell and Buyer's Agent agrees to purchase approximately One Hundred Thousand (100,000) troy ounces of Platinum more or less in shipments of Twenty Thousand (20,000) ounces monthly, priced on the basis of 1000 fineness, the same to be a transaction through a mutually acceptable bank in Zurich, Switzerland.

(b) In connection with the said purchase and sale, the following procedure shall be followed:

  (1) Upon the execution of this agreement, the Buyer's Agent shall take immediate steps to cause to be issued to the Foreign Commercial Bank, Bellairestrasse 82, Zurich, Switzerland, a divisible, transferrable, irrevocable, unconditional and without recourse, letter of credit payable in U.S. currency, in an amount sufficient to purchase the first shipment of Twenty Thousand (20,000) troy ounces of Platinum issued by a bank acceptable to Seller's Agent. The said letter of credit shall be in the form set forth, attached hereto and made a part hereof; a non-negotiable copy of the letter of credit so posted shall be furnished to Seller's Agent to examine.

  (2) Ten (10) banking days herefrom is granted to Buyer's Agent to deposit said letter of credit from the date of acceptance of this agreement and signature thereof.

14-00000

337

(3) Seller's Agent shall deliver the first shipment and the documents at the Foreign Commercial Bank, within twenty (20) banking days after the posting of the letter of credit and thereafter shall continue such deliveries until all of said Platinum has been delivered, such delivery of all of said Platinum to be completed within One Hundred Eighty (180) days after the posting of the letter of credit.

(4) For the payment of such transaction, the Seller's Agent shall cause to be exhibited to the Buyer's Agent the documentation to be delivered to Buyer's Agent to effect said sale, to-wit: (a) Warehouse receipt, (b) Intransit permit and (c) Assay report;

(5) Thereupon, the Buyer's Agent shall provide Seller's Agent with satisfactory evidence of insurance by which the Seller's Agent and his principals are protected against all hazards from the loss of said Platinum during the time it is being assayed by Buyer's Agent's assayer (should Buyer's Agent desire an assay by his assayer) and extend to the time of payment as herein provided, it being understood that legal title shall not pass to Buyer's Agent or his principals until payment in full has been made to Seller's Agent;

(6) Payment shall be made by the said bank from the letter of credit on deposit within five (5) banking days from the date of delivery of the Platinum to the bank in Zurich, Switzerland, and payment shall be made on the basis of the accompanying assay certificates; provided, however, that within this five (5) banking day period Buyer's Agent may have the Platinum assayed by a recognized assayer of his own choosing, in which event the Seller's Agent shall have his representative of his choice on hand with the Buyer's assayer at the point of assay for the purpose of observing the assaying of any material which is the subject of this agreement. If the parties hereto do not agree with the results of such assaying, then each may select an umpire and these two shall select a third umpire and the conclusion of any two of these umpires as to the value of the Platinum referred to herein shall bind the parties. Such umpire procedure shall be completed and a report made within the period not to exceed five (5) additional banking days. If this umpire procedure is used, and while it is being used, payment shall first be made immediately on the basis of Seller's Agent's assay, as to the undisputed amount, with the disputed amount to await payment until the umpire's report has been made, whereupon payment shall immediately be made on the umpire's report for the amount, if any be determined due by umpire's report. When no assay is requested by Buyer's Agent, payment shall be made immediately on the basis of the assay certificates which accompany the material. The expense of Buyer's assay shall be to the Buyer, and the cost, if any, of the umpires shall be paid equally by Buyer's and Seller's Agents.

(7) Buyer's Agent shall assume the cost of packaging and freight insurance, transfer to airport and all responsibility of the Platinum once payment has been completed to Seller's Agent. At this point, Seller's Agent shall be completely free of any responsibility in regard to said Platinum.

(c) It is specifically understood that neither the Seller's Agent nor the Buyer's Agent shall under any condition disclose to anyone, except the Seller's Agent's undisclosed principals and the Buyer's Agent's undisclosed principals respectively, the nature of this agreement.

338

(d) This Agreement to the extent it contravenes any national or local government laws, ordinances or regulations of Switzerland or the United States of America, shall be deemed null and void.

(e) Performance under this Agreement shall be excused for and so long as forces majeure, acts of God, strikes, war in which either country is involved, or any similar force majeure cause which may interfere with the performance beyond the control of the parties hereto.

(f) Seller's Agent shall provide Buyer's Agent a Warehouse receipt in in-transit permit, and an assay report with each shipment.

(g) All notices which may be given under this Agreement shall be given in writing by prepaid cable, airmail, or by personal service to Buyer's or to Seller's Agent at the address listed below.

(h) The price of said Platinum shall be Ninety-five ($95.00) U.S. Dollars per troy ounce per 1000/fine.

(i) Seller's Agent expressly agrees that if Buyer's Agent shall have furnished a letter of credit as specified in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section b above, and Seller's Agent shall fail to deliver all of said Platinum as provided in sub-paragraph (3) of Section b above, and the documentation referred to in paragraph (4) of Section b above, then Buyer's Agent, at his option shall be entitled to cancel this contract and neither party shall have any further obligation hereunder.

Seller's Agent

Buyer's Agent Clarence Lester McGhee

I, NANCY J. KOCH Consul of the United States of America at [illegible] duly commissioned and qualified, do hereby certify that on this [illegible] day of [illegible] before me personally appeared

CLARENCE LESTER MC GHEE

to me personally known, and known to me to be the individual described in, whose name he subscribed to, and who executed the annexed instrument, and being informed by me of the contents of said instrument he duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same freely and voluntarily for the uses and purposes therein mentioned.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and official seal the day and year last above written.

Nancy J. Koch
NANCY J. KOCH
American Consul

339

SIT
S: [illegible] 8(f)
SI/[illegible] - [illegible]
LOG, DAVID, KOV, LAY

6 October, 1969

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LIBACON 1

DATE, TIME & PLACE: 6 Oct. 1100-1200, JET Cafe.

1. Subject arrived at the Cafe five minutes late (unusual for him) fairly bubbling over with "good news". Subject had a little difficulty gettingto to LOGINOV'S Embassy despedida at 1900 hrs. as he had planned. It seems that the neighbor with whom he had planned to leave his child was not at home and so he had to wait until his wife came home, at about 2000 hrs. Subj arrived at the Embassy at about 2020 hours where he was warmly greeted by LOG. After only a few words of greeting, Mrs. LOG fixed Subj a drink and a sandwich, and LOG excused himself saying he had to take care of the many guests and telling Subj to make himself at home, "you are more or less one of us." It should be noted that LOG did not introduce anyone to Subj. Subj soon approached Yuri CHERNYSH and a rather long, innocuous convesation ensued. Mikhail P. DAVYDOVSKI approached the pair and was introduced to Subj by CHERNYSH. (Card attached.) Subj was very taken with DAVYDOVSKI's charm and simplicity and learned that the latter had at one time been a "locksmith," (?) and having studied at the "International Diplomatic Institute" recived this appoinument as Private Sect to the Ambassador.

2. During one of Subj's free moments he approached Pavel KOVALEV, whom he recognized from the Army Day party which attended, but he could not recall his name. KOVALEV said he thought he recognized Subj's face but could not place it. Subj then told him that his mother taught Spanish at the Embassy (actually Subj told me he is not sure she is still doing so.) KOVALEV said he was interested in forming a small group to study Spanish and have Subj teach it and the latter heartily agreed to do so. KOVALEV promised to phone Subj at the earliest opportunity. Subj asked KOVALEV how the latter should be addressed, i.e., what was his position at the Emb? K replied that he was more or less attached to the Military Attache's office.

NIKOLAYENKO [illegible]

3. Subject met a young lady, Tanya LNU, and husband name unknown. They have been in Mexico for three months. Very little, if anything else, was said but Subj was impressed with the girl, physically that is. Subj left the party before [illegible], got a bear hug from LOG and was escorted to the door by KOVALEV. Subj having only had two drinks while at the party went to Gill's but she was out, so he went elsewhere (no identification) where he spent the night "talking."

DFD
D. F. DI[illegible]SON

[illegible]

i.e. he didn't tell LIBACON, as he has others, that "will be back" - VRC

340

El Heraldo – Sunday, 5 Feb. 1967

2

3

4

En Honor del Cónsul de la Unión Soviética

El señor Valentin S. Loguinov, cónsul de la Unión Soviética en México, y su distinguida esposa, Alejandra de Loguinov, regresaran en fecha proxima a su país; por ello un grupo de amigos ofrecieron en días pasados una fiesta para despedirles.

La cita fue allá en San Angel, en la residencia del doctor Luis Gómez Correa quien junto con su esposa Silvia M. de Gómez atendieron a sus huéspedes de maravilla.

Esa noche la cena estuvo riquisima... Platillos típicos de los dos paises, complementados con el tradicional vodka. Musica popular rusa amenizó la velada de la que se disfrutó hasta las primeras horas del domingo.

1: Mercedes Pinto, Gloria Z. de Pinto y Alejandra de Longuinov.
2: Beatriz Bacon
3: Ralph Weigan.
4: El anfitrión de esa noche doctor Luis Gómez Correa con el agasajado señor Valentin S. Longinov y don Tomas Lopez Sanchez.
5: Lourdes Aguilar, CONTENTISIMA, toda la noche, con ella Manuel Hernández.
6: FLASH!... Virginia Fernandez de Aguilar y Ruth B. de Wiegandt.
7: Doctor José Maria Pinto y Adrián Aguilar.
8: ¡MIRADITAS! de... Guillermo Marcos a Vicky Aguilar.

5

6





341

[illegible]

October 4, 1963.

Contact Report
Subject: LIOVAL-1 (P-8903)
Date/Place of Meet: Oct 3 at Rest. Hoyo at 1330 Hrs.

1. Prearranged meet to which L-1 came 10 min. early.
Next meet: October 16 at the same place at 1430 hrs.

2. Since our last meet (Sept 19) L-1 had not seen LIBACON-1 who in two instances apologised (2-3 days after the class was due) for not holding the class "because he was not feeling well". In both cases it was obvious to L-1 that he was dead drunk when he phoned. In view of the fact that LIBACON-1 did not phone to L-1 for a whole week, L-1 gave him a ring on Oct 2 and he promised to give a lesson to L-1 at 1630 hrs of Oct 3.

3. L-1 explained me that his working schedule in the new scholar year keeps him busy in the morning and the afternoon, except, Friday afternoons, which makes it difficult on him to be tieing himself twice a week for LIBACON-1's class which most of the time does not take place. L-1 felt that nothing would be lost if he reduced the Russian language classes to one per week, which would be more than he ever actually had in the past. I told him to go ahead and suit himself.

4. I told L-1 that AEDIEHARD was scheduled to leave in about a week and it would be interesting to ascertain whether LIBACON-1 knew it. L-1 will show to LIBACON-1 the Excelsior of Sept 25 in which the Sov Emb farewell party was announced. L-1 felt bad about the fact that he did not even have a chance to see AEDIEHARD face to face.

5. L-1 asked could he remind LIBACON-1 that he promised to make some arrangements which would enable L-1 to meet Alla (GLEBOVA /P-13,482/) and suggest that AEDIEHARD's departure was opening the possibility to do something along that line. I told L-1 that there was no reason to expect that LIBACON-1 would accomplish anything, but L-1 should be after him on the basis of his former promise.

P-11712

6. I told L-1 that he should tell LIBACON-1 that a person he knew quite well 3-4 years ago returned to the US Embassy and that this American Embassy official was a very close friend of a dear friend of his (L-1). I explained to L-1 that such news would certainly please LIBACON-1 for several obvious reasons, but it was more important to ascertain whether LIBACON-1 would relay such news to some of his Sov acquaintances. If it happens that ANDIEHARD's replacement or another Sov official attempt to contact L-1 through LIBACON-1, it would be an indication that LIBACON-1 got the news of L-1's US Embassy contact to them. L-1 liked the idea and will give the story to LIBACON-1.

7. At this point it may be recalled that L-1 had met NECHIPORENKO (P-7442) at the time he had met YATSKOV.

8. Comment by BHF:

> In view of the fact that NECHIPORENKO by himself is a determined KGB case officer who is agressive in pursuing American targets, I felt that we stand to lose nothing by adding to L-1 a label of having a contact in the US Embassy.

BHFernald

343

SECRET

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

FROM : C/CUB

SUBJECT : Visit to the Soviet Embassy, Night of 1 October 1969; Occasion: Despedida for Valentin LOGINOV

1. As members of the Cuerpo Consular, Terence D. SISTONE and his wife were formally invited to Valentin LOGINOV's despedida. The scheduled hours on the invitation were from 7:00 to 9:00. Actually, they arrived at about 7:45 and left at about 9:15. SISTONE had two main purposes in attending the reception: 1) to determine LOGINOV's replacement, and 2) to meet the Cubans present, if any. On the first count SISTONE was successful. Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO was formally introduced to the crowd as LOGINOV's replacement by Mr. KAZANTSEV, the Soviet Chargé. On the second count SISTONE was not successful. The only Cuban present that he recognized from mug photos was Rafael MIRABAL Fernandez, who quite obviously avoided any contact with SISTONE, rather furtively staying on the other side of the room at all times. In all, SISTONE talked to some nine Soviet Embassy officials that he could recognize from the mug book and had somewhat extensive conversation with three, LOGINOV; KAZANTSEV, the Chargé; and Eduard Anatolyevich SARATOV, TASS representative. For cover

349

purposes SISTONE, of course, also had to spend much of his time with fellow members of the Cuerpo Consular, mostly with Leander VOURVOULIAS, the Cuerpo Consular president and ex-Greek Consul General, and Sra. Marta FONSECA Guardia de JIMENEZ, the Consul from Costa Rica and Cuerpo Consular secretary. SISTONE also met a Mexican engineer, Alfonso SIBAJA C., who is married to a Greek woman who is Press and Cultural Attache for Greece. SIBAJA is therefore active in, though not a member of, the Cuerpo Consular. It is very early to tell, of course, but a man like this could conceivably become an access agent to either Soviet or Cuban officials.

[illegible]

Are we following? VC.

2. At the entranceway SISTONE met and recognized Col. Konstantin Nikandrovich BOGATYREV, the Soviet Military Attache. Both on this occasion and later in the evening BOGATYREV seemed to have a forced grin on his face. He exchanged pleasantries but provided nothing of significance.

3. In the reception area inside, SISTONE greeted Valentin LOGINOV and his wife, who readily recalled SISTONE and wife from the excursion to the Ford factory in July. LOGINOV also recalled that SISTONE was Raymond A. FRADYER's replacement and asked after the latter: Had he yet arrived in Paris? SISTONE said that he understood that FRADYER probably had arrived by now. SISTONE asked LOGINOV when he was leaving for the Soviet Union. LOGINOV answered that he was leaving

345

on 7 October and that en route he was visiting New York City, a place that he was anxious to visit. He added that he would not be visiting Paris to see his friend FRADYER. LOGINOV all evening was a very amiable host, circulating and talking to practically everyone present. About half the time he was surrounded by a circle of very young and apparently unattached Mexican ladies - perhaps university students. Mrs. LOGINOV was quite transformed from the very drab woman of the Ford excursion. She was quite dressed up, even attractive, and did her best to be a charming hostess, although this was obviously a forced chore for her. (Later in the evening she busied herself pointing out what she thought to be the choicest items on the buffet table.) Valentin LOGINOV invited SISTONE and his wife to visit him in Russia. SISTONE answered to the effect that this would be wonderful someday if he Loginov or the Russian Government would pick up the tab. LOGINOV replied that that was not necessary because all Americans are so rich they can afford a trip anywhere. Later, talking to SARATOV (see paragraph 9 below), SISTONE was told that LOGINOV would be spending three days in New York City. Later in the evening LOGINOV had his picture taken, probably by a press photographer, with SISTONE's wife, and he was in general quite gallant with her. In the little speech following the buffet, LOGINOV thanked VOURVOULIAS for his few words of farewell and the Cuerpo

[illegible]

Consular gift of a silver plate. He ended his speech by saying, "Thanks on my wife's behalf and mine. You all have been very attentive to my great country." About the only times that LOGINOV seemed reflective and serious during the evening were during this little speech and later in saying good-by to SISTONE (accompanying this with an abrazo). LOGINOV's last words to SISTONE were said with much real or imagined feeling: "You Americans and we Russians have to be real friends in these days of the world."

4. Negatively, SISTONE did not see LIREALM-1; SAO's friend, Yuriy VANOVSKY; or Chief, SB's friend, Boris CHMYKHOV, at the Soviet reception. Since there were over 100 people milling about, SISTONE, of course, could have missed those people.

5. Prior to the buffet, SISTONE met again Leon (Spanish version of Lev) N. GOLOUZOV, a member of the Soviet Commercial Staff. SISTONE had met GOLOUZOV on the Ford excursion as well, and the two chatted briefly about that trip. GOLOUZOV gave SISTONE his calling card, copy of which is attached.

6. Standing beside GOLOUZOV, and obviously a very junior officer under the latter's wing, was Vladimir PETROV, also of the Soviet Commercial Office. Following the example of big brother, PETROV also gave SISTONE his calling card, copy of which is attached. PETROV looked to be no more than in his late 20's.

347

He is almost baby faced, has sort of a pug nose, is perhaps 5' 9" tall, is of medium to slim build, and has light hair. PETROV said he had only been in Mexico two weeks and was terribly confused by the vehicular traffic, which is much noisier and extensive than that of Moscow. Although he speaks Spanish quite well, he said that this is his first tour in Latin America.

7. Also early in the evening SISTONE met Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN, Soviet Vice Consul. He is a fairly tall, heavy built, athletic-looking young man with a very strong handgrip on being introduced. KORMUSHKIN was almost the only Russian with whom SISTONE talked who did not even try to be friendly. He just stood around most of the evening, listening and looking very ill at ease.

8. SISTONE only met Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO, LOGINOV's replacement, very briefly and on an occasion when LOGINOV was not around. Therefore, SISTONE was not formally introduced by title or as FRADYER's replacement to NECHIPORENKO. This man looks very Latin and could mix in a crowd on the street without any difficulty. He stayed very much in the background all evening. During the little ceremony in which he was introduced by the Chargé as LOGINOV's replacement, he was asked when he had previously served in Mexico by the latter. He replied he had been in Mexico from 1960 (or 1961) to 1965. stationed previously

/ you bet - Speaks good Spanish, too

The Chargé described him as a young man advancing rapidly in the Soviet Foreign Service. He also said he had been a simple ~~Military~~ Attache before but is now a Second Secretary and is taking over as Consul. The Chargé described NECHIPORENKO as a non-Great Russian. SISTONE missed his nationality, if it was mentioned. The Chargé hastened to add that NECHIPORENKO's wife, however, is Great Russian.

9. Possibly the longest conversation SISTONE had with any Russian was that with Eduard Anatolyevich SARATOV, the TASS representative. SISTONE was introduced to him by Findley HOWARD, local Pan American representative. SARATOV was the only one with whom SISTONE spoke in English. All other conversation with Russians and other non-Americans was in Spanish. SARATOV is a very smooth, gallant man-about-town. He seemed to really enjoy talking to Americans and other non-Russians at the reception, and bowed and established rapport with the ladies of all ages. He said he has been in Mexico two years, is married, and has one son in the fourth grade, who is naturally attending the Embassy school and who will be sent next year to the Soviet Union for his further education. He asked SISTONE how many children he has and commented on the answer, five, by saying that in his business it is not practical to have many children. SISTONE asked him how he gets his news to send home. SARATOV replied that he is obliged to send home

348

daily a resume of the most important Mexican events, much of which he obtains from the Mexican press. He added, with a smile, that he, of course, has to supplement such newspaper accounts with information from his own contacts. SISTONE asked if this meant, among other things, getting handouts from Government offices. SARATOV dismissed such sources as unimportant. He said this daily resume which he sends home by Telex takes him about two or three hours. He said he is the lone TASS representative here. He has his own office separate from the Embassy and prefers it that way. SARATOV claimed to have traveled around Mexico quite a bit. He seemed to be impressed with the Yucatan and wanted to know if SISTONE has visited there. The latter replied that he has not yet visited the Yucatan since being stationed here, but that, as a tourist, he had seen the ruins there some years ago. SARATOV said that he is from Siberia, and in answer to a SISTONE question said he thinks the Georgians are the warmest and friendliest people of the Soviet Union. SARATOV obviously likes to brag about having been stationed previously in Washington. He also said he would very much like to have been assigned to the new TASS office being opened in San Francisco. According to SARATOV, per an agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. the former will have a Consulate in Leningrad and the latter a Consulate in San Francisco. The opening of

350

the TASS office in San Francisco is somehow connected with the establishment of the Consulate. In speaking of LOGINOV's three days in New York, SARATOV said he would recommend three things for him to visit: a good steak house, a good Chinese restaurant, and Rockefeller Center Music Hall.

10. Somewhat after the despedida ceremony, SISTONE noted the Chargé, Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV, alone and introduced himself. From a distance KAZANTSEV looks extremely young for his high position; closer up he looks a little older. KAZANTSEV was extremely affable when he learned that SISTONE was a new member of the Cuerpo Consular. He said he is a member of an equivalent organization among the diplomats and in that context knows Mr. Wallace STUART quite well. yes He said he was extremely privileged a couple of nights previously to be able to shake Astronaut ARMSTRONG's hand and talk to him. He thinks the space program a wonderful adventure for both our countries, and he mentioned the current negotiations between the American Atomic Energy Commission and its Russian equivalent in working out the rules for use of peaceful nuclear energy. While affable, KAZANTSEV does not impart any feeling of sincerity whatsoever. He seems transparently cynical, and reminds one of a second-rate American politician. After the above conversation and when SISTONE was talking to a Mexican airport official, for some reason KAZANTSEV reapproached

Am COSAD

Embassy Reception

Agree completely VPR

351

SECRET

SISTONE and said to him and the Mexican that he hoped there would be a rapprochement soon between the United States and Cuba. SISTONE cannot figure out why KAZANTSEV made that remark at that particular time unless 1) he thought the Mexican airport official was a Cuban, or 2) he had been briefed by LOGINOV not only on the fact that SISTONE is FRADYER's replacement, but that FRADYER had somehow been connected with Cuban operations.

11. SISTONE only met Yuriy CHERNYSH, Soviet Vice Consul, very briefly to shake hands near the end of the evening. He was easily recognizable from his very light gray hair.

12. SISTONE was only sure of one Cuban's being present, Rafael MIRABAL. At one time, SISTONE thought he saw a gentleman who looked a little like Ambassador Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, but at second glance he did not think so. There was no doubt in SISTONE's mind that MIRABAL was avoiding him. On one occasion, MIRABAL was quite close, within earshot, and may well have heard SISTONE either talking English to a fellow American or his wife, or discussing something American. Thereafter, every time SISTONE tried to work his way toward MIRABAL, the latter would shortly move further away. Twice SISTONE talked to people that vaguely looked like they might be Cubans from the mug book, only to discover in both cases that they were Mexican.

SECRET

13. One of the above Mexicans turned out to be Alfonso SIBAJA C., who described himself as a mechanical engineer and industrial consultant. His address is Ezequiel 82, Mexico 14, D.F., and his telephone number is 17-88-85. This man is the husband of a lady he described as Press and Cultural Attache of the Greek Embassy. SISTONE was also introduced to her somewhat later and got the impression that she is not Greek but either all Mexican or perhaps of partial Greek ancestry. Her name is Heliana K. de Sibaja. SIBAJA and SISTONE exchanged calling cards (copy of SIBAJA's is attached). SIBAJA said that he and his wife attend such functions as this reception quite frequently and definitely recalled not having met SISTONE before. The latter explained his recent arrival. SIBAJA claimed that he is a good singer of folklore songs and that his wife knows how to dance them. They have performed spontaneously quite often at diplomatic and consular affairs. Asked whether he would be going on the Cuerpo Consular excursion to Monterrey scheduled for late October, SIBAJA said he would like to go. He is a working man, however, and was not sure he could get away. SIBAJA and wife and SISTONE and wife established rapport rather easily, and all agreed they should meet again rather shortly. SIBAJA said that he is of partial French ancestry. He looks as though he might be Mideastern, however. He is proud that he is from JUAREZ' home state of Oaxaca. It would seem to SISTONE that this is

actually a secretary

Sounds interesting!

the kind of man who might be used as a fairly nonsuspicious access agent to either the Soviets or the Cubans. He obviously circulates in their social milieu. SISTONE intends to follow up on this man. He said he lives in Colonia Lindavista, where SISTONE's wife's relatives are concentrated. He has a son going to Colegio Tepeyac in that area.

14. The only Americans SISTONE was aware of at the reception were 1) Clyde SNIDER, Chief of the Visa Section of the Consulate, 2) Findley HOWARD, of Pan American, and 3) David WIESLEY, American businessman and Honorary Consul of Iceland.

15. Considering the fact that SISTONE was only in the Soviet Embassy a little over one hour and had to spend a good part of his time talking to SNIDER, VOURVOULIAS, and that real pain-in-the-neck, Sra. JIMENEZ, he considers his contact with Soviets about the maximum that could be achieved under the circumstances.

Attachment:
  Copy of calling cards (3)

Distribution:
  Orig - SIBAJA (new P), w/att
     1 - P-11712 (LOGINOV), w/o att

TDS:lmp

14-00000

354

[illegible] e/sb
[illegible] DIF [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] when [illegible]
[illegible]

1 October 1969

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LIBACON 1

DATE, TIME & PLACE: 1 Oct., 1600 - 1730, El Mortiro Rest. & Hotel Emperador.

1. I arrived ten minutes prior to the appointed time, noted Subject's car parked around the corner, entered the Restaurant and found Subj without difficulty.

2. Without any preliminaries to speak of, Subj told me that he had interesting news for me. As he hesitated for a moment I asked him if he had been invited to the despedida this evening. He was a bit shocked and probably disappointed, ~~xxxxx~~ with a "who, what", but recovered quickly and admitted that this was to have been the interesting news - yes he had been invited and was going. He explained that he had made a phone call to the Embassy to invite LOGINOV to his house for a farewell party, but the latter turned the tables and invited Subj to the despedida. Subj claimed that he told LOG that this in reality a "dirty deal", but LOG countered with the claim that Moscow wants him to return urgently and now he was too busy to consider personal invitations. (Subj did not appear to be unhappy with this turn of events.) Subj promised to keep his eyes and ears open and fervently hoped that LOG would introduce him to his replacement, the unofficial one.

S/F any need?

Libacon called Loginov on 25 Sept to postpone meeting - No subsequent calls

3. Above, of course, took only a few minutes, the rest of the time Subj discussed women, food, drink, and related topics. He would like, he said, to be better acquainted with Alla GLEBOVA (works at Sovemb) whom he considers to be an exceptionally interesting girl, although married. (I don't believe he is a position to do much about this. I believe he is capable of seducing a lot of girls, but I don't see how he could work up much access to this woman.)

4. Subj gave a copy of a short paper (written in Russian) he worked up on his friend HENARES who lives in San Juan del Rio, near Queretaro. Subje is very anxious to have us help this individual but I still don't see much point in it. I asked Subj if HENARES is acquainted with anyone at the SOVEMB and was told that he might know one or two the ~~local~~ Russ/Span ~~xix~~ (ninos ?) who are employed there. HENARES is one of these himself. A translation of the document is attached.

9

ninos - but not employed by Sov

5. Subj is a very friendly, likable chap, but I do not ~~him~~ think ~~it~~ he would find it difficult to fabricate something, whether it be important or otherwise. This is purely an opinion, so far, based on nothing concrete.

6. Subject expressed a desire to have a "blast" with me sometime with no reference to business. I said I would consider it, perhaps it would be amusing.

DFD

DFDI[illegible]

14-00000

355

1 October 1969

Below is translation of document written by LIBAG[illegible] 1 re his friend HENARES who lives in San Juan del Rio.

"HENARES

A Spaniard born in the province of ASTURIA. During the Spanish Civil War was taken to the USSR with other children. Completed his elementary schooling in Spanish childrens' schools. Entered Leningrad University majoring in history, and following graduation was a given a chair in the same deartment. Arrived in Mexico, I believe, in 1957, with the aid of his sister, who lives in San Juan del Rio. Is a manager of a restaurant. Henares is a very intelligent, sensitive, fellow. Always studied with pleasure. Was very fond of nature and animals. During periods of vacation from the elementary schools, instead of just fooling around as did the other kids, he would work as a shepherd, water boy, in vineyards, took long walks, read, swam, and always tried to be a loner. Therefore, he was not very well liked, was teased, and once, knowing that he was not a good swimmer, was thrown from a steep bank into the river KLYAZ[illegible]. My mother dragged him out. He always loved her, and to this day has great affection for her. Whenever he visits Mexico he never fails to call on her. Being acquainted with his character and sentiments, I would say that now, living in a dead city, he suffers greatly. I suppose that because of his loneliness he impregnated a stupid, old fashioned, Indian girl. His political views are the most liberal, and being an intelligent fellow, he was never placed in an unconfortable position, although he was not fully trusted.

I think, that were it possible to use these characteristics, we could use him to our great advantage."

I told Subject that we would make no move whatsoever, until, and perhaps not even then, he provided me with personal biographic data re the above individual.

DFD

D. F. DIT[illegible]SON

Испанец

Испанец, родился в провинции Астурия. Во время испанской гражданской войны был вывезен из Испании вместе с другими ребятишками в Союз. Окончил школу в испанских детских домах. Поступил на исторический факультет в Ленинградский университет, и после его окончания получил кафедру [illegible]. Приехал в Мексику, кажется, в 1957-м году по вызову сестры, которая живёт в San Juan del Rio. Заведует рестораном. Испанец очень умный и душевный человек. Всегда улыбается с [illegible]. Любил очень природу и животных. В испанских детских домах, на каникулах, вместе [illegible], когда [illegible] с маленькими ребятишками, [illegible] пастухами, [illegible], на озерах, пели, удил, читал, плавал и всегда стремился быть на природе. Поэтому он не очень любил город, а раз, зная, что он плохо плавал, бросили с крутого берега в Клязьму. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Он всегда её очень любил и долго [illegible] [illegible] к ней [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Когда [illegible] [illegible] в Мексику, то [illegible] [illegible] её. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] и [illegible], а он сказал, что [illegible] жила в

[illegible], када [illegible] [illegible] [illegible],
и завршени [illegible] и стварно [illegible]
Политичке Бугарске у последње вре-
ме, бугарским посланицима, а и не [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible], који су [illegible] [illegible]-
[illegible].

Држим, да [illegible] [illegible] било би [illegible]
[illegible], то [illegible] [illegible] би [illegible] [illegible].

358

TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING

C/VIS-2
AMB
DCM
CCA
CG
PR
CHRON

8/ssc

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

Charge:

Control: 5364

Date: 1 Oct 1969
4:40 pm

ACTION: Secstate WASHDC

MEXICO 5364

FOR FBI

VISAS HORSE Valentin LOGUINOV C-3 December 23, 1927 Moscow, employee of Soviet Embassy in Mexico. Arr. New York October 7, 1969 via Air France Flt. 700. Dep. New York October 10 via Aeroflot. Accompanied by wife, Alexandra LOGUINOVA August 20, 1928 Moscow, and son, Dimitri LOGUINOV born 1959.

MCBRIDE

Drafted by: C/VIS:CWSnider/mal
10/1/69

Approving Officer: C/VIS:CWSnider

Clearances

P.117/2

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

359

From LITENSE-1

Mexico

To September 27,1969

1. Talking to various people, such as Guillermo Tardiff, no information has been circulated or has circulated regarding the fact that Carrillo Flores did not attend the interview of Raul Roa, foreign minister of Cuba and president Diaz Ordaz.

2. By going to the General Assembly of the United Nations, lic. Carrillo Flores, secretary of Foreign Relations is out of the presidential race by constitutional reasons.

According to people who may be considered as knowing about politics Carrillo Flores never had a chance to be nominated because of his close associations with United States bankers.

C/SB

2. On the 18 of September I went to the national day celebration at the Chilean embassy, where I met Kazantsev who invited me to go to their embassy on the first of October for a farewell party fcr Valentin Loxguinov, who is leaving soon. The new Checoslovaquian ambassador was with Kazantsev. I arrived late and many people had already left. Wallace Stuart was there,the new Rau ambsaador, the Ghana ambassador, the Paraguyan chargé d'affairs, an several other diplomats of minor importance. The Chilean colony seems to be quite large.

file LOGINOV

14-00000

360

FERNO
[illegible] - file no 6

26 September 1969

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LIBACON 1

DATE, TIME & PLACE: 25 Sept. 69, 2030 - 2200 hrs., Firenze Rest.

1. Subj arrived eight minutes late and realising same, apologized. He appeared to be in a good mood and when asked told me that he and his wife were now getting along very well. He claimed that he called LOGINOV xx, at the Embassy on the morning of the 15th and asked that their dinner engagement for that evening be postponed. According to Subject LOG told him that their dinner had been scheduled for the 18th, not the 15th, so Subj xxxxxx assumed LOG was correct. I reminded Subj that to the best of my recollection it had been for the 15th. In any event, Subj said LOG took the postponement very well, especially when Subj confirmed with LOG again that the latter was not leaving in October, perhaps not even in November. Subj apologized to LOG, explaining that his wife had just taken on a new job, was nervous about it, and in addition, was taking care of her parents dog and birds, and was simply not in condition to have a party. (I am not sure Subj went through with this explanation to LOG or to me only.) Subj plans to visit LOG at the Embassy on the 29th, 30th, or the first of October, at which time he will set a date for the dinner, hopefully he said, for the same week. If the dinner is to be held prior to xxxxx the evening of the first of Oct. Subj will call the office, (as in the past) and so inform the party on the other end. Our next meeting is scheduled for 1600 hours, 1 Oct., at the "El Mortiro" (?) Rest. xxxxxx in the Suites Emperador.

2. Subject's wife, described as a "bilingual" secretary/typist is now employed by "Orbita Suplementa", and is paid $ 3,500 monthly. Sujb. claims that she will be earning $ 4000 by next month, if everything goes off well. One of the partners xxxxx (?) of this supplement is: Andrea Cataño Michelena.

3. Subj then asked me if I could check a street map of Moscow and see if I could find Ul. NEZHDANOVA on it. I told him I could but would not give him an answer one way or the other unless he would provide me with a satisfactory reason. After extracting a promise from me that I would not laugh at him, he proceeded to tell me about a recent experience he had with a medium at Andrea's home. He prefaced his story with an assurance that he is an atheist and does not believe in the hereafter nor in spiritualism in particular, nevertheless, he was shaken with the experience. He claimed that the medium (name unknown to Subj.) did not go into a trance, nor turn off any of the lights, but simply asked Subj. if he had ever known a girl by the name of "Tanya" while Subj. lived in xxx small town near Ivanova (also not far from Moscow.) Subj claimed that he recalled a girl by that name, that he and she were only about 10 yrs of age at the time, and that they used to go mushroom gathering together. He He said he broke out in a cold sweat when the medium asked this question because he was absolutely positive that no one in Mexico would remember the girl's name nor the episode. The medium then said, speaking for Tanya, "Zdorovo Rafichka", (Hello, Rafael). Subj claims that the medium has no knowledge of the Russian language and that he had not been called "Rafichka" since early childhood. xxxx The medium explained that Tanya had died six months ago and was now present in the room. Through the medium, Tanya explained (in Spanish) that she had been married to a Valentin [illegible], now living at [illegible] Ul. Nezhdanova,

361

apt. 23, Moscow. Subj was not sure he had the correct numerical address, nor did he know what region of Moscow the street was in. Tanya further explained that KIRASOV was engaged in some unspecified underground work, possibly ~~xxxx~~ anti-government activity, and that one member of this group was actually employed by the KGB. He was not further identified.

4. Subj then went on to relate two other "odd" experiences he had had prior to his coming to Mexico. They are not worth repeating here. I told Subj I would try to locate the afore mentioned street on the Moscow map but that I did not take any of this very seriously. Although Subj realized that I was amused by this tale he was not ~~xxxxx~~ angered by my attitude saying he did not know what to make of it himself.

DFDOITMANSON

362

~~[illegible]~~
SB/F
SB/[illegible]
~~[illegible]~~

PRODUCT SALES REPORT [illegible] DATE OF REPORT: 28-IX-59

File

1. Salesman DIEHARD
2. Supervisor John Francis
3. Date/meeting 27-IX-59. 2000-0300 hours
   Site Home of Dr. Luis Gomez. Iglesias 221
4. Date/next mtg. --
   Site --
5. Administrative

   Nothing.

6. Instructions to salesman

   Nothing.

7. Report by salesman

   1. Party. The occasion was a farewell party given by our tennis group in the home of Dr. Gomez for DIEHARD, who leaves October 7th or 8th for Moscow. In addition to myself and my wife, the following were present:

      Gloria Pinto
      Pepe Pinto
      Luis Gomez
      Sylvia Gomez
      Mercedes Pinto (elderly writer, aunt of Pepe, mother of Ruben, mother of Pitucha who is the wife of Herb Wallace) By [illegible] (Rojas)
      Ruben Rojas. Batchelor. Actor in TV soap operas (novelas) and the legitimate theater.
      [illegible] DIEHARD
      [illegible] DIEHARD's wife

      (continued next page)

8. Competition

   —

9. Supervisor's comments

   Please instruct me as to whether or not you want me to attend the reception Wednesday, and if so, what to look for besides meeting DIEHARD's replacement. Can you call off the FBI?

[illegible] FBI

[illegible]

F 11,712

363

Adrian Aguilar
Virgen Aguilar
Tomasito (lnu)
Ralph Wiegandt
Ruth Wiegandt

The party was very gay, excellent food brought by each of the guest, much music, dancing, and drinking. No politics. Everyone was in a very friendly mood.

2. Formal farewell reception. Wednesday, October 1, at 1900 hours at the Soviet embassy will be the formal party for DIEHARD.

The Pintos, Gomez and possibly others from our group will attend this party. I do not know how big it will be.

DIEHARD was disappointed when I said I would not attend, but that this was no reflection on my friendship for him. I stated that I felt it unwise for an American to visit the Soviet embassy. I was afraid that the FBI or CIA would learn of my visit. Val was very insistent and said he'd be disappointed if we did not come. Later in the evening he brought up the subject again and insisted there would be no way anyone could know if I were present or not--there would be no risk to me--no names would be recorded. I said I would think about it, but doubted that we would come.

He [illegible] well not? [illegible] Quite a [illegible]? [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] from [illegible].

3. DIEHARD's replacement. During the course of the evening speeches were made, or at least semi-formal comments and wishes of goodluck to DIEHARD and his wife. DIEHARD said that his replacement would be at the farewell party at the embassy and he hoped we would all meet him. Ralph Wiegandt stated that he wanted DIEHARD's replacement to know that he, the replacement, would be welcome in our group. Our group is somewhat international and has given us all a chance to exchange views. We would regret losing contact with the Soviets. DIEHARD then mentioned that his replacement is something of a sportsman.

Good?

4. Yuri Tchernich. I told DIEHARD that I hadn't seen Yuri for a long time. I asked what had happened to him. He answered that Yuri had been on vacation for a while. This does not account for the many months, perhaps five or six, that I have not seen Yuri. I did not press the issue.

This [illegible] day [illegible] Guanajuat [illegible] [illegible].

5. DIEHARD FLIRT. DIEHARD seemed to be indifferent to Pepe's presence. When he danced with Gloria he often seemed very intimate--dancing close, whispers and ~~giggles~~ giggles, soulful looks. Gloria did not try to control this situation, but rather participated. My wife later reported that while dancing with DIEHARD he also tried to flirt with her, but on a more discrete level, holding her too close, squeezing her hand meaningfully, etc.

6. Dr. Gomez' comments. We arrived promptly at 2000 hours. We were the firsts guests to arrive and the only guests for nearly an hour. During this time Dr. Gomez made several comments of interest. First, let me say that I have thought that Luis

364

was a communist sympathyzer, despite his wealth. He became famous some time back by successfully sewing back on a hand that was amputated in an accident. He is a doctor with Seguro Social. Mexico since has shown him off to the world as Mexico's great hand surgeon. He travels around the world attending medical conventions and is the principal host to medical conventions here in Mexico. An elaborate book was published by Seguro Social on surgery of the hand and Luis' work in that field. I mention the above since it seems to set the stage for someone who might believe that socialism and socialized medicine is good, because he himself has profited so greatly from it.

Further, Luis and Sylvia had made it known for quite some time that they wanted to have the farewell party for DIEHARD in their home. I always felt that this was due to communist sympathy. Now I don't know. And I am at a loss to explain why they insisted upon holding the party. They do not seem to be close friends of DIEHARD, are somewhat different in social and intellectual status, and no longer seem to me to be communist sympathyzers.

Luis commented that DIEHARD's son would probably come to the party since they have no maid. Incidentally, he did not come. He then stated that the boy still speaks no Spanish at all. He added that the boy has lived in Mexico for five years and before that for several years in Cuba. Luis explained that the Soviets are afraid to have their children see how the world really is. Luis added that Kruschev saw a super-market in Los Angeles and simply couldn't believe his eyes. Luis was frankly critical of the Soviets and their intellectual isolationism.

7. DIEHARD MIGHT RETURN. DIEHARD and his wife both conceded that there was a good chance they might come right back to Mexico. She told me that if she did, she would like to teach me Russian. We had exchanged a few elementary words during the evening.

[illegible] [illegible] of comment & one convinced that he would. i.e. I say that he would have appeared to have heard something which made him say what he did.

365

~~SR/1~~
SR/I
SR/Sec. - file Log.

P-LOGINOV
P-LIBASSO

C/[illegible]
C/CUB
CUB/F

MEMORANDUM

México, D.F., Septiembre 26 de 1969.

Con relación al asunto del italiano, LOGINOV que hemos tratado, me permito indicarte que la amistad se inició por la necesidad de traducir unos documentos oficiales que nos solicitaba la Secretaría de Gobernación, por medio de los cuales debíamos demostrar el nombre correcto de un cliente.

Dicha amistad se ha conservado bajo un nivel normal y más o menos se inició hace aproximadamente un año, sin que se hayan tenido otras citas como no es para tomar algunos tragos o almorzar.

Sin embargo, el día de ayer mismo se hizo una cita la cual se llevará a efecto el día de mañana y ya me permitiré informarte más sobre el particular.

THIS IS LIBASSO-1 NOTE ON LOGINOV, WHOM HE EXPECTS TO MEET AT A RESTAURANT ON 27 SEP. PURPOSE IS FOR LIBASSO-1 TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH LOGINOV FOR ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLY DEVELOPMENT FOR A PITCH BY SOMEONE OF OUR CHOICE AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

Libasso-1 will be asked to ask Log when he is leaving

P. 11/12

14-00000

366

~~SR/P~~

~~SR/[illegible]~~

SR/Sec

SECRET

26 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief SB

INFO : Chief, CUBA

SUBJECT : Relationship Between AEDIEHARD and Gloria PINTO

1. In response to a conversation between Chief, SB, and the undersigned, LIREALM-1 was questioned in detail on 25 September concerning the relationship which exixts between AEDIEHARD and Gloria PINTO with a view toward possible embarrassment of AEDIEHARD before his superiors.

2. LIREALM-1 and his wife both believe (but have no proof) that it is probable that Gloria PINTO is having or has had an affair with AEDIEHARD. Both LIREALM and his wife are close friends of the PINTO's and know that Gloria is strongly attracted to AEDIEHARD who is both physically and intellectually superior to her husband. Due to Gloria's continued friendship with AEDIEHARD at the French Club and other places, LIREALM-1 feels sure that Gloria's husband, Pepe, does not yet know of the affair.

3. LIREALM-1 characterized Pepe PINTO as: sweet, slow-witted and below average in intelligence. He is a physician specializing in lung disorders, born in the Canary Islands. He considers himself a Spaniard with the characteristic Spanish lack of respect for women. He attempts to tightly control Gloria's activities while, according to Gloria, having as many affairs himself as he can. Gloria greatly resents Pepe's attitude toward her. Pepe is basically defensive and would not want anyone to know if Gloria were having an affair with another man. He would probably deny it if anyone said so, even if he were aware of it. He would take it out on Gloria, however, and would probably beat her and restrict her movements even more closely.

Agreed VPR

4. In view of the above, it would certainly appear that there would be nothing to gain, and perhaps much to loease, by any attempt at exposing her supposed affair with ABDIEHARD. Since she now appears to be in contact with SHEVCHENKO, much better to hope for better developments in this case.

Andrew E. PELLEMENT

SECRET

367

P-7442
P-2270
P--9026
P-880
P-11,712
P-1612

1. Agent/Subject: LICOZY-5 DATE: 25 September 1969

2. Case Officer Vincent P. RIZZUTO VR

3. Date and site of contact: 25 September Cafeteria Parque

paragraph 5 (continued)

it off than attempt to collect the money. There are sufficient funds in the project.)

paragraph 7 (continued)

is more to this invitation than meets the eye and that the KGB will be going all out to recruit him. I think Subject may be right and I think he should probably find a good excuse for not going.

Subject states that he had complained to KAZANTSEV (P-880) about the shoddy treatment he had been getting from LOGINOV (P-11,712). Never before had he been forced to "stand in line" for Soviet visas for his clients. In the past, he had been able to sent passports to the Soviet Embassy any day--never mind the office hours--and get the passports back with visa the same day. Subject says that LOGINOV himself finally admitted that ~~this was because Subject had~~ [illegible] having been uncooperative (meaning that he had refused to let LOGINOV recruit him). Subject says unequivocally that LOGINOV is leaving PCS by the end of October and that he is not being replaced by a newcomer. Subject understands that NECHIPORENKO, who in a former tour had worked in the Consular Section, will take over as Chief of the Consular Section when LOGINOV leaves.

Subject says that KAZANTSEV is about to leave (in fact, Subject thought KAZANTSEV had already left) and that both a replacement for him and a new ambassador were on the way. I told Subject that as far as I know, KAZANTSEV was to be replaced by another ~~concierge~~ Consejero who would be Chargé, but Subject insisted that an ambassador had been named and would be coming soon. He did not know who the ambassador would be.

Subject remarked that both IVANOV and ~~NIKITOFOV~~ Nikiforov had left and he said that ~~NIKITOFOV~~ Nikiforov was, he thought, a very decent person.

Subject said that PRIKHODKO (P-2270) had come to see him to say goodbye. PRIKHODKO had said, almost with tears in his eyes, that Subject had been a very good friend and that he would never forget him. He invited Subject and wife to come visit him in Moscow. Then when Subject asked PRIKHODKO for his address, PRIKHODKO hemmed and hawed and said that he didn't really have an address yet but that Subject could write him in care of Latin American Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Subject remarked that PRIKHODKO was undoubtedly being sincere, but when you came right down to it, he was just as hemmed in and afraid as anything of the others. Subject said that it was a real tragedy that the Soviet system made such robots out of good people.

Excelsior
25 Sept 1969

Misiones Diplomáticas

EL EMBAJADOR de China, Chih-Ping Chen, asiste como miembro de la delegación de su país a la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Regresará a mediados de diciembre. En México está como encargado de negocios el ministro consejero Chin-Hsien Tang... El embajador de Argentina, Enrique Martínez Paz dio una cena en honor del secretario de Comunicaciones y Transportes; Antonio Padilla Segura, a la que asistieron varios amigos del anfitrión y del agasajado... Keith William Baker, tercer secretario de la embajada de Australia y su esposa María Magdalena Ramírez regresarán de su luna de miel en Acapulco la semana próxima... Wolfang Remer, representante del Mercado Común Europeo, está en México en pláticas con funcionarios del gobierno y dirigentes de los hombres de negocios. Varios diplomáticos de la embajada de Bélgica le dieron la bienvenida en el aeropuerto... Regresó y asumió sus funciones el decano del cuerpo diplomático, embajador de los Países Bajos, barón Schelto van Heemstra. Estuvo varios meses de vacaciones en su patria... La Comisión Cultural del Cuerpo Consular en México, organizadora de la convención de cónsules que habrá en Monterrey los días 27, 28 y 29 de octubre, preparó un programa que mantendrá a los delegados muy ocupados y contentos durante esos tres días. Visitarán las grandes empresas como la Fundidora, Hojalata y Lámina, la Cervecería Cuauhtémoc y la Vidriera y serán declarados huéspedes de honor de la ciudad por el alcalde. Tendrán además banquetes y un baile de gala en el Casino de Monterrey... El cónsul de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas, Valentín S. Loguinov dará una fiesta en la embajada de su país —calzada de Tacubaya 204— el primero de octubre a las 19 horas, para agradecer las atenciones y la amistad que se le ha brindado en México. Durante esa fiesta de despedida, el presidente del Cuerpo Consular en México, Leander P. Vourvoulias, le obsequiará, en nombre de los cónsules, una bandeja de plata. Loguinov es uno de los dirigentes del Curepo Consular en México... El embajador de Ecuador, Miguel Roca Osorio y su familia asistieron en Guadalajara a la Feria Internacional de Artesanías en la que su país participa.

Despedida for Loginov
— Loginov
L

F 1171.2

369

C/KB ~~Staff~~
SB/S — see attached sheet
SB/Sec

September 23, 1969

Memorandum
TO: RIZZUTO through ARCHBOLD
From: FERNALD
Subject: AEDIEHARD (P-11,712) - Thoughts Re possibility of Pitching Him

1. Assuming it was agreed that A should be pitched before his PCS departure, because there are no indications that he would be more susceptible ~~later~~ to an approach later when he comes to a new post abroad in few years and, to the contrary, it is more likely that he would be still more daring, more selfconfident and more determined to advance and solidify his position within the KGB, I wish to add some views of mine to the list of possibilities as to how a pitch could be carried out.

2. My views and thoughts on this subject will be based on the possible use of existing assets and means. I am fully aware that there will be plenty of room for improvements, additions and modifications of what will be said in the following paras.

3. As far as I know we are lacking adequately solid facts in which we could put our teeth, i.e. we do not ~~we do not~~ posses worthwhile mentioning material which we could use to exert a desired pressure on A.

4. I am inclined to believe that we are in a position to make a serious attempt to obtain a "pressure argument" through the use of existing assets which are targeted against A and that it can be done without taking an undue risk.

5. As a move in this direction I was thinking in terms of having recorded a SABORI-A meet for which we would prepare SABORI. To be more specific I have in mind a situation along the following lines:

a. In going to one of his next meets with A, SABORI should carry on his person a transmitter. I am not in favor of a body recorder, because the recording time is limited and it requires the bearer to be turning it on and off, while the transmitter can be set and it requires no action by the bearer on one hand and on the other the bearer is under the impression that

Canbury says Station transmitter does not have [illegible] which would [illegible] body [illegible] in any [illegible] binaural [illegible] restaurant [illegible] every action and statement of his is recorded from the moment the transmitter is strapped on him.

b. SABORI should go to such a meet with experession of a person who is in exceptionally good mood, because of a business success and he was given a substantial advance on his commission. After A and SABORI have their routine two drinks, SABORI will state to A that he would pick up the tab for the evening (after being treated by A so many times) but he would want to celebrate the occasion. It would be desirable that A agrees on a drink or two to please S, but even if that does not take place, it is anticipated that A would want to accompany S^{X} in his good humore. What ever be the case, the situation lends itself to a free talking, critical commenting and some bitching, just to play it big. It will be up to us to prepare S as to how to run the conversation to get out of A a few statements which he would not like his superiors to know about.

c. As far as S is concerned I believe that he can be persuaded to carry a transmitter on his person and as a reason for requesting it we could tell him that it represented a complimetary element to the PAQ which he made on A, because the psychologist who reviewed his PAQ considerd it essential to have a tape covering one meet. There is no way of hiding the fact that we will be recording what is transmitted, but we will not have to give any explanations regarding how it will be done.

d. I hope that one way or the other we will be in possession of a tape which could be used as a pressure factor. From there on all becomes a matter of manupulation: S may request a meet with A under the pretext that that the people interested in the platinum deal sent to S their specialist, who would like to clear some

371

questions before opening the letter of credit and that it was essential that the person who arrived here see A, because that will strangthen S' position in the deal. I mentioned the platinum deal because it would give some common ground to the new person being introduced on the scene, but some other story might be as good.

e. The new person showing up under the platinum deal or any other pretext would be a case officer of ours. I feel that such a person should at first sight show that he was a Yankee, that he be versed in platinum or what ever the pretext may be and that he should be a Russian language speaker. I am inclined to believe that after some business talk and after creating an atmospher of mutual understanding there would be no problem for the case officer to start speaking Russian. If A takes this fact in good mood and the business conversation continues in Russian, S would be in a position to excuse himself as a person who was no longer needed. It is almost impossible to anticipate what would be As reaction to the fact that S wanted to leave. If insisted that S stay, we will have to accept it. Nevertheless, S will be instructed to "go to the bathroom" for a while and the case officer will have to use this opportunity to drop his cover and go on with his job. He will have in his pocket a reel of tape to counteract As emphatic refusal (which we must anticipate).

f. It may be mentioned that S will not have to know anything about the existance of the tape and as far as the case officer is concerned S may have to be satisfied with the explanation that the c.o. was the psychologist who decided that he wanted to meet A in person. Of course, developments may not bear out this cover, but that will be at the stage ~~of developments~~ when we could not care less.

g. There is no doubt that S will be burned whether the

372

the things turn out right orwrong, but S will be left only with guesses as to what transpired between the case officer and A in Russian.

h. It is the fate of any officer making the pitch to be burned if the exgersice ends in anything less than a success. Therefore, it would be worthwhile considering to get a suitable laguage speaker case officer from Hqs for this purpose.

6. I am aware of the fact that ~~that~~ the above discussed scheme has a quite certain weakness in as much as it is built on and around an untested asset as S is. Nevertheless, in terms of security and protection of Agency/ ~~Assets~~ Station assets the scheme is advantageous, which is selfevident.

7. It should be assumed that S might come up with some objections when it comes to introducing another person to A from fear that he would deal himself out of the game and terminate his usefulness to us. I do not consider it difficult to put him at ease.

8. For your consideration and comments.

BHFernald

This is not a bad plan, but I think it breaks down on the following points (most of which Fernald himself has pointed out):

1) I think SOBOLI is still too much of an unknown quantity to build any type of approach around.

2) I question the efficacy of what is, stripped to its essentials, a blackmail approach! Why should he worry about what's on the tape (he can say he was just saying it for SOBOLI's benefit) ~~[illegible]~~ and his reaction would not likely be a favorable one.

3) I doubt we can get a technically adequate tape

4) It looks now as if LOG will be leaving soon - possibly as early as 18 October - so no time to set up properly.

Nevertheless well thought out within the problem at hand: how to make a pitch to [illegible] —

373

Agree that blackmail won't work - but in reading file main thing that stands out (to me at least) is the energy with which AEDEHARD pursues his career. Believe he is ruthlessly ambitious to get ahead. If we are willing to burn SABORI, it might be advantageous to insert senior Russian speaking staffer as suggested in this paper (but without transmitter) who will make A offer to think over on long cold Moscow nights prior to his arrival at a new post. Our offer will consist of first, sewing seeds of discontent on fact that he is now 42 years old and has not risen to the heights in his profession~~s~~ that he could have. (He is only listed as 3rd Secretary while younger men are 1st and 2nd Secretaries) I don't know his KGB rank but it can be intimated that we know his rank could be higher. Talking fast, we could then suggest to A that we will work out a plan in his absence whereby we can aid his future career by putting ~~him~~ in his path advantageous situations such as allowing him to "recruit" a U.S. official at his next post. In return, he would service our requirements during his tour. Our working relationship with A could have a time limit with control factors on both sides. "No answer is wanted now. Report the approach if you wish. The offer will be good upon your arrival at the new post whereever it is." (A, of course, will think the talk is recorded so there must be some way of assuring him it is not. SABORI, naturally, must be absent.)

Not a bad idea, but the intermediary should be someone like LIOVAL, not SABORI. I don't mind burning SABORI, but I think turning Aedehard's agent on him would produce wrong psychological effect. Anyway, unless Aedehard does stay until end of year, think not likely, this thing is academic -

UFK

SANDERSON OPERATIONS REPORT
MEXICAN SALES MARKET

Date: 23-IX-69

1. Salesman/Contact : JOHN FRANCIS — LIREADCM-1
2. Supervisor : ~~John P. SANDERSON~~ CUB/P
3. MEETING date/time :
   location :
4. NEXT MTG date/time :
   location :
5. Administration :
6. Instructions issued :
7. Report from salesman:

GLORIA PINTO CALLED JF's WIFE today TO INFORM HER THAT THE FAREWELL PARTY FOR AEDIEHARD WILL BE SATURDAY ~~28 IX~~ @ HOME OF DR. GOMEZ. HE LEAVES 8-X-69.

8. Competition activity:
9. Sanderson comments :

Info copy for C/SB UPA
file Rogers

375

PRODUCT SALES REPORT

~~SB/A~~
-SB/J file
SB/Sec - for [illegible] file
CC Chevchenko

1. Salesman Oleg Chevchenko
2. Supervisor John Francis — LIREALM-1
3. Date/meeting 13-IX-69, 1000-1100 hours
   Site French Club
4. Date/next mtg. None planned
   Site

5. Administrative

Not applicable

COPIES MADE

6. Instructions to salesman

Not applicable

7. Report by salesman

Has been playing tennis for two years. However, has always been active in sports, especially basketball and volleyball.

Hovde. Asked is I new Bill Hovey (could have been Hovde). Said this was a businessman, an American but with military rank. The Directory shows

Col. William J. Hovde (Am.); wife, Norma G. (Am.)). Destilby S.A., Miguel Cervantes Saavedra 25, z.17. Tel. 45-65-60. Res. Rio Escondido 20, Lomas-Hip., z.10. Tel. 20-71-38. Clubs: ChapGolf, WhFr, NavyL.

Note: Win's address is Rio Esc. 16.

Billy Hovde is former Air att - retired here - in the booze business - good friend of Winston [illegible] Willard C CURTIS

8. Competition

See item #9.

9. Supervisor's comments

1. It is possible that Oleg had been planning to contact me and had deliberately had placed himself in my path.

2. It is also possible that Oleg, like all the other Soviets, hates to spend money and would rather play with another club member than to spend money on an instructor. He may be trying to build up a group of friends or acquaintances with whom he can ~~pxxxtxxhixxxifxxxx~~play.

(continued next page)

P-11,712

376

9. Supervisor's comments (continued)

3. If he had been looking for me, it could be that he has been asked to step in where Val failed. That is, as an American friend, I never invited Val to my home. He never met other Americans through me. Note, however, that he never invited me to his home either--though he did invite us frequently to various events which were under the auspices of the Soviet embassy. We did not but rarely accept, One such occasion was the Moscow circus.

4. If he had been looking for me, it could be that he wants to assure his acceptance by our tennis group where Gloria Pinto is a possible target. Oleg has gotten to Gloria, but I, the American who is somewhat and sometimes hostile to soviets, might be considered a stumbling block. Perhaps he, Oleg, will try to reach all the other members of the group individually so that an invitation by Gloria to one of our functions will meet with general acceptance.

SCENARIO OF CONTACT

I arrived about 0900 and took an instructor.

About 0950 Olegk arrived to play with and instructor on the adjoining court. He made no effort to greet me. He had been pointed out to me by Val, but I had not been pointed out to him do my knowledge--though it is certain that Oleg and jVal must have discussed the "players" in their"game" and counted me as possibly on the other team. That is, I am sure that Val has pointed me out to Oleg, but Oleg would not have wanted to acknowledge this.

At 1000 my hour was up and I told my instructor I was through--I did not want to continue for another hour. As I was paying my instructor I noticed that Oleg was paying his. It is very unusual and possibly even bad form to take an instructor for less than half-an-hour. I am suggesting that he wanted to be free to contrive an accidental meeting with me.

I set a course for one of the several gates from the courts we were using. I could see that Oleg had headed for the same gate (this could have been perfectly natural) and at a speed which after some thirty yards would bring him to the gate at the same moment as I (this was not entirely natural).

Since I had an excuse to greet him, having had him pointed out in front of Pepe Pinto the preceding week, I did so. I ~~xxkxx~~ said Good Morning and asked if Val were here. He looked very pleased (I kthought possibly relieved) when I took the initiative and recognized him.

377

Oleg said that Val had not arrived as far as he knew. I said I had been training to get ready for Val. I wanted my revenge for last week.

Oleg seemed amused by this and immediately asked if I would like to play with him since Val was not here. I agreed. We found a court and played for about one hour. Olgg won 6-3, 6-4.

Bike riding maybe

Oleg is very athletic in appearance and played and excellent game for someone who has played for only two years (if this is true). He has enormous muscular thighs. It escapes me what sport would produce this, other than weightlifting. Weightlifting is out since his upper torso, though muscular, is far less developed than his legs. Basketball does not seem likely to produce his particular kind of development.

Oleg is pleasant. Speaks excellent Spanish. Has not made any political comments (yet!). Seems more intelligent, but less extroverted than Val.

Oleg asked if I were with the American Embassy. I answered"no, I have my own business". It was then that he asked if I knoew another "Bill" who is in private business and who xx has an army rank. Oleg xxxxxxxxxxx thought the other person was a major.

I left at this point. Oleg stayed on to play some more. My wife could not see him and it is not therefore, known with whom or how much longer Oleg did play. Val was not seen during the course of the morning. The Pintos are in San Francisco.

378

September 11, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: Jimmy SABORI (P-13,830)
Date of Meet: Sept 10 at Sanborns-Lafragua at 1700 Hrs

1. Prearranged meet and S came 10 min early.
NEXT MEET: Friday Sept 12 at Chez Rene at 2000 hrs.

2. Instead of receiving the Agency Contract from the Moon Valley Corp. Dallas, Texas, he received a phone call (his phone was connected) on Sept 10 in the morning and was requested to sign the contract immediately and return it by registered mail. The caller (Lester MacGhee) told S that the contract was mailed "Registered-Return Receipt" on Mon Sept 8 ". S concluded that he expected receiving it on Sept 11, but more likely on Sept. 12.

3. S was disappointed because he counted on showing the contract to AEDIEHARD that evening and the absence of the contract will necessitate another meet with A when the contract arrives. FERNALD repeated to S that he needed a Xerox copy of the same and decided to meet with S on Sept 12 to debrief him on his meet with A and get a copy of the contract.

4. S will not have much to report to A when he meets him that evening. S went to the Hotel Geneve where a friend of his used to be a manager and was disenchanted when he found out that he no longer worked there. The new manager did not want to show him the register of guests and his attempt to spot a girl or girls who lived in the hotel and appeared to be working bore no results, because all he was able to see or exchange few words were tourists. S spoke to TANG by phone to inform him that the Luau manager wanted to check with the embassy on the size of the add he was to place in the monthly MISSION. TANG stated that he would take care of that and he reminded S that WANG wanted to see the article before it was printed. Other, than to capitalize on the info that Echeverria would be the next President of Mexico and speak about the platinum deal S had practically nothing to report.

5. F repeated the instruction he gave S on Sept 8 with regard to stalling IS activities with A and as far as the platinum deal was concerned it was made clear that his fair and square [illegible] will determine our attitude.

BHFernald

211712

14-00000

329

[illegible] (s/[illegible] [illegible])
[illegible]
[illegible] - [illegible]
[illegible]

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: [illegible]-1

DATE, TIME & PLACE: 10 Sept. 6[illegible], 2030 - [illegible], [illegible] Post.

1. Arriving on the dot, found Subj already there. First thing he said was that he could not stay late, was having trouble with his wife but due entirely due to his bad behaviour. Apparently he had stayed out all night Sunday, with a girl friend whom he did not identify and I did not push it. I do not feel, at this time, that this is a particularly important item.

2. First thing I asked for was possible [illegible] aliases of:

(a) Pax [illegible], or [illegible] (according to Subject)
(This turned out to be Pax [illegible])
born ca 1927, USA, wife Loli ([illegible]), no children,
resides somewhere in Lomas, employed by Instituto
Mexicano Norteamericano de Relaciones, Hamburgo 115,
as a director of exhibitions, lectures, etc. (The
surname was confirmed by my instructor.)

Trace

(b) Miguel Angel [illegible]
born ca 1942, Asturias (province ?), Spain
resides, Belgica 927, Apt. 1.
wife, Maria Isabel, born Spain,
son ca 5 yrs of age, same name as father.
Employed as Administrator, Club Recreativo
Asturianos de Tlalpan.
Formerly owned a furniture store, sold.

Trace

3. When asked Subj confirmed that his dinner party for [illegible] will be on the evening of the 15th Sept, and only that couple is expected.

4. I told Subj to continue to refuse to write reports on his friends for [illegible], but that he could do so on a so called friendly basis and not to accept any money from [illegible]. Subj put on a pretty good act talking to me as though I were [illegible]. "I do not intend to write any reports for you on my friends unless you can tell just exactly what you them for and what you intend to do with them. You have told me that this would help you and the Soviet, I want to know how. I am a serious man and I do not intend to take this sort of a request frivolously. If you tell me the facts, I will think over your offer, but I am not going to play games, etc, etc." The way Subj talked it would not surprise me to have him pull the same stunt on [illegible], re lying, of course, what he has been told. This, incidentally does not satisfy me 100 %.

5. Subject told me he has a close personal friend, with the same b.g. as Subject, living in San Juan del Rio in [illegible], in retire. Subj. wondered if we could find any use for him to be useful. My first reaction was that living where the man does is of very little use, but I was willing to discuss it with Subj at a later date. I would, of course, need complete details, etc. Subject said he would provide them for the next time.

6. No further business.

7. Next meeting 17 Sept. [illegible], 2030 hours. We may move to another place a little [illegible].

[illegible]

4-00000

380

- Silver

file [illegible]

September 9, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: Jimmy SABORI (P-13,830)
Date of Meet: Sept 8 at Cez Rene at 1400 Hrs

1. The meet was prearranged and S came on time. The meet lasted about 3 hours.

NEXT MEET: Sept 10 at 1700 hrs at SAMBORNS-La fragua if S does not request to see me earlier.

2. S was advised by phone from Dallas, Texas, that the Moon Valley Corporation was able to meet the Sov requirements concerning the platinum deal and that they mailed on Sat Sept 6 a contract (agency contract) to S which enables him to purchase 10 ounces of platinum per month from the Sov seller (an export company). According to the same phone message the contract provides for a US$3.00 commission per ounce.

3. S hopes to receive the contract before he meets with AEDIKHARD on Sept 10 at 2000 hrs. On his own intiative S decided that he would want to show the contract to FERNALD before taking it to A. That was the reason for arranging another meet with F before the scheduled meet with A.

4. The generous commission provided for by the contract enables S to offer to A US$1.00 per ounce. Even if the minimum required by Sovs is purchsed a $1.- commission per oz. would still net $20.000.-, according to S' estimates. S anticipates that the purchases would go above the required minimum. S was taking in consideration the possibility that A would not want to accept any commission. ~~and~~ Therefore, S came up with a scheme by which there would be a bank account for A and the money would be his, whether he wanted it or not, or better said , it would be up to him to decide when he wanted to use it.

5. At this point it may be mentioned that apart of the fact whether the Sovs would want to close the platinum deal the entire above mentioned account is strictly S' interpretation of what he was told over the phone

381

and only the copy of the Moon Valley Agency Contrat with S will clarify many questions one would like to ask right now. Nevertheless, it appears to be probable that an Agency Contrat was promised to S.

6. In spite of the fact that at the time of this writing one can deal only with "ifs", it is worthwhile mentioning that S believes that A would like to facilitate S to get the deal, because in that case S would be on one hand morally obliged to him and on the other S would had collected a nice sum of money. In turn this would make A feel that he obtained a satisfactory control factor over S and the rest is quite obvious. Other than reccurring to methods which are quite rarely used gainst people as S, we in a situation of a very inconfortable spectator left with a hope or a which that A might go for the commission.

7. As far as S'willingness to give to A the attractive chunk of money is concerned he is doing it for a double purpose: to please us (indirect protection of his interest) and to protect his interest directly by assuring A' willingnees to help him in getting the deal.

8. Although, our situation is not pleasant (if the deal is to materialize) we are not helpless onlookers. S mentioned that if it comes to closing of the deal he will have to travel to Zurich, Switzerland, and for that he needs a passport. How much S is aware of our control position (by enabling him to get a pessport fast or dragging its granting) can be best illustrated by the fact that he told F that he would certainly put aside a worthwhile sum for F. Needless to mention that F gave him a ~~[illegible]~~ darn good lecture ~~[illegible]~~ when he made his silly statement. Nilly-willy F was obliged to turn weakness into stregth and S understood that he could as well forget about the deal (if it comes his way) if he would not play it fair and square with us.

9. S brought up quite reasonably the question that A would most likely put pressure on him to get producing along the lines of assignments against the US Embassy and as the first thing the question of obtaining the Embassy phone directory would be thrown in S' lap.

10. F told S that because of the new development in the platinum business F will allow S to follow A' instruction ~~as~~ as to how to go about getting the directory. F told him to go ahead and look up all the USIS

382

girls he can find in the Hotel Geneve and report to A his findings. F pointed out that we demand from hin to stall as much as possible. On S' remark that he should have something to report to A when he sees him on Sept 10 F commented that he will have no objection that S report his findings.

11. S really stalled all he was able in connection with the Chinese Embassy; he did not go there at all, because he still did not obtain the ad from the restaurant Luau.

12. After the above conv S completed the PAQ, which is attached hereto.

13. S told F that his home phone was disconnected because he did not have money to pay the bill of MN 632.- This happened at unconvenient time because the Moon Valley from Dallas, Texas, was not able to reach him and they were obliged to contact him through a friend ~~mg~~ of his. F anticipated that S would in one or the other way be asking for money and he had with him a filled receipt for MN500.- which sum he gave him . F implied that he would give him a couple hundred pesos more at his earliest convenience.

14. Then, S spoke about the presidential race and stated that the Gobernacion Secretary Echevarria would be the PRI official candidate and that the public announcement to that effect would be made on Sept 19. F phoned this info to ARCHBOLD. See Attachment.

BHFernald

383

SB/5 Tky CUBA/P AP
SB/4 Grp
SB/Sec

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 6 September 1969

FROM :CUBA/PELLEMENT AP

SUBJECT: Recent and Proposed Contact Between LIREALM-1 and AEDIEHARD

1. At the 5 September 1969 meeting between LIREALM-1 and Andrew E. PELLEMENT, the following information was received from and discussed with LIREALM-1:

a. LIREALM-1, following Station advice ~~following~~ after the the recent incident where AEDIEHARD approached LIREALM-1 with an offer to pay LIREALM-1 for any information he could obtain from the U.S. Embassy, has avoided contact with AEDIEHARD at the French Club. LIREALM-1's wife, an almost daily visitor to the Club, has been asked by LIREALM-1 to note AEDIEHARD's activities and associates and report anything interesting to LIREALM-1.

"Station" advice was FRADVERS — actually they + Station wanted relationship retained as long as AEDIEHARD refrained from being provocative — JPR

b. Mrs. LIREALM recently told LIREALM-1 that for a number of consecutive Saturdays, AEDIEHARD had brought a young lady, whom MRs LIREALM thinks to be German, to the Club as his guest. Mrs. LIREALM did not attempt to determine the identity of the female, but reported the information to her husband. She has noted no other items of interest in AEDIEHARD's pattern of activities at the Club. He has not seemed to single out any individual as a tennis partner, nor is he frequently seen socializing with anyone in particular while at the Club.

SB/F any ideas
no

2. LIREALM-1 was advised that the Station had learned that AEDIEHARD will not return to MHHARSH immediately as originally thought, but he will probably remain in Mexico for another five months. LIREALM-1 was told that this information was not yet public knowledge, but the Station would like LIREALM-1 to confirm this if possible. This led to a general discussion of LIREALM-1's association with AEDIEHARD since the recent incident. LIREALM-1 was instructed that it was not the Station's wish that he avoid contact with AEDIEHARD, but rather that he not single out AEDIEHARD for special attention or closely court his friendship. It is the writer's opinion that a sufficient time has elapsed since the last incident for LIREALM-1 to again renew some association with AEDIEHARD, and a particularly opportune chance to do so is available: LIREALM-1 and AEDIEHARD both belong (as has previously been reported) to a group of tennis enthusiasts at the Club who take turns entertaining each other in their homes. To date, all the members of this group have given parties except LIREALM-1. Mrs. LIREALM, following the incident and thinking that AEDIEHARD was soon to depart, has stated that she did not want to have AEDIEHARD in her home since he represents a government so opposed to the principles of her government, etc. Based on AEDIEHARD's extension in Mexico and the fact that the LIREALM's owe their friends a party, LIREALM was instructed to plan a party for the group and to include AEDIEHARD and his wife in the group invited. At the party, LIREALM-1 should not focus an undue amount of attention on AEDIEHARD, but should take advantage of the opportunity to renew their general friendship and let the matter, more or less, take its own head from there. As a first step in this general direction, LIREALM-1 plans to go to the Club over the weekend of 6-7 September at times when AEDIEHARD usually plays tennis to at least say hello.

On 7 Sept he told LIREALM he leaving in Oct!

File: P-11,712

S E C R E T

SECRET

3. A second reason why both LIREAMH-1 and his wife plan to go to the Club is to see if they can identify the new "girl-friend" of AEDIEHARD. LIREALM-1 says he almost always carries his camera with him when he goes to the club and frequently takes pictures of his wife and their friends. Under this pretext, he will try and take a picture of the girl friend if the opportunity presents itself where it will not come to the attention of AEDIEHARD.

4. LIREALM-1 is preparing a written teport in some greater detail concerning AEDIEHARD and his relationship with him since the incident. He will also attempt to see if his can get any more details about the girl friend from his wife.

5. The substance of the above including the idea for the party has been verbally reported to C/SB and he is in accord with the plan for the party, which will be, at least in part, paid for out of Station funds.

SECRET

14-00000

385

PRODUCT SALES REPORT DATE/RPT. 4.IX.69.

1. Salesman VAL LOGUINOV + FRIEND ♀
2. Supervisor MRS. JOHN FRANCIS
3. Date/meeting 31 AUGUST 1969 AM.
   Site FRENCH CLUB
4. Date/next mtg.
   Site
5. Administrative

6. Instructions to salesman
MORE DETAILS TO BE OBTAINED: NAME, CAR, PICTURES, ETC.
see 9 below

Mrs Francis will attempt find name of girl and some background info. Pics will follow if she shows up on weekend. B.

7. Report by salesman
VAL WAS SEEN AGAIN WITH THE GIRL PRESUMED TO BE GERMAN.

8. Competition

9. Supervisor's comments
MRS. J.F. HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED, NOT TO RECORD EVERY MOVEMENT AND CONTACT OF VAL BUT, RECORD AND CALL TO OUR ATTENTION: 1. CONTACTS WHEN REPEATED FREQUENTLY, 2. OTHER SOVIETS ACCOMPANYING VAL, 3. UNUSUAL OR SUSPICIOUS [illegible]

p-11, 712

PRODUCT SALES REPORT | Date/Rept 17-IX-67

1. Salesman Party for Tennis Group
2. Supervisor John Francis
3. Date/meeting 5-IX-67
   Site
4. Date/next mtg.
   Site
5. Administrative

6. Instructions to salesman

7. Report by salesman

Mrs. John Francis reports having explaining to one & all, including some thirty shrewd persons, her unwillingness to invite the tennis group to her home as long as Stugunov is still here. Her reasons as expressed involved the 90% Soviet support of the Viet Cong effort.

It now agreed that they will host a party when the "Group" return from vacation in about mid-Oct. She will gradually "reverse" her opinion in the meantime. Party will be about 18 Oct.

8. Competition

9. Supervisor's comments

I agree that there is no reason for us to reverse our opinion & aversion to Soviets at this time. A reversal would be suspicious. Our stand was to positively opposed to be reversed now

387

PRODUCT SALES REPORT　　DAT/RPT: 15 IX 69.

1. Salesman　VALENTIN GOGUINOV

2. Supervisor　JOHN FRANCIS

3. Date/meeting　15-IX-69. 1130 - 1300

Site　FRENCH CLUB

4. Date/next mtg. ____________

Site ____________

5. Administrative

6. Instructions to salesman

7. Report by salesman

NOTE: → "WILL LEAVE IN OCTOBER." IS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEVERAL DAYS IN NEW YORK + IS BRUSHING UP ON HIS ENGLISH FOR THE OCCASION.

HA!

8. Competition

9. Supervisor's comments

HIS GIRL-FRIEND WAS NOT WITH HIM THIS TIME. I PLAYED TENNIS WITH HIM. (& lost two sets).

which is the German girl friend. also not there

7 IX　IB

388

PRODUCT SALES REPORT DIC/RPT: 5-IX-69

1. Salesman OLEG (LNU) [illegible]ENCHENKO
2. Supervisor JOHN FRANCIS
3. Date/meeting 6-IX-69. 1130
Site FRENCH CLUB
4. Date/next mtg. —
Site —
5. Administrative

—

6. Instructions to salesman

—

Second report with more detail forthcoming. P.B.

7. Report by salesman

AUXILIARY MILITARY ATTACHE. HAS MUSTACHE. IS LEAN + ATHLETIC. PLAYS A BETTER GAME OF TENNIS THAN VALENTIN. WAS SEEN PLAYING W/GLORIA PINTO + TWO OTHER PEOPLE, UNKNOWN. VALENTIN SUPPLIED NAME + POST. ACCORDING TO MRS J.F. OLEG PLAYS WEEKLY + WEDNESDAYS FOR A PERIOD AND THEN A PERIOD OF ABSENCE.

8. Competition

—

9. Supervisor's comments

IT APPEARS THAT OLEG HAS INSINUATED HIMSELF INTO GLORIA'S PRESENCE DESPITE HER OBVIOUS PREFERENCE FOR THE COMPANY OF VALENTIN.

389

PRODUCT SALES REPORT DATE/RPT: 4.IX.69

1. Salesman KAREN ELLY + HUSBAND
2. Supervisor MRS. JOHN FRANCIS
3. Date/meeting 4-IX-69. AM.
   Site FRENCH CLUB
4. Date/next mtg. 11-IX-69 AM.
   Site FRENCH CLUB
5. Administrative

—

6. Instructions to salesman

—

7. Report by salesman

KAREN + HER HUSBAND CAME TO MEXICO ABOUT SIX MONTHS AGO FROM CHILE. THEY LIVE IN LOMAS. HER HUSBAND IS IN THE EDUCATION DEPT. HE IS NOT IN THE OFFICIAL LIST.

SHE IS A CLASS "A" TENNIS PLAYER. HE IS PROBABLY "B".

HE WAS PLAYING WITH GORDON JONES ON SUNDAY.

8. Competition

9. Supervisor's comments

THIS COUPLE COULD MEET VALENTIN LOGINOV. VAL IS A CLASS "C" PLAYER.

WILL NOT PURSUE PER AEP 5-IX-69

COS & I are in touch with ELLY, who has been briefed to turn down LOG & SCHEVCHENKO VPRussia

390

PRODUCT SALES REPORT DA-/RPT 17-IX-69

1. Salesman PARTY FOR TENNIS GROUP

2. Supervisor JOHN FRANCIS.

3. Date/meeting 5-IX-69

Site

4. Date/next mtg.

Site

5. Administrative

COPIES MADE

6. Instructions to salesman

7. Report by salesman

MRS. JOHN FRANCIS REPORT HAVING EXPLAINING TO ONE & ALL, INCLUDING SOME FAIRLY SHREWD PERSONS, HER UNWILLINGNESS TO INVITE THE TENNIS GROUP TO HER HOME AS LONG AS LOGINOV IS STILL HERE. HER REASONS AS EXPRESSED INVOLVED THE 90% SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE VIET CONG EFFORT.

It now agreed that they will host a party when the "Group" return from vacation in about mid-Oct. She will gradually "reverse" her opinion in the meantime. Party will be about 18 Oct.

8. Competition

9. Supervisor's comments

I AGREE THAT THERE IS NO REASON FOR US TO REVERSE OUR AT OPINION & AVERSION TO SOVIETS AT THIS TIME. A REVERSAL WOULD BE SUSPICIOUS. OUR STAND WAS TO POSITIVELY OPPOSED TO BE REVERSED NOW

FILE:
P-11,185
P-11,712

391

cc [illegible] Sb/Ke [illegible]

September 4, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: LJOVAL-1 (P-8903)
Date of Meet: Sept 4 at Hoyo 19 Rest at 1340 Hrs.

1. The meet was prearranged.
Next meet: Sept 11 at the same place at 1330 hrs.

2. During the language class on Mon Sept 1 LIBACON told L-1 that he had a lunch with AEDIEHARD on Aug 29 and on that occasion A accepted to come to LIBACON-1s house for dinner on Sept 15 about 1900 - 1930 hours. LIBACON-1 added that Yuriy CHERNYSH (P-13,042) would ~~xxx~~ also attend the dinner.

3. LIBACON-1 told L-1 that he wanted to invite him to the same dinner L-1 with wife, Mrs. REX and Odil, but his wife refused to have more guests than the two Sov couples, because they did not have suffient space and could not afford to spend the amount money the additional number of guests would cost. He went on to state that even this way he was in a quite embarrassing situation because he would not have money to buy more than a bottle of Castillo rum.

4. L-1 thanked LIBACON-1 for thinking of him and added that he would not have been able to come for dinner that evening because he had to give a class which he was not able to cancel. LIBACON-1 felt releaved, but he appeared to be very nervous. L-1 added, as ~~xxxxxx~~ an afterthought that he would bring to LIBACON-1 a bottle of wisky, because his friend Octavio from Matamoros was scheduled to come to town before Sept 15 and he usually brings him a couple of bottles of wiskey; if not sooner L-1 was certain that Octavio would call on him Sept 14 or 15 the latest and in that case L-1 could hand the bottle to LIBACON-1 on the evening of the party at 2100-2130 hrs. LIBACON-1 felt that this would be great and that L-1 could remain with his guests for a drink.

5. L-1 commented that the above mentioned developments made it unnecessary for him to go through the gimmic of asking to have his classes at LIBACON-1s place. Further, LIBACON-1 told L-1 that he had asked AEDIEHARD for the fishing knife L-1 had requested, but A did not know whether they had them on stock and if there were any he would bring it

392

to the dinner.

5. LIOVAL-1 fet certain that LIBACON-1 was very nervous during the class and, especially, when he spoke about his meet with AEDIEHARD and the forthcoming dinner. He went to the bathroom 4 times in an hour and a half (he usally goes twice when served the same amount of liquor). This lead L-1 to speculate that there might be something fishy in the connection with the dinner, including the possibility that AEDIEHARD requested to meet L-1 at LIBACON-1s place and that his wife spoiled the plans by limiting the number of people. To keep the matter from developing into wishful thinking I told L-1 that it was possible that LIBACON-1 felt imbarrassed for not being able to invite him to the dinner. L-1 commented that LIBACON-1 had no reason to tell him anything about the dinner and if he kept it to himself there would had been no reason for embarrassment. We agreed that there was no reason to speculate, but to wait and see. L-1 stated that his hopes went high because LIBACON-1 told him that AEDIEHARD ~~told~~ stated that his departure was postponed and that he did not count on leaving before the end of December '69. Difficulty in finding a suitable replacement was given as reason for postponement of departure.

7. Requirement: In view of the fact that LIBACON-1 is used to see at L-1s place wisky which doed not have the tax tags (stamps), because he normally gets his from Octavio (a Customs inspector in Matamoros), L-1 requested that I supply him a bottle of wiskey which entered the country tax free (L-1 usually has the Old Par).

I will [illegible]

8. For his personal use L-1 would like to borrow a John Plain catalogue, the issue valid after Aug 18, '69.

OK - but not here yet

BHFernald

14-00000

393

[illegible] Rex [illegible] 3 Sept. 63

cc to LOG [illegible]

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LIBACH 1

DATE, TIME & PLACE: 3 Sept. 1600 - 1700, [illegible]'s - Londres.

1. Subject was already at the meeting site when I arrived ten minutes after the hour - late because of another downpour and traffic tie-up. He had to leave early to pick up his wife and child and take them home and, therefore, asked if we could continue our meeting at a later hour, same day. I had no objection so we agreed to meet at Sanborn's, Tiber & Reforma, and proceed elsewhere from that point.

2. Subject did not prepare any notes for me re his meeting with LOG as I had requested but assured me that he recalled it vividly. He then proceeded to describe it to me without any prompting by me.

3. Subject met LOG at the ~~xxxxx~~ Fonda del Refugio, 166 Liverpool, at 1400 hours, 29 Aug. as had been arranged. They stayed in the restaurant for approximately 90 minutes. LOG asked Subj if he had seen any of his American friends lately and Subj replied that he had seen "John" and "Rex" in the usual manner, i.e. as students. LOG offered the opinion that Subj was being "surrounded" by Amis and didn't Subj feel the same way. Subj denied that this was so, at least as far as he was concerned, but if LOG felt that some of these people were "intelligence" types, he, the Subj certainly did not feel that way. LOG then asked Subj how he was fixed financially and the latter said he was as broke as usual. LOG then suggested that Subj could have a little extra money if he would only agree to write a report or two about these Americans. Subj told LOG that he had already reported orally all he knew about John and Rex and that he saw little point in repeating it in writing. LOG then suggested that he would pay for such reports and thus help Subj out of his financial difficulties. When asked by Subj., LOG offered to pay 200 pesos for each report, claiming that "we have unlimited funds for this sort of thing". Subject did make any commitment, and said that "as a fellow Soviet I would hate to accept any money for such a favor." LOG insisted that this small amount would help Subj take the vacation he was so eager to take. LOG told Subj that he had bad news, he would not be able to return to Moscow on the first of Oct as he had wished. A replacement for him is not available and he therefore has no idea when he will depart. In fact he had hoped that he could have brought his replacement with him to this meeting, but no luck. In any event Subject invited LOG and his wife to come to his home for a farewell (?) dinner on 15 Sept at 1930 hours. LOG asked Subj to invite Miguel Angel HERODIO and wife also, and Subj agreed. Subject commented to me that the 15th was a particularly bad date, he having forgotten that this was a big holiday. He will [illegible] call LOG and see if he still wants to keep the same date.

4. Subject told me that HERODIO had confided in him to the effect that LOG had tried to recruit him by writing reports on his friends but HERODIO refused. HERODIO made Subject promise that he would not breathe a word of this to anyone.

394

5. [illegible] mention [illegible] about the possibility of showing the Spanish Civil War film. Subj did not bring this topic up with LCS however.

6. I told Subj that we were not in favor of his playing a double agent role, at least at this time, however, I would discuss the possibility of his writing a report for LCS with my superiors and let him know about the decision at a later meeting. I also told him to go ahead and write a brief report as though for LCS but to give it to me instead. He promised to do so but I ~~have doubts~~ really doubt that he will do it. I explained to him that a double agent is not permitted to keep moneys received from both sides and that any money he might receive from LCS, for whatever purpose or for any reason, would have to be turned over to me. He seemed to understand this reasoning very well.

7. We met at Sanborn's as arranged and I am not very happy about this site for a meeting place. Although nothing untoward happened as far as I know, we will not meet there again. We did not move from there as I had planned to but inasmuch as we were sitting in a rather dark corner I did not press a move. It is quite apparent, and I suppose with good reason, that Subj is very naive in respect to espionage in general. For example he claimed that he did not the meaning of the term "resident". ~~Kostanfski~~ I presume that this term would hardly have any use or meaning inside the USSR. Most of Subject's youth was spent outside of Moscow, in a small mining town about 100 mil northeast of Moscow. Subject claimed that he is becoming more and more interested in working with us, not so much against the Soviet Union but for the dignity and freedom of humanity.

Subj [illegible]

8. I asked Subj if he had read the Penkovskiy Papers. He claimed that he asked for a copy once or twice but "Boh" had not been able to obtain it. He would like to read it in Russian if possible. I think it ~~xxx~~ might open his eyes a bit more but I really don't know where he would get a chance to read it without revealing the fact to his wife or someone else.

Will send [illegible] done file

9. Next meeting is scheduled for 10 Sept, 2030 hours, Firenze Rest.

[illegible]

As agreed ~~[illegible]~~ between Dittmann & Frank 5 Sept, Dit will try to get [illegible] to take LCS to 15 Sept meet — [illegible] will be present to "chaperon" — see separate CR.
Dan should stress necessity for [illegible] to write report for LCS, which I don't [illegible] him to do — as a friend [illegible] anything [illegible], [illegible] not want to [illegible] a report (not [illegible] report [illegible] with the character for ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]). [illegible]

395

List of Soviets in Mexico passed out to all Case Officers on 27 Aug69

LOGINOV, Valentin Sergeyevich
Official Function: Third Secretary (Consul)
Wife: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna
Residence: Ignacio Esteva 21-2 (Tacubaya)
Car: 31 DG (69 Green Chevie Chevelle)
Intel Status: Known KGB
Tour in Mexico: Aug 1965 -
Clubs: Consular Association, French Club

He is primarily targetted against Americans at the US Embassy and specifically RVROCK. He is a ladies man who cultivates American women. He is an extremely active and skilled intel officer who deliberately needles US citizens whom he believes to be RVROCK. Attempted an open recruitment pitch to LIREALM-1 after so accusing him. Has recently levied requirements for an Embassy phone book and info re American female Embassy employees. Additionally has recently requested an agent to cultivate a Chinese Embassy employee from whom he wants info re relations between Soviets and National Chinese against the Chicoms. LOGINOV is scheduled to leave Mexico PCS in mid-October. Avid tennis player; has wide range of Mexican and third national contacts.

R-11,712

14-00000

396

Contact reports, etc., forwarded from the field.

14-00000

397

USSR, Moscow

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Consular Section,

Valentin LOGINOV

Translated by: M.A.
On: 7 Nov. 70

- -

Mexico, 2 Nov. 1970

Dear Valya, (LOGINOV)

It doesn't seem to be true, but it is. I am writing a letter ((to you)). Several times I got ready to write, but couldn't because of either laziness or too much work.

One and a half years have gone by since you left. My wife and I remember you often, more so, because there are practically all new and some very serious faces in the Embassy ((now)). I went to the reception on the Red Army Day, but since I didn't have an invitation, they didn't let me in, even though CHERNYSH and NECHIPORENKO tried to help me. As you see, my brother, times change. In our days, i.e. when you were here, everything was simpler and I would say even gayer.

Well, enough of complaining. I'll now turn to the news. The most important news, at least for me, is that Tege is expecting. We are waiting for the "Parisien package" approximately in February. It would be nice to have a son, since we are not going to produce more children. But if it is a girl, that too would be nice. I will feel as though I am in a harem.

I am studying English and French seriously. In 2-3 years my wife and I want to move to Spain. I have had enough of Mexico. I have been living here for 14 years. On the other hand, with the knowledge of languages, one can earn a better living in Spain. You know yourself that life is much happier in Europe. Last year 21 million tourists visited Spain. One can make a good living through tourism, and without much difficulty.

I continue working in the Institute. We bought a good lot on Rin Street and built a three-story building. Juan Luis's wife is also expecting their second child.

Please extend our big hello to your wife. We remember her often. You have a very nice and kind wife. Looking forward to/hear your news, we embrace you.

Rafael Vidloya

COPIES MADE

[illegible]

398

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Тому письмо ~~несколько~~ раз собиралась писать, да потом то из-за [illegible], то из-за работы и так до сих пор, так все откладывала. Сейчас [illegible] как [illegible] прошло уже не [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] и я часто вспоминаем о тебе, тем более, что в институте почти все новые лица и каждого уже слишком серьезные. В день Красной Армии пошёл на прием и не пропустили так у меня не было пригласительного билета. Не смотря на то, что и Борис и Катя Никифоровы [illegible] помогли мне все же не пропустили. Как видишь, брат, времена меняются. В наше время, т.е. когда ты здесь был, все было проще и я бы сказал гораздо повеселее.

Ну, ладно, хватит [illegible]. Перейду к новостям. Самая интересная новость, интересней для меня, это то, что [illegible] [illegible] ребенка. Ожидаем „горячую посылку" приблизительно в феврале. [illegible] было бы [illegible] ибо больше [illegible] [illegible] на будущее. А если выйдет [illegible], ну тогда тоже [illegible].

Буду себя чувствовать как в [illegible]

Усердно занимаюсь испанским и французским языками. Хочу с женой через 2, 3 года переправиться в Испанию. [illegible] напоминает мне надоевшую Мексику. Я уже здесь живу 11 лет. Да и событий в Испании, [illegible], можно хорошо [illegible] заработать. Затем, ты сам знаешь, в Испании жизнь-быт веселее. В прошлом году Испанию навестило 21 миллион туристов. На этой почве можно как следует развернуться и без особенного труда.

Подробно работаю в [illegible]. Купили хороший участок на ул. [illegible] и выстроили 3х этажное здание. Жена Хуан [illegible] ожидает уже 2го ребенка.

Передай жене сердечный привет. Мы о ней часто вспоминаем. Очень у тебя милая и сердечная жена.

Жду ответа

Крепко обнимаю.

Рафаэль [illegible]

400

Moscú. U.R.S.S.

С.С.С.Р. Москва,
Министерство Иностранных Дел.
Консульский Отдел
Лошинову, Валентину.

POR AVION
AIR MAIL

401

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP/ADB. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

FROM:

IP/

MARUKO [illegible]
IP/AN
EXT. 5112

HF-S39
CA50
TUBE GT7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

1-3 your reference?

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SB/X/EU			2/1	
2.				
3. SB/CI/X		3 - JAN 1973		
4. Fritz				
5. VIVIAN				
6. ~~Kat~~ Don		8 JAN 1973		
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. IP/FI				

FILE TITLE

ABSTRACT

DATE

27751

14-00000

402

450

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Bern (B)

SUBJECT
REDTOP INBREED: Request for Photos and Bio Data

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference : ESBW-13096, 14 November 1972

1. As requested in Reference, Station queried INBREED as to why they had included Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-0285412) in their list of Soviets who had been PNG'd or expelled from various countries in the past five years.

2. In INBREED's reply to our query, they stated that in the periodic "Das Beste" there was an extract from the Reader's Digest of 1 January 1972, of a book titled "Moscow's Attack on Mexico" by John Barron. From this article it was learned that the KGB officer LOGINOV met secretly with Mexican students at the time of the student demonstrations in Mexico in 1968. In March 1971, when five Soviet officials were PNG'd from Mexico, it was believed that Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV was among those ousted.

3. Upon learning that LOGINOV served in the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City as Third Secretary/Vice Counsel from August 1965 to October 1969, INBREED has now advised the Station that LOGINOV's name [redacted] erroneously appeared in their list of Soviets who had been PNG'd.

Ronda W. Schweers
Ronda W. SCHWEERS

Distribution:
[redacted]-C/SB
3-C/EUR

E2 IMPDET

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
ESBA-21,494

DATE
20 December 1972

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
[redacted]

403

SECRET

LOGINOV, Valentin Sergeyevich

Born: 23 December 1927, Moscow

Wife: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna, born 20 August 1928, Moscow

Children: Two

LOGINOV was an Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Havana from September 1960 to September 1963. He was Third Secretary/Vice Consul at the Embassy in Mexico City from August 1965 to October 1969, replacing NECHIPORENKO. We have no information to indicate he has ever been expelled from a country. He accompanied a Soviet soccer team on a Latin American tour as escort and interpreter December 1961.

Languages: Fluent Spanish and poor English

REF: XJBA 20902 19 Nov 72
Status cbl to
XJBU 15096 17 Nov 72

SECRET 201-[illegible]

404

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

LOGINOV, VALENTIN
201-285412
SEX M DOB ?

C68-C02-004/03
ESBA-20902A01
19 JAN 72
P6

CIT ?
OCC ?
NAME APPEARS ON LIST FROM SWISS INTEL SERV WHICH REQUESTS BIO DATA/PHOTOS OF SOVS PNGD OR EXPELLED FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES DURING LAST FIVE YRS

R 7202032049

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 285 412			

FORM 867
SECRET
(7-60)

405

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
SEX M DOB ?

CIT USSR
OCC 3RD SECY
SOVIET EMBASSY
< MEXICO, MEXICO

200-005-042/02
OST -22819
07 APR 66
STATE

731

R 7111230503

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 285412

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-60)

406

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

RID/

CARROLL ED
RID/AN
EXT. 5178

EP-613
CA50
TUBE QTY

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SB/X/WH			13/9	RR
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. SB/R/S		18 SEP 1970		
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15				
13.				

17

RID 71

[illegible]

150162

14-00000

407

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP/
C Forwarding of PCQ on Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a completed PCQ in Spanish on Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV. This PCQ was prepared by AEMIDRIFF and was turned in on 6 August 1970. The Station is not retaining a copy of this PCQ.

Grace H. FARMILANT

Attachment:
PCQ Form - h/w

Distribution:
2 - Chief, SB, w/att
1 - Chief, WH, wo/att

ATT H/W

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-39325	10 August 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412

14-00000

408

Antes de completar el siguiente Cuestionario para Evaluar la Personalidad, sírvase suplir la siguiente información acerca de sí mismo:

Edad [illegible] **Sexo** M **Nacionalidad** [illegible]

Antecedentes sociales y culturales:

¿Con qué frecuencia ha observado usted al sujeto?

Casi cada día

¿Cuándo observó por última vez al sujeto?

6 de Octubre, 1963

¿Qué tipo de contacto tiene usted con él? (trato directo, recepciones o fiestas en las embajadas, informantes, interrogatorio de otros, etc.)

¿Puede usted producir una muestra de la escritura del sujeto?

Sí ____ No ✓

¿Puede usted suplir el nombre de alguna persona o los nombres de varias personas que en su opinión estén capacitadas para suministrar información sobre el sujeto? En otras palabras, personas con suficiente conocimiento para completar al menos parte de este cuestionario.

H/W ATT/TO
HMMA
39325

CS COPY

201-285418

409

CUESTIONARIO PARA EVALUAR LA PERSONALIDAD

I. DESCRIPCION

1. Impresión general (Marque la descripción más apropiada)

1.01 Viril, atlético, práctico, de fácil trato social (campechano) ___

1.02 Viril, robusto, práctico, cauto en su trato social (autoritario) ___

1.03 Blando y afectivo pero socialmente agradable y apto (buena persona) ___

1.04 Blando y afectivo, pero socialmente, cauto y taciturno (posible quejumbroso) + atlético ___✓

1.05 Masculino, de aspecto agradable y profesional, socialmente pulido (ejecutivo) ___

1.06 Austero, preciso y sistemático (trabajador aplicado) ___

1.07 Educado, refinado, artístico y socialmente pulido (diplomático) ___

1.08 Sensible, intenso y ensimismado (tipo artista o profesor distraído) ___

1.09 Ninguna de las descripciones es adecuada. Yo lo describiría en la siguiente forma: ___

2. Vestido (Marque la descripción más apropiada)

2.01 Bien arreglado (elegante) (recepciones) ___
2.02 Limpio (bien cuidado) ___✓
2.03 Exigente (minucioso) ___
2.04 Emperifollado (remilgado) ___
2.05 Indistinto (desgarbado) ___
2.06 Poco arreglado (no acicalado) ___
2.07 Descuidado (indiferente) ___✓

410

2.08 Mal pergeñado (ajado) ___
2.09 Desaliñado (chocante) ___
2.10 Modo de vestir

2.10.01 De acuerdo con sus antecedentes culturales ___
2.10.02 Cosmopolita ___
2.10.03 Pasado de moda ✓
2.10.04 Extremado o único ___

3. Características de la cabeza.

3.01 Medidas del cráneo:
3.01.01 De lado a lado — Ancho___ Promedio___ Estrecho ✓
Del frente hacia atrás — Ancho___ Promedio ✓ Estrecho___

3.02 Frente: Ancha ✓ Promedio___ Estrecha___

3.03 Ojos: Apartados___ Promedio ✓ Juntos___

3.04 Cejas
a) Arqueadas___ Promedio ✓ Derechas___
b) Espesas___ Promedio ✓ Escasas___
c) Altas___ Promedio ✓ Bajas___

3.05 ¿Hay algo de su cabeza o de la estructura de su cabeza que requiera mención especial?

4. Características generales

4.01 Edad, peso, estatura:
4.01.01 ¿Qué edad tiene? 40 41
4.01.02 Su edad aparente es — Mucho más joven___ Más joven___
Más o menos la misma ✓ Mayor___
Mucho mayor___

4.01.03 ¿Qué estatura tiene? 1.82 cm

411

4.01.04 ¿Tiene apodo? Sí ___ [✓ No] ___
En caso afirmativo, ¿le molesta que lo llamen por él? Sí ___ No ___

4.01.05 ¿Responde a un diminutivo (Juanito, Pepito, etc.)? Sí ___ No ___

4.01.06 ¿Tiene alguna cicatriz u otra marca distintiva? Sí ___ [✓ No] ___
En caso afirmativo, descríbala.

4.02 Cabello:

4.02.01 Color Muy claro ___ Claro ___ [✓ Mediano] ___
Canoso o blanco ___ Oscuro ___ Muy oscuro ___

4.02.02 Onda [✓ Rizado] ___ Promedio ___ Lacio ___

4.02.03 Cantidad Espeso ___ [✓ Promedio] ___ Escaso ___
Tiende a la calvicie ___ Calvo ___

4.02.04 Cuidado [✓ Bien cuidado] ___ Reacio ___
Promedio ___ Desgreñado ___

4.02.05 ¿Hay algo poco corriente en su cabello o su peinado? ___
En caso afirmativo, describa:

4.03 Ojos:

4.03.01 Color Gris ← ___ Verde ___ → Azul ___
Amarillento ___ Avellanado ___
Castaño ___ Castaño Oscuro ___

4.03.02 Usa espejuelos [illegible] Siempre ___ Para leer ___ Nunca ___

412

4.03.03 Cristales de los espejuelos — Gruesos ___ Promedio ___ Bifocales ___

4.03.04 Estilo de los espejuelos
Armadura gruesa ___
Sin armadura ___
Armadura corriente ✓
Lentes de contacto ___

4.03.05 ¿Tienen sus ojos alguna característica poco corriente que requiera mención especial? En caso afirmativo, descríbala. ___

4.03.06 ¿Se quita él los espejuelos mientras habla? Sí ___ No ___

4.03.07 ¿Gesticula con los espejuelos? Sí ___ No ___

4.03.08 ¿Usa alguna vez espejuelos oscuros bajo techo? [✓ Sí] No ___

4.04 Tez

4.04.01 Color — Rubicundo ___ Oscuro ___ Tostado ___ [✓ Claro] Pálido ___

4.04.02 Cara
a) Con cicatrices ___ [✓ Arrugada] Lisa ___
b) Con barba ___ Bien afeitada ___
Con bigote ___ Sin afeitar ___

4.04.03 Describa el tipo de bigote o de barba:

4.04.04 Pelo o vello del cuerpo (brazos, piernas, pecho)
[✓ Espeso] Medio ___ Escaso ___

4.04.05 ¿Se le ven pelos en la nariz? Si

4.04.06 ¿Se le ven pelos en las orejas? Si

4.04.07 ¿Tiene su piel o el color de su piel alguna particularidad poco común? En caso afirmativo, descríbala. ___

·413

4.05 Cara:

4.05.01 Expresividad Expresiva___ Promedio_✓_ Inexpresiva___
Muy expresiva___ Muy inexpresiva___

4.05.02 Si la cara es expresiva, es Natural___ Tensa_✓_

4.05.03 Si la cara es inexpresiva, es Tranquila___ Completamente inexpresiva___

4.05.04 En general, sus reacciones faciales son
Inapropiadas___ Apropiadas_✓_

4.05.05 ¿Hay alguna característica poco común en sus expresiones faciales? En caso afirmativo, descríbala.

4.06 Labios:

4.06.01 Tipo Salientes___ Fruncidos_✓_ Finos___
Gruesos___ Flojos___

4.06.02 Sonríe a) Espontáneamente___ De manera tensa___
Mecánicamente_✓_

b) Muy a menudo___ A menudo___ Como el promedio___ Poco___ Nunca___

4.06.03 ¿Lo ha visto usted alguna vez sonreír solo? Sí_✓_ No___

4.06.04 Si lo ha visto hacerse retratar
¿Puede sonreír cuando se lo piden? Sí_✓_ No___
¿O se ve tieso o incómodo? Sí___ No___

4.06.05 Si no lo ha visto hacerse retratar
¿Qué tipo de fotografía cree usted que preferiría?
Seria___ Sonriente_✓_

4.06.06 ¿Tienen sus labios o su sonrisa alguna característica poco común o llamativa? En caso afirmativo, descríbala.

4.07 Dientes

4.07.01 Forma Regular___ Promedio ✓ Saliente___ Desusada___

4.07.02 ¿Tiene usted la impresión de que aprieta los dientes? Sí___ No ✓

En caso afirmativo, ¿bajo cuáles circunstancias?

4.07.03 ¿Tiene dientes de oro o trabajo dental poco común? Sí___ No___

4.07.04 Cuando sonríe,
¿Se le ven los dientes? Sí ✓ No___
¿Frunce los labios? Sí ✓ No___
¿Se tapa la boca con la mano? Sí___ No___

4.07.05 Al hablar, ¿se tapa la boca con la mano?
Nunca ✓ Frecuentemente___ A veces___ Siempre___

4.07.06 Matiz de los dientes Blanco ✓ Apagado___ Manchado___

4.07.07 ¿Tienen sus dientes alguna característica poco común o llamativa?
En caso afirmativo, descríbala:

4.08 Porte

4.08.01 Derechura Ligeramente encorvado ✓ Encorvado___ Erecto___ Tieso___

4.08.02 Mantiene su postura Constantemente___ No siempre ✓

4.08.03 Hombros Ancho de hombros ✓ De hombros caídos un poco
Promedio ✓ De hombros estrechos___

415

4.08.04 Complexión Flaca ✓ Promedio___ Corpulenta___

Obesa___

4.08.05 En conversación, ¿hacia dónde se inclina principalmente con relación a la otra persona?

Hacia la otra ✓ En dirección opuesta___

De ninguna forma___

4.08.06 ¿Es su postura mientras escucha diferente de cuando habla? ___

En caso afirmativo, describa:

4.08.07 Postura sentado a) Reposada___ Promedio___ Tensa___

b) Erecta___ Promedio___ Desplomada ✓

4.08.08 Cuando está en un grupo, tiende a Estarse quieto___

Moverse sin andar___ Recostarse a la pared___

Sentarse aun si otros están parados___

Echarle el brazo a otros ✓

4.08.09 Si su talla es más que la común, ¿se inclina para que su estatura se avenga más al grupo? Sí ✓ No___

4.08.10 Si es menos que la común, ¿se para derecho para avenirse al grupo? Sí___ No___

[illegible]

4.08.11 Cuando asiste a una conferencia (o pieza dramática o película)

Se sienta quieto y mira al conferenciante___

Se mueve en su asiento, parece inquieto, cambia de posición___

4.08.12 ¿Hay alguna característica en su postura, porte o maneras que requiera mención especial? En caso afirmativo, descríbala.

4.09 Manos:

4.09.01 Mano dominante Derecha ✓ Izquierda___

4.09.02 ¿Tiende a usar su mano menos dominante? Frecuentemente___

Raramente___ A veces ✓ Nunca___

416

4.09.03 Tamaño de las manos Muy grandes___ [✓ Grandes___] Promedio___
Pequeñas___ Muy pequeñas___

4.09.04 Usa las manos Con gracia___ [✓ De manera común___]
Torpemente___

4.09.05 Normalmente, sus brazos están [✓ Sueltos___] Tiesos___ Promedio___

4.09.06 De pie, hablando o escuchando, tiende a
Abrir y cerrar las manos___
[✓ Meterse las manos en los bolsillos___]
Pasarse la mano por la cara o el cabello___

4.09.07 Cuando se mete las manos en los bolsillos, tiene mayor tendencia a ponerlas en
El del pantalón___
[✓ El de la chaqueta___]

4.09.08 Uñas [✓ Limpias, sin manicura___] Con manicura___
Promedio___ Desiguales___ Sucias___ Mordidas___

4.09.09 Si tiene las uñas mordidas, ¿hasta qué grado?
Superficial___ Promedio___ Profundo___

4.09.10 Tiene dedos Cortos___ Promedio___ [✓ Largos___]

4.09.11 Sus manos son [✓ Callosas___] Asperas___ Promedio___
Lisas___ Suaves___

4.09.12 En público Se hala la nariz, se la frota, se la hurga con los dedos___
Se frota la nuca___
Se pasa la mano por la cara o la boca___
Se rasca alguna parte del cuerpo___
Se hala la ropa___
[✓ Nunca hace nada de esto___]

4.09.13 Pone los brazos en la mesa A menudo___ [✓ A veces___]
Raramente___ Nunca___

4.09.14 Apoya los codos en la mesa A menudo___ [✓ A veces___]
Raramente___ Nunca___

4.09.15 Sentado a una mesa o escritorio, [✓ habla___] o escucha___ con la cabeza en las manos [✓ A menudo___] A veces___
Raramente___ Nunca___

4.09.16 Mientras habla, tiende a [✓ Cerrar los ojos]____
Ponerse la mano sobre los ojos____
A menudo____ A veces____ Raramente____ Nunca____

4.09.17 Si cierra o se cubre los ojos, se inclina más a hacerlo
Cuando trata de explicar algo____
[✓ Cuando escucha a otra persona]____

4.09.18 ¿Tamborilea en la mesa con los dedos?
[✓ Nunca]____ A veces____ A menudo____

4.09.19 Se inclina más a ~~hacer~~ esto cuando
Habla____ Escucha____ Piensa____

4.09.20 Acostumbra Traquetear con las monedas en el bolsillo____
Juguetear con algún objeto____
A menudo____ Algunas veces____
Raramente____ [✓ Nunca]____

4.09.21 ¿Hay alguna característica en sus manos o brazos que requiera mención especial? En caso afirmativo, descríbala.

4.10 Pies

4.10.01 ¿Tiende a usar primero uno u otro pie?
Izquierdo____ Derecho____

4.10.02 Caminando con otro, ¿se esfuerza por ir al par? [✓ Sí]____ No____

4.10.03 ¿Cruza los pies por los tobillos cuando se sienta? [✓ Sí]____ No____

4.10.04 De ser así, ¿qué pie va encima? Izquierdo____ Derecho____

4.10.05 Cruza las piernas [✓ Solamente cuando cambia de orientación]____
Tan pronto como se sienta____
Un rato después de sentarse____
A veces____ Nunca____

4.10.06 Si cruza las piernas, ¿qué pierna va encima? La izquierda____
La derecha____ Depende de cómo esté sentado____

4.10.07 ¿Cambia la pierna que cruza?
Depende de su orientación relativa____
[✓ Con frecuencia]____ A veces____ Nunca____

418

4.10.08 Comparado con la mayoría, camina
Más rápido___ Más despacio___ [✓ A igual velocidad___]

4.10.09 Si su paso no va al par con el de usted, ¿lo nota y cambia de paso? [✓ Sí___] No___

4.10.10 En conversación, cuando se interesa con calor,
Descruza las piernas y se inclina hacia delante___
Descruza las piernas y se inclina hacia atrás___
Cruza las piernas y se sienta derecho___
[✓ Cambia a una posición más derecha___]
Cambia a una posición más reposada___
Cambia poco de posición___

4.10.11 Sus pies son [✓ Grandes___] Promedio___ Pequeños___

4.10.12 Sus zapatos son a) Puntiagudos___ [✓ Promedio___] Redondeados___
b) Muy lustrosos___ Promedio___ Mal cuidados___

4.10.13 ¿Hay alguna característica relacionada con sus pies o piernas que requiera atención especial? En caso afirmativo, descríbala.___

4.10.14 Cuando tiene las piernas cruzadas,
Se sienta quieto___ [✓ Mueve el pie___] Mece o mueve la pierna___

4.10.15 ¿Golpea el suelo con el pie? Sí___ No___

4.10.16 ¿Se mece sobre los pies cuando está parado y hablando en un grupo?
[✓ A menudo___] Raramente___
A veces___ Nunca___

4.10.17 Cuando camina sus pasos son [✓ Largos___] Promedio___ Cortos___

4.10.18 Cuando camina, sus brazos Cuelgan sueltos___
[✓ Se mecen de acuerdo con su paso___]
Se mecen, pero fuera de tiempo___
Se mantienen tensos___

4.10.19 Camina con los pies
Hacia afuera___ Hacia el frente___
[✓ Hacia adentro___]

4.11 Voz:

4.11.01 Tiene timbre Bajo ✓ Promedio___ Alto___

4.11.02 Habla en voz Baja ✓ Promedio___ Alta___

4.11.03 En su lengua materna su tono de voz es notablemente
Más alto___ Más bajo___ Más o menos lo mismo ✓

4.11.04 ¿Tiene algún impedimento vocal? Sí___ No___
En caso afirmativo, descríbalo:

4.12 Uso del idioma

4.12.01 Su vocabulario en lengua materna parece ser
Rico___ Limitado___ Promedio ✓ Pobre___

4.12.02 En el idioma que mejor domina, aparte del materno, tiene
Plena fluidez___ Escasa fluidez___
Bastante fluidez ✓ Ninguna fluidez___

4.12.03 Aprende frases idiomáticas Pronto___
Despacio___ Normalmente___ No las aprende ✓

4.12.04 ¿Aprende lenguas extranjeras con facilidad? Sí___ No ✓
En caso afirmativo,
Aprende principalmente "de oído" y experimentando___
Aprende principalmente usando libros___

4.12.05 Con respecto a su mejor idioma extranjero, puede cambiar de su idioma nativo
Fácilmente y sin vacilación___
Eficientemente y con vacilación promedio___
Despacio, con bastante vacilación ✓
Torpemente y con bastante cortedad___

4.12.06 Cuando usa mal el idioma, generalmente parece
No darse cuenta___
Darse cuenta pero con indiferencia ✓
Darse cuenta, con inquietud___
Darse cuenta, muy avergonzado___

420

4.12.07 En general, lo describiría como

Lacónico___ Promedio ✓ Locuaz___

4.12.08 En conversación ordinaria el tema tiende a ser primordialmente

Personal___ Impersonal___
Interpersonal ✓ Cauto___

4.12.09 En conversación ordinaria, el contenido es

Preciso y a propósito___
Apropiado___
Promedio ✓
A propósito pero con ambages___
Inapropiado___

4.12.10 Tiende a

Discutir a menudo problemas personales ✓
Raramente discutir problemas personales___

4.12.11 ¿Usa lenguaje soez en su idioma materno?

En ocasiones ✓ Frecuentemente___ Nunca___

4.12.12 ¿Usa lenguaje soez en un idioma aprendido?

En ocasiones ✓ Frecuentemente___ Nunca___

4.12.13 ¿Hay alguna característica poco común en su manera de hablar o en su estilo de conversación? Sí___ No___

En caso afirmativo, descríbala:

4.13 Gestos

4.13.01 Gesticula al hablar Siempre___ Algunas veces ✓
Nunca___

4.12.02 Su gesto más característico es

Apuntar con el dedo___
Agitar una mano ✓
Barrer con las manos___
Trozar con las manos___

14-00000

421

4.13.03 Cuando gesticula, sus movimientos son

Agraciados____ [✓ Promedio____] Mecánico____

4.13.04 Cuando se le habla, se pone tenso

A menudo____ Raramente____

[✓ A veces____] Nunca____

4.13.05 Es relativamente fácil saber si realmente le interesa un asunto determinado

[✓ Siempre____] Raramente____

Algunas veces____ Nunca____

4.13.06 Sus ojos son muy expresivos Siempre____ [✓ Algunas veces____]

Raramente____

4.13.07 . La mayoría diría que tiene ojos

[✓ Hermosos____] Promedio____

Agradables____ Desagradables____ Siniestros____

4.13.08 Mantiene contacto visual [✓ Siempre____] Frecuentemente____

Algunas veces____ Raramente____ Nunca____

4.13.09 En un grupo, ¿lo ha visto clavar la vista repetidamente en una persona que parece interesarle?

A menudo____ [✓ Algunas veces____] Nunca____

4.13.10 Cuando admira (sigue con los ojos) a una muchacha atractiva, lo hace

[✓ Con desparpajo____] Como cualquiera____

Con disimulo____ Nunca lo he visto____

¿Lo ha visto usted sonrojarse? [✓ Sí____] No____

Si su respuesta es afirmativa, describa la situación:

Cuando tiene dudas

4.13.11 ¿Hay alguna característica particularmente notable y que requiera mayor explicación relacionada con los movimientos de su cuerpo, sus ojos, y la forma en que se comporta en un grupo? ____

En caso afirmativo, descríbala:

14-00000

422

4.14 Hábitos de dormir

4.14.01 ¿Le gusta dormir y se duerme fácilmente? [✓ Sí] No

¿Lee o camina en preparación para dormir? Sí No

4.14.02 ¿Se levanta fácilmente? Sí No

¿Prefiere quedarse en cama hasta el último minuto? [✓ Sí] No

4.14.03 ¿Le gusta Madrugar?

[✓ Comenzar el día tarde?]

4.15 Impresiones

4.15.01 De acuerdo con lo que conoce de él, cree que la mayoría de las mujeres lo encontraría

Encantador [✓ Agradable] Promedio

Desagradable Muy desagradable

4.15.02 De acuerdo con sus conocimientos, cree usted que la mayoría de los hombres lo encontraría

Encantador Agradable [✓ Promedio]

Desagradable Muy desagradable

4.15.03 Si no lo conociera, usted y lo viera en la calle, lo calificaría de

Tipo indefinido Promedio [✓ Llamativo]

4.15.04 Sin conocimiento previo y basándose sólo en su apariencia, lo tomaría por

Campesino Dirigente

Obrero Profesional

Comerciante [✓ Oficial Militar]

Algún tipo de artista

4.15.05 ¿Hay alguna característica notable y que, requiera mayor explicación relacionada con la impresión general que él da?

En caso afirmativo, sírvase describirla.

II. ANTECEDENTES

5. Generales

5.01 Origen étnico:

5.01.01 Sírvase describir el origen étnico del sujeto:

5.01.02 A juzgar por otros del mismo origen, es

Como la mayoría ____
Personificación del "tipo" ____
Diferente a la mayoría ____
Imposible para mí conocer su origen ____

5.02 Antecedentes culturales

5.02.01 Si de él depende, ¿cree usted que, viviendo en una cultura extraña

Nunca cambia su manera de vivir habitual? ____
Mantiene su manera de vivir habitual, pero muestra algún interés en la costumbres locales? ____
Se interesa en las costumbres locales y se adapta? ____
Si puede, vive como los del país? ____

5.02.02 Dentro de su grupo es

Como todos los otros ____
Algo diferente de los otros ✓
Unico ____

5.03 Educación

5.03.01 ¿Qué enseñanza ha tenido? Descríbala:

Se graduó del Instituto de Relaciones Exteriores

424

5.03.09 En su opinión, comparado con la mayoría de sus congéneres culturales,

Tiene igual instrucción ✓
Está mejor informado ___
Parece estar mejor instruido de lo que dice ___
No puedo creer que tenga la instrucción que dice ___
Si duda de sus antecedentes, explíquese. ___

6. Impresión general de sus antecedentes (Marque la descripción más apropiada)

6.01 Fuerte y robusto ("de pelo en pecho") ___
6.02 Fuerte, robusto, pero independiente (solitario, autosuficiente) ___
6.03 Compasivo, sensual y comprensivo (popular con las mujeres) ___
6.04 Cambiante, emotivo y a veces amargado ("incomprendido") ✓
6.05 Directo, inteligente y responsable (profesional) ___
6.06 Diestro, inteligente e intenso (técnico) ___
6.07 Sensible, refinado y mundano (que busca impresionar con apariencias) ___
6.08 Sensible, de carácter voluble, fuera de lo corriente (bohemio) ___
6.09 Ninguna de estas cabe. ___

Yo lo describiría así: ___

III. COMPORTAMIENTO SOCIAL

7. Impresión General. (Marque la más apropiada.)

7.01 El tipo de hombre que acostumbra ser puntual, tiende a saludar a todos con sencillez y parece sentirse satisfecho consigo mismo al entrar en una pieza. ____

7.02 El tipo de hombre que es siempre puntual, tiende a saludar a todos con alguna cortedad y parece sentirse incómodo al entrar en una pieza. ____

7.03 El tipo de hombre cuya puntualidad es imprevisible, tiende a ser muy cálido y amigable con todos sus conocidos y da impresión de confianza en sí mismo al entrar en una pieza. ____

7.04 El tipo de hombre puntual cuando hace una cita pero que tiende a romper compromisos con cierta frecuencia, tiende a saludar sólo a los que ha conocido antes y es un tanto retraído y huraño al entrar en una pieza. ____

7.05 El tipo de hombre que tiende a hacerse esperar pero es cortés y atento cuando llega, tiende a ser preciso y correcto al saludar a todos y puede dar una gran impresión al entrar en una pieza. ____

7.06 El tipo de hombre muy puntual, que tiende a ser muy formal en el saludo y las más de las veces es rígido e inflexible al entrar en una pieza. ____

7.07 El tipo de hombre de puntualidad imprevisible, que tiende a ser atrayente y pulido en su saludo a todos y tiene gran aplomo social al entrar en una pieza. ✓

426

7.08 El tipo de hombre que a menudo llega muy tarde y no le preocupa, que tiende a ser breve y brusco al saludar y a veces da la impresión de torpeza al entrar en una pieza. ____

7.09 Ninguna de las anteriores. ____

Yo lo describiría así:

8. Presentaciones:

8.01 Al dar la mano

Avanza hacia la otra persona ✓

Las más de las veces el otro tiene que avanzar ____

8.02 Al dar la mano, el apretón es

Muy fuerte ✓ Promedio ____

Fuerte ____ Flojo ____

Imperceptible ____

8.03 Al dar la mano

Sacude la del otro ____

Aprieta la del otro ✓

Deja que el otro apriete ____

8.04 ¿Hay algo en su manera de dar la mano que deba mencionarse? En caso afirmativo, descríbalo. ____

8.05 Al ser presentado por primera vez

Mira al otro directamente en los ojos ✓

Inclina la cabeza hacia el que presenta pero se fija en el presentado ____

Inclina la cabeza y no mira a nadie ____

14-00000

427

8.06 Cuando oye un nombre por primera vez

No aparenta esforzarse por recordarlo
Lo repite al responder a la presentación
Pide al que lo presenta que lo repita o lo confirme
Pide al presentado que lo repita ✓

8.07 Si se cambian tarjetas

Lee la tarjeta y la guarda con cuidado ✓
Lee la tarjeta y la mete en el bolsillo
Cuidadosamente la guarda sin leerla
La mete en el bolsillo sin leerla

8.08 Cuando presenta a otros lo hace

Con facilidad y donaire
Con cierta cortedad o vacilación ✓
Con bastante torpeza

8.09 ¿Qué diferencia hay en su manera al ser presentado a una mujer?

Ninguna___ La normal___ Notable ✓

8.10 Si se porta de modo diferente, ¿qué descripción es aplicable?

Usa ambas manos para estrechar la de ella
Se acerca más al responder a la presentación
Es más ceremonioso y distante
Es caluroso y efusivo ✓
Es caluroso y efusivo sólo con las chicas bonitas
Es muy cortés y amable con mujeres de edad
Varía según la mujer
En tal caso, explique

8.11 Al ser presentado a un número regular de personas

Dedica un momento a cada una ____

Responde a cada presentación rápidamente y espera la siguiente ✓

Mira a la persona siguiente casi a la vez que saluda a la que acaba de conocer ____

8.12 En general, ¿le parece a usted persona que

Siempre recuerda un nombre? ____

Tiene retentiva normal? ____

Recuerda nombres con dificultad? ✓

Recuerda nombres muy mal? ____

8.13 ¿Le ha pedido a usted alguna vez que vuelva a identificar a una persona a quien ya usted le ha presentado anteriormente?

No ____ Sí ✓

9. Hábitos de fumar y comer

9.01 Hábito de fumar:

9.01.01 Diga si fuma Dejó de fumar

Cigarrillos ____	Tabacos ____	Pipa ____
Por costumbre ____	Por costumbre ____	Por costumbre ____
A veces ____	A veces ____	A veces ____
Nunca ____	Nunca ____	Nunca ____

9.01.02 ¿Cuánto fuma? Mucho ____ Promedio ____

Poco ____

9.01.03 Diga si usa su propio Encendedor___ Paquete de fósforos___

9.01.04 Diga si es el tipo de persona que
Siempre pide lumbre ___
A menudo pide lumbre ___
Generalmente tiene su propia lumbre ___
Siempre tiene su propia lumbre ___

9.01.05 Diga si usa boquilla
Con cigarrillos___ Con pipa___
Siempre___ Siempre___
A veces___ A veces___
Nunca___ Nunca___

9.01.06 Despunta los tabacos Siempre___ A veces___ Con los dientes___

9.01.07 Diga si cuida la pipa Minuciosamente___ Como todos___
No la cuida___

9.01.08 Al encender un cigarrillo
Baja visiblemente la cabeza y ahueca las manos___
Lo hace sin ceremonia mientras habla ___

9.01.09 ¿Lo ha visto usted retener un cigarrillo sin encender y aguardar una pausa en la conversación para encenderlo? Sí___
No___

9.01.11 ¿Lo ha visto usted retener en la boca un tabaco, una pipa o un cigarrillo sin encender? Sí___ No___

9.01.12 Es fumador constante --
Enciende un cigarrillo con otro ___
Fuma hasta la colilla y enseguida enciende otro ___
Siempre tiene encendido un cigarrillo aunque no lo fume mucho ___

9.01.13 Fuma Solamente después de las comidas ___
Solamente cuando alguien le ofrece cigarrillo ___
Entre el plato principal y el postre cuando otros fuman ___

9.01.14 Manchas de tabaco en los dedos
Muy notables ___
Visibles ___
Apenas visibles ___
No tiene ___

9.01.15 Al fumar

(a) Deja acumular mucha ceniza en el cigarrillo ____
Sacude la ceniza normalmente ____
Presta extraordinaria atención al cenicero ____
(b) Deja caer la ceniza en la alfombra ____
Pone la mano ahuecada bajo el cigarrillo ____
Siempre usa el cenicero ____

9.01.16 Al apagar el cigarrillo, diga si

Usa el cenicero con mucha ceremonia ____
Parece apagarlo de manera normal ____
Parece descuidado al apagarlo ____

9.01.17 Diga si

Fuma con visible fruición ____
Fuma con placer normal ____
Fuma por fumar, mecánicamente ____

9.01.18 Diga si es persona que ofrece lumbre a otros

Siempre ____ Raras veces ____
Con frecuencia ____ Nunca ____

9.01.19 Diga si es persona que

Cruza la pieza para brindar lumbre a una dama ____
Brinda lumbre a una dama como cualquiera lo haría ____
Rara vez ofrece lumbre a una dama ____

9.01.20 Que usted sepa, ¿ha dejado de fumar por motivos de salud?

Sí ____ No ____

9.01.21 Diga si le ha oído decir que

Debería dejar de fumar pero no puede ____
Ha tratado y no ha podido dejar de fumar ____

9.01.22 Diga si le ha oído decir que le molesta el olor de

Tabacos ____ Pipa ____ Cigarrillos ____
Si nunca le ha oído mencionar ninguno de los tres ____

9.01.23 ¿Tienen sus hábitos de fumar alguna particularidad que requiera mención o descripción especial? En tal caso, descríbala.

431

9.02 Hábitos . comer

9.02.01 En sus hábitos de comer es
Como la mayoría de sus colegas ✓
Algo distinto a la mayoría de sus colegas ____
Notablemente distinto a la mayoría de sus colegas ____

9.02.02 Come en cantidad Abundante____ Promedio ✓ Pequeña ____

9.02.03 El hecho de que tiene marcadas preferencias en el comer es
Muy notable____
No muy notable ✓
Nada notable____

9.02.04 Come con
Fruición ____
Placer corriente ✓
Indiferencia____

9.02.05 En el comer es Rápido____ Promedio ✓ Lento ____

9.02.06 Generalmente tiende a
Servirse de nuevo ✓
Servirse del todo una sola vez ____
Dejar parte de lo que se sirve ____

9.02.07 Diga si
Explica la mucha falta que le hacen sus comidas nativas ____
Se interesa normalmente en las comidas locales ____
Se interesa bastante en las comidas nuevas o extrañas ✓

9.02.08
(a) No come mientras Habla ✓ Escucha ____
(b) Sí come mientras Habla____ Escucha ✓

9.02.09 Su tendencia a adaptarse a los modales a la mesa de la gente con quienes come es
Notable____ Promedio ✓
Ninguna; come como siempre ha acostumbrado ____

9.02.10 Dada la oportunidad, por motivos no de negocios, sugiere un lugar preferido para comer
Siempre____ A veces ✓
Raras veces o nunca ____

9.02.11 En el restaurante . Se le hace muy difícil escoger la comida ____
Espera a que el otro pida y entonces pide lo mismo ____
Siempre sabe rápidamente lo que quiere ✓

9.02.12 En el restaurante es
Algo extravagante si sabe que usted va a pagar ____
Atento al precio si sabe que él mismo va a pagar ____
Atento al precio no importa quién vaya a pagar ____
Indiferente al precio no importa quién vaya a pagar ✓

4132

9.02.13 Es el tipo de persona que
Regularmente quiere comprobar la cuenta, no importa quién vaya a pagar ___
No se ocupa de la cuenta si otro va a pagar ✓

9.02.14 Cuando él paga, comprueba la cuenta .
Discretamente ✓ Muy cuidadosamente (y sin disimulo) ___

9.02.15 Cuando él paga la cuenta Cuenta el vuelto sin disimulo ___
Muestra indiferencia al aceptar el vuelto ___
Toma el vuelto de manera normal ✓

9.02.16 En su trato con el Jefe de camareros es Agresivo ___
Normal y convencional ✓ Algo servil ___ Brusco ___

9.02.17 Si no le place el servicio tiende a quejarse
A su acompañante ___ Directamente ___ No se queja ✓

9.02.18 Trata a los camareros Según la costumbre general ✓
Con excesiva confianza ___ Con desusada cortesía ___

9.02.19 ¿Hay alguna característica en sus hábitos de comer o en sus maneras que merezca mención especial? De ser así, descríbala:

9.03 Impresión general de sus hábitos de comer y fumar. (Marque la descripción más apropiada).

9.03.01 Persona de enorme apetito y preferencias bien definidas. Come y fuma con bastante fruición, pero tiende a ser un poco rústico y tosco. Es fácil imaginarlo comiendo grandes emparedados y tomando cerveza con sus amigotes en la taberna del barrio. ___

9.03.02 Persona de enorme apetito y preferencias limitadas. Come y fuma con fruición pero sus modales son definitivamente toscos y rústicos. Es fácil imaginar su aspereza con el camarero que le sirve comida extraña o preparada de manera desusada. ___

9.03.03 Persona de comer sensual que conoce todos los restaurantes y sus especialidades. Se empeña en que otros prueben los platos que él ha descubierto. Come con visible placer, saborea sus cigarrillos, y aunque raramente se muestra tosco, se preocupa más de su comida que de sus modales. Es fácil imaginarlo cocinando y sirviendo platos especiales a sus amigos. ___

433

9.03.04 Persona de comer sensual que tiende a comer solo si puede. Parece comer de todo y tiene cierto aire de glotón. Come con visible fruición, saborea sus cigarrillos y luego se queda a la mesa solo, regodeándose. Es fácil imaginarlo solo rondando la mesa de los bocadillos en un cóctel, golósineando.

9.03.05 Persona de comer rutinario que generalmente hace lo que los demás. Probablemente padece de alergias que le impiden comer ciertos alimentos. Da la impresión de gustarle más fumar que comer, ~~pero sus~~ modales a la mesa se adaptan a cualquier situación. Es fácil imaginarlo tomando pastillas digestivas en su cuarto.

9.03.06 Persona de comer rutinario que generalmente hace lo que los demás. Come con algún desgano y raras veces habla de lo que le gusta o no le gusta. Fuma cada vez que puede, pero más mecánicamente que con fruición. Por lo general trata de adaptar sus modales a la situación pero posiblemente con alguna torpeza y sin disimulo. Es fácil imaginarlo comiendo algo a la carrera en algún puesto callejero a cualquier hora.

9.03.07 Gastrónomo cuyo refinamiento en el comer es pronunciado y extenso. A la mesa es muy ritualista y para él el ambiente y el servicio son casi tan importantes como la comida. Es agraciado y culto a la mesa así como al fumar. Es fácil imaginarlo cambiar de ropa para comer y disfrutar buen vino y finos platos a la luz de candeleros.

9.03.08 Persona de comer desusado, diminuto. Come de modo preocupado, indiferente a la comida y a lo que le rodea. No sería sorprendente que tuviera manías gastronómicas (de vegetariano, de fórmulas especiales, etc.).

9.03.09 Nada de esto cabe.
Yo lo describiría así:

434

9.04 Hábitos de beber

9.04.01 Acostumbra beber
Nunca ____ Promedio ✓
Poco ____ Mucho ____

9.04.02 Bebe
Solo (bebedor solitario) ____
Con otros mayormente por ser amigable ✓
En ocasión de ceremonia ____
Después del trabajo, en casa ____

9.04.03 Parece beber
Principalmente por el gusto ____
Principalmente por el efecto ____
Por ambos ✓

9.04.04 Prefiere beber
Cerveza ____ Vino ____ Whiskey ✓
Vodka ____ Ginebra ____ No tiene preferencia ____

9.04.05 Prefiere
Cócteles ____ Jáibols ✓ Licor casi puro ____
Tragos sin mezcla ____

9.04.06 Bebe
Despacio ____ Normalmente ✓ Rápido ____

9.04.07 Bebe
De un trago ____ A sorbos ____

9.04.08 Después de la primera bebida
Se empeña en conseguir la segunda ____
Acostumbra esperar a que le ofrezcan otra ✓
Siempre espera a que le ofrezcan otra ____

9.04.09 En cuanto a vinos
Es muy entendido ____
Le gustan pero no es muy entendido ✓
Le son indiferentes ____
Ni los conoce ni le importa ____

9.04.10 En cuanto a sus preferencias en la bebida
Las explica en detalle (y con gran complacencia) ____
No habla de ellas más de lo corriente ✓
Nunca habla de ellas ____

902.11 En cuanto a las bebidas de su tierra natal

¿Se enorgullece francamente de ellas e invita a probarlas? Sí ✓ No ____

¿Las tiene en cuenta normalmente y las ofrece si corresponde? Sí ✓ No ____

¿Las menciona raras veces, sin insistir en hacerlas probar? Sí ____ No ✓

435

9.04.12 ¿Se ocupa poco de si beben o no los demás? ____
¿Sirve la bebida de modo socialmente apropiado? ✓
¿Tiende a obligar a otros a beber? ____

9.04.13 En comparación con sus colegas, ¿cómo son sus hábitos en cuanto a la bebida?
En extremo diferentes ____ Muy parecidos ____
Más o menos los mismos ✓
Si son en extremo diferentes, sírvase explicar:

9.04.14 Cuando ha empinado varias veces, su comportamiento
No cambia visiblemente ____
Cambia algo ✓
Cambia de veras ____
Si cambia de veras, sírvase describirlo:

9.04.15 Cuando bebe
Se come las palabras ____
Habla casi normalmente ✓
Habla como siempre ____

9.04.16 Cuando bebe, su tono de voz
Se eleva ____ Se suaviza ✓ No cambia ____

9.04.17 ¿Lo ha visto usted alguna vez ebrio de veras? Sí ✓ No ____
En tal caso, se mostraba
Socialmente activo ✓ Con dominio propio ____
Ruidoso ____ Poco coordinado ____
Hostil ____ Deprimido ____
Tranquilo, retraído ____ Sexualmente excitado [illegible]

436

9.04.18 Si no lo ha visto ebrio, ¿cree que que en estado de embriaguez se pondría

Muy activo ____ Muy pasivo ____
Muy desagradable ____ Bastante agradable ____
Nunca se emborracha ____
No me imagino cómo actuaría si se emborrachara ____

9.04.19 Diga si lo ha visto al día siguiente de una borrachera. No ____ Sí ✓

En caso afirmativo diga si es un tipo que
Deja ver los efectos pero funciona bastante bien ____
Deja ver un poco los efectos, pero mayormente en los ojos y su comportamiento general ____
Deja ver los efectos y se queja mucho del malestar que siente ✓
No se ve mal, diga lo que diga ____

9.04.20 ¿Hay algo especial en sus hábitos de beber que requiera mención? De ser así, sírvase describirlo:

9.05 Impresión general como bebedor (señale la más apropiada):

9.05.01 Bebedor expansivo y en cantidad a quien no afecta mucho el licor. Siempre es muy bullicioso y al beber cambia poco. ____

9.05.02 Bebedor en cantidad que a menudo da la impresión de poder beber más que nadie. Cuando bebe cambia poco de conducta pero se trasluce que si se le provoca se puede poner muy violento. ____

9.05.03. Bebedor constante a quien se ve que le gusta estar achispado. En cierto modo es algo simpático cuando lo está y puede ser la diversión principal en una fiesta.

9.05.04 Bebedor constante que se pone un poco más sensiblero cuando se achispa o embriaga. Tiende a decir a otros lo simpáticos que le son y a veces les pregunta si lo hallan simpático. Da la impresión de poder hacerse muy repulsivo si se pone muy beodo. ✓

437

9.05.05 Bebedor constante a quien afecta muy poco el licor. Siempre conserva muy bien su dignidad y generalmente mantiene su aplomo aun cuando otros estén poniéndose muy ebrios. Sin embargo, no se aísla del grupo, o sea que da poco indicio de desagrado o aburrimiento. ____

9.05.06 Bebedor parco que espacía los tragos. Parece beber sólo por imperativo social. Según adelanta la fiesta se va poniendo reservado y distante. No es extraño que siga hablando de su trabajo aunque no venga a cuento. ____

9.05.07 Bebedor parco que bebe menos y menos según pasan las horas. Generalmente consigue mantener una reserva de hombre de mundo para con los demás. A menudo se empareja con alguno que se le parezca. Según transcurre la fiesta demuestra franco desagrado por todo lo que crea burdo o ruidoso. A menudo critica con sarcasmo la conducta de otros. ____

9.05.08 Bebedor muy parco que o bien bebe por compromiso o se niega a beber. Generalmente no forma parte realmente del grupo festejante y se ve que le molesta que lo hayan traído contra su voluntad. Tiende a estar solo y en la primera oportunidad se escabulle. ____

9.05.09 Ninguna de las anteriores descripciones le cuadra. Yo lo describiría así:

10. Hábitos de Conducir y de Caminar

10.01 Hábitos de conducir:

10.01.01 Como conductor de automóvil
Es inusitadamente diestro ____
[✓ Tiene destreza promedio]
Tiene desusada falta de destreza ____
No cuenta, pues no conduce ____

438

10.01.02 Conduce a velocidad Muy alta___ Promedio_✓_ Muy baja___

10.01.03 Mientras conduce y conversa, da la impresión de que

Presta poca atención al manejo ___
Presta atención promedio al manejo _✓_
Sin duda le parece más importante conducir que conversar ___

10.01.04 Comparado con sus colegas, su interés en autos importados es

Más o menos el mismo _✓_
Muy diferente ___

10.01.05 Su interés en el cuidado y la reparación de autos es

Inusitado___ Promedio_✓_ Poco o ninguno___

10.01.06 Su cortesía como conductor es

Como la de la generalidad de sus colegas ___
Como la de la generalidad de la gente que usted conoce ___
Fuera de lo normal por lo cortés y cautelosa _✓_
Fuera de lo normal por lo burda y exigente ___

10.01.07 Por lo que a usted le consta, es el tipo de persona que

Se familiariza muy pronto en una ciudad extraña _✓_
Usa bastante bien un mapa de caminos o croquis urbano ___
Se las arregla haciendo muchas preguntas ___
Casi siempre depende de que otros lo guíen a donde va ___

10.01.08 Como pasajero, ¿es persona muy consciente de la tarea del conductor y reacciona al par con éste (o sea, hace como que aplica los frenos, se adapta en su asiento a los cambios en el tráfico, etc.)? No_✓_ Sí___

10.01.09 Como pasajero, ¿es persona que parece adaptarse al modo de conducir del que va al timón, de manera corriente o apropiada?

No___ Sí_✓_

4-00000

439

10.01.10 Como pasajero en un automóvil, ¿es persona que permanece muy en calma y relativamente indiferente a la manera de manejar del conductor? No____ Sí __✓__

10.01.11 Es persona que
Nunca conduciría mientras bebe ____
Tiende a saber cuándo no debe conducir ____
Siempre insistiría en conducir, aun estando ebrio __✓__

10.01.12 Ofrece llevar pasajero Cuando es apropiado ____
Casi siempre __✓__ Nunca ____

10.01.13 Hay algo sobre su manera de conducir que deba mencionarse?
De ser así, descríbalo:

10.02 Hábitos al caminar

10.02.01 Es la clase de persona que Camina mucho __✓__
Camina lo mismo que la mayoría ____
Nunca camina si puede evitarlo ____

10.02.02 Cuando camina, su paso es Rápido___ Promedio __✓__ Lento ____

10.02.03 Cuando usted camina con él, usualmente
Camina al paso suyo __✓__
Obliga a usted a caminar al paso de él ____

10.02.04 Cuando camina mueve los pies
A derecha e izquierda (hacia afuera) ____
Más o menos paralelos ____
Hacia adentro __✓__

10.02.05 Camina Erecto con cabeza alta __✓__
Erecto con cabeza agachada ____
Agachado pero con los ojos en alto ____
Muy agachado ____

10.02.06 Cuando camina mira alrededor
Mucho____ De manera normal __✓__ Nunca____

10.02.07 Cuando saluda a alguien que conoce en la calle su cara
Se ilumina __✓__
Muestra expresión normal o apropiada ____
Raramente cambia de expresión ____

440

10.02.08 ¿Hay algo llamativo o poco usual en su paso o manera de andar? En caso afirmativo, descríbalo: ______

10.03 Impresión general de sus hábitos al conducir o caminar: (Marque la descripción más apropiada)

10.03.01 Individuo activo y despierto de paso resuelto que parece tener una mente muy práctica. Le gusta reparar cosas, parece tener buen conocimiento de automóviles y conduce de manera calmada y eficiente. ______

10.03.02 Individuo activo que es algo retraído (o negativo) con los demás. Su paso es rápido y resuelto. Parece tener una mente práctica, es muy celoso de lo que posee y lo protege con exceso y no le gusta compartirlo. Repara cosas sin alarde, parece tener buen conocimiento de automóviles y conduce de manera resuelta (a veces hostil) pero eficiente. ______

10.03.03 Individuo activo y despierto de paso despreocupado, que parece estar de buen humor la mayoría del tiempo. Casi nunca trata de arreglar cosas pero a menudo es muy diestro en hacer que se las arreglen. Parece tener poco conocimiento de automóviles pero conduce de manera calmada y eficiente. ______

10.03.04 Individuo activo que camina algo cautelosamente, como que es fácil abochornarlo o sorprenderlo. Parece algo indefenso y lerdo cuando tiene que reparar algo. Evidentemente tiene poco conocimiento de automóviles y conduce de manera cuidadosa (a veces tensa) pero eficiente. ______

10.03.05 Individuo dueño de sí mismo y atento que camina de manera algo cortada y formal. Aunque en general es individuo práctico, casi nunca trata de hacer nada a ciegas. Tiene que leer las instrucciones y prepararse antes de reparar algo. Parece haber adquirido bastantes conocimientos sobre automóviles, pero conduce de manera algo mecánica y muy controlada. ______

10.03.06 Individuo dueño de sí mismo que a menudo está algo preocupado hasta al caminar. Cuando se toma el tiempo de reparar algo lo hace intensamente y con precisión. A menudo sabe mucho de automóviles y cuida el suyo o se ocupa de que lo cuiden meticulosamente. Sin embargo, cuando está en conversación o preocupado con algo, puede a veces ser conductor muy peligroso. ✓

10.03.07 Individuo dueño de sí mismo que camina con soltura y gracia. Tiene poco o ningún interés en arreglar cosas pero generalmente conoce los mejores lugares en que encargar trabajos y tiende a ser muy exigente en cuanto al trabajo que se le hace. Parece tener relativamente poco conocimiento del funcionamiento de un automóvil, pero aprecia y cuida bien de uno bueno. Conduce con confianza pero generalmente a velocidad y sin darse mucha cuenta de otros. ______

10.03.08 Persona bastante nerviosa y temperamental que camina rápida y torpemente. Tiene poco o ningún interés en saber reparar cosas y se inclina a ignorar o botar las cosas que no trabajan bien. Parece interesarse poco y tener poco conocimiento de automóviles y su manera de conducir lo demuestra. A veces espanta tener que viajar con él de conductor. ______

10.03.09 Ninguna de estas descripciones cabe.
Yo lo describiría como sigue:

10.04 Entretenimientos, deportes

10.04.01 ¿Tiene el alguna ocupación favorita? Sí ✓ No___ No sé______
Si su respuesta es afirmativa, describa sus ocupaciones favoritas:

Leer, reparar cosas

Si su respuesta es "No" o "No sé" ¿cuál cree usted que sería la ocupación que le interesaría más?

No puedo imaginármelo con alguna ocupación favorita ______

Coleccionista (¿Qué colecciona? Armas de fuego, monedas, libros, mariposas, etc.)

____

Como coleccionista es Avido ____ De mediano interés ✓ Despreocupado ____

Artes (Pintura, cerámica, etc.) ✓

Mecánico (motores, equipo fonográfico, etc.) ____

Destrezas (carpintería, construcción de modelos, etc.) ____

Intelectual (historia, filosofía, etc.) ____

Actividades (baile en grupos, deportes ligeros como el ping-pong, juego de bolos o volibol) ✓

Deportes al aire libre (caza, pesca, golf, etc.) tennis ✓

Juegos sociales (ajedrez, póker, bridge, etc.) ✓

Espectador (oír música, asistir a obras de teatro, a juegos de pelota, etc.) ____

Distracción mental (crucigramas, anagramas, criptogramas, etc.) ____

10.04.02 ¿Ha mencionado él alguna vez haber tenido ocupaciones favoritas en el pasado? Sí ____ No ____

En caso afirmativo, sírvase dar detalles:

Viajes por todas partes

10.04.03 ¿Cómo baila? Extremadamente bien ____ Bien ✓ Normalmente ____ Mal ____ No baila ____ No sé si baila ____

10.04.04 Describa la clase de bailes que le ha visto ejecutar.

443

10.04.05 ¿Juega ajedrez? Sí ✓ No ____
Si su respuesta es afirmativa, ¿sabe usted si juega bien? ____
¿cree usted que probablemente juega bien? ____
¿sabe usted que juega medianamente? ✓
¿cree usted que probablemente juega medianamente? ____
¿sabe usted que juega mal? ____
¿cree usted que probablemente juega mal? ____

10.04.06 Si usted sabe jugar póker, diga la clase de jugador de póker que cree que él sería:

10.04.07 ¿Es la clase de persona con quien le gustaría a usted jugar póker? Sí ____ No ____
Si su respuesta es negativa, explique por qué:

10.04.08 ¿Le ha oído usted cantar? Sí ✓ No ____
En caso afirmativo, es su voz Buena ____ Promedio ✓ Mala ____

10.04.09 ¿Parece saber muchas canciones? Sí ✓ No ____

10.04.10 Cantando en grupo,

10.04.11 ¿Toca algún instrumento musical? Sí ____ No ✓
En caso afirmativo, ¿qué instrumento?

10.04.12 ¿Ha mencionado alguna vez haber tocado algún instrumento? Sí ____ No ✓
En caso afirmativo, sírvase dar detalles:

10.04.13 ¿Practica algún deporte activo? Sí ____ No ____

Tennis, Volleyball, Ping-Pong

(Juega Tennis desde estudiante, obtuvo medallas)

14-00000

444

Si su respuesta es negativa, ¿qué clase de deportes cree usted que le interesaría más?

No es tipo para deportes
De contacto físico (fútbol, rugby, sóccer, etc.) ____
De destreza (tenis, balón de mano, volibol, etc.) ____
De destreza, individual (natación, tiro de flechas, tiro de pichones, etc.) ____
Puede que le interese todo ____

10.04.14 Juega golf? Sí____ No ____
En caso afirmativo, ¿lo toma muy seriamente? ____
¿Lo toma de manera normal? ____
¿Lo toma con indiferencia? ____

10.04.15 Como jugador de golf, ¿sabe usted que juega bien? ____
¿Cree que probablemente juega bien? ____ ¿Sabe que juega medianamente? ____ ¿Cree que probablemente juega medianamente? ____ ¿Sabe que juega mal? ____
¿Cree que probablemente juega mal? ____

10.04.16 Si usted juega golf, ¿es él la clase de persona con quien le gustaría a usted jugar? Sí____ No____
En caso negativo, explique por qué:

10.04.17 Diga si Caza mucho____ Pesca mucho____ Caza ~~a veces~~ Nunca
Pesca a veces ✓ Nunca caza____
Nunca va de pesca____

10.04.18 ¿Sabe usted si toma las ocupaciones de cazar y pescar seriamente? Sí ✓ No____
En caso afirmativo, explique:

10.04.19 ¿Ha mencionado alguna vez haber practicado deportes en el pasado?
En caso afirmativo, sírvase dar detalles (incluya cualquier referencia que el pueda haber hecho a medallas, trofeos, participación en algún equipo, etc.):

Tennis / tiene trofeos medallas
las últimas medallas, y trofeo
los recibió en Mexico de 1959

10.04.20 ¿Ha oído usted a alguien describirlo como atleta? Sí ✓ No ___

En caso afirmativo, sírvase dar detalles:

10.04.21 Diga si es persona que Se ocupa mucho de mantenerse en buenas condiciones físicas ✓
Trata bastante de mantenerse en buenas condiciones ___
Se interesa poco en mantenerse en buenas condiciones ___

10.04.22 ¿Ha indicado o alguna vez tener interés en levantar pesas?
En caso afirmativo, sírvase explicar: Sí ___ No ✓

10.04.23 Diga si es tipo más bien
Musculoso y atlético ___
Fuerte, de buena constitución ✓
Algo fofo ___
Fofo y nada atlético ___
Afeminado ___

10.04.24 ¿Tiene inclinación a la mecánica? Sí ✓ No ___
En caso afirmativo, diga si
Prefiere seguir instrucciones de los libros ✓
No se ocupa de las instrucciones y trata de arreglárselas por sí mismo ___

10.04.25 Si fuera posible suministrarle revistas y publicaciones de EE.UU., ¿cuáles de las siguientes cree que le gustarían realmente?
El New York Times ___ Saturday Review ___ Newsweek ___
Playboy ✓ Sports Illustrated ✓ Life ___ Atlantic ___
Field and Stream ___ Popular Mechanics ___ New Republic ___
Better Homes and Gardens ___ Readers Digest (Selecciones) ✓
Kenyon Review ___ Ramparts ___ Scientific American ___
Christian Science Monitor ___

No puedo imaginármelo leyendo una revista de EE.UU. ___

446

10.04.26 ¿Qué libros le ha oído mencionar haber leído con placer, si ha mencionado alguno?

10.04.27 ¿Qué películas le ha oído mencionar haber visto con placer, si ha mencionado alguna?

10.04.28 Si él pudiera escoger, probablemente iría
Al cine____ Al teatro____ Al ballet ✓ A un partido de sóccer____ A una corrida de toros____ A un concierto____

10.05 Comportamiento en la oficina

10.05.01 Información general (Marque lo aplicable)

De trato fácil ____
Formal ____
Atento al reglamento ____
Innovador ____
Actuador ____
Práctico ____
Dilatador ____
Adicto a los memorándums ✓
Encarga su trabajo a otros ____
No puede encargar a otros ____
Productivo ____
Pensador ____
Organizado ____
Desorganizado ____
Piensa que no le aprecian su trabajo ____

10.05.02 Reacción de otros trabajadores:

Subalternos

	Sí	No	No sé
Lo estiman	✓		
No lo estiman			
Es cortés con ellos	✓		
Se preocupa por ellos			
No se ocupa para nada			
Le temen		✓	
Lo consideran	✓		
Se atribuye el trabajo que ellos han hecho			✓
Reconoce mérito en justicia	✓		
Lo tratan socialmente	✓		

447

Superiores

Confían en su criterio		[illegible]	
Lo estiman	✓		
No lo estiman			
Le encargan responsabilidad	✓		
Lo tratan socialmente	✓		

IV. CONSTITUCION EMOCIONAL

11. Temperamento y humorismo

11.01 Temperamento:

11.01.01 En su trato con otros usted lo considera
Tímido ____
Cauto ____
Convencional y correcto ____
Amistoso ✓
Cálido ____

11.01.02 Su estilo de conversación es
Poco diestro ____
Confiado ____
Vacilante ____
Fácil ✓
Convencional ____
Voluble ____
Artificioso ____

11.01.03 Su trato hacia las mujeres es
Más o menos el mismo que hacia los hombres ____
Más correcto y controlado que hacia los hombres ✓
Más cálido y fácil que hacia los hombres ____

11.01.04 En general, diga si cree que es persona que
Se enfada fácilmente ____
Puede enfadarse fácilmente, pero se controla ✓
Tiene genio normal ____
Tiene buen genio y se altera raramente ____
Es en extremo tolerante y casi nunca se enfadaría ____

11.01.05 ¿Le ha visto usted alguna vez enfadarse? No ✓ Sí ____
En caso afirmativo, describa brevemente el incidente, incluyendo la reacción de él:

448

11.02 Humor:

11.02.01 Es persona a quien usted
Nunca ha visto bromear con otro ___
[✓ Frecuentemente ha visto bromear con otro]
No se puede imaginar que bromee con otro ___
Considera normal en cuanto a gustarle bromear ___

11.02.02 Es persona
Que notoriamente no tolera las bromas ___
[✓ Con quien a la mayoría le gusta bromear]
Con quien a la mayoría nunca se le ocurriría bromear ___
A quien claramente le gusta ser objeto de bromas ___

11.02.03 Su sentido del humor es Más o menos como el de la mayoría
Notablemente ausente ___ [✓ Avispado]
Sutil ___ Seco ___ Tosco ___ Burdo ___

11.02.04 Cuenta chistes y anécdotas Nunca ___ [✓ A veces]
Frecuentemente ___

11.02.05 Haciendo cuentos es Muy bueno ___ [✓ Promedio]
Pobre ___

11.02.06 Se inclina más a hacer un cuento [✓ A un grupo]
Aparte a un amigo o conocido ___
Solamente cuando lo animan ___

11.03 Impresión general del temperamento y sentido del humor:
(Marque la descripción más apropiada)

11.03.01 Tipo campechano que ríe con gran placer. Su sentido del humor es directo, no sutil, y aunque a veces es ruidoso, raramente es desagradable o reprensible. La mayoría del tiempo su buen humor es contagioso. ___

11.03.02 Tipo campechano que cuando ríe lo hace con bastante placer. Sin embargo, es frecuentemente seco y a veces poco tolerante y algo desprovisto de buen humor. Su bromas son directas, hasta crudas y a veces impropias. Tiende a ser la clase de persona que se ríe de otros y no con otros. ___

449

11.03.03 Tipo bienhumorado que a veces puede ser considerado alegre y despreocupado. Sus chistes son avispados y oportunos. Es muy sensible a los estados de ánimo y sentimientos de otros, y a menudo puede animar una fiesta muy apropiadamente. Aunque hasta cierto punto le gusta bromear con otros, nunca es cruel o insensible. ____

11.03.04 Generalmente es tipo algo tranquilo y afable que a veces puede volverse sorprendentemente alegre y despreocupado. Sin embargo, cuando está alegre a veces se extralimita y molesta un poco a los que están a su alrededor. Sus bromas son a menudo avispadas pero puede volverse muy sarcástico y aun mordaz en ocasiones ____

11.03.05 Tipo de buenas maneras, generalmente muy convencional y propio. No aparece desprovisto de buen humor necesariamente, pero lo muestra muy raramente. A veces es difícil conocer si está de buen humor, debido a su manera de esconder y frenar sus sentimientos. Tiene humorismo intencionado más bien que espontáneo pero nunca burdo o impropio. ____

11.03.06 Tipo austero y sin vena humorística, siempre serio e intenso. Es difícil bromear en su presencia, en parte porque no responde a ello y en parte porque parece serle molesto. ____

11.03.07 Tipo sensato y de mundo, de sutil vena humorística. En un ambiente adecuado puede ser muy atrayente y divertido, pero su humorismo tiene cierta cualidad aristocrática y puede ser muy condescendiente con los que no entienden o no aprecian su humorismo. ____

11.03.08 Tipo artificioso algo cínico que a veces puede ponerse muy impertinente. Sus chistes tienden a ser un poco desorbitados. Parece tener chistes privados que comparte con sus íntimos. A veces es difícil saber si trata de ser chistoso o sutilmente hostil. ✓ ____

11.03.09 Ninguna de las anteriores descripciones le cabe. Yo lo describiría como sigue:

450

12. Actitudes sexuales

12.01 Generales:

12.01.01 Su actitud hacia lo sexual es

Muy oscura ___
Difícil de determinar ___
Normal para su cultura y antecentes ___
Carente de interés ___
Indiferente ___
De interés bien definido ✓

12.01.02 En presencia de mujeres es Tieso ✓ Corriente ___
Vulgar ___
Hostil ___ Indiferente ___

12.01.03 Asiste a espectáculos donde actúan mujeres semidesnudas
A menudo ___ Nunca ___ A veces, en grupo ___
No puedo imaginármelo en tales sitios ___
No sé lo que cree de tales espectáculos ___
Cada vez cuando se ofrece una oportunidad

12.01.04 Entre hombres, habla de lo sexual
A menudo ✓ A veces ___
Raramente ___ Nunca ___

12.01.05 ¿Cambia en su comportamiento y/o actitudes sobre lo sexual después de beber? Sí ___ No ✓ No sé ___
En caso afirmativo, describa el cambio:

451

12.01.06 ¿Tiene usted idea de su opinión acerca de las prostitutas? Sí ✓ No ____

12.01.07 Si no, ¿cree usted que es tipo que
Iría donde una prostituta ____
No puedo imaginarlo con una prostituta ____
No tengo fundamento para opinar ✓

12.01.07 Si tiene idea, diga si dicha opinión es de
Negativismo hacia las prostitutas ____
Indiferencia hacia las prostitutas ____
Interés en las prostitutas ✓

12.01.09 En sus relaciones con las mujeres, actúa
Generalmente de acuerdo con su edad y experiencia ____
Generalmente con poca madurez, que no concuerda con su edad y experiencia ____
Con bastante soltura y equilibrio ____
Con bastante inquietud o torpeza ✓

12.01.10 Al describir a una mujer atractiva es más probable que mencione
El pelo ____ Los senos ____
Los ojos ____ La ropa ____
La figura ✓ La personalidad ____
Las piernas ____ No sé ____

12.01.11 ¿Ha oído usted a una mujer describirlo? Sí ✓ No ____
En caso afirmativo, ¿qué dijo de él la mujer?

Bien atractivo, agradable, buena persona

12.02 Impresión general: ¿Cuál de las siguientes descripciones le viene mejor:

12.02.01 Es hombre elemental, robusto, que no parece apocarse en materia del sexo. Trata a las mujeres apropiadamente, pero hace poco esfuerzo por esconder su admiración y atracción. Parece viril y confiado hacia las mujeres y a la mayoría de ellas les agrada. ____

12.02.02 Es hombre elemental, robusto, que ocasionalmente puede ser burdo o hasta vulgar. Trata a las mujeres algo ásperamente y puede volverse muy insistente cuando lo atrae una mujer. Parece estar muy orgulloso de su virilidad. Su agresividad ofendería o repelería a muchas mujeres, pero eso a él parece no importarle.

457

[✓ 12.02.03 Es hombre algo sensual, blanducho, muy atento con las mujeres. Se inclina a retener la mano de una mujder más de lo necesario al hablarle y a menudo echa el brazo a mujeres que admira. A menudo usa lisonjas y frases de cortesía pero lo hace de manera agradable. A la mayoría de las mujeres les gustan sus atenciones.]

12.02.04 Es hombre sensual, pero en forma penosa e insegura. Es hombre blanducho que se esfuerzo por no ofender. Sin embargo, frecuentemente sigue con la mirada a una mujer atractiva cuando cree que nadie lo mira. También se inclina a tropezar con las mujeres o a tocarlas "accidentalmente" cuando tiene oportunidad.

12.02.05 Es hombre confiado y bastante pulido que es correcto y convencional hacia hombres y mujeres y es difícil adivinar sus actitudes e intereses sexuales. En un grupo siempre se comporta de acuerdo con las reglas y usualmente de manera muy eficiente.

12.02.06 Es hombre confiado y preciso, con cierto aire de profesional. Es cortés hasta el límite y se toma las mayores molestias por encenderle el cigarrillo a una dama u ocuparse de que esté bien atendida. Sin embargo, en sus relaciones con las mujeres es bastante distante. A veces su formalidad está fuera de lugar pero raramente o nunca cambia sus modales o procedimientos de acuerdo con la situación.

12.02.07 Un hombre agradable y educado que es al mismo tiempo amistoso y de mundo. Trata a las mujeres de modo culto pero muestra poca sensualidad o impropiedad sexual. Es aseado y hasta apuesto, y puede ser muy meticuloso. La mayoría de sus relaciones con las mujeres parecen ser muy platónicas. Es el tipo de persona que probablemente tiene varias amigas íntimas.

12.02.08 Es hombre algo tímido e indiferente, considerado por algunos singular o extraño. Muestra poco o ningún interés en las mujeres en público. En general es persona preocupada que solamente busca la compañía de otras con intereses similares. La mayoría de las veces tiene cierto aire ascético y asexual.

12.02.09 Ninguna de las anteriores descripciones cabe. Yo lo describiría así:

453

V. VIDA FAMILIAR

13. Estado civil

13.01 ¿Está casado? [✓ Sí] No ____

13.01.01 ¿Vive su esposa con él? [✓ Sí] No ____

13.01.02 ¿Va su esposa a funciones sociales con él? Nunca ____ Raramente ____ Normalmente ____ [✓ A menudo]

13.01.03 Su esposa es Mayor que él ____ [✓ ~~Más o menos~~ de su edad] Más joven que él ____ No sé ____

13.01.04 Su esposa es Extremadamente atractiva ____ [✓ Normalmente atractiva] Extremadamente poco atractiva ____

13.01.05 En general, su esposa es socialmente Diestra ____ [✓ Aceptable] Inepta ____

13.01.06 Además de su lengua materna, ¿qué otros idiomas habla su esposa?

[illegible]

13.01.07 Se esposa es Más instruida que él ____ Tan instruida como él ____ [✓ Menos instruida que el]

13.01.08 ¿Estuvo él casado anteriormente: Sí ____ [✓ No] No sé ____
En caso afirmativo sírvase dar detalles si los conoce.

13.02 Su esposa parece [✓ Tener muchas amistades] Tener pocas amistades ____ No tener casi amistades ____

13.02.01 En público, para con su esposa, él es Muy atento ____ [✓ Bastante atento] Indiferente ____

13.02.02 En público, para con él, su esposa es Muy atenta ____ Bastante atenta ____ [✓ Indiferente]

13.02.03 Describiría usted a su esposa como
Agresiva ____ [✓ Dominante] Independiente ____
Complaciente ____ Sumisa ____ Dependiente ____

13.02.04 En la zona donde ella vive, parece estar Muy contenta ____
Normalmente contenta ✓ Muy descontenta ____

13.03 ¿Ha estado usted alguna vez en su casa? Sí ✓ No ____
En caso afirmativo, con cuánta frecuencia?
[illegible]

13.03.01 La vivienda de ellos es En extremo elegante para la zona ____
Típica de la zona ✓
En extremo pobre para la zona ____

13.03.02 Como anfitriones, los esposos son: Inusitadamente buenos ____
Buenos ✓ Adecuados ____ Algo deficientes ____
En extremo deficientes ____

13.03.03 Como anfitriona, la señora parece: Muy en su ambiente ____
Bien adaptada ✓ Algo nerviosa ____
Muy incómoda ____

13.03.04 Su vivienda Refleja la personalidad de él ____
Refleja la personalidad de ambos ✓
No refleja la personalidad de ninguno ____

13.03.05 En general el mobiliario es Descolorido ____
Convencional ✓ De inusitado buen gusto ____

13.03.06 La señora está Visiblemente interesada en su casa ✓
Tan interesada en su casa como la mayoría de sus vecinas ____
Visiblemente indiferente a la casa ____
No sé si realmente se interesa o no ____

13.03.07 El comportamiento social de ella en casa es
Más o menos el mismo que fuera de ella ____
Más en su ambiente que fuera de ella ✓
Menos en su ambiente ____

13.03.08 Normalmente son gente que
Recibe a menudo y le gusta hacerlo ____
Cumple con sus compromisos sociales y le gusta bastante ✓
Prefiere invitar sólo a sus íntimos ____
Recibe sólo cuando es de obligación ____
Prefiere no recibir a nadie ____

13.04 ¿Critica él a su esposa? Sí ____ No ✓
En caso afirmativo, ¿qué es lo que se inclina más a criticar?

455

13.04.01 En general, como matrimonio son:
Visiblemente compatibles ____ Normalmente compatibles ✓
Visiblemente poco compatibles ____

13.04.02 El se inclina a:
Nunca parecer celoso de ella ✓
Raramente parecer celoso de ella ____
Parecer a menudo celoso de ella ____

13.04.03 Ella se inclina a:
Nunca parecer celosa de él ____
Raramente parecer celosa de él ____
Parecer a menudo celosa de él ✓

13.04.04 ¿Tiene la esposa alguna característica que requiera mención o descripción especial?

13.05 Como esposo, se le puede describir más bien como:

____ Hombre expresivo que es visiblemente el cónyuge dominante en el matrimonio. Tiende a proteger a su esposa y cuando es posible siempre la incluye en sus actividades sociales.

____ Hombre activo que como esposo es autoritario y dominante. Es poseyente con su esposa y tiende a ser exigente con ella.

____ Hombre expresivo que depende mucho de su esposa. Ella tiende a ser el cónyuge dominante y él parece estar a gusto y esperar que así sea.

____ Hombre activo pero de genio algo áspero que visiblemente depende mucho de su esposa pero raramente lo confiesa. Puede tener alguna tendencia a ser celoso y poseyente con su esposa.

✓ Marido como la mayoría que trata a su esposa con respeto. Raramente delata en público lo que siente. Es difícil conocer sus verdaderos sentimientos por ella. Pero, visiblemente depende de su esposa en alto grado

____ Marido consciente de sus deberes que toma su matrimonio muy seriamente. Su esposa corre parejas con él y ambos toman en serio las obligaciones de familia y sociales.

____ Hombre socialmente activo que puede ser muy galante con las damas aun en presencia de su esposa. Parecen llevar vidas separadas pero muy compatibles.

456

______ Hombre tranquilo que visiblemente depende de su esposa en alto grado. Ella se ocupa de él de manera poco ostentosa pero es visible que influye bastante en su comportamiento y actitudes.

______ Ninguna de las anteriores descripciones le viene bien. Yo lo describiría como sigue:

457

13.06 Hogar:
¿Se ocupa él de la apariencia o el funcionamiento de su casa? Sí ✓ No ___
¿Hace reparaciones de poca importancia por sí mismo? Sí ✓ No ___
En caso afirmativo, las hace Medianamente bien? ___
Torpemente? ✓
(según su esposa)

14. Hijos

14.01 ¿Tiene él hijos?

14.01.01 Número de hijos 2 Edades 17, 11 Sexo F/M

14.01.02 ¿Viven todos sus hijos con él? Sí ✓ No ✓
En caso negativo, ¿dónde viven?
(ahora)

14.01.03 Se ocupa de sus hijos
De manera inusitada ✓
De manera normal ___
Poco ___

14.01.04 Su esposa es
Madre inusitadamente atenta ✓
Madre normal ___
Madre inusitadamente indiferente ___

14.01.05 Los hijos se comportan
Inusitadamente bien ✓
Normalmente bien ✓
En extremo camorristas, difíciles ___

14.01.06 Diga si él
Nunca habla de sus hijos ___ Rara vez habla
de sus hijos ✓ Habla de sus hijos cuando
corresponde ✓ Habla de sus hijos con
frecuencia ___ Parece muy preocupado por
sus hijos ___

14.01.07 ¿Tiene alguno de sus hijos algo anormal (constitución enfermiza, alergias, defecto mental, deformidad o parálisis, especial inteligencia)? Sí ✓ No ___
En caso afirmativo, descríbalo:

Su hijo padece de epilepsia desde muy niño. Por lo general tiene 1-2 (ataques al año.

458

14.02 Cuando esposa y familia están ausentes de casa

Se ve muy solo y sin saber qué hacer ____
Mantiene probablemente su rutina ____
Probablemente intensifica su actividad social ____
No sé lo que hace ____

Se trata de disfrutar en grande

14.03 Como padre, se le puede describir mejor así:

____ Padre de familia activo y feliz, orgulloso de su familia.

____ Padre de familia activo que tiende a ser estricto y exigente con sus hijos.

____ Padre de familia activo que pasa mucho tiempo con ella. Tiende a malcriar a sus hijos.

____ Padre de familia activo pero inseguro que se preocupa mucho con sus hijos.

____ Padre activo y responsable, pero que no tolera tonterías. Su trabajo es primero y la familia lo sabe.

✓ Padre responsable y cuidadoso, cumplidor con su familia pero no muy afectuoso o expresivo.

____ Padre despreocupado que no pierde sueño por la familia. La mayoría del tiempo sus miembros se las arreglan por su cuenta, con buen éxito.

____ Padre indiferente que a veces parece no darse cuenta de su familia.

____ Ninguna de las anteriores descripciones le viene bien. Puede ser descrito mejor como sigue:

14.04 Diga si lleva fotos de N,
Su familia ____ Su esposa ____
Sus hijos ____ Sí mismo ____

14.05 En su oficina o cuarto exhibe fotos de N, Su familia ____
Su esposa ____ Sus hijos ____ Sí mismo ____

14.06 ¿Hay alguna característica en sus relaciones con su esposa o su familia que requiera mención o descripción especial?

459

VI. POSICION IDEOLOGICA

15. General

15.01 En general:

____ Es hombre de opiniones francas y evidentes. Es capaz de expresar dichas opiniones sin importarle al parecer los sentimientos y actitudes de otros.

[✓] Es hombre de muchos prejuicios e ideas dogmáticas. Puede expresarlos acalorada y resueltamente cuando es necesario.

____ Es hombre que posiblemente desvía opiniones de controversia con ligereza o buen humor. A veces es difícil conocer sus opiniones porque es difícil hacerlo hablar con seriedad.

____ Es hombre que puede tener muchas opiniones firmes pero se le hace difícil mostrarlas. Tiende a disculparse y a mostrar timidez y desasosiego cuando se avecina una discusión.

____ Es hombre cuyas verdaderas opiniones son difíciles de conocer. Usualmente es diplomático y convencional cuando se discuten temas polémicos o prohibidos.

____ Es hombre serio y resuelto a portarse en forma apropiada y convencional. Tiene las maneras de una persona bien disciplinada que solamente dice lo que se supone decir o lo que otros esperan que diga.

____ Es un hombre de opiniones muy educadas. Está bien informado y es capaz de sostener un argumento de manera considerablemente articulada, pero a veces se vuelve cínico o sutilmente sarcástico.

____ Es hombre tímido y taciturno en cuanto a sus opiniones. Es muy difícil hacerlo expresarse sobre un tema, particularmente si es tema polémico.

____ Ninguna de las anteriores descripciones sirve; se le describe mejor como sigue:

460

15.01.01 ¿Hay algún tema que tiende a ponerlo colérico? Sí____ No _✓_
En caso afirmativo, ¿cuál es?

15.02 Es hombre cuyo patriotismo es
Patente e intenso ____
Como el de la mayoría de sus colegas ____
Cauteloso y no muy intenso _✓_
Difícil de precisar ____

15.02.01 En asuntos generales de política
Generalmente está bien informado sobre la posición y actitud de su país ____
Está tan bien informado como la mayoría de sus colegas _✓_
Está extremadamente mal informado ____

VII. HISTORIAL MEDICO

16. Estado de salud

16.01 Que usted sepa, ¿tiene él algún problema de salud? Sí____ No ✓
En caso afirmativo, explique:

16.02 ¿Tienen su esposa o hijos algún problema de salud: Sí ✓ No____
En caso afirmativo, explique:

Su esposa es mal de hígado y estómago
Su hijo padece de epilepsia

16.03 ¿Ha indicado alguna vez haber tenido problemas de salud en el pasado? Sí____ No ✓
En caso afirmativo, explique:

16.04 Que usted sepa, ¿toma regularmente píldoras o medicina de alguna clase? Sí____ No ✓
En caso afirmativo, explique:

16.05 Es persona que: Nunca habla de su salud o de lo que siente____
Habla como todos de su salud o de lo que siente____ Frecuentemente habla de su salud o de lo que siente ✓.

16.06 Cuando se siente mal: Todos se percatan____ Se nota de modo normal ✓ La mayoría de la gente no lo notaría____
Nunca he sabido que se sienta mal____.

14-00000

467

16.07 Su aspecto es
Robusto y saludable ✓
Esencialmente como la mayoría a su edad ____
Enfermizo ____

16.08 Tiene
Cara saludable ✓ Barriga grande ____
Tendencia a faltarle el aliento al esforzarse ____
Manos frías y húmedas ____ Tendencia a sudar
demasiado ____ Mal aliento ____.

16.09 Que usted sepa, ¿tiene dieta o régimen especial? Sí ____ No ✓

En caso afirmativo, explique:

16.10 De manera general, le parece individuo que
Tiene mucha energía y no se cansa nunca ✓
Tiene energía, pero no siempre ____
Tiene energía moderada ____
Es letárgico, indiferente ____

16.11 ¿Hay algo en cuanto a su salud o la de su familia que deba ser comentado en detalle?

1) Hace mucho años su esposa es mal de hígado y estómago. Tiene dieta especial de vegetales y toma frecuente medicinas constantemente

2) Su hijo padece de epilepsia desde muy niño. Tiene 1-2 ataques al año.

BB
SEP 25 70

463

23 April 1970

Soviet Operational Contacts:

AEMIDRIFF made the following comments concerning what appeared to her to be operational contacts and/or modus operandi of Soviet intelligence officers in Mexico:

Debriefing conducted 23-26 April 1970:

LOGINOV - During the affair between AEMIDRIFF and LOGINOV, they went to the movies once or twice a week, the Futurama and Cine Mod being the theaters most frequently attended. LOGINOV always made some sort of contact during these outings, according to AEMIDRIFF. She stated that he usually left his seat about 2300 hours and went out to the lobby for some time. She did not know where the contacts were actually made. Once she and LOGINOV encountered, apparently accidentally, outside the Cine Mod theater, a Mexican Army Colonel, who was introduced to her by LOGINOV as "Col. Sergio." In this instance LOGINOV did not excuse himself to have a private conversation with the Mexican. "Col. Sergio" was described by AEMIDRIFF as about 40, tall, no moustache or glasses, thick, curly hair, appeared to be of Spanish descent. The woman with "Col. Sergio" appeared to be about 25 years old and was introduced as his wife (which AEMIDRIFF doubted because, as she put it, he didn't treat her as one would a wife, but rather as a mistress). AEMIDRIFF knew nothing more about this Mexican and never saw him again.

On another occasion, LOGINOV and AEMIDRIFF met an American in front of the Futurama theater. LOGINOV introduced him to her as "Col. Michael." AEMIDRIFF stated that he was dressed in civilian clothes. He

201-285412

464

had blond hair, was of medium height, no glasses, large grey eyes (AEMIDRIFF thought him quite attractive). LOGINOV told "Michael" that he would call him the next day on urgent business. "Michael" was alone. AEMIDRIFF commented that they did not have a private conversation. She esimated this encounter took place about September 1959.

GOLCUZOV - AEMIDRIFF stated that GOLCUZOV used her in the same manner, i.e., took her about 3 times in all to Cine Chapultepec, then left her during the movie to make some sort of contact.

Debriefing conducted 12-16 May 1970:

Concerning Soviet Contacts in the Mexican Police: AEMIDRIFF stated that she overheard GOLCUSOV and DYOMIN talk about many contacts which they had in the police here. She said she had also overheard KOLOMYAKOV, BAKULIN, AND CHEKHOV talk about how many good police contacts the Soviets have. However, each specific example which AEMIDRIFF could give concerned some non-operational favor which the Soviets could get taken care of, e.g., when the Soviets wanted to get something through Aduana; when some Soviet was missing and police cooperation was needed; getting advance notice when some demonstration hostile to the Soviets was about to take place, etc. She was not able to recall any hints that Soviets had operational contacts in the police; agents reporting on what the police were doing; assets who assisted Soviets operationally in some way. However, AEMIDRIFF thought the Soviets probably have such assets.

Concerning Soviet contacts in West German Police: AEMIDRIFF recalled that when she went to Germany as interpreter for Soviet surgeon and textbook writer, Pablo AMASOV, in January 1968 (they went to Cologne

West Germany on Commercial Ministry business), the Soviet Ambassador in West Germany stated that the Embassy had some paid agents within the West German police who helped them to protect the Soviets (in context that it was dangerous there; some Soviet official could be kidnapped by the enemy, etc.) AEMIDRIFF noted that AMASOV was quite old and very pro-regime.

Miscellaneous operational notes - AEMIDRIFF had no knowledge of Soviet safe houses or safe apartments. She stated that many Soviet visitors stayed at the Hotel Virreyes or in two other hotels near the Soviet Embassy (she couldn't remember names). She did not know whether the Soviets had any sort of special arrangement or contacts in these hotels.

AEMIDRIFF stated that she had attended several parties at which Mexicans also were present (she recalled specifically parties at the homes of KOLOMYAKOV, BAKULIN, LOGINOV) and in each instance the Soviet officer, at some point during the evening, had a private conversation with a Mexican guest. (Unfortunately, AEMIDRIFF was unable to recall the names of any of the Mexicans she met on these occasions, and of course there is no way of knowing whether such private conversations were operational meetings.) AEMIDRIFF commented that at purely Soviet parties, husbands always went off together and talked business, and if wives approached, they stopped their conversation.

Debriefing conducted 1-6 June 1970:

KORMUSHKIN - AEMIDRIFF commented that she thought KORMUSHKIN made operational meetings in the Bremen Bar, since she often saw him sitting in that bar, wearing dark glasses and trying to look inconspicuous.

466

(AEMIDRIFF sometimes passed by this bar and would look inside, although she never went in.)

KUPLYAKOV - Possible PCM Contact - AEMIDRIFF stated that she was told by Daniel Montiel (Daniel MENDEZ Montiel, 201-258951), the Soviet's chauffeur, that his brother, who is a Central Committee member of the PCM and who worked on the PCM publication "La Voz de Mexico," was in contact with KUPLYAKOV. In addition, AEMIDRIFF stated that she believed that Armando VERDUGO (iden with Armando MARTINEZ Verdugo, 201-851726) had an uncle, also named Armando VERDUGO, who is First Secretary of the PCM and who is in contact with KUPLYAKOV. At least this was strongly inferred by Montiel, according to AEMIDRIFF. (Editor note: Arnoldo MARTINEZ Verdugo, 201-064254, who is brother of Armando, is First Secretary of PCM). AEMIDRIFF stated that KUPLYAKOV always seemed to be very interested in and knowledgeable of what appeared in "La Voz de Mexico" and in the PCM publication "La Epoca." She stated that, in general, KUPLYAKOV paid so much attention to local politics and seemed to be so well informed on PCM matters that she felt certain he had something to do with the PCM.

AEMIDRIFF stated that KUPLYAKOV's wife was a good friend of Salvador GONZALEZ Marin, head of the Fondo de Cultura Popular. GONZALEZ' wife works in the Museum of Anthropology. GONZALEZ sold a lot of Soviet books, according to AEMIDRIFF, and for that reason was in contact with KUPLYAKOV, but she commented that GONZALEZ may also have been utilized by KUPLYAKOV in some other operational way. Most of KUPLYAKOV's contacts seem to be journalists. (These were the people AEMIDRIFF saw talking to him at receptions, etc.).

467

AEMIDRIFF stated that Leopoldo ARENAL, whose wife is the daughter of David Alfaro SIQUIEROS, is another Soviet asset who is handled by KUPLYAKOV (she heard VANOVSKIY talk about this). AEMIDRIFF said that ARENAL works with Eduardo ARAUJO (economic consultant for "Minera Continental, S.A.", mentioned in Commercial Office). She also stated she knew that ARENAL went at times to the Embassy to see KUPLYAKOV. AEMIDRIFF said that ARENAL goes to Moscow every year or so. (ARENAL identical with Leopoldo ARENAL Bastar, 201-117999).

468

Soviet Involvement in Student Disorders of 1968:

Debriefing conducted 25-26 April 1970: AEMIDRIFF stated that LOGINOV went out at nights often during this period and told her it was to make "contacts." LOGINOV also stated that his work during this period was some of the most dangerous he had ever done. AEMIDRIFF was certain that these "contacts" involved in student riots. AEMIDRIFF related that once at Auto Cine, LOGINOV made a meeting with a group of youths who came in another car (Falcon). Another time, some 2 or 3 days later, LOGINOV had MITOPOLSKI give him some shotguns which MITOPOLSKI had charge of. LOGINOV got the guns about 2200 or 2300; the guns were returned the next morning. Others who seemed to be going out all the time at night during the student riots (and talking about their meetings in general the next morning) were BOLSHAKOV, KORMOUSHKIN, NIKIPOROV. AEMIDRIFF never heard mention of money being passed during this period (i.e., to Soviet assets involved in riots) nor any mention of any names or positions of assets (This not in agreement with some of Dan James info). CHMYKOV seemed to be involved also.

Debriefing conducted 12-16 May 1970: AEMIDRIFF was again questioned on her knowledge of Soviet activities during the 1968 student disorders. She reported that all she really knew was that the Soviets were very busy during this period; that LOGINOV told her he was going out every night to make "contacts;" that she overheard Soviet case officers talking at various times during this period to effect that they very busy, making many contacts; that the situation was potentially explosive and a dangerous time for them to be making such contacts. AEMIDRIFF twice was with LOGINOV

469

when he met with some "youths" in private conversations. However, AEMIDRIFF stated she did not ever hear any mention of any names of Soviet contacts in relation with the student disorders, any mention of the level of involvement of these contacts in the student organizations, any mention of Soviet guidance to the student movement, financing of the student movement, or the like. She really doesn't know that the Soviets had any contacts with direct access to information to these activities, but she strongly assumes that they did, based on their level of activity and the strong tenor that LOGINOV and other case officers gave to the idea that the contacts they were making were dangerous ones for them to be seen with during this period.

Debriefing conducted 1-6 June 1970: AEMIDRIFF questioned re 1968 student disorders again, for clarification previously reported details. She stated that the Soviets had some different types of rifles in the Commercial Office which served as samples of guns which they were trying to sell commercially in Mexico. One night about 11 o'clock, during the period of student riots, LOGINOV came to the Commercial Office with MITOPOSSKI (AEMIDRIFF was there watching TV). They got "some" rifles - AEMIDRIFF could not see how many or what kind. They took them out in some sort of bags. The next morning "some" rifles were returned to the Commercial Office, but AEMIDRIFF doesn't know whether all of them were brought back. She doesn't know whether or not LOGINOV might have been duty officer for the Embassy for that night.

AEMIDRIFF stated that NECHIPORENKO's trip back to the USSR during the 1968 riots may well have been to report on the riots. However, she didn't know that this was the case and noone specifically told her so.

14-00000

476

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 05/05/70

X-REF. SHEET

X-REF.	SYM NUMBER	DOC. DATE	CLASSIFICATION
201-285412	HMMA-38637	06 APR 70	201-789963

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT (S) IS CROSS REFERENCED TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.

6 April 1970
201-285412

201-285412

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

47

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 37/21 PER: DOP-117

ACTION UNIT: C/SB 5

ACTION NO.: 182

INFO: FILE, VR DDP ADDP CAC C/CI C/WH 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE / TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. FEB 25 10 51 AM '70

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

II

S E C R E T 252314Z FEB 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2565

DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED REDTOP AEMIDRIFF FJPASTIME

REF: MEXICO CITY 2557 (IN 031735)

26 FEB 70 IN 031930

M

1. PER REF, AEMIDRIFF CONTINUED REVIEW OF PHOTOS WITH HQS DEBRIEFER AND LITEMPO-14. REVIEW OF 83 PHOTOS (INCLUDING WIVES) DURING 20 AND 21 FEBRUARY SESSIONS PROVIDES FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS IN ADDITION TO OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WAS ALREADY KNOWN:

VALENTIN BAKULIN: CHIEF OF ONE OF AEGRIP SECTIONS. EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA FROM PRIOR TOURS BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA.

LEV GOLOUZOV: WORKS UNDER BAKULIN (WHICH TENDS CONFIRM AEGRIP STATUS PREVIOUSLY SUSPECTED). WHILE DRUNK AND NASTY, INFORMED AEMIDRIFF SHE BEING SENT HOME.

SERGEY PROVOROV: WORKS UNDER BAKULIN. AEGRIP.

✓ NIKOLAY SOKOLOV: CHIEF OF REFERENTURA.

LYUDMILA SHAPOVALOVA: WORKS UNDER SOKOLOV IN REFERENTURA. SERVED IN CUBA AT ONE TIME.

ALEKSANDR KOZLOV: WORKS IN REFERENTURA UNDER SOKOLOV. IN CHARGE OF PHOTO PROCESSING AND MICROFILMING. ALSO WORKS AT INTERNAL SECURITY AND AS WATCHDOG. HAPPY AND AGREEABLE PERSON

LEE ______

BOB ______ D

JACK ______ J

JERRY ______

TRISH ______

KATHY ______

DIANA ______

BARB ______

KATHY ______

FILE ______

DESTROY ______

RETURN TO ______

D

POL DISSEM

DESENSITIZED

CS COPY

SECRET

201-285412

4-00000

472

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2565 SECRET

VLADIMIR TSERADZE: WORKS IN REFERENTURA BUT IS ALSO UNDER ORDERS OF BAKULIN. TIMID, DOMINATED BY WIFE.

YURIY ROMANENKO: WORKS IN REFERENTURA. FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES PAVEL KOVALEV OUT AT NIGHT. DRINKS A LOT AND HAS TROUBLE WITH WIFE BECAUSE OF IT.

YURIY KUPLYAKOV: HAS JOB SIMILAR TO KOLOMYAKOV'S. VERY IMPORTANT PERSON WITHIN EMBASSY AND HAS ACCESS TO REFERENTURA. VERY REFINED AND CULTURED. MANY IICMU CONTACTS THROUGHOUT MEXICO AND ALSO CULTIVATES FRIENDSHIPS WITH DIRECTORS OF MUSEUMS, LIBRARIES AND OTHER SUCH INSTITUTIONS.

BORIS CHMYKOV: VERY EXPERIENCED. SEEMS TO HAVE PERFORMED BRILLIANTLY IN PAST WITH NO FAILURES. SOMETHING OF A LADIES' MAN AND HAS, ON OCCASION, BEEN MIXED UP IN INTERNAL SCANDAL. ENAMORED OF SOKOLINA. TRAVELS FREQUENTLY THROUGHOUT MEXICO.

VLADISLAV KORMUSHKIN: AEKICK. SERVED IN BRAZIL, SEVERAL MONTHS IN FRANCE AND FOUR TO SIX MONTHS IN ARGENTINA. SPEAKS SPANISH, FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE.

VALERIY KOSTIKOV: AEKICK

OLEG KOROLEV: AEKICK

VLADIMIR MAKAROV: NOT CERTAIN, BUT PROBABLY AEGRIP. HOWEVER, FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES BOLSHAKOV. APPEARS COLD AND CRUEL. ONE

SECRET

14-00000

473

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ____

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 2565 SECRET

OF AEMIDRIFF'S WATCHDOGS DURING JANUARY 1970. SPENT TIME IN RED CHINA.

IOAKIM BULAVIN: ASSIGNED TO COMMERCIAL OFFICE BUT DOES NOT PHYSICALLY WORK THERE. PROBABLY WORKS FOR KOLOMYAKOV, AEKICK REZIDENT.

SERGEY VERBENYEV: RIS, SERVICE UNKNOWN. PERFORMS INTERNAL SECURITY AND WATCHDOG FUNCTIONS.

VLADIMIR GORDEYEV: BELIEVES HE AEKICK WORKING FOR SOKOLOV AND KOLOMYAKOV.

PAVEL KOVALEV: CONSIDERS HIM DANGEROUS. SPEAKS SPANISH AND ENGLISH ALMOST WITHOUT ACCENT. HAS MANY FRIENDS IN GOVERNACION.

ANATOLIY STEKLYANNIKOV: BACHELOR. BODYGUARD FOR KOVALEV. WORKED FOR SECRET POLICE IN MOSCOW AFTER THREE YEARS IN MILITARY. WILL RETURN MOSCOW SOON.

KONSTANTIN BOGATYREV: CHIEF OF ALL GROUPS OF MILITARY INTEL IN MEXICO. (AEMIDRIFF PREVIOUSLY INDENTIFIED CHMYKOV AS AEGRIP CHIEF. STATION BELIEVES CHMYKOV POSSIBLY CHIEF FOR THOSE UNDER CIVILIAN COVER BUT JUNIOR TO BOGATYREV.)

OLEG SHEVCHENKO: SPEAKS SPANISH WITH ARGENTINE ACCENT. THIS IS FIRST TOUR IN LATIN AMERICA.

SECRET

14-00000

474

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 2565 SECRET

VALENTIN LOGINOV: ALTHOUGH HAD AFFAIR WITH AEMIDRIFF, RECALL SIX MONTHS EARLY WAS DUE TO SOME FAILURE AND NOT TO AFFAIR.

VALERIY SOKOLIN: RECALLED SIX MONTHS EARLY DUE TO SOME FAILURE ALSO.

VIKTOR IVANOV: LIKED TO LIVE WELL. OWNED 27 SUITS AND OFTEN CHANGED TWO OR THREE TIMES A DAY. GOOD FRIEND OF OCTAVIANO CAMPOS SALAS, SECRETARY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE. NOW IN MOSCOW IN CHARGE EXPORTING FURS FOR SOYUZPUSHNINA.

BORIS KAZANTSEV: SERVED IN CUBA WHERE HAD SOME PROBLEM OR FLAP DUE TO DRINKING AND HIS CHARACTER. DOMINATED BY WIFE WHO INFLUENCES MANY OF HIS DECISIONS. WIFE WORKS AS TYPIST IN REFERENTURA. SHE VERY JEALOUS OF HUSBAND, YET FLIRTS WITH YOUNGER OFFICERS WHICH HAS CAUSED MARITAL PROBLE

FEDOR YEVESYEV: BELIEVES HE RIS, PROBABLY AEGRIP. BODYGUARD FOR AMBASSADOR AND CURRENTLY FOR CHARGE. BELIEVES HE HAS NO OTHER FUNCTION.

MIKHAIL DAVIDOVSKIY: GRADUATED MFA ACADEMY ABOUT THREE YEARS GO, MEXIC IS FIRST POST. AEKICK. HAS ACCESS TO REFERENTURA. FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES KAZANTSEV AND YEVSEYEV.

SECRET

475

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ___

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES
SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______
X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______
☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT
INFO FILE, VR
ACTION NO.

PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 2565 SECRET

HAS MARITAL PROBLEMS DUE TO NEUROTIC WIFE AND FACT HE HAS, BY FORMER WIFE, EIGHT YEAR OLD CHILD WHO MENTALLY RETARDED FROM INFANTILE PARALYSIS.

DMITRIY DYAKONOV: MEMBER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE CPSU. BELIEVES HE AEKICK. HAS MANY FRIENDS IN GOBERNACION AND RELACIONES EXTERIORES. SERVED IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL. MORE REFINED AND INTELLIGENT THAN PRESENT CHARGE, KAZANTSEV.

BORISKOLOMYAKOV: AEKICK REZIDENT, THIRED IN IMPORTANCE IN EMBASSY. GRADUATE ACCOUNTANT, SERVED AS ACCOUNTANT IN USSR, ARGENTINA AND FIRST TOUR MEXICO. RETURNED TO MEXICO AS REZIDENT. VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD, STRONG PRINCIPLES. DRINKS MODERATELY. CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS WITH ARGENTINE DIPLOMATS. FREQUENTLY TRAVELS WITH KAZANTSEV, SOMETIMES WITH BOLSHAKOV.

YEVGENIY FEDIN: FOURTH IN IMPORTANCE IN EMBASSY. FREQUENTLY WORKS IN REFERENTURA. HAS FEW FRIENDS WITHIN EMBASSY BECAUSE OF FICKLE CHARACTER, AND FACT HE AT ROOT OF MANY INTERNAL INTRIGUES BY SENDING ANONYMOUS ACCUSATORY LETTERS.

VALERIY NIKOLAYENKO: AEKICK. IN CHARGE OF ASSIGNING HOUSING AND FURNISHINGS. SPENT SIX MONTHS IN CUBA AS EMPLOYEE, RATHER THAN DIPLOMAT, BEFORE MEXICO. ATTENDED MFA ACADEMY IN MOSCOW.

2. FILE: 201-835670. GP-1

SECRET

4-00000

976

SECRET

23 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Operation Road Course

REFERENCES: A. Our memorandum dated 9 December 1969, same subject.
B. Memorandum No. S-69/4748, dated 10 December 1969, same subject.

1. The following comments from CAS/MEX on References are forwarded for your information. In an effort to identify "George", CAS/MEX obtained the following information from reliable sources concerning the 3 and 4 October 1969 meeting between Subject and the Soviets.

2. CAS/MEX sources reported the presence of certain Soviets at the Soviet Embassy on the morning of 4 October 1969, which is when the debriefing of Subject took place. Although the presence of some of these Soviets have been reported previously in Reference A, the context of the observations could indicate that possibly one or more of these individuals was involved in the interview of Subject on 4 October 1969.

3. Yevgeniy Ivanovich FEDIN was seen entering the Embassy on 4 October at 0953 hours. He was seen working in Window #12, which is his and Yuriy Viktorovich KUPLYAKOV's office. This office is also used for receiving VIP visitors. FEDIN was seen exiting the Embassy with Mikhail DAVIDOVSKIY and Lev GOLOUZOV at 1240 in an automobile carrying license plates "83 DD".

4. Boris Pavlovich KOLOMYAKOV was seen entering the Embassy on 4 October 1969 at 0910 hours. At 0919 hours, KOLOMYAKOV was observed speaking with Vladislav Sergeyevich KONIUSHKIN in the garden of the Embassy, then KOLOMYAKOV entered the main Embassy building by the main entrance. At 1007 hours, KOLOMYAKOV was again observed in the garden speaking with Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, after which both went

201-235412

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

14-00000

477

SECRET

into the receiving room just inside the gate, into the Embassy [illegible]. If [illegible] or [illegible] is the Soviet who was interviewing Subject as described in his debriefing report, then this conversation in the garden might have ensued during one of the times "Soviet [illegible]" (as described by Subject) left the room. KOLOMYAKOV was seen exiting the Embassy at 1314 hours that day in an automobile carrying license plates "89 DA."

5. Valdislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN was seen entering the Embassy at 0910 hours on 4 October in the company of KORMUSHKINA, dirving an automobile with license "76 DD." Other than the conversation mentioned in paragraph 4 above, he was not seen again until 1324 hours when he exited the Embassy alone. It is not known when KORMUSHKINA left the Embassy.

6. Oleg Sergeyevich KOROLEV was seen entering the Embassy on 4 October 1969 at 0840 hours driving a dual-control car from a local driving school. The car and instructor then departed. KOROLEV entered the main Embassy building and was not seen again until 1349 hours, when he exited the Embassy on foot.

7. Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV was seen entering the Embassy at 0849 hours the ~~morning of 4~~ October 1969. He was seen exiting the Embassy in his car, license plates "31 DG," at 0913 hours and was seen entering the Embassy again at 0939 hours in the same vehicle. At 1016 hours he was seen exiting again in car "31 DG" with LOGINOVA. The above is brought to your attention because all of these Soviets are known KGB officers (except FEDIN, who is carried as Suspect KGB), and all have at least passable English speaking ability.

8. Attached is a photograph of Genrikh Ivanovich KUZNETSOV, who might have been the driver for car "23 DD," in which Subject was smuggled out of the Soviet Embassy on 4 October 1969. Since his wife, Yelizaveta Ivanovna KUZNETSOVA, may have been with him, her photograph is attached. Also attached is a photograph of Yevgeniy Grigoryevna KHOKHLOVA, wife of Inva Fedorvich KHOKHLOV, who might be identical with the woman who met Subject at the gatehouse as he entered the Embassy on 4 October.

9. With reference to the emergency instructions for Subject on the last page of Reference B, CAS/[illegible] reports that they were not briefed concerning this emergency means of com-

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

478

munication. If Subject had called, in accordance with his instructions, the fact that [illegible] was unaware of this arrangement makes it possible that a serious flap could have developed. Because of this potential problem, we would appreciate receiving in advance any such communications plans for either Subject or other such agents prior to their pre-mission briefing. Such emergency planning must be completely coordinated with CAS Headquarters prior to implementation.

10. Please advise if Subject was able to identify any of the Soviet individuals he met, utilizing the photographs which we loaned to you during our meeting on 19 December 1969. We would also appreciate learning if Subject is able to identify KUZNETSOV, KUZNETSOVA, and KHOKHLOVA, whose photographs are attached.

11. It is requested that your office return all photographs of the Soviets in Mexico which we have passed to you previously, including attached photographs.

Attachments:
1 - Photograph of KUZNETSOV
2 - Photograph of KUZNETSOVA
3 - Photograph of KHOKHLOVA

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. and 1 - 902 (w/att)
1 - SB/X/WH (for filing in AEMEASTRO 201-107668)
1 - SB/CI/O
1 - CI/LI
1 - CI/OPS
1 - 201-163926 (FEDIN)
1 - 201-744341 (KORMUSHKIN)
~~1~~ - 201-281412 (LOGINOV)
1 - 201-231160 (KOROLEV)
1 - 201-837202 (KUZNETSOV) (w/att 1&2)
1 - 201-269759 (KHOKHLOVA) (w/att 3)
1 - 201-893878 (SCILEASE-1)
1 - George tempo file
1 - Chrono

WH/1:LMOsborne:lmr/3E04 4157/1973

SECRET [illegible]

14-00000

479

Notes from the Debriefing of AEMIDRIFF - 20 to 23 February 1970

1969

10) Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV: He left on the 6th of October for Moscow, six months before the completion of his tour. He was head of the consular section and the lover of Raya. Apparently the causes for his sudden return were 1) having been Raya's lover; and 2) not having had good results from his work and, according to Raya, some kind of failure. He was in Mexico on two different occasions.

She states that during the time she was having an affair with Valentin LOGINOV, who was chief of the consular section, he occasionally took her out at night to places where she knows he made contact with persons who seemed to be Mexicans. She says that she doesn't know with which persons he made contact, nor if they were Mexicans or not, because she never saw them, but that he, on several occasions took her to these places: the Cine Mod on Lomas de Tecamachalco, the Cine Futurama in Colonia Lindavista, the drive-in theater called Autocinema del Valle, the drive-in called Autocinema Satelite and the Cine Tlaltelolco. When she accompanied him to those places, he left the car and she remained in it; that he would go for 10, 15 or 20 minutes to converse with those people. He never told her who these persons were nor what they talked about.

480

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
P.R. CESTARES, SB
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED
BY: 7 AT: 1815 Z
DISSEM BY 30 PER SOC .117
ACTION UNIT C/SB 5
ACTION NO. 020

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 5
SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.
X-REF TO CS FILE NO.
☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

PRECEDENCE

INFO: FILE, VR DDP, ADDP, C/CI, CAC, C/WH 2

S E C R E T 221715Z FEB 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2539 (PRALLETT ACTING)

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED REDTOP AEMIFRIFF FJPASTIME

22 FEB 70 IN 030146

REF MEXICO CITY 2517 (IN 028754)

1. DEBRIEFER REPORTS SLOW BUT STEADY PROGRESS WITH AEMIDRIFF, WHO BEGINNING TO ACCEPT DEBRIEFER AS FRIEND. LITEMPO-14 TAKING LEAD IN DEBRIEFING (WHICH AEMIDRIFF SEEMS PREFER AT THIS POINT), WITH DEBRIEFER CHIMING IN OCCASIONALLY AS "INTERPRETER". SINCE SPANISH IS COMMON LANGUAGE TO ALL THREE, MOST IF NOT ALL OF DEBRIEFING WILL BE IN SPANISH. L-14, WHO HANDLING AEMIDRIFF VERY WELL AND WHO VERY AMENABLE TO ALL SUGGESTIONS FROM DEBRIEFER, IS TAKING COMPLETE NOTES AND IS DICTATING NOTES ONTO TAPE. FIRST TAPE NOW BEING TRANSCRIBED. WILL CABLE HIGHLIGHTS.

2. AS OF EVENING 20 FEBRUARY, AEMIDRIFF HAD STARTED GOING THRU PHOTOS OF SOVIET PERSONNEL WITH DEBRIEFER AND L-14. EARLY READING IS THAT AEMIDRIFF HAS NO KNOWLEDGE INTEL ACTIVITIES OR CONTACTS AND PROBABLY LITTLE IN WAY OF OPS LEADS. HOWEVER, SHE SHOULD BE ABLE CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO IN-DEPTH KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET MISSION MEXICO CITY.

3. AEMIDRIFF IN GOOD SPIRITS AND ADJUSTING WELL, BUT IN SOMEWHAT POOR HEALTH, WITH COLD, FEVER BLISTERS, AND INTESTINAL PROBLEMS (FOR

AEMIDRIFF

LEE
ECD
JACK

201-285412

SECRET

P&L DISSEM
DESENSITIZED
CS COPY

1 00000

c/81

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT | INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2539 S E C R E T

WHICH SHE HAS MEDICINE).

4. RE PERSONAL HISTROY, AEMIDRIFF SAID SHE RAISED BY FAMILY OF GERMAN-SPEAKING UKRAINIAN JEWS. WAS MEMBER KONSOMOL FROM AGES 14 TO 28. SHE THEN LEFT KONSOMOL AND CLAIMS SHE DID NOT JOIN COMMUNIST PARTY BECAUSE SHE "MARRIED" NUCLEAR PHYSICIST NAMED MIKHAIL ALEKSANDROVICH ALEKSANDROV, WHO DIED AT AGE 28 IN 1967. ACTUALLY MARRIAGE NOT OFFICIAL SINCE MIKHAIL'S MOTHER WAS OPPOSED, BUT EVERYONE KNEW THEY LIVED TOGETHER. GERMAN WAS AEMIDRIFF'S MAIN LANGUAGE AT UNIVERSITY (SHE NOW CAN READ BUT NOT SPEAK IT, ALSO READS FRENCH AND KNOWS SOME ENGLISH WORDS). GOT JOB WITH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE, AND THRU INFLUENTIAL FRIENDS MADE THERE GOT TRAVELLING ASSIGNMENTS AFTER DEATH OF MIKHAIL. WENT TWICE TO LEIPZIG, ONCE TO EAST BERLIN, AND ONCE TO COLOGNE FOR SIX DAYS. SAYS SHE HAD WANTED TO COME TO MEXICO SINCE TIME, TEN YEARS AGO, WHEN SHE HEARD MEXICAN SINGERS WHO APPEARING MOSCOW.

5. AEMIDRIFF SAID SHE WENT AROUND WITH AEDIEHARD "ALL THE TIME" UNTIL HIS RECALL, BUT SAYS THAT RECALL WAS NOT CAUSED BY THIS AFFAIR. AEDIHARD WAS RECALLED DUE TO SOME "FIASCO" WHICH OCCURRED ABOUT THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO RECALL. AEMIDRIFF CLAIMS TO KNOW NO DETAILS. EARLIER STATEMENT THAT HE HAD BEEN RECALLED

SECRET

482

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT: FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 2539 SECRET

BECAUSE OF HER WAS APPARENTLY MEANT TO BE JOKE.

6. AEMIDRIFF DID NOT START GOING OUT WITH URUENA AND FRIENDS UNTIL AFTER AEDIEHARD DEPARTURE. SHE NOW SEEMS HAVE NO DESIRE SEE UREUNA, WHO SHE BELIEVES RAN OUT ON HER. SHE VAGUE ABOUT FUTURE PLANS, BUT SEEMED HAPPY TO LEARN SHE MIGHT BE ABLE STAY AT SAFESITE THRU END FEBRUARY.

7. DEBRIEFER BELIEVES AEMIDRIFF IS ESSENTIALLY APOLITICAL. SHE PROBABLY TELLING ALL, OR NEARLY ALL SHE KNOWS, PERHAPS HOLDING BACK AT PRESENT ON SOME PERSONAL THINGS.

8. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN SAFESITE AREA.

9. FILE 201-835670. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

483

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
MR. MESTRES (SB/X) VH

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED

BY: M AT: 2050 Z

DISSEM BY 42 PER SOP # 117

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES /2

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

PRECEDENCE II

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/SB5

INFO FILE, VR ADDP, DDP, C/CI, CDC, C/WH 2,

ACTION NO. 651

S E C R E T 141905Z FEB 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2472 (PRALLETT ACTING)

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

IN 025743
M

DESENSITIZED REDTOP AEMIDRIFF FJPASTIME

SECTION ONE OF TWO

REF: MEXICO CITY 2462 (IN 025422)

1. FOLLOWING IS GIST OF DEBRIEFING OF AEMIDRIFF EVENING 12 FEBRUARY BY LITEMPO-14.

2. SUBJECT WAS BORN 1939 (31 AUGUST PER IMMIGRATION DOCUMENT). MOTHER DIED IN CHILDBIRTH. FATHER WAS ENGINEER WORKING FOR GOVERNMENT WHO IN 1943, WHILE WORKING IN SIBERIAN FACTORY ON MILITARY PROJECT, WAS ACCUSED OF SABOTAGE. NEVER SAW HIM AGAIN. SHE WAS RAISED BY GIRLFIREND OF HER FATHER AND ONLY RELATIVE IN USSR IS MARRIED SISTER BORN ABOUT 1938. SUBJECT STUDIED LINGUISTICS AND GYMNASTICS AT UNIVERSITY OF MOSCOW. MARRIED (DATE NOT STATED) MIKHAIL LNU WHO WAS STUDENT OF PHYSICS AND MATH AT UNIVERSITY OF MOSCOW. HUSBAND DIED 1967 AS RESULT OF RADIATIONS RECEIVED IN EXPERIMENTS. SUBJECT WAS IN COLOGNE, WEST GERMANY, AT THAT TIME, WORKING AS AIDE AND INTERPRETER FOR SOVIET SCIENTIST OR LITERARY FIGURE. AFTER HUSBAND'S DEATH, SUBJECT WORKED AS INTERPRETER SEVERAL TIMES AT LEIPZIG FAIR. HAS ALSO BEEN IN EAST BERLIN.

?

This should be [illegible] HSP?

3. SUBJECT SAID SHE ACQUAINTED WITH UN TRANSLATOR RECENTLY

SECRET

P&L DISSEM
DESENSITIZED
CS COPY

201-285412

14-00000

484

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2472 SECRET

ARRESTED FOR ESPIONAGE (ALEXANDER V. TIKHOMIROV). MET HIM IN MOSCOW WHEN HE WAS STUDYING AT INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. AT THIS TIME SHE WORKING FOR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE, IN ADJACENT BUILDING. TIKHOMIROV HAD REPUTATION OF BEING ONE OF BEST TRANSLATORS OF HIS TIME.

4. SUBJECT EARNS 2500 PESOS (200 USD) PER MONTH PLUS SMALL QUANTITY RUBLES DEPOSITED IN MOSCOW. STATED SHE NEVER HAD OR HOLDS ON TO MONEY BECAUSE SHE ALWAYS LIKED TO BUY NICE THINGS.

5. EVER SINCE ARRIVAL IN MEXICO SUBJECT HAS BEEN REPRIMANDED FOR HER TASTES WHICH WERE "OUTSIDE EMBASSY NORM", ABOVE ALL IN MORAL QUESTIONS, BUT ALSO FOR DYEING HER HAIR, WEARING PANTS, AND NOT BUYING SAME CLOTHES EMBASSY WIVES USUALLY BOUGHT. SHE HAD FOLLOWING "MORAL" PROBLEMS:

A. SHE WAS MISTRESS OF FORMER HEAD OF CONSULAR SECTION (VALENTIN LOGINOV) WHO WAS SENT HOME WHEN THEIR RELATIONSHIP DISCOVERED. SHE HERSELF WAS PARDONED EVEN THOUGH THEY FIRST SAID SHE WOULD RETURN WITH LOGINOV.

B. ON 13 DECEMBER 69 SHE SNEAKED OFF TO CUERNAVACA WITH URUENA FOR WEEKEND. WHEN HER ABSENCE DISCOVERED ON 14 DECEMBER SOVIETS LOOKED ALL OVER MEXICO CITY AND EVEN ASKED

SECRET

485

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ____

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______
X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______
☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

2		5		
3		6		
4		7		
		8		

ACTION UNIT
INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 2472 SECRET

POLICE TO HELP LOOK. WHEN SHE RETURNED SHE WAS THOROUGHLY INTERROGRATED BUT DID NOT WANT TO REVEAL WITH WHOM SHE HAD GONE. ALEXANDR NIKITIN TOOK THE RAP, SAYING HE HAD BEEN WITH HER. FOR THIS REASON SHE WAS NOT PUNISHED BADLY, ALTHOUGH SHE WAS THREATENED WITH BEING SENT HOME. WHEN NIKITIN REALIZED THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE PUNISHED HE DENIED COMPLETELY THAT HE HAD BEEN WITH HER THAT WEEKEND.

6. SUBJECT MET URUENA ABOUT ONE YEAR AGO AT PARTY GIVEN BY HER FORMER CHIEF (VIKTOR IVANOV, WHOM SUBJECT DESCRIBED AS VERY NICE PERSON WHO LOVED TO GIVE PARTIES AND WHO HAD MANY MEXICAN CONTACTS). SAW URUENA FREQUENTLY AS HE REPRESENTED MEXICAN FIRM DEALING WITH COMMERCIAL OFFICE (DOROCO). ALL HER CONTACTS WITH MEXICAN FRIENDS WERE MADE THROUGH URUENA. (SUBJECT STATED SHE MET MANY OTHER MEXICANS, WHOSE NAMES SHE DOES NOT RECALL, IN HER FREQUENT VISITS TO MUSEUMS, THEATERS, AND OTHER PUBLIC PLACES. SOMETIMES THESE MEXICANS WOULD PICK HER UP AND BRING HER HOME, ALTHOUGH SHE NEVER TOLD THEM HER NAME OR OCCUPATION.) THROUGH URUENA SUBJECT MET GROUP OF FREE-SPENDING YOUTHS, MANY OF SPANISH BACKGROUND (AS IS URUENA), AND SHE ENJOYED GOING OUT WITH THEM.

AY
SAID SHE HAD ALWYAS BEEN FREE SPIRIT WHO DID NOT LIKE THE

SECRET

14-00000

486

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ____

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 2472 S E C R E T

RESTRICTIONS CUSTOMARY IN HER COUNTRY AND, THEREFORE, SHE WOULD OFTEN GO TO THE MOVIES BEHIND THE BACKS OF HER EMBASSY AND HER CHIEFS. IT WAS IN THIS WAY SHE BEGAN TO GO OUT WITH URUENA AND HIS GROUP. SHE SAID THAT HER CHARACTER HAD ALWAYS BEEN A LITTLE ADVENTUROUS AND AT TIMES CAUSED HER PROBLEMS (LITEMPO-14 COMMENTED THAT FROM HER CONVERSATION IT CLEAR SHE IS GIRL OF " NOT VERY STRICT MORAL CONDUCT." ON THE CONTARY, SHE IS WOMAN WHO ENJOYS CONTACT WITH MALES VERY MUCH.)

7. SUBJECT DECIDED STAY IN MEXICO WHEN SHE LEARNED SHE TO BE SENT HOME 8 FEBRUARY (ORIGINAL DATE WAS 4 FEBRUARY). LEARNED THIS FROM MALE COLLEAGUE (THUS FAR UNIDENTIFIED) WHO WAS DRUNK. DOES NOT KNOW IF COLLEAGUE TOLD HER OUT OF KINDNESS OR DRUNKENNESS. SHE IN TURN TOLD URUENA WHO SAID HE WOULD FIND HELP, SAID HE COULD NOT HELP PERSONALLY BUT WOULD GIVE HER KEYS TO HIS APARTMENT. ON 6 FEBRUARY SHE SUSPECTED PROVOCATION WHEN, AS SHE ENTERED LOCAL PHARMACY, TWO WOMEN APPROACHED HER PROPOSING THAT SHE REMAIN IN MEXICO. NOT KNOWING HOW THESE WOMEN COULD KNOW THAT SHE WAS RETURNING, SHE SUSPECTED THAT THE WOMEN HAD BEEN SENT BY HER EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY SINCE SHE HAD JUST SEEN FIRST SECRETARY "BORIS" (PROBABLY KOLOMYAKOV, POSSIBLY CHMYKHOV). BORIS HAD

SECRET

487

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 2472 SECRET

ALWAYS GREETED HER AFFECTIONATELY BUT THIS TIME, ON SEEING HER, HE IGNORED HER. ON 7 FEBRUARY SHE AGAIN ASKED URUENA FOR HELP, SAYING IF HE DID NOT THERE WAS NO WAY OUT-- EITHER SHE RETURNED TO SOVIET UNION AND SUFFERED CONSEQUENCES, OR SHE COMMITTED SUCIDE IN MEXICO. URUENA THEN INTRODUCED HER TO ONE RICARDO FIERRO, WHO HID HER FOR TWO DAYS. (STATION COMMENT: THIS VERSION OF SEQUENCE OF EVENTS APPEARS SOMEWHAT GARBLED. ADDITIONAL DETAIL RE ACTUAL ESCAPE CAME IN CONVERSATION WITH FLUTEO WHEN SUBJECT SAID SHE HAD RECEIVED PERMISSION TO GO TO FAREWELL PARTY 7 FEBRUARY. PARTY WAS IN APARTMENT IN WHICH SHE TOOK REFUGE.)

8. SINCE DEFECTION SUBJECT HAS BEEN TRYING TO FIND URUENA, WHO WAS DUE TO RETURN FROM MONTERREY, WHERE HE HAD GONE ON 6 FEBRUARY. RICARDO FIERRO HAS BEEN GO-BETWEEN, AND HE REPORTED ON 11 FEBRUARY, THAT "DUE TO THE SITUATION" URUENA COULD NOT MOVE.

9. URUENA'S SISTER MARI, WHO WORKS FOR MAGAZINE "GENTE," CALLED SUBJECT WHEN SHE LEARNED OF BOMB EXPLOSION ACROSS STREET FROM COMMERCIAL OFFICE (CASE WHICH RESULTED IN FIRST REMOVAL OF LITEMPO-12 PER PARA 1 MEXICO CITY 2444). MARI KNEW THAT MAN WHO HAD BEEN KILLED WAS CLOSE FRIEND OF TRADE MISSION CHAUFFEUR DANIEL MONTIEL (WHO HAS WORKED FOR TRADE MISSION FOR 15 YEARS.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

488

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 5
2 6
7
4 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 6 MEXICO CITY 2472 S E C R E T

10. CONFRONTATION OF SUBJECT IN GOVERNACION WAS ATTENDED BY OLEG NECHIPORENKO, CHARGE BORIS KAZANTSEV, AND ONE OTHER SOVIET (IDENTITY NOT CLEAR). SUBJECT STATED ALL THREE SPOKE TO HER NICELY, SAYING THAT IF SHE NEEDED ANYTHING SUCH AS MONEY OR CLOTHING, THEY WOULD SEND IT TO HER. THEY WERE HER FRIENDS AND WERE ONLY TRYING TO HELP HER. BUT AT END OF INTERVIEW WHEN SHE SAID THAT SHE WAS REMAINING IN MEXICO AND IT WAS BETTER THAT THEY FORGOT ABOUT HER, KAZANTSEV TOLD HER THAT "THE LONGER SHE STAYED THE WORSE IT WOULD BE FOR HER WHEN SHE RETURNED."

11. FILE: 201-835670.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

989

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, SB via Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
RADTOP/MKCRUSH
Assessment of AEDIKHARD

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HMMA 37833, 12 September 1969
B. HMMA 37926, 10 October 1969

1. The two Personality Assessment Questionnaires on AEDIKHARD which were transmitted as separate cover attachments to Reference A were unfortunately not received until 30 September, by which date we knew from a visa cable sent the State Department by the Embassy in Mexico City that AEDIKHARD was departing PCS one week thereafter, on 7 October. Reference B confirmed that departure.

2. Since but one week was available for the completion of the MKCRUSH assessment, and its transmittal to the Station, we decided not to go ahead with it. The PAQ's have been made a part of AEDIKHARD's file, and should he appear in the future outside the USSR, an assessment can be made at that time.

Norma W. LETCHWORTH

Distribution:
3-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW 17572

DATE
7 NOV 1969
5 November 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-285412
201-285412

SB/X/WH
SB/mc
C/WH/1
SB/CI/O
RID

AN
AB
IN
IS
IT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SB/X/WH	D.Davis	bm	6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CSB/X/WH	5/11	J M
SB/CI/O	[illegible] 1969	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	6/11/69	

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

490

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP
Anatoliy Sergeyevich MAZURIN (201-)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: DIRECTOR 27830, 7 August 1969

1. LIFIRE reported the PCS arrival in Mexico City of the MAZURIN family on 20 October 1969 aboard Air France flight 707 from New York City. Subject travelled on Soviet Diplomatic Passport D-027105 and his wife, Lidiya Petrovna, and son, Andrey, travelled on Soviet Diplomatic Passport D-027106.

2. Per Reference cable, Subject was scheduled to replace Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412). Subject will be replacing LOGINOV in slot but apparently not in position. Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870) was introduced at LOGINOV's farewell reception at the Soviet Embassy as LOGINOV's successor as "Head of the Consular Section." Since we do not have passport coverage on Air France flights, we were unable to obtain Subject's passport, which would indicate his title.

3. Subject was escorted into the Soviet Embassy on his first day in Mexico by NECHIPORENKO.

4. Photographs and further information on Subject will be forwarded when received.

5. A 201 number for Subject is requested.

for/John A. PROBERT

Distribution:
2 - C/SB
1 - C/WH

CS COPY FILED IN 50-8-10

file in
201-285412

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-38043

DATE
30 October 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-285412
[redacted]

991

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

49

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK. IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI/LS 2-C-35		31 OCT 1969		
2.				
3. SB/X/DO				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. SB/BIO		NOV 5 1969	DEC 9 1969	
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-285412

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

1037766

492

FBI DOCUMENTS   LANDING CARDS

DATE: 17 OCTOBER 1969

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: LOGINOV, VALENTIN S.
LOGINOV, DMITRY V.
LOGINOVA, ALEXANDRA T.

4-00000

493

ORIG: Charles V. Belt
UNIT: WH/1 3E04
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 16 October 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 41 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8
INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/CA,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T 17 23 40 Z OCT 69 CITE DIRECTOR 47566

TO MEXICO CITY

REDLEG AEDIEHARD AEKICK

REF: A) MEXICO CITY-1638 (IN 62539)*

B) DIRECTOR-14106, 21 JUNE 69**

1. SUBJECT OF REF ASSIGNED 201-853538. Jimmy Sabori

2. REF B ADVISED NO RECORD SUBJECT. RETRACES UNDER NAME VARIATION IN PRQ NEGATIVE. COVERT NAME CHECKS WITH NATIONAL AGENCIES PENDING.

3. STATION IS REQUESTED TO CONTINUE PROCESSING CASE UNDER CSI-F-10-5, PARA 19. PRIMARY EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON SUBJECT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AEDIEHARD (201-285412) WHO HAS BEEN CULTIVATING SUBJECT SINCE FEBRUARY 69. SUBJECT EVIDENTLY ATTRACTIVE TO AEKICK ON BASIS WIDE RANGE OF CONTACTS AMONG PROMINENT MEXICANS.

FILE: 201-853538; 201-285412.

END OF MESSAGE

201-285412

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

494

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE DIRECTOR 47566

TO

PAGE TWO

WH Comment: *Request Headquarters and National Agencies traces.

**Forwarded early Headquarters traces.

SB/X/WH ______

[redacted]

CI/OPS/WH ______

CI/OA J. F. Kelly

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

495

STATE DEPT TELEGRAM

MEXICO 5364

DATE: 1 OCTOBER 1969

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: VISAS HOSSE VALENTIN LOGUINOV..

496

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, SB Division		XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT REDTOP AEKICK
Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Subject, accompanied by his wife, Aleksandra Dmitriyevna, and son, Dmitriy, departed Mexico City PCS on 7 October 1969. They travelled to New York via Air France flight 700. From New York they would fly Aeroflot to Moscow.

2. Subject and his wife were honored by several going-away parties, one of which was given on 1 October at the Soviet Embassy.

3. Subject stated several times before he left that he hoped that he would return to Mexico and said that there was a good chance he would come back.

4. Subject introduced Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870) as his replacement as Chief of the Consular Office of the Soviet Embassy. Subject replaced NECHIPORENKO as Vice-Consul when he arrived PCS in August 1965.

5. We do not have any information as yet as to the arrival of Anatoliy Sergeyevich MAZURIN (201-), who according to DIRECTOR 27630, 7 August 1969, is scheduled to replace LOGINOV.

6. Forwarded herewith is transit visa information as well as copies of the passports used by Subject and his wife.

Grace H Tannelant
for/John A. PROBERT

Attachment:
Passport and visa h/w

MICROFILMED
OCT 23 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
(2) - C/SB w/att h/w
1 - C/WH w/o att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-305870	HMMA-37928	10 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412 201-28541

497

22P

10/1
5:00

No. 288

La Embajada de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas saluda muy atentamente a la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América y tiene el honor de solicitar que se sirva extender las visas de tránsito en los pasaportes diplomáticos del Sr. VALENTIN LOGUINOV, Tercer Secretario de la Embajada de la URSS en México, su esposa Sra. ALEXANDRA LOGUINOVA, con el hijo DMITRI.

Las personas mencionadas salen de México a Nueva York el día 7 de octubre de 1969 por la Cía "Air France" y van a continuar su viaje rumbo a Moscú el día 10 de octubre por la Cía "Aeroflot".

Flight 700

La Embajada de la URSS agradece de antemano la atención que la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América tenga a bien de prestar a esta solicitud y aprovecha la oportunidad para reiterar las seguridades de su más alta y distinguida consideración.

México, D.F. 30 de septiembre de 1969.

A LA EMBAJADA DE LOS ESTADOS
UNIDOS DE AMERICA

MICROFILMED
OCT 23 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

[illegible]

COPY

[illegible]

14-00000

498

APELLIDO LoGINOV	**NOMBRE** VALENTIN	**SEGUNDO NOMBRE**	**DOCUMENTO DE VIAJE** Pasap. diplom.
RESIDENCIA Ignacio Esteva 21 - 2			
FECHA Y LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO Moscú	**DIA** 23 **MES** 12 **AÑO** 1927		**TEZ**
CABELLO	**OJOS**	**ESTATURA**	**NACIONALIDAD** Ruso
SEÑAS			
ESTADO CIVIL ☒ C ☐ S ☐ V ☐ D	**SEXO** ☒ M ☐ F	**PROFESION** diplomat	**DURACION Y PROPOSITO DE ESTANCIA EN LOS EE.UU.** transito, 7-9.10.69

Entiendo que la posesión de una visa no le concede al portador el derecho de entrar a los EE.UU. si al llegar al puerto de entrada se descubre que es inadmisible.

Certifico que la información que figura en la presente solicitud, inclusive cualesquiera declaraciones que formen parte de la misma, ha sido suministrada por mí y es correcta y completa según mi saber y entender.

El solicitante fué entrevistado por mí y su solicitud fué firmada en mi presencia.

de

V. Loginov

(Firma del solicitante)

Suministrado gratis por la Oficina Consular de los EE.UU.

FORM 2-61 FS-257 (SPANISH)

Form Approved
BB No. 47-R107.10

499

APELLIDO LOGINOV **NOMBRE** VALENTIN **SEGUNDO NOMBRE**

DOCUMENTO DE VIAJE pas. dipl.

RESIDENCIA Ignacio Esteva 21-2

FECHA Y LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO Moscú **DIA** 23 **MES** 12 **AÑO** 1923

TEZ

CABELLO	**OJOS**	**ESTATURA**	**NACIONALIDAD** Ruso	**SEÑAS**
ESTADO CIVIL ☒ C ☐ S ☐ V ☐ D	**SEXO** ☒ M ☐ F	**PROFESION**	**DURACION Y PROPOSITO DE ESTANCIA EN LOS EE.UU.**	

Entiendo que la posesión de una visa no le concede al portador el derecho de entrar a los EE.UU. si al llegar al puerto de entrada se descubre que es inadmisible.

Certifico que la información que figura en la presente solicitud, inclusive cualesquiera declaraciones que forman parte de la misma, ha sido examinada por mí y es correcta y completa según mi saber y entender.

El solicitante fué entrevistado por mí y su solicitud fué firmada en mi presencia.

(Firma del solicitante)

Suministrado gratis por la Oficina Consular de los EE.UU.

FORM 2-62 FS-257 (SPANISH)

Form Approved
BB No. 47-R187.10

8

500



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 010264

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ

ПАСПОРТ

Д № 010264

501



Предъявитель сего, гражданин СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

ЛОГИНОВ Валентин Сергеевич,

Третий Секретарь Посольства СССР в Мексике,

отправляется за границу

ИМЕНЕМ СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Министерство Иностранных Дел просит все гражданские и военные власти СССР и Дружественных Государств пропускать беспрепятственно владельца настоящего паспорта и оказывать ему всяческое содействие.

Паспорт действителен на ПЯТЬ ЛЕТ

г. Москва, 24 июня 1965 года

М. П.

Заместитель Министра
Иностранных Дел СССР

502



Traduction.

Le titulaire du présent, citoyen...... de L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Valentin LOGUINOV,

Troisième Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS

au Mexique,

se rend à l'étranger

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Ce passeport est valable pour cinq ans

Moscou, le 24 Juin 1965

L. S.

Le Suppléant du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de l'URSS

Pour traduction conforme: PL

14-00000

503

Отметки о продлении паспорта. Renouvellement.

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен
по „........“.......................................19........ г.
Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé
Jusqu'au „........“.......................................19........
„........“.......................................19........ г.
м. п.
le „........“.......................................19........
Подпись
Signature ....

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен
по „........“.......................................19........ г.
Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé
Jusqu'au „........“.......................................19........
„........“.......................................19........ г.
м. п.
le „........“.......................................19........
Подпись
Signature ....

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен
по „........“.......................................19........ г.
Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé
Jusqu'au „........“.......................................19........
„........“.......................................19........ г.
м. п.
le „........“.......................................19........
Подпись
Signature ....

— 7 —



ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№ 532504/1

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до „01“ ноября 19 55 г.

через любой пограничный пункт

м. п. Подпись

— 8 —

504



СССР
ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА
№ 085509
* I У 25 0367 *
Москва 46
ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР
до „07" [illegible]
[illegible] 19 67 г.
через любой пограничный пункт
м. п. Подпись

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА
№..................
ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР
до „......" ....
.............................19......... г.
через любой пограничный пункт
м. п. Подпись

— 9 —

Визы. Visas.

EMBAJADA DE MEXICO en la
U. R. S. S.-
VISA DIPLOMATICA No. 136
VALIDA por [illegible]
Deberá utilizarse antes
del día :
Moscú, III 8
Julio 6 [illegible] 1965

Encargado de Negocios a. i.
Fernando Elías Calles

— 10 —

14-00000

505



Визы. Visas.

— 11 —

Визы. Visas.

DE/65/SU 1601

DIPLOMATIQUE / DIPLOMATIEK / DIPLOMATIC
VISA
de transit / voor transit / for transit

Valable pour
Geldig voor Benelux/ —
Valid for

Délivré le / Afgegeven op / Issued on 13. 07. 1964

Ce visa est valable pour un/deux transit(s)
Dit visum is geldig voor een/twee doorreis(en)
This visa is valid for one/two transit(s)

à effectuer avant
te volbrengen vóór
to be completed before 13.10.19

Faites contrôler votre passeport à la frontière
... stamped at the frontier.

Ambassade de Belgique
Ambassade van België
à Moscou
te Moskou

LEENTHAVEN
12
ARNHEM

77

— 12 —

14-00000

506



Виз. Visas.

— 13 —

ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS
Виз. Visas.
SECRETARIA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
DIRECCION GENERAL DEL CEREMONIAL

Visa DIPLOMATICA Número 304

SE AUTORIZA AL TITULAR DE ESTE PASAPORTE
Sr. Valentin Loguinov
Secretario de la
Embajada de la URSS

PARA SALIR Y ENTRAR A MEXICO DURANTE EL
TERMINO DE 6 OCT 1967

MEXICO, D. F. 26 JUL 1967

...TE DEL CEREMONIAL
Cortés O
...AN CORTES C...AYA

SECRETARIA DE
RELACIONES EXT.
DIRECCION GENERAL DEL CEREMONIAL

Д. Nº 010264

— 14 —

14-00000

507



Визы. Visas.

— 15 —

Визы. Visas.

LE BOURGET

R.th. du Boullay

Д № 010264

— 16 —

508



Визы. Visas.

AMBASSADE DER NEDERLANDEN
MOSKOU

No. ___

DIPLOMATIQUE/DIPLOMATIEK

5 AUG 1957

VISA

de transit/voor transit/for transit

Valable pour:
Geldig voor: Benelux
Valid for:
Délivré le/Afgegeven op/Issued on

Ce visa est valable pour un/deux transit(s)
Dit visum is geldig voor een/twee doorreis(zen)
This visa is valid for one/two transit(s)
à effectuer avant
te volbrengen voor
to be completed before

Attention: Faites estampiller votre passeport à la frontière
Opgelet: Paspoort aan de grens laten afstempelen
Attention: Passport to be stamped at the frontier

DE AMBASSADEUR,
voor deze,

Signature et sceau
Handtekening en stempel

Д № 010264

— 17 —

— 18 —

14-00000

509

APELLIDO Logùinora	NOMBRE Alexandra	SEGUNDO NOMBRE	DOCUMENTO DE VIAJE pas dip.

RESIDENCIA Ignacio Esteban 21-2

FECHA Y LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO Moscú	DIA 20	MES 8	AÑO 28	TEZ

CABELLO	OJOS	ESTATURA	NACIONALIDAD	SEÑAS

ESTADO CIVIL ☒ C ☐ S ☐ V ☐ D	SEXO ☐ M ☑ F	PROFESION hogar	DURACION Y PROPOSITO DE ESTANCIA EN LOS EE.UU. tránsito 7.10-9.10

Entiendo que la posesión de una visa no le concede al portador el derecho de entrar a los EE.UU. si al llegar al puerto de entrada se descubre que es inadmisible.

Certifico que la información que figura en la presente solicitud, incluso cualesquiera declaraciones que formen parte de la misma, ha sido examinada por mí y es correcta y completa según mi saber y entender.

El solicitante fué entrevistado por mí y su solicitud fué firmada en mi presencia.

(Firma del solicitante)

Suministrado gratis por la Oficina Consular de los EE.UU.

FORM 2-62 FS-257 (SPANISH)

Form Approved
BB No. 47-R107



~~[illegible]~~

201-285412



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 010265

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № 010265

Предъявитель сего, гражданка СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

ЛОГИНОВА Александра Дмитриевна,

супруга Третьего Секретаря Посольства СССР

в Мексике,

отправляется за границу с сыном Дмитрием, 1959 г.р.

ИМЕНЕМ СОЮЗА
СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Министерство Иностранных Дел просит все гражданские и военные власти СССР и Дружественных Государств пропускать беспрепятственно владельца настоящего паспорта и оказывать ему всяческое содействие.

Паспорт действителен на ПЯТЬ ЛЕТ

г. Москва, 24 июня I965 года

М. П.

Заместитель Министра
Иностранных Дел СССР

14-00000

512

Traduction.

Le titulaire du présent, citoyenne de L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Alexandra LOGUINOVA,

épouse du Troisième Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS au Mexique,

se rend à l'étranger avec son fils Dmitri, né en 1959

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Ce passeport est valable pour cinq ans

Moscou, le 24 Juin 1965

L. S.

Le Suppléant du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de l'URSS

Pour traduction conforme: PL

14-00000

513



Отметки о продлении паспорта. Renouvellement.

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен
по „......“..........................19........ г.
Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé
Jusqu'au „......“..........................19........
м. п. „......“..........................19...... г.
le „......“..........................19........
Подпись
Signature ....

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен
по „......“..........................19........ г.
Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé
Jusqu'au „......“..........................19........
м. п. „......“..........................19...... г.
le „......“..........................19........
Подпись
Signature ....

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен
по „......“..........................19........ г.
Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé
Jusqu'au „......“..........................19........
м. п. „......“..........................19...... г.
le „......“..........................19........
Подпись
Signature ....

— 7 —

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№ 332505

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР
01 — ([illegible])
до „......“ [illegible] 19 65 г.
через любой пограничный пункт
м. п. Подпись

— 8 —

514

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

СССР

№ [illegible] 25 08[illegible]

Москва 61

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до „07" (первого) [illegible]

[illegible] 19 67 г.

через любой пограничный пункт

м. п. Подпись

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№............

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до „......"..........

.... 19...... г.

через любой пограничный пункт

м. п. Подпись

Визы. Visas.

EMBAJADA DE MEXICO en la U.R.S.S.-

VISA DIPLOMATICA No. 137

VALIDA por [illegible]

Deberá utilizarse antes del dia : ____

Moscú, JUL 6 1965.

Encargado de Negocios a.i.

[illegible] Elías Calles

5 15



Визы. Visas.

Accompagné de son fils [illegible]

Визы. Visas.

BE/65/SU [illegible]

Nº

DIPLOMATIQUE / DIPLOMATIEK / DIPLOMATIC

VISA

de transit / voor transit / for transit

Valable pour
Geldig voor Benelux/ —
Valid for

Délivré le / Afgegeven op / Issued on 13.07.1964

Ce visa est valable pour un/deux transit(s)
Dit visum is geldig voor een/twee doorreis(zen)
This visa is valid for one/two transit(s)

à effectuer avant
[illegible]
to be completed before 12.10.1964

Faites contrôler votre passeport à la frontière
[illegible] afstempelen.
Have your passport stamped at the frontier.

à Moscou
te Moskou

14-00000

S.16

Визы. Visas.

ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS

Визы. Visas.

SECRETARIA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

DIRECCION GENERAL DEL CEREMONIAL

Visa diplomática Número 305

SE AUTORIZA AL TITULAR DE ESTE PASAPORTE

Sra. Alexandra Loguinova e hijo menor, esposa del Secretario de la Embajada de la URSS Valentin Loguinov

PARA SALIR Y ENTRAR A MEXICO DURANTE EL TERMINO DE 26 OCT 1967

MEXICO, D. F. 25 JUL 1967

SECRETARIA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES No 01026

DIRECCION GENERAL DEL CEREMONIAL

EL JEFE DEL CEREMONIAL

JUAN CORTES CENAYA

517



Визы. Visas.

Визы. Visas.

[illegible]
15 JUIL 1967
[illegible]

LE BOURGET
15 JUIL 1967
[illegible]

R.Th. du Boulay

Д № 010265

5 18



Визы. Visas.

AMBASSADE DER NEDERLANDEN

MOSCOU

Визы. Visas.

No.

DIPLOMATIQUE/DIPLOMATIEK/DIPLOMATIC

VISA

de transit/voor transit/transit

Valable pour:
Geldig voor: Benelux
Valid for:

Délivré le/Afgegeven op/Issued on

Ce visa est valable pour un/deux transit(s)
Dit visum is geldig voor een/twee doorreis(zen)
This visa is valid for one/two transit(s)
Le transit doit être
De doorreis moet
to be completed before

Attention! Faites estampiller votre passeport à la frontière
Opgelet! Paspoort aan de grens laten afstempelen
Attention! Passport to be stamped at the frontier

DE AMBASSADEUR,
voor deze,

Signature et sceau
Handtekening en stempel

25 AUG 1967

Д № 010265

14-00000

519

ʟBLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	ʟASSIFIED MES	TOTAL COPIES 21	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S ET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

1	W/H	5	
2	CI	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH-8 INFO FILE, VR SB-8 CI, CI/OPS, RI/AN

ACTION NO. 097

SECRET 092300Z OCT 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1638

DIRECTOR

9 OCT 69 IN 62539

M

REDLEG AEDIEHARD AEKICK (IN91241)

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 0810, 27 JUNE 1969

B. HMMA 37513, 14 JULY 1969

C. HMMA 37846, 22 SEPTEMBER 1969

1. REFS PROVIDED FULL BIO DATA AND REQUESTED TRACES JIMMY SABORI. TO DATE NO REPLY RECEIVED.

2. REQUEST RESULTS RVROCK AND LNHARP AGENCY TRACES ASAP.

3. FILE: 201- SABORI.

SECRET

SECRET

201-285412

14-00000

520

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R ET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP AEKICK
Subject of References

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. MEXICO CITY 0810, 27 June 1969
B. HMMA-37513, 14 July 1969

Action Required: See below

1. Reference A requested Headquarters to re-trace Subject under name variant and full biographic data which was forwarded therein. Reference B forwarded a completed PRQ Part I on Subject. We would appreciate receiving the results of Headquarters traces as well as Subject's 201-number (please note that AEDIEHARD's 201-number was inadvertently used on Reference B).

2. As part of the effort to establish Subject's bona fides, we would appreciate receiving a license plate resolution on the following vehicle, which was driven by Subject to a 7 July 1969 meeting.

Car: Pontiac Bonneville (year not known)
Color: Blue with light top
License: HRD 755 Texas, Hemisfair (1968) plates.
Black plates.

for/John A. PROBERT

Distribution:
2 - C/SB
1 - C/WH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-37846

DATE
22 September 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201- 235412

14-00000

521

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP AEKICK AEDIEHARD
Transmittal of PAQ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For review by MKCRUSH

Transmitted herewith are two Personality Assessment Questionnaires completed by LIBACON-1 and IDENTITY on AEDIEHARD. The Station would welcome any comments or assessment MKCRUSH might make on the basis of these reports. The Station is not retaining copies of these PAQs.

John D Arizmendi
for/John A. PROBERT

Attachment:
1. IDENTITY u/s/c
2. PAQ h/w

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 24 SEP 69

Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att h/w and u/s/c
1 - C/WH w/att #1 u/s/c; w/o att #2
3 att.

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-37833

DATE
12 September 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-285412
201-285412

14-00000

522

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDLEG
LIBACON-1 Progress Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References:
A. HMMW-17178, 26 March 1969
B. HMMA-36817, 28 March 1969
C. HMMA-36881, 8 April 1969

1. Forwarded herewith is Bruce H. FERNALD's progress report on LIBACON-1, covering the period 30 January to 15 August 1969.

2. As FERNALD's report indicates, steady progress has been made in developing LIBACON-1 into a responsive agent. LIBACON-1's credentials vis-a-vis the Soviets are excellent, and he is learning to use these credentials to the Station's benefit. He was reluctant at first, possibly because he did not want to do the same thing for RVROCK that he refused to do for AEKICK. Patient handling by FERNALD seems to have overcome this reluctance, and LIBACON-1 now responds well to direction.

3. So far, there seems to be no reason to suspect the sincerity of LIBACON-1's relationship with RVROCK. He developed strong personal affection and professional respect for both KARTASUK and FERNALD, and his turnover to Douglas F. DITMANSON on 14 August 1969 represents an effort to strengthen the emotional attachment, which seems to be so important to him, by providing him with a case officer who speaks his native tongue. And, although LIBACON-1's private life is a mess, we will watch closely to see that this does not cause any greater problem than occasional missed meetings and delays in completing assignments.

4. In the next phase of LIBACON-1's activity, we expect to concentrate on two things:

a. Strengthening the ties with AEDIKHARD (there have been indications that AEDIKHARD's tour may not be ending shortly after all, in which case he will remain a prime Station target).

b. Spotting additional agent prospects, as suggested by Reference A.

for/Horace E. PRALLETT

Attachment
Progress Report h/w
IDENS u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - C/WH w/att h/w and u/s/c
① - C/SB w/att h/w and u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-37762

DATE
27 August 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201 215412
301-288043

523

SECRET

H/W Attachment to HMMA-37762, 27 August 1969

24 August 1969

PROGRESS REPORT

Subject : LIBACON-1

Period Covered: January 30 to August 14, 1969

1. LIBACON-1 was recruited by Samuel J. KARTASUK on January 30 and was handled by him until March 26. During this period they held nine ops meetings.

2. Bruce H. FERNALD took over LIBACON-1 on March 26 and handled him to August 14, when he turned him over to Douglas F. DITMANSON. During this period 16 ops meetings were held.

3. After a fine recruitment job KARTASUK also accomplished the difficult task of converting LIBACON-1's agreement to work for KARTASUK personally into a regular working arrangement.

4. Of the nine meetings KARTASUK held with LIBACON-1, actually only six were working meetings. Info was obtained on LIBACON-1's personal background as well as his ops potential. LIBACON-1 was SGSWIRLED with satisfactory results. Further, LIBACON-1 was motivated to work for us and he was mentally prepared to accept another handler. During this period the condition which LIBACON-1 had placed on his agreement to work for us was respected (i.e., that he would not be asked to report on his personal friends such as Spaniards, his students, or Mexicans to whom he was emotionally attached). LIBACON-1 did complete for KARTASUK a 15-line written report on AEDIEHARD.

5. FERNALD encountered no problems in getting along with and handling LIBACON-1, whom he got accustomed to following instructions and to submitting reports in writing.

6. LIBACON-1's initial attitude was that he had agreed to work, or more accurately, to assist us in our work against AEKICK, but he was determined to keep himself away from everybody and everything associated with AEKICK. He did not see AEDIEHARD for more than four months, and when they met accidentally in a resort, LIBACON-1 was decisively turning down everything AEDIEHARD asked for. He went so far as to accept a luncheon appointment with AEDIEHARD, and then a day before it was to take place he postponed it indefinitely.

SECRET

524

7. FERNALD succeeded in convincing LIBACON-1 that he should maintain social or friendly personal contact with AEDIEHARD and his colleagues and that he could do it without either giving in to his or their demands, or at the other extreme, without saying no to everything they mention or ask for. LIBACON-1 followed instructions and went to AEDIEHARD's office to ask him why he had not called him for ten weeks. The result was that LIBACON-1 had two luncheon meetings with AEDIEHARD in July, and on August 8 LIBACON-1 and his wife were dinner guests of AEDIEHARD and his wife at their apartment. The AEDIEHARDs agreed to come to LIBACON-1's place for a farewell dinner in September and in the meanwhile LIBACON-1 and AEDIEHARD will meet for a luncheon on August 29.

8. FERNALD insisted from the beginning of his handling of LIBACON-1 that the latter prepare bio sketches on the MHHARSHers he knew personally and on Spaniards who had lived in the USSR. LIBACON-1 prepared bio sketches, which are actually personality assessments, on AEDIEHARD, IDENTITY A, IDENTITY B, IDENTITY C, and IDENTITY D. The latter two reports showed that he would also report on two Spaniards who are close friends of his, in spite of his earlier conditions. Further, FERNALD instructed LIBACON-1 to contact a good friend of his (IDENTITY E) when the latter returned from a longer trip to Czechoslovakia. LIBACON-1 carried out the assignment well and reported (orally) about IDENTITY E's observations, impressions and conclusions concerning what he saw and heard during his stay in his country. IDENTITY E is also a good personal friend of LIBACON-1.

9. From the above it can be seen that LIBACON-1 has developed into a person who has confidence in us, and he accepts without reservation that we know what we are doing.

10. In analyzing LIBACON-1's written reports it can easily be seen that LIBACON-1 takes his assignments seriously and when he makes a statement about a person he is scrupulous about drawing only that conclusion which can be corroborated with facts. LIBACON-1 is equally serious and reliable when he reports about his meetings with AEDIEHARD: He first reports the course of the meeting and reports AEDIEHARD's statements verbatim, as much as possible. Then, he uses his area knowledge and the knowledge of the person to relay the actual meaning of the statements. FERNALD not only believes that LIBACON-1's reporting is reliable, but he also feels that one can depend on LIBACON-1 to use his knowledge of the area and people to separate the appearance and verbiage from the facts, be they good or bad.

11. An assessment of the moral and political reliability of LIBACON-1, from the point of view of his work and activity on our behalf can only be favorable. The same cannot be said when one views his personal life. In this field he has many problems, which, generally speaking, are a result of the fact that while he is intellectually mature (or at least adequately mature for his age),

525

when it comes to emotions he acts like a teen-ager. LIBACON-1 is aware of this fact and he ascribes it to the fact that he grew under conditions of regimentation and moral terror; and when he found himself in a world in which people live free and there are no restrictions on personal activities, as long as they do not violate the laws of the country, he remained possessed by the desire to enjoy this freedom. Fortunately, his personal immaturity affects his work for us only to the extent that he occasionally may not complete an assessment; but when he does do a job he does it very well.

12. To conclude: Although LIBACON-1 has his problems, there are restricted to the area which does not affect his reliability, dependability and loyalty to us and our cause. It is felt that LIBACON-1 will be still more productive and easier developed when handled by a case officer speaking Russian; i.e., the language of his formative years.

Bruce H. FERNALD

526

SECRET

u/s/c Attachment to HMMA-37762, 27 August 1969

IDENTITIES

IDENTITY A - Vasil CHICHKOV (201-207254)

IDENTITY B - Aleksandr BROVKIN (201-185114)

IDENTITY ~~C -~~ Ricardo CASTELLOTE

IDENTITY D - Carmen CASTELLOTE de WOLNY

IDENTITY E - Karel WENDEL (201-267892)

SECRET

527

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
VOICE SAMPLE ATTACHED

050-008-010
HMMA-37724
20 AUG 69
P2

R 6909030717

FILE IN 201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

14-00000

528

Jil

ORIG: DIANA DAVIS
UNIT: SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412 1315
DATE: 6 AUGUST 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: S8 8 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 07 17 10Z AUG 69 CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

REDTOP AEKICK

11P

27630

1. ACCORDING TO SENSITIVE HEADQUARTERS SOURCE, MEXICAN DIPLOMATIC VISAS REQUESTED FOR ANATOLIY MAZURIN, WIFE AND SON. MAZURIN SCHEDULED TO REPLACE LOGINOV.

2. VISA REQUEST SUBMITTED U.S. EMBASSY MOSCOW PROVIDES FURTHER BIO DETAILS AS FOLLOWS: ANATOLIY SERGEYEVICH MAZURIN, DPOB 25 SEPTEMBER 1938 AT ANNENKA; WIFE, LIDIYA PETROVNA, DPOB 17 MARCH 1941 AT MOSCOW: SON, ANDREY ANATOLYEVICH, DPOB 31 DECEMBER 1963 AT MOSCOW.

3. NO HEADQUARTERS TRACES MAZURIN OR FAMILY.

4. FILE 201-285412 AND 201-.

MICROFILMED
AUG 19 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/SB/X/WH

SB/CI/O

WH/1 J. J. Barry

AN
AB ✓
IN ✓
PS
BY 2
~~DESTROYED~~
FI

RID/EDI
RECEIVED

11 18 AUG 69

C. T. Matten
SB/XO

201-285412 ✓

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
for

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

529

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1	TOTAL COPIES 28
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	
BY: AT:	INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. X-REF TO FILE NO.	
DISSEM BY DKB PER	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.	
ACTION C/SB5 805 ☐ RID COPY	INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH8, C/CI/SO, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI2, C/CCS2, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO	

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 242340Z JUN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0763

MEXI

DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED REDTOP AEKICK

REF MEXICO CITY 0713 [IN 86366]

PME SG WH INDEX

25 Jun 69 IN 88533

1. FERNALD MET SUBJECT REF 23 JUNE,. SUBJECT EXPLAINED HE HAD FIRST MET AEDIEHARD IN FEB 69 AT PARTY AT HOME OF LOCAL COMMUNIST DR. FEDERICAO MARIN (STATION TRACES CONFIRM MARIN LEFT WING CONTACTS BUT NO PREVIOUS RECORD SPECIFIC FJSTEAL CONTACTS). SUBJECT ACCEPTED AEDIEHARD INVITATION TO DINNER AND RELATIONSHIP FLOURISHED ON BASIS "FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND USSR". IN COURSE OF MEETINGS (AT LEAST ONCE IN SUBJECT'S APARTMENT) SUBJECT DROPPED NAMES OF "INFLUENTIAL MEXICAN FRIENDS" (AMONG THOSE MENTIONED TO FERNALD WERE INDUSTRIALIST CARLOS TROUYET, PRESIDENTIAL PRIVATE SECRETARY JOAQUIN CISNERSO, JOURNALIST AGUSTIN BARRIOS GOMEZ, AND PAINTER DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS) WHICH APPARENTLY LED AEDIEHARD TO BELIEVE SUBJECT MIGHT BE WELL-INFORMED ON MEXICAN SCENE. AEDIEHARD ASKED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON POLITICAL MATTERS, SUCH AS: DOES LUIS ECHEVERRIA HAVE BETTER CHANCE OF BECOMING MEXICAN PRESIDENT THAN ANTONIO CARRILLO FLORES; AND WHAT IS REAL PURPOSE OF ROCKEFELLER MISSION (FACT-FINDING COULD NOT BE REAL PURPOSE SINCE EMBASSIES AND

CS COPY

25 June 69
201-285412

SECRET

14-00000

530

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY: ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0763 S E C R E T

CIA IN THESE COUNTRIES MUST KNOW EVERYTHING THERE IS TO KNOW). RECENTLY AEDIEHARD ASKED ~~IT~~ IF SUBJECT HAD FRIENDS IN LNPURE. WHEN SUBJECT SAID HE DID (WITHOUT SPECIFYING NAMES) AEDIEHARD ASKED HIM TO GET PHONE DIRECTORY, WHICH HE NEEDS AS LNPURE CHANGES DIRECTORY EVERY SIX MONTHS (TRUE). AT 20 JUNE MEETING SUBJECT TOLD AEDIEHARD HE HAD NOT YET HAD CHANCE TO TRY OBTAIN DIRECTORY, BUT PROMISED TRY HAVE ONE FOR 25 JUNE MEETING.

2. AEDIEHARD HAS CAREFULLY PROBED SUBJECT BY ASKING IF HE NOT AFRAID OF HAVING FJSTEALER TO HIS HOME (SUBJECT REPLIED THIS WOULD NOT AFFECT HIM IN ANY WAY); BY SUGGESTING THAT SUBJECT "SO WELL INFORMED HE MUST BE WOFIRM AGENT" (SUBJECT LAUGHED THIS OFF AND TOLD AEDIEHARD HE HATED WOFIRM); AND BY EXPLAINING TO SUBJECT HE NEEDS THE INFO HE ASKED FOR "ON ONE HAND TO ADVANCE IN HIS ~~S~~CAREER AND ON OTHER HAND TO PREVENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS TO WHICH LACK OF INFO CAN EASILY LEAD". WHILE AEDIEHARD GAVE SUBJECT HIS PHONE NUMBER, HE TOLD SUBJECT NOT TO USE IT. MEETINGS (USUALLY IN RESTAURANTS) ARE ARRANGED IN ADVANCE, AND SUBJECT HAS NOTED THAT AEDIEHARD PARKS SIX BLOCKS AWAY FROM MEETING PLACE, TAKES BUS TO POINT ONE BLOCK PAST MEETING PLACE, THEN SLOWLY WALKS BACK OBSERVING SURROUNDINGS. MEETINGS SCHEDULED FOR HOURS WHEN RESTAURANTS NORMALLY QUITE EMPTY,

SECRET

531

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT:

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 0763 SECRET

AND AEDIEHARD LOOKS OVER CLIENTEL CAREFULLY.

3. STATION DOES NOT INTEND RUN SUBJECT AS DOUBLE. AMONG OTHER REASONS, WE WOULD BE FORCED COME UP IMMEDIATELY WITH PHONE DIRECTORY AND NAME OF PERSON WHO SUPPLIED IT. SUBJECT ACTUALLY DOES NOT KNOW ANYONE IN LNPURE, AND HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED ADMIT TO AEDIEHARD THAT HE HAS NO CURRENT CONTACTS IN LNPURE AND THUS HAS NO READY SOURCE FOR DIRECTORY. HE IS TO ADD THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HARD TO DEVELOP SUCH CONTACTS. STATION HOPES THIS CANDOR WILL DISCOURAGE OR DELAY AEDIEHARD'S USE OF SUBJECT AS AGENT AGAINST LNPURE WITHOUT DESTROYING RELATIONSHIP, LEAVING STATION FREER TO SHAPE RELATIONSHIP TO WOFIRM ADVANTAGE (ASSUMING STATION ASSESSEMENT OF SUBJECT IS FAVORABLE). FERNALD INITIAL IMPRESSION IS THAT SUBJECT IS SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE. HE OBVIOUSLY CONTACTED LNPURE BECAUSE HE AFRAID HE GETTING IN TOO DEEP; MAY ALSO BELIEVE THERE MONEY TO BE MADE IN GAME HE THUS FAR ENJOYING. NEXT FEW MEETINGS WITH FERNALD WILL BE DEVOTED TO OBTAINING BIO AND BACKGROUND DATA AS WELL AS COMPLETE DETAILS HIS DEALINGS WITH AEDIEHARD.

4. AEDIEHARD PCS DEPARTURE NOW SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER (PER LIREALM-1) OR OCTOBER/NOVEMBER (PER LIBACON-1 FROM 201-825743).

5. FILE 201-285412.

SECRET

SECRET

4-00000

532

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED CS/DO ☐ SLOTTED

BY ___ AT 0140 Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ___

ACTION
C/SBST
#591 WH

☐ RID COPY

...SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ___

X-REF TO FILE NO. ___

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ___ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, CS/DO, C/WH8, C/CI/OPS
C/CI

...TING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

SCRET 210040Z JUN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0713
MEXI

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

21 JUN 69 IN 86366

DESENSITIZED REDTOP AEKICK

WH 1

2P

1. REQUEST PRIORITY TRACES JAMES SABORI, BORN ~~ABOUT~~ DOB CA 1925, CIT USA CITIZEN OF ITALIAN EXTRACTION, RESIDENT OF TEXAS AND CALIFORNIA, CURRENTLY IN MEXICO ON TOURIST VISA SELLING INSURANCE.

2. SABORI WALKED IN TO COS 20 JUNE ON RECOMMENDATION BOB JOHNSON, FORMER LNERGO AGENT GUADALAJARA, NOW RETIRED IN TEXAS. JOHNSON HAD RECOMMENDED COS AS LNPURE FIRST SECRETARY WITH WHOM HE ACQUAINTED.

3. SABORI CLAIMED HE HAS HAD 12 MEETINGS WITH AEDIEHARD, WITH NEXT MEETINGS SCHEDULED FOR EVEINGS 20 AND 25 JUNE. SABORI WOULD NOT SAY MUCH ABOUT NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP, EXCEPT THAT AEDIEHARD HAD ASKED HIM PROCURE LATEST LNPURE TELEPHONE DIRECTORY, WHICH WAS REASON FOR HIS CONTACT WITH COS. WHEN ASKED WHY HE WOULD WANT TO FULFILL SUCH A REQUEST, SABORI ANSWERED THAT THERE REALLY WAS NOT MUCH THAT AEDIEHARD COULD GET OUT OF HIM, AN INSURANCE SALESMAN, BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE DO LITTLE FAVORS IN RETURN FOR FAVORS AEDIEHARD COULD DO FOR HIM. AS EXAMPLE, AEDIEHARD HAD INVITED HIM TRAVEL PJSTEAL. COS SAID HE HAD NO AUTHORITY TURN OVER PHONE BOOK.

MICROFILMED
JUL 28 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

21 June 69
201-285412

SECRET

14-00000

1533

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0713 SECRET

SABORI SUGGESTED COS CONTACT "PROPER PEOPLE" AND HE WOULD CALL COS FOR ANSWER. ALSO SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO "PROPER PEOPLE" CONTACTING HIM AT LOCAL ADDRESS.

4. SABORI CALLED COS AT 1800 HOURS 20 JUNE AND AGREED TO AWAIT CALL AT 0900, 23 JUNE. WAS TOLD PERSON CONTACTING HIM WOULD HAVE ALL FURTHER ADVICE, TO WHICH HE ALSO AGREEABLE.

5. PLAN HAVE BRUCE H. FERNALD CONTACT SABORI 23 JUNE TO ATTEMPT TO GET DETAILS OF CONTACTS WITH AEDIEHARD WITHOUT FRIGHTENING SABORI OFF AND WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH CHANCES AEDIEHARD WILL TURN OVER SABORI TO SUCCESSOR. UNLESS THERE ARE DRAMATCI DEVELOPMENTS, STATION SEES THIS AS CHANCE TO GET AGENT IN ON GROUND FLOOR WITH SUCCESSOR RATHER THAN OPPORTUNITY TAKE LAST-DITCH ACTION AGAINST AEDIEHARD. WILL NOT PROVIDE PHONE BOOK BUT WILL TAKE PASSIVE ATTITUDE, EVEN IN FACE SABORI REFUSAL PROVIDE FURTHER DETAIL, UNTIL HE TURNED OVER TO AEDIEHARD SUCCESSOR.

6. INEX SABORI. FILE: 201-285412.

SECRET

14-00000

534

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______

ACTION C/SB-5 ☐ RID COPY

(459)

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

10 SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE VR. C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/WH-8, C/FI-2

UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 142334Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0238

DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED REDTOP AEKICK AEDIEHARD

15 MAY 69 IN 58536

REF DIRECTOR 01478

1. ASSUMPTION PARA 2 REF CORRECT.

2. FILE: 201-238943; 201-751909; 201-285412.

SECRET

SECRET 201-285412

14-00000

535

ORIG: W.L. PIEKNEY
UNIT: SB/X/WH
EXT: 6413 1315
DATE: 12 MAY 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	WH	5	
2	CI	6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: C/SBS INFO FILE, VR. C/CI/SO, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CI/OPS

(classification) SECRET (date and time filed) 13 17 00z MAY 69 (elite) (pica) (reference number) CITE DIRECTOR 01478

TO MEXICO CITY

DESENSITIZED

~~ ~~DTOP AEKICK AEDIEHARD

REFERENCE A: MEXICO CITY 0159 (IN 54970)**

B: MEXICO CITY 0152 (IN 54251)*

1. [illegible] AGREE WITH GUIDANCE GIVEN LIBACON-1 PER PARAGRAPH 2, AND WITH STATION OBJECTIVES FOR USE LIOVAL-1 PER PARAGRAPH 3, OF REFERENCE B.

2. ASSUME LIOVAL-1 HAS BEEN BRIEFED NOT TO APPEAR ANXIOUS, SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY AEDIEHARD, AND THAT THE LATTER SHOULD BE THE ONE TO GENERATE THE MOMENTUM FOR SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS.

3. FILE: 201-238943; 201-751909; 201-285412.

END OF MESSAGE

CSB/X/WH [illegible] SB/CI/O J. Whitten C/WH/1 [illegible]

*Originators Comments: AEDIEHARD flatly demanded that LIBACON-1 introduce him to LIOVAL-1, a request which LIBACON-1 was reluctant to honor. AEDIEHARD said that such an introduction was important to his career.
**AEDIEHARD did not actually state that an introduction was important to his career but left that impression with the reporting source.

Douglas Shatney
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C T Malton
SB/XO

201-285412

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

336

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 32 PER #

ACTION C/SB 5 ☐ RID COPY

173

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (22)

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, C/FI/SD, C/WH8, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI2

FING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

MEXI

SECRET 091932Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0159

SB/H/WH

ABSTRACT INDEX

9 MAY 69 IN 54970

m 1P

DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED REDTOP AEKICK AEDIEHARD

REF MEXICO CITY 0152 (IN 54239).

1. 8 MAY LUNCH MEETING DID NOT TAKE PLACE. LIBACON-1 PHONED AEDIEHARD TO POSTPONE FOR 45 MINUTES BECAUSE OF CONFLICT WITH CLASS. AEDIEHARD REPLIED IN THAT CASE HE WOULD CALL LIBACON-1 TO ARRANGE LUNCH FOR FOLLOWING WEEK.

2. CLARIFICATION PARA 4 REF: AEDIEHARD DID NOT ACTUALLY SAY THAT MEETING LIOVAL-1 WAS IMPORTANT TO HIS CAREER. THIS WAS LIBACON-1'S INTERPRETATION BASED ON EVIDENT IMPORTANCE TO AEDIEHARD OF MEETING LIOVAL-1, LIBACON-1'S CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT AEDIEHARD HAVING TROUBLES AT WORK (AEDIEHARD SPEAKS CONTEMPTUOUSLY OF HIS COLLEAGUES), AND AEDIEHARD'S STATEMENT EARLIER IN CONVERSATION THAT HE NOT LOOKING FORWARD TO SPENDING NEXT TWO YEARS AT HOME.

3. FILE: 201-285412, 201-283943, 201-751009.

SECRET

MICROFILMED
JUL 1 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

B 201-238943
B 201-751909

SECRET

9 May 69
201-285412 ✓

537

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

25

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF. TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ___ PER ___

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION c/SB 5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, c/ci/sa, c/WH 8, c/ci, c/ci/ops, c/FI2

112

S E C R E T 090040Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0152

MEXI

3P

DIRECTOR

9 MAY 69 IN 54251

m

DESENSITIZED EDTOP AEKICK AEDIEHARD

1. IN CHANCE 15-MINUTE MEETING AT OUT OF TOWN SWIMMING RESORT 3MAY, AEDIEHARD SUDDENLY AND DESPERATELY BRACED LIBACON-1 TO INTRODUCE HIM TO LIOVAL-1. AEDIEHARD PREVIOUSLY AWARE LIOVAL-1 LIBACON-1 CONTACT AND HAD AT TIMES FISHED FOR INTRODUCTION BY OCCASIIONALLY ASKING LIBACON-1 TO PUT HIM ON CONTACT WITH PERSONS WHO COULD TRAVEL TO WOLADY, BUT HAD NEVER BEFORE MENTIONED LIOVAL-1 BY NAME. WHEN LIBACON-1 RESISTED BY STATING LIOVAL-1 NOT ONLY HIS STUDENT BUT ALSO GOOD FRIEND WITH WHOM AEDIEHARD COULD ACHIEVE NOTHING BECAUSE OF LIOVAL-1'S PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL CONVICTIONS, AEDIEHARD BECAME ABUSIVE AND FLATLY DEMANDED THAT LIBACON-1 MAKE INTRODUCTION. LIBACON-1 CONTINUED TO REFUSE (HE IS TRULY OPPOSED TO MAKING INTRODUCTION AS HE DOES NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED WITH AEKICK AND DOES NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD MAKE LIOVAL-1 SUSPECT HE IS INVOLVED WITH AEKICK) AND AEDIEHARD EVENTUALLY INSISTED THEY MEET FOR LUNCH FOLLOWING WEEK TO DISCUSS MATTER FURTHER.

9 May 69

2. LIBACCON-1 SELECTED 8 MAY FOR LUNCH (SO THAT HE COULD

CS COPY

B 201-238943
B 201-751407

MICROFILMED
JUL 1 1969

SECRET

SB/X/WH

201-285412 ✓

538

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1	1	6
		2	7
	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	3	8
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO	4	9
BY: AT:	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.	5	10
	X-REF TO FILE NO.		
DISSEM BY: PER	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO	BRANCH ☐	DESTROY ☐ SIG.
ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO: FILE, VR.		

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0152 SECRET

REPORT ABOVE TO CASE OFFICER AT SCHEDULED 7 MAY MEETING). CASE OFFICER INSTRUCTED LIBACON-1 TO CONTINUE BE RELUCTANT IN ORDER TO FORCE AEDIEHARD TO LAY HIS CARDS ON TABLE AND TO DO ALL PLANNING FOR INTRODUCTION. ON OTHER HAND, LIBACON-1 NOT TO BE SO RELUCTANT AS TO PUT HIMSELF ON AEKICK BLACKLIST AND HE SHOULD EVENTUALLY AGREE MAKE INTRODUCTION IF AEDIEHARD CONTINUES INSIST.

3. STATION OBVIOUSLY INTERESTED IN HAVING LIOVAL-1 MEET AEDIEHARD NOT ONLY FOR CONTINUED CLOSE ASSESSMENT AEDIEHARD BUT ALSO TO NOTE ANY AEKICK REACTION TO LIOVAL-1'S INVOLVEMENT IN AEKITE CASE. LIOVAL-1 HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON HOW TO REACT IF APPROACHED BY AEDIEHARD. STATION ALSO WISHES BE IN POSTION TO INTRODUCE PERSONS OF ITS CHOICE TO AEDIEHARD AND/OR HIS SUCCESSOR VIA LIBACON-1 IN FUTURE. HE SHOULD THEREFORE NOT BURN HIS BRIDGES BY ADAMANT REFUSAL INTRODUCE LIOVAL-1.

4. LIBACON-1 SUPRISED BY AEDIEHARD'S COMPLETE "LOSS OF COOL" IN INSISTING ON INTRODUCTION. AEDIEHARD EVEN INDICATED THAT MEETING LIOVAL-1 WAS IMPORTANT FOR HIS CAREER AND THAT IF HE WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL HE MIGHT HAVE TROUBLE GETTING ANOTHER TOUR ABROAD. HE NOT LOOKING FORWARD TO RETURNING HOME. (STATION COMMENT: ABOVE AND RECENT LIREALM INCIDENT INDICATE AEDIEHARD FEELS SELF UNDER INCREASING

SECRET

14-00000

539

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 0152 SECRET

PRESSURE TO PRODUCE PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.)

5. FILE: 201-285412, 201-238943, 201-751909 .

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

546

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLAS MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (11) ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1	JH	6	
2	CI	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 32 PER 38 • KQ

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

C/SB 5
883

INFO:

FILE, VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH2

—EYES ONLY—

S E C R E T 032343Z APR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 9722 MEXI

DIRECTOR

4 APR 69 IN 28943

DESENSITIZED EDTOP LIREALM AEDIEHARD AEKICK [redacted]

M

REF MEXICO CITY 9456 (IN 12827)

1. ON 22 MARCH LIREALM-1 SAW AEDIEHARD AT CLUB. THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY FOR AN EXTENDED PRIVATE CONVERSATION. THEY DISCUSSED A MOVIE CAMERA WHICH AEDIEHARD WANTS TO SELL AND LIREALM SAID HE MIGHT FIND A BUYER. THEN TOLD AEDIEHARD THAT HE HAD SOMETHING HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT AND HOPED TO GET TOGETHER SOON TO DO SO. AEDIEHARD SAID HE WOULD CALL LIREALM DURING WEEK AND TAKE HIM TO LUNCH.

2. ON 24 MARCH AEDIEHARD CALLED LIREALM AT LATTER'S OFFICE FROM PHONE BOOTH (STREET NOISE IN BACKGROUND) TO MAKE LUNCHEON DATE. LIREALM-1 SUGGESTED 26 MARCH AND INVITED AEDIEHARD TO A KEY CLUB WHICH LIREALM USES FOR BUSINESS LUNCHES. AEDIEHARD DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE CLUB BUT AGREED.

3. MORNING OF 26 MARCH AEDIEHARD CALLED LIREALM AT OFFICE TO CANCEL LUNCH GIVING SON'S DOG BITE AS EXCUSE (A THIN ONE SINCE IT HAPPENED A WEEK PREVIOUSLY). ~~HEK~~ (COMMENT: STATION SUSPECTS AEDIEHARD CASED KEY CLUB AND FOUND NOT TO HIS LIKING SINCE IT IS PRIVATE.)

AN W
AB K
IX
P
D
DC
FI

4 Apr 69

CS COPY

SECRET

201-285412

541

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: DEC 23 4 22 PM '6[illegible]

DISSEM BY: ______

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9722 S E C R E T

4. ON 30 MARCH LIREALM AGAIN SAW AEDIEHARD AT CLUB. LET AEDIEHARD KNOW HE DISPLEASED AT LUNCHEON CANCELLATION AND CONSIDERED EXCUSE A DODGE. (AEDIEHARD'S SON WAS THERE WITH SMALL BANDAID ON ARM.) FROM HIS EXPRESSION, AEDIEHARD WAS EMBARRASSED AND OFF-BALANCE.

5. AFTER TENNIS LIREALM GOT AEDIEHARD ASIDE TO TELL HIM PURPOSE OF LUNCH WAS TO TELL HIM THAT HIS JOKING AND NEEDLING OF LIREALM HAD EMBARRASSED HIM IN FRONT OF MEXICANS, PARTICULARLY RECENT OFFER OF MONEY. AEDIEHARD INTERRUPTED TO SAY IT WAS ONLY A JOKE. LIREALM SAID HE CONSIDERED IT MALICIOUS AND HE WOULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH BEHAVIOR IN FRONT OF FRIENDS IN FUTURE. AEDIEHARD APOLOGIZED PROFUSELY, SAID HAD NO BAD INTENTIONS AND PROMISED NOT REPEAT IT IN FUTURE.

6. LIREALM REPORTED AEDIEHARD WAS COMPLETELY UNPREPARED FOR ABOVE EXHANGE AND WAS TRANSPARENTLY DISTURBED, DISTRESSED, AND DISADVANTAGED.

7. LIREALM WILL CONTINUE TO BE FRIENDLY TO AEDIEHARD WITHOUT GOING OUT OF HIS WAY.

8. WILL REPORT ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

9. FILE: 201-285412 AND 201-77337.

S E C R E T

The following action is authorized: Sensitized

Signed: Roger [illegible]

R.O. [illegible] 53/RAAO

Note: [illegible] [illegible]ate if appropriate.

SECRET

542

(13) On 12 December 1968 two team members spotted Valentin S. LOGINOV (known KGB) walking with an unknown Mexican male. After LOGINOV departed the Mexican remained at a restaurant for an hour appearing to be waiting for someone. The Mexican finally departed after making a phone call and was lost in heavy traffic. The team members obtained the Mexican's license plate number from which he was identified as Ignacio VALLINA Barros.

From notes for COS Conference, 24-28 March 1969

201-285412

14-00000

543

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
() Contact Between 201-823021 and AEDIEHARD.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HMMA-33764, 28 December 1967
B. HMMW-16769, 11 October 1968

1. Per LIENVOY Subject of References (Subject) contacted AEDIEHARD at 10:15 on 6 February 1969. Subject said that she was in Mexico for a few days before returning to the USA and had just spent two weeks in Acapulco. She invited AEDIEHARD for lunch but he could not make it. He agreed to visit her at the home of her host (reported in Reference A) at ca 19:00 the same day.

2. When Subject had not contacted the Station, she was called at the home of her host the next morning, 7 February, and a meeting was set for 15:00. Both on the phone and at the meeting, Subject had a severe hangover.

3. Subject gave full information on her call to AEDIEHARD on 6 February. She said that she was just about to call the case officer on 7 February when he called her. She did not call in on 6 February because she wanted to wait until after she saw AEDIEHARD so that she would have something to report. She stated that she had not visited Mexico since the trip reported in Reference A when she first met AEDIEHARD because she is tied down with the care of her mother who is still alive. She had sent two or three letters to AEDIEHARD but he had never answered them and on 6 February AEDIEHARD said that he had not received them.

Attachment:
Address u/s/c

Distribution:
② - C/SB w/att u/s/c
2 - C/WH w/att u/s/c

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
√ 201-285412	HMMA-3[illegible]729	17 March 1969
	CLASSIFICATION CS Copy in → S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER [illegible]

14-00000

5'14

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-33729

4. As previously, Subject's reporting was terribly confused. Almost every point let her into rambling tangents. She said that AEDIEHARD arrived at her host's home at ca 19:30 on 6 February. About four women and Subject were there. They were all guests at the luncheon to which AEDIEHARD had been invited. The male guests had long since departed to their jobs. AEDIEHARD made his usual impressio on all the girls, none of whom he had met before. "They all loved him." AEDIEHARD stayed until ca 22:00 when he left pleading a previous appointment.

5. AEDIEHARD debriefed her on her activities since they last met and told her that he would be coming to New York on vacation. She invited him to visit her and gave him her address and telephone number (under separate cover). She asked about the manuscript of her book which she had left with him. He told her that it was in good hands and that he was looking for a publisher. She told him that she was leaving on the morning of 9 February and he promised to see her again before she left. Actually, AEDIEHARD spent considerably more time charming the other ladies than he spent talking to Subject.

6. At ca 10:30 on 7 February, Subject called AEDIEHARD in the case officer's presence. He was not in. She was told to call later which according to LIENVOY she did but he was still not in.

7. The case officer called her again on the evening of 8 February but since AEDIEHARD had not contacted her, she was not met. She was instructed to call the Station before contacting AEDIEHARD on her next visit. She departed on the morning of 9 February.

8. Since AEDIEHARD did not engage in significant conversation with her and made no attempt to see her a second time, it would seem that he has no interest in her. This is not surprising since AEDIEHARD could hardly escape the same assessment of her that the case officer has. She made an even worse impression than at the first interview--a totally self-centered person who could not even remember the last names of the women who met AEDIEHARD although she can talk endlessly about them on how they relate to her. Her mind is totally distracted.

9. In view of the above, the Station believes that Subject would be of no use against AEDIEHARD and plans to terminate her, if she reappears in Mexico.

Francis J Coyne

for/Willard C. CURTIS

545

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
TO HMMA-3 729, 17 MARCH 1969

Elizabeth Duncan
P.O. Box 425
Spring Lake, New Jersey

Telephone No: 201-449-3309

SECRET

546

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES **SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY 1 WH 6 2 CI 7 3 8 4 9 5 10
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO	
BY: ______ AT: ______ ______ Z	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______ X-REF TO FILE NO. ______	
DISSEM BY 3 PER SB # 1	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.	
ACTION C/SB 5 ☐ RID COPY 681	INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 2, DDP, ADDP	

By CS only

S E C R E T 122215Z MAR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 9456 MCAS 2

DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED REDTOP LIREALM AEDIEHARD AEKICK [redacted] 12 MAR 69 IN 12827 M

REF A. DIRECTOR 81831

B. MEXICO CITY 9421 (IN 10973)

1. LIREALM BRIEFED ON REF A PLAN ON 11 MARCH. HE IS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT AND FINDS IT IN HARMONY WITH HIS COVER STATUS AND TEMPERAMENT. WHETHER AEDIEHARD AGREES TO QUID PRO QUO OR NOT, BOTH LIREALM AND STATION BELIEVE THAT TALK WITH AEDIEHARD WILL STRENGTHEN LIREALM'S COVER. LIREALM IS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT CONTINUED CONTACT WITH AEDIEHARD ON BASIS QUID PRO QUO.

2. IN EVENT AEDIEHARD DOES NOT AGREE TO QUID PRO QUO AT FIRST ENCOUNTER BUT CONTINUES TO PROVOKE OR HARASS LIREALM, BOTH LIREALM AND STATION CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL FOR LIREALM TO WALK IN IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT ORIGINAL PLAN FORWARDED IN MEXICO CITY 9375 AND 9381. THIS FEATURE WILL BE AUTOMATIC ON FIRST WORKING DAY AFTER ENCOUNTER, LIREALM HAVING CHECKED WITH THE STATION IN ADVANCE.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ORDERS TO STAY AWAY FROM AEDIEHARD, LIREALM HAS SCHEDULED LEGITIMATE BUSINESS TRIP ON 15 MARCH WEEK-END. HE IS COMMITTED TO PLAY AEDIEHARD IN A TENNIS TOURNAMENT

AN W	
~~AS~~	
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~BX~~	
~~DVS~~	RFD
FI	

CS COPY

12 Mar 69

SECRET

201-285412

14-00000

547

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: DEC 23 4

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY: ________ PER ________

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9456 SECRET

AND WILL SCHEDULE IT FOR 22 OR 23 MARCH. HOWEVER, IF NATURAL OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO AEDIEHARD OCCURS EARLIER, LIREALM WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY.

4. SHOULD LPAURORA SLUG BE USED THIS TRAFFIC?

5. FILE: 201-285412; 201-773337.

SECRET

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. #1 - Unit SB/RMU
Note: If destroyed, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

SECRET

549

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 36 PER SB . 1(E.O.)

ACTION C/SB5 ☐ RID COPY

550

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE, VR. DDP ADDP C/WH2 — EYES ONLY —

S——S

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	WH	6	
2	CI	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 102307Z MAR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 9421

MEXI

DIRECTOR

10 Mar 69 IN 10973

M

DESENSITIZED REDTOP LIREALM AEDIEHARD AEKICK [redacted]

REF DIRECTOR 81831

1. [redacted] STATION FULLY CONCURS IN PLAN CONTAINED REF. LIREALM-1 WILL BE BRIEFED ON 11 MARCH.

2. IN CONSIDERING TARGETTING AEDIEHARD, HE HAS TOLD LIREALM-1 AND OTHERS IN GROUP THAT HE RETURNING HOME IN JUNE. DOES NOT KNOW IF IT IS PCS OR HOME LEAVE. HOWEVER, HIS WIFE TOLD LIREALM THAT IT WILL BE PCS AND THAT SHE CANNOT WAIT. SINCE AEDIEHARD ARRIVED PCS IN AUGUST 1965, HE IS ABOUT READY FOR PCS TRANSFER.

3. FILE: 201-285412 AND 201-773337.

S E C R E T

RECORD OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Desensitized
Signed: R. D. H.
R.O. #I - Unit SB/2 MO
Note: If a destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

AY (3)
AD X
F
FA
FX
EX
F

CS COPY

SECRET

10 Mar 69
201-285412 ✓

549

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE (24)
TOTAL COPIES
SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED C/SB E.O.

BY [illegible] AT 0155 Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER SB I (E.U.)

ACTION
C/SB 5
379

☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE, VR. DDP ADDP C/WH 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	[illegible]	6	
2	C/	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

SECRET 070050Z MAR 69 CITE MEXICO ~~CITY~~ 9387 7 MAR 69 IN 08490

MEXI 9381

DIRECTOR

~~DESENSITIZED~~ REDTOP LIREALM AEKICK ~~[illegible]~~

*NOT REC'D C/S 02002 7 MAR 1969.

RFS: A. MEXICO CITY 9375 *(IN

B. DIRECTOR 81435

1. LIREALM WILL AVOID CONTACT WITH 201-285412. HOWEVER LIREALM PARTICIPATING IN TENNIS TOURNAMENT WHERE MIGHT SEE HIM BUT CAN EASILY AVOID CONVERSATION.

2. RE PARA 3 REF B: STATION IS INTERESTED IN SUGGESTION OF POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF THIS INCIDENT AND BELIEVES SOMETHING COULD BE DONE WITHOUT REVEALING LIREALM'S TRUE WOFIRM STATUS. MOST INTERESTED IN HAVING HEADQUARTERS IDEAS.

3. FILE: 201-773337; 201-285412.

SECRET

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: Desensitized

Signed: [illegible]

R.O. [illegible] - Unit SB/RMU

Note: [illegible] cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

AN W
AB ✓
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DES~~ [illegible]
FI

201-285412 ✓

CS COPY

[redacted]

SECRET

7 Mar 69

550

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLA[illegible]ED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED
C/SB E.O.
BY [illegible] AT 0215 Z

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 30 PER SB I(E101)

ACTION
C/SB 5 ☐ RID COPY
#380

INFO
FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2 -EYES ONLY-
5 5

ROUTING	AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1	WH	6	
2	C/	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

[illegible]

S E C R ET 070050Z MAR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 9375 (MEXI) 7MAR69IN 08492

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED REDTOP LIREALM AEKICK [redacted]

REF: MEXICO CITY 9356 (IN07511)

1. FOLLOWING FROM LIREALM-1 SECOND WRITTEN REPORT AND DEBRIEFING ON 6 MARCH.

A. LIREALM-1 AND 201-285412 (SUBJECT) ARE MEMBERS OF AN INFORMAL GROUP WITHIN THEIR CLUB WHICH REPAIRS TO ONE OF GROUPS HOME EVERY SECOND SUNDAY FOR LUNCH AFTER TENNIS. 2 MARCH INCIDENT OCCURRED AT SUCH A LUNCH WITH CA 25 PEOPLE PRESENT.

B. DISCUSSION WAS NOT OUT OF EARSHOT OF OTHER GUESTS BUT AT TABLE DURING LUNCH. SUBJECT MADE AN ATTEMPT TO KEEP IT PRIVATE. IN FACT, AFTER STATING HE HAD SEEN LIREALM SEVERAL TIMES AT SANBORNS WITH INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, SUBJECT TURNED TO A GERMAN GUEST AND ASKED, "DO YOU THINK THAT LIREALM COULD EARN AS MUCH MONEY AS HE DOES, DOING WHAT HE SAYS HE DOES, WITHOUT HELP FROM WOFIRM?" THE GERMAN, GOING ALONG WITH THE JOKE SAID, "OF COUSE NOT".

C. SUBJECT PRESENTED THE WHOLE THING AS A JOKE BUT WITH A DEFINITELY MALICIOUS TWIST.

AN	U
AB	X
IN	
FI	
DX	
~~[illegible]~~	
FI	

8

SECRET

7 MAR 69
201-285412 ✓

14-00000

531

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
DEC 23 4 21 PM '64
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID/EDI RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
INFO
FILE, VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9375 SECRET

D. THIS PROVOCATION OF HIS CONTACTS IS STANDARD PRACTICE WITH SUBJECT. HE SEEMS TO HAVE A COMPULSION TO COME UP WITH SLIGHTLY OFFENSIVE PROVOCATIONS. THUS TWO WEEKS AGO AT A SIMILAR LUNCH AT ANOTHER GERMAN,S HOUSE, HIS PROVOCATIONS TO TWO GERMANS ON NIXON'S VISIT TO BERLIN AND ELCTION OF PRESIDENT THERE LED TO HIM INSULTING HOSTS AND LEAVING IN A HUFF SHORTLY BEFORE HE WOULD HAVE BEEN EVICTED.

E. LIREALM FEELS THAT HIS HARPING ON LIREALM'S WORK FOR WOFIRM IS SUBJECT'S STANDARD PROVOCATION FOR HIM (LIREALM AND WIFE ARE ONLY AMERICANS IN GROUP) AND THAT SUBJECT HAS NO HARD INFO ABOUT HIS WOFIRM CONNECTIONS. HOWEVER, LIREALM ALSO FEELS THAT IF SUBJECT IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE THIS PROVOCATIVE LINE WITHOUT EFFECTIVE REBUTTAL, LIREALM CAN BE MADE TO LOOK TO FOOL IN THE GROUPS EYES. IN LIREALM'S ESTIMATE NONE OF GROUP SUSPECTS HIS STATUS IN MEXICO BUT THINK THAT THE WOFIRM LINE IS JUST SUBJECT'S WAY OF PROVOKING THE ONLY GRINGO IN THE GROUP.

2. LIREALM STATED THAT SUBJECT IS VERY GOOD IN DISHING IT OUT TO EVERYBODY BUT INVARIABLY COMES OUT A POOR SECOND IN REPARTEE AFTER DELIVERING INITIAL DIG. HE CAN NOT TAKE IT, IS THIN SKINNED , AND EMBARRASSES EASILY.

SECRET

552

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

C ...IED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

...ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 9375 S E C R E T

3. PLAN OUTLI~~V~~NED PARA 4 REF WAS PRESENTED TO LIREALM WITH PROVISO IT IS SUBJECT TO HQS CONCURRENCE. HE WAS ENTHUSIASTIC SINCE IT PARALLELS HIS OWN THINKING. HE BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD EFFECTIVELY SILENCE SUBJECT, IS GUARANTEED TO THROW HIM INTO DEEP EMBARRASSMENT AND CONFUSION, AND BURN HIM WITHIN THE GROUP SINCE LIREALM WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CO ~~MAVSA~~ENFRONATTION WITH OTHERS PRESENT SINCE WHOLE GROUP KNOWS HOW SUBJECT NEEDLES HIM AND SEVERAL HEARD SUBJECT OFFER HIM MONEY. STATION CONCURS IN THIS ADDITON TO PLAN.

4. HOWEVER, SUBJECT PREFERS NOT TO WALK-IN TO MR. SPRUCE SINCE HE IS HIS ONLY SOURCEE OF BUSINESS, TRADE BUSINERYAIIDE AND ADVICE IN THE EMBASSY. HE SUSPECTS THAT SPRUCE WOULD ATTEMPT TO PRY. THEREFORE, AGREED HE WOULD WALK-IN TO SECURTIY OFFICER, INDICATE THE NATURE OF HIS PROBLEM, AND ASK TO TALK TO A WOFIRM REP.

5. STATION IS CONVINCED ~~CONVINCE D~~ THAT PARA 4 REF PLAN ~~PALN~~ WITH ABOVE MODIFICATINONS WILL EFFECTIVELY TERMINATE SUBJECT'S PROVOCATIONS, IS PERFECTLY NATURAL FOR A PERSON IN LIREALM'S POSITION, ~~POSNBUJUJ~~ AND WILL STRENGHTEN HIS COVER VIS-A-VIS HIS AND SUBJECT'S MUTUAL FRIENDS. THERFORE, URGE PROMPT HQS CONCURRENCE.

6. FILE: 201-77337 AND 201-285412.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

553

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND-OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	WH	5	
2	CI	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: L. MESTRES/mvb
UNIT: C/SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412, R-1315
DATE: 7 MARCH 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 46 PER SB # 1/ed

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/S 25 INFO FILE. VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2
Eyes Only

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

07 23 20 MAR 69

CITE DIRECTOR 81831

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

DESENSITIZED REDTOP LIREALM AEDIEHARD AEKICK [redacted] [redacted]

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR-81435

B. MEXICO CITY-9375 (IN 08492)

C. MEXICO CITY-9381 (IN 08490)

1. 201-285412 HAS BEEN ASSIGNED AEDIEHARD.

2. THERE APPEAR TO BE TWO KEY OBJECTIVES WHICH SHOULD BE SOUGHT IN THIS LATEST LIREALM/AEDIEHARD DEVELOPMENT. THEY ARE:

A. PROTECT AND STRENGTHEN LIREALM'S COVER IN A NATURAL MANNER, AND

B. OPERATIONALLY EXPLOIT AEDIEHARD'S AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE IN POSITIVE TERMS SO THAT STATION CAN DEVELOP ADDITIONAL ACCESS TO HIM WHILE MAINTAINING THAT WHICH IS ALREADY EXISTENT.

3. IF OUR ACTIONS ARE CAREFULLY PLANNED, THESE OBJECTIVES NEED NOT CONFLICT. REVIEW OF AEDIEHARD'S FILE REVEALS FOLLOWING GENERAL CONCLUSIONS:

A. DESPITE HIS AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE AND VISIBILITY, THERE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY SIGNIFICANT SUSCEPTIBILITIES.

AH W
AB X
~~EE~~
EB
SX
DDS/FPD
FI
RE

201-285412

(CONTINUED)

7 MAR 69

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

554

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: L. MESTRES/mvb
UNIT: C/SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 7 MARCH 1969

DEC 23 4 21 PM '69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

RID
☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ... BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 81831

TO PAGE TWO

B. HIS ACTIONS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS THOSE OF AN RIS OFFICER TRYING TO ATTRACT ATTENTION TO HIMSELF FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER. HE IS NEITHER PARTICULARLY SUAVE NOR SUBTLE IN HIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS. YET HE IS CRAFTY, QUICK ON HIS FEET, AND MAKES FAST DECISIONS AND ACTS ON THEM. HE IS DEFINITELY SOCIALLY ACTIVE AND MORE UBIQUITOUS THAN MANY OTHER SOVIETS IN MEXICO. THIS VISIBILITY, HIS APPARENT MOBILITY, HIS KNOWN KGB AFFILIATION, AND HIS OUTWARD PERSONALITY MERIT OUR CONSIDERATION FOR PLACING HIM ON STATION'S PRIORITY TARGET LIST.

(IN 67511)

4. WHILE THE PLAN OUTLINED IN MEXICO CITY 9356 AND FURTHER MODIFIED IN MEXICO CITY 9375 WOULD EFFECTIVELY TERMINATE LIREALM/AEDIEHARD RELATIONSHIP AND CERTAINLY BE NATURAL ACTION FOR U.S. BUSINESSMAN TO TAKE (THEREBY IN HARMONY WITH LIREALM'S COVER), PERHAPS THIS ACTION (REPORTING TO THE EMBASSY HIS CONTACT WITH AEDIEHARD) IS NOT NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE FOR STATION'S CONSIDERATION SUBJECT, NATURALLY, TO

(CONTINUED. . .)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

55 5

ORIG: L. MESTRES/mvb
UNIT: C/SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 7 MARCH 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 81831

TO PAGE THREE

MODIFICATION:

A. LIREALM WOULD ATTEMPT AVOID CONTACT AND CONVERSATION WITH AEDIEHARD FOR NEXT FEW DAYS.

B. THEN, AFTER PERHAPS ONE WEEK OR MORE, LIREALM WOULD SEEK OUT AEDIEHARD AND ASK TO SPEAK WITH HIM ALONE.

C. LIREALM WOULD FIRMLY EXPLAIN TO AEDIEHARD THAT HE ENJOYS TALKING WITH HIM ON OCCASION WHEN THEY CHANCE TO MEET BUT THAT AEDIEHARD'S CONSTANT PUBLIC NEEDLING AND JOKING ABOUT LIREALM'S SUPPOSED CONNECTION WITH WOFIRM WAS CAUSING HIM EMBARRASSMENT IN MEXICAN/AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND HAD TO STOP. LIREALM WOULD TELL SUBJECT THAT AS PATRIOTIC AMERICAN CITIZEN HE HAD SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME THINKING ABOUT REPORTING THIS CONTACT TO AMERICAN EMBASSY AND EXPLAINING TO U.S. OFFICIALS HIS PREDICAMENT VIS A VIS AEDIEHARD'S JOCULAR BUT INSISTENT PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS.

D. LIREALM WOULD THEN STATE THAT HE HAD NOT DONE SO FOR THREE REASONS:

(CONTINUED. . .)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

556

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND-OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: L. MESTRES/mvb
UNIT: C/SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 7 MARCH 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY ______ PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 81831

TO PAGE FOUR

(1) HE DID NOT WANT TO CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT FOR AEDIEHARD IN EVENT U.S. OFFICIALS WOULD TAKE SOME ACTION EITHER THROUGH MEXICAN GOVERNMENT OR DIRECTLY WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS.

(2) HE DID NOT WANT TO CAUSE TROUBLE FOR HIMSELF IN EVENT U.S. OFFICIALS DECIDED TO INVESTIGATE HIM. HE FELT THAT REGARDLESS WHETHER THEY DID INVESTIGATE HIM OR NOT, THEY WOULD PLACE HIM ON SOME SORT OF "SUSPICIOUS LIST" AND THIS COULD HANDICAP HIS BUSINESS INTERESTS AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH VARIOUS EMBASSY COUPLES WITH WHOM HE AND HIS WIFE WERE FRIENDLY.

(3) HE SAW NO REASON WHY HE COULD NOT CONTINUE TO SEE AEDIEHARD SOCIALLY AS BEFORE BUT THAT HE KNEW THAT IF HE REPORTED TO EMBASSY HE WOULD PROBABLY BE ASKED TO CEASE THIS CONTACT IN HIS BEST INTERESTS AND THOSE OF THE EMBASSY.

E. LIREALM WOULD THEN ASK FOR QUID PRO QUO. "LET US CONTINUE AS FRIENDS, SUCH AS LEONOV AND I WERE, BUT DROP THIS

(CONTINUED. . .)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND-OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IO: L. MESTRES/mvb
NIT: C/SB/X/WH
T: 6412
ATE: 7 MARCH 1969

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

Y ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE. VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 81831

TO PAGE FIVE

SPY ACCUSATION BUSINESS OR I WILL HAVE NO RECOURSE BUT TO PROTECT MYSELF AND REPORT TO THE EMBASSY."

5. THIS ACTION ON THE PART OF LIREALM IS IN PERFECT HARMONY WITH ACHIEVING OBJECTIVE NUMBER ONE: PROTECTING AND MAINTAINING LIREALM'S COVER. HOPEFULLY IT WOULD SET STAGE FOR CONTINUING CONTACT WITH AEDIEHARD ON PROFITABLE BASIS SO THAT WE CAN PROFESSIONALLY ASSESS THIS SOVIET WHICH FULFILLS THE SECOND OBJECTIVE. WE EVALUATE LIREALM'S REPORTING ON HIS SOVIET CONTACTS AS ACCURATE, LUCID, AND USEFUL. THE RECENT ~~PRQ~~ PAQ ON AEDIEHARD COMPLETED BY LIREALM IS POSITIVE STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION. HOWEVER, SHOULD AEDIEHARD PERSIST WITH HIS GAMES PLAYING WE HAVE NOT CLOSED DOOR ON LIREALM GOING TO THE EMBASSY AND CARRYING OUT ACTION DESCRIBED IN STATION MESSAGES. THUS THIS OPTION STILL VALID.

6. APART FROM SEEKING TO OBTAIN ABOVE OBJECTIVES BY TAKING THE INITIATIVE WE ALSO AVOID A LIREALM WITHDRAWAL FROM AEDIEHARD WHICH, NO MATTER HOW WELL PLANNED, SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY SUSPECT AS SOME FORM OF DEFENSIVE ACTION ON LIREALM'S PART IN VIEW OF HIS

(CONTINUED. . .)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

558

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: L. MESTRES/mvb
UNIT: C/SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 7 MARCH 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 81831

TO PAGE SIX

EXPOSURE BY SUBJECT. ACTION SUGGESTED THIS MESSAGE KEEPS CONTACT OPEN, WE MAINTAIN INITIATIVE, DOES NOT PRECLUDE TAKING DEFENSIVE ACTION IN FUTURE SHOULD AEDIEHARD STUBBORNLY PERSIST, AND IS NATURAL FOR SOMEONE LIKE LIREALM GIVEN THIS SORT OF SITUATION. ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE HERE IS FOR STATION TO DETERMINE THROUGH CONTINUED CONTACT PLUS ADDITIONAL ACCESS TAILORED TO LIREALM'S INFORMATION WHETHER OR NOT A PLANNED DEVELOPMENTAL EFFORT AIMED AT RECRUITMENT SHOULD BE INITIATED.

7. ~~THE~~ ABOVE SUGGESTION MADE WITH REALIZATION THAT ~~PROPOSAL IS OFFERED TO THE STATION FOR CONSIDERATION.~~ STATION IS IN BEST POSITION TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THIS TYPE OF EXPLOITATION OF CONTACT WITH AEDIEHARD CAN BE EFFECTIVE IN TERMS OF FURTHER PROFESSIONALLY ASSESSING THE TARGET AND IN CONSIDERATION OF LIREALM'S OTHER OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES. IN NO WAY DO WE WISH TO HAVE THIS ACTIVITY CONFLICT WITH LIREALM'S ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCT HIS OTHER PRESENT OR PLANNED OPERATIONAL EFFORTS.

(CONTINUED. . .)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

1400000

559

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG: L. MESTRES/mvb
NIT: SB/X/WH
T: 6412
ATE: 7 MARCH 1969

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

ONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 81831

TO PAGE SEVEN

8. WELCOME STATION COMMENTS AND/OR MODIFICATIONS TO ABOVE PLAN.

9. FILE: 201-285412, 201-773337.

END OF MESSAGE

HQS. COMMENT: References concern discussions for operational exploitation of LIREALM/AEDIEHARD relationship.

SB/CI/O
SB/XO
C/WH/1
C/LPGLOBE Eugene Milligan

William V. Broe
C/WH

SB/COPS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

560

SECRET

DATE [illegible]	**REQUEST FOR CODE DESIGNATION** *Fill out in duplicate* *Hand Carry*
SR MC	
RID CR (1 D 15)	

1.	REQUEST FOR	☐	PSEUDONYM	☐	ALIAS	☒	CRYPTONYM
	NAME ASSIGNED AEPIEHARD						
2.	BRANCH [illegible]			CASE OFFICER [illegible] C. McIntyre			
	BADGE NUMBER [illegible]			HOME PHONE [illegible]			
3.	DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT OR AGENT (what, where, use, etc.) Subject is a ~~former~~ Soviet KGB Officer in Mexico City.						
4.	STATUS	☐	STAFF EMPLOYEE	☐	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	☐	STAFF AGENT
		☐	CONTRACT AGENT	☐	FIELD AGENT	☒	OTHER
5.	TYPE OF ACTIVITY	☐	FI	☐	CI	☐	CA
6.	IS THIS TO BE USED IN CABLE TRAFFIC			✓	YES	☐	NO
7.	LIST ANY PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED PSEUDONYM OR CRYPTONYMS						

THIS PORTION IS DETACHED AND THE ABOVE IS SENT TO CABLE SECRETARIAT ON CRYPTONYMS ONLY THAT WILL HAVE CABLE TRAFFIC

File: [illegible]

TRUE NAME [illegible]

FILE NUMBER (201, Project, Subject)

201-285412

FORM 1-66 2611 SECRET

561

ORIG: L. MESTRES
UNIT: CSB/X/WH
EXT: 1315
DATE: 6 MARCH 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	WH	5	
2	CI	6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER SB #E(0)

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/SB 5 INFO: FILE, VR, DDP ADDP C/WH 2 —EYES ONLY—

5 5

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 06 23 33 Z MAR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 81435

TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY

DESENSITIZED [redacted] REDTOP LIREALM AEKICK [redacted]

REF: MEXICO CITY 9356 (IN 07511) *

1. PLEASE CABLE DETAILS 6 MARCH DEBRIEFING AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

2. IN INTERIM LIREALM SHOULD TAKE NO ACTION WITH RESPECT TO REPORTING HIS CONTACT WITH LOGINOV UNTIL FURTHER GUIDANCE RECEIVED FROM HEADQUARTERS. PREFERABLY, HE SHOULD AVOID CONTACT WITH LOGINOV, IF POSSIBLE, UNTIL WE HAVE COLLECTIVELY REVIEWED WITH STATION VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES FOR ACTION.

AN
AB
IA
PS
BA
DES NFD
FI

3. REVIEW OF LOGINOV FILE REVEALS COMPLEX PAST HISTORY OF DEALINGS WITH MEXICANS AND OTHERS WHICH WARRANT ANALYSIS FOR POSSIBLE PRESENT EXPLOITATION OF LIREALM DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT EXPOSING HIS TRUE WOFIRM STATUS. WILL ADVISE. 6 Mar 69

4. FILE 201-773537, 201-285412.

201-285412 ✓

*Station reported overture made to LIREALM by LOGINOV. [redacted]

END OF MESSAGE

SB/CI/O D. Lopez CS/XO C. T. Malley WH/1

C/WH SB/COPS

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 845 COPY NO.

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LOPEZ, HENRI P
201-253203
VOL. II

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
18 July 78	18 July 78	Lopez	Edwin Juan Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

LOPEZ HENRI P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
General - Operational
Specific - Henry Lopez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXI-2755, dated 11 March 1965

Forwarded herewith is the coverage of Henry Lopez' telephone for the period 17 February 1962 to 26 March 1962.

Stewart R. Pataker
for
Willard C. CURTIS

RECORD OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Remove R/DAT Control
Signed: John Blake Smith
R.O. [illegible] - Unit: WH/1
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

Attachment:
1. As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
3 - WHD w/att h/w
3 - Files

AN	J((
AB	✓
IN	
PS	
BX	
PES	EFD
PI	

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-25595

DATE
17 March 1965

CLASSIFICATION
DESENSITIZED
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
[illegible]53[illegible]

To Analysis 9/11/71

HMMA-25595 17 March 1965 201-253203

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Benefits and Services Division/OP
WSLUNGAGE
Hospitalization Claim - Edward G. [illegible]

(a) HMMT - 5791, dated 9/22/65
(b) HMMT - 6030, dated 12/9/65

1. Please inform subject employee that a check in the amount of $642.93 was forwarded to DYEARN on 4 November 1965. This amount represents all benefits payable under subject's Contract Hospitalization Insurance policy for the claim he submitted with reference (a).

2. If subject has any further questions regarding transmittal of his settlement, he should contact DYEARN.

James K. Hewitt
JAMES K. HEWITT

Distribution:
3, COS-Mexico City

06 ... 1965

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HMMW - 4493 27 December 1965

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OP/BSD/IB HLMichalski llc 3608

1 ID AC/IB
1 WH WH/Pers.

14-00000

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12.

SECRET

ORIG : HENRY F. CONNOR
UNIT : WH/B&F
EXT : 7763
DATE : 15 DEC 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

Y XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

15 DEC 65 20 32 G

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG CEN~~

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY OF 2

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

65500

REFS: A. DIR 47834

B. MEXI T/A 64-66

SINCE TICHBORN PAID BY STATION, LOAN SHOULD BE CARRIED BY STATION AND $125 PAYROLL DEDUCTION APPLIED.

ACCORDINGLY, HDQRS T/A'ING LOAN TO STATION AND RETURNING DOCUMENTATION.

END OF MESSAGE

Sally:
Tichborn
201 file
R.

WILLIAM V. BROE
For C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Robert D. Carter
ROBERT D. CARTER
C/WH/B&F
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-253723

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE/PERSONNEL
Overt and Covert 1964 Income Tax Forms of Edward G. TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Per Paragraph 1

REFERENCE : MEXI 5550

Chandler

1. Please query Jerome H. BALSIS in regard to the location of the 1964 overt and covert tax returns and payment check in the amount of $1774.00 of Edward G. TICHBORN and advise.

2. TICHBORN states that he passed the only two copies of each return and the check to BALSIS on 28 April 1965, further stating that BALSIS told him he would completely audit both returns to assure their accuracy in regard to mathematical computations and application of tax liability. BALSIS was to return a copy of the overt return for TICHBORN's retention.

3. A thorough search of Station files failed to uncover the subject tax returns and check or any transmittal record of returns or payment.

4. Since TICHBORN will be extremely hard pressed to duplicate the returns without a copy of the overt return, the location of the returns is very important.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WHD

201-253263

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-6033

DATE
14 December 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, OF 2, CCS 3

S E C R E T 081945Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5558

8 Dec 65 IN 10658

REF: DIR 62414

1. 1964 COVERT TAX RETURNS FOR BENADUM, LIMOTOR 19 (BARBARA C. HUFIG), PINEINCH, SANDAMANIE BEING SENT BY HMMT 6018 IN 10 DEC POUCH. NOT POUCHED EARLIER AS OVERLOOKED IN STATION ADMIN FILES.

2. RETURN FOR CAZAZZUS SENT HMMT 5399 APR 23 (JOINT WITH DOUGLAS J. FEINGLASS). RETURN FOR LIFUED 30, NOW RITA N. BLAZIK, SENT HMMT 5908, 28 OCT 65.

3. LIHUFF 1 SUBMITTED RETURN THROUGH OVERT CHANNELS; SIGNED COPY BEING POUCHED HQS.

4. WILL REPORT ON TICHBORN SEPARATELY.

S E C R E T / ADVISE HQ WHEN EXPECT 196[illegible] COVERT TAX RETURNS REQUESTED [illegible] 5-0366

CFN 5558 62414 1964 BENADUM LIMOTOR 19 BARBARA C HUFIG PINEINCH SANDAMANIE HMMT 6018 10 NOT POUCHED CAZAZZUS HMMT 5399 APR 23 DOUGLAS J FEINGLASS LIFUED 30 RITA N BLAZIK HMMT 5908 28 65 LIHUFF 1 HQS

BT

SECRET

Tichborn

201-353203

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

51

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CCS 3, 022,

SECRET 080108Z

8 DEC 65 IN 09909

DIR INFO LAPA ZITE MEXI 5541

KICAPER LICOLIC

REF DIR 59669 ✓

1. SINCE TICHBORN MAY WELL BE NEEDED IN LAPA NEXT SPRING, STATION AND THOMAS W. LUND (IDEN) HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSED COVER POSSIBILITIES WITH HIM. WHILE NO CONCRETE PROPOSAL FORTH COMING, HAVE CONCLUDED THAT PART OF PROBLEM STEMS FROM HIS NEVER HAVING BEEN IN BOLIVIA, AND STATION LAPA NOT HAVING READING OF HIM AND HIS CAPABILITIES.

2. SUGGEST BRIEF VISIT TICHBORN TO LAPA UNDER TOURIST COVER TO CONSULT WITH LAPA OFFICERS AND SURVEY COVER POSSIBILITIES. THIS MONTH BEST TIME FROM MEXI STANDPOINT; NEXT ISSUE LIREAM PUBLICATION HAS JUST GONE TO PRINTERS AND HE RELATIVELY FREE TRAVEL. TICHBORN FULLY COOPERATIVE, ANXIOUS TO SERVE IF NEEDED.

SECRET

+ HQS SEARCHING FOR SOMEONE TO FILL BOLIVIA REQUIREMENT

59669 TICHBORN LAPA THOMAS W. LUND NO CONCRETE NOT HAVING LAPA MONTH BEST TIME LIREAM

SECRET

Tichborn 201 file 201-253203

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG : J. Fisher
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 29 Nov 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

2 Dec 65 22 06z

TO : Mexico City

FROM: DIRECTOR ~~SIG CEN~~

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY OF 2, CCS 3

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 62414

PLS ADVISE WHEN HDQS CAN EXPECT 1964 COVERT TAX RETURNS* REQUESTED HMMS-4366. IF NOT RECEIVED SOON, KUBARK MAY BE FORCED REVEAL TRUE NAMES TO IRS WHO WILL THEN TAKE DIRECT ACTION.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested 8 delinquent 1964 Covert Income Tax returns.

WH/B&F

William V. Broe
C/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-253, c 5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH-8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

FILE VR CCS-3, 2A-2

DIR INFO LAPA CITE MEXI 5309 (EASBY ACTING)

15 Nov 65 IN 95063

KICAPER LIREAM

1. AFTER EXTENSIVE CONSULTATION WITH TICHBORN, STATION UNABLE DEVELOP ACCEPTABLE PROPOSAL FOR HIS COVER IN LA PAZ. HAVE EXAMINED AND DISCARDED THREE MAIN POSSIBILITIES:

A. LAWYER WITH MINING CLIENTS.

B. WRITER WITH FOUNDATION GRANT.

C. PRODUCER OF POSSIBLE MOVIE.

2. IN REGARD TO (1A) TICHBORN BELIEVES HE CERTAIN TO RUN INTO HENRY HILL, WHO LEGITIMATELY INTERESTED IN BOLIVIAN ANTIMONY MINING, HAS CONSULTED IN PAST WITH TICHBORN, AND WOULD RECOGNIZE FISHY NATURE HIS PRESENCE LA PAZ. TICHBORN BELIEVES HILL WOULD REACT BADLY, SPREAD WORD THEIR MUTUAL CIRCLE.

3. PROPOSAL 1B SMELLS TOO STRONGLY OF OPERATION CAMELOT, AND WOULD OPEN TICHBORN TO ATTACK EVEN FROM THOSE TO WHOM THIS COVER MIGHT APPEAR PLAUSIBLE.

4. PROPOSAL 1C WOULD IMMEDIATELY DRAW ATTENTION FROM ALFARO MUTIS, CLOSE ACQUAINTANCE OF TICHBORN, AND LATIN AMERICAN REP OF

Tichborn

201- 253203

TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX.

IN 17365 Pg 2

MUTIS JOB IS TO TRAVEL AREA, KEEP CLOSE TRACK OF ANY AND ALL DEVELOPMENTS IN CINEMA FIELD. TO HIM THIS COVER WOULD APPEAR LUDICROUS, AS IT WOULD TO TICHBORN-MUTIS CIRCLE OF ACQUAINTANCES IN MEXICO.

5. ALL ABOVE IDEAS ARE, OF COURSE, COVER FOR STATUS ONLY. COVER FOR ACTION WITH PROMINENT POLITICAL PERSONALITY MUCH MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM, AND STATION AGREES THAT CLANDESTINITY PROBABLY ONLY RECOURSE. WHILE MEXI NOT CLOSELY FAMILIAR OPS CLIMATE LA PAZ, SPECULATE THAT TICHBORN WOULD QUICKLY BECOME OBJECT CURIOSITY IN SMALL CAPITAL. HE DEFINITELY NOT LITTLE GRAY MAN TYPE, AND MEXI CONSIDERS THAT JOB OF CONCEALING SIGNIFICANT BEHIND SCENES ROLE IN FAST MOVING POLITICAL SITUATION COULD UNDULY TAX HIS TRADECRAFT.

5. TICHBORN HAS SUBMITTED MEMO MAKING ABOVE POINTS PLUS SOME SPECULATION REGARDING USE OF FALSE IDENTITY, WHICH STATION CONSIDERS UNREALISTIC, WILL POUCH ADDEES.

SECRET

CFN 5309TICHBORN LA PAZ CLIENTS (IA) TICHBORN HENRY HILL BOLIVIAN ANTIMONY MINING LA PAZ CAMELOT. IC ALFARO MUTIS FOX TICHBORN-MUTIS

NOT CLOSELY LA PAZ TICHBORN SMALL CAPITAL NOT LITTLE GRAY MAN TYPE

UNDULY TAX MEMO

BT

NNNN

5 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Brown

REFERENCE : WH/1 Memorandum 10 June 1965

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN
(201-253205)

1. This is to confirm telephone conversation this date between Mr. Lally of your Office and Mr. Halliwell of WH/1.

2. WH/1 again requests that a new Operational Approval be expedited on Subject. TICHBORN'S project is awaiting this action in order to undergo renewal for FY 1966.

3. Please advise this Office if any further action is required by the Branch.

W.J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Dosier

DDP/WH/1/Zorance:bp

201-253203

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Edward G. TICHBORN, Administrative

Action Req: Para 2

References: A. HMMT - 5791, 22 Sept 65
B. MEXI 5549
C. HMMT - 5271

1. Due to operational requirements a meeting was not held with Edward G. TICHBORN by an Admin representative, however, the items noted below were briefly discussed with him by telephone on 26 October.

2. TICHBORN was advised information would be forwarded to the Station and, upon his return to the Station, he should ask his contact about the items--both as a reminder and for fuller explanation. As will be noted, there is a time element concerned with c. below.

a. Reference A (Transmittal of hospitalization claim). TICHBORN asked about the claim and was advised the dispatch was received 5 October and the separate cover was received by the Insurance Branch on 25 October. The insurance section has agreed to expedite the claim and it is expected Finance will advise the Station of the amount of reimbursement to TICHBORN within the next two-three weeks.

b. Reference B (Concerned signing the contract amendment forwarded by Book Dispatch 5178). The provisions of the BD regarding signing the amendment still pertain. The subject was very briefly but, by no means thoroughly, explained. In this connection, it had been planned to have him read the two attached pamphlets "Your Social Security" and "Social Security Amendments--1965". If cover or operational considerations do not preclude, the pamphlets may be given to TICHBORN to either read and return to the Station or to retain.

C O N T I N U E D . . .

HMMS - 6399 28 October 1965

S E C R E T

WH/Pers/W.S. Renehan: gms 6376

Distribution:
1 - WH/Pers wo/att
1 - WH/1 wo/att
1 - WH/Reg wo/att C/WH/PERS

C/WH/1

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMS - 4393

c. Reference C (Transmitted Income Tax information in response to Book Dispatch 4659). The Tax Committee was checked regarding TICHBORN and advised they needed additional explanatory information from TICHBORN prior to being able to compute an assessment and bring him under the revised tax procedures. TICHBORN could not recall sufficient facts and figures to provide the required information. He was therefore advised it was to his benefit to submit the information to the Station as soon after his return as practicable.

(1) Other Income. He had indicated receipt of fees but did not state whether they were the result of work outside the U.S. or if they were received while in, and as a result of work in the U.S. If the fees were earned as a result of work outside the U.S., they are excludable for federal tax purposes.

(2) Itemized Deductions. He had indicated under "other" $1400. but did not provide any breakdown or explanation as to what the amount represented. It is necessary to provide sufficient supporting information to enable the Committee to recognize the amount as an allowable item. He also indicated a loss of $2,000 on investments. Explanatory facts are required such as--names, when, reason for the loss (sale of stock at $XX versus cost of $XX or whatever), whether the loss was a carryover from prior year(s), etc. It is better that too much information be provided rather than too little.

TICHBORN is to provide the information in writing with his certification as to completeness and accuracy for transmittal to Headquarters. If the information is received within the first part of November it is likely the revised procedures will be applied for the 1965 tax year.

Ernest A. LUSBY

Attachments:
As Stated

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

28 Oct 65

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/B&F

SUBJECT : Transfer of funds via CCS/EC to LIREAM Activity, Mexico City

REFERENCE : DIR 33730 3 Aug 65

It is requested that $8,500.00 from Project LILISP-X be transferred through CCS/EC to the LIREAM activity in Mexico City. The details on the actual transfer from a New York bank to the Instituto Cultural Inter-Americano, Banco Nacional de Mexico, Sucursal Lomas, Mexico D.F., Mexico of $4,500.00 allegedly being made by Cass Canfield, and a Cashier's check from a New York bank for $4,000.00 allegedly donated by Robert Dowling to be pouched to the Station from Headquarters, have been discussed with CCS/EC.

W.J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CCS/EC
1 - 50-126-36/2
>1 - 201-253203 (TICHB:Cc)
1 - WH/1

DDP/WH/1/Halliwell:bp 28 Oct 65

201-253203

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

15 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/O 4, CA/PROP, CI/OA, DC 4, DO/H 3

SECRET 141750Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5027 14 Oct 65 IN 72946

LICOLIC LIREAM

REF A DIR 49336 *

B MEXI 5025 (IN 72965)

1. TICHBORN ETA NEW YORK 17 OCT, WILL AWAIT CONTACT HILTON HOTEL.

2. IN ADITION TICHBORN COVER AND FUTURE OF MAGAZINE, SUGGEST HQS AND TICHBORN WORK OUT MORE ADVANCED METHOD OF FUNDING LIREAM. PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS NO LONGER APPEAR ADEQUATE.

SECRET

CFN [illegible] 49336 5025 TICHBORN ETA 17 OCT HILTON HOTEL HQS AND TICHBORN WORK OUT MORE NO LONGER

BT

SECRET

* HQS CONCURRED TICHBORN NEW YORK TRIP.

Tichborn 201

201-253203

WH [illegible] G · Mexico City

[illegible]

Chief, [illegible]

Contract [illegible] Social Security [illegible] for Certain [illegible] Cecil B. ARLISS, Rita N. BLAZEK, Barbara G. HUFIG, LIFEUD/19, LIHUFF/1, Joyce H. PINEINCH, John R. SANDAMANIE, Philip K. TESSAROLO, Edward G. TICHBORN, Carol K. ZINSMEISTER

PRIORITY

Action Required: As Noted

1. Electronic data processing methods of the Internal Revenue Service have made it necessary to effect a procedure by which Social Security self-employment taxes and credits may be securely transferred for those Contract Agents (Independent Contractors) who do not have an attributable cover source for income tax [illegible] under their contracts. Such individuals will be taxed under the Social Security tax rate and provisions applicable to self-employed [illegible]. Deductions at the [illegible] rate will begin [illegible] 1965 (retroactive to the 1965 tax year) on contract compensation.

2. The attached document is for your retention and includes those Contract Agents who should participate in the new procedure. Acceptance by the individual is presumed since the Social Security tax is at a lesser rate for the same [illegible].

3. It is suggested the individual under written contract be asked to sign the agreement.

CONCUR 18 OCT 1965

Attachment:
As Stated

[illegible] 65

Hqs Dispatch 5176

Retain

SECRET

Distribution:
2 - WH/PERS
1 - WH/1
1 - WH/2
1 - WH/3
1 - WH/4
1 - WH/5
1 - WH/7
1 - WH/C

6576

[illegible]

[illegible] a contract employee [illegible] basis. [illegible] for the [illegible] this year.

[illegible] amendment to [illegible] Social Security [illegible] during 1963, [illegible] on or before 15 December 1963.

[illegible]

SECRET

Mr. Edward C. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your current contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Arrangements have been recently completed allowing certain independent contractors of this organization to obtain social security credits by covering such individuals under the social security tax provisions applicable to employees. These arrangements also include a provision for retroactive applicability to the beginning of the 1965 tax year. This can be done only for reasons of security since the procedure results in reducing the social security tax from the self-employed rate to the employee rate. For example, in January of 1965 the tax rates were 5.4% and 3-5/8% respectively.

As a consequence thereof, said contract is amended by deleting all reference to social security and by adding the following paragraph:

"Effective 1 December 1964, social security taxes will be covertly deducted by this organization from your compensation in the same manner and to the same extent as would be done if you were a Government employee. Security reasons make this procedure necessary. Its implementation does not imply in any manner the actual creation of an employee-employer relationship. Your legal status under this agreement continues to be that of an independent contractor."

If you receive or expect to receive full or partial social security credits from overt sources you will so notify this organization and an adjustment will be made or covert deductions discontinued, depending upon the circumstances. Further, if you should subsequently receive overt social security credits, evidence thereof will be submitted to this organization. In such event your covert credits will be erased and your covert deductions returned.

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BY SIGNED
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

..ROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : C.R.Halliwell
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 1 Oct 65

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

2 S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

5 Oct 65 17 02z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG CEN~~

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY FI-2

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 47834

REF: MEXI 4855 (IN 60704)*

1. REFERENCE LOAN APPROVED. TA LOAN TO HQS.

2. OBTAIN AND SEND TO HQS FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS SIGNED BY TICHBORN.

A. PROMISSORY NOTE IN THE AMOUNT OF LOAN.

B. RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGING FUNDS RECEIVED.

C. MEMO AUTHORIZING PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS HIS SALARY EFFECTIVE 1 NOVEMBER 65 OF $125 MONTHLY.

3. PROJECT LICOLIC WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR EXTRA $3000 TO PROVIDE LOAN STIPULATING REPAYMENT OVER TWO YEAR PERIOD.

END OF MESSAGE

*MEXI 4855 Request approval TICHBORN $3,000 for purchase car in US..

WH/BGF H. Crai
C/WH/SS
WH/PO/B [illegible]

Tichborn 201
201-253203

William V. Broe
Chief, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

7/30 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, UR

S E C R E T 272344Z 28 SEP 65 IN 60704

DIR CITE MEXI 4355

LICOLIC

1. REQ APPROVAL ADVANCE TICHBORN 3000 DOLLARS FOR PURCHASE CAR IN US, WILL WORK OUT REGULAR REPAYMENT SCHEDULE. DISCUSSED WITH ANDRIETTE.

2. TICHBORN MUST EXIT AND REENTER MEXICO PRIOR. PLANS TRAVEL LAREDO, PICK UP CAR, FRESH VISA.

S E C R E T

CFN 4355 TICHBORN 3000 IN US 13 OCT

BT

SECRET

Tichborn 201-253207

201-253207

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Overdue 1964 Covert Income Tax Returns

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Priority

The following agents in Mexico City are delinquent in the filing of their 1964 Covert Income Tax returns. You are requested to obtain these outstanding returns as soon as possible since delinquent tax returns are subject to 6% statutory interest on the unpaid tax due from 15 April to the date of payment, and in addition are also subject to a penalty of 5% per month, not to exceed 25% of the tax liability.

Jeremy K. BENADUM
Sandra B. CAZAZZUS
LIFEUD/30
LIHUFF/1
LIMOTOR/19
Joyce C. RNEINCH
John R. SANDAMANIE
Philip K. TESSAROLO
Edward G. TICHBORN

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

Tichborn 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMS 4278	19 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-253203

☐ YES ☐ NO
TO FILE NO.
TO FILE NO.
RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 45

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

FROM
MEXICO CITY
ACTION
C9/O4
☑ RID COPY
ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
INFO
FILE, VR, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2, WH 8

SECRET 032232Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4330

3 AUG 65 IN 24983

LIREAM DTDORIC

1. TICHBORN WILL ATTEND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GENERAL SEMANTICS, SAN FRANCISCO, NINE TO THIRTEEN AUGUST, AT INVITATION ORGANIZER S.I. HAYAKAWA. HE IS SCHEDULED TO SPEAK ON NINE AUGUST AND LEAD PANEL DISCUSSION ON THIRTEEN AUGUST. AT HAYAKAWA'S SUGGESTION HE WILL MOUNT LIREAM DISPLAY AND WILL DO WHATEVER ELSE APPROPRIATE TO PUSH PRODUCT.

2. PLANS TO BE IN CONTACT WITH EDGAR KAISER (THROUGH HAYAKAWA) CHAIRMAN BOARD KAISER INDUSTRIES, AND WITH PHILANTHROPIST NORMAN SIMON (THROUGH JUNE WAYNE, HEAD OF TAMARIND GALLERY). ALTHOUGH NEITHER TICHBORN NOR STATION PARTICULARLY SANGUINE POSSIBILITY CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD LIREAM FROM THESE PERSONALITITIES BELIEVE SUCH PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITY ON HIS PART HELPS SUPPORT HIS COVER.

3. HE WILL ALSO CALL ON WALLACE STEGNER, HEAD OF CREATIVE WRITERS CENTER AT STANFORD AND ON ARTHUR COONS, EX-PRESIDENT OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE, THROUGH WHOM HE HOPES TO BE INTRODUCED TO SUCH CALIFORNIA CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS (UNSPECIFIED) AS MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN LIREAM.

SECRET

Tichborn 201

201-253203

SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2
IN 24983

4. IF HQS WOULD LIKE TO CONTACT TICHBORN (PERHAPS IN REGARD TO SUBJECT MEXI 4312) HE WILL BE BEVERLY HILTON LOS ANGELES FROM FOUR TO EIGHT AUGUST AND AT FRANCIS DRAKE SAN FRAN EIGHT TO THIRTEEN AUGUST.

SECRET

CFN: 4339 TICHBORN GENERAL SEMANTICS SAN FRANCISCO S I HAYAKAWA HAYAKAWA'S LIREAM EDGAR KAISER HAYAKAWA KAISER NORMAN SIMON JUNE WAYNE TAMARIND NEITHER TICHBORN NOR STATION LIREAM WALLACE STEGNER STANDFORD ARTHUR COONS EX-PRESIDENT OCCIDENTIAL COLLEGE CALIFORNIA LIREAM HQS TICHBORN 4312 BEVERLY HILTON LOS ANGELES FRANCIS DRAKE SAN FRAN

BT

SECRET

29 June 1965

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Chief, WH Division**

SUBJECT : Self-Employment Credit for Social Security Coverage
Edward G. TICHBORN

1. The responsibility for filing Schedules SE (Form 1040) "U. S. Report of Self-Employment Income" with the Social Security Administration for credit to the taxpayer's social security account has been delegated to this office for those individuals who have filed covert returns.

2. In order to discharge this responsibility and to insure that each contract agent receives full social security credit for any self employment tax paid through the Covert Unit, it is necessary for this office to prepare the Schedule SE (Form 1040) for each taxpayer for secure transmission to the Social Security Administration. In order to complete Form SE for Subject Contract Agent, it is necessary that the following information (designated by an "X") be furnished:

X True Name (As it appears on Subject's Social Security Card)

___ Social Security Number

X Stateside address currently applicable or the address used when the taxpayer last resided in the U. S.

X Type of Business activity to be reflected in reporting Social Security credits from self employment, such as management consultant, translator, writer, etc.

3. Since a three year statute of limitations applies to the filing of self-employment schedules for social security coverage, it is requested that the above information be furnished as soon as possible. Any questions regarding this subject should be directed to OF/[illegible]/Covert Tax Branch.

S M O'LEARY
Chief, Covert Tax Branch

[illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

10 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN (201-253203)

REFERENCES : CI/OA Memorandum of 30 September 1964
CI/OA Memorandum of 3 June 1961

1. All of the information requested on Subject has now been submitted to your office. Project LICOLIC, which provides support for TICHBORN, describes Subject's duties as follows:

a. Subject moves in Mexican leftist and Marxist intellectual circles with a good range of associations in this milieu; in this context, he has successfully developed and now publishes an intellectual magazine under Station direction.

b. He is available to the WH Division for travel to other Latin American countries for political assessments or for ad hoc assignments involving contact with local political figures of interest.

c. He is used to handle dissident or disaffected Communists or far leftists where contacts are required by other Stations and where CA objectives are involved.

2. It is requested that a new OA on Subject be expedited.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

DDP/WH/1/CHalliwell:ljc (10 June 1965)

Lally 1886
6157

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - 201-253203

Called Lally on 5 Nov
requesting [illegible] solution

SECRET

[illegible]

201-253203

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 3 June 1965 prc
TO: WH/1 - R. Armijo	C NO. 201-253203
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LOPEZ, Henry P.

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	XX	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST XX SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Receipt is acknowledged of PRQ Part II.

201-253203

FORM 1-62 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

20 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN
(201-253203)

To further assist you in your reinvestigation of TICHBORN, there is attached a copy of an updated PRQ Part II on him.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

Attachment:
PRQ Part II (1 copy)

DDP/WH/1/JZerance:jm (20 May 1965)

Distribution:
- O & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - 201-253203

SECRET

201-253203

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET

☒ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE

SECRET 191757Z

19 MAY 65 IN 71091

DIR CITE MEXI 3465

REF A HMMW 13631

B HMMA 261030
C HMMA 26033

D HMMT 5461

REFS B AND C APPARENTLY CROSSED REF A IN FOUCH. IN ADDITION REF D IN THIS WEEK'S FOUCH SHOULD CONTRIBUTE.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

Jackson 201

201-253203

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/R DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Administrative/Security -- Edward G. TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: DIR-90817

1. The Station, after reference incident, felt more strongly than ever that it really did not have a complete assessment of TICHBORN in the sense of what is his real ideological viewpoint. This is not to say that the Station was overly concerned that TICHBORN was flirting with the opposition. As a result of the events described below, the Station feels it has a reasonably clear idea on these points now.

2. On 15 May, being a Saturday and two days prior to TICHBORN entering a Mexican hospital for a long-delayed and somewhat apprehensive (on his part) hernia operation, TICHBORN was in an unusually loquacious mood for a luncheon engagement with the Station case officer. He showed little opposition to three good Manhattans and, for the first time, the Station case officer felt he was seeing clearly TICHBORN "the person" and not TICHBORN "the lawyer". In other words, there was no protective veneer involved in the rather long luncheon discussion which followed. The issue which brought forth the entire discussion was reaction of the Mexican intellectual to the Dominican Republic situation. In the process, TICHBORN brought out very sincerely, passionately, and clearly the following points:

a. When he was a trial lawyer in California for five years, his real inclinations were what he termed "leftist". He harbored a number of "reservations" about the way that things were or were not happening in the U.S. under the U.S. system. These were private thoughts and reservations and did not translate

-continued-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
3 - WH

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-5461	17 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/R DESENSITIZED	HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET/SENSITIVE | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-5461

themselves into action, but nonetheless points of real concern to him. Then, he came to Mexico for a period to get "that" novel and writing off his chest: during that period, he saw the Mexican system and some of the Latin American Systems. At that juncture, he became very much aware of the fact that it was the "system" that counted, in spite of whatever imperfections existed, and that there "was, and is, nothing that can anywhere nearly approach the U.S. system". As he said, "Sure, there are a lot of things wrong, because of decisions made by human-beings who are fallible and have their own interests to look after, but there is so much good and so many compensations on the plus side of the system and the way it works, you can afford to recognize the wrongs and work them out within the system". He said that this was so obvious from abroad that he just wondered why he ever had worried about incidents and didn't realize that it was the "system" that mattered.

b. He told about some of the discussions he had had with leftist Mexican intellectuals on these points such as, "Is the Soviet system capable of producing and absorbing such pictures as 'Dr. Strangelove' or having a John Steinbeck write a 'Grapes of Wrath' and run off with all prizes in the writing and motion picture field? Can you even approximate that in Mexico? Witness the furore over 'The Children of Sanchez' here while the 'Grapes of Wrath' was every bit as harsh with respect to similar circumstances in the U.S. and won everything." On and on. In so many words, our system thrives on "self-criticism", and there are things to criticize, but what other system in this world is not only permissive of that, but thrives on it. And so on. He has no doubts about any governmental/social/political/economic system in any combination being able to even approach it.

3. The foregoing is a very brief synopsis of a rambling and long philosophic discussion on these points in which TICHBORN concluded his statement and, even, tirade (his Latin heritage had gotten the better of him at that point) with the statement that "My philosophy on this point, and my present sentiments, have been forged in the fire of thinking as a leftist critic and having come to see and understand a great deal; and they can't tell me a damn thing about what is the best system nor on the basis of their present circumstances in their own countries have they any right or basis for criticizing the U.S. and its actions. Nothing is per/fect, and I can't defend it as being perfect, but for every imperfection they try to show me in the U.S. and what it has or has not done, I can show them hundreds in their country and any other one they try to hold up as a model."

4. In so many words, at least the Station case officer at the present time is satisfied in his own mind that TICHBORN was speaking sincerely during this discussion and there is no question in the Station's mind about where TICHBORN stands ideologically even though he may be considered "left of center."

5. Since this issue seems to hover constantly in the background with TICHBORN insofar as KUBARK is concerned, the Station felt it would be a good idea to register the foregoing incident and appraisal with Headquarters.

Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, Mexico City	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WH Division		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Edward G. TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AC REQ: Submission of updated PRQ Parts I and II

REF : DIR 96004, 26 March 1965

Since KUDESK is reprocessing TICHBORN's clearance, they have requested an updated PRQ Part I and a new PRQ Part II. Please submit additional biographic information since 1959 and full details of Subject's use by the Station in order that we may facilitate the reprocessing.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
 0 & 1 - COS, Mexico City

13 MAY 1965
20 - 253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-13631 CS COPY	DATE 11 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-253203

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	J. Zeranco	ljc	4523

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WHD		Desmond Fitzgerald

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

7Y SECRET

☐ COPY ☐
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE , DF 6

S E C R E T 112007Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3353

REF A. DIR 05802, 11 MAY 65 +

B. HMMT-5265, 11 MAR 65

11 MAY 65 IN 64517

1. REF B FURNISHED INFO ASKED REF A.

2. RETURNS DISPATCHED AS FOLLOWS: HAMMARQUIST ? HMMT-5170, 1 FEB 65 ITEM 48 POUCH 4517; TESSAROLO HMMT-5012, 5 NOV 64 ITEM 44 POUCH 4443; TICHBORN HMMT-5111, 17 DEC 64 ITEM 77 POUCH 4482; LIHUFF ONE HMMT-5205, 11 FEB 65 ITEM 81 POUCH 4525 4525

S E C R E T

CFN +REQUESTED INCOME TAX FORMS,

SECRET

TICHBORN 201

201-253263

MESSAGE FORM /6

78 **SECRET**

/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 10 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: OF 6, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 08802

REF: HMMS-3992, 3 MAR 65*

PLS FORWARD OVERDUE COVERT INCOME TAX RETURNS ON HAMMARQUIST, TESSAROLO, TICHBORN AND LIHUFF ONE ORIGINALLY REQUESTED SEPT 1964.

END OF MESSAGE

* Requested overdue income tax returns be forwarded.

TICHBORN

Desmond FitzGerald
C/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

201-253303

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET 1P

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XX	MICROFILM

TO Chief, WHD
INFO.
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City W
SUBJECT General - Operational
Specific - Updated PRQ-I on Henry P. LOPEZ 201-253203
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
MAY 13 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REFERENCE: DIR-96004 (IN 53853), dated 26 March 1965

Forwarded herewith is an updated PRQ-I on Henry P. LOPEZ. It was completed on a local Spanish form since this type of form looks much less official than the others.

Stewart R Pataker
for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
/3 - WHD w/att hw
2 - Files

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26033	6 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	

5P

1. Nombre completo: HENRY P. LOPEZ
(Primer nombre) (Apellido paterno) (Apellido materno)

2. Su firma corriente Henry P. Lopez

3. Nombre al nacer, (si es distinto) ENRIQUE P. LOPEZ

4. Aliases, apodos o cambios legales en su nombre (indique brevemente en que tiempo, la razón para su uso, y a donde) none

MICROFILMED
MAY 13 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

5. a. Fecha de nacimiento 5/28/20 b. Lugar de nacimiento DENVER, COLORADO

6. Ciudadania en la actualidad U.S.A. Raza

7. Nacionalidad al nacer y cualquier otra nacionalidad que haya adquirido después (si distinta del No. 6) U.S.A.

8. Residencia en la actualidad (dirección) SIERRA AMATEPEC 289
Dueño o inquilino? Renting

9. Dirección permanente (si es distinta de la indicada en el No. 8) Same

10. Su ocupación en la actualidad (puesto, sueldo) LAWYER

11. Ha sido usted naturalizado como ciudadano de los Estados Unidos? X
Indique la fecha y a nombre de quién se expidió el certificado de naturalización? X
Han sido naturalizados ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos sus parientes cercanos? X
Indique la fecha y a nombre de quién se expidieron los certificados de naturalización X

12. Parientes, amigos, personas con quienes corresponde en los Estados Unidos, Nombre y Dirección:
MR & MRS JESE LOPEZ 5121 [illegible] Ave. Los Angeles, Calif
MR ALFRED LOPEZ 3302 Western Ave. Park Forest, Illinois
MR. SANDER JOHNSON 315 S. Beverly Dr. Beverly Hills, Calif.

[illegible] -26033

CS COPY

201-253203

13. Padre - Nombre completo, ocupación, dirección actual, fecha y lugar de nacimiento, nacionalidad al nacer y nacionalidades subsiguientes: JOSE P. LOPEZ 5201 Budlong Ave. Retired. Born on October 25, 1890 in Chihuahua, Chihuahua, Mexico Became naturalized American citizen in 1945

14. Madre - (la misma información que del padre)
HERMINIA MARTINEZ de LOPEZ, 5201 Budlong Ave. Los Angeles, California. Housewife. Born on April 16, 1895 in Chihuahua, Chihuahua, Mexico. Naturalized American citizen in 1945

15. Esposa (o marido): nombre completo, nombre de soltero, fecha y lugar de nacimiento, fecha y lugar del matrimonio, nacionalidad al nacer y cualquier otra nacionalidad que haya tenido después, dirección actual, divorcio, anulación de matrimonio. (De la misma información en cualquier otro matrimonio anterior que haya tenido)
MRS. MILDRED McGREGOR de LOPEZ, born in May 25, 1933 in Lexington Kentucky Native born U.S. citizen. Married April 5, 1955 in Mexico City. Lives at Sierra Amatepec 285 Mexico City. She was divorced from Richard George on Feb 14, 1954 in Mexico

16. Hijos: nombre completo, sexo, fecha y lugar de nacimiento, nacionalidad actual y cualquier otra nacionalidad que haya adquirido después, dirección actual.
JOAQUIN LOPEZ born on Feb 27, 1952 in Los Angeles, Calif
GREGORY LOPEZ (stepson-adopted) born on August 6, 1954 in Mexico City
DRUSILLA LOPEZ born on Sept 17, 1957 in Los Angeles, Calif

17. Hermanos y hermanas: nombre completo, sexo, fecha y lugar de nacimiento, nacionalidad, dirección actual.
ALFRED LOPEZ, male, born on July 5, 1916 in Chihuahua, Mexico naturalized U.S. Citizen in 1944
JOSEPH LOPEZ, male, born in El Paso Texas Oct 22, 1918
BEATRICE LOPEZ, female, born in Denver, Colorado

3302 Western Ave, Park Forest, Illinois
address unknown San Pedro, California
April 14, 1922 4460 Rogers Pl. Los Angeles, Calif

18. Parientes al servicio de cualquier gobierno, nombres y puestos que ocupan.
ALFRED LOPEZ works for U.S. LABOR DEPT. in Chicago, Illinois as veteran's placement advisor

(wife of HENRY (Enrique) P. Lopez, 201-253203)

19. Indique todos los carnets de identidad que tiene, con fechas, números, lugar donde fueron expedidos y fecha hasta que sean válidos.

U S Passport #
Issued at Buenos Aires, Argentina

20. Religión. Es miembro de alguna orden religiosa?

Catholic

21. Afiliaciones politicas, en la actualidad y anteriormente

Democrat

22. Viajes fuera del pais en que reside - pais que visitó, fechas, propósito del viaje, gente y firmas comerciales que visitó.

Several - you have all the data

23. Educación - escuela en que asistió, lugar, cursos, diplomas, fechas.

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER 1942-45 B.A. Political Sci.
HARVARD UNIV. GRAD SCHOOL - 1945-46 Economics
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 1946-48 Bachelor of Laws

24. Idiomas y dialectos (indique si los sabe bien, regular o mediocremente)

Idioma SPANISH Habla ✓ Lee ✓ Entiende ✓
Idioma ENGLISH Habla ✓ Lee ✓ Entiende ✓
Idioma ______ Habla ______ Lee ______ Entiende ______

25. Servicio militar - fechas, de que país, que unidad, grado, facción, donde prestó sus servicios, decoraciones, cuando fué licenciado y por qué. Dé detalles si alguna vez fue prisionero de guerra.

U.S. ARMY 1942-44 Detachment Medical Corps, Cp. Carson, Colo.
discharged honorably as Staff Sgt.

26. Indique de que organizaciones ha sido o es socio (profesionales, sociales, politicas, etc.)

Harvard Club de Mexico

27. Habilidades especiales, capacidades, aficiones, (radio, fotografia, etc.)

none

28. Situación monetaria - sueldo, depósitos en los bancos, bonos, propiedades.

✓

29. Datos de empleos - clase de trabajo, sueldo, fechas, patrones, direcciones, razones para dejar el empleo. Incluya empleos que haya tenido con cualquier gobierno.

Self employed attorney

30. Ha escrito algo? De detalles incluyendo titulos de libros, articulos, casa impresora, fechas.

Enumere las personas que viven en su misma dirección, sus socios intimos (individuos o grupos), sus corresponsales dentro y fuera del pais.

32. Dé cinco personas como referencias, con direcciones:

33. Antecedentes de Corte - La Corte, fecha, detenciones, cargos, fallos, etc.

34. Descripción:

Edad 44 Postura 5 ft 10"
Edad que representa 44 Peso 170 lbs
Altura 5 ft 10" Dientes completo
Ojos brown Pelo black
Forma de la cara oval Cicatrices none
Cutis brown Figura elegante!
Sexo Male
Aspecto general elegantísimo
Facciones prominentes none
Otras facciones distintivas wear glasses

35. Otros datos biográficos y comentarios.

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 3 May 1965 cru
TO: WH/1 - R. Armijo	C NO. 201 - 253203
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA Edward P. Broad	SUBJECT: LOPEZ, Henry P.

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	XX	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA ****
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

**** FINAL INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

This field inv. report contained no derog on Subj. It was reviewed by the WH/1 desk officer on 6 May. It disclosed that Subj's cover since his residence in Mexico City is holding up very well re his friends and associates in Los Angeles. They report that LOPEZ is believed to be working for motion pix and legal work in Mexi. and that he enjoys a good income of around 30,000. (Its around 23th).

Inf. R has seen

TICHBORN

HMMW-13631
4 IV

FORM 9-63 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(20)

201-253203

11-21

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : C. HALLIWELL
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 25 MARCH 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-253203

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[illegible] 00z

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO C/0A, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 90004

LICOLIC

REF: DIR 90817

PLS FORWARD UPDATED BIO DATA PRQ I SINCE OCT 1959 AND NEW PRQ II EDWARD G. TICHBORN.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref-KUDESK reprocessing clearance on Subj.

W J Kaufman

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
CHIEF WH/1

file 201-253203

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET/RYBAT

ORIG : C. HALLIWELL
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 15 MARCH 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-253203

12 Dummy

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY
☒ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

PRIORITY

TO : Mexico City

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 6 INFO ADDP, C/CI, D/OS 2, VR, FILE

TO PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR

RYBAT CURTIS FOR RESTRICTED HANDLING 47 52740

RI	
PS	
DEST	WH/1
ABSTRACT	
INDEX	

R I C O P Y

201-253203

15 Mar 65

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT ADMINISTRATIVE/FINANCE
Loss of Personal Funds - Edward G. TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMS-3432, 22 April 1964

1. The delay in answering reference should not be construed as lack of desire or intent, on the part of TICHBORN or the Chief of Station, that the case be submitted to the Board of Review for Shortages and Losses for consideration, but rather as an administrative delay of getting the facts, people, papers, etc., together and in one place for submission.

2. Attached is a statement prepared by TICHBORN regarding the loss of funds and containing the pertinent circumstances of the case. The sub-paragraph numberings are in accordance with, and relating to, the requirements of paragraph 3, a of FR 34-250. The information requested in sub-paragraphs numbered 8 through 12 is answered jointly by Stewart R. PATAKER and Jerome H. BALSIS who were assigned to investigate the matter by the reporting official.

3. PATAKER and BALSIS talked with TICHBORN, at different times, regarding the shortage of funds and the happenings as related to them were substantially the same as outlined in TICHBORN's statement. Since there is no other way to verify the facts and TICHBORN has proven himself to be truthful and forthright in his dealings with the Station his statement regarding the loss of funds is accepted as fact.

4. Since TICHBORN is authorized travel expense "on actual, reasonable, and necessary expense basis" it does not seem sensible for him to have reported the loss of funds in other than the way he says actually happened.

(CONTINUED)

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-5261	DATE 10 March 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMT-5261

5. It is recommended that TICHBORN be allowed the amount of $575.00, representing loss of funds while enroute from Panama City to Buenos Aires on 25 March 1963, and a credit T/A be sent to Station to clear the advance established in TICHBORN's account by Headquarters T/A HQ2954, dated 23 June 1964.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

This is to certify that the above report, to the best of my knowledge and belief, includes all information pertinent to the consideration of the settlement of the account.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

34 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

VR. FILE CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP

S E C R E T 061845Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2712 (EASBY ACTING)

6 MAR 65 IN 1751

LICOLIC

REF DIR 68516

~~REF DIR 68315~~

TICHBORN GOING BE TIED UP WITH FOURTH ISSUE GRMANTLE FROM APRIL THRU LATE MAY IF ANY PLANS NEAR FUTURE RE REF.

S E C R E T

CFN

201-253263

14-00000

18

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT Contract Amendment Edward G. TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIR 67851

Action Required: FYI

1. Forwarded herewith is the referenced amendment Edward G. TICHBORN's contract which provides for a one year extension effective 19 November 1964 and a compensation increase from $9,000 to $12,000.

2. During Subject's recent TDY in Washington it was made clear to him that this substantial pay raise and extension of his contract was on the basis that TICHBORN continue to devote 85 to 90% of his time to KUBARK activity. In view of the fact that Subject is currently handling only one intellectual project for the Station, please explain to him that in the event that his work load reverts to the 50 to 65% level, he cannot expect to continue to receive the present amount of compensation. During Subject's talks at Headquarters, it appeared that TICHBORN understands this most clearly. As a contract agent, he is remunerated on the basis of services rendered. In return for this arrangement, the government makes no claim on income he might receive from his private business activities. Obviously it is our hope that coupled with the occasional full-time assignments in other WH countries levied on TICHBORN, that the Station will be able to continue to utilize Subject's services at the high level of activity which will justify his current compensation.

Chester D. DAINOLD

MICROFILMED
MAR 24 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
Amendment, h.w.

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexco City

201-253203

~~50-6-116/1~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO
50-6-116/1

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW 13408

DATE
04 MAR 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-116/1
201-253203

RI
Chrono
WH/Pers

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	201
RID/MIS	KL
RID/FS	10
~~RID/FI~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	C. [illegible]well	jah	4523

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
[redacted]		
	Feb 65	[illegible]

RELEASING

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City x

Chief, WH Division

1963 Covert Income Tax Returns

Reference: HMMS 3700, September 1964

Please reply to reference which concerned the delinquent Covert Income Tax Returns of:

Otto HAMMARQUIST

LIHUFF-1

Philip K. TESSAROLO

Edward G. TICHBORN

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

3 MAR 1965

HMMS 3092

SECRET 201-209600

RI
Chrono

WH/1 Jane Zerance:jah 4523

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT General - Administrative
Specific - Covert Income Tax Return to Edward G. TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMS-3952, dated 15 January 1965

1. Referenced dispatch has caused TICHBORN and the Station to become aware of some new problems with the Mexican banking system. As Headquarters may not be aware, TICHBORN has a dollar account with a Mexico City bank for his personal affairs. Mexican banks do not return cancelled checks to the depositor, but only provide statements. TICHBORN requested his bank to provide him with his cancelled check (on a loan basis) so that copies could be made of it. It developed over a process of several weeks that the bank could not locate this check nor had it been run through TICHBORN's account. Since ample time had expired (it was mailed in June 1964), the bank checked all accounts of persons with TICHBORN's last name on the theory that it might have been run through someone else's account (not an unusual occurrence here). It had not that the bank could discover.

2. As a result, TICHBORN is stopping payment on the check with the bank, writing the office with which he filed his overt income tax, advising that office of the circumstances, and requesting some word back whether or not, in fact, that office received and cashed the check. If the check was received, TICHBORN will provide the Station with a copy of the letter so stating and remove the "stop payment" order on the check. If the check was not received (mail is another problem), then TICHBORN will send another check and a copy of the interchange of correspondence on the matter with the bank and the income tax authorities will be provided Headquarters. It is hoped this will be satisfactory.

3. The only reason the Station is providing all the gruesome details on the foregoing is so that Headquarters will have some understanding of the Mexican banking problems should questions of this nature arise again.

for Tichborn 20
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

201-253183

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-5226

DATE
24 February 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

NON-OFFICIAL COVER CONCURRENCE

DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY CI/OA ONLY

SUBJECT'S NAME [illegible] (P) TICH[illegible], Edward C.

C OR 201 NO. 201-[illegible] 253203

DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]

PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

U.S. RESIDENCE [illegible]

OVERSEAS RESIDENCE

EMPLOYER [illegible]

PROJECT [illegible]

DIVISION OR STAFF [illegible]

CASE OFFICER [illegible]

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION [illegible]

PROPOSED USE [illegible]

TO BE COMPLETED BY CCS ONLY

CCS/NC CASE OFFICER (Extension 5144)

CCS FILE NO.

Central Cover Staff concurs in your proposal to use subject for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon CCS to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise CCS/NC promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated. The pseudonym assigned subject should be provided CCS/NC at the time notification of activation is forwarded. If notification of activation is not received in CCS/NC one year from above date it will be assumed proposed use did not materialize.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject or his employer is in CCS/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCS/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

☐ If check mark appears here the proposed use of subject requires DDP approval under CSI 240-6, para. 5. Please review CSI 240-6 and initiate action as appropriate.

DISTRIBUTION: 1-CCS 1-CI/OA 1-AREA DIVISION

CHIEF [illegible]

FORM 2219

SECRET

201-253203

14-00000

SECRET

(TICHBORN)

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROM   ERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)

Henry P. LOPEZ 201-253203-CI/DA

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

28 May 1920 Denver, Colorado

4. CITIZENSHIP

American

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Legal Adviser to motion picture company Produccione Marc IV, S. A.
Mexico D. F., Mexico

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

LLB Harvard Law School 1948
PHI Beta Kappa 1942
Writer and Lecturer

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 167603

DATE ~~25 January 1965~~

[redacted]

TO

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME R. Armijo
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/1
ROOM, BUILDING 3B2607
EXTENSION 4523

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
US Army Medical Corps 1942-1943		
Attorney, specializing in trial work Subject active in California state politics; ran unsuccessfully for Secretary of State, 1958	L. A., Calif.	1949-57

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

Democrat Catholic

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

Mildred McGregor born Lexington, Kentucky

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

Three minor children, two sons and a daughter

12. SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

See Green List 077832 April 1959

116322 July 1961

611

36 PR 1

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D.

SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 8-61 501

SECRET

201-253203

SECRET

5 Feb 1965
DATE

TO: R.Armijo

FROM: FI/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO Except INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

* Previous green list request from PP/PAD, 13 Apr 59, op, GL 77832, No record.
WH/PO/B, 7 July 1961, op, GL 111621, No record.

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 25 January 1965

TO:
☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: R. Armijo
WH/1
3B2607
4523

SUBJECT: (True name) Henry P. Lopez

PROJECT: [illegible]

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: Edward G. Tichborn

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 253203

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Mexico

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

During past FY subject has assisted in the development and publishing of an intellectual journal. Also political action missions to other Latin American countries.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 167603

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☒	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 8-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-253203

S-E-C-R-E-T

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief of Finance

Edward G. [illegible] - Covert Income Tax Return

HMMA-5111 dated 17 December 1964

1. Headquarters review of [illegible]'s 1963 overt and covert tax returns revealed that he reported his covert income on the overt return and that the tax computation on the overt return was incorrect. The covert return appears to be correct, however, it will be necessary for Subject to advise Headquarters whether correspondence has been received from IRS regarding the apparent error in the overt tax computation.

2. It is, generally, the rule that a copy of the cancelled check, in payment of the overt tax liability, be forwarded to Headquarters when the covert income is reported on the overt return.

3. It would be appreciated if Subject would forward his cancelled check, or a copy thereof, with the above requested information.

DORA B. [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City

HMMW - 3952 15 January 1965

S-E-C-R-E-T

1 - CFD/CFD
1 - Division
1 - CF Reg.
1 - RI/ED

CF/CFB/CFA/SED'Leary/[illegible]/elb 8391

VE/EP

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	CA
2		6	
3		7	WE
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
C/WH 4

INFO
VR. FILE, CA 2, WE 6, WH 7, CCS 3

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

S E C R E T 082245Z

DIR INFO PALP CITE MEXI 2132

9 JAN 65 IN 56563

DTDORIC QKOPERA

REF A MEXI 2075 (

B DIR 75171

TICHBORN HAS SO MANY COMMITMENTS FOR SPECIFIC TIMES BY LETTER, ETC. TO VARIOUS PEOPLE ON THIS TRIP IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO REVERSE HIMSELF NOW AND RESCHEDULE. ASSUMING LUND WILL BE PRESENT IN MEXI FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, TICHBORN COULD TOUCH BASE WITH LUND ON MORNING 23 JAN WHEN HE WILL BE BACK IN MEXI IF OK WITH LUND.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

TICHBORN

201-255203

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

TO: WH/1 -- J. Halliwell	DATE: 30 December 1964 jb
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward [illegible]	C NO. C - 77119
	SUBJECT: LOPEZ, Henry P.

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRO I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRO II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND XX THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Since the original traces were run in 1959, and in light of questionable information developed; it is requested that a new 772 request for amendment with up-dating of all traces and new Green List request be submitted. On the 772, please supply full details of use by the Mexico City Station.

An up-dating of the biographic data submitted in 1959 will facititate matters.

WH/1 is again reminded that no Operational Approval for use exists at this time. OA granted 14 Oct 1959 ?

Unless appropriate action is taken within 30 days, this case will be closed.

201-253203

: D.B. McGRATH
: WH/2/DR
: 7983
ATE: 2 DEC 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM 13

28 SECRET

ROUTING

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO: MEXICO CITY, SANTO DOMINGO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, VR, FILE

3 DEC 64 21 39z

SIG CEN

TO ~~[illegible]~~ MEXI INFO: SDOM CITE DIR 68316

REF: MEXI 1788 (IN 33670)

IN HQS DISCUSSIONS WITH TICHBORN IT TENTATIVELY AGREED THAT EARLY DECEMBER 1964 MIGHT BE A SUITABLE TIME FOR TICHBORN VISIT DOMREP TO MAKE ASSESSMENT OF REID'S PUBLIC IMAGE AND RECOMMENDATIONS HOW TO IMPROVE SAME. HOWEVER, IN VIEW EXCELLENT AND THOROUGH ASSESSMENT ALONG SIMILAR LINES PROVIDED BY RECENT JMTUBA REPRESENTATIVES HQS CONSIDERS DESIRABLE THAT VISIT BY TICHBORN SHOULD BE MADE AT APPROPRIATE LATER DATE AND WITH MORE SHARPLY DEFINED OBJECTIVES. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/1

Tichborn 201

RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/2

201-253203

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ [illegible] ☐ CONF[illegible]AL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

REQUEST NO:

REQUEST DATE:

FROM:
RID/Files
G C 52
Ros

EXTENSION 6740

NO

DATE 14 MAR 68

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/6 5006			
2. VIA WH/RMO			
3. 3 B 12			
4.			
5. [illegible]			
6. DO/CO ~~1H19~~			
7. 3C19 1. Mr allen		3/21/68	
8. 2. Tieflow file			
9.			
10. WH/RMO Attn: Mr. Wilson			
11. 3 B 12			
12.			
13. return to: DoCo/Dale allen 1H33			
14.			
15. ~~RID/Files~~ ~~G C 52~~			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Please att to basic doc. HMMA-24860 in 201-253203 which is on perm charge to your office

Thanks

#10 - DoCo does not have original copy of dispatch. Please locate dispatch & forward to us for 201 file.

Libby, DO/CO
x4135

Someone suggested the number should be HMMA, Mexico City, [illegible] HMMA.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (OP-24) ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1 Dec 64

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ IN[illegible]L US[illegible]LY ☐ CONFI[illegible]AL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/RMO	EXTENSION	NO.
		DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/CO/Col. Allen/3E19 1H-33				The original copy is lost if it is not in your file where it should be.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-61 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XX	MICROFILM

TO Chief, WHD

INFO. Chief, KUWOLF

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT General - Operational/Specific - Edward G. TICHBORN Letter of Resignation to William D. KIMROY.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXI-1745, dated 25 November 1964

Forwarded as a separate cover attachment to this dispatch is a copy of the letter which TICHBORN prepared and forwarded to KIMROY on 25 November 1964.

Stewart R Patahes
for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. As Stated (UNDER SEPARATE COVER)

CS COPY

Distribution:
2 - WHD w/att u/s/c cc to KUWOLF
1 - KUWOLF w/att u/s/c
4 - Files

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN [illegible]

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-24860	1 Dec 64
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-124-112 50-6-116/3

Dear Mr. Thomas:

Due to increased demands upon my time from other clients, I find it necessary to relinquish my duties as legal counsel for the IILR here in Mexico, and I do so with great reluctance. One of my heretofore-lesser clients has recently expanded his activities in certain real estate developments in Guadalajara and Puerto Vallarta, thereby necessitating my frequent absence from Mexico City. Then, too, I had underestimated the amount of time and effort required to satisfactorily attend the various legal and administrative matters confronting CEDS. Should you so desire, I could recommend other legal counsel; but I am inclined to feel that the Centro's principal problems would be of an administrative nature rather than a legal one.

As for my legal fees to date, I am submitting a bill for $650.00 U.S. Cy. This represents a total of 65 hours at the rate of $10.00 per hour. My regular fees amount to $20.00 per hour, but, in keeping with my own political affinity for labor causes, I have reduced them to the lesser figure.

May I thank you again for your confidence and good will in having chosen me as legal counsel for your organization's activities in Mexico. I shall be happy to give you a personal report of my observations on my next trip to New York.

Sincerely yours,

Henry P. Lopez

CS COPY

Att to HMMA 24860

201-253203

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN

Please extend for a period of one year with the following amendment the present contract of Edward G. TICHBORN, which was due to expire 18 November 1964:

> "Increase in basic compensation to $12,000 per annum effective 1 December 1964; and additional compensation of $1,500.00 dollars for full time services rendered in June, July and August of 1964."

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/DF/CRHalliwell:kte (20 November 1964)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/Personnel
1 - WH/1/Mexico (201-
1 - WH/1/Mexico Memo file
1 - WH/Registry

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

1/ SECRET

GROUP 1

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2	1	6	
3		7	CA
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO
VR. FILE, CA 2, CA/O 4, OP 2, OF 3

SECRET 121750 Z

DIR CITE MEXI 1558

12 Nov 64 IN 21897

CP

LICOLIC**
REF A DIR 63360
B MEXI ~~OTTO~~ 1559*

CONCUR ALTHOUGH REF B MAY ALTER SOME CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED.

SECRET

CFN
*NO RECORD IN C/S AS OF 1500, 12 NOV 64.
** RE TICHBORN CONTRACT.

SECRET

201-253203

C R Halliwell

ORIG : C.R. Halliwell
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 9 NOVEMBER 1964

MESSAGE FORM

27

S E C R E T

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-253203

50-6-116/2

22

ROUTING RI

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

11 Nov 64 20 10z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 INFO RI/AN, CA/O 4, CA2, OP2, OF3, VR, FILE SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

LICOLIC 63360

REF: HMMA 24353

1. EDWARD G. TICHBORN DISCUSSED TERMS HIS KUBARK CONTRACT DURING VISIT HQS EARLY NOVEMBER. HQS AGREES PRESENT ~~XXRXRX~~ EXPIRING CONTRACT CALLED FOR ABOUT TWO THIRDS SUBJ'S TIME. TICHBORN POINTED OUT PER REFERENCE HE NOW ENGAGED NINETY PERCENT TIME FOR KUBARK.

2. SUBJECT STATION CONCURRENCE HQS RECOMMENDS NEW ONE-YEAR ~~KRXXARXKX~~ CONTRACT PROVIDE RAISE FROM $9000 TO $13000 PLUS $3000 QUARTERS PER ANNUM. ALSO LUMP SUM PAYMENT 1500 DOLLARS FOR COMPENSATION HIS RECENT FULL TIME SERVICE FUASPEN. ADVISE IF YOU CONCUR EXTEND HIS CONTRACT ONE YEAR EFFECTIVE 19 NOVEMBER.

3. HQS TOLD TICHBORN WE CONSIDERED HIS SERVICES VALUABLE AS WELL AS HIS EVER-WILLINGNESS DEPART ON SHORT ~~N~~ NOTICE ASSIGNMENTS OTHER DIVISION AREAS. OBVIOUSLY THIS PROPOSED RAISE WITH WHICH SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST HAPPY SINCE STILL IMPOSES NO RESTRICTIONS ON HIS SOMETIME OUTSIDE LEGAL WORK, WILL BE WITH UNDERSTANDING HE CONTINUE DEVOTE NEAR FULL-TIME MANAGEMENT AND HANDLING QRSHINE AND QRMANTLE PLUS other ~~MISCELLANEOUS~~ STATION or Hqs ~~XX~~ ASSIGNMENTS.

CONTINUED 201-253203

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO PAGE TWO

TO INFO. CITE DIR 63360

4. DISPATCH FOLLOWS ON QRMINE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/POB

WH/PERS

WH/BGF

5
4
3
2
1

R. W. Herbert
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 3 November 1964 dlr

TO: WH/1 - J. Halliwell

C NO.: C - 77119

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: LOPEZ, Henry P.

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRO I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRO II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

If it is still your intention to utilize Subject, please comply with CI/OA memorandum of 30 September 1964. You will note that original OA was granted to PP/PAD in 1959; therefore, in essence, no approval exists on Subject.

[illegible]

FORM 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
8-60

SECRET

(20)

201-253203

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG: WALTER RAYMOND, JR.
UNIT: CA/OH
EXT: 7697
DATE: 21 OCTOBER 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CA/[illegible]
INFO: [illegible], [illegible], CI/OPS, WH 7, [illegible]

22 Oct 64 22 17z

SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO PALP CITE DIR

DTDORIC QKOPERA

56804

REFS: A. MEXI 1219 (IN 93163)
B. DIR 36520

1. BELIEVE 3 OR 4 NOV GOOD DATES FOR WINTERROWD TICHBORN MEETING MEXI. WILL CONFIRM WITH TICHBORN WHEN HE VISITS HQS.

2. PER REF B PARA 3: HUYETTE NOW BELIEVES THAT QRMANGER SHOULD REOPEN CORRESPONDENCE WITH DTGODOWN. SUGGEST TICHBORN PROMPT QRMANGER SEND HUYETTE COPY QRMANTLE WITH COVERING LETTER SUGGESTING NEW YORK MEETING. THEN HUYETTE COULD RESPOND, WITHOUT APPEARING OVER EAGER, ALONG PRECISE LINES NOTED REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

Gave Tichborn's Travel plans and queried for possible meet w/ Winterrowd on U.S. Trip

file Tichborn

WH/ [illegible]

C/SR

Robert L. [illegible]
C/CA/[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

~~I~~ Helliwel

RI ☑ COPY ☐ OUDONY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM: MEXICO CITY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION: WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT / TIME / BY

INFO: VR, FILE, CA/O 4, CA 2, CCS 3, CA/PROP, CA/PEG

S E C R E T 202232Z

DIR CITE MEXI 1386

200CT64 IN 96921

REFS A MEXI 1219 (IN 93163)

B DIR 53655

C DIR 56520

1. TICHBORN ETA WASH NOW OCT 25 AND WILL MAKE CONTACT INDICATED REF B.

2. ASIDE FROM GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ON ~~QRMINE~~ Center AND QRMANTLE TICHBORN EXPECTED DISCUSS FOLL SPECIFIC ITEMS:

A. ~~LIKULAK~~ Elba CONTRACT AND CHANGE IN COVER FUNDING FOR QRMINE. LIKULAK STILL WANTS BETTER ASSURANCE THAN ILR DTRACCOON AS SIGNATORY TO CONTRACT AND, IN ANY EVENT, WOULD LIKE SIGNED COPY OF CONTRACT (ALL COPIES POUCHED TO HQS). TICHBORN TOLD TO BRING SIGNED COPY BACK WITH HIM FROM PBPRIME IF ALL POSSIBLE TO TAKE SOME HEAT OFF THIS ISSUE.

B. JUAN BOSCH BOOK SINCE ~~LIKULAK~~ Elba SUGGESTING HANDLING PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY THAN ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED AND STATION NOT CERTAIN COMPATIBLE WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS ON FINANCING IT.

C. TICHBORN CONTRACT PER HMMA-24353.

3. TICHBORN SENT LETTER TO THOMAS, BRINGING PROSPECTUS, AND THREE COPIES QRMANTLE AIRMAILED PER REF C.

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-253203

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21 RI COPY ☐ DUCITY

3 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
PARIS (LCPIPIT)

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION
CA/O 4

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED TO: UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, WH 7, WE 6

SECRET 201610Z

20 OCT 64 IN 96671

MEXI INFO DIR CITE PALP 2532

DTDORIC QKOPERA

REF MEXI 1219 (IN 93163) *

1. RE PARA 2 REF, WINTERROWD (Hunt) WOULD PREFER 3-4 NOV. WILL CONTACT STATION FIRST AS PLANNED AND STATION CAN ARRANGE MEETING WITH TICHBORN.

2. NO INDEX.

SECRET

* Queried if TICHBORN could see WINTERROWD on U.S. Trip or on Return to Mexi 3 or 4 Nov.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WHD	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, KUWOLF		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City	XX	MICROFILM

SUBJECT General - LICOLIC
Specific - Edward G. TICHBORN Cover and Working Papers.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-24456 dated 8 Oct 64.

1. As Headquarters is aware, Edward G. TICHBORN is in Mexico on a tourist visa and with a number of "associations" (i.e., law firm in PBPRIME, TV and movie contacts in Mexico) which have sufficed to provide satisfactory superficial cover for his presence and activities here up to this time. However, he has been here long enough now and made enough trips to other Latin American countries where a continuation of this tourist status and present cover arrangements should be changed for something more substantial. All of this became apparent when he began to try to obtain his working papers. TICHBORN's profession, of course, is that of a lawyer, but he cannot practice this profession in Mexico under Mexican law. Therefore, to find a peg for working paper approval, something else had to be found. None of his numerous present cover associations or stories had enough substance to provide a sufficiently plausible basis for working papers. The corporation being created for the QRMANTLE activity under the cover story being used (e.g., fairly affluent PBPRIMER interested in culture and intellectuals trying to get something of the QRMANTLE nature started and, then, interest PBPRIME foundations in picking it up) will not support an application for working papers. As a result, the Station and TICHBORN were casting about for something else with more depth and durability.

(continued)

Attachment:
1. Identity (UNDERSEPARATE COVER)

Distribution:
2 - WHD w/att u/s/c
1 - KUWOLF w/att u/s/c
3 - Files

		WH/6
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

CS COPY

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-24457	13 Oct 64
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-116/2 FYN: P-4277

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	SECRET	HMMA-24457

2. During the week of 27 September, an old friend of TICHBORN's, Identity A, came up with the following proposition:

a. Identity A owns Identity B which operates out of Mexico City and distributes PBPRIME shows dubbed into Spanish throughout the Caribbean and South American area. The business has been in existence for some time and, according to TICHBORN, is thriving. Identity A said that his business had reached a point where he needed legal assistance of various types, but was not prepared to turn it over to just any local lawyer since it involved a wide range of problems.

b. Identity A, who knew from conversations with TICHBORN that the latter was thinking about getting Mexican working papers, made an offer to TICHBORN. He said that he would provide TICHBORN with office space and telephone in his present office area in downtown Mexico City on Reforma if TICHBORN would just advise him on what local lawyers to see on these various legal problems and act as a very general legal advisor to him on dealings with these people. He and TICHBORN figured this would take, perhaps, 5% of the latter's time. Further, and most important, Identity A said he would provide the basis with Identity B for TICHBORN obtaining his working papers. For various reasons, however, Identity A desired an answer right away (within several days).

3. The Station checked out Identity A in Station files and found that there had been some previous traffic on him in the period, 1957-61: HDC-W-334 dated 19 December 1957; HMM-A-9445 dated 12 February 1958; DIR-40866 dated 20 May 1961; DIR-41304 dated 22 May 1961; DIR-41303 dated 23 May 1961; DIR- 41298 dated 23 May 1961; and MEXI-8085 dated 23 May 1961. As will be noted, the May 1961 traffic concerned TICHBORN coming to Mexico and being employed as legal counsel to Identity A. (This never really reached fruition although TICHBORN used an association with Identity A, which was never more than close social contact and an interest in show business, as one of his various cover stories.) In all this traffic, there was not any derogatory information developed on Identity A. Therefore, the Station on strength of the timing required and this previous traffic told TICHBORN to go ahead with the arrangement since it is not only essential for his local activities, but will provide him with stronger and readily-available cover for any further Latin American trips (i.e., FUASPEN) he might be required to make. TICHBORN has been told, to transact an absolute minimum of his business for KUBARK at this office on his regular projects. (e.g., QRMINE and QRMANTLE).

4. Hopefully, this will also straighten out the working papers problem on some sort of rational basis in the near future.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment #1 to

HMMA-24457

Identity A - John Nichols MANSON III

Identity B - Magnun TV and Mark IV Productions

SECRET

CS COPY

ATT TO HMMA 24457

201-253203

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

Sep 24 10 08 PM '64

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

— Your recommendations pls re subj in ind contr.

Copy Detached WMD

pl. for info + services only—

FROM:

RID/ bn

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/CWH/1			25 XI	
2.				
3. Halliwell				H.
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10. RID/AN				
11.				
12. RID/MIS				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17 RID/FI				

RID PROCESSING SUSPENDED
PLEASE INDICATE HANDLING

X Retain in 50-6-116/3
(CI Number)

☐ [illegible]

☐ [illegible]

☐ [illegible]

NOTE: [illegible] of the CI [illegible] the Desired Handling is Checked Above and the Document returned to RID.

201-253203 ✓

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-253203

14-0000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XX	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHO

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT General - LICONGA
Specific - Edward G. TICHBORN Contract 201-253203

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-24352, dated 22 September 1964.

1. As probably can be discerned from previous communications on this subject, the Station has never been too certain about the original understandings with Subject on his relationship with KUBARK. At least some understandings have been supplementary to the formal contract (such as, his availability for extended trips to Latin American areas in election periods). This is no complaint on the part of the Station, but merely a prelude to a matter which the Station brought up with TICHBORN in connection with his intellectual magazine and QRMINE activities.

2. It has been the Station's inference, from talking to TICHBORN as well as communications on other aspects of his relationship with KUBARK not covered in his contract, that he is not to be considered a full-time contract agent. In other words, he has outside activities in the legal and other fields here which it was understood would provide additional income to him at the time he entered into his original relationship with KUBARK. As can be discerned from his biographic data, he has operated at a level and enjoyed an income outlook that would not be satisfied by the present contractual arrangements on salary. It has become obvious to the Station, however, that if he is to handle, properly, present requirements being imposed on him by the Station a very high percentage of his available time is going to be involved.

(continued)

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

RECLASSIFIED
RI/AN
RI/MIS

RI/Files

CS COPY

[illegible]

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-24353	22 Sep 64
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-116/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | SECRET | HMMA-24353

3. Taking all the foregoing into consideration and to avoid complications with his present projects or TICHBORN, the Station asked him what understanding he had on the proportion of his time to be devoted to KUBARK activities. He said that his present contract was predicated on approximately 60 to 66-2/3% of his time being utilized by KUBARK. His present estimate is that he is devoting 85 to 90% of his time to KUBARK activities; and, if he is to do the kind of job that is desired on the two intellectual projects recently acquired, he will sustain that percentage. Of course, he continues to be available for appropriate election of political assignments (such as FUASPEN) in other countries from time to time; but, it has to be recognized that when he is absent from Mexico, this represents 100% of his time.

4. The Station agrees with his analysis on current commitments against his time on behalf of KUBARK. Therefore, it was indicated to TICHBORN that he should be prepared to take up this matter with Headquarters at the time he makes his late October trip to PBPRIME in connection with the new intellectual magazine (see reference) and that the Station would request Headquarters to be prepared to discuss the matter at that time. It is the Station's understanding that his present contract extension expires 19 November 1964.

5. The Station would like to emphasize that this matter was brought up at its initiative in order to try (a) to assure that demands being placed on TICHBORN recently could be reasonably expected to be fulfilled and (b) to get a complete understanding on all aspects of TICHBORN's contractual status (written and unwritten) so that neither the Station nor TICHBORN get committed to these continuing activities and suddenly find themselves in contention about the time/salary involved. It should also be emphasized that TICHBORN has not complained about recent requirements, but has devoted whatever time required to handle them and do the job expected.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XXXX	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Edward G. TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-12847, 21 August 1964

Edward G. TICHBORN's contract should be renewed. Station is awaiting his return from Chile to discuss possible changes, which will be forwarded as soon as possible.

Julian Y. Hammett
for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
③ - WHD
2 - Files

CS COPY

✓

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-24259

DATE
4 September 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-253203

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief WH Division

SUBJECT
1963 Covert Income Tax Returns

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

1. According to the records in the Office of Finance, the following named individuals have failed to file the required Covert Income Tax returns for 1963. Since the due date for Income Tax Returns is 15 April for individuals physically present in PBPRIME on that date and 15 June for individuals who are abroad on 15 April, all of the following individuals are now delinquent with respect to their PBPRIME Income Tax responsibilities:

Otto HAMMARQUIST	Mexico COA
LIHUFF - 1	Mexico COA
Philip K. TESSAROLO	Project LIENBOSS
√ Edward G. TICHBORN	Project LICOLIC

2. It is requested that steps be taken to procure the outstanding tax returns as soon as possible since delinquent tax returns are subject to 6% statutory interest on the unpaid tax due from 15 April to date of payment and in addition are also subject to a penalty of 5% per month (not to exceed 25% of the tax liability) for failure to file tax returns.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 COS, Mexico City

201-253263

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW 3700

DATE
4 September 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201

SECRET

31 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1

SUBJECT : 1963 Covert Income Tax Returns

1. According to the records in the Compensation and Tax Division, Office of Finance, the following named individuals are required to file Covert Income Tax Returns for 1963, but have failed to do so to date. The due date for Income Tax Returns is 15 April for individuals physically present in the United States on that date and 15 June for individuals who are abroad on 15 April. Therefore, all of the following listed individuals are now delinquent with respect to their U. S. Income Tax responsibilities:

Otto HAMMARQUIST	Mexico OOA
LIHUFF/~~2~~1	Mexico OOA
Philip K. TESSAROLO	Project LIEMBOSS
✓ Edward G. TICHBORN	Project LICOLIC

2. It is requested that steps be taken to procure the outstanding tax returns as soon as possible since delinquent tax returns are subject to 6% statutory interest on the unpaid tax due from 15 April to date of payment and in addition are also subject to a penalty of 5% per month, not to exceed 25% of the tax liability, for failure to file tax returns.

3. It is also requested that WH/B&F be furnished with a copy of any correspondence going to the Field with respect to this subject.

for Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

[illegible] 3700

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

SECRET

201-253203

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Subject's contract will expire 18 November 1964. Please advise by return dispatch whether the contract should be renewed and if any changes are desired.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

✓

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-12847

DATE: 31 August 1964

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-253203

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/1/R. L. Lehman:chk

OFFICER

TYPIST

EXT. 4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/PERS	25 Aug 64	E Menapace for [illegible]

Distribution:
1-RI
1-Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
RID/ES	

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

27 SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

1 INFO : CCS 3, CA 2, VR

SECRET 122228Z

12 Aug 58 IN 49029

SAGO INFO DIR CITE MEXI 3553

FUASPEN

EDWARD G. TICHBORN ETA LIMA 0700 17 AUG AND ETA SANTIAGO 1130 17 AUG VIA CANADIAN PACIFIC. CHECKED FLIGHT SCHEDULES FROM ANTOFAGASTA AND FEARS STOPOVER THERE CAN TIE HIM UP THREE DAYS. IF STOPOVER DESIRED ANYWAY PLS INFORM MEXI BY COB 15 AUG.

SECRET

Mary — put in TICHBORN's 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

201-253263

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : PAUL K. WESTPHAL
UNIT : FINANCE
EXT : 7483
DATE : 26 MAY 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

27 MAY . . . 27z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : CFD 3
INFO : WH 7, VR

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 24108

FINAN

REF: MEXI 9607 (IN 90958)

PAY TICHBORN $993.30 EFFECTIVE PAY PERIOD ENDING 31 MAY 1964.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: STATION REQUESTS AMOUNT FIELD SALARY TO PAY TICHBORN.

Tichborn

C/WH/FPSS
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/SS/BF
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/C&TAB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: G. DROLLER
UNIT: C/WH/2
EXT: 6868
DATE: 23 MAY 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
1 2
2
3
4 (3)
5
6 (4)

TO: MEXICO SANTIAGO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: CA 2, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, FI, VR

File Tichborn 201

X / [illegible]

23 MAY 64 15 52z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PRIORITY

TO PRIORITY MEXI INFO SAGO CITE DIR 23360

FUASPEN TICHBORN

REF: MEXI 9577 (IN 88422)
SAGO 7034 (IN 89145)

1. CONCUR TICHBORN MAKE ARRANGEMENTS PER PARA 1 B REF.

2. TICHBORN IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS HENRY SHOULD CONTACT WALLACE R. PARLETT AS SOON AS HE ARRIVES NEW YROK TO SET UP BRIEFING IN WASH NOT LATER THAN 28 MAY. TICHBORN COULD LEAVE FOR SAGO ON 29 MAY. PARLETT'S OFFICE EXTENTION IS 6868. HOME NUMBER IS IN VIRGINIA SECTION OF WASH DIRECTORY.

3. FOR SAGO: IN ORDER TO AVOID OVERLAPS AND CROSSING OF LINES IT IMPORTANT STICK TO CONCEPT TICHBORN'S UTILIZATION PER REF B, I.E., HE WILL BE STATION EYES AND EARS BUT NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN ORGANIZING CAMPAIGN FOR INDEPENDENTS OR OTHER ELEMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REF RYBAT.

W/ [illegible]

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

GERARD DROLL
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

14 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	P
2		5	R
3	CA	6	

TO : DIRECTOR

File Tichborn
201-253203 -

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/CCS 3, VR.

22 May 64 IN 88422

S E C R E T 220057Z

DIR INFO SAGO CITE MEXI 9577

DESENSITIZED

REF DIR 22437

1. TICHBORN PREPARED LEAVE FOR SAGO WEEKEND 30-31 MAY. SOME PROBLEMS INVOLVED BUT NOT INSURMOUNTABLE:

A. TICHBORN HAS NUMBER COMMITMENTS INVOLVING INTELLECTUAL MAGAZINE TRYING TO GET OFF GROUND. MEXI EDITOR AND NUMEROUS OTHER MEXI INTELLECTUALS ALREADY BEING PULLED INTO EFFORT. NUMBER PEOPLE ALREADY BEING CONTACTED FOR ARTICLES, ETC. SO FAR GONE IN THIS THAT CONNOT BACK OUT OR DEFER LAUNCHING MAGAZINE WITHOUT KILLING TICHBORN WITH LEFTIST INTELLECTUAL AND OTHER CIRCLES HERE FOR GOOD. FURTHER, AT THIS STAGE, WILL NEED BADLY TICHBORN GUIDANCE IN ORDER TO KEEP EFFORT FROM GOING AWAY. THEREFORE, TICHBORN WILL HAVE TO MAINTAIN SOME KIND OF INTERIM CONTACT WITH THIS. PROBABLY CAN BE HANDLED BY MAIL THRU HIS WIFE, BUT VERY POSSIBLE HE WOULD NEED MAKE ONE OR TWO VERY SHORT TRIPS BACK TO MEXI DURING SOME PART OF THIS PERIOD FOR THIS PURPOSE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

201-253203

AND SOME OF THIS PRIVATE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES WHICH HE CANNOT JUST DROP FOR PERIOD. THIS COULD BE ARRANGED AT TIME DEEMED BEST BY SAGO AND TICHBORN CONSIDERING ALL FACTORS.

B. TICHBORN COVER UP TO THIS POINT ON MUCH SHORTER TRIPS HAS BEEN INTEREST IN LOS ANGLES MOVIE COMPANY AND SOME SHORT TERM MOVIE INTEREST IN AREA TO WHICH HE WENT. HOWEVER, DO NOT BELIEVE THIS WOULD SATISFY TWO TO THREE MONTH STAY. TICHBORN SUGGESTED IDEN 1 [S.A. & Eur. America [illegible] T.A. Wash DC [illegible] Co.] WHOSE INTERESTS HE ACTUALLY REPRESENTING AS LAWYER TRYING FIND INVESTORS, ETC. THIS COULD INVOLVE SURVEY TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA ON ITS BEHALF WITH LETTER FROM IDEN 2 [Carlos McCormick] WHO REMAIN UNWITTING. THIS COULD BE LAID ON BY TICHBORN AT TIME HE MAKES SCHEDULED 27 MAY BUSINESS TRIP TO NEW YORK. SINCE IDEN 1 LOCATED WASHINGTON, HE SEE IDEN 2 McCormick EASILY AT THAT TIME, GET LETTER, AND ALSO ANY INSTRUCTIONS OR BRIEFING HQS MIGHT DESIRE GIVE. THEN, HE COULD LEAVE FROM WASHINGTON FOR SAGO ON WEEKEND.

2. ADVISE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

C/S COMMENT: *WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER EDWARD G. TICHBORN AVAILABLE 2-3 MONTH TDY SAGO BEGINNING ASAP.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

44 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	D
2	2	5	R
3	CA	6	

TO : DIRECTOR

Tulborn 201 file.

FROM : MEXICO CITY

201-253203

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/CCS 3, VR

SECRET 220058Z

22 MAY 64 IN 88420

DIR INFO SAGO CITE MEXI 9578

DESENSITIZED

REF MEXI 9577 (IN 88422)

IDEN 1- SOCIEDAD ANONIMA DE LUZ Y FUERZA ELECTRICA INTER-AMERICANA, WASHINGTON, D.C. NEW COMPANY IN FORMATIVE STAGE.

IDEN 2- CARLOS MCCORMICK, PRESIDENT OF SALFEI.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

201-253203

13 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN

Please extend for a period of six (6) months the present contract of Edward G. TICHBORN which was due to expire on 18 May 1964.

W. E. Brooks
C/WH/Support

201-253205

14-00000

Felix Nelson

SECRET

201-253203

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

201-253203.

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI/OA, VR

S E C R E T 112013Z

IN 80506

DIR CITE MEXI 9386

REF A DIR 22023

B HMMA 19848

C HMMW 11562

1. AS INDICATED IN REF B IN MID-1962, IT WAS STATION UNDERSTANDING UNTIL FAIRLY RECENTLY THAT TICHBORN'S PRIMARY MISSION HERE WAS TO BE AVAILABLE FOR ELECTION AND OTHER POLITICAL ACTION ASSIGNMENTS IN HEMISPHERE FOR, IF NEED BE, EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME. IN SO MANY WORDS, HE ASSIGNED HERE FOR LA BASE OPERATIONS WITH MEXI HAVING RIGHT USE HIM WITHIN THOSE LIMITATIONS. OBVIOUSLY, MEXI COULD NOT SADDLE HIM WITH NORMAL AMOUNT OF PROJECTS REQUIRING ROUTINE AND ASSURED MANAGEMENT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, USED HIM FOR NUMBER ONE-SHOT AND TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENTS PLUS INITIALTING AND HANDLING PROJECT LIFIZZ WHICH AS MUCH AS STATION FELT COULD BE DONE WITHOUT TYING HIM DOWN TOO MUCH. REF C IN MID 1963 APPARENTLY RECOGNIZED THAT STATION WAS USING HIM SOMEWHAT MORE THAN ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED. PROJECT LICOLIC NOTED HE WOULD NOT BE HANDLING INTELLECTUAL JOURNAL PROJECT. PROJECT LIFIZZ OR SOME REPLACEMENT, PLUS REMAINING AVAIL FOR SHORT-DURATION POLITICAL ACTION ASSIGNMENTS IN OTHER AREAS.

201-253203

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

IF DTRACCOON PUBLISHING CENTER CONTACT [illegible]DED (WHICH PERFECTLY AGREEABLE TO STATION), THEN APPEARS TO STATION THAT TICHBORN WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT TO KEEP HIM BUSY. BELIEVE HQS. WILL AGREE WITH TICHBORN CONTACTS AND PAST HISTORY HERE WITH LEFTIST INTELLECTUAL TYPES THIS IS FIELD MOST SUITABLE FOR HIM AND NO POINT IN TRYING TO PUCH STRAIGHT PROPAGANDA OR YOUTH STUDENT OPREATIONS TO HIM. HE QUITE VALUABLE AND HAS UNIQUE CAPABILITY THIS FIELD AND IS GIVEN NUMBER ASSIGNMENTS BY STATION WHICH WOULD FIND DIFFICULT SATISFY WITH ANYONE ELSE: FOR EXAMPLE, CULTIVATING CEDRIC BELFRAGE AND GETTING HIS VIEWPOINTS ON HIS CUBAN VISIT OF SOME DURATION.

2. BASED ON FOREGOING, STATION RECOMMENDS THAT PRESENT CONTRACT ARRANGEMENT RMAIN IN EFFECT SINCE STATION MOVING HIM INTO APPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES AS OPPORTUNITY PREESENTS ITSELF AND HE BEING KEPT BUSY (STATION HAS AVERAGE THREE MEETINGS WEEK WITH HIM).

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED HQS REVIEW OF PROJECT LICOLIC.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI/OA, EE 4, FE 6, OS 2, VR

put copies —

LIMOPE 1
LIMOPE 2
CLACKETT
WIMPHEN
WILSTED
RENADUAL
TCHADERN
FRECARINE
LIKAYAK-2
LIKAYAK-20
LIMOTOR-19
BIRON
SIMONA-1

LINEB
LIJENNET
LINILE

SECRET 080121Z

8 MAY 64 IN 78380

DIR CITE MEXI 2349

LCFLUTTER

REF DIR 19396 *

1. AGREE TEST THOSE NAMED REF EXCEPT LIMOTOR 19 WHO TESTED OCT 63, LINILE WHO CASE OFFICER FEELS UNDER NO OBLIGATION BE TESTED AND WOULD BE ALIENATED.

2. STATION NOT NOW IN CONTACT WITH LIKAYAK 20. HOPE ESTABLISH CONTACT SOON TO GET FEEL OF LIKAYAK 2 ALTER E30. ONCE THIS DONE AGREE LCFLUTTER DESIRABLE.

3. WISH ADD DMPETAL TO LIST.

4. ADVISE TEAM ITINERARY.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED CABLE WHETHER STA CONCURS LCFLUTTER CANDIDATES.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

201-253 203

14-00000

ORIG: C. Bustos:chk
UNIT: WH/3/Mexico
EXT: 5940
DATE: 5 May 1964

SECRET

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: CI/OA, OS 2, VR, FE 6

6 May 64 49z

SIG CEN

ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 19396

LCFLUTTER

REF: MEXI 9254* (IN 73450)

1. HDQS SUGGESTS STATION CONSIDER LCFLUTTER FOR FOLLOWING:

A. LIHOPE-1 AND 2 BECAUSE OF STPESO SECURITY.

B. CAREER AND CONTRACT AGENTS WHO HAVE NEVER BEEN FLUTTERED: CLACKETT, WIMPHEN, WILSTED, RENADUE, TICHBORN, FREAPANE, LIKAYAK-2 AND 20, LIMOTOR-19.

C. BELIEVE RIXON AND SIMONCINI WHO PREVIOUSLY FLUTTERED SHOULD BE REFLUTTERED.

D. LINER-[illegible], LIJEHNET, AND LINILE BECAUSE OF SECURITY OF SENSITIVE OPS.

2. CABLE WHETHER STATION CONCURS ON ALL OR HOW MANY SO KUBODA CAN PLAN TRIP ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR INTERVIEWS.

3. POA APPROVED TO LCFLUTTER LIEMBRACE TEN.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Personnel: Mexico Station's suggestions for LCFLUTTER.

WH/SEC/Mullane (phone)
CI/OA/Lally (draft)

RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN L. WHITTEN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-253203

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2	3	5	CA
3		6	Dc

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : CA/O 4*(CA/O COPY SLOTTED AT 2045 15 APR BP)

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, WH 7, VR

C/Quelle Hammel

S E C R E T 152225Z

PRIORITY DIR GUAT CITE MEXI 9020 (EASBY ACTING)

REF A GUAT 3836 (IN 62001)

15 APR 64 IN 62286

B DIR 14135 (NOT SNT GUAT)

1. TICHBORN PRESENTLY OUT OF TOWN, BUT RETURNS 17 APR. HE TRYING GET REF B OFF GROUND, SO THIS NOT BEST TIME FOR ABSENCE. HOWEVER, ASSUME TRIP WOULD BE FOR WEEK OR LESS AND IF THIS GENERAL TIMING SATISFACTORY WITH ALL CONCERNED, CAN RELEASE SOON AS TRAVEL CAN BE ARRANGED. ADVISE.

2. NO INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DTDORIC USED.

**REQUESTED TIME SCHEDULE FOR TICHBORN.

file Tichborn

201-253203

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

2\ SECRET

ROUTING

4

5

3 6

DIRECTOR

Techborn 201

MEXICO CITY

Feb 201-253203

ACTION: CA/O 4

INFO: PG 2, DDOS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, WE 4, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 201738Z

DIR INFO PALP CITE MEXI 8739(EASBY ACTING)

DTDORIC QKOPERA

20 Mar 64 IN 43935

REF DIR 86971

(also read TECHBORN)

1. LAST MEETING TECHBORN (T) HAD WITH XIRAU(X) ABOUT FOUR WEEKS AGO. BUT THEREAFTER HAS BEEN AVOIDING HIM SINCE CANNOT GO BEYOND STATE EXPRESSION STRONG INTEREST UNTIL GO THRU SOME DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN T AND X NARROWED FACT X FEELS NEEDS ASSURANCE CONTINUITY AND SECURITY IN JOURNAL VENTURE PRIOR ABANDONING OTHER SIDE INCOME POSSIBILITIES TO DEVOTE TIME AND EFFORT REQUIRED JOURNAL. THIS INFERS SALARY FOR X WHICH T THINKS WILL NEED BE FIVE TO SIX HUNDRED DOLLAR RANGE PER MONTH ONCE PROJECT UNDERTAKEN T FEELS CAN GET X WORK WITH HIM ON PRELIMINARY COST STUDIES AND OTHER DATA FOR REIMBURSEMENT X'S TIME AND WHATEVER OTHER COSTS INVOLVED WITHOUT NECESSITY ANY LONG-TERM COMMITMENT. T ESTIMATES THIS TAKE AT LEAST TWO WEEKS AT TOTAL COST $700 (U.S.). THIS MUST BE DONE TO GET ENOUGH PRELIMINARY DETAIL FOR PROJECT SUBMISSION.

2. IN ADDITION, TWO OTHER PRELIMINARIES SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN SOONEST:

A. INITIATE ACTION FOR T'S MEXICAN WORKING PAPERS WHICH REQUIRED

201-253203

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

BEFORE HE CAN SERVE IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY WITH JOURNAL OR JOURNAL CORPORATE MECHANISM TO BE SET UP. THIS TAKES ABOUT MONTH IF NO HITCHES AND COST ESTIMATED $600(U.S.) IN "GRATUITIES" FOR VARIOUS MEXICAN OFFICIALS INCLUDING INCIDENTAL TAX AND LEGAL FEES.

B. START CORPORATION PAPERS. PLAN IS FOR T HAVE LAW FIRM HANDLE INCORPORATION IN FIRM'S NAME FOR SILENT CLIENT WHICH UNDERSTAND IS COMMON PRACTICE HERE. STOCK CERTIFICATES TO BE BEARER TYPE AND TO BE HELD BY T FOR ASSURED CONTROL. ESTIMATE WILL REQUIRE AT LEAST MONTH IF NO SNAGS AND COST $700(U.S.) INCLUDING REQUIRED GRATUITIES. CORPORATE CAPITAL REQUIRED IS $4,000(U.S.) WHICH MUST BE OF DEPOSIT WITH BANK FOR MEXI AUTHORITIES VERIFICATION AT TIME INCORPORATION BUT MAY BE SPENT ANYWAY DESIRED AFTER INCORPORATION OR IF PROJECT DOES NOT GO THROUGH MAY BE WITHDRAWN FROM BANK AND RETURNED KUBARK. T'S STORY TO LAW FIRM WILL BE HE STARTING CORPORATION AS FLYER IN CULTURAL FIELD NOT ONLY SINCE FILLS IMPORTANT VOID, BUT BECAUSE HE HOPES LATER ATTRACT BIG FOUNDATION MONEY(I.E., FORD OR ROCKEFELLER) AND, THEN, IN SOME SALARIED CAPACITY T WILL GET CUT PROCEEDS. THIS EMINENTLY REASONABLE HERE.

3. BASED FOREGOING, REQUIRE AUTHORITY USE $2,000(U.S.) D&TO FUNDS TO UNDERTAKE DEVELOPMENTAL ACTION IN ORDER GET X WORK ON PROSPECTUS, POSSIBLE ASSISTANTS, CONTRIBUTORS, ETC. AND OTHER FACETS. $4000 CORPORATE CAPITAL DEPOSIT WILL BE REQUIRED LATER WHEN CORPORATION FORMATION NEAR FINAL STAGE. IF DESIRE TO TAKE SUCCESSIVE STEPS, THEN ONLY $700 REQUIRED BUT MUST RECOGNIZE THIS WILL SPAN OUT CONSIDERABLY TIME OF STARTING ACTIVITY.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: HQS ANXIOUS TICHBORN WORK OUT DETAILS JOURNAL.

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: B.E. Reichhardt:rg
UNIT: WH/3/Mexico
EXT: 5940
DATE: 6 March 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

Destroy

6 MAR 64 21 53z

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO: ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, DD/S, D/OP, VR

SIG CEN

R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 06038

DESENSITIZED

file

REF: A. DIR 03351
B. MEXI 8448*

1. HDQS HAS BEEN ADVISED CONFIDENTIALLY THAT TICHBORN NO LONGER UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR REF APPOINTMENT. NO REASON GIVEN.

2. TICHBORN SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE ADVISED OF THIS INCIDENT.

3. IT ASSUMED TICHBORN NOW REMAIN IN PLACE. REPLY TO REF B BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

END OF MESSAGE

SPASST/DD/P Gordon Mason (phono)

*IN 30532

for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CCS 3, VR

201-253203

12 MAR 64 IN 30666

S E C R E T 022305Z

DIR CITE MEXI 8455

1. EDWARD G. TICHBORN ON EMERGENCY LEAVE TO HANDLE UNEXPECTED LITIGATION CASE IN CALIF. HE DEPARTED MEXI ON 2 MAR AND EXPECTS RETURN 6 MAR. HE CAN BE REACHED THRU IDEN.

2. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

file Tichborn

201-253203

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
	4
	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : [illegible] 3, 4

SECRET 022305Z

2 MAR 64 IN 30665

DIR CITE MEXI 8456

REF MEXI 8455 (IN 30666)

IDEN: ALLEN KAUFMAN, ATTORNEY
BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.

SECRET

201-253203

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO , DIRECTOR
FROM , MEXICO CITY
ACTION, C/WH 5 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 2100, 25 FEB 64 (DD)
INFO , ADDP, D/OP, DOS, VR

whether has taken action

S E C R E T 260053Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 8384

REF DIR 03351 *

25 FEB 64 IN 26519

DESENSITIZED

(CS COMMENT: * REQUESTED OPINION TICHBORN.)

NO NITE ACTION

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OPINION OF TICHBORN, FROM OFFICERS WHO HAVE DEALT WITH HIM: EXCELLENT CHARACTER AND COMPLETE LOYALTY TO ODYOKE. ALTHOUGH AT STATION REQUEST TICHBORN HAS DEALT IN MEXI WITH PERSONS OF FAR LEFT, THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO INDICATION THAT HIS POLITICAL INCLINATIONS ARE ANYTHING BUT COMPLETELY PRO-PBPRIME. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT HIS ABILITY AT ANY CHORE INTERESTING ENOUGH TO STIMULATE HIM. HE IS EXTREMELY LUCID, AND HIS MIND CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS BRILLIANT. HE HAS AN EVEN, PLACID TEMPERAMENT. HIS JUDGEMENT APPEARS TO BE SOUND (ALTHOUGH IN MEXI HIS ASSIGNMENTS HAVE USUALLY BEEN OF THE TYPE IN WHICH HE FOLLOWED STATION GUIDANCE). HE IS NOT GOOD AT DETAIL, SUCH AS REPORTING AND ACCOUNTING. IN ESSENCE, HE IS A SHARP OPERATOR, WHO COULD PROBABLY DO WELL IN POSITION OF IMPORTANCE.

2. STATION NOT IN POSITION TO COMMENT ON HIS LEGAL ABILITY. HIS LOCAL ACTIVITY FALLS IN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS CATEGORY (AS A PBPRIME CITIZEN HE NOT ALLOWED PRACTICE MEXI).

S E C R E T

file Tichborn

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH 3
5613
24 FEBRUARY 1964

24 FEB 64 23 31 z

SIG CEN

ROUTINE

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 3

INFO : ADDP, DDS, D/OP, VR

File

C Quillet

CITE DIR 03351

TO PRIORITY MEXI

DESENSITIZED

ODYOKE CONSIDERING EDWARD G. TICHBORN FOR IMPORTANT APPOINTMENT IN LEGAL FIELD. ODENVY KNOWS HE WORKS FOR KUBARK AND WE MUST GIVE AUTHORITATIVE OPINION OF HIS CHARACTER, ABILITY, TEMPERAMENT, AND JUDGEMENT. WITHOUT ADVISING TICHBORN, REQUEST YOU CABLE DATA AND OPINIONS OF YOURSELF AND OFFICERS WHO HAVE DEALT WITH HIM. WE HAVE HIGHEST OPINION OF HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

J.C. King
J.C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH 3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT: 2105, 3 FEB 64 DD)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, VR

4 FEB 64 IN 11629

S E C R E T 040336Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY GUAT CITE MEXI 8361

DESENSITIZED

[illegible]ESGAIN

REF DIR 98833*

1. TICHBORN CONTACTED ESGAIN-7 BY TELEPHONE AT 1700 LOCAL 3 FEB. WILL MEET AT 1730 LOCAL 3 FEB.

2. AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *RE PLS CABLE REPORT ON INITIAL CONTACT AND INSTRUCTIONS WILL FOLLOW.

201-253203

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: JOHN M. WHITTEN:erd
UNIT: C/WH/3
EXT: 5613
DATE: 3 FEB. 1964

SECRET

INDEX ☒
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

3FEB64 18 18z

TO: MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO: ADDP, C/CI, VR

DEFERRED SIG CEN
ROUTINE
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR 98833

DESENSITIZED

RESGAIN

REFS: A. DIR 97690*

B. DIR 97691**

1. ESGAIN 7 PHONED GALBOND MORNING 3 FEB FROM MEXICO CITY AND GAVE NEW ADDRESS: MARIANO ESCOBERO OR ESCOBEDO 479, APARTMENT 203, TELEPHONE 45 6440 EXTENSION 203. PLS HAVE TICHBORN MAKE CONTACT UNDER ALIAS ASAP. file

2. IF TICHBORN NOT AVAILABLE, PLS HAVE ETSINGER MAKE TELEPHONE CONTACT ASAP. PLS CABLE REPORT ON INITIAL CONTACT AND INSTRUCTIONS WILL FOLLOW.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: *Iden staying with wife at Continental Hilton. Expects contact.

**Gives true name of Iden.

J C King
J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET 15

ORIG : JOHN M. WHITTEN:cmy
UNIT : C/WH/3
EXT : 5613
DATE : 30 JANUARY 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-253203

ROUTING
1 ✓ | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

30 JAN 64 15 16z

TO : MEXICO CITY INFO: GUATEMALA CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, VR

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO ROUTINE GUAT CITE DIR 98045

ESGAIN

REF MEXI 7984*

Tich Born 201

1. CONCUR USE TICHBORN UNDER ALIAS. MAKE CONTACT AT ONCE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *IN 08477.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3/Mexico	
~~DESTROY~~	

J. C. KING
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/3/CA
WH/3/MEXI)
WH/CCPS W. Hood
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER ✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

FORM 1389a

RI COPY RI COPY

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (TEMPO FOR WH SLOTTED AT 1900-29 JAN 64)

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, VR

29 JAN 64 IN 08477

SECRET 292129Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY GUAT CITE MEXI 7984

REF DIR 97690 *

PREFER NOT USE ETSINGER ON ESGAIN 7 OR OTHER OP UNTIL STA AND HQ BOTH SATISFIED SECURITY ASPECTS. SUGGEST USE TICHBORN TO CONTACT INITIALLY AND IF DESIRED, PATAKER CAN TAKE OVER ON HIS ARRIVAL. ON RECEIPT REPLY WILL MAKE CONTACT.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *REQ CONTACT IDEN, HGGW 3547.

Answered

File Tichborn 201 — J.

201-253203

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WH Division

KUWOLF/ Operational, Status of Projects on Principal Agents

Action: As Stated Below

REFS: A. HMMW-11534
B. HMMA-21914
C. DIR-63035
D. DIR-61786
E. MEXI-5613
F. DIR-62204
G. HMMA-22041

1. Now that Douglas Freapane's conversion has been approved, Headquarters requests that the Station submit a Project outline for his support. Headquarters is aware that the Station had drafted this project but was holding it until FREAPANE's new status became clarified.

2. Station is also requested to submit a project on Edward G. TICHBORN, as per references D and F. In reply to reference E, TICHBORN is considered a Station Mexico City agent which means that his salary should no longer be charged to JMPOPLAR/10.

3. With reference to LIEBONY-1, the Station indicated in paragraph 6 of reference G, that with the arrival of SANDAMANIE it might possibly drop this agent. In the event Station decides to continue using LIEBONY-1, please submit an amendment to LIPLUM Project or a separate support project for LIEBONY-1.

Oliver G. GALBOND

Distribution:
Orig 1 - COS, Mexico City

201-17585

201-253205 201-218343

201-253205

HMMW-12081

5 November 1963

201-17888

21 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Audit Staff

THROUGH : SSA-DD/S

SUBJECT : Report of Audit of Project JMPOPLAR/10
1 April 1962 - 31 March 1963

REFERENCES : A. Memorandum for Chief, WH Division, subject as above, from Chief, Audit Staff dated 22 August 1963

B. Memorandum for Comptroller, subject: "Headquarters Treatment of Advances to Projects Funded Through Projects JMPOPLAR/10 and JMPOPLAR/12", from Chief, Audit Staff, dated 24 September 1963

1. The following is WH Division's reply to paragraph 5 of reference A:

a. The JMPOPLAR/10 Administrative Plan will be revised to incorporate the recommendations made in subject report.

b. Investigation by WH Division determines that the salary of Edward G. TICHBORN has been charged improperly to JMPOPLAR/10. A new project is being initiated against which TICHBORN's salary will be charged.

c. Appropriate Declarations of Trust will be obtained from project personnel for the University City Bank account.

d. WH Division is initiating action to close the project's account at the First National Bank.

2. The revised Administrative Plan, referred to in paragraph 1a above, will include changes which reflect the recommendations made in reference B.

(SIGNED) W. E. BROOKS
For J. C. KING
Chief, WH Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - SSA-DD/S
1 - FD/Proprietary Accounts Section
1 - WH/7
1✓ - WH/3 - Mexico
1 - WH/BF

13-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

J. SECRET

TICHBORN 201
(201-253203)

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : PG 2, CA 2, CI/OA, RF 2

S E C R E T 170218Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5813

REF DIR 61786

KUWOLF

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED PROJECT RENEWAL REQUESTS FOR LICHEW, LICOAX, LILISP C, LILISP X, LINOODLE, LITAINT. ALSO REQUESTED STA FORWARD NEW PROJECT OUTLINES TO COVER TICHBORN AND RIKON

17 Aug 63 IN 01392

1. HMMA-21914 POUCHED 9 AUG IS GENERAL STATION COMMENT ON KUWOLF RENEWALS. AS REFERENCE INDICATES DISPATCHES POUCHED 9 AUGUST NOT RECEIVED MEXI KUWOLF DESK AS OF 16 AUG SUGGEST VALUE OBTAINING HMMA-21914 ASAP.

2. STATION UNAWARE APPARENTLY SIGNIFICANT LAG BETWEEN ARRIVAL DISPATCHES HQS AND DELIVERY TO DESK. HMMA-21864, ACCORDING TO REF, HAD NOT HIT DESK AS OF 16 AUGUST YET SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECEIVED HQS 8 AUG. PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS IS NORMAL DELAY. IF SO CERTAIN MATTERS NOW TREATED DISPATCHES WILL OF NECESSITY BE SUBJECT CABLE TRAFFIC.

3. REF PARA TWO REF. TICHBORN RECRUITED AND BEING PAID FROM HQS. STATION HAS AVOIDED UTILIZATION TICHBORN IN PROJECTS SO TIME CONSUMING AS TO PROHIBIT TRAVEL, AS IT WAS UNDERSTOOD HE WAS TO BE KEPT IN READY STATUS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSIGNMENT. SHOULD THIS UNDERSTANDING BE RETAINED NEW PROJECT FOR TICHBORN, OR CAN MEXI NOW CONSIDER HIM AS PRIMARILY MEXI AGENT?

S E C R E T

201-253203

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

18 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (p), Amendment of Contract

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended for Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Agent, be further amended effective 1 June 1963 as follows:

a. Increase basic compensation from $8,000 to $9,000 per annum.

b. Provide additional compensation for quarters procurement at the rate of $3,000 per annum for self and dependents.

c. Extend the period of the contract for an additional year.

d. All other provisions of the contract remain in effect.

2. The increase in compensation as recommended by the Mexico City Station is based on the manner of TICHBORN's performance and the increased amount of time which he devotes to Agency requirements.

3. The WH Division concurs with the Station recommendation. TICHBORN has become an increasingly valuable and productive covert asset.

W. E. BROOKS
Chief, WH Support

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201 2532-3

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC, C/FI 2, CA 2, [illegible]

S E C R E T 24[illegible]

DIR INFO GUAT PARI CITE MEXI 4543

IN51881

4 JUN 1963

DESENSITIZED

LINLUCK

1. LINLUCK MET BY OUTSIDE CASE OFFICER EVENING 31 MAY. TOLD CASE OFFICER HE DISTRESSED BECAUSE "LEARNED DAY BEFORE DEPARTING PARI THAT WIFE HAD CANCER". SAID HE BEEN THINKING RECENTLY OF "RESIGNING" FROM KUBARK, BECAUSE IT BETTER BE "GOOD FRIEND THAN BAD SERVANT". ADDED HOWEVER THAT HE HAD NOT MADE FIRM DECISION.

2. FYI: AT LAST MINUTE IT WAS NECESSARY TO SUBSTITUTE LEO C. REDLICH FOR TICHBORN AS OUTSIDE CASE OFFICER. THIS DUE FACT LICOOKY-1 APPROACHED TICHBORN SHORTLY BEFORE LINLUCK ARRIVAL REQUESTING TICHBORN MEET LINLUCK AS SOON AS LATTER ARRIVED MEXI. STATION, IN PLANNING FOR TICHBORN AS CASE OFFICER, HAD NOT REALIZED TICHBORN KNOWN TO LICOOKY BY true TRUE NAME.

S E C R E T

Tichborn

201-253203

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

12

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

SECRET 212325Z IN43671

DIR CITE MEXI 4670 22 MAY 1963

REF HMMW-11562 IN 43671

1. STATION AGREES HQS EVALUATION TICHBORN AND CONCURS SALARY INCREASE AND HOUSING ALLOWANCE AMENDMENT. ALSO AGREE INSURANCE RIGHTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED CONTRACT.

2. BELIEVE RAISE SHOULD BE $1,000 PER ANNUM WITH HOUSING AT $3,030, WHICH TOTAL MEETS TICHBORN'S OWN REQUEST. THESE FIGURES PROPOSED TO TICHBORN (WITHOUT COMMITMENT) 21 MAY AND ACCEPTABLE TO HIM.

SECRET

201-253203

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : KUWOLF/Edward G. TICHBORN (ps)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACT: Cable comments on Contract renewal and amendment

1. While TICHBORN was at Headquarters in April, he said he needed $4,000 per year more than the $8,000 plus expenses he receives under his present contract. He cited the high cost of life insurance he must take out for all his air flights, since he does not receive KUBARK rights of survivorship as a Contract Agent. He also mentioned the rising cost of living in Mexico, and the increased amount of time he is spending on behalf of KUBARK, at the expense of his cover. He said that his financial situation will soon force him to spend more time on his law practice, limiting his availability to KUBARK.

2. Headquarters thinks highly of TICHBORN, and we regard him as an excellent long time asset who might possibly be converted to career agent in the future, when his legal practice is less lucrative, or he chooses to work almost full time for KUBARK.

3. Meanwhile, Headquarters believes that the fairest arrangement for KUBARK and for TICHBORN, would be to keep him in contract status, raising his salary. This would ensure KUBARK's continued utilization of his valuable services, would assure the maintenance of a strong cover, and at the same time would give TICHBORN the incentive to work hard at his cover and would permit him to realize the return from his cover efforts. If TICHBORN were converted to Career Agent status now, there would be almost, if not total offset of his cover income.

(continued)

✓

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

DATE TYPED
9 May 1963

DATE DISPATCHED
13 MAY 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-11562

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-253203

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET DESENSITIZED

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico/Bustos:dd			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DC/WH/CA		M. E. Curci
WH/Pers/Renahan	May 9 1963	
WH 3		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	10 May 63	J. C. King

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-11562

4. Headquarters suggests that when TICHBORN's contract is renewed as of 19 May 1963 for two years, it be amended to increase his salary by $1,000 per year, and that additional compensation of $3,500 per year be included for housing. The whole amount would be taxable. A clause can also be added to the contract authorizing TICHBORN to apply for the special life and hospitalization insurance given Contract Agents.

5. Please discuss the proposal in paragraph 4 and/or any Station ideas with TICHBORN, but avoid making any commitments. Since the present contract expires on 19 May, it is requested that the Station cable its views on TICHBORN's future use and proper pay.

END OF DISPATCH

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

FROM:

RID/

RID/AN = 7

M

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/3				
2. MEXI			-	A
3. Lowe				Jr
4. WH/1/Ven		[illegible]	7 May	FC
5. [redacted] PR Pk			[illegible]	DK
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. WH/3/Mex				X
10. Bustos				B
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. RI/AN				M
15. RI/MIS				
16.				
17. RID/FI		10		

COMMENTS

logged & cy. det.

copy detached

Pls reindex with 201-253203

FILE TITLE ✓

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) ~~[illegible]~~ 201-253203

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 24 APR 63

DOCUMENT NUMBER HMMA 21148

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Caracas

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Tichborn Report on Caracas Travel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-11415, 22 March 1963 5[illegible]-134-[illegible]

1. Station Mexico regrets that, to date, it has been unable to obtain the Reference report from Tichborn. As Headquarters is aware, Tichborn, while brilliant and articulate, is not always dependable, especially when it comes to routine tasks. It is true, however, that Tichborn has been extremely busy traveling for KUBARK, and is at the moment on another of his frequent trips.

2. In any event, Tichborn has promised to provide the report as soon as he returns from his present trip. It will be forwarded when received from him.

RECLASSIFIED	
RI/AN	
RI/MIS	
RI/Files	

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

201-253203
~~50-124-6~~

3 - WHD
2 - Caracas
2 - Files

DATE TYPED
4/24/63

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-21148

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-126-0/21

CS COPY

33

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1	[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3	[illegible]	6	

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CCS 2, FI, S/C 2

TICHBORNE

SECRET 042234Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE BUEN 9200 5 APR 1963 IN11567

1. TICHBORNE RETURNING EVENING 5 APRIL. PLEASE ADVISE WIFE. ALSO PLS REITERATE OUR APPRECIATION HIS EFFORTS HERE AND AT SAME TIME REMIND HIM THAT HE AGREED POUCH US A FULL REPORT HIS BUEN VISIT.

2. FOR DIR: TICHBORNE ABLE DEVELOP IN SHORT TIME AVAILABLE GOOD FEELING FOR LOCAL SITUATION THROUGH CONTACTS DEVELOPED ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE PLUS CONFERNECES WITH KEY STATION PERSONNEL, INCLUDING REUTLINGER AND BUCCHERI.

INTERVIEWED

IPWE

ES 100 PERSONS FROM NEWS VENDORS TO SENIOR BUSINESS LEADERS. UNABLE MAKE CONTACT WITH BICENTER WHO INDICATED THAT DUE PRESENT MILITARY CRISIS HIS EVERY MOVE COVERED BY NEWSMEN, THUS HE PREFRRED NOT SEE TICHBORNE.

SECRET

S/C NOTE: *PORTION GARBLED-BEING SVCD.

201-253203

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

20 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Edward O. TICHBORN (p), Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract for Edward O. TICHBORN, Contract Agent, be amended to delete the current paragraph 2. Travel and Operational Expenses and insert:

> "2. Travel and Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds on an actual, reasonable and necessary expense basis for those expenses incurred by you in connection with such travel or may be directed or authorized by the Government and while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. In addition, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by the Government. Payment and accounting for all expenses incurred hereunder will be in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

The effective date of the amendment should be as of the effective date of the contract, 19 May 1961.

2. The above request is corrective in nature as it was not intended to change the travel expense provision which had been in effect during his previous contract.

W. E. BROOKS
Chief, WH Support

SECRET

[illegible]

201-253203

FILE
TICHBORN

19 March 1963

Paul O:

Tichborns original contract provided for travel on an actual expense basis. This was when he was working on a daily or job rate basis.

This contract was terminated and a new contract was written in May 1961. He was given ~~an~~ $8,000 per year, and the reimbursement for operational travel section reads "This may include per diem in lieu of subsistence---."

None of Tichborn's travel claims have been processed since the new contract has been effective. All travel claims submitted by him starting in June 1961 have been submitted on an actual expense basis.

Finance takes the view that the "This may include per diem---" as restricting Tichborn to per diem only plus of course operational expenses. Processing Tichborns old accounts on this basis would require him to refund several hundred dollars.

An ammendment to the contract would take care of these old accounts as submitted.

Options:

1. Get refund from Tichborn
2. Ammend contract to cover actual expenses to present date.
3. Ammend contract to cover actual expenses past and future.

What are your wishes?

Currie

Avoid any action that would require refund — this works out 2 or 3 with WH/3+F — select most equitable and operationally justifiable arrangement. PO 19 March 63

201-253203

20 March 63 Discussed with Riordan — Revision in amending of contract to state actual expenses plus per diem. Rum

14-00000

3.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Linton

4
5
6

TICHBORN

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, S/C 2

S E C R E T 112135Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE BUEN 9047

DESENSITIZED

11 MAR 1963

IN83870

REF: MEXI 3703 (IN 82504)

1. FEEL TDY CAN BE LIMITED TEN WORKING DAYS. PLEASE ADVISE ETA AND TRUE NAME TICHBORN.

2. CONTACT PLAN: TICHBORN (AS MR. WILLIAMS) SHOULD CALL 46-3248 DURING OFFICE HOURS AND ASK FOR KEN TO ARRANGE LUNCHEON MEETING SAME DAY AT NOGARO HOTEL, J. A. ROCA 562. WILL BE MET IN LOBBY WHERE HE SHOULD BE SEATED AND READING "TIME" MAGAZINE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *SUBJ AVAILABLE MID-MARCH.

201-253203 K

201-253203

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

DISPATCH

SECRET

HSS-A-6000

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 63-6-3

FROM: Chief of Station, San Salvador

DATE: 9 March 1963

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (p)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 3.

REFERENCES: HSSW-1806

1. Referenced dispatch was discussed with the Ambassador on 6 March. He said that in talking with Oliver G. GALBOND and others in Headquarters in early 1962 as well as with Chief, DYVOUR support, he had expressed great appreciation for the assistance rendered by Edward G. TICHBORN. He said that he still felt that a similar survey, made a year or so after the first one, would be most helpful in assessing significant changes in the outlook of the various segments of Salvadoran society. Also discussed was the possible utility of an early April 1962 survey on the issues and personalities as they might develop during the forthcoming elections, presently scheduled for 29 April 1962. However, the Ambassador concluded that he was, of course, aware that there are other priority needs for TICHBORN's services.

2. While the Station would welcome another visit by subject, it does not appear that the need for a general survey is so pressing as it was a year ago. It is doubted that basic conditions have changed greatly, and the changes which have taken place have been fairly well covered in ODACID reporting. With regard to the pre-election estimate, mentioned above, it should be noted that there are no other parties to date in the field except the government party, the Partido Conciliacion Nacional (PCN), and only the PCN has thus far put forward candidates for President and Vice President. Unless postponed, the closing date for announcements is 12 March. In other words, at the moment it appears that the net result of the overwhelming victory of the PCN in the elections of last December has made the forthcoming elections a mere formality.

3. The Station will appreciate early advice of a second visit by TICHBORN, if his schedule permits.

STEPHEN H. KARHANY

SHK/gsm

7 March 1962

Distribution:
3-WHD
1-Mexico City

[illegible] 100 / 63-6-4

201-255203

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 27 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BUENOS AIRES

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, S/C 2

FILE TICHBORN

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 27 2218Z 63

ROUTINE

MEXI INFO DIR CITE BUEN 8978

DESENSITIZED

REF: HABW-7725 (NOT SENT MEXI)

IN75985

1. REQUEST ADVICE ON AVAILABILITY TICHBORN FOR VISIT BUEN WITHIN NEXT MONTH. PURPOSE TO MAKE INITIAL CONTACTS AND SURVEY LOCAL ISSUES, PERSONALITIES AND POWER ELEMENTS TO BE FACTORS ELECTIONS NOW SCHEDULED 23 JUNE HAVING IN MIND HIS RETURNING IN LATE MAY FOR PERIOD THROUGH ELECTIONS SHOULD DEVELOPMENTS INITIAL VISIT SO WARRANT.

2. EFFORTS BY REUTLINGER TO CONTACT IDENTITY HAVE REVEALED THAT HE NOT ARAMBURU CAMPAIGN MANAGER NOR CURRENTLY DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN HIS CAMPAIGN. THIS MAY WELL BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE SINCE WE PREFER THAT TICHBORN CONTACT A BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL LEADERS AND GROUPS. HOWEVER PREFER TO EXPLORE IDENTITY POSITION FURTHER BEFORE TICHBORN CONTACT SO REQUEST HE NOT ADVISE IDENTITY OF TRIP YET.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] to proposal (x)

201-253-203

K

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFI-
CATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 27 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BUENOS AIRES

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 27 2216Z 63

ROUTINE

IN 75979

TO MEXI INFO DIR CITE BUEN 8971

KAPOK

REF: BUEN 8970 (IN 75985)

IDEN IS JULIO PIACINTINI.

END OF MESSAGE

K

201-253203

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FILE NO. 201-253203

S E C R E T

DATE : 5 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : CARACAS

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated. ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☑
RE Indexing (check one):
☐ None required ☑
Signature:

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 5 1934Z 63

ROUTINE

AN	FI	
PB	DEST	
ABSTRACT	X	X

IN6244

MEXI INFO DIR CITE CARA 7335

REF MEXI 3299 (IN 61054)

UPON RETURN TICHBORN MEXI, CARA STATION WILL APPECIATE AS DETAILED INFO AS POSSIBLE ON IDENTITIES BUSINESSMEN CONTACTED, TECHNIQUES DESIRED AND GENERAL IMPRESSIONS, ETC.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *MC CORMICK INVITED TO CARA BY "GROUP OF BUSINESSMEN" WHO WANT INSTRUCTIONS IN POLITICAL ELECTIONS TECHNIQUES.

RI COPY

✓

201-253203

5 Feb. 63

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1389a

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FILE NO. 201-253203

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 2, FEB 63 WLB

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

FEB 2 2307Z 63

ROUTINE

IN 61083

TO CARA INFO DIR CITE MEXI 3291

REF MEXI 3290 (IN 61084)

IDEN OF REF MR HENERY (HANK) LOPEZ.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

RI/BR	☒
RI/MIS	☒
RI/FI	✓

201-253203

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING &
DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S NO 201-253203

SECRET

DATE : 2 FEB 63

TO : RECTOR

FROM : ME. CO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

RI Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 2 2306Z 63

ROUTINE

CARA INFO DIR CITE MEXI 3290

IN61084

1. FYI: MEXI STATION CONTRACT AGENT EDWARD G TICHBORN (IDEN) ARRIVING CARA TWO FEBRUARY FOR FOUR DAY VISIT. HIS BUSINESS PERSONAL AND NO CONTACT WITH STATION PLANNED.

2. TICHBORN TRAVELING WITH MR CARLOS MCCORMICK, MOGUL OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE. MCCORMICK INVITED TO CARA BY "GROUP OF BUSINESSMEN" WHO WANT INSTRUCTION IN POLITICAL ELECTION TECHNIQUES. MCCORMICK INSISTED THAT TICHBORN, WHO HANDLED GPIDEAL CAMPAIGN IN PBPRIME SPANISH-SPEAKING AREAS, ACCOMPANY HIM ON TRIP.

3. SHOULD ABOVE ACTIVITY NEGATIVELY CROSS WIRES WITH CARA STATION OPERATIONS, OR SHOULD CARA WISH CONTACT TICHBORN FOR ANY REASON, HE STAYING TAMANACO AND WILL RESPOND TO "FRIEND OF DAVE'S".

END OF MESSAGE

RI

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	
RID/ITS	
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

201-253203

FORM 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 28 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI/OA, S/C 2

RI/FI Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RI Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature: ____

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 28 0935Z 62

ROUTINE

GUATINFO DIR CITE MEXI 2939 IN41500

REF DIR 49455*

TICHBORN ETA GUAT 2 JANUARY PAN AM 501. WILL REGISTER BILTMORE HOTEL AND AWAIT CONTACT FROM "FRIEND OF DAVE".

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * REQUESTED TICHBORN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO GO TO GUAT AND ASSESS PUBLIC OPINION ON MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, AND TRENDS.

RI COPY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-253203

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 4 DEC 62 495

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH CO NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1550 4 DEC DH)

INFO : CA 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DEC 4 2050Z 62

PRIORITY

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 2748 IN29417

REF DIR 41115 (OUT 85000)*

DIR 41364 (OUT 95432)

MEXI 2426 (IN 12015)

1. TICHBORN REPORTS TWO TELEPHONE CALLS TO HIS HOME FROM ARGENTINA DURING HIS ABSENCE. PRESUMES CALLS FROM SUBJECT OF REFS OR HIS AIDE TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITY TICHBORN APPROACHING CERTAIN AMERICAN COMPANIES WHO HAVE PREVIOUSLY INDICATED WILLINGNESS "SUPPORT" SUBJECT REFS SHOULD HE DECIDE RUN FOR PRESIDENCY.

2. WHAT SHOULD TICHBORN'S RESPONSE BE SHOULD CALLS COME THROUGH? ADVISE SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REF KAPOK.

SECRET

[illegible]

201-213203

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:pk
UNIT: WH/2/A
EXT: 6400
DATE: 4 DECEMBER 1962 1766

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

4 DEC 62 [illegible] 39 z

TO: MEXICO CITY BUENOS AIRES

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO PRITY MEXI INFO BUEN CITE DIR 02932

REF MEXI 2748 (IN 29417)*

1. IF REF CALLS ARE FROM BICENTER GROUP, TICHBORN SHOULD DECLINE ACT AS FUND RAISER, AND IF POSSIBLE SHOULD DISCOURAGE BICENTER FROM ATTEMPT TO RAISE CAMPAIGN FUNDS IN PBPRIME. REALIZE THIS MAY BE DIFFICULT FOR TICHBORN HANDLE GRACEFULLY. PERHAPS TICHBORN COULD PLEAD PREVIOUS BUSINESS COMMITMENTS AS EXCUSE. IN ANY CASE HQS WILL DEFER TO HIS JUDGMENT RE IMPLEMENTATION.

2. HQS REASONING RE ABOVE IS THAT FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF PBPRIME BUSINESS INTERESTS COULD PREJUDICE BICENTER REPUTATION AND ELECTION PROSPECTS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Tichborn has received telephone calls from Argentina.

C/WH/2

WH/COPS

201-253203

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

192

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 28 NOV 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CI/OA, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 28 1138Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 25604

TO MEXI INFO DIR CITE GUAT 2620

REF: MEXI 2665 (IN 24747)*

TICHBORN TRIP IN JANUARY DESIRED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * REQ. ADVISE IF TICHBORN TRIP EARLY JANUARY DESIRED.

RI COPY

201-253203

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 263
19 NOV 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1445 19 NOV 62 OJ)

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OA, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No Cd Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy file as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 19 1907Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 20632

PRITY DIR INFO PRITY MEXI CITE GUAT 2504 IN20632

REF: DIR 49455 (out 99299)*

WE BELIEVE AUTHORITATIVE SURVEY PUBLIC OPINION IN CAPITAL, OTHER MAIN CITIES AND RURAL AREAS WOULD BE VERY VALUABLE IN CONNECTION FUTURE POLITICAL ACTION OPS HERE. WE THEREFORE WELCOME TICHBORN ASSIGNMENT IF HE CAPABLE SUCH SURVEY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED TICHBORN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO GO TO GUAT AND ASSESS PUBLIC OPINION ON MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND TRENDS. HE IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN IN MEXICO CITY.

RI COPY

RID/MIS

RID/FI

JAN 11 1963

201-253203

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. (33)

14-00000

201-253203

1750

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : John H. Whitten:jz
UNIT : CWH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 16 November 1962

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

17 Nov 62 03 37z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT99299

TO : MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, S/C 2

TO PRTY MEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR 49455

1. REQUEST TICHBORN BE MADE AVAILABLE SOON TO GO TO GUAT AND ASSESS PUBLIC OPINION ON MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, AND TRENDS. IN RECENT GUAT CITY MAYORALTY ELECTION, AREVALO SUPPORTER, VILLAGRON KRAMER, RAN SURPRISINGLY STRONG SECOND, EVEN WITHOUT AREVALO'S EXPRESS ENDORSEMENT. DESIRE CHECK PARTICULARLY ON SENTIMENT OUTSIDE GUAT CITY; EVENTS SHOW THAT LEFTIST TREND IN THAT CITY DOES NOT PROVE SIMILAR TREND IN OTHER AREAS. PLS ADVISE.

2. FOR GUAT: TICHBORN IS U.S. CITIZEN LAWYER IN MEXI CITY WHO ALSO WRITER. HAS DONE VALUABLE SURVEY OF OPINION IN SAN SALVADOR. RECOMMEND TICHBORN CONSULT STATION ON ARRIVAL. PLS COMMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	BF
RID/MIS	
~~RID/[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	

WH/3/GUAT ____________

WH/COPS ____________

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

	055
DATE :	10 OCT 62
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	MEXICO CITY
ACTION :	C/WH 5 (C/WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 0400, 10 OCT) RD
INFO :	ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 10 0637Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 36842

TO DIR INFO BUEN CITE MEXI 2170

RE DIR 41118 (OUT 85000)
DIR 41364 (OUT 85432)*

DEKAPOK

TICHBORN ARRIVING NEW YORK 12 OCTOBER.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS STATED THEY HOPEFULLY AWAITING FAVORABLE WORD TICHBORN ABLE TAKE ASSIGNMENT INTERPRETER/ESCORT OFFICER.

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

1656

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

OUT 9 22 21 62

ROUTING

1	LOGS	4	
2		5	
3		6	

ORIG : LOUIS P. NAPOLI:pk
UNIT : WH/2/UP
EXT : 7957
DATE : 9 OCTOBER 1962

OCT 9 2231Z 62

TO : MEXICO CITY BUENOS AIRES

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, S/C 2

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT85432

TO OPIM MEXI INFO ROUTINE BUEN CITE DIR 41364

KAPOK

C/S COMMENT: *IDEN (UNIDENTIFIED) COMING U.S. ON UNOFFICIAL VISIT BEGINNING 10 OCT. HQS CONSIDERING TICHBORN AS ESCORT OFFICER 16-28 OCT. QUERIED ANY REASON HE NOT AVAILABLE OR UNABLE UNDERTAKE JOB.

REF DIR 41118 (OUT 85000)*

1. HQS HOPEFULLY AWAITING FAVORABLE WORD TICHBORN ABLE TAKE REF ASSIGNMENT AS IT CONSENSUS [illegible] HERE HE MAN FOR JOB, ON ASSUMPTION ALL FAVORABLE PLS INSTRUCT TICHBORN:

A. ARRIVE NEW YORK CITY [illegible] EARLIEST DATE, IF POSSIBLE BY 12 OCTOBER.

B. CHECK INTO HOTEL OF CHOICE.

C. PHONE METROPOLITAN 8-0469, WASHINGTON, D.C., IDENTIFYING SELF TRUE NAME, REPORTING NAME OF HOTEL AND ROOM HE STAYING AND ASK THAT THIS INFORMATION BE RELAYED TO MR. NELSON. (THIS IS 24 HOUR ANSWERING SERVICE AND UPON RECEIPT OF INFO HQS CASE OFFICER WILL PHONE TICHBORN TO ARRANGE EARLIEST MEETING IN NEW YORK FOR COVER AND ASSIGNMENT BRIEFING.)

2. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comment: *Ref KAPOK

WH/POB
WH/3/Mexico
C/WH/2
WH/COPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-253-03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : LOUIS P. NAPOLI:pk
UNIT : WH/2 1636
EXT : 7957
DATE : 8 OCTOBER 1962

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3 Mexi	6

8 OCT 62 17 52z

TO : MEXICO CITY BUENOS AIRES
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/PG, C/CA 2, C/CI, S/C 2

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT63000

TO PRITY MEXI INFO BUEN CITE DIR 41113

KAPOK

UNITED STATES

1. IDEN COMING ~~EXX XX~~ ON UNOFFICIAL VISIT BEGINNING 10 OCTOBER. AS IDEN IS OF GREAT INTEREST TO KUBARK IT PLANNED TO PROVIDE INTERPRETOR/ESCORT OFFICER DURING 18 DAY VISIT.

2. HQS CONSIDERING TICHBORN AS ESCORT OFFICER 16-28 OCTOBER. PLS CABLE PRITY ANY REASON HE NOT AVAILABLE OR UNABLE UNDERTAKE ASS. IN MEANTIME AND IF MEXI RESPONSE FAVORABLE SUGGEST TICHBORN BE ALERTED TO POSSIBILITY OF ASS. ~~AND MAKE PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS [illegible] ARRIVE NEW YORK BY 15 OCTOBER.~~ TRUE NAME OF IDEN SHOULD NOT BE REVEALED TICHBORN UNTIL ASSIGNMENT FIRM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/3/Mexico
C/WH/POB F. Latrash for
C/WH/2 L. Napoli
~~WH/COPS~~

RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-253203

14-00000

8-62

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : LOUIS P. NAPOLI:pk
UNIT : WH/2 1687
EXT : 7957
DATE : 8 OCTOBER 1962

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

8 OCT 62 22 26z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT85001

TO : MEXICO CITY BUENOS AIRES

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/PG, C/CA 2, C/CI, S/C 2

TO PRITY MEXI INFO BUEN CITE DIR 41119

KAPOK

REF DIR 41118 (OUT 85000)*

IDEN - GENERAL PEDRO ARAMBURU

END OF MESSAGE

Cable Sec: *Pls fill in number of attached cable as ref.

WH/3/Mexico
C/WH/POB
C/WH/2
~~WH/COPS~~

for RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

for NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Tichborn

SECRET

DATE : 13 SEP 62
147

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CCG 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 13 0840Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 21383

DIR CITE MEXI 1927

1. EDWARD G TICHBORN HAS RECEIVED INVITATION BE GUEST SPEAKER SESSION HARVARD CENTER LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES SEMINAR 17-22 SEPTEMBER. UNDERSTAND THIS WILL BE KICK-OFF MEETING YOUNG LATIN POLITICAL LEADERS PRIOR TWO MONTH OBSERVATION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS.

2. STATION FEELS TICHBORN ATTENDANCE VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY CULTIVATE MEXICAN DELEGATES. ALSO WOULD BOLSTER HIS COVER, AND PROVIDE EXCELLENT CONTACTS FOR FUTURE REQUIREMENTS OTHER COUNTRIES.

3. TICHBORN MUST RESPOND TO INVITATION IMMEDIATELY. HE WILL ACCEPT UNLESS HEADQUARTERS ADVISES OTHERWISE PRIOR COB 14 SEPTEMBER.

4. WILL ADVISE TICHBORN TRAVEL PLANS WHEN FIRM SHOULD HQS WISH TO CONTACT.

END OF MESSAGE

201-253703

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

Melbourne file

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Availability of TICHBORN and REHLICH for JMTURA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

HMMW-10859, 20 August 1962

1. Edward G. TICHBORN is available at any time for JMTURA travel. Trips of more than five weeks would be difficult, both for the Station and for TICHBORN. (He is currently handling operation [illegible], which is so sensitive that the Station would be reluctant to use an interim cut-out).

2. In the case of Leo C. REHLICH, he can of course be released as requested by Headquarters for JMTURA. His absence will, as previously noted, work considerable hardship on the Station's current KUWOLF program. REHLICH handles [illegible], which takes very little time; [illegible]-1, which takes considerable time; and LICOAX, which is almost a full-time job. In the latter project, for instance, he meets with his principal agents almost daily, and with his Station case officer at least five times a week. It would be extremely difficult to release him during the six-week period immediately prior to elections at the National University each year (usually September, October). Since REHLICH, in his cover capacity, is active as a professor, as much lead time as possible is requested prior to travel requests. As an example, REHLICH is already signed up to deliver lectures in Monterrey in November of this year. Reference dispatch says travel for JMTURA would require a minimum of three weeks, but does not mention the possible maximum. Primarily for cover reasons, and secondarily for operational reasons, the Station feels that any travel lasting more than four weeks would be almost impossible to accept. In spite of the above restrictions the Station will, of course, release REHLICH at any time for any period if Headquarters feels his contribution will be greater elsewhere.

Willard C. Curtis

201-253203

3 - WHD
2 - Files

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
7 Sept. 1962	11 Sept. 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-19777

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-124-0

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO	Chiefs, Mexico City, San Juan, Santiago, Lima
INFO	
FROM	Chief, WHD
SUBJECT	Political System Analysis for Election Planning - [illegible]

X

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. There are a number of countries where we want to begin detailed political systems analyses as a basis for election planning. We have in mind here a "nuts and bolts" examination of the building blocks of the political parties and the political systems ~~and~~ IN countries such as Peru and Chile among others.

2. While planning of the above is at this stage still tentative, we would like an indication from Mexico and San Juan Stations as to the availability of [illegible] and [illegible] (separately) in Mexico and [illegible]-1 in Puerto Rico to go on such survey missions for a minimum of 3 weeks sometime during the next 4 months. We understand that Mexico Station would much prefer that we use [illegible] rather than [illegible] for this type of survey but we would like to test the capabilities of [illegible] in this field if it is at all possible to break him loose from his current activities.

3. Addressees' comments are solicited.

END OF DISPATCH

3-Mexico City
1-San Juan
1-Santiago
1-Lima

DATE TYPED	30 Aug 62
DATE DISPATCHED	31 AUG 1962
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	200-134-157/D
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	[illegible]-10889

SECRET

Distr:
1-WH/3/Mexi
1-WH/San Juan
1-WH/2/Chile
1-WH/1/Lima
1-WH/RR
1-WH/CA/[illegible]
1-WH/DC/CA/Chrono
1-RI

UNIC
[illegible]

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	EXT
WH/DC/CA	F.Y. Latrash	7307

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/CA		
C/WH/1		
C/WH/2		201-253203
C/WH/3		
WH/[illegible]		

RELEASING

WH/[illegible]		[illegible] RAFORD W. HERBERT

DISPATCH

4-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
[illegible]	ACTION	[illegible]
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, San Salvador

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Operational/Headquarters Debriefing of TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

Herewith attached are the original and one copy of the Headquarters report of the debriefing of Edward TICHBORN which took place in ZRMETAL in early June, 1962. It is requested that the original be passed to the local ODACID chief, after the Station has insured that the report has been sterilized to its satisfaction.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - San Salvador

Attachment:
Headquarters report

✓

201-253203

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
8 August 62	10 AUG 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HSSW-1844

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-253203

ROUTING	INITIAL
~~1 - RI~~ RID/AN WH/3/CAN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/TPS~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/CAN	Porter Goss	cae (CAN)	6400

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. KING

FORM 53 [illegible]

DISPATCH

6 August 1962

The following information was derived from a transcription of a tape made during a meeting with Edward TICHBORN in early June 1962 in Washington, D.C. The purpose of the meeting was to debrief TICHBORN concerning his opinions and experiences gained from a recent trip to El Salvador. TICHBORN spoke from notes for the first part of his report (pp 1-6) and answered specific questions for the remainder.

TRANSCRIPTION

I would like to go into several of the things that I have previously covered in my report. First of all, I am happy to say that the radio schools started by DURON'S Group seemed to have gotten off to a very good start. There have been about 100 sets distributed so that there are about now something like 10,481 students enrolled in 1,000 of the radio schools. It's apparently had very good success. They publish books that go along with the radio classes. As you ~~probably will~~ remember, there was a literacy campaign that was fashioned after the idea that was promulgated by Father SALCEDO in Columbia. Interesting to me is the fact that the radio schools have received about 1,400 letters with suggestions and praise and various other commentaries. One of the problems they are having right now is there isn't a transmitter powerful enough to get much beyond the capital. I understand that a transmitter is on route and it would certainly be a big boon to them. It seems to me that the radio is probably the most effective way of getting out to the groups in the outlying areas. There are no newspapers to speak of, and once you get the listeners hooked on the radio, then of course, you can go from literacy campaigns into various other things we have in mind. Incidently, these radios as you probably realize are on a fixed frequency, and the program is lead by a priest, named Father Manuel MOLINA SIERRA.

Speaking about the priest, it is interesting to note that there has apparently been a considerable shift in the attitude of the Catholic Church with respect to reforms in San Salvador. It would not be surprising to note that this is probably a Hemisphere-wide, if not a world-wide attitude on the part of Pope John, the 23rd. You might even kind of correlate this to what is happening in Spain and also in Portugual. In El Salvador, itself, the Bishop issued a letter sometime back with the last several months calling for social reforms and for immediate changes within the social structure of El Salvador. As I mentioned to you earlier, it caused considerable consternation with the so-called ruling 14. As a matter of fact, the ambassador mentioned to me that they have been complaining recently that they have lost the big three pillars of strength that they had, the army, the Church, and the American Embassy. As was predictable and I think I mentioned this in my last report, the so-called 14 and some of the less wealthy people in El Salvador have looked askance at the Alliance for Progress. I think you will remember that in my last report I predicted that we would have problems with respect to many reforms if they were to be the sine qua non of aid from the United States.

With respect to the Church, I think it might be a good idea to give some very detailed study as to how we can exploit to the best possible extent, the apparent change within the Church not only in El Salvador but all over Latin America. I think that it might be a thing that we should sit around or someone sit around for a considerable time trying to analyze all the ins and outs, and how we can fit this into the whole program of action in Latin America.

Now you ask me in our informal chats about the structure of these as far as the nationalities of the people involved in the hierarchy. I think it's in the upper structure, Spaniards and Italians; but in the lower structures most of the people are from El Salvador and some from Guatemala and that their natural inclination would be to go with the people. I think I mentioned in my earlier report that very frequently the priests in their early Masses (say at 5:00, 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. would be attended naturally by the low-income groups) would ask for social changes and reforms. At the later Masses, they would change the attitudes of their sermons because of the different economic complex of the people attending church. It's interesting to note that the Bishop's letter that was issued with respect to reforms got a very angry reaction from the 14.

Now one of the things that I note with respect to the general political atmosphere in San Salvador is that there seems to be a considerable confusion among the people with respect to some of these reforms. Let's take for example, the minimum salary. It is one of the cornerstones of reform by the present ruling JUNTA, and it will be carried through by President-elect RIVERA. As of right now, there seems to be a very calculated campaign on the part of business and on the part of financiers to confuse the people, and they have done a good job of it. I remember talking to many people asking them candidly, "what is this minimum salary all about?" Many of them told me the government has decided that they can be paid only so much and no more. In other words, they have really converted it into an idea that this is maximum salary. Also there has been a considerable laying off of all people in certain factories and the reason being given, that the government now makes it impossible for us to keep a full staff, and therefore we are reducing. This, of course, could have very serious effects on any ability of the government to carry through its reforms with respect to minimum wage. Interesting enough, there are even people in the lower classes, who having been confused by what it means, are very definitely against the whole idea of minimum wage. I think, here again, it is a necessity for the government either to acquire a newspaper or to buy a considerable interest in one of them and also to do a job of publicizing and getting the message across with respect to the general class of laborers. However, I anticipate that this difficulty--that the people, with the economic power, are in a good position to at least partially sabotage this particular reform by the simple expedient of just laying people off and blaming it on the government. Let's face it, with respect to political reform in Latin America, the thing that is most meaningful to people is not political liberty, but "bread in the belly." We have got to constantly bear in mind that when we, with our own criteria of political liberties here in the United States, go into Latin America we have got to realize that sometimes the right to vote and the right to express our views is a meaningless concept to a peasant who really is worried about whether he gets one tortilla or two tortillas; it's the bread that is the biggest political factor in any part of Latin America. In this respect, it is interesting to note that whereas the last time I was in El Salvador there was a lot of talk about Fidel Castro that was just kind of spontaneous and extemporaneous on the part of some several hundred people that I talked to. This time I also went through many of the low-income barrios out in the countryside and talked to a great number of people, and a great number of them kept mentioning Martinez who was the president for about 10 to 12 years back, 1934 to 45, Many of them, particularly, the older people spoke rather nostalgically about the times of Martinez when there were jobs and when the prices were low and when even though the wages were low, you could buy a full meal and could get comparatively comfortable housing. Of course, it is known that Martinez is one of the worst tyrants that they have had there; and for a long time the thing they remember is not the repressive measures that he took, not the number of people that were slaughtered under his orders. The thing that is remembered now mostly is the fact that there were more jobs, that the prices were low, etc. We've got to constantly bear in mind that the things that are mostly meaningful to these groups of people is whether they are working, the price structure, and just the general bare economic needs that are met by any government. I want to talk now for a moment about the Alianza para Progresso and some of my impressions about how it's doing, not only in El Salvador, but in Guatemala and some of the other countries that I observed. One of the most immediate impressions that I get is during the last few months is that the Alianza para Progresso has been terribly over publicized. I think we made a serious mistake in arousing expectations in Latin America that may not be met. As a matter of fact, I know from talking with many of the people there that the expectations ~~they~~ have simply are not within the reckoning of what the United States has planned. I even think it's unfortunate if we have a slogan, that the Alianza para Progresso as a slogan is open to serious attacks both humorously and satirically. As a matter of fact, already many people even our friends are beginning to use the slogan by way of criticism. I have in mind recently, that the Foreign minister of Honduras was in Mexico and in a public statement said, "we have a lot of alliance but no progress." And of course in the schools in El Salvador, there are all kinds of turnings about twisting the words around by way of criticism.

What I mean by over publicizing and sloganizing is the fact that almost all over Latin America, the newspapers are reporting an outpouring of millions and millions of dollars, and as you might expect they convert the figures into pesos, or other local currency whatever you happen to be, so that there is an announcement saying that the Alianza para Progresso has allocated 10 million dollars and then they convert that into 120 million pesos; it sounds like an awful lot of money. Immediately people have grandioso ideas about what is going to be done with all this money when in effect it is only a request for that kind of money that has been done. We have, basically speaking, still some problems among Congress as to how much money is going to be allocated. Let me give you a specific case about what I feel is an over publicizing of the Alliance's program. In El Salvador there was an announcement in the papers that three million dollars had been allocated by the United States Government for the building of schools. Now, 3 million dollars converted into local currency is something like seven and half million colones. That's a big sum of money down there and, of course, it got tremendous play in all the newspapers. Well it turned out, what the Alliance had in mind, along with the Junta, was to build one hundred small schools. This would be 100 schools worth around $30,000 a piece. Well, one of the model schools, right now, is in the process of constructions in one of the neighborhoods in El Salvador. While I was there, there was considerable snide criticism by the press; by a lot of the population that this was a poor example of Alliance for Progress spending. It was a small school; it was within the desired $30,000 budget, but I am thinking that most of the people in El Salvador having talked about 7,500,000 colones, were expecting palaces to be built. Suddenly you have a very small school, and it was being criticized by the press; by the people at large. The next day, quite fortunately, the Minister of Education very ably took this issue and quieted it by saying: "We said we are going to build schools, not palaces." But I think that even this criticism could have been avoided had we announced rather that the expenditure of 3 million dollars or 7,500,000 colones, had we just announced that the Alliance for Progress, in cooperation with the El Salvador government, was going to build 100 small schools and say so without any more dressing it up, not even mention the amount of money that was going to be spent in total because then no one could expect more than a small school. Also I think it would have been better to have the first schools outside El Salvador, possibly in a little town like Santa Tecla or one of the other neighboring towns; and then build the school right next to the old school so that there would be a marked contrast in every way. You could see it immediately. Certainly there is always land available near all the old schools, and just destroy the old school when you've built the new one; and then really to do a public relations job, get statements from the teachers, from the students, and, perhaps, have the oldest school teacher in the neighborhood lay the cornerstone to the school. Really do a public relations job of it on a very personal basis rather than trying to stagger people with huge sums of money. This is what I mean by talking in huge figures when you can do a better job and arouse less expectation. When you have few expectations, almost anything is better; so I think if we talk little and act big, we're going to be much better off in the long run.

I think also a very highly over-publicized group is the Peace Corps. Here again, I think we're setting ourselves up for some possible difficulty. All of this publicizing is very good for consumption here in the United States; but in the world we're living in now, the same kind of propaganda gets outside the United States. Already there are all kinds of jokes about the Peace Corps. Its done a terrific job of publicizing here in this country. They get great coverage in all the big picture magazines. In time there's going to be a musical comedy about the Peace Corps. All this is great stuff as far as the United States is concerned, but I'm afraid it is going to create serious problems abroad. Actually the actual observable benefit of the Peace Corps in the various areas will be very minimal when you consider, for example, they have about 29 people that will be in the Peace Corp in San Salvador. They're not going to be able to make much of a dent in separate communities, because they are separated. As I understand it, from talking to the manager of the Peace Corps for the Central American area; most of these kids will be alone in the villages they are going to, and whatever they do is not going to be very observable as far as the general population is concerned. Unfortunately, one of the things that we haven't yet learned in our thinking about these under-developed countries is the fact that we do such naive things as this: there is an elderly lady about 63 years of age that has been assigned to one of the small villages in southern El Salvador and her expertise is home economics. If you have ever been to one of these small villages and if you have seen that they subsist, and I say subsist, merely on a small supply of beans and maybe one or two tortillas; and the difference between the supply of one or two tortillas is a very meaningful one. When you start talking about balancing the diet and varying the diet and having a home economics expert to teach them this, this gets pretty ironic. This is precisely the thing that could easily be open to criticism and easily open to satire. I can imagine if I were someone in a position of Dr. Jose Rodriguez RUIZ, who was a very left leaning Dean of the School of Economics in El Salvador--if I really wanted to cede on one issue and ridicule it, I would talk about this person who was an expert on home economics; balanced dieting; and how many vegetables you should have; what variety of vegetables, how much cottage cheese you should have; and the whole thing in the balanced diet. I could murder this whole thing in very short time and make it very ridiculous.

I think these are things that we've got to think about. We've got to think about all the possible weaknesses, how this thing can be turned around. I know that in the United States, I know that in the hometown of this woman (she's from Nebraska) it sounds absolutely marvelous and this home economics expert is going down to a little Latin American country and tell them all about home economics, but from the point of view of the Latin American it's sheer irony and it's susceptible to attack.

With respect to your question about the influence of the Church with the campesinos in other parts of the community; I think that it's probably true all over Latin America that the Church has great influence on the thinking of the population. It's interesting to note that in San Salvador and Mexico the real church goers are the women and not the men, but the men are very certain that their wives go to church so that they're their surrogates and that they take their children along with them. Although they are not great church goers, I think they are Catholics and are greatly influenced by the priests.

You asked whether the people in El Salvador are aware that there have been food shortages in Cuba and that the Castro program is undergoing serious difficulties and the answer to that is "yes". As a matter of fact I was interested in this when I talked to various people, including cab drivers and boys that shine your shoes, people working in the markets, and some of the campesinos. There is an awareness, certainly in the city, that Castro is having his difficulties. One of the things that is interesting and, of course, I think this may be referable to their Church influence, is that the word Communism per se still has a serious effect on people. I think it's one of the things they talk about--social reform, etc., etc., but, the tag Communism is still a very harsh tag in the Latin American mind. I think this is one of the serious errors Castro made from his point of view was to declare himself a Communist and a Marxist-Lenninist because many people that might have gone along with him at that moment got frightened off. There is an awareness that he is having troubles and that the Revolution hasn't gone along on the way it has. Also there was a lot of talk among a certain group of people that I talked with--these were some workers from a textile mill, that there had been an awful lot of killing that was done by Castro. Apparently, there had been pictures of a lot of executions in some of the Latin American newspapers; and this has had an effect on them.

With respect to the government prosecuting anyone for violation of the minimum wage law: As far as I understand, it's still in its infancy. I think the belief of the government is that if they start to impose any violations this might have a serious effect in getting the program across. But in this respect, I'd like to mention the seventh day wage that was passed about a year ago when I was in Salvador apparently is working fairly well. You'll recall that this was accepting with the Bible that if anyone worked for six days (this was referable to the campesinos) he was entitled to the seventh day pay. I was worried at the time and mentioned my worries to Chometic (Phonetic) and also the Minister of Economics who was at breakfast with us at that time, that one of the possible dangers of any reform is that it is not carried through intelligently and forcibly. It is better not to have a reform, not to announce a new idea, not to arouse expectations, if there is going to be violation of those expectations. At that time it was contemplated that the army would administer the program of the seventh day pay. Apparently they have changed their mind on that and have a civilian group that is administering the program; there has been no real scandal with respect to violations of this. I was a little fearful that a local army guy would get paid off by some of the big plantation owners and thus be permitted to do all kinds of violations. Apparently this has not happened, and they've been pretty effective in the administration.

My big objection at that time was that again the minimum salary thing was not properly publicized. They could have had all kinds of radio and television programs, interviews with the campesinos, and asked them what they felt about this and actually doing that kind of public relations job which they did not do. I think this is true with all these reforms. I think that they have got to be brought to the people where you get reaction from the people as to the extent of the change, any reform has on their personal existence. This again is a matter of attitude, a matter of technique in public relations.

Well, it is certainly true that there has been a considerable amount of publicity about the Alianza para Progresso. I was not aware that it was this specific group that was pushing the program of publication. However, harking back to a previous statement, I think that there is a serious possibility that over publicizing of the Alianza will cause more trouble than we can at present anticipate. As a matter of fact some of the problems are already beginning to arise. I had a long talk with Ambassador Williams on this, and I think we both agreed that we ought to soft pedal much of the talk about the Alianza; and certainly to stay away from these enormous figures of millions of dollars. As far as the people in Latin America are concerned they really think the world is going to change overnight and expect it to change overnight. When the changes aren't forthcoming, they are going to be very embittered and we may possibly create enemies we need not have had.

I have in mind talking with one man; he was a newspaper vendor and I happened to see a headline about the Alianza para Progresso, and this of course gave me an opening to talk to him about it. I said, "What is this going to mean to you?" He said, "I understand they are going to give me a new house." Someone standing close to him said, "What do you mean--they're going to give you a house," and they actually had an argument about the thing. The man selling the newspapers insisting that's what they were going to do--build him a new house, etc. The other man saying that's all propaganda, it's all demagogy; they say this all the time and nothing is going to occur. The chances are very strong that this man will not get into a house. The chances are almost equally strong that he won't even get an apartment because you cannot possibly meet the housing shortage in such a place in San Salvador, where I doubt more than 10% of the people have adequate hygienic dwellings. So here again, well at least, this newspaper vendor has gotten an enormously over bloated notion about what we're going to do. It may be that in his particular case, he is more aware of the Alianza and more aware of the million dollars because he is selling newspapers and magazines and he is reading about it all the time. Here again I think is one of the dangers with respect to the publicity about the Alianza.

I think I mentioned in my report about a year ago it might be a good idea to get some experts in public relations, and that they might be recruited from such places as Mexico and Puerto Rico where you have people who have worked with either government agencies, with some of our embassies, or with some of the public relations firms such as General Rubicam & Noble Advertising and other very widely-known public relations groups in Latin America. I think it might be a good idea for the government to have someone counseling him and particularly on any wide shifts of policy on how to present it to the public. I think it would be an enormously effective way in presenting the programs of the government, and it would be a good investment they could make at this point. And I don't just mean getting the ordinary Madison Avenue flack. I think it ought to be a person who has had some experience dealing with the Latin American temperament because any program has to arise out of the psyche of the people that are being dealt with.

Incidentally, I did see some of the pictures and some of the coverage that was given Rivera during his election campaign and whoever handled that, I think, was very effective; and I've suggested to the Ambassador that he might suggest that the same people or person be retained to accompany Rivera into his position as president.

I think one of the key persons with respect to the left in El Salvador is the Dean of the School of Economics whose name is Jose Rodriguez Ruiz. He is also the son of the president of the University. Now first a word about the young son--he gave a lecture on Marxism one of the nights I was there, and I went to the lecture. The hall was filled to capacity; there were people standing in the doorways, and I would estimate there were 400 or 500 people there. It was a rather interesting experience because from what I heard I had been led to believe that it would be kind of a rabble rouser and that he would try to instigate the people into action. Actually what I saw was--personally it was very moving, really: He has kind of the manner of a priest. His voice tends to tremble at first; but as he got more involved, he lost the tremor in his voice and sounded more like a very intense professor. The interesting thing was when he spoke about the United States, it was more in symbolic terms; there was nothing of real harsh personal rancor either in his voice, his manner, or in what he was actually saying; but it was almost as if he were referring to an abstraction of the United States. He didn't take off on the Ambassador personally. He just talked about American ambassadors and he was bitter, less inclined to be sarcastic than merely bitter. He is a very effective human being. I note as I sat there, he moved the audience that he had, emotionally. I could see one of them kind of swallowing and the tears running down eyes of the girl to the left of me. There was really no attempt to rabble rouse as such, there was no attempt to get the people out in the streets as it were. Toward the end he made a very interesting statement--he said: "We know that there are changes necessary, we know that we have got to free ourselves of the imperialist yoke of the United States, and we know that these changes have got to come through us; no one is going to help us but ourselves," but he says in making these changes come about, let us be careful that we do not ruin and that we do not set back our program by taking precipitous action, without plan. Suddenly, it came almost as a jarring note, he said--well perhaps we're not ready to act yet, but whatever we do, we've got to do it reasonably so that we don't lose the revolution as such. I don't know whether he had reference to the fact that maybe in Cuba the revolution did not work because certainly he was very pro Castro. I think that there was a kind of note of wariness in his talk, and it is interesting.

I suggested to the ambassador that it might be a good idea for him to set up a meeting with Guillermo Moscoso with the older Jose Napoleon Rodriguez Ruiz who was the (rector) of the University, and possibly ask this younger fellow, the Dean of the School of Economics to come along and try in effect to have Moscoso say, "Look, I know you probably disagree with a lot that we're doing and you are very skeptical about the Alianza para Progresso; you're very skeptical about the United States per se. Maybe in many senses you're right, maybe in the past you had reason to feel that there has been imperialism, but we want to indicate to you that we have a change of attitude and just give us a chance and I need your counsel and you're an economist and I want to know. I realize that we may disagree, but I wanted to meet you anyway." I think that there is a possibility that a person in his frame of mind and I say this is only a possibility and it may be very minimal as a possibility; but there is a chance that we may be able to recreate some kind of tie with him so that he is not as bitter and as antagonistic. I do not think, at least from hearing that lecture, that evening that he is entirely beyond the pale; and bear in mind that there were no Americans, there was no one in the audience (that I could detect at least) who were not from El Salvador itself. I realize that there may be various opinions with respect to this, but I did suggest it to the ambassador. He thought it might be a good idea and he may very well do that.

Apparently the father, Jose Rodriguez Ruiz, Sr. (Napoleon), is a person who is approachable. He is not as far to the left as his son. He is a liberal, but he is not considered a Communist. There is, I understand, something in the Embassy about him, but apparently it has been checked out and it is felt that he is not a Communist. In any event, there has been an invitation extended to him to come to the United States. I think, as a matter of fact, that with many of these people that if they were to come to the United States and given some kind of chance to observe the United States first hand, they would be less bitter about us. I think that they have adopted some very dogmatic notions about us; they believe some of what they see in the movies; kinds of snatches of newsreels about the situation in the South. Actually, they have a very distorted notion, and some of it is a very sincere distorted notion. They really believe some of the things they've heard. I think if they would see us first hand they might feel differently. Just as I think sometimes when a lot of these fellows go to Russia or Cuba; they come back disenchanted that it isn't what they have been told it is. I know that I've talked to some people in Mexico who have seen Cuba first hand during the last year and have had noticeable changes of mind as to what it is. It's one thing to hear all the good things that the leftists say about a thing, but it's another thing when you actually go there and observe some of the tyrannical atmosphere. I think the same thing is true on the reverse that you can disenchant people by sending them to Russia or to Cuba or behind the Iron Curtain. Just as sometimes you can rub away some of the malimpressions, erroneous impressions by sending people to the United States and having them live on a campus for example, such as Cambridge,Michigan, or any such place where they can see first hand that we're not the oppressors that they have been led to believe for a long time. Much of this is really lack of exposure.

During the time that I was in El Salvador about 10 days ago, there arose a serious problem of the deportation of Salvadoranians from Honduras; and it was all over the newspapers, and very strong statements were issued both in the editorials and by people over the radio about chasing out some of the Salvadoranians that had been working in Honduras for a long time. Apparently there has been a rapproachment; there were meetings between the foreign ministers and I think the problem may be resolved.

It's interesting to note that El Salvador is the most heavily populated country of Central America. I think they have a population of about 120 per square mile, whereas Honduras and Nicaragua have something like 15 or 17 per square mile. Therefore, you have a very definite problem of space and overpopulation in San Salvador. The other thing is traditionally the people of San Salvador are supposed to be the hardest workers in Central America. I remember that Antonio Rivera, a very well-known attorney in San Salvador, said that the Salvadorans were referred to as the

Japanese of Central America because they're the tough workers. Also there is a considerable amount of Salvadoranian capital that is in various industries throughout Central America which is an interesting thing to me. The comparison to the Japanese seems to be very appropriate in this situation.

I think that the real focus of trouble, if there is going to be any, would be either the Labor unions or I think more particularly in the University. My feelings about Central America, generally, is that your revolutions do not come from the campesinos or they do not even come from the lower classes. They generally are the middle-class groups or the low-middle-class groups. I think in Havana, for example, Batista was overthrown, not by the campesinos but by the middle classes; and then the campesinos came in afterwards because there was very little doing outside of Havana even in the Sierra Madres, there was only Castro with a small group of people. When Batista really fell is when he had so damn much trouble inside of Havana. He fled and left because he was having problems of sabotage in Havana itself and not because Castro was seriously threatening him from the Sierra Madres, for he had actually withdrawn about a month before, if you recall.

I think with respect to the situation in Santo Domingo, here again Union Civica Nacional was made up by the intellectuals and by the middle classes and not by the campesinos. As a matter of fact, Trujillo has tremendous support and adulation among many of the campesinos and his real basic political strength was from the low economic groups. As a matter of fact the Secret Police was recruited from the lower barrios where he had the toughest little juvenile delinquents you could imagine as a Secret Police, and this was a real force. The interesting thing is that right after Trujillo died, the first big mass meeting that his son had was in the poorest barrio in Santo Domingo because he knew that's where Trujillo still had basic strength.

I think the same thing is true in San Salvador. I don't think it will be the campesinos that will give you the trouble; it will be the students. With respect to the student situation, I think they might borrow leaf from PRI's book in dealing with the students. I think the government ought to make a very strong attempt to form a liaison with the universitites and whenever they get some apt pupils to give them a job in the government, to bring them into the various positions within the government and the same thing with professors, to have them as economic advisors whenever they can. They're human beings--one, they'll be flattered and another thing, they'll need the money. I think one of the things that might be helpful with respect to the situation in the universities is to try and catch some of these students in the high school level. I suggested to the ambassador, a plan that would be something comparable to the Rotary Club's scholarships that are given in Colorado. I remember that when I was going through high school, I was given $10 a month by the Rotary Club and I was given a sponsor. I used to meet him once a month and we'd have lunch. I remember this very strongly because it was meaningful to me to have this kind of relationship. I think that many of the businessmen in San Salvador could get the bright young guys in the high schools who are actually the guys who become the effective leaders in the college. Get them on the high school level and become friends with them. Once they have gotten to know some of the people who are supposed to be the ogres that they later talk about, and have had some actual financial help from them; they are more apt to be approachable. At least the person who has been their sponsor during the time in high school can approach them. I think we have got to start working on this at a stage before they get to the university. Your leaders can be spotted, the people who are going to be your most effective in colleges can be spotted in the high schools. I think that is the time to start bringing some of the people in close contact with the government, also the business community. I talked to the ambassador about this and he said he felt it was a good idea and was going to talk to some of the people about it. I think, bearing in mind, that the universities are really power seats in many of the Latin American countries. We have got them to accept this as a starting point and then work with this and find out what are the elements that produce the leaders and when do the leaders first become observable and try to catch them at the earliest possible time. I think it would ameliorate much of the situation with respect to the students. The other thing (still on the university thing) I've observed in places that I have been is that the newspapers in these universities really are not newspapers. I think the leftist newspapers are really truly ineffective as far as appealing to the middle span. The same thing with the rightist, you have either the right or the left. The Catholics, generally speaking, have newspapers that are more costly; and they are very dogmatic to the right. Then you have the leftist students who have poorly printed or poorly mimeographed newspapers to the left. I suspect that the vast number of students who are in the middle never have any newspapers and here, I think, is a fertile field for us to get into the act. I saw a newspaper in El Salvador called the Daily News; it's an American newspaper. I don't know who is the editor of it, but it is really truly a newspaper and it's a good job. It is well edited; it is a newsy periodical and I think it could be used as a format for many of the newspapers in some of these Central American universities. In Mexico I think you would have to have a printed newspaper because there are more resources, but a lot can be done with mimeographed newspapers if they are made into newspapers. My suggestion would be that you have actual news, gossip columns in these newspapers about who is going with whom and all that sort of stuff, have student programs, have actual news about lectures that are given; and make it about two-thirds news and about only one-third editorial. Once you get people in as readers then they will read some of your editorial comment. Also it can become the organ to the middle because none of the middle groups in any of the universities I have ever seen have a newspaper that speaks for them. I think, for example, and I mentioned this to Dave Phillips and Bill Carlson in Mexico, that there isn't an effective student newspaper at the University of Mexico. This is a place where you have 83,000 students and this is the growing middle class, these are the spokesmen. They don't have a newspaper, and I think it might be a good idea, for example, to have some kind of symposium in El Salvador where you invite prospective editors of student newspapers to study the techniques of typography; to study the techniques of what makes a newspaper readable. Actually La Quincena that is published in Mexico, for example, is obviously a political tract. There isn't one single article that appears that doesn't have a political pitch, a very strong anti-leftist pitch. Frankly, it is a boring newspaper and typographically it looks very presentable; it's an expensive project. Interesting enough in the third issue of it they had a big editorial page saying we are not supported by the American Embassy. We have gathered our own funds, etc. Well, "Me thinkest thou protesteth too loudly," is certainly true in that situation. As I understand it we are not really sponsoring the newspaper, but it has the look of it. None of these newspapers have any ads or anything of this nature. I think that when you don't have any ads or you don't have any (parental where-withall) it is always suspected of being a paid-for newspaper. I think even in these little mimeograph sheets we could always find people who would give a nominal sum, say even a dollar a month, for just an ad just so you could use an ad advertising their book store or dry goods store to give it the appearance of a newspaper that is making its own go and it is not just a paid-for propaganda piece. I think there is a great need for these kinds of newspapers in all of these universities. I would be tickled to death, as a matter of fact, for I have a special interest in this thing, to give whatever help I can. I know that the Ambassador in Salvador is very interested in this. He is a former newspaper editor. He edited the student newspaper and of course it hit him immediately as a good idea. I edited a student newspaper and perhaps that is why I am especially aware of this kind of thing, but I think we've missed the boat many years in this. I think even if we have to edit the newspaper ourselves, these organs should be in the universities.

14-00000

201-253203

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : PORTER J. GOSS
UNIT : WH/3/C-R
EXT : 5400
DATE : 12 June 1962

RE 1528 ... No CS Record Value. Destroy.
1528 ... Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ______ None required ______
Signature: ______

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3	12 Jun 61	6	17 38z

TO : SALVADOR

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO : ADDP, PG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT92790

TO SALV INFO CITE DIR 16185

REFERENCE: SALV 4142* (IN 48642)

AMBASSADOR AWARE TICHBORN AND NOLTENIUS ARE ACQUAINTANCES.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

WH COMMENT: *Is Ambassador aware of Tichborn's contact with minister of Public works Julio Noltenius?

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

for J.C. KING
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

NED F. HOLMAN
201-253203
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

FORM 1389 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 016
8 JUN 62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN SALVADOR

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : PG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2
ADDP

JUN 9 0230Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 48642

DIR INFO MEXI CITE SALV 4142

REF DIR 15052 (out 90798)*

SALV 4119 (NOT SENT MEXI) (in 21405)

1. MINDEF HAS INFORMED ARMY ATTACHE MATTHEWS RIVERA CANNOT LEAVE BEFORE 11 JUNE.

2. STATION AS YET UNABLE CONFIRM ANY NOLTENIUS TRAVEL PLANS FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

3. WAS AMBASSADOR AWARE TICHBORN CONTACT WITH NOLTENIUS.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT, *IF PRESIDENT RIVERA AND OR MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS JULIO NOLTENIUS COMING TO ZRMETAL, ADVISE HQS ETA. TICHBORN PLANNED CONTACT NOLTENIUS IN ZRMENTAL FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION TO RIVERA.

RI COPY

✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-253203

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

201-253203

201-253203

1917 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : PORTER GOSS
UNIT : WH/3/CAN.
EXT : 6400
DATE : 6 JUNE 1963

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

6 JUN 63 12 28 Z

SIG CEN

TO : SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY INFO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : FG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 20798
OUT 20798

TO PRITY SALV INFO MEXI CITE DIR 15052

15052

1. IF PRESIDENT RIVERA AND OR MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS JULIO NOLTENIUS COMING TO ZRMETAL, ADVISE HQS ETA.

2. TICHBORN PLANS TO CONTACT NOLTENIUS IN ZRMETAL FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION TO RIVERA.

END OF MESSAGE

RI/AW
RI/MS
RI/FC
COPY
RI

WH/3/Mexico Al Wedemeyer

WH/COPS

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-253203

14-00000

IE 201

CONTACT REPORT

MEMORANDUM : of Contact and Conversation Date 5 June 1962

SUBJECT: Henry Lopez

1. Messer's Dick Ouderkirk and Porter Goss contacted Subject at the Shoreham Hotel in room 506 N on 5 June to debrief him on his current travel in El Salvador. Subject will be in Washington until Thursday, 7 June. At the Subject's request a further debriefing will take place Wednesday, 6 June at 0930 hours with the benefit of a tape recorder. Subject believed that there was sufficient material to warrant a detailed question and answer type discussion and stated that he preferred this form reporting.

2. During the course of luncheon, at which the majority of the meeting was conducted, the following items of interest were brought out in conversation. Most topics were discussed in generalities in view of the arranged formal briefing scheduled for the following morning with a recorder.

a) Subject feels that there is a chance for real stability in the Rivera government with the proper support from the US Government.

b) Subject stated that a slight disparity existed in the direction being taken between the State Dept (Ambassador) on the one hand and the COS on the other. Specifically, Subject believed that COS was supporting elements too far to the right.

c) The military is apparently a true "third force" and not aligned with the 14 families, but broken up into conservative senior officers and an emerging more liberal junior officer corps. Subject believed that there may be a possibility of getting to the campesinos through the liberal element of the military, but not to the 14 families.

d) 14 families are becoming isolated and have neither the full support of the church, the military, or the government. The attitude toward the minimum wage rate of the Rivera government seems to be "pay one half as many twice as much.". The cooperation of the 14 families is needed for the econom

201-253203

development of the country, but as of now they are all the way Right. As for the minimum wage concept, the campesinos apparently do not grasp it s meaning.

e) The church is not so far Right that it supports the 14 families and it is tending more towards the relative left.

f) The Alliance for Progress has been badly handled, as have some of the activities of the Peace Corps. Subject believes that too much has been promised through propaganda already without corresponding results. He believes the danger of the program falling into ridicule is great if the US continues to promise only, or continues its badly managed publicity ~~[illegible]~~ program.

g) Discussion of the student University papers yielded Subject's opinion that they are largely ineffective because they deal in polemics rather than fact and news items, and ~~[illegible]~~ because the ones with too good format are obviously US puppets.

h) Less conversation about Fidel Castro is evident in public, although the Fidel movement is still to be reckoned with. Recently there has been a resurgence stimulated by the Right of the Martinez - dictator of the 40's - good old days when everybody had a job - this sentiment was even expressed by some campesinos.

3. Subject mentioned that he had both high and low level contacts in El Salvador and had managed to get a reading of public opinion and private belief. Apparently it is a mistake for Rivera to delay the inauguration so long after the election, at which time a favorable image of the Col. was successfully kept before the public, but which is now wearing off.

4. Subject proposed the following courses of action in certain fields that were discussed in more depth.

a) Radio is the best means of communication with the campesinos. Subject was impressed with the results of the operation run by the Catholic priest in Bolivia, using pre-beamed radios. He considers that a similar operation would be extremely valuable if properly handled.

b) Recommends that the 14 families be approached on a millionaire to millionaire basis to cooperate with a reasonable reformist movement. Also that they be approached by the Church thru the women.

c) That the son of Rodriguez ~~[illegible]~~ Ruiz - son is head of the Economics Dept at the University- be approached by Moscoso ~~and himself~~ ~~[illegible]~~ (?) and asked to cooperate for at least a year's trial basis. The son is a very moving orator, but Marxist oriented, ~~and~~ skeptical about the success of the Alliance, but not an inflamatory type & would be a fair contestant in any issue.

d) That an effective student/ youth newspaper be developed which is a newspaper and not a propaganda sheet, which appeals to the student body.

e) That he use his newly formed contact- the Minister of Public Works- Julio Nottenius - to get an introduction to Rivera when he is in Washington. ~~Subject plans to develop his relationship with Julio and would like to have at least a cocktail relationship with Rivera.~~ Subject claims a very intimate relationship with Julio & is positive that Julio would ~~party~~ include him in gatherings while in Washington ~~that~~ would provide a close contact with Rivera.

201-253203

023

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	201-253203	4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 4 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CA/PRG, S/C 2

JUN 5 0152Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 45887

DIR INFO SALV CITE MEXI 0977

REF DIR 13809 Out 88702*

TICHBORN SCHEDULED DEPART MEXI 4 JUNE WITH STOPOVER NYC, FOR ARRIVAL HQS MORNING OF 5 JUNE. WILL PHONE 5 JUNE PER REF.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS CONCURS TICHBORN HQS CONSULTATION TO BEGIN APPROX 4 JUNE.

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID~~	
RID/FI	
~~DES~~	

✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-253203

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	201- [illegible]	4	
2	253203	5	
3		6	

ORIG : PORTER J. GOSS 1635
UNIT : WH/3/CAN
EXT : 6400
DATE : 31 MAY 1962

TO : MEXICO CITY INFO: SAN SALVADOR
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : CA 2, CA/PRG, S/C 2

RE FILING (check one): No CS Record Value. Destroy ___ Return to ___ Branch copy filed as indicated ___
RE INDEXING (check one): Marked ___ None required ___
Signature: ___

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT88702

TO PRITY MEXI INFO SALV CITE DIR 13809

REF: MEXI 9927 (IN 42601)*

HQS CONCURS PARA 2 REF. ADVISE ETA. CONTACT MR. FORREST SHIVERS OR MR. AL WEDEMEYER AT 356 8073 IN ZEMETAL BETWEEN 0800 AND 1700 HOURS WEEKDAY UPON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

WH Comment: *Advise concurrence TICHBORN Hqs consultation to begin approx 4 June.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/3/MEXICO
WH/COPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Forrest Shivers
[illegible] F. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-253203

201-253203
201-253203

.ASSIFIED MESSAGE

231
29 MAY 62

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

WH 8

CA 2, CA/PRG, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ____
RI file this copy as indicated ✓
Branch copy filed as indicated ____
RS Indexing (check one):
Marked ____ None required ____
Signature: S McLaren

MAY 29 1038Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 42601

DIR INFO SALV CITE MEXI 0927

REF MEXI 0763 (IN 34358) *

1. TICHBORN RETURNED MEXI 25 MAY AFTER COMPLETING SURVEY SALV POLITICAL AND EDUCATIONAL FIELDS AND HOLDING DISCUSSIONS SALV ODACID CHIEF AND COS. TICHBORN REPORTS SALV SURVEY HIGHLY COMPLEX AND AS RECOMMENDED IN SALV, HE REQUESTS APPROX TWO DAY CONSULTATION HQS TO PRESENT HIS REPORT, DISCUSS SALV DEVELOPMENTS AND DEVISE POSSIBLE ACTION PROGRAM.

2. FOR SALV HQS: ADVISE CONCURRENCE TICHBORN HQS CONSULTATION TO BEGIN APPROX 4 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *TICHBORN WOULD ARRIVE SALV 16 MAY.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	ZB
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
RID/FI	
AUG 1 1 02 PM '62	
~~DESTROY~~	

201-253203

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 1389
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET DESENSITIZED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-19040

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 10 May 1962

SUBJECT: Qualifications of Lee C. REHLICH for Political Operations

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

REFERENCES:

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

HMMW-10573, 11 April 1962

1. The Station had been aware of REHLICH's association with Congressman King. Quite frankly, however, the Station was not aware of the extent to which REHLICH engaged in political election activities until receipt of Reference and a discussion with REHLICH. Headquarters is correct in considering him qualified for political action operations involving elections.

2. Perhaps Station Mexico's comments were colored by the desire not to lose REHLICH's services even temporarily. His cover occupation as a professor at the National University makes it difficult for him to leave classes for TDY assignments. He is also handling two Station operations. One of them, [illegible], involves meetings with his Station officer at least three times a week. In some circumstances, such as the present student strike situation, REHLICH and the Station case officer must meet daily.

3. Also pertinent is the fact that Edward G. TICHBORN has qualifications in the election field which are certainly superior to REHLICH's. (See HR-00417 for Headquarters evaluation.) Furthermore, Station Mexico has understood that TICHBORN's assignment in Mexico was based on the presumption that he would be on hand for just such assignments. Although Station Mexico is using TICHBORN, it has constantly borne in mind that he may be called on to travel at any moment, as he is doing this date in San Salvador. Finally, the Station feels strongly that TICHBORN as a personality, is better suited to such assignments.

4. In summary: REHLICH will be available for any assignment in any area requested by Headquarters. At the same time, Station Mexico will appreciate Headquarters consideration of TICHBORN for such assignments, for the reasons stated above.

Willard C. Curtis

17 May 1962

Distribution:
 3 - WHD
 2 - Files

SECRET/[illegible] DESENSITIZED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

317

DATE : 12 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CA/PRG, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 12 20512 62

ROUTINE

IN 34358

TO SALV INFO DIR CITE MEXI 0765

RE DIR 09174 (OUT 81006)*

TICHBORN WILL ARRIVE 16 MAY VIA PAA AT 1210.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS CONCURRED TICHBORN TDY SALV TO REAPPRAISE POLIT SIT.

SECRET

201-253203

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 201-253203

SECRET

ORIG: C. BUSTOS
UNIT: WH/3/MEXICO 1666
EXT: 5940
DATE: 8 MAY 1962

TO: SAN SALVADOR, MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: CA 2, CA/PRG, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

8:00б

TO SALV INFO MEXI CITE DIR 09174

REF: SALV 4099 (IN 31360)*

1. HQS CONCURS TICHBORN TDY SALV PER REF REQUEST.

2. MEXI: PLS ADVISE SALV DATES TICHBORN AVAILABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ambassador Willions requests Edward G. Tichborn travel Salvador to reappraise political situation.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~[illegible]~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/30/B	
~~[illegible]~~	

WH/3/CAN
WH/PO/B
WH/COPS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

E. P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-253203

045

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TICHBORN
DYE

ROUTING

1	Alec	4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 29 MAR 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CCG 2, S/C 2

MAR 30 0447Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 11122

DIR INFO RIOD CITE MEXI 0414

ALSWOOP

REF: RIOD 6974 (IN 48985)*

FYI: DUE PLANNED PERSONAL BUSINESS TRIP IN LOS ANGELES FROM 2 THRU 9 APRIL, LOPEZ AVAILABLE FOR REF TRIP ANY TIME THEREAFTER. IN CONSIDERING COVER POSSIBILITIES FOR REF TRIP, HQS MAY WISH UTILIZE LEGITIMATE LOPEZ COVER AS LAWYER WHO NOW REPRESENTING MEXI-U.S. BUSINESS INTERESTS IN PROMOTING LA INDUSTRIAL USE NEW COFFEE BEAN REFINING MACHINE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED BACKGROUND CAPABILITIES AND COVER FOR MR. LOPEZ.

201-253203

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ORIG : LEE SMITH
UNIT : WH/5
EXT : 8495
DATE : 27 MARCH 1962

1675

1675

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : RIO DE JANEIRO MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO : CCG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

[illegible]

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

OUT66244

TO PRTY RIOD MEXI INFO CITE DIR 00417

REF RIOD 6974 (IN 48985)

ALSWOOP

1. EDWARD O. TICHBORN (P) IS KUBARK CONTRACT AGENT RESIDENT MEXI. BORN DENVER 1920 OF MEXICAN PARENTS. ACTIVE SEVERAL YEARS CALIFORNIA STATE POLITICS MOST RECENTLY DURING KENNEDY CAMPAIGN AND AS PRESIDENT YOUNG DEMOCRATS CLUB. WAS MANAGER CAMPAIGNS JAMES ROOSEVELT AND HELEN GAHAGAN DOUGLAS IN EARLY FIFTIES AND WAS 1958 CANDIDATE FOR CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE WHICH CAMPAIGN HE LOST DESPITE GETTING MORE VOTES IN LOS ANGELES AREA THAN ANY DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR ANY OFFICE IN HISTORY.

2. TICHBORN HAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED VALUABLE POLITICAL ASSESSMENT ASSIGNMENTS IN CUBA, EL SALVADOR AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. HE IS PERSONABLE, INTELLIGENT, SHREWD, AGGRESSIVE AND APPEARS TO HAVE WELL-DEVELOPED SECURITY SENSE. HE OPERATIONALLY INVOLVED MEXI BUT GENERALLY AVAILABLE FOR SHORT (UP TO TWO WEEKS) ASSIGNMENTS ELSEWHERE. HIS COVER AS INDEPENDENT LAWYER WITH BUSINESS CLIENTS AND WITH OFFICES IN LOS ANGELES AND MEXI AND AS EMPLOYEE TELEVISION FILM PRODUCER MEXI GIVE HIM MOBILITY THROUGHOUT SPANISH

201-253703

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

PAGE TWO

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 66244

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 00417

AMERICA. HQS UNABLE DETERMINE SUITABILITY HIS COVER FOR BRAZIL.

3. RIOD SHOULD DECIDE FEASIBILITY USE TICHBORN BRAZIL AFTER CONSIDERATION OF TICHBORN'S EVALUATION HIS COVER (FOR BRAZIL) WHICH ~~MXXI~~ REQUESTED CABLE RIOD SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: REF REQUESTED BACKGROUND, CAPABILITIES, COVER TICHBORN.

C/WH/CA P Egbert
WH/COPS
WH/3/Mexico
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER
J. C. KING, C/WHD

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
ROBERT D. GAHAGEN, C/WH/5

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

4-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DTE - Tichborn

528
ATE : 26 MAR 62

O : DIRECTOR

OM : RIO DE JANEIRO

CTION : WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1815 26 MAR 62)

NFO : CCG 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 26 2219Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 48985

PRITY DIR INFO PRITY MEXI CITE RIOD 6974

ALSWOOP

REF DIR 496[illegible] (Out 63745)*

STATION DOES NOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE CAPABILITIES MR. LOPEZ. REQUESTED VISIT ON ADVICE MR. LEE SMITH WHO NO LONGER HERE. IN VIEW SERIOUS SECURITY HAZARDS NOW BECOMING EVIDENT BELIEVE LOPEZ VISIT REQUIRES DETAILED PLANNING. THEREFORE, REQUEST CABLE HIS BACKGROUND, CAPABILITIES AND COVER.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED CABLE DECISION RE MOST EFFECTIVE TIME FOR LOPEZ VISIT TO BRAZIL.

201-253203

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

TO
Chief of Station, San Salvador

INFO.
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Edward G. TICHBORN (p)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. In February or March 1961 Subject, a contract agent (Identity under separate cover) presently based in Mexico, was sent on TDY to El Salvador to make a private evaluation of general social, economic and political conditions in that country. Upon his return, Subject wrote a lengthy report which has been useful as background information concerning El Salvador as of early 1961.

2. On an official visit to El Salvador in early February 1962, the Chief, [illegible] Support, visited Ambassador Williams. The Ambassador said that he was pleased with Subject's accomplishments during the visit described in paragraph 1, above, and requested that Subject again be sent to El Salvador on TDY. This is the first word to reach Headquarters that the Ambassador had expressed such a desire.

3. The COS, San Salvador is requested to ascertain what specific tasks the Ambassador has in mind for Subject at this time.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Identity, u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - San Salvador, w/att as noted
2 - Mexico City, w/att as noted

✓

DATE TYPED
26 Feb 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible] MAR 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HFSW-1306

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-253263

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/CAN	Nelson R. Smith	nth	3229

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/3/Mexico		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

DISPATCH

SECRET

IDENTITY

Henry Lopez

Separate cover attachment - HMMW-1805

Dated - 26 February 1962

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/WH/SS

NO.

DATE 9 February 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/3	12 FEB 1962		RH	~~Please detach your copy~~ GH
2.				
3. DC/WHD			Bud	1-3: I don't know why he wants to go at this time
4. C/WH/3			CH	
5. ~~C/WH/5~~				4-6: Pls. see me
6. CA/N				3 to 4 We should get the Station to find out the purpose of the proposed visit —
7. Millie - file original and cover sheet in Salv memo Chrono				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201253203

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

9 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Request from Ambassador Williams, El Salvador

1. While visiting with Ambassador Williams and the COS during my recent trip to San Salvador the Ambassador mentioned the good work done by Mr. Henry Lopez whom the Agency had sent to El Salvador for TDY.

2. The Ambassador was so pleased with the accomplishments of Mr. Lopez that he asked me to convey to you his desire that Mr. Lopes by sent again on TDY.

PAUL E. ARNESON
Chief, WH Support

SECRET

File - Tichborn

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

597

DATE : 31 JAN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ~~JMWAVE~~ Mexico

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CA/PRG, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 1 0111Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 20768

DIR CITE MEXI 3324 WARE ACTING

REF DIR 38154 Cont 949987

DUE PERSONAL COVER BUSINESS COMMITTMENTS AND RELATED SECURITY ASPECTS, TICHBORN REPORTS REF TRIP FOR APPROX TWO MONTH PERIOD EXTREMELY DIFFICULT ARRANGE. IN ADDITION, TICHBORN, IN ABSENCE RIKON, NOW HANDLING LILISP C, OTHER RELATED STUDENT OPS WHICH REQUIRE FREQUENT CONTACTS. STA SUGGESTS, WITH TICHBORN CONCURRENCE, IF OP REQUIREMENTS PER REF STILL ABLE BE FULFILLED, TICHBORN COULD ARRANGE LOCAL ACTIVITIES PERMIT WEEK-TEN DAY COLOMBIAN VISIT DURING MID FEB WITH FOLLOW-UP WEEK-TEN DAY VISIT IN MARCH.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED IF SUBJ AVAILABLE GO COLOMBIA ASSIST STA PLANNING CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS.

SECRET

201-253203

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LOPEZ, HENRY P.
201-253203
VOL. IV

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			[illegible] 3+4 [illegible] 1+2
18 July 78	18 July 78	Lopez	[illegible]

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

Z/HENRY/P.
201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE NO. ~~201-[illegible]~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

032

DATE : 17 JUL 61 ck

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : CIUDAD TRUJILLO

ACTION : BELL 10 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR BELL AT 0200, 18 JUL)

INFO : CA 2, CA/PRG, WH 5, S/C 2*

RI FILING (check one)
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RI INDEXING (check one)
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

JUL 18 0420Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 40041

TO PRITY DIR MEXI CITE TRUJ 1006

REF DIR 00793 (OUT 76177)**

1. DO NOT HAVE REF. ASSUME THIS IS LOPEZ IF SO CONCUR.

2. THE EXILE MOVEMENT IS LIVING MAINLY IN HOTEL COMMERCIAL. SUBJ MAY WISH MINGLE WITH THIS TYPE. LOCATION CLOSE TO SPORADIC POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN COLON PARK.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO DYVOUR-4 CABLES.
**HQS STATED IT WOULD LIKE EDWARD G. TICHBORN TO RETURN TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SOONEST TO STUDY SITUATION IN DEPTH.

201-0253203

ROUTING INITIAL

RF

201-253203

SECRET

FORM 1389 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

FILE NO. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TE : 376
25 JUL 61

: DIRECTOR

OM : MEXICO CITY

TION : BELL 10 *

FO : CCG 2, CA 2, CA/PRG, WH 5, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature: B Ley

JUL 25 1834Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 43480

DIR INFO TRUJ CITE MEXI 8499

RE DIR 02142 (out 78556)

TICHBORN AVAILABLE MAKE REF TRIP DEPARTING MEXI 30 JULY. SINCE TICHBORN HAS COVER BUSINESS CLIENTS NYC, WILL MAKE CIRCUITOUS ROUTE TO HQS VIA NYC INSTEAD LOS ANGELES. WILL LAY OVER NYC 30 JULY AT STATLER HOTEL, ARRIVE WASH MORNING 31 JULY AND CONTACT HQS THAT TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR 4 CABLES.

RI COPY

ROUTING

RK

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE NO. ~~201-211139~~

DATE : 598
19 JUL 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : TRUJILLO

ACTION : BELL 10 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR BELL AT 2300-19 JUL)

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, WH 5, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
RE Indexing (check one): ☐
Signature:

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 20 0248Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 41148

PRITY DIR MEXI CITE TRUJ 1025

REF MEXI 8435 (IN 40025)*

DYVOUR

1. STATION AGREES TOURIST COVER NOT SUFFICIENT PERMIT EXTENDED STAY DOM REP FOR POLITICAL STUDY IN DEPTH. ESSENTIAL TICHBORN HAVE ADEQUATE BACKSTOPPED COVER TO JUSTIFY HIS TALK WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL TYPES BOTH IN GOVT AND IN OPPOSITION.

2. TARGETS OF INTEREST ARE FOL.: UNION CIVICA NACIONAL; 14TH OF JUNE MOVEMENT; MOVIMIENTO POPULAR DOMINICANO (PRO CASTRO); PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DOMINICANO; AND PARTIDO DOMINICANO.

3. JOURNALIST COVER WOULD GIVE BEST ACCESS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE LIBELER ATTEMPTS MAKE COVER ARRANGEMENTS FOR DOMREP TRIP.

201-253203

SECRET

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

032

DATE : 17 JUL 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : CIUDAD TRUJILLO

ACTION : BELL 10 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR BELL AT 0200, 18 JUL)

INFO : CA 2, CA/PRG, WH 5, S/C 2*

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 18 0420Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 40041

PRITY DIR MEXI CITE TRUJ 1005

REF DIR 00793 (OUT 76177)**

1. DO NOT HAVE REF. ASSUME THIS IS LOPEZ IF SO CONCUR.

2. THE EXILE MOVEMENT IS LIVING MAINLY IN HOTEL COMMERCIAL. SUBJ MAY WISH MINGLE WITH THIS TYPE. LOCATION CLOSE TO SPORADIC POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN COLON PARK.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO DYVOUR 4 CABLES.

**HQS STATED IT WOULD LIKE EDWARD G. TICHBORN TO RETURN TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SOONEST TO STUDY SITUATION IN DEPTH.

~~201 211639~~

~~253203~~

SECRET

201-253203

14-00000

7

056

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FILE NO. 201-~~2~~ 37

SECRET

DATE :17 JUL 61 ~~gl~~

TO :DIRECTOR

FROM :MEXICO CITY

ACTION :BELL 10 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR BELL AT 0345, 18 JUL)

INFO :COP, ADDP/A, CCG 2, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, WH 5, S/C 2*

RI Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
RI Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 18 0553Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 40077

[redacted]

PRITY TRUJ DIR CITE MEXI 8435

1. DUE PREVIOUS BUSINESS/TRAVEL COMMITMENTS, TICHBORN UNABLE MAKE REF TRIP UNTIL LAST WEEK JULY. T WILLING GO DOMREP THAT TIME BUT FEELS TOURIST COVER TOO LIGHT FOR EXTENDED TRUJ VISIT TO OBTAIN SITREP IN DEPTH AS REQUESTED, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW SMALLNESS AND TIGHT SECURITY OF TARGET CITY.

2. FYI PER MEXI-8235, (IN 26303) LIBELER STILL ATTEMPTING MAKE COVER ARRANGEMENTS FOR DOMREP TRIP. MEXI NEWSPAPERS REFUSED GRANT HIM COVER DOCUMENTATION AS SPECIAL REPORTER, BUT IT NOW POSSIBLE HE ABLE ARRANGE COVER BACKSTOPPING AND INTERVIEWS/ENTREES WITH TOP DOMREP OFFICIALS USING HIS PAST BACKGROUND AS MEXICAN INDEPENDENT WRITER AND BOOK AUTHOR OF LA POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND PERSONALITIES. L EXPECTS FINAL COVER AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN NEXT SEVEN DAYS.

3. STA ATTEMPTING FINALIZE LITEA-1 DOMREP ASSIGNMENT PER MEXI-8416. (IN 38612)

4. IN VIEW T'S COVER LIMITATIONS PER PARA 1 ABOVE, ADVISE SOONEST HQS VIEWS RE DESIRABILITY T MAKE TRIP.

REQUESTS HQS REQUIREMENTS INDICATED REF FOR POSSIBLE USE TICHBORN, LIBELER, AND LITEA-1 TRAVEL TO DOMREP.

(END OF MESSAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO DYVOUR 4 CABLES.

FORM 1389

SECRET

201-253203

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CONFIDENTIAL

SPEED LETTER

REPLY REQUESTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

DATE: 5 Dec 74 [illegible]

LETTER NO.: 201- [illegible]

TO: E/IE/S

ATTN:

FROM: OSC/OC, 2 B 16. Hqs

SUBJECT: LOPEZ, Henry P.

A review of OSC/OC records indicates Subject has an Operational Approval which is five years old or older. Updating the OA is ~~not~~ required at this time. If updating is required, OSC/OC will need the following:

a. Updated PRQ I—new information reflecting changes in address, employment, family status, etc. (There is normally no need to submit a complete new PRQ I form.)

b. Updated traces together with current operational use and area of use.

Note: 1. PLEASE CHECK APPROPRIATE SQUARE BELOW AND RETURN TO OSC/OC.

2. The existing OA will continue in effect until updating is completed and your office notified of results.

SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE

1. ☐ Active case: Agent is currently being utilized. (If case requires updating Desk will forward update traces and PRQ I to OSC/OC.)

2. ☒ Inactive case: Agent is no longer active and OA should be cancelled and OSC/OC folder retired.

3. ☐ An Office of Security approval has superseded the OA which is thus no longer required. Please cancel OA and retire folder. (Please specify type of current OS clearance: PCSA ____, CSA ____, CSC ____, Other ____)

2

0/015/

SIGNATURE

RESPONDER'S FILE

FORM 5-67 1831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

December 19, 1968

Mr. Miguel Tirado
2925 Waverley Drive
Los Angeles, California

Dear Friend,

Merry Christmas!

I regret that it has taken this long to settle the matter of your letter of September 22, 1968, but better late than never, I guess. Although your efforts in our behalf with Hank were not successful, we do appreciate the fact that you and your wife went out of your way to try to help us.

I referred the matter of your late moving bill to the appropriate individual. Unfortunately, this bill was received too late, as all your accounts had been settled. He has asked me to extend his regrets on this matter.

Please accept my best wishes for a Joyous Christmas and the hope that 1969 will indeed be a good year for you and yours.

Sincerely,

Gale

Enclosure: $267.00 Check

TREASURER'S CHECK

Morgan Guaranty Trust Company OF NEW YORK

FE 14018

1-23/210

New York, December 17, 1968

Pay MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST CO. $267 AND 00 CTS

To the order of MIGUEL TIRADO * * * * * *

NOT TO EXCEED FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS

FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEPARTMENT

Matthew R Perry

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑈000140018⑈ ⑆0210⑉0023⑆ 404 00 210⑈

☒ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ [illegible] ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
SOCIAL SECURITY [illegible]

FROM: [illegible] and Tax [illegible]
[illegible]
Contract Agents Accounts Section
Room 702 Key Building

EXTENSION | NO.

DATE
11-1[illegible]-[illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CHIEF, [illegible] PERSONNEL 202 [illegible] BLDG.			[illegible]	Identification on [illegible] memo dated 5/23/68.
2. Mr. Allen	22	NOV 1[illegible]	[illegible]	2-3 This is the first time we seen such a memo. Since [illegible] was not under DO proprietary cover except for Oct–Dec 1966, suggest use of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in Mexico. [illegible] DO/C
3. CONTRACT TAX COMMITTEE GH-56 HQS.	22	NOV 1[illegible]3		
4.				
5. [illegible]/CAPS 702 [illegible]				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

201-253263

FORM [illegible] USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

15 NOVEMBER 1968
FOLLOWUP FROM 23 AUGUST 1968

TO, CHIEF : DDS, PERSONNEL

ATTENTION : Central Cover Staff

FROM : AFB/Contract Agents Accounts Section

SUBJECT : Handling of Social Security Wage Credits of Terminated Contract Agent, Edward G. TICHBORN, which are on file with the Agency.

REFERENCES : HR 20-45, Comptroller Instruction 21, para 5a (1)

1. This office has been advised that the above named individual terminated from the rolls of Agent Payroll Branch as of COB 31 August 1968.

2. The credits below are Social Security Wage Credits on file with the Agency on which Social Security tax was withheld from salary. These Social Security Wage credits were not reported to Bureau of Old-Age Survivors Insurance Agency currently because of the individual's covert status at the time wages were earned.

Name	[illegible]
TICHBORN, EDWARD G.	1964, 1965 & 1966

3. It is requested that it be determined which of the following employers are to be used in reporting wage credits to the BOASI. As indicated in reference, it is expected that cases of this kind can ordinarily be reported indicating CIA or Army as employer. Otherwise, it will be necessary to report the earnings in the name of a non-official ostensible employer. These reports are Hand Carried to cleared officials of the Bureau.

4. Please indicate by signing in the appropriate space whether Subject's earnings may be reported with:

(a
(c) CIA as the employer ______________________
Signature

(b) Army as the employer ______________________
Signature

(c) An ostensible non-official employer
Name:
Address:

____
Signature
Central Cover Staff

When an ostensible employer is to be selected, the operating division will also indicate the general type of business activity in which this individual could have been engaged in, and Central Cover Staff will furnish this office the full name and address of an appropriate ostensible employer.

5. Prompt attention to this matter is necessary in the interest of final closing of Subject's pay account. Accordingly, a suspense date of 27 NOVEMBER 1968 is established for furnishing the information requested above.

Chief
Contract Agents Accounts Section

Q - 66 P

SECRET

22 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: OF/CSTU/CAAS

THROUGH : DO/Personnel

SUBJECT : Contract Agent Cover Report for Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

Contract Agent Edward G. TICHBORN (P) was paid by his cover company, WUSALINE, $17,000 in calendar year 1967 and $11,333.28 for the period 1 January to 31 August 1968. He was also upon termination paid through a second DO cover company a one-time lump sum taxable payment of $3,311.00. The latter payment was made on 12 September 1968. TICHBORN's effective termination date was 31 August 1968.

Gale W. Allen
DO/CO/C

CC: DO/Personnel

SECRET

201-253203

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Christopher D. Costanzo
E/IB
4B2607

EXTENSION: 1564

NO.:

DATE: 14 October 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/E/IB		14/10		
2. C/DO/CO		15 Oct		
3. DO/CO/C 210C Key Building ATTN: Gale W. Allen				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-253203

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

14 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: DO/CO/C

ATTENTION: Gale W. Allen

SUBJECT: Howard T. FAZZARE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum dated 26 September 1968

1. In the reference you stated that DO will send FAZZARE a sterile check for his expenses incurred in his efforts to persuade TICHBORN's wife to agree to an assignment in Spain. You also forwarded a bill which FAZZARE sent for additional air freight expenses from Madrid for which he has not been reimbursed.

2. EUR does not wish to reimburse FAZZARE for this claim. When he resigned from the Agency he submitted his final accounting and signed a Quit-Claim for all expenses. In his note to you, a copy of which you forwarded with reference, he asked that you forward his bill "to the Spanish Section for reimbursement if not too late..." We would appreciate it if you could send FAZZARE a note when you forward his sterile check and state that we are sorry but this final accounting has been completed, that the books have been cleared, and that it is indeed too late to authorize additional funds.

for Timothy S. Griggs

Christopher D. Costanzo
E/IB

SECRET

File Fullam
201

TRAIN, CABOT & ASSOCIATES
375 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

PLAZA 1-1044
CABLES INVESTMENT NEWYORK

October 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM

To: HPL
CC: JJT ✓
From: RHO'N

Subject: Advances

Attached are summaries of advances received by you from TCA, ICAP and Devco for the major portion of 1967 and all of 1968 and of the accountings submitted by you for these advances.

The net result is as follows:

ICAP-	Net balance due ICAP	$ 179.93
TCA -	Net balance due HPL	(11.00)
DEVCO-	Net balance due Devco	33.45
	Total due from HPL	$ 202.38

I am also returning the various xerox copies of accountings belonging to you.

Unfortunately, although you have given us a summary of the accountings for the January and February 1968 TCA advances of $500. - each, we still find no record of the detail of these accountings in our files.

Please review the attached and discuss with myself or John Trask at your convenience.

201-253203

ICAP CORPORATION

HENRY P. LOPEZ

	Advances	Total Trip Expense	Additional Payment
uary 2, 1967	$ 500.00		
June 22, 1967 (via TCA)	1,200.00		
September 8, 1967 Trip to Puerto Rico February 13 to 17, 1967	(500.00)	$ 509.75	$9.75
September 30, 1967 Trip to Washington, D.C. June 21 and 22, 1967	(39.45)	39.45	
Trip to Madrid, Paris etc. June 25 to July 16, 1967	(458.83)	458.83	
Trip to Washington, D.C. August 5 and 6, 1967	(53.60)	53.60	
Trip to Washington, D.C. September 8, 1967	(80.60)	80.60	
Trip to Washington, D.C. September 12 and 13, 1967	(31.80)	31.80	
Trip to Boston, Mass. September 22 to 25, 1967	(99.88)	99.88	
October 2, 1967 Received from HPL	(435.84)		
Subtotal	$ -0-	$1,273.91	$9.75
October 16, 1967	500.00		
December 31, 1967 Trip to Mexico-Los Angeles-Texas October 17 to October 27, 1967	(447.93)	447.93	
June 14, 1968	75.00		
June 25, 1968	600.00		
September 11, 1968 Trip to Los Angeles July 1 to July 9, 1968	(452.92)	452.92	
Trip to Washington, D.C. July 9 to July 11 and August 6 and August 7, 1968	(94.22)	94.22	
BALANCE DUE ICAP	$ 179.93	$2,268.98	$9.75

ICAP CORPORATION

HENRY P. LOPEZ

TAIL OF BALANCE DUE ICAP

Remainder of October 16, 1967 Advance	$ 52.07
June 14, 1968 Advance	75.00
Remainder of June 25, 1968 Advance	52.86
	$179.93

TRAIN, [illegible]

HENRY P. LOPEZ

	Advances	Total Trip Expense	Additional Payment
January 9, 1968	$500.00		
February 21, 1968	500.00		
April 18, 1968 (via ICAP)	250.00		
June 13, 1968 Trip to Los Angeles April 17 to 21, 1968	(250.00)	$ 308.18	$124.08
August 20, 1968	50.00		
September 10, 1968 Trip to Cambridge, Mass. August 13 to 15, 1968	(44.38)	44.38	
Received from HPL	(5.62)		
September 30, 1968 Trip to Caracas, Venezuela January 1968	(474.00)	474.00	
Trip to Caracas, Venezuela February 1968	(537.00)	537.00	
BALANCE DUE HPL	($ 11.00)	$1,363.56	$124.08

DETAIL OF BALANCE DUE HPL

Remaining Balance of January 9, 1968 Advance	$26.00
Excess on February 1968 Caracas Trip Accounting over Advance	(37.00)
	($11.00)

VALENCIA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

HENRY P. LOPEZ

October 16, 1967 - Advance	$250.00
December 31, 1967 Trip to Mexico-Los Angeles-Mexico October 17 to October 27, 1967	(216.55)
BALANCE DUE DEVCO	$ 33.45

SECRET

19 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

SUBJECT : Project WUBRINY - Termination Settlement with Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. The undersigned on 12 September 1968 went to New York to effect a termination settlement with Edward G. TICHBORN (P). A hotel room at the Shoreham Hotel, 33 West 55th Street, was obtained for a meeting place. There were two principal aspects to the settlement:

a. secure TICHBORN's acceptance of an amendment to his contract providing for a one-time lump sum taxable payment of $3311.00 and releasing the U. S. Government from any further claim and,

b. insure that TICHBORN had, as of 31 August 1968, administratively severed his relationship with WUSALINE, particularly that his accountings for expenses incurred in 1968 were submitted, recorded by WUSALINE, and certified correct and proper by both TICHBORN and WUBRINY/11.

2. The first part of the settlement went smoothly. TICHBORN on 12 September 1968 readily accepted the amendment to his basic contract. He brought along for the Covert Tax Unit a copy of his 1966 income tax return which the undersigned had stipulated as a requirement for settlement. He was given his one-time lump sum taxable payment of $3311 in two checks ($2833.62 and $477.38) drawn on a DO proprietary company (WUTACTIC) which will issue TICHBORN a Form 1099 for income tax filing. He readily endorsed and gave to the undersigned the check for $477.38 in settlement of the amount he owed WH Division from his tour in Mexico City.

3. Through no fault of TICHBORN, the administrative severance from WUSALINE did not go as smoothly. In spite of several requests by both TICHBORN and the undersigned,

SECRET

201-253203

WUBRINY/11 did not have ready a list of expenses incurred by TICHBORN in 1968 for checking by the undersigned and certification by TICHBORN and WUBRINY/11. WUBRINY/11 telephoned to say that his accountant was unable to locate some of TICHBORN's accountings. The undersigned then requested WUBRINY/11 to join him and TICHBORN. The undersigned had a partial list of TICHBORN's expenses previously submitted by WUBRINY/11. The undersigned enjoined TICHBORN and WUBRINY/11 to prepare a complete list of expenses for 1968. TICHBORN was asked to record the purpose of each expense. The undersigned emphasized in WUBRINY/11's presence that TICHBORN should ensure that no expenses chargeable to WUBRINY/1's private firm were charged to WUSALINE. Both TICHBORN and WUBRINY/11 were reminded that all expenses on the Venezuela project were chargeable to WUBRINY/1's private firm as well as one-half of the expenses on the Mexican Border project. TICHBORN said that he would get all of the accountings from WUBRINY/11's comptroller to determine which, if any, accountings were missing and, as requested, to note the purpose of the expenses. It was agreed to meet the following morning of September 13, 1968 on this matter.

4. On the morning of September 13, 1968, TICHBORN telephoned the undersigned to say that he was able from his records to supply the missing data. He also said that notations on the records obtained from the comptroller showed that he had, in fact, submitted the accountings that were missing. TICHBORN concluded from this that WUBRINY/1's private firm had lost the missing accountings. TICHBORN also said that a few of the charges on the partial list of expenses which the undersigned had given him to review should have been charged to WUBRINY/1's private firm. The undersigned then requested TICHBORN and WUBRINY/11 to meet with him at noon so that the undersigned could review the accountings and obtain certifications from TICHBORN and WUBRINY/11. Both agreed to the meeting. Subsequently, TICHBORN telephoned to say that he and WUBRINY/11 were all set to come to the undersigned's hotel when the unwitting comptroller took all the financial statements to review them again. TICHBORN and WUBRINY/11 were in no position to retain the statements and thus could not meet as scheduled. Both TICHBORN and WUBRINY/11 agreed that the accountings were now in order. The undersigned again informed TICHBORN and WUBRINY/11 by phone that each must certify that the expenses were proper charges to WUSALINE. WUBRINY/11 was instructed to mail the list to the undersigned as soon as possible.

5. Certain other administrative matters were taken up with TICHBORN and WUBRINY/11 during the afternoon of 12 September 1968. The undersigned secured agreement from TICHBORN and WUBRINY/11 that TICHBORN's services on WUBRINY/1's Venezuela project were as great as any other officer who worked on it and that, therefore, WUSALINE should receive for TICHBORN's services on this project compensation at least equal to that given any officer in WUBRINY/1's private firm. The undersigned obtained from TICHBORN the two credit cards (American Express and Pan American air travel card) issued to him under WUSALINE sponsorship. The undersigned asked TICHBORN if he had charged any expenses under these cards since 31 August 1968. TICHBORN said that he had entertained a movie producer who visited him as an outgrowth of his trip to California to develop a movie adjunct to his cover. For this reason, TICHBORN opined that the Agency should pay for the expense. The undersigned said that TICHBORN was not authorized to incur any further expenses after 31 August 1968. TICHBORN then readily agreed to pay the expense.

6. There is a possibility that WH Division may want TICHBORN to take an operational TDY in Chile. TICHBORN was alerted to this possibility. He expressed interest in the assignment, but pointed out that he now has to get a job and that, consequently, his availability will depend upon his job situation.

7. TICHBORN was extremely friendly and cooperative and the settlement was amicably effected.

Gale W. Allen

Gale W. Allen
DO/CO/C

GWA/ekw

Orig - TICHBORN file
1 - C/DOCO, DC/DO, C/DO
1 - WUBRINY chrono

Tichborn 201

SECRET

9 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT: Project WUTACTIC - Funding Through WUGAMP

1. On Monday afternoon, the undersigned was requested by Mr. Gale Allen, DO/CO, to provide a mechanism for funding $3,311.00 to an Agent he was terminating (Edward G. TICHBORN (P). Mr. Allen is traveling to New York on Thursday, 12 September 1968 and would like to pay the termination bonus to TICHBORN at that time. Prior to our discussion, Mr. Allen had arranged for the funds to be paid by sterile check, However, Mr. Randall, DO/BF, suggested that he consult DO/CM for a funding mechanism in order to insure proper tax reporting by TICHBORN.

2. Mr. Allen explained to the undersigned that TICHBORN had been employed, until his termination, by one of the Project WUBRINY entities. Apparently, there is an unwitting Comptroller in the WUBRINY entity and there was no reasonable story that could be offered to explain the $3,311.00 termination bonus. Therefore, it is necessary to use another entity that can provide a Form 1099 for tax purposes.

3. Since WUGAMP has sufficient funds in its bank account to manage a $3,311.00 disbursement, it was decided to utilize this company. Mr. Allen was advised to stop the sterile check process and to have the $3,311.00 voucher approved and forwarded to DO/CM for payment instructions. At that time, the undersigned will prepare a Request for Advance of Funds (WUTACTIC) in the amount of $689.00 and Payment Instructions for $4,000.00 ($3,311.00 plus $689.00). This procedure is being followed in order that WUGAMP can show a slight profit as well as to prevent the exact same amount of money being received and disbursed.

SECRET

201-253203

4. GOODBEE was advised of the above and will have the funds ready for Mr. Allen on Thursday morning for his pick up. GOODBEE was also provided TICHBORN's address and Social Security Number for the preparation of the Form 1099.

Donald G. Lemieux

Donald G. Lemieux
DO/CM

1. As [illegible] information is forwarded [illegible] concerning the suitability of [illegible]

[illegible] is a [illegible] contract agent [illegible] for nearly ten years [illegible] has been a writer, political [illegible] practicing attorney, [illegible] the [illegible] case officer [illegible] as intellectual [illegible] to penetrate [illegible] intelligence collection purposes.

[illegible] creditably performed [illegible] the [illegible] area and has been [illegible] as a political [illegible] in conjunction with [illegible] being released [illegible] activities [illegible] in connection with the [illegible] his contract [illegible] languages [illegible] during the past [illegible] interested in [illegible] at a later time, we will contact [illegible] would be available.

[illegible] is a [illegible] contract agent [illegible] fluently. Born in Vienna in [illegible], he received a doctorate in philosophy from the [illegible] and for the past [illegible]

[illegible] September 196[illegible]

DESENSITIZED

nine years he served as the Paris-based correspondent for several Brazilian publications. He was recruited in 1959 and has successfully performed difficult operational tasks in Red China, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, Brazil and the USSR. WUINDIGO/1, who projects himself as a left-wing correspondent, is the representative of Italian, Swiss and Canadian publications, and is currently in contact with a number of U.N. representatives. He is available for temporary foreign assignments and is fluent in Spanish, Portuguese, German, French and English. WUINDIGO/1 is a reliable, productive intelligence agent who is skilled in eliciting information and in spotting and assessing targets of interest.

c. ALABUCO/1 (Identity C) who is now second in command of the ministry mentioned in Reference B and has become extremely busy during the past year overseeing all administrative work in the ministry. Although he still has wide press contacts and fairly good entree to leading members of the government party, his recent promotion has been greatly limited and his present capabilities now lie in the political action field. It is doubtful that he would undertake [illegible] in Chile.

3. It appears that TICHBORN and WUINDIGO/1 would be the most desirable candidates.

Sylvia B. [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - COS, Santiago

Attachment:
Identity, u/s/c

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

SECRET RYBAT

S E C R E T

Under Separate Cover Attachment To:

HCSB-7409

8 September 1968

IDENTITIES:

A. Henry P. LOPEZ

B. Louis H. [illegible]

C. Antonio F. PORTO Sobrinho

S E C R E T

SECRET RYBAT SENSITIVE

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
AC/DO
Rm. 3-C-19 Hqs.

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/DO/COG Rm. 210 - Key Bldg.				FYI
2.				
3. Mr Allen	19 AUG 1968			
4.				2833.34 477.38
5.				
6.				3310.72
7.				Tichborn 201
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				12 Aug 68 201-253203

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

12 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH: Assistant for Non-Staff Personnel

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (P) - Contract Agent

1. Subject has been given 30 days notice as provided in his contract, to the effect that his contract will be terminated 31 August 1968.

2. Subject was initially employed in 1959 and was transferred to DO Division in July of 1967 from the WH Division. In the course of discussing the termination of his services, subject stated that during his tenure with the WH Division, he had been promised certain bonuses upon termination of his Agency service. The WH Division has agreed to a termination payment of $3,310.72 which represents two months' salary of a per annum salary of $17,000 plus $477.38 in settlement of his accounting which is nontaxable.

3. In addition it is requested that the following statement be included in the amendment:

> You release and forever discharge the United States Government and any Agency, Department or Instrumentality thereof and its agents, officers, employees and representatives from any and all claims, demands and liabilities in any form or by any party whatsoever throughout the World arising from services performed by you for the United States Government under said contract.

4. Attached is signed Notice of Termination in duplicate.

(Signed) W. T. Montgomery
W. T. MONTGOMERY
Chief, DO Support Group

Attachment:
as stated

201 253203

Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee, 1-Asst for Non-Staff Pers., 1-DO/PERS
1-WH/BF, 3-DO/SG DC/DO/SG:jm
1-DO/CO/Allen

Given to -/1B
by Gail Allon (DODS)
on 18 July 68

MEMO TO : AG

FROM : LH ([redacted]) TICHBORN

IN RE : Meetings with MT re Spain

I had several long conversations with FAZZARI MT regarding various aspects of potential assignment in Spain:

a) long confab over two drinks after our joint session Wednesday afternoon;

b) shorter talk on plane ride to New York;

c) extended conversation on Thursday evening, when we had dinner with our respective spouses - 6:30 PM to 2:00 AM.

Our many hours together (with and without our wives) produced two principal conclusions:

1. Reinforced my wife's objections to moving to Spain, also convincing me that it would be prejudicial for my children.
2. Convinced me that, even if there were no family objections to moving, it would be unwise to establish permanent residence in Spain because of the security risks involved therein. Both MT and I feel that several in-and-out trips would accomplish our purposes without running the risk of appearing implausible in that traditionally-suspicious country.

A. Family objections to moving:

1. Health hazards - My wife's fears about hepatitis and other diseases (originally aroused by Mike's casual reference to same) were ~~somewhat~~ reinforced by MT and wife's pointed cautions about food and water.

2. Negative effect on my children - When my wife explained Greg's school difficulties since moving from Mexico (he failed three subjects last semester and is attending summer school), both MT and wife flatly said that it would be risky and perhaps permanently-damaging to move him once again. Mrs. T, who is a professional guidance counselor for children, fully agreed with the child psychologist who has advised us against moving Greg out of the United States at this time. Having fallen behind in his reading skills while in Mexico (i.e., in relation to U.S. standards), he's now suffering certain psychological setbacks that are related to his scholastic difficulties.

B. Security risks of projected cover:

Even if there were no family objections to our moving to Spain, my conversations with MT have convinced me that our present "cover arrangements" will not support permanent residence in Spain.

intel services

As I had previously surmised, MT says that Spain is an inordinately suspicious country - that almost everyone suspects all foreigners of some ties with foreign banks. He himself was frequently told to his face that he was a bank employee, and he told us that at our two meetings last Tuesday and Wednesday. He says that government officials and the kind of higher-up business tycoons we're shooting for (he saw our list) are almost pathological in their suspicions.

> MT : "You're going to have to live like a rich man to have access to those people, and no rich man would move to Spain with his family unless he had already established the kind of business activity that would pay him enough to warrant such a move. Mere prospecting for business opportunities might draw such a man for short look-around visits, but he would look pretty foolish moving his whole family just to 'prospect.' Those sharp-nosed Spanish industrialists would smell you out within a few months, perhaps a few weeks."

MT agrees with all of us that the movie cover offers the best and least-expensive chance for penetration, but here again he argues against establishing perman residence:

> "My father and brother (president of Associated Distributors of Spanish-Speaking Films) have been in motion pictures all their lives, and I know from my peripheral exposure to the business that no producer would establish permanent residence unless he's actually filming a big picture. Until he actually starts shooting, the producer flits in and out of the country, rushing back to Hollywood or New York to work on other picture deals. Movie people are expected to be jet-setty; they don't travel with their goddamned families, certainly not kids. As a "bachelor" producer with a temporary suite at the Hilton or Ritz, where you could invite Mr. Tycoon to mingle with starlets and models, you could be quite plausible as a guy who's still looking for the right picture deal to jell (perhaps for a couple of years)......."

In view of our previous inactive relationship with our Iberian associate (and Mike's continued skepticism), I frankly agree with MT's reservations about establishing permanent residence while in the "prospecting stage." The over-all prospects and utility of PACI [illegible] (also TCA) could be compromised by an implausible cover at any stage.

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
SD/3/OSD ROOM G-E-73		DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief DODS attn Janice Wright [illegible] A Key	1 July 68			
2.				
3. Library				
4. [redacted]				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-253203

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

28 JUN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief DODS

ATTENTION : James Wright

SUBJECT : LETTER ADDRESS
306 512

1. With reference to your verbal request of 14 June 1968 the following action was taken concerning facility

Post Office Box 432, Church Street Station, New York City, New York

________ Cancelled

____X____ Added as co-addressee

Enrico Cortez

________ Deleted as coaddressee

2. Any inquiries concerning the above action should be directed to the Special Facilities Desk of this Office, Room GE 73, Headquarters, extension 6851.

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

Tichborn Greenlist
requested # 189405
on 26/June/88.

201-253203

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY Y PER

ACTION EUR 6 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE VR. OP2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2	E/IBS	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 251314Z JUN 68 CITE MADR[illegible] 5[illegible] 2[illegible] JU[illegible] [illegible]3C

ACTION

DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 09586

ESTIMATE IMPORT DUTY AT $1,500. IN ADDITION THERE WILL BE 22 1/2 PER CENT LUXURY TAX ASSESSED ON VEHICLE BASED ON VALUE APPRAISED BY SPANISH CUSTOMS. SUGGEST PROJECT ESTIMATE OF $2,000. TO COVER ALL IMPORT COSTS.

S E C R E T

BT

Tickbous

SECRET

201-253203

File Tichborn Spain

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

Secret

ORIG: Christopher Costanzo
UNIT: E/IB/S
EXT: 1564
DATE: 24 June 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3	DC/C/[illegible]	8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 4A PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: Eur 6 ☐ RID COPY

DISSEM: FILE , VR . CCS 2, CSPS, DO 4

MPS/BG 2, CI/OA OP 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 24 22 42 Z JUN 68 CITE DIRECTOR 10834

TO MADRID

QUHELP

REF: A. DIRECTOR 09712

B. MADRID 5263 (IN 36208)

1. SYMPATHIZE WITH FAZZARE DESIRE CONSUMMATE PERSONAL PLANS OUTLINED REF B AND WE WILLING HE TDY AT HQS AT END OF TWO WEEK VACATION WITH WIFE IN NEW YORK AREA. THIS WAY NO BREAK PERSONAL PLANS. NO NEED COVER SUDDEN BREAK WITH FRIENDS AND NO NEED EXTRA EXPENSE LATER ROUND TRIP. WILL DETERMINE TICHBORN AVAILABILITY 15 16 17 JULY.

2. DO NOT SEE HOW FAZZARE'S FUTURE PLANS WITH WOFIRM (ENTERTAINING VISITING SPANIARDS IN WOLADY AND PERIODIC VISITS LOCAL WOPLAY OFFICE) REQUIRE INVOLVED FAMILY DISCUSSIONS OR ARRANGEMENTS WITH EMPLOYER. POINT REMAINS FAZZARE NOW FORMALLY TERMINATING CONTRACT AND WE ANXIOUS END HIS DISAPPOINTINGLY SHORT TOUR WITH MINIMUM EXPENSE.

/CONTINUED/

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER S E C R E T GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

201-253203

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 22 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 15 PER

ACTION Eur 6 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR. CCS2, CSPS, DO4, MPS/OG 2, CI/OA

6 Mr Allen

OP 2

S E C R E T 211805Z JUN 68 CITE MADRID 5263

22 Jun 68 IN 36208

DIRECTOR

QUHELP

REF: DIRECTOR 09712

1. FAZZARE HAD ORIGINALLY EXPECTED BRING FAMILY MADRID, WITH TENTATIVE IDEA RENEWING CONTRACT AT END OF YEAR. DUE FAMILY COMPLICATIONS (BUSINESS AFFAIRS OF HIS AGED FATHER-IN-LAW, HEALTH HIS AGED MOTHER AND AUNT), HOWEVER, HIS WIFE FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE LEAVE HOME CITY. HE HAS THEREFORE NOT SEEN WIFE FOR A YEAR, FOR REASONS OF WOFIRM CONVENIENCE AND NOT HIS OWN. HE HAS PROMISED WIFE THEY WILL HAVE UNBROKEN TWO WEEKS VACATION NEW YORK FROM MOMENT HIS PLANE LANDS. SHE HAS THEREFORE MADE ENGAGEMENTS FOR BOTH WITH FAMILY FRIENDS IN NEW YORK AND CONNECTICUT AND EXPECTS FAZZARE RETURN HOME WITH HER THEREAFTER.

2. MORE IMPORTANT, HIS COVER OFFERS NO PLAUSIBLE REASON HE COULD GIVE THE FRIENDS WITH WHOM HIS WIFE HAS MADE ENGAGEMENTS, IF HE SHOULD SUDDENLY BREAK FIRM PLANS AND GO TO WASHINGTON FOR THREE DAYS.

3. FAZZARE CAN MAKE NO SOLID PLANS WITH WOFIRM UNTIL HE HAS TALKED SERIOUSLY WITH WIFE AND TWO SONS AND CONSULTED HIS

SECRET

201-253203

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY: ________ PER ________ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MADRID 5263 SECRET

EMPLOYER IN HOME CITY. UNTIL HE HAS OPPORTUNITY HOLD THESE DISCUSSIONS HE WOULD THEREFORE BE UNABLE CONDUCT ANY MEANINGFUL OPERATIONAL DISCUSSIONS AT HQS. THEREFORE ISSUES RAISED OSMW-11012 COULD NOT BE RESOLVED UNTIL FAZZARE DISCUSSES FUTURE WITH FAMILY AND EMPLOYER.

4. STATION CONSIDERS FAZZARE USE OF MUCH IMPORTANCE IN COMING YEARS. TICHBORN WILL BE ABLE REPLACE HIM IN SOME AREAS AND PICK UP SOME OF HIS CONTACTS BUT FACT REMAINS FAZZARE HAS UNIQUE ACCESS CERTAIN TARGETS. STATION EXPECTS TICHBORN TO BECOME VALUABLE COMPLEMENT TO FAZZARE OPERATION AND OPEN GROUND FAZZARE CANNOT, BUT HE WILL NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE. THIS SHOULD BE BORN IN MIND WHEN TICHBORN AND FAZZARE MEET.

5. ON REF PARA 3, STATION HAS NO COPY FAZZARE CONTRACT. IF TERMINATION STATEMENT NEEDED IN SOME OTHER FORM THAN OFFICIAL REPORT OF DECISION TO TERMINATE AS IN OSMA 23801 OF 30 APRIL 1968, PLEASE ADVISE AS TO FORM AND PHRASING.

6. REQUEST APPROVAL TRAVEL AS IN REF PARA 1 BUT REPLACING TDY STOPOVER WASHINGTON WITH ROUND TRIP CALIFORNIA WASHINGTON ON TDY IN AUGUST.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

21 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

SUBJECT : Project WUBRINY - Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. At the request of Chief, DO/COG, the WOFIRM medical staff arranged for TICHBORN to be examined by a specialist in back disorders to check the nature of TICHBORN's back problem. TICHBORN had earlier injured his back when a bench on which he was sitting in the laundry room of his apartment collapsed. Since his injury, TICHBORN has, of course, been under the care of a doctor in New York. A back brace and physical therapy exercises have led to considerable improvement. However, in view of plans for TICHBORN's PCS assignment to Spain, a check by an independent specialist was deemed advisable.

2. TICHBORN's appointment was with Dr. Henry L. Feffer, 2520 L St. N.W., Washington, D.C. at 1115 hours on 19 June 1968. TICHBORN used the alias of Enrique Cortez with a New York post-office address supplied by the Office of Security, to wit:

P. O. Box 432
Church Street Station
New York, N. Y. 10008

He paid the bill of $38.50 upon leaving. The receptionist asked the name of TICHBORN's doctor and where the report should be sent. TICHBORN gave a fictitious name and address of a doctor in New York and said that Dr. Feffer knew where to send the report. (The report will be sent to Dr. Borscherding of the WOFIRM Medical Staff who will call C/DO/COG.)

3. At a luncheon meeting at Fort Myer after the examination, TICHBORN informed Chief, DO/COG and the undersigned that Dr. Feffer had been more positive than TICHBORN's doctor in New York that TICHBORN does not have a ruptured disc. Dr. Feffer recommended physical therapy

SECRET

201-253203

exercises varying somewhat from those prescribed by TICHBORN's New York doctor. TICHBORN said that his back pains him toward the end of the day. Dr. Feffer opined that this condition should be cleared up within three months.

4. TICHBORN appeared to be in excellent spirits at the luncheon. He was very enthusiastic about movie deals as a substantial part of his cover arrangements. He obviously is at home in this field and believes it will give excellent access to operation targets in Spain. TICHBORN has contacts in the U. S. movie industry, one of whom is a friend interested in making a movie in Spain. TICHBORN plans to meet this friend and other contacts in Los Angeles the first week of July.

5. At the request of EUR/IB/Spain, the undersigned asked TICHBORN to be available in Washington, D. C. during the period 8-10 July 1968 to meet the contract agent whom TICHBORN will be replacing in Spain. TICHBORN agreed to do so and also to stay loose later in July for conversation with the Deputy Chief of Station, Madrid.

6. The undersigned informed TICHBORN that from the cover point of view, it would be desirable for TICHBORN, enroute to Spain, to view the operation of WUBRINY/E in Greece. While there, we would like TICHBORN to assess a Greek whom WUBRINY/1 considers to have good operational potential.

7. TICHBORN said that he has not received a reply from the IRS to his request for a copy of his 1966 income tax return (requested by C/DO/Pers). TICHBORN said that he is, therefore, writing another letter.

Gale W. Allen
Gale W. Allen
DO/C

CC: TICHBORN file
WUBRINY/Ops
chrono

14-00000

ORIG: Christopher D. Costanzo
UNIT: E/IB/S
EXT: 6689/1564
DATE: 19 June 1968

TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

MO

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	CHRIS
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 46 PER ______ #

CONF: CURB

☑ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-253203

INFO: FILE VR, 022

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 09586

TO MADRID

19 23 12z JUN 68

NEED ASAP FOR TICHBORN PROJECT ESTIMATE IMPORT DUTY INTO SPAIN FOR HIS POV WHICH 1965 FORD STATION WAGON.

END OF MESSAGE

E/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AC/E/IB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201253203

14 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SD/3/OSD

SUBJECT : Enrico CORTEZ (A)

1. As discussed with Mr. Gilbert of your office on 14 June 1968, it is requested that this above named Subject be added to:

P. O. Box 432
Church Street Station
New York, New York 10008

2. The individual involved is a covert asset of this Division who will possibly need the address to give to an uncleared medical specialist in the D.C. area when Subject undergoes treatment on 19 June 1968. Should he not have to provide the address, you will be advised to terminate further interest. If he has to give it, we will want daily service through August 1968 with any mail received forwarded to the undersigned.

James F. Wright
Chief, DO/Security

cc: Mr. Gale Allen

201-253203

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

10 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EUR/IB/Spain

SUBJECT : Project WUBRINY - Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. Forwarded herewith is the revised proposal from WUBRINY/1 to Edward G. TICHBORN (P) covering the latter's assignment to Spain. It differs from the original in that the journalistic feature is dropped in favor of strictly commercial endeavors. Added is the possibility of developing a movie deal for submission to investors.

2. TICHBORN had two meetings with QUSALT/1, both of which went well from the cover point of view. The first meeting involved TICHBORN and QUSALT/1, while TICHBORN brought his wife for the second in which QUSALT/1 was wined and dined. TICHBORN said that QUSALT/1 is all in favor of TICHBORN's proposed assignment. However, in view of past WUSALINE/Iberia inactivity, QUSALT/1 has an attitude of "I will believe it when I see it." QUSALT/1 was particularly intrigued with the possibility of a movie deal and said that Spain is by far the cheapest place to make movies.

3. The one disquieting feature of the meetings with QUSALT/1 concerned TICHBORN's wife. She took the occasion to query QUSALT/1 on all aspects of living in Spain. All went well until the subject of health came up. QUSALT/1 commented that everyone should expect to get hepatitis and said that he had a severe case. This comment shook TICHBORN's wife whose best friend in Mexico caught hepatitis and whose children subsequently got it.

4. The undersigned specifically asked TICHBORN if his wife's concern with hepatitis posed the possibility of a refusal to accompany him. TICHBORN said that he thought not, but that he was going to drop the matter for a week. The undersigned stressed to TICHBORN that the Agency views his assignment as very important as

SECRET

[illegible]

201-253203

evidenced by the favorable terms offered him. We have done considerable staff work on his assignment and don't have another suitable candidate immediately available. Should TICHBORN not be able to go to Spain, it would be a severe blow. TICHBORN said that he appreciates our position and did not see any reason to worry. The undersigned said that we are preparing a contract for TICHBORN and would like to make it for at least three years. TICHBORN agreed, saying that he too prefers a long-term contract.

Gale W. Allen

Gale W. Allen
DO/C

GWA/ekw

Distribution:

Orig - Adse
1 - C/DOCO, DC/DO, C/DS
1 - TICHBORN file
1 - chrono

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY 7 PER ______

ACTION
ENR 8 ☑ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE VR. c, ci/ops ci/oa wh 8

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

FI

SECRET 101612Z JUN 68 CITE MADRID 5153

DIRECTOR

10 JUN 68 IN 27980

S

QUHELP

REF: OSMW 11812

1. BELIEVE TICHBORN IS LOGICAL CHOICE TO MEET AND DEVELOP SELECTED INDIVIDUALS NOW UNDER CULTIVATION BY FAZZARE. BOTH TICHBORN AND FAZZARE ARE INTERESTED IN PROBLEMS OF LATIN AMERICANS LIVING IN AMERICA. BOTH ALSO INTERESTED AND KNOWLEDGEABLE SPANISH LITERATURE.

2. SUGGEST WE CONTRIVE MEETING THIS SUMMER OF FAZZARE AND TICHBORN IN NEW YORK OR CALIFORNIA FOR PURPOSE (A) EXCHANGING IDEAS RE OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES SPAIN AND (B) ARRANGING HOW TICHBORN CAN PICK UP SELECTED FAZZARE CONTACTS WITHOUT IMPEDING FAZZARE'S FUTURE USEFULNESS TO WOFIRM IN SPAIN.

3. ADVISE IF CAN BEGIN PLAN TOWARD SUCH MEETING. 11 JUN

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-253203

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 6 June 1968 ejp

C NO.: 201-253203

SUBJECT: LOPEZ, Henry P.

TO: E/IB, Richard Long

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA Edward P. Brown

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐ PRQ I
☐ PRQ II
☐ FIELD TRACES
☐ RI TRACES
☐ OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES
☐ RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☐ GREEN LIST

☐ REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐ REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐ OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

This will acknowledge receipt of your memorandum (dated 3 June 1968) requesting amendment to Subject's OA.

Before the OA may be amended, all Field and Headquarters traces (including Green List) must be brought up to date.

It is also requested that you bring bio data up to date from 1965.

201-253203

(20)

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

3 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

VIA: C/DO/CO

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (P), 201-253203
Amendment of OA

1. European Division, with the cooperation of Domestic Operations Division, plans to assign Edward G. TICHBORN to Madrid, Spain under deep cover on a PCS basis in late summer of 1968.

2. Since October 1966, TICHBORN [redacted] DO Division, working [illegible] as a legal [illegible] proprietary WUSALINE in [redacted] and early July [redacted] sent TICHBORN TDY to Madrid to [redacted] access to priority targets in Spain which might be provided by the WUSALINE Spanish affiliate, WUSALINE/Iberia. The results of this trip indicated that such access did exist and could be exploited by the assignment of a qualified officer as the WUSALINE representative in WUSALINE/Iberia. This assignment was offered to TICHBORN in the summer of 1967 but he was unable to accept it for personal reasons at that time. TICHBORN is now available for the assignment and we hope to place him in Madrid by September 1968.

3. TICHBORN's new assignment will involve the following operational duties:

a. To identify, cultivate, and acquire intelligence from those individuals and groups within Spain who now play, and can be expected to play in the post-Franco period, a significant role in determining Spanish domestic and foreign policy.

b. To spot and assess individuals within the above group for possible recruitment by other Station assets.

SECRET

201-253203

4. It is not anticipated that TICHBORN himself will attempt recruitments nor that he will be required to break his cover. Contact with the Madrid Station will be maintained under secure conditions at all times.

5. Upon his assignment to Spain, TICHBORN will fall under the operational and administrative control of Europe Division. DO Division will provide cover support. He will be supported under Project QUBLOOM.

6. [illegible] quested that Subject's OA be amended to [illegible] the above assignment.

William Sorrels
AC/E/IB

Coordinated:

C/DO/CO

(Date)

[illegible]ution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/DO/CO
1 - 201-253203
1 - E/IB MemoChron

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Gale Allen, DO/C
210-A Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 3689

NO.

DATE 22 May 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. EUR/IB/S/Dick Long 4 B 2607				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-253203

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

22 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

SUBJECT : Project WUBRINY - Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. The undersigned met with TICHBORN at 1630 hours on 19 May 1968 at the undersigned's room in the Shoreham Hotel, 33 West 55th Street, New York City. TICHBORN was still suffering from an injured disc and either stood or lay down on the bed during the course of the meeting. He said that he had been fitted for a back harness which he would get the following day. If his back did not improve with the harness, going into traction would be necessary. TICHBORN said that his back injury occurred when a bench on which he was sitting in the laundry room of his apartment collapsed. He said that he is meeting with a representative of the insurance company with which his apartment owner is insured to seek compensation. He had previously asked for and was mailed a list of benefits under his Agency hospitalization policy. TICHBORN can sit down, but once sitting, it is very painful for him to get up.

2. Per agreement with Chief, EUR/I/Spain, the undersigned offered TICHBORN a fee of $25,000 out of which TICHBORN will have to pay his own housing and educational expenses. Inasmuch as the normal housing allowance for Spain is $3,680.00 a year and the educational allowance for two children $1,120.00 or higher, the offer to TICHBORN amounts to a $20,000 base salary. TICHBORN was informed that additional benefits outside his basic fee would include:

a. Round-trip transportation less than first-class for him and his family to Spain and return to New York,

b. Cost of shipping and storage of household effects,

c. Temporary lodging allowance of $9 per day per adult and children over 11 up to 90 days with an additional $5 per day per child if the lodging has no kitchen facilities (TICHBORN has two children, a boy age 13 and a girl age 11).

SECRET

d. Transportation allowance of $50 per month,

e. Operational expenses

TICHBORN is satisfied with his basic fee, commenting that [illegible] is [illegible] better than Mexico. He then added that money doesn't mean as much to him as it did, because his agent thinks that TICHBORN's book will be a good seller and earn a lot of money. TICHBORN opined that the temporary lodging and transportation allowances are low. The undersigned pointed out that these allowances are applicable to staff employees and that they have been found adequate.

3. The undersigned noted that TICHBORN, by virtue of his association with WUSALINE and WUSALIFY and his 1967 trip to Spain, is in an excellent cover position for this assignment. He has also had the opportunity to meet the Agency representative in Madrid with whom he will be dealing. The undersigned gave TICHBORN a copy of WUBRINY/1's letter outlining TICHBORN's cover assignment (unamended copy attached). The undersigned noted that the senior officer of the firm participating with WUSALINE in WUSALINE/Iberia in late 1966 had suggested that a developer of new business be obtained. This overture was followed by TICHBORN's exploratory trip in June 1967. Subsequently, a WUSALIFY company for which TICHBORN is a legal consultant, followed up on TICHBORN's trip by sending a geologist to assess several abandoned silver properties. In this way, the stage should be well set for TICHBORN as outlined in the cover letter prepared by WUBRINY/1.

4. At 1800 hours, WUBRINY/1 and WUBRINY/11 joined the meeting to discuss cover arrangements. The undersigned emphasized that the arrangement would not only have to be plausible, but, in due course, there would have to be commercial results. TICHBORN was also emphatic on this point. He suggested that the cover letter also include the possibility of putting together a movie deal. TICHBORN said that he is thoroughly at home in the movie field and finds it a good access to targets of operational interest. WUBRINY/1 seized eagerly upon TICHBORN's suggestion, stating that he had always wanted to finance a movie deal. WUBRINY/1 said that he

would amend the cover letter to include this possibility. Both the undersigned and WUBRINY/1 stressed the importance of TICHBORN's obtaining U. S. clients to represent in Spain. Some further training for TICHBORN was recommended by WUBRINY/1, including visits to certain WUSALINE affiliates. The undersigned concurred, stating that a visit to WUSALINE's affiliate in Greece would be particularly useful because TICHBORN might also do an assessment there on a Greek associated with WUSALINE's affiliate.

5. WUBRINY/1 said that QUSALT/1 is coming to the U. S. the third or fourth week in May 1968. It was agreed that WUBRINY/1 and TICHBORN would gear up to get QUSALT/1's endorsement of TICHBORN developing business for WUSALINE/Iberia.

6. Both TICHBORN and the undersigned informed WUBRINY/1 that employment terms have been agreed upon and opined that these terms might be more liberal than WUBRINY/1 would privately extend. The undersigned said that the Agency would embody TICHBORN's employment terms in a contract from which commercial terms could be drawn. The undersigned added that all of the funding of TICHBORN would not necessarily have to be accomplished through WUBRINY/1.

7. TICHBORN owes the Agency $199.99 on an old loan. TICHBORN promised faithfully to send the undersigned a check in this amount prior to 31 May 1968.

8. The Covert Tax Unit desires a certified copy of TICHBORN's income tax filing for 1966. TICHBORN said that he had been unable to locate one and had asked the IRS for a copy.

9. TICHBORN's wife is concerned about schools in Spain. The undersigned gave TICHBORN information on schools in Spain as obtained from EUR/I/Spain and from a friend who spent three years in Spain.

10. TICHBORN said that he would like to go alone to Spain in August so as to be able to make arrangements in advance for his family.

11. An amended cover letter is awaited from WUBRINY/1 as well as QJSALT/1's response to TICHBORN's assignment.

Gale W. Allen
Gale W. Allen
DO/C

1 - EUR/IB/S/Dick Long
1 - C/DOCO
1 - TICHBORN file
1 - chrono

ICAP CORPORATION
375 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022

PLAZA [illegible]
CABLES [illegible]

CAPITAL FOR DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL CONSULTANTS

May 15, 1968

Henry P. Lopez, Esq.
5900 Arlington Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Henry,

I have carefully considered your most interesting idea of activating our relationship in Madrid.

Your operations with us here have been entirely satisfactory from our standpoint, and indeed, the volume of client business that you have been able to develop exceeded our expectations. On the other hand you say that some of these clients will follow you to Spain, and it would appear that the market in Spain for consulting services is somewhat less competitive than is the case here, so the eventual prospects could be good.

As you may know, our operation in Athens, which has worked out extremely well (although it involved a lot of hard work and trouble) came about in just the same way: after a year or so in the office here George Economakis one day suggested that he might be able to start a similar operation in Athens, to which we eventually agreed; it has all grown from there, and has been a most satisfactory business.

In considering your idea I have thought of two categories into which your work might be divided: things which can be done through the medium of ICAP [illegible], which certainly needs [illegible] up, and things which can be done separately from it. [illegible] take up each category in turn.

1. [illegible] ICAP Iberia.

[illegible] formed the joint venture with BAYP, S.A., [illegible] the name of ICAP Iberia, the understanding was that [illegible] a serious long-term effort to get business for [illegible] systematic prospection on their behalf of [illegible] clients.

To date we have not found it possible to carry out

201-253203

this prospection owing to budgetary limitations and a lack of spare time. Also, the other ICAP offices abroad have been too busy with their own affairs to think too much about getting business for each other.

As you may know, part of the original idea was that George Train would carry out this representative function with the American business community, but in the event, he developed a close relation with a Spanish bank, and devoted most of his available time to their concerns.

BANIF has become restive as a result, and in fact yesterday I received a letter from them which raises the issue of winding up the arrangement.

The first activity, therefore, which I feel you could most advantageously carry out on our behalf in Spain would be that of seeking new business for ICAP Iberia. After an initial familiarization with the work of the office, I would suggest that you might call on the U.S. firms operating in Madrid and offer the services of ICAP Iberia. You can get a list of such firms through the Department of Commerce. There is also an American Club in Madrid (of which George Train was a founder) whose members would certainly be appropriate for such prospection.

After you have prospected the American business community, you could go on to the European firms operating in Spain, in the same way.

I doubt if ICAP Iberia has the time for such extensive prospection, so your work here would be valuable to them, I would think.

Another related area in which your services could be of help would be in helping in client relationships with U.S. clients that have begun working with ICAP Iberia or BANIF or are on the point of doing so.

To the extent that your existing Latin American or U.S. clients would need your services in Spain, you would naturally want to have prime responsibility for their affairs yourself. You would want to determine which of their needs could best be served by ICAP Iberia, using BANIF S.A. and other possible sources of support, and which you should handle separately or through New York.

As you know, ICAP Corporation and BANIF own approximately equal shares of ICAP Iberia. ICAP Iberia, in turn, gives first refusal on all consulting work to BANIF, but receives what amounts to a 30% override on such work. In other words, our indirect interest in consulting work which we get for BANIF through ICAP Iberia is 15%, which comes off the top.

We would be pleased to allocate to you a share in our interest in any such work brought in through your efforts (and recognized for fee purposes by ICAP Iberia and BANIF) as follows: 7½% (i.e., half of our indirect interest) of all fees during the first year after the actual commencement of billings for each client; 5% during the second year; and 2½% of all subsequent business.

Another sector where you could work directly with ICAP Iberia is related to the foregoing, and is simply U.S. law. To the extent that you could provide an in-house U.S. legal capability for them, particularly with respect to U.S. corporate practice and tax matters, I am sure this would be helpful.

Finally, correspondence is essential to international business. We do not hear from our Spanish friends as we do from George Economakis or Giovanni Manes. The result is that we do not know what is going on in Spain, and do not have them on our minds. I am sure that if you were there you would keep us informed of opportunities, and as a result we could do a more effective job for them. In addition, you could act as the point of liaison between ICAP Iberia and the other ICAP affiliates.

(This would of course involve your knowing the strengths and weaknesses of the other ICAPs, so as a first order of business I would request that you spend two or three weeks in ICAP Hellas, ICAP Italia and on a general prospection in France, Germany, and Benelux.)

2. Activities outside of ICAP Iberia.

By far the most important of these is generating a placement capability for investment opportunities developed by ICAP Iberia. I do not think we expected when we started ICAP Hellas that the most important figure in this company would be one who was not even on the masthead at that time, namely Tony Lykiardopulo. The really profitable side of our business is, as you know, the entrepreneurial one, not the professional one.

It is fine to have good ideas and to carry out thorough feasibility studies, but if you do not have a client who will go into these plans, they will not do you much good. Until Tony came along, ICAP Hellas did four or five studies a year for their own account, which they did not consummate. Now they seem to be in about the same position we are, which is that before we proceed with the full study we have sold the deal, and the study is mostly by way of documentation and background. Most investors come in on our say-so on the telephone, not in response to any documents. Tony has this power, and the others in ICAP Hellas, for some reason, generally do not. If you personally could carefully study every aspect of deals that BANIF might work up, and then present them to individuals whom we might suggest, there is a fair chance that we can do a real job of merchandising, which we can never do on writeups.

The second capability you might be able to develop for us outside the ICAP Iberia channels is related to the foregoing, namely to generate securities business for this office, just as Tony Lykiardopulo does. Our Special Account has the best performance record of any readily available investment medium that a foreigner is likely to see, and it has been getting better as time has gone on. It makes an excellent illustration of our capabilities in the investment management line. You would not be required to actually place our services with individual investors whom you might meet, but if you could identify them, and determine their needs in a preliminary way, on one of my periodic trips I could discuss our operation with them, and in the course of time there is little doubt that we would develop a slowly growing clientele. In addition, Tony Lykiardopulo can come to Madrid from time to time and maintain contact. Alternatively, you might eventually discover a customer's man in a brokerage house who would like to join us in the rather more elegant world of investment counsel, and we could make an arrangement directly with him.

You have spoken from time to time of your desire to increase the proportionate amount of time which you spend on creative writing and your interest in collaborating on a book on the "Establishment" in Spain, which in fact I agree with you is a fascinating subject that I have never seen well written up. Certainly, there is no case I know of where a quite tightly-knit aristocracy (or oligarchy) really runs things the way it does there. Anyway, making contact with some of the figures in that group could certainly tie in nicely with the various activities mentioned above.

Finally, of course, we have your existing clients and their various interests in Spain, to which you have referred. You would need to allocate your time between these various activities as at present, letting us know where we stood.

All in all, it adds up, in my opinion, to a workable package, with, I would say, perhaps even more upside potential than the arrangements under which we are operating in New York now.

After consultation with our directors, therefore, I am happy to tell you that we are willing, in principle, to go ahead with this plan, and to negotiate a detailed understanding at your convenience.

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: DO/COG/Allen

EXTENSION: 4135 4136

NO.

DATE: 5 April 58

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Chief/EUR/E/IB			
2. Mr Duffey 4 B 26 07			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

DON:
Herewith info on Tilton.
You know his performance
on the survey trip to Spain.
His main cover association
is as [illegible] on the [illegible] Exchange.
He is also associated with
land development project in
Venezuela. He also has [illegible]
as an author and as a lawyer.
Although his previous [illegible]
reveal an administrative
deficiency in financial reporting,
I have not had any such problem.
In fact, the auditors who recently
checked his financial reporting found
his reports detailed & fully
explained. He is a unique
asset for the Agency & I hope
we can get him for PCS [illegible].
Will let you know ~~[illegible]~~ when
this works or sooner if possible.

GA

201-253203

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

25 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DO

VIA : Chief, DO/CO

SUBJECT : Edward G. Tichborn (P)

1. The undersigned on 23 May 1967 reviewed in WH Division Tichborn's 201 file (4 folders) and related operational files. Particular attention was given in this review to Tichborn's security.

2. The files reflect that Tichborn is very security conscious. There is no evidence that Tichborn was ever suspected of being a WOFACT operative.

3. Tichborn practiced law in California and was active in state and national politics. He was recruited as a political advisor on a part-time basis in 1959 by the CA Staff. In 1962, he was taken on full-time under contract by WH Division and assigned to Mexico City. His cover for this assignment was publishing and movie interests in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America. In Mexico City he published a magazine, Dialogos aimed at left-wing intellectuals. The CI/OA staff review in 1965 stated that Tichborn's cover story was completely accepted by his friends and associates. The [illegible] of Tichborn in 1965 revealed that he had informed only his wife of his association with WOFACT.

4. The files reflect that Tichborn is very sensitive about security. He balked at working with a WOFACT officer in Mexico City, because a friend told Tichborn that the WOFACT officer not only was WOFACT but had openly admitted it to the friend. A proposed trip to Bolivia was aborted because Tichborn felt there was no suitable cover.

5. Tichborn has traveled extensively in Latin America on training and election assignments. Three countries in which he worked are Chile, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. On these assignments Tichborn used his legal, publishing, and movie cover. It is understood that he also used aliases and disguises, although this was not noted in the quick review of the files. He can, of course, be debriefed in detail on this aspect.

SECRET

6. The files show that Tichborn's magazine, Dialogos was funded through Tichborn by various individuals through arrangements made by CCS. The AC/WH/6 interrogated Tichborn on any foundation funding. Tichborn could recall only one instance of foundation funding, some $2-2,500 given Dialogos Editor Susan Hirsu by the Fairfield Foundation. There is also a reference in the files that one, Louis Mercier, was informed that ODACID also supported Dialogos.

7. The files reflect very favorably on Tichborn's performance - two reports by the Mexican Station and one from COS/Santo Domingo are most commendatory. On the negative side, administrative details bore him.

8. The undersigned has confirmed with Chief, WH/CA that if DO will take over Tichborn's contract, WH will pay Tichborn's salary and expenses for the first quarter of FY 1958. Chief, WH/CA is awaiting DO's decision.

9. The undersigned is very favorably impressed by Tichborn. By 1 October, it is believed that Tichborn will be sufficiently well-trained in commercial and investment banking matters to do legal-business consulting on a fee basis for WUBALINE. He should be able, depending on the number of operational requirements, to earn a part, if not all, of his salary. On this basis, it is recommended that DO assume administration of Tichborn effective 1 July 1957, under WUBriny, with the understanding that WH Division will defray Tichborn's salary and expenses during the first quarter of FY 1958.

Gale W. Allen
Gale W. Allen
DO/CO

CONCUR:

Chief, DO/CO

26 MAY 1957
Date

APPROVED:

Chief, WH/Division

26 May 1957
Date

CC: DO/[illegible]
cc: Briny/Support

DISPATCH

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Madrid

FROM: Chief, Europe Division

SUBJECT: Operational/Edward G. TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OSMA-23350, 11 January 1968

Action: Your comments are requested.

1. We regret our delay in responding to Reference and preceeding correspondence on this case. We will attempt below to answer the questions posed and comment where pertinent, keyed to paragraph 2 of Reference.

a. WUSALINE Iberia can, in principle, be used as an information collection mechanism. The type of requirements to be levied via WUSALINE would have to be consistent with that organization's past and present dealings with WUSALINE Iberia, i.e. commercially logical and feasible. Operating on this assumption, we believe that both general and specific requests for information could be levied and could cover a wide range of economic and commercial topics. We solicit your ideas on such requirements.

b. This subject was investigated with TICHBORN during a visit he made to Headquarters during the week of 29 January 1968. There seems to be little doubt that TICHBORN could obtain the necessary interviews, write an article, and have it published in a publication such as Life International. In considering this proposition, however, we wonder just what a trip would accomplish. We foresee that TICHBORN would obtain biographic and limited assessment data on certain high-level economic figures. He might also obtain some positive intelligence information by elicitation. But, given TICHBORN's background and talents, the most important gain, especially should a favorable article subsequently appear in print, would be in his establishment of viable personal contact with those persons interviewed. Therein lies the problem, that of transferring the relationship established by TICHBORN to someone else in the Station. We feel that you will agree that this is a difficult thing to do. In short, will the benefit to us from a short (possibly two/three weeks) foray by TICHBORN be worth the

(continued)

Attachments: USC
1. TICHBORN notes
2. Identities

Distribution:
3 - COS, Madrid w/atts

1 - CS Copy
1 - E/IB

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMW-10390	22 Feb 13 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	65-120-13

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
E/IB	R. Long	cs	6353

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

201-253203

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/E/IB		James D. Duffey

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(40)

DISPATCH

necessary investment in time, money and effort. Included in the latter would be Chief/LOLACE approval. Such approval always requires solid operational justification and such justification would be especially necessary in this case, due to the probable publication outlet involved, Life International. We are inclined to think that such a trip would not be worth it, unless, and this is a possibility discussed below in paragraph 2, TICHBORN were to be assigned PCS to Spain for a period of a year or more.

c. Also discussed with TICHBORN during his recent visit was the subject of his contacts with Spaniards in his home city and of his use in assessing and developing visiting Spanish contacts of the Station who might be steered to him. In the former category, we determined that TICHBORN has not yet been active in making new contacts but would be willing to do so, on a selected basis. The question here is, whom would we wish him to meet and develop? (TICHBORN's immediate reaction was to suggest he meet the Spanish ambassador to Washington.) Unless the Station has some specific candidates in mind, we believe the most profit to be had from this exercise initially, would be to give TICHBORN the task of assembling a spotting report on Spaniards in his home city engaged in commercial activities to whom, presumably, TICHBORN would be able to logically develop access. We feel that to give him a broad assignment of reporting on any and all Spaniards he meets would be self-defeating. On the latter category of targets, those selected Spaniards visiting TICHBORN's city who might be steered to him by the Station, we feel that cover considerations will have to be carefully handled in order to protect TICHBORN's now solid cover. TICHBORN currently is covered as a business consultant and attorney under Identity A. He is specifically identified with Identity B and, when required, as on his trip to Spain, with WUSALINE. We would be perfectly willing to consider using TICHBORN in this way provided the targets were carefully selected and could be steered to TICHBORN without endangering his cover.

d. In answer to paragraph 2d of the Reference, we are forwarding under separage cover copies of the reports which TICHBORN submitted to Headquarters after his return. We can find no indication that these were sent to you at the time, although that was our intention. In any event, they appear to constitute additional detail to verbal reports provided to the Station by TICHBORN while he was there last year.

2. As the Station notes, the question of a PCS assignment to Madrid for TICHBORN was shelved last year due to a variety of reasons, both personal and professioanl. Recent discussions with WOPLAY, however, indicate that such an assignment should not be ruled out. It is possible that TICHBORN would be available for PCS assignment to Spain in 1959, assuming that suitable cover arrangements can be worked out. In this regard, his assignment to Madrid as WUSALINE's man in WUSALINE Iberia might be a logical extension of his past and present activities. In view of the Station's comments in paragraph 3c of Reference, we would appreciate your thoughts on this and on any other cover possibilities which come to mind. Granted that such an assignment is presently no more than a long range possibility, it is nevertheless an attractive one, worth an exchange of views.

3. Developments cited in paragraphs 3a and 3d of the Reference are welcome as both appear to constitute potential access of value. We will be most interested in your progress.

4. The case of QUSALT/1 is, as ever, a thorny one. We will comment on it by separate dispatch.

5. To sum up, Headquarters is also impressed with TICHBORN's potential as indicated by his all-to-brief visit to Spain last year.

(continued)

Judging from his performance there it appears that he would be a valuable addition to the Station effort against the unilateral target, if he were to be assigned to Spain. His utility here, or on a brief TDY assignment from here is, we feel, far less and can only be taken advantage of by a realistic selection of any tasks we may ask him to perform. There is little doubt that he can meet Spaniards of interest, the problem lies in how to follow up at long range, of how to transfer a relationship established by TICHBORN to someone else who could take operational advantage of it. Otherwise, we will end up with a long list of names and little else. On this basic point, a summation of the specific items dealt with above, we would welcome an exchange of views with the Station.

HOWARD G. DOBBS

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT #2 to OSMW-10890

Identity A: Train, Cabot & Associates, Inc.

Identity B: Silver Resources Corporation, a company organized by Train, Cabot & Associates.

SECRET

Tichborn 201

2 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Land Development Project - Valencia, Venezuela

1. Contract Agent Edward G. TICHBORN (P) under Project WUBRINY has a major role in subject project which is being developed by a consortium of private and Venezuelan businessmen who have retained TICHBORN's services. The two principal Venezuelans involved financially in this project are Luis Ramon Bigott and Pablo Henning. Through these individuals, either socially or on a professional basis, TICHBORN has access to:

a. Eugenio Mendoza - businessman

b. Pedro Tinoco - lawyer and advisor to IBEC and David Rockefeller.

c. Luis Ignacio Mendoza - lawyer

d. José Cordido Freytes - lawyer and partner of ex-foreign minister Arismendi.

e. Diego Cisneros - owner of largest television station; has Pepsi Cola franchise for Venezuela, Brazil and Central America; owns ice cream manufacturing plant; is largest distributor of U.S. films.

f. Irwin Klein - good friend of TICHBORN's who works for Cisneros; formerly worked for the American Broadcasting Company.

g. José Mayobre - Minister of Petroleum; formerly head of ECLA; close friend of Pablo Henning, and also known personally by TICHBORN.

SECRET

201-253203

h. Pila Henning - wife of Pablo Henning; daughter of one of Venezuela's richest men whose name TICHBORN could not recall; studied at the Maryknoll College, Tarrytown, New York; was sympathetic to Perez Jimenez.

2. TICHBORN has also met Mr. Harold Horan who is Executive Secretary of the American Chamber of Congress.

3. It is anticipated that TICHBORN will be meeting the contacts noted above as well as additional contacts in the event the project continues to move ahead favorably. Should any of TICHBORN's contacts merit operational assessment and development, DO personnel concerned with Project WUBRINY would be glad to work with WH/3/Venezuela.

Gale Allen

Gale Allen
DO/CO

Distribution:
1 - For the Record
1 - WH/3/Venezuela
1 - ~~WUBRINY file~~ 201
1 - DO/CO Chrono
1 - Wubriny/ops

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

/

FROM: DO/CO/Gale Allen GJ-64	EXTENSION 6054	NO. DATE 1 February 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. C/DO/CO Rm. 502 - 1750 Bldg.				
2. DO/CO/Allen			GMJ	
3. GJ-64				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

Gale.

Take it easy
w/ LIFE-INT.
This gets into
the Katzenbach
BAN AREA.

File 201 or
also filed Rs

201-253203

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief/E/IB/S

SUBJECT: Project WUBRINY - Possible Operational Support of Madrid Station Objectives by Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

REFERENCE: OSMA 23,350 Dated 11 January 1968

1. Per Mr. Long's request, the undersigned on 30 January 1968 discussed with Edward G. TICHBORN (P) possible support of Madrid Station objectives as raised in ref. It was confirmed that:

a. WUSALINE/Iberia can be used as an information collection mechanism in cases where information requirements can be couched in plausible economic and commercial terms for contractual surveys.

b. TICHBORN can assess and develop selected Spanish contacts of Madrid Station who may be visiting New York and who desire introductions in US commercial circles.

c. TICHBORN can develop Spaniards in New York as may be of operational interest to the Madrid Station. TICHBORN has not made an effort to develop Spaniards in New York but is willing and able to do so for any designated as operational targets. If desired, TICHBORN thinks he can meet the Spanish Ambassador to the U.S. through a friend, Senator José Montoya of New Mexico.

d. TICHBORN feels that he could write an article concerning leading Spanish industrialists and bankers for publishing in a prominent publication, such as "Life International." TICHBORN believes that he has excellent bonafides for such a task because he previously published in "Life International" a four-page spread on birth control in Latin America. This article was favorably reviewed. TICHBORN suggested a related article on the population explosion in Europe and its effect on business as a possible topic for interviewing leading Spanish businessmen. TICHBORN, as a result of journalistic collaboration with Katherine Anne Porter, is represented in New York by a top literary agent, Monica McCall. TICHBORN thinks that it would take him two to three weeks in Spain interviewing top Spanish industrialists and bankers. He would send letters in advance to these targets informing them of his proposed itinerary, the purpose of his trip, and enclosing copies of his previous articles with favorable reviewer comments. He could be essentially a free lance journalist or have a business purpose as well. In the latter connection, it is of interest that following TICHBORN's trip to Spain, WUBRINY/1 sent a geologist to WUSALINE/Iberia to look into acquisition of silver properties in Spain. This purely commercial development appears to be a direct result of TICHBORN's trip and thus enhances TICHBORN's commercial bonafides.

2. It is understood that E/IB/S has a copy of TICHBORN's report for dispatch to the Madrid Station per ref.

3. Personnel concerned with Project WUBRINY will be glad to work with E/IB/S in any follow-up to the possibilities noted above.

/S/
Gale Allen
DO/CO

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/DO/CO ✓
1 - C/DO & DC/DO
1 - WUBRINY file
1 - Chrono

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, European Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid SGR.

SUBJECT
Operational/Edward G. TICHBORN Trip to Madrid

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OSMA 22,778

1. Madrid has awaited a report of TICHBORN's trip to Spain and some response to the various proposals made in Reference Dispatch. SHERIDAN carried back the message that TICHBORN would not be assigned PCS to Madrid as suggested he might be in DIR 32794. We have a high opinion of TICHBORN's talents, so this was a disappointment.

2. Regarding the proposals we made about how TICHBORN might continue to be useful in his target "Study on Dynamics of Spain As an Economic Entity" (see DIR 13385), there are several that we would like Headquarters to review:

a. Can WUSALINE Iberia be used as an information collection mechanism? [illegible], yes

b. Has further thought been given to TICHBORN's writing an article (possibly for "Life International") on leading Spanish industrialists and bankers?

who does he know

c. Can TICHBORN develop Spaniards in his home city for Madrid Station? Can the Station ask selected Spanish contacts, who will be travelling to TICHBORN's city, to look up TICHBORN as a means of assessing and developing them? yes

d. Is TICHBORN preparing a report or contemplating any follow-up action to Reference trip?

3. Reference provides sufficient details to make all these questions clear. If Headquarters can give us a status report on the above questions and where we now stand with TICHBORN and WUSALINE, we can in turn make suggestions on how we believe TICHBORN's talents can be used in the future. As mentioned above, we have a high opinion of his ability and we hope we can benefit from it. In the meantime,

Distribution:
2 - C/EUR

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

65-120-13

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA 233,50

DATE
11 January 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
HQS: 65-120-13
FFN: WUSALINE

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	OSMA 23,350

there are several developments relating to TICHBORN/WUSALINE, etc. that should be mentioned.

a. The Station is now in direct contact with IDEN G of Reference.
Richard ROONEY

b. If he can be cleared, Station plans to attempt to recruit QUSALT/1.

c. The Station is no longer considering WUSALINE Iberia as a possible cover mechanism.

d. The Station (through HARRIOTT and NOGGLE) has met IDEN B. of Reference.

4. We would appreciate Headquarters help in putting some momentum back into the Mission TICHBORN embarked on and on which he made a good start.

Juan Antonio RUIZ de Elda

Pres of BANIF

Stewart G Ropard

STEWART G. ROPARD

14-00000

[illegible]

1 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project WUBYZAS Status Report

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Record, dated 23 January 1968, Same Subject

1. Ref. noted that John A. BLENKISOP (P) had suggested certain changes in his proposed contract and that these suggested changes had been referred to the OGC for comment.

2. Attached are the OGC comments on BLENKINSOP's suggested changes. In brief, the OGC stood firm on the proposed contract as written and rejected BLENKINSOP's suggested changes. One change suggested by BLENKINSOP, i.e. to allow interim hotel expenses greater than $1000.00 in Instanbul, if necessary, was considered administrative by the OGC and left to DO for decision. In view of the rejection of BLENKINSOP's other suggested changes, it was decided to accept BLENKINSOP's request for interim hotel expenses to exceed $1000.00 if necessary. BLENKINSOP's suggested change reads "Barring extraordinary circumstances, these /expenses/ are not to exceed the amount of $1000.00." In his justification for this change, BLENKINSOP notes that time in transit for furniture could extend to six weeks and that in this case hotel expenses could be closer to $2000.00.

3. WUBRINY 11 was advised on 24 January 1968 of our position on the contract. He will relay it to WUBRINY 1 and/or BLENKINSOP. BLENKINSOP's reaction is awaited.

/S/

Gale Allen
DO/CO

Distribution:
1 - For the Record
1 - WUBYZAS file
1 - DO/CO Chrono

201-253203

[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: GWA
G. W. Allen, DOCO
GJ 64 Hdqs.

EXTENSION: 6054

NO.:

DATE: 11 Jan 68

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/DO/CO (Mr. Davis)			✓	✓ [illegible] est [illegible] ops
2.		16 Jan	[illegible]	
3. Chief, DO		16 Jan 68	[illegible]	
4.				
5. Mr. Allen			GWA	
6. GJ-64, Hqs				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

10 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

SUBJECT : Agreement with WUBRINY/1 to Defray a Portion of Edward G. TICHBORN's (P) $17,000 Annual Contract Fee

1. Chief, DOCO, DC/DOCO, Mr. Ed Welch, and the undersigned met on 3 January 1968 with WUBRINY/1 and WUBRINY/11. WUBRINY/1 had previously agreed in principle to buying a portion of TICHBORN's time. He was asked at the 3 January meeting to make a specific proposal on this matter. It was pointed out to WUBRINY/1 that the Agency does not have at this time any operational requirements for TICHBORN and that, ideally, TICHBORN's $17,000 annual contract fee would be offset completely by commercial fee income.

2. WUBRINY/1 said that he is forming a development company in Venezuela for a land development project in which TICHBORN could be very useful the next six months. He proposed that the development company retain TICHBORN for six months at $5,000. If the project is continued, TICHBORN will be retained for a higher figure for the next six months plus a bonus if the project is successful. The company will, of course, also defray TICHBORN's expenses incurred on the land development project. For the Agency and Project WUBRINY, the agreement with WUBRINY/1 means that WUSALINE will expend $3,500 to retain TICHBORN for the next six months.

3. The Venezuelan Desk was advised that TICHBORN will be going to Venezuela on 10 January 1968 and will be spending considerable time there during the next six months. The Venezuelan Desk was very receptive to exploiting TICHBORN operationally and prepared a detailed cable for COS/Caracas. However, this proposed cable was modified by WH Division upper

SECRET

echelons to a notification that TICHBORN will be in Venezuela. As of 9 January, there had been no response by COS/Caracas.

Gale W. Allen

Gale W. Allen
DOCO

GWA/ekw

Orig- Mr. Davis (C/DOCO)
C/DO
1 - WUBRINY/Ops
1 - DOCO chrono
1 - Tichborn #1

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
LOPEZ, HENRY R.

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO. VoN. CS MATERIAL

DATE Undat. 1 - 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

201-253203

BULKY

Contains:

TRAVEL VOUCHERS
PERFORMANCE REPORTS
EARNING STATEMENTS
MEDICAL RECORDS
CONTRACT COPIES
CREDIT CARDS

CALL IP/FILES, EXT. 6867
FOR ATTACHMENTS. RECORDS
CENTER JOB NO. 72-115
BOX NO. 5

201-253203

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Tichborn 201

SECRET

27 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DO/CM

ATTENTION : Mr. Donald G. Lemieux

SUBJECT : Funding of Project WUBRINY through Project WUTACTIC/WUGLITTER

1. As you know, WUTACTIC/WUGLITTER currently holds $17,338.58 of Project WUBRINY funds consisting of:

a. $3,000.00 from NE Division to reimburse WUSALINE for support of Staff Agent Martin J. UNGRICH (P),

b. $1,659.51 from Project WUTARDY to reimburse WUSALINE for an operational survey in Spain,

c. $5,000.00 from WH Division to reimburse WUSALINE for support of Contract Agent Edward G. TICHBORN (P),

d. $7,679.07 remaining of Project WUBRINY/F funds

2. Transmitted under separate cover is a billing from WUSALINE to WUTACTIC/WUGLITTER in the amount of $17,265.50. Please arrange for a check to be drawn in the favor of WUSALINE in this amount and sent to WUSALINE Attention: the author of the billing.

3. Would appreciate completing this transaction prior to 31 December 1967. If the check route is not feasible, a bank transfer would be all right. Necessary data for a bank transfer can be supplied, if needed, by telephone. By my calculations, the remainder of Project WUBRINY funds in WUTACTIC/WUGLITTER after this funding will be $73.08.

Gale W. Allen
DOCO

Orig & 1 - DO/CM
✓ 1 - Tichborn 201
1 - UNGRICH file
1 - DO/CO chrono
1 - ICAP/Iberia
1 - F/Support

201-253203

ICAP CORPORATION
375 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022

PLAZA 1-1944
CABLES INTRATRUST NEWYORK

CAPITAL FOR DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL CONSULTANTS

December 20, 1967.

Sr. Ismael Aguila
President
Diamond de Panama
S.A.
Apartado 4297
Panama City, Panama

Dear Ismael:

Please forgive me for not having submitted my accounting sooner than this. As you know, I have been away from New York on several trips and my correspondence has accordingly fallen behind. Should there be any question concerning the data which you will find on the attached sheet, please let me know, and I shall be happy to submit any clarification you desire.

At the moment I am devoting all my time to the Sattelite City project in Venezuela, and have consequently let matters ride with respect to the Mexican border development program.

Please let me know when you are coming to New York, for I would like to take you to that wonderful Latino restaurant you mentioned in our recent phone conversation.

Un abrazo carinoso

Henry P. Lopez.

EXPENSE REPORT

Oct. 3, 1967	American Management Assoc. Conference on business problems of Spain	$ 175.00
Oct. 4	Mayflower Hotel Discussions regarding border development	36.58
Oct. 4	American Express Spanish trip regarding silver mines	574.30
Oct. 13	Reimburse Lopez Extra expenses regarding border dev.	88.32
Oct. 16	Advance to Lopez Expenses Mexico-San Antonio-Los Angeles regarding border development	250.00
Oct. 30	Charged to TCA Expenditures re ICAP general	39.40
Nov. 14	Diners Club Entertainment Mex Consul ICAP general	18.10
Nov. 14	American Express Entertain various officials re border dev.	82.58
Nov. 14	Vision Travel Inc. 1/2 of plane fare for Mexico-L.A. trip	201.22
		$1465.50

Total Expenses	$ 1,465.50
Total Consulting Fees	15,800.00
Total Due	$17,265.50

14-00000

☒ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
C/WH/Contracts/WSRenehan 3D 5321	4460	DATE 16 November 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/DO/SS 1715 BLDG				Va 6304 File [illegible] 201 201-253203
2.				
3. C/DO/Pers 17 51 BLDG.	27 Nov	27 Nov		
4.				
5. Mr Gale Allen				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum SECRET

TO : C/DO/Pers

DATE: 16 November 1967

FROM : C/WH/Contracts

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN, Insurance Premiums

1. It is requested your office effect necessary arrangements for Edward G. TICHBORN to forward future insurance premiums directly to a DO component for related processing.

2. Heretofore TICHBORN has been sending his check for premiums to:

Mr. William Rodgers
P.O. Box 10146
Woodridge Station
Washington, D.C. 20018

3. It was noted that on his last check, TICHBORN had of course signed the check in true name but had also inserted "TICHBORN Medical Insurance". It would appear to be advisable to brief TICHBORN on the use of a pseudonym.

Wm. Renehan

SECRET

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/B&F 3D5325	EXTENSION 6823	NO. DATE 29 September 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/B&F 3D5325	9/29	9/27		
2.				
3. C/WH/SS	29 Sep 67			file Tichborn 201
4.				
5. C/DODS (ALLEN)				Tichborn advised on 9 October to pay 3 installment of 125.00 each.
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-253203

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

29 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DODS

ATTENTION : Mr. Gale Allen

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN (P) - Settlement of Outstanding Account

REFERENCE : Memorandum from C/WH, dated 29 August 1967 - Same subject

1. During a meeting on 13 September 1967, C/WH/B&F advised subject that monthly payments of $125.00 had been received through May 1967 and that funds due him from TDY travel in the amount of $175.01 was applied as his June payment.

2. TICHBORN stated he thought he had mailed a check for $125.00 and he would check his records when he returned to New York. As of this date no check has been received.

3. It is requested that TICHBORN be contacted and advised that the loan payment he promised has not been received; and that he should forward his check in the amount of $375.00 which will currently pay his loan through 30 September 1967.

4. Please advise WH/B&F accordingly.

Carroll Z. Hauser by

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

20 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DO/Personnel

SUBJECT : Renewal and Amendment of the Contract for Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. It is requested that the contract for contract agent Edward G. TICHBORN (P) be extended for another year from 1 October 1967 through 30 September 1968.

2. It is further requested that Tichborn's contract be amended to permit profit sharing along lines as follows:

> "It is anticipated that in the conduct of your cover duties, you will represent various clients on a fee basis. In the event such fees, less all approved allocable expenses, exceed your basic compensation of $17,000, the excess over $17,000 will be split 50-50 between you and your cover company, except that your total compensation shall not exceed the highest salary for a GS-15 as may prevail during the period of your contract."

Gale W. Allen
DOCO

GA:ekw
0 & 1 - DO/Pers
1 - Tichborn file
1 - DOCO chrono

201-253203

SECRET

SEP 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/B&F

SUBJECT : Reimbursement of Proprietary Project WUBRINY for Salary and Expenses of Edward G. TICHBORN (P) (201-253203)

1. A DO proprietary company (WUSALINE) under Project WUBRINY provided cover and funding for contract agent Edward G. TICHBORN (P) (WH Project UOACE) during the period 1 October 1966-30 June 1967. It was agreed between WH and DO Divisions that DO would assume operational responsibility for TICHBORN on 1 July 1967, but that WH Division would continue to defray TICHBORN's salary for the first quarter of FY 1968. It was also agreed that WH Division would reimburse DO Division for operational expenses funded by WUSALINE during the period 1 October 1966-30 June 1967. These expenses amount to $2,335.99. WH Division previously transferred $14,750 to DO Division for salary and expenses of TICHBORN.

2. It is requested that WH Division reimburse DO Division additionally in the amount of $4,585.99 covering the $2,250.00 balance of TICHBORN's salary ($17,000-14,750) and the $2,335.99 expenses incurred prior to 30 June 1967. Payment instructions are attached.

(signed)

W. T. MONTGOMERY
Chief, DO Support Group

DOCO/Gale Allen/ekw (11 Sep 67)

Distribution:
1 - DO/BF
1 - 201-253203
1 - DOCO chrono

SECRET

201-253203

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance

Date: **11 September 1967**

FROM : **DO/CH**

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)__________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to **See Below** (NAME OF PAYEE (True)), ________ (STATUS (e.g.) CASE OFFICER, INTERESTED) **$4,583.99** (AMOUNT)
2. Method of Payment

a. By check:

(1)_____Devised Cover Check. Account No.__________

(2)_____Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking below)

☐	ATLANTA	☒	DALLAS*	☐	KNOXVILLE	☐	MINNEAPOLIS	☐	RICHMOND	☐	WASHINGTON*
☐	BOSTON	☐	DENVER	☐	LOS ANGELES	☐	NEW ORLEANS	☐	SAN FRANCISCO	☐	WILMINGTON
☐	CHICAGO	☐	DETROIT	☐	MIAMI	☐	NEW YORK*	☐	SEATTLE	▨	▨
☐	CLEVELAND	☐	KANSAS CITY	☐	MILWAUKEE	☐	PHILADELPHIA	☐	ST. LOUIS	▨	▨

*Checks in any amount up to $25,000.00 from New York; $10,000.00 from Dallas; $2,500.00 from Washington are available for immediate delivery.

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc. to Payee's Bank Account: Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer or Compensation and Tax Division)

Complete the following:

(1) Account Name: **Diamond De Panama, S. A.**

(2) Account Number: **123-011-234**

(3) Bank Name: **Chemical Bank New York Trust Company**

(4) Bank Address: **850 Third Avenue**

__________ Zip: ______

(5) Transfer: ☐ via Mail ☒ Bank Wire or ☐ Cable

(6) Payment to be originated from **Dallas** (SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)

(7) Indicate remittor if desired: **Southwestern Development Company**

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country______ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. Discuss details with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch, ext. 3523.

3. Payment by other means: Contact Monetary Division Banking Branch Officer, ext. 3493.
4. Check will be picked up at ☐ 6E29 Hqs. or ☐ (Specify)
5. When transaction is complete notify **Donald G. Lemieux** (NAME) ext. **11-61172**

DONALD G. LEMIEUX, DO/CH (SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER) **11-61172** (EXT.) **FREDERICK C. [illegible], C/DO/CH** (SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER) **11-6[illegible]** (EXT.)

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

METHOD OF PAYMENT	ACCOUNT NO.		CODE		NAME		
	CHECK ON - BANK			PAYABLE TO - BANK			
	ACTION BY BANK						
	CHECK	DEPOSIT	MAIL	WIRE	CABLE	TELEPHONE	

FORM 5-66 1864 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(23)

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance

Date: 11 September 1967

FROM : [illegible]

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.) ______ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to [illegible] (NAME OF PAYEE (True)) ______ (STATUS (e.g.) CARRIER, INTEREST) $ ~~[illegible]~~ $5,000.00 (AMOUNT)

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:

(1) ______ Devised Cover Check. Account No. ______

(2) ______ Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking below)

☐	ATLANTA*	☒	DALLAS*	☐	KNOXVILLE	☐	MINNEAPOLIS	☐	RICHMOND	☐	WASHINGTON*
☐	BOSTON	☐	DENVER	☐	LOS ANGELES	☐	NEW ORLEANS	☐	SAN FRANCISCO	☐	WILMINGTON
☐	CHICAGO	☐	DETROIT	☐	MIAMI	☐	NEW YORK*	☐	SEATTLE	▨	▨
☐	CLEVELAND	☐	KANSAS CITY	☐	MILWAUKEE	☐	PHILADELPHIA	☐	ST. LOUIS	▨	▨

*Checks in any amount up to $25,000.00 from New York; $10,000.00 from Dallas; $2,500.00 from Washington are available for immediate delivery.

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc. to Payee's Bank Account:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer or Compensation and Tax Division)
Complete the following:

(1) Account Name: [illegible], S. A.

(2) Account Number: [illegible]

(3) Bank Name: [illegible] Company

(4) Bank Address: [illegible]

Zip: ______

(5) Transfer: ☐ via Mail ☒ Bank Wire or ☐ Cable

(6) Payment to be originated from Dallas (SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)

(7) Indicate remittor if desired: [illegible] Development Company

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ______ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. Discuss details with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch, ext. 3523.

3. Payment by other means: Contact Monetary Division Banking Branch Officer, ext. 3593.

4. Check will be picked up at ☐ 6229 Hqs. or ☐ (Specify) ______

5. When transaction is complete notify [illegible] C. [illegible] (NAME) ext. 11-[illegible]172

[illegible] C. [illegible], [illegible]/[illegible] (SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER) 11-21172 (EXT.) [illegible] C. [illegible], C/[illegible]/CI (SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER) 11-21[illegible] (EXT.)

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

METHOD OF PAYMENT

ACCOUNT NO.	CODE	NAME
CHECK ON - BANK	PAYABLE TO - BANK	

CHECK	DEPOSIT	MAIL	WIRE	CABLE	TELEPHONE

[illegible] ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(33)

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/WH/B&F 3D5325	EXTENSION 7765	NO. DATE 29 August 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/B&F	8/29/67		
2.			
3. C/WH/SS	29 Aug 67		
4.			
5.			
6. C/DODS ATT: GAIL ALLEN	30 AUG 1967		
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

arrange meeting
between Tichborn
& WH/B+F officials
on 13 Sept.
GMA

File Tichborn
201

201-253203

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

29 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DODS

ATTENTION : Gale Allen

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN (P) - Settlement of Outstanding Accounts

1. The finance records of WH Division Budget and Fiscal Branch reflect an outstanding unaccounted for balance of funds amounting to $3,813.38. This amount represents unaccounted for funds utilized by TICHBORN while on assignment in Mexico City with the LIREAM Project. TICHBORN has been advised previously as to the nature of what these unaccounted for funds represent and was to contact WH Division when he was in the Headquarters area for further discussion and settlement.

2. In addition, TICHBORN received a loan from the Agency which he is required to repay at the rate of $125.00 per month. He is presently two months in arrears in payments, of which his current loan balance is $1,074.99.

3. It is requested that your office advise TICHBORN regarding the settlement of the unaccounted for funds of $3,813.38, and also that the amount of $250.00 is due on his loan.

4. Please advise WH/B&F accordingly.

/s/

Jacob D. Esterline
Acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

ROUTING SLIP

4. [illegible]

5. [illegible]

6. [illegible]

7\.

RETURN TO SENDER

Tichborn 27

ACTION	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION
COMMENT	FILE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

[illegible]

FROM

NAME AND ADDRESS

PHONE NO.

DATE

FORM 1-53 (40)

Form 1582
1582

9 Aug 67

201-253203

[illegible]

Chief, European Division

Chief of Station, [illegible]

[illegible] C. TICHBORN Trip to [illegible]

References: A. [illegible]

B. [illegible]

1. The further [illegible] did a very creditable [illegible] on his recent trip to [illegible]. Much [illegible] to be done to complete [illegible] spelled out in Reference B, [illegible] has been accomplished. [illegible] in [illegible] a little [illegible] short [illegible] to tackle all points of Reference A. [illegible] might be expected [illegible] more progress [illegible] in paragraphs 4. and 5. of Reference A. than [illegible] listed in paragraphs 2. and 3. [illegible] inexperience on the [illegible].

2. Since [illegible] expected, he [illegible] did not go to [illegible] until 13 June. According [illegible] the reception was correct but hardly enthusiastic. This [illegible] dealings with [illegible] (SEE B.) [illegible] willing to spend the [illegible] with [illegible]/1 and [illegible] the intentions of [illegible] Reference A.

3. [illegible] and hardworking [illegible] in [illegible] opinions [illegible] these opinions. [illegible] would like, we [illegible]

[illegible]
1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]

[illegible]
2 - [illegible]

OSMA-22,778

13

1 - Wubring/ops
1 - Tichborn 201.

[illegible]

[illegible] said [illegible] he/ [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] ready for [illegible] [illegible] of the story [illegible] [illegible] before.

[illegible] (who, apparently, [illegible]/1) received [illegible] of the financial capabilities of [illegible] has not got a full picture of the activities [illegible] involved. However, [illegible] is wealthy, [illegible] and his standards are high. [illegible] to [illegible] on this. [illegible] Y/1

[illegible] In considering areas in which [illegible] might [illegible] some sort of cooperative basis with [illegible] in [illegible], although there are extremely [illegible] [illegible] to develop a great deal more information than [illegible] following cases:

a. Leasing of heavy machinery or possibly aircraft.

b. Investment in mining ventures. [illegible] that many mines have not been reactivated since the [illegible] told [illegible]/1 has experience in this type of venture;

c. Food processing which is still in a very primitive [illegible], and

d. Household appliances to help the housewife [illegible] getting [illegible].

7. [illegible] tried to [illegible] the possibility of [illegible] an officer [illegible] is a representative of [illegible] of course before [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

8. [illegible]

[illegible] to [illegible] — in [illegible] can [illegible] / [illegible], traveling [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible] consideration of [illegible] and the foregoing paragraph, [illegible] questions pose themselves:

1. Can [illegible] be [illegible] for collection of [illegible] the type of [illegible] outlined in paragraph [illegible] 2., [illegible] reference [illegible] can

2. [illegible] establish [illegible] this business relationship [illegible]

3. That can be done, [illegible] to [illegible], to [illegible] into a [illegible] and,

4. [illegible] for [illegible] or [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] it appears [illegible]

[illegible] or [illegible] questions. [illegible] be very inconsiderable [illegible] that the cover [illegible] there [illegible] will be [illegible] can [illegible] the possibility [illegible] him [illegible] to [illegible] if there are other [illegible] cover in other areas (Greece, for example) [illegible] cover [illegible] for them.

2. [illegible] saying that [illegible] should only be [illegible] cover if valid [illegible] business interests [illegible].

3. [illegible], for [illegible] to [illegible] in the [illegible] office [illegible]. He would be under [illegible] representative [illegible], [illegible] for investment [illegible], but it might [illegible] should also [illegible] job for [illegible] little [illegible] for a separate [illegible].

[illegible] to the [illegible] which [illegible] be difficult [illegible] may have [illegible] views on [illegible].

4. If [illegible] involving [illegible] [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] threats [illegible] with [illegible]

[illegible] 22, [illegible]

[illegible] Headquarters Officers.

[illegible] Attachment [illegible] a list of names [illegible]

[illegible] S. HOWARD

CONFIDENTIAL

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT #1

TO [illegible] 22,7.8 3 July 1967

[illegible] A. BANIF, S.A., Juan Bravo, Madrid

[illegible] B. Juan Antonio RUIZ [illegible], President of BANIF

ITEM C. Miguel [illegible], Managing Director of BANIF

ITEM D. Alvaro ALONSO-CASTRILLO

ITEM E. Mr. Irving Brown

ITEM F. Antonio GARRIGUES, Ambassador to the Holy See

ITEM G. Mr. Robert MOONEY

ITEM H. Miss Casilda USERA Figueroa

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible], July 6th

[illegible] Party at home of [illegible]
President of [illegible] Films
[illegible] movie producer

Met with Bob and Barbara [illegible] and with Candida [illegible] Figueroa

1. Ted Richman, Producer of the [illegible] film

2. Marques de [illegible] DE LA SIERRA, [illegible] Bank

3. Florentino [illegible], President of [illegible] Films

4. Joaquin de la ROSA, member of de la ROSA family (ship-building) in Mallorca

5. Donald Daniels, President of International Commodities Corp.

6. Lee J. COBB, American Actor

Many others

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

[illegible] at the home of [illegible] (one of [illegible] family which owns Kelvinator Plant in Spain)

[illegible] with [illegible]

1. Marquis de [illegible]

2. [illegible] (member of Abello family, which owns large drug and chemical company)

3. Juan Huarte, one of Huarte family which owns large large construction company (HUARTE y CIA) also a client of Bob [illegible]'s

4. Young member of Domecq (Brandy) family whose name was was mumbled

5. Benito [illegible], independent movie producer

6. [illegible] Navarro de [illegible], a young sculptress who is apparently a close friend of Princess Beatriz de Saboya

7. Alvaro Alonso-[illegible] ([illegible]) already know him

8. Susanna [illegible], movie actress, accompanied by young playboy type whose name escapes me.

Many other

SEPARATE COVER ATT #4
to CS- 22,775, 13 Jul 67

GUEST LIST

1. [illegible] VILLALONGA, Marquez de la Vega Inclan
2. [illegible]
3. Marques [illegible] ([illegible])
4. Luis [illegible] (Banco Hispano Americano)
5. [illegible] BASAGOITI (Banco Hispano Americano)
6. Pedro CAREAGA Basabe, Conde del Cadagua
7. Alfonso FIERRO Viña, Banco Iberico
8. Arturo FIERRO, Banco Iberico
9. Ignacio FIERRO, Banco Iberico
10. Marcelino BOTIN, Banco de Santander
11. Juan LLADO, Banco Urquijo
12. Jose FERNANDEZ Rodriguez, Galerias Preciados
13. Ramon [illegible], Galerias Preciados
14. Ramon Areces, El Corte Ingles
15. Manuel de la [illegible], [illegible], S.A.
16. Alejandro Fernandez de Araoz, [illegible] de España
17. Jose Antonio de la [illegible], S.A. [illegible]
18. [illegible] de [illegible], Cia de [illegible] Agricolas
19. Roberto M. [illegible], [illegible]
20. Guillermo [illegible] y [illegible], [illegible], S.A.
21. Jose [illegible], [illegible]
22. Luis [illegible] de [illegible], [illegible]
23. Jose [illegible], [illegible]
24. Luis [illegible] de [illegible], [illegible], S.A.
25. [illegible] y [illegible], Conde de los Gaitanes.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

26. Genaro [illegible] Pardo, Electricas Reunidas, S.A.
27. Juan March Cervera
28. Jose Maria ORIOL, Marques de Casa Oriol
29. Jose [illegible] Felipe, Union Electrica
30. Jose Maria VALLS Taberner, S.A. Cros
31. Joaquin REIG Rodriguez, Banco Central
32. Jose Maria de URQUIJO y LANDECHO
33. Jose Maria de Arteche y Olabarri, Nitratos de Castilla
34. Victor de CHAVARRI y ANDUIZA, Marques de Triano
35. Eugenio CALDERON Montero-Rios, SNIACE
36. Ignacio HERRERO Garralda, Marques de Aledo
37. Ignacio VILLALONGA Villalba, Banco Central
38. Eduardo Angulo [illegible], [illegible]
39. Jose Maria de Lapuerta y de las Pozas, REPESA
40. Felipe de Cubas y Urquijo, Marques de Fontalba
41. Leandro Jose de Torrontegui e Ibarra
42. Juan Antonio de [illegible] y [illegible], [illegible]
43. Juan de [illegible]
44. Pedro R. de Gandarias Urquijo
45. Luis Urquijo y Landecho, Marques de Bolarque
46. Aureo Fernandez [illegible], [illegible]
47. Jose Maria [illegible] de [illegible], [illegible]
48. Carlos Mendoza Gimeno [illegible]
49. Eduardo [illegible]
50. [illegible] Moreno, Union Electrica

CONFIDENTIAL

51. Pedro [illegible], [illegible]

52. Jaime [illegible], [illegible]

53. Alfonso [illegible], [illegible] de [illegible]

54. Javier de la [illegible], Cía de la [illegible] ([illegible])

55. [illegible], [illegible] Films

56. Benito [illegible], [illegible] Productor

57. Florentino [illegible], [illegible] Films

58. Jesus [illegible], [illegible] y Cía.

59. Juan [illegible], [illegible] y Cía.

60. Felipe [illegible], [illegible] y Cía.

61. Jose [illegible], [illegible] S.A.

62. [illegible], [illegible] S.A.

63. Guillermo [illegible]

64. Conde de [illegible], [illegible]

65. Pedro [illegible]

66. [illegible]

67. Juan [illegible] ([illegible])

68. [illegible]

69. [illegible]

70. [illegible]

71. [illegible]

72. [illegible]

73. [illegible]

74. [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

76. [illegible]
77. Robert [illegible]
78. Joaquin GARRIGUES y Diaz, [illegible]
79. Alejandro de [illegible] y Aragon
80. M. [illegible], [illegible]
81. Agustin Gil GUARDIOLA, Attorney
82. Alfredo GONZALEZ Reyes
83. Rudy GREER, Sears Roebuck
84. Ernest [illegible], PENCA
85. LOPEZ-MUÑOZ y LARRAZ, Attorney
86. Marques de [illegible] de la SIERRA, BANESTO
87. Jose Maria AREILZA y Martinez de Rodas, Conde de Motrico
88. Carlos de MIRANDA Gurr, Conde de Casa Miranda
89. Antonio GARRIGUES Walker

CONFIDENTIAL

I. Can ICAP-BANIF serve our operational needs?

a) Present status:

As we all undoubtedly realize, our relations with BANIF have been rather loose and underdeveloped due ~~[illegible]~~ to budgetary limitations. We have, in effect, a nice-sounding relationship called "ICAP IBERIA S.A." - with a rather impressive board of directors - but we have generated almost no business to date. As Miguel Echegaray so wryly observed: "After all, Hank, we've had less than $200 income for ICAP IBERIA, and that wouldn't even pay one day's overhead in this office." As a consequence of our limited business activity with their office, I doubt that ICAP figures very prominently in the over-all plans of the BANIF people. Nevertheless, they have explicitly stated that the ICAP-BANIF combination has considerable potential "if you people in New York would devote a little more time and money to certain Spanish projects." They apparently feel that we have access to American business firms who could actively engage in joint ventures with some of their Spanish clients - or that ICAP itself could invest therein.

The BANIF people also feel that we should be able to "feed" them clients for market surveys and feasibility studies. I've read two of their more impressive studies, and I'm inclined to believe that this particular suggestion has some merit. With this thought in mind, I suggested that Echegaray send me a copy of the study they did for Olin Mathieson, so that we might duplicate it on the Xerox and thereafter show it to prospective clients.

There should be a number of other ways in which we can strengthen our ties with BANIF - all of them requiring time, effort and money - and I strongly suggest that we do so because I am also fairly well convinced that ICAP IBERIA (through its association with BANIF) can be developed into a viable channel to the target people. I discussed this at great length with our link representative in Madrid, and we have agreed: a) that there is a considerable operational need for close contact with the target businessmen, and b) that BANIF offers at least one channel to these people. (I'll discuss at least two other channels later on in this report.)

3) ICAP IBERIA (BANIF) [illegible]

Most of the officers of BANIF are also officers of ICAP IBERIA S.A., but I should like to discuss their background and contacts as they relate to BANIF.

14-00000

1. Miguel Echegaray:

Echegaray is the number-three man at BANIF and the person most directly involved with [illegible]. He is generally a very pleasant and intelligent person, but if we should ever consider recruiting him for the bank, I would recommend against such a move. Aside from certain personal traits (a tendency to be a glutton and general untidiness), Mike is often excessively outspoken and indiscreet. In a strongly-Catholic country he frequently blasts the Church without bothering to ascertain the religious inclinations of the person he's addressing - and his political views are bruited about with equal abandon. Furthermore, I have a feeling that Echegaray wants to get out of Spain and perhaps out of the investment business. Perhaps he's one of those perpetually-dissatisfied human beings who are always bitching about their jobs or resident countries but never make the move - quien sabe?

2. Alvaro Alonso-Castrillo, Marques de Casa Pizarro

Although frankly skeptical about hiring Echegaray for the bank, I am intrigued with the notion of recruiting his colleague Alonso-Castrillo. As a permanent legal adviser to the Spanish Government at cabinet level (Letrado del Consejo de Estado), he is obviously wired-in to the threads we're interested in. Moreover, he seems to have a penchant for a bit of intrigue. Some time ago he acted as a "bag man" for George Brown, the labor leader, who gave Alonso-Castrillo a large bundle of greenbacks for certain Spaniards who were engaged in combatting commie influence in labor. And in recent years he has served as the "secretary" of the shadow cabinet of Don Juan de Bourbon, attending periodic meetings in Lisbon even though he "knows it's a lost cause." I rather suspect he would enjoy a little extra cash, but his principal reason for helping the bank would be the ~~psyxxhlogixxl~~ psychological satisfaction of being involved in something with an international flavor and political hanky-panky. In addition to his duties at BANIF, Alonso-Castrillo is a member of the board of directors of the following firms: Farmabion, S.A. (ethical drugs), Peniberica, S.A. (antibiotics), Inmobiliaria Centro, S.A. (real estate), Artes Graficas Aren (printing), Artes Graficas Clavileno (printing).

He's a lawyer with a taste for scholarly pursuits as evidenced by his having worked for Master's Degrees in International Law at Harvard and at Paris University. Moreover, he's an associate professor of international law at the University of Madrid and has published several books and articles.

[illegible] A. Ruiz de Alda

I was unfortunately unable to get much of a "line" on this gentleman. During my several visits to BANIF he was heavily involved in negotiating what Echegaray characterized as "a very big and complicated deal with some French and American financiers." In any event, we saw each other only briefly - but I got the impression that ICAP-IBERIA has not developed sufficiently to engage his interest.

For the record we might note that Ruiz de Alda is on the board of directors of the following firms: Algodonera de Castilla S.A. (cotton ginning), Energia e Industrias Aragonesas S.A. (power producer and chemical manufacturer), Hilaturas Alda S.A. (a family company engaged in cotton spinning).

Echegaray informed me that Ruiz de Alda has close personal ties with Luis Usera, managing director of Banco Hispano Americano; Alfonso Fierro, president of Banco Iberico; and Pedro Careaga Basabé, Conde del Cadagua, president of Banco Vizcaya.

CASILDA USSIA FIGUEROA - A most useful friend:

One of Bob Rooney's chief associates is CASILDA USSIA FIGUEROA, a member of a distinguished family headed by Luis Ussia y Gavaldá, Conde de los Gaitanes, the owner of Minero Siderurgica de Ponferrada. His company is listed as one of hundred largest enterprises in Spain.

As a preface to my remarks about Casilda, I should like to point out that I had previously met with George Train and Miguel Echegaray, and I had asked them to name some of the outstanding figures in banking, manufacturing, utilities, chemicals, construction, etc. Except for two or three of the better-known names, neither Train nor Echegaray seemed to have such information at the tip of the fingers, but they both took my previously-prepared check list of categories and volunteered to fill in the blanks during the next few days.

That same afternoon I dropped in at Bob Rooney's office and casually mentioned that I would like to identify Spain's top business leaders for a possible moonlighting-on-the-job article for FORTUNE magazine. "Well, that's easy," said Bob, "My two associates know all about them." He then introduced me to Casilda Ussia Figueroa and Gloria de las Barcenas, both about 23 years old and quite attractive in their miniskirts. Having glanced at my list, Bob said, "Would you please tell Senor Lopez the names of the leading bankers in Spain?" Without a moment's hesitation, they named the ten leading banks and then told me who owned or directed them, also adding such tidbits as "Alfonso and Ignacio Fierro really have more say-so at the Banco Iberico than their brother Arturo" or "Don Ignacio Villalonga is rather old now, so Luis Escamez will probably take charge of the Banco Central pretty soon."

When I asked about manufacturing, construction, food processing, automobiles and accessories, utilities, etc., they reeled off scores of names (plus intra-family marital connections) like two chatty IBM machines, not once referring to the several boxes of index cards they had previously prepared for Rooney. After they had finished their amazing ad-lib performance, Bob and I checked the notes I had taken against the information listed in his "file of Spain's 500 outstanding busines and society people," and they matched perfectly - not one error. I later checked their data with the information published in LAS PRIMERAS IMPRESAS ESPANOLAS, edited by the Sociedad Editorial de Economia y Finanzas, and here again it proved correct in every respect. At no time did Miguel Echegaray, Alonso Castrillo, George Train, Anthony Cefaratti (or anyone else I met) demonstrate such an encyclopaedic knowledge of names and businesses related thereto.

Aside from the consideration of future marital prospects, I simply can't imagine what has motivated these girls in their accumulation of such data, but I was further flabbergasted by Casilda's IBM-ish mind during the next several days. Soon after our initial meeting I escorted Casilda to a party given by [illegible] Gonzalez, having both been invited to accompany the Rooneys. During the party she introduced me to twenty or thirty people, many of them friends of her family, and after each introduction she would give me a thumbnail sketch of the person we had just met: profession, family background, marital status, relatives, schooling, name-of-mistress, etc. On the following night she took me to a pre-dinner cocktail party at the home of Jaime Clozabal, whose family controls Kelvinator de Espana. There I met the Marquez de Casa Tremanes, Graciela Abelló (of the Abelló drug products clan), Juan Huarte (head of Huarte y Cia. construction company), a playboy member of the Domecq family, Benito Perojo (an independent movie producer), Malu Navarro de Zubillaga (young sculptress who is apparently a close friend of Princess Beatriz de Saboya), and an actress named Rosanna Yanni, who was accompanied by a young yeh-yeh playboy whose name was mumbled by Casilda. Incidentally, she speaks with a Madrileño lisp that is often confusing to my Mexican ear.

At the urging of CD (and with my willing assent), I spent considerable time and moola cultivating Casilda - dinner dance on Saturday, to the bullfights at Toledo with an American movie crowd, and a brief visit with Casilda and her off-and-on fiance in Paris, where he presumably studies at the Sorbonne. Casilda had planned to go to Paris for Bastille Day (the Spanish ambassador, Carlos de Miranda Quar, is a family friend), and she suggested that I stop there on my way to New York "to meet my perhaps-fiance." [illegible] ascertained that this would involve no extra plane fare. CD advised me that a Paris stopover would probably strengthen my ties with Casilda, whom we both feel will prove to be a valuable source of information. xxx During my brief stay in Paris I realized that she was probably "cultivating" me for a very specific purpose: the maternal (Figueroa) side of her family has some silver mines which have not been in production since the Civil War, and Bob Rooney had told her that I represented a group of New York investors who are looking for silver properties. She broached the subject on the day I left Paris, and I asked her to forward any and all available information on the said mines. If, in fact, the Figueroas do have economically-operable mines, we could then establish genuinely firm relations with the Ussias, Figueroas, Oriols, *et al*.

In any event, I would suggest that we maintain close ties with Casilda Ussia Figueroa and her friend Gloria de las Bardenas.

[illegible] INDUSTRIALISTS AND FINANCIERS OF SPAIN

In the following pages is a list of the largest business enterprises in Spain and the names of the persons who own or control them. Whenever possible I have noted the [illegible] for each company, bearing in mind that Spanish businessmen are not always totally candid in their financial statements. But aside from the accuracy or inaccuracy of these reports, one soon realizes that certain individuals and/or families control two or more of these companies and perhaps many others of lesser magnitude. And in my conversations with several Madrileños (Echegaray, Ussia, Alonso-Castrillo, Cefarrati, Garrigues, et al) some of these same names kept popping up time and again, thus leading me to conclude - at least tentatively - that the following individuals or families are the leading industrialists and financiers of Spain:

1. Juan March Cervera
2. Pedro Careaga Basabe, Conde del Cadagua
3. Ignacio Villalonga Villalba, Marques de la Vega Inclan
4. Alfonso Fierro - and brothers Ignacio and Arturo
5. Jose Maria Oriol, Marques de Casa Oriol
6. Marques Deleitosa (Gomez-Acebo family)
7. Luis Urquijo y Landecho - and other Urquijos
8. Joaquin Reig Rodriguez
9. Eduardo Aguilo [illegible]
10. Eduardo Barreiros (close to Franco)

Note, the Spanish banks, especially the "Big Five", are heavily and directly involved in the commercial and industrial life of the country. Several of them tend to be family banks and various members of these banking families actively manage or serve on the boards of the largest companies in Spain.

Banco Central
    Ignacio Villalonga Villalba, Marques de la Vega Inclan
    Luis Escamez is apparently next in line

Banco Espanol de Credito (BANESTO)
    Marques Deleitosa - Gomez-Acebo family

Banco Hispano-Americano
    Jose Maria Basagoiti, Ch of Board
    Luis Usera is director

Banco de Vizcaya
    Pedro Careaga Basabe, Conde del Cadagua

Banco Bilbao
    Juan March family allegedly controls

Banco Iberico
    Alfonso, Arturo and Ignacio Fierro

Banco de Santander
    Marcelino Botin

Banco Urquijo
    Mostly owned by Urquijo family
    Juan Llado is managing director

[illegible]	Valores en MW/h	4,638,110,622
Hidroelectrica Espanola	" "	3,701,162,900
F. Electricas de Cataluna	"	3,185,907,216
Cia Sevillana de Electricidad	"	2,000,394,713

Empresa Nacional de Electricidad ENDESA
Luis Saez de Ibarra de Urban
Inmovilizado Neto 5,491,909,000 pts

Empresa Nacional Hidroelectrica de Ribagorzana
Jose Maria Aguirre Gonzalo (ENHER)
Inmovilizado Neto 11,495,093,000 pts

Electra de Viesgo S.A.
Luis Maria de Ybarra
Inmovilizado Neto 3,624,348,000 pts

Electricas Leonesas S.A.
Luis de Ussia y Gavalda (Conde de los Gaitanes)
Inmovilizado Neto 1,516,921,000 pts

Electricas Reunidas de Zaragoza S.A.
Genaro Poza Ibanez
Inmovilizado Neto 4,002,272,000 pts

Fuerzas Electricas de Cataluna S.A.
Juan March Cervera
Inmovilizado Neto 12,916,555,000 pts

Hidroelectrica Espanola S.A.
Jose Maria Oriol, Marques de Casa Oriol
Inmovilizado Neto 24,821,133,000 pts

Iberduero S.A.
Pedro Careaga Basabe, Conde del Cadagua
Inmovilizado Neto 22,661,143,000 pts

Union Electrica Madrilena S.A.
Jose Cabrera Felipe
Inmovilizado Neto 6,941,013,000

[illegible] AND METALLURGY

Compania Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles S.A.
Felipe de Cub[illegible] y Urquijo, Marques de Fontalba (Urquijo)
Inmovilizado Neto 1,237,063,000 pts

Sociedad Espanola de C[illegible]ructiones Babcock & Wilcox
Leandro Jose [illegible]orrontegui e Ibarra (Ibarra)
Inmovilizado [illegible] 2,835,555,000 pts

Cia. Euskalduna Construccion de Buques
Juan Antonio de Aznar y Zavala
Inmovilizado Neto 1,193,202,000 pts

General Electrica Espanola S.A.
Pedro Careaga y Basabe, Conde de Cadagua (here again)
Inmovilizado Neto 1,499,264,000 pts

Material y Construcciones S.A.
Joaquin Reig Rodriguez
Inmovilizado Neto 1,278,432,000 pts.

Altos Hornos de Vizcaya S.A.
Juan de Aguirre (de Aguirre again)
Inmovilizado Neto 15,590,663,000 pts.

S.A. [illegible] Basconia
Pedro P. de Gandarias Urquijo (Urquijo again)
Inmovilizado Neto 1,696,985,000 pts.

Sociedad Metalurgica Duro Felguera
Luis de Urquijo y Landecho, Marques de Bolarque
Inmovilizado Neto 4,362,743,000 pts. (Urquijo)

Empresa Nacional Siderurgica S.A. (ENSIDESA)
Aureo Fernandez Avila
Inmovilizado Neto 27,764,094,000 pts

Espanola de Zinc S.A. (ZINSA)
Ignacio Villalenga Villalba (small but note Villal)
Inmovilizado Neto 642,949,000 pts

Minero Siderurgica de Ponferrada
Luis de Ussia y Gavalda, Conde de los Gaitanes (Ussia again)
Luis de Ussia y Gavalda
Inmovilizado Neto 1,062,120,000 pts

[illegible]

S.A. Cros
    Jose maria Valls Taberner
    Inmovilizado Neto 5,349,817,000 pts

Dow-Unquinesa
    Pedro de Careaga y Basabe, Conde de Cadagua
    Inmovilizado Neto 1,813,755.000

Energia e Industrias Aragonesas S.A.
    Jose Maria de Urquijo y Landecho
    Inmovilizado Neto 200,518,000 (note Pierro)

Indusurias Quimicas Canarias S.A.
    Joaquin Reig Rodriguez
    Inmovilizado Neto 423,594,000 (small - but note Peig)

Nitratos de Castilla S.A.
    Jose Maria de Arteche y Clavarri (de Artecho again)
    Inmovilizad Neto 1,177,443,000 pts

Sociedad Espanola de Fabricaciones Nitrogenadas S.A. (Sefanitro)
    Victor de Chavarri y Anduiza, Marques de Triano
    Inmovilizado Netro 1,472,574,000 pts

Sociedad Nacional Industrias Aplicaciones Celulosa (SNIACE)
    Eugeneio Caldero Montero-Rios
    Inmovilizado Neto 2,811,794,000 pts

Union Espanola de Explosivos
    Ignacio Herrero Garralda, Marques de Aledo
    Inmovilizado Neto 3,612,436,000 pts

Compania Espanola de Petroleos S.A.
    Ignacio Villalonga Villalba (note this name)
    Inmovilizado Neto 7,019,770,000 pts

Empresa Nacional Calvo Sotelo (ENCASE)
    Eduardo Angulo Otaolaurruchi
    Inmovilizado Neto 11,755,283,000 pts

Refineria de Petroleos de Escombreras S.A. (REPESA)
    Jose Maria de Lapuerta y de las Pozas
    Inmovilizado Neto 4,359,932,000 pts

[illegible] TIRES AND ACCESSORIES

Citroen Hispania S.A.	produced 22,[illegible] in 1965
I.M.O.S.A.	produced 10,434 in 1965
Barreiros Diesel S.A.	produced 8,000 in 1965
FASA Renault	produced 8,241 in 1965
Motor Iberica	produced 6,834 in 1965

Sociedad Anonima Fabrication de Neumaticos Michelin
Roberto M. Luiseaux Michelin
Inmovilizado Neto 2,126,212.00 pts

Productos Pirelli S.A. (tires)
Guillermo Azcoitia y Muesca
Inmovilizado Neto 2,484,173,000 pts

Sociedad Espanola de Autos de Turismo SEAT
Jose Ortiz Echague
Inmovilizado Neto 3,627,515,000 pts

FOOD AND BEVERAGES

Sociedad General Azucarera de Espana
Alejandro Fernandez de Araoz
Active Disponible y Realizable 1,348,241,000 pts

S.A. de Aguila
Jose Antonio de la Cuesta [illegible]
ADR 2,876,921,000 pts

Compania de Industrias Agricolas
Manuel Garcia de [illegible]
Capitales Permanentes 1,4[illegible],000 pts

[illegible] [illegible]

Dragados y Construcciones S.A.
[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible],528,000 pts

Urbis S.A.
[illegible] Quintana
owns Barrio del Nino Jesus and Barrio Moratalaz

Banus S.A.
Jose Banus
owns Barrio de la Concepcion

HUARTE S.A.
Huarte brothers (Jesus, Juan and Felipe)
several companies in roads, homes, furniture

Agroman S.A.
Jose Maria Aguirre Gonzalo
one of the older and larger construction companies

Motion Pictures and Television

Suevia Films
Cesario Gonzales
Largest producer, distributor, exhibitor in Spain

Izaro Films S.A.
Florentino Reyzabal
Largest distributor and exhibitor in Madrid

Perojo Films
Benito Perojo
Independent producer (allied with Paramount Pictures

Newspapers and Magazines

Prensa Espanola S.A.
Guillermo Luca de Tena
Publishes ABC, largest daily, and other mags

Diario Vanguardia
Conde de Godo
Largest daily in Barcelona, publishes mags, etc.

Aguilar S.A.
Aguilar family
Leading book publisher, also magazines

[illegible] and Ship-building

Cia. Aznar S.A.
    Eduardo Aznar (owns biggest fincas in Spain)

Ybarra y Cia.
    Ybarra family of Sevilla
    They are also largest olive oil producers

Transmediterranea S.A.
    Alfonso Guell, Marques de Comillas

Cia. de la Rosa
    Javier de la Rosa
    Ship-building company based in Palma, Mallorca

Hotels and Resorts

Cadena Melia S.A.
    Melia brothers
    own about 30 hotels on Costa del Sol
    began as travel agency and boomed

HUSA S.A.
    hotel chain mainly controlled by Banco Central
    has about 14 hotels in Spain

Department Stores

Galerias Preciados
    Jose Fernandez Rodriguez
    Have about 17 stores throughout Spain

El Corte Ingles
    Ramon Areces
    Have about 5 stores

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SPAIN

NAME OF AMERICAN FIRM	NAME OF FIRM OPERATING IN SPAIN
[illegible] 30 Rockefeller Plaza	Gallina Blanca Arbor Acres, S.A. Fernan Gonzalez 57 Madrid (9) Poultry business. (See also IBEC-Transoceanic, Arbor Acres Farm Inc., Borden Foods Co. and Ralston Purina Company).
Armco Steel Corporation 703 Curtis Street Middletown, Ohio	Armco, S.A. Ronda San Pedro 17 Barcelona (10) Manufacturer of steel tubing: distributor.
Bank of America 37/41 Broad Street New York, N.Y.	1) Banco Comercial para America, S.A. Paseo de la Castellana 13 Madrid (1) Commercial banking. 2) Banco Intercontinental Espanol, Paseo de la Castellana 29 Madrid (1) Investment banking.
Borden Foods Company 350 Madison Avenue New York, N.Y. 10017	Gallina Blanca, S.A. Avda. Infanta Carlota 38 Barcelona (15) Manufacturer of foodstuffs. (See also Ralston Purina Co., IBEC-Transoceanic, and Arbor Acres Farm, Inc., and ARBEC)
California Texas Oil Corp. 380 Madison Avenue New York, N.Y. 10017	1) Caltex Oil, S.A.E. Arapiles 13 Madrid (15) Distribution of petroleum products. 2) Refineria de Petroleos de Escombreras, S.A. (REPESA) Paseo del Prado 28 Madrid (14) Oil refining. Affiliates of above concern: a) Butano, S.A. b) Compania Auxiliar Maritima de Escombreras, S.A.

[illegible] International Investment [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Manhattan Plaza New York, N.Y. 10005	[illegible] Tin [illegible], S.A. [illegible] Madrid (6) Trade promoti[illegible] and investments.
[illegible] Detroit, Michigan	[illegible] Diesel, S.A. [illegible] Madrid (5) Motor vehicle manufacturer.
Continental Can Company 633 Third Avenue New York, N.Y. 10017	1) Compañia Internacional de Envases, S.A. (CIDESA) Moratin 11 Valencia Manufacturer of tinplate containers. 2) Oleo-Metalgrafica del Sur, S.A. Avda. Andres Segovia 21 Linares (Jaen) Manufacturer of metal containers. Subsidiaries of above concern: a) Union Metalgrafica Andaluza. b) Metalgrafica Logronesa, S.A. c) Comercial de Envases, S.A.
Continental International Finance Corporation 231 South La Salle Street Chicago, Illinois	Banco Atlantico Ramblas 134 Barcelona Commercial Bank.
Deere and Company Moline, Illinois	1) Lanz Iberica, S.A. Apartado 10 Getafe (Madrid) Manufacturer of tractors and agricultural machinery. 2) John Deere, S.A. Vereda de la Concepcion Getafe (Madrid) Sales of publicworks and agricultural machinery.
Dow Chemical Company 1000 Main Street Midland, Michigan	1) Envases y Recubrimientos, S.A. Km 5,6 Carretera de Alcobenda Madrid (20) Manufacturer of flexible plastic containers.

Dow Chemical Co. (Cont'd)

2) Dow Chemical Iberica, S.A.
Alberto Alcocer 5
Madrid (16)
Distributors of chemical products.

3) Dow Unquinesa, S.A.
Apartado 506
Bilbao (Lugo Erandio)
Manufacturer of chemical and plastic products.

Affiliates of above concern:

a) Cia. Espanola de Plasticos, S.A.

b) General Quimica, S.A.

c) Industrias Quimicas, S.A.

d) Auxiliar Quimica de la Fundicion, S.A.

e) Metal Quimicas del Nervion, S.A.

f) Resinas Poliesteres, S.A.

g) Impregnacion de Maderas, S.A.

h) Ferro Enamel Espanola, S.A.

i) Fertilitas, S.A.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio

1) Firestone Hispania, S.A.
Apartado 406
Urbi-Basauri, Bilbao
Manufacturer of tires and other rubber products.

2) Compañía Espanola de Plasticos, S.A.
Ribera 1
Bilbao
Manufacturer of plastic articles

Affiliates of Firestone Hispania:

a) Remolques Fruhauf, S.A.E.

b) Navi, S.A.

c) Ximenez y Compania, S.A.

d) Julio Galan, S.A.

e) Abastecedora Catalana, S.A.

[illegible] Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada) [illegible] Ohio	Affiliates of Compania Espanola de Plasticos: a) Derivados Vinilicos, S.A. b) Polimeros Industriales, S.A. c) Monomeros Espanoles, S.A. d) Formica Espanola, S.A. e) Distirlas, S.A. f) Sintepol, S.A. g) Casa Neel, S.A.
Food Machinery Corporation 1105 Coleman Avenue San Jose, California 95106	International Machinery Corporation Espanola, S.A. Dr. Fleming 35 Madrid (16) Sale and rental of food processing machinery.
Food Machinery & Chemical Co. (FMC Corporation) P.O. Box 1178 San Jose, California	Food Machinery Espanola, S.A. Paz 28 Valencia 3 Manufacturer of fruit packing machinery.
General Electric Company International Division 159 Madison Avenue New York, N.Y. 10016	1) International General Electric Company of Spain, S.A. Edificio Espana Avda. Jose Antonio 88 Madrid (13) Representations. 2) General Electrica Espanola, S.A. Plaza Federico Moyua 4 Bilbao Manufacturer of electric machinery and equipment. 3) Electrificacion Domestica Espanola, S.A. (E.D.E.S.A.) Cardenal Gardoqui 8 Bilbao Manufacturer and distribution of electric household appliances.

[illegible] Electric Company [illegible] Division [illegible] Avenue New York, N.Y. 10016 (Cont'd)	4) [illegible] Iberica [illegible], S.A. [illegible] Madrid (7) Electric power company. 5) [illegible] Bull de Espana Avda. del Generalisimo 74-C Madrid (16) Sales and service of electronic computers. Affiliate of General Electrica Espanola, S.A.: Sociedad Iberica de Construcciones Electricas, (SICE).
Monsanto Chemical Co. 800 Lindbergh Boulevard Saint Louis, Missouri 63166 (Through its Panamanian subsidiary).	1) Monsanto Agricola de Espana, S.A. Provenza 286 Barcelona (8) Manufacturer of feed supplements. 2) Aiscondel, S.A. Lepanto 350 Barcelona (13) Manufacturer of plastic materials. Affiliates of above concern: a) Monsanto Iberica, S.A. b) [illegible] Quimica, S.A. c) SADEN, S.A. de Desarrollos Industriales.
Phillips Petroleum Company Bartlesville, Oklahoma 74003	1) Calatrava, Empresa para la Industria Petroquimica, S.A. Avda. Generalisimo 20 Madrid (16) Petrochemicals manufacturer 2) [illegible], S.A. Carretera Sevilla-[illegible] Dos Hermanas (Sevilla) Manufacturer of plastic containers. 3) Phillips Calatrava [illegible], S.A. Autopista de Barajas Km 11.7 Madrid (2) Petrochemical products.

Standard Oil Co., (New Jersey) 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10020	1) Amoniaco Español, S.A. Alfonso XII, 14 Madrid (14) Fertilizer manufacturer. 2) Esso [illegible] Inc. Felix Boix 8, 2 Madrid (16) Petroleum exploration. 3) Esso Standard Espanola, S.A. Felix Boix 8, 2 Madrid (16) Sales subsidiary. 4) Inversiones Esso, S.A. Felix Boix 8, 2 Madrid (16) Industrial projects. 5) Esso de Petroleos Espanoles, S.A. Felix Boix 8, 2 Madrid (16) Oil refinery. 6) Fibras Esso, S.A. Felix Boix 8, 2 Madrid (16) Fiber manufacturer.
U. S. Steel Company 525 William Penn Place Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	Altos Hornos de Vizcaya Carmen 1 Baracaldo (Vizcaya) Manufacturer of iron and steel.
Westinghouse Electric International Co. 200 Park Avenue New York, N.Y. 10017 (Through its Swiss subsidiary).	1) Westinghouse Iberica, S.A. Serrano 27 Madrid (1) Representative Office 2) Constructora Nacional de Maquinaria Electrica, S.A. Avda. José Antonio 10 Madrid (14) Manufacturer of electrical machinery. 3) Industrias Electronicas y Electromecanicas de España, S.A. "INELEC" Carretera de Loeches 9 Torrejon de Ardoz (Madrid) Manufacturer of television and receivers.

14-00000

-7-

[illegible] Exhibit (Cont'd) [illegible] of Washington
D.C., U.S.A.

[illegible]
[illegible], D.C.

[illegible]

During our last session in Madrid, our bank representative (CL) and I discussed the possibility and advisability of recruiting ROBERT ROONEY as a bank advisor on a part-time basis. Bob has a public relations office which specializes in publicizing motion picture productions during the shooting phase and therefore has good contacts with producers, directors, actors, etc. In countries like Spain movie people are much sought-after by local businessmen and their spouses, and they frequently hobnob with the top echelons of society and government. (The Spanish government, incidentally, frequently subsidizes motion pictures which "portray the better aspects of our country.") Bob took me to a party hosted by Cesario Gonzalez, largest movie producer and distributor in Spain, and there I met the following: the Marques de Viesca de la Sierra (BANESTO bank), Joaquin de la Rosa (Mallorca ship-building family), Florentino [illegible] (Madrid's principal theatre owner), Ted Richman (producer of the Yul Brynner film), Lee J. Cobb, and several other people from Madrid's high-titled business community.

In addition to his open-sesame publicity job, Rooney has another big asset: his wife, [illegible], who is the most beautiful and charming woman I saw during my entire stay in Spain. Judging from the attention she received at the Gonzalez party, several of those upper-crust guests seemed to know the Rooneys quite well - I would guess that Barbara opens many doors for Bob. On one particular evening when I took the Rooneys to dinner at one of the better restaurants, we ran into Mr. and Mrs. Felipe Huarte (he's one of the brothers who own Huarte y Cia., one of Spain's largest construction companies and a client of Bob's), and both the Huartes gushed over Barbara and begged her to drop by for a Sunday brunch since Bob would be out of town on business.

I first met Rooney in Mexico City when he was handling publicity for the production of VIVA MARIA, a movie starring Brigitte Bardot and Jeanne Moreau. You may recall that I interviewed Moreau for DIALOGOS and was invited to spend several days with the company when it went on location near Veracruz. Well, during those few days Bob and I became rather close friends, and I had a good opportunity to observe him under a variety of circumstances, professional and otherwise. He's intelligent, discreet, holds his liquor well, and has the kind of inquisitiveness that could be useful to the bank. He seems rather nonpolitical to me, but I would assume that he probably votes Democratic.

Since he has just expanded his office, thereby increasing his overhead, Bob would probably welcome some additional cash and might therefore be amenable to recruitment. And, of course, we must bear in mind that his two associates are Casilda Ussia Figueroa and Gloria de las Barcenas, the two well-connected women I have mentioned elsewhere. It would be most helpful for us to have access to Rooney's cross-referenced list of "Spain's 500 top business and society people," which was prepared for him by the [illegible].

CD has asked if I could approach Rooney to work for us, and I very emphatically pointed it out that it would be much to risky. If he should turn us down - or even if he should accept - I would be fully exposed to him and to some of our mutual friends. Consequently, I think he should be approached (if, indeed, we decide to do so) by someone totally unrelated to me or to ICAP.

OPUS DEI AND THE INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS DE LA EMPRESA:

The INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS DE LA EMPRESA (generally known as IESE) is located in Barcelona and is a graduate school of the University of Navarre, which is directed by OPUS DEI. The director of this most impressive organization is Profesor Antonio Valero, who is also currently President of the European Association of Management Training Centers, of which IESE is an active member. The Instituto's work is carried out in several directions: basic and applied research, management training and executive development programs, education in business management for university students, international programs, documentation and information services, etc. Moreover, most of IESE's professors are engaged independently as consultants to private firms.

Top management officials from all parts of Spain attend the annual seminars of the Instituto, and there is little doubt that IESE is having and will continue to have a considerable influence in the business life of the country. An indication of OPUS DEI's direct influence is the fact that the Instituto's prospectus clearly states that "IESE [illegible] to cultivate, through its activities and its graduates, a professional [illegible] based on a Christian concept of the business [illegible] [illegible]." Although many Spaniards are apt to characterise the OPUS DEI as "overrated," two or three businessmen told me that "any young man who attaches himself to Opus Dei will have a head-start in business."

What surprised me most about the IESE is its close tie with the Harvard Graduate School of Business. A considerable proportion of its [illegible] faculty is Harvard-educated and many of the advisers and visiting professors are also from the "other side of the Charles River." On the detached sheet I have listed the names of IESE people who have attended Harvard's business school.

One should also note the practicality of the IESE directors in selecting Barcelona as its headquarters, even though the parent institution (the University of Navarre) is located in Pamplona.

[illegible]

[illegible] 51 [illegible] Harvard
Bus. School

ABADIA POCINO, Leopoldo
Doctor Ingeniero de Industrias Textiles, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Tarrasa.
ITP Graduate School of Business Administration, Universidad de Harvard.
Política de Empresa.

X

ALEGRET RICART, Alberto (*)
Doctor Ingeniero Naval, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Navales de Madrid.
Colaborador Científico.
Comportamiento Humano en la Organización.

ARANDA NICOLAS, Fernando
Ingeniero de Industrias Textiles, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Tarrasa.
Colaborador Científico Visitante.
Dirección Comercial.

ARGANDOÑA RAMIZ, Antonio.
Licenciado en Ciencias Económicas, Universidad de Barcelona.
Profesor Mercantil, Escuela de Altos Estudios Mercantiles de Barcelona.
Colaborador Científico.
Política de Empresa.

ARQUER ARMANGUE, Joaquín de
Doctor Ingeniero Industrial, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Barcelona.
Profesor Agregado.
Comportamiento Humano en la Organización.

BAÑARES MARTI, Guillermo (*).
Licenciado en Derecho, Universidad de Barcelona.
Colaborador Científico.
Relaciones Fiscales.

BULTO FONT, Manuel (*)
Licenciado en Derecho, Universidad de Barcelona.
Profesor Agregado.
Política de Empresa.

CAMACHO Y FERNANDEZ DE CASEDO, Fernando
Licenciado en Derecho, Universidad de Madrid.
Colaborador Científico Visitante.
Dirección Financiera.

CAVALLE PINOS, Carlos
Doctor Ingeniero Industrial, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Barcelona.
ITP Graduate School of Business Administration, Universidad de Harvard.
Profesor Agregado.
Dirección de Producción.

X

DIAMANTE CA[illegible] (*)
Doctor Ingeniero de Caminos, Canales y Puertos, E.T.S. de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos de Madrid.
Licenciado en Derecho, Universidad de Madrid.
Colaborador Científico.
[illegible] Cuantitativo.

[illegible] SOLE[illegible], Antonio
Licenciado en [illegible], Universidad de Valencia.
Profesor Agregado.
[illegible] Financiera.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible], José Manuel
[illegible] Industrial, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Bilbao.
[illegible]

[illegible], José María de (*)
[illegible] de Industrias Textiles, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Tarrasa.
[illegible] Científico.
[illegible] de Producción.



FARRÁN NADAL, Juan
Licenciado en Derecho, Universidad de Salamanca.
Licenciado en Ciencias Políticas y Económicas, Universidad de Madrid.
ITP Graduate School of Business Administration, Universidad de Harvard.
Profesor Agregado.
Dirección Comercial.

FAUS PASCUCHI, José
Doctor Ingeniero Industrial, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Barcelona.
Licenciado en Ciencias Matemáticas, Universidad de Barcelona.
Doctor of Business Administration, Universidad de Harvard.
Profesor Agregado.
Técnicas Matemáticas.

FERNÁNDEZ ROJAS, Máximo (*)
B.S. Universidad de Notre Dame, Indiana.
Profesor Agregado.
Dirección Financiera.

FIGUEROLA ESQUIUS, José
Doctor Ingeniero Industrial, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Barcelona.
ITP Graduate School of Business Administration, Universidad de Harvard.
Profesor Agregado.
Sistemas.

GALLO LAGUNA DE RINS, Miguel Angel
Doctor Ingeniero Industrial, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Barcelona.
Colaborador Científico.
Dirección de Producción.

GARCÍA-PLANAS VILARRUBIA, José María (*)
Ingeniero de Industrias Textiles, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Tarrasa.
Colaborador Científico.
Política de Empresa.

GINEBRA TORRA, Juan-B. (*)
Doctor Ingeniero Industrial, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Barcelona.
Profesor Agregado.
Dirección Comercial.

[illegible] Manuel (*)
[illegible] Profesional de Comercio de Sabadell.
[illegible] Social de Barcelona.
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] (*)
[illegible] E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Barcelona.
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] Ingeniero de Montes, E.T.S. de Ingenieros de Montes de Madrid.
[illegible] Ingeniero Geógrafo, Instituto Geográfico de Madrid.
[illegible] Graduate School of Business Administration, Universidad de Harvard.
[illegible]
Dirección Financiera.

LINATI BOSCH, José Antonio (*)
Licenciado en Derecho, Universidad de Barcelona
Colaborador Científico.
Política de Empresa.

MASIFERN SANS, Esteban
Ingeniero de Industrias Textiles, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Tarrasa.
ITP Graduate School of Business Administration, Universidad de Harvard.
Profesor Agregado.
Sistemas.

MASLLORENS GRAU, Jorge (*)
Licenciado en Derecho, Universidad de Barcelona.
Profesor Mercantil, Escuela de Altos Estudios Mercantiles de Barcelona.
Colaborador Científico.
Política de Empresa.

MESEGUER ALBIAC, Ramón
Licenciado en Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Barcelona
Colaborador Científico.
Comportamiento Humano en la Organización.

MUSTIENES LAGUARTA, José Antonio
Doctor Ingeniero de Industrias Textiles, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Tarrasa.
ITP Graduate School of Business Administration, Universidad de Harvard.
Profesor Agregado.
Dirección Comercial.

NEGRE VILLAVECCHIA, Antonio
Licenciado en Derecho, Universidad de Barcelona.
Colaborador Científico.
Dirección Financiera.

OCARIZ BRAÑA, Luis
Doctor Ingeniero Naval, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Navales de Madrid.
MIT Special Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Colaborador Científico.
Dirección de Producción.

[illegible] DE, José María
[illegible] E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Barcelona.
[illegible] Graduate School of Business Administration, Universidad de Harvard.
[illegible]
[illegible] Control.

[illegible] IGLESIAS, Luis
Licenciado en Derecho, Universidad de Zaragoza.
[illegible]
Dirección de Personal.

ASISTENTES DE INVESTIGACION

BONAREU VILAPLANA, José María
Ingeniero Industrial, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Barcelona.
Dirección de Producción.

[illegible] MASDEU, Antonio
Ingeniero Industrial, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Barcelona.
Dirección de Producción.

DOMÍNGUEZ DEL BRÍO, Francisco ⊙
Licenciado en Ciencias Económicas, Universidad de [illegible].
Profesor Mercantil, Escuela Superior de Comercio de Salamanca.
[illegible] Graduate School of Business Administration, Universidad de Harvard.
[illegible]

[illegible] PALLARÉS, Luis
Profesor Mercantil, Escuela de Altos Estudios Mercantiles, Universidad de Barcelona.
Licenciado en Ciencias Económicas, Universidad de Barcelona.
Dirección Financiera.

GÓMEZ LÓPEZ-EGEA, Sandalio Pedro.
Licenciado en Ciencias Económicas, Universidad de Madrid.
Comportamiento Humano en la Organización.

[illegible] GARCÍA, José ○
Ingeniero de Industrias Textiles, E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales de Tarrasa.
[illegible] Matemáticas

TORIBIO DÁVILA, Juan José △
Licenciado en Ciencias Económicas, Universidad de Barcelona.
Profesor Mercantil, Escuela Superior de Comercio de [illegible].
[illegible] Graduate School of Business Administration, Universidad de Harvard.
Política de Empresa.

(*) Con dedicación parcial a las actividades del IESE. Excepto, a dedicación completa:
[illegible] en la «Graduate School of Business Administration» de la Universidad de Harvard, durante el año académico de 1965-66.
[illegible] en la Universidad de Stanford, durante el año académico 1965-66.
[illegible] en la Universidad de Chicago, durante el año académico 1965-66.

[illegible]
[illegible] International University Centre, [illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] del Colegio de Agentes de Cambio y Bolsa de Barcelona

[illegible]
[illegible] Business Environment de la Graduate School of Business Administration de la Universidad de Harvard.

[illegible]
Presidente del Consejo de Administración de Sears Roebuck de España S. A.

LAW, Warren
Professor de Financial Management and Economic Analyses de la Graduate School of Business Administration de la Universidad de Harvard.

MANZANARES, Rafael
Técnico Comercial de la Dirección General de Expansión Comercial.

[illegible], Vicente
Comisario Adjunto al Plan de Desarrollo.

ORTIZ, Juan Antonio
Director del Instituto de Crédito a Medio y Largo Plazo.

OSORIO, Alfonso
Subsecretario de Comercio del Gobierno Español.

PETERFFY, George von
Profesor de Planning and the Business Environment de la Graduate School of Business Administration de la Universidad de Harvard.

PUIG ROJAS, Enrique
Técnico Comercial del Estado.

RABADÁN, Mariano
Secretario General de Sociedad Anónima de Documentación y Análisis Financiero, DOFISA y del Instituto Español de Analistas de Inversiones.

SAIAS, Maurice A.
Profesor de la Universidad d'Aix-Marseille.

SÁNCHEZ PEDREÑO, Antonio
Secretario General Técnico del Banco Europeo de Negocios.

SANTAMARÍA, Miguel Angel
Subdirector General de Expansión Comercial.

SEGARRA, Ignacio
Doctor en Derecho Canónico.

SWARUP, B. N.
Consejero de la Misión Permanente de la India ante la Oficina Europea de las Naciones Unidas.

TAGIURI, Renato
Profesor de Social Sciences in Business Administration de la Graduate School of Business Administration de la Universidad de Harvard.

UDINA, Santiago
Subsecretario de Obras Públicas.

VERNON, Raymond
Profesor de International Trade and Investment de la Graduate School of Business Administration de la Universidad de Harvard.

VILLAR MIR, Juan Miguel
Director General de Empleo.

(Indica el cargo que ostentaban cuando intervinieron en los Programas)

[illegible]:

Most of our contacts in Madrid feel that JUAN MARCH is probably the wealthiest and most influential industrialist in Spain, and I'm happy to note that I might be able to meet him on a casual social basis through an old friend and Harvard classmate, PAUL TEMPLE. Formerly president of Esso Iberica S.A., Paul is now president of Gas Natural S.A., a subsidiary of Catalana de Gas y Electricidad, which is principally owned by Juan March. I spent considerable time with Paul during my brief stay in Barcelona and I gathered (from certain remarks between him and an associate) that he has a close personal relationship with Juan and Bartolome March. He, in fact, offered to introduce me to Juan March on my next visit to Barcelona - probably for lunch or dinner. Moreover, Paul expressed great interest in my projected FORTUNE-style article on Spanish financiers and industrialists and has offered to advise me on the technical aspects and to introduce me to some of his business friends in Barcelona and Madrid.

ACCOUNTING

TRIP TO SPAIN

Advanced on June 24 by ICAP $1200

Expenditures:

25 June, 1967		
Taxi to NY airport + tip	$10.75	
Tips to skycaps	.50	
	11.25	11.25
26 June. 1967		
Tips to skycaps (Madrid)	.50	
Taxi to hotel (got gypped in unmetered cab)	4.00	
Tips at hotel	.75	
Hotel room	15.00	
Valet service plus tips	4.20	
Telegram	.50	
Breakfast	1.50	
Lunch w/ Echegaray + tip	13.20	
Drinks w/ Rooney + Gomez	7.80	
Cab fares	1.00	
Phone calls	.50	
Dinner w/ Rooney (my share only)	6.50	
	$55.45	$55.45

201-253203

27 June		
Laundry & valet	3.00	
Breakfast & tip	1.80	
Phone calls	.50	
Cab fares	1.00	
Lunch and drinks w/ Donald Daniels (movies)	13.50	
Drinks w/ Medina (ex-Californian)	4.20	
Hotel room	15.00	
Dinner w/ Medina (my share only)	7.20	
	46.20	46.20
28 June		
Breakfast	1.80	
Cab fares	1.00	
phone calls	.50	
Local dailies & mags	1.50	
Hotel room	15.00	
Lunch w/ Lopez-Munoz (attorney)	11.50	
Drinks w/ Ramatti (movie producer)	3.50	
Dinner w/ Bob Rooney & Cecilda Ussia	22.00	
Cab fare re above	1.20	
	58.00	58.00

③

29 June

Breakfast & tip	1.85	
Valet	2.00	
Laundry	4.10	
Hotel room	15.00	
Long distance call (NY office)	23.30	
Lunch	3.50	
cab fare & tips	1.20	
Drinks w/ Maria & tips	5.20	
Dinner w/ ~~Mr~~ Ted Richman & ed (magazine)	7.20	
	$63.35	$63.35

30 June

Breakfast & tip	1.80	
Long distance to home	27.18	
Hotel room	15.00	
Cab fare & tips	1.50	
Lunch w/ Echegaray (he's a glutton)	14.20	
Drinks w/ Daniels & Ramatti (movie people)	7.80	
local phone calls	.50	
	$67.98	$67.98

July 1, 1967

Breakfast	1.80	
Cab fares & tips	1.20	
phone calls	.60	
Drink w/ Medina & Gomez	3.00	
Lunch w/ Medina (my share)	6.20	
Hotel room	15.00	
Dinner w/ Rooney & Berenas	17.50	
Cab fare & tip	1.20	
	$46.50	$46.50

July 2, 1967

Breakfast	1.60	
Hotel room	15.00	
phone calls	.50	
Lunch w/ Richman & Steiner (movie producers)	21.50	
Cab fares & tips	1.60	
Dinner & tip	3.00	
	$43.20	$43.20

5.

July 3, 1967		
Breakfast	1.80	
Cab fares	1.50	
Valet	1.50	
Hotel room	15.00	
Dinner w/ Vesia & Barcena	21.50	
Drinks w/ Rooney	5.40	
phone calls	.60	
	47.30	47.20
July 4		
Breakfast	1.80	
Cab fares & tips	2.00	
Lunch w/ Train & Celegaray	17.20	
Hotel room	15.00	
phone calls	.60	
Laundry	5.40	
Valet	1.75	
Drink w/ Daniels	2.25	
Dinner w/ Rooney (Mr & Mrs)	13.20	
	59.20	59.20

July 5, 1967

Breakfast	1.70	
Cab fares + tips	1.90	
Phone calls	.60	
~~Hotel~~ Hotel room	15.00	
Book on "Primeras Impresas" (900 pts)	15.00	
Magazines + dailies	1.40	
Drinks w/ Richman + Cesario Gonzalez (movie people)	8.20	
Dinner w/ Richman (my share)	8.70	
Cab fare re above + tip	1.20	
	$53.70	$53.70

July 6.

Breakfast + tip	1.80	
Laundry	3.20	
Valet + tip	3.00	
Hotel room	15.00	
Phone calls	.70	
Lunch w/ Bobo Saavedra (cover)	11.20	
Drinks w/ Cafaratti + Medina	4.50	
Dinner w/ Gil Guardiola (attorney)	14.80	
Cab fares + tips	1.80	
	$56.00	$56.00

2966
1055

July 7, 1967

Breakfast & tip	2.10	
Cab fares & Tips	1.75	
Lunch w/ Echegaray (drinks)	12.70	
Hotel room	15.00	
Drinks w/ Richman & Lee J. Cobb (movie)	7.30	
	$38.75	$38.75

July 8

Breakfast & tip	1.80	
Hotel room	15.00	
Long distance call to office	27.18	
Lunch	3.25	
Cab fares & tips	1.40	
phone calls	.60	
Dinner w/ Casilda Usera (dined w/ Marques de Casa Tremañes and others - but paid for Usera's one)	19.20	
Cab fares re above & tips	1.90	
	$70.33	$70.33

July 9

Breakfast	1.70	
Cab fares	1.40	
Lunch w/ Ussia (our share of ~~[illegible]~~ lunch with movie crowd at Toledo)	14.80	
Hotel room	15.00	
Drinks w/ Ussia, Cobb, Domecq (Toledo)	7.40	
Phone calls.	.60	
Drink w/ Daniels	2.50	
~~[illegible]~~		
Dinner w/ Richman + Lee J. Cobb (my share only)	6.50	
	$49.90	$49.90

July 10

Breakfast + tip	1.80	
Laundry	5.10	
Valet	1.00	
Hotel room	15.00	
Lunch w/ Florentino Reyzabal (IZARO)	11.60	
Cab fares	1.40	
Dinner w/ Rooney + Joaquin de la Rosa (my share)	7.60	
Drink w/ Alonzo-Castrillo	3.00	
	46.50	$46.50

July 11, 1967

Breakfast + tip	1.50	
Hotel room	15.00	
Phone calls	.10	
Cab fares	1.40	
Lunch	2.70	
Drinks w/ Ussia, Rooney, Barcena	6.80	
Dinner w/ Ussia	10.50	
	38.00	38.00

July 12, 1967

Breakfast + tip	1.80	
Cab fares to + from BANIF + tips	1.40	
Lunch w/ Echegaray	9.10	
Cab to Madrid airport + tip	2.70	
Luggage - excess weight	2.90	
Tips to Madrid hotel maids	4.00	
Tips to hotel + airport porters	1.00	
Barcelona airport to Hotel	2.70	
Tips at Barcelona airport + hotel	1.00	
Hotel room	9.20	
Long distance call to NY office	32.75	
Dinner	3.80	
	72.85	72.85

July 13, 1967		
Breakfast + tip	1.80	
Hotel room	9.20	
Lunch w/ Paul Temple	12.80	
Cab fares	1.60	
Dinner w/ Luis Stumer (my share)	9.40	
Phone calls	.60	$35.40
	$35.40	
July 14		
Breakfast + tip	1.60	
Lunch w/ Stumer (my share)	3.20	
Cab to Barcelona airport + tip	2.70	
Tip to maid + porter (Barcelona)	1.30	
Tip at Barcelona airport	.50	
Excess weight (luggage)	1.50	
~~Cab~~ Bus + Cab fm from Paris airport to hotel	2.50	
Hotel room (Paris) + tax	25.00	
Drinks w/ Casilda Usera + fiance	6.20	
	$49.70	49.70

July 15

Breakfast + tip	1.90	
Hotel room	25.00	
Lunch	3.00	
Dinner w/ Ussia + fiancé (my share)	8.70	
Cab fares + tips	2.30	
	40.90	$40.90

July 16

Breakfast + tip	1.75	
Lunch	2.90	
phone calls	.70	
Drinks w/ Ussia	3.20	
Cab + bus to Paris airfield	2.70	
Tips at hotel + airport	1.00	
Tips at N.Y. airport	.75	
Taxi: NY airport to home + tip	10.75	
	23.75	$23.75

Misc:

Paris airport tax 25 Fr	5.00	
Barcelona ~~Mexico~~ airport tax	0.80	
	$5.80	5.80
Purchase of Travelers checks	12.00	12.00

Preparatory trip to Wash

June 20		
Cab from home to airport + tip	$8.25	
Lunch w/ Henry Koch (my share)	3.20	
Hotel room	18.90	
Cab fare to hotel from Wash airport	4.25	
Tips at airport + hotel	1.00	
Drink w/ Spanish Commercial attache	4.30	
Cab fares	1.60	
Long distance call to NY office	.83	
	42.23	$42.23
June 21		
Breakfast	1.80	
Lunch w/ Cong. Roybal (my share)	6.68	
Phone calls	.60	
Valet service + tip	1.25	
Cab to Wash airport + tip	4.25	
Tips at hotel + Wash airport	1.00	
NY airport to home + tip	8.25	
	23.83	$23.83

13.

TOTALS FOR TRIP TO SPAIN	$1092.01
TOTALS FOR TRIP TO WASHINGTON	66.06
	$1158.07

CREDIT CARD CHARGES FOR SPAIN	455.88
CREDIT CARD CHARGES FOR WASHINGTON	26.61
	$482.49

1158.07
482.49
PAID OUT IN CASH $675.58

TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	$1200.00
TOTAL CASH PAYMENTS	675.58
DUE ICAP CORP	$524.42

ADDENDUM:

~~AIRFARE~~

PLANE FARE TO SPAIN PAID BY ICAP	$526.30
PLANE FARE TO WASH. (CREDIT CARD ICAP)	33.00
	$559.30

[illegible]

1158.07
559.30
1717.37
104.60
123.54
$1945.51
286.00
$1659.51 To be [illegible] & [illegible]

Direct reimbursement to [illegible] under [illegible] [illegible]
for ops expenses not [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
to an unwitting account

$200.60
53.60
31.80
$286.00

30 June [illegible] balance sheet
3408.54
2750.00 WH received
658.54
526.30 [illegible]
132.24 to to [illegible] DO

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LUCE, CLAIRE BOOTH
[illegible] DOCUMENTS
(ARCHIVES)

INCLUSIVE DATES: ______

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: ______

ROOM: ______

DELETIONS, IF ANY: ______

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
1335 28 JUL 1978	7/25/78 4:30	Palmer	Betsy Palmer

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

"DO" RECORD MATERIAL

DUE DATE

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES, RM GA-50, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4598.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 3-77 1790 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

3. IP/EIS GA-10 S. Corbit			✓
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14. RETURN TO			
15. IP/ARD Rm ~~GE-50~~ GA-50			

FILE NO. Wash-Dir-OFF-OP-266

DOCUMENT: #9109

FOLDER:

PAGE:

BOX: 64

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Luce Clare 9109
middle east
Auchinleck

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

By Courier

November 14, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel:

You may have heard already about Mrs. Luce's campaign of political warfare in respect of the British Empire, but it's so interesting and so relevent to our operations that I am taking a chance on boring you with a repetition:

When Mrs. Luce went to the Middle East some time ago she had an interview with Auchinleck, among others, and obtained from him some extremely important and previously confidential information. According to one account, she even learned the date on which the British offensive in North Africa was due to begin. She wrote this information down in her notebooks -- and also inscribed her opinion of Auchinleck and of the British Administration in that part of the world and elsewhere, all of this in extremely uncomplimentary terms.

Previous to her return to America, she persuaded Monckton to put her notes under some kind of an official British seal with the idea that this would clear them without inspection, through any British posts she might be passing on her way home. In addition to these notes under seal, Mrs. Luce also had further notes in her possession which she wrote after the earlier material was sealed. When she arrived at the British censorship in Trinidad, a British official looked through her unsealed papers and found among them the notes in which she had expressed herself with considerable feeling on the British. The official was moved by this discovery to break the seal which Monckton had placed on the earlier material, and send that too. Mrs. Luce felt very strongly about this action, and protested with great feeling, but the official at Trinidad was not deterred.

So grave a view was taken in Trinidad of Mrs. Luce's notes, and most particularly of the information she had obtained from Auchinleck, that all the papers were sent to London. According to one version, they even went to Mr. Churchill himself. They were then sent to Washington--apparently to the White House. It was only after these several examinations that they were returned to Mrs. Luce.

This history is supposed to explain the disciplinary action taken against both Monckton and Auchinleck some time ago, and it's firmly believed in at least some quarters that Mrs. Luce's experience was not altogether unconnected with the "Open Letter" to the British people recently published in Life Magazine.

Shortly after Mrs. Luce's return to this country, she spoke at an off-the-record meeting of the Overseas Press Club in Washington about her travels and took a very strongly anti-British-Empire position. The meeting was more or less informal, and the atmosphere was friendly to her, so there seems to be no reason to suppose that she was provoked into saying anything she did not really mean. Among other things, she said at this meeting that the Suez Canal should be turned over to the Egyptians.

"When do you think this should be done?" she was asked.

"Right now," she replied.

"Does that go for the Panama Canal too--do you think that ought to be given back to Panama?" another correspondent present asked.

"Yes," Mrs. Luce replied. "It goes for Panama too."

I cannot guarantee this account of the latest stages in Mrs. Luce's political career, but it comes from extremely well informed and sober minded persons who are without prejudice.

Hope to see you again soon.

All the best.

Yours,

Wallie Deuel

14-00000

TO:

FOR ARCHIVES/RECORDS CENTER USE

"DO" RECORD MATERIAL

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES, RM GA-50, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4598

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 3-77 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

DUE DATE
9-26-78
13/5/78

3. ITB/3, GA-10			ok
4. IP/EIS GA10 Stella Corbat			✓
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. RETURN TO: IP/ARD/PSU GA-50			

To Requester:

Please return this referance to IP/ARD/PSU immediately after use.

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 76-789 BOX 44

RECORDS CENTER

JOB NO. 76-789

SPACE NO. 324138
324138

FILE NO Wash Reg-Int 78

DOCUMENT VAN-850

FOLDER NO. KCV-12c thru-Vol 9 39

BOX NO. 44

E2 IMPDET CL BY: 062147

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

"CS" RECORD MATERIAL

DUE DATE
[illegible]
[illegible]

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO RID/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, ~~RM GE-56~~, ~~ON OR BEFORE~~ DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION ________.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 12-62 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (41)

3. RID/CE Julian Edwards	2306 L		✓
4. AF/N J. Ainslee	2207 I		[illegible]
5. RI/CI			[illegible]
6. Nag Milovich RI/CE GA-E			[illegible]
7. SB/X/FE Toplin 4D39			BB
8. CI/RA 2C29 Paul Hartman		7 Oct 72	[illegible]
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14. RETURN TO			
15. RI/ARCHIVES	1232 R&S		

MUTILATE FOLDER.

D-1

DE-[illegible]

Copy H

FILE NO. Wash Reg INT 178

DOCUMENT: YKX 850

FOLDER:

PAGE:

BOX: ~~#~~ 13

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (OP-8) 7-56 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
X-2 Branch
[illegible]

Office of Origin: Kunming
Report No.: YKX- 850
Report Made At: Kunming
Date: 9 January 45
Period Covered:
Made By: BH/023
Subject: APPEARANCE OF COMMUNIST NEWSPAPER IN KUNMING
Classification: (Subversive Activities)
Status: ~~XXXXX~~ Pending
Reference:

Approximately four days ago one of the U. S. Agencies in Kunming managed to pick up a copy of THE UNDERGROUND, a Communist paper. It was the first time, as far as we could learn, that this paper had appeared. Nothing is known about where it is printed or how it is distributed.

The month is marked but no date, altho it appears quite regularly. During this past ten days three different editions have been picked up. These editions have been taken to the Intelligence Division of the OWI and there translated.

UNDEVELOPED LEAD: This office is making every endeavor, in cooperation with the Office of War Information in Kunming, to locate the source of this paper and also its backers. Further information will be reported as soon as had.

B4/023

VERIFIED

Evaluation:

Distribution: 2-Washington (1 Copy of translations attached)✓
1-Det. 202
1-Repro
1-New Delhi
1-[illegible]

Approved by: BH/015
Officer in Charge

SECRET

[illegible]能品。

戰

[illegible]

新加坡和近東所必需之[illegible]路，石油、橡皮、蔗糖和其他以百計的各種原料品，都要通過這條路運往日本本土。三年以來，因爲[illegible]日本的一個內湖。敵人已經不能在空中和[illegible]，因此他們的水路[illegible]

[illegible]

三艦隊飛機

襲香港汕頭廈門

台灣前日大半天在空襲中

[illegible]十五日電）[illegible]十三日[illegible]香港、汕頭、廈門，[illegible]共打沉日艦[illegible]十[illegible]艘，打傷二十八艘，[illegible]擊毀[illegible]一百十二架，[illegible]損失[illegible]十[illegible]

（[illegible]十五日[illegible]）台灣[illegible]本日午後[illegible]公報：「[illegible]」從十五日晨八時三十分到午後一時[illegible]台灣各部[illegible]，[illegible]台灣中部[illegible]、高雄和其他各地，[illegible]

（[illegible]十五日[illegible]）：中國[illegible]上[illegible]的[illegible]飛機七十架，今日上午九時三十分起，[illegible]之久。

[illegible]十四日[illegible]所得的結論[illegible]世界安全[illegible]中，[illegible]世界[illegible]太平洋[illegible]

[illegible]到各[illegible]公布[illegible]世界。[illegible]

如此人事[illegible]行

[illegible]

監院大批彈劾案

包括：中茶公司、長沙市警察局、[illegible]郵政儲金匯業局、三家銀行[illegible]市公用事業和公共汽車管理局[illegible]等機關

（中央社[illegible]）監察院[illegible]公布[illegible]：本年九月間[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]運輸隊每月可運物資七

、八萬噸來華

（中央社[illegible]十五日[illegible]）[illegible]

[illegible]

貴州省政府改組

政院任楊森爲省主席，吳鼎昌調任國府文官長。

（中央社[illegible]）[illegible]

[illegible]

央打字機行

本行擇於一月十五正式開幕專爲各機關學校團體試貨服務修理工精配件迅速如蒙 賜顧無任歡迎

（池中新建中三路上〇號（兩路口郵局對面）

LOG DATA

FOR ARCHIVES/RECORDS CENTER USE

SPACE NUMBER

NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS SENT | NOTIFIED

"DO" RECORD MATERIAL

DUE DATE 13/5/78

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES, RM GA-50, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4598.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 3-77 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

3. Stella Corbat IP/E15 GA10			✓
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. RETURN TO: IP/ARD/PSU GA-50			

To Requester:

Please return this reference to IP/ARD/PSU immediately after use.

RECORDS CENTER

JOB NO. 57-75

SPACE NO. 408112

FILE NO. Central File 7751

DOCUMENT

FOLDER NO.

BOX NO. 30

E2 IMPDET CL BY: 062147

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OUT

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd SA ....

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Dep Dir		5/3	5/12	[illegible]	1. Routing for info.
2. Far East		5/14		[illegible]	
3. [illegible]		5/15	5/1	[illegible]	
4. N. East		5/15	5/1	[illegible]	
5. W. Eur.		5/16	5/18	[illegible]	
6. Afr.		5/18	5/20	[illegible]	
7. Prod. Off.		5/21		[illegible]	
8. Files					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 1755

Date Rec'd SA 5/29/42

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Ofr	1281		1-8	JB	
2. Registry					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in *To* column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

Mr. Shapiro.

[illegible]

5/18/42 DW

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: David Williamson

From: W. J. D.

Please have your people read the attached memorandum from Dr. Mason. What I am interested in is the suggestion from Perry Jester that we might win over various Vichy agents in Africa. I would like to have your views as to whether Jester should be talked with and that suggestion of his explored.

Please return the enclosure, after it has served your purpose.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

May 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO Colonel William J. Donovan

FROM Edward S. Mason

SUBJECT J.I.C. Sub-Committee Meeting, May 12, 1942 (W.W. Rostow attending)

The Sub-Committee is undertaking three new papers:

German Manpower Losses

French Capabilities as an Active Axis Ally

Russian Capabilities

The first paper is assigned to COI for preparation. Responsibility for the preparation on Russian Capabilities is also assigned to this office, it being understood that the military section on the Western front will be undertaken with the cooperation of Colonel Montague and that the military aspects of the Siberian area will be covered by Commander Kenney. A Sub-Committee consisting of Commander Foskett, Dr. Hornbeck, Col. Meloy and Col. Fortier will undertake the preparation of the paper on French Capabilities as an Active Axis Ally.

Mrs. Clare Luce then addressed the meeting and a report of her remarks is appended.

E. S. M.

cc with enc. Dr. Baxter
Major Bruce

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

J.I.C. Meeting, May 12, 1942 - Statement of Mrs. Clare Luce

I Background

Mrs. Luce travelled to the Middle and Far East via the Trans-African ferry route, visiting Burma, India, and the Middle East. She had extensive opportunities for formal and informal conversation with the major military and political figures, as well as various operating airmen, soldiers, and correspondents. She carefully distinguished the quality of her sources, indicating where her views were based on observed facts, official statements, or gossip.

II Burma and China

Mrs. Luce arrived at Lashio at the time of the visit of Chiang and Madame Chiang. Their intervention was required not only to facilitate cooperation between the British and General Stillwell's Chinese forces, but also to enforce discipline on the Chinese generals nominally under Stillwell. It was rumored that a major opportunity to defeat the Japanese was lost at Tongou due to the unwillingness of the Chinese generals to obey Stillwell and attack. The arrival of the Chiangs was immediately known to the Japanese who bombed the Headquarters area for the first time in force. Mandalay, which Mrs. Luce saw immediately after the main bombing attack early in April, was leveled and deserted, with two to five thousand dead left in the ruins.

In a long conversation with Madame Chiang great bitterness was expressed against the British. Madame Chiang went back to Hong Kong, the Treaty Ports, and the Opium War, ending up with Wavell's failure to accept Chinese assistance in Burma. Madame Chiang indicated, however, that she would not accept a negotiated peace under any circumstances with the Japanese, recalling the Japanese occupation of Nanking. Under questioning Mrs. Luce stated that she did not believe the Japanese would move in force against China. All Intelligence sources in Chungking believe that the Japanese will move against Russia before June of this year. As for India Mrs. Luce stated that a full-fledged invasion by land forces seemed unlikely in the immediate future, but that bombing attacks on the Calcutta area were very likely -- these designed to exploit the political instability there and the concentration of Indian industrial strength.

In general Mrs. Luce believes that the British in Burma fought as well as their resources permitted. The R.A.F. was bombed out of Magwe early, leaving the main operations without air protection. The British claim that their radio directional finders were sabotaged by the Burmese Fifth Column; elsewhere gossip stated that the finders had been withdrawn prior to the Japanese attack. The one hundred British tanks proved ineffective as the main highway, on which they could operate, was flanked by forests through which the Japanese filtered. The presence of American technicians in the Burma oil fields probably guaranteed thorough destruction. Elsewhere there was "no earth worth scorching". The British General Alexander expressed the general belief that the failure in Burma was, in the long run, unimportant; that after the defeat of Hitler the Japanese could easily be driven out. This blandness seemed to characterize the view of almost all Britishers in the Far East, although the Viceroy of India expressed regret that, for the sake of the Indians, British control in India would "not survive another fifty years".

Mrs. Luce visited the headquarters of the A.V.G. She expressed the hope that they would not be kept alive as a unit, but that their experience in fighting Japanese planes would be transferred to American pilots in training, especially at Karachi. She felt that neither the A.V.G. nor General Stillwell should return to China, despite their obvious value in maintaining and American link and American prestige. General Stillwell has apparently distinguished himself, under most trying circumstances, by his comradeship with the Chinese and his willingness to share front-line dangers and hardships. At a time when the Chinese are extremely sensitive, General Stillwell's attitude and action were of great importance.

III India

Indian morale is extremely low, lower in fact than before the Cripps Mission. The net result of the Mission appears merely to have strengthened Gandhi and the policy of passive resistance. Mrs. Luce believes, however, that, in a short run at least, there is nothing wrong with the morale of the Indians and the Chinese that could not be corrected by a couple of substantial victories. Wavell, in a letter to Mrs. Luce expressed himself as more concerned about Indian morale and possible military consequences of that situation, than with the strictly military aspects of defense. Mrs. Luce spoke very highly of General Brereton as a member "of that new race, the air man". It is Brereton's view that no important action should be taken by the air force under his command until they are in a position of local superiority; he did, however, "leak a little", by bombing the Andaman Islands and Rangoon. Mrs. Luce believes that a first-line air force maintained at 300 planes in India could defeat the Japanese in any move in that direction.

IV Middle East

General Maxwell is reported to be extremely popular in the Middle East; while General Adler was unpopular, possibly due to his forthrightness in criticising the British methods. Mrs. Luce visited the most advanced tank station in the British controlled desert area. She found numerous complaints, not specified, about American equipment. In general, however, she holds that the British have done a good job in the desert.

The British in Cairo have had extensive and chronic difficulties with their various allies. A Jugoslav revolution almost took place in Cairo while she was there. The Poles, Jugoslavs and French appear unwilling to enter British air units but hold out for independent air squadrons. The one hundred thousand Poles, "dumped across the border by Russia" were reported by gossip to have been turned down by Wavell and Auchinlech, successively, and then shipped to Britain. Mrs. Luce stated that the

British have been trapped by their own propaganda on behalf of their minor allies; and that the allies now overestimate their contribution to the war effort and steadily make trouble.

The biggest problem, however, throughout Africa and the Middle East, is that of inducing a shorter turn-around for shipping. At every port the complaint is the same, the blame being distributed between British administrators and the American Maritime Unions. The flow of planes over the Trans-African route was, at the time of Mrs. Luce's passage, very thin. She reported heavy fighter plane losses by crack-up; and a total lack of preparedness against air attack (in Liberia, Takoradi, Lagos, Fort Lamy, etc.).

Mrs. Luce passed along a statement from a Free French administrator in Lagos that extensive air preparations are under way in Morocco; and she quoted Perry Jester, American Consul at Lagos, now in the United States, as believing that it would still be possible to win over various Vichy agents and territories in West Africa.

W. W. Rostow

R. Boulton

May 5, 1942

Maj. David Bruce

Report by Mr. Jester, Consul at Lagos

In the early part of April the attached abstract of file 1896 (accessioned about April 1) was prepared at the request of Mr. Shapiro. There subsequently came to the attention of the African Section the attached memorandum to Colonel Donovan from Mr. Kimbel on the same subject. It would appear that (1) Colonel Donovan must have seen Mr. Kimbel's memorandum of March 12 already and (2) that the present abstract of file 1896 is now possibly inappropriate.

Lest this very important matter may have become sidetracked or mislaid through some accident of routine, I send you herewith all the pertinent data of which I have knowledge.

R. B.

ABSTRACT OF FILE 1896

Subject: Report of Perry N. Jester re Organization of Consular Service in West Africa

To: Frank Mauran

1. Mr. Mauran believes that "American activities (presumably all activities besides shipping) must be coordinated."

2. Mr. Jester believes his reports and recommendations to the State Department are filed without adequate study.

3. Mr. Jester remarks that "one of our most important and urgent needs.....is a better set up of our consular representation (in West Africa)". He is "firmly convinced" that:

a. The Lagos office should be a Consulate-General.

b. That other consular representatives in British West Africa should report through and coordinate with the Lagos office.

c. That independently reporting consuls at other posts in British West Africa should not be appointed.

d. That the Consul General should be a ranking Foreign Service Officer (of Class 4) middle-aged and experienced.

e. That the U. S. Consular organization in West Africa should be set up in accord with the controlling economic and political factors on the coast.

f. That the best organization would be as follows:

Lagos - Consul General (to be concerned with "larger issues of our over-all policy, our trade policy, our relations with West African governments, the effect of British Colonial policy on our interests and the relations (in cooperation with an independent American Consul at Dakar) of British and French colonies and policies."

Two Consular officers (to be concerned with Nigerian problems alone.)

Accra - One Consul (to be concerned with Gold Coast problems, Accra being the military center of B.W.A. and of importance principally for the shipment of bauxite, mahogany and manganese).

Freetown - One Consular Agent (because of the Naval importance of Freetown).

Bathurst - One Consular Agent (because of the importance of this point to air communications). This would be welcomed by the Governor of Gambia.

These recommendations and opinions and the irregular method used of bringing them to attention are arrived at from a consideration of the following points:

a. Mr. Jester has no personal interest since his tour of West Africa is almost finished.

b. Lagos is the political and economic center of British West Africa with a larger territory, larger population, and larger commerce than any other colony.

c. Lagos is the seat of the British West African Governor's Conference and this arrangement after the war is believed certain to continue anddto develop into a Governor Generalship of British West Africa.

d. The headquarters of the principal oil, shipping and trading companies is at Lagos.

e. Lagos was the site of headquarters of the Franck Economic Mission.

f. Not only now but after the war West Africa will be of increasing importance to the U.S. since British discrimination against U.S. trade will nevitably decline and development of our opportunities could now be implemented by strong and efficient consular representation.

4. "The official U.S. activities in the Gold Coast are in an uncoordinated mess", as a result overlapping of function and activities and division of authority of the

1. U.S. War Shipping Administration
2. U.S. Military Observer
3. U.S. Ferry Command
4. Barber Wst African Line

Abstracted by R.B.

14-00000

IP/AR
GA-50

TUBE GT-7

Aug 78	76-1971	76	2
DOCUMENT FILE NUMBER Wash-CA-PRO	DOC. SYMBOL & NO. 385	DOC. DATE (mth-day-yr) 24	

FROM:

[illegible]
REQUESTER'S AREA, STAFF & BRANCH

CA/[illegible] [illegible]
ROOM NO. PHONE TUBE

[illegible] Corbit
REQUESTER'S NAME - PLEASE PRINT

SUBJECT OR TITLE: Luce, Clare Booth

ACTION REQUESTED

☒ TEMPORARY CHARGE ☐ WILL RETURN IN 30 DAYS ☐ INDEFINITE ☐ PERMANENT RETENTION ☐ INFORMATION ONLY

TYPE REQUEST

☐ ROUTINE ☒ TELEPHONE PRIORITY (next available run see no. 1 below) ☐ SPECIAL PRIORITY (Requires exclusive run see no. 2 below)

TIME NEEDED: DATE (day-mth) TIME

RMO OR AUTHORIZED DESIGNEE SIGNATURE

MATERIAL TO BE USED FOR (√ check one)

☐ FOIA ☐ PRIVACY ACT ☐ OTHER (specify)

REMARKS:

OCC

SP

NOTE

1. MATERIAL IS RECEIVED IN IP/AR AT 12:30 AND 4:30.
2. SPECIAL PRIORITY REQUESTS MUST BE AUTHORIZED BY RMO OR AUTHORI

IP/AR USE

RESTRICTED TO

REQUEST CLERK CA

3

CONFIDENTIAL CL. BY: 062147

[illegible]			
7. [illegible] 10 [illegible]			
8. [illegible] 4C44 Puchnick			
9. RID/CLR Reedy, Elli 9G10			
10. CI/SI 2B405 Hayes, Ruth	7 June 71	rh	
11. CI/SIG 2B405 H. [illegible]	1 July		
12. C/RQA [illegible] 2E17		✓	
13. D. Hyles GA-10 S. Corbit			
14. RETURN TO			
15. RID/ARD Rm ~~GE 50~~ CA-50			

Job 71 ~~1997~~
Space 319424

FILE NO Wash-CA-PRO-385

DOCUMENT:

FOLDER: 10

PAGE:

BOX: 1

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OP-81 F-64 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

Nov. 17 Munson phoned from N.Y. (see Memo). He had a long phone conversation with Shub that p.m., and hopes [illegible] in person Nov. 21. They both seem to want [illegible] the book.

Nov. 20 Sims saw Munson at hotel. Munson expects to see Shub tomorrow. Suren is going to do the book.

Dec. 14 Letter from Shub. "My collaborator is one of the top lay-out men on Life...." Munson will fill in on the details. Phoned Munson: will see him tomorrow morning. He said he was "re-assured by developments last week & thinks things will work out OK."

Jan. 8, 1951 Munson told Sims "Shub should be arriving soon".

Jan. 15 MEMO to LST on status of Photo-book, by request.

" " X SHUB phoned: text of book is completed. See above Memo.

Jan. 16 Phoned MUNSON. He will fly later today to see Bob Winston, who will return to him several papers on behalf of Bob [illegible].

no TS

SECRET

14-00000

Continued in

folder #2

no TS

SECRET

22 May 1951

Ray Millard says B. Shub
is a Covert Staff Agent.

HSS.

Boris told me 25 May '51
this is incorrect; he is a
covert contract agent.

SECRET

21 May 1951

If you decide you really need any of these, please let me know promptly, citing the XYZ number, so I can get the necessary permission. It shouldn't be too difficult to get permish, especially for ##2, 3, 6, and 7.

There are some dozen other 1941 Lithuania photos, but (a) some are very blurred; (b) they aren't dated nor located more closely than "victims of NKVD Lithuania 1941", i.e. it might be corpses or torture chambers anywhere. So you don't want them do you?

Am searching for the other items you asked for on the phone.

Bill

Sending photos ##XYZ—1 to 7 to Shub this afternoon.

21 May 1951

file "STALIN - PHOTO-BOOK

RE: Reproductions of CIA Graphics photos, given to WSS by DCS 17 May 1951. DCS requested them from Graphics several weeks before. Sent to him with a covering note from Dick Cornish, saying that Graphics forgot to omit the CIA captions. Cornish cut out the CIA numbers, but left the captions.

I have filed most of these in my folder PHOTOS.

The following I am sending to Shub, having cut out the CIA-typed captions and written same, in sterilized form, with the XYZ numbering, on the back.

I am reminding Shub that they can't be used without clearance by Graphics.

XYZ—1...USSR Asiatic RSFSR Primorsk Region VLADIVOSTOK 43 08 N 131 54 E
SECOND RIVER CONCENTRATION CAMP. 1946. CONFIDENTIAL.

XYZ—2...Germany, Brandenburg near Oranienburg 52 45 N 13 15 E
Sachsenhausen, former Nazi Concentration Camp, now used by Soviets. It is reported that there are 14,500 men and 1,500 women, mostly political prisoners, confined in this camp. June 1949. RESTRICTED.

XYZ—3...LATVIAN SSR RIGA 56 56 N 24 41 E
Soviet Deportation Car. 1941. RESTRICTED.

XYZ—4...Hungary Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun Budapest 47 30 N 19 02 E
Hangman loops strangling noose about neck of enemy of Communism in courtyard of old Marko Jail. 1948. CONFIDENTIAL.

XYZ—5...Hungary Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun Budapest 47 30 N 19 02 E
Enemies of Communism are strangled in courtyard of old Marko Jail. 1948. CONFIDENTIAL.

XYZ—6...USSR Lithuanian SSR
Corpse of the rector of Lankeliskiai tortured to death by the NKVD. 1941. RESTRICTED.

XYZ—7...USSR Lithuania SSR
Row of corpses of Lithuanian workers in sugar refinery murdered by the NKVD. 1941. RESTRICTED.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 May 1951

PHONED SHUB

Lou Scherer ([illegible]) phoned to say that he had to see Levitas, editor of New Leader, in connection with a new project, and with several other matters. Would like to see him for about an hour. CSP had suggested I ask Boris Shub to arrange the appointment.

I phoned Boris Shub, and phoned Scherer back that Shub would meet him at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow in the bookstore below (?) the NL office at 7 E. 15 St. Shub will introduce Scherer to Levitas at 11.

Re PHOTO BOOK

Boris said there are 3 matters which "we can live without, but it would distinctly strengthen the book if you could perhaps get them at the Library of Congress."

(1) It is conceivable that there exist photos of crowds being fired upon in Nov.—Jan. 1917-1918, in connection with rioting on the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. (See Shub's Lenin).

(2) Fighting in Moscow, Nov. 1917 (There was no fighting in Petersburg).

(3) Collectivization. Some think it is conceivable there exist photos of peasants being shipped north to Siberia during Collectivization.
Cf. CIA Graphics?
Cf. Library of Congress.

Maj Journal

Re RUSSIANS AS ALLIES

Boris has just heard from a Russian friend, and has sent to London for confirmation —seen nothing in the papers about it here— that there has been formed in London a BRITISH SOCIETY FOR A FREE RUSSIA, with Major Hilton (author and ex-military attache in Moscow) as president and the Duchess of Atholl as vice-president. Encouraging, he thought.

He also mentioned the FREEDOM UNION FOR GERMAN-RUSSIAN FRIENDSHIP reported in the May 11 NY Herald-Trib, with Mayor Reuter and some Russians among the members.

Re PHOTO BOOK

LAY-OUT of the book received from Munson in SP/PW today.

SECRET

19 May 1951

DICK

Our man "can live without, but it would help greatly to tie the book together."

(1) Photos of crowds being fired upon during rioting, Nov. 1917—Jan. 1918, in connection with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

Page 282 of Lenin by David Shub says: "The Assembly was scheduled to open on the morning of January 18, 1918. In anticipation of the long-awaited event, Lenin ordered a detachment of Lettish sharpshooters to PETROGRAD (St. Petersburg, now Leningrad; might be listed under any one of these names in Graphics files?).

(2) Fighting in Moscow, Nov. 1917. (There was no fighting in Petrograd, he says).

(3) Photos of peasants being shipped north to Siberia during Collectivization. Some think it "conceivable" they may exist. That would be around 1932, 1931 I guess.

He suggests trying:

1. CIA Graphics, Bldg 14. (Mr. Kessinger; used to be ex-2657
Mr. Beattie too).

2. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

You could ask Chuck Vetter whether he could arrange for you, without too much trouble to get into the place and borrow any photos they have, in the name of CIA, for a month or a couple of weeks (longer, if possible of course) for our man to make copies of.

I think it really would improve the book if you could get #(1) for them.

Many thanks.

WSS

14-00000

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* 53-50

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

SECRET

26

Control: 11327
Rec'd: April 23, 1951
4:51 p.m.

IE
Info

P
GER
OLI
CIA
DCR

FROM: Frankfort

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 8583 April 23, 8 p.m.

Recent discussions with Lunt, INP, pamphlet with comic, Soviet combative possibilities proposed, with thought giving publication attribution to local group to be determined. Urge INP's publications branch dummy up along following lines for production here: pocket size format, eight pages. Cover to carry photograph Stalin in friendly greeting with high-ranking, current party boss in good standing from one satellite countries. Title to reflect theme "Stalin's friends". Each page of inside book to carry photograph Stalin in friendly pose with such fallen, one-time heroes or friends of Sov Union as Trotsky, Hitler, Bucharin, Tito, Clementis or others dependent on existence pictures in archives.

Captions for pictures can be taken from one of two sources or both. Either original photo caption or quotation from that era when "friend" was in favor, or a later quote from a denunciatory statement concerning the fallen man. Possibly both quotes could be used, the former above, the latter below the pictures. Suggest most careful research be made for most succinct quote to carry off this idea. Request reaction soonest.

MCCLOY

PAF:DES

Copy for SP/PW files.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

18 May 1951

SECRET

RE "STALIN" PHOTO BOOK

(also KMFUNNY "Communist Zoo)

We sent in report on 17 May.

SDG saw MUNSON from 11 to 12.40

A thorough review of the whole set-up. Munson stressed two points:

(1) "The book must be locked up by July 31." Otherwise it couldn't be printed in September. And in that case it might be necessary to wait till about next March.

(2) "It must bex the sort of book that Doubleday might be putting out." Firstly, because if it is "too propagandistic" the retailers just won't handle it (cf details re C.Zoo). Secondly, "Swen is still secure, stands up well under Dun & Bradstreet examination, and has been a great success in the FE. It has the NY reputation of a Far Eastern firm which does unusual things in the US. Swen as a going concern is more important than any one book: the book shouldn't be allowed to jeopardize Swen by being too obviously propaganda."

I returned the layout to him. (He has not seen the text either, nor I think the other 60-odd pages). He doesn't plan to tell Shub we've seen it. He recommended that we give Shub another week to continue on it. Then that, about Monday, May 28, Sims and/or Brynn go down to NY for 2 or 3 days and work with Shub on it.

NB: He said that, later, it might be possible for Shub to introduce me to his collaborator as an informal consultant whom he'd called in. In other words, in attempting to sell our views of it to Shub, we have also the problem of whether Shub could sell them in turn to his collaborator. And Security.

We both gave our views of the book at length.

Lyle's views included: that with the text it may be better than it looks; that there's 66 pages to come; that it is better to get out something than nothing; that we can always do a 2nd or revised version; that we must face facts and not put out a book which a high percentage of retailers simply won't handle; He also, at the start, said something along the lines of what I regard as Shubian erroneous doctrine: that we should show the responsibility that the USA and Germany (Hitler?) had for the state of affairs in the USSR; I said all such things might be sub-themes, if they could be tucked in without detracting from the main themes, but that I thought they were very dubious: 172 pages isn't enuf to show what a bad man and regime it is.

Omit all this

My views, agreeing with much he had said, included: that we ought to put out something that the man in the barber-shop, anywhere in the world, would leaf through and couldn't turn over more than 3 or 4 consecutive pages without beginning to think: "This really must be a bad man, killing that many of his own cabinet." That we should not attempt either an exhaustive or even consecutive chronological treatment of the 71 years since 1879 or even since 1905 or 1917. Just hammer home main points, such as that they had a Constituent Assembly, until Lenin killed it by force and fraud, etc.

[illegible]

SECRET

That the main themes should be such as: SECRET anti-Christianity + all other religion

He kills & kills & kills
He lies & lies & lies
They defect & defect & defect
The worshippers return disillusioned, in droves
The top CP men get liquidated as soon as Stalin takes over, in:
Bulgaria
Hungary
Czechoslovakia (Clementis trial coming up), etc etc

That what we should include is the things that differentiate them from us, after everything that can be said against us has been said: The things they DO DO, that we don't do.

That we are putting ourselves behind the 8-ball, to invite interminable arguments in re diplomatic history. Historians are still arguing about whether England, Austria or Russia was most responsible for W W I. It is folly to waste space attacking Stalin because he fought the Finns in order to get better defenses for Leningrad, —as we might fight anyone who threatened the Panama Canal. Or even to try too hard to pin WW II on him. (It is still at least arguable that it wd have taken place, in some form, even if Russia had still been Tsarist. After all, there has been much carnage long before Stalin was even born.)

We should, to be sure, touch the War and Peace theme, which means so much the world over. But the way to do it is to establish beyond doubt that the man is and always has been bad, ditto the regime; they both tolerate no opposition: therefore they are, in "self-defense" expansionist. But let us do this with broad, repetitive strokes, not get bogged down in the details of Munich, the Finnish War, Pearl Harbor.

We agreed that the best we can do, in all the circs, is to ~~ax~~ try once more to sell this view to Shub, and content ourselves with whatever result we can get.

NO

In view of past failures to sell Boris on the subject (at least on many points), I'm not too optimistic. I think we should:

(1) Devil's advocate him on the pictures we think should be scrapped;

(2) Get a promise from him that he will give some space to certain topics such as the SLAVE LABOR MAP and a display of, say, a dozen of the "11 Years in Soviet Camps" type of authors; a display of the "God That Failed" ~~man~~

I stressed that JBIII and self would be only too delighted if Boris can convince us it is better than we fear.

RE $90,000. I asked what about this figure, which I had heard mentioned yesterday. Lyle said that Swen's investment in it would be amounting to about that. I asked if FE or SP would have to produce that sum. He said NO, Swen's budget is sufficient to cover it, as is.

Doubt

RE ROYALTIES FOR SHUB. He said the collaborator would be getting 7½%, which he thought might bring him in $60,000. He thought it might be justifiable —"discuss it with Legal and Joe"— that Boris's contract should be amended so that he would get a portion of the royalties that nominally come to him, insofar

SECRET

as they exceed his annual salary. I asked "What portion?" and Lyle said "oh, perhaps ¼ or 1/3," which, if the excess were $12,000 —a figure Lyle suggested as possible— would bring him in an extra $4 or $6,000.

Shub's contract with CIA expires 31 Dec. 1951. His contract with Swen, Lyle pointed out, would still be in effect after that. / But his contract with ~~Xxxx~~ CIA would still no doubt obligate him to return royalties to CIA, i.e. Swen, even after 31 Dec. 1951. /

I said this mightn't be a bad idea, as Shub may tend to go somewhat sour, seeing his collaborator getting his much larger salary and 7½% royalties on top of that. On second thoughts, however, it is doubtless a very poor precedent —and we could perhaps obtain and quote to Shub CIA Legal's opinion to that effect— that OPC employees should take royalties from commercial enterprises with which they happen to be connected.

I believe he is paid quite a generous figure, which ought to keep a married man with no dependents ahead of the Collector of Internal Revenue. If not, or if it is thought he is really worth more, the possibility of suggesting to him a salary raise, when his contract as Agent comes up for renewal, could be considered. At any rate, in the interests of keeping his morale up during the final phases of work on the book, I suggest the whole matter should be handled not too brusquely.

RE "COMMUNIST ZOO", and refusal of many US retailers to handle it, see attached Memo of Record of what Munson told me.

Munson: "We have to face plain facts. My experience with "CZ" shows that we have to mix in glasses of orange juice with the castor oil. "CZ" is about as vicious as the traffic will bear. If the "Stalin" photo-book smacks too strongly of propaganda, a lot of retailers just won't even handle it."

CONCLUSION. We should stay in NY long enuf to

✓ (a) Hear everything Shub can say in defense of his version;

✓ (b) Do a strong debil's advocate job against the pages we think he should delete

✓ (c) Insist that, in the remaining 66 pages, certain topics must be adequately dealt with: Slave Labor, Defections, Cultural Purges, Purges of top Communists in Iron Curtain countries.

Hm (d) Hope for the best and be prepared to accept what may be a not too satisfactory bargain, —especially in view of what Lyle says about retailers, and about maintaining Swen's reputation.

WSS

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

17 May 1951

PHONED SHUB

Lou Scherer (WE) phoned to say that he had to see Levitas, editor of New Leader, in connection with a new project, and with several other matters. Would like to see him for about an hour. CSP had suggested I ask Boris Shub to arrange the appointment.

I phoned Boris Shub, and phoned Scherer back that Shub would meet him at 10.50 a.m. tomorrow in the bookstore below (?) the NL office at 7 E. 15 St. Shub will introduce Scherer to Levitas at 11.

Re PHOTO BOOK

Boris said there are 3 matters which "we can live without, but it would distinctly strengthen the book if you could perhaps get them at the Library of Congress."

(1) It is conceivable that there exist photos of crowds being fired upon in Nov.—Jan. 1917-1918, in connection with rioting on the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. (See Shub's Lenin).

(2) Fighting in Moscow, Nov. 1917 (There was no fighting in Petersburg).

(3) Collectivization. Some think it is conceivable there exist photos of peasants being shipped north to Siberia during Collectivization.

Cf. CIA Graphics?
Cf. Library of Congress.

Re RUSSIANS AS ALLIES

Boris has just heard from a Russian friend, and has sent to London for confifmation —seen nothing in the papers about it here— that there has been formed in London a BRITISH SOCIETY FOR A FREE RUSSIA, with Major Hilton (author and ex-military attache in Moscow) as president and the Duchess of Atholl as vice-president. Encouraging, he thought.

He also mentioned the FREEDOM UNION FOR GERMAN-RUSSIAN FRIENDSHIP reported in the May 11 NY Herald-Trib, with Mayor Reuter and some Russians among the members.

Re PHOTO BOOK

LAY-OUT of the book received from Munson in SP/PW today.

SECRET

SECRET

re STALIN PHOTO-BOOK

From CFW's Log for 17 May 1951

This morning I spent an hour and a half with Lyle Munson and Mrs. ~~Sherry?~~ Vinson (FE), going over Boris Shub's narrative-in-pictures of the career of Stalin. Lyle showed us 114 finished layouts / i.e. 57 two-page spreads / of an eventual 172 or 174 and told us that the remainder would be finished in about 3 weeks. He also said that 60 pages of the text were now finished, and the rest would be done in about 6 weeks. He has asked us to provide him with the following material:

- a. A memorandum from Bob Winston about the Finnish Air Force's 60 to 1 preponderance in its war with Russia. } JBIII sent to Lyle. Log 18 May.
- ✓ b. A memorandum from Harold Gosnell tracing US aid to Russia.
- ✓ c. A set of photos of the Katyn Massacre and a copy of John Broderick's summary. / I sent Shub Katyn photos several weeks ago /.

SECRET

File STALIN PHOTO-BOOK SECRET

From CPW's LOG, 2 May 1951

Bill Kintner has suggested that Mr. Burris-Meyer consult with Boris Shub in New York tomorrow on themes for black PW against the USSR. Pinky and I see no objection to this meeting, and I have notified Shub to expect a call from Burris-Meyer.

Shub told me that his Stalin picture-book now promises to run to 172 pages, or about 80 double-page spreads, comprising some 500 photographs. He expects the layouts to be completed by 20 May, and the text by mid-June. Its price will be $2 or thereabouts.

SECRET

Mailed to SH'B, May 3, 1951.

LITHUANIAN DAYS, Vol. 2, No. 2, March 1951, published at 9204 S. Broadway, Los Angeles 3, California. With note:

"FYI, page 5 / rather blurred photos of Lithuanian resistance fighters and bodies of Soviet victims / and elsewhere as marked."
Note there is no indication that any of the material is copyrighted.

/Page 19: "Lithuanian Genocide Show in Waterbury.

Two American newspapers, the WATERBURY SUNDAY REPUBLICAN and the AMERICAN carried two long articles on Feb. 11 and 12 marking the opening of a genocide exhibit organized by Waterbury, Conn., Lithuanians.

The exhibit, the first of its kind in the U. S., has on display Soviet deportation orders, documents on confiscation of farms, actual photographs of atrocities committed by the Soviet Union in Lithuania, and other evidence. We reprint here a portion of the article which appeared in the WATERBURY AMERICAN."

Page 20: Poem, LITHUANIA CRUCICIFIED, by Nadas Rastenis; 6 verses in English. _7

WRS

"STALIN PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT (for Monthly Report, 27 April '51)

Publication of a book of photos with text exposing evils of Stalin and his regime throughout his career.

a. Great progress has been made in assembling the book, by ROBERT H. HEADLEY and a collaborator. They are planning on a book of 175-195 pages, with some 600 photos.

b. The publisher is pressing for a September 10 press date, and has lined up a Chicago press.

W. S. Sims

SECRET

Mailed to Shub

21 April 1951

Concluding paragraph of Melvin J. Lasky's article "Did Hitler Help Stalin in the Frame-up?" in NEW LEADER, 25 Dec. 1948:

["Those were awful and terrible years. Years of intrigue and deceit, of betrayal and calculated evil-doing.] Hitler and Stalin were at once creators and products of this epoch. From these new glimpses into the secrets of their political affairs we see once again Adolf Hitler, single-purposed and resourceful, and Josef Stalin, ruthless, perhaps for a moment gullible, but in the end unswervable. [And what a dark witches' brew emerged from all of this— the German militarists trained and equipped a Soviet Army which was later to destroy them and annex a third of Germany— the Soviet reared the German military power which was later to lay waste to all of European Russia."]

Rather vividly put; some such phrases might be useful in your text? Whole article, with which you're doubtless familiar, of interest in re the biography.

Best regards,

Bill

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

12 April 51
DATE

TO: MR. [illegible] Sims

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:
FYI: "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK

Excellent information.
Encouraging. Etc
Thanks

FROM: WSS

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

SECRET

file "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK

SECRET

MUNSON saw Sims, Smith, Loebs at his hotel 16 April 1951

Munson went through the complete book last Wednesday and Thursday evenings, April 11 and 12. He is sure it will be "one of the really important books of 1951."

He has asked for 3 photostat proofs of the layout, which we can look at down here. He agrees with me that no useful purpose would be served by my going to NY to see it, as B Shub had suggested. He thinks it inadvisable that "a stream of people" should go to Shub's collaborator's apartment.

They are now aiming at a book of 175 to 195 pages, the pages to be of Vogue size; which, on an average of 7 to 8 photos per double-page, will come to some 600 or more photos.

It is more than the personal career of Stalin; it could better be called something like "The Rise and Rule of Stalinism."

He is pressing for a SEPTEMBER 10th PRESS DATE. That may be too optimistic, but he has located a Chicago press which prints either Vogue (Conde Nast) or a Vogue-size magazine, and which, if they stick to that format, can handle it with dispatch. Munson will be going to Chicago to investigate.

PRICE. "I could be 100% wrong on this estimate," but: it should cost a minimum of $1.25 to print, and, if we want to make 25¢ net, $2.95 or $3.00 would be the minimum at which Brentano could retail it. / I'll bet it will come to more than this. WSS /

Shub's collaborator, "absolutely wonderful; the book is now 75% his", will get 7½% royalties. Shub's nominal royalties will revert to Swen.

Munson feels strongly that it is very bad policy to sell a book at less than obvious cost. He says he is completely certain that this is true in the Orient, and gave us a chapter-and-verse example (which escapes me) to illustrate it.

By "obvious" cost he means that it may be OK to count on the public's not guessing how much it may have cost you to pay a Barnes and to do, e.g., seven prints of some of the "C.Z." photos; but it is bad to price a book at less than what the physical components must obviously have cost.

He is dead sure this applies to the Orient, and strongly suspects that it would hold good for Western Europe also.

* [illegible]

W.S.S.

SECRET

"Excellent. Information. Encouraging. Thanks.
JB III"

Re STALIN

SECRET

17 April 1951

SECRET

FOR QUARTERLY REPORT

Please change part on "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT as follows:

a. Swan Publishing Company will publish and is meeting expenses. / Delete the rest of this para. /

c. Book will consist of some 175 to 195 Vogue-size pages, about 600 photos with text, and several who have seen it are certain it will be one of the important books of 1951, a devastating expose, suitable for world-wide circulation. ~~[illegible]~~

Change d. to read:

d. The publisher is pressing for a September 10 press date, and has lined up a Chicago press.

e. All rights in the book, and the royalties nominally paid to HEADLEY, will revert to CIA (Swan).

SECRET

147

SECRET

16 April 1951

DRAFT FOR QUARTERLY REPORT

"STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT: publication of a book of photos with text exposing the treacheries, brutality, etc., of Stalin and his regime throughout his career.

a. Swen Publishing Company will publish and is meeting expenses; therefore project ~~is~~ has ~~not been formally written up; this will be done shortly.~~

b. Great progress has been made in assembling the b ook, by ROBERT H. HEADLEY and a high-level layout collaborator who draws on the photo files of a national picture magazine.

c. Book will consist of some 500 or more photos with text, and several / JHIII and Munson / who have seen it are sure it will be a devastating expose, suitable for world-wide circulation.

d. The authors have estimated publication in August, 1951 as a possibility; but this may well prove over-optimistic.

e. All royalties and rights in the book will be turned over to CIA (Swen Publishing Company).

WSS

See version
of this,
above

SECRET

MEMO OF RECORD

SECRET

SIMS saw MUNSON in his hotel 19 March 1952

In addition to the details which he gave about "Communist Zoo" and the "Stalin" photo-book, Munson said:

Re Swen. "Tell Joe I need a man who knows the book publishing business, as a "consultant" or part-time helper. To be paid something like $300 to $400 a month, for which he would give, say, a week of his time each month."

I asked if he would like to have any CIA man detailed to do liaison with and be part-time helper of Swen; Munson said he didn't think a staff man would be very secure. He'd need to travel, deal with other publishers, etc.

Swen offices are established in Taipei, Tokyo, Manila, Hong Kong, Bangkok.

Swen will reproduce material in any language, in any format. If anybody wants him to do a job, let them contact him.

I asked how about getting material translated; he said you can always get it done in New York.

The finished product would be cargoed out to the field.

Re ROCKPORT, the artist. Munson has been paying him ($350 a month I think), and now feels he has gotten about as much material out of him as he will need. "Why not suggest to SCHILLER that The Challenge employ him on a regular basis?"

I said that the editors of The Challenge (all Russian-speaking) must already know him, since they have used his drawings. That when he finds himself unemployed he can, and quite likely will, approach them anyway. Why not let them decide whether they want to employ him, rather than for us to complicate matters, through SCHILLER, by forcing this extremely "difficult" man on them? Munson agreed we should let it ride.

If the editors themselves want to employ him, we can then decide whether and how much of the DTEXCISE funds should be used to pay him. As he is very difficult and dilatory it might be better to stipulate that he be paid on a piece-work basis.

Re "Great Swindle" and Swen's distribution problem in general.

Munson said that, while the photo-books should pay their own way, it was never contemplated that The Great Swindle would be a commercial success. Distribution of such material is Swen's great problem.

SCHILLER wrote Munson that he (FTUC) couldn't use The Great Swindle. Munson thinks professional jealousy entered into this. SCHILLER made some criticism to the effect that the booklet bears no Trade Union logotype, whereas he should know perfectly well that lithographed material never does.

SCHILLER should simply be told: "Put out so many copies of the Great Swindle." Alternatively, the geographic Divisons should give indigenous Anti-Communist groups $25,000 or $2,500 and say: "This is yours if you mail out umpteen thousand copies of the booklet with it."

Re State Dept. and Great Swindle. Munson suggested my giving a copy of the Great Swindle to Mrs. Crosswell or Col. Stubbs and asking them to recommend it to MacKnight as something they had come across, with the suggestion that the State Department buy copies of it for all their Reading Rooms.

SECRET

I asked whether MacKnight or anyone in State knew of CIA's connection with Swen. He said he did not know, though he dared say MacKnight might. He said he would be willing to call on MacKnight to discuss State Dept. assistance in getting Swen stuff disseminated, representing himself merely as a private citizen.

I said I hadn't and wouldn't make any mention of Swen to anyone at State.

Horace Eng is as much [redacted] as anyone Munson's main CIA contact, but, he said, Horace of course doesn't have time to concern himself actively with dissemination outside the FE area.

I told him about recent State publications, in their "gray" program, such as "Glossary of Soviet Terms", and pointed out that State and Swen are now putting out similar material.

I said I hoped some sort of set-up might be arranged whereby State would help disseminate some of Swen's publications.

Suggest that the initiative towards any such set-up has to come primarily from Munson himself, but that it will be potentially an important matter requiring careful working out by CPW, Col. Stubbs, Munson and State Dept.

WSS

cc – SP/Labor
SP/Bruskin
Sims/Swen file

Thanks JBill

SECRET

SECRET.

[illegible]
6 max. 9 500

file: "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK SECRET

SIDS saw MUNSON in his hotel 19 March 1951

Munson said they are now planning in terms of a book of "up to 220 pages, between 1,000 and 1,500 photos" (some of which might be two or four photos to a page. "It will cost a lot of money."

I mentioned again that we have $40,000 appropriated under KUFUBY for "similar photo-books at the discretion of CSP", but Munson said there was no need to spend the taxpayer's money: as many as possible of these books should be made to pay their own way.

cc: Mr. Bryan

SECRET

SECRET

30 March 1951

MR. EASTON--

I have just phoned Boris Shub, AC-2-0164. He will expect Jack Morgan to get in touch with him. 510 West 110th St., NY 25.

Shub can be reached there any time any morning. In the evenings he is working in the apartment of a collaborator, and prefers not to be phoned there.

He expects to be in town both Tuesday and Wednesday.

WSS

Shub and his collaborater work all Sundays and Mondays at the latter's apartment. Therefore if Morgan wants to phone him Monday he had better catch him at breakfast.

SECRET

17

SECRET

30 March 1951

SIMS phoned SHUB, 1200

To ask him to see Jack Morgan (LA) (on an LA job). Shub said he will be in town both Tuesday and Wed., and that Morgan can always reach him in the mornings, anytime.

In the evenings he is working at his collaborator's apartment, and prefers not to be phoned there.

I told him I would phone him on the 16th, so that we can get together. He wants me to see the lay-out, which should be pretty complete at that time, "minus the final text". They were working on it till 4 a.m. last night; evenings are the only time his collaborator can work, except Mondays which he has off; they work on it all day Sundays and Mondays.

They have looked over 6,000 photos.

I told him Dawson wd be sending him a couple of dozen photos.

SECRET

17

26 March 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: File, STALIN PHOTO-BOOK

SHvB, [illegible]

Sending Subj 12 photos captioned as follows:

1. Papers from body of Polish army chaplain.
2. One of the mass graves.
3. Before he was murdered his hands were lashed behind his back...
4. Thousands of the corpses show the four-edged wounds.
5. 2. This is the certificate authroizing them to wear...
6. Arch Deacon JASINSKI picks his way...
7. A former major.
8. 4. And this is SMORAWINSKI again.
9. 3. This is his cigarette case.
10. Map showing location of Katyn.
11. 12 layers of Polish officers.
12. This family photograph survived.

This leaves just 8 photos remaining in our JBEXTRA files.

bj — ?

26 March 1951

Dear Boris,

Thanks for y ours of the 22nd, reached me Saturday evening, crossing mine of the 23rd to you.

It is all wonderful news, and the more you think about it the more amazing it is that "nothing even remotely resembling it has ever been done— anywhere in the world". And I know what a hell of a lot of work and worry it is, and what a relief it will be when it is safely done.

Twelve pix [Katyn] go to you this morning by registered mail. These are my all at the moment. You will find them a great deal better than none. In fact, you may think they are enough to do the trick. Reflect that no one of them —fakery in photos having a long history since WW I— can in itself constitute conclusive proof, nor any photo that could be.

For that, your text will carry more weight: the undisputed facts of geography and chronology; the depositions; the TACIT ADMISSION OF GUILT IN THE DAMNING FAILURE OF THE USSR TO RAISE THE MATTER AT NUREMBERG (here see Churchill's last volume, and perhaps quote a sentence or two from him; "names make news"; see also Mikolajczyk, from whom you may cull a juicy quote or two.)

It seems that "about a dozen" photos were given to all who attended the 21 Nov. 1949 press conference. So you may find Ep and/or the HL has one or two more. But there is not much more. Just one or two others of layers of corpses.

Your impact will come from the skilfull addition of citation of facts to the pix I'm sending, don't you think?

On your second request I'll do what I can. But you know one of the main reasons why it may not be much. My friend who will know returns from out of town tomorrow.

"Baltic Review" has no pix. "Estonian Magazine" has only scenic. However I may be able to do something tomorrow.

Here again I suggest you consider capitalizing on the very absence of pictures, remembering that y ou have a great gift for the trenchant phrase. E.g., life in Riga pre-1939 was not too bad; now, as you can quote from the press, there is deportation after deportation; partisans; exploitation; almost universal hatred of the "people's democratic" regime. Edmund Stevens in This is R, Uncensored you'll recall said nothing so gave him the impression of the living-death-under-Stalin as Riga, which he revisited. Therefore, just show a RIGA PEOPLE-IN-MARKET SQUARE SCENE, PLUS QUOTE FROM STEVENS, and a bit of biting Shubian prose contrasting 1939 and 1949. Don't you think there is a place for a few "peaceful" pictures of this sort? Pix of partisans in action are few and far between, and often fuzzy, and there can anyway be, as you were saying, such a thing as too many atrocity pictures.

Pari passu, why not use some ordinary, peaceful UKRAINIAN scenes, plus RECENT QUOTES FROM PRAVDA, repeat PRAVDA, OFFICIALLY ADMITTING ACTIVE RESISTANCE THERE. I can't give you said quotes, but you or some of your friends very likely can lay hands on them.

After all, no "resistance" photo, what with fakery, will carry conviction to those who won't be convinced. But a PHOTO OF THE FACE OF PRAVDA, with the sentences underlined, must shake even the faithful.

On Lubianka I can't help. If the *NY Times* won't help, and there is nothing in any agency files —can this be?— I guess you've had it. Here again you might capitalize on the absence: can they be *ashamed* of this historic edifice, which plays so vital a role in the national life? E.g., Herblock today has a "cartoon" which has merely a black border around a white space, with the mast-head of *La Prensa* above. Needless to say, it is eye-catching in the extreme. Why not do the same with Lubianka?

Alternatively, you might have a photo of 60 Andrassy Ut, and perhaps combine same with the above "empty space" treatment.

I grant you that if this technique were carried to the extreme, you would be making history with a photo-less photo-book; but rest assured the Herblock cartoon *is* a 100% attention-catcher.

Couldn't agree more with your last paragraphs. However, there *has* been marked progress.

I expect, d.v., at long last to be absent from Friday the 30th till Monday the 16th, and mail probably won't be forwarded. Therefore please write J if need arises.

Best regards,

Bill

(W S Sims)

Sent
Special Delivery

510 West 110 Street
New York 25, New York
March 22, 1951

Dear Bill:

Picture book now in high gear as layout is beginning to take shape. New pictures of both historical and photographic pricelessness still coming in (e.g. a shot showing a wildly cheering crowd of Russian peasants greeting first German troops---before latter went in for mass murder) This picture never used in this country. Could multiply by many examples but prefer to have you come down and see for yourself. If you could be here about three weeks from now, you could get a fairly good notion of what the finished product will look like (although there will still be a lot of polishing, caption writing and final checking to do). I am now certain that the book will be a major political event. Nothing even remotely resembling it has ever been done--anywhere in the world.

Need help on two sectors promptly:

1. Katyn massacre pictures. Saw lots of them your neck of the woods. Please send them soonest, properly packed in cardboard to prevent folding or cracking. This is a must, since for some odd reason this is missing from the otherwise bottomless archives which we've unearthed.

2. Any decent shots of anti-Communist resistance behind the Iron Curtain. We have a few of the East German things with the "F" painted on walls. But Joe mentioned others. Cant have too much of this, since it constitutes an essential element in the closing part of the story.

Will be difficult to incorporate such stuff unless we get it fast, because would mean dislocating the layout, which is now designed toflow like a motion picture recording of the whole big story. Hope this presents no obstacles. Joe thought your end could send stuff to me. Registered mail sufficient precaution, it seems to me.

The Acheson letter in today's NY Times re friendship with the Russian people a step in the right direction though still a long way even from the speech delivered at Town Hall by McMahon day before yesterday. But somehow, someone must teach Acheson to cut out this sort of humbuging:

> "If the Men of the Kremlin could but conquer their inward fears and resolve their contradictions, if they could but bring themselves to the comity which is the foundation of peace, great burdens would be lifted from the shoulders of people everywhere."

What is the purpose of this rubbish? I know lots of professional diplomats think this is very "cute" and arch stuff, really meant to "embarrass" people like J.Stalin and G. Malenkov. Actually, the only thing it can arouse, bothnamong the Kremlin war criminals and among their victims is ---utter contempt. If anybody in Moscow takes that drivel at face value, they conclude that the U.S. is still too frightened of the boogey man in the Kremlin to call a spade a spade. That silly stuff must end! Please end it. The inward fears of Stalin-Malenkov-Beria will only be resolved on the gallows. Best regards.

[MARCH 22, 1951] Boris

Packett (x3144 ~~[illegible]~~) phoned. 24 March 1951

"Estonian Mag ", in English
published in germany (available from London)
29 Ashburn Pl., London SW7

~~have only one copy~~
has only some pix — only scenery.

"Baltic Review" has no pictures.

Tabard Inn
1739 N St., NW
Washington 6, DC

March 23, 1951

Dear Boris,

Thanks for the clippings. All to the good.

Will do what I can to help, but, for reasons that will re-occur to you, y ou shouldn't bank on its being a great deal.

Suggest you might well get excellent results by following the trail, via phone and taxi, of the AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF THE KATYN MASSACRE, INC., which was, at the time of its founding circa Nov. 1949, at Room 1209, 470 Fourth Avenue, NY 16, MU-6-4468.

Chairman, Arthur Bliss Lane. Vice-chairmen: Max Eastman, Dorothy Thompson, Treasurer: Montgomery M. Green. Executive Secretary: Julius Epstein.

Why not contact Lane, or Epstein? Why shouldn't they be glad to help with their material, both textual and photographic.

Others listed as Committee Members: Constantine Brown, G. Creel, W. J. Donovan, A. W. Dulles, Farley, B. F. Gunther, Sol M. Levitas, [illegible]. B. Luce, Charles Rozmarek, Sokolsky, V. S. Freedom, Jas. A. Walsh.

I mailed him some of our Katyn photos.

New Leader, 30 Sept. 1950, had an article "New Light on Katyn Massacre." "The Defense Dept.'s release of a top-secret report on the mystery-shrouded Katyn massacre has shed new light.....The release of the Van Vliet report, written by an American Lt.-Col. held captive in Germany who reluctantly fixed the guilt on Moscow after a Nazi-sponsored visit to Katyn is the first major break in the conspiracy of silence which has surrounded the affair ever since.

"In 1943..the NL carried an exclusive article by Kerensky..directly charging the Kremlin..Last year the NL published a special 4-page supplement on Katyn by Julius EPSTEIN. (See your local phone-book)....

"It was only as a result of the Committee's persistent efforts that the long-suppressed Van Vliet report was finally released..."

If you haven't you should glance at Mikolajczyk's account in The Rape of Poland. Because it contains a verbatim alleged account of "how it came about" by a shame-faced Russian officer in London, which you might find quotable. "So they asked 'Father' (Stalin) and 'Father' said..etc.."

/Churchill in his latest volume, in an oddly restrained account, makes it clear he knows Stalin was responsible, and refers to the books by M. and Anders./

Photos. The NY Times, serializing Churchill, 9 Nov. 1950, had, if you are interested in irony or impudence or whatever, a rather blurred photo, "released at the time by SOVFOTO," which Sovfoto described as showing members of the Polish Corps of the USSR holding memorial services at "the common grave of the Polish officers and men brutally shot by the Germans."

Some of the corpses show marks made by the four-sided, peculiarly Russian bayonet, and others had hands tied with the MVD-type knot. Surely Epstein can help you here?

Please let me know how you make out with Epstein and/or others, and don't hesitate to ask me again. I Just think he's a better, quicker bet. I'll do what I can re the other pix and let you know. It sounds a masterpiece.

Sincerely,

Bill.

SECRET

CPW log. New York, 17 March 1951

1. I spent three hours with Boris Shub today, two of them in looking over his collection of photographs with his associate, Mr. Quint, of Life. Boris and Quint hope to have their book ready for publication by the end of May, when they will have reduced their collection to 500 photographs, which they estimate will fill about 200 pages. I have no doubt that the book will be a commercial success; my only wonder is why it has not been done before. Boris asks our help in obtaining certain photographs. (Bill Sims please note.) He wants all procurable photos of the Katyn Massacre, all resistance photos (Bill: Is there a magazine called the Estonian Review, which prints a good many of these?) and a certain photo of Lubianka prison, in Moscow. The New York Times had a photograph of Lubianka in its issue of Saturday, 12 November 1949, to illustrate installment 7 of General Smith's Memoirs, and ISB should be able to discover where the original came from. No! Boris has a letter from the Vanguard Press expressing hope that his biography of Stalin would be ready by 1 May; he will notify Vanguard that it cannot possibly be ready for another seven months. Finally, he told me that he was meeting Colonel Kintner on 20 March, for several conferences on BRAINWAVE. He signed his secrecy agreement, which I will deliver to John Shields on my return.

2. a. Corey Ford informed me that his story about General Smith (originally written for Flair) had been rejected by both Look and This Week and is now awaiting a decision from Harper's. (I reported

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

12-3-50
DATE

TO: Mr ~~BRYAN~~ SIMS

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Re ~~SHVB~~. last ¶. What do you suggest?

FROM: 1055

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

SECRET

SECRET

12 March 1951

CSP

SP/OPW

Re: ROBERT H. HEADLEY

At lunch today Munson said that HEADLEY has finished his part of the work on the photo-book on the career of Stalin; he has completed the text part; his collaborator is "1000%" better qualified to select the photos and do the lay-out.

/ Re security the collaborator's employers told Munson "brutally" firmly that while the collaborator's name can appear on the book (along with HEADLEY's) and it will be revealed that that magazine was the source of the pictures, and they may help "syndicate" it, if it is blown that they are making the pictures available free, the deal is off.

Munson thinks the book will be a world-beater, but that it may take till August to have it ready.

I said that we have $40,000 still untouched in KUFUNNY , which was appropriated for "similar photo-books at the discretion of CSP", and suggested helping Swan out with some of that. He said he wasn't worried about money; that he thought OPC was if anything too ready to spend the taxpayer's money; that Swan's products should be able to pull their own weight. The book might have to sell for $3.50 or more in the US; in Hong Kong it would be a $1 or $2.

He will pay both HEADLEY and the collaborator royalties. HEADLEY's will be returned to Swan./

SECRET

TS copy Initialed by LST 9 III

SECRET

KSACLAY wrote me recently that the book was now at a stage where most of the work had to be done by his collaborator. Since his name is to appear on it, I imagine he will still have to put in quite a bit of time on it, from time to time. [illegible] He is [illegible] also —or was when I last heard— doing "part-time" work on loan to HB in connection with BRADEWAVE.

Conclusion: except for the above, he is not occupied, and Munson suggests we should give him another job to do.

WSS

cc: "Stalin" photo-book file.

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: SP/Sims

NO.

DATE 6 March 1951

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. CSP					Excellent news from Shub re the photo-book on the career of Stalin.
2. SP/DCPW					
3. SP/CPW					
4. SP/Sims				WSS	I have written him for an appointment on the 17th.
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

March 3, 1951

Dear Bill:

Good to hear from you, even though your letter, as usual, too brief for my appetite. From "our mutual friend William" you know more about my activities than I do about yours.

My collaborator [a top Life lay-out man] is working like a fiend, with the assistance of a sub-fiend (female) who digs up pictures by the hundreds (literally). Last night I worked with him until 2 oclock in the morning (with a brief intermission for a prize fight on his television set). In that long stretch we went through over 400 pictures which he had just combed out of various labyrinths. Out of this batch we discarded about one-third, tossed away a couple of dozen poor substitutes for the real thing which the new haul corrected, and filled the present 40-odd chapter folders (provisional) with the cream of the crop.

As you will gather from the above paragraph, the illustrated book on the man and his international network --and the forces all over the world arrayed on his side and against him--- ain't no ordinary picture album. It will be, I am quite certain, a major work. There is little point my attempting to describe it in a letter, but I am quite confident that it will be read xxxx--and even more important--looked at, with absorbed interest this year, next and ten years from now. What is more important, it will make convincing, I am certain, what no words, written or spoken, can ever make completely convincing.

As far as the "date when it will be wrapped up"--- I can only say that I am acting the role of the slave-driver and the speedup man right now. It is, however, a ticklish role, which would have undesirable results if overdone. [illegible] [illegible] Both my main collaborator, who is certainly one of the best men in the country in the field--and the best man for this particular book, is giving it every free moment, as is his fantastic research assistant. But a good picture book--as I told you xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx when we discussed the idea originally, is as much of a job as any good book. I think we have broken the back of the job, and I am confident that the product will excel your fondest dreams. As far as pinpointing the date, I think I'll be in a better position to do that in about three weeks, when the haul will be substantially in, xxxx and when we will have pared down our present mountainous collection to the essence. I should imagine that xx when our friend ~~the publisher~~ [Swan] returns from his present jaunt, my collaborator and I will be able to give him a fairly full draft. At that point we'll have to settle with him the major technical questions in connection with the actual printing job. The largest single question we see is this: Price of book versus quality and lasting value. What I mean is that the book as now shapes up

is a major work--a complete pictorial history not only of the man, but of the setting that produced him, the international ramifications that are so much a part of his life, his intrigues and his machinations. ~~Yo[illegible]xxxxx~~ But what is even more intriguing, we are reaching the stage where the pictures illustrating all this will be of thrilling pictorial quality. ~~How is we do all this and still [illegible] a book that~~ to ~~[illegible] yet [illegible] [illegible] abroad?~~ is priced
~~[illegible] we have that question licked, the rest will move fast.~~ We are agreed that it would be a serious mistake to sacrifice either quality or essential elements of the over-all story. The trick now is to do all that and yet turn out a book that, by ~~xxx~~ one means or another, will sell at a price likely to make it a mass-circculation job.

For further details, please board first available train or plane and join me over a drink at 510 West 110 Street. Perhaps I've already put too much of this on a typewriter. I wish you could have seen the pictures we worked on last nite. You ~~xxxx~~ would then realize that the original stuff you saw was so much fourth rate stuff by comparison.

(I guess the last two sentences are really intended as a lure. But I really would like to see you soon)

Best regards to the gang. Will give you a more exact timetable as soon as it is feasible.

Doris

SECRET

8 March 1951

STATUS OF W.S.S. PROJECTS

"STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT.

This has not yet been formally written up as a project, because it has been being implemented, *de facto*, by our salaried contract agent HEADLEY in conjunction with the publisher Swen Publishing Co., who has been meeting the bill and will continue to do so.

Nevertheless I think it will shortly prove desirable for me to write it up, since (a) it may prove desirable for SP (under KMFUNNY) to subsidize Swen on it, in order to make possible a somewhat lower selling price, and (b) it will be more convenient to have it wrapped up as a named project, which can be referred to by name, and for which SP can have credit in its status reports.

HEADLEY has completed the text part of the book. He and a top-flight *Life* lay-out man, of whom he has a very high opinion (and an assistant who helps the *Life* man dig up photos) have been through a very large number of photos. HEADLEY is confident that the book will be a first-class job.

If all continues to go well on the *Life* front, —i.e. if they make no objection to the use of pictures from their files— the main remaining problem will be: how to combine retention of high quality, i.e. adequate reproduction of as many photos as they need to tell the story the way they feel it should be told, with quantity, i.e. sale at a low enough price to make possible wide dissemination.

Too heavy a subsidy (by OPC) would blow the Government-inspiration of the book. Perhaps, if the book proves to be as good as we feel it should, the State Department's ILI Information Program or Book Translation Program might get behind it in a big way?

We should go energetically into this problem of selling it at a low enough price as soon as Swen's president returns. In the meantime HEADLEY and I are of opinion that quality should not be sacrificed. If it is of really first-class quality and PW effectiveness, quantity can be achieved, sokehow, by subsidy.

HEADLEY will appear overtly as the author. Possibly the A. F. of L. might help give it world-wide distribution, as they have done in the case of the maps of the Slave Labor Camps in the USSR.

If all continues to go well, it looks as though the book might be getting into shape for the printer in April or May.

When this is written up as a Project, it will be a Sub-project under KMFUNNY. KMFUNNY, approved long ago, includes a Recommendation (para 5) "...that...the sum of $40,000 be appropriated for the development and distribution of simiolar photo-books at the discretion of Chief, SP." The Sub-project requires only the signature of Chief, SP, as I understand.

EXPENSES. Small sums were paid to HEADLEY, summer 1950, duly recorded in Ray Millard's office, for payment in connection with photos obtained from New

York agencies. These sums were charged either to KMFUNNY, or to DGHOUSE, to be transferred to KMFUNNY when KMFUNNY should be approved, or when the "STALIN" SUB-PROJECT under KMFUNNY should be written up and approved.

Tabard Inn
1739 N Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

March 6, 1951

Dear Boris,

Delighted!

And I have circulated the good news around.

Yes, when our pal returns —which I gather should be somewhere round about March 15— we will have to address ourselves in a big way to the problem of achieving both quality and quantity. As time goes on, I imagine he will get better and better able to cope with that problem, and I think he should be helped in a big way to do so. In the meantime, I agree with what I'm sure is your view (your letter is not at hand at the moment) that any conflicts between q. and q. should be resolved in favor of quality. The quantity can follow. (Build the really quality mouse-trap, and sooner or later, preferably sooner, the world will beat the path).

Just a detail: you've undoubtedly seen the De Custine in the March 5 LIFE. Could you use:

> "To live in the Kremlin is not to live; it is to protect oneself; oppression creates revolt; revolt necessitates precautions; precautions increase the danger; and of this long series of actions and reactions is born a monster, despotism which has built itself a house in Moscow —the Kremlin!" (p. 124) ?

I still agree with you the thing as a whole is marred slightly by the phrase "..this essentially aggressive nation.."

I haven't any immediate plans to go to N. Y., but we must certainly foregather before long.

Best regards,

Bill

Tabard Inn
1739 N Street N W
Washington 6, D. C.

Feb. 26, 1951

Dear Boris,

Glad to hear from Dee-dee that you are still alive and kicking. And, especially, that there is some prospect of your getting down this way. I sure hope you do.

Also glad to hear from our mutual friend William that He's seen you, and to get some news of you from him; and that you will have got some news in general from him.

How is your collaborator coming, and is he squared away with his bosses? What is your best current guess as to the date when it will be wrapped up?

Joe got generally overworked and came down with grippe, and left for two or three weeks or more to recuperate. A lot of people round here have been or are laid up; I was for a couple of days and am still somewhat under the weather. However, even if I haven't written I've thought of you often.

Drop a line, and don't delay your visit to the Nation's Capital too long.

Best regards,

Bill

SECRET

file "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK

20 Feb. 1951

Re SHUB and BRAINWAVE

At request of Mr. Winston I phoned ~~x~~ Shub (AC-2-0164) to ask about progress on the Photo-book, and what is the earliest date at which he may be thru with it. No answer.

RAW says Kintner is asking for him for BRAINWAVE. I suggested not interrupting him till he has finished the photo-book. RAW consulted LST, who said to say Shub might be made available on a part-time basis. RAW understands he would do his work for BRAINWAVE in NY. I said this seemed OK, if it were to be only part-time.

21 Feb. 1951

I phoned Kintner re Shub. He has recently seen Shub in NY. Shub said he had reached the stage in his work (on photo-book) for us where his collaborator wd hv to do most of the work for about a month. Kintner said the work Shub wd do for him wd be in NY, and only part-time. I said this all sounded OK. /Shub not referred to by name over the phone/.

WCS

SECRET

SECRET

16 Feb. 1951

MUNSON left about Feb. 7th for 4 or 5 weeks.

Due back about March 14th.

SECRET

5 Feb. 1951

"Every 'peace program' is a deception of the people and a piece of hypocrisy, unless its princip~~le~~al object is to explain to the masses the need for a revolutionary struggle of the masses."

From Lenin, April 1916, selected works, International Publishers, New York, 1943, Volume V, page 237, —taken out of context.

SECRET

SECRET

MR. FINSTON:

30 Jan. 1951

Re: "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK, tie-in with *Life*.

H.'s DAILY DIARY of Jan. 27: "Piernie of PE-1 [illegible] informed me that he understood that *Time* and *Life* absolutely did not want any of their people connected with any intelligence organization and that Allen Dulles had given instructions that none of them were to be approached without Mr. Wisner's written approval. On the assignment in question, Piernie gave up any attempt to utilize the man they have on *Life's* staff and has sent another man to cover the assignment instead."

Shub, who is preparing a photo-book on Stalin's career for Swan, is getting (or hopes he is getting) the help of "one of *Life's* top lay-out men" (only Shub knows his name; Hunson didn't want to ask him who it is), at $35 per diem.

Shub, of course, is doing the book ostensibly as a private citizen, so if security is maintained it doesn't seem to involve a *Life* man's being "connected with any intelligence organization."

As they get ready to publish (perhaps April), the *Life* man will have to decide whether he wants his name to appear on the book as collaborator, in which case he will probably have to (a) get *Life's* permission. And (b) if they use any photos from *Life's* files, as well as from agencies, he will have to get permission for that too.

It should all be OK if Shub keeps up his cover as private citizen.

HSS

CC: Mr. Winston
"Stalin" photo-book file.

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

23 January 1951

Mr. Richards (Legal) phoned, on behalf of Mr. Kelley, re the contract between HE[illegible]DLEY & CIA re disposition of royalties.

He said Mr. Kelley had referred it to him, with some such message as: "OK to let it stand as it is, if appropriate documentation of the records there / Swen? / and here can be provided."

Mr. Richards asked if doing the photo-book was to be H[illegible]'s main activity. I said yes, for a month or two, after which he would have some new assignment. He said all the better.

I said the only problem had seemed to be whether there was any legal objection to having Swen hold the rights to the book instead of "the Government" and Swen receive back the royalties instead of "CIA". Mr. Richards seemed to agree there was no substantial difficulty there, and ended: "Ok, Joe or I will let you know if there seems to be any difficulty there or need to amend the contract", or words to much that effect.

WSS

SECRET

SECRET

KMFUNNY = #2 = "Stalin" photo-book = for PRB 17 Jan '57

Personnel = Munson (Swen) & Shub, & *Life* collaborator

Security = OK = Shub = covert contract agent

Materials = ± 150 sterilized photos from CIA Graphics
± 75 photos obtained by Shub
more photos will be got by Shub & *Life*

Spent = ± $172 for photos obtained by Shub and for services in obtaining them.

Swen will meet expenses
" has advanced $ to Shub for expenses
" has authorized Shub to pay *Life* man not more than $35 per day.

SECRET

[Were not called to the meeting]

SECRET

12 Jan. 1951

QUESTION for Munson:

Re the second photo-book: Stalin Biography

Any dates or figures that could go in a progress report? Pub. April

What does he estimate will be total number of photos? 150

Any tentative estimate on the selling price? No.

Has his collaborator gotten permission from his employers to use their files and/or to sign the book as collaborator? Unknown

Re first photo-book:

What is best estimate of date it should be on sale? APRIL 1

RW showed this to Munson Jan. 16

Munson wrote the above answers.

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SL.

1 Jan
DATE

TO: Bill Sims

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Noted with interest
many thanks.

Show to JBIII

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

15 January 1951

15 Jan. '51

MR. THOMPSON

SUBJECT: Shub's work for SP.

1. He is a covert "contract agent", contract expiring 1st Dec. 1951.

2. As far as I know, he is working only on the "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK, a book of probably some 150 photos-cum-text on the career of Stalin exposing, mostly out of his own mouth, his duplicity and ruthlessness to his own colleagues, etc., etc. This is to be published by Swan Publishing Co. There will be master negatives, and it should be good for publication in every country.

3. "The Choice" was published October 29, and after giving him a week to recover from the excitements of first-time authorship (he had a good many radio and TV interviews),

4. JBHH needled him November 9:

> "We are very anxious to have the photo-book finished as fast as possible. Handled as you alone can do it, this book will be one of the most effective shots that can be fired and we need it quick.
>
> "My understanding is that you are now engaged full time on it. Is that also your understanding? If so, please let me know (1) that the photo-book is your first concern, and (2) what progress you have made to date.
>
> "Again let me emphasize the great enthusiasm we have for the photo-book, and our complete confidence that it will have your own brilliant, informed and incisive touch when completed."

5. Shub replied November 13:

> "I am anxious to get the picture book rolling and done as quickly as possible. The loose ends connected with ~~him~~ THE CHOICE (radio appearances, sticking pins and needles into Donothing, Sloth and Fierce, etc.) while nerve-racking, do not take so much of my time any longer, so that I am in a position to devote my full time to the picture book....
>
> "I'm partially stymied, however, by your cryptic series of notes and instructions regarding a publisher. Thought the thing was pretty well settled when your note was given to me at the lunch at

SECRET

Biltmore recently / with LST_/. But your letter of November 8, 1950 had this footnote:

> 'Please be sure not to say anything at all to anyone about the mutual friend who was mentioned at lunch / Munson_/; very important; he'll explain why when and if he sees you, perhaps within a week or two.' / This was just that Munson was anxious about security for Swen_/.

"Without a final decision on type of publisher it is exceedingly difficult to determine character, size, tone and scope of the book. It would help me a great deal to know what's up on that score. Simon & Schuster presents one type of problem —and suggests one kind of approach. The mutual friend, who I assume (without being 100% sure) is the publisher you referred to in the note you sent to the Biltmore— suggests something quite different —perhaps much simpler and direct— and more outspoken.

"If this question cannot be clarified by mail, please arrange for us to get together soonest. Once this is out of way, I hope to move fast. I'd be a four-flusher and liar if I pretended that I had made notable progress until now. I've been held up not only by the above, but —being painfully human— by a lingering desire to keep THE CHOICE from being embalmed in the Doctthing, Sloth & Pierde Funeral Parlors. I've now given it about all I've got and will do my darnedest ~~to~~ not to allow it to cause me any further loss of sleep or diversion of energy from the job on hand.."

6. Munson had a long phone conversation with Shub November 17, at Sims's request, and planned to see him November 21.
November 20 Munson told Sims that Swen will publish the book.

7. A Contract between Shub and CIA was drawn up by Joe Kelley and Sims, and signed Sept. 16, 1950, whereby "the Government" will own all rights to the book, and Shub will return his royalties "to CIA".
Now that Swen is to be the publisher, I have asked Joe Kelley whether it will be OK that the rights should be owned by Swen (a CIA-controlled corporation) and the royalties returned to Swen; or whether he wants to amend the contract.

8. Progress on the book. Last summer Shub and I got some 150 photos from CIA Graphics, of which I sent him sterilized duplicates to New York. He also got 75 excellent ones from New York photo agencies. I have from time to time sent him a lot of suggestions for photos and captions, and if he wants anything done down here he will let me know.

Shub wrote me, December 14:

"This is just a brief note to give you the latest on the picture front. I won't fill you in on the details because our mutual friend / Munson_/ will be in Washington early next week and will give you all the dope. ~~[illegible]~~

"Suffice it to say that my collaborator / whom Swen has authorized him to pay $35 per diem_/ is one of the top lay-out men on at Life, one of those $25,000 per annum men. For the present he doesn't want his association with the picture book known to his employer for several good and compelling reasons. (Including the fear that they would plagiarize the idea). But in the final stages he'll have to tell them in order to get their cooperation on digging into their files as well as their official permission for the use of his name as a collaborator.

"Needless to say, all of the above is a deep dark secret, but then what isn't these days? More important than all of the above is the fact that the gentleman in question / Munson purposely didn't ask Shub who his collaborator is /, in addition to being a top-flight picture man, is deeply interested in the subject and— miraculously— knows a great deal about it.

"I hope nothing happens to make him back down on his decision. Impossible to get anybody nearly as qualified. Our friend will fill you in on the rest: what remains to be done, how to do it, etc.

"Of one thing you may be sure: If my collaborator stays with the project and if no act of God intervenes, the final product will be the picture book of all time. He wants to see it sold on newsstands among other places.."

9. Munson told me January 8 he had seen Shub about a week before, and "he should be rolling pretty soon."

10. FLASH! Shub just phoned. He said I had proved correct on the point that "Having the book all pictures, without words, is rubbish." He has found it necessary to do a brief written Life of Stalin, bringing in all his major misdeeds, and keeping it as simple & clear-cut as possible.

The MS of that is now being typed. That was the hardest part of the job. Now it should go fast, if the mechanics can be done fast. Namely, the Life collaborator will get the extra pictures from the files needed to fill in the story.

Shub thinks it is really pretty good.

I asked if the Life man's name will appear on it. We both agreed there is no reason why it shouldn't. It will depend on whether the Life man wants it, and whether he thinks it would go down with his bosses.

I told Shub Munson was planning to be away 3 to 4 weeks from about Jan. 28, possibly earlier. Shub will contact Munson before then. We agreed Shub should be able to carry on with Munson's printer in Munson's absence.

11. CONCLUSION. Depending on (a) how much time the Life man can give to it, and (b) how fast Munson's printer can handle it / he is just starting in on the printing of [illegible] Animal photo-book / the book should, with luck, be ready about 6 or 8 weeks from now, —say about March 15.

SECRET

12. Re Shub & other SP work. JBIII, a week or two ago, was about to phone Shub about some job he wanted him to do. I suggested he leave him to concentrate on the photo-book.

13. Re Boris Shub's & David Shub's "BIOGRAPHY OF STALIN". Last summer, OLMSTEAD having raised the matter, I was told to draw up a project to give David Shub $3,000 for 6 months leave-of-absence from his job, to complete the biography. This was killed because, I was told, you had instructed Shub to work on it himself, during working-time.

Shub and his father had a contract with a publisher for this biography, on which they were already overdue. When JBIII wrote to needle Shub about the picture book, I wanted to clear up the status of the biography, —how they stood with their publisher now that we had instructed Shub to work on the photo-book instead. JBIII said, "Leave Shub to raise the matter if he wants to;" this turned out fine, as Shub's enthusiastic reply of November 15, above, didn't mention the biography.

If there is nothing more pressing for him to do, perhaps Shub might be asked to work again on the biography when he has wrapped up the photo-book. Or the project to subsidize his father for 3 or 6 months work on it might be revived. Judging from the 18 Chapters that were seen here, it should be a very good book, highly readable and fit to give pause even to fellow-travellers and Stalinists.

WSS.

[redacted]

3 Dec. 1951
He never made any mention of it
then or since. On Nov. 29, 1951 he told me
he told Vanguard he wanted to work on the
photo-book for Shub first, and that the
photo-book would be a quickie.
W.S.S.

Noted with interest
by R. Winston, 15 Jan.

SECRET

SECRET

16 Jan. 1951

MUNSON has an appointment to see Shub in NY tomorrow. I told him Shub had phoned yesterday, reporting progress.

MUNSON said he doubted Shub would be fully ready for the printer before Munson's return, and didn't want him to try to handle it with the printer in Munson's absence.

MUNSON will try to see Bob Winston later this afternoon.

He will return from NY Friday evening, Jan. 19.

WSS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

12 Jan. 1951

SECRET

Mr. KELLEY

RE: Agreement (16 Sept. 1950) between CIA
and HEADLEY re production of photo-book.

You will recall that in the agreement, which you drew up and which was signed 16 Sept. 1950 by Mr. Echols and ROBERT M. HEADLEY, it is provided that HEADLEY "will be required to transfer the gross royalties to CIA."

Swan Publishing Co. is now to be the publisher of the book. I saw Munson Dec. 19, who told me he has already advanced money to [illegible] HEADLEY for expenses, and has authorized him to pay his collaborator (a Life lay-out man) on a fixed fee basis, i.e. not more than $35 per diem.

Swan plans to pay all the expenses of production. It is his understanding that

(a) Swan will, on paper, pay HEADLEY standard royalties, which HEADLEY will return to Swan, and that

(b) Swan will own all rights in the book (which will facilitate Swan's putting out foreign editions).

In other words, it is Munson's hope, and mine, that, as he put it, Swan, being a wholly CIA-controlled corporation, "will simply step into the shoes of 'the Government' and 'CIA' in the agreement."

Munson said you had drawn up the papers for Swan. We both hoped this way of handling the matter, whereby the financial details would all be handled in Swan's books and not occupy the time of OPC personnel, will be legally acceptable?

When I mentioned the matter to John Bischoff, Jan. 5, he said he thought we should check with you whether:

(a) we can simply let the 16 Sept. 1950 agreement stand as is, or

(b) whether the agreement should be amended to read "to Swan" instead of "the Government" and "CIA".

SP/M. S. Sims

To
Kelley

SECRET

SECRET

Daily Diary, Jan. 7, '51

JB lunched Munson.

Munson going on a trip

("roughly 22 Jan. to 10 March").

SECRET

SECRET

Re: KMFUNNY.........and "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK;

SIMS saw MUNSON in his hotel, Dec. 19, 1950

Munson leaves for NY this evening. OK to leave messages for him to phone.

Re JOKE-BOOK. He mentioned a contemplated pocket-size book, collecting anti-CP jokes. I said I would contribute what we had in PB II and add from time to time. For further details see my folder JOKES.

He gave me post-card (Sw) by Rockport illustrating joke about "Who Owns the Automobiles". (He got this from a 13-yr-old boy in Germany in 1947, and he and an Army man each put $20 of their own into having it ~~xxx~~ printed and spread).

Re KMFUNNY. Barnes was to have met him Friday (Dec. 15), but had to go out of town to a funeral.

He expects to see Barnes tomorrow (Dec. 20), when Barnes is to deliver about 60 of the photos with his own captions. Munson will then let CHAPPELL look it over for a couple of days. He will then bring it down here and ask Messrs. Bryan. Nadler and Sims look at it. (I told him not to hesitate to leave me out).

Barnes has been OK. I said I would check how his clearance is coming. It was requested Nov. 2 and should be ready, says John Shields, about 3½ months from Nov. 2

Re "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK. See Shub's letter to Sims, Dec. 14, in file. Munson also thinks it is coming well, and should be good, if the Life man continues to prove a good collaborator.

Munson does not know the name of Shub's Life collaborator: he did not encourage Shub to tell him. [Munson says he is sure SWEN is still secure, and there is no reason why it shouldn't continue to be, "if everyone in CIA will keep their big mouths shut; too many know about it"). SWEN may be suspected of Government-inspiration, but it should not be blown.]

Munson has advanced Shub money to pay expenses, and has authorized him to pay his collaborator not more than $35 a day. The collaborator will definitely be paid on a fixed fee basis, i.e. per diem, no royalties.

SWEN can pick up the tab for Shub's expenses in procuring photos, etc That will appear in Swen's accounts, but, happily, there is no need for KMFUNNY's files to be cluttered up with the details.

Re contract

MUNSON knows of the agreement, re disposition of royalties, which SHUB (HEADLEY) signed with CIA. He "has seen" it; i.e., presumably has seen the sterilized notes Shub made of it, —since Shub retained no copy.

MUNSON understands that SWEN will own all rights to the book. I.e., "SWEN will simply step into the place of CIA in the above agreement." I.e., SWEN, on paper, will be paying Shub standard royalties, but Shub will return them to SWEN.

I said that, as far as I could see, this sounded OK, SWEN being 100% a CIA corporation. Munson said that Joe Kelley had helped draw up the papers setting up SWEN, and was therefore fully cognizant of it and sympathetic to it. Only an excessively legal-minded bureaucrat would quibble over having the royalties re-absorbed by SWEN, rather than disposed of according

SECRET

to para. 4 of the above-mentioned agreement (16 Sept. 1950), according to which "You will be required to transfer the gross royalties to CIA..." (This agreement was also drafted by Mr. Kelley). There doesn't seem to be any difficulties of substance there.

There has been no decision on the size, format, etc. of the book. I mentioned that I had written Shub, mentioning that Simon & Schuster is able to offer its $3.95 FDR a Pictorial History —"260 photos with commentary"— at only $1.50 in cloth.

I said Shub had written some time ago that it would be a help to know the approximate number of photos as soon as possible, and Lyle said he of course agreed. He thought Shub and his collaborator should have something to show in, say, 30 days.

I mentioned that the "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK, when written up, which I will do shortly, will merely be a sub-Project of KMFUNNY, and will therefore require only Mr. Thompson's signature. Lyle queried whether it was necessary to make a formal project of it at all. I said that, for purposes of Status Reports, etc., it would be more or less necessary to have a formal title for it, and he agreed.

Shub has about 150 sterilized CIA Graphics photos, which we selected last summer. None of them could actually be printed, published, without a release from CIA Graphics. I therefore urged Munson to urge Shub to work up a good cover story about them, vis-a-vis his collaborator. Munson said he would advise him not to use them at all. (They are run-of-the-mine; they could all be duplicated with ease from agencies).

I told Munson that Mrs. Poland, of CIA Graphics (of whom he knows) had personally made an arrangement with Roy Larsen, whereby he supplies them with photos from Time-Life files, but not for publication. And that she had told me she is particularly anxious to do nothing that would undermine her relations with Time-Life.

We agreed that, if Shub's collaborator gets permission to use photos from Life's files in the book, it will still be a book being prepared for the overt SWEN Company, and that Life will not know the Government is involved. Munson thinks Shub is being very circumspect about all this.

WSS

JB III read
- fine!

Dec. 18, 1950

Dear Boris,

Swell!!

I've phoned our friend and will be seeing him tomorrow morning.

I do hope something or other may bring me to New York — though there's no immediate prospect of it — as it would be great fun to foregather.

Incidentally, I expect to be in Boston the 4 days after Xmas, to get the benefit of the two Monday holidays.

Incidentally also, re sale on newsstands (which sounds fine) did you notice that S&S are able to offer FDR, a Pictorial Biography, which is 260 photos with captions and commentary, and is $3.95 in cloth, at only $1½ in paper?

J much pleased too.

Best regards,

Bill

December 14, 1950

Dear Bill:

This is just a brief note to give you the latest on the picture front. I won't fill you in on the details because our mutual friend will be in Washington early next week and will give you all the dope. Suffice it to say that my collaborator is one of the top layout men on *Life*; one of those $25,000 per annum men. For the present xxxx he doesn't want his association with the picture book known to his employer for several good and compelling reasons. (Including the fear that they would plagiarize the idea). But in the final stages he'll have to tell them in order to get their cooperation on digging into their files as well as their official permission for the use of his name as a collaborator. Needless to say, all of the above is a deep dark secret, but then what isn't these days? More important than all of the above is the fact that the gentleman in question, in addition to being a top flight picture man, is deeply interested in the subject and--miraculously--actually knows a great deal about it. I hope nothing happens to make him back down on his decision. Impossible to get anybody nearly as qualified. Our friend will fill you in on the rest: what remains to be done, howxto do it, etc. xxxxx Of one thing you may be sure: If my collaborator stays with the project and if no act of God intervenes, the final product will be the picture book of all time. He wants to see it sold on newsstands among other places. xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Are you planning to visit New York one of these days? If you do, please let me know. Very anxious for a chance to chew the fat in a leisurely fashion. Am losing touch with the mythical world in which you live. Best regards to the gang.

Boris

P.S. The $.35 edition of Lenin is ready. Goes on sale officially on Dec 22, but I notice that Columbia U. bookstore is already selling it. ("Mentor Book", New American Library)

[illegible] 36 III

SECRET

Nov. 17, 1950

MUNSON PHONED FROM NY. , 10 a.m.

He will phone Shub now. Perhaps they can lunch together. Munson "definitely wants" the photo-book. Is agreeable to whatever size, etc., we think it should be. Told him I had suggested to Shub that he proceed on an estimate of about 150 pages.

I forgot to mention Joe's suggestion that Simon & Schuster (which Joe says would be better than Doubleday, probably) might do the book in the US, with Swen to have the foreign rights. Will tell Lyle about thqt this weekend.

Munson comes to Washington this afternoon or evening. I will give him the KUFUNNY pictures this weekend.

WSS

See log-sheet, Nov. 17

SECRET

Letter from Shub to Sims, Nov. 13, '50

filed in folder "SHUB, THE CHOICE"

See copy of it, above, in Memo of 15 Jan. '51 to LST.

14-00000

96 III

C-O-P-Y SECRET

1739 N St NW
Nov. 13, 1950

Dear Boris,

Many thanks for your excellent letter of the 13th, which I got this evening, and all the good news about "The Choice", which I'll share.

I'll try to clarify about our mutual friend / Munson / just as soon as I possibly can. Couldn't reach him all this evening. Maybe I can get him tomorrow morning. Will urge him to see you at the earliest and get it all clarified, as that will —as you say— be a great help. Meanwhile why not go ahead on an estimate of say 150 pp. Hope he can see you by Tuesday or at earliest thereafter.

Best regards
hastily

P.S.

Good about "Lenin" too.
And the Navy!
And the dual German edition!
And how right Matthew xiii, 57
was about prophets.

SECRET

Retain or Destroy

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

9 Nov. '50
DATE

TO: ~~A. R. BRYAN~~

BUILDING	ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

OK

FROM:

BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 30-2

CONF.

SECRET

9 Nov. 1950

KB

I queried Ray about how to send your letter to Shub, and he sterilized it and said it could go as sterilized. I will mail it this evening. Ray changed no matters of substance. (But the sentence about "we are pressed for full weekly reports" had to go out; the sterilized version of it wouldn't do the trick).

Re communicating with Shub. Ray says there is no OPC man in NY/OO. There may be one ~~letter~~ later. That NY/OO are not supposed to know SP details, and that, failing the OPC man there, the only means of regular communication with Shub are:

(1) fully sterilized letters thru ordinary mail
(letters via OO would equally have to be sterilized)

(2) hand-carried letters

(3) personal contact

WSS

SECRET

1698 32nd St., N. W.
Nov. 9, 1950

Dear Boris,

We are very anxious to have the photo-book finished as fast as possible. Handled as you alone can do it, this book will be one of the most effective shots that can be fired and we need it quick.

My understanding is that you are now engaged full time on it. Is that also your understanding? If so, please let me know (1) that the photo-book is your first concern, and (2) what progress you have made to date.

Again let me emphasize the great enthusiasm we have for the photo-book, and our complete confidence that it will have your own brilliant, informed and incisive touch when completed.

Joe
per
Bill

P.S.

Joe left town (till evening of the 12th) before I could discuss this with him. Please note his new address, as above.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

9 Nov. '50
DATE

TO: Ray

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Could this letter, to Shub, signed "Jo" be sent thru the ordinary mail? I imagine not. Who should I see here re arrangements for [illegible] communicating with

FROM:

BUILDING
Shub [illegible]

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO 36-8
SEP 1946

via NY/00? Carpenter? Dillon? WBS

SECRET

9 Nov. 1950

~~xxxxxxxxx~~

We are very anxious to have the ~~xxxx~~ photo-book finished as fast as possible. Handled as you alone can do it, this book will be one of the most ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ effective shots that ~~we~~ can fire for ~~the cause~~ the Better ~~[illegible]~~. ~~My~~ understanding is that you are now engaged full time on it. ~~this project as your present assigned job with the corporation~~. Is that also your ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ understanding? If so, please let me know (1) that the photo-book is ~~now~~ your first concern, and (2) what progress you have made to date. [We need the ~~information~~ to study our financial needs in relation to the program] ~~we are pressed for full early reports of all jobs now on foot, we must include [illegible] your progress to justify & and continue the present financial arrangement.~~ Again, let me emphasize the great enthusiasm we have for ~~the product~~ photo-Book, and our complete confidence that ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ it will have your own brilliant, ~~xxxxxxxx~~ informed and incisive touch when completed.

635

No OPC man in NY/00 now: trying to get one

Ray says only way to handle it is
(1) fully sterilized, as above
OR
(2) hand-carry

NY/00 are not supposed to know SP details, so anything sent via 00 [pending getting an OPC man up there] would have to be sterilized anyhow.

SECRET

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

8 Nov. '50

DATE

TO: Mr. Bryan

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

FF:

FROM: WBS.

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

14-00000

R-E-D-R-A-F-T

6 Nov. 1950

TO SHUB

via NY/OO, hand-carried; who can keep this and any later
letters for Shub to consult from time to time
if necessary.
He can transmit periodic reports of progress
via NY/OO. sterilized ones direct.

Dear Boris,

Re your book. I went fully into the question of ordering copies, and it is clear that it is not policy anywhere to do anything official to promote the distribution of it. There is just nothing in the charter that would authorize officially promoting a book of that very wide scope, —except for limited internal circulation.

That leaves it, as I imagine you gathered at lunch the other day /with IST/ that you should work on it only during weekends and other free hours.

That in turn leaves the question of the current status of the "Stalin" biography and of the Stalin photo-book.

Re the photo-book. On the one hand, (1) Joe is very keen to get the photo-book finished as fast as possible, and (2) the friend who was mentioned to you at lunch the other day /Munson/ is interested in it, and (3) we have already got a good deal of it done, —the some 225 photos already on hand, etc. and (4) perhaps most important: it could be completed in less time than would be required to complete the biography.

Shubs [illegible]

/JBIII: I wrote him yesterday, when sending him the Pocle paper, to be particularly careful not to say anything at all to anyone about "the friend who was mentioned to you at lunch" (Munson)/

/JBIII: Please note the security angle in what follows. Also, the project to have one or both Shubs complete the "Stalin" biography, in re which I have the full file, has been batted around from Olmstead to Kelley

SECRET

to LST, and there is or was a contract with Vanguard.

First, I was instructed to draw up a Project to subsidize David Shub to complete the biography. Later I was told that Boris had been sent to NY, with instructions to complete it himself.

LST, a few days ago, told me he was under the impression that you had worked out arrangements with Boris in re the biography. But you haven't. Neither has Kelley, nor Kramer. And Bill Rowland (to whom LST referred me) knows of no one else in OIC from whom Shub should be receiving directives.

Therefore, let's take time to get it cleared up, on paper, what is the status of Shub pere et fils re "Stalin".

Re "Stalin" biography. On the other hand, we are not clear what is the current status of the biography, (1) do you have any written directives from us about it, and (2) what are your and your father's current obligations to Vanguard as to completing it?

An important question is: if you complete the photo-book first, are your obligations to Vanguard such that you would have security difficulty in explaining to them why, and on whose behalf, you were delaying two months (more or less) to finish it, before resuming work on the biography?

(esp. if Swen were to be the publisher)

Since the photo-book and the biography have deal with the same subject-matter, I suppose there is a bare possibility that you could work on the photo-book during "office" hours, while collaborating with your father on the biography evenings and weekends. But that does not seem a happy arrangement. We are called on for weekly Progress Reports, and Vanguard would be wanting to know what gives, and why. Much better to concentrate on one job at a time, and be under obligations to only one crowd at a time.

Status of the biography. As far as anyone here knows, you have only oral instructions to complete it. According to my rough notes of a talk we had July 31, you had a contract with Vanguard, July '49, calling for a book "by David & Boris Shub" to be completed March 1, 1950. And as of June 10, your father had had a $900 advance on it.

Would the copyright be in your name, or both? I think it would be

SECRET

simplest to have the actual copyright in your name alone (he could assign his share to you), so that any arrangements for foreign publication could be made with the minimum delay over the legal and security aspects.

If I got it right, as of July 31 you had about 100 pages in pretty much finished form, about 70-80 pages in rougher draft, plus Chapters IV & V the typescript of which was circulated here (and which I mailed back to you Oct. 5). Anyway, you thought there would have been an absolute minimum of 3 solid months more ~~xxxx~~ full-time work in it for your father. All in all, if you were working on it whole-time and your father part-time, would a minimum of 3 and maximum of ~~8~~ 6 be about the right estimate?

(It's so much better, and better reading, than the Deutscher, it ought to come out as soon as possible. Incidentally, have you considered that the "Atlantic" or "Harper's" might print chapters of it in advance? Chapters IV & V are certainly highly readable.)

Re completing photo-book. What time do you estimate it would take you, whole-time, to do a photo-book worth doing? (Say between 100 and 200 photos?). I should think an absolute minimum of a month, and much more likely 2 or 3 months in actual practice, wouldn't you?

You probably noted that "Life's WW II Picture History" occupied "the fused talents of 'Life's' entire photographic and editorial staff." ~~XXXX~~ But yours would be only 150 or 200 photos, and you have almost all the caption material in your head or on your desk, so perhaps, with a cooperative publisher and cooperative photo agencies, 2 or 3 months full-time work would do it?

Please give all these details in writing, so we can make a decision. You could leave your carbon with NY/CO for safe-keeping, and arrange with them to consult it ~~fxxx~~ when and if necessary. Fully sterilized letters, about details of work-in-progress, we can exchange direct.

The friend who was mentioned at lunch said he may be free to come and see you in a week or two. But please be extremely careful about mentioning him to anyone. He'll explain why that's important.

Best regards,

Bill

two carbons

41

Bill: This is not what I want. I want Shub to be told that we are paying hi to complete his picture book,* but we hear that he is merelym promoting The Choice. What are the facts? When will the picture book be finished? I also want you to devise a system whereby we can check Shub's progress. Lastly, we could never allow a letter like this one to go through the mails. In the wrong hands, it would be TNT.

JB3

*What about Stalin biography?

No. NY/00 1655.

8 Nov '50

SECRET

14-00000

D-R-A-F-T

7 Nov. 1950

To SHUB

ny/00 6383.

D-R-A-F-T

c/O LITTAUER, who can keep this and subsequent letters in his safe, filed under HEADLEY, for Shub to consult from time to time, if necessary.
Sterilized letters, dealing with details of his work, I can exchange with him direct.

~~Dear Headley (pseudonym),~~

Dear Boris,

Re "The Choice". I hope the Overseas Press Club panel was a success. Nothing in the "NY Times" about it, but they don't usually write up those affairs. —I've seen nothing further in the "Post", ~~xxxx~~ since the mention in the ed I sent you; will send you anything I see.

I have a complete file, "The Choice", here, with all the reviews, etc. in it. I went fully into the question of ordering copies, and it is clear that it is not policy anywhere to promote the distribution of it (or for that matter, equally clearly, any other book). After all, if the head man himself / Bedell Smith / had written "The Choice", there is nothing in his official charter that would authorize him to promote it in his official capacity; on the contrary. Nothing anywhere against you personally or the book; it's just that there is no policy to promote any book of that wide scope.

Therefore, as I imagine you gathered at lunch the other day / with IST / work in connection with "The Choice" should be during weekends and other free time.

I hope Winchell's mention of it, and the good "NY Times" review, etc., will help sales, and that if it hasn't gotten off to a fast ~~stop~~ start, it will develop as a ~~"creeper".~~ "sleeper"

SECRET

4

Re "Stalin" biography and/or Stalin photo-book.

That leaves the question whether you are supposed to be working on completion of the "Stalin" biography or on the Stalin photo-book, or on both. What is your own preference?

On the one hand, (1) Joe is anxious to get the photo-book done, and (2) the friend who was mentioned to you at lunch the other day /Hinson/ is interested in it, and (3) we have already made a beginning on it, and, perhaps most important, (4) it could be completed in less time than would be required to complete the biography.

(Incidentally, please be particularly careful not to say anything to anybody about the publisher who was mentioned at lunch. /Swen/. It could raise a really first-class stink. /Hinson thinks other publishers would raise hell if they found out the Government had gone into competition with them/. Very important).

On the other hand, what are your and your father's current obligations ~~xx~~ to Vanguard, in re the Stalin biography, and would you have security difficulty in explaining to Vanguard why and on whose behalf you were taking two months (more or less) to do the photo-book, before resuming work on the biography? If so, that might be an argument for completing the biography first.

Please give me all relevant details as to the current status with Vanguard. As far as anyone here knows, you have only oral instructions to complete the biography. According to my rough notes of a talk we had July 31, you had a contract with Vanguard, July '49, calling for a book "by David & Boris Shub" to be completed March 1, 1950. And as of June 10, 1950 your father had had a $900 advance on it.

The copyright would be in your name, or in your father's also? I think

SECRET

it would be simplest to have ~~them~~ it in yours alone from the start (or he could assign his to you), so that arrangements for foreign publication / ~~perhaps by Swan~~ / could be made with the minimum delay ~~[illegible]~~ over the legal and security aspects.

If I got it right, as of July 31st you had about 100 pages in pretty much finished form, about 70-80 pages in rougher draft, plus Chapters IV & V the typescript of which was circulated here (and which I mailed back to you Oct. 5). Anyway, you thought there would have been an absolute minimum of 3 solid months more work in it for your father. All in all, assuming you were working on it whole-time, would a minimum of 3 and maximum of 8 months be about right? (It's so much better, and so much better reading, than the Deutscher, I think we ought to get it out as soon as possible. Incidentally, have you considered that the "Atlantic" or "Harper's" might print chapters of it in advance? Chapters IV & V are certainly highly readable).

What time do y ou estimate it would take you, whole-time, to do a photo-book worth doing? (Say between 100 and 200 photos?). I should think an absolute minimum of a month, and much more likely 2 or 3 months in actual practice, wouldn't you?) I have been keeping a file of everything done in the photo-book line, such as "Life's Picture History of World War II" and to produce ~~[illegible]~~ the 1,000 photos of "The Life of F.D.R. in Pictures", and note that/the former occupied "the fused talents of Life's entire photographic and editorial staff". Yours would be only 150 or 200 photos, and you have almost all the caption material in your head or on your desk, so perhaps, with a cooperative publisher and cooperative photo agencies, 2 or 3 months hard work would do it?

SECRET

I have written you care of Littauer, whom we have asked to keep a file for you, of letters of this sort — and you could deposit carbons of your replies if necessary with him — which you could consult when and if necessary.

Sterilised letters, ~~[illegible]~~ about details of work-in-progress, we can exchange direct.

The friend who was mentioned at lunch said he may be free to come and see you in a week or two. But please be extremely careful about mentioning him to anyone. He'll explain why that's important.

Best regards,

Bill

two carbons

Has Littauer a safe?

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SI

6 Nov. '50
DATE

TO: ~~CSP~~ [illegible]

BUILDING | ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

F.Y.I.

JBIII and I are writing to him.

FROM: W.S.S.

BUILDING | ROOM NO. | EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

6 Nov. 1950

MR. THOMPSON.

Re: Boris Shub

(1) Bill Rowland says that, as far as he knows, Shub is not under the direction of anyone except CSP.

(2) Shub is a covert "contract agent". His contract runs until 1st Dec. 1951.

W.S.S.
WSS

cc: Mr. Thompson
for file "Stalin photo-book"

SECRET

3 Nov. '50

"L'URSS EN CONSTRUCTION", #12

~~xx~~ WSS wrote on cover sheet of date 30 Oct. '50, from I/IS: "CF/FW/Sims would like to see material such as this, and if possible would like to have a copy of "L'URSS en Construction". #12, 1949.

The latter is the handsomely got out, printed in Moscow, #12, 1949 issue, dealing with the ~~xx~~ 70ty bday of Stalin. A lot of idealized paintings of Stalin with Lenin et al; the house where he was born, his activs in 1905, in Georgia ; in 1917, etc.

(We cd live without it, however).

The mags were shipped to the Sov Legation in Havana. It may be possible to get similar publications in the future. Request interest be indicated. SP/IS also expressed interest.

Attachments must be returned to OSO by 17 Nov.

The other attachment is big mag "SOVIET UNION", #5, July '50.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 Oct. '50

SECRET

MR. THOMPSON

(1) I just phoned Shub and asked him to get in touch with you at the Biltmore around 9 a.m. Thursday, in re having lunch with you.

(2) His phone is ACademy 2-0164, 510 West 110th St.

(3) re "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK. I wrote him Oct. 18: "Please don't approach any publishers until you hear more. Another very helpful possibility has come up."

He was understandably puzzled, and I couldn't explain it over the phone. Could y ou please explain to him it means: Don't approach Simon & Schuster or other publishers because SWEN PUBLICATIONS, INC. is much interested in doing the book.

WSS.

SECRET

Books of The Times

19 Oct.'50.

By CHARLES POORE

"LIFE'S Picture History of World War II"* is decorated with salvos of interpretative prose by John Dos Passos. "The Prospect Before Us"† is a wide-ranging, deeply pondered discussion of what's going on in the world and what may loom, by John Dos Passos. Our main guide this morning, then, is Mr. Dos Passos, as we look at the embattled present, future and past.


John Dos Passos

In ordinary life when you are being shown through picture galleries, you sometimes get so interested that you lose sight of your guide. And much the same sort of thing happens while Mr. Dos Passos is leading you through "Life's Picture History of World War II." There are fields and towns and seas and beaches that may interest you, for personal reasons, far more than they can ever interest many other people. You stop and look again and again at these: in the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic or the South Pacific, say, and let the rest of the party, guided by Mr. Dos Passos, go on.

The whole book, though, is a magnificent and impressive performance. It will probably become our day's equivalent of the Brady Civil War albums, unless someone finds a better way to keep a planetary conflict in human scale. Hundreds of black and white prints are supplemented with maps and color plates of photographs—and dozens of those curiously immaculate war paintings.

The seas churn, the continents blaze, the new, improved, economy-size superhomogenized Bikini bomb raises its cauliflower head. But the measure of it all is man. The measure of it all is a submariner reporting by intercom from the engine room. An American citizen dead on a Leipzig balcony where he fell covering the Second Infantry's advance across a bridge. An Englishman called Tedder giving a light to an American called Spaatz. A German called Rommel who hit our side so frequently and so hard in North Africa that we are apparently hell-bent on endowing him, posthumously, with supernatural powers.

Pictures Not to Be Forgotten

There is a picture of the beaches of Namur on Kwajalein atoll that you won't soon forget. The air seems to be made of the substance of death. There is a picture of Nazi troops—garrison troops, at that—goose-stepping through the Arc de Triomphe that you won't want to remember. There are pictures of Japanese suicide planes, late in the war, coming in on American ships that should be printed with all articles explaining how completely we had beaten the enemy long before the Enola Gay sailed over Hiroshima.

One of the most dramatic pictures in the book shows half a page of a typewritten letter. Man named Einstein is writing a man named Roosevelt, on Aug. 2, 1939. The letter begins: "Sir: Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and more important source of energy in the immediate future. * * *" The free world's "immediate future" has been immeasurably lenghtened because Einstein wrote that letter.

Winston Churchill, who is writing the greatest continued story of our day, said in THE NEW YORK TIMES last Thursday that "it is easier to infuriate Americans than to cow them." He was speaking of the havoc the U-boats made along our coasts in 1942, when the war came very close to America, as you can see by this book's picture of an American tanker torpedoed off the Jersey shore. You can also apply Churchill's observation to many other pictures, particularly those of the black days after Pearl Harbor. The book's last shot shows a combat veteran who might be in Korea today. The final text by Mr. Dos Passos is: "The Pacific phase of the second of the world wars of the bloody twentieth century had ended, but its ending brought no peace."

In his own new book, "The Prospect Before Us," which contains stuff he first wrote for Life and for Harper's Magazine, Mr. Dos Passos expands on that. He takes us all over the wartime and post-war map, to Akron and Argentina, England and Brazil, Lima and Kansas City. He arranges his bursting briefcases full of material into a series of lectures complete with hecklers and other askers of penetratingly troublesome questions, that become light-heavyweight bouts with the leading problems of the world. What shall we do about capitalist cartels and Communist trusts? How can the institutions of democracy be safeguarded in a world where security is in short supply? What must we do to be saved? Little man, little world, there's little time. The battle is still on.

Lessons at Hand Everywhere

If we want to get a notion of the price of failure, Mr. Dos Passos says, "all we have to do is to visit the ruins of Berlin or to imagine the lives men live in Prague or Bucharest or Moscow." If we want to get an inkling of the cost of survival, all we have to do is to read Mr. Dos Passos' recollections of his wartime experiences in Britain. And now they've passed from their ordeal by fire to what Mr. Dos Passos calls their "ordeal by government." At all points he maintains his faith in man. Free man.

All over the world he chats easily with men and women of all degrees. There seems to be a breezy and unconstrained flowering of Mr. Dos Passos when he leaves New York. In Coon Rapids, Iowa, he drops into a coffee shop and finds that "Bob Garst was sitting in his accustomed corner laughing like he'd split about the difficulties of getting seed corn detasseled." In Peru a puffing fellow says: "A curious thing about Lima * * * the only history that has remained in our minds * * * is that candlelit colonial romance of the aged viceroy and the actress La Perricholi."

That "candlelit" romance, as a matter of fact, had such far-reaching influences that it eventually led to the broadening of the Pulitzer Prize conditions, so the 1928 decoration could go to Thornton Wilder's novel about La Perricholi, "The Bridge of San Luis Rey."

---

*LIFE'S PICTURE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II. Edited by [illegible]. Picture editor, [illegible]. Text by John Dos Passos and others. [illegible] pages. [illegible] $10.

†THE PROSPECT BEFORE US. By John Dos Passos. Illustrated by [illegible]. [illegible] pages. Houghton Mifflin. [illegible]

18 Oct. 1950

Air-mail to SHUB

Please don't approach any publishers until you hear more. Another very hopeful possibility has come up. #

Adele is here and says to send you her love.

As D-day approaches we trust you are taking aspirin every hour on the hour. Best regards and sympathy to Libby.

Bill

Possibility that Swen publications will publish the "Stalin" PHOTO-Book, initially in the U.S. and/or in the foreign editions.

SECRET



16 Oct '50

THE fused talents of LIFE'S entire photographic and editorial staff have gone into this superb new kind of history book. It contains nearly 1000 photographs, paintings, maps, many in color, and 75,000 words of brilliant narrative by John Dos Passos, Robert Sherrod, and others. Foreword by Henry R. Luce.

The first printing of this monumental book is one half million copies; the size 10" x 14"; the weight, approximately 6 lbs. Each copy comes in its individual carton. Price $10 a copy; deluxe edition $12. At all bookstores. —SIMON AND SCHUSTER

Life's Picture History of World War II (Time, Inc.; Simon & Schuster, $10, de luxe edition $12). A thousand pictures and 80,000 words of text.

Year: Mid-Century Edition, 1900-1950 (Year, Inc., [illegible]). A record of fifty years in 1,000 pictures and 100,000 words.

Oct. 16, '50

for QUARTERLY REPORT

SECRET

6 Oct. '50

KMFURTY: This project is to produce a book of animal photos with satirical anti-Communist captions for publication in France. It is being developed with the assistance of Clarence A. Barnes, author of the best-selling "Home Sweet Zoo" and other photo-books. Twenty-one captioned photos have been submitted to a French publisher, who has indicated willingness to publish. These photos have been recalled, so that a final selection may be made from among them and 59 further photos supplied by Mr. Barnes. If the French edition is successful, editions in other areas are contemplated. $6,000 has been allotted to publishing this book, with approximately $600 obligated to date; and an additional $40,000 has been set aside for publishing similar books. / Earliest publishing date 6 weeks; latest estimated at Jan. 1, 1951 /. If there are editions in other countries, this project will be active for more than one year, and it may be necessary to subsidize the publishers in order to obtain the desired distribution.

1685

[redacted] KM KNOT

SECRET

SECRET 6 Oct. '50

for QUARTERLY REPORT

RE [illegible] "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT

This project, which will be a sub-project of [illegible], has not been formally drafted, but is being developed. The project is to prepare and publish in the U.S. a book of photos and text on the career of Stalin, with the expectation of very widespread foreign distribution to follow. Mr Robert M. Headley, CIA contract agent, is at work on the book; more than 200 photos have been assembled; a legal agreement concerning copyright and royalties between CIA and Headley was signed Sept. 16. Cost of 150 photos at $6 would be $900; any profit in the form of royalties will be returned to CIA.

John Shields: there has already been some expense for (a) travel by Snowden to NY to take contract to Headley for signing, and (b) about $150 paid to Headley's agents to pay the agencies for photos obtained, and (c) $100/down paymt to them for their services in obtaining.

SECRET

SECRET 6 Oct. 1950

for QUARTERLY REPORT (?)

Re: the bit listed as #5 (No name).

As far as I know this is not, and probably never will be, technically a Project.

As far as I know Headley is just under instructions from IS7, —as soon as he has finished work on the Stalin photo-book— to complete his biography of Stalin.

W88

SECRET

secret

SECRET

For Dawson, for
QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT

5 Oct. '50

"STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT (to be named KMKNOUT)

Is a project for preparation of a book of photographs-plus-text on the career of Stalin.

When formally written up, it will be titled KMKNOUT, and will be a sub-project of KMFUNNY, requiring only the approval of LST.

Some photographs have been assembled, from CIA Graphics and from agencies in N.Y., and a legal agreement has been drafted and signed, between ~~[illegible]~~ CIA and Robert H. HEADLEY (pseudonym for B.S.), who will prepare the book for publication in the U.S. under his own name, retaining the copyright, which (together with royalties) he will assign to CIA.

Mr. Headley is now working on the book. It is planned that, after publication in the U.S., there will be editions (some perhaps subsidized) in many foreign areas.

KMFUNNY

I assume you have the details on this.

EXRADIO

I am listed as responsible for this, but know nothing about it. (I am going to look at the file today). Ray Millard and LST know about it.

"STALIN" BIOGRAPHY

This, I believe, is not technically a project. But I understand that Robt. H. HEADLEY, ~~xxxx~~ contract agent, has instructions from LST, after finishing the "Stalin" photo-book, to complete a biography of Stalin, for publication in the U.S. under his own name; with the expectation of foreign editions to follow.

WSS

SECRET

51

6 Oct. 1950

Re PHOTO: of a panel of distinguished literary figures, artists, musicians, etc., who have been banned in USSR, are exiles, and/or became disillusioned with the "Soviet experiment".

Dateline Berlin, Aug. 16, '50. The West Berlin "Volksblatt" reports that the SED has forbidden the works of the following to appear in official entertainment programs or in public libraries in the East Zone:

Andre GIDE: "an enemy of the Soviet Union"

Ignace PADEREWSKI: "a Polish reactionary chauvinist and enemy of the Soviet Union"

Igor STRAVINSKY: "implacable enemy of the Soviet Union"

Arturo TOSCANINI: "rootless, with Western tendencies" (!!)

R. M. RILKE: whose work is "sterile and unpopular"

Stefan GEORGE: "a decadent dreamer and champion of the Germanistic infallibility myth"

Jean-Paul SARTRE

Musicians

To what extent any or all of them left the USSR for primarily political reasons I don't know (do you), but taken in all, with the caption pointing out "It can't be a coincidence that all these men preferred to get away from and stay away from the USSR", they wd make an impressive gallery:

STRAVINSKI
HOROWITZ
ELMAN
HEIFETZ
GOLSCHMANN?(b.Paris)

RACHMANINOV
KOUSSEVITSKY
BARER
BRAILOWSKY
GARBOUSOVA

KOSTELANETZ
KURTZ
MEDTNER (?)
MILSTEIN
MOISEIVICH

PIATIGORSKY SEVITZKY STERN ZIMBALIST

ETC. ETC.

Photo: of MVD officer, or 6 Oct. 1950

Photo: PIROGOV (as on the cover of his book; Duell, Sloan)

Caption: a quote from him, such as (from the jacket of the book):

"The Soviet major and the American colonel personified two worlds, two worlds between which I was to choose.

"One was my country where everything was infinitely dear to me: her breadth, her limitless abundence, her simple, kindly folk who can sing in times of sorrow as in times of joy.. Scores of friendly faces flashed across my mind, scores of people I should never see again.

"But then all of that was blanketed in mist and all I saw was the sleek mask of the Soviet major sitting across from me. The cold, rigid features expressed all I detested: cruelty, contempt for the sufferings of others, the fear and sham of everyday life, the cheerless toil, and the perennial threat of tyranny..

"The alternative was an alien ~~land~~ America where I should be a stranger,.. but where I should at least be free..

"But I did know that I could no longer live in the land of my birth, live as a slave among slaves, conscious of my impotence to help them or myself.."

Comment: this quote could of course be pruned, retaining little more than the underlined bits.

Here is text which, joined to a photo of a particularly repellent MVD type, will do something to put across how the MVD is detested.

/ Sure, he's an anti-Stalinist, but that's Stalin's fault, not ours, You could add, if it seems necessary, as he and Ada Siegel point out, that there are thousands like him, and the only reason we don't hear from them is that it's a rare & lucky & plucky man who has a plane handy for escape./

6 Oct. 1950

?? Photo of TROTSKY and/or LENIN

Caption: quote from Trotsky's letter to Chheidze, 1913, describing Lenin as "this professional exploiter of all the backwardness in the Russian working class movement." (BS manuscript, p. 120).

Comment: several photos and quotes of this sort to expose the myth of one-big-happy-family life among the Communists, whole-souled in their adoration of Big Brother. A Trotsky quote such as the above could be used in conjunction with the Stalin quote on the "ordinariness" of Lenin, and the Lenin quote on the "roughness" of Stalin. And throw in two or three more and you have a striking (and amusing) little

Section on: the Politburo as just a Band of Brothers, happy home life among the Communists; the CC (circa 1924, anyway) a snake-pit; band of backbiters and backstabbers

3 x 2 equals 6 photos would give an exhibit of each of the three Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky backbiting each of the others.

Then these could be followed with the photo of Trotsky dead after stabbing bt Stalin's assassin, which in turn could be followed (or the whole preceded by) photo of Dostoevsky with the quote:

"Brothers will begin to cut each other's heads off in order to obtain brotherhood".

6 Oct. 1950

?? Photo of DOSTOEVSKY

Caption: an appropriate quote from him.

Orville Prescott reviews "Fyodor Dostoevsky" by R. Fulop-Miller, 137 pp., $2., Scribners, in "NY Times", Oct. 6, and quotes:

> "Brothers will begin to cut each other's heads off in order to obtain brotherhood... It is madness to want to bring about a new era and a new humanity by sacrificing a hundred million heads..."

He says there are "many amazing prophecies...of the tyranny of the totalitarian state."

I imagine you have read most of Dustamoffsky, and would know other quotes as good as or better than the above.

JH

6 Oct. 1950

In re: How many pictures?

"NY Times" book page says "THE PICTURE STORY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT" By Gene Schoor, which will be issued Nov. 7 by Frederick Fell, will contain

125 illustrations with
20,000 words of text.

This is evidently a second FDR photo-book, and will be competing with the SLAIN & SCHUSTER (Simon Legree & Schuster) one by Stefan Lorant, "The Life of FDR in Photographs and Text".

Letter from Shub to Sims, 26 Sept, 1959:

"...On the picture book: I am following your idea of trying to get a working draft done myself, with a clear story and a tentative arrangement of pictures, before calling in a collaborator. I am going to need many more pictures than I now have to do a real job. Please continue to forward any suggestions you may have, as well as any picture material you encounter."

SECRET

File [illegible]

A third volume of Rooseveltiana will be published in a period of a month when Frederick Fell will issue on [illegible] "The Picture Story of Franklin Delano Roosevelt," by Gene Schoor. It will contain 125 illustrations with 20,000 words of text. On Sept. 29 Duell, Sloan & Pearce published Frank Kingdon's "As F. D. R. Said: A Treasury of His Speeches, Conversations and Writings." Beacon Press issued on Sept. 27 "The Wit and Wisdom of Franklin D. Roosevelt," edited by Maxwell Meyersohn with the collaboration of Adelle Archer.

To Boris SHUB

28 Sept. 1950

Just FYI

"As Russia Sees It", MARCH OF TIME, Aug. 1950

Presents an analysis of the world situation today, from the viewpoint of the Kremlin. It evaluates the opportunities for conquest as Stalin and his henchmen see them, and shows why the Soviets chose to take action now in Korea rather than elsewhere.

It also shows how the U.S. is meeting the challenge in Korea: the mobilization of manpower and industry; the reactivation of planes, tanks, and ships laid up since the end of WW II; and the actions which the US is taking with other members of the UN to check permanently the aggressions of Stalin and his Communist satellites.

Running time about 22 minutes.

Of course through someone such as Jensen, Time and/or Life could provide stills from this.

25 Sept. 1950

[To Shub]

As you probably saw in yesterday's "N. Y. Times Book Review", SIMON & SCHUSTER will be the publishers this fall of "The Life of FDR in Photographs and Text" (sic) by Stefan Lorant, and of "LIFE's Picture History of World War II".

Also Boris Shub has a book coming out on "the cold war and propaganda".

Are you sending complimentary copies to Drew Pearson and to Bernard Baruch? The latter's recent article in "Look" had a sentence or two faintly, but only faintly, along the lines of "the choice."

If you have a copy to spare, why not send one to Gen. Wedemeyer, c/o Pentagon; he's the one who maintains the first sine qua non is to have a political policy.

[Simo]

19 Sept. '50

Re your MS. P is in bed with some kind of fever. He got Dick today
to take the MS to Floyd McCaffery, chief of research for Republican Nat'l
C'ee, who will give it to the Col. Fellers who wrote the "How to Beat the
Russians" article in the current "Colliers".
Elliston (Washington Post) has had the MS, at any rate of the last
chapter. P rang Kay Halle, his sec'y, to ask her to tell him it should
get all possible publicity.
Don't worry too much (except in your capacity as a tax-payer, etc.!)
about the sales. One Elliston reading it means more than the thousands
reading the "Worlds in Collision" tripe,—which even Churchill can't dis-
lodge from #1 on the Best Seller list.

Re photo-book. Please keep such screeds as I sent, for any possible
future cross-reference.
They are mainly grains of sand dropped in to contribute to the pro-
duction of the pearls. (That simile seems better, the more you think of it,
don't you think?).
Re Slave-labor: J suggests possible use, lacking photos, of drawings
such as the enclosed from Sept. 18 NY Times Book Review by Korolkov (Stalin
Prize Winner!) and said to be artist of very high calibre. Don't throw it
away. Wait & see. A number of his drawings appeared in Life a year or two
ago; I've seen them, but there is no clue to the date, so you'd have to
ask Life.
Important: J says "Ask Littauer to tell Jenson about it". Of course
Littauer will know to what extent you can sound out two different publishers
simultaneously, should you already have approached Doubleday or another.
Jensen's still being on Life ("leave of absence") sounds fine, but
Littauer will know whether he (Picture Press) could handle production &
advertising as well as Doubleday?

Scratch my stuff about a possible Hiss photo in my screed of Sept. 15;
had no time to proof-read it.

Enclosed what look to me offhand 3 or 4 highly possible quotes from
Karsmev & Zinoviev, from frontispiece of Murder in Mexico.

Think that Korolkov idea is worth keeping in mind. You could play up
the angle: there are no photos, and they bleat about the "worker's paradise"
and refuse all UN inspection committees, make survivors swear to say nothing
about the camps. It is Joe's fault there are no photos on this page, but this
gives an inkling of what it's like, etc.
Korolkov being a Stalin prize-winner adds greatly, it seems to me.

Item. Photo of SHOSTAKOVICH, name familiar in every country, with
just as caption the three lines of his abject, comical recantation.
Bedell Smith's book, p. 298. You could also quote PROKOFIEV.

Thanks for postcard. Best regards.

19 Sept. '50

Photo DMITRI SHOSTAKOVICH

Caption: "I know that the party is right, that the party wishes me well, and that I must search for and find creative paths which lead me to Soviet realistic popular art."

Why shouldn't there be photos also of PROKOFIEV and KHACHATURIAN, world names, much more living than Zinoviev et al, with as captions quotes from the incredible "resolution" by the Central Committee, condemning the "degenerate, formalistic, bourgeois" music, Bedell Smith pp.296-8.

If you were given complete license to ijvent anti-Stalin material on the fate of the Arts in the USSR, how could you better this?

Will send brief suggested quotes from those pages shortly.

4

Excerpts from "Murder in Mexico" by General Leandro A. Sanchez Salazar, Ex-Chief of Secret Service of the Mexican Police with the collaboration of Julian Gorkin, London, Secker & Warburg, 1950.

XX

"To choose the victim, carefully prepare the blow, satisfy an implacable vengeance, then go to bed. . . There is nothing sweeter in the world."
(Stalin to Dzerjinski and Kamenev in the course of a conversation held in the spring of 1923.)

"You think that Stalin is worrying himself trying to find a reply to your arguments? You are mistaken. He is only considering in what manner he can suppress you without danger to himself."
(Kamenev to Trotsky in 1923.)

"He would have got rid of you at any moment since 1924 if he had not feared reprisals from the youth section in the form of terrorist activities. That is why Stalin has decided to start by destroying the framework of the opposition and then to kill you afterwards, when he is sure of being able to do so with impunity."
(Zinoviev to Trotsky in 1925.)

"If we die suddenly, let it be known that it is the work of Stalin."
(Zinoviev and Kamenev in letters placed in safe keeping after their rupture with Stalin in 1925.)

123

Lev Davidovitch invited Joe, who was near to me, to write in his notebook what was, I learned later, his farewell to life: "I am sure of the triumph of the Fourth International. Forward!"

207

The working-class writer, Ciliga, after having worked several years in the U.S.S.R., has called it "the country of the great lie."

Time, Sept. 11, 1950

"...interpretation of Stalin's personality, doctrines and aims are pregnant with tragic misunderstandings between Americans and the Russian people— the best potential ally in the struggle for freedom.

"The Russian people were the first victims of the totalitarian yoke. They dream not of expansionism but only of the restoration of human freedom...As to Stalin, he "spits" as Lenin once said, on Russian interests, because Russia must merely be "used as a base for world revolution."

"Stalin...and all his international henchmen fanatically believe that 'the capitalist system as a whole is already ripe for revolution.' They fanatically believe, as Lenin proved, that 'the importance of war as a midwife of Revolution can scarcely be exaggerated'..."

Alexander Kerensky

I imagine the "spits" is a correct quote from Lenin, but referring to someone else (perhaps himself) rather than to Stalin. J. was wondering.

6

15 Sept. 1950

To Boris Shub.

Just thinking out loud. If you care to call it thinking. Call it "revolt in the provinces", "Trotskyist deviationism" if you like. But don't let it upset your digestion.

This will be a wonderful book. Really well done, it should sell several hundred thousands in the U.S. alone (and Canada). At $1 the 3 "Zoo" books sold 700,000-plus. Even at $2.50 or $3., —I very much doubt that you could do the job as it should be done for $1— it should have a big sale. There is a crying need for it, in the U.S. alone. It is almost fantastic that there hasn't long since been a "Stalin-in-pictures" book. (But then there was no "Life", to parallel the "London Illustrated News" until circa 1932). There is a great thirst for really readable, believable information on what makes Stalin and the USSR tick. You are ideally set to fill it.

Just tell the story of "Stalin" (the biog) in pictures, —with as much wordage as is necessary and no more. The sovereign virtue of photos is that people who wouldn't crack a book of solid print will read a page or half page of print, if need be, if there's a photo alongside it. (Cf. the book "The Photographs of Lincoln", where I found myself reading the entire printed parts, which I wouldn't have bought nor read without the photos). Let's add to your favorite axiom, "The Best Photograph tells its Own Story" the corollary "An arresting photo will carry reader-interest for quite a bit of caption".

"THE STORY OF JOSEPH STALIN". Just tell the story. What he did. What he is doing. Properly done, that will leave the reader with the feeling of revulsion & distrust as to what he will do next; "Who sups with the devil must have a long spoon".

All the world loves a story. And what a story this is. As a reviewer of Deutscher said (the "NY Times", I think) "After all, it's the 'success' story of the 20th Century. From cobbler's cottage ~~xxx~~ to the Kremlin where he is

SECRET

still pulling the wool over the eyes of an aimed-at 400 million signers of a Petition in the name of "peace" (with the largest standing army in the world's history) and mouthing "democracy" (while holding down more than 15,000,000 slave laborers in his own country alone). And your readers won't learn (millions of 'em don't know) he has more than 15,000,000 slave laborers unless you tell them. Not screaming at the top of your voice, —but tell them. And no harm in giving the figure "15,000,000" more than once, if it proves convenient. Repetition is no sin.

In fact repetition can be dandy. Witness the world-wide best seller (second only to the Bible,(a mighty repetitive book itself) Andersen's fairy tales. Plenty of repetition in them. If the sh story is good, the theme gripping, the reader laps up the repetition: if the Wicked Uncle is wicked, it's more than OK to keep on saying (or, in your case, showing) it. And you've certainly got a story, and the Uncle is wicked. Let's show it, by any and every truthful means that doesn't detract from readability.

Re Repeition. I'm sure there is a lot in what J says. That when you are writing for mass readership, you ought to use a good deal of repetition: "I am going to tell you the story of how.......So here is the story.....So that was the story." After all, that is the time-tested fairy story technique, and they are the world's best sellers.

So why should we shy away from (a) repetition, or (b) calling the spade the spade, dotting the i's and crossing the t's. ⌈If you don't/~~xxx~~ cross your t's pretty vigorously & regularly, a lot of woolly-minded readers are going to have a breathing space in which to say: "Still, he had his dear old mother up to stay with him in the Kremlin, so there must be some good in the man; and Byrnes (a Catholic) writes that he is undeniably a 'likable' fellow." Of course, y ou will an ticipate & counteract that with photos of Big Brother accepting bouquets from schoolgirls, juxtaposed with photos showing Big Brother in a much less happy light.

The Uncles were Wicked, and Grimm said so. Stalin is history's greatest slave-master. Say so. It's not an adjective. It's a fact. Throw the book at him. Dallin. Kravchenko. Pirogov. Anything and/or everything that it takes to ram home the fact. If you can do it without Kravchenko or any other "avowed anti-Stalinist" so much the better, I entirely agree. But let's do it. Stalin keeps the 15,000,000 hidden, so we've got few photos. So if you have to use a photo of a few slave-laborers and caption that "there are millions like them", OK. Or use a "There is all this smoke, and it's because there is all this fire" argument, OK. I.e., if you have to use the cumulative technique of quoting a few sentences from Tchernavin and Dallin and Kravchenko and any others, let's do it. The fact of the slave-camps has got to be in there. If it isn't made credible you haven't told the story.

For example, re-read "Seeds of Treason". Chambers says that what made the scales fall from his eyes was "I SPEAK FOR THE SILENT" by Tchernavin. (I've never read it, and had forgotten it; you'll do no harm if you mention it somewhere. Of course Tchernavin is an anti-Stalinist). If that was good enuf for Chambers, it should be good for other CP readers, even, too.

What I'm getting at is: I DON'T [illegible] CRAMP YOUR STYLE BY ARBITRARILY RULING OUT THE USE OF "ANTI-STALINIST" WITNESSES. Let the motto be: ANY truthful means that tell's Stalin's story is OK. He made the story, we didn't. It's his fault if you have to say: Pirogov was only one airman who escaped, and a mere lieutenant, but there are thousands like him.

PIROGOV. Just a random suggestion, but I see no reason of principle why you shouldn't have, say: Photo of Stalin, sounding off about the worker's paradise, juxtaposed with Photo of Pirogov (a nice clean-cut looking type, smiling), and a quote from Pirogov (he's definitely eloquent, as you say) to the effect that he didn't like to leave his native land, but couldn't stick it living "as a slave among slaves". Cf. *Ada Siegel*, to the effect (in Preface) that there are thousands like him ("The Choice") and he is unusual only in that he had few close living relatives, and a plane, and enterprise.

If it *could* be done without the Pirogovs & Kravchenkos, fine. But I'm sure you'll find when you chain yourself to your desk and start sweating blood over it that you just *can't* do justice to (a) SLAVE-LABOR and (b) MVD's EVERYBODY-AN-INFORMER with just a photo of Beria, —even if he looked like a two-headed baby in a bottle. I just don't see how it can begin to do justice to the subject. It wasn't any photo (though his first sight of Rykov in the flesh shook him badly) that took the scales from Chambers eyes, but the Tchernavin story.

Also he was shaken by (a minor news item in the *New Masses*) the proof that the Kremlin were *liars*, bent on systematic, petty denigration of Trotsky. Anything —preferably out of their own mouths, as you say— that builds the *THEY ARE LIARS* theme is good.

There is so much to choose from, and it seems to me that repetition is so good and, probably, so necessary, that I should say, as you do, that a $1 book couldn't do the job. "White Collar Zoo" is 80 pages in all, of which 74 pages have photos. 74 photos won't be enuf, by a long shot. The story is so absorbing, properly told, that 150 or more photos wouldn't be a bit too much. Ask K what about the economics of "The Cardinal", where Simon & Schuster got out more than 400 pages of close print for only $1, with *paper* cover. Perhaps we could get by for $2.50, if they felt assured of a large sale. And why shouldn't there be a large sale. You've got the real dirt on Stalin, and the prestige of "Lenin". Give them "Stalin" in pictures, with the minimum wordage, but enuf wordage. It will make Deutscher (and Prof. Carr) look like moral lepers.

The quote from Lenin, "any dodge, ruse, etc", should definitely be in there, and I should think offhand would be an excellent one as a frontispiece. Right out of his own mouth.

Just another offhand suggestion: buy "Why I Escaped" and ask I. to re-read it, and see if she doesn't think there are some good brief anecdotal quotes in it. I.e., you could have a photo of a couple of ordinary USSR air-men, sitting at mess-table, or what have you, and a few sentences of conversation from Pirogov, --where the SMERSH man tells him he'd better inform on his pals, or else, --with the subscript: --Peter Pirogov, "Why I Escaped", page so&so. It wouldn't do any harm to advertise Pirogovs & Kravchenkos & Tchernavins anyway; all in the same good cause.

Item. On the left-hand page a photo of Alger Hiss montaged (or alongside) one of Mrs. Hede Massing (cf. her book)(she's quite photogenic I think) with caption quoting her on how Hiss & she agreed, after squabbling good-naturedly about interfering with each other's apparatuses, "We're both working for the same boss". Then on the right-hand page, a photo of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Hiss, with quote from "Seeds of Treason" on how, at Yalta, at one point FDR, JVS and Hiss (and one interpreter) were closeted together in the same room. (Roosevelt allegedly emerging saying, "I don't know how they persuaded me to give in, but I did"). There is probably a Yalta photo showing Hiss standing behind some of the others. Just an idea, but when you stop to think what may have been passing thru (a) Hiss's and (b) Stalin's mind at that little tete-a-tete, it might make a dramatic set of photos. But perhaps wouldn't really buttress any of the main themes.

"VERDICT OF THREE DECADES". I'm getting it today. There may be some good caption material in it.

ILLUSTRIOUS DEFECTEES. No one of them, perhaps, is important enuf to deserve a photo. But how about devoting two or three pages to photos of the 2 or 3 dozen most illustrious figures who have been admirers of the Soviet system & then become disillusioned? Taken all together, they ought to make a pretty impressive gallery: Gide, Koestler, Mann(??), Silone, etc. etc. etc., and you could have a quarter-page of caption giving a one-sentence quote from each of them (..."a spy-ridden slave-camp"...."more totalitarian than any Hitler"...etc), or a single caption to the effect ex-admirers of "The Light that Failed". After all, when one Gide "defects" it may not be much, but when they all do, sooner or later, it makes a pretty telling point, and a point which will have a multi-national and racial appeal (Silone, Gide, Richard Wright, etc). Throw the book at the bastards. Don't miss any tricks. If you have a good brick right at hand, why not throw it. ("Any stigma is good enuf to beat a dogma", as someone erroneously said).

"LENIN": a wonderful book, and perfect for selling by the thousands to the Karnoviches & Bullitts & Bedell Smiths. But remember the photo-book editions should total in the millions, for the ordinary reader everywhere. That's why, if I may harp on it, I think it should lean towards the tone & style of Grimm's fairy tales, where you don't read very far before you know the Uncle is Wicked, or strongly suspect it. Therefore the photo of Lenin with the quote "use any dodge, ruse or deception" would be an excellent frontispiece. Offhand I should say "YOU CAN NEVER AFFORD TO TRUST, BELIEVE THIS MAN" is the main theme, with "The more people let this man dupe them, the more this man means slavery and WAR" perhaps a close second. It's their propaganda you're combatting, and if you can show the reader "HE'S NEARLY ALWAYS LYING, and for his sake not yours" you've just about done it.

Re "The STORY of Joseph Stalin". Got to tell it. There's got to be a story, a more or less chronological narrative. But I don't see, do you, how you can begin to tell the whole story! there's too much of it; you could put the war against Finland in, or you could leave it out; there are too many areas and episodes of that order to put them all in. At any rate not with photos; i.e., if you decided to mention Finland at all, it might have to be just with literally 2 or 3 words sandwiched in somewhere in a caption, where (and if) they would heighten the effect. E.g., you might show photos of the taking over ("welcoming back") of Latvia and/or Est. & Lit., and then add that "..since 1945 the USSR has been expanding at the rate of 65 sq. miles (or whatever it is) per day." (Since 1939, I think it is 65 sq. m per day. Can dig it up, —and let me know any other research you might want to have done). Then juxtapose it with Stalin's statement (1942) about "not wanting an inch of anyone else's territory". / And throw in "This is my last territorial demand" of Hitler, if it wouldn't clutter things up /.

Item. Alongside the frontispiece quote from Lenin, re "any deception", underneath it you could put Hitler's famous quote about the "big lie". Just because the idea of making the whole book a Hitler-Stalin parallel has been shelved, is no reason why you shouldn't draw the parallel wherever you see fit, if it heightens the effect.

More re: not telling the whole story, namely:

The Problem of the BIG FAMINE. Your telling the story of the Wicked Uncle, and heaven knows this is an important ~~x~~ "episode" in it. Hard to see how it could be omitted entirely. And yet to deal with it is a problem. It is just the sort of problem that has been leading me to think you've got to lean on Text to do part of the job. I.e., the book is a PHOTO-book, and the pictures are the piece de resistance. But the beauty of really effective photos is that they heighten the effect, and carry you through patches where, unavoidably, no really arresting photo is available, —in which patches, I'd say, you're going to have to be content with an ordinary photo and lean at that point on your caption. Which doesn't worry me too much, because, after all, anti-Stalinist literature (and your own malicious mind) are ~~[illegible]~~ not lacking in pithy & sizzling texts, such as alone will make the given page readable and memorable. (E.g., to pick at random a mediocre sample: "If the U.S.S.R. is a democracy, then Leavenworth Prison is a democracy"; nothing to write home about, but, with brevity, it paints a picture, after a fashion.) After all, words alone can paint _pictures_, and evoke emotions, and as your basic aim is to evoke an emotional response, there's no need to cramp your style with a self-imposed restriction banning the use of words. I should think the test would be: If the reader wants to stop reading it in the middle, the caption, however true, is bad; if you've held his interest to a pitch where he really wants to read on, _and_ is painting _pictures_ in his own mind as he reads, then it's OK. E.g., if you have the photo of the three purgees Rykov, K., & Z., and then continue in your caption to the tune "there was a bullet in the back of the head for X, _and_ for Y, _and_ for Z too" it will be, _faute de mieux_, OK if the reader is already gripped to the point of picturing to himself all these Comrades being ground thru the mill of "opposition"—demotion—arrest—"confession"—death.

E.g. also, I'd strongly recommend, offhand, inclusion of the striking photo of Mindszenty, circles under his eyes, at the trial, and then you could add to the effect that he is merely the highest-ranking of the, e.g., more than 12,000 Catholic clergy who have been imprisoned in Czechoslovakia since 1948. (I have the figures).

Re THE FAMINE, to get back to it. The best I can suggest is that you could have either (a) one of the rare, if existing at all, photos, of a famine scene or (b) a photo of a normal Village Scene, Harvest Scene, with the caption: It could have been like this, but Big Brother wanted an ORGANIZED FAMINE, plus the most devastating quote you can get from the highest-ranking _non_-anti-Stalinist source; and/or plus brief but human-interest quotes from Pirogov and/or Kravchenko, whereby you translate into human-interest terms the cold statistics of several million dying of famine.

More re FAMINE, It's a problem, how to do it justice, and I'd suggest you have to do at least two things: (a) make it believable & believed, and

(b) heighten the emotional effect. If you succeed in (a), it will automatically help with (b). And I should think it would help toward (a) to put in the points you were mentioning. Namely, to make a flat, quiet, sober statement to the general effect; "At first glance it passes credibility that the rulers of a great country would deliberately plan the mass-starvation of several millions of their fellow-citizens and potential arms-bearers. But this is exactly what they did, and they did it for two reasons (1) to break the political power of the peasants, and (b) to get grain for valuta for machine tools."

The same method would be good (I think almost obligatory) in doing justice to SLAVE LABOR. I.e., you just quietly state that, whereas it may seem too nightmarish that a regime could keep 15,000,000 slave-laborers ~~xxxxxx~~ like cattle, it's not the nightmarish product of an Orwell's imagination, it's a fact, and it is done for the following coely ~~thoughout~~ reasons...." Then quote, either in substance or, preferably, verbatim, from I Chose Justice, bottom p. 238, where Kravchenko's NKVD school-mate gives the ~~xxxxx~~ reasons for segregating potential trouble-makers and working them to death to get their products for 1/5 the cost in the free market. A verbatim quote is by no means essential (though I think quotation marks always liven a page) but I think the EXPLANATION, unblushing proffered by you, the author of the photo-book, is an almost essential ingredient. When you explain how the FAMINE and the SLAVE-LABOR go ~~make~~ sense, to the Kremlin ~~mind~~, ~~you have~~ (a) enhanced the credibility, (b) gratified your reader, to them, in many cases, ~~xx~~ one or more of these things (the TRIALS, e.g) may for years have been a source of puzzlement, and (c) heightened the horror and the emotional response.

Cf. how "1984" builds up to quite a pitch of nightmare, but it is only by dint of a good deal of explanation and repetition. (There is a great deal more artistic ~~xxxx~~ economy in "Animal Farm", of course, and if you can make use of it and/or its technique, more power to your elbow.) E.g., how "Animal Farm", perhaps the best brief anti-Stalin literary effort (isn't it?) is just a fairy tale, and yet has a good deal of repetition in it.

Sorry to go on at such length. Luckily the postman knocketh now. Hope there is some value in it. Let me know anything I can do to help.

W.S.S.

SECRET

8 Sept. 1950

ROBERT M. HEADLEY

is a contract agent; the effective date of his contract with CIA is 1st Dec. 1949, for two years.

Fred Richards (CFD) says the agreement with him re royalties, etc., should be signed by Mr. Eccles, as contracting officer.

General Counsel's office informed of the above today, on their inquiry.

W85.

SECRET

LETTER TO BORIS SHUB Sept. 11, 1950

Dick hopes to see you in person next weekend. Meanwhile entirely OK to go ahead. The copyright should be all in your name. Lay-out assistant should be offered only a fixed fee, —half down, half on publication. Also credit line as collaborator if you think he deserves it. Consult Ken as to what would be a reasonable fee to offer him.

J suggests as possible publishers in approximate order of preference Doubleday; Picture Press (270 Park Ave., J. J. Thorndike, Jr., former m.e. of "Life" and Oliver Jensen, on leave of absence from "Life"); Simon & Schuster.

Best to Libby.

S

Letter to Boris Shub, 510 W. 110th.
non-watermark paper.

61

223..Painting of Stalin & Red Army General Staff, in Red Army Hall,
Pyongyang, Korea (?)

226..East German People's Police march in Red-sponsored torchlight parade
celebrating Stalin's 70th b'day, 1949.

224..East German People's Police in Lustgarten Sq. during CP youth demonstration, 28/5/50

225..People's Police, Lustgarten Sq., May Day 1950

214..East German Police (left) & W.G. Police as buffer on Berlin border 1950.

54...Students vote for Moscow People's Court, Feb. '49; Soviet source.

55...Voting for Moscow People's Court, Feb. '49; Soviet source.

216..Russians (left) take over guard duties from US, 1949, at Spandau Prison,
where many former top Nazis are serving sentences.

227.."Frankfurter Allee" in East Sector renamed "Stalin Allee" , 70th b'day.

53...Army personnel get ballot for election of Moscow People's Court,
Feb. '49; Soviet source.

229..Front page of anti-C underground paper, 1949.

228..Part of rev'y pamphlet from anti-C u'ground press "somewhere in Russia".
The "fork of freedom" is u'ground symbol. 1949.

141..general view of Moscow.

22...Stalin accepts flowers from Russian kids, 70th b'day.

21...Moscow univ. students being examined in math.

104-5-6..Stalin, 1943.

98...Head of statue of Stalin placed on snapped off light pole by German
soldiers, 1941.

97...Stalin; no date.

2.3..no data

1...Opening of XI Olympiad, Lustgarten, 1936.

6...Nazi Party Day, Berlin, 1938.

8...Labor Day demonstration, Tempelhof Field, 1934.

7...Marching for Hitler, Adolf Hitler Platz, Berlin, Party Day '38.

9...Opening of 1941-2 War Winter Relief Drive, Sportspalast, Berlin.

10...Hitler reviewing German Youth, 1939.

5...Nazi Party Rally, Berlin, 1938; Hitler.

47...Moscow, Fourth Kantemirovka Tank Division of Guards mechanized unit. 1949.

37...Red Army commanders stand review by Stalin; Moscow, 1945.

35...Troops in Palace Square, Leningrad, May Day 1948.

36...Red Army in Red Square with Nazi & Wehrmacht flags, 1945.

41...Soviet air force cadets, May 1949, Moscow.

43...T-34 medium tanks (foreground) and SU-100 self-propelled 100 mm guns
moving up Gorky Street toward Red Square; 1949.

44...Infantry at May Day parade, Moscow, 1949.

45...Red Army parading, Moscow, 1945.

40...Zhukov gallops into Red Square, 1945

38...All Union Physical Culture parade in Dynamo Stadium, 1947.

39...Students of Zhukovsky Military Aviation Academy passing thru Red Square
during parade of Moscow Military Garrison, 1949.

30...Peter Kapitsa in Institute of Physical Problems, Moscow; he is
director, at left; 1945.

29...Deputies to the Supreme Soviet, 3 Heroes of the S.U., l.to r. Major of
Colonel of the Guards A. Pokryshkin, Marshal G. Zhukov; Major of
Guards I. Kozhdub; in the Kremlin Palace. Acme Newspics 805096

27...Workers celebrating 32nd anniv. of Rev., 1949. "May it live and flourish—
a united, independent, democratic peace-loving Germany"; Moscow.

24...FDJ members march to Russian War Memorial; Treptow, Berlin, '49.

23...Col. Serge Tulpanov, chief of Propaganda Dept of Sov Mil Admin in Berlin,
addresses second annual Parteitag of the SED; calls "fascist" US Europe's foe.
Acme Newspictures NYC, # BER(lin) 848674, 9-24-47

111..Moscow; anti-religious campaign; century-old bells crashed down from
tower, to be melted for farm machinery.

107...Bogayavlensk Cathedral, Moscow.

128...Ribbentrop signing German-Russian pact, 1939.

127...no data

130...Stal, Mol, Rib signing pact, Aug '39.

136...Mol & Rib, Aug. '39; Moscow.

17...Grave of S's wife Nadyeshda Allilnyeva, Moscow '37.

149..Malenkov; Acme Newspictures, NYC, 8/4/46; SOV300930

165..Yeshov, '38
167..Sergusy Nikiforovich Kruglov, '47
168..Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, born 1889, Min of State Control; '47

79...Library, Moscow Univ., 1942.
81...Woman conductor, Moscow streetcar; before 1936.
84...Workers on Moscow-Rostov railway.
78...Women cleaning loco of Northern Line after overhaul at Moscow Depot; Oct. '31.
76...Grocery store with home delivery service in Bauman district, Moscow; bef.'37
71..Chaplin, "City Lights" Metropole theater, Moscow.
72...[illegible] unloading sausages from truck for market.
74...Women selling food in city market; 1935
68...Collective farm girls with primitive implements; Moscow oblast, July '46
83...Soccer team, Moscow, Feb. '49.
14...Lenin Institute, Moscow.
58...Red Army men inspect English-language books in Moscow shop. 1942.
85...Soldiers visit a farmer, Feb. '49, Moscow
65...Woman readying bricks for bricklayers, Moscow, '47.
77...Moscow (State) Univ., 1944.
69...American bean seed being distributed to collective farmers of Ystra
District, Moscow oblast, 1945.
66...Women carry girder to job manned mostly by women; Moscow '47.

86...no data
96...Boy drummers, Red Sq., '46; appears in Bedell Smith's book.
89...Girls saluting Big Brother's bust in young pioneers "House of Children",
in Eastern Sector, Berlin, 1950.
88...Lenin Hills, looking n.e. across Moscow River, 1947.
92..."Children's Town" at Park of Culture and Rest, Moscow; before 1939.
94...All Union Physical Culture Parade at Dynamo Stadium, 1947
95...Members of 11th Congress of Lenin Young Communist League greet members
of Congress, Moscow, 1949.

120..Stalin smiles as Churchill takes out cigar; Yalta, Feb. '45.

7 Sept. 1950

CIA GRAPHICS! NUMBERS FOR ABOUT 82 PHOTOS, OF WHICH STERILIZED DUPLICATES ARE TO B E SENT TO SHUB SEPT. 8

223..CIA 36685 Confidential
226..CIA 36892 Conf.
224..CIA 36751 Restr.
225..CIA 36786 Restr.
214..CIA 36899 Conf.
54...CIA 30018 Secret. Soviet source.
55...CIA 30002 Secret. Soviet source.
216..CIA 36897 Conf.
227..CIA 36893 Conf.
53...CIA 30023 Secret. Soviet source.
229..CIA 28023 Restricted.
228..CIA 28024 Restricted.
141..OSS 969039 APL 347289
21...CIA 28508 Conf.
22...CIA 32340 Restricted.
106..OSS-P-11061 Press Assoc. Photo
105..OSS-P-11060 Press Assoc. Photo
104..OSS-P-11062
97...CIA Not for release
98...CIA 28453 Conf.
2....no description; nothing on the back
3....same as 2
1....26586 82 (nothing else)
6....26586 82
8....26586 82
7....ditto
4....25090 0
9....26586 82
10...26586 82
5....25090 0
47...CIA 28020 Restr.
37...CIA 27124 Conf.
35...CIA 27118 Conf.
36...CIA 27123 Conf.
41...CIA 30050 Secret
43...CIA 28021 Restr.
44...CIA 28022 Conf.
45...CIA 27119 Conf.
40...CIA 25472 Conf.
38...CIA 28792 Conf.
39...CIA 34475 Restr.
29...Acme newspictures, 8th Avenue, NYC
30...CIA 26005 Conf.
23...Acme Newspictures, BER(lin) 848674, NY Bureau
27...CIA 28018 Restr.
24...26586 82
107..27060 82
111..27060 82
128..CIA 28039 Restr.
127..CIA 28454
130..CIA 26946 Restr.
136..CIA 26947 Restr.

—17...27986 82
169..Acme Newspictures, [illegible], NY Bureau; 8/4/46
165..CIA-P-2958
168..CIA-P-4010 Secret
167..CIA-P-4003 Secret
—79...CIA 25716 Conf.
81...OSS 771112
84...OSS.969079
78...OSS 771093
76...OSS 771238
71...OSS Pictorial Records Division; 473.23
M891
B 915 USSR Moskva 22480
72 77...OSS Pict. Records Div. 473.23 M891 B 915 USSR; 22639
74...OSS Pict. Records Div. 473.23 M891; b 915 USSR 22505
68...CIA 2506 Graphics Donor #6, Restr.
83...CIA 30047 Secret
14...CIA 25686 Conf.
58...CIA 28941 Conf.
85...CIA 30034 Secret
65...CIA 28797 Conf.
77...CIA 25717 Conf.
—69...CIA 26017 Conf.
66...CIA 28789 Conf.
86...no description
—96...CIA 28441 Conf. (also in Bedell Smith's book).
—89...CIA 32617 Conf.
88...CIA 2166
Restr. Graphics Donor #6
92...OSS 771227
94...CIA 27996 Secret
95...CIA 17361 Restr.
120..OSS-P-11172 Signal Corps Photo.

82 total

64

SECRET SECRET

5 Sept. 1950

RE: AGREEMENT TO BE MADE BETWEEN OPC and ROBERT M. HEADLEY (pseud.)

in re publication of a book.

(1) Headley is a covert OPC employee. He is either a staff agent or a contract employee; Mr. Millard (ex-2798) can verify which.

(2) Headley —who is now engaged in preparing the book— is to approach a publisher in his own name, and as a private citizen.

(3) The book to be published under Headley's real name; with perhaps the addition of "...in collaboration with Blank / Headley's lay-out man, yet to be selected, if Headley feels the lay-out man deserves such credit/"

Copyright to be held by Headley, both US and foreign.

Royalties to be received by Headley.

(4) Headley to have discretion in selecting a lay-out assistant, whom he will offer to pay either

(a) a fixed fee, half down and half on publication; or
(b) the fixed fee, plus a percentage of royalties; or
(c) a percentage of royalties.

Probably Headley will offer (a).

(5) The book to be published initially in the U.S. It is hoped that there will later be editions in many foreign languages, possibly subsidized.

(6) Royalties over a given period will be either smaller or larger than Headley's salary.

Headley is to turn over the gross royalties to OPC —submitting the royalty statements or copies thereof— less the difference between Headley's income tax including royalties and the tax as it would have been if he had not received royalties.

Headley should submit also a copy of his Income Tax return(s).

(7) Copyright to be assigned by Headley to OPC.

(8) Arraignment re royalties to be terminable. Royalties might continue to dribble in for several years, after Headley might have severed his connection with OPC.

Therefore a claise is suggested to the effect: "at such time as the Government in its discretion may decide, the obligation on the part of Headley to turn over royalties may be cancelled, and thereafter any royalties shall be received by Headley for his own use."

(9) Headley should submit itemized/written statements of all expenses chargeable to the project; receipts from his collaborator for payment of fixed fee; etc.; of the contract with the publisher

(10) Headley to submit the final dummy for approval by an OPC representative.

Saw Mr. Joe Kelly, 224 Admin. about this Sept. 6th. He will call Sept. 8th

SECRET

5 Sept. 1950

To Boris Shub
510 W. 110th St.

Thanks for receipt.

They expect to have the photos ready tomorrow.

Other arrangements are proceeding apace and in the simplest manner.

Thought you'd like to see this editorial.

non-watermark

66

5 Sept 50

5 Sept. 1950

L-1030 Mr. Eccles, Ray, WSS.

Ray artist fixed fee, or.
ff + royalties, or.
% of royalties.

Ray Rogs suppose smaller
" larger

EE: there was a similar book; published in US (OPC)

REM: BS = staff agent thinks or contract employee

EE. * highly impt =
written assignment of rights (copyright) & royalties to OS
BS turns over gross royalties
Less increased tax

WSS "

EE "at such time as the Govt may decide
the obligation to pay royalties may be ~~terminated~~ cancelled".
dribs & drabs

EE Tax returns wd be identical
few minutes work

BS give certified copy of return...
1) his actual tax return
2) statement of his royalties... END

COPY

September 2, 1950

Received from Robert M. Headley the sum of one hundred (100) dollars ~~in~~ as part payment for services in procuring photographs for the Stalin picture book project.

W. J. Green

original given to
John Bischoff
5 Sept. 50.
W. S. S.

Re "STALIN" PHOTO . 31 Aug 50

31 Aug. '50.

BS

If NCFE must be used as cover, make sure it is spelled out ~~that their~~ role is confined merely to vouching for the cover story, and ~~that they have~~ no say over the contents of this book, ~~— that they~~ don't even see it.

SECRET

30 Aug. '50

Gave SHUB Amson's file of magazije articles on Stalin (which he doesn't want returned), and Crankshaw article of 25-6-50 in Sunday "NY Times" magazine "AGAIN THE BATTLE FOR LENIN'S MANTLE", marked "Please return to WSS when & if you can spare it".

WSS

SECRET

copy to Shub 30 Aug 50

MR. BRYAN: FYI
a given to Jim Hasen.

FROM "New York Times", Sunday, 25 June 1950:

"PICTURE PRESS" is the newest shingle on Publishers' Row, hanging from 270 Park Avenue. Editors are Joseph J. Thorndike, Jr., former managing editor of "Life", and Oliver Jensen, on leave of absence from the magazine. The firm will concentrate on serious, inexpensive photo-text books with a general interest and news slant.

WSS

41

30 Aug '50

BS will send rcpt to me
, to give to John B., .. for $100 cash
"rec'd from RM Headley by "wf green"
-- composite name for his
2 "N.L." friends, —— suggested
by JBritt

COPY

30 August 1950

Received from W. S. Sims $100 cash, for services in obtaining photographs to be used in a photo-book, under project SGHOUSE, later to be charged to KMFUNNY.

Robert M. Headley

Robert M. Headley

R
A

29 Aug. '50

Mr. Kessinger called. (x-2657).

They will try to get the 82 photos done within a week.

Will send the originals back to me, for me to make a sterilized list.

To Shub

29 Aug. '50

LITTAUER & WILKINSON
200 Madison Avenue
See Kenneth Littauer

SIMON & SCHUSTER published "The Baby" & "The Frenchman" & "Happy Holiday"

DOUBLEDAY & CO. published the "Zoo" books

+ Box 1901 address

OWI Book "I am not crazy enuf to want a war"

"STALIN'S PUBLIC INTERVIEWS AND STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS" 1936-48.
Sov Affairs Notes #35

"Sov. Imperialism Poland 1939-48" Sovaff Notes #38

Mr Sub

~~Mr. Bryan~~

~~Top copy~~

~~given to Mr. Thompson~~

Bill: Excellent! Pick
a name for the project
(KMKNOUT?) for
file purposes. Let
me know th. Tom

MR. BRYAN

25 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference of JBIII, Shub and Sims, Aug. 25, re "STALIN" photo book.

(1) Some 202 photos were examined; the best, about 67, obtained by
Shub in NY, the others furnished by CIA Graphics; plus some magazine articles
with photos, supplied by Jim Williamson.

(2) Sims is to do utmost to get clearance by CIA Graphics for maximum
use of their photos by Shub: clearance, if possible, for Shub to take the
photos to NY (probably not possible); and/or duplicates minus CIA markings;
and/or lists of the sources from which CIA got them.
/ Failing these, I can make descriptive list of the CIA photos.
It should not be difficult to duplicate most of them in NY agencies, and the
Shub pictures are in any case the kernel of the book //.

(3) Length of book. Not much discussed. More important to set the
tone and decide the main theme. Thirty-five pictures would almost certainly
be too few; 150 might be OK.

(4) KMFUNNY? Sims to clear with Mr. Thompson and Millard whether
the "Stalin" photo-book could be done under KMFUNNY, which reads:
"5, b. That the purposes of this project / animal photos, with
satirical captions, in many languages / be approved in principle and a sum
of $40,000 be appropriated for the development and distribution of
similar photobooks at the discretion of Chief, SP."

/ Anyhow, let's get on with the book and, if necessary, amend
KMFUNNY or write up a new project, later /.

(5) Book to be prepared by Shub, working in NY. Period of 6 months
work by Shub, as co-author with David Shub of biography of Stalin, to begin
after completion of work on photobook.

(6) Shub to approach publisher as private citizen; to hold copyright,
take royalties, for transmission to the account of KMFUNNY presumably. / Pre-
sumably CIA's legal eagles are equipped to handle the income-tax xx angles
of this overt-covert set-up /.
Book to be published under signature "Boris Shub".

(7) Collaborator for Shub in lay-out. JBIII will give Shub a list
of possible helpers. JBIII: mentioned Dick Lyon; "See Littauer; ask him for
a good layout man; the best is the New Yorker's man, but he doesn't specia-
lize in photo media; you want a Life-type man, they have better layout than
Look.
"Pay him on a one-shot basis, a fixed fee. Tell him he gets a
certain amount down, and the same again if the book is published."
/ Jim Williamson says he would be glad to help on layout, if
there is difficulty getting anyone else /.

SECRET

3 carbons

(8) Publication to be in the US first, with a view to subsidisation (if necessary) of editions (possibly abridged) in Western Europe and elsewhere.

(9) Publisher. JBIII: "Duell would be lousy. You'd get no advertising. Simon & Schuster would be excellent if you can get them to do it. Ask Littauer to shop it around."

Sims mentioned Picture Press, which was described in the "NY Times" of 25 June 1950:

> "PICTURE PRESS is the newest shingle on Publishers' Row, hanging from 270 Park Avenue. Editors are Joseph J. Thorndike, Jr., former managing editor of "Life", and Oliver Jensen, on leave of absence from the magazine. The firm will concentrate on serious, inexpensive photo-text books with a general interest and news slant."

JBIII to Shub: "Ask LST what he thinks about Jensen"."

(10) What type of book? Shub: It should be called "Joseph Stalin", and to the casual reader it should look, at first glance, non-propagandistic. Then, as you look more closely at it, you see the degeneration of the system, in the faces, down to its present "tertiary phase", —the evolution from the early revolutionary dream of a better life for Russia to the present monster regime. The less captions in it the better.

JBIII: The main theme should be "Where are they now?", —all those individuals and countries that have been outmanoeuvred and taken over and liquidated by Stalin.

When you are writing for mass distribution, your technique should be: "I will tell you this, I am telling you it, I have told you it".

Sims: The thread running through it, starting with Lenin, could be: Cunning, plus "Ruthlessness" (one of Lenin's favorite words), plus complete Intolerance of any opposition to a very narrow and constantly-being-purged Kremlin clique. Moral: (1) "Nobody can trust these people", and (2) "Because they tolerate no opposition, they mean War".

/ A possible title, or sub-title might be "Half slave, half free?", the quotation from Lincoln, which would tie in with the campaign to expose the USSR as the true "reactionary" and the US as the true "revolutionary" champion of freedom. /

Shub: As far as possible, the photos, and the sequence in which they're arranged, should tell the story. OWI's war-time, 32-page photobook on Hitler ("I am not crazy enough to want a war") relies too much on captions. We should make a book that Molotov & Stalin would squirm when they read it, and have no answer to. Then it will be good for publication anywhere."

(11) Shub to move to NYC September 1.

WSS

W.S.S.

(12) Shub to pay this summer in addition NYC associates $100 for the photos they have already obtained, plus $100 on publication of the book.

SECRET

✓To Shal 29 Aug '50

22-7-50

Cover of book:

photo of

STALIN

~~as in Room 2412~~

a) cover of NY Times Bk Review on Deutscher.

Caption: JOSEPH STALIN

1917—195?

Comment: The "195?" (a) arouses curiosity;

(b) suggests he, —and to that extent the Stalin regime— will come to an end in the 1950's;

(c) carries the implication(?): Couldn't his regime be overthrown?

Alternative cover: might be, tp put on the cover whichever photo proves most telling; the same photo to be printed also in its proper sequence in the book, at which point its meaning will become clear; e.g. the splendid photo of Stalin walking with, but apart from, Rykov, Kamenev & Bukharin, with its message: "this man bides his time, then treacherously strikes down all these 'comrades' who have ceased to be useful to him".

14-00000

22-7-50

the weird photo of
LENIN'S FIGURE SILHOUETTED
OVER THE RUSSIAN LANDSCAPE

Caption: "The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable.. A series of frightful clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."

To which might be added: (1) Stalin's statement, circa 1945 that the bourgeois & Soviet states can co-exist, and

(2) Stalin's statement of 9 April 1947 to Stassen: "Lenin is our teacher, and we Soviet people are Lenin's disciples".

Comment: Somebody's lying.

Photo suggests the peaceful Russian landscape, dominated by this founder (Lenin) of a dictatorial clique, whose dogmatism, intolerance and ballicosity are suggested by such words as "unthinkable", "inevitable", "frightful clashes".

photo of LENIN:
just any ordinary photo;
seated at his desk, or
in any inactive pose.

Caption:

"I had...fancied Lenin as a giant, stately and imposing.

"How great was my disappointment to see a most ordinary-looking man, below average in height, in no way, literally in no way, distinguishable from ordinary mortals."

—Stalin.

Comment: Crankshaw says: "This impression of a man so great that he could afford to appear ordinary was one which Stalin found it necessary to obliterate from the consciousness of Soviet citizens.

Therefore let's revive it.

This will tie in, of course, with Lenin's Testament: "find a way to remove this man.."

photo of

PLEKHANOV

(we haven't got; can be obtained)

Caption: to the effect: "Georgi Plekhanov, one of Lenin's oldest disciples and collaborators, of whom Lenin said in 192_ 'No one is a true Bolshevik who does not know Plekhanov' (or words to that effect which I've read somewhere), and who told his wife, when the Red Guards forced their way into his house, November 13, 192_:

> 'How little you know these people! They are capable of hiring an assassin to kill me and shedding crocodile tears after my death to arouse people's emotions.'"

Comment:

We want to drive home the fact, unknown to most readers, that Lenin was bitterly opposed by some of his oldest collaborators; that there were (and are?) schisms even in the inner core; that what fastened itself on the back of the Russian people was a clique that was "capable" of all "ruthlessness"; ~~[illegible]~~ of anything that would serve its main end: to remain in power.

The quotation also brings out Soviet "crocodile" hypocrisy.

photo of KRONSTADT

(we haven't; can be got)

Caption: to the effect: this is the island fortress off Petrograd, from which the Bolshevik's own creme-de-la-creme marched against Kerensky in July 1917; stormed the Winter Palace in November to put Lenin in power.

Here, on March 1, 1921, 15,000 Bolshevik sailors and soldiers revolted against Lenin's regime, and dispatched a radio message to the world:

> "The first shot has thundered. But the entire world knows of it. The bloody Field Marshal Trotsky who stands up to the waist in the fraternal blood of the workers was the first to open fire against revolutionary Kronstadt, which rebelled against the government of the Communists in order to re-establish the real power of the Soviets. We will rise or fall under the ruins of Kronstadt, fighting for the bloodstained cause of the laboring people. Long live the power of the Soviets! Long live the world Socialist Revolution!"

Marshal Tukhachevsky described the outcome:

> "I was in the war for five years, but I cannot remember such a slaughter. It was not a battle; it was an inferno. The sailors fought like wild beasts. I cannot understand where they found the might for such rage. An entire company fought for an hour to capture one house and when the house was captured it was found that it contained two or three soldiers at a machine-gun. They seemed half-dead, but they snatched their revolvers and gasped, 'Too little did we shoot at you scoundrels.'"

Comment: shows it has been done, —a revolt of 15,000, nearly four years after Lenin came to power.

The average reader knows nothing of the fact this revolt occurred, and should be reminded.

Tukhachevsky, incidentally, adds an item of "continuity" to the story, since further on there is a photo of him, as one of those executed.

Note: the above would admittedly make a lengthy caption; but a vivid one; and necessary, because there is no photo (presumably) in existence of the actual revolt; and the fact it occurred should be driven home.

Fri. 25 Aug. 50

(non-labelled)

TAKING FOR REPRINTING ON MONDAY:

Soviet militarism..............	11	
Nazism........................	10	2 very big
Personalities....	2	
Soviet Germany.......	3	
Stalin alone..........	5	
Lenin........	1	
Stalin's inner circle....	4	
Daily life........	17	
Religion..........	2	
Stalin & Churchill.....	1	
Nazi-Soviet pact etc...	4	1 dupl.
Stalin's wife's grave.	1	
Children: war or peace?.....	7	1
Big brpther.......	2	
Other "yes"'s.......	12	
	82	

47

28 August 1950

Please retrun these 82 original photos, along with the sterile duplicates of them, so that we can make a sterile list of captions, and a list of the original CIA numbers.

W. S. Sims/SP
K-2410
ext-569

28 Aug. 1950

BORIS

Mrs. Poland is going to get the 82 duplicates made just as fast as she can. She couldn't give a time limit on it this a.m.

Incidentally, re the 68 photos for which you got the agencies' bill of about $150 this morning, she says agencies like those often sell you photos for a dollar or two for your own private use, but that the usual fee for use for publication is $6 or more. So you'd better make sure when on the point of publishing whether you've paid for the publishing right.

(The photo we were in doubt about is one of CIA's)

WSS

Paul Breitweiser is charging the $150-odd temporarily against SCHOUSS

They were billed at $6.-

SECRET

SIMP

Mr. Thompson

Shab is going to NY to start work on this Sept. 1st.

Do you want to take up any points with him before he leaves?

OK

WBS

MR. THOMPSON

25 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference of JBIII, Shub and Sims, Aug. 25, re "STALIN" photo book.

(1) Some 202 photos were examined; the best, about 67, obtained by Shub in NY, the others furnished by CIA Graphics; plus some magazine articles with photos, supplied by Jim Williamson.

(2) Sims is to do utmost to get clearance by CIA Graphics for maximum use of their photos by Shub: clearance, if possible, for Shub to take the photos to NY (probably not possible); and/or duplicates minus CIA markings; and/or lists of the sources from which CIA got them. [Failing these, I can make descriptive list of the CIA photos. It should not be difficult to duplicate most of them in NY agencies, and the Shub pictures are in any case the kernel of the book].

(3) Length of book. Not much discussed. More important to set the tone and decide the main theme. Thirty-five pictures would almost certainly be too few; 150 might be OK.

(4) KMFUNNY? Sims to clear with Mr. Thompson and Millard whether the "Stalin" photo-book could be done under KMFUNNY, which reads: "5, b. That the purposes of this project [animal photos, with satirical captions, in many languages] be approved in principle and a sum of $40,000 be appropriated for the development and distribution of similar photobooks at the discretion of Chief, SP."

[Anyhow, let's get on with the book and, if necessary, amend KMFUNNY or write up a new project, later].

(5) Book to be prepared by Shub, working in NY. Period of 6 months work by Shub, as co-author with David Shub of biography of Stalin, to begin after completion of work on photobook.

(6) Shub to approach publisher as private citizen; to hold copyright, take royalties, for transmission to the account of KMFUNNY presumably. [Presumably CIA's legal eagles are equipped to handle the income-tax xx angles of this overt-covert set-up].

Book to be published under signature "Boris Shub".

(7) Collaborator for Shub in lay-out. JBIII will give Shub a list of possible helpers. JBIII; mentioned Dick Lyon; "See Littauer; ask him for a good layout man; the best is the New Yorker's man, but he doesn't specialize in photo media; you want a Life-type man, they have better layout than Look.

"Pay him on a one-shot basis, a fixed fee. Tell him he gets a certain amount down, and the same again if the book is published."

[Jim Williamson says he would be glad to help on layout, if there is difficulty getting anyone else].

SECRET

(8) Publication to be in the US first, with a view to subsidization (if necessary) of editions (possibly abridged) in Western Europe and elsewhere.

(9) Publisher. JBIII: "Duell would be lousy. You'd get no advertising. Simon & Schuster would be excellent if you can get them to do it. Ask Littauer to shop it around."

Sims mentioned Picture Press, which was described in the "NY Times" of 25 June 1950:

> "PICTURE PRESS is the newest shingle on Publishers' Row, hanging from 270 Park Avenue. Editors are Joseph J. Thorndike, Jr., former managing editor of "Life", and Oliver Jensen, on leave of absence from the magazine. The firm will concentrate on serious, inexpensive photo-text books with a general interest and news slant."

JBIII to Shmb: "Ask LST what he thinks about Jensen"."

(10) What type of book? Shmb: It should be called "Joseph Stalin", and to the casual reader it should look, at first glance, non-propagandistic. Then, as you look more closely at it, you see the degeneration of the system in the faces, down to its present "tertiary phase", —the evolution from the early revolutionary dream of a better life for Russia to the present monster regime. The less captions in it the better.

JBIII: The main theme should be "Where are they now?", —all these individuals and countries that have been outmaneuvered and taken over and liquidated by Stalin.

When you are writing for mass distribution, your technique should be: "I will tell you this, I am telling you it, I have told you it".

Sims: The thread running through it, starting with Lenin, could be: Cunning, plus "Ruthlessness" (one of Lenin's favorite words), plus complete Intolerance of any opposition to a very narrow and constantly-being-purged Kremlin clique. Moral: (1) "Nobody can trust these people", and (2) "Because they tolerate no opposition, they mean War".

/ A possible title, or sub-title might be "Half slave, half free?", the quotation from Lincoln, which would tie in with the campaign to expose the USSR as the true "reactionary" and the US as the true "revolutionary" champion of freedom. /

Shmb: As far as possible, the photos, and the sequence in which they're arranged, should tell the story. OWI's war-time, 32-page photobook on Hitler ("I am not crazy enough to want a war") relies too much on captions. We should make a book that Molotov & Stalin would squirm when they read it, and have no answer to. Then it will be good for publication anywhere."

(11) Shmb to move to NYC September 1.

W.S.S.
W.S.S.

(12) Shmb to pay NYC associates $100 for the photos they have already obtained, plus $100 on publication of the book.

3 carbons

25 Aug. '50

Re "Stalin" Photos

Shub's returned to him = highest # = #68

102 photos winnowed out for return to CIA Monday.

CIA has sent us

202 - 68 shubs = 134

+ ## 203-227 25

+ ## 228-235 rec'd Aug. 1, '50 8

TOTAL 167

Returning 102

should leave 65

Actually taking 83 "yes"'s to Mrs. P. Monday

27 June '50

Re: "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK.

Target: Stalin.

Basic theme: Stalin means WAR.

For publication in: to be suitable for publication in any country. France to start with.

Item: BS: "It should be so good that Stalin himself couldn't answer it. Captions to be as far as possible genuine quotes from Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Molotov, under photos showing undeniable facts such as the assassination of Trotsky. Nothing phoney. If we have a book that no one in the Kremlin can pick holes in, it will be good for publication anywhere in the world."

Item: BS: Target is Stalin and his regime. "It should not contain a line that would offend any non-Communist Russian".

Item: BS: "Don't use any quotes from avowed anti-Stalinists such as Kravchenko."

Title? "Joseph Stalin", "This Man Wants 'Peace'", "This Man Talks Peace"
"Thirty-three Years of Peace", "The Trojan Dove".
BS: Don't let's worry about the title now.

Item: BS: K says there is a very striking contrast between photos of the Politburo leaders in the 20's and unretouched photos of them now, e.g. in the official 20-minute news-reel of May Day 1949 in Red Square, bloated fatcats. BS: It looks (28 June) as tho this news-reel, and stills from it, may be available. ~~BS~~ JW: If it's technicolor, so much the better.

Item: ~~BS~~ JW: "Pictorial History of Russia" by John Stuart Martin.

CONTENTS, suggested by BS:

(1) Photo of Tsar & Kaiser together.
Be-medalled.
(There are many of these "Willy—Nicky" photos).

(2) Photo showing Devastation of World War I.
Corpses, refugees.
BS: preferably in what area? France?

(3) Photo: Lenin (genuinely) urging Peace.
Lenin on soap-box, with crowds carrying banners "Peace"
Caption indicating translation of Russian for "peace".

(4) Close-ups of Lenin & his Politburo in power.
Including one of Lenin & Trotsky (& Stalin?) together.
They wanted peace; what became of them? Followed by:

(5) Trotsky reviewing troops.

(6) Trotsky dead, with head bandaged.

Caption: quotation from Stalin to the effect "We owed much in 1917-18
to the organising genius of Comrade Trotsky".

(7) [or (4)?]

Lenin "a most ordinary-looking man".

Caption: Stalin's "How great was my disappointment to see a most
literally
ordinary-looking man, below average in height, in no way,
in no way, distinguishable from ordinary mortals." (From Crankshaw
article, "The Battle for Lenin's Mantle", in NYTimes mag., 25/6/50).

(7½) Photo Stalin.
Perhaps the unshaven one in Deutscher, or the one from his/
Tsarist police dossier.

Caption: Lenin's 4 Jan. 1923 postscript to his Testament:
"Stalin is too rough...Therefore I propose that the comrades find
a way to remove Stalin..." (Crankshaw article).

Title for BOOK?: "FIND A WAY TO REMOVE STALIN"—V.I. LENIN

(8) "Photo of USSR being put on a war footing"

I.e., photo of ____________? a collective farm?
photo of famine during the enforced collectivization?
photo of liquidated kulaks?
photo of a mass of tractors?

NB: the argument here is: The real purpose behind Collectivization was (a) to break the peasants as a political force, and (b) to put the country on a war footing: to get the grain, in order to get foreign exchange, in order to get war machinery.

NB: this will need a cogent caption, to make the argument convincing.

(9) Photo of Tukhachevsky & generals shot in '37

1. Tukhachevsky
2. Gamarnik (had a beard)
3. Yakir
4. Yegorov
5. Feldman
6. Kork

Caption?
How does the fact Stalin shot them prove "Stalin means War"?

(10) Stalin with Ribbentrop, after signing Pact 1939 (Aug).

Caption: birthday greeting telegram from ______ to ______:
"Our friendship is cemented in blood"

(11) Moscow airdrome decorated with the Swastika.

(12) Stalin & Matsuoka together after signing neutrality pact, April '41.

(13) Left page: Red Army marching into Poland, 1939
Right " : Nazis marching into Poland, 1939

Caption: "...With one blow the so-called State collapsed"
(See quotations from "Rape of Poland" by Mikolajczyk; NS has)

(14) Red Army meeting Nazis at Lwow, about Nov. 1939.

(15) Scene from Russo-Finnish war.

emphasis on Russian soldiers dead.

Caption: quote Stalin on Finnish independence, 1917; he signed
the decree;
WS: who has the text of the decree on hand? "Deutscher"?

(16) Stalin makes war on his native Georgia; Feb. 1921

??But any photo hard to come by?

Caption: quote Lenin: "I am outraged by the arrogance of Ordjonikidze and the connivance of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky". (Crankshaw article).

For photo: use shot of Stalin's birthplace, or of Tiflis, or
something like that?

JH has read Chavchavadze's book.

(17) Photo of invasion of Russia, June 1941.

Caption:

ES: I can turn this to good account.

(18) Stalin with Churchill & Roosevelt, posing as one of the champions of "Democracy".

Caption: ES "I have millions of captions for this in
'Stalin's War-time Speeches'".

(19) Meeting on Elbe of USA & USSR soldiers.

Caption: this time people thought peace had really come (in Europe)

(20) Red Army display of tanks & men in Red Square

from some Nov. 7 or 1st May photo.

(21) Beria & Malenkov looking "loathsome"

unretouched stills from news-reel of May 1, '49 in Red Square.

Caption?

(22) Hitler's Chancellery in ruins.

(23) Nuremberg War Criminals lying in a row after being hanged.

(24) Anti-CP peace-rally in W. Berlin

Caption: "the people still want peace".

(25) Eisenhower & Zhukov together (in uniform), 1945

(26) Eisenhower as Columbia president (in civilian clothes)

Caption: "Where is Zhukov now?"

Item: "They bungled their way into helping destroy the German Republic and brining on Hitler. They raised up Hitler to invade them." —BS.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: W. Sims	NO.
	DATE 21 June 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. B. Shub					① Don't sign any author's name on this ② Don't have any group known to be hostile to Russians as the sponsors ③ A Russian edition is essential, therefore it should contain nothing that will offend Russian (as distinguished from Stalinist) sensibilities ④ Would suggest the new anti-Communist World Trade Union Federation as the sponsor — if one is needed. ⑤ Main political objective is not Stalin's cruelty or his power, But. — He is planning aggressive war which would destroy mankind therefore its necessary to destroy him first
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

SECRET

20 June 50.

"Flattery will get you everywhere"

MR. SHUB--

(1) Re "STALIN IS HITLER" PHOTO BOOK, suggested by you 16 June.

(2) I have asked ISP to supply us with all available personality photos of Hitler & Stalin, i.e. "photos in which they appear in close-up /—we might also have one of Red Square & Nuremberg?/ receiving bouquets from little girls, visiting wounded soldiers, voting, pinning medals on generals, receiving visiting statesmen from dominated areas, —with emphasis on photos showing the two dictators engaged in similar activities."
I have my doubts as to whether they will come up with a large number. It will probably also be necessary to draw on the big New York photo agencies.

(3) THE PROJECT. The book to be published, first, in France; then in other countries: Italy, West Germany, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, etc.

Russian edition essential (for DP camps at first)

(4) OBJECT. Discredit Stalin. Reveal him as the ruthless master of a "spyridden slave-camp". Show him as worse than Hitler. More dangerous, because his poison is more exportable; more ruthless; more cunning.
Much more important to show he is planning aggressive war

(5) BOOK TO BE COMPILED BY Williamson, in conjunction with SP. Williamson to be paid his fully daily rate, to enable him to neglect his regular work. q

(6) BOOK TO BE SIGNED BY? Howard Hunt suggests, in France, some organization such as the Polish National Liberation Committee, or Federation of Iron Curtain Journalists; or NCFE? or Force Ouvrière? (the last is the best)

N-

It might be signed with some pan-European pseudonym such as "Stefan Mueller"?

No! —

(7) IS AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE BOOK TO BE CONCEALED?

[illegible]

(8) TO BE PUBLISHED BY? In France, a French publisher.

An excellent literary agent might be Gérard Boutelleau, Kravchenko's literary agent, described on page 22 of "I Chose Justice".

(9) SUBSIDY. Estimates of production costs for this type of book have been made in connection with KM FUNNY. To insure widespread sale, a considerable subsidy would be necessary.

But with no author

SECRET

(10) SIZE OF BOOK? A maximum of 75 pages of photos. This would give some 36 or 37 two-page sets of Hitler-Stalin photos.

(11) CAPTIONS? I think we will need them, and should have them; at least for a good many of the photos. (I think this will prove to be the case when you come to make up any actual dummy).

(12) Something a good deal more eye-catching and forceful, as a TITLE than the tentative "Stalin Is Hitler" should be forthcoming?

"Your Leader?" "Do you want this man?" "Slave-master", NO "Man of Steel, —and Blood", NO NO "This Man Wants War!!"?

(13) CAN 36 SETS OF PHOTOS SHOWING PARALLELS BETWEEN H & S BE PRODUCED? Undoubtedly yes. But:

(14) HOW MANY PARALLEL CLOSE-UP PHOTOS CAN YOU SUGGEST?

I.e., we can have parallels showing each dictator receiving a bouquet from an awe-struck child; parallels of each of them "voting", — with suitably biting captions under each; parallels of Hacha on the carpet at Berchtesgaden, alongside some Satellite minister summoned to Moscow.

But how, with any close-up photos of H & S can you deal with such matters as Slave Labor, the Gestapo, the MVD. For these, it seems to me, it will be necessary to have non-close-up photos, i.e., photos in which H & S do not appear. But the parallel between the two regimes can be emphasized (a) in the Captions, and (b) by some such typographic device as:

Hitler and Himmler — Stalin and Beria (Gestapo & MVD parallel)

(15) OVER-PRINT A SWASTIKA & HAMMER-SICKLE in the upper corner/s of each set of non-close-up photos.

(16) TEXT? Captions, it seems to me, will be found necessary, and perhaps even some inter-leaved pages of parallel texts. E.G., you can have, on a left-hand page, a photo of Witzleben (and/or some of the other bomb-plot German Generals being executed in 1944), and on the right-hand page photos of Tuchachevsky and the 6 other Red Army generals who were executed along with him (with no photographers present) in 1937. But how can any photo of Tuchachevsky et al. begin to do justice to the subject of the Purge-as-a continuous-featureeof-Soviet-life-ever-since-1917?????

"The first & greatest misunderstanding about the Purges has to do with their duration. To most Americans / also Western Europeans, he says elsewhere: Kravchenko, "I Chose Justice", p.145 /, a Soviet purge is something exceptional, a violent phenomenon which they vaguely understand has happened once, or several times perhaps, but is then over and done with. This is a basic error. Purges are part of the permanent machinery of the Soviet regime. They are continuous and never-ending. There have been periods of intensification....But there has never been a period free of purging..."

How can we possibly do justice to Purges-under-Stalin, as described by Kravchenko in the ten pages 145-155, with a few photos? (Even more so, how do justice, with photos alone, to what it is like to live under a regime where "one person in every 7" is an MVD informer"?) — [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], too — if we don't want to [illegible] [illegible]

Therefore why not something such as:

(17) PURGE PHOTOS PLUS TEXT?

Have one or two good, gruesome gallows photos: plus photos (perhaps a half-dozen or more to a page) of several dozen major figures who have been killed: Tuchachevsky, 6 out of 7 of the 1924 (wasn't it) Politburo itself, the Jan. 1937 purgees ("all shot except Radek"), the Trial of the Twenty-one (March 1938: "all shot except Rakovski"), etc etc., plus Kostov, Rajk, etc.

Then, between pages of photos, have a page of text, to drive the Purging-is-continuous point home. We could, e.g., reprint the above-quoted paragraph from Kravchenko (whose name every French reader would recognize), and some of the lists of purgees he gives on p. 148-9.

Then the gruesome photo (available?) of Trotsky sprawled across his desk after Stalin's assassin had been at him with the meat-cleaver, which would lead the reader on to perhaps one more page of text. And eye-catching text, not hard to read, in display form:

Yes

Need not be gruesome

Much more effective picture — the corpse with bandaged head -

POLITBURO	Pyatakov........................	shot
	Rykov........................	shot
	Bukharin........................	shot
	Trotsky........................	assassinated
	Kostov........................	"deviationist": shot.
	Rajk........................	"deviationist": shot.
	Dimitrov........................	?
	Voznesensky........................	?
	Thorez........................	195? ? ETC ETC ETC.

(18) A "SPY-RIDDEN" REGIME.

To put this point across, in photos, seems offhand difficult. However, it might be possible simply to have an ordinary photo of an ordinary citizen, looking somewhat apprehensive, with underneath it a Caption consisting of a single sentence from, e.g., Kravchenko:

"....Finally Donenko escaped. He found his wife and three children living in the Donets Basin under a false name.

"'No one except my wife,' Donenko said, 'could know who I really was. I took lodging in their house as a stranger. My own children called me uncle, and grew up without knowing that the man who boarded in their house was in reality their own father.'" (I Chose Justice, p.506).

(19) KATYN & OSWIECIM, etc. We can of course have parallel photos here.

But a map of the USSR with a large black dot for each place where there is a labor-camp, with Caption underneath in very large type, "15,000,000 and more!" might help to drive home the extent of slave labor under Stalin. I can't see how any single photo of slave-laborers can make the point.

There is such a map of the labor-camp locations in Dallin, but it is typographically a very poor one, and it is devoutly to be hoped that CIA Cartographic can come up with a better one.

(20) TUESDAY, June 27. WILLIAMSON is making a trip to Washington, and should be in the office early in the morning. Could you meet with him then?

Yes

In preparing these photo books there seems to be nothing like actually getting down to the preparation of a dummy. Could you prepare some sort of rough Dummy or List of Contents to submit to Williamson, indicating the Themes ~~in~~ which you would like to have the photos illustrate?

WSS
W. S. Sims

(19½) My tentative view in re this Photo Book might be summed up as the "Seydlitz powder" theory. I.e., (1) a page of printed statistics of purgees, alone, is no good; (2) a page with a ~~gruesome~~ gallows photo alone is not good enuf, but (3) put the two together, and you have something "graphic" to bring home to the reader what it would be really like to live under Stalin.

Was to the MAIN Theme

Not Horror or Gruesomeness

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.

2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES, RM GE-58, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.

3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4598.

3 Jan 76
(Liev)

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 3-75 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

3. [illegible] OSG/OC 2B16		✓	
4. DDO/PS 1D-4427 SF27 H. Stilson			
5. E/[illegible] 4E44 [illegible]			✓
6. IP/EIS GA-10 S. Corbat			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14. RETURN TO			
15. RID/AHD Rm GE58			

MUTILATE FOLDER.

78-1614

Job # ~~[illegible]~~

Space # 319474

FILE NO [illegible]

DOCUMENT:

FOLDER: [redacted] 4

PAGE:

BOX: [redacted] 1

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OP-01 9-64 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 76-607 BOX 51

319474

Job 59-48
Box 49
1627

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB ____ BOX ____

RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 79-25 BOX ____

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO RID/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

(7-13)

FORM 3-66 2593

See IO for any additional information on PDQUICK.

Most of the people mentioned came to a conference in Berlin (1st Congress for Cultural Freedom) - arranged by PDQUICK, an EE/PPG Project.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lindsay, CEE

THROUGH: Mr. Schreyer, EE III

SUBJECT: Congress for Cultural Freedom

Attached is an interim report. A considerable amount of material, including American and foreign press cuttings, a photographic exhibit and full text of speeches, will be available within the next few days and can, at that time, be made the subject of an additional report.

LOUIS GLASER
German Desk, EE III

1 Attachment
Report described above

EE III/LG/fdr
cc:

SECRET

SECRET

CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM

Berlin, Germany
26 to 30 June, 1950

I. Origin and Purpose

Early in 1950 a plan was conceived to gather together in Berlin, in the heart of Soviet Germany, a representative group of the Western World's intellectual leaders and to provide them with an instrument to repudiate the totalitarian concept of intellectual subservience to the state. OPC planned to convene the Congress of Cultural Freedom in June 1950 at a moment most advantageous to counteract the psychological effect of the Soviet-sponsored Whitsuntide Youth Rally. The meetings and pronouncements of the Congress were to be widely publicized by press, radio and printed material not only to the Western World but by sustained clandestine distribution in communist-controlled areas.

II. Development

To achieve maximum effect and credibility, it was apparent from the outset that the actual sponsorship of such a convention should not be permitted to appear. Accordingly, the Congress for Cultural Freedom ostensibly sprang into being as the inspiration of a meeting between Ernst Reuter, Lord Mayor of Berlin; Dr. Otto Suhr, Rector of the Berlin College of Political Science, and Dr. Redslob, Rector of the Free University of Berlin. Melvin J. Lasky, HICOG editor of the intellectual periodical, Der Monat, was introduced into the formative committee and nominated Acting General Secretary to steer the operation for OPC.

SECRET

In the name of an international sponsoring committee(1), invitations to the Congress were extended to prominent intellectual, cultural and labor figures of the Western World or in exile from communist-dominated Eastern countries. The complicated task of gathering together these widely-scattered individuals at the site of the Congress required the closest coordination with and cooperation of official and private United States agencies and individuals of many nationalities. The delicate matter of covertly financing the travel and expenses of delegates for example, had to be accomplished with the assistance of three American committees with established interests in international affairs. An enormous amount of organizational detail was handled in Berlin and elsewhere on the continent and in the U. S. under OPC sponsorship and direction. Provision of interpreters, press and radio coverage, an elaborate book display, accommodations for personal comfort and security of the delegates and facilities for the official business of the Congress, were among the problems which had to be solved.

OPC is particularly grateful to the State Department which, through the office of Mr. Bruce Buttles, rendered exceptional and sympathetic cooperation throughout the progress of negotiations and arrangements. This cooperation extended to letters from the State Department to invitees, backing up Committee invitations, a general to be supported by funds of CIC and delegates were characterized as American police spies and war mongers. In the U. S., considerable coverage was given by the N. Y. Times, N. Y. Herald Tribune, Baltimore Sun, Washington Star and other papers. Additional coverage is expected in periodicals in the form of reviews and feature articles. In recording the opening of the Congress, the Christian Science Monitor referred to the fact that it was being held just one month after the Communists had staged the greatest totalitarian youth meeting ever held in Europe. The Monitor went on to say:

---

(1) The Committee included such names as:

Bertrand Russell, Arthur Koestler, Great Britain; Charles Plisnier, Belgium; David Rousset, Andre Gide, and Andre Malraux, France; Haakon Lie, Norway; Ignasio Silone, Italy; John Dewey and Arthur Schlesinger, U. S.; Carlo Schmid, Germany; Dennis Rougement, Switzerland.

> "There is as much difference between these gatherings as can be imagined. The one emphasized numbers and blind obedience to collectivism. The other will be composed of a select company of noted public leaders and scholars from the Western World and will stress the all-importance of freedom of expression and of human rights."

In its deliberations, the cultural and intellectual slavery imposed by the Soviet Union and her satellite states was emphatically and repeatedly denounced. The attack by North Korea was immediately seized upon by delegates and made the subject of vigorous repudiation. In this connection, it is significant that the delegates were not bound, limited, or instructed in any way.(1) It was well known that one delegate, Dr. Hans Thirring, Austrian atomic scientist, had prepared a speech which contained a considerable amount of criticism of the Western democracies. The speech had been printed and distributed to delegates in advance of the session. When the Korean news broke, he stood before the Congress and, amidst cheers, openly repudiated his prepared document, stating that in view of the cynical Korean aggression he would confine himself to a denunciation of communist despotism.

---

(1) While no control was exercised over papers and statements of delegates, it was necessary that the general course of business and tenor of the Congress be held within the bounds of the original concept. This was accomplished by an informal steering committee the key member of which was a highly respected, internationally famous delegate, who was also an OPC agent.

The Congress delegates represented many divergent backgrounds and philosophies. They were free to express any opinion. Yet at no period during the five days of discussion, debate and oratory was there any critism of the U. S. or of its policy in the Far East. U. S. policy was, in fact, vigorously defended by a number of delegates, including Haakon Lie, noted Norwegian labor leader.

The Congress unanimously approved the following "Letter to the East", a message to writers, authors and scientists behind the Iron curtain:

> "The great conflict now raging in the world is not a conflict between East and West. It is not a conflict between peoples. We definitely reject the accusation that we who have come together from many countries and different parts of the world are hostile to the peoples of Russia and the countries subjected to the domination of the Stalin dictatorship. Quite the reverse: we have amongst us representatives of those peoples.
>
> "We are deeply convinced that the problem of the freedom of the peoples who are today enslaved under the Stalin dictatorship and the problem of ensuring freedom and peace throughout the world are inseparably linked.
>
> "All those who fight for freedom against oppression can be assured of our unlimited solidarity."

Deliberations of the Congress concluded with a unanimous manifesto (see Tab A) in which the delegates rejected the idea of neutrality in the struggle between freedom and tyranny and stated that intellectuals should not stand silent on the sidelines but should adhere to the defense of freedom and indeed to the expansion of freedom.(1) Acting on a joint proposal of the Congress, and the Assembly of the City of Berlin, Lord Mayor Reuter announced a resolution to establish a memorial in honor of all those who have fallen under totalitarian tyranny, the monument to be erected in the British sector near the Brandenburg gate.(2)

The final action of the Congress was self-perpetuation in the form of a Standing Continuation Committee which in turn selected an Executive Committee, consisting of:

Ignazio Silone
David Rousset
Arthur Koestler
Irving Brown
Carlo Schmid

Francois Bondy was elected Field Secretary of the Executive Committee, which will maintain offices in Paris and Berlin.

---

(1)Among the supporting statements were those of:

Arthur Koestler: "The Congress has unified all intellectuals who are not communists around a program for cultural freedom. We are prepared to take the offensive."

Ignazio Silone: "We men of the resistance propose to form a new league of resistance to totalitarianism everywhere."

Robert Montgomery: "There is no neutral corner in the field of freedom. If an artist shrinks from the fight for freedom he dies twice. For he dies as an artist before he dies as a man.

(2)The idea of a permanent monument was "suggested" to Mayor Reuter by one of the delegates. Reuter, himself a victim of totalitarian oppression, pushed it through enthusiastically.

IV. Future Plans

The first meeting of the Executive Committee, which will be controlled by OPC, is scheduled for Paris, in September, at which time arrangements will be made for future sessions of the Congress and the continued exploitation of its activities and the anti-communist declarations of its members.

OPC plans for the exploitation of this operation called for clandestine dissemination of the output of the Congress, especially its resolutions, speeches and manifestos, throughout East Germany and the Soviet satellites. East Germany has already been covered once, through a special edition of the Neue Zeitung and reports carried by other papers which the OPC mission subsidizes and secretly distributes in Soviet Germany.

Plans are now being perfected for circulation, in a number of languages, of millions of copies of the speeches, declarations and resolutions of the Congress. Much of this material has already been carried by the Voice of America and by Radio RIAS. Since the Congress has determined to perpetuate itself through a Continuation Committee, OPC will encourage additional statements and declarations by key persons, these also to be distributed throughout the satellite area. Many millions of people, some of them cut off from any news of resistance to communist tyranny over the thoughts of men, will be informed that not only are the philosophers and scientists and cultural leaders of the world outraged at the attempted obliteration of intellectual freedom, but that they propose to fight it.

The project is a continuing one. There will be other sessions of the Cultural Congress and further dissemination of the voices of men who are free to say what they think and thus bring to those still enslaved the message that they too may hope to be free.

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: III/RE - D & P

Date Received: DEC [illegible]

NO. 323-CF6WU

DATE 8 Dec 1950

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EE			SAS gave memo on 13 June	
2.				
3. Former	Read & have filed PDQUICK			T/ F
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy 1 of 3 ☑
~~Attachments~~ ____
1____ 3____
2____ 4____

Copy 2 of 3 ☐
~~Attachments~~ ____
1 C/EE 4____
2 EE-2 5____
3____ 6____

Copy 3 of 3 ☐
~~Attachments~~ ____
1 C/EE
2 EAD
3 III/RE-file

FIELD DISPATCH

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

10—61156-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

State telegram requesting priority cooperation of all Consular officers in providing entry permits for delegates, several cables expressing overall interest and extraordinarily complete arrangements to cover the Congress by VOA. To accomplish this latter mission, VOA's special representative in Berlin made elaborate arrangements for re-broadcasting from New York.

III. The Sessions of the Congress

The Congress convened in Berlin on 26 June 1950 and consisted of more than 100 representatives of 16 nations.(1) It was officially welcomed by the City of Berlin and was greeted with an outpouring of publicity in the European and American press.

The impact of the Congress on the press of Europe cannot be recorded fully at this time. Clippings and a complete operational report have not yet been received from the field. There are many known indications, however, that it was furiously opposed by the communist press. Soviet-sponsored papers and Radio Berlin denounced delegates as the hounds of Wall Street and even accused Congress members of setting fire to the House of Soviet Culture. The Congress was said

---

(1) Among the leading delegates: Great Britain - R. H. S. Crossman, MP, author, editor of New Statesman and Nation; Arthur Koestler, author; Herbert Read, art critic, poet, novelist. France - Henri Frenay, editor; Suzanne Labin, author; Andre Malraux, author; Gabriel Marcel, philosopher; Andre Philip, professor of economics; Jules Romains, novelist. Germany - Franz Borkenau, historian and journalist; Anna Siemsen, educator, Carlo Schmid, political scientist, educator. USA - Sidney Hook, educator and philosopher; Irving Brown, labor leader; George Schuyler, editor; H. J. Mueller, Professor of Biology, Nobel prize winner; A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., Professor of History. Switzerland - Francois Bondy, editor; Wilhelm Roepke, Sociologist and economist. Norway - Haakon Lie, labor leader. Italy - Ignazio Silone, Novelist; Franco Lombardi, philosopher. Russia - Nicolai Andreyev, literary critic, lecturer; Boris Nicolaevsky, historian. Holland - Hendryk Brugmans, Professor. Turkey - Aslan Humbaraci, Journalist. Czechoslovakia - Karel Kupka, Professor. Sweden - Ture Nerman, poet and editor.

14-00000

SECRET

~~11~~ 8 December 1950

32)-C:GMU

SUBJECT: American Ballet

TO: Chief, FJCAPE
Washington, D. C.

INFO: Chief, DTRAPID

ATTN: Joseph K. Stribling

1. For the reasons outlined below, we have been forced to take emergency action on the following matters.

2. During the period of preparation for FDQUICK, Mallison had in hand a project which involved bringing the American Ballet to Berlin for a brief series of performances in both the east and west sectors of the city. We encouraged him in this idea, since the performance dates coincided with FDQUICK, and would have added substantially to the culture surrounding the central event. Mallison, however, was faced with a complicated financing problem, since the business manager of the ballet company wouldn't accept marks, and Mallison had no dollars for such purposes. At that time we indicated, because of the advantage to FDQUICK, that we would resolve his difficulty by exchanging his money for him.

3. For a variety of reasons, the ballet was delayed and couldn't include Berlin during the period in question. We regarded the deal as dead and put it out of our minds, but not Mallison. He chose to regard our commitment as open, and without consulting us until today, has obligated himself to pay 3050 green dollars to the ballet company, which is arriving in Berlin tomorrow, and whose business manager expects to be paid immediately on arrival. Both Mallison, and indirectly Balster, have appealed to us to take him off the hook. We have informed him that such deals are contrary to FJCAPE policy, and anyway our original reason for considering such assistance is no longer operative. But because he and his shop are extremely useful to us in a variety of ways, we have told him we might perform the service of exchanging his marks on the open market, citing a six-to-one rate as probably the best obtainable.

4. Regardless of what Mallison has been told, we do not wish to involve this mission in local open market transactions. We are, therefore, exchanging from our funds here 3050 green dollars for 18,300 Deutsche marks from Mallison. He will, of course, obtain a mark receipt from the ballet company's business manager in order to keep his books straight, and no paper outside FJCAPE files referring to this matter will exist. We believe this operation secure and not disadvantageous to FJCAPE from either a financial or influence standpoint.

Gearing saw & approved this deal
in draft prior to his departure

SECRET

[illegible] S. SPAETH

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: III/RE - D & P

Date Received: DEC 8

NO. 323 - CF6100

DATE 8 Dec. 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EE				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy 1 of 3 ☐
~~Attachments~~
1 C/EE 3
2 EE-2 4

Copy 2 of 3 ☑
~~Attachments~~
1 4
2 5
3 6

Copy 3 of 3 ☐
~~Attachments~~
1 C/EE
2 EAD
3 III/RE-file

FIELD DISPATCH

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

10—01150-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

KMIXON

11 December 1950

323-CFOWU

SUBJECT: American Ballet

TO: Chief, FJCAPE
Washington, D. C.

INFO: Chief, DTRAPID

ATTN: Joseph K. Stribling

1. For the reasons outlined below, we have been forced to take emergency action on the following matters.

2. During the period of preparation for PDQUICK, Mallison had in hand a project which involved bringing the American Ballet to Berlin for a brief series of performances in both the east and west sectors of the city. We encouraged him in this idea, since the performance dates coincided with PDQUICK, and would have added substantially to the culture surrounding the central event. Mallison, however, was faced with a complicated financing problem, since the business manager of the ballet company wouldn't accept marks, and Mallison had no dollars for such purposes. At that time we indicated, because of the advantage to PDQUICK, that we would resolve his difficulty by exchanging his money for him.

3. For a variety of reasons, the ballet was delayed and couldn't include Berlin during the period in question. We regarded the deal as dead and put it out of our minds, but not Mallison. He chose to regard our commitment as open, and without consulting us until today, has obligated himself to pay 3050 green dollars to the ballet company, which is arriving in Berlin tomorrow, and whose business manager expects to be paid immediately on arrival. Both Mallison, and indirectly Balster, have appealed to us to take him off the hook. We have informed him that such deals are contrary to FJCAPE policy, and anyway our original reason for considering such assistance is no longer operative. But because he and his shop are extremely useful to us in a variety of ways, we have told him we might perform the service of exchanging his marks on the open market, citing a six-to-one rate as probably the best obtainable.

4. Regardless of what Mallison has been told, we do not wish to involve this mission in local open market transactions. We are, therefore, exchanging from our funds here 3050 green dollars for 18,300 Deutsche marks from Mallison. He will, of course, obtain a mark receipt from the ballet company's business manager in order to keep his books straight, and no paper outside FJCAPE files referring to this matter will exist. We believe this operation secure and not disadvantageous to FJCAPE from either a financial or influence standpoint.

HERBERT S. SPAETH

KMIXON

14-00000

Subject	Date
cc memo 7 June 56 [illegible] to [illegible] Letter of Instructions	26 Feb 57

SECRET

11 September 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADPC

VIA: EE

SUBJECT: Unclassified HICOG report on Congress of Cultural Freedom

REFERENCE: ADPC memorandum of 21 August, same subject

1. In regard to the recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of reference memorandum, an inquiry was sent to the Chief of the German Mission to determine the author of subject report and the circumstances surrounding its preparation. On 6 September the German Mission Chief replied as follows:

a. Subject report was one of three requested by Mr. Shepard Stone from Mr. Kenneth Downs, Mr. Melvin Lasky, and Mr. Ralf Von Eckart, the latter being Deputy Chief of the Editorial Projection Branch, ISD. Subject report, sent to State Department, is verbatim as prepared by Mr. Von Eckart.

b. Mr. Von Eckart was present throughout the Congress and required no assistance or guidance in preparation of this report. It is considered unlikely that he had in mind promoting the interests of Mr. Lasky, with whom he had a sharp disagreement concerning press relations. Mr. Von Eckart originally went to the Congress expecting to handle the press but was abruptly cut off by Lasky to make way for another individual.

c. The document was not classified by HICOG because it was considered to contain nothing of a classified nature; there was no internal HICOG distribution of it outside of Mr. Stone's Public Affairs Division.

d. The original report bears a notation by Mr. William J. Egan, Chief of ISD, to the effect that he considered it "relatively objective". The Chief of our German Mission himself considers the report a fair summary of HICOG's quite enthusiastic reaction to the Congress as a whole.

e. It is known to the Chief of the German Mission that Lasky is not aware of the existence of subject report.

2. This report was handled in a quite routine manner upon receipt by the State Department here, getting neither highly limited nor highly wide-spread distribution. In addition to the Office of German Affairs, it went also to United Nations Affairs, Office of Libraries and Institutions, Mr. Barrett's division, and the division concerned with international organizations and conferences. So far as Mr. Bruce Buttles, who has been most discreet and helpful to us throughout the Congress matter, has been able to find out the report created no particular stir one way or the other.

PDCWICK

3. There have been no recent incidents involving Mr. Lasky, and it appears at this point that control of him is well in hand.

4. Mr. Lasky's own report of the Congress is written in narrative rather than editorial style. It emphasizes primarily the favorable aspects of the Congress but does not go completely overboard and makes no mention whatever of Lasky's own part in it. It does not appear at all to be an ax-grinding document but simply one which was written in a flush of enthusiasm.

5. EE-3 is retaining subject report in the PDQUICK file.

John E. Baker

JEB/njh
cc: CFC File
CFC Chrono
SP
EE-3 Chrono
EE-3 PDQUICK file

K-2453 486418

FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

13

SECURITY: SECRET

PRIORITY: AIR POUCH

RETAIN OR DESTROY

761.00/7-2650

TO: Department of State

FROM: HICOG Frankfurt 260, July 26, 1950 1 Enclosure

REF: Dept Cable Srl No. 1509, 13 Sep 49, to USPOLAD Frankfurt

SUBJECT: PERIPHERAL - ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY OF BORIS IVANOVICH NIKOLAEVSKI.

B C D 7

ACTION EUR

INFO DCR
GER
UNA
OLI
S/S
R
G
UNA/R

e

12917

(1)

Enclosed is a memorandum describing the activities of Boris Ivanovich Nikolaevski, head of the socialist League of New York, who has been in Germany for the past six weeks. It will be noted that Mr. Nikolaevski has been endeavoring to establish a bloc of left and center groups within the Russian emigration and that he is hopeful of obtaining the support of the executive committee set up by the recent Congress for Cultural Freedom in Berlin for a congress to be held in Paris attended by representatives of so-called "democratic" groups within the Russian emigration and by democratic figures from Western Europe and the United States.

XR 861.411

It is recommended that the Department give serious consideration to the position which it should take with respect to Nikolaevski's proposal. If plans are proceeding to create a unified front within the Russian emigration which would receive American support in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the Halley report, it would appear inadvisable at this stage to give any official encouragement to a congress of Russian groups which would not be fully representative and would therefore tend to emphasize divergent trends within the emigration rather than minimizing differences and endeavoring to enlist broad support within the emigration for a program of anti-Communist activity.

B. R. Shute
Director
Office of Intelligence

Enclosure:
Memorandum

Distribution:
American Embassy, Paris
HICOG Eastern Element, Berlin

FBStevens
FBStevens/ams

SECRET

THIS IS NOT A PERMANENT RECORD COPY.

SECRET

Enclosure [illegible] to HICOG Frankfurt
Despatch [illegible], July 26, 1950

ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY OF BORIS IVANOVICH NIKOLAEVSKI

Boris Ivanovich Nikolaevski, the well-known Russian historian and journalist and head of the New York socialist League, has been in Germany for the past six weeks attempting to line up support for a bloc of Russian groups of the left and center and to promote a congress of "democratic" elements within the emigration which he hopes to convene in Paris in the fall under the sponsorship of the executive committee created at the recent Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom.

Nikolaevski is a man of great energy and of very considerable stature among the Russian refugees in Germany. By virtue of his long-standing record as a social democrat he has excellent contacts with German social-democratic and trade union circles and has been personally acquainted with many of the present leaders of these organizations since his residence in Berlin in the early 30's. He also enjoys wide confidence among Russian refugees by virtue of the fact that he was the first old Russian emigre of any stature to come to Germany after the war in an effort to give encouragement and assistance to members of the new Russian emigration.

Nikolaevski has divided his time between Munich, Berlin and Frankfurt and has talked with a constant stream of visitors.

He has also made numerous side trips to seek out refugees in whom he is interested. His principal objective has been to unite as many of the progressive or, as he calls them, "democratic" Russian groups as possible in an organization which will concentrate on the struggle against Communism. He has succeeded in establishing close personal relations with Boris Aleksandrovich Yakovlev, head of SBONR (Fighting Union for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia), and has also interested SVOD, the military twin of SBONR, and the Solidarists (NTS) in his plan. As far as I have been able to discover, however, no agreement has been reached between these groups for the formation of a united organization, and NTS, following its customary practice, has indicated a willingness to cooperate but has not committed itself beyond that point. Nikolaevski anticipates some opposition to his project from the left wing of the New York League by virtue of the Vlasovite antecedents of these organizations, but feels that he can eventually gain the support of his own organization. It is presumed that final negotiations for the establishment of the new organization will take place only after Nikolaevski returns to New York and gains League endorsement of his activities in Germany.

SECRET

After the Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom, in which Nikolaevski played a prominent and enthusiastic role, he conceived a new project, namely the convocation of a conference in Paris under the sponsorship of the permanent executive committee created at the Berlin Congress. The Paris congress would be attended by "democratic" Russian emigres, both old and new, as well as by "democratic" leaders and intellectuals from Western Europe and the United States, including a number who attended the Berlin conference. The principal purpose of the Paris congress would be propagandistic; it would, in Nikolaevski's words, constitute a demonstration of the solidarity of anti-Communist sentiment among the Russian emigration and the democratic forces of the Western world.

Nikolaevski is a convinced and doctrinaire socialist and is firmly opposed to cooperation with or apparently even exposure to those groups within the emigration which are not ideologically sympathetic to him. His particular antipathy is directed toward the Supreme Monarchist Council (VMS) and its president, Yuri Meyer, who, he claims, is manipulated by the sinister behind-the-scenes figure of Colonel Baranovski. He can produce no evidence beyond rumor to support his allegations regarding the role of Colonel Baranovski who himself has personally denied to me in the most emphatic terms that he plays any political role whatsoever. It is a striking coincidence that Colonel Neryanin, the head of SVOD, one of the organizations which Nikolaevski includes in his proposed union, is one of the principal assistants in the intelligence network of Colonel Baranovski, who expresses the highest regard for him.

I suggested to Nikolaevski, and discussed with him at considerable length, the desirability of broadening the proposed Paris congress to include representatives of all the principal groups represented in the emigration. I pointed out that the propaganda value of a congress in which the principal elements in the emigration were represented would be substantially greater than that of a meeting with only fragmentary representation; that a meeting from which certain influential groups were excluded might result in a rival congress which would merely underline the diversive trends within the emigration and tend to crystallize them; that a congress meeting under the banner of democracy should be prepared to permit a democratic expression of opinion; and that participation in a meeting of this kind with rival groups would in no sense constitute endorsement or approval of their programs. To these arguments Nikolaevski turned a deaf ear. He stands firmly on the position that the social democrats, whom he consistently refers to as "democrats," cannot afford to compromise themselves or endanger their standing with the Russian people by the slightest evidence of cooperation with the right wing.

Nikolaevski is extremely anxious to gain the blessing of the United States Government for his Paris venture. I told him frankly that while I was in no position to express an official opinion and could not venture a guess as to Washington's' reaction, it seemed unlikely to me that the American Government could afford to take sides in the internal political struggle within the Russian emigration, and that until the emigre groups succeeded in reconciling their own differences and were prepared to concentrate their efforts against the Soviet regime rather than against each other, the American Government would hardly be in a position to associate itself in any way with them. Nikolaevski replied that the anti-Communist struggle itself was an inadequate program and that something positive must be offered to the Russian people. I agreed to this position but suggested that a united program on which the emigration could agree would probably have much greater impact than a variety of programs offered by competing groups. Nikolaevski, however, stuck to his ideological guns.

Nikolaevski was considerably perturbed by news he received just before his departure from Frankfurt to the effect that Yakovlev had been approached by Colonel Kromiadi, who is nominated in the Kelley memorandum as the leader of the united front organization, to lend the support of SBONR to an emigre congress to be convened in Munich. Yakovlev had gained the impression that this project had American support, although Kromiadi had apparently made no explicit statement to this effect. He had based his arguments on the broad concept of united emigre effort against the Soviet regime and had indicated that it would be a congress of Russian patriots rather than of representatives of emigre organizations. This appeal had obviously made a considerable impression on Yakovlev, who is much less ideologically minded than Nikolaevski and much more inclined to ally himself with any activity which he feels can effectively bring pressure against the Soviets. Nikolaevski, while expressing high personal regard for Colonel Kromiadi, immediately attributed this project to the machinations of Meyer and Baranovski and adopted a completely negative attitude toward it. I told him that I had had no previous knowledge of the project and that I felt reasonably sure that it did not enjoy American support.

Nikolaevski plans to proceed to France and attend the first meeting of the executive committee established at the Berlin Congress in an effort to interest them in his project for a congress of Russian emigres.

COMMENT

If Nikolaevski in his intransigent position is supported by his organization, which I assume will be the case, it will present a serious obstacle to any plans for uniting the forces of the Russian emigration in the anti-Communist struggle. Nikolaevski's ideological principles are so firmly enrooted that it appears unlikely that anything will shake them or that he can be persuaded to cooperate with groups whose political views differ markedly from his own. Nikolaevski's name and pen carry great influence among Russian emigres and it is most desirable that they be utilized to the utmost. It would be neither realistic nor practical, however, to accept Nikolaevski's position and thereby eliminate other influential groups within the emigration. One solution for this dilemma might be to ignore the extremist groups, right and left, which refuse to participate in the common effort and concentrate primarily on the new emigration who are more flexible in their political ideas and whose understanding of the Soviet regime is more recent and more profound. The extremists will then be faced with the alternative of carrying on alone or of making peace with their conscience and joining the common cause.

Francis B. Stevens

Francis B. Stevens

CONFIDENTIAL

14 August 1950

QZ/224

The following views of LEIGOVNOW on the Berlin Congress have been reported as of interest to the sponsors of the Congress.

1. The Berlin Congress is regarded in France as a movement exclusively of the extreme left, of former Communists and present non-Stalinite Marxists. Observers regard with disfavor the fact that the Congress was extremely mild in its attack against the Soviet regime. They point out that:

   (a) The Soviet regime as such is not mentioned in a single resolution, which limited themselves to the condemning "totalitarian regimes."

   (b) The issuance of an anti-Franco resolution in the absence of an anti-Stalin resolution is significant.

   (c) The refusal to recognize the representatives of the Russian NTS group present at the Congress as "listed delegates" confirms the extreme leftist nature of the Congress.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: EE-3	NO.
	DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. CEE		2	21 aug	eBB	to 1:
2. EAD		22 Aug	22 Aug	CAT	FGW may wish to
3.					see this. Please return
4. EE-3		AUG 22 1950			for [illegible]
5. WE-III					1 To 2: This reports
6.					Baker's conversation
7.					with Hambley re
8.					Berlin Cultural Congress. This conversation
9.					had pursuant to
10.					ADPC instruction.
11.					Do you think ADPC want to see this?
12.					eBB
13.					Noted.
14.					
15.					File: PDZ [illegible]

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1949

SECRET

EE-801

18 August 1950

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Congress for Cultural Freedom

1. On 15 August, I discussed the Berlin Cultural Congress with Kenneth H. Hambley, with particular emphasis on the problem of bringing the continuing Congress organization under control and, at the same time, expanding it into an effective anti-communist weapon.

2. I expressed to Hambley our concern over the manner in which Charles A. Skeggs had conducted himself during the Congress, and Hambley replied that he had been equally concerned. He said, however, that while Skeggs activities had caused an unfavorable reaction on the part of a number of the delegates, that reaction had been more directed against Skeggs personally than against him as a representative of the government. Hambley agreed with my suggestion that two bits of silver lining could be found in the Skeggs cloud, namely that he had taken most of the opposition heat himself, thus sparing some of our other people, and that he had conducted himself like anything but the "Polizeispitzel" the communist press of Germany made him out to be. In fact, said Hambley, Skeggs general attitude was such as to cause some of the delegates to disremember that Skeggs was attached to the government in any fashion or presumably subject to any discipline at all.

3. Hambley said that most of the delegates with whom he had talked were perfectly willing to accept the explanation that the Congress was smiled upon by the United States Government to the extent that some official funds were supplied for the physical staging of the meeting (as indeed they were) but that the rest of the money came from somewhat vague unofficial sources in the United States. Those who suspected something more, with the exception of the Trevor-Roper group, were generally happy that the United States was doing something of this kind and were in no mood to ask any embarrassing questions or raise any delicate points.

4. I asked Hambley what he thought his future role in the Congress should be. He replied that he was perfectly willing to undertake any activities we asked him to undertake but personally felt he should retire into the background as rapidly as possible.

SECRET

I told him that feeling coincided entirely with our own views and that we would expect him to conduct himself in that fashion. It was agreed that he should continue as a member of the International Committee of Twenty-five but should take no active overt part in organizational or policy matters and would operate behind the scenes only when so directed.

5. I discussed with him the problem raised by the presence of David Rousset and Ignazio Silone on the Executive Committee. Hambley agreed that neither of these individuals could be considered fully reliable but explained it had been impossible to exclude them from the Committee because of their prominence and the interests which they represented. He said he ~~liked~~ thought of Rousset as a person who considered himself basically on the American side even though from time to time he had to make noises of a sort to satisfy his leftist constituents. He also described Rousset as a bit of a bluffer who could be handled by a combination of firmness and tact, particularly so long as he continued to desire to be an American ally. Hambley described Silone as a more complex case--a vain, egocentric person of strong intellect but weak will and an inept politician who insisted on engaging in politics solely to satisfy his ego. Hambley said Silone probably would have been lost to the cause entirely had he not been given a prominent role including a position on the Executive Committee but that, as it was, he appeared on the surface now to be a convert, albeit a dubious one. Hambley expressed belief, however, that Silone could be controlled if handled expertly and that, if worst came to worst, he could be separated from the Committee without disastrous effect. Hambley said that in his opinion Arthur Koestler and Carlo Schmid were altogether reliable politically and could be depended upon to counterbalance Silone and Rousset even though it would be unwise to take them fully into confidence as to the nature of the Congress' backing. Irving Brown, of course, is considered completely reliable.

6. Inasmuch as the Executive Committee is a creature of the Committee of Twenty-five and draws its membership from that Committee, the latter constitutes the real point of control in the Congress organization. The Committee of Twenty-five, as it stands, is reliable on balance. If necessary, it could be weighted more heavily in our favor by exercise of the privilege of co-opting additional members on whom we could depend, Hambley said. He suggested that it might be well to establish a principle either of rotating members of the Executive Committee or of conducting regular elections of the parent Committee of Twenty-five, probably preferably the latter. This mechanism would provide means whereby obstreperous Executive Committee members might be sidetracked. Hambley agreed that this might prove a workable scheme.

SECRET

John E. Baker

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: ADPC

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Acting CEE		Aug ✓	8 aug	eBOB	1 & 2: Please talk to me about this very promptly eBOB
2. Baker EE III					
3. WE-III					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

File [illegible] am

Somewhere [illegible]

to mislead [illegible]

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

EE 7 17

SECRET

8 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRECKINRIDGE

SUBJECT: Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom; activities of Melvin Lasky.

REFERENCE: Memo fr EE-3/Glaser to CEE dtd 4 Aug 50 w/atts (TSL2928).

1. I continue to be very disturbed about the manner in which this entire matter has been conducted, including the non-observance of my original memorandum of 7 April 1950, in which I approved this project, subject to the condition that Lasky would not be permitted to figure publicly in this operation. The memorandum of Mr. Glaser and the conversations which I have had with Messrs. Lindsay and Baker have done very little to relieve my apprehension on the score that no effective action to exclude Lasky from continuing to play a blatantly conspicuous role either has or will be taken by us.

2. I submit that paragraph six of the reference memorandum, in both tone and content, is entirely unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

a. It fails to reveal any appropriate acknowledgment or comprehension of the damage which has resulted from Mr. Lasky's conduct. This was a major blunder, has been branded as such by our best friends in the State Department, has been revealed as such by the publicity which is analyzed in the reference memorandum itself and must be acknowledged by the responsible members of our staff both here and in Germany.

b. It betrays an unfortunate tendency, apparently more deeprooted than I had suspected, to succumb to the temptation of convenience (doing things the easy way) and irrespective of security and other technical considerations of the utmost importance.

3. I have stated to Mr. Lindsay orally and I want to make myself completely clear on this point that unless means can be found to sanitize this operation by the removal of Lasky, Burnham and other persons of known or traceable official significance from overt roles in the proposed continuing organization, then I am unwilling to have OPC

continue

SECRET

continue its backing. I repeat my request that this be delivered to the field as an instruction and that it be so regarded and acted upon within this headquarters. I do not wish to create the impression that I am in any way opposed to the continuation of the operation, provided it can be sanitized and handled with a greater degree of sophistication and technical expert-ease than has characterized our performance up to date. However, I do not wish to be associated with any repetition of what we have seen thus far.

F.G.W.

FGW:lgw

P.S. Since dictating the foregoing, I have just learned from General
Magruder that he showed our report on this Congress to Secretary Johnson,
together with his own very complimentary appraisal of the operation.
Secretary Johnson was so favorably impressed with this report and General
Magruder's comment that he took the papers over and showed them to the
President, who expressed himself as being very well pleased. I can only
hope that the very rough edges which have recently appeared are not
brought too sharply to the attention of these lofty officials. In any
case this development underscores in red everything which I have said
about the necessity for tidying up this operation and eliminating all
of the "Irish pennants".

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: Glasser

NO. 23549

DATE AUG 14 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Mr. Baker					Chad =
2. EE		2	11 Aug	[illegible]	Do you think FGW would like to see this?
3. ~~EE-III~~ Baker					
4.					
5. ADPC		11 Aug	14 Aug	JGW/w	
6. EE-III	[illegible]	~~AUG 14 1950~~			
7.					
8.					2 to 5: I think you will be interested in reading this — particularly in the light of our recent conversations.
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					5 to 2 and 6:
14.					Please see marginal notations and underlinings.
15.					What are we doing to strengthen and build up this [illegible] along sound lines? [illegible]

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

EE-120

SECRET

9 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BAKER

SUBJECT : PDJUICK; Conference with Mr. Burnham

1. In the first of a series of talks with Mr. Burnham, following his return from Europe, a broad coverage of the Cultural Congress was explored as well as post-Congress plans and proceedings.

2. I went into very little detail with Mr. Burnham as to the eventual setup of the Congress as a permanent institution except to suggest that it had very broad and far-reaching implications and would be carefully studied and pursued within the next few weeks. Mr. Burnham, however, expressed his point of view (which is to be further explored in other meetings this week) as follows:

a. The continuation of the Congress as a going concern of intended permanence is now a fact. (We know that there is an executive committee, an operating committee and that the institution of a Paris Office has been authorized.) Overtly, a permanent Congress for Cultural Freedom can vastly improve the climate of opinion throughout Europe, at least, to the extent that it may considerably counter Soviet propaganda and may very well affect large groups of people far beyond the point of neutrality, perhaps to resistance. Also overtly, the Congress can utilize its participants in various forms of writing, speaking, and political action. Covertly, the Congress can perform a number of useful functions, including maintenance of contact with various resistance groups, forwarding money to such groups, spreading of clandestine propaganda and other purposes. No great pretentions are necessary in connection with the establishment of the Congress as a permanent institution, though a small office in Paris and another in Berlin are indicated. The sponsorship of a French Intellectual Periodical seems to be one of the most pressing and one of the best ideas, and Aron is enthusiastic about it and is willing to work for such a magazine as editor. Other members of the Congress, Yakevlew, for instance, are willing to work on Congress publications and both Koestler and Buber-Neuman are very anxious to take part in the literary and political activities. Bondy is a very useful man, apparently entirely reliable and a good writer and organizer; he knows languages and knows European politics.

Yes

This I doubt very much

SECRET

b. The impact of the Congress on Berlin was terrific and Reuter's part magnificent. The whole city was very eager and receptive and paid an extraordinary amount of attention to all of the Congress activities. The book display at the Congress itself was only fairly effective, but was extremely telling in the book stores throughout Western sectors, which made special displays of the books and photographs of the authors. Broadcasting by radio RIAS seems to have been more or less nominal, although RIAS cut tapes of all of the Congress speeches, but the Voice of America team did a first-class and absolutely outstanding job. The Congress was given big coverage by VOA in several languages. In addition to the records of European publicity that are on hand, a considerable additional amount was produced. For instance, there was daily broadcasting of a French radio station and sporadic broadcasting coverage by other stitions. There was a large amount of publicity in France and England and a substantial amount in Italy, Sweden and other countries. Special articles are still appearing in the European press and periodicals. The influence of the Congress on a number of important literary and political leaders appears to be very significant. This was especially true in the case of Frenay and Silone, both of whom under-went an apparent conversion due to the operations of the Congress. On the other hand, the composition of the Congress was unbalanced nationally and also because it was too leftist, too radical.

c. The irritation caused by the Trevor-Roper article in the Manchester Guardian was a reflection of the attitude of three members of the British delegation, Trevor-Roper, Ayer, and Peter de Mendelssohn. Actually, Mendelssohn (an old buddy of Lasky's) was the cause of the trouble. He is a second-rate writer, a neurotic, frustrated intellectual, who had a chip on his shoulder and unquestionably inspired Trevor-Roper and Ayer with his spirit of antagonism. Another complication was the fact that Ayer and Koestler have been intellectual rivals and bitterly dislike each other. Ayer was infuriated by Koestler's prominence and communicated this antagonism to Trevor-Roper. The letter is an excessively conceited man (Burnham added at this point that almost all intellectuals are excessively conceited) and was openly annoyed because he did not figure in the proceedings with sufficient prominence. ("Incidentally," says Burnham, "Trevor-Roper's description of Koestler as a 'rootless European' follows Pravda, which uses that term as a general description for Jews.") The annoyance felt by Trevor-Roper and Ayer at their relegation to minor roles in comparison to Koestler found its outlet in articles which both of these men have written, (Note: We have only seen the one by Trevor-Roper.) and the situation was complicated by the desire of Trevor-Roper to maintain a high and academic objectivity in relation to world affairs, whereas the delegates to the Congress insisted on making it a realistic denunciation of the Communist strangle-hold on culture and intellectual freedom. Koestler epitomizes the lofty philosophical viewpoint by saying, "Do you want partial liberty or total slavery?" Lasky has written a reply, over his name, to Trevor-Roper.

d. Melvin Lasky is granted the qualities of ability, courage, hard work and political intuition but he is, at the same time, the most vain and egocentric individual imaginable. In addition to which, he is an intellectual snob and a publicity hound. Also, he definitely is not reliable, cannot be counted upon to do things that he should do unless they work in with his own ideas. He has the Russian Menshevik point of view which is simply that of useless intrigue for the sake of intrigue. His intellectual snobbery was indicated in his process of meeting delegates. If they were very important, he went to meet them with his personal car and driver--along with newspaper photographers. If they were reasonably important, a private car was sent for them. If they were ordinary delegates, they was given transportation on a bus. At least one delegate was contacted by Burnham and arrangements were made with Lasky to invite him but no invitation was sent. In the case of Max Yergin, Lasky succeeded in humiliating him and in the case of Yakevlew, Lasky at first refused to print his name on the program at all. Lasky has done a wonderful job with Der Monat and there is no question as to his natural ability and capacity for hard work but it is difficult to see how he can be used in any outstanding position in connection with a continuation of the Congress unless it is in an advisory capacity, possibly in charge of the Berlin office and with a strong hand to subdue his self-advertising proclivities.

3. The above represents Burnham's general views, in some cases expressed spontaneously, in others drawn out by questions, and it is now proposed to have a further meeting and ask him to talk about the development potentialities and techniques.

Glaser

LOUIS GLASER

EIII/LG/mk
cc: EIII Chrono
EIII Subject File
Mr. Schreyer

SECRET

9 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WISNER

SUBJECT: FDQUICK - Existing Organization

1. Pursuant to your oral request of this morning, there are set forth below the elements of subject organization. As you are aware subject is in a fluid stage but, as of 7 July 1950, the following steps had been taken (except that the action described under "a" was taken at the end of the month of July):

a. A small Paris office was opened with M. Louis Gibarti as Secretary, on trial for a two-month period.

b. Letters had been sent out to the honorary Chairmen requesting them to continue to serve in that capacity. These chairmen are: Croce, Dewey, Maritain, Jaspers, and Russell. This action was taken by the Congress in session.

c. An Executive Committee of five had been nominated. This committee consists of Ignazio Silone, David Rousset, Arthur Koestler, Irving Brown and Carlo Schmid. This action was likewise taken by the Congress in session.

d. Also at the Berlin session of the Congress an International Committee of twenty-five was nominated. All but the last five of these were also confirmed. The last five had not been confirmed as of 7 July 1950. The names of these twenty-five individuals follow:

✓ Ignazio Silone
✓ David Rousset
Arthur Koestler
Carlo Schmid
Irving Brown
Julian Amery
Haakon Lie
James Burnham
Sidney Hook
Nicolas Nabokov
Eugen Kogon
Theodor Plievier
Herbert Read
Denis de Rougemont
Lionello Venturi
Boris Nicolaevsky
Karel Kupka
Josef Czapski
Margarete Buber-Neumann
Andre Philip
Richard Crossman
Francois Mauriac
Pablo Casals
Thornton Wilder
Oskar Pollak

[illegible]

C. D. G. B.
EX/EE

CDGB:T
DISTR:
Orig. - ADPC
EE Chrono & subject - 1
Registry - 2

SECRET

4-00000

News and publicity accomplishments
of N.Y. office

=

News coverage out of Berlin by U.S.
Correspondents

=

News coverage and ensuing publicity
by Messrs. Montgomery and Conant

=

What news coverage in Western Europe?

=

Delegates from Middle East?

=

Last minute invitations issued by Lasky —
including more wives?

=

Did Melvin have a press Conference in
Berlin? Was Grisez mentioned in
publicity at all?

=

What happened to the book displays?
(There were no photographs)

What was distributed to East Germany in the
form of propaganda, during the Congress?

=

Accounting.

Harkey

1. Montgomery had ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]

Also French [illegible] every day

Compensation is unbalanced [illegible]

B. too little to [illegible]

[illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]

Set up not too [illegible]

Influence upon Frenchmen ([illegible] Condat) and [illegible]

([illegible] [illegible] [illegible])

Peter de Mendelssohn – source of [illegible]

[illegible] Refor

[illegible]

([illegible] Buddy of Harkey)

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] around [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] not [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

If [illegible] with [illegible] quite close [illegible] [illegible] – [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] ([illegible] [illegible])

Example / [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] with [illegible] [illegible] – [illegible] sent // [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Political [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] part of [illegible] not reliable

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Important on Berlin was transfer

[illegible] part [illegible]

which [illegible] [illegible] eager and [illegible]

[illegible] display was fairly effective but mostly in [illegible]

Continuation

Current

improve climate of opening in [illegible] to [illegible] Soviet [illegible]

— to

[illegible] participants [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Current

[illegible] projects to [illegible] [illegible]

establishing contact [illegible], etc.

Aron [illegible] to work on magazine as editor

Yalenship – with [illegible] with [illegible] group [illegible]

Bondy – very useful man

[illegible] languages

[illegible] European [illegible]

Good contact man – [illegible] – organizer

Koestler ([illegible] Naumann) prepared to work

[illegible] required as to decision magazine

SECRET

9 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. R[illegible]ER

SUBJECT : PDDICK; Conference with Mr. Burnham

1. In the first of a series of talks with Mr. Burnham, following his return from Europe, a broad coverage of the Cultural Congress was explored as well as post-Congress plans and proceedings.

2. I went into very little detail with Mr. Burnham as to the eventual setup of the Congress as a permanent institution except to suggest that it had very broad and far-reaching implications and would be carefully studied and pursued within the next few weeks. Mr. Burnham, however, expressed his point of view (which is to be further explored in other meetings this week) as follows:

a. The continuation of the Congress as a going concern of intended permanence is now a fact. (We know that there is an executive committee, an operating committee and that the institution of a Paris Office has been authorized.) Overtly, a permanent Congress for Cultural Freedom can vastly improve the climate of opinion throughout Europe, at least, to the extent that it may considerably counter Soviet propaganda and may very well affect large groups of people far beyond the point of neutrality, perhaps to resistance. Also overtly, the Congress can utilize its participants in various forms of writing, speaking, and political action. Covertly, the Congress can perform a number of useful functions, including maintenance of contact with various resistance groups, forwarding money to such groups, spreading of clandestine propaganda and other purposes. No great pretentions are necessary in connection with the establishment of the Congress as a permanent institution, though a small office in Paris and another in Berlin are indicated. The sponsorship of a French Intellectual Periodical seems to be one of the most pressing and one of the best ideas, and Aron is enthusiastic about it and is willing to work for such a magazine as editor. Other members of the Congress, Yakovlev, for instance, are willing to work on Congress publications and both Koestler and Buber-Neumann are very anxious to take part in the literary and political activities. Bondy is a very useful man, apparently entirely reliable and a good writer and organizer; he knows languages and knows European politics.

SECRET

b. The impact of the Congress on Berlin was terrific and Reuter's part magnificent. The whole city was very eager and receptive and paid an extraordinary amount of attention to all of the Congress activities. The book display at the Congress itself was only fairly effective, but was extremely telling in the book stores throughout Western sectors, which made special displays of the books and photographs of the authors. Broadcasting by radio RIAS seems to have been more or less nominal, although RIAS cut tapes of all of the Congress speeches, but the Voice of America team did a first-class and absolutely outstanding job. The Congress was given big coverage by VOA in several languages. In addition to the records of European publicity that are on hand, a considerable additional amount was produced. For instance, there was daily broadcasting of a French radio station and sporadic broadcasting coverage by other stations. There was a large amount of publicity in France and England and a substantial amount in Italy, Sweden and other countries. Special articles are still appearing in the European press and periodicals. The influence of the Congress on a number of important literary and political leaders appears to be very significant. This was especially true in the case of Frenay and Silone, both of whom under-went an apparent conversion due to the operations of the Congress. On the other hand, the composition of the Congress was unbalanced nationally and also because it was too leftist, too radical.

c. The irritation caused by the Trevor-Roper article in the Manchester Guardian was a reflection of the attitude of three members of the British delegation, Trevor-Roper, Ayer, and Peter de Mendelssohn. Actually, Mendelssohn (an old buddy of Lasky's) was the cause of the trouble. He is a second-rate writer, a neurotic, frustrated intellectual, who had a chip on his shoulder and unquestionably inspired Trevor-Roper and Ayer with his spirit of antagonism. Another complication was the fact that Ayer and Koestler have been intellectual rivals and bitterly dislike each other. Ayer was infuriated by Koestler's prominence and communicated this antagonism to Trevor-Roper. The latter is an excessively conceited man (Burnham added at this point that almost all intellectuals are excessively conceited) and was openly annoyed because he did not figure in the proceedings with sufficient prominence. ("Incidentally," says Burnham, "Trevor-Roper's description of Koestler as a 'rootless European' follows Pravda, which uses that term as a general description for Jews.") The annoyance felt by Trevor-Roper and Ayer at their relegation to minor roles in comparison to Koestler found its outlet in articles which both of those men have written, (Note: We have only seen the one by Trevor-Roper.) and the situation was complicated by the desire of Trevor-Roper to maintain a high and academic objectivity in relation to world affairs, whereas the delegates to the Congress insisted on making it a realistic denunciation of the Communist strangle-hold on culture and intellectual freedom. Koestler epitomizes the lofty philosophical viewpoint by saying, "Do you want partial liberty or total slavery?" Lasky has written a reply, over his name, to Trevor-Roper.

d. Melvin Lasky is granted the qualities of ability, courage, hard work and political intuition but he is, at the same time, the most vain and egocentric individual imaginable. In addition to which, he is an intellectual snob and a publicity hound. Also, he definitely is not reliable, cannot be counted upon to do things that he should do unless they work in with his own ideas. He has the Russian Menshevik point of view which is simply that of useless intrigue for the sake of intrigue. His intellectual snobbery was indicated in his process of meeting delegates. If they were very important, he went to meet them with his personal car and driver—along with newspaper photographers. If they were reasonably important, a private car was sent for them. If they were ordinary delegates, they was given transportation on a bus. At least one delegate was contacted by Burnham and arrangements were made with Lasky to invite him but no invitation was sent. In the case of Max Yergin, Lasky succeeded in humiliating him and in the case of Yakovlev, Lasky at first refused to print his name on the program at all. Lasky has done a wonderful job with Der Monat and there is no question as to his natural ability and capacity for hard work but it is difficult to see how he can be used in any outstanding position in connection with a continuation of the Congress unless it is in an advisory capacity, possibly in charge of the Berlin office and with a strong hand to subdue his self-advertising proclivities.

3. The above represents Burnham's general views, in some cases expressed spontaneously, in others drawn out by questions, and it is now proposed to have a further meeting and ask him to talk about the development potentialities and techniques.

LOUIS GLASER

EIII/LG/mk
cc: EIII Chrono
EIII Subject File ✓
Mr. Schreyer

~~TOP~~ SECRET

4 August 1950

Sent

One copy ([illegible] 10)
EE/C
[illegible] May 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: CEE

THROUGH: MR. SCHREYER, EE 3

SUBJECT: Activities of Mr. Melvin Lasky in connection with Congress for Cultural Freedom (Project PDQUICK)

1. This is in response to your request that we examine our files and submit a statement concerning the undue prominence given to Mr. Melvin Lasky in connection with the Cultural Congress.

2. Lasky was publicly identified, early in the preparations for the Congress, as the spark plug and leading light. This unsatisfactory position was anticipated by Mr. Wisner, who, in his approval of Project PDQUICK, cautioned against emphasis on Lasky's participation. (Attachment A).

3. From the beginning, the home office was cognizant of the danger of a spotlight being thrown on any overt U. S. employee, and, in addition to previous warnings, on 7 April cabled specific instructions for the retirement of Lasky to the background. This and other admonitions, from the home office and the OPC German Mission chief, will be found at attachment B.

4. However, a review of the publicity which the Congress received shows an unfortunate amount of concentration on Lasky. In Berlin, for instance, where the Congress received its greatest publicity output, out of 180 newspaper clippings which are available, approximately 15 specifically featured Lasky, some of them photographically. Of the U. S. and British press clippings which were available, several featured Lasky prominently. In a feature article in the New Leader, the subject of which was the Cultural Congress, Lasky was referred to as the initiator of the Congress and he was featured in at least two of the formal press releases which were given out in Berlin. Of the 73 photographs which covered the Congress and which were released for press and historical purposes, Lasky is prominently featured in 6. (a large amount of this publicity material, including photographs, press cuttings and press releases, is available in our files.) While Lasky's part as General Secretary was over-emphasized in a number of newspapers and periodicals, the most damaging article appeared as a review of the Congress in the Manchester Guardian, written by the prominent historian, Mr. H. R. Trevor-Roper in which Lasky was described as connected with American Information Services and the organizer of the Congress. The statement was unfortunate because this was the only critical article of the Congress known to have appeared in the Western press. In passing, it might be mentioned that the London Economist also picked up Lasky's appointment as General Secretary, as suggesting U. S. sponsorship. Its review,

~~TOP~~ SECRET

COPY 1 OF 6 COPIES

~~#2727~~

however, was laudatory and pointed up the sincerity and usefulness of the gathering. The holding of the Congress in Berlin was described as "a gesture of defiance"; the meeting was called an event of "considerable significance" (strong words for the London Economist) and it was referred to as marking, or at least reflecting "a turning point of the western counter-attack in the cold war." "Korea," said the Economist, "made the fortune of the Congress and crystallized the real issue before the delegates." Trevor-Roper, in a letter to the Economist, commenting on its article, was much more temperate than in his article in the Guardian. For example, in the Economist he declared, "We were almost all united against Communism from the start."

5. At this point, it should be specified that from the time the Congress was first discussed, it was recognized that the Communist press would indict it as a fascist, war mongering, propaganda group operating under the intelligence auspices of the U. S. and that this accusation would be broadcast by the Communist machine (as it was) whether or not, in fact the Congress had been under any external controls. It was also recognized that the General Secretary of the Congress would inevitably receive a certain amount of attention from the press. It seems to be clear, however, that this amount of attention was unnecessarily large.

6. Notwithstanding the undue personal publicity achieved by Mr. Lasky, it is significant that:

a. He played a most important role in the conception, development, organization and control of the Congress. Without his active interest and support the launching of the Congress would have been most difficult.

b. The Congress was a highly successful operation. In its stand against intellectual neutrality in the struggle against Communism, its "Letter to the East," its final "Manifesto," and its deliberations and intellectual discussions, the Congress has proven its propaganda value which will be extended and expanded to a greater degree in the future.

LGlaser

LOUIS GLASER

EE 3/LG/fdr

cc: CPC registry - 3 and 4 of 6
EE - 2 of 6
EE 3 - 5 and 6 of 6

Attachments a and b
See description above

SECRET

COPY 1 OF 6 COPIES

SECRET

C O P Y

7 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MESSRS. FRANK
LINDSAY
OFFIE

SUBJECT: Project PDQUICK

1. With reference to my conversation with Mr. Baker concerning the project outline covering the subject project, I have approved this project subject to the following condition. It makes no sense to me that we should state in paragraph 6 under the heading of security that all practicable measures will be taken to disguise the official U. S. interest, financial and otherwise; and at the same time to provide that one of the two active sponsors will be Mr. Melvin J. Lasky, editor of the overt HICOG monthly magazine "Der Monat." I understand that Mr. Lasky is needed as one of the principal organizers and operatives but I think it quite unnecessary for his name to be flourished about as a sponsor. After all, he is officially employed by HICOG--he is, therefore, an acknowledged member of the U. S. apparatus in Germany. Why then should his name be used? Reuter is an excellent sponsor and surely it will be possible to find one or more others--non-American or at least non-official American--to serve as sponsors.

2. Generally in the same connection I assume that our consultant, Mr. Burnham, will operate in the wings and that his name will not be too prominently displayed. As the result of his recent book and the furor of communist commentary, he is a "sitting duck" for hostile propaganda in my opinion. I am entirely in favor of his participating extensively in the arrangements, but the more his participation can be in the form of "off-stage whispers" the better.

/s/ F. G. W./w

FGW:lgw/fdr

Attachment: Subj. Proj. (38294)
(Not attached to this copy)
Distribution:
1 of 2 - CEE
2 of 2 - CEE-3

Secret
Eric Jones
FE/E aud 10
15 May 58

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES
41040 | Series 6

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: EE 3

NO.

DATE 4 August 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. EE 3 (Schreyer)					Attachment B contains the following:
2. EE					WASH 3291 (OUT 52862) FRAN 139 (IN 22622)
3. Return to EE 3					WASH 2884 (OUT 53482) 945-CWUFG
4.					FRAN 233 (IN 25106) FRAN 451 (IN 30207)
5.					BRLN 3033 (IN 31100)
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

B

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1948

SECRET

28 July
Ref. PDQUICK

T. S.

The decision on this is not up to me. I will appreciate opportunity to discuss it with you.

My point of view is that ALL of this current PDQUICK stuff is premature and a case of a lot of hungry actors smelling easy money and wanting to get into the act and get the show on the road.

We have no budget for PDQUICK for this period - and literally are living on borrowed funds. We can't make up a budget because we have no accounting from the field, do not know where we stand.

Here are some other questions in my mind:

What were the publicity accomplishments of the relatively expensive NY office?

What happened to the Berlin news coverage by US correspondents?

What happened to the bright and sanguinary forecasts of tremendous amounts of publicity, special magazine articles, radio broadcasts, etc. which were to emanate from the attendance at the Congress of Messrs. Montgomery and Conant - a little matter which cost the US about two thousand pieces of lettuce ? (It seems clear that their attendance was absolutely worthless otherwise.)

What happened to their efforts to obtain delegates from the Middle East?

Why did Lasky proceed with a dozen last minute invitations to innocuous persons (these were supposed to be 'a few' and to extremely important people) including several wives.

A cablegram was sent urging that a press conference be arranged for Franz Mehring? Did it take place?

There were no photographs of the book displays. This book display was an expensive item. Did it take place?

Now with all these questions in my mind, adding up to a realization that if the Congress was a success, it was only a success as far as it went, and it has a long way to go to completely justify itself - the next steps NOT being spending a lot of dough for the support of deserving intellectuals who have no other source of income, but in getting a distribution of a million pieces of literature, and other publicity, in Satellite areas - I would hesitate (which is a euphemism for blankly object) to blandly appropriating an extra ten thousand bucks to support an innocuous group of Russian exiles who want to air their grievances, NOT under our control.

LG

File
PDQUICK

Glaser

20 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: CKX 3

SUBJECT: 229-[illegible]U, Special Report on PDQUICK

Glaser and Kroller have discussed the attached paper and are agreed as follows:

a. We think that in the preparation of the paper, Josselson was acting as a reporter rather than fundamentally expressing his own ideas.

b. In our opinion, the whole scheme, as described in the special report, is much too grandiose, ambitious and cumbersome.

c. We agree that the Congress should continue in existence but we do not think that it has to have any legal establishment.

d. We see the functioning of a continuing organization as providing the basis for future Congress meetings, providing members with a focus of interest, providing a logical source of information, propaganda, publications, and publicity, and as a cover for certain F[illegible] operations.

e. We think the organization of the Congress could follow the outline in paragraph 4 of the Reference down to, and including, the General Secretary, with the addition of an Executive Assistant, a stenographer, and a typist, and elimination of the rest of the suggested personnel.

f. We think it advisable that the Congress have one office, possibly, though not necessarily, in Paris, and that its other "offices" (which in actuality need be little more than letter drops) would require no personnel and no administrative machinery except arrangements for the forwarding of mail. Any other sporadic use to be made of such "offices," such as localized press releases, for instance, could be accomplished through a resident member of either the Executive Committee or the International Committee.

g. We think that it need not cost more than $25,000 for the next year to maintain the Congress organization, pay for administration, traveling expenses, including the salaries of personnel, which would assume a General Secretary who would be an OPC agent. (This latter concept may not be absolutely necessary; but if not, then provision should be made for OPC contact some other way.) In addition to the $25,000, specified above, there should be an allotment of $50,000 for the holding of the next Congress. Another $25,000 should be added for special purposes largely connected with publicity. The major part of the expenditures for the next year for collection, printing, and dissemination of Congress material and which could conceivably amount to as much as $250,000 as a top figure, would be provided, it is hoped, by ECA funds.

h. The activities mentioned in Part II of subject report could very well be handled under the setup outlined above with certain exceptions which seem to be too broad in scope to be justified at all.

GERALD DROLLER

LOUIS GLASER

Encl.
  Special Report

EE-3/LG/fdr
cc: Glaser
  Droller
  Chrono

Attachment to 229-C

SPECIAL REPORT: Situation and Perspectives.

I ORGANIZATION

1. At the conclusion of the Berlin sessions of the CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM, the basis for continuing work was created by the appointment of several committees. Some confusion and uncertainty reigned at this period; these need to be clarified. The following is suggested:

a. Honorary Chairman: Letters will go out this week to the Five Philosophers -- Croce, Dewey, Maritain, Jaspers, and Russell -- requesting them to honor the CONGRESS by continuing to serve with the permanent commission.

b. Sponsors: A great many distinguished men in the field of art and science had given their support to the Berlin Congress, although they were unable to come. Their names would be most useful in the Congress' continuing activities. If, as seems only appropriate, the final International Committee of 25 should consist only of "active members", then some of the nominations originally included should be transferred by the working Executive Committee to this special list of Sponsors. These (before the Congress) included -- and permission here will also be requested -- Andre Gide, Ralph Bunche (important, for no Negro was nominated in Berlin), Carl Zuckmayer, Salvador de Madariaga......among many others.

c. International Committee of 25: At the Berlin sessions the following were nominated -- (1) Ignazio Silone; (2) David Rousset; (3) Arthur Koestler; (4) Carlo Schmid; (5) Irving Brown; (6) Julian Amery; (7) Haakon Lie; (8) James Burnham; (9) Sidney Hook; (10) Nicolas Nabokov; (11) Eugen Kogon; (12) Theodor Plievier; (13) Herbert Read; (14) Denis de Rougemont; (15) Lionello Venturi; (16) Boris Nicolaevsky; (17) Karel Kupka; (18) Josef Czapski; (19) Margarete Buber-Neumann; (20) Andre Philip..... These were all present and are confirmed. The following were nominated and still have to be informed, and confirmed; (21) Richard Crossman; (22) Francois Mauriac; (23) Pablo Casals (for the "Sponsors"?); (24) Thornton Wilder; (25) Oskar Pollak; and (26) Salvador de Madariaga ("Sponsor"?).

d. Executive Committee of 5: This consists of the first five named above -- Silone, Rousset, Koestler, Brown, and Schmid (who has definitely accepted, and thus taken the place of Kogon).

2. It was decided to hold the first meeting of the CONGRESS Executive Committee during the first week in September in Paris. It will probably be desirable to hold several informal meetings before then in order to work out the outline and details of a functioning CONGRESS plan.

3. Urgent problem facing the CONGRESS by September is the working out of a legal or constitutional basis of the permanent CONGRESS organization. Who are "members"? How is the International Committee to be maintained; how are additions, substractions, changes in this and the Executive Committee to be made? Who invites to the next Congress, and who "votes"? A number of proposals should be considered before a final Memorandum is presented. This should be done in conjunction with the man who will probably be General-Secretary and/or Executive Director of the CONGRESS.

4. It is suggested that the original title be kept and made permanent — namely, CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM/KONGRESS FUER KULTURELLE FREIHEIT/CONGRESS POUR LA LIBERTE DE LA CULTURE. The use of the word "CONGRESS" in such connection has its parallel both with the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) in the USA, and with the Congress Party in India.

5. A provisional plan for the organization of the CONGRESS should be worked out, less in the expectation that it will be immediately set up than in the hope that within the next six months it can be more and more realized. The following sketch is submitted:

CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM

Honorary Chairman
Sponsors

International Committee of 25

Executive Committee of 5

General Secretary

Executive Director
Editorial Director
Research Director
Paris Bureau Director
Berlin Bureau Director

Exec. Asst.
Edit. Asst.
Research Asst.

Stenographer
Translator

Typist

In the light of this table of organization, several provisional appointments could be made in order to get CONGRESS activities working immediately, e.g. appointment of Frau Buber-Neumann as executive of the Berlin bureau; appointment of Francois Bondy as Editorial Director; appointment of somebody like Richard Loewenthal as Research Director. The urgencies will become clearer below.

II ACTIVITIES

1. Publications Project: the immediate editing of a volume on the founding Berlin CONGRESS. Most of the material is already available in three languages: French, English, and German. This will be completed in the next month by the transitional CONGRESS Bureau in Berlin. Norbert Muhlen is assisting in putting out the special double number of "Der Monat" on the Congress, which may be a kind of "experimental model". Francois Bondy is returning to work out a table of contents and an editorial approach to the Congress volume.

2. Pamphlet Project: the immediate preparation and publication in many languages of a simple straight forward brochure (12-24) pages on "What is the Congress for Cultural Freedom?" It should be illustrated; should tell the story of the Berlin sessions; should print the Manifesto of Intellectual Liberty (and possibly a revised improved Message to the East); should outline a plan of Congress work to be followed and point to the future. This is essential for CONGRESS sympathizers, for the press, for the public in general. The Editorial Director (Bondy) can be assigned to prepare a draft for revision and approval in September.

3. Investigation Project: the first of a series of White Book reports on the situation of cultural freedom. Silone has recommended, and the CONGRESS has announced, a documented account of the Writer, Artist, and Scientist in the countries behind the Iron Curtain (an account which the UNESCO, because of its governmental connections, cannot do). An immediate beginning should be made with the appointment of a Research Chief for this project, responsible for working out an editorial plan, contacting sources for information; this project chief should have the sociological and journalistic qualifications of men like Loewenthal and Muhlen (and Peter de Mendelssohn).

4. Protest Project: the CONGRESS should, with the specific signatures of its leading supporters, keep in the forefront of public attention by taking up via the press, open meetings, debates, etc., cases of flagrant violations of the principles of the CONGRESS as stated in the Manifesto and other documents. The CONGRESS cannot, to be sure, become an international civil-liberties union, but it can speak out on special issues (purge of a University, liquidation of a scientist, arrest of a writer, etc.).

5. Break-away Project: the CONGRESS should by means both of information and agitation keep alive the difference between those who are choosing freedom and those who are willingly or unknowingly supporting totalitarianism and its deceptions. The dramatic defection of Prof. Alfred Kober during the Congress Berlin session from the Soviet-controlled Academy of Science is an example of what can be done; this specific German movement is gathering strength; there have been another half-dozen resignations, and the news is spreading in Eastern Germany. This has also involved the world-famous

Charite hospital in Eastern Berlin, almost 3/4 of the distinguished medical specialists are ready to break away, and we are now hoping to reach some constructive arrangement by which they can maintain themselves in West-Berlin. This type of activity — ranging from welcoming prominent individuals from the East, to sheltering groups and institutions, and beginning with initial private contact — can transform the CONGRESS from a group of spokesmen for the libertarian ideal into "activists for freedom".

6. Radio-Broadcasting Project: inaugurating a special series of radio programs to be prepared by the CONGRESS. Liaison should be established with RIAS, the Free Europe network, the French, Austrian, German and British stations, including the Voice of America. Plans have been started for the first series — namely, "Dialogues Across the Curtain"; a dozen 'open-letters' — Koestler to Seghers and Brecht, other to Becher, Eisler, Lukacs, Lysenko, Tarle, Ehrenburg, et. al. -- personalized messages of five-minutes (less in hateful opposition, more in open-hearted pity). This would be a practical follow-up to the CONGRESS' "Message to the East". These could be published in various newspapers; later in small book-form.

7. Annual Prize-Award Project: the CONGRESS should award each year a number of CONGRESS prizes to various personalities for distinctive services and contributions to the cause of Cultural Freedom. This could be given on the basis of a new book, a career, or some special activities. Two types can be distinguished: the Nobel-Prize model, and the University Stipend. The latter would enable the recipient (an American, a Frenchman) to spend four weeks in Berlin, giving a series of 5 CONGRESS lectures at the Free University, later to be printed as a special CONGRESS volume. (This is equally true of an English recipient at Heidelberg, a German at the New School in N.Y.C., a Frenchman at the London School of Economics, etc.)

8. Publishing-House Project: this could be a modestly-conceived annex to the CONGRESS Berlin-Bureau, which would actually bring out the CONGRESS volumes (indicated above). It would also publish the pamphlets and brochures mentioned. It would consider the popular cultural-political library (the Birkenfeld proposal). It could be the house to which "Der Monat" would go, if and when this monthly becomes completely independent. It would gradually build up its own list of authors from among prominent CONGRESS writers (Koestler, et. al.) The Publishing-House could be started from the existing transitional CONGRESS bureau now functioning in Berlin; the Bureau-Director, or the Executive Assistant, could be charged with the responsibilities of a normal international Publisher in Germany (incorporation as a G.m.b.H., and the like).

9. News-Letter Project: immediate plans for a fortnightly communication to all CONGRESS sympathizers, the press, etc. should be started, completed. A 2-4 page mimeographed information-bulletin will keep alive CONGRESS interest.

III SOME LARGE-SCALE LONG-RANGE PROPOSALS

1. Film Proposal: a series of CONGRESS documentary films, possibly produced in connection with other organizations. Suggestion for a first film: a full-length feature on World-Communism, a script for which (The Hammer & The Sickle") has been outlined by M.J. Lasky and Stuart Schulberg (one of the leading U.S. documentary-makers, who would most probably be available in Europe for it). These could have normal commerical distribution, special schools, and universities distribution.

2. Lecture-Tour Proposal: building up a circuit throughout western-Europe, the United States, and elsewhere, for political and cultural CONGRESS speakers.

3. Research-Institute Proposal: this could be a normal and logical outgrowth of the first CONGRESS research activities. It would mean the establishment of a "Chatham House" on an international basis for serious studies of the cultural-political problems of our day. Scholars and journalists, on the basis of specific assignments and awards, could be associated with CONGRESS activities. This would be linked with the Paris and Berlin bureaus of the CONGRESS, with such international reviews as are affiliated with the CONGRESS (Der Monat", etc.), and with the CONGRESS Publishing House.

4. University Proposal: a centre for Eastern exile professor and students, either in the form of an independent academic institution (the Czapski resolution) -- or perhaps in the more practical form of scholarships for the exiled students, and university chairs for the scholars — both is existing European and American academic institutions (Berlin Free University, Sorbonne, Zurich, Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, etc.).

5. School-for-Freedom Proposal: the organization, at first on a very modest summer-school-type basis, of a "George Orwell School for Freedom" (Hochschule fuer Freiheit), in which special courses and seminars in the political and cultural problems of our day could be given. Students could be invited (and thus give the youth some measure of intellectual training): leading publicists and officials could participate. This could be associated with the Research Institute (whose researchers become teachers and participants in the School Sessions), and with the University Project. "Congress cadres" could be developed here.

6. Proposal for Other National Bureaus: expanding into other European capital cities -- Stockholm for Scandinavia, Vienna for the Balkans, Rome for the Mediterranean, New York and Havana for North and South America. It will, in any case, probably become imperative to establish a sub-Bureau in New York City for the next period, so that American public opinion is not neglected.

TOP SECRET

17 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MESSRS. LINDSAY
BAKER

SUBJECT: Berlin Congress of intellectuals (Congress for Cultural Freedom).

1. Thank you for obtaining the attached copy of General Magruder's estimate of the above mentioned operation which I note was given in a memorandum of transmittal to Secretary Johnson. I have furnished a copy of this estimate to Mr. Joyce who I understand will show it to certain significant people in the State Department.

2. I think that all persons concerned with this operation are entitled to the heartiest congratulations and if you have not already done so, I should appreciate your passing on the substance of General Magruder's appraisal to the field. I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Thompson, who I assume will pass on the word to the members of his staff who played a role in this operation.

F.G.W.

FGW:lgw
Att:
TS 42664

Distribution:
#1 - EE & EE-3
#2 - SP
#3 & 4 - III/RE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION [illegible]
Secret
BY
Eric Jones
EE/[illegible] and 10
12 May 58

TOP SECRET ~~42666~~ 1 of 4

~~TOP~~ SECRET

C
O
P
Y

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Congress for Cultural Freedom - an OPC organized accomplishment.

This is an Operational Report of an actual accomplishment. It is a subtle covert operation carried out on the highest intellectual level. It is unconventional warfare at its best in which the objectives are men's minds. It is the opening operation of a continuing campaign.

The origin and purposes are stated in Section I. The details in organizing a delicate operation of this nature are only hinted in this report, but enough is expressed to arouse admiration for the principal operatives.

The report is already too condensed for briefing. I urgently recommend that you scan the whole of it.

John Magruder

C
O
P
Y

Secret

For Jones + IOA
CE/G
15 May 58

2 2

~~[illegible]~~
Series 0

Sanitized
COPY

SECRET

12 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. Bumstead, Stribling, and Ragsdale

FROM : Charles Olmstead

SUBJECT : Confidential Report Received By Schiller on Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom

1. When Mr. Stribling's shop requested me, at the behest of a cable request of Mr. Hambley, to attempt to appease Schiller in connection with his indignation for the manner in which Max Yergin, the American Negro, had been handled in Berlin, Schiller reacted in the manner described in my earlier memorandum on this subject, which was on the whole satisfactory. He has since received a complete report from a reliable and competent observer at the Berlin Congress which I am quoting below:

"On the whole, the Congress has achieved some useful results. In my opinion, the best thing about the Congress was that it was held in Berlin. A Congress in Paris, in Switzerland or in any other place would have had neither the same political significance nor would it have received the same publicity. For the Berliners, the fact that Berlin was chosen as the meeting place was renewed proof of Western solidarity with their resistance against the Russians. They need such proof again and again, especially in view of the fact that they have a definite and justified impression that the Bonn Government is not inclined to manifest any particular fervor as far as help for the Berlin population is concerned.

"The Congress, moreover, has been a success inasmuch as it showed the determination of an important group of intellectuals, scholars, and artists to leave no longer unchallenged Communist attempts to dominate the scene through their various "cultural" front organisations. The permanent machinery established by the Congress for the purpose of continuing its work may be of great importance provided that certain conditions are observed in its activities.

"The following critical remarks regarding certain phases and features of the work of the Congress should not be construed as an attempt to deny the fact that the Congress has achieved a useful purpose. Nor is this criticism made from a perfectionist point of view. However, while it is admitted that in a gathering of artists, scholars, and writers, many of whom tend to display prima-donna attitudes and a spirit of coterie, a certain amount of friction is inevitable, it cannot be said that everything was done to reduce such frictions to a minimum. As a result, many delegates whom I had an opportunity to ask for their impressions of the Congress, left Berlin with mixed feelings, some of them not without a certain amount of disappointment.

attachment to
[illegible] 2 [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible] file

"While the organisation of the Congress was excellent as far as the technical side was concerned, (hotels, public meetings, receptions, press interviews, etc.), the debates of the Congress took place under conditions which showed a considerable lack of imagination and ignorance of parliamentary procedure on the part of those responsible for the way in which the business of the Congress was transacted. Skeggs, Muhlen, and Bondy are certainly nice fellows with the best intentions. However, they seem to have had no previous experience at all ~~on~~ how to run a conference.

"All delegates had been asked to prepare papers on various subjects. It was obviously impossible to have all those papers read in the public meetings of the Congress (they were mimeographed and will be distributed). It was necessary to make a selection of topics and speakers. The best method would have been to appoint a steering committee which would have made this necessary selection with the maximum of objectivity. Unfortunately, this was not done. Instead, the question of who was to speak and how long was decided by Skeggs and his associates who did it in a rather arbitrary and haphazard manner. To explain what I mean let me cite a few examples: First, the case of our friend, Max Yergin. Together with Max we worked rather hard on his paper (one night we had no more than two hours sleep). The final product received rather favorable comments from Hambley and Arthur Schlesinger. I tried to make Skeggs understand the importance of having Communist propaganda regarding the Negro problem answered and refuted by a competent person who is a Negro himself. Skeggs first promised me that Yergin would have fifteen minutes speaking time. When we arrived at the meeting where Max was scheduled to speak, he was told that he would not get more than ten minutes. We went to work again, and deleted some passages so as to have a ten-minute text. However, when Max was about to take the floor, he was informed by Bondy that he should not speak longer than five minutes. As a result, Max got confused and delivered a completely inadequate version of what he originally wanted to say. Similarly, Sascha Schwarz was prevented from making a report on the situation of the working class in Russia. Nor did the delegate from Spain and the one and only representative of Latin-America to the Congress have a chance to speak.

"On the other hand, Koestler spoke four or five times and there was generally a marked tendency to build him up as a kind of praeceptor mundi. He seems to have enjoyed himself in the role of a task-master censoring and lecturing the delegates. As far as I gathered from a conversation with Skeggs, Koestler was given this prominent place because, due to the fact that as a well-known writer, his pronouncements were supposed to attract public attention in a greater measure than speeches by other delegates. The same consideration was evidently applied in the case of Silone. However, Silone seemed to be anxious to be as non-committal as possible, quite in line with his ambiguous political attitude. While Skeggs' preoccupation with problems of publicity is understandable, I do not think that the method of treating authors according to the sales of their books is apt to promote a lasting cooperation among writers, scholars, etc. For once, scholars will never be able to sell as many copies of their books as Koestler.

SECRET

"At a certain moment, the debates took a very unfortunate turn. On one of the frequent occasions, when Koestler was given the floor, he read a paper wherein he attacked Socialism in general and the British Labor Government in particular. Considering 1) that about 70% of the delegates were people who professed socialist opinions; 2) that the purpose of the Congress required that a unity of all democratic intellectuals, both socialists and non-socialists in the struggle against totalitarianism be emphasized and 3) that the chairman of the Congress was Ernst Reuter, head of the social-democratic city government of Berlin -- Koestler's attack was absolutely out of place and should not have been made regardless of whether he was right or not. As a matter of fact, the paper in question proved that Koestler is mistaken in assuming that a brilliant journalist and a successful novelist is eo ipso qualified to play the role of a philosopher, historian and sociologist. In addition, mistaken statements by British Labor regarding the problem of European unity do not justify in my opinion the kind of vitriolic all-out attack against the British Labor Government which was made by Koestler who seems to have forgotten, that, regardless what one may think of some of its policies, British Labor is today one of the principal pillars of the world democratic front.

"Evidently Koestler's attack provoked immediate reaction on the part of the Socialist Congress delegates, beginning with Reuter who was in the chair. In my opinion, this entire discussion was completely unnecessary. The British conservative M. P., Amery, showed much better judgment than Koestler by studiedly avoiding in his pronouncements, any criticism of the Labor Government. If an attitude similar to that of Koestler would have been adopted in the trade union field, the I.C.F.T.U. could not have been created. As in the labor movement, the organization of intellectuals for the defense of democracy cannot be successful unless it is understood that democratic socialism is a powerful influence among the best intellectuals of Europe and Asia and that, therefore, everything should be done to secure cooperation of all democratic forces in spite of all ideological differences. I was rather astonished to find that Irving seemed to like Koestler's discourse on socialism. I spoke with quite a number of delegates and found that they didn't like it at all.

"Instead of appointing on the first and second days of the Congress a resolution Committee which would have been able to work seriously on any draft resolutions, proposals and suggestions made by the delegates, a draft manifesto and draft resolution were submitted to a plenary meeting which had to decide on them within a few hours. That meeting appointed some committees who had exactly one hour's time to amend the resolutions. Of course, no serious work of re-writing and completing the resolutions could be done under such circumstances. You will notice that the manifesto treats the question of cultural freedom principally from the point of view of the journalist and less from that of the scholar and the artists. At least this is my opinion. A draft appeal to the intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain, which was submitted by Skeggs, evoked an immediate sharp criticism on the part of the Polish and Russian delegates. The committee on which they were represented, amended it. However, later on not the amended text which was adopted by the Congress but the original draft was released to the press, thus creating additional resentment.

"Yergin was not in a happy mood when he left. A public meeting had been arranged for him and Schyler where they read their papers in full. However, they did not like the way they were treated insofar as speaking time at the Congress meetings was concerned and Max made remarks to the effect that now the Communists will say they had been jim-crowed since they had to present their case in a special meeting. They also resented the fact that the permanent committee elected by the Congress does not contain any representative of the colored race. It would, of course, have been difficult to appoint one of them to the committee since the representation of the United States was limited on purpose so as not to create the impression of American domination. However, the right of cooptation granted by the Congress to the permanent committee should be used to introduce as soon as possible in the committee intellectuals from India, Japan and other non-white areas.

"Some of the papers read at the Congress were excellent, for instance those of Prof. Muller (Schiller's man) and Arthur Schlesinger to name only a few. As far as the future work of the movement initiated by the Congress is concerned, certain things should be taken into account to make possible the full use of existing possibilities which are quite favorable. 1) Representatives of Asia and possibly Africa should be drawn into the work of the committee. 2) All due respect for literary fame, the organs of the new movement should not become a platform for the peculiar ambitions of certain individuals whatever their gifts and talents. 3) While among the intellectuals it will probably be impossible to avoid discussion of so-called ideological problems, the purpose of such discussions should not be the struggle of rival ideologies, but the finding out of the points and areas where advocates of different ideologies may meet for cooperation in the defense of democracy against totalitarianism. 4) Establishment of contacts with other movements engaged in the struggle against totalitarianism, especially in the labor movement. 5) Better organization of the work of future congresses and conferences.

"The Congress undoubtedly reflected the progress made during the last year as far as the attitude of European intellectuals is concerned. There is no trace of neutralistic attitudes in the resolutions of the Congress. The same cannot be said of all the speeches. However, no openly neutralistic speech was made at the Congress. The only paper advocating a neutralist attitude was withdrawn by its author, the Austrian physicist, Thyrring, when he heard of the Russian attack on Southern Korea. I wouldn't say that people like Rousset and especially Silone are quite clear about the present world situation, particularly as far as military defense against Russia is concerned, however, they wisely refrained from any openly neutralistic statements.

"On the whole, it can be said of the Congress that all is well that ends well. The criticism made above is not intended to contradict this general favorable impression."

2. I find on reading and rereading this criticism, that it is, in general, sound and sensible. I should like to request that particular attention be paid to the latter part of the memorandum in which five recommendations are made with regard to the future work of the movement initiated by the Berlin Congress. I should also like to draw particular attention to the reaction to the behavior of David Rousset and Ignazio Silone. This is one further indication for justification that Rousset must be constantly and thoroughly watched with a critical eye.

2

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: SP/Kelley 12 July 50

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. SP/NV		14 July	19 July	RBY	
2.					
3. Thompson		7/17	7/20	SPK/LT	
4.					
5.					
6. Glaser					
7.					
8.					
9. SP/NV					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

[illegible] U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

10 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. Thompson and Glaser

FROM: Charles Olmstead O.

SUBJECT: Berlin Intellectual Congress

1. I wish to refer to Mr. Glaser's informal memorandum with regard to the mishandling of the American Negro, Max Yergin, at the Berlin Intellectual Congress.

2. When I informed Schiller that I wished to discuss this matter with him he proceeded to read to me a letter which he had just received from Berlin giving a rather full report on the Berlin Congress and which contained a great deal of information. Among the items reported on therein was the incident regarding Max Yergin. I explained to Schiller that it was a most difficult task to control the group of assorted Europeans who attended the Berlin Congress and sufficient time was not given, therefore, to United States delegates, but that Yergin's excellent speech, which had been cut off the radio at the microphone, was being widely used in press, radio, book and pamphlet form.

3. Schiller accepted this explanation, but in closing our discussion of this subject, wise-cracked that our boys in Berlin did not include Yergin on any social doings and closed his remarks with the statement that "even intellectuals like Burnham don't like to sit down and eat with Negroes." I chided him briefly and there the matter was closed.

SECRET

SE..F [redacted]

Informal memo.

Can you communicate this information to C.O. - as soon as practicable? (I will do so, if you prefer.)

A cable from Jim Burnham, states that Max Yergin was not satisfied with the way he was handled at the Cultural Congress in Berlin.

His complaints:

His speech - described as "excellent" - was cut off at the microphone.

He did not, apparently, receive the kind of attention he thought was due him.

He is expected to make an adverse report to Schiller.

Burnham would like Offie to appease Schiller by assuring him that the staff of the Congress had their hands full trying to control the bunch of assorted Europeans there, and could not give sufficient time and attention to US delegates. And that they intend to use Yergin's excellent material in press, radio, book and pamphlet form, giving it wide distribution. In comparison to this, Burnham considers the actual promulgation at the sessions of the Congress a minor matter.

[redacted]

SECRET

Congress for Cultural Freedom

Congrès pour la liberté de la culture ★ *Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit*

Berlin, Germany—June 26-30, 1950

International Committee:
Benedetto Croce
John Dewey
Karl Jaspers
Jacques Maritain
Bertrand Russell

GENERAL SECRETARY:
Melvin J. Lasky
Hotel am Steinplatz,
Berlin-Charlottenberg,
Germany

PUBLIC RELATIONS:
Arnold Beichman
20 West 40th St., New York City
CHickering 4-3060
LOngacre 5-3344

June 29, 1950

Colonel Louis Glaser
3051 Idaho Avenue NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Glaser:

Thanks for the testimonial. I am enclosing a copy of our financial statement to date. You will note that our expenses, exclusive of the books, were $917.05. However, this does not include our June telephone bill for phone calls and cables. I am skipping town tomorrow before the laurel wreath turns into a brickbat.

The files and left-over stationery are being stored at Freedom House pending our decision on future activities. Mr. Beichman has the check book and will pay the telephone bill and refund the balance when Jim returns.

My summer address will be 115 East Chester Street, Long Beach, L.I. Jim may want to contact me. I hope somebody will send me copies of the resolutions passed at the Congress. Will you please remind Jim for me?

Sincerely,

Pearl Kluger

Pearl Kluger

4-00000

CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM

Statement

As of June 30, 1950

Income					
Melvin J. Lasky				$200.00	
James Burnham	5/25	$500.00			
	6/ 8	500.00			
	6/12	218.36			
		4.82			
	6/20	300.00		1,523.18	
Total Income					$1,723.18
Expenses					
Clipping Service				30.60	
Printing - stationery				42.33	
Rent - Freedom House				150.00	
Salary				400.00	
Books - University Pl. Bookshop		263.53			
(Parcel Post) " " "		128.00	391.53		
- Pearl Kluger		4.82			
(Parcel Post "		14.70	19.52		
				411.05	
Multigraphing and Mimeographing				40.80	
Telephone - June 1 bill				20.75	
Telegrams and Cables (paid in Cash)					
To Newspapers for press conference			38.00		
To Lasky			2.87		
				40.87	
Military Permits (Muller, Stone, Schlesinger)				11.00	
Postage (incl. mailing photographs, clippings, etc. to Berlin)				51.35	
Western Union - Messenger Service				4.35	
Arnold Beichman - Expenses				100.00	
Miscellaneous - Phone calls, taxis, fare, office supplies, etc.				25.00	
*Total Expenses as of June 30, 1950					1,328.10
Balance in Bank					$ 395.08

*This does not include the June telephone bill

TO: MR. GLASER

28 June 1950

FROM: MR. MILLARD

"I talked with Allen ~~Douglas~~ dulles who stated that he knew nothing of this man's executive ability, that he does not know of any position he has held where that might have been exerted and added that he might be wrong on this factor. Stated further that he knew him as a very brilliant writer. With reference to his political idealism, ~~Douglas~~ Dulles stated that he believed he was a Socialist and a little to the left; however, this factor was temperate with the statement that with regard to Fascist or Communist, he was definitely anti-Nazi and he believed tha he was anti-Communist. He continued by saying that he was a man of high character and that he personally liked him but that he would not consider him for an executive secretary's position. With further reference to the last point, he mentioned that he was basing this on the fact that he did not know of any executive position that the individual had held."

File ~~[illegible]~~ copy with m[illegible] cables referring [illegible] 'Berlin 3019' [illegible] 30500

(WASH 8258 - Out 59168)

PDQUICK

VE 3

Taken verbatim - [illegible]

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: EE III

NO.

DATE 28 June 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Mr Ellis 2706	[illegible]			WR	The cable substance: attached was sub-
2.					mitted 27 June by your office
3.					Mr. Schreyer, combining your cable with one
4.					prepared by EE III [illegible] the attached
5.					cable to [illegible]
6.					and [illegible] [illegible] subject to your agreement.
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

1. JONATHAN S. GEARING HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED COORDINATE DETAILS OF PDQUICK. NO FURTHER ACTION NECESSARY YOUR STATION.

Congress for Cultural Freedom

Congrès pour la liberté de la culture ★ *Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit*

Berlin, Germany—June 26-30, 1950

International Committee:

Benedetto Croce
John Dewey
Karl Jaspers
Jacques Maritain
Bertrand Russell

GENERAL SECRETARY:

Melvin J. Lasky
Hotel am Steinplatz,
Berlin-Charlottenberg,
Germany

PUBLIC RELATIONS:

Arnold Beichman
20 West 40th St., New York City
CHickering 4-3060
LOngacre 5-3344

June 27, 1950

Colonel Louis Glaser
3051 Idaho Avenue NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Glaser:

Walter Mehring finally got off last night. There was no room on Saturday's plane for which he stood by, but he was scheduled to take a Sunday morning plane. Due to some mechanical difficulty, that plane did not leave until last night. The American Express Co. was unofficially informed that as a result of President Truman's intervention all other planes were chartered for the stranded students. I even spoke to Mr. Buttles about getting Mr. Mehring on one of the chartered planes if the scheduled flight did not get off last night. If Mehring, too, did not turn up our counter-Grosz campaign would have looked bad. I therefore felt that he mustleave even if it meant being present at only part of the Congress.

I received a letter from George Grosz which I requested when I spoke to Mrs. Grosz:

"Here is my statement:
I regret not to be able to attend the Congress for Cultural Freedom. My reasons are entirely personal. I am delighted with your efforts to mobilize Art and scientists of the world for Freedom and Peace."

I cabled the text of the statement, signed with his name, to Berlin; and airmailed the letter and envelope to them.

Unfortunately Middleton of the Times is on vacation from Berlin. We seem to be getting better coverage in the Herald-Tribune, which has a by-line correspondent on the job.

Adolph Berle, as Chairman of the Liberal Party, cabled greetings to the Congress.

If anything goes wrong with the fruit crop in Berlin or anyplace in Europe for that matter, they'll probably blame it on Muller's fruit flies.

Sincerely

Pearl Kluger

7 D9118

x

CONFIDENTIAL

HICOG,

FRANKFORT.

PEPCO.

Since material upcoming from Berlin Cultural Congress likely have great propaganda value in combatting SOV peace campaign and other SOV efforts in psychological field, DEPT desires arrangements be made for complete photo and literary coverage with view obtaining manuscript and pictorial files basic to PUB in major languages not only in GER but other countries.

Suggest Dalcher now on TDY from DEPT with ISD, OPA, visit Berlin during Congress to study Congress output for PUB possibilities in US. To coordinate with ECA on PUB in other EUR countries, Lasky, Josselson or other qualified officer SHLD confer with Waldemar Nielsen Hotel Talleyrand, Paris after WED June 21.

CODE ROOM: Repeat HICOG, BERLIN, PEPCO, as_______.

GER:GAI:EPE[illegible] 6/19/50 P - MacKnight

CONFIDENTIAL

June 21, 1950

Dear Mr. Glaser:

I am enclosing herewith two letters received from American Express and copy of answer as per our telephone conversations.

RM Woods

Rose Mary Woods

FOREIGN SERVICE EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION
1906 FLORIDA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

June 14, 1950

American Express Company
65 Broadway
New York, New York

ATTENTION: Mr. O. J. Gilmore

Dear Mr. Gilmore:

Thank you for your letter of June 13, 1950. This will authorise you to arrange for the side trip to Stockholm as requested by Mr. Burnham and charge same to our account.

Sincerely yours,

Philip H. Watts
Vice President

rw

AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY

TRAVEL DEPARTMENT
B. E. WHITE
VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER
W. F. FOX
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT AND
PASSENGER TRAFFIC MANAGER
GERARD J. GILMORE
ASSISTANT PASSENGER TRAFFIC MANAGER

TRAVELERS CHEQUES
MONEY ORDERS FOREIGN REMITTANCES
TRAVEL AND FOREIGN SHIPPING

65 BROADWAY
NEW YORK 6, N. Y
CABLE ADDRESS: TOURAMEX

June 13, 1950

Mr. Philip H. Watts, Vice President
Foreign Service Educational Foundation
1906 ~~Florida~~ Avenue, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Mr. Watts:

Re: Congress for Cultural Freedom

In connection with the travel to the Congress for Cultural Freedom which you are sponsoring for Mr. and Mrs. James Burnham, the servicing office has advised us that Mr. Burnham has requested a side trip to Stockholm.

Will you kindly advise us whether this additional transportation is for the account of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation or for the account of the passengers.

Sincerely yours,

G. J. Gilmore
Ass't. Passenger Traffic Manager

GJG:BP:ret

6/14/50 [illegible] — 9376)
Called [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

1850 — 100th Anniversary — 1950

FOREIGN SERVICE EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION
1906 FLORIDA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

June 21, 1950

Mr. G. J. Gilmore
Assistant Passenger
Traffic Manager
American Express Company
65 Broadway
New York 6, New York

Dear Mr. Gilmore:

Re: CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM
Mr. Elliot Cohen, Editor
Commentary Magazine

Your letter of June 16th with regard to the above matter was on my desk upon my return to the city this morning.

Mr. Cohen is entitled to transportation and if you have not supplied him with any other transportation then we have no objection to your reimbursing Mrs. Cohen for Mr. Cohen's ticket on the S. S. Queen Elizabeth.

Sincerely yours,

Philip H. Watts
Vice President

AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY

TRAVEL DEPARTMENT
R. E. WHITE
Vice President and General Manager
W. F. FOX
Assistant Vice President and Passenger Traffic Manager
GERARD J. GILMORE
Assistant Passenger Traffic Manager

Travelers Cheques
Money Orders - Foreign Remittances
Travel and Foreign Shipping

65 BROADWAY,
NEW YORK 6, N. Y.
CABLE ADDRESS: TOURAMEX

June 16, 1950

SPECIAL DELIVERY

Mr. Martin K. Williams
Foreign Service Educational Foundation
1906 Florida Avenue, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Mr. Williams:

Re: CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM
Mr. Elliot Cohen, Editor
Commentary Magazine

On May 22 the Foreign Service Educational Foundation authorized American Express to provide round trip transportation between New York City and Berlin to Mr. Cohen. The delegate advised us that air transportation would be unacceptable and that, because of commitments in New York, the only steamship sailing to which he could agree was the S. S. QUEEN ELIZABETH due to leave New York after last midnight.

Space on eastbound sailings at this season is at a premium, and on this particular one has been sold out for a considerable time, being actually under ticket. We exerted our best efforts in behalf of Mr. Cohen, but were unable to come up with the desired space. Mr. Cohen, on the recommendation of the line, we understand, attended the departure of the ship in the event that a passenger would be unable to sail and space be made available at the last moment.

An odd berth did become available in this manner and it was allotted to Mr. Cohen. The passenger borrowed from accomodating friends and made payment directly to the line. Will you authorize us to reimburse Mr. Cohen for funds he expended for his eastbound passage?

It would be of great assistance if we could have your reply on Monday.

Sincerely yours,

G. J. Gilmore

G. J. Gilmore
Asst. Passenger Traffic Manager

please turn over

P. S. Since dictating the foregoing letter, I have been advised by Miss Kluger of the local New York office of the Congress for Cultural Freedom that it is Mr. Cohen's wish that reimbursement be made to Mrs. Cohen. I presume this arrangement will be agreeable to you should you find the reimbursement in order.

Congress for Cultural Freedom

Congrès pour la liberté de la culture ★ *Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit*

Berlin, Germany—June 26-30, 1950

International Committee:
BENEDETTO CROCE
JOHN DEWEY
KARL JASPERS
JACQUES MARITAIN
BERTRAND RUSSELL

GENERAL SECRETARY:
Melvin J. Lasky
Hotel am Steinplatz,
Berlin-Charlottenberg,
Germany

PUBLIC RELATIONS:
Arnold Beichman
20 West 40th St., New York City
CHickering 4-3060
LOngacre 5-3344

June 23, 1950

Colonel Louis Glaser
3051 Idaho Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Glaser:

Report from Berlin: The story is Groszly exaggerated. The Stalinists have not even mentioned the Congress for the last two weeks. Berlin is seething over the Congress; the city is plastered with it.

Report from New York: Harold Lavine of Newsweek, at our instigation, spoke to Grosz who said that he is an artist, that he received numerous communications from the Eastern section of Germany about the Congress; that he is an artist and that he can't be bothered getting involved in so much correspondence. Newsweek will carry the story next week. Will Lissner of the Times is also interested.

Kempton did not carry the story; he was sidetracked by the distressing tale of the young girl Progressive Partyite who discovered the PP is not exactly democratic (her branch refused to hear Rogge on Tito). But the fruit flies made Lyons' column (enclosed). Did you see yesterday's N.Y. Herald-Tribune? There was a good story on the Congress by Joseph Newman from Berlin. I have only one copy; if I can get another, I will forward it.

Walter Mehring has his military permit for Berlin; I hope that by this time he has cleared his income tax statements for the last three years with the Treasury Dept. (he is an alien), but as I haven't heard from him for the last three hours, presumably things are going well. The American Express Company is working on his ticket.

Tomorrow the last of the delegates are off. I will be around to answer any press inquiries during the week of the Congress and then will close the office. I think the delegates can do their own worrying about the rubbers they left in Berlin.

I feel just like Cinderella — who never got to the ball.

Sincerely,

Pearl Kluger
Pearl Kluger

14-00000

SECRET

23 June 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

SUBJECT: OPC Operations in Connection with Whitsun Communist Youth Demonstration in Berlin

1. At the request of the Departments of State and Defense, we had asked the Chief of the OPC German station to obtain a statement from General Maxwell D. Taylor, U. S. Commandant in Berlin, as to the effectiveness of the subject operations.

2. The cablegram from Lawrence De Neufville, Chief of OPC German Mission, dated 22 June, stated that General Taylor had asked Mr. De Neufville to convey his appreciation in the following terms:

a. "It has been of most positive value to my headquarters to know that lines of action outlined by our propaganda authorities have been disseminated throughout the Soviet Zone by a group such as yours." The success of the OPC mission in distributing over one million pieces of propaganda material before and during the Deutschlandtreffen is an achievement upon which the organization should be congratulated.

b. "Your mission is a delicate one in that you are specifically charged with avoiding attribution of your activities to any U. S. Government source or agency. This you have evidently succeeded in doing and it has been a matter of satisfaction to me to know that various matters that it was in our interest to accomplish could be performed by OPC without disclosing American interest or activity.

c. "If judgment from Berlin is of value to your organization, let me say that OPC work has proved its value during the Deutschlandtreffen. We are relying on similar or increased help from OPC in the future."

3. The German mission has advised that the original communication from General Taylor was pouched on 22 June 1950.

LOUIS GLASER
Executive for Germany, E III

EEIII/LG/far
cc: OPC Registry (2)
EEIII Chrono
EEIII Subject ✓ PD Quink
EEIII Glaser File

SECRET

File with Project

Congress for Cultural Freedom

AP Berlin June 23

While the Communists planned their youth peace rally, the Soviet-controlled press railed at a western-sponsored International Congress for Cultural Freedom assembling in this city 100 miles behind the Iron Curtain.

A vanguard of more than 100 anti-Communist intellectuals arrived today for the five-day congress which is to open Monday. Writers, scientists and political and trade-union leaders are to attend from a score of countries.

Called "Center Of Spies"

The Communist press called the delegates "chained dogs of Wall Street," "an elite of renegades and Trotskyites," and said the congress was a "center of spies" and a "congress of warmongers."

Communists also claimed supporters of the congress were to blame for a fire which swept an East Zone Communist clubhouse yesterday.

James Burnham, American author, said the congress "must proclaim positively that the Kremlin-controlled 'partisans of peace' movement, which met at Stockholm, is an utter fraud. It must show that there is only one way to peace, and that is the freedom road."

Barge Detention Denounced

Other Americans coming are David Lilienthal, former chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission; Tennessee Williams and Carson McCullers, playwrights; Robert Montgomery, actor, and Irving Brown, trade-union leader.

Meanwhile, the Russians accused British occupation officials of apparently trying to stoke up the cold war by "aggressive provocations" in the detention of 76 barges on canals in West Berlin.

~~[illegible] 24 June 50~~

Baltimore SUN 24 June 50

14-00000

with
in J. [illegible]
Project - file

CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM

U.S. Group Set For Culture Role

By Reuters

Berlin

Eight Americans distinguished in the fields of arts, science and letters will represent the United States at the "Congress for Cultural Freedom" to be held in Berlin from June 26 to 30.

They are: David Lilienthal, former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the United States Atomic Energy Commission; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., author and Harvard University professor of history; Robert Montgomery, motion picture actor; Tennessee Williams, playwright; Guiseppe A. Borgese, author; James T. Farrell, novelist; and James Burnham and Sidney Hook, authors of political and philosophical works.

Delegations from Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries also will attend the Congress.

Monitor 21 June 50

File PDQUICK

ITINERARY

June 10 to 18	Kent, Connecticut Kent 78, ring 1, 2
18 June	Leave New York
19 June	Arrive Berlin (Kongress Fur Kulturelle Freiheit) Hotel am Steinplatz Berlin Charlottenburg 2 Berlin, Germany Chase National Bank Frankun am Main Taunas Anlage 11
5 July	Leave Berlin
5 July	Arrive Stockholm (Grand Hotel)
11 July	Leave Stockholm
11 July	Arrive Brussels (Hotel Metropole)
13 July	Leave Brussels
13 July	Arrive Paris (Hotel de la Tremoille) Chase National Bank 41 rue Cambon Paris
24 July	Leave Paris
24 July	Arrive Shannon ???
29 July	Leave Shannon
30 July	Arrive New York

File PDQuick

14-00000

C O P Y

June 11, 1950

Dear Doctor,

Very happy news given in your call of yesterday. I found when I got here confirmation of our room at Hotel de la Tremoille, 14, rue de la Tremoille, scheduled for July 15-[illegible]. (The rue de la Tremoille is a short street off Ave. Francois 1er.) We shall expect to see you there and then.

I enclose from yesterday's H-T an item that you may not have seen. Our man seems to be doing just right so far.

I had last night a lengthy telephone call from William Phillips (the editor of Partisan Review who was in Paris last autumn, and who was concerned in the plan for a French edition). When Mel Lasky was here, Phillips was ill; and Mel invited Philip Rahv (his co-editor) to go to Berlin, more or less as representing Partisan Review. Rahv later turned the invitation down. An official invitation was never given to Phillips, but he had been approached informally, I believe. Last night Phillips was concerned both with Berlin and (especially) with the French magazine setup. He understands that the original idea for a French edition of P R is out, but that there is now in process a French magazine which would have a special relation to P.R. (He made a few points, in confidence, about who is supposed to be concerned in this magazine - and I, for one, am not altogether easy in my mind on the matter.)

In any case, Phillips thinks that if a special P R connection is thought of, he probably ought to be involved a bit. Specifically, if the French magazine affair is going ahead, he would like to be in Paris; and he would also like to be in Berlin. He evidently thought that if he were officially invited to Berlin, then he could go afterwards to Paris on the magazine; and he suggested that if something were going on, I could also work on it when in Paris in July.

I bring this to the attention of you and your friends. (I told Phillips that I would see in Berlin as soon as I got there how things stood. He said that he would be ready to leave at once if he were invited.)

My own opinion tends to be: 1) Phillips should not be invited merely for Berlin, since there are enough Americans; and if there are to be more, another type is more important; 2) however, Partisan Review - that is, the American connection - should be in the French magazine setup thoroughly from the beginning; 3) if, therefore, the French magazine is now going ahead, then P R should be represented before these unreliable French characters twist matters up; 4) a combination trip of Berlin and the French magazine might justify an invitation for Phillips - I gather that if he is invited to Berlin, he will finance the Paris part of his trip; 5) it may, however, be that I, as a member of P R's Advisory Board, can sufficiently represent P R at this stage, if it be in order for it to be represented.

Well, I bring this to your attention, and through you to whomever else's relevant. You might see that a comment on the matter reaches me next week in Berlin. My own hesitation in giving a definite opinion on it comes from the fact that I have not heard for many months anything about the French magazine prospect and plan.

Our friend whom Davron saw in New York seems worth pursuing at least a step or two farther. I have more or less arranged to get together with him in Paris. He apparently has one quite precise idea that, in the not too much I know about it now, sounds useful and possible.

We were delighted that Katherine and John were here.

We shall see you.

/s/ Jim

National Pre[illegible]
Washington

JEB   16 June

Present at conference in office of Asst. Secretary of State McKnight at conference today:

Messrs: McKnight
Grundahl
Kalorek
Buttles
Huddle
Neilson
Glaser

I have a complete, practically verbatim record of the meeting, but am setting down an extract of what took place.

Mr. McKnight stated that the meeting had been called to discuss ways and means of taking advantage of the Cultural Congress in Berlin by widespread dissemination of the product of the Congress, speeches, declarations, etc. Why would it not be a good idea to have Buttles communicate with Lasky and have latter send the material to Paris for publication in France, as well as here.

Mr. Neilson (ECA) said that speaking for ECA, they have a liberal view as to spending ECA funds and are anxious to cooperate with State, subject to limitations which are relevant to the present case, which are (a) expenditure to be approved on a project basis (b) a finger to be kept on the progress of expenditure (c) within certain totals (d) keep away from the flamboyant and spectacular. (For instance, no large gobs of ECA money to send US symphony orchestras touring through Europe.) Said Mr. Neilson, the Cultural Congress would fall within the zone of probable acceptability and should be a cooperative enterprise with State, to be cleared with ECA financial and legal advisers, but do not anticipate difficulty because the Cultural Congress is clearly related to the approved ECA policy of countering the Soviet peace offensive.

Mr. Buttles suggested that the best thing to do with product of Congress was to get local people to publish it; we furnish translations, paper, ink, etc.

The above suggestion led to one by Neilson that a Dissemination Committee might be formed, backed with our money. Buttles added that in addition to a more profound type job, there might be one for the unwashed public with illustrations - and extracts of speeches.

Mr. McKnight concurred, thought we needed to work out the distribution problem by use of a committeewhich would take charge of publication and distribution - in many languages. Buttles added that we should use Germans and German facilities to see that manuscripts and photos are made available.

(At this point I suggested to Buttles that there would be a question of sponsorship of material.)

McKnight and Buttles agreed that Lasky should be contacted and put in a position of discussing the matter with Neilson who is returning to Paris tonight,

Neilson added he would like to get together with Cody and other State people in Paris.

At McKnight's suggestion, Buttles said he would communicate with Lasky and ask him to come to Paris to talk about the matter with Neilson.

Following are actual quotes:

Neilson: "I don't know a great deal about this Cultural Congress, is it apt to produce a major offensive against the USSR and against the peace offensive?"

McKnight: "Yes, I think so. They are a very important bunch of people."

Kelorek: "They are big names. Very high calibre, very impressive; their discussions could be dynamite in putting over telling ideas."

Neilson then pointed out that ECA was going to be in the business of using very important organizations of all kinds in Europe (gave some Italian references) but thought that because of the temporary character of ECA such a thing as develmopment of the Cultural Congress should be turned over to State or CIA to handle and continue. (Somewhere previously I had asked Buttles, in order to make a point, whether the Congress was going to be self continuing - Bruce said he thought so.) Neilson said we should develop a full head of steam on the proposition and then should not drop out, should be continued by State through Lasky, or by CIA. (Actually was a plea for CIA to take notice of the Congress and take it over.)

McKnight then asked me if CIA was interested in the proposition as a whole. I replied it seemed very interesting. He then said if a conference was arranged in Paris would we like to have a CIA representative there, I answered I thought we might like to have someone. I then asked Buttles if he was sure Lasky would go to Paris - Buttles said he would try to arrange to have either Lasky or Josselson (which was the reply I hoped for.) He said they were both State department people, both familiar with the Congress.

In effect, that was the end of the conference. McKnight again said that CIA should certainly be cut in on the proceedings from now on because of their future interest in the Congress.

Neilson's name: WALDEMAR NEILSON

Paris address: HOTEL TALLEYRAND

Time of meeting: NEILSON REQUESTS THAT IT TAKE PLACE AFTER WEDNESDAY OF NEXT WEEK.

I suggest that a cable be sent to Mike explaining exactly what is in the wind (info to Larry.) Personally I would decide to send either Lasky AND Mike, or Mike, or Lasky and Larry, or Larry alone. They wought to be advised at once. That ECA is willing to provide funds for production of a million copies of the speeches of the Congress and other publicity. Neilson said that labor committees and other cooperative groups might be used for dissemination. However, the greatest caution must be exercised to see that a committee on publications, or words to that effect, is appointed during the sessions of the Congress, and in my opinion it should be an unwitting group, except for one member; it should NOT have more than one US representative. It MIGHT be entirely German. Again it looks as though Lasky might have to be the secretary of such a group. I think all they have to do is start a quick 'fund raising campaign' for publications - and won't they be surprised at the speed with which French, Italian, British and US organizations respond with lots of money for the purpose! Buttles and I had a quiet talk after the conference this afternoon and he is entirely in sympathy with my point of view, anxious to cooperate and not entirely sure that Lasky is the right man to go single handed to Paris. This guy Neilson is a peach. Sharp, keen, responsive and a worker - sticks out all over him.

I feel like a sheep killing dog not to stay on the job and see this through, but I've only got one son and I hope he'll only be married once. Please let me know if you need me; I will be at Hotel Fensgate, Bay State Road, Boston.

L. G.

Also — I think we should see that Burnham — or some other delegate — or several — touch on the Peace Offensive, exposing it as a swindle — which would endear the Congress all the more to State and ECA — and is well worthwhile in itself,

Sol

File PDQUICK

Memo of telephone conversation with Jim Burnham in New York

10 a.m. Thursday morning 15 June, 1950.

a. Contact with Burnham. In reply to my suggestion that I stop in New York Sat. morning to see him, discuss Congress affairs and deliver a pistol, Burnham replied that he was leaving this afternoon for his camp in Connecticut, would not return until Saturday night, was flying on Sunday morning. He suggested that there was little necessity for additional discussion of the Congress, that if any papers or articles (the pistol) were to be delivered to him, they could be sent by mail or otherwise to his NY address, care of Mrs. Claude Burnham, 3 E 69 St., telephone Rhinelander 47890; the address is a safe one, he says, with a trusted doorman on duty and a maid in the residence. (Not safe from our point of view - but presumably nothing classified is to be transmitted.) Discussed this with Smith who says he will arrange to get pistol to Burnham.

b. Between now and Sat. night, Burnham will be at his camp in Connecticut, telephone: Kent 78, Ring 1 - 2 .

c. Matter of extra expense to be allowed Pearl Kluger for gather signatures for cablegram to Congress, and for certain other incidentals connected with travel of delegates, Burnham's estimate this would not amount to more than $100. I authorized him to spend up to $150 for this purpose.

d. Matter of closing N.Y. office. I authorized continuation after July 1st only in form of one week's part time employment of Kluger, couple of hours a day and use of telephone.

e. Matter of permanent continuation of Congress office (presumably in Berlin); I said this should be discussed in Berlin, that we would expect a cablegram of recommendation before first of July, would immediately respond with a decision, possibly as to project amendment calling for funds for support of continuing office. (Impossible, I think, to anticipate decisions now as they would depend on success of Congress in attracting world publicity, furnishing base for continuing propaganda and arousing communist opposition.)

L. G.

COPY

Berlin-Charlottenburg, 12 June 1950

Dear Jim,

Thanks for letter of the 6th. Good to know that you and Marcia are due here so nice and early. Four more shoulders on which to unload the awful burden of this hard world.

What's this about not accepting the brilliant Aron-Koestler-Burnham Memo? That is now our working gospel. The International Committee lives on? No, no. It's been killed, it's dead. The five philosophers reign. The alphabetical order has come into new glory. Under separate cover you will receive the latest news from A to Z. New Correspondence paper is being printed. The program of the Congress will be the revised printed booklet which you already have.

As for the names, pretty kettle of fish you chaps fished together. We extended invitations. A few came up with affirmatives. Ayer from England, etc. Also--Jules Romains. Now that he's coming, Koestler -- via telephone yesterday -- says, oh, oh. Well, why in the world was he put on the list when he's so wishy-washy? You can't have him without letting him speak. And he's tentatively scheduled for about 10 minutes on the opening Monday program. Also, by the way, Koestler informed he won't be able to turn up even for a day before the Congress. I am writing today to ask him to plan a short opening address to round off the somewhat too ceremonial opening program with a political-keynoting speech. You might write him too, if it won't be overdoing it.

Also under separate cover, some papers that we have been sending out.

See you soon.

Yours,

MELVIN J. LASKY

Inc.

from Hotel
in Paris

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: Louis Glaser

NO.

DATE 12 June 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. MR. BAKER					PD Quick File
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1949

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

12 June 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, EE III

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction for Kenneth H. Hambley

1. Accompanying the approval of subject letter of instruction, it was requested by AIFC that I prepare a memorandum of my conversation with Mr. Richards covering arrangements for the travel of Hambley's wife.

2. On 31 May I saw Mr. Richards of Confidential Funds Division and explained the situation to him. Mr. Richards gave the following opinion:

> Mrs. Hambley may travel to the Cultural Congress, at the invitation of the Congress, in her own right, drawing money from the travel fund for the purpose of such travel without consideration of Hambley's status vis-a-vis CIA. This on the theory that whether or not Mrs. Hambley is a delegate to the Congress, her travel may be considered necessary because of services she will be expected to render, and also because her presence will protect her husband's cover. The Cultural Congress is ostensibly financially independent. It would, therefore, make any such arrangements without consideration of CIA rules regarding the travel of employees and agents.

LOUIS GLASER

EIII/LG/fdr

cc: EIII (2)

Noted
CDJ 13 June 50

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: E [illegible]

NO.

DATE 7 June 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. EE					
2. W.E.					
3. ADPC		8 June	8 June	CDH	To Ch. EE (Lindsay)
4. Ch. EE		8 June			ADPC approves the last
5.					sentence of par 1 of the
6.					attached memo of
7.					inst. on the understand-
8.					ing that it is understood
9.					by Hambley and all
10.					concerned that this action
11.					is not to be considered as
12.					establishing a precedent
13.					and that it is done
14.					solely because of the
15.					operational usefulness

of the individual (Mrs H)

over

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1948

SECRET

in this operation. ADPC also requests that Mr. Glaser prepare a memo of this conversation with Mr. Richards covering this arrangement in which Richards is understood to have stated that there was no objection to this from the point of view of CFD

7 June 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Kenneth H. Hambley

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions

1. Departure and Arrival

You will proceed on or about 19 June 1950 to Berlin, Germany, reporting upon your arrival there to the Chief of VLKiva Mission through arrangements of which you have been advised orally. En route to Berlin you are authorized to stop over in Paris if you deem such a step advisable in the furtherance of your mission. You will leave Berlin, Germany, on or about 29 June 1950 and return to the home station. En route to the home station you are authorized to stop over in Stockholm, Brussels and Paris for such amounts of time as may subsequently be approved by the home office upon your recommendation. In your visits to these European cities carefully refrain from establishing or indicating any official contact with representatives of this agency or other U. S. officials. You will be furnished travel facilities to Berlin and from Berlin to U. S., in advance, but you will be responsible for procuring all of your own travel facilities and hotel accommodations in cities which you visit en route. Authorization for this travel also extends to your wife, who has been briefed as to her operations in Berlin and also will accompany you as a matter of cover.

2. Cover

Your cover is that of a free-lance writer and lecturer visiting Berlin as a delegate to the Cultural Congress. Your general appearance and conduct at all times must be in keeping with this cover. You will not carry any classified material with you while traveling. You are not to recognize other employees of this agency unless arrangements have been made in advance or unless you can do so in full keeping with your cover. You will not attract attention to yourself either by acts uncharacteristic of your cover or by the absence of actions consistent with your cover.

3. Duties and Responsibilities

a. Operational

You have been thoroughly briefed on Project PBQUICK, and you will undertake such operational activities in connection with this project as fall within the instructions you receive from the Chief, VLKiva Mission or his authorized representative. These operational activities will be in addition to your cover responsibility as a delegate to the Cultural Congress.

b. **Security**

You are specifically charged with both physical and operational security in connection with matters which you handle and for which you are given responsibility.

David W Ragsdale

DAVID W. RAGSDALE

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO. 5-25-2d4

DATE 7 June

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. EE-III	2204	JUN 12 1950			
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					D.Zuick

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1948

SECRET

JUN 9 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

SUBJECT : Lectures at Berlin House of Culture

1. Referring to your communication of 29 May, with enclosures, we are retaining the brochure and reports concerning lectures at the Berlin House of Soviet Culture.

2. This material has value for our work, but its value is somewhat vitiated by being more than two months late.

3. In reply to your further question we are interested in receiving such schedules of Soviet-sponsored lecture series, and summaries of principal lectures as you are able to supply conveniently.

4. It would be desirable to receive schedules of lectures and other cultural events as far in advance of the projected dates as possible.

FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

EIII/CTC/mc
cc: CSO
OPC Log (2)
EIII Chrono
EIII File

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

5-44980

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	AD OPC-"K" [illegible]	CAH	31 May
2	EE 31 May	M.G.	3 June
3	EIII		
4	EE-III		
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	ADSO		
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

REMARKS:
2- For info
3- For appr. action

5 June 50

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MAY 29 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Lectures at Berlin House of Culture

1. Attached are reports and a brochure concerning lectures at the Berlin House of Soviet Culture.

2. May we ask you to inform us if this material is useful to you and if you are interested in receiving any other material of the sort that we may obtain.

ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director
Special Operations

SO DB-25432

Encl: Two

1. A Brochure Concerning Lectures at Berlin House of Culture
2. Reports Concerning Lectures at Berlin House of Culture

SECRET

MAY 29 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Lectures at Berlin House of Culture

1. Attached are reports and a brochure concerning lectures at the Berlin House of Soviet Culture.

2. May we ask you to inform us if this material is useful to you and if you are interested in receiving any other material of the sort that we may obtain.

ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director
Special Operations

SO DB-25432

Encl: Two

1. A Brochure Concerning Lectures at Berlin House of Culture
2. Reports Concerning Lectures at Berlin House of Culture

Bibliothek

(30 000 Bände, der größte Teil in deutscher Sprache)

Öffnungszeiten: täglich von 12.00 bis 20.00 Uhr (außer mittwochs),
sonntags von 16.00 bis 20.00 Uhr.

Die Bücher können im Lesesaal eingesehen bzw. für die Dauer von 10 Tagen entliehen werden.

Dem Leser stehen zur Verfügung:

Werke des Marxismus-Leninismus, Werke über die politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Entwicklung der Sowjetunion (Standardwerk: Große Sowjetische Enzyklopädie in 64 Bänden) und Werke der fortschrittlichen Schriftsteller der ganzen Welt.

Es liegen aus: 100 sowjetische und 90 deutsche Zeitschriften. Entsprechende Zeitschriften- und Buchkataloge ermöglichen den Zugang zu den wichtigsten und aktuellsten Fragen auf jedem Gebiete.

Ausstellungen

Öffnungszeiten: täglich von 12.00 bis 19.00 Uhr (außer mittwochs),
sonntags von 16.00 bis 19.00 Uhr.

Die Sowjetarmee — das Bollwerk des Friedens
und der Sicherheit in der ganzen Welt

Lenin-Ausstellung

Stalin-Ausstellung

Fünfjahrplan
(Diagramme und Bildberichte)

Die Geschichte der KPdSU (B)

Das Kinderbuch

Reproduktionen der Tretjakow-Galerie

RUSSISCHE SPRACHKURSE werden ständig durchgeführt, Neuanmeldungen für Anfängerkurs, der im März beginnt, Zimmer 229.

Zum Besuch unserer Veranstaltungen wollen Sie folgendes beachten:

Für Vorträge, Musik- und Literaturabende werden in der Organisationsabteilung unseres Hauses (Zimmer 15, Tel. 42 50 51, App. 157 und 250) Eintrittskarten kostenlos ausgegeben. Wegen der starken Nachfrage empfiehlt es sich, die Kartenbestellungen rechtzeitig vorzunehmen. Betriebe werden bei Sammelbestellungen bevorzugt.

Die Kinoveranstaltungen um 19.00 Uhr sind für die berufstätige Bevölkerung reserviert. Kinder unter 14 Jahren haben zu diesen Vorstellungen keinen Zutritt. Für Kinder können in Vereinbarung mit den Schulen dienstags und donnerstags in der Zeit von 10.00 bis 14.00 Uhr Sonderveranstaltungen eingelegt werden.

Es wird gebeten, die Plätze rechtzeitig einzunehmen, da nach Beginn der Veranstaltung die Karten ihre Gültigkeit verlieren und die freien Plätze von Besuchern ohne Karten benutzt werden.

Fahrverbindung: U- u. S-Bahn Friedrichstraße, Straßenbahnen 1 u. 46, Omnibus 9.

Druckerei 36

SECRET DB-23432

HAUS DER KULTUR
DER SOWJETUNION

BERLIN C 2, UNTER DEN LINDEN, AM FESTUNGSGRABEN 1

Veranstaltungen

VOM 15. MÄRZ BIS 31. MÄRZ 1950

15. Mittwoch — 18.00 Uhr, Theater

FESTVERANSTALTUNG: „Die Wahlen in der SU — ein Fest des Sowjetvolkes". Mitwirkende: die Solistenvereinigung des Berl. Rundfunks unter Leitung von Nationalpreisträger Helmut Koch, Robert Trösch und das Ballett: „Das verlorene Tuch".

16. Donnerstag — 18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal

VORTRAG: Wilhelm Koenen: „Die Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschlands im Tageskampf". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

12.00 Uhr, Eichensaal

VORTRAG: Oberstleutnant Simonenkow: „Was bringen die neuen Preissenkungen dem Sowjetvolk?" Anschließend Diskussion.

17. Freitag — 18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal

✓ VORTRAG: Heinz Abraham: „Die ideologischen Grundlagen der bolschewistischen Partei" (W. I. Lenins Werk „Was tun?"). Anschließend Diskussion und Dokumentarfilme über die Wahlen in der SU.

18 Uhr, Eichensaal

VORTRAG: A. Pimenow: „Der Sport in der SU". Anschließend Sportfilmprogramm.

18. Sonnabend — 18.00 Uhr, Theater

Festlicher Abend anläßlich des Tages der Jugend: „Die Jugend der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik — eine Jugend mit einer großen Zukunft". Es spricht: Paul Verner. Mitwirkende: Robert Trösch und Tanz- und Chorgruppen der Jugend.

20. Montag — 18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal

✓ VORTRAG: Oberstltn. Naliwaiko: „W. M. Molotow — ein hervorragender Staatsmann der SU".

SECRET

21. Dienstag — **18.00 Uhr, Theater**

VORLESUNG: Major Plotnikow: „Die Partei der Bolschewiki in der Periode des Überganges zur friedlichen Arbeit an der Wiederherstellung der Volkswirtschaft". Anschließend Diskussion und Film: „Stürmischer Lebensabend".

19.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal

VORTRAG: Stefan Heymann: „Die nächsten Perspektiven des kulturellen Lebens im demokratischen Deutschland". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

24. Freitag — **18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal**

VORTRAG: Hanns Wolf: „Der Block der Kommunisten und Parteilosen — Ausdruck der Sowjetdemokratie". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

BUCHDISKUSSION: N. D. Schtscherbow u. Hans Siebert über das Werk: „Der Weg ins Leben" von A. S. Makarenko.

25. Sonnabend — **19.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal**

Mussorgskij-Klavier-Abend. Es spielt und spricht: Günter Hunold.

26. Sonntag — **19.00 Uhr, Theater**

LITERATUR-ABEND: „Gorki — Kämpfer für den Humanismus — Kämpfer gegen die Weltreaktion". Es spricht: Achim Wolter. Es rezitieren namhafte Künstler der Berliner Bühnen. Es spielt: Willi Niggeling.

27. Montag — **12.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal**

VORTRAG: Hermann Matern: „Unser Kampf um die Festigung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

28. Dienstag — **18.00 Uhr, Theater**

VORLESUNG: Major Plotnikow: „Die Partei der Bolschewiki im Kampf für die sozialistische Industrialisierung des Landes". Anschließend Diskussion und Films: „Donezbecken" und „Ural".

18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal

VORTRAG: Siegbert Kahn: „Das labouristische England — Anhängsel des amerikanischen Imperialismus". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

29. Mittwoch — **19.00 Uhr, Theater**

VORTRAG: Arnold Zweig: „Die Aufgabe des Schriftstellers im Kampf der Nationalen Front um die Einheit und Unabhängigkeit der deutschen Nation". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

30. Donnerstag — **18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal**

VORTRAG: Hermann Axen: „Was ist die amerikanische Lebensweise?" Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

18.00 Uhr, Theater

VORTRAG: Kurt Heiß: „Die Wahlen in der SU — Ausdruck der Sowjetdemokratie".

31. Freitag — **18.00 Uhr, Theater**

VORTRAG: Prof. Gerhart Eisler: „Der Kampf der Sowjetdiplomatie um den Frieden". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal

VORTRAG: Dozent Glaschkin: „Die sowjetische Staatsordnung". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

Theaterveranstaltungen

VOM 20. MÄRZ BIS 31. MÄRZ 1950

Lustspiel

„INSEL DES FRIEDENS"

von I. Petrow, deutsch von Georgia Tanewa
Regie: Eduard Matzick

Premiere am Montag, 20. März, um 19.00 Uhr im Theater. Weitere Vorstellungen finden am 22., 23., 24. und 27. März jeweils um 19.00 Uhr sowie am 25. um 20.00 Uhr im Theater statt. Eintrittspreise von DM 1,— bis DM 3,—.

Karten an der Theaterkasse in der Zeit von 11 bis 19 Uhr erhältlich oder Zimmer 5, Telefon 42 50 51, Apparat 175.

Filmveranstaltungen

VOM 17. MÄRZ BIS 31. MÄRZ 1950

Kinosaal

17.—23. März	„Die Csardasfürstin"
24.—26. März	„Kunst in der Sowjetunion"
27. u. 28. März	„Unter fremden Menschen"
30. u. 31. März	„Meine Universitäten"

Täglich 17.00 und 19.30 Uhr, freitags und sonnabends nur 17.00 Uhr. Sonntags 14.30, 17.00 und 19.30 Uhr.

Karten erhältlich im Zimmer 5, Telefon 42 50 51, Apparat 175.

Kinderveranstaltungen im Theater:

19. März	„Der Zauberfisch" und „Der erste Unterricht"	11.00 u. 14.00 Uhr
26. März	„Die Kinder des Kapitän Grant" „Gesetz der großen Liebe"	11.00 u. 14.00 Uhr

Die Veranstaltungen um 11.00 Uhr sind nur für die Kinder aus den Westsektoren Berlins. Die Karten werden durch die Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft ausgegeben.

Karten für die 14.00-Uhr-Vorstellung kostenlos: Haus der Kultur der Sowjetunion, Zimmer 5, Telefon 42 50 51, Apparat 175.

"Cuno" 14.3.50. DB-26932

Bericht Nr. 12.

Die Veranstaltungen im Haus der Kultur der S.U. zeigen eine aufsteigende Linie. Den Gästen wird ein immer vielseitigeres Programm dargeboten. Immer mehr Besucher, davon viel Stammgäste, stellen sich ein. Damit steigt auch die Wirkung, der Einfluß im Sinne der sowjetischen Gastgeber bei deutschen breiten Volksmassen.

Anläßlich des dreijährigen Bestehens des Hauses gab die Geschäftsführung auf großen dekorativen Wandtafeln bekannt, daß 1947 105 Vorträge stattfanden; 1948 waren es 197 und 1949 schon 328 geworden. Gegenwärtig gibt es in einer Woche mitunter etwa zehn Vorträge, meist mit anschließendem Film, daneben zahlreiche musikalische und künstlerische Vorstellungen und die eigentlichen Filme, im Monat annähernd zehn verschiedene. Berücksichtigt man dazu noch die ständigen Ausstellungen, die stets lebhaft besucht werden, und häufige festliche Versammlungen, so kann man schätzen, daß mindestens zweitausend Menschen täglich (mit Ausnahme eines Ruhetages in jeder Woche) das Haus der Kultur betreten. Sie werden auch durch die repräsentative äußere Aufmachung und die kostenlose Betreuung beeindruckt. Solche Räume kennen manche (wohl die meisten) Besucher nur aus Film oder Bildern, und auf seidendamastbespannte Polstermöbel aus Schloß Sanssouci können sie sich sonst auch nicht setzen.

Die Vorträge kann man ihrem Inhalt nach in einige Kategorien aufteilen. Da gibt es solche, die das Grundsätzliche und Dogmatische der Parteilehre erläutern. Hierzu gehört etwa "Die marxistisch-leninistische Lehre vom Staat" oder "Klassen und Klassenkampf" oder "Materialismus oder Idealismus"; ferner Vortragsreihen über Lenins Werke oder über die Geschichte der Partei der Bolschewiki.

Andere Vorträge haben außenpolitische Fragen zum Gegenstand, z.B. ein Vortragszyklus über die Außenpolitik der UdSSR, ferner über den "Sieg der Volkskräfte in China", über den "Freiheitskampf der kolonialen Völker" oder die "Hintergründe der amerikanischen Außenpolitik".

Weitaus die meisten Vorträge befassen sich mit inneren Zuständen der UdSSR. Es ist selbstverständlich, daß alle Einrichtungen der Sowjetunion im günstigsten Lichte dargestellt werden. Der Hörer erfährt von Macht und Reichtum, Fortschritt und Rekorden der Sowjetunion und von den vorbildlichen Leistungen ihrer Einwohner. Einige charakteristische Themen lauteten: "Bodenschätze der S.U.", "Der Nachkriegs-Fünfjahrplan", die "Stachanow-

Bewegung" und "Der Plan zur Umwandlung der Natur". Auch über den "Lebensstandard der Werktätigen" wird berichtet, über den Staatshaushalt der UdSSR, über Volksbildung, Sport, Leben der Frauen und dergleichen mehr. Das Programm ist vielseitig und findet immer eine interessierte Hörergemeinschaft.

Hieran reihen sich auch deutsche Themen. Während die vorgenannten Vorträge vorwiegend von sowjetischen Offizieren oder Funktionären gehalten werden, holt man zur Behandlung der Deutschland betreffenden Fragen meist "prominente" Persönlichkeiten der S.E.D. und der ostdeutschen Regierung oder solche, die bekanntermaßen mit deren Ideen sympathisieren (z.B. Minister Rau, Prof. Gerhart Eisler, Dr. Kurt Fischer, Wilhelm Koenen, Arnold Zweig u.s.w.). Gegenwärtig steht die Politik der "nationalen Front" im Vordergrund. Soweit Musik von hervorragender Qualität geboten wird, ist sie meist auf die gleiche politische Tendenz abgestimmt. Auch den verschiedenen volksdemokratischen Ländern sind bestimmte Vorträge und Filme gewidmet.

Die Ausstellungen gehen ständig nebenher. Jetzt gibt es u.a. eine solche über sowjetische Architektur, die meisterhafte Riesenphotos der größten und schönsten modernen Bauten der UdSSR enthält, Regierungspaläste, Theater, Arbeitergroßwohnhäuser, Sanatorien, Bahn- und Hafengebäude, Parks. Eine über die sowjetische Armee steht vor der Eröffnung. Andere Ausstellungen zeigten oder zeigen Leistungen der sowjetischen Malerei, Graphik, Plakatkunst, Bücher und Kinderbücher, Bühnenbilder, Material zum Leben von Lenin, Stalin, Gorki und Puschkin, Filmwesen, 800 Jahre Moskau, Fünfjahrplan, Geschichte der kommunistischen Partei/ und Kampf um den Frieden u. dgl.

Stets gewinnt man den Eindruck, daß der Betrieb im Hause mit Hilfe reichlichen Personals sorgfältig organisiert ist.

DB-25832

"Cuno"

16. März 1950.
Bericht Nr.13.

Über die "Nationale Froht" des "demokratischen" Deutschlands im Tageskampf sprach Wilhelm Koenen am 16.3.50. im Haus der Kultur der S.U. Der Theaterrraum war voll; viel Polizisten als Zuhörer. Koenen, prominenter SED-Bonze, linientreuer Mann des "Volksrats", ist ein typischer Agitator und Demagoge. Er spricht mit lauter, geschulter Stimme, lebhaft und einprägsam. Dabei reiht er Phrasen und Schlagworte aneinander, ohne eigene Ideen zu entwickeln. Aber der kritik- und urteilslose Hörer erliegt leicht seinem Wortschwall. Scharf und heftig sind seine Ausfälle. Adenauer ist der "skrupellose Vertreter amerikanischer Monopolinteressen" und nebenbei ein " Schwager zweiten Grades von Mac Cloy" und hat Westdeutschland leichtsinnigerweise mit mindestens 35 Milliarden Westmark Schulden belastet, während die "Deutsche Demokratische Republik" schuldenfrei dasteht. Elend, Verfall und Hoffnungslosigkeit herrschen in Westdeutschland. "Bei uns (d.h. im glücklichen östlichen Teil Deutschlands) geht es schrittweise voran, während es im kolonialen Deutschland (gemeint ist der Westen) sprungweise zurückgeht!", rief Koenen aus.

Der Redner forderte, daß die politische Agitation in ganz Berlin sowie in der Ostzone planmäßig verstärkt werden solle. Überall sollen Agitationstrupps geschult werden. Sie sollen z.B. in kleinen Gruppen in den Berliner S- und U-Bahnen durch laute Gespräche im Sinne der "nationalen Front" die Öffentlichkeit "aufklären". Im Ostsektor und in der Ostzone sollen sie Verständnis wecken für die (von der SED und ihren Auftraggebern) geforderte vorfristige Erfüllung des Zweijahrplanes sowie für ein neues Gesetz, das die Ablieferungspflicht der Landwirtschaft erhöht. Auch das Einsammeln von "Buntmetallen" soll durch die politische Organisation bis herunter zu den Hausobleuten gründlicher betrieben werden. Daneben soll die "Wachsamkeit" (auch ein Wort typisch moskauer Prägung) gegenüber den Lauen und Widerspenstigen verschärft werden. Zur Erläuterung, wie und wo die Gefahr von "Saboteuren" droht, wurde anschließend der Defa-Film "Der Auftrag Hoegners", der schon oft im Hause gelaufen ist, nochmals gezeigt.

Die deutsche Bevölkerung steht, wie Koenen ausführte, vor einem entscheidenden inneren Kampfabschnitt. Es gilt, die Schranken zu beseitigen, welche die "nationale Front" noch von ihrem Ziel trennen, ihre Grundsätze auf ganz Deutschland auszudehnen. In diesem Sinne soll das Pfingstreffen der deutschen Jugend zu mehr als einer Demonstration werden. Ganz Berlin soll damit gewonnen werden.

Vortrag W. Koenen am 16.3.50., Blatt 2. 00 - 55432

"Cuno" - Bericht Nr.13. /Fortsetzung/

Berlin ist (laut Koenen) ~~[illegible]~~ der Mittelpunkt nicht nur Deutschlands, sondern des Blocks der Volksdemokratien und ganz Europas! Ohne Berlin kein Friede, keine "Freiheit", keine Einheit Deutschlands. Der jetzige Zustand, daß Westberlin sich dem Herrschaftsanspruch der "nationalen Front" entzieht, muß beseitigt werden.

Etwa die zweite Hälfte des Koenenschen Vortrags beschäftigte sich mit den Vorgängen bei der Demontage in Watenstedt-Salzgitter und enthielt drastische Kommentare zu den Pressenachrichten der letzten Tage. Koenen schilderte den erfolgreichen Widerstand der deutschen Arbeiterschaft gegen die Zerstörung ihrer Arbeitsstätten, gegen aggressive Pläne der Westalliierten. Am Schluß des Vortrags meldete sich zur Diskussion nur ein Mann aus dem Publikum mit dem Vorschlag, der Belegschaft in Watenstedt-Salzgitter die Sympathie aller Versammelten telegraphisch auszusprechen. Die Resolution wurde in Abstimmung einstimmig angenommen.

"Cuno" Bericht Nr.14. NB-05432

" Die Sowjetarmee – das Bollwerk des Friedens und der Sicherheit in der ganzen Welt "
ist das Motto einer Ausstellung, die am 17.3.50. im Haus der Kultur der Sowjetunion eröffnet wurde.

In einer blumengeschmückten Vorhalle und drei Räumen sieht man Bilder, Landkarten mit Erläuterungen und großplakatierte Zitate. Das ganze könnte man als einen kriegsgeschichtlichen Schnellkursus der sowjetischen Armee bezeichnen. Waffen, Uniformen und dergleichen, was sonst in Heeresmuseen zu finden ist, werden hier nicht gezeigt. Auch technisch ist über den heutigen Stand der Armee nichts Neues zu entnehmen. Die Ausstellung trägt mehr ideologischen Charakter und eine bestimmte politische Tendenz. Die äußere Ausstattung ist dekorativ sehr sorgfältig und künstlerisch gemacht.

Die Bilder beginnen zeitlich mit Gemälden aus der Revolutionszeit im Oktober 1917, als die ersten Trupps bewaffneter Arbeiter sich zur "Roten Garde" zusammenschlossen. Stets stehen schon hier Lenin und Stalin Seite an Seite.

Auf mehreren Landkarten werden sodann die Feldzüge des Bürgerkrieges illustriert, in deren Verlauf die Rote Armee nacheinander die fremden Invasionstruppen sowie ihre inneren weiß=russischen Gegner besiegte. Von März bis Oktober 1919 ging es gegen die von Osten anrückenden Truppen Koltschaks, nachdem schon 1918 britische Expeditionstruppen von Murmansk aus vergeblich ins Land einzudringen versucht hatten. Bedrohlicher für die junge Sowjetmacht wurden damals (1919/20) die Vorstöße Denekins von Süden her, die jedoch Ende 1920 mit einem vollen Sieg der Roten Armee und Vertreibung der Gegner aus der Krim endeten. Auch des polnischen Angriffs erwehrte sich die Rote Armee. Schließlich gelang es ihr auch, in Kämpfen, die sich bis Oktober 1922 hinzogen, ihre Macht von Irkutsk bis Wladiwostok im Fernen Osten wiederherzustellen. Die Rolle Stalins bei der Leitung dieser Unternehmen wird besonders hervorgehoben. Eine auf einem großen Tisch montierte Kartenskizze zeigt z.B. durch Fähnchen und Daten Stalins Fahrten durch das ausgedehnte Operationsgebiet zwischen Nordrußland und Kaukasus.

Der größte Raum wird durch Bilder aus dem letzten Krieg gefüllt. Darunter ist kaum Material, das nicht schon durch Zeitschriften früher bekannt geworden wäre. Wieder zeigen große Lage= und Bewegungs=Skizzen die Zerschlagung der Hitler=Armeen in groß=

angelegten, für die Sowjetarmee siegreichen Schlachten. Man kann sich deutlich vorstellen, wie die Schlachten vor Moskau Dez. 1941, bei Stalingrad Sept.-Dez. 1942, bei Kursk und Charkow im Sommer 1943 und schließlich im Raum um Berlin sich abwickelten. Unter einem Bilde von einer sowjetischen Waffenfabrik steht: " "Die sowjetische Armee errang ihre Erfolge mit Waffen, die von sowjetischen Konstrukteuren gebaut sind." In einer Inschrift zu 10 großen strategischen Bewegungen der Armeen im Jahre 1944 heißt es: "In der so entstandenen Situation war es klar, daß die Sowjetunion auch ohne Hilfe der Verbündeten im Stande ist, ganz Deutschland zu besetzen und auch Frankreich zu befreien".

Auf diese eigentlichen Kriegsbilder folgt eine Serie unter dem Leitspruch "Befreiung der Völker". Man sieht, wie einrückende sowjetische Truppen in Prag, Budapest, Bukarest und auch im Fernen Osten von der einheimischen Bevölkerung jubelnd begrüßt werden, und gewinnt aus Bildern von der Parade im Jahre 1947 vor dem Kreml einen gewissen Eindruck von der heutigen Stärke und Einsatzbereitschaft der Armee. Bilder von besonders verdienten Militärs finden sich in allen Abteilungen.

Im Moskau und in anderen sowjetisvhen Städten gibt es auch besondere Armee-Theater, deren Aufführungen Themen von Siegen, Feldherren und Heldentaten der sowjetischen Armee verherrlichen. -

In diesem Rahmen mögen noch zwei Filme erwähnt sein, die kürzlich im Haus der Kultur der S.U. gezeigt wurden.

Der eine behandelt den 2. Teil der Stalingrad-Schlacht. Kein eigentlicher Kriegs-Dokumentarfilm, d.h. keine im Kriege an der Front gemachten Aufnahmen, sondern später mit Schauspielern und Statisten-Truppen gestellte filmische Handlung. Die Persönlichkeit des Generalissimus Stalin steht im Vordergrund der Idee. Der deutsche Beschauer erfährt, in wie sinnloser Weise der wahnsinnige Hitler Hunderttausende deutscher Soldaten in aussichtsloser Lage dahin opferte. Das Publikum nahm den Film mit Ernst und Ergriffenheit auf.

Ein anderer Film "Die von Kronstadt" heroisiert den erfolgreichen Widerstand Roter Marinetruppen im Jahre 1919 vor Leningrad im Kampf gegen weißrussische Judenitsch-Truppen. Je heftiger gekämpft und geschossen wird, desto lebhafter reagieren die zahlreichen Jugendlichen unter den Zuschauern. Der Film läuft in russischer Sprache mit deutschen Unterzeilen.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: III/RE

NO. NO.NO(See ZRPacer Manifest #153)

DATE Rec'd. 9 June 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. EE 3					Copy 1 and 2 of letters a/e manifest.
2. [illegible]					
3.					Copy 3 of 3 TO: EE III/RE
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					File [illegible]

FIELD DISPATCH
PLEASE
EXPEDITE

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

SECRET

POUCH MANIFEST

TRUE NAME POUCH

5 June 1950

[illegible] POUCH No. 153

TO: Chief, VLKiva
Washington, D. C.

ATTN: Joseph F. Stribling

1. Two letters (each in trip) from the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

Julia T. Barry

Received: [illegible]

Date: JUN [illegible] 1950

SECRET

accompanied by invitation to Max Yergan and Prof. S[illegible]

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: Olmstead [illegible] 2223

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

* 7500 ([illegible]

~~* 10000 ([illegible]~~

200 ([illegible]

200 [illegible]

1050 [illegible]

* 10000 [illegible] 270 [illegible]

1,2 [illegible]

FROM: *

BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 38-8
SEP 1946

SECRET

8 June 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: EE

SUBJECT: Status of Advanced Accounts (PDQUICK)

1. With reference to advances of money for FDQUICK, referred to in memorandum of 7 June signed by Chief, Staff III, ~~four~~ of these advances, involving participation of Mr. Carmel Offie, are itemized as follows:

$12,000 delivered to Mr. Offie on 26 April 1950 for which a receipt was obtained dated 27 April 1950 from Mr. Jay Lovestone of the Free Trade Union Conference.

$10,000 advanced to L. Glaser on 18 May for which a receipt is on file signed by Jay Lovestone dated 19 May.

$7,500 delivered to Mr. Offie about 20 May for which receipt is on file, this money delivered to National Committee For Free Europe.

2. The first two items referred to above report a duplication. This was called to Mr. Offie's attention on 26 May, again on 31 May, and again on 7 June. On these occasions, Mr. Offie stated that he was aware of the situation (that FTUC had received an extra $10,000 for PDQUICK) and that he would either have the money returned or would see that it was designated for another project. This adjustment is now in process ~~for~~ of handling.

LOUIS GLASER
EE III

EE/III/LG/fdr
cc: EIII - 3

SECRET

F. [illegible]
POTRICK

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
dedicated to [illegible]
[illegible] — [illegible]
and [illegible] the Reichsmann
[illegible]

Dedicated to the cause of Peace Through Freedom — NOT "Peace Through Slavery" — We, as citizens both of free countries and of countries suffering Soviet tyranny,

Hereby hail the initiative of the Berlin Congress For Cultural Freedom in joining together intellectual leaders who cherish the freedom of the republics of the West, and seek the freedom of the peoples of the East;

And declare our hope that those nations which now temporarily endure Kremlin-imposed spiritual and physical bondage shall soon, by man's unconquerable love of liberty, be restored to the fellowship of free men, free thought, and free expression; [and that the cultural leaders of those nations will, after their liberation, take upon themselves the responsibility of enlightening their fellow citizens so long held in darkness.]

The Warden of St. Antony's

One bright afternoon in the fall of 1948, a big car made its way through the streets of Oxford, England, bearing a tubby little old man with a scraggly mustache, who had come to take his first look at the university. At that time few Oxonians had ever heard of 70-year-old Antonin Besse. Nor did they know that he was the mysterious, anonymous French millionaire who had just given Oxford one of the biggest gifts in its history—$6,000,000 for a new college (TIME, Jan. 31, 1949). But by last week, the whole university was buzzing with preparations for Oxford's first new college in 13 years.

To house the students of the newest college, Oxford authorities had acquired a small group of buildings once used as an Anglican convent. These they renamed St. Antony's, in honor of Benefactor Antonin Besse. Then they began laying plans for the curriculum which St. Anthony's students would follow.

Explosion in Yugoslavia. Antonin Besse had laid down only one stipulation. He wanted both Frenchmen and Englishmen to be admitted, to study in an atmosphere of Anglo-French cooperation. To create that atmosphere, Oxford picked as St. Antony's first warden just the sort of independent-minded, well-educated Englishman Besse had learned to admire during the years he had traded and trav-

Reference WASH 6049 Out 56805
and cable written 5 June WASH Out

The Warden of St. Antony's

[illegible] afternoon in the fall of [illegible] a [illegible] made its way through the streets of Oxford, England, bearing a [illegible] little old man with a straggly mustache, who had come to take his first look at the university. At that time few Oxonians had ever heard of [illegible]-year-old Antonin Besse. Nor did they know that he was the mysterious, anonymous French millionaire who had just given Oxford one of the largest gifts in its history—$6,200,000 for a new college (TIME, Jan. 31, 1949). But by last week the whole university was buzzing with preparations for Oxford's first new college in 13 years.

To house the students of the newest college, Oxford authorities had acquired a small group of buildings once used as an Anglican convent. These they renamed St. Antony's, in honor of Benefactor Antonin Besse. Then they began laying plans for the curriculum which St. Anthony's students would follow.

Explosion in Yugoslavia. Antonin Besse had laid down only one stipulation. He wanted both Frenchmen and Englishmen to be admitted, to study in an atmosphere of Anglo-French cooperation. To create that atmosphere, Oxford picked as St. Antony's first warden just the sort of independent-minded, well-educated Englishman Besse had learned to admire during the years he had traded and traveled all over the world. Slim, trim Frederick William Dampier Deakin was the man.

OXFORD'S DEAKIN
"Just six files and me."

A Fellow and tutor of history at Oxford's Wadham College, he had worked with Winston Churchill on Churchill's monumental life of Marlborough. Right after Munich, he joined the army. He was the first officer to parachute into Yugoslavia,* worked so closely with Tito that the two were once wounded by the same bomb explosion. After the war, a lieutenant colonel with a D.S.O., he returned to Wadham, also began helping Churchill with his famed war memoirs. Last week 36-year-old Bill Deakin took over as Warden of St. Antony's.

Trouble in the Drains. So far, Warden Deakin had neither staff, students nor furniture—"just six files and me." He still had a great deal of remodeling to do to get ready for Michaelmas term in October. Then, "after getting all the drains

Reference
and cable

Cit

---

* Under the command of cloak-&-dagger [illegible] (TIME, May [illegible]).

[illegible] 22, 1950

(OVER

Miss
Metro-Goldwyn-
filmed at Su
Van Johnson and

settled," he would have to pick a permanent committee of British and French scholars to select his students.

As Besse had suggested, a third of those 50 students will be French. Though their pattern of study will be much the same as that of other Oxonians, its emphasis will be on European history and economics. And now & then, after things get started at St. Antony's, M. Besse himself will drive up in his big car to offer his advice. "I shall welcome it," says Warden Deakin. "He's an extraordinary man . . . a genius."

Right at Home

When pretty, brown-haired Martha Lucas, 37, resigned as President of Sweet Briar College for women (TIME, Oct. 17), she caught the colonnaded Virginia campus a bit off guard. Nevertheless, the trustees set right to work hunting for a successor. Judging by their choice last week, they had apparently kept as their model Martha Lucas herself.

Walter McCardell

ANNE PANNELL
Women and the world.

The new president is pretty, brown-haired Anne Gary Pannell, 39, the mother of two sons. Southern-born (in Durham, N. C.), like her predecessor, she went to Oxford for her doctorate in history (Martha went to the University of London), eventually became academic dean of Baltimore's Goucher College for women (Martha was a dean at Radcliffe). In recent years, while global-minded Martha Lucas became a UNESCO delegate and started a Junior Year Abroad program for Sweet Briar, global-minded Anne Pannell has spent much of her time arranging international student scholarships.

Incoming President Pannell will take over her new post July 1. For the 450 girls at fashionable, forward-looking Sweet Briar, her appointment meant that everything would go right on running just as smoothly and amiably as ever.

2 June 1950

American Express Company
65 Broadway
New York, N. Y.

ATTENTION: Mr. Gerard Gilmore

Dear Mr. Gilmore:

Please add the following two names to the list of authorized delegates to the Congress for Cultural Freedom:

Professor German Arciniegas (now at Columbia University) who will require transportation either from Ann Arbor, Michigan, or New York City — whichever he selects.

Mr. George Schuyler (Editor)
270 Convent Ave.
New York, N. Y.

Sincerely yours,

FOR MR. PHILIP H. WATTS:

MARTIN K. WILLIAMS
(Louis Glaser)

1 Jun

JEE:

Re - Schlaesinger.

He is a German Jew, US citizen, lives in New York, in construction business, makes trips to Germany, knows German industrialists and politicians. About 55.

Offie kept his paper - is having it copied, will send us a copy.

S. was in Germany five or six weeks ago and was commented on critically and unfavorably in HICOG cables. Offie says this is because S. is disgusted with entire State and HICOG handling of German affairs, says people are either uninformed or incompetent or vicious, meaning by vicious the group of German Jews who were disciples of the Morgenthau plan, who hate Germany and Germans. He has let his antipathy to the HICOG crowd be seen and has avoided them. Offie suggested that Kellerman and Rheinstein probably were examples of the type that S. referred to.

L. G.

Re - Yergin (and Spero)

C.O. was under some misapprehension as to the formula for drawing funds for delegates. He is now straightened out and has agreed that he will advise JL to add Yergin's name to his list and notify Am. Express. Yergin then simply draws his money from Am. Express. CO was under impression that the amount would be designated and Yergin given an order for it, or words to that effect. Spero also will be on FTUC list.

Re - paras. 4 and 5 of Brln. 2887.

Para. 4 does not require answer - though Hambley and I think they are wrong in rejecting Thompson.

I would like to send attached draft in answer to para. 5. Had to consult Hambley before I could prepare this.

Re: HJ Mueller. He will be added to NCFE list.

Re: Robt. Montgomery. He has been pressuring Hambley for more funds, wants to take assistant along. Hambley will advise him no dice. (Lasky evidently painted glowing picture to Montgomery of valuable reporting and press relations services.)

31 May 1950

MEMO: PDQUICK

Conversations with Mr. Carpenter (25 May) and with Mr. Richards (31 May

with reference to attendance at Cultural Congress of Mrs. Burnham:

Both Carpenter and Richards agree that Mrs. Burnham may travel to the Congress, at the invitation of the Congress, in her own right, drawing money from travel fund for that purpose, without consideration of Burnham's status vis-a-vis CIA. This on the theory that the travel is desirable because of services she may render to the Congress (not as a delegate necessarily) and because of the protection of Burnham's cover. The Congress, as ostensibly independent financially, would make any such arrangements without consideration of rules of CIA regarding travel of employees and agents.

L. C. Glaser

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: EIII

NO. 5-44989

DATE 29 May

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. EE		24 May	29 May	MV	[illegible] circulated the report.
2. EEIII X					
3.					~~[illegible]~~
4.					~~[illegible]~~,
5.					MV
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

SECRET

2[illegible] May 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lindsay

SUBJECT : Report on May Day Counter-propaganda in the Soviet Sector of Berlin and the East Zone of Germany.

REFERENCE : Memorandum from Mr. Lindsay of 3 May, requesting special reports on successful operations for Mr. Wisner.

In compliance with your request of 3 May, I submit a report on May Day counter-propaganda in the Soviet Sector of Berlin and the East Zone of Germany.

John E. Baker

EIII/ADR/mc
cc: [illegible] Regs (2)
EIII Chrono
EIII File

SECRET

File
PDQUICK

02.179

23 May 1950

To: Colonel LOUIS GLASER

Subject: Information From Mr. MELVIN LASKY Concerning the Berlin Congress

1. I attach (a) a copy of the letter received from MELVIN LASKY, (b) a list which he prepared of the expected American delegates at the Congress, (c) together with three additions to the British list.

2. LASKY evidently means the American list to be definite as of this date. However, according to my information, at least two or three of the delegates whom he lists are still uncertain; for example, SIDNEY HOOK and DAVID LILIENTHAL.

3. The idea of a strong Soviet delegation, gathered from Western Germany seems to me excellent, and capable of major exploitation as we noted yesterday. However, it does not seem to require SHUB's presence in Germany.

4. I don't know exactly what arrangements LASKY has in mind for continuing the payments necessary to maintain the New Y.k office. One sentence in this letter suggests that he plans to make payment from Berlin. This matter ought to be clarified immediately.

5. You will note in the LASKY letter the address and telephone number of the New York office.

KEH

Copy of letter from MELVIN LASKY dated 21 May 1950, New York City

"Dear Jim,

"I have just finished with the press conference here at Freedom House. I think Beichman managed a nice turn-out -- Hartrich of the Herald-Tribune, David Anderson of the Times, Henry Beckkett of the Post, et.al. I won't be able to see the clippings tomorrow; doubtless much will be asked. But publicity won't hurt, and may do much much good. I have given Beichman two hundred dollars for now; another two hundred has already gone in phone calls, telegrams and the like. Spoke to Upton Sinclair again; can't come. Silone is writing the piece for the Times. Hook is doing an opening piece in the NL; with Levitas promising a nice spread. Beichman is writing letters, sending out releases. Pearl Kluger is working in the little office, hired out from George Field of Freedom House (20 West 40th Street, Tel: Chickering-4-3060). I have instructed him to consult you and refer all problems to you. I think he can do a most useful job with the press. I have done my best to keep all such expenses down, but in the end this job will be more important than the expensive presence of many of the delegates in Berlin. Do keep in touch with him until your departure.

"On the Russian matter, I think it would be an almost criminal waste of opportunities if there weren't the strongest possible Iron-Curtain delegation there on the platform in Berlin. Nicolaevsky and Shub have come up with the proposal to smoke out the professors, deans, scientists, poets now secluded in Western Germany; five or six of these worthies (Russians, Ukrainians, Asiatics) would indeed be a most appropriate bombshell. If they -- Nicolaevsky to give them Russian-political-confidence, Shub to give them American-diplomatic assurances -- could have a week together working out from Frankfurt and Munich ten days or so before the Congress begins, this might turn the trick. I think that's the way, and probably the only way to do it. God knows I won't be able to round them up. In any event, -- although I have been reluctant to raise the issue for fear that my motives might be misinterpreted -- I think that Shub's presence in Berlin would be of immeasurable value, handling the radio and Russian angles; and he's not considered there another "American outsider". Which is important.

" On the book matter, it would be wonderful if we could go ahead with our project of book exhibitions of all works of Congress authors. I have asked Pearl Kluger -- she can be reached at the above number in Freedom House -- to go ahead with a limited amount of orders from the publishers. I trust there will be money to cover it; although some of the bills will go out to me in Berlin.

" I am leaving tonight for Westover Field. It was a big mistake not to get commercial air travel on my orders. No planes to London, none to Paris. First stop tomorrow -- Frankfurt! And there I turn around again. But then my contract calls for no breakdowns until the first of July. See you in the sanitorium at that time.

" Best regards to you and Marcia, and remember me to your children, who fascinated me.

"Yrs,

/s/MELVIN J. LASKY "

USA (Revised Listing)

Name	Coming From	Address
James Burnham, author	Washington	1327 33rd St., N.W.
Irving Brown, labor man	Paris	Brussels, Belgium
Sidney Hook, philosopher	Santa Barbara	New York University Un of Calif., Santa Barbara
Elliot Cohen, editor	NYC	Commentary Magazine, NY
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.	Cambridge, Mass.	Department of History Harvard University
Robert Montgomery film & radio	NYC	NBC, 30 Rockefeller Pl. NY
S.M. Levitas, publisher	NYC	The New Leader, 7E.15th
Prof. Carl J. Friedrich	Heidelberg	Harvard University
James T. Farrell, novelist	Zurich/or Paris	...E.58th St. c/o American Express Par.
X Prof. Franz L. Neumann historian	Berlin	Columbia University
George Grosz, artist	NYC	The Cottage, Hilaire Farm, Huntington, L.I.
Prof. G.A. Borgese	Chicago	University of Chicago
George Schuyler, Negro editor	NYC	270 Convent Avenue, NYC
Tennessee Williams, playwright	Paris	Hotel Sherry Netherland in NYC; c/o American Express Company in Paris
Carson McCullers, novelist	Paris	
Boris Nicolaevsky Russian historian	NYC	417 West 120th Street NYC
David Lilienthal, public figure	Paris	c/o Hotel Bellman Rue Francois I, Paris
Prof. George S. Counts educator	NYC	Columbia University Morningside, NYC

Additions:

From England:

Peter de Mendelsohn, novelist	London	c/o The New Statesman and Nation, London
Sebastian Hafner, editor	London	The Observer, a publicat. London, England
Prof. D.W. Brogan political scientist	London	Cambridge University England

Copy of letter from Melvin J. Lasky, Tuesday a.m. (5-23-50)

"Tuesday a.m.
Westover Air Field

"Dear Jim:

"I spoke to Prof. GERMAN ARCINIEGAS last night. He is probably the best known South American literary critic - now at Columbia University (N.Y.C.). He has agreed to come - writing a paper on 'Literarian Ideals in South American Literature'. ROMWALDI of the AFL in Washington tells me he is very sound politically. ARCINIEGAS should be added to the list - giving us at least one non-North American.

"Best

/s/ MELVIN J. LASKY

"P.S.

"ARCINIEGAS is also having a little trouble with summer session committments. Could you ask BRUCE BUTTLES to have "standard' State Dept. letter go out in ARCINIEGAS' behalf (release for about 10 days a la HOOK) to Prof. I. LEONARD, Romance Languages Dept., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor... "

X

02.179

23 May 1950

To: Colonel LOUIS GLASER

Subject: Information From Mr. MELVIN LASKY Concerning the Berlin Congress

1. I attach (a) a copy of the letter received from MELVIN LASKY, (b) a list which he prepared of the expected American delegates at the Congress, (c) together with three additions to the British list.

2. LASKY evidently means the American list to be definite as of this date. However, according to my information, at least two or three of the delegates whom he lists are still uncertain; for example, SIDNEY HOOK and DAVID LILIENTHAL.

3. The idea of a strong Soviet delegation, gathered from Western Germany seems to me excellent, and capable of major exploitation as we noted yesterday. However, it does not seem to require SHUB's presence in Germany.

4. I don't know exactly what arrangements LASKY has in mind for continuing the payments necessary to maintain the New York office. One sentence in this letter suggests that he plans to make payment from Berlin. This matter ought to be clarified immediately.

This has been clarified by [illegible] [illegible]

5. You will note in the LASKY letter the address and telephone number of the New York office.

KBH

02.179

Copy of letter from MELVIN LASKY dated 21 May 1950, New York City

"Dear Jim,

"I have just finished with the press conference here at Freedom House. I think Beichman managed a nice turn-out -- Hartrich of the Herald-Tribune, David Anderson of the Times, Henry Beckkett of the Post, et.al. I won't be able to see the clippings tomorrow; doubtless much will be askew. But publicity won't hurt, and may do much much good. I have given Beichman two hundred dollars for now; another two hundred has already gone in phone calls, telegrams and the like. Spoke to Upton Sinclair again; can't come. Silone is writing the piece for the Times. Hook is doing an opening piece in the NL; with Levitas promising a nice spread. Beichman is writing letters, sending out releases. Pearl Kluger is working in the little office, hired out from George Field of Freedom House (20 West 40th Street, Tel: Chickering-4-3060). I have instructed him to consult you and refer all problems to you. I think he can do a most useful job with the press. I have done my best to keep all such expenses down, but in the end this job will be more important than the expensive presence of many of the delegates in Berlin. Do keep in touch with him until your departure.

"On the Russian matter, I think it would be an almost criminal waste of opportunities if there weren't the strongest possible Iron-Curtain delegation there on the platform in Berlin. Nicolaevsky and Shub have come up with the proposal to smoke out the professors, deans, scientists, poets now secluded in Western Germany; five or six of these worthies (Russians, Ukrainians, Asiatics) would indeed be a most appropriate bombshell. If they -- Nicolaevsky to give them Russian-political-confidence, Shub to give them American-diplomatic assurances -- could have a week together working out from Frankfurt and Munich ten days or so before the Congress begins, this might turn the trick. I think that's the way, and probably the only way to do it. God knows I won't be able to round them up. In any event, -- although I have been reluctant to raise the issue for fear that my motives might be misinterpreted -- I think that Shub's presence in Berlin would be of immeasurable value, handling the radio and Russian angles; and he's not considered there another "American outsider". Which is important.

"On the book matter, it would be wonderful if we could go ahead with our project of book exhibitions of all works of Congress authors. I have asked Pearl Kluger -- she can be reached at the above number in Freedom House -- to go ahead with a limited amount of orders from the publishers. I trust there will be money to cover it; although some of the bills will go out to me in Berlin.

"I am leaving tonight for Westover Field. It was a big mistake not to get commercial air travel on my orders. No planes to London, none to Paris. First stop tomorrow -- Frankfurt! And there I turn around again. But then my contract calls for no breakdowns until the first of July. See you in the sanitorium at that time.

"Best regards to you and Marcia, and remember me to your children, who fascinated me.

"Yrs,

/s/MELVIN J. LASKY "

USA (Revised Listing)

Name	Coming From	Address
✓ James Burnham, author	Washington	1327 33rd St., N.W.
✓ Irving Brown, labor man	Paris	Brussels, Belgium
✓ Sidney Hook, philosopher	Santa Barbara	New York University Un of Calif., Santa Barbara
✓ Elliot Cohen, editor	NYC	Commentary Magazine, NY
✓ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.	Cambridge, Mass.	Department of History Harvard University
✓ Robert Montgomery film & radio	NYC	NBC, 30 Rockefeller Pl. NY
✓ S.M. Levitas, publisher	NYC	The New Leader, 7E.15th
Prof. Carl J. Friedrich	Heidelberg	Harvard University
James T. Farrell, novelist	Zurich/or Paris	...E.58th St. c/o American Express Par.
Prof. Franz L. Neumann historian	Berlin	Columbia University
George Grosz, artist	NYC	The Cottage, Hilaire Farm, Huntington, L.I.
✓ Prof. G.A. Borgese	Chicago	University of Chicago
George Schuyler, Negro editor	NYC	270 Convent Avenue, NYC
✓ Tennessee Williams, playwright	Paris	Hotel Sherry Netherland in NYC; c/o American Express Company in Paris
✓ Carson McCullers, novelist	Paris	
✓ Boris Nicolaevsky Russian historian	NYC	417 West 120th Street NYC
David Lilienthal, public figure	Paris	c/o Hotel Bellman Rue Francois I, Paris
✓ Prof. George S. Counts educator	NYC	Columbia University Morningside, NYC

Additions:

From England:

✓ Peter de Mendelsohn, novelist	London	c/o The New Statesman and Nation, London
✓ Sebastian Hafner, editor	London	The Observer, a publicat. London, England
Prof. D.W. Brogan political scientist	London	Cambridge University England

14-00000

TOP SECRET

Secret

23 May 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Patrick J. Mc Feily

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions.

1. Departure and Arrival

You will proceed on or about 24 May 1950 to Frankfurt, Germany, reporting by telephone upon your arrival to the Chief of the VIKiva Station. From Frankfurt you will proceed to Berlin in accordance with orders of Chief of Station. You will procure your own travel facilities and hotel accommodations at the cities in which you stay.

2. Cover

Your cover is that of a student and tourist visiting Europe to improve your language proficiency and for summer travel. Your general appearance and conduct at all times must be in keeping with this cover. You will not carry any classified material while traveling. You are not to recognize other employees of this agency unless arrangements have been made in advance or unless you can do so in full keeping with your cover. While in Germany you may be asked to volunteer to work on the staff of the Berlin Cultural Congress. Acceptance of such an offer by you is considered to be in keeping with your cover. Permission will be requested of Home Office for any type of duty required of you which would tend to break your student-tourist cover.

3. Duties and Responsibilities

You have been thoroughly briefed on projects PDQUICK and FJMAYBE, and you will undertake such operational activities in connection with these projects as fall within the instructions you receive from the Chief VIKiva Station. In carrying out these operational activities you will avoid drawing public attention to yourself to the maximum possible extent.

4. Security

You are specifically charged with both physical and operational security in connection with matters which you handle and for which you are given responsibility.

David W. Ragsdale

DAVID W. RAGSDALE

4

TOP SECRET

COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SL

DATE

TO: LGZ

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Suggest discreetly
query Jim about
[illegible] then [illegible]
[illegible]
proceed [illegible]

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

17 May 1950

Subject: Report on Distribution of Der Monat through an Exemplary Outlet

While in Berlin I acquired a copy of the report dated March 13, 1950. I do not know whether it has been made available. The information in it seems to me interesting in itself and valuable for what it suggests in terms of further activities.

KBH

13 March 1950

Report on Distribution of *Der Monat* through an Exemplary Outlet

1. This describes the distribution activities of a single outlet, with connections primarily but not exclusively to students in the Soviet Zone. Since December 1949 the outlet has been supplied 1115 single copies and several hundred separate articles. At first single issues were supplied in numbers of 100, but because of rapidly increasing demand was later increased to 150 copies. However, the popularity of *Der Monat* has spontaneously led to a broader range of possibilities and a total of at least 300 copies per issue has been requested. To provide a total of so many copies from number 8/9 to 16 inclusive will mean a further delivery of 1575 copies. A few copies of numbers 5, 6 & 7 have been delivered as well as stapled single copies of George Orwell's "Animal Farm" and other articles taken by breaking up these same issues. Distribution has been free of charge and this has been emphasized to the contacts. It has been decided, however, to permit contacts to ask a nominal East Mark price when distributing a copy to an employed person. This would help cover the travel expenses of contacts to and from Berlin.

2. Reactions to *Der Monat* delivery through this outlet has been overwhelmingly encouraging. Each copy is said to change hands "at least" eight or nine times and as many as twenty times is considered usual. The result is that *Der Monat* has become widely known among students in the Eastern Zone. It is reported that it is even read openly in the mess-halls; SED students procure it and read it, although when on their own they are said to be more secretive than the non-communist organized student. Certain articles have become widely known, particularly Orwell's "1984". An explanation of where the magazines come from is given in the following terms: they are bought for SOVZON students by the Free University. It is generally accepted in the Soviet Zone that the Free University is the source of "anti-communist student agitations" etc. Persons connected with the Free University who come in contact with East Zone students state that they are being continuously asked for copies of Der Monat, in the sense of "I've been getting it seventh hand; I'd like to get it first hand."

3. Attention was continuously drawn to the popularity of Orwell's "1984". Hence the outlet asks whether it would be possible to make-up from broken numbers single stapled copies of "1984" - recalling that this had been done for them in the case of "Animal Farm" and other articles.

4. The outlet operates through an apparatus of couriers to all universities of the Soviet Zone. Universities are supplied by as many as four and an average of three different couriers, unknown to one another. Leipzig, Halle, Jena, Greifswald, Dresden and Rostock are thus covered. There are a large number of delivery contacts at the Humboldt University. Also there are contacts to the "Landes Hochschule" in Potsdam which is designed especially for training SED functionaries, teachers, and key occupations. Couriers from other academic institutions and circles are also supplied, as well as to a number of non-academic circles of significant strategic value, as described below.

5. The following examples are cited:

a) At a recent four-zonal meeting of evangelical student-ministers from all zones fifteen copies were distributed to several SZ delegates. More could not be furnished because of lack of supplies at that time. The recepients subsequently expressed such interest that regular delivery with a large number of copies has been established. The Karl Jaspers article was considered popular in this circle, and strong curiosity was expressed regarding "1984" which was being discussed in the zone.

b) A professor of journalism at one Soviet-Zone university approached a contact for two copies, promising to make good use of them. He asked that they be supplied regularly and sent a student from Leipzig to confirm this and pick them up. Both students and professor were checked upon and the delivery made.

c) A group of liberal and social-democratic students organized in the SED cooperate in a closed working-committee is recognized by the university as an academic activity of the faculty to which these students and professor belong. Monat articles are read and discussed and then translated into non-German languages and passed on as reading matter to trusted students in other sections of the Philosophical faculty.

d) The CDU executive in a city in Saxony receives the magazine, using it as discussion material regularly at closed educational forums for training party functionaries. Three weeks ago the article Tito contra Stalin was discussed.

e) Until recently a FDJ school for higher functionaries in Mecklenburg near the zonal border was supplied with copies of Der Monat which were read officially as the basis for working out counter-arguments. The connection was broken by the arrest of the courier, who was carrying Telegraf leaflets.

f) Twenty copies are regularly supplied for distribution to and through a Volkspolizei unit in Thuringia.

6. The outlet expresses great satisfaction with Monat distribution, considers it the ideal kind of reading for equiping oppositional students in the Soviet Zone with relatively safer and strategically suitable weapons, e.g. "ideas" and the "spirit of Europe". Der Monat is often contrasted with the Telegraf in this sense: Der Monat is not considered to exaggerate, is not the other pole, "with the truth somewhere between", but is respected and trusted for itself.

FDQUICK 15 May 1950

Notes of conference at the home of Mr. Burnham. Present: Messrs. Baker, Burnham, Lasky and Glaser.

1. Attention called to article in current issue of LIFE, mentioning the Cultural Congress in Berlin.

2. Memo from Stone states that JJ McCloy is not going to write special letter of invitation to Eleanor Roosevelt - apparently because of press release in which she stated she had changed her mind about attending. Lasky will take up with State the matter of special letters going to Roosevelt, Lilenthal and Conant, attempt persude them attend.

3. Some kind of pressure to be used to insure attendance Sidney Hook, possibly letter from Asst. Secy. of S. to Chancellor of U of C requesting leave of absence for 10 days.

4. Discussion of centralizing publicity releases from US. Lasky of opinion that Pitzele and Beichman would handle, requiring only small amount for expenses; decided to authorize this and Lasky will be given $200 to add to $200 which he already has (not having delivered same to Hook because Hook did not require it) with which he is sure he can lay proposition on.

5. Discussion of Am. Express technique of handling transportation. Agreed that interest of Foreign Service Ed. Foundation, FTUC and NY Com. should not be emphasized or revealed unless necessary.

6. Recital of steps being taken currently in Berlin.

7. List of delegates left with Burnham and Lasky in order that addresses may be filled in and returned. Will then be compared with list expected from Berlin. And final lists (up to this point) organized for delivery, through money sponsors, to Am. Express.

SECRET

A.

Publicity,

Interpreters.

Delegates

Am. Ex. Techniques

Ray M. / 2798
off: 2034

Briefe (current)

Letter Eleanor [illegible] — out

Pressure for Hook? U of C To Chancellor

EB – State [illegible] that Hook get permanent ; — McC has requested

Discussion of Publicity releases from US

for PR — [illegible]

[illegible] Lever [illegible]

[illegible] 1/2 [illegible]

Humor for travel only if question asked

Trans...

(Movies?) [illegible] A.F.

Chin. Haden (Lilienthal) Current

List [illegible] Burnham and Cosby for [illegible]

4

Aides Memoire for F.S.E.F. and N.Y. Com. respectively

MEMORANDUM

Foreign Service Educational Foundation

1. The American Express Company will be informed that the ~~School of Advanced International Studies~~ will sponsor and pay for the travel to Berlin and return of a number of persons, the names of whom will be furnished at a later date to the American Express Company.

2. At the same time that this notification is given to the American Express Company, the sum of ten thousand dollars will be turned over to them from which travel expense may be taken.

3. The clearing house for this business with the American Express Company will be the office of Mr. Gerard J. Gilmore, Assistant Passenger Traffic Manager of the Travel Department, 65 Broadway, New York, N. Y. When the names of the persons who are sponsored are furnished to the American Express Company, all data will be forwarded to the office of Mr. Gilmore, though the persons may be located anywhere in the world. The Company will cable instructions to their branch offices.

4. The actual furnishing of transportation will be effected as follows:

a. The American Express Company will have the name and address of the person, furnished by you.

b. The person will be instructed to present himself at a specified office of the American Express Company and identify himself.

c. He then will be given his choice of transportation by rail or air, will be given the requisite documents, will be authorized to spend up to 10% of the cost of travel, for incidental expenses.

5. The American Express Company will furnish to you a list of all persons to whom such transportation and expense money actually is provided. In the unlikely event that more money is needed than is covered by your deposit of $10,000, arrangements will be made for you to deposit additional money with the American Express Company. Any unexpended funds left in the hands of the American Express Company will be returned to you at the time a final accounting is rendered.

6. Arrangements will be made with the American Express Company, in your name, by Mr. Martin K. Williams, of Kingston, Penna.

12 Mar
[illegible] dollar check for
Transmitted by Williams to Gilmore
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] direct to Gilmore [illegible]

May Program for the Congress:

1. Printing of 4-page program, with special 4-page French and English translated supplement.
2. Cover letter to all delegates who have accepted; enclosures of program; ask what discussions most interest them; what they would be prepared to give, a formal 20-30 minute paper; or shorter comment; but there will be both semi-formal and informal discussion, so that all would have chance to participate. Mention matter of Europa-Union meeting (see von Trotha) other meetings (Civil Liberties Committees), University lectures, etc.
3. Problem of approaching "key men" to take over papers for main discussion. Also: problem of collecting as many papers for printing, if not to be delivered at Congress. Messages.
4. Check with M.J. about progress in getting art-exhibition of Berlin masters into town for June.
5. Ordering of books for (a) Taberna book-stalls, (b) special book-store show-window exhibits during Congress week, (c) special collections in British-French-American information centers. Should include original French, German, Italian, etc. editions — plus as many translations of Silone, Koestler, Burnham, et.al. as can be gotten. Get Scandinavia through Copenhagen bookstore? Italian editions through Frankfurt International (Koch GmbH.). British volumes through Libris (this time not paid via Peter Hart). French through Frohnau or Maison-de-France. To be checked with Frau Marga Schoeller. Special problem of reduced rates to facilitate sales. Include books of Orwell (also Russian ed.).
6. The ordering of photos of all relevant personalities: News and Art-style.
7. Kubicek to whip up with books and photos some special book shows for stores, windows, Taberna, etc.
8. Arrangement to have a "court photographer" at the Congress; weekly fee, plus expense-payment for film costs. Also: cartoonist for sketches.
9. Color banners with "Kongress", also French-English, for Titania, Tabernica, and Sporthalle.

10. Problem of Printed Invitations. Also cards for the Press. Cards for Taberna guests. Preparation of Berlin Guest List — Key people for Titania Invitation, and special invites to Heger-Eberlein-Scholz-Lemmer-Montijo-Hers et.al.-crowd in town.

11. Preparation of political-historical introduction to post-war Berlin. Simple, non-propagandistic, somewhat factual, possibly illustrated. (After fashion of excellent Breslau-Polish material)

12. Publishing of Congress Program booklet, Index to Sponsors, delegates. Photographs. To be finished last fortnight before Congress.

13. Purchase of heavy folder-portfolio to hold Congress materials for all delegates. Purchase of notebook, with Congress named, etc.

14. Finishing up of Placard design for Berlin and Western Germany.

15. Setting up of finance and especially Travel Buro with Travel personnel for all Congress return-trips.

16. Checking to see whether Visa or Military Entry Permits are moving easily; possibly free issuance. Intervention when difficulties arise. Mention this in letter to all delegates.

17. Check with RIAS for complete tape coverage of Congress; sections to be given to other German and foreign-language stations.

18. Approach BBC for British coverage. See Patrick Smith.

19. Preparation of page for feuilleton pages — series of photographs of key people coming to Congress, plus sketches.

20. Stenographic account of all discussions.

21. Mimeograph staff — allied with translation group — for papers, resolutions, special messages. Office space.

22. Publicity material for all literary editors in Western Germany, Austria (send through Dr. Liebl), Switzerland, Italy, France, England. Preparation of list of leading dailies, weeklies. Hiring of a Publicity man.

23. Check with Stadtrat May and Tietjen about "Fidelio" performance.

24. Check with Niklas about the Steinplatz park.

25. Complete arrangements for Steinplatz and Am Zoo Hotel rooms.

26. M.J. and the question of "Security" at the Hotels and Taberna.

27. Contract for Titania on Monday afternoon, and the Sporthalle for public meetings.

28. Arrangements for City-Congress reception on Monday evening — most preferably on the Wannsee, at the Gaestehaus.

29. Arrangement for a dozen taxis or so — hired for the week — with "motor pool dispatcher" — each cab marked "Kongress" — cutting down use of cruising cabs (security).

30. Has arrangements (who as guides?) for tour of city on a free morning (Monday, Thursday), or other times — not into Soviet sector, but along border points, Brandenburger Tor, etc.

31. Collecting vague thoughts about place and character of final reception party. Congress, commandants? where (Lakeside? Pfaueninsel?).

32. Problem of Congress meals and Congress expenses for Delegates. Austrians (among others) are broke. Usual Congress custom of meals.

33. Completion of several Monat reprints for the Taberna book-stall and Congress material. Silone, Koestler, among others. Monat exhibition. Bound volumes? Order fifty more.

34. Ticket and Information Bureau — facilitate to theater performances, concerts, restaurants, and the like.

35. Arrangements about at least two good interpreters — one to be native in German language. Translators into French and English should be native-in-language; also checkers. Allied liaison.

36. Press Facilities arrangements: telephone, cable.

37. Check on improved Buffet at Taberna.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: EAD

NO. 5-22911

DATE 26 April

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. FPB		16 apr			
2.					
3.					File
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					File: PD [illegible]
15.					[illegible]

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1949

SECRET

SECRET

25 April 1950

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: OPC Liaison with the Department of State

PARTICIPANTS: CPP, PS-II, Chief ABB, Chief FEB, and EAD

1. Mr. Frank stated that recent cables from the OPC representative in Germany concerning the Berlin rally in May and the Congress in June had raised policy questions which required State Department coordination. He stated that as a result of these cables he had requested Mr. Harrison to discuss these policy questions with Mr. Joyce and had requested Mr. Joyce to arrange for the necessary liaison with the Office of German Affairs.

2. Mr. Harrison stated that Mr. Joyce had arranged a meeting in his office where Mr. Batirbov and Mr. Baker of OPC had discussed these problems with Mr. Kellerman and Mr. Strauss of the Office of German Affairs, together with Mr. Schwinn. As a result of this meeting, the Office of German Affairs dispatched a State Department telegram to Hicog indicating that the Department was coordinating with CIA on a program designed to combat the effectiveness of the Berlin rally in May. This telegram received a wide distribution in Washington as well as in the headquarters of Hicog in Frankfurt.

3. Mr. Frank said that although he recognized the insecurity of the Office of German Affairs as evidenced by this telegram, he felt that it was essential for OPC to maintain liaison with the Office of German Affairs on policy matters. He proposed to recommend to Mr. Joyce that either Col. Byroade or Mr. Geoffrey Lewis be designated as the liaison officer for the Office of German Affairs to deal with OPC on policy matters subject to clearance in each instance with Mr. Joyce.

4. The undersigned agreed with Mr. Frank's proposal subject to the understanding that such liaison would be exercised under the existing policy laid down by ADPC, namely: that OPC liaison with the Department of State will be conducted only by ADPC, SADO, or CPP, and that if this authority is delegated it will only be done so when the individual authorized is satisfied that it is essential and can be controlled, and subject to the further understanding that such liaison will not involve operational details of OPC plans and operations.

C. V. H.

CVH/abf

cc: SADO
CPP
PS-II
Chief, FEB ✓
Chief, ABB

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:
CRDS

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. FB-III					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					File PD [illegible]

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1949

H 15-63 SECRET

SECRET

26 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. THOMAS K. [illegible], PSD/OSS

SUBJECT: Slow-burning Fuse

1. It is requested that one crate of fifty units of slow-burning fuse be procured for OPC. This fuse is a Barium Selenium Oxide mixture, made up in a quarter-inch lead tube, with a burning time of 279 seconds per unit.

2. It is further requested that Mr. John H. Jeffries, Consultant, PDC/OPC, be authorized to purchase this fuse, for which he will be reimbursed. (The estimated cost of one crate will be $46.56.) Charges for this procurement should be made against Project [illegible].

3. The above-mentioned fuse is to be delivered to CRDS on 27 April 1950 by Mr. Jeffries. After sufficient testing and formulation of instructions, CRDS will turn the fuse over to Mr. John Baker, FB-III, Operations Division, OPC.

L. R. DAILEY
Acting Chief
Research and Development

APPROVED:

John E. Baker

Chief of Operations

cc: FB-III ✓
COS

LRD/dr

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL

4/27
DATE

TO: Mr. Richard Baker

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Let's discuss.

FROM: C.V.

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

SECRET

April 24, 1950

Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom, June 26-30, 1950.

Professor Sidney Hook, Head, Department of Philosophy,
New York University.

Mr. Bruce Buttles, GAI.

GER - Mr. Henry A. Byroade
S/P - Mr. Robert P. Joyce

The undersigned called upon Professor Hook at his home, 696-A Third Street, Brooklyn 15, N. Y., at 3:00 o'clock on April 22, 1950 to discuss domestic arrangements in support of the Congress, for which Professor Hock has been designated American representative. There were no other persons present.

Professor Hook opened the conversation by emphasizing the need to minimize the Government's interest in the Congress. He felt that it was essential to retain the appearance of a completely private venture. I assured him this was also the Department's view. Referring to the status of Melvin J. Lasky, secretary of the Congress in Berlin, as an employee of HICOG, Professor Hook then said he thought Mr. Lasky should be given a leave of absence in order to carry through the project in a private capacity. I promised to look into this problem, and commented that it could not be done readily without Mr. Lasky's cooperation. I also suggested that since Mr. Lasky to my knowledge was spending some of his personal funds on preparations for the Congress, it would only be fair to look for some other source of income for Mr. Lasky during such time as he might be on leave from Government service.

On continuing

SECRET

On continuing the discussion, it was clear that in working alone Professor Hook had as yet been unable to make any considerable progress on behalf of the Congress, and that there was urgent need for (a) a minimum staff to handle the program in this country and (b) a small allocation of funds to pay for telephone, stationery, publicity, etc. Until the present time, Professor Hook has been carrying the entire expense and work himself, and apparently has had to be extremely careful about such items as long distance telephone calls. For example, he felt he could afford to telephone Professor John Dewey in Florida and ask him to sponsor the Congress (which invitation Professor Dewey accepted,) but he hesitated to put out the larger funds to telephone Upton Sinclair in California. He would also like to call the Congress headquarters in Berlin, but felt that the transatlantic toll charge was quite beyond his means.

In reply to my query as to what sort of budget would be necessary, Professor Hook suggested that he would need a secretary-typist for two months and a public relations man on a part-time basis for the same period. He thought the secretary could be obtained for $250 a month and the publicity man for less than $500, In addition, $500 would be sufficient for such items as rental of typewriters, stationery, telephone calls, postage, etc. This would make a total budget of $2,000. The rental expense could be reduced, he thought, by using the offices of The New Leader, a Socialist publication of which he is one of the editors. He did not think it advisable to have a pretentious office, since obvious affluence would incite suspicion. The activity could be organised by Americans for Intellectual Freedom, of which he is the founder. This group staged the anti-Communist program in New York in March 1949 for less than $25.00.

As to the expenses of American representatives going to Berlin, Professor Hook hoped that it would not be necessary to use military transportation, since that would create the impression of Government sponsorship. He thought commercial transportation would definitely be preferable, and added that he would like to be in a position to give cash grants to the delegates of about $700, that is, the round-trip fare plus a few dollars over for incidentals. He felt it would be undesirable for too large an American representation to be sent. Probably six or seven people would be enough. This would mean a transportation budget of less than $5000.

Several times during the conversation, Professor Lasky stressed that it was not necessary to have a large sum of money. For what was needed, he said, the right people could hardly be paid; it was essential, he said, to have "dedicated personnel" who were willing if necessary to make personal sacrifices.

On the other hand, he thought it vital to have the right sort of publicity. The press arrangements should be carefully made. He hoped that someone in Washington could ask Mr. Henry Luce of Time and Life and Mr. A. H. Sulzberger of the New York Times to arrange the right sort of coverage, that is, by the right people, such as Anne O'Hare McCormick

of the

of the Times. He would like to invite Luce himself, but doubted if it would be politically desirable. At this point, I suggested inviting Mrs. Clare Booth Luce, and Professor Hook thought that might be the answer to his dilemma.

To handle the publicity Professor Hook thought he might hire Arnold Beichman (20 West 84th Street, New York), who is editor of a trade union paper in New York. Beichman handled press matters successfully for the anti-Communist demonstration last March. Professor Hook could make the first necessary arrangements himself, but would be glad to have any offer of assistance come to him through the offices of the New Leader, at 7 East 15th Street, New York 3. Telephone: SPring 7-8260.

I suggested that there was some indication that the Advertising Council might be able to find some space or other publicity assistance, and Professor Hook said he would be most grateful for that type of help. He hoped that the people concerned would approach him in the near future.

GER:GAI:BButtles:es

[illegible] Jim Henry Luce Tel. 55401

SECRET

14 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: SADO

SUBJECT: Congress for Cultural Freedom

One of the most pressing problems in connection with the proposed Intellectual Peace Congress to be held in Berlin is the matter of providing funds for transportation of delegates. We have conceived the possibility of two or three organizations overtly financing trips for cultural and intellectual leaders from various countries. The money thus provided might be deposited with the American Express Company with instructions to honor transportation requests from persons holding bona fide invitations to the Congress endorsed by one of the sponsoring organizations.

It is expected that there will be a total of approximately 60 delegates. At this date, the following persons have been invited:

England
- Bertrand Russell, Philosopher
- Julian Huxley, Biologist
- R.H.S. Crossman, M.P. and Author
- Victor Gollancz, Publisher
- Barbara Ward, Editor

France
- André Gide, Author
- Arthur Koestler, Author
- David Rousset, Editor

Germany
- Karl Jaspers, Philosopher
- Alfred Weber, Sociologist
- Carlo Schmid, Politician
- Eugen Kogon, Editor

Italy
- Benedetto Croce, Author and Politician
- Ignazio Silone, Novelist
- Carlo Levi, Author

SECRET

File: PDTuck

United States
John Dewey, Philosopher
Reinhold Niebuhr, Theologian and Publicist
Sidney Hook, Philosopher and Writer

Also the following:

Herbert Read
Raymond Aron
Remy Roure
Hendryk Brugmans
Frode Jakobsen
David Williams
Irving Brown
Francois Bondy
Edouard Roditi
Norbert Muhlen
Alexander Mitscherlich
Dolf Sternberger
William Phillips
Franz Borkenau
Peter de Mendelsohn
David Rousset

J.L.B.

FBIII/IC/[illegible]
cc: OPC Reg (2)
FBIII Chrono
FBIII File

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:	NO. DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1.					[illegible] Emmett [illegible]
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

File PP guide,
Nobody has room.

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

12 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Kenneth H. Hambley

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions

1. Departure and Arrival

You will proceed on or about 13 April 1950 to Frankfurt, Germany, reporting upon your arrival there to the Chief of the VLKiva Mission through arrangements of which you have been advised orally. From Frankfurt you will proceed to Berlin in accordance with further arrangements of which the Chief of VLKiva German Mission will apprise you. En route to Frankfurt you are authorized to stop over, for a period not to exceed 4 days, in Paris if you deem such a step advisable in the furtherance of your mission. You will leave Berlin, Germany, on or about 7 May 1950 and return to the home station. En route to the home station you will be authorized to stop over at such other European cities, and for such amounts of time, as may subsequently be approved by the home office upon your recommendation. You will be responsible for procuring all of your own travel facilities and hotel accommodations at the cities in which you stay.

2. Cover

Your cover is that of a free-lance writer and lecturer visiting Europe to procure material for future publications. Your general appearance and conduct at all times must be in keeping with this cover. You will not carry any classified material with you while traveling. You are not to recognize other employees of this agency unless arrangements have been made in advance or unless you can do so in full keeping with your cover. You will not attract attention to yourself either by acts uncharacteristic of your cover or by the absence of actions consistent with your cover. While in Germany you may be asked to act for a period as a special consultant to the Office of the High Commissioner. Acceptance of such an appointment by you is considered to be in keeping with your cover. Within your cover you are authorized also to accept invitations to lecture on subjects not directly related to your primary mission.

3. Duties and Responsibilities

a. Operational

You have been thoroughly briefed on projects SGHound and PDQuick, and you will undertake such operational activities in connection with these projects as fall within the instructions you receive from the Chief of the VLKiva Mission and his authorized representative. In carrying out these operational activities, you will avoid drawing public attention to yourself to the maximum possible extent, and you will in particular avoid, for the purposes of this trip, publicly associating yourself with project PDQuick. This injunction, however, will not prevent your meeting privately with any other individuals concerned with either the overt or covert phases of the project. You will, in addition, act as consultant to the Chief of the VLKiva Mission and his authorized representatives on such other matters as they may wish to bring to your attention.

4. Security

You are specifically charged with both physical and operational security in connection with matters which you handle and for which you are given responsibility.

David W Ragsdale
DAVID W. RAGSDALE

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: OPC Reg

NO. BNCF-30

DATE 12 April 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. FBB		12 Apr			1 of 3 copies
2.					FIELD DISPATCH PLEASE EXPEDITE
3.					
4.					2 of 3 copies to: SADO ~~ABB/III Denby~~ PB II
5.					3 of 3 copies to: COP Reg
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					File PD [illegible]

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

4-00000

BNCP- 30

4 April 1960

SUBJECT: Congress for Cultural Freedom

TO: Jonathan S. Gearing

1. Berlin newspapers have recently carried a dpa announcement of a Congress for Cultural Freedom to be held during the last week of June 1950. The notices in DER TAGESSPIEGEL and DER TAG of 2 April and in DIE NEUE ZEITUNG and TELEGRAF of 4 April were all similar and brief - about one inch in length. DAS BERLINER STADTBLATT (Social Democrat) of 2 April, however, carried a large(2¼"x 7"), front-page article.

2. The dpa text of the former newspapers was generally as follows:

> A Congress for Cultural Freedom will be held in Berlin during the last week of June. The Berlin Committee which is preparing the Congress consists of Ernst Reuter, Lord Mayor of Berlin, Professor Edwin Redslob, Rector of the Berlin Free University, and Dr. Otto Suhr, Director of the Berlin Hochschule fuer Politik. Melvin J. Lasky, Editor of the international review DER MONAT, will act as General Secretary to the congress.

3. The article in the Berliner Stadblatt contains the information of the dpa release and adds the following:

> It is believed that a large number of prominent writers and men of learning will attend the Congress. Among others, the following men are expected to participate: Author Ignazio SILONE (Italy), Professors Julian HUXLEY (England) and Sidney HOOK (USA), Poet Arnulf OVERLAND (Norway) and Ture NERMAN (Sweden) as well as David ROUSSET and Arthur KOESTLER.

MATTHEW T. CHRISTIE

Dist:
cc: H.O. (3) ✓
Bingham (1)

-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

Staff II, [illegible]

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Mr. Baker	2202				File
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

SECRET

11 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BAKER

SUBJECT: PDQUICK and TPPIKER

1. I refer to the attached memorandum of 7 April 1950 addressed to you by Mr. Glaser.

2. I refer particularly to paragraph 4 sentence 2 of the above memorandum and to FRAN 117 paragraph 1, B.

3. My suggestion in this regard is as follows:

I suggest that we do not desire for PDQUICK a Rhino Circular to Embassies similar to the circular supporting QKIVORY, because a circular of that sort is not essential and would unnecessarily invite attention to the U. S. interest in PDQUICK.

4. A copy of the QKIVORY circular is attached for your information.

J. C. DENBY

JCD/aef

SECRET

C O P Y

CONFIDENTIAL

CIRCULAR AIRGRAM
21 June 1949

TO: Certain American Diplomatic Officers

The Formation of National Committee for Free Europe, Inc., with headquarters in New York, was announced on June 1, 1949. This Committee is a private organization concerning itself with democratic leaders and scholars who are exiled from the following countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The Committee will be financed by private contributions.

The following is quoted from a statement issued by Joseph C. Grew, Chairman of the Committee in announcing its formation:

> "Our program begins with the tangible fact of the presence here of these exiles and refugees. There is an American tradition of hospitality to political refugees. The promise which we gave at Yalta remains unredeemed. More than that we have a definite self-interest in helping to keep alive, and in full vigor political leaders who share our view of life--leaders who have refused to knuckle under, men who have not hesitated to risk their lives for their democratic faith. As item No. 1 in our immediate program we propose--have in fact already begun--to find suitable occupations for these democratic exiles... We are setting out to find suitable positions for them in colleges and universities. We are proposing to ask others of them to prepare studies on topics for which they are especially equipped... At the same time we are encouraging each national group of exiles to draw together politically--all democratic elements, that is, those other than Fascists or Communists--in order to form in their temporary American haven National Committees which can stand as symbols of democratic hope for their countrymen in Eastern Europe.... We look forward to the day when there will no longer be an Iron Curtain....and these six nations which we helped liberate from the Nazi oppression will be free from the Communist oppression and once more can organize their existence in their own way. When that time comes there will be something close to social chaos and political vacuum, for the first effort of totalitarian regimes is to destroy all constructive elements which might build anything different from themselves. Looking forward to that historic and critical time we have in mind that, if meanwhile democratic leaders have been helped to keep alive and in vigor in the democratic havens to which they have been driven we can hope that, returning, they will have parts in a democratic reconstruction. Our second purpose will be to put the voices of these exiled political leaders on the air, addressed to their own peoples back in Europe, in their own languages, in the familiar tones. We shall help them also if we can to get their messages back by the printed word. . . . Of course we are not going to compete with the Voice of America. We shall en-

CONFIDENTIAL

deaver to supplement the Voice of America, for the Voice is under restrictions by reason of its official character. It is our American habit not to leave everything to government. In the field of the contest of ideas there is much which private initiative can accomplish best. The third and final point in our immediate program is to set out at once to bring the exiled leaders into a broad contact with American life. . . Our idea is to enable these proven champions of democracy to see with their own eyes how freedom and democracy are working out in the United States . . . I have no doubt that as we go along other activities will be added to our program . . ."

Members of the Committee, as of 1 June 1949 were: Frank Altschul (Treasurer), Hamilton Fish Armstrong, A. A. Berle, Francis Biddle, Robert Woods Bliss, Hugh A. Drum, Allen W. Dulles, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mark Ethridge, James A. Farley, William Green, Joseph C. Grew (Chairman), Charles R. Hook, Arthur Bliss Lane, Henry R. Luce, Arthur W. Page, DeWitt C. Poole (Executive Secretary), Charles H. Spofford, Charles P. Taft, DeWitt Wallace, Mathew Woll.

For your information, the Department has been continually informed of the process of formation of the Committee, although the Department has no active concern with the Committee's activities, it has given its unofficial approval to the Committee's objectives. Because of the implicitly political nature of the Committee's work, there will be coordination between it and the Department. We expect that the Committee will cooperate in every way toward the accomplishment of our objectives in Eastern Europe and of the general aims of our foreign policy.

14-00000

SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING

DATE : 7 April 1950

SUBJECT : PDQUICK and TPPIALR

PRESENT : Messrs. Glaser, Denby, Chester, Droller, Smith.

1. Discussion of arrangements made for departure and cover for James Burnham. Mr. Smith will handle details.

2. It was agreed that a recommendation be made to COP that two members of this committee, representing COP and CPP, respectively, be given authority to take emergency action on cables received out of normal hours of work requiring emergency handling; it being anticipated that such emergencies may arise in connection with projects TPPIMER and PDQUICK over any of the weekends between the present date and 1 June.

3. FRAN 113 (IN 21595) was considered in detail and all items in paragraph 1 and 2 were approved. With reference to item F of paragraph 2, project [illegible] FRAN 111 (IN 21715), Mr. Denby assumed the responsibility for clearing this matter with the State Department through Mr. Offie, and if a favorable response is received, a cable of concurrence will be sent to the field.

With reference to paragraph 3, it was proposed by Mr. Droller that items A and B be combined. That is, that no scare be created with reference to bubonic plague or other serious diseases but that a campaign be instituted to the effect that the water of East Berlin is seriously contaminated and is causing dysentery, that warnings be issued and published in the press sympathetically urging the populace of East Berlin, including the FDJ participants, not to drink the water without boiling it, not to drink it under any circumstances except from paper cups, not to wash clothes in such water nor to bathe or shave with it and to take every precaution to protect themselves. Then proceed with item A and doctor the soup with a strong but harmless laxative which would not only serve a purpose in itself but would tend to bear out the rumor contained in item B.

The committee was not in favor of item D unless it could be justified more logically and did not understand the [illegible] of item C. Dispatch 57-C[illegible] was examined and read with much gratification. The lists of names are being compared with lists which have been gathered here and recommendations will be sent to the field

4. FRAN 117 (IN 21944) was examined and it was decided to refer item 1A to Mr. Baker to be taken up with Mr. Wisner as a recommendation beyond the competence of this committee to handle. Item 1B was referred to Mr. Denby for analysis and report. With reference to item 1C it is not understood why interpreters of this caliber will not be available in Berlin and cable will be sent to the field. With reference to paragraph 1 D, this was referred to Mr. Droller who will discuss it with Mr. Bryan for the [illegible] of specific suggestions; in this connection, the suggestion was offered by Mr. Droller that a cash award should also be included.

L.G.

LC/mc

cc. Mr. Baker

7 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Dawson Smith

SUBJECT : Travel arrangements concerning Kenneth P. Hambley

1. In connection with PDQUICK and TPPIKER, it is now proposed that Hambley shall leave the U.S. on or about 17 April, proceed to Berlin, remain there approximately two weeks (rendering assistance in preparations for PIKER affair, also in preparations for QUICK) and shall then leave Berlin to return to the U.S. En route, on return, he will, if indicated by the course of affairs in Berlin, make calls on prominent people in Western Europe who are to be present at the PDQUICK meeting, in order to confirm their acceptances or induce them to accept if they have not already done so. He is expected to return to the U.S. approximately between 5 and 10 May. He is scheduled to return to Berlin sometime between 5 and 15 June to help in completing arrangements for QUICK including his own participation.

2. Arrangements in prospect:

a. Hambley will attend to renewal of passport and obtaining entry permit to Germany (as author interested in details concerning publication of his book in Germany.)

If there are delays in obtaining passport or entry permit, Carpenter will expedite.

If, for any reason, entry permit becomes impracticable from Washington, Hambley will go to Paris where, by cooperation with Carmel Offie, he will apply for entry permit to Germany which will be made immediately available.

b. Hambley will go directly to Frankfurt where he will get in touch with de Neufville, and arrangements made to put him under HICOG cover as consultant to Der Monat. Lasky may be in Frankfurt at time - in any event Hambley will proceed to Berlin where Lasky will be his cover for contact with others in Berlin.

c. A covert travel order is being prepared which will authorize advance to Hambley of $1500. Hambley will buy his own transportation.

3. All

3. All of these matters will have to be ironed out and coordinated. Routine matters will be in hands of Miss Johnson, FBIII. She will be in contact with Carpenter and will know all details concerning travel order, advance, entry permit, and passport, so far as necessary cooperation from Carpenter's office is concerned. Arrangements should be completed, if practicable, on Monday 10 April.

Louis Glaser

LG/mo

cc: Miss Johnson

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION
Secret
BY AUTH
ADPC
Eric Jones
Ch. EE/G and IC
15 July 58

6 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADPC

VIA: COP

SUBJECT: OPC Plans for Counter-Action against the Deutschlandtreffen.

1. In compliance with your request, there is submitted herewith a report on OPC covert operations, in progress or under consideration, to counter the Communist-sponsored Free German Youth rally (Deutschlandtreffen), scheduled for 27-28-29 May in Berlin.

2. The initial objective of OPC counter-action is to so harass, hinder and frustrate the Deutschlandtreffen that it cannot be used as a weapon to oust the Allied Powers from the Western Sectors of Berlin. If a substantial degree of success is achieved in that phase, major effort could then be directed toward instigating anti-communist demonstrations in the Soviet Sector, thus turning the rally entirely to Western advantage.

3. The OPC program for this event is designed to supplement and reinforce overt activities planned by occupation authorities to achieve the same objective. All OPC operations directed against the Deutschlandtreffen either have been or will be cleared with appropriate civilian and military officials, with whom high level liaison is maintained in the field.

4. A major criterion of OPC activities is that they not be directly attributable to the U.S. government. Hence they fall into two classes:

a. Those conducted by entirely clandestine means and not attributable to any actual source, and

b. Those attributable to indigenous individuals and groups, with official U.S. instigation or support concealed.

In view of the strongly pro-Western and anti-Soviet orientation of the Berlin population generally, the second type of activity offers exceptional opportunities to inspire, guide and covertly assist actual German resistance to the rally.

5. Activities

Copy #2

5. Activities in various stages of planning or implementation by OPC include the following:

a. Propaganda:

Preparation of 750,000 anti-communist leaflets by the Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, an indigenous German organization sponsored by OPC, to be distributed during the rally;

Staff preparation of at least two counter-rally pamphlets, to be distributed by clandestine networks into the Soviet Zone prior to the event;

Preparation by a controlled German attorney of indictments stressing illegal aspects of the rally, including the matter of parental responsibility for minors;

Instigation of letters of warning from West Berlin students to acquaintances in the Soviet Zone;

Planning for special editions of one or more West Berlin newspapers to be distributed free during the rally;

Subsidizing distribution of 150,000 extra copies of the magazine Freundschaft, organ of a West Berlin anti-communist youth group;

Consideration of publishing fake editions of Communist newspapers, containing propaganda of deception and confusion;

Preparation of a letter, addressed to Soviet Zone clergymen, asking them to use their influence to keep young people out of Berlin during the rally;

Inspiring West Berlin newspapers and the U.S.-licensed radio station, RIAS, to carry material favorable to U.S. aims before, during and after the rally.

b. Harassment and Deception:

Promotion of a rumor campaign to the effect that Communists are eager to have German young people killed and injured during the rally, to provide martyrs for the Moscow cause;

Promotion of another rumor campaign to the effect that Communists plan recruitment of rally participants for labor in Russia;

Circulation

Copy #2

Circulation of a forged order, indicating that the rally actually is a device for recruitment of German youth into the Soviet Zone People's Police;

Planting a news story to the effect that the rally came about as the result of direct orders issued by Moscow to Walther Ulbricht, German Communist leader, on the occasion of his recent visit to the Russian capital;

Faking offers to provide billeting for rally participants in ruins, unsavory hotels or other undesirable space;

Consideration of disrupting transportation and other rally plans by issuance of false orders and proclamations;

Obtaining FDJ uniforms for possible use by agents of disruption;

c. Counter-Attractions:

Sponsorship by the Kampfgruppe of a fireworks display the evening of 29 May;

Covert guidance and encouragement of West Berlin merchants to prepare attractive displays of merchandise, illustrating the relatively high standards of Western living;

Covert sponsoring of free, or low-priced motion picture shows, featuring especially interesting films;

Covert sponsoring of sports events or other mass attractions, designed for the double purpose of maintaining West Berlin morale and distracting rally participants;

Approximately three weeks after the rally, covert sponsorship of a cultural and intellectual congress in Berlin—one of its objectives being to unmask the hypocrisy of communist intellectual appeals to youth.

d. Counter-Violence:

If, and only if, high policy considerations require, covert organization, support and guidance of pro-Western indigenous street-fighting units to meet a display of force with greater force.

6. In

SECRET

Copy #2

6. In addition to the foregoing plans, further opportunities unquestionably will arise for CPC direct activities or support to indigenous German groups with plans of their own to counteract the rally.

7. CPC is reinforcing its German staff with all available qualified personnel, and is prepared to set aside such sums of confidential funds as may be required to provide effective financial support for approved activities.

John H. Baker
FDE

SECRET

Copy #2

SECRET

4 April 1950

REPORT

SUBJECT : TPPIKER

TO : John E. Baker, Chief, FBB

1. Background

a. The communist youth mass meeting planned for Berlin during the Whitsun holidays, 27, 28, and 29 May, has been and is the subject of a major propaganda offensive by the Russians and by German communists. It has followed the characteristic Soviet pattern of creating confusion and tenseness on the part of the propaganda targets achieving this objective by alternating belligerent threats with peaceful platitudes. The threats have ranged from declarations that the communist youth would drive the Western imperialists out of Berlin to outright statements that they would seize the Western Berlin government and restore the city to a unified, peaceful capital of Germany. The peaceful declarations have stated that the demonstration of 500,000 boys and girls (from all over Germany, and from other countries) will chiefly take place in Eastern Berlin and will consist of rally-marching, sports events, fireworks, and huge peace meetings. Permission was requested by the FDJ, of Oberburgermeister Reuter, to march in a body to the Olympic Stadium (in the British Sector) but Reuter briefly and emphatically refused.

b. Three groups are officially dealing with the situation.

(1) The Berlin Allied Kommandatura

(2) A committee under Oburgermeister Reuter

(3) A special HICOG committee.

These groups have coordinated their plans and accordingly reasonable precautions ~~should~~ are expected to be taken to protect vital installations in West Berlin. The police force has been augmented and provided with riot equipment.

c. It is now estimated that it is not the intention of the communists to make a serious effort to drive the Western occupying forces out of Berlin, or to seize the West city government. However, their campaign has succeeded to this extent, that it is not known whether or not they will attempt an actual putsch, or if they will adopt a policy of opportunism and probe-and-thrust at West Berlin defences with the determination to advance as far as they can; or if they will, in fact, confine themselves to meetings and demonstrations in East Berlin. The possibility exists that their demonstrations may get out of hand or go beyond the intention of the impressarios of the show. Whether or not they attempt a coup d'etat, they assuredly will press every propaganda advantage.

SECRET

d. The

d. The situation has been regarded as serious and potentially dangerous. Even as a propaganda triumph it might serve to strengthen communist drives all over Europe, especially in Germany, and if there was any manifest weakness or temporizing on the part of forces in West Berlin, the Deutschlandtreffen might serve as a springboard to huge gains.

2. Purpose of OPC plan

OPC operations against the Deutschlandtreffen are intended to oppose, harrass and attempt to turn to U.S. advantage the communist FDJ rally; also to render cooperation with other elements of resistance. To achieve this purpose, it is contemplated that a number of propaganda and psychological warfare activities will be utilized; it may also be necessary to provide specific support for resistance groups prepared to use physical violence to prevent FDJ demonstrations in West Berlin.

3. Plans

Since January, the German Mission, OPC, has been planning a counter-attack. On 31 January, a field dispatch outlined steps to be taken and this has been amplified considerably in the last two months. At the present time, plans to neutralize or defeat the psychological and physical attack of the communists, contemplate the following:

a. Clandestine propaganda, distributed throughout East Germany, in advance of the Deutschlandtreffen, intended to break down desire to participate and exposing the militaristic and totalitarian character of the affair. Included:

a pastoral letter, addressed to all clergymen in the East Zone, entreating that young people be kept out of Berlin during the FDJ rally, to prevent damage to their souls and bodies;

spreading of rumors that large masses of young Germans are to be rounded up and shipped elsewhere for forced labor, and that numbers of them will be killed (with the murders charged to the Americans) in order to create martyrs for the cause;

special editions of Berlin papers (distributed in East Germany) emphasizing the spectacle of Soviet Russia driving German youth into militarism.

b. Organized radio, press and other forms of publicity, during the Deutschlandtreffen, distributed throughout East Berlin and East Germany, featuring positive achievements of the West as contrasted to negative achievements of the East.

c. The staging of counter attractions, intended to reveal to large numbers of communist youth the better, unregimented life of

Western

Western Germany as exemplified in West Berlin. In connection with this campaign, the illumination of West Berlin shops with display of luxury merchandise, special theatrical and movie attractions, sports events, possibly an automobile show. ?

d. Neutralization of possible communist propaganda claims of abuse and martyrdom, by discounting claims in advance and ridiculing the purpose.

e. Preparation to support groups of street fighters organized to resist attempts on the part of the FDJ to seize or damage installations in West Berlin and to meet any demonstration of force with greater force - if high policy approves such defense operations.

f. A plan (subject of project PDQUICK) to hold, shortly after the Deutschlandtreffen, an Intellectual and Cultural Peace Congress in Berlin, bringing together a number of leaders of German, American, British, French, Russian, Czech, Italian, and other nationalities, representing high achievement and international reputation in fields of labor, philosophy, politics, literature, art, music, education, and science. The Congress, held on the borderline between free and slave Europe, will concern itself with denouncing and exposing the swindle of communist peace propaganda, will beam its message to the satellite states to the effect that only intellectual and cultural slavery is possible in the Soviet system. Arrangements will be effected for broadcasting and publicizing the meetings of the Congress and a large distribution of its deliberations throughout East Germany and satellite Europe. Arrangements also will be made for worldwide publicity and follow-up. It is expected that the Congress will be self-perpetuating and will hold further meetings.

4. Headquarters action

Following Mr. Lindsay's memorandum of 25 January and the field dispatch of 31 January, headquarters action with reference to the Deutschlandtreffen - and the Cultural Congress, as tied in - has taken the following course:

(a) A conference was held in PE-III on 7 February at which the basic idea of PDQUICK was approved by representatives of Staffs II and III, SADO, and PE-II. Based on this approval a cable of authorization was sent to field the same date.

(b) During February a committee was organized consisting of Messrs. Glaser (Chairman), Chester, Droller, and Denby, to act as an expediting and coordinating group. At this date, the committee has had two formal and a number of informal meetings. Members of the committee have also met twice with Dr. Hilger and four times with Mr. Burnham.

(c) Arrangements

(c) Arrangements were completed to send a 'task force' to the field, consisting of two senior propaganda consultants and four junior assistants. At this date one of the juniors is on duty in Berlin, three others are ready to depart this week; the two senior consultants are expected to be in Berlin during this month.

(d) Approval of initial propaganda operations, involving mailing of approximately 100,000 pieces to East Germany, was cabled.

(e) Various suggestions have been sent to the field, including recommendation that a complete documentary and photographic record be made.

(f) A dossier of information, with reference to the Deutschlandtreffen, has been collected, including record of a State Department conference (by teletype) and summary of plans approved by the Allied Kommandatura.

(g) A project has been prepared (SGHOUND) allotting $35,000 for emergency support of activities in connection with resistance to the Deutschlandtreffen.

X (h) Discussions have been held, ideas formulated and support research accomplished, most of this material held in suspense awaiting reports from the field as to current and planned requirements.

Louis Glaser
FE-III

FEIII/LG/mc

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: LG —

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:
Burnham has some solid views contra Reichstag promotion. Suggest you talk over with him. How is his baseball coming?

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP. 1946

1 April May?

JEB: This idea sounded as though it might have mischief-making potentialities; I have discussed it with Shub and Droller.

The last time a group of Germans met before the Reichstag (which is 100 yards from the Soviet Sector of Berlin) was the 9th of September 1948 - the occasion on which Reuter make his ringing declaration of defiance of the Russians, and ALSO defied the Western Powers, saying: "You cannot buy us or sell us into slavery" by which he warned them not to make any deals with the Russians that would deliver Berlin to the communists. After that meeting, at which 23 were shot, one killed, the British Commandant denied the use of the Reichstag Platz for any future meetings. Gen. Bourne has changed his mind for the 1st of May, will permit a great anti-communist mass meeting (probably several hundred thousand people) which will again be addressed by Reuter. Anything can happen, because West Berlin police and West Allied troops will be on one side of the Brandenburg Thor facing East Berlin police and Russian troops on the other side. The 9th of September 1948 was historical, I have a hunch the 1st of A~~pril~~ 1950 will be also.

Would that be a good time for Reuter to lay the foundation of establishment of the Reichstag as a 'House of European Peace?' If it is, a cable along the following lines might be sent:

I, APPRECIATE YOUR OPINION OF APPROACHING REUTER WITH REFERENCE MAY FIRST REICHSTAG MEETING WITH SUGGESTION HE INCORPORATE IN HIS REMARKS DECLARATION TO FOLLOWING EFFECT:

THIS BUILDING, SYMBOL OF FAILURE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, DESTROYED BY NAZIS IN CAMPAIGN TO IMPOSE POLITICAL AND MORAL SLAVERY ON WORLD, STANDS ON PRECISE BORDER OF TWO WORLDS, ONE FREE OTHER SLAVE. WE REDEDICATE BUILDING AS HOUSE OF EUROPEAN FREEDOM, SYMBOL OF OUR PURPOSE AND PURPOSE OF ALL LIBERTY LOVING PEOPLES OF EUROPE NEVER TO LAY DOWN ARMS IN STRUGGLE AGAINST DESPOTISM. WE INVITE ALL FREE MEN AND WOMEN TO JOIN IN OUR DECLARATION THAT PEACE AND FREEDOM SHALL NEVER PERISH, WE ESPECIALLY INCLUDE THE COMMON PEOPLE OF RUSSIA AND THOSE COUNTRIES UPON WHOM THE BITTER COMMUNIST YOKE HAS BEEN IMPOSED ~~THRUST~~, WE KNOW IF THOSE PEOPLE COULD THROW OFF THE MERCILESS, FASCIST TRYANNY OF THE POLITBURO, THEY WOULD BE THE FIRST TO JOIN US. THIS BUILDING SHALL BE RESTORED, SHALL ARISE FROM ITS ASHES AS MONUMENT TO DETERMINATION OF FREE MEN THAT THEY

NEVER SHALL SUBMIT TO CHAINS OF POLITICAL SLAVERY. AS MEETING AFTER MEETING IS HELD HERE, THE VOICE OF FREE EUROPE SHALL BE HEARD IN SLAVE EUROPE. ONE DAY THE PEOPLE OF ALL EUROPE SHALL BE UNITED IN DECENT, HAPPY LIFE PLANNED FOR THEM BY THE GREAT REVOLUTIONISTS OF HISTORY, BY HEINE, GARIBALDI, MAZZINI, VOLTAIRE?, DANTON, VERA FIGNER. FREEDOM BELONGS TO ALL MEN AND CONCERNS ALL MEN, IT BELONGS TO RUSSIANS/, GERMANS, FRENCHMEN, CZECHS, POLES, IT IS ONE AND INDIVISIBLE.

2. obtaining complete coverage IN EAST GERMANY WILL GUARANTEE INFILTRATION INTO BORDERING SATELLITES. THESE CAN BE DEVELOPED IS OUR VIEW. ANXIOUS HAVE YOUR OPINION AND IF YOU AND REITER THINK SOUND PROCEDURE ~~ALSO [illegible]~~.

21 March

JEB: Spent an hour and a half this morning at the home of James Burnham; present - Burnham, Denby, myself and Col. Lansdale from Chester's office.

COVER. Burnham says that the matter of his going over as attached in any way to McCloy was brought up because he wanted to have an opportunity to meet and talk with McCloy. In the meantime, McCloy came over here and Burnham saw him three times (we have one memorandum of conversation.) He added that cover has never been a serious point with him, that he has travelled a number of times in various parts of the world pursuing his profession as a writer and lecturer, furnishing his own cover. The last time he went to Germany he was attached as consultant to ISD. He is willing to go over without any cover at all, or as consultant to Der Monat, if that seems indicated. I told him I believed something like that was indicated as giving him a base of operation and rationalizing his contacts. Therefore, I shall prepare the memo. for Garland on the 'open' basis I had previously suggested but with Der Monat in mind.

TIMING. Burnham is disturbed at the prospect of going to Europe for as long as sixty days and is quite reluctant to consider a longer period. This brought up the entire matter of the Congress and its juxtaposition to the FDJ Deutschland Treffen. All of us evidenced some despair over the fact that obviously we cannot mastermind either project without further advices from the field which seem to have been suspended.

The question was raised as to whether or not the Congress actually could be held in June, considering the lateness of the present date. Burnham brought up for consideration the possibility of his going to Berlin about the first of May, or the last week in April, staying over the end of May, then returning to the United States - on the theory that the Congress might not be held until August or September. He proposed the 23rd of August (date of the Nazi-Russian pact) as an appropriate date. He then would start out again, presumably in the middle of August; in the meantime, he would establish contact with people in England, France and the US who might need pressure brought to bear upon them to attend the Congress.

If the Congress is to be held about the 20th of June, he suggests that he might go to Berlin about the middle of April, accomplish all he can in the way of advice as to the Deutschland Treffen, leave Berlin very early in May, travel through France and Engla land back to the US, building up acceptances for the Congress, returning to Berlin on the 25th of May and staying over for the Congress.

CONSIDERATION OF REICHSTAG PROPOSAL. He does not favor the idea of proposing the Reichstag building as a symbol of European Freedom, and thinks that the other European nations would shoer away from the whole concept. He says that even to Germans the wretched building is only a symbol of the failure and futility of the Weimar Republic.

LISTS. We again went over lists of proposed delegates.

BOLESLAW WIERZBIANSKI. This gentleman has been in Washington and will be here again, Burnham thinks he has been in touch with the New York Committee. He is head of the International Federation of Free Journalists of Eastern Europe and Baltic and Balkan Countries, headquarters: 10 Stanhope Place, London W2. According to Burnham the outfit represents 1200 journalists scattered over Western Europe, the USA, Australia and South America. They are said to be publishing 170 papers of varying degrees of importance. Burnham says that the services of the organization are being offered - presumably for propaganda use - and that their first objective is to establish a New York office, for operation and liaison, and that they need $42,000. Burnham thinks someone here should explore the potential usefulness of the group and I suggested that if they had been in contact with the NY Committee they probably were being explored.

LG

SECRET

16 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: PCS

THROUGH: COP

SUBJECT: Gerard DROLLER

1. It is requested that arrangements be made with State Department for subject to depart for Berlin on or about 25 April 1950 as a WOC Consultant. This is a temporary duty assignment for thirty days plus air travel time.

2. Subject's application for Foreign Service employment is attached herewith in duplicate.

3. It would be appreciated if you would keep us advised of the progress of this action.

J.L.B.
FB3

Enc: FSS Appl. (2)

cc: OPC Reg (2)
PB-III Chrono
PB-III Subject ✓

SECRET

March 8, 1950.

REICHSTAG PROJECT

(To be broadcast over worldwide radio network in all languages in collaboration with Radio Free Europe, RIAS, the various European networks, BBC, CBS-NBC and the Voice of America).

I) Purpose

To re-assert the universal fight for freedom in simple dramatic terms which men everywhere will understand, ~~Including~~.

II) Occasion

The opening session of the Berlin cultural Freedom Congress, now scheduled for late June 1950.

III) Sponsor

The Congress. Its executive body should include spokesmen for all leading countries. Most specifically, it should include at least two outstanding Russians of world reputation and no minor ax to grind. The Russian nobel prize winning novelist Ivan~~x~~ Bunin (living in Paris, I believe), Igor Stravinsky, Serge Koussevitsky are names that suggest themselves. ~~[illegible]~~ If the Congress itself includes a larger delegation from the leading European countries, then several Russian scholars and scientists now in U.S. or in DP camps should be included. ~~[illegible]~~ All delegations, from countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain, should be made up entirely of men of unimpeachable moral stature and real reputation. Professional politicians, even when they're good democrats, should be rest~~x~~ricted to the rock-bottom ~~minimum~~ minimum and must be of the moral stature of Mayor Ernst Reuter of Berlin. Petty, self-seeking politics must be kept out. Would kill the whole show.

IV) GENERAL STAGING AND PRODUCTION TECHNIQUE

The general treatment will flow from the moral and political tone of the production. The two are inseparable.

~~Nothing~~ in this show must be cute or clever. Sincerity and moral conviction ~~must dominate the proceedin. From beginning to end, the whole Cong~~ress and the ceremony at the Reichstag must be treated as an organic whole: the rededication of a historic building ~~into~~ a House of European Freedom or House of Free Europe.

Why the Reichstag?

1. It stands on the precise frontier of two worlds, one

free, the other slave. It is within a few feet of the Soviet flag on Brandenburg Gate and the warlike Soviet memorial within the British sector. It is the most dramatic spot for a visible answer to these two symbols of despotism and force that exists anywhere in the world. It is the only place to dedicate a palace of freedom which will be clearly visible to soldiers and officers of the Soviet army.

2. The Reichstag earned this rededication on September 9, 1948 when 300,000 Berliners flocked before its steps to defy the Kremlin during the grim days of the Berlin blockade.

3. It was set on fire by Hermann Goebing and Josef Goebbels, who then presented the world Communist movement with undeserved martyrs and heroes in the person of Dimitrov and his co-defendants. Its rebirth as a meeting place for free men of all nations is a more than fitting historical answer to the Reichstag fire.

4. As long as the Reichstag stands in its present ruined condition it is a cancer feeding on the offended national pride of most Germans. This is particularly true because it is within sight of the strident Soviet war memorial. Even the best German democrat cannot pass this building without being mad at most of the world. In the normal course of events, the building would probably be restored for some narrow German purpose. By making it the Houseof European Freedom we kill ~~two~~ several birds with one stone:

a) We give normal, healthy German and Berlin pride (as distinguished from its morbid, resentful and chauvinistic manifestations), a positive outlet. This is reeducation through dramatic action instead of Sunday school moralising which registers with nobody. All Berlin will be tremendously ---and healthfully---proud of itself on this day.

b) We strike a blow for freedom everywhere.

c) We deal an effective blow to resurgent German nationalism in Western Germany and in the Soviet zone, by making both its forms seem low, provincial, stupid, and bush league compared to the Reichstag rising like phoenix out of the ashes in the cause of European freedom.

d) We give West Berlin an enormous morale boost and forcefully remind them that (i) Berlin is a great metropolis (Weltstadt) and (ii) that it remains part of the free world---in fact one of the great bastions of that free world.

B) The Stage Sets

No attempt should be made to prettify the Reichstag for the ceremony. Reconstruction will proceed later, with pennies collected from people all over the world. (A top limit should be placed on contributions to prevent men of wealth and power from contributing more than simple plain folks everywhere).

At the unveiling, there should be temporary name plaques or plaster-cast ~~busts~~ bas-reliefs of the Great Men of Freedom who will adorned the building. Perhaps their names—done in big bold strokes in the two leading alphabets of Europe (the Latin and Cyrillic)-- is enough for the opening ceremony. Two names ~~for~~ and/or busts for each country will suffice. A great quote from each could go with it.

Examples:

1. France: Voltaire (I disagree with everything you say but will defend to the death your right to say it-- words to that effect)
   Danton

2. Germany: Goethe
   Heine (There is a Heine quotation which Mayor Reuter (as the host of the Congress) could well use in his opening remarks.It would set the right tone for all that follows. ~~[illegible]~~ Heine says somewhere that when the black-red-gold flag of 1848 becomes the flag of European freedom, he will gladly subscribe to it. I need not belabor the point. ~~[illegible]~~ If the Germans can be sold on this approach, it is the most devastating answer to nationalism, to the resurgent neo-fascist groups who are now ~~[illegible]~~ flying the black-white-red of Imperial Germany. ~~[illegible]~~ Heine's words offer to the Germans their only chance of return to greatness which the non-German world can ever respect. (Note that the black-red-gold is the present flag of West German Republic)--without, however, the freedom-loving European content that Heine wanted to give it.

3. Italy--- Garibaldi
   Mazzini (?)

4. If we want to include the U.S. despite the fact that this is house of European freedom, there are two great names that will sell without causing any negative reaction anywhere.

   a) Jefferson (The most effective answer to the Communist charge that we are reactionaries are his words on the revolutionary right to overthrow a bad regime. I see no reason why the dictators of the Kremlin and the NKVD should steal the revolution from the men of Lexington and Concord, Valley Forge and th Declaration of Independence. The fact that a few lost souls in this country are afraid of Jefferson's great words, is also no reason not to use them.

   b) Lincoln.

~~[illegible]~~

5. Russia: The Decembrists. These are the men who returned to Russia from the Napoleonic wars imbued with western ideas and attempted to challenge the Tsarist autocracy with a revolutionary democratic program. They were hanged in 1825. A famous plaque showing the profiles of the five leaders has been reproduced very widely in the Soviet Union and is known to practically every Russian school child. In fact, the Russians know everything about these men, except the ideas and ideals they represented. These have been carefully suppressed or rendered false through Soviet Newspeak. For the Reichstag unveiling, I'd have this plaque reproduced--large enough to be seen across the street in the Soviet sector. It should face the Soviet side of the street and have the word "DECEMBRISTS" in the Russian language as well as English, German, French.

5. Russia (continued)

Vera Figner: A great Russian revolutionary and a militant fighter for freedom. Also a woman of extraordinary beauty and moral integrity. She was known in the Tsarist fortress prison where she spent most of her life, as the "Madonna of the Schluesselburg."

When President Garfield was assassinated, Vera Figner and her prison comrades addressed an open letter of sympahhy to the American people in which they condemned this act of terrorism. They said that the use of terror against the elected representative of the people was just as immoral and wrong as absolutism's use of terror against the Russian people. They explained that they were forced--against their will--to combat despotism with force, but intended to discontinue its use as soon as a representative democratic government existed in Russia.

Vera Figner lived to be liberated by the democratic revolution of March 1917. She delivered a great speech in a Petrograd theatre on the meaning of freedom, shortly after the fall of the Tsar. Because of her age and exceptional moral prestige in Russia, the Soviet government let her die in peace. Her name stands for all the noble ideals that the Soviet dictators seek to eradicate from the Russian conscience and consciousness. Yet her name as such---robbed of its moral content--is known to most Soviet Russians. Soviet textbooks never speak badly of her---nor do they tell her great story. Here is an opportunity to restore her name to the Russians --alongside of the Decembrists. Would be difficult indeed to find a better symbol to stand together with such names as Danton, Jefferson, Garibaldi, Heine.

This is not dramatic corn; it is psychological warfare with atomic power. By restoring Vera Figner to the Russians, from the steps of the House of European Freedom in Berlin, we start the chain reaction. Whether this becomes an atomic explosion of test-tube or of operative intensity, depends on how much is done ~~on other fronts~~ to win the Russian people. But clearly here's a way of reaching them (and the "them" includes high officers of the Soviet army and officials of the Soviet government as well as the rank-and-file) through a POSITIVE APPROACH to which they are acutely susceptible after over 30 years of spiritual and moral starvation.

C) ACCOMPANYING MUSIC, THEATRE, ETC

1. Music for the Congress should be of two general categories (a) a special concert by the Berlin Philharmonic, if possible with an outstanding conductor. The ideal would be Arturo Toscanini (he practically spit in Mussolini's eye). If Toscanini is not available, the next best would be Serge Koussevitsky or Igor Stravinsky. The reason is obvious. I think that of the German conductors, only Bruno Walter would be right for our broader moral purposes. To use Furtwaengler would be a mistake. If we did, we'd no longer be on the side of the angels. I think the Beethoven Ninth with its closing hymn on the Brotherhood of man (Schiller's Ode to Joy) is just right. Could be preceded by the Prometheus or Egmont Overtures, both of which are perfect in political content--and are exciting music to European ears as well. This concert could be given in a hall, broadcast and then portions of the tape recording could be used again at the Reichstag. The concert should precede the Reichstag ceremony.

b) More popular stuff, including the stirring folk songs and revolutionary music which neither Communism nor Nazism have polluted (e.g. the Marseillaise, Serbian chetnik songs, Brüder zur Sonne zur Freiheit, whose Russian version was sung by generations of revolutionists and illegal words of which are still disseminated today among Soviet troops--I've seen an actual leaflet). These songs need not be in the least provocative or an incitement to anything—except to a deep feeling that freedom is one and indivisible. These songs can be recorded in RIAS or Free Europe studios well in advance of meeting, and can be piped over loudspeakers at Reichstag meeting, with the crowds joining in. This technique was successfully used with the last of the abovementioned songs at the Reichstag rally of September 9, 1948. It is very simple and effective. Radio listeners get the impression that several hundred thousand people are singing, if the acoustics are handled right. No songs should be used to which exception can be taken on the ground that it is aimed against any particular existing regime. There is no reason to do so. The good old stuff applies by implication— and it is an implication which the adversary cannot admit. Can only shut its ears.

The right use of music at the Reichstag is essential to the success of the whole. It is a vital part of the over-all production. Its importance for broadcasting purposes can scarcely be overestimated. Gives the whole show the lift and the universal lilt that is needed.

V) THE POLITICAL LINE

1. Freedom is one and indivisible. It concerns all men everywhere. EVERYBODY DESERVES IT. THERE ARE NO CHOSEN PEOPLES, NATIONS OR CONTINENTS. THERE IS ONLY MAN.

2. This is NOT Europe defying Russia. On the contrary, it is Europe reaching out north, south, east and west to all its children, including the Russians, and summoning them in the great crusade which must go on until all are free. If the Soviet rulers want to turn their backs on Europe, that's their business. The Freedom Congress and Mayor Reutor of Berlin will assume that the Russians want very much to be part and parcel of Free Europe. This is the only approach which divides the Politburo not only from the common people, but from a decisive segment of the upper party, intellectual and army command of Russia.

3. Free Europe Versus Slave Russia is the sure road to World War III. Lets stay away from this at all times

4. Free Europe, including the Russians, versus the Politburo and the Cominform, is the only way to make the Burnham thesis work---or at least give it a fighting chance. It is at least worth a good test run from the Reichstag steps in connection with this project. Involves no risk, except the use of a little imagination, and its cost is very slight indeed.

VI) SECURITY AND SURPRISE

Most of the impact will be lost if the approach leaks out through press conferences or other channels. There should be no press conferences until the actual curtain goes up in Berlin. In no event should the Russians be tipped off as to the approach. Let them assume that the Congress intends to conduct a Europe versus Soviet Union Congress. ~~[illegible]~~ Let them gear their propaganda accordingly, fill their broadcasts, etc with vituperation aimed at the wrong targets That will make this show doubly effective. Therefore, the working details should be made known to as few people as possible.

The National Committee for Free Europe should assist in all technical preparations, furnish the necessary language announcers for broadcasts of the proceedings in the appropriate languages. ~~[illegible]~~ But it is essential that the contents remain secret until the show goes on the air. This is not only security in the ordinary sense; it is also a matter of delivering the blow with maximum effect.

U.S.

2. Adequate/guards should be posted at all ~~[illegible]~~ broadcasting and transmitter facilities in Berlin. I am thinking particularly of the transmitter in the Brits section of Berlin, which is far too close to the Soviet line for comfort. While I am convinced that the Russians would make no attempt to ~~[illegible]~~ start a disturbance at the Reichstag (if we take normal security precautions), I think they may well attempt to sabotage some of the radio installations. I would not trust any except proper American and/or British public safety officers and guards to protect these.

Alternate transmitting and broadcasting units should be held in readiness in case of sabotage against Brits installations or elsewhere. I believe RIAS has two transmitters, but I dont know whether they are both in Brits or not. ~~[illegible]~~

3. The number of persons at the Berlin end to be informed of the project should be kept as small as possible and ~~[illegible]~~ transmitted at last possible date consistent with an effective production job. Everything which can be recorded at the New York end should be taken along on ~~[illegible]~~ unbreakable platters and put on German tape ~~[illegible]~~ at the Berlin end when operation is in final phase. This is a simple matter. ~~[illegible]~~ It ~~[illegible]~~ is done regularly with VOA transcriptions sent to Germany.

4. No one in RIAS ~~need~~ should know of this operation until final preparatory stage.

5. All policy considerations must be cleared in such fashion as to prevent any form of bureaucratic sabotage ~~[illegible]~~ or buck-passing at the Berlin end of the operation.

6. One American, thoroughly familiar with the aims, large and small, of this project, should maintain close personal liaison with Mayor Ernst Reuter of Berlin. That ~~he~~ REUTER is in agreement with the general aims and objectives formulated above---and that he is precisely the man to present these aims in terms which all Berliners, decent Germans, and the rest of the world will understand and admire, I know is the case. He is the perfect host and master of ceremonies. He speaks German, English, French, Russian, Turkish ---and believes that freedom is indivisible.

Please excuse excess wordage. ~~[illegible]~~

Boris Shub

ADDENDUM; AFTER THE CONGRESS IS OVER

On pp. 1-6 supra, I indicated the general lines that would make the Reichstag dedication as a House of European Freedom effective. This ceremony, together with the other events of the ~~xxxx~~ Berlin cultural Congress of June 1950, will be broadcast--as indicated supra--over a world-wide network. That is the dramatic spectacle where everything worth saying on the subject of freedom and the dignity of man will be compressed into a few good days. (Another event ~~might~~ during Congress week could be a special performance of Buechner's play Dantons Tod at the Hebbel Theatre. If possible get Vladimir Sokoloff from Hollywood for the Robespierre role. He did it for Max Reinhardt. I trust he's still alive). Assuming that the show is a success, that only discharges half the mission. The other half is to gradually build up the Reichstag structure, stone by stone, in line with the political and moral ideals indicated above. The Reichstag as House of European Freedom:

THE HOUSE OF EUROPEAN FREEDOM (or Free Europe).

1. The general spirit has already been indicated above. The great names and words should be presented in simple dramatic terms, designed by an artist with the talent and moral fibre to understand what this is all about. The aesthetic problem is a rather tricky one. The Reichstag is hardly the most beautiful structure in the world, yet it would be a mistake to depart from ~~xx~~ its basic style in the course of reconstruction. To reconcile these two problems--the greatness of simplicity, with the stuffiness of the existing structure, is a problem for some contemporary Michelangelo or a pint-sized version of same, to solve. It can be done.

The exterior should not contain more than a dozen or so names of the calibre indicated on pp 2-4 supra(Jefferson, Danton, Voltaire, Vera Figner, Garibaldi). But we should never lose sight of one objective without which the rest is largely wasted effort: the Russians. If we leave them out, the whole thing is a boomerang and nothing more, which will ~~[illegible]~~ furnish grist for the anti-American, anti-western propaganda mill. It is also essential that the Russian names and busts or bas reliefs face the Russian side of the city --where the Russians can gaze on them with wonder and admiration--and go home to think about the meaning of things in the present world.

Inside the building, there could be an international hall of fame--in the same spirit --selected by peoples throughout the world. Here we could have the great scientists, writers, philosophers, etc of Europe and perhaps the rest of the world, placed in simple niches. The busts should avoid the hollow heroic style that the Nazis and Soviets perfected. ~~xx~~ They should be in exactly the opposite spirit, presenting the great as they were-- human beings with all the weaknesses and contradictions of the human race. ~~Naturally~~ The sculptors or sculptors for this job should be selected by an international board, including French, German, Russian, Italian, etc experts who are fully cognizant of the spirit of the thing

2. ~~Contribxx~~ Contributions should come from people all over the world, with the emphasis on pennies not dollars. The longer it takes to complete the job--within limits of course--the better for political purposes. Enough if one segment is finished ~~xxxx~~ fairly soon, with an auditorium ~~xx~~ and/or exhibition hall. The prolonged fund-raising drive will supply Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America, BBC and lots of other agencies with a steady flow of good, positive copy with the theme

of freedom running through it all the time. Contributions coming from DPs individually, and from special fund-raising events in DP camps, would have an obvious dramatic value.

3. As the structure begins to become usable, it should feature all the type activities that make Europe and European civilization worth saving. The emphasis should be on things of lasting value rather than refrigerators, Coca Cola and such. In other words, the best in European films—whether these be French, German, Italian, etc. Some of the old Soviet films, since withdrawn from circulation because they dont fit the line, should also be shown. The *best* (repeat *best*) in American pictures could also be shown. By best is meant that which *Europeans* would respect for its artistic or spiritual content, not those which make the most money—they can be seen elsewhere in Berlin.

Exhibitions of painting, lectures on current trends in literature, lectures in political science, history and contemporary politics, by outstanding artists, scholars, etc., should be part of the feature of the House of European Freedom, insofar as possible. The building should house a library, and even if it isnt very *large*, it should include the Great Books in the leading languages, as well as current periodicals, etc to keep the intellectuals of Berlin—and any other callers—on their toes. There is no such library in Berlin today.

Symposia, Town-Hall-Meeting of the Air, etc events could also be held here from time to time. The important thing is to keep the building, its reconstruction, and the events it presents, as close to the spirit of the opening ceremonies as possible.

4. All of the above is far simpler than it sounds. Europeans love to be given such projects. And I rather suspect that Americans would take to it too, if the broadcast account of the Congress proceedings properly presents the issue to them.

E.C.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Baker

DATE: 2 March 1950

FROM : JD

SUBJECT: Clearance status - Melvin J. Lasky

1. Regarding Provisional Clearance - Mr. Garland has informed me that the CIA indices check has revealed derogatory information (in part the derogatory information concerns the fact that OSS would not utilize services of subject). Mr. Garland stated Provisional Clearance would be considered only if there is a written statement concerning status of employment, that is: exactly how subject will be utilized, will Gov't or CIA interest be shown, with whom will he be working and will that person be under cover?

2. Regarding Operational Clearance - Mr. Garland advised that investigation of subject cannot be initiated at least for another month as subject is currently being investigated by FBI for Voice of America.

SECRET

8 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEC

THROUGH : COP, CSE

SUBJECT : Melvin J. LASKY

1. It is requested that a provisional security clearance be initiated for subject individual whom it is proposed to employ in Germany on a one-time operation involving his arranging for and participation in a public demonstration in Berlin. He will not have access to classified information.

2. LASKY is editor of Der Monat, a U. S. sponsored German-language intellectual monthly published in Berlin. When additional background information is available, it will be forwarded to your office in order that full operational security clearance may be secured.

J.E.B.
FBIII

FBIII/JED/mo
cc: OPC Reg (2)
FBIII Chrono
Subject File

PPS given to SEC - 11 Feb 50 initial provisional clearance.

SECRET

[illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPL[illegible]CATION FOR FEDERAL EMPL[illegible]YMENT

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50-R046.

[illegible] Answer every question [illegible] and completely. [illegible] INK. [illegible] read the [illegible] other forms required by [illegible] Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in [illegible]

1. Name of examination or kind of position applied for.

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement).

3. Place of employment applied for.

4. Mr. Mrs. Miss (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last) Melvin J. Lesky

5. Street and number or R. D. number: US Press Center, BNP

City or post office (including postal zone), and State: APO 742

6. Legal or voting residence (State): New York | 7. Office phone No. | Home phone.

8. Place of birth (city and State, if born outside U. S. name city and country): New York City

9. Date of birth (month, day, year): 15 Jan 1920 | 10. Age last birthday: 30 | 11. ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. ☐ Married ☒ Single | 13. Height without shoes 5 feet 8 inches | Weight 170 pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No

If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade:

APPLICATION No. | ANNOUNCEMENT | SELECTION No.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Appor. ☐ Nonappor. | ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned | Entered register:

Notations: | App. Review: Approved:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		
3 to 6 months?		
6 to 12 months?	X	
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— in Washington, D. C.?	X	
anywhere in the United States?	X	
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations:

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept: $ 8000 per year.

You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify: ☒ Occasionally ☒ Frequently ☐ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the spaces provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience).
(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.
(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (Month, year): From: 1948 To present time

Exact title of your present position: Information Specialist

Salary or earnings: Starting, $8000 per An | Present, $ per

Place of employment (city and State): Berlin, US Sector

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Dept of Army/ State Dept

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): US Information

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: 10 German Editors

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Alfred V. Boerner Deputy

Reason for desiring to change employment:

Description of your work: Edit and publish a monthly political and cultural magazine (in the German language which is distributed for sale in Germany and Austria and neighboring countires

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16—[illegible]

14. CONTINUED

Dates of employment (Month, year): From 1947 To 1948

Place of employment (city and State): Berlin, Germany

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Newsleader Publ Assoc.

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Newspaper

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

S.V. Levitas, Publisher

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for leaving: Another offer

Exact title of your position: Foreign Correspondent

Salary or earnings: Starting $ [illegible] per

Final $ per

Description of your work: Regular European dispatches on political situations for publication for news weekly.

Dates of employment (Month, year): From 1943 To 1946

Place of employment (city and State): E/T, ETO

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: US Army

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.):

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for leaving: Honorable Discharge

Exact title of your position:

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per

Final $ per

Description of your work:

Enlisted man 1943-1944

Officer, Military Intelligence, Historical Division (1944-1946

Active duty, France and Germany

Dates of employment (Month, year): From 1941 To

Place of employment (city and State): New York City

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: New Leader Publ. Assoc

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Newspaper

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: 3 Asst. Editors

Name and title of immediate supervisor: S.N. Levitas

Reason for leaving: US Army

Exact title of your position: Assistant Editor

Salary or earnings: Starting $2500 per

Final $3000 per

Description of your work: Edited manuscrips, wrote articles for the weekly news-political magazine.

Dates of employment (Month, year): From 1940 To 1941

Place of employment (city and State): New York City

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Dept. of Interior Nat'l Pk Serv.

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Federal Monuments

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: --

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Geo. Palmer, Superintendent

Reason for leaving: Newspaper offer

Exact title of your position: Historian

Salary or earnings: Starting $1500 per

Final $2000 per

Description of your work:

Historical research into American past.

Lectures on American History.

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 56) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of application.

14-00000

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE — In order to make the most effective placement of our veterans, detailed information is needed about the training and experience they have obtained in the Armed Services. [illegible] If you attended no special or technical schools while in the service, write in Item (a) "No attendance at service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all [illegible] changes in duty assignment, showing dates of each assignment.

(a) First special service school attended:
OCS

Location:
Camp Lee, Virginia

Dates attended (months, years):
From June 1944 To Oct 1944

Rating received at end of this training:
2nd Lt. Aus

(b) What were you taught in first Special Service School?
Officers Training

(c) Duty assignment or ratings after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School):

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):
From: To:

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?
Military Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
Historical Division, France, Germany

(e) Second special service school attended:

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):
From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(f) What were you taught in Second Special Service School?

(g) Duty assignment after this training:

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):
From: To:

(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION — Circle highest grade completed: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of:

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(b) Give name and location of last high school attended:
DeWitt Clinton H.S. New York City

(c) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired:
General

(a) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended		Years Completed		Degrees Conferred		Semester Hours Credit
				Day	Night			
City Coll. NYC	Hist	~~1935~~	1939	4		B.S.S.	1939	120
Univ. of Mich	"	1939-	1940	1		M.A.	1940	30
Columbia Univ.		1940	1942			Phd cr		30

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
US & European His	40	US and European Hist	25
Literature	25	Literature	15
Philosophy	15	Sociology	10

(e) Other training such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of schools), or "in-service training" in a Federal agency:

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended		Years Completed	
	From—	To—	Day	Night

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair
German	x			x			x		
French		x				x			x

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?
Study-residence abroad

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries, indicate (1) names of countries, (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e.g. business, education, [illegible]):
1944-46 France & Germ. USArmy
1946-50 Journalist and US Service

20. List [illegible] special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of [illegible], [illegible] machine, key punch, [illegible] scientific or professional devices.

Approximate number of words per minute in typing ...... shorthand ......

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)

☐ Yes ☒ No Give kind of license and State:

First license or certificate (year):

Latest license or certificate (year):

22. Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application such as
(a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(b) your patents or inventions
(c) public speaking and public relations experience
(d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

23. REFERENCES.—Give three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your [illegible] Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item [illegible]

FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Sidney Hock	New York University	Prof.
S. M. Levitas	7 E. 15th St. New York City	
James Burnham	New York University NYC	Author

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		X
28. Since your 16th birthday, have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating if retired from military or naval service.		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 38		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous break-down? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?		
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?		
(c) Was service performed on an active full-time basis with full military pay and allowances?		

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service:	Date of separation or separations:
1943	1946

Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	Serial No. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation.)
Army	Capt.

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, **PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY,** OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime **ONLY**, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service-connected disability?		

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d) IS "YES," AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate (o ________________ 19___

Agency: ____________ Title ____________

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions (indicate item numbers to which answers apply).

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80)

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and are made in good faith.

Date ____________

Signature of applicant ____________

(Sign your name in full, your given name first. [illegible] If a woman, prefix Miss or Mrs.; and if married use your own given name, [illegible] Mrs. Mary L. [illegible])

[illegible] 16—[illegible]

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? ________ (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office: 42669
Ext. ________
Home: 804603

A. FULL NAME ~~Mrs~~ Mr. ~~Miss~~ (Use No Initials) Melvin (First) J. (Middle) Lasky (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS US Press Center, Berlin, APO 742 (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, NYC, NY (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

B. NICKNAME None WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? ________

________ UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ________

HOW LONG? ________ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ________

________ (Where?) ________ (By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 15 Jan 1920 PLACE OF BIRTH New York (City) N.Y. (State) USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP US (Country) BY BIRTH? Yes BY MARRIAGE? ________

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # ________ ISSUED ________ (Date) BY ________ (Court)

AT ________ (City) ________ (State) ________ (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) ________ (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ________ TO ________ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ________ (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS ________

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS: ________

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? ______ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ______

LAST U.S. VISA NA
Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 30 SEX Male HEIGHT 5' 8" WEIGHT 170

EYES Brown HAIR Black COMPLEXION Ruddy SCARS None

BUILD Stocky OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES None

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE X MARRIED ______ DIVORCED ______ WIDOWED ______

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR SEPARATION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT ______
NA

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDE ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE NA
First Middle Maiden Last

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ______

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE ______
St. & No. City State Country

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ______ TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______
Date Date

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
______

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Samuel Lasky
First Middle Last
LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE ____ CAUSE ____
PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, New York City
St. & No. City State Country
DATE OF BIRTH 4 July '91 PLACE OF BIRTH Lodz, Poland
City State Country
IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY 11 March 1911, NYC
CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? 10 Aug '18 WHERE? US Dist. Ct, Augusta GA.
City State Country
OCCUPATION Manufacturer LAST EMPLOYER NA
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 279 West 39th St. NYC
St. & No. City State Country
MILITARY SERVICE FROM May '18 TO Dec. '18 BRANCH OF SERVICE US Army
Date Date
COUNTRY US DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Esther Lasky
First Middle Last
LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE ____ CAUSE ____
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, NYC
St. & No. City State Country
DATE OF BIRTH 24 Mar. '99 PLACE OF BIRTH Lodz, Poland
CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Dec. '18 WHERE? NYC
City State Country
IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NYC, 18 Sept 1911

OCCUPATION NA LAST EMPLOYER NA

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS _____ St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM _____ TO _____ BRANCH OF SERVICE _____

COUNTRY _____ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

_____

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME Floria (First) (Lasky) (Middle) Altman (Last) AGE 27
   PRESENT ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, NYC (St. & No. / City) _____ State _____ Country _____ Citizenship
2. FULL NAME Joyce (First) _____ Middle Lasky (Last) AGE 19
   PRESENT ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, NYC (St. & No. / City) _____ State _____ Country _____ Citizenship
3. FULL NAME _____ First _____ Middle _____ Last AGE _____
   PRESENT ADDRESS _____ St. & No. _____ City _____ State _____ Country _____ Citizenship
4. FULL NAME _____ First _____ Middle _____ Last AGE _____
   PRESENT ADDRESS _____ St. & No. _____ City _____ State _____ Country _____ Citizenship
5. FULL NAME _____ First _____ Middle _____ Last AGE _____
   PRESENT ADDRESS _____ St. & No. _____ City _____ State _____ Country _____ Citizenship

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NA (First) _____ Middle _____ Last

LIVING OR DECEASED _____ DATE OF DECEASE _____ CAUSE _____

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS _____ St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH _____ PLACE OF BIRTH _____

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY _____

_____

CITIZENSHIP _____ WHEN ACQUIRED? _____ WHERE? _____ City State Country

OCCUPATION _____ LAST EMPLOYER _____

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME ____________ First ____________ Middle ____________ Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________ City ________ State ________ Country

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country
2. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country
3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country

---

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________
2. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________
3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

SEC. 12. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ______ ADDRESS NYC Bronx (City) New York (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1926-1932 GRADUATE? Yes

HIGH SCHOOL De Witt Clinton ADDRESS Bronx, NYC (City) (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1932-1935 GRADUATE? Yes

COLLEGE City College of NY ADDRESS NYC (City) (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1935-1939 DEGREE B.S.S.

COLLEGE Univ. of Michigan ADDRESS Ann Arbor, Mich. (City) (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1939-1940 DEGREE M.A.

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

US (Country) US Army (Service) Capt. (Rank) 1943-1946 (Dates of Service)

U.S.F.E.T. (Frankfurt (Last Station) B-013470 0-[illegible]7 (Serial No.) Hon. (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: ______

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER #88 ADDRESS NYC (Bronx)

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON ______

SEC. 14. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

FROM 1948 TO Present

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Department of the Army (Mil. Govt)

ADDRESS Occupation Force, Germany (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Government ISD NAME OF SUPERVISOR Col. Textor

TITLE OF JOB Editor & Publisher SALARY $ 6000. PER annum

YOUR DUTIES Editing and publishing a German-language monthly magazine (Der Monat), Berlin

REASONS FOR LEAVING ______

FROM 1946 TO 1948

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY New Leader Publishing Association

ADDRESS 7 E. 15th St. New York City
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS Newspaper NAME OF SUPERVISOR S.M. Levitas

TITLE OF JOB European Editor SALARY $ 5000 PER An

YOUR DUTIES Correspondent in Europe

REASONS FOR LEAVING Offer to publish "Der Monat" in Berlin

FROM 1943 TO 1948

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY US Army

ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB SALARY $ PER

YOUR DUTIES Active duty France, and Germany

REASONS FOR LEAVING Hon. Discharge

FROM 1941 TO 1943

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY New Leader Publishing Association

ADDRESS 7 E. 16th St. New York City
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS Newspaper NAME OF SUPERVISOR S.M. Levitas

TITLE OF JOB Asst. Editor SALARY $ 3000 PER An

YOUR DUTIES Writing for and editing "The Newleader weekly newspaper

REASONS FOR LEAVING US Army

FROM 1941 TO 1941

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY US Dept. of Interior

ADDRESS National Park Service, Bedloes Island, New York
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS National Monument ~~Historian~~ NAME OF SUPERVISOR Geo. Palmer

TITLE OF JOB ~~[illegible]~~ SALARY $ PER

YOUR DUTIES Historical research and lecturing

REASONS FOR LEAVING Newspaper (New Leader) Offer

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Sidney Hook	BUS. ADD.	Washington Square Col.	New York City	
	RES. ADD.			
2. James Burnham	BUS. ADD.	New York Univ. N.Y.C.		
	RES. ADD.			
3. Merle Curti	BUS. ADD.	Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison,		Wisc.
	RES. ADD.			
4. Charles A. Pearce	BUS. ADD.	Duell, Sloan & Pearce Publishers		
	RES. ADD.	Madison Ave., NYC		
5. Wm E. Bohn	BUS. ADD.	7 E. 15th St.	New York City	
	RES. ADD.			

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Lionel Trilling	BUS. ADD.	Columbia Univ.	NYC	
	RES. ADD.			
2. Richard Hofstadter	BUS. ADD.	Columbia Univ.	NYC	
	RES. ADD.			
3. Max Eastman	BUS. ADD.	Readers Digest,	Pleasantville,	NYC
	RES. ADD.			
4. Edgar S. Mooney, Jr.	BUS. ADD.	Bates Manuf.	80 Work St.	NYC
	RES. ADD.			
5. S.M. Levitas	BUS. ADD.	7 E. 15th St.	NYC.	
	RES. ADD.			

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	See Note 2.	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
2.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
3.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? no
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

	NAME	ADDRESS St. & No.	City	State
1.	Sam Lasky	719 Avenue Y.	NYC	
2.	S.M. Levitas	7 E. 15th St.	NYC	
3.	E. B. Mooney Jr.	80 Work St.	NYC	

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	St. No.	City	State	Country
1946	Present		US Sector, Berlin,		Germany
1943	1946		US Army		
1941	1943	1485 Townsend Ave.	NYC		
1940	1941	278 East 171st St.	NYC		
1939	1940	Michigan Univ. Campus,	Ann Arbor		USA
1932	1939	1465 Fulton Avenue	NYC		

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

	FROM	TO	City or Section	Country	Purpose
A.	1945	1946	European Command, USArmy		
	1946	1948	Europe, West		Journalism
	1922	1923	Eruope		Child accompanied parents on tour.

FROM ________ TO ________ ________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT—NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: 64174 Paris, France
16 July 1946, Issued at US Embassy, Paris

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? NA GIVE APPROXIMATE

DATES: ________

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: ________

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. See Note No. 1
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

2. ________
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

3. ________
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

4. ________
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

5. ________
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

6. ________
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

7. ________
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE German SPEAK Fluent READ Fluent WRITE Fair

LANGUAGE French SPEAK Fair READ Fair WRITE Fair

LANGUAGE ______ SPEAK ______ READ ______ WRITE ______

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Tennis (College Varsity)

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Historian - Research

Editor - Journalism

University - Lecturer

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

Dept of Interior (Nat'l Park Service) 1940

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: No

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? No IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Samuel Lasky RELATIONSHIP Father

ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, (St. & No.) New York City (City) New York (State) (Country)

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No.

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Berlin, Germany DATE 25 Jan 1950
City and State

Witness

Melvin J. Lasky
Signature of Applicant

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

Note 1. (Sec.22)

I may have been a member of
(a) American Newspaper Guild
(b) American Historical Assoc.
but I do not definitely recall whether membership had been completed.

Note 2 (Sec 18)

Inasmuch as I have not been "resident at home" in seven (?) years I am unable to give names of neighbors.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: JDent

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

How is Brer Lasky getting along?

jeb

Mr. Baker

Mr. Garland's office advises Provisional Clearance will come thru 23 or 24 February.

JED

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: LG

BUILDING

ROOM NO

REMARKS:

Herewith project with comments: Believe we should advise commo that increased traffic expectable in Germany in May (SO may expect same thing).

Think this generally excellent job so far and we can proceed to put in shape for final ok.

jeb

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

7 Feb 50
DATE

TO: Mr. Baker

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS: Ennis Hobbins.

OSE advises papers on subject are en route to that office — clearance should be effective by week's end. Will follow-up!

Michael [illegible]

FROM: Jack

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO 36-8
SEP 1946

W. Germany Trade Show

U.S. Symphony Orchestra
Berlin Fair Educational Exhibit
Ballet
open air band concerts

Special lighting of W. Berlin streets.

(candles in windows)

Suggest Conf. technique for setting this up

TO: OD

RE: PBQUICK

Please print up the simplest form of light board megaphones (perhaps five inches deep), in West German colors and printed:

DEUTSCHLAND, FREI U. UNABHAENGIG

For distribution to street crowds.

FWW



5 in deep

Black/white/Red

Deutschland Frei

Berlin ist keine Soviet Kolonie

SECRET

1 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible]
ATTN: Mr. Garland

SUBJECT: James Burnham

REFERENCE: Project [illegible]

1. The project is a proposal to hold an Intellectual and Cultural Congress in Berlin, Germany, to be sponsored by leading German intellectuals, notably Dr. Redslob of the Free University of Berlin. The object is to establish a base of freedom in political, cultural and social thought, established where it may serve as a springboard for propaganda infiltration into the Iron Curtain countries including East Germany. At the same time, and perhaps of even greater importance, the Congress will be held either immediately preceding or immediately following the Communist Youth Rally to be held in Berlin the last three days of May - serving to offset considerably the influence of the Communist rally and as a basis for counter propaganda and counter action.

2. The Berlin OPC field office has urged the sending of two propaganda experts to the field as special consultants. James Burnham fits the requirement, is under contract, and we have proposed in a cablegram to send him during the month of April for a period of from 30 to 60 days. While in the field he will serve in approximately the same capacity and perform the same functions as when on duty in Washington. The second propaganda expert is a staff employee.

[illegible]

FBIII/LG/mm
cc: OPC Reg (2)
FBIII Chrono file
Subject file ✓ [illegible]

SECRET

Dear ...

This letter will serve as an official invitation and credential as a delegate to the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The passport and visa authorities know about the Congress and will extend all facilities to delegates. When you have secured your passport, you can obtain your Berlin visa from the Allied High Command Permit Office, 42 Broadway, New York City. The American Express Company, through its foreign travel section, will arrange for air-travel bookings. We will inform you when your ticket is available and all further details of transportation.

We are enclosing a copy of our first New York release. It contains a copy of the proposed program of the Congress and the names of many of our international delegates and supporters. The details of the program are now being worked out in Berlin. As soon as we receive them, we shall be happy to send you a copy.

Copies of your books are being ordered and will be sent to Berlin where they will be on public display. We would appreciate your sending us a negative of your photograph for use in connection with this display.

If there is any other information you require, or any way we can be of help to you, please feel free to call upon us at our New York office.

Sincerely yours,

20 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR Chief, I & S - Attention: Mr. George Laker

THROUGH: COP and SEC/OPC

SUBJECT: Franklyn A. Johnson

1. Subject is being sent to Germany for a period of 90 days TDY, beginning on or about 10 March 1950, to take part in the activation of an approved FB-III project. He is an OPC intelligence officer assigned to FBA/OPC, but is being detailed to FB-III/OPC for this particular assignment. The project will be a propaganda warfare operation.

2. For travel to and from Germany and during his sojourn there, Mr. Johnson will use Department of Army cover; his orders will show him to be a civilian employee of the Department of the Army and he will have a special passport. He will report to the Chief of Operations of the OPC German Mission who has offices in Heidelberg. The cover designation of this unit is Documents Disposal Unit, Department of Army. Mr. Johnson's activities in connection with his TDY assignment in Germany will take him also to Frankfurt and Berlin, where he will use the same cover.

3. Mr. Johnson has been briefed on the cover used by the station to which he will report and on the measures to be taken to conceal his connection with CIA during his sojourn in Germany.

John E. Baker
Chief, FB-III

cc: OPC File
OPC Chrono
FB-III Chrono
FB-III subject (PD-Quick)

KIBLIN, Patricia A. FB-II GS-5, $3100. p/a

Washington, D. C., to Heidelburg and Berlin, Germany, for 90 days TDY, and return to Washington, with no leave enroute.

Requested TDY is considered essential. Subject will report to Chief, JEDICT field station as clerical assistant in connection with approved operations requiring immediate activation. Project S-56-JEDICT (8 November 1949)

Has been assigned by FB-II to FB-III for this special, temporary duty.

66 10 March 1950 X

X X

X

Maximum allowable S-54-JEDICT

Travel advance of $500.00 requested.

20 February 1950

John E. Baker, FB-III

27 Feb

Take up with Garland after seeing Joe Bryan who will not return until 27th

Lg

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: L.G.

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Assume you will fix him up.

JB

FROM:

BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

24 February '50
DATE

TO: Mr. Baker

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Herewith is Mr. Hobbing's clearance!

Clearance is covert security type which, I believe, puts this individual in category of staff agent and, therefore, under Peg Johnson's jurisdiction.

No I think he will be contract - part time agent.

JB

FROM: JED

BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO 36-8
SEP 1946

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ADPC Attention: Security Officer DATE: 20 February 1950

FROM : Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

SUBJECT: J.G. - 273
#36778

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 15 February 1950 concerning the subject.

This memorandum requested change in status for the subject from an operational clearance to that of a covert consultant for the purposes as outlined in the memorandum of 16 February 1950.

In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's memorandum of 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances", a covert security clearance as requested in the memorandum of 15 February 1950 is granted for the use of the subject.

This covert clearance as granted does not always constitute complete compliance with the provisions of AI 10-2. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, please advise Inspection and Security sufficiently in advance so that no delay is caused in the transition.

This Office would further appreciate being advised when the contemplated use as set forth in your memorandum of 15 February 1950 for the subject has been completed, so that the files of this Office may be kept up to date.

FOR THE CHIEF, INSPECTION AND SECURITY STAFF

George P. Loker Jr.

GEORGE P. LOKER, JR.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

17 February 1950

MEMORANDUM TO: CPB II

SUBJECT: Meeting with Kenneth B. HAMBLEY and Messrs. Williams, Droller, Glaser, and Smith re Berlin Conference

1. Direct action is imperative in Berlin.

a. Organize groups to beat the Commie opposition in street fighting.

b. Carry the counterattack into the Soviet Sector.

c. It is not undesirable to have Soviet's fire on German citizens.

2. Fighting, against the background of the Peace Conference, with the general population and the conference participants in the streets, would have tremendous and desirable effect.

a. To be beaten in the streets would be defeat complete.

b. A fight is important. A successful fight is imperative. It would cause good publicity, instill confidence in the Berlin population and insure major victories for our side.

c. If no Commie fighting group plans to start the fight, create one and beat it up.

3. A head-on challenge — rioting and perhaps shooting — is inherent in the streets as it is now conceived.

4. HAMBLEY thinks that the Soviet authorities plan control of the streets.

5. What would mass effect be of a background of American tanks?

a. If it is necessary to prevent defeat — do it.

b. It would be far better, however, to have force exercised by the Berlin population — with no American military force in sight.

CENTRAL [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION [illegible]
Secret
Eric Jones [illegible]
EE/G
15 [illegible] 57

TOP SECRET

~~38580~~

COPY 1 OF 7 COPIES

TOP SECRET

6. According to political reliability, the participants' names fall in the following categories:

a. Black

b. Gray

c. White

7. Eliminate the blacks. We can keep the gray if the white list is long enough.

8. Jean Paul Sartre is a type which should be excluded. He has fixed political ideas of the wrong sort. If our people discuss Soviet labor camps, he will bring up Spanish camps, Greek islands, South Africa, etc. He would only be an obstructionist.

9. Eliminate Plievier.

10. Eliminate Julian Huxley.

11. Include Czapski on the sponsoring committee.

12. A delegate from South America should be selected.

13. It is recommended that Sidney Hook go to Berlin within two weeks to organize the whole affair.

Dawson Smith
DAWSON SMITH

PB II: DS/mw

cc: #1 JBIII
#2 CDroller Chrono
#3 DSmith-HAMBLEY File
#4 DSmith Chrono
#5 PB II Chrono
#6 OPC Registry Chrono
#7 OPC Registry File

TOP SECRET

~~3828~~0
Copy 1 of 7 Copies

[illegible]

SECRET

16 February 1950.

Suggestions for Mr. Baker

Re: Project Memorandum No. 35.

1. I would suggest that the following person and organizations be invited to attend and participate in the May meeting:

a. Dr. Reinhold NIEBUHR (USA)
presently at the Union Theological School, Columbia University he is a member of the Commission on the Occupied Areas and past chairman of the General Committee of World Student Service Fund.

b. International Student Service (ISS)
an outstanding international cultural exchange medium of the university community (ie. both professors and students are included) with headquarters in Geneva. This organization was formed after the first world war and in addition to its conference and tour activities it has been primarily responsible for the relief work done throughout the world in the colleges and universities. This organization is the most prominent existing opponent of the International Union of Students (IUS) in which the FDJ holds membership.

c. World Assembly of Youth (WAY)
organized recently (1948) in London this is an international youth organization formed to counter the influence and activities of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) The WFDY is communist dominated and controlled. The FDJ is a member of the WFDY.

2. With reference to the Project Memorandum dated 31 January 1950.

6. a. The facilities of the World Radio University (WRUL) a non-governmental short-wave radio station in NYC and Boston might be used in connection with pre-publicizing the May meeting. USA participants could be interviewed and the day-to-day activities of the meeting presented via the air waves.

6. c.d. This should be encouraged.

8. d. An anonymous publication of COLLOQUIUM might be useful here. This student magazine at the University of Berlin (as opposed to the Free University) prior to April 1948 acted as a spokesman of the student opposition to the Soviet.

SECRET

9. Why are we apprehensive? Is there a possibility that the west German youth would follow the cp line?

11. Considering (9) in the light of (11) I would think that it would serve US interests to fly into Berlin students now in the western zones who have fled their former eastern German homes. These students, oriented towards the West, might best serve our propaganda interests. Dialect speaking to dialect, etc.

P.K.

Memo: 10 Feb.

8 Feb. Discussion with Williams reference theme of congress and FW possibilities.

Talk with Denby reference project - he produced outline draft.

9 Feb. Met Dr. Hilger, preliminary talk reference personalities involved in Congress, plan for future meetings.

Conference at home of Jim Burnham (Williams, Droller, Smith, Burnham, Glaser.

At this meeting Mr. Burnham, in response to questions, stated his enthusiasm for the idea. He proposed that Sidney Hook be sent over to Germany for a few weeks on an exploratory mission - and to render what assistance he may in connection with planning. He expressed his willingness to go over to Berlin sometime in advance of the congress (under cover of an invitation he has received from the Free University) to actively assist in planning the agenda and other details. He is making up a list of proposed delegates to be invited; thinks it important someone from S.America be included. He is particularly opposed to the inclusion of Sarte in the list of delegates; is not sure of Pliever but not opposed. Arrangements made to continue conferring, probably next week.

10 Feb. 1st draft of Project completed.

13 Feb. idea of money compensation — money could come from Marsh, sponsored by ~~[illegible]~~ Orientation Funds "if your university is not prepared to finance your travel — etc."
[illegible]
(Steinplatz hotel suggested) (Taberna)

[illegible] any ~~Hook~~ desirable

14 Feb. [illegible] to [illegible] send [illegible] and Lawrence to Berlin. Hook? Postpone next talk with Burnham until date settled.

16 Feb. [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] (OVER)

see Burnham with some of [illegible] questions.

His answers:

1. The whole question of the title of the Congress has been giving him some concern. Held at any other time than in immediate juxtaposition to the Communist Youth Rally, it would be OK. Held at that time it is inevitably going to be regarded as a counter attack and in those terms a 'Congress of Culture' is not adequate. He wants to broaden the base - perhaps label it a political Congress. (My own idea, at the moment, is opposed to a political label; but I agree that a Congress for Intellectual Freedom - which could take in political aspects - might be better than restricting it to culture.)

2. He suggests June as a date - unless we can turn out this affair in a BIG and SIGNIFICANT enough fashion to really offset the communist convention. I don't know his arguments for June but I can imagine that they would take the line that instead of being lost in the world wide attention and publicity for the communist deal, it would come as the last shot, after the communists had exposed themselves as slaves of Moscow, and might make a ringing effect. Also June would be the right time for college people to get away from their universities, might be very difficult in May.

3. He is anxious to have labor represented and suggested a big representation from labor groups, including Dubinsky. Also certain leading political figures.

21 Feb. Comms notified of views in [illegible].

22 Feb. Project put in circulation for coord.

23 " Cable to field (held until 27 for coord.)

27 " Began chat [illegible] (through Time)

" " [illegible]

Arrangements with Chester, [illegible], [illegible] - to meet
(in Chester's apartment)

[illegible] talk [illegible]

28 " Cair not Chester!

Got Chester in person - Complete talk

Made calls for Committee conf. on Monday

Prepared draft of dispatch to field

Am. Express.

Interview under name of Martin K. Williams, of Kingston, Pa., with Mr. Gilmore, Asst. Passenger Traffic Manager of Trav. Dept.

Am. Ex. will accept money (check, draft or cash) in one place - N.Y. office - or in several places (Paris, for instance) provided one central office knows details and can coordinate.

Will then write to all offices involved, authorizing transportation, etc., for list of persons (which may be added to at last moment). We specify what credentials persons must present. We also specify whether transportation is to be by air, steamship, rail, etc.; first class or otherwise; whether or not 'expenses' are to be allowed - in this connection they suggest that travelling expenses be allowed (for meals, etc.) not to exceed 10% of transportation. They suggest that we act as soon as practicable because of rush for travel to Europe but Mr. Gilmore says they can be reasonable certain of providing air transportation.

They will render a complete accounting of transportation and expense money provided, and remit unexpended balances.

Meeting Sam in [illegible]

Burnham/Farley

Skeggs.

Samples of material so far issued.

They are working on the matter of satellite representation. Examples: Geidrovich and Chapski from Poland; Porutka from Czechoslovakia; Nocolievsky and Yakofleff from Russia. Several others.

Eleanor Roosevelt had accepted, but after appearance of NY Times story she was seen by a reporter and was said to have stated that she had changed her mind. Hook is also doubtful because of his commitment to U of Cal. However, a personal letter is going to these three, from McCloy, urgently asking them to attend. Helen Douglas and Robt. Montgomery are both regarded as excellent prospects.

Skeggs expressed dim view of Buttles' activities and is anxious US interest and US releases be played down. However, he is anxious that there should be great deal of publicity as time approaches. Furthermore, I got impression that he had inspired Buttles, to some extent at least, to take the action in approaching Hook. For instance, Skeggs is anxious that we consider suggestion that about the 1st or 2nd of June an advertisement appear in NY Times and Wash. Post, signed by large number of organizations and persons, calling attention to Congress. He suggested this could be organized by Sidney Hook which gave me idea that he may have suggested some such activity to Buttles, which may have resulted in Buttles' trip.

Details in Berlin are being crefully worked out. Delegates will stop either at the Steinplatz or Amzoo hotel - obvious reasons for having them all together. They will have official taxis for their use, corridors and entrances will be guarded by plain clothes German and US personnel, some of them will be inconspicuously guarded personally. Meeting place - Taberna Academica - will be well guarded.

Matter of interpreters being worked upon, report later.

There will be press delegates from all countries, in addition radio RIAS will tape the entire proceedings and will furnish cuttings to individual radio stations, for instance - if the Vienna radio wants the speech of one of the Austrian delegates, it can be provided. Rias also will be on air with reports of proceedings, but they may need some pressure later on.

He will deliver the $200 to Hook and thinks that will be sufficient. He and Hook and Burnham will try to work out methods of definitely signing up certain doubtful prospects. He will report to Marian Saunders and when he comes to Washington, to Kellerman. On my advice, he will play it straight with both - as though he had no contact with us, says he will listen rather than talk, but I regard that as impossible. Will assure State that everything is going well, is completely in hands of committee and that all action should stem from Berlin in order to have central control and full coordination.

Was delighted at plans for financing travel of delegates.

8 February 1950

MEMORANDUM

REF: PDQUICK

1. All of the names suggested so far are listed. Suggestions are needed for additions.

Frau Luise Schroeder
Dr. Klaus Mehnert 201-17292
Frieda Utley
A. Rossi
Dorothy Thompson
Ruth Fischer
Sperber
Lin Yu Tang
*Aver
*Barankovic
*Tonvonlovic
*Iovanic
*Gabrilovi
*Babette Gross – 201-3892 ([illegible] Peter DOB 1923)
Ralph Bunche
Walter White
Max Yergin
Rector – Frankfurt University
Hu-Shih

L. G.

for main Committee
Schumacher
von [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: FB-III

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. SADO			✓/1	e.o.	
2. PB-II		2/3		Pm	
3. Staff II				W	
4. COP					
5. DDPC					
6. FB III					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1949

SECRET

7 February 1950

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom

REFERENCE: Dispatch No. 131-CEGWU, dated 6 January 1950
Matthew T. Christie memorandum dated 29 December 1950

1. A conference to discuss subject project was held 6 Feb 1950 in the office of Mr. John E. Baker, Chief FB-III. Present were:

Mr. Carmel Offie, SADO
Mr. John Harrison, Chief Staff II, PPD
Mr. James O. Denby, Staff II, Area Branch B
Mr. Joseph Bryan III, Chief FB-II, PPD
Mr. Fred W. Williams, FB-II
Mr. Gerald Droller, FB-II
Mr. Louis Glaser, FB-III
Mr. Baker

For the purpose of this conference, Mr. Harrison acted as the personal representative of CPP, and Mr. Baker as the personal representative of CCP.

2. Reference communications concerning subject project were read and discussed. There was unanimous agreement upon the following points:

a. That the project was feasible, worthy and particularly valuable as a partial counter to the Communist German youth rally scheduled for 27 May in Berlin;

b. That it could not be staged successfully for less than $40,000, but that an allocation of $50,000 should be made to insure fully adequate financial support;

c. That approval of the French and British High Commissioners for Germany should be obtained to insure tri-partite support of the Congress, and that French and British material aid should be forthcoming, at least to the extent of providing transportation for delegates from their countries.

3. It was agreed also that an effort should be made to arrange the attendance at the congress of representative refugee intellectuals from curtain countries, but that these should not

include members of the various national committees.

4. The question of using NYLON funds for this project was not discussed, but will be considered in due course.

5. Therefore, it was decided to draft a cable to the German mission granting approval to the project, subject to the stipulation concerning French and British participation, and authorizing the field to proceed with preliminary contacts and organizational work. Immediately thereafter, it was agreed, appropriate representatives of OPC and PPD would proceed with the drafting of a project plan in official form, together with appropriate operational annexes to guide implementation of the project.

6. Draft of proposed cable to the German mission is attached hereto.

John E. Baker
FB-III

Concur:
Mr. Offie C.O.
Mr. Harrison
Mr. Denby JOD
Mr. Bryan
Mr. Williams
Mr. Droller
Mr. Glaser

JEB/njh
cc: OPC Reg (2)
FB-III (2)

7 February 1950

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom

REFERENCE: Dispatch No. [illegible], dated 6 January 1950
Matthew T. Christie memorandum dated 28 December [illegible]

1. A conference to discuss subject project was held 6 Feb 1950 in the office of Mr. John [illegible] Baker, Chief PP-III. Present were:

Mr. Carmel Offie, SAPC
Mr. John Harrison, Chief Staff II, PPD
Mr. James C. [illegible], Staff II, Area Branch D
Mr. Joseph Bryan III, Chief PP-II, PPD
Mr. Fred [illegible]. Williams, PP-II
Mr. Gerald Miller, PP-II
Mr. Louis Glaser, PP-III
Mr. Baker

For the purpose of this conference, Mr. Harrison acted as the personal representative of [illegible], and Mr. Baker as the personal representative of [illegible].

2. Reference communications concerning subject project were read and discussed. There was unanimous agreement upon the following points:

a. That the project was feasible, worthy and particularly valuable as a partial counter to the Communist German youth rally scheduled for 27 May in Berlin;

b. That it could not be staged successfully for less than $40,000, but that an allocation of $50,000 should be made to insure fully adequate financial support;

c. That approval of the French and British High Commissioners for Germany should be obtained to insure tri-partite support of the Congress, and that French and British material aid should be forthcoming, at least to the extent of providing transportation for delegates from their countries.

3. It was agreed also that an effort should be made to arrange the attendance at the congress of representative refugee intellectuals from curtain countries, but that these should not

include members of the various national committees.

4. The question of using STLOH funds for this project was not discussed, but will be considered in due course.

5. Therefore, it was decided to draft a cable to the German mission granting approval to the project, subject to the stipulation concerning French and British participation, and authorizing the field to proceed with preliminary contacts and organizational work. Immediately thereafter, it was agreed, appropriate representatives of OPD and PPD would proceed with the drafting of a project plan in official form, together with appropriate operational annexes to guide implementation of the project.

6. Draft of proposed cable to the German mission is attached hereto.

JEB

John E. Baker
FD-III

Concur:

Mr. Offie________ CO

Mr. Harrison________ HH

Mr. Denby________ TCD

Mr. Bryan________ [illegible]

Mr. Williams________ FW

Mr. Droller________ GD

Mr. Glaser________ LG

JEB/ajh
cc: OPC Reg (2)
FE-III (2) SADO STAFF II STAFF II/AREA BRANCH B
FE-II

SECRET

3 copies made [illegible] 21 Feb.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: CPB II

NO. S/7708

DATE 7 Feb. 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. FBB III (Mr. Baker)		2/8			LG:
2. LG					Suggest we
3.					talk also
4.					with [illegible] would be
5.					good — but
6.					we'll have to
7.					get out of
8.					sight,
9.					B
10.					9 Feb.
11.					Memo by L.G.: Droller could be of extreme value, not as
12.					contributing anything substantial to the Congress (which he is qualified
13.					to do, but which would not be necessary) but because the follow up will call for intensive P.W.
14. [illegible]					planning — and seeing and hearing the Congress and discussions
15.					with the people met there, would make PB II follow up work much more efficient and effective.

29

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET (Me Too!)

SECRET

7 February 1950

MEMORANDUM TO: COP

VIA: DS III, CPP

SUBJECT: Berlin Intellectual Congress

REFERENCE: COP's memo to FB II, 25 January 1950

1. FB II agrees that the proposed congress deserves thorough support.

2. We would like to send Gerald Droller to Berlin, to arrive a few days before the congress opens and to remain a few days after it closes. Mr. Droller is a native of the city and is specially qualified to represent FB II's interests.

3. Our substantive recommendations have already been expressed to Mr. Baker.

J. BRYAN, III

PB II/JBIII/cm

cc: FBS III (Mr. Baker)
FBA III (Mr. Miller)
DS II (Mr. Harrison)
FB II Branch Chrono
JBIII Chrono
OPC Registry Chrono
OPC Registry File

SECRET

For Mr. Glaser

EET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: Mr. Glaser

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Mr. Baker					
2. Mr Glaser					Lou I have asked Nancy to make 5 copies of project for our conference. JB
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. [illegible]
APR [illegible]

SECRET

What started out to be a hope was that it would be [illegible] this particular [illegible] of the general idea of a Congress to [illegible]. She is only one of numerous people, including DeN. Jesselson, who have long [illegible] the idea [illegible] it [illegible] last spring [illegible]

SECRET

3 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Baker

1. I first heard of this proposal at a de-briefing of Ruth Fischer, which took place about three months ago. I first took a negative view of the proposal, which seemed to be in danger of loose and ineffective handling; however, I have an entirely different opinion of such a conference as outlined by Josselson and under his guidance. It could, if very well handled, furnish an opportunity for creation of morale, basis for propaganda and a spring-board for continuing effort.

2. Berlin not only is the obvious place for the conference, it is the only place where the impact could immediately be felt in Satellite countries. (Berlin radio, press and personal contact with East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.)

3. Should the sponsoring committee include a woman? Possibly Louise Schroeder or Frau von Zahn-Harnack or Jeanette Wolf? I also suggest Karl Arnold. And would like you to consider the inclusion of a known anti-Soviet intellectual who also is anti-U.S.

4. I think the budget should be expanded to cover the possibility that the City of Berlin may not, or perhaps should not, provide the various halls and opera houses free of charge; also a "convention" in Germany involves more flowers and music (usually a 100-piece symphony orchestra) than a Vanderbilt Wedding. I think the over-all Berlin expense of DM 10,000 should have a reserve of at least an additional DM 10,000

5. I think this proposal should, in the interest of speed, be implemented as follows:

a. A conference of representatives of OCP, OPC, SADC - for quick (24-hour) agreement in principle, so that a cable may be sent to the field.

b. Preparation of a Project Plan and procurement of special assistants.

c. Preparation of a subsidiary propaganda plan - to insure adequate reporting of the conference and adequate circulation of its deliberations, in several languages, behind the curtain..

6. Even with the method proposed in paragraph 5, unless a cable of basic approval can go out of here before the 9th of February - and the Project can be prepared, coordinated and fully approved prior to 21 February,- I do not believe we can count on the timing suggested by Mike which, incidentally, is excellent coming as it does prior to the big presumptive explosions of 1 May and the Communist Youth Conference. I, therefore, propose that the suggestion in 5 (a) be [illegible] on 6 February.

SECRET

L.G.

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: C O P

NO. 5-16228

DATE 26 Jan.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. Baker		1/27			
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					File [illegible]
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

SECRET

25 January 1950

MEMORANDUM TO: BAKER
MILLER
HARRISON
BRYAN

SUBJECT: Berlin Intellectual Conference

1. A proposal for the support of an Intellectuals' Conference in Berlin has been pouched in by Gearing. He asks that this be given urgent consideration and that a decision should be made as quickly as possible. If the operation is undertaken, Josselson will need the assistance of two or three people in Berlin. These people might be the same as those mentioned in relation to the Communist Youth meeting in Berlin this Spring.

2. Arrangements for the organization of a political and psychological coordinating group in HICOG have been completed and are awaiting McCloy's approval. The purpose of this group is to coordinate the activities of the various staff sections in McCloy's office in these fields, and to develop a more intensive program of action.

3. Gearing will sit as a member of the Committee representing SHUTE. This will give him the opportunity of being acquainted with all overt action planned in Germany so that covert operations can be properly coordinated with them.

F.

FAL:mt

SECRET

COPY

January 11, 1950

Your letter of December 29 was late in arriving and I am replying by hand to save delay.

(a) The idea of a "MOHAT" Congress is an excellent one! But should it be a "MCHAT" Congress or something undertaken under the auspices of a non-government, especially a non-occupying government group. Perhaps the Free University can be nominal sponsor or some European Fed for Cultural Freedom ad hoc.

(b) Spring is too soon to organize such a conference properly. Suggest late summer or fall.

(c) To be effective conference must be tied in with some concrete issue of a cultural character in which all delegates can agree despite their difference on other things. What specific issue positive or negative is shaping up in Germany today in which leading intellectuals can take a position? The differences among the participants, if not as great as at Paris, will certainly be considerable, and this is not at all a bad thing if things don't end up as they did in Paris. The main thing, however, is to see that there is at least one major practical issue on which everyone can agree independently of differences in fighting Stalinism.

(d) I assume you can arrange to cover expenses for Reise and Unterkunft of all delegates.

(e) Suggest the following be united from this country: Edmund Wilson, Dos Passos, Sinclair Lewis, Upton Sinclair, William Faulkner, Reinhold Niebuhr, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Philip Rahv, William Phillips, Lionel Trilling, Farrell, perhaps me. If you can get 5 from the U.S. to attend, it would be enough.

(f) Koestler was planning something similar to this. My suggestion would be to get in touch with him at once to see whether anything has come of his plans. He would also be a good man to draft the statement of the call which should be signed by one person from England (Orwell or Russell), France, Netherland, Germany Italy, Belgium and US, perhaps some Spanish exile.

The suggestion to set up an International Committe for Cultural Freedom may serve as the least common denominator of the varying interests. Careful preparation, of course, is necessary but if you can get 50 to 60 people together of outstanding stature, we can do the trick.

In conclusion, timing is important and the few people in this part of the world can get away in the [illegible]

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LYNCH; GRAYSON
DCD FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2:15 22 AUG 78		PAT ORR	
6 P.M. 22 Aug '78	SAME	JAMES P. KELLY	James P. Kelly

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

A-19-44-94

GRAYSTON LYNCH

8709 Bay Point Drive
Tampa, Florida

BUSINESS:

Subject is a retired CIA employee.

CONFIDENTIAL

DCD-399/78
10 April 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/ISS/IP/EIS

FROM : Ruth Elliff
DCD/FIO/PAO

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations Request (OLC 78-1035)

1. I have searched DCD's records on the individuals listed in subject request with the following results:

a. Carlos Quiroga - negative

b. Pedro Diaz Lanz - Two documents for your retention. Please note that the teletype of 6 February 1977 also includes the names of several other individuals of interest to the committee.

c. Roland Masferrer - File A-16-88-46 on loan and documents for retention. (Masferrer is a subject of a recent FOIA request, F-77-260.)

d. Manolo Rey - DCD case 42315 on loan (also contains references to Manuel Artime). Retention copies of additional documents also included.

e. Antonio Cuesta Valle - Documents for retention.

f. Antonio Veciana - Documents for retention (please note that the documents also contain references to Antonio Cuesta Valle).

g. Edward L. Freers - negative

h. Mrs. G. Stanley Brown - negative

i. David E. Murphy - negative

j. Aline Mosby - Documents for retention.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 386090

WARNING NOTICE
[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

DCD-399/78
10 April 1978

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations Request
(OLC 78-1055)

---

k. Abraham Isaac Goldberg - One document for retention.

m. Robert J. Korengold - negative

n. Marita Lorenz - File A-20-44-72 on loan. Please note that Ms. Lorenz recently filed a request under the Privacy Act (P-77-2794).

o. Evelio Alpizar Perez - Documents for retention.

P. Antonio Soto Vazque - negative

2. With regard to the four names listed together on page two of subject memorandum, I am forwarding documents dealing with Justin McCarthy and a Robert M. Moore. It is uncertain whether or not these individuals are the ones of interest to the HSCA (our files contain references to at least 15 other individuals named Robert Moore; without considerable additional information, we cannot make any positive identification). I am forwarding, on loan, our file on Grayson Lynch (A-19-44-94). You may wish to consult with DCD later with regard to releasing this individual from his obligation of secrecy.

Ruth Elliff

Attachments a/s

RELLIFF:wfc
Distribution
0 - Addressee
1 - DCD Chrono
1 - Staff A
3 - RElliff
5 - Control

19-44-94

27 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Grayston Lynch, ex-BKHERALD Staff Employee

A 194494

1. John Greaney called on 26 February to advise that in his judgment DCD's roll in this matter is finished. Greaney has sent this material to John Kennedy, NARCOG, who has advised John Werner, Drug Enforcement Agency, who will contact Lynch directly.

2. Mr. Greaney has contacted Lynch directly and notified him that Mr. Werner will be calling him. We, therefore, see no further action by DCD in this matter, and Mr. Knaysi has been so advised.

E. H. Watts
E. H. WATTS
Deputy Chief of Operations, DCD

EHW:jt

Distribution:
Orig. - OC/DCD Chrono
✓1 - Control

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 018877

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NFL-002-76

Chief, Domestic Collection Division

14 January 1976

ATTN : Deputy Chief of Operations (Watts)

Chief, Miami Field Office

IDEN A, ex-BKHERALD Staff Employee

1. We met with IDEN A, a retired BKHERALD staff employee, on 7 January 1976 at his home in Tampa, Florida. IDEN A had requested the meeting through contact with an attorney in IDEN B. IDEN A spoke for several hours about his life since retirement in 1971. What follows is a long summation of his comments, and at the memo's conclusion his reasons for bringing this situation to our attention. [Forwarded under Separate Cover].

2. IDEN A, who had a major role in the Bay of Pigs activities, and who was associated with JMWAVE during the period 1961-68, has maintained many contacts within the Cuban community in Florida. LNCOLLAR, which was aware of the involvement of some ex-BKHERALD assets (Cubans) in the drug importation business, had been unable to penetrate this group in the period to late 1973. IDEN A, in the meantime, had moved to Key West, Florida, purchased a lobster fishing boat and equipment, and become a respected member of the community.

3. In late 1973, a former BKHERALD asset (AMTABY Project) who had been terminated in 1963, IDEN C, came to IDEN A in Key West, claimed he had escaped from jail in Cuba in 1970 (where he had been jailed for drug running between Cuba and WODUAL), and said he had information on drug traffic. He asked IDEN A to contact someone in LNCOLLAR and indicate IDEN C's willingness to be of assistance. IDEN A replied he was retired and could not help. A few months later, IDEN D (AMTABY-27), another former asset, flew to Key West from Miami. He met IDEN A and informed him LNCOLLAR had sent him down to check on IDEN C. IDEN D identified his LNCOLLAR contact as IDEN E, an ex-BKHERALD asset and former BKHERALD contract employee. At about this time IDEN F, a former BKHERALD staff employee, moved to Key West and informed IDEN A that LNCOLLAR was being staffed with BKHERALD employees in its Intelligence Division, and that the leader of the division was IDEN G, another BKHERALD staffer.

4. A few months later, IDEN A received a call from IDEN H, another BKHERALD retiree, who asked about IDEN A's access to boats IDEN H wished to purchase for a relative of his wife, the relative residing in Venezuela. He photographed every boat in the Key West harbor, and it was apparent to IDEN A he was LNCOLLAR-involved. Later, IDEN F approached IDEN A and said

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

CONFIDENTIAL

two BKHERALD people in Miami wanted to meet with IDEN A. IDEN A agreed to a meeting, and IDEN F introduced IDEN I and IDEN E. IDEN A knew IDEN I, but was aware of IDEN E only by reputation, which was unsavory. IDEN E claimed to be a BKHERALD employee, as did IDEN I. IDEN A, of course, knew otherwise, but said nothing. In March 1974, IDEN A got a call from IDEN J of the IDEN K, Miami. He was an ex-BKHERALD officer, and he said IDEN G wished to speak with IDEN A in Miami on an urgent basis.

5. IDEN G told IDEN A that he wanted the latter to work for LNCOLLAR to establish intelligence networks in the Cuban community in Key West. He said no one else could do it, and he promised to provide at the start US$100/week plus expenses plus money to pay IDEN A's agents. He said this money would not be reportable as income. When IDEN A asked about the effect of his own ex-BKHERALD status, IDEN G replied BKHERALD does not want or need to know of this arrangement. IDEN G acknowledged that US$100/week was a small payment, but said any information resulting in a seizure of drugs, the arrest of drug traffickers, or damage to drug rings will be assessed by a board within LNCOLLAR, and money (thousands of dollars) rewarded for this assistance. IDEN A would then be free to split the money with his agents. IDEN J, who was at the meeting, added that within a year IDEN A should be able to afford the best and largest lobster boat available.

6. IDEN G and IDEN J impressed IDEN A with the dangerous nature of his assignment. They stressed cover as the most important consideration, and IDEN G said, "I don't want to go to any more funerals". They added that if IDEN A got into trouble, there were 150 LNCOLLAR agents in Miami who would come to his aid instantly. IDEN A was given emergency telephone numbers and code names, and was told LNCOLLAR would arrange for his airlift out (through the LNTUCK Air Station) if needed. If his LNCOLLAR affiliation was blown, IDEN G said there would be compensation provided up to US$40 thousand, as well as relocation assistance. The relocation assistance was not specified, but IDEN A assumed this meant six months living expenses and assistance in job search activities, as well as reimbursement for moving expenses. IDEN J and IDEN L, another ex-BKHERALD official, were to come to Key West one week later to brief IDEN A on the local situation. In the meantime, IDEN A was to prepare a report on what he knew about drug traffickers in the Key West area. Two weeks later, the two did appear in Key West. The little they knew about Key West drug activities was included in IDEN A's report, which also contained much additional data.

7. IDEN A subsequently set up an intelligence net, and began sending back reports. IDEN A was frequently summoned to Miami for meetings with IDEN G. Often these meetings were a waste of time, and on occasion IDEN G

would not even show up. At one point IDEN J asked IDEN A to write a paper on the capability of ex-BKHERALD assets who were drug traffickers, and who had been trained in infiltration and exfiltration, to penetrate WODUAL coastal defenses with drugs. IDEN A showed how the assets could circumvent any government effort to stop the drug traffic. The paper "scared LNCOLLAR to death," according to IDEN A. At the end of June 1974, IDEN J asked IDEN A to journey to Washington to brief top LNCOLLAR officials on his conclusions. It was to be an all expense paid trip, and IDEN A flew up and stayed one week. Total remuneration received for the journey was only US$150. During the week, IDEN A had many meetings with IDEN G and his deputy, IDEN M, a former IDEN N staff employee. IDEN G indicated at that time he was impressed with IDEN A's reports and access in Key West.

8. Later, IDEN A told IDEN G he had sent lots of reports, but there had been no arrests, and therefore no bonuses. IDEN A said he would no longer work for just US$100/week. IDEN G replied he might be able to make IDEN A a LNCOLLAR consultant to protect his retired status. He also promised IDEN A a large lobster boat (taken from those confiscated in LNCOLLAR raids), and an additional US$500/month to meet expenses and agent payoffs. IDEN G also spoke of using IDEN A in LNCOLLAR activities in Jamaica and South America. Nothing ever was forthcoming on any of these matters. During this period, IDEN A also provided LNCOLLAR (at its request) with the names of potential sources of information in the Miami area. Several persons were approached by LNCOLLAR using IDEN A's name, and a number of former BKHERALD assets were picked up in this manner. Included in this group are IDEN O, IDEN P, and IDEN Q.

9. In May 1974, IDEN F came to IDEN A at a party and, while drunk, said he had heard IDEN G wanted to recruit IDEN A for LNCOLLAR activities. In June he made similar comments while at another social gathering. IDEN A made no comment (other than requesting that IDEN F shut up). When IDEN A was recruited by IDEN G and IDEN J, they had made quite a point of saying only they would be aware of IDEN A's LNCOLLAR ties. Later in June 1974, IDEN F said he knew IDEN A was working with LNCOLLAR. In July 1974, IDEN G said he did not like having IDEN L, who was IDEN A's handling officer in Miami, dealing with him since IDEN L was known to be an LNCOLLAR officer. IDEN G wanted to have IDEN A deal directly with him in Washington, but IDEN A objected, saying the arrangement was too cumbersome. In late July, IDEN G introduced IDEN A to his new contact, IDEN I.

10. In November 1974, it became apparent the drug ring in Key West on which IDEN A's group was reporting was becoming spooked and overly cautious. Through several of his agents IDEN A learned this resulted

from a direct approach to the violators by LNCOLLAR officer IDEN E, who had come to Key West unbeknownst to IDEN A. Through friends in Miami IDEN A found out IDEN E was in charge of IDEN A's operation in Key West, had a homosexual relationship with IDEN F which went back for many years (and was responsible for the breakup of IDEN E's first marriage), had big real estate deals going in Miami, had a Swiss bank account, and was still using BKHERALD cover in Miami.

11. IDEN P, who was aware of IDEN E's LNCOLLAR connection, and two other LNCOLLAR assets in the Miami area, had agreed to assist LNCOLLAR only if LNCOLLAR officials could guarantee IDEN E would never know of their relationship or see any of their informant reports. IDEN I arranged for this through IDEN G, and the three agents' files were placed in IDEN M's safe. IDEN A subsequently has learned IDEN E routinaly saw all of IDEN P's reports. Later, when the revelations in the preceding paragraph were known, IDEN I told IDEN A there were many allegations about IDEN E, and that he had mentioned this to IDEN G. IDEN G had assured him he would be brought to Washington to discuss the matter, but nothing ever came of it. Ironically, IDEN E was taken into LNCOLLAR on the orders of LNCOLLAR Director IDEN R, and it was specified that no clearance or background check would be undertaken on him.

12. IDEN I and IDEN A decided to approach IDEN F to learn more about IDEN E. During a one hour discussion, IDEN F said he had been appointed the recruiting officer within BKHERALD for persons who would go to LNCOLLAR. IDEN F said he had known IDEN E for a long period of time, and had brought him along in BKHERALD hierarchy. IDEN A believes IDEN F also engineered the absence of a security check on IDEN E by LNCOLLAR since he did not want his homosexual relationship with IDEN E revealed. At that point IDEN A called IDEN G and filled him in on what had been learned, including IDEN F's admission that IDEN E had told him IDEN A was an LNCOLLAR asset. IDEN G denied knowing IDEN F, but said he would check on IDEN E. IDEN A met with IDEN G the next day in Miami to fill him in further, and IDEN G ordered a full investigation. In the meantime, IDEN F told IDEN E of his meeting with IDEN I and IDEN A, and IDEN E wrote a memorandum saying a fellow LNCOLLAR officer (IDEN I) had overstepped the bounds of propriety in his relationship with an LNCOLLAR asset (IDEN A), and that IDEN I and IDEN A were running an investigation on IDEN E. IDEN E described the situation as "intolerable". The LNCOLLAR inquiry, then, turned from IDEN E to improper actions by IDEN I in discussing an LNCOLLAR employee with an asset. The Internal Affairs section of LNCOLLAR did continue the IDEN E probe and concluded by May 1975 that the charges against IDEN E were accurate. In the meantime, IDEN I was interrogated by IDEN M on his relationship with IDEN A.

13. In August 1975, IDEN G informed IDEN A that control of his operation was being transferred to the Miami regional office, and that his financial relationship with LNCOLLAR would be terminated and then re-established locally following 1 September 1975. On 9 September 1975, a state-federal task force arrested 39 persons in Key West. IDEN A knew nothing about the arrests in advance. He called IDEN G to find out what was happening, and IDEN G said he also was unaware of them. He asked IDEN A to continue reporting on these developments. The next day IDEN A met with a source who told him someone had blown IDEN A's LNCOLLAR affiliation to the drug ring. He described the leak as coming from an ex-BKHERALD officer who hated IDEN A. IDEN A's source, who was in touch with drug ring members, told IDEN A the codename of his LNCOLLAR operation (IDEN S), and IDEN A learned IDEN F had spread this word all over town. IDEN A subsequently received telephone death threats (one of the ring member's girl friend called to tell him a white LNCOLLAR informant (IDEN A) would not get out of town alive). There had been eight informant deaths in Monroe County (Key West) in 1975, all unsolved murders. There was every reason, then, to take the threats seriously. IDEN A informed LNCOLLAR about the threats. LNCOLLAR replied that IDEN A was pushing the panic button, and asked for more information. IDEN A requested that the emergency evacuation apparatus be used, but LNCOLLAR refused. Finally, LNCOLLAR said "We don't know what you expect us to do since you've been terminated". IDEN A, who had been terminated by LNCOLLAR/Washington, had not been picked up subsequently by the Miami Regional Office.

14. IDEN A, desiring to keep a low profile, could not talk to many of his agents in Key West, but the few he did reach were expecting a portion of the reward money since the ring that was rolled up was one the agents had reported on for many months. IDEN A checked with LNCOLLAR on this, and was informed his net's information was not used as the basis for the arrests. IDEN A learned that IDEN F had passed the word around Key West that IDEN A was not an LNCOLLAR staff employee, which made IDEN A fair game for removal. He also learned plans had been made locally for his murder. At that point, IDEN A then made his escape with his wife. In Miami, he met with IDEN M. IDEN M claimed IDEN E had not caused any of the problems IDEN A had experienced. Concerning money assurances, IDEN M first denied any promises had been made. Later he said any that had been made (by IDEN G) were unauthorized. He reiterated IDEN A's reporting, although accurate, was not used in the arrests. LNCOLLAR agreed to provide IDEN A with US$1800 for all his problems, and raised the sum later to US$3 thousand. IDEN A accepted the money, but did not indicate he was satisfied with this sum.

15. IDEN A snuck back into Key West and packed his household goods in one evening. His boat was given to a fish supply house to sell. Since he owed the company money for supplies he had purchased, the fish house

sold the boat for a sum equal to his debts. IDEN A's wife quit her job without notice, and he estimates his actual financial losses are US$25 thousand. LNCOLLAR has indicated the US$3 thousand payment is "all IDEN A will get", and he is determined to get more.

16. IDEN A believes many of his agents think he did receive a payoff from LNCOLLAR following the arrests, and that he took all the money and ran, leaving them exposed in Key West. The cars of two of his agents were burned, and IDEN D, IDEN P, and others in the Miami area quit working for LNCOLLAR when they learned of the treatment he had received and/or received death threats themselves. IDEN T. As a result, IDEN A cannot return to Key West, and his lobster business no longer exists.

17. The purpose of IDEN A's contacting the BKHERALD is first to let us know what has happened to many of its former employees and assets. IDEN A believes BKHERALD should know of the false promises that were used to lure some BKHERALD employees to work at LNCOLLAR. As documentation, he provided IDEN I's grievance letter to LNCOLLAR which is attached*and for retention. IDEN I has, incidentally, been taken out of the Intelligence Division of LNCOLLAR and placed in enforcement work in Miami. IDEN I is currently seeking to return to BKHERALD employment, and IDEN A says IDEN I will verify his statements on the treatment of BKHERALD personnel who transferred to LNCOLLAR. (IDEN I's home phone in Miami is IDEN I.) He and the other ex-BKHERALD employees working at a lower level are fed up with LNCOLLAR, and are convinced they will never receive fair treatment in that organization. Since IDEN A believes the recruitment of BKHERALD officers to switch to LNCOLLAR will be a continuing thing, he feels we should know the realities of life in LNCOLLAR.

*[Forwarded Separately]

18. In addition, he notes LNCOLLAR is using many retired BKHERALD people and former BKHERALD assets in its activities. IDEN A believes these persons, in many instances, are being both used and abused. Any flap which occurs as a result of LNCOLLAR mismanagement will bounce back on BKHERALD, since it appears BKHERALD is involved in the LNCOLLAR operation. Indeed, IDEN G has given the impression his activities have been cleared with and approved by BKHERALD. Those assets who are being turned off by LNCOLLAR mismanagement are going to be lost to BKHERALD as well as to LNCOLLAR. Some of these persons could be significant assets in years to come.

19. A flap may not be so far off. In recent weeks IDEN U, who is writing a book about the role of the Cubans IDEN V and IDEN W in the IDEN X affair, called IDEN A and said he has information that IDEN G's wife and IDEN Y's business manager made a trip to Florida recently. Also IDEN U said he has learned that a former BKHERALD man who is a

LNCOLLAR agent is a homosexual, and that US$15 thousand in LNCOLLAR funds were given to someone in Miami to bail out a Puerto Rican drug dealer. The investigation of IDEN E by LNCOLLAR internal affairs did reveal, according to IDEN A, that US$15 thousand could not be accounted for by IDEN E, whose career appears to have been unaffected by the investigation. IDEN U, who obviously has a source within LNCOLLAR, also told IDEN A about many of the individuals (by name) in LNCOLLAR who are formerly BKHERALD employees.

20. IDEN U's information appears to be accurate, according to IDEN A, who recalls receiving a telephone call from IDEN G in July 1975. IDEN G was agitated, and asked IDEN A to handle a matter for him quickly and quietly. He said his wife, children, and the business agent of IDEN Y were in Key West, and were supposed to stay in the apartment of a retired BKHERALD employee named IDEN Z (formerly with IDEN AA). IDEN Z, a friend of IDEN F, had left the area and gave his apartment key to IDEN F. When IDEN G's wife and the others arrived in Key West, they could not locate IDEN F to get the key. IDEN G asked IDEN A to find out what they were doing, "and just how far my neck is stuck out". IDEN A learned they had checked into a local motel. He called IDEN G and passed on this information. IDEN G was relieved, but asked IDEN A to keep an eye on them and report their movements to him. Subsequently, while on a trip to Miami, IDEN A was approached by an LNCOLLAR officer in Internal Affairs. This individual said the episode was under active investigation, and asked IDEN A what he knew about it.

21. Finally, IDEN A is giving BKHERALD an opportunity to provide whatever advice, guidance, and assistance it wishes to furnish before he takes further action to obtain just compensation from LNCOLLAR. He is thinking in terms of possible BKHERALD intervention on his behalf with LNCOLLAR. He recognizes BKHERALD may wish to let him fend for himself. In that event, he plans to approach IDEN BB in Tampa to reveal the above story, and seek IDEN BB's assistance in petitioning LNCOLLAR for financial relief. He will not take any action with IDEN BB until he has heard from BKHERALD. Since he is anxious to get started on this matter, a speedy reply to his request for assistance will be appreciated.

22. IDEN A, incidentally, has decided to remain in Tampa, and has obtained a job as chief investigator for a local private security service. We indicated a reply would be forthcoming either through us or directly to IDEN A. His phone number is IDEN A. He resides at IDEN A.

BRUCE E. MAINWARING

EJKnaysi:paw

Separate Cover Attachment to Follow

C O N F I D E N T I A L 161430Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13376

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (WATTS)

SUBJ: IDENTITIES IN MFL-[illegible]-76 DATED 14 JANUARY 1976 FORWARDED
IN POUCH NO. 234

A194494

IDEN A - GRAYSTON LYNCH, 8739 BAY POINT DRIVE, TAMPA, FLORIDA
PHONE NUMBER: 813-884-8618

IDEN B - OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNCIL

IDEN C - GUSTAVO FERNANDEZ

IDEN D - AMADO CANTILLO A182529

IDEN E - ROBERT MEDELL

IDEN F - GEORGE SOIL (NICKNAME ''JERRY'')

IDEN G - LUCIEN CONIEN

IDEN H - BENEDICT MATTICH

IDEN I - GARY MATTOCKS, PHONE NUMBER 279-0945

IDEN J - WILLIAM LOGAY

IDEN K - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

IDEN L - MIKE BRUN

IDEN M - BUD FRANKS

IDEN N - BUREAU OF NARCOTICS

IDEN O - RAFAEL GARCIA

IDEN P - GONZALO HERRERA A86956

IDEN Q - JULIO PESTONIT

IDEN R - [illegible]

(C)

PAGE 2 DCD/MIAMI 13076

IDEN S - (GRAY GHOST)

IDEN T - THE DRUG RING THAT WAS ROLLED UP WAS A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR OPERATION. THE GROUP HAD A COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE BUDGET OF ABOUT US$ONE MILLION ANNUALLY, AND INCLUDED (EITHER AS ACTIVE RING MEMBERS OR WITTING OF ITS ACTIVITIES) THE SON OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE IN KEY WEST, THE STATE'S ATTORNEY, THE SHERIFF AND CHIEF OF POLICE, THREE MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL, THE ENTIRE POLICE DEPARTMENT, OVER HALF OF THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, THE FIRE CHIEF, AND VARIOUS CITY AND COUNTY OFFICIALS. THE RING ALSO RAN THE PROSTITUTION, NUMBERS, AND THEFT RINGS IN THE AREA. WHILE SOME OF THESE PERSONS WERE ARRESTED (THE FIRE CHIEF, FOR ONE), OTHERS WERE NOT, AND ALL ARE FREE ON BAIL AT THIS TIME.

IDEN U - GEORGE CRILE

IDEN V - BERNARD L. BARKER A181871

IDEN W - EUGENIO R. MARTINEZ A181872

IDEN X - WATERGATE

IDEN Y - MADAM NHU

IDEN Z - RALPH JOHNSON A194000

IDEN AA - VNO

IDEN BB - CONGRESSMAN SAM GIBBONS E2 IMPDET CL BY 011663

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ORIGINATOR AND FIELD NO.
Knaysi/NFL 2-76

XX DIVISION SOURCE AND CHRONO. E

SUBJECT FILES AND CHRONO, FILE

DATE OF MATERIAL
14 Jan

CLASSIFICATION
Conf

DATE RECEIVED
16 Jan 76

NO COPIES RETAINED

SUBJECT
Memo: Grayston Lynch, ex-BKHERALD Staff Employee

19-44-94

ROUTING	DATE	INITIALS
1. Mr. Watts	4 Feb	WW
2. C/OPS		
3. C/DCD		
4. Jeane	27 Feb	jt
5.		
6.		
7.		
8. Control	3/2	

REMARKS

20 Feb 1976: John Greaney has passed to John Kennedy - D'ARCOG who in turn will inform DEA, where in JOHN Greaney's view, it belongs. When he hears from DEA we will inform LYNCH. ~~[illegible]~~

FILES DISPOSITION

FILE THIS COPY WITH DOCUMENT

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

NFL-002-76

TO : Chief, Domestic Collection Division
ATTN : Deputy Chief of Operations (Watts)
FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

DATE: 14 January 1976

SUBJECT: IDEN A, ex-BKHERALD Staff Employee

1. We met with IDEN A, a retired BKHERALD staff employee, on 7 January 1976 at his home in Tampa, Florida. IDEN A had requested the meeting through contact with an attorney in IDEN B. IDEN A spoke for several hours about his life since retirement in 1971. What follows is a long summation of his comments, and at the memo's conclusion his reasons for bringing this situation to our attention. [Forwarded under Separate Cover].

2. IDEN A, who had a major role in the Bay of Pigs activities, and who was associated with JMWAVE during the period 1961-68, has maintained many contacts within the Cuban community in Florida. LNCOLLAR, which was aware of the involvement of some ex-BKHERALD assets (Cubans) in the drug importation business, had been unable to penetrate this group in the period to late 1973. IDEN A, in the meantime, had moved to Key West, Florida, purchased a lobster fishing boat and equipment, and become a respected member of the community.

3. In late 1973, a former BKHERALD asset (AMTABY Project) who had been terminated in 1963, IDEN C, came to IDEN A in Key West, claimed he had escaped from jail in Cuba in 1970 (where he had been jailed for drug running between Cuba and WODUAL), and said he had information on drug traffic. He asked IDEN A to contact someone in LNCOLLAR and indicate IDEN C's willingness to be of assistance. IDEN A replied he was retired and could not help. A few months later, IDEN D (AMTABY-27), another former asset, flew to Key West from Miami. He met IDEN A and informed him LNCOLLAR had sent him down to check on IDEN C. IDEN D identified his LNCOLLAR contact as IDEN E, an ex-BKHERALD asset and former BKHERALD contract employee. At about this time IDEN F, a former BKHERALD staff employee, moved to Key West and informed IDEN A that LNCOLLAR was being staffed with BKHERALD employees in its Intelligence Division, and that the leader of the division was IDEN G, another BKHERALD staffer.

4. A few months later, IDEN A received a call from IDEN H, another BKHERALD retiree, who asked about IDEN A's access to boats IDEN H wished to purchase for a relative of his wife, the relative residing in Venezuela. He photographed every boat in the Key West harbor, and it was apparent to IDEN A he was LNCOLLAR-involved. Later, IDEN F approached IDEN A and said

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

CONFIDENTIAL

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

two BKHERALD people in Miami wanted to meet with IDEN A. IDEN A agreed to a meeting, and IDEN F introduced IDEN I and IDEN E. IDEN A knew IDEN I, but was aware of IDEN E only by reputation, which was unsavory. IDEN E claimed to be a BKHERALD employee, as did IDEN I. IDEN A, of course, knew otherwise, but said nothing. In March 1974, IDEN A got a call from IDEN J of the IDEN K, Miami. He was an ex-BKHERALD officer, and he said IDEN G wished to speak with IDEN A in Miami on an urgent basis.

5. IDEN G told IDEN A that he wanted the latter to work for LNCOLLAR to establish intelligence networks in the Cuban community in Key West. He said no one else could do it, and he promised to provide at the start US$100/week plus expenses plus money to pay IDEN A's agents. He said this money would not be reportable as income. When IDEN A asked about the effect of his own ex-BKHERALD status, IDEN G replied BKHERALD does not want or need to know of this arrangement. IDEN G acknowledged that US$100/week was a small payment, but said any information resulting in a seizure of drugs, the arrest of drug traffickers, or damage to drug rings will be assessed by a board within LNCOLLAR, and money (thousands of dollars) rewarded for this assistance. IDEN A would then be free to split the money with his agents. IDEN J, who was at the meeting, added that within a year IDEN A should be able to afford the best and largest lobster boat available.

6. IDEN G and IDEN J impressed IDEN A with the dangerous nature of his assignment. They stressed cover as the most important consideration, and IDEN G said, "I don't want to go to any more funerals". They added that if IDEN A got into trouble, there were 150 LNCOLLAR agents in Miami who would come to his aid instantly. IDEN A was given emergency telephone numbers and code names, and was told LNCOLLAR would arrange for his airlift out (through the LNTUCK Air Station) if needed. If his LNCOLLAR affiliation was blown, IDEN G said there would be compensation provided up to US$40 thousand, as well as relocation assistance. The relocation assistance was not specified, but IDEN A assumed this meant six months living expenses and assistance in job search activities, as well as reimbursement for moving expenses. IDEN J and IDEN L, another ex-BKHERALD official, were to come to Key West one week later to brief IDEN A on the local situation. In the meantime, IDEN A was to prepare a report on what he knew about drug traffickers in the Key West area. Two weeks later, the two did appear in Key West. The little they knew about Key West drug activities was included in IDEN A's report, which also contained much additional data.

7. IDEN A subsequently set up an intelligence net, and began sending back reports. IDEN A was frequently summoned to Miami for meetings with IDEN G. Often these meetings were a waste of time, and on occasion IDEN G

would not even show up. At one point IDEN J asked IDEN A to write a paper on the capability of ex-BKHERALD assets who were drug traffickers, and who had been trained in infiltration and exfiltration, to penetrate WODUAL coastal defenses with drugs. IDEN A showed how the assets could circumvent any government effort to stop the drug traffic. The paper "scared LNCOLLAR to death," according to IDEN A. At the end of June 1974, IDEN J asked IDEN A to journey to Washington to brief top LNCOLLAR officials on his conclusions. It was to be an all expense paid trip, and IDEN A flew up and stayed one week. Total remuneration received for the journey was only US$150. During the week, IDEN A had many meetings with IDEN G and his deputy, IDEN M, a former IDEN N staff employee. IDEN G indicated at that time he was impressed with IDEN A's reports and access in Key West.

8. Later, IDEN A told IDEN G he had sent lots of reports, but there had been no arrests, and therefore no bonuses. IDEN A said he would no longer work for just US$100/week. IDEN G replied he might be able to make IDEN A a LNCOLLAR consultant to protect his retired status. He also promised IDEN A a large lobster boat (taken from those confiscated in LNCOLLAR raids), and an additional US$500/month to meet expenses and agent payoffs. IDEN G also spoke of using IDEN A in LNCOLLAR activities in Jamaica and South America. Nothing ever was forthcoming on any of these matters. During this period, IDEN A also provided LNCOLLAR (at its request) with the names of potential sources of information in the Miami area. Several persons were approached by LNCOLLAR using IDEN A's name, and a number of former BKHERALD assets were picked up in this manner. Included in this group are IDEN O, IDEN P, and IDEN Q.

9. In May 1974, IDEN F came to IDEN A at a party and, while drunk, said he had heard IDEN G wanted to recruit IDEN A for LNCOLLAR activities. In June he made similar comments while at another social gathering. IDEN A made no comment (other than requesting that IDEN F shut up). When IDEN A was recruited by IDEN G and IDEN J, they had made quite a point of saying only they would be aware of IDEN A's LNCOLLAR ties. Later in June 1974, IDEN F said he knew IDEN A was working with LNCOLLAR. In July 1974, IDEN G said he did not like having IDEN L, who was IDEN A's handling officer in Miami, dealing with him since IDEN L was known to be an LNCOLLAR officer. IDEN G wanted to have IDEN A deal directly with him in Washington, but IDEN A objected, saying the arrangement was too cumbersome. In late July, IDEN G introduced IDEN A to his new contact, IDEN I.

10. In November 1974, it became apparent the drug ring in Key West on which IDEN A's group was reporting was becoming spooked and overly cautious. Through several of his agents IDEN A learned this resulted

from a direct approach to the violators by LNCOLLAR officer IDEN E, who had come to Key West unbeknownst to IDEN A. Through friends in Miami, IDEN A found out IDEN E was in charge of IDEN A's operation in Key West, had a homosexual relationship with IDEN F which went back for many years (and was responsible for the breakup of IDEN E's first marriage), had big real estate deals going in Miami, had a Swiss bank account, and was still using BKHERALD cover in Miami.

11. IDEN P, who was aware of IDEN E's LNCOLLAR connection, and two other LNCOLLAR assets in the Miami area, had agreed to assist LNCOLLAR only if LNCOLLAR officials could guarantee IDEN E would never know of their relationship or see any of their informant reports. IDEN I arranged for this through IDEN G, and the three agents' files were placed in IDEN M's safe. IDEN A subsequently has learned IDEN E routinely saw all of IDEN P's reports. Later, when the revelations in the preceding paragraph were known, IDEN I told IDEN A there were many allegations about IDEN E, and that he had mentioned this to IDEN G. IDEN G had assured him he would be brought to Washington to discuss the matter, but nothing ever came of it. Ironically, IDEN E was taken into LNCOLLAR on the orders of LNCOLLAR Director IDEN R, and it was specified that no clearance or background check would be undertaken on him.

12. IDEN I and IDEN A decided to approach IDEN F to learn more about IDEN E. During a one hour discussion, IDEN F said he had been appointed the recruiting officer within BKHERALD for persons who would go to LNCOLLAR. IDEN F said he had known IDEN E for a long period of time, and had brought him along in BKHERALD hierarchy. IDEN A believes IDEN F also engineered the absence of a security check on IDEN E by LNCOLLAR since he did not want his homosexual relationship with IDEN E revealed. At that point IDEN A called IDEN G and filled him in on what had been learned, including IDEN F's admission that IDEN E had told him IDEN A was an LNCOLLAR asset. IDEN G denied knowing IDEN F, but said he would check on IDEN E. IDEN A met with IDEN G the next day in Miami to fill him in further, and IDEN G ordered a full investigation. In the meantime, IDEN F told IDEN E of his meeting with IDEN I and IDEN A, and IDEN E wrote a memorandum saying a fellow LNCOLLAR officer (IDEN I) had overstepped the bounds of propriety in his relationship with an LNCOLLAR asset (IDEN A), and that IDEN I and IDEN A were running an investigation on IDEN E. IDEN E described the situation as "intolerable". The LNCOLLAR inquiry, then, turned from IDEN E to improper actions by IDEN I in discussing an LNCOLLAR employee with an asset. The Internal Affairs section of LNCOLLAR did continue the IDEN E probe and concluded by May 1975 that the charges against IDEN E were accurate. In the meantime, IDEN I was interrogated by IDEN M on his relationship with IDEN A.

13. In August 1975, IDEN G informed IDEN A that control of his operation was being transferred to the Miami regional office, and that his financial relationship with LNCOLLAR would be terminated and then re-established locally following 1 September 1975. On 9 September 1975, a state-federal task force arrested 39 persons in Key West. IDEN A knew nothing about the arrests in advance. He called IDEN G to find out what was happening, and IDEN G said he also was unaware of them. He asked IDEN A to continue reporting on these developments. The next day IDEN A met with a source who told him someone had blown IDEN A's LNCOLLAR affiliation to the drug ring. He described the leak as coming from an ex-BKHERALD officer who hated IDEN A. IDEN A's source, who was in touch with drug ring members, told IDEN A the codename of his LNCOLLAR operation (IDEN S), and IDEN A learned IDEN F had spread this word all over town. IDEN A subsequently received telephone death threats (one of the ring member's girl friend called to tell him a white LNCOLLAR informant (IDEN A) would not get out of town alive). There had been eight informant deaths in Monroe County (Key West) in 1975, all unsolved murders. There was every reason, then, to take the threats seriously. IDEN A informed LNCOLLAR about the threats. LNCOLLAR replied that IDEN A was pushing the panic button, and asked for more information. IDEN A requested that the emergency evacuation apparatus be used, but LNCOLLAR refused. Finally, LNCOLLAR said "We don't know what you expect us to do since you've been terminated". IDEN A, who had been terminated by LNCOLLAR/Washington, had not been picked up subsequently by the Miami Regional Office.

14. IDEN A, desiring to keep a low profile, could not talk to many of his agents in Key West, but the few he did reach were expecting a portion of the reward money since the ring that was rolled up was one the agents had reported on for many months. IDEN A checked with LNCOLLAR on this, and was informed his net's information was not used as the basis for the arrests. IDEN A learned that IDEN F had passed the word around Key West that IDEN A was not an LNCOLLAR staff employee, which made IDEN A fair game for removal. He also learned plans had been made locally for his murder. At that point, IDEN A then made his escape with his wife. In Miami, he met with IDEN M. IDEN M claimed IDEN E had not caused any of the problems IDEN A had experienced. Concerning money assurances, IDEN M first denied any promises had been made. Later he said any that had been made (by IDEN G) were unauthorized. He reiterated IDEN A's reporting, although accurate, was not used in the arrests. LNCOLLAR agreed to provide IDEN A with US$1800 for all his problems, and raised the sum later to US$3 thousand. IDEN A accepted the money, but did not indicate he was satisfied with this sum.

15. IDEN A snuck back into Key West and packed his household goods in one evening. His boat was given to a fish supply house to sell. Since he owed the company money for supplies he had purchased, the fish house

sold the boat for a sum equal to his debts. IDEN A's wife quit her job without notice, and he estimates his actual financial losses are US$25 thousand. LNCOLLAR has indicated the US$3 thousand payment is "all IDEN A will get", and he is determined to get more.

16. IDEN A believes many of his agents think he did receive a payoff from LNCOLLAR following the arrests, and that he took all the money and ran, leaving them exposed in Key West. The cars of two of his agents were burned, and IDEN D, IDEN P, and others in the Miami area quit working for LNCOLLAR when they learned of the treatment he had received and/or received death threats themselves. IDEN T. As a result, IDEN A cannot return to Key West, and his lobster business no longer exists.

17. The purpose of IDEN A's contacting the BKHERALD is first to let us know what has happened to many of its former employees and assets. IDEN A believes BKHERALD should know of the false promises that were used to lure some BKHERALD employees to work at LNCOLLAR. As documentation, he provided IDEN I's grievance letter to LNCOLLAR which is attached*and for retention. IDEN I has, incidentally, been taken out of the Intelligence Division of LNCOLLAR and placed in enforcement work in Miami. IDEN I is currently seeking to return to BKHERALD employment, and IDEN A says IDEN I will verify his statements on the treatment of BKHERALD personnel who transferred to LNCOLLAR. (IDEN I's home phone in Miami is IDEN I.) He and the other ex-BKHERALD employees working at a lower level are fed up with LNCOLLAR, and are convinced they will never receive fair treatment in that organization. Since IDEN A believes the recruitment of BKHERALD officers to switch to LNCOLLAR will be a continuing thing, he feels we should know the realities of life in LNCOLLAR.

*[Forwarded Separately]

18. In addition, he notes LNCOLLAR is using many retired BKHERALD people and former BKHERALD assets in its activities. IDEN A believes these persons, in many instances, are being both used and abused. Any flap which occurs as a result of LNCOLLAR mismanagement will bounce back on BKHERALD, since it appears BKHERALD is involved in the LNCOLLAR operation. Indeed, IDEN G has given the impression his activities have been cleared with and approved by BKHERALD. Those assets who are being turned off by LNCOLLAR mismanagement are going to be lost to BKHERALD as well as to LNCOLLAR. Some of these persons could be significant assets in years to come.

19. A flap may not be so far off. In recent weeks IDEN U, who is writing a book about the role of the Cubans IDEN V and IDEN W in the IDEN X affair, called IDEN A and said he has information that IDEN G's wife and IDEN Y's business manager made a trip to Florida recently. Also IDEN U said he has learned that a former BKHERALD man who is a

LNCOLLAR agent is a homosexual, and that US$5 thousand in LNCOLLAR funds were given to someone in Miami to rat out a Puerto Rican drug dealer. The investigation of IDEN E by LNCOLLAR internal affairs did reveal, according to IDEN A, that US$15 thousand could not be accounted for by IDEN E, whose career appears to have been unaffected by the investigation. IDEN U, who obviously has a source within LNCOLLAR, also told IDEN A about many of the individuals (by name) in LNCOLLAR who are formerly BEHFRALD employees.

20. IDEN U's information appears to be accurate, according to IDEN A, who recalls receiving a telephone call from IDEN G in July 1975. IDEN G was agitated, and asked IDEN A to handle a matter for him quickly and quietly. He said his wife, children, and the business agent of IDEN Y were in Key West, and were supposed to stay in the apartment of a retired BEHFRALD employee named IDEN Z (formerly with IDEN AA). IDEN Z, a friend of IDEN F, had left the area and gave his apartment key to IDEN F. When IDEN G's wife and the others arrived in Key West, they could not locate IDEN F to get the key. IDEN G asked IDEN A to find out what they were doing, "and just how far my neck is stuck out". IDEN A learned they had checked into a local motel. He called IDEN G and passed on this information. IDEN G was relieved, but asked IDEN A to keep an eye on them and report their movements to him. Subsequently, while on a trip to Miami, IDEN A was approached by an LNCOLLAR officer in Internal Affairs. This individual said the episode was under active investigation, and asked IDEN A what he knew about it.

21. Finally, IDEN A is giving BEHFRALD an opportunity to provide whatever advice, guidance, and assistance it wishes to furnish before he takes further action to obtain just compensation from LNCOLLAR. He is thinking in terms of possible BEHFRALD intervention on his behalf with LNCOLLAR. He recognizes BEHFRALD may wish to let him fend for himself. In that event, he plans to approach IDEN BB in Tampa to reveal the above story, and seek IDEN BB's assistance in petitioning LNCOLLAR for financial relief. He will not take any action with IDEN BB until he has heard from BEHFRALD. Since he is anxious to get [illegible] on this matter, a speedy reply to his request for assistance will be appreciated.

22. IDEN A, incidentally, has decided to remain in Tampa, and has [illegible] a job as chief investigator for a local private [illegible] [illegible]. We indicated a reply would be forthcoming [illegible] of [illegible] to IDEN A. His phone number is IDEN A. He is aware of IDEN A.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Separate Cover Attachment to Follow

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: NFL-002-76
[The "Informal Grievance" was written by IDEN I]

SUBJECT : Informal Grievance

1. This written informal grievance is being submitted in order that it may be passed to higher authority for resolution. It is anticipated that final action will be required by top echelon DEA officials in order to satisfactorily resolve all or part of the issues.

2. I wish to file a grievance on the following subjects which constitute commitments made to me by representatives of DEA at the time of my recruitment from CIA into the DEA Narcotics Intelligence Division.

a. I was specifically told by DEA representatives at the time of my initial recruitment interviews that the retirement plans were the same in both agencies and that my previous time in government would transfer with me with no break in service. I am now informed that my previous service will not count toward retirement under section 8336(c), title 5, USC Law Enforcement Retirement. This leaves me with no chance to accumulate the required time for retirement.

b. I was told by the DEA representatives that in order to expedite my transfer from CIA it would be necessary to bring me on duty in schedule "A" status, however, action would be initiated shortly after my EOD to place me in competitive career status. I have now been on duty with DEA for two years and three months, and I am still on schedule "A" status.

c. As a recruitment enticement the DEA representatives stated to me that after two years of satisfactory service with DEA I would be a grade GS-13. No promotion is forthcoming after 27 months of satisfactory service.

d. DEA representatives stated to me that I would be coming to DEA as part of the "ground floor" personnel of trained and experienced intelligence officers to staff the newly formed intelligence division of DEA and that I could expect rapid upward movement on the career ladder. At this point there is no apparent intelligence career ladder in DEA

3. The minimum action that would satisfy my grievance is complete fulfillment of items a-d above. DEA should take whatever action necessary to credit my previous service for retirement under 8336(c), and career status should be established with the CSC. If DEA cannot fulfill the commitments made to me when it's representatives recruited me from CIA in 1973, then the highest echelons of the Justice Department should expedite my transfer back to CIA as soon as possible.

C O N F I D E N T I A L 161400Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13276

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (WATTS)

SUBJ: IDENTITIES IN NFL-282-76 DATED 14 JANUARY 1976 FORWARDED IN POUCH NO. 234

JAN 16 11 10 AM '76

IDEN A - GRAYSTON LYNCH, 5709 BAY POINT DRIVE, TAMPA, FLORIDA
PHONE NUMBER: 813-884-8618

IDEN B - OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNCIL

IDEN C - GUSTAVO FERNANDEZ

IDEN D - AMADO CANTILLO

IDEN E - ROBERT MEDELL

IDEN F - GEORGE SOHL (NICKNAME ''JERRY'')

IDEN G - LUCIEN CONIEN

IDEN H - BENEDICT MANDICH

IDEN I - GARY MATTOCKS, PHONE NUMBER 279-0945

IDEN J - WILLIAM LOGAY

IDEN K - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

IDEN L - MIKE BRUM

IDEN M - BUD FRANKS

IDEN N - BUREAU OF NARCOTICS

IDEN O - RAFAEL GARCIA

IDEN P - GONZALO HERRERA

IDEN Q - JU[illegible] PEST[illegible]I

IDEN R - ING[illegible]LL

IDEN S - (GRAY GHOST)

IDEN T - THE DRUG RING THAT WAS ROLLED UP WAS A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR OPERATION. THE GROUP HAD A COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE BUDGET OF ABOUT USSONE MILLION ANNUALLY, AND INCLUDED (EITHER AS ACTIVE RING MEMBERS OR WITTING OF ITS ACTIVITIES) THE SON OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE IN KEY WEST, THE STATE'S ATTORNEY, THE SHERIFF AND CHIEF OF POLICE, THREE MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL, THE ENTIRE POLICE DEPARTMENT, OVER HALF OF THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, THE FIRE CHIEF, AND VARIOUS CITY AND COUNTY OFFICIALS. THE RING ALSO RAN THE PROSTITUTION, NUMBERS, AND THEFT RINGS IN THE AREA. WHILE SOME OF THESE PERSONS WERE ARRESTED (THE FIRE CHIEF, FOR ONE), OTHERS WERE NOT, AND ALL ARE FREE ON BAIL AT THIS TIME.

IDEN U - GEORGE CRILE

IDEN V - BERNARD L. BARKER

IDEN W - EUGENIO R. MARTINEZ

IDEN X - WATERGATE

IDEN Y - MADAM NHU

IDEN Z - RALPH JOHNSON

IDEN AA - VNO

IDEN BB - CONGRESSMAN SAM GIBBONS E2 IMPDET CL BY 011663

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MFL-003-76

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
ATTN : Deputy Chief of Operations (Watts)

13 January 1976

Chief, Miami Field Office

194494

Publication of Items Relating to Cuban Operations

1. We met with Grayston Lynch, a retired Agency staff employee, on 7 January 1976 at his home in Tampa, Florida. Lynch had requested the meeting through contact with OGC. One item of interest to Lynch concerns a book he wishes to write on Cuban operations during the period 1961-67. Lynch currently is in the process of preparing one book (on the Bay of Pigs) for publication. Recently, however, he spoke with George Crile, who is writing a book on Watergate burglars Eugenio Martinez and Bernard Barker. Crile indicated he and co-author Taylor Branch plan to follow that book with one on the Agency's Cuban operations, and focus on Lynch and William Robertson, two major figures in the Bay of Pigs invasion. Since Martinez was deeply involved with Lynch as a ship captain during the Bay of Pigs and in subsequent operations against Cuba, he will be the primary source for the book.

2. Lynch believes the story Martinez will provide will be somewhat inaccurate because he only saw developments from the vantage point of a ship captain. Lynch (whose cohort Robertson is deceased) believes only he can provide an accurate recounting. The Martinez book is scheduled for printing in the summer of 1976. Lynch would like to beat Crile and Branch to the punch. Indeed, he believes they will not publish their book if they know he is going to publish one on the same subject. What Lynch wishes is an indication of general Agency reaction to any manuscript he might write on the period.

3. Lynch wishes to write about the operations of the AMLILAC group (Commandos Mambises) during the period 1961-67, when Lynch conducted about 100 infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba. Any manuscript he drafts will, of course, be submitted to the Agency for review. He does not wish to get into the writing job, however, if there is a blanket prohibition on describing Agency operations which occurred in that period and place. He notes that Martinez, not fettered by Agency restrictions, will provide Crile and Branch with his recollections. Lynch believes he can cover the material in a way which will not hurt anyone or expose anything. He had no intentions of getting into the commando raid recounting business until he heard from Crile recently.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

4. Since time is important on this matter, Lynch shall appreciate a fairly quick response on this question. He recognizes no final decision on his manuscript can be made until Agency officials review it. At the same time, however, it may not be too difficult to ascertain the presence or absence of a blanket restriction on writing about this era.

BRUCE E. MAINWARING

EJKnaysi:ljh

19-44-94

DEC 16 3 29 PM '75

CONFIDENTIAL 162000Z DEC 75 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13034

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (WATTS)

FROM: CHIEF, MIAMI FIELD OFFICE

SUBJ: GRAYSTON LYNCH, TAMPA, FLORIDA

REF : TELECON OF MAINWARING/WATTS, 16 DECEMBER 1975, SAME SUBJECT.

I TALKED WITH SUBJECT BY TELEPHONE THIS AFTERNOON. HE WILL BE INTERVIEWED IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE AND WE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH A FULL REPORT. E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

Control

CONFIDENTIAL

DIARY, 16 December 1975

194494

1. John Greaney, OGC, called this date to advise that ex-CIA employee (now retired) Grayston Lynch told John over the telephone that he wants to consult with a CIA officer on some undefined problems concerning other ex-CIA employees. It seems that Lynch, who was involved in the Bay of Pigs operation and is an open protagonist of CIA, is writing a book. He is in contact with Greaney with respect to OGC's need to review the book before it is published.

2. Greaney, who believes that Lynch may be connected with Dave Philips' Ex-CIA Employees Association, asked if we could have a DCD officer from the Miami Field Office visit Lynch in Tampa, where he is now living, and listen to his story. Greaney attached some importance and urgency to his request and indicated that it would be advantageous for the Agency to remain on good terms with Lynch.

3. I told him I would pass his request on to higher DCD authority and let him know what is decided. Lynch's address is: 8709 Bay Point Drive, Tampa, Florida, telephone: 813-884-8610.

CSmyth/pk

Former Employee

CONFIDENTIAL E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

[illegible]

OCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLEC[illegible]S

SECTION 1. To be completed by the field

1. METHOD OF COLLECTION				2. DIRECTED TO. Group/Desk Officer
INTERVIEW	TRIP REPORT	OTHER DOC.	OTHER (Specify)	
X				DCD/ICG/AMA (Hunter/Budelier)

3. SUBJECT AND AREA
Recruitment of Cuban Exile Aircrews

(Zaire)

4. FIELD COMMENTS	5. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
INTERNAL USE ONLY CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY	Grayston Lynch 8709 Bay Point Drive Tampa, Florida
	6. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address) Same
	7. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address) None

8. REPORT SERIES	9. REPORT NO.	10. CASE NO.	11. DATE FWD'D			12. FO/RO	13. EXCHANGES			
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	1 - 7	8 - 12	13-14	15-16	17-18	19 - 22	23			
A B X K T S Y			MO.	DA.	YR.		1. Exchanges	2. Bilateral	3. Commercial	4. Article IV
E(R)	07314-77	64,954	03	31	77	XMIM				

14. OBJ.	15. KIQ.	16. JOINT	17. MILITARY		18. I/O (32 - 43)	19. F.O. CHIEF
24 - 26	27 - 29	30	31	1. Air Force 2. Army 5. Navy		
Kla	11				BMainwaring	BMainwaring

SECTION 2: To be completed by Headquarters

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS (Do not reveal source indentities)

Process sheet and report was typed in Headquarters/International Collection Group, AMA Section from Miami teletype 13953. ZIBET VIA USG (Foster)

Coordinated w/ ZIBET -
made 1UC at ZIBET request
ORPA - 6G05 NIO/AF 7E47
CRG - 7G50
CPS - Rot Foster 7F24

SUBJECT	NO DISSEM.		[illegible]	DATE RELEASED			[illegible]	GRADE	E(GMPOR)
44 - 47	48	49	50	51-52	53-54	55-56	57	58-59	60
				MO.	DA.	YR.			
0 ECO	1. Sufficiently well known	0	0	04	01	77		05	R
1 S&T		1	1						
2 POL	2. Too general	[✓ 2]	2	EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM:					
[✓ 3] MIL	3. Data supplied by other agencies	3	[✓ 3]						
4 ---		4	4						
5 SOC	4. Other, Misc.	5	5						
6 GEO	5. Combined with	6	6	DESK OFFICER					
7 BIO		7	7	NBudelier for MHunter:djm					
8 ---	6. Insufficient interest	8	8	BRANCH SECTION CHIEF					
9 TOS		9	9	Nomie Budelier					

SECTION 3: To be completed by ICB

CNTRY CODE	MAJOR AREA CODE	TYPE REPORT	UO/REST.
61-64	65	66	67
190	5	E	X

	INDIVIDUAL NO.	ORGANIZATION
CONTACT		
	68 - 73	74 - 79
SOURCE		
SUB-SOURCE		

FORM 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

1

(20-41)

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Domestic Collection Division
Foreign Intelligence Information Report

COUNTRY Zaire

SUBJECT Recruitment of Cuban Exile Aircrews

DCD REPORT NO. OO- E 324/07314-77

DATE DISTR. 1 April 1977

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DCD Case 64,954

DATE OF INFO. March 1977

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, a former professional intelligence officer. He received this information from a long time acquaintance who was invited to participate in the project discussed in this report.

1. An individual described as chief pilot to Zaire President Sese Seko Mobuto has been attempting to recruit pilots and ground crews from among Cuban exile groups to counter invading forces. Especially desired are members of the former Cuban Congo brigade.
2. Active in this project is an individual named Rene Garcia.
3. According to prospective participants, two qualified pilots may have recently left for South Africa, presumably in connection with this project.
4. Zaire is also seeking to purchase skyraider aircraft.

- end -

WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 011668 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption category [illegible] Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification

THE DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS CONTROLLED BY DCID 1/7.

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

19-04-94

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD RESIDENT OFFICE	ORGANIZATION NUMBER	CASE NUMBER	FORWARDED MO. DAY YR	REPORT SERIES & NO.	34
X N F L			0 1 1 3 6	~~A~~ 0 0 2 7 0 7 6	3

RELEASED MO. DAY YR: 01226

SUBJECT AND AREA
Eulugio Cantillo/Claim of High Quality Uranium Deposits in Cuban Mine

(Cuba)

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Grayston Lynch
8790 Bay Point Drive
Tampa, FL

INDIVIDUAL NO.

TYPE OO-E •
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

* NOT DISSEMINATED

ORGANIZATION NO.

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	–	–	–
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8			–
[✓ 9]	[✓ M]	[✓ I]	[✓ S]

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ. PROCESSING ELEMENT 51	52
1	1
2	2
[✓ 3]	[✓ 3]
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
8	8
9	9

METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT
☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

EXCHANGES (COL. 35)
1-EXCHANGE
2-BILATERAL
3. COMMERCIAL
4. ARTICLE IV

DIRECTED TO	CSG	SREE	ICG	ETF	DESK OFFICER
	X				

FIELD COMMENTS
We decided OO-A(S) would be the most appropriate format for this information since AKULE has (according to Source) had a long relationship with the general. Any follow-up request for verification would likely go through that route. Source has not previously passed the information to an Agency representative.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS
AKULE

HH 27779

MBO	KIQ	GRADE	INDIVIDUAL NO.	MA	TR	COUNTRY
CIA	XX	OX		7	A	014A

EJKnaysi:ljb

F BEMA IRWARING

DESK OFFICER: C. Murphy

BRANCH SECTION CHIEF: CSG

FORM 7-75 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 006697

(20-41)

1

CLASSIFICATION

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

REPORT NO. OO-A(S) 322/00270-76

DATE 13 January 1976

COUNTRY Cuba

NO. PAGES 1

SUBJECT Eulugio Cantillo/Claim of High Quality Uranium Deposits in Cuban Mine

REFERENCES

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report is believed to contain information of operational interest and may not be disclosed to personnel outside the Directorate of Operations without the prior permission of the Domestic Collection Division.

US citizen, individual with longtime relationship with Eulugio Cantillo. Source is a retired Agency staff employee.

1. Eulugio Cantillo, a Cuban national who resides at 6791 S.W. 2nd Street, Miami, Florida, is a former Cuban general. In 1956, when he was the Chief of the Cuban Air Force under Cuban dictator Batista, Cantillo's uncle came to him with an ore sample the uncle had uncovered in an abandoned former Spanish mine in Cuba. The uncle suspected the ore was uranium. Cantillo brought the specimen to the US, where it was assayed by an unnamed US survey company as being the richest uranium sample the firm had ever tested. Cantillo and the uncle, who were the only individuals aware of the location of the mine, recognized archaic Cuban laws did not protect their find, so the general attempted to get Batista to change the mining statutes. Batista suspected the general had come across something significant, andhhe sent a team of men to the Pinar del Rio area for six months on a search. The team uncovered nothing. Batista also tried to work out a deal where he would be a partner in the venture as a pre-condition to changing the mining laws. He was unsuccessful in convincing Cantillo to permit him to become a partner. At that time, the revolution reached full intensity, and Batista left the country.

2. Cantillo's uncle is still in Cuba. Despite Cantillo's imprisonment by the Fidel Castro regime for nine years, he has never told anyone about his uncle's find. Approximately one year ago, Cantillo approached a retired Agency staff employee and informed him of the uncle's find. He did so after all these years because of the developing relations between the US and Cuba. Cantillo feels the US may be able to make use of information that Castro does not possess about the riches that exist in his own nation, and that Castro and the USSR would capitalize on the find if they were to become aware of it. In his view, the US should know of this potential before it conducts negotiations with Castro. The general is willing to provide the name of the assay company, so that documentation can be obtained on the purity of the uranium.

3. The general's US contact notes Cantillo is not the sort of man who speaks inaccurately about things such as this. He described Cantillo as a "solid guy", and says the information Cantillo has provided probably is reliable.

- end -

CLASSIFICATION

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 007622
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification

3216 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-1552

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 29 June 1954

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM: Chief of Mission, Mexico City

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Subject of HMM-W-1507

REFERENCE: HMM-W-1507, 18 June 1954

TKRW-975
976

1. Subject is contacted by a member of this Mission about twice a month usually on a semi-social basis. Subject is quite familiar with the workings of the organization based on his experience in Panama, his frequent visits there, and his contacts with this office during the past four years. From time to time subject provides bits of information or opinions on local affairs which he thinks may be of interest. Ways in which he could be of further operational use have also been discussed with him in general terms. Subject has provided his name for use in registering a station automobile and for obtaining postoffice boxes.

2. Subject appears to be well versed in some of the operational methods of the organization and has always expressed a willingness to assist in any way possible. This might include acting as a cut-out, furnishing general political and Communist information, setting up cover establishments, and the development of informants in several fields. To date, no specific opening for his services has been evolved but it is highly likely that such a spot will appear in the future.

3. This Mission foresees no strong obstacle or reason against subject's being contacted by KUJUMP again but feels that if subject had any information of possible interest to this organization he would immediately contact the writer. In addition, such a contact might possibly re-kindle subject's previously expressed feeling that at times it appeared that "the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing". It is suggested that if KUJUMP has any specific type of information in mind, questions indicating the line of interest could be forwarded to this Mission and placed before subject for his comment. If KUJUMP particularly desires to interview subject it is suggested that this Mission be authorized to so inform subject so that the matter will appear completely coordinated in subject's mind.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201 30999

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

RI COPY

4. This Mission appreciates the receipt of reference as an excellent example of such coordination.

GMRyerson

Gordon M. Ryerson

GMR/crt

29 June 1954

Distribution:
✓3-Wash
2-Files

201 [illegible]0000

~~50-5-2-259~~

14-00000

AIR HMM-A-1547

June 18 1954

: Chief of Mission, Mexico City

: Chief, WHD

- Operational
- Subject of TMM-A-775

REF: TMM-A-976

1. A representative of KUJUMP recently contacted subject, a U.S. manufacturers' representative, who lives in Mexico City. After KUJUMP made its standard explanation of KUBARK interests, the subject said that he felt that he should make it clear that he worked for KUBARK in Mexico. He qualified this statement by saying that his extensive background and experience in Mexico enabled him to set up meeting places and front offices as well as other cover projects for KUBARK, ODACID and ODENVY.

2. Subject seemed quite candid and KUJUMP had no reason to believe that he was not telling the truth. Subject doubted that he could give KUBARK a great deal of information which was not available through official agencies operating in Mexico. However, he seems to be generally knowledgeable on the situation there and KUJUMP feels that he might be a source of some interesting information if their contacting him would not interfere with arrangements which your Mission might have made with him.

3. Headquarters requests your comments regarding subject. Please advise as soon as possible, since KUJUMP would like to contact subject again when he returns to this country in July.

11 June 1954

J. C. KING
C/WH

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - RI
✓1 - Subj.

WH/III/MJOgden/jw

J. C. KING

O. M. DOERFLINGER

201 30999

ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE APR 2 1955

14-00000

Boston 8266

Chief, FI/Plans/Cover

11 May 1954

Chief, Contact Division, OO

Alfonso R. Wichtrich (HH-1265)

1. A representative of this Division recently contacted subject, a US manufacturers' representative, who lives in Mexico City. Wichtrich was visiting representatives of the Nehi Corporation which is one of his accounts in Mexico City. After our representative made his standard explanation of Agency interests, Wichtrich said that he felt that he should make it clear that he worked for the Agency in Mexico. He qualified this statement by saying that his extensive background and experience in Mexico enabled him to set up meeting places and "front" offices as well as other "cover" projects for this Agency, the State Department and the Bureau.

2. He seemed quite candid and our representative had no reason to believe that he was not telling the truth. Wichtrich doubted that he could give us a great deal of information which was not available through official agencies operating in Mexico. However, he seems to be generally knowledgeable on the situation there and we believe that he might be a source of some interesting information if our contacting him would not interfere with arrangements which the covert offices might have made with him.

3. We should appreciate your comments. If you prefer, we shall not see him again. On the other hand, if you have no objection, we should like to contact him when he returns to this country in July. Please advise.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

HMM.W.

201 30999

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TMM-W-916

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico

FROM : FDT

DATE: 1 February 1950

SUBJECT: GENERAL.

SPECIFIC. Operational
Subject of TMM-W-976

o WICHTRICH, ALPHONSE R,

1. Subject was engaged by our field station, Panama, in October 1947 with the thought that he was qualified to organize a net directed against a target of high priority interest. His services were terminated in April 1949 when he took residence in Mexico for business reasons.

2. The Chief of Station, Panama, described this man as having great singleness of purpose which produces superior results in the field of his primary interest. But the experience in Panama revealed that the subject's primary interest - his business - was such that he gave little time to work as an agent.

3. The Subject organized an intelligence net for the U.S. Army in China during World War II and, therefore, understands covert operations. Despite his capabilities, proven reliability, and his expressed desire to be of service in Mexico, Headquarters does not recommend that the subject be engaged by field station, Mexico, unless there is unusual need for a man of his background.

COPY

RECLASSIFIED
~~RI/[illegible]~~
RI/[illegible]
FWR:gee
RI/Files

DECLASSIFIED
per CSN 43-28

Wm. M. Wheeler Jr.
Wm. M. Wheeler
[illegible] Dean

201 30999
ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE APR 23 '55

STC
John P. Gleason
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

Wm. M. Wheeler
Wm. M. Wheeler
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: FDT

KAPOK

NO. RPA-690

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Connolly		16 Jun		re	
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8. Reid					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					201 30999
14.		45-28			ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX ☐
15.					DATE APR 21 55

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1949

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TTP-A-690

SECRET - KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 16 January 1950

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Agents and Informants
SPECIFIC- Subject of TTP-A-689

The address of subject is:

Royal Crown, S. A.
Dante #4
Mexico, D. F.

Howard W. Antell
Howard W. Antell

HWA:rtp

Distribution: Wash 2 ✓
Files 1

SECRET - KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

201 30999

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO. TZPA-689

DATE 16 Jan 50

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. FDT	2014	[illegible]		sl	
2. Rodriguez					File attached. Suggest
3. Dean		25 Jan 25		wdc	[illegible] of the [illegible] 3 & 4 Please discuss this disp.
4. Rastetter		[illegible]		[illegible]	with Vandermeer re a recommendation to mission Field Station Mexico
5. Reid					advised of Hydrol's
6.					recent arrival in
7.					Mexico. Dispatches written by RWR TMM-41-975
8.					
9. Connally		26 Jan		rc	
10. Reid					
11.					201 - 30999
12.					ABSTRACT ~~INDEX~~ DATE APR 21 1955
13.					
14.					OSO Registry JAN 23 1950
15. SSR	1514				10

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-590

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 16 January 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Agents and Informants
SPECIFIC- HYDROL

The services of subject had been terminated prior to my arrival at this station and, in fact, subject has not been residing here since my arrival.

He was recently in Panama on a business trip and was introduced to me by HYDRACID. In the course of the conversation, subject indicated a desire, after he becomes more settled in Mexico City, to have contact with our office there.

Since Headquarters and particularly Grover J. WARING are in a better position to judge subject and whether he might be of assistance to our station in Mexico City, no recommendation is being made.

The address of subject will follow in a separate dispatch.

Howard W. Antell

HWA:rtp

Distribution: Wash 2 ✓
Files 1

REGISTRY COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-30999

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: FDT

ACCESSION NO. DI-A-607

DATE RECEIVED IN S.A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Rd		[illegible]		[illegible]
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. Rein				JP
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

copy detached for Gen [illegible].

202-999

201 30999

ABSTRACT ✓ ~~INDEX~~

DATE APR 21 1955

FORM NO. 51-10
SEP 1946

SECRET

(1333)

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TZP-A-607

SECRET - KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 4 November 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama HMB

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative
SPECIFIC- HYDROL

For the completion of Headquarters' records, advice is herewith furnished that subject's services are not being utilized by the Panama City station. This fact was made known to Headquarters under date of April 12, 1949 in TZP-A-454.

No further action is contemplated in connection with this project.

Bruce O. Sturgess
Bruce O. Sturgess

BOS:rtp

Distribution: Wash 2
Files 1

201 30999

SECRET - KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Chief, Registry Division

DATE: 15 June 1949

FROM Chief, FBT

SUBJECT: Hydrol
File No. 202-999

1. Subject file is transmitted herewith for retention in Registry. The project has been terminated.

2. Appropriate indexing has been completed.

3. Access to subject file must be cleared with the Chief of FBT.

Note - carded in RI/CO
7 Oct 54

SECRET

201 30999

SECRET

8 June 1949
Date

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

SUBJECT: Authorization of Field Project Expenditures for **Panama City, Panama**.
(field installation)

1. This will inform you of the authorization of the following Field Projects and my approval of the expenditure of special funds for the following:

PROJECT	AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED			1949	TOTAL
Name or Symbol	1 July-30 Sep.	1 Oct-31 Dec.	1 Jan-31 Mar.	1 Apr-30 Jun	
HYDROL				**Terminated 1 April 1949**	
TOTAL					

2. The project expenditures herewith authorized will be charged against the appropriate quarterly Operating Expenses of **Panama City, Panama**.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.
Chief, Foreign Branch **T**

cc: IOFF

SECRET

201 30999

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-A-454

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FBT

DATE: 12 April 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Agents and Informants
SPECIFIC- [illegible] - Operational Review

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY: YANKEE. PERIOD COVERED: October 1948 - March 1949.
CATEGORY: [illegible].

1. Subject is no longer an active operative of this station. He was forced to discontinue his activities on our behalf because of the press of personal business. HYVOLCANIC is now in contact with HYMACID and HYTROL I has been taken over by HYDROPHOBIC.

2. During the period of his connection with this station, [illegible] failed to submit any informational report which in itself merited transmission to the Home Office. None of his operations were clean in the sense that a U.S. Government influence had to be introduced into the actual activation of each of his sources. This coupled with the fact that he lacked follow-through has given a slightly sour aspect to all of his operations. We intend to discontinue our connections with Subject.

Grover J Waring
Grover J. Waring

25 Jan 1950
Were this man to apply for a staff position I would recommend that he be employed as he is a man of great singleness of purpose and gets [illegible] in ~~[illegible]~~ the fulfillment of his primary interests. On the other hand this quality which would be an asset to a staff employee proved a drawback to his ability to perform [illegible] agent while engaged in [illegible] mission. I would ~~not recommend him as~~ [illegible] for another country unless they needed such a man very badly.
[illegible]

GJW:emh

Distribution:

Wash (2)
Files (1)

REGISTRY COPY

201 306699

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

CLASSIFICATION

DOCUMENTS IN DOSSIER

TZP-A-102

TZP-A-381

TZP-A-454

A-690

A-689

TZP-151

TZP. W. 975

TZP. W. 976

Name check

Project terminated, April 1949

201 30999

6 January 1949

Memorandum for Chief, Special Funds

Hydrol $150 for second quarter 1949

Terminated

201 3098

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: FRI

ACCESSION NO. TZP-A-381

DATE RECEIVED IN S.A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Pafton	2216		9/12	P.P.	Field informed by despatch on 9 Dec. that the project is not to be activated as requested here. Directed to allot $50.00 per month for Hydrol and an additional $50.00 for salary and expenses of his sub-agent.
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					

201 30999

ABSTRACT / INDEX

DATE APR 21 1955

NO. 51-10

SECRET

(1333)

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: ______
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TZP-A-321

SECRET — Kapok
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FET

DATE: 22 November, 1948

FROM : Chief of Station
Panama City, Panama

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Agents and Informants
SPECIFIC- HYDROL Operational Review and Project Report

Ref: FM No. 51
TZP - 151
TZP - A - 102
TZP - W - 321

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY: YAWNER

PERIOD COVERED: 20 October, 1947 to present.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:

Subject's original assignment was the establishment of an intelligence net for the Republic of Panama with a view to developing information on our various YAWNER objectives. The assignment was too broad because subject is establishing a new business and has not had sufficient time to devote to our work. His activities were redirected along the lines of cultivation of specific individuals. His cultivation and recruitment of the informant HYDRACID was excellent. His handling of the subject of TZP-A-269 was excellent. His handling of HYDRAMANIAC has been unsatisfactory in that he has not spent sufficient time on the project. He states he will correct this deficienty. His latest assignment is the penetration of communist circles in the National University of Panama. He has recruited an excellent individual for this purpose who will be employed at a salary of one Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per month. This project is approximately one year old.

SALARY

To date subject has not received a salary, but has been compensated socially and by

SECRET — Kapok
CLASSIFICATION

201 30999

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

making purchases for him in the government commissaries. We plan to place him on a salary status in the future. When this is done we intend that his salary be One Hundred Dollars per month ($100.00) per month. He no longer has cover in his activities as concerns the U. S. Army in this area. This is due to the fact that Gen. Sibert USARCarib attempted to recruit him as an army informant after subject had performed two week's active duty with Army Intelligence. To avoid refusing the General's request, subject informed him that he was processing his information through [illegible]. Since that date, army CIC men have called at subject's place of business inquiring for information. However, we seem to have his real loyalty and we are the ones who can provide him with funds to cultivate sub-agents.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES:

As stated above subject has performed excellent services but has not devoted a great deal of time to our work. His interest has greatly increased since you permitted HYDROL to receive home office training. He has fairly good contacts and is capable of cultivating almost any one we might wish. His services should become more valuable in the immediate future.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED:

To date subject's intelligence information has only been valuable as a supplement to other sources. His operational information has been excellent and is of real value. He is more interested in the operational side of our activities than in reporting.

OTHER FACTORS:

This agent has been handled as outlined in TZP-151 subject to the modifications of increased social contacts necessitated by the fact that subject's wife is interested in the social advantages to be gained from her husband's activities.

COMMENTS:

We plan to contimue using this agent to cultivate other potential agent personnel. His primary continuous project will now be the penetration of communist activities in the National University of Panama. We may rearrange the relationship between HYDROL, HYDRACID and HYLIFE in view of HYDRACID's current schooling. This project is still in the development or probationary stage in that HYDROL's background is such that he regards the sky as the limit in the expenditure of intelligence funds and is inclined to commit himself financially without real assurance that we will receive full value for the funds expended. Realizing that time is an important factor in the development of high level operations we hope this will prove to be the most efficient expenditure of our funds. If not we will convert the funds to other projects. As a matter of operational organization we feel our ultimate objective in this area should be to ferret out and operate with a minimum number of skilled American resident agents. Offsetting the criticism mentioned above are the facts that subject is a man of real integrity and definitely a high level operative.

REQUEST: It is requested that Project HYDROL be approved to permit an expenditure of Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) per quarter.

Grover J. Waring
Grover J. Waring

Interview with Alfonso Rudolf Wichtrich by Paul P. Paxton

1. On 17 November 1948, the subject called at Que Building and was interviewed by Paul P. Paxton. He had been advised to pay his respects to Harry A. Real by the Chief of Station, Panama City. The subject ~~was~~ [illegible] to learn what the procedure would be if he wished to offer his services with CIA at a future date. At the present time he is managing the Royal Crown Bottling Works in Panama City and is negotiating for a franshise to distribute a milk product in that area. His primary purpose in coming to the United States at this time was to make arrangements for this latter business venture. The subject has been aiding the Chief of Station in Panama for the past year in a manner that has been extremely helpful to our operations. During the war he was a Lt. Col. in United States Army Intelligence serving for a considerable time in China in an undercover capacity. He gives evidence of being very well versed in intelligence matters and shows keen appreciation for security matters.

2. He stated that within six or eight months his private business affairs in Panama would be developed to the point where he could accept a position with this Agency in a full-time capacity. He evidenced interest in either the Latin American area or in the Far East, preferably China. I made no commitments as far as future employment is concerned but I did suggest that ~~you~~ he visit this headquarters on his next visit to the United States providing he is in a position to accept full-time employment. I recommend that his application be given serious consideration in the light of his past intelligence experience and by virture of his valuable assistance to our operations in Panama.

201 30999

MR 25963—Panama Canal—1-29-48—1,000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TZP-151

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FBT

DATE: 9 July 1948

FROM : Chief of Station
Panama City, Panama

SUBJECT: GENERAL Agents and Informants
SPECIFIC Operational Data - HYDROL

Ref - TZP-A-102, WASH/F 8786 and PACY 188

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

1. HYDROL.

2. Subject's background has been with the U. S. Army in China, where he organized a complete intelligence net. He is an organizer and planner and best qualified for the supervision of intelligence nets and informants, and intelligence operations in general.

3. He is a very personable individual and has the facility for getting along with Latins. He is very well accepted even though he has been here only a little over a year.

4. In Latin America because of his knowledge of Spanish. He is also well qualified to operate in the China Theater in view of his past experiences, although he has no knowledge of the language.

5. Subject makes frequent business trips to Mexico.

6. Subject has discussed plans for expanding his business into South America.

7. Subject has five people working for him. (a) HYDRACID; HYDRAMATIC; and the subject of TZP-A-269. He has also cultivated two unwitting informants, one of whom is a fairly prominent Arnulfista and the other is a socially prominent Panamanian and businessman on whom we will submit biographical data at a future date. (b) None of the people are paid. The subject of TZP-A-269 has been informed that we will defray any expenses which he may have incidental to our operations. HYDRACID has expressed a desire to have a savings or retirement fund opened for him in the United States. This we have agreed to do and estimate that the cost will be about $100 to $150 per month.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

201 309-95

(788)

8. No.

9. In view of the fact that subject contacted the Home Office prior to his departure from the United States, he is thoroughly cognizant of the ultimate destination of his information.

10. Yes. In view of HYDROL's experience in the intelligence field he has been given the assignment of supervising and controlling the activities of HYDRACID who has an excellent knowledge of the local situation but lacks experience as an intelligence operative. This also serves to maintain HYDRACID's cover.

11. Through letter drop. In addition frequent personal contacts take place between HYDROL and the Chief of Station. These are usually at night at the homes of the individuals concerned. Cover is provided in that the Chief of Station and HYDROL both have children attending the same school and the wives are acquainted socially.

12. Subject usually reports orally, accompanying his oral reports with brief notes. He is training the subject of TZP-A-269 and HYDRACID to report in writing.

13. During the 1½ years subject has been in Panama, he has been principally concerned with establishing his own business. He has devoted only a small percentage of his time to our work to date, however, since he is now better established and better oriented, it is contemplated that he will become more active.

14. Contract with subject is oral. A written contract will be prepared at the time he is placed on our payroll.

15. Yes. He is attempting a high-level penetration of the Partido del Pueblo. At the present time, a foreign national who has been approached by HYDRACID is attempting to buy one of the Directors of the Partido del Pueblo.

16. Subject is quite capable of using his own judgment on the sort of work he is to do. Since his time has been limited in the past, he has confined his activities to projects specifically requested by this Station.

PAYMENT

17. Subject is a volunteer informant who is rewarded for his services by the occasional presentation of exchange commodities. Since subject does not have U. S. Government Commissary privileges, purchases on his behalf are made by the Station. This results in approximately 60% reduction in the cost of necessities purchased in this manner.

18. Yes. Salary arrangements have been discussed between HYDROL and the Chief of Station. We both agree that no salary should be paid until such time as he becomes more productive. It is contemplated that when we actually

start payment the figure will be something less than $150.00 a month and it will probably be placed into some sort of a savings account. This plan may be placed into effect at any time.

19. Subject has been informed that we will defray all expenses incurred by him on our behalf.

20. No cost of purchase of information is involved but he is authorized to engage in this practice.

EVALUATION OF SUBJECT'S WORK

21. Subject appears to be a highly dependent individual. (a) The accuracy of his reports have been good. (b) From a security angle he is excellent.

22. In view of subject's previous intelligence background, it is believed he is only suitable for semi-covert work.

23. Subject is unquestionably a high-level operative and quite possibly might penetrate any of the local social or government circles, but again his background from China is such that it would probably be impossible for him to accomplish a penetration of any leftist organizations or foreign intelligence agencies.

YAGUAZA

Panama

IN 38550
PACY 183
29 Mar 48

201 30999

WICHTRICH, Alfonso Rudolph

Panama

IN 38550
PACY 188
29 Mar 48

201 30999

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FBT

DATE: December 23, 1947

FROM : CSB

SUBJECT: WICHERICH, Alfonso R.

Reference is made to your memorandum of October 31, 1947, wherein you request that this office conduct a four way name check relative to the above-entitled subject.

This is to advise that a four way check was instituted concerning the subject, with the following results:

L-5 Nothing identifiable
L-3 No record
L-1 Nothing derogatory.

There is transmitted herewith a copy of a report obtained from the files of Confidential Government Agency L-2; it is requested that this report be returned to this office when it has served its purpose.

The above completes our action in this matter unless advised to the contrary.

Robert H. Cunningham
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM
Chief, Security Branch, OSO

1 Incl.
L-2 Report

Info sent to field on 26 December 1947. R.F.

T20- a-102

SECRET

201 30999

CONFIDENTIAL

WICHTRICH, Alfonso Rudolph 4 December 1947

On December 3, 1947 the investigative files of Confidential Government Agency (L-2) were examined and disclosed the following:

Included in the file is an investigative report dated June 25, 1943 regarding one Captain Al. R. Wichtrich, Army Serial Number 0377220, which revealed no adverse information regarding Subject. It was mentioned, however, by four informants that Subject's father was suspected of having pro-German leanings during World War #1, but these suspicions were not verified by the informants. Persons interviewed vouched for Subject's father's loyalty at the time of the investigation.

It was noted that Subject's Personal History Statement dated February 16, 1943 indicates that he was born on October 30, 1915 at Willcox, Arizona. The investigation verified the fact, however, that Subject was born in Chihuahua, Mexico on October 30, 1915.

In a casual conversation with another officer, Subject volunteered the following information with respect to records of his birthplace. Subject stated that he had no birth certificate and had moved from Chihuahua Mexico to El Paso, Texas, with his parents, when he was one or two years of age. Subject stated that he had never inquired about, nor realized that he was born in Chihuahua until he was in high school, having previously presumed that he was born in the locale in which his childhood was spent, Viz; Willcox, Arizona.

Subject stated further that he gave his birthplace as Willmox, Arizona on his application for enlistment in ROTC to eliminate conflict with any previous records which would then require a lot of "red tape" in making what he considered then a minor discrepancy of no consequence, inasmuch as his father's naturalization automatically made him (Subject) a citizen of the United States.

It was the opinion of the officer making the above report on Subject's birthplace, that any conflicting records of Subject's birthplace was not due to any motives of subterfuge, but was most probably due to Subject's desire to expedite his entrance into college without encountering

CONFIDENTIAL

the difficulties of time required and uncertainty of results in procuring certain papers which might be required if Subject were to indicate Chihuahua, Mexico, as his birthplace.

The file indicates further that records of the Superior Court, County of Cochise, Bisbee, Arizona, disclose that Subject's father, Gustave Wichtrich, was naturalized at Tombstone, Arizona, September 15, 1923; Certificate Number 1738933; Port of Entry, El Paso Texas, June 19, 1916. On his petition for naturalization, Subject's father gave as one of his several sons, Alfonso Wichtrich who was born at Chihuahua, Mexico, on October 30, 1915. Subject's family was residing at Willcox, Arizona, on May 15, 1920. Subject's father was born in Germany.

The above-mentioned Personal History Statement indicates that Subject's mother is Fermina Esparza Wichtrich who was born in Mexico of Spanish National origin. As of February 16, 1943, her application for U. S. citizenship was in process.

JEB:mcm

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:
FBT

ACCESSION NO.

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. CIC	221 Adm.		28/11		① Re par 4 basic file, no derogatory information is contained in MID files on this individual. The files are not made available to this office, but were searched by responsible individual in [illegible].
2.					
3.					
4. Paxton			26/12	P.P.	
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					201 30999

FORM NO. 51-10
SEP 1946

SECRET

(1333)

SECRET

5 November 1947

TO: Chief, Liaison Control
Att: Mr. Gaynor

FROM: Chief, Foreign Branch T for R. G. Ledig

SUBJECT: Alfonso Rudolph WICHTRICH

Your attention is directed to paragraph 4 of the attached dispatch which mentions a document in the hands of the Military Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army. This office would like to obtain the information contained in this document and is forwarding this request for the appropriate action you deem necessary.

SECRET 201 30999

1106403

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

SECRET Dispatch No. TZP-19-102

VIA: Air Classification Date 20 October 1947

TO : FBT

FROM : TZP

SUBJECT: General -- Operations

Specific -- Alfonso Rudolph WICHTRICH
alias Al WICHTRICH

1. Subject is a United States citizen born 30 September 1915 in Mexico. He is a Catholic and the owner of a house located near Radio Station HOX in Golf Heights, R. de P. which he purchased from Jack Fidanque. His business partner in the Pan American Industries Co. Inc. is George M. ARIAS, who is Secretary and Manager of the company. Other key men are Enrique Lefevre, Vice-President; and Amadeo Lupi, Treasurer. He speaks fluent Spanish and appears to be getting along very well with the more influential Panamanians. The telephone number of the Pan American Industries Co. Inc. chartered for bottling Royal Crown Cola where WICHTRICH has his office is Panama 3490-A, located at Calle 30 y Justo Arosemena. His office hours are 0900 to 1200 and 1430 to 1730. His post office address is Box 1121 Ancon, Canal Zone. It is believed he was decorated by the Koumentang government for his service in China.

2. His wife is Rachel B. WICHTRICH also a U. S. citizen. She was born 13 February 1917 in Avoca, Texas. She is the bearer of U. S. passport #146432. Her brother is believed to be employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

3. WICHTRICH is the father of two children, a girl approximately age 7 and a boy of about 4. He is planning a business trip to Mexico City, Mexico on 2 November 1947. He will be accompanied by his wife and remain in Mexico until 15 November at which time he will return to Panama.

4. Subject states there is a complete file concerning him in the hands of the Military Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army. It would be appreciated if you would obtain their file and forward all pertinent information to this station.

SECRET ABSTRACT INDEX

201 36989

54-6-4
110600

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: 30 oct 47

ACCESSION NO TZP. A-102

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A. OCT 30 1947

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. FBT	2211	30/10			
2. Easton			30/10	R.P.	Carbon copy furnish Security
3. [redacted]					Results of check sent to [illegible] on 26 Dec 1947
4.					Nothing derogatory.
5.					
6. Geary					30/10 4-way name check
7.					requested. BG
8.					C Red.
9.					4-way name
10.					check attached BG.
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.	INDEX		CS COPY		
15.					

MICROFILMED
AUG 19 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

01 30999
ABSTRACT ✓ ~~INDEX~~
DATE APR 21 1955

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

SECRET
Classification

Dispatch No. TZP-A-142
Date 20 October 1947

VIA: Air

MICROFILMED
AUG 19 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO : FBT

FROM : TZP/ASW

SUBJECT: General -- Operations

Specific -- Alfonso Rudolph WICHTRICH
alias Al WICHTRICH

1. Subject is a United States citizen born 20 September 1915 in Mexico. He is a Catholic and the owner of a house located near Radio Station HOX in Golf Heights, R. de P. which he purchased from Jack Fidanque. His business partner in the Pan American Industries Co. Inc. is George M. ARIAS, who is Secretary and Manager of the company. Other key men are Enrique Lefevre, Vice-President; and Amadeo Lupi, Treasurer. He speaks fluent Spanish and appears to be getting along very well with the more influential Panamanians. The telephone number of the Pan American Industries Co. Inc. chartered for bottling Royal Crown Cola where WICHTRICH has his office is Panama 3490-A, located at Calle 30 y Justo Arosemena. His office hours are 0900 to 1200 and 1430 to 1730. His post office address is Box 1121 Ancon, Canal Zone. It is believed he was decorated by the Koumintang government for his service in China.

2. His wife is Rachel E. WICHTRICH also a U. S. citizen. She was born 13 February 1917 in Avoca, Texas. She is the bearer of U. S. passport #146432. Her brother is believed to be employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

3. WICHTRICH is the father of two children, a girl approximately age 7 and a boy of about 4. He is planning a business trip to Mexico City, Mexico on 2 November 1947. He will be accompanied by his wife and remain in Mexico until 15 November at which time he will return to Panama.

4. Subject states there is a complete file concerning him in the hands of the Military Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army. It would be appreciated if you would obtain their file and forward all pertinent information to this station.

21 Oct 47

INDEX

SECRET CS COPY

201 30999

OSS Form 2202a

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

ADO

[illegible] 3 07

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd SA ....

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. PPS	103				Request that subject be called in for interview with Mr. Leddy.
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in *To* column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

201-30999

(20640) **CONFIDENTIAL** ~~202-1653~~

Interviewer's Report

SOURCE: [illegible]e__ Field__ Casual ✓

Referred by____________

DATE: 8 Nov 46 RECOMMENDED FOR BRANCH:______ CONTROL NO:______

1. NAME: WICHTRICH (last) AL (First) R (middle) GRADE:________ BRANCH:________

2. SERIAL NUMBER:__________ ORGANIZATION:__________ DATE OF BIRTH:____

3. ADDRESS:____________________ Tel. No.:__________
Business or Military

4. 3444 GUNSTON RD ALEX VA Tel. No.: AL 8357
Home

4. CITIZENSHIP: (how acquired) RELIGION:
~~U.S. Parents~~ ~~Parents in~~ Born in Mexico - naturalized by parents' naturalization in 1926

5. EDUCATION: (schools, degrees, dates, majors, grades, extra curricular activities)
AB - 1939 - UN. OF ARIZ - Range ecology, animal husbandry

6. LANGUAGES: (degree of fluency, how acquired)
SPANISH - FLUENT

7. FOREIGN EXPERIENCE: (extent, purpose)
CHINA - 2 YRS WITH MIS-X. CPMU BRANCH, MIS, WDG-2

8. PRINCIPLE CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE: (main occupation, special skills, accomplishments, elective offices)
RANGE ECOLOGIST - DEPT OF AGR. —

NOW MEMBER OF FIRM ESTABLISHING BOTTLING PLANTS THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA.

9. MILITARY EXPERIENCE: (principal duties, service schools, physical profile, If Officer: Manner of performance rating; If EM: AGCT score, Spec Nos, degree of Skills, MOS and MCO Nos, and titles)
Entered Army, Jan 41 - MAR 46. - LT. COL.
SERVED AT FT. RILEY - CRTC
COMPLETED G-2 COURSE AT LEAVENWORTH. PLUS MIS-X COURSE IN WASHINGTON.

10. ANY UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES: (civil or military)

SD-30999
202-1333 [illegible]

11. REMARKS: (any additional pertinent information)

Not personally interested in a spot- but he and other officials of the corporation (ex-officio) are interested in being of any assistance they can.

12. CLEARED AS AVAILABLE BY:

13. SERVICE RECORD CHECKED: Form 66-1 Form 20

14. RATINGS:

Motivation - Energy, effort, initiative, interest in assignment.	
Practical Intelligence - Judgment decisiveness, alertness, perception.	
Stability - Emotional control and maturity, absence of nervous symptoms.	
Ability to work with Others - Tact, absence of annoying traits.	
Leadership - Organizing ability, ability to win cooperation.	
Physical Ability - Appearance, presence, vigor, stamina.	

(Interviewer's Signature) (Rank and Br. of Service) (CIG Branch)

14-00000

5-04

August 30, 1946

MEMORANDUM TO Mr. Lightsey

Subject: Lt. Colonel Al R. Wichtrich (Inactive)

Some months ago, Lt. Colonel Al R. Wichtrich, 3444 Gunster Road, Alexandria, was recommended to me as a possible candidate for service in China.

During the war he headed up the AGAS in China for G-2.

He was recommended to me by Colonel Edward R. Johnston formerly of G-2.

KINGMAN DOUGLASS
"B" Deputy
Office of Special Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

201-5896
202-1833 [illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Byron C. Sarvis
Chief, Procurement Section

DATE: 6 September 1946

FROM : Personnel Officer, CIG

SUBJECT: Memorandum re - Lt. Col. Al R. Wichtrich (Inactive)

The attached memorandum of 30 August 1946 from Kingman Douglass, with regard to Colonel Wichtrich, is referred to you for consideration.

Since it would appear that Colonel Wichtrich would be of more value to S.O., it is forwarded for consideration by officials in that Branch.

This correspondence has been recorded in the Central Records of CIG and I should be advised if you desire to retain it in your files.

Judson H. Lightsey
JUDSON H. LIGHTSEY
Personnel Officer, CIG

Attachment

cc: Central Records, CIG (2)

Mrs. Waller -

CONFIDENTIAL

201-30999

202-18 [illegible]

File

5 November 1946

Lt. Col. Al R. Wichtrich (Inactive)
3444 Gunster Road,
Alexandria, Virginia

Dear Sir:

Your name has been referred to us by Colonel Edward R Johnston as a person who might be interested in a possible assignment with this organization.

Although we are not presently engaged in a general recruiting program, we are always interested in specially qualified personnel.

If you are interested in exploring the possibilities of employment with this organization, it is requested that you call at this office for interview. We are located at the South Building, 2430 E St. N.W.

Thank you for your cooperation.

BYRON C. SARVIS Chief,
Personnel Procurement Section
Project Support Division

201-38999
201-1833 [illegible]

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

057 1 FEB 63 C/S

DATE : 24 JAN 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, WE 4, FI, S/C 2

ADDED: WH 8, WE 4

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

JAN 24 0253Z 63

ROUTINE

IN 55255

DIR CITE MEXI 3133

REF A. DIR 09718

B. DIR 12178 *

IN55255

05, 08

1. ON 4 DEC 62, 01 [SMOTH] REP MEXI TOLD COS "OFF RECORD" THAT [JOHN RETTIE, BRITISH B.B.C. NEWSMAN, WHO IN PAY SECRET SERVICE] IN CONTACT LICOOKY-1. 06 [RETTIE] ACCORDING 01 [SMOTH] REP READS AND WRITES FLUENT RUSSIAN AND FINNISH, ALSO SPEAKS SPANISH AND FRENCH. FORMERLY MARRIED FINNISH WOMAN. 06 [RETTIE] NOW LIVES WITH LICOOKY-1 GREAT DEAL TIME. HE IS HER PRESENT LOVER ACCORDING 01 [SMOTH] REP. 06 [RETTIE] REPORTED THAT L-1 NOT COMMUNIST, VERY INTELLIGENT, EXCELLENT "MISTRESS" AND CLOSE JUAN JOSE AREVALO. 01 [SMOTH] REP ALSO SAID 06 [RETTIE] TRYING MAKE CONTACT WITH MARIO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO.

2. STATION AWARE 06 [RETTIE] LICOOKY-1 RELATIONSHIP THROUGH L-1. L-1 INTRODUCED 06 [RETTIE] TO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO ON 3 JAN 63. MEXI SUGGESTS HQS TELL 01 [SWALTITE] THAT STATION IN INDIRECT CONTACT L-1 RE GUAT EXILE ACTIVITIES MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED REPLY RE 11 [BRITISH] INQUIRY RE LICOOKY.

Licooky-1

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

13/88

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City
16-3

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Operational/Meeting with KDACETONE-1
02

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

16-3
Reference: MEXICO CITY 23232

1. In accordance with a policy decision to keep BKHERALD contact with U.S. business representatives discreet, a small luncheon was held in lieu of the customary formal briefings in the Headquarters building. 02 KDACETONE-1, IDENTITY 1, David C. HIGBY and Floyd N. AIMONET attended the luncheon which was characterized by cordiality and candor. 02 KDACETONE-1 waited until the conclusion of the meeting to raise his current favorite subject, that of countering the leftist propaganda contained in SIEMPRE. Fortunately, HIGBY was forewarned and effectively turned around the thrust of the effort upon 02 KDACETONE-1's shoulders, without offending him. IDENTITY impressed HIGBY with his interest, intelligence and sincerity. He offered the services of IDENTITY 2 to "do things" on our behalf but was convinced by HIGBY that the best way to approach the problem was through the compartmented use of individual members, rather than through IDENTITY 2 as an organization.

could link to ACC, seems reasonable

2. Discussions were held concerning Mexican affairs as well as Hemispheric trends. In the former category, our guests were most disturbed about the nationalization process in Mexico and enumerated

(continued)

Attachment:
IDENTITIES (USC)

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City (W/Att. USC)
27, 16-3

RECORD COPY

MAY 31 1 24 PM '73

[illegible] 1015147

10H

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: 22 HMMW-19453

DATE: 11 MAY 1973

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-0309939 23

Distribution:

1 - WH/1/CHRONO
1 - 201-0309939 23

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT.
DC/WH/1	Raymond J. Swiderczak		5/8/73	9354

03

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	9/5/73	John C. Murray

AB
23

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

"1/Rd

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMW-19453 22

02

the latest cases with some alarm. KDACETONE-1 repeated his prediction that President ECHEVERRIA would effectively nationalize most private investment in Mexico before the end of his term.

3. The meeting was judged effective and afforded HIGBY the opportunity to lay the ground work for his future relations with IDENTITY 2 members, while satisfying the guests' need for reassurances that our goals were parallel. They appeared happy with the conversations despite the informality.

Floyd N. AIMONET

23
201-030999

3/RS

SECRET

22

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: HMMW-19453

06, 68

IDENTITY #1 - George Blake, V.P. of American Chamber of Commerce

29

IDENTITY #2 - American Chamber of Commerce Mexico

22

A/c att 1 to HMMW 19453

SECRET

RECORD COPY

23

201-030999

11 MAY 73

5/RS

DISPATCH 16-3 SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

62

Operational/Meeting with KDACETONE-1

16-3

Reference: MEXICO CITY 23282

1. In accordance with a policy decision to keep EKHERALD contact with U.S. business representatives discreet, a small luncheon was held in lieu of the customary formal briefings in the Headquarters building. 62 KDACETONE-1, IDENTITY 1, David C. HIGBY and Floyd N. AIMONET attended the luncheon which was characterized by cordiality and candor. 62 KDACETONE-1 waited until the conclusion of the meeting to raise his current favorite subject, that of countering the leftist propaganda contained in SIEMPRE. Fortunately, HIGBY was forewarned and effectively turned around the thrust of the effort upon KDACETONE-1's shoulders, without offending him. IDENTITY impressed HIGBY with his interest, intelligence and sincerity. He offered the services of IDENTITY 2 to "do things" on our behalf but was convinced by HIGBY that the best way to approach the problem was through [illegible] use of individual members, rather than through IDENTITY 2 as an organization.

2. Discussions were held concerning Mexican affairs as well as Hemispheric trends. In the former category, our guests were most disturbed about the nationalization process in Mexico and enumerated

(continued)

Attachment:
IDENTITIES (USC)

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City (W/Att. USC)
27, 16-3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
22
HMMW-19453

DATE

SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
23
201-030999

Distribution:
1 - WH/1 CHRONO
1 - 201-030999
23

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT
DC WH/1	Raymond J. Swiderski 63		5 ?, 73	9354

COORDINATING

RELEASING

C/WH/1 John C. Murray

FORM 53

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-19453

22

62

the latest cases with some alarm. KDACKTONE-1 repeated his prediction that President ECHEVERRIA would effectively nationalize most private investment in Mexico before the end of his term.

3. The meeting was judged effective and afforded HICBY the opportunity to lay the ground work for his future relations with IDENTITY 2 members, while satisfying the guests' need for reassurances that our goals were parallel. They appeared happy with the conversations despite the informality.

Floyd H. ARMONET

2 RS

SECRET

22

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: HMMW-19453

06, 08

IDENTITY #1 - George Blake, V.P. of American Chamber of Commerce

29

IDENTITY #2 - American Chamber of Commerce Mexico

SECRET

3/Rs

SUBJECT: LIHUFF-1 (201-)

The attached explains the involvement of Subject in the circumstances surrounding the recruitment attempt and personal harrassment of Soviet official AFRODENT 62 (201-733422) in June, 1968.

The narrative is presented by Keith 06, 08 Cameron JOHNSON (201-837607), Dean of Men at the University of the Americas, who was deeply involved in the operation. While no apparent direct or serious damage to LIHUFF-1 resulted from this, it must be borne in mind that 08 Johnson did rent his house from LIHUFF-1 and that if the Soviets ever had suspicions of LIHUFF-1's relations with 16-3 the Station, L-1's appearance in these events might be viewed by the Soviets as possibly more than coincidence.

4/RJ

LEVENDERIS COMMBURY
After letting and off on a dark side road, I parked my car nearby and then walked back to my house.

02
AKRODENT the
I saw that the old car, [illegible] which we saw and/policeman was there, so I crept through the bushes up to the wall, climbed over the back wall of my yard, and crept along the side keeping in the shadows and trying to see into my house to see if anybody was in there. I finally made my way to the back door. Looked in and determined that there was not anybody in there, but if there was I had every right to come into my own house, and I found that I was not particularly afraid so I decided to go in. I quietly opened the back door, came into the house, quickly looked around the corner into the bedroom and into the bathroom, and decided that there was not anybody in there. I walked over and closed the front door, which was wide open, quickly drew the drapes and turned off the lights. I then changed into old clothes and tennis shoes, got a flashlight and walked over to the kitchen window, shined my flashlight into the face of one of the men sitting in the car just outside. I was only able to shine it on one mans face so I held it there for a little while then snapped it off and walked back to a good corner inside the house. There I waited with the flashlight in hand knowing that the people outside could not enter through the front door and if they entered through the back door I'd beable to club one of them and kick the other one before either of them was able to do anything. I stood there and heard them come up to the front door and try the front door. But, when they were unsuccesful they didn't do any more or come around to the back. They then got into their car, started it up, turned it around and drove off. While they were turning around I went out the back door, climbed up on a sink, so I could see over the wall, and watched them drive off. I didn't really know how many people were outside. Nor did I know how many people had left in the car. Thinking that this might have been a decoy and that they might have left somebody behind I silently climbed up on to the roof of the house and walked across the roof and peeped over the edge thinking that if there was one person left behind I could jump on him from the roof and seriously injure him. There was not anybody there
LIHUFF-1
so I left the house, walked up to the landlord's house, ; and and told the family that there had been some strange people hanging around when I came home, that they had lunged for the car and made an obvious attempt

4RS

to get at the door handle, and that I had no idea who they were etc. I was sufficiently scared and put the car in reverse, backed up and took it down and parked it out of sight. I explained that I had climbed over the back wall and so on. They were quiet aware of the problem since they had observed, or thought they had observed, people hanging around the house all day. They pointed out to me too, that when their 18 year old son, Bill, was riding on horseback he encountered two men who had just arrived in a white Camaro driven by a middleaged or younger blonde lady. They got out of their car and walked up to my house. One of them, he said, was carrying a pipe and the other one was carrying a screwdriver. The son asked if he could help these men but they rushed him off saying that he couldn't . The two men peered in the front gate and stayed around, hanging around for quite a while until a blue Chevrolet appeared and two people got out of it and went inside the house. While these people were inside the house, the two men outside hung around near the house.

2

After spending sometime in the house, LIHUFF-1 reported to me two men came out and there was some confusion going on around the car and they couldn't seem to be able to start it. Finally, the two men who had been inside the house left and the other two men got in the car and left. None of the LIHUFF-1 family was exactly sure what was going on except that there was confusion around the car. Eventually all the people left one way or another.

I said that I was very concerned about these people hanging around my house. That I didn't like the idea of people being inside my house and I wanted to call the police. Mrs. LIHUFF-1 said that she had called her husband and he was coming right home, and that he had some very good contacts in LNPURE and he would probably be able to help out in this matter. I agreed to wait until he got home and that I would go and get my car and bring it back home, which I then did. I spent the rest of the night with the LIHUFF-1s visiting and as quickly as possible I moved the conversation away from this to other colpletely unimportant things. I decided in the presence of LIHUFF-1, that there probably was not any reason to get concerned about this, that it was probably just some students trying to make me look foolish or something on that order.

One thing that I forgot to mention was that Mrs. LIHUFF-1 was extremely upset because a tall blond man and a Mexican policeman came up to her house after the kids reported the people left. They reported that a car had been stolen. She asked who the blond man was, and he said he wanted to call his embassy. She brightened up and and asked if he was an American, but he said no, "URS." One of the kids asked if "URS" meant U.R.S.S., and he made no attempt to hide the fact that he was from the Soviet Embassy. They barged in the LIHUFF-1 house, and in fact it was later reported that he tried to talk to Mrs. LIHUFF-1 in Russian which upset her even more. The tall blond man used the telephone, and as far as Mrs. LIHUFF-1 knows, he did call his embassy.

Earlier, when I arrived at the University behind the Russian car, I told the Lt., for the University police force that I wanted the car towed away at 9:30 the next morning if it was still there at the time, and he said that he would be glad to if it was.

When I went to get my car after talking to the LIHUFF-1s around 23:30 hours. I did go down the road past the entrance to my house out to the main highway just to look around. I went down as far as The Lady's Bar. When I passed the corner of the main highway and the road leading off from it to my house, I saw a blue Chevrolet which looked very much like the car we had pushed down to the University and some people standing around it including at least one uniformed policeman. I concluded that this was connected with this case. I went down to The Lady's Bar, turned around and came back up the main highway, but from a point considerably below from where that car was parked until considerably past it I kept a bus between those people and myself and I don't think, on the bases of later things that they have said, that they saw me come back up the hill. The bus effectively shielded me all the way up. I went clear up to Cuajimalpa then and turned down the road that leads to my house so I didn't have to pass them again and went on in and parked my car inside the compound.

The next morning I went to the University at about 8 o'clock and noticed that AIRODENT's blue Chevy was gone from the parking lot. Then I worked until my secretary notified me that some Federal plainclothes policemen were there looking for IDEN-E. I immediately went to my office and found three or four Federal policemen outside the office and unfortunately the Lt. of our police

1/RS

SECRET

29 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/CA

SUBJECT : Response to Memo on "Council for Latin America"

The activities of WH/1 touch upon four organizations listed below. There are no other activities as they may concern organizations listed on the CA memo (attached).

29

1. Secretariado Social Mexicano. The LIEMPTY project, currently budgeted at $60,000 annually, supports in part this organization, which also receives funds (some $750,000 yearly) from MISEREOR, a German Bishops' fund with headquarters in Aachen, Germany. The objective of this effort is to help establish model or prototype agrarian organizations designed to alleviate and hopefully to advance the social and economic status of the Mexican campesino. 08

2. Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales y Economicas - The executive director of this organization was formerly associated with the LIEMPTY project, but he is no longer an active member of this project which is funded at the current rate of $4,300 annually and supports LIEMPTY-1, the Station's only agent with access to rightist political organizations. 29

29

3. Centro Nacional de Estudios Sociales - The director of this organization (LISIREN-3) is no longer an active WOFACT agent. The LISIREN project was terminated in 1965 and had been funded at an annual rate of some $65,000. The project supported a mass media propaganda effort directed at the middle and lower classes of Mexico and sponsored by a front group of conservative Mexican businessmen.

29

4. American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico - The vice president of this organization is a current Station asset, LICHUFF-1. No money is provided from WOFACT sources to this organization, although LICHUFF-1 receives monthly $300.00. The duties of this agent do not directly relate to his 08

SECRET

4/RJ

SECRET

29

Chamber of Commerce responsibilities. LI[illegible]-1's principal duty is to gather material on rightist political organizations.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Attachment:
Memorandum

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
cc - LIMOOSE Project
cc - LI[illegible]-1 201
cc - LI[illegible]-3 201
cc - WH/1/Cr

SECRET

1/RS

SECRET

19 AUG 1964

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Lyle STUART

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 1 June 1964, in which you provided this office with several questions you wished to have passed to Miss Viola June COBB regarding Lyle STUART. There follows the information provided by Miss COBB in answer to your inquiry:

1. Regarding Lyle STUART, Juan Jose AREVALO, and Antikomunismo en America Latina:

Early in the spring of 1962, in Mexico, AREVALO told me that STUART was prodding him about getting another of his books translated, to take advantage of the publicity around The Shark and the Sardines. I was already far beyond speaking terms with STUART and therefore declined to have anything further to do with him. About three months later, AREVALO told me that STUART was going to publish Antikomunismo en America Latina and that a young American student, married to a Mexican, Angela delli SANTE ARROCHA (who had written Arevalo, pensador contemporaneo, published by Costa Amic, 1962, financed by Als Radical Revolucionario de El Salvador) was doing the translation into English. Early in 1963, AREVALO told me that the translation hadn't been satisfactory and therefore STUART had obtained a re-translation, by Charleton BEALS.

When STUART was here in Mexico in June, he told Dr. OSEGUEDA that he was very happy about the way the book was selling.

Inasmuch as STUART has paid AREVALO only 10 per cent of moneys received by STUART on the Shark and the Sardines sales (in contrast with some book contracts in which the author receives 10 per cent of the money represented by number of copies sold multiplied by the retail sales price) I would assume he is no more generous with Antikomunismo.

CS COPY

SECRET

201-278841

I know of no affiliations of STUART with foreign political parties of government. His attempts to get close to Fidel CASTRO in 1960 were motivated by a desire to exploit the journalistic advantages of an interview. His original interest in The Shark and the Sardines was apparently motivated by money-making interests and by the hope that he might spark a sensation - exactly what he did manage to do with his outrageous advertising. He seemed to calculate that there might be libel suits possible against the firms and the newspapers he could provoke to attack him.

The original contract of AREVALO with STUART was superseded by another in November of 1961, granting STUART certain rights with regard to other foreign language editions of The Shark and the Sardines and, I believe, establishing that STUART should have first option on other AREVALO books translated into English.

Information about STUART's dealings with AREVALO and whatever others, could be obtained (with guile) from Eileen BRANT, who was his editor at the time of the first contact with AREVALO. She subsequently broke with him because of deep and bitter resentment against him, then returned not too long ago to collaborate with him. She is his wife's sister. She is certainly working with him now only because he finally offered her a little better pay. For her to have changed her mind about him would be almost impossible, I believe, in view of the long history of incidents that had brought her to have contempt for him, at the time I knew her in 1961. She knows his operation inside-out. In order to get information from her, it would be absolutely necessary to approach her from some angle that would give no hint of government investigation. She is very gregarious. She is a fortyish medium-attractive, lonely, New York single woman (unless her status has changed since I knew her). If contacted by somebody she would assume to be a writer, and who would be a bit friendly with her and see her off-hours, she would probably talk freely about STUART. But she is quite clever and rather worldly in some respects, so that must be kept in mind in case she is contacted. SHE HAS A VERY DEEP AND LONGTIME NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION. She was active in liberal activities in Chicago, and if I remember correctly, although she is certainly not communist, she considered herself a little jeopardised by the Mc Carthy period.

Angela Delli SANTE-ARROCHE could also be contacted, of course.

[illegible]

SECRET

2. Regarding Lyle STUART, Dr. Raul OSEGUEDA, Bartolome COSTA Amic, and Mario MONTEFORTE Toledo:

Dr. OSEGUEDA apparently has had a secret longing to get something of his own printed in English. He seized upon the opportunity of commenting BEALS' introduction to Antikomunismo in order to write to STUART this spring. STUART wrote very cordially back to OSEGUEDA, hoping to meet him on a trip to Mexico in June. When OSEGUEDA confessed to me his correspondence with STUART, he sought to make me see it as an attempt to speak with STUART about the royalties STUART has never paid me.

When Dr. OSEGUEDA finally did see STUART here in Mexico during the book congress in June, he only very timidly and very, very briefly touched upon the royalty problem, and indeed went to a great deal of trouble to serve STUART by introducing him to COSTA Amic and to Mario MONTEFORTE Toledo. (STUART had expressed interest in getting in touch with some publishers and writers.) OSEGUEDA bustled about, taking OSEGUEDA and MONTEFORTE Toledo to lunch with STUART, even managed to get the MONTEFORTE Toledos to invite STUART to dinner at their apartment. There were tentative discussions of collaborating in the distribution of COSTA Amic books in the United States and of publishing some book of MONTEFORTE Toledo's.

However, both COSTA Amic and the MONTEFORTE Toledos told me that they found STUART offensively vulgar and were not at all enthusiastic about having anything to do with him.

Two weeks ago, OSEGUEDA sketched the outline of a book (contemporary history of U.S. and Latin American relations) he hopes STUART will want to publish, and sent the outline up to him.

CSCI-316/00789-64

18 August 1964

WH/1/C. Bustos:chk

BASIC: HMMA 24092

PROJECT: NONE

LIAISON: NONE

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - RI (201-278841)
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/1
1 - WH/PO/A

201-

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

33 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : VR

14 Aug 64 IN 51668

S E C ~~R~~ R E T 141643Z

DIR CITE MEXI 0582

LICOOKY

REF A. DIR 40439

B. HMMA 12641

LICOOKY/1 ANSWERS TO REF B SENT IN HMMA 24392 ON 11 AUG.

S E C R E T

LICOOKY/1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Answers to Inquiries Submitted in Reference

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HMMW 12641

Forwarded herewith are answers to the inquiries forwarded in reference dispatch submitted by subject of 201-278841 on 6 July 1964.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att

CS COPY

2 att

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic [illegible]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA 24092	DATE 11 August 1964
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-278841

14-00000

SECRET

July 6, 1964

LYLE STUART
AREVALO
"ANTIKOMUNISMO EN AMERICA LATINA"

Early in the spring of 1962, here in Mexico, Arévalo told me that Stuart was prodding him about getting another of his books translated, to take advantage of the publicity around "The Shark and the Sardines". I was already far beyond speaking terms with Stuart and therefore declined to have anything further to do with him. About three months later, Arévalo told me that Stuart was going to publish "Antikomunismo en America Latina" and that a young American student, married to a Mexican, Angela delli Sante Arrocha (who had written "Arevalo, Pensador Contemporaneo")* was doing the translation into English. Early in 1963, Arévalo told me that the translation hadn't been satisfactory and therefore Stuart had obtained a re-translation, by Charleton Beals.

When Stuart was here in Mexico in June, he told Dr. Osegueda that he was very happy about the way the book was selling.

Inasmuch as Stuart has paid Arévalo only 10 percent of moneys received by Stuart on "The Shark and the Sardines" sales (in contrast with some book contracts in which the author receives 10 percent of the money represented by number of copies sold multiplied by the retail sales price) I would assume he is no more generous with "Antikomunismo". I can ask Dr. Osegueda the exact terms, but I haven't been able to see Osegueda this week.

I know of no affiliations of Stuart with foreign political parties of government. His attempts to get close to Fidel Castro in 1960 were motivated by a desire to explicit the journalistic advantages of an interview. His original interest in "The Shark and the Sardines" was apparently motivated by money-making interest and by the hope that he might spark a sensation - exactly what he did manage to do with his outrageous advertising. He seemed to calculate that there might be libel suits possible against the firms and the newspapers he could provoke to attack him.

I am sure you have it on file, but I will enclose a copy of Arevalo's original contract with Stuart. It was superceded by another in November of 1961, granting Stuart certain rights with regard to other foreign language editions of "The Shark and the Sardines" and, I believe, establishing that Stuart should have first option of other Arévalo books translated into English.

Information about Stuart's dealings with Arévalo and whatever others could be obtained WITH GUILE from Eileen Brant, who was his editor at the time of the first contact with Arevalo, subsequently broke with him because of deep and bitter resentment against him, then returned not too long ago to collaborate with him. She is his wife's sister. She is certainly working with him now only because he finally offered her a little better pay. For her to have changed her mind about him would be almost impossible, I believe, in view of the long history of incidents that had brought her to have contempt for him, at the time I knew her in 1961. She knows his operation inside-out. In order to get information from her, it would be absolutely necessary to approach her from some angle that would give no hint of government investigation. She is very gregarious. She is a fortyish medium-attractive, lonely, New York single woman (unless her status has changed since I knew her). By somebody she would assume to be a writer, and who would be a bit friendly with her and see her off-hours, she would probably talk freely about Stuart. But she is quite clever and rather worldly in some respects, so that must be kept in mind in case she is contacted. SHE HAS A VERY DEEP AND LONGTIME NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION. She was active in liberal activities in Chicago, and if I remember correctly, although she is certainly not communist, she considered herself a little jeopardized by the Mc Carthy period.

---

* Published by Costa Amic, 1962. Financed by Als Radical Revolucionario de El Salvador.

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

att 1 to HMMA24072

201-278841

Angela Delli Sante-Arroche could be contacted, too, of course. I will look for her address at Costa Amic's office and pass it along.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

June 6, 1964

Lyle Stuart
Dr. Raul Osegueda
Bartolome Costa Amic
Mario Monteforte Toledo

Dr. Osegueda apparently has had a secret longing to get something of his own printed in English. He seized upon the opportunity of commenting Beals' introduction to "Antikommunismo" in order to write to Stuart this spring. Stuart wrote very cordially back to Osegueda, hoping to meet him on a trip to Mexico in June. When Osegueda confessed to me his correspondence with Stuart, he sought to make me see it as an attempt to speak with Stuart about the royalties Stuart has never paid me.

When Osegueda finally did see Stuart here during the book congress in June, he only very timidly and very, very briefly touched upon the royalty problem, and indeed went to a great deal of trouble to serve Stuart by introducing him to Costa Amic and to Mario Monteforte Toledo. (Stuart had expressed interest in getting in touch with some publishers and writers.) Osegueda bustled about, taking Osegueda and Monteforte Toledo to lunch with Stuart, even managed to get the Monteforte Toledos to invite Stuart to dinner at their apartment. There were tentative discussions of collaborating in the distribution of Costa Amic books in the United States and of publishing some book of Monteforte Toledo's.

However, both Costa Amica and the Monteforte Toledos told me that they found Stuart offensively vulgar and were not at all enthusiastic about having anything to do with him.

Two weeks ago, Osegueda sketched the outline of a book (contemporary history of U.S. and Latin American relations) he hopes Stuart will want to publish, and sent the outline up to him.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Att 2 to HMMA 24092

201-278841

MESSAGE FORM

33 SECRET

ORIG: C. Bustos
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 6 AUGUST 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	FI
3		7	D
4		8	Reg

6 AUG 64 23 08 z

SIG CEN

TO: ~~MEXICO CITY~~

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: VR

TO: MEXI INFO. CITE DIR 40489

LICOOKY

REF: HMMW-12641*

PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *FBI requested that certain questions be given to LICOOKY by us concerning Juan Jose Arevalo and Lyle Stuart, and the book Shark and the Sardines. Justice is thinking of prosecuting Stuart.

Licooky-1

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

24 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4 2
2	5
3	6 FI

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SR 7, VR

File LICOOKY-1

S E C R E T 032241Z

4 AUG 64 IN 41824

DIR INFO MANA GUAT TEGU SALV CITE MEXI 3449

REF SJOS 6916 (IN 39629)*

1. NIGHT 30 JULY LICOOKY-1 SPENT SEVERAL HOURS COMPANY MARIO SOSA NAVARRO AND DIANA GAMES. LATTER IS HONDURAN AND FIANCE HONDURAN COMMIE RODIL RIVERA RODIL. GAMES NOW DIVORCING MEXICAN DIPLOMAT WHO PREVIOUSLY SERVED TEGU AND PLANS MARRY RIVERA.

2. ACC L-1, WHEN ISABEL GUILLEN DE ZELAYA, AT WHOSE HOUSE L-1 AND SOSA MET, ACCUSED SOSA OF BEING A "RUSO" LATTER MADE MILDLY DEROGATORY REMARKS ABOUT SOVIET UNION. SAID HIS WIFE AND SMALL SON IN GUAT AND WIFE NOW DIVORCING HIM.

3. L-1 INSTRUCTED MAINTAIN CASUAL CONTACT SOSA IN ORDER KEEP TABS HIS WHEREABOUTS.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *MARIO SOSA NAVARRO ARRIVED IN SAN JOSE 22 JULY.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and

24

Minty

File LICOOKY-1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : SR 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

SECRET 031759Z

03 AUG 64 IN 41779

DIR CITE MEXI 0444

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

REF A DIR 39266*

B MEXI 9796 (IN 01559)

1. APPRECIATE REF A APPROVAL USE LICOCKY-1 AGAINST KUKHARENKO. HOWEVER HAVE RECENTLY LEARNED FROM LIENVOY AND SUBJ REF B (REQUEST CRYPTO) THAT K DEPARTING EARLY AUG HOME LEAVE. WILL TRY INJECT L-1 AFTER K'S RETURN.

2. REPORTING BY DISPATCH SUB BREF B RECENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH K EXCHANGE VODKA FOR TRANSISTOR RADIOS.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: * LICOOKY-1 OA AMENDED PERMIT HER USE TO DEVELOP AND ASSES KUKHARENKO.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

ORIG: Terry Ward
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 31 JULY 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-260831

27 S-E-C-R-E-T

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

31 Jul 64 22 01z

SIG CEN

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH8
INFO: SR7, CI, CI/OPS, FI, VR, CI/OA, CI/IC 2

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 39266

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

REF: MEXI 0306 (IN 30508)*

LICOOKY-1 OA AMENDED PERMIT HER USE TO DEVELOP AND ASSESS KUKHARENKO. SHOULD NOT BE USED MAKE RECRUITMENT SINCE B NOT EXPERIENCED RECRUITER, FAILURE WOULD COMPLETELY BLOW HER TO SOVS AND SINCE HER RELATIONSHIP WITH LINLUCK KNOWN, COULD BE UNFAVORABLE BLOWBACK ON LINLUCK.

~~2. SINCE SOVS COULD PRESUMABLY COME IN CONTACT WITH LINLUCK THROUGH LICOOKY-1, STATION MAY CONSIDER TIPPING OFF LINLUCK AT OPPORTUNE TIME TO BE CAREFUL OF LICOOKY-1'S DOINGS AS CONTINUING STATION INVESTIGATION OF HER DISCLOSES SHE ASSOCIATING WITH SOVS.~~

Wyde
P. Blake
by phone

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Requested permission use LICOOKY-1 to develop high priority SOV target.

CI/ICG/Burke (in draft)
CI/OA/Lally (in draft)
SR/O/WH Kasparovich Duff
WH/POA/Priest 4B Priest

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

27 SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH8

INFO : DDP, WH/SA8, RI/AN, SI, SI/INT, CI/OPS, CI, VR

S E C R E T 282313Z

TEGU INFO DIR GUAT SALV CITE MEXI 3431 28 JUL 64 IN 37910

REF TEGU 5547 (IN 36159)

1. LICOOKY-1 SAID 27 JULY ISABEL A. GUILLEN ZELAYA, SISTER OF LORENZO ZELAYA'S WIFE, TOLD HER MARIO SOSA NAVARRO AND SON, CARLOS, WHO SECOND YEAR MEDICAL STUDENT AT UNAM IN MEXICO CITY, CAME BY TOKIO NO. 35 NIGHT 26 JULY. ISABEL RUNS BOARDING HOUSE THIS ADDRESS AND L-1 NOW LIVING THERE.

2. SWLUCK-1 SAID 27 JULY RICARDO FREIJI, PCH MEMBER NOW LIVING MEXICO CITY, TOLD HIM HAD TALKED WITH SOSA ABOUT 20 JULY

3. INDEX.

S E C R E T

Y C/S COMMENT: Security measures taken by PCH to protect party members returning from Cuba.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, DC/WH/SA 5, VR

S E C R E T 242337Z

25 JAN 64 35904

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 8374

DESENSITIZED

[illegible]

REF WAVE 4985 (IN 33739)

1. MEXI WILL ASK LICOOKY-1 MAKE DISCREET INQUIRIES TO DETERMINE IF NOEL GUERRERO SANTIAGO STILL MEXI AND PRESENT ADDRESS.

2. LATEST MEXI INFO ORLANDO QUAIT QUINTANA IS HMM-376 12 DEC 63 WHICH STATES HE TRYING COME TO MEXI, BUT NO INFO HIS ACTUAL AR

STATION DID NOT RECEIVE HMMW 1082.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 24 July 1964 dlr

TO: WH/1/Mexico - W.J. Kaufman

C NO. C - 83492

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRO I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFFED DOSSIER
☐	PRO II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFFED COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

I have discussed with Paul Burke, DC/CI/ICG, Mexico's request for amendment of OA to use LICOOKY-1 against the Soviet official. We both are of the opinion that she can be used for development of the target to determine his susceptibility to recruitment, but that she should not be used to make the actual recruitment should the matter develop to that point, due to these considerations: (1) She is not a recruiter, never has made a recruitment. (2) Odds are she would be blown to the Soviets, since we must consider that the odds for successful recruitment of a Soviet official are not favorable. (3) Her relationship with LINLUCK in Mexico is fairly well known, so that there could be an unfavorable blow back on LINLUCK.

In authorizing her use in the developmental role, Burke would like for Station to be informed that it should tell LINLUCK that Station's continuing investigation of LICOOKY-1 discloses her association with Soviets; therefore, he should be very careful in his relationship with her.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

45 SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, SR 7, VR

S E C R E T 222322Z

23 JUL 64 IN 34008

TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 0348

REF A MEXI 0288 (IN 29790)
B TEGU 5531 (IN 30664)
C DIR 36752 *
D MEXI 0347 (IN 33999)

1. DUE POSSIBLE USE LICOOKY-1 IN REDCOAT OP, HER FRIENDSHIP WITH ABEL CUENCA MARTINEZ AND WIFE, AND HER MANY CONTACTS AND USEFULLNESS AMONG CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMIES AND LEFTISTS MEXICO, STATION DOES NOT WISH INVOLVE HER IN OP AGAINST LUIS MANUEL ZUNIGA SARAVIA PER REFS.

2. RE PARA 4 REF C AGREE COLD APPROACH HAS LIMITED CHANCE SUCCESS BUT APPEARS HE MOST SUSCEPTIBLE NOW AND DOUBT THAT OP SUGGESTED REF B WOULD BE WORTHWHILE. VIEW HIS DECISION REMAIN MEXI AND POSSIBILITY HE MAY ATTEMPT WREST CONTROL PCH FROM BEJARANO, PROBABLY UNSUCCESSFULLY, HE MAY WELL TAKE SOME ACTION NEAR FUTURE MAKING REHABILITATION IN FUTURE IMPOSSIBLE.

LICOOKY-1

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * REQUESTED MEXI CAREFULLY REVIEW LICOOKY ROLE REDCOAT AND ZUNIGA OPS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG: C. Bustos
UNIT: WH/Z 1
EXT: 4507
DATE: 20 July 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	FI
3		7	D
4	2	8	Rig

21 ROUTINE 11z

SIG CEN

TO: MEXICO CITY   INFO: TEGUCIGALPA
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: SR 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

TO MEXI   INFO TEGU   CITE DIR 36752

REF A. MEXI 0288 (IN 29790)
B. TEGU 5531 (IN 30664)

1. TEGU SUGGESTIONS REF B RE USE LICOOKY IMPLY HER INVOLVEMENT IN BUILDUP OF ZUNIGA TO POINT OF RECRUITMENT. (FOR INFO TEGU, LICOOKY HAS LIMITED CLEARANCE WHICH WOULD REQUIRE SPECIAL AMENDMENT TO PERMIT HER BECOME ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN SUCH OP).

2. MEXI HAS ALSO REQUESTED SPECIAL PERMISSION USE LICOOKY IN REDCOAT OP OUTLINED MEXI 0306 (IN 30508) AND HDQS HAS RESERVATIONS INVOLVING HER ANY MORE THAN MERE INFORMANT IN ZUNIGA OP.

3. REQUEST MEXI CAREFULLY REVIEW LICOOKY ROLE REDCOAT AND ZUNIGA OPS AND ADVISE ITS DESIRES.

4. HDQS AGREES REF B THAT COLD APPROACH ZUNIGA AT THIS TIME NOT ~~BE~~ DESIRABLE, AND THAT ANY APPROACH IDEALLY SHOULD BE MADE AFTER INFO COLLECTED AND ASSESSMENT MADE.

END OF MESSAGE

LICOOKY-1

C/WH/2 Maurel
WH/Honduras J. Stoker
CI/ICG E.L. Whiteside

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

20 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : Amendment of the Operational Approval for LICOOKY-1 (201-278841)

1. It is requested that the Operational Approval for LICOOKY-1 be amended to include authority for Mexico City Station to utilize her as an access asset against a Soviet Press Attache and Soviet Information Bulletin Representative.

2. It should be noted that the 29 June amendment of LICOOKY-1's OA was not implemented since that target's visit to Mexico City never materialized.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : *SR 7

INFO : CI/CA, WH 7, VR

Tell [illegible] when OA oked

S E C R E T 171724Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2326

REDCOAT
REF DIR 31925

17 JUL 64 IN 30508

1. HAVE COMPLETED STUDY ON ONE OF STATION'S PRIME SOV TARGET FOR DEVELOPMENT, PRESS ATTACHE AND SOV INFO BULLETIN REP, SERGEY SEMYONOVICH KUKHARENKO. SEE NO OPPORTUNITY UTILIZE LATTER'S LOCAL CONTACTS FOR ACCESS SINCE ALL DECIDEDLY LEFTIST OR COMMIE.

2. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL DIRECT LICOOKY-1 AGAINST K, FOR SAME REASONS AND POSSIBILITIES CITED MEXI 0021. (4 [illegible]) AFTER APPROVAL OBTAINED, MEXI WILL DEVELOP SPECIFIC PLAN TO FACILITATE HER INITIAL ACCESS.

3. FYI L-1 WAS NOT ADVISED OF ABSCTTAGE OP.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR REDWOOS USED.

**AMENDED LICOOKY-1 OA FOR USE AGAINST KOBYSH.

Terry - call Kennewick on this

X 1315

[illegible] OA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

21 SECRET

1
2
3

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IA, CA 2, FI, FI/INT 2, RI/AN, VR

SECRET 151522Z

TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 0288

REF MEXI 0245 (IN 17863)

IN 29790

1. DULBUCK-1 SAID 15 JULY DIONICIO BEJARANO RAMOS AND RIGOBERTO PADILLA RUSH TOLD HIM AND OTHER HONDURAN COMMIE EXILES THAT LUIS MANUEL ZUNIGA SARAVIA, WHO RETURNED MEXI 24 JUNE FROM SOVIET UNION, DISCIPLINED AT RECENT PCH CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM HELD MEXI AND REDUCED TO SIMPLE CELL MEMBER. PADILLA SAID THIS DONE BECAUSE OF MANY ERRORS ZUNIGA HAS MADE. MRS ABEL CUENCA MARTINEZ, ZUNIGA'S MOTHER, TOLD LICOOKY-1 RECENTLY ZUNIGA HEALTH FINE BUT HE HAVING SERIOUS "PROBLEMS" WHICH WORRY HER.

2. JULY 15 L-1, WHO ORDERED BY DOCTOR MOVE FROM APT SHE RENTED RECENTLY BECAUSE IT DAMP AND COLD, SAID ZUNIGA AND WIFE MOVED INTO APT L-1 VACATED WHICH LOCATED CALLE RIO TAMESSES 14, APT 3, MEXICO CITY 1, TELEPHONE 46-33-88. THIS ARRANGED BY MRS CUENCA WHEN SHE LEARNED L-1 MOVING. ACC MRS CUENCA, ZUNIGA AND WIFE PLAN LIVE MEXICO CITY AND HE LOOKING FOR WORK. ZUNIGA'S WIFE NOW TAKING IN SEWING HELP DEFRAY FAMILY EXPENSES, AND S-1 SAYS ZUNIGAS TRYING SELL

file LICOOKY-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

BUSINESS THEY OWN IN SAN PEDRO S.L.A.

3. JULY 13 L-1 HAD DINNER WITH MRS CUENCA, ABEL CUENCA, ZUNIGA
AND WIFE. L-1, WHO HAD SEEN ZUNIGA BRIEFLY AT CUENCA HOME JUST BEFORE
ZUNIGA LEFT FOR SOVIET UNION ON 31 JAN 64, SAYS HIS ATTITUDE
TOWARD HER HAS CHANGED. HE NOW FRIENDLY, TALKATIVE AND APPEARS
WANT BE FRIEND, BUT HAS NOT MENTIONED PCH OR ANY DIFFICULTIES TO
L-1.

4. BELIEVE ZUNIGA, AS RESULT PCH ACTION AND NEED FOR MONEY, MAY
BE SUSCEPTIBLE RECRUITMENT APPROACH. COULD PROVIDE
VALUABLE INTEL AND OP INFO ON PCH AND PCH LEADERS AS OF PRESENT
TIME, AND IF RESPONSIVE TO GUIDANCE COULD PROBABLY REGAIN HIGH LEVEL
POSITION WITHIN ONE YEAR OR SO.

5. IF TEGU INTERESTED BELIEVE APPROACH COULD BE MADE WITHOUT
UNDUE RISK L-1 SECURITY. USING LIRICE TEAM, APPROACH COULD BE MADE
ON STREET OR AT OR NEAR CUENCA HOME WHERE ZUNIGA AND WIFE TAKING MANY
THEIR MEALS. CUENCA HOME WELL KNOWN, AND IN VIEW APPROACH TO PCH MEMBER
IN JAN 64 DOUBT ZUNIGA WOULD CONNECT APPROACH WITH LA-1.
IF APPROACH MADE COULD USE OLIVER Q. WIMPHEN BUT DUE HIS DEEP
INVOLVEMENT RECRUITMENT OPS AGAINST PCH TARGETS WOULD PREFER TEGU
OR HQS PROVIDE RECRUITER.

6. INDEX.

SECRET

YC/S COMMENT: ACCORDING SWLUCK/1 LUIS MANUEL
ZUNIGA SARAVIA ARRIVED MEXI 26 JUNE FROM
USSR.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : C.Finney:bc
UNIT : SR/O/[illegible]
EXT : 6412
DATE : 26 June 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-286805

ROUTING
4
5
6

29 JUN 64 22 04z

TO : MEXICO CITY RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 7

INFO : CI, CI/CPS, CI/OA, FI, WH 7, VR

CP

O

DEFERRED SIG CEN
x ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO RIOD CITE DIR 31926

REDWOOD AECOTTAGE

REF: A. MEXI 0021 (IN 14984)*
B. RIOD 5073 (IN 12837)**

1. OA FOR LICOOKY/1 AMENDED TO AUTHORIZE ONE TIME USE AGAINST KOBYSH AS PROPOSED PARA ONE REF.

2. Vitaliy Ivanovich KOBYSH BORN 27 JULY 28 POLTAVA OBLAST. WIFE EMMA. SON SERGEY AGE ABOUT 6. FROM PHONE TAP INFO LEARNED SUBJ HAS OCCASIONAL DISAGREEMENTS WIFE. SHE ACCUSES HIM INFIDELITY. WIFE ON BAD TERMS OTHER SOVS RIO BECAUSE SON SUFFERS UNDERTERMINED AMOEBA DISEASE WHICH OTHER SOVS FEAR COMMUNICABLE. HENCE THEY HAVE THEIR CHILDREN SHUN SON KOBYSH. ALSO AGGRAVATING SITUATION IS WIFE SUFFERING HEPATITIS.

3. CAREER SUBJ: MEMBER RADIO DELEGATION NORWAY 54. ASSIGNED MOSCOW 55. ALSO 55 VISITED SWEDEN AND DENMARK WITH SOV PIANIST. RETURNED NORWAY 56. ASSIGNED NEW YORK SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 60. MEMBER KRUSHCHEV PARTY MEETING KENNEDY VIENNA JUNE 61. ASSIGNED BRAZIL CIRCA AUGUST 62.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

22-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

23 [illegible] 04z

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 31926

PAGE 2

4. RE PARA 3 REF B: FYI ONLY FROM SENSITIVE HQ SOURCE UNDER KGB CONTROL IT LEARNED SUBJ WAS RECALLED FROM USA TO USSR BECAUSE OF INDISCREET PHONE CALL TO MOSCOW WHICH RIS HAD RECORDED AND CRITICIZED ON GROUNDS SECURITY. ALSO WHILE DUTY OFFICER RADIO MOSCOW INADVERTENTLY PERMITTED BROADCAST OLD TAPE RECORDING LAUDING HAMMARSKJOLD AT TIME OFFICIAL SOV LINE JUST OPPOSITE. (NO CONFIRMATION INFO THIS PARA RECEIVED THUS FAR.)

END OF MESSAGE

*Basis Ref B info, believe LICOOKY-1 would be excellent logical and feasible access to Subj . . . . ** (Subj) is Izvestiya and Radio Moscow representative . . . .

C/SR/ODB
CI/OA Mr. Brown (by phone CN for para 1)
SR/CI/K
WH/1 Mr. Spera (draft)
WH/PO/A
WH/5 Mr. Sulc (draft)

C/WH W Wood

C/SR/O/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
4
5
6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : SR 7

INFO : CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, EE/D 4, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 252025Z

DIR INFO RIOD CITE MEXI 0021 26 JUN [illegible] 14984

REDWOOD AECOTTAGE

REF DIR 30675

RIOD 5073 (IN 25334)

1. BASIS REF B INFO, BELIEVE LICOOKY-1 WOULD BE EXCELLENT LOGICAL AND FEASIBLE ACCESS TO SUBJ. SHE HAS LEFTIST JOURNALIST CONTACTS TO FACILITATE ACCESS, IS ATTRACTIVE AND COULD BECOME AS INTIMATE WITH SUBJ AS NECESSARY.

2. DESPITE LIMITATIONS L-1 OF WHICH HQS AWARE, REQUEST HQS APPROVAL USE L-1.

3. DIR: PLS PROVIDE MORE INFO SUBJ'S BACKGROUND, HIS VULNERABILITIES.

4. RIOD: PLS SEND RECENT PHOTO, PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ADVANCE TRAVEL NOTICE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * GAVE B/D DATA OF KO [illegible], IZVESTIYA AND RADIO MOSCOW REP WHO POSSIBLE DEFECTION TARGET.

Ari [illegible]
to Cly x 1956

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET

C No.83492

Scott

Bustos

B

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1/Mexico W.J. Kaufman

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of LICOOKY/1 __________________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated 26 June 1964.

Operational Approval for LICOOKY/1 is amended to include authorization for her use on a one-time basis for the purpose set forth in your memorandum dated 26 June 1964.

file married

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 26 June 1964 dlr

file LICOOKY-1

GROUP 1
[illegible]

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

SECRET

14-00000

Buslos
Jmp

26 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Amendment of LICOOKY-1 Operational Approval

It is requested that the Operational Approval for LICOOKY-1 be amended to include authority for Mexico Station to use her on a one-time basis as an access asset against a Soviet newspaperman, who will be visiting Mexico and who has been a target for defection of Rio de Janeiro Station. (See MEXI 0021 (IN 14984) and preceding traffic.)

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

DDP/WH/WJK/ASpera:kte (26 June 1964)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - addressee
1 - LICOOKY-1 201 file

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT

Operational/Progress Report for Project LIHLUCK for April and May, 1964

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith is a progress report for Project LIHLUCK for the period specified. This report was prepared by Leo C. HEDLICH, the outside case office.

2. LIHLUCK/1 has provided information for operational purposes on a number of subjects and/or individuals in which the Station has an interest or some sort of requirement from others (i.e., Mario Monteforte Toledo). Also, he sent a bundle of papers left by Major Alfonso Prera Sierra, one of Yon Sosa's followers, at the time of their Guatemala revolt effort in 1962. Lee E. MULCHEARNE has gone through the papers and has had about 170 frames made. The negatives will be forwarded to Headquarters.

3. The affair between LIHLUCK/1 and LICOOKY/1 is, temporarily at least, suspended. Undoubtedly, the return of LIHLUCK/1's wife had a good deal to do with this plus the fact that pressure was being put on the two principals by the Station. Whether this separation can be maintained permanently is difficult to say, but LIHLUCK/1 has been put on notice that he is going to be subject to penalty if it isn't. Outside of that, LIHLUCK/1 has been quite responsive to any requirements imposed on him; on the other hand, he has not been reporting on his personal situation and contacts as fully as he should. This will shape up however.

Willard C. CURTIS

File

Attachment:

Rpt, h/w

Distribution:

3 - WHD, w/att
3 - Files, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMA-23070

DATE

15 June 1964

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

50-6-50/3

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, Mexico City		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WH Division		MICROFILM
SUBJECT LICOOKY-1		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 29 May ODENVY asked KUDESK whether KUBARK had a current interest in LICOOKY as they had questions concerning Juan Jose AREVALO and Lyle STUART which they wanted passed to her. If we had no current contact they wanted to know whether we had any idea of her present whereabouts.

2. KUBARK orally told ODENVY that we formerly utilized her as a sub-source and we believed we could reestablish contact with her in order to pass to her the ODENVY questions. ODENVY was told that she was in Mexico.

3. ODENVY subsequently furnished the attached list of questions. It is requested that the Station pass this list to LICOOKY-1 and obtain from her, answers to be forwarded to Headquarters for passing to ODENVY. The Station is asked to comment on whether her testimony in court might be prejudicial to any KUBARK operations, or whether the Station can see no objection to such a court appearance.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Attachment:
1 u/s/c

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-278841/R

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER CS COPY HMMW-12641	DATE 16 JUN [illegible] 3 June 1964
	CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY S E C R E T	~~HQS FILE NUMBER~~ ✓201-278841 201-6803

ROUTING | INITIAL
Distribution:
1-RI w/att.
RID/AN
1-Chrono
RID/MIS
RID/
WH 3/MEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:chk			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/LIA		Roman J. Roman
CI/OPS		Hughes (draft)
WH/CAN/GUAT		Carley (draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	9 JUN 1964	Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40) **DISPATCH**

SECRET

June 1, 1964

RE: LYLE STUART

This Bureau currently is conducting an investigation in order to determine if the subject has violated the Registration Act. His firm published the 1964 American edition of the book entitled, "Anti-Communism in Latin America," written by Juan Jose Arevalo, former President of Guatemala. The nature and extent of subject's relationship with Arevalo is therefore pertinent to our investigation.

As you know, Viola June Cobb, known to your agency, personally knows Arevalo and worked with him on the translation of his book, "The Shark and the Sardine." It is therefore possible that Cobb may be in a position to furnish some information which can be of assistance to this Bureau. We would appreciate if your agency would interview Cobb and endeavor to obtain answers to the following:

(1) What information does she have concerning the relationship between the subject and Arevalo regarding the book, "Anti-Communism in Latin America"?

(2) Does she have any information indicating that subject is in any way affiliated with foreign political parties or governments?

(3) Does she know of any contractual agreement existing between subject and Arevalo or between subject and any other foreign principals?

(4) Does she know of anyone else who may be in a position to furnish information concerning subject?

(5) In the event that Cobb is in a position to furnish information concerning any of the above points, we desire to be informed if she would be willing to testify in court.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, RI/AN, VR

Licooky 1 201

SECRET 212234Z

22 [illegible] IN 08379

DIR INFO MANA CITE MEXI 9565

REF DIR 19514 *

1. LICOOKY-1 SAID MATILDA DE CUENCA, WIFE ABEL CUENCA MARTINEZ, WHO CLOSE FRIENDS WITH EDELBERTO TORRES ESPINOZA FAMILY, TOLD HER 19 MAY TORRES SHARE PANAM AWARD WAS 83,000 DOLLARS BUT BECAUSE CURRENCY RESTRICTIONS HE HAS BEEN ABLE WITHDRAW LESS THAN HALF SO FAR.

2. INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *RE SETTLEMENT GUAT LAW SUIT.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : [illegible]

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

21 SECRET

1242

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

5 MAY 61 22 16z

TO : MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

DEFERRED SIG CEN
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR 19165

201 file

REF MEXI 9238 (IN 73285) (NOT SENT GUAT)

1. HDQS FULLY SHARES MEXI CONCERN OVER LICOOKY AND LINLUCK PROBLEM. WE SUGGEST THAT PERHAPS ARRIVAL OF WIFE FROM PARIS MAY SOLVE PROBLEM OF LINLUCK'S RESIDENCE LICOOKY APARTMENT. STATION CAN QUERY LINLUCK ROUTINELY AS TO HIS FUTURE PLANS FOR WIFE WITHOUT THUS REVEALING OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH LICOOKY. PRESUMABLY HE WILL RESPOND THAT HE HAS SENT WIFE FUNDS TO JOIN HIM MEXICO. IF SHE PLANS STAY WITH HIM PERMANENTLY, THEN LICOOKY PROBLEM WILL BE ALLEVIATED. IF HER STAY ONLY TEMPORARY, THEN CORRECTIVE ACTION (AS SUGGESTED IN REF) COULD BE TAKEN IF NECESSARY. FEEL THAT THIS COULD BE EASIEST SOLUTION TO PROBLEM AS NEITHER AGENT WOULD BE FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN OTHER OR KUBARK.

2. WIFE'S ARRIVAL MEXI OF INTEREST IN ITSELF TO HDQS AS THIS WILL HAVE EFFECT ON LINLUCK MOBILITY. WE ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING PLAN FOR FUTURE ROLE OF AGENT AND WILL ADVISE SOON.

3. FYI: WE HAVE NEVER CONSIDERED MEXI STATION TO BE MERELY CUTOUT TO LINLUCK. YOUR OFFICERS HAVE SAME AUTHORITY TO DEAL WITH HIM AS YOU DO WITH YOUR OTHER AGENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE 2

DEFERRED

R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR 19165

WH Comment: Ref related Mexi concern at LICOOKY/LINLUCK relationship, and asked for authority to pressure them apart.

DC/CI/ICG

WH/3/Mexico

RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8
INFO : CI/CPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

for LICOOKY-1 201 file

S E C R E T 321830Z

DIR CITE MEXI 9238

LINLUCK

[illegible] 78208

REF DIR 14975

1. LICOOKY TOLD CASE OFFICER 23 APRIL THAT LINLUCK TOLD HER 20 APRIL OF ARREST OF PACO AMADO ABOUT TWO WEEKS BEFORE IN GUAT WHERE ALLEGEDLY STILL HELD. ALSO OUT OF LAST PAYMENT SENT THOUSAND DOLLARS TO HIS WIFE FOR PASSAGE MEXI. NEITHER FACT REPORTED REDLICH.

2. STATION IN AWKARD SITUATION ACTING AS COMMO CHANNEL AT DISCRETION AGENT WHO NOT PLAYING BALL ESPECIALLY RE REPORTING INFO OF OBVIOUS KUBARK INTEREST. FEEL REDLICH CAPABLE DEALING WITH LINLUCK IF GIVEN AUTHORITY. VIEW APPARENT DELAY IN HQ DECISION RE LINLUCK FUTURE. STATION REQUESTS AUTHORITY LAY DOWN LAW TO HIM ABOUT MOVING OUT OF LICOOKY APARTMENT OWING "CURRENT GOSSIP RE LICOOKY WHICH POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS HIS FUTURE USEFULNESS". WISH USE 30 DAY CLAUSE IN REF CONTRACT AS CLUB TO ENFORCE ORDER. ALSO REQUEST AUTHORITY BRIEF HIM ON HIS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

3. REGRET NECESSITY THIS REQUEST, BUT LICOOKY SEEMS INCAPABLE INITIATING DISENGAGEMENT DESPITE FACT SHE HIGHLY OVERWROUGHT AT HIS TOTAL MONOPOLY HER TIME AND RESULTANT INABILITY DO HER KUBARK

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

JOB. COULD RIDE WITH PRESENT SITUATION IF CERTAIN HQ PLANS WOULD REMOVE HIM MEXI BY SPECIFIC DATE. OTHER ALTERNATIVE IS OFFER LICOOKY CHOICE BETWEEN LINLUCK AND KUBARK. UNABLE PREDICT RESULT.

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LICOOKY-1/Comments on Meeting with Joel N. HIEBECKER on 26 February 1964

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: None, for information only.

Attention: Joel N. HIEBECKER

1. Joel N. HIEBECKER, while in Mexico City during the week of 24 - 28 February 1964, met with LICOOKY-1, from 1500 to approximately 1600 hours on the afternoon of 26 February 1964, in connection with his review of the [illegible] operation. Upon leaving the meeting site HEIBECKER noted two unidentified young men who may have been conducting a surveillance of him. Later, at about 1630 hours, HEIBECKER saw LICOOKY-1 on Avenida Madero, about one mile from the meeting site. The case officer was requested to query LICOOKY-1 on any significant remarks LIELUCK-1, who lives with LICOOKY-1, might have made to LICOOKY-1 before and/or after the meeting with HEIBECKER, and to report same to Headquarters.

2. The next meeting with LICOOKY-1, as scheduled, was held on Friday afternoon, 28 February. LICOOKY-1 said that she did not see HEIBECKER on Avenida Madero on 26 February, and added that she did not have her glasses with her and without them cannot identify anyone more than 20 feet or so away. LIELUCK-1, she said, wanted to know with whom she spoke at noontime on 26 February (the meeting was arranged by the C/O via telephone and LIELUCK-1 answered the telephone), and later queried her regarding where she met and what had been said. He was satisfied, however, that she had been talking to a PBPRIMEr and did not press the matter further. She did not tell him where, or with whom, or what had been said. According to LICOOKY-1, LIELUCK-1 has no objections to her seeing and talking to PBPRIMErs, but he objects violently to her having anything to do with any non-PBPRIME leftists or Communists.

(continued)

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	HMMA- 23027	5 March 1964
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA- 23027

5. On 2 March 1964 LICOOKY-1 reported that she had decided to visit her brother in PBPRIME for two weeks or so, and will take advantage of the trip to renew her tourist documentation. She said that LIHUACK-1 has become extremely difficult to live with since HEIBECKER was here, and that she must get away from him for awhile. He objected to her leaving, but acquiesced when he became convinced that she intends to return to Mexico. LICOOKY-1 plans to leave on 4 March 1964, and will return on or about 20 March 1964.

Willard C. CURTIS

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station Mex. City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LICOOKY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMA-22258

1. LICOOKY-1 was granted an OA on 27 January 1964 for use as outlined in the PRQ II forwarded with HMMA-22258. The OA as granted, however, was restricted to approval to use LICOOKY-1 in such a manner that information is taken from her, but that as little classified information as possible is to be passed. Specific requirements should be passed only when necessary, and should be made in such a manner that sensitive operational or ODYOKE programs, plans, and objectives are not revealed. The office granting the OA also indicated that the limitations proposed in the Station's comments in Section XVI of the PRQ II should be implemented.

2. If LICOOKY-1 is ever to be used as a directed and fully controlled asset, without the limitations expressed above, an amendment to the OA will be necessary.

3. Reference is made to Section X, para 1 of the PRQ II forwarded in ref, which indicates that LICOOKY-1 may be given a bonus for a particularly outstanding job. The Station is reminded that since LICOOKY-1 is a Contract Agent, and PBPRIME citizen, her contract must be amended each time a bonus payment is contemplated.

Oliver G. GALBOND

Distribution:
O&1-COS, Mexico City

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-12327

DATE: 10 February 1964

10 FEB 1964

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-278841

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST: WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:chk

EXT. 5940

~~Distribution:~~

~~ROUTING~~	INITIAL
1-Chrono	
RID/AN CI/OA	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OA	12 FEB 1964	Lolly

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	1964	J. C. King

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

10 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CCG/NC

SUBJECT : LICOOKY-1

LICOOKY-1 was granted an OA on 27 January 1964. She was recruited in June 1960 and has been utilized by SAS and WH Division since that time.

J. M. Whitten
C/WH/3

file
Licooky-1

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
XX	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIHUFF/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: A. HMMW-11321, 13 Feb 1963
B. HMMA-20931, 22 Mar 1963

1. Transmitted under separate cover truename attachments are the following forms to complete Headquarters' records on subject:

a. Personal History Statement
b. Personal History Statement (Appendix I)
c. Report of Medical History

2. Subject was originally recruited as a cutout for the LIHUFF/2 organization. However, his actual duties for KUBARK entail far more than contact and communication with LIHUFF/2. He is an outside agent. In addition to acting as the contact between the Mexico Station and the LIHUFF/2 Institute, LIHUFF/1 is responsible for organizing and directing the KUWOLF student groups in the LIHUFF/2 project; printing and distributing of propaganda; planning and initiating student harrassment activities. Since LIHUFF/1's duties are those of an outside agent, his salary was established to reimburse him for the amount of time it is necessary for him to spend on LIHUFF activities. In this regard, it is felt that the sum of $500. monthly is not an excessive amount. Headquarters is requested to process a contract for subject in this amount.

OK

3. Subject's social security number is 255-58-5834.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

23
x201-30999

Enclosures:
as stated above (UNDER SEPARATE COVER)

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/encls

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
29 Apr 63

DATE DISPATCHED
30 Apr 63

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-21166

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-30999 23

3/Rs

SECRET

PART III

NOTE: DETACH THIS PORTION OF FORM AND DISTRIBUTE SEPARATELY

18. [illegible] 6741

19. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 255-58-5884 08

IF SOCIAL SECURITY NO. IS NOT AVAILABLE, HAVE FORM NO. SS-5, "APPLICATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS," COMPLETED AS PROVIDED IN DETAILED PROCEDURES.

20. CITIZENSHIP USA

21. ADDRESS OF RECORD (*In U.S.*) none

22. ADDRESS (*Foreign*) Mexico City, Mexico

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

1/RS

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

ISSUED BY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE *(Fill In)*

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: Wichtrich, Alfonso Rudolph 03
2. AGE: 47
3. SEX: ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

4. HEIGHT: 6'3"
5. WEIGHT: 185
6. COLOR OF EYES: Brown
7. COLOR OF HAIR: Brown
8. TYPE COMPLEXION: Light
9. TYPE BUILD: Med.

10. SCARS *(Type and Location)*: None

11. OTHER DISTINGUSHING PHYSICAL FEATURES: None

12. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)*:
Toluca Highway - Kim 19-1/2
El Magueyito, Cuajimalpa 10
Mexico, D. F., Mexico

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)* AND PHONE NO.:
Same as (12)-
Phone 20-77-47 08

14. CURRENT PHONE NO.: 20-77-47 08
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.: 35-96-53 08
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE *(State, Territory or Country)*: Mexico

17. NICKNAMES: Pancho - Al 08
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED: None

19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including Length of Time)* UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.
OK Pancho - through college - Willcox & Tucson Ariz. Al - Used to date. 08

20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by What Authority)*

SECTION II POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING

2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT *(You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary)*. $

3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT

4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS *(Check "X" each item applicable)*:
☐ WASHINGTON D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY *(Specify)*:
☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

FORM 4-58 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (4)

8/PS

09, 10

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH Oct. 30, 1915	2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Chihuahua, Chih., Mexico.	3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country) U.S.A.
4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY ☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☒ OTHER (Specify): derivirive.	5. DATE NATURALIZED N.A.	6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. N.A.
7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE N.A.	8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country) N.A.	
9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY ☐ YES ☒ NO	10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY N.A.	

11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

N.A.

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP ☐ YES ☒ NO	13. GIVE PARTICULARS N.A.

14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)?
N A

15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S. 1916	16. PORT OF ENTRY El Paso, Texas	17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY Unknown
18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue) N.A.		19. DATE VISA ISSUED N.A.

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL Willcox Grammar School 05	2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country) Willcox, Arizona 10
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To) 1922-1930	4. GRADUATE ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL Willcox Union High School 08	2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country) Willcox, Arizona 10
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To) 1930-1934	4. GRADUATE ☒ YES ☐ NO
1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL	2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To)	4. GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM QTR HOURS (Specify)
University of Arizona Tucson Arizona 08	Range Ecology	Animal Husb.	34	39	Bachelor	May 1939	10 Sem-

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

6/es

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

N.A.

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
N.A.				
N.A.				
N.A.				

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
Cav. School - Basic Ft. Riley, Kansas	Troop Duty Horse & Mechanized		1941	3
Cav. School - Advanced Ft. Riley, Kansas	" " "		1942	3
Command & General Staff, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan	G-2 - C&GS		1943	3

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

War Dept. Mis-X - Intelligence
Fort Hunt, Washington, D.C. 1943 - 6 months

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes).	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak: EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			HOW ACQUIRED: NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Spanish	x	x	x														x	x	x

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

4 years high school
2 years college

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

N.A.

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

Business terminology - write - speak - read & translate.
Socio-Economics - write - speak - read & translate.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION VI GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Mexico -	Industrial - Bus. Socio-Economia Politics	1949- Present	N.A.	X	X	X	X
Panama 10	Business Terrain - R.R.	1946-1949	N.A.	X	X		X
China	Terrain Local Conditions	1943-1945	N.A.	X	X	X	X
Central Amer.	Terrain Local Conditions	1946-Present	N.A.		X		X

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

10
Mexico - Business - Work Assignment
Panama - Business - Work Assignment
China - Army.

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE IF ISSUED.

98 #118056 - Expired August 20, 1962

SECTION VII TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM			
		GREGG	SPEEDWRITING	STENOTYPE	OTHER (Specify):
x Unknown	No				

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.).

None.

SECTION VIII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Major Athletics - Good
Riding Horseback - Good
Horse shoes - Good
Gardening - Fair
Bridge - Fair

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

3/RS

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE *(Provide License Registry Number, if known).*

N.A.

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)*: N.A.

7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)*: N.A.

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(Do NOT submit copies unless requested)*. INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.)*.

N.A.

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

N.A.

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

Throughout College and business career.

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

Alpha Zeta - Honorary)
Bob Cats) University of Arizona 08
Scabbard & Blade)

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*: 1/1/63 - Present
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY: American Chamber of Commerce 27
3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: 16 Lucerna 78 - Mexico D. F.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS: 08 Promote trade & good will
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR: Executive Committee 08
6. TITLE OF JOB: 08 Executive Vice President
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ 9600. per annum
8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*:
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: 27
Management & direction of Chamber. P. R. Defend free enterprise system. 08
Coordinate committee work. Promote trade develop good will. 08
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING: N.A.

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

9/RS

14-00000

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Sept. 1949 - Dec. 31, 1962
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY R.C. Cola Company 29
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Columbus, Georgia
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Soft Drink 08
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR T.H. Stanley 06
6. TITLE OF JOB Gen. Mgr. Royal Crown, S.A. 08
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 12,000 PER year
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Direction of manufacturing concentrates. Marketing. Advertising. Development of sales. Franchising. Mexico and C. America. Supervision of all franchised bottling plants 08
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Transfer to States - Preffered Mexico.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Dec. 1946 - Sept. 1949
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY R.C. Bottling Co. of Panama 29
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Panama - Rep de Panama 10
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Bottling & Sales - Soft drinks 08
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Board of Directors
6. TITLE OF JOB
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $19,000. PER year
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Direction of Company.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Unfavorable climatic conditions.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

8/RS

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

5

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

6

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

7

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

8. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN.

9. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

SECTION X MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS N.A.

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 *(As amended)*	YES NO	2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION	3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON		5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS	

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE *(Specify):*
HAVE SERVED ←	XX								
NOW SERVING ←									

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S)
Cavalry - MIS

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY *(Past service)* 6-46		4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES *(Past and current service)* 6 years	
5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY →	PAST SERVICE Jan. 1941	CURRENT SERVICE	6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION
7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE	PAST SERVICE Lt. Col. O8	CURRENT SERVICE	8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER *(If now serving, provide current number)* 0-3[illegible]7220 O8
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	PAST SERVICE MIS		CURRENT SERVICE
10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	PAST SERVICE G-2 Cav.		CURRENT SERVICE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES *(Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)* Past.
Troop duty - troop and squadron - horse and mechanized cavalry.
Military Intelligence - War Dept. Assigned CBI (MIS-X)

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

HONORABLE DISCHARGE	X	RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE		UNDUE HARDSHIPS
RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	X	RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY		OTHER:
RETIREMENT FOR AGE		RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY		

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

REGULAR	X	RESERVE *(Including the National and Air National Guard)*	X	OTHER *(Including AUS)* AUS

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS?	X	YES	2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.?		YES	3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC?	YES
		NO		X	NO	X	NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

X	ARMY	MARINE CORPS	NATIONAL GUARD	COAST GUARD	NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
	NAVY	AIR FORCE	AIR NAT'L.GUARD	ARMY ROTC	AIR FORCE ROTC	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE Lt. Col. O8	6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK 1944	7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY	READY RESERVE	STANDBY *(Active)*	X	STANDBY *(Inactive)*		RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE MI	10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE Unknown

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES
N.A.

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT		YES	13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
	X	NO	
14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT?		YES	15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
	X	NO	

16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY	YEARS Unknown	MONTHS	17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT? Unknown

3/RS

SECTION XI FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES [✓ X NO]

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

Investments.

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Falls Church Bank	Falls Church, Virginia
Banco Nacional de Mexico	Mexico, D.F.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY. ☐ YES [✓ X NO]

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
Falls Church Bank	Falls Church, Virginia
R.C. Bottling of Baltimore 29	401 East 30th St. 10, Baltimore Md.
Popular Dept. Store	El Paso, Texas.

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES [✓ X NO]

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☒ YES ☐ NO (If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled) SPECIFY: Married

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

N.A.

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME (First) Rachel (Middle) Esther (Maiden) Williams (Last) Wichtrich 06

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE Dec. 23, 1938

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country) Tucson, Arizona - Pima County 10 U.S.A

6. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country) 10 3300 Hawthorne St., Tucson, Ariz., U.S.A.

7. LIVING XX YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased) Toluca Highway, Klm. 19 1/2, El Maguevito, Cuajimalpa, Mexico, D.F., Mexico

11. DATE OF BIRTH 2/13/1917 09

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Avoca, Texas, U.S.A.

13. CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.

10 SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

8/RS

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.
15. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.
16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): N.A.
17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N.A.
18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): N.A.
19. OCCUPATION: Housewife
20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers): N.A.
21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): N.A.
22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.): N.A.
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: N.A.
24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED: N.A.
25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: B N.A.

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
John Allen Wichtrich 06	Son	8-14-40 09,10 Tucson, Arizona	U.S.A.	Navy OCS Newport, R.I.
Janet Rae Wichtrich 06	Daughter	3-5-1943 09	U.S.A.	Univ. of N. Mex. Albuquerque, N.M.
Ellen Anne 06	Daughter	6-28-1948 09 Panama R.P. 10	U.S.A.	Mexico, D.F.
William Gus 06	Son	6-8-1950 09 Mexico, D.F. 10	U.S.A.	Mexico, D.F.
Patricia Jean 06	Daughter	3-17-1955 09 Mexioo, D.F.	U.S.A.	Mexico, D.F.

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨ 4

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, step-parents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨ 5

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information for Stepfather and or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wichtrich, Gustaf 06
2. LIVING: YES X NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: Feb. 1950?
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Pneumonia
5. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country): Willcox, Arizona 10
6. DATE OF BIRTH: 1864
7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Germany
8. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.
9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: Unknown
10. PLACE OF ENTRY: Unknown 10
11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): German
12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: 9-15-23
13. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): Tombstone, Cochise Co., Arizona
14. OCCUPATION: Owner, Sheetmetal Shop
15. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed): N.A.
16. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED: Willcox Arizona 10
17. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To): N.A.
18. BRANCH OF SERVICE: N.A.
19. COUNTRY: N.A.
20. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: N.A.

14/RS

14-00000

SECTION XV MOTHER (Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Esparza Fermina 06
2. LIVING: ☐ YES ☒ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: Feb. 1951
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Pneumonia
5. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED (No., Street, City, State, Country): Willcox, Arizona 10
6. DATE OF BIRTH: 1874
7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Chihuahua Mexico, D.F.
8. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.
9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: Unknown 10
10. PLACE OF ENTRY: El Paso, Texa
11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): Mexican
12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: 11-24-1944 09
13. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): Bisbee, Arizona
14. OCCUPATION: Housewife
15. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed): N.A.
16. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED: N.A.
17. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To): N.A.
18. BRANCH OF SERVICE: N.A.
19. COUNTRY:
20. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: N.A.

SECTION XVI BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)

	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	5. LIVING	6. AGE
1	Mrs. Margaret Anderson 06	Sister	U.S.	1037 Olson St., El Paso, Texas 10	☒ YES ☐ NO	54
2	Mrs. Charlette Edelman 06	Sister	U.S.	N.A.	☐ YES ☒ NO	
3	Mrs. Mary Thanna Pauer 06	Sister	U.S.	228 Nogales, Santa Barbara, California 10	☒ YES ☐ NO	52
4	Mrs. Sherman Dent 06	Sister	U.S.	3228 East Almeria Rd., Phoenix, Arizona 10	☒ YES ☐ NO	51
5	Frank Wichtrich 06	Brother	U.S.	Los Angeles Area (Address Unknown)	☒ YES ☐ NO	50
6	Gus Wichtrich 06	Brother	U.S.		☐ YES ☒ NO	
7					☐ YES ☐ NO	
8					☐ YES ☐ NO	
9					☐ YES ☐ NO	

13/RJ

SECTION XVII FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Williams, John Newton OC
2. LIVING: YES X NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: 1944
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Stroke
5. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Deming, New Mexico
6. DATE OF BIRTH: Unknown
7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Rome, Georgia
8. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.
9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.
10. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.
11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)]: N.A.
12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N.A.
13. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): N.A.
14. OCCUPATION: cotton ginner
15. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): self

SECTION XVIII MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Williams, Lucy OC
2. LIVING: YES X NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: 1918
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Flu
5. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Tempe, Arizona
6. DATE OF BIRTH: Unknown
7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Virginia
8. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.
9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.
10. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.
11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)]: N.A.
12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N.A.
13. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): N.A.
14. OCCUPATION: House wife
15. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): N.A.

SECTION XIX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT N.A.

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

SECTION XIX CONTINUED TO PAGE 13

2/Rs

SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE

Any relatives I might have in Mexico or Germany are unknown.

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. CITIZENSHIP
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)

2

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. CITIZENSHIP
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)

3

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. CITIZENSHIP
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S., WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No. Street City and State)
Stanley T. Hiram 06		501 Look-Out Drive 10 Columbus, Georgia
Franklin, William C. 06	401 East 30th St. 10 Baltimore, Md.	
Teeter, Carl 06		521 West Lewis 10 Phoenix, Arizona
Harvil Richard 06	Pres. Univ. of Arizona 08 Tucson, Arizona 10	
Pistor, William 06	Univ. of Arizona Animal Science	

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY - NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No. Street, City and State)
Bechtold, Edward 06	29	1514 Conrad Sauer 10 Houston, Texas
Raven, William 06	P.A.A. - Miami, Florida	Rt. 2 - Box 307 10 Homestead = Florida
Scott, Bil 06		705 16 St N.W. 10 Albuquerque, N. Mexico
Pearson, George 06		8524 Carlsbad Way 10 Riverside, California
Alt, Ed 06		71 Silver Ridge Rd. 10 New Caanan, Conn.

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No. Street, City and State)
Pawley, Ted. 06		3468 Gunston Rd. 10 Alexandria, Va.
Aurand, Peter 06		219 Orchard Drive 10 Fairfax, Va.

24/RJ

SECTION XXII CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind *(Include membership in, or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country)* to which you belong or have belonged.

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
Sigma Chi	Univ of A., Tucson, Ariz 08, 10	1935	1939
Alpha Zeta	" " " "	"	"
Bob Cats	" " " "	"	"
"A" Club	" " " "	" "	"
American Club	Mexico, D.F.	1950	1955
American Club	" "	1963	
American Chamber of Commerce 29	" "	1950	1963
Knights of Columbus	" "		
St. Pat's Council	" "	1958	1963

SECTION XXIII RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	INCLUSIVE DATES	
	FROM	TO
Mexico, D.F., Mexico - 655 Sierra Leona 10	1949	1952
Mexico, D.F., Mexico - Toluca Highway, Klm 19 1/2 10 Cuajimalpa, D.F. 10	1952	1963
Panama Rd. P. Golf Heights 10	1946	1949

4/Rs

SECTION XXIV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF; OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, EXPLAIN

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Moderate

5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940

None.

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A *MINOR* TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XXV	PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(First-Middle-Last)* Mrs. Rachel Esther Wichtrich 06

2. RELATIONSHIP Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* Toluca Highway, Kim 19 1/2 Cuajimalpa Mexico D. F. 10

4. HOME PHONE NO. 20-77-47 06

5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico
Lucerna #78, Mexico, D. F. 29, 10

6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT. 35-96-53 06

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Mr or Mrs Ellen Claridge - 619-16th St., N.W. 06, 10
Albuquerque, New Mexico - (Sister in law)

6/RS

SECTION XXVI — **CERTIFICATION**

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES 8 May 1963	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT
3. SIGNED AT (City and State) Mexico City, Mexico	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Dorothy J. Hennick

07

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates. sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

Section XI - (9) - Shares in Ron Castillo S.A. - Mexico, D.F.
Shares in Telefonos de Mexico, S.A.

Section XXI (3) Only neighbors - remaining in area.

1/RS

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT — (Appendix I)

Listed below are names of organizations identified by the Attorney General, under his responsibility pursuant to Executive Order 10450, dated 27 April 1953, to list the names of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which he designates as Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or as having adopted or having shown a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Each applicant or employee and spouse (if any) must review the following list of organizations for certification purposes, and sign on the last page.

Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
Action Committee to Free Spain Now
Alabama People's Educational Association (see Communist Political Association)
American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
American Branch of the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions
American Christian Nationalist Party
American Committee for European Workers' Relief (see Socialist Workers Party)
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born
American Committee for Spanish Freedom
American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidjan, Inc.
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
American Committee to Survey Labor Conditions in Europe
American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee for National Unity
American Council on Soviet Relations
American Croatian Congress
American Jewish Labor Council
American League Against War and Fascism
American League for Peace and Democracy
American National Labor Party
American National Socialist League
American National Socialist Party
American Nationalist Party
American Patriots, Inc.
American Peace Crusade
American Peace Mobilization
American Poles for Peace
American Polish Labor Council
American Polish League
American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the United American Spanish Aid Committee)
American-Russian Fraternal Society
American Russian Institute, New York, also known as the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union
American Russian Institute, Philadelphia
American Russian Institute of San Francisco
American Russian Institute of Southern California, Los Angeles
American Slav Congress
American Women for Peace
American Youth Congress
American Youth for Democracy
Armenian Progressive League of America
Associated Klans of America
Association of Georgia Klans
Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party

Baltimore Forum
Benjamin Davis Freedom Committee
Black Dragon Society
Boston School for Marxist Studies, Boston, Massachusetts
Bridges-Robertson-Schmidt Defense Committee
Bulgarian American People's League of the United States of America

California Emergency Defense Committee
California Labor School, Inc., 321 Divisadero Street, San Francisco, California
Carpatho-Russian People's Society
Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent, also known as Central Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian Women
Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai)
Central Japanese Association of Southern California
Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance (Deutsche-Amerikanische Einheitsfront)
Cervantes Fraternal Society
China Welfare Appeal, Inc.
Chopin Cultural Center
Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges
Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)
Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder
Citizens Emergency Defense Conference
Citizens Protective League
Civil Liberties Sponsoring Committee of Pittsburgh
Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations, including:
  Civil Rights Congress for Texas
  Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York
Civil Rights Congress for Texas (see Civil Rights Congress)
Columbians
Comite Coordinador Pro Republica Espanola
Comite Pro Derechos Civiles
(See Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles)
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
Committee for Constitutional and Political Freedom
Committee for Nationalist Action
Committee for Peace and Brotherhood Festival in Philadelphia
Committee for the Defense of the Pittsburgh Six
Committee for the Negro in the Arts
Committee for the Protection of the Bill of Rights
Committee for World Youth Friendship and Cultural Exchange
Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland
(See Congress Against Discrimination; Maryland Congress Against Discrimination; Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland)
Committee to Aid the Fighting South
Committee to Defend Marie Richardson
Committee to Defend the Rights and Freedom of Pittsburgh's Political Prisoners
Committee to Uphold the Bill of Rights
Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas
Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates

Communist Political Association, its subdivisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates, including:
  Alabama People's Educational Association
  Florida Press and Educational League
  Oklahoma League for Political Education
  People's Educational and Press Association of Texas
  Virginia League for People's Education
Congress Against Discrimination
  (See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Congress of American Revolutionary Writers
Congress of American Women
Congress of the Unemployed
Connecticut Committee to Aid Victims of the Smith Act
Connecticut State Youth Conference
Council for Jobs, Relief and Housing
Council for Pan-American Democracy
Council of Greek Americans
Council on African Affairs
Croatian Benevolent Fraternity

Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of Japan or Military Art Society of Japan)
Daily Worker Press Club
Daniels Defense Committee
Dante Alighieri Society (between 1935 and 1940)
Dennis Defense Committee
Detroit Youth Assembly

East Bay Peace Committee
Elsinore Progressive League
Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees (founding body of the North American Spanish Aid Committee)
Everybody's Committee to Outlaw War

Families of the Baltimore Smith Act Victims
Families of the Smith Act Victims
Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U. S. A. Inc. (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani, Federazione degli Stati Uniti d'America)
Finnish-American Mutual Aid Society
Florida Press and Educational League (see Communist Political Association)
Frederick Douglass Educational Center
Freedom Stage, Inc.
Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)
Friends of the Soviet Union

Garibaldi American Fraternal Society
George Washington Carver School, New York City
German-American Bund (Amerikadeutscher Volksbund)
German-American Republican League
German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische Berufsgemeinschaft)
Guardian Club

Harlem Trade Union Council
Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee
Heimusha Kai, also known as Nokubei Heieki Gimusha Kai, Zaibei Nihonjin, Heiyaku Gimusha Kai, and Zaibei Heimusha Kai (Japanese Residing in America Military Conscripts Association)
Hellenic-American Brotherhood
Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)
Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society — a group of Japanese War Veterans)
Hokubei Zaigo Shoko Dan (North American Reserve Officers Association)
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy
Hungarian Brotherhood

Idaho Pension Union
Independent Party (Seattle, Washington)
  (See Independent People's Party)
Independent People's Party
  (See Independent Party)
Industrial Workers of the World
International Labor Defense
International Workers Order, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates
Japanese Association of America
Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)
Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940
Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City
Jewish Culture Society
Jewish People's Committee
Jewish People's Fraternal Order
Jikyoku Iinkai (The Committee for the Crisis)
Johnson-Forest Group
  (See Johnsonites)
Johnsonites
  (See Johnson-Forest Group)
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
Joint Council of Progressive Italian-Americans, Inc.
Joseph Weydemeyer School of Social Science, St. Louis, Missouri

Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of Japanese Ancestry who have returned to America after studying in Japan)
Knights of the White Camellia
Ku Klux Klan
Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League (Kyffhaeuser Bund), Kyffhaeuser Fellowship (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)
Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)

Labor Council for Negro Rights
Labor Research Association, Inc.
Labor Youth League
League for Common Sense
League of American Writers
Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts)

Macedonian-American People's League
Mario Morgantini Circle
Maritime Labor Committee to Defend Al Lannon
Maryland Congress Against Discrimination
  (See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Massachusetts Committee for the Bill of Rights
Massachusetts Minute Women for Peace (not connected with the Minute Women of the U. S. A., Inc.)
Maurice Braverman Defense Committee
Michigan Civil Rights Federation
Michigan Council for Peace
Michigan School of Social Science

Nanka Teikoku Gunvudan (Imperial Military Friends Group of Southern California War Veterans)
National Association of Mexican Americans (also known as Asociacion Nacional Mexico-Americana)
National Blue Star Mothers of America (not to be confused with the Blue Star Mothers of America organized in February 1942)
National Committee for Freedom of the Press
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners
National Committee to Win Amnesty for Smith Act Victims
National Committee to Win the Peace
National Conference on American Policy in China and the Far East (a Conference called by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy)
National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
National Labor Conference for Peace
National Negro Congress
National Negro Labor Council
Nationalist Action League

Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
Nature Friends of America (since 1935).
Negro Labor Victory Committee
New Committee for Publications
Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre)
North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy
North American Spanish Aid Committee
North Philadelphia Forum
Northwest Japanese Association

Ohio School of Social Sciences
Oklahoma Committee to Defend Political Prisoners
Oklahoma League for Political Education (see Communist Political Association)
Original Southern Klans, Incorporated

Pacific Northwest Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Palo Alto Peace Club
Partido del Pueblo of Panama (operating in the Canal Zone)
Peace Information Center
Peace Movement of Ethiopia
People's Drama, Inc.
People's Educational and Press Association of Texas (see Communist Political Association)
People's Educational Association (incorporated under name Los Angeles Educational Association, Inc.), also known as People's Educational Center, People's University, People's School
People's Institute of Applied Religion
Peoples Programs (Seattle, Washington)
People's Radio Foundation, Inc.
People's Rights Party
Philadelphia Labor Committee for Negro Rights
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art
Photo League (New York City)
Pittsburgh Arts Club
Political Prisoners' Welfare Committee
Polonia Society of the IWO
Progressive German-Americans, also known as Progressive German-Americans of Chicago
Proletarian Party of America
Protestant War Veterans of the United States, Inc.
Provisional Committee of Citizens for Peace, Southwest Area
Provisional Committee on Latin American Affairs
Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland
(See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles (CLC)
(See Comite Pro Derechos Civiles)
Puertorriquenos Unidos (Puerto Ricans United)

Quad City Committee for Peace
Queensbridge Tenants League

Revolutionary Workers League
Romanian-American Fraternal Society
Russian American Society, Inc.

Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association — composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War)
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts
Santa Barbara Peace Forum
Schappes Defense Committee
Schneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee
School of Jewish Studies, New York City
Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Serbian-American Fraternal Society
Serbian Vidovdan Council
Shinto Temples (limited to State Shinto, abolished in 1945)
Silver Shirt Legion of America
Slavic Council of Southern California
Slovak Workers Society
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee for European Workers' Relief
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
Southern Negro Youth Congress
Suiko Sha (Reserve Officers Association, Los Angeles)
Syracuse Women for Peace

Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York
Trade Union Committee for Peace
(See Trade Unionists for Peace)
Trade Unionists for Peace
(See Trade Unionists for Peace)
Tri-State Negro Trade Union Council

Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union
Union of American Croatians
Union of New York Veterans
United American Spanish Aid Committee
United Committee of Jewish Societies and Landsmanschaft Federations, also known as Coordination Committee of Jewish Landsmanschaften and Fraternal Organizations
United Committee of South Slavic Americans
United Defense Council of Southern California
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization
United May Day Committee
United Negro and Allied Veterans of America

Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York (see Civil Rights Congress)
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Virginia League for People's Education (see Communist Political Association)
Voice of Freedom Committee

Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey
Washington Bookshop Association
Washington Committee for Democratic Action
Washington Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights
Washington Commonwealth Federation
Washington Pension Union
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation
Workers Alliance (since April 1936)

Yiddisher Kultur Farband
Young Communist League
Yugoslav-American Cooperative Home, Inc.
Yugoslav Seamen's Club, Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I certify that I have read the names of the above listed organizations.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, I am not, nor have I been a member of, contributed to, received literature from, signed petitions of or in behalf of, or attended meetings of any organization listed above, or any organization outside the United States espousing Communist, Fascist, Totalitarian or Nazi causes, except as noted below.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, none of my close relatives are, nor have ever been members of, contributed to, received literature from, signed petitions of or in behalf of, or attended meetings of any such organizations, except as noted below.

INSTRUCTIONS

For the purpose of this certification, if an applicant or employee is completing this form, the term "close relative" will include spouse, children, parents, brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts. "Close relatives" of the spouse, for this purpose, will include children, parents, brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts.

If there are exceptions to this certification, set forth below under Remarks all pertinent information concerning the nature and extent of your activities or those of your close relatives in such organizations, including the names of the organizations, dates of membership, meetings attended, titles of positions held, amounts and dates of contributions, nature of petitions signed falling within the meaning of the above certification and circumstances thereof, titles and authors of literature received, and dates on which received.

In exceptions concerning relatives, include only such information presently known to you or available from your own records.

If necessary, use additional sheets and sign each sheet. Write none if there are no exceptions.

REMARKS: To be completed by Spouse	REMARKS: To be completed by Applicant or Employee
None	None
Date 2-17-63	Date 2-17-63
Signature of Spouse 06	Signature of Applicant or Employee 03
Address — City and State Mexico	Address — City and State [illegible] 06
Witness	Witness Dudley J Kennick
Address — City and State	Address — City and State Mexico, D F Mexico

3/Rs

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

LIRING-3 NEXT 286-3-B IV

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LIRING-3 VOL IV
201-0798301

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 Aug 1967 - 28 Nov 1968

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO

ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
17 JUL 1978		Edwin J. Lopez	Edwin J. Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 22 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION: WH6 ☐ RID COPY INFO: FILE VR, DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, DDP, ... 3

dcs/sco

SECRET 232122Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6228

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PERUMEN LIRING-3

27 Nov 68 IN 43465

MERTZ

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 3159 (1*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9739 (IN 40612)

1. LIRING-3 WRITTEN REPORT PER LIRING-9 REQUEST WAS REVIEWED BY STATION WITH ASSISTANCE LEONARD S. TORMET. REPORT LIMITED TO ACTUAL EXPERIENCES WHILE INCARCERATED GUATEMALA CITY AND INFORMATION ACTUALLY RECEIVED FROM FAR MEMBERS IN SAME JAIL. LIRING-3 BRIEFED TO DECLARE HIMSELF READY HELP GUAT REBELS FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS AND AT SAME TIME IMPLY HE IN NEED MATERIAL HELP AFTER LONG IMPRISONMENT.

2. LIRING-9 WAS WAITING AT LIRING GATE 1732 HOURS WHEN LIRING-3 ARRIVED WITH REPORT. MEETING HELD IN BACK ROOM CONSULATE AND LIMITED TO LIRING-3 AND LIRING-9. FOLL HIGH POINTS THIS MEETING:

A. LIRING-9 DID NOT READ REPORT BUT HAD LIRING-3 GIVE HIM MAIN POINTS ORALLY. APPEARED MOST INTERESTED IN LIRING-3 STATEMENTS ON HOW GUAT REBELS FEEL TOWARDS PBRUMEN. NODDED WHEN LIRING-3 STATED WHAT REBELS NEED IS ADEQUATRE FUNDS NOT ADDITIONAL

*NO RECORD IN C/S 28NOV 68 0300Z.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 6228 S E C R E T

MEN (MEANING UDVISORS).

B. LIRING-3 EXPLAINED HE ANARCHIST, LEFTIST, IDELAIST AND FELT TRUE REVOLUTION GOING ON GUATEMALA. THIS WHY HE INTERESTED IN HELPING GUAT REBELS ANY WAY POSSIBLE. THIS SEEMED SATISFY LIRING-9.

C. LIRING-9 AGAIN MENTIONED TRIP TO HIS COUNTRY FOR LIRING-3 AND WIFE AND AGREED ARRANGE FOR PASSAGE LIRING-4 ON PERUMEN SHIP TO CANADA SO LIRING-4 COULD SEE FATHER WHO NEW YORK RESIDENT AND ILL. LIRING-9 ADAMANT LIRING-4 SHOULD NOT SEEK VISA TO UNITED STATES AS THIS WOULD EXPOSE HER TO "GRILLING" BY LOCAL EMBASSY.

D. LIRING-9 MADE VAGUE PROMISES HELP LIRING-3 IN CURRENT DIFFICULT SITUATION ALTHOUGH NO FINANCIAL HELP MENTIONED.

E. LIRING-3 WAS REQUESTED TO RETURN TO LIRING 4 DEC SECOND FOR FUTHER TALKS. LIRING-9 WAS SHOWN LETTERS REVENTLY RECEIVED BY LIRING-3 FROM FAR CONTACTS IS GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 DECLINEDO HOWEVER TO LET HIM KEEP THEM AND LIRING-9 MADE NO ATTEMPT COPY THEM.

3. POUCHING LIRING-3 REPORT. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. APPRECIATE TORMET VISIT AND ASSISTANCE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

SECRET

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CSDO:

VANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT 2240 Z

SSEM BY 31 PER

TION

422 clwh6

☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR clrilsa, cslos, clwhcx, ~~[illegible]~~, clses

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 232206Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9739

LIRING/3

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT PERUMEN

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN

23 Nov 68 IN 40612

B. DIRECTOR 56469

1. LEONARD S. TORMET (IDEN) GUATEMALA CITY CASE OFFICER TO TRAVEL MEXICO CITY FOR REF DISCUSSIONS. TORMET ATTEMPTING BOOK PASSAGE PAN AM FLT 502, 24 NOV. WILL ADVISE FIRM ETA BY CABLE 24 NOV. REQUEST MEET AND ACCOMODATE.

2. FILE: 201-798301

S E C R E T

SECRET

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CS/DO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

OVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

Y AT 2340 Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

PRECEDENCE

SSEM BY 21 PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CTION

421 cl/wh 6

☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR, c/ci/so, cs/dc, c/wh/oc, c/cs 2, c/csps

S E C R E T 232215Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9748

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN

REF: GUATEMALA CITY 9733 (IN 40612

23Nov68 IN 40611

IDEN: BARRY G. ROYDEN.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY D 3355 Z

DISSEM BY 33

ACTION 36 C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PRECEDENCE

INFO FILE VR. C/RI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, C/CI, C/CI/PS, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3, C/CS/SCO

SECRET 232321Z NOV 63 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9736

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ROUTINE JMCOBRA

RYBAT/PERUMEN/LIRING-3

22 Nov 63 IN 40291

REF: MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN *)

1. BECAUSE LIRING-3 COULD NOT LOGICALLY HAVE GAINED DETAILED INSIGHT INTO INSURGENCY MOVEMENT IN GUATEMALA DURING ENCARCERATION, DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY FOR GUATEMALA CITY STATION OFFICER PROVIDE EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED BRIEFING FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT. SUGGEST FOLLOWING GENERAL GUIDELINES, SUBJECT TO HQS APPROVAL, WHICH OSTENSIBILY TO BE IMPRESSIONS OF LIRING-3 BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH FAR LEADERS WHILE IN JAIL.

A. EMPHASIZE FRAGMENTATION, DISORGANIZATION AND COMPETITION OF INSURGENT FORCES HAVE SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED INSURGENT MOVEMENT, WHICH NOW STAGNANT.

B. LEADERSHIP IS OBVIOUSLY IMMATURE AND INCAPABLE OF ORGANIZING AN EFFECTIVE MOVEMENT.

C. ACCORDING ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA" FAR FUNDS MISUSED BY LEADERS IN "NON-REVOLUTIONARY WAYS."

D. RECENT FAR TERRORISM, WHICH FOR MOST PART ILL-CONCEIVED AND NOT PART OF OVERALL STRATEGY, HAS WEAKENED MOVEMENT THROUGH

*NO RECORD IN C/S 23 NOV 68 0400Z.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9736

LOSSES FROM GOG RETALIATION. GOG ABLE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IMPULSIVE ACTIONS BY FAR MEMBERS WHO FAILED MAKE ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS BEFOREHAND.

E. ESSENTIAL THAT NEW LEADERSHIP CADRE BE FOUND TO REPLACE PRESENT COMMAND IF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TO SUCCEED.

2. FYI: OBJECTIVE OF ABOVE IS TO PAINT AS DISMAL A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE FOR CUBANS, AND TO SUGGEST THAT LATTER IMPOSE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT INSURGENT LEADERSHIP. FEEL THAT ANY ATTEMPT BY CUBANS TO REPLACE CURRENT LEADERSHIP WOULD FURTHER FRACTIONALIZE AND DEMORALIZE INSURGENTS.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-798301.

SECRET

14-00000

CA TARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
CSDO

ASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 10
SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY: 06 AT 6140 Z
DISSEM BY 28 PER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

PRECEDENCE
SS
RR

ACTION
C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY
359
INFO
FILE VR C/CI/SD CS/DO C/WH/COG 5 RG
C/CI, C/FI2

S E C R E T 230230Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8159

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY,DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7900 [IN 25321]

22 Nov 68 IN 40273

1. DURING LONG DISCUSSION LIRING-9 HAD AT LIRING WITH LIRING-3 ON 21 NOV LIRING-9 ASKED LIRING-3 PREPARE DETAILED WRITTEN REPORT DUE 1730 HOURS 25 NOV ON HIS EXPERIENCES GUATEMALA AND HIS CONTACTS WITH FAR PERSONALITIES WHILE INCARCERATED. WHEN LIRING-3 MENTIONED LACK ADEQUATE PBRUMEN SUPPORT LIRING-9 EXCITEDLY AGREED STATING HIS CAPITAL DID NOT UNDERSTAND FAR AND HAD DONE MANY THINGS ~~WOING~~ WRONG. HE ADDED LIRING-3 SHOULD POINT OUT ON PAPER HOW PBRUMEN HAD FAILED IN GUATEMALA AND GIVE HIS OPINION OF WHAT NEEDED. LIRING-9 ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT LIRING-3 KNOWS OF SQUABBLE BETWEEN GUAT LEFTISTS. AMONG MANY OTHER QUESTIONS LIRING-9 WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER JEANETTE FIRK HAD FAR MISSION BEFORE HER DEATH.

2. LIRING-9 STATED CHIEF LIRING "DOES NOT HAVE VERY MUCH TO DO WITH THESE THINGS" (CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES IN GUATEMALA) AND "HIS OPINION DOES NOT MATTER." SAID WOULD ARRANGE FOR

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ________ AT ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY________ PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 S E C R E T

MEETING AT 1730 ON 25 NOV WITH "SOME MY COLLEAGUES" SO CAN DISCUSS LIRING-3 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS AT LENGTH " IN BETTER PLACE FOR PRIVATE TALK." WHEN LIRING-3 EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT AMPLIFY HIS REPORT IN PERSON IN PBRUMEN CAPITAL, LIRING-9 SUGGESTED HE MIGHT BE INVITED FOR CULTURAL EXPOSITION TO MAKE TRIP APPEAR INNOCUOUS AND OFFERED TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. REQUEST GUAT CITY STATION OFFICER FAMILIAR WITH FAR/PGT OP PROCEED MEXICO CITY MORNING 23 NOV TO DISCUSS ABOVE AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT TO LIRING. IN ADDITION TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE LIRING-3 COULD ATTRIBUTE INFO WHICH WOFIRM MIGHT WANT REACH PBRUMENERS TO NOW DEAD JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO (LOPEZ) RUIZ WITH WHOM HAD CONTACT IN JAIL. PLS ADVISE ETA BY IMMEDIATE. WILL MEET AT AIRPORT BUT IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG OFFICER SHOULD PHONE IDEN.

4. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

RYBAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 19

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

B

C/SDO

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: 66 AT 0140 Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

DISSEM BY 28 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

PRECEDENCE

PP

ACTION C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

358

INFO FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, CS/DO, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

		6	
2		7	
		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 230031Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8160

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY ,DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

DIRECTOR

22 Nov 68 IN 40270

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 8159 [IN 40273]

1. ILEN IS FRANCIS SHERRY, PHONE NO. 20-76-66.

2. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET 16

ORIG: Marvin Francis/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 1 Nov 68

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 41 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

SECRET

01 26 12Z [illegible]

CITE DIRECTOR 47408

TO MEXICO CITY [redacted] INFO: GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 23221)*

1. SUBJECT TO GUATEMALA STATION CONCURRENCE, WE BELIEVE LIRING/3 SHOULD BE CANDID WITH LIRING/10 AND TELL HIM WHAT AND AS MUCH AS HE WANTS TO KNOW. WE FEEL IF LIRING/3 ATTEMPTED WITHHOLD OR DISTORT DETAILS HIS IMPRISONMENT, IT COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO OPERATION SINCE LIRING/10 PROBABLY COULD CHECK OTHER SOURCES FOR ACCURACY.

2. THERE NO URGENCY FOR LIRING/3 MAKE TRIP TO PBRUMEN. WE BELIEVE IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR HIM TO REMAIN MEXICO AND ATTEMPT BECOME INVOLVED LOCAL PBRUMEN/GUATEMALA EXILE ACTIVITIES. IF, HOWEVER, LIRING/10 SUGGESTS LIRING/3 GO PBRUMEN, HE SHOULD NOT HESITATE DO SO.

3. DEFER TO GUATEMALA CITY FOR IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE WAR NAMES.

4. FILE 50-6-141/3, 201-798301 AND 201-776733.

END OF MESSAGE

Calvin M. Smyth
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

WH/COG/OPS
WH/2/G

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: M. Francis/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 6 November 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

OPS | OS
EV | TC
PP | SS
ER |

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 3 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: c/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR 5 SA c 6 COG/REG

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 48471

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7945 (IN 27533)*

~~File~~
File LIRING-3

1. HQS TRACES NEGATIVE RE RAFAEL ARGUETA AND ENRIQUE PUENTE.

2. FILE 201-248917, 201-798301 AND 50-9-11.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *LIRING/3 received brief typewritten unsigned letter which expressed happiness his release from Guatemala jail. Envelope was from Enrique Puente Men's Store in Guatemala City and writer identified self as Rafael Argueta.

WH/COG/OPS

WH/2/G

Calvin M. ... for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 18 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐

ACTION C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR [illegible]

OPS	OS
EV	TC
PP	SS
RR	
SA	COG REG

Fi6 LIRING/3

SECRET 250255Z NOV 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 7945

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

5Nov63 IN27533

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 7903 (IN 25321)

1. LIRING-3 RECEIVED BRIEF TYPEWRITTEN UNSIGNED LETTER DATED 22 OCT FROM "RAFAEL ARGUETA A." LETTER WHICH CONTAINS MANY TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS EXPRESSED HAPPINESS LIRING-3 FINALLY RELEASED AND HOPED HE WILL SOON RECOVER FROM THE "GRAN ANGUSTIA" CAUSED BY "MY COUNTRY." WRITER CONCLUDED WITH APOLOGIES FOR MISTAKES IN ORTHOGRAPHY AND EXPRESSED DESIRE SEE LIRING-3 AGAIN. ASKED LIRING-3 TO REPLY TO HIM AT FOLLOWING ADDRESS: 2 AVE 27, 57, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. RATHER THAN TO ONE APPEARING AS RETURN ADDRESS ON ENVELOPE.

2. ENVELOPE IS AIRMAIL STATIONERY "LA DALIA AZUL, ENRIQUE PUENTE C, ARTICULOS PARA CABALLEROS, 6A AVENIDA Y 10A CALLE, TEL: 44-72, GUATEMALA, C.U." WITH RETURN ADDRESS ON BACK: RAFAEL ARGUETA A., 11 AV. 25 22, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. ENVELOPE IS POSTMARKED 22 OCTOBER 1963 AND IS ADDRESSED TO LIRING-3 AT CALLE HAVRE 7, COL. JUAREZ, MEXICO, D.F. (SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICANA WHICH LIRING-3 HAD GIVEN TO JUAN AND MIGUEL LEON BARRIOS AS BEST

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7945 SECRET

ADDRESS TO USE IF ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH HIM.)

3. LIRING-3 COMMENTED LETTER PROBABLY SIMPLY DESIGNED CHECK NEW COMMO CHANNEL. STATED HE HAS NEVER HEARD OF NAME RAFAEL ARGUETA A AND ASSUMES IT ALIAS OR NOTIONAL LETTER DROP. PLANS REPLY IMMEDIATELY ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT AND ASKING "ARGUETA" WRITE NEXT LETTER DIRECTLY TO APARTMENT LIRING-4 RENTED DURING LIRING-3 ABSENCE. LIRING-3 WILL ASK FRIENDS TO EXPEDITE CONTACT "SINCE HE PLANNING TRAVEL".

4. IS THERE SOME WAY GUATEMALA CITY STATION CAN CHECK ON PARA 1 ADDRESS WITHOUT AT LEAST FOR MOMENT MAKING ON SPOT CHECK OR USING LIAISON?

5. FILE 201-245917, 201-792331.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER #

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. C/RISD, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI

7181

S E C R E T 041649Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9650 IN 27296
4 NOV
9650 d/

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIR-47408

B. MEXICO CITY-7923 (425321)

f/6 Liring-3

1. AGREE REFERENCE A.

2. TRACES ON PERSONS MENTIONED REF B AS FOLLOWS:

A. JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO (LOPEZ) RUIZ, AKA JORGE HERNANDEZ RIVAS, AKA "CEBOLLA" - FAR MEMBER ARRESTED 9 MARCH 1968 AND EXECUTED LATE APRIL 1968.

B. JUAN JOSE AND MIGUEL ANGEL DE (LEON) BARRIOS, BOTH WITH VARIOUS ALIASES, BROTHERS WHO TRAVELED SOVIET UNION 1964, MEMBERS OF FAR, ARRESTED LATE MARCH 1968, BELIEVED SENT TO PAVON PENAL FARM 26 APRIL 1968 AND STILL SERVING SENTENCE.

C. FRANCISCO (RAMIREZ) CORADO - PGT LEADER ARRESTED MAY 1967 AND RELEASED LATE AUGUST 1968.

D. JULIO CESAR (MACIAS) MAYORA, AKA "CESAR MONTES" - FAR LEADER WHOSE CURRENT LOCATION UNKNOWN.

E. "PAVEL" - NO TRACES.

3. STATION WILL DISCUSS LIRING-3 CASE AT ANYTIME CONVENIENT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	1 6 2 7 3 8 4 9 5 10
BY: AT:	INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO	
	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.	
	X-REF TO FILE NO.	
DISSEM BY: PER	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.	
ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE. VR.	

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9652 S E C R E T

OTHER PARTIES.

4. DEFER FILE#

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	33 **SECRET** (When Filled In)	GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION (17)	6
	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		OPS · 8 CS
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO		EV · 9 TC · 10
BY ______ AT ______ Z	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______		PP · SS
DISSEM BY 33 PER ______	X-REF TO FILE NO. ______		RR
	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH		DESTROY · SA · CCS REG
ACTION C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE, VR, C/R/SD, C/(H)CCG 5,		

1554

S E C R E T 012132Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7922

Fi6 LIRING/3

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

1 Nov 68 IN 25321

1. ROWTON REESTABLISHED CONTACT LIRING-3 29 OCT AND BEGAN DETAILED DEBRIEFING EVENING SAME DAY. ROWTON ALLEDGED HE ARRANGED RELEASE THROUGH BROTHER OF BUSINESS CONTACT WHO COLONEL GNA. LIRING-3, WHO ACCEPTED STORY WITHOUT QUESTION, STATED HE UNDERSTOOD ROWTON COULD NOT HAVE ARRANGED EARLY RELEASE FOR OBVIOUS SECURITY REASONS AND FELT ALMOST INTOLERABLE SUFFERING WORTH PAIN SINCE HAS COME OUT IN BEST POSSIBLE POSITION VISA-A-VIS FAR AS WELL AS PBRUMEN.

2. LIRING-3 HAS BEGUN GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ARREST, DETENTION AND CONTACTS ESTABLISHED DURING AND AFTER RELEASE. ASKED ROWTON KEEP SENSITIVE POINTS IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. PARTICULARLY FROM LIRING-4, WHOM FEELS WOULD NOT APPROVE HIS CONTINUED POLITICAL ACTIVITY EVEN ON BEHALF ROWTON. HIGHLIGHTS DEBRIEFING FOLLOW:

A. ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA". FAR OFFICIAL, WHO SHARED CELL BLOCK 402 WITH LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD SENT REPORT ~~OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD DSENT REPOR~~ OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRIN-3 AND PLACING BLAME ON FRANCISCO

Lopes [illegible]

CARLOS RAUL GONZALEZ
mexi 7890

SECRET

Javier contreras
Hector Sanchez Gonzalez
mex 7744
22 oct 18686

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

DISSEM BY PER

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7922 S E C R E T

LARA AND CARLOS PERSABAL TO FAR HDQS THROUGH HIS MOTHER WHO ALLOWED TO VISIT HIM PRIOR TO HIS EXECUTION.

B. BROTHERS JUAN AND MIGUEL (LEON) BARRIOS, WHO CLAIMED TO BE G-2 FAR, WHO ALSO SHARED CELLBLOCK AND REMAINED IN CLOSE CONTACT LIRING-3 THROUGHOUT HIS DETENTION, SHOWED LIRING-3 REPORT THEY HAD RECEIVED JULY FROM "RELIABLE FAR SOURCES MEXICO" DESCRIBING LIRING-3 AS "ANARQUICO, SIN PARTIDO, CONDUCTA BUENA, CONFIABLE, RESPONSABLE PERO DIFICIL CONTROLAR." FOLLOWING THIS GENERALLY FAVORABLE REPORT JUAN AND MIGUEL (LEON) BARRIOS DISCUSSED FAR SITUATION FREELY WITH LIRING-3 AND ARRANGED FOR SECRET CONTACT WITH FAR REPRESENTATIVE MEXICO "PAVEL". ALSO TOLD LIRING-3 MONTES COMPLETELY STRIPPED OF POWER SINCE HAD IN FACT DESERTED REVOLUTION BY REMAINING OUTSIDE COUNTRY FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. MONTES CURRENTLY MEXICO WHERE EXPECTED REMAIN. FAR HAS COMPLETELY BROKEN WITH GUAT CP. THIS ACCORDING LIRING-3 REFLECTED IN COOLNESS EVIDENT BETWEEN LEON BROTHERS AND FRANCISCO CORADO, CP RESPONSIBLE IN PAVON PRISON. FAR HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVING FINANCIAL OR MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM PBRUMEN FOR PAST SIX MONTHS SINCE REFUSAL FAR ACCEPT PBRUMEN TERMS (SUPERVISION PBRUMEN EXPERTS, FAVORED POSITION

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

BY ______ AT ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 7922 SECRET

FAR MEMBERS TRAINED IN PBRUMEN) ALL FUNDS (IN PAST CHANNELED THROUGH GUAT CP ETC).

3. LIRING -3 TOLD ROWTON HE INSTRUCTED LEON BROTHERS HAVE "PAVEL" GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM (DETERMINE HIS ADDRESS) THROUGH SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICAN BY POSING AS PERSON REPRESENTING "VILETA" WHO INTERESTED IN BUYING LIRING-3 WATERCOLORS (DONE IN PRISON). LIRING-3 PLANS FOR COVER PURPOSES WORK IN SIQUEIROS STUDIO CUERNAVACA AND ARRANGE SOONEST BELLAS ARTES SPONSORED EXPOSTION HIS LATEST PAINTINGS.

4. WILL POUCH COMPLETE LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING AS SOON IN COMPLETED. STATION HOPES LIRING AND PARTICULARLY LIRING-10 WILL TRY ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AS HE CAN BE EXPECTED HAVE INFO OF VALUE TO PBRUMEN REGIME. STATION INTENDS HAVE LIRING -3 TELL LIRING-10 ENOUGH TO WET HIS APPETITE AND CONVINCE HIM LIRING-3 SHOULD BE DEBRIEFED AT SOME LENGTH. LIRING-3 WOULD TELL (LIRING 10) HE WILLING OUTLINE DETAILS HIS ORDEAL INCLUDING INFO "PBRUMENS SHOULD KNOW" BUT ONLY TO HIGH PBRUMEN FUNCTIONARY AND IN PBRUMEN. PRIOR TO POSSIBLE LIRING-3 TRIP PBRUMEN, SUGGEST HQS, GUATEMALA CITY AND MEXICO CITY STATIONS DETERMINE WHAT CAN BE PASSED PBRUMENS. CONFERENCE IN GUATEMALA

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 7922 S E C R E T

CITY BETWEEN ROWTON, FRADYER AND GUAT CITY STATION REPS MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THIS CONNECTION.

5. ASSUME GUAT NAMES MENTIONED ABOVE ARE "WAR NAMES". CAN GUATEMALA CITY SHED SOME LIGHT THEIR IDENTITIES.

6. FILE 201-750301.

SECRET

Guat

LIRING/3

ASSUME THAT HE will NOT
AllUDE method of Release & Routons
Alleged Aid.
AS CUBANS CAN check on everything
prefer he not hold back any info

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT:

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY: PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION (926) WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR. WH/COG 8, RI/AN, PI, CI/OPS, FI 2

S E C R E T 241826Z OCT 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY (Mexi) 9614

24 OCT 68 IN 20246

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LIRING/3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7775 (IN 19623)

1. ESMICA/13 REPORTED LIRING/3 AND COMPANION DEPARTED GUATEMALA 18 OCTOBER 1968 VIA TACA FLIGHT 210 FOR MEXICO CITY. THEY ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED ESCORT DIRECTLY FROM PRISON FARM TO AIRPORT.

2. FILE: 201-248917.

S E C R E T

AN
AB X
IX
FS X
RX
IP
FI

MICROFILMED
NOV 13 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Liring-3
24 OCT 68
201-798301

B 201-248917

SECRET CS COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ USED

INFO FILE VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS

1	OPS	5	OS
3	EVY	7	C
4	RP	8	SS
UNIT		TIME	BY
RR			
SA		COG REG	

S E C R E T 242228Z [illegible] CITE MEXICO CITY 7775 24 OCT 68 IN 19623

GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

[illegible] LIRING-3

File LIRING-3 4 [illegible] file

REFS A. MEXICO CITY [illegible] (~06501)

B. GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (u 16895)

1. WOULD APPRECIATE DISCREET EFFORT DETERMINE WHETHER LIRING-3 FREED. IF NOT YET RELEASED WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHEN HE SCHEDULED BE AND HOW WILL RETURN MEXICO.

2. TO FACILITATE SUBSEQUENT CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AND OPEN DOOR TO POSSIBLE CLAIM HE INSTRUMENTAL IN LIRING-3 RELEASE STATION PLANNING HAVE ROWTON SEND LIRING-3 LETTER UNDER DOUBLE ENVELOPE VIA MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LETTER ON MEXICAN BELLAS ARTES OR OTHER SUITABLE STATIONERY WILL MENTION ROWTON [illegible] UNDERSTANDABLE TO LIRING-3. UNABLE CONTACT LIRING-3 WIFE [illegible] FOR [illegible]. LETTER WILL HINT AT IMMINENT RELEASE AND ASK LIRING-3 PHONE ROWTON ANSWERING SERVICE AS SOON AS RETURNS MEXICO.

3. FOR DIRECTOR: ROWTON WHO [illegible] ~~AT THIS POINT~~ RECONTACT LIRING-3 THROUGH ARTIST FRIENDS OR CUBANS SO FAR UNABLE REESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM.

4. FILE 201-[illegible]

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 49 PER RYBAT

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐

INFO FILE VR C/RI/SD, C/WH/6, C/CI, C/FI

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

OPS
CS
TC
SS
PP
RR
SA
CS REG

SECRET 042307Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7486

File LIRING-3

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

5 OCT 68 IN 06501

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 36584

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9517 (IN 02560)

C. HMMA 35:22 PARA 5

1. STATION WISHES TO REITERATE ONCE MORE ITS RELUCTANCE TO SOMEHOW TRY TO FREE LIRING-3 FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA CITY BY GOING TO LIAISON AND EXPOSING HIS WOFIRM CONNECTION. MEXICO CITY STATION IN AGREEMENT WITH REF B STATEMENT THAT MORE TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE IF LIRING-3 WILL NOT BE RELEASED IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE WITHOUT INDICATING WOFIRM INTEREST. AS STATED IN REF C SUCH INDICATION IF IT LEAKED (AND STATION ASSUMES THIS POSSIBLE IN GUATEMALA) OR IF IT ATTRACTED SUSPICION GUAT REBELS, MEXICAN LEFTISTS OR PBRUMENERS WOULD RENDER FURTHER OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4 PROBLEMATIC. IT MIGHT EVEN PROMPT GUAT REBELS TO TAKE REPRISALS AGAINST LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4. FURTHERMORE STATION NOT AT ALL SURE THAT FREEING LIRING-3 THROUGH INTERVENTION LIAISON MIGHT NOT JEOPARDIZE ROWTON SECURITY.

2. IF LIRING-3 RELEASED AFTER NORMAL TRIAL WITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE STATION ASSUMES BOTH HE AND LIRING-4

SECRET

14-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		
BY ______ AT ______ Z	INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO		
	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______		
	X-REF TO FILE NO. ______		
DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐	DESTROY ☐ SIG.	
ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE VR.		

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7486 S E C R E T

WILL HAVE INCREASED OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL. IF LIRING-3 NOT RELEASED IN NEAR FUTURE LIRING-4 MAY FIND ONLY WAY OUT HER CURRENT PREDICAMENT IS AT LEAST TEMPORARY RETURN TO PERUMEN. SHE MIGHT AT THAT POINT BE AMENABLE UNDERTAKE MISSION SIMILAR TO THAT SHE PREVIOUSLY AGREEABLE ATTEMPT FOR WOFIRM.

[illegible]

3. STATION WOULD NATURALLY BE WILLING RE-EXAMINE ITS POSITION RE LIRING-3 IF GUATEMALA CITY STATION COULD DETERMINE BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPROACH OF JUDGE THROUGH LIAISON WOULD NOT LEAK. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION GIVE SUCH ASSURANCE?

4. FILE 201-798381.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

3E SECRET

ORIG: ETsikerdanos/jmw
UNIT: DC/WH/1
EXT: 7375
DATE: 26 Sept 68

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10 CC

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. RR

CONF: c/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR c/WH/COG 5, c/CA, c/FI 2, c/RI/SD

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

26 22 37z SEP 68

CITE DIRECTOR 36584

TO ~~MEXICO CITY~~, GUATEMALA CITY

File [redacted] LIRING 4 or 3

RYBAT TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7335 (IN 99476)*

1. ROWTON RETURN STILL UNCERTAIN PENDING RESOLUTION DEVELOPMENT ACCESS TO AMCAGE/1.

2. RE LIRING/4, ROWTON COULD SEND MONEY OSTENSIBLY FROM L/4'S FATHER IN NEW YORK TO BAIL HER OUT OF PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION, BUT THIS WOULD BE ONLY TEMPORARY SOLUTION IN ADDITION INHERENT SECURITY RISKS (FATHER IS REPORTEDLY HOSPITALIZED AND NOT IN POSITION PROVIDE FINANCIAL HELP AT THIS TIME). L/4'S REFUGE IN LIRING ESTABLISHMENT, ON OTHER HAND, WHICH ROWTON COULD NOT CONVINCE HER TO TAKE AS LONG AS HE WAS GIVING HER MONEY, WILL SERVE TO IMPROVE HER ACCESS AND MAY LEAD TO REPATRIATION. ROWTON FEELS LATTER EVENTUALITY LIKELY ONLY IN EVENT HIS CONTINUED FAILURE RECONTACT HER SINCE L/4 WOULD POSSIBLY HAVE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE. IN THAT CASE, REBRIEFING AND RESUPPLY S/W PRECLUDED PRIOR DEPARTURE. ROWTON COULD DEBRIEF L/4 UPON HER RETURN MEXICO IF AND WHEN LIRING/3 RELEASED FROM PRISON AND CONTACT REESTABLISHED.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 36584

TO

3. FOR GUATEMALA: WOULD APPRECIATE RECOMMENDATIONS RE POSSIBILITY EARLY RELEASE OF LIRING/3 AND ASSOCIATE FROM JAIL. AWARE WOFIRM INTEREST MUST BE SHOWN AT HIGH LEVEL BUT FEEL GUAT OFFICIALS COULD ALLEGE MEXICAN GOVT INTEREST TO THEIR SUBORDINATES AS BASIS OF RELEASE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

END OF MESSAGE

* RYBAT

WH/COG

William V. Broe
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/2/~~Guatemala~~

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 28 PER ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR, C/RI/SD, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CCS 2, C/CSPS

S E C R E T 252131Z SEP 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7335

DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC 25 SEP 68 IN 39476

1. LIONION MONITORING LISAMPAN REPORTED LIRING-4 ENTERED LIRING MORNING 25 SEPTEMBER. REQUESTED LIRING FURNISH PLACE TO STAY BECAUSE SHE UNABLE FIND WORK THIS NOT ABLE PAY FOR LODGING. SAID WOULD STAY LIRING UNTIL PROBLEM SOLVED.

2. WISH BRING ABOVE ATTENTION ROWTON. ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE INFO ROWTON TRAVEL PLANS AND ETA STATION.

3. FILE 201-798301

S E C R E T

File LIRING-4

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

SEP 30 11 03 PM '68

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT:

ACTION COPY

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY: PER

ACTION

C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, C/WH6, C/RI/SD, C/CI, TFT2

SECRET 301842Z SEP 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8517 IN 02560 Cuino

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC LIRING

1. GUATEMALA CITY STATION IS WILLING TO USE ITS LIAISON RELATIONSHIP IN ANY WAY NECESSARY TO SUPPORT UNILATERAL WOFIRM OPERATIONS. NEVERTHELESS IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT AFTER 6 MONTHS, REVEALING WOFIRM INTEREST IN LIRING-3 IS SOMEWHAT AWKWARD. WHILE GUATEMALAN CITY STATION IS NOT FULLY COGNIZANT OF ALL OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS LIRING-4 OPERATION AND ITS VALUE TO WOFIRM, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT BY ALLOWING MORE TIME LIRING-3 AND COMPANION WILL BE RELEASED WITHOUT NEED INDICATE WOFIRM INTEREST. THIS APPEARS MORE IN LINE WITH MEXICO CITY STATION POSITION THEY DEFINITELY NOT IN FAVOR INTERVENTION WITH GUAT AUTHORITIES WHICH WOULD FINGER LIRING-3 AS SOME TYPE WOFIRM ASSET (MEXICO CITY 5964).

2. IF MEXICO CITY HAS CHANGED ABOVE POSITION AND NOW AGREES WOFIRM INTEREST CAN BE INDICATED, SUGGEST FOLLOWING APPROACH: STATION WILL ADVISE ESMAJOR-20 THAT MEXICO CITY HAS DEVELOPED AN OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN LIRING-3'S WIFE BUT UNABLE PROCEED WITH OPERATION BECAUSE OF HER CONCERN OVER FATE OF HER HUSBAND. WE CAN THEN ASK ESMAJOR-20 ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN WHEN TRIAL

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9517 S E C R E T

SCHEDULED AND INDICATION WHAT SENTENCE MAY BE. BELIEVE ANY INTEREST

SL ESMAJOR-20 MAY REVEAL TO THE COURTS WILL DEVELOP RESPONSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO REVEALING WOFIRM INTEREST DIRECTLY IN LIRING-3, THE STATION CAN SO ADVISE ESMAJOR-20 AND REQUEST HIS HELP.

3. FILE: 201-248917.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

	18 Feb 67 mexi 0426	Julian Lopez DIAZ states in HAVANA that L-3 has contacts w/mexi police
	3 MAR 67 HMMA 31493	L-3 relation w/cubans has deteriorated for unknown reasons.
LIRING-4 Access →	4 JAN 68 mexi 3994	L-4 going to cuba for 3 months to separate from husband because of his affairs with carmen Lozada.

carlos Persaval

mexi 3985 TDCS-314/00124 4 JAN 68	MARCUE	solicited signatures so doc protesting against the cuban cultural congress 4-11 JAN 68
ERNESTO CAPUANO mexi 4314 31 JAN 68		suspicion that L-3 works for WOFIRM - HAVANA evidently did not believe this

Francisco LARA
~~Rodolfo SANDOVAL~~
carlos JURADO
carlos ~~Jurad~~ Persaval

2 1/2 Preston recruited under false flag 43

Mexi-5375 25 Apr 68 mexi gov intervention on behalf LIRING-3

Mexi 5540 (85701) L-3 sentenced to 6 month minimum term

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		X MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
PERUMEN: Activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4 May through Mid-September 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-818842

MICROFILMED
OCT 14 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REF: HMMA 34682, 17 May 1968

Action Required: For your information.

1. Forwarded under separate cover are twelve reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4, and contacts of the latter.

2. The main topic covered in ROWTON's reports is LIRING-4's efforts to obtain help in getting LIRING-3 out of jail in Guatemala as soon as possible. LIRING-4 is almost penniless (ROWTON has made only token payments to her after 15 June) and has been moving from one apartment to a cheaper one living on the sale of paintings left by LIRING-3 and small loans from leftist contacts. In the hope that she may be able to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has resisted all of ROWTON's efforts to get her to undertake a clandestine mission to PERUMEN, a mission, as Headquarters knows, was planned long ago. As a foreigner, LIRING-4 cannot work in Mexico without taking the chance of being deported, if caught. Although she has not tried it, she would probably be refused a visa to go to Guatemala to visit LIRING-3. She might also face difficulties in Guatemala including possible detention and interrogation if she succeeded in obtaining an entry permit to that country.

3. By mid-September 1968 LIRING-4 had received very little help from her Mexican leftist or outright Communist friends. In spite of promises to try to bribe the Guatemalan judge scheduled to try LIRING-3 all LIRING-4's "friends" succeeded in doing was to print several articles in the local press (some of them with LIRING-3's photo) claiming that LIRING-3 was unjustly imprisoned, that he was about to be executed, etc. If anything, these

continued . . . . . .

Attachments: 12 reports u/s/c #1
4 Iden rpts u/s/c #2

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD w/atts
Copy Filed in 201-798301

LIRING-3

201-818842

S/c att:

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 35502	26 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

articles did little to prejudice the Guatemalans in favor of LIRING-3. As a matter of fact, the latter who succeeded in sending LIRING-4 a few letters via the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City who comes to visit him in jail, recently claimed that he was saved from a prison "transfer" by the Guatemalan army by the arrival of the Mexican Consul. LIRING-3 viewed this "transfer" purely and simply as an execution attempt.

4. LIRING-4 received even less help from LIRING who told her that there was nothing it could do to help LIRING-3. LIRING-4, on the advice contained in one of the notes sent from prison by LIRING-3, kept away from LIRING and its employees until she met LIRING-10 by accident at the office of one of the leftist papers on 27 July. LIRING-10 convinced her to resume her visits to LIRING. That the local PBRUMENs still have doubts about LIRING-3 despite his imprisonment in Guatemala is indicated by the statements made by Rodolfo REYES (see ROWTON's 17 July report) to the effect that the latter would not be willing to help LIRING-3 until he found out on what side of "el griego" (ROWTON under false identity) he was. REYES added that LIRING suspects the "griego" of WOFIRM connections, although it has no definite proof of this.

5. Statements such as those made by REYES confirm the Station's belief that LIRING, upon orders from home, is still attempting to investigate ROWTON. Such statements also re-enforce the decision of the Station not to attempt, through liaison, to obtain the release of LIRING-3. Such an attempt, if it leaked, would not only expose LIRING-3 to PBRUMEN and Guatemalan FAR reprisals, it would probably also have adverse repercussions on ROWTON's security. LIRING-11 whom ROWTON met briefly on 5 July (see ROWTON's report dated 9 July) said nothing about LIRING-3's arrest when ROWTON complained that mail which he said he sent to LIRING-3 remained unanswered. It is also to be noted that REYES, who of course knows that LIRING-4 is in Mexico, told ROWTON that she was probably in PBRUMEN. This shows clearly the distrust with which LIRING views ROWTON.

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

6. LIRING-4 developed close relationship with Orlando SUAREZ of the Ministry of Culture now in Mexico at the invitation of the Mexican Communist mural painter David ALFARO Siqueiros. By mid-September, in fact, SUAREZ was staying at LIRING-4's apartment although LIRING-4 claimed to ROWTON that there was no romancing between the two and that SUAREZ used her apartment because he was too broke to get one of his own. In view of LIRING-4's assessment of SUAREZ as very leftist and pro-AMTHUG-1 no effort was made to approach him.

7. Contacts between ROWTON and LIRING-4 have taken place with decreasing frequency because the usefulness of LIRING-4 to WOFIRM has sharply decreased and because LIRING-4 is more and more convinced that ROWTON cannot or will not help her obtain the release of LIRING-3. In her frantic efforts to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has in fact not had any contact with ROWTON since early September. Unless LIRING-3 is released by the Guatemalan authorities or receives only a light sentence keeping him in jail only a short time longer, it is doubtful that LIRING-4 will be of much use to ROWTON and the Station.

for Willard C. CURTIS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES 6

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: _____ AT: _____ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____

X-REF TO FILE NO _____

DISSEM BY 4 PER _____ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO _____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, RI/AN,

S E C R E T 271602Z SEP 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9511

27 SEP 68 IN 01147

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 36584

1. MEXICO CITY 7335 NOT RECEIVED BY GUATEMALA CITY.

2. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: ETsikerdanos/jmw
UNIT: DC/WH/1
EXT: 7375
DATE: 26 Sept 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 3 PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: c/wh 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, c/wh/cog, c/ci, c/fi, c/ci/ed

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 26 22 37 z SEP 68 CITE DIRECTOR 36584

TO MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7335 (IN 99476)*

1. ROWTON RETURN STILL UNCERTAIN PENDING RESOLUTION DEVELOPMENT ACCESS TO AMCAGE/1.

2. RE LIRING/4, ROWTON COULD SEND MONEY OSTENSIBLY FROM L/4'S FATHER IN NEW YORK TO BAIL HER OUT OF PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION, BUT THIS WOULD BE ONLY TEMPORARY SOLUTION IN ADDITION INHERENT SECURITY RISKS (FATHER IS REPORTEDLY HOSPITALIZED AND NOT IN POSITION PROVIDE FINANCIAL HELP AT THIS TIME). L/4'S REFUGE IN LIRING ESTABLISHMENT, ON OTHER HAND, WHICH ROWTON COULD NOT CONVINCE HER TO TAKE AS LONG AS HE WAS GIVING HER MONEY, WILL SERVE TO IMPROVE HER ACCESS AND MAY LEAD TO REPATRIATION. ROWTON FEELS LATTER EVENTUALITY LIKELY ONLY IN EVENT HIS CONTINUED FAILURE RECONTACT HER SINCE L/4 WOULD POSSIBLY HAVE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE. IN THAT CASE, REBRIEFING AND RESUPPLY S/W PRECLUDED PRIOR DEPARTURE. ROWTON COULD DEBRIEF L/4 UPON HER RETURN MEXICO IF AND WHEN LIRING/3 RELEASED FROM PRISON AND CONTACT REESTABLISHED.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 36584

TO

3. FOR GUATEMALA: WOULD APPRECIATE RECOMMENDATIONS RE POSSIBILITY EARLY RELEASE OF LIRING/3 AND ASSOCIATE FROM JAIL. AWARE WOFIRM INTEREST MUST BE SHOWN AT HIGH LEVEL BUT FEEL GUAT OFFICIALS COULD ALLEGE MEXICAN GOVT INTEREST TO THEIR SUBORDINATES AS BASIS OF RELEASE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

END OF MESSAGE

* RYBAT

WH/COG

William V. Broe
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/2/~~Guatemala~~ [illegible]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

E. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH

INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CCS 2, C/CSPS

[✓ OPS]	6 7 OS
EW	8 TC
PP	16 SS
RR	
SA	COG/REG

S E C R E T 252131Z SEP 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7335

DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC

25 SEP 68 IN 39476

1. LIONION MONITORING LISAMPAN REPORTED LIRING-4 ENTERED LIRING MORNING 25 SEPTEMBER. REQUESTED LIRING FURNISH PLACE TO STAY BECAUSE SHE UNABLE FIND WORK THIS NOT ABLE PAY FOR LODGING. SAID WOULD STAY LIRING UNTIL PROBLEM SOLVED.

2. WISH BRING ABOVE ATTENTION ROWTON. ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE INFO ROWTON TRAVEL PLANS AND ETA STATION.

3. FILE 201-798301

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER

ACTION #223 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

26 SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE VR RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, SA, FI, CA, INT 2, (WA/COG 8)

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
OPS			OS
			IC
PP			SS
DD			

S E C R E T 231854Z AUG 68 CITE ~~GUATEMALA~~ GUATEMALA CITY 9326

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

8 Aug 68 IN 67011

REF A. MEXICO CITY 6658 (IN 66274)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9242 (IN 49331)

C. GUATEMALA CITY 9138 (IN 35920)

1. ST ~~503, 223509, 9, 1843,~~ ATION POSITION ON LIRING/3 CASE CONTINUES BE SAME AS THAT REPORTED REF B.

2. DURING LAST QUERY OF LIAISON RE STATUS OF CASE (REPORTED REF C), LIAISON OFFICER SAID SINCE CASE IN HANDS OF COURT THEY UNABLE PROBE FURTHER RE OUTCOME. BELIEVE ANY ADDITIONAL QUERY OF LIAISON WOULD BE CLEAR INDICATION OF SPECIFIC STATION INTEREST IN LIRING/3.

3. DIRECTOR 16024 (REF B OF MEXICO CITY 6658) NOT RECEIVED BY GUATEMALA CITY.

S E C R E T

BT

File LIRING/3

4072

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ________ AT ____________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____________

DISSEM BY 21 PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/CA

#216

S E C R E T 072243Z AUG 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6658

GUATEMALA CITY ,DIRECTOR

8 Aug 68 IN 66274

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)

B. DIRECTOR 16224

wife of JURADO

1. ROWTON SO FAR UNABLE LEARN MORE FROM LIRING-4 ABOUT HOW JUDGE SCHEDULED TRY CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR COULD BE BRIBED OTHER THAN STATEMENT BY ARTURO (SERRANO) BEREA TO EFFECT THIS TO BE ARRANGED BY GUAT COMMUNIST PARTY AT REQUEST MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. PERSON TO MAKE ACTUAL BRIBE, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE KNOWN AS LEFTIST.

LIRING-3

2. MEXICO CITY ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY "THE NEWS" 5 AUG CARRIED ARTICLE TITLED "MEXICAN ARTIST TO BE EXECUTED". ARTICLE QUOTED GROUP OF INTELLECTUALS INCLUDING PAINTERS, WRITERS, POETS AND SCULPTORS TO SAY GUAT GVT PLANNING EX ~~25 0) ,,2,3 5~~/ECUTE JURADO BECAUSE HE ENTERED GUATEMALA IN HIS CAR FOUR MONTHS AGO AND PICKED UP SOME HITCHHIKING YOUTHS WHO LATER TURNED OUT BE CONNECTED WITH GUAT COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS. ARTICLE OBVIOUSLY PLANTED BY LOCAL LEFTISTS IN EFFORT SPREAD NEWS JURADO ARREST AND DETENTION TO FORCE OFFICIAL GVT INTERVENTION. ROWTON TRYING ESTABLISH FROM LIRING-4 WHO PLANTED ARTICLE.

File LIRING/3

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ________ AT ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 6658 SECRET

3. BELIEVE NEWS ARTICLE COULD BE USED TO APPROACH LIAISON AND ASK FOR DETAILS ON JURADO CASE WITHOUT INDICATING ANY SPECIAL CONNECTION TO JURADO. SPECIFICALLY, WHAT SENTENCE CAN BE EXPECTED IN JURADO CASE AND WHEN?

4. FOR DIRECTOR: DESPITE SOMEWHAT COOLER RELATIONSHIP WITH ROWTON AT THIS POINT BECAUSE JURADO SITUATION, LIRING-4 STILL WILLING GO PBRUMEN AS SOON AS JURADO FUTURE SETTLED, PARTICULARLY IF HE DEPORTED OR SENTENCED RELATIVELY SHORT JAIL SENTENCE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

BY

ISSEM BY 15 PER

ACTION 131 WH 7 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 121716Z JUL 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9242

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

12 JUL 68 IN 49331

REF A. SCWASHINGTON 94613

B. DIRECTOR 15576

STATION APPRECIATES MEXICO CITY STATION OPERATIONAL PROBLEM WITH LIRING/4. HOWEVER, SICE ACTION SUGGESTED REF A MIGHT RESULT IN LIRING/3 CASE BEING WORKED OUT WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL INTERVENTION, BELIEVE REASONABLE THIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PASS PRIOR LIRING/4 TAKING ANY ACTION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 26 PER

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☒ ☐ ☐ RETURN TO

☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

INFO: xref 50-9-11 201-[illegible] FILE , VR RI/AN, C/IPS, C/CA, CI, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

11 22 06z Jul 68

CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9236 (IN 47690)**

1. HQS FILES INDICATE ARTURO SERRANO IN 1966 WAS DIRECTOR PCM PUBLISHING HOUSE FONDO DE CULTURA IN MEXICO CITY, BUT THERE NO DETAILS RE HIS CONTACTS WITH THIRD COUNTRY EXILES OR OFFICIALS. WE THEREFORE UNABLE COMMENT ON VALIDITY HIS CLAIM TO ASSIST LIRING/3.

2. CONCUR GUATEMALA CITY COMMENT REF B. FEEL LIRING/4 SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS SERRANO FOR MORE DETAILS HIS CHANNEL TO AND IDENTITY OF GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED. BELIEVE LIRING/4 AND STATION WILL THEN BE IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS VALIDITY SERRANO CLAIM. SUGGEST LIRING/4 ALSO CHECK SERRANO STORY WITH LEFTIST CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO ATTEMPT VERIFY ~~[illegible]~~ IT AND EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDS IF FEASIBLE. STATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

DISPO:
FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY

PAGE - 2

SHOULD NOT ADVANCE LIRING/4 ANY FUNDS UNLESS LIRING/4 ABLE SECURELY EXPLAIN THEIR SOURCE.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX - SERRANO

WH COMMENTS: *LIRING/4 approached by PCM member Arturo SERRANO who claimed he has contact with Guatemalan exile who could arrange bribe through relatives in Guatemala to assist LIRING/3 who imprisoned that country.
**Guatemala City requested more information prior to commenting on feasibility of bribe offer by SERRANO.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

WH/2/G:

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 35/29 PER ______

ACTION
C/WH 6 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH

INFO.
FILE. VR. C/WH/COG 5, ADDP, C/CI

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 OPS 6
2 EW 7
3 8
4 PP 9 SS
5 10
RR
SA COG REG

S E C R E T 202236Z JUNE 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 5934 20 Jun 63 IN 35210

File LIRING 3

GUATEMALA CITY , DIRECTOR

KAPOK

1. LIRING-4, WHO POSTPONED DEPARTURE TO CUBA IN HOPE HELPING LIRING-3, HAS RECEIVED SEVERAL DISTRESSING NOTES FROM LATTER WHO, CONTRARY TO PREVIOUS INFO, STILL AWAITING SENTENCE IN JAIL. LIRING-3 COMPLAINS ABOUT VERY MEAGER FOOD, UNSANITARY QUARTERS AND CONSTANT FEAR OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE.

2. IN ONE NOTE LIRING-3 STATES MEXICAN EMBASSY IN GUATEMALA CITY ABLE DO VERY LITTLE FOR HIM AND HINTS HE MAY RECEIVE SEVERE SENTENCE UNLESS SOME EFFORT MADE INFLUENCE JUDGE DECISION. JUDGE TO BE "INFLUENCED" MENTIONED AS JUAN SANCHEZ, OFICIAL TERCERO DEL JUZGADO CUARTO DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA. IN OPEN CODE LIRING-3 REQUESTED LIRING-4 APPEAL TO ROWTON (IN ALIAS) IN CONNECTION WITH ABOVE AS EXPECTS HIS TRIAL AND SENTENCING EARLY JULY.

3. MEXICO CITY STATION DEFINITELY NOT IN FAVOR INTERVENTION WITH GUAT AUTHORITIES WHICH COULD FINGER LIRING-3 AS SOME TYPE WOFIRM ASSET. IS THERE SOME WAY, HOWEVER, GUAT CITY STATION COULD DISCREETLY ASCERTAIN PROBABLY SENTENCE GIVEN LIRING-3 AND ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1	1 / 6
	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	2 OPS / 7 OS
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO	3 / 8
BY: ______ AT: ______ Z	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______	4 / 9 TC
	X-REF TO FILE NO. ______	5 / 10 SS
DISSEM BY 30 PER RYBAT.	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.	RR / SA / COG REG
ACTION c/WH6 ☒ RID COPY	INFO: FILE, VR, c/ca, c/FI2, c/FI/INT	

c/WH/COG5

S E C R E T 211830Z JUN 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9138

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 21 Jun 68 IN 35920

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY-8996 (IN 12603)

B. MEXICO CITY-5984 (IN 35210)

SITUATION UNCHANGED FROM THAT REF A. LIAISON CONTINUES OPINE THAT SENTENCE WILL BE LIGHT VIEW ONLY KNOWN CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTION COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 52 PER #

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

FILE VR CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

Whole file: LIRING-3 201

S E C R E T 251816Z MAY 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 5685

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

25 MAY 63 IN 13245

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5598 (IN 12717)

B. GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (IN 13509)

1. HECTOR RODOLFO (SANDOVAL) ALEGRIA IS GUAT REBEL WHO TOGETHER WITH FRANCISCO (LARA) ENGINEERED LIRING-3 AND FRANCISCO LARA TRIP TO GUATEMALA WHERE NOW INCARCERATED. SANDOVAL SAW LIRING-4 SEVERAL TIMES AFTER LIRING-3 ARREST AT ONE POINT SAYING HE MIGHT HAVE TO HOLD UP BANK TO COME TO LIRING-4 ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS, SANDOVAL ARRESTED 5 MAY SHORTLY AFTER HIS WIFE RETURNED FROM TRIP TO GUATEMALA. SANDOVAL WIFE NOW STAYING AT HOUSE OWNED BY MARCUE TOGETHER WITH FAMILY FRANCISCO LARA.

2. IN ATTEMPT COUNTER EVENTUALITY MEXICAN POLICE (ON BASIS INFO PROVIDED BY SANDOVAL) MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR LIRING-4 FOR INTERROGATION, STATION HAS ASKED LIRING-4 GIVE UP BOTH APARTMENTS SHE AND LIRING-3 HAVE BEEN RENTING. LIRING-4 NOW LIVING WITH GIRLFRIEND. BEFORE MOVING SHE RECEIVED VISIT OF MAN WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS LAWYER OF MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LAWYER SAID HE APPOINTED DEFEND LIRING-3. LIRING-4 HAS RECEIVED FIVE SHORT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

RID COPY ☐

INFO

FILE VR

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5683 S E C R E T

MESSAGES FROM LIRING-3 SMUGGLED FROM JAIL. ONE IN OPEN CODE SUGGESTED S/W BE PASSED TO HIM. STATION NATURALLY WILL DO NO SUCH THING.

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

5 p.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/Activities of LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 1 April to 10 May 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-34484, 16 April 1968

1. Forwarded under separate cover are eleven contact reports on the activities of LIRING-3 and -4 for the period 1 April to 10 May 1968 prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON.

2. The main points covered in ROWTON's reports are:

a. LIRING-3's association with Guatemalan rebels in Mexico City, his departure for Guatemala and his arrest and sentencing there;

b. The reaction of friends of LIRING-3's and LIRING contacts to the news of his arrest;

c. LIRING-4's efforts to "case" the offices of the LIRING Consulate, particularly the "safe room", and;

d. The obvious provocations of LIRING-4 by Sergio VALDEZ.

Continued.....

Attachments:
Reports (under separate cover)

MICROFILMED
MAY 31 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
S/C att. 1 3 - C/WHD w/atts (under separate cover)

CS COPY

B 201-815342

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-34682

DATE: 17 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-34682

3. The product of LIRING-4's efforts to case the LIRING consulate will be reviewed in a separate dispatch which will also transmit floor plans and drawings of that LIRING component. There is little question that the news of LIRING-3's arrest in Guatemala gained LIRING-4 the sympathy of various members of LIRING including LIRING-3, -9 and -16. They seem to understand LIRING-4's desire to postpone her departure for PBRUMEN after having received her long awaited PBRUMEN visa. The problem now is to have LIRING-4 leave for PBRUMEN while LIRING-3 is still incarcerated in Guatemala. As mentioned in a recent cable, BOWTON has encouraged LIRING-4's plans to try to visit LIRING-3 in jail in Guatemala City as BOWTON feels that LIRING-3 will probably urge LIRING-4 to spend in PBRUMEN at least some of the time he has to spend in jail. As for the conduct of Sergio VALDEZ (see BOWTON's reports dated 19 April and 6 May), it appears that the latter has deliberately been provocating LIRING-4. As this Station sees it, VALDEZ's purpose was to try to "shake up" LIRING-4 in the absence of LIRING-3 to test her reactions. It is doubtful that he acted as he did strictly for his own account. There is so far no solid indication that he may have been doing this for the PBRUMEN's (although this is no doubt a possibility). The Station is looking into the desirability, at this point, of placing VALDEZ under surveillance. The claim that BOWTON in alias offered Carmen LOZADA a certain sum of money for intelligence information in PBRUMEN has no foundation.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

MICROFILMED
MAY 31 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

16 April,1968

18P

Subject: Wallace B Rowton Meeting with LIRING/4.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at the Diana Restaurant (Calle Mississippi) from about 1815 until 1900 on 15/4/68. L/4 asked Rowton whether he had heard anything from LIRING/3 and stated that she was beginning to worry since he had promised to let her know of an address in Chiapas to which she could write. Rowton pretended not to know precisely where and for how long L/3 intended to be away, commenting that he felt it unfortunate that he had been out of town three days before L/3 had left and did not have the benefit of a final discussion. Rowton alleged that L/3 had not told him very much in the letter he had left with L/4 for him just before leaving, and, in fact, had not mentioned anything about Raúl Moreno driving him and Francisco Lara to Chiapas in his car. In a further effort to ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ dissuade L/4 from believing subsequently (when she finally learned of his arrest) that Rowton was responsible for the tragic development, Rowton alleged that he had urged L/3 not to cross the border but only to guide Lara to a safe crossing point and return immediately to San Cristóbal.

2. L/4 stated that unfortunately she herself knew very little of the final arrangements. She explained that L/3 had told her that he had persuaded Raúl Moreno to drive him and Lara to Chiapas because of the self-inflicted leg wound that prevented Lara from walking any great distance. She added that L/3 in his last telephone conversation with her told her that Raúl Moreno had finally "chickened out" and returned to Mexico City. (L/4 made no mention of Carlos Persaval and Rowton assumes that after Raúl Moreno backed out of his previous commitment, probably even before they left Mexico City, L/3 turned to Carlos Persaval and persuaded him to drive them to Chiapas in his car, and subsequently to accompany them across the border). L/4 continued that she was happy that Rowton had dissuaded L/3 from crossing the border becasue she was well aware of the dangers involved if he fell into a trap or was picked up by the Guatemalans. She added that she didnot particularly like Francisco Lara anyway and felt that he was too well known to escape detection.

3. In reply to Rowton's query, L/4 stated that Sandoval of the "thirteenth" (Yon Sosa Group) had telephoned her several times to ask if he could help her in any way, but did not apparently have any news. Rowton suggested that L/4 keep in touch with Sandoval just incase he might have learned something from FAR or Yon Sosa contacts. L/4 gave Rowton Sandoval's address as Lerma 54, apt B, but commented that she felt a little embarrassed to see him alone in the absence of L/3. Rowton then suggested that perhaps it might be more discreet

9/c att. 1
HMMA-34532

CS COPY

201-778301

to send L/3's 16-year-old son (who was staying with her at the time) around to enquire. L/4 agreed that this would be best and indicated that she would do so the next day. L/4 also stated that she felt she could get in touch more or less naturally with Raúl Moreno through Sergio Valdez to determine what had happened during the trip to Chiapas.

4. Rowton then asked L/4 to revisit the LIRING offices the following morning to study the lay-out of the back room (LIRING/9's office) and to use the typewriter again. L/4 stated that she finally found out that the typewriter in the main office was a German one but had not as yet been able to determine the exact name. She added that the one in the Mexican/Cuban Cultural Relations Office on Calle Hamburgo was a Remington and not the same as the one in the LIRING office. Rowton also asked L/4 to pick up as many blank forms and letter-head paper as possible.

5. L/4 commented that she had become quite close to Catalina Cepero during the past month and could count on her as a pretext for future visits to the office. L/4 added that on the previous afternoon Catalina had told her that the salaries of Cubana de Aviación personnel had been reduced and that her husband's salary had been cut from 450 dollars per month to 300 and that the LIRING office informed her that gasoline was being rationed for all mission personnel. Catalina also told her that packages destined for Cuba were not being delivered by Cubana de Aviación and that the backlog was so great that two officials had just arrived from Havana to attempt to resolve the problems involved. Catalina also complained that she was "sick and tired" of working in the office without pay and had tired to quit but was told by LIRING/9 that she must continue to help since the workload was so great. L/4 also told Rowton that Catalina had complained of money problems because of the cut in her husbands salary and hinted that she could use any money L/4 could loan her until next payday. Rowton suggested that L/4 lend Catalina 100 or 200 pesos in view of the usefulness Catalina might provide in L/4's continued access to the LIRING offices. L/4 added that Catalina had apparently become so attached to her that she was asking L/4 to move into the apartment across the hall from her which had become vacant (Cepero's apartment is 204 at Calle Juanacatlán 169).
6. L/4 also reported that Catalina had told her that a new directive had come out prohibiting all employees of the mission from carrying back to Havana any packages of personal items whatsoever. Catalina commented that for that reason Echemendía (Suarez de la Paz) who left the previous week could not take an ostraciser back with him to her family.

? ostarizer blender ?

Wallace B Rowton

17 April,1962

Subject: LIRING/4 Report on Visit to LIRING Offices.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at the Mississippi Restaurant from about 2035 until 2115 on 17/4/63 to debrief her on her visit to the LIRING office earlier that day. LIRING/4 was obviously worried, and said so at one point, about LIRING/3 in view of the total absence of any news or communication from him. Rowton pretended to be even more ignorant of L/3's current whereabouts than L/4 herself, and asked anxiously whether she had learned anything from Sandoval or Sergio Valdez. L/4 replied that Sergio had told her that Raúl Moreno while driving L/3 and Lara to Chiapas had had an accident in the car that had proved very costly to him, although fortunately no injuries resulted to anyone. Valdez continued that Raúl had to appeal to his father for money to cover the expenses involved in getting the car running again. Valdez did not know what had happened to L/3 and Lara after Raúl Moreno left them (apparently enroute to Chiapas) and could not provide any further information.

2. As to Sandoval, L/4 told Rowton that the latter had again telephoned her to offer any help she might need but did not have any news from Lara or L/3. L/4 gave Rowton the home address of Francisco Lara as care of Martha I. Lara de Rodriguez, 16 Avenida 20-74, Zona 12, Guatemala, Guatemala, tel: 48-17-17.

3. L/4 then reported that she had visited LIRING/9's office as requested by Rowton and managed to get another look at the book-case cabinet in the corner of the room. She commented that on entering the premises she was surprised to find that the typewriter (German make) previously located in the middle office (that used by Mirabal) had been moved into the back office of L/9 and that Rosita, the wife of Luna, was struggling with two fingers to type out something as she entered. L/4 said that L/9 was quite cordial to her and invited her in for a coffee and presenting her with five tickets to the ballet performance that evening. When L/4 asked him whether anything had come in re her re-entry permit, the latter immediately began opening the mail on his desk with the comment that perhaps a reply had arrived that morning and he would check at once. After looking through the mail he replied in the negative but did not discourage L/4 from hoping that the reply would be in soon.

4. L/4 then stated to Rowton that she noticed that the cabinet in the corner of the room was bigger ~~than~~ and lower than she had recalled from previous visits and had legs about two inches high. She added that the cabinet which was divided into two sections, the one to the left containing a shelf on which there was nothing but cigars and cigarettes and the right/half consisting of a compartment with a door covered with sack cloth (costal) and possibly locked by key.

She stated that the cabinet was placed catty-cornered and that in the rather spaciousix triangle behind it she could see many rolls of paper, which she assumed were discarded posters apparently placed there at random. L/4 then made the attached sketch on a napkin stressing the difficulty she had in providing Rowton with exact measurements. She added that there were two windows facing the street, one in the reception room and one in the middle room, but the only window in the back room faced on the inside patio and had a venetian blind and a gauze curtain but no drape.

5. L/4 then told Rowton that she had learned from Jorrín that he would be returning PCS very soon since his replacement had already arrived. He gave L/4 his home address as Velasquez 94 Altos, e/Infanta y Cruz del Padre, Barrio Villa Nueva. Habana. L/4 commented to Rowton that she would take advantage of his return (possibly on 22/4/68) to send another letter to Abreu asking for a definitive reply to her re-entry request. She added that she felt she could count on Jorrín for this service, she her relations with him had always been very cordial.

6. L/4 also mentioned that she had seen and greeted Cepeda who had just returned from Havana (apparently without his wife). L/9 told L/4 that he himself had been in Havana the preceding week on a regular courior run.

7. L/4 also turned over to Rowton several publications which she had received from Catalina Cepero and the press office. She commented that the wife of Cruz was working as secretary to the Chief LIRING in addition to her duties as responsible for confidential documents.

Wallace B. Rowton

19 April,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Conversation with Sergio Valdez re LIRING/3 Alleged WOFACT Affiliation.

1. LIRING/4 met with Rowton at the new safehouse room Rowton rented for security reasons under the alias Jean Mercier at the Suites Marne. Rowton had given L/4 a key and she entered the building and proceeded directly to the apartment, arriving at about 1700. Rowton posed as a French businessman and introduced L/4 to the owner(and his sister) as his secretary.

2. LIRING/4 stated that she was glad to have some time alone with Rowton since she had received a disturbing report from Sergio Valdez again revealing that reports of LIRING/3's alleged affiliation with WOFACT were circulating in leftist circles. She explained that Sergio Valdez had talked with her at her apartment (Atoyac) Monday ~~Monday~~ evening (15 April,1968) far into the night about two reports he had received about LIRING/3. Sergio Valdez explained that about three weeks previously his father (who works on the staff of "Siempre" told him that he should be careful in his dealings with LIRING/3 since the latter was a WOFACT agent. Sergio Valdez told L/4 that he bacame indignant at this telling his father that he had known L/3 for the past ten years and considered L/3 as his mentor in revolutionary philosophy and had absolutely no reasons to distrust him in his current activities. Sergio Valdez added that he threatened to break with his father unless the latter revealed to him the source of his information. His father finally confessed that he learned this from Alberto Dominguez, his boss in Siempre, but he could not say from whom Dominguez had received the report.

3. Sergio Valdez continued that in addition to this report he had also been told some time ago by General Heriberto Jara (now deceased) that he should be careful in his dealings with LIRING/3 since the latter was known to be a "traitor to the revolution". Sergio Valdez added that General Jara did not specfify any reason for his allegation or give details.

4. Sergio Valdez, according to L/4, stated in reference to these allegations that he was quite naturally very disturbed and had hesitated to mention them to LIRING/3 before his departure in order not to upset him. He stated that he had given the matter a great deal of thought and had come to the conclusion that Orozco was the person passing out this scurrilous report and that he intended to get to the bottom of the whole business himself without involving LIRING/3. He explained that he was planning to organize a group of four or five armed men to kidnap Orozco and interrogate him until he confessed everything. He added that if Orozco finally confessed that he had passed this

CS COPY

calumny to Alberto Dominguez they would assassinate Orozco on the spot. If, however, it became clear that Orozco was innocent they would look for some one else who might have been the source.

5. LIRING/4 stated that this whole conversation had shaken her badly since it was again an indication that L/3 was through no fault of his own accused of betraying the revolution and she was well aware of the drastic action that the Guatemalan revolutionaries as well as the Cubans were willing to take again persons accused even on slim evidence of being traitors. She asked Rowton under no circumstances to reveal this latest report to LIRING/3 since she knew such reports might drive him to do something drastic.

6. LIRING/4 also reported that in the course of conversation Sergio Valdez had brought up the name of Mr. Harris, but not in connection with the above-mentioned report against L/3. She explained that Sergio Valdez said that he knew of L/3's business relations with Harris in the past and that he himself hoped some day to be able to meet Harris so that he might interest Harris in his own commercial ventures. I/4 told Rowton that she pretended not to have much direct dealing with Harris and alleged that as far as she knew he was currently in Canada.

Wallace B Rowton

22 April, 1968

Subject: Rolando Mendez Aguilar, Guatemalan Rebel Contact in Mexico City.

1. LIFEAT coverage of the home telephone of LIRING/3 has revealed Subject to be a contact of Francisco Lara of FAR and Rodolfo Sandoval of the Yon Sosa group of Guatemalan rebels in Mexico City.

2. On two occasions in early April, 1968, Francisco Lara, during a visit to LIRING/3's apartment, made telephone calls to 45-60-30 (listed as Publicaciones e Impresiones Mexicanas S.A. - Diario Ovaciones, Calle Lago Sirahuén 297) and asked for Sr. Mendez Aguilar on extension 27. It is apparent from the context of conversation that Subject is a close friend and possible collaborator of Lara's. LIRING/3 reported the telephone call to Rowton, which he stated was made in his presence in an effort by Lara to locate Rodolfo Sandoval. According to L/3, Lara asked the person whom he telephoned (L/3 could not identify this person since Lara did not use his name while talking) where "their fine friend" was. L/3 continued that Lara did not mention Sandoval's name, apperently for security reasons, but he had previously told L/3 that he was calling to determine the whereabouts of Sandoval. L/3 also reported that he heard Lara refer to a certain "El Gato" and to "El Gordo". L/3 told Rowton that he could not identify the former, but it appeared that "El Gordo" referred to the young friend of Lara's whose photograph L/3 had previously given to Rowton for copying and who was named only "Roberto" in conversations with Lara.

3. The LIFEAT intercept reveals that Francisco Lara told Mendez Aguilar that he had been with Sandoval early the preceding evening but that the latter had not shown up for the meeting arranged for that same morning. When pressed Mendez confessed that Sandoval had returned home drunk and was probably sleeping off the effects of the previous evening. This would indicate that Sandoval probably lived with Mendez Aguilar, or at least maintains close contact with him.

4. The Station is attempting to determine the home address of Subject in the hope that further specific information can be uncovered concerning his relationship with FAR.

Wallace B. Rowton

24 April,1968

1. LIRING/4 informed Rowton 24 April,1968, that she received telegram from Mexican Consulate Guatemala City advising her "Consulate intervening in case her husband; will continue to keep informed". LIRING/4 on her own initiative (before she able meet with Rowton) asked advice Sergio Valdez and Manuel Marcué Pardiñas (of defunct Politica).

2. On recommendation Valdez, LIRING/4 telephoned Mexican Consulate Guatemala City and spoke at some length with Consul Octavio Serrano. Latter assured her LIRING/3 well and that he taking personal interest since he ~~personal~~ old friend LIRING/3's father. He explained that initial hearing would take place next day and that judge would have eight days in which decide disposition of the case. He gave LIRING/4 his home telephone and promised to keep her informed.

3. No mention made either in conversation with Serrano or in local press of simultaneous arrest of Francisco Lara,although arrest of Carlos Persabal Marcué ~~xxxx~~ reported~~simultaneous~~. Charge listed as "distributing communist propaganda".

4. LIRING/4 also reported that in her hurried meeting with Manuel Marcué Pardiñas latter at first took "it-served-them-right-approach" but confided that he had learned of arrest preceding day and immediately appealed to Corrillo Flores. According Marcué, Flores sent telegram in his presence to Mexican Consulate instructing it to bring matter to diplomatic level if necessary.

5. LIRING/4 also showed Rowton note from LIRING/3 in pencil on brown paper apparently/hastily torn from paper bag which she stated she received that day in plain envelope with typed address and apparently notional return address. She assumes this sent at request LIRING/3 by Octavio Serrano. Note reassure LIRING/4 that LIRING/3 in good health and that he can handle matters on his own. He states "Persabal is to blame" and instructs LIRING/4 to warn wife of Francisco Lara not to talk to anyone. Also to urge mother of Lara not to come Guatemala City in attempt help him.

6. Rowton instructed LIRING/4 give maximum play this development to LIRINGs in hope that this might wipe out adverse reports circulating against loyalty LIRING/3. LIRING/4,who expects re-entry permit PBRUMEN momentarily, will ask LIRINGs for extension in view developments.

25 April, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Visit to LIRING Offices.

1. LIRING/4 reported to Rowton at 1000 on 25/4/68 at the hotel saferoom that she had visited the LIRING establishment that morning to inform everyone of the news concerning LIRING/3. She stated that on entering her friend (LIRING/9's secretary) informed her that her re-entry permit had come through the preceding evening. L/4 explained at once that unfortunately she could not leave on the next flight becasue of LIRING/3's arrest. She then, despite the fact that his secretary told her that LIRING/9 was in a nasty mood, went into the latter's office and told him what had happened. LIRING/9 was very sympathetic, telling her that he also read the article in the paper. When L/4 showed him the hasty note allowed to her by L/3 which contained the sentence "Persabal tiene la culpa", LIRING/9 became very agitated and exclaimed that he would immediately "make out a card" (ficha) recording this treachery of Persabal. L/9 agreed that L/4 could not possibly leave for PEKING as planned and felt it would not be difficult to get an extension over the usual twenty-day limit of the re-entry permit.

2. LIRING/4 continued that she then went to see LIRING/2 and recounted the whole story to him, including L/3's involvement with FAR and the 13th of November movement. She noted that when she casually commented that Rodolfo Sandoval had told her that Yon Sosa had returned from PEKING via Mexico City about a month previously, LIRING/2 pretended not to be aware of this, exclaiming, "Imagine, they don't tell us those things!" LIRING/2 then said that he was leaving for a week TDY in PEKING the next day and would be happy to take along any letters L/4 might wish to send to their mutual friends explaining why she could not leave for PEKING at that time.

3. LIRING/4 also reported that while she was in the office of LIRING/9 she met Leo Deven who runs a hotel in Huatulco and whom she remembered from occasional visits he made to the LIRING offices while she was working there She described Deven as an obvious homosexual, well dressed and patronizing in his manners. He told her that he planned to travel to PEKING "on Friday" (whether 26 April or 3 May was not specified) to see his son who was studying there. L/4 commented that everyone at the LIRING office appeared to treat Deven with respect and confidence.'.

4. Re the layout of the office of LIRING/9 (backroom) LIRING/4 said she noted the addition of the typewriter table (formerly in the middle room) against the left wall with a portable Olympia typewriter on it. The German typewriter was still on the big desk. Also behind the small coffee table in the corner she noted that the rolled up posters were gone and in their place were two or three packages of books.

T.B. Rowton

24 April,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Telephone Conversation with Yolanda Díaz.

1. LIRING/4 reported to Rowton on 22 April,1968, that she received a telephone call from her negro doctor friend, Yolanda Díaz from PBRUMEN, on the evening of 19 April,1968, advising her that her re-entry permit had been approved. Yolanda added cheerfully, according to LIRING/4, that she would be expecting her on the 22 April flight.

2. LIRING/4 continued to Rowton that she telephoned her friend, LIRING/9's secretary, early on 22 April, to find out whether the LIRING office locally had received the approval. She was told that no word had as yet been received. LIRING/4 repeated the request for confirmation that same afternoon in the presence of Rowton but again received a negative reply.

Wallace B. Rowton

CS COPY

27 April,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Meeting with Manuel Marcué Pardiñas.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 for lunch at the Punto Blanco restaurant on Melchor Ocampo at 1300 on 27/4/68. Rowton had given up the safe-room in the Hotel Suites Marne earlier that morning since he felt it was not longer necessary.

2. LIRING/4 reported that Manuel Marcué Padiñas, the uncle of Carlos Persabal Marcué, had telephoned her the previous evening "from the street" and arranged to see her privately at the Koala Restaurant (Maria Isabela hotel) later in the evening. According to LIRING/4, Marcué told her that through his appeal to Carrillo Flores the case of LIRING/3 and his nephew was now in diplomatic channels and he hoped that both prisoners would be simply deported after a summary trial. He could not, however, guarantee anything, especially the length of time involved, and asked LIRING/4 to refrain from any activity that might prejudice the case. Specifically he instructed LIRING/4 to break off all contact with the Guatemalan revolutionaries in Mexico, the LIRING establishment, and all communication with the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City. He ~~xxxxxx~~ stressed that any false move on LIRING/4's part might cause Carrillo Flores to withdraw his intervention. Marcué promised to keep in touch with LIRING/4 so that she would not feel completely helpless. He added that the mother of Carlos Persabal Marcué (supposedly Manuel Marcué Pardiñas' sister) would be traveling to Guatemala City in the next few days so that she could visit her son and follow the case at first hand.

3. LIRING/4 also reported to Rowton that Rodolfo Sandoval of the Yon Sosa group had promised to visit her at her apartment the previous evening at 2200 in the company of Sergio Valdez to discuss matters further. H ad informed her on the phone in making the date that "El Gordo" had returned from Guatemala City - implying that the latter had news concerning the fate of Francisco Lara (whose arrest was not reported in the press, nor by Octavio Serrrano, the Mexican Consul, to LIRING/4). LIRING/4 surmised that Francisco Lara had escaped arrest and his involvement with LIRING/3 was not known. She therefore agreed with Marcué that she should not see Sandoval and the other Guatemalans in public, and especially not at her apartment.

4. LIRING/4 also reported that Manuel Marcué Pardiñas had asked her not to call him at his home again to ask for news, or as a matter of fact discuss in any way the case by telephone. He stated that he felt the phone of LIRING/4 as well as his own phones were tapped and that possibly LIRING/4's apartment was being watched. He did not specify by whom or for what purpose, but LIRING/4 told Rowton that she assumed it would be either by the Mexican Government or the Mano Blanca of Guatemala or both. Rowton again encouraged LIRING/4 to move out of the Atoyac apartment and back into the less conspicuous calzada Tacubaya place, commenting that this would not only prevent future security risks but also convince the LIRINGs that she was suffering financially because of LIRING/3's plight (she stated that she has already intimated this inconversations with the wife and secretary of the LIRING Chief, as well as with LIRING/2). LIRING/4 agreed but expressed regret that the Tacubaya apartment did not have a phone and that she might miss important mail addressed to the Atoyac apartment and arriving after her departure. Rowton suggested one last letter to the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City simply advising him of the change of address.

5. LIRING/4 also showed Rowton the return address typed on the envelope in which the note from LIRING/3 to her had been forwarded. The address, which Rowton supposes is notional, placed on the envelope by Otavio Serrano at the suggestion of LIRING/3 for security reasons, is as follows:

Carlos Rodriguez
35 Avenida 20-57, Zona 5
Guatemala C.A.

6. Rowton concluded with the comment that he felt LIRING/4 need not take Marcué's instruction not to visit the LIRING offices too seriously, since it was a well known and easily ascertainable fact that LIRING/4 had a logical reason for going there occasionally. Rowton did not wish LIRING/4 to break off relations at this critical time, expecially since LIRING/2 had commented to her on her last visit that she should feel free to come in at any time she needed help or consolation during the crisis.

Wallace B. Rowton

29 April,1968

SUBJECT: LIRING/4 Report of Contact with Sandoval and Marcué.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 for late lunch at the Punto Blanco restaurant on Melchor Ocampo on 29/4/68. She had to bring her child along since the 16-year-old son of LIRING/3 was not at her apartment at the time.

2. LIRING/4 reported that Sandoval of the 13th of November Group of Yon Sosa had again visited her and shown great concern for her welfare. He again offered her some money, such as he had, but LIRING/4 refused in view of his simultaneous complaints of the financial crisis he himself was undergoing. He explained that since Francisco Lara left he had been supporting Lara's entire family consisting of Lara's wife, mother, and their two young children. LIRING/4 said Sandoval reached a point in emotional frustration during the conversation that he exclaimed that he would have to resort to robbery or a hold-up in order to get the necessary money not only to support Lara's family but to send someone to Guatemala City to see LIRING/3 and procure a good lawyer for him. LIRING/4 told Rowton that this upset her so that she spent the rest of the evening pleading with Sandoval not to commit any criminal act. Sandoval then revealed that he and his friends had held up a policeman during the Humphrey visit and taken his gun, since they were short one weapon.

3. LIRING/4, commenting that Sandoval's only income was from selling language records for the Cortina Instituto Linguistico, told Rowton that she promised to contact all her friends in an attempt to help him sell the records and thus raise some money legally. L/4 explained to Rowton that Sandoval's commission is about 350 pesos per set of records, which is actually the down payment made by the customer (the remainder being paid in weekly or monthly instalments of about 165 pesos). L/4 asked Rowton's help in finding customers among his business contacts to help Sandoval.

4. LIRING/4 also reported that Manuel Marcué Pardiñas had visited her at her apartment late the previous evening. He told her that Carlos Fersabal's wife, Teresa Lozada, would be accompanying her mother-in-law to Guatemala City. He also stated that he was optimistic since Carrillo Flores had instructed the Mexican Consul to appeal to the Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs. Marcué commented that unfortunately the Mexican Consul could not reach this official himself since he was currently in New York. He hoped however that the Consul would see the Minister's secretary to arrange direct intervention. L/4 commented to Rowton that Marcué seemed very curious about

the LIRING office, but she fended off his questions by alleging that she had little or no contact with it. L/4 also commented that Sergio Valdez, who was being particularly helpful to her at this time, warned her sternly against accepting any money from Marcué in light of his reputation as an unscupulous Lothario. L/4 added that Marcué promised to see her again the following evening to keep her informed.

5. When Rowton again suggested that LIRING/4 move from the Atoyac apartment back to the Tacubaya place despite its dreariness and lack of telephone, she presented no objection, commenting that with all the traffic in and out of her Atoayac apartment at all hours of the night her reputation was probably in jeopardy, especially with her immediate neighbors and the cleaning women and maids. She promised Rowton to move out the following day since it was the end of the month and a logical time. She also promised when revisiting the LIRING office the next morning to make this known, stressing her financial plight.

6. LIRING/4 then appealed to Rowton to help her establish some sort of contact with LIRING/3, if for nothing else than to find out how he was and whether he needed anything . L/4 felt that Rowton might send some business contact of his to visit L/3 on Rowton's behalf, giving some recognition signal to LIRING/3. When Rowton pointed out the danger in this of possibly making things worse for L/3, LIRING/4 commented that Sandoval had told her that visitors were not required to sign a register or give lengthy explanations. L/4 added that she might find someone, including Sergio Valdez or Raúl Moreno or one of their friends who might make a short trip to Guatemala City to see LIRING/3. In reply to Rowton's query,L/4 commented that she did not expect anything from the wife or mother of Carlos Iersabal since they had not even bothered to telephone her since the arrest became known.

7. Rowton promised to give the matter some thought and discuss it further with LIRING/4 the following afternoon.

Wallace B. Rowton

6 May,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Contacts with LIRING Office.

1. On 3 May,1968, LIRING/4 reported to Boston that she had revisited the LIRING offices the preceding day and noticed that the black telephone was replaced in the middle office (where she herself used to work). She stated that she could not be certain that it was the same instrument and that it was replaced by one of the LIRING employees,but it appeared that way since she had not seen the instrument there on her visit on the previous Friday (26/4/68) and LIRING/9 had commented that the telephone would be replaced in the middle room.

2. With regard to LIRING/3's current situation, LIRING/4 reported that she had again talked to the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City by telephone on 2 May,1968, and was reassured that LIRING/3 was in good health. The Consul informed her that he could visit L/3 on Thursdays and Sundays, and would be glad to pass any letters that L/4 might send to him for L/3. The Consul also commented that the Mexican Relaciones Exteriores had instructed him to take up L/3's case with the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He added that he hoped with this pressure to persuade the Guatemalan government to deport L/3 within the next ten days.

3. LIRING/4 then reported what she described as a very disturbing conversation on 3 May,1968, with Sergio Valdez. She related that Valdez had come to see her in the morning to apologize for not having any money to lend her to help her meet expenses. He explained that he had not been paid by the Revista¿Porque? and was very short of funds himself. L/4 continued that she would have to appeal to all her friends and those of L/3 for some money to tide her over until L/3 returned. She then regretted that she had not been able to locate "Sr. Harris" but if and when he came to Mexico again she would have to "renew diplomatic relations"with him. Sergio Valdez then, according to LIRING/4, laughed and said that this reminded him of another nasty rumor that he had heard. He then revealed that Raúl Moreno had recently told him that a certain Gonzalez of the Spartaco Club had told him (Moreno) that LIRING/4 had been fired from the LIRING offices because she had been providing information to the PBPRIME Embassy and that he had learned this from the LIRING "service" officer. Sergio Valdez also mentioed that a "girl who worked in the zona rosa" who knows Teresa or Carmen Lozada had mentioned that Sr. Harris had offered Carmen Lozada the sum

CS COPY

of $4,000.00 for information on the situation in PBRUMEN. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she was badly shaken by these comments but attempted to assume as non-chalant an air as possible and did not question Sergio Valdez to determine the exact source. She noted that Sergio Valdez had mentioned Rowton several times to her, always apparently in passing, with the obvious hope that LIRING/4 would reveal his presence in Mexico and arrange an introduction to him for Sergio Valdez. LIRING/4 agreed with Rowton that Valdez was probably provoking her since at all times he appeared to be well disposed toward Sr. Harris from what he knew of him from LIRING/3. Rowton commented to L/4 that the last report concerning Carmen Lozada appeared to have been fabricated either by Sergio Valdez or one of his friends, simply on the basis of the fact that Sr. Harris had been in touch with Carmen Lozada while she was in Mexico.

4. LIRING/4 then stated that she felt she had to continue to impress Sergio Valdez with her desperate need for money and accordingly telephoned the LIRING gatekeeper in his presence and asked for a loan. When the gatekeeper responded favorably, she left Sergio Valdez waiting in the apartment and went to the LIRING Offices at once to collect the loan. The gatekeeper gave her 100 pesos on the spot, fortunately in the presence of LIRING/13. L/4 told Rowton that she promised to return the money in the next week, as soon as she received money promised to her by her father.

5. LIRING/4 added that as she was leaving the LIRING office she ran into the leftist writer, Jaime Labastida, who expressed his sorrow at the arrest of LIRING/3. Labastida commented that someone had told him recently that a cartoon of some kind had appeared in a Tapachula newspaper "against LIRING/3". When L/4 pressed him he gave a description of the "someone" that definitely identified him as Sergio Valdez. L/4 continued that when she confronted Sergio Valdex with this upon her return to the apartment, he hotly denied it, much to L/4's mystification.

6. LIRING/4 also commented that Manuel Marcué Pardiñas continued to telephone her at very late hours of the night in the hope (she assumed) that she would invite him up. She called him a "viejo verde" and added that she had no intention of seeing him alone at her home at night.

Wallace B. Rowton

8 May,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report Concerning Sentencing of LIRING/3.

1. LIRING/4 reported to Rowton at the Punto Blanco restaurant on Melchor Ocampo at 1300 on 8/5/68 that Manuel Marcué Pardiñas had informed her at 0100 that same day that he had just learned that LIRING/3 and his nephew had been sentenced to prison, with a minimum term of six months. Marcué added that his sister and her daughter-in-law would be returning to Mexico City by the end of the week and should be able to supply details of the trial and prospects for the immediate future of having the prison term reduced. LIRING/4 explained to Rowton that she had accepted a dinner invitation at Sanborns extended to her by Aguirre Jerjes, a professor at [illegible] with whom she had studied at the University of Havana, and arrived at the home of Gilberto and Blanca Amant (Blanca Peña de Amant), with whom she was staying, rather late and found Manuel Marcué waiting for her. After apologizing profusingly for his previous rude conduct with L/4, he reported the latest news concerning L/3 to her.

2. LIRING/4 agreed with Rowton that although the prison sentence was probably definite, she should check it out with the Mexican Consul personally. She stated that fortunately she remembered a certain Josefina Rodriguez who worked in the larga distancia service of Telefonos de México whom she had originally met as a friend of LIRING/2. L/4 commented that Srta Rodriguez whom she described as "muy fea" was enamored of LIRING/2 some years ago but stopped seeing him (to her knowledge) when she found out that he was married. L/4 continued that Srta Rodriguez had already promised to put through long distance calls to Guatemala for L/4 without charging the calls, if they could be arranged during her shift at the switchboard.

3. LIRING/4 also reported that she had again visited the LIRING offices at 1345 on 7/5/68 and again about 1130 that same morning. At Rowton's request she again checked the phone in the third office. On the first visit the office had already been closed but she ran into LIRING/13 at the gate and accepted a ride home (she felt this fortunate since he dropped her at the Tacubaya apartment at her request). On this occasion during a brief exchange of comments with the gatekeeper and L/13, LIRING/4 learned that LIRING/2 will return from ABRUKEN on 10/5/68. CS COPY

4. On visiting the LIRING offices on the morning of 8/5/68, LIRING/4 told Rowton that fortunately only her friend Catalina and Rosita (secretary of LIRING/9) were present. When she went into the third office where Rosita was working she asked to use the phone and approached the instrument. She

was able to note that the name "Oki Electric,Tokyo,Japan" was marked on the instrument. She also noted the word "Gall" but could not tell whether it was part of the manufacturer's name or a Mexican or U.S. subsidiary. She also noted that below the receiver were four switches (like the ordinary push light switches) unmarked or unnumbered. When she exclaimed to Rosita: "How do you dial on this phone", Rosita replied:"But it's not a phone,it's an intercom". LIRING/4 told Rowton that she then commented:"But how come, the intercom is in the first office." Rosita then, according to L/4, stated: "But that's a special intercom." (L/4 explained that she was referring to the phone she had in her hand).

5. LIRING/4 continued that when she passed through the second office, she noted that the phone which had been replaced in that room was of Erickson manufacture and was the same instrument previously there when she worked in that office. She assumes that the LIRINGs replaced the phone themselves.

6. LIRING/4 also told Rowton that she had located an excellent apartment in the Edifico Condesa (Matzatlán and Veracruz) through her friend Blanca Peña who lives in the same development. LIRING/4 added that she had given the administrator 300 pesos to hold the apartment for her until she could arrange a fiador. She also stated that she could obtain a telephone eventually since the former tenant had applied and received approval just before he left. LIRING/4 reassured Rowton that she was telling everyone, particularly the LIRINGs, that she was living at the Tacubaya apartment and temporarily staying as a house guest at the home of Blanca Peña de Amant. She also reassured Rowton that she had informed the LIRING gatekeeper when she returned the 100 peso loan that she had received money from her father in New York. LIRING/4 added that several friends, including the well-known writer Revueltas, had offerred to find her some sort of work. She stated that if she could find suitable employment in the mornings she would accept the offer, if only for appearances.

Wallace B. Rowton

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
ON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 33

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33/21 PER ______ #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______ file: LIRING-3

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8, CA5, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2

S E C R E T 162103Z MAY 63 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8996 16 May 68 IN 12603

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5540 (IN 08570)

LIAISON REPORTS THAT PERSAVAL AND LIRING/3 BEING HELD PAVON PRISON FARM PENDING SENTENCING BY FOURTH JUZGADO DE PRIMERA CNSTANCIA. ONLY CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. LIAISON SPECULATES THEY WILL RECEIVE LIGHT SENTENCE IF ANY.

S E C R E T

BT

Branch file

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION C[illegible]FIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20 R[illegible]G AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
[illegible]

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY_____ AT_____ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER _____

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO._____

X-REF TO FILE NO._____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO _____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 301612Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5423

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIREC~~OTR~~ TOR

30 Apr 68 IN 01169

PBRUMEN LIRING-3 LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY 5375 (in 98384)

1. RETURN ADDRESS OF ENVELOPE IN WHICH NOTE FROM LIRING-3 SENT LIRING-4 IS

CARLOS RODRIGUEZ
35 AVENIDA 20-67 ZONA 5
GUATEMALA C.A.

2. ALTHOUGH THIS MAY BE NOTIONAL ADDRESS WOULD APPRECIATEM

STATION CHECK.

SECRET

BT

WH/1 file:
LIRING-3 201
WC

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

JURADO DEL MAR, CARLOS
201-798301
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
MEXICAN PASSPORT ONE ZERO THREE THREE EIGHT EIGHT
ARRESTED BY GUATEMALAN SECURITY FORCES ON APRIL ONE THREE, ONE NINE SIX EIGHT, WHEN ATTEMPTING TO INTRODUCE INTO GUATE- MALA COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA WHICH HAD BEEN CONCEALED IN THE SIDE PANELS OF THEIR AUTOMOBILE

035-004-017
DBC -15440
26 APR 68
FBI CABLE
P2

R 6805270834

798301

FILE IN 201-

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

3 P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
APR 30 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO: Chief/WHD

INFO.: COS/Guatemala City INFO HGG

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Review of Events Leading to LIRING-3's Arrest in Guatemala

201-798301

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

201-832457

1. The purpose of the present dispatch is to summarize the developments leading to the trip made by LIRING-3 to Guatemala in the company of FAR member, Francisco Alalberto *LARA Barrios, and Carlos Manuel *PERSAVAL Marcue, Mexican national and nephew of Manuel Marcue Pardinas, ex-director of the now defunct Politica. This trip, as the Guatemala City Station has advised, resulted in the arrest of all three persons in Guatemala just over the Mexican border on the weekend 13-14 April, and their current imprisonment in Guatemala City in the custody of the Guatemalan army.

continued.......

Distribution:
3 - Chief/WHD
2 - COS/Guatemala City

TOUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO B 201-832457	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 34531	DATE 25 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

2. According to reports submitted to Wallace B. ROWTON by LIRING-3, the latter met Carlos Manuel Persaval Marcue originally through the latter's sister-in-law, Carmen Lozada de Ramirez, who had been carrying on an extra-marital affair with LIRING-3 since early November 1967. On the evening of 3 March 1968, Persaval approached LIRING-3 in connection with the difficulties that a young Guatemalan woman living in Mexico City was having in obtaining false documentation to enable her to travel to Guatemala to recontact her husband, whom Persaval described as "an important guerrilla leader". Persaval revealed to LIRING-3 that he had been assisting the FAR in propaganda work in Mexico for some time and gave LIRING-3 several copies of a pamphlet entitled "Violencia en Guatemala" which Persaval said had been published on one of his uncle's presses and was being sold at the nominal price of three Mexican pesos to help raise money for the FAR.

3. When LIRING-3, under ROWTON's direction, responded favorably to this initial approach, Persaval pursued the matter and finally, on 8 April, revealed that he was in touch with two "important guerrilla leaders" who needed help in returning clandestinely to Guatemala. Persaval asked LIRING-3 to arrange to guide these persons across the Guatemalan border south of Chiapas, an area LIRING-3 had previously told Persaval he was very familiar with from his previous residence in San Cristobal. Persaval made no further reference to the "young Guatemalan wife of the FAR leader". LIRING-3 surmised to ROWTON that this person might actually have been the wife of Francisco Lara Barrios, but that plans for her return were discarded in favor of the trip by Lara himself.

4. At ROWTON's urging, LIRING-3 insisted on meeting the two Guatemalans involved and in talking to them before undertaking such a mission. Persaval finally introduced LIRING-3 to Francisco Lara Barrios on 17 March 1968, and the latter presented LIRING-3 to a certain "Rodolfo", who LIRING-3 ascertained subsequently was a member of the 13th of November group headed by Yon Sosa by the name of Sandoval. Francisco Lara Barrios confided to LIRING-3 that he had in his possession a false Guatemalan passport in the name of Jose Maria Oliva Carranza and that he had obtained legal residence in Mexico with his wife and children through the efforts of ex-Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas. He also named a certain Eskenazi and LIREBEL-1 as persons who assisted Guatemalan exiles in Mexico. Station believes Eskenazi may be identical with Luis David Eskenassy Cruz, a former agent of the Guatemala City Station.

5. With the approval of ROWTON, LIRING-3 agreed to help the above-mentioned persons to cross the Mexican/Guatemalan border and to accompany them to Guatemala City. This latter extension of the original trip was made by Lara at the suggestion of LIRING-3 so that the latter could meet with the FAR woman responsible for logistics. LIRING-3 reported to ROWTON subsequently that just before their departure, Lara also offered to arrange for LIRING-3 to travel clandestinely to the Sierra de las Minas to meet directly with FAR and 13th of November leaders to discuss further support that LIRING-3 might be able to provide through his commercial contacts in Chiapas and northern Mexico.

6. LIRING-3 fabricated a false Mexican identity document (Secretaria de Education) for Francisco Lara Barrios in the name of Jacinto Rangel Cervantes with Lara slightly disguised so that the latter could move about more unobtrusively on the Mexican side of the border just prior to crossing. On 3 April 1968, just prior to their scheduled departure date, Francisco Lara

informed LIRING-3 that their mutual friend Rodolfo Sandoval would not be accompanying them since he was too well known and his mission was not important enough to justify the risk and the expense involved.

7. LIRING-3 did not depart as he had hoped on 5 April 1968, because Lara unfortunately accidentally shot himself in the ankle on the morning of that day while cleaning his gun and had to be given medical attention before he could make the trip. LIRING-4 told ROWTON that LIRING-3, Francisco Lara and Raul/Moreno, a friend of LIRING-3, finally left Mexico City in the personal car of Raul Moreno on 10 April 1968, but that Moreno had returned to Mexico City two days later as a result of an accident that disabled the car somewhere in Chiapas. LIRING-4 did not report anything concerning the subsequent involvement of Carlos Persaval Marcue, stating that she had not received any communication from LIRING-3 after his telegram of 12 April, in which he reported the return of Raul Moreno. ROWTON surmises that when Raul Moreno had to return to Mexico City, LIRING-3 and Lara asked Carlos Persaval Marcue to join them and drive them to the border in his own car, and that Persaval continued on with them toward Guatemala City.

8. Guatemala City Station advised on 22 April 1968, that the story of the arrest of Lara, Persaval and LIRING-3 had reached the local press and that they would be turned over to the appropriate courts for trial. This indicates that LIRING-3 may eventually be released and hence be available to ROWTON for complete debriefing.

9. The only significant name that had surfaced as a result of LIRING-3's involvement with the Guatemalan rebels in Mexico City is that of Rolando/Mendez Aguilar, whom Francisco Lara Barrios contacted on 45-60-30 extension 27, in early April from the home telephone of LIRING-3. (This number corresponds to the "Publicaciones e Impresiones Mexicanas, S.A. - Diario Ovaciones, Calle Lago Sirahuen 297, Mexico City). From the LIFEAT coverage on LIRING-3 it is apparent that Mendez is a close contact of both Lara and Sandoval and may be providing or have provided employment for them in Mexico. The Station is attempting to determine the home address of Mendez in the hope that further details of his possible collaboration may be uncovered.

Raymond A.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3   TOTAL COPIES 31   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 24 PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. WH/COG 8, CAS, CA/PROP

FI, FI/INTL, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 252105Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5375

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

PERUMEN LIRING-3 LIRING-4

25 Apr 68 IN 98384

REF: GUATEMALA CITY 8936 (IN 95701)

1. LIRING-4 RECEIVED CABLE FROM MEXICAN CONSULATE GUATEMLA CITY 24 APRIL STATING CONSULATE INTERVENING ON BEHALF LIRING-3. LIRING-4 PHONED CONSULATE, WAS TOLD BY CONSUL OCTAVIO SERRANO THAT LATTER CLOSE FRIEND LIRING-3 FATHER. SERRANO SAID LIRING-3 "ALL RIGHT," WOULD HAVE INITIAL COURT HEARING 25 APRIL AFTER WHICH JUDGE WOULD HAVE EIGHT DAYS DECIDE DISPOSITION OF CASE. CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTION COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. NO MENTION MADE BY SERRANO OR PRESS OF FACT FRANCISCO (LARA) BARRIOS ARRESTED WITH TWO MEXICANS.

2. LATE 24 APRIL LIRING-4 RECEIVED LETTER FROM LIRING-3 HASTILY SCRIBBLED ON BROWN PAPER, AND PROBABLY MAILED TO HER BY SERRANO. LETTER IN DOUBLE TALK SAYS LARA "ALL RIGHT" AND WARNS AGAINST HAVING HIS WIFE TALK TO THE PRESS OR HIS MOTHER COME GUATEMALA TO TRY HELP HIM. GOES ON TO SAY "THINGS MAY TAKE A WHILE" AND BLAME PERSAVAL FOR ARRESTS.

3. LIRING-4 CONTACTED MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS AFTER RECEIVING

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5375 SECRET

CABLE. MARCUE SAID HIS NEPHEW PERSAVAL "ALWAYS IN TROUBLE AND DESERVED BE LOCKED UP" BUT ADMITTED CALLING ON MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ANTONIO (CARRILLO) FLORES ON BEHALF PERSAVAL WITH RESULT THAT MINISTER SENT MEXICAN CONSUL GUATEMALA CITY INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVENE.

4. PER STATION BRIEFING LIRING-4 TAKING LIRING-3 LETTER TO LIRING 25 APRIL WITH VIEW ASK AID LIRING-2 AND LIRING-9 AND USE LIRING-3 ARREST TO TRY CORRECT ADVERSE REPORTS CIRCULATING RE HIS LOYALTY. LIRING-4 RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM GIRLFRIEND IN PERUMEN CAPITAL 19 APRIL SAYING LIRING-1 WHO ASKED GIRL TO CALL HAD SUCCEEDED OBTAINING PERUMEN ENTRY VISA FOR LIRING-4. IF NEWS VISA GRANTED ALREADY AT LIRING, LIRING-4 TO STATE SHE DOES NOT WANT LEAVE UNTIL LIRING-3 FREED OR HIS FATE CLEARLY SETTLED. STATION NATURALLY HOPING ARREST OF LIRING-3 IN GUATEMALA WILL HELP LIRING-4 POSITION DURING VISIT PERUMEN. IN REPORT ANNOUNCING LIRING-3 ARREST IN GUATEMALA PASSED STATION 23 APRIL LITEMPOS BRANDED LIRING-3 AS "COMMUNIST."

SECRET

SECRET

23 April 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: LIRING-3 Visit To Guatemala With Guerrillas FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARRA BARRIOS and CARLOS MANUEL PERSAVAL MARCUE

1. On 5 March 1968, LIRING-3 had dinner with CARLOS PERSAVAL MARCUE, nephew of MANUEL MARCUE PARDINES, director of the now defunct magazine "POLITICA", a Communist bimonthly publication. During the dinner PERSAVAL queried LIRING-3 if he could obtain a false passport for the wife of an important Guatemalan guerilla leader so that she could travel from Mexico to Guatemala. LIRING-3 replied that he would do his utmost to assist.

2. On 8 March 1968 PERSAVAL told LIRING-3 that two(2) Guatemalan revolutionaries had need to travel to Guatemala by mid-March. LIRING-3 commented that there was limited possibility of obtaining false documents, but that he could brief the Guatemalans so as to facilitate their illegal crossing of the Mexican/Guatemalan border, or if they desired, he would guide them.

3. On 9 March 1968, PERSAVAL again discussed the matter with LIRING-3, saying that one of the two travellers possessed legal travel documents. Since the other person has no such legal documents, they should enter Guatemala illegally.
/MEXI-4790/

4. LIRING-3 reported on 27 March 1968, that one of the traveller to Guatemala is FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS. The group is of the opinion that LIRING-3 should also go to Guatemala in order to meet an unidentified woman, described as the FAR logistics officer, to discuss FAR support from Mexico.
/MEXI-5000/

5. Departure was delayed because LARA sustained a self-inflicted gun shot wound while cleaning a weapon. On 10 April LIRING-3, LARA, and another person--described as a member of the YON SOSA Faction--departed en route to Guatemala. LIRING-3 was informed that the FAR and the YON SOSA group are now working together, but that a certain amount of compartmentation exists.
/MEXI-5205/

SECRET

SECRET

6. During the 14-15 April week-end, Guatemalan authorities arrested three individuals near the Mexican border. They were brought to Guatemala City where they are being held for interrogation.
The persons arrested are:

- a. FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS (Guatemalan)
- b. CARLOS JURADO DEL MAR (Mexican)
- c. CARLOS MANUEL PERSAVAL MARCUE (Mexican)

When arrested LARA admitted that he is a Communist, and that he is returning to Guatemala to renounce his affiliation.
/GUAT-3880 7

7. The G-2 of the Guatemalan military was not successful in its interrogation of the Subjects. Liaison attempted it but was compelled to conduct its interrogation in the presence of G-2 officials who continually interrupted. Liaison was attempting additional interrogation under more favorable circumstances. Meanwhile G-2 is considering turning over the Subjects to the "Army Special Unit" for further interrogation.
/GUAT-8890 7

SECRET

LIKING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F | TOTAL COPIES 11 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 32 PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR. CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2,

S E C R E T 222145Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5308

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

22 APR 68 IN 95857

REF: GUATEMALA CITY -8906 (IN 95701)

1. ALL INFO IN MEXICO CITY-5301 (IN 95626) MAY BE PASSED LIAISON.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE COPY OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLE ON PERCADAL AND JURADO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

LIRING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 15 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. CAS, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 221758Z APR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8906

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 22 Apr 68 IN 95701

REF A GUATEMALA CITY 8880 (IN 91436)

B. MEXICO CITY 5301 (IN 95626)

1. PRESS OF 21 APRIL 1968 REPORTED THAT PERZABAL AND JURADO HAD BEEN CONSIGNED TO THE GUATEMALAN COURTS. LARA STILL BEING HELD BY THE GUATEMALAN ARMY. CONSIGNMENT MEANS THE END TO INTERROGATION AND HAS, IN THE PAST, RESULTED IN A SPEEDY TRIAL AND LIGHT SENTENCING, IF AT ALL. OFFICIAL MEXICAN GOVERNMENT INTEREST HAS NOT YET SURFACED. CHECKING MILITARY SOURCES IN ATTEMPT OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. WILL ADVISE.

2. PLS ADVISE WHAT PORTIONS REF B CAN BE PASSED LIAISON.

S E C R E T

BT

Copy should be filed LIRING-3 201.

Vince

~~Heathe~~ UK

SECRET

14-00000

14915

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 8 PER

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE. VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

ACTION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 221620Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5301

PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR 22 APR 68 IN 55026

REF GUATEMALA CITY 8887 (IN 92664)

1. TELEPHONE NUMBER 48-44-97 IS REGISTERED TO ELGA SOBERON, MOTHER IN LAW OF MANUEL MARCUE PARDINAS. LATTER LIVES IN HOME WHICH LOCATED AVENIDA DE LAS FUENTES 616, COLONIA JARDINES DEL PEDREGAL. THIS TELEPHONE HAS BEEN TAPPED BY MEXICAN FEDERAL SECURITY FOR SEVERAL YEARS.

2. TELEPHONE NUMBER 32-02-18 (UNLISTED) REGISTERED TO FNU GARZA, CALLE SUR 71 NUMBER 427, COLONIA BANDIJAL. STATION CANNOT IDENTIFY THIS PERSON.

S E C R E T

file
201- LIRING-3

Vince

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 26

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 12 PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH/6 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 161625Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5223

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR , TEGUCIGALPA

LIRING

16 APR 68 IN 91979

REF: MEXICO CITY 5221 (IN 91483)

ACTION

TWO CORRECTIONS IN REFERENCE. PARAGRAPH TWO: MANUEL MARCUE PARDINAS IS A COMMUNIST NOT A LEFTIST; HIS MAGAZINE NAMED "POLITICA" NOT "PERIODICA".

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

karbe

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 22 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY LIRING-3

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 25 PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE VR. CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6

S E C R E T 172146Z APR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8890

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 17 Apr 68 IN 93083

REF: GUATEMALA CITY-8887 (IN 92664)

1. ACCORDING TO LIAISON, G-2, BECAUSE OF LACK OF ABLE INTERROGATION OFFICERS HAS BEEN UNABLE OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION OF VALUE FROM TWO MEXICAN PRISONERS. LIAISON FORCED INTERROGATE (LARA) BARRIOS IN PRESENCE TWO G-2 REPRESENTATIVES WHO CONTINUALLY INTERRUPTED EFFORT. PRIMARY INTERROGATION LARA ADMITTEDLY NOT COMPLETE. ESMICA WILL TRY ARRANGE FURTHER INTERROGATION IN MORE FAVORABLE SURROUNDINGS.

2. BECAUSE G-2 HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN ITS INTERROGATION OF MEXICANS, THEY ARE CONSIDERING TURNING BOTH OVER TO "ARMY SPECIAL UNIT" FOR INTERROGATION.

3. WILL ADVISE DETAILS AS AVAILABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. · 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM · 8. DATE OF INFO. · 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST · 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN · 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

JURADO DELMAR, CARLOS
201-798301
SEX M DOB ?

035-004-017
GUAT-08880
16 APR 68

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
MEXICAN CARRYING PP NO. 103388.
CAPTURED BY GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES NEAR MEXICAN BORDER OVER PAST WEEKEND. ITEMS TAKEN FROM PRISONERS WAS MESSAGE FROM /OR TO NESTOR VALLE /FAR PSEUDO OF NERY DE LEON LICARDIE, FAR LEADER/, GUERRILLA TRAINING MATERIAL AND THREE SMALL STONE BELLS

HMM

R 6805160769

Lienvoy-3

FILE IN 201-798301

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

14-00000

LIRING -3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED /CSDO

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY D AT 6440 Z

DISSEM BY 46 PER

ACTION WH8 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], G/KD

FI, FI/INT2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	(1)	6	C
2		7	
3		8	
4	3	9	
5	3	10	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

S E C R E T 160402Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5221

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR ROUTINE TEGUCIGALPA

LIRING

REF A MEXICO CITY 5285 (IN 91298)

B GUATEMALA CITY 8882 (IN 91436)

15 [illegible] 01 : 02

1. DESPITE DESIRE HELP LIRING-3 WHO DEPARTED FOR GUATEMALA AS PART STATION EFFORTS AGAINST GUAT REBELS, MEXICO CITY DOES NOT WANT LIAISON MADE WITTING LIRING-3 WAS STATION CONTACT. LIRING-3 HANDLED BY ROWTON UNDER FALSE FLAG AND NEVER MADE WITTING ROWTON CONNECTION WITH WOFIRM. BELIEVE DISCLOSURE LIRING-3 CONNECTED WITH WOFIRM AT THIS TIME WOULD CREATE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR STATION WITH MEXICAN GOVT WHICH COMPLETELY UNWITTING STATION ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO DIRECTED AT GUAT REBELS. IT WOULD CREATE SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES FOR LIRING-3 IN EYES CUBANS AND MEXICAN LEFTISTS NOT TO MENTION LIRING-4 WHO CURRENTLY AWAITING CUBAN VISA.

2. CARLOS MANUEL PERSAVAL MARCUE IS NEPHEW OF MANUEL MARCUE PARDINAS, IMPORTANT MEXICAN LEFTIST AND EX DIRECTOR MEXICAN PERIODICAL WHICH RECENTLY DISCONTINUED PUBLICATION ALLEGEDLY, AMONG OTHER REASONS, AS RESULT WITHDRAWAL CUBAN SUBSIDY. PERSAVAL WHO MARRIED TO SISTER LIRING MISTRESS ORIGINALLY INTRODUCED LIRING-3 TO GUAT REBEL

SECRET

K.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ 2

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5221 SECRET

EXILE GROUP MEXICO CITY. ALTHOUGH ROWTON LACKS LATEST DETAILS, IT PROBABLE PERSAVAL WAS PERSUADED ACCOMPANY LIRING-3 AND LARA AT LAST MINUTE SINCE HE HAD CAR AND LARA GUN WOUND MADE BUS TRAVEL IMPOSSIBLE. SUGGEST GUATEMALA CITY INFORM LIAISON MARCUE WELL KNOWN MEXICAN LEFTIST RELATED TO EX DIRECTOR PERIODICA AND LARA GUAT LEFTIST EXILE BUT INDICATE IT HAS NO TRACES LIRING-3.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE DETAILS LIRING-3/LARA/PERSAVAL ARRESTS AND SUBSEQUENT INTERROGATION AS BECOME AVAILABLE. IS THERE CHANCE ARRESTS LIRING-3/PARSAVAL MAY LEAK TO PRESS OR LOCAL MEXICAN AUTHORITIES? PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

9-67 EDITIONS

LIRING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B

TOTAL COPIES 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY D AT 0110 Z

DISSEM BY 3 PER

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

1		6	C
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

INFO FILE VR CS/DO, SOD 6, ADDC/A, CI/OPS, 16 APR 68 IN 91436

SECRET 152357Z APR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8838

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ROUTINE TEGUCIGALPA

LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5285 (IN 91298)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 521 (NOT SENT TEGUCIGALPA)

C. GUATEMALA CITY 8822 (NOT SENT TEGUCIGALPA) (IN 80309)

1. ON AFTERNOON 15 APRIL 68 LIAISON REPORTED THAT FRANCISCO ADALBERTO (LARA) BARRIOS, GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST WHO CARRIED MEXICAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS IN NAME JACINTO (RANGEL) CERVANTES; CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR, MEXICAN CARRYING PASSPORT NO. 103388; AND CARLOS MANUEL (PERSAVAL) MARCUE, MEXICAN CARRYING PASSPORT NO. 38171, WERE CAPTURED BY GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES NEAR MEXICAN BORDER OVER PAST WEEKEND (EXACT DATE NOT AVAILABLE). ALL THREE WERE BROUGHT TO GUATEMALA CITY AND ARE BEING HELD FOR INTERROGATION.

2. AMONG ITEMS TAKEN FROM PRISONERS WAS MESSAGE FROM (OR TO) "NESTOR VALLE" (FAR PSEUDO OF NERY DE LEON LICARDIE, FAR LEADER), GUERRILLA TRAINING MATERIAL, AND THREE SMALL "STONE" BELLS. WHEN ASKED ABOUT BELLS (EACH OF PRISONERS CARRIED A BELL) INTERROGATORS GOT THREE DIFFERENT STORIES. DURING INITIAL INTERROGATION BY ARMY, LARA ADMITTED HE COMMUNIST, BUT CLAIMED HE RETURNING TO GUATEMALA

K.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY________ AT:______________Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.__________

X-REF TO FILE NO.__________

DISSEM BY__________ PER________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 5880 SECRET

TO RENOUNCE HIS AFFILIATION.

3. LIAISON REQUESTED STATION FOR TRACES ON THREE PRISONERS. ADVISE INFORMATION MEXICO CITY WISHES PASS LIAISON.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

5P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 1968
DOC MICRO SER.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operations Against PBRUMEN Targets Involving LIRING-3, LIRING-4, and Their Contacts - January to 31 March 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References : A. HMMW-16222
B. HMMA-33842

1. The development, handling, and exploitation of any asset under false pretenses by someone operating under false flag has and will continue to have many drawbacks. In the case of LIRING-3/LIRING-4 the situation is further complicated by the fact that PBRUMEN nationals at home and in LIRING (the main target against whom the two have been directed) have long suspected their motives for maintaining contact and wanting to cooperate with them. The ups and downs of the LIRING-3/LIRING-4 marital relations have from time to time further complicated the conduct of operations involving them. The Station can understand that Headquarters has some reservations on the conduct of these operations. They have been complicated, time consuming, and have blown hot and cold depending on the state of mind of the PBRUMENers at the time and the difficulties between LIRING-3 and LIRING-4. Because of incomplete control, an almost inescapable feature of this type of operation, a considerable effort was made to check the reliability of LIRING-3 and LIRING-4. This involved LIFEAT coverage, audio monitoring (LIROSIN), and occasional

Continued....................

Attachments:
A. Reports (15), u/s/c
B. Identity Sheet, u/s/c

Liring-3

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy att A; 3 copies att B)

S/c atts: 2

CS COPY

201-818842

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
B 201-798301	HMMA - 34484	16 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

surveillance by the LIEMBRACEs. The results, at least in the PBRUMEN phase of this operation, have been unspectacular so far. The main usefulness of LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 has been a) as access agents to LIRING, (although this has been largely reduced to the LIRING Consulate), and b) to introduce Wallace B. ROWTON to visiting PBRUMEN officials and members of the local leftist community with access to PBRUMEN and LIRING. A major effort was started recently to take this operation up one more notch and, taking advantage of a recent crisis in the relations between LIRING-3 and LIRING-4, send the latter to PBRUMEN on a mission to assess and hopefully recruit new sources of information. The exploitation of LIRING-3's contacts with representatives of the Guatemalan FAR rebel movement was the object of separate correspondence. LIRING-3's renewed contacts with these representatives do not at this time involve PBRUMEN, although the latter clearly supports at least some of their activities.

2. Forwarded under separate cover are fifteen reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4, and some of their contacts from late January to 31 March 1968. The Station has noted Headquarters' desire for more frequent progress reports per reference A. It felt, however, that in this case partial reporting of LIRING-4's difficulties in obtaining a PBRUMEN visa (by far the most important aspect of this operation during the period under review) could have been misleading, as the situation changed several times and LIRING-4 did not really know what to expect from LIRING from one meeting with its representatives to the next, not to again mention the ups and downs of the LIRING-3/LIRING-4 relationship, which hit a new low during this period. The Station would like to point out in passing that, in addition to cable reporting and dispatches transmitting ROWTON's contact reports, the operations in which LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 are involved in are reviewed in some detail in the over-all monthly report submitted by the PBRUMEN Section of this Station.

3. The last time LIRING-4 accompanied LIRING-3 to PBRUMEN, she obtained an entry visa in a few days. LIRING-4 thus felt that as an ex-employee of LIRING with good connections in PBRUMEN and LIRING she would obtain a new PBRUMEN entry visa fairly easily. Entry visas are now quite a bit more difficult to obtain, however, for PBRUMEN nonofficial citizens abroad. It also appears that the LIRING staff did not really know what to make of LIRING-4's stated desire to return to PBRUMEN for an extended period of time, as this was obviously based on a domestic quarrel. LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 have had other quarrels, and the LIRING staff may have thought that this last one would subside and that LIRING-4 would postpone or cancel her plans for going to PBRUMEN. It was to convince the LIRING staff that the difficulties with his wife were serious that LIRING-3 first went to LIRING. In a maneuver to further convince the LIRING employees, particularly LIRING-2 and LIRING-9, that LIRING-4 seriously wanted to go to PBRUMEN as a result of domestic problems, ROWTON decided to have LIRING-3 openly question LIRING-4's right to take their child with her. It must be remembered that, in Mexico, a wife cannot leave the country, and especially take a child with her, without the express and official consent of the husband. This little scenario appears to have been well played. On the other hand, it did not help LIRING-4 obtain a visa any faster. LIRING-2 appeared to be waiting, among other things, for LIRING-3 to arrive at a decision regarding their child acceptable to his wife. LIRING-3 finally "agreed" to let LIRING-4 take the child at his 26 February meeting at LIRING. Two days before, LIRING-4 had been told by LIRING-2 that the

"consejo superior" of LIRING, of which he said he was a member, had not yet taken up her case. This was indirectly confirmed by LIRING-16, who told LIRING-4 the same day that nothing about her visa case had yet been sent to PBRUMEN as he would otherwise know it, since he handled all visa correspondence.

4. There is naturally the possibility that LIRING-4's visa request was handled by LIRING via classified correspondence not seen by LIRING-16. This channel may have been used because LIRING-4's visa request brought out the old problem of LIRING-3's reliability in the eyes of the PBRUMENers. Although LIRING-2, LIRING-9, and Identity appeared sympathetic toward LIRING-4 and her projected visit to PBRUMEN (to the point where they advised her on more than one occasion not to come back to Mexico), they, at the same time, sought to clarify two things. They first made another attempt to throw some light on the sources through which LIRING-3 had obtained information of particular interest to LIRING. Secondly they brought up the question of "the Greek" (ROWTON) and tried to obtain answers to pertinent questions. LIRING, as mentioned by both LIRING-2 and Identity, is not used to being given sensitive information without at the same time obtaining good source description. Specifically, how did LIRING-3 hear of the arrest of the LIRING member involved in a subversive case in 1966, how did he learn of its proposed publication in the press of a Central American country, how did he obtain the report on Rico GALAN which he passed to LIRING, and how could he have learned of certain of the activities of Moises OROZCO Leal? To all these questions LIRING-3 replied by saying that he had good sources in Mexico and Central America and that he was not about to divulge them to the PBRUMENers. Both LIRING-2 and Identity in their conversations with LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 took pains to say that LIRING-3's conduct in his dealings with LIRING and PBRUMEN was "above reproach." They wanted to be sure, however, that he "had not fallen victim to unscrupulous elements constantly surrounding the revolution." To quote the old cliche, LIRING-3 "got their message."

5. ROWTON's introduction to LIRING-2 and other LIRING members by Rodolfo REYES Cortes and his subsequent meetings with LIRING-2 were bound to make the latter somewhat curious about this wealthy Greek businessman and proclaimed friend of "the revolution" who seems to travel extensively and appears to have well-informed and influential friends in many parts of the world. LIRING-2 was apparently ruffled by ROWTON's criticism of the LIRING efficiency (see ROWTON's report dated 1 January sent as an attachment to reference B) since he finally phoned ROWTON's "office" after the incident described in ROWTON's 1 January report. For some reason LIRING-2 made the call on a legal holiday when offices are usually closed, and the operator of ROWTON's answering service answered "Mr. ROWTON's (in alias) office." This apparently made LIRING-2 even more inquisitive. During a one hour meeting at LIRING on 15 February LIRING-2 asked LIRING-4 about her relationship with "the Greek." LIRING-2 wanted to know where and for whom he worked, et cetera. ROWTON's report of 17 February covers this conversation in detail. LIRING-2 appeared to suspect ROWTON may have been one of the sources of the information passed LIRING by LIRING-3 and warned LIRING-4 "to go easy with the Greek," if not for her sake, at least for LIRING-3, who "has not always treaded on firm ground." LIRING-4 provided some "information" on her Greek acquaintance on 24 February. ROWTON, who had briefed her in detail on what

she should tell LIRING-2, felt, after listening to LIRING-4's report, that the latter had at least partly succeeded in lessening LIRING-2's suspicions. These suspicions may have been further reduced after LIRING-3's discussion with LIRING-2 on 26 February. ROWTON did expect LIRING-2's questions and felt in the end that he had "passed the test."

6. The Station does not know at this point whether LIRING-4 will get a PBRUMEN entry visa but is still optimistic that she will. The PBRUMENers appear convinced that there is serious trouble between her and LIRING-3, and LIRING-1, to whom LIRING-4 wrote for help recently, asked her to be patient, pointing out that red tape in PBRUMEN takes time. The possibility that the PBRUMENers may allow LIRING-4 in their country to interrogate her about the activities of her husband and some of her friends has occurred to ROWTON and the Station. Such a possibility is, however, most unlikely as the object of the PBRUMEN suspicions is LIRING-3 and not LIRING-4, who has several times told them that she knows little of what LIRING-3 does. The most important consideration, however, is that LIRING-4 is married to a Mexican citizen, and as suspicious as they may be of the latter's doings, the PBRUMENers have, to the best of our knowledge, no proof that this Mexican has done anything against their regime. On the contrary, LIRING-3 has time and again warned them of impending difficulties or problems. The fact that LIRING-4 is married to a Mexican and that she enjoys the status of immigrant in Mexico is also the best assurance that she would be allowed to return to Mexico, as the PBRUMENers want no trouble with the Mexicans. The SGSWIRL examination recently given LIRING-4 has cleared the air at least on two points. First, that LIRING-4 is not an enemy penetration, and, second, that she has not revealed the nature and extent of her contacts with ROWTON to anyone else than LIRING-3. The Station agrees with ROWTON that LIRING-4 would, if given a chance, prove herself to be a good asset. As for the question of being left with continuing obligations in this operation, both LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 know that there is little ROWTON could do beyond providing legal-type advice to bring LIRING-4 back to Mexico if the PBRUMENers refused to allow her to return to her husband, an unlikely possibility as mentioned above in view of current Mexican/PBRUMEN relations. The letter of understanding signed by LIRING-4 specifies the extent of ROWTON's commitment and leaves no doubt as to the extent of his obligations. The Station hopes that LIRING-4's relationship with LIRING-3 will not improve with time to the point where she will lose the proper motivation and cover to undertake the mission to PBRUMEN for which she has been trained and briefed.

7. The attempt made to exploit Carmen LOZADA's trip to PBRUMEN to obtain assessments and vulnerability information on a number of persons she knows who have operational potential turned out to be a complete failure. LOZADA ran into such difficult family problems in PBRUMEN that she had no time (or, as it turned out, desire) to obtain the information requested of her. The strain of her personal problems was such that she nearly had a nervous breakdown after returning to Mexico City on 16 February. Not even LIRING-3 could get anything out of her. The victim of a type of family blackmail by her pro-AMTHUG husband, LOZADA returned to PBRUMEN on 15 March. ROWTON did not fare much better with Rodolfo REYES Cortes, who returned to Mexico City in early March. REYES, who is preparing to go to Chile to put on a ballet performance, has been extremely busy since his return with private and professional matters. ROWTON nevertheless managed to debrief

CI: Indonesia
A: [illegible]
Occ: Dipl

him at least partially on his contacts in PBRUMEN. The only concrete result of REYES' trip to PBRUMEN so far is the contact which he made with Sukendah *HANAFI, the ex-Ambassador of Indonesia in Havana. According to REYES, HANAFI expressed interest in meeting ROWTON to "work something out" to the mutual advantage of both the Greek and Indonesian revolutions. After a couple of phone calls, it turned out, however, that HANAFI would probably be unable to obtain a Mexican entry visa. The Station believes, anyway, that little would be gained by a meeting. From the information at hand, HANAFI is a convinced leftist who does not lack for money and seems to have an enjoyable life in PBRUMEN. The Station is finally not interested in the Indonesian "revolution" or in what HANAFI could do to help the Greek leftists.

8. If she does not go to PBRUMEN an effort will be made to further exploit the antagonism LIRING-4 has developed for the personnel of LIRING in the course of her attempts to obtain a PBRUMEN visa to obtain additional operational information on LIRING and its employees. LIRING-4 has been so humiliated and angered that she is willing to do literally anything against LIRING. She told ROWTON that she would put a time bomb in the building if he asked her to do so. LIRING-4 has already been used unwittingly for MHCREDO purposes. It may be possible if she stays in Mexico City to use her in connection with an audio operation against the "safe room" of the LIRING Consulate.

for Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

11P

SECRET

MICROFILMED
MAY 2 1968
DOC MICRO. SER.

Separate Cover Attachment B to
HMMA-34484

Identity Sheet

Identity: Ismael SUAREZ de la Paz

S/c att: 2
HMMA-34484

SECRET

CS COPY

201-778301

31 March,1968

Subject: SGSWIRL Examination of LIRING/4. [illegible] SUITABLE FOR [illegible]

1. LIRING/4 was given an SGSWIRL examination from about 1030 until 1300 on 31/3/68 at room 602 of the Hotel del Bosque on Calle Melchor Ocampo. Rowton rented the suite in the name Nicolas Spyropoulos and no security problems were encounted in using this site.

2. Rowton first proposed the examination to LIRING/4, after discussing it briefly with LIRING/3, at 1600 on 30/3/68 in the coffee shop of the Hotel Bosque in the presence of the examiner. L/4's initial reaction was almost identical to that of LIRING/3 - one of shock, indignation, and outright refusal on the ground that it was "servil" and beneath her dignity at any price. She made it clear that she felt she had been and was taking all the risks and consiered it completely unfair that she should have to subject herself to such a "police" interrogation when she had done nothing wrong and in fact knew nothing about Rowton. At one point she commented that this whole thing made her think that Rowton was an agent of WOFACT. She did not dwell on this point, however, or return to it subsequently.

3. In view of this unfavorably turn at the initial session Rowton agreed with the examiner that the latter should gracefully bow out and give Rowton a chance to soften L/4 up by a more thorough explanation,especially since L/4 refused flatly to accompany Rowton and the examiner to the safehouse room upstairs. Rowton then spent the next two hours explaining the test emphasing that it would not include any indiscriminate frivolous questions and that L/4 would know beforehand what the precise questions were. Rowton made it clear that he was interested mainly in determining whether L/4 had betrayed him to her LIRING contacts and had any sort of secret agreement with PERUMEN to work against him. L/4 finally agreed to take the examination the following morning since as she stated her conscience was clear.

4. The responses appeared favorably on pertinent questions and the control question on any theft of money (suggested by Rowton on the basis of the report given to him in confidence by liring/3 that L/4 had taken 2,000 pesos from the LIRING safe which she almost immediately replaced on his insistence) proved to be excellent. L/4 did not reveal the specific theft but she was evidently thoroughly convinced after the test that the SGSWIRL is reliable and cannot be beaten Rowton and the examiner felt it unwise to break her on this control question since it would prove counterproductive and would probably expose L/3 as the source. The test will proably serve as an excellent deterrent and additi nal control for future assessment of L/4 and evaluation of her reporting.

S/c att:1
HMMA-34484

CS COPY

WB 201-798301
Wallace B. Rowton

24 March,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Status of Request for Re-entry Permit.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at her request at 1630 on 23/3/68 at the Denny's Restaurant (Reforma & Diana) to discuss the status of her visa (re-entry) request. She stated that she had just received a letter from her friend Doctor Yolanda Díaz, transmitted through Jorrín and given to her by the latter that same morning. The translation of the text of the letter is as follows:

"Año del Guerrillero Heróico"
La Habana.Febrero 9/68

Sra.
México,D.F.

~~Quer~~ Dear · As I explained to you last night when we spoke (on the telephone) the processing of your entry is being held up because of a number of things that have to be done which in ~~the~~ view of the priorities you know~~s~~ exist result in it~~s~~ not being done as rapidly as one would wish.
I don't think you should be discouraged and rest assured that as soon as it comes through, we'll advise you, especially since Abreu is going to follow it through. Kisses to your child and regards to Carlos.

/s/ Yolanda

2. The letter, a copy of which was made by Rowton, also contains a P.S. from Abreu, a translation of which follows:

> I'm taking an interest in your matter. As Yolanda explains red tape takes time. I received your cable and letter.
>
> Fondly,
>
> /s/ Abreu

3. LIRING/4 called to Rowton's attention the length of time (almost six weeks) for the letter to reach her dispite the fact that Abreu himself most probably forwarded it through the pouch. L/4 commented that when she remarked this to her friend Catalina Cepero, the latter stated that she had received a ltter in the pouch the same day but it was dated in December,1967, and another from Yolanda dated February 9,1968.

4. LIRING/4 also reported that she had finally managed to talk with her father on the telephone, and,although he appeared uneasy and somewhat abrupt (seco), she was reassured that he was in reasonably good health. She finally assured Rowton that she no longer suspected him of any foul play and agreed that her father was apparently acting on the advice of his lawyer in connection with the visa reuqest of her brother (to emigrate to the U.S.) that was being processed in New York.

WB Rowton

22 March,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of News Concerning her Father in New York.

1. At 1600 on 22/3/68 Rowton visited LIRING/4 at her residence to discuss with her a report she had received from a mutual friend concerning her father. Earlier in the day LIRING/3 had informed Rowton that LIRING/4 had received a disturbing piece of news to the effect that someone had approached her father in New York City and told him to break off all contact with LIRING/4 in order to avoid jeopardising his residence in the U.S. According to LIRING/3, LIRING/4 was convinced as a result of this report that Rowton, and possibly with the knowledge of LIRING/3 himself, had arranged this approach to preclude any ~~xxx~~contact L/4 might have had with her father that might jeopardise her mission to Havana. Rowton assured LIRING/3 that he had take no such action and agreed to talk to LIRING/4 to reassure her also since according to LIRING/3 she was very upset and her confidence in both Rowton and LIRING/3 himself shaken.

2. Rowton reassured LIRING/4 when he saw her but, of course, could not furnish proof of any kind that he had not intervened. He asked several times the identity of the source, but LIRING/4 seatfastly refused to divulge it, saying only that a lawyer friend of her father had written to her stating that the reason her father had not communicated with her over ~~xxxx~~ the past three months and had not answered her letters and telephone calls was that "they" had told him not to maintain any contact with his daughter at the risk of losing his residence in the U.S. Rowton asked whether the lawyer's name was Portuondo (a lead furnished by LIRING/3) but L/4 would not confirm or deny this, syaing simply that she would look into the matter herself. She said that she suspected Rowton since he was the only person to whom she had given her father's address in New York and she could not imagine why any other person would have a motive to contact her father in that way. She added that if her father had just given her some sort of explanation she could understand, but acting the way he did indicated that someone had terrorized him into complete silence. Rowton again insisted that he did not in any way contact her father, and would never have done so without first consulting her. He surrised that possibly her father's lawyer had counseled him to break off contact in connection with the application her father was making ~~fr~~ for a visa for LIRING/4's brother on the ground that the American authorities might deny the visa if they knew of LIRING/4's previous employment in the LIRING offices.

Wallace B. Rowton

4

12 March,1968

1. Rodolfo Reyes Cortes informed Rowton 8/3/68 that while in Havana he discussed with his friend Sukendah Hanafi, ex-Indonesian Ambassador to Cuba, possibility of collaboration with his Greek leftist businessman friend both in international commercial deals and politically. According Reyes, Hanafi expressed immediate interest, accepting Reyes' word that he could place full trust in Rowton. Hanafi stated that he felt something could be worked out to ~~their~~ mutual advantage of both the Greek and the Indonesian revolution, since he had contact himself with the liberation army of Indonesian.

2. Hanafi asked Reyes to set up a meeting for him with Rowton upon his return to Mexico City, ~~[illegible]~~ perferably in Mexico City where Reyes could make the introduction personally, but indicating that he might run into difficulty in obtaining a visa. He added that if Mexico City not possible he would travel to Paris where he has never had visa trouble.

3. Reyes reported to Rowton on 11/3/68 that he had talked to Hanafi on telephone ~~xxx~~ asking him arrange trip soonest to Mexico City, but Hanafi had replied that his initial check had revealed Mexicans would insist on clearance with Indonesian Embassy Mexico City prior to issuance of visa. Hanafi added, however, that he taking matter up with Raúl Roa and might be able arrange some sort of official travel to facilitate issuance of visa. He promised advise Reyes soonest since he aware that Reyes must leave for Chile by end March (as soon as his wife, Tatiana, obtains Chilean visa).

WBRowton

LIRING/4 reported also that L/2 told her that Ramiro Abreu's home address is

CalleHerrería 41
esquina Lacret
Santo Suarez
La Habana

9 March,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Contact with LIRING/2 and LIRING/9.

1. At 0930 on 9/3/68 LIRING/4 reported to Rowton that she had again on 8/3 visited the LIRING establishment to check on the status of her re-entry permit. She stated that LIRING/2 was cordial but politiely passed the buck on her re-entry permit to LIRING/9, stating that it was a matter for L/9's office and that in any case he himself was so busy looking for a house for the Chief that he could not do anything else at the moment. He said in passing that he had to go to Acapulco that evening and would be there until Sunday night (10/3/68). He jokingly invited L/4 along for the ride. He also commented that he himself would be back in Havana about June and why didn't L/4 wait to go back with him. He added that in any case he hoped to see her there.

2. LIRING/4 also reported that Echemendía (Ismail Suarez de la Paz),who happened to be present when she was talking to L/2, commented that his wife would be leaving on the 11 March flight and that he himself expected to be returning in about two weeks. L/4 then commented sarcastically that at the rate things were going with L/2 she would probably be still waiting for her entry permit when he left and in that case he could personally expedite it. L/2 then by way of apology stated that the mother-in-law of the Swiss Ambassador had been waiting for over three weeks for her entry visa and there was nothing he could do to speed things up from this end. L/4 replied that this was after all little consolation for her, although she felt very sorry for the Swiss mother-in-law.

3. LIRING/4 continued to Rowton that she then spoke briefly with LIRING/9 who greeted her cordially and asked her to take a coffee with him in his private office. On entering this office L/4 noted that the plaster had fallen from the ceiling just above the desk and L/9 commented that it had just happened the day before and that he hoped to have it repaired soon. He added that he would also be getting better furniture and some pictures to decorate the bare walls. L/4 noted that the phone was still attached to the wall and no lamp of any kind was in the room.

4. According to L/4, LIRING/9 is still waiting for a reply from Havana re her re-entry permit, and hoped to have some reply by 11/3/68. His secretary privately assured L/4 that she would let her know at once if anything came in. LIRING/4 also reported to Rowton that she talked to her friend

CS COPY

Yolanda Díaz on the telephone as a follow-up on her telegram to ask Ramiro Abreu to expedite her request for the re-entry permit. L/4 told Rowton that Yolanda explained that she had been unable to contact Abreu at first but finally got to him on 8/3/68 and he promised to do what he could soonest, although he commented that it would be impossible to do anything over the week-end.

5. LIRING/4 also reported to Rowton that she had talked briefly with srta Esperón of L/2's office and was surprised to hear her complain of the "insupportable" conditions under which she had to work. Srta Esperón said that she had been employed in the LIRING offices for the past 38 years and prior to the revolution had been relatively happy. Lately, however, everything was full of mystery, all doors and cabinets locked up, and nobody trusting anyone. She confided in L/4 that she had had enough ("harta") and was afraid that she would have to leave, abandoning any hope she still had of getting her pension after so many years.

WBRowton
Wallace B. Rowton

6

1 March,1968

Subject: Miscellaneous Information Furnished by LIRING/4.

1. At his meeting with LIRING/4,on the morning of 1 March,1968, Rowton asked L/4 for various miscellaneous information that might be of use to the Station. L/4 recalled that when she worked in the Consulate office, the combination of the safe was as follows:

4 times to right,stopping at 10,
3 times to left, stopping at 65,
2 times to right, stoppingat 75,
then turn to left until one can feel tumbler drop in place.

2. L/4 also furnished Rowton with information for the attached sketch of the consular office where she formerly worked, indicating the location of the safe (in the corner concealed behind a wooden door locked by key). Likewise L/4 gave details of the office of Abelardo Curbelo which she stated he shared with his new secretary,Conchita - the wife of the Olympic Attaché.

3. L/4 also told Rowton that she learned recently from Jorrín that all confidential papers are now handled and processed by one person. L/4 added that she learned from conversation with MercededMartinez Moreno de Gonzalez that she is in fact the person handling the confidential documents. She stated to L/4 that she has to process the confidential papers of all the offices, specifically Curbelo, Cicard, Luna, as well as her husband's,(Crux) and Martinez'. L/4 explained to Rowtonthat previously each office handled its own confidential documents, and filed them in their respective safes.

4. L/4 also gave Rowton the form given her by the Consulate to be filled in for the "Registro de Ciudadanos Cubanos". L/4 explained that she alleged that she had lost the original form given to her and thus obtained another so that she could provide Rowton with a sample of the form(attached herewith).

5. L/4 also reported that,as Rowton had requested,she typed out a letter to her father (given to the Station) at 1330 on 1 March,1968, on the consulate typewriter. She regretted not having been able to obtain the name of the typewriter since it was not visible on the case. When she asked Adia E. Lopez de Valdes the name the latter surprised her be saying that L/4 was the second person to ask for such information that day. In view of that comment, L/4 felt she could not press for the information desired.

W B Rowton
Wallace B. Rowton


BATH
PATIO
BOOKS
Papers
lower section
DESK
RECEPTION
Typewriter on stand
DESK
Book shelves
Safe (3-way)
BOOKS
Papers
Telephone
Archives
File Cabinet
wooden cabinet with key
Telephone.

LIRING/4 1 March, 1968


Olga Martinez' office
Sofa
Ambassador's Office
Section where pouch made up
Srta Esperón's office
Curbelo's office (shared by Conchita

LIRING/4

1 March, 1968

27 February,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Conversation with LIRING/2.

1. At 0930 on 27/2/68 LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had spoken briefly to Echemendía (Ismail Suarez de la Paz) on 24/2/68 and to LIRING/2 at some length on 26/2/68 in the LIRING offices. L/3 explained to Rowton that Echemendía had passed a message to him through L/4 that he wanted to talk to him and that he would telephone himto arrange a meeting. L/3 continued that Echemendía finally contacted him by phone at about noon on 24/2/68 and asked him to come to the LIRING office that afternoon. L/3 told Rowton that when he finally saw Echemendía the latter was very vague and general in his statements and that all he could gather from his statements was that Echemendía was apologetic for the "misunderstanding" that had arisen as a result of L/4's request for a re-entry permit. Echemendía stated that "we" are concerned that L/3, whom they considered honest and above reproach in his dealings with PBRUMEN, might have fallen victem to unscupluous elements who constantly surround the revolution. L/3 confessed to Rowtn that this vague and almost incoherent line of Echemendía annoyed him to such an extent that he felt it useless to continue his conversation with him and as a result terminated it at the first opportunity.

2. LIRING/3 continued thathe met with LIRING/2 on 26/2/68 at the latter's office with much more fuitful results. According to L/3, L/2 began by stating that "they" appreciated the information L/3 had passed to them at various times in the past, specifically the report of Julian Lopez' arrest, the proposed publication of the arrest in the Guatemalan press, the report concerning the letter of Rico Galán and the Crozco afair, but they were frankly perflexed with regard to the source of such sensitive information. L/3 told Rowton that he explained to L/2 that he had excellent Central American contacts,as well as Mexican sources in good positions, who could furnish such information witout naming anyone. He told L/2 that he had no intention of jeopardising his business contacts by revealing their identity, and he felt that what he had done was in the interest of PBRUMEN and the revolution and that L/2 and his friends should not lock a gift horse in the mouth and see spies behind every blade of xxxxx grass, just becasue they themselves had no capability to check out his reports.

3. L/3 then told Rowton that L/2 asked directly aboot "el Griego" and his relationship to L/3. L/3 stated that he feigned surprise and asked "What Greek", adding that he knew several Greeks in Guatemala, Venezuela and Mexico. L/2 clarified by stating that he meant the Greek introduced to him

CS COPY

by Rodolfo Reyes. L/3 then exclaimed: "Oh, you mean señor Harris." to which L/2 replied in the affirmative. L/3 then explained that he felt that sr. Harris was a high-minded revolutionary with high level contacts throughout the world developed through his business xxxxxxx relationships who had helped him a great deal over the past two years both financially and morally He then asked L/2 what he knew about international business, to wich L/2 repiled that he knew practically nothing, L/3 told Rowton that he then closed in with a somewhat elaborate explanation of how international businessmen acquire valubable bits of inteeligence with trying as a result of the sensitive relationship they develop with political personalities in various governments. L/3 stated to Rowton that he felt L/2 was impressed favorably with his explanation, since he finally stated that in reality "they" (meaning himself, Sergio Martinez, Ismail Suarez de la Paz and Cepeda), the Consejo Superior de la Embajada" had nothing against sr. Harris but simply that they did not know enough about him. L/2 then stated that L/3 must realize that the revolution was surrounded by provocateurs and that when they have the least suspicions that they must put on "the amber light" of caution. L/3 then stated that his dealings with sr. Harris were sensitive high-level business negotiations for the procurement of sulphur and that he could produce documents to prove this. L/2 replied thatthis was not at all necessary and that it was simply just a question of knowing a little more about the sources available to L/3 and about the "Greek". L/3 conluded with a statement that L/2 must in the last analysis weigh the entire affair in terms of whether L/3 in fact had ever done anything against the revolution. L/2 replied without hesitation that everyone felt that L/3 had always acted in good faith and h-d the best of intentions. It was simply that they felt that L/3 might have become a victim of a provocateur without realizing it.

4. L/2 then stated that he had no objection to giving L/4 an entry permit but he hoped that L/3 was not just trying to solve a domestic problem by sending her back to her mother. L/3 replied that there was in fact a serious domestic problem and confessed th t he had had an affair with another woman which L/4 had discovered but he felt this was a very personal problem about which L/2 should not be concerned. L/2 replied that he agreed with this and was concerned simply about the child which he felt L/4 should be permitted to take with her. L/3 told Rowton that he finally conceded to L/2 that perhaps he was right and that he should be more considerate of L/4 and permit her to take the child to Havana. L/3 told Rowton that the meeting with L/2 ended on a rather cordial note and that he had the impression that L/2 would grant L/4 the re-entry permit without further delay.

14-00000

8

25 February, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Conversation with LIRING/2.

1. LIRING/4 reported to Rowton at 1045 on 24 February, 1968, that she had again spoken to LIRING/2 about her entry permit to return to Havana. She appeared depressed and began the conversation stating that she was "fed up" (harta) with the LIRING office, explaining that she felt that she had been treated very unfairly and shabbily, particularly by LIRING/2. She stated that she had waited for several hours to see LIRING/2 on the mroning of 23 February inside the premises of the LIRING offices but had finally to leave after only a few words of conversation with him. She related that LIRING/2 and LIRING/9 were occupied in conversation with Eugenia Olguin(who had recently returned from a three-months stay in Havana with her sister Marcela) and she did not feel it proper to interrupt to ask about her permit to return to Cuba. When she finally buttonholed LIRING/2, he said that he would rather talk to her the following morning - about 1000, since it was Saturxday, explaining that he was very busy with a number of diffacult cases.

2. LIRING/4 continued that when she returned to his office about 1015 the following morning (24 February) she again had to wait about 15 minutes before finding LIRING/2 alone. To her annoyance he again brushed her off, stating that he still did not have a final answer since the matter had not as yet been taken up by the "consejo superior" of the establishment. L/2 continued that he hoped to have some sort of decision by Monday and asked L/4 to see him again. L/4 stated to Rowton that she could not contain her feelings any longer and exploded in a burst of invective again the LIRING office, accusing them among other things of giving visas to all sorts of hippies and delinquents and making her wait on pins and needles when she had a right to return. L/4 then stated that just as she was leaving, she turned to L/2 and said:"Oh, I forget to tell you, but I managed to see the 'Greek.'" L/4 told Rowton that at this L/2 came suddenly back to life and invited her into his office again, closing the door and ushering her to a chair. She then stated that she had telephoned "the Greek" (Rowton) on the pretext that she wanted him to buy some jewelry for her on his next trip to Switzerland and succeeded in having coffee with him at Sanborns. She continued that in the course of conversation she learned that his telephone is actually an answering service and hence operates 24 hours per day, and that he is interested in buying sulphur in Mexico and that his principal client is the Greek shipowner, Niarchos. She then showed L/2 a matchbox on which the Greek had written the name Niarchos in both Greek and English

script, since she pretended to be curious about the spelling of the name. According to L/4, L/2 snatched up the match-box with expressions of appreciation, and continued to listen with interest. L/4 continued that the Greek explained to her the difficulties and complexities of working with the Mexicans in procuring sulphur and other critical products, but she confessed to L/2 that she knew nothing about such matters and felt very confused. She commented, however, that the Greek appeared quite relaxed and willing to answer her questions. She added that when she turned the conversation on Cuba, the Greek replied that he was interested naturally as a good revolutionary, but frankly was very disappointed ("decepcionado") at the treatment received by the LIRING officials he had met, including L/2. L/4 continued that the Greek had commented that he had many dealings with foreign officials in his normal business operations but had never encountered the discourtesy shown by LIRING officers, who did not even answer his telephone calls. L/4 conluded with a statement that she felt the Greek was no longer interested in Cuba and assumed that he had obtained whatever information he needed from other sources.

3. LIRING/4 then asked L/2 whether he needed any more information since she might be seeing the Greek once more before he left for Europe again. L/2 replied that he appreciated what she had already obtained and added that he felt it wise in these cases to get to know the person "more and more" before making a judgement. L/4 told Rowton that at this point she could not refrain from the outburst:" But you have known me for several years, and you still can't make up your mind. How much time do you need to figure things out". She told Rowton that L/2 just smiled at this and again asked to be given until Monday for the final answer re the permission to return.

4. LIRING/4 then told Rowton that as she was leaving the premises,she stopped briefly to chat with Jorrín. The latter appeared genuinely surprised that LIRING/4 had not as yet been granted her permit. When she commented that probably L/2 had to wait for a reply from Havana, Jorrín exclaimed:" No, that's not probable, since he did not send any cable on you; otherwise I would know". He added as an afterthought that possibly he could have sent a dispatch which he would not know about, but he doubted that in view of the time element involved. Jorrín then commented that"everything"had changed since L/4 had left her job, explaining that now all confidential papers, not only from L/2's oofice but also from L/9, the Commerical Section, and from "Luna's office" were handled by one person rather than as previously by each office, (L/4 commented to Rowton that she had never heard of a person by the name of Luna) and that things in general had been tightened up from a security standpoint.

9

20 February,1968

Subject: Carmen Lozada Statments to LIRING/3 re trip.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Newton at 2130 on 19/2/68 that Carmen Lozada had telephoned him about 0930 that morning and that he had seen her again at her request. On this occasion he found her relatively composed and quite coherent as compared to their first meeting since her return.

2. L/3 reported that she stated that the situation in Havana was "chaotic" -- economically a disaster with no rice on the market, gasoline rationing (8 gallons per month for ordinary cars and 20 for larger) strictly enforced and police control "brutal". She stated that at the Havana airport everything is searched even of Mexicans as herself and what can be taken for personal reasons is removed on the pretext of having it "checked".

3. Carmen Lozada stated specifically to L/3 that she had heard strong rumors in Havana that Fidel Castro would be replaced by Dorticós mainly because of the failure of Fidel's economic policies. It was also rumored that sugar productionx would fall far below last year's figure, possibly exceeding 4,000,000 tons by only a fraction. Bad fertilizer xxxxxxxxxxx xxxx is blamed but the general feeling is that it is rather bae management and Fidel's advisors are taking the blame.

4. Carmen also reported that she had heard "confirmed" reports that César Montes is no longer leader of the Guatemalan revolucion, although she could not say who had replaced him.

10

19 February,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Conversation with Echemendía (Ismail Suarez de la Paz).

1. LIRING/4 reported to Rowton at 1000 on 19/2/68 at the Duca d'Este café that she had met with Echemendía for about one hour on 17 February at a small coffee shop off calle Pachuca in Colonia Condesa. She explained that she had telephoned Echemendía fromthe home of her friend Blanca Peña de Amand and arranged to meet him about 1730 at a nearby corner.

2. LIRING/4 stated that Echemendía was cordial as usual and told her that he hoped - looked forward- to seeing her again whenever she felt she could go out with him for lunch or dinner. He asked her again about her trip to Havana and she informed himthat she hoped to leave on the 23 February flight. Echemendía asked if she thought she might have difficulty returning to Mexico, to which L/4 replied in the negative, commenting that in the past neither the Mexicans nor the Cubans had given her any trouble.

3. According to L/4, Echemendía then queried her in some detail about how LIRING/3 was doing, his business in Chiapas, where they were living, and what his plans were. She replied in as matter-a-fact way as possible, alleging that L/3 was selling his paintings and doing well in business.

4. Echemendía then commented that the LIRING office locally had commented re L/3 that although they appreciated the information he had passed to them they did not have the sources and details and hence had to view them with suspicion. Echemendía apologized to ~~L/3~~ LIRING/4 for having to say this (me da mucha pena) but he felt obliged to pass it along to her. He added that both Havana and LIRING are accustomed to get sources along with the reports turned in to them and always are uneasy when these are lacking. He agreed with L/4 that L/3 had acted in good faith, but also defended the position of the LIRING office which he said was surrounded by provactions and infiltrations.

5. L/4 told Rowton that she did not tell L/3 about this rendevous with Echemendía (whose attentions to L/4 in the past have made L/3 particularly jealous and annoyed) since she did not want to disturb him. LIRING/3, however, reported to Rowton at about 2100 the previous evening (18/2/68) in an obviously irritated tone that by pure chance he had seen Echemendía and LIRING/4 together at a coffee shop about 1800 on 17/2/68. When Rowton explained that he had known of and approved of the meeting beforehand, LIRING/3 calmed down and shrugged it off.

Wallace B. Rowton

4 February,1968

1. LIRING/4 signed contract with Rowton (alias) effective 15 February through 30 April,1968, providing payment for information and services. No obligations specified other than financial(total $750.00 for period specified). LIRING/4 also signed acknowledgement of alias "María Barragán" which was used in contract and receipts for funds.

2. L/4 departure which originally scheduled for 16 February,1968, will be delayed until following Fridxx to permit intensive commo and security training, and strengthen backstop for objective of trip. On 12 February LIRING/2 told L/4 that he would issue permit to return and, in expression apparently genuine sympathy, urged her take trip and remain "where she belonged". On morning 13 February Echemandía (Ismail Suarez de la Paz) who met L/4 by chance inside LIRING compound remarked he happy to learn she going back home for a trip and then added "go back and stay". He then invited her to lunch or dinner but L/4 felt it wise to turn him down first time. They had lunch inxxxx LIRING dining room. On Rowton suggestion she will, however, accept for outside lunch so sound him out further on his reaction to her return.

3. Simultaneously in order build up conviction in minds LIRING officials that L/4 returning becasue of marital problem with LIRING/3 (which she herself stated to Rowton that she hesitated to reveal to anyone), LIRING/3 talked with LIRING/2 in his office 13 February (at moment L/4 elsewhere in LIRING offices) and pretended to have just learned of L/4's request for permission to return. L/3 in angry tone alleged that he could not understand why L/4 would want to return, that he had treated her as well as he could, and that in any case he would not permit her to take their daughter. LIRING/2 although obviously somewhat embarassed took L/4's part and urged L/3 to reconsider and give permission to L/4 to take daughter along since she would be reluctant to leave as a "good mother". L/2 went so far as to state that if L/3 insisted it would be tantamount to "blackmail" against LIRING/4. L/2 continued that he felt obliged as a LIRING official to grant LIRING/4 permission to return but he did not want to oblige her to depart without her child. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he did not give in and left LIRING/2 with the impression that his mind was made up regarding the child.

CS COPY

4. LIRING/4, who was not witting of the above action of LIRING/3, accepted

it later when informed by Rowton as being in her best interest. She agreed that child would not be properly taken care of at mother's home in Santiago becasue of short supply of essential food with neither parent present, that her departure without child would permit frequent correspondence with L/3, and provide excellent pretext for return to Mexico (to convince L/3 to permit her move child to Havana with her once she established.

5. For hdqtrs info, Rowton convinced that LIRING/3 wants permanent separation from LIRING/4 feeling that situation has become "intolerable", whereas LIRING/4 still hoping against hope that their domestic difficulties can be patched up and that when she returns they can resume normal marital relations. She insisted to Rowton that she would remain loyal to him and do nothing to increase his antipathy for her. (Rowton feels this is probably best control that can be hoped for in her operational work).

6. Following lengthy meetings with L/4, Rowton has evolved following operational plan with her approval:

(a) LIRING/4 on arrival will re-establish contact with and assess the following contacts:

(1) Ramiro Abreu
(2) Arnol and Ruby (wife) Rodriquez
(3) Caribel Guilfrido
(4) Capt Luis Carballo and wife
(5) Loló de la Torriente
(6) Mercedes Morales Lereverent.

These persons will be referred to in S/W messages by number only for security reasons. L/4 knows that numbers three and five have already expressed strong anti-revolutionary sentiments and will attempt discreetly to determine present attitude and access.

(b) Discreet efforts will be made learn of efficiency and modus operandi of DSE. LIRING/4 insisted on this for her own protection since Rowton alleged that he could not provide her with necessary briefing. She feels confident that she can get at least some basic data from Ramiro Abreu. L/4 commented that she almost certain the DSE is manipluated by a "foreign service" since she certain that Cubans themselves incapble of efficient and secure operations.

(c) When L/4 feels she has reached point with any of above that she can make some sort of "deal" (for instance assistance to them from outside in exchange for help to her in finding "interesting position" during her forced stay there) she will notify Rowton by S/W and proceed further or withdraw as per instructions.

(d) In event L/4 meets other persons who might prove recruitable she will mention their names xxx address and position in text of open letter to LIRING/3 adding that they send their regards and need something no available in Cuba. The persons thus mentioned will be referred to in S/W by next consecutive number in subsequent message. Rowton has stressed that he interested only in persons in excellent positions and conceivably recruitable. the list should therefore not be exhaustive.

(e) LIRING/4 will have two channels for S/W. First to "Lic. Antonio Ponce " with false return a dress and sent through open mail, and second to LIRING/3 sent by hand through Ramiro Abreu to LIRING office and delivered by hand by Jorrin to Tacubaya apartment, or given by L/4 to some friend traveling to Mexico. In first case all letters mailed, except the frist, will contain S/W message; In second case all letters with envelope bearing "Colonia Condesa" after address will be for Rowton and have S/W. L/4 promises sent several letters to L/3 without messages as soon as she arrives to test channel.

(f) Only channel for incoming messages for L/4 will be letters from LIRING/3 containing words" Chiapas" and "arte" and either hand carried, sent through pouch, or through open mail.

(G) The following signals have been agreed on for purpose specified:

(1) Danger signal will be absence of name Zinzuni in open text to L/3. In all other letters L/4 will mention name. In event hostile control child will be referred to by nickname, or endearing expression but not by name.
(2) "All my B-12 complex vitamins are gone" indicates need for new carbon. "I have no more cologne that everyone liked so much" indicates need for developer.
(3) New carbon sent to LIRING/3 will be recognized by simple drawing xxxxxxx attributed to daughter and sent as expression of sentiment by LIRING/3.

7. In reply her query re best course of action in event she has reports DSE planning arrest, Rowton advised LIRING/4 destroy S/w supplies, and take refuge in Mexican Embassy in hope that she would be able communicate with LIRING/3 (she did not ask nor did Rowton volunteer how she could notify him since she assumes Rowton would remain in continuing contact LIRING/3).

8. LIRING/4 encouraged by attitude and sympathy shown by LIRING/2 and Echemandía re her remaining in Cuba, but she made it clear to Rowton that she would not do anything jeopardize her residence permit in Mexico or forfeit the time accumulated,unless Rowton could arrange have Mexican Ambassador in Havana renew her xxxxxxx visa and assure her. She added that best approach would be return after time up to attempt bring child back and at that time make new contract with Rowton providing for guarantees. Rowton agreed stating that he not in position for many reasons,including security, to make such commitments at this time. L/4 made it clear to Rowton also that she realizes that he probably operating in an alias and is affiliated with some sort of service or organization (this came out during discussion of contract and acknowledgement of pseudonym which she did not want),but she stated bluntly that she did not want to know any more about Rowton than the little she already knew since "it would be easier to face an interrogation without betraying him completely".

12

17 February,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Questioning by LIRING/2 re Rowton ("The Greek").

1. at 1030 on 17 February,1968, LIRING/4 informed Rowton that she had dropped into the LIRING offices at about 1230 on 15 February and again on the morning of the following day to check with LIRING/2 concerning her entry permit for travel to Havana. On the first occasion LIRING/2 asked her casually whether she had seen anything of the "Greek friend" lately. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she replied that she and LIRING/3 heard from him from time to time, mainly by telephone, and that he had invited her out occasionally, but she,LIRING/4, had turned him down.

2. On the second occasion, during the late morning of 18 February,1968, LIRING/2 saw L/4 again on the premises and asked to not to leave until she had seen him, since he wanted to discuss something with her. When she fihally saw him in his office some 30 minutes later, he again asked whether she had seen the "Greek", not mentioning Rowton by his alias (Harris). Since L/2 had mentioned L/4's Greek friend whom he had met through Rodolfo Reyes on a previously occasion, LIRING/4 felt she could not pretend not to know about whom he was talking. She therefore replied again that occasionally she heard from him when he was on a trip to Mexico. LIRING/2 asked what L/4 thought of him (the Greek), to which she replied that she found him pleasant and very generous (bondadoso). L/2 replied, "Yes, but what does that generosity come from?" He then added that he had many question-marks concerning that person. He gave as an example the fact that when he telephoned his number on a holiday, 31 December or 1 January, his "secretary" replied. It seemed very strange, continued L/2, that the Greek's telephone was manned at all times, night and day, and even on holidays. He then further expressed doubts about where this person lived and how he earned his money, and why he was so interested in Cuba.

3. LIRING/4 stated to Rowton that she was at first quite taken aback by this direct "interrogation", even though it was made in a friendly tone, and replied as best she could by ear. She stated that she assumed the Greek was carrying on lucrative business and lived in Europe although she could not supply any specific answers. She was aware that he had brought some of LIRING/3's paintings at an excellent price and took hisgenerosity for granted since she enjoyed living from the good business LIRING/3 gained through him. LIRING/4 then asked L/2 why he himself didn't do some checking of his own, since she assumed the that LIRING office was capable of such

activity when the occasion called for it. LIRING/2 replied that he had too many other things to do, and anyway, when something smelled bad ("apesta") he keeps away from it. LIRING/4, continuing to take the offensive, stated that on several occasions inthe past the Greek had invited her out but she had not accepted, but that she easily could accept on the next occasion and possibly even obtain a photo of some kind for LIRING/2. L/2 replied that a photo would not be of any use, all he could do with it being to send it to Havana. He added that he had many suspicions,particularly as a result of the telephone, but had nothing concrete "in his hands", and that what he needed was "datos".

4. LIRING/2 then asked L/4 whether she knew when Rodolfo Reyes was returning and where he would be living? She told Rowton that she replied in the negative, commenting simply that she had heard that he would be moving to Chile to work in the national ballet there. L/2 returning again to the Greek wondered why he was so generous with gifts and entertainment. L/4 stated that she never looked a gift horse in the mouth, to which LIRING/2 replied that she must be careful, if not for her own sake at least for the sake of LIRING/3 who, he felt, was not treading on firm ground("terreno firme"). L/4 admitted that she was often worried about L/3's activities, about which he told her almost nothing. L/2 then commented "Invesitigate the Greek and you'll feel better." (Averigua lo del Griego). He then added that that supposed letter from Rico Galán was not considered authentic, and also the case of Crozco definitely involved the police. LIRING/4,since she was aware that L/3 had discussed both these cases with L/2, except that L/3 had not to her knowledge mentioned the arrest of Crozco, stated that she felt L/3 had acted in completely good faith, even though he might have been somewhat impulsive ("precipitado").

5. LIRING/2, continuing the conversation, which according to L/4 lasted over one hour,stated that both she and L/3 must be careful of their contacts. He commented that he could not even go out on a date with a girl without thinking of the consequences. He could go out once maybe, but he felt it wiser to drop the contact for security reasonsL/4 told Rowton that she concluded the conversation with a promise to elicit as much data from the Greek as possible as soon as she could get in touch with him.

6. Rowton then told L/4 that he felt relieved in fact that L/2 had brought this whole matter up, since it was better to face such an interrogation here in Mexico rather than in Havana without the benefit of Rowton's advice and briefing. He then stated that he felt it essential that L/4 provide L/2 with much-needed answers to his questions. To avoid the impression of

collusion, Rowton suggested that L/4 see L/2 again and ask for Rowton's telephone number, which she could alleged she could not find at home and which she preferred not to ask L/3 for, in order not to arouse his suspicions. Once she obtained the number she could allege that she telephoned Rowton on some pretext (provided if possible by LIRING/2 himself) and managed to see him at lunch a few days later. She could then report to L/2 that Rowton had told her that his telephone was actually an answering service and hence only messages were taken around the clock. He had no need of an office since he traveled in and out so often and his business did not require an office with the accompanying headaches. L/4 would continue that Rowton confided that he was working on sensitive deals to purchase Mexican sulphur (an expensive and difficult item to procure anywhere in the world at this time) and that his principal business connection was with Stavros Niarcos,the wealthy shipowner. His interest in Cuba stemmed from Niarcos' desire to study the shipping possibilities there in the event the Northamerican embargo was lifeted.

6. Rowton instructed L/4 to commented to L/2 that when she spoke of the LIRING office, Rowton appeared very irritated and remarked that he was "decepcionado" with the tre tment he had received from both L/2 and the commerical office. If L/2 appeared surprised and curious about this, L/4 could continue that Rowton commented to her that he could not understand the cavalier manner in which the LIRINGs did business. He cited the example of at least three telephone calls he had made some weeks previously to both L/2 and the commercial office, leavinf his name and telephone, and that no one had had the courtesy to reply. L/4 could then added that as a result Rowton was annoyed andhad decided to go directly to Havana to get the infomation he needed on prospective business on behalf of Niarcos.

WBRowton
Wallace B. Rowton

CS COPY

10 February, 1968

Subject: Briefiing in Communications and Security of LIRING/4.

1. During the past four days Rowton has had daily meetings with LIRING/4 to give her initial training in S/W and discuss channels of communication that might be used securely and logically by LIRING/4 and Rowton. A"contract" to serve as a letter of understanding for both Rowton and LIRING/4 was drafted as a basis for present and future colaboration. No reference to WOFACT was made or implied, but Rowton made it clear that he had "firends and colleagues" who were interested in intelligence coverage of PBRUMEN and who would carry on his collaboration with LIRING/4 in the event of Rowton's death or unavailability.

2. The first item discussed was a simple open code to designate persons of interest either as targets or possible hostile elements, so that L/4 could mention these persons in the text of her S/W correspondence without compromising herself. A list of the persons concerned with the code names is attached herewith. LIRING/4 understands that these code names will not be used in open letters to LIRING/3 under any circumstances.

3. As far as letter drops are concerned, Rowton instructed LIRING/4 to send her S/W messages with innocent text cover to the following address:

Lic. Antonio Ponce Cortés
Multifamiliar Miguel Alemán C-326
México 12, D.F.

using a noticnal return address that could not be easily traced, and dropping the letter in a public mailbox in the center of town. Rowton did not give LIRING/4 an indicator for the cover text since it was understood that all messages, except the first, would contain an S/w message. LIRING/4 promised to mail an innocent text letter as soon after arrival as possible so that Rowton would have a good idea of the lenth of time involved in his receiving future letters.

4. LIRING/4 was advised that she would receive S/W messages from Rowton on the paper backing of seriographic designs (Aztec seals) being produced by LIRING/3. The designs, prepared in the form of greeting cards, would be addressed to a third party and contain a brief message of greeting in the handwriting of LIRING/3 and would be sent as an attachment to a routine letter from LIRING/3 sent by hand or through the LIRING pouch. Both LIRING/4 and Rowton agreed that open mail, since it would have to bear her true name and address, would be both too risky and too slow. In the unlikely event of discovery, L/4 would have some way out, alleging that she

had nothing to do with the message and placing the blame on LIRING/3.

5. At subsequent meetings,however, LIRING/4 accepted the probable long delays in receiving messages, both to and from her, involved in the open mail and agreed that it would be necessary to take the risk involved in sending at least some of the messages under cover of normal correspondence to LIRING/3. She also agreed with Rowton that sending S/w on the back of seriographic designs would constitute a pattern and might attract undue attention.

6. It was therefore agreed that LIRING/4 would also write S/w in letters to LIRING/3 that would be hand-carried to Mexico by a friend or sent in the pouch and delivered by Jorrín to her Tacubaya address. Rowton structed LIRING/4 to insert"Colonia Condesa" in the address on the envelope if the letter contained S/w, otherwise leave out this addition. Since Rowton would have a key to the Calzada Tacubaya apartment he could check regularly for any letters that Jorrín might have slipped under the door during periods when LIRING/3 might be absent from Mexico City.

7. At his meeting with LIRING/4 on 14/2/68 the following additional signals were agreed on:

(a) Danger Signal : Omision of name Zinzuni from open text. The child would always be referred to in regular correspondence with LIRING/3 by name. In event of hostile control, LIRING/4 would refer to child as "hijita" or by some other endearing name, but refrain from using her first name.

(b) New Carbon Needed: to be indicated by the phrase "I need more vitamin B-12" or "I have run out of my B-12 complex vitamins".

(c) New Developer Needed: " I have run out of that nice cologne I brought with me".

8. As far as incoming S/W was concerned, Rowton stated that if a cover letter from LIRING/3 contained the words "Chiapas" and"arte" it would indicate that an S/W message was being forwarded in that letter.

19 February, 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting with Carmen Lozada.

1. At 2100 on 18/2/68 LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had met with Carmen Lozada at about 1130 on 17/2/68, at the square in Coyoacán. He explained that on 15/2/68 their mutual friend, Carmen Molina, had contacted Carmen Lozada by telephone and had learned that the latter planned to return to Mexico the following day (Friday, 16/2/68). Carmen Lozada had told her on the phone to give her regards to her friend (LIRING/3) but to ask him not to meet her at the airport since she would be accompanied by her daughter and would be met by her parents on arrival in Mexico. LIRING/3 therefore contacted her through Carmen Molina on the morning of 17/2/68 and made the date to meet her near her parents home.

2. L/3 continued that as soon as he saw Carmen Lozada he knew at once that something unpleasant had happened during her visit to Havana. He told Rowton that she had apparently lost five or six pounds, was dressed in a slovenly manner and gave of appearance of a distraught person, almost on the verge of insanity. Her manner and subsequent conversation, often incoherent and half hysterical, confirmed in L/3's mind that she was suffering from severe strain and depression. L/3 told Rowton that he understood from her remarks that she had found the Havana airport, Havana, Cuba and the Cubans in general "detestable". She exclaimed at one point: "Odio a esa isla maldita!' She added that she was on the point of becoming an enemy of Cuba (volverse gusana). In the next breath, however, she stated that she had to return "en pocos días" as soon as treatment had been arranged for her daughter (suffering from asthma). L/3, pretending to think that she had patched up things with her husband, Enrique, asked whether she had been reconciled and found that she really loved her husband after all. She exclaimed, according to L/3, in a half hysterical voice that she hated her husband and everything her represented.

3. L/3 continued that despite his repeated questions Carmen Lozada refused to give him details of what actually had happened to her. She repeatedly stated that she was under "intense, horrible pressure" that she could not explain. When L/3 commented that L/4 was preparing to return to Havana, Carmen Lozada burst out again with "Qué horrible!" but again did not explain. In view of Carmen Lozada's obvious state of psychological and physical disintegration, LIRING/3 told Rowton that he felt it best to terminate the meeting at the first opportunity (about 1630) and leave as gracefully as he could. He added that when he left he looked back to see her standing in a daze for a full five minutes before walking off.

15

30 January,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of letter from Maceiro, Vice Minister of Education.

1. At 1000 on 30 January,1968, LIRING/4 reported to Rowton that she had seen Jorrín the previous afternoon and that he had told her that he had been to her apartment the previous evening but had failed to find her or LIRING/3 in. He explained that Dr. Marinelo,who was visiting Mexico City, had asked him to deliver to LIRING/4 ax letter from their mutual friend, Dr. Maceira. Jorrín then gave LIRING/4 the letter.

2. LIRING/4 stated to Rowton that the letter was simply a request for shoes for Maceira's child which could not be obtained in Cuba. LIRING/4 commented that this was only another of a series of such requests that Maceira and Figueroa of the Ministry of Education had been making to her since their last visit to Mexico. She had in the past ignored the requests since she felt she had done enough and could see no useful purpose in running around town as a purchasing agent, partacularly when there was no guarantee that they would reimburse her.

3. Rowton suggested that on this occasion, however, it might prove worthwhile, in view of Marinelo's apparently important position in Havana and LIRING/4's forthcoming trip. He suggested that LIRING/4 purchase the shoes (about 60 pesos) and attempt to deliver them personally to Marinelo; she could then invite him to lunch or dinner in the hope of assessing his present feelings toward the regime. LIRING/4 recalled that Marinelo had been Rector of the University of Havana and was a member of the old guard communist party. She added that Jorrín had mentioned that Marinelo held Ambassadorial rank and was serving at the present time in some sort of international delegation.

4. LIRING/4 also reported that she had run into an old Cuban friend, Aralia Arizmendi, on the street, and that the latter had given her her home phone as 23-79-95. LIRING/4 explained that Arizmendi had married a Mexican psychiatrist and left Cuba some years back. As far as she knew Arizmendi was sympathetic with the Castro regime and on more or less friendly terms with LIRING. On this occasion Arizmendi joked with L/4 about the inefficiency of the LIRING offcials, saying that the only person she felt was doing a decent job was Cepeda.

CS COPY

5. LIRING/4 also reported that she had written a short letter to her negro medical student friend, Yolanda, and dropped the letter, as requested by Rowton, in the open mail (to ascertain the time taken to deliverrthe letter to Havana. LIRING/4 gave Yolanda's full name and address as:

Yolanda Diaz
Porvenir 112 - Depto 12,
entre Aguilera y Bouza
Lawton

Tel: 99-46-88.

Wallace B. Rowton

CS COPY

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment B to
HMMA-34484

Identity Sheet

Identity: Ismael SUAREZ de la Paz

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOACRE

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
AQUATIC/LIRING-3 - LIROSIN Deactivation of Audio Installation.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None

Reference: HMMA-31821, dtd 3 April 1967.

1. On 15 April 1968, circa 1410 hours, the audio installation described in reference was deactivated. The SPT-2A was recovered by Walter W. CORNBURY and returned to Station stock. The LP equipment, an SPR-2A and UHER 4000 L, will also be returned to Station stock.

2. Inasmuch as LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 were terminating their "lease" on the target apartment, it was felt the SPT-2A carrier current transmitter would have to be removed because of its shallow concealment. To continue the assessment of target personalities however, we wanted to wait until almost the last minute. The week of 15 April 1968 was selected as an appropriate time by Wallace B. ROWTON, who is in contact with the targets.

3. At about 1300 hours, 15 April 1968, Walter W. CORNBURY and Oliver D. CIMOCH entered the LP and were greeted by LIROSIN who knew we were coming but did not know why. A check of the audio device revealed that LIRING-4 and a young (teen-age) male relative were in the target. This was as expected. At 1330 hours, LIRING-4 left the apartment, alone, for a luncheon date with ROWTON. She returned a few minutes later and made the male relative accompany her. (This was obviously at the insistence of ROWTON.) The telephone number of the target apartment was tried a few minutes after their departure and was not answered, again as expected. At 1400 hours a telephone call was received in the LP from the Station as a relay from ROWTON that the targets were safely ensconsed for at least the next hour. (It was known that LIRING-3 was out of the city.) Another telephone call to target with no answer, and CORNBURY entered the target

-continued-

Distribution:
2 - C/WOACRE cs copy IN 50-6-18
② - C/WHD

WH/1 file: LIRING-3 201.
WC

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34491	16 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-18/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-34491

apartment using keys provided by ROWTON. The wall plate was removed, the AC lines to the SPT-2A clipped off close to the plug, the SPT-2A easily removed, the wall plate refastened, and the target apartment vacated. Total time about two minutes. CORNBURY and CIMOCH left the area immediately. There were no security problems noted at any time.

4. The LP equipment will be removed by LIROS16 and returned to stock on 17 April 1968.

5. Please note that no ADP sheet has been submitted with this report.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

LIRING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 14 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ____________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____________

DISSEM BY 11 PER ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. C/OPS, C/CA, FI

S E C R E T 151615Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5225 15 Apr 68 IN 91298

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

B. MEXICO CITY 5141 (IN 86263)

1. UPON RETURN FROM SHORT VACATION, WALLACE B. RUBION WAS GIVEN SEALED LETTER FROM LIRING-3 BY LIRING-4. LETTER INDICATED

A. LIRING-3 DEPARTURE FOR GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS DELAYED WHEN FRANCISCO LARA ACCIDENTALLY SHOT SELF IN ANKLE WHILE CLEANING GUN. LARA ANXIOUS NEWS OF ACCIDENT NOT REACH EARS OF FAR AS FAR MEMBERS FORBIDDEN CARRY WEAPONS IN MEXICO.

B. LIRING-3 DEPARTED 10 APRIL WITH LARA AND OTHER GUAT WHO MEMBER YON SOSA FACTION. LIRING-3 STATED IN LETTER THIS GUAT INSISTENT HE TALK DIRECTLY WITH YON SOSA.

C. LIRING-3 AND LARA WILL PROBABLY VISIT SAN SALVADOR IN ADDITION GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS.

2. PER LIRING-4 OTHER GUAT WHO INTRODUCED TO LIRING-3 BY LARA AND IS PROBABLY RODOLFO SANDOVAL CALLED AT HER APARTMENT 9 APRIL LOOKING FOR LIRING-3 WHO OUT. SANDOVAL STATED HE HAD TO TALK TO LIRING-3 IN PRIVATE AS DID NOT WANT LARA LISTEN TO CONVERSATION. SANDOVAL IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER SOSA FACTION. EXPLAINED THAT

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TOTAL COPIES

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY: ________ PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5225 SECRET

ALTHOUGH SOSA GROUP AND FAR NOW GENERALLY WORKING TOGETHER THERE WERE STILL MANY THINGS "KEPT ON A COMPARTMENTED BASIS." ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 DID NOT REFER TO SANDOVAL IN HIS LETTER TO ROWTON, HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD "LONG TALK" BEFORE LEAVING.

3. LIRING-3 WILL KEEP ROWTON ABREAST OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS VIA ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

LIRINE-3

DIS

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Chief of Station, Guatemala City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

LIRING-3 Contacts with Guatemalan Revolutionaries in Mexico

Action Required: None; FYI

Reference : Mexico City-5600, dated 23 March 1968

1. On 23 and 25 March 1968, the Mexico City Station placed photo coverage on Rio Lerma 64, the address where several Guatemalans, including Francisco LARA Barrios, were staying in Mexico, according to LIRING-3. Coverage of this address led to photo coverage of [illegible], another address where Guatemalans appeared to congregate.

2. Since LIRING-3 is not available at the present time to identify any of the persons in the photographs, the Station decided to make them available to the Guatemala City Station for possible identification.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Photos

Distribution:
2 - COS, Guatemala City w/att
2 - C/WHD wo/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-34413	DATE 8 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 35-9-8

LIRING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F

TOTAL COPIES 18

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	Gui
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER ________

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ________ BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

INFO

FILE VR. CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI

S E C R E T 260232Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5141 [illegible] IN 86253

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

1. ON 5 APRIL 68 STATION RECEIVED PHOTOGRAPHIC COPIES OF GUATEMALAN PASSPORT WHICH LIRING-3 SAID FRANCISCO LARA WOULD USE TO ENTER HONDURAS FROM GUATEMALA. COPIES INDICATE THERE WAS DISCREPENCY IN NAME ORIGINALLY REPORTED IN REF AND NAME ON PASSPORT. CORRECT NAME IS JOSE MARIA OLIVA CARRANZA, ORDINARY GUATEMALAN PASSPORT NUMBER 134825 SERIES D REGISTRY NUMBER 02743 ISSUED 27 MAY 1963 IN GUATEMALA CITY. OLIVA BORN SAN FELIPE, RETALHULEU ON 9 FEB 1935.

2. OTHER DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED INCLUDE MILITARY INSCRIPTION IN GUATEMALAN ARMY, CARD NUMBER 49059, BIRTH CERTIFICATE NUMBER 2825671, CEDULA DE VECINDAD 287165 AND ELECTIRON CARD 107817.

3. THESE DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED BY LIRING-3 WHEN THEY PASSED TO HIM BY FRANCISCO LARA TO USE IN MAKING FALSE MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION. POUCHING COPIES OF DOCUMENTS TO ADDRESSEES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City HGG

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief of Station, Tegucigalpa HHT

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
201-798301 201-832457
Carlos JURADO Delmar and Francisco Adalberto LARA Barrios

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
CIT: Mexico
A: Mex Co

Action Required: None; FYI

Reference : Mexico City-5111, dated 4 April 1968

1. Attached for the Addressees' information and retention are copies of the documentation cited in the reference above.

2. ~~Please note that Francisco Adalberto [illegible] uses~~ the aliases of Francisco Lara, Miguel Angel OLIVA Castaneda and Jacinto RANGEL Cervantes, according to LIRING-3.

CIT: Guatemala
A: Mexico
CCC: Professor

for/Willard C. CURTIS

re: documentation received on subj.

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Liring-3

HMMA 34404/1
Francisco Adalberto
LARA Barrios
(201-832457)

Attachment:
As stated in Paragraph 1

CS COPY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Guatemala City w/att
2 - C/WHD w/att
h/w atts: 2 1 - COS, Tegucigalpa w/att

201-798301
~~35-9-8~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-34404

DATE
4 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
35-9-8

14-00000

MICROFILMED
APR 16 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2P



SECRETARIA DE EDUCACION PUBLICA
DIRECCION GRAL. DE ADMON.
DEPARTAMENTO DE PERSONAL

Nº 127999
SERIE "C"

[illegible]

ES [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

y suya la firma que aparece al reverso

México, D. F., a [illegible] de 196[illegible]

El Jefe del Depto. de Personal.

h/w att: 1
HMMA-34404

CS COPY

201-798301
~~35-9-8~~

14-00000

- RING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F
TOTAL COPIES 16
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 26

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION WH 8

☑ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR. CI/OA, CI, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 041950Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5111
4 Apr 68 08151

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: GUATEMALA CITY-8822 (NOT SENT TEGUCIGALPA) (IN 80309)

1. AFTERNOON 3 APRIL 68, LIRING-3 REPORTED HE PLANS DEPART FOR GUATEMALA CITY VIA LAND IN COMPANY GUATEMALAN CITIZEN FRANCISCO LARA CIRCA 4 APRIL 68. ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 HAS VALID MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION AND LARA HAS FALSE MEXICAN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION DOCUMENTATION, THEY WILL ATTEMPT ENTER GUATEMALA ILLEGALLY.

2. IN GUATEMALA CITY, LARA PLANS INTRODUCE LIRING-3 TO WOMAN WHO LOGISTICAL OFFICER FOR FAR IN GUATEMALA CITY. TRIP WILL THEN BE ARRANGED FOR LIRING-3 TO VISIT FAR SIERRA DE LAS MINAS HEADQUARTERS TO DISCUSS FUTURE SUPPORT OF FAR FROM MEXICO CITY.

3. AFTER APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS IN GUATEMALA, LARA AND LIRING-3 WILL TRAVEL TEGUCIGALPA TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES OF SETTING UP PRINTING PRESS UNDER LIRING-3'S TRUE NAME.

4. LARA'S FALSE MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION IS IDENTITY CARD FROM SECRETARIA DE EDUCACION PUBLICA UNDER NAME JACINTO RANGEL CERVANTES. FOR IDENTITY CARD PHOTOGRAPH, LARA WORE GLASSES, HAIR DYED GREY AND NO MUSTACHE. LARA TOLD LIRING-3 THAT FOR TRAVEL TO TEGUCIGALPA FROM GUATEMALA CITY, HE WILL USE GUATEMALAN PASSPORT UNDER NAME

Vince

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY __________ AT: __________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO __________

X-REF TO FILE NO. __________

DISSEM BY __________ PER __________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5111 SECRET

MIGUEL ANGEL OLIVA CASTANEDA. LIRING-3 WILL PROBABLY USE VALID MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION. POUCHING COPIES OF LARA AND LIRING-3 DOCUMENTATION.

5. FOR TEGUCIGALPA: LIRING-3 (IDEN) IS STATION PENETRATION OF GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA GROUP IN MEXICO CITY. FRANCISCO LARA IS FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS, GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARY WHO HAS RESIDED IN MEXICO FOR PAST YEAR AND WHO CLAIMS TO BE FAR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO.

6. ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 HAS TELEPHONE NUMBER AND POST OFFICE BOX IN MEXICO CITY FOR STATION CONTACT, DO NOT BELIEVE STATION WILL BE ABLE SUPPLY ADDRESSEES WITH INFO ON HIS TRIP TO GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS UNTIL HE IS THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED AFTER HIS RETURN TO MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

JURADO DELMAR, CARLOS
201-798301 035-009-008
SEX M DOB ? HMMA-34404
04 APR 68

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO
RE DOCUMENTATION RECEIVED ON SUBJ.

HGGHHT R 6804180322

FILE IN 201-798301

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-64 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 30

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

LIRING-3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: D AT: 0430 Z

DISSEM BY: 48 PER

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE VR, CS/DO, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, WH/COG 8,

S E C R E T 282327Z MAR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8622

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5822 (IN 80219) 29 MAR 68 IN 80309

1. RE PARA 4 REF: DUE 28 MARCH CHANGES WITHIN GUATEMALAN ARMY, INCLUDING REMOVAL OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAFAEL (ARRIAGA) BOSQUE, STATUS OF "OPERATION AZTECA" UNCERTAIN. CONSEQUENTLY STATION CANNOT GUARANTEE ANY TYPE PROTECTION FOR LIRING-3 IN CASE HE CAPTURED. ALSO NOTE THAT MEXICAN BORDER AREA BEING HEAVILY PATROLLED.

2. ESMOOSE-1 REPORTED THAT ON EARLY MORNING 28 MARCH ESMARVEL-1 ALERTED SPECIAL COMMANDO UNIT OF GUAT ARMY (SCUGA) TO BE PREPARED FOR IMPORTANT OPERATION. HE SAID INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED THAT GROUP OF THIRTY CASTRO CUBANS PLANNED ENTER GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO AND THEIR ARRIVAL TIED IN WITH WAVE OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE WHICH REPORTEDLY TO TAKE PLACE 31 MARCH. ESMARVEL-1 DID NOT INDICATE SOURCE OF ABOVE INFO. HE SAID THAT REINFORCED SCUGA TEAMS WOULD BE SENT TO THE DEPARTMENTS OF SAN MARCOS AND HUEHUETENANGO ON MEXICAN BORDER, WITH A BACK-UP TEAM IN DEPARTMENT OF QUEZALTENANGO. SCUGA UNIT WAS IN PROCESS OF PREPARING VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT WHEN WORD RECEIVED OF REMOVAL OF ARRIAGA. ESMOOSE-1 SAID AS RESULT OPERATION CANCELLED. POSSIBLE HOWEVER THAT SAME

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY:________ AT:______________Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.____________

X-REF TO FILE NO.____________

DISSEM BY__________PER______#

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE VR

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 8822 SECRET

INFO HAS BEEN PASSED TO MILITARY UNITS AT BORDER WHICH MIGHT MAKE LIRING-3'S CROSSING INTO GUATEMALAN EVEN MORE DANGEROUS.

3. FOR HQS: PARA 2 INFO HAS NOT BEEN DISSEMED DUE LACK OF CONFIRMATION AND SCARCITY OF DETAILS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

LIRING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ✓ TOTAL COPIES 31

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

BY ____ AT: ____ Z

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR, FI, CI/OPS, CI/ICA, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, TSD 6, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, ADDP, DDP

S E C R E T 282120Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5083

28 MAR 68 IN 80219

PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4828 (IN 70689)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 5551 (IN 41009)

C. MEXICO CITY 4486 (IN 50312)

1. ON 27 MARCH 68 LIRING-3 REPORTED THAT GUAT FAR MEMBER WHO PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS MIGUEL ANGEL OLIVA CASTANEDA IS ACTUALLY FRANCISCO LARA, PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS, AKA CARLOS LARA (REFS B AND C). LARA INADVERTENTLY GAVE HIS TRUE NAME WHILE DISCUSSING WITH LIRING-3 THE PLANNED TRIP TO GUATEMALA.

2. AT PRESENT, LIRING-3 MAKING FALSE DOCUMENTS FOR PERSONS HE TO LEAD INTO GUATEMALA. THEY PLAN TRAVEL SOMETIME BEFORE 31 MARCH. LIRING-3 TO ENTER GUATEMALA WITH GROUP IN ORDER MEET UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN WHO IS FAR LOGISTICAL OFFICER. GROUP BELIEVES LIRING-2 SHOULD TALK TO HER TO DETERMINE WHAT SUPPLIES HE CAN MAEK AVAILABLE TO FAR (COULD UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN BE DIAN ADELA JIMENEZ OR BRENY HOSEL CUENCA?)

3. LIRING -3 IS NOW ATTEMPTING DETERMINE TRUE NAMES OF OTHER PERSONS HE TO TAKE TO BORDER AND EXACT DEPARTURE DATE. STATION

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY:________ AT:________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.________

X-REF TO FILE NO.________

DISSEM BY________PER________#

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR,

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5000 S E C R E T

WAS ABLE TAKE PHOTO OF PERSON LIRING-3 IN CONTACT AND LIRING-3 IMMEDIATELY IDENTIFIED THIS PERSON AS FRANCISCO LARA. STATION HAS ALSO TAKEN PHOTOS OF ADDRESS WHERE GUATS BELIEVED BE STAYING AND FILM BEING DEVELOPED. WILL PRIORITY POUCH PHOTOS AND LIRING-3 REPORTS.

4. LIRING-3 WILLING ENTER GUATEMALA WITH FAR MEMBERS BUT WOULD LIKE KNOW IF OPERATION AZTECA STILL IN FORCE. IF NOT, COULD STATION GUATEMALA ARRANGE ANY TYPE OF PROTECTION FOR HIM IN CASE HE IS CAPTURED BY MILITARY OR POLICE?

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Guatemala City HGG

INFO.: Chief, ~~Western~~ Hemisphere Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIRING-3 Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

Action Required: None; FYI

Reference : Mexico City-5000

#CIT: Guatemala
A: Mexico

Attached are the LIRING-3 reports on the meetings he has held with the Guatemalan FAR members as reported in the reference above. Also attached are photos of Carlos *Percabal Marcue and his wife, Teresa nee *Lozada de *Percabal, a blown up copy of the documentation LIRING-3 is falsifying, and several shots of AKA Francisco *Lara who is probably identical with Francisco Adalberto *LARA Barrios, also known AKA as Carlos *Lara.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Reports
Photos

MICROFILMED
APR 8 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
2 - COS, Guatemala City w/att
② - C/WHD w/att

h/w atts: 2

CS COPY

201-799301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-34367

DATE: 28 March 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

HQS

8P

27 March 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Identification of FAR Memeber.

1. At 1130 on 27/3/68 L/3 told Rowton that at last he had obtained the true name of the FAR member he had met through Carlos Persaval and who had previously identified himself to L/3 under the alias Miguel Angel Oliva Castañeda. LIRING/3 said he learned that the~~xxx~~ true name of this person is Fancisco Lara and that he and some 14 other Guatemalans are here in Mexico City legally as exiles. L/3 added that he met "Rodolfo", the older and apparently more important FAR member, yestereday (26/3/68) but as yet has not been able to learn his true last name.

2. LIRING/3 also immediately idenditied the surveillance photo (clipped portion sh[redacted]returned herewith) as that of Francisco Lara.

FAR Commandante

3. The other surveillance photos, as follows he identified as of Carlos Persa~~v~~bal Marcus and his wife Teresa Lozada de Fersaval respectively.

Wallace B. Rowton

MICROFILMED
APR 8 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Francisco Adalberto
LARA Barrios

h/w
3H:1

CS COPY

201-798301

22 March, 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with Guatemalans in Mexico City.

1. At a brief meeting with Rowton at 1700 on 22/3/68 at bhe Diana Restaurant LIRING/3 reported that he was working on the fabrication of identity documents for the two FAR representatives (Miguel Angel Oliva Castañeda and Rodolfo) through his seriographic process and that he hoped to have the pictures of the persons concered the following day. He asked Rowton to bring along his copying kit so that he could quickly copy the pictures just before LIRING/3 put them on the identity cards. Rowton promised to bring the kit to the Atoyac apartment at 1600 on 23/3/68.

2. LIRING/3 also reported that he had learned from the Guatemalans that a certain Esquenasi or Eskenazi, a Guatemalan who has resided for many years in Mexico and who owns or operates a factory called "Cromos de México", has been very helpful to the FAR memebers in Mexico. Likewise a doctor by the name of Jorge Flesch has been of service when needed.

3. In reply to Rowton's query LIRING/3 stated that all the seven Guatemalans he had recently met (four of whom live at 54 Río Lerma) appeared to be FAR adherents, except one, who he had learned in passing was a follower of Jan Sosa. L/3 also stated that he had learned that the one who worked in the photo shop on San Juán Latrán street was an accountant rather than a photographer.

Wallace B. Rowton

20 March, 1968.

Subject: LIMING/3 Contacts with FAR Guatemala in Mexico City.

1. LIMING/3 reported to Rowton at 1600 on 20/3/68 that he had again met with Miguel Angel Oliva Castañeda, this time at about 1930 in front of the Chapultepec movie and went with him to the Café Literario on Calle Lieja. L/3 told Rowton that Oliva confided to him that he had just learned from four Guatemalan comrades who lived together in an apartment on Calle Lerma that their residence was being surveilled by what they felt was the Mano Blanca. He explained that they had noted several fairly well-dressed men hanging around the apartment house and had tried to follow one of them but he had run off. This all indicated to them that the surveillance was not being carried out by the Mexican Police, but by some private group. Oliva then stated that they knew that the deputy chief of the Mano Blanca organization Oliverio Castañeda, was currently in Mexico City, and assumed that he had organized the surveillance. Oliva then mentioned that one of the four living at Calle Lerma was the well-known Guerrilla leader who had recently sought sanctuary in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala City and was granted asylum to Mexico through the intervention and influence of Lazaro Cárdenas.

2. In order to determine the exact location of the Lerma apartment, LIMING/ told Rowton that he offered to help identify the surveillance by conducting a countersurveillance himself the following evening. He also offered the use of his Tacubaya studio, recommending that in any case the four should disperse at least temporarily.

3. L/3 also reported to Rowton that he again met with Oliva at 1015 that same morning and that the latter had taken him to a printing shop on Calzada Tlalpan near Calle José T. Cuéllar, named "Regia", as L/3 recalled. (The Mexico City telephone directory lists "Resca-Impresos y Rayados, Calle J.T. Cuéllar 57, tel: 78-05-01). Oliva told L/3 that this shop produced various ID papers for them in the past but unfortunately was not able to fabricate a good Mexican ID card because of the unavailability of the special type used. L/3 said that he was confident that he could make the reproduction through his seriographic process. In the course of conversation Oliva confided to L/3 that the Guatemalan lawyer, Capuano, had provided blank Guatemalan ID cards in the past and in general had been very helpful. He added that Capuano had succeeded in getting all the Guatemalans released from prison after their arrest in the Julian López case.

4. Oliva also stated that he felt it possible and advisable that L/3 travel

with him to the FAR headquarters in the Sierra Mina on his forthcoming trip so that L/3 could get first-hand requirements from the FAR supply responsible (whom Oliva referred to as a woman). Oliva also mentioned that FAR was hoping to obtain a lathe to permit the manufacture of weapons locally (in the mountains).

5. Oliva also stated that the principle purpose of the visit of his comrade "Rodolfo" was to obtain funds and to return to Mexico. Oliva added that in the event L/3 could make the trip he could also return with Rodolfo to Mexico. In reply to L/3's query, Oliva stated that the funds Rodolfo would be given in Guatemala were from various robberies carried out by Far for the purpose of raising its own funds. Oliva commented that they could not count on the Cubans or the CPG for financial support when it was needed. He added that the sale of the booklet "Terror in Guatemala" (of which L/3 had obtained a copy from Carlos Persival) had helped to supply some of the money to be used for the trip. Oliva indicated that he himself planned to remain in Guatemala with the FAR forces in the mountains.

Wallace B. Rowton

19 March, 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with Memebers of FAR, Guatemala.

1. At 0945 on 19/3/68 at the Robbins Restaurant, Calle Leibnitz and Melchor Ocampo, LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had again met the FAR member whose sketch he had given Rowton the previous day and whom he had met thru Carlos Persaval on 17/3/68. He explained that Persaval had finally contacted him by phone late Sunday afternoon (17/3/68) and introduced him to one of the two Guatemalans who wanted to return clandestinely to their country. L/3 described this man, who later showed him Guatemalan identification papers in the name of Miguel Angel Oliva, aged 33, as short, stocky, with black hair trimmed short and rather thick prominent eyebrows. L/3 estimated his age as 35 and said there was no doubt in his mind that he was a native-born Guatemalan. He added that this person wore a thin moustache. L/3 then drew Rowton a sketch of the person concerned which Rowton passed in to the Station the same day.

2. LIRING/3 continued that he conversed with the Guatemalan, Oliva, in the presence of Carlos Persaval and his wife Teresa Lozada de Persaval at the Miss restaurant on Reforma for about 45 minutes, taking the line that he was willing to help the cause as he had done in the past, but he wanted to be certain of the exact affiliations and bona fides of the persons with whom he was dealing. When this apparently surprised and somewhat shocked Carlos Persaval and Teresa, L/3 explained that he had had some unpleasant experiences with such persons as Orozco and was aware that many FAR desertors were circulating around Mexico these days. The Guatemalan, Oliva, however reacted favorably saying that he understood L/3's position and did not blame him. He added that he would furnish proof of his FAR affiliations and indicated that there were two other comrades, one much more important than himself, who also needed help in returning. L/3 told Rowton that he stressed to all present the risks involved in providing false documentation and acting as a guide for them to cross the border illegally and his original commitment to help only two persons. In reply to L/3's query, the Guatemalan Oliva stated that their destination would be Guatemala City itself and they hoped that L/3 would be able to accompny them there since they were not familiar with the countryside betweenthe border in the Comitán area and Guatemala City.

3. According to LIRING/3 the latter insisted that he meet the other, more important Guatemalan, and be given an opportunity to make carfeful plans before attempting the journey to Chiapas and Guatemala City. Oliva then made a date with Persaval and L/3 for the next evening at 2300 at the corner of

San Juán Latrán and Madero at which time he would try to arrange a meeting with his comrade.

4. LIRING/3, at his meeting with Rowton the following morning (19/3/68) reported that when he arrived at the place designated he found the Guatemalan Oliva waiting with neither of them saw Hersaval. Oliva, after a wait of about 45 minutes, suggested that they give up and go to a cafeteria, Copa de Leche, on San Juán Latrán. L/3 stated to Rowton that while they were waitin they were joined by another Guatemalan, a young man of about 22 years of ag and rather stout, who accompanied them to the cafeteria. The older Guatemal then showed L/3 a Guatemalan passport in the name of Miguel Angel Oliva Casteñada which he said was false but which enabled him to travel in Mexico. The younger man sated that he had legal documents but did not volunteer his name to L/3. In the course of conversation L/3 learned that the older Guatemalan, Oliva, formerly worked in the advertising business in Guatemala City and that the younger man was familiar with electronic equipment and radio communications problems. The older Guatemalan apologized to L/3 for not having been able to bring along the other FAR comrade, to whom he referred as "Rodolfo" and again promised to introduce him to L/3 the following evening. He promised to telephone L/3 at 1400 the next day to confirm the meeting.

5. LIRING/3 then told Rowton that the two Guatemalans then escorted him to the Hotel del Valle on Calle Independencia (Rowton recalls that Dr. Bustamante resided there during his stay in Mexico City several months ago). L/3 told Rowton that he met two other Guatemalans there in the lobby and comment that they talked rather freely in front of him, discussing at one point even the illegal acquisition of a revolver needed by one of them. In the course o conversation L/3 stated that he learned that César Montes is now back in Guatemala and that the FAR is planning an April offensive. All the Guatemalans expressed concern over the increase in the power of the "Mano Blanca" and blamed it for the kidnapping of the Guatemalan Archbishop. They also commented that the military in Guatemala were disenchanted with the "puppet president", Montenegro, and could be expefted to increase the terrorism from the right in order to place Montenegro in an impossible position and eventually justify his removal.

6. L/3 commented to Rowton that he noted that at no time did any of the Guatmalans mention Cuban aid or assitance. In fact one of them at one point said that he had tried unsuccessfully to obtain a visa for travel to Cubasome thirty days previously.

Wallace B. Rowton

17 March,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting with Carlos Persaval.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1115 on 16/3/68 at the restaurant Hiss on Reforma and Calle Mississipi that unfortunately his meeting with the two Guatemalans scheduled for the previous evening at 2230-2300 in Danny's restaurant (Reforma at Diana Circle) did not come off. He stated that he arrived at the restaurant at 2230 and waited until about 2315 without seeing either Persaval or being approached by any Guatemalan. He continued that just as he was about to leave, he heard a tap on the window behind him and turned and saw Teresa Lozada de Persaval on the street. He wnet out and accompanied her to a car where Carlos Persaval was waiting. He was then driven to Sanborn's Angel and remained there with Carlos and Teresa for some thirty minutes.

2. According to LIRING/3, Carlos Persaval explained that he had been stood up by the Guatemalans and had been unable to get in touch with them to introduce them to L/3 as he had hoped. He added that one of the persons had been in Cuernavaca two or three days previously and perhaps had not been able to return in time for the meeting. Persaval, who appeared to L/3 to be quite nervous in Sanborn's, suggested that they go elsewhere to continue their discussion and LIRING/3 invited him and Teresa to his Tacubaya studio.

3. They then proceeded there to continue the discussion. Teresa excused herself on arrival saying that she was very tired, and promptly fell asleep in one of the bedrooms. Carlos Persaval then continued talking with L/3 until about 0300. He mentioned that one of the Guatemalans he hoped to introduce to L/3 was well-known and important in FAR, while the other (who had documents) was relatively unimportant and could probably get by the police checks without as much risk. In reply to L/3's queries, Persaval stated that both men wanted to travel to Guatemala City and that one (the important one) would probably be returning to Mexico after a short stay. Persaval revealed that as far as he knew the purpose of their trip was to obtain much-needed funds to continue their work in Mexico.

4. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he again promised to guide the Guatemalans across the border south of San Cristóbal but insisted on meeting them in Mexico City prior to escorting them over the border. Persaval then asked L/3

whether he was in a position to obtain a radio transmitter for the FAR friends, stating that he was certain that they had the financial means necessary to pay for such equipment. L/3 stated that he felt he had a good source in his brother and various other contacts up north, including Archi who worked for the radio station and had access to technical equipment.

5. At the conclusion of the meeting Pesaval promised to telephone L/3 again at 2200 the following night (16/3/68) in the hope of being able to set up a meeting that night or the following. L/3, however, reported to Rowton by telephone that as of 2300 on 16/3/68 no one had telephoned him to set up the meeting.

Wallace B. Rowton

GHANA 34867

SECRETARIA DE EDUCACION PUBLICA

Dirección General de Personal

Departamento de Relaciones Públicas

OFICINA DE INFORMACION

SECCION DE CREDENCIALES


LARA
LARA

14-00000





SECRET/KAPOK

HMMA-34333
27 March 1967
50-120-13

c. LIRING-3: From recent activity it appears that the Guatemalan FAR may have renewed its interest in LIRING-3. In late January, an emissary of FAR representatives in the PBRUMEN capital traveled to Mexico and contacted the person who had carried to PBRUMEN the letter sent by LIRING-3 in the summer of 1967 denouncing Moises OROZCO Leal. The emissary brought the word that the FAR had much appreciated LIRING-3's letter on OROZCO and warned that the FAR organization in Mexico City was infiltrated by a WOFIRM operator. Try as he might, however, LIRING-3 failed, at least by the end of this period, to meet with the FAR man.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 235-4-17

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-798301

DISSEM BY 30 PER

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/COG8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S, FI/INT 2, DDP, ADDP, C/CA, C/CA/PEG

AN [illegible]

ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX

S E C R E T 141942Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4823

GUATEMALA CITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

14 MAR 68 IN 70689

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4792 (IN 68111)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 6733 (IN 68957)

1. FOLLOWING CABLED IN ANSWER QUESTIONS RAISED PARA 3 REF B:

A. FAR KNOWS LIRING-3 HAS CAPABILITY OBTAIN FALSE DOCUMENTATION. LIRING-3 FOR EXAMPLE OBTAINED FALSE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND MILITARY REGISTRATION CARD FOR JACOBO PADILLA.

B. LEFTIST CONTACTS LIRING-3 INCLUDING GUATS KNOW HE FAMILIAR WITH GUAT BORDER AREA IN CHIAPAS. LIRING-3 WORKED FOR NUMBER OF YEARS IN CHIAPAS FOR MEXICAN EQUIVALENT INDIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU. IT ALSO WELL KNOWN TO FAR THAT LIRING -3 HAS BUSINESS LOCATED IN BORDER AREA IN ST CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS SINCE THIS BUSINESS WAS TO BE USED AS COVER FOR ARMS SUPPLY TO GUAT REBELS.

MICROFILMED
MAR 26 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

C. AS GUAT CITY STATION WILL REMEMBER LIRING-3 WAS TAKEN BY FAR TO HIDEOUT IN GUAT WHERE HELD TALKS WITH FAR MEMBERS. LIRING-3 EVEN SUPPLIED FAR SOME MEDICINE AND COGNAC FOR WHICH INCIDENTALLY HE NEVER PAID.

D. IN LIRING-3 OPINION, FACT FAR REPS IN CUBA RECENTLY EXPRESSED THANKS FOR HIS DENUNCIATION MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL IN

LIRING-3

~~201-~~

D 35-4-17

SECRET

201-798301
14 MAR 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ MAR 20 9 38 AM 68 AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO 20 4 35 [illegible] 68

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4828 SECRET

SUMMER 67 AND SENT WARNING THAT FAR "PENETRATED BY WOFIRM AGENT" (SEE MEXICO CITY 4314) IN 40487 CONSTITUTES INDICATION HE STILL IN GOOD GRACES OF AT LEAST SOME OF FAR RANK AND FILE.

E. REQUEST LIRING-3 HELP FAR REPS OVER GUAT BORDER CAME FROM CARLOS (PERSAVAL) MARCUE, NEPHEW OF MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINES, VIA CARMEN (LOZADA) DE RAMIREZ, PERSAVAL SISTER IN LAW *AND RECENT MISTRESS LIRING-3. AVF 4513,5 ~~(8543 3848, & 3.~~ AS FAR AS STATION KNOWS PERSAVAL, MARCUE OR LOZADA HAVE NO DIRECT CONNECTION WITH ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO AND OTHER GUAT LEFTISTS WITH WHOM LIRING -3 PREVIOUSLY IN CONTACT.

2. LIFEAT ON LIRING-3 CONFIRMED PERSAVAL SCHEDULED PHONE LIRING-3 14 MARCH TO SET UP 15 MARCH MEETING WITH TWO MALE AND ONE FEMALE GUAT REBELS LIRING-3 AGREED GUIDE OVER GUAT BORDER. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, STATION KNOWS GUATS MAY PHONE LIRING-3 AND ASK FOR IMMEDIATE MEETING. TO FACE SUCH POSSIBILITY LIEMBRACES STARTED SURVEILLANCE LIRING-3 MORNING 14 MARCH, WILL TRY OBSERVE MEETING WITH GUATS, TAKE PHOTOS OF THEM AND DETERMINE THEIR ACTUAL RESIDENCE THROUGH TAILING EXERCISING UTMOST CAUTION.

3. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

SECRET * SERVICED

BT

88 6 3 [illegible]

CC

SECRET

14-00000

LIRING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 38 PER

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE VR. CI, C/OPS, C/CA, FI, FI/INT 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	1	10	

S E C R E T 122147Z MAR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8733

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

12 MAR 68 IN 68951

REF MEXICO CITY 4790 (IN 68111)

WOMAN

1. ALTHOUGH SPECULATION ONLY, POSSIBLE THAT YOUNG WOMAN WHO TO RETURN GUATEMALA COULD BE CLEMENCIA (PAIZ) CARCAMO (AKA "LUISA"), SISTER OF MIRNA (PAIZ) CARCAMO WHO RECENTLY RELEASED FROM JAIL IN MEXICO. ACCORDING TO FEMALE INFORMANT OF GUAT ARMY, CLEMENCIA IS WIFE OF JULIO CESAR (MACIAS) MAYORA (AKA "CESAR MONTES"). ALSO REPORTED THAT CLEMENCIA WAS TO TRAVEL TO MEXICO IN MID-DECEMBER 1967 TO ARRANGE FOR SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO FAR, AND WAS POSSIBLY TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY DINGRDELA (JIMENEZ) MUNOZ AND HILDA (SOSA) ALDANA. THERE HAS BEEN NO CONFIRMATION THAT ANY OF THE ABOVE WOMEN TRAVELLED, BUT PRESENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

2. STATION DOES NOT HAVE BIO DATA OR PHOTOGRAPHS CLEMENCIA, AND ESLAIR TEAM HAS NOT BEEN ABLE LOCATE ENTRY FOR HER IN FILES OF CIVIL REGISTRY. ATTEMPTING OBTAIN FROM ESMICAS, AND WILL SEND TO MEXICO CITY IF SUCCESSFUL.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE MEXICO CITY COMMENTS ON WHY LIRING/3 APPROACHED TO OBTAIN FALSE DOCUMENTS FOR RETURNEES AND WHY HE MIGHT BE SELECTED

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY:________ AT:________ Z

DISSEM BY________ PER ________ #

ACTION ☐ NO COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.________

X-REF TO FILE NO.________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE VR

PAGE TWO GUATEMALA CITY 8733 S E C R E T

TO SERVE AS GUIDE. ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE THAT MEMBERS OF PGT SUPPORT NET IN MEXICO--SUCH AS ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO, MAY BE UNWILLING ASSIST FAR MEMBERS IN VIEW RUPTURE PGT/FAR RELATIONS, WOULD SEEM THAT FAR WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ENTRUST DELICATE MISSION OF THIS NATURE TO LIRING/3 WHO RELATIVELY UNKNOWN QUANTITY.

S E C R E T * SERVICED

BT

SECRET

FORM 3020 9-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

4

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

DISSEM BY: 48

ACTION: WH8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-798301

X-REF TO FILE NO. 50-9-11

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/1 BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG. O. Daly

INFO. FILE VR, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, SOD6, CA5, FI, FI/INT2

MICROFILMED APR 2 1968 DOC. MICRO. SER.

S E C R E T 122255Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY (Mexi 4796)

HGG

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

[illegible] 68111

CIT: Mexico

A: Mexico

2P

1. ON 5 MARCH 68, LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD DINNER WITH CARLOS X PERSAVAL MARCUE, NEPHEW OF MANUEL MARCUE PARDINES, DIRECTOR OF THE NOW DEFUNCT MAGAZINE "POLITICA", COMMUNIST BI-MONTHLY PUBLICATION. PERSAVAL ASKED LIRING-3 IF HE COULD OBTAIN A FALSE PASSPORT FOR WIFE OF re: involvement with IMPORTANT GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA LEADER IN MEXICO WHO MUST TRAVEL GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO OBTAIN DOCUMENTS.

2. ON 8 MARCH, PERSAVAL SAID TWO IMPORTANT GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES HAD TO TRAVEL TO GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO BY MID MARCH AND ASKED IF LIRING-3 STILL WILLING TO HELP. LIRING-3 ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE BUT SAID THERE WAS LIMITED CHANCE OBTAINING FALSE DOCUMENTATION. HE COULD, HOWEVER, BRIEF THESE REVOLUTIONARIES ON GUAT/MEXI BORDER IN ORDER MAKE ILLEGAL CROSSING EASIER. IF THEY DESIRED, HE COULD PERSONALLY GUIDE THEM ACROSS BORDER.

3. ON 9 MARCH, PERSAVAL CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS WITH LIRING-3 ON GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES WHO HAD TO TRAVEL GUATEMALA URGENTLY. HE SAID ONE OF THEM HAS LEGAL DOCUMENTATION BUT OTHER DOES NOT. HE

AS PW	
PS An	WH/1
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X

cks

050-9-11

12 Mar 68

201-798301

FORM 3020A 9-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION RECEIVED
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED RID/FMIS

MAR 26 8 04 AM '68
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #
ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

MAR 1 5 14 PM '68

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. FORWARDED RID/EDI
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
INFO:
FILE VR

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4798 S E C R E T

THEREFORE DECIDED BOTH SHOULD ENTER GUATEMALA ILLEGALLY. THEY CANNOT ENTER THRU TAPACHULA, HOWEVER, SINCE THEY WELL KNOWN THERE. LIRING-3 SUGGESTED SAN CRISTOBOL AREA WHICH NOT SUBJECT TO MEXICAN OR GUATEMALAN SURVEILLANCE. THE PERSON WITHOUT DOCUMENTS IS WOMAN 28 YEARS OLD. PERSAVAL NOT WILLING GIVE LIRING-3 NAMES OF REVOLUTIONARIES BUT PROMISED ARRANGE FOR CONTACT BETWEEN THEM EVENING 15 MARCH.

4. STATION HAS NO INFO ON IDENTITIES OF MAN AND WOMAN WHO MUST RETURN GUATEMALA MID MARCH. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

FILE LIRING-3

ORIG: Vince Daly/bb
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ___ # ___

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR C/WH/COG-5 C/CI.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 71522

TO MEXICO CITY FEB 1 23 35Z

INFO: GUATEMALA CITY JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 4314 (IN 40487)* 201

NO OBJECTION TO ENCOURAGING LIRING-3 TO RENEW CONTACTS IN GUAT FAR CIRCLES. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE SOME DOUBT WHETHER LIRING-3 IN FACT ABOVE SUSPICION OF FAR, SUGGEST HIS ACTIVITIES BE CLOSELY MONITORED DURING NEXT FEW MONTHS. IF HE UNABLE SHOW TANGIBLE EVIDENCE DURING THIS PERIOD THAT HE IN FAR GOOD GRACES SUGGEST CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 BE PHASED OUT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Request Addressees comments on continued use of LIRING-3 as contact of FAR in Mexico.

WH/2/GUAT
WH/COG/OPS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

file ELIRING-3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIF. TO FILE NO. 201-798301
X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-812145
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

25

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, C/WH/COG 5, ADDP, DDP, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/CI, C/SOD 3, C/CI/SI-G, C/CI/PS, MEXI

S E C R E T 310120Z JAN 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4314

GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 2331 (IN 23361)

B. MEXICO CITY 2363 (IN 25077)

C. MEXICO CITY 2438 (IN 29707)

D. MEXICO CITY 2564 (IN 37717)

E. MEXICO CITY 1930 (IN 00593)

F. MEXICO CITY 3581 (IN 99801)

G. HMMA-33842 (NOT SENT GUATEMALA CITY)

WH/1

3P

31 JAN 68 IN 40487

MICROFILMED MAR 8 1968 DOC. MICRO. SER.

LIRING-3

1. ON 31 JULY 1967 LIRING-3, PER REF A, OBTAINED CONFESSION FROM GUATEMALAN LEFTIST MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL THAT LATTER TRIED BETRAY FAR GUERRILLAS. LIRING-3 SUBSEQUENTLY DENOUNCED OROZCO AS FAR TRAITOR TO LIRING-2 (WHO SUPPOSEDLY RELAYED DENUNCIATION TO CUBAN AUTHORITIES) AND PER REF C TO ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO, CLOSE CONTACT OF FAR IN MEXICO. HE ALSO SENT LETTER DENOUNCING OROZCO TO ARNOL (RODRIGUEZ) CAMPS IN HAVANA FOR PASSAGE TO FAR REPS THERE. LETTER, SEALED, WAS GIVEN ALBERTO (DOMINGO) OF MAGAZINE SIEMPRE WHO THEN TRAVELING CUBA BY SERGIO (VALDEZ), LEFTIST FRIEND OF LIRING-3. LIRING-3 NEVER HEARD CUBAN OFFICIAL REACTION. PER SEC

B. 201-812145

201-798301

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 4314 SECRET

REF D CAPUANO DECIDED LIRING-3 WAS WOFIRM PROVOCATION, DISCUSSED WITH LIREBEL-2 INVESTIGATION OF OROZCO AND ORDERED FAR CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 DISCONTINUED. "GARCIA" WHO CLAIMED BE FAR REP ASSIGNED MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH LIRING-3 HAD HIS LAST MEETING WITH LIRING-3 IN JUNE 67. LIRING-3 ~~HER~~ AD NO OTHER MEETING WITH FAR REPS SINCE THAT TIME.

2. ON 23 JANUARY 1968 SERGIO VALDEZ TOLD LIRING-3 THAT FAR REP HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED MEXICO FROM HAVANA WITH MESSAGE FOR ALBERTO DOMINGO THAT THREE UNIDENTIFIED FAR REPS IN HAVANA WANTED EXPRESS THEIR THANKS FOR LETTER CONCERNING TRAITOR OROZCO. FAR REPS ALSO WANTED "PERSONS CONCERNED" TO BE WARNED THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER FAR TRAITOR, A GUATEMALAN WORKING FOR WOFIRM. DOMINGO WHO NOT AWARE OF CONTENTS LIRING-3 LETTER TO FAR PASSED MESSAGE ON TO VALDEZ. AT SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH VALDEZ FAR VISITOR IDENTIFIED TRAITOR AS ONE CARLOS (SALAZAR). VALDEZ EXPRESSED APPRECIATION BUT ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SALAZAR AS WELL AS PROOF HE FAR TRAITOR SAYING DID NOT PERSONALLY KNOW GUAT BY THAT NAME. VISITOR PROMISED CHECK AND PASS ON FURTHER INFO.

3. CARLOS SALAZAR PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR WHO TALKED TO LIRING-4 AT CUBAN EMBASSY 22 JUNE 67 (SEE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 4314 SECRET

REF D. AS NOTED THIS REF CUBANS GAVE THIS GUAT COLD SHOULDER. LIRING-3 DID NOT SUCCEED IN CONTACTING SALAZAR AFTER LATTER VISIT TO EMBASSY. INTERESTINGLY, CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR PER REF F WAS REPORTED BY CUBAN CITIZEN OTONIEL (PENA) ENTENZA (MADE CONTACT WITH STATION IN MAY 65) TO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ERNESTO CAPUANO DEL VECCHIO. PENA STATED THAT SALAZAR BELONGED TO PRO-COMMUNIST GROUP DESIGNED SUPPORT YON (SOSA) REBEL FACTION IN GUATEMALA. IT WAS PROBABLY TO CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR THAT LIRING-9 REFERRED TO WHEN PER PARA 5 REF G AND ATTACHMENT HE WARNED LIRING-4 NOV 67 TO BE CAREFUL AS GUAT WHO WAS WOFIRM AGENT HAD MENTIONED HER NAME AS REFERENCE.

4. IT APPEARS FROM ABOVE THAT LIRING-3 MAY BE ABLE TO RENEW CONTACT WITH GUAT FAR. AS FIRST STEP, HE ENDEAVORING MAKE DIRECT CONTACT WITH FAR VISITOR WHO TALKED TO SERGIO VALDEZ. IT ALSO APPEARS FAR IN HAVANA DID NOT TAKE ERNESTO CAPUANO SUSPICION THAT LIRING-3 WORKING FOR WOFIRM SERIOUSLY. IT WOULD APPEAR IN FACT FROM ABOVE THAT CAPUANO IS NOT TRUSTED BY FAR IN HAVANA.

5. REQUEST ADDEE COMMENTS.

SECRET

SECRET

ACTION

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

32

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CA 5, CA/PROP, CA/PEG, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, F
FI/INT 2,

S E C R E T 172155Z JAN 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4171
DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

17 JAN 68 IN 32328

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 64232
B. JMWAVE 0805 (IN 25903)
C. MEXICO CITY 4119 (IN 29292)

WH/1 file

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED THAT ON EVENING 15 JANUARY HE ATTENDED MEETING OF MEXICAN INTELLECTUALS AT HOME OF LUIS CARRION VILLA; WAS DISAPPOINTED TO FIND ONLY FOUR OTHER PERSONS PRESENT. THE TWENTY OR SO OTHER MEXICAN INTELLECTUALS WHOM HE WAS LED TO BELIEVE WOULD BE PRESENT DID NOT SHOW UP. (LIEMBRACES OBTAINED SOME PHOTOS OF PEOPLE ATTENDING MEETING.)

2. CARRION DID MOST OF THE TALKING, INTRODUCING HIMSELF AS A TRUE REVOLUTIONARY WHO HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE CAUSE OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, COMPROMISING HIMSELF ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS IN THE PAST, AND HE TRUSTED THAT EVERYONE PRESENT FELT THE SAME. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO STRONG ATTACK AGAINST CASA DE LAS AMERICAS FOR HAVING INVITED THE "MAFIA" OF MEXICAN INTELLECTUALS, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY JUAN VICENTE MELO, JUAN GARCIA PONCE, EMANUEL CARBALLO AND , PARTICULARLY, CARLOS MONSIVAIS. HE CHARACTERIZED THESE AS "OPPORTUNISTIC" AND WITHOUT THE TRUE IN-

SECRET

WH

cc Rpts

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4171 SECRET SECRET

TEREST OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AT HEART.

3. CARRION SAID HE FELT THAT ALL "TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES" SHOULD MAKE STRONG PROTEST TO CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND REST OF THE WORLD THAT WOULD FORCE CASA DE LAS AMERICAA TO "CORRECT ITS POSITION" AND ALIGN ITSELF PROPERLY TO THE PERSONS WHO TRULY REPRESENTED MEXICAN REVOLUTIONARY THINKING. HE PRPOSED THAT ALL STATEMENTS MADE BY THE MEXICAN DELEGATION BE STUDIED CAREFULLY TO GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO THE PROTEST, THAT HE HOPED TO OBTAIN FULL PRESS RELEASES FROM PRENSA LATINA SINCE HE DID NOT EXPECT MUCH TO APPEAR IN MEXICAN PRESS.

4. CARRION MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE PROTEST WOULD NOT INCLUDE CRITICISM OF DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS OR JESUS SILVA HERZOG, WHOM EVERYONE RESPECTED AND WHO WERE CONSIDERED ABOVE ANY SPECIFIC GROUP.

5. CARRION REQUESTED THAT GROUP MEET AGAIN AS OFTEN AS NECESSARY TO FORMULATE THE PROTEST AND ASKED EACH PERSON PRESENT TO BRING SUBJECT OF THEIR MEETING TO ATTENTION OF OTHER INTELLECTUALS WHO MIGHT BE WILLING SIGN PROTEST ONCE IT IS WRITTEN.

6. LIRING-3 WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT OBTAIN COPY OF FINAL DRAFT.

7. INASMUCH AS STATION HAS ALREADY DISSEMINATED TWO INTEL

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE MEXICO CITY 4171 SECRET

REPORTS THIS SUBJECT, AND AS YET NOTHING HAS MATERIALIZED, STATION RELUCTANT DISSEM THE ABOVE AT THIS TIME, ALTHOUGH RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT INASMUCH AS EARLIER REPORTS CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION THAT MEXICAN PROTEST WAS AGAINST THE CULTURAL CONGRESS PER SE. PROPOSE DISSEM BE WITHHELD PENDING FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. IF PROTEST DOES NOT MATERIALIZE, WILL DISSEM GIST OF ABOVE.

SECRET.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LIRING /3/
201-798301
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE FUTURE USE OF SUBJ.

201-[illegible]
HMMA-33842
12 JAN 68

UFG

R 6801261736

FILE IN 201-798301

16. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached for Headquarters information is a memorandum prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the SGSWIRL examination of LIRING-3.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
  Memorandum (1 copy)

Distribution:
  Orig & 2 - C/WHD, w/att

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 33579	1 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

H/W ATTACHMENT
HMMA-33579

2 October,1967

Subject: SGSWIRL Examination of LIRING/3.

1. From about 1330 until 1530 on 29 September,1967, LIRING/3 was given an SGSWIRL examination. Rowton arrived at the safehouse (Tacubaya) with the SGSWIRL operator at 0930 that morning and remained with the operator until the examination was completed. He had not given LIRING/3 any previous notice of the nature or extent of the examination, but simply asked him,on 27 September, to keep the entire day of 29 September free for a lengthy dicussion with Rowton. Rowton introduced the SGSWIRL operator as señor Albertini, a trusted "socio", and spent the first hour or so reviewing his relationship with LIRING/3, ostensibly for the benefit of Albertini. Rowton then,introducing the subject of certain doubts that he had in the past concerning LIRING/3's reporting, stated that Albertini had a means of checking scientifically the truthfulness of LIRING/3's statements. Rowton explained that he was particularly concerned about the possiblity of LIRING/3 having doubled back with LIRING andmaintaining with them a secret agreement of some sort to report on Rowton and his activities.

2. LIRING/3 went into a state of visible shock at this and stated that even the thought of betraying Rowton had never occurred to him at any time. When the SGSWIRL operator explained the scientific means he was to use on LIRING/3, the latter stated that he could not possibly accept this humiliating means of testing him since it was diamentrically opposed to his principles. He pointed out that he had accepted Rowton at his word and he could not see or understand why Rowton could not do the same for him, adding that the whole thing smacked of methods used by ACFACT and LIRING. He added that if this meant that he would have to break with Rowton, then regretfully he would have to accept this alternative. He explained that submitting to the SGSWIRL examination would inevitably destroy the idealistic and profound relationship which he had previously felt he enjoyed with Rowton.

3. Rowton and the SGSWIRL operator spent the next two hours calming LIRING/3 down and finally convincing him that he would not be compromising with his deeply-felt principles by taking the test. He at last consented to be questioned on his loyalty to Rowton and insisted that he be asked,"Do you believe in Rowton?"

4. After a brief break for lunch the examination was given inone of the bedrooms of the apartment while Rowton waited in the living room. LIRING/3

ATT #1 HMMA 33579 201-798301

appeared to be in reasonably good spirits after the test, although he was obviously emotionally strained by the experience. Rowton made a date to see him again that evening at 2100 to talk things over in a clamer atmosphere.

5. At that meeting with LIRING/3 Rowton explained that he had felt it necessary to ascertain as objectively as possible the extent of LIRING/3's loyalty to him and he was happy to have scientific proof that LIRING/3 had not berayed him to the LIRING's. LIRING/3 stated that after it was all over he felt better and admitted that he agreed with Rowton on the necessity for such an examination, humiliating as it might at first have appeared to be. He confessed that any "errors" (fabrications and ommissions) that he had made in the past, were due to his intense desire to produce for Rowton, since he still felt very sensitive about having to accept money from Rowton without being able to render commensurate services. He stressed, however, that at no time had he ever been disloyal to Rowton or done anything against Rowton's interest, as señor Albertini could prove with the results of the SGSWIRL. LIRING/3 promised in the future to follow Rowton's direction scrupulously and assured Rowton that he no longer felt under any compulsion to exaggerate or fabricate anything to impress Rowton.

6. Headquarters and the Station may find the SGSWIRL examination disappointing in its limited coverage, but it must be realized that LIRING/3's initial reaction was entirely negative and at one point he threatened to break off completely with Rowton because of the insult to his "dignity". Although the SGSWIRL operator felt that from a professional standpoint it would be better to administer the examination at another time when LIRING/3 was less emotionally upset, Rowton asked both him and LIRING/3 to go thru with it on the spot, feeling that psychologically it was essential to make LIRING/3 submit, even for a limited test. Rowton also feels that the test did serve as a very favorably deterrent over LIRING/3 in the future, when a second one can be more painlessly administered, in a calmer atmosphere. It, of course, also covered the very pertinent question of whether LIRING/3 had been an LIRING double agent or betrayed Rowton in any way.

Wallace B. Rowton

201-798301

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
SGSWIRL Report on LIRING/3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached herewith is the SGSWIRL report (Idens u/s/c) on LIRING/3.

2. Please note that the SGSWIRL interviewer has made the point that the principal misfortune in this interview probably was that LIRING/3 was not tested on the fabrication of contacts with the IDEN D's, which was thought to be the most probable area of deception.

3. In view of LIRING/3's threat to quit working for ROWTON, we would be interested in hearing of any repurcussions or change in attitude that may have resulted from LIRING/3's having taken the test. We also are interested in the Station's comments and recommendations as to the continued use of LIRING-3, bearing in mind ROWTON's recent report of LIRING suspicions that L-3 may be working for WOFIRM.

Chester R. MENDRICK

Distribution:
Orig. & 1-COS, Mexico City

Attachments:
Report - u/a - 2 cys.
Idens. u/s/c - 2 cpys.

LIRING-3
201-798301

2 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-15966	DATE 30 NOV 1967 22 Nov. 67
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

RI
CHRONO

ABSTRACT X

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	W. Kerbe	sl	6955

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
OS/IRD	11/27	J.B. Bednar

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	[illegible]	W.J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

IND 10-915

IDENTITY SHEET

IDEN A	Carlos JURADO Del Mar
IDEN B	artist
IDEN C	Greek businessman interested in selling arms to the communist-oriented rebels in Guatemala
IDEN D	Guatemalan revolutionary
IDEN E	Cuban Government

SECRET

Att #1 to HMMW 15966

CS COPY

201-798301

16 November 1967

SUBJECT : LIRING-3 (IDEN A) PRD #69719

Subject was interviewed and tested with SGSWIRL on 29 September 1967 in a Mexico City safe site. The interview was requested by Raymond A. FRADYER.

The interview was conducted in Spanish by the examiner. Wallace A. ROWTON, Subject's principal agent, was present during substantially all of the interview except for the testing period.

Subject has not previously been tested, and has had no contact with any WOFIRM representatives other than ROWTON.

Subject is a married male Mexican citizen, an IDEN B by profession. Prior to recruitment his apparent political sentiments were somewhere in the far left, but he was not believed to be significantly involved in intelligence activities or organized political activities. He was recruited by ROWTON under the cover of a IDEN C. Subject has since his recruitment had contact with IDEN D elements and with IDEN E elements in his efforts to insert himself and ROWTON into the desired position. The initial goal of this operation was to monitor such traffic and pick up whatever additional intelligence information might be incidentally encountered. As Subject was and is, in his own idiosyncratic way, a communist sympathiser, ROWTON has not indicated any anti-communist, anti-IDEN E, or anti-revolutionary aims.

Subject was known to have lied and concealed information on numerous occasions, and it was presumed that considerably more lies were not yet known to WOFIRM. On this basis, SGSWIRL coverage was to have covered numerous issues, centered on other intelligence involvement, fabrication of contacts with significant IDEN D and IDEN E figures, and revelation of his association with ROWTON. The issue of revelation of association with ROWTON was rather complex in that ROWTON never revealed his true name, nationality, or interests to Subject, and also he instructed Subject to reveal certain ostensible facts to various specific individuals.

The examiner was presented to Subject as an associate of ROWTON of Italian extraction.

ATT #2 TO HMMW 15966 CS COPY 201-798301

PROCEDURE

Subject first refused to take the test, basically on the grounds that in his estimation his relationship with ROWTON, as well as his whole way of life, were at variance with any such procedure. In the three or four hours that this was being discussed, Subject also decided to quit working for ROWTON.

Eventually, over a specific matter of hurt pride, Subject agreed, or rather demanded, to be tested on "two questions--whether (he) was betraying ROWTON to IDEN E intelligence and whether (he) trusted ROWTON," following which he would break off contact with ROWTON. Under the circumstances ROWTON judged that the best course would be to follow this lead and attempt no more than a clarification of Subject's relationship with IDEN E intelligence. The examiner was not optimistic about the possibility of getting a valid test under these circumstances, but after talking with Subject for a time it was possible to develop what the examiner considers a reasonable and technically acceptable test covering unreported involvement with any intelligence service.

The above procedure might be visualized more accurately if it is mentioned that once having met with Subject, ROWTON and the examiner had almost no time together without Subject being present, and it was not possible for them to converse in any language other than Spanish without damaging their cover.

RESULTS

Subject has no connections or commitments unknown to ROWTON with any government or intelligence service. He has no involvement with the IDEN E's that he wishes to conceal from ROWTON, and he has no dealings with the IDEN E's which are contrary to what he believes to be ROWTON's interests.

Concerning revelation to the IDEN E's of Subject's association with ROWTON, the issue itself was, not unexpectedly, a cloudy one. In brief, Subject stated that he could not really recall the exact extent to which he might have revealed the fact that he was backed by a IDEN C or that the IDEN C's name was (ROWTON's alias). Subject himself suggested that he be asked if he was "informing the IDEN E's of ROWTON's movements," Subject's way of expressing the idea of "reporting on" ROWTON. The examiner used this question, and Subject appears to have been truthful in his negative answer to this question.

NOTE

1. By the end of the interview, ROWTON and Subject had made an appointment for a meeting that same evening, indicating that it is quite unlikely that Subject will break contact with ROWTON.

2. It was not really possible for the examiner to determine the extent to which Subject believed the story of the IDEN C and the Italian SGSWIRL examiner. The examiner feels that there were no real flaws in the maintenance of this cover and that the cover's only real weakness is its inherently shaky plausibility. Subject appeared to accept the alias used by the examiner and even made passing references to Italy; whether this was done because he believed what he was told or because he just thought it was the most courteous way to handle the situation is not known. He did make several "hurt" references to the injustice of ROWTON and the examiner demanding to use a SGSWIRL on him when he did not even know for sure who ROWTON was. On at least one occasion he mentioned that for all he knew ROWTON might even be working for WOFIRM. This reference did not seem strained, although it is conceivable that its purpose was provocation; ROWTON has told the examiner that Subject recently hypothesized out loud that ROWTON might be a Soviet.

3. The principal misfortune of this interview is probably that Subject was not tested on fabrication of contacts with IDEN D's. This was thought to be the most probable area of extensive deception. It should be pointed out, however, that the Station already knows that Subject has fabricated such contacts, and the most likely contribution of SGSWIRL would have been merely a further accumulation of examples of this same basic vice. It might also be pointed out that Subject's "reporting" to date has dealt almost exclusively with his own activity, hence his fabrication has been more an irritation than a threat.

Paul I. NAPOLILLI

14 November 1967

SUBJECT : LIRING-3 (IDEN A) IBD 469919

Subject was interviewed and tested with SGSWIRL on 29 September 1967 in a Mexico City safe site. The interview was requested by Raymond A. FRADYER.

The interview was conducted in Spanish by the examiner. Wallace A. ROWTON, Subject's principal agent, was present during substantially all of the interview except for the testing period.

Subject has not previously been tested, and has had no contact with any WOFIRM representatives other than ROWTON.

Subject is a married male Mexican citizen, an IDEN B by profession. Prior to recruitment his apparent political sentiments were somewhere in the far left, but he was not believed to be significantly involved in intelligence activities or organized political activities. He was recruited by ROWTON under the cover of a IDEN C. Subject has since his recruitment had contact with IDEN D elements and with IDEN E elements in his efforts to insert himself and ROWTON into the desired position. The initial goal of this operation was to monitor such traffic and pick up whatever additional intelligence information might be incidentally encountered. As Subject was and is, in his own idiosyncratic way, a communist sympathizer, ROWTON has not indicated any anti-communist, anti-IDEN E, or anti-revolutionary aims.

Subject was known to have lied and concealed information on numerous occasions, and it was presumed that considerably more lies were not yet known to WOFIRM. On this basis, SGSWIRL coverage was to have covered numerous issues, centered on other intelligence involvement, fabrication of contacts with significant IDEN D and IDEN E figures, and revelation of his association with ROWTON. The issue of revelation of association with ROWTON was rather complex in that ROWTON never revealed his true name, nationality, or interests to Subject, and also he instructed Subject to reveal certain ostensible facts to various specific individuals.

The examiner was presented to Subject as an associate of ROWTON of Italian extraction.

PROCEDURE

Subject first refused to take the test, basically on the grounds that in his estimation his relationship with ROWTON, as well as his whole way of life, were at variance with any such procedure. In the three or four hours that this was being discussed, Subject also decided to quit working for ROWTON.

Eventually, over a specific matter of hurt pride, Subject agreed, or rather demanded, to be tested on "two questions--whether (he) was betraying ROWTON to IDEN E intelligence and whether (he) trusted ROWTON," following which he would break off contact with ROWTON. Under the circumstances ROWTON judged that the best course would be to follow this lead and attempt no more than a clarification of Subject's relationship with IDEN E intelligence. The examiner was not optimistic about the possibility of getting a valid test under these circumstances, but after talking with Subject for a time it was possible to develop what the examiner considers a reasonable and technically acceptable test covering unreported involvement with any intelligence service.

The above procedure might be visualized more accurately if it is mentioned that once having met with Subject, ROWTON and the examiner had almost no time together without Subject being present, and it was not possible for them to converse in any language other than Spanish without damaging their cover.

RESULTS

Subject has no connections or commitments unknown to ROWTON with any government or intelligence service. He has no involvement with the IDEN E's that he wishes to conceal from ROWTON, and he has no dealings with the IDEN E's which are contrary to what he believes to be ROWTON's interests.

Concerning revelation to the IDEN E's of Subject's association with ROWTON, the issue itself was, not unexpectedly, a cloudy one. In brief, Subject stated that he could not really recall the exact extent to which he might have revealed the fact that he was backed by a IDEN C or that the IDEN C's name was (ROWTON's alias). Subject himself suggested that he be asked if he was "informing the IDEN E's of ROWTON's movements," Subject's way of expressing the idea of "reporting on" ROWTON. The examiner used this question, and Subject appears to have been truthful in his negative answer to this question.

NOTE

1. By the end of the interview, ROWTON and Subject had made an appointment for a meeting that same evening, indicating that it is quite unlikely that Subject will break contact with ROWTON.

2. It was not really possible for the examiner to determine the extent to which Subject believed the story of the IDEN C and the Italian SGSWIRL examiner. The examiner feels that there were no real flaws in the maintenance of this cover and that the cover's only real weakness is its inherently shaky plausibility. Subject appeared to accept the alias used by the examiner and even made passing references to Italy; whether this was done because he believed what he was told or because he just thought it was the most courteous way to handle the situation is not known. He did make several "hurt" references to the injustice of ROWTON and the examiner demanding to use a SGSWIRL on him when he did not even know for sure who ROWTON was. On at least one occasion he mentioned that for all he knew ROWTON might even be working for WOFIRM. This reference did not seem strained, although it is conceivable that its purpose was provocation; ROWTON has told the examiner that Subject recently hypothesized out loud that ROWTON might be a Soviet.

3. The principal misfortune of this interview is probably that Subject was not tested on fabrication of contacts with IDEN D's. This was thought to be the most probable area of extensive deception. It should be pointed out, however, that the Station already knows that Subject has fabricated such contacts, and the most likely contribution of SGSWIRL would have been merely a further accumulation of examples of this same basic vice. It might also be pointed out that Subject's "reporting" to date has dealt almost exclusively with his own activity, hence his fabrication has been more an irritation than a threat.

Paul I. NAPOLILLI

LIRING-3

SECRET

Chief, WOACRE

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

AQUATIC/Documentation

Action Required: See Par 2.
Reference: HMMW-3614, 12 October 1967.

1. Returned herewith is one signed receipt as requested in Reference, Par 3.

2. Per Par 4 of Reference, Wallace B. ROWTON has stated that LIRING-3 could get backstopped documents at a cost of 1,000.00 M.N. ($80.00 US) plus travel expense. These are regional type "Passports." Something above an identity card. ROWTON suggests that two or three identifications be provided of such general terms that substitution would be fairly easy. What he needs for each document are six photographs full face and full profile, both left and right, along with a complete physical description. The subject should be 45-50 years old and have a Mexican or Latin appearance.

3. Blank Mexican Passports seem unlikely at this time because of our limited dealings with the Foreign Office. We suggest you talk with the Mexican desk on this point.

For/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1 Receipt H/W

Distribution:
2 - C/WOACRE, w/att
2 - C/WHD, w/o att

HMMT-8462

16 November 1967

50-6-18/8

LDCcl · 3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

** MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

31

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief of Station, JMWAVE (uFG)

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

MICROFILM 201-143711

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/LIRING-3/Rodolfo REYES-Cortes, Carmen MOLINA de CARRASCO and Carmen LOZADA de Ramirez.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Addressees' comments - (see para 5)

MEXICO CITY 3351

1. Forwarded attached are three reports dated 23, 28 and 30 October written by Wallace B. ROWTON on his contacts with Rodolfo REYES-Cortes, Carmen MOLINA de CARRASCO and Carmen LOZADA de Ramirez. ROWTON first met these three persons when he accompanied LIRING-4 to a party given by Carmen MOLINA on 27 October, passing himself as a wealthy Greek client of LIRING-3 who had called at the latter's house to pay for a painting he had ordered but had been invited by LIRING-4 to come to the party. As previously agreed with the Station, ROWTON directed his main attention to REYES. The latter has resided in Havana since 1960 when he founded the Cuban Ballet Folklorico. Until recently REYES has received the monthly salary of one thousand pesos from the Cuban government, and, according to LIRING-3 is well acquainted with political and government personalities in Cuba. As pointed out in Reference, ROWTON found REYES to be apolitical, a superficial sympathizer of the Cuban revolution and a great admirer of American choreography (he told ROWTON he would very much like to go to New York to see some of the shows there.) REYES complained about the relatively low salary he is currently receiving from the Mexico City Belles Artes for organizing a Cuban Ballet Folklorico show to be held in Mexico City next December. He readily agreed to ROWTON's offer

(CONTINUED)

MICROFILMED
NOV 24 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachments:
1 photo
3 contact reports

See HMMW-15995

Distribution:
0&1 - CWHD, w/1 cy ea att 1 cc w/o att to WH/Regc
1 - JMWAVE, w/1 cy ea att

201-798301

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-33442	6 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-798301

to be his patron (to "help him out financially") if this could be done on a very discreet basis. He said he hoped to put on another Cuban show in Chile, before returning to his family in Havana. LIFEAT coverage of LIRING-3's apartment for 26 October showed, incidentally, that REYES maintains close enough relations with Silvia DURAN (of Lee Harvey OSWALD fame) to be invited by her to her house for lunch.

2. Carmen MOLINA de CARRASCO is the leftist wife of a prominent local neurosurgeon, Juan CARRASCO with whom she spent some years in Cuba. Both are Mexican citizens. According to what she previously told LIRING-3, Carmen MOLINA helped gather some of the information used to defend both Victor RICO-Galan and the ROSENBERGS. With the help of Alicia ECHEVERRIA and the latter's uncle (who is the current Mexican Minister of Interior) Carmen obtained a prominent position on the Mexican Olympic Committee in the publication department. She is a close friend of Carmen LOZADA who is planning to divorce her husband, Enrique RAMIREZ, a rabid pro-CASTRO Mexican chemical engineer who is still in Cuba. Carmen LOZADA's father, Armenegildo LOZADA, a noted Mexican physician is married to a pro-CASTRO Cuban. According to information made available to LIFTER-1, in early 1967 both he (Armenegildo) and his second and present wife are hard core Marxists. This wife, Dra Maria Victoria de la CRUZ, a Cuban, still according to LIFTER-1, is a personal friend of several Cuban leaders including the CASTRO brothers. Husband and wife maintain a close relationship with the local Cuban Ambassador, Joaquin HERNANDEZ-Armas. Carmen LOZADA apparently also started out as a hard line Marxist. Information dated 1961 from RNLABILE indicates that she was active in Communist organizational work at UNAM and participated in Cuban led activities directed against ex-Peruvian President PRADO. Although she is still clearly a leftist, Carmen may not be quite as red now. She told ROWTON, for example, that she felt nothing but disgust for her fanatically pro-CASTRO husband and had strong resentment toward her step-mother. Per LIENVOY, July 1961, Carmen was in contact with Teresa PROENZA when the latter was at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

3. At a private lunch with Carmen MOLINA, 28 October, ROWTON explained that he was a Greek leftist (although not a KKE member) involved in lucrative international business. He said that because of the current situation in Greece, it was difficult for him to operate in Mexico as openly as he would like. He could thus use MOLINA's help in obtaining certain types of information and making discreet contacts with Mexican government and business circles. MOLINA agreed to do what she could. She stated that she was not a member of any Mexican or any other Communist organization, but merely a leftist sympathizer. She also stated that she currently maintains little or no contact with the Cuban Embassy. LIONION-1, to whom a photograph of MOLINA, REYES and LOZADA (copy of which is forwarded attached) was shown stated he had never seen these three persons enter the Cuban Embassy.

4. Following the developments described above, Station plans to:

a. Continue to develop REYES to the point where, per Reference, he may be recruited by ROWTON either under false flag as a Greek leftist or in alias as a WOFIRM member to become a reporting source in Havana. Primary motivation in REYES' case would almost certainly be financial.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-33442

b. To continue social development of MOLINA as access agent to Carmen LOZADA (the two women are planning to live together) and a possible entree to the Mexican Olympic Committee and foreign olympic delegation.

c. To attempt operational development of Carmen LOZADA directly via ROWTON or indirectly via LIRING-3 in the hope that we can play on her "disgust" for the fanaticism of her husband and her dislike of her mother-in-law to elicit information on the activities of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and its personnel, and, hopefully to attempt her recruitment.

5. Station would welcome addressees' comments on the above. Headquarters attention is attracted to ROWTON's report of 30 October which quotes REYES' statements to the effect that some members of the Mexican colony in Havana believe that LIRING-3 may be working for WOFIRM (or for the CASTRO government.)

for Willard C. CURTIS

201-798301

28 October,1967

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Contact with Rodolfo Reyes Cortes(Subject).

1. Rowton met Subject on the evening of 27 October,1967, at a small party at the home of Carmen Molina de Carrasco, Calle Amsterdam 252/6. The only other persons at the party besides/ LIRING/3 and /4 and the son and daughter of Carmen Molina were Carmen Lozada and Enrique Canudas, the latter two of whom had returned from Havana some 30 days previously. All the above are Mexicans who have spent several years in Havana and are social acquaintances of LIRING/3 and LIRING/4.

2. ROWTON crashed the party in the company of LIRING/4 according to a previously agreed plan. LIRING/3 arrived at about 2030 alone, explaining that he had had to leave LIRING/4 at home to wait for an important client who was making a payment on one of LIRING/3's paintings that he had recently purchased. LIRING/3 was to add that LIRING/4 would try to persuade this client to accompany her to the party so that he could meet everyone, and have a drink. LIRING/3 told Rowton he was certain that Carmen Molina would have no hesitation in inviting Rowton to stay once he got into the apartment.

3. Rowton and LIRING/4 arrived about 2130 and found the party in full swing with LIRING/3 and Eduardo Canudas struggling to get the phonograph operating (they eventually borrowed another and played several Cuban revolutionary records.). Rowton was introduced as Sr. Harris,a Greek businessman and long-standing client, and felt at the end he was able to convince all present that he actually was not from WOLADY (although most apparently had that impression at the outset). Rowton managed to toss out a few phrases of Russian at the right time in the direction of Carmen Molina to impress her (fortunately her Russian is weaker even than Rowton's) Rowton spoke some English with as good an accent as he could manage. Carmen Molina volunteered to him privately that she had a great many "progressive" friends in the U.S. Rowton was able to insert several comments about the current political situation in Greece that was forcing him into a virtually clandestine existence in Mexico, as well as elsewhere. Everyone appeared to sympathize with Rowton and ceased asking any personal questions.

4. Rodolfo Reyes Cortes, apparently the guest of honor, arrived at about 2300, apologizing for being late and explaining that he had to attend a memorial service (un acto) for Che Guevara. He refused all offers of liquor

insisting on a Coca Cola. He appeared genuinely happy to meet Rowton and explained in quite serious tones that he was engaged in the training of a Mexican ballet group under the auspices of Bellas Artes to present a performance of the Folklorico Cubano in the near future. He added that he had been the founder of the Folklorico Cubano in the early 60's in Havana and had a wife (ballerina) and young daughter in Havana whom he was anxious to return to.

5. Since Rowton felt that Rodolfo was at the moment the best target for assessment he invited him to join him in visiting the Señorial night-club to see the Greek dances put on by a group of Greek musicians. Rodolfo accepted eagerly and they both left the party at about 0030. Rowton had perviously obtained the office telephone of Carmen Molina (34-60-32,ext 38) at the office of the Olympic Committee where she was working and had promised to take her to lunch the following day. Rowton had also gotten in a few private comments (i.e. compliments) to Carmen Lozada so that he could follow up at a later date if this was considered desirable. He found Carmen Lozada in excellent spirits and at times definitely provocative, despite her current marital situation (she had that same day notified her husband, Enrique Ramirez, a civil engineer working in Havana, that she had begun divorce prodeedings).

6. When Rowton and Rodolfo Reyes arrived at the Señorial, they were refused entrance into the main room since Rodolfo was not wearing a tie and jacket. Fortunately however, the Greek musicians, in their native costumes, were relaxing in a corner of the entrance lobby and Rowton was able to introduce Rodolfo Reyes to them and speak enough Greek to convince Reyes that he knew them well and was himself a Grrek. The musicians, who probably assumed Rowton was a Greek-American, did not speak enough Spanish to talk directly to Rodolfo. They invited Rowton and Rodolfo to return on 31 Oct when they expected fewer people in the audience and when they could show Rodolfo some of the most popular Greek dances.

7. Rowton then invited Rodolfo Reyes to the Kinneret Restaurant for a late supper (no food was served at the Carmen Molina party) and he was able to continue his conversation with him there. Rodolfo revealed that he plans to visit Chile in mid-December,1967, to organize a Folklorico Cubano group there, and then return to Havana. He said Rowton could contact him daily at the Ballet Folklorico de Mexico from 1100 until about 1300 and gave the telephone as 21-04-18 or 21-16-09. He appeared from his conversatinn to be a n admirer of the Cuban revolution and Castro although

201-798301

at no time did he express and strong anti-ACLADY sentiments. He complained at one point of the meager compensation he received for his services at the Folklorico in Mexico City and said that he had just about enough money to live on and help support his parents (he remarked that his family comes from San Cristóbal in Chiapas). Rowton, explaining that he had brought a number of LIRING/3's paintings to help him with his living expenses as well as because he liked the style, stated that he had once aspired to be an artist but had drifted off into business and somewhat regretted this abandonment of art, despite his lucrative dealings in international trade. He took this opening to offer to help Rodolfo financially from time to time, but on a very confidential basis. Rodolfo reacted spontaneously with great expressions of gratitude, assuring Rowton that no one would learn of Rowton's interest in him and his family. Rowton made no commitment but indicated that he would consider helping Rodolfo with his living expenses while he was still in Mexico.

8. Rodolfo Reyes is obviously dedicated to his art and appeared to Rowton to be a seriousminded ~~xxx~~ choreographer. He showed a certain effeminite manner in his gestures and remarks (speaking only in Spanish) characteristic of many persons in his profession. He accepted an invitation to meet again with Rowton at 2300 at the Kinneret Restaurant on 31 October, 1967, so that Rowton and he could revisit the Señorial night-club to see the Greek musicians perform.

W B Rowton
Wallace B. Rowton

201-798301

Sra. Carmen Molina

Enrique Camots

Carlos Jurado

Sra. Carmen Lozada

Sra. Enricha Jurado

1P

ATT: HMMA 33442
CS COPY 201-288301



MICROFILMED
NOV 24 1967
DOC MICRO SER.

EP

23 October,1967

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton 23/10/67 that Carmen Lozada, neurologist, and Canudas (fnu), chemical engineer, visited his home evening 21 October in company Carmen Carasco. LIRING/3 and /4 state they knew both Carmen Lozada and Canudas in Havana since 1961 (both are Mexicans) under contact with GOC and were surprised to learn from them that they will not return to Cuba because of disillusionment.

2. Carmen Lozada stated that she will divorce her husband. Enrique Ramirez, a civil engineer, still in Havana and resume work in Polytecnico in Mexico City.

3. Canudas informed L/3 that mutual friend Rodolfo Reyes of the ballet folklorico, much to everyone's surprise, will return to Cuba next month. LIRING/3 promised Rowton to get in touch with Reyes to determine motivation for return. L/3 surmises that real reason may be Reyes disgust with family in Mexico and desire to be reunited with his Cuban wife who, according L/3, is talented and very attractive.

4. Carmen Lozada informed L/3 that her ~~fxxily~~ parents who very close to Ambassador ~~xxxxx~~ Hernandez Armas(who frequent guest at their home) will be disappointed to learn of her decision divorce her husband and remain in Mexico.

WBRowton

MICROFILMED
NOV 24 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

ATT #2 HMMA 33442

201-798301

30 October,1967

Subject: Report of LIRING/3 Suspect Affiliation with WOFIRM.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 0900 on 30 October,1967, that he had finally managed to have a private talk with Rodolfo Reyes Cortes, his Mexican chereographer friend, on the afternoon of 27 October,1967; and that, in the course of conversation, Rodolfo Reyes had revealed to LIRING/3 in confidence ~~that~~ the reason why the LIRINGS had assumed a rather cool attitude toward LIRING/3 over the past year. Rodolfo Reyes explained that the last time he was in Havana he had heard rumors, among his friends in the Mexican colony, that LIRING/3 was working "either for WOFIRM or the Cubans". Rodolfo went on to say that the origin of this rumor, as far as he could ascertain, was the fact that LIRING/3 had made two trips into Havana for no known specificreason and at his own expense. Rodolfo Reyes, indicating that he himself did not believe the rumors or, at least, did not care whether they were true or not, commented to LIRING/3 that other members of LIRING/3's profession were naturally jealous of the success of anyone of their group and were always quick to draw their own conclusions.

2. LIRING/3 commented to Rowton that, although this news had shaken him and LIRING/4 badly at the time, neither of them cared particularly what the LIRINGs thought of them, since their own conscience was clear. LIRING/3 added that it was important, however, to continue to develop his commercial activity in Chiapas (especially since Rodolfo Reyes' home is by coincidence located in San Cristóbal) so that word would gradually filter back to the LIRINGs that he actually did have financial resources outside his art production. LIRING/3 continued that obviously the LIRINGs did not have any specific proof or they would long ago have cut off all contact with him as well as LIRING/4. He concluded that since the LIRINGs had certain suspicions, they naturally warned all his friends and former contacts (including, of course, Arnol Rodriquez) to avoid close contact with him until their doubts could be resolved.

3. In reply to Rowton's query LIRING/3 stated that Rodolfo Reyes and Carmen Molina (separately) had commented to him that they were favorably impressed by Rowton and did not voice any suspicion of Rowton's bona fides (as a Greek leftist businessman). Carmen Molina, in fact, had gone so far as to show some irritation that LIRING/3 had not introduced her to Rowton previously since she was anxious to develop some sort of lucrative business

dealing with him. Carmen Molina commented to LIRING/3 that she felt sure she could help Rowton in his business and political problems and at the same time make a little much-needed money for her own living expenses.

4. LIRING/3 continued that he had been maintaining discreet personal contact with Carmen Lozada over the week-end (he commented that LIRING/4 has already shown some signs of jealousy and therefore he had to be careful not to give her cause to distrust him). LIRING/3 stated that Carmen Lozada had told him that her father, a well-to-do Mexican doctor residing in Coyacan, had remarried tand that her step-mother was a Cuban sicentist who had lived many years in Mexico. She added that both her father and step-mother were on excellent social terms with Ambassador Hernández Armas. She revealed that she had already notified her husband, Enrique Ramirez, that she intended to divorce him, and she expected a storm of protest both from him (in Havana) and her father and step-mother, both of whom were "puritanic" despite their "progressive" convictions. She added that she expected Enrique Ramirez to rush over from Havana as soon as he received her letter and to appeal to her father and step-mother to save his marriage. She, however, insisted to LIRING/3 that she had made up her mihd that she would go through with the divorce. She added that for this reason she did not wish to live with her father and had decided to stay with her friend, Carmen Molina, until the divorce papers were through and the storm had blown over. She added that she did not particularly like being a house-guest in the small aprtment of Carmen Molina, but at the moment she had no choice.

Wallace B. Rowton

Wallace B. Rowton

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief of Station, Tegucigalpa H 4 T

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/Letter received by LIRING-3 for Mailing to Rene OCHOA Funez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded under separate cover is a letter and photograph received by LIRING-3 on 2 October 1967 from the mother of Rene OCHOA Funez in Honduras for remailing to her son in Havana, CUBA. OCHOA is a Honduran revolutionary.

OCT 31 1967

Raymond A. Frankyn
for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above, u.s.c. S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/WHD w/att 1 cy, u.s.c.
1 - COS/Tegucigalpa w/att 1 cy, u.s.c.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

H A T T

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-33278

DATE: 13 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-798301

Don
Carlos Jurado
Calzada de Tacubaya
172.-apto.-6-D.
Mexico. 11. D.F.

REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS

SEP 30 1967

CORREO AEREO
VIA AIRMAIL

Rte. Camila Funes L.
19 calle. #507.-5a y 6a Avenida
Bo. Villa Adela
Comayaguela

CORREOS
7:00
ADMON.

MICROFILMED
OCT 31 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Comayagüela, 28 de septiembre 1967

Querido hijo: ojalá que estén bien, todos que Katy y mis nietos, todos estén buenos, y que no hayan problemas, por aquí estamos regulares. no te había escrito porque mi salud no a andado bien; pero todos los días pienso en en el hijo ausente, y en su familia, quizá no esté lejano el día que nos volvamos a reunir. cuando no lo esperes recibirás las rosquillas, las tengo encargadas, para que con el viaje no se vayan arruinar, no se puede mandar cantidad porque irán certificadas. Por aquí, ya están sintiendo la venida de los exámenes finales, Rigo con demasiado trabajo a veces no duerme, con los estudios y las clases, Avencio, lo mismo, pero dice que este año es el mas difícil, si logra pasarlo, ya los siguientes son mas fáciles, yo creo que cuando Rigo y Avencio ya no estudien estarán mejor, te mandan las fotos de los hijos de Avencio, Elsa Corina los saludan, Rigo y en fin toda la familia, y de mi recibe en unión de Katy y los nietos un fuerte abrazo de tu madre. Camila Chirinos

Los hijos de Avencio encima pintados.

4-65

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO. [illegible]

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

201-355222

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 22

4-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

49

ACTION WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2.

MEXI

MICROFILMED
NOV 2 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

S E C R E T 1520ZZ CITE MEXICO CITY 2476

IN 31615

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA ~~CITY~~

PERUMEN

1. IN INITIAL TALKS WITH LIRING-3 IN LATE JULY MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL MENTIONED MERCEDES PEREIRA (WHOM LIRING-3 KNEW IN HAVANA 1962-64 AS SPANISH REVOLUTIONARY INVOLVED IN SUPPORT GUAT REVOLUTION) NOW LIVING MEXICO CITY. ~~LIRING-3~~ OBTAINED HER ADDRESS FROM ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO.

SEX: F

(DOI 13 AUG 67)

2. LIRING-3 SPENT FOUR HOURS 13 AUG WITH PEREIRA AND 17 YEAR OLD ARMANDO PEREIRA WHO CLAIMED HE RECEIVED GUERRILLA TRAINING CUBA. PEREIRA STATED HER SISTER SOFIA PEREIRA CURRENTLY WORKING CZECH EMBASSY HAVANA EXPECTS TRANSFER CZECH EMBASSY MEXICO CITY IN "NEAR FUTURE". PEREIRA WHO IN PROCESS BECOMING MEXICAN CITIZEN SAID SHE STILL IN CONTACT WITH GUAT REVOLUTIONARIES AND HOPES CONTINUE SUPPORT GUAT REVOLUTION FROM MEXICO AS "MATTER OF CONSCIENCE". SHE FELT LIRING-3 SHOULD MEET GUAT FRIENDS WHOM PLANNING INTRODUCE IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

DOB CA 1950

SEX: F

(DOI 13 AUG 67)

3. REQUEST ADDEES COMMENTS AND TRACES. STATION FILE CHECK PRODUCED ONLY 1962 LIFEAT INFO TO EFFECT PEREIRA (THEN LIVING MEXICO CITY) WAS IN CONTACT WITH NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST EDELBERTO (TORRES) ESPINOZA (201-252680?).

S E C R E T

BT

AN	FI	
PS	~~DESK~~	
ABSTRACT		INDEX X

201-[illegible]
15 AUG 67

SECRET

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

38

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/DO G 3, CI, CI/OPS, CI/ICL, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 122225Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3121

LIMA DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

12 OCT 67 IN 71[illegible]

PBRUMEN

1. DURING VISIT TO CUBAN CONSULATE 11 OCT WHEN SHE FOUND ALL OFFICERS OUT, LIRING-4 WAS TALKING WITH CONSULATE SECRETARY WHEN MAN ABOUT 22 CAME IN, SAID HE WAS PERUVIAN, HAD JUST ARRIVED MEXICO, AND URGENTLY WANTED SPEAK WITH "SOMEONE" AS HE WANTED COMMUNICATE WITHOUT DELAY WITH COMPANERO IN HAVANA. WHEN TOLD ALL OFFICERS OUT, PERUVIAN WAITED FOR LIRING-4 OUTSIDE AFTER HEARING FROM SECRETARY THAT LIRING-4 PREVIOUSLY WORKED IN CONSULATE. PERUVIAN EXPLAINED TO LIRING-4 THAT COMPANERO IN HAVANA WAS ABOUT TO RETURN PERU AND THAT HE WOULD WALK INTO POLICE TRAP UNLESS WARNED AS POLICE SURVEILLING HIS HOUSE. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO MEXICO BY COMPANEROS IN LIMA TO CONTACT CUBAN WHOSE NAME WRITTEN ON PAPER HE SHOWED LIRING-4 WAS GARBLED VERSION LIRING-9'S NAME (IDEN FOR LIMA).

SECRET

WH/1
file 201-798301

L-3 K.

COMPANEROS IN LIMA HAD BEEN ABLE COME UP ONLY WITH PRICE ONE WAY TICKET TO MEXICO AND PERUVIAN NOW WITHOUT A CENT AND COUNTED ON CUBAN EMBASSY TO PAY HIS RETURN TRIP LIMA. PERUVIAN HINTED THAT ARREST OF COMPANERO NOW IN HAVANA COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IN PERU. AS HE AFRAID RETURN CUBAN EMBASSY BY HIMSELF, HE ASKED LIRING-4 MEET HIM NEXT MORNING AT NEARBY SMALL CAFE SO THAT HE COULD GIVE HER WRITTEN MESSAGES HE CARRYING APPARENTLY FOR LIRING-9 (WHO KNOWN IS).

2. LIEMBRACE TEAM WHICH COVERED AREA OF CAFE INDICATED BY LIRING-4 DID NOT SPOT HER NEXT MORNING, POSSIBLY BECAUSE, ACCORDING LIRING-4, SHE ONLY SPENT FEW MINUTES INSIDE WITH PERUVIAN. LATTER HANDED HER FOUR PIECES OF PAPER WHICH HE INDICATED CONTAINED BONA FIDES AND REQUEST FOR CUBAN HELP, WHICH HE WANTED LIRING-4 TAKE TO CUBAN EMBASSY RIGHT AWAY. LIRING-4 ASKED THAT PAPERS BE PLACED IN SEALED ENVELOPE WHICH SHE PROPOSED OBTAIN AT NEARBY POST OFFICE. BY COINCIDENCE LIRING-4 SPOTTED OTHER LIRING MEMBER AT TELEGRAPH OFFICE NEAR POST OFFICE AND REFERRED PERUVIAN TO HIM. PERUVIAN WAS TOLD BLUNTLY TO COME IN TO EMBASSY IF WANTED ANYTHING AS HIS ATTITUDE SUSPISCIOUS. LIRING-4 LATER SAW PERUVIAN AT CUBAN EMBASSY BUT DOES NOT KNOW OUTCOME

PAGE THREE MEXICO CITY 3121 S E C R E T **SECRET**

HIS REQUEST FOR HELP.

3. WILL TRY HAVE LIRING-4 IDENTIFY PERUVIAN IN TALK WITH CUBAN CONSULATE SECRETARY. ABOVE INDICATES ONCE MORE POOR STATE OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CUBAN SUPPORTED SUBVERSIVES IN LATIN AMERICA AND CUBANS. CAN LIMA THROW ANY LIGHT ON ABOVE?

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment A to HMMA-32989 dated 6 September 1967

AUDIO

1. Special COS operations No. 1 and No. 2 have functioned satisfactorily with no calls for assistance.

2. LIRING-3/LIRENO: A UHER-4000L has been installed for this operation in lieu of a Revere. There was a slight problem at first when the LP operator recorded too loud and distorted the tape. The UHER uses batteries and the quality has greatly improved by getting off the AC line. CORNBUZZ has come to the conclusion that Mexico City does not have a good earth ground. Consequently, great adjustments must be made with any equipment that needs an earth ground.

3. DISPERSE: A separate report is being prepared on this operation. To date, we are not too happy with the results. There is an intermittent buzz which we cannot identify and the present switching arrangement makes it hard to follow Subject from room to room. More details will be included in a separate dispatch.

4. LISAMPAN: We now feel that this operation is beginning to shape up, thanks to the expertise of Peter J. DEYRUP. Inasmuch as DEYRUP will provide a technical report, and presumably is still working on some of the problems, the details will not be repeated here. It is too soon to say, but we hope to be able to have the LP keepers move defective QTL-1's out and replace them with operating units whenever there is a failure. A problem might be having to adjust each unit on the target line. Time will tell.

5. Plans for LISAMPAN are to activate the CCT of LISAMPAN/BAKER early in September using LICAICE as the LP. When we have reliable switching on LISAMPAN/DOG, this, too, will be piped to LICAICE via CCT from LISASH.

6. There were a few other miscellaneous AUDIO chores. Three duplicate tapes had to be made for the COS, three Revere tape recorders had to be cleaned and repaired, and one UHER 4000-L was cleaned and repaired.

LIRING-3
201-798361

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION:
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

MICROFILMED [illegible] 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI
Reference : HMMA-38250, 28 August 1967

Headquarters notes that on 9 August 1967 LIRING-3 was in contact via LIFEAT with one Electa LNU. Given LIRING-3's artist background and the subject of conversation - the visit of Rodolfo Heisler, a Swiss artist, to Cuba - it is suggested that Electa LNU might be Electa ARENAL (201-173795), the mother-in-law of David ALFALO Siquieros the well-known Mexican Communist artist.

Andrew F. MERTON

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO: B 201-173795

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HHMW-15790

DATE: 21 SEP 1967
12 September 1957

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-798301

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	J. Stewart	sas	6954

RI
Chrono

AUTO		WH/1
ABSTRACT X		

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	9/12	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, WH/COG

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Reference: HMMA 32778

1. Forwarded under separate cover are six reports dated 31 July, 5, 11, 14 and 17 (two reports) August 1967 concerning the LIRING-3 Operation prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON.

2. The first three reports 31 July, 5 and 11 August deal with the recent Moises OROZCO Leal "affair" (see reference) and it's aftermath. The 17 August report, which is a review of the LIRING coverage on LIRING-3, also deals with this subject. LIRING-3's conversation with Mercedes *PEREIRA (report dated 14 August 1967) was reported in MEXICO CITY 2476.

3. ROWTON's report dated 17 August 1967 is of some interest.

A. The departure of the secretary LIRING-4 previously filled in for reopens the possibility that LIRING-4 may, again, work at LIRING. LIRING-4, in fact, recently received a necklace from this secretary (a rather unespected gift at this juncture).

B. The report indicates that LIRING personnel have doubts about some of LIRING-3's activities (this is not too surprising).

Raymond H. Freeze

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Reports a/s para 1 UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att USC
1 - C/WH/COG w/o att
4 - FILES

s/c att'd by RID/AN
6 Sep 67

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-32850	28 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-7983C1

MICROFILMED
SEP 5 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

14P

17 August, 1967

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Conversation with

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1100 on 17 August, 1967, that he had had a pleasant chat with ______ the previous day in the latter's office. Among other things revealed that Araceli [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ and her husband had been recalled to Havana unexpectedly and would probably be leaving for good in about 7-10 days. did not provide LIRING/3 with any explanation, but L/3 surmises that the recent inspection uncovered the fact that Araceli is a chronic complainer and performs relatively little work, and her husband is virtually superfluous at Cubana de Aviación since he never has been able to take over the management from Rojas as originally planned. LIRING/3 commented that this might be the much-hoped-for chance for LIRING/4 to resume work in LIRING/9's office. Rowton asked L/3 to encourage L/4 to accept the offer if it should be made. He added that the last time he talked with L/4 she appeared a little reluctant to get involved again, explaining that she commented when discussing the shortage of funds (2-3,000 dollars) that she was glad that she wasn't still working and hence not subject to any investigation. L/3 promised to put pressure on L/4 to accept the job. He noted with satifaction that L/4 had recently received a message from Araceli Cepero that she had a gift (neclace) for her. L/3 added that L/4 has not rushed over as yet to pick up the gift, but feels it better to wait until Lati has departed in the hope that Araceli might talk more freely at that time.

2. LIRING/3 zalso reported that ______ commented in the course of conversation that his colleagues did not believe that Rico Galán had broekn down and talked to the Mexican police, despite the letter (furnished by L/3) to the contrary. L/3 suggested that they check out the letter with Elena Garro, since he understood that she was the one who hand-carried it to the Gobernación. L/3 commented with some bitterness to that it seems that every time he tries to help the revolution by pass on bits of information (Julian Lopez case in particular) it turns out prejudicial to him in the eyes of the superiors of . At this smiled and asked L/3 to have patience and try to understand their point of view. He reiterated that they had doubts but felt sure it would be straightened out eventually.

3. At the end of the meeting L/3 promised Rowton that he would try his best to "lie low" during Rowton's absence. He agreed with Rowton that

S/c att to HMMA 32658

CS COPY

201-798301

Liring-2

LIRING-2
L-2

L-2

L-2

L-2

L-2

L-2

it would be a good idea to visit San Cristóbal to show some sign of life at the "Florimex" factory and to reassure the land-lady that he is still interested in using the house but has had unexpectedly delays in obtaining the license. L/3 also agreed to go to Havana in the event he received an invitation and could not stall long enough to consult with Rowton after the latter's return to Mexico City. He stated that he assumed that the invitation would come from the "Casas de las Americas" and might concern some sort of art exposition with fixed dates.

4. Rowton gave L/3 his New York City P.O. Box(in alias) and requested L/3 to drop him a line between 25-31 August, when he expected to be passing through New York from Montreal enroute to Europe. L/3 stressed again that he hoped to cash in on Sergio Valdez' [illegible] venture in Venezuela, especially in the eyes of the Cubans, since it was a bona fide effort that could easily be checked out with favorable results.

Wallace B. Rowton

17 August, 1967

Subject: Review of LIFEAT Traffic Relating to LIRING/3 and LIRING/4 for the period 2-14 August, 1967.

1. A review of the LIFEAT intercepts for the period 2-14 Agust, 1967, reveals confirmation of the following points previously reported to Rowton:

(a) Commercial (cover) activities of LIRING/3. SAN-28(2.2) confirms that srita Guadalupe Vasquez, the friend of Sergio Valdez, was working on the license (as of 2 August) for the importation of the plastic flowers from Guatemala for L/3. She states that she is going to court with the petition "right now". In another intercept on [illegible] August Sergio Valdez tells L/3 that he and Alejandra (Urbina Torres) will make up their legal and personal agreements the following week (with regard to "Colorlux", the glass factory located at Plaza Miravaille). They expected to assemble the samples (for Venezuela) the following day.

(b) LIRING/3 conversations with his Honduran friend, René Ochoa, in Havana. SAN-41 (7.7) reveals that Ochoa is anxious to talk seriously with L/3 and wants to get to Mexico City soonest. He states that the only problem is the visa and promises to send L/3 data so that L/3 can attempt to expedite a Mexican visa.

(c) LIRING/4's social contacts with the LIRING personnel. With regard to L/4's general feeling toward the LIRING establishment, L/3 tells Rojas (of the Cultrual office) that L/4 visits LIRING "only occasionally", and adds that "those people were very hard to get along with and she no longer has anything to do there.. Only goes by once in a while to say hello."

(d) LIRING/3's contacts with Ernesto Capuano during the week of 7 August, although the substance of the conversations with him is not confirmed. SAN-41(5.0) indicates that Sergio Valdez assisted L/3 in his attempts to locate Capuano and make the first appointment.

(e) LIRING/3's contact with César Tejeda Fonseca and sra. Merceded Fereira on 10 and 13 Agust, 1967.

2. The review likewise reveals that the following information not previously known by Rowton or passed to him by LIRING/3:.

7

(a) In general the extent of the participation of both Sergio Valdez and Raúl Moreno in LIRING/3's operational as well as commercial efforts. L/3 has told Rowton repeatedly that Valdez and Moreno are aware of L/3's relationship in the plastic flower business with certain Czechs but that they are not witting of Rowton's alias or of the true nature of their relationship. LIFEAT intercepts, however, reveal that L/3 keeps Sergio Valdez informed of his meetings with Rowton (and it must be assumed) of the general content of their conversations. During this period, Rowton is referred to once as "Zorba" and several times as "Palacio", whereas previously he was referred to simply as "that person". L/3 has stated to Rowton that Sergio Valdez believes that he, L/3, is a high-level [illegible] agent and that his Czech contacts are purely commercial.

(b) L/3's relationship and rendezvous' with Silvia Durán and Berta Wigisser. In DAN-40(44.5) Silvia Durán invites L/3 to her home between 1530 and 1700 on 7/8/67 when she will be free. She calls and talked to L/4 for the first time on 10/8/67. L/4 says that she has heard of Silvia from L/3 and Silvia replies that she hopes they will meet someday soon. DAN-40(5.5) indicates that L/3 is using Rowton as an excuse to stay at the Tacubaya apt (probably during a tryst with either of the above women). He saw Rowton from 1700-1900 on 4/8/67 but called L/4 at about 1915 to say the the "matter with Harris is not finished yet", and later to add that "the thing is dragging out".

(c) L/3's telephone contact with a certain Electa on 9/8/67 who tells him that the Swiss artist, Rodolfo Heisler, is visiting from Cuba. L/3 comments that he has known Heisler since 1961 - since L/3 first went to Cuba.

Wallace B. Rowton
Wallace B. Rowton

!! not Electa ARENAL mother in law of David Alfaro Siqueiros -?

14 August,1967 10

Subject: LIRING/3 Meeting with Mercedes Pereira.

1. At his meeting with Houton at 1100 on 14 August,1967, LIRING/3 reported that he had learned from Ernesto Capuano that sra Mercedes Pereira, his Spanish relovutionary friend, was living at Diagonal San Antonio 4, in apartment 6. (According to L/3, his interest in Pereira was revived by a comment made to him by Moisés Orozco Leal on 31 July,1967, to the effect that Mercedes Pereira was in Mexico).

2. LIRING/3 continued that upon learning her address he called on sra. Pereira unannounced at 1030 on 13 August with LIRING/4 and fortunately found her in with her 17-year-old son, Armando. He found the apartment almost completely unfurnished, except for a table and several chairs and a minimum of bedroom furniture. According to L/3, Sra. Pereira explained that she and her son had just returned to Mexico and were organizing their household on their very limited resources. She added that her son had found work in a factory and that she hoped to locate a job as soon as her Mexican immigrant papers came through.

3. She and her son welcomed LIRING/3 and /4 after so many years, but sra. Pereira confessed later in the conversation that she was expecting L/3 to visit her since she had already received word from Ernesto Capuano. She then recounted to L/3 and L/4 the vicissitudes and turmoil of her life since she had last seen them in Havana(in 1964). She stated that her very confused citizenship status had continued to plague her in Havana and ,when she finally decided to leave in order to settle the inheritance left by her/deceased Spanish husband in Spain, she had great difficulty in leaving Cuba. She explained that many obstacles were put in her way, despite all the work she had done for the revolution, and she was forced to leave in effect as a "gusanita". She said that her mother and sister, Sofia, were still in Havana, and added that her sister is still working at the Czech Embassy. She also stated parenthetically that her sister, Sofia, was hoping to be transferred to the Czech Embassy in Mexico City in the near future, where she had worked prior to going to Havana.

4. Sra. Pereira stated that she was greatly disillusioned with the Cubans and felt that the Tricontinental had done more harm than good by trumpeting its intention of helping all Latin American revolutions. She commented that the situaton in Guatemala, which she had recently visited as a tourist with Spanish documents, was very bad for the revolutionaries. She explained that not only were there many factions in the movement -

FAR, Yon Sosa, the Primero de Mayo, the "Cravos" and other splinter groups - but there were recently, during the last six months many deserters filtering into Mexico and that LIRING/3 would have to move with extreme caution in his contacts with the revolutionaries. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he felt this an opportune opening to relate his story of Moisés Orozco Leal and he did so briefly. Sra. Pereira commented that she first met Orozco in Havana when she was very much involved there with Guatemalans revolutionaries. She added that she was favorably impressed with Orozco and was surprised to learn recently that he had deserted from FAR. She added that there was another FAR deserter in Mexico City even more important than Orozco, by the name of "El Gallo" or "El Gallito", whose true name she did not know. Salvador Quillava Morales

5. According to L/3, sra. Pereira commented that she thought LIRING/3 had acted properly with regard to Orozco and agreed with him that he shoudl attempt to retain friendly contact with Orozco until he recieved a definitive reply from FAR as to the best course of action to take with him. She offerred to introduce L/3 to several Guatemalans she knew well in Mexico City - not directly involved in the revolution but useful contacts in any case. In reply to L/3's query, she stated that Ernesto Capuano was a reliable and intelligent person, but so exposed in Mexico City that he could not operate as freely as he would like. She stressed to L/3 that Capuano was closely watched and could be a contact that might conceivably compromise L/3 in his future travels to Guatemala. She stated that she herself was being extremely cautious because of her past history in Guatemala as well as Havana, and had even gone to the length of paying a considerable sum to have her file removed from Gobernación, so that there would not be a trace of her travels to Cuba and Guatemala. She explained that after leaving Havana, she and her son went to Spain and managed to collect a small inheritance (about 7,000 pesos in value) and at the same time took out Spanish papaers and was issued a Spanish passport, as a refugee. LIRING/3 explained to Rowton that sra. Pereira had been born in Spain, but moved to Mexico many years ago, married a Guatemalan doctor, accompanied him to Guatemala where he worked under the Arbenz regime, sought refuge in Mexico with him after the overthrow of the government. After her husband (either legal or common-law) died she left for Havana, in 1962, as L/3 recalls, with her son, Armando, who had been born in Guatemala City about 1950. L/3 continued that she became closely connected with the Guatemalan revolutionaries in Havana and represented Guatemala at the Tricontinental. L/3 stated that sra. Pereira is a well educated woman of about

forty-six years of age, and that her son, aged about 17, is a very husky teen-ager who was trained in guerrilla warfare by the Cubans. L/3 also recalled that Sra. Pereira's mother's name is Isabela, and will probably resettle in Spain, once she leaves Cuba with her other daughter, Sofia Pereira.

6. [illegible]/3 stated that he hoped to see Sra. Pereira again within the xx week since he was quite certain that she could put him in touch with the [illegible] people in Mexico City and possibly act as a liaison herself in the future.

Wallace E. Rowton

11 August,1967

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with Moisés Crozco Leal.

1. At 1100 on 11 August,1967, at hte safehouse Rowton learned from LIRING/3 that Moisés Crozco Leal telephoned him the previous afternoon to thank him for the letter and the interest he has shown in him. L/3 stated that he told Crozco that his main concern was what if anything the Mexicans had asked him about L/3 and whether he had been forced to reveal any of L/3's business (in Guatemala). According to L/3,Crozco assured him that, although the Mexican police had asked him "many and repeated questions" about his travels, he revealed nothing about L/3. One of the questions asked repeatedly by the Mexicans was what he knew about the husband of a certain Aura Marina. Crozco claimed that he knew nothing of this person and so replied in the negative to the police. Crozco continued that he could not let L/3 know where he was at the moment but would get in touch with him in a short time, as soon as the heat was off, through his mother. According to L/3, Crozco's mother's home has been searched several times since Crozco's release on 4 August,1967.

2. LIRING/3 then explained that after he learned of Crozco's arrest and release (through Ernesto Capoano) he felt it urgent that he communicate with Crozco to determine what Crozco had revealed to the Mexican police and how he was treated. He therefore sent a telegram to Crozco addressed to Crozco's mother at her home address (Calle Tennis 408,Col.Country Club on 6 August, simply asking Crozco in double talk to get in touch with him When nothing happened, L/3 continued, he sent LIRING/4 around to Crozco's mother's home about 1030 on 9 August with a short note, the text of which is as follows:

> Valentín:
>
> We have learned of late about your mishap. We want to give you the help we can, since, apart from everything,we understand the human problems (invloved).
>
> We want to see you to find out what we can do for you, but we'll leave it to your discretion as to the contact.
>
> I enclose some money, which we know is only a small thing but we hope that it will be of some use to you.
>
> Cordial greetings from all.

3. L/3 stated that he enclosed 200 pesos in the note, and that the envelope

wass personally delivered without difficulty to Orozco's mother by L/4. (This was confirmed to Rowton by LIRING/4, whom he met with privately at 1630 on 9 August at the restaurnat of Sear Roebuck,Insurgentes).

4. LIRING/3 also reported that he hoped to receive a message from his friend René Ochoa through Aurelio Alonzo (Comercio Exterior) who, according to Ochoa,was due in to Mexico City that same day (11/8/67). L/3 added that he expected a telephone call from Ochoa the preceding evening and,although the phone rang several times, he did not receive any communication from him.

5. L/3 also reported that thus far his efforts to locate Dr. Mercedes Pereira through her son Armando have been unsuccessful. L/3 said that he still had not given up hope that Capcano would get the word to Pereira and that she would eventually contact him.

6. L/3 asked Rowton to meet him again at 1000 the following day so that he could report on whether he had received word from René Ochoa on the flight from Havana.

WBRowton
Wallace B. Rowton

5 August,1967

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1700 on 4/8/67 that he informed by Sergio Valdez that morning that Alberto Domingo of Siempre was taking plane to Havana that afternoon. L/3 stated that he took this opportunity write a hasty note to Arnol Rodriguez explaining recent developments in Moisés Orozco Leal affair and asking Arnol to expedite new contact for L/3 with FAR either in Havana or Guatemala City. L/3 explained to Rowton that in order put heat on Arnol and FAR he wrote that if he not invited to Havana within next two weeks he will definitely be in Guatemala City staying at hotel Florida from 26-28 August and that new FAR liaison should identify himself as "José Luis". He added that Arnol should cable him using code "La medicina está en mal estado" in event FAR wished him keep out of Orozco affair.

2. L/3 stated that Sergio Valdez personally asked Alberto Domingo deliver sealed envelope containing this letter to Arnol Rodriguez. Valdez feels that Domingo will not read letter, although it [illegible] mentions him as person who (unwittingly) originally referred Orozco to ~~Valdez~~ LIRING/3/

3. L/3 also reported that he spoke with Ernesto Capoano by phone and has appointment to meet with him at 1000 on 7/8/67. Capoano cautioned L/3/ who did not identify himself on phone not to mention names by give some indication of nature of business. L/3 stated it concerned "the medicine" and it was then that ~~Mr~~ Capoano gave him appointment.

LE Rowton

31 July,1967

3

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Meeting with LIRING/3.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/3 at 1700 on 31 July,1967, at the safehouse. L/3 reported at once that he had moved his family into the safehouse and that L/4 and their child were out at the moment so that he and Rowton could talk privately. He explained that things were moving very rapidly and that Mioses Crozco Leal was in fact staying at his apartment (Tacuba-ya) in preparation for the trip they were to take to Tapachula. He stated that he had met with Crozco as planned at 2200 on 29 July and after a lengthy talk, Crozco had asked to be put up in L/3's apartment for the night, since it was late and it would be better in view of the trip that they planned to take together. L/3 commented that Crozco appeared quite nrevous and was particularly concerned about answering the door in the event someone knocked while L/3 was away. It was agreed that he would answer the door only in the event that there were three knocks, indicating that the person was LIRING/3 himself. According to L/3 Crozco stated that he had at all costs to get to Tapachula within the next two or three days to meet FAR contacts that were expecting him there. He expressed fear of traveling by plane or even train and welcomed the suggestion of L/3 that the latter's friend Raúl Moreno drive himand L/3 to Tapachula in Moreno's car. L/3 commented to Rowton that he was amazed at the knowledge Crozco had concerning him and his activities, including the dates of his (L/3's) trips to Guatemala and Cuba.

2. Rowton then realizing that L/3 had probably walked into a dangerous trap, queried him very carefully concerning the origin of his contact with Crozco. Rowton explained that he was certain that L/3's story of the trip to Tapachula and the meeting with the Guatemalan woman there wasuntrue and that he assumed that L/3 had a good reason for distorting the truth. Rowton continued that he had come tothe conclusion that L/3 had had a domestic crisis again and had decided to disappear for a few days and had told his wife that he had to go out of town on business for Rowton. He was therefore forced to lie to Rowton also for fear that Rowton might disclose the truth to L/4. Rowton stressed that it was essential that he know the true facts surrounding the first contact with Crozco, since, as L/3 would see later, it might be a matter of life and death for him.

3. LIRING/3 then confessed that he had not actually made the trip but not for the reason Rowton supposed. The real reason he explained was that when Crozco contacted him he saw Sergio Valdez shortly thereafter and the latter to his amazement commented:" I have been contacted. Have you been

contacted also?" According to L/3, he asked Valdez how it was possible that he knew of any new contact that he had, and Valdez replied:"I'm in this thing also." LIRING/3 continued that this statement of Valdez so surprised and disturbed him and he decided to investigate to what extent Valdez was involved in the whole affair of the Guatemalans. In the absence of Rowton he had no resources other than his own ingenuity. He decided to disappear so that he could investigate more securely and he informed L/4 that he had to make a trip to Chiapas. He then telephoned Valdez several times, disguising his voice, and pretending to be "Valentin" in the hope of eliciting some sign of recognition from Valdez. L/3 continued that this, however, did not work and he failed to prove any connection between Valdez and Crozco. L/3 explained then that he did not want to reveal this to Rowton, first because he was afraid that Rowton would consider him stupid or unbalanced and secondly because he was afraid Rowton might tell L/4. He added that he hoped Rowton could understand the terrible pressure he was living under from all sides, with people contacting him, surveilling his movements, controling him. In fact he felt trapped by unknown force . He stated that for instance he was certain that he entrance of Sergio Valdez and Raúl Moreno on the scene was not coincidental but was part of some larger picture that he could not understand. He added that this time he was determined to find out how Valdez was linked with Crozco.

4. Rowton then asked L/3 what he knew about Crozco. L/3 replied that he knew only what Crozco himself had revealed to him, viz.,that his mother was living in Mexico City, that his father had ~~kxxx~~ never been progressive and had in fact been arrested by the government (presumably Arbenz) but had not been harmed since he had been so"honest" and his reputation was above reproach. Crozco also informed L/3 that he had been to Cuba several times and recently was in touch with Montes in Guatemala and up to recently had been doing propaganda work for the FAR.

5. Rowton then stated that he had been doing his best to collect as much information on Crozco as possible and that he was far from happy with what he had managed to uncover to date. He explained that he had verified the address given to him by L/3 (Calle Tenis 38/5) but discovered that it was the home of Crozco's mother and that Crozco was not actually residing there. He added that he had also learned that Crozco's father was probably unstable mentally and that his brother worked in Politica,and this ~~mmg~~ might account for Valdez' connection wtih him (Valdez' working for Rafaga) Rowton then stated that he had a report that he had not as yet been able

to check out to the effect that Crozco had been in Guatemala in May 1967 assigned to some guerrilla activity in the Cobán area but had unexpectedly disappeared and returned to Mexico, probably because he was afraid of capture. L/3 excliamed in evident surprise: "Then he's a deserter!" Rowton agreed that this might be the case and added that this would explain why he wanted to hide out in L/3's apartment. L/3 then agreed that this probably was the case and exclaimed again:" But then it's very dangerous for hix me to be sheltering him!" Rowton agreed but urged L/3 to keep calm and exploit the opportunity to learn from Crozco the true facts of his present relationship to FAR and how he came to use L/3 unwittingly as a refuge. L/3 asked Rowton how he could confront Crozco with his suspicions and get him to reveal what Rowton wanted to know. Rowton then suggested that L/3 drop casually the name of Ernesto Capoano, saying that he had to see this lawyer the next day on some business. Rowton explained that he thought this would force Crozco to talk since he would naturally be fearful of L/3's revealing his whereabouts to Capoano. L/3 replied that he would willingly do this but unfortunately he did not know Capoano. He suddenly thought, however, of a ruse that might work. He could get in touch immediately with Jacobo Rodriguez Padilla, who would certainly know of Capoano, and get as much information on Caponano from Jacobo before springing the name on Crozco. Rowton agreed and stressed that it was essential that L/3 get as much of the true story from Crozco that night as possible. He urged L/3 to pose as a friend and offer to put up Crozco in some other safe place, explaining that his continued presence would jeopardize his own position vis-a-vis the FAR.

6. During the meeting L/3 positiviely identified the photograph (Passport) that Rowton showed him of Moisés Crozco Leal. L/3 commented that Crozco now was wearing glasses and a moustache and had shaved his head, giving himself the appearnace of a person of at least 45 years of age (his true age is 37, according to his own statement). L/3 recalled that Crozco informed him in passing that Leonardo Castillo of FAR had been killed in action recently.

7. In view of the urgency of the developemtns Rowton arranged another meeting with L/3 that same evening (31 July) at midnight at Sanborns Reforma.

Wallace B Rowton

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM 41/53

ACTION c/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, c/CI, c/FI 2, c/WH/COG 5

ASSIFIED MESSAGE 7 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	①	5	C
2		6	
3		7	
4	2	8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

ACTION

26 AUG 67 IN 39473

SECRET 260100Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2605

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

REFS A DIRECTOR 30629

B MEXICO CITY 2564 (I-37317)

1. AFTERNOON 25 AUGUST 67 LIREBEL-2 REPORTED THAT MEETING HELD ON 23 AUGUST TO DISCUSS CARLOS JURADO CASE AND OTHER ITEMS PROVED TO BE OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE. ERNESTO CAPUANO SAID AN INVESTIGATION HAD TO BE MADE BUT HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE LOCATE MOISES OROZCO LEAL WHO PRIME WITNESS. IN MEANTIME, CAPUANO WILL CONTACT CARLOS NAVARRETE TO REVIEW HOW JURADO ORIGINALLY MADE CONTACT.

2. PER SUGGESTION REF A THAT STATION SHOULD NOT FEED INFO TO LIREBEL-2 IN ORDER PROTECT JURADO, LIREBEL-2 TOLD ONLY THAT CASE SOUNDS INTERESTING AND STATION WOULD LIKE BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS. STATION ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST EXILE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES AND CAPABILITIES.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

file

8

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ORIG: JACK STEWART/lm
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 24 AUGUST 1967

		6	
		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 27 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: c/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, c/WH/COG 5, c/CI, c/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) [illegible] (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 30629

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

REF: MEXICO CITY 2564 (IN 37717)

HEADQUARTERS WOULD PREFER SIMPLY HAVE LIREBEL-2 CONTINUE REPORTING ALL INFO RECEIVED RE LIRING-3 RATHER THAN TRY FEEDING INFO DESIGNED PROTECT LIRING-3. THIS DISCUSSED WITH ROWTON WHO IN AGREEMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref advises info given LIREBEL-2 by Ernesto CAPUANO de Vecchio, Guatemalan Communist exile in Mexico, concerning suspicions of LIRING-3. Station waiting until results meeting Guat Commie exiles concerning LIRING-3 prior considering possibility carefully feed info via LIREBEL-2 designed protect LIRING-3.

WH/COG/CICS
WH/2/GUAT

for JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

J.H.V. FISHER
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-779131
X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-244191
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☒ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (4)

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MICROFILMED
SEP 18 1981
DOC. MICRO. SER.

3

ACTION cl/wh6 ☒ RID COPY ☐ ☐ ☒ UNIT cs/dc TIME 2127z BY D

INFO FILE, vr, cs/dc, ddp, adp, cl/ci, cl/ops, ci/ic 2, cl/sa, eir 2, cl/wh/cog 5

S E C R E T 231912Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2564 23 Aug 67 IN 37717

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

ABSTRACT

1. AFTERNOON 22 AUG 67 LIREBEL-2 REPORTED FOLLOWING STORY HE RECEIVED FROM ERNESTO CAPUANO DEL VECCHIO ON 19 AUG:

FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, MEXICAN PAINTER CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR HAS ATTEMPTED MAKE CONTACT IN MEXICO WITH TOP LEADERS FUERZAS ARMADAS REBELDES (FAR) TO OFFER SALE OF MEDICINE AND ARMS. HE FIRST MADE CONTACT WITH CARLOS NAVARRETE (KNOWN TO ADDRESSEES) AND EXPLAINED HE HAS GREEK FRIEND WHO SELLS ARMS ALL OVER WORLD. GREEK BECAME INTERESTED IN SELLING ARMS TO FAR AND ASKED JURADO TO MAKE NECESSARY CONTACTS. NAVARRETE FOUND JURADO TOO EAGER AND TOO INSISTENT ON MAKING CONTACT WITH FAR AND IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO SUSPECT HIM AS CIA OR MEXICAN SECURITY SERVICE PROVOCATION. NAVARRETE DID NOT HELP HIM AND JURADO SOMEHOW MADE CONTACT WITH MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL. CAPUANO DOES NOT KNOW WHAT RELATIONSHIP OROZCO HAD WITH JURADO EXCEPT THAT LATTER OFFERED HIM ARMS, MEDICINE AND MONEY (300 DOLLARS) THE LATTER OF WHICH OROZCO DID NOT ACCEPT. RECENTLY, JURADO CALLED CAPUANO AND ASKED TO MEET WITH HIM. SHOWED CAPUANO LETTER WRITTEN BY OROZCO WHICH CLEARLY INDICATED OROZCO WAS TRAITOR

SECRET

SECRET

TO "CAUSE" (SENT ADDRESSEES IN HMMA 32[illegible] AND 32807). AFTER SPEAKING SECURITY PROVOCATION BASED ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. JURADO TOO EAGER AND INSISTENT ON CONTACTING FAR LEADERS.

B. JURADO, WHO SUPPOSEDLY IN ARMS BUSINESS TO MAKE MONEY, OFFERED OROZCO MONEY FOR FAR (300 DOLLARS). ACTUAL ARMS SELLER WOULD MAKE NO SUCH OFFER.

C. JURADO WANTED TO MAKE FAR LEADERS AWARE OF OROZCO'S TRAITOROUS ACT AND ARMS SELLERS USUALLY TAKE NO INTEREST IN INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF GUERRILLA GROUPS THEY SELL TO.

D. CAPUANO DOES NOT BELIEVE "GREEK" EXISTS AND JURADO USED THIS AS "COVER" TO PENETRATE FAR MOVEMENT.

2. CAPUANO ASKED LIREBEL-2 TO AID IN INVESTIGATION OF JURADO. FIRST PHASE WILL BE TO INTERROGATE OROZCO ON HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH JURADO TO DETERMINE HOW FAR JURADO HAS PENETRATED THE FAR. CAPUANO SAID THERE IS NO PLAN TO DO JURADO BODILY HARM FOR THE PRESENT, BUT HE WILL BE IGNORED BY GUAT EXILES.

3. LIREBEL-2 SAID THAT IN CONNECTION WITH JURADO, A GUAT WHO HAS LIVED IN CUBA FOR SEVERAL YEARS RECENTLY ARRIVED MEXICO

SECRET

WITH WIFE. THIS PERSON, ARMANDO PEREIRA, MET JURADO IN CUBA (NO DATE) AND WAS TOLD BY CUBANS THAT JURADO ACTS VERY SUSPICIOUSLY AND IS NOT TO BE TRUSTED.

4. ON 23 AUG LIREBEL-2, CAPUANO, JOSE LUIS BALCARCEL AND LUIS CASTILLO RALDA WILL HOLD MEETING TO DISCUSS GUAT COMMUNIST EXILE LEADERSHIP IN MEXICO AND JURADO CASE.

5. IT OBVIOUS FROM ABOVE THAT CAPUANO DOES NOT HAVE FULL STORY JURADO'S ACTIVITIES AND HAS MANY OF HIS "FACTS" BADLY MIXED UP. FOR ONE THING CAPUANO MADE NO MENTION OF JURADO'S TRIPS TO GUATEMALA WHERE HE ACTUALLY CONTACTED FAR NOR OF HIS MEETINGS WITH "GARCIA" IN MEXICO CITY. IF JURADO'S STATEMENTS TO WALLACE B. ROWTON CAN BE BELIEVED, IT WAS FAR WHO ASKED HIM ABOUT POSSIBILITY TRANSPORT TO BORDER AREA WEAPONS PURCHASED BY FAR PROCUREMENT MECHANISM SOME OF WHICH WAS IN TEXAS. IT WAS ALSO FAR THAT ASKED FOR MEDICINES. DO NOT BELIEVE JURADO OFFERED FAR MONEY, ON CONTRARY HE REPEATEDLY ASKED FOR PAYMENT OF MEDICINE AND OTHER ITEMS "SOLD" FAR. EITHER CAPUANO MISUNDERSTOOD JURADO OR LATTER DID NOT REPORT HIS CONVERSATION WITH CAPUANO ACCURATELY TO ROWTON. JURADO WAS INSTRUCTED TO POINT OUT TO CAPUANO HE TOOK DIM VIEW OF BEING USED BY OROZCO TO DTUBLE CROSS FAR EMPHASIZING THAT, HAD HE ...

SE

Page 4

SECRET

HAD ARMS TO GIVE OROZCO (WHICH HE DOD NOT) HE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE RECEIVED HIS PAYMENT IN LEAD SINCE OROZCO COMPLETELY BROKE. THUS IN OROZCO "AFFAIR" IT WAS FINANCIAL AND PERSONAL SECURITY ANGLES WHICH OSTENSIBLY BOTHERED JURADO AND NOT HIS INTEREST IN FAR INTER POLITICS. HE FURTHERMORE LOANED OROZCO 322 PESOS AND NOT THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS.

6. WHATEVER HOLES AND CONFUSION EXIST IN CAPUANO'S STATEMENTS RE JURADO'S ACTIVITIES HE NEVERTHELESS HAS GUESSED BASIC TRUTH AND IS APPARENTLY DETERMINED TO MAKE FULL INVESTIGATION. THAT JURADO MAY HAVE EXCEEDED HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND NOT REPORTED HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH FAR AND CAPUANO ACCURATELY TO ROWTON MAY BE CAUSE OF CURRENT TROUBLE. ROWTON SEVERAL TIMES CAUGHT HIM IN FABRICATIONS WITH HELP EXTENSIVE STATION MONITORING HIS ACTIVITIES. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DIFFICULT TO PREVENT HIM FROM BEING OVERACTIVE IN HIS DESIRE PRODUCE VALID FAR CONTACT. STATION HAS ALREADY TOLD LIREBEL-2 THAT IT HAS NO CONNECTION WITH JURADO. WILL WAIT FOR RESULTS FAR 23 AUG MEETING MEXICO CITY CITED ABOVE BEFORE EXPLORING POSSIBILITY CAREFULLY FEED INFO VIA LIREBEL-2 TO PROTECT JURADO. BELIEVE WARNING JURADO VIA LETTER SENT BY ROWTON OR OTHER MEANS WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AT THIS TIME.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 2564 S E C R E T

7. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: ~~J. Stewart/sas~~
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 21 August 1967

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG 8 CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 29467

21 22 23 Z

TO MEXICO CITY

INFO GUATEMALA CITY

[illegible]

REF MEXICO CITY 2476 (IN 31815)

1. FOLLOWING HQS TRACES POSSIBLY IDEN OR RELATIVES PEREIRAS REF:

A. MERCEDES LLANOS DE PEREIRA, CUBAN WHO TOOK REFUGE MEXICAN EMBASSY IN GUATEMALA CITY AFTER FALL ARBENZ. LEFT GUATEMALA 4 SEPT 1954 FOR MEXICO (HGGA-1434, 12 NOVEMBER 1954).

B. SOFIA PEREIRA MARTIN, SISTER MERCEDES (HGGA-1434, 12 NOVEMBER 1954).

C. AUGUSTO PEREIRA LLANOS, SPANIARD WHO TOOK REFUGE MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY XXXX AFTER FALL ARBENZ. LEFT GUATEMALA FOR MEXICO 4 SEPTEMBER 1954 (HGGA-1434).

D. AMADOR PEREIRA REDONDO, SPANIARD WHO TOOK XXXX REFUGE MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY AFTER FALL ARBENZ. LEFT GUATEMALA FOR MEXICO 4 SEPTEMBER 1954 (HGGA-1434); DOCTOR AMADOR PEREIRA, PERSONAL FRIEND AND POSSIBLE BUSINESS ASSOCIATE OF EMILIO ROSENSTEIN STEN, POLISH-BORN COMMUNIST MEXICO AND SUSPECT SOVIET AGENT. PRACTICING PHYSICIAN WITH OFFICE AT CALLE MONTERREY 122-17. MAY BE IDEN WITH

LIRING-3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF:
☐ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 29467

TO DOCTOR AMADOR PEREIRA REDONDO, SPANISH REPUBLICAN IN MEXICO WHO HAS LONG BEEN ACTIVE IN CENTRAL AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND IS MEMBER OF SPANISH COUNCIL FOR PEACE (HMM-1501, 29 MARCH 1956).

E. AMADA ENRIQUEZ PEREIRA, SISTER MIRNA TORRES, PGT MEMBER (GUATEMALA CITY 3625, 8 JANUARY 1964).

2. ALSO PROCESSING TRACES MERCEDES AND ARMANDO PEREIRA, WILL ADVISE POSITIVE RESULTS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: LIRING-3 in touch with MERCEDES and ARMANDO PEREIRA.

WH/2/Guat
C/WH/2
WH/COG/CI6S

fr Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DO NOT MUTILATE

Contents: LETTER FROM LIRING-3 TO ROUTON ~~[illegible]~~ TH IN NEW YORK 20 AUG 67.

2 XEROX COPIES SENT MEXI VIA NON ACCT POUCH TM 121646 21 SEPT 67.

File WH/1
LIRING-3
201-798301

14-00000

Correo Aereo

CORREOS—MÉXICO

TARJETA CARTA

CORREO
AEREO

40 CORREOS CTS.

40 CORREOS CTS.

Sr.
Nicolas Harris
P.O. Box 63
Grand Central Station
Lexington Avenue & 45th Street
New York, City.
U.S.A.

REMITENTE C. Jurado
DOMICILIO Calzada Tacubaya 77-5
POBLACION Mexico 11, D.F.
ESTADO

CORREO AEREO

A FORMA TIENE UN VALOR ADICIONAL DE $0.05

MEX. AGOSTO 20-67

Estimado Sr. Harris:

Estas líneas para saludarlo y decearle buen viaje.

Hasta ahora no tengo noticias importantes. Chichay está yendo al Consulado pero no todos los días. No recibo todavía la carta de Venezuela ni tengo noticias de abajo. Creo que en esta semana sabré algo. Estoy trabajando con lo de las flores y si tengo algo concreto posiblemente a principios de otra semana iré a San Cristóbal.

Reciba nuestros saludos

Carlos Jurado

14-00000

Mex. Agosto 20 - 67

Estimado Sr. Harris:

Estas líneas para saludarlo y desearle buen viaje.

Hasta ahora no Tengo noticias importantes. Chichay está yendo al Consulado pero no Todos los días. No recibo Todavía la Carta de Venezuela ni Tengo noticias de abajo. Creo que en esta semana sabré algo.

Estoy Trabajando con lo de las flores y si Tengo algo concreto posiblemente a principios de otra semana iré a San Cristóbal.

Reciba nuestros saludos

Carlos Jurado

CORREO AEREO

CORREOS - MÉXICO

TARJETA CARTA

CORREO AEREO

40 CORREOS CTS

40 CORREOS CTS

REMITENTE C. Jurado
DOMICILIO Calzada Tacubaya 132-51
POBLACION MEXICO 1, D.F.
ESTADO

Sr.
Nicolas Harris
P.O. Box 63
Grand Central Station
Lexington Avenue & 45th Street
New York City.
U. S. A.

ESTA FORMA TIENE UN VALOR ADICIONAL DE $0.05

CORREO AEREO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief, WH/COG

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/False Documentation Obtained by LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: FYI

Forwarded under separate cover in single copy is a false driver's license recently obtained by LIRING-3 via the corrupt judge in the state of Coahuila who is also helping him obtain a false passport.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Photos a/s UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WHD w/att usc
- 1 - C/WH/COG w/o att
- 2 - FILES

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN 22/11/67

1 cc TO WH/REGC

LIRING-3

201-798301

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-32814	17 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-798301

14-00000

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-32814 of 17 August 1967

TO: CHIEF/WH DIVISION

FM: COS/MEXICO CITY

COPY

201-778301

SECRET



GOBIERNO DEL ESTADO
DE COAHUILA
DIRECCION DE POLICIA Y TRANSITO.

1966 1967

LICENCIA No. LE 15171
CLASE CHOFER
NOMBRE ALBERTO ZARATE VIDAL

SABINAS Coah. 14 de Julio 1967

El Delegado de Tránsito

27-41-L E



Nota: Esta Licencia es indispensable para manejar.

PROHIBICIONES:

1.- Manejar en estado de ebriedad.
2.- Hacer señales innecesarias.
3.- Rebasar por la derecha.
4.- Cambiar de carril sin hacer la señal debida.
5.- Manejar con exceso de velocidad.
6.- Descender de un vehículo por el lado de la circulación.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: J. STEWART/lm
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 17 AUGUST 67

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION: 22 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ADV: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 28757

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 2479 (IN 32323)

REGRET HAVE BEEN UNABLE COME UP WITH SUITABLE INTERIM HANDLER FOR LIRING-3. SUGGEST ROWTON SET UP PLAN FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT BY "TRUSTED BUSINESS ASSOCIATE WHO MAY BE COMING THROUGH AREA." WILL DISCUSS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES WITH ROWTON DURING LATTER'S TDY HQS BEGINNING 21 AUGUST.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: ROWTON going on home leave 18 August. Station feels it most desirable keep direct contact with LIRING-3 during ROWTON's absence.

Jacob D. Esterline

WH/COG W. CINI (IN DRAFT)

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

J. H. V. FISHER
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Tegucigalpa

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/Letter Received by LIRING-3 from Rene *OCHOA Funes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

cit Honduras

Cuba

Forwarded as Attachment One, herewith, is a report written by Wallace B. ROWTON dated 5 August 1967 about a letter recently received by LIRING-3 from Rene OCHOA Funes, the Honduran revolutionary in Havana. Forwarded as Attachment Two, under separate cover, are photocopies of this letter. It does not look, from the sound of the letter, that OCHOA's morale is too high.

MICROFILMED
AUG 30 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
# I - Report [redacted] attached
# II- Copy of Letter UNDER SEPARATE COVER
s/c f'd by [illegible]

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/atts #I & #II usc
1 - COS/Tegucigalpa w/att #II only usc
2 - FILES

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-32815

DATE
17 August 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

GROUP 1
[illegible]

MICROFILMED
AUG 30 1961
DOC. MICRO. SER.

5 August, 1967

1. LIRING/3 received/~~letter~~ three page typewritten letter dtd 27/2/67 from René Ochoa Funez ~~delivered 2x/2/27x byxhandx~~ mailed in Mexico City 2/3/67 by "M.C., Cerrada Rio Janeiro 122, Mexico 7, DF" after having been hand-carried from Havana by the wife of a "compañero de trabajo" of Ochoa. Copy being pouched.

2. In letter Ochoa states he understands L/3's situation "since it is necessary to move ahead with one's own resources and to prove with deeds". He addes that he hoped to send ~~detailsx~~ "concrete and complete news" but he still laboring under difficulties known to L/3. He assures L/3 that he has delivered L/3's last letter to ~~xxxxxxx~~ the "compañero" (Arnol Rodriguez) but could not talk with him privately because of the many visitors who had arrived that day. Arnol's wife Ruby told him that they had received L/3's letters and had answered them (L/3~~x~~ told Rowton that he has never received these replies from Arnol). Ruby Rodriguez also informed Ochoa that the "organismos corres calientes" were going to invite L/3 to Havana. Ochoa promised L/3 that he would do whatever he could to expedite this trip (hacer nuevas gestiones).

2. Ochoa complains of the "realidades que me han tocado vivir aquí" ~~xxx~~ but indicates that he has no intention "resign himself" to bureaucracy commenting that it is necessary "provocar la ruptura, aprediendo a rascarse con las propias uñas", taking the initiative and not expecting anything from anyone. He adds that he has finally cut the "ties which have bound" him to Cuba and although he feels that he can do a great deal there, but it is "infinitiely small in comparison with what he must do ~~xx~~ outside". He assures L/3 that he is serious and that it concerns a "planteamiento serio".

3. Ochoa also cautions L/3 against loosing sight of the ultimate objective in his commercial activity, indicating that he has discussed this aspect of L/3's plans with "a friend" who knows some of these questions better that L/3. He adds that L/3's "asuntos y actividades" interest him intnsely, and that their situation is similar.

WBRowton

att 1 to
HMMA 32815

CS COPY

201-798301

Remite. M.C
Cerrada Rio Janeiro 12 B
Mexico 7 DF

Sr. Carlos Jurado Delmar
Calzada de Tacubaya 172, ap. 5D.
México 11 DF

MICROFILMED
AUG 3 0 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RE

Por: [illegible] Camilo Fariñez
15 calle, 559 [illegible] Casa 507
[illegible], P.C. Marianao, C. A

A. Carlos Jurado Delmar
Calzada de Tacubaya 172 - apto 5D
CALLE NUM. APTO.
México 11, D. F.
ENTRE REPARTO

PUEBLO O ZONA POSTAL PROVINCIA

VALOR 5¢

201-798301

NO COPY

S/C att 2 to
HMMA 325

La Habana,27 de Julio de 1967.

Estimado Carlicho:

Hoy hace más de un mes que recibí tu carta,por las conversaciones telefónicas sostenidas habrás podido comprender que la demora en contestarte se debe,no precisamente a apatía de mi parte,sino falta de canales adecuados para tal fin.

Esta te la envió por la gentileza de un compañero de trabajo cuya esposa va hacia ésa,dicho sea de paso yo no la conozco a ella,por lo tanto es realmente una casualidad que te pueda enviar noticias;pero bien no quería demorar más y he aquí estas líneas.

Creo que entiendo perfectamente tu situación,pues es necesario abrirse paso con los propios medios,demostrar con hechos;esto puede que al principio te huela a consejo,pero realmente no lo es pues precisamente la idea la he tomado de ti y ahora la adopto como posición o actitud ante los hechos.Era mi deseo poderte enviar noticias concretas y amplias esta vez,pero justamente tengo las mismas dificultades que tu enumeras,a pesar de la cercanía física.Entregué tu carta al compañero no me fue posible hablar con él sobre el particular pues el día que fuí llegaron muchas visitas,antes de que él llegara hablé algo con la señora,concretamente me dijo que habían recibido tus noticias,que también te habían contestado;que te iban a invitar los organismos correspondientes pero que ellos aún no tenían noticias concretas;despues como te dije llegaron las visitas y no pude sacar ninguna conclusión;estimo que a estas alturas ya debes tener noticias; posteriormente no he podido ocuparme de ello principalmente por líos de mi parte,fundamentalmente por cuestiones de trabajo.

Ahora bien,te prometo hacer nuevas gestiones pues en estos días tengo un respiro,aunque las gentes por aquí en estos días están bastante ocupadas con la cantidad de actividades y de acontecimientos especialmente de este mes,pero ya veremos.

Creo que no es necesario que te aclare,que en general,tendrás que acostumbrarte a estos problemas,pues las cosas a veces le parecen a uno muy fáciles y desde luego no lo son mas que en apariencia,es necesario comprender a los otros,máxime en estas cosas,un poco pensar como ellos;alguna vez en nuestras discusiones me has señalado como yo justificaba las cosas siempre con la frase"hasta cierto punto tal o tales cosas son inevitables";creo que esta no es una frase sin sentido no es una cómoda salida, es para mi una conclusión de las realidades que me han tocado vivir aquí,hoy la sigo repitiendo y aún tiene más sentido.Lo anterior,por supuesto,no significa que hay que resignarse y esperar que los acontecimientos se desarrollen normalmente,todo lo contrario,hay que provocar la ruptura,cómo?,justamente "aprendiendo a rascarse con las propias uñas", demostrando con hechos y un poco "no esperar nada de nadie".

Dirás por fin cayó en el plano del consejo,te ratifico no se trata de eso,tu mismo lo has dicho eres lo suficientemente grande para comprender las responsabilides que adquieres,por lo tanto huelgan los consejos,sobretodo los que se dan a control remoto. simplemente trato de imbuirte de una idea que ya tienes.Me parece que hay seriedad y responsabilidad en lo que haces era de esperar de ti,me complace que midas todo lo que implica por ambas partes, es un camino sumamente peligroso,sé que lo sabes mejor que yo,pero Carlos siempre tu eres demasiado bueno y de la bondad a la ingenuidad no hay más que un pasito,esto es algo de lo cual tu no eres consciente,en estas cosas es de vital importancia comprender a profundidad esto.Nadie trabaja o lucha,buscando aquello en lo cual no exista peligro,por lo menos entre nosotros,nadie le tiene miedo a los cuatro metros de tierra,pero el aliciente o la meta no es el peligro ni la muerte,realmente con eso no se hace nada,simplemen- es dejar un nombre para una Fábrica,en el mejor de los casos;se trata de algo muy distinto.Me hablas de una cosa normal y lucrativo, esto es bueno a condición de que se comprenda que eso constituye el aspecto externo de la cuestión, es decir la forma, pero lo importante es lo interno el contenido lo esencial; no se conoce la casa por la fachada, ésta la mayoría de las veces nos engaña. A qué todo esto?; bueno, en primer lugar es la opinión de un amigo que algunas cuestiones las conoce un poco mejor que tu, además conociéndote tengo necesidad de referirme a esto y en segundo lugar porque necesito de ti, de tu situación, de tu comprensión, porque también yo he agotado mi capacidad de espera y realmente en estos momentos cuento conmigo mismo y contigo, no hace falta explicarte porque pues nuestra situación es similar, por lo tanto tus apuntes y actividades me interesan sobremanera por las cuestiones apuntadas anteriormente.

Ahora tus noticias son fundamentales para mi, sobre todo dame detalles, quiero hacer las cosas sabiendo y conociendo lo que voy a hacer, tengo prisa por hacer algo pero no por los posibles 4 metros de tierra, no lo excluyo, pero tampoco los busco especialmente. Por fin he resuelto lo que me ataba a este gran país, comprendo que aún puedo hacer mucho aquí, pero es infinitamente pequeño comparado con lo que tengo que hacer fuera de aquí; sabes bien que no soy capaz de emborronar tantas cuartillas simplemente por llenarlas se trata de un planteamiento serio.

Espero que la Cichay (la C cuando se traduce del inglés al chino suena como CH o al revés) ya esté bien, esas son las consecuencias de ser su propio médico (libretero), pero de todas maneras nos alegramos mucho de que haya podido salir de las garras de todos los OLCGes. Carliche necesitaría que en la próxima oportunidad me consiguieras unos encerios (Zapatos) para la Cati, si se da cuenta de esta solicitud me asesina, pero yo cargo con el pedido, son el número 6½ a 7,.-

espero tus noticias, saludos a Ciha y (Chichay-).

Perdona lo abstracto y las repeticiones Fito esta vez tiene que ser así, por razones obvias.

Luego les retornaré todo.

Seis días después de tu llamada me llamaron del Dept. para [illegible] a verme

hoy [illegible] de [illegible] y [illegible]

Te escribiré ahora siempre Carta por Casa.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

21

ACTION
C/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/WH/COG 5

S E C R E T 162722Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2492 16 Aug 67 IN 33264

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REF: MEXICO CITY 2455 (IN 30815)

1. MOTHER OF MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL PHONED LIRING-4 ON 14 AUGUST AND ASKED MEET HER. AT ENSUING MEETING OROZCO'S MOTHER STATED THAT AURA MARINA ARREOLA, HER HUSBAND AND SON WERE RECENTLY DEPORTED TO GUATEMALA BY MEXICAN POLICE WHERE EXECUTED ON ARRIVAL.

2. IN ~~IMU N~~ VIEW OF MANNER IN WHICH REF INFO OBTAINED, DO NOT PLAN CHECK ABOVE WITH LITEMPOS. BUT TRYING OBTAIN DETAILS THEIR INTERROGATION OF OROZCO CONDUCTED ON BASIS STATION REQUIREMENTS AND OROZCO BACKGROUND INFO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 21 PER #

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

INFO: FILE. VR, WH/COG 8, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2, OEZ 4, SECUR 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

SECRET 151515Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2479

ACTION

15 AUG [illegible] IN 32323

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

PBRUMEN

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON DEPARTING ON HOME LEAVE 18 AUGUST.

2. AFTER THoROUGH REVIEW LIRING-3 OPERATION FEEL IT MOST DESIRABLE KEEP DIRECT CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 (WHO LIABLE GO CUBA AND POSSIBLY GUATEMALA IN NEAR FUTURE) DURING ROWTON'S ABSENCE. UNTIL SGSWIRL CAN BE GIVEN LIRING-3 BY SPANISH SPEAKING OPERATOR AS REQUESTED BY STATION, FEEL IT WISE NOT PUSH LIRING-3 TO WITTING LNHARP RECRUITMENT. THEREFORE BELIEVE LIRING-3 SHOULD BE HANDLED BY SPANISH SPEAKER ABLE PASS NOTIONALLY AS EUROPEAN BUSINESS FRIEND OF ROWTON (I.E. WITHOUT GRINGO ACCENT). ALTHOUGH KNOWLEDGE EUROPEAN LANGUAGE NATURALLY DESIRABLE IT NOT ESSENTIAL AS PER ROWTON LIRING-3 WILL NOT QUESTION BACKGROUND HIS FRIEND OR MEET HIM IN PRESENCE OF OTHER FOREIGNER SINCE MEETINGS HELD IN SAFEHOUSE. TO AVOID SECURITY COMPLICATIONS AT THIS JUNCTURE BELIEVE LIRING-3 WOULD BEST BE HANDLED FOR THREE - FOUR WEEK PERIOD BY TDYER FROM WAVE OR HDQS WITH ABOVE REQUIREMENTS. STATION WILL CONTINUE TO ASSUME COMPLETE DIRECTION THIS OPERATION.

3. ALTERNATIVE TO HANDLING BY TDYER WOULD BE TO PLACE

maybe get L-3 go [illegible] and [illegible]

201
LIRING-3
201-798 301
201 Stuart

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES
SECRET
(When Filled In)
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

DISSEM BY PER #
NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ACTION ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2479 S E C R E T

LIRING-3 "ON ICE" FOR PERIOD ROWTON'S ABSENCE SENDING HIM OUT OF MEXICO CITY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND THUS CUTTING HIM OFF TEMPORARILY FROM FURTHER CONTACTS WITH CUBANS, GUATEMALAN REBELS AND LOCAL MEXICAN LEFTIST FRIENDS. THERE NO GUARANTEE HOWEVER LIRING-3 WOULD STAY OUT OF MEXICO AND FURTHER OPERATIONAL INVOLVEMENT FOR FULL PERIOD ROWTON'S ABSENCE.

4. PLS ADVISE PRIORITY.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
XX ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, WH/COG

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/Developments of the LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES FYI

References:
A. MEXICO CITY 2322
B. MEXICO CITY 2331
C. MEXICO CITY 2358
D. MEXICO CITY 2363
E. MEXICO CITY 2396

1. Forwarded as Attachment One under separate cover are seven contact reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on recent developments of the LIRING-3 Operation dated 27 and 28 July, 1, 3 (two reports), 5 and 9 August 1967 (two reports). One of the reports dated 3 August is a monthly resume of operational activities for the month of July. It is forwarded together with the other reports rather than seperately to give as complete a picture as possible of LIRING-3's dealings with Moises OROZCO Leal, the circumstances in which the two men met and the reporting of these dealings by LIRING-3 to ROWTON. Forwarded as Attachment Two, also under separate cover, are photo copies of a two page typewritten message left by OROZCO at LIRING-3's apartment on 1 August. Another copy of this message is being forwarded Guatemala City seperately.

continued.......

Attachments:
I - Seven Reports a/s para 1 UNDER SEPARATE COVER
II- Message Left by OROZCO UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/atts USC
1 - C/WH/COG w/o atts
4 - FILES

1 ATT.

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO
23 AUG 67

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-32778

DATE
15 August 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2. There is little question that LIRING-3 seized the opportunity given him by the sudden apperition of OROZCO on the scene to cover vis a vis his wife a few days of misbehaving. Instead of proceeding to Tapachula to receive from the FAR new contract instructions in Mexico City (an awkward arrangement to say the least), LIRING-3 remained at the safe house he uses in the capital to receive the visit (as indicated by LIFEAT) of Berta WIGISSER his "regular" mistress, Silvia DURAN (of Lee Harvey OSWALD fame) and possibly a certain Yolanda (who appears for the first time in this operation and whose phone number is not in the Station reversed Mexico City telephone directory). Pinned down on the fact that he was in Mexico City during the period of 19 to 21 July, LIRING-3 admitted that he was but felt that he had to tell another lie rather than admit his misbehavior. This lie was that he did not want to appear dependant on Sergio VALDEZ in the eyes of ROWTON and so made his first meeting with OROZCO "more intriguing" by inventing the trip to Tapachula. To add credence to the Tapachula story, LIRING-3 previously asked his wife to impress ROWTON with her concern for him, telling ROWTON that he had disappeared for three days without telling her where he went. This she did very convincingly with much sobbing and crying. The LIROSIN LP which continues to experience technical difficulties now and then did not operate properly that day (it's recorder broke down) but, as luck will have it LIROSIN live monitored a conversation between LIRING-3 and his wife during which the latter reported that her tears seemed to have convinced ROWTON. Another point on which ROWTON had some pretty blunt talk with LIRING-3 concerned the mention of the alias which ROWTON uses with LIRING-3 and 4 to various persons with whom LIRING-3 is in touch. LIFEAT coverage had indicated, for example, that LIRING-3 mentioned ROWTON in alias to Sergio VALDEZ. This LIRING-3 denied. He produced on 3 August 1967 a written review of all the people of interest to ROWTON with whom he has been in contact indicating whether or not he mentioned ROWTON's alias to them. This review is attached to one of ROWTON's reports dated 9 August.

3. What happened between OROZCO, LIRING-3, Sergio VALDEZ and Raul MORENO is explained in detail in ROWTON's reports forwarded with this dispatch. A few additional points should probably be made here. First of all, part of the first meeting between LIRING-3 and OROZCO at LIRING_3's safehouse was live-monitored by LIROSIN when the latter returned home from his regular bartending job in the early hours of the morning. LIROSIN heard enough (his recorder was once more inoperative) to basically confirm LIRING-3's report of his meeting with OROZCO to ROWTON. Secondly, neither VALDEZ nor MORENO were present during the night of 31 July - 1 August when LIRING-3 told OROZCO that the latter was in fact a deserter from the FAR, refusing to indicate how he knew this (ROWTON had passed LIRING-3 information on OROZCO received by the Station from both LIREBEL-1 and 2). The two men arrived at LIRING-3's apartment in the early morning hours when OROZCO had admitted everything and thus do not know what prompted him to tell the truth. Thirdly, LIRING-3 insists that he told OROZCO nothing about his plastic flower business and it's contemplated use to cover activities in support of the Guatemalan rebels. According to him, OROZCO already knew this as well as other details of his dealings with the FAR. LIRING-3 presumes that OROZCO learned this from the higher-ups of the FAR guerrillas while in the hills. OROZCO mistakenly apparently thought that LIRING-3 was in the actual arms procurement business whereas his discussions with the FAR have been limited up to now to the eventual transportation of FAR acquired supplies from Northern Mexico to Guatemala (with the FAR assuming the responsibility of smuggling these supplies over the Guatemalan border). LIRING-3's plastic flower business designed to cover support activities on behalf of the FAR, is not, as a matter of fact operative yet. Thus OROZCO was badly informed of LIRING-3's activities. How OROZCO hoped to obtain arms from LIRING-3, had the latter been able to deliver some at the Guatemalan border area, in view of the fact (as he later admitted) that he was stone broke, is a matter of conjecture. A desperate man may do desperate things and LIRING-3 could have found himself in serious trouble. Judging from the FAR's shooting habits it is a good thing in any case that OROZCO was not armed during the argument at LIRING-3's apartment the night of 31 July to 1 August, particularly when VALDEZ started to threaten him.

4. This Station believes that the LIRING-3 Operation has reached a critical point as a result of the OROZCO affair. Both the Cubans and the FAR (via Ernesto CAPUANO Del Vecchio) have been notified by LIRING-3 of OROZCO's conduct and statements (a copy of OROZCO's message forwarded as Attachment Two was given CAPUANO). If the FAR is at all interested in LIRING-3 he will somehow hear from the Guatemalan guerrillas and negociacions concerning arms and equipment will be resumed. LIRING-3 has not heard from "GARCIA" since June and does not even know if the latter is in Mexico. It is the Station's opinion that he probably will hear nothing directly from the Cubans.

5. Headquarters will note, per ROWTON's report dated 28 July, the relative ease with which LIRING-3 claims to be obtaining a false passport and other identity papers. The Cuban's passports that LIRING-3 purchased in Nuevo Laredo, mentioned in the same report, were issued in 1953 and 1959 and may be of marginal value. They will nevertheless be forwarded to Headquarters together with other documentation held by the bearers of these passports.

"Garcia" is who?

Juan CASTILLO Rolda?

David CASCIA?

Ramiro BERMUDEZ Mellol?

Mario Ima?

Valentin Irue? — no files in Orozco.

Raymond A Frodge

for Willard C. CURTIS

4/S/C

Att No. II to HMMA-32778, 15 August 1967. 201-798301

CS COPY

TALLER DE VITRALES

PLAZA MIRAVALLE 2

MEXICO, D. F.

y mi en lo personal lo que mas me ha molestado [illegible] es la forma en que [illegible] y [illegible] llaman unos los hombres [illegible] la revolucion, sin tomar en cuenta los sacrificios que [illegible] han echo y de [illegible] la revolucion en propiedad particular de [illegible], por me habia [illegible] encontramos envuelto en la entre la [illegible] de la realidad, que tener que [illegible] de algunos, yo estoy dispuesto a que son mia. los [illegible] un [illegible] de confianza, mas no el de dar un paso en [illegible] mi [illegible] ya [illegible] que no soy ni he sido [illegible] en esta vida [illegible] que esa vida lo que [illegible] en las [illegible] y [illegible] que [illegible]

[illegible] esta [illegible] ese cuerpo sistema nervioso que esta [illegible] de la [illegible], en la primera vez que tener que [illegible] ciones mi [illegible], ya que en el [illegible] no [illegible] de servicio en [illegible] lo presento y que [illegible] hacer el papel [illegible] una pues en otras condiciones yo ya [illegible] mi propia letra para [illegible] la historia, [illegible], la historia la hacen los vencedores [illegible] a [illegible] los [illegible], mas no estoy todavia colgado, como [illegible] si [illegible] alguno de [illegible] de mi [illegible] de cobrar mi domicilio, [illegible] y hacer que pasa, para eso [illegible] posible [illegible] por mi propio esfuerzo mi [illegible] con [illegible] ningun [illegible], [illegible] que no den [illegible] nada, [illegible] lo fui y podia contarles mi historia [illegible] en lo justo para que uno [illegible] criticar y [illegible] ya [illegible] desde su punto de vista, [illegible] pendejadas que se cometen a diario y [illegible] quieran ver, [illegible] un dedo si no cuento con el apoyo [illegible] es desde el [illegible] o [illegible] como [illegible] puede juzgar, la solidaridad humana es una cosa que a todos [illegible] debe preocupar pero no desde el punto de soy esto sino [illegible], [illegible] que

tan buena informacion a [illegible] de mi persona [illegible] mas a respecto y de lo que [illegible] tener las [illegible] yo esto dispuesto par la etapa de [illegible] ya la pase hace mucho tiempo, hoy soy consciente y [illegible] que toda la vida me la he [illegible] en [illegible] hasta haciendo locuras como [illegible] por hoy he tenido mas suerte que muchos, he incluso [illegible] inteligencia que muchos he sido mas [illegible] que muchos y no he tenido pelos en la lengua cuando [illegible] puntos de vista se trata he sido discreto y no hay cuidado en lo que se refiere a torturas y demas yo la vida ya la [illegible] y no es una carga pero tampoco [illegible] vivir unos dias mas o menos mas no sin que esto tenga su justificado fin, de pasarme algo lo unico que me apena es mi madre por lo que la hice sufrir [illegible] mas de lo que [illegible] ran a la mano le podrian echar la culpa, y luego a fin de cuentos cuantos fusilamientos romanticos en la historia de las revoluciones no han habido y la revolucion sigue su camino contra viento y marea a pesar de que los dogmaticos se cuidan como si ellos no [illegible] flote en los triunfos populares, la revolucion en [illegible] y sin [illegible] a pesar de los [illegible], no la [illegible] a bailar a [illegible] no soy [illegible] y [illegible] todas las atenciones que han tenido con mi persona si uds. lo creen conveniente sino [illegible] que se haga, pueden [illegible] la hora que gusten para la tarea que quieran mas no [illegible], [illegible] soy un soldado [illegible] y menos [illegible], [illegible] un paso lo [illegible] y soy de decisiones rapidas para [illegible] a nadie en una aventura en la que considere que no pueda salir adelante con el dolor de ver que alguien por mi culpa falta.

el

[illegible] no [illegible] desconfianza no se trata [illegible] dejo esto [illegible] justificarme [illegible] de [illegible] y le he dicho a otros creo que a mi me [illegible] y lucha [illegible] de otras yo [illegible] en contra de todos pero no [illegible], en mi [illegible] hay cobardia que he tenido que [illegible] que [illegible] estar [illegible] de la [illegible] y darme la [illegible] dos cosas que [illegible] pero que [illegible], el [illegible] las [illegible], hay cosas [illegible] los [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] objetivos, valientes [illegible] la [illegible], [illegible], sino que [illegible] todas las [illegible] en una esquina y que no [illegible] por creerse el [illegible], del que en determinada [illegible] todo y despues [illegible] el olvido, o cuando [illegible] loco [illegible] las realidades, entonces comienza a creer el que le [illegible] el [illegible], todo porque porque para ellos [illegible], los que [illegible] romanticos [illegible] estan [illegible] confundidos y de verdad es que [illegible] que no necesitamos los frentes [illegible] no [illegible] es mas en [illegible] ellos [illegible] el [illegible] al pueblo [illegible] tomar parte en este echo, [illegible] NO SON [illegible] DE LA VERDAD SON [illegible] porque no le llegan a las masas y las masas los admiran pero no los [illegible] pide accion y ellos [illegible] la causa [illegible] y que no lo es [illegible] que es revolucionario y que no [illegible] sobre los echos ya se puede hacer historia [illegible] la que por no no han echo y cual es el futuro si no se toma en cuenta las condiciones [illegible] de desarrollo del movimiento, se [illegible] por falta de [illegible], se perdio la iniciativa por [illegible] cuenta de que las vias pacificas estaban cerradas en toda su plenitud, y que guerra es guerra pero en toda su plenitud no [illegible] de [illegible] bravucones y viejos [illegible], se [illegible] con el [illegible] muerto y ellos [illegible] a muerto donde esta el [illegible], en el que, les dice las verdades y cree en la revolucion, la violencia blanca no la han podido parar porque si esto, si aquello, si lo otro, la lista larga de los que se han [illegible] en [illegible] por falta de [illegible], disciplina, [illegible] etc. no la quiero alargar mucho quiere decir que este cuerpo no se [illegible] de [illegible] un dia pero que no sea a lo estupidos, como los [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] en fin yo no llevare [illegible] si la tubiera una zona liberada, cuando apenas estoy en la primera etapa, de lo que es la revolucion porque [illegible] de ella no [illegible] mi padrin [illegible] asesinado por eso y cuanta gente de su propia [illegible] cuidado pero yo quiero caer por algo no por pendejo y [illegible] de [illegible], sin el minimo de seguridad no regreso, o sea sin como defender mi vida no regreso estoy dispuesto a tomar el camino que siempre me ha pertenecido como parte del movimiento, si tienen algo en lo que les pueda ser util estoy a sus ordenes previa discusion del caso, los telefonos y otras cosas las queme por seguridad, no es desconfianza sino seguridad.

14-00000

usc

TALLER DE VITRALES

PLAZA MIRAVALLE 3 MEXICO, D. F.

el de como en esto y tu [illegible] en
esta, es bien [illegible]

A mi en lo personal lo que mas me ha molestado [illegible] la forma en que tiran y troquan [illegible] unos [illegible] de la revolucion, sin tomar en cuenta los sacrificios que [illegible] hecho y de donde la revolucion en propaganda particular de uno o un cargo, mas me hubiera gustado encontrarme envuelto en la entre la masa inconsciente de la realidad, que tener que terminar [illegible] de ajedrez, yo estoy dispuesto a [illegible]. los [illegible] un voto de confianza, [illegible] mi direccion ya [illegible] y no soy ni he sido [illegible] de pelicula barata, todos [illegible] en esta vida, [illegible] no han sido gratos y precisamente con todo lo que [illegible] podrian fundirme en las tinieblas de la carcel y es mas [illegible] que soy un [illegible] en el [illegible] que tuve que [illegible] que la [illegible] no [illegible] algun hermano que esta [illegible] de una [illegible], no es la primera vez que tengo que [illegible] ni sera la ultima, ya que en el trabajo como no hay hoja brillante de servicios [illegible] y que hay que hacer el papel [illegible] mas en [illegible] condiciones yo ya [illegible] la guarda loura para continuar la [illegible] solo se [illegible] y cuantos nuevos surgen, la historia la hacen los [illegible] los vencidos, claramente los hombres [illegible] los [illegible] surgen de los [illegible], mas no estoy [illegible] de mi [illegible] sobre mi domicilio, [illegible], andaremos [illegible] y haber que [illegible], pero eso si los aprehendere de ser posible [illegible] y por mi propio esfuerzo mi pluma con sus respuestas necesarias [illegible] aunque [illegible], para que no den sin necesario nada, merecen [illegible] contarles mi historia mas de ellos dependen estan en lo justo para que uno los pueda criticar y en mas de mi la critica es jugosta desde su punto de vista, [illegible] podria [illegible] que se cometen a diario y no la quieren ver, no [illegible] ni un dedo si no cuento con el apoyo suficiente cuando menos en lo moral en desde el punto idealista o idealisticamente como dicen, como se puede [illegible], la solidaridad humana es una cosa que a todos nos debe preocupar pero no desde el punto de soy esto sino de echos, -- [illegible]

tan buena informacion a recabado de mi persona porque no [illegible] mas a respecto y de lo que saben tomen las soluciones yo esto dispuesto para la etapa de suicida ya la pase hace mucho tiempo, hoy soy consciente y mas que nada la vida me la he jugado solo en muchas ocasiones [illegible] haciendo locuras como dicen por hay he tenido mas suerte que muchos, he incluso mas inteligencia que muchos he sido mas sincero que muchos y no he tenido pelos en la lengua cuando he [illegible] puntos de vista [illegible] he sido discreto y no hay cuidado en lo que se refiere a torturas y [illegible] yo la vida ya la conoci y no es una carga pero tampoco me gusta vivir unos dias mas o menos mas no sin que esto tenga su justificado fin, de pasarme algo la unica que me apena es mi madre por lo que la hice sufrir. los pensamientos corren mas de lo que se [illegible] a la mano le podrian echar la culpa, y luego a fin de cuentas cuantos fusilamientos romanticos en la [illegible] historia de las revoluciones no han habido y la revolucion sigue su camino contra viento y marea a pesar de que los dogmaticos se cuidan como si ellos no [illegible] a flote en los triunfos populares, la revolucion en medio de [illegible] y sin [illegible] se ha dado a pesar de los [illegible], no la paran ni [illegible] a bailar a chalma no soy deshonesto y les pagare todas las atenciones que han tenido con mi persona si uds. lo creen conveniente sino [illegible] que se hace, puedan [illegible] a la hora que quieran para la tarea que quieran mas no incondicionalmente, [illegible] soy un soldado [illegible] y menos de esa [illegible], [illegible] un paso lo [illegible] y soy de decisiones rapidas para [illegible] a nadie en una aventura en la que considere que no pueda salir adelante con el dolor de ver que alguien por mi culpa falta.

el

no [illegible] desarrollamos no me gusta, yo podria decir como hombre [illegible] cumpli, justificaria eso. [illegible] pasado y lo he dado a otros creo que [illegible] culpan, y hasta culpas de otros yo podria constituirme en [illegible] de todos pero no seria [illegible], en mi pueblo hay camaradas que he tenido que aguantar [illegible] que seguir aguantando estas [illegible] saber que de la [illegible] y darme la [illegible] son dos cosas que [illegible] pero que [illegible], si quieren [illegible] las [illegible] verdaderas, hay cosas [illegible] de ellos son los muchachos [illegible], [illegible], desarrollados [illegible], [illegible] objetivos, valientes [illegible] la [illegible], [illegible] de barra [illegible], sino que lo miran todos los [illegible] que [illegible] en una esquina y que no les han [illegible] el [illegible], del que en determinada forma [illegible] y despues [illegible] el olvido, o cuando [illegible] para con ellos las realidades, entonces comienza a [illegible] el que le puede quitar el hueso, todo porque porque para ellos [illegible] es su [illegible], los que [illegible] romanticos en [illegible] estan mas [illegible] confundidos y de verdad es que si estos y aquellos se dieran cuenta que no necesitamos los frentes populares no existirian [illegible] es mas en dado momento ellos [illegible] evitar al pueblo evitar tomar parte en este echo, [illegible] de [illegible] NO SON [illegible] DE LA VERDAD SON [illegible] porque no se ligan a las masas y las masas [illegible] porque la masa pide accion y ellos se [illegible] de la cuenta de que es marxista y que no lo es de que es revolucionario y que no lo es sobre los echos ya se puede hacer historia en la que por no no han echo y cual es el futuro si no se [illegible] las condiciones reales de desarrollo del movimiento, se ha [illegible] por falta de objetividad, se perdio la iniciativa por confiados cuando se dieron cuenta de que las vias pacificas estavan cerradas en toda su plenitud, y que guerra es guerra pero en toda su plenitud no guerritas de chamacos bravucones y viejos amargados, se [illegible] con el petate del muerto y ellos arrastan a muerto donde esta el [illegible], en el que, les dice las verdades y cree en la revolucion, la violencia blanca no la han podido parar porque si esto, si aquello, si lo otro, la lista larga de los que se han convertido en martires por falta de cordinacion, disciplina, [illegible] etc. no la quiero alargar mucho quiere decir que este cuerpo no se tenga que dejar un dia pero que no sea a lo estupidos, caso los 23, caso [illegible] chinipo, [illegible] [illegible], rio hondo en fin yo no llevare [illegible] solo si lla tubiera una zona liberada, cuando apenas estoy en la primera etapa, se lo que es la revolucion porque en medio de ella me he creado mi padrino fue asesinado por eso y cuanta gente de mi propia sangre no ha quedado pero yo quiero caer por algo no por pendejo y porque me apendeje, sin el minimo de seguridad no regreso, o sea sin conque defender mi vida no regreso estoy dispuesto a tomar el camino que siempre me ha pertenecido como parte del movimento, si tienen algo en lo que les pueda ser util estoy a sus ordenes previa discucion del caso, los telefonos y demas cosas las queme por seguridad, no es desconfiana sino seguridad.

27 July,1967

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at brief preliminary debriefing that during Rowton absence a Guatemalan (unidentified) telephoned him a safehouse and instructed him go to Tapachula on 19 July and await contact in lobby of local moviehouse. LIRING/3 stated that he took trip and was approached in lobby by same xxxxx young Guatemalan woman (with oriental features) whom he had met in Guatemala City during his last trip. This woman simply informed him that a comarade would contact him (L/3) at his home in next few days and disuuss future operations. LIRING/3 continued that he returned to Mexico 6ity next day and was contacted at his home by Guatemalan aged about 45, mustache, glasses, balding head,slightly hooked nose, wearing hat xxxxxxxx who later stated his true name is Moises Crozco Leal and that he has been in Mexico past twenty years.

2. At meeting next day in safehouse Crozco informed L/3 that he ordered by Montes group to establish contact with L/3 in order expedite first shipment of arms and ammo which urgently needed. When L/3 mentioned possiblity airlift from San Cristóbal area through small privately chartered plane, Crozco intensely interested and acceded to L/3 request that he first meet with "responsible high-level" FAR representatives. Crozco stated that in his opinion L/3 should discuss whole operation with Montes himself and volunteered to arrange meeting in near future.

3. LIRING/3 states that he is awaiting further instructions from Crozco and is prepared for trip to Chiapas once final arrangements made.

4. Re Garcia L/3 reported that he has not reappeared and when he queried Orozco about him, xxxx Orozco stated he personally not acquainted with him, since strict compartmentation being enforced. Also in course of conversation Orozco stated that only part of the medicines procured by L/3 had arrived at their dextination and it is presumed that remainder was captured by Guatemalan army. He added that FAR needed a docstor urgently for about ten days and would appreciate L/3 a ranging this if feasible. L/3 suggested to Rowton that Raúl Moreno, who is in third year of medical studies, might qualify if Rowton could not come up with fully qualified docstor.

5. Request traces Moises Crozco Leal.

7/5/c

CS COPY

201-798301

Att No I to Hmma - 32778 of 15 August 1967





MOISES
OROZCO
LEAL

20 AÑOS EN MEXICO
36-~~38~~ EDAD APROX.

28 July,1967

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Meeting with LIRING/3.

1. On the morning of 27 July,1967, the day after his return to Mexico City, Rowton contacted LIRING/3 at his home and arranged for a meeting at the safehouse at 1130 that same morning. L/3 commented that he was greatly relieved that Rowton had returned safely since many things had happened during his absence and L/3 had felt uncertain about what he shoul do in the event Rowton had been delayed any longer.

2. At the 1130 meeting at the safehouse, LIRING/3 reported that he and LIRING/4 had accompanied L/3's half brother in his car to Sabinas,Coah., on the afternoon of 10 July (the day that Rowton had departed). L/3 related that immediately on arrival he had his half-brother introduce him as planned to the judge in Nueva Rosita, a small village near Sabinas. L/3 reported to Rowton that the judge is named Francisco Mario Valdez Hernández and is actually a "Juez Ménor" but also a notario publico and an "agente del Ministério Público", and,as such, has authority to issue important documents. According to L/3, judge Valdez, who gave the appearance of a homosexual, spoke openly about his ability and willingness to issue false documents and arrange for a passport for L/3 in the alias Alberto Zárate. He promised to take care of the matter for the sum of 2,000 pesos, but accepted a down payment of 1,500 pesos and gave L/3 a receipt for this amount "para el arreglo de un pasaporte mexicano", addressed to Alberto Zárate Vidal. In addition LIRING/3's half-brother persuaded the judge to ~~xxx~~ arrang for the issuance to Alberto Zárate of an identity card showing that Zárate was an "actuario" of the Ministry of Labor, and for a driver's license,so that Zárate would have additional documents attesting to his identity.

3. LIRING/3 commented that he was certain that he could arrange for false papers for Rowton in the event the latter felt he could use such papers. L/3 continued that he and L/4 then proceeded to Nuevo Loredo and picked up the three Cuban passports that his half-brother had purchased on his behalf for the sum of 500 pesos. L/3 explained that although the persons to whom the passports were issued were dead they might conceivably be of use to Rowton in the future.He added that the hotel clerk who sold the documents to his half-brother had originally asked 1,500 pesos but apparently was glad to get the 500 when it was offered in cash on the table.

4. LIRING/3 continued that he and L/4 returned to Mexico City on 14 July

taking the bus at Torreón. LIRING/3 then announced jubilantly that a few days after his return, while he was visiting the safehouse in the hope of Rowton's return or at least a telephone call, he received a telephone call from an anonymous man, obviously a Guatemalan, who asked whether he could make a trip to Tapachula in order to meet with a friend. When L/3 indicated that he could make the trip, the person instructed him to wait in the lobby of the Figueroa movie house until he was approached by the "friend". LIRING/3 told Rowton that he then proceeded by train to Tapachula (on 19 July) and waited in the lobby as instructed. To his great surprise, he was approached by the same Guatemalan young woman who had met him in GuatemalaCity in late January,1967, and told that a certain "Valentín" would contact him at his home in Mexico City in the near future and that this person was to be his new contact with FAR. LIRING/3 continued that since this appeared to be the sole purpose of the trip, he returned to Mexico City on 21 July in order to await the arrival of "Valentín". According to LIRING/3 this occurred in a rather strange way. When he returned home he found a note under the door with a brief text stating that someone had passed by to see him. The note was signed with a five-pointed star rather crudely drawn in the place of a signature. L/3 stated that he was completely puzzled at this, but on reflexion felt that the five-pointed star meant 1700 and he therefore went to the safehouse at 1700 that day to await further contact. According to L/3, a person did telephone him shortly after he arrived and identified himself as "Valentín." He asked L/3 to await another call at 1030 the following day so that a meeting could be arranged. L/3 continued that he finally succeeded in meeting with "Valentín" and brought him to the safehouse on the evening of 25 July. He stated that he talked with this person until 0400 the following morning.

5. LIRING/3 reported that "Valentín", who identified himself by true name as Moisés Orozco Leal, Calle Tennis 88, Apt 5, Zona 21, Country Club, Col. Churubusco, Mexico City,D.F. Orozco stated to L/3 that he had been in Mexico some twenty years and had been engaged in propaganda work for the FAR. He added that recently he had received instructions to contact L/3 and talk with him "very frankly" concerning the procurement problem. He explained to L/3 that Far had had very disappointing experiences in the past and was in desperate need of secure and efficient channels for the procurement of arms and ammunition from the U.S. and Mexico. He stated that FAR had the cash necessary to purchase the arms and hoped that LIRING/3's commercial netweork could handle the procurement and transport. He indicated to L/3 that FAR had checked him out with favorable results both locally and with

the Cubans. In the course of conversation "Valentín" mentioned that Doctora Mercedes Pereira, whom L/3 had met in Havana, was currently in Mexico. "Valentín" stated that it was a very critical time for FAR and that everyone hoped that something would be resolved in Havana with regard to concrete aid from the Cubans. He indicated that in the past both the Cubans and the Soviets had done more talking than producing in both material and hard cash. In speaking of the most immediate needs, "Valentín" stated that FAR needed a doctor urgently to train the revolutionaries in first aid, and he asked L/3 whether he could recommend a doctor that might be willing to visit FAR headquarters for about ten days for this purpose. L/3 told Rowton that he promised to look into the matter soonest, adding that he had in mind his friend Raúl Moreno Monchee, who was a medical student and probably qualified to give first aid instruction.

LIREBEL-1 ?

5. LIRING/3 continued that he expressed his willingness to help FAR in the arms procurement effort, but would prefer to be able to talk directly with FAR leaders to get first-hand information as to their needs, and arrange secure methods of payment. When L/3 referred to the delinquent account (medicine and radio tubes) "Valentín" relpied that unfortunately only part of the medicine had arrived intact, the other part presumedly having been captured by the Guatemalan army. He promised that L/3 would be paid ~~afr~~ for the material furnished and apologized for not having the money with him he added that he receives not financial assistence from FAR and has to live as best he can from his own resources. In reply to L/3's query, "Valentín" stated that he did not personally know "Gardia", since Far insisted on compartmentation, and there had been no need for him to meet "Garcia" in the past. He then lectured L/3 on security, stating that FAR prinicipal problem to date had been within the organization itself resulting from laxness on the part of revolutionarimis and outright betrayal by some members. He added that LIRING/3 had been assigned the battle-name "Rafael" and that henceforth he should use that name whenever dealing with FAR members.

6. LIRING/3 told Rowton that, in the course of conversation regarding possible supply channels, he mentioned the possibility of air-drops from small privately chartered planes, using ~~the~~ Raúl Moreno as a pilot. According to L/3, "Valentín" showed immediate interest in this, commenting that he was certain FAR would be most interested. He then stated that he felt L/3 was an important enough asset to meet directly with César Montes himself and he promised to look into the possibility of arranging a personal interview. L/3 replied that he would welcome this opportunity since it would clarify

the entire picture for him and enable him to render the most efficient service to FAR. "Valentín" promised to have some specific word on this at their next meeting which he requested for Friday 28 July, promising to come to L/3's home between 1500 and 1700. "Valentín" explained that although the safehouse appeared to be an excellent meeting place, it was FAR policy not to use the same apartment or place of meeting more than once.

7. Rowton met with LIRING/3 again at 1430 on 29 July,1967, at the safehouse The second meeting had been scheduled for 1900 on 22 July, but on arrival at hte safehouse, Rowton found a note from L/3 stating that he would not be able to make the 1900 meeting but would see Rowton at 1430 the following day. The only explanation in the note for the delay was "cosas muy importantes han sucedido". When Rowton met with LIRING/3 the next day at 1430, the latter explained that "Valentín" had left a note at his home saying the meeting would be delayed, and then appeared unannounced when L/3 was not at home and talked briefly with LIRING/4. L/3 stated that he alarmed LIRING/4 by stating that he ("Valentín") had a wounded man that must be taken care of urgently and asked L/4 to pass on the message to L/3 in the hope that L/3 could look into the possbility of locating a good trusted doctor. "Valentín" promised to come back to the house as soon as he could. According to L/3, "Valentín" reappeared unannounced at about 1000 on 29 July, and showed L/3 a telegram which he had just received from Guatemala City. The telegram contained the text " If you are interested in further details concerning the business, present yourself here", and was addressed to "Valentín" in his true name and address. L/3 stated that he could not recall the sender's name or address but he assumed that it would be an alias in any case.

8. According to L/3, "Valentín" explained to him that the telegram meant that a meeting with César Montes could be arranged and that L/3 should accordingly prepare himself for the trip. In reply to L/3's query, "Valentín" stated that this took priority over the operation involving the wounded comrade, who was expected in Mexico City in about 7-8 days. "Valentín" then stated that he and L/3 would have to make a trip to Tapachula as soon as feasible ~~and~~ in order to receive from a FAR contact a sealed envelope containing the name of the first contact in Guatemala City. He added that he himself would not know what was in the envelope and would himself proceed on into Guatemala with the FAR contact who delivered the letter. He added that L/3 would then have to return to Mexico City and fly into Guatemala City under commercial cover, since it would be too dangerous to

proceed on to Guatemala City from Tapachula by air (the airport being small and all travelers being subject to the curiosity and scrutiny of the local officials). Valentín then stated that L/3 should be able to pass through the Bustemala City airport without difficulty provided he kept his eye out for a certain José Linares, an ex-Chief of Police who worked for the North-American Embassy and had a complete file on all suspect persons who might enter or leave the airport. "Valentín" described Linares as a man of short stature, thin, grey hair combed in a high peak in front, usually dressed in a double-breasted jacket. "Valentín" added that Linares was considered the most dangerous man at the airport, although he is not an offici l but simply a secret agent of the North Americans.

9. "Valentín" then, according to L/3, stated that the latter should procure the following items at once so that he could bring them to Tapachula with him:

1) Khaki shirt and trousers(pantalón y camisa de lona muy gruesos)
2) Leather combat boots (zapatos de campaña)
3) Browning or Walter 9mm automatic weapon with 3 clips and 50 rounds of ammunition.
4) Detonators with wick or electric fuse
5) Gauze for medical treatment
6) Three pills of most potent poison avialable.

007

"Valentín" explained that the Borwning automatic was the best since it could be converted easily into a "machinegun" with its clip of 13 cartridges. The Walter was also good since it could be fitted with a silencer. "Valentín" also explained that the poison capsules were desirable to be taken in the event of capture by the army to avoid the possibility of anyone confessing under torture. He added that one was for the use of L/3 and the other two for the comrades who would be his escorts.

10. "Valentín" further explained that L/3 should open the sealed envelope he had received in Tapachula when he was aboard the plane enroute to Guatemala City, memorize the name and address and then destroy the paper. He added quickly that he realized L/3 could open the envelope any time after he received it in Tapachula, and he was free to do so, but it was hoped for security reasons that he would open it only after he had left Mexico City airport. "Valentín" added that he himself had no idea of what name would appear on the paper, but in any case he was sure that it would be the name of a person not directly involved in revolutionary activities.

201-758301

LIRING/3 was to pay a friendly visit to this person, making no reference to politics, but simply using a prearranged code word in the conversation. This recognition signal would lead to the first meeting with the comrades (probably two) who would escort LIRING/3 to César Montes.

11. LIRING/3 stated that he had another meeting with "Valentín" at 2200 that same evening (29 July) at the Café Literario where he hopes to obtain more detail regarding the timing of the trips. L/3 said that he preferred to make the first trip (to Tapachula) on 1 August since LIRING/4 was greatly upset over the recent developments and had to be calmed down. He added that L/4 was very pessimistic over L/3's chances of returning from such a trip alive and he would have to reassure her that he intended to take all possible precautions.

12. Inasmuch as Rowton's careful review of LIFEAT traffic for the period ~~22~~ 14-24 July failed to reveal any telephone call from anyone asking L/3 to make the trip to Tapachula, and in fact revealed traffic indicating that LIRING/3 was in Mexico City during the period 19-21 July, when he claimed to be in Tapachula, Rowton stated that he did not believe L/3's story regarding his initial contact with "Valentín" and his trip to Tapachula. Since Rowton's telephone answering service reported repeated messages from "señor Juarez" and L/3 himself in true name, he felt he could use this rather than intimate in any way that L/3's (safehouse) phone was tapped. LIRING/3 became thoroughly upset, as he had done on the previous occasion when Rowton had impugned his veracity, and assured Rowton with tears in his eyes that he had always been "fundamentally" honest, although he might have exaggerated in the matter of details and exact dates. L/3 was so emotionally disturbed that he felt it unwise to press the matter further at that time and proposed to L/3 that he (Rowton) meet with LIRING/4 that evening at 2200, when he would be meeting with "Valentín" again. Rowton turned down L/3's invitation to be present at the Café Literario so that he could get a look at "Valentín" himself, since Rowton hoped that the meeting would be covered in any case by the Station team (which had L/3 under surveillance since the previous afternoon).

DON'T UNDERSTAND THIS. IF L-3 CALLING THE ANSWERING SERVICE, HOW CAN HE TELL ROWTON HE IN TAPACHULA AT SAME TIME? SEEMS IRRELEVANT.

13. LIRING/4 came to the safehouse at 2200 and Rowton was able to talk privately with her for about two hours. She arrived in a highly emotional state, alleging that she was not aware of what was happening and was sure that L/3 was heading for disaster. She exclaimed that "risking capital was one thing, but risking one's life was another", and that although she agreed with the principle of the revolution, she could not accept the terrible

consequences of revolutionary activities that had suddenxly become a reality for her. She complained that L/3 kept her in the dark about many things and that she could not understand his willingness to risk his life and the happiness of his family "so precipitously". When Rowton questioned her discreetly as to L/3's trip to Tapachula, she stated in uncontrollable sobs (they appeared to Rowton quite genuine) that he suddenyl left the preceding week, saying he was going to Chiapas and disappeared for 3-4 days. She said she was so upset she could not remember anything but the feeling of abandonment. She then complained that although Rowton was the only person she could turn to in a crisis like the one she went through last week, she could not locate him anywhere. She called his telephone (answering service) repeatedly and then in desperation called LIRING/7 in the hope that he would know something (L/7 replied that he di not know "which Harris" she was referring to). LIRING/4 then stated that she realized suddenyl that if L/3 were to disappear she would be subject to deportation to Cuba, a fate which she apparently genuinely dreaded. Rowton assured her that he would do everything possible to see that she was taken care of in this eventuality, but she protested that L/3 was the only person she could hope to find happiness with and Rowton could not bring him back if anything happened to him.

14. Rowton then stated that before L/3 could take such a trip with serious risks involved, he would have to study the situation thoroughly. He explained that at the moment he had serious doubts regarding the contacts that have brought L/3 to this point. L/4 replied that she herself had seen the latest contact ("Valentín") only once when he came to the house and gave her the message regarding the wounded person. When Rowton queried her again concerning the trip to Tapachula, she stated that L/3 had told her upon his return that he had asked someone else to make daily calls to Rowton's answering service, and upbraided her for calling. (This would explain what appeared to be L/3's daily calls during the period 19-21 July, but it would not explain L/3's conversations with Berta Wigisser and Sergio Valdez on 20/7/67 and his remark to Berta Wigisser on 21/7/67 that he "did not go out of town after all".)

15. Rowton felt that, although his meeting with L/4 was not particularly productive, it served its purpose in advising L/3 indirectly that he did not accept L/3's story of the trip to Tapachula and his initial contact with "Valentín".

Wallace B Rowton

Wallace B Rowton

1 August, 1967

1. At meeting with Rowton 1700 31 July LIRING/3 reported that Moisés Crozco Leal, who claimed be L/3's new FAR liaison for procurement of arms, currently staying in his apartment on Calzada Tacubaya. L/3 explained to Rowton that at 2200 29 July meeting with Crozco, latter stated that he had ~~instructions~~ "orders" from FAR headquarters to escort L/3 to Tapachula for contact instructions and instructed L/3 procure immediately Browning or Walter 9mm automatic with ~~52~~ three clips and at least 50 cartridges plus detonators with normal or elctric fuse and three poison tablets of highest possible potency which h~~e~~ (L/3) would needs on trip from Guatemala City to Montes headquarters. Crozco, however, insisted that L/3 bring these items with him to Tapachula and added that he would himself see to it that they were safely delivered to Guatemala City for eventual pick-up by L/3.

2. At end of meeting Crozco asked L/3 to put him up for the night at his home "since it was very late and in any case he wanted to discuss their travel plans further". L/3 did so without the least suspicion Crozco's true motives, and appeared to Rowton to have accepted Crozco's bona fides although he admitted that he had never heard of Crozco before latter's unexpected approach to him 25 July. L/3 stressed to Rowton that Crozco revealed an astounding knowledge Guatemalan revolution, Cuba, as well as L/3's past activities and dates his trips to Guatemala.

3. Rowton stated to L/3 that his preliminary checks revealed that Crozco in all probability a deserter from FAR who actually using L/3's apartment as a hideout. Rowton confessed he could not understand why Crozco would want to return to Guatemala with~~xxt~~ or without LIRING/3, but urged L/3 to attempt to get the truth from Crozco posing as sympathetic but indicating that he was aware of Crozco's true status in the hope that Crozco could be moved to a safehouse and made available for thorough interrogation. L/3 agreed and arrangements made for Rowton/L/3 meeting at midnight 1 August.

4. When L/3 appeared at 0030 he reported enthusiastically that he had succeeded in breaking Crozco down but that he had had to call on his friends Sergio Valdez and Raúl Moreno "to help". Crozco stated that he had been sent to mountains to organize guerrilla bands but found everyone "stupid" and his task impossible. He added that David Casasola who was with him was undisciplined and made mistakes that led to capture of many of his men and probably to his own capture. Crozco continued insisting that he was the

only intelligent revolutionary, referring to "the PAR Party" and at one point calling Montes a "cabrón". When he asked L/3 who had given him the information that he was a deserter and L/3 refused to divulge his source, Crozco, according to L/3, exclaimed: "It was Roberto, I know." Crozco then stated that he intended to form his own revolutionary movement which he named "First of May" and had approached L/3 for ~~xxx~~ support since he at the moment had no financial or material means. L/3 told Rowton that it was then that he realized that Crozco intended to use the supplies listed para one above for his own use and that once he turned them over to Crozco he would never see them or Crozco again.

Sergio the KARATE type

5. In reply to L/3's query as to how Crozco had gotten to him, Sergio Valdez (who joined L/3 at the end of the session) explained in the presence of Crozco that Alberto Domingo had referred him to him and that he knew nothing of Crozco's background. At this point Valdez threatened Crozco with physical violence ~~xxx~~ exclaiming to L/3 that they must dispose of him at once so that he could not reveal vital secrets of the revolution. L/3 claimed to Rowton that he managed to calm Valdez down and get him out of the apartment. L/3 stated that he left both Valdez and Moreno "on guard" outside the apartment house in the event Crozco tried to escape before he could confer with Rowton.

6. In view of this highly explosive development Rowton instructed L/3 to return to the apartment and attempt to persude Crozco to accompany him to a hotel where Rowton could arrange some sort of protective surveillance until Crozco thoroughly interrogated. L/3 insisted that Crozco be kept incommunicado in view of the information he possesses about L/3, Valdez and Moreno. Rowton promised to do the best he could but insisted that Crozco be removed from ~~the~~ L/3's apartment as soon as possible, L/3 promised to make every effort and asked Rowton meet with him again at 0300 to discuss results his effort.

7. At 0400 Rowton met L/3 at the safehouse (where AIRING/4 had moved with their child) and L/3 reported that Crozco could not be persuaded to leave the apartment. Although he feigned calmness, L/3 realized that he was terrorized of what might await him the moment he stepped out of the apartment house. Crozco promised to talk to L/3 again at 1000 that same morning when he had more time to think things over. L/3 stated that he left Valdez and Moreno on guard outside the apartment house (in Moreno's car) on the possible chance that Crozco would make a run for it. L/3 stated that "under no circumstances" would Crozco be allowed to escape.

8. Rowton, not excluding the possibility of Crozco's commiting suicide in L/3's apartment or attracting attention of the neighbors, recommended that L/3, Moreno and Valdez enter the apartment soonest and remain inside with Crozco until Rowton could work out some plan to remove him from the apartment early ~~xxexfz~~ that same morning. L/3 promised to try but was not at all sure that he could convince Crozco to open the door (which he had bolted from the inside). In any case he assured Rowton that he and his two friends would remain on guard outside so that they could surveil or seize Crozco the moment he left the premises. L/3 stated that he was quite certain that Crozco was unarmed and without funds and could easily be controlled by ~~thexthreexmfx~~ Moreno and Valdez, thus permitting him (L/3) to communicate with Rowton.

9. Alternatives in this sensitive situation appear to be following:

(a) Rowton instruct L/3 deliver Crozco to specified place where he can be turned over to "pistoleros" hired by Rowton for purpose of getting Crozco off hands of L/3 and his friends and detaining him long enough for interrogation. L/3 assured Rowton that he able make delivery and agrees desirability thorough interrogation by Rowton or person designated by him. Delivery could possibly be arranged without presence Valdez and Moreno.

(b) LIRING/3 reveal entire affair to LIRING and/or ~~xx~~ FAR (probably via Ernesto Capoano de Vecchio) and let decision rest with them, interrogating Crozco as best he could in the meantime in his apartment.

(c) Let Crozco escape, after giving him enough money to make his way out of town or to another hideout.

10. Alernative (a) would permit lengthy interrogation but would involve eventual disposal of Crozco that would be acceptable Moreno and Valdez (L/3 would accept Rowton final decision). L/3 could allege subsequently that Crozco disposed of by Rowton pistoleros and report this to LIRING and FAR. Alternative (b) would mean loss to WOFACT of valuable debriefing if this deemed desirable. Alternative (c) according to LIRING/3 probably not feasible since Valdez and Moreno fanatic enough to kill Crozco themselves rather than see him escape.

11. L/3 insists that he has not revealed Rowton's coaching in this affair to either Valdez or Moreno.

Wallace B. Rowton

What about alternative D - turn O over to [illegible] (which was actually done).

3 August,1967

Subject: LIRING/3 Report on Developments in Moisés Orozco Case.

1. During the early morning hours of 1 August,1967, Rowton remained in constant contact with L/3, either through brief meetings with him or through LIRING/4 who acted as a cut-out at the phone of the safehouse. When Rowton telephoned L/4 at the safehouse at about 0730 on 1 August, she stated that L/3 had called a few minutes before and passed the message that "things were a ltiile better, but he needed help". Rowton knew that L/3 and Sergio Valdez together with Raúl Moreno were surveilling the Tacubaya apartment house in order to pick up Orozco if and when he tried to leave the premises. L/3 had told Rowton at an earlier meeting (0400) that morning that when Orozco refused to accompany him peacefully to a hotel, he gave Orozco two alternatives. First he stated (bluffing) that he had a direct channel to FAR and would query FAR about Orozco and bring with him a FAR representative at 1000 that morning and if Orozco had a clear conscience he would have nothing to worry about; secondly, if Orozco did not desire this he could take 3000 pesos which L/3 put in an envelope and leave the apartment for some other place of refuge. L/3 explained to Rowton that he hoped Orozco would take the second alternative so that he and Valdez and Moreno could follow him or seize him as he left the apartment. L/3 asked Rowton to assist in this operation by providing a few pistoleros. Rowton, feeling that he might be able to arrange to take Orozco off L/3's hands once he was out of the apartment (provided the Station could provide a safehouse and several unilateral agents to guard Orozco and eventually interrogate him) promised to hire several pistoleros who would be unwitting of the true situation to help L/3 and his friends. L/3 also asked for a weapon which he said might be necessary if Orozco gave him any trouble. Rowton, of course, refused to comply, saying that since Orozco was unarmed it was unnecessary at that time.

2. When Rowton talked again to L/3 on the phone (from the safehouse) the latter reported that things were still quite difficult. He explained that Orozco was still in the apartment and refused to answer the doorbell,obviously terrorized that L/3 had already notified the FAR of his whereabouts L/3 reported in addition that Raúl Moreno had taken off in his car,apparently too tired to continue the surveillance; he and Sergio Valdez were consequently left alone without a car to surveil Orozco in the event he left the apartment. L/3 again appealed to Rowton for help. Rowton stalled since

6 201-798301

he was unable to confirm whether the Station had any unilateral assets to assist or in fact was interested in taking over Crozco from L/3 until after 0900 that morning. When Rowton talked to L/3 again on the phone at about 0915, L/3 reported that Crozco had left the apartment at 0830 and proceeded directly via pesero to his mother's house (Tenis 188/5) in Colinia Country Club and that L/3 and Sergio Valdez had succeeded in surveilling him there and were at that moment watching the house from nearby. About 20 minutes later L/3 reported that Crozco had left the house and was at that moment in a nearby barbershop. L/3 added that he and Valdez could not carry on the surveillance much longer since they were becoming conspicuous (as later reported, a police car (unmarked) was spotted by Valdez in the vicinity and might have approached them if the house was actually under surveillance by the Mexican police).

3. Rowton therefore reported to the Station that he had instructed L/3 to remain on surveillance for about 10 minutes more and that unless Station assets could take over the surveillance would have to be abandoned. Rowton was informed that a decision had been made to request the Mexican police to arrest Crozco at the home of his mother and that therefore L/3 could be taken off the case. Rowton met with L/3 again at the safehouse at about 1030 and the latter reported that he and Sergio Valdez had been forced to abandon the surveillance effort. Rowton alleged that in the meant me he had rounded up three "pistoleros" and sent them to the house but shortly thereafter had received from them a "danger signal", indicating that the house was being watched by the Mexican police and that they could not become involved. As a result they had left the area and could not be of any further use.(Rowton felt constrained to invent this story since he was aware that Crozco's arrest was imminent and in order to throw the blame off himself when the report reached L/3 and Valdez).

4. Rowton met with L/3 that afternoon at 1700 at a small coffeeshop on Reforma and denied to L/3 that he had any knowledge of what had happened to Crozco in the meantime. L/3 reported that he ant Valdez were attempting to make plans as to the b st course of action. Rowton advised L/3 to contact Jacobo Rodriquez Padilla and through him to attempt to contact a FAR representative in Mexico City (possibly through the lawyer Ernesto Capoano). L/3 agreed that this was essential since he and Valdez had come to the conclusion that Crozco must somehow be "eliminated" before he fell into the hands of the Mexican police since he knew too much, especially about L/3's

commercial cover plans and activities and his past connections with FAR. L/3 promised to meet with Jacobo the following morning and press him for contact with the FAR. In the meantime Rowton continued to feign ignorance of the arrest of Crozco (which took place about 1000 on 1 August,1967).

5. Rowton met again with L/3 at his Tacubaya apartment at 1800 on 2 August. L/3 reported that he had talked with Jacobo Rodriguez Padilla at 1200 that ~~xxxx~~ day in the Café Literario but with disappointing results. Jacobo as usual appeared very fearful of involving himself in any way politically, and when L/3 informed him that he had to see someone from FAR urgently and it occurred to him that the lawyer Ernesto Capoano might be able to arrange the contact, Jacobo replied that he could not vouch for Capoano at all as far as political matters were concerned. He stated that Capoano was generally helpful for Guatemalans seeking papers and legalizing their status (for which he gave his services gratis) but he was not sure that Capoano would stick out his neck for L/3. According to L/3 he then dropped the matter, without diclosing to Jacobo that he was interested in Crozco, feeling that it would be too risky to bring Capoano into the picture (although Jacobo had offerred to arrange a meeting with him for L/3).

6. L/3 continued that he felt his only other alternative was to talk the matter over ~~xk~~ with Cepeda in/his LIRING office. He therefore went directly there after having talked with Jacobo, and, not finding Cepeda in, went to the office of Curbelo. He managed to see Curbelo privately and related to him the entire affair. He explained that originally he had had a very discreet~~x~~ contact with FAR but that unexpectedly this contact had disappeared ("Garcia"). Recently however, equally unexpectedly, a new contact in the person of Moisés Crozco Leal had appeared claiming that he was a bona fide FAR representative and had been referred to L/3 by Alberto Domingo of Siempre. L/3 purposely stressed this, commenting that he assumed that Alberto was in touch with LIRING and therefore a person to be trusted. L/3 then informed Curbelo that he found several loop-holes in Crozco's story and decided to check on him. He contacted a friend in Guatemala and discovered to his amazement that Crozco had deserted from FAR and was actually in hiding in Mexico. L/3 revealed to Curbelo that Crozco had locked himself in L/3's apartment the preceding night after he had confessed to L/3 his true status. L/3 conluded that as far as he knew Crozco was currently in hiding at his mother's home. L/3 then stated that he needed desperately to communicate these facts to FAR so that appropriate action could be taken to eliminate Crozco before he fell into the hands of the Mexican police

and revealed very sensitive information about FAR as well as about his own(L/3's) involvement. L/3 commented to Rowton that Curbelo appeared thoroughly shaken by this and his hand trembled as he made notes. He replied to L/3 that he would communicate this development immediately to FAR Cuba inthe hope that he would receive some guidance to pass along to L/3.

7. L/3 then reported that he and Sergio Valdez (apparently both were disgusted with Raúl Moreno for having left them holding the bag and did not recontact him again) had decided that it was essential to discover whether Crozco had been arrested so that they could plan some sort of action to "eliminate" him before he could be deported to Guatemala. L/3 reported that Valdez had sent his girl-friend Alejandrina URBINA TORRES of the glass factory (Plaza Miravalle) to the home of Crozco's mother in an attempt to determine whether Orozco was still there or arrested in the meantime. L/3 later (at 2200) that evening reported that no one had answered the door at the apartment and hence the woman friend of Valdez had been unable to learn anything about the fate of Crozco. L/3 added that he and Valdez had struck upon another plan which they hoped would flush out the true facts. In the meantime he asked Rowton to attempt to determine whether Crozco had been arrested. When Rowton telephoned L/3 the following morning at 0900 as he had promised he agains denied any knowledge and suggested that L/3 go ahead with the plan and report to Rowton that evening at 1800. (Rowton did not wish to have prior knowledge of the plan since he felt it better for L/3 and Valdez to proceed on their own in a spontaneous manner so that L/3 would have a well backstopped story to give Curbelo when he met with him again.)

Wallace B. Rowton

3 August,1967

Subject: Monthly Report of Developments in the LIRING/3 Operation.

1. During the month of July,1967, the most important development in the LIRING/3 operation was the approach made to LIRING/3 by Miosés Crozco Leal, who purportedly conveyed instructions to L/3 from the FAR of Guatemala for a personal meeting with César Montes in the mountains of Guatemala. This new contact was reported to Rowton by LIRING/3 at the first meeting following Rowton's return from TDY in Goergetown,Guyana (26 July,1967). When Station traces revealed that Moisés Crozco had actually deserted the FAR forces some time after May,1967, and that FAR was actively looking for him most probably to eliminate him and thus prevent his revealing sentsitive information to the Mexicans and/or Guatemalans regarding FAR plans and activities, Rowton warned LIRING/3 against taking Crozco's statements and claims seriously and suggested that he question him carefully concerning his past connections with FAR. L/3 did so at his 31 July,1967, meeting with Crozco,who was then living in L/3's apartment (on Calzada Tacubaya), and informed Rowton later that evening that he had "broken" Crozco, and that the latter had admitted that he had deserted the FAR forces and claimed to be in the process of forming his own guerrilla movement to be called "Primer del Mayo".

2. In consultation with Rowton through the early morning hours of 1 August, LIRING/3 with the help of his friends Sergio Valdez and Raúl Moreno, attempted to persuade Crozco to leave L/3's apartment and remain in hiding in a nearby hotel (which Norris K. Umphlett had rented in an alias "Antonio Sanchez" at Rowton's request). Crozco, however, refused to leave L/3's apartment with them by sneaked out at 0830 when he apparently thought that L/3 was not in the vicinity. L/3 and Sergio Valdez, however, were watching the apartment house and manged to surveil Crozco to the home of his mother in Colonia Country Club. L/3, however, on Rowton's instructions, aboandoned the surveillance of the house at about 0930 that morning. L/3 subsequently reported the affair to Curbelo of the LIRING office in the hope of getting word to FAR of the whereabouts of Crozco and of the ruse he attempted to play on L/3. The latter said that he str-ssed to Curbelo that it was Alberto Domingo of Siempre who had originally sent Crozco to LIRING/3 (through Sergio Valdez).

3. LIRING/3 continued to monitor the activities of his friend Sergio Valdez who during the month set up a company (Colrluz) in the workshop of his Mexican firend, señorita Alejandra Urbina Torres, at Plaza Miravalle in Mexico

← NO RI NO MEXI DAR line

City. In view of the response of the Venezuela Station (discouraging Rowton from directing L/3 into Venezuelan guerrilla activites with Sergio Valdez and Raúl Moreno) Rowton instructed L/3 to refrain from involvement with them in this aspect of the operation. He agreed, however, with L/3 that the new company gave him much-needed additional financial cover, especially in the eyes of the PBRUMENS in the likely event that they would question him more closely during a future trip into their area.

NO FI NO MORE OSA -

4. During the month, on a trip to Sabinas, Coah., L/3 succeeded through his half-brother in meeting Judge Francisco Mario Valdez of Nueva Rosita who promised to arrange for the issuance to L/3 in the alias Alberto Zárate Vidal of a (false) passport. LIRING/3 feels that the possession of such a false document will enhance his potential in the eyes of the PBRUMENS as well as FAR.

5. During his trip to northern Mexico LIRING/3 also managed to "purchase" the passports of three (deceased) Cubans who had left the documents together with other papers at the hotel in Nuevo Loredo where they had stayed prior to their supposedly clandestine entry into the U.S. L/3 procured these documents with Rowton's prior approval on the asumption that they might prove useful to Rowton at some future date.

6. In connection with the Moisés Orozco affair, Rowton uncovered an important instance of deception on the part of both LIRING/3 and LIRING/4. A review of LIFEAT interecepts revealed that L/3 was in the safehouse during the period 19-21 July, when he had claimed to Rowton that he was on a trip to Tapachula to receive contact instructions for his first meeting with Orozco. LIRING/3 apparently asked L/4 to backstop his story when Rowton queried her separately, since she did so (although claiming ignorance of the purpose of the trip). L/3 subsequently admitted to Rowton that he had not made the trip to Tapachula but had actually met Orozco through Sergio Valdez (who had been referred to him by Alberto Domingo of Siempre) and that he had not wanted to reveal this to Rowton until he"could figure out how Valdez fitted into the picture". Since Rowton and the Station felt that this was another opportunity to SCHWIRL LIRING/3, a request was repeated to Headquarters for a Spanish-speaking operator. The request could not be complied with at the time and Rowton has had to continue checking LIRING/3's reports as carefully as he can without benefit of the technical interrogation.

Wallace E. Rowton

Wallace E. Rowton

201-798301

5 August,1967

Subject: Analysis of LIFEAT Traffic Relating to LIRING/3 Operation. for the Period 29 June to 1 August,1967.

1. During this period the most significant operational support provided by LIFEAT intercepts occurred during the period 17 July to I August, the period of LIRING/3's contact with Moisés Crozco Leal. On 27 July,the first meeting Rowton had with L/3 after Rowton's return from TDY to Guyana, L/3 reported that he had been contacted in a mysterious manner by a FAR representative who identified himself by true name as Crozco. He related that he had received a telephone call requesting him to travel to Tapachula, andthat he had made the trip 19-21 July, and received contact instructions to meet with a certain "Valentín" in Mexico City. LIFEAT intercepts revealed, however, that L/3 was physically in Mexico City during the period 19-21 July. SAN 33(8.2) reveals that L/3 telephoned sra. Berta Wigisser and made a date for 1930 on 21/7/67 at the safehouse apartment. He commented that he did not go out of town after all. Furthermore Rowton's telephone answering service reported to him regular calls from L/3 asking for Rowton daily during the period he was allegedly out of town. This gave Rowton sufficient evidence to challenge L/3's story at his meeting on 29 July. In order to prtect the security of LIFEAT Rowton used the evidence of his telephone asnwering service and his own intuition and logic to discount L/3's story of his original contact with Crozco. LIRING/3 finally confessed that he had made up the story because of the involvement of his friend Sergio Valdez (who it now appears met Crozco through Alberto Domingo and introduced him to L/3). LIRING/3 felt that reporting the true facts to Rowton would not have been as intriguing in Rowton's eyes and would have made him appear dependent on Valdez for this productive aspect of the operation. On the morning of 31 July, LIRING/3 justified his action by stating that he continued to feel under extreme psychological pressure to "produce" for Rowton since he felt deeply obliged to him for the confidence and financial support he had been giving him. He now states that he realizes that he can repay Rowton only by reporting accurately and fully all deveopments in his dealings with FAR and other revolutionary groups.

Is L-3 a Simperon?

2. All other LIFEAT intercepts relating to the Crozco affair check out with reports given to Rowton by LIRING/3, including the latter's effort to contact Capoano through Jacoto Rodriguez Padilla (SAN-37(22). In SAN-33(10.2) it is apparent that L/3 has discussed "señor Harris" or at least some contact he has with Sergio Valdez, since he states that "he" has not yet

returned. L/3 has admitted to Rowton that he has revealed to Sergio Valdez and Enrique Morales that he has a businessman who finances him in certain commercial ventures, but swears that he has never revealed Rowton's alias to anyone (this can most effectivley by checked in an SQSWIRL examination).

3. LIFEAT intercepts confirm the reports from LIRING/4 that she has made every effort to maintain social contact with Urti Cepero and Yolanda Díaz as well as Cubrbelo in the hope of keeping the door open to future re-employment in LIRING. LIRING/4's reports to Rowton appear reliable with the exception of the one relating to the alleged trip to Tapachula, when L/4 backstopped L/3's deception (although vaguely since she insisted that she did not know where he was during the period 19-21). This, of course, indicates that L/4 is basically loyal to L/3 and cannot be trusted to provide independent information conerning his movements and activities in the future.

4. SAN-32 (3.7) xnd confirms L/3's conversation with René Cchoa, his Honduran friend inxx Havana on 17/7/67. LIRING/3 subsequently received the latter from Cchoa mentioned in the intercept and passed the original to Rowton (5/8/67). LIFEAT intercepts of conversations between L/3 and his half-brother in Sabinas also confirm L/3's reports to Rowton concerning the false passport and birth-certificate for himself in the alias Alberto Zárate.

5. Additional control information was provided in SAN-29(4.7) concerning L/3's affair (amorous) with Silvia Durán, as well as with a new woman, Yolanda, with whom he attempted to make a date (SAN-35(9). This woman, whose husband's first name is Rolando, has telephone 43-25-59, and has not previously appeared in the L/3 operation. Rowton has not confronted L/3 with any data provided by LIFEAT of this nature in the hope of using it in an eventual SGSWIRL interview.

WBRowton
Wallace B Rowton

9 August,1967

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with Ernesto Capoano.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/3 at 1700 at the Tacubaya apartment and remained with him until about 1900. LIRING/3 reported that he had telephoned Ernesto Capoano at his officeon 4/8/67, after having obtained the phone number from César Tejeda Fonseca, the husband of the daughter of Pascual Ortiz Rubio (ex-President). L/3 stated that he did not identify himself to Capoano, but stated simply that he wanted to talk with him regarding a sensitive matter. According to L/3 Capoano said quickly:"Don't mention any names, but give me some idea of what it's all about". L/3 continued that he replied simply that it concerned "the medicine". At the mention of this, Capoano requested that the caller telephone him again at 1000 on 7/8/67 for an appointment, explaining that he had to leave town over the week-end. L/3 reported Capoano's number as 18-62-09.

2. LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that when he called again on 7/8/67 as requested, still not identifying himself, Capoano asked to meet him in front of Gobernación at 1200. Each gave a general description of the other for recognition. When, however, L/3 appeared in front of Gobernación at the time appointed, he saw no sign of anyone answering the description of Capoano (about 45 years old, wearing dark glasses,with green suit), nor was he approached by anyone. After waiting about 30 minutes in the vicinity L/3 told Rowton that he left. L/3 then stated that he planned to drop in to Capoano's home that same evening since obviously the phone call had not smoked him out. He gave the address of Capoano as Calle Bucareli 128, apt. C-7, which he stated he received from César Tejeda.

3. When Rowton met with L/3 again at 1000 on 8 August, the latter reported that finally he had managed to contact Capoano at his home (and office). He reported that at about 1930 he rang the bell and was shown into a spacious and mce elegant apartment and asked to take a seat in what served as a waiting room. After about twenty minutes Capoano appeared, introduced himself, and led L/3 into his office.

4. The following is a verbatim account of the conversation between Capoano and LIRING/3, as recalled by Rowton from L/3's report:

L/3: I have come to see you on a rather delicate matter that is of great concern to me personally. Can we talk safely here?

Cap: Yes, I think it is private enough here in my office.

(Cap. then closed blinds) We can talk in a low voice just to be sure. What is it you wish to talk to me about?

L/3: It concerns a person with whom I have recently been in contact. I must explain that I have certain commercial affairs in Guatemala and travel there more or less regularly. I have also had contacts of a rather delicate nature with elements there and also a contact here in Mexico City until recently. This particular contact was abruptly cut off for reasons I am not aware of, and apparently take up by the person I have come to talk to you about.

Cap: Who is this person?

I/3: I shall tell you later. In any case I have come to you since this person mentioned your name and I feel that you might be in a position to give me some advice. I stress again that I feel my commercial affairs have been jeopardized by this last contact.

Cap: So you are the person who called me last Friday.

L/3: Well, I wanted to reach you in the most discreet manner.

Cap: You did very well. As I told you when you called, I avoid mentioning names on the telephone, since I am sure that my phone is tapped. I am afraid that in all probability my mail is being intercepted. For your information I was at Gobernación, just to take a look at you, but I did not approach you feeling that surely you would come to my home eventually.

L/3: Fine. Now let me give you an account of what has happened to me. As I said, this new contact met with me several times and asked for a certain kind of help, claiming to represent certain elements in Guatemala and mentioning names and facts that concerned my own previous activities there. At first I accepted him at face value, but later he made certain comments that disturbed me. He criticized the most important faction from that area and suddenly asked me to arrange for a trip to Tapachula so that he could enter without formality. He also asked me to put him up in my home and requested that I provide certain things that appeared strange.

Cap: Did he ask for a revolver?

L/3: Yes, but a special one - a Browning automatic with three clips and fifty cartridges, canvas clothes and, most surprising three poison pills. He said these items were to be for my own use once I entered the territory of Guatemala. All this appeared strange to me in the light of my previous contacts. The other people had never asked for such things and always had a place of their own to live in while in

Mexico City. I therefore queried him carefully, and, to make a long story short, he broke down (se abrió) and told me things that convinced me that he did not represent the main faction and had in fact deserted from it some time ago. After this he insisted on remaining in my home and I was forced to give him the following alternative. I alleged that I had another contact with his people and that I planned to consult with this contact and bring him along with me the following day at 1000 so that the three of us to continue the conversation. When the person showed obvious alarm at this, I said that he could, however, if he choose, leave my home of his own free will and I gave him some money - 300 pesos - in an envelope, just in case he was without funds. I felt very concerned about my commercial affairs and wanted to seperate myself from this person as soon as possible. I had no desire to do him any harm, despite the fact that by that time I realized that he had tried to trick me and even place my life in jeopardy. In any event he left the apartment on his own the following morning, leaving my keys, the envelope with the money, and a letter for me on the table

Cap: A letter? This is very important. Can you tell me who this man is?

L/3: Yes. His name is Moisés Crozco Leal, and he has lived many years in Mexico.

Cap: Ah, yes, I know this man. He was arrested recently by the Mexican police and released Friday. I have been informed of this by his family.

L/3: Then things are worse than I imagined. Who knows what he has revealed to the Mexicans about my business connections.

Cap: Please do not be too worried. I have been given to understand that Crozco, who is a valiant person, conducted himself in a commendable manner. I doubt that he revealed anything about you. Now the important thing for me to tell you is that I have certain very indirect delicate contacts with them there ("arrita") and I am in a position to check on this person.

L/3: I am still worried since he possesses so much detailed knowledge. I was planning another trip to Guatemala City, but now I don't know what to do.

Cap: Please do not move until you have heard from me.

L/3: Fine, then here is my full name, telephone number and my references.

Cap: I really don't need referneces.

L/3: But I shall give them to you anyway, since I want to be aboveboard with you in all this. (L/3 then writes out names of César Tejeda and Jacobo Rodriquez Padilla).

Cap: So you know César Tejeda Fonseca and Jacobo. Fine. Now the important thing is the letter. Could you give me a copy as soon as possible? this is very important. You have done a very wise thing in coming to see me about all this - much wiser than you could realize.

L/3: The letter is typewritten on my typewriter and unsigned, but I'm sure anyone who knows Crozco could recognize the style.

Cap: Yes. Could you send it by hand with Jacobo? Whatever you do, please do not telephone and talk about anything sensitive, or use names.

L/3: I could send my wife tomorrow morning, or possibly even later tonight.

Cap: Alright,but send it as soon as possible.

L/3: Just one other thing. I am anxious to get in touch with an old friend of mine, Dra. Pereira. I understand that she is in town, and I might be able to contact her through you. What I suggest is this, that you give her my name and telephone number and ask her to call me at her convenience.

Cap: Fine. I'll do what I can. In any case I'll be in touch with you. Again please don't leave town until you have talked with me again onthis matter.

5. Rowton made a date with L/3 for 1030 the following day (9/8/67) to pass to L/3 a copy of the Crozco letter. It will be recalled that he gave the original of the letter to Abelario Curbelo. Incidentally L/3 stated that no mention of the Cubans was made during his conversation with Capoano.

WBRowton
Wallace B. Rowton

201-798301

14-00000

9 August,1967

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Knowledge of Rowton Alias.

1. On the evening of 8 August,1967, LIRING/3 gave Rowton the attached typewritten statement of the persons who might be aware of Rowton's alias, as per Rowton request to L/3 at their previous meeting.

2. L/3 has explained that he feels safe enough from a security standpoint in his relationship with Rowton, since at present he actually does know or has known a fair number of Greeks in Mexico and Central America, including Pandelis Economou, Gazdelis, Betsakis (all of whom he has met) and Stylianos Frevolis, Angel Arvanitis, with whom he is in indirect business contact through Rowton. He feels that if Rowton's name (alias) comes up either in conversation with the Cubans or Guatemalans, he can cover it under the umbrella of his Greek commercial contacts without difficulty.

3. L/3 cannot recall either Sergio Martínez or Hugo del Pino ever bringing up Rowton name or querying him about Rowton's current activities. He recalls Martínez on one occasion many months ago simply asking him to give "señor Harris" his regards.

W B Rowton
Wallace B Rowton

6 p.

Personas que están enteradas de mis actividades en forma general:

Arnold Rodríguez NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE sabe que estoy relacionado con Griegos
Osmani Cienfuegos NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE " " " " " "
Ismael Echemendía NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE " " " " " "
Personas de Seguridad del Estado en
Cuba NO CONOCEN POR MI CONDUCTO NINGUNA DE MIS ACTIVIDADES
Zepeda NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE Le he dicho que mis informes provienen de amigos centroamericanos.
Joaquín Hernández Armas
Embajador. En el mismo caso de Zepeda.
René Ochoa NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE, cree que mis actividades están patrocinadas por negocios normales particulares con Griegos.
" García" NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE sabe que estoy relacionado con Griegos.
Compañeros de Guatemala En el mismo caso de García.
Curbelo y Abreu en el mismo caso de Zepeda y el Embajador.
Sergio Valdez NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE sabe que estoy relacionado con Griegos.
Raúl Moreno en el mismo caso de Valdez.

Sergio y Hugo de comercial CONOCEN SU APELLIDO, posiblemente hablaron de usted con Echemendía, Zepeda y el Embajador. No lo aseguro.

Enrique Morales y su esposa CONOCEN SU APELLIDO pero suponen que me patrocina comprándome cuadros . Saben que estoy relacionado con Griegos para negocios normales en Guatemala. (La esposa de Morales es de orígen guatemalteco y su hermano Ricardo es Marxista.)
Jacobo Rodríguez NO SABE ABSOLUTAMENTE COMO Y PORQUE DESARROLLO MIS ACTIVIDADES.
Carlos Navarrete En el mismo caso de Jacobo.
Enrique Martínez NO SABE ABSOLUTAMENTE NADA supone que quiero instalar un negocio en San Cristóbal.
Carlos Navarrete conoce a Esperanza la esposa de Morales.

14-00000

4-05 [illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

47

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	1	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	2	8	

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 1502Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2476

ACTION

15 AUG 67 IN 31815

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

PBRUMEN

1. IN INITIAL TALKS WITH LIRING-3 IN LATE JULY MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL MENTIONED MERCEDES PEREIRA (WHOM LIRING-3 KNEW IN HAVANA 1962-64 AS SPANISH REVOLUTIONARY INVOLVED IN SUPPORT GUAT REVOLUTION) NOW LIVING MEXICO CITY. LIRING-3 OBTAINED HER ADDRESS FROM ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO.

2. LIRING-3 SPENT FOUR HOURS 13 AUG WITH PEREIRA AND 17 YEAR OLD ARMANDO PEREIRA WHO CLAIMED HE RECEIVED GUERRILLA TRAINING CUBA. PEREIRA STATED HER SISTER SOFIA PEREIRA CURRENTLY WORKING CZECH EMBASSY HAVANA EXPECTS TRANSFER CZECH EMBASSY MEXICO CITY IN "NEAR FUTURE". PEREIRA WHO IN PROCESS BECOMING MEXICAN CITIZEN SAID SHE STILL IN CONTACT WITH GUAT REVOLUTIONARIES AND HOPES CONTINUE SUPPORT GUAT REVOLUTION FROM MEXICO AS "MATTER OF CONSCIENCE". SHE FELT LIRING-3 SHOULD MEET GUAT FRIENDS WHOM PLANNING INTRODUCE IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. REQUEST ADDEES COMMENTS AND TRACES. STATION FILE CHECK PRODUCED ONLY 1962 LIFEAT INFO TO EFFECT PEREIRA (THEN LIVING MEXICO CITY) WAS IN CONTACT WITH NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST EDELBERTO (TORRES) ESPINOZA (201-252883?).

[illegible] running traces

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

ORIG: TOM WHITE
UNIT: WH/2/G
EXT: 6026
DATE: 15 AUGUST 1967

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 23 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: c/wH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR c/SB 5, c/ci, c/ci/ica, c/FI,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

15 17 10Z

CITE DIRECTOR 28195

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

REF: MEXICO CITY 2455 (IN 30815)

1. AURA MARINA (ARRIOLA) PINAGEL DE MENDEZ, 201-732208, JMTIGER, MISTRESS OF RICARDO ARNOLDO (RAMIREZ) DE LEON, 201-83287, JMTIGER, MARRIED TO HERNAN (MENDEZ) ROJO PER HMMA 18102, 1 NOVEMBER 1961. ARRIOLA REPORTED CUBA 1965 WITH RAMIREZ, PER HGG-3762, 22 APRIL 1965. CHE GUEVARA APPARENTLY GOD FATHER OF ARRIOLA-RAMIREZ SON.

2. HERNAN (MENDEZ) ROJO WENT USSR OCTOBER 1961 ON 6 YEAR SCHOLARSHIP. HERMAN (MENDEZ) ROJO REPORTED STUDENT LENINGRAD STATE UNIVERSITY MAY 1964. HERMAN (MENDEZ) ROJO'S PARENTS ARBENZ COMMUNISTS.

3. JORGE ROLANDO (MENDEZ) AGUILAR AND MARIO AUGUSTO (MENDEZ) AGUILAR ARRESTED GUATEMALA CITY JULY 1963 FOR VIOLATION LAW OF DEFENSE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS (OUTLAWING COMMUNIST PARTY) PER NEWSPAPER REPORT EL IMPARCIAL 24 JULY 1963. FURTHER TRACES AS FOLLOWS:

A. MARIO PARTICIPATED ATTACK ON GUATEMALAN ARMY BUS 26 MAY 1964 PER HGG 3590, 13 OCTOBER 1964, FOR WHICH ARRESTED 4 FEBRUARY 1966

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 28145

TO

AND HELD INCOMUNICADO FOR OVER 2 MONTHS BY SALVADOR NATIONAL GUARD AT GUATE REQUEST , SALV 6203, 5 APRIL 66, AND SALV 6205, 11 APRIL 66.

B. MARIO AGAIN ARRESTED GUATE CITY MARCH, 1966, FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND REPORTED LIVING CLANDESTINELY IN MEXICO CITY PER HMM 10576, 3 AUGUST 66.

C. ROLANDO MENDEZ TRAINED IN URBAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES, WANTED BY GUATE AUTHORITIES, FOR SECURITY REASONS, IN MEXICO CITY FOR MEDICAL OPERATION PER MEXI 6879, 13 APRIL 1966.

4. NO HEADQUARTERS TRACES ON MENENDEZ AS WRITTEN PARA 3 REF. BELIEVE STATION MEANS MENDEZ AS WRITTEN PARAS 2 AND 4.

5. PER PARA 4 OF REF MEXICAN AUTHORITIES MIGHT BE CONCERNED WITH ACTIVITIES OF HUSBAND HERMAN MENDEZ, OR PARAMOUR RICARDO RAMIREZ WHO HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE PGT/FAR MEMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Mexico City asked by Guatemala City Station for enlightenment as to Mexican authorities interest in activities of husband of Aura Arriola during Mexican interrogation of Moises OROZCO Leal.

WH/1
WH/2/HDEES
WH/COG
SB/CI
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

See MEXI 2455 in 30815

FOLLOWING TRACES SUBJECTS PARA 3 REFERENCE:

A. AURA MARINA(ARREOLA)PINAGEL DE MENDEZ 201-732208

14-00000

SECRET

FROM: (requester's name) ① J Stuart		BADGE NO. DT 629	NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST
BRANCH W H/1/mex	ROOM 3E4463	EXTENSION 9141	DATE	RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS	CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		14 Aug 67	MCX	
REQUESTER	FS-6			②	
RID/FILES	DT-6				
REQUESTER				③	
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7				
RID/201	DB-6				TELE. REQ.
RID/INDEX	DT-5		✓		

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME MENDEZ AGUILAR,	GIVEN NAMES Mario Alberto
SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED 5 ✓	201 NO. IF KNOWN
AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	COMMENTS C-40 lines NL
☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)	CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED	YES / NO
OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS	FILE TO RE-PORT	RID / DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/AFD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in SR/OCR x7997.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

14-0000

SECRE

MENDEZ, Mario 65-7-4-20

Spain June 49
an alias of Mario Roatta (Gen.)

MENDEZ, Mario

probably MENDEZ Montenegro, Mario 200-4-173-172
(HRS-365)

MENDEZ, MARIO

SEX M DOB 03 JUL 20 201-778550.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AZUA
CIT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
OCC CHIEF MARITIME SECT. TYPE NAME T
REF SDOM-05637, 26 JUN 65. OCC CODE ?
EXCL FM LIST N
A DOMINICAN REPUBLIC OI CODE ?
CHIEF OF MARITIME SECT, SANTO DOMINGO POST
OFFICE. DOI JUN 65.

339453

6507061060

MENDES, Mario

in Brazil

16-4-26-96
TRR 3180

2

THI

ED

338073

SECRET

MENDEZ, MARIO

022-004-134
DEF -06981
25 NOV 66
DEFENSE
P3

SEX M DOB ?

CIT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
OCC ?
< DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

MENDEZ, Mario

035-009-0008
(GUAT 00264
(25 Jun 57

THIS CARD

MENDEZ AGUILAR, MARIO

035-004-134
SALV-06203
05 APR 66

SEX M DOB ?

CIT GUATEMALA
OCC ?
SALV NATL GUARD DETAINED SUBJ AT LA HACHADURA BORDER POINT 04 FEB AND PRESENTLY HOLDING HIM INCOMMUNICADO IN SAN SALVADOR. ARREST MADE AT REQUEST GUAT JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES WHO ADVISED SUBJ WAS INVOLVED COMMIE, SUBVERSIVE AND TERRORIST ACTS GUAT.

HGG 6605170060

MENDEZ, Mario

200-7-33-1741
(SALV 1817)
(IN 41176)
(1955)

MENDEZ, MARIO (MAJ.)

IN 29565
Salv 307

Sal - 20 Apr 49

(Commander).

14-00000

SECRET

MENDEZ AGUILAR, MARIO AUGUSTO

SEX M DOB ?

035-004-135
SALV-06205
11 APR 66
P1

CIT GUATEMALA
OCC ?
BEING HELD BY SALVADORAN NATIONAL GUARD SINCE 04 FEB 66 AT REQUEST GUAT JUDICIAL POLICE. MEMBER GUAT GUERRILLAS WHO MACHINEGUNNED GUAT ARMY BUS 26 MAY 64 AND SUBSEQUENTLY ARRESTED AND IMPRISONED.

MENDEZ AGUILAR, MARIO AUGUSTO

037-009-008
HGG -03590
13 OCT 64
*35-9-8.3

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ ASSOCIATE OF HECTOR RODOLFO SANDOVAL [illegible], PARTICIPATED IN ATTACK ON ARMY BUS ON 26 MAY 64.
RE INFORMATION ON GUERRILLAS AND COM- MUNISTS FROM POLICE INTERROGATIONS DURING JUL AND AUG.

MENDEZ, Mario

200-4-173-118
(HRS-[illegible])

200-4-173-211
(HRS-903)

MENDEZ, Mario

TAIS

MENDEZ, Mario

73-6-4-5
(HUMB-72)
TS-[illegible]
(Att 5)

2

339458

TH[illegible] FILED
[illegible]
IN MAIN INDEX

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

CRET

MENDES, Mario

Rio de Janeiro-CIA-Int-1
Folder # 20-649
Sect. # 2

3

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX

11 VIII 57

338274

MENDES, Mario

202-7051
(TBR-A-1137)

1

338272

MENDES, MARIO

151-300-002
OPL -02028
05 AUG 65
P2

SEX M DOB ?

CIT PORT GUINEA
OCC ?
Δ GUINEA, CONAKRY
SUBJ IN OFFICE OF AFRICIAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY
FOR GUINEA AND CAPE VERDE IN DAKAR, SENEGAL 63.
SUBJ FORMERLY WORKED FROM TOSCANO AND S.
DOMINGOS.

6508250893

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM: (Requesters name) ① J. Stewart	BADGE NO. D8629			
BRANCH WH/1/MEX	ROOM 4B4404	EXTENSION 9041	DATE	RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS	CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		[illegible]		TELE. REQ.
REQUESTER	KS4			②	
RID/FILES	DT-6				
REQUESTER				③	
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7				
RID/201	DB-6				
RID/INDEX	DT-5				

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME ARREOLA- M.~~ENDEZ~~	GIVEN NAMES Aura Marina
SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED 5-11	~~201 NO.~~ IF KNOWN
AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐	NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	COMMENTS
✓	CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)	CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED	
	YES	NO
OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS	FILE TO BE KEPT	
	RID	DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

SECRET

ARREOLA, M.

50-4-2-966

HMM [illegible] 631

Monterrey, Nuevo Leon,
Mexico

2

21 MAR 55

THIS
CARD
FILED IN
MAIN
INDEX

SECRET

DE MENDEZ, MARINA BACA MEJIA

Ministry Public Security 72

53-6-4-196
(SANJ 2416
(1957
(ZRCL

17 JUN 57

THIS
CARD
FILED IN
MAIN
INDEX

339451

MENDEZ, AURA MARINA

201-732208*

SEX F DOB ?
GUATEMALA
CIT GUATEMALA
OCC ?
Δ ?
REF HGGA-07008, 30 AUG 63
NEE OF ARRIOLA P NAGEL DE MENDEZ, AURA MARINA
CP MBR. SCHEDULED FOR DEPORTATION TO
MEXICO ON 9 AUG 63. WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

CORR CARD
#HGG

338868

1 703 166

MENDEZ, AURA MARINA

201-732208*

SEX F DOB ?

CIT GUATEMALA ?
OCC ?
Δ
REF
NEE OF ARRIOLA PINAGEL, AURA MARINA

338869

1 557 250
1 362 250

[illegible]

[illegible]

MENDEZ, MARIO

201-062086
UFGA-07259
23 JAN 63
PI

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
Δ USA, FLA., TAMPA, 1802 MACDILL ST.
OCCUPANT OF ACCOMODATION ADDRESS
PROVIDED BY SUBJ OF /201-62086/.

FLD INDEX ONLY

1 3[illegible]6 271

14-00000

SECRET

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM: (Requester's name) ① J. Stewart

BADGE NO. 05629

BRANCH WH/1/MC4

ROOM r-3B403

EXTENSION 904

DATE

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	GT-5		14 Aug 197[illegible]	
REQUESTER	FS-6			②
RID/FILES	GT-6			
REQUESTER				③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7			
RID/201	GW-6			
RID/INDEX	GT-5			

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

TELE. [illegible]

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME MENDEZ-AGURAR, GIVEN NAMES Rolando NMN-I

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

S-N

201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS C. 40 [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED ☐ YES ☐ NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO BE KEPT ☐ RID ☐ [illegible]

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

FORM 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-65

SECRET

(4-5-38)

SECRET

MENDEZ, ROLANDO

SEX M DOB 12
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
FATHER OF ROBERTO MENDEZ.

019-005-030
324 -2061366
27 DEC 66

MENDEZ, ROLANDO

SEX M DOB C 11

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
SUSPECT AGENT OF DEPT. OF STATE SECURITY.
ALLEGEDLY WORKS AS DSE TEAM WITH SON, ROBERTO.
RANCHO BOYEROS, HAVANA.

019-005-030
UFGA-27182
17 MAR 67

5

MENDEZ, ROLANDO

SEX M DOB 12
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
< CUBA, HAVANA, RANCHO BOYEROS,
CALLE 8 BETWEEN 10TH AND 11TH
S IN REPARTO RIO VERDE
A

019-005-030
324 -2061366
27 DEC 66

MENDEZ, ROLANDO

SEX M DOB C 43

CIT GUATEMALA
OCC ?
< MEXICO
TRAINED IN URBAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES.
WANTED BY GUAT AUTHORITIES AND WENT
MEXICO FOR OPERATION FOR SECURITY REASON.

035-004-135
MEXI-06879
13 APR 66

MENDEZ, R.J.
DOB ?

CIT ARGENTINA

FROM BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA
NOT IDEN W/SUBJ 201-234256.

200-007-218
ONH -04906

SER 435

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
DISSEM BY 3 PER #
ACTION C/WH 6 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19
SECRET
(When Filled In)
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:
INFO: FILE. VR C/WH/COPS C/CI C/FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	1	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4	2	9	
5	2	10	

S E C R E T 112315Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2455

12 Aug 67 IN 30815

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REF MEXICO CITY 2438 (29707)

ACTION

1. LIRING-3 VERY CONCERNED AFTER HEARING OF ARREST AND RELEASE MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL DECIDED REESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM AS:

A. HE AFRAID OROZCO MIGHT COME GUNNING FOR HIM IF CONVINCED LIRING-3 RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS ARREST. LIRING-3 ANXIOUS DEMONSTRATE HE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ARREST.

B. HE INTERESTED LEARN DIRECTLY FROM OROZCO IF POSSIBLE WHAT LATTER TOLD MEXICAN POLICE ABOUT HIS (LIRING-3'S) DEALINGS WITH FAR.

C. HE INTERESTED LEARN OROZCO'S CURRENT HIDING PLACE FOR POSSIBLE TURNOVER TO FAR IF SUCH TURNOVER NECESSARY IN LIRING-3'S MIND FOR HIS SECURITY.

2. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, LIRING-3 SENT LIRING-4 TO OROZCO'S MOTHER WITH NOTE FOR OROZCO TELLING HIM HE HEARD OF ARREST AND RELEASE AND HOPED EVERYTHING NOW ALL RIGHT. MOTHER TOLD LIRING-4 THAT MEXICAN POLICE HAD TWICE SEARCHED HER HOUSE SINCE HER SON'S RELEASE AND PROBABLY HAD PHONE TAPPED. SHE SAID OROZCO NOT MISTREATED BY

Traces
[illegible]
Cub [illegible]
Cub [illegible]
[illegible]
RI [illegible]

SECRET

8

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
DISSEN BY PER
ACTION RID COPY ☐

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

INFO:
FILE,

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 2455 SECRET KAPOK

POLICE WHICH ASKED BASICALLY SAME QUESTIONS LIRING-3 HAD ASKED HIM SHORTLY BEFORE OROZCO'S ARREST. ONE OF TOPICS POLICE SEEMED MOST INTERESTED IN AND KEPT COMING BACK THROUGHOUT OROZCO'S QUESTIONING WAS ACTIVITIES OF HUSBAND OF AURA MARINA ARREOLA. MOTHER SAID THAT OROZCO DID NOT KNOW ARREOLA OR HUSBAND. OROZCO PHONED LIRING-3 ON 10 AUG TO THANK HIM FOR NOTE AND ASSURE HIM HE TOLD MEXICANS NOTHING REGARDING LIRING-3'S ACTIVITIES.

732208

3. INFO IN STATION FILES DATED JULY 63 INDICATES AURA MARINA A ARREOLA DE MENDEZ PGT FAR CONTACT AND COURIER BETWEEN GUATEMALA AND MEXICO. SHE KNOWN BE MISTRESS OF RICARDO RAMIREZ DE LEON, GUAT GUERRILLA FROM WHOM HAD CHILD. HUSBAND COULD BE ROLANDO OR MARIO AUGUSTO MEN~~EN~~DEZ AGUILAR WHO GUAT BROTHERS. STATION INFO DATED APRIL 1966 INDICATES ROLANDO TRAINED IN GUERRILLA WARFARE AND WANTED BY GUAT AUTHORITIES FOR URBAN TERRORISM. MARIO AUGUSTO ONLY LISTED IN STATION FILES AS GUAT EXILE. LIREBEL-1 STATED 10 AUG THAT MEN~~EN~~DEZ BROTHERS NOW LIVING MEXICO CITY WITH OTHER GUAT JULIO SOSA AT ADDRESS HE GAVE STATION.

NR dash

HMM-4003 [illegible] in PGT. HMM 3734 Mex [illegible]

HMM-10576 30 Jul 66 PGT [illegible]

arrested 23 July 63 [illegible]

4. CAN GUATEMALA STATION CONFIRM ARREOLA MARRIED TO ONE OF MENDEZ BROTHERS AND THROW SOME LIGHT ON MEXICAN CONCERN ACTIVITIES ARREOLA'S HUSBAND?

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
FROM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

ACTION C/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, 15, C/CI, DDP, ADDP, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 111552Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7781

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

12 AUG 67 IN 30565

KAPOK

REF: GUATEMALA CITY 7738 (IN 24232)

1. ACCORDING TO GUAT AIR FORCE AIDE, MIN DEF COL ARRIAGA WAS TO HAVE DEPARTED EARLY IN MORNING 11 AUGUST BY FAG AIRCRAFT ON UNPUBLICIZED TRIP TO MEXICO. LNPURE HAS REPORT ARRIAGA MAY BE VACATIONING WITH WIFE IN ACAPULCO BUT AIDE INDICATED TRIP WAS RELATED TO MISSION OF SUBJECTS OF REF WHO HAVE NOT YET RETURNED FROM MEXICO.

2. REQUEST ANY INFO THAT COMES TO YOUR ATTENTION CONCERNING PURPOSE OF ARRIAGA'S VISIT. ARRIAGA DUE RETURN GUAT 14 AUGUST.

S E C R E T

BT

OROZCO case
(involves LIRING-3)

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

ORIG: J. STEWART/lm
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 11 AUGUST 67

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	1	6	C
2		7	
3		8	
4	2	9	
5	∅	10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________ #________

CONF: WHR

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ddP/ wH/coG

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 27465

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY 12 1146Z

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 2438 (IN 29707)

NO TRACES CESAR TEJEDA FONSECA. NOTE POSSIBLE IDEN OR RELATIVE: CARLOS TEJADA FONSECA, FORMER GUATEMALAN MINISTER HEALTH UNDER ARBENZ, WENT FROM MEXICO TO GUATEMALA 10 DECEMBER 1955; DOCTOR CARLOS TEJEDA, REPORTED BE GUATEMALAN SUBVERSIVE 19 JULY 1961; CARLOS ENRIQUE TEJEDA, GUATEMALAN PASSPORT 107383, WENT FROM MEXICO TO CUBA DECEMBER 1961; CARLOS TEJADA FONSECA WENT FROM CUBA TO MEXICO JANUARY 1962.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/2/GUAT S. Cuaaaa

WH/COG/CICS F. AMES (TELECON)
C/WH/2 Emanuel

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 7/p

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION TSD6 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, WH/COG 8, FI

10 AUG 67 IN 29685

SECRET 101930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2436

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

AQUATIC

PLEASE POUCH TWO UHER 4000L RECORDERS WITH ACCESSORIES.

CHARGE PBRUMEN.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

I am guessing - ops - TSD says these believed to be for LIRING-3. HMMA-32672 16 Aug. cost for two around 500-600 $. J

201-798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE H TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED C

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

32

ACTION

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH/COG5, C/CI, C/FI2, C/SOD3,

S E C R E T 102200Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2438

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

PBRUMEN KAPOK

10 Aug 67 IN 29707

REF A MEXICO CITY 2358 (IN 24956)

B MEXICO CITY 2363 (IN 25077)

C MEXICO CITY 2396 (IN 26963)

1. HAVING HEARD NOTHING FROM CUBANS RE MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL, LIRING-3 OBTAINED PHONE NUMBER ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO FROM CESAR (TEJEDA) FONSECA, HUSBAND OF DAUGHTER OF PASCUAL (ORTIZ) RUBIO, EX MEXICAN PRESIDENT. WITHOUT IDENTIFYING SELF LIRING-3 MADE APPOINTMENT TALK TO CAPUANO (THIS CONFIRMED BY LIFEAT).

2. WHEN CAPUANO DID NOT SHOW AT MEETING LIRING-3 WENT TO HIS HOUSE 7 AUG. DURING CONVERSATION CAPUANO (A) ADMITTED HE IN CONTACT (DELICATE AND INDIRECT) WITH GUAT GUERRILLAS.

B. TOLD LIRING-3 OROZCO ARRESED AND RELEASED 4 AUG BUT DOUBTED HE SAID ANYTHING REGARDING LIRING-3.

C. SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN LIRING-3 STORY RE OROZCO'S ATTEMPT USE LIRING-3 TO DOUBLE CROSS FAR AND ASKED FOR COPY OF LETTER LEFT BY OROZCO AT LIRING-3'S APARTMENT.

D. REQUESTED LIRING-3 DO NOTHING IN CONNECTION WITH GUAT

SECRET

TRACES
MEXI
RI
GUAT
CUBAN

2 hits

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 2438 SECRET KAPOK

GUERRILLAS QUOTE UNTIL YOU HEAR FROM ME UNQUOTE. WARNED HIM AGAINST CONTACTING HIM BY PHONE AS HIS NUMBER DEFINITELY TAPPED.

3. AFTER SERGIO VALDEZ DETERMINED ALBERTO DOMINGO OF MAGAZINE "SIEMPRE" (WHO RECOMMENDED OROZCO TO VALDEZ) ABOUT TO FLY TO HAVANA LIRING-3 DECIDED USE DOMINGO TO HAND CARRY SEALED LETTER TO ARNOL (RODRIGUEZ) CAMPS

Ideas en Politica

A. GIVING DETAILS OROZCO AFFAIR.

B. TELLING RODRIGUEZ HE CONTACTED CUBAN EMBASSY RE OROZCO,

C. POINTING OUT DOMINGO'S CAR~~Y~~LESSNESS IN RECOMMENDING OROZCO AS GOOD FAR CONTACT PARTICULARLY SINCE DOMINGO "MUST BE TRUSTED CUBAN CONTACT."

4.? STATION FILE CHECK PRODUCED INFO FROM LIENVOY-2 DATED 31 MARCH IDENTIFYING TEJEDA AS GUAT COMMUNIST GUERRILLA.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 32/29 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐

ADV. COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS – SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE. VR, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2, CI/IC2,

S E C R E T 101830Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7777 10 Aug 67 IN 25649

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR 26670 (IN 24232)

1. GUAT OFFICIALS CITED GUATEMALA CITY 7738 DID TRAVEL MEXICO CITY. EXPECTED RETURN GUAT 10 AUGUST. IT POSSIBLE THEY AWARE INDISCRETIONS LOPEZ MORAGA AND HE MAY HAVE BEEN THORN IN THEIR SIDE IN OROZCO CASE. IF SO, THEY UNDOUBTEDLY WILL REPORT SAME TO ARRIAGA.

2. HOPEFULLY WE WILL GET READING ~~REAKNG~~ ON RESULTS MISSION GUAT OFFICIALS FROM ESMICA-3 (GUATEMALA CITY 7745) (IN 25060) WHICH MIGHT SHED LIGHT ON WHETHER FURTHER ACTION DESIRABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

WH/1

LIRING-3

201-798301

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 13

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	SAC	5	C
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 24/WH #9

ACTION C/WH-6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, C/CI, C/WH/COG-2

S E C R E T 092230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2428 9 AUG 67 IN 22886

DIRECTOR

KAPOK PBRUMEN JMROD

REF DIRECTOR 24435

1. IN REPLY TO ROWTON QUERIES, LIRING-3 SAID HE FIRST HEARD ARREST TERESA PROENZA SOMETIME IN 1964 FROM HERMES CABALLERO, CUBAN HIGH FUNCTIONARY IN MINISTRY EDUCATION DURING LATTER'S VISIT TO MEXICO. CABALLERO WARNED LIRING-3 NOT TO REVEAL HE HAD KNOWN HER OR HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH HER SINCE SHE IMPRISONED AS WOFACT AGENT AND LIRING-3 MIGHT UNWITTINGLY FALL UNDER SUSPICION IN INVESTIGATION THEN GOING ON. LIRING-3 RECALLED HE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCUSSED PROENZA CASE IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION IN CUBA WITH ARNOL (RODRIGUEZ) CAMPS (WITH CUBAN SUGAR MINISTRY), RENE OCHOA FUNEZ (HONDURAN REVOLUTIONARY) AND MAX FIGUEROA ARAUJO (CUBAN VICE MINISTER EDUCATION) BUT COULD NOT REMEMBER EXACTLY WHAT SAID.

2. LIRING-3 COMMENTED FAMILY TERESA PROENZA MOST PROBABLY UNDER SUSPICION BUT NOTED THAT HER SISTER, CARIDAD, WIFE OF JORGE (ROJAS) MENDOZA OF CUBANA DE AVIACION, MEXICO CITY, SEEMS BE CIRCULATING FREELY. HE ADDED PROENZA WAS SECRETARY DIEGO RIVERA AND WAS INVOLVED IN MARQUITAS/ORDOQUI CASE. SECRET

LIRING-3

201-798301

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 2428 S E C R E T KAPOK

3. LIRING-3 BELIEVED TERESA PROENZA STILL IN JAIL WITH NO INDICATION WHEN WILL BE RELEASED AND OFFERED DISCREETLY CHECK ON THIS WHEN NEXT VISITS HAVANA. LIRING-3 DID NOT KNOW OF ANY RELATIONSHIP PROENZA MIGHT HAVE HAD WITH ELENA (VASQUEZ) GOMEZ OR MIRTA AGUIRRE. ALTHOUGH LAST NAME RANG BELL.

4. DOES HDQS WANT MAKE PROENZA REQUIREMENT FOR LIRING-3'S NEXT TRIP HAVANA R IN CONVENWITH SOURCES IN MEXICO?

SECRET

SECRET

ET *[illegible]

OR IN CONVERSATIONS WITH SOURCES IN MEXICO ?

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ~~201-~~
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☒ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	1	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	55	8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, SECUR 4, C/OA, CCS 3, CSPS

S E C R E T 040235Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2374

ACTION

4 Aug 67 IN 25162

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: DIRECTOR 24298

AS STATION HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED NEED SPANISH SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR TO PASS AS SGSWIRL EMPLOYEE OF ONE OF LOCAL BANKS (WHICH USE SGSWIRL INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES). ROWTON, WHO WILL BE VISITING HDQS WHILE ON HOME LEAVE LATE AUGUST CAN DISCUSS THIS REQUIREMENT DIRECTLY WITH SGSWIRL PERSONNEL.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Rall OS. Bedna [illegible]

[illegible]

201-798391

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

PRECEDENCE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	1	5	C
2		6	
3	2	7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CSDO TIME 0145Z BY M

INFO FILE, VR CSDO, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 032343Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2370

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 251860

NIGHT ACTION

4 AUG 67 IN 25136

1. COS HAS PUT NO PRESSURE AT LITEMPO/8 OR LIRAMA LEVEL ON HIS CASE; AND SINCE OROZCO FOUND TO HAVE IMMIGRANTE STATUS WITH ALL PAPERS IN ORDER AND SINCE HE CLAIMED HE WOULD BE KILLED BY EITHER FAR OR GOVERNMENT IF SENT BACK TO GUATEMALA, NO PRESSURE OF ANY KIND HAS BEEN PUT ON LITEMPOS TO RETURN HIM.

2. WILL LET LITEMPOS AND GUATS WORK OUT CASE, AND BELIEVE LITEMPOS WILL RELEASE OROZCO BY NOON ON 4 AUGUST IF REPEAT IF GUATS HAVE NOT CONVINCED THEM RETURN HIM PRIOR THAT TIME.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

no index

Xref 201-[illegible] 742616 Abelardo Curbelo Padron
201-812145 [illegible]
201-210804 Jacobo Padilla [illegible]

PRECEDENCE

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
~~DESTROY~~ ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
22

ACTION
C/WH6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CSDO TIME 2215Z BY [illegible]

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH/COG5, CSDO, C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/INT2, DDP, ADDP, C/CA2

S E C R E T 032120Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2363 MEXI

3 AUG 67 IN 25077

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

KAPOK PBRUMEN

MICROFILMED
AUG 23 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2P

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 24844

B. GUATEMALA CITY 7743 (I-24531)

C. MEXICO CITY 2358 (I-24556)

WH/ [illegible] WH/1
ABSTRACT Y INDEX

1. PROBABLY BECAUSE ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO DID NOT HELP HIM OBTAIN BADLY NEEDED DOCUMENTATION WHEN NEEDED IT AND BECAUSE RELATIVE OF MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL APPARENTLY WORKING CAPUANO'S OFFICE, JACOBO PADILLA WOULD NOT DO MORE THAN SET UP CAPUANO INTERVIEW FOR LIRING-3 AFTER WHICH LIRING-3 ON HIS OWN. IN VIEW OF THIS, LIRING-3 FELT HE BETTER NOT SEE CAPUANO ABOUT OROZCO AND PRESSED PADILLA FOR CONTACT WITH OTHER FAR REP. PADILLA WHO VERY NERVOUS ABOUT WHOLE OROZCO AFFAIR SAID HE WOULD SEE WITHOUT COMMITTING SELF.

2. ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT KNOW OF OROZCO'S ARREST BY MEXICAN POLICE, LIRING-3 AND SERGIO VALDEZ IN FACT SUSPECT IT AFTER SEEING WHAT THEY THOUGHT WAS POLICE CAR IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF ADDRESS WHERE OROZCO ARRESTED BY LITEMPOS. UNABLE CONTACT FAR REPS, LIRING-3 FELT OBLIGED TO PROTECT SELF TO TELL CUBAN EMBASSY ABOUT OROZCO. LIRING-3 ACCORDINGLY TOLD ABELARDO (CURBELO) PADRON, WHO HAS ACTED

SECRET

B-201-742616
B-201-812145
B-201-210804

B-201-350227

201-798301
3 Aug 67

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2363 SECRET **SECRET**

AS CHARGE IN CUBAN AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE, ABOUT OROZCO'S STATEMENTS AGAINST FAR LEADERSHIP AND HIS ATTEMPT USE LIRING-3 TO DOUBLE-CROSS FAR LEADERS. CURBELO TOOK DETAILED NOTES WHICH HE SAID WOULD CABLE IMMEDIATELY TO RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE IN CUBA AND ADVISE LIRING-3 OF THEIR RESPONSE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

4-83 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 8

ACTION C/WH 6 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 1831 BY S

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/SOD 3, ADDP

3 AUG 67 IN 24956

S E C R E T 031730Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2358

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REF A GUATEMALA CITY 7738 (IN 24232)

B DIRECTOR 24844

1. STATION CONSIDERED THERE SOME RISK OROZCO MIGHT BE EXECUTED IF TURNED OVER GUAT AUTHORITIES BEFORE TAKING STEPS HAVE HIM ARRESTED BY LITEMPOS. IN VIEW NAKED FAR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN GUAT DID NOT FEEL HOWEVER SUCH POSSIBILITY SHOULD DETER US FROM AQUISITION RECENT AND MEDIUM LEVEL INFORMATION ON GUAT GUERRILLA MOVEMENT (WHICH OROZCO NO DOUBT HAS). SUBJ INFO MIGHT ENABLE GUATS TO STOP DEVELOPMENT OF NEW GUERRILLA ARE OROZCO ORIGINALLY ENTRUSTED WITH AND SAVE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE.

2. TRUST GUAT CITY CAN MAKE DEAL WITH GUAT AUTHORITIES HAVE OROZCO GIVEN TRIAL AND LENGTHY JAIL SENTENCE. SUCH SENTENCE WOULD PROBABLY IN THE END SAVE OROZCO'S LIFE AT LEAST UNTIL RELEASED AS THERE LITTLE DOUBT FAR WOULD KILL OROZCO (IT MAY EVEN KIDNAP HIM IN MEXICO) AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY. THIS PARTICULARLY TRUE SINCE FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS WHICH STATION BELIEVES SOUND, LIRING-3 INSTRUCTED DENOUNCE OROZCO TO FAR. LIRING-3 ALREADY CONTACTED JACOBO

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 2358 SECRET

SECRET

PADILLA IN THIS CONNECTION AND ASKED HIM SET UP INTERVIEW WITH ERNESTO CAPUANO KNOWN FAR REP IN MEXICO CITY TO SHOW HIM TWO PAGE VIRULENT DENUNCIATION FAR LEADERS LEFT BY OROZCO AT LIRING-37S APARTMENT. STATION CAN NOT AT THIS POINT REVERSE THIS MOVE CALCULATED TO Fu DRTHER INGRATIATE LIRING-3 WITH FAR.

3. WOULD LIKE STRESS THAT PURE AND SIMPLE RELEASE OROZCO IN MEXICO IS NO GUARANTEE IN VIEW OF ABOVE THAT FAR OR GUAT GOVT WILL NOT ATTEMPT PUT THEIR HANDS ON EX GUERRILLA LEADER AND EXECUTE HIM AFTER DEBRIEFING. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE SUCH DEBRIEFING WILL NOT BE AS PROFESSIONAL AS WOFACT ONE CONDUCTED WITH GUATEMALA'S BLESSING AFTER OROZCO ARREST IN GUATEMALA. IN ADDITION, AND THIS SHOULD BE VIEWED AS MAJOR CONSIDERATION, RELEASE OF OROZCO IN MEXICO WOULD CONSTITUTE OPERATIONAL AS WELL AS PERSONAL THREAT TO LIRING-3 AS OROZCO MAY FEEL, AFTER WHAT HAPPENED FEW DAYS AGO IN HIS APARTMENT, THAT LIRING-3 TURNED HIM IN.

4. SO FAR AS STATION AWARE, NO GUAT REQUEST RECEIVED AS OF NOON 3 AUGUST BY MEXICANS. LITEMPOS INSIST THEY HAVE NO REASON TO HOLD, AND STATION FEELS HE WILL BE RELEASED, PROBABLY NOT LATER THAN EARLY 4 AUGUST, UNLESS GUATS CAN MAKESTRONG CASE WITH PROMISE OF TRIAL AND PRISON SENTENCE ONLY.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 11

S E C R E T

ORIG: CHARLES W. ANDERSON
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 7208
DATE: 18 AUGUST 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 22 PER WH 9

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE ... DDP C/CI

S E C R E T

4 22 20 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 25548

TO MEXICO CITY

[illegible]

REF: [illegible], 19 JUNE 67

1. PER ROWTON/LIRING CONTACT REPORTED 26 MAY 67 WE NOTE LIRING-3 REPORTED TERESA PROENZA CONVICTED AS WOFACT AGENT.

2. WITHIN LIMITATIONS ROWTON-LIRING/3 RELATIONSHIP PLEASE QUERY LIRING-3 ON ALL POSSIBLE ASPECTS THIS STATEMENT INCLUDING HIS SOURCES OF INFORMATION, EXACT NATURE AND APPROXIMATE DATES OF THEIR STATEMENTS, PROENZA'S CURRENT STATUS, WHETHER OTHER MEMBERS OF HER FAMILY SIMILARLY SUSPECT AND WHAT HER CONNECTIONS HAVE BEEN AND STILL ARE WITH ELENA VAZQUEZ GOMEZ, NOW SECRETARY TO LAZARO CARDENAS. ARE CUBANS PLANNING RELEASE PROENZA OR PERMIT HER TRAVEL ABROAD? WHAT ARE HER RELATIONS WITH MIRTA AGUIRRE?

END OF MESSAGE

Joe Stewart
LIRING-3
201-798301

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible] J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

FILE VR, CS/DO, C/[illegible]

S E C R E T 231558Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7743

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

3 Aug 57 IN 24931

KAPOK

REF: DIRECTOR 24844

1. IN DISCUSSION THIS CASE WITH ESLYRIC-1, COS STRESSED DESIRABILITY OF ATTEMPTING DEFECT OROZCO AS WAS DONE IN CASE OF "GALLO GIRO". PUBLIC DENUNCIATIONS OF FAR LEADERS [illegible] CUBANS BY OROZCO WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE GREAT IMPACT, PARTICULARLY AT THIS TIME WHEN INTERNAL DISSENSION RAMPANT IN GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. ESLYRIC-1 IN AGREEMENT AND STATED THAT IF OROZCO TURNED OVER TO GUATEMALA, THEN ATTEMPT TO SECURE HIS DEFECTION WILL BE PRIMARY EFFORT. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WILLINGNESS OF OROZCO TO COOPERATE, AND STATION, OF COURSE, CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT HE MIGHT NOT BE EXECUTED.

2. STATION AGREES THAT OROZCO HAS PROBABLY BEEN NUETRALIZED AS A FAR ASSET, BUT BELIEVE THAT IF HE WERE TO BE RELEASED LIKELY HE WILL TRY TO AFFILIATE WITH "RED GUARD" EXTREMISTS LED BY "GABRIEL SALAZAR", JOSE MARIA (ORTIZ) VIDES, AND RICARDO (RAMIREZ) DE LEON. AS THIS CHINESE LINE GROUP WILL UNDOUBTEDLY NEED ASSETS IN MEXICO,

SECRET

SECRET

OROZCO MIGHT VERY WELL BE ACCEPTED.

3. STATION DOES NOT WISH TO MINIMIZE POSSIBILITY THAT OROZCO MIGHT BE KILLED BY GUATEMALANS, BUT DOES BELIEVE THAT ESLYRIC-1 WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SECURE HIS DEFECTION. BELIEVE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT CONTINUATION OF EFFORTS TO HAVE MEXICANS TURN HIM OVER TO GUATEMALAN FOR DETAILED INTERROGATION AND ATTEMPTED DEFECTION.

S E C R E T

BT * [illegible] Sec'd. per c[illegible]

SECRET

NNNNOUOFG

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM 21

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	11
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH-6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CI

2 AUG 67 IN 23437

S E C R E T 012318Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7732

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REF: MEXICO CITY 2323 (IN 22588)

1. JOSE LINARES OF REF PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JOSE BERNABE (LINAGES) SOSA (201-149973), WHO RABID ANTI-COMMUNIST. HELD HIGH POLICE POSITIONS DURING REGIMES OF UBICO, PONCE, CASTILLO ARMAS, AND YDIGORAS.

2. STATION DOES NOT KNOW PRESENT WHEREABOUTS LINARES, BUT WILL CHECK.

S E C R E T SECRET

~~CR~~

Stuart

SECRET

[illegible]

CITE DIRECTOR 24844

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA CITY

REF A [illegible]

B. MEXICO CITY [illegible] (IN 22426)**

C. MEXICO CITY [illegible] (IN 23361)***

1. [illegible] HQS INTERESTED IN OROZCO DEBRIEFING WOULD NOT WANT [illegible] ACTION WHICH WOULD PLACE HIS LIFE IN JEOPARDY. BELIEVE IF OROZCO RETURNED GUAT HE WOULD EITHER BE EXECUTED BY [illegible]

2. IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES RECOMMEND MEXICO CITY SUGGEST LITEMPO'S DEBRIEF AND RELEASE OROZCO. ARREST AND DETENTION HAVE ALREADY SERVED USEFUL PURPOSE OF NEUTRALIZING OROZCO'S FUTURE AS FAR ASSET.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Guatemala City to discuss extradition of Moises OROZCO [illegible], Guat Communist guerrilla, with Guat Govt contacts.
**Mexico City states OROZCO can be detained by Mexican [illegible] until 3 [illegible].
***[illegible] arrested by Mexican authorities who have taken steps to have him returned to Guatemala.

C/WH/2

WH/FI

[illegible]

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

PRECEDENCE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

chw 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☒

UNIT C/A/KZ TIME 2225 BY M

INFO

FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CA, C/A2, CI/F1, WT2

S E C R E T 022155Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7738 02 AUG 65 24232

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY 773 (IN 23416)

B. MEXICO CITY-2338 (IN 23436)

1. COS DISCUSSED OROZCO CASE WITH ESLYRIC-1 ON AFTERNOON 2 AUGUST. ESLYRIC-1, WHO INDICATED LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN ABILITY OF GUATEMALAN AMBASSADOR TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION, SAID HE WILL PHONE GUATEMALAN MILITARY ATTACHE AT 1600 HRS 2 AUGUST AND REQUEST THAT HE INITIATE ACTION THROUGH MEXICAN MILITARY TO HAVE OROZCO HELD PENDING ARRIVAL OFFICERS DESCRIBED BELOW. (ALTHOUGH CHANNELS WHICH GUATEMALAN MILAT WILL USE NOT KNOWN, WILL PROBABLY GO THROUGH HIGH RANKING DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS WHO CLOSE CONTACTS OF ESLYRIC-1.)

2. ESLYRIC-1 SAID THAT LT. COL. JORGE MANUEL (ESTRADA) ESTEVEZ, OFFICIAL OF GUATEMALAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, AND ISRAEL (CHINCHILLA) MORALES, DEPUTY CHIEF OF GUATEMALAN REGIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNIT (SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE UNIT UNDER OFFICE OF PRESIDENT), WILL TRAVEL MEXICO CITY ON 4 AUGUST TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR TURN OVER OF OROZCO. CONTACTS OF THESE TWO OFFICERS WILL PROBABLY BE WITH MEXICAN DEFENSE MINISTRY, AND ARRANGEMENTS WILL PROBABLY BE MADE TO HAVE OROZCO

SECRETLY HANDED OVER TO GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES AT BORDER.

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	1	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	2	8	

FROM 24

ACTION C/WH-6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/FI/INT-2

S E C R E T 020055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2338

2 AUG 67 IN 23436

PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

(NO NIGHT ACTION)

ACTION

KAPOK -231

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 22584)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 7734 (IN 23416)

BELIEVE CAN TALK LITEMPOS INTO HOLDING OROZCO UNTIL 3 AUGUST NOON. PLEASE ENCOURAGE GUAT TAKE ACTION SOONEST AS LITEMPOS HAVE NO LEGAL GROUND AT PRESENT TO HOLD OROZCO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Stewart

w 4/1/77

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

INFO
Chief of Station, Mexico City
Chief of Station, Managua

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Luis CASTILLO Ralda

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HGGW-4269, 17 August 1967
B. MEXICO CITY 2323, 1 August 1967

Reference B refers to a photograph of Luis CASTILLO Ralda that was provided to ROWTON during a visit to Guatemala City. It is requested that a copy of this photograph be forwarded for inclusion in CASTILLO's 201 file at Headquarters.

Kenneth F. SARFATY

Distribution:
O and 1 - Guatemala City
1 - Mexico City
1 - Managua

30 August 1967

LIRING-3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HGGW-4298

DATE
7 SEP 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-820375

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 7

PRECEDENCE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

1		5	C
2		6	
3		7	
		8	

FROM 30

ACTION C/WH6 ☒ RID COPY ☐ ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TIME 00/02 BY M

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, DDP, ADDP

23416

1 aug 67 IN ~~[illegible]~~

S E C R E T 012322Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7734

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REF: MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 23584)

1. MOST EFFECTIVE AND SECURE CHANNEL TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE REF IS THROUGH ESLYRIC-1 WHO WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DISCUSS MATTER PERSONALLY WITH PRESIDENT.

2. ESLYRIC-1 EXPECTED RETURN GUATEMALA CITY EITHER LATE 1 AUGUST OR 2 AUGUST. WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT CONTACT HIM IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL.

3. HOW LONG CAN LITEMPOS HOLD OROZCO PENDING GUAT GOVT ACTION?

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CADEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 27

PRECEDENCE

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	1	5	C
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION

ACTION c/WH6 ☒ RID COPY ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED AT WH TIME 2159 BY M

WH CD 3

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, c/WH/COG 5, c/CI, c/CI/PS, c/FI 2, c/SOD 3, c/FI/INT 2, c/CA 2, c/CS/SSO

1 AUG 67 IN 23361

S E C R E T 012041Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2331

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REF MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 22584)

1. WITH ROWTON INFO THAT MOISES OROZCO MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TELLING TRUTH ABOUT OROZCO'S ALLEGED CONTACTS WITH FAR GUERRILLAS (INFO BASED ON LIREBEL-1 AND LIREBEL-2'S STATEMENTS PER REF) LIRING-3 SUCCESSFULLY CONFRONTED AND "BROKE" OROZCO AT HIS APARTMENT NIGHT 31 JULY IN PRESENCE SERGIO VALDEZ AND RAUL MORENO. OROZCO ADMITTED HE RECENTLY SENT GUATEMALA TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA AREA BUT SAID HE UNABLE ACCOMPLISH HIS TASK DUE STUPIDITY FAR REPS. OROZCO DEMANDED TO KNOW SOURCE LIRING-3 INFORMATION. WHEN LIRING-3 REFUSED SAYING ONLY HE IN CONTACT WITH FAR, OROZCO SAID "IT MUST HAVE BEEN ROBERTO". HE WENT ON TO THROW INSULTS ON CESAR MONTES AND OTHER FAR REPS (MENTIONING WAR NAMES) SAYING THAT DAVID CASSASOLA WHO WITH HIM IN GUATEMALA WAS UNDISCIPLINED AND RESPONSIBLE FOR CAPTURE OF MANY OF HIS MEN AND PROBABLY HIS OWN. OROZCO CLAIMED HE ONLY TRUE GUAT REVOLUTIONARY AND ADMITTED HE HAD HOPED ENLIST LIRING-3'S HELP IN OBTAINING ARMS WITH WHICH HE HOPED REARM FAR FOLLOWERS LOYAL TO HIM AND FORM OWN REVOLUTIONARY GROUP. OROZCO WAS GIVEN LIRING-3'S PHONE NUMBER BY

SECRET

Stewart

VALDEZ WHEN LATTER RECOMMENDED TO OROZCO AS FAR MEMBER BY ALBERTO DOMINGO OF REVIEW POLITICA THOUGHT OROZCO WOULD BE GOOD CHANNEL TO GUAT GUERRILLAS. VALDEZ BECAME VERY ANGRY DURING ABOVE CONFRONTATION, CALLED OROZCO A TRAITOR AND THREATENED TO KILL HIM. OROZCO BEHAVIOR THROUGHOUT CLEARLY INDICATED HE VERY MUCH AFRAID FAR GUNNING FOR HIM.

2. AT 0400, VALDEZ, MORENO AND LIRING-3 DEPARTED, BUT OROZCO APPARENTLY TERRORIZED REFUSED LEAVE LIRING-3'S APARTMENT BUT PROMISED HAVE NEW DISCUSSION AT 1000 HOURS. LIRING-3, AFRAID OROZCO MIGHT COMMIT SUICIDE HIS APARTMENT TRIED REENTER HIS PLACE A LITTLE LATER BUT FOUND OROZCO UNWILLING OPEN UP. LIRING-3 AND VALDEZ THEN SPENT REST OF NIGHT IN FRONT LIRING-3'S APARTMENT TO MAKE SURE OROZCO "WOULD NOT ESCAPE". AT ROWTON SUGGESTION, LIRING-3 HIRED TAXI WHICH WAITED NEARBY. BETWEEN 0800 AND 0900 1 AUG OROZCO LEFT LIRING-3'S APARTMENT AND WENT TO HIS MOTHER'S ADDRESS FOLLOWED BY LIRING-3 AND VALDEZ IN TAXI.

3. AFTER REVIEWING ABOVE CASE STATION DECIDED CALL LITEMPO'S AND HAVE THEM PLACE OROZCO UNDER ARREST. STATION FELT LITEMPOS COULD HAVE RECOGNIZED OROZCO WHEN STAKING OUT MOTHER'S PLACE (OROZCO HAS KEPT AWAY FROM HIS MOTHER'S ADDRESS IN HIDING FOR

SEVERAL WEEKS). LIRING-3 AND VALDEZ WHO COULD NOT GET TAXI TO WAIT ANY LONGER RETURNED TO LIRING-3'S APARTMENT BEFORE ARRIVAL OF LITEMPO'S WHO TOOK OROZCO IN CUSTODY. LIRING-3 WAS THEN INSTRUCTED ATTEMPT MAKE URGENT CONTACT WITH FAR TO FINGER OROZCO VIA JACOBO PADILLA (WHO FIRST INTRODUCED LIRING-3 TO FAR). LIRING-3 NATURALLY NOT TOLD OF OROZCO'S ARREST BY LITEMPOS. STATION DOES NOT BELIEVE OROZCO'S ARREST WILL JEOPARDIZE FUTURE LIRING-3 OP.

4. ALTHOUGH LITEMPO'S FOUND OROZCO'S PAPERS IN ORDER ARTICLE 33 OF MEXICAN CONSTITUTION ALLOWS DEPORTATION OF FOREIGNERS WHOSE PRESENCE IN MEXICO IS UNDESIRABLE. THUS IF GUAT GOVT INSTRUCTED IT'S AMBASSADOR IN MEXICO CITY TO PRESS CHARGES AGAINST OROZCO AS DANGEROUS REVOLUTIONARY AND ASK FOR HIS RETURN FOR TRIAL, LITEMPOS WOULD VERY PROBABLY QUIETLY TURN OROZCO OVER TO GUATS. WOFACT WOULD THEN HOPEFULLY HAVE OPPORTUNITY INTERROGATE OROZCO AT LENGTH ON HIS RECENT GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN GUAT. JUDGING FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE GUATS WOULD PROBABLY QUIETLY DO AWAY WITH OROZCO AFTER INTERROGATION.

5. IN VIEW OF ABOVE RECOMMEND GUAT STATION CONTACT LIAISON IMMEDIATELY AND TAKE STEPS HAVE OROZCO TURNED OVER TO GUAT REPS AND TAKEN TO GUATEMALA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO FACE REVOLUTIONARY AND OTHER CHARGES. IN VIEW RECENT ARRESTS OF SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS

IN MEXICO TRYING INITIATE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND GUERRILLA WARFARE, BELIEVE LITEMPOS CAN BE EXPECTED BE MOST COOPERATIVE.

6. STATION MAKING AVAILABLE TO LITEMPOS DETAILED REPORT COVERING OROZCO'S BACKGROUND AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO AND GUATEMALA.

SECRET

BT

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

ORIG: Jack Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 1 August 1967

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 35/21 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG 8, C/OA, SECUR 4

(classification) 1 19 19 7 CCS 3 (date and time filed) 24298 (elite) (pica)

PRIORITY

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REFERENCE: A. MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 22504)
B. DIRECTOR 99380
C. MEXICO CITY 2105 (IN 11046)

REGRET SPANISH-SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR READIED 1 JUNE PER REFERENCE B NOW NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL SEPTEMBER. CAN FURNISH ENGLISH-SPEAKING OPERATOR FROM HEADQUARTERS Now IF ACCEPTABLE. ~~COULD ALSO HANDLE REFERENCE C CANDIDATES IF DESIRED.~~ PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST. ASSUME YOU UNDER NO ILLUSION ABOUT HIDING GOVERNMENT INTEREST ONCE SGWHIRL USED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Comments: A. Requested SGSWIRL operator for LIRING-3 4 Aug. B. Spanish-speaking SGSWIRL operator available for LIRING-3 1 June. C. Station queries if can examine new Station contract employee and three field agents.

WH/COG MAHONEY (TELECOORD)
OS/JRD BEONAR (TELECOORD)

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/WH/1
W.J. Kaufman
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM 49

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE f TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION Clwh 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, Cd/Cl

SECRET 312335Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2323

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

1 Aug 67 IN 22588

REF: MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 22584)

22588

1. PHOTO LUIS CASTILLO PALDA PROVIDED POWTON DURING RECENT VISIT GUATEMALA CITY SHOWN WITH DARK GLASSES AND LONGER HAIR TO LIRING-3. LIRING-3 STATED PHOTO VERY PROBABLY THAT OF GARCIA OF FAR. LIRING IDENTIKIT COMPOSITE OF GARCIA PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED BY LIREBEL-2 AS VERY PROBABLY CASTILLO.

2. MOISES OROZCO LEAL WARNED LIRING-3 STAY AWAY FROM JOSE LINARES WHO DESCRIBED AS LNPURE AGENT AND EX CHIEF POLICE WORKING AT GUAT CITY AIRPORT. REQUEST TRACES. STATION FILES CONTAIN REFERENCES DATED 57 AND 58 TO CHIEF OF SECRET POLICE BY SAME NAME.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 26 PRECEDENCE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1 2 5 C

30

ACTION CWH6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CSDO TIME 0320Z BY M

INFO FILE, VR, C/CA, C/FI2, C/FI/INT2, C/SOD3, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

S E C R E T 312335Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2322

1 Aug 67 IN 22584

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

1. LIRING-3 REPORTS HE UNEXPECTEDLY CONTACTED 23 JULY BY MOISES OROZCO LEAL (201-812145) WHO SAID HE NOW HAS FAR LIAISON. OROZCO CLAIMED NOT KNOW GARCIA WHO HE IN FACT REPLACING AND SAID HE ORDERED ACTIVATE PROCUREMENT OF ARMS AND SUPPLIES VIA LIRING-3 IN VIEW CURRENT DESPERATE FAR SITUATION IN GUATEMALA. (OROZCO EVEN ASKED LIRING-3 FOR A DOCTOR.) LIRING-3 CLAIMS THAT TO EXPEDITE MATTERS, OROZCO PROPOSED DIRECT MEETING BETWEEN LIRING-3 AND CESAR MONTES IN GUATEMALA.

2. STATION ESTABLISHED THAT HOLES EXIST IN LIRING-3 STORY AT LEAST ON DETAIL OF MANNER IN WHICH FIRST OROZCO MEETING CAME ABOUT. THERE ALSO FACT THAT ACCORDING TO LIREBEL-1 AND LIREBEL-2, TWO SEPARATE SOURCES, OROZCO WHO WAS IN GUATEMALA IN CONNECTION WITH GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES, APPARENTLY GOT COLD FEET, RECENTLY RETURNED MEXICO AND IS CURRENTLY HIDING FROM FAR.

3. BEFORE GOING ANY FURTHER REQUEST HDQS PROVIDE SPANISH SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR BY 4 AUGUST. AS POINTED OUT PARA 3B HMMA 32635 SENT AS ITEM 31 OF POUCH NO. 5242 DUE HDQS 31 JULY, HDQS

Stewart

SPEED LETTER SECRET

REPLY REQUESTED	X YES NO
DATE	16 Oct 72 pm
LETTER NO	C - XXXXX /201- 330173 101663

TO : WE/1/XXXXX Mexico
ATTN.

FROM: CI/OA
Paul Marine, 2B11, x1886

SUBJECT: ESPERON, Consuelo

(1) A review of CI/OA records reflects that Subject was of interest to W/3/Mex.; OA dated 20 Aug. 63, under JMATE.

(2) CI/OA requests that the responsible desk inform CI/OA by reply whether this case is still active, or whether CI/OA may cancel and retire its folder.

~~XXXXXX XXXXX~~
ACTING Chief, CI/OA
SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE 19 Oct 72

TO : CI/OA

FROM : [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]

(1) Case is:

a. Active ( )

b. Inactive (✓)

(2) CI/OA may/~~may not~~ cancel and retire Subject file.

2 [illegible] 0454

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 9-67 1831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C. 101663.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 26 PER #

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ,2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐

ADV. COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

INFO FILE. VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, C/OA, FI, TSD 6

S E C R E T 060230Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5139 6 APR 68 IN 86257

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 985

m

8 APR 68

C. 101663

PBRUMEN LITAMIL-7 LISAMPAN

1. LITAMIL-7 RETIRED BY EMBASSY EFFECTIVE 31 MARCH 1968. LIENVOY TAKE 28 MARCH REFLECTING THIS DEVELOPMENT RECEIVED STATION 29 MARCH LITAMIL-7 LAST DAY OF WORK. LITAMIL-7 DID NOT NOTIFY C-87966 LITAMIL-3, CLAIMING BE WAITING FOR SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH EMBASSY PERSONNEL TO DETERMINE TYPE AND AMOUNT SEVERANCE PAY. REFUSED BRING OUT ANYTHING FROM LIRING (ADDRESS BOOKS, KEYS, ETC) FOR FEAR MIGHT AFFECT FINAL SETTLEMENT. ASKED CHIEF LIRING IF COULD PURCHASE OLD TYPEWRITER SHE HAD BEEN USING 22 YEARS BUT WAS REFUSED.

2. LITAMIL-7 WAS PAID 60,000 PESOS 2 APRIL. WILL GET 7,000 ON 11 APRIL AND FINAL 2,500 END APRIL. ABOVE TOTALS PROPER COMPENSATION FOR 36 YEARS SERVICE, BASED MEXICAN LAW.

3. ALTHOUGH LITAMIL-7 RETIREMENT ELIMINATES ONLY STATION PHYSICAL ASSET AT LIRING, DEVELOPMENT PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY ACTIVATE LISAMPAN/CHARLIE. AS ADDEES AWARE LITAMIL-7 HAD BEEN ISOLATED COMPLETELY FROM ANY BUT MOST INNOCUOUS CONVERSATIONS. HER REPLACEMENT BY WIFE LIRING STAFFER MAY PROVIDE INTERESTING INFO. STATION PLANS ACTIVATE CHARLIE WEEK 14 APRIL, AFTER WEEK OF TAKE ON TEST

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5139 SECRET

BASIS OF FOXTROT, REACTIVATED 5 APRIL.

4. STATION PLANS MAINTAIN OCCASIONAL CONTACT LITAMIL-7 WHENEVER PERSONNEL OR OPERATIONALY REQUIREMENTS WARRANT SUCH CONTACTS. IT PROBABLE HOWEVER SHE WILL REMAIN RETICENT UNTIL FINAL PAYMENT PARA 2 ABOVE.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 51 C-101663

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

30

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WHP ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 2, EE 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI,

S E C R E T 070104Z MAR 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 4732 7 MAR 63 65226

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE THE HAGUE

PBRUMEN MHAPRON AMCRUMB-1

C-82583 C-87966

1. BOTH LITAMIL-2 AND LITAMIL-3 MADE INDEPENDENT EFFORTS MAKE CONTACT WITH AMCRUMB-1 DURING LATTER VISIT TO IN LAWS IN MEXICO CITY. LITAMIL-3 PHONED TO MAKE DATE FOR SOCIAL VISIT AND LITAMIL-2 ACTUALLY CALLED AT AMCRUMB-1 CURRENT RESIDENCE. IN BOTH CASES AMCRUMB-1 WIFE STATED HER HUSBAND OUT OF TOWN (WHICH NOT TRUE).

C-101663

2. LITAMIL-7 REPORTED 5 MARCH THAT AMCRUMB-1 HAD COMPLAINED HE BEING BOTHERED BY FORMER CUBAN FRIENDS BUT AVOIDING CONTACT WITH THEM. IN VIEW OF THIS PROSPECTS FOR AMCRUMB-1 APPEAR BLEAK.

S E C R E T

SECRET

11 MAR 1963

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 2 TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 49

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 3, [illegible], [illegible], CI/IC 2, [illegible]

S E C R E T 212115Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2219

21 JUL 67 IN 16105

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

PERUMEN

OVER

REF A MEXICO CITY 2053 (IN 98509)

B DIRECTOR 22277

1. CHECK ALL CUBANA MANIFESTS 12 JUNE TO 15 JULY SHOWED ONLY TWO CUBANS REMAINED MEXICO ANY LENGTH OF TIME DURING THIS PERIOD. ONE WAS HISTORIAN ERASMO DOMPIERRE ARENAS WHO IN MEXICO 24 JUNE TO 15 JULY FOR HISTORICAL RESEARCH (LIENVOY CONFIRMED HE CONTACTED PEOPLE IN HIS FIELD TO WORK WITH THEM). OTHER WAS JESUS CRUZ GONZALEZ WHO IN MEXICO 12 JUNE TO 15 JULY IN CONNECTION WITH PRENSA LATINA MATTERS (TOGETHER WITH ORLANDO FUNDORA LOPEZ AND TITO LUSSON BATTLE WHO SPENT SHORTER TIME MEXICO). LIENVOY SHOWED CRUZ IN WORKING CONTACT WITH LIRING-9 AND 201-775733.

NR

C-82545

2. LITAINT-2 SAW RAFAEL MIRABAL FERNANDEZ 8 JULY IN COMPANY OF CUBAN WHOM MIRABAL TREATED AS VISITING OFFICIAL WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION (MIRABAL SURPRISED LITAINT-2 BY TURNING DOWN LUNCH INVITATION TO STAY WITH CUBAN VISITOR). LITAMIL-7 STATED 18 JULY THAT THREE CUBANS UNKNOWN TO HER QUOTE HAD BEEN RUNNING AROUND EMBASSY UNQUOTE DURING PREVIOUS WEEK WITH PORTFOLIOS, FILES,

C-101663

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY [illegible]

PAPERS AND BOOKS PICKING UP BIG PAPER IN HIS OFFICE TO WORK SOMEWHERE ELSE IN EMBASSY. ONE OF THESE MEN FIT DESCRIPTION OF OFFICIAL CUBAN VISITOR SEEN BY LITAINT-2.

3. LITAINT-2/LITAMIL-7 INFO SEEMS INDICATE UNUSUAL ACTIVITY IN CUBAN EMBASSY FIRST SECOND WEEK OF JULY. ONLY VISITOR WHO SPENT TIME AT EMBASSY WHO COULD HAVE ARRIVED DIRECTLY FROM CUBA WAS ORTIZ. OTHERS SEEN BY LITAMIL-7 MAY HAVE ARRIVED FROM CANADA, FAR EAST, OR ELSEWHERE. VISITORS FROM CANADA USUALLY ANNOUNCE THEIR ARRIVAL AHEAD OF TIME AND TURN UP ON LIENVOY WHICH PRODUCED NO SUCH INFO IN THIS CASE.

4. LIRING-9 MET LISASIY 13 JULY BUT [illegible] UNABLE DEBRIEF AS YET. LIRING-9 MADE ATTEMPT CONTACT LIRING-7 ON 7 OR 8 JULY AFTER RETURNING FROM CUBA 3 JULY BUT LIRING-7 NOT AT HOME. LIRING-9 GAVE NO SIGN OF LIFE UNTIL LIRING-7 PHONED HIM 14 JULY. LIRING-9 SAID WOULD VISIT LIRING-7 NEXT DAY BUT DID NOT SHOW UP. THIS SEEMS CONFIRM INFO OBTAINED BY LIRING-4 THAT LIRING-9 VERY BUSY (AS RESULT OF REPORTED INSPECTION).

304668

NR

5. IF INSPECTION TOOK PLACE AND IRREGULARITIES FOUND THIS OFFICE, LIRING-9 MAY HAVE BEEN OBJECT UNFAVORABLE COMMENTS AS REPORTED REF A. SERIOUSLY DOUBT HOWEVER HE IN ANY DANGER BEING

SECRET

PAGE THREE MEXICO CITY 2249 S E C R E T

SENT HOME. INFORMATION OBTAINED BY LIRING / (WHO RECENTLY COMPLETED PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT FORM ON LIRING 9 WHICH STATION FORWARDING), LIRING-4, LITAMIL-9, LISASSY AND OTHERS DOES NOT INDICATE LIRING-9 IS SUITABLE TARGET AT THIS TIME FOR RECRUITMENT-DEFECTION ATTEMPT. THIS DOES NOT MEAN STATION NOT MAKING EFFORTS OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO ON HIS ACTIVITIES AND SHORTCOMINGS AS SITUATION, WITH WOFACT HELP, COULD CHANGE. ATTEMPT CURRENTLY BEING MADE FOR EXAMPLE, TO FIND SUITABLE CONTROLLABLE FEMALE ASSET TO ACT PART HIS GIRLFRIEND (LIRING-9 CURRENTLY LOOKING FOR NEW ONE) TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO HIS EXTRA CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES, DEEPEN HIS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND TRY ELICIT OPERATIONAL INFO FROM HIM. INITIAL APPROACH IDEN (WHO PREVIOUSLY SELECTED BY STATION FOR THIS JOB) BY RAYMOND H GERENDE UNDER COVER LOCAL DETECTIVE BUREAU OPERATOR TOOK PLACE . JULY. WILL POUCH DETAILS AFTER GERENDE'S SECOND MEETING WITH IDEN.

6. WOULD APPRECIATE TRACES IDEN. LOCAL TRACES NEGATIVE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

40

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION
[illegible]

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 3, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PA

S E C R E T 210115Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2222

21 Jul 67 IN 16039

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF MEXICO CITY 2219 (IN 16109)

IDEN IS SILVIA TREVINO CASPARI.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 35 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, Eur 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 272243Z CITE JMWAVE 8473

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR, PARIS, BARCELONA

27 JUL 67 IN 20506

TYPIC AMCJILE QUOTA

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 8472 (IN 20509)

SUBJECT REFERENCE PARA 2.A. AMCUTLER/2, WIFE SUBJECT REF PARA 2.B. WHO AMCUTLER/1. A/1 WAVE ASSET 61-FEB 67 WHEN TERMINATED. A/1 RECRUITED WAVE AREA TO RETURN TO PBRUMEN WHERE HE WORKED SHORT PERIOD HELPING BROTHER (AMFAUNA/1) SUCCESSFULLY ORGANIZE PRODUCTIVE AMFAUNA NET. A/1 OBTAINED ASYLUM VENEZUELAN EMBASSY AND RETURNED WAVE AREA SEPT 61; AMCUTLER/2 BECAME PRIMARY AMFAUNA NET ASSET PBRUMEN UNTIL ARRESTED DEC 63. AMCUTLER/2 BEING HELD GUANAJAY WOMEN'S PRIOSN AS OF OCT 66. LAST STATION CONTACT WITH A/1 WAS MAY 67. A/1 AND AMFAUNA/1 ATTEMPTING OPEN AMUSEMENT PARK WAVE AREA AT THAT TIME.

C-101135

C-87550

C-88260

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1 5
2 6
3 7
4 8

dissem ... 22

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED UNIT CS/DO TIME 0315 BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/IC

S E C R E T 242335Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9122 IN 3240

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (ATTN: FRADYER) INFO MANAGUA

(8)

NO NIGHT ACTION

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

OVER

REF: DIRECTOR- 44183 (NOT SENT MANAGUA)

1. DUE PROLONGED STAY LITAMIL-17 HONDURAS, STATION BEGAN ATTEMPTS CONTACT LITAMIL-9 THROUGH LITAMIL-3 WHO AWARE L-9 IN TOWN FROM LITAMIL-7. INITIAL ATTEMPTS CONTACT UNSUCCESSFUL BUT LITAMIL-7 INFORMED LITAMIL-3 ON 2 NOV THAT LITAMIL-9 WISHED SEE HIM URGENTLY. LITAMIL-3 AGAIN ATTEMPTING CONTACT LITAMIL-9.

2. THROUGH LITAMIL-7, STATION AWARE THAT GOBERNACION HAS NOT GRANTED PERMISSION LITAMIL-9 REMAIN IN MEXICO FOR THREE MONTH PERIOD REQUESTED. PBRUMEN DIPLOMATS ONLY ALLOWED 10 DAY STAY MEXICO ON TDY WITHOUT REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR LONGER STAY FROM GOBERNACION. LITAMIL-3 CLAIMS CAN ARRANGE FOR LONGER STAY THROUGH CONTACTS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY AND HAS TOLD LITAMIL-7 TO INFORM LITAMIL-9 OF SAME. LITAMIL-9 SITUATION CRITICAL FROM POINT OF OVERSTAYING 10 DAY LIMIT BUT NEGOTIATIONS STILL TAKING PLACE BETWEEN LIRING AND FOREIGN MINISTRY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY [illegible] S E C R E T

3. IF HQS CONCURS [illegible] CAN BE RE[illegible]STED AUTHORIZE LITAMIL-9 EXTENSION [illegible] MEXICO [illegible]. ABSENCE CURTIS, BENADUM WOULD CONTACT LITEMP[illegible] [illegible] LIKE LITEMPO-8 AND PROBABLY LIRAMA [illegible] LITAMIL-[illegible] [illegible] WOFACT. ADVISE [illegible]. [illegible] WOULD BE [illegible] LITAMIL-3 CLAIMING HE ARRANGED EXTENSION.

4. RECENT [illegible] FOR SHRYOCK.

5. WILL ADVISE ANY ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS LITAMIL-9 SITUATION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

B. CAREW:mot
UNIT: WH/C/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 28 SEPT 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE . WH 8, CI/CA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

FI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 39039

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE 13132 Z

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A) MEXICO CITY 3651 (IN 04697)*

B) MEXICO CITY 7711 (IN 43725)**

FROM HQS READING OF THIS OP, APPEARS THAT ROWTON/LIRING-3 RELATIONSHIP MAY BE NEARING POINT OF POSITIVE RECRUITMENT. REQUEST CURRENT STATION READING OF OPERATION AND UPDATED ASSESSMENT LIRING-3 AND -4 INCLUDING POSSIBLE PLANS FOR RECRUITMENT OF EACH. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE PLACE TECHNICAL OR OTHER SURVEILLANCE AS MENTIONED REF B? HAS LITAMIL -7 BEEN ABLE VERIFY [redacted] EMPLOYMENT LIRING?

795301

C-71C1663

LIRING/4

END OF MESSAGE

*
** REFS ATTACHED.

C/WH/C/CICS

C/WH/C/FI T. Hazlett (draft)

WH/C/FI/TC J. Lucey (draft)

C/WH/C/CA/PA C. Anderson (draft)

C/WH/1 J. Fisher (draft)

WH/C/MO R. Ortman (draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

28-23

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

10

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLASS: TO FILE NO.
X-REF FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED [redacted]

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D 4, ODC, DDP, ADDP,

28 [illegible] 83830

ALL

OVER

SECRET 252130Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 5555

TYPIC MHSPAWN MHAPRON

REF DIR [illegible]*

* RE STATION REQUEST CABLE SPECIFIC LEADS IN ORDER HOS GERE RGMS.

1. GIST OF FIRST TEN PARAS REF AND GUIDANCE OF PARA 11 PASSED LIROOK-1 WHO EXPECTED EXPLOIT IN MEXI PRESS.

2. FOLLOWING PROPOSALS REPRESENT STATION THINKING OF FUTURE EXPLOITATION OF PURGE/UNREST SITUATION AT PRESENT:

A. MAKE PITCH TO JORRIN. APPROACH TO BE MADE BY ROWTON ON STREET. ROWTON INTRODUCE SELF AS FRIEND OF "QUIQUE" (ENRIQUE VILLAVICENCIO) [redacted], ASK HOW VILLAVICENCIO IS, WHETHER IT TRUE HE IN TROUBLE, EXPLAIN HE TOLD ROWTON ALL ABOUT WHAT A GOOD FRIEND JORRIN WAS. INDICATE THAT VILLAVICENCIO AND ROWTON HAD MANY GOOD TIMES TOGETHER INCLUDING SEVERAL PARTIES WITH ACCOMODATING GIRLS. ASK JORRIN WHAT CAN BE DONE TO HELP VILLAVICENCIO, COULD JORRIN GET ANYTHING TO HIM. INDICATE HAS HEARD JORRIN DUE FOR TRANSFER BACK TO HAVA SOON. ROWTON BELIEVES COULD MAKE QUICK DETERMINATION FROM JORRIN REACTION TO APPROACH WHETHER JORRIN INTERESTED IN PLAYING CASE FOR CUIS, INTERESTED IN HELPING VILLAVICENCIO OR MERELY WISHES BE LEFT ALONE. IF

SECRET

ANY EVENT, IF HE CAN BE DRAWN INTO CONVERSATION ROWTON COULD TAILOR PITCH TO REACTION AND MAKE CLEAR TO JORRIN THAT IT TO HIS BEST INTEREST LISTEN TO AND COOPERATE WITH ROWTON

B. MAKE PITCH TO JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ. WHEN QUERIED IN NOV 65 AS TO WHO HE WOULD GO AFTER IF HAD TO CHOOSE ONE EMBASSY STAFFER, LIONION-1 2-8891 PICKED OUT LOPEZ. ASKED TO ELABORATE ON REASONS, HE EXPLAINED LOPEZ APPEARS LIKE BETTER THINGS OF LIFE, QUICKLY PUT EMBASSY CADILLAC INTO USE AFTER HE ARRIVED IN MEXI, DRESSES WELL, GIVES IMPRESSION OF WISHING TO BE "GRAN SENOR." ON 22 MAR, IN LIGHT OF CASTRO PURITANICAL PURGE, LITAMIL-7 2-101663 WAS ASKED WHO SHE FELT WAS MOST DEVOTED TO "DOLCE VITA" AMONG EMBASSY STAFFERS. SHE PICKED JULIAN LOPEZ FOR SAME REASONS SET FORTH EARLIER AND INDEPENDENTLY BY LIONION. STATION HAS NOT YET FORMULATED PLANS FOR METHOD OF APPROACHING LOPEZ. REVIEW OF AVAILABLE DATA CONTINUING. WOULD PROBABLY USE ROWTON OR ALECCIA TO MAKE CONTACT.

C. WORK ON HERNANDEZ ARMAS. BELIEVE PURGE OFFERS GOOD OPPORTUNITY PUT HIM BEHIND EIGHT BALL. PROPOSE USE

PAGE THREE MEXI 6656 S E C R E T IN 23830 PAGE 3

LICLOD-1 (201-759176) AS VEHICLE. PROPOSE EXPANDED VERSION OF STORY OF MEXI 2565 (6), 23 SEPT 64, WHICH CONTAINED STATEMENTS BY HERNANDEZ WIFE THAT HE VIRTUAL PRISONER, WATCHED BY SECURITY PEOPLE, ETC. EXPANDED VERSION WOULD BUILD ON ACTUAL STATEMENTS OF WIFE TO INCLUDE SIMILAR STATEMENTS SUPPOSEDLY MADE BY HERNANDEZ HIMSELF IN SECRET MEETINGS WITH LICLOD IN SEPT 64. THESE PURPORTED STATEMENTS WOULD HAVE HERNANDEZ DISILLUSIONED "OLD COMMUNIST," STILL ESSENTIALLY FAITHFUL TO MARXIST THEORY BUT DISMAYED AT CASTRO COMMUNISM IN PRACTICE. IN ADDITION TO BEING VIRTUAL PRISONER, UNDER EVER WATCHFUL EYE OF SECURITY PERSONNEL, WOULD HAVE HIM ADMIT SADLY TO LICLOD THAT HE ALSO PRISONER IN SENSE THAT ALTHOUGH HE DISILLUSIONED HE FINDS SELF LOOKED UP TO AS ONE OF FOREMOST APOSTLES OF COMMUNISM IN MEXI BY MEXI COMMUNISTS SUCH AS RECTOR UNIVERSITY MORELIA (EREMAUNTZ), OTHERS OF LIKE PROMINENCE. THESE PEOPLE APPARENTLY FOOLED BY CASTRO COMMUNIST FACADE AND HERNANDEZ UNWILLING LET THEM DOWN. HERNANDEZ ALSO AFRAID MOVE BECAUSE OF FAMILY, PARTICULARLY TWO BROTHERS WHO HOLD HIGH GOC POSITIONS. PROPOSE FOLLOWING SCENARIO

SECRET

FOR SURFACING STORY: LICLOD, HAVING LEARNED ABOUT PURGE IN CUBA, TO GO ON AIRWAVES THROUGH APPROPRIATE CUBAN EXILE OUTLET. EXPLAIN WHO HE IS, TELL OF HIS LONG ASSOCIATION WITH HERNANDEZ FAMILY, VERY HIGH REGARD FOR HERNANDEZ AS INDIVIDUAL. EXPLAIN THAT WHILE IN MEXI IN SEPT 64 HAD CONTACTS WITH HERNANDEZ AND WIFE BUT BOTH MADE HIM SWEAR NEVER TO REVEAL WHAT THEY TOLD HIM. NOW REALIZES IS BREAKING PLEDGE TO WELL-MEANING FRIENDS BUT IN VIEW OF RECENT TURN OF EVENTS IN CUBA FEELS MUST TELL WHAT HE KNOWS. HAS CHOSEN PUBLIC FORUM AS BEST MEANS FORCE FRIEND HERNANDEZ TO OPENLY MAKE BREAK HE MADE IN HEART TWO YEARS AGO. EXPLAIN WROTE LETTERTO HERNANDEZ "TWO DAYS AGO" TELLING HERNANDEZ OF PLAN ASKING HIS FORGIVENESS FOR BREAKING CONFIDENCE BUT IMPLORING HIM TO UNDERSTAND LICLOD HIGH MOTIVES. WOULD ACTUALLY HAVE HIM MAIL SUCH A LETTER. BELIEVE LICLOD, PROPERLY REHEARSED, AND USING HIS EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF HERNANDEZ BACKGROUND (SEE MEXI 0752 1 SEPT 64) COULD GIVE STORY RING OF SINCERITY AND TRUTH. SWIFT PRESS FOLLOW-UP COULD INSURE RAPID PROPAGATION OF STORY. GOC COULD CHECK LICLOD BACKGROUND UNTIL BLUE IN

PAGE FIVE MEXI 6556 S E C R E T

IN 83830 PAGE 5

FACE AND NOT SHAKE GOOD PART OF STORY. BELIEVE THIS MIGHT PLACE HERNANDEZ IN VIRTUALLY UNTENABLE POSITION IN MEXI AND ALSO WITH HIS GOVT. MIGHT ALSO MAKE MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF MORE AMENABLE TO APPROACH OR AT LEAST SHAKE THEM UP.

3. VARIATION OF THEME 2, C, WOULD BE HAVE LICLOD COME TO MEXI TO MAKE APPROACH TO HERNANDEZ. HOWEVER NOTHING IN STA FILES INDICATES HERNANDEZ RIPE FOR RECRUITMENT. HE MIGHT BE SOFTENED UP BY PUBLICITY PER 2, C, AND A FOLLOW-UP DEFECTION ATTEMPT MIGHT THEN BE IN ORDER.

4. CAN HQS LOCATE LICLOD? AMCONCERT-4 SHOULD KNOW HIS WHEREABOUTS. [illegible] RECORDS DO NOT SHOW STATESIDE ADDRESS.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS CONCURRENCE PARA 2 PLANS. IF DECISION MADE GO AHEAD WITH LICLOD OR STATION WILL PROPOSE SEND BARKER TO REHEARSE LICLOD FOR HIS PRESENTATION.

S E C R E T

CFN 6556 11 LIPOOK-1 4 JORRIN POWTON QUIQUE ENRIQUE VILLAVICENCIO VILLAVICENCIO VILLAVICENCIO NAVA CUIS 3 JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ NOV 65 CADILLAC GRAN SENOR 22 MAR CASTRO LITAMIL-7 DOLCE VITA ALECCIA C HERNANDEZ ARMAS LICLOD-1 201-759175 MEXI 2585 23 SEPT 64 MEETINGS/S SEPT 64 RECTOR UNIVERSITY MORELIA (GREMMUNTZ) GOC CUBA SEPT 64 MEXI [illegible] 1 SEPT 64 GOC 2, C, 2,C, AMCONCERT-4 NOT SHOW HQS 2 BARKER LICLOD

ST

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/CA, WE 8

15 FEB 66

14 FEB 66 IN 54788

File

SECRET 1922Z

DIR HAGU CITE MEXI 6265

PERUMEN LITAMIL AMCRUMB

REF HAGU 9927 (54509)*

1. LITAMIL-7 REPORTS AMCRUMB-1 TOLD HER 7 FEB HE WOULD BE RETURNING CUBA THENCE HOLLAND SOON. A-1 WIFE TOLD L-7 SHE DISLIKES HOLLAND, NOT ANXIOUS RETURN.

2. L-7 SAYS A-1 APPEARS IN GOOD HEALTH AND SPIRITS, WIFE APPEARS TO HAVE AGED, LOOKS SICKLY.

SECRET * REF FIGHT

CFN 6265 PERUMEN LITAMIL AMCRUMB 9927 LITAMIL-7 AMCRUMB-1 7 A-1 L-7 HOLLAND NOT ANXIOUS L-7 A-1

BT

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING
4
5
6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (TEMPO FOR WH SLOTTED AT: [illegible], 17 JUNE 64)

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WE 6, WH/SA 8, VR

SECRET 172244Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO HAGU CITE MEXI 9923

PERUMEN AKORUM

REF MEXI 9885 (IN 07151)*

101113

17 JUN 64 08907

1. LITAMIL-7 REPORTS THROUGH LITAMIL-3 THAT AKORUMB-1 TRIP TO PERUMEN IS TEMPORARY CAUSE, THAT HE EXPECTED RETURN MEXI SOON. STATION WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PITCH HIM.

2. ACCORDING L-7 AKORUMB WANTS TO RETURN HAGU POST OR OTHER POST ABROAD TO INSURE HE NOT ASSIGNED PCS PERUMEN.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *RYBAT REF.

18 JUN 1964

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH/SA 8

INFO : DCI, WH 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, VR.

26 MAR 1964

File

IN 47435

C-101663

S E C R E T 252132Z

DIR CITE MEXI 8898 (EASBY ACTING)

TYPIC AMROD

FOLLOWING FROM LITAMIL-7, 25 MARCH: TERESA PROENZA VISITED PERUMEN EMBASSY 24 MARCH WITH SISTER CACHITA. SAID SHE RETURNING HABANA SOON ON UNSPECIFIED DATE. HER PASSPORT MARKED "PARA REINTEGRARSE (REINTEGRARSE) EN SU CARGO", BUT L-7 TELLS OF CABLE PRECEDING PROENZA ARRIVAL: "LLEGARA A LIQUIDAR SUS ASUNTOS. TENGANOS INFORMADOS". EMB STAFF WARNED NOT TO TELL PROENZA OF THE WORDING OF CABLE WHICH INDICATES SOMETHING DONE BEHIND HER BACK DESPITE WHAT SHE MAY HAVE BEEN TOLD. P SAID SHE NOW PREFERS WORK INSIDE PERUMEN RATHER THAN IN AN EMB SINCE SHE CAN DO MORE GOOD THERE. L-7 BELIEVES THAT EVEN HABANA NOT SURE WHAT TO DO WITH PROENZA.

S E C R E T

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET

C No. 101663

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/Mexico Wayne Carley

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of LITAMIL/7
, for the purpose specified in your request
dated 24 June 1963.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 20 August 1963 dlr

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

FORM 9-59 124 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 20 AUG 1963	CASE NO. 101663

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
✓	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

Leonard W. Tate

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

-OA-

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

16 AUG 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : C-101663
#280 142

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 15 August 1962 requesting an appropriate investigation of Subject in connection with his use under an Operational Approval as an FI agent by IFW in Mexico City.

2. In view of the certification set forth in your request, no CIA files other than those of the Office of Security have been searched in connection with this case.

3. It is assumed that all pertinent information concerning Subject as requested in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5 has been furnished.

4. This memorandum pertains only to this proposed assignment. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision in this case.

5. The records of Government agencies were checked regarding the Subject with the following results:

ONI - NR
ACSI - NR

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Aug 16

file
20 aug 63

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

16 AUG 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : C-101663
0280 142

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 15 August 1962 requesting an appropriate investigation of Subject in connection with his use under an Operational Approval as an FI agent by TFW in Mexico City.

2. In view of the certification set forth in your request, no CIA files other than those of the Office of Security have been searched in connection with this case.

3. It is assumed that all pertinent information concerning Subject as requested in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5 has been furnished.

4. This memorandum pertains only to this proposed assignment. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision in this case.

5. The records of Government agencies were checked regarding the Subject with the following results:

ONI - NR
ACSI - NR

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/3/M - W. Carley

NUMBER
C - 112663

SUBJECT
LITAMIL/7

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated

crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA is reinstated until 23 September 1963.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	28 JUN 1963

FORM 7-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (5)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 28 JUN 1963	CASE NO. C-101663

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE NOTICES DATE		EXPEDITE FBI NOTICES: DATE
SET UP FOR ✓	OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T W. CHK		USE AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
✓	REINSTATE POA FOR 90 DAYS UNTIL 28 Sep 63		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 8-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (811)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 1 July 63 cjn

PROJECT: JMATE

TO : Deputy Director of Security

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT : c-101663-[illegible], Consuelo

NO. 280142

1. TYPE OF REQUEST							2. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY (Date)
☐	PSA	☒	OA	☐	SPEC. INQ.	☐ CSC	

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY

4. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT

5. USE OF SUBJECT

6. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION		
B. C.I.A. INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION		
C. SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM		
D. SUBJECT AWARE OF C.I.A. INTEREST IN HIM		

E. LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

F. SUGGESTED "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

G. REASON FOR NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA (Explain fully)

7. RI TRACES

8. DIVISION TRACES

9. FIELD TRACES

10. GREEN LIST INITIATED	☐	YES	☒	NO		
11. ATTACHMENTS	☐	PRQ PART 1	☐	PARTIAL BIO.	☐	OTHER:

12. REMARKS

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

INITIALS EFB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 4-61 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-7
C-101663
201-330173

Attached is the PRQ part II on LITAMIL-7. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

JUN 26 9 41 AM '63

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA 21526

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215 paragraphs 6a, 9, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ, part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM LITAMIL - 7

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

LITAMIL-3, a former superior of LITAMIL-7 in the PBRUMEN Embassy handled her for several months before turning her over to Clyde K SHRYOCK on 7 May 1962. SHRYOCK is known to L-7 as "Roberto". Direct contact with L-7 was made in order to get better and more detailed information re the PBRUMEN Embassy personnel and activities.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any Spanish speaking Case Officer through LITAMIL-3, who continues to be her closest and most trusted friend.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Not applicable

SECRET

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is anti-Communist and pro-U.S. She wants to prove that she is anti-Communist by providing information to ODYOKE re activities inside the PBRUMEN Embassy.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico City has little control over Subject except to reveal her activities to PBRUMEN authorities.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Meetings are held at the home of LITAMIL-7 and if necessary the Case Officer could represent a visiting "friend".

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject is employed at the PBRUMEN Embassy and her information is gathered during the course of her working day.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(will work) (is working)*.

Subject knows she is working for ODYOKE. She does not think in terms of intelligence agencies.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject has had no connection with any intelligence service in the past.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

LITAMIL-3, who introduced Subject to Case Officer and frequently attends meetings with Case Officer.

LITAMIL-9 suspects that Subject is working for ODYOKE. He knows she is in contact with LITAMIL-3 and he knows L-3 is in contact with Case Officer.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has had no training in clandestine operations. She is becoming increasingly aware of intelligence techniques, however, and her production has improved for this reason.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject, being a Mexican, would probably collaborate with the Mexican Government if approached by high authorities.

SECRET

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

LITAMIL-3 has been in contact with Subject for many years and continued in contact with her as of this date. Subject provided information on the [illegible] Embassy through L-3.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains her information from [illegible] personnel at the Embassy and by observation and elicitation.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject is aware that the information which she provides goes to Washington D.C.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is presently being used to provide information re travel to [illegible] [illegible] applies the issuance of "courtesy visas" which she handles and information on the personalities and activities of [illegible] personnel through "clear" cable traffic, conversations, elicitations, and observation.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY: AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is collaborating with KUBARK unselfishly. On occasions the Case Officer has sent her gifts and tried to help re visa problems, scholarships (close friend).

SECRET

SECTION XIII	**AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**
1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.	
Subject is a bird fancier (canaries and parakeets).	
SECTION XIV	**GENERAL**
1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.	
Subject is from Oaxaca and typifies the native of that region, i.e. she has Indian facial characteristics. Subj is probably recognizable as a Mexican.	
2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.	
Information on PRQ Parts I and II came from Station files, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-9, and LITAMIL-7, herself.	
3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (Also see para. 43b, supra)	
Subject's termination will be routine.	
SECTION XV	**EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**
1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W, WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?	
The Case Officer has a phone number through which contact can be made in an emergency. Subj knows the [illegible] phone number and extension. She will ask for "Roberto" and she will use the name "Paula". Contact can also be made through LITAMIL-3.	
SECTION XVI	**MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**
Subject was "pitched" by LITAMIL-3 during the period Dec. 60 and Jan. 1961. Subject was offered $10,000 U.S. to "defect" and make statements provided by CUZOKE, which she refused to accept after serious consideration. LITAMIL-3 was the "cut-out" for this operation which was handled by Andrew F MERTON.	
DATE 12 June 1963	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 27 May 63 dlr

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WH/3/Mexico

ATTENTION: Wayne Carley

C# 151663

The file on LITAMIL/7 is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ Part II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 23 May 63	CASE NO C-101663

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE

SET UP FOR		OA		SP INQUIRY		GOV'T N. CHK	USE AREA:

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
XXXX	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST 21 TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Failure to submit PRQ Part II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

27 MAY 1963

dlr

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

pc for EPB

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 19 March 1963 jmh
TO: WH/3/MEXICO ATTN: BLAINE CAREY	C NO. 101663
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT: LITAMIL/7

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☒	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired 19 March 1963. Please submit PRQ II. If within 30 days no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 19 MAR 1963	CASE NO. C-101663

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: (No notice to division)	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	XXX	TICKLE 45 Days
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
XXXX	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I XXXX PRQ II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

POA expired on 10 March 63. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

Edward L. Brown

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (21)

~~2~~15 March 63

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] : [redacted]

[redacted] : [redacted]

[redacted] : [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

File for ~~the~~ Barns
JAB

[redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

This illegible thermo merely transfers responsibility for this case from SAS to WH/3/Mexico.
EPB

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TFW
Attn: H. E. Mulloy

NUMBER
C-101663

SUBJECT
LITAMIL/7

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
13 August 1962

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

GROUP 1

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	10 September 1962

FORM 7-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET				DATE		CASE NO. C-101663		
SET UP FOR P.O.A.								
☐	EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE		☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE		
SET UP FOR	☐	OA	☐	SP INQUIRY	☐	GOV'T N. CHK	USE AREA:	
☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL			☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"			
☑	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL			☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW			
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL			☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION			
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL			☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM	☐ SECURITY OFFICE	☐ DIVISION	
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION			☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA			
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE			☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA			
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: (No notice to division)			☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA			
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*			☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE			
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES			☐	FILE			
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES			☐	TICKLE			
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES			☐	NOTICE	☐ FIRST	☐ SECOND	☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST	☐ PRQ I	☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER			

REMARKS

[illegible] Carroll, Jr.

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 15 Aug 62 cjb

TO : Deputy Director of Security

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : C 101663 P

NO.

PROJECT: JMATE

1. TYPE OF REQUEST			
☒ POA	☐ OA	☐ SPEC. INQ.	☐ CSC

2. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY *(Date)*: 28 Aug 62

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY: 21 Aug 62

4. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT: TFW - Mexico City

5. USE OF SUBJECT: FI agent

6. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION	☒	☐
B. C.I.A. INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION	☐	☒
C. SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM	☒	☐
D. SUBJECT AWARE OF C.I.A. INTEREST IN HIM	☐	☒

E. LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT: None

F. SUGGESTED "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT:

G. REASON FOR NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA *(Explain fully)*:

7. RI TRACES: NDI

8. DIVISION TRACES: NDI

9. FIELD TRACES: NDI

10. GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

11. ATTACHMENTS: ☒ PRO PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO. OTHER:

12. REMARKS:

P. O. A.
CI/OA Advised ____
Date ____

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

INITIALS

FORM 4-61 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 14 AUG 1962

CASE NO.:

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

✓ EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE 21 Aug 62

✓ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE 28 Aug 62

SET UP FOR: ☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T'N. CHK

USE : AREA:

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

Area - Mexico City

Use - FI agent

1cc PRQ I to SO

Brown

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (21)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
TFW/Cus Spt
G H 5512

NO.

DATE
13 Aug 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI/OA 2 B 11				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 676751

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION *(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)*		DATE 13 Aug 62
TO:	☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division ☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security	FROM: Wendell Ullery TFW/Ops Spt G H 5512 7646
SUBJECT: *(True name)*	Consuelo ESPERON	PROJECT JMATE
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES	LITAMIL-7 ✓	CI/OA FILE NO.
		RI 201 FILE NO. 330173 / SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

XX	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Will be used for reporting on Cuban Embassy activities and personnel.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X
E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. None		
F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.		
IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY		

Aug 13

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 127452

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
	NOT INITIATED *(Explain)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER H.E.Mulloy	EXTENSION 7646	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF William K. Harvey

FORM 8-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

RI NO.

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Sex)*
[illegible]

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*
"Carlo"

5. DATE OF BIRTH
[illegible]

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
[illegible], Mexico

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*
Drinks socially.
Catholic - extremely religious.

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)*
No Record.

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

9a. SEX M ☐ F ☐	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION [illegible]	9g. FACE *(Shape)* [illegible]
9h. COLOR OF HAIR [illegible]	9i. COLOR OF EYES Brown		9j. TEETH Some gold.	9k. BUILD Stout	9l. POSTURE Erect	

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE
Neat dresser.

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 7-60 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP	2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1.)*

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 3.)*

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)* [illegible]

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION [illegible]	2. TITLE	3. SALARY *(Per annum)* [illegible]

4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)* [illegible]

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
[illegible]				

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	

SECRET

14-00000

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

12 Oct 1962

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Shorthand

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY*	DATES FROM	DATES TO			

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

1	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) [illegible] - Present	2. EMPLOYER Cuban Embassy	3. ADDRESS Mexico, D.F.
	4. TYPE OF WORK Secretarial	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ [illegible]	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
2	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
3	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
4	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
5	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION IX					**MARITAL STATUS**						
1. CHECK ONE:	☐	SINGLE	☐	MARRIED	☐	WIDOWED	☐	SEPARATED	☐	DIVORCED	☐ ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PLACE OF BIRTH
8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*

SECTION X **CHILDREN**

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI **FATHER**

1. FULL NAME [illegible]	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII **MOTHER**

1. FULL NAME [illegible]	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECRET

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

* FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Luis	X			[illegible]	Mexican
Enrique	X				
[illegible] Mariano	X				
[illegible]	X				
Maria [illegible]		X			

SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Luis - Superintendent of Pemex Maritime.

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Luis [illegible]

Ricardo Vidal Dominguez

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE

27 July 1962

SIGNATURE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

13 AUG 1975

MFR

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP/ADB. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

FROM:

IP/

CLARK [illegible]
IP/[illegible]
EXT. 4[illegible]

GT-[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] GT7

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/1	14	AUG 1972		
2. Davis				D
3.				
4. DDC/WH/1				
5.				
6. IP/DMS				pdg
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. IP/FI				

COMMENTS

9192

Copy Detached

1-2 Pls get a hold of Cy Cybulski in BK/6 and ask him to [illegible] a memo. J.

8/15/73 - Mr. Cybulski will prepare memo.

LITAMIL-7 file is 201-330173

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE TITLE

~~Wrong file~~ ~~this is~~ ~~LITAMIL-9's file~~

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

~~201-~~ ~~[illegible]~~

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

3 July 72

DOCUMENT NUMBER

HMMA 42186

FORM 610a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-330173

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City	MICROFILM
SUBJECT	LITAMIL-7	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Subject's Station file has just been reviewed for purging, and it was noted that his OA is still active and no final dispatch has been written closing this file, even though we are no longer in contact with Subject. Since Gerald D. FAHLANGER was the last Case Officer in contact with LITAMIL-7, it is requested that Headquarters have FAHLANGER (now assigned Headquarters) prepare a memorandum describing his last relationship with LITAMIL-7 and requesting that his OA granted on 7 February 1968 (HMMW-16118) be cancelled and file be closed. The Station plans no further contact with LITAMIL-7. Contact was dropped with LITAMIL-7 by mutual consent; he was not a paid agent and was not anxious to play an aggressive role against the PBRUMEN target. See MEXICO CITY 4955 of 26 March 1969.

Jesse R. GARDALPHE

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY ....

E2 [illegible] FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

(unless impossible, insert date or event)

Distribution:
3 - WHD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-42186	DATE 31 July 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-330173 ~~201-329609~~

TX-1616

22 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-7

1967

1. According to Gerald D. FAHLANGER, LITAMIL-7, who is a female, was a secretary in the Mexico City PBRUMAN Embassy for more than 30 years. She was originally recruited by former Station asset LITAMIL-3 in approximately 1966-67. Although Subject was never a very productive asset, she did provide information on activities of the installation and individuals working therein. In approximately 1969-70, Subject was retired by the PBRUMAN Embassy, ending her previous usefulness for the Station. In spite of her loss of access to the embassy, she did continue to maintain contact with the personnel, including the ambassador. For this reason the Station maintained contact with her through LITAMIL-3. However, this too was not very productive because she felt she had been treated fairly upon retirement, and felt a certain degree of loyalty to them. This was somewhat incongruous, since she did not feel such loyalty when she was working in the embassy.

2. Subject met FAHLANGER, as Jose (Pepe) Martin, approximately six times in her home. The last time she was told that in view of her retirement, which resulted in the loss of access to the embassy, our relations with her would be terminated. However, if she reestablished contact with the personnel, or was recalled to work part or full time, we would, of course, consider contact again. This, of course, never happened.

3. While Subject was not paid a regular salary, she did receive spot payments for the information she submitted. She also received occasional small gifts at Christmas time and on her birthday. The

AN
AD
JN
PJ
NFD
PI

1 ATT

CS COPY

E2, IMPDET, WN-SISM
CL BY: 055272

22 Aug 72

~~201-334604~~
201-330173

termination was amicable, and Subject agreed to notify LITAMIL-3 if she had any information of value to report.

4. Attached is the Agent Termination Report on Subject.

Suzanne Lulewicz
WH/1/IA

SECRET

Attachment to ______________

15 August 1972

Agent Termination Report

1.	AGENT CRYPTONYM:	LITAMIL-7
2.	PROJECT IDENTIFICATION:	LITAMIL
3.	AGENT RECRUITED BY:	LITAMIL-3
4.	CAPACITY IN WHICH AGENT SERVED:	Penetration of the FBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico City
5.	RATE OF PAY:	Spot payments based on information she submitted. Average was approximately $20.00 U.S. per month.
6.	OTHER COMMITMENTS:	None
7.	AGENT DISMISSED BY:	Gerald D. FAHLANGER
8.	SECURITY RISKS:	None
9.	IS AGENT RECOMMENDED FOR RE-USE:	No
10.	REASON FOR AND MANNER OF DISMISSAL:	She retired from her position in the embassy. Termination by FAHLANGER was done at a meeting with her.
11.	LETTER OF TERMINATION SIGNED:	No. She was not witting of her role for LNBUZZ, and was not receiving a specific monthly salary.

h/w att #1 of TX1616.

ES COPY

E2, IMPDET, WN-SISM
CL BY: 055272

201-330173
~~201-339609~~

SECRET

14-00000

SPEED LETTER SECRET

REPLY REQUESTED				DATE [illegible]
X	YES		NO	LETTER NO. [illegible]

TO : [illegible]
ATTN:

FROM: CI/OA
[illegible] 2B12 x1598

SUBJECT: [illegible]

(1) A review of CI/OA records reflects that Subject was of interest to [illegible] dated 23 Aug. 5[illegible], [illegible]

(2) CI/OA requests that the responsible desk inform CI/OA by reply whether this case is still active, or whether CI/OA may cancel and retire its folder.

Joseph J. Dwyer
[illegible]
SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE [illegible]

TO : CI/OA
FROM : [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]

(1) Case is:

a. Active ( )

b. Inactive (✓)

(2) CI/OA may/~~may not~~ cancel and retire Subject file.

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

SIGNATURE

RESPONDER'S FILE

FORM 9-67 1831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

B. LITAMIL-7: The Station had no contact with LITAMIL-7 during this period. She was, however, seen chatting with LIRING members on several occasions. She was not observed visiting LIRING.

HMMA-36185
15 JAN 69

HMMA-35501
80-120-13
10 OCTOBER 1968

B. LITAMIL-7: The Station had no contact with LITAMIL-7 during September.

HMMA-35523
50-120-13
30 September 68

B. LITAMIL-7: The Station continued to maintain periodic contact with LITAMIL-7 during July and August, but she still is not prepared to return to work.

ORIG: W. FRIETZE/act wet
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R 1819
DATE: 14 AUGUST 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 36

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ #________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR WH 8, FI/AN, DO 4, CAS, FI 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 24706

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, SAN JOSE INFO JMCOBRA

WH/1 file: LITAMIL-7 201

TYPIC

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 6703 (IN 69063)

B. DIRECTOR 24373 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE)

1. SINCE PORTUONDO APPEARS BE ON UNESCO MISSION REGULATION MENTIONED REF B ALSO APPLICABLE HIS CASE.

2. SUGGEST LITAMIL-7 ATTEMPT DETERMINE HIS PRESENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS REGIME.

3. FOR SAN JOSE, SUGGEST STATION ATTEMPT FIND OUT IF PORTUONDO IN FACT ATTENDING UNESCO CONF OR HE ON SOME OTHER MISSION FOR GOC.

wlc

END OF MESSAGE

DC/WH/COG Paul E. Oberst
C/WH/2/Chesnell

Calvin M. Smyth
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
for

W. J. Kaufman
WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

Cuba

HMMA-34973
50-120-13
8 July 1968

201-file

A. LITAMIL-7: LITAMIL-7 was met on 21 May. She was debriefed more on the physical layout of LIRING, and was offered a job—in general terms. (The Station is considering using her as a transcriber of LISAMPAN.) LITAMIL-7 was receptive to the idea of maintaining contact with the Station, but asked for more time to put her personal affairs in shape.

14-00000

HMMA-34623
10 May 1968
19-120-13/1

201-330173

E. LITAMIL-7: LITAMIL-7, the Station's only physical penetration of LIRING, was finally retired by LIRING. This had been in the wind for some time. The problem was that according to Mexican laws LIRING had to pay LITAMIL-7 one month's salary for every year worked, and she had worked for LIRING 38 years. She was notified on 28 March that on instructions from the Foreign Ministry her employment with LIRING was being terminated effective 31 March 1968. On 28 March, all her phone books, keys, et cetera were taken away, and her appearance on 29 March was a mere formality. Her termination pay ($6,000 U.S.) is being given in three installments, with the last one the end of April. LITAMIL-7 gave her Case Officer no advance notice of her release, probably for fear of compromising her retirement benefits. Station will, however, continue to maintain casual contact with her after she receives the last installment of her severance pay. She may be of help in the future in identifying LIRING visitors or newcomers. Now that LITAMIL-7 is gone, the Station plans to activate LISAMPAN/CHARLIE, which, it is hoped, will become a regular source of information on LIRING.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/LITAMIL-7
Progress Report for the Period January through March 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : MEXICO CITY-5139, 5 April 1968

Summary: During the period of this report, LITAMIL-7 was met on a weekly basis. Most of the meetings with LITAMIL-7 were conducted in the presence of LITAMIL-3, who has known her for many years and is the only person who can pressure her into reporting information on the daily LIRING activities. Unfortunately, LITAMIL-7 has reported only routine information, much of which the Station already obtained through other means. In many cases, however, her information served to support information the Station suspected or needed to confirm. The following were factors that contributed to LITAMIL-7's apathy and reluctance to collect and report information of value. First, there was the problem of her health. Although she did have high blood pressure, most of her preoccupation over this condition was psychosomatic. It appeared that it provided her with a crutch to justify her inability to service Station requirements. Second, and this was probably the most significant factor behind her reluctance to collaborate fully, she was aware of the LIRING attitude towards retention of foreign employees in that office. In January 1968, LIRING released all local employees except LITAMIL-7, and as the months went by it became increasingly evident that it was only a matter of time before she would be released also. Evidence of her

Continued......................

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD

16 MAY 1968

re: Litamil-7

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 34598

DATE
6 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-128/3

imminent termination was given by the fact that she was given less duties as the months passed, until at the very end she did little more than put in her time. With the spectre of unemployment looming over the horizon, LITAMIL-7 was reluctant to take any risk that might have compromised her situation at LIRING. At stake was a sizable termination payment which the PERUMENers were obligated to pay her according to local employment regulations. Obviously, she would do nothing to jeopardize this payment, which amounted to approximately $6,000 (U.S.). A further deterrent to her collaboration with the Station, even after her release by LIRING on 31 March, was the LIRING arrangement to make the termination payment in three increments, the last to be made at the end of April 1968. In view of this latest development in this operation, the Station has terminated the weekly meetings between the Station Case Officer and LITAMIL-7.

1. Introduction: During the period covered by this report, LITAMIL-7 was met and debriefed on a weekly basis. Her information was very limited and usually dealt with internal activities of a routine nature in LIRING. As pointed out above, her supervisors isolated her from all but the most routine administrative duties. Consequently, she lost access to virtually everything that may have been of interest to the Station. The Station asked her to bring out the book of addresses and telephone numbers which she had compiled over the years, but she refused for fear that it would be missed during the afternoon when she was not on duty. The Station then asked that she begin to copy the contents of the book a few pages each day. She agreed, but before she began this process the book disappeared, and all efforts to find it failed. She then began to compile a new book of addresses and telephone numbers, which she intended to bring out, but one of the LIRING officers asked for it on the day she was fired. In the end, the sum total of LITAMIL-7 LIRING information during the first three months of 1968 was the identification of several photographs of LIRING employees, the tentative identification of offices and rooms in LIRING (tentative because she had not been in the second floor area since 1961, thus much of the identification was from memory), and finally, LITAMIL-7 confirmed telephone numbers assigned to specific LIRING personnel and furnished telephone numbers of individuals and companies servicing LIRING maintenance requirements (dry cleaners, pharmacy, typewriter repairmen, etc.). LITAMIL-7 volunteered to provide additional information on LIRING to the Station provided it was within her capability, and after she received her final severance payment from LIRING.

2. Finance: LITAMIL-7 received no salary and no termination bonus from the Station.

3. Security: Since all contact with LITAMIL-7 was maintained through LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-7 does not have a Station telephone number. She does not know the true names of any of the Station Case Officers who handled her. All meetings with her were held in her home, thus no safehouses were used, and she was never seen with Case Officers in public. She had no telephone, so no contacts were made with her by phone. From the security point of view, the LITAMIL-7 operation enjoyed a long life, January 1961 through March 1968. Taking into account her fear and apprehension, plus the fact that she maintained good relations with LITAMIL-3, this record is all the more remarkable. From the intelligence point of view, it is unfortunate that her production was so minimal.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA - 34598

4. Future of the Operation: Although for all intents and purposes the LITAMIL-7 operation has come to an end, the Station intends to maintain a casual contact with her. It is very likely that she may know new personnel assigned to LIRING and may be able to furnish information on these individuals. There may also be developments in LIRING which, on the basis of her lengthy service in LIRING, she might be able to assess and clarify. Since LITAMIL-7 was not a salaried agent for the Station, the operation cost nothing more than the investment of Case Officer time, and an occasional gift of flowers. In view of her intense pride, there is little reason to believe that she will accept money in the future. If she is able to provide information to the Station it will probably be done without any thought of compensation.

for Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 26 PER #

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

ACTION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO

ADV. COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, TSD 6

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

S E C R E T 060030Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5139 6 APR 68 IN 86257

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 985

PBRUMEN LITAMIL-7 LISAMPAN

WH/1 file: m
LITAMIL-7 201. [illegible]

1. LITAMIL-7 RETIRED BY EMBASSY EFFECTIVE 31 MARCH 1968. LIENVOY TAKE 28 MARCH REFLECTING THIS DEVELOPMENT RECEIVED STATION 29 MARCH, LITAMIL-7 LAST DAY OF WORK. LITAMIL-7 DID NOT NOTIFY LITAMIL-3 CLAIMING BE WAITING FOR SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH EMBASSY PERSONNEL TO DETERMINE TYPE AND AMOUNT SEVERANCE PAY. REFUSED BRING OUT ANYTHING FROM LIRING (ADDRESS BOOKS, KEYS, ETC) FOR FEAR MIGHT AFFECT FINAL SETTLEMENT. ASKED CHIEF LIRING IF COULD PURCHASE OLD TYPEWRITER SHE HAD BEEN USING 22 YEARS BUT WAS REFUSED.

2. LITAMIL-7 WAS PAID 60,000 PESOS 2 APRIL. WILL GET 7,000 ON 11 APRIL AND FINAL 2,500 END APRIL. ABOVE TOTALS PROPER COMPENSATION FOR 38 YEARS SERVICE, BASED MEXICAN LAW.

3. ALTHOUGH LITAMIL-7 RETIREMENT ELIMINATES ONLY STATION PHYSICAL ASSET AT LIRING, DEVELOPMENT PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY ACTIVATE LISAMPAN/CHARLIE. AS ADDEES AWARE LITAMIL-7 HAD BEEN ISOLATED COMPLETELY FROM ANY BUT MOST INNOCUOUS CONVERSATIONS. HER REPLACEMENT BY WIFE LIRING STAFFER MAY PROVIDE INTERESTING INFO. STATION PLANS ACTIVATE CHARLIE WEEK 14 APRIL, AFTER WEEK OF TAKE ON TEST

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5139 SECRET

BASIS OF FOXTROT, REACTIVATED 5 APRIL.

4. STATION PLANS MAINTAIN OCCASIONAL CONTACT LITAMIL-7 WHENEVER PERSONNEL OR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS WARRANT SUCH CONTACTS. IT PROBABLE HOWEVER SHE WILL REMAIN RETICENT UNTIL FINAL PAYMENT PARA 2 ABOVE.

SECRET

SECRET/KAPOK

HMMA-34335
27 March 1968
50-120-13

H. LITAMIL-7: The Station was successful in obtaining limited operational support intelligence from LITAMIL-7 during February. She was again sick almost half the month and unavailable for meetings. The Station is also using LITAMIL-7 as a source of information in its physical target study of LIRING.

SECRET

HMMA-33910
24 JANUARY 1968
50-8-128/3

6. There were no major problems involving assets under this project during this period. LITAMIL-7 continued to be in poor health from time to time, but this is not expected to change.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

HMMA-33910
24 JANUARY 1968
50-8-128/3

12. LITAINT-2 and LITAMIL-7 were of extreme value in monitoring the reaction of LIRING-2 during the roll-up of AMQUACK-1 and his associates. LIRING-2 was implicated in the AMQUACK-1 support apparatus in Mexico.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

HMMA-33910
24 JANUARY 1968
50-8-128/3

22. [redacted] continues to provide items of interest on the personnel of LIRING. His most valuable use is to identify photographs of the staff and visitors.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ESPERON-PEREZ, CONSUELO
201-330173
SEX M DOB ?

050-009-012
HMMA-33722A01
10 JAN 68

CIT ?
OCC ?
SEC TO 2ND SEC
CUBAN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN MEXICO

UFG

R 6801262172

LITAMIL-7

FILE IN 201-330173

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-81 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

HMMA - 33695
19 December 1967
19 - 120-13/1

[illegible] were valuable eyes into LIRING during the period immediately after the publicized death of "Che" Guevara and the roll-up of the commo system of the revolutionaries in Bolivia. They were especially useful in monitoring the reaction of LIRING-2 who was very closely tied to this commo net and against whom the Station was planning an operation.

C. Through LITAINT-2, two denigation leaflets were produced attacking the LIRING staff in Mexico. One on the LIRING representative in Veracruz produced a reaction in the form of a reward being offered for the apprehension of the perpetrators of this material.

14-00000

7318

Dos. M13.- 24 abril 67.-

168.- Entrada a las 1045hs.- MF con Chelo.- PLATICA PERSONAL./ ---- MF invita a Chelo a comer con ella hoy para platicarle de Lucho.--- Chelo acepta.-- 198.

209.- Salida al 196643.- 1054hs.- Chelo con Conchis.- Asuntos personales. - Chelo le pide disculpas por haberse violenta de el otro día con ella por lo de Lucho.--- Conchis se encuentra agripada.--- Chelo: que le habló María Elena y que le dice que se va a Oaxaca para el casamiento de Pila y que hoy ella va a comer con ella.-- 244.-Chelo come con María Elena.

258.- Salida al 135807.- [illegible]hs.- Chelo con Huelgas le hace un pedido de papel, sobres y artículos de escritorio.- 312

326.- 358. Salida al 111727.- 1118hs.- Chelo con MF le pide que ,manden a una persona para que revisen la máquina IBM que us a el embajador.- MF que van a hacer todo lo posible por pasar en la mañana.--- 405.

443. Salida al 462220.- 1130hs.- Chelo con MF que le diga a la Srita.Jasso y al Lic. Santana, haber si es posible que el Sr.Subsecretario pueda recibir hoy a Abreu porque sale mañana.-- MF que les pasará el recado.--- 466.

467.- Salida a las 1132hs.- Chelo con MF el Lic. García Camberos hablan sobre una cita solicitada por Abreu y Cicard - con el Sr.Director.- García: que va a ver si es posible que los reciba hoy, que luego le llama.--- 490.

LIENVOY 50-6-75/4
HMMA-31987 22 May 67

504.- Salida al 141326.- 1304hs.- Chelo con Guerrero hablan sobre el pago de ciento cincuenta pesos por unos boletos de la Cruz Roja.-- 533.

FILE WH-1 LITAMIL/7

542.- Salida al 109551.- 1311hs.- Chelo con MF la Srita.Luna le pide dos ejemplares del Anuario Financiero de México, cuyos ejemplares cuestan 150 pesos cada uno.- Chelo queda en mandar recogerlos.--- 589.

201-330173

590.- Salida a la embajada de Suiza.- Chelo con la embajado -- de Suiza confirma el pago de los boletos de la Cruz Roja.-

le dice que está muy sentido porque no vinieron al coctel de su despedida el jueves 20; que para el sábado próximo sale para la Habana definitivamente pero que antes pasará a despedirse de ellos.-- Abreu le pregunta por el teléfono de Juan.-- MF que es el 480207.---- Abreu le pregunta por Pepo. MF que no tienen noticias.--- Abreu queda en comunicarse con pages a la revista.--- 560.

569.- Salida al 480207.- 1320hs.- Abreu con MF Juan se saludan y se citan para el viernes a las 9.30pm en el María Isabel.-- Abreu le dice que el sabado sale para la Habana.-- 603

604.- Entrada a las 1328hs.- MF Gustavo con Chelo su hermana le dice que ha estado esperando su llamada como le dijo. Chelo: Presión muy alta.--- Visitas a familiares.--- Gustavo que su mamá está muy mala grave que tiene los intestinos pegados y que tiene infección intestinal.-- Chelo como de costumbre con sentimentalismos, que por que no le había hablado....---- Gustavo queda en llamarla el viernes por la mañana.--- 653.

654.- Entrada a las 1340hs.- MF con Chelo que el Dr.Chavarría del Grupo José Martí, quiere hablar con el embajador.- Chelo que un momento.--- Chelo que el embajador no está en su despacho.--- MF que se encuentra en la casa del maestro Ancona.- Chelo: que como ha seguido de sus males.- MF que está mejorado.- Que Ancona quiere saber si salieron los guajolititos aquellos que si se embarcaron.... Chelo: que le parece que sí, pero que en cuanto vea al embajador le dice que le llamaron.--- 710.

723.- Entrada a las 1355hs.- MF la guera con Chelo.- Asuntos personales.--- Chelo le ofrece unas prendas usadas para la confeccion de otras prendas que se utilicen.-- La guera queda en mandar a Eduardo por las prendas.--- 878.

831.- Salida al 436980.- 1400hs.- MD Arturo pregunta por Cepeda.- MF que no ha llegado.- Arturo: que cuando llegue que se comunique con el porque le tiene un recado del embajador.-
---895.--------------. . . .

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

Chief, WH Division
PBRUMEN/LISAMPAN
Cuban Embassy Floor Plan

Action Required: Update Floor Plans, Cuban Embassy, Mexico City

Reference : MEXICO CITY 1231 (IN 54233)

1. It would be appreciated if the Station would prepare up-to-date as possible seating and office plans of all floors of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in order to assist Headquarters in following LISAMPAN and LIENVOY take. Locations of the various telephones by number would also be appreciated in this connection. If architect floor plans are available, these would be welcome but sketches are acceptable. Presumably LIFEUD-2, LITAINT-2 and LITAMIL-7 would contribute to this requirement.

2. What type of and how much activity is there in reference office?

3. Please indicate the probable location of the room AMBEATLE-1 alleged the Cubans described as the only one not bugged by WOFACT (UFGA-27310). Is a LISAMPAN unit scheduled for installation in this room?

Andrew F. MERTON

LITAMIL-7

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

4 MAY 1967

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

50-6-75/3 HMMW-15446 3 May 1967

50-6-145/3

SECRET

WH/1 J. Stewart pem 6954

RI
Chrono
50-6-75/3
LITAMIL-7

WH/COG/CICS

7. Physical Penetration and Coverage of LIRING.

1 Oct 66 - 31 March 67

A. LITAMIL-7. LITAMIL-7 continued to report on the activities known to her of the LIRING personnel she comes in contact with and to provide information on PBRUMEN visitors and dependents of LIRING personnel. She furnished interesting information on the goings-on at LIRING at the time of the [illegible] crash including the presence of General Lazaro CARDENAS. Later the same month, she obtained from one of the LIRING officers propoganda records produced by the Cultural Ministry which she lent us for copying. She was the first to report that a former LIRING intelligence officer had gained a high level position in the PBRUMEN Ministry of Culture.

Extract from HMMA 31777, 10 apr 67

479. Entrada 1249.-[illegible] de enterarse de que Chelo tiene la presión alta, queda de mandarle ahorita el papel -- para [illegible] como el que le ha mandado y Chelo acepta y - aclara que el lunes arreglan cuentas.- 520.-

520. Entrada 1306.- HP de la Juventud Sindicalista pregunta dónde puede conseguir el disco donde viene la primera declaración de La Habana y Chelo pide hable al 255679.- 521.-

521. Entrada 1316.- HP extranjero queda de pasar por Chelo - a las 2 y ésta acepta. [illegible]: Bien.- 529.-

529. Salidas al 169596.-1317.-Abreu pregunta por Silvia y HP dice que acaba de hablar con ella y ésta le dijo que no ha - terminado de sus compras pero que no se preocupe; que en caso de que no lo encuentre en la embajada, se los llevará al aeropuerto. Abreu acepta y pide que si le habla, le diga que el avión sale como a las 5. HP: Bueno.- 551.-

552. Salida al 299600.-Alberú se comunica a Relaciones, pide la ext.273 y posteriormente pregunta a Carlos Serrano si ya consultó en relación con la invitación y éste dice que sí, - pero nuevamente hablará con el licenciado; que se espere. -- Alberú acepta. Luego Carlos pide le hable como a las -- 2½ porque el licenciado ahorita está en una conferencia a -- larga distancia. Alberú está de acuerdo.- 614.-

614. Entrada 1352.-Félix y su querida Chelo Esperón platican de sus enfermedades y de sus cosas personales.- 706.-

- -

(4.-113.- 23 Oct.66).-

some

HMMA 30545 (50-6-75/4)

LITAMIL-7

File

201

C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO
Chief, WH; Chief, WE

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Rome

SUBJECT
Forwarding Papal Blessing

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

HMMA-28330, 17 February 1966

In accordance with request contained in Reference, attached is Papal Blessing.

Joseph M. RILANDER

Attachment:
Papal Blessing h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w
3 - C/WH w/o/att
2 - C/WE w/o/att

Litamil-7

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OIRT-8664

DATE
6 April 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Rome

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/Procurement of Certificate of Papal Blessing for LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LITAMIL-7, an aging spinster, is a penetration agent of the Mexico Station inside the PBRUMEN Embassy. She has recently been seriously ill on two occasions and has been shabbily treated by her employers while the Station has lavished attention on her. As a result of this contrast in demonstrated concern for her wellbeing, LITAMIL-7 has shown a determination to be of much more active service to the Station than in the past.

2. LITAMIL-7 is a devout and practicing Roman Catholic. It is the Station's understanding that certificates of Papal blessing can be obtained without too much difficulty in Rome. If this is the case, and the Rome Station can securely obtain such a certificate, it is believed that its presentation to her would cinch her already demonstrated determination to help the Station with its anti-AMTHUG work.

3. A blessing of LITAMIL-7's home or prayer for her continued health or any other appropriate form of certificate would be much appreciated. Please T/A any costs to the Mexico Station. LITAMIL-7's identity follows by separate cover attachment.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Identity u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS/Rome w/att u/s/c [illegible]
1 - C/WHD w/o att

201-330173

GROUP 1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28330

DATE
17 February 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-330173

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO
FILE VR WH/C 8 CI/K 2 C/OPS C/OA

S E C R E T 131716Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5887

13 Jan 65 IN 33126

PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

1. LITAMIL-7 UNDERWENT SURGERY 12 JANUARY FOR OVARIAN TUMOR. POST OPERATIVE CONDITION NOT YET DETERMINED. LITAMIL-3 KEEPING TAB ON SITUATION.

2. IN PREPARATION POSSIBLE EXTENDED DELAY LITAMIL-7 RETURN

To WORK LIRING, STATION PROPOSES ATTEMPT PLACE BROTHER-IN LAW LITAINT-2 IN LIRING ASSIST LIRING-1 AND 2.. LITAINT-2 HAS BEEN TOUCHING LIGHTLY IN THIS AREA BUT PREFER NOT INVOLVE HIM IN STEADY EMPLOY INSIDE LIRING AS MAY RAISE QUESTIONS HIS OUTSIDE SOURCE INCOME IF WORKING LONG HOURS LIRING. LITAINT-2 BROTHER-IN-LAW APPROX 21 YEARS AGE AND WOULD BE ABLE WORK PART TIME LIRING WHILE CONTINUING STUDIES AT UNIVERSITY. THROUGH LITAINT-2 GRADUAL INTRODUCTION LIRING-1 AND 2, BROTHER-IN-LAW NOW ON MAILING LIST LIRING AND SOVEMB INFO BULLETIN.

3. WILL CABLE ESSENTIAL DATA FOR POA AND POUCH PRQ I WHICH BEING COMPLETED.

S E C R E T

CFN 5887 LITAMIL-7 12 OVARIAN TUMOR NOT YET LITAMIL-3 LITAMIL-7 LIRING LITAINT-2 NOT INVOLVE 21 LITAINT-2 POA PRQ I

BT

201

SECRET

PROJECT LITAMIL	DATE OF INFORMATION 31 Jan to 5 Mar 62	FIELD NO. REPORT HMM-6235
SOURCE LITAMILs-2,3,4,5,7 (B) MICASCADE-3	DATE ACQUIRED 31 Jan to 5 Mar 62	CABLE
		IN
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION	RI NO.
	DATE 6 Mar 62	
	GRADE B-2	REPORTS OFFICER ILS/kpr
SUBJECT Bloque Pro-Unidad Cubana En Exilio (Mexico), New Cuban/Mexican Anti-CASTRO Organization	TO	
	WASH. DISTRIBUTION	C S 3/504,205
	DATE	EVAL. REQUESTED
	GRADE	AREA Mexico/Cuba
	TO	

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-82
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT No Project

SOURCE LITAMIL-7

SUBJECT Scheduled Interview Between Mexican Foreign Minister and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION 8-11 Jan 63

DATE ACQUIRED 9 Jan 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 10 Jan 63

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE F-2

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT [illegible] 6923

CABLE MEXI 3052

IN 47307

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER jct

C S 3/533,327

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

This report was sent to the desk for processing because the source was received "LIAMIL-7". The desk that handles LITAMIL-7 said the source evaluation should be F.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(24) 2

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPORT PROCESSING RECORD

CITE [illegible] 3052

IN NO. [illegible] 7307 dH

[illegible] 63

NOT DISSEMINATED

DISSEMINATED

COMMENTS CJZ

[illegible]

INTEL FORMAT

NON-INTEL FORMAT

IW HAS NO SOURCE DATA CARD FOR LIAMIL 7.

RECEIVED | NOT DISSEMINATED | DISSEMINATED

FORM 8-60 1736 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(13-20)

PROJECT No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9
LITAMIL-7 ✓

SUBJECT
Activities of Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Cuban Ambassador, in Mexico City

DATE OF INFORMATION 10-14 January 1963

DATE ACQUIRED 12-14 January 1963

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE [illegible]
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE MEXI-3078, 3091
IN 49031 49380

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER jct

CS 3/534,370

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Portions of these two cables disseminated as a CS.

SECRET

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 JUN 55

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
No Project

DATE OF INFORMATION
24 January 1963

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 6966
CABLE MEXI 3205
IN

SOURCE
LITAMIL-3 from LITAMIL-7

DATE ACQUIRED
24 January 1963

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 24 January 1963
GRADE B fm F - 2
TO

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jct

SUBJECT
New Employees of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

C S

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

No dissemination. Information of this type is reportable by ODACID.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT No Project	DATE OF INFORMATION 13 April 1963	FIELD NO. REPORT HMM-7188 CABLE MEXI 4214 IN
SOURCE LITAMIL-7	DATE ACQUIRED 18 April 1963	RI NO.
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 17 April 1963 GRADE B-2 TO	REPORTS OFFICER jct
SUBJECT Meeting Between Cuban Ambassador in Mexico and Mexican Foreign Minister	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	C S / EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

This report was not disseminated. Information marginal, no intel value to customers.

Hq notes that the Station has apparently raised LITAMIL-7 from F to B. We feel that a more proper evaluation for this source (from whom little of disseminable value has been received) would be C. If in the future her reporting warrants further upgrading to B, the station should at that time make a recommendation.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 JUN 55

SOURCE RECORD

(24) 3

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPORT PROCESSING RECORD	CITE MEXI 4214	IN NO.
	APR 18 ... 33 53	
	NOT DISSEMINATED	DISSEMINATED
COMMENTS CNS	HMM 7188	INTEL FORMAT / NON-INTEL FORMAT

---THIS LOOKS PRETTY MARGINAL TO THIS IWO. TO DESK FOR REVIEW.

nada

nada

RECEIVED	NOT DISSEMINATED	DISSEMINATED

FORM 8-60 1736 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(13-20)

PROJECT No Project

SOURCE LITAMIL-7

SUBJECT Resignation of Quintin PINO Machado, Cuban Ambassador to Hungary

DATE OF INFORMATION 26 April 63

DATE ACQUIRED 26 April 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 30 April 63

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT BKH-7225

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Cuba/Hungary

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

No dissemination. Already known.

Re Source evaluation, see Source Record Card for BKH-7188.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT No Project
LIFIAB

SOURCE
LITAMIL-7 ✓
LIFIAB

SUBJECT
Travel to Cuba of Jorge Aspillaga Gonzales and Jose Cruz Talavera

DATE OF INFORMATION 18 Apr 63

DATE ACQUIRED

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 7 May 63
GRADE P & B - 2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT T04-7236
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER PHS/jet

C S 04

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS (REASON FOR REDUCTION; CUSTOMERS AND USER EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

No dissemination.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

14-00000

PROJECT LIFIRE and
No Project

SOURCE
LIFIRE
LITAMIL-7 ✓

SUBJECT
Travel of Latin Americans to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION 26 April 1963

DATE ACQUIRED 26 April 1963

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B & C-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE MEXI-4351, 4366
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER jet

CS 3/545,898

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba/Central Am.

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

S E C R E T

Information in the two cited cables were disseminated as a CS report.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-82
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (24) 3

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-7

SUBJECT
Dania Zelaya Alger, New Director of the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations

DATE OF INFORMATION
3 May 1963

DATE ACQUIRED
3 May 1963

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 7 May 1963
GRADE F-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE C-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-7238
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jct

CS
3/548,928

EVAL REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES, COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT No Project	DATE OF INFORMATION 8 May 1963	FIELD NO. REPORT HMM-7251 CABLE MEXI-4516 IN
SOURCE LITAMIL-7	DATE ACQUIRED 8	
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 10 May 63 GRADE B-2 TO	RI NO. REPORTS OFFICER [illegible] IMOG
SUBJECT Cancellation of Cuban Embassy Festivities Planned for 20 May 1963	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE B-2 TO	CS DB 3/556,827 EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS. SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES. COMMENTS TO FIELD. ETC.)

SECRET

Disseminated by IMOG as received.

Left to "C"

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(21)

PROJECT SECRET	DATE OF INFORMATION	FIELD NO. REPORT CABLE IN
SOURCE LITAMIL-7	DATE ACQUIRED	
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	RI NO. REPORTS OFFICER
SUBJECT	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	CS EVAL. REQUESTED AREA

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Re HMM 7251, Supdata.

The complete production of LITAMIL-7 has been reviewed by Headquarters. Of the 10 reports submitted from September 1962 through May 1963, of which L-7 was the source of the complete, or a specific part of the report, 5 were not disseminated. In addition to those which were disseminated, 2 dissems used info received in ops cables which was from L-7.

The info from this source is considered to be quite low-level and fragmentary, including few details.

After this careful review, we fail to find any justification for raising her to a "B".

We wish to point out that source's access to information does not affect her rating. That would be reflected in the appraisal of content.

LITAMIL-7 is considered a "C" source by Headquarters.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(30)

PROJECT
LIFIRE & Ho Project

SOURCE
LIFIRE
LITAMIL-7

SUBJECT
Alba Rosa Gonzalez Quevedo, Cuban, Training in Nursing in Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION
6-8 May 63

DATE ACQUIRED
8 May 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 May 63
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE 3 Jun 63
GRADE B-2
TO C

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-7261
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jct

C S 3/548,931
EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT No Project LIENVOY, LIRACK	**DATE OF INFORMATION** [illegible]	**FIELD NO.** **REPORT** [illegible]-7353 **CABLE** MEXI-4966 **IN** [illegible]-167
SOURCE LITAMIL-7 LIENVOY LIRACK	**DATE ACQUIRED** [illegible]	
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION **DATE** Para 1: 31/[illegible]63 **GRADE** [illegible]-2	**PI NO.**
SUBJECT Bank Accounts and Transactions of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.	**TO**	**REPORTS OFFICER** [illegible]ct
	WASH. DISTRIBUTION **DATE** 17 June 63 **GRADE** C, 2, B - 2 **TO**	**C S** 3/550,623 **EVAL. REQUESTED** **AREA** Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

[illegible] - [illegible]

Three items were combined for dissemination.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

14-00000

PROJECT No Project	DATE OF INFORMATION 14 Aug 63	FIELD NO. REPORT HMM-7636 CABLE MEXI-5805 IN
SOURCE LITAMIL-7	DATE ACQUIRED 14 Aug 63	
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 16 Aug 63 GRADE B-2 TO (Not in C)	RI NO. REPORTS OFFICER
SUBJECT Aaron SILCBAS Casado	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	C S None EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

No dissem. Of no intel value to customers.

(24) 3

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPORT PROCESSING RECORD		CITE	IN NO.	
ACTION DIV.:	PRECEDENCE:	FIELD REPORT NO.	TDCS	INTEL FORMAT / NON-INTEL FORMAT
RECEIVED		NOT DISSEMINATED		DISSEMINATED

COMMENTS

THE DESK SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO CUSTOMERS TO WARRANT DISSEMINATION AS A TDCS.--

RECEIVED NOT DISSEMINATED DISSEMINATED

FORM 3-63 1736 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (13-20)

PROJECT No Project

SOURCE LITAMIL-7

SUBJECT Issuance of Visas on Separate Pieces of Paper by the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City

DATE OF INFORMATION 7 Dec 63 - 9 Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED 23 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 6 Feb 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE C-2

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT HM 8403

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER FLS/jct

C S 3/573,314

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

LITAMIL-7 is considered a "C" source.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

14-00000

C 10

CLA. .FIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

34 SECRET

RI ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2	FI	6	
3	RID	7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/FI/D 4

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO TR. FILE *C/FI, DGI[illegible]

24 MAY 63 IN / 4046

[illegible]C R E T 241825Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3532

REF DIR 12800

PBRUMEN

LITAMILS-3 AND -7 BOTH [illegible]. STATION WILL COMPLY REF ASAP.

LITAMIL-7

* DISSEM PER. RYBAT LAURICLE

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible] DU BOIS/[illegible]
UNIT: [illegible] Ops
EXT: 5975
DATE: 26 MAY 65

TO MEXICO

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: C/F/04 INFO C/FI, DC/WH/C, VR, FILE, C/WH.

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 2000

RYBAT LAURICLE PBRUMEN

REFS: A. BOGH DISPATCH 4684

File LITAMIL-7

B. SOWATN 14336

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RQMS FORWARDED MEXI BASIS SABETAY'S RECENT VISIT AND DISCUSSION HELD WITH STA PERSONNEL RE PBRUMEN TARGET.

2. INFO AVAILABLE HQS INDICATES LITAMIL/7 CURRENTLY ONLY STA ASSET WITH DIRECT BUT CURRENTLY LIMITED ACCESS WITHIN PBRUMEN INSTALLATION. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT REQUEST FOLLOWING RQMS BE LEVIED L/7:

A. COMPLETE DETAIL DEBRIEFING RE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STRUCTURE TARGET.

B. UPDATED LIST RE PERSONNEL WORKING WITHIN INSTALLATION, THEIR PHYSICAL WORK LOCATION, DUTIES AND INDICATION UNUSUAL WORKING HRS.

C. SECURITY PROCEDURES ENFORCED DURING WORKING HRS, AFTER WORKING HRS, AND DURING WEEK-ENDS AND HOLIDAYS.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

TO PAGE 2 INFO CITE DIR 12086

D. AREAS L/T DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS, REASONS FOR SAME AND OPINIONS RE NATURE ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE THEREIN.

E. SPECIFIC LOCATION CODE ROOM, SECURITY MEASURES PERTAINING THERETO, AND CODE CLERK DUTY HRS.

3. PRIORITY DETAIL ANSWERS TO ABOVE RQMS WILL IMMEASUREABLY ASSIST HQS IN PREPARATION TARGET STUDY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/CUBA

C/WH/1

C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/FI/D

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

47.

SECRET
(When Fil

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

INTRATOR, MAX
201-330173
SEX M DOB ?

201-737921
EGGA-03180
09 NOV 64

CIT CUBA?
OCC ?
RE INTERCEPTED LETTER FROM HANS-WERNER
ABTMEYER TO BRAULIO LOPEZ 201-737921

R 6503092805

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

TOTAL COPIES 19 RUN BY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2 SECRET

FROM MEXICO CITY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

ACTION WH8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, PG2, CA2, CI/OA, CA/O4

S E C R E T 072289Z

DIR CITE MEXI 1845

LIRANCH

REF A. HMMA-24694

B. DIR 65339

C. DIR 65334

IN 37862

1. FOLLOWING KEYED TO REF B:

A. PARA 2. CALVILLO CHARGED TO OOA DURING ALL FY 64. WISH HAVE HIS FY 65 OBLIGATIONS CHARGED LILISP X AS STATED IN REF A OWING PURELY KUCAGE DUTIES. SO CHARGING AT STATION. LITAINT 2 CHARGED LILISP X DURING ALL FY 64. SINCE DUTIRES NOT IN KUCAGE FIELD STATION CHARGING HIM TO OOA DURING FY 65 AND WISH HIM INCLUDED IN LIRANCH. ABOVE DO NOT REPRESENT OBLIGATIONS OVER AND ABOVE THOSE LISTED LILISP X.

B. PARA 3. LIHUFF AMOUNTS LISTED PARA II A REF A WERE CHARGED OOA UNTIL 1 MAR 64. DURING FY 65, THROUGH NOV 64, 4100 DOLLARS PAID LIHUFF FROM LILISP X FOR STUDENT ACTIVITIES. FOR OVER YEAR STATION AWAITING WORD ON PROJECT ACTION ONE WAY OR OTHER. STATUS REPORT HMMA-24682 OF 5 NOV RENEWS PLEA FOR DECISION. WOULD LIKE EITHER TERMINATE OR GET ON WITH IT.

C. PARA 7. PROJECT IN PREPARATION.

SECRET

E. PARA 8A. LIFEUDS BEING PROJECTED SEPARATELY AS SUGGESTED. ASSUMPTION RE LICAMEO CORRECT. AS NOTED MEXI-1783 (IN 32956) ON BASIS HAVE NOTIFICATION PLAN TERMINATE LICAMEO 31 DEC. DEDUCT 600 DOLLARS FROM LIRANCH TOTAL. -1, -2 (w/ [illegible])

F. PARA 8B. PREPARING PROJECT AS REQUESTED. LISICLE SHOULD GET ONLY 500 FOR OPS EXPENSES. HIS SALARY TERMINATED 1 APRIL 64 AS UNJUSTIFIED, BUT SERVICES RETAINED AS UNPAID COLLABORATOR. LITAMIL-7 IS UNPAID AGENT, BUT WILL BE INCLUDED IN PROJECT. LITAMIL-2 OMISSION FROM REF A WAS OVERSIGHT. WILL BE INCLUDED AT TOTAL EXPENSE FOR FY 65 OF APPROXIMATELY 9,600 DOLLARS. RECENT EVENTS INDICATE LITAINT-7 MAY REMAIN MEXI AND WILL INCLUDE HIM IN PROJECT FOR 1.400 DOLLARS. CLEARANCE ACTION BEING REQUESTED. AMPANIC-6 TERMINATED 6 AUG 64, WILL NOT BE USED FURTHER.

2. REF B. BELIEVE ALL ANSWERS CONTAINED HMMA-6628 (IN 32112), ALTHOUGH STATION VIEWS OOA AMOUNT AND LITAU PROJECTION AS EXCESSIVE.

3. REQUEST HQ FILE NUMBER FOR LIRANCH.

SECRET *

* PRESUMED EXPENSES LISTED AGAINST CALVILLO AND LITAINT-2 UNDER OOA WERE MADE TO RELEIVE OVEROBIGATION OF LILISP-X.

MESSAGE FORM

27 SECRET

ORIG: C. Betos
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 450
DATE: 19 NOVEMBER 1964

☐
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
3
4
5
6
7
8

19 Nov 64 Z: 49 z

SIG CEN

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: PG2, VR, File

LITAMIL-7

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

55305

LIRANCH

REF: HMMS 24694

1. UPON RECEIPT ANSWERS FOLLOWING QUESTIONS HDQS READY SUBMIT OOA PROJ WHICH BEING REDRAFTED HERE AND ASSIGNED CRYPT LIRANCH.

2. PRESUME EXPENSES LISTED AGAINST CALVILLO AND LITAINT-2 UNDER OOA WERE MADE TO RELIEVE OVEROBLIGATION OF LILISP-X AND DO NOT REPRESENT OBLIGATIONS OVER AND ABOVE THOSE LISTED LILISP-X. PLEASE CONFIRM.

3. ASSUME MONEY OBLIGATED AGAINST LIRANCH FOR LIHUFF IS RPT IS IN ADDITION THAT LISTED LILISP-X AND INCLUDES LIHUFF SALARY.

4. EVEN THOUGH PAYROLLED AT HDQS SALARIES OF STATION ASSETS MUST BE INCLUDED UNDER STATION PROJECTS. HDQS ACCORDINGLY ADDING SALARIES FOR LICOOKY 1, AS WELL AS MANY OTHERS SINCE TRANSFERRED TO FORMAL PROJECTS.

5. MONEY MUST BE INCLUDED IN LIRANCH FOR ALL OOA CHARGES PRIOR TO EFFECTIVE DATE OF NEW PROJECTS APPROVED DURING CURRENT FISCAL YEAR. THEREFORE HAVE ADDED MONEY FOR LICOMET, LIOXIDE. ALSO INCLUDING MONEY FOR NEW SOVIET AND CUBAN RRXR PROJECTS FOR SIX MONTHS. THESE NEW PROJS MUST BE SUBMITTED DURING DECEMBER AND MADE EFFECTIVE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

page two

TO INFO CITE DIR 65335

B

5
1 JANUARY 196/.

6. SUGGEST PROJ FOR SUPPORT ASSETS AGAINST SOVIET TARGETS XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (PARA TWO B REF) INCLUDE LICAGE SINCE HE MIGHT BE TRANSFERRED OTHER LCIMPROVE BASE. INCLUDE RENT, SALARIES AND MISC EXPENSES OF ALL BASEHOUSES AND KEEPERS.

7. RECOMMEND ALSO LILINK PREPARE NEW PROJECT COVERING LICENTO-1 AND LICOOKY -1 AS XXXXXXXXX INFORMANTS CENTRAL AMERICAN EXILE ACTIVITY MEXI.

8. REGARDING NEW PBRUMEN PROJECTS:

A. SUGGEST LICAMEOS ✓ 2 ✓ AND LIFEUDS 22 AND 23 BE INCLUDED IN SEPARATE SINGLE NEW PROJECT AS STRAIGHT SUPPORT ASSETS. XXX ASSUME ONLY ONE LICAMEO BEING PAID AT RATE ONE HUNDRED PER MONTH.

B. PREPARE SECOND PROJECT TO COVER GENERAL INFORMANTS AND SPOTTERS PBRUMEN OPS. INCLUDING:

1) AMPACA

2) ✓ LISICLE-1. BELIEVE STATION FORGOT INCLUDE HIS SALARY IN REF SO HDQS ADDING THREE THOUSAND PER XXX YEAR FOR THIS.

3) LITAMILS 3, 9 LISTED REF. ACCORDING OUR RECORDS LITAMIL ✓ SEVEN ALSO ACTIVE AND SHOULD BE INCLUDED. WOULD INCLUDE LITAMIL-2 ✓

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

ROUTING

		5	
		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR 65335

EVEN IF SLIGHT POSSIBILITY HE TO BE RETAINED.

4) LITAINT-2. SUGGEST INCLUDE LITAINT-7 IF POSSIBILITY HE BE RETAINED. NOTE HE HAS NO CLEARANCE, SEE HMMW 13128.

5) HDQS SUGGESTS AMPANIC-6 XR WHO RECEIVES $240 MONTHLY PER PRQ ALSO BE INCLUDED.

8. AGREE DEGRIP LICHAP AND LICRAFT REMAIN OOA.

9. PLEASE CABLE REPLY. SEE SEPARATE KR CABLE MRID.

END OF MESSAGE

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

2-[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, DDOS/L, DDOS 4, SPOG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 061751Z

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 8037

IN - 13994
6 Feb 64

HTBASTE PBRUMEN

REF MEXI 7540 (IN [illegible])*

ACCORDING LITAMIL-7, LECHUGA TRAVEL PLANS CHANGED: HE WENT CANADA, WILL REMAIN UNTIL 18 FEB, PROCEEDING PBRUMEN.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED SUBJS TRAVEL PLANS.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

1 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT:1325, 27 JAN 64 LMG)

INFO : DDP, DDOS/L, DODS 4, SPOG, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 271549Z

PRIORITY DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 7940 — 27 [illegible] 06532

KTBASTE

REF: [illegible]

LITAMIL-7 OVERHEARD CONVERSATION INDICATING CARLOS LECHUGA ARRIVING MEXI 28 JAN. NO DETAILS, NO CONFIRMATIONS. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED — Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMW-11739

LITAMIL-7 was granted an OA on 20 August 1963 for use as outlined in PRQ II forwarded in HMMA-21539.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-330173

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-11882

DATE 29 AUG 1963
27 August 1963

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-330173

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
[illegible]	
[illegible]	
[illegible]	
WH/3/M	
[illegible]	

1 - RI
1 - ~~Chrono~~

ORIGINATING
OFFICE / OFFICER / TYPIST: WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:dd
EXT. 5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WHD
DATE: 27 AUG 1963
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: /s/ J. C. King

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

C No. 101663

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/Mexico Wayne Carley

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of LITAMIL/7 ________________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated 24 June 1963.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 20 August 1963 dlr

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: FYI

REFS: A) HMMW-11621, 5 June 1963
B) HMMA-21539, 13 June 1963

As of 28 June 1963 the POA on LITAMIL-7 was reinstated until 28 September 1963. On 24 June the Headquarters desk requested that an OA be granted on the basis of the PRQ Part II submitted by Reference B.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
0 & 1 - COS, Mexico City

201-330173

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-11739	11 JUL 1963 5 July 1963
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-330173

Distribution:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono

FILING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3/m	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	W. Carley	db	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	5 JUL 1963	for J. C. King

FORM 1-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/3/M - W. Carley

NUMBER
C - 101663

SUBJECT
LITAMIL/7

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
CTM

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA is reinstated until 28 September 1963.

field notified 5/7/63

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	28 [illegible] '63

FORM 7-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9)

SECRET

PROJECT

SOURCE

LITAMIL-7

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFORMATION

DATE ACQUIRED

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
RLPC #1
CABLE
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
C S
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Re HMM 7251. Supdata.

The complete production of LITAMIL-7 has been reviewed by Headquarters. Of the 10 reports submitted from September 1962 through May 1963, of which L-7 was the source of the complete, or a specific part of the report, 5 were not disseminated. In addition to those which were disseminated, 2 dissems used info received in ops cables which was from L-7.

The info from this source is considered to be quite low-level and fragmentary, including few details.

After this careful review, we fail to find any justification for raising her to a "B".

We wish to point out that source's access to information does not affect her rating. That would be reflected in the appraisal of content.

LITAMIL-7 is considered a "C" source by Headquarters.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

14-00000

Summary -

LITAMIL-7

Field has submitted a total of 11 reports, of which 9 LITAMIL-7 was given as source for all, or a specific part of the report. 1 she was subsource, and in [illegible] she was one of 6 sources and her contribution not specified. Plus that, info from her taken from 2 Ops cables for use in dissem.

Of the 11, 5 were NO DISSEM. (one still on my desk, probably no dissem.)

xx The info submitted by her is all pretty low level. Matter of fact, pretty much what would be considered overt in any normal embassy or consulate. She obviously reports what happens to come to her attention, but no indication she makes any effort to GET info to fill in the fragmentary info she submits.

I just can't see WHY the field considers her a B (except that they seem to consider all their sources a B.) It will be noted that they considered her a B from the very first report they ever submitted from her. IF they have justification for raising her, why don't they spell it out.
If this low-level informant is considered a B reporting agent - maybe we better devise some super evals for the GOOD sources.

Needless to say, I think C is very generous.

I doubt whether the RO or CO in Mexi ever evaluated her stuff.

Now - what is your opinion, Wayne? If you think she xxxxx is worth a B, its certainly OK by me (it probably would be the easy way out). However, looking at the over-all, seems wrong to give her a B unless she really deserves it -

LITAMIL-7

12 June 63

LITAMIL-7's production (All of it)

C	HMM-6235	Jan-Mar 62	New Cuban/Mexi anti-Castro Organ. (LITAMIL-7 only 1 of 6 sources reporting on a meeting that all supposedly attended. Report given overall C.) CS-3/[illegible]
B - ND	HMM-5759	Sept 62	Domestic Employees of CubanEmb in Mexi (Names and salaries only. No info on 'em.) No Dissem Received as "B". Unfortunately, the HQ didn't mention the eval in the SAC. (Opn cover sheet said it classified NO FOREIGN DISSEM because source believes it could pinpoint her as source!!)
B - F	HMM-6923 MEXI [illegible]	Jan 63	Sched interview between Mexican Foreign Minister & Cuban Amb to Mexi (Reported the interview sched for 11 Jan. No other info. This during short time Lechuga in Mexi before going on to Cuba - returning fm UN in NY.) CS 3/533,927 Field evaluated "B". Cut to F" By Hq for dissem. SAC to field call d their attention to fact she an "F".
- F	MEXI 3078 MEXI 3091	Jan 63	Activities of Lechuga in Mexi City (Bits from 2 cables put out as dissem. Portion fm LITAMIL-7 reported that the 11 Jan meeting did not take place, and that Lechuga and family left Mexi for Hava 1- Jan.) This portion was given a source eval of "F". (Never did learn whether the Amb saw the ForMin before he left) CS-3/534,370
F	HMM-6966	Jan 63	New Employees of CubEmb in Mexi No Dissem - State gives reporting info. Field correctly evaluated her as "F". (This actually recd as IL-3 from 7.)
B - C	HMM-7158 MEXI-4214	Apr 63	Meeting between Cub Amb and Mexi ForMin No Dissem - No intel value to customers. (Merely said meeting sched for 13 Apr - at Amb's request) (Lechuga now back fm Cuba - enroute to NY.) SAC went into detailxx re her eval - this report carried her as "B". SAC: " We feel that a more proper eval for this source (from whom little of disseminable value has been received) would be C. If in the future her reporting warrants further upgrading to B, the station should at that time make a recommendation."

HMM-7225 - next pg

F - ND	HMM-7236	Apr 63	Travel to Cuba of 2 people (Portion of report from L-7 was that visas were issued the 2, and Cub Govt paying their fares.) No Dissem - Hq not dissening travel info at that time. The field gave her inf and F in this report. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Fld probably hadn't recd the SAC for 7158 yet, so went by the earlier SAC's - and gave her an F. (But HMM-7225 was "B" !!)

LITAMIL-7's production

MEXI-4351 May 63 Travel of [illegible] to Cuba
HMMW-4526
Info from these cables (4 sources) combined for a dissem.
CS-3/[illegible]
- C
Portion from LITAMIL-7 was that visas for some of people were on separate papers, & that Cub Govt paid fares for all.
Sent as Ops cable, so no eval by field.
She given a "C" by us.

HMMA-7225 Apr 63 Resignation of Cub Amb to Hungary
No dissem (by SAS) - adequately covered by other sources.
B - C?
This report gave her a "B" - [illegible] following report was "F".
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
(Found it - called attn to SAS for HMMA-7183 re source eval.)

X HMMA-7232 May 63 New Dir of the Mexi-Cuban Instit of Cultural Relations
CS-3/542,928
C
Field gave her a "B" in this case. Dissemed as "C".
(SAS not yet prepared)

HMMA-7261 May 63 Cuban (female) studying nursing in Mexi
Info only that she studying nursing in Mexi on Cub Govt scholarship.
(Arrival info in LITAMIL)
B - C
CS-3/5[illegible],[illegible]31
Field gave her a B on this one, cut to C for dissem

HMMA-7251 May 63 Cancellation of CubAmb Festivities Planned for 20 May
MEXI 4515
TDCS-3/546,872 - Disseminated by IACG. Field gave it a "B" - and so did IACG - which is wrong. Just why IACG dissemed it, is hard to determine. I don't think they even have a source card on her - at least not one giving her a "B" - that's certain.
B - + Sure mistake
Perhaps the field's argument in the supdata swayed them. It said: "Source LITAMIL-7 who station definitely considers B source. Most info submitted by L-7 is obtained directly from Cuban Embassy records. In present case L-7 personally read cable recd fm Hava."

That still doesn't qualify her for a B - that would up the appraisal of content.

HMMA-7353 31 May Cuban Embassy Financial Transactions
(Title misleading - lists 2 banks in Mexi where Emb has accounts - nothing more. No actn taken yet - but doubt whether it's worth dissem, unless it represents some change.)
Dissemed - with other info
"Source data sheet says: "Source recd info personally from Buenaventura Reyes.
" Ref made to SAS for HMMA 7156 & 7225. Hq attention called to HMMA 7251 (Mexi 4515) wherein the Sta pointed out that it definitely considers LITAMIL-7 a B source. It is requested that Hq reconsider its C eval & and raise LITAMIL-7 to B which the Sta feels to be a more proper eval."

They gave the report ~~of~~ a B

SECRET

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-7
C-101663
201-330173

Attached is the PRQ part II on LITAMIL-7. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
KAPOK

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT
Transmittal of PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: OA on Subject

Reference: HMMW 11426
HMMW 11621

There are attached three (3) copies of PRQ Part II on Subject and operational approval is requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
PRQ Part II

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD, w/att
2 - Files

201-330173

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
KAPOK

DATE TYPED
13 June 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21539

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201 - 330173
P - 7575

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA 21526

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM: LITAMIL - 7

2. PSEUDONYM:

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. [illegible] AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

LITAMIL-3, a former superior of LITAMIL-7 in the PBRUMEN Embassy handled her for several months before turning her over to Clyde K SHRYOCK on 7 May 1962. SHRYOCK is known to L-7 as "Roberto". Direct contact with L-7 was made in order to get better and more detailed information re the PBRUMEN Embassy personnel and activities.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any Spanish speaking Case Officer through LITAMIL-3, who continues to be her closest and most trusted friend.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Not applicable

FORM NO. 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-95a WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 NOV 56

SECRET CS COPY

(4-20)

ENCL # 16 HMMA-21539

301-330173

SECRET

SECTION II — **MOTIVATION AND CONTROL**

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist".)*

Subject is anti-Communist and pro-U.S. She wants to prove that she is anti-Communist by providing information to ODYOKE re activities inside the PBRUMEN Embassy.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico City has little control over Subject except to reveal her activities to PBRUMEN authorities.

SECTION III — **COVER**

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Meetings are held at the home of LITAMIL-7 and if necessary the Case Officer could represent a visiting "friend".

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject is employed at the PBRUMEN Embassy and her information is gathered during the course of her working day.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working).*

Subject knows she is working for ODYOKE. She does not think in terms of intelligence agencies.

SECTION IV — **INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING**

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject has had no connection with any intelligence service in the past.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

LITAMIL-3, who introduced Subject to Case Officer and frequently attends meetings with Case Officer.

LITAMIL-9 suspects that Subject is working for ODYOKE. He knows she is in contact with LITAMIL-3 and he knows L-3 is in contact with Case Officer.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has had no training in clandestine operations. She is becoming increasingly aware of intelligence techniques, however, and her production has improved for this reason.

SECTION V — **COLLABORATION POTENTIAL**

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject, being a Mexican, would probably collaborate with the Mexican Government if approached by high authorities.

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

LITAMIL-3 has been in contact with Subject for many years and continued in contact with her as of this date. Subject provided information on the PBRUMEN Embassy through L-3.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains her information from PBRUMEN personnel at the Embassy and by observation and elicitation.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject is aware that the information which she provides goes to Washington D.C.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is presently being used to provide information as travel to PBRUMEN, particularly as it applies to the issuance of "courtesy visas" which she handles and information on the personalities and activities of PBRUMEN personnel through "clear" cable traffic, conversations, elicitations, and observation.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is collaborating with KUBARK unselfishly. On occasions the Case Officer has sent her gifts and tried to help re visa problems, scholarships (close friend).

SECRET

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is a highly qualified Spanish speaking secretary with more than 30 years of government service, i.e. with the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico. ~~Subject takes Spanish shorthand.~~

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject does not get paid any salary and has refused same when offered.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

The Case Officer introduced a friend of Subject's to Dr. Juan GOODWIN of USIS re a scholarship to PBPRIME, has requested a visa through LITEMPO for a friend of Subject and has tried to help Bubject's brother re draft dodging problem, i.e. provided him with contact in INS in Mexico City.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files and intimate friends of Subject down through the years, i.e. LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-9, LITAMIL-2, all trusted Station assets.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

None

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Yes

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

POA granted 10 Sept 62

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, religious (Catholic), provincial in outlook, unsophisticated, intelligent, sincere, "simpatica" and unselfish. She is reliable and very security conscious.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with the Case Officer has been clandestine and is known to only LITAMIL-3, a trusted Station agent. On occasions the naivete of Subject has allowed her to introduce several relatives to the Case Officer without mentioning any names, i.e. a friend.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject does not drink, smoke, does not participate in any other vices as far as the Case Officer is able to determine. She is very religious and lives her religion.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII — AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1- INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is a bird fancier (canaries and parakeets).

SECTION XIV — GENERAL

1- INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is from Oaxaca and typifies the native of that region, i.e. she has Indian facial characteristics. Subj is probably recognizable as a Mexican.

2- INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information on PRQ Parts I and II came from Station files, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-9, and LITAMIL-7, herself.

3- IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

Subject's termination will be routine.

SECTION XV — EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1- GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

The Case Officer has a phone number through which contact can be made in an emergency. Subj knows the ODACID phone number and extension. She will ask for "Roberto" and she will use the name "Paula". Contact can also be made through LITAMIL-3/

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

Subject was "pitched" by LITAMIL-3 during the period Dec. 60 and Jan. 1961. Subject was offered $10,000 U.S. to "defect" and make statements provided by CDYOKE, which she refused to accept after serious consideration. LITAMIL-3 was the "cut-out" for this operation which was handled by Andrew F MERTON.

DATE 12 June 1963	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER Clyde K SHRYOCK

ENCL #12 HMMA-21539 SECRET 201-330173

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Req: Submit PRQ Part II

REF: HMMW-11426, 29 March 1963

1. As mentioned in the reference, the POA on LITAMIL-7 expired on 10 March 1963. As of 27 May the file on L-7 was cancelled and closed by KUDESK/OA because of the failure to submit PRQ Part II as required under CSI 10-5 and because of the failure to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of L-7.

2. Please forward PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-7 as soon as possible.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-330173

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-11621	29 May 1963 5 JUN 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-330173

1 - RI
~~1 - Chrono~~

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH3/MEX	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico/W.H. Carley:jp			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
CWHD	29 MAY 1963	J. C. King

FORM 1-63 53 ~~USE PREVIOUS EDITION~~ (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 27 May 63 dlr

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WH/3/Mexico

ATTENTION: Wayne Carley

C# 101663

The file on LITAMIL/7 is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ Part II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 3-62 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

vo 7d 1   ip   ill

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACTION POSTED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SAS

INFO.
Chief of Base, Merida
Chief of Stattion, WAVE; Chief, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Contact Report/LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PERUMEN

Attached, for addressees, is a copy of Subject report dated 14 May 63.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C CURTIS

1 att H/W

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
✓2 - C/SAS, w/att
2 - COS, WAVE, /w/att VE
2 - COB, Merida, w/att HMS
~~2~~3 - C/WHD, w/att C/WH/3
3 - Files

~~MICROFILMED~~
~~DOC. MICRO. SER.~~

MICROFILMED
FEB 25 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Index X
201- 330173

DATE TYPED 21 May 1963	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA 21402	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201 - 330173 P - 7575	

CROSS REFERENCE TO
DUP

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET 2P

Memorandum for the Record 14 May 1963

Subject: LITAMIL-7

On 13 May 63, I went to Subject's home with LITAMIL-3. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS NOTED. Time: 1830-1900.

LITAMIL-7 reported as follows:

1. On 8 May 63, "courtesy" visas on separate piece of paper were issued to 13 Ecuadorans. Plane tickets to Habana only were also provided. (COMMENT: This might mean that this group plans on returning via another route.)

On 10 May 63, "courtesy" visas were issued on separate paper to 2 Argentines and 2' Brazilians. The latter group was issued a visa colectiva, i.e. one visa with the names of all the group on the paper. The 2 Argentines were provided with Cubana "round trip" tickets.

On 11 May 63, no "courtesy" visas were issued.

On 13 May 63, 9 Argentines were issued (separate) "courtesy" visas. L-7 said that there were four other persons with the above 9, who had already received "courtesy" visas on separate piece of paper in Santiago, Chile. She said she believes they were Argentines but she is not sure.

On 13 May 63, "courtesy" visas outside the passport were issued to 1 German and to 1 Uruguayan.

On 12 May 63, L-7 reported that two "courtesy" visas on separate pieces ~~XXXX~~ of paper were issued to 2 Peruvians.

2. I-7 reported that the two Cuban courriers, Agustin [illegible] ~~FR~~ 201-345986 and Braulio ~~FR~~ RODRIGUEZ, 201-356102 were scheduled to arrive ~~MEXICO CITY~~ on 13 May 63, according to a cable she received.

3. L-7 reported that the following Cubans are living inside the Embassy: Manuel VEGA Perez, Buenaventura REYES Acosta, Armando SARDINAS, Jose LLAGOSTERA Garcia, and probably Emigdio ~~XXXXXXX~~ VEGA Calero.

4. L-7 reported that a Dr. BRITO called re Joaquin HERNANDEZ the new Amb. This conversation came up on LIENVOY.

SECRET

MICROFILMED
FEB 25 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

MICROFILMED
JUN 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

att #1 HMMA 21402

201-330173

5. L-7 provided the following list of telephones within the Cuban Embassy compound:

14-13-25 - Gate

14-42-37 - In the office of the Amb's private secretary, i.e. Buenaventura [illegible] Has extension in Amb's office.

14-92-14 - This is in the office of LITAMIL-7, but is an extension of Teresa P's phone in the Cultural office behind the Embassy bldg proper.

25-59-14 - This is a private phone in the Amb's bedroom.

****

11-28-47 - Consulate (downstairs)

25-09-14 - Commercial Section (upstairs)

****

14-13-25 - This is extension of gate phone and is located in small library at top of stairs in bldg behind the Emb. It is usually not answered.

25-07-35 - This phone is not being used. It is in empty office and was formerly used on occasions by [illegible]-1. It is this phone that SINCRAS plans to transfer to his house.

14-92-14 - This is the phone in the Cultural Office which has an extension in L-7's office.

CKS

SECRET

FILE: LITAMIL-7

201-330173

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-7 -201 file

SUBJECT
Meeting Between Cuban Ambassador in Mexico and Mexican Foreign Minister

DATE OF INFORMATION
18 April 1963

DATE ACQUIRED
18 April 1963

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 19 April 1963
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-7188
CABLE MEXI 6214
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jcd

C S

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

This report was not disseminated. Information marginal, no intel value to customers.

Hq notes that the Station has apparently raised LI[illegible]IL-7 from F to B. We feel that a more proper evaluation for this source (from whom little of disseminable value has been received) would be C. If in the future her reporting warrants further upgrading to B, the station should at that time make a recommendation.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROCESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief of WH Division

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACT. REQ.: Submission of PRQ Part II

1. The POA on Subject has expired as of 10 March 1963.

2. If the Station has further interest in Subject, please submit PRQ Part II.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-330173

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 27 Mar. 63

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11426

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-330173

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ROUTING	INITIAL
1 - RI 1 - Chrono	f
	4
[redacted]	
[redacted]	
C/WH/3	
[redacted]	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST: WH/3/Mex/Jane Zerance ds

EXT: 5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	28 MAR 1963	J. C. King

FORM 9-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 19 March 1963 jmh

TO: WH/3/MEXICO
ATTN: WAYNE CARLEY

C NO.: 111663

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ [illegible] Carroll, Jr.

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/7

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'S DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'S COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	DI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☒	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired 10 March 1963. Please submit PRQ-II. If within 30 days no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (20)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE • 1/u = LITAMIL-7

SECRET

032 28 JAN 63 WH

DATE : 25 JAN 63 CNT

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW 2, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2.

ADDED: SAS 5

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

JAN 25 0304Z 63

ROUTINE

IN 56591

TDCS

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 3205

INTEL

REF HMM-6913 SUPDATA SOURCE LITAMIL-3 FROM LITAMIL-7 FILED 251915Z REPORT CLASS SECRET HMM-6966 MEXICO CUBA SUBJECT NEW EMPLOYEES OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY DOI 24 JANUARY 63 PADA MEXICO MEXICO CITY 24 JANUARY 63 APR 2 SOURCE PERSONS (F) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY.

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

[illegible]
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND
[illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY

REPORT NO. TDCS

SUBJECT

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCES IN 56591

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. LUISA CALDERON, A CUBAN, HAS REPLACED ROSARIO "CHAYO" VAZQUEZ, A MEXICAN, AS SECRETARY IN THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY (FIELD COMMENT: IT WAS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY THAT ACCORDING TO VAZQUEZ, THE CUBAN EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HABANA TO DISCHARGE ALL MEXICAN EMPLOYEES OF THE EMBASSY.)

2. JACINTO VAZQUEZ DE LA GARZA, HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE CUBAN EMBASSY AS FIRST SECRETARY. (SOURCE COMMENT: VAZQUEZ WILL REPLACE ANA MARIA BLANCO, FORMER SECRETARY TO CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO.) (FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	

STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1-63 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

J— LITAMIL-7 and AMLAW-1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

DATE : 15 JAN 63

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : MEXICO CITY

CTION: TFW 10 (TFW COPY SLOTTED AT 2200 14 JAN 63 DM)

NFO : DDP, ADDP, DODS, DODS/M 4, CA 2, SPOG, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW 2, WH 7, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JAN 15 0300Z 63

PRIORITY

IN 49880

PRITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3091

GYROSE LITAMIL-7

1. ON 14 JAN 63 LITAMIL-7 REPORTED THAT AMB CARLOS LECHUGA. HIS WIFE AND CHILD LEFT MEXICO FOR HAVANA VIA CUBANA ON THAT DATE. WHEN QUERIED WHETHER THEY RETURNING MEXI WIFE LECHUGA TOLD L-7 "WE DO NOT KNOW" AND AMB LECHUGA TOLD HER HE RETURNING MEXI AS HE STILL CUBAN DELEGATE UNITED NATIONS. L-7 HAS FEELING LECHUGA NOT RETURNING AS AMB MEXI.

2. L-7 COMPLETELY SURPRISED AT DEPARTURE WIFE LECHUGA WHOM SHE SAW 12 JAN AND WHO MADE NO COMMENT IMPENDING DEPARTURE FOR CUBA. LECHUGA DID NOT MAKE APPOINTMENT WITH MANUEL TELLO SCHEDULED FOR 1900 ON 11 JAN AND ON 12 JAN RAMON SINOBAS ASKED L-7 CALL FOREIGN OFFICE ASCERTAIN WHETHER APPOINTMENT SCHEDULED FOR 14 JAN CONFIRMED. L-7 CALLED BUT NO ANSWER FROM FOREIGN OFFICE. L-7 BELIEVES LECHUGA TELLO MEETING HELD MORNING 14 JAN AS LECHUGA LEFT EMBASSY EARLY.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 5 JAN 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

JAN 5 0620Z 63

ROUTINE

IN45036

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 2994 (OUSLER ACTING)

GYROSE LITAMIL-9

1. ON 3 JAN 63 RAMON SINOBAS CASADO, CUBAN CHARGE, TOLD L-9 THAT MANUEL VEGA PEREZ, CUBAN G-2, WAS GOING HAVA 6 JAN VIA CUBANA. VEGA, ACCORDING SINOBAS, WILL REMAIN HAVA FROM 15 TO 20 DAYS. LITAMIL-7 GAVE VEGA FAREWELL LUNCHEON AFTERNOON 3 JAN 63.

2. ON 3 JAN SINOBAS TOLD L-9 AND ANDRES ARMONA RAMOS, COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR, THAT IN FUTURE PLANS CUBAN GOVT L-9 AND ARMONA WILL NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED DIPLOMATS EXCEPT WHEN ASSIGNED OVERSEAS EMBASSY POSTS. WHEN HAVA L-9 AND ARMONA WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED DIPLOMATS. L-9 ACCORDING SINOBAS WILL FALL UNDER JURISDICTION CULTURAL DEPARTMENT MINISTRY EDUCATION AND WHEN NECESSARY FOREIGN OFFICE WILL ASK MINISTRY PROVIDE PERSONNEL FOR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS. SINOBAS TOLD ARMONA HIS SITUATION SIMILAR WITH MINISTRY FOREIGN COMMERCE RESPONSIBLE HIS ASSIGNMENT.

3. SINOBAS CAME AWAY FROM PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION 3 JAN HIGHLY ELATED AND SURPRISED VIEW PRES LOPEZ MATEOS' REMARK "TRANSMITA MIS SALUDOS A FIDEL CASTRO Y A PRES DORTICOS." SINOBAS TOLD L-9 AND ARMONA HE DID NOT HAVE CHANCE MAKE HIS PREPARED STATEMENT AND IT

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

APPEARED HIM LOPEZ ANXIOUS GET HIS MESSAGE ACROSS. L-9 WHO IN RECEPITION LINE NOTED LOPEZ DELAYED SINDBAS LONGER THAN MOST OTHER DIPS AT RECEPTION.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7- LITAMIL-7

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2	FI	5	
3		6	

DATE : 28 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

DEC 28 2104Z 62

ROUTINE

DIR CITE MEXI 2940

IN41878

GYROSE LITAMIL-7

REF MEXI 2904 (IN 39430)*

1. ON 21 DEC 62 CO NOT ABLE MAKE CONTACT LITAMIL-7 WHO UNEXPECTEDLY VISITED BY GLADYS LECHUGA, WIFE CUBAN AMB AT SCHEDULED TIME MEETING CO AND L-7. WIFE LECHUGA WHO ACCOMPANIED BY PARENTS STAYED TWO HOURS HOME L-7.

2. ON 27 DEC 62 CO AND LITAMIL-3 WENT HOME L-7, WHERE SHE REPORTED THAT ON THAT AFTERNOON SHE AND RAMON SINOBAS CASADO MADE OUT CUBAN DIP LIST FOR 1963 WHICH FORWARDED FOREIGN OFFICE. L-7 SHOWED CO COPY LIST. CUBAN DIPS LISTED FOLLOWING PRECEDENCE: CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA (ABSENT), RAMON SINOBAS CASADO, ANDRES ARMONA RAMOS, TERESA PROENZA PROENZA, LUIS ALBERU SOUTO, MANUEL VEGA PEREZ, PEDRO LARA MUNOZ, JOSE ANTONIO GARCIA LARA, BENIGNO CASTELLAR RAMIREZ. L-7 QUERIED SINOBAS RE GARCIA STATUS AND SINOBAS TOLD HER PUT HIM ON LIST AS HE IS EXPECTED RETURN.

3. ALTHOUGH WIFE LECHUGA STAYED TWO HOURS HOME L-7 PER PARA 1, L-7 SAID SHE DID NOT TALK POLITICS NOR DISCUSS HUSBAND ENTIRE EVENING.

SECRET

[illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2	L-7	5	
3		6	

IN 41878 MEXI 2940

4. L-7 SAID SHE ISSUED 22 COURTESY VISAS ON 27 DEC TO MEXICANS ALL OF WHOM GIVEN VISAS ON PAPER APART FROM PASSPORTS. L-7 SAID THIS TRUE MOST ALL INVITEES TRAVELLING HAVA AT THIS TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE CUBAN FOREIGN OFFICE PLANNING RECALL ALL AMBS FOR CONSULTATION RE INNOVATIONS FOREIGN OFFICE BASED SUGGESTIONS BLOC REPS HAVA.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 21

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10 * (TFW COPY SLOTTED AT: 1530 21 DEC/AW)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS,
CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

DEC 21 1906Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OPIM DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 2974 IN39430

TYPIC LITAMIL-9 LITAMIL-7

REF DIR 86618

1. IN SEPT 62, GUILLERMO LEON ANTICH, CUBAN DIP, WHILE MEXI ON ROUTE POST CHILE (?) TOLD CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, CUBAN AMB MEXI IN PRESENCE LITAMIL-9 THAT CUBAN FOREIGN OFFICE PLANNED RECALL ALL AMBASSADORS FOR CONSULTATION RE INNOVATIONS FOREIGN OFFICE BASED SUGGESTIONS BLOC DIPS HAVA. SINCE THAT TIME, HOWEVER, NO INFO AVAILABLE L-9 INDICATING DIPS BEING RECALLED.

2. TRANSFER CUBAN DIPS MEXI AND BELIEVED REASONS FOR SAME AS FOLLOWS: CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, LEFT MEXI 26 OCT 62 FOR HAVA TAKE POST U.N. DELEGATION NEW YORK. LECHUGA EXPECTED RETURN MEXI 22 DEC WHERE WILL AGAIN TAKE UP AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES PROBABLY AFTER GOING HAVA REPORT U.N. DEVELOPMENTS. JOSE ANTONIO GARCIA LARA LEFT MEXI 23 NOV 62 FOR HAVA. RETURN HAVA STRAIGHTEN OUT COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS, TAKE EXAMS AND POSSIBLY REPORT IN PERSON ON CONTACT KUBARKER MEXI. RETURN UNCERTAIN. RAMON CUENCA MONTOTO LEFT MEXI 22 SEPT 62 FOR HAVA. DEFECTION PEDRO ROIG ORTEGA AND POOR ADMINISTRATION COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROBABLY ACCOUNT FOR TRANSFER. ANA MARIA BLANCO TABRALE LEFT MEXI 12 DEC FOR OTTAWA. LECHUGA "LOVE" AFFAIR BELIEVED REASON

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

[illegible] RADULFO PAEZ PEREZ LEFT MEXI 17 DEC FOR HAVA. [illegible] YEAR MEXI AND TRANSFER NOT UNUSUAL ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE [illegible] SYSTEM INTRODUCED CUBAN EMB AND THIS UNKNOWN TO HIM. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED PAEZ REPLACED BY PEDRO LARA MUNOZ WHO SPENT YEAR MOSCOW.

3. ON 19 DEC 62, LITAMIL-7 REPORTED THAT ONLY RAMON CUENCA AND ANA MARIA BLANCO OF ABOVE GROUP HAVE BEEN "DROPPED" OFFICIALLY FROM CUBAN DIP LIST MEXI. OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION PAEZ EXPECTED SHORTLY. GARCIA AND LECHUGA STILL ON LIST. CO HAS SCHEDULED MEETING 21 DEC WITH LITAMIL-7 AT WHICH TIME EXPECTS HAVE REPORT ON NEWLY DRAWN UP CUBAN DIP LIST FOR PASSING FOREIGN OFFICE WHICH DUE FIRST OF YEAR. L-7 OPINION THIS WILL REVEAL FUTURE STATUS DIPS IN QUESTION PARTICULARLY GARCIA LARA.

4. ON 10 DEC 62 ALBERTO MANUEL FERRER, CUBAN DIP PP 32/695 ARRIVED MEXI FROM HAVA. LITAMIL-9 BELIEVES HE MEXI INSPECT EMB ACTIVITIES. ASSOCIATES WITH RAMON SINOBAS CASADO, MANUEL VEGA AND PEDRO LARA ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY. ON 19 DEC L-7 REPORTED SHE INTRODUCED TO RODRIGUEZ FNU A MYSTERIOUS CHARACTER WHO LIVING AT EMBASSY. STATION BELIEVES RODRIGUEZ AND FERRER IDENS. FERRER SCHEDULED RETURN HAVA ON 21 DEC VIA CUBANA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR GYROSE USED.

14-00000

4/

SECRET

		ROUTING	
1			4
2			5
3			6

DATE : 069
6 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WH 7, S/C 2

OCT 6 0432Z62

ROUTINE

IN 34941

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 2159

GYROSE/AMLAU-1

1. OSCAR LANDERMAN OLIVA AND MERCEDES ORTIZ LA RUBIA, CUBAN PARENTS WIFE AMLAU-1 ARRIVED MEXI 4 OCT VIA CUBANA. (LIFIRE B/DOC) ON 4 OCT LITAMIL-7 REPORTED BOTH LIVING AT CU BAN
EMBA /1

MERCEDES ORTIZ VERY FRIENDLY L-7. (B/2)

2. ADA KOURI BARRETO, WIFE RAUL ROA ARRIVED SAME FLIGHT AND GAVE CONTACT AS CUBAN EMBASSY. (LIFIRE B/DOC)

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

-4-7

ORIG: H.Z. MULLOY/H.G. KITCT :JS:em
UNIT: TFW/FI
EXT: 6172
DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1962 1534

CWT

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO: DDP, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

22 SEP 62 19 54z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT79341

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 38057

GYROSE LITAMIL-7

1. PLS LEVY FOLL STANDING RQMTS LITAMIL-7 AT STATION DISCRETION:

A. REPORT NAMES AND AVAILABLE BI MEXI CITIZENS WHO REGULARLY VISIT SPECIFIC CUBAN IN EMBASSY. GIVE KNOWN OR SUSPECTED REASON FOR VISITS.

B. REPORT DETAILS ANY DISAGREEMENTS, PERSONALITY CONFLICTS, FEUDS, DISLIKES, ROMANCES, MARITAL, FINANCIAL, OR OTHER PROBLEMS AMONG CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

C. REPORT DETAILED DESCRIPTION PROCEDURE FOR PROVIDING CUBAN VISA TO NON-MEXICAN TRAVELERS FROM LA COUNTRIES WHO ARRIVE IN MEXICO WITH MEXICAN VISA AND INTEND TO CONTINUE ON TO CUBA BUT DO NOT WISH EVIDENCE CUBAN VISIT RECORDED IN PASSPORT. INCLUDE HOW PROCESS WORKS ON SUCH TRAVELERS RETURN HOME VIA MEXI. PROVIDE NAMES AND BIO DATA ON ALL SUCH TRAVELERS.

2. PLS FORWARD TO HQS ANY SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITY DATA RE CUBAN OFFICIALS OR MEXICIANS IN CONTACT WITH CUBANS WHICH ALREADY HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY LITAMIL-7.

(END OF MESSAGE)

TFW/RQMTS for
WH/3/MEXI
C/WH/3

for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWARD A. MAPELIUS
C/TFW/FI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

22-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

REQUIREMENTS FOR LITAMIL - 7

1. WHEN TRAVELLERS FROM LATIN AMERICA COME TO MEXI ON MEXICAN VISA WITH INTENTION CONTINUING CUBA WITHOUT EVIDENCE CUBAN VISIT APPEARING IN THEIR PASSPORT, NEED DETAILED DESCRIPTION HOW VISA HANDLED. INCLUDE HOW PROCESS WORKS ON THEIR RETURN HOME VIA MEXI.
2. GIVE NAMES AND BI MEXICAN CITIZENS WHO REGULARILY VISIT SPECIFIC ~~XXXXX~~ CUBAN IN EMBASSY. GIVE ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ KNOWN OR SUSPECTED REASON FOR VISITS.
3. NEED DETAILS ON ANY DISAGREEMENTS, ~~EE~~ FUEDS, AND DISLIKES AMONG CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS.
4. REQUEST ANY SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITY DATA WHICH LITAMIL-7 HAS PROVIDED BE FORWARDED HQTRS.

Reqmts received from Kitchens
21 Sept 1962

ORIG: W. ULLERY / crk
UNIT: TFW/OPS SPT
EXT: 7646
DATE: 13 SEPT 62 1505

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

5 SEP 62 01 47z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT 76977
OUT 76977

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO: DDP, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

Mulloy

To: FI

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 36454 36454

GYROSE

REF: HMMA 19471 *

POA GRANTED LITAMIL 7 SUBJ REF 10 SEPT 62. 201-330173.

file.

END OF MESSAGE

TFW COMMENT: * Transmitted PRQ Part 1 and requested POA for Subject

TFW/FI
TFW/INTEL
WH/3/MEXI HOLMAN (by phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
C/TFW
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-25

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Nee)*
[illegible]

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*
[illegible]

5. DATE OF BIRTH

6. PLACE OF BIRTH

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*
[illegible]
[illegible]

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)*
No Record.

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

9a. SEX	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION	9g. FACE *(Shape)*
M ☐ F ☐			FT. IN.			

9h. COLOR OF HAIR	9i. COLOR OF EYES	9j. TEETH	9k. BUILD	9l. POSTURE
				[illegible]

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE
[illegible]

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 7-60 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4-20)

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP

2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1)*

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 3.)*

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

No travel

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION [illegible]

2. TITLE

3. SALARY *(Per annum)* [illegible]

4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

Moderate means.

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Secondary				

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Shorthand

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDS ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

1
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) 1960 - Pres...
2. EMPLOYER Cuban Embassy
3. ADDRESS Mexico, D.F.
4. TYPE OF WORK Secretarial
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ [illegible] PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

2
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

3
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

4
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

5
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECRET

SECTION IX					**MARITAL STATUS**							
1. CHECK ONE:	SINGLE	☐	MARRIED	☐	WIDOWED	☐	SEPARATED	☐	DIVORCED	☐	ANNULLED	
2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS												

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE	*(First)*	*(Middle)*	*(Nee)*	*(Last)*
4. DATE OF MARRIAGE	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE			
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PLACE OF BIRTH			
8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS			
10. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*				

SECTION X			**CHILDREN**		
FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI		**FATHER**	
1. FULL NAME	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII		**MOTHER**	
1. FULL NAME	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

GROUP 1 [illegible]

SECRET

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]				
[illegible]	[illegible]				
[illegible]					
[illegible]		[illegible]			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Luis - Superintendent of Pan [illegible] Maritime.

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Ricardo Vidal Dominguez

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE 27 July 1962

SIGNATURE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

ESPERON, Consuelo

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 101663.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-330173

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(IX-48)

14-00000

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TFW Attn: H. E. Mulloy	NUMBER C-101663
	SUBJECT LITAMIL/7
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 13 August 1962

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

HMMA-19471

file 201-330173

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

APP[illegible] Carroll, J

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	10 September 1962 mu

FORM 7-60 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9)

(Malley) 201-330173

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK No 127452

DATE 13 Aug 62

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME Wendell Ullery
OFFICE DESIGNATION TFW/Ops Spt
ROOM, BUILDING G H 5512
EXTENSION 7646

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Consuelo ESPERON C-101663

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.
LITAMIL-7

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
Ca. 1909, Oaxaca, Mexico

4. CITIZENSHIP
Mexican

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Secretary - Cuban Embassy, Mexico City

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Secretary ; Secondary

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Secretary - Cuban Embassy	Mexico, D.F.	1930-Present

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5' 4"	150	Brown	Grey		Stout

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
FATHER: Deceased
MOTHER: Deceased
BROTHERS: Luis, Enrique, Octavio, Mariano, Rogelio and Raul
SISTERS: Maria Louisa and Esperanza

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
All pertinent info.

ASSOCIATES: Luis Alberu Souto
Ricardo Vidal Dominguez

Hold in [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 8-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

TO: **Wendell Ullery**

21 Aug 62
DATE

FROM: FI/D mh

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

Noted C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

emc D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION
(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 13 Aug 62

TO:
☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: Wendell Ullery
TFW/Ops Spt
G H 5512
7646

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Consuelo ESPERON

PROJECT: JMATE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LITAMIL-7

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 330173

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Will be used for reporting on Cuban Embassy activities and personnel.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. None

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 127452

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☒	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: H.E.Mulloy

EXTENSION: 7646

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: William K. Harvey

ESPERON, Consuelo



[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

JULY GYROSE PROGRESS REPORT

LITAMILS - No previous progress report other than regular operational reporting has as yet been forwarded on the LITAMIL group. Their activities have expanded considerable during July, and this report will attempt to give a birds-eye view of the overall activity as a basis for future progress reporting. In summary during July 1962 the LITAMILS recruited a new penetration of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and a former employee of that Embassy, with excellent access to Cuban Embassy circles; they had one [illegible] internal functioning actively during the month; they located a site for their clandestine radio; they have a cover company possibility which is being seriously considered for activation; and they have approximately seven legal traveler operations under development or active. The LITAMILS now number 13, practically all of them are active in one or more of these phases. The principal men behind the entire activity are LITAMILS 1 and 2.

HMMA-19554
10 August 1962

H LITAMIL-7 is a secretary-level penetration of the Cuban Embassy whose production has been fairly limited due to her timidity. However, she became more active during July, furnishing exemplars of Cuban letterheads, envelopes etc., and acting as a "listening post." She has [illegible] furnished a copy of the [illegible] travelers who do not wish their travel to Cuba to appear in their passports. A station case officer is in direct contact with her. [illegible] reference include MEXIS 1594, 1570 and HMMA 19471 which forwarded PRQ Part I on her.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Consuelo ESPERON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

There are attached (4) copies of a PRQ, Part I on Subject.

A POA is requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Field TRACES - Non-Derog.
MEXI 1594 (IN 39209) 3 Aug 62

LITAMIL-7

RI - NR
DIV - att.
GL-127452

Attachment:
PRQ, Part I

Distribution:
~~2~~ - C/Task Force W w/2 att
2 - C/WHD w/2 att
2 - Files

2cc w/att to WH/3

CS COPY

201 FILE OPENED ON THE BASIS OF THIS DOCUMENT

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
30 July 1952

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19471

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-330173

Encl-1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-19471

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) ✓ (Middle) (Last) (Nee)
Consuelo ESPERON

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)
"Chelo"

5. DATE OF BIRTH
Circa 1909

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
Oaxaca, Mexico

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)
Drinks socially.
Catholic - extremely religious.

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)
No Record.

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

9a. SEX	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION	9g. FACE (Shape)
☐ ☒	55	55	FT. 5 IN. 4	150	Dark	Round

9h. COLOR OF HAIR	9i. COLOR OF EYES	9j. TEETH	9k. BUILD	9l. POSTURE
Grey	Brown	Some gold.	Stout	Erect

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE
Neat dresser.

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

CS COPY

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

30 July 62

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 7-60 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS Att to HMMA-19471 [illegible]

201-350193 (4-20)

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: Mexican

2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (*If different than Item 1.*)

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Indicate as owner, [illegible] or sub-tenant*): Calle Oriente 53 #262, Mexico, D. F.

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*If different than Item 3.*)

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Countries, dates and purposes*)

No travel

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION: Secretary

2. TITLE

3. SALARY (*Per annum*): Approx. $2400. US

4. FINANCIAL STATUS (*Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property*)

Moderate means.

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Secondary				

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(*List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.*)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	

SECRET

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES. ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Shorthand

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED. DECORATIONS. WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
1	1930 - Present	Cuban Embassy	Mexico, D.F.
2			
3			
4			
5			

	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
1	Secretarial	200.00	month	
2				
3				
4				
5				

SECTION IX	**MARITAL STATUS**

1. CHECK ONE ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PLACE OF BIRTH
8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*

SECTION X	**CHILDREN**

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI	**FATHER**

1. FULL NAME DECEASED	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII	**MOTHER**

1. FULL NAME DECEASED	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII — BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Luis	X			Oaxaco, Mexico	Mexican
Enrique	X			" "	"
Octavio	X			" "	"
Mariano	X			" "	"
Rogelio	X			" "	"
Raul	X			" "	"
Maria Louisa		X		" "	"
Esperanza		X		" "	"

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Luis - Superintendent of Pemex Maritime.

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Luis Alberu Soto
Ricardo Vidal Dominguez

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS

DATE: 27 July 1962

SIGNATURE: Clyde K. SHRYOCK

SECRET

201-330173

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 2 AUG 62 036

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	OPS SPT
3		6	

AUG 3 0420Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 39209

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1594

GYROSE/LITAMIL-7

REF DIR 26991 (Out 61057)*

HMMA [illegible]

C/S COMMENT: * REQUESTED PRQ PART 1 INFO ON SUBJECT.

PRQ 1 POUCHED REF B 31 JULY 62. NO DEROG TRACES. CO IN DIRECT CONTACT LITAMIL-7 WHOSE ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDE REPORTING ON EMBASSY ACTIVITIES AND PERSONNEL AS WELL PROCUREMENT EXEMPLARS SEALS, ENVELOPES (UNUSED AND THOSE MAILED FROM CUBA). L-7 ONLY STATION ASSET INSIDE EMBASSY RESIDENCE, WHERE AMB. LECHUGA, ANA MARIA BLANCO, RAMON SINOBAS CASADO AND RADULFO PAEZ PEREZ ALSO WORK. L-7 NOW COOPERATING WELL BUT APPEARS HAVE LITTLE ACCESS IMPORTANT INFO. HER WORK CONSISTS MOSTLY UNCLASSIFIED PROTOCOL NOTES MEXI GOVT AND ISSUANCE COURTESY AND DIP VISAS, I.E. THOSE NOT ISSUED CONSULATE. SHE ALSO PAY CLERK LOCAL EMPLOYEES. SHE THUS FAR NOT AGGRESSIVE "MATA HARI" TYPE AND PROVIDES ONLY INFO WHICH AVAILABLE HER ROUTINE WORK. AT LEAST MTG 27 JULY PROVIDED FIRST TANGIBLE ITEM WHEN SHE GAVE CO EXEMPLAR COURTESY VISA GIVEN ALL TRAVELERS HAVA WHO NOT WISH HAVE VISA PASSPORTS. L-9 EXPLAINED IN DETAIL MANNER FILLING OUT COURTESY VISA WHICH ISSUED ON SHEET CUBAN EMB PAPER. THIS MAJOR STEP L-7 DEVELOPMENT. NEXT MTG 6 AUG.

(END OF MESSAGE)

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : H. E. MULLOY:jd
UNIT : TFW/FI
EXT : 6172
DATE : 31 JULY 1962

5-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 01 19 02z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO : DDP, WH 7, S/C 2

~~SIG CEN~~
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT61057
OUT 61057

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 26991
26991

GYROSE LITAMIL/7

REF: DIR 23257 (OUT 54577)*

PLS REPLY REF.

(END OF MESSAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED PRQ, PART 1 INFO SUBJ (NOT INDICATED) RESULTS LOCAL TRACES AND CURRENT OPS ASSIGNMENT.

C/TFW/FI

C/WH/3

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

31-6

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	OPS SPT
2	R	5	
3		6	

DATE : 1 AUG 62 618 DJM

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DOP, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

AUG 1 0246Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 37787

TO DIR WAVE INFO CITE MEXI 1570

GYROSE/LITAMIL 7

RE A MEXI 0444 (IN 12825)

B MEXI 1560 (IN 37258)*

PLEASE DISREGARD IDEN REF A WHO ASSIGNED CRYPT LITAMIL-7.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED POA CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT FEDORA CAPDEVILA.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : H. E. MULLOY:jc 18
UNIT : TFW/FI
EXT : 6173
DATE : 13 JULY 1962 1644

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

mulloy

☐	DEFERRED
☒	ROUTINE

OUT 54577

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 23257

GYROSE LITAMIL/7

PLS CABLE SOONEST PRQ, PART I INFO SUBJ: RESULTS LOCAL TRACES, AND CURRENT OPS ASSIGNMENT.

Consuelo Esperon

C/TFW/FI Esy

C/WH/3 Stivers

R. K. Harris
for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

13-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief Task Force W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

522

DATE : ~~2 APR 62~~

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : TFW 10

INFO : DDP, COP, CA 2, CA/PKG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 2 2151Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 12825

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 0444 MEX - 0446

IN - 12879

3 APR 62

Mexi 0511
IN 16351
[illegible] Apr 62

CYROSE

ON 29 MAR 62, LITAMIL-3 REPORTED THAT LUIS ALBERU SOUTO, CUBAN CULTURAL ATTACHE MEXI WOULD NOT RETURN TO CUBA WHERE HE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO UNITED NATIONS SECTION FOREIGN OFFICE. SOUTO WHO ARRIVED MEXI FROM HAVA 16 MAR TOLD LITAMIL-8 (IDEN) THAT CONDITIONS TERRIBLE CUBA AND WOULD REMAIN IN MEXI. SOUTO TOLD L-8 TELL L-3 HE WOULD VISIT HIM NEAR FUTURE. STATION HOPES EXPLOIT SOUTO DEFECTION THROUGH L-3.

Dir 01703
Out 68527
4 Apr 62

No!

END OF MESSAGE

MEXI 1506
IN 34586
26 Jul 62

Dir 11250
Out 84385
21 May 62

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY O[illegible] THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

578

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 2 APR 62 DB

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : TFW 10*

INFO : DO/P, COP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 3 0019Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 12879

TO DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 0446

RE MEXI 0444 (IN 12825)

IDEN: CONSUELO ESPERON, MEXICAN SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR GYROSE USED.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO : RID/201 Section

DATE 2/8/6

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

FROM: TFW/REG GG2702

ROOM NO.

PHONE *6572

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO. [illegible]

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [illegible]

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

NAME VARIANT

10 TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)

VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA

11. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH [illegible]

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible]

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION [illegible]

CODE [illegible]

15. CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

16. AFFILIATION CODE B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION *(Clear text)*

19. ORG/GROUP CODE

20. OCCUPATION/POSITION *(Clear text)* SECRETARY DCI-JULY 62

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION

22. ACTION DESK MEX

23. CODE [illegible]

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

26. CRYPTONYM

27. PSEUDONYM

COMMENTS

SIGNATURE

30. IDN-

201- [illegible]

831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

14-00000

E 2 MEXICO CITY 2322 S E C R E T

I ADVISED SUITABLE OPERATOR AVAILABLE BY 1 JUNE. PER DISCUSSION WITH
ZCO, LIRING-3 TO PROCEED TAPACHULA 1 AUG TO PICK UP CONTACT
TRUCTIONS FOR INITIAL CONTACT GUAT CITY, RETURN MEXICO CITY AND
EED BY AIR TO GUAT CITY AND MONTES MEETING IN MOUNTAINS
BABLY WEEK 7 AUG. STATION HOWEVER WILL INSIST LIRING-3 DELAY
IG TAPACHULA UNTIL DISCREPANCIES HIS STORY CAN BE RESOLVED WITH
SESWIRL. ROWTON WILL AWAIT SGSWIRL OPERATOR BEFORE HAVING FINAL
DOWN WITH LIRING-3. IF DISCREPANCIES SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED IT
BE POSSIBLE SOMEHOW TO FOLLOW LIRING-3 TO MONTES MEETING, DE-
INE LOCATION AND ATTEMPT CAPTURE IN COOPERATION WITH GUAT LIAISON.
C R E T

SECRET

2-P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILMED
JAN 5 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
C PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 2.

References : A. HMMA-35905, 27 November 1968
B. MEXICO CITY-8228, 27 November 1968

1. Forwarded herewith as attachment #1 are four reports on the latest developments of the LIRING-3 operation prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON and dated 5, 10, 11, and 12 December. The most important points covered in these reports are as follow:

a. LIRING-3 made contact on 5 December with one Humberto*GONZALEZ Vega (no Station traces), who has apparently been designated by the FAR as the latter's contact with LIRING-3 in Mexico City. A description and a sketch of GONZALEZ provided by LIRING-3 are contained in ROWTON's 10 December report.

Continued.....................

Re: connection with 201-798301

Attachments:
1. Reports (4), h/w
2. Letter (1), u/s/c
3. Identity sheet (1), u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each #1 and #2; 3 copies att #3)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each #1 and #2; 2 copies att #3)

s/c att: 2
h/u att: 1

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 36114

DATE
27 December 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 36114

b. According to GONZALEZ, Identity D, who left for Guatemala with LIRING-3 and, according to the latter, was probably executed after a period of detention, may still be alive and may have made a "deal" with the Guatemalan authorities. Identity D had apparently misappropriated FAR funds before going to Guatemala. LIRING-9's remarks to LIRING-3, as mentioned in ROWTON's report of 5 December, may be connected with Identity D's misdoings.

c. LIRING-3 hinted to LIRING-9 that he may accept a teaching job at the University of Jalapa. (Such a job was indeed recently offered to him.) LIRING-9 advised LIRING-3 not to accept this as he would much rather send him on a trip to PBRUMEN.

d. From a letter received from Gustavo *COLINDRES Barrios, LIRING-3 gathered that the *BARRIOS brothers (Miguel and Juan Leon) may soon be released and may, in fact, contact him in Mexico City. The original text of that letter and its envelope are forwarded under separate cover as attachment #2. LIRING-3 interpreted some remarks made to him by Humberto GONZALEZ as another indication of a possible contact by the BARRIOS brothers in the near future. LIRING-3 plans to write back to the address given by COLINDRES and mention that he is in contact with GONZALEZ in the hope of getting a reaction from COLINDRES.

Cit. Guatemala
Guatemala

2. The Station plans to check further the identity given by GONZALEZ. Among other things, an attempt will be made via LIKAYAK-2 to check whether a file in that name exists in the archives of the Mexican Ministry of "Gobernacion." The Station may, at a later date, attempt spot surveillance of GONZALEZ. Meanwhile, any information that can be provided by the Guatemala City Station to further identify GONZALEZ would be appreciated.

for Willard C. CURTIS

XX BARRIOS, Miguel (201-216006)
X BARRIOS, JUAN Leon

[illegible] att. 3

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

SECRET

HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO
HMMA-37739
21 Aug 69

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. Agent Cryptonym: LIRING-3

2. Project: LIEVINE

3. Agent Recruited By: Wallace P. HOLTON

4. Capacity in Which Agent Served: Access agent to Cuban Embassy; Informant on Central American revolutionary groups and activities.
5. Rate of Pay: Did not receive regular salary, but was given between 3000 and 3500 Mexican pesos per month. (Equivalent to $240 to $280).
6. Other Commitments: None

7. Agent Dismissed By: Leonard S. TORMET. Dismissal effective 1 July 1969.

8. Reason for Dismissal: Agent in effect terminated himself, since he failed to initiate contact with Station after being turned over to TORMET by HOLTON.

9. Security Risks: LIRING-3 was not made witting of [illegible] interest in this case. He knew both HOLTON and TORMET in alias. No safehouses were exposed to LIRING-3. LIRING-3 was met once in TORMET's QF vehicle.

10. ~~Security Risks:~~

11. Manner of Dismissal: As stated above, no direct dismissal was made, since LIRING-3 broke off contact with the Station.

12. Letter of Termination Signed: No

13. Cost of Termination: None

14. Station Case Officer: Leonard S. TORMET Leonard S. Tormet
(Signature in Pseudonym)
Acting
15. Chief of Station: Horace E. PROLLETT Horace E Prollett
(Signature Pseudonym)

APPROVED:
WH CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
Sep. 18, 1969

SECRET

REVIEWED:
Special Contracting Officer

h/w att. 1

HMMA-37739

CS COPY

201-798301

Attachment #1
HMMA-36114

5 December, 1968

MICROFILMED
JAN 6 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

EP

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date and Site of Meeting: 1100, 5/12/68; Identity A
3. Next Meeting: 1700, 6/12/68; Iden A
4. Administrative: Rowton asked LIRING/3 to rent a small apartment that they could use as a safehouse, in lieu of Iden A, for the future. This was not only in the interest of economy, for for are obvious security reasons. Rowton gave LIRING/3 1,500 pesos as an advance for this purpose.
5. Reports/Information Passed by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had dropped into the LIRING office on 4/12/68 in the hope of running into the LIRING Chief so that he could mention to him casually the proposed trip to PBRUMEN at the end of the month. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he did not see the Chief inasmuch as he was intercepted by LIRING/9. The latter appeared as cordial as on the previous occasion, but this time made a brief reference to LIRING/3's report. He asked: "Are you sure you included everything?" L/3 told Rowton that he replied in a rather puzzled tone, "Of course. Everything, that is, that I could remember." To which L/9 explained: "I mean about the 'motivos' of the arrest. It seems there's more to it than you wrote. We have some interesting data on that subject. We'll discuss it with you on Friday." LIRING/3 then reported to Rowton that when he and LIRING/4 dropped in to Identity B on 3/12/68 the secretary of the Director, Identity C, gave them a message that a person by the name of Humberto Gonzalez Vega, residing at Calle Manzanillo 42, in apartment 8, had visited Iden B several times asking for the address of LIRING/3.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that he attempted to contact Humberto Gonzalez Vega at the address given on 4/12/68 but was told by a woman of about 35 years of age with a slight Guatemalan accent that he was out at the time. She took L/3's address with interest and suggested that L/3 return after 1500 the following day in the event Gonzalez did not contact him at his home. L/3 told Rowton that he guessed (and hoped that this was "Pavel".

h/w att:1
HMMA-36114

CS COPY

201-795301

ATTACHMENT #1
HMMA-36114

10 December,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with Humberto González Vega.

1. At 1000 on 9/12/68 at Identity A , LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had met with Humberto González Vega on 5 and 6 December. He related that he had gone back to the apartment on Calle Manzanillo on the afternoon of 5 December, met González and made a date to see him again on the morning of 6 December. When he returned about 1030 on that day González' wife said that he had just stepped out to telephone the embassy of Ecuador. L/3 went out and found González at a nearby telephone booth and managed to have a relatively detailed chat with him.

2. According to L/3, González sarted off by saying that he had been looking forward to meeting L/3 for some time, since he had heard a great deal about him from mutual friends. González went on to say that although he had been away from Guatemala for the past four years, he kept in touch with his friends there. He dropped the names of Sandoval Alegría, Jorge Torrón and a certain Avecillas (phon) who he assumed were known to LIRING/3. He concluded his introductory remarks with the statement that he hoped he and L/3 would become friends, since they could be of mutual help.

3. González added that he was making a living selling books and was planning to open a book store at the University. He indicated that he might be able to help L/3 financially if the latter were interested in this business venture. González then stated that he was aware of L/3's arrest and detention and alleged that he had advance information concerning L/3's trip to Guatemala in the company of Identity D . He then asked L/3 whether he knew the real purpose of Iden D trip. When L/3 replied in a non-committal way, González alleged thatIden Dhad been accused of misappropriation of funds and took the trip in the hope of defending himself against these charges, González then produced a typewritten letter, undated and addressed to himself and signed by "Cruz", advising him of the charges againstIden D.González told L/3 that the letter was from FAR headquarters and was received some time beforeIden Dand L/3 left on their trip.

4. González then went on to say that he and his friends were not at all certain thatIden Dhad been executed,as L/3 and many other people assumed. He stated that some months ago Iden D mother in Mexico City had received a letter from him informing her that he was then at Salamá (phon). González added that it was not to be excluded thatIden Dhad made some sort of deal with the authorities to save his skin in exchange for services he might perform against Far in the future.

5. González then cautioned L/3 against indiscriminate contacts with persons

representing themselves to be from legitimate "revolutionary" movements. González recounted that he himself ~~had~~ to go into hiding for the previous two months as a result of his having been exposed to a certain Nuñez who had arrived in Mexico City with a group of Guatemalan exiles. González described Nuñez as a known member of the "Mano Blanca" and a former police officer ("tercero jefe de la Judicial").

6. González then asked L/3 whether he had made any close friends while in Guatemala. This, L/3 felt, was an attempt to smoke out his relationship with the Barrios brothers (Miguel and Juán León Barrios). He told Rowton that he evaded the issue by giving a vague reply, to which González replied: "Well, I hope to have a great surprise for you soon ('alegría')" González then suggested that they meet again on 12 December and promised to visit L/3 at his home in the company of his wife, "so that L/3's and his wife could keep each other company while they themselves were talking in L/3's apartment." L/3 told Rowton that he shot this idea down by explaining that although his wife was revolutionary and trustworthy, he preferred to keep any politicial discussions strictly between himself and González. The latter then suggested that he simply drop by L/3's house and that they both proceed somewhere for a coffee on a suitable pretext.

7. LIRING/3 described Humberto González Vega as a "rather tall" man (about 1.78) heavy (about 85-90 k.), apparent age 42, with light eyes ("ojos claros") and straight ("lacio") black hair. He drew Rowton the attached sketch for possible identification.

8. LIRING/3 agreed with Rowton that it was advisable for him to tell LIRING/9 at his next meeting of his contact with González Vega to provoke a reaction from the LIRING establishment.

Wallace B. Rowton

HUMBERTO GONZÁLEZ VEGA

40-45 años
alto ~~1.68~~ 1.78
ojos claros
85-90 K.
pelo negro lacio



14-00000

ATTACHMENT #1
HMMA-36114

11 December, 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with LIRING/9 and LIRING/10.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1300 on 10 December, 1968, that he had finally succeeded in talking again with LIRING/9. He related that when he went/the LIRING office as requested at about 1030 on 9/12/68 he was told by the receptionist that LIRING/9 was still out. L/3 was asked to telephone later, about 1300, to check whether L/9 had returned. LIRING/3 telephoned, as requested, a little after 1300 (in Rowton's presence) but was told that LIRING/9 had not returned. L/3 left a message for L/9 that he would come to his office again the following morning.

2. LIRING/3 continued that he reappeared at the LIRING office about the same time the next day (10/12/68) and was told this time by the receptionist (the wife of LIRING/10's assistant) that LIRING/9 was in. At this moment LIRING/9 himself emerged from his office with papers in his hand, winked at LIRING/3 and returned without addressing him. A few minutes later L/3 was told by the receptionist that L/9 would see him. The following is Rowton's reconstruction of the conversation that took place between LIRING/3 and LIRING/9, based on L/3's report to Rowton:

L/9: "Come in. I'm sorry I couldn't see you Friday or yesterday. I was out of town."

L/3: "It's alright with me, except that I have a number of things pending as far as my own plans are concerned."

L/9: "Well, how are you doing?"

L/3: "Fairly well. I just received a letter from my good friend, Prof. Carlo Antonio Castro of the University of Veracruz. He has been insisting that I go down to Jalapa to see him. He wants to organize an exposition and also to offer me an interesting position at the University."

L/9: "But would that mean that you would have to stay in Jalapa?"

L/3: "Yes, of course; that is, if I accept. It's a tempting solution to my personal problems. As I told you I'm still 'up in the air'."

L/9: "But I don't think that's the solution. A trip would be much better."

L/3: "Yes, but I have to make a decision soon. Also my wife received a letter from her father inviting her to New York. Here's the letter. Do you want to read it?"

L/9: "No. What does it say?"

L/3: "Her father says that he can give her medical certificates to prove he is very sick so that she can get a visa without any difficulty."

L/9: "But as I said before, she shouldn't go to the American Embassy. Keep her away from it. That would be bad, as I explained last time."

L/3: "I'm doing my best, but it's not easy. Things are still up xx in the air with us."

(At about this moment in the conversation, LIRING/10 entered the office, and, after greeting LIRING/9 rather perfunctorily, carried on the following conversation with LIRING/3:)

L/10: "How have you been?"

L/3: "Rather well, thanks?"

L/10: "And your wife? Is she recovering from the strain?"

L/3: "Just about. The nightmare is finally over and she feels better now."

L/10: "WEll I hope you'll come by here often - as often as you xlike. We enjoy chatting with you."

(After this brief exchange, LIRING/10 left the office.)

L/3: "By the way, how is your Chief doing? I'd like to drop in to express my appreciation for the interest he xxxxxx and his wife showed in helping my wife during my absence."

L/9: "Well, he's not doing too well."

L/3: "Oh, another thing. I finally met that Guatemalan 'Pavel' I mentioned in my report."

L/9: "Yes, how did it go?"

L/3: "His name is Humberto González Vega. He's been in Mexico for some time. A former activist in the PTG. You must know him."

L/9: "Yes.

L/3: "He wants to see me again on Thursday for a more detailed talk."

L/9: "Fine. Well, I hope you keep coming around to see us whenever you can."

3. LIRING/3 commented to Rowton that he felt that LIRING/10's intrusion had not been coincidental, and that L/9 had advised him of L/3's arrival before he himself received L/3 into his office.

Wallace B. Rowton

ATTACHMENT #1
HMMA-36114

12 December,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Receipt of Letter from Gustavo Colindres.

1. LIRING/3 reportedto Rowton at 1700 on 12/12/68 that he had received a letter from Gustavo Colindres, a Guatemalan of about 40 years of age whom he had met in the Pavón prison in Guatemala City. LIRING/3 stated that Colindres is the uncle (mother's side) of the León Barrios brothers, although he does not have the same name of sra. Barrios. L/3 explained that they were born of different fathers. L/3 added that Colindres was imprisoned some 18 months ago for responsibility in an arms cache discovered in or near his home.

2. The following is Rowton's translation of the original letter which LIRING/3 gave Rowton for copying:

"I hope that when you arrived in your Mexico, you found only peace and satisfaction in being once again in the warmth of your home. Here on the farm we have missed you and felt badly at not hearing from the artist and the professor, and now that I have succeeded in obtaining your address, I am taking the liberty of dropping your a few lines. I want you both to keep abreast of what's going on at the old farm, even though we're still struggling to turn it over to new owners, but they haven't as yet agreed to the price. I guess I'll be the last to leave the ship, since I haven't a chance to get off. The lions are the next to leave their cage.'Lorenzana' left a month ago and the Queen left on the 2nd of December. Promise me that when you take a drink you'll toast the farm and the date that is approaching.

My best to your wife, kisses to your child.and my best wishes for your welfare. May this year of strange experiences engrave in your mind the memory of a friend.

Guat. 7/12/68

/s/ G.Colindres

Please send your correspondence to me in the name of my wife,Isabel Donis de Colindres, 5 av. y 7a Calle,lote 6-Manzana 26,Colonia Santa Marta, Zona 19,Guat.Cuidad,América Central. The address on the envelope is not correct.

3. LIRING/3 told Rowton he understood the "lions are next to leave their cage" to mean that the León Barrios brothers are soon to be released and that this letter is a signal to him to be on the alert for a contact from them in the near future. L/3 told Rowton that he intended to reply to this

letter at once,and to take the occasion to mention casually that he has met a Guatemalan in Mexico City by the name of Humberto González Vega who seems to know everyone there quite well. L/3 hopes that this will provoke some sort of comment from the León Barrios brothers wither directly or indirectly.

4. LIRING/3 stated that Gustavo Colindres, who is still in the Pavón prison, obviously smuggled out this letter through his wife who visits him regularly. L/3 commented that Colindres told him that he isa faithful FAR member, but refused to belong to the PTG, or even to accept the financial aid doled out at the Pavón prison by Francisco Corado,the PTG representative there.

Wallace B. Rowton

1P

S E C R E T

Separate Cover Attachment #3
HMMA-36114

MICROFILMED
JAN 6 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Identity Sheet

Identity A: Suites Marne

Identity B: Salón de la Plastica Mexicana

Identity C: Sra. Lourdes GOMEZ L. de Chumacero

Identity D: Francisco FR LARA Barrios

(201-832457)

S E C R E T

sk att 3
HMMA-36114

CS COPY

201-798301

ATTACHMENT #2
HMMA-36114

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM



Señor
Carlos Jurado [illegible]
Edificio Bandera 3-4 [illegible]
Pt. Veracruz México [illegible]

CORREO AEREO
VIA AIRMAIL

7c
GUATEMALA CORREO AEREO



STE Carlos Barrios 5-31 [illegible] Z. 2
Ciudad Guatemala C.A.

CORREOS
1968
ADMON.

sk att 2
HMMA-36114

CS COPY

201-798301

[illegible]:

Espero que al arribar a su México no hayan tenido otra cosa que solo tranquilidad y satisfacción de estar de nuevo en el calor familiar.

Hemos extrañado en la granja, el hermetismo del artista y el profesor, ya no supimos nada de Uds. y ya que conseguí su dirección, me tomo la libertad de dirigirle estas líneas, quiero que estén al día de las noticias de la granjita, aun seguimos luchando por dejarsela a nuevos dueños pero no han llegado al precio, yo creo que seré de los últimos en abandonar la nave, no tengo posibilidad para dejarla, ~~Sonzogna,~~ los leones ya están próximos para dejar la jaula, Sonzogna salió hace un mes, la Reyna se fue el 2 del mes que tenemos, Procúrame que al tomar una copa brinde por la finca y la fecha que se aproxima

Me saluda a la Señora, besos a la nena y recibiendo con la más sana intención por su bienestar, que este año de experiencias extrañas esculpan en su mente el recuerdo de un amigo,

Guat 7/12/65

Por favor su correspondencia a nombre de mi Esposa [illegible] de [illegible]
5a Av. y 5a calle lote 6 - Manzana 26 Colonia [illegible]
Vista. Zona 14 Guatemala América Central

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 PBRUMEN/LIRING-3 Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References : A. HMMA-35905, 27 November 1968
B. MEXICO CITY-8228, 27 November 1968

Forwarded under separate cover are Xerox copies of the handwritten report prepared by LIRING-3 and given by him, per reference B, to LIRING-9. The report was written in two instalments, the first titled "Situacion General" and the second titled "Antecedentes" and various other notes.

Raymond A. Fradyn.
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Report, u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/att - 2 copies)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/att - 1 copy)

s/c att:1

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 36115

DATE
27 December 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

S/c att: 1
HMMA - 36115

201-798301

Situación General:

Durante los días que permanecí en la celda 400 del 2º Cuerpo de policía tuve oportunidad de cambiar impresiones con Rolando Ortiz "Cebollita" sobre la situación general de Guatemala especialmente de FAR. por aquel entonces Cesar Montes había sido destituido y se iniciaba una campaña de terrible represión por parte del gobierno; de acuerdo con las informaciones se desprende lo siguiente: La división entre PGT y FAR provocó una situación difícil pero algunos miembros del PGT renunciaron a éste y pasaron a las filas de FAR. aunque teóricamente el PGT dice apoyar la ~~[illegible]~~ lucha armada e incluso ~~[illegible]~~ disponer de contingentes en la montaña (Zona de Zacapa?) lo cierto es que provoca más la división y no apoya en lo más mínimo la línea de FAR esto es a grandes rasgos ya que los detalles son bien conocidos. En los últimos tiempos el PGT ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ trata de ahondar ~~[illegible]~~ más las divergencias. Como ejemplo doy la situación que presencié en Pavón, donde el representante del PGT trataba de ganar adeptos entre los presos pertenecientes a FAR ofreciéndoles ayuda económica - insistiendo en que su línea (lí. de FAR) es equivocada en muchos aspectos.

Al ser nombrado Yon Sosa Comandante General se esperaba que el grupo 13 de noviembre se aglutinara. En teoría esta aglutinación se llevó a cabo, pero en la práctica se ha demostrado que este grupo sigue actuando por su cuenta anárquicamente.

Todas estas circunstancias: divisiones, falta de organización, falta de madurez ideológica etc. han traído por consecuencia un debilitamiento de la lucha armada en Guatemala. A esto contribuye el fortalecimiento cada día mayor de las fuerzas represivas obra de los norteamericanos. Un ejército equipado con las armas más modernas asesorado y entrenado por ellos, controla cada vez más la situación en la montaña. La consecuencia de todo esto ha sido la intensificación de la guerrilla urbana. Los jóvenes de FAR han tenido que bajar a la ciudad y hacen esfuerzos desesperados pero anárquicos para efectuar acciones que muchas veces, muerte del Embajador Gordon Main por ejemplo, traen consecuencias negativas, ya que las fuerzas del Gobierno intensifican la represión acabando con cuadros valiosos y necesarios. En la montaña se han sufrido reveses muy grandes, la muerte de Nestor Valle, Efigenio, la de Camilo en la Ciudad etc. han debilitado aún más las acciones de FAR, pues las especiales circunstancias que hoy se viven en Guatemala impiden la rápida sustitución de estos cuadros. La falta de fondos para financiamiento es uno de los problemas mas grandes, pues actualmente el dinero tiene que conseguirse a base de asaltos a empresas comerciales, dando por resultado muchas veces, que por conseguir una cantidad pequeña han muerto varios revolucionarios.

En mis charlas con los hermanos de Ton Barrios se me hizo notar el sentido negativo que algunos aspectos de la ayuda Cubana representa. Se criticó duramente a los cuadros que se formaban allá, pues según dicen, en las a veces largas estancias en Cuba se inadaptaban a la realidad Guatemalteca, o, provocando a su vuelta conflictos a veces serios. El ejemplo más concreto es el reciente caso de César Montes, destituido por no haberse incorporado a su realidad en el momento necesario.

En Guatemala existe un fuerte nacionalismo, por esto los jóvenes de FAR rechazan cierto tipo de ayuda procedente de Cuba; se habla mucho allí entre ellos de fracasos dirigidos por los Cubanos formados allá y de un supuesto ofrecimien- ~~[illegible]~~ to Cubano de ayudarlos incluso con hombres.

Por ahora, hablando francamente, la lucha en Guatemala se ha debilitado. Los golpes sufridos han sido muchos y fuertes y es de extrema urgencia una reorganiza-ción [redacted]

Uno de los aspectos más necesarios para el desarrollo de la lucha armada

de Guatemala es una mayor comprensión
de la situación interna de ese país, y prestar
por lo consiguiente la ayuda más adecuada.
Es verdad que el [illegible] fortalecimiento de
esta lucha será a largo plazo, pero para ello
es necesario que la ayuda sea más efectiva
y realista, de acuerdo con las opiniones de
los hermanos de León Barros, elementos
jóvenes pero entusiastas y valiosos, [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] (ellos trabajan
[illegible]
uno en servicio de inteligencia, otro ab anticomunistas)
yo Tengo que seguir trabajando [illegible]-
[illegible] con las FAR; la especial situación
de América, mis experiencias personales y
la confianza que ellos me depositan han
hecho que mantenga mis contactos, espe-
rando por estos días la llegada de una
persona muy responsable que me busca-
rá con el nombre de PAVEL, para seguir
trabajando en un sentido positivo.

14-00000

El día 13 de abril de 1968, Francisco Galdatz
Sara Barrios (Guatemalteco)

Antecedentes

En México y por conducto de Carlos Perzabal Amaral, establecí contacto con F. A. S. Barrios Amarcué, quien según se me informó, era Guatemalteco, miembro/FAR ~~de~~ encargado de la pro- ~~[illegible]~~ paganda en esta ciudad. Sara Barrios tenía necesidad de hacer un viaje a Guatemala, pero dada su situación de exilado político no podía abandonar el país en forma legal y por ese motivo se me pidió ayuda, ya que por tener conocimiento de la región sur del país y además un pequeño negocio establecido en San Cristobal las Casas estaba la posibilidad de llevar a Sara Barrios hasta la Ciudad de Guatemala.

A través de varias pláticas tenidas con él, se llegó a la conclusión de que además de realizar dicho viaje, podríamos hacer algunos movimientos que tuvieran por finalidad prestar una ayuda efectiva a las FAR.

Fue entonces que se elaboró un plan, cuya realización quedaría sujeta a la aprobación de elementos directivos en Guatemala. Inicialmente este plan consistía en el establecimiento de un negocio de impresiones en Honduras; es decir estudiar las posibilidades en ese país para montar una pequeña maquina de ofsett para editar un Teleguía que pudiera servir en otros países Centroamericanos inclusive Guatemala. Pero Barrios tenía conocimientos de este tipo de negocio, ya que según me informó, había trabajado antes en varias compañías de Publicidad. El criterio principal de esto era el de colaborar para obtener, por esos medios, ayuda financiera para las FAR. Con esa intención y desde antes, yo había montado ~~en~~ en San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, un negocio ~~paralelo~~ de impresiones tipográficas con la razón social de "EMARDEL de San Cristobal"

Para realizar el viaje se pensaron en varias de las posibilidades más seguras. La mejor, dada la seguridad que proporcionaba, era conseguir documentación mexicana para Sara ir. Para el efecto elaboré, con la mayor perfección posible una credencial de maestro de la SEP, ya que un documento de este tipo es suficiente para obtener visado en la frontera.

En los últimos días antes de realizar dicho viaje y ya teniendo todo preparado, Sara Barrios me informó que Carlos Perzabal y su esposa Teresa Posada querían acompañarnos pues tenían motivos ~~[illegible]~~ para ir. Como la situación que esto planteaba era difícil me opuse al viaje de estas personas, pero Sara Barrios argumentó que tenían necesidad de entrevistar con motivos periodísticos a algunas personalidades en Guatemala. Las discusiones al respecto se prolongaron varios días pues no era conveniente mezclar dos tipos de trabajo en un viaje que de por sí tenía sus riesgos; por entonces surgieron varios inconvenientes que fueron retrasando dicho viaje, uno de ellos fue que Sara Barrios — quien era el encargado de la misión — se hirió accidentalmente la mano con una pistola calibre 25 al hacer

una práctica de tiro, y otro que por esta causa
hubo necesidad de posponer la salida y buscar
un medio más adecuado, por lo que se
recurrió por mi parte a conseguir que una persona
de confianza nos llevara en automóvil ~~para~~,
dicha persona fue Raúl Moreno quien se prestó
para hacerlo. Los detalles sobre todo esto son
variados y obran en este informe, pero hay
que hacer notar que hubo muchos incidentes
y errores por parte de todos los que íbamos
a participar en esa misión.

El 18 de abril de 1968 salimos de la
Ciudad de México, Fco Adalberto Lara Barrios,
Carlos Perzabal y ~~[illegible]~~ un
Raúl Moreno, pues la señora Teresa Posada desis-
servidos, pues la señora Teresa Posada desis-
tió del viaje debido a que estaba embarazada
y se consideró peligroso para ella.

Durante el trayecto y a la altura
de Matías Romero Oaxaca, debido a la
alta velocidad a que conducía Moreno
el automóvil, sufrimos un aparatoso acci-
dente que dejó seriamente dañado el
automóvil. Al llegar a Tuxtla Raúl
Moreno habló por teléfono con su

familia para informar del accidente y
nos dijo que le pedían volviera pues su padre
había sufrido un infarto cardiaco. Él a Todos
nosotros nos llevó hasta San Cristobal, desde
donde nosotros continuaríamos el viaje.

Carlos Perzabal llevaba consigo unas publi-
caciones de TAR impresas en la imprenta
del Dr. Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, las
que había ocultado entre las páginas de unas
revistas de modas, pero de un modo tan
visible que no creímos oportuno que
las llevara. Al llegar a las oficinas ~~[illegible]~~ de
inmigración
Ciudad Cuauhtémoc en un Taxi de alquiler
procedimos a documentarnos para el paso a
Guatemala. La Credencial que se elaboró
para Lara Barrios funcionó perfectamente
y le fue dado un permiso para viajar en
Guatemala válido por Tres meses. En ese lugar
y dado que no habíamos Tenido dificultad
alguna y para no entorpecer nuestro movimien-
to, Tanto Lara Barrios como yo le pedimos
a Perzabal que no llevara las revistas, a
lo que accedió depositándolas en una barraca
cerca de la frontera usada como letrina.

El paso se hizo sin dificultad apa-siente, sólo que Sara Barrios debía obtener un permiso del Cónsul de Guatemala, trámite usual para todos los turistas. El Consulado de Guatemala que debería funcionar en Comitán o Cdad. Cuauhtémoc, se encuentra por extrañas razones en La Mesilla, dentro del territorio guatemalteco. Sara Barrios se puso un tanto nerviosa cuando acudimos al Cónsul para el permiso, mismo que éste extendió sin dificultad. No obstante pensamos que el nerviosismo de Sara Barrios le provocó alguna sospecha misma ~~que le hizo haber~~ ~~con el Chofer del Taxi quien pudo haberse hablado~~ ~~al Cónsul~~ que después confirmamos pues las autoridades guatemaltecas (después de haber sido detenidos) nos mostraron las revistas donde Pezzabal había escondido las publicaciones de FAR, y que sólo pudieron haber sido obtenidas por el Cónsul quizá proporcionadas por el Chofer del Taxi que nos llevó, ~~[illegible]~~ y que tomamos en Comitán, ya que éste durante el trayecto nos habló de su amistad con el Cónsul y seguramente se pudo dar cuenta de que "algo sospechoso" dejó Pezzabal en la banca.

En la mesilla, después de pasar la aduana donde se nos hizo una revisión superficial y donde estuvo presente el Cónsul, abordamos una Camioneta de pasajeros rumbo a Huehuetenango, pero al ir en esta nos dimos cuenta que este señor nos rebasó en su automóvil.

Al llegar a la garita de inspección en el Campamento militar "EL CABLE" fuimos detenidos quien tenía grado de C. por indicaciones de dicho Cónsul quien ordenó al oficial nos incomunicara. Antes de bajar de la Camioneta y al darnos cuenta de que había problema, Sara Barrio me entregó una serie de documentos que llevaba (pasaporte auténticos, cédula de vecindad etc) mismos que por fortuna pudimos desaparecer antes del registro que el oficial nos practicó después, echándolos por entre las hendeduras de la barraca prefabricada donde nos encerraron.

Por desgracia al practicársenos el registro a Carlos Perzabal le fueron ... encontradas un par de botas soviéticas, una entrevista inconclusa con Nestor Valle, un carnet de la Universidad de la Habana y otros documentos. A partir de ese momento quedamos a disposición del ejército suponiendo que seríamos asesinados. Del Campamento el "Cable" fuimos trasladados por la policía militar Ambulante a otro Campamento en el poblado de "Buenos aires" en el Depto. de Huehuetenango. El Transporte se hizo en un Camión de Carga que nos llevó primero a Huehuetenango donde Perzabal fue brevemente interrogado por un Coronel quien nos dijo que seríamos fusilados. En el poblado de Buenos aires fuimos interrogados y maltratados durante Toda la noche, los interrogatorios fueron hechos por separado. Al día siguiente fuimos Trasladados a Guatemala en un avión de las FAG # 540, quien fue enviado por el ministro de la Defensa, mismo que nos recibió en el aeropuerto militar la noche del día 14. Todavía dentro del avión, y ya en el Campo, subió a bordo de este un un Teniente coronel con uniforme militar ~~[illegible]~~ quien me preguntó de manera violenta si yo me llamaba "Efigenio".

Del aeropuerto militar, fuimos trasladados al 2º Cuerpo de la policía (Pezabales y yo en una camioneta, Sara en un jeep) donde fuimos incomunicados en las bartolinas de la celda Nº "400". Durante varias noches fuimos sometidos a ~~[illegible]~~ "interrogatorios". Quiénes éramos, a quienes íbamos a ver, eran ~~#~~ la preocupación que tenían. En la celda 400 estaban presos algunos miembros de las FAR, los hermanos de León Barrios (Juan José y Miguel), así como el conocido por "Cebollita", ~~[illegible]~~ acusado del atentado a la base militar de "los Cipresales" y miembro destacado de las FAR. A estos compañeros Sara Barrios informé con detalle de lo que nos había sucedido. El día 20 de abril pudimos ~~[illegible]~~ enviar clandestinamente a la prensa una nota escrita en una caja vacía de cigarros que publicó el diario "EL GRÁFICO" el día 21 de abril. Por este motivo fuimos visitados por el Cónsul de México al día siguiente, e-vitando así el primer intento de asesinato contra nosotros. Para Barrios para entonces había sido identificado ya como Guatemalteco.

Al hacerse pública nuestra detención las autoridades Guatemaltecas inventaron un delito: "repartir propaganda subversiva en las calles de la Ciudad" y fuimos consignados por esto a un Juzgado para ser sujetos a "un juicio".

El 26 de abril fuimos Trasladados al Campo de Concentración "Granja Penal Pavón" en una Cuerda donde También iba el "cebollita" y posiblemente Sara, Barrios a quien dejamos de ver el día que fuimos consignados y Trasladados a la Crujía general. En el Camino a Pavón desapareció "cebollita" a quien según el parte policíaco, "secuestraron sus compañeros" pero que fue arrestado por la policía.

A la Granja Penal Pavón llegamos en compañía de los hermanos de León Ramos quienes fueron nuestros compañeros durante los meses que allí permanecimos y donde pude conocer más a fondo la realidad de Guatemala y establecer contactos para seguir trabajando posteriormente.

Durante esos meses (casi 7) tuve una estrecha comunicación con estos dos muchachos, quienes por sus condiciones, pudieron explicarme la verdadera situación de las FAR en relación con la situación general del país.

Es necesario hacer notar que en ese tiempo estaban recluidos allí 9 miembros del PGT esperando la sentencia de los Tribunales. El representante del grupo, Fco Coradolera quien administraba los fondos que recibía para repartir entre los presos políticos, fondos de los cuales no aportó nunca nada a ningún miembro de las FAR. Cuando nosotros llegamos trató de "asimilarnos", pero cuando yo le dijo que no pertenecía a ningún partido ni menos de "Trotzkista" acusación que recibió por parte de Perzabal (que le mintió [illegible]) (se me hacía una investigación en México por parte de su señora esposa Teresa Losada.

Por su parte las FAR hicieron lo mismo constatando que yo no pertenecía a ningún grupo y terminando así con una situación molesta que se había generado.

A medida que pasó el tiempo fui haciendo amistad personal con estos muchachos; para entonces nos habían pedido, para enviar a la dirección del FAR, un informe a cada uno de nosotros de los motivos que nos llevaron a Guatemala. De manera franca y abierta quiero decir que Carlos Perzabal (quien en muchas circunstancias se portó bien) en este caso ocultó los verdaderos motivos de nuestra detención. Por fortuna y gracias a los informes que dio personalmente Sara Barrios a las FAR por conducto del "Cebollita" y los

hermanos de León, esto ya ~~[illegible]~~ sabían se conocían.
Me veo obligado a mencionar esto, ya
que durante el tiempo que estuvimos
encarcelados, la ~~[illegible]~~ Sra. Teresa Posada
y la señora mamá de Pezajal así como
el Sr. Manuel Marcué Pardiñas,
propagaron falsos informes en contra de
mi esposa, haciéndola aparecer como
"delatora" agente de la Cia, etc. etc; in-
fluidos ciegamente para ocultar respon-
sabilidades y por problemas de índole
personal que nunca debieron mezclar.
Así mismo quiero dejar bien claro que
por lo que a esto respecta ~~[illegible]~~ estoy dispuesto
a deslindar responsabilidades frente
a ellos, si es que insisten en esa posición.

Impresiones con "CEBOLLITA"
(situación de FAR, sugestiones trabajo futuro etc)

fraccionalismo radical entre los diversos
Grupos (PGT, 13 nov. FAR) motivo del Fraccio-
nalismo, rompimiento con el PGT, asimilación
del 13 de nov. Nombrando a Yon Sosa 1er
Comandante. Críticas buenas y malas
a Cuba, motivos de las críticas.

falta de comprensión atribuida por las FAR a Cuba en los problemas internos de Guatemala;* indebido uso de los fondos proporcionados, etc. Crítica a los cuadros formados en la Habana, quienes al regresar no se integraban a la realidad de las necesidades de las FAR.

Situación actual de FAR.

Anarquía, falta de organización, debilitamiento, elementos jóvenes con entusiasmo pero sin formación ideológica correcta y medios materiales. Un "profesional de FAR" percibe un promedio de Q40.00 al mes para su trabajo.

Fortalecimiento del Gobierno, expansión del Ejército con la ayuda de USA.

Debilitamiento de las Guerrilla de montaña que obligan el trabajo en la Ciudad (Guerrillas urbanas y Terrorismo) que motiva a su vez una represión cada vez más fuerte y contraproducente.

Pérdida de cuadros valiosos: el Néstor Valle, Efigenio, "Cebollita" "el Barco, etc." debidas a falta de organización de medios y al fortalecimiento de las fuerzas represivas.

* Nacionalismo Guatemalteco que rechaza una ayuda directa en el sentido de participación activa por extranjeros, ellos no entienden por ese nacionalismo, que este tipo de ayuda es necesaria a veces para el desarrollo de la Rev. latinoamericana. Situación que no se planteó en mi caso gracias a la comprensión de la mentalidad guatemalteca por razones de ser chiapaneco y tener afinidades culturales de años con ellos.

Destitución de César Montes por motivo de haber estado mucho tiempo fuera y no integrarse a la lucha en el momento necesario; impresión que se tiene en Guatemala de algunos elementos Guatemaltecos que hace tiempo viven en Cuba.

Situación General:

Durante los días que permanecí en la celda 400 del 2º Cuerpo de policía tuve oportunidad de cambiar impresiones con Rolando Ortiz "Cebollita" sobre la situación general de Guatemala especialmente de FAR; por aquel entonces César Montes no había sido destituido y se iniciaba una campaña de terrible represión por parte del gobierno; de acuerdo con las informaciones se desprende lo siguiente: La división entre PGT y FAR provocó una situación difícil pero algunos miembros del PGT renunciaron a éste y pasaron a las filas de FAR, aunque teóricamente el PGT dice apoyar la ~~[illegible]~~ lucha armada e incluso ~~[illegible]~~ disponer de contingentes en la montaña (Zona de Zacapa?) lo cierto es que provoca más la división y no apoya en lo más mínimo la línea de FAR esto es a grandes rasgos ya que los detalles son bien conocidos. En los últimos tiempos el PGT ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ trata de ahondar ~~[illegible]~~ más las divergencias. Como ejemplo doy la situación que presencié en Pavón, donde el representante del PGT trataba de ganar adeptos entre los presos pertenecientes a FAR ofreciéndoles ayuda económica e insistiendo en que su línea (la de FAR) es equívoca en muchos aspectos.

Al ser nombrado Yon Sosa Comandante General [illegible] se esperaba que el Grupo 13 de noviembre se aglutinara. [illegible] [illegible] En teoría esta aglutinación se llevó a cabo, pero en la práctica se ha demostrado que este Grupo sigue actuando por su cuenta anárquicamente.

Todas estas circunstancias; divisiones, falta de organización [illegible], falta de madurez ideológica etc. han traído por consecuencia un debilitamiento de la lucha armada en Guatemala. A esto contribuye el fortalecimiento cada día mayor de las fuerzas represivas obra de los norteamericanos. Un ejército equipado con las armas más modernas asesorado y entrenado por ellos, controla cada vez más la situación en la montaña. La consecuencia de todo esto ha sido la intensificación de la guerrilla urbana. Los jóvenes de FAR han tenido que bajar a la ciudad y hacen esfuerzos desesperados pero anárquicos para efectuar acciones que muchas veces, muerte del Embajador Gordon Main por ejemplo, traen consecuencias negativas, ya que las fuerzas del gobierno ~~[illegible]~~ intensifican la represión acabando con cuadros valiosos y necesarios. En la montaña se han sufrido reveses muy grandes, la muerte de Néstor Valle, Efigenio, la de Camilo en la Ciudad etc. han debilitado aún más las acciones de FAR, pues las especiales circunstancias que hoy se viven en Guatemala impiden la rápida sustitución de estos cuadros. La falta de fondos para financiamiento es uno de los problemas más grandes, pues actualmente el dinero tiene que conseguirse a base de asaltos a empresas comerciales, dando por resultado muchas veces, que por conseguir una cantidad pequeña han muerto varios revolucionarios.

En mis charlas con los seminaristas de León Barrios se me hizo notar el sentido negativo que algunos aspectos de la ayuda cubana representa. Se criticó duramente a los cuadros que se formaban allá, pues según dicen, en las a veces largas estancias en Cuba se inadaptaban a la realidad Guatemalteca, se mueve a su vuelta conflictos a veces serios. El ejemplo más concreto es el reciente caso de César Montes, destituido por no haberse incorporado a su realidad en el momento necesario.

En Guatemala existe un fuerte nacionalismo. Por esto los jóvenes de FAR rechazan cierto tipo de ayuda procedente de Cuba; se habla mucho allí entre ellos de fracasos obtenidos por los cuadros formados allá y de un supuesto ofrecimiento Cubano de ayudarlos incluso con hombres.

Por ahora, hablando francamente, la lucha en Guatemala se ha debilitado. Los golpes sufridos han sido muchos y fuertes y es de extrema urgencia una reorganización

Uno de los aspectos más necesarios para el desarrollo de la lucha armada

de Guatemala - es una mayor comprensión
de la situación interna de ese país, y prestar
por lo consiguiente la ayuda más adecuada.
Es verdad que el ~~[illegible]~~ fortalecimiento de
esta lucha será a largo plazo, pero para ello.
es necesario que la ayuda sea más efectiva
y realista, de acuerdo con las opiniones de
los mexicanos de Jesús Barrios, elementos
jóvenes pero entusiastas y valiosos, ~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~ (ellos trabajan
~~[illegible]~~ otros abastecimientos.
unos en servicio de inteligencia,
yo Tengo que seguir Trabajando ~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~ con las FAR, la especial situación
de Tráfico, mis experiencias personales y
la confianza que ellos me depositan han
hecho que mantenga mis contactos, espe-
rando por estos días la llegada de una
persona muy responsable que me busca-
rá con el nombre de PAVEL, para seguir
Trabajando en un sentido positivo.

~~El día 13 de abril de 1968, Francisco~~ [redacted] ~~Lara Barrios (Guatemalteco).~~

Antecedentes

En México y por conducto de Carlos Perzabal Marcué, establecí contacto con F. A. L. Barrios Guatemalteco, quien según se me informó, era [illegible] miembro de las FAR ~~de~~ encargado de la propaganda en esta ciudad. Lara Barrios tenía necesidad de hacer un viaje a Guatemala, pero dada su situación de exilado político no podía abandonar el país en forma legal y por ese motivo se me pidió ayuda, ya que [illegible] por tener conocimiento de la región sur del país y además un pequeño negocio establecido en San Cristóbal las Casas estaba la posibilidad de llevar a Lara Barrios hasta la Ciudad de Guatemala.

A través de varias pláticas tenidas con él, se llegó a la conclusión de que podríamos, además de realizar dicho viaje, hacer algunos movimientos que tuvieran por finalidad prestar una ayuda efectiva a las FAR.

Fue entonces que se elaboró un plan, cuya realización quedaba sujeta a la aprobación de elementos directivos en Guatemala. Inicialmente este plan consistía en el establecimiento de un negocio de impresiones en Honduras, es decir estudiar las posibilidades en ese país para montar una pequeña maquina de offsett que pudiera servir para editar un Teleguía en otros países Centroamericanos inclusive Guatemala. Lara Barrios tenía conocimientos de este tipo de negocio, ya que según me informó, había trabajado antes en varias compañías de publicidad. El criterio principal de esto era el de colaborar para obtener, por esos medios, ayuda financiera para las FAR. Con esa intención y desde antes, yo había montado en San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, un negocio ~~similar~~ de impresiones serigráficas con la razón social de "EMARDEL de San Cristobal".

Para realizar el viaje se pensaron en varias de las posibilidades más seguras. La mejor, dada la seguridad que proporcionaba, era conseguir

documentación mexicana para Lara B.
Para el efecto elaboré, con la mayor perfección
posible una credencial de maestro de la SEP,
ya que un documento de este tipo es suficiente
para obtener visado en la frontera.

En los últimos días antes de realizar dicho
viaje y ya teniendo todo preparado, Lara
Barrios me informó que Carlos Pérez del Val
y su esposa Teresa Posada querían acompañarnos pues tenían motivos ~~[illegible]~~
para ir. Como la situación que esto planteaba era difícil me opuse al viaje de
estas personas, pero Lara Barrios argumentó que tenían necesidad ~~[illegible]~~ de entrevistar
con motivos periodísticos a algunas personalidades en Guatemala. Las discusiones
al respecto se prolongaron varios días pues no
era conveniente mezclar dos tipos de trabajo
en un viaje que de por sí tenía sus riesgos; por
entonces surgieron varios inconvenientes que
fueron retrasando dicho viaje, uno de ellos fue
que Lara Barrios — ~~[illegible]~~ quien era el encargado
de la misión — se hirió accidentalmente la
pierna con ~~#~~ una pistola calibre 25 al hacer

una práctica de uso, y otro que p esta Causa hubo necesidad de posponer la salida y buscar un medio más adecuado, ~~[illegible]~~ lo que se alcanzó por mi parte a Conseguir que una persona de Confianza nos llevara en automovil, ~~para~~ dicha persona fue Raúl Moreno quien se prestó: para hacerlo. Los detalles sobre Todo esto son variados y obvian en este informe, pero hay que hacer notar que hubo muchos incidentes y errores por parte de Todos los que íbamos a participar en esa misión.

El 10 de abril de 1968 salimos de la Ciudad de México, Fco Adalberto Lara Barrios, Raúl Moreno, Carlos Perzabal y ~~otro~~ mi servidor, pues la señora Teresa Losada desistió del viaje debido a que estaba embarazada y se consideró peligroso para ella.

Durante el Trayecto y a la altura de Matías Romero Oaxaca, debido a la alta velocidad a que Conducía Moreno el automóvil, sufrimos un aparatoso accidente que dejó seriamente dañado el automóvil. Al llegar a Tuxtla Raúl Moreno habló por Teléfono con su familia para informar del accidente y nos dijo que le pedían volviera pues su padre había sufrido un infarto cardiaco. Él todos juntos nos llevó hasta San Cristóbal, desde donde nosotros continuaríamos el viaje.

Carlos Perzabal llevaba consigo unas publicaciones de TAR impresas en la imprenta del Dr. Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, las que había ocultado entre las páginas de unas revistas de modas, pero de un modo tan visible que no creímos oportuno él que las llevara. Al llegar a las ~~aduana~~ oficinas de migración Ciudad Cuauhtémoc en un taxi de alquiler procedimos a documentarnos para el paso a Guatemala. La credencial que se elaboró para Lara Bamo funcionó perfectamente y le fué dado un permiso para viajar en Guatemala válido por tres meses. En ese lugar y dado que no habíamos tenido dificultad alguna y para no entorpecer nuestros movimientos, tanto Lara Bamo como yo le pedimos a Pizabal que no llevara las revistas, a lo que accedió depositándolas en una barraca cerca de la frontera usada como letrina.

El paso se hizo sin dificultad apa-

siente, sólo que Sara Barrios día obtener,
su permiso del Cónsul de Guatemala, trámi-
te usual para todos los Turistas. El Consulado
de Guatemala que deberá funcionar en Comitán
o Cd. Cuauhtémoc, se encuentra por extrañas
razones en la mesilla, dentro del Territorio
Guatemalteco. Sara Barrios se puso un
tanto nervioso cuando acudimos al Cónsul
para el permiso, aunque éste extendió
sin dificultad. No obstante pensamos que
el nerviosismo de Sara Barrios le provocó
alguna sospecha misma ~~que le hizo hablar~~
~~Con el Chofer del Taxi quien pudo haberse hablado~~ ~~el Cónsul~~
~~Co~~ que después confirmamos pues (después
~~te~~ las autoridades Guatemaltecas
de haber sido detenidos) nos mostraron
las revistas donde Pezal al había escondido
las publicaciones de FAR, y que sólo pudieron
haber sido obtenidas por el Cónsul quizá
proporcionadas por el Chofer del Taxi que
nos llevó, ~~[illegible]~~ y que tomamos en
Comitán, ya que éste durante el trayecto
nos habló de su amistad con el Cónsul
y seguramente se pudo dar cuenta de
que "algo sospechoso" dejó Pezabal
en la barraca.

En la mañana, después de pasar la aduana donde se nos hizo una revisión superficial y donde estuvo presente el Cónsul, abordamos una camioneta de pasajeros rumbo a Huehuetenango pero al ir en ésta nos dimos cuenta que este señor nos rebasó en su automóvil.

Al llegar a la garita de inspección en el Campamento militar "EL CABLE" fuimos detenidos por indicaciones de dicho Cónsul quien tenía ordenado quien ordenó el oficial nos incomunicara. Antes de bajar de la camioneta y al darnos cuenta de que habría problema, Sara Barrios me entregó una serie de documentos que llevaba (pasaporte auténtico, cédula de vecindad etc) mismos que por fortuna pudimos desaparecer antes del registro que el oficial nos practicó después, echándolos por entre las hendeduras de la barraca prefabricada donde nos encerraron.

Por desgracia al practicársenos el registro, a Carlos Perzabal le fueron encontradas un par de botas soviéticas, una entrevista inconclusa con Néstor Valle, mi carnet de la Universidad de la Habana y otros documentos. A partir de ese momento quedamos a disposición del ejército suponiendo que seríamos asesinados.

Del Campamento el "Cable" fuimos trasladados por la policía militar ambulante a otro Campamento en el poblado de "Buenos aires" en el Depto. de Huehuetenango. El Transporte se hizo en un Camión de Carga que nos llevó primero a Huehuetenango donde Perzabal fue brevemente interrogado por un Coronel quien nos dijo que seríamos fusilados. En el poblado de Buenos aires fuimos interrogados y maltratados durante toda la noche, los interrogatorios fueron hechos por separado. Al día siguiente fuimos trasladados a Guatemala en un avión de las FAG # 540, quien fue enviado por el ministro de la Defensa, mismo que nos recibió en el aeropuerto militar la noche del día 14. Todavía dentro del avión, aún en el Campo, subió a bordo de éste un posteriormente con uniforme militar quien me preguntó de manera violenta si yo me llamaba "Efigenio".

Del aeropuerto militar, fuimos trasladados al 2º Cuerpo de la policía (Pezabal y yo en una camioneta, Sara en un Jeep) donde fuimos incomunicados en las bartolinas de la celda Nº "400". Durante varias noches fuimos sometidos a "interrogatorios". Desconocíamos a qué nos íbamos a ver, eran la preocupación que teníamos. En la celda 400 estaban presos algunos miembros de las FAR, los hermanos de León Barrios (Juan José y Miguel, así como el conocido por "Cebollita", acusado del atentado a la base militar de "Los Cipresales" y miembro destacado de las FAR. A estos compañeros Sara Barrios informó con detalle de lo que nos había sucedido. El día 20 de abril pudimos enviar clandestinamente a la prensa una nota escrita en una caja vacía de cigarros que publicó el diario "EL GRAFICO" el día 21 de abril. Por este motivo fuimos visitados por el Cónsul de México al día siguiente, evitando así el primer intento de asesinato contra nosotros. Para Barrios para entonces había sido identificado ya como Guatemalteco.

Al hacerse pública nuestra detención las autoridades Guatemaltecas inventaron un delito "repartir propaganda subversiva en las calles de la Ciudad" y fuimos consignados por esto a un Juzgado para ser sujetos a "un juicio".

El 26 de abril fuimos Trasladados al Campo de Concentración "Granja Penal Pavón" en una Cuerda donde También iba el "cebollita" y posiblemente Para Barrios a quien dejamos de ver el día que fuimos consignados y Trasladados a la Crujía general. En el Camino a Pavón desapareció "cebollita" a quien según el parte policiaco, "secuestraron sus compañeros" pero que fue asesinado por la policía.

En la Granja Penal Pavón llegamos en compañía de los hermanos de León Barrios quienes fueron nuestros compañeros durante los meses que allí permanecimos y donde pude conocer más a fondo la realidad de Guatemala y establecer contactos para seguir trabajando posteriormente.

Durante esos meses (casi 7) tuve una estrecha comunicación con estos dos muchachos, quienes por sus condiciones, pudieron explicarme la verdadera situación de las FAR en relación con la situación general del país.

Es necesario hacer notar que en ese tiempo estaban recluidos allí 9 miembros del PGT esperando la sentencia de los Tribunales. El representante del Grupo, Fco Coradg era quien administraba los fondos que recibía para repartir entre los presos políticos, fondos de los cuales no aportó nunca nada a ningún miembro de las FAR. Cuando nosotros llegamos trató de "asimilarnos," pero cuando yo le dije que no pertenecía a ninguno partido me acusó de "Trotzkista" acusaban que (que es miembro del PGT) motivó por parte de Perzabal (se me hiciera una investigación en México por parte de su señora esposa Teresa Posada.

Por su parte las FAR hicieron lo mismo constatando que yo no pertenecía a ningún grupo y terminando así con una situación molesta que se había generado.

A medida que pasó el tiempo fui haciendo amistad personal con estos muchachos; para entonces no habían pedido, para enviar a la dirección del FAR, un informe a cada uno de nosotros de los motivos que nos llevaron a Guatemala. De manera franca y abierta quiero decir que Carlos Perzabal (quien en muchas circunstancias se portó bien) en este caso ocultó los verdaderos motivos de nuestra detención. Por fortuna y gracias a los informes que dio personalmente Sara Barrio a las FAR ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~antes~~ ~~[illegible]~~ por conducto del "Cebollita" y los hermanos de León, ésto ya lo conocían. Me veo obligado a mencionar ésto, ya que durante el tiempo que estuvimos encarcelados, la ~~[illegible]~~ Sra. Teresa Posada y la señora mamá de Penzabal así como el Sr. Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, propagaron falsos informes en contra de mi esposa, haciéndola aparecer como "delatora" agente de la CIA, etc. etc; influidos seguramente para ocultar responsabilidades y por problemas de índole personal que nunca debieron mezclar. Así mismo quiero dejar bien claro que por lo que a ésto respecta ~~[illegible]~~ estoy dispuesto a deslindar responsabilidades frente a ellos, si es que insisten en esa posición.

Impresiones con " CEBOLLITA "
(Situación de FAR, sugestiones trabajo futuro etc)

fraccionalismo radical entre los diversos grupos (PGT, 13 nov. FAR) motivo del fraccionalismo, rompimiento con el PGT, asimilación del 13 de nov. Nombrando a Yon Sosa 1er Comandante. Críticas buenas y malas a Cuba, motivos de las críticas.

falta de comprensión atribuida por las FAR a Cuba en los problemas internos de Guatemala;* indebido uso de los fondos proporcionados, etc. Crítica a los cuadros formados en la Habana, quienes al regresar no se integraban a la realidad de las necesidades de las FAR.

Situación actual de FAR.

anarquía, falta de organización, debilitamiento, elementos jóvenes con entusiasmo pero sin formación ideológica correcta y medios materiales. Un "profesional de FAR" percibe un promedio de Q40.00 al mes para su trabajo.

Fortalecimiento del Gobierno, expansión del Ejército con la ayuda de USA.

Debilitamientos de las guerrilla de montaña que obligan el Trabajo en la Ciudad (Guerrillas urbanas y Terrorismo) que motiva a su vez una represión cada vez más fuerte y contraproducente.

Pérdida de cuadros valiosos: Néstor Valle, Efigenio, "Cevallito" y el Barco, etc. debidas a falta de organización de medios y al fortalecimiento de las fuerzas represivas.

---

* Nacionalismo Guatemalteco que rechaza una ayuda directa en el sentido de participación activa por extranjeros, ellos no entienden por ese nacionalismo, que este tipo de ayuda es necesaria a veces para el desarrollo de la Rev. latinoamericana. Situación que no se planteó en mi caso gracias a la comprensión de la mentalidad guatemalteca por razones de ser chiapaneco y tener afinidades culturales de años con ellos.

Destitución de César Montes por motivo de haber estado mucho tiempo fuera y no integrarse a la lucha en el momento necesario; impresión que se tiene en Guatemala de algunos elementos guatemaltecos que hace tiempo viven en Cuba.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM Chief of Station, Guatemala City

SUBJECT PBRUMEN/LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Mexico City, please see Paragraph 3

REFERENCES : A. HMMA-35905, 27 November 1968
B. HMMA-35904, 27 November 1968

1. Guatemala City has the following information on Oscar Moises ROLDAN Espinoza, who is undoubtedly identifiable with the Oscar Moises ROLDAN E. who sent one of the letters to LIRING-3 forwarded with Reference A: ROLDAN was arrested by the Guatemalan National Police on 11 May [illegible], along with one Oscar Rolando ESTRADA Aldana, after robbing a taxi driver of his car. In his interrogation by the Guatemalan authorities, ROLDAN admitted to being a member of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). He stated that the car was to have been used for a kidnapping, but he refused to name the target of the planned kidnap attempt. (Note: ROLDAN named "CAMILO" (deceased FAR leader Carlos Francisco ORDONEZ Monteagudo), "ARMANDO" (unidentified FAR Urban Resistance leader), "JAIME" (Luis Felipe CARVAJAL, FAR Urban Resistance leader) and Percy Amilcar JACOBS de Leon, among others, as FAR members with whom he was in contact. This would tend to indicate that ROLDAN was an important militant in the FAR Urban Resistance Front.) According to information available to the Station, ROLDAN was consigned to the courts. He apparently was later sent to El Pavon prison, where he met LIRING-3.

2. A check of the files of Miguel and Juan Jose de LEON Barrios shows that the home address given by them to the police was the same as the return address on the letter sent to LIRING-3 by "Marta," the mother of the de LEON brothers.

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City
~~2-C/WHD~~

CS COPY

DEC 1 [illegible] 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HGGA- 9697

DATE
13 December 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301
[redacted]

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HCGA-9697

3. Guatemala City notes in the letter which LIRING-3 received from the mother of the de LEON brothers reference to greetings being sent from "Miguel, Elsa, La Negra, La Chiquita, Felisa, Maria Elena, and La Gordita." It is requested that LIRING-3 be queried for any details he can provide to further identify these individuals and any information he knows as to the FAR roles of these individuals. Equally, it is requested that LIRING-3 be queried for similar information on ROLDAN, whom he apparently knew as "Espinoza." Finally, Guatemala City will be greatly interested in all of the information LIRING-3 can provide on "PAVEL," including a full physical description, if and when he is put in contact with this individual. Since "PAVEL" is supposed to be a "genuine FAR representative," he may well turn out to be "Javier Contreras," or the "MIGUEL" known to [illegible]-1.

4. Per Paragraph 3 of Reference B, Guatemala City feels that it would be best to wait until LIRING-3 received a clear idea of what, if any, role he is to be given by LIRING, before any further direct discussions are necessary between Guatemala and Mexico City. As discussed during TORMET's recent visit, Guatemala City's interests would be best served if LIRING-3 can convince his LIRING contacts that he is now ready to help in PBRUMEN's efforts to support the FAR, that because of his poor financial position he will in the future be forced to work in a controlled fashion for LIRING, and that because of the contacts which he established with FAR leaders during his Guatemalan imprisonment he is trusted by the FAR and therefore can be influential in helping achieve LIRING's ends in its dealings with the FAR. Also, once LIRING-3 has been put into direct contact with the FAR support network in Mexico City, as he has been promised, we should have a clearer idea to what extent the FAR itself plans to utilize LIRING-3.

5. Guatemala City awaits with interest the results of LIRING-3's further discussions with LIRING.

6. For Headquarters: A seperate dispatch will be forwarded containing the information available to the Station on ROLDAN.

Leonard S. TORMET

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	/	6	C
2	/	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: DEC 12 3 52 PM '68

DISSEM BY 8 PER

ACTION COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

959

S E C R E T 12172Z DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8397

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

12 Dec 68 IN 53169

PBRUMEN

1. PER LITAINT-2 LIRING-10 LEAVING DEFINITELY FOR PBRUMEN 20 DEC. HAVING "DESPEDIDA" 12 DEC WHICH LITAINT-2 SCHEDULED ATTEND. REPLACEMENT TO BE LIRING-24. REPLACEMENT CONFIRMED BY LIRING-3 TO WHOM LIRING-10 INTRODUCED LIRING-24 AS "MY SUCCESSOR."

2. FILE 201-759016, 201-776733.

S E C R E T

WH/ file:
LIRING-10
LIRING-24
LIRING-3
} 201

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, Finance

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Transmittal of MOC for LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Forwarded herewith is a Memorandum of Oral Commitments for LIRING-3.

Raymond A. Frazier
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
MOC (1), h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/att - 2 copies)
2 - C/FINANCE (w/att - 1 copy)

1 h/w Att.

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 35908

DATE
29 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

S E C R E T

Attachment
HMMA-35908

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 29 November 1968

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LIRING-3 as Independent Contractor

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project LIRAVINE and is chargeable to LIRAVINE. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 December 1968 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been terminated. Type________. Date________196___.

320
2
640
320

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (XX) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid 4,000 per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 320.00 dollars. Subject ( ) will (XX) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to ________. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: None

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner:

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (x) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase of cost-of-living and quarters expenses:

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (x) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (x) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimbursed: operational entertainment, inducement payments, cover expenses.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation:

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

SIGNED Wallace B. ROWTON
CASE OFFICER

APPROVED Willard C. CURTIS
Field Contracting Office (COS)

REVIEWED:
Contract Approving Officer
Jan. 7, 1969

REVIEWED:
Special Contracting Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies of Hqs
1 - File P- 12729
1 - Support

S E C R E T

CS COPY

14-00000

Payroll ✓

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, Finance

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Transmittal of MOC for LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

CAAS

Action Required: FYI

Forwarded herewith is a Memorandum of Oral Commitments for LIRING-3.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
MOC (1), h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/att - 2 copies)
② - C/FINANCE (w/att - 1 copy)

31 DEC 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 35908

DATE: 29 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-798301

SECRET

ATTACHMENT
HMMA-35908

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 29 November 1968

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LIRING-3 as Independent Contractor

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project LIRAVINE and is chargeable to LIRAVINE. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 December 1968 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been terminated. Type________. Date________196___.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (xx) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid 4,000 per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 320.00 dollars. Subject ( ) will (XX) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to ________. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: None

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner:

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (x) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase of cost-of-living and quarters expenses:

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (x) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (x) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimbursed: operational entertainment, inducement payments, cover expenses.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation:

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the subject.

Wallace B. Rowton
SIGNED Wallace B. ROWTON
CASE OFFICER

Willard C. Curtis
APPROVED Willard C. CURTIS
Field Contracting Office (CCS)

REVIEWED: ________________
Contract Approving Officer

REVIEWED:
[illegible] R Wilson for
/s/ Rogers C. Brooks
Special Contracting Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies of Hqs
1 - File P- 12729
1 - Support

SECRET

10

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILMED
DEC 12 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRING-3
Transmittal of Cuban "Literary" Pamphlet

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. Forwarded under separate cover is an issue of a supposedly "literary" Cuban publication containing two short essays by the Salvadorian poet and writer Roque DALTON. The first of these essays is dedicated to LIRING-3. The interesting thing is that LIRING-3 was at that time imprisoned in Guatemala. The essay may thus be viewed as a tribute to "a suffering supporter of the cause."

2. Roque DALTON (201-215097) is, according to the files of the Station, an agent of the Cuban Intelligence Service engaged in clandestine activities for the Communist Party of El Salvador. DALTON spent some time in Czechoslovakia and is now living in Cuba. He is the brother of Margarita DALTON (201-751261), whom the Cuban IS recruited to work in Mexico. LIRING-3 got to know DALTON in Havana in 1962-63 and became a close friend of his (see HMMA-32283, 19 June 1967). DALTON at one point confided to LIRING-3 that he had been approached by WOFIRM while incarcerated in El Salvador.

3. The Station is hoping that DALTON's essay is an indication that LIRING-3 is going to be viewed by the Cubans in much better light after his incarceration in Guatemala. A report of LIRING-3's complete debriefing by ROWTON was forwarded with HMMA-35904, 27 November 1968.

Raymond A. Frodgen
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Magazine (1), u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/att - 1 copy)

S/c att 1

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
3 201-215097 3 201-751261	HMMA - 35915	29 November 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

201-798301

CS COPY

TO : Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

Separate Cover Attachment to
HMMA-35915

s/c att: 1
HMMA-35915

SECRET

RC-10

Adolfo Sánchez
Vázquez • Alberto
Moravia • Jacques
Charriere • Charles
Bettelheim • Roque
Dalton • José Lezama
Lima • Cmdte.
Jorge Serguera

ENTREMESES JAPONESES

Director Artístico
ROLANDO FERRER

Escenografía
RAUL OLIVA

Vestuario
MARIA ELENA MOLINET

Conjunto de Arte Teatral
LA RUEDA

SALA HUBERT DE BLANCK
Calzada entre A y B / Vedado

este número:

La Industria azucarera analizada dentro del contexto histórico de Cuba, es el tema del trabajo PROMETEO ROMPE UNA CADENA del Comandante Jorge Serguera • QUE ES LA PRAXIS? de Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, capítulo de su libro **Filosofía de la Praxis**, editado en México. Sánchez Vázquez es profesor de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad Autónoma de México y autor de diversos trabajos filosóficos: Marxismo y Existencialismo, Las ideas estéticas de Marx, etc., este último libro ha sido publicado en Cuba por el Instituto del Libro • BASE ECONOMICA Y SUPERESTRUCTURAS IDEOLOGICAS de los economistas franceses Charles Bettelheim y Jacques Charriere, este trabajo forma parte del libro La construcción del Socialismo en China, publicado en México por la editorial ERA • LA PALMA DE LA MANO, poema del cubano José Lezama Lima (Dador, Versos Orficos, Paradiso). Lezama Lima trabaja en el Instituto de Literatura y Lingüística de la Academia de Ciencias • LA CASA DE CARLOS y PRIMAVERA EN JEVANI, textos del poeta salvadoreño Roque Dalton (El turno del ofendido poesía) • DEBATE, entre el escritor Alberto Moravia y cinco estudiantes italianos. Este debate fue organizado por L'Espresso de Roma, y en él se ponen de manifiesto las contradicciones existentes entre la actual generación de intelectuales y la anterior, de la que forma parte el escritor Moravia.

RC
REVOLUCION
Y CULTURA

REVISTA BIMENSUAL
Año 1 Número 10
Mayo 15 de 1968
"Año del Guerrillero Heroico"
Director: Lisandro Otero
Secretaría de Redacción:
Rebeca Chávez

Impresa por el Instituto del Libro,
Unidad Productora N° 11.
La Habana, Cuba
Telf : 80 3020
Territorio Libre de América
Precio por ejemplar: 20 ctvs.

Prometeo rompe una cadena

Cmdte. Jorge Serguera

Cuando aquel aparato comenzó con su ruido atronador a echar paja por detrás, caña en trozos por el costado izquierdo, humo por arriba y cortaba hojas verdes y cogollo, alante, hacia la izquierda; alguien dijo: ¡Es bárbaro! Se había realizado un sueño que tenía 100 años. Parece que le va a llegar la hora de museo al machete. Pero todavía falta; ahora hay que construir muchas y sobre todo mejorarla. Hay que patentarla para que todo el mundo pueda usarla y uno solo no se enriquezca con el trabajo de todos: la patente revolucionaria.

La esclavitud fue sustituida por el colonato. Una especie de servidumbre que se hizo tan común en nuestro país que cualquiera se hubiese asombrado de que así no fuese. Cuando el precio aumentaba en el mercado mundial la alegría del cubano hacía carnaval y se enfrentaba a una danza de millones. Cuando bajaba el precio del azúcar la tasa de crecimiento de muertes aumentaba por vía del suicidio como ocurrió en 1930 1932. Si había paz entre naciones poderosas había crisis económica en Cuba, si había guerra, prosperidad. Así fácilmente puede inferirse que la base del progreso estaba en la guerra. Teoría muy común en el pasado. Cuando el precio era bajo había la esperanza del aumento. Cuando era alto el temor de que bajara. Así la mentalidad azucarera del pueblo a causa del monocultivo, o como técnicamente dicen, economía unilineal, era inestable. Y si se tiene en cuenta además la historia de los últimos 60 años, sus convulsiones, guerras, etc., el desequilibrio económico tenía que ser factor de angustias y alegrías, esperanzas y desilusiones que gravaban hondamente el pensamiento del pueblo. Cualquier oscilación de precio se sentía desde el último bohío hasta la primera residencia. Claro está que en forma muy diferente.

No obstante saber todo el mundo o decir que el problema era el monocultivo y que había que diversificar los cultivos para liberarse de la dependencia de un producto, sobre todo después de la crisis económica de los años 30, no se hizo; porque el uso de las máquinas cortadoras, para realizar la más dura de todas las operaciones de recolección "no se permite en Cuba donde hay superexistencia de mano de obra y las leyes sociales vigentes hacen su uso extremadamente difícil" (carta de Agregado Agrícola de los Estados Unidos, La Habana, 16 de febrero de 1954). Y también porque "la mecanización en cualquier campo de actividad humana incluyendo la agricultura, no debe ser llevada demasiado lejos si ha de amargar a los hombres que aman la tierra, la libertad y la dignidad personal". Por eso en la Unión Soviética, donde la mecanización sobrepasa incluso la agroindustrialización, de la producción cubana del azúcar, se dice que los campesinos "tararean canciones de protesta aun a riesgo de ser castigados severamente" (Azúcar Amargo, Byron White, pág. 48).

Todos estos pretextos y otros, reflejos de una realidad social, de una contradicción insuperable en las condiciones en que se planteaba, caracterizó el período prerevolucionario. Era verdad que el 56% de la tierra cultivada era dedicada a caña. Que el cultivo era extensivo; pero sobre todo porque "una mecanización óptima y precipitada de los campos cañeros podría tener consecuencias caóticas, a menos de encontrar inmediatamente otros empleos para esa fuerza de trabajo". Byron White, pág. 50).

La Contradicción que sólo una Revolución podría resolver:

Cuba era un país de monocultivo. El 56% de la tierra cultivada era dedicada a caña. El producto de mayores dividendos, por vía de exportación, era el azúcar. El volumen de las importaciones estaba determinado por la cantidad de azúcar exportada. El desbalance podría ser resultado de la oscilación del precio en el mercado mundial. La especifica o especial calidad del suelo cubano para el cultivo de la caña, más los bajos salarios de la mano de obra para el corte fueron determinantes en el análisis de la costeabilidad más baja de la producción azucarera cubana en comparación con Hawai y Louisiana, donde la mecanización agrícola del corte, alza y siembra pudieron haber determinado un costo más bajo en la producción, en la década del 40 al 50.

Con una población de más de 5 millones de habitantes entre los años 40 y 50, Cuba destinaba 500 000 al corte de caña o sea cerca del 10% de la población. Pero si se considera la población activa en edad de trabajo, los números varían escandalosamente.

Los propietarios necesitaban mano de obra, barata, y en cantidad para realizar la zafra. La recolección duraba cuatro meses. Los temporeros de zafra se convertían en desempleados cuando ésta terminaba. Mecanizar la industria azucarera podría significar un aumento de las utilidades por el bajo costo de producción que conllevaría; pero el desempleo aumentaría agravando una situación social cuyos resultados eran imprevisibles. Por otra parte, a nivel internacional, una disminución en costo de producción azucarera de Cuba, óptima en este caso, sería determinante del precio, por cuanto éste, lejos de venir determinado por la oferta y la demanda, es resultado de los promedios sociales de producción a nivel internacional. Esto hubiese provocado la quiebra en Hawai, Puerto Rico, Luisiana, etc. Y los norteamericanos, tutores y beneficiarios de la explotación neocolonial velaban por un cierto equilibrio en sus neocolonias. El desplazamiento de otros productores hubiese permitido una concurrencia privilegiada de Cuba en el mercado mundial. Este sueño dorado de los capitalistas cubanos fue cortado con un simple sistema de cuotas que la metrópoli norteamericana impuso, poniendo así paz entre los inquietos tutelados. Naturalmente que la medida determinó también un estancamiento económico.

Internamente, los obreros se oponían a todo lo que fuese mecanización porque esta acarrearía un desempleo en masa y no se veían, por no existir, posibilidades de opción en otros trabajos que no fuese la industria azucarera.

El sueño de industrializar y diversificar la agricultura del país no podía realizarse porque su estado de dependencia económica y neocolonial no se lo permitía. La política del comprador determinaba el producto. Para industrializar y diversificar hay que ser libres y los gobiernos cubanos eran dependientes de la metrópoli norteamericana que no había previsto en su planificación de obtención de beneficios estas aspiraciones. La importación de materias primas y la exportación de excedentes manufacturados es un privilegio de grandes y desarrollados. El chiquito que llegaba tarde a la mesa no podía sentarse a comer. Tenía que esperar a que los "grandes" terminasen; pero eran de una voracidad sin límites. Martí lo había previsto. "El pueblo que compra, manda. El pueblo que vende, sirve. Hay que equilibrar el comercio, para asegurar la libertad. El pueblo que quiere morir, vende a un solo pueblo; y el que quiere salvarse, vende a más de uno" (Obras completas, Vol. II, Tomo I, pág. 262).

La verdadera liberación se halla en esas palabras: La evolución tenía que resolver esa contradicción:

Una ley de desarrollo capitalista es que la acumulación se hace a expensas de la explotación, empobrecimiento y depauperación progresiva de los proletarios. Porque el valor de la fuerza de trabajo viene determinado por la posibilidad de reproducción de dicha fuerza. Al aplicar esta ley del desarrollo capitalista, la clase dominante obtiene beneficios a expensas de la clase obrera; pero en la interrelación de fuerzas y con el propio desarrollo del capitalismo, la dirección principal de la explotación en los países capitalistas, pasó de la clase obrera nacional a las colonias y neocolonias, sufriendo estas últimas el mayor rigor de la ley del valor y produciéndose la actual acumulación de capital de los países desarrollados a expensas de los subdesarrollados. Por eso mientras más desarrollados son unos, más atrasados son otros.

Esta contradicción: para poder desarrollarse hay que liberarse del explotador, se planteaba en Cuba de forma confusa, como un circulo vicioso. Para salir del monocultivo y dependencia económica de un producto hay que diversificar e industrializar y para lograr la industrialización y diversificación agricola hay que liberar la fuerza de trabajo dedicada al azúcar a través de la mecanización cañera y para mecanizar hace falta la seguridad económica de que ésta rendirá utilidades.

El Circulo Vicioso:

a) Los obreros se oponían a la mecanización porque no existía otra alternativa de trabajo.

b) Los capitalistas no mecanizaban por la inseguridad del precio en el mercado mundial.
La mecanización debe habérsele presentado a algunos como una inversión dudosa. Por otra parte la mano de obra era barata y en grandes cantidades. El suelo tenía tales características que casi sin atención producía en condiciones explotables.

c) Hay un factor más complejo: La industria azucarera no tenía perspectivas a largo plazo; pero tampoco era desechable en lo inmediato por la rentabilidad que producía. Su futuro era incierto; pero su presente daba utilidades. Estas características, causas de inestabilidad, vacilaciones, crisis, alzas y bajas, lejos de provocar decisiones en una u otra dirección, mantuvo un estatismo en los propietarios y gobernantes. Tal parece que hubiesen esperado que un imponderable o el simple transcurso del tiempo resolviese una situación que a la par que les preocupaba, demostraban ineptitud para resolver.

d) Si el azucar era la fuente principal de ingresos y acumulación, por tanto la base financiera del desarrollo debía ser ésta.

Problemas específicos:

a) 500.000 cortadores de caña. Representa el 10% del total de la población y cerca del 40% de la población en edad laboral.

b) El 50% de la tierra cultivada destinada a caña

c) La concentración de la caña: la única actividad productiva que podía permitir ingresos casi seguros, se encontraba distribuida entre un número relativamente bajo.

d) La repartición democrática de la fuerza de trabajo era, como las instalaciones azucareras, horizontal, es decir, a lo largo y ancho de la isla. Concentrar las instalaciones azucareras en tierras de mayor productividad y acorde con las instalaciones de mayor capacidad, suponía también la concentración de la mano de obra.

Las dos fuentes de riquezas principales de Cuba, suelo y Mano de Obra, quedaron supeditados a un monocultivo cuyo futuro era incierto.

Pudieron haber arriesgado la diversificación e industrialización del país no tanto con las probabilidades de ganancia de un producto inseguro, sino con la realidad de un suelo rico y una fuerza de trabajo apta, pero por ineptitud y conformismo unidos a las presiones y tutela de los Estados Unidos no encararon con resolución un proceso dinámico que su visión estrecha les hacía aparecer estático.

El simple transcurso del tiempo con dos consecuencias inevitables, una social y otra económica (crecimiento de la población y concentración de capital), en las condiciones de la economía cubana, conducía a una crisis del sistema imperante: la Revolución fue la respuesta. Allí donde la burguesía en su doble condición de propietaria y gobernante demostró incapacidad y vaciló, la Revolución tenía que superarla. La Revolución heredó los problemas que no habían sido encarados y las contradicciones que no habían sido resueltas.

Las soluciones que algunos escritores progresistas, estudiosos o economistas planteaban a los graves problemas de la economía nacional, no sólo resultaban con el tiempo meros paliativos que solamente lograban la dilación de la crisis e irresolución de los problemas, sino que resultaban reformas impracticables por las contradicciones que a su vez creaban. Véase a modo de ejemplo el apéndice No. 5 de José Antonio Guerra, de fecha 28 de septiembre de 1942. También algunas conclusiones de Byron White en "Azúcar Amargo", pág. 178 y siguientes.

Pero la Revolución no solamente heredó problemas y contradicciones, sino que por su sola presencia y naturaleza del proceso como otros problemas y contradicciones que se vieron agudizados tanto por la agresividad que desde el primer momento desarrollaron los imperialistas estadounidenses como por la ignorancia y falta de madurez del pueblo, quien permeado por las ideas fáciles del pasado creía que con la simple nacionalización de la industria azucarera y otros sectores podían superarse los problemas. La distribución de la riqueza, acumulada por la burguesía hasta entonces, no hubiese servido para sobrevivir más que pocos años y además de ser utópica hubiese enajenado el desarrollo industrial del país. Por otra parte, el capital acumulado no bastaba para financiar una diversificación agrícola ni instalaciones industriales. También el mercado seguro que los Estados Unidos representaba para las exportaciones azucareras y las importaciones, tanto de alimentos, artículos de lujo y piezas de repuesto, desaparecía. La seguridad que la burguesía aceptaba, a precio de angustia e incertidumbre, esta seguridad relativa, desaparecía con la Revolución.

Esta era resultado de una contradicción que en el plano de las relaciones internacionales, bilaterales y casi exclusivas entre Cuba y los Estados Unidos, los últimos llevaban la mejor parte. El desarrollo económico tenía que haberlo encarado la burguesía cubana a pesar de los Estados Unidos. Desarrollar si se quiere una concepción nacionalista, chauvinista, de independencia económica, pero su concepción de fatalismo geográfico, sus temores y balbuceos le impidieron realizar una política para la que hacía falta, además de coraje, inteligencia. De una parte la naturaleza del imperialismo se revela incapaz para conceder reformas y por otra, es una característica sui generis de las burguesías nacionales latinoamericanas, su temor a rebelarse contra los tutores de una política y economía que por su poder y rapacidad les infunde temor. En el caso de latinoamérica no es tanto que no haya cristalizado una conciencia nacional burguesa, sino que la existencia de esta clase tiene una conciencia de dependencia de Estados Unidos que la incapacita en este período histórico para ver la posibilidad de una existencia independiente.

Con el triunfo de la Revolución, los burgueses y pequeños burgueses abandonaron Cuba, no solamente por las intervenciones revolucionarias, sino también por la convicción que tenían de que no podía mantenerse un gobierno que aplicase una política no sólo a pesar de los Estados Unidos, sino contra los intereses y objetivos de los Estados Unidos. Habían sido muy dependientes y cobardes. Desarrollaron y aceptaron como incuestionables, conceptos que elevaron a categorías de axiomas políticos, sin percatarse que eran el reflejo de una ideología y creencias temerosas: "Sin azúcar no hay País". "El pueblo cubano es haragán", "Cuba está muy cerca de los Estados Unidos para hacer lo que le plazca", etcétera.

Si al gobierno de los Estados Unidos y a las burguesías latinoamericanas causó asombro y estupefacción la proclamación socialista de la Revolución cubana, en los cobardes burgueses y pequeños burgueses, así como en los cubanos en Miami, el origen del asombro no era tanto económico, sino que provenía del hecho de que se mantuviese la Revolución. La cobardía jamás concibe otras soluciones que las ya experimentadas. Para ellos las reformas eran difíciles, casi utópicas. ¡Una Revolución, imposible!

Los soviéticos y demás países socialistas ofrecieron mercado para el azúcar.

Las inversiones económicas para el desarrollo de la industria que la lógica priorizaba, se vieron obstaculizadas por el bloqueo impuesto por los norteamericanos y por la necesidad de desarrollar un aparato militar fuerte y modernísimo, capaz de enfrentar tanto las agresiones, como las amenazas constantes que los Estados Unidos y gobiernos latinoamericanos realizaban.

Hoy la situación se plantea con agudeza. Para llevar adelante la diversificación agrícola e industrialización del país, hace falta mano de obra. Los cubanos en edad laboral somos unos 2 000 000 y el 30 por ciento está dedicado a la recolección azucarera.

Liberar esta fuerza de trabajo supone la posibilidad de dirigirla a otros sectores donde su productividad y desarrollo permita la acumulación de riquezas necesarias al despegue económico. Para esto hay que mecanizar la industria azucarera. La máquina que corte y alce liberará no sólo 500 000 cubanos, formidable fuerza de trabajo, sino que terminará por primera vez con el fatigoso corte de caña, uno de los trabajos más duros y violentos que en el planeta se conoce. El machete, símbolo de libertad y esfuerzo del cubano, también signo de dependencia y angustia, se convertirá en una pieza de museo.

Todavía por algunos años habrá que depender del monocultivo cañero, y del azúcar como producto principal de exportación. Esta prioridad azucarera es una de las razones que determina la imposibilidad de contar con mano de obra suficiente para desarrollar otros cultivos de manera intensa. Es posiblemente sólo en Cuba, donde se da el fenómeno de un equilibrio entre la densidad de población y las tierras cultivables, equilibrio en nuestro caso desfavorable al desarrollo económico, y que se ve causado o agravado por el predominio cañero.

Si en vez de 7 millones fuésemos 10 millones de cubanos el problema se plantearía en otros términos. Podría tal vez encararse la mecanización azucarera como paulatina y paralela al desarrollo de otros sectores; pero en nuestras condiciones la mecanización resulta un requisito sine qua non.

Pero la mecanización no sólo produce efectos económicos, sino que el más profundo es de carácter ético. La verdadera liberación será de la fatigosa carga del corte manual.

Alguien ha dicho que el verdadero fin de la Revolución es una máquina cortadora, que cuando esto ocurra la Revolución habrá roto una de las cadenas más pesadas y difíciles.

Esto representará la liberación de una parte considerable de la población en edad laboral y romperá las barreras de una baja productividad cuyos resultados a mediano y largo plazo, son difíciles de prever. La industria azucarera sigue siendo incierta, en tanto existe la posibilidad de producir azúcar sintético; en condiciones económicas. Pero hasta tanto eso no ocurra, la industria azucarera de la caña, seguirá siendo la base de nuestro desarrollo económico. y en pocos años, descansando en las riquezas de nuestro suelo y en la fuerza de nuestro pueblo, la Revolución habrá resuelto las contradicciones y problemas que timoratos y vacilantes no supieron encarar con el valor y el coraje que le habían legado las tradiciones mambisas: el machete que sirvió para romper el nudo con España, sirve hoy también como garante exclusivo, por la mano que lo empuña, de un desarrollo económico en el que sin riesgo de ningún tipo pueden confiar todos los gobiernos y pueblos del mundo.

---

a) La combinada de corte y alza que vimos en la Básica del Cauto representa una ayuda inestimable al prolongado esfuerzo y sacrificio que hay que realizar en años de una acumulación de riquezas para financiar tanto la industria como la diversificación agrícola.

b) Representa un incremento de la población en edad laboral.

c) Hará desaparecer una especie de sentimiento de culpabilidad que naturalmente tenemos que sentir todos respecto al obrero agrícola cortador.

d) La máquina de corte y alza constituye el primer eslabón de la Revolucion Industrial necesaria a nuestro desarrollo y nuestra total liberación.

¿Que es la Praxis?

Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez

Actividad y praxis.

Toda praxis es actividad, pero no toda actividad es praxis. Al señalar Marx que el idealismo, en contraste con el materialismo, admite el lado activo de la relación sujeto-objeto, y al subrayar, a su vez, su defecto —no ver esta actividad como práctica—,(1) nos previene contra todo intento de establecer un signo de igualdad entre actividad y praxis. De ahí que para delimitar el contenido propio de esta última y su relación con otras actividades, sea preciso distinguir la praxis, como forma de actividad específica, de otras que pueden estar incluso íntimamente vinculadas a ella.

Por actividad en general, entendemos el acto o conjunto de actos en virtud de los cuales un sujeto activo (agente) modifica una materia prima dada.(2) Esta caracterización de la actividad justamente por su generalidad no especifica el tipo de agente (físico, biológico o humano) ni la naturaleza de la materia prima sobre la que actúa (cuerpo físico, ser vivo, vivencia psíquica, grupo, relación o institución social) ni determina tampoco la especie de actos (físicos, psíquicos, sociales) que conducen a cierta transformación. El resultado de la actividad, o sea, su producto se da asimismo, en niveles diversos: puede ser una nueva partícula, un concepto, un útil, una obra artística o un nuevo sistema social.

En este amplio sentido, actividad se opone a pasividad, y su esfera es la de la efectividad, no la de lo meramente posible. Agente es lo que obra, lo que actúa y no lo que está solamente en posibilidad o disponibilidad de actuar u obrar. Su actividad no es potencial, sino actual. Se da efectivamente sin que pueda ser separada del acto o conjunto de actos que la constituyen. La actividad muestra en las relaciones entre las partes y el todo los rasgos de una totalidad concreta. Varios actos desarticulados o yuxtapuestos casualmente no permiten hablar de actividad: es preciso que los actos singulares se articulen o estructuren, como elementos de un todo, o de un proceso total, que desemboca en la modificación de una materia prima. Por ello, a los actos del agente y a la materia sobre la cual se ejerce esta actividad, hay que agregar el resultado o producto que es esa materia misma ya transformada por el agente.

Nuestro concepto de actividad es lo suficientemente amplio para que englobe, por ejemplo: a un nivel físico, las relaciones nucleares de determinadas partículas que conducen a la transformación de unos elementos químicos en su conjunto, o la actividad de un órgano en particular; a un nivel psíquico, las actividades del hombre o del animal del tipo de la sensorial, refleja instintiva, etcétera; en este plano instintivo, la actividad puede manifestarse como una serie de actos tan complejos como el de la construcción de un nido por un pájaro, sin que por ello deje de ser una actividad meramente biológica, natural. El hombre también puede ser sujeto de actividades —biológicas o instintivas— que no rebasan su nivel meramente natural y que, por tanto, no podemos considerarlas como específicamente humanas.

La actividad propiamente humana sólo se da cuando los actos dirigidos a un objeto para transformarlo se inician con un resultado ideal, o fin, y terminan con un resultado o producto efectivos, reales. En este caso, los actos no sólo se hallan determinados causalmente por un estado anterior que ~~se ha dado efectivamente~~ —determinación del pasado por el presente—, sino por algo que no tiene una existencia efectiva aún y que, sin embargo, determina y regula los diferentes actos antes de desembocar en un resultado real; o sea, la determinación no viene del pasado, sino del futuro.

La adecuación a fines.

Este modo de articulación y determinación de los diferentes actos del proceso activo distinguen radicalmente la actividad específicamente humana de cualquier otra que se halle a un nivel meramente natural. Dicha actividad entraña la intervención de la conciencia gracias a la cual el resultado existe dos veces —y en tiempos distintos—, como resultado ideal y como producto real. El resultado real, que se quiere obtener, existe primero idealmente, como mero producto de la conciencia, y los diferentes actos del proceso se articulan o estructuran conforme al resultado que se da primero en el tiempo, es decir, el resultado ideal. Por esta anticipación del resultado que se pretende obtener, la actividad propiamente humana tiene un carácter consciente. Lo característico de ella es que por mucho que diste el resultado real del ideal se trata, en todo caso, de adecuar intencionalmente el primero al segundo. Ello no significa que el resultado obtenido haya de ser forzosamente una mera duplicación real de un modelo ideal preexistente. No; la adecuación no tiene por qué ser perfecta. Puede asemejarse poco, o incluso nada, al fin originario, ya que éste sufre cambios, a veces radicales, en el proceso de su realización. Ahora bien, para que pueda hablarse de actividad humana basta que se plantee en ella un resultado ideal o fin a cumplir, como punto de partida, y una intención de adecuación, independientemente de cómo se plasme, en definitiva, el modelo ideal originario.

Esta inadecuación entre intención y resultado se pone de manifiesto tanto en la actividad de los individuos como en la propiamente social. Aquí, mientras los hombres no son conscientes de las leyes que rigen el proceso económico-social, la persecución de diferentes fines por los miembros de la sociedad da lugar a actividades diversas de los individuos o grupos sociales en los que dichos fines se contraponen, equilibran o se subordinan entre sí produciendo resultados que no concuerdan con sus intenciones o que se dan con independencia de éstas. Las relaciones de producción, por ejemplo, son relaciones que los hombres contraen independientemente de su voluntad y de su conciencia. Es decir, son producidas por los hombres como productos suyos inintencionales.(3) El progreso histórico se caracterizará, entre otras cosas, por una superación de esta inintencionalidad. Los hombres que en el pasado produjeron inintencionalmente la esclavitud, el feudalismo y el capitalismo se proponen hoy, conscientemente, la destrucción de las relaciones capitalistas de producción y la instauración del socialismo. Pero aunque la historia humana registra resultados que nadie ha querido, esta inintencionalidad no es sino la forma que socialmente adopta el resultado de la actividad desplegada por los individuos como seres sociales que actúan conscientemente.(4) Volveremos más adelante (en el capítulo V) sobre esta cuestión.

La actividad humana es, por tanto, actividad conforme a fines, y éstos sólo existen por el hombre, como productos de su conciencia. Toda acción verdaderamente humana exige cierta conciencia de un fin, el cual se supedita al curso de la actividad misma.

El fin es, a su vez, la expresión de cierta actitud del sujeto ante la realidad. Por el hecho de trazarme un fin, adopto cierta posición ante ella. Quien se propone realizar un viaje, construir una silla, pintar un cuadro o transformar un régimen social, muestra determinada actitud ante una situación real, presente. Si el hombre viviera en plena armonía con la realidad, o en total conciliación con su presente, no sentiría la necesidad de negarlos idealmente ni de configurar en su conciencia una realidad inexistente aún. Carece de sentido, en verdad, proponerse un fin ya alcanzado, o un resultado obtenido. El fin prefigura idealmente lo que aún no se logra alcanzar. Por el hecho de trazarse fines, el hombre niega una realidad efectiva, y afirma otra que no existe todavía. Pero los fines son productos de la conciencia, y, por ello, la actividad que rigen es consciente. No se trata de la actividad de una conciencia pura, sino de la conciencia de un hombre social que no puede prescindir de la producción de fines en ninguna forma de actividad, incluyendo, por supuesto, la práctica, material.(5)

Marx hace resaltar el papel del fin en una actividad práctica como el trabajo humano: «Al final del proceso de trabajo, brota un resultado que antes de comenzar el proceso existia ya en la mente del obrero: es decir, un resultado que tenia ya existencia ideal. El obrero no se limita a hacer cambiar de forma la materia que le brinda la naturaleza, sino que, al mismo tiempo, realiza en ella su fin, fin que él sabe que rige como una ley las modalidades de su actuación, y al que tiene que supeditar su voluntad».(6)

Al subrayar aquí el papel de la producción de fines en el proceso de trabajo, Marx destaca asimismo el papel del objeto —«la materia que le brinda la naturaleza»— sobre el cual se ejerce dicha actividad. La transformación de la naturaleza material en productos mediante el trabajo no podría darse sin estas condiciones materiales, pero, a su vez, Marx subraya justamente por tratarse del trabajo como una actividad específicamente humana el papel determinante del fin, y su carácter de ley en dicho proceso de transformación material.

El fin, por tanto, prefigura aquí el resultado de una actividad real, práctica, que ya no es pura actividad de la conciencia. Gracias a ello, el hombre no se halla en una relación de exterioridad con sus diferentes actos y con su producto como sucede cuando se trata de un agente físico o animal, sino en una relación de interioridad con ellos, ya que su conciencia establece el fin como ley de sus actos, ley a la que se subordinan, y que rige, en cierto modo, el producto. Este dominio jamás puede ser absoluto, ya que se halla limitado por el objeto de la acción y los medios con que se lleva a cabo la materialización de los fines.

Así, pues, al anticipar idealmente el resultado efectivo, puede ajustar sus actos como elementos de una totalidad regida por el fin. Esta prefiguración ideal del resultado real diferencia radicalmente la actividad del hombre de cualquier otra actividad animal que, externamente, pudiera asemejarse a ella. «Una araña —dice Marx— ejecuta operaciones que semejan las manipulaciones del tejedor, y la construcción de los panales de las abejas podría avergonzar, por su perfección, a más de un maestro de obras. Pero hay algo en que el peor maestro de obras aventaja, desde luego, a la mejor abeja, y es el hecho de que, antes de ejecutar la construcción, la proyecta en su cerebro».(7)

Tomando en cuenta la semejanza externa que puede darse entre ciertos actos animales y humanos, hay que concluir que la actividad propia del hombre no puede reducirse a su mera expresión exterior y que de ella forma parte esencialmente la actividad de la conciencia. Esta actividad se despliega como producción de fines que prefiguran idealmente el resultado real que se quiere obtener, pero se manifiesta, asimismo, como producción de conocimientos, es decir, en forma de conceptos, hipótesis, teorías o leyes mediante los cuales el hombre conoce la realidad.

Entre la actividad cognoscitiva y la teleológica hay diferencias importantes, pues mientras la primera tiene que ver con una realidad presente de la cual se pretende dar razón, la segunda hace referencia a una realidad futura, y, por tanto, inexistente aún. Por otro lado, mientras la actividad cognoscitiva de por sí no entraña una exigencia de acción efectiva, la actividad teleológica lleva implícita una exigencia de realización, en virtud de la cual se tiende a hacer del fin una causa de la acción real. En efecto, en cuanto anticipación ideal de un resultado real que se quiere alcanzar, el fin es también expresión de una necesidad humana que sólo se satisface con el logro del resultado que aquel prefigura o anticipa. Por ello, no es sólo anticipación ideal de lo que está por venir, sino de algo que, además, queremos que venga. Y, en este sentido, es causa de acción y determina —como porvenir— nuestros actos presentes. Cierto es que el hombre no solo anticipa el futuro con su actividad teleológica; al dar razón de una realidad presente, y sobre la base de su conocimiento puede prever una fase de su desenvolvimiento que no se da aún. Tal es la legítima función de la previsión científica. Con ella, se anticipa idealmente lo que todavía no existe efectivamente. Pero esa anticipación ideal del futuro no entraña necesariamente que queramos su existencia real, o aspiremos a contribuir a que advenga. En este caso, el futuro no determina nuestros actos; es decir, la prefiguración ideal de una realidad inexistente no rige como una ley —a diferencia del fin— nuestra acción. En pocas palabras, la actividad cognoscitiva de por sí no nos mueve a actuar.

Pero eso no significa que una y otra actividad de la conciencia se hallen separadas por una muralla insalvable. No se conoce por conocer, sino al servicio de un fin, o serie de fines que puede tener como eslabón inicial el de la conquista de la verdad; a su vez, como antes señalamos, los fines que la conciencia produce llevan en su seno una exigencia de realización, y esta realización presupone —entre otras condiciones— una actividad cognoscitiva sin la cual dichos fines jamás podrían tocar tierra, es decir, cumplirse. Por otro lado, todo fin presupone deterximiento concreto de la realidad que el niega idealmente; y, en este sentido —como índice de cierto nivel cognoscitivo— no podría desvincularse tampoco del conocimiento.

Así, pues, la actividad de la conciencia, que es inseparable de toda verdadera actividad humana, se nos presenta como elaboración de fines y producción de conocimientos en íntima unidad. Si el hombre aceptara siempre el mundo como es, y si, por otra parte, se aceptara siempre a sí mismo en su estado actual, no sentiría la necesidad de transformar el mundo ni de transformarse él a su vez. Se actúa concretamente, de la misma manera que —como veremos más adelante— se conoce, actuando. El conocimiento humano en su conjunto se integra en la doble e infinita tarea del hombre de transformar la naturaleza exterior, y su propia naturaleza. Pero el conocimiento no sirve directamente a esta actividad práctica, transformadora; se pone en relación con ella a través de los fines. La relación entre el pensamiento y la acción requiere la mediación de los fines no han de quedarse en meros deseos o ensoñaciones, y van acompañados de una apetencia de realización, esta realización —o cumplimiento de una materia dada para producir determinado resultado— requiere un conocimiento de su objeto, de los medios e instrumentos para transformarlo y de las condiciones que abren o cierran las posibilidades de esa realización. En consecuencia, las actividades cognoscitiva y teleológica de la conciencia se hallan en una unidad indisoluble.

La actividad de la conciencia que por sí tiene un carácter que podemos denominar teórico en cuanto que no puede conducir por sí sola, como mera actividad de la conciencia, a una transformación de la realidad, natural o social.(8) Tanto si se trata de la formulación de fines como de la producción de conocimientos, la conciencia no rebasa su propio ámbito; es decir, su actividad no se objetiva o materializa. Por esta razón, si una y otra son actividades no son, en modo alguno, actividad objetiva, real, es decir, praxis.

La actividad práctica

Como toda actividad propiamente humana, la actividad práctica que se manifiesta en el trabajo humano, en la creación artística o en la praxis revolucionaria, es una actividad adecuada a fines, cuyo cumplimiento exige —como hemos señalado— cierta actividad cognoscitiva. Pero lo distintivo de la actividad práctica radica en el carácter real, objetivo, de la materia prima sobre la cual se actúa, de los medios o instrumentos con que se ejerce la acción, y de su resultado o producto. En la actividad práctica, el sujeto actúa sobre una materia que existe independientemente de su conciencia, y de las diferentes operaciones o manipulaciones exigidas por su transformación. La transformación de esa materia —sobre todo, en el trabajo humano— exige una serie de actos físicos, corpóreos, sin los cuales no podría llevarse a cabo la alteración o destrucción de ciertas propiedades que hace posible la aparición de un nuevo objeto, con nuevas propiedades. En el trabajo, dice Marx, «el hombre se enfrenta como un poder natural con la materia de la naturaleza. Pone en acción las fuerzas naturales que forman su corporeidad, los brazos y las piernas, la cabeza y la mano, para de ese modo asimilarse, bajo una forma útil para su propia vida, las materias que la naturaleza le brinda».(9) Finalmente, el producto de tal actividad transformadora es un objeto material que subsiste con independencia del proceso de su gestación, y que, con una sustantividad propia, se afirma ante el sujeto, es decir, cobra vida independientemente de la actividad subjetiva que lo ha creado.

En este sentido, podemos decir que la actividad práctica es real, objetiva o material. Y, a nuestro juicio, así la caracteriza Marx en sus Tesis sobre Feuerbach(10) al emplear la expresión «actividad objetiva». Marx subraya el carácter real, objetivo, de la praxis en cuanto transforma el mundo exterior que es independiente de su conciencia y de su existencia. El objeto de la actividad práctica es la naturaleza, la sociedad o los hombres reales. El fin de esa actividad es la transformación real, objetiva, del mundo natural o social para satisfacer determinada necesidad humana. Y el resultado es una nueva realidad, que subsiste independientemente del sujeto o de los sujetos concretos que la engendraron con su actividad subjetiva, pero que, en definitiva, sólo existe por el hombre y para el hombre, como ser social.

Sin esta acción real, objetiva, sobre una realidad —natural o humana— que existe independientemente del sujeto práctico, no puede hablarse propiamente de praxis como actividad material consciente y objetiva; por tanto, la mera actividad subjetiva —psíquica—, o meramente espiritual que no se objetiva materialmente no puede considerarse como praxis.

Formas de praxis

La materia prima de la actividad práctica puede cambiar dando lugar a diversas formas de praxis. El objeto sobre el cual ejerce su acción el sujeto puede ser: a) lo dado naturalmente, o entes naturales; b) productos de una praxis anterior que se convierten, a su vez, en materia de una nueva praxis, como los materiales ya preparados con que trabaja el obrero o crea el artista plástico; c) lo humano mismo, ya se trate de la sociedad como materia u objeto de la praxis política o revolucionaria, ya se trate de individuos concretos. En unos casos, como vemos, la praxis tiene por objeto al hombre y, en otros, una materia no propiamente humana: natural, en unos casos, artificial, en otros.

Entre las formas fundamentales de la praxis tenemos la actividad práctica productiva, o relación material y transformadora que el hombre establece —mediante su trabajo— con la naturaleza. (11) Gracias al trabajo, el hombre vence la resistencia de las materias y fuerzas naturales y crea un mundo de objetos útiles que satisfacen determinadas necesidades. Pero como el hombre es un ser social, este proceso solamente se realiza en determinadas condiciones sociales, es decir, en el marco de ciertas relaciones que los hombres contraen como agentes de la producción en este proceso y que Marx llama justamente relaciones de producción.(12)

En el proceso de trabajo, el hombre valiéndose de los instrumentos o medios adecuados transforma un objeto con arreglo a un fin. En cuanto materializa cierto fin o proyecto, se objetiva en cierto modo en su producto. En el trabajo —dice Marx— el hombre asimila «bajo una forma útil para su propia vida, las materias que la naturaleza le brinda»,(13) pero sólo puede asimilarlas objetivándose en ellas, es decir, imprimiendo en la materia trabajada la marca de sus fines. Marx señala esta adecuación a un fin como uno de los factores esenciales del proceso de trabajo: «Los factores simples que intervienen en el proceso de trabajo son: la actividad adecuada a un fin, o sea, el propio trabajo, su objeto y sus medios».(14)

En esta caracterización del proceso de trabajo, podemos hablar de condiciones objetivas —la actividad del hombre y las condiciones materiales del trabajo— representadas tanto por el objeto del trabajo como por los medios o instrumentos con que se lleva a cabo esa transformación. Sin embargo, esta división no puede considerarse absoluta. En primer lugar, el hombre transforma el objeto con arreglo a fines valiéndose de instrumentos que él mismo usa y fabrica, razón por la cual Marx dice que su uso y fabricación «caracterizan el proceso de trabajo específicamente humano».(15) Al reducir Marx el instrumento de trabajo —condición material y objetiva del proceso laboral— a trabajo humano, el instrumento aparece así humanizado también —tanto por su uso como por su fabricación—. Cierto es que esta humanización no puede concebirse en un sentido abstracto, antropológico, sino como expresión tanto de una determinada relación entre el hombre y la naturaleza como de las condiciones sociales en que los hombres producen (relaciones de producción). Por ello dice Marx: «Los instrumentos de trabajo no son solamente el barómetro indicador del desarrollo de la fuerza de trabajo del hombre, sino también el exponente de las condiciones sociales en que se trabaja.(16) Gracias a los instrumentos, la relación entre el hombre y la naturaleza deja de ser directa e inmediata. La aparición de instrumentos más perfeccionados modifica el tipo de relación entre el hombre y la naturaleza, y, en este sentido, es un índice revelador del desarrollo de su fuerza de trabajo y de su dominio sobre la naturaleza. El poder de mediación del instrumento se ha extendido y elevado con la introducción de la máquina hasta llegar a la automatización con la que el hombre queda separado radicalmente del objeto de la producción. Pero cualesquiera que sean los instrumentos de que se valga para transformar la materia conforme a sus fines, es, en definitiva, el hombre quien los usa y fabrica, y es él, en última instancia, el que valiéndose de ellos actúa sobre las materias y las transforma conforme a sus necesidades. El papel dominante de los medios de producción, subrayado por Marx, lejos de eliminar la presencia del hombre concreto, como sujeto de la producción, lo revela inequívocamente. Pero esta presencia se pone de manifiesto abiertamente con el tercer factor del proceso de trabajo señalado por Marx: su carácter de actividad personal adecuada a un fin. No se puede desconocer el papel de este factor al analizar el proceso de trabajo aunque ello se haga para subrayar la naturaleza material de las condiciones del proceso de trabajo y el papel dominante de los medios de producción.»(17)

Se puede afirmar el carácter teleológico de la actividad práctica, material, que es el trabajo humano, sin que ello implique hacer abstracción de la materialidad misma de ese proceso, materialidad que no se reduce, por otra parte, al objeto de trabajo y a los instrumentos materiales, sino que incluye también, la propia actividad subjetiva del hombre que se enfrenta con sus instrumentos a la materia ya que en el trabajo «pone en acción las fuerzas naturales que forman su corporeidad, los brazos y las piernas, la cabeza y la mano...» (18)

La praxis productiva es así la praxis fundamental porque en ella el hombre no sólo produce un mundo humano o humanizado, en el sentido de un mundo de objetos que satisfacen necesidades humanas y que sólo pueden ser producidos en la medida en que se plasman en ellos fines o proyectos humanos, sino también, en el sentido de que en la praxis productiva el hombre se produce, forma o transforma a sí mismo. «A la par que de ese modo actúa sobre la naturaleza exterior a él y la transforma —dice Marx en El Capital—, transforma su propia naturaleza desarrollando las potencias que dormitan en él y sometiendo el juego de sus fuerzas a su propia disciplina».(19)

Otra forma de praxis es la producción o creación de obras de arte. Al igual que el trabajo humano es transformación de una materia a la que se imprime una forma dada, exigida no ya por una necesidad practico-utilitaria, sino por una necesidad general humana de expresión y objetivación. En cuanto que la actividad del artista no se halla limitada por la utilidad material que el producto del trabajo debe satisfacer, puede llevar el proceso de humanización que —en forma limitada— se da ya en el trabajo humano hasta sus últimas consecuencias. Por ello la praxis artística permite la creación de objetos humanos o humanizados que elevan a un grado superior la capacidad de expresión y objetivación humanas, que se revela ya en los productos del trabajo. La obra artística es, ante todo, creación de una nueva realidad, y puesto que el hombre se afirma, creando o humanizando cuanto toca, la praxis artística —al ensanchar y enriquecer con sus creaciones la realidad ya humanizada— es una praxis esencial para el hombre.(20)

Como toda verdadera praxis humana, el arte se sitúa en la esfera de la acción, de la transformación de una materia que ha de ceder su forma para adoptar otra nueva: la exigida por la necesidad humana que el objeto creado o producido ha de satisfacer. El arte no es mera producción material ni pura producción espiritual. Pero justamente por su carácter práctico, realizador y transformador, está más cerca del trabajo humano —sobre todo, cuando éste no ha perdido su carácter creador—, que de una actividad meramente espiritual.

Entre las formas de actividad práctica que se ejercen sobre una materia dada hay que incluir también la actividad científica experimental que satisface, primordialmente, las necesidades de la investigación teórica, y, en particular, las de la comprobación de hipótesis. Esta forma de praxis es la que se pone de manifiesto cuando el investigador actúa sobre un objeto material modificando a voluntad las condiciones en que se opera un fenómeno. Tal es el sentido de la experimentación como praxis científica. El investigador produce fenómenos que son una reproducción de las que se dan en un medio natural, pero los produce justamente para poder estudiarlos en un medio artificial —el del laboratorio— sin las impurezas y perturbaciones con que se presentan en el medio natural y que, por esa razón, dificultan su estudio. En cuanto que se trata de producir determinados fenómenos con ayuda del instrumento físico adecuado, la actividad científica experimental es, evidentemente, una forma de praxis. Se trata de una actividad objetiva que da lugar a un producto o resultado real y objetivo.

En este tipo de praxis el fin inmediato es teórico. El experimento se lleva a cabo para probar una teoría, o determinados aspectos de ella. Se experimenta respondiendo a ciertas exigencias teóricas con el fin de facilitar el desarrollo de ella. Un determinado experimento —por ejemplo, los realizados en agronomía— puede tener consecuencias prácticas, pero no directamente, sino a través de la teoría que trata de comprobar.

Ahora bien, la experimentación no es privativa de la ciencia; cabe hablar también de una actividad experimental en otros campos: artístico, educativo, económico o social. En estos casos, a diferencia de la actividad experimental científica, el experimento no está al servicio directo e inmediato de una teoría, sino de una forma específica de praxis; el experimento artístico o educativo tiene por fin el impulso de la actividad práctica correspondiente, el arte o la educación. De este modo, vemos que mientras en la ciencia el fin de la actividad experimental es teórico —fortalecer o impulsar el desarrollo de una teoría—, y, de un modo mediato, sirve por tanto a determinada actividad práctica, en otros campos la experimentación contribuye al desenvolvimiento de la praxis correspondiente, pero de una manera directa e inmediata: en cuanto que sus resultados se aplican en la esfera práctica adecuada.

Tales son las formas fundamentales —aunque no exclusivas— de la praxis cuando la acción del hombre se ejerce más o menos inmediatamente sobre una materia natural —naturaleza inmediata, o naturaleza ya mediata, o trabajada que sirve de objeto de nueva acción—. Veamos, ahora, el tipo de praxis en que el hombre es sujeto y objeto de ella; es decir, praxis en la que actúa sobre sí mismo.

Esta actividad práctica del hombre ofrece diversas modalidades. Dentro de ella caen los diversos actos encaminados a su transformación como ser social, y, por ello, a cambiar sus relaciones económicas, políticas y sociales. En cuanto que su actividad toma por objeto no a un individuo aislado, sino a grupos o clases sociales, e incluso a la sociedad entera, puede denominarse praxis social, aunque en un sentido amplio toda práctica (incluyendo aquella que tiene por objeto directo a la naturaleza) reviste un carácter social, ya que el hombre sólo puede llevarla a cabo contrayendo determinadas relaciones sociales (relaciones de producción en la praxis productiva) y, además, porque la modificación práctica del objeto no humano se traduce, a su vez, en una transformación del hombre como ser social.

En un sentido más restringido, la praxis social es la actividad de grupos o clases sociales que conduce a transformar la organización y dirección de la sociedad, o a realizar ciertos cambios mediante la actividad del Estado. Esta forma de praxis es justamente la actividad política.

En las condiciones de la sociedad dividida en clases antagónicas, la política comprende la lucha de clases por el poder y la dirección y estructuración de la sociedad, de acuerdo con los intereses y fines correspondientes. La política es una actividad práctica en cuanto que la lucha que libran los grupos o clases sociales se halla vinculada a cierto tipo de organización real de sus miembros (instituciones y organizaciones políticas, como son, por ejemplo, los partidos) en segundo lugar, aunque la actividad política vaya acompañada de un choque y contraposición de ideas, proyectos, programas, etcétera, y esta lucha ideológica ejerza una influencia indudable en las acciones políticas reales, concretas, el carácter práctico de la actividad política exige formas, medios y métodos reales, efectivos, de lucha; así, por ejemplo, el proletariado en su lucha política se vale de huelgas, manifestaciones, mítines e incluso de métodos violentos. En tercer lugar, la actividad política gira en torno a la conquista, conservación, dirección o control de un organismo concreto como es el Estado. El poder es un instrumento de importancia vital para la transformación de la sociedad.

La praxis política presupone la participación de amplios sectores de la sociedad. Pero no se trata de una actividad espontánea, aunque se den en ella actos espontáneos de determinados individuos o grupos. Persigue determinados fines que responden a los intereses radicales de las clases sociales, y en cada situación concreta la realización de esos fines se halla condicionada por las posibilidades objetivas inscritas en la propia realidad. Una política que responda a esas posibilidades y que excluya todo aventurerismo, exige un conocimiento de esa realidad y de la correlación de clases para no proponerse acciones que desemboquen inexorablemente en un fracaso. La lucha tiene que ser, por tanto, consciente, organizada y dirigida, y la necesidad de librarla en esta forma explica la creación de los partidos políticos.

Los partidos trazan, con una mayor o menor conciencia de los objetivos, posibilidades y condiciones, la línea de acción. Los métodos para transformar lo ideal en real, es decir, para realizar prácticamente la línea política trazada por un partido constituye la estrategia y la táctica. La estrategia señala las tareas correspondientes a una etapa histórica general, y la táctica determina el modo de cumplir la línea política de un período relativamente breve. Estrategia y táctica se relacionan dentro de la línea política y de su aplicación como lo general y lo particular.

La praxis política, en cuanto actividad práctica transformadora, alcanza su forma más alta en la praxis revolucionaria como etapa superior de la transformación práctica de la sociedad. En la sociedad dividida en clases antagónicas, la actividad revolucionaria permite cambiar radicalmente las bases económicas y sociales en que se asienta el poder material y espiritual de la clase dominante, e instaurar así una nueva sociedad. El agente principal de este cambio es el proletariado a través de una lucha consciente, organizada y dirigida, lo que presupone la existencia de un partido que eleve su conciencia de clase y trace claramente los objetivos de esta lucha, su estrategia y su táctica, que organice las fuerzas y las dirija.

Si el hombre existe en cuanto tal como ser práctico, es decir, afirmándose con su actividad práctica transformadora frente a la naturaleza exterior y frente a su propia naturaleza, la praxis revolucionaria y la praxis productiva constituyen dos dimensiones esenciales de su ser práctico. Pero, a su vez, una y otra actividad, junto con las restantes formas específicas de praxis, no son sino formas concretas particulares de una praxis total humana gracias a la cual el hombre como ser social y consciente humaniza los objetos y se humaniza a sí mismo.

La actividad teórica.

La actividad teórica en su conjunto —como ideología y ciencia—, considerada también a lo largo de su desenvolvimiento histórico, sólo existe por y en relación con la práctica, ya que en ella encuentra su fundamento, sus fines y criterio de verdad, como trataremos de poner de manifiesto más adelante. Pero por estrechas que sean las relaciones entre una y otra actividad, la actividad teórica de por sí no muestra los rasgos que hemos considerado privativos de la praxis, y, por ello, no debemos ponerla en el mismo plano que las formas de actividad práctica que antes hemos examinado. A nuestro modo de ver, la actividad teórica no es de por sí una forma de praxis.

Aunque la «práctica» teórica transforme percepciones, representaciones o conceptos, y cree el tipo peculiar de productos que son las hipótesis, teorías, leyes, etcétera, en ninguno de esos casos se transforma la realidad. No se cumplen en ella las condiciones que señalábamos anteriormente con respecto a la materia prima, la actividad y el resultado en el proceso práctico. Falta aquí el lado material, objetivo, de la praxis, y por ello no consideramos que sea legítimo hablar de praxis teórica.

Lo que a nuestro juicio veda caracterizarla así es precisamente lo que hay de distintivo en la actividad teórica, entendiendo por ésta tanto la producción de fines como de conocimientos. Por su objeto, fines, medios y resultados, la actividad teórica se distingue de la práctica. Su objeto o materia prima son las sensaciones o percepciones —es decir objetos psíquicos que sólo tienen una existencia subjetiva—, o los conceptos, teorías, representaciones o hipótesis que tienen una existencia ideal. El fin inmediato de la actividad teórica es elaborar o transformar idealmente, no realmente, esa materia prima, para obtener, como productos, teorías que expliquen una realidad presente, o modelos que prefiguren idealmente una realidad futura. La actividad teórica proporciona un conocimiento indispensable para transformar la realidad, o traza fines que anticipan idealmente su transformación, pero en uno y otro caso queda intacta la realidad efectiva. Las transformaciones que lleva a cabo la actividad teórica con relación a ésta —paso de una hipótesis a una teoría, y de ésta a otra teoría más fundada— son transformaciones ideales: de las ideas sobre el mundo, pero no del mundo mismo. (21) Y las operaciones que el hombre lleva a cabo para producir fines o conocimientos son operaciones mentales: abstraer, generalizar, deducir, sintetizar, prever, etc. que si bien exigen un sustrato corpóreo y el funcionamiento del sistema nervioso superior, no dejan de ser operaciones subjetivas, psíquicas, aunque puedan tener manifestaciones objetivas.

Por otra parte, pensamos que la admisión de una praxis teórica se halla en contradicción con la crítica que Marx formula en sus Tesis sobre Feuerbach. Si recordamos el contenido de la Tesis I veremos que Marx critica a Feuerbach justamente por concebir la relación sujeto-objeto (u hombre-naturaleza) como una relación meramente contemplativa, o sea teórica. En esto radica el defecto fundamental de la filosofía Feuerbachiana, así como del materialismo tradicional. En este sentido, Marx contrapone relación (contemplativa) teórica y práctica. Y en ese mismo sentido contrapone también en su Tesis XI la filosofía como interpretación, es decir, como teoría desligada de la práctica, y la filosofía vinculada conscientemente a la transformación del mundo.

Esta contraposición de contemplación (teoría) y praxis demuestra que Marx, lejos de admitir la teoría como una forma de praxis, establece por el contrario una contraposición, entre una y otra. Por otra parte al distinguir claramente en su Introducción a la crítica de la economía política, lo concreto real y lo concreto pensado, y presentar la actividad teórica cognoscitiva, es decir, la producción de conocimientos como un proceso ascensional de lo abstracto a lo concreto —proceso que se opera en el pensamiento y que consiste en la reproducción espiritual del objeto real bajo la forma de lo concreto pensado—, Marx señala claramente que se trata de una actividad o producción que no produce nada efectivamente, es decir no transforma la realidad. (22) Una actividad que se opera sólo en el pensamiento y que produce el tipo peculiar de objetos que son los productos de éste no puede, por tanto, identificarse con la actividad práctica que llamamos praxis.

Si llamamos praxis a la actividad práctica material, adecuada a fines que transforma el mundo —natural y humano—, no cabe incluir la actividad teórica entre las formas de praxis ya que falta en ellas la transformación objetiva de una materia mediante el sujeto, cuyos resultados subsisten independientemente de su actividad. (23)

Solamente subjetivizando el concepto de praxis hasta borrar toda diferencia específica con el de actividad en general, podríamos hablar de una praxis teórica. Pero, en cuanto que la actividad teórica de por sí no modifica realmente el mundo —aunque sí nuestras ideas sobre él— no nos parece legítimo hablar de praxis teórica.

La actividad filosófica transforma nuestra concepción del mundo, de la sociedad o del hombre, pero no modifica —directa e inmediatamente— nada real. Cabría preguntarse, sin embargo, si esto es válido para toda actividad filosófica, incluyendo aquella que concibe el mundo no sólo como objeto de interpretación, sino de transformación. De acuerdo con la Tesis XI de Marx sobre Feuerbach podríamos dividir las filosofías, desde un punto de vista histórico, en filosofías que se limitan a tratar de dar razón de lo existente y que desembocan, como muestra palmariamente el sistema de Hegel, en una conciliación del pensamiento con la realidad (filosofía como aceptación del mundo), y filosofías que sirven —por su vinculación consciente con una praxis revolucionaria— a la transformación del mundo (filosofía como instrumento teórico o guía de una transformación humana radical). Ahora bien, ¿no podría decirse que, en este último caso, la actividad filosófica es ya una forma de praxis, que podríamos denominar precisamente praxis teórica? Y, de no ser así ¿no se colocarían todas las filosofías en el mismo plano teórico y se borraría la diferencia cualitativa que Marx establece en la Tesis citada entre uno y otro tipo de filosofía?

Detengámonos brevemente en esta cuestión que nos parece de suma importancia para delimitar el contenido de la verdadera praxis.

Descartemos, en primer lugar, el considerar que pueda hablarse legítimamente de praxis filosófica por el simple hecho de que una filosofía tenga consecuencias prácticas. Ya decíamos en nuestra introducción que todas las grandes doctrinas filosóficas las han tenido siempre, en mayor o menor grado, más o menos directamente; en cuanto que independientemente de las intenciones del filósofo, han cumplido cierta función social. Esto vale incluso para filosofías que —como el idealismo alemán— distaban mucho de pretender servir a la transformación efectiva del mundo. No se trata, pues, de eso.

Al plantearnos la cuestión de si la actividad filosófica puede ser praxis de por sí, nos referimos a la filosofía que, vinculada conscientemente a la práctica, se propone ser instrumento teórico de la transformación de la realidad. Pensamos precisamente en el propio marxismo como filosofía que —de acuerdo con la Tesis XI sobre Feuerbach— tiene presente que se trata no sólo de interpretar el mundo, sino de transformarlo. ¿Puede decirse que la actividad filosófica, en este caso, sea praxis, sin olvidar por un momento el contenido que hemos dado a este término? A nuestro juicio, la filosofía ni como interpretación del mundo ni como instrumento teórico de su transformación es de por sí, de un modo directo e inmediato, praxis. La filosofía marxista, siendo necesariamente una interpretación científica del mundo, responde a necesidades prácticas humanas; expresa, a su vez, una práctica existente y, por otro lado, aspira conscientemente a ser guía de una praxis revolucionaria. Con ello se subraya la función ideológica y social de una filosofía que sólo puede ser práctica en cuanto que excluye la utopía y trasciende sus elementos puramente ideológicos para ser científica. Lo que la diferencia de las doctrinas filosóficas a que alude Marx en la primera parte de su Tesis XI sobre Feuerbach, así como de otras doctrinas socialistas es, pues, su carácter científico, pero también —y no secundariamente— el concebirse a sí misma en función de la praxis; es decir, como filosofía al servicio de la transformación efectiva, real, del mundo, integrando así la praxis revolucionaria como fin de la teoría.

La teoría de por sí —en este caso como en cualquier otro— no transforma el mundo. Puede contribuir a su transformación, pero para ello tiene que salir de sí misma, y, en primer lugar, tiene que ser asimilada por los que han de suscitar, con sus actos reales, efectivos, dicha transformación. Entre la teoría y la actividad práctica transformadora se inserta una labor de educación de las conciencias, de organización de los medios materiales y planes concretos de acción; todo ello como paso indispensable para desarrollar acciones reales efectivas. En este sentido, una teoría es práctica en cuanto que materializa, a través de una serie de mediaciones, lo que antes sólo existía idealmente, como conocimiento de la realidad o anticipación ideal de su transformación.

Pero si la teoría de por sí no cambia al mundo sólo puede contribuir a transformarlo justamente como teoría. Es decir, la condición de posibilidad —necesaria, aunque insuficiente— para transitar conscientemente de la teoría a la práctica, y, por tanto, para que la primera cumpla una función práctica, es que sea propiamente una actividad teórica —en la que los ingredientes cognoscitivos y teleológicos se hallen íntimamente vinculados y mutuamente considerados—. En este sentido, una filosofía vinculada a la práctica, que aspira conscientemente a realizarse, lejos de carecer de un contenido propiamente teórico, ha de mostrarlo en toda su riqueza. El paso de la teoría socialista de la forma utópica que tiene en Saint-Simon, Fourier u Owen, o de las doctrinas comunistas utópicas como la de Moses Hess, a la forma científica que recibe en Marx y Engels entraña, pudiéramos decir, junto a una elevación de su función práctica, una elevación de su contenido teórico, con la particularidad de que ambos aspectos se hallan en una relación indisoluble.

La filosofía que se ve a sí misma como instrumento teórico de la praxis es teoría, y como tal no transforma real y efectivamente de por sí. Interpretar no es transformar. Pero de lo que se trata —como dice Marx en la Tesis XI— es de transformar; de ahí que la teoría haya de ser arrancada de su estado meramente teórico y, por las mediaciones adecuadas, tratar de realizarla. Pero este segundo aspecto que es vital cuando no se acepta el mundo como es y se trata de transformarlo, lejos de abolir el contenido teórico de la filosofía, o de reducirlo a un ingrediente meramente ideológico, presupone aquél necesariamente —al nivel de la ciencia—, como condición ineludible para guiar la acción. Así, pues, la actividad filosófica en cuanto tal no es praxis. Y no lo es tampoco la filosofía de la praxis o teoría de la actividad práctica del hombre en sus relaciones con la naturaleza y con otros hombres.

La concepción de la filosofía de la praxis como actividad práctica de por sí es, a nuestro juicio, una concepción idealista, incompatible con el verdadero concepto de la praxis que antes hemos delimitado, y entraña la vuelta a puntos de vista filosóficos —como el de los jóvenes hegelianos—, que ya fueron criticados y superados por Marx precisamente para poder elaborar una filosofía como guía o instrumento teórico de la transformación de la realidad, y hacer posible así la transformación efectiva de ésta.

La actividad filosófica —desligada de la práctica o vinculada conscientemente a ella—, como mera interpretación o como instrumento teórico de su transformación, cultivada por intelectuales de origen burgués o de origen proletario, es siempre una actividad intelectual, teórica. La diferencia cualitativa por su carácter esencial —ideológico o científico—, o por la función que una u otra filosofía puede cumplir, no basta para hablar legítimamente de una praxis teórica.

En suma, la praxis se nos presenta como una actividad material, transformadora, y adecuada a fines. Fuera de ella, queda la actividad teórica que no se materializa, en cuanto que es actividad espiritual pura. Pero por otra parte, no hay praxis como actividad puramente material, es decir, sin la producción de fines y conocimientos que caracteriza la actividad teórica. Ello quiere decir que el problema de determinar qué es la praxis requiere delimitar más a fondo las relaciones entre teoría y práctica.

---

(1) C. Marx, Tesis (I) sobre Feuerbach, en C. Marx y F. Engels, La ideología alemana, traduc. de W. Roces, EPU, Montevideo, 1959, página 633

(2) Actividad es aquí sinónimo de acción entendida también como acto o conjunto de actos que modifican una materia exterior o que es inmanente al agente.

(3) Asimismo la contradicción fundamental del modo de producción capitalista es también inintencional. «Es resultado —dice Maurice Godelier— de la acción de todos los agentes del sistema y del desarrollo del sistema mismo, pero no ha sido nunca el proyecto de ninguna conciencia ni un fin querido por nadie». (M. Godelier, Rationalité et irrationalité en économie, Ed. Maspero, París, 1966, página 79).

(4) Cf. a este respecto la carta de Engels a J. Bloch, del 21-22 de septiembre de 1890, en la que el primero dice: «... La historia se hace de tal modo, que el resultado final siempre deriva de los conflictos entre muchas voluntades individuales, cada una de las cuales, a su vez, es lo que es por efecto de una multitud de condiciones especiales de vida; son, pues, innumerables fuerzas que se entrecruzan las unas con las otras, un grupo infinito de paralelogramos de fuerzas, de las que surge una resultante —el acontecimiento histórico—, que, a su vez, puede considerarse producto de una potencia única, que, como un todo, actúa sin conciencia y sin voluntad... De este modo hasta aquí toda la historia ha discurrido a modo de un proceso natural y sometida también, sustancialmente, a las mismas leyes dinámicas. Pero del hecho de que las distintas voluntades individuales ... no alcancen lo que desean, sino que se fundan todas en una medida total, en una resultante común, no debe inferirse que estas voluntades sean igual a cero. Por el contrario, todas contribuyen a la resultante y se hallan, por tanto, incluidas en ella.» (C. Marx y F. Engels, Obras escogidas, en dos tomos, ed. esp., tomo I, Moscú 1952, páginas 459-460.)

(5) Sobre la finalidad como categoría específica de la actividad humana y sus relaciones con la causalidad, véase mi estudio «Contribución a la dialéctica de la finalidad y la causalidad», Anuario de Filosofía, UNAM, año I, México, 1961, páginas 56-61

(6) C. Marx, El Capital. Crítica de la economía política, traducción de W. Roces, 3a. ed. especial, t. I, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México-Buenos Aires, 1964, páginas 130-131.

(7) Marx, El Capital, ed. esp. cit., t. I., p. 131.

(8) Hablamos aquí de lo teórico en un sentido amplio que abarca tanto la esfera de los fines como de los conocimientos. En este sentido lo teórico se contrapone —no de un modo absoluto, sino relativo, como veremos en el capítulo siguiente— a lo práctico. En un sentido más restringido, lo teórico —el dominio de la teoría— se aplica a un conjunto de conocimientos aglutinados en torno a un principio unificador que los articula y sistematiza constituyendo así un campo científico dado.

(9) C. Marx, El Capital, t. I, página 131.

(10) C. Marx, Tesis (I) sobre Feuerbach, ed. cit., página 633.

(11) «El trabajo es, en primer término —dice Marx—, un proceso entre la naturaleza y el hombre, proceso en que éste se realiza, regula y controla mediante su propia acción, su intercambio de materias con la naturaleza». (El Capital, I, página 130).

(12) C. Marx, Prólogo a la Contribución a la crítica de la economía política, en C. Marx y F. Engels, Obras escogidas, ed. esp. cit., t. I, páginas 332-333.

(13) C. Marx, El Capital, I, ed. cit., página 130.

(14) Ibidem, página 131.

(15) Ibidem, página 132.

(16) Ibidem.

(17) Al analizar la concepción de Marx del proceso de trabajo en El Capital, Louis Althusser subraya, interpretando el pasaje correspondiente, la naturaleza material de las condiciones del proceso de trabajo y el papel dominante de los medios de producción en dicho proceso. A juicio suyo, el proceso de trabajo se halla determinado por esas condiciones materiales («el proceso de trabajo como mecanismo material se halla denominado por las leyes físicas de la naturaleza y de la tecnología»). Al mostrarse así las «condiciones materiales irreductibles del proceso de trabajo», Marx rompe con la concepción del «trabajo como esencia del hombre» y con el «idealismo del trabajo» que esta concepción —propia de los Manuscritos de 1844— entraña (Cf. L. Althusser, «L'objet du Capital», en el t. II de Lire Le Capital, F. Maspero, París, 1965, páginas 144-149).

L. Althusser tiene razón al pronunciarse contra una «ideología antropológica del trabajo» y, por ello, procede justamente al subrayar la importancia de las condiciones materiales del trabajo, lo que le lleva a detenerse sobre todo en dos de los elementos constitutivos de dicho proceso según Marx. Pero en su análisis omite por completo el estudio del tercero de ellos: la actividad adecuada a un fin, o trabajo propiamente dicho. Es esa omisión la que le permite contraponer radicalmente en esta cuestión los Manuscritos de 1844 a El Capital al reducir la concepción de la primera obra a «idealismo del trabajo» y la de la segunda a una «concepción materialista de la producción». A nuestro juicio, la importancia de ese tercer factor del proceso de trabajo —señalado en distinta forma tanto en los Manuscritos de 1844 como en El Capital— es la que mantiene cierta continuidad entre una y otra concepción sin que por ello se borren sus diferencias esenciales.

(18) C. Marx, El Capital, I, ed. cit., página 130.

(19) C. Marx, El Capital, t. I, ed. cit., página 130.

(20) Sobre las relaciones entre el arte y el trabajo, y la concepción del trabajo artístico como creación, véase mi libro, Las ideas estéticas de Marx (Ed. Era, México, D. F., 1965), particularmente los estudios titulados «El marxismo contemporáneo y el arte» y «Las ideas de Marx sobre la fuente y naturaleza de lo estético».

(21) Ya en La Sagrada Familia decían Marx y Engels: «Las ideas no pueden conducir nunca más allá de las ideas del viejo estado universal de cosas. Las ideas no pueden nunca ejecutar nada. Para la ejecución de las ideas hacen falta los hombres que pongan en acción una fuerza práctica» (C. Marx y F. Engels, La Sagrada Familia, ed. esp. cit., página 165).

(22) «... El método que permite elevarse de lo abstracto a lo concreto no es otra cosa que el modo como el pensamiento se apropia lo concreto bajo la forma de lo concreto pensado. Pero no es de ninguna manera lo concreto mismo.» (Contribución a la crítica de la economía política, ed. francesa, París, 1957, página 165).

(23) En ocasiones se emplea la expresión «praxis» o «práctica teórica», para designar una «práctica específica que se ejerce sobre un objeto propio y conduce a su producto propio: un conocimiento» (L. Althusser, Pour Marx, París, 1965, página 175). En este caso, se presenta como una forma específica de la práctica en general, entendida como «proceso de transformación de una materia prima dada y determinada en un producto determinado, transformación que se lleva a cabo por un trabajo humano determinado, utilizando medios (de producción) determinados». (Ibidem, página 167). La práctica teórica así entendida corresponde en gran parte —no totalmente, puesto que nosotros incluimos también en ella la producción de fines— a lo que nosotros denominados actividad teórica.

Althusser no emplea, por tanto, esta expresión en el sentido idealista, tan firmemente rechazado por Marx, de producción de ideas que transforma por sí misma la realidad. Se esfuerza asimismo por subrayar el carácter distintivo e irreemplazable de la «práctica teórica» (cf. también a este respecto su estudio Teoría, práctica teórica y formación teórica. Ideología y lucha ideológica, en la revista Casa de las Américas, número 34, La Habana, Cuba, páginas 13-17). Sin embargo, la extensión del término «práctica» a todo tipo de relación o apropiación del mundo real, incluyendo no sólo la teórica e ideológica, sino también la ética y la religiosa (cf. Lire Le Capital, I, página 85) hace que se borre el carácter esencial de la praxis que Marx justamente pretendió destacar (como transformación efectiva, real de un objeto real) frente a un «idealismo de la praxis» (reducción de ésta a la actividad teórica o moral). Creemos, por ello, que el empleo del término «práctica» allí donde no se ocupera esa transformación objetiva y real induce a confusión pese al empeño en diferenciar sus formas específicas.

Base económica y superestructuras ideológicas

Charles Bettelheim, Jacques Charriere

Los objetivos fundamentales perseguidos por todos los países que han iniciado la vía del socialismo, consisten en principio en esforzarse en realizar tanto transformaciones de base como transformaciones superestructurales, es decir, lograr por una reestructuración social (y no sólo económica) y por transformaciones ideológicas profundas; aunque hay distintos puntos de vista acerca de los lazos que unen a esas diversas transformaciones.

En China se subraya con frecuencia que su meta no consiste sólo en lograr ritmos de desarrollo más rápidos que los que puede realizar el capitalismo sino también y sobre todo promover una nueva formación social con sus normas de comportamiento y superestructuras específicas.

Desde el punto de vista marxista la persecución de ese objetivo no se debe a una opción arbitraria sino al reconocimiento de una exigencia histórica impuesta por el nivel del desarrollo posible de las fuerzas productivas modernas. El reconocimiento de tal exigencia histórica significa la aceptación de que sin un cambio radical no sólo de las relaciones de propiedad sino también del conjunto del modo de producción y de la superestructura de la sociedad las fuerzas productivas o no pueden desarrollarse o sólo se desarrollan de manera contradictoria, es decir, engendrando fuerzas destructivas crecientes tanto en el plano material como en el de los propios hombres. Estos últimos son esclavizados cada vez más por sus propios productos, incluyendo la esfera del consumo.

Más específicamente, el análisis anterior implica que el modo de producción, el modo de producción socialista, no puede progresar y mantenerse sin la edificación de estructuras adecuadas, es decir, particularmente de relaciones sociales, actitudes, comportamientos e ideas sociales determinadas. Sin superestructuras adecuadas, la base económica sobre la que se construye el socialismo está amenazada por transformaciones regresivas, tanto al nivel de las relaciones de producción como al nivel de las propias fuerzas productivas. Estas últimas, en efecto, corren el peligro de progresar cada vez con mayor lentitud si no encarnan con rapidez las actitudes y comportamiento que exige el desarrollo de la sociedad socialista y, sobre todo, si dichas actitudes, conductas y sistemas de valores adecuados tienden no a fortificarse sino a estancarse, en favor de actitudes, conductas y sistemas de valores que caracterizan a las formas sociales anteriores y que conservan todavía una base objetiva en las condiciones materiales, mientras el nivel de las fuerzas productivas no se haya elevado suficientemente.

Por lo tanto, la cuestión que se plantea es la de las relaciones entre la base económica y las superestructuras correspondientes. Según la interpretación mecanicista de dicho problema, se puede pensar que toda forma de producción engendra en última instancia nuevas actitudes, nuevos sistemas de valores, una nueva ideología y un hombre nuevo.(1)

Por el contrario, la interpretación dialéctica del problema nos lleva a pensar que si el progreso de una forma de producción (es decir, de sus fuerzas productivas y de sus relaciones de producción) constituye la condición necesaria de la transformación de la superestructura, esta última, dentro de ciertos límites, tiene un dinamismo propio y, sobre todo, que puede ejercer una acción regresiva sobre la misma base económica. No es inútil recordar aquí algunas de las interpretaciones que se han formulado de ciertos textos de Marx y Engels.

Una interpretación estrecha de algunos párrafos del Manifiesto Comunista o del Anti-Duhring ha originado a veces una interpretación mecanicista que, sin embargo, es contraria a los análisis globales que nos han dejado Marx y Engels. En efecto, éstos insistieron siempre en el carácter global de las transformaciones sociales y, por tanto, en la interacción de los diferentes elementos cuya suma constituye la totalidad de una formación social.

Por ejemplo, Engels en su libro sobre El origen de la familia, de la propiedad privada y del Estado, ha puesto de relieve las profundas influencias que pueden tener ciertos elementos de la superestructura ideológica sobre la evolución social. Así, cuando analiza la incapacidad de la sociedad esclavista para dar lugar directamente a un nuevo método de producción favorable al desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, insiste en el "desprecio hacia el trabajo productivo" heredado de la sociedad esclavista, y que representa un freno al desarrollo.

Engels escribe: "La esclavitud... al morir, dejó detrás de sí su aguijón venenoso bajo la forma de proscripción del trabajo productivo por los hombres libres. Tal es el callejón sin salida en el cual se encontraba el mundo romano: la esclavitud era económicamente imposible, y el trabajo de los hombres libres estaba moralmente proscrito. La primera no podía ya y el segundo no podía aún ser la forma básica de la producción social. La única salida posible era una revolución radical.(2)

En ese texto podemos ver claramente de qué manera una actitud ("el desprecio hacia el trabajo productivo"), se convierte en un obstáculo al desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas y cómo Engels estima que sólo una revolución completa podía transformar suficientemente el elemento de la superestructura para que fueran posibles nuevos progresos.

Ya que hemos recordado el anterior texto de Engels, que tiene su equivalente para otras épocas en multitud de análisis marxistas,(3) no es inútil recordar igualmente que Engels prolonga su análisis de la revolución que tuvo lugar entre el quinto y el noveno siglos de nuestra era, ya que se trata esencialmente de una revolución que se efectuó al nivel de las superestructuras ideológicas y que adaptó estas últimas a las exigencias de las nuevas fuerzas productivas.(4)

Engels subraya que a lo largo de los cuatro siglos durante los cuales tuvo lugar dicha revolución, no hubo prácticamente ningún progreso, ni en las fuerzas productivas, ni en las relaciones de producción. A pesar de los grandes cambios a que dio lugar la caída del Imperio Romano y las invasiones de las tribus germánicas, encontramos bajo una nueva etiqueta, las viejas formas de propiedad y las viejas relaciones de producción.

Escribe Engels: "Así, pues, parecía como si al cabo de cuatro siglos la masa de la población hubiese vuelto a su punto de partida".(5) Sin embargo, añade inmediatamente, se había avanzado, porque aun cuando las clases sociales seguían siendo casi las mismas, "los hombres que formaban estas clases habían cambiado".(6)

La referencia a estos análisis sólo en apariencia nos aleja de nuestro tema, el del lugar especialmente importante que se atribuye en China a la adhesión de las masas al sistema de valores, de actitudes y comportamiento que corresponde a las exigencias de la construcción de la sociedad socialista.

Por otra parte, los anteriores análisis nos conducen a rechazar ciertas interpretaciones mecanicistas de las relaciones entre la base económica y la superestructura. Incluso autores que, por lo demás, abordan buen número de problemas desde un punto de vista dialéctico, han sugerido interpretaciones de ese tipo.

Así, hay una cierta interpretación mecanicista en el capítulo 2 del Tomo I del Tratado de Economía Política de Oskar Lange. En ese texto, la eliminación de la no-correspondencia entre las relaciones de producción, por una parte, y el nivel de desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas y el carácter de esas fuerzas, por la otra, aparece como el resultado de la "acción de la primera ley fundamental de la sociología". Esta última, afirma Oskar Lange, "restablece la correspondencia entre las relaciones de producción y las nuevas fuerzas productivas".[7]

En la misma obra, se dice: "Es la acción de la segunda ley fundamental de la sociología (quien) restablece la correspondencia entre la superestructura y las exigencias de la nueva base económica..."[8]

Tales formulaciones sugieren la acción unilateral de las fuerzas productivas sobre las relaciones de producción, y de la base económica sobre la superestructura. El mismo esquema aparece en la página 38 de la obra mencionada; en ese esquema, las "flechas" sólo significan que hay un movimiento de "abajo hacia arriba".

Un corolario lógico de esta concepción es la idea del "carácter conservador tanto de la base económica como de la superestructura".[9] Una y otra son vistas esencialmente como obstáculos al progreso de las fuerzas productivas y como algo incapaz de adaptarse sin retraso, bajo la acción de las dos "leyes fundamentales de la sociología".

Aun cuando Oskar Lange reconoce que el cambio de una forma social a otra constituye un proceso dialéctico, porque resulta de la solución de una serie de contradicciones, la descripción que ofrece de dicho proceso es unilateral. Se limita a invertir la dialéctica hegeliana, pero deja escapar la especificidad de la dialéctica histórica. Esta última se desarrolla a través de contradicciones no sólo operadas, sino pensadas. Por otro lado, las contradicciones no se resuelven por la intervención de una "ley" abstracta, sino por la intervención de las clases o capas sociales que integran objetivamente uno de los polos de la contradicción principal de una época, y que toman conciencia de ella.

Sólo así puede nacer una ideología o una conciencia revolucionaria, es decir, los elementos de una nueva superestructura. La superestructura, lejos de tener un carácter conservador, conduce, por el contrario, a la transformación de la base económica y a un nuevo progreso de las fuerzas productivas.[10]

Cuando se analizan en términos marxistas las transformaciones de la superestructura que condicionan un nuevo progreso de las fuerzas productivas, con frecuencia se consideran esenciales en el análisis las transformaciones políticas y jurídicas, la sustitución de un tipo de Estado por otro, del dominio de una clase por otra, de relaciones de propiedad y de producción por otras. En efecto; se trata de transformaciones decisivas, ya que permiten la sustitución de una vieja superestructura que obstaculiza el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, por una nueva, mejor adaptada a ese desarrollo. Sin embargo, tales transformaciones son posibles porque las clases antes dominadas han rechazado la ideología anterior (que les había hecho aceptar el antiguo orden de cosas) y se han adherido, al menos en lo esencial, a una nueva ideología que expresa mejor las exigencias de las fuerzas productivas y de las relaciones de producción correspondientes, es decir, las exigencias de la base económica. En este caso se hace evidente que la ideología no es un factor de resistencia al cambio, sino, por el contrario, uno de sus elementos motores.

El papel de la ideología no se limita a la fase más aguda de una transformación social. De hecho, toda nueva forma social sólo puede desarrollarse si la ideología que exige su funcionamiento es cada vez más profundamente, la ideología dominante. Así, según la naturaleza y el grado de dominación y penetración en las masas de una ideología dada, ésta puede frenar el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas o, por el contrario, contribuir a su desarrollo.

Las indicaciones precedentes no sólo tienen un interés teórico. En efecto; si se subraya de una manera unilateral el papel de la base económica, existirá la tendencia a impulsar esencialmente el progreso de esta base, y en particular, el progreso de las fuerzas productivas, el surgimiento de una superestructura ideológica adecuada (en virtud de la "segunda ley fundamental de la sociología").

Por el contrario, si se reconoce que hay una acción recíproca entre la base y la superestructura, al mismo tiempo que se impulsa directamente el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas (por la política económica), se buscará también en las masas el progreso de la ideología que corresponde a la nueva base económica, en particular a través de la educación. Esta última debe procurar que desaparezcan las actitudes y comportamientos heredados del pasado y sustituirlos por actitudes, comportamientos y sistemas nuevos de valores, correspondientes a las exigencias mismas del desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas.

Parece indispensable reconocer que este papel de la educación y de la ideología es tanto más necesario, cuando más avanzadas estén las relaciones de producción y propiedad, establecido por un proceso revolucionario, sobre el nivel de desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas en un país dado.

El avance[11] del régimen político y social sobre el nivel local del desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, da lugar, en efecto, a un tipo particular de contradicción, a una contradicción que favorece el progreso rápido de las fuerzas productivas, con la condición de que esté influida correctamente y conscientemente dominada. Esta última formulación no significa que sólo a través de un desarrollo de la conciencia se encuentra asegurado el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas[12], sino más bien que, en ese caso, la conciencia de las relaciones reales de producción y de las contradicciones que pueden caracterizarlas, así como la capacidad de dominar estas contradicciones por un comportamiento adecuado, son necesarias al progreso de las fuerzas productivas.

Para ser socialmente significativas, la conciencia y la capacidad deben expresarse no sólo en términos de conceptos y conocimientos, sino también en forma de organización y actitudes que interpreten de manera apropiada los sistemas de valores y de acción. Si faltan estos últimos, las categorías conceptuales y el conocimiento o la conciencia no son más que abstracciones sin eficacia social.

Sólo después de este largo rodeo podemos volver a ciertas características específicas de la construcción del socialismo en China.

---

1. En realidad, la misma interpretación mecanicista de las relaciones entre los diferentes niveles de la vida social, ha llevado a algunos marxistas a pensar que el progreso de las fuerzas productivas es suficiente para engendrar todas las condiciones de la transformación revolucionaria de un modo de producción, mientras que en realidad dicho progreso es la condición básica de esa transformación: finalmente, la transformación no se produce sino a través de las contradicciones sociales y de la acción política que engendran estas últimas, es decir, por una acción consciente de los hombres.

2. F. Engels, *El origen de la familia, la propiedad y el Estado*, Ediciones en Lenguas Extranjeras, 1952, Moscú, Tomo II, página 280.

3. Es conocida la célebre frase de Lenin: "las ideas se convierten en fuerzas cuando penetran en las masas". (Lenin, *Obras Completas*, Tomo XXI, Ediciones Sociales Internacionales, 1930, página 310).

4. En efecto, las ideas se convierten en fuerzas positivas cuando corresponden a las exigencias del desarrollo social, es decir, al nivel de las fuerzas productivas y de las relaciones sociales existentes o en proceso de formación.

5. F. Engels, *El origen de la familia...* op. cit., página 283.

6. (Ibid., página 281). El análisis que presenta Engels de esta "transformación de los hombres" ("amos y esclavos") es extraordinariamente interesante. Engels subraya que los hombres de la Europa occidental del siglo noveno, no se habían formado "con la decadencia de una civilización agonizante, sino entre los dolores del parto de una civilización nueva".
Esta "nueva civilización", "en plena vitalidad de desarrollo", debía sus características a las instituciones, actitudes, comportamientos e ideas específicas que introdujeron las tribus germánicas.
Hablando de esas tribus y del origen de su contribución revolucionaria, en el preciso sentido de la transformación de los hombres, Engels escribe:
"Su capacidad y su valentía personales, su espíritu de libertad y su instinto democrático... en una palabra, todas las cualidades que los romanos habían perdido... ¿qué eran sino los rasgos característicos de los bárbaros del estadio superior de la barbarie, los frutos de su constitución gentilicia?"
(Ibid., página 285), y precisa: "Sus hábitos de gentiles, las supervivencias, vivas entre ellos, de los tiempos del derecho materno" y sus "comunidades de las pequeñas ciudades".
Aquí, Engels subraya el aporte decisivo de las instituciones, de las ideas y de las cualidades morales características del "estadio superior de la barbarie" a la revolución que se desarrolló entre el quinto y el noveno siglos. En tanto que la sociedad surgida del antiguo esclavismo había perdido toda su vitalidad, "sólo bárbaros eran capaces de rejuvenecer un mundo servil que sufría una civilización moribunda". (Engels, Ibid., página 286).

7. Oskar Lange, *Économie Politique*, Presses Universitaire de France, Paris, 1962, XVII-403, página 42.

8. Ibid., página 42.

9. Ibid., página 43; cf. también páginas 39 a 41 e, igualmente, páginas 45 a 48 de la misma obra.

10. Dicho progreso revolucionario es descrito brevemente y de manera parcial por Oskar Lange en la obra citada (páginas 47 y 48), pero sin demostrar que en esto consiste el proceso real de toda transformación social radical, ya que tal proceso implica necesariamente una acción revolucionaria que no se presenta sino cuando ciertos elementos de la superestructura, las ideas, las actitudes, etcétera, se han integrado y encarnado en la "conciencia de clase revolucionaria", y en la forma concreta de organizaciones a través de las cuales esta conciencia de clase toma cuerpo y se expresa.

11. Según la expresión bien conocida de Lenin, cuando habla de la Rusia Soviética como un "país políticamente avanzado y económicamente atrasado".

12. Tal interpretación parece ser la de Ernesto Che Guevara en su artículo "La planificación socialista, su significado", en "Cuba Socialista", junio de 1964, páginas 13 a 24, cf. página 17 in fine.

LA PALMA DE LA MANO

José Lezama Lima

La palma de la mano sobre el río.
La palma paso a paso, hacia mí, leyéndome.
Narciso mascado por la niebla ascendente,
vuelven los dioses descensores, Orfeo
y Stephanophorophoro.
El índice demuestra, señala la inflexible
llanura de la nieve, demuestra.
El índice demuestra la carreta sobre un hilo,
la diagonal con cuerpo de cocodrilo
y cabeza de gavilán,
el anillo de oro en el tumor de la luna.
La mano se extiende sobre la llanura
de nieve, la palma de la mano
acompasa la boga del río.
La carreta conduce un canoso
reloj de pared. Icaro con dos guadañas.
Saturno se come las alas de cera.
Se extiende, demuestra, se deja leer.
Icaro, ya caído, nadando,
habla con el Resucitado sentado en el légamo.
El vencido por el sol regresa con las estaciones
y el que triunfa de la muerte se vuelve a morir.
Es un bodegón de cebolla, manzana y amapolas.
El aire está exprimido en el puño
que se cierra, el arador por la palma de la mano
deja el reminiscente batido y batihojas,
el deseo paliducho, la serpiente, el doble
del comienzo, el truchimán vindicativo,
círculo que golpea en las narices.
La capota caída se mide por su sombra.
Icaro vencido y el Resucitado vencedor,
el Resucitado esperando la muerte
y el Icaro eterno relator.
En su sangre el laberinto y el torete
oscuro luchando con el tigre dormido.

¿Quién de bruces acompasado en la ebriedad del relojero?
Arrugado, puro detesto, cara de rompeolas.
El Príncipe de Praga, relojero sin deseos,
ahogado en el reloj de agua,
ola por ola, ola sin sucesión,
ola para ojos
El tiempo caminando detrás de las pestañas
como elefante, casquetes, medialunas,
ensortijados monos llorones,
verde portezuela y amarillo prestidigitador,
abrían el bostezo en la cantina escandinava,
un penique por cada bostezo
y va de contra el bigotillo
para el perrequete circulante,
pero el tiempo no es como el aguacero
que tapa las grietas
y baldea el puente parabólico de la guitarra.
Tenemos que medir el tiempo por el vaivén
de los ojos y cerrar los ojos
y el murmullo que nos va devorando
cuando nos sumergimos en la madre de carbón.
Sumergidos toda inocencia puede llegar a ser culpa,
tan pronto surge la polifemaida del otro,
los martillazos desconchados
en el cálculo de la [illegible] sombreada.
Los entorchados del fusilamiento, el pez egipcio
saltando al sol, pueden hacer el pecado inocente.
El tic-tac raspado es pecador en Isis
y después es inocente en Osiris.
El jinete escita peca sin testes y la franja
celeste rompe el cántaro de las bodas,
Así seguimos colocando ladrillos en el muro
y sobre los muros cascos de botella,
así nos cosimos la oreja en el cancán.

1967

LA CASA DE CARLOS

PRIMAVERA EN JEVANI

Roque Dalton

Carlos Jurado sufrió tanto en su infancia, que en cuanto se casó escogió como hogar aquella casa de la zona 12 del DF, adornada con una cabeza de caballo en el portón. Era una casa enorme, dividida en innumerables pisitos, buhardillas y simples rincones, donde las veraneras y los jacintos parecían engordar de humedad y de sol matutino, como pupilas de matrona provinciana que llevase una alacena repleta de mermelada de grosella en vez de corazón y quien, luego de la merienda de las diez, hubiese gastado un cuarto de hora en consumir su puro de mariguana que le abriría el apetito para el almuerzo. En el laberinto de sus jardines y corredores se perdió hace años Chaflán, aquel olvidado cómico de cine mexicano, del cual tuvieron luego que decir que había muerto, ahogado o apopléjico, en el extranjero. Precisamente la mujer de Carlos, Chichai, encontraría su esqueleto bigotudo detrás de una maceta de geranios en marzo de 1965 y, a fin de rescatarlo para hacerlo clavar en la gran cruz de la biblioteca dormitorio, tuvo que disputarlo seriamente durante toda una mañana a una vasta jauría de cucarachas doradas. Carlos paradójicamente, se había enamorado a primera vista de las rejas españolas que adornaban muchos de los ventanales interiores de la casa, porque le recordaban las de San Cristóbal de Las Casas y las de su propio hogar allá, que por cierto le servían de jaula-prisión cuando lo castigaban por mojar la cama a los ocho años de edad, exponiéndolo a las miradas de los transeúntes que marchaban friolentamente a misa, con aquel cartel autocrítico colgado del pecho: "Soy meón y cagón". Carlos nunca perdonó a su familia la imputación calumniosa del segundo pecado. Aquella casa, para empezar a decir algo funcional a su respecto, era deliciosa de habitar, tal esos sueños que se nos repiten de cuando en cuando y nos van configurando poco a poco un ideal de no sé qué, cuyos definitivos perfiles y texturas venimos tan sólo a comprender 23 horas antes de morir. Hablamos, desde luego, para personas que han nacido o viven en el Hemisferio Norte. Era eso sí, una casa enemiga del invierno. Cuando llegaban las lluvias, el caballo del portón se volvía rojo de ira y desde debajo de las tejas surgían miles de tentaculillos vibrátiles, rematados en diminutos paragüitas color sangre azul que formaban una especie de pleura monumental que rechazaba el agua y convertía las calles adyacentes en Niágaras de barrio. Las paredes echaban una pelusa lanosa de un centímetro de espesor, lo cual no les impedía, sin embargo, tiritar en las madrugadas, derrumbando en los interiores reproducciones de Siqueiros, depósitos de agua bendita, diplomas de Abogados y Dentistas. Desde sus patios, ventanas, claraboyas, no se podía ver nunca la luna en esa temporada, aunque esplendiese, llena, en las escampadas; para ello había que cruzar la calle. De allí que algunos opinen que, además de la pleura aquella, la casa se erigía entonces una cúpula invisible que para el ojo humano no detenía sino los rayos de la luna. Porque las estrellas se miraban lo mismo. Y los pájaros. En el invierno cambiaba en la casa el tono del eco hasta adoptar el de un viejo bajo acatarrado impostando la voz con pésimo oficio teatral para demostrar ira patética. No importaba entonces que la voz original fuera del niño de una familia de violinistas, acostumbrado a hacer sus requerimientos fundamentales a fuerza de chillidos especialmente agudos, o de una señorita asustadita, ubicable en algún Buró Político de la Orden Tercieria del Santísimo Sacramento, en plena reacción oral ante los sustos curativos del hipo. No es que la casa se volviese en aquel tiempo incómoda o agresiva. Todas aquellas transformaciones poseían su propia gravedad y hermosura y más bien construían un mundo especial de seres objetos y fenómenos relacionados entre sí con una disciplinada, responsable armonía, similar a la de las pasiones shakespeareanas, que, desde luego, podríamos objetar, en uso de una moralidad aguafiestas, únicamente con el argumento de que toda ella estaba basada en el odio al invierno. Y hablar luego con toda hipocresía de las necesidades de la producción de cereales, de los pastos para el ganado de leche, de las sequías en el Brasil y sus hambrunas concomitantes. Hasta allí somos capaces de llegar, estéticamente cobardes como, de vez en cuando, somos. Oh, queridas lectoras, pero ¡qué indiscutibilidad reinaba sobre la belleza de aquella casa cuando llegaba la primavera! Ni los espíritus más audaces serían capaces de racionalizar a primera vista la absoluta integralidad de la misma y más bien comenzarían por confundirla con una simple, aunque esplendente, paz, un orden de integración a los días en que la naturaleza se despereza y se lava la cara, una —con el perdón de ustedes y en última instancia— táctica. Por el contrario, la casa en primavera era la casa como nunca, lógicamente cerrada sobre sí, poblada de innumerables datos que nos decían de su relación directa con lo Absoluto, fulgurante en medio de una sequedad de agua dura, como una esmeralda o una espada pulimentada para muestrario, soberbia en fin, como una bailarina de dieciséis años cuando se incorpora del lecho sobre la segunda hora de amor y nos deja, mientras se mete en el cuarto de baño para sentarse en el bidet, con una mano en alto, lánguida y expectante a la vez, como en el instante de iniciar el Pas de Quatre, y nos deja, decía, felices, pero con una bolita de duda entre las manos que de pronto comienza a crecer hasta tomar un tamaño tal que nos vemos abismados a iniciar con ella (o sea, la ex-bolita de duda), angustiados, un nuevo cuerpo a cuerpo con el que no contábamos, que a lo mejor no nos permitirá ese cuarto episodio, el que decimos preferir por cuanto nos permite conocer desde ahora las urgencias de los placeres de la madurez y cuya misma posibilidad se nos torna de pronto problemática porque Ella nos ha llamado con suavidad desde el baño y nos ha dicho que no encuentra la llave del agua caliente, pero a pesar de todo nos quiere mucho y además va a pedirnos que nos asomemos porque se le antoja vernos desnudos un poquitín. Como un joven jefe de Estado Mayor que dirige, antes que nadie, la batalla. Pero me parece que hablábamos de alguien, en algún lugar de México. Y como momentáneamente no sé si se trataba de alguna referencia, en algún sentido, política, permítaseme que haga un paréntesis preventivo para ubicarme en mi normal estado de responsabilidad. Alguno de ustedes podría ayudarme, digo yo.

PRIMAVERA EN JEVANI

Colores andróginos, una verdadera Patagonia de colores, acechantes, anfitriones de la duda, impermeables a la mayor voracidad, organizadamente salvajes, manducables como una neo sinfonía japonesa escuchaba junto al sol que te ha despertado de la más larga noche de amor. Los pajarillos no temen de Oswaldo Barreto ni de mí, posiblemente nos confunden con dos obreros de las fábricas de embutidos de Praga. Por el contrario, silban sobre nuestras cabezas valses para Banda Municipal y nos hacen avergonzarnos (vergonzosa vergüenza) de los gritos de nuestras urracas y nuestros querques, de la chachalaquería de las bandadas de pericos, de la pescozada sonora del azacuán herido en tiempo de frío. "A las seis de la mañana no va bien la cerveza —nos dice Ingra al traer los tarros humosos. Es, pues, éste, un peligroso lugar. Como para decir, a la hora del crepúsculo (aunque es aún demasiado temprano para pensar en él, estimadas todas las cautelas): "La vida, en general, ha sido bella". Precisamente ayer, después de discutir sobre la excesiva carga sexual de la literatura moderna, visitamos una granja de cerdos. Veterinarios con gabachas blancas examinaban a los gigantescos animales rosados con estetoscopios respetantes, a la vez que conmovedores, mientras demandaban de nosotros que no habláramos en voz alta. Antes de entrar, nos habían cubierto el rostro con bozales de gasa, para evitar que nuestros microbios personales se quedaran allí. Se nos dijo que el lugar estaba incluso alejado de las carreteras y las vías de ferrocarril, pues todo ruido extraño asusta infinitamente a los cerdos, los hace perder peso y los puede matar del corazón. Nunca vi cerdos con más aspecto de hijo de puta que éstos. Son jamones vivientes, con horribles venitas azules por todos lados, insolentes, idénticos a Monseñor Francisco Castro y Ramírez, un exageradamente soberbio obispo del oriente de mi país. Oswaldo Barreto, de pronto y sin advertírmelo, emitió el más agudo alarido que recuerdo haber oído en los últimos cinco años. El desconcierto cundió como diría un novelista hondureño, sobre todo porque los cerdos comenzaron a mostrar síntomas de angustia que pronto se transformaron en una especie de ataque de asma colectivo. Los veterinarios corrían espantados de aquí hacia allá y nuestro guía, absolutamente furioso y temblón, le dijo a Oswaldo: "La regla aquí es el silencio". "Yo suelo gritar —contestó éste— soy venezolano". "Al país que fueres haz lo que vieres" —citó, popular, pero no menos tensamente, el guía. "Cuando Uds. lleguen a Venezuela no los obligamos a gritar" —sentenció Oswaldo imperturbable antes de que yo lo sacara casi a empujones del lugar. Casi vomité de la risa. Como cuando vi aquel rótulo en una calle de Santiago de Chile: "Zorobabel Galeno, sastre militar". Aunque ahora no recuerdo lo que tal anuncio tenía de gracioso. Oswaldo pagó, no obstante, su delito: anoche soñó que lo habían echado para atrás en sus estudios y que se encontraba de nuevo en cuarto año de secundaria, iniciando un examen final de trigonometría sin saber ni siquiera pronunciar la palabra cateto. Despertó sudando en plena madrugada y me ha despertado también para pasear un poco y buscar cerveza. Entonces es que yo he decidido hablar sobre la primavera. Epoca del año en que florecen hasta los futbolistas, como todo el mundo sabe. Y que en Checoslovaquia se transforma en una orden edilicia para bañarse entre las truchas o buscar hongos y muchachas desnudas bajo el sol que los pinos del bosque dejan bajar al suelo. Mañana volveremos a Praga con la cara quemada por ese sol. Oswaldo Barreto y yo debemos salir de estos lugares lo más pronto posible, so pena de ponernos a tener hijos rubios con Zdenas y Janas y engordar a fuerza de grandes filetes, algodonosos melocotones y fresas con crema, hasta olvidar que alguien está muriendo mal en nuestra vieja casa, preguntando por nosotros con perentoriedad. Viva esta primavera, sin embargo.

14-00000

DEBATE CON ALBERTO MORAVIA

"L'Espresso" de Roma organizó, recientemente, un debate entre el escritor **Alberto Moravia** y los estudiantes **Massimiliano Fuksas, Sergio Petruccioli y Duccio Staderini**, quinto año de Arquitectura; **Valerio Veltroni**, primer año de Filosofía, y **Oreste Scalzone**, tercer año de Filosofía. El tema del debate se centra en la crítica y en la oposición a esta última generación de intelectuales contra aquellos que se dicen izquierdistas y contra aquellos que dominan el mundo de la cultura oficial. Este debate polémico pone de manifiesto las contradicciones entre ideología y vida práctica de algunos intelectuales.

Moravia: Yo pertenezco a ese tipo de proletario que se llama a sí mismo artista. Los objetos que yo fabrico son novelas y dramas, o sea, que logro crear de la nada, con mis manos o mejor dicho con mi mente, algo que antes no existía, y lo vendo. Si estuviera en la China no podría colocar mis productos porque no hay demanda, en la China de hoy, para productos como los míos. En Italia esa demanda existe parcialmente; de todas formas yo vendo estos productos a quien los paga según las leyes del mercado, porque, como he dicho, vivo de mi trabajo en un país, que es Italia. No podría colaborar en diarios partidarios pues no pertenezco a partido alguno, es decir tengo mis propias ideas que, en ciertas ocasiones, pueden o no coincidir con las de algún partido. Si yo colaborara con **Unitá** (Organo del Partido Comunista), por ejemplo, no podría escribir todo lo que se me ocurriera; y por otra parte, si bien actualmente no tendría dificultad en compartir la línea de **Unitá** con respecto a Viet-Nam, durante veinte años en cambio (hasta el XX congreso) el stalinismo me habría impedido colaborar en forma absoluta. De manera que yo publico mis novelas en el Corriere della Sera. Sin embargo, ustedes no encontrarán en el Corriere della Sera una sola palabra en favor del sistema existente hoy en Italia.

Scalzone: Quisiera recordarle a Moravia que cualquier obra literaria, cualquier producto intelectual es un hecho político. Ignorar todo eso significa hacer ya una elección política, entrar en el juego de los intereses creados, en otras palabras integrarse. Publicando novelas en el Corriere della Sera, cualquiera que sea su contenido, usted, Moravia, está tomando una posición política bien definida.

Moravia: No más que cualquier proletario en un régimen capitalista. ¿Por qué entonces los pintores deberían eximirse de esa acusación? ¿Por qué los profesores? ¿Por qué los arquitectos, o los directores de cine? ¿Por qué los obreros que trabajan, supongamos, en una fábrica de armas?

Scalzone: En efecto, nosotros no proponemos como modelo la figura del obrero esclavizado, sino la del obrero que se libera de la esclavitud. El obrero puede liberarse políticamente, volviéndose revolucionario militante. El escritor, en cambio, manipula material intelectual y a menudo identifica y limita su actividad en el acto de escribir.

Petruccioli: El obrero dentro del sistema, es un esclavizado. El intelectual, en el momento en que acepta moverse dentro del aparato de la cultura dominante, acepta un papel que no es el del esclavizado: se vuelve un intermediario entre la clase que está en el poder y los consumidores. Cuando, para vender su producto, él usa como medios de comunicación justamente aquellos canales que constituyen la fuerza y la continuidad de la cultura dominante, entonces está asumiendo una posición clara, prescindiendo del contenido de sus obras.

Scalzone: En otros términos, no se trata sólo del contenido o de las ideas, sino de la función que el libro pasa a asumir en la estructura económica.

Moravia: En un sistema capitalista los editores son capitalistas y el escritor es un proletario al igual que cualquier otro que está en condiciones de ser aprovechado (y a menudo lo es), y el libro es un producto a ser consumido. Si ustedes afirman que el arte no es expresión sino producto, entonces, no pueden pretender que el escritor sea un intelectual, o sea un creador con privilegios y responsabilidades mayores que los demás. Deben en cambio admitir que es una especie de artesano, o sea un proletario. Hay contradicción entre el papel que ustedes le exigen al intelectual, y el valor de producto que le atribuyen al arte. Por otra parte, habría que ver si el producto literario está hecho para el consumo o para la representación. Hay una gran diferencia entre la industria cultural y la expresión artística. La primera produce un arte de élite, que en los países capitalistas obedece a las leyes del beneficio y en los países comunistas, a las leyes del Estado: es lo mismo, por lo menos para los fines del arte.

En Occidente existe el límite del beneficio; en Oriente el de la propaganda. Se trata siempre de un arte de élite. O sea una literatura que tiene que ser consumida, no importa dónde, en el tren o en los bancos de las escuelas. Nunca revolución alguna quiso eso. Las revoluciones quieren la libertad de la expresión artística. Es decir, considerando que para ustedes los contenidos (o sea la crítica del poder) no cuentan, quieren la libertad del lenguaje.

El escritor que no quiere ser intermediario entre las clases dominantes y el público puede encontrarse operando en tres situaciones históricas diferentes. Si la situación lo permite, o sea los tiempos son cómodos, puede hacer arte de cualquier tipo; si los tiempos apremian deberá abandonar la representación y la poesía para el ensayo, el artículo; finalmente, si los tiempos no dejan otra alternativa, dejará de ser escritor, hombre de cultura, y será el ciudadano que defiende su libertad con un fusil. Ahora yo les pregunto: ¿en cuál de estas situaciones nos encontramos hoy? En mi opinión podemos trabajar todavía con un margen bastante amplio, en Italia por lo menos, como para hacer representación artística aunque, como sabemos, es ambigua de por sí. Cuando los tiempos apremian ciertamente la poesía ya no alcanza: se necesita la publicación periodística. Cuando finalmente empiezan a entrar los nazis en la casa de uno (como me pasó a mí) entonces es necesaria la lucha armada.

Petruccioli: Me parece que la diferenciación de Moravia entre el momento del artista, del periodista y del ciudadano, vuelve a presentar el error que ha existido en la cultura izquierdista en los últimos veinte años. ¿Qué significa individualizar tres niveles de integración para un intelectual que opera en el interior de un cierto régimen? Significa procurarle una protección ideológica.

Scalzone: Significa darle la posibilidad de considerarse inocente cuando vende las novelas al **Corriere** en nombre de la búsqueda estilística y comprometido cuando firma un cartel por la paz en nombre de sus recuerdos de la Resistencia. Significa darle la posibilidad de jugar en dos mesas.

¿Dónde puedo escribir —dice Moravia—, qué canal puedo utilizar, que me deje ser plenamente libre? Si yo escribiera en **Unitá** no podría criticar por ejemplo una película soviética como **Natacha**. Por lo tanto, escribo en el **Corriere della Sera**.

Scalzone: Esa forma de razonar refleja la personalidad del intelectual de izquierda de la década del 50. Refleja la psicología de cierta generación de intelectuales de izquierda para los cuales el compromiso político ha sido exclusivamente actividad de resistencia, que es algo muy diferente de una orgánica actividad revolucionaria. ¿No le parece, Moravia, que usted se está quedando estérilmente atado a ese mundo?

Moravia: Creo que no soy extraño a lo que está pasando alrededor de mí. Antes de la guerra teníamos el fascismo. Después de la guerra, la lucha de clases. Hoy tenemos la civilización industrial o de los consumos. Hoy, a pesar de que siguen existiendo las clases y las luchas de clase, me interesan principalmente los males de la civilización industrial.

Veltroni: Yo quisiera hablar de nuestra situación de universitarios, de nuestra polémica. Nosotros nos damos cuenta de que la universidad, en la sociedad occidental, sólo sirve para proveer los técnicos que contribuyen al fortalecimiento de la estructura capitalista. No es instrumento de libertad, no sirve para sustituir la represión policial con el libre juego intelectual. Por eso criticamos tanto a un determinado tipo de hombre de cultura. Ciertos intelectuales para nosotros son simplemente agentes. Fingen representar a la izquierda, pero en realidad no hacen otra cosa que servir al sistema.

Moravia: La relación entre arte y política no es tan simple como ustedes creen. Cuando escribía **Gli Indiferenti**, por ejemplo, yo era prácticamente apolítico. Sin embargo todo el mundo vio ahí una denuncia política.

Staderini: Mire señor Moravia, a mí no me interesa cómo usted organiza sus relaciones con la sociedad. Sólo me preocupo de que usted no trate de justificarlas que no trate de salvar su alma, como han estado haciendo los intelectuales de izquierda en los últimos veinte años. Han conciliado lo que no es conciliable. Han repetido a cada instante "Soy un comunista, soy un marxista y por lo tanto no estoy de acuerdo con esta sociedad". Pero enseguida agregaban: "Pero ésta es la sociedad en que vivo y la actividad que yo puedo desarrollar en ella es el arte". En otras palabras han reservado para sí mismos una intervención que no cambia nada. Es una manera de integrarse, aunque sea una manera un poco hipócrita.

Moravia: Yo no deseo salvar mi alma aquí en Italia, ni en Rusia, ni en Estados Unidos ni en ninguna otra parte.

Veltroni: Usted dijo que la autogestión de las fábricas por parte de los obreros y el aprovechamiento de los obreros, aun bajo un dueño iluminado son la misma cosa. Como comunista, cuando escuchamos cosas como ésa nos rebelamos: Es una posición social-demócrata.

Moravia: Ya dije solamente que el eslabón de la cadena de montaje es factor de alienación tanto en una fábrica en autogestión como en una fábrica capitalista. En otros términos, la cuestión de fondo sigue sin resolverse: el hombre integrado en una cadena de montaje, ¿cómo hará para ser hombre? ¿Cómo hará para comunicarse?

Fuksas: Este es el secreto y la finalidad de la revolución cultural: permitirle comunicarse.

Moravia: Si usted hubiera leído mi libro sobre China, habría encontrado aquí que, para mí, una de las grandes esperanzas de la revolución cultural consiste justamente, en hacer pasar al hombre desde la condición campesina a la tecnológica sin que tenga que pasar por la etapa burguesa de los consumos.

Petruccioli: El intelectual de izquierda está atado a un tipo de actividad desarrollada en el pasado, que hoy él llama revolucionaria pero que objetivamente no lo es.

Moravia: ¿Qué actividad?

Petruccioli: A la actividad desarrollada durante la Resistencia, que actualmente se usa para justificar una serie de operaciones equivocadas.

Cuando usted dice que hoy el problema ya no consiste en la lucha de clases sino en la lucha contra la civilización industrial y la ética de los consumos, asume una actitud de esclavo. Su posición es análoga a la de aquellos que dicen que es suficiente el hecho de estar inscritos en alguna organización política para calificar sus productos. Ese es un razonamiento falso. En otras palabras, serían más sinceros si se limitaran a decir: "Yo necesito ganar plata. Trato de cumplir con mi trabajo libremente, pero cuando no lo consigo tengo el atenuante del estado de necesidad". Este es el discurso que hay que rebatir; vuestra mala fe es demostrada por la venta misma de vuestros productos. Presentando vuestros productos de esa forma, como fruto de la ideología de la clase obrera ustedes desacreditan a la clase obrera misma. Ustedes se presentan como inocentes de cómo andan las cosas en el mundo capitalista a pesar de compartir la responsabilidad de todas esas cosas.

Scalzone: Quisiera recordarle la frase de Carmichael, el líder del Poder Negro, "El intelectual no nos interesa por lo que hace, sino por lo que hace por nosotros". Esto es también nuestro criterio. Con él medimos la posición política del artista.

Moravia: Ustedes, en otras palabras, quisieran un arte completamente politizado. Por mi parte, yo no escribo artículos políticos en el **Corriere**, como no los escribía en **Unità**. No tengo partido, odio a los partidos. No me afiliaría a ninguno de ellos. Me transformaría en un instrumento y no podría serle útil a nadie, ni siquiera al partido al cual estuviera afiliado.

Fuksas: ¿Pero usted está seguro, en su condición actual, de no ser un instrumento?

Moravia: Permítame definir al artista. El artista es el hombre, el único hombre que tiene el deber de mantenerse parecido a un niño, o sea no reprimirse y condicionarse en favor de sociedad alguna. La función social del artista, en otras palabras, es la de ser en alguna medida un antisocial.

Veltroni: Y afirmando eso, ¿usted sigue creyéndose marxista?

Moravia: Desde luego soy marxista. Pero no existe sólo el marxismo. Creo que éste es un excelente instrumento de conocimiento, pero no el único.

Scalzone: El marxismo no es un instrumento de conocimiento, sino de transformación del mundo.

Moravia: Conocimiento, para un artista, quiere decir transformación del mundo. Yo no soy hombre de acción: si lo fuera todo sería mucho más simple, aceptaría al marxismo como instrumento de transformación, como doctrina para la acción.

Veltroni: El "Che" Guevara ha dicho: "Los intelectuales deberían suicidarse, como clase". Eso significa que el intelectual no debe usar su pluma como instrumento para hacer lo que le gusta y evitarse el enfrentamiento con la realidad. ¿Qué piensa usted de esa frase, que en parte es aceptada también por Mao?

Moravia: Digo que es la frase de un hombre de acción, revolucionario de profesión. Un hombre que coloca la acción política por encima de todo lo demás. Pienso también que la pluma es un instrumento para hacer lo que nos gusta y en consecuencia enfrentarnos a la realidad.

Veltroni: ¿Su juicio sobre las obras de Mao y Guevara?

Moravia: Opino que Mao es un excelente escritor. Permítame citar mi libro sobre China. Página 45: "Ha sido al mismo tiempo el Lenin, el Trotski y el Stalin (pero también el Maiakovski) de China". En cuanto a Guevara, lo conozco poco como escritor. Como hombre de acción su figura (lo afirmé en una entrevista a **Paese Sera**) es heroica.

Scalzone: Usted, Moravia, ¿cree que sus reportajes desde China o desde Corea, o sobre Podgorny, pueden contribuir a la lucha que los países socialistas o del tercer mundo están llevando en contra del imperialismo?

Moravia: Nunca escribí nada acerca de Podgorny. El artículo desde Corea (Ver ANALISIS, No. 334) era una descripción verídica de la espantosa situación de Corea del Sur. Léanlo, o vuélvanlo a leer, y verán. Junto con otros escritores europeos he firmado en una página del New York Times, un llamado contra la guerra de Vietnam. Llamé hace poco tiempo a la Academia de Artes y Letras americana, de la cual formo parte como miembro honorario, con el fin de que se decidan a tomar posición en contra de la guerra. Naturalmente firmé manifiestos contra la guerra, no se hace otra cosa desde hace veinte años. ¿Pero para qué sirve? Se debiera hacer más. Debería impedírsele a Estados Unidos hacer la guerra. Pero yo, como escritor, ¿qué puedo hacer?

Veltroni: Debería hacer dos cosas. Primero: en el momento en que usted escribe reportajes o artículos por ejemplo, no debería apoyar al imperialismo. Segundo: no debería preocuparse sólo de lo que escribe, sino también de dónde lo escribe, y quién lo leerá.

Scalzone: Otra pregunta a Moravia. La relación entre hombre y cadena de producción es de todas formas una relación alienada. La contradicción que interesa en el plano social es la relación entre aprovechador y aprovechado. ¿Usted de qué lado está? Si está con el segundo, ¿piensa combatir el primero? ¿Con cuáles medios? ¿Piensa que pueden ser los propios de su profesión de escritor? ¿O que se pueda y deba combatir con otros medios?

Moravia: Representar, en arte, es combatir, porque la representación es acusación y juicio. Fuera de ello, queda la acción política o armada.

Fuksas: La "generación intermedia" a la cual Moravia pertenece, ha formado una especie de monopolio cultural y económico de toda la producción. Esta es la razón por la cual renegamos de los hombres de cultura de aquella generación.

Moravia: Yo no participo de ningún monopolio cultural ni mucho menos económico. He protestado siempre, en mis libros. Protesten ustedes también. Prueben a escribir una novela en contra del monopolio.

Staderini: Una última pregunta: ¿Usted dijo que firma llamados por la paz en Vietnam?

Moravia: Es cierto.

Staderini: Firma también en el Corriere della Sera, que es el órgano de la opresión imperialista en Italia. ¿No es una contradicción?

Moravia: Si es cierto que el **Corriere della Sera** es el órgano de la opresión imperialista en Italia, es una contradicción. De todas formas no escribo artículos ideológicos, y si los escribiera, no los publicaría en el **Corriere della Sera.** Finalmente, a pesar de que yo no sea stalinista, permítame citar a Stalin: "Dicen que nos contradecimos. Pues sí, nos contradecimos". Sólo los agit-prof no se contradicen.

(Tomado de la revista "Análisis", Argentina, marzo de 1968)

Jorge Lu Reyes

PROXIMAMENTE

TEATRO MUSICAL DE LA HABANA

Los Siete Pecados Capitales

comedia musical de

Héctor Quintero



10

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/2
9354
23 November 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	CE
2	JS	7	
3		8	
4	TC	9	
5		10	

ES SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 8 PER ___ # ___

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301; x-ref 201-340938

C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE C/FI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, CSDO, C/FI 2, ISOD 3

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

IMMEDIATE 22 19 [illegible]

MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY ROUTINE: JMCOBRA

CITE DIRECTOR 53469

RYBAT/PBRUMEN

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (IN 40[illegible]91) *

B. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN 40273) **

C. DIRECTOR 47408 *** (NOT SENT JMCOBRA)

3 refs ?

JP
23 Nov 68

1. AGREE POINTS REF A PARA 1 A THRU E BUT BELIEVE TIME NOW PROPITIOUS FOR DIRECT GUAT CITY STATION REP DISCUSSION WITH MEXICO CITY STATION ON GUAT INSURGENCY SITUATION AND REPORTED CUBAN ~~[illegible]~~ INVOLVEMENT. FOR THAT REASON, UNLESS IMPORTANT NEEDS TO CONTRARY, RECOMMEND KNOWLEDGEABLE GUAT CITY STATION CASE OFFICER PROCEED MEXICO AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. BELIEVE AS STATED REF C THAT LIRING-3 SHOULD BE FACTUAL AS POSSIBLE IN PREPARING REPORT ON CONTACTS AND EXPERIENCES WHILE IMPRISONED GUATEMALA, AND IN GIVING OPINION ON HOW CUBANS ~~[illegible]~~ HAVE FAILED THERE. TO MAKE HIM APPEAR TOO KNOWLEDGEABLE ON FAR/PGT COULD AROUSE SUSPICIONS LIRING-9 AND COLLEAGUES.

3. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE LIRING-9 MAY HAVE BEEN RELATING DIRECTLY TO ACTIVITIES OF HECTOR SANCHEZ GONZALEZ PER MEXICO CITY 7744 (IN 18686) IF LIREBEL-2 REPORT INDEED BASED ON FACT.

MICROFILMED
FEB 27 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONTINUED

Ring 13

201-798301

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
_______ PER _______ # _______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

#: ☐ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE , VR .

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 53465

PAGE TWO

MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY

4. OBJECTIVE, OF COURSE, IS TO LEARN OF GUAT INSURGENT FORCES AND [illegible] ANY CUBAN EFFORT THERE. AT SAME TIME DESIRE ENTICE ~~[illegible]~~ CUBANS TO EXPOSE HAND AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHIN FEASIBLE KNOWLEDGEABILITY LIRING-3. ACCORDINGLY BELIEVE DETAILED DISCUSSION IN MEXICO WITH GUAT STATION C/O AT THIS TIME WOULD BE PROFITABLE AND WELL WORTH VISIT.

END OF MESSAGE

Hqs Comments: *) References attached
**)
***)

WH/COG: Paul Oberst (telecon)
WH/2: Jack Murray (draft)

Chief, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
Att 3
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References : A. HMMA-35904, 27 November 1968
B. MEXICO CITY-8159, 22 November 1968

1. Forwarded herewith as attachment #1 are three reports on the most recent developments of the LIRING-3 operation, one dated 17 November and two dated 22 November, prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON. The gist of the 22 November report relating the conversation which LIRING-3 had on that date with LIRING-9 was cabled in reference B. Some additional comments by LIRING-9 passed on orally by ROWTON and not included in his report were included in reference B.

2. Forwarded as attachment #2 are Xerox copies for both addressees of two letters received by LIRING-3 from FAR contacts in Guatemala. The third letter was prepared as an answer by LIRING-3.

Raymond A. Frankye
for Willard C. CURTIS

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC MICRO. SER.

Attachments:
1. Reports (3), h/w
2. Letters (3), u/s/c
3. Identity Sheet (1), u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each)

S/c att: 2
h/w att: 1

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 35905	27 November 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-798301

14-00000

Att 1
HMMA-35905

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

17 November,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 [illegible] tact with LIRING Office.

1. During the period 4-15 November,1968, Rowton met with LIRING/3 on four occasions to debrief him on his activities. LIRING/3 agreed with Rowton that there were several phases to his renewed operational activity that needed careful planning and co-ordination. He commented on these as follows:

(a) Maintenance of Contact with FAR: LIRING/3 sent a letter to Rafael Argueta A. giving him his current address so that "Pavel" could be informed how to contact him. In response to this letter, LIRING/3 received a note from the mother of the Miguel and Juán León Barrios on 14/11/68 enquiring about his health. Since the letter was addressed to LIRING/3's new address he felt it was proof that his reply to Argueta's letter had been received. He stated that he hoped "Pavel" or some one else representing FAR would soon appear.

(b) RE-establishment of Contact with LIRING AND PERUMEN: LIRING/3 agreed with Rowton that his ultimate objective would be a trip to PERUMEN to act as liaison between the authorities there and FAR. Rowton stressed the need to keep the local LIRING establishment informed and in support of his activities, to avoid hurting their feelings by going over their head (as happened before the last trip). LIRING/3 commented that he would have to maneuver matters so that he was extended an invitation. He would try this through LIRING/10, but if it did not succeed he would try a discreet approach through Orlando Suarez who, he felt, could arrange a cultural invitation without difficulty.

LIRING/3 subsequently reported to Rowton that he met with LIRING/10 on the morning of 15/11/68 in the patio area of the LIRING establishment and that the latter had introduced him to his replacement, who invited LIRING/3 to meet with him any morning about 1100 except Mondays and Fridays. LIRING/9 also asked LIRING/3 to meet with him privately at his convenience so that he could debrief him on his experiences. LIRING/3 commented that LIRING/2 was very cordial but did not ask him any specific questions or show interest in debriefing him. LIRING/3 promised Rowton that he would attempt to gain access to LIRING/10's office for the debriefing.

(c) Cover Problems: LIRING/3 told Rowton that he would make every effort to obtain some kind of cover employment so that he could justify any funds given to him by Rowton. He stated that he was attempting to

h/w att: 1

HMMA-35905

CS COPY

201-778301

arrange for an exposition to display his products and at the same time persuade a leading member of his profession to permit him to work in his establishment (for a nominal salary). LIRING/3 then suggested a better possibility - an exposition in Montreal, Canada, where he had contact with a person who could arrange matters for him. LIRING/3 confessed that he favored Canada for another personal reason. He explained that LIRING/4's father was suffering from what appeared to be terminal cancer of the throat or esophagus and that L/4 was very anxious to see him before he died. L/4 had stated several times that she planned to request a visa for travel to New York since it was out of the question for her father to travel to Mexico City to visit her. LIRING/3 told Rowton that in any case he felt it unwise to permit L/4 to visit New York where she would inievitably fall in with all sorts of refugees who would report on her attitudes. He preferred to travel with her to Montreal under cover of the exposition and then ask her father to join them there - a trip within reason for a person in his condition. L/3 added that he felt he and L/4 could travel by boat at a modest fare and this would permit him to carry as many of his products as possible for the exposition.

Rowton agreed that this might be a solution, but recommended that L/3 look into the possibility of returning to Mexico via IBRUNEN (on the boat) since this would kill two birds with one stone. Rowton suggested that L/3 determine whether L/4's father was actually in a condition to travel even the relatively short distacne. If not it might be possible for L/4 to travel to New York via Montreal by train at less expense than by air.

WBRowton

Wallace B. Rowton

Att 1
HMMA-35905
22/11/68

1. LIRING/3 received letter ~~acknowledging~~ from "Marta" postmarked 9 November, Guatemala,C.A. acknowledging receipt L/3's letter and expressing relief from anxiety. Gives greetings from "los canchitos" Miguel,Elsa,"La Negra","La Chiquitia",Felisa,Maria Elena,"La gordita" Envelope written by other hand is addressed to L/3 at his new residence and bears return address: M.Bol.,28c "B" 8-25 Zona 8. LIRING/3 told Rowton this letter from mother Juán and Miguel ~~xxxxx~~ León Barrios, sent apparently to test commo channel. L/3 replied to letter 22/11/68 stating he expects soon make trip "outside country" and asking ~~xxxxx~~ Marta to tell "los canchitos" (her sons Miguel and Juán) to send him the assignment ("encargo") soonest since he in position to help them in some way. L/3 enclosed clipping from "Siempre" of letter to editor describing his experiences in Guatemala.

2. L/3 also turned over ~~to Rowton~~ letter from "Espinoza" postmarked 7 November,Guatemala,C.A., sending warmest greetings, but containing phrase,"the León Barrios send you greetings",which L/3 interprets to be signal from Juán and Miguel that contact with FAR imminent. Envelope addressed to L/3 at his new address bears return address: Oscar Moises Raldán E.,Granja Penal Pavón,Fraijanes,Guatemala.

3. LIRING/3 also reported ~~that~~ he had private talk with LIRING/9 on late morning 21 November in which L/9 stated he most interested in any observations L/3 might wish make concerning attitude and opinions his FAR contact with respect to PBRUMEN support. He asked L/3 to put his thoughts in writing and submit them to him at 1730 on 26 November. At L/3 request he promised invite LIRING/10 and other interested LIRING officials to this meeting. LIRING/9 expressed opinion that LIRING/3 should subsequently travel to PBRUMEN for "more detailed" discussions and offered arrange cultural cover invitation. He added that it would not be necessary for L/3 make formal application for visa.

4. LIRING/3 will submit to Rowton draft of his report on afternoon 25/11/68 so that Rowton may amplify as desired. L/3 told Rowton he plans take line that PBRUMENs do not understand local problems and that their aid in past has been dissapated in factionalism. L/3 asked Rowton for as many details as Rowton can gather to strengthen his report (such as

local FAR attidute toward César Montes and CPG leaders through whom PBRUMEN has worked in past. Also in French girl who executed recently about whom L/9 asked L/3 a number of questions, indicating PBRUMEN interest in exact role she played via-á-vis FAR.

WBRowton

Att 1
HMMA-35905

22 November,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting with LIRING/9.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at the safehouse (Identity B) at 1015 on 22 November,1968, that he had met with LIRING/9 at the latter's private office late the previous morning for a very serious discussion. L/3 explained that he had visited the LIRING offices with LIRING/4 to pass out invitations to the exposition scheduled to begin on 23/11/68, and that L/9 approached him immediately and asked him to come into his office for a chat,"if he could spare the time." Early in the conversation, Rowton's reconstruction of which follows, LIRING/3 got the impression that L/9 had been delegated by LIRING/10 to talk privately with him on the matters he broached:

9/ "I'm glad, chico, that you have a few minutes, since I wanted to talk over a few things very seriously and in private."
3/. "I'm at your disposition. What do you have in mind?"
9/."Well, what are your plans?"
3/."What plans do you mean? After all I have a lot of plans for different things,as you can imagine."
9/."I mean your plans for the immediate future."
3/."Well, I pllan giving this exposition (to which you are invited, of course) in the hope of raising enough money to take a trip to Montreal where I expect to have another exposition already being arranged by CPIC. This will enable LIRING/4 to come up there to see her father who is very ill, as you probably know. Her father will gladly help us financially to cover some of the cost of the trip."
9/."Yes, but I mean what about your plans for continued political activity?"
3/" Well, that's different. As you know I have had a long standing interest in Central America politically, and, despite the fact that it has cost me a great deal personally, I hope to continue helping my friends within my capabilities. Fortunately, there in really nothing that I know of against me here in Mexico,since I have not become involved with organizations and parties."
9/."I see. But has your experience in Guatemala affected your attitude towards us?"
3/."Frankly it has. I have a much better idea of the struggle from first-hand experience, and much more sympathy for the difficultie

that the comrades there had had to undergo."

9/."But could you be more specific?"

3/."Well, it's a long story. I had hoped to discuss it in some detail with several of you together, particularly LIRING/10 and his replacement."

9/."Yes, that will be arranged. But first I would appreicate your going over everything with me."

3/."Well first of all, I would like to have present Iden A with his wife since I want once and for all to clear up any questions about the circumstances of our mutual experience there."

9/. "Don't be childish. We know all about Iden A, just exactly what kind of person he is as well as his wife. Such a confrontation is a waste of time, as far as we're concerned."

3/."But don't forget the fact that the parents of the wife of Iden are ~~a~~ very close friends of the LIRING Chief and it's quite natural that they'll present their point of view when they see him."

9/. "Don't worry about that. It's a purely social relationship,and, in any case, our Chief really hasn't got very much to do with these things,and his opinion won't matter."

3/. "I hope so. I'd feel better in any case to talk about the detail in Iden's presence, so that he will agree,as he must on his responsibility. You realize, of course, that he carried with him such compromising material that it was a miracle that we were not assassinated on the spot."

9/."Yes, but that is unimportant now. What is important isthe fact that you have learned a great deal about the mentality of our friends down there, and that this could prove very useful to us in our future dealings."

3/."Yes,for instance, they told me among other things that César Montes had spent too much time with your people, on trips to your country and to Mexico, and had completely lost touch with the revolution. That's the reason he was "destituido".

9/."So, you know that!"

3/."Yes, and many more details of wh y they are unhappy - the lack of adequate financial support, the inability of ~~PBRIME~~PBRUMEN to embarrass PBPRIME In their increasing trade success."

9/." Very interesting! I have a suggestion. Suppose you prepare a written report (informe) and bring it in at 1730 sharp on 26 November. I'll have some of my colleagues present so that we can all discuss your opinions and suggestions. I suggest 1730 because it will be quieter then and we can go to a better place to talk privately."

3/."Fine, but I would like to be able to amplify my report in person inthe PBRUMEN capital. Perhaps I could stop off there on the way back from Montreal."

9/."But there are no passenger ships making that run. Only cargo ships. I have a better suggestion. We could arrange an invitation for a cultural exposition that would appear innocuous."

3/."Fine. I agree that would be best. Do I have to make any formal application?"

9/."No. It won't be necessary. I'll handle everything. But what about LIRING/4?"

3/. "That's a rather delicate matter. She has not quite gotten over my experience,and might object to my re-involvment in political matters. I therefore would request you not to mention this aspect to her. She could go off to her home town and visit her family and think that the whole trip is cultural."

9/."Yes,I agree that would be best under the circumstances."

Wallace B Rowton

ATT 2
HMMA-35905

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9



R/Cesar Morales Roldán G.
Granja Penal Pavón
Fraijanes Guatemala

DIA DEL CARTERO
12 DE NOVIEMBRE

ENTREGA INMEDIATA

Señor:
Carlos Jurado
Edificio Cardusa A-6
Pachuca y av. Veracruz
Mexico 11, D.F.

CORREO AEREO
VIA AIRMAIL

GUATEMALA 8
CORREOS DE GUATEMALA C.A.
5
AEREO



CORRESPONDENCIA
CONTROL
[illegible]

s/c att. 2
HMMA-35905

CS COPY.

201-795301

7/11/68

Estimado Carlos

no sabes la alegría que recibí al tener noticias tuyas ya que me imaginaba muchas cosas a Dios gracias no fue así, y me siento feliz de que te encuentres con los tuyos.

De este lugar pues te diré seguimos siempre con el martirio de encontrarnos privado de nuestras libertades yo pues siempre dandole a la pelota tu sabes que es la unica distracción que hay te agradezco infinitamente por las cosas que me dejaste [illegible] [illegible] Juan Barrios te [illegible] saludan, cuentame de verdad yo se que no quisieran ni recordar este lugar y tienen mucha razón, [illegible] pero siempre me escribas ya que me siento triste mis únicos amigos pues eran Uds, y tu sabes que en este lugar hay que saber elegir sus amistades. Bueno Carlos despues te contare muchas cosas saludame a tu esposa y a Carlos, los recuerdo al ver la Champa y me da tristeza enviame una postal. tu amigo sincero

ATT 2
HMMA-35905



[illegible] M [illegible]
[illegible] "B" 8-35 [illegible]
Guatemala, C.A.

GUATEMALA
7

Señor Carlos [illegible]
Edificio Condesa A-6
Pachuca y Avenida [illegible]
México 11, D.F.

CORREO AEREO AIR MAIL PAR AVION



ADMON. No. 11
1NOV.58-17
MEXICO 11 D.F.

Guatemala, 8 de Noviembre
1.963.

Carlos con que gusto recibimos tu misiva pues se nos quito la angustia que teniamos por ustedes.
Nosotros siempre igual ~~tod~~ esperando la voluntad de Dios y del tiempo.
Los conchitos como tu les dicas estan bien y te mandan saludos abrazos y muchos recuerdos a ti y a tu esposa y nenas

yo cada ves que voy alla tengo la impresion de verte pa supuesto no lo tomes a mal pues es sin duda el cariño que te profeso pero no deseo nunca nunca jamas verte esa condicion.
Resibe cariños de Miguel el rigotudo. Elsa, la negra, la Chiquitia, Eliza, Maria Elena, la gordita de la Cari y de tu amiga que nunca te olvidara. y dale a tu esposa que no valla i sentar celos

de esta vieja fea pero que las estima y quiere con todo corazon

Marta

Profe perdona letra y Ortografia pero no se escribir. Que no vuelva hacer la primera y la ultima

"México" DF. 21 de Nov. 68

Marthita:

Le envío un recorte. Próximamente haré un viaje fuera del país. Necesito les diga a los Carnalitos me envíen el encargo lo más pronto posible pues puedo tratar de ayudar en algo.

Espero hayan recibido mis líneas sin novedad y reciban TODOS mis saludos afectuosos.

C.

AIR MAIL AVION AIR MAIL AVION

[illegible] Alberto [illegible]
[illegible] Condesa 156
México 11 DF.

Sra.
Martha Barrios
28 Calle "B" 8-25 Zona 8
Guatemala, Guatemala
C. A

PAR AVION
VIA AIR MAIL

AVION AIR MAIL AVION AIR MAIL

ATT 2
HMMA-35905

Siempre! Nov. [illegible]-60

AVENTURA DE JURADO EN GUATEMALA

Sr. José Pagés Llergo
Director de SIEMPRE!

Hace unos días volví a la ciudad de México, después de haber permanecido encarcelado durante casi 7 meses en Guatemala, sujeto a un juicio —del cual salí absuelto— acusado por las autoridades de aquel país de "atentar contra las instituciones democráticas".

No pretendo hacer una crónica de las circunstancias de mi detención, del proceso judicial, etc., pues estos detalles en parte fueron dados a conocer en su oportunidad por SIEMPRE!; pero sí quisiera relatarle en una forma breve algunas de las cosas que observé durante esos meses en el campo de concentración de Pavón, mal llamado "Granja Penal Pavón", donde estuve confinado.

Dicha "granja" está situada a más o menos 20 Kms. de la ciudad de Guatemala en el Departamento de Frajanes y consiste en un hoyanco artificial rodeado de cercas electrificadas y torretas de vigilancia, como eran los campos de concentración nazis. Se supone que en los países civilizados los sistemas carcelarios disponen de los medios suficientes para proporcionar a los reclusos un mínimo de comodidades o elementos que le permitan su desarrollo o rehabilitación; pero en este sitio sólo imperan el terror y el hambre, así como las condiciones más infrahumanas y espeluznantes, ya que la insalubridad y la falta de atención en todos los aspectos es lo que allí impera.

La población aproximada de "la Granja" oscila entre 1,300 y 1,500 reos, de los cuales los "presos políticos" no llegan a 20, ya que los detenidos por delitos de esta naturaleza son generalmente asesinados después de su detención y estar sujetos a torturas.

Por lo tanto, la casi totalidad de los presos son "delincuentes comunes", pero podría decirse que en un 40% son inocentes del delito de que se les acusa: pues en Guatemala, para ser encarcelado no es necesario tener pruebas en contra. Una simple acusación policíaca o de particulares basta para quedar sujeto a un proceso en el cual es común salir absuelto después de uno o dos años de encarcelamiento.

La administración interna del penal está encomendada a los reclusos, para lo cual se escoge a los delincuentes más depravados y que tienen condenas largas: asesinos, drogadictos, etc.

Para mantener la disciplina se ha formado un cuerpo de represión denominado "servicio especial" o "garroteros", como vulgarmente se les llaman. Este grupo, cuya impunidad es ilimitada, mantiene a los reclusos en terror constante, ya que basta la falta más mínima para que golpeen con saña brutal al infractor, llegándole a causar hasta la muerte.

El penal no proporciona a los reclusos ningún medio de trabajo, pero sí propicia la formación de mafias internas que explotan a quienes tienen mayores necesidades, haciéndolos trabajar en fábricas elementales de algunas artesanías: canastos, juguetes rudimentarios o pelotas de futbol; productos que envían a la calle para su venta y de los cuales esas mafias obtienen grandes ganancias que comparten con la dirección del Penal.

Uno de los negocios más productivos, y del cual participan las autoridades en combinación con los reclusos influyentes, es la venta de seconales sódicos y mariguana a los reclusos; drogas con las que una gran mayoría trata de borrar su desesperación y angustia, pero trayendo por consecuencia reyertas que degeneran muchas veces en el asesinato.

Como mencioné antes, la "Granja Penal de Pavón" consiste en un hoyanco artificial cuyo espacio habitable se reduce a un rectángulo de 170 por 70 metros, aproximadamente, el cual incluye 5 cuadras y una explanada al aire libre, irónicamente llamada "campo deportivo". Cada una de las cuadras alberga un promedio de 250 personas que viven en la más absoluta promiscuidad. Para agravar esta situación funciona diariamente —durante 12 horas— un altoparlante, audible en todos los rincones, y que se utiliza para acrecentar el amedrentamiento y el terror. Por ese altoparlante se llama a los recluidos, que son solicitados para presentarse a la autoridad del penal, pero siempre haciendo hincapié en la amenaza y en la intimidación.

Los reincidentes o reos peligrosos, están confinados en el "Triángulo", que es un espacio pequeño, protegido por alambradas, del cual no pueden salir ni siquiera a la explanada. En las cuadras, sólo una parte de los reclusos dispone de literas; la mayoría duerme en el suelo cubriéndose con trapos viejos o cartones. La alimentación que el penal proporciona consiste en dos pequeños panes y café por la mañana, seis tortillas y un poco de caldo o de frijoles al mediodía, y otro poco de frijoles por la tarde. Una parte de los reos se alimenta con los escasos medios que sus familiares les llevan los días de visita o en pequeñas fondas que algunos han instalado para obtener ingresos. Tampoco existe atención médica adecuada: sólo una barraca con algunos implementos rudimentarios [illegible], para cualquier enfermedad, se proporcionan cuando mucho dos aspirinas, o un [illegible] y gasa, si es una herida, ya sea leve o grave.

Un [illegible] que reviste gravedad extrema [illegible]
[illegible] llegar requiere de [illegible]
[illegible]

tarios o presos de [illegible] que [illegible] les esas mafias obtienen grandes ganancias que comparten con la dirección del Penal.

Uno de los negocios más proc[illegible]vos, y del cual participan las autoridad[illegible]en combinación con los reclusos influyentes, es la venta de seconales sódicos y mariguana a los reclusos; drogas con las que una gran mayoría trata de borrar su desesperación y angustia, pero trayendo por consecuencia reyertas que degeneran muchas veces en el asesinato.

Como mencioné antes, la "Granja Penal de Pavón" consiste en un hoyanco artificial cuyo espacio habitable se reduce a un rectángulo de 170 por 70 metros, aproximadamente, el cual incluye 5 cuadras y una explanada al aire libre, irónicamente llamada "campo deportivo". Cada una de las cuadras alberga un promedio de 250 personas que viven en la más absoluta promiscuidad. Para agravar esta situación funciona diariamente —durante 12 horas— un altoparlante, audible en todos los rincones, y que se utiliza para acrecentar el amedrentamiento y el terror. Por ese altoparlante se llama a los reclusos, que son solicitados para presentarse a la autoridad del penal, pero siempre haciendo hincapié en la amenaza y en la intimidación.

Los reincidentes o reos peligrosos, están confinados en el "Triángulo", que es un espacio pequeño, protegido por alambradas, del cual no pueden salir ni siquiera a la explanada. En las cuadras, sólo una parte de los reclusos dispone de literas; la mayoría duerme en el suelo cubriéndose con trapos viejos o cartones. La alimentación que el penal proporciona consiste en dos pequeños panes y café por la mañana, seis tortillas y un poco de caldo o de frijoles al mediodía, y otro poco de frijoles por la tarde. Una parte de los reos se alimenta con los escasos medios que sus familiares les llevan los días de visita o en pequeñas fondas que algunos han instalado para obtener ingresos. Tampoco existe atención médica adecuada: sólo una barraca con algunos implementos rudimentarios donde, para cualquier enfermedad, se proporcionan cuando mucho dos aspirinas, o un poco de menteolato y gasa, si es una herida, ya sea leve o grave.

Un hecho que reviste gravedad extrema para los reclusos acusados de delitos políticos, es el de cómo llegar seguros de vuelta a sus hogares el día que reciben su libertad de ese infierno. En todas las "cárceles" del país el total de presos políticos no llega a 100. Una gran mayoría de ellos al [illegible] el penal, son "[illegible]

(Sigue en la página 70)

[illegible]

(Viene de la página 6) cuestrados" y desaparecidos en la carretera por cualquier grupo de los innumerables cuerpos policíacos represivos que existen en Guatemala, previo aviso, claro está de la dirección del Penal, que comunica con toda anticipación el día que un preso político obtiene su libertad.

En general, la "Granja Penal Pavón" es posiblemente una de las prisiones más terroríficas que existen en Latinoamérica y sería oportuno que la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la ONU organizara una revista de inspección, para desenmascarar así una de las tantas formas de violencia que imperan hoy día en tan bello pero desafortunado país.

Le agradezco muy sinceramente las informaciones y defensa que la revista SIEMPRE! ha hecho de mi caso.

Atentamente,

Carlos Jurado.

SECRET

Attachment #3
HMMA-35905

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Identity Sheet

Identity A: Carlos PERSABAL Marcue

Identity B: Suites Marne

CIT: Mexico
Δ: Mexico

re: connection with
Subj. of 201-798301

SECRET

S/c att 3 HMMA-35905

201-798301

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
Att 2
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City HGG

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 3.

1. Forwarded herewith is one copy each for Headquarters and the Guatemala City Station of the report covering the debriefing by Wallace B. ROWTON of LIRING-3 on his imprisonment in Guatemala. Identity A of ROWTON's report is a Guatemalan rebel living in Mexico who, as addressees will remember, accidentally shot himself in the leg a few days prior to his departure for Guatemala with LIRING-3. This wound may have convinced the Guatemalans that he had recently been involved in terrorist activities and may, in fact, have cost him his life. Identity B of the same report is the nephew of Identity F, a Mexican Communist who was arrested on 19 September 1968 during a student demonstration in Mexico City; he is still in jail.

2. As this dispatch is being written, LIRING-3 has an appointment to talk at length about his experience in Guatemala with the LIRING Station Chief, LIRING-10. The general idea is for LIRING-3 to go to PBRUMEN in the hope that he can be used to penetrate PBRUMEN-sponsored subversion efforts in Latin America or become, at least for a time, a reporting source in PBRUMEN.

3. ROWTON and the undersigned are prepared to travel to Guatemala to discuss the LIRING-3 case and its Guatemalan/FAR implications whenever the Guatemala City Station, after reviewing the available information, feels ready for such discussion. Please advise.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
1. Report (1), h/w
2. Identity Sheet (1), u/s/c

CS COPY

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each)

H/w att: 1
s/c att: 1

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 35904	27 November 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-798301

14-00000

Liring-3

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment I
HMMA-35904

2 vember,1968

9P

Subject: Report of Debriefing of LIRING/3.

1. Upon his return from TDY, Rowton made discreet efforts to re-establish contact with LIRING/4 as directly as possible. He checked on the last known residence of L/4 on the nights of 24 and 25 October but found the third floor apartment totally blacked out. He therefore assumed that LIRING/4 had abandoned the apartment either because of fear of the Gobernación agents that had attempted to exort 500 pesos from her (as indicated in LIFEAT take for 11 Sept) or as a result of her inability to pay the October rent, or both. Rowton checked his telephone answering service but found no message from LIRING/4 as he had hoped. Rowton concluded that L/4 must have assumed that Rowton had left the country on an extended trip, since prior to his departure (15 September) Rowton had left a note on the afternoon of 11 September under the door of the apartment advising L/4 that he had to leave the country and hoped to see her the following morning at 1000 at the "Consultorio". LIRING/4 did not show at 1000 the following morning or the next, probably because of the visit of the police to the apartment.

2. Rowton then telephoned **Identity C** and,on the pretext of interest in the watercolors of LIRING/3, asked srta Carillo who answered for the address of LIRING/4. Srta Carillo replied that unfortunately she did not have the present address but did have the watercolors and could show them to Rowton. She added that LIRING/3 was in Guatemala and that LIRING/4 passed by **Iden C** from time to time to check on the sale of the pictures. When she offered to give L/4 any message Rowton might have, the latter asked her to tell L/4 to telephone Rowton at his telephone answering service(alias)

3. Rowton then felt his only other source of L/4's whereabouts that would not attract undue attention (particularly on the part of the LIRING office) would be a check with LIRING/3's first wife, since he recalled that she had taken care of LIRING/3 and /4's child almost every week-end,even after L/3's arrest. Rowton therefore obtained the telephone used by LIRING/3 to contact his first wife (from the Station file) and decided to call on the morning of 29 October. In the meantime, however, Rowton learned from the Station that LIRING/3 had been released and returned to Mexico City on 18 October.

4. When Rowton called the number of the frist wife (apparently a small store in the Casas Grandes development), he asked for Carlito, the eldest son of L/3,(whom Rowton had already met) rather than for the first wife of L/3 whom Rowton did not know. A young girl replied saying that her brother Carlito was not at home at the moment. Rowton then explained that he was actually

h/w att: I HMMA-35904.

S COPY

201-795301

trying to locate LIRING/3. The child then explained that L/3, her father, was at that very moment upstairs in her home. Rowton asked her to ask her father to come to the phone as soon as possible. After a few minutes delay. L/3 came to the phone and talked directly to Rowton.

5. LIRING/3 appeared from his tone of voice to be rather depressed and showed no sign of enthusiasm in re-establishing contact with Rowton. Rowton explained that he had been out of the country and had unfortunately not been able to see I/4 before he left. Rowton added that he had returned on 19 Oct, the day after LIRING/3 himself had returned (Rowton said this for effect, since he knew it would impress L/3 to indicate that he was fully aware of the exact date of L/3's return). When he then asked to see L/3, the latter replied "of course, when:" Rowton then made a date to 1200 that same day at the Kiss restaurant on Reforma. He then telephoned **Identity D** and reserved a room for that afternoon so that he would be able to give L/3 the safehouse at their first meeting..

6. LIRING/3 appeared on time and looked reasonably well, despite his long confinement. He explained that he had been able to recuperate during the past ten days and felt much better for the normal diet he had been able to resume. The only physical effect he still felt, besides the weakness from loss of weight and dysentery, was a recurring pain in the side,which L/3 feared resulted from a fractured rib that had healed without medical treatment. He explained that he had been beaten severely on several occasions during the initial interrogation both by the military and the police and "of course" did not have the benefit of medical treatment afterwards.

7. Rowton then alleged to LIRING/3 that he had done "everything possible" to arrange his release, principally through a notional GNA colonel whose brother was a business friend of Rowton. He explained that when he had learned that L/3 had left Mexico City for the trip as planned, he telephoned the colonel and explained that a Mexican friend, LIRING/3, was planning to visit his country and might conceivably need help at some point. Rowton continued that this gesture proved to be literally a life-saver for L/3,since a few days later, the colonel called Rowton back and reported the arrest of L/3 in the company of "very dangerous persons." At the colonel's request,Rowton met with him several days later at the border and they both planned the best course of action to save L/3. Rowton alleged that the colonel on his own initiative arranged to have L/3 transferred from the frontier to Guatemala City so that he could be released from army custody to the civilian authorities. L/3 apparently accepted this story at once, remarking that it did appear strange to him that he was flown with his companions in a twin

engine plane and that the Minister of [illegible] was present at the airport when they disembarked. L/3 told Rowton that he felt certain that had he remained in the control of the army he would have been executed without trial or publicity of any kind.

8. LIRING/3 added that when he arrived he found LIRING/4 in a state of virtual exhaustion from nervous tension and worry. He stated that L/4 had become understandably bitter at the attitude of the police and felt abandoned by everyone, including Rowton, during the last weeks of L/3's imprisonment. L/3 added that, as Rowton suspected, L/4 was not anxious for him to resume any kind of political activity and would try her best to dissuade him from resuming collaboration with Rowton, if it meant reinvolvement with FAR and the LIRING office. In reply to Rowton's query, L/3 stated that L/4 had managed financially since Rowton's departure by selling a few of his paintings, one of which was purchased by a "northamerican woman" at an excellent price and then donated to Bellas Artes (after the purchaser learned of L/3's plight).

9. Rowton met with L/3 again that same evening at 2000 in the saferoom of **Identity D** and was able to debrief him at some length under more secure conditions. LIRING/3 showed no reluctance to provide Rowton with all the details of his trip to Guatemala and to answer Rowton's questions frankly. At Rowton's request L/3 gave the following chronological account of his experiences over the past six months:

"Idens A and B and myself crossed the border on Easter Saturday(April13) without incident, Iden A using the false Mexican documents I had provided and Iden B and myself traveling with our legal passports that had been properly vissed in Mexico City before we left. I had originally planned to get Iden A across the border illegally north of Mesilla and meet him subsequently in Guatemala City, but I was dissuaded from this plan partly by Iden A's fear of traveling alone without properly vissed papers and partly by the fact that it was an important holiday and there was more than usual movement across the border.

"Incidentally Iden B joined us at the invitation of Iden A when Iden B expressed an interest in concluding an interview with Nestor Valle of FAR (the first interview had occurred some months previously during Iden B's last trip to Guatemala). Iden B did this on his own initiative to impress his uncle with his newspaper initiative and ability, and Iden A felt that bringing Iden B with him would enhance his own prestige in the eyes of the FAR headquarter officials he hoped to meet. I myself realized that Iden B's presence was not altogether unfavorable for me, since if anything happened I would not have to bear the responsibility alone but could share it with Iden B.

"In any event we passed through the Mexican immigration and customs without difficulty, although Iden A was told that he would have to stop off at the Guatemalan consul's office (strangely enough on the Guatemalan side) to get a tourist visa, which was described as a "mere formality". At this point Iden A began to show signs of nervousness and refused to enter the Consul's office alone. I therefore accompanied him to calm him down. We found that the Consul was a colonel in the GNA, and a very observant person, despite his rather polite treatment of Iden A. Iden A, incidentally had dyed his hair at my suggestion to reduce the chances of his being spotted by an acquaintance.

"But I forgot to mention that the real reason for Iden A's nervousness was an unfortunate incident at the immigration office shortly before. One of the immigration officers mistook Iden B for a person wanted for some sort of fraud and insisted on examining him closely and even checking his height with a tape measure. Fortunately Iden B proved to be several centimeters taller than the person wanted by the police and we were alowed to pass on. This delay however did attract considerable attention and produced a state of nervous tension in both Iden A and, of course, B.

"Iden A was granted the tourist visa without delay and we proceeded to the Customs, about 200 yeards up the road. Iden A, who had only a briefcase, refused to enter the Customs shed, but waited for us in a nearby cafe to keep as calm as possible. Iden B and I had to open our valises in Customs for the routine check. It was then that I myself got a nervous shock. My own bag had nothing but clothing in it, but Iden B was carrying a camera, a Czech recording machine, Soviet-made hiking boots, and, worst of all, a Mexican magazine between the pages of which he had concealed (very crudely) several FAR propaganda leaflets (which he told me later he was carrying to "impress" the FAR with the work being done on his uncle's press in Mexico City). Altho the Customs officers asked no questions and allowed Iden B to proceed I am certain that they spotted the leaflets and noted the rather unusual equipment Iden B was carrying with him.

"When we joined Iden A at the cafe, he asked anxiously, 'No hubo clavo?' and when we assured him that there hadn't been an problem ('clavo') he regained his composture. He then hailed a small, six-passenger autobus that was bound for Huehuetenango with three passengers (Guatemalans) already aboard. About 3 kilometers outside the town (Mesilla) the driver told us we were approaching the military outpost of 'El Cable' and that we would be checked again. He, to our surprise, warned us to hide any guns we might have been carrying "under the seats" since the military would search the bus. Just then we saw a car pass us a rather high speed and recognized the Consul in the driver's seat. Iden A's nervousness gained him again and he shoved into my hand his Guatemalan passport and a few other of his legal papers. I quickly put them into my pocket and hoped that I would not be searched.

"When we reached the control point, we saw the Consul, by then wearing a side-arm, leaning against his car, waiting for the arrival of the bus. As soon as we stopped, he shouted to a nearby soldier to have the Colonel Commandant come out. When the soldier refused saying that it was more proper for him, the Consul, to goto the office of the Commandent, the Consul insisted in a rather stern voice. Finally the soldier disappeared and returned in a few minutes with the commandant, a young officer of excellent bearing. After a few minutes conversation with the Consul, the Commandant ordered us (Iden A,B and myself) out of the bus. The driver then returned our fare and was allowed to proceed on to Huehuetenango, after we had removed our luggage. We then found ourselves surround by soldiers and escorted into the "El Cable" compound. There we were assigned to different prefabricated huts and questioned separately. At an opportune moment, when the soldier guarding me (through the window of the hut) went off to get me some water, I managed to squeeze the passport of Iden A and his other papers through a crack in the floor boards where I felt sure that they would not be discovered.

"The Commandant, who was fairly polite and even gave us coffee, asked me the purpose of my trip and how well I knew the other two. I replied that I was simply sightseeing and that I had known Iden B in Mexico City since he was a well-known catedrático at the University but that I had run into him at San Cristóbal. With regard to Iden A, I alleged that I did not know him and had simply run into him by chance at the Immigration Office and had joined him and Iden B on the bus to save money in traveling to Huehuetenango. The Commandant then asked me to open my valise and he proceeded to search the contents carefully. He was particularly attracted to a clay bell which Iden A or B had placed there without my knowledge. (I later found out that they had stolen three bells from the hotel at San Cristóbal in a spoof and had put one on my valise). I told the Commandant that I did not know the bell was in my valise but recognized it as one sold at the tourist stand of the Hotel in San Cristóbal. I subsequently realized that they thought that the bells were some sort of recognition signal and wanted to get to the bottom of the apparently perplexing matter.

"After about three or four hours an army truck arrived drived by sargeant who appeared to have been drinking heavily (it was Holy Saturday and a festive occasion in the village). He ordered us tied hand and foot and literally thrown into the back of the truck. He then took off at reckless speed without any thought of the pain he was causing us (our hands were tied behind our back and we were forced to remain lying on the floor of the truck). At one point he stopped and instructed the soldiers to shoot us if we made any attempt to escape. Later one of the soldiers brutally kicked Eden A in the side when he moved suddenly, apparently to ease the strain on his arms.

"We were finally taken from the truck at the village of Buenos Aires, on the outskirts of Huehuetenango, and escorted into another military establishment where we were again interrogated. I stuck steadfastly to my original simply story, and, although I am sure that they did not believe me, there was no incriminating evidence in my luggage or on my person to serve as a básis for their suspicions. After several hours, from a good vantage point just inside the main door, where I had been deposited (still tied up) by the last interrogator, I overheard an officer sending a radio message to the Ministry in Guatemala City reporting our arrest and asking for instructions. He must have been told that a helicopter would be coming to pick us up, becasue I heard him reply that a helicopter would not be adequate and that a plane should be sent, since we were "dangerous types".

"The plane, a twin engine military aircraft, finally arrived and we were hustled into it and forced again to lie on the floor even while in flight. When we landed at the Guatemala City airport we were not removed from the plane for several hours. I recall hearing someone say,'Leave then inside. The Minister hasn't arrive yet.' Shortly thereafter, a Northamerican army officer came aboard the plane and came straight toward me. He rolled me over roughly with his boot and began interrogating me. He appeared under the impression that I was a FAR leader and at first did not believe him when I gave him my true identity. I remember him very well since he spoke with a distinct northamerican accent and had a bandage around one of his legs (apparently he had been wounded in a skirmish).

"We were finally removed from the aircraft and taken directly to the 2nd Police Corps Headquarters in Guatemala City and assigned to cell block 400, which is reserved for political prisoners (incidentally I later learned to my amazement that they are no more that 40 political prisoners in Guatemala - the others all having been executed before trial.

of the Pavón prison
"In cellblock 400, where I spent several weeks awaiting arraignment, there are six cells with thick wooden bars, three on each side, in three of which Iden A, Iden B and myself were confined. I discovered that in one of the other cells was Rolando "Cebollito", an important FAR leader, and in another cell were two young FAR members, the brothers Miguel and Juán León Barrios, who later told me that they were members of the G-2 of FAR. In the remaining cell were three members of the 'Mano Blanca', one of whom I later learned was named Inez Nufio Padilla.

"As soon as we became acquainted, 'Cebollito' made an investigation of the circumstances surrounding our arrest, as he said, on behalf of FAR. 'Cebollito' who had already been arraigned had more freedom than the others and was able to wander in and out with relative ease (I noted that the door of his cell was often unlocked). He therefore was able to talk discreetly with each of us through the bars to 'interrogate' us to his satisfaction. After several days he reported that he found Iden A's conduct 'inexcusable' and Iden B completely stupid in his unnecessarily exposing his companions with the compromising material he was carrying. He told me that he felt I had been the victim of very unfortunate circumstances and my only mistake was to have attempted to cross the frontier with the other two. He added that he intended to sent his report to FAR via his mother, who was able to visit him more or less regularly. Several weeks later I saw 'Cebollito' being pushed into an army truck and learned from the León brothers that he was taken out and executed before his trial was completed. The last time I saw Iden A was about April 25, when he waved to me from his cell (I had already been taken out of cellblokk 400 and moved into the large compound).

"Fortunately the Mexican Consul, Serrano, recognized my family name and told me that he was a friend of my father. He did what he could to help me get messages out to my wife and to supply me with materials to write and do some painting. Also of great help and comfort to me was Mario Armando Amador, the First Secretary, whose life, I learned later, was threatened befause of the interest he took in me and Iden B. Armando confided to me on one occasion that he had to be very discreet in sending messages to Relacions Exteriores in Mexico since the "North-americans decipher and read everything we send." He therefore had to send everything concerning me by diplomatic pouch despite the delay involved.

"I managed to get a message out to the press in a very strange way. I had gotten to know one of the'Mano Blanca'(the oldest of the trio that had been arrested for the kidnapping of the Archbishop), Inez Nufio Padilla, and felt he was sympathetic toward us. I therefore prepared a brief message on the inside of an empty package of cigarettes 'To whom it may Concern' stating that we had been arrested and were being held unjustly, and on the day that the trio were called out to appear in court, where I knew there would be newspaper reporters present I slipped the note to Nufio with a plea that he give it to a reporter as soon as he could. I later learned that he did so and that my note appeared verbatim in the local press.

"Several weeks later the mother and wife of Iden B visited us and either because of what he told them or on their own initiative spread the nasty rumor that I had been responsible for the arrest and that I was a Trotskyite (the wife and mother of Iden B are both members of the CP Mexico). This proved very disquieting to me but I was reassured to some extent by the León brothers who told me that they would 'investigate' and clear up the matter as soon as they could. About two months later, theytook me aside in the prison compound and show me a report they stated they received from "FAR sources in Mexico". In this report I was described as"an anarchist without party affiliations, of good character and conduct, trustworthy and responsible but difficult to control". Iden B, on the other hand was described as "an opportunist, without sincere ideology, in reality a bourgeois of superficial convictions."

"From that moment the León brothers took me into their confidence. They revealed that FAR had broken completely with the CP Guatemala becasue of complete dissatisfaction with the party's handling of support matters. They pointed out to me Francisco Corado in the compound as the CP representative and commented that all financial help from the outside was being channeled through him despite the fact that he distribute the aid to his friends who were not even party members and neglected everyone else. The brothers also told me that FAR had stripped César Montes of all his authority and that he was in exile in Mexico. They commented that Montes had spent almost all his time outside Guatemala and had not accomplished the missions he was sent on. They also stated that financial and material aid from Cuba had dwindled to almost nothing because of FAR refusal to accept Cuban terms. They explained that the Cubans insisted on sending their experts to direct everything and channeled all their financial aid through the CP Guatemala.

"The León brothers also suggested that if and when I returned to

Mexico, I should maintain contact with a "genuine FAR representative" and that I should do everything possible to convince the Cubans to take a more realistic position vis-a-vis their revolution. I welcomed this suggestion, assuring them that I could and would make a trip to Havana as soon as feasible. Since I was not certain of my wife's whereabouts, I asked the brothers to have their representative in Mexico, whom they described simply as 'Pavel', contact me through **Identity C** . I suggested that 'Pavel' could contact the director, **Identity E** or her secretary sra Carillo, and introduce himself as a person representing a certain sra Violeta who was interested in purchasing the watercolors I had already sent to my wife. 'Pavel' could then ask for my address or leave a message telling me where I could contact him. They agreed and promised to communicate with me as soon after my release as possible.

"The trial of myself and Iden B was nothing more than a formality, since the judge was well aware that the prosecution had no solid evidence (fortunately for us Iden A had already been eliminated and could not testify even under duress). Since at least three attempts had been made to execute us before the trial (on the well-known pretext of removing us from the prison and assassinating us while supposedly attempting to escape), I demand an escort after the acquittal to accompany us to the airport. We arrived in Mexico City on 18 October and I was met there by my wife."

10. After relating the above, LIRING/3 asked Rowton to keep the proposed contact with 'Pavel' in strictest confidence, particularly from his wife, since he felt she would be very upset to learn that he, L/3, was planning to resume political activity on behalf of FAR. In reply to Rowton's query, L/3 stated that as yet he had not had time to recontact anyone in the LIRING office but promised to do so as soon as the opportunity presented itself. He agreed with Rowton that LIRING/4 would be the logical person to arrange a discreet meeting with LIRING/10. L/3 told Rowton incidentally that L/4 had protested to LIRING/10 some weeks previously that Rodolfo Reyes was speading rumors to the effect that the LIRING office did not trust LIRING/4. L/10 replied indignantly that if there was anyone they did not trust it was Rodolfo Reyes, and that L/4 could bring him in and L/10 would tell him such to his face.

Walls B. Rowton
Wallace B. Rowton

14-00000

S E C R E T Attachment #2
HMMA-35904

1P

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Identity Sheet

Identity A: Francisco *LARA (201-[illegible])

Identity B: Carlos *PERSABAL Marcue

Identity C: Salon de la Plastica Mexicana

Identity D: Suites Marne

Identity E: /Sra/ Lourdes *CHOUMACERO

Identity F: Manuel MARCUE Pardinas, former editor of Politica magazine

CIT: Mexico
A: Mexico
Sex: F

Re: connection with
Subj of 201-798301

S E C R E T

S/c att: 1
HMMA-35904

CS COPY

201-798301

S E C R E T

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Guatemala City

Chief of Station, Mexico City

PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

Action Required: See paragraph 3.

1. Forwarded herewith is one copy each for Headquarters and the Guatemala City Station of the report covering the debriefing by Wallace B. ROWTON of LIRING-3 on his imprisonment in Guatemala. Identity A of ROWTON's report is a Guatemalan rebel living in Mexico who, as addressees will remember, accidentally shot himself in the leg a few days prior to his departure for Guatemala with LIRING-3. This wound may have convinced the Guatemalans that he had recently been involved in terrorist activities and may, in fact, have cost him his life. Identity B of the same report is the nephew of Identity F, a Mexican Communist who was arrested on 19 September 1968 during a student demonstration in Mexico City; he is still in jail.

2. As this dispatch is being written, LIRING-3 has an appointment to talk at length about his experience in Guatemala with the LIRING Station Chief, LIRING-10. The general idea is for LIRING-3 to go to PBRUMEN in the hope that he can be used to penetrate PBRUMEN-sponsored subversion efforts in Latin America or become, at least for a time, a reporting source in PBRUMEN.

3. ROWTON and the undersigned are prepared to travel to Guatemala to discuss the LIRING-3 case and its Guatemalan/FAR implications whenever the Guatemala City Station, after reviewing the available information, feels ready for such discussion. Please advise.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
1. Report (1), h/w
2. Identity Sheet (1), u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each)

HMMA - 35904

27 November 1968

S E C R E T

201-7[illegible]8301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY _____ AT _____ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER _____ #

ACTION C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

R **SECRET** (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO _____

X-REF TO FILE NO. _____

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/WH/COG5, C/CI, C/FI2, C/SOD3, C/CS/SGO

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 230100Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8223
MEXI

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY INFO JMCOBRA

27 Nov 68 IN 43465

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

WH/1

INDEX

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN *

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9739 (IN 40612)

1. LIRING-3 WRITTEN REPORT PER LIRING-9 REQUEST WAS REVIEWED BY STATION WITH ASSISTANCE LEONARD S. TORMET. REPORT LIMITED TO ACTUAL EXPERIENCES WHILE INCARCERATED GUATEMALA CITY AND INFORMATION ACTUALLY RECEIVED FROM FAR MEMBERS IN SAME JAIL. LIRING-3 BRIEFED TO DECLARE HIMSELF READY HELP GUAT REBELS FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS AND AT SAME TIME IMPLY HE IN NEED MATERIAL HELP AFTER LONG IMPRISONMENT.

MICROFILMED
DEC 19 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2. LIRING-9 WAS WAITING AT LIRING GATE 1730 HOURS WHEN LIRING-3 ARRIVED WITH REPORT. MEETING HELD IN BACK ROOM CONSULATE AND LIMITED TO LIRING-3 AND LIRING-9. FOLL HIGH POINTS THIS MEETING:

A. LIRING-9 DID NOT READ REPORT BUT HAD LIRING-3 GIVE HIM MAIN POINTS ORALLY. APPEARED MOST INTERESTED IN LIRING-3 STATEMENTS ON HOW GUAT REBELS FEEL TOWARDS PBRUMEN. NODDED WHEN LIRING-3 STATED WHAT REBELS NEED IS ADEQUATRE FUNDS NOT ADDITIONAL

CS COPY

Liring/4
B. 201-818842

* NO RECORD IN C/S 28NOV 68 0300Z.

B. 201-340938 Liring/9

SECRET

27 Nov 68 Liring/3
201-798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY_______ AT:_______

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO._______

X-REF TO FILE NO._______

DISSEM BY_______ PER_______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8228 SECRET

MEN (MEANING UDVISORS).

B. LIRING-3 EXPLAINED HE ANARCHIST, LEFTIST, IDELAIST AND FELT TRUE REVOLUTION GOING ON GUATEMALA. THIS WHY HE INTERESTED IN HELPING GUAT REBELS ANY WAY POSSIBLE. THIS SEEMED SATISFY LIRING-9.

C. LIRING-9 AGAIN MENTIONED TRIP TO HIS COUNTRY FOR LIRING-3 AND WIFE AND AGREED ARRANGE FOR PASSAGE LIRING-4 ON PERUMEN SHIP TO CANADA SO LIRING-4 COULD SEE FATHER WHO NEW YORK RESIDENT AND ILL. LIRING-9 ADAMANT LIRING-4 SHOULD NOT SEEK VISA TO UNITED STATES AS THIS WOULD EXPOSE HER TO "GRILLING" BY LOCAL EMBASSY.

D. LIRING-9 MADE VAGUE PROMISES HELP LIRING-3 IN CURRENT DIFFICULT SITUATION ALTHOUGH NO FINANCIAL HELP MENTIONED.

E. LIRING-3 WAS REQUESTED TO RETURN TO LIRING 2 DEC FOR FUTHER TALKS. LIRING-9 WAS SHOWN LETTERS REVENTLY RECEIVED BY LIRING-3 FROM FAR CONTACTS IS GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 DECLINED HOWEVER TO LET HIM KEEP THEM AND LIRING-9 MADE NO ATTEMPT COPY THEM.

3. POUCHING LIRING-3 REPORT. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. APPRECIATE TORMET VISIT AND ASSISTANCE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

DISSEM BY 33 PER

ACTION #761 C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

R SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE, VR. C/RI/SD, C/WH/COG5, C/CI, C/FI2, C/SOD3
C/CS/SGO

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4	2	9	
5	3	10	

LIRING-3
201

S E C R E T 280122Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8223

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY INFO JMCOBRA

27 Nov 68 IN 43465

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (1*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9739 (IN 40612)

201 WH/1 file.

1. LIRING-3 WRITTEN REPORT PER LIRING-9 REQUEST WAS REVIEWED BY STATION WITH ASSISTANCE LEONARD S. TORMET. REPORT LIMITED TO ACTUAL EXPERIENCES WHILE INCARCERATED GUATEMALA CITY AND INFORMATION ACTUALLY RECEIVED FROM FAR MEMBERS IN SAME JAIL. LIRING-3 BRIEFED TO DECLARE HIMSELF READY HELP GUAT REBELS FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS AND AT SAME TIME IMPLY HE IN NEED MATERIAL HELP AFTER LONG IMPRISONMENT.

2. LIRING-9 WAS WAITING AT LIRING GATE 1730 HOURS WHEN LIRING-3 ARRIVED WITH REPORT. MEETING HELD IN BACK ROOM CONSULATE AND LIMITED TO LIRING-3 AND LIRING-9. FOLL HIGH POINTS THIS MEETING:

A. LIRING-9 DID NOT READ REPORT BUT HAD LIRING-3 GIVE HIM MAIN POINTS ORALLY. APPEARED MOST INTERESTED IN LIRING-3 STATEMENTS ON HOW GUAT REBELS FEEL TOWARDS PBRUMEN. NODDED WHEN LIRING-3 STATED WHAT REBELS NEED IS ADEQUATRE FUNDS NOT ADDITIONAL

*NO RECORD IN C/S 28 NOV 68

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY:________ AT ______________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______________

X-REF TO FILE NO ______________

DISSEM BY__________PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8228 SECRET

MEN (MEANING UDVISORS).

B. LIRING-3 EXPLAINED HE ANARCHIST, LEFTIST, IDELAIST AND FELT TRUE REVOLUTION GOING ON GUATEMALA. THIS WHY HE INTERESTED IN HELPING GUAT REBELS ANY WAY POSSIBLE. THIS SEEMED SATISFY LIRING-9

C. LIRING-9 AGAIN MENTIONED TRIP TO HIS COUNTRY FOR LIRING-3 AND WIFE AND AGREED ARRANGE FOR PASSAGE LIRING-4 ON PERUMEN SHIP TO CANADA SO LIRING-4 COULD SEE FATHER WHO NEW YORK RESIDENT AND ILL. LIRING-9 ADAMANT LIRING-4 SHOULD NOT SEEK VISA TO UNITED STATES AS THIS WOULD EXPOSE HER TO "GRILLING" BY LOCAL EMBASSY.

D. LIRING-9 MADE VAGUE PROMISES HELP LIRING-3 IN CURRENT DIFFICULT SITUATION ALTHOUGH NO FINANCIAL HELP MENTIONED.

E. LIRING-3 WAS REQUESTED TO RETURN TO LIRING 2 DEC FOR FUTHER TALKS. LIRING-9 WAS SHOWN LETTERS REVENTLY RECEIVED BY LIRING-3 FROM FAR CONTACTS IS GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 DECLINED HOWEVER TO LET HIM KEEP THEM AND LIRING-9 MADE NO ATTEMPT COPY THEM.

3. POUCHING LIRING-3 REPORT. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. APPRECIATE TORMET VISIT AND ASSISTANCE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

R

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ ________ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ________

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CI/SO, C/WH/COG5, C/CI, C/FI2, C/SOD3
C/CS/SGO

S E C R E T 280102Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8228

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY INFO JMCOBRA

27 Nov 68 IN 43465

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (1*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9739 (IN 40612)

201 CC: LIRING-9
WH/ file.

1. LIRING-3 WRITTEN REPORT PER LIRING-9 REQUEST WAS REVIEWED BY STATION WITH ASSISTANCE LEONARD S. TORMET. REPORT LIMITED TO ACTUAL EXPERIENCES WHILE INCARCERATED GUATEMALA CITY AND INFORMATION ACTUALLY RECEIVED FROM FAR MEMBERS IN SAME JAIL. LIRING-3 BRIEFED TO DECLARE HIMSELF READY HELP GUAT REBELS FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS AND AT SAME TIME IMPLY HE IN NEED MATERIAL HELP AFTER LONG IMPRISONMENT.

2. LIRING-9 WAS WAITING AT LIRING GATE 1730 HOURS WHEN LIRING-3 ARRIVED WITH REPORT. MEETING HELD IN BACK ROOM CONSULATE AND LIMITED TO LIRING-3 AND LIRING-9. FOLL HIGH POINTS THIS MEETING:

A. LIRING-9 DID NOT READ REPORT BUT HAD LIRING-3 GIVE HIM MAIN POINTS ORALLY. APPEARED MOST INTERESTED IN LIRING-3 STATEMENTS ON HOW GUAT REBELS FEEL TOWARDS PBRUMEN. NODDED WHEN LIRING-3 STATED WHAT REBELS NEED IS ADEQUATRE FUNDS NOT ADDITIONAL

*NO RECORD IN C/S 28NOV68 0300Z.

Keith

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY_______ AT____________

DISSEM BY__________ PER _______

AC ON ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO __________

X-REF TO FILE NO __________

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 3228 SECRET

MEN (MEANING UDVISORS).

B. LIRING-3 EXPLAINED HE ANARCHIST, LEFTIST, IDELAIST AND FELT TRUE REVOLUTION GOING ON GUATEMALA. THIS WHY HE INTERESTED IN HELPING GUAT REBELS ANY WAY POSSIBLE. THIS SEEMED SATISFY LIRING-9.

C. LIRING-9 AGAIN MENTIONED TRIP TO HIS COUNTRY FOR LIRING-3 AND WIFE AND AGREED ARRANGE FOR PASSAGE LIRING-4 ON PERUMEN SHIP TO CANADA SO LIRING-4 COULD SEE FATHER WHO NEW YORK RESIDENT AND ILL. LIRING-9 ADAMANT LIRING-4 SHOULD NOT SEEK VISA TO UNITED STATES AS THIS WOULD EXPOSE HER TO "GRILLING" BY LOCAL EMBASSY.

D. LIRING-9 MADE VAGUE PROMISES HELP LIRING-3 IN CURRENT DIFFICULT SITUATION ALTHOUGH NO FINANCIAL HELP MENTIONED.

E. LIRING-3 WAS REQUESTED TO RETURN TO LIRING 2 DEC FOR FUTHER TALKS. LIRING-9 WAS SHOWN LETTERS REVENTLY RECEIVED BY LIRING-3 FROM FAR CONTACTS IS GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 DECLINEDO HOWEVER TO LET HIM KEEP THEM AND LIRING-9 MADE NO ATTEMPT COPY THEM.

3. POUCHING LIRING-3 REPORT. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. APPRECIATE TORMET VISIT AND ASSISTANCE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES 1	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification		1 2 3 4 5
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		6 7 8 9 10
BY ____ AT ____ Z	INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO		
	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____		
	X-REF TO FILE NO. ____		
DISSEM BY 2 PER ____ #	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐		DESTROY ☐ SIG.
ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE, VR, CCS 2, CS/PS.		

#630

S E C R E T 262200Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8283 26 Nov 68 IN 42426

M

GUATEMALA CITY, INFO DIRECTOR

ADMIN

REF: GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (IN 40676)

1. TORMET WILL RETURN GUATEMALA PAA 581, 27 NOV.

2. APPRECIATE HIS VISIT, WHICH VERY HELPFUL.

S E C R E T

WH/file: LIRING-3 201
201-793301
ulc

C WH/1
DC
~~[illegible]~~ Kate ulc

SECRET

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CSDO

VANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

2240

SSEM BY 21 PER

TION 123 clwh 6 ☐ RID COPY

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP: EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO FILE, VR, c/RI/CD, cs/DO, c/wh/cog 5, c/ccs 2, c/ccs 5

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

GUAT

S E C R E T 232206Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9739

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT PERUMEN

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN

B. DIRECTOR 53469

23 Nov 68 IN 40612

CA

WH/3/G

1. LEONARD S. TORMET (IDEN) GUATEMALA CITY CASE OFFICER TO TRAVEL MEXICO CITY FOR REF DISCUSSIONS. TORMET ATTEMPTING BOOK PASSAGE PAN AM FLT 502, 24 NOV. WILL ADVISE FIRM ETA BY CABLE 24 NOV. REQUEST MEET AND ACCOMODATE.

2. FILE: 201-798301

S E C R E T

SECRET

23 Nov 68

201-798301

[illegible]-3

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
CSDO

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	55	10	

DVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

Y ______ AT 2240 Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

SSEM BY 21 PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ S.G.

PRECEDENCE

CTION
421 c/WH 6

☐ RID COPY

INFO
FILE, VR, c/FI/SD, CS/DO, c/WH/COG 5, c/CCS 2, c/CSPS

S E C R E T 232215Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9740

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN

REF: GUATEMALA CITY 9739 (IN 40612

23 Nov 68 IN 40611

IDEN: BARRY G. ROYDEN.

S E C R E T

WH/1 file:
LIRING-3
201

201-798301

SECRET

C/WH/1 ______
DC/WH/1 WN
Kerb WC

14-00000

14

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 36

SECRET

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
9354
23 November 1963

OUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	✓
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION: 8 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301; x-ref 201-340938

C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, CSDO, C/... /SOD 3

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

IMMEDIATE 23 19 ...

MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY ROUTINE: JMCOBRA

CITE DIRECTOR 53469

RYBAT/PERUMEN

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY 9736 (IN 40291) *

B. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN 40273) **

C. DIRECTOR 47408 *** (NOT SENT JMCOBRA)

1. AGREE POINTS REF A PARA 1 A THRU E BUT BELIEVE TIME NOW PROPITIOUS FOR DIRECT GUAT CITY STATION REP DISCUSSION WITH MEXICO CITY STATION ON GUAT INSURGENCY SITUATION AND REPORTED CUBAN ~~[illegible]~~ INVOLVEMENT. FOR THAT REASON, UNLESS IMPORTANT NEEDS TO CONTRARY, RECOMMEND KNOWLEDGEABLE GUAT CITY STATION CASE OFFICER PROCEED MEXICO AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. BELIEVE AS STATED REF C THAT LIRING-3 SHOULD BE FACTUAL AS POSSIBLE IN PREPARING REPORT ON CONTACTS AND EXPERIENCES WHILE IMPRISONED GUATEMALA, AND IN GIVING OPINION ON HOW Cubans ~~[illegible]~~ HAVE FAILED THERE. TO MAKE HIM APPEAR TOO KNOWLEDGEABLE ON FAR/PGT COULD AROUSE SUSPICIONS LIRING-9 AND COLLEAGUES.

3. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE LIRING-9 MAY HAVE BEEN RELATING DIRECTLY TO ACTIVITIES OF HECTOR SANCHEZ GONZALEZ PER MEXICO CITY 7744 (IN 18686) IF LIREBEL-2 REPORT INDEED BASED ON FACT.

CONTINUED

C/WH/1 wjk
DC/WH/1 ...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
____ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

FROM:
☐ RID COPY
INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 53465

PAGE TWO

MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY

4. OBJECTIVE, OF COURSE, IS TO BREAK UP GUAT [illegible] FORCES AND NEGATE ANY CUBAN EFFORT THERE. AT SAME TIME DESIRE ENTICE ~~[illegible]~~ Cubans TO EXPOSE HAND AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHIN FEASIBLE KNOWLEDGEABILITY LIRING-3. ACCORDINGLY BELIEVE DETAILED DISCUSSION IN MEXICO WITH GUAT STATION C/O AT THIS TIME WOULD BE PROFITABLE AND WELL WORTH VISIT.

END OF MESSAGE

Hqs Comments: *) References attached
**)
***)

WH/COG: Paul Oberst (telecon)
WH/2: Jack Murray (draft)

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Chief, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
9354
23 November 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 8 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301; x-ref 201-340938

C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR , C/FI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, CSDO C/FI 2 /SOD 3

SECRET

IMMEDIATE 23 16 52 Z NOV 68

MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY ROUTINE: JMCOBRA

CITE DIRECTOR 53469

RYBAT/PBRUMEN

23 Nov. 68

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY 9750 (IN 40491) *

B. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN 40273) **

C. DIRECTOR 47408 *** (NOT SENT JMCOBRA)

1. AGREE POINTS REF A PARA 1 A THRU E BUT BELIEVE TIME NOW PROPITIOUS FOR DIRECT GUAT CITY STATION REP DISCUSSION WITH MEXICO CITY STATION ON GUAT INSURGENCY SITUATION AND REPORTED CUBAN ~~[illegible]~~ INVOLVEMENT. FOR THAT REASON, UNLESS IMPORTANT NEEDS TO CONTRARY, RECOMMEND KNOWLEDGEABLE GUAT CITY STATION CASE OFFICER PROCEED MEXICO AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. BELIEVE AS STATED REF C THAT LIRING-3 SHOULD BE FACTUAL AS POSSIBLE IN PREPARING REPORT ON CONTACTS AND EXPERIENCES WHILE IMPRISONED GUATEMALA, AND IN GIVING OPINION ON HOW CUBANS ~~[illegible]~~ HAVE FAILED THERE. TO MAKE HIM APPEAR TOO KNOWLEDGEABLE ON FAR/PGT COULD AROUSE SUSPICIONS LIRING-9 AND COLLEAGUES.

3. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE LIRING-9 MAY HAVE BEEN RELATING DIRECTLY TO ACTIVITIES OF HECTOR SANCHEZ GONZALEZ PER MEXICO CITY 7744 (IN 18686) IF LIREBEL-2 REPORT INDEED BASED ON FACT.

MICROFILMED
DEC 20 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONTINUED

Liring-3
23 Nov 68
201-798301

B.201-340938

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 53469

PAGE TWO

~~MEXICO CITY~~ GUATEMALA CITY

4. OBJECTIVE, OF COURSE, IS TO BREAK UP GUAT INSURGENCY FORCES AND NEGATE ANY CUBAN EFFORT THERE. AT SAME TIME DESIRE ENTICE ~~[illegible]~~ CUBANS TO EXPOSE HAND AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHIN FEASIBLE KNOWLEDGEABILITY LIRING-3. ACCORDINGLY BELIEVE DETAILED DISCUSSION IN MEXICO WITH GUAT STATION C/O AT THIS TIME WOULD BE PROFITABLE AND WELL WORTH VISIT.

END OF MESSAGE

Hqs Comments: *)
**) References attached
***)

WH/COG: Paul Oberst (telecon)
WH/2: Jack Murray (draft)

Chief, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE PROHIBITED.

14-00000

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CSDO

VANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT: 2240 Z

SSEM BY: 21 PER

TION

422 clwh6 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR. c/Ri/SO, CS/DO, c/WH/COG 5, c/CCS 2, c/CSPS

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	.55	10	

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 232206Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9739

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN

23Nov68 IN 40612

B. DIRECTOR 53469

1. LEONARD S. TORMET (IDEN) GUATEMALA CITY CASE OFFICER TO TRAVEL MEXICO CITY FOR REF DISCUSSIONS. TORMET ATTEMPTING BOOK PASSAGE PAN AM FLT 502, 24 NOV. WILL ADVISE FIRM ETA BY CABLE 24 NOV. REQUEST MEET AND ACCOMODATE.

2. FILE: 201-798301 Living 3

S E C R E T

c/WH/1 WJK

DC/WH/1

Kesk

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 2

SECRET (When Filled In)

TOTAL COPIES 25

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: D 1355 Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

PRECEDENCE

DISSEM BY: 33 PER ____ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION 3/6 C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. C/CI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, DDP, ADDP, CSDO, C/CI, C/CI/PS, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3, C/CS/ISG 0

S E C R E T 230301Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9736

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ROUTINE JMCOBRA

RYBAT/PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

22Nov68 IN 40291

REF: MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN *

1. BECAUSE LIRING-3 COULD NOT LOGICALLY HAVE GAINED DETAILED INSIGHT INTO INSURGENCY MOVEMENT IN GUATEMALA DURING ENCARCERATION, DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY FOR GUATEMALA CITY STATION OFFICER PROVIDE EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED BRIEFING FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT. SUGGEST FOLLOWING GENERAL GUIDELINES, SUBJECT TO HQS APPROVAL, WHICH OSTENSIBILY TO BE IMPRESSIONS OF LIRING-3 BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH FAR LEADERS WHILE IN JAIL.

A. EMPHASIZE FRAGMENTATION, DISORGANIZATION AND COMPETITION OF INSURGENT FORCES HAVE SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED INSURGENT MOVEMENT, WHICH NOW STAGNANT.

B. LEADERSHIP IS OBVIOUSLY IMMATURE AND INCAPABLE OF ORGANIZING AN EFFECTIVE MOVEMENT.

C. ACCORDING ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA" FAR FUNDS MISUSED BY LEADERS IN "NON-REVOLUTIONARY WAYS."

D. RECENT FAR TERRORISM, WHICH FOR MOST PART ILL-CONCEIVED AND NOT PART OF OVERALL STRATEGY, HAS WEAKENED MOVEMENT THROUGH

*NO RECORD IN C/S 23 NOV 68 0400Z.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9736

LOSSES FROM GOG RETALIATION. GOG ABLE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IMPULSIVE ACTIONS BY FAR MEMBERS WHO FAILED MAKE ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS BEFOREHAND.

E. ESSENTIAL THAT NEW LEADERSHIP CADRE BE FOUND TO REPLACE PRESENT COMMAND IF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TO SUCCEED.

2. FYI: OBJECTIVE OF ABOVE IS TO PAINT AS DISMAL A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE FOR CUBANS, AND TO SUGGEST THAT LATTER IMPOSE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT INSURGENT LEADERSHIP. FEEL THAT ANY ATTEMPT BY CUBANS TO REPLACE CURRENT LEADERSHIP WOULD FURTHER FRACTIONALIZE AND DEMORALIZE INSURGENTS.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY D AT 0355 Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

TOTAL COPIES 25

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	C
		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION 386 C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR C/R/SD, C/WH/COG 5, DDP, ADDP, CSDO, C/CI, C/CI/PS, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3, C/CS/SGO

SECRET 230301Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9736

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ROUTINE JMCOBRA

RYBAT/PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

22 Nov 68 IN 40291

REF: MEXICO CITY [illegible] *

1. BECAUSE LIRING-3 COULD NOT LOGICALLY HAVE GAINED DETAILED INSIGHT INTO INSURGENCY MOVEMENT IN GUATEMALA DURING ENCARCERATION, DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY FOR GUATEMALA CITY STATION OFFICER PROVIDE EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED BRIEFING FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT. SUGGEST FOLLOWING GENERAL GUIDELINES, SUBJECT TO HQS APPROVAL, WHICH OSTENSIBLY TO BE IMPRESSIONS OF LIRING-3 BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH FAR LEADERS WHILE IN JAIL.

A. EMPHASIZE FRAGMENTATION, DISORGANIZATION AND COMPETITION OF INSURGENT FORCES HAVE SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED INSURGENT MOVEMENT, WHICH NOW STAGNANT.

B. LEADERSHIP IS OBVIOUSLY IMMATURE AND INCAPABLE OF ORGANIZING AN EFFECTIVE MOVEMENT.

C. ACCORDING ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA" FAR FUNDS MISUSED BY LEADERS IN "NON-REVOLUTIONARY WAYS."

D. RECENT FAR TERRORISM, WHICH FOR MOST PART ILL-CONCEIVED AND NOT PART OF OVERALL STRATEGY, HAS WEAKENED MOVEMENT THROUGH

*NO RECORD IN C/S 23 NOV 68 0400Z.

C/WH/1

DC/WH/1

Keele

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

DVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

Y_____ AT:________ Z

ISSEM BY________ PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.________

X-REF TO FILE NO.________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9736

LOSSES FROM GOG RETALIATION. GOG ABLE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IMPULSIVE ACTIONS BY FAR MEMBERS WHO FAILED MAKE ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS BEFOREHAND.

E. ESSENTIAL THAT NEW LEADERSHIP CADRE BE FOUND TO REPLACE PRESENT COMMAND IF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TO SUCCEED.

2. FYI: OBJECTIVE OF ABOVE IS TO PAINT AS DISMAL A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE FOR CUBANS, AND TO SUGGEST THAT LATTER IMPOSE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT INSURGENT LEADERSHIP. FEEL THAT ANY ATTEMPT BY CUBANS TO REPLACE CURRENT LEADERSHIP WOULD FURTHER FRACTIONALIZE AND DEMORALIZE INSURGENTS.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	/	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT 6140 Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PRECEDENCE

ACTION C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CI/SD, CS/DO, C/WH/COG5, C/CI, C/FI2

359

S E C R E T 250032Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8159

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7982 (IN 25321)

22 Nov 68 IN 40273

1. DURING LONG DISCUSSION LIRING-9 HAD AT LIRING WITH LIRING-3 ON 21 NOV LIRING-9 ASKED LIRING-3 PREPARE DETAILED WRITTEN REPORT DUE 1730 HOURS 26 NOV ON HIS EXPERIENCES GUATEMALA AND HIS CONTACTS WITH FAR PERSONALITIES WHILE INCARCERATED. WHEN LIRING-3 MENTIONED LACK ADEQUATE PBRUMEN SUPPORT LIRING-9 EXCITEDLY AGREED STATING HIS CAPITAL DID NOT UNDERSTAND FAR AND HAD DONE MANY THINGS ~~WRING~~ WRONG. HE ADDED LIRING-3 SHOULD POINT OUT ON PAPER HOW PBRUMEN HAD FAILED IN GUATEMALA AND GIVE HIS OPINION OF WHAT NEEDED. LIRING-9 ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT LIRING-3 KNOWS OF SQUABBLE BETWEEN GUAT LEFTISTS. AMONG MANY OTHER QUESTIONS LIRING-9 WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER JEANETTE FIRK HAD FAR MISSION BEFORE HER DEATH.

2. LIRING-9 STATED CHIEF LIRING "DOES NOT HAVE VERY MUCH TO DO WITH THESE THINGS" (CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES IN GUATEMALA) AND "HIS OPINION DOES NOT MATTER." SAID WOULD ARRANGE FOR

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ____________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 SECRET

MEETING AT 1730 ON 25 NOV WITH "SOME MY COLLEAGUES" SO CAN DISCUSS LIRING-3 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS AT LENGTH " IN BETTER PLACE FOR PRIVATE TALK." WHEN LIRING-3 EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT AMPLIFY HIS REPORT IN PERSON TO [illegible] OFFICIAL, LIRING-9 SUGGESTED HE MIGHT BE INVITED FOR CULTURAL EXPOSITION TO MAKE TRIP APPEAR INNOCUOUS AND OFFERED TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. REQUEST GUAT CITY STATION OFFICER FAMILIAR WITH FAR/PGT OP PROCEED MEXICO CITY MORNING 23 NOV TO DISCUSS ABOVE AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT TO LIRING. IN ADDITION TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE LIRING-3 COULD ATTRIBUTE INFO WHICH WOFIRM MIGHT WANT REACH PERUMENERS TO NOW DEAD JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO(LOPEZ) RUIZ WITH WHOM HAD CONTACT IN JAIL. PLS ADVISE ETA BY IMMEDIATE. WILL MEET AT AIRPORT BUT IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG OFFICER SHOULD PHONE IDEN.

4. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDD

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY 6 AT 6140 Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER

ACTION C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

359

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE VR C/EI/SD, CS/DO, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 232032Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8159

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 25321)

22 Nov 68 IN 40273

1. DURING LONG DISCUSSION LIRING-9 HAD AT LIRING WITH LIRING-3 ON 21 NOV LIRING-9 ASKED LIRING-3 PREPARE DETAILED WRITTEN REPORT DUE 1730 HOURS 26 NOV ON HIS EXPERIENCES GUATEMALA AND HIS CONTACTS WITH FAR PERSONALITIES WHILE INCARCERATED. WHEN LIRING-3 MENTIONED LACK ADEQUATE PBRUMEN SUPPORT LIRING-9 EXCITEDLY AGREED STATING HIS CAPITAL DID NOT UNDERSTAND FAR AND HAD DONE MANY THINGS ~~WORNG~~ WRONG. HE ADDED LIRING-3 SHOULD POINT OUT ON PAPER HOW PBRUMEN HAD FAILED IN GUATEMALA AND GIVE HIS OPINION OF WHAT NEEDED. LIRING-9 ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT LIRING-3 KNOWS OF SQUABBLE BETWEEN GUAT LEFTISTS. AMONG MANY OTHER QUESTIONS LIRING-9 WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER JEANETTE FIRK HAD FAR MISSION BEFORE HER DEATH.

2. LIRING-9 STATED CHIEF LIRING "DOES NOT HAVE VERY MUCH TO DO WITH THESE THINGS" (CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES IN GUATEMALA) AND "HIS OPINION DOES NOT MATTER." SAID WOULD ARRANGE FOR

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 S E C R E T

MEETING AT 1730 ON 25 NOV WITH "SOME MY COLLEAGUES" SO CAN DISCUSS LIRING-3 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS AT LENGTH " IN BETTER PLACE FOR PRIVATE TALK." WHEN LIRING-3 EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT AMPLIFY HIS REPORT IN PERSON IN PBRUMEN CAPITAL, LIRING-3 SUGGESTED HE MIGHT BE INVITED FOR CULTURAL EXPOSITION TO MAKE TRIP APPEAR INNOCUOUS AND OFFERED TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. REQUEST GUAT CITY STATION OFFICER FAMILIAR WITH FAR/PGT OP PROCEED MEXICO CITY MORNING 23 NOV TO DISCUSS ABOVE AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT TO LIRING. IN ADDITION TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE LIRING-3 COULD ATTRIBUTE INFO WHICH WOFIRM MIGHT WANT REACH PBRUMENERS TO NOW DEAD JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO(LOPEZ) RUIZ WITH WHOM HAD CONTACT IN JAIL. PLS ADVISE ETA BY IMMEDIATE. WILL MEET AT AIRPORT BUT IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG OFFICER SHOULD PHONE IDEN.

4. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ____ AT 6140 Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ____

ACTION C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

359

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, CS/DO, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 230232Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8159

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 25321)

WH/1

22 Nov 68 IN 40273

1. DURING LONG DISCUSSION LIRING-9 HAD AT LIRING WITH LIRING-3 ON 21 NOV LIRING-9 ASKED LIRING-3 PREPARE DETAILED WRITTEN REPORT DUE 1730 HOURS 26 NOV ON HIS EXPERIENCES GUATEMALA AND HIS CONTACTS WITH FAR PERSONALITIES WHILE INCARCERATED. WHEN LIRING-3 MENTIONED LACK ADEQUATE PBRUMEN SUPPORT LIRING-9 EXCITEDLY AGREED STATING HIS CAPITAL DID NOT UNDERSTAND FAR AND HAD DONE MANY THINGS wrong. HE ADDED LIRING-3 SHOULD POINT OUT ON PAPER HOW PBRUMEN HAD FAILED IN GUATEMALA AND GIVE HIS OPINION OF WHAT NEEDED. LIRING-9 ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT LIRING-3 KNOWS OF SQUABBLE BETWEEN GUAT LEFTISTS. AMONG MANY OTHER QUESTIONS LIRING-9 WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER JEANETTE FIRK HAD FAR MISSION BEFORE HER DEATH.

2. LIRING-9 STATED CHIEF LIRING "DOES NOT HAVE VERY MUCH TO DO WITH THESE THINGS" (CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES IN GUATEMALA) AND "HIS OPINION DOES NOT MATTER." SAID WOULD ARRANGE FOR

MICROFILMED
DEC 13 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Liring-9
201-340938

CS COPY

Liring-3
22 Nov 68
201-798301

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

BY ____ AT ____ Z

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION ☐ RID COPY INFO FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 S E C R E T

MEETING AT 1730 ON 25 NOV WITH "SOME MY COLLEAGUES" SO CAN DISCUSS LIRING-3 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS AT LENGTH " IN BETTER PLACE FOR PRIVATE TALK." WHEN LIRING-3 EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT AMPLIFY HIS REPORT IN PERSON IN PBRUMEN CAPITAL, LIRING-9 SUGGESTED HE MIGHT BE INVITED FOR CULTURAL EXPOSITION TO MAKE TRIP APPEAR INNOCUOUS AND OFFERED TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. REQUEST GUAT CITY STATION OFFICER FAMILIAR WITH FAR/PGT OP PROCEED MEXICO CITY MORNING 23 NOV TO DISCUSS ABOVE AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT TO LIRING. IN ADDITION TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE LIRING-3 COULD ATTRIBUTE INFO WHICH WOFIRM MIGHT WANT REACH PBRUMENERS TO NOW DEAD JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO (LOPEZ) RUIZ WITH WHOM HAD CONTACT IN JAIL. PLS ADVISE ETA BY IMMEDIATE. WILL MEET AT AIRPORT BUT IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG OFFICER SHOULD PHONE IDEN.

4. FILE 201-798381.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO
ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY ___ AT 6140 Z
DISSEM BY 25 PER ___
ACTION C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY
359

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18
SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ___
X-REF TO FILE NO. ___
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ___ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
INFO FILE VR, C/EI/SD, CS/DO, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 230332Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8159

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7982 (IN 25321)

22 Nov 68 IN 40273

1. DURING LONG DISCUSSION LIRING-9 HAD AT LIRING WITH LIRING-3 ON 21 NOV LIRING-9 ASKED LIRING-3 PREPARE DETAILED WRITTEN REPORT DUE 1730 HOURS 26 NOV ON HIS EXPERIENCES GUATEMALA AND HIS CONTACTS WITH FAR PERSONALITIES WHILE INCARCERATED. WHEN LIRING-3 MENTIONED LACK ADEQUATE PBRUMEN SUPPORT LIRING-9 EXCITEDLY AGREED STATING HIS CAPITAL DID NOT UNDERSTAND FAR AND HAD DONE MANY THINGS ~~WRONG~~ WRONG. HE ADDED LIRING-3 SHOULD POINT OUT ON PAPER HOW PBRUMEN HAD FAILED IN GUATEMALA AND GIVE HIS OPINION OF WHAT NEEDED. LIRING-9 ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT LIRING-3 KNOWS OF SQUABBLE BETWEEN GUAT LEFTISTS. AMONG MANY OTHER QUESTIONS LIRING-9 WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER JEANETTE FIRK HAD FAR MISSION BEFORE HER DEATH.

2. LIRING-9 STATED CHIEF LIRING "DOES NOT HAVE VERY MUCH TO DO WITH THESE THINGS" (CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES IN GUATEMALA) AND "HIS OPINION DOES NOT MATTER." SAID WOULD ARRANGE FOR

C/WH/1 ___
DC/WH/1 ___
Keshe ___

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 SECRET

MEETING AT 1730 ON 25 NOV WITH "SOME MY COLLEAGUES" SO CAN DISCUSS LIRING-3 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS AT LENGTH " IN BETTER PLACE FOR PRIVATE TALK." WHEN LIRING-3 EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT AMPLIFY HIS REPORT IN PERSON IN PBRUMEN CAPITAL, LIRING-9 SUGGESTED HE MIGHT BE INVITED FOR CULTURAL EXPOSITION TO MAKE TRIP APPEAR INNOCUOUS AND OFFERED TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. REQUEST GUAT CITY STATION OFFICER FAMILIAR WITH FAR/PGT OP PROCEED MEXICO CITY MORNING 23 NOV TO DISCUSS ABOVE AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT TO LIRING. IN ADDITION TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE LIRING-3 COULD ATTRIBUTE INFO WHICH WOFIRM MIGHT WANT REACH PBRUMENERS TO NOW DEAD JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO(LOPEZ) RUIZ WITH WHOM HAD CONTACT IN JAIL. PLS ADVISE ETA BY IMMEDIATE. WILL MEET AT AIRPORT BUT IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG OFFICER SHOULD PHONE IDEN.

4. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CSDO

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ___ AT 0140 Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ___

ACTION

C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

358

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

B

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ___

X-REF TO FILE NO. ___

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ___ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, CS/DO, C/WH/COG 5 C/CI, C/FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4	6	9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 230031Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 3160

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY ,DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

22 Nov 68 IN 40270

DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 3159 [IN 40273]

1. IDEN IS FRANCIS SHERRY, PHONE NO. 20-76-66.

2. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

SECRET

Kerbe

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ___ AT 0140 Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ___ #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ___

X-REF TO FILE NO. ___

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ___ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION C/WH6 358 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, CS/DO, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 230031Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8160

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY ,DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

22 Nov 68 IN 40270

DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 8159 [IN 40273]

1. IDEN IS FRANCIS SHERRY, PHONE NO. 20-76-66.

2. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
CSDO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

3

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY [illegible] AT 0140 Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION
C/WH6
358
☐ RID COPY

INFO
FILE VR, C/RI/SD, CS/DO, C/WH/COG5
C/CI, C/FI2

S E C R E T 230031Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8160
MEXI

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

22 Nov 68 IN 40270

DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 8159 [IN 40273]

T/e.c.
WH

1. IDEN IS FRANCIS SHERRY, PHONE NO. 20-76-66.

2. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

MICROFILMED
DEC 13 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Liring-3

Liring-9
B 201-340938

CS COPY
SECRET

22 NOV 68
201-798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY D AT 1355 Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER

ACTION 3/C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

INFO FILE, VR, C/CI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, C/CI, C/CI/PS, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3, C/CS/SGO

/CL/ WH/1

SECRET 230301Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9736 GUAT

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ROUTINE JMCOBRA

RYBAT/PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

22 NOV 68 IN 40281

REF: MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN ✱)

1. BECAUSE LIRING-3 COULD NOT LOGICALLY HAVE GAINED DETAILED INSIGHT INTO INSURGENCY MOVEMENT IN GUATEMALA DURING ENCARCERATION, DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY FOR GUATEMALA CITY STATION OFFICER PROVIDE EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED BRIEFING FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT. SUGGEST FOLLOWING GENERAL GUIDELINES, SUBJECT TO HQS APPROVAL, WHICH OSTENSIBLY TO BE IMPRESSIONS OF LIRING-3 BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH FAR LEADERS WHILE IN JAIL.

A. EMPHASIZE FRAGMENTATION, DISORGANIZATION AND COMPETITION OF INSURGENT FORCES HAVE SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED INSURGENT MOVEMENT, WHICH NOW STAGNANT.

B. LEADERSHIP IS OBVIOUSLY IMMATURE AND INCAPABLE OF ORGANIZING AN EFFECTIVE MOVEMENT.

C. ACCORDING ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA" FAR FUNDS MISUSED BY LEADERS IN "NON-REVOLUTIONARY WAYS."

D. RECENT FAR TERRORISM, WHICH FOR MOST PART ILL-CONCEIVED AND NOT PART OF OVERALL STRATEGY, HAS WEAKENED MOVEMENT THROUGH

✱ NO RECORD IN C/S 23 NOV 68 0400Z. Liring-3

22 Nov 68

201-798301

SECRET

CS COPY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9736

LOSSES FROM GOG RETALIATION. GOG ABLE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IMPULSIVE ACTIONS BY FAR MEMBERS WHO FAILED MAKE ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS BEFOREHAND.

E. ESSENTIAL THAT NEW LEADERSHIP CADRE BE FOUND TO REPLACE PRESENT COMMAND IF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TO SUCCEED.

2. FYI: OBJECTIVE OF ABOVE IS TO PAINT AS DISMAL A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE FOR CUBANS, AND TO SUGGEST THAT LATTER IMPOSE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT INSURGENT LEADERSHIP. FEEL THAT ANY ATTEMPT BY CUBANS TO REPLACE CURRENT LEADERSHIP WOULD FURTHER FRACTIONALIZE AND DEMORALIZE INSURGENTS.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-798301.

S E C R E T

SECRET

1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY 6 AT 0140 Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER

ACTION C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY
359

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE VR C/RI/SD CS/DO, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 230032Z NOV 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 8159

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7900 [IN 25321]

22 Nov 63 IN 40273

1. DURING LONG DISCUSSION LIRING-9 HAD AT LIRING WITH LIRING-3 ON 21 NOV LIRING-9 ASKED LIRING-3 PREPARE DETAILED WRITTEN REPORT DUE 1730 HOURS 25 NOV ON HIS EXPERIENCES GUATEMALA AND HIS CONTACTS WITH FAR PERSONALITIES WHILE INCARCERATED. WHEN LIRING-3 MENTIONED LACK ADEQUATE PBRUMEN SUPPORT LIRING-9 EXCITEDLY AGREED STATING HIS CAPITAL DID NOT UNDERSTAND FAR AND HAD DONE MANY THINGS ~~WGING~~ WRONG. HE ADDED LIRING-3 SHOULD POINT OUT ON PAPER HOW PBRUMEN HAD FAILED IN GUATEMALA AND GIVE HIS OPINION OF WHAT NEEDED. LIRING-9 ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT LIRING-3 KNOWS OF SQUABBLE BETWEEN GUAT LEFTISTS. AMONG MANY OTHER QUESTIONS LIRING-9 WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER JEANETTE FIRK HAD FAR MISSION BEFORE HER DEATH.

2. LIRING-9 STATED CHIEF LIRING "DOES NOT HAVE VERY MUCH TO DO WITH THESE THINGS" (CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES IN GUATEMALA) AND "HIS OPINION DOES NOT MATTER." SAID WOULD ARRANGE FOR

SECRET

Kerbe

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 SECRET

MEETING AT 1730 ON 25 NOV WITH "SOME MY COLLEAGUES" SO CAN DISCUSS LIRING-3 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS AT LENGTH " IN BETTER PLACE FOR PRIVATE TALK." WHEN LIRING-3 EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT AMPLIFY HIS REPORT IN PERSON IN PBRUMEN CAPITAL. LIRING-9 SUGGESTED HE MIGHT BE INVITED FOR CULTURAL EXPOSITION TO MAKE TRIP APPEAR INNOCUOUS AND OFFERED TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. REQUEST GUAT CITY STATION OFFICER FAMILIAR WITH FAR/PGT OP PROCEED MEXICO CITY MORNING 23 NOV TO DISCUSS ABOVE AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT TO LIRING. IN ADDITION TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE LIRING-3 COULD ATTRIBUTE INFO WHICH WOFIRM MIGHT WANT REACH PBRUMENERS TO NOW DEAD JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO (LOPEZ) RUIZ WITH WHOM HAD CONTACT IN JAIL. PLS ADVISE ETA BY IMMEDIATE. WILL MEET AT AIRPORT BUT IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG OFFICER SHOULD PHONE IDEN.

4. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X Att MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Letter Received by LIRING-3 from Guatemala

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : MEXICO CITY-7945, 4 November 1968

1. Forwarded under separate cover for each addressee is a Xerox copy of the letter recently received by LIRING-3 from Guatemala mentioned in reference.

2. The Station hopes that contact between LIRING-3 and representatives of the Guatemalan rebels will be initiated in the near future. Station plans are to discreetly surveil meetings between LIRING-3 and his Guatemalan contact after the first such meeting.

for Willard C. CURTIS

MICROFILMED
NOV 29 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
Letter (1), u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/att - 1 copy)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/att - 1 copy)

s/c att: 1

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 35822

DATE
18 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

Att HMMA-[illegible]

2P

Guatemala 22 de Octubre de 1968.

MICROFILMED
NOV 29 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Señor :

Carlos Jurado Del Mar

Mexico D. F.

Apresiable y distinguido amigo Carlos cuanto gusto es para mi saludarlo desandole dicha y felicidad.

No sabé cuato me alegro que ya hayan recobrado esa angustiada libertad espero en Dios que se restablesca pronto de esa gran angustia le causaron mi País y tambien que esto no vuelva a suseder ya que eso es muy duro de soportar .

es- Es cuanto tengo qus decirle y perdone las faltas de-Ortografia que he cometido pero todavia me encuentro un tanto nervioso saludeme a [illegible] y Usted un cariñoso saludo de su amigo que verlo desea :.

Rafael [illegible]

cit: Guatemala

mi direccion es la siguiente :
2 Av. 27-57 Zona 12
Guatemala C. A.

en el sobre le voy a poner otra si es que me contesta Agalo a esta por favor. esta que le anote aca adentro

re: contact with 201-798301.



LA DALIA AZUL
ENRIQUE PUENTE C.
ARTICULOS PARA CABALLEROS
6a. AVENIDA Y 10a. CALLE
TEL. 44-72
GUATEMALA, C. A.

Señor:
Carlos Jurado del Mar
Havre.# 7
Col. Juárez Mexico D.F.

CORREO AEREO

CORREOS DE GUATEMALA C.A.
1968
CORREOS

s/c att:

HMMA-[illegible]

CS COPY

14-00000

Att HMMA-35322



Remite: Rafael Argueta A.
11 Av. 25-22 Zona 12
Guatemala C. A.

S E C R E T X Att

Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Letter Received by LIRING-3 from Guatemala

Action Required: FYI

Reference : MEXICO CITY-7945, 4 November 1968

1. Forwarded under separate cover for each addressee is a Xerox copy of the letter recently received by LIRING-3 from Guatemala mentioned in reference.

2. The Station hopes that contact between LIRING-3 and representatives of the Guatemalan rebels will be initiated in the near future. Station plans are to discreetly surveil meetings between LIRING-3 and his Guatemalan contact after the first such meeting.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Letter (1), u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/att - 1 copy)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/att - 1 copy)

HMMA - 35822 18 November 1968

S E C R E T 201-798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/WH-6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR C/RI/SD, C/WH/COG-5, C/CI, C/FI-2.

#105

S E C R E T 272311Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9675

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REF A. MEXICO CITY 7945 (IN 27533)

28 Nov 68 IN 30198

traces requested

M

B. DIRECTOR 48471

1. ESLAIR TEAM CAUTIOUS INVESTIGATION REVEALS:

A. JUAN CARRERA, WIFE DARIA GARCIA DE CARRERA, AND CHILDREN LIVE ELEVENTH AVENUE ADDRESS. HOWEVER, BROTHERS RIGOBERTO AND RAFAEL ARGUETA ARE OWNERS AND LIVED THERE PREVIOUSLY. HOUSE NOW UP FOR SALE. LUIS ARGUETA, FATHER OF BROTHERS, LIVES IN CHIQUIMULA.

B. SECOND AVENUE ADDRESS OCCUPIED BY CANDELARIO ALVARADO AND FAMILY. NO FURTHER DETAILS BUT NAME INDICATES POSSIBLE FAMILY TIE WITH ARGUETA ALVARADO BROTHERS.

C. "LA DALIA AZUL", OWNED BY ENRIQUE PUENTE C., DOES EXIST AS INDICATED REFERENCE.

2. STATION FILES SHOW:

A. NO TRACES CARRERA AND FAMILY, PUENTE, LUIS ARGUETA, OR ALVARADO.

B. PRENSA LIBRE, 28 AUGUST 1968, REPORTED THAT RAFAEL ARGUETA ALVARADO ARRESTED DURING MAY DAY PARADE 1967 AND RELEASED 27 AUGUST 1968

C/WH/1, Wil
Kerbe

SECRET

2

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY______ AT ______Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

DISSEM BY______ PER ______#

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9675 S E C R E T

DUE LACK EVIDENCE.

C. ON 15 SEPT 1967 LIAISON REPORTED IT INVESTIGATING RIGOBERTO ARGUETA ALVARADO WHOSE NAME IN DOCUMENTS CAPTURED DURING RAID ON GUERRILLA MEETING SITE IN GUATEMALA CITY. HIS RESIDENCE GIVEN AS 11 AV. 25-22, ZONE 12, WHERE HE LIVED WITH MOTHER AND TWO BROTHERS. HIS SONS WORKED IN INTERIOR. PRENSA LIBRE OF 25 MAY 1967 AND 28 AUGUST 1968 REPORTED, RESPECTIVELY, THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL DETAINED 1 MAY 1967 AND REALEASED FROM PRISON AUGUST 1968 FOR LACK EVIDENCE.

D. HGGA-5975, 28 SEP 1967, REPORTED THAT LIAISON INVESTIGATING MIGUEL FRANCISCO ARGUETA ALVARADO WHO IT WAS LEARNED "HAD CONTACTS WITH SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS WHO RESPONSIBLE FOR SABOTAGE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES." LIAISON MADE ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT HIM BUT "DURING INTERVIEW HE SHOWED SIGNS OF FEAR INDICATING HE BELIEVED HIMSELF TO BE ASSASSINATION TARGET."

3. FILE: 201-248917. INDEX: ALVARADO, AND RAFAEL, RIGOBERTO, MIGUEL FRANCISCO ARGUETA ALVARADO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

FROM

FRANCIS MARY DY-175

WH/1 3E05

BRAN EXT. 4168 TUBE DU7

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 8 Nov 1968

RID CONTROL NO.:

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS	CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		11/5	68	PEW	
REQUESTER					②	
RID/FILES	DT 6					
REQUESTER					③	
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7					
RID/201	DU-6					
RID/INDEX	DT-5					

OVER. 2" DB NL AC

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: ✓ ALVARADO, Candelaria

GIVEN NAMES:

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED:

201 NO. IF KNOWN:

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (*Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.*):

SEX: M

DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP: Guat

RESIDENCE: Guatemala City, Guatemala

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS: C20 hus NL

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (*If any*)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: YES ☐ NO ☐

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO BE KEPT: RID ☐ DESK ☐

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

14-00000

ALVARADO, C.A.
DO3 ?

CIT COLOMBIA

FORMAL MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 7TH WYF TO BE HELD IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA JUL. 59.

200-004-233.2
DIR-28561 EC.
[illegible]
P3

166903

14-00000

SECRET

FROM

FRANCIS MARV
WH/I
EXT. 4168

DY-175
3E05
TUBE DU7

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 8 November 1968

RID CONTROL NO.:

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		9-11	68	JG
REQUESTER					②
RID/FILES	DT-6				
REQUESTER					③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7				
RID/201	DW-6				
RID/INDEX	DT-5				

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

2113BNC

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: CABRERA, Juan

GIVEN NAMES:

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED:

201 NO. IF KNOWN:

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (*Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.*):

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M			Guat	Guatemala City, Guatemala

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (*If any*):

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS:

FILE TO BE KEPT: ☐ RID ☐ DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OGS and CIG are in RID/AFD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER:

SECRET

CARRERA, JUAN

056-004-109
HZP -05971
29 MAY 63
P1

SEX M DOB ?

CIT PANAMA
OCC ?
TREASURER OF THE CTRP. PLANS OF CP LABOR LDRS TO USE HIM IN EFFORT TO LEARN SOURCE OF FUNDS OF CRIT-AFFILIATED CTRP. /CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE LA REPUBLICA/.

* 085223

1 494 004

CARRERA, Juan

63-4-7-348
(TSS-852)

Communist involved in labor matters who escaped arrest

[illegible] FILED
[illegible] OCT 52
IN MAIN INDEX

085224

CARRERAS, Juan Durall

DURALL CARRERAS, Juan — Xref

100-2-[illegible]
([illegible])
(Encl. 1)

12 APR [illegible]
THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN

085225

CARRERA, Juan Jose

201-40334-1
(HCG-165)
(11 May 53)

TH[illegible] FILED
[illegible]
[illegible] INDEX

085226

SECRET

SECRET

FROM

FRANCIS MARV
BRAN WH/1
EXT. 4168

DY-175
3E05
TUBE DU7

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 9 November 1963

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		9/11/63		
REQUESTER					②
RID/FILES	DT-6				
REQUESTER					③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7				
RID/201	DW-6				
RID/INDEX	DT-5				

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: AGUETA, Rigoberto

GIVEN NAMES

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)
Guatemala City resident who possibly involved in subversive activities.

SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH
PLACE OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP: Guat
RESIDENCE: Guatemala City, Guatemala

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
☐ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: YES | NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO RE REPT: RID | DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

ARGUETA, FNU
DCB ?

CIT GUATEMALA

035-004-124
HGG -01551
29 DEC 59
GUAT-00510

INSPECTOR FOR FENIX BUS COMPANY GUATEMALA CITY RECEIVED SCHOLARSHIP AND PLANNED TO LEAVE FOR MOSCOW VIA MEXICO JAN 60.

306942

SECRET

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM
FRANCIS MARY
WH/1
BRAN EXT. 4168

DY-175
3E05
TUBE DU7

DATE
8 Nov 1968

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		9-21-68		WD
REQUESTER					②
RID/FILES	DT-6				
REQUESTER					③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7				
RID/201	DW-8				
RID/INDEX	DT-5				

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME GARCIA de Carrera, Darie	GIVEN NAMES
SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED	201 NO. IF KNOWN
AKA. ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (*Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.*) Wife of Juan CARRERA

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
F			Guat	Guatemala City, Guatemala

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☐ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (*If any*)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED
YES NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO BE KEPT
RID DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/AFD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

SECRET

FROM:

FRANCIS MARV　　　DY-175
WH/1　　　3E05
EXT. 4168　　　TUBE DU7

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 8 Nov 1968

RID CONTROL NO.:

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		11/5/68	[illegible]
REQUESTER				②
RID/FILES	DT-6			
REQUESTER				③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7			
RID/201	DU-6			
RID/INDEX	DT-5			

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

Nov

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: [illegible]

GIVEN NAMES:

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED:

201 NO. IF KNOWN:

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I.S. affiliations, etc.):

SEX: M

DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP: Guat

RESIDENCE: Chiquimula, Guatemala

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS: 1 Name listed

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any):

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: YES ☐ NO ☐

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS:

FILE TO BE KEPT: RID ☐ DESK ☐

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, CSS and CIG are in RID/AFD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER:

ARGUETA, LUIS BARRIOS

35-4-134-7
HGGA-1558
ENCL. 1
PAGE 3

THIS
CARD
FILED IN
PART
[illegible]

306977

ARGUETA, FNU
DOB ?

035-004-124
HGG -01551
29 DEC 59
GUAT-00510

CIT GUATEMALA
INSPECTOR FOR FENIX BUS COMPANY GUATEMALA CITY
RECEIVED SCHOLARSHIP AND PLANNED TO LEAVE FOR
MOSCOW VIA MEXICO JAN 60.

306942

ORIG: M. Francis/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4137/1973
DATE: 6 November 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH/COG 5, C/RI/SO 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 40471

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7945 (IN 27533)*

6 Nov 68

1. HQS TRACES NEGATIVE RE RAFAEL ARGUETA AND ENRIQUE PUENTE.

2. FILE 201-248917, 201-798301 AND 50-9-11.

MICROFILMED
DEC 12 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *LIRING/3 received brief typewritten unsigned letter which expressed happiness his release from Guatemala jail. Envelope was from Enrique Puente Men's Store in Guatemala City and writer identified self as Rafael Argueta.

WH/COG/OPS

WH/2/G

Calvin M. for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CS COPY

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

Liring-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

B. 201-798301
D. 50-9-11

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 6 Nov 68 COPY NO.

201-248917

3 of [illegible] EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 18 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

BY ____ AT ____ Z

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 41 PER ____

ACTION #787 C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. [illegible] C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 052055Z NOV 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 7945

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

5 Nov 63 IN 27533
m

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 7903 (IN 25321)

1. LIRING-3 RECEIVED BRIEF TYPEWRITTEN UNSIGNED LETTER DATED 22 OCT FROM "RAFAEL ARGUETA A." LETTER WHICH CONTAINS MANY TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS EXPRESSED HAPPINESS LIRING-3 FINALLY RELEASED AND HOPED HE WILL SOON RECOVER FROM THE "GRAN ANGUSTIA" CAUSED BY "MY COUNTRY." WRITER CONCLUDED WITH APOLOGIES FOR MISTAKES IN ORTHOGRAPHY AND EXPRESSED DESIRE SEE LIRING-3 AGAIN. ASKED LIRING-3 TO REPLY TO HIM AT FOLLOWING ADDRESS: 2 AVE 27, 57, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. RATHER THAN TO ONE APPEARING AS RETURN ADDRESS ON ENVELOPE.

2. ENVELOPE IS AIRMAIL STATIONERY "LA DALIA AZUL, ENRIQUE FUENTE C, ARTICULOS PARA CABALLEROS, 6U AVENIDA Y 10A CALLE, TEL: 44-72, GUATEMALA, C.U." WITH RETURN ADDRESS ON BACK: RAFAEL ARGUETA A., 11 AV. 25 22, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. ENVELOPE IS POSTMARKED 22 OCTOBER 1963 AND IS ADDRESSED TO LIRING-3 AT CALLE HAVRE 7, COL. JUAREZ, MEXICO, D.F. (SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICANA WHICH LIRING-3 HAD GIVEN TO JUAN AND MIGUEL LEON BARRIOS AS BEST

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY INFO FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7945 S E C R E T

ADDRESS TO USE IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH HIM.)

3. LIRING-3 COMMENTED LETTER PROBABLY SIMPLY DESIGNED CHECK NEW COMMO CHANNEL. STATED HE HAS NEVER HEARD OF NAME RAFAEL ARGUETA A AND ASSUMES IT ALIAS OR NOTIONAL LETTER DROP. PLANS REPLY IMMEDIATELY ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT AND ASKING "ARGUETA" WRITE NEXT LETTER DIRECTLY TO APARTMENT LIRING-4 RENTED DURING LIRING-3 ABSENCE. LIRING-3 WILL ASK FRIENDS TO EXPEDITE CONTACT "SINCE HE PLANNING TRAVEL".

4. IS THERE SOME WAY GUATEMALA CITY STATION CAN CHECK OF PARA 1 ADDRESS WITHOUT AT LEAST FOR MOMENT MAKING ON SPOT CHECK OR USING LIAISON?

5. FILE 201-245917, 201-793321.

S E C R E T

SECRET

ORIG: Marvin Francis/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 1 Nov 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 41 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR . C/RI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

01 23 12z Nov 68

CITE DIRECTOR 47403

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 25321)*

1. SUBJECT TO GUATEMALA STATION CONCURRENCE, WE BELIEVE LIRING/3 SHOULD BE CANDID WITH LIRING/10 AND TELL HIM WHAT AND AS MUCH AS HE WANTS TO KNOW. WE FEEL IF LIRING/3 ATTEMPTED WITHHOLD OR DISTORT DETAILS HIS IMPRISONMENT, IT COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO OPERATION SINCE LIRING/10 PROBABLY COULD CHECK OTHER SOURCES FOR ACCURACY.

2. THERE NO URGENCY FOR LIRING/3 MAKE TRIP TO PBRUMEN. WE BELIEVE IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR HIM TO REMAIN MEXICO AND ATTEMPT BECOME INVOLVED LOCAL PBRUMEN/GUATEMALA EXILE ACTIVITIES. IF, HOWEVER, LIRING/10 SUGGESTS LIRING/3 GO PBRUMEN, HE SHOULD NOT HESITATE DO SO.

3. DEFER TO GUATEMALA CITY FOR IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE WAR NAMES.

4. FILE 50-6-141/3, 201-798301 AND 201-776733.

C/WH

END OF MESSAGE

Calvin M. Smith
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

WH/COG/OPS
WH/2/G

W. [illegible]
C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 18 TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS

SECRET 242022Z [illegible] CITE MEXICO CITY 7775 (Mexi) 24 OCT 68 IN 19623

GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 7465 (~06501)

B. GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (GU 16895)

1. WOULD APPRECIATE DISCREET EFFORT DETERMINE WHETHER LIRING-3 FREED. IF NOT YET RELEASED WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHEN HE SCHEDULED BE AND HOW WILL RETURN MEXICO.

2. TO FACILITATE SUBSEQUENT CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AND OPEN DOOR TO POSSIBLE CLAIM HE INSTRUMENTAL IN LIRING-3 RELEASE STATION PLANNING HAVE ROWTON SEND LIRING-3 LETTER UNDER DOUBLE ENVELOPE VIA MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LETTER ON MEXICAN BELLAS ARTES OR OTHER SUITABLE STATIONERY WILL MENTION ROWTON (UNDER PSEUDONYM UNDERSTANDABLE TO LIRING-3) UNABLE CONTACT LIRING-3 WIFE [illegible] FOR [illegible]. LETTER WILL HINT AT IMMINENT RELEASE AND URGE LIRING-3 PHONE ROWTON ANSWERING SERVICE AS SOON AS RETURNS MEXICO.

3. FOR DIRECTOR: ROWTON WHO RELUCTANT AT THIS POINT RECONTACT LIRING-3 THROUGH LEFTIST FRIENDS OR CUBANS SO FAR UNABLE RE-ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HER.

4. FILE 2[illegible]

SECRET

1P 4

AN	GL
~~AB~~	X
~~V~~	
PT	
[illegible]	H
I	D

SECRET

MICROFILMED
NOV 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B201-815342

CS COPY

24 OCT 68
201-798301

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Deputy Chief WH/C

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/LIRING/Review of LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Attached is an operational review of the LIRING-3 operation prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON. Attention is also called to PRQ Parts I and II. Part I was sent as HMMA 30540 and part II is being prepared for pouching.

Frank C. Medbery
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
LIRING-3 Review HEREWITH

Distribution:
② - C/WHD w/att
1 - DCWH/C w/att
3 - FILES

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-30585

DATE
16 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

9 November,1966.

Subject: Review and Assessment of LIRING Operation.

I. Background, Character and Assessment of LIRING/3:

1. Liring/3 (Subject) is a 26-year-old Mexican artist of the Diego Rivera School and an atheistic existentialist oriented toward the philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre, with relatively strong leftist political convictions. He has produced a fair amount of painting and had relatively good success in murals both in Cuba and Mexico, but has not succeeded in selling many of his works despite numerous expositions, sponsored by the Mexican Government plastic arts organization (Bellas Artes). Because of his family, educational and environmental background, Subject feels that his work has not been appreciated for its intrinsic worth by the Mexican Government and tends to blame his political convictions for this lack of acceptance. Subject, however, has, as he himself asserts, no feelings of bitterness or resentment. Although he frequently experiences the "anguish, forlornness and loneliness" of the existentialist, but he has not permitted himself to degenerate into a beatnik either in his personal or artistic life. Subject has confided to Rowton that he has no real friends and that he has withdrawn from society, the dictates of which he cannot accept. He enjoys the prospect of travel, especially abroad, "to develop his art" but also as an escape from the pressures and obligations of the social life he has been forced to lead in Mexico.

2. Shortly after he met Rowton, in April,1966, Subject confessed that he felt himself at a critical point in his personal and artistic life. He indicated that he felt the paradoxes inherent in his philosophy were overwhelming and depressing him and that he welcomed friendship with Rowton, an experienced foreigner whom he felt he could trust implicitly. At one critical point, Subject quit his rather tedious job with the Ministry of Education (teaching art in a public school) with the comment that "everyone must make personal decisions and take risks, and I have decided to throw my lot in with you (Rowton) for better or worse. and so have quit the job since it was interfering with my availability". This he did without knowing any more about Rowton than his name, which technical surveillance revealed he did not accept as a true name, and with no guarantees of future financial support from Rowton. Rowton, in his conversations with Subject, has been careful not to reveal any data concerning his personal life and background, including his permanent or local address, providing Subject only with the number of a telephone answering service, and using the safehouse rented by Subject as a principal point of contact. Subject has accepted money from Rowton, at first only for previously approved expenses, and subsequently for his personal use, but has accepted Rowton's initiative in this matter, and made no demands on Rowton for remuneration for services rendered. He has been meticulous in accounting for funds and shown no reluctance to sign receipts presented to him by Rowton (with his true-name signature). Subject has confessed (and shown) an almost complete lack of experience in business and intelligence work, but has accepted Rowton's guidance, where required, without hesitation.

att. #1 to HMMA-30585

CS COPY

201-798301

B- Development of LIRING/3 by Rowton:

6. Rowton met Subject in April 1966 by cold approach in the art studio where Subject at the time was presenting his latest works under sponsorship of Bellas Artes. Rowton posed as a Greek businessman interested in Subject's style and his immediate objective at the time was to ascertain the address in New York City of Subject's wife's father (a Cuban of Chinese origin who had left Cuba as a refugee). Rowton, feeling that he had to present an above-average prospect to Subject to permit future meetings, alleged that he was anxious to arrange for the painting of a mural to be installed in a New York nightclub owned by a Greek friend of his (Nina Dmitri, owner and performer at the "La Chansonette"). Rowton felt that pin-pointing the New York nightclub would have the double advantage of determining Subject's sentiments toward working in New York City and in a bourgeois environment.

7. Subject reacted very favorably to the initial approach and accepted Rowton's invitation to dinner in the company of Subject's wife the next evening. Both Subject and his wife were cautious in revealing any specific data concerning [illegible] history, but neither concealed their mutual approval of Castro's regime and dislike for the corruption in Mexico. As a result of this meeting Rowton realized that any attempt at a direct approach to either Subject or his wife, who was then employed part-time at the Cuban Consulate, would be counterproductive and that a more subtle approach would have to be developed. Rowton decided that a strong personal relationship developed with Subject would be productive and could eventually lead to useful production on Subject's part.

8. When, therefore, on 2 May 1966, Subject expressed gratification at having met Rowton and indicated that he wished to continue his friendly contacts, regardless of whether Rowton purchased his painting or arranged for the mural, Rowton xx moved in with an offer to "hire" Subject as his business associate on an unofficial basis, so that Subject could acquire a degree of independence financially and perhaps do some traveling for Rowton. In order to develop as much clandestinity as possible in his future contacts with Subject, Rowton explained that he was simply a tourist in Mexico and as such not permitted to engage in lucrative business activities. He would therefore have to depend on Subject's discretion in any dealings he might have with him. Subject accepted this as quite normal but pointed out to Roton his limitations xas far as business training and experience went. In reply to Rowton's query, he did confess, however, that he had excellent contacts in Havana that could be exploited for business dealings with Cuba. He volunteered to make an exploratory trip to Havana to renew his friendship with the perons concerned. Rowton accepted this offer, not only to test Subject's story but also to seize the occasion to be in a position to provide Subject with money to make the trip and thus compromise him somewhat at the outset.

9. Rowton's next move was to explain to Subject that he had a long-term interest in Cuba and hoped to do a great deal of business in the fuutre but first felt it was essential that both he and Subject develop the proper contacts inside to ensure success. Subject readily agreed to this and felt relieved that Rowton did not expect him to produce concrete results overnight. When Rowton, therefore suggested that Subject find and rent a safehouse for entertainment and development of prospective contacts, Subject went to work immediately without question. (Although Rowton's suggestion was first made on 17 June, Subject did not succeed in finding a suitable place until the end of July.) This project, however, gave Subject something specific and relatively clandestine to do for Rowton without seriously compromising any of his principles. Subject, as it developed later, was interested in such a hide-away, unknown even to his wife, for his own purposes.

off on a [illegible] with some friends. [illegible] then [illegible] to Rowton his criticism of López' [illegible] and [illegible] that [illegible] his [illegible] functions (in the [illegible]) López had [illegible] off his admonitions with the comment that there were more important things to do for the revolution. This disregard [illegible], with which López as well as [illegible] other Cuban officials, had treated Subject's friendly advice in the past, obviously cut Subject to the quick and fostered in him the resentment of a peasant toward his master. Taking this into consideration and in the hope of stirring up as much trouble for López and the Embassy as possible, the Station permitted Rowton to pass to Subject the highly restricted information that López had actually been arrested by the Mexican police for complicity in the arms smuggling ring that had recently been uncovered in their operations from Mexico into Guatemala. Rowton gave Subject enough details to make the story convincing and asked Subject to attribute the information to "Central American friends" and to stress that it was already inthe hands of the press. In addition Rowton suggested that Subject pass this information [illegible] to López as a hot tip so that López could discreetly disappear before the reporters managed to question him. When Subject did as requested by Rowton, López was apparently so overwhelmed with gratitude for Subject's good intentions that he informed the Ambassador the following morning (just before his [illegible] departure for Havana). Events then moved swiftly. The Ambassador called in Subject and expressed his personal appreciation for Subject's interest and help in this delicate matter and agreed with Subject that the involvement of Embassy personnel in arms smuggling was placing Cuban-Mexican relations in jeopardy. Overnight this raised Subject's status in the eyes of the Ambassador and his closest advisors (Curbelo and Cepeda) to that of a valued confident rather than simply a friend of the revolution. This obviously pleased Subject and made him all the more anxious to conceal the role of Rowton in the affair so that all the credit would continue to fall to him.

13. As a result Subject was subsequently called in by Curbelo and Cepeda and asked to offer his services to help the Tricontinental in its work in Central America. On Rowton's advice (which Subject sollicited) the offer was accepted on condition that the work to be done would be serious (i.e. worth the personal risks Subject would have to run) and that Subject would be permitted to work without the overt involvement of the local Embassy, These conditions were promptly accepted and Subject was invited to visit Havana again so that he could be briefed on the spot by Osmani Ciefuego and his staff.

14. Subject was thus catapulted into the level of IS activites,with Rowton maneuvered into a position of éminence grise. It remains to be seen following Subject's return from Havana (estimated at 21 November,1966) whether Subject will be entrusted with secret requirements by the Tricontinental, but it appears certain at this point that Rowton will be able to provide full guidance to Subject and to steer the operations he might be engaged in toward targets of interest to ______ : WOFACT

C- Biographical Data Elicited from LIRING/3:

15. Subject was born in Mexico City in 1930 of a middle class family. Subject's grandfather was a well-known textile merchant who served some 12 years as president of the Chamber of Commerce. At least one of Subject's aunts is currently well-to-do and the owner of several apartment houses in Mexico City. Subject has at present little or no contact with his family.

16. At the age of 15 Subject left home to join the Mexican Navy. Subject has commented to Rowton that his childhood was not particularly happy and that his mother and father separated, eventually, when he was in his teens. It appears likely that Subject left home as a result of family dissension. Subject states that his desire to travel and see the world was very strong at the time he joined the navy.

17. Inasmuch as the legal age for enlistment was 18, Subject had to have his birth certificate altered to show that he had been born in 1927 rather than [illegible]. As a result [illegible] all of Subject's official documents now show his birth-date as [illegible], including his passport.

18. Subject served a three-year hitch in the Navy and visited nearly all the ports of Mexico and many of Central America. Subject's specialty appears to have been in the quartermaster branch, where he learned the rudiments of navigation and ship-handling. [illegible] he left the naval service. Subject entered the University of Mexico and took courses in Archaeology and Anthropology for the next two years. Subject simultaneously developed a strong interest in painting and sculpture and over the next five or so xx years, studied under such masters as Rivera and Siqueiros.

29. Subject was married in 1950 at the age of twenty years to a young Mexican woman from Leon, GTO. and during the next ten years had at at least four children by her. He divorced his wife in about 1960, just prior to his departure for Cuba, but he had not been on good terms with her for several years prior to the divorce. From about 1954 to 1960, Subject worked in the Mexican Government Social Service among the Indians in the southern states of Mexico. Subject attributes some of the tension that arose between him and his wife to this employment venture. He commented to Rowton that his first wife wanted to live a quiet normal life in Mexico City and was unwilling to share with him the hardships of social work in remote areas of tropical Mexico. During this period Subject gradually developed his own style in painting and began to establish close contacts with Mexican art circles.

20. Subject went to Cuba in about 1960 "to join the revolution", apparently as a result of his increasingly leftist political sympathies. He did a relatively large amount of painting and mural work during his four-year residence in Cuba, while at the same time working in the Ministry of Labor and Education. In about 1961 he married a Cuban woman of Chinese origin from Santiago de Cuba and the following year a (girl) child was born to them in Havana. Subject has told Rowton that he has had very little contact with his first wife since his divorce and pays no alimony. He added that his family, however, has continued to take an interest in his first wife and the children of his first marriage and has helped to support them financially. During his stay in Cuba, Subject developed close friendship with many Cuban revolutionaries, particularly Arnol Rodriguez, whose wife worked with Subject in the Ministry of Education at the time when Arnol Rodriguez was serving as Minister of Labor.

21. Subject returned to Mexico City in 1964 with his new wife and child (whom he had naturalized as a Mexican citizen). By this time Subject had become a professional artist but supplemented the rather modest income he acquired from the sale of his painting by teaching art privately and in Mexican public schools. His monthly income during [illegible] and early 1966 did not exceed 3,000 pesos.

Wallace B Rowton

[illegible] Rowton

LIRING 3?

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 18 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 1/4

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2	1	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ACTION COPY

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 11 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION #87 C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. C/R/SO, C/WH/COG 5, C/CA, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 050255Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7945

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY 5 Nov 68 IN 27533

RYBAT [illegible] LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 7933 (IN 35321)

1. LIRING-3 RECEIVED BRIEF TYPEWRITTEN UNSIGNED LETTER DATED 22 OCT FROM "RAFAEL ARGUETA A." LETTER WHICH CONTAINS MANY TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS EXPRESSED HAPPINESS LIRING-3 FINALLY RELEASED AND HOPED HE WILL SOON RECOVER FROM THE "GRAN ANGUSTIA" CAUSED BY "MY COUNTRY." WRITER CONCLUDED WITH APOLOGIES FOR MISTAKES IN ORTHOGRAPHY AND EXPRESSED DESIRE SEE LIRING-3 AGAIN. ASKED LIRING-3 TO REPLY TO HIM AT FOLLOWING ADDRESS: 2 AVE 27, 57, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. RATHER THAN TO ONE APPEARING AS RETURN ADDRESS ON ENVELOPE.

2. ENVELOPE IS AIRMAIL STATIONERY "LA DALIA AZUL, ENRIQUE PUENTE C, ARTICULOS PARA CABALLEROS, 6A AVENIDA Y 10A CALLE, TEL: 44-72, GUATEMALA, C.U." WITH RETURN ADDRESS ON BACK: RAFAEL ARGUETA A., 11 AV. 25 22, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. ENVELOPE IS POSTMARKED 22 OCTOBER 1968 AND IS ADDRESSED TO LIRING-3 AT CALLE HAVRE 7, COL. JUAREZ, MEXICO, D.F. (SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICANA WHICH LIRING-3 HAD GIVEN TO JUAN AND MIGUEL LEON BARRIOS AS BEST

SECRET

14-00000

MA

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: Marvin Francis/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 1 Nov 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 41 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR . C/RI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

01 23 12z Nov 68

CITE DIRECTOR 47408

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 25321)*

INDEX

10

1. SUBJECT TO GUATEMALA STATION CONCURRENCE, WE BELIEVE LIRING/3 SHOULD BE CANDID WITH LIRING/10 AND TELL HIM WHAT AND AS MUCH AS HE WANTS TO KNOW. WE FEEL IF LIRING/3 ATTEMPTED WITHHOLD OR DISTORT DETAILS HIS IMPRISONMENT, IT COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO OPERATION SINCE LIRING/10 PROBABLY COULD CHECK OTHER SOURCES FOR ACCURACY.

2. THERE NO URGENCY FOR LIRING/3 MAKE TRIP TO PBRUMEN. WE BELIEVE IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR HIM TO REMAIN MEXICO AND ATTEMPT BECOME INVOLVED LOCAL PBRUMEN/GUATEMALA EXILE ACTIVITIES. IF, HOWEVER, LIRING/10 SUGGESTS LIRING/3 GO PBRUMEN, HE SHOULD NOT HESITATE DO SO.

3. DEFER TO GUATEMALA CITY FOR IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE WAR NAMES.

4. FILE 50-6-141/3, 201-798301 AND 201-776733.

MICROFILMED
DEC 12 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

END OF MESSAGE

Calvin M. Smyth
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

WH/COG/OPS

WH/2/G Dundas Burns

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

VB. 201-798301 Liring-3
B. 201-776733 Liring-10

CS COPY.

50-6-141/3

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 33 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION (17)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY 35 PER ______

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☑ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION c/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, c/RI/SD, c/WH/COG 5, c/CI, c/FI 2

1554

MEX E

wH/1

S E C R E T 010132Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7920

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

1 Nov 68 IN 25321

1. ROWTON REESTABLISHED CONTACT LIRING-3 29 OCT AND BEGAN DETAILED DEBRIEFING EVENING SAME DAY. ROWTON ALLEGED HE ARRANGED RELEASE THROUGH BROTHER OF BUSINESS CONTACT WHO COLONEL GNA. LIRING-3, WHO ACCEPTED STORY WITHOUT QUESTION, STATED HE UNDERSTOOD ROWTON COULD NOT HAVE ARRANGED EARLY RELEASE FOR OBVIOUS SECURITY REASONS AND FELT ALMOST INTOLERABLE SUFFERING WORTH PAIN SINCE HAS COME OUT IN BEST POSSIBLE POSITION VISA-A-VIS FAR AS WELL AS PBRUMEN.

2. LIRING-3 HAS BEGUN GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ARREST, DETENTION AND CONTACTS ESTYLISHED DURING AND AFTER RELEASE. ASKED ROWTON KEEP SENSITIVE POINTS IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, PARTICULARLY FROM LIRING-4, WHOM FEELS WOULD NOT APPROVE HIS CONTINUED POLITICAL ACTIVITY EVEN ON BEHALF ROWTON. HIGHLIGHTS DEBRIEFING FOLLOW:

A. ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA". FAR OFFICIAL, WHO SHARED CELL BLOCK 400 WITH LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD SENT REPORT ~~OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD SENT REPORT~~ OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRIN-3 AND PLACING BLAME ON FRANCISCO

CS COPY

SECRET

1 Nov 68

201-798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7930 SECRET

LARA AND CARLOS PERSABAL TO FAR HDQS THROUGH HIS MOTHER WHO ALLOWED TO VISIT HIM PRIOR TO HIS EXECUTION.

B. BROTHERS JUAN AND MIGUEL (LEON) BARRIOS, WHO CLAIMED TO BE G-2 FAR, WHO ALSO SHARED CELLBLOCK AND REMAINED IN CLOSE CONTACT LIRING-3 THROUGHOUT HIS DETENTION, SHOWED LIRING-3 REPORT THEY HAD RECEIVED JULY FROM "RELIABLE FAR SOURCES MEXICO" DESCRIBING LIRING-3 AS "ANARQUICO, SIN PARTIDO, CONDUCTA BUENA, CONFIABLE, RESPONSABLE PERO DIFICIL CONTROLAR." FOLLOWING THIS GENERALLY FAVORABLE REPORT JUAN AND MIGUEL (LEON) BARRIOS DISCUSSED FAR SITUATION FREELY WITH LIRING-3 AND ARRANGED FOR SECRET CONTACT WITH FAR REPRESENTATIVE MEXICO "PAVEL". ALSO TOLD LIRING-3 MONTES COMPLETELY STRIPPED OF POWER SINCE HAD IN FACT DESERTED REVOLUTION BY REMAINING OUTSIDE COUNTRY FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. MONTES CURRENTLY MEXICO WHERE EXPECTED REMAIN. FAR HAS COMPLETELY BROKEN WITH GUAT CP. THIS ACCORDING LIRING-3 REFLECTED IN COOLNESS EVIDENT BETWEEN LEON BROTHERS AND FRANCISCO CORADO, CP RESPONSIBLE IN PAVON PRISON. FAR HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVING FINANCIAL OR MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM PBRUMEN FOR PAST SIX MONTHS SINCE REFUSAL FAR ACCEPT PBRUMEN TERMS (SUPERVISION PBRUMEN EXPERTS, FAVORED POSITION

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 7920 S E C R E T

FAR MEMBERS TRAINED IN PBRUMEN) ALL FUNDS (IN PAST CHANNELED THROUGH GUAT CP ETC).

3. LIRING -3 TOLD ROWTON HE INSTRUCTED LEON BROTHERS HAVE "PAVEL" GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM (DETERMINE HIS ADDRESS) THROUGH SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICAN BY POSING AS PERSON REPRESENTING "VILETA"WHO INTERESTED IN BUYING LIRING-3 WATERCOLORS (ONE IN PRISON). LIRING-3 PLANS FOR COVER PURPOSES WORK IN SIQUEIROS STUDIO CUERNAVACA AND ARRANGE SOONEST BELLAS ARTES SPONSORED EXPOSTION HIS LATEST PAINTINGS.

4. WILL POUCH COMPLETE LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING AS SOON IN COMPLETED. STATION HOPES LIRING AND PARTICULARLY LIRING-10 WILL TRY ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AS HE CAN BE EXPECTED HAVE INFO OF VALUE TO PBRUMEN REGIME. STATION INTENDS HAVE LIRING -3 TELL LIRING-10 ENOUGH TO WET HIS APPETITE AND CONVINCE HIM LIRING-3 SHOULD BE DEBRIEFED AT SOME LENGTH. LIRING-3 WOULD TELL LIRING 10 HE WILLING OUTLINE DETAILS HIS ORDEAL INCLUDING INFO"PBRUMENS SHOULD KNOW" BUT ONLY TO HIGH PBRUMEN FUNCTIONARY AND IN PBRUMEN. PRIOR TO POSSIBLE LIRING-3 TRIP PBRUMEN, SUGGEST HQS, GUATEMALA CITY AND MEXICO CITY STATIONS DETERMINE WHAT CAN BE PASSED PBRUMENS. CONFERENCE IN GUATEMALA

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 7920 SECRET

CITY BETWEEN ROWTON, FRADYER AND GUAT CITY STATION REPS MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THIS CONNECTION.

5. ASSUME GUAT NAMES MENTIONED ABOVE ARE "WAR NAMES". CAN GUATEMALA CITY SHED SOME LIGHT THEIR IDENTITIES.

6. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

TABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET
When Filled In

GROUP 1 (17)
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. C/R/SD, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

1554

S E C R E T 012132Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7922

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

1 Nov 68 IN 25321

1. ROWTON REESTABLISHED CONTACT LIRING-3 29 OCT AND BEGAN DETAILED DEBRIEFING EVENING SAME DAY. ROWTON ALLEDGED HE ARRANGED RELEASE THROUGH BROTHER OF BUSINESS CONTACT WHO COLONEL GNA. LIRING-3, WHO ACCEPTED STORY WITHOUT QUESTION, STATED HE UNDERSTOOD ROWTON COULD NOT HAVE ARRANGED EARLY RELEASE FOR OBVIOUS SECURITY REASONS AND FELT ALMOST INTOLERABLE SUFFERING WORTH PAIN SINCE HAS COME OUT IN BEST POSSIBLE POSITION VISA-A-VIS FAR AS WELL AS PBRUMEN.

2. LIRING-3 HAS BEGUN GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ARREST, DETENTION AND CONTACTS ESTYLISHED DURING AND AFTER RELEASE. ASKED ROWTON KEEP SENSITIVE POINTS IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, PARTICULARLY FROM LIRING-4, WHOM FEELS WOULD NOT APPROVE HIS CONTINUED POLITICAL ACTIVITY EVEN ON BEHALF ROWTON. HIGHLIGHTS DEBRIEFING FOLLOW:

A. ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA", FAR OFFICIAL, WHO SHARED CELL BLOCK 422 WITH LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD SENT REPORT ~~OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD SENT REPORT~~ OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRIN-3 AND PLACING BLAME ON FRANCISCO

file LIRING3 201

C/WH/1
DC
Kent

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7922 SECRET

LARA AND CARLOS PERSABAL TO FAR HDQS THROUGH HIS MOTHER WHO ALLOWED TO VISIT HIM PRIOR TO HIS EXECUTION.

B. BROTHERS JUAN AND MIGUEL (LEON) BARRIOS, WHO CLAIMED TO BE G-2 FAR, WHO ALSO SHARED CELLBLOCK AND REMAINED IN CLOSE CONTACT LIRING-3 THROUGHOUT HIS DETENTION, SHOWED LIRING-3 REPORT THEY HAD RECEIVED JULY FROM "RELIABLE FAR SOURCES MEXICO" DESCRIBING LIRING-3 AS "ANARQUICO, SIN PARTIDO, CONDUCTA BUENA, CONFIABLE, RESPONSABLE PERO DIFICIL CONTROLAR." FOLLOWING THIS GENERALLY FAVORABLE REPORT JUAN AND MIGUEL (LEON) BARRIOS DISCUSSED FAR SITUATION FREELY WITH LIRING-3 AND ARRANGED FOR SECRET CONTACT WITH FAR REPRESENTATIVE MEXICO "PAVEL". ALSO TOLD LIRING-3 MONTES COMPLETELY STRIPPED OF POWER SINCE HAD IN FACT DESERTED REVOLUTION BY REMAINING OUTSIDE COUNTRY FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. MONTES CURRENTLY MEXICO WHERE EXPECTED REMAIN. FAR HAS COMPLETELY BROKEN WITH GUAT CP. THIS ACCORDING LIRING-3 REFLECTED IN COOLNESS EVIDENT BETWEEN LEON BROTHERS AND FRANCISCO CORADO, CP RESPONSIBLE IN PAVON PRISON. FAR HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVING FINANCIAL OR MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM PBRUMEN FOR PAST SIX MONTHS SINCE REFUSAL FAR ACCEPT PBRUMEN TERMS (SUPERVISION PBRUMEN EXPERTS, FAVORED POSITION

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO

DISSEM BY PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 7920 S E C R E T

FAR MEMBERS TRAINED IN PBRUMEN) ALL FUNDS IN PAST CHANNELED THROUGH GUAT CP ETC).

3. LIRING -3 TOLD ROWTON HE INSTRUCTED LEON BROTHERS HAVE "PAVEL" GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM (DETERMINE HIS ADDRESS) THROUGH SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICAN BY POSING AS PERSON REPRESENTING "VILETA" WHO INTERESTED IN BUYING LIRING-3 WATERCOLORS (DONE IN PRISON). LIRING-3 PLANS FOR COVER PURPOSES WORK IN SIQUEIROS STUDIO CUERNAVACA AND ARRANGE SOONEST BELLAS ARTES SPONSORED EXPOSTION HIS LATEST PAINTINGS.

4. WILL POUCH COMPLETE LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING AS SOON IN COMPLETED. STATION HOPES LIRING AND PARTICULARLY LIRING-10 WILL TRY ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AS HE CAN BE EXPECTED HAVE INFO OF VALUE TO PBRUMEN REGIME. STATION INTENDS HAVE LIRING -3 TELL LIRING-10 ENOUGH TO WET HIS APPETITE AND CONVINCE HIM LIRING-3 SHOULD BE DEBRIEFED AT SOME LENGTH. LIRING-3 WOULD TELL LIRING 10 HE WILLING OUTLINE DETAILS HIS ORDEAL INCLUDING INFO "PBRUMENS SHOULD KNOW" BUT ONLY TO HIGH PBRUMEN FUNCTIONARY AND IN PBRUMEN. PRIOR TO POSSIBLE LIRING-3 TRIP PBRUMEN, SUGGEST HQS, GUATEMALA CITY AND MEXICO CITY STATIONS DETERMINE WHAT CAN BE PASSED PBRUMENS. CONFERENCE IN GUATEMALA

unkoc [illegible]

Hector [illegible] Langley
MFH 7744 22 Oct

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 7900 SECRET

CITY BETWEEN ROWTON, FRADYER AND GUAT CITY STATION REPS MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THIS CONNECTION.

5. ASSUME GUAT NAMES MENTIONED ABOVE ARE "WAR NAMES". CAN GUATEMALA CITY SHED SOME LIGHT THEIR IDENTITIES.

6. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION (926) WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, RI/AN, PI, CI/OPS, FI 2

S E C R E T 241826Z OCT 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9614

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LIRING/3

24 Oct 68 IN 20246

REF: MEXICO CITY 7775 (IN 19623)

1. ESMICA/13 REPORTED LIRING/3 AND COMPANION DEPARTED GUATEMALA 18 OCTOBER 1968 VIA TACA FLIGHT 210 FOR MEXICO CITY. THEY ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED ESCORT DIRECTLY FROM PRISON FARM TO AIRPORT.

2. FILE: 201-248917.

S E C R E T

WH file: LIKAVINE o/s
50-6-128/3
LIRING-4

cc's: LIRING-3
201

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

file LIRING/3 201

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 240026Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7775 24 OCT 68 IN 19623

4

GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

[illegible] LIRING-3

REFS A. MEXICO CITY [illegible] (-06501)

B. GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (20 16895)

1. WOULD APPRECIATE DISCREET EFFORT DETERMINE WHETHER LIRING-3 FREED. IF NOT YET RELEASED WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHEN HE SCHEDULED BE AND HOW WILL RETURN MEXICO.

2. TO FACILITATE SUBSEQUENT CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AND OPEN DOOR TO POSSIBLE CLAIM HE INSTRUMENTAL IN LIRING-3 RELEASE STATION PLANNING HAVE HORTON SEND LIRING-3 LETTER UNDER DOUBLE ENVELOPE VIA MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LETTER ON MEXICAN BELLAS ARTES OR OTHER SUITABLE STATIONERY WILL MENTION HORTON [illegible] UNABLE CONTACT [illegible] WHICH WILL HINT AT IMMINENT RELEASE AND [illegible] LIRING-3 [illegible] HORTON ANSWERING SERVICE AS SOON AS RETURNS MEXICO.

3. FOR [illegible] T HORTON WAS [illegible] AT THIS POINT RECONTACT LIRING-3 THROUGH LEFTIST FRIENDS OR CUBANS SO FAR UNABLE REESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM.

4. [illegible]

S E C R E T

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ______

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION 22

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ✓

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CA 5, CA/PEG, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

19 Oct 68 IN 16895

S E C R E T 191835Z OCT 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9602 GUAT

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 7486 (IN 06501)

1. 19 OCTOBER GUATEMALAN DAILY PRENSA LIBRE REPORTED COURT OF APPEALS CONFIRMED DECISION OF LOWER COURT ABSOLVING LIRING-3 AND COMPANION OF CHARGES VIOLATION LAW OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. NO MENTION MADE WHETHER THEY ACTUALLY RELEASED FROM CUSTODY.

2. WILL REPORT ANY INFO RECEIVED ON RELEASE LIRING-3

3. FILE: 201-248917.

S E C R E T

AN 7W	
AB X	
~~IP~~	
~~PS~~	
~~DX~~	
~~DES~~	[illegible]
~~RI~~	
WH/1	

CS COPY

SECRET

19 OCT 68

201-798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 47 PER RyBAT

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO FILE. VR. C/RI/SD, C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI 2/CI/ WH/C/OR

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 042307Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7486

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

5 OCT 68 IN 06501 JP

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 36584

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9517 (IN 02560)

C. HMMA 35500 PARA 5

MICROFILMED
OCT 31 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. STATION WISHES TO REITERATE ONCE MORE ITS RELUCTANCE TO SOMEHOW TRY TO FREE LIRING-3 FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA CITY BY GOING TO LIAISON AND EXPOSING HIS WOFIRM CONNECTION. MEXICO CITY STATION IN AGREEMENT WITH REF B STATEMENT THAT MORE TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE IF LIRING-3 WILL NOT BE RELEASED IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE WITHOUT INDICATING WOFIRM INTEREST. AS STATED IN REF C SUCH INDICATION IF IT LEAKED (AND STATION ASSUMES THIS POSSIBLE IN GUATEMALA) OR IF IT ATTRACTED SUSPICION GUAT REBELS, MEXICAN LEFTISTS OR PBRUMENERS WOULD RENDER FURTHER OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4 PROBLEMATIC. IT MIGHT EVEN PROMPT GUAT REBELS TO TAKE REPRISALS AGAINST LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4. FURTHERMORE STATION NOT AT ALL SURE THAT FREEING LIRING-3 THROUGH INTERVENTION LIAISON MIGHT NOT JEOPARDIZE ROWTON SECURITY.

2. IF LIRING-3 RELEASED AFTER NORMAL TRIAL WITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE STATION ASSUMES BOTH HE AND LIRING-4

Lirg-3

CS COPY

B.201-818842

5 Oct 68
201-798301

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: _______ AT: ____________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE, VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7486 SECRET

WILL HAVE INCREASED OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL. IF LIRING-3 NOT RELEASED IN NEAR FUTURE LIRING-4 MAY FIND ONLY WAY OUT HER CURRENT PREDICAMENT IS AT LEAST TEMPORARY RETURN TO PBRUMEN. SHE MIGHT AT THAT POINT BE AMENABLE UNDERTAKE MISSION SIMILAR TO THAT SHE PREVIOUSLY AGREEABLE ATTEMPT FOR WOFIRM.

3. STATION WOULD NATURALLY BE WILLING RE-EXAMINE ITS POSITION RE LIRING-3 IF GUATEMALA CITY STATION COULD DETERMINE BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPROACH OF JUDGE THROUGH LIAISON WOULD NOT LEAK. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION GIVE SUCH ASSURANCE?

4. FILE 201-798501.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

57

1H

ORIG: Marvin Francis/lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 4167:1973
DATE: 4 October 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET 23

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 46 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR, 3/AN, WH/COG8, CI, CI/OPS, FI2

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR DIR 38881

04 20 23z OCT 68

TO GUATEMALA CITY INFO: MEXICO CITY

4 Oct 68

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY 9517 (IN 02560)*

B. DIRECTOR 36584**

1. APPRECIATE REF A RESPONSE. AGREE WE DO NOT WANT SURFACE WOFIRM INTEREST LIRING-3 OR WIFE TO GUATS IF CAN BE AVOIDED.

2. REF B WAS SENT FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH LIRING-3'S CASE OFFICER, ROWTON WHO STILL TDY HQS. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH ROWTON, HOWEVER, WE PREFER GUAT STATION TAKE NO ACTION ON REFERENCE B REQUEST UNTIL ROWTON RETURNS MEXICO. HE CAN THEN ATTEMPT OBTAIN UPDATED READING ON LIRING-3 STATUS FROM LIRING-4 OR OTHER SOURCE, AFTER WHICH ROWTON AND MEXICO CITY STATION CAN DECIDE IF ESMAJOR-20 INTERVENTION WARRANTED.

3. INDEX 201-248917, 201-798301.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB X
TX
EB
BX
D/S
EX
WH/1

MICROFILMED
OCT 14 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Liring-3
4 OCT 68
201-798301

CS COPY

B 201-248917

B 201-818842

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG: Marvin Francis/lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

OCT 10 11 51 AM '60

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____ PER ____

CONF:

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:

FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 38881

PAGE 2

TO

WH/1 COMMENT: *Indicated liaison contact ESMAJOR 20 could attempt intercede on LIRING-3's behalf to learn when his trial would take place or possibly to obtain his release. Station reluctant surface WOFIRM interest however without Mexico City Station concurrance.

**Headquarters commented on fact LIRING-4 recently took up residence in Cuban Embassy, Mexico City because lacked funds pay rent. Also asked Guatemala Station if could arrange for early release LIRING-3 and associate from jail through high level Guat official.

WH/COG/

WH/2/G

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Calvin M. Smyth
for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY: ______ PER ______

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE VR, C/WH6, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2,

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

GUAT

S E C R E T 301842Z SEP 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9517 IN 02560

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC LIRING

ABSTRACT INDEX

1. GUATEMALA CITY STATION IS WILLING TO USE ITS LIAISON RELATIONSHIP IN ANY WAY NECESSARY TO SUPPORT UNILATERAL WOFIRM OPERATIONS. NEVERTHELESS IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT AFTER 6 MONTHS, REVEALING WOFIRM INTEREST IN LIRING-3 IS SOMEWHAT AWKWARD. WHILE GUATEMALAN CITY STATION IS NOT FULLY COGNIZANT OF ALL OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS LIRING-4 OPERATION AND ITS VALUE TO WOFIRM, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT BY ALLOWING MORE TIME LIRING-3 AND COMPANION WILL BE RELEASED WITHOUT NEED INDICATE WOFIRM INTEREST. THIS APPEARS MORE IN LINE WITH MEXICO CITY STATION POSITION THEY DEFINITELY NOT IN FAVOR INTERVENTION WITH GUAT AUTHORITIES WHICH WOULD FINGER LIRING-3 AS SOME TYPE WOFIRM ASSET (MEXICO CITY 5984).

2. IF MEXICO CITY HAS CHANGED ABOVE POSITION AND NOW AGREES WOFIRM INTEREST CAN BE INDICATED, SUGGEST FOLLOWING APPROACH: STATION WILL ADVISE ESMAJOR-20 THAT MEXICO CITY HAS DEVELOPED AN OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN LIRING-3'S WIFE BUT UNABLE PROCEED WITH OPERATION BECAUSE OF HER CONCERN OVER FATE OF HER HUSBAND. WE CAN THEN ASK ESMAJOR-20 ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN WHEN TRIAL

MICROFILMED
OCT 11 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

30 Sept 68

201-818842

SECRET

201-798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9517 S E C R E T

SCHEDULED AND INDICATION WHAT SENTENCE MAY BE. BELIEVE ANY INTEREST ~~SL~~ ESMAJOR-20 MAY REVEAL TO THE COURTS WILL DEVELOP RESPONSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO REVEALING WOFIRM INTEREST DIRECTLY IN LIRING-3, THE STATION CAN SO ADVISE ESMAJOR-20 AND REQUEST HIS HELP.

3. FILE: 201-248917.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

RID

2P

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R ~~E T~~	PROCESSING ACTION
		X MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT 0 PBRUMEN: Activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4 May through Mid-September 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES 201-815842

MICROFILMED
OCT 14 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REF: HMMA 34682, 17 May 1968

Action Required: For your information.

1. Forwarded under separate cover are twelve reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4, and contacts of the latter.

2. The main topic covered in ROWTON's reports is LIRING-4's efforts to obtain help in getting LIRING-3 out of jail in Guatemala as soon as possible. LIRING-4 is almost penniless (ROWTON has made only token payments to her after 15 June) and has been moving from one apartment to a cheaper one living on the sale of paintings left by LIRING-3 and small loans from leftist contacts. In the hope that she may be able to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has resisted all of ROWTON's efforts to get her to undertake a clandestine mission to PBRUMEN, a mission, as Headquarters knows, was planned long ago. As a foreigner, LIRING-4 cannot work in Mexico without taking the chance of being deported, if caught. Although she has not tried it, she would probably be refused a visa to go to Guatemala to visit LIRING-3. She might also face difficulties in Guatemala including possible detention and interrogation if she succeeded in obtaining an entry permit to that country.

3. By mid-September 1968 LIRING-4 had received very little help from her Mexican leftist or outright Communist friends. In spite of promises to try to bribe the Guatemalan judge scheduled to try LIRING-3 all LIRING-4's "friends" succeeded in doing was to print several articles in the local press (some of them with LIRING-3's photo) claiming that LIRING-3 was unjustly imprisoned, that he was about to be executed, etc. If anything, these

continued . . . . . .

Attachments: ~~12~~ reports u/s/c #1
4 Iden rpts u/s/c #2

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD w/atts
copy filed in 201-775301

S/c att:

CS COPY

201-815842
[redacted]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 35502	26 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 35502

articles did little to prejudice the Guatemalans in favor of LIRING-3. As a matter of fact, the latter who succeeded in sending LIRING-4 a few letters via the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City who comes to visit him in jail, recently claimed that he was saved from a prison "transfer" by the Guatemalan army by the arrival of the Mexican Consul. LIRING-3 viewed this "transfer" purely and simply as an execution attempt.

4. LIRING-4 received even less help from LIRING who told her that there was nothing it could do to help LIRING-3. LIRING-4, on the advice contained in one of the notes sent from prison by LIRING-3, kept away from LIRING and its employees until she met LIRING-10 by accident at the office of one of the leftist papers on 27 July. LIRING-10 convinced her to resume her visits to LIRING. That the local PBRUMENs still have doubts about LIRING-3 despite his imprisonment in Guatemala is indicated by the statements made by Rodolfo REYES (see ROWTON's 17 July report) to the effect that the latter would not be willing to help LIRING-3 until he found out on what side of "el griego" (ROWTON under false identity) he was. REYES added that LIRING suspects the "griego" of WOFIRM connections, although it has no definite proof of this.

5. Statements such as those made by REYES confirm the Station's belief that LIRING, upon orders from home, is still attempting to investigate ROWTON. Such statements also re-enforce the decision of the Station not to attempt, through liaison, to obtain the release of LIRING-3. Such an attempt, if it leaked, would not only expose LIRING-3 to PBRUMEN and Guatemalan FAR reprisals. It would probably also have adverse repercussions on ROWTON's security. LIRING-11 whom ROWTON met briefly on 5 July (see ROWTON's report dated 9 July) said nothing about LIRING-3's arrest when ROWTON complained that mail which he said he sent to LIRING-3 remained unanswered. It is also to be noted that REYES, who of course knows that LIRING-4 is in Mexico, told ROWTON that she was probably in PBRUMEN. This shows clearly the distrust with which LIRING views ROWTON.

ct: Cuba
4 Cuba

6. LIRING-4 developed close relationship with Orlando SUAREZ of the Ministry of Culture now in Mexico at the invitation of the Mexican Communist mural painter David ALFARO Siqueiros. By mid-September, in fact, SUAREZ was staying at LIRING-4's apartment although LIRING-4 claimed to ROWTON that there was no romancing between the two and that SUAREZ used her apartment because he was too broke to get one of his own. In view of LIRING-4's assessment of SUAREZ as very leftist and pro-AMTHUG-1 no effort was made to approach him.

7. Contacts between ROWTON and LIRING-4 have taken place with decreasing frequency because the usefulness of LIRING-4 to WOFIRM has sharply decreased and because LIRING-4 is more and more convinced that ROWTON cannot or will not help her obtain the release of LIRING-3. In her frantic efforts to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has in fact not had any contact with ROWTON since early September. Unless LIRING-3 is released by the Guatemalan authorities or receives only a light sentence keeping him in jail only a short time longer, it is doubtful that LIRING-4 will be of much use to ROWTON and the Station.

David D. Falkner
for Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

SECRET

17 May,1968

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Meeting with LIRING/4.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at the Punto Blanco Restaurant from about 1900 until 2015 on 16/5/68. LIRING/4 had telephoned Rowton's answering service and left a message that "Dr. Barragán would see him at his office"at that time and date.

2. LIRING/4 reported that she had learned that seven Guatemalans residing in Mexico City had been arrested along with Rodolfo Sandoval. She had learned this from Manuel Marcué Pardiñas but was not able to learn the identities of the other seven. She recalled that Marcué had said that Sandoval had been arrested on 5 May,1968, just after his wife had arrived from Guatemala, and that he, Marcué,was burdened with the support not only of Francisco Lara's family (wife,mother and children) but now of Sandoval's wife. LIRING/4 understood that Marcué had moved these dependents into one of his several houses in the city. LIRING/4 added that finally she decided to avoid any further contact with Marcué since he has become a complete nuisance, telephoning and droppping in unannounced at all hours of the night.

3. LIRING/4 also reported that she had obtained a job at the Secretaría de Comercio y Industria,paying 1,200 pesos permonth, through Sergio Gonzalez Marin, and had started working regular hours (1000-1400) on 13/5/68. When she,however, mentioned this to Zacosta (FNU,phon.),Director of the office of Relaciones Culturales of the Sec Relaciones Exteriores, he told her to quit the job immediately since it was not legal for her to work, particularly in a government office where official records were kept. He promised to help her find a job where she could work on the Q.T. without jeopardizing her immigration status.

4. LIRING/4 also reported that she had received three short notes from LIRING/3 mailed from the prison where he is being detained. She stated that she was reassured by these letters that L/3 is in reasonably good health, despite the fact that he and his fellow arrestees were not given any food for nine days following their arrest on 13/4/68.

5. LIRING/4 stated that she had talked to LIRING/2 after his return from PBRUMEN and found him very suntanned and thinner. L/2 told her that he had been cutting cane and had gotten engaged to a local woman while he was "on vacation". L/2 stated that he most probably would remain in Mexico through the Olympics,although he did not state when he planned to get married. L/2 regretted that he and his office could not help L/4 financially,but he encouraged L/4 to visit the office whenever she wished.

SECRET

SECRET

6. LIRING/4 also told Rowton that she had managed to find a suitable apartment in the Edificio Condesa, Letra A,#6, for 1,100 pesos per month, through her friend, Blanca Peña, who lives in apartment 2 of Letra O. She added that she had overcome the problem of the fiador by applying to a sr. Muñoz who advertised in the newspaper and provided her with a certain sra. Gloria Beltrán, Calle Tajin 24,Col. Narvarte (at a fee of 330 pesos). She also stated that she has already given the administrator of the edificio Condesa at 500 peso "gratificación" to hold the apartment until she can arrange the fiador contract.

7. Rowton then suggested that LIRING/4 might consider making her trip to PBRUMEN in the near future since it appeared to him an ideal time. L/4 replied that, although she felt obliged to make the trip in view of her previous commitment to Rowton, she felt it premature. She stressed her continued anxiety over the welfare of L/3, commenting that she was the only person who could be counted on to correspond with him, and that such correspondence from PBRUMEN would be very difficult and slow. Rowton then suggested that perhaps L/4 might be able to obtain a visa to visit L/3 for a short time to discuss with him the desirability of the trip and arrange to provide him with paints and canvasses. L/4 agreed that this would ease her mind and permit her to make the trip to PBRUMEN with less concern but she wondered whether a trip to Guatemala, provided, of course, that she could get the visa, might possibly make matters worse for L/3 since L/4 would have to travel on her PBRUMEN passport. Rowton agreed with this and suggested the following: (a) L/4 write immediately to the Mexican Consul asking him his opinion and requesting him to check it out with L/3; (b) L/4 discuss the matter soonest with L/2, explaining that she has decided to make her trip to PBRUMEN during L/3's imprisonment but that she hoped to visit him before leaving Mexico. L/4 agreed and added that she would invite L/2 to dinner at the home of Blanca Peña (de Amand) where she was currently staying as a house guest.

8. Rowton stressed that he did not wish under any circumstances to "force L/4 to make the trip to PBRUMEN, but he felt the time most opportune and he was not in a position financially to assist L/4 to any significant degree if she remained in Mexico. Rowton added that he failed to see how L/4 could earn enough in any "unofficial" job she might obtain. L/4 agreed to think the matter over and give Rowton her decision at their next meeting scheduled for 1300 on 20/5/68.

SE

Wallece B. Rowton

SEC

20 May,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Conversation with LIRING/2.

1. At 1300 on 20 May,1968, LIRING/4 reported to Rowton at the Punto Blanco restaurant that she had seen LIRING/2 at the LIRING offices and, as instructed by Rowton, discussed with him her difficult financial situation resulting from the detention of LIRING/3. She then stated that she was seriously considering taking her long planned trip to IBRUMEN, since there she would be able to resolve the problem of living expenses. LIRING/2 sympathized with her but asked her not to make any rash decision. He pointed out that although her temporary financial problem would be solved, the moral obligation she had to follow LIRING/3's case from as close to Guatemala as possible would argue in favor of her waiting a little more. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she felt that LIRING/2 was prompted to say this in light of a comment she had just made to him that a certain Lic. Castillo, a Guatemalan lawyer affiliated with the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala City, had gotten in touch with her over the weekend and told her he had come to Mexico City in connection with LIRING/3's case which he was handling at the request of the Embassy. (LIRING/4 told Rowton that Castillo was staying in room 904 of the El Presidente Hotel and that she talked to him there for about 15 minutes.)

2. LIRING/2 then said that he would do everything he could to find some sort of work to help LIRING/4 financially. He commented that work in the LIRING offices proper was out of the question, since the only persons employed there now are party members sent from the IBRUMEN capital. He added, however, that he would propose to the LIRING "consejo" that LIRING/4 be given a position in the outside cultural office. He stressed that he could not promise anything, but he would do what he could to convince the powers that be.

3. LIRING/4 promised Rowton to press LIRING/2 for this job since it would indicate the extent to which the LIRING Chief trusted her and give her some official access to the establishment, limited though it might be.

W.B. Rowton

SE

SECRET

12 June,1968

Subject: WALLACE B. Rowton Meeting with LIRING/4.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at the Diana Restaurant,Calle Mississippi, from 1300 until about 1410 on 11 June,1968. LIRING/4 reported that she had finally moved into the apartment in the Edificio Condesa with the few pieces of furniture of the Tacubaya apartment. She stated that she intended to remain in close touch with her friend Blanca Peña de Amand and, of course, Catalina Cepero, at whose homes she hoped to be able to take her main meals. LIRING/4 added that she was still attempting to find some sort of work to help her meet her expenses, as well as to find a person, preferably a PBRUMEN student, to rent a room in her apartment.

2. With regard to employment LIRING/4 stated that LIRING/2 had told her the previous week that his reccommendation that she been employed in the (outside) LIRING cultural office had been turned down and consequently she had appealed to Mexican friends to help her find employment. She also told Rowton that she had queried LIRING/2 about PBRUMEN students who might share her apartment but was told that the only female students (two) at present in Mexico were studying in Pátzcuaro.

3. LIRING/4 continued that she had been receiving letters regularly from LIRING/3 directly from his place of confinement. She showed Rowton a portion of one of the letters in which LIRING/3 stated that there were about 2,000 prisoners in all and that he feels obliged to share whatever food he can purchase with the money sent to him by LIRING/4 with six others who are closest to him and whose relatives cannot provide even the essentials of a basic diet. According to LIRING/4, LIRING/3 has not complained about what appear to be very difficult conditions but has revealed his constant fear of physical violence, the threat of which he feels hangs over the prison. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she had finally obtained officially notarized statemants from the proper Mexican authorities testifying to LIRING/3's bona fides as an artist, as requested by the Mexican Consul. She gave Rowton a letter from the latter which requests this information(copy of which is attached).

4. LIRING/4, in reply to Rowton's queries, stated that she still hoped to be able to make the trip to PBRUMEN but could not consider leaving Mexico at this time in view of LIRING/3's situation and the fact that she was the only point of contact he had on the outside. Rowton sympathized with her but stressed that his ability to help her financially was limited by her

SEC

performance in terms of the contract between them. Rowton reminded LIRING/4 that he contract had terminated as of 15 May,1968, and could be extended only on the condition that she would be able to make the trip. He added that he felt he could pay her for the period 15 May until 15 June,1968, but that would have to constitute a final payment unless LIRING/4 could commit herself to futube production. Rowton added that in addition he would have to deduct the 1,375 pesos he gave to her as a travel advance inasmuch as this money was not used for the purpose intended.

5. LIRING/4 replied that, much to her regret, she could not make any firm commitment regarding the trip at the moment. She stated that she was attempting to maintain friendly relations with the LIRING personnel but had to be cautious in the light of LIRING/3's admonition to her to avoid contact with the establishment ("la casa grande" as he described it. She then stated that she had attended a play on the evening of 7 June at which she met socially with LIRING personnel in the audience. She added that LIRING/10 greeted her cordially and that she spoke briefly with LIRING/9 and LIRING/13 as well as LIRING/16. LIRING/4 also stated that she had learned from LIRING/17, who had just returned from an unexpected TDY that their mutual friend "Echemendía" had been called up on the carpet for the inferior job he had done during his last commercial mission to Mexico City. LIRING/4 also reported that she had been given a very brief note from her friend Yolanda hand-carried by LIRING/17 in which Yolanda wrote that she as still hoping that LIRING/4 would be able to make the trip.

ROWTON COMMENT: Rowton feels that LIRING/4 will make the trip to PBRUMEN wit in the next two months or sooner, provided she is assured that LIRING/3 is resigned to his fate and that everything has been done to support his appeal. Rowton has told LIRING/4 that he can give her only minimum financial support in the future, and that only on behalf of LIRING/3. Rowton feels that LIRING/4 will have great difficulty supporting herself even on a subsistence level during the next month, and will probably reconsider her decision regarding the trip. Rowton feels he should not put any direct pressure on LIRING/4 in the light of her personal situation.

SECRET Wallace B. Rowton

SECRET

[illegible]INA. DEJA RE[illegible] [illegible]OS [illegible]LLILLOS. NO
VAYAS A LA CA[illegible] GRANDE. URGENTE
ENVIES DIRECTAMENTE VARITA MAGICA.
BESOS : CARLOS


GUATEMALA
VIA AIR MAIL

Srta.
BLANCA PEÑA
EDIFICIO CONDESA LETRA "C" DEPTO. 2
AV. VERACRUZ Y MATEHUALA
(ENTRADA POR MATEHUALA)
MEXICO 11. D.F.

SECRET

Ing. Octavio R. Serrano
Cónsul General de México

SECRET

Guatemala, 21 de mayo de 1958.

Sra. Miriam Chichay de Jurado.
México, D. F.

Estimada Sra:

Me refiero a su grata carta de 17 del actual para informar a Ud. que Carlos se encuentra sin novedad, su aspecto físico es inmejorable y su ánimo muy levantado, pues ha sabido asimilar esta emergencia con filosofía.

Respecto a su situación, estamos bastante optimistas pues confiamos ampliamente en la rectitud del juez. Yá se presentaron tres testigos de descargo y el el curso de la presente semana se tomará declaración a otros dos. Hemos corrido con la suerte de que para todas las diligencias los plazos se han acortado al máximo.

Ni un solo momento lo hemos dejado solo, tanto a él como a Manuel, pues constantemente se les ha estado visitando, unas veces nuestro Encargado de Negocios, otras nuestro abogado asesor y el suscrito.

Su carta anterior la recibió en propias manos y también le informé de la tarjeta que Ud. me puso.

Tanto la Sra. Marcué de Parsabal, como la esposa de Manuel, los estuvieron visitando casi a diario durante su estancia en ésta. No les ha faltado nada pues la Sra. Marcué dejó 175 dolares para que se les estuviera proviendo de lo necesario. A Carlos se le llevó un block para dibujo que pidió y se les llevan periodicamente cigarros, etc.

El jueves iré a verlos de nuevo y yá le informaré de su carta.

No creo que sea necesario que venga Ud. pues puede tener la seguridad de que estamos haciendo todo lo que está en nuestras manos por resolverles su situación a la brevedad posible. No sería de lo malo que esté Ud. en contacto con la Sría de Relaciones para estar al tanto del caso, pues estoy informando constantemente del curso del proceso. Creo que será cuestión de más o menos tiempo pero tengo confianza en que todo se resolverá favorablemente.

Por conducto de la esposa de Manuel le envié recado que sería conveniente enviara una constancia de Bellas Artes abonando la conducta de su esposo y que este documento lo llevara a legalizar ante el Consulado de Guatemala en México (Vallarta # 1) pues ayudaría mucho para probar su solvencia moral.

SECRET

SECRET

Perdóneme si con anterioridad no le había informado, pero consideré que era innecesario hacerlo mientras no se tuviera algo concreto como es la declaración de los testigos de descargo.

Tenga confianza y calma que estamos viendo éste caso con profundo interés y simpatía.

Le ruego saludar de mi parte a mi buen amigo Daniel (su suegro) de quien hace tiempo no tengo noticias y decirle que su amigo de Arriaga lo recuerda con afecto.

Procuraré tenerla informada y puede escribirme cuantas veces lo desee.

Suyo afmo. atto. y S. S.

SECRET

[illegible] 22 -6[illegible] SECRET

Clara mía:

[illegible] al papel para un asunto que preocupa mucho; ¿[illegible] la comunidad de los niños? Infórmate [illegible] de y [illegible] [illegible] la [illegible] [illegible] mientras ya te (SEA CUAL FUERE LA [illegible] pregunta... Indícame decir (Como tú sabes) a la prisión o decir directamente. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] mi nombre. Toda la correspondencia está censurada.

Lee la carta que mandaste al Consul.
NO SE TE OCURRA POR NINGUN MOTIVO SALIR DE MEXICO.

Recibe todo mi cariño

Carlos

SECRET

SEC

18 June, 1968

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/4
2. Date and Site of Meeting: 1300, 18/6/68; Diana Restaurant.
3. Date and Site of Next Meeting: 1030, 20/6/68; Diana Restaurant.
4. Information/Reports Passed by Agent: LIRING/4 reported to Rowton that she had received two distressing letters from LIRING/3 complaining about the miserable conditions under which he is living - very meager food, unsanitary quarters, and the constant fear of physical violence. LIRING/4 showed Rowton a paragraph of one of the letters in which LIRING/3 asks her to appeal to the "socio" to influence the judge by a gratificación of 100 quetzals so that he would dismiss the case when it finally came to trial early the following month. LIRING/3 stated that the judge to be influenced was a certain Juan Sanchez, Oficial Tercero del Juzgado Cuarto de Primera Instancia. LIRING/3 added that he felt there was no other solution, since it had become evident that the Mexican Embassy could do nothing to speed up the final release and that if Rowton could not intervene, anything could happen.

   LIRING/4 also reported that she had been asked by LIRING/9 to see him the next day (19/6/68) at his office. She did not know the purpose of the invitation, but assumed LIRING/9 wanted to be briefed on the latest developments in the LIRING/3 case.
5. Information/Guidance Given to Agent: Rowton sympathized with LIRING/4 in her distress over the desperate situation being faced by LIRING/3 but stressed that intervention on his part was not as easy as LIRING/3 might think. He pointed out that since LIRING/4 to date had not been able to make the [illegible] trip he could not ask his own colleagues in Europe to intervene through their Guatemalan government contacts and that therefore anything that he could do himself would not be effective. LIRING/4 did not volunteer any indication of her intention regarding the trip, and Rowton felt he could not press her in view of her frame of mind at the time. He suggested that they meet again after LIRING/4 talked with LIRING/9 in the hope that the latter might make some important comments on the case.

SEC

W. Rowton

SECR

9 July,1968

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Meeting with LIRING/11.

1. After several days of attempts by Rowton to met with LIRING/11 in the vicinity of his (LIRING/11's) residence(which is about six blocks from Rowton's home) Rowton finally succeeded at about 1600 on 5 July,1968.

2. Rowton hadchecked the home address of LIRING/11 about 1550 that day and when he had found that LIRING/11's car had not beeen parked in front, hailed a cab passing in the opposite direction. As an after-thought,however, Rowton asked the cab to go around the block on the off chance that he might catch LIRING/11 approaching his home from the intersection of Gutenberg and Ejercito Nacional. Fortunately just as Rowton's cab approached LIRING/11's apartment house, he spotted LIRING/11 alighting from his car in front of the building. Rowton stopped the cab and ran over to greet LIRING/11.

3. LIRING/11 although obviously surprised at seeing Rowton in that area, responded cordially. Rowton alleged that he had been in Switzerland and Canada most of the time since he had last seen LIRING/11, and to his regret had lost contact withtheir mutual friends?LIRING/3 and Iden A. Rowton continued that he had written LIRING/3 at least five letters from Europe but had not received any answer, and had found that he had moved from his Atoyac address as well as his Tacubaya studio. LIRING/11 did not volunteer any information concerning the whereabouts of LIRING/3 but immediately gave Rowton the news that Iden A was working at a sort of night club (giving the name and street on which it was located.)

4. Rowton then said that he had hoped to be able to invite LIRING/11 to lunch but he had to take a short trip to Nuevo Laraddo to attempt to arrange for the purchase of a car. (This was thrown out as bait in view of a comment by LIRING/4 that LIRING/11 was scheduled to return PCS and would have to sell his car). LIRING/11 did not react to this, simply suggesting that Rowton get in touch with him as soon as Rowton returned.

5. Rowton then returned to the waiting cab and continued his trip, taking the opportunity to mention to the driver in the course of conversation that he was a businessman from Europe (Switzerland) who often visited Mexico.

SECRET

Wallace BRowton P. 11,264

SEC...

9 July, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of activities.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at 1900 on 8 July, 1968, at the Sears Restaurant on Insurgentes. He had not seen her for the previous ten days because of his leave (28/6/68-5/7/68).

2. LIRING/4 reported that an old friend, Iden A, had arrived the previous week from the PBRUMEN capital, and that she had seen him several times prior to his moving to Cuernavaca. She commented that Iden A was divorced and lived alone (his wife having been a notorious model of loose morals). She added that his apparent age is 40, and that he must have political influence since he obtained a six-month exit permit following the invitation of Siqueiros.

3. LIRING/4 then related that she received a message early in the previous week that Iden A was trying to get in touch with her and she accordingly went to the LIRING offices on 27/6/68 to find his address. When she entered the office of LIRING/9, she found it crowded and was on the point of leaving (after getting the address of Iden A) when LIRING/9 approached her and asked her to take a ride in his car so that he could "chat "with her. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she assumed that LIRING/9 was enroute to one of the Secretariats in a rush and had asked her to accompany him to that he could save time by talking to her on the way. She was therefore surprised when he drove her to the Vaca Negra on Insurgentes and later returned with her to the offic

4. According to LIRING/4, LIRING/9 asked her routine questions as to how she was making out living as she was on her own. LIRING/4 relied that she was doing the best she could to raise enough money to survive, through part-time work arranged by Sra. Chumaceira of Artes Plasticas, the sale of some of LIRING/3's paintings and financial help from her father (all of which is partly true). She then asked LIRING/9 for a "loan" to tide her over the week-end, to which he responded with a 100 peso bill. LIRING/9 commented that things were going well with his office financially as a result of the increased fees. He dropped the figure $6,000 (US) as receipts for the previous mont LIRING/4 asked Rowton for his opinion as to why LIRING/9 would take off an hour or so on such a busy day to drive her around town, commenting that she herself could not understand his motives. She did not get the impression that he was interested in her"personally" since in that case he would have invited himself to her apartment to asked her out to dinner in the evening

SECRET

5. Rowton replied that he assumed that LIRING/9 had received some sort of

official request from his superiors to determine the conditions under which LIRING/4 was living as well as her general attitude following the arrest of LIRING/3. LIRING/4 promised to continue to see LIRING/9 and her other LIRING friends as often as possible, but stressed that she could not throw herself at them without attracting undue attention.

6. LIRING/4 then continued that when she finally got in touch with Iden A he was most cordial, inviting her for a trip to Cuernavaca, and expressing concern for the welfare of LIRING/3. Iden A commented to LIRING/4 that he had arrived from the [illegible] capital with only twenty Mexican pesos which he had left from a previous trip and that he would have to count on the generosity of Siqueiros for his living expenses during his anticipated three-month stay in Mexico. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she felt certain that Iden A was not a CP member, although she could not as yet determine whether or not her was pro-regime. She explained that at their first meetings she felt it best to steer clear of politics and let Iden A do the talking. LIRING/4 added that she expected to see Iden A whenever he came to Mexico City and if and when she herself could take a brief trip to Cuernavaca (if Rowton ~~feltt~~ felt that necessary).

7. LIRING/4 then asked whether Rowton had been able to arrange some sort of intervention with the judge who would preside over the court in LIRING/3's case. When Rowton replied that he had asked some of his friends to inform hi as to the status of the case, she commented that Iden B had offered to do what he could since he had close friends among the Guatemalans. Rowton sugges ted that LIRING/4 get in touch with Iden B again and find out as many detail as possible concerning the channels he would use both in Mexico Cit and Guate mala City. LIRING/4 explained that at that point all she knew was that Iden whom she described as an active member of the CP Mexico, had a close friend among the Guatemalan exiles and that this friend could forward bribe money to the judge through his family in Guatemala City. LIRING/4 promised Rowton that she would try to meet with this Guatemalan to get details from him.

8. LIRING/4 also reported incidentally that LIRING/16 had left PCS and that her friend, the wife of LIRING/17, was planning to go on home leave in the near future. She added that she thought that LIRING/16's replacement was a bit "tonto". LIRING/4 also mentioned that she had learned from Iden A that Iden C had been forced to take "indefinite leave" from her job ~~xxxxxx~~ which was tantrount to dismissal.

SECRET

Wallace B. Rowton

SEC

9 July,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Activities.

Iden A is Orlando Suarez, Director de Cultura.

Iden B is Arturo Serrano.

Iden C is Mercedes Morales.

Wallace B. Rowton

SECR

SEC

12 July, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Activities.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at a saferoom of the Suites Marne for about two hours on the morning of 10 July and again on 12 July, 1968. Rowton attempted to clarify his position for the future with LIRING/4, as well as LIRING/3. He stated that he was doing the best he could to determine the probable outcome of the case of LIRING/3, and stressed that any precipitous intervention, even if could be arranged, might do more harm to LIRING/3 than good at this point. LIRING/4 confessed that her only concern at the moment was somehow to get LIRING/3 out of prison and back to Mexico. She admitted that it was hard for her to be concerned about the future. particularly about either her or LIRING/3's usefulness to Rowton, in view of what had happened to him. She said that she felt he had sacrificed enough during his three month imprisonment in such a "horrible" place, and that Rowton should himself "influence" the judge to speed up the formalities and issue a verdict simply expelling LIRING/3 and his companion. She did not see any other solution in view of the inability of the Mexican Consulate to arrange the release.

2. In reply to Rowton's query, LIRING/4 stated that she had seen Arturo Serrano of the CP Mexico during lunch at his home on 10 and 11 July, 1968, and that the latter had told her that he would arrange for the 100 Quetzal bribe to be transmitted to the judge concerned via the CP Mexico and the CP Guatemala. He added that, of course, the bribe would finally be offered by a person in Guatemala completely clean of any CP ties. LIRING/4 continued to Rowton that she then alleged to Serrano that she would telephone her father at once so obtain the money. Serrano suggested that a letter or telegram might be more advisable, at which LIRING/4 wrote a letter to her father in his presence and accepted an offer from him to accompany her to the post office to mail the letter at once. LIRING/4 told Rowton that in fact she does not expect any further financial help from her father (who is unwitting of LIRING/3's situation) since he is very ill with cancer of the throat and in no position to help her at this time.

3. Rowton then expressed to LIRING/4 his doubts that the bribe would work but he agreed that it might be worth trying, particularly through Serrano. Rowton added that if this did not work, there would be only one alternative. Rowton, through his contact in Europe, might be able to approach the Guatemalans on a level higher than the judge and offer to supply them with

SECRET

information on the Guatemalan rebel activities in PERUMEN. This would of course necessitate LIRING/4's traveling to PERUMEN and remaining there at least two months to obtain such information. Rowton felt morally certain that through this offer he could arrange for a mild sentence for LIRING/3 and (possibly 6 months, three months of which he has already served) and subsequent expulsion to Mexico.

4. LIRING/4 took this proposal very seriously, at first expressing revulsion at the thought of providing information that would most probably mean the arrest and execution of revolutionaries who might be the subject of her report but subsequently accepting the idea, when assured by Rowton that he himself would control the dissemination of such information. Rowton stressed that he was presenting this proposal on his own so that he could get her initial reaction. Rowton added that even if this were acceptable to the Guatemalan authorities, the release of LIRING/3 could not be expected for several months this is until LIRING/4 had accomplished her mission in PERUMEN, although his living conditions might be improved by removal to another prison (if such existed) where he could be treated more humanely.

Rowton Comment: Rowton made the above proposal to LIRING/4 to determine her true attitude toward the release of LIRING/3 and to establish stronger control over her in the event she does make the trip.
Rowton feels that it might be feasible for Guatemala liaison to arrange the eventual release of LIRING/3 or at least to speed up the formalities (in the event that it is planned to issue a stiff sentence) in exchange for the alleged recruitment of LIRING/3's wife who could be sent to PERUMEN for the collection of information of interest not only to WOFIRM but also Guatemala. This would, of course, blow LIRING/4 to the Guatemalans, but this might be the only solution if LIRING/3 is given a long prison term.

Wallace B. Rowton

SECRET

14-00000

atta met Filicl-in Tran

SECR-1 17 July.1968 JLLICH
201-867833

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Rowton Affiliation with WOFIRM.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at the Duca D'Este tea shop from 1200 until about 1245 on 15/7/68. LIRING/4 stated that she had again spent the week-end in Cuernavaca with Orlando Suarez, staying at the Casino de la Selva with her daughter in a room of an artist friend of Suarez (who had gone to Mexico City for the week-end). She added that she had been to visit the CIDOC (Centro Internacional de Documentación) again with Orlando Suarez and was impressed by its extensive library as well as the loftist orientation of its staff. She recalled the name of the director as Larry Green and one other northamerican McGregor (fnu) from the University of Puebla. She said that she learned in the course of conversation that a group of the students (possibly ten in number) had been invited to PBRUMEN directly, from the government there (LIRING/4 said that she did not believe that the PBRUMEN consulate was as yet invloved). LIRING/4 also commented that Orlando Suarez had been invited to give a lecture on PBRUMEN culture (for a fee of 200 pesos) although as yet the date had hot been determined.

2. LIRING/4 then stated that she had again visited the home of Arturo Serrano of the Mexican CP and that on this occasion Serrano's wife had told her that she had succeeded in locating Rodolfo Reyes and had told him about the current financial plight of LIRING/4 and urged him to help her if hee could. Serrano's wife continued that Reyes then remarked: "I won't help her until I find out on what side LIRING/3 is. If he's with "El Griego I won't help since the G-2 of LIRING told me that they suspect him of being with WOFIRM, although they have no proof ("datos"). They also think he's an arms smuggler." Serrano's wife added that Reyes concluded with the statement that if it turns out that LIRING/3 acted on his own, then he would personally go to the LIRING Chief and have him request the President of Mexico to intervene.

3. LIRING/4 stated that although these comments of Rodolfo Reyes were apparently not taken seriously by Serrano or his wife (Serrano at this same occasion offered again to pass bribe money to the CP Guatemala via the CP Mexico), she herself was badly shaken and angry with Reyes whom she described as a homosexual gossip, worse than a woman. She stated that she intended to tell LIRING/9 that Rodolfo Reyes owed her money for the use of her telephone to call the PBRUMEN capital several months previously and had never paid her. Rowton agreed that this would not only serve to collect the badly need money but also dispel any notion Reyes might have that Ro the telephone call.

W.B. ROWTON

SECRET

18 July, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report on CIDOC, Cuernavaca.

1. Rowton saw LIRING/4 again briefly at 1000, 18/7/68, at the Duca d'Este tea shop, to pass her 500 pesos to forward to LIRING/3 with vitamins.

2. LIRING/4 reported that she was continuing to see Orlando Suarez and hoped to ascertain the exact date when he would be giving the lecture at CIDOC in Cuernavaca. In reply to Rowton's queries, she stated that she had first gotten in contact with CIDOC through Prof. Jerjes Aguirre, whom she and LIRING/3 had known in PBRUMEN where Aguirre had spent some six years (part of the time at the University which LIRING/4 had herself attended). LIRING/4 continued that Aguirre had recently mentioned to her at a chance meeting that he was giving a series of lectures at CIDOC and was being well paid ($25.00 US) per lecture. When LIRING/4 met Aguirre again in Cuernavaca he introduced her to the director, a certain Larry Green, and to an American Prof McGregor, who both invited her, LIRING/4. to give a lecture on PBRUMEN women.

3. LIRING/4 told Rowton that, although she was interested in the compensation she felt totally unqualified, and took the occasion of Orlando Suarez' visit to introduce him and recommend that he give a lecture. Orlando Suarez jumped at the chance to make some money to supplement the meager allowance doled out to him by Siqueiros, and is prepared to give the lecture when a definite date is set.

4. LIRING/4 continued that when she casually mentioned this developments to the wife of Arturo Serrano (Ruth), the latter exclaimed: "Oh, don't you know that CIDOC is just an instrument of WOFIRM. You might as well recommend Orlando to the PBRIME Embassy here." LIRING/4 was shocked by this and after reflection thought is best to repeat the comment to Orlando Suarez. She did this when he visited Mexico City on 15-16 July (and stayed at her apartment). Suarez' only comment was that such people as Ruth Serrano were "sectarian" and whether CIDOC was with WOFIRM or not did not bother him.

5. LIRING/4 also commented incidentally that Ruth Serrano was escorting a group of French journalists from L'Humanité" around town and that she had complained to LIRING/4 that she had been given only 200 pesos by the CP Mexico to cover the expenses (figate!). L/4 recalled that Ruth Serrano had mentioned that these Frenchmen had been to PBRUMEN and were planning to return very shortly.

Wallace B. Rowton

SECRET

SE

20 July,1968

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Recontact with RODOLFO REYES.

1. Rowton met Rodolfo Reyes at about 2230 in the dining room of the Vendimia Restaurant and night club (60 calle Liverpool) by design on 15 July,1968. Rowton had previously been informed by LIRING/11 that Reyes was currently working at the Vendimia and felt that he should meet Reyes again to pass along the story that he had given to LIRING/11 that he was unable to locate LIRING/3 or LIRING/4 in the hope that Reyes would disclose LIRING/3's arrest.

2. As soon as Rowton met Reyes the latter invited him to a corner table with what appeared to be superficial cordiality. He asked Rowton how he had located him and appeared a little surprised when Rowton said that LIRING/11 had given him hthename of the night club and the address. Rowton then alleged that he had been away for the past three months in Switzerland and Canada and just the previous week in Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo trying to buy a car (Rowton had given the same story to LIRING/11). Rowton continued that when he returned he had been unable to locate LIRING/3 or his wife and that they had not replied to his letters from Europe.

3. Reyes then revealed that LIRING/3 had been arrested in Guatemala and charged with the murder of three men! Rowton feigned surprise, shock and fear at this news. He told Reyes that this might have serious consequences for his commercial contacts, whose names LIRING/3 might reveal, as well as for himself. Reyes then said he thought LIRING/3 was very stupid to get himself arrested in such a country where anything can happen inside as well as outside of jail. In reply to Rowton's query Reyes stated that LIRING/4 was probably in PBRUMEN.

4. When Rowton remarked that he could not believe that LIRING/11 had refused to tell him the news about LIRING/3, Reyes replied that it was quite possible that LIRING/11 did not know about it, especially since he, Reyes, had just leanred abuut it some three days previously. At this point the conversation was interrupted by the arrival at the table of a negro choreographer and his (white) Mexican wife, who appeared to be close friends of Reyes. Rowton sat with them through the floorshow and in the course of conversation Rowton discovered that the negro was a Cuban who had emigrated to Mexico some fifteen years previously. Neither he nor his wife appeared to be interested in politics. They both seemed dedicated to his career in Bellas Artes.

SECRET

Wallace B. Rowt

23 August, 1968

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/4
2. Date and Site of Meeting: 1700, 21/8/68 and 1600, 22/8/68; Suites Marne.
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 28/8/68; Duca d'Este coffeeshop.
4. Information/Reports Passed by Agent:

LIRING/4 stated that she had been doing her best to get Mexican leftist writers and artists to show interest in LIRING/3's case by sending telegrams and letters to the Guatemalan government urging his prompt release. She showed Horton the article in Sucesos which she claimed credit for (attached herewith) but did not appear to have any knowledge of the notice in the 5 August edition of the News, commenting that it must have been picked up from articles she had planted in other Mexican papers

LIRING/4 reported that she had purposely avoided direct contact with the LIRING office, especially during the student demonstrations, since it appeared to be closely watched by the local police. She stated that she was maintaining some contact, however, through her friendship with Iden A, who called on her whenever he came to Mexico City and on occasion stayed at her apartment overnight. She added that Iden A generally stayed at the apartment of LIRING/2 when he was in town although he commented to her that he felt he was imposing on LIRING/2 and his roomates in the already crowded quarters. LIRING/4 added that Iden A informed her that LIRING/9 had returned to PBRUMEN AND was remaining there during the student unrest "in order to protect himself", implying that LIRING/9 had been in direct touch with some of the student leaders and could not afford to compromise himself and his office by his physical presence in Mexico City during the demonstrations.

In reply to Horton's query, LIRING/4 stated that although Iden A appeared to be quite liberal in his views and mixed easily with all sorts of people he ran into, he was definitely a "revolutionary" at heart and she assumed loyal to the present PBRUMEN GOVERNMENT.

LIRING/4 aslo reported that she hoped to persude and influentia lawyer from Chiapas to travel to Guatemala City on her behalf to investigate LIRING/3's case and possibly influence the judge in his favor. She added that she was quite sure that the lawyer, who was a personal friend of LIRING/3, would take the case without a fee, but she felt obliged to offer to cover his expenses. Rowton suggested that she talk this over with the family of Iden 3 who would also benefit from any success the lawyer might have.

5. Administrative: LIRING/4 told Rowton that she had spent a "considerable" amount of money (some 300 pesos) on telegrams, postage stamps and vitamins for LIRING/3 since his arrest. She stated that she was able to survive and meet these expenses by supplementing the money given to her by Rowton through the sale of works produced by LIRING/3 and sent to her periodcially. Rowton asked LIRING/4 to keep account of such incidental expenses, since he felt it better to charge these items off as operational expenses rather than to continue to charge money given to her on LIRING/3's behalf simply as "sorvicios".

Wallace B. Rowton

SEC

23 August, 1968

Iden A: Orlando Suarez

Iden B: Carlos Perzabal

WBR
Wallace B. Rowton

SECR

SUCESOS Y SUCEDIDOS

Por AZOR



Carlos Perzabal, catedrático de la Universidad de México, y Carlos Jurado Delmar, destacado pintor mexicano, son víctimas de la cacería de brujas instaurada en Guatemala con extremos que llegan al absurdo.

Los dos mexicanos están propiamente secuestrados por las autoridades guatemaltecas desde el 15 de abril del año en curso. Se les hacen una serie de cargos dignos de la mentalidad de un mosquito. Desde luego, como es costumbre en estos casos, cuatro meses después de su ilegal aprehensión ni siquiera han sido puestos a disposición de un juez que los juzgue.

El licenciado Antonio Carrillo Flores, nuestro secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, ha venido interviniendo en defensa de estos infortunados compatriotas, pero hasta ahora sus gestiones oficiales no han sido atendidas debidamente por el gobierno de Guatemala.

Para que usted, lector, tenga idea del atropello incalificable de que son víctimas los dos mexicanos, publicamos copia de la carta que Carlos Jurado Delmar y Carlos Perzabal dirigieron recientemente a la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la ONU:

Comisión por los Derechos Humanos.

ONU.

Por este medio nos dirigimos a ustedes, pidiéndoles su intervención en nuestro caso.

El día 13 de abril de 1968, mientras nos dirigíamos pacíficamente a la República del Salvador y Honduras, fuimos detenidos con lujo de violencia por elementos del Ejército de Guatemala, en un lugar llamado "El Cable" a cuatro kilómetros escasamente de la frontera de México con Guatemala denominada "La Mesilla".

De ahí, llevados a un lugar llamado "Buenos Aires" donde permanecimos por una noche sujetos a torturas físicas y morales. Al día siguiente fuimos conducidos en un avión (No. 540) de la FAG a la ciudad capital, donde quedamos encarcelados en el 2o. Cuerpo de la Policía Nacional, sujetos también a torturas físicas y morales que hicieron y hacen peligrar nuestra vida.

Tan obvio es el error cometido con nosotros, que a pesar de que nuestra detención se llevó a cabo desde el día 13 de abril, como puede ser probado fácilmente con testigos presenciales y desde entonces mantenidos en prisión, el gobierno guatemalteco nos acusa de haber sido detenidos el día 17 del mismo mes, en las calles de la ciudad. ¡¡Repartiendo propaganda subversiva!! Incongruencia mayor no cabe en ninguna mente que se precie de normal.

Desde el día 26 de abril de 1968 fuimos confinados al campo de concentración de Pavón, mal llamado "Granja Penal". Donde las condiciones de vida para los reclusos y la violencia al que están sometidos, son espeluznantes como puede ser fácilmente comprobado por la H. Comisión de los Derechos Humanos.

Hemos sido sujetos a un "juicio" que el gobierno guatemalteco alarga deliberadamente con el único propósito de cubrir su error y a la vez perjudicarnos; por ésto y sobre todo por considerar en grave peligro nuestra integridad física, pedimos la rápida intervención de la H. Comisión de los Derechos Humanos para que se exija nuestra inmediata libertad.

Atentamente, Cárcel de Pavón, Guatemala, Julio 68.

Carlos Jurado, Pintor Miembro del Salón de la Plástica Mexicana.

Carlos Perzabal, Catedrático de la Universidad de México.

●

El actual ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Guatemala, licenciado Emilio Arenales Catalán, ha sido mencionado varias veces como candidato a presidir la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la ONU. Ojalá no espere a obtener ese cargo para intervenir en este caso, que según parece es de su especialidad.

●



CARLOS JURADO DELMAR, secuestrado por las autoridades guatemaltecas



LIC. ANTONIO CARRILLO FLORES en defensa de dos mexicanos en desgracia



CARLOS PERZABAL, secuestrado por las autorida- [illegible]

29 August, 1968

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/4
2. Date and Site of Meeting: 1000, 28/8/68; Duca d'Este Tearoom.
3. Next Meeting: Same time and place, 2/9/68.
4. Information/Reports Passed by Agent:

LIRING/4 informed Rowton that she had run into LIRING/10 and his assistant, Iden A, the previous afternoon (27/8/68) at about 1345 at the office of the director of Siempre, where she had gone in connection with added publicity for LIRING/3. She stated that LIRING/10 greeted her cordially with an abrazo and asked how she was doing. He seemed genuinely disturbed to hear that things were no better, and commented that he had been hearing about her from time to time from Iden B, but felt that she should make her problems known to the LIRING office herself. When LIRING/4 commented that Iden C had told her and Iden B that it might be wiser for her to avoid contact openly with the LIRING office, LIRING/10 brushed this off, remarking that he felt it would be perfectly alright for LIRING/4 to come in whenever she felt it necessary for moral and whatever material help could be offered.

LIRING/4 told Rowton that in view of this comment of LIRING/10, she visited the LIRING office early that same morning (28/8/68) and found that LIRING/2 had returned from his TDY. She said that LIRING/2 greeted her cordially as usual, but he apparently did not have time to chat with her on that occasion.

5. Information/Guidance Given to Agent:

Rowton asked LIRING/4 to follow up on her contact with LIRING/10, especially since he appeared so friendly. Rowton suggested that L/4 ask L/10 to appeal to the Director of Siempre to give L/3's case good publicity. L/4 promised to do so and commented that L/10 appeared to be quite chummy with the director and apparently had a luncheon date with him for that same day.

Wallace B. Rowton

SECRE

29 August,1968

Iden's of LIRING/4 Contact Report

Iden A: Felix Luna Mederos
Iden B: Orlando Suarez
Iden C: Jesus Cruz Gonzalez

Wallace B. Rowton

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	X	PROCESSING ACTION MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM
SUBJECT PBRUMEN: Activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4 May through Mid-September 1968		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMA 34682, 17 May 1968

Action Required: For your information.

1. Forwarded under separate cover are twelve reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4, and contacts of the latter.

2. The main topic covered in ROWTON's reports is LIRING-4's efforts to obtain help in getting LIRING-3 out of jail in Guatemala as soon as possible. LIRING-4 is almost penniless (ROWTON has made only token payments to her after 15 June) and has been moving from one apartment to a cheaper one living on the sale of paintings left by LIRING-3 and small loans from leftist contacts. In the hope that she may be able to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has resisted all of ROWTON's efforts to get her to undertake a clandestine mission to PBRUMEN, a mission, as Headquarters knows, was planned long ago. As a foreigner, LIRING-4 cannot work in Mexico without taking the chance of being deported, if caught. Although she has not tried it, she would probably be refused a visa to go to Guatemala to visit LIRING-3. She might also face difficulties in Guatemala including possible detention and interrogation if she succeeded in obtaining an entry permit to that country.

3. By mid-September 1968 LIRING-4 had received very little help from her Mexican leftist or outright Communist friends. In spite of promises to try to bribe the Guatemalan judge scheduled to try LIRING-3 all LIRING-4's "friends" succeeded in doing was to print several articles in the local press (some of them with LIRING-3's photo) claiming that LIRING-3 was unjustly imprisoned, that he was about to be executed, etc. If anything, these

continued . . . . . .

Attachments: 12 reports u/s/c #1
4 Iden rpts u/s/c #2

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD w/atts

CS copy in 201-815342

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 35502	26 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

articles did little to prejudice the Guatemalans in favor of LIRING-3. As a matter of fact, the latter who succeeded in sending LIRING-4 a few letters via the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City who comes to visit him in jail, recently claimed that he was saved from a prison "transfer" by the Guatemalan army by the arrival of the Mexican Consul. LIRING-3 viewed this "transfer" purely and simply as an execution attempt.

4. LIRING-4 received even less help from LIRING who told her that there was nothing it could do to help LIRING-3. LIRING-4, on the advice contained in one of the notes sent from prison by LIRING-3, kept away from LIRING and its employees until she met LIRING-10 by accident at the office of one of the leftist papers on 27 July. LIRING-10 convinced her to resume her visits to LIRING. That the local PBRUMENs still have doubts about LIRING-3 despite his imprisonment in Guatemala is indicated by the statements made by Rodolfo REYES (see ROWTON's 17 July report) to the effect that the latter would not be willing to help LIRING-3 until he found out on what side of "el griego" (ROWTON under false identity) he was. REYES added that LIRING suspects the "griego" of WOFIRM connections, although it has no definite proof of this.

5. Statements such as those made by REYES confirm the Station's belief that LIRING, upon orders from home, is still attempting to investigate ROWTON. Such statements also reenforce the decision of the Station not to attempt, through liaison, to obtain the release of LIRING-3. Such an attempt, if it leaked, would not only expose LIRING-3 to PBRUMEN and Guatemalan FAR reprisals. It would probably also have adverse repercussions on ROWTON's security. LIRING-11 whom ROWTON met briefly on 5 July (see ROWTON's report dated 9 July) said nothing about LIRING-3's arrest when ROWTON complained that mail which he said he sent to LIRING-3 remained unanswered. It is also to be noted that REYES, who of course knows that LIRING-4 is in Mexico, told ROWTON that she was probably in PBRUMEN. This shows clearly the distrust with which LIRING views ROWTON.

6. LIRING-4 developed close relationship with Orlando *SUAREZ of the Ministry of Culture now in Mexico at the invitation of the Mexican Communist mural painter David ALFARO Siqueiros. By mid-September, in fact, SUAREZ was staying at LIRING-4's apartment although LIRING-4 claimed to ROWTON that there was no romancing between the two and that SUAREZ used her apartment because he was too broke to get one of his own. In view of LIRING-4's assessment of SUAREZ as very leftist and pro-AMTHUG-1 no effort was made to approach him.

7. Contacts between ROWTON and LIRING-4 have taken place with decreasing frequency because the usefulness of LIRING-4 to WOFIRM has sharply decreased and because LIRING-4 is more and more convinced that ROWTON cannot or will not help her obtain the release of LIRING-3. In her frantic efforts to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has in fact not had any contact with ROWTON since early September. Unless LIRING-3 is released by the Guatemalan authorities or receives only a light sentence keeping him in jail only a short time longer, it is doubtful that LIRING-4 will be of much use to ROWTON and the Station.

for Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

illu

ORIG: ETsikerdanos/jmw
UNIT: DC/WH/1
EXT: 7375
DATE: 26 Sept 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

3E SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: clunt 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR clunt log 5, c/ca, c/fi 2, c/ri/an

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 26 22 37z SEP 68 CITE DIRECTOR 36584

TO MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA CITY

WH/1

RYBAT TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7335 (IN 99476)*

1. ROWTON RETURN STILL UNCERTAIN PENDING RESOLUTION DEVELOPMENT ACCESS TO AMCAGE/1.

2. RE LIRING/4, ROWTON COULD SEND MONEY OSTENSIBLY FROM L/4'S FATHER IN NEW YORK TO BAIL HER OUT OF PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION, BUT THIS WOULD BE ONLY TEMPORARY SOLUTION IN ADDITION INHERENT SECURITY RISKS (FATHER IS REPORTEDLY HOSPITALIZED AND NOT IN POSITION PROVIDE FINANCIAL HELP AT THIS TIME). L/4'S REFUGE IN LIRING ESTABLISHMENT, ON OTHER HAND, WHICH ROWTON COULD NOT CONVINCE HER TO TAKE AS LONG AS HE WAS GIVING HER MONEY, WILL SERVE TO IMPROVE HER ACCESS AND MAY LEAD TO REPATRIATION. ROWTON FEELS LATTER EVENTUALITY LIKELY ONLY IN EVENT HIS CONTINUED FAILURE RECONTACT HER SINCE L/4 WOULD POSSIBLY HAVE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE. IN THAT CASE, REBRIEFING AND RESUPPLY S/W PRECLUDED PRIOR DEPARTURE. ROWTON COULD DEBRIEF L/4 UPON HER RETURN MEXICO IF AND WHEN LIRING/3 RELEASED FROM PRISON AND CONTACT REESTABLISHED.

CS COPY

26 Sept 68
201-798301

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______ PER______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 36584

TO

3. FOR GUATEMALA: WOULD APPRECIATE RECOMMENDATIONS RE POSSIBILITY EARLY RELEASE OF LIRING/3 AND ASSOCIATE FROM JAIL. AWARE WOFIRM INTEREST MUST BE SHOWN AT HIGH LEVEL BUT [illegible] GOVT OFFICIALS COULD ALLEGE MEXICAN GOVT INTEREST TO THEIR SUBORDINATES AS BASIS OF RELEASE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

END OF MESSAGE

* RYBAT

William V. Broe
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COG

C/WH/2/~~Guatemala~~

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

HMMA-35523
50-120-13
30 September 68

A. LIRING-3: LIRING-3 is still in jail in Guatemala.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 20 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OA

216

S E C R E T 072243Z AUG 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6658

GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

6 AUG 68 IN 66274

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)

B. DIRECTOR 16024

1. ROWTON SO FAR UNABLE LEARN MORE FROM LIRING-4 ABOUT HOW JUDGE SCHEDULED TRY CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR COULD BE BRIBED OTHER THAN STATEMENT BY ARTURO (SERRANO) BEREA TO EFFECT THIS TO BE ARRANGED BY GUAT COMMUNIST PARTY AT REQUEST MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. PERSON TO MAKE ACTUAL BRIBE, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE KNOWN AS LEFTIST.

2. MEXICO CITY ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY "THE NEWS" 5 AUG CARRIED ARTICLE TITLED "MEXICAN ARTIST TO BE EXECUTED". ARTICLE QUOTED GROUP OF INTELLECTUALS INCLUDING PAINTERS, WRITERS, POETS AND SCULPTORS TO SAY GUAT GVT PLANNING EX ~~25 6) , ,8,6 3~~/ECUTE JURADO BECAUSE HE ENTERED GUATEMALA IN HIS CAR FOUR MONTHS AGO AND PICKED UP SOME HITCHHIKING YOUTHS WHO LATER TURNED OUT BE CONNECTED WITH GUAT COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS. ARTICLE OBVIOUSLY PLANTED BY LOCAL LEFTISTS IN EFFORT SPREAD NEWS JURADO ARREST AND DETENTION TO FORCE OFFICIAL GVT INTERVENTION. ROWTON TRYING ESTABLISH FROM LIRING-4 WHO PLANTED ARTICLE.

WH/1 file:
LIRING-3
201.

K UK

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE. VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 6658 SECRET

3. BELIEVE NEWS ARTICLE COULD BE USED TO APPROACH LIAISON AND ASK FOR DETAILS ON JURADO CASE WITHOUT INDICATING ANY SPECIAL CONNECTION TO JURADO. SPECIFICALLY, WHAT SENTENCE CAN BE EXPECTED IN JURADO CASE AND WHEN?

4. FOR DIRECTOR: DESPITE SOMEWHAT COOLER RELATIONSHIP WITH ROWTON AT THIS POINT BECAUSE JURADO SITUATION, LIRING-4 STILL WILLING GO PBRUMEN AS SOON AS JURADO FUTURE SETTLED, PARTICULARLY IF HE DEPORTED OR SENTENCED RELATIVELY SHORT JAIL SENTENCE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY____ AT____ Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER ____ #

ACTION #223 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

26 **SECRET** (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.____

X-REF TO FILE NO.____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2
WH/COG 8

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 081854Z AUG 63 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9326

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

8 Aug 63 IN 67011

REF A. MEXICO CITY 6658 (IN 66274)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9242 (IN 49331)

C. GUATEMALA CITY 9132 (IN 35990)

1. ST ATION POSITION ON LIRING ~~[illegible]~~/3 CASE CONTINUES BE SAME AS THAT REPORTED REF B.

2. DURING LAST QUERY OF LIAISON RE STATUS OF CASE (REPORTED REF C), LIAISON OFFICER SAID SINCE CASE IN HANDS OF COURT THEY UNABLE PROBE FURTHER RE OUTCOME. BELIEVE ANY ADDITIONAL QUERY OF LIAISON WOULD BE CLEAR INDICATION OF SPECIFIC STATION INTEREST IN LIRING/3.

3. DIRECTOR 16024 (REF B OF MEXICO CITY 6658) NOT RECEIVED BY GUATEMALA CITY.

S E C R E T

BT

Fi: LIRING/3

SECRET

201-798301

Carlos JURADO was target of LIFEAT coverage on behalf of Cuba section. Coverage terminated 2 April 68. Name included in list attached to HMMA 35074, 19July68

Lehrey-3

SECRET

46

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET 3V

ORIG: Marvin Francis
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

MICROFILMED
JUL 25 1968
DOC MICRO. SER.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 26 PER ______ #

☒ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: xref 50-9-11 201-818842 FILE, VR, RI/AN, C/I/PS, C/I/ A
CI, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

HMM HGG 11 22 06z JUL 68

CITE DIRECTOR 11 July 68 DIR 15576

2P

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9236 (IN 47690)**

cc: Publisher.
: Mexico
CIT: Mexico

1. HQS FILES INDICATE ARTURO SERRANO IN 1966 WAS DIRECTOR PCM PUBLISHING HOUSE FONDO DE CULTURA IN MEXICO CITY, BUT THERE NO DETAILS RE HIS CONTACTS WITH THIRD COUNTRY EXILES OR OFFICIALS. WE THEREFORE UNABLE COMMENT ON VALIDITY HIS CLAIM TO ASSIST LIRING/3.

2. CONCUR GUATEMALA CITY COMMENT REF B. FEEL LIRING/4 SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS SERRANO FOR MORE DETAILS HIS CHANNEL TO AND IDENTITY OF GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED. BELIEVE LIRING/4 AND STATION WILL THEN BE IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS VALIDITY SERRANO CLAIM. SUGGEST LIRING/4 ALSO CHECK SERRANO STORY WITH LEFTIST CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO ATTEMPT VERIFY IT AND EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDS IF FEASIBLE. STATION

Offered help to 201-818542 re: imprisoned 201-798301

9

AN PW	FI	
PS 7-H	DEF	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X	

Liring 3

D-50-9-11
B-201-818842

11 July 68
201-798301

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 Jul[illegible]

JUL 22

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER RECEIVED RID/EDI

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY PAGE - 2

SHOULD NOT ADVANCE LIRING/4 ANY FUNDS UNLESS LIRING/4 ABLE SECURELY EXPLAIN THEIR SOURCE.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX - SERRANO

WH COMMENTS: *LIRING/4 approached by PCM member Arturo SERRANO who claimed he has contact with Guatemalan exile who could arrange bribe through relatives in Guatemala to assist LIRING/3 who imprisoned that country.
**Guatemala City requested more information prior to commenting on feasibility of bribe offer by SERRANO.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/2/G:

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 19

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 53 PER ______

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

WH/file: LIRING-3 201

25 May 68 IN 18245

S E C R E T 250105Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5683

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5590 (IN 12717)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9002 (IN 13509)

1. HECTOR RODOLFO (SANDOVAL) ALEGRIA IS GUAT REBEL WHO TOGETHER WITH FRANCISCO (LARA) ENGINEERED LIRING-3 AND FRANCISCO LARA TRIP TO GUATEMALA WHERE NOW INCARCERATED. SANDOVAL SAW LIRING-4 SEVERAL TIMES AFTER LIRING-3 ARREST AT ONE POINT SAYING HE MIGHT HAVE TO HOLD UP BANK TO COME TO LIRING-4 ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS, SANDOVAL ARRESTED 5 MAY SHORTLY AFTER HIS WIFE RETURNED FROM TRIP TO GUATEMALA. SANDOVAL WIFE NOW STAYING AT HOUSE OWNED BY MARCUE TOGETHER WITH FAMILY FRANCISCO LARA.

2. IN ATTEMPT COUNTER EVENTUALITY MEXICAN POLICE (ON BASIS INFO PROVIDED BY SANDOVAL) MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR LIRING-4 FOR INTERROGATION, STATION HAS ASKED LIRING-4 GIVE UP BOTH APARTMENTS SHE AND LIRING-3 HAVE BEEN RENTING. LIRING-4 NOW LIVING WITH GIRLFRIEND. BEFORE MOVING SHE RECEIVED VISIT OF MAN WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS LAWYER OF MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LAWYER SAID HE APPOINTED DEFEND LIRING-3. LIRING-4 HAS RECEIVED FIVE SHORT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5683 SECRET

MESSAGES FROM LIRING-3 SMUGGLED FROM JAIL. ONE IN OPEN CODE SUGGESTED S/W BE PASSED TO HIM. STATION NATURALLY WILL DO NO SUCH THING.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33/7 PER ______

ACTION

WH 8

☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CA 5, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, FI, FI/INT 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 162103Z MAY 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8996 /16 May 68 IN 12603

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5540 (IN 98570)

LIAISON REPORTS THAT PERSAVAL AND LIRING/3 BEING HELD PAVON PRISON FARM PENDING SENTENCING BY FOURTH JUZGADO DE PRIMERA CNSTANCIA. ONLY CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. LIAISON SPECULATES THEY WILL RECEIVE LIGHT SENTENCE IF ANY.

SECRET

BT

Wml file:
LIRING-3 201
h/c
201-798301

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ____

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE. VR. WH/COG8 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 CI/OA FI FI/INT2 DDP ADDP CSDO

G AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	1	6	C
2		7	
3		8	
4	2	9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 102305Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5540

10 May 68 IN 08570

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 5375 (IN 98384)

WH/ file: LIRING-3 201

WC

1. MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS INFORMED LIRING-4 8 MAY THAT HIS SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW HAD SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING GUAT VISA AND TRAVELED GUATEMALA CITY IN AN EFFORT TO SEE CARLOS MINUEL (PERSAVAL) MARCUE IN JAIL. MARCUE SAID SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW WHO RETURNING WEEK 12 MAY LEARNED PERSAVAL AND LIRING-3SENTENCED TO MINIMUM TERM OF SIX MONTHS.

2. LIRING-4 CURRENTLY EXPLORING POSSIBILITY TRAVEL GUATEMALA TO TALK TO LIRING-3. STATION IN FAVOR SUCH TRAVEL IF SHE CAN GET VISA AS LIRING-3 CAN BE EXPECTED URGE LIRING-4GO CUBA DURING HIS TERM OF IMPRISONMENT.

3. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION CONFIRM LIRING-3 SENTENCE AND PROVIDE DETAILS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

HMMA-34623
10 May 1968
19-120-13/1

E. LIRING-3: During this period, LIRING-3 was introduced to members of a Guatemalan exile group by the husband of the sister of his mistress. LIRING-3 agreed to help one or more representatives of this group cross the Guatemalan border. At the urging of these representatives he also agreed to meet in Guatemala with a woman in charge of logistics for the FAR movement. LIRING-3 spent the better part of the period under review manufacturing false documentation for the Guatemalan exiles. The Station used the LIEMBRACE surveillance team to cover some of the meetings between LIRING-3 and some of his nervous Guatemalan friends. Copies of photographs taken by the LIEMBRACEs of these meetings were forwarded to the Guatemala City Station and Headquarters. Due to several postponements, LIRING-3 and his Guatemalan contacts had not left for Guatemala by the end of the period under review.

201-798361

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, Guatemala City

LIRING-3 contacts with Guatemalan Revolutionaries in Mexico

REFERENCE: HMMA-34413, 5 April 1968

LiRing/3

The Guatemala City Station has not been able to identify any of the persons whose photographs were forwarded as an attachment to Reference.

Peter [illegible]

Distribution:
1 - COS, Mexico City
1 - Chief, WH
2 - Files

201-[illegible]

HGGA-9386

3 May 1968

SECRET

35-9-8

SECRET

14-00000

CRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
NIT NOTIFIED

SSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 2 ✓

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

TING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT ______ Z

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8, AI, CI/OPS, FI,

E C R E T 032121Z MAY 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8961

EXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

ERUMEN LIRING-3 LIRING-4

EF: MEXICO CITY 5423 (IN 01169)

WH/1 file: 201. WC

3 MAY 68 IN 03831

M

1. ESLAIR TEAM PRETEXT INVESTIGATION CARRIED OUT TO

ETERMINE OCCUPANTS OF 35 AVENIDA 22-67, ZONA 5 GUATEMALA CITY

ITH FOLLOWING RESULTS:

A. OCCUPANTS OF HOUSE ARE TIRZO (FUENTES) SANDOVAL, ORN 19 JULY 1922 AT SAN ANTONIO VILLASECA, DEPT OF RETALHULEU, ND HIS WIFE, MARIA DEL MILAGRO (PERALTA) E. DE FUENTES. (NO TATION TRACES EITHER FUENTES OR WIFE.) BEAUTY SHIP (SALON DE ELLEZA "LILLIAN") ALSO INSTALLED IN HOUSE, BUT NOT YET ABLE ETERMINE NAMES OF EMPLOYEES.

B. ESLAIRS HAVE NOTICED 1963 MERCURY WITH GUAT LICENSE LATES P-31-341 PARKED AT HOUSE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. THIS CAR EGISTERED TO FEDERICO (CALDERON) GALICIA WHO ADDRESS 21 AVENIDA 3-36, ZONA 7. (NO STATION TRACES CALDERON.)

2. ESLAIRS WILL ATTEMPT IDENTIFY ANY OTHER PERSONS -- SERVANTS EMPLOYEES -- WHO MAY BE AT ADDRESS.

E C R E T

BT

WC

SECRET

SECRET A-16-88-46

ROLANDO MASFERRER, JR.

BUSINESS:

Subject is the Vice President of Sales at the following Corporation:

A168762 - Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. E-77-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated: [illegible]

Document Located by: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ______

[illegible]

RECOMMEND:

______ Release in full-text
______ Release in sanitized form
✓ Deny in toto
______ Defer decision to ______
______ Coordination with ______ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓) Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( ) Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓) Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(✓) File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( ) Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(✓) Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( ) Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( ) Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DCD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

May 77

Document No. ______
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ______

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn: Support Branch

DATE: 22 Aug [illegible]

FROM : Chief, Detroit Office

SUBJECT: Interview with Wilbur Gee, Seaman Patient at USPHS Hospital, Detroit

1. Wilbur Gee, born at Vincennes, [illegible], [illegible] Jul [illegible], called the Detroit Field Office on the afternoon of [illegible] Aug [illegible] and requested an interview. He said he had information he thought 'would help us'. In response to his request, a D/S called on him the [illegible] afternoon at the hospital.

2. Physically, Gee gave the appearance of having been down on his luck for [illegible]. He is married to a Venezuelan citizen, and his wife and two children live in Maracaibo. He is a dragline operator by profession. He suffered an injury to his foot on a job in Cleveland on or about 11 August, and has been at the Detroit USPHS Hospital since that date. He carries passport no. [illegible], re-validated at Maracaibo, Venezuela on 17 Jul 59. Gee has a sister-in-law, Ana [illegible], whom he describes as a [illegible] newspaperwoman of Maracaibo, and a member of Accion Democratica. The following is the gist of what he said in the course of the two and a half hour interview.

3. Communist-backed Anti-Somoza Movement: Through his sister-in-law, Gee met in 195[illegible] a [illegible] newspaperman by the name of Pena, a reporter for the Diario [illegible] Occidente of Maracaibo. Pena introduced him to people connected with an anti-Somoza movement composed mainly of Nicaraguan exiles in Venezuela. Gee makes the implication that they would have employed him, but he found out the movement was backed by the Communist Party of Venezuela, and so he dropped them.

4. Shortly after his meeting with the anti-Somocistas, Gee came in contact with a Professor [illegible], Director of the Colegio Jose Marti, and head of the 26 of July Movement in Maracaibo. [illegible] was under the impression that Gee was an airplane pilot, and expressed an interest in using him to run arms into Cuba, to supply the Castro forces. This was prior to the Batista overthrow of January 1959.

5. Gee took a job in Miami, working on contract on a dredging operation. In Miami in July 1960, he met a man named [illegible], who introduced him to [illegible], leader of an anti-Castro group. [illegible] took Gee into the group and [illegible] him he would like to employ him when his job on the dredging operation ended. [illegible], according to Gee, was the one who dispatched the "Invading Force" composed of [illegible], [illegible], and [illegible]. All of them were caught and executed shortly after their landing in Cuba. Gee says [illegible] had intended [illegible] of three, but a [illegible] caused an extension of the dredging operation [illegible] Gee unavailable. [illegible] however, [illegible] Gee that he would be kept in [illegible] with the "[illegible]" and that, upon arrived there, he [illegible] contact the "[illegible]" [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Gee's opinion of [illegible] Rodriguez is low. He thinks Rodriguez is an [illegible], who is only [illegible] in the anti-Castro movement for the money he can get out of it. Rodriguez told Gee he has a brother in Cuba who is a [illegible]. He also volunteered to Gee that he was a member of the group who attacked the Cuban Consul in the Consulate in Miami, [illegible] word was received that Marra, Fuller and Thompson were [illegible] executed. He says [illegible] is a "[illegible]".

7. When Gee [illegible] his [illegible] and he was finally available to enter the Masferrer group full time, he met a fellow by the name of Harry [illegible], in the company of Rolando and [illegible] Masferrer. [illegible] is Rolando's [illegible] and walks with a much more pronounced limp than does Rolando. Harry had an office in the same building as the Cuban Consulate, and seemed to act as a [illegible] for Masferrer, as well as a procurer of weapons on a small scale. Harry apparently has serious character flaws, since [illegible] he swindled two of the members of the Masferrer militia out of [illegible] each on the pretext of taking their checks from home to have them cashed for them.

8. Murder of Russ Masher: When Masferrer started actively recruiting Americans [illegible] he did not make any effort to check them out. Among them were Russ Masher, who claimed to be an [illegible] pilot formerly in the service of Castro. One night Gee was in a bar next to the Masferrer task force's barracks at [illegible] West with Masher, Juan (also known as El Musico) and a former member of the Castro secret police whom he could not name. There were many other Cubans and Americans as well. Juan was a Portuguese who claimed to have entered the US illegally at Key West after jumping the Havana-Key West Ferry. His nickname derived from his musical talents. He also claimed to have had no military experience, but he proved so adept at military tactics that he later became second in command of the task force. The former Castro secret policeman was in his early 20's, about six feet tall, husky build and claimed to have been a schoolteacher. In the course of the evening at the bar, one of the three - Masher, Juan, or the ex-secret policeman - made the remark that, on the occasion of their landing in Cuba, they should break away from the Masferrer group and try to join up with some other. Gee overheard the remark and reported it to the task force leader, though he said he could not identify which of the three had made it. The ex-secret policeman was thereupon thrown out of the task force, but Masher was also strongly suspected of being the author of the dissident remark. As a result of this suspicion, Masher was not allowed to take any firearms with him when the group went into training on No-Name Key. Gee, however, was allowed to take a .22 pistol. Besides Gee's weapon, the only other firearms at No-Name initially were a 12-gauge shotgun and a .22 rifle. Masher was unable to keep up with the rigorous physical training schedule of the group, and so absented himself from that part of the training. Masher adopted the habit of rising early in the morning and going out to hunt in the woods, having managed somehow to appropriate the .22 rifle. Because of his get-[illegible] attitude toward the training, plus the suspicion that surrounded him as the possible author of the dissident remark in the Miami bar, an acute bitterness grew between him and the group leader at No-Name, Lago, also known as Pig Lago. Lago was a former Batista police sergeant who had been tried and condemned to death in absentia. Lago proposed shooting it out with Masher, but Masher declined the invitation. Masferrer visited No-Name once in the company of [illegible] ---, an ex-G.I. who had served in Korea. Masferrer brought with him a .45 service automatic and a Garand rifle. These guns were left by Masferrer, upon his departure the next day, in the custody of [illegible] Companero, who had been a BAR man in Batista's army and claimed to have killed [illegible]. Companero was married to an American [illegible] who lived in Miami. Masher arose early one morning and went hunting, according to his custom. About breakfast time, the men in the camp heard shots, and then [illegible]

[illegible] ... boat, being partly in a small pool where he had apparently [illegible] ... in the pool ... police ... [illegible] ... Masferrer first told police ... [illegible] ... Masferrer admitted to police ... [illegible] ... and no further investigation was made.

9. Bill Bishop and CIA Contacts: About two days after [illegible], the group received word from Masferrer that they had to leave No-Name(?), [illegible]. They went to Little Pine Key, [illegible] Bill Bishop was sent out to take charge of them there. They spent about one week at Little Pine with no supplies whatever, and then returned to Miami. Bishop impressed the group as being a psycho, and no one would take orders from him. He left the Masferrer group after the return to Miami, but shortly thereafter contacted [illegible] and asked him to join him in his [illegible] with [illegible]. Gee visited Bishop in his apartment in Miami, and described it as a rather expensive set-up. [illegible] Bishop called Charles, [illegible], Miami, gave him a report, and [illegible] a discussion. At the conclusion of the call Bishop appeared upset, and explained that he had been denied an expected pay-off. He confided to Gee that all information from [illegible] went to CIA. He said he was fed up with Cubans and felt like bailing out.

10. Other members of the Masferrer group included Henry Proctor, --- [illegible], and a man known as "Dutch" not otherwise identified. Julio Fernandez, Administrative Assistant to Masferrer, paid these three a total of [illegible] to waylay and beat up [illegible] and his wife, in revenge for an article [illegible] had written for a Miami newspaper which displeased Masferrer. The [illegible] were hospitalized. In the Masferrer group there was also a - - - [illegible] (phonetic), blond, with a blond mustache, claimed to be a German and a Nazi sympathizer. [illegible] tried to organize a group that would be armed with torpedoes for the purpose of raiding Russian shipping en route to Cuba, in the vicinity of the Bahamas. Henry Proctor got drunk one night, and he and several others beat up [illegible], sending him to the hospital. Upon release from the hospital, [illegible] moved in with the [illegible], the family of the [illegible] executed in Cuba along with Carta(?) and Thompson. Proctor, incidentally, claimed to have been a POW of the Communists in Korea, one of the famous 21 or so who refused repatriation in 1953.

11. Breakup of the Masferrer group occurred around early January 1961, when Masferrer was asked by the police to close up the barracks. The members of the group were told to go their several ways, but they were nearly all flat broke. Julio Fernandez took Gee to the home of Dr. Anselmo [illegible] Alliegro, ex-President of the Cuban Senate. While Gee waited outside in the car, Julio went into the house and returned shortly with a "wad" of money. He turned it over to Gee [illegible] to pay each of the men [illegible], constituting final pay-off and liquidation of the employment agreement. Gee was able to find 17 of the men. To each of them he gave three [illegible] in a sum of [illegible] which he still has in his possession. All of the men delivered their [illegible] to get to Cuba ...

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

of some kind. Six of them had left in a group before the payoff, had stolen a [illegible] at Marathon, and set sail for [illegible] hoping to reach a "friendly [illegible]" there. [illegible] navigation. Apparently, [illegible] ended up instead in [illegible] where they were arrested and sentenced to 10 years each. Gee added [illegible] that one of the six was a [illegible]. Another small group of the ex-trainees stole a boat and [illegible] with the [illegible] intention of [illegible] to Cuba. They were picked up by Miami Police before they got out of the harbor.

12. All Anti-Castro Terrorist Activity in the Miami area, according to Gee, is under the direction of [illegible] Fonseca, of the [illegible] organization, whose residence is at S.W. 1st and 19th Ave., Miami. Gee says she procures, or makes, bombs and sees to their delivery on target.

13. Jimenez-[illegible] anti-Betancourt Plot: (Gee says that he gave the following [illegible] him in response to his phone call sometime early this year to [illegible] office in Miami.) Sometime early this year. Gee is vague about the time, he met a man named Edward Davis who upon hearing that Gee was interested in returning to his family in Maracaibo, introduced him to one Luis Phillip Prato of [illegible] Collins Ave., Miami. Prato arranged an interview for Gee with a Colonel Casanova, who was introduced to him as the head of the anti-Betancourt movement in Miami. Casanova asked Gee and Davis if they could - on 30 days notice - organize and arm a group of 400 ex-G.I.'s. He assured Gee and Davis that unlimited cash would be at their disposal for the task. Casanova said all kinds of arms would be needed, including artillery and flame throwers. He was most interested in whether or not Gee and Davis had any channel for procuring the arms. They assured Casanova they could raise the 400 men and obtain the desired arms and equipment. Casanova said he had already arranged transportation for the force via commercial airline, that they would be flown to a mountain site "behind" Caracas, leaving the US disguised as tourists, and they would be given 30 days rigorous training under the direction of English-speaking Venezuelan army officers. Casanova explained that the tentative plan was for an attack by the 400 on Caracas, simultaneously with an Army revolt within the city and at other unspecified points. The attempted coup in early 1961, involving an attack on Radio [illegible], resulted in the arrest of several army officers involved in the Casanova plot, and according to Prato, necessitated an indefinite delay. Prato told Gee, however that Perez-Jimenez was still interested in the plan, and that it would be carried out.

14. Contacts with Gun-runners: Through [illegible] Santiago, who lives with [illegible], a relative of the ex-dictator, Gee met [illegible] Rose, former owner of the hotel [illegible] in Miami. Rose told Gee that, if he were provided with one thousand dollars cash for expenses, he would go to Belgium and buy any kind of arms needed, and he could guarantee delivery to any part of the world. Another gun-runner with whom he came in contact was Charlie Adams, 1010 NW 9th Ave., Miami, telephone number FR [illegible]-2764. Adams told Gee that he could obtain, for $175.00 each on minimum orders of one thousand, a weapon described as Arma-Lite (Fairchild), with NATO ammunition. A third arms dealer that Gee contacted was Mel Castle, 2921 SW 21st St., Miami, Telephone CA [illegible]. He provided Gee with a list of surplus US arms which he could obtain in any quantities desired.

HH-7[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

HW-7300

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F77-260

Document Description: [illegible] Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

____ Release in full-text
____ Release in sanitized form
__✓__ Deny in toto
____ Defer decision to ____________
____ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

Only [illegible] [illegible]

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(✓)	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

[illegible] DCD DCD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

May 77

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ____________

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

3966

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO	CO-[illegible](3) 3,2[illegible],678
SUBJECT	US Citizens in Circular [illegible], Isle of Pines Prison, as of 24 Dec 62	DATE DISTR.	
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO	[illegible]		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Isle of Pines Prison/24 Dec 62		

Eduardo Suarez Rivas
4766 Alton Road,
Miami, Fla.
Beach

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, A [illegible], age [illegible].

Former owner of a tourist concession at Havana Riviera Hotel for three years, source served a prison term at Isle of Pines for being anti-Castro. Released after 20 months on 24 Dec 62 with the 2506 Brigade prisoners. Source studied three years of law at Villanueva University in Havana. He speaks English fluently, appears to be very pro-US. One of a series of reports from this source.

[This report was developed by an Air Force representative assigned to the Office of Collection.]

1. The following US citizens were in Circular [illegible], Isle of Pines Prison, as of 24 Dec 62:

a. Robert John Gentile, age 28-30, 6'2", 150 lbs. brown eyes and hair, divorced; home address: 12517 Kelso Ave, Cleveland, Ohio. He was caught in the Copacabana Hotel, Miramar, Havana, in December 1960 for being a counterrevolutionary. He allegedly belonged to a secret anti-Castro movement. He was supposed to have helped in an uprising in the Escambray Mountains in early 1961. He is serving a 15-year prison term. He is in urgent need of medical care, has a stomach ulcer, and is losing weight daily. He has lost 70 lbs since he has been in prison. I saw him before I left. He is nothing but skin and bones.

b. Eustace Danbrunt, age 37-40, 5'6", 157 lbs, dark brown eyes and hair; married; home address: [illegible] Deerfield Blvd, Baltimore, Md. He was caught on north coast of Cuba because of counterrevolutionary activities in 1961 traveling in a yacht with seven or eight other Americans. He is serving a 15 to 20-year prison term. He has lost some weight but otherwise is doing fine. I saw him and talked to him before I left.

c. Peter Lambton, age 2[illegible], 5'10", 175 lbs, dirty blond hair, brown eyes; single; home address: Nassau, Bahamas. His father is an American residing in the Bahamas; his mother is English. He was an airplane pilot and water skiing and skindiving instructor in the Bahamas. He was caught in the Pinar del Rio Mountains, in the summer of 1960 fighting with a group of anti-Castro guerrillas. He is not a very intelligent boy and keeps to himself. Walks with a limp caused by an airplane accident.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

[illegible] very much.

[illegible], [illegible] lbs, [illegible] hair, brown eyes; [illegible]. His wife lives in Miami [illegible] breaking up. [illegible] not write to [illegible]. He was arrested [illegible] operations and was caught [illegible]. He was going to be tried [illegible] escaped from there with another Cuban [illegible] at the St. [illegible] Hotel in Havana. He was [illegible]. He is serving a 30-year sentence. [illegible] prison guards [illegible] while he was [illegible] prison. When he couldn't get up, they [illegible] him [illegible]. He [illegible] a lot of weight. [illegible] by the prison administration because of the [illegible] that he escaped.

c. [illegible] [illegible], 35- 8 years old, 5'8", [illegible] lbs, blond hair and blue eyes, [illegible] single. He is a civil pilot who taught in an aviation school in north Florida. Seems very well educated; speaks Spanish [illegible] well now. He was arrested in the summer of 1959 for being connected with a conspiracy with Chester Le Cayo to overthrow [illegible], [illegible] in Nicaragua. Le Cayo was traveling by commercial aircraft [illegible] from the US on his way to Puerto Rico, stopped at Jose Marti International Airport, Havana, to pick up passengers, was taken out of the plane, arrested, and taken to prison. Le Cayo was trying to recruit personnel in order to overthrow [illegible] at the time. Bradley is serving a 15- to 30-year prison term. He was actually working for Le Cayo at the time of his arrest. Bradley was caught two or three days before Le Cayo, who is also in prison now. Le Cayo has no love for the US although he acts as if he loves the US.

d. Rafael del Pino is a naturalized US citizen (Cuban parents), 35, 5'10", 155 lbs, [illegible] hair, dark brown eyes; home address: 121 [illegible], Miami, Fla (telephone [illegible]). His wife's name is [illegible]. He landed in [illegible] in 1959 in an aircraft he was flying by himself in order to pick up some Cubans to get them out of the country. One of the Cubans he was to pick up was a G-2 agent. The plane had landed, and he was waiting for the passengers when they started to shoot at him. He tried to take off, but he and the plane were badly shot up. He was nearly dead when he was taken from the burning aircraft. He was a member of the 26 July Movement and the right hand of Fidel Castro. He met Fidel in school, went with him to Bogota ([illegible]) and [illegible], then later turned against Fidel and started to work against him. Del Pino was a Korean War veteran and was president of the Cuban Korean War Veterans Association in Havana. He is serving a 30-year prison term.

e. [illegible] Carswell, 35-40, 5'10", 190 lbs, black hair and blue eyes; [illegible]. He was arrested early in 1961 in a boat on the north coast of Cuba with Eustace Dubrunt mentioned above. He is serving a 15-year term for counterrevolutionary activities. He was formerly manager of a bar in the US. I did not know him too well; he was sort of quiet and kept to himself. He is in fair health.

f. [illegible], 35-40, 5'9", 175 lbs, black hair, brown eyes; [illegible]; home address: 202 [illegible] Ave, Dothan, Ala, telephone [illegible] 2-[illegible]. He is in fair health, lost a lot of weight. He is serving a 15- to 30-year term for being a counterrevolutionary and was caught on the boat with Carswell and Dubrunt.

g. Edmund [illegible], 33, 6'1", 145 lbs, blond hair, blue eyes; Harvard graduate; [illegible] Boston, Mass. He lost so much weight, he is nothing but skin and bones. Always keeps to himself and [illegible] of the Americans. He is allegedly a CIA agent who was caught with

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

another US citizen in the Capri or St Johns Hotel in Havana in 1961 placing a microphone and wire recorder in the wall between his apartment and that of a Chinese delegation. The engineer, I believe, was either James [illegible] or Joe Green. He is also serving a 15-year term at Isle of Pines.

j. James [illegible]; [illegible], 5'9", 170 lbs, brown eyes, black hair; home address: Box 16, RFD 1, Franklinville, North Carolina. He may be the engineer who was caught with Marandy mentioned above. He also keeps to himself. His health is fair. He is also serving a 15- to 20-year term.

k. Joe Green, 30-35, 5'8", 160 lbs, brown hair and eyes; home address unknown. He is very quiet, soft-spoken, well-educated, keeps to himself. He may have been the electrical engineer who was caught with Marandy. He is also serving a long prison term.

l. Leonardo [illegible], 21 years old, 5'8", 150 lbs, dirty blond hair, blue eyes; high school graduate; home address unknown. He is very healthy, quiet, played chess all the time, stays with the US group. He was one of the seven caught in the yacht with the US citizens on the north coast of Cuba with Dubrunt. He is serving a 15- to 20-year prison term for counterrevolutionary activities.

m. Alfred Gibson, 30-35, 5'8", 160 lbs, fair health, Southern accent, fair education. Kept with the rest of the US citizens. I believe he was also caught in the same yacht with Dubrunt. He is also serving a long prison term.

n. Richard Allen Pecoraro, 30-35, 5'8", 150 lbs, dark brown hair, blue eyes; home address unknown. He is completely crazy, of irrational behavior, tried to escape in one of the big trash cans. Has had several crazy fits. He has been in the hospital several times. Two prisoners who are psychiatrists have been trying to help him, but in vain. He urgently needs psychiatric help. He was allegedly caught in the Escambray Mountains and arrested for being a counterrevolutionary. He was caught in late 1960 or early 1961, is serving a 15-year term. Sometimes goes around all day talking to himself.

o. [illegible] [illegible], 40-45, 5'9", [illegible] lbs, brown eyes and hair, naturalized US citizen (Cuban parents). Korean War veteran. His wife (Lucy) and two daughters are residing in Miami. He is in fair health, lost a lot of weight. He was arrested in Havana in 1961 for being a counterrevolutionary.

p. Michael ([illegible]), 25-30, 5'9", 150 lbs, light-brown hair, blue eyes, Korean War veteran, a Southerner, high school education. He was also caught in the yacht with Dubrunt, who was allegedly working for Rolando Masferrer. He worked in a New York resort center before going to Cuba.

7. These are all the US citizens that I know about who are at the Isle of Pines Prison now.

-end-

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. E-77-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

______ Release in full-text
______ Release in sanitized form
______ Deny in toto
______ Defer decision to ____________
______ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(✓)	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DCD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

May 77

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ____________

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

Form 1-77 3355

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. 00-[illegible] 3,245,641

SUBJECT Undesirables, Cuban Criminals and Suspected G-2 Agents among Asylees in the Ecuadorean Embassy in Havana

DATE DISTR. [illegible]

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES [illegible] A-12-856-761 [illegible]

DATE OF INFO. Aug 61 - Sep 62

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [illegible]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 12 856 761, who arrived in the US on 16 Sep 62 as a political refugee.

Source is a Cuban of Ecuadorean extraction and was employed as a clerk by the Ecuadorean Embassy until September 1962.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. The majority of the Cuban asylees in the Ecuadorean Embassy were bonafide victims of the Communist regime. However, during the time I served as secretary of the Embassy I observed that some men and women of unsavory reputation entered the Embassy as political refugees. The following are those whom I consider to be undesirable: Manuel [illegible], organizer of the G-2 activities in the Isle of Pines and who executed many opponents of the regime, entered the Embassy to avoid being arrested for black market activities and embezzlement of public funds. [illegible] is an accomplished bully and terrorized the rest of the asylees with his reckless display of weapons he brought into the Embassy. As far as I know he is still in the Embassy.

2. Juan Garcia [illegible], a hired killer who was one of the most notorious members of the gang known as "Los Tigres" led by former Senator Rolando Masferrer. [illegible] Garcia [illegible], a professional gambler, who organized gambling within the Embassy [illegible] Francisco Garcia, Jr. Garcia and his son are in Miami. [illegible] del [illegible], a notorious prostitute who was in [illegible] and [illegible]. These two females have been in Miami for [illegible].

3. Among the suspected G-2 agents were: Vicente Ibor, [illegible] Miami, Florida. [illegible] Communist Party who is presently in [illegible] Ecuador. [illegible] in Miami, Florida. Juan [illegible] also a Communist [illegible] in Miami. [illegible] Fidel Castro [illegible] the Embassy because of his participation in the automobile [illegible] who was involved with a ring of [illegible]. He is also a [illegible] pilot.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

[illegible] [illegible]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

4. Arturo [illegible], a member of a wealthy family from Santiago de Cuba, served as prosecuting attorney during the early days of the Revolution and sent many Cubans to the firing squad. This man and his family are residing in Miami. Sara [illegible], a mentally unbalanced female who kept the G-2 informed concerning the asylees' activities.

-end-

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F77-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

- ________ Release in full-text
- ________ Release in sanitized form
- ________ Deny in toto
- ________ Defer decision to ____________
- ________ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
( )	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(✓)	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DCD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

May 77

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ____________

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

FORM 3056

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

[illegible]

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch

DATE: [illegible] 1963

[illegible](S) - [illegible]

FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

SUBJECT: Plan to Unite the Cuban Exiles

1. At their request, Luis G. Rodriguez met with Dr. [illegible] Rafael Sardinas, secretary of the Cuban Cane Planters Association in Exile and with Juan Amador [illegible], former Cuban Senator and editor of the Spanish language radio newspaper "El Periodico del Aire [illegible]." [illegible] advised that they have been meeting with several personalities of the exile colony in an effort to organize all the exiles into a single group which will represent all the exiles regardless of former affiliations.

2. They feel that after the sorry spectacle provided by the Cuban Revolutionary Council, they must avoid getting involved in matters which are in conflict with the policies of the US Government. Therefore, they would like to discuss this project with Mr. John Crimmins.

3. The following personalities have been approached and have indicated their desire to cooperate to the fullest extent in an effort to unite all the Cubans in exile: Antonio Manuel de Varona, Dr. Julio Garceran, Dr. Carlos Prio, Dr. Carlos Marquez Sterling, Carlos Hevia, Jose Ignacio Rivero, Jose Alvarez Diaz, Raul [illegible], Aureliano Sanchez Arango, Luis Conte Aguero, Manuel Artime, [illegible], [illegible], Orlando Cuervo Galano, Jose Ignacio Pasos, [illegible], Herminio Portell Vila, Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, Lomberto Diaz, Santiago Alvarez, Ruben de Leon. Also included in this roster are General Generoso Campos Marquetti, veteran of the War of Independence, and Facundo [illegible], leader of the Transportation Workers, because both are Negroes.

4. Representatives of the Medical Association, Bar Association, Teacher and Newspaper Associations and the Students Directory have also been contacted and indicated their desire to assist in this endeavor.

5. Amador and Sardinas stated that former President Prio indicated that former members of the Castro regime who are exiled in the US should also be invited to join because their presence in the organization will indicate to the people of Cuba that the aim of the organization is not the return to certain conditions that prevailed before 1 Jan 59. Dr. Prio maintains that with former Fidelistas joining the organization the members of the Rebel Army and the militia plus the government bureaucracy will not fear reprisals if and when the Castro regime is ousted. Dr. Prio added that with names such as Felipe Pazos, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Raul Chibas and even controversial Manolo Ray, the chances of defection by members of the Armed Forces will increase.

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

6. The organization will also invite to join many prominent Cubans who served under the Batista Administration and who were given a clean bill of health after the Revolution. However, such notorious criminals like Colonels Esteban Ventura, Conrado Carratala, [illegible], Irenaldo Garcia Baez and others, will not be admitted. Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and his group will not be invited because they are considered to be agent provocateurs.

7. If this works out, the new organization will be ruled by a five man board selected by a general assembly of all the above mentioned personalities. The chairmanship of the board will be rotated periodically.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

LCRodriguez:es

cc: SAS, Miami

SAS
29 April 63

CONFIDENTIAL

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. E77-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: [illegible]

RECOMMEND:

_____ Release in full-text
_____ Release in sanitized form
__✓__ Deny in toto
_____ Defer decision to _____
_____ Coordination with _____ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓) Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( ) Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓) Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(✓) File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(c)
( ) Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( ) Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( ) Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( ) Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DCD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE
May 77

Document No. _____
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: _____

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

16-88-96

Chief, Washington Field Office 12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)

A-168346 A-168762

Rolando Masferrer (Jr.), Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : Van Napper/Musulin telecons

A-127900

1. Attached per referent telephone conversations is copy of Dun and Bradstreet report as requested on Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Powder Springs, Georgia. Please note that Chairman of the Board, is Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III. Werbell is a former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer known to this writer during assignments in China during WWII.

2. This Agency, as well as other government agencies, have considerable information on Werbell. He is an old and unsavory, unsolicited, contact of the Miami Field Office dating from 1959. He is of dubious character and reputation who had and has been involved in grandoise schemes and international arms deals. He has had perpetual financial difficulties.

3. Werbell was involved with Roland Masferrer, Senior, in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion in 1967. This may throw a different light on possible source development of young Rolando Jr. Any approach to him should be executed with some degree of caution. We do not desire to get involved with Werbell. However, we cannot foresee any objection to planned debriefings of Masferrer Jr., following his trips to Latin America and other areas, in pursuit of FPI and possible information of operational significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
OSMusulin/lld
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILED: HR 23880

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON APPROVAL OF DCI

CLASSIFIED BY 42-1445

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY
5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) [illegible]

[illegible]
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

2 c

14-00000

Central / Paul
cc Washington
28 Jul 72
[illegible]

16-88-46

7 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

A-168846

SUBJECT: Assessment of Recruitability - Rolando Masferrer, Jr.
Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corporation
and Associated with Defense Systems Incorporated

A168762

1. Subject seems to have inherited that particular Latin American penchant for involvement in covert political activities. However, the Subject's involvement is not merely pastime or recreation but it is instead intimately connected with his chosen profession as an arms salesman. Here the phrase "for fun and profit" seems aptly suited. He seems to be a man of action with the ability to exploit an opportunity, rather than a towering intellect.

2. Subject has excellent contacts and access in Latin America. This access developed from his extended family, professional appointments, and his involvement with Cuban exile groups. His family is well-known (infamous) throughout many sectors of Latin America and opens many doors for him (although it also closes others). It should also be mentioned that his family has recently developed a rather checkered association with this Agency. The particular nature of his military products gives him contact with high military, police, and security officials throughout Latin America. He seems to be well versed on the status of various arms deals (both official and under-the-table) in the countries he travels. He has been involved with several Cuban exile political and para-military organizations.

3. Politically, Subject is a staunch anti-Communist. This position is probably ingrained from his family, but also reinforced from his various political and professional activities. He has voiced a particular hatred for Cuban Communists. He seems to view them not as respected enemies, but as hated traitors. He is vehemently anti-Castro.

1c

4. Subject has developed what could be interpreted as a certain patriotism for this country. During conversations he referred a few times to "my country" meaning the U.S. I believe that the fact he volunteered for U.S. military training reflects not only the selfish motives of becoming Special Forces qualified but also a sense of duty. I also believe that his recent statements to me regarding international security matters is not merely empty loquacity but is evidence of his desire to contribute something and become involved in the national interest.

5. Subject would need sober briefings on the responsibility of any Agency association as well as subsequent careful handling. He would need to get away from the "Flagler Street Commando syndrome" of visual and verbal bravado. He would need instruction to discern rumor from fact, to identify sources, and to assess the reliability of acquired information.

6. I am sure that the Subject is recruitable. The question is what degree of association with the Agency would be appropriate. If the decision is made to approach the Subject, may I suggest that his association be initially limited to Agency briefings and debriefings before and after his trips to Latin America. Once his reliability is established and the accuracy of his reporting is proven then further utilization may be possible. Since his financial situation seems to be secure I am sure he could be handled on a non-pay basis.

7. Subject is scheduled to leave on a two-week business trip to Venezuela and Colombia beginning in early August 1972. He claimed to have appointments with a Venezuelan Air Force General and with Venezuelan national security officials in DISIP.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

16-77-

Chief, Washington Field Office 16 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service, OSS

Rolando Hasferrer, Jr. - Possible Source Lead

1. Attached for your information and whatever interest you may have in this source lead from WH/3/Venezuela (Jeffrey G. Peterson).

2. On the basis of the information submitted, Mr. Hasferrer, Jr., may be a useful source of FPI.

3. Suggest you arrange contact to obtain routine biographic data to initiate security checks; determine his intelligence potential and explain the DCS mission, without revealing in any way the past relationship with Mr. Peterson. Subject's personality profile appears to be very interesting.

4. It appears that the Clandestine Service is not ~~repeat~~ not interested in subject's operational potential at this time. We leave this in your capable hands to determine what course of action you may wish to contemplate in this matter.

JAMES R. MURPHY

GSMusulin/daa
cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed: EE 23880

SECRET

12 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando MASFERRER, Jr.

1. Please be informed of a possible future contact--Rolando MASFERRER, Jr., recently promoted to Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Washington D.C. office, 905 L' Enfant Plaza, #4020. He is also associated with Parabellum Corporation, another military weapons firm. Subject, born approximately 1945, in Habana, Cuba, is believed to be a naturalized citizen.

2. Subject makes frequent sales trips to Latin America. Because of the nature of his main product(machine pistols with silencers) he has good access to top Latin American governmental officials and military and security officers. He has personally met many Latin American presidents. He should be a good source of information on the current status of arms sales in Latin America; internal security, military armament levels, order-of-battle, and internal politics in host countries; and, if needed, status of Cuban exile movement. He is presently on a sales mission to Colombia and is scheduled to return in mid-June.

3. MASFERRER, Jr. has been a Miami resident since 1959 and more recently lived in Atlanta. He will permanently locate in the Washington, D.C. area when he returns from his Colombian trip.

4. Subject is not to be confused with his father by the same name, the infamous Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER y Rojas(201-42669). Masferrer Sr. was a former Cuban Senator and leader of a dreaded private army of Batista enforcers called "Los Tigres(The Tigers)". He is presently serving in a U.S. federal prison for attempting to organize a 1967 invasion of Haiti in order to set up a base of operations against Cuba. Masferrer Sr., violently anti-Castro, was involved in numerous Cuban exile operations against Cuba during the last decade.

5. I was Subject's Commanding Officer in the Florida National Guard and sometimes saw him socially while in Miami. Although Cuban by birth, he now feels that he is an American. Politically anti-Communist, he joined the National Guard(while not under duress from the draft) to become a "Green Beret." He is polite and correct in his social relationships. I received a letter from him, 7 June 1972, informing me of his impending move to the Washington, D.C. area. He

SECRET

solicited my aid in finding a local army reserve unit.

6. If you are interested in exploring this possibility further, please feel free to contact me at any time. I could suggest cautions and method of contact or introduction. Subject is unwitting of my Agency employment.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

WH/3/V

Orig. & 2

SECRET

Chief, Washington Field Office   28 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)   B-67-52

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Possible Source Lead   #168846

REFERENCES: A) Memorandum for the Record dated 12 June 1972; Same Subject
B) Van Happer/Musulin telecon

1. In regard to referent telephone conversation of recent date, we asked Jeffrey G. Peterson (WH/3/Venezuela) for additional [illegible] information on Rolando Masferrer, Jr., Vice President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Headquartered in Georgia.

1163762

2. Jeffrey Peterson is a young "career trainee" who has been with the Agency for about six months. He met Masferrer in Miami, Florida, where both belonged to a Florida National Guard Unit. Peterson knows Masferrer socially as well having met frequently for "snacks and beer".

3. According to Peterson, based on his observations, subject is a personable, intelligent, individual who appears trustworthy, and of sound mind and judgment. He is a solid citizen completely assimilated in the American mainstream; intensely interested in the U.S. political processes. Politically, he is of moderate conservative persuasion. He is an astute businessman of demonstrated ability and integrity. To highlight this point, Peterson mentioned that Masferrer spurned lucrative cash offers for "under the table" deals to engage in illegal weapons trade in Latin America. He refused these offers to operate in legitimate business circles.

4. Young Rolando takes a sociable drink; has no known bad habits. He has a keen eye for attractive females, but no more so than all healthy males. Peterson said he would not hesitate to recommend subject for a position of trust and confidence.

5. Rolando Masferrer, Jr. served with the Green Berets, elite U.S. Army unit whose members require special security clearances by the military.

6. Peterson underlined his previous statement that Rolando should not be confused with his father, Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, a former Cuban Senator who was leader of the notorious "Los Tigers", the dreaded army of enforcers under Batista.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

7. Peterson believed, and we are inclined to agree, that Rolando Jr., may be a good candidate for source development. He will be located at 905 L'Enfant Plaza, Washington, D.C., as the representative of Military Armaments Co. He will also represent Parabellum Corporation another military weapons firm.

8. Dun and Bradstreet reports were requested from New York and a copy will be forwarded when received.

JAMES R. MURPHY

GS:muslin/lld
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILED: HH 23880
23880

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16-88-46

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REQ. CODE	C. CASE NUMBER
XMIM	CC400	

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR.	REPORT NO.	RELEASED MO. DA. YR.
07 10 3	~~A~~ 2026573	07 16 3

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
Guillermo Yglesias/Efforts to Raise Money Under Alleged Agency Auspices

(Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rolando MASFERRER
6080 W. Flagler Avenue
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
[✓ 9]	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
[✓ 3]	0055		
4			

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
WH

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X			

FIELD COMMENTS

Our local colleagues wish us to report on Yglesias and record these developments.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

HH 25263

WH/COG/OS 4 D 16 7-040
ATTN CHRIS HOPKINS

Yglesias is certainly a fraud and should come to the attention of the FBI and police authorities. Masferrer should also be known to your office since we sent some background info on him to MM F.O. He is a slick operator. Be very cautious in your dealings in the fut.

C.O. MMacVane:paw

F.O. CHIEF BEMAINPARING

CASE OFFICER

DIVISION/STAFF/DESK

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO. 00-A(S)-322/20265-73

DATE

COUNTRY Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala

NO. PAGES 2

SUBJECT Guillermo Yglesias/Efforts to Raise Money Under Alleged Agency Auspices

REFERENCES

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

---

1. On 26 June 1973 the Miami Field Office responded to a call on the listed line from a man who identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. Mr. Masferrer requested to meet with Matt MacVane of the Miami Field Office. Mr. Masferrer said that he had some information concerning one Guillermo Yglesias (subject of 00A(S) 322/17013-73) that would prove to be of interest to the Central Intelligence Agency. Rolando Masferrer lives at 6080 W. Flagler Avenue, Miami, Florida. As a result of his request Matt MacVane and Luis Desa-Soto of the Miami Field Office responded to the call and met with Rolando Masferrer that afternoon.

2. Mr. Masferrer related details of his relationship with one Guillermo Yglesias, age about 38, an individual on whom there are other Agency references. According to Masferrer, Yglesias approached him in late March 1973 and identified himself as working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Yglesias said that he was trying to raise a large sum of money to finance secret CIA operations. Yglesias said that CIA funds have been tied up as a result of the Watergate affair. He referred to these operations as black operations. Mr. Masferrer said that he knew several high ranking government officials in Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala. Masferrer contacted several of these friends in South America and asked them to aid the Central Intelligence Agency in raising funds for secret operations in South America and the Caribbean. Masferrer has contacted Manuel Vega, a retired Colombian army colonel and presently head of the Colombian Internal Police. He has also contacted one Alvaro Vargas, who is an advisor in armaments to the Colombian National Police. Masferrer also passed Yglesias the name of Carlos Fabri, head of the Venezuela Internal Police. Yglesias showed a great interest in small arms of all types. Masferrer said that he personally turned over five M-26 fragmentation hand grenades, one M-16 automatic rifle, one AR-15 semi-automatic rifle, and several handguns 38 caliber type. Masferrer was led to believe that the weapons would be used in a secret CIA operation in Puerto Rico. This operation was described by Yglesias as a black operation.

3. During our conversation with Masferrer, he raised an additional point. Masferrer said that he contacted Manuel Vega in Colombia and that Vega agreed to help all that he could. Vega expressed deep concern to

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

Classified by: 007632
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

Masferrer because, according to him, any time the US Embassy people in Bogota were passed information the Colombian guerrillas were somehow informed. Vega told Masferrer that he believed a leak had developed in the US Embassy and that the "Embassy boys" could no longer be trusted.

- end -

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16-88-46

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-4)	B. REQ. CODE (11-15)	C. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. (22-26)	REPORT NO. (27-33)	J (34-36)
XMIM	10400		05243	A 1386473	

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Possible False Recruitment Effort

(Cuba/Haiti)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39)

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40-44): D5363

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rolando Masferrer
c/o Daniel Bermudez
6080 W. Flagler, Apt 17
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE DOC. GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50		AREA 51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN	1	S	O	V
1	S	&	T	2. TOO GENERAL	2	I	N	T
2	-	-	-	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES	3			
3	M	I	L		4			
4	-	-	-	4. OTHER MISC				
5	S	O	C	5. COMBINED WITH				
6	G	E	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST				
7	B	I	O					
8	-	-	-					
9	M	I	S					

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT

☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☒ OTHER (specify below) Call-in

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE): ☐ NO ☐ TO USSR ☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: WH

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X			Musulin

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS HH-23880

FYI and Possible Interest

Copies to:
WH/C/FI - 3-D-38
WH/7/HT 3-B-0001
WH/C/CI 3-D-46
7-014A

Believe your caller was Rolando Masferrer Jr. who is the nephew of the infamous Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, serving in a U.S. federal prison for organizing (1967) invasion of Haiti. Young Rolando was associated w/Mitchell L. WerBell III. Story given by Rolando Jr. ([illegible]) We will send you some background.

FIELD COMMENTS

Our local colleagues have asked us to report this brief item in order to put it in the system.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 004476

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF DESK
BEMainwaring:mbf	BEMAINWARING		

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-61)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO. 00-A(S)-322/13864-73

DATE 26 May 1973

COUNTRY Cuba/Haiti

NO. PAGES 1

SUBJECT Possible False Recruitment Effort

REFERENCES

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

---

1. At 1700 hours on 14 May 1973 the Miami Field Office received a telephone call on the listed line from an individual who ultimately identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. It is believed that Masferrer is identical with former Cuban senator and Batista associate Rolando Masferrer Rojas who is of dubious reputation and is well known for several nefarious actions in Haiti, Guatemala and perhaps elsewhere. Rolando Masferrer was convicted of conspiracy to invade Haiti in 1967. It is believed that there are extensive Agency files on Rolando Masferrer.

2. Masferrer was very reluctant to provide details, but finally said he could be reached at local telephone 261-3689. A separate check reveals this number to be registered to Daniel Bermudez, 6080 W. Flagler, Apartment #17.

3. In any event the listed line caller indicated that he had been approached by one Guillermo Iglesias and asked to engage in certain activities which he did not further describe. According to Masferrer, Iglesias carried credentials or other identifying material which seemed to link him with the U.S. Coast Guard in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Masferrer said, however, that Iglesias indicated also that he was in some way representing the Central Intelligence Agency. Masferrer then said that the purpose of the telephone call was to check on the bona fides of Guillermo Igleaias.

4. Masferrer was told that the name Guillermo Iglesias meant nothing to the Miami Field Office and was otherwise given a rather noncommital response.

- end -

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

Classified by: 007622
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O 11652, exemption category: 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

CONFIDENTIAL

16-88-46

Chief, Washington Field Office 12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (DCS)

A-168846 A-168762

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : Van Happer/Musulin telecons

A 127900

1. Attached per referent telephone conversations is copy of Dun and Bradstreet report as requested on Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Powder Springs, Georgia. Please note that Chairman of the Board, is Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III. Werbell is a former Office of ~~Strategic Services (OSS) officer~~ known to this writer during assignments in China during WWII.

2. This Agency, as well as other government agencies, have considerable information on Werbell. He is an old and unsavory, unsolicited, contact of the Miami Field Office dating from 1959. He is of dubious character and reputation who had and has been involved in grandoise schemes and international arms deals. He has had perpetual financial difficulties.

3. Werbell was involved with Roland Masferrer, Senior, in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion in 1967. This may throw a different light on possible source development of young Rolando Jr. Any approach to him should be executed with some degree of caution. We do not desire to get involved with Werbell. However, we cannot foresee any objection to planned debriefings of Masferrer Jr., following his trips to Latin America and other areas, in pursuit of FPI and possible information of operational significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
CS/Musulin/lld
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILED: HH 23880

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON APPROVAL OF DCI

CLASSIFIED BY 42-1445

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) [illegible]

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

2

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F77-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

____ Release in full-text
____ Release in sanitized form
____✓ Deny in toto
____ Defer decision to ____________
____✓ Coordination with [illegible] prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓) Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( ) Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( ) Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(✓) File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( ) Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( ) Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( ) Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( ) Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DCD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

May 77

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ____________

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

16-88-C

Chief, Washington Field Office 16 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service, OSS

Rolando Masferrer, Jr. - Possible Source Lead

1. Attached for your information and whatever interest you may have in this source lead from WH/3/Venezuela, (Jeffrey G. Peterson).

2. On the basis of the information submitted, Mr. Masferrer, Jr., may be a useful source of FPI.

3. Suggest you arrange contact to obtain routine biographic data to initiate security checks; determine his intelligence potential and explain the DCS mission, without revealing in any way the past relationship with Mr. Peterson. Subject's personality profile appears to be very interesting.

4. It appears that the Clandestine Service is not ~~repeat not~~ interested in subject's operational potential at this time. We leave this in your capable hands to determine what course of action you may wish to contemplate in this matter.

JAMES [illegible] MURPHY

GSMusulin/daa
cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed: HH 23880

SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F-77-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ______

[illegible]

RECOMMEND:

- ______ Release in full-text
- ______ Release in sanitized form
- ✓ Deny in toto
- ______ Defer decision to ______
- ✓ Coordination with [illegible] prior to above denial/release.

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓) Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( ) Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓) Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(✓) File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( ) Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( ) Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Excepted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( ) Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( ) Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DCD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE
May 77

Document No. ______
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ______

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Chief, Washington Field Office 28 June 1972

B-67-52

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)

A #168846

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Possible Source Lead

REFERENCES: A) Memorandum for the Record dated 12 June 1972; Same Subject
B) Van Epper/Musulin telecon

1. In regard to referent telephone conversation of recent date, we asked Jeffrey C. Peterson (WH/3/Venezuela) for additional assessment information on Rolando Masferrer, Jr., Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Headquartered in Georgia.

A 168762

2. Jeffrey Peterson is a young "career trainee" who has been with the Agency for about six months. He met Masferrer in Miami, Florida, where both belonged to a Florida National Guard Unit. Peterson knows Masferrer socially as well having met frequently for "snacks and beer".

3. According to Peterson, based on his observations, subject is a personable, intelligent, individual who appears trustworthy, and of sound mind and judgement. He is a solid citizen completely assimilated in the American mainstream; intensely interested in the U.S. political processes. Politically, he is of moderate conservative persuasion. He is an astute businessman of demonstrated ability and integrity. To highlight this point, Peterson mentioned that Masferrer spurned lucrative cash offers for "under the table" deals to engage in illegal weapons trade in Latin America. He refused these offers to operate in legitimate business circles.

4. Young Rolando takes a sociable drink; has no known bad habits. He has a keen eye for attractive females, but no more so than all healthy males. Peterson said he would not hesitate to recommend subject for a position of trust and confidence.

5. Rolando Masferrer, Jr. served with the Green Berets, elite U.S. Army unit whose members require special security clearances by the military.

6. Peterson underlined his previous statement that Rolando should not be confused with his father, Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, a former Cuban Senator who was leader of the notorious "Los Tigres", the dreaded army of enforcers under Batista.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

7. Peterson believed, and we are inclined to agree, that Rolando Jr., may be a good candidate for source development. He will be located at 905 L'Enfant Plaza, Washington, D.C., as the representative of Military Armaments Co. He will also represent Parabellum Corporation another military weapons firm.

8. Dun and Bradstreet reports were requested from New York and a copy will be forwarded when received.

JAMES R. MURPHY

GSMusalin/lld
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILED: HN 23880
23880

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F77-260

Document Description: Memos

Dated: 12 June 1972
7 July 1972 (2)
6 July 1972

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

____ Release in full-text
____ Release in sanitized form
____ Deny in toto
__✓__ Defer decision to WH Div
____ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
( )	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( )	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5343, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Geo. Elliff
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ____________

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

FORM 5-77 3966

6 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando Masferrer, Jr.

1. On Monday, 3 July 1972, from 2100 to 2400 hours at Clyde's Bar, Washington, D.C.; and Tuesday, 4 July 1972, from 1300 to 1600 hours, poolside, 7625 Matera St., Apt. 201, Falls Church, Virginia, the undersigned talked with Rolando Masferrer, Jr.

2. I mentioned to Masferrer that my superiors (supposedly in the State Department) were interested that some responsible U.S. Government authority be informed of his story regarding U.S. citizen involvement in drug trafficking and guerrilla training in Mexico. Masferrer said that last February he told the story up to that date to Miami, F.B.I. Agent Bob Dyer, and also certain information to U.S. Customs Bureau Agent Buchanan (fnu). Masferrer said he had not informed any government entities of events subsequent to February. I mentioned that such information was not necessarily within the unique purview of the State Department, but that my superiors would probably be interested in anything further.

3. Rolando Masferrer, Jr., related to me four different occasions when an insurgent organization, "Force Seven", comprised of American adventurers in Mexico, was brought to his attention.

4. The first time the Subject heard of "Force Seven" was from Francisco BRAVO (or Brabo) [NFI], Chief of Judicial Police, State of Morelos. Subject had met Bravo "a few years ago". They met again in Atlanta, Georgia, late December 1971, when Bravo came for a weapons demonstration at the Military Armament Corp, Powder Springs, Georgia, some 20 miles outside Atlanta. Bravo told Masferrer of the insurgency problem in the Mexican states of Morelos and Guerrero. Bravo mentioned the existence of "Force Seven". Bravo indicated his police

CLASSIFIED BY 51-1391

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)

23880

needed weapons to fight the insurgents and subsequently invited Masferrer and Anselmo Alliegro [son of a former Cuban Senator, naturalized citizen, and Masferrer's partner in Parabellum Corporation] to come to Mexico. Bravo promised to introduce Masferrer and Alliegro to Mexican police authorities competent to purchase firearms.

5. Subject again heard the name "Force Seven" in Miami, January 1972, from Oliverio CASTANEDA Paiz, former First Vice-President of the Guatemalan Congress. [Castaneda was head of the Guatemalan civilian counter-insurgency forces in the Zacapa region during 1967-68, and, according to Masferrer, the chief of the Mano Blanco. Castaneda was killed 12 June 1972. The Guatemalan insurgent group, F.A.R., "took credit" for the killing.] Castaneda was travelling to the U.S. with Messers. Sandoval and Figaroa. [Probably Mario SANDOVAL Alarcon, President of the Guatemalan Congress and head of the M.L.N. party; and Alvaro CUEVAS Figaroa, Castaneda's predecessor as First Vice-President of Congress. Several TDCS reports during January and February 1972 indicated Cuevas Figaroa was trying to smuggle arms from the U.S. to Guatemala supposedly for a planned coup in Costa Rica] Masferrer said Castaneda was trying to arrange the release from U.S. federal prison Rolando Masferrer, Sr. Castaneda wanted Masferrer, Sr., to emigrate to Guatemala to become involved in state security matters and also to organize an anti-Communist army. Castaneda mentioned to Masferrer, Jr., the growing insurgency problems in the Peten area of Guatemala. Castaneda mentioned that U.S. insurgents operating under the name "Force Seven" entered the Peten from Mexico. The Guatemalan Army's Mariscal Zavala Brigade had been dispatched from Guatemala City to the Mexican border in Peten province to counter the infiltration, but had recently been shifted to the border adjacent British Honduras. Masferror said Castaneda believed that former U.S. "Green Berets" were involved with the insurgents. Castaneda said that a list of all U.S. Special Forces-trained Guatemalans had disappeared when the U.S. military training mission was terminated. Now the guerrillas in Guatemala are pinpointing those U.S. trained, local military personnel with uncanny accuracy. From that evidence, Castaneda believed that "Force Seven" must include some of the U.S. "Green Berets" that had originally trained the local Guatemalan military.

SECRET

23880

6. During the first three months of 1972, Subject made two trips to Mexico. During his first trip, three weeks in late January and February, Masferrer travelled with Alliegro and Mitchell Werbell (Mitchell Livingston Werbell III, 201-259910, former OSS member in C-B-I in World War II; former President of Military Armament Corporation; and presently associated with Defense Systems Incorporated, Powder Springs, Georgia.) In Mexico City, Francisco Bravo introduced the delegation to Mexico City Police Chief Santos [Daniel GUTIERREZ Santos] and Miguel NAZAR Haro, "Chief of Political Police". [Actually Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, DFS, a political and intelligence organization working within the Secretariat of Government.] During conversations Nazar admitted Mexico's insurgency problems and specifically named "Force Seven". Masferrer mentioned that both Nazar and Gutierrez Santos were angry with President Echeverria because of the Mexican Government's policy of light criminal punishment and short prison terms for bandits and/or guerrillas painstakingly captured by the police.

7. Bravo took the three to Cuernavaca where he showed them a house on the outskirts of the city that the police used for unofficial detentions and heavy-handed interrogations. Bravo complained that the local Catholic Archbishop was implicated with the insurgents as well as certain U.S. film personalities who vacation in the American community in Cuernavaca. Bravo also implicated a professor that was kidnapped in Guerrero in late 1971. Bravo believed that the professor [Jaime CASTREJON Diez, Rector of the University of Guerrero] actually conspired with the insurgents for his own kidnapping in order to raise the ransom money for the insurgent movement. [The ransom was finally paid by President Echeverria.]

8. Subject travelled again to Mexico in March 1972 with Bernardo DE TORRES. [Mexico 2038, 4 December 1969, mentions that LITEMPO-12, WH/MIAMI, received a phone call from one Bernardo De Torres regarding a supposed Swiss contraband arms dealer in Mexico City.] Nazar had invited Masferrer to return to Mexico to go on a "hunting party", that is, to participate in an actual counter-insurgency operation. Masferrer and De Torres arrived in Acapulco and were met by Bravo. They travelled by police vehicle for about an hour east of Acapulco to an area near La Treintas (NFI).

23850

Just before they arrived they heard on the police radio that the Army had just "shot down" a twin-engine Beechcraft. When they arrived, a search of the wreckage yielded a few weapons. A short firefight (about 15 minutes) ensued with insurgents that left two soldiers dead. Masferrer said he did not know the number of insurgent casualties. One insurgent was captured along with his .45 caliber pistol.

9. The captured insurgent turned out to be a U.S. citizen, white, male, approximately 27 years old. (Masferrer claimed he forgot the prisoner's name, but that he had it in Miami.) Bravo did not trust the Acapulco or the Guerrero state police and had his men take the prisoner to the detention house outside of Cuernavaca. Masferrer said he witnessed the interrogation in which the prisoner's head was repeatedly dunked in a rain barrel to make him talk. The prisoner eventually revealed the following information about "Force Seven": participating Americans were ex-ranger, airborne, Marine or Special Forces types, many with Vietnam combat experience. They were armed with CAR-15 (M-16) rifles and some had M-79 grenade launchers. Other Americans operated elsewhere in Latin America. "Force Seven" provided training to the insurgents and, whenever possible, supplied weapons. In return, the Americans were paid in money and drugs, mostly marijuana, but some cocaine. Masferrer said no heroin was mentioned. The prisoner said the insurgents used the money from the drug smuggling to finance operations. Bank robberies had become increasingly difficult since the Army began posting armed guards at area banks. The prisoner said he had worked under Genaro VASQUEZ [Mexico's infamous bandit-turned-guerrilla; killed in a car accident last February]. The prisoner put guerrilla strength at about 1,000 men. Masferrer, however, said Bravo felt that figure to be high. The prisoner also mentioned that some of the insurgents had previously received guerrilla training in North Korea.

10. Masferrer said that later, upon Nazar's orders, the American prisoner was shot and killed. The whole affair was never reported in the local press because, according to Masferrer, such information, if revealed, would damage the area's tourist trade.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

SECRET 2388

12 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando MASFERRER, Jr.

1. Please be informed of a possible future contact--Rolando MASFERRER, Jr., recently promoted to Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Washington D.C. office, 905 L' Enfant Plaza, #4020. He is also associated with Parabellum Corporation, another military weapons firm. Subject, born approximately 1945, in Habana, Cuba, is believed to be a naturalized citizen.

2. Subject makes frequent sales trips to Latin America. Because of the nature of his main product(machine pistols with silencers) he has good access to top Latin American governmental officials and military and security officers. He has personally met many Latin American presidents. He should be a good source of information on the current status of arms sales in Latin America; internal security, military armament levels, order-of-battle, and internal politics in host countries; and, if needed, status of Cuban exile movement. He is presently on a sales mission to Colombia and is scheduled to return in mid-June.

3. MASFERRER, Jr. has been a Miami resident since 1959 and more recently lived in Atlanta. He will permanently locate in the Washington, D.C. area when he returns from his Colombian trip.

4. Subject is not to be confused with his father by the same name, the infamous Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER y Rojas(201-42669). Masferrer Sr. was a former Cuban Senator and leader of a dreaded private army of Batista enforcers called "Los Tigres(The Tigers)". He is presently serving in a U.S. federal prison for attempting to organize a 1967 invasion of Haiti in order to set up a base of operations against Cuba. Masferrer Sr., violently anti-Castro, was involved in numerous Cuban exile operations against Cuba during the last decade.

5. I was Subject's Commanding Officer in the Florida National Guard and sometimes saw him socially while in Miami. Although Cuban by birth, he now feels that he is an American. Politically anti-Communist,he joined the National Guard(while not under duress from the draft) to become a "Green Beret." He is polite and correct in his social relationships. I received a letter from him, 7 June 1972, informing me of his impending move to the Washington, D.C. area. He

SECRET

solicited my aid in finding a local army reserve unit.

6. If you are interested in exploring this possibility further, please feel free to contact me at any time. I could suggest cautions and method of contact or introduction. Subject is unwitting of my Agency employment.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

Jeffrey G. Peterson

WH/3/V

Orig. & 2

Central / [illegible]
CC Washington
28 Jul 72
[illegible]

16-88-46

7 July 1972

A-168846

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Assessment of Recruitability - Rolando Masferrer, Jr.
Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corporation
and Associated with Defense Systems Incorporated

A168762

1. Subject seems to have inherited that particular Latin American penchant for involvement in covert political activities. However, the Subject's involvement is not merely pastime or recreation but it is instead intimately connected with his chosen profession as an arms salesman. Here the phrase "for fun and profit" seems aptly suited. He seems to be a man of action with the ability to exploit an opportunity, rather than a towering intellect.

2. Subject has excellent contacts and access in Latin America. This access developed from his extended family, professional appointments, and his involvement with Cuban exile groups. His family is well-known (infamous) throughout many sectors of Latin America and opens many doors for him (although it also closes others). It should also be mentioned that his family has recently developed a rather checkered association with this Agency. The particular nature of his military products gives him contact with high military, police, and security officials throughout Latin America. He seems to be well versed on the status of various arms deals (both official and under-the-table) in the countries he travels. He has been involved with several Cuban exile political and para-military organizations.

3. Politically, Subject is a staunch anti-Communist. This position is probably ingrained from his family, but also reinforced from his various political and professional activities. He has voiced a particular hatred for Cuban Communists. He seems to view them not as respected enemies, but as hated traitors. He is vehemently anti-Castro.

5-139

4. Subject has developed what could be interpreted as a certain patriotism for this country. During conversations he referred a few times to "my country" meaning the U.S. I believe that the fact he volunteered for U.S. military training reflects not only the selfish motives of becoming Special Forces qualified but also a sense of duty. I also believe that his recent statements to me regarding international security matters is not merely empty loquacity but is evidence of his desire to contribute something and become involved in the national interest.

5. Subject would need sober briefings on the responsibility of any Agency association as well as subsequent careful handling. He would need to get away from the "Flagler Street Commando syndrome" of visual and verbal bravado. He would need instruction to discern rumor from fact, to identify sources, and to assess the reliability of acquired information.

6. I am sure that the Subject is recruitable. The question is what degree of association with the Agency would be appropriate. If the decision is made to approach the Subject, may I suggest that his association be initially limited to Agency briefings and debriefings before and after his trips to Latin America. Once his reliability is established and the accuracy of his reporting is proven then further utilization may be possible. Since his financial situation seems to be secure I am sure he could be handled on a non-pay basis.

7. Subject is scheduled to leave on a two-week business trip to Venezuela and Colombia beginning in early August 1972. He claimed to have appointments with a Venezuelan Air Force General and with Venezuelan national security officials in DISIP.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

7 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Jeffrey G. Peterson's Conversation with
Rolando Masferrer, Jr.

1. On Sunday, 2 July 1972, from 1800 to 2000 hours at the [illegible] Restaurant, Arlington, Va., I met with Rolando Masferrer, Jr. (Masferrer is unwitting of my Agency employment. My cover story is that I am a Program Officer with the State Department. I supposedly work in a research capacity for the American Republics Area until the time I can be programmed to enter the next Foreign Service Institute class.)

2. Masferrer and I, old National Guard comrades, had not seen one another for 5 months. We had dinner and later went on a tour of apartment sites in the District and northern Virginia. During the course of the conversation, he related the events of his trips to Mexico and his recent trip (June 1972) to Colombia in the course of his job as Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corp.

Mexico: Subject mentioned the trouble the Mexican Government is having with leftist guerrillas, particularly in two western states. He claimed the rebels were being trained in part by U.S. adventurers who claimed to be ex-ranger, airborne Marine or Special Forces types, many with Vietnam experience. The Americans were training the rebels in return for money and marijuana and a piece of the drug smuggling action. The Americans operated under the nom de guerre "Force Seven". This same "Force Seven" claimed to have connections and affiliations in Guatemala. Subject claimed even to have participated in a small firefight with the Mexican Army and the Judicial Police against the guerrillas in an effort to prove the worth of his particular military products.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY 51-1391

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)

SECRET

23880

Colombia: Subject mentioned Colombia's increasing alarm with the problems of drug trafficking within the country. While in Colombia he claimed to have stayed in the house of his family friend MG Jaime [illegible], Chief of Staff of the Colombian Army.

2. The entire conversation was kept on the level of buddies swapping war stories. Subject, however, swore to the veracity of his statements. I mentioned that the State Department was currently interested in the problems of drug trafficking in Latin America and maybe there would be some interest in pursuing the matter further. I also indicated I would ask my superiors at the State Department if they had ever heard anything about the existence of a "Force Seven" or anything on the curious admixture of U.S. adventurers, drug smuggling, and leftist guerrilla movements in Mexico.

3. On Monday, 3 July 1972, I coordinated with the following people at Headquarters:

Robert Brugger, Acting Desk Chief, Colombia
Richard Wheeler and John Murray, Branch 1, Mexico
Robert Weicha, C/WH/FI
Drake Reid, WH/NARC

Their collective suggestions and instructions were:

a. Go slow on efforts to elicit information so not to arouse suspicions of Agency involvement.

b. Find out any information regarding the Colombian Army's B-2 battalion, U.S. citizen's involvement in drug trafficking in Latin America (names, dates, and places), Cuban involvement in cocaine traffic, and any ties between leftist guerrillas and drug smuggling.

c. Write a memorandum and Subject evaluation (where he works, where he goes, who he meets, and an assessment of recruitability).

23880

4. I made arrangements to meet Mcferrer again the evening of 3 July 1972 and the afternoon of 4 July 1972.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. E 17-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated. [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ______

RECOMMEND:

______ Release in full-text
______ Release in sanitized form
✓ Deny in toto
______ Defer decision to ______
______ Coordination with ______ prior to above denial/release

[illegible]

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(✓)	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( )	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DCD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

May 77

Document No. ______
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ______

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

F-16-88-46

SECRET

OSS-820-73
31 May 1973

Chief, Miami Field Office

Director, Domestic Contact Service (Support Division/OSS)

Rolando Masferrer

REF : OOA(S) 322/13864-73 ROLANDO MASFERRER

1. Attached for your information and background orientation is some material pertaining to Rolando Masferrer, who appears to be identical to subject of reference.

2. Subject should not be confused with his uncle by the same name, the infamous Rolando Masferrer y Rojas (erroneously reported as father of subject). The elder Masferrer was imprisoned in 1967 for organizing an unsuccessful invasion of Haiti. Young Masferrer may be engaged in dubious activity and contact with him should be viewed with cautious circumspection. He may be on a "fishing expedition" to obtain some information on Guillermo Iglesias; or he may be seeking to cement an affiliation with the Agency via the Miami Field Office. Masferrer may not be the good guy that the attached material represents him to be. He is known to be a wheeling and dealing fast dollar artist. Should he volunteer any information in the future, please note it, and send it to Headquarters. Of specific interest would be any information he may provide on narcotic trafficing and those involved in this illicit trade.

3. DDO has no interest in young Masferrer. If we can be of further assistance, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
GSMusulin/ds
cc: Services Division (Control)
Filed HH 23880

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 004476

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

[illegible] FOIA/PA Request No. [illegible]

Document Description: [illegible] Dates:

Document Located By : [illegible]
OFFICE : [illegible]

Document referred to DDO for review by:

[illegible]

RECOMMEND:

______ Release in full-text
______ Release in sanitized form
__✓__ Deny in toto
______ Defer decision to ______
______ Coordination with ______ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
( )	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(✓)	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Excepted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

Document No. ______
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ______

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

FORM 3956

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16-88-46

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE: XMIM

B. DCS CODE: 10466

C. CASE NUMBER

FORWARDED: MO. DA. YR.: 052788

73 3 6 4 5 3

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD

RELEASED: MO. DA. YR.: 753 8

E. SUBJECT AND AREA

Possible False Recruitment Effort

(Cuba/Haiti)

F. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rolando Masferrer
c/o Daniel Bermudez
6080 W. Flagler, Apt 17
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

TYPE DOC.: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NO. DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT: C L C O; 1 S & T; 2 P O L; 3 M I L; 4; 5 S O C; 6 G E O; 7 E C O; 9 L I S

1. EXCLUSIVELY ...
2. NOT GENERALLY ...
3. EXTRA DISSEM TO OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA: 1 S O V; 2 I N T; 3; 4

0055

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT

☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☒ OTHER (specify below)

Call-in

EVALUATION

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES: NO / TO USSR / FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: WH

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	CSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X			Musulin

FIELD COMMENTS

Our local colleagues have asked us to report this brief item in order to put it in the system.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 004475

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

HH-23880

FYI and Possible Interest

Copies to:
WH/C/FI - 3-D-38
WH/7/HT 3-B-0001
WH/C/CI 3-D-46

7-014A

Believe your caller was Rolando Masferrer Jr. who is the nephew of the infamous Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, now in a US federal prison [illegible] Haiti. In organizing (1969) invasion of [illegible] Rolando was associated with [illegible] Rolando (Thread [illegible]) [illegible]

C/S: RFMainwaring:rbl

F.O. CHIEF: RFMAINWARING

CASE OFFICER

DIVISION/STAFF/DESK

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(20-41)

2

- end -

CLASSIFICATION:

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO. 00-A(S)-322/13364-73

DATE 25 May 1973

COUNTRY Cuba/Haiti

NO. PAGES 1

SUBJECT Possible False Recruitment Effort

REFERENCES

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

---

1. At 1750 hours on 14 May 1973 the Miami Field Office received a telephone call on the listed line from an individual who ultimately identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. It is believed that Masferrer is identical with former Cuban senator and Batista associate Rolando Masferrer Rojas who is of dubious reputation and is well known for several nefarious actions in Haiti, Guatemala and perhaps elsewhere. Rolando Masferrer was convicted of conspiracy to invade Haiti in 1967. It is believed that there are extensive Agency files on Rolando Masferrer.

2. Masferrer was very reluctant to provide details, but finally said he could be reached at local telephone 251-3639. A separate check reveals this number to be registered to [illegible] Bermudez, 6030 N. Flagler, Apartment 917.

3. In any event the listed line caller indicated that he had been approached by one Guillermo Iglesias and asked to engage in certain activities which he did not further describe. According to Masferrer, Iglesias carried credentials or other identifying material which seemed to link him with the U.S. Coast Guard in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Masferrer said, however, that Iglesias indicated also that he was in some way representing the Central Intelligence Agency. Masferrer then said that the purpose of the telephone call was to check on the bona fides of Guillermo Iglesias.

4. Masferrer was told that the name Guillermo Iglesias meant nothing to the Miami Field Office and was otherwise given a rather noncommittal response.

- end -

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16-88-46

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE: XIII

00-400

FORWARDED (MO. DA. YR.): 07 10 63

A 202673

RELEASED (MO. DA. YR.): 07 11 63

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
Guillermo Yglesias/Efforts to Raise Money Under Alleged Agency Auspices

(Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala)

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rolando MASFERRER
6030 W. Flagler Avenue
Miami, Florida

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

AREA: 3055

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: WH

DIRECTED TO: CSS X

FIELD COMMENTS

Our local colleagues wish us to report on Yglesias and record these developments.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

HH 25263

WH/COG/OS - 4D-46-7-040
Attn. Chris Hogkins

Yglesias is certainly a fraud and should come to the attention of the FBI and police authorities. Masferrer should also be known to your office since we sent some background info on him to MM F.O. He is a [illegible]. [illegible]

CA: FMacVane:pew

F.C. CHIEF:

FORM 3-59 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(20-41)

2

COUNTRY Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala

NO. PAGES 2

SUBJECT Guillermo Yglesias /Efforts to Raise Money Under [illegible] and Agency Auspices

REFERENCES

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

---

1. On 26 June 1973 the Miami Field Office responded to a call on the listed line from a man who identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. Mr. Masferrer requested to meet with [illegible] of the Miami Field Office. Mr. Masferrer said that he had some information concerning one Guillermo Yglesias [illegible] which would prove to be of interest to the Central Intelligence Agency. Rolando Masferrer lives at 6020 W. Flagler Avenue, Miami, Florida. As a result of his request [illegible] and [illegible] of the Miami Field Office responded to the call and met with Rolando Masferrer that afternoon.

2. Mr. Masferrer related details of his relationship with one Guillermo Yglesias, age about 38, an individual on whom there are other Agency references. According to Masferrer, Yglesias approached him in late March 1973 and identified himself as working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Yglesias said that he was trying to raise a large sum of money to finance covert CIA operations. Yglesias said that CIA funds have been tied up as a result of the Watergate affair. He referred to these operations as black operations. Mr. Masferrer said that he knew several high ranking government officials in Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala. Masferrer contacted several of these friends in South America and asked them to aid the Central Intelligence Agency in raising funds for covert operations in South America and the Caribbean. Masferrer has contacted Manuel Vega, a retired Colombian army colonel and presently head of the Colombian National Police. He has also contacted one Alvaro [illegible], who is an advisor in narcotics to the Colombian National Police. Masferrer also passed Yglesias the name of Carlos [illegible], head of the Venezuela National Police. Yglesias showed a great interest in small arms of all types. Masferrer said that he personally turned over five M-26 fragmentation hand grenades, one M-16 automatic rifle, one AR-15 semi-automatic rifle, and several handguns 38 caliber type. Masferrer was led to believe that the weapons would be used in a covert CIA operation in Puerto Rico. This operation was described by Yglesias as a black operation.

3. During our conversation with Masferrer, he raised an additional point. Masferrer said that he contacted Manuel Vega in Colombia and that Vega agreed to help all that he could. Vega expressed deep concern to

14-00000

F-16-88-41

SECRET

OSS-820-73
31 May 1973

Chief, Miami Field Office

Director, Domestic Contact Service (Support Division/OSS)

Rolando Masferrer

REF : OOA(S) 322/13364-73 ROLANDO MASFERRER

1. Attached for your information and background orientation is some material pertaining to Rolando Masferrer, who appears to be identical to subject of reference.

2. Subject should not be confused with his uncle by the same name, the infamous Rolando Masferrer y Rojas (erroneously reported as father of subject). The elder Masferrer was imprisoned in 1967 for organizing an unsuccessful invasion of Haiti. Young Masferrer may be engaged in dubious activity and contact with him should be viewed with cautious circumspection. He may be on a "fishing expedition" to obtain some information on Guillermo Iglesias; or he may be seeking to cement an affiliation with the Agency via the Miami Field Office. Masferrer may not be the good guy that the attached material represents him to be. He is known to be a wheeling and dealing fast dollar artist. Should he volunteer any information in the future, please note it, and send it to Headquarters. Of specific interest would be any information he may provide on narcotic trafficing and those involved in this illicit trade.

3. DDO has no interest in young Masferrer. If we can be of further assistance, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
GSMusulin/ds
cc: Services Division (Control)
Filed HH 23880

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 004476

SECRET

Subject has been identified as having remained in Korea since 28 January 1960, presumably in the above position.

PERSONS WITH WHOM GEORGE PARISTEROPOULOS IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT:

1. Kenneth C. MILLER, Chase Manhattan Bank, Tokyo, Japan. Listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

2. Al (Alphonse) RIGOD (name of firm illegible but probably L. RONDON and Company, of Tokyo, Japan), listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

   The KANTO DIRECTORY for Tokyo and Yokohama, Japan for 1955 on page 325 lists L r. and Mre. Alphonse (Alphonse) RIGOD, with residence address of 67 [illegible]-machi, Shigaya-ku, Tokyo, with business address for Alphonse RIGOD as c/o L. RONDON and Company, Ltd. (Japan), Tokyo. Tel. 27-3521-4.

   Alphonse RIGOD was identified in 1949 as a French citizen, resident in Shanghai, China at 75 Route Frelupt, who was serving as a cut-out conveying French Intelligence Requirements to a double agent in Shanghai in 1949.

3. Gregory TOPZE, of the RONYE Company, Tokyo, Japan. Listed by Subject as a personal reference in 1957.

4. Antonios (Anthony) E. PAPPADOPOULOS, Greek Consul, Yokohama, Japan, listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

5. Valentine HAHN aka Valentin Vasiliyevich ZHAN aka Wen-Shin HAN, former Soviet Agent, who is elsewhere identified.

6. Emanuel Abraham OSTROVSKY, who in 1953 was the manager of the Tokyo Branch of Sandovich Brothers, Incorporated, by which organization Subject was then employed.

7. William Hamilton MARTIN, as reported in cover dispatch.

SECRET

[illegible]

8. Officials of the Claggett-Nolan Company, Incorporated, Tokyo, Japan, whose identities have not been determined on basis of reported direct contact with Subject, but who are presumed to include Richard William Nolan CHILD and Mortimer Claggett COOKE, Junior, the principal officers.

SECRET

HX-3

18 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Agency

ATTENTION: Mr. S. Wesley Reynolds

SUBJECT: Vernon Ferguson MITCHELL, William Hamilton MARTIN, Espionage - R

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. Reference is made to information orally furnished by your office to representatives of this Agency to the effect that William Hamilton MARTIN at one time mentioned the fact that prior to his resignation from his civilian contract employment with the Department of the Army in Tokyo, Japan, and prior to his actual return to the United States in late August or early September 1955, he had been offered a job as a rug salesman by one George PARIS of Tokyo, Japan.

2. A check of the indices of this Agency reveals that William MARTIN's Tokyo acquaintance, who offered him a job as a "rug salesman", and whom MARTIN called "George PARIS" is undoubtedly identical with one George S. PERISTEROPOULOS aka PARISTEROPOULOS aka PERISTEROPOULOU aka George S. PARIS, aka George PARIS, born 2 January 1909 at Constantinople, Turkey, but of Greek nationality since birth. According to information provided abroad to representatives of this Agency by a Japanese liaison service, George PERISTEROPOULOS in about 1946 abbreviated his name to George PERIS. The liaison service added that he operated the Pickels Rug Company in Tientsin and Shanghai, China, as "his own business" between 1927 and 1941, at which time the firm was closed down because of the war. Between 1942 and 1945 he was under house arrest, or "confined to his home" in Shanghai, but significantly was not interned by the Japanese. From 1946 to 1950 he operated the George PERIS COMPANY in Shanghai. He claimed to have been unemployed between 1950 and 1952, at which time he emigrated to Tokyo, Japan, from Shanghai, obtaining employment in Tokyo with the firm of SONDOVICH

SECRET

1/800

[illegible] INCORPORATED, and in 1951 he became the manager of the Tokyo branch of this firm. In 1954 he established his own firm under the name of PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, which firm appears in the trade indices published for Japan, and is reflected in attachment. In 1955 George PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERIS was appointed to the position of Honorary Deputy Greek Consul in Yokohama, in which position he was the deputy to Antonios A. PAPPADOPOULOS aka Anthony A. PAPPADOPOULOS, the Honorary Greek Consul in Yokohama. PERISTEROPOULOS appears to have continued in this diplomatic post until sometime in mid 1959, when an official Royal Hellenic Diplomatic Mission to Japan was accredited to the current government of Japan, and the functions of the Yokohama Consular Office were taken over from the two honorary consuls.

3. Liaison reported that on 28 January 1960 George [illegible] and that he had not returned to Japan as of 30 August 1960. Through a sensitive source in Seoul, with whom representatives of this Agency are in operational contact, and who is believed to be reliable, it has been ascertained that George PERIS left Haneda Airport in Tokyo on 28 January 1960 aboard regular CAT scheduled flight to Seoul, Korea, where he was to assume the position of resident representative in Seoul, Korea, of the firm of CLAGGETT-NOLAN COMPANY, INCORPORATED, an export-import firm, with offices in the Hotel Bando, in Seoul. This firm is listed in the Foreign Directory for Seoul as having headquarters in the United States, located at 24 California street, San Francisco, California. PERIS replaced a British national named Julian James PRIOR, as representative of the CLAGGETT-NOLAN Company in Korea.

4. On basis of an official inquiry by a representative of our Agency to the United States Embassy in Seoul, it was learned that the above firm of CLAGGETT-NOLAN Company enjoys a good reputation locally and deals in the sale of electrical and mechanical machinery and equipment. It was also learned that the capital stock of the firm is controlled by one Mortimer C. COOKE, Junior, and a Richard W. CHILD, both of whom are United States citizens. The indices of this Agency reveal that Mortimer C. COOKE, Junior, of the above mentioned firm is identical with Mortimer Claggett COOKE, Junior, co-owner with Richard William Nolan CHILD of the firm of BA[illegible]COM TRADING COMPANY INCORPORATED, which has offices in Tokyo, Japan, and is incorporated under the laws of Panama. Additional

information concerning the above firms and regarding Richard William Nolan CHILD and Mortimer Claggett COWAN, Jr. will be furnished separately.

5. The activities and contacts of George PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERIS in Japan and Korea are currently being investigated by this Agency.

6. George S. PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERIS, identified above, and known to William H. MARTIN as "George PARIS", is identical with the individual whom Valentin HAHN aka Valentin Vasiliyevich KHAN aka Won-Shin HAN, admitted former (1947) Soviet agent, identified as "George PARIS, a Greek businessman in Tokyo", and as one of HAHN's close contacts and friends in Japan. When interviewed by representatives of this Agency in 1958, Valentine HAHN advised that the above "George PARIS" was the person who introduced HAHN to a Tokyo nightclub, located off the Ginza, the name of which HAHN gave only as "The Tomorrow Is Too Late Club". HAHN claimed that this was an exact and direct translation into English of the actual Japanese name, which, however, he never mentioned during the interview. Date of HAHN's visit to this "club" in company of George PERIS aka PARIS, is estimated to have been somewhere between 1954 and 1957. HAHN stated that at the "Tomorrow Is Too Late Club" he was introduced to a Japanese hostess by the name of Noriko MATSUZAKAYA alias Noriko AWAJI, with whom HAHN subsequently enjoyed dates. It is believed that Noriko MATSUZAKAYA @ AWAJI became the mistress of Valentine HAHN for an undetermined period of time following his original introduction to her at the above "Club" while in the company of George PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERIS aka PARIS. HAHN also advised, that following his original introduction to this establishment by PERIS, HAHN had taken a number of unnamed married American nationals, who were stationed in Tokyo, to the same club, where such persons had also been introduced to and had enjoyed dates with the hostesses. At this time, there is no information to indicate that either William Hamilton MARTIN or Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL were among the United States nationals HAHN referred to as having been taken to the aforementioned club by HAHN. Neither is there any information currently available to reflect that William Hamilton MARTIN was known to Valentine HAHN through their mutual acquaintanceship with George PERISTEROPOULOS.

7. As attachment herewith, we are forwarding a chronologically

organized biographical outline of all information on George PARISTEROPOULOS aka PARIS, developed to date. Attachment to this communication indicates that PARIS has been or may still be a contact of Emanuel Abraham OSTROVSKY, suspect Soviet Agent, who is the Tokyo Branch Manager of the firm of SUNDOVICH BROTHERS INCORPORATED, which firm has long been suspected of being a front or cover organization for Soviet intelligence operations. Attention is invited specifically to the fact that Attachment reflects that the 1954 Japan Directory of Foreign Firms lists E. OSTROVSKY as Tokyo representative of this firm, which has offices at 61 - Tamura-cho, 4-chome, Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo, and telephone lines: 43-1809, 43-4369, 43-4287, whereas in 1958 subject is officially listed as George PARIS, of PARIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, located at 64-3 Chome, Tamura-cho, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Telephones: 43-1809 and 43-4287, reflecting that he shared telephone numbers with SUNDOVICH BROTHERS, and presumably with Emanuel A. OSTROVSKY. It is suggested that the Department of the Army, Office of the [illegible] Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation may have additional information on George PARISTEROPOULOS aka PARIS and associates.

8. No additional information, to supplement that which is reported in paragraph 6 above, identifiable with Noriko MATSUZAKAYA @ AWAJI, could be located in the indices of this Agency.

9. With reference to the "Tomorrow is Too Late Club", mentioned in paragraph 5 above, to which Valentine HAHN claims to have been taken by George PARIS, an exact and direct re-translation of the club name into Japanese from the English as given by HAHN, would read "Asu de wa Ososugiru". It is noted that the Tokyo Telephone Directory for 1957 contains a listing for an establishment of this name, as follows: ASU DE WA OSOSUGIRU, located at Chuo-ku, Ginza, 8-Chome, 3 Banchi, Tokyo-to, Telephone Nos.: 57-0945, 57-6363, 57-6928. A reliable source, who is familiar with the city of Tokyo, advised in October 1960, that as of 1959 this establishment was still operating at the listed location, and that it is a coffee-house rather than a nightclub in the western sense, although alcoholic beverages are available for consumption on the premises by the patrons. The same source also advised that the above coffee-house employs "Japanese hostesses", as is customary in such establishments in Japan, and that such females might be "dated" under the circumstances indicated by Valentine HAHN. However, it should be noted

SECRET

[illegible] CONTROL

that the same source also indicated that the coffee-house known as ASU DE WA OSOSUGIRU to which he was referring, which is identical with the establishment of this name listed in the 1957 Tokyo Directory, is the type of place which is not frequented in general by American nationals stationed in or visiting Tokyo as tourists; rather it caters mainly to indigenous patrons and their guests, or to foreign residents of Tokyo who have been introduced to the place and the management by indigenous patrons. These foreigners then become regular patrons after becoming known to the management. Inasmuch as the above described ASU DE WA OSOSUGIRU coffee-house generally fits the description of the "Tomorrow is Too Late Club" mentioned by Valentine HAHN as a nightclub" to which he was taken by George PERIS, it is suggested that they are one and the same establishments.

10. In light of the mutual acquaintanceship of William H. MARTIN and Valentine HAHN with George PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERIS, and in turn, PERIS' role vis-a-vis HAHN's introduction to the ASU DE WA OSOSUGIRU coffee-house, it is suggested that PERIS may have played a similar role in terms of introducing William MARTIN to Japanese night-life. This may have eventually led to MARTIN's contact and involvement with Japanese individuals, who introduced him to or indulged his masochistic interests.

11. Additional information on the individuals mentioned above will be forwarded as developed. It is requested that addressees forward to this Agency any information on George PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERIS, his contacts and activities, and on the other individuals mentioned herein.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

1 Attachment:
as stated

cc: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of the Army, ACSI

DDP/FI/D/AP:mem
Orig & 2 - addressee
1 - 100-6-124/3 (ZRGRACE)
1 - 201-284530
1 - 201-282337 (MARTIN)✓
2 - OS/SRS
1 - chrono

SECRET

[illegible] CONTROL

SECRET

ATTACHMENT

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

SUBJECT: Summary of Information on
George PERISTEROPOULOS
aka George PERIS, aka George D.
PERISTEROPOULOU, aka George
PERISTALLEROPOLU, aka
George PARIS.

Born:	2 January 1909 at Constantinople, Turkey
Nationality at Birth:	Greek
Present Nationality:	Greek
Parents:	Names not reflected in the record, both deceased. Father died Chita, Siberia, USSR, date unknown. Mother died in Shanghai, China, date unknown.
Marital Status:	Widower since about 1956; marital status since that date unknown.
Name of deceased Spouse:	Aurelia PERISTEROPOULOS nee CZERWINSKA, DOB unknown. Nationality: Polish. Married at Shanghai, China. Date of marriage not reflected in the record. Died in Tokyo, Japan circa 1956. In April 1948, under maiden name, listed as registered member of the Polish Citizens' Association of New Poles in Shanghai, which organization is loyal to the Polish Government in Warsaw.
Relatives:	Mother-in-law: Mrs. Bronislawa CZERWINSKA, Polish National; 1951 resident Shanghai, China; as of 1953 applicant for a United States Immigrant Visa filed in Tokyo, Japan.

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

SECRET
NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

	Sister-in-law: Mrs. Irene ADAMSKY, nee CZERWINSKA; 1953 resident 1366 Massachusetts Avenue, San Bernardino, California.	
Residences:	1909-1915:	Constantinople, Turkey
	1915-1917:	Illegible, but probably Odessa, Russia
	1917-1923:	Chita, Siberia, USSR
	1923-1924:	Harbin, China
	1924-1937:	Tientsin, China
	1937-1952:	Shanghai, China
	1952-1957:	Tokyo, Japan
	April 1953:	3-Chome, Denenchofu, Ota-ku, Tokyo, Japan
	1958:	#64, 3-Chome, Denenchofu, Ota-ku, Tokyo. Home telephone: 72-3444
	1959:	#64, 3-Chome, Denenchofu, Ota-ku, Tokyo. Telephone: 59-1606.
	1-28 January 1960:	Tokyo, Japan
	Since 28 January 1960:	Seoul, Korea
Employment Record:	1927-1935:	Operated "own business", Nichols Rug Company in Tientsin, China.
	1935-1937:	Unknown
	1937-1941:	Operated "own business", Nichols Rug Company, Shanghai, China. Closed in 1941 because of war.
	1942-1945:	Confined to own home in Shanghai, China, but not interned by Japanese occupation authorities.
	1946-1950:	Operated firm George Peris Company, Shanghai, China.

SECRET
NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

1950-1952: Unemployed (presumably in Shanghai).

Mid-1951: Subject and wife from Shanghai, China applied for visas to enter Japan from China. Subject claimed he held Greek Passport A 6/50-1 issued by the Greek Consulate in Shanghai on 26 September 1950 and valid until 9 September 1951.

Wife held Greek Passport A 26/50-1, issued Shanghai, 15 June 1951, valid until June 14, 1952.

Subject indicated he was engaged in the import and export business, dealing in raw wool.

1952: First entered Japan at Yokohama on 2 February 1952 with status of semi-permanent resident. Stated on arrival in Yokohama to Japanese Police that he had come to Japan "to seek peace and freedom".

Employed by Tokyo Branch of Sandovich Brothers, Incorporated, through 1952.

Other indices consulted reflect that Subject in 1952 operated the firm of George PERIS in Tokyo, Japan during 1952.

1953: Subject was elevated from the position of "employee" to that of Manager of the Tokyo Branch of Sandovich Brothers in 1953.

Also, Subject was reported still operating the George PERIS Company in Tokyo in 1953.

SECRET

1954: Subject reportedly terminated his employment with Sondovich Brothers sometime during 1954, exact date not known, and established his own firm under the name of PARIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES.

The 1954 Japan Directory of Foreign Firms lists SONDOVICH BROTHERS as a United States firm, with offices at #1 - Tamura-cho, 4-chome, Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan. Telephones: 43-1609, 43-4369, 43-4287, and lists E. OSTROVSKY as the Tokyo Representative.

E. OSTROVSKY, of course, is Emanuel Abraham OSTROVSKY, who is known to have been the Tokyo Branch Manager of the above firm, who resided in 1954 at 19 Kouncho-Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo. Home telephone: 43-6773.

1955: Subject continued in his position as President of PARIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES.

During 1955, exact date not specified, Subject was named to the position of Honorary Deputy Greek Consul in Yokohama, in which position he became the Deputy to Antonios E. PAPPADOPOULOS, the Honorary Royal Greek Consul in Yokohama.

It is presumed that the Consulate in 1955 was probably located at the same address given in the December 1957 Gaimusho "Consular List", which reports the following information:

SECRET

"Royal Greek Honorary Consulate in Yokohama, Sutherland Building, No. 75, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Tel. 8-1713.

Mr. Antonios PAPPADOPOULOS,
Honorary Consul

Mr. George PERISTEROPOULOS,
Honorary Deputy Consul."

1956: Continued as President of PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, Tokyo. Continued as Honorary Greek Deputy Consul, Yokohama.

1957: Continued as President of PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, Tokyo. Continued as Honorary Greek Deputy Consul, Yokohama.

1958: Continued as President of PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES; Listed in directories as George PERIS, PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, located at 64 - 3 Chome, Tamura-cho, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Tel. 43-1809 and 43-4287. (1958 Japan Times Directory)

A separate listing is also carried in the name of George PERISTEROPOULOS with office telephone listed as: Yokohama 8-1713, which is the same telephone number given in the December 1957 Consular List for the Royal Greek Honorary Consulate in Yokohama, above.

1959: Subject continued as president of PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, and is listed as George PERIS, in connection with this firm, whose offices according to the 1959 Japan Times Directory are located at 64-3 Chome, Tamura-cho, Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo. Telephone 59-1666.

It should be noted that this is the same address listed for subject and the PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES in the preceding year, but there is a change in the telephone exchange.

1960: On 28 January 1960, Subject departed by air from Haneda Airport, Tokyo, enroute to Seoul, Korea. It was learned from a source believed to be reliable that subject was going to Korea as the Seoul Resident Representative of the American-owned firm of Claggett-Nolan Company, Inc., which has its home office at 25 California Street in San Francisco, California, and maintains an office in Seoul in the Bando Hotel. Subject allegedly replaced one William James PRICE, a British National, in this post. The capital stock of Claggett-Nolan Company, Inc. is controlled by Mortimer Claggett Cooke, Junior, and Richard William Nolan CHILD, both American citizens, who are also the principal controlling stockholders and officers of the BALCOM TRADING COMPANY, which has its main offices in the Fukoku Building, 2-Uchisaiwai-cho, 3-Chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan, but also has branches in Seoul and Pusan, Korea. BALCOM TRADING COMPANY also controls another subsidiary firm known as Allied Distributors, Incorporated, with which firm Thomas Robert KIRK aka Boris YASHIN has been affiliated for a number of years.

Subject has been identified as having remained in Korea since 28 January 1960, presumably in the above position.

PERSONS WITH WHOM GEORGE PERISTEROPOULOS IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT:

1. Kenneth C. MILLER, Chase Manhattan Bank, Tokyo, Japan. Listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

2. Al (Alphonse) RIGOD (name of firm illegible but probably L. RONDON and Company, of Tokyo, Japan). Listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

   The KANTO DIRECTORY for Tokyo and Yokohama, Japan for 1955 on page 325 lists Mr. and Mrs. Alphonse (Alphonse) RIGOD, with residence address of 69 [illegible]-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, with business address for Alphonse RIGOD as c/o L. RONDON and Company, Ltd. (Japan), Tokyo. Tel. 27-3521-4.

   Alphonse RIGOD was identified in 1949 as a French citizen, resident in Shanghai, China at 75 Route Frelupt, who was serving as a cut-out conveying French Intelligence Requirements to a double agent in Shanghai in 1949.

3. Gregory TOPZE, of the FONVE Company, Tokyo, Japan. Listed by Subject as a personal reference in 1957.

4. Antonios (Anthony) E. PAPPALOPOULOS, Greek Consul, Yokohama, Japan, listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

5. Valentine HAHN aka Valentin Vasilyevich ZHAN aka Won-Shin HAN, former Soviet Agent, who is elsewhere identified.

6. Emanuel Abraham OSTROVSKY, who in 1953 was the manager of the Tokyo Branch of Sondovich Brothers, Incorporated, by which organization Subject was then employed.

7. William Hamilton MARTIN, as reported in cover dispatch.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

9 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI/Division D

SUBJECT: ZRGRACE - Tokyo Aspect;
George PERIS aka George PERISTEROPOULOS aka
George PARIS, Identified Contact of Valentin HAHN
aka Valentine Vasiliyevich KHAN aka Won-shin HAN,
Self Confessed Soviet Agent

1. Following information was made available to the writer by Messrs. CARRICO and SAYLE of CS/SRS from the Security Office file on Valentin HAHN. The information herein reported was provided by oral briefing only, and the writer was not permitted to review the HAHN file itself. Following details are therefore based entirely on notes taken during the meeting which took place in CARRICO's office on 6 September.

2. Valentin HAHN, who was born as Valentine Vasiliyevich KHAN on 22 April 1908, Slavyanka, Russia, and who is a Russian of Korean origin, admitted in the course of a Polygraph examination administered on an unspecified date, that he had acted as an agent in behalf of the Soviets. HAHN has been in the employ of CIA since approximately 1952, originally in Seoul, Korea, later in Tokyo, Japan, subsequently being transferred to Okinawa. He was terminated on unspecified date as a contract agent of the SR Division, and currently is or has been resettled in Hokkaido, where he has been given a job as a translator with the FBIS listening post at Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan. During the debriefing which accompanied his Polygraph testing, HAHN advised that during his service in Tokyo, Japan, his closest associates had been the following individuals in the order listed:

a. Arseniy YANKOVSKY and wife.

03 13-3

b. [Basil EFREMOFF] - CIA Staff Employee of [Tokyo Station,] who has been terminated on unknown date. He was identified as a Japanese Intelligence agent.

c. John Mc COY and wife - Mc COY was or still is an employee of SR Division, stationed in Japan.

SECRET

2/90

d. Vadim MEDISH - CIA Contract Agent in employ of SR Division stationed in Tokyo. 13-3 In process of being terminated after identification as former NKVD agent, a former Abwehr agent, and subsequent agent activity in behalf of the Soviets while in DP camps.

e. Kazua KANAZAWA - Cousin of Valentin HAHN; at one time was proposed for operational use by this Agency.

f. Charlotte BERGHOLTZ - Close friend of Anastasiya SNOW nee YANKOVSKIY.

g. Golli-Grigorevna and Marguerita PODSTAVINA - PODSTAVINA is the Godmother of Arseniy YANKOVSKIY.

h. Nicholas Anatole [illegible] - CIA Staff employee of SR Division in Tokyo 13-3 under Department of State 32 cover. Former FBI employee.

i. George PARIS (Spelling as picked up originally by Office of Security in written report of Polygraph examination report, and therefore likely phonetic.) - Greek businessman in Tokyo.

3. In the course of further debriefing in connection with his Polygraph Test, HAHN claimed that George PERIS or PARIS was the individual who had introduced HAHN to a club in Tokyo located off the Ginza, the name of which club translated into English is "Tomorrow is Too Late". At this club HAHN met a Japanese hostess by the name of Noriko AWAJI, whose real name was later established to be Noriko MATSUZAKAYA, whom he subsequently dated. There is no further information currently available on this hostess. In the interim, HAHN has obtained a divorce from his wife, who had been a witting participant in his agent activities for the Soviets, and is known currently to be living in a common-law relationship with a Japanese girl who may be identical with Noriko MATSUZAKAYA. As indicated above, HAHN and his current mistress are currently in Sapporo, Hokkaido.

4. The ex-wife of Valentin HAHN, whose full name is not known to the writer, and the two HAHN sons, are currently being sponsored for resettlement by the Agency in the United States, where all three are scheduled to receive their U.S. citizenship under CIA sponsorship.

5. With reference to the "Tomorrow is Too Late" Club, HAHN stated that a number of CIA Staff Employees of the Tokyo Station 13-3 frequent or have frequented this establishment and have dated the Japanese hostesses employed

4/90

there. Date of HAHN's introduction to the Club and to Noriko MATSUZAKAYA by George PARIS aka George PERIS was estimated by Mr. Sayle to have been somewhere between 1954 and 1957. With regard to Valentin HAHN's own inclinations toward sharing his knowledge of romance with others, Mr. Sayle advised that Security Office had established that while employed as a contract agent of the [Tokyo Station] HAHN had pimped for CIA Staff personnel in Tokyo.
13-3

6. As attachment herewith, the writer appends additional background data on the professional intelligence activities and contacts of Valentin HAHN and family as noted during the oral briefing by Sayle.

7. On basis of the above, it can be safely assumed that the George PARIS known to HAHN is identical with George PERISTEROPOULOS aka George PERIS, well-known Tokyo businessman and Honorary Deputy Consul of the Royal Greek Consulate in Yokohama, Japan, as reported in SCTOKY-63 and SCTOKY-64. It is noteworthy that PERIS' contacts throughout his career, commencing with his original reported employment in Tientsin, China, through his activities and contacts in Shanghai, China, and later in Tokyo, not excluding his marriage to Aurelia CZERWINSKA, have been exclusively with individuals of Russian or Eastern European background, many of them of Russian Jewish background, who are either highly suspect or have been identified as long-time agents of Soviet Intelligence. PERIS' reported route of arrival in Tokyo via Harbin, Tientsin and Shanghai, as well as his employment by Sondovich Brothers and contacts with individuals who tie in with the Boris SOLOMONIK complex and Borsol Fur Trading Corporation, smacks very strongly of the old Comintern Apparat of the 20's and 30's. Also it parallels the travel patterns of a number of individuals involved in the SOBLE case, principally the SOBLES themselves who were exfiltrated from the Soviet Union via Tokyo, Japan, to the U.S.A. and who, most notably of all, also were under cover of operating a Bristle Business as is Sondovich Brothers.

8. According to earlier reporting in the ZRGRACE investigation, George PERIS is alleged to have been a contact of William Hamilton MARTIN in Tokyo, and to have offered MARTIN some type of job or business partnership deal in connection with the rug business.

9. Mr. Carrico informally indicated that he personally suspects that MARTIN's introduction to the fine art of masochistic torture by an unidentified Japanese female, as reported by Mrs. Ardelle GASDA to FBI agents, may have been effected at or through his patronage of the "Tomorrow is Too Late" Club to which he may well have been taken or introduced by his friend PERIS. This possibility, however, is subject to further investigation.

22 22
10. As initial follow-up to [SCTOKY]-63 and [SCTOKY]-64, outgoing cable of 7 Sept. 60 requesting further check-out of the Club, etc. was prepared.

SECRET

EYES ONLY

3/90

SECRET

EYES ONLY

A second cable to be sent by Privacy Link to Seoul, Korea, has also been drafted, and requests check of PERIS' arrival, activities and contacts, departure from Korea subsequent to 28 January 1960. This cable has been presented separately for your approval and may likely be subject to revision, wherefore no copy is attached. It is further suggested that Office of Security be authorized to pass to NSA Security Officials working on this case the information on PERIS relayed in above SCTOKY cables, such information to be properly sterilized of course, and that NSA in turn be requested to check and obtain from U.S. Navy Personnel Records full copies in duplicate of the original reports on the specific duty stations or assignments, including dates of service at each, to which MARTIN and MITCHELL were detailed, also detailed leave records, travel records, and other pertinent background data contained in such files, to cover the entire period of their respective service with the U.S. Navy. It is also suggested that NSA officials be requested to obtain similar detailed original reports in duplicate from the Department of the Army to cover the period of MARTIN's civilian employment in Japan, with special emphasis on any reports of MARTIN's extra-curricular activities, contacts, club memberships, identified personal contacts with persons not employed in his own office, leave travel, etc., which may be reflected in official records. One copy of all such reports are requested for this Agency, to permit further checking of known or newly identified contacts he may have had in Japan.

ANITA POTOCKI

1 Attachment: as stated

FI/D/AP:mem

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - ZRGRACE File ✓
1 - MARTIN 201 file ✓
1 - PERIS file
1 - chrono

SECRET

EYES ONLY

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME. MASFERRER y ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-42669
VOL. IX

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 JAN 67 THRU 31 DEC. 68

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
9:00 4 AUG 78		PAT ORR	
5 AUG 78		Pat ORR	
7 AUG 1978		ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

FBI doc
18 aug 67 (Miami)
Subject - Rolando Arcadio
Masferer Rojas
Bureau # 2-156

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 56-7-E
~~X-REF TO FILE NO.~~ 201-42669
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. R Lehman
WH/7/HT

D MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

Dissem by 24

ACTION c/WH6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO TIME 0045Z BY

INFO FILE, CS/DO VR, C/WH/COG-5, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/CA-2, C/OPSER, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 042338Z CITE JMWAVE 4894

5 JAN 67 IN 71230

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

[redacted] DYVOUR PBRUMEN

RID/Files

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 4385 (IN 71162)

1. THRU SENSITIVE LOCAL CONTACT STATION ASCERTAINED THAT REF CALLES WERE MADE TO FOLLOWING:

"ALEX": J.A. MASFERRER, 3242 42ND STREET, QUEENS, NEW YORK CITY. TEL NO 565-3621.

"MONTREAL": (REV) DIEGO MADRIGAL, 230 ALEXANDER AVENUE, BRONX, NEW YORK CITY. TEL NO 545-2307.

2. NO FURTHER INFO RE POSSIBLE IDENTITY OF "LANG/LONG".

Rolando MASFERRER (201-042669) called Subj. 3 Jan 67 to solicit aid in getting release from Key West jail

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

[redacted]

MICROFILMED
NOV 2 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: Disseminating

Signed: Ruth Lehman

R.O. #517 - Unit WH/7/HT

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

5 Jan 67

201-42669

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED TO

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-300-021
DBC -39309
18 DEC 68
FBI
P28

R 6901230755

FILE IN 201-42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-63 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

18 Dec 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
FORMER CUBAN SENATOR NEWSPAPER EDITOR
LEADER NOTORIOUS PRIVATE ARMY CUBA KNOWN
AS LOS TIGRES /THE TIGERS/

019-300-021
DBC -39554
11 DEC 68
FBI
P7

R 6901130123

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

11 Dec 68

FBI ltr.
30 Sep. 68 (Miami)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojás
Bureau # 2-156

FBI doc
14 aug 68 (Miami)
Re- Cuban Exile Involvement in
Haitian Revolutionary
Activities

71

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 22

ORIG: GEORGE KULSTAD:eb
UNIT: WE/7/HT
EXT: 5595
DATE: 23 JULY 1968

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 33 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, OSC 2, SOD 6, CS/SEO,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T 23 17 43Z JUL 68 CITE DIRECTOR 18614

TO PRIORITY JMCOBRA, SANTO DOMINGO INFO: PORT AU PRINCE

23 Jul 68

REFS: A. JMCOBRA-0363 (IN-55140)*

B. SANTO DOMINGO-5912 (IN-55244)**

C. SANTO DOMINGO-5907 (IN-54327)***

AB 2	FI	
RS	DESE	1447145
ABSTRACT		INDEX

1. HQS HAS NO OBJECTION. BELIEVE LNYUMA SHOULD CONSULT WITH U.S. ATTORNEY MEADOWS FOR DETERMINATION LEGAL STATUS, SINCE LATTER BEYOND OUR PURVIEW.

2. DOES JMCOBRA FEEL THAT MASFERRER PROPOSED TRIP IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH REFS B AND C? SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS 1859 DATED 16 MARCH 1967 SAID THAT REY TEJEDA SPECULATED THAT THERE IS LINK BETWEEN ABBES, ROLANDO MASFERRER AND WESSIN, POSSIBLY THROUGH SECEN. SECEN FORMERLY UOAM[illegible]-4.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comments: *I&NS, through JMCOBRA, requested priority advice on whether any objections exist Hqs on proposed travel Rolando from Miami to New York by automobile.

MICROFILMED
AUG 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

23 JUL 68

CONTINUED....

201-042667

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE: Jul 25 11 23 AM '66

JUL 26 2 55 PM

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY RID/EGI

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S-E-C-R-E-T PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 18614

TO

**Vladimir Secen in Santo Domingo on possible arms purchasing mission.

***Vladimir Secen told EVMUSCLE-1 in Santo Domingo that latter should be ready with group for invasion of Haiti as Secen had money and backers and would be ready shortly.

[illegible]

OGC (Mr. John Greany) John K Greany

AC/WH/7

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 10 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CS/DO

Z 6 SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY 9 AT 2220 Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PRECEDENCE

ACTION 758 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. RI/AN, WH/COG 8, CS/DO

22 JUL 68 IN 55140

S E C R E T 222018Z JUL 68 CITE JMCOBRA 8363

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

JMUNION

STATION HAS BEEN ASKED BY LNYUMA IF WOFIRM HAD ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE TRAVEL OF ROLANDO MASFERRE BY AUTOMOBILE FROM MIAMI TO NEW YORK. UNLESS ADVISED TO THE CONTRARY JMCOBRA PLANS TO ADVISE LNYUMA THAT WE HAVE NO LEGAL GROUND OBJECT. ADVISE PRIORITY.

SECRET

BT

MB21

AN
AB X
IN
PS
PY
ESC | FYD
FI

CS COPY

22 JUL 68

SECRET

201 - 042669

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, RCLANDO
201-042569
SEX M DOB ?

028-006-033/03
UFGA-30185
12 JUN 68

CIT ?
OCC ?
SURJ TRIED TO RECTUIT AMSLOUCH/1,
201-351947 TO WORK FOR MIM IN CUBA.

MMM

R 6806190489

FILE IN 201-42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

12 Jun 68

FBI doc
10 June 68 (NY)
Subject - Rolando Arcadio
Masferrer Rojas

DOD (National Agency Name Check)
3 May '68
Subject - Masferrer

FBI doc
9 May '68 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau # 2-156

INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. CS -311/02537-68

DATE DISTR. 15 March 1968

COUNTRY Costa Rica/Haiti

DOI 9 February-4 March 1968

SUBJECT Indications by Fernando Melo, Cuban Exile in Costa Rica, that Negotiations Between Ludwig Starke, Costa Rican Right-Wing Extremist, and Rolando Masferrer, Cuban Exile Involved in Plotting Against Haitian Government, Were Not Progressing Well

ACQ Costa Rica, San Jose (4 March 1968)

FIELD NO. HRS-4108

SOURCE An official Costa Rican service.

1. (Field Comment: The following report should be read in conjunction with TDCS-314/01096-68, HRS-4065 and CS-311/02024-68, HRS-4099, which reported that Fernando Melo Fontanills, a Cuban exile in Costa Rica, was serving as an intermediary in negotiations between Ludwig Starke Jimenez, a Costa Rican right-wing extremist, and Rolando Masferrer, a Cuban exile in the United States who was involved in plotting against the government of President Francois Duvalier of Haiti. The negotiations dealt with a plan whereby Starke would provide a staging area for an invasion of Haiti by Haitian and Cuban exiles under Masferrer's leadership. In return Masferrer, if successful, would subsequently support a move by Starke against the Costa Rican Government. Melo was reported to be planning a trip to New York on 21 February 1968 to talk with Masferrer and the latter's representative in the negotiations, Father Diego Madrigal Alvarez.)

2. When Melo returned to San Jose on 2 March after visiting New York City and Miami, Florida, he was detained and searched by security officials at the airport. Among Melo's possessions the security officials found a letter, signed by Melo, addressed to Father Diego Madrigal, New York. The letter was dated 9 February 1968. It was typewritten on letterhead stationery of Rogelio R. Pinto Impresos. (Costa Rican Service Comment: Melo sells printing equipment and thus may have a business connection with the Pinto firm.)

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OPE	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
FBI 2	IANS							

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/IC	1	WH/R	1	WH/PRIN	#	HRS-4108
CI/OP/WH	1	WH/3/CA	1	WH/FACT	#	HUCLIB
		WH/SIGS	1			(HUCLIB-5)
CA/INT	1	WH/MASA	#	WH/COG/EE		CS-311/02537-68
CA/PROP	1	WH/7/HT	2	[illegible]	#	

TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH/COG 1, WH 8(1), DO 1

LIAISON # 18

HK
GED/P

(20)

201-42669

3. Melo's letter acknowledged receipt of a cable from Madrigal; it then went on to state that "Rogelio obtained the visa" and now "the Haitian can come when he wishes." (Field Comment: Rogelio may be Rogelio Pinto. CS-311/02024-68 quoted Melo as saying that Starke had obtained a visa for Jacques Moringlane, a Haitian who would be the first of the Masferrer group to arrive in Costa Rica.) Melo then wrote that because nothing had been heard from Madrigal since the latter's visit to Costa Rica "the friends here" had begun to believe that "everything has been a pipe dream of mine; that we neither are going to do anything nor have anything." Melo complained that Madrigal's silence appeared to have "lessened the enthusiasm of this man of action and of rapid resolutions, who does not like to be made to waste his time." Melo warned Madrigal that if the Masferrer group had not reached a decision to move ahead with the plan, it would be better for the Haitian not to come to Costa Rica. Melo also warned that if there were no Cubans participating in Masferrer's project, he, Melo, would not support it, since he was interested only in the Cubans' problems and not those of the Haitians. Melo informed Madrigal that he expected to arrive in New York on 18 February; he suggested that they discuss the subject in detail at that time.

4. On 4 March Melo again left San Jose for Miami. He told the Costa Rican security officials that he would be away from Costa Rica for a month.

5. Field Dissem: State Army CINCSO (Also sent Managua and Port-au-Prince.)

FBI doc
11 Mar '68 (Miami)
Re - alleged Plan for
Haitian Invasion from Boat
"Yipee"
Bureau # 105-14078

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. 201 FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED TO / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

201-823979
HPS -04108
07 MAR 68

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
INVOLVED IN PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOVT OF PRES DUVALIER IN HAITI. LTR INDICATING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SUBJ AND LODWIG STARKE /201-767989/ HAD NOT PROGRESSED WELL

UFGHTPHNM

R 6803261209

FILE IN 201-42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-61 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 7 Mar 68 (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. 201 FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO 201 FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

~~MASFERRER, ROLANDO~~
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

100-300-017
DRC -12057
04 MAR 68
FBI
PA

CIT ?
OCC ?
KNOWN AS THE BUTCHER OF THE ORIENTE PROV, A CLOSE ASSCC OF BATISTA, A MASS MURDERER AND SADIST, OWNER OF PRIV GANGSTER GP, THE TIGERS, USED BY CIA IN PREPARING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION AND AGAIN IN 67 CF THE UNSUCCESSFUL INVASION OF HAITI, ESCAPED TO FLORIDA.

R 6804120056

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9-40)

4 Mar 68

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 201-42669

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. CS -311/02024-68

DATE DISTR. 1 March 1968

COUNTRY Costa Rica/Haiti

DOI February 1968

SUBJECT Negotiations Between Ludwig Starke, Right-Wing Extremist in Costa Rica, and Rolando Masferrer, Cuban Exile Involved in Plotting Against Governments of Haiti and Cuba, with A View Toward Mutual Support for Projected Revolutionary Movements

ACQ Costa Rica, San Jose (15-23 February 1968)

FIELD NO. HRS-4099

SOURCE A high-level member of the National Liberation Party (PLN) who has access to and the confidence of top leaders of his party. His strong identification with the PLN and the knowledge that his reporting will reach U.S. official circles probably cause him to present his reporting to the best advantage of the PLN. He has submitted reliable information during the past year, but he has been known to withhold pertinent information. He received the information from Daniel Oduber.

1. (Field Comment: TDCS-314/01096-68 reported that Ludwig Starke Jimenez, a right-wing extremist who is the leader of the security forces of the Movimiento Costa Rica Libre (MCRL), anti-Communist businessmen's group, had informed Daniel Oduber Quiros, of the National Liberation Party (PLN), that he was making plans and seeking support for a possible move against the Costa Rican Government in the event that it should appear to be in danger of passing into the hands of leftists. To that end Starke was negotiating with sympathetic groups outside of Costa Rica. He was in indirect contact with Rolando Masferrer, a Cuban exile involved in plotting against the Governments of Haiti and Cuba, through Fernando Melo Fontanillis, a Cuban exile in Costa Rica who was in touch with a priest associated with Masferrer.)

2. In mid-February Oduber said that he had contacted Melo, whom he had known for some time, in an effort to learn more about the negotiations between Starke and Masferrer, in which Melo had been acting as an intermediary. Melo said that the objective of the negotiations was to work out a plan whereby Haitian and Cuban exiles, with Starke's

201-42669

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
FBI 2	I&NS							

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CA/INT	1	WH/SJOS	1	CI/IC	1		HRS-4099
CA/PROP	1	WH/MANA	#	CI/OP/WH	1		NP(HUGALLY)
		WH/PACY	#			SJOS-0018 (IN 57320)	HC: HUGLIB(HUGLI
~~WH/R~~	1	WH/PRIM	#	WH/7/HT	2		CS-311/02024-68
WH/2/CR	8			WH/R File	1		COORDINATING / RELEASING HK GED/pi
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 12 (1), DO 1.						LIAISON 6	

cooperation, would use Costa Rican soil as a staging area for an invasion of Haiti, to overthrow President Francois Duvalier. If successful, Masferrer and his Haitian consorts would then supply funds and armament to Starke for his projected move against the Trejos government.

3. Melo later informed Oduber that he was planning to go to New York City on 21 February, ostensibly to visit members of his family. However, the true purpose of his visit is to talk with Masferrer and Father Diego Manuel Abilio 1 Mar 68 Madrigal Alvarez, the priest who has represented Masferrer 201-42619 in the negotiations, through Melo, with Starke. Melo has been commissioned by Starke to ascertain the quantity and source of arms that the Masferrer group will make available to Starke if the group succeeds in overthrowing Duvalier. Melo also is to find out what other assistance the Masferrer group will provide to Starke, how many Haitian and Cuban exiles Masferrer will send to Costa Rica, and when they will arrive.

4. Melo said that a Costa Rican visa already has been obtained for Jacques Moringlane, a Haitian, who will be the first of the group of Haitian and Cuban exiles to come to Costa Rica to set up their staging area. Moringlane's visa was obtained by Starke through Rodrigo Arauz Bonilla, who until recently was the chief clerk (oficial mayor) of the Ministry of Public Security.

5. (Field Comment: Melo has the reputation locally of being an inveterate intriguer and a braggart. Therefore, his veracity is open to question. It is possible that the information he has given to Oduber is to some extent exaggerated or distorted. It is also possible that Starke will find Melo to be a less than trustworthy intermediary.)

6. Field Dissem: State Army CINCSO. (Also sent Managua and Port-au-Prince).

7. (Headquarters Comment: An official Costa Rican Service reported on 23 February 1968 that Fernando Melo Fontanils, left San Jose for Miami and New York on 21 February 1968 via LACSA flight 620.)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-42669
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
[illegible] WH/COG/EPS
FROM 2/f

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES -2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION		ADVANCE COPY	UNIT	TIME	BY
WH/COG-8	☒ RID COPY	☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED		2310Z	7

INFO FILE, CSDO, VR, ~~WH 8~~, ADDP, CA-5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/D-4, FI/INT, IW, GR [illegible] INTERNAL [illegible]: DDI, D/OCI-3

S E C R E T 292148Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1467
WAVE

DIRECTOR

23 FEB 68 IN 61102
M

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

1. SENTENCES PASSED 28 FEB ON MASFERRER AND CO AS FOLLOWS: ROLANDO MASFERRER, FOUR YEARS; JEAN BAPTISTE GEORGES, SIXTY DAYS; RENE LEON, SIXTY DAYS; MARTIN CASEY, NINE MONTHS; ATUN CONSTANZO, SIXTY DAYS; ANTONIO LEON, SIXTY DAYS.

2. ALL OUT ON BOND PENDING APPEAL.

3. POUCHING MIAMI HERALD CLIP ON THIS STORY.

S E C R E T

ANAL	FI	
PG	[illegible]	
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

SECRET

201-42669
29 Feb 1968

FBI doc
27 Feb 68 (Miami)
Re - Alcides Perez Bauza
Bureau # 105-14702

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-767989

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

D 201-823979

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET 4

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI,

23 FEB 68 IN 57328

S E C R E T 232230Z FEB 68 CITE SAN JOSE 8815

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, MANAGUA, PORT AU PRINCE

UFG WH PAP

[illegible]

FERNANDO MELO FONTANILS (201-823979) CUBAN EXILE RESIDING COSTA RICA, LEFT SAN JOSE FOR MIAMI AND NEW YORK ON 21 FEB 68 VIA LACSA 620. ACCORDING TO HRS-4899 BEING POUCHED ALL ADDRESSEES HE COMMISSIONED BY LUDWIG STARKE JIMENEZ, COSTA RICAN ACTIVIST, TO DISCUSS WITH ROLANDO

201-042669

~~MASFERRER~~ PLANS FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVE AGAINST DUVALIER.

S E C R E T

SECRET

[illegible]	71	
[illegible]		
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX ✓	

MICROFILMED
MAR 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

D-201-767989

D-201-823979

23 Feb 68

201-042669

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED TO / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

019-022-008
HRS -04097
23 FEB 68

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
NEGOTIATING W/LUDWIG STARKE JIMENEZ /201-767989/ RE MUTUAL SUPPORT FOR PLANNED REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. CUBAN EXILE

R 6803072384

HTPHNM

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

23 Feb 68
201-42669

FBI doc
26 Jan 68 (Miami)
Re – Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau # 2-156

FBI doc
26 Dec 67 (Miami)
Re – Alleged Plan for Haitian
Invasion from Boat "Yipee"
Bureau # 105-14078

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
	2. RI FILE NO.		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE PLAN FOR ACTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

072-009-013
WAVE-00427
30 NOV 67
UFG -09179
P4

R 6803271995

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

30 Nov 67

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-42669

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

WH/C/CI

7 3 2 5 7

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

PRECEDENCE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE RF DCI D/DCI DCI (GOODWIN) DDP ADDP CSRF CS/DO C/OPSER C/CI C/WH 6 IG C/CSPS C/CA2 C/FI

AS	FI	
PS	7257	
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

S E C R E T 171807Z CITE [illegible]WAVE 8281

DIRECTOR

17 Nov 67 IN 55653

[redacted] TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

1. TRIAL TURNED OUT TO BE NO PROBLEM FOR AGENCY OR STATION. DEFENSE PLAN TO TURN IT INTO ANTI-CIA CIRCUS WAS TOTALLY FRUSTRATED BY JUDGE CABOT'S FIRM RULING AND BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH OF U.S. ATTORNEY MEADOWS. AMSWIRL-1 WAS NEVER CALLED AS WITNESS, NOR WERE ANY OF OTHER FORMER AGENCY ASSOCIATES OR EMPLOYEES WHOM DEFENSE HAD ASKED TO HAVE SUBPOENAED. ONE PROSECUTION WITNESS ABOUT WHOM WE HAD BEEN WORRIED, DAVID CABEZA, FORMER AGENT AND RECENTLY PERSISTENT HARASSER OF CIA AND JMWAVE, HANDLED HIMSELF EXTREMELY WELL. COURT RULINGS PREVENTED DEFENSE FROM LURING HIM INTO OPERATIONAL REVELATIONS DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION.

2. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL PRECEDENTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY MANNER IN WHICH THIS TRIAL WAS CONDUCTED WHICH CAN BE HELPFUL IN FUTURE LITIGATION INVOLVING AGENCY. E.G., COURT ISSUED ORDER ON FIRST DAY OF TRIAL WHICH PRECLUDED TAKING OF PHOTOGRAPHS IN COURTROOM AND RESTRICTED PUBLICATION OF ANY TESTIMONY OR ARGUMENTS MADE OUT OF PRESENCE OF JURY.

SECRET

201-42669

Rolando Masferrer 17 Nov 67

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 0281 S E C R E T

THE LATTER WAS MOST SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTION AS IT RELATED DIRECTLY TO QUESTIONS INVOLVING CIA. U.S. ATTORNEY PUT FORTH MOTION, WHICH COURT GRANTED, WHICH REQUIRED THAT QUESTIONS TO WITNESSES ON CROSS-EXAMINATION WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO MENTION OF CIA BE ASKED AFTER JURY HAD LEFT COURTROOM.

3. LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE WAS LIGHT AND FACTUAL. PRESS SHOWED NO DESIRE TO EXPAND UPON OR INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF CIA CONNECTION. AS FAR AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE, THERE WAS NO NATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE OF TRIAL. INTEREST IN TRIAL IN LOCAL CUBAN AND HAITIAN COMMUNITIES MINIMAL.

4. TRIAL REPRESENTS SETBACK FOR ROBERT K. BROWN. ONE OF HIS LOCAL HENCHMEN, MARTIN CASEY, WAS CONVICTED. ANOTHER OF HIS LOCAL HENCHMEN, RALPH EDENS, WAS PRESENT AS OBSERVER DURING ENTIRE TRIAL AND WAS OVERHEARD BY FERENCE MAKING ANTI-CIA REMARKS AND ALLEGATIONS IN CONSULTATION WITH DEFENDANT MARTIN CASEY AND DEFENSE COUNSEL NEGRETTI. NOTHING CAME OUT IN TRIAL THAT BROWN COULD FIND OF MUCH USE IN BOOK HE IS REPORTEDLY WRITING.

5. LIKEWISE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING DEVELOPED IN TRIAL THAT COULD PROVIDE ANY GRIST FOR JIM GARRISON'S ANTI-CIA MILL

SECRET

IN NEW ORLEANS.

6. CASTRO GOT NOTHING OUT OF TRIAL EITHER. ITS VERDICT UNDERMINES HIS CONTENTION THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT IS CONTINUALLY AIDING AND ABETTING EXILES IN SUBVERSIVE EFFORT AGAINST CUBA.

7. ONLY IRONY ABOUT THIS TRIAL IS FACT THAT ITS FAVORABLE OUTCOME TENDS TO UNDERMINE IN RETROSPECT ORIGINAL AGENCY ARGUMENTS AGAINST HOLDING IT IN FIRST PLACE. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PREVENTIVE EFFORTS NEVERTHELESS SERVED VERY USEFUL PURPOSE--HAD DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NOT BEEN IMPRESSED WITH POTENTIAL SENSITIVITY OF THIS CASE FOR CIA, THEY WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE TAKEN CARE THEY DID IN PREPARING AND CONDUCTING IT. OUR OWN EXTENSIVE PREPARATION, OUR COOPERATIVE POSTURE WITH COURT AND CAREFUL BRIEFINGS OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY BY FERENCE ON ALL ASPECTS CONCERNING CIA ALL CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO WHOLESOME CLIMATE IN WHICH TRIAL WAS CONDUCTED AND HELPED DEMORALIZE THE DEFENSE WHICH, IN ALL, DISPLAYED VERY LITTLE SKILL AND NOT MUCH OF THE FIENDISHNESS WE HAD EXPECTED.

8. STATION ESPECIALLY WISHES TO COMMEND EDWARD K. FERENCE[2]

201-42669
17 Nov 67

SECRET

PAGE 4 JMWAVE 0281 SECRET

FOR HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL, COOL HEADED AND CONSCIENTIOUS MANNER IN WHICH HE CARRIED OUT HIS DUTIES IN CONNECTION WITH TRIAL. INTERESTS OF STATION AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE TOTALLY PROTECTED AND OVERALL INTERESTS OF AGENCY WERE EXTREMELY WELL SERVED BY HIS PRESENCE HERE.

SECRET

[illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-42669

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM WH/C/FI

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY: ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, DDP, ADDP, SOD 6,

WAVE

17 Nov 67 IN 55479

SECRET 171554Z CITE JMWAVE 8274

DIRECTOR INFO JMBAR

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

AX 62	71	
~~15~~	DUTY	
ABSTRACT	✗	INDEX

1. FOR FIRST TIME IN MORE THAN A WEEK TRIAL HAS MADE FRONT PAGE OF 17 NOV MIAMI HERALD WITH STORY HEADLINED "SIX CONVICTED OF CONSPIRACY TO INVADE HAITI". LONG STORY WITH EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND ON THE CASE CONTINUES ON PAGE-23A UNDER HEADLINE: "CIA ROLE IN PLOTTING DISCOUNTED".

2. EXCERPTS FOLLOW: "MAXIMUM SENTENCE EACH COULD RECEIVE IS A $35,000 FINE AND SEVEN YEARS IN PRISON. SENTENCING WAS DEFERRED PENDING BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS. FATHER GEORGES... HAD NO COMMENT. HOWEVER, MASFERRER LABELED IT A 'POLITICAL TRIAL'. HE SAID IT "REFLECTED THE CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY OF THE U.S." "DOCUMENTS INTRODUCED AT THE TRIAL INDICATED THAT THE HAITIAN INVASION WOULD GET SOME MILITARY BACKING FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THROUGHOUT THE SIX-DAY TRIAL, U.S. ATTORNEY WILLIAM MEADOWS AND HIS ASSISTANT, LLOYD BATES, PUT ON 30 WITNESSES. THE DEFENSE RESTED WITHOUT OPENING ARGUMENTS AND WITHOUT CALLING A SINGLE WITNESS. THE ONLY DEFENSE OFFERED

201-42669

17 Nov 1967

SECRET

PAGE-2 JMWAVE 0274 SECRET

WAS THE THEME THAT THE HAITIAN VENTURE WAS CIA-SPONSORED. HOWEVER, JUDGE TED CABOT RULED THERE WASN'T ANY EVIDENCE TO BACK UP THAT THEORY AND THE JURY DIDN'T GET ANY DETAILED COMMENTS ON IT. GINO NEGRETTI... ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENSE, LABELED THE DEFENDANTS FREEDOM FIGHTERS...AND ATTACKED THE LAW UNDER WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED." "NEGRETTI SAID ALL THE DEFENDANTS WILL APPEAL."

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-12669

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 1 : 7

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 3/WH/C/CI

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8. ~~ADDP, CS/DO,~~ CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/PS. CS/SSO, CA2, CA/PROP. [illegible] CA/PEG, CA/4, FI, FI/D4, FI/INT2, [illegible] SOD6. CA/INTEGRAL USE CA/[illegible], DDI.

WAVE

SECRET 170815Z CITE JMWAVE 0272 DKCS;

DIRECTOR

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

17 Nov 67 IN 94838

AS OF 1815 HOURS 16 NOVEMBER JURY RETURNED VERDICT OF GUILTY ON BOTH COUNTS AGAINST ALL REPEAT ALL DEFENDANTS.

SECRET

AN	FI	
PP	DESP	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

201-12669
17 Nov 1967

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-42669
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM WH/C/CI

ACTION WH/COG ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR WH8 C/ [illegible] /PR [illegible] A/D4 , CI/OPS , FI/INTZ OS/CP

WAVE

SECRET 151647Z CITE JMWAVE 8241

DIRECTOR INFO JMBAR

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

AN /	FI	
~~DO~~	~~DEPT~~	
ABSTRACT ✓		~~INDEX~~

MIAMI PRESS COVERAGE RESUMPTION OF TRIAL ON 14 NOVEMBER EXTREMELY LIGHT. "HERALD" OF 15 NOVEMBER HAS STORY ON PAGE 21-A HEADLINED "DOMINICAN GENERAL OFFERED TO HELP SEIZE HAITI, JURY TOLD" WHICH DEALS WITH DOCUMENT INTRODUCED BY PROSECUTION WHICH ALLEGEDLY SHOWS THAT GENERAL ANTONIO IMBERT BARRERAS WAS PREPARED TO HELP THE GROUP. DOCUMENT WAS SEIZED DURING 2 JANUARY 67 RAID ON HOUSE IN KEYS WHERE MASFERRER GROUP WAS GATHERED. NO MENTION OR ALLUSION TO CIA.

SECRET

SECRET

201-42669
15 Nov 1967

SECRET

14 November 1967

EXCERPTS FROM: Memorandum for the Record

SUBJECT : Regular Weekly Meeting with Department of State, 6 November 1967

5. Mr. Broe noted that the Rolando Masferrer trial is finally coming up in Miami. He left a document concerning the present status of the trial with Mr. Sayre for his perusal and later return to the Agency. A similar memorandum of Mr. Sherman Kent's discussions with Diaz Ordaz was also given to Mr. Sayre for reading and return at a convenient time.

SECRET

19 Nov 67
201-042669

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-042669
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
#1

ACTION
WH/COG-8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT [illegible] TIME [illegible]

INFO
FILE [illegible]

WAVE

9 Nov 67 IN 50320

AN X PI
ABSTRACT X

SECRET 091612Z CITE JMWAVE 0169

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMBAR

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

MIAMI PRESS COVERAGE MORNING 9 NOVEMBER VERY LIGHT. "HERALD" CARRIES STORY ON PAGE 10-C ENTITLED "TWO LIVE GRENADES HANDED HIM, EX-DEPUTY TESTIFIES" WHICH HAS NO CIA MENTION. STORY SUMMARIZES TESTIMONY OF YESTERDAY'S PROSECUTION WITNESSES, NONE OF WHOM CONNECTED WITH PRESENT OR PAST JMWAVE OPERATIONS AND ALL OF WHOM SUPPLIED CONCRETE INFORMATION ON MASFERRER GROUP'S RENTING OF PROPERTY IN KEYS AND MOVEMENT OF MEN AND ARMS.

SECRET

SECRET

201-042669
9 Nov 1967

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-042669
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH B
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
~~[illegible]~~
FROM
3C

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WH/COG TIME 2155Z BY B

INFO FILE, VR, DCI, D/DCI, DCI/General Counsel, DDP, ADDP, CS/EF, CS/DO, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2,

S E C R E T 082042Z CITE JMWAVE 2156 WAVE

IN [illegible] E22

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMBAR

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

ANS BY:	
~~2~~	
ABSTRACT	X

MIAMI NEWS OF AFTERNOON 8 NOV 67 CARRIES STORY ON PAGE 3-A ENTITLED "MASFERRER WARNED ON CIA TALK" FROM WHICH FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS:

"LAWYERS FOR RALANDO MASFERRER AND FIVE OTHERS ON TRIAL FOR CONSPIRACY IN AN ATTEMPTED INVASION OF HAITI CANNOT INDISCRIMINATELY RAISE THE GHOST OF THE CIA IN CROSS-EXAMINATION, FEDERAL JUDGE TED CABOT HAS RULED.

"THE JUDGE'S RULING CAME YESTERDAY ON A MOTION--OUT OF THE JURY'S PRESENCE--BY U.S. ATTORNEY WILLIAM A. MEADOWS.

"MEADOWS ASKED THE COURT TO REQUIRE THE DEFENSE, BEFORE ASKING A WITNESS ABOUT POSSIBLE CONNECTIONS WITH THE CIA, TO SHOW OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY WHAT IT HOPES TO ELICIT FROM THE WITNESS.

"OTHERWISE, 'SAID MEADOWS, 'WE HAVE COUNSEL ASKING ABOUT CIA CONNECTIONS WHEN THERE MAY NOT BE ANY, BUT NEVERTHELESS LEAVING THE JURORS WITH THE WRONG IMPRESSION.'

"THE MOTION WAS BITTERLY ATTACKED BY GINO NEGRETTI, CARLOS

SECRET

201-042669
8 Nov 1967

RECEIVED
RID/MIS
Nov 21 2 54 PM '61

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 0156 S E C R E T

FERNANDEZ AND HAROLD WITTLING, THE DEFENSE COUNSEL, BUT WAS GRANTED BY THE JUDGE.

"HE RULED THAT IF THE DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO SHOW, OUT OF THE JURY'S PRESENCE, THAN AN ANSWER FAVORABLE TO ITS CASE WAS FORTHCOMING FROM A WITNESS, THE SAME QUESTION WOULD BE PERMITTED WITH THE JURY PRESENT."

S E C R E T

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-242669
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
FROM
~~[illegible]~~
5

[illegible]FIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

PRECEDENCE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/SA [illegible]
☑ RID COPY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED
UNIT WH/SG
TIME [illegible]
BY [illegible]

INFO
FILE [illegible] CS/DO [illegible] CA/E 4
CA 2 [illegible]

WAVE

S E C R E T 081455Z CITE JMWAVE 0158 8 Nov 67 IN 26278

PRIORITY DIRECTOR ~~INFO JMBAR~~

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

ANAL	
ABSTRACT	X

MIAMI HERALD OF 8 NOVEMBER HAS STORY ON 7 NOVEMBER DEVELOPMENTS AT TRIAL ON PAGE 12-A ENTITLED "DEFENSE MANEUVER STYMIED IN HAITIAN 'INVASION' TRIAL". FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS MOST PERTINENT PASSAGES.

"A GOVERNMENT WITNESS IN MIAMI'S HAITIAN INVASION TRIAL WAS THE MAN WHO TIPPED THE U.S. TO THE RUSSIAN ROCKET BUILDUP IN CUBA, A DEFENSE ATTORNEY SAID TUESDAY.

"THE COMMENT BY GINO NEGRETTI WAS PART OF A DEFENSE MOVE TO TIE THE CIA INTO THE CONSPIRACY CHARGED IN AN INDICTMENT AGAINST SIX ANTI-CASTROITES IN FEDERAL COURT.

"HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION AND THE FACT THAT THE WITNESS, DAVID CABEZA COUPAU, 601 SW 11TH ST., ONCE WORKED FOR THE CIA NEVER REACHED THE JURY'S EARS.

"U.S. ATTORNEY WILLIAM MEADOWS HAD BEATEN DOWN THE DEFENSE MANEUVER BEFORE IT GOT OFF THE GROUND. JUDGE TED CABOT AGREED WITH MEADOWS THAT THE DEFENSE WOULD HAVE TO OFFER SUPPORTING TESTIMONY FOR ANY QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE CIA OUT OF

201-242669
8 Nov 1967

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 8150 S E C R E T

THE PRESENCE OF THE PANEL. AND ANYTHING THAT WOULD GO TO THE JURY WOULD HAVE TO GET THE APPROVAL OF THE BENCH.

"BUT THE FACT THAT CABEZA, WHO NOW RUNS AN AMUSEMENT PARK IN MIAMI, HAD SEVERED HIS CONNECTIONS WITH THE CIA IN 1964 CAUSED CABOT TO TURN THUMBS DOWN ON FURTHER QUESTIONS.

"THE GOVERNMENT HAD ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT HE WORKED FOR THE FEDERAL AGENCY DURING THE TIME THE ALLEGED HAITI INVASION WAS BEING HATCHED IN LATE 1966.

"CABOT ALSO RULED OUT ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNECTIONS WITH THE CIA OF A BROTHER OF CABEZA.

"CABEZA, ONE OF 23 WITNESSES THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTS TO CALL, TESTIFIED EARLIER THAT HE HAD A ROLE IN THE INVASION PLOT.

"HE SAID HE WAS TO ACT AS A PROPAGANDIST IN THE STATES AND TELL THE PUBLIC THE AIM OF THE INVASION: A REVAMPING OF THE DUVALIER DICTATORSHIP AND MAKING HAITI A BASE FOR A CUBAN INVASION.

"BUT THE LITTLE ARMY THAT HAD BEEN RECRUITED MET ITS DEFEAT THE DAY AFTER NEW YEAR'S 1967--AT THE HANDS OF CUSTOMS

AGENTS IN KEY WEST.

"CABEZA TESTIFIED THAT EARLIER HE HAD DRIVEN A TRUCKLOAD OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES TOWARD KEY WEST BUT FELL INTO THE HANDS OF OFFICIALS WHO DIDN'T BELIEVE HIS STORY THAT HIS PANEL TRUCK CARRIED ONLY PAINT.

"THE GOVERNMENT ALSO CALLED A MIAMI MAN, JULIO HORMILLA, OF 1450 SW 17TH ST., WHO TESTIFIED HE ACTED AS A SORT OF ADVANCE MAN FOR THE LIBERATION OF HAITI."

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
	2. RI FILE NO.			
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE		
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER RUJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

201-273015
DBB -99864
31 OCT 67
FBI
P9

CIT ?
OCC ?
DURING THE PERIOD 59/60 HAD BECOME ACTIVELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE ANTI CASTRO ORGANIZATION OF SUBJ FORMER CUBAN SENATOR AND NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER

WAS 100-005-014

R 7003060742.

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

31 Oct 67 (7-46)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES 8

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

JK

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO TIME 0015Z BY D

INFO FILE, VR, OS/DO, WH 8, OGC 2, CCS 3, CSPS, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 262244Z CITE JMWAVE 9943

26 Oct 67 IN 80657

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

RE DIRECTOR 46521

1. CABEZA IS NOT LISTED AS PROSECUTION WITNESS IN MASFERRER TRIAL. COPY OFFICIAL DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INDICTMENT LISTS CABEZA AS CO-CONSPIRATOR WHO COOPERATED WITH DEFENDANT MASFERRER IN ACQUIRING USE OF A HOUSE IN COCO PLUM, MARATHON, FLA. AND IN TRANSPORTING OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION FROM NEW YORK AND ATLANTA TO MIAMI. OFFICIAL CUSTOMS REPORT FORWARDED TO U.S. ATTORNEY WILLIAM A. MEADOWS ON 6 FEBRUARY 1967 LISTS CABEZA AS A DEFENDANT. TESTIMONY BY CUSTOMS AGENTS AND THEIR INFORMANTS CITE CABEZA AS STATING HE HAD GREEN LIGHT FROM U.S. GOVERNMENT TO ENGAGE IN HAITIAN INVASION.

2. WOFIRM WILL HAVE NO CONTROL OVER MANNER IN WHICH CABEZA CHOOSES TO TESTIFY. EXPECT MASFERRER DEFENSE WOULD HAVE NO QUALMS IN FORCING CABEZA TO TESTIFY IN MANNER AIDING GROUP'S POSITION.

3. BASED ON REVIEW AND DISCUSSIONS WITH STATION PERSONNEL FAMILIAR CABEZA ACTIVITIES, WE SHOULD PROBABLY EXPECT CABEZA TO USE WOFIRM AS WHIPPING BOY OR "EMINENCE GRISE" BEHIND

SECRET

CS copy in 100-9-16

File in 201-42669

PAGE TWO JMWAVE 9943 S E C R E T

INVASION PLOT. IN LIGHT THIS POSSIBILITY, SUGGEST U.S. ATTORNEY BE BRIEFED BACKGROUND CABEZA'S WO IRM EMPLOYMENT WITH GENERAL RECAP ON HIS PERSONALITY AND ATTITUDE AS IT RELATES TO CASE. ALL PERTINENT INFO AVAILABLE AT HQS.

S E C R E T

INS name trace
19 Oct 67
Subject - Masferrer

FBI doc
12 Oct '67 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Serial# 2-156

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

[illegible]

FROM: AD

RID/AN

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REGC		25 OCT 1967		
2.				
3. WH/C/CA		25 OCT	[illegible]	
4.				
5. WH/C/RR				
6.				
7. WH/C/CIS		2/11		SOR
8. NG				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
OCT 18 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX X

DATE MICROFILMED

FILE TITLE
24 NOV 1967

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-012269

DOCUMENT DATE
10 Oct 1967

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFGA 28655

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

IP

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMOT/Operational
Anti U.S. Government Bulletin - EL ECO DE HOLGUIN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI.

1. Attached herewith is AMOT Report EE-7688, dated 3 October 1967 and its attachment, a bulletin entitled EL ECO DE HOLGUIN (The Voice of Holguin) dated September 1967.

F circulate

2. As noted in the report, Rolando MASFERRER Rojas (201-042669) is the author of the bulletin which attacks the U. S. Government and its agencies, including the CIA.

Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
3 - CH/WH/COG w/att. h/w

MICROFILMED
OCT 1 6 1967
DOC MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

1 att

OCT 1 0 1967
201-042669

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-042669	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-28655	DATE 9 Oct 67
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-5-3/4-6 10 Oct 67 201-42669

S E C R E T ATT. TO UFGA-28655

FROM: SE (I-27) EE-7688

9P

AGENT: E-2 3 Oct. 1957

VIA: I-1

SUBJECT: Attacks on the U.S. Government and its departments and agencies

SOURCE: Bulletin entitled "El Eco de Holguin" of September 1967

REF: EE-7314

1. Attached herewith is a copy of the bulletin, "El Eco de Holguin," Year 1, No. 1, dated September 1967. This bulletin calls itself the "Official Organ of the Municipality of Holguin in Exile."

2. The author of this bulletin is Rolando MASFERRER Rojas, who uses in it some of the pseudonyms he formerly in his articles in the paper, El Tiempo, of New York, such as "Ignotus," "Miguel Peralta" and "Criso."

3. It is false to say that the bulletin is the official organ of the Municipality of Holguin, as MASFERRER and his group do not belong to that organization and at a meeting held on 9 July 1967, when MASFERRER and his group tried to oust the directorate of the organization, they were completely routed.

4. This bulletin follows the same line as the other bulletin put out by MASFERRER under the name Ahora, which was also called the "official organ of the Municipality of Holguin." (See EE-7314.)

5. In this bulletin MASFERRER attacks the U.S. Government and its departments and agencies. These attacks are underlined in red in the attached copy.

MICROFILMED
OCT 18 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

[illegible]

SECRET

CS COPY

Att. 1 UFGA-28655

10 Oct 67
201-042669

14-00000

mc

SECRET ATTACHMENT TO UFGA-28655

EL ECO DE HOLGUIN

ORGANO OFICIAL DEL MUNICIPIO DE HOLGUIN EN EL EXILIO

NUM. 1 SEPTIEMBRE DE 1967 AÑO I

EDITORIAL

Según la "hard intelligence", en los años 70, China dispondrá de los medios de acarreo (cohetes intercontinentales) que amenazarán a Estados Unidos y Rusia.

Sábese que los chinos han impreso mapas con las fronteras del imperio de Mao en los Urales.

El potencial humano y los grandes saltos en tecnología militar de China y la realidad de su gran masa cargando sobre el sureste de Asia, Japón y Filipinas son un serio desafío para el poderío norteamericano en el Pacífico. Al extremo de que tanto Norteamérica como Inglaterra, planean ya una cadena de bases en el océano Indico.

Esto explica el acuerdo defensivo ruso-americano que contempla ya, provisoramente, tan inquietante perspectiva que solo puede resolverse en una guerra de E. U. y la URSS contra China.

Y explica los motivos norteamericanos para amarrar las manos a los exiliados cubanos que quieren golpear al tirano Castro, hasta el presente bajo la protección del acuerdo Kennedy Kruschev.

Norteamérica no puede poner en riesgo su luna de miel con la URSS y de repente, el Tío Sam se convierte en el mas eficaz [illegible] de Castro.

Toda la charlatanería de los incapaces dirigentes anticomunistas cubanos levantando falsas esperanzas en la Organización de Estados Americanos de quienes se espera, vanamente, una actitud viril frente a las provocaciones del hediondo bandido de La Habana, revela incomprensión y cobardía de gentes oportunistas que no tienen el coraje para llamar las cosas por su nombre. La posición de que los

Pase a la Pag. 2

BOBBY FULLER

Bobby Fuller era un americano de Holguín. Hijo de otros dos holguineros nacidos en Norteamérica Guillermo Fuller y Jenny Jewett, colonos de Lewiston, próximo a Cacocum.

Notable atleta en sus días de estudiante en Miami, Bobby fue destacado miembro del glorioso cuerpo de Infantería de Marina de Estados Unidos.

Tras haberse jugado la vida en tareas clandestinas, en los primeros tiempos de la tiranía comunista, Bobby desembarcó en la primera expedición armada llegada a la costa Norte de Oriente, en ayuda de los alzados en la región de Guantánamo-Baracoa.

Fue capturado tras penosa odisea en las montañas. Y fusilado en Santiago de Cuba, junto a otros dos valerosos norteamericanos amigos de Cuba: Tony Barba y Dale Thompson.

Los holguineros, que ven con tristeza como muchos de sus hermanos de la patria chica de Calixto García, olvidan sus deberes con los que han quedado atrás, tienen un altar en sus corazones para Bobby Fuller, como para Barba y Thompson, que un día no muy lejano, tendrán un monumento al pie de las empinadas lomas de Oriente.

Los Renegados

Por Miguel Peralta.

Estados Unidos prefería, a todas luces, una vecina Cuba democrática al régimen de opresión entronizado de Fidel Castro.

Pero es evidente que mucho más que la situación de miseria y terror que padecen los cubanos interesa a Norteamérica la posición de enemistad internacional y de peón de los rusos y los chinos que juega la nación cubana en el tablero de la guerra fría.

El destino triste, el hambre, la enfermedad, el miedo

Pase a la Pag. 3

SECRET

2

[illegible] 1
Exhibit [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

EDITORIAL....Continuación.

yanquis los escojan a ellos para administrar a Cuba libre los convierte en vulgares cómplices de esta política que ha condenado a la esclavitud al pueblo cubano que se creía, en su ingenuidad, amparado en su soberanía por los papeles mojados de los acuerdos de Rio, Caracas, Bogotá y por la letra muerta de la doctrina Monroe.

La OEA, como ha dicho valientemente el dirigente venezolano Carlos Andres Pérez, hace lo que mande Washington, y éste, al presente, baila al son de la balalaika.

Se trata, pues, de convenir en que nadie nos va a sacar las castañas del fuego. Y que nosotros, debemos pelear por nuestras libertades. Como lo hemos hecho siempre: solos.

En Cuba ocurrirá una guerra únicamente cuando desde el destierro, llegue una fuerza armada de decenas de miles de hombres. Y es evidente que Estados Unidos, por estas realidades de política mundial, no permitirá jamás que aquí se organice esta fuerza.

Pero los cubanos podemos conquistar, en alianza con luchadores democráticos de otros países, un santuario donde alistar ese ejército con aviones y tanques.

Castro no tiene más poderío militar que el que mantenía España en Cuba en 1895-98. Y hoy, la emigración tiene más potencial humano y económico y las posibilidades de adquirir armamentos en Europa y América son incomparablemente mayores que a fines del siglo pasado.

Este es el único camino para cumplir con nuestro deber y salvar nuestro honor y escaparnos de los hospitales y los cementerios bajo la nieve que son hoy la única amarga alternativa del destierro.

Quien no lo comprenda es un asno. Quien no tome esta senda es un cobarde, no importa qué pretextos o argucias esgrima para ocultar su infamia y desvergüenza.

HAY MAS DE MIL MILLONES DE DOLARES DE LOS CUBANOS RICOS Y ACOMODADOS, EN LOS BANCOS DEL DESTIERRO. ALGUN DIA, LOS SABROSONES, LOS QUE TIENEN PROPIEDADES EN CUBA, TENDRAN QUE HACER, QUIERAN QUE NO, SU CONTRIBUCION AL TESORO DE LA GUERRA.

CUBANOS MALOS Y BUENOS

Algunos cubanos han sufrido el decomiso de sus armas, la prisión o la expulsión de la Florida por intentar hacer llegar armas y municiones a Cuba o por hacerle la guerra al bandido Castro en Méjico o el Canada. En cambio, otros, más afortunados, se han hecho ricos o han gozado de una vida muelle en sus trajines de luchadores contra la tiranía.

Esto ha causado la división del destierro. A la vez que la corrupción y el escepticismo.

Si alguien quiere ganarse algunos dolares, o ser incluído en la nómina de la CIA o La Aduana, no tiene más que delatar, meterse impúdicamente a chivato y soplón. Hasta se le autoriza a portar un arma. Pero si alguien quiere arriesgarse a sufrir cárcel y persecuciones, a que le chequeen el teléfono; y aun a que se le difame por la prensa y la radio, pues que se atreva a desafiar la neutralidad norteamericana y trate de hacer una incursión a la costa de Cuba o adquiera, una embarcación para llevar armas de contrabando a la isla. O se meta en trajines de sabotaje contra Castro.

Nunca con más vigencia el viejo postulado bíblico: Por sus obras los conocereis ...

Esos dirigentes de hoteles y jets, son los bien pagados.

Los que han sufrido encierros, expedientes de deportación ... esos son los de fiar.

Que obras son amores y no buenas razones.

El alto nivel de vida de Estados Unidos, que absorbe a los desterrados cubanos en el disfrute de los bienes materiales de la sociedad americana, conspira contra el patriotismo y la abnegación que deben primar en el espíritu de la emigración. Quizá si hubiésemos dado en otras playas más inhospitalarias, en el Matto Grosso, en el Peten o en la Tundra canadiense, ya habría comenzado la guerra de independencia.



Represa "Cacoyuguín", acueducto de Holguín

LOS RENEGADOS...

Viene de la Pag. 1

y la abyección de los cubanos, en ocho años que dura su martirio, no ha llevado ni a Estados Unidos ni a las naciones del hemisferio que siguen su politica exterior, sin discrepar en una coma, a librarlos de su sufrimiento.

Ni siquiera en el mero cumplimiento de lo que mandan los compromisos internacionales escritos en Caracas, Bogotá y Rio de Janeiro.

Estados Unidos y las mal llamadas repúblicas hermanas del Continente, no solo no mueven un dedo para ayudar, como vienen obligadas, a que el pueblo de Cuba reconquiste su soberania y restablezca sus libertades, sino que impiden con la fuerza, todo intento de los patriotas cubanos por hacer llegar a los que desafian el paredón de las ejecuciones en la isla, su mensaje solidario en la forma de armas y municiones.

Esto, más que fariseismo e hipocresía, es un acto canalla, que convierte en una mojiganga a la OEA y los tratados.

Si no fuese por el eficaz rol de guardaespaldas del asesino y bandido Castro a que ha sido llevada Norteamérica, quizá habria ya una guerra civil en Cuba.

Norteamérica dice que simpatiza con los cubanos libres. Pero el aparato de represión de las actividades de los patriotas en esta nación, es cien veces más amplio y costoso que el que existía cuando los comunistas en la Sierra Maestra usaban a la Florida como base de apoyo logistico para su insurrección.

Es un secreto a voces que las armas que llevaron Hubert Matos y Díaz Lanz a Cienaguilla, Oriente, desde Venezuela, que incluian cien rifles automáticos y millones de tiros, sin los cuales Castro habria sido aplastado por el general Eulogio Cantillo, fueron adquiridas por la Agencia Central de inteligencia. Lo de la "Campaña del Bolivar" para pagar estas armas compradas en Alexandria, Va. a la "Interarmco", fue una cortina de humo.

El afán de defender la absurda ley de neutralidad no era tan vigoroso como hoy, a pesar de que Estados Unidos no tiene relaciones amistosas formales con el barbudo de La Habana.

Quien crea que Estados Unidos o la OEA van a hacer algo contra Castro es un idiota incurable o es un vendido miserable.

Quien, por mantener estos espejismos, cobra dinero, que es el caso de muchos malos cubanos, mañana tendrán que responder de su felonia.

Norteamérica y Rusia, a pesar de sus discrepancias en público, están de acuerdo en el gran plano mundial. Nada los separa. Y solo les preocupa a ambos el peligro amarillo que para los años 70 dispondrá de los cohetes intercontinentales para agredir a la URSS y a EE. UU.

Quizá Norteamérica no tenga otra alternativa en su estrategia global y en la defensa de su vida misma.

Para que se sepa que en ese idilio de Washington y Moscu, el pueblo cubano ha sido clavado en la cruz.

Y que se diga que también los malos cubanos que anteponen los intereses de Estados Unidos a los de la patria, haciéndose pagar 30 dineros por su negra traición son una piara de cerdos.

Las organizaciones que no tienen armas, ni barco ni dinero, ni sus dirigentes desafían la hipócrita ley de neutralidad, son organizaciones de mentira.

ABUSO CRIMINAL

Jesús Fanjul, responsable militar del Municipio de Holguín en el Exilio, ex-oficial del ejército de Estados Unidos, graduado en una academia militar de este país, descendiente de muy respetable familia de nuestro término, ex-preso político en Cuba y uno de los dirigentes de la abortada expedición a Haití, fue condenado a dos meses de prisión el pasado miércoles.

Un periodista provocador y un juez de esos que destilan odio discriminatorio contra los cubanos que no se venden a la CIA ni a Castro, lo mandaron por 60 días a la temible cárcel del Condado, bajo la falsa acusación de haberle pegado al periodista que lo retrataba cuando Fanjul y otros 70 cubanos anticomunistas se hallaban presos tras el fracaso del 3 de Enero en Cayo Maraton.

De nada valieron los numerosos testigos que afirmaron que Fanjul no fue quien le pegó al impertinente cínico. El juez y el reportero, que aparentemente goza de grandes influencias en la corte, donde ejerce de cronista judicial, se reían burlonamente del condenado, en un odioso abuso de poder.

En todo caso, estas riñas se penan con una pequeña multa. Quizá con cinco días de arresto.

Fanjul tiene una esposa y una pequeña hija que ahora tropiezan, amén de con la merma de sus ingresos, con la dificultad de trasladarse al trabajo y a la escuela.

Maldito juez que en su furia anticubana, recuerda los tribunales populares del castrato.

Son los mismos endiablados chupatintas que mantienen a Felipe Rivero en las propias ergástulas sin fianza ni juicio, en violación flagrante de sus derechos civiles y humanos, desde hace más de tres meses.

Loma de La Cruz

?PODEMOS GANAR SOLOS LA GUERRA?

Yo creo que sí, pero ese no es el tema del artículo. Lo que sí creo es que los cubanos no estamos haciendo todo lo necesario para ganar. En efecto, podemos formar un ejército invasor de 25,000 cubanos bien adiestrados y apertrechados, adquiriendo armas, aviones y barcos para desembarcar por distintos puntos extratégicos, al mismo tiempo que la resistencia interna inicie en toda la isla una campaña de sabotaje que propicie el triunfo.

Eso lo podemos hacer sin la ayuda de nadie, nos bastan nuestros hombres y nuestro dinero.

Si para entonces, Rusia ha retirado sus tropas de la isla, el triunfo será clamoroso y rápido, pero de lo contrario, a la América Libre y a los Estados Unidos, no le quedará otra alternativa que apoyar nuestra guerra justa y necesaria.

La iniciativa asumida por los propios cubanos, descarta la posibilidad de una guerra internacional, que es el único valladar que hasta ahora, se ha opuesto a las determinaciones de la OEA y de Washington.

Se necesita mucho sacrificio por parte de los cubanos aptos para la guerra y de los adinerados, porque ellos son los que tienen que dar vida y hacienda por la independencia de la patria y la felicidad de las generaciones futuras.

Ambos sacrificios están acreditados por nuestros antepasados: Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, Antonio Maceo, Francisco V. Aguilera, Ignacio Agramonte, y un pueblo entero, Bayamo, y otro pueblo, Guáimaro, ardieron para iluminar el camino de la libertad, a la par que infinidad de cubanos ofrendaron vidas y fortunas en aras de la independencia.

Estamos incurriendo en las mismas privaciones, en identicos sacrificios, en iguales inmolaciones y ejemplos nobles, porque estamos defendiendo la misma causa sagrada.

Hay que hacer conciencia de guerra, conciencia de sacrificio. No importa quien ha de dirigir la guerra, que a la patria se sirve desde cualquier lugar.

El triunfo no será de los jefes, sino de todos los que participemos en la lucha; todos tenemos que trabajar: la hora es de sacrificios y renunciamientos. A lo único que no podemos renunciar es a pelear por Cuba y morir por ella.

La patria es ara y no pedestal; es agonía y deber, dijo el Apóstol, y murió en Dos Ríos.

CUBA EN EL EXILIO

Por CRISO.

Hay 10 mil holguineros en Estados Unidos. La mayor parte exilados. Aunque abundan los emigrados que no muestran interés alguno en vengar agravios ni reconquistar su perdida dignidad de hombres.

10 mil hombres y mujeres en pie, poniendo cada día su grano de arena en el edificio de la libertad, podrían hacer mucho. Pero los comecheques que hasta aquí dirigían la organización del término en el destierro, ni se reunían, ni juntaban armas ni dinero, ni hacían una publicación, ni movilizaban a nadie en actos patrióticos. Eso sí, algunos vivos recibían su cheque de la CIA por debajo de la mesa. Y a yantar. Su consigna: "tu no comedes. Yo sí comedes..."

■

En la asamblea en que obtuvieron 16 votos y fueron echados de la organización del municipio por sometidos a la política de apaciguamiento y convivencia de E. U. con Castro, los "chivos" llegaron como guapitos a algunos soplones de la CIA con sus pistolitas al cinto.

Entre ellos, un chiquito hijo de españoles de apellido Ugartemendía que hace poco andaba por los portales de Holguín vestido de miliciano metiéndole miedo a las gentes y mostrando orondo, su carnet del G-2.

¡Jesús, que miedo..!

■

Rumores circulantes al cierre de esta edición del boletín de la gente de La Chamba afirman que le "cortaron el tubo del potaje" al ínclito picúo Luis Conte Aguero, el hombre que aplaudió el asesinato de su hermano Nicolás en Santiago de Cuba a manos de la "maffia" castrista. La sabrosona "mulata de fuego" llegó a recibir la friolera de 15 mil dólares al mes de manos de la próvida CIA. Lo cual quiere decir que si no ha montado negocios privados como su parigual Manolito Artime, ahora empezará el exilio para quien dijo: "Fidel, me miro en tus ojos..."

No se deje engañar: no hay ni mil cubanos que que se reunan cada semana con su grupo, que se multen con unos pesos al mes, o que sueñen con el fusil que nos quitará de la frente la ceniza del deshonor.

CUBA POR DENTRO

Por IGNOTUS

Un ex oficial del ejército castrista recién llegado a Miami desde Cuba, dijo que los alistados de la famosa división 50 del ejército comunista con acantonamiento en Mangos de Baraguá, son todos del servicio militar obligatorio y de menos de 20 años y que no muestran entusiasmo por "la tía Tata" como llaman a Fidel Castro.

Agregó que si no hay un desembarco desde afuera, cualquier mañana las amas de casa, desesperadas por la crisis de los alimentos, salen por cientos de miles a la calle y derriban al régimen.

Finalizó diciendo que en San Luis, sólo hay 13 comunistas. Y que esto es poco más o menos la situación en Cuba entera.

●

El pseudo escritor Lee Lockwood que ha puesto en circulación un lujoso libro que se vende a 10 dólares en Estados Unidos, con decenas de fotografías de la "tía Tata" y una amplia descripción de su apetito de Fantagruel (almuerzo en Uvero: Lechón asado, arroz, frijoles, yuca y fufú de plátano, pollo frito, cerveza, vino, coñac, filete mignon y tabacos), dice que abunda un excelente pasto para el ganado llamado "marabú", al que el INRA da mucha atención.

●

Ana Laura Infante, que era quizá la señora más aristocrática y discriminatoria de Holguín, casada con un tipo parasitario, gallego, llamado Fernando Zorrilla, es de las de "patria o muerte", y en sus alardes democráticos barre las calles de la ciudad. Su hijo "Pincho" bebedor, parrandero y alborotador, que llegó a robar a sus parientes, es todo un jefe del INRA en Holguín....

Y un candidato seguro a la soga y el sebo en la guásima cuando caiga la satrapía rusa del Caribe.

●

Se ven muy pocos rusos en Holguín y en toda la provincia de Oriente. Corre el rumor de que se van los que quedan. Una muchacha cubana que trabajaba como doméstica de una rusa, dice que esta le regaló alguna ropa y le dijo que se marchaba a su país.

Armando Acosta Cordero, antiguo concejal comunista de Sancti Spiritus, que desertó de la vieja guardia, siendo premiado con el bajalato de la provincia oriental, estaba entregado a la "dolce vita", practicaba el contrabando y la bolsa negra, disponía de muchos autos, fincas y casas. Bebía como un demonio. Días pasados hizo una boda fastuosa a su hija en Santiago de Cuba. Ahora está en desgracia. Le han quitado el mando.

●

Se han destruido las vallas de gallos en las ciudades del interior. Pero se mantienen las de los pobladitos monte adentro. Se apuesta fuertemente en las lidias. Son frecuentes las "paradas" de cinco mil pesos. El dinero es producto de la enorme corrupción de las autoridades, la bolsa negra y el juego de terminales protegidos por milicianos y comités de vigilancia. Es normal que los genízaros del régimen "decomisen" pero no encausen a los infelices que matan un cerdo o venden, a hurtadillas, un racimo de plátanos o unas frutas.

Es de viejo sabido que la corrupción de la administración es siempre el preludio del derrumbe.

●

Con motivo de la conferencia de OLAS se ordenó la reparación y pintura de fachadas de los edificios de las avenidas y carreteras. Se acopió carne y cerveza en todos los pueblos y se llevó a los hoteles donde se alojaría la "maffia" comunista latinoamericana. En Cuba todo es simulación y mentira. Mucho periódico y revista mal escrito, y peor impreso en pésimo papel. Nadie cree ya en Fidel Castro. Ni lo respetan. En especial, son virulentos los comentarios de las mujeres, incluyendo miembros del partido, en los establecimientos vacíos de mercancías.



Vista aérea de la ciudad de Holguín

DEMOCRACIA Y COMUNISMO

EL ECO, se escribe con letra de pueblo, con acento de libertad y por eso emplea el mensaje directo a los obreros y campesinos, a los estudiantes, militares, profesionales, propietarios y a todas las clases que integran la sociedad democrática.

Cuba, Hungría, Rumanía ..... no tienen actualmente estudiantes ni centros de cultura; en esos pueblos no pueden haber actividades docentes porque éstas exigen necesariamente un clima de libertad y derecho que es imposible en los estados comunistas.

El estudiante, el profesional y el intelectual, como el artista, el político, el atleta, el trabajador y el campesino, el militar y el industrial, necesitan de la libertad como del aire mismo. El hombre fue hecho para la libertad y sin ella prefiere la muerte.

En los pueblos esclavizados por el comunismo no pueden haber institutos militares, porque los ejércitos constitucionales son instrumentos que garantizan el imperio de las leyes y los derechos de la ciudadanía, y en los países comunistas no se respetan esos principios, sino que se violan constantemente para mantener al individuo bajo un estado de terror permanente.

Allí no pueden haber profesionales ni intelectuales, ni políticos, porque la libertad de pensamiento está restringida y solo se pueden repetir las consignas.

En esos países comunistas no hay prensa libre, todo está bajo el control del estado, lo mismo que las organizaciones obreras, cívicas, etc.

Los propietarios y los industriales han sido despojados de sus bienes y negocios, porque la propiedad privada y la iniciativa particular están terminantemente prohibidas.

El hombre no puede tener ni ideas ni bienes propios.

La madre no puede educar sus hijos, porque estos son servidores del Estado y desde pequeños el Partido Comunista los somete a adoctrinamiento.

Se suprimen y se racionan los alimentos, porque un pueblo sano y fuerte es rebelde.

Cumplimos nuestro deber de incorporarnos al movimiento general para salvar a la América; queremos coadyuvar en los esfuerzos que se realizan en ese sentido y para ello no escatimaremos ningún sacrificio.

Somos demócratas y, por tanto, somos esencialmente anticomunistas.

Somos cristianos y, por tanto, somos esencialmente anticomunistas.

Somos libres y, por tanto, somos esencialmente anticomunistas.

La Libertad o la prisión; la Patria o la esclavitud; Dios o el materialismo.

Junto a la Libertad, junto a la Patria y junto a Dios, está la Democracia; al lado de la opresión, el crimen, la miseria y el materialismo, está el comunismo.

* * *

VENEZUELA

No nos ha soprendido la actitud postrera de. Gobierno de Venezuela, al retirar prácticamente, la denuncia que "valientemente" había presentado ante la OEA, contra el gobierno comunista cubano por su agresiva política de intervención y subversión.

El camarada Leoni ha venido jugando con dos barajas; tan pronto manda a prender a los comunistas como los pone en libertad; los persigue ahora y los ampara luego. Su gobierno ha sido una obra perfecta de malabarismo político.

Estamos seguros, absolutamente seguros, que si el Ejército venezolano no se hubiera mantenido firme en su disciplina militar y obediencia a la Constitución, ya los comunistas se hubieran apoderado del gobierno venezolano y la patria de Bolívar estaría viviendo el mismo calvario que sufre la patria de Martí.

No dudamos que al presidente de Caracas le retoza el experimento marxista y por eso, hemos seguido atentamente sus pasos. Cuando las fuerzas de la democracia derrocaron al Presidente Goulart del Brasil, Leoni no reconoció al nuevo gobierno, lo mismo sucedió en el caso de Santo Domingo, apelando a una precaria y absurda doctrina de su antecesor y mentor, don Rómulo Betancourt.

¿Qué quería el camarada, qué se quedaran en sus puestos Bosch y Goulart? ¿Y si los patriotas cubanos derrocan al tirano Castro y se constituye en la isla un gobierno provisional, será reconocido por Leoni?

Hay hombres por cuyas venas no corre sangre, lo que corre es petróleo ...

¿OPTIMISMO O PESIMISMO?

En el ambiente del exilio cubano, flota la interrogante de si conviene ser optimista o si perjudica que los voceros de la opinión pública del destierro, se excedan en sus pronunciamientos, torciendo quizá la dirección de los acontecimientos, al precipitar a los patriotas en una dirección que, por su naturaleza requiere más tiempo y mayores reflexiones.

Unos estiman que es fatal para la causa cubana, que los periodistas y los líderes de la acción anticomunista se muestren demasiado optimistas porque así desorientan a los patriotas del exilio y a los de la resistencia interior, desalentándolos para proseguir la lucha al hacerles creer que no son ya necesarios sus heroicos esfuerzos, porque de todos modos, con el concurso de los norteamericanos, los acuerdos de la OEA, la colaboración de los gobiernos latinoamericanos y la concurrencia de factores imponderables, Cuba ha de ser libre en una fecha próxima.

Otros creen que lo que resulta altamente perjudicial para la causa de la independencia cubana es el pesimismo que derrochan algunos comentaristas y dirigentes, porque al formarse ese derrotismo en la masa cubana, dentro y fuera de la isla, todos nos resignaremos a continuar viviendo en el extranjero o iremos pensando en adaptamos a las exigencias del régimen castrista.

Nosotros reconocemos que ambas tesis están avaladas por buenas razones y por lo tanto se justifica que cada una tenga numerosos prosélitos que defienden calurosamente sus postulados.

Pero, creo que no debemos caer necesariamente en uno de los dos bandos extremos. Debemos ser optimistas sin llegar a la fantasía; un optimismo sensato que lejos de confundir a la opinión pública y desalentar a los patriotas, sea capaz de formar una opinión más firme y canalizar los esfuerzos de todos en la lucha a muerte contra el comunismo opresor.

Nuestro optimismo debe ser medido, ha de dar la sensación precisa de que sí lo podemos hacer, pero con el esfuerzo y el sacrificio de todos. Nuestro optimismo ha de ser fe en el triunfo, resolución heroica de luchar hasta vencer.

El optimismo ha de ser sincero, que muestre grandeza; debe ser valiente y generoso para que se contagie a los que aun están equivocados o indecisos.

El pesimismo debe ser suprimido de raíz; nadie debe sentirse pesimista, no podemos perder la batalla antes de que comience. Morir anticipadamente, por nuestra irresoluta voluntad, equivale al suicidio y nadie tiene derecho a desoir el llamado urgente de la Patria; nadie puede inhibirse.

El pesimismo debe ser suprimido netamente por el realismo; pesar nuestras fuerzas no es encontrarnos débiles sino ponernos más fuertes para vencer.

El pesimismo debe ceder su lugar a la estrategia guerrerista, para atacar cuando seamos suficientemente poderosos para derrotar al enemigo. No es cobarde aplazar el combate.

Tenemos que hacernos fuertes y tener un plan; debemos estar conscientes de nuestra fuerza, de nuestra moral y de nuestro valor; y estar seguros del triunfo definitivo.

Y, sobre todo, despojarnos de ambiciones personales, de vanidades y complejos. El momento es de guerra y sacrificios, para todos hay un lugar de peligro y gloria; que cada cual ocupe su puesto.

El Caballo se enfermó
y tan furioso se puso
que un veterinario ruso
vino y lo reconoció.
Tan enfermo lo encontró
que le quitó la montura
y al verle la matadura
rebosante de gusanos
dijo a todos los cubanos:
—El Penco no tiene cura ——

LOS CHOMBEROS EN EL EXODO

Llama grandemente la atención la eterna juventud del Dr. Eduardo (Guarro) Ochoa en sus 56 años que parecen 40. Atribuye el ex-alcalde este milagro a su equilibrio espiritual logrado en estudios y meditaciones en las disciplinas de la orden mística de los "Rosacruces".

Dice "Guarro": "A fines de año se cumple el ciclo espiritual del azote comunista en Cuba. Eso marca el final de Fidel Castro".

•

Dónde están y qué se han hecho los ex-legisladores Andrés (Pupito) Puzo y Rodrigo Suárez Bester. No han concurrido a una sola reunión dominical del Municipio. Causa extrañeza esa desición después de su airada condenación de la mediatización de la CIA en la organización.

•

La organización acaba de perder un valioso cuadro de trabajo en el Ingeniero Andrés Paseiro, quien se mudó para Inmokalee, donde se desempeña como profesor de Ciencias en un High School.

•

Honró la última reunión de los holguineros, la presencia del batallador anticomunista y patriota de pinta firme, Evelio Borrego, actualmente Capitán del Ejército de los Estados Unidos. Durante un año, Borrego combatió en Vietnam, como oficial de un batallón de la 9a. división de infantería. Viene destinado de nuevo a Fort Benning, Georgia.

Hace un tiempo le preguntó a un jefe en Washington como podría ir a pelear en Cuba si se precipitaban los acontecimientos allí. Y el general le contesto: Donde quiera que se halle, estaré a menos de 20 horas de su patria".

•

EL GENERAL OLIVA

Cada cierto tiempo, el señor capitán del Ejército de Estados Unidos, Erneido Oliva, se pone su traje de paisano y hace media docena de declaraciones en la primera página de la prensa anunciando que "prepara un ejército secreto para cuando llegue el momento de derrocar a Castro".

Se da unos cuantos viajes por el mundo y regresa a sus funciones militares. Estamos por tercera vez en presencia del fenómeno, después que Oliva salió de las prisiones de Castro, tras el fiasco de Bahía de Cochinos.

Al presente, quedan unos 70 oficiales cubanos en las fuerzas armadas de Norteamérica. La mayor parte de ellos combatiendo en el Sureste de Asia. Sólo Oliva se ha perdido la magnífica experiencia que enriquecería su aval de soldado profesional.

Ahora Oliva anda trajinando de la mano del travieso Enriquito Huertas, el hombre del Banco José Martí, que ya rompió los records de viajes de Manolo Artime, Juanita Castro y Luis Conte Agüero.

En su afán de ser aceptado por los influyentes izquierdistas de Washington, Oliva, ex-oficial del ejército constitucional que cuando cayó Batista cursaba en una escuela militar yanqui en Panamá, apareció en la primera plana del "Herald" de Miami como ex-ayudante de Fidel Castro en la Sierra Maestra. Y en unas declaraciones mal aconsejadas, Oliva hizo una desafortunada incursión en la política atacando a sus antiguos jefes militares en Cuba.

Todo lo cual ha ayudado poco al ex-segundo en el mando de la Brigada 2506, quien no debía gastar pólvora en salvas ni dejarse "chotear" por los vivos.

O



La foto muestra el bonito parque "Calixto García" de nuestro pueblo, donde se reunían alegremente los vecinos de Holguín . . .

O

TODOS LOS DOMINGOS, A LAS DOCE DEL MEDIODIA, SE REUNE LA ASAMBLEA DEL MUNICIPIO DE HOLGUIN EN EL DESTIERRO.

Lugar: Local del Colegio de Abogados de Cuba en el Exilio.- Avenida 17 y Calle 12 del South West.

No sea usted de los que olvidan o los que quedaron atrás.

Si no hay reuniones periódicas para trabajos prácticos, no hay organización, y sin organización, militancia y disciplina, no habrá guerra de liberación.

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/AN	EXTENSION	NO. XAA2-27948 DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. [illegible] RID/FILES				AN S FI FL RS DEST ABSTRACT X INDEX R 15 Sep 67 201-042669
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

XAAZ-27947

OGC 67-1772

15 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Walter Cini

SUBJECT: Masferrer Trial, Miami, Florida

1. I called Mr. Philip Morris, attorney in the Department of Justice responsible for the Masferrer case, and ascertained from him that the conspiracy trial is scheduled in the United States District Court in Miami, Florida, for 6 November 1967. Of the original defendants indicted, the only one dropped was Mitchell Livingston Wer Bell of Powder Springs, Georgia. A recap of the current defendants is as follows:

ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, also known as
ROLANDO MASFERRER, also known as "PANCHO"
JEAN BAPTISTE GEORGES
ANTONIO LEON ROJAS
RENE JUARES LEON
JULIO ATON CONSTANZO PALAU
MARTIN FRANCIS XAVIER CASEY

2. Mr. Morris further said that Orlando Bosch was scheduled for trial in Valdosta, Georgia, on Monday, 18 September 1967; however, he was in an automobile accident in the Miami area sometime during the week of 4 September, and therefore there would be a hearing in Valdosta, Georgia, requesting a continuance of this trial until sometime in October. Bosch is now scheduled to go on trial in Miami, Florida, on 2 January 1968.

3. It was deemed appropriate to ask the Department of Justice the status of these trials in view of Martin Casey's name appearing in cable traffic relative to "the Brown interview."

CS COPY

John K Greaney

JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

15 Sep 67
201-042669

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
< FLORIDA, MIAMI 6745 S. W. 26TH ST.
TELEPHONE 6619834

100-009-016
DBB -87656
25 JUL 67
FBI
P3

R 1704160314

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

25 Jul 67
201-42669

FBI doc
28 June 67 (Miami)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojás
Bureau# 2-156

FBI doc
30 Mai 67 (Dallas)
Re- Raimundo Braulio Pedro
Masferrer Rojós

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-006-122/03
UFGA-27175
16 MAR 67
P6

ACCORDING TO MARIANO SORE MARIN, WAS HEAD OF COMMUNIST SHOCK TROOPS IN UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA IN EARLY 1940S. HE WAS OPPOSED BY THE FED. OF UNIVERSITY OF STUDENTS OF WHICH SORI WAS THEN SECRETARY GENERAL.
FFN 19-120-30-13/4

R 6703290056

FILE IN 201- 42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

FORM 8-60 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

16 Mar 67

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MASFERRER Y ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-42669
(VOL. VII)

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 JAN. 64 THRU 31 DEC. 65

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10-25 4 AUG 78		PAT ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

MASFERRER Y ROJAS, Rolando [illegible]

23. Approximately in July 1964 I-1 had a second interview with "Nordic in the presence of "Jim" and "Enrique."

24. At the special request of the "friends," in September and October 1964 we sent forward reports on the officers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in the six provinces, including any background data and information we had on them. Afterwards, the work of making Summaries of Information was intensified.

25. During August-September-October 1964 picket lines were formed in front of the airline companies that had flights to Mexico, and in front of airports, Mexican tourist agencies, and Mexican Consulates as a protest against the Mexican Government and its policy with relation to Cuba This was done in Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Miami, New York and other place in the United States. This was done daily in Miami and New York. On different occasions pickets were placed in front of theaters which were showing Mexican films. In October pickets were placed in Miami and Miam Beach and propaganda was handed out at the time of the holding of the ASTA (Thirty-fourth World Congress of Travel Agencies).

26. In November 1964 we began to pass information to the "friends" abou the training camps which were being opened in New Jersey to prepare and train people for the invasion of Haiti. We infiltrated some of our peop into this group and thus kept informed of everything that went on.

27. At the end of 1964 and up to April 1965 we continued to make studie Among them were those on the Cuban Telephone Enterprise, the Department of Port and Coastal Vigilance, censorship of correspondence, Cuban natio al budgets 1964/65, radio programs heard in Cuba.

28. At the request of the "friends" we collaborated in the reception activities for Juanita CASTRO and obtained the support of the exile organizations for rallies organized in Miami and New York.

29. In December 1964 we organized a great propaganda campaign, mobilizi all the Masonic lodges so they would back the proposal of the Masons who were supporting LOPEZ Mateos at the UN.

30. We acted as a support mechanism to the "friends" in the matter concerning Mrs. LIPPERT.

31. In the first months of 1965 an attempt was made on three different occasions to carry out Rescue Operation No. 1.

32. During the first months of 1965 we kept informed about the situatio in the Dominican Republic and the participation of the Cubans and Dominicans in the Miami area in what was going on.

33. During this whole period, in view of the division existing among the exiles and of the formation of so many new exile groups, we infiltrated our agents into all the organizations and reported on all the movements of leaders of these groups and their activities, on all their statements and action plans. Our aim and purpose was to report everything about the movements of the Cubans and the exile groups.

34. During this period we also began carding all our reports for the

COMBAT HAITI

COMBAT

(Organization)

An exile org - backed by Joseph [illegible], Daniel [illegible], and Louis [illegible] [illegible] which has had very little success in getting established. It recently [illegible] received an invitation from the [illegible] to merge - and is presently considering the [illegible] offer.

A force of 150 to 200 trained men of the Haitian exile group.
TDCSDB-315/01038, 16 Oct 64 file 201-04[illegible]

Group to support the Government in Exile of Haiti in the US. Combat will not form any govt. in Haiti, but will support the Government in Exile's candidates. Combat, according to source, Fermin Joseph of NYC, is against Communism and against any Commies in any future government of Haiti.
DBA-43412, 18 June 63 file 36-9-6

One of 5 organizations combined as Haitian exile organization called [illegible]. See [illegible].
DBA-59773, 18 Dec 63 file 201-118281

Haitian exile organization. Leaders of this organization and Legion Liberatrice have offered to place themselves under the personal leadership of [illegible], who also has a working relationship with the leaders of Jeune Haiti. These three groups, along with the exiles in Santo Domingo & those now in Haiti will form part of the FARH, but without losing their individual groups identity.
TDCS 3 [illegible] 039 1 (IN 7 17) 16 Sept 6 EMLACE/1 Pro.

"COMBAT"

"Combat" originally formed in 1963, recently re-activated. Organization has reportedly given military training to members and some have been sent to the Miami area. "Combat" reportedly plans to invade Haiti.
DBA 96183, 25 Jun 65

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

JAN 6 1966 JAN 7 1966

SUBJECT: (Optional) Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER				
FROM: WH/SA/Reports			EXTENSION	NO. XAAZ 17997 DATE ~~17 Nov 64~~ 18 Aug 64
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RI/AN				This was delivered to SA/RLC on 17 Nov 64
2. RI/MIS			M	
3.				
4.				
5.				
6. RI/files				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

CLASSIFIED
201-42669

AN QUD
IN X
PS
BX 2
~~DES~~ ~~NFD~~
~~PI~~

File

~~201-042669~~

ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX
XAAZ 17997
DATE 18 Aug 64

18 AUG 64
201-042669

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

XAAZ 17997

TO : Mrs. Sue Panzer

DATE: 18 August 1964

FROM : Chief, DO Division CTB

SUBJECT: Meeting with Rolando Masferrer

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 27 1972
MICROFILMED

2P

1. In accordance with our conversation, I am sending you the facts as I know them regarding the 7 August meeting in New York City between Rolando Masferrer and Averell Clark.

2. Apparently Masferrer knows Stanley Ross, the Editor of El Tiempo, a Spanish-language newspaper published in New York. The office is at 78 Fifth Avenue and the telephone number is WA 4-2750. Possibly Masferrer did not previously know Ross. But at any rate, either on his own or through someone else, he got in touch with him in late July or early August and said that he wanted to be put in touch with an American with an aviation and military background. I do not know too much about Ross at the moment except that he has had considerable Latin American experience and would be a logical person for any Latino to approach. It would be very easy to obtain additional evidence on him if desired.

3. I am attaching for your information a list of the stockholders in El Tiempo, Inc. to provide some indication of who is behind Ross. In addition, we have a list of all the senior officers of El Tiempo.

4. Ross knew of Clark through the Hitchcocks listed, as you will note, as stockholders. Mrs. Margaret Hitchcock is Clark's aunt, while Thomas Hitchcock III is his first cousin as presumably, is William Hitchcock. During the war Clark was an outstanding fighter pilot, having flown with the RAF through the roughest days of the Battle of Britain, and thereafter shifted to the Americans with whom he flew many missions as a P-47 pilot. He is still in the Air Force Reserve.

5. At Ross's request Clark met Masferrer at the El Tiempo office in New York City on 7 August. Ross left the room so that the session was only between Clark and Masferrer. As a pro-Batista Cuban, Masferrer was known to us at the time of the Bay of Pigs. In fact, at one point just before the invasion, the U.S. Department of Justice arrested him and put him in jail in Florida for violation of the provisions of the Neutrality Act.

1 ATT H/W

SECRET
[illegible]

18 Aug 64
301-042669

6. Masferrer alleged to Clark that he was representing some twenty Cuban exile organizations, and that he was working with a Haitian, Charles Forben, head of an anti-Duvalier organization known as "Capois La Mort." Forben allegedly asked Masferrer to help his organization by leasing or buying a PBY-5 aircraft for use against Duvalier. Masferrer claimed that Forben's group was in a position to take control of the Ile de la Gonave, an island just off the west coast of Haiti in the gulf north of Port au Prince. It is conceivable that this is the wrong island since Clark did not have the name of the island in question, but based on the description of its location by Masferrer, I am assuming this to be the island involved. At any rate, in return for help from Masferrer, Forben was to be asked to let Masferrer and some of his Cuban exiles use the island in question as a base from which to harrass the eastern end of the Island of Cuba.

7. Clark told Masferrer that as a member of the Air Force Reserve, he would have to report the conversation to the USG and could not do anything without clearing with the USG. Masferrer said that he had no objection to this, particularly with regard to the activities of Forben and his group, but he asked that Clark not mention his intention to harrass Cuba, since he maintained that the USG would forbid this as being against USG policy. Clark said that Masferrer would have to leave to him what matters he chose to discuss with the USG. It was then agreed that Clark could reach Masferrer through Ross's office for about a week, and thereafter could pass a message to him through Ross.

8. Clark got in touch with me because I had known him during the war; I had known his family for many years, and one of his closest friends, James B. Watriss, is a cousin of mine and was, until about a year ago, associated with the Agency. Incidentally, I believe that Clark has had some discussions with SOD with the idea of possibly being used in connection with special operations.

18 aug 64

201-042669

14-00000

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 27 1972
MICROFILMED

EL TIEMPO

19

Spanish Language National Newspaper

STANLEY ROSS
Editor

78 FIFTH AVENUE
New York, N. Y. 10011
WA 4-2750

SUBJ A STOCKHOLDERS IN EL TIEMPO, INC.

201-162402

✓ Miguel Alemán, former President of Mexico, and President of the Mexican National Tourist Council

Nicholas Duke Biddle, investor, civic leader, Chairman of the Board of Puerto Rican Social Service, active in Latin American Affairs

ND 201 R.

✓ Samuel Berger, executive vice-President, Kinney Service Corp.

ND 201

✓ Dr. Enrique J. Cervantes, Correspondent of EL TIEMPO, and Prominent Public figure in Spain

Mrs. Alfred L. Cornwell, wife of the former President and Chairman of the Board of F. W. Woolworth Corp.

201-220570

✓ Luis Ferre, Puerto Rican senator, industrialist, philanthropist

William Mellon Hitchcock, President of EL TIEMPO, Inc. and member of the firm of Lehman Bros.

Mrs. Thomas Hitchcock II, (Mrs. Margaret Hitchcock)

Mr. Thomas Hitchcock III, prominent philanthropist

ND 201

✓ Sheldon J. Kravitz, executive vice-President, Smith & Dorian, Inc.

ND 201

✓ Stanley Kogut, President of Mechanical Rubber Corp.

ND 201

✓ Marshall Sundheim, Associate of Hirsch & Co. in Wall Street and leading investor in Venezuela

ND 201

✓ Edward Robinson, president of Smith & Dorian, Inc.

201-644727

✓ Stanley Ross, editor of EL TIEMPO, Inc. SUPT IN CONTACT WITH ROLANDO MASFERRER 201-042669 AUG 64

ND 201

✓ Lew Sarnoff, investor and executive, brother of Gen. David Sarnoff of NBC and RCA

✓ Max Schulman, real estate and investments

Gen. Anastasio Somoza, President of American Hemisphere Marine, The Mamenic Lines, and Lanica Airlines

ND 201

✓ Samuel Weiss, President of Rayco Stores

Att #1 to XAAZ 17997

18 Aug 64
201-042669

Sent to Analysis
16 Oct: 70

[redacted]

LIFG 6267 26 Nov 64 " "

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

3. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-[illegible]
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-095/04
OFGA-24005
14 DEC 65
P1

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
MANUEL GARCIA [illegible] RUBIO /201-353897/ AND GROUP OF PERSONS TRUSTED BY SUBJ AND SERAFIN A. PEREZ CARRIL /201-294518/ CONTRIBUTED 7[illegible],000 DOLLARS TO THE CUBAN EXILE NEWSPAPER MUNDO AMERICANO. CURRENTLY HAVE FINANCIAL CONTROL OF NEWSPAPER.

R 6512220077

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(10-00)

14 Dec 65

FBI doc
8 Oct 65 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
7 Oct 65 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau # 2-156

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

100-009-014
DBB -16116
16 JUL 65
FBI

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ OF EL TIEMPO. STATED HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT ERNESTO RICARDO VALERO-ABREU HAD TOLD ASSOCIATES HE HAD WRITTEN ARTICLES UNDER PSEUDONYM FIALLO.

R 6610032370

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	40 12-26 If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.
FROM: RID/ An RN	PROPER FILE NO. TO: ALL ADDRESSEES FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/7/HT		[illegible] 63		
2.				
3.				
4. WH/7/DR/FI		15 oct	15 oct	
5.				
6. Vitter				EW inf
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
SEP 1 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

[illegible]

14-00000

H.Q.S.

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION 30

FROM
JMWAVE

Francis D. RACHFIELD
Henry J. SLOMAN

HQS

REPORTS OFFICER
John C. Tarboll/bcp

APPROVING OFFICER
Oliver C. Payne
Philip G. ELMARD

REPORT NO.
UFG-7482 ✓

DATE OF REPORT
24 August 1965

PROJECT

SOURCE CRYPT
UOAMBER-6
AMOT-84

XX	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
	CS DISSEMINATION
	TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY

4 - Hqs.
1 - OO/C
2 - JMBARR (for COMKWESTFOR)
2 - Panama City (for CINCSO)
2 - Santo Domingo H2P
2 - Port au Prince HDC

HTP

EXTRA-AGENCY

Miami reps of:
State
FBI
I&NS
Customs
Border Patrol
USCG

MICROFILMED
SEP 1 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

DYVOUR JMPALM PBRUMEN

Source for paras. 1 to 3: UOAMBER-6 from Antonio Rojas Masferrer, 23 August 1965. Paras. 4 and 5: AMOT-84 from Raul ARANGO de la Noval (please protect) in DD-1559, 11 August 1965.

RI: Please card the following for the field:

*LEON Fernandez, Homero, Cuban emigre. Involvement with Rolando MASFERRER in plot to invade Haiti. Leader of FACCE.

Cit Cuba. Δ USA

Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

REPORTS
AUG 25 1965

CS COPY

HQS RI COPY

D 36-8-5

24 Aug 65

FORM 7-64 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

201-042669

(20)

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Haiti/Cuba/Dominican Republic

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT Plans to Overthrow Government of Haiti by Leon Cantave and Rolando Masferrer Rojas

DATE OF REPORT 24 August 1965

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. August 1965

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (11 and 23 August 1965)

UFG-7482

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: See below.

Source for paras. 1 to 3: Former Latin American diplomat who maintains relationships with officials of Latin American countries. Source is a trained reporter and his information has been reliable in the past. He received the information in this report from an associate of Rolando Masferrer Rojas.

1. On 20 August 1965 an associate of Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas, former Cuban senator, said that Masferrer is in touch with General Leon Cantave regarding a plot to invade Haiti from the Dominican Republic. Masferrer is trying to recruit unmarried Cubans in New York who are willing to go to the Dominican Republic and eventually to live in Haiti. He does not want Cubans who would want to return to the United States because of family or for any other reason.

2. Masferrer asked Antonio Rojas Masferrer, his cousin, to manage a farm in the Dominican Republic which will be used as a training and staging area for about 100 men which Masferrer will recruit. This group will be enlarged by men which Cantave has in the Dominican Republic.

3. Cantave is negotiating with Dominicans to determine whether the recruits from New York will travel to the Dominican Republic with visas or whether they will enter the country illegally.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Source for paras. 4 and 5: A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961. This information is from another Cuban emigre who is associated with Homero Leon Fernandez.

4. On 9 August Homero Leon Fernandez[1] said that Masferrer will arrive in Miami in August to complete preparations for an invasion of Haiti. He will bring 100 men from New York. In Miami they will be joined by 100 men from Brigade 2506 and 100 men from Leon's group. The 300 men will leave for an undetermined place from where they will invade Haiti.

5. According to Leon, Masferrer plans to use four boats and five aircraft for the invasion of Haiti. The aircraft will be used to bomb Santiago de Cuba, Oriente Province, Cuba, after Francois Duvalier has been overthrown.

Field Comment. Leon, a Cuban emigre, is a leader of the Fuerzas Armadas Constitucionales de Cuba en el Exilio (FACCE, Constitutional Armed Forces of Cuba in Exile).

FBI doc
30 June 65 (Miami)
Re Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Bureau #MM 2-156

FBI cable
1 July 65
Re Dominican Situation

FBI cable
15 June 65
Re Dominican Situation

FBI doc
6 May 65 (Miami)
Re: Jorge L. Valdes Amable
Bureau # 105-84265

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FORM 4-63

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

APR 30 2 PM 65

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM: ft

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Copy Detached

CSDB-312/01143-65
10 May 65

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/RS			3 May 65	RH
2.				
3. WH/C/RR/RE			13 May	JC
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
MAY 3 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-42669

0-14f (Rev. 10-23-64)

MAR 10 1965

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

ATTENTION: Deputy Director, Plans

Dear Sir:

☑ For your information, I am enclosing communications which may be of interest to you.

☐ No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter.

☐ You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection with this inquiry.

☐ Please note change in caption of this case.

☑ Status of case: ☑ Completed ☐ Incomplete

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enc.

(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)

14-00000

2P 465

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

REPORT NO UFG-7077 ✓

FROM
JMWAVE

DATE OF REPORT
27 April 1965

REPORTING OFFICER
Francis D. RACHFIELD

RD. NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
Margaret R. NANKALL/lcp

PROJ.

APPROVING OFFICER
Andrew K. REUTEMAN

S'CE CR.

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

DYVOUR JMPALM

Source: UOAMBER-6 from Miguel TABERNO Blas from Rolando MASFERRER Rojas.

RID: Please index the following names.

SEX: F CIT: Cuba

Aurea Esther POGGIO Aragon - DPOB: 11 March 1935 in Cuba, Habana. Involved with Rolando MASFERRER Rojas in the storage of arms. Subj. #201-42669

Rolando MASFERRER Rojas - 201-042669.

Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

MICROFILMED
MAY 3 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs. 1 - 00/C 2 - JMBARR 2 - COS, Santo Domingo 2 - COS, Port-Au-Prince 2 - PANAMA CITY (for CINCSO)	Miami Reps: 1 - State 1 - FBI 1 - Customs 1 - I&NS

COUNTRY

NO. OF ENCLOSURES

NO. PAGES
1

SUBJECT
HQS FI COPY

REFERENCES

PADA

APPR

SECRET

DOI

FORM 8-60 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CS COPY

27 Apr 65

201-42669

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba/Haiti/Dominican Republic	REPORT NO.	
SUBJECT	Alleged Transfer of Weapons to Miami by Rolando Masferrer Rojas, a Cuban Exile Leader	DATE OF REPORT	27 April 1965
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	16 April 1965		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	United States, Miami (23 April 1965)		UFG-7077

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

Former Latin American diplomat who maintains relationships with officials of Latin American countries. Source is a trained reporter and his information has been reliable in the past.

1. As of about 16 April 1965, Rolando Masferrer Rojas, a Cuban exile leader, had been sending weapons to Miami, Florida, for use by Haitian exiles in an attempt to overthrow Haitian dictator Francois Duvalier. The arms were being stored in the home of Aurea Esther Poggio Aragon,[1] a Cuban woman whose last known address was 1431 E. 8th Court, Hialeah, Florida. The weapons were to be transported to an undisclosed destination outside the United States.

2. In early April 1965, Poggio went to the Dominican Republic on behalf of Masferrer regarding the Haitian exile scene. When Poggio was out of Miami, the keys to her residence were left with Antonio Rojas Masferrer.

[1] Field Comment: The same source reported in CSDB-3/661,878, dated 18 June 1964, that Masferrer had met with Poggio, among others, on 29 May 1964 regarding an expected revolt in Cuba.

AMBER

F.S. 65

Letters to Defence, State & Justice

~~It has come to the attention~~

of this Agency that on 28 February

This Agency is in possession of information which was obtained from a confidential source the substance of which is as follows: On Feb 28 Mr. Rodolfo Masferrer was interviewed in Miami, Florida. He stated that he had recently received a letter from his brother Rolando Masferrer ~~[illegible]~~ in which he claimed that he was visited by two U.S. Government officials in New York. These two officials allegedly asked him if he was ready to participate in an armed action against Cuba. Masferrer replied that he had been preparing himself for such action since his arrival from Cuba. In this letter, Masferrer made it clear that this was the first time that he had been under consideration by the U.S. Government. ~~That~~ He further estimated that he could round up immediately between 300 & 400 men.

This agency does not ~~[illegible]~~ now ~~[illegible]~~ and does it ~~not~~ currently have any relationship with Rolando Masferrer. It would be ~~apprec~~ appreciated if your Department would ~~check~~ investigate and let this agency know, at your earliest convenience, if any member or members of your organization has been or ~~is~~ currently in contact with the subject. ~~and if any persons inquiries were [illegible] directed to them along the lines outlined above.~~

14-00000

jer

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6 RI ☐ COPY ☑ DUMB

27 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	EA	5	RR-RE
2		6	DDI
3	CA	7	C
4	MO	8	D

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/C 3

INFO VR. FILE DDP

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME

S E C R E T 050059Z

DIR CITE WAVE 9086

5 MAR 65 IN 16162

Dm

[redacted] TYPIC YOBITE UOAMBER = Vladimir Secades

ON 28 FEB 65 UOAMBER-4 VISITED OFFICE OF DENTIST RODOLFO MASFERRER WHO TOLD SOURCE HE HAD RECEIVED LETTER FROM HIS BROTHER, ROLANDO, IN WHICH ROLANDO CLAIMED HE WAS VISITED IN HIS NEW YORK OFFICE BY TWO ODYOKE OFFICIALS ON UNSPECIFIED DATE. THEY ALLEGEDLY ASKED HIM IF HE READY PARTICIPATE ARMED ACTION AGAINST PBRUMEN. HE REPLIED HE WAS AND HAD BEEN PREPARING HIMSELF FOR ACTION FROM FIRST DAYS HIS ARRIVAL PBPRIME. HE INDICATED IN HIS LETTER THAT FOR FIRST TIME HE UNDER CONSIDERATION BY ODYOKE.? HE ESTIMATED HE COULD IMMEDIATELY ROUND UP 300 TO 400 MEN.

S E C R E T

CFN

Rolando Masferrer

X

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: desensitize

Signed:

R.O. #15 - Unit: WH/C/CICS

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

SECRET

5 Mar 65

201-42269

FBI doc
19 Feb 65 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Bureau# 2-1622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

6. DATE OF INFO.

7. EVALUATION

8. ANALYST

9. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-095/04
WAVE-05976
11 DEC 64
UFG -06370
P3

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ OPERATES EIGHTH FORCE OF ASSAULT AND COMMANDOS, A GROUP WHICH TRAINS AT CAMP MARTI IN STATE OF NEW JERSEY

* 6511170198

FILE IN 201- 042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨	201	04	26	69

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

11 Dec 64

[redacted]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
& USA
RE COMMENTS ABOUT PAUL TONSSAINT'S INVASION PLANS.

200-009-038
UFG -06307
08 DEC 64
WAVE-05812
P1

R 6501051027

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 04 26 69

FORM 9-59 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 8 Dec 64 (7-46)

FBI doc
8 Dec 64 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Haitian Revolutionary activities

FBI doc
3 Dec 64 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
2 Dec 64 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
A HAITI ?
RE SUBJ'S ATTEMPTS TO CONTINUE ASSOCIATION WITH HAITIAN EXILES IN THEIR OPERATIONS AGAINST HAITI.

200-120-061
UFG -06267
26 NOV 64
WAVE-05253
P1

R 6501260744

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 04 26 69

FORM 8-58 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 26 Nov 64 (17-40)

FBI doc
20 Nov 64 (NY)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
A USA
RPTDLY WAS VERY UPSET BECAUSE HE THOUGHT HAITIAN EXILES WANTED TO EXCLUDE HIM FROM COMBINED EFFORT TO INVADE HAITI.

200-009-038
UFG -06213
17 NOV 64
WAVE-04913
P1

R 6412310521

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 04 26 69

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

8-64 12A-3 Use Previous Editions

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

25

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: WH/SA 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, RI/AN, VR, FILE.

AD/CI 2, AD/NE.

INDEXED AND CONTROL COPIES MATCHED

S E C R E T 122311Z NOV 13 0305Z 64 IN 22194

DIR INFO LANT PACY BARR PRIN SDOM CITE WAVE 4726 4P (77)

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM PBRUMEN

SUPDATA: AMCARACKLE-1 FROM ELISEO GOMEZ FERNANDEZ. RID: INDEX.

FILED 122311Z

MICROFILMED FEB 1 1965 DOC. MICRO. SER.

REPORT CLASS COMFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: HAITI/CUBA

SUBJ: ATTEMPT BY ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS TO OBTAIN TRANSPORTATION FOR HIS MEN OUT OF THE UNITED STATES

DOI: 10 NOVEMBER 1964

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (12 NOVEMBER 1964)

UFG-6199

SOURCE: U.S. CITIZEN WHO TEACHES SPANISH AT THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL AND WHO HAS HAD LONG RESIDENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE IS TRAINED IN THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION. SOURCE'S REPOR[illegible]CH IS

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	BSC
RID/PS	[illegible]
RID/FI	
RID/[illegible]	

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS

ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

BASED ON:

201-042669

LIAISON:

13 NOV 64

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

S E C R E T

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

[illegible] ACTION UNIT [illegible] RI COPY [illegible] PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

(20) MFO 11-63

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 22194

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

CH

e.i Cuba A Miami, USA

INFO RE ATTEMPT OF MASFERRER TO OBTAIN TRANSPORTATION FOR "INVADERS" CH

201-216018

201-042669

201-133549

1. ON 10 NOVEMBER 1964 ELADIO DEL VALLE, AKA "YITO," A REPRESENTATIVE OF ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, ASKED ELISEO GOMEZ FERNANDEZ, A PARTNER IN THE ANTILLEAN MARINE SHIPPING CORPORATION OF MIAMI, IF HE COULD USE GOMEZ' BOAT TO TRANSPORT "INVADERS" OUT OF THE UNITED STATES TO AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION AT SEA.

2. ACCORDING TO GOMEZ, TEOFILO BABUN, GOMEZ' PARTNER, LEARNED FROM HIS COUSIN, RUDOLPH BABOUN, HAITIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI, THAT RUDOLPH HAD INFORMED AMERICAN AUTHORITIES THAT THE MASFERRER PEOPLE IN MIAMI WERE PREPARING AN INVASION OF HAITI. RUDOLPH ALSO SAID THAT MASFERRER WAS VERY UPSET BECAUSE HIS PLANS LEAKED OUT.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

FORM 1-64 3003 Obsolete Previous Editions of Form 2026a CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

PLACE CONTROLS ABOVE TOP BLACK LINE AND BELOW BOTTOM BLACK LINE

IN 22194

CONFIDENTIAL TDCS PAGE 2

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, BORDER PATROL, AND USCG.

(END OF MESSAGE)

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI doc
12 Nov 64 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
31 Oct 64 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
29 Oct 64 (Wash)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
A USA, FLORIDA, MIAMI
SUBJ INVOLVED IN AMASSING HAITIAN AND CUBAN EXILES IN MIAMI FOR TRAINING.

200-009-038
UFG -06058
17 OCT 64
~~WAVE-03474~~
P1

R 6411061097

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 04 26 69

FORM 8-61 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 12044 (7-46)

~~[illegible]~~ carded

(201- [illegible] -042669)

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT 033

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

ORIG.	HELEN MORGAN	ROUTING				
UNIT	WH/2/HAITI	1		4		
EXT.	6026	2		5		
DATE	16 OCTOBER 1964	3		6		OCT 17 14 35 Z '64

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 12

TDCS DB-315/01035-64

INFORMATION COPIES

CI/IC, DI/OPS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA/C 6, CA/PEG, DCDS, SOD, WH/SA 5

DATE DISTRIBUTED
16 OCTOBER 1964

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/2/HT	4	WE/PRIN	1			PRIN	#	
		WH/JMWAVE/JMAIM			1	LANT	#	
						PACY	#	
						BARR	#	

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
IN 94154 (WAVE 3380)
UFG-6049
XP (UCAMBER/2 FROM UCAMBER/5)
LIAISON #

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

CONTROLLED DISSEM

RECOMMEND FOR EXO

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Wayne D. Bray
C/WH/2/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/SA/R M. Corragio (Telephone)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/RO H. Benchea

COPY NO.

FORM 1E-3 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

16 Oct 64

201-42669

NFG 11-63

CONTROLLED DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY HAITI/CUBA

TDCS DB-315/[illegible]-64

DATE OF INFO. 15 OCTOBER 1964

DISTR. 16 OCTOBER 1964

SUBJECT

PLANS TO RECRUIT CUBAN EXILES TO JOIN THE HAITIAN EXILE GROUP, "COMBAT"

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (15 OCTOBER 1964)

REF IN 94154

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-6049

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A CUBAN EXILE WHO HAS CONTACTS IN THE EXILE COMMUNITY IN MIAMI AND NEW YORK, FROM DAVID QUINTAS.

1. ON 15 OCTOBER 1964 DAVID QUINTAS SAID THAT OVIDO MIRO, A CUBAN, AND ROMAN (SIC) RAMIREZ, A HAITIAN, RECENTLY ARRIVED IN MIAMI FOR THE PURPOSE OF RECRUITING APPROXIMATELY 200 CUBANS TO AUGMENT A FORCE OF 150 TO 200 TRAINED MEN OF THE HAITIAN EXILE GROUP, "COMBAT." (FIELD COMMENT: IT WAS REPORTED IN TDCSDB-315/00917-64 THAT PAUL TOUSSAINT, A HAITIAN, AND THREE CUBANS WERE IN MIAMI TO RECRUIT CUBAN EXILES, WHO WOULD BE USED TO INVADE HAITI.)

2. MIRO AND RAMIREZ ASKED DAVID QUINTAS TO LOCATE A HOUSE IN THE MIAMI AREA IN WHICH THE TRAINED MEN COULD BE QUARTERED.

3. (SOURCE COMMENT: QUINTAS DOES NOT WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH THE "COMBAT" GROUP, BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THAT ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS IS SUPPORTING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
TREASURY CUSTOMS BORDER PATROL USCG FBI INS

THE GROUP AND THAT HE SHOULD TAKE CARE OF "THIS SORT OF THING" HIMSELF.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, COMMWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, USCG, BORDER PATROL, INS, FBI AND CUSTOMS (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE).

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

#77

INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CSDB-312/00853-64

(primarily Masferrer Tigers)

SUBJECT Training at a Cuban Exile Military Camp in New Jersey

DATE DISTR. 16 October 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

TE

DATE OF INFO. Late September 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (30 September 1964)

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-6300

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A member of a group of Cuban émigrés trained in the elements of information collection. This group has provided useful reports for about three years. This information was obtained from an individual with first-hand knowledge.

1. On a week-end during the latter part of September 1964, a group of about 250 Cuban exiles were receiving military training at the "Jose Marti Encampment" which was on a farm owned by a New Jersey councilman or individual of similar political position. The farm is in a mountainous region just off Interstate Route 80 about one and a half hours by automobile out of Union City, New Jersey. The camp is directed by Martinez Morejon (fnu) and Bienvenido Cueto; it is active only on week-ends, but there is a permanent armed guard at the camp.

2. Training consists of storming and capturing hilly redoubts, and training in the use of weapons which range from semi-automatic to fully automatic rifles, submachineguns, and .30- and .50-caliber machineguns.

3. Rolando Masferrer Rojas and about 50 of his followers were among those undergoing training. Masferrer was overheard to say that the camp was being operated without any financial assistance from the United States Government. Masferrer also said that rather severe measures would be effected against any United States Government informer who might be discovered at the camp.

4. According to some of the individuals who were undertaking training, small groups of Masferrer's men were periodically being sent from the New Jersey area to Miami, and Alfaro (fnu) aka "Sacramento" was administering the transfers. After arriving in Miami they were taken to Sheriff's Key, or some small key in the vicinity of Sheriff's Key,[1] where they were being staged prior to invading Haiti, which was to be the first step in the plan for an eventual landing in Cuba.

5. There was no apparent degree of ill-feeling between many former Castro adherents and the "Masferrer's Tigers" at the Camp. Some Puerto Ricans were also in training there.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	I&NS	OCI	FBI 2
EXPCIN	[illegible]	I&NS	CINCLANT					

Field distribution indicated by "#"

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

- 2 - CSDB-312/00853-64

6. The training was being observed by two individuals who appeared to be neither Cuban nor American.

1. Field Comment. This may refer to Ragged Key, which has a Sheriff's Dock. One of several small keys off Ragged Key is owned by a sheriff.

16 Oct 64

201-42[illegible]

FBI doc
12 Oct 64 (Miami)
Title - Jorge L. Valdes Amable
Bureau# 105-84265

FBI doc
9 Oct 64 (Miami)
Re - Attack on Spanish Vessel
"Sierra Aranzazu", 13 Sep 64
Bureau# 2-373

FBI doc
6 Oct 64 (NY)
Re - Attack on Spanish Vessel
"Sierra Aranzazu," 13 Sep 64

1-64 12A-3 Use Previous Editions

201-642669
(Masferrer)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

60

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	2	5	Re
2		6	c
3	6	7	8
4	CA-FI	8	Reg

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: WH 8

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, SOD 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/CPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, (RI/AN,) WH/SA 8, VR, FILE, CS/RF.

AD/CI 2, AD/NE.

SECRET 032212Z OCT 4 0239Z 64 IN 86643

DIR INFO SDOM PRIN LANT PACY CITE WAVE 2720

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM PBRUMEN

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. AMFAST-6[1] IN AMOT[2] DD-1152 OF 29 SEPT OBTAINED FROM JOSE GARCIA VALDEZ. FIELD COMMENT BASED UFG-5934.

RID: PLS INDEX. FILED 03/2212Z

REPORTS CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

CUBA HAITI DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

SUBJ: TRANSPORTATION OF A MIXED CUBAN-HAITIAN GROUP TO THE HAITIAN-DOMINICAN BORDER

DOI: 28 SEPT 64

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (29 SEPT 64)

UFG-5974

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EMIGRES WHO HAVE BEEN TRAINED

CS in 200-009-038

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/PS	
RID/	
DESTR	

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4 Oct 64
201-42669

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

FORM 8-64 12A-3 Use Previous Editions

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM:

ACTION:

INFO:

PAGE 2 IN 86643

IN THE ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION COLLECTION. THE GROUP HAS PROVIDED USEFUL REPORTS FOR THREE YEARS.

IW COMMENT:

TDCS

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-042669 (Mayers)

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

1441 SECRET

ORIG. HELEN MORGAN	ROUTING				Oct 2 23 40 Z
UNIT WH/2/HAITI	1		4		
EXT. 6026	2		5		
DATE 2 OCTOBER 1964	3		6		

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 15

TDCS 33-315/00917-64

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA/O 6, CA/PEG, DODS, WH/SA 5.

DATE DISTRIBUTED
2 OCTOBER 1964

PRECEDENCE
☑ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/R	1	WH/SA/R	4			WH/PRIN	#	WH/PRIN	1
WH/2/CR	2					WH/SJOS	#		
WH/2/HT	4					WH/BARR	#	WH/WAVE	1
WH/6	1					WH/LANT	#		
						WH/PACY	#		

BASED ON (P.D. RPT., PROJ.)
IN 85442 (WAVE-2571)
UFG-5966
HP (HULAKE-1)
LIAISON *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE X ARMY NAVY AIR

ROUTING | INITIALS
RID/AN
RID/[illegible]
RID/[illegible]

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

CONTROLLED DISSEM

RECOMMEND FOR EXO

BASIC DOCUMENT HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO DCI

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

CS in 200-009-038

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Wayne D. Bray
C/WH/2/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/SA (by phone)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
GROUP 1 [illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER
FM C/WH/R H. Bencker

COPY NO.

FORM 10-61 [illegible] OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONTROLLED DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY HAITI

TDCS DB-315/00917-64

DATE OF INFO. 20 SEPTEMBER 1964

DISTR. 2 OCTOBER 1964

SUBJECT

RECRUITMENT OF CUBAN EXILES
FOR PROPOSED INVASION OF HAITI

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (22 SEPTEMBER 1964)

REF IN 85442

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-5966

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: CUBAN EXILE (C) WHO HAS CONTACTS IN THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN MIAMI AND NEW YORK. APPRAISAL: 2 (THAT THESE RECRUITING OPERATIONS ARE GOING ON AND THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE AS REPORTED).

1. ON 20 SEPT 64, PAUL TOUSSAINT, ACCOMPANIED BY RICARDO ZARAGOZI, JOSE A. MARTINEZ, AND ANOTHER UNIDENTIFIED CUBAN, ARRIVED IN MIAMI FROM NEW YORK. MARTINEZ, ZARAGOZI, AND THE UNIDENTIFIED CUBAN CAME TO MIAMI TO CONTACT CUBAN FRIENDS OF THEIRS FOR A PROPOSED FORCE OF 100 CUBAN EXILES WHO WOULD BE USED TO INVADE HAITI "WITHIN A TEN-DAY PERIOD". ALLEGEDLY THE INVASION WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. ON THE EVENING OF 20 SEPT, TOUSSAINT RETURNED TO NEW YORK BY AIR IN ANSWER TO WHAT HE SAID WAS "AN URGENT REQUEST FROM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES". TOUSSAINT HAD PLACED SEVERAL CALLS TO NEW YORK AFTER HE ARRIVED

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO FBI I&NS

EXO

IN MIAMI.

2. WHILE IN MIAMI THE CUBANS CONTACTED FRIENDS OF THEIRS IN AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN RECRUITS FOR THE HAITI OPERATION. AMONG THOSE WHO WERE CONTACTED WERE OTTO SIRGO PRIETO, MEMBER OF THE ANTONIO MACEO BRIGADE, FRANK DIAZ, AND EUGENIO PEREZ COWLE. SIRGO SAID THAT HE COULD PROVIDE 25 MEN FOR ANYTHING RELATING TO CUBA. DIAZ SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF. OR 15 MEN WHOM HE COULD PROBABLY RECRUIT, UNTIL HE COULD OBTAIN CLARIFICATION OF THE ENTIRE AFFAIR. PEREZ, WHO HAD RENTED THE HUMBOLDT 7 APARTMENT IN CUBA FOR YOUNG STUDENT LEADERS WHO WERE LATER KILLED BY THE BATISTA FORCES, SAID HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN JOINING THE OPERATION, AND HE PLEDGED SIX MEN FOR THE INVASION FORCE.

3. ON 22 SEPT, TOUSSAINT INFORMED ONE OF HIS MIAMI REPRESENTATIVES THAT THERE WAS NO MONEY TO GIVE THE RECRUITED MEN. HOWEVER, TOUSSAINT SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WANTED 200 MEN INSTEAD OF THE ORIGINALLY PLANNED FORCE OF 100 MEN AND THAT EXPENSE MONEY FOR THE TRIP FROM MIAMI TO NEW YORK COULD PROBABLY HE PROVIDED FOR THE RECRUITS, BUT NO FURTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS COULD BE ASSUMED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

4. ON 24 SEPT TOUSSAINT CALLED ONE OF HIS MIAMI REPRESENTATIVES AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO GET TO NEW YORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE "TIME IS DRAWING NEAR." HE SAID THERE WAS A TRAINING BASE FOR THE HAITI INVASION FORCE AT AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION IN NEW JERSEY, WHICH WAS HEADED BY CAPTAIN MIR, FORMER OFFICER FOR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.

THE GROUP HAD THREE AIRPLANES READY FOR USE IN THE INVASION, AND LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS, SOME OF WHICH WERE STORED IN THE OFFICE OF ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, IN NEW YORK CITY. ARMS WERE ALSO CACHED AT AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION IN MIAMI. TOUSSAINT SAID THAT CUBANS COULD USE HAITI AS A BASE OF OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA IF THE INVASION WAS VICTORIOUS AND DUVALIER WAS REMOVED.

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, BORDER PATROL AND USCG. (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE AND SAN JOSE.)

(END OF MESSAGE)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ USA
RE SUBJ'S INVOLVEMENT IN HAITIAN REV
ACTS AGAINST GOVT OF HAITI.

036-009-006
UFGA-17300
17 AUG 64
P3

PAFR 2115297

0000000000000000000000
111 1 1111111111 1111
22222222222222 222 22
3333333333333333333333
4444444444444444444444
5555555555555555555 555
6 6666 666666666666666
777 7777777777777777
8888888888888888888888
9999999 99999999999999

2 115 297

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 04 26 69

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

17 Aug 64

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

MFR 4-63

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

JUL 28 RID 1 26 PM '64

FROM:
RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WHEAESC			30 July	QH
2.				
3. WH/SA/EOT			4 aug	
4.				
5. C/WH/6				
6.				
7.				
8. DCWH2CB/DR		5 AUG 1964		
9. ELW				ELW
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Copy Detached

CSDB - 312/00236-64
30 Jul 64

MICROFILMED
JUL 29 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | INDEX

20

H2S

REPORT COVER SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

REPORT NO. UFG-5559

FROM
JMWAVE

DATE OF REPORT
22 July 1964

REPORTING OFFICER
Robert S. HUNKELER

RD. NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
Margaret R. NANKALL/lcp

PROJ.

APPROVING OFFICER
Andrew K. REUTEMAN Floyd W. Stalnaker

S'CE CR.

MICROFILMED
JUL 29 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:
TYPIC

Source: UOAMBER-3 who spoke with Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER Rojas, whom he has known for many years, during his visit to New York City between 9 and 12 July 1964.

RID: Index.

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

REPORTS
JUL 22 1964

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs. 1 - 00/C 2 - BARR 2 - SANTO DOMINGO - To OOT Pouch	Miami Reps: 1 - State 1 - FBI 1 - I&NS 1 - Customs

COUNTRY

NO. OF ENCLOSURES

NO. PAGES
2

SUBJECT
HQS RI COPY

REFERENCES
CS COPY

PADA

APPR

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

DOI
22Jul64

D19-9-9
D22-9-26

201-42669

FORM 8-60 1461 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba/Dominican Republic

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT Comments of Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas Regarding his Plans and Activities in Support of Dominican and Cuban Exiles

DATE OF REPORT 22 July 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 11 July 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (17 July 1964)

~~UFG-5559~~

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Former high-level Latin American Government official (C) who has travelled frequently throughout the Caribbean and Central America where he maintains close friendships with a wide range of military and political leaders. Source is a rightist, a trained reporter, and his information has been fairly reliable in the past. This information was obtained from Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas.

1. Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas, prominent Cuban exile and financial backer of several Caribbean paramilitary operations directed against Fidel Castro Ruz, revealed on 11 July 1964 that he is maintaining close contact with Dominican Consul Carlos Peguero Guerrero, the brother of General Belisario Peguero Guerrero, Dominican Police Chief. Masferrer said that he is collaborating with Consul Peguero by giving his full support to the Partido Liberal Evolucionista (PLE, Liberal Evolutionist Party) and that he is ready to go to the Dominican Republic should Luis Amiama Tio, a leader of the PLE, call for him. When discussing the method by which Masferrer was participating with the PLE, Masferrer suggested that he was prepared to offer his Cuban assets to the Dominican supporters of Amiama should the latter decide to carry out action against the triumvirate government.

2. Concerning the future of Joaquin Balaguer as a Dominican presidential candidate, Masferrer said that Balaguer was "mistaken" in his belief that he would soon be able to return to the Dominican Republic. The Dominican authorities will not permit the return of Balaguer because Diego Bordas Hernandez, former leader of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD, Dominican Revolutionary Party), was successfully financing a "stop Balaguer" movement.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

[illegible]

According to Masferrer, Bordas recently paid Stanley Ross, editor of the New York publication "El Tiempo", $5,000 to assist Bordas in stopping Balaguer from obtaining favorable publicity in the Ross publications.

3. Concerning the next candidate supported by the PLE, Masferrer said that the PLE political machine had planned to promote General Antonio Imbert Barrera instead of Amiama although Amiama had previously been pushed for the presidential candidacy with the support of the PLE.

4. Concerning Cuba, Masferrer said that he has 250 highly trained men available for paramilitary action against the Castro regime. He is personally carrying out daily practice sessions in a light twin-engine aircraft in preparation for future flights to be made by Masferrer in distributing propaganda and attacking strategic points in Cuba. He has no immediate plans, however, for an invasion nor did he reveal the locations of arms and money which he claims to have at his disposal. He said, however, that he has much faith in the United States Government and its appraisal of the Cuban problem and expected a "green light" to be forthcoming from the United States Government soon.

5. Masferrer said that unfortunately several prominent politicians and government officials have been recommending that he not be permitted to return to the State of Florida in spite of an earlier petition signed by many Cuban exiles requesting an amendment to an earlier court ruling prohibiting Masferrer from returning to Florida.[1]

6. When asked about the participation of other Cuban exile leaders with Masferrer's group, Masferrer did not comment other than to say that Carlos Marquez Sterling was a "lyric poet" but that his association with Masferrer had not been productive.

[1] Field Comment: Refer to CSDB-3/661,878, dated 19 June 1964, regarding the efforts of Masferrer's brother to obtain the signatures of Cuban exile leaders, which he intended to submit to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in Miami with a request for Masferrer's legal return to Miami.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

MFR 4-63

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

JUN 15 1 31 PM '64

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO

FROM:

RID/AN

D.A.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. WHSAESC		19 June 64		[illegible]
2. WH/SA/Rpts			19 June	
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COPY DETACHED

CS DB-3/661,878
19 June 64

MICROFILMED
JUN 18 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT
INDEX

201-042669

DOCUMENT NUMBER

HGS

REPORT COVER SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

RPT. NO. UFG-5343

FROM
JMWAVE

DATE OF REPORT
9 June 1964 3f

REPORTING OFFICER
Robert S. HUNKELER

RD. NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
Margaret R. NANKALL/uta JCT

PROJ.

APPROVING OFFICER
Andrew K. BEUTEMAN

S'CE CR.

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

TYPIC

Source: Paras 1 - 3 from UOAMBER-6 who attended the meeting on 29 May 1964. Para 4 from UOAMBER-3 who met with Masferrer on 1 June and was able to confirm that Masferrer did arrive with arms and ammunition. Para 5 from AMSWIRL-1 from a reliable source who requested that his name not be revealed.

RID: Please index.

REPORTS

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

MICROFILMED
JUN 18 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs. 1 - OO/C 2 - JMBARR	1 cy. each to Miami reps of: State Coast Guard Border Patrol F.B.I. I & NS, Customs

COUNTRY

NO. OF ENCLOSURES

NO. PAGES
2

SUBJECT

REFERENCES

HQS RL COPY

PARA

APPR

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

DOI

FORM 8-60 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CS COPY

9 Jun 64
201-042669

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY	**Cuba**	REPORT NO.	
SUBJECT	**Return to Miami of Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas With Arms and Ammunition**	DATE OF REPORT	**9 June 1964**
		NO. PAGES	**2**
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	**22 May - 4 June 1964**		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	**United States, Miami ~~(4 June 1964)~~**		**UFG-5343**

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: **See below.**

The information in Paras. 1-3 were obtained from a former Latin American military officer who at one time resided in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He still maintains fairly close friendships with officials of those countries. Source is a trained reporter and his information has been reliable in the past.

42669

no 2b no w no 201 no w 1. **On 29 May 1964 Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas, a Cuban exile leader, met with Miguel Taberno Blas, former member of the Cuban House of Representatives; Cecilio Ignacio Napoles Hidalgo, former army major during the administration of Fulgencio Batista; Pedro Duque, former army lieutenant under Batista; and Aurea Ester Poggio Aragon, a Cuban woman. Masferrer said that within the next 60 days there would be a revolt within the ranks of Castro's forces and that anti-Castro groups would become active both in Cuba and outside.**

FR 239288

2. **Masferrer said that Manuel Ray Rivero, leader of the Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (JURE, Cuban Revolutionary Junta), would play an important role in the events that were to transpire in the next two months. Although he did not elaborate on just how the revolt would come about, Masferrer did say that the uprising would be possible because those persons participating in the revolt would have access to weapons and ammunition already cached in Cuba.**

no 20

3. **On 4 June 1964 Enrique "Kiki" Masferrer Rojas, Rolando's brother, had obtained the signatures of several Cuban exile leaders, which he intended to submit to the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Miami requesting authorization for Masferrer to return to Miami.1 It was expected that the document would be submitted sometime in early June 1964.**

The information in Para. 4 was obtained from a former high-level Latin American Government official who has travelled frequently throughout the Caribbean and Central America where he maintains close friendships with a wide range of military and political leaders. Source is a rightist, a trained reporter, and his information has been reliable in the past.

4. Masferrer arrived in Miami on 27 May with an undetermined quantity of arms and ammunition which he plans to use against Castro.

The information in Para. 5 was obtained from a local law enforcement officer who is well acquainted with maritime matters in Florida. Source has submitted a large number of reports based on the debriefing of Cuban refugees and has been a consistently reliable reporter on the plans and activities of anti-Castro groups engaging in boat operations. This information was obtained from an unidentified informant described as reliable.

5. As of 22 May, Masferrer was alleged to have equipment in Miami to arm about 200 men. The plan called for moving this equipment from the United States mainland to an unidentified key where it would be buried. When the fighting began in Cuba, about 200 men were to proceed to the key, arm themselves with the cached materiel and proceed to Cuba. In this way they could also claim to be the liberators of Cuba.

1. Field Comment: Masferrer has been prohibited from returning to the State of Florida following an order issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.

FBI doc
14 May 64 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau # 2-1622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. · 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM · 8. DATE OF INFO. · 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST · 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN · 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

1904552

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO ARCADIO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

036-009-006
UFG -04662
25 FEB 64
P1

CIT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
OCC ?
RE SUBJ'S INVOLVEMENT IN PREPARATIONS BY ROLANDO ARCADIO MASFERRER ROJAS TO SUPPORT LEON CANTAVE'S SECOND INVASION ATTEMPT OF HAITI.

PAFR
000000000000 000 0000
11111_11111111_111111
2222222222222222222_
3333333333_3_33333333
44444444 4444444.444
_5555555555555555555__5
66666_666666666666666
7777_77777777_7777777
88888888_88_888888888
9999999_9999999_99999

#HDC HTP

1 904 552

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ▷ | 201 | 04 | 26 | 69

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

25 Feb 64

(7-60)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

201-727690
UFGA-14051
19 FEB 64
200-120-63
P3

SUBJ IS POSS SOURCE OF SUPPORT FOR POSS PLANS TO INVADE HAITI.

1892224
PAFR

```
_00000000_000000000000
111_1_11111111_111111
22222222222222222___2
333333333_33333333333
_44444444444444444444_
_555555555555555555555
6_6666_666666666666666
77_7_77777_7777777777
88888888_888888_88888
9999999_99999999_9999
```

HTP

1 892 224

P3

16. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 04 26 69

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

19 Feb 64

FBI doc
10 Feb 64 (NY)
Re-Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Bureau# 2-1622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-081/03
UFGA-13525
21 JAN 64

1846224

PAFR

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ USA ?
RE REPORTS OF INVESTIGATION OR SURVEILLANCE OF SUBJ.

```
000000000000000000000
111_1_11111111_111111
222222222222222222__2
333333333333333333333
_4444444444444444_444_
555555555555555555555
6_6666_6666666666_666
77_7_7777777777777777
888888888888888888_88888
9999999_9999999999999
```

1 846 224

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 200 04 26 69

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

24 Jan 64

FBI doc
15 Jan 64 (Newark)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Bureau# 2-1622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042569
SEX M DOB ?
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ USA, NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY ?
RE RPTD DISCUSSIONS W/201-118281 PERTAINING TO INVASION OF HAITI. DOI 12 DEC 63.

019-009-009
UFG -04435
15 JAN 64

1844720
PAFR
_00000000_0000000000_
11111_11111111_111111
2222222222222222222_2
33333333_3333333333
4444444444444444__444
555555555555555555555
66666666666666666666
777_77777_77777777_77
88888888_888888888888
99999999_999999999999

4HTP

1 844 720

16. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 04 26 69

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 15 Jan 64

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MASFERRER Y ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-42669
(VOL. VIII)

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 JAN. 66 THRU 31 DEC. 66

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:25 4 AUG. 78		PAT ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

MASFERRER Y ROJAS, Rolando A. [illegible] 201-42669

SECRET

OGC 66-2615

16 December 1966

The Honorable J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Walt:

201-42669

After you informed me on 29 November 1966 of the possible indictment by the U. S. Attorney in Florida of Rolando Masferrer and others concerned in the plan to launch an expedition from Florida against President Duvalier of Haiti, I asked for a report on our knowledge of, or involvement in, this activity.

As you know, we have installations in the Miami area which utilize a variety of sensitive covers. The Chief of Station coordinates his activities closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Bureau of Customs of the Department of the Treasury and disseminates to those offices in the area pertinent intelligence information.

Our Station was well informed on the plans of Masferrer and his cohorts and disseminated this information in the normal manner. Part of this reporting included information that Masferrer and some of his associates repeatedly asserted that their plotting had been approved by the U. S. Government. On some occasions they stated this approval came from this Agency, and the other times they intimated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had approved their actions. These claims were apparently used to persuade various persons, primarily Cuban exiles, some of whom formerly had contact with the Agency, to join the plot. It appears logical to assume that Masferrer would continue to claim that he had received what he interpreted to be U. S. Government approval of the scheme to overthrow President Duvalier, and if he has

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

2396

File in 201-42669

nothing more positive he can take the approach that he considered the U. S. Government tacitly approved his plot since it obviously knew about it and did not take any action against him.

For the record, it can be flatly stated that neither by statement nor by implication has the Central Intelligence Agency indicated to anyone that it approved or was supporting the plot. On the contrary, those who queried people they knew were connected with our Agency concerning possible participation in the plot were told that it had no U. S. Government backing whatsoever. Some of the plotters attempted to contact this Agency through various intermediaries, and the intermediaries were told that the Agency wished to have nothing to do with the undertaking and that any information concerning violations of U. S. laws should be passed to law-enforcement agencies, particularly the Bureau of Customs and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Technically, therefore, the Agency has stayed clear of the plotters, and we would be in a position to state that we had no connection with the plot and had given it no encouragement or backing of any sort.

As a practical matter, however, if prosecution were pursued, Masferrer, and perhaps other defendants, would probably claim that they had CIA backing and some might even believe it to be true. This might well lead one or more defendants to seek a subpoena duces tecum for an Agency witness and the Agency documentation on the subject. As noted above, the witness can testify to the fact that the Agency had in no way participated or encouraged the activity. If it proved impossible to quash the requirement for production of documents, however, we would be faced with a situation where we would almost certainly have to claim the documents were privileged on the grounds of security. Aside from the sensitivity of the reports and their possible compromise of sources, we would have the problem of identification of our personnel under cover and of protecting the sensitive cover arrangements.

The same is true to a lesser extent of action against Masferrer in connection with violations of his parole. In view of the flagrant and numerous violations which were actually known to and reported by Government agencies without any punitive action resulting, it would appear that he could make a plausible claim that the Government had at least winked at, if not condoned, his activities. It would seem preferable to have him immediately put under a more stringent parole, perhaps with an accompanying requirement of bond. In the event he violated this new status, prompt action could be taken on those circumstances alone.

Sincerely,

s/

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

cc: The Honorable David C. Acheson
Special Assistant to the Secretary
(For Enforcement)
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

ExDir-Comp
DDP
CI
Office of Security

I33

[illegible]

201-42669

FBI doc
31 Dec 66 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Bureau # 2-156

FBI doc
16 Dec 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
7 Dec 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas

14-00000

Masferrer

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

ORIG : A. WISNIOWSKI/eir
UNIT : WH/COG/MO/FI
EXT : 3458
DATE : 5 Dec. 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-42669

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ✓ BRANCH

DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ # ___

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/COG-5 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY DDP, OGC-2, C/WH 6, C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 7 1415Z CITE DIRECTOR (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER) 57687

TO JMWAVE

RYBAT TYPIC

ABSTRACT

REF JMWAVE 4359 (IN 49628)

1. FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM GENERAL COUNSEL IN RESPONSE REF.

2. REF REPORT IS EXCELLENT AND VERY USEFUL IN CONNECTION OGC DISCUSSIONS WITH DEPT OF JUSTICE.

3. TECHNICALLY, ON FACTS STATED, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR BE ANY REASON WHY WOFACT SHOULD OPPOSE INDICTMENT AND TRIAL OF MASFERRER. THIS BASED ON GROUND THAT WE COULD REFUTE ANY CLAIMS MASFERRER AND HIS COHORTS MADE OF WOFACT SUPPORT. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS DOES NOT RECOGNIZE TYPE OF SITUATION WOFACT LIKELY GET INTO IF INDICTMENT IS BROUGHT. WOFACT LEARNED THROUGH EXPERIENCE THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL ONLY TOO EAGER CLAIM WOFACT PARTICIPATION AND APPROVAL AS PART OF DEFENSE, AND IT NOT DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO LAY ENOUGH BASIS FOR COURT TO ISSUE A SUPOENA DUCES TECUM REQUIRING PRESENCE OF A WOFACT

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER 7-3 COORDINATING OFFICERS **SECRET** GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

03

7 Dec 66
201-42669

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 57687

TO PAGE TWO

WITNESS TOGETHER WITH ALL WOFACT DOCUMENTATION ON THE SUBJECT. IN THE BUFFALO B-26 CASE THIS WAS NOT TOO BAD AS ONLY DOCUMENTATION WAS FOUR REPORTS IN WHICH THE INFO WAS NOT SENSITIVE, AND JUDGE AGREED TO EXCISE SOURCE AND OTHER SENSITIVE INFO BEFORE PAPERS WERE INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE.

4. IN MASFERRER CASE A SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM WOULD REQUIRE PRODUCTION OF ALL DOCUMENTS WE HAVE WHICH TOUCH ON MASFERRER-HAITIAN PLAN AND ACTIVITY. OGC REASONABLY SURE WOULD NOT BE ABLE HONOR SUCH SUBPOENA, AND DEPT OF JUSTICE AGREES WITH OGC. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT PROCESS OF SUBPOENA AND PRODUCTION OF RECORDS WOULD PROBABLY COME TO ISSUE BEFORE WOFACT WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE TO REFUTE THE CLAIM OF OUR PARTICIPATION. IF WOFACT REFUSED TO HONOR SUBPOENA, THE GOVT WOULD HAVE TO DROP ITS CRIMINAL CASE SO CHANCES SUCCESS ARE MINIMAL, BUT THE PROCESS WOULD DEVELOP EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY

(CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

RIG :
NIT :
XT :
ATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 57687

TO PAGE THREE

WHICH EXPERIENCE SHOWS WOULD BE MOSTLY UNFAVORABLE AND WHOLE PROCEEDING MIGHT WELL EXPOSE JMWAVE COVER AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

5. BASED ON OGC DISCUSSION OF ABOVE ASPECTS, DEPT OF JUSTICE FEELS INDICTMENT SHOULD NOT BE SOUGHT. ONE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS THAT CUSTOMS THINKS THEY HAVE HOT CASE AND WANT TO PURSUE IT. ACCORDINGLY, WITH AGREEMENT OF DEPT OF JUSTICE, OGC HAS TALKED TO DAVID C. ACHESON, DEPT OF TREASURY AND POINTED OUT PROBLEM. ACHESON IS LOOKING INTO IT AND OGC WILL PROBABLY CONTACT HIM IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

6. OGC STATES DOES NOT WISH HAVE JMWAVE BLAMED FOR INTERFERING WITH CUSTOMS CASE AND THAT JMWAVE CAN PUT THE FULL BURDEN ON OGC AND DEPT OF JUSTICE. OGC SUGGESTS, HOWEVER, THAT UNLESS JMWAVE IS APPROACHED BY CUSTOMS JMWAVE SHOULD MAKE NO MOVE UNTIL OGC GETS THINGS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED AT HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

Flores

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
for AC/WHD

C/WH/COG/MO
OGC L. R. Houston (telecon)

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM — CONFIDENTIAL — NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

SUBJECT Proposed Invasion Cancelled

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/19112-66

DATE DISTR. 30 Nov 66

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES This report was previously disseminated as TD-00B-321/19112-66

DATE OF INFO. 23 Nov 66 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. --- 23 Nov 66

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, soldier of fortune type with wide experience in Latin America. He is closely associated with Rolando Masferrer.

[This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. During the night of 22 Nov 66 a decision was reached to call off the proposed invasion of Haiti by the group sponsored by Rolando Masferrer. The invasion is off indefinitely.

2. Father Jean Baptiste Georges and Colonel Rene Leon have been arguing with Masferrer which has caused confusion and disorganization in the movement. Many Cubans scheduled to participate have pulled out and military chief Napoleon Villaboise (sic), a Cuban national and alleged military expert, has resigned because of dissension in the group.

3. It is believed that US Government agencies have infiltrated the movement and the leaders fear that all weapons and equipment would be confiscated if plans for the invasion proceeded.

- end -

CONFIDENTIAL

30 Nov 66

201-42669

[illegible] [illegible]

7617

Broe

Confidential

Thursday - November 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION between

Andrew St. George -- CBS photographer.
William G. Bowdler.

SUBJECT: Invasion of Haiti

Andrew St. George called me from Miami.

He said that he and the CBS film crew, headed by a Mr. McMullin (phonetic), were back in Miami to cover the departure this weekend of the expedition which Rolando Masferrer was organizing to invade Haiti. St. George claimed that Masferrer had recruited 300 men and arranged for the use of one B-25, two C-46s and a large boat. He said that all the preparations were so much in the open that it was evident that Masferrer and his Haitian colleagues had received the "green light". Recent events in Haiti, plus Masferrer's activities, were attracting a lot of newsmen to Miami.

I told St. George that he was mistaken about the "green light". We will not tolerate violation of our neutrality laws. Our enforcement agencies, whose duty it is to enforce these laws, will not permit what he described taking place. I wanted him and those with whom he was dealing to be clear on this point. He said he would inform Mr. McMullin.

William G. Bowdler

cc: Walt Rostow
Bill Moyers
Linc Gordon/State.
Bill Broe/CIA.

n Roule
201-042669

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM S E C R E T **NO DISSEM ABROAD**

COUNTRY Haiti/Dominican Republic/ Bahamas

REPORT NO. OO- B-321/17879-66

SUBJECT Planned Invasion of Haiti between 5-13 Nov 66

DATE DISTR. 7 Nov 66

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES This report was previously disseminated as TD-OOB-321/17879-66

DATE OF INFO. 28 Oct 66

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---1 Nov 66

CITE C-DC6-52851

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national with wide travel experience in Latin America. He speaks some Spanish, and has many social and business contacts in the Dominican Republic.

[This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. On 28 Oct 66 I spoke with Rolando Masferrer Rojas, a Cuban exile, and he told me that he has organized a military force of approximately 250 men to invade Haiti. The invasion force consists of Cuban and Haitian exiles residing in the US, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic. The invasion will probably be launched from the Dominican Republic sometime between 5 and 13 November and the target is Port-au-Prince. The invasion force will strike in the early hours of the morning selected. It is well armed, and will have air cover; the presidential palace will be bombed.

2. Masferrer stated that Eugene L. Maximilien, Haitian Consul in Miami, Florida, is aware of the invasion, but he has no knowledge of the invasion date. Maximilien is presently in Haiti informing President Duvalier that the invasion can be prevented by paying off $200,000 to Masferrer. Maximilien will return to the US on 3 November and he has agreed with Masferrer that if Duvalier agrees to the pay-off, Maximilien will receive $50,000 and Masferrer $150,000.

3. Masferrer told me that the invasion will take place in any event and the $150,000, if received, would be used to further support the invasion.

4. Masferrer stated that he met within the past 10 days with several dissident Haitian army officers and he had received their support. The Haitian army officers told Masferrer that they would revolt as soon as informed that the invasion had commenced. They do not know that the target will be Port-au-Prince; they believe that it will be in the cap Haitien area.

5. Masferrer stated that he was confident that the invasion will succeed, and if successful, Father Jean Baptiste Georges would be appointed provisional president. Masferrer stated that Colonel Rene Leon, Haitian exile, will participate in the invasion.

7 Nov 66

201-42069

FBI doc
28 Oct 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

100-009-016
DBB -63505
20 OCT 66
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE INVOLVEMENT IN HAITIAN EXILE ACTIVITIES.

R 6701130960

FILE IN 201- 042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

20 Oct 66
201-42669

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. CS-311/10608-67

SUBJECT Alleged Plan by President Francois Duvalier to Have Anti-Duvalier Revolutionaries in Miami, Florida, Assassinated

DATE DISTR. 13 October 1967

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 21 September 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (26 September 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-9090

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Former Latin American diplomat who maintains relations with officials of Latin American countries. Source is a trained reporter and his information has been reliable in the past. He obtained this information from Aurea Esther Poggio.

1. On 21 September 1967 in Miami, Florida, Aurea Esther Poggio, Cuban emigre who is a secretary to Rolando Masferrer Rojas, said that plans had been made to assassinate persons linked with revolutionary movements in Miami opposing President Francois Duvalier of Haiti. Poggio said that the first such attempt was against Julio Aton Constanzo Palau on 17 September 1967.[1]

2. Poggio said that Masferrer's group was investigating the matter in an effort to find out who was carrying out the assassination plans for Duvalier.[2]

1. Field Comment: Constanzo, Cuban emigre, was among those indicted with Masferrer, former Cuban senator, and Father Jean Baptiste Georges, Haitian emigre, by a federal grand jury in Miami in February 1967 on charges of conspiring to launch an invasion of Haiti from the Florida Keys. No coverage of an attempt to kill Constanzo has been noted in the local press.

2. Headquarters Comment: According to TDCS-314/08728-67, about mid-1967 Duvalier instructed Andre Elie, Haitian Consul in New York, to keep close surveillance on Haitian exiles and to report all plans for invasions of Haiti.

5
4
3
2
1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI 2
	CINCSO				SECRET SERVICE (PID)			I&NS

(Field Distribution indicated by "#") (Also sent Port-au-Prince)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

	WH/FP DI	1	WH/PACY (CINCSO) - 1		UFG-9090
	WH/7/DR	1			BP
	WH/EDOM	1	[illegible]	1	(DOAMBER-6)
	WH/COG/PB	3			CS-311/ 8-67
	WH/HAIT	1			

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. | 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM | 8. DATE OF INFO. | 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST | 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN | 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
ACTIVITY OF ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS
AND FATHER JEAN BAPTISTE GEORGES IN
PREPARING FOR ACTION AGAINST HAITI

100-C09-016
UFG -08589 ✓
12 OCT 66
PI

HOCHTP

R 6610210178

FILE IN 201-42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 10-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

12 oct 66
201-42669

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

201-002705
UFG -08588
12 OCT 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
REPORTEDLY ANDREW ST. GEORGE, A FREE-
LANCE PHOTOGRAPHER, HAD RECEIVED
PERMISSION FROM MASFERRER TO MAKE A FILM
FOR THE COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM
CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MAS-
FERRER GROUP WITH RESPECT TO AN INVASION
OF HAITI TO BE MOUNTED FROM THE DR

R 6610190209

FILE IN 201-42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 2-64 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

12 Oct 66

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

201-787733
UFG -62250
03 OCT 66
[illegible]

CIT ?
OCC ?
IN EARLY MAR 66 GONZALEZ, ELSILIA /201-787753/ ACCOMPANIED SUBJ TO NYC THINKING HE WOULD HELP LIBERATE CUBA BUT FINDING HIM FALSE, SHE LEFT MASFERRER AND MOVED ABOUT NYC LIVING WITH FRIENDS. MASFERRER STATED IN APR 66 HE DID NOT TRUST GONZALEZ AND FELT SHE WOULD RETURN TO CUBA

R 6610260297

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

3 Oct 66

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-42669
X-REF TO FILE NO. ______
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 25 PER [illegible]

ACTION
WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, [illegible] W/H/a, [illegible], CA 2, CA/PEG, [illegible]
CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, 14, [illegible]

23 Sep 66 IN 02597

WAVE

S E C R E T 231938Z CITE JMWAVE 3193 (LUEHRSEN ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO, PORT AU PRINCE

TYPIC

ABSTRACT X

REFERENCES: A. JMWAVE 3141 (IN 08817)
B. JMWAVE 3155 (IN 09311)

1. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON FUNK AND DUNKIN CITED PARAS TWO AND FIVE REF A AS FOLLOWS:

A. ADDRESS FOR ROBERT FUNK IS NEW YORK OFFICE OF CBS.

B. ADDRESS GIVEN FOR JOHN T. DUNKIN IS HIS CURRENT RESIDENCE. PRIOR MARCH 65 HE LIVED AT 215 TWELFTH STREET N.E. ATLANTA GEORGIA, WORKED FOR ATLANTA NEWS AS COPY READER AND HELD THIS JOB SINCE AUGUST 64. PRIOR TO THIS DATE DUNKIN WORKED FOR PALM BEACH POST.

#/no 201

2. FYI COORDINATOR FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS MIAMI REPORTED ON 22 SEPTEMBER THAT LOCAL LNWAPA HAD LOCATED AND STAKED OUT TWO BOATS BEING LEASED BY ROLANDO MASFERRER. ALLEGEDLY THESE BOATS WILL BE USED TO TRANSPORT ARMS TO LARGER MOTHER VESSEL LOCATED OFF FLORIDA COAST. ACCORDING LNWAPA CURRENT

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 3193 S E C R E T

ARMS SHIPMENT EXPECTED TO BE AT LEAST ONE HUNDRED TONS AND WILL INCLUDE HEAVIER WEAPONS [illegible] IN MIAMI AREA.

23 Sept. 1966
201-42669

14-00000

J.E. Tomas

ORIG: J.E.TOMAS:sld
UNIT: WH/7/Haiti
EXT: 5595
DATE: 22 Sept. 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TOTAL COPIES: 31

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 24 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE • WH/C-8, SOD 6, DDP, Addl, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 23 17 00Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 37582

TO PORT AU PRINCE, JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS

-PRIORITY-

REF: JMWAVE 3153 (IN 00931)

1. FOR YOUR INFORMATION: ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1966, FREELANCE PHOTOGRAPHER ANDREW ST. GEORGE REPORTED FOLLOWING TO WILLIAM G. BOWDLER, ~~STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE~~ LATIN AMERICAN REFERENT ON ROSTOW STAFF AT WHITE HOUSE: ST. GEORGE IS ON A CBS CREW FILMING A STORY OF GUNRUNNING FROM THE U.S. TO THE D.R. FOR USE AGAINST HAITI. CREW HAD COMPLETED ITS FILMING IN MIAMI AND SOON WOULD TRAVEL TO SANTO DOMINGO TO FILM OPERATION AT THAT END. ROLANDO MASFERRER AND MITCHELL WARBEL (PHONETIC) HAD PERMITTED ST. GEORGE TO FILM LARGE ARSENAL IN MASFERRER'S HOUSE IN MIAMI. WARBEL DESCRIBED AS A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE/ARMS MERCHANT FROM ATLANTA WHO ASSISTING MASFERRER IN ACQUIRING ARMS. WARBEL SUPPOSEDLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SEIZURE OF MANUEL RAY'S VESSEL "VENUS" WITH ARMS ABOARD IN DOM REP. PLOTTERS PLAN TO USE BEATA ISLAND AS BASE. ARRANGEMENTS IN DOM REP BEING HANDLED THROUGH SANTIAGO REY, MARTINEZ ARANA

probably Mitch WERBELL

MR 8 July 2014

....CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

22 Sept 66 COPY NO.
201-049669
MASFERRER, Rolando/201

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 37582

TO PORT AU PRINCE, JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS

2

AND OTHERS. PRES BALAGUER HAS GIVEN NOD TO OPERATION.

2. BOWDLER EXPRESSED DOUBT TO ST. GEORGE CONCERNING BALAGUER'S COMPLICITY AND ASSURED ST. GEORGE THAT U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WOULD TAKE NECESSARY ACTION.

3. ON 20 SEPTEMBER, RELIABLE SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTED THAT XX ROLANDO MASFERRER MADE AN OFFER TO A COMMUNICATIONS MEDIUM OF ADVANCE STORY OF AN INVASION WHICH HE PLANNING, ON CONDITION THAT STORY BE HELD UNTIL AFTER ACTION STARTS. IN MAKING OFFER, HE REFERRED TO HIS SALE TO CBS OF FILMS OF HAITIANS BEING TRAINED FOR INVASION.

4. HQS REALIZES THIS PROBABLY ANOTHER IN LONG LINE OF RUMORS OF INVASION OF HAITI BUT REQUESTS STATIONS WATCH THIS MATTER EVEN IF ONLY REALITY INHERENT THEREIN IS THAT MASFERRER IS ENGAGING IN SELF-PROMOTION SCHEME.

5. FOR PORT AU PRINCE: PLS INFORM AMBASSADOR OF ABOVE.

....CONTINUED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 37582

TO PORT AU PRINCE, JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS

3

6. FOR SANTO DOMINGO: SUGGEST COS BRIEF EMANTHEM-1 ON SUBSTANCE OF ~~[illegible]~~ ABOVE DURING NEXT MEETING. ~~[illegible]~~

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: REPORT OF MASFERRER CLAIM THAT SMALL FORCE WILL LEAVE BY BOAT FOR DOM REP TO SET UP BASE FOR SUBSEQUENT ATTACHS ON HAITI AND CUBA, AND THAT HE HAS SUPPORT OF DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

David Ronis
C/WH/7/DR

(by phone)
Ernest Chiocca
WH/C/MO/PM

Paul V. Harwood
C/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-042669

21 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Liaison Meeting with FBI New York Agent Frank O'Brien

1. At 1500 hours on 13 September, Ken Millian and I met with FBI Cuban specialist Frank O'Brien at a cafe/coffee shop at 72nd St. and 3rd Ave., two blocks away from the Bureau's New York headquarters. I had arranged the meeting by telephone from Washington and advised O'Brien that I wanted to review and coordinate a number of items with him. I also informed him that I would be accompanied by Millian, a colleague interested in the Cuban UN Mission.

2. The meeting opened at an easy pace with an uninhibited review of happenings of mutual interest: O'Brien noted that in his view the Cubans at the Mission had been relatively inactive and had not recently been involved in subversive activities of any magnitude. He reviewed FBI coverage of as yet not fully explained purchasing activity by Mission personnel which included procurement from various New York area military surplus outlets of ponchos, leggings, and other similar equipment. He implied that in the process of covering the activities, the Bureau had acquired a substantial amount of surplus equipment itself but he didn't provide details and we didn't pursue the matter.

mission Stuff for Che's group? Inc.

3. He noted that blanket Bureau coverage of the activities of Rolando Masferrer was continuing and that he occasionally talked with Masferrer by telephone or in person. He indicated that the Bureau was intimately aware of efforts on the part of Masferrer and other Cubans both in New York and Florida to procure arms in the U.S. and position them in the Dominican Republic. He reported that an attempt to move a shipment of such arms from the Florida Keys to the D.R. currently was underway and that the U.S. Customs Service was alerted to move in at the appropriate time to confiscate the material. (Although acknowledging Masferrer's gangster background, O'Brien complemented him on his intelligence and efficiency and indicated that Masferrer was one of the ablest Cuban refugees he had met.)

4. O'Brien also surfaced his current contact with former Rebel Army Captain Raimundo F. Antonio de la Torre y

201

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

21 Sep 66

201-042669

Ugarte, 81-11 Pettit Ave., Elmhurst, Long Island, tel. NR 2-5487. De la Torre apparently is involved with Cuban refugees in the U.S. who are attempting to re-establish the 26th of July Movement here in the United States minus the Communist implications contributed by Fidel. O'Brien apparently is impressed with De la Torre's sincerity and ability and believes that De la Torre should be of interest to us. De la Torre has until recently stayed away from exile activities and according to O'Brien is pushing the revitalized 26th of July idea by personal contact rather than make any splash. According to O'Brien De la Torre is now operating a successful painting business and at one time held a good position with Union Carbide International. In conversations with O'Brien De la Torre has been critical of CIA. When queried O'Brien indicated that De la Torre's only real gripe was the Bay of Pigs. (C/O note: We should look into De la Torre to see if he could be used in any revitalized effort abroad to establish lines of access to non-Communist 26th of Julyers still in Cuba - Carlos Franqui etc.) We indicated that we would evaluate information available to us and discuss De la Torre with him again in the future.

Franqui a weak character now working on Fidel's biog GUE.

5. Note: O'Brien has been working the Cuban target in New York for over ten years and is impressively conversant with the subject. It is, therefore, sometimes difficult to stay with him when he covers various complicated subjects with abbreviated statements, e. g., during subject meeting, he alluded to one Miguel Morales, the former husband of Nellie Barletta, daughter of Batista's ambassador to Argentina Amleto Barletta. He apparently feels there may be mileage in Morales. We will, therefore, review Morales, Barletta, et al, and resurface the subject with him when time permits.

6. The two principal action items on my agenda were the coordination of my planned luncheon meeting with photo-journalist Lee J. Lockwood (201-78771), and discussion of NEKNIFE, who allegedly was interviewed by the Bureau in New York several years ago. O'Brien advised me that he had reviewed their Lockwood file and talked with the Bureau agent responsible for the Lockwood "case". He stated that he had not uncovered any derogatory information on Lockwood and saw no reason to prevent my meeting with him. I told him I would advise him of my meeting arrangements with Lockwood when they were firm and that I would brief him after the meeting was over. (It is of interest to note that during my briefing of O'Brien on the morning of the 16th, the day following my luncheon with Lockwood, O'Brien noted that some of his superiors in Washington thought Lockwood was an opposition (sic) "spy". When I asked if there was anything to support this

Said speculation [illegible] his [illegible] contact with Souza?

theory, O'Brien said absolutely not, it was pure speculation.)

7. O'Brien checked the Bureau's New York indices on NEKNIFE but without success. If he was in fact interviewed by the FBI in New York there apparently was no record of it. I told him that NEKNIFE was expected in New York City in late September to visit his daughter and son-in-law and that we probably would attempt a meeting with him at the time. He had no objection.

8. Specific items of business concluded, we moved into a general and historical discussion of the Cuban Mission to the UN, which was the main purpose of Millian's attendance at the meeting. Recent changes in Mission personnel, including the assignment of Ricardo Alarcón Quesada (201-347590) as Ambassador, were discussed and itineraries of Cubans arriving for the General Assembly were noted. Early in the conversation, O'Brien surfaced his long term contact with Cuban UN Advisor and Alternate Representative Antonio de Souza Carvajal (201-354048), a friend of Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa, who has served the Cubans in New York for the past ten years or more and has been with the Cuban Foreign Service for 40 years. The Souza subject was not new to me, since O'Brien had brought it up in conversations I had with him earlier this year. I did not choose to pursue the subject with him at that time, however, without first reviewing all implications of the case with Agency officials in Washington. O'Brien indicated no interest in Miguel Juan Alfonso Martínez (201-354041), Counselor at the Mission, whom we suspected they might be in contact ~~with~~.

9. O'Brien's eagerness to discuss the Souza matter seems to imply that he is deeply interested in it and may suggest that he is not satisfied with results thus far obtained. At one point he indicated that his headquarters was not at all happy with the take from Souza. He reviewed the history of the contact with complete candor beginning with his initial contacts with Souza in the mid/late 1950's when O'Brien had open access to the Cuban Mission in New York and was a frequent visitor there. From his description, Souza would appear to be a thoroughly experienced and skilled diplomat who has survived the numerous changes in the Cuban government because of his friendship with Roa and other influential Cubans, and because of his ability to implement effectively for the Cubans the more subtle diplomatic maneuvers required by membership in the UN community. In fact, O'Brien feels that the Cubans utilize Souza exclusively on these latter duties and tend to exclude him from high level matters involving political, military, or economic policy.

This, according to O'Brien, accounts for Souza's inability to provide information of real value. O'Brien did indicate, however, that the usual P.I. requirements had no punch. He cited, for example, the requirements after Souza's return from Hawaii, which in effect amounted to: What's new?

10. Despite the long history of the Souza contact, O'Brien is not now meeting with Souza in person. Souza feels that O'Brien is too well known in the Cuban community in New York and even the most elaborate contact arrangements would not be free of danger. Souza also shys away from talking on his home phone for fear that it may be tapped. O'Brien can, however, telephone Souza and lay on alternate telephone or even meeting arrangements. We did not establish the frequency of O'Brien's current contacts with Souza nor did we establish at what point in the history of the contact the decision was made to dispense with personal meetings; the nature of our meeting with O'Brien did not permit elaborate and detailed questioning. He did recount, however, an interesting aspect of the case which followed from the fact that a State Department security officer assigned to New York, (fnu) Swazey, occupied the apartment directly above Souza during his tour in New York and became quite friendly with Souza. O'Brien apparently used Swazey as an informal go-between on the case. (Should we choose to pursue the Souza lead, an attempt perhaps should be made to locate and debrief Swazey with O'Brien's concurrence. Note: This could be Anthony Clinton Swezey, DOB 9 August 1913, who was Special Assistant to Secretary General of U.S. Mission to UN 1946 to 1947. In 1963 he was First Secretary, FSO-2, in Paris.)

11. It is difficult at this point to identify with accuracy the true nature of O'Brien's tie with Souza. Based upon O'Brien's comments, it does not appear that Souza should be classified as an "agent" of the Bureau in the classical sense, particularly at this point when there apparently are no formal arrangements for contact, no remuneration or even instructions given, and apparently no reports received from Souza. It is probable that a critical point in this operation was reached about three years ago when, according to O'Brien, Souza talked about his advancing age (now 65), his retirement equities with the Cuban government, and his financial needs in general. O'Brien thought that Souza was looking for guarantees which would provide for his future should he choose to cooperate fully and ultimately be surfaced and forced to forego his retirement and remain in the U.S. O'Brien apparently presented Souza's case to his superiors but was unable to generate any substantial enthusiasm. He stated they were not willing to give Souza a stipend. The

Bureau's position, both then and now, apparently is that Souza has little potential as an asset for internal security matters and therefore would not justify any substantial financial obligation. In very low key, it was made clear to O'Brien that the Agency was interested in Souza's Positive Intelligence potential (his access in Havana should be good, given his long friendship with Roa and his closeness to María Celia Girona Fernández (201-327421), cousin of Celia Sánchez Manduley) and well might find justification for providing modest security for Souza's old age.

12. Throughout our conversation it appeared clear that O'Brien was of the opinion that there may be a role for the Agency in the Souza operation. We asked him, therefore, whether or not he felt Souza may still be interested in feathering his nest and, if so, if it would be bureaucratically possible to get word to Souza that such a possibility existed. O'Brien felt that Souza would still be interested and he was of the opinion that he could get the point across to Souza via double talk in a telephone conversation. This approach was accepted and it was agreed that O'Brien would advise us of the results after the call was made. If prospects appeared encouraging, it was agreed that we would then get together again to discuss the next step which might entail arranging direct contact with Souza. O'Brien noted that Souza lives in Jackson Heights and usually drives to work. Possibly a contact could be arranged somewhere along the route. The foregoing generally covers the extent of our discussion regarding Souza. When I met with O'Brien again on 16 September just prior to my departure for Washington, I requested that he not take any action on the Souza case in our behalf until he heard something further from me.

13. During our meeting we reviewed other members of the Cuban Mission with particular reference to DGI types. O'Brien noted that Chafik Homero Saker Zenni (201-335014) undoubtedly is the senior member of the DGI group but even so he was not thought to be particularly active. He reported that Saker had been in contact with Lee Lockwood (see above) on several recent occasions but nothing was known of the nature of the meetings. He also noted that the Bureau was in contact with Saker's Cuban girl friend in New York City whom they had just traced without surfacing any derogatory information. She is cooperating and the Bureau is optimistic about her potential. He did not provide the girl's name but indicated that we should hear about her shortly through channels. O'Brien also acknowledged that the Bureau has a penetration of Prensa Latina in New York. He did not provide the name or any details but on the basis of his comments we pre-

? V-lles

sumed it to be Francisco V. Porte~~ll~~a (201-281963). It would be helpful if we could obtain additional details on both these latter cases.

Ricardo [illegible] Cobos Rivero

14. Without prompting, O'Brien surfaced the AMBIG-3 double agent case. He noted that he had been involved to a degree and actually was present at the hotel bar in downtown New York when the agent made his meet with the Cuban case officer. O'Brien, accompanied by at least one other Bureau man, reported that AMBIG-3 winked at them while passing close by them at the bar on one occasion. O'Brien took this to mean that AMBIG-3 presumed that O'Brien and his friend were Bureau men assigned to surveil the meeting. O'Brien also stated that after his meeting with his Cuban DGI contact, AMBIG-3 called for an emergency meeting with the Bureau and they gave him $200.

15. It was close to 2000 hours before our meeting terminated. We parted on a cordial note with agreement reached that we would talk soon again when some of the material discussed had been further sifted.

John R. Lucey

John R. Lucey

201-42669

FBI doc
14 Sep 66. (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio
Masferrer Rojas

FBI doc
7 Sep '66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION September 6, 1966

SUBJECT: Andrew St. George -- free lance photographer now working with CBS

Mr. St. George came to see me at his request. I have known him from the time that he went to Cuba in the late fifties to film the Castro movement.

He said he wanted to see me as an old friend to tell me that CBS is filming a story of gun-running from the U.S. to the D.R. for use against Haiti. He is working with the CBS crew.

Mr. St. George said that the CBS team had completed its filming in Miami and in the near future would be travelling to Santo Domingo to film the operation at that end. He claimed that in Miami Rolando Masferrer and Mitchell Warbel (phonetic) had permitted him to film what he described as a large arsenal in Masferrer's house.

In response to my question about the identity of Warbel, he said that he is a soldier-of-fortune - arms merchant type from Atlanta who is working with Masferrer in the acquisition of arms. St. George claimed that Warbel had been responsible for the seizure of Manuel Ray's vessel "Venus" in the Dominican Republic and the acquisition of the arms (mostly sub-machine guns) which were on board.

St. George stated that the base in the Dominican Republic was on Beata Island. Arrangements in the DR are being handled through Santiago Rey with Martires Araña and others whom he did not name. St. George said that Balaguer had given his nod to the operation. I told him that I did not believe there was any truth to this latter point as President Balaguer has recently normalized diplomatic relations with Haiti and is not interested in foreign adventures of this type.

In closing, St. George said he had come to see me because he believed that someone in the United States Government should know about the gun-running and the CBS film. I told him that our law enforcement agencies

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

file in
6 Sep 66
201-042669

were aware of Masferrer's past activities and would take whatever action is necessary to prevent violation of our laws. On the film, I told him that I seriously doubted whether an objective treatment of the facts of Haitian and Cuban exile efforts would add up to the type of story he described. Therefore, I questioned the wisdom of making such a film. He responded that the facts were quite different from what I thought.

William G. Bowdler

cc - Mr. Rostow
Mr. Bill Moyers
Mr. Robert Sayre, State - ARA
Mr. Edward T. Long - State/ARA-CAR
Mr. Robert Stevenson - State/ARA-CCA
Ambassador John Crimmins - Embassy, Santo Domingo.

FBI doc
12 July 66 (NY)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

8 July 1966

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Activities of Rolando MASFERRER Rojas

1. Reference is made to a memorandum from this office, Subject: Plot to Overthrow Haitian Government, dated July 6, 1966, concerning a visit to a farm in the Atlanta, Georgia area by an informant who witnessed the loading of arms at the farm for shipment to temporary cache sites in homes in Miami and Coral Gables, Florida; the pickup of arms from these homes; their transfer to small boats already on trailers; and the offloading of latter at Miami River docking sites for shipment to Santo Domingo and ultimate sites on the Haitian Coast. While the information below may not be related to the incident reported in reference, the similarity of the two reports merits attention.

2. A friend of Rolando MASFERRER Rojas told a usually reliable source of this office that on 27 June 1966 MASFERRER went to a house in Miami where 200 firearms were stored. He was accompanied by two American newsmen, one of whom was a photographer. The arms were removed from the premises by agents of MASFERRER whose faces were covered. The American photographer took photographs during the removal of the arms.

3. The same usually reliable source of paragraph two reported in conjunction with the above that as of early July 1966, action groups such as the Second National Front of the Escambray, ALPHA-66, Comandos-L, and Los Pinos Nuevos, possessed only small quantities of arms. The only substantial amount of arms in the area was in the hands of MASFERRER.

4. This information is being disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of State.

WH/C/CICS/J. Vidal:kcj

Distribution:
2 - Department of State
2 - FBI
4 - WH/C/CICS
1 - 201-42669

Based On:
AMBIDDY/1
Raw Report, Miami
28 June 1966

[illegible]
201-42669

FORM 1-66 3015

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE - 17 JUNE 66
IN - [illegible]
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

Distribution for BACKGROUND USE ONLY to: SDO 2, DDI DC, D/ONE

COUNTRY: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC/HAITI/CUBA

DOI: 13-14 JUNE 1966

SUBJECT: PLANS OF ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR, FOR ACTION AGAINST HAITI FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

ACQ: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (16 JUNE 1966) UFG-8382

SOURCE: FORMER LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WHO MAINTAINS RALATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. HE IS TRAINED REPORTER AND HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST.

1. ON 13 JUNE 1966 IN MIAMI, FORIDA, ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR, SAID THAT HE HAD REVISED HIS PLANS FOR ACTION AGAINST PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DEVALIER OF HAITI TO INCLUDE THE COOPERATION OF SANTIAGO REY PERNA. REY HAD SAID THAT MASFERRER WOULD BE ALLOWED TO TAKE A VESSEL WITH SIX OR SEVEN MEN TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AFTER JOAQUIN BALAGUER IS INSTALLED AS PRESIDENT

Secret

FORM 1-64 3007

IN — [illegible]

TDCS

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

[illegible]

(classification) (dissem controls)

OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN JULY. MASFERRER, HIS COUSIN ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER, AND ATON CONSTANZO PALAU WOULD BE AMONG THOSE ON THE VESSEL.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: REY, A CUBAN EMIGRE WHO WAS A CABINET MINISTER UNDER FULGENCIO BATISTA ZALDIVAR, WENT TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN APRIL TO ACT AS AN ADVISER TO BALAGUER DURING THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. IN MIAMI IN MID-JUNE, HE REPORTEDLY PLANNED TO RETURN TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. SEE ALSO UFG-8378, WHICH REPORTED THAT ACCORDING TO REY HE HAD BEEN OFFERED THE USE OF A FINCA IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FOR ANTI-CASTRO GUERRILLA TRAINING. ANOTHER SOURCE, WHO HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST, REPORTED THAT REY WAS CONFERRING WITH ROLANDO MASFERRER AND ANTONIO ROJAS ON 14 JUNE. CONSTANZO PALAU, CUBAN EMIGRE IN MIAMI, HAS BEEN REPORTED EARLIER AS INVOLVED WITH ROLANDO MASFERRER IN PLANS FOR ANTI-DUVALIER ACTION.)

3. MASFERRER ASSERTED THAT IN ORDER TO MISLEAD AUTHORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (USG) AND THUS PREVENT INTERFERENCE, THE GROUP ON THE VESSEL WOULD

Secret

FORM 1-65 3007

IN - 40092

TDCS

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

Secret
(classification) (dissem controls)

GO TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC OSTENSIBLY AS REVOLUTIONARIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. HE ADDED THAT AS ANOTHER PRECAUTION AGAINST D FFICULTIES WITH THE USG, THE GROUP WOULD NOT USE UNITED STATES ARMS OR ATTEMPT TO TRANSPORT ARMS FROM THE UNITED STATES. MASFERRER SAID THAT HENRI VIXAMAR HAD ARMS ELSEWHERE, AND THAT THE ATTACK AGAINST HAITI WOULD BE LAUNCHED FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO SOURCE, MASFERRER DID NOT YET HAVE VESSEL. VIXAMAR, A HAITIAN EMIGRE WHO HAS BEEN RESIDING IN CANADA SINCE MID-APRIL, HAS BEEN DESCRIBED EARLIER AS IN CHARGE OF THE PLANS FOR ACTION AGAINST DUVALIER.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: C ECSO, CINLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBU, I&NS, CUSTOMS, USCG, BOARDER PATROL (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO, PORT AU PRINCE)

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

~~BT~~

14-00000

12-65 [illegible] WHICH IS OBSOLETE

INDEX: ☒ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-04[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

UFG-8382

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION		ADVANCE COPY	UNIT	TIME	BY
WH 8	☒ RID COPY	☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED	CSDG	0205Z	D

INFO VR. FILE. ADDP. CA 2, CA/PEG. CA/PROP. CI/OPS. CI/IC 2. FI. FI/D . FI/INT . . CS/DO

DCI, D/DCI, DDP, CS/RF, SOD 4, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, CS/SGO, [illegible], IW.

ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 172331Z CITE JMWAVE 1553

DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS,

PORT AU PRINCE, PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, JMBAR

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM PBRUMEN 18 [illegible] 40092

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. NO PROJECT. SOURCE UOAMBER-6 FROM EMILIO

VERA LEYVA FROM ROLANDO MASFERRER. SOURCE MENTIONED FIRST

FILED COMMENT UOAMBER-~~4~~ 2.

NO INDEX FILED 172331Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

UFG 8382

201-42669

18 June 1966

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

100-009-014
DBB -50924
17 JUN 66
FBI

RE MASFERRER WAS EVEN REALLY SINCERE IN OVERTHROWING THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI AND ESTABLISHING A BASE ON THE COAST OF HAITI, FROM WHICH ATTACKS WOULD BE MADE AGAINST ORIENTE PROVINCE, CUBA.

R 6608101426

FILE IN 201-42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

17 Jan 66

(7-46)

FBI doc
25 May 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

4-63

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

4P

PROPER FILE NO

FROM:

RID/AN

MICROFILMED
JUN 27 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RL

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REG				✓
2.				-
3. WH/C/ES	26	May	66	J
4.				
5. WH/C/RR/RE				ne
6. RI/AN				RL
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION I ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Insufficient bio. We have 201-43686 on one Harris, Bill.

24 May 66 [illegible]
copy detailed
RID/201/wh area

[illegible]
~~MAR 23 1966~~
[illegible]

CSDB-3/1/01615-66

RID PROCESSING SUSPENDED
PLEASE INDICATE HANDLING

☐ Index in ____
(File no.)

☐ Index as Indicated in Document

☐ Document Reviewed and Found Not to be Incorporated into the CS Records System. Records Officer Stamp and Signature Required.
If Retention of Document Desired for the Desk Working File Copy, Also Check This Box ☐

NOTE: This Document Will Remain Outside of the CS Records System Until the Desired Handling Is Checked Above and the Document Returned to RID.

AN	FI	
	DESK	
ABSTRACT		

~~DEFERRED~~

201-42669

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX X

201- 42669

DOCUMENT NUMBER

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

FROM
JMWAVE

REPORTING OFFICER
Henry J. SLOMAN HJS

REPORTS OFFICER
Eleanor D. SIMSLER/vkl

APPROVING OFFICER
Philip G. ELMARD

REPORT NO.
UFG-8288 ✓

DATE OF REPORT
17 May 1966

PROJECT

SOURCE CRYPT
AMOT

COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY

CS DISSEMINATION

TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs 1 - DCS 2 - Port-au-Prince 2 - Ottawa	State FBI Customs Border Patrol USCG

HTP
OCO

JUN [illegible] 196[illegible]
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

DYVOUR/JMPALM

SOURCE: AMOT Source Raul ARANGO de la Hoval in EE 5237, 10 May 1966. ARANGO got the information in a conversation with Antonio ROJAS Masferrer at the home of Enrique MASFERRER Rojas on 6 May 1966. Please substitute the dissemination numbers where UFG-8225 and UFG 8241 are cited in Field Comment No. 1.

~~MAY [illegible] 1966~~

RID: Please index for field:

✓ NAME: *HARRIS, Bill insufficient bio
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
CIT : ~~Prob~~ USA ?
OCC : Unknown. Emissary of Rolando MASFERR[illegible]jas to go to Subj's office in Miami re anti-DUVAL[illegible]anning.

✓ NAME: *JOHNSON, Vernon No 201
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
CIT : ~~Prob~~ USA ?
OCC : Arms runner; dealer in military equipmen[illegible] In touch with emissaries of Rolando MASFERRER Roj[illegible] re anti-DUVALIER planning. Subj is Negro.

Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification.

REPORTS
MAY 17 19[illegible]

201-426669

FORM 7-64 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Haiti/Cuba

REPORT NO. CSDB-312/01605-66

SUBJECT Further Developments in Plan for Action Against the Haitian Government

DATE OF REPORT 17 May 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 27 April - 6 May 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (11 May 1966)

UFG-8288

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. On 27 or 28 April 1966, in New York, Rolando Masferrer Rojas, former Cuban senator who has been involved in plans for action against President Francois Duvalier of Haiti, received a letter from the Haitian who is heading the operation against Haiti. The Haitian instructed Masferrer to send a trusted person to the office of Bill Harris, 7150 N.W. 77th Avenue, Miami, Florida, to talk with Vernon Johnson, a Negro. The Haitian described Johnson as a trustworthy person who would be in charge of getting arms. Under no circumstances was Masferrer's ~~emisarry~~ emissary to talk with anyone else.

2. Antonio Rojas Masferrer, Rolando Masferrer's cousin in Miami, ~~[illegible]~~ contacted Johnson, who said that he had in the Miami area all the equipment and arms needed for the operation ~~[illegible]~~ ~~was only awaiting the orders to~~ release them.

3. Rojas and Enrique Masferrer Rojas, Rolando Masferrer's brother, asked a son of Cesar Camacho Coveni, who was Minister of Justice in Cuba under Fulgencio Batista ~~XXX~~ Zaldivar, to investigate Johnson. Camacho's son, who conducts private investigations, reported later that Johnson is an arms runner who also deals in military equipment.

ment. Rojas said he had also been able to learn that although Johnson dressed in a suit and necktie he lived in a small, cheap room in one of the poor, Negro sections of Miami.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
-2-

[illegible]3-316/01605-66

UFG-8288

4. After writing the letter, the Haitian visited Rolando Masferrer in New York, brought to him equipment worth $2,000, and told him to be patient, for the operation against Haiti would be accomplished.

5. On 6 May Antonio Rojas Masferrer received a long-distance telephone call from the Haitian, who was in Canada. According to Rojas, the Haitian had told him that when Duvalier goes to Argentina he will not return to Haiti.[3] Rojas added that the United States Government knows this; that some of the Ton Ton Macoutes (Duvalier's personal police) were already giving up their jobs and others had been killed in the streets. The United States Government therefore fears that the Communists may take over in Haiti.

~~6. [illegible] Rolando Masferrer was [illegible] about the~~

6. Rojas said that Rolando Masferrer was worried about the lapse of time in initiating the Haitian operation and feared that the plan might never materialize. However, Rojas felt that if the Haitian plan did not work out, the arms, which would have supplied about 150 men, could be used in attacks against Cuba.

against Cuba.

Field Comments:

1. Source gave the Haitian's name as Vicemart (sic). Henri Vixamar, who has been identified earlier as the Haitian in charge of the anti-Duvalier plan, is undoubtedly the person referred to. Vixamar left Kingston for Toronto by air on 12 April. For two related reports, see ~~UFG-8275~~ and ~~UFG-8281~~. CSDB-312/01431-66 CSDB-312/01440-66

2. The telephone directory for the Greater Miami area lists Central Truck Sales at this address.

3. Duvalier has announced that he will attend meeting of heads of State scheduled to be held in Buenos Aires in July.

STATE ✓ DIA ARMY NAVY AIR NSA OCR F

REPCINCLANT CINCSO # ~~USIA ( )~~ I&NS ( )# #O:S # Custom # UCC

WHC/FI	1	WHC/SI	1	WE/5/R	1
WHC/RR	1	WHC/WAVE	1	WE/MADR	1
WHC/2E	3	WHC/CA	1	[illegible] Haiti	2
WHC/CICS	1				
WHC/MO	1	WH/PACY	1	CI/OPS/WH	2

~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]

TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DC/H 1, Liaison
WHC 9 (1), WE 1 (1), WH (1)

(Plac sent [illegible]
[illegible] Total 826 [illegible]

UFG-8288
RP(RPT)

TDCSDB-312/01605-66

COORD. RELEASE.
FG [illegible]
[illegible]

14-00000

FBI doc
6 May '66 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

1 14 PM '66

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:
RID/AU

UFG-8281

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Copy detached

CP

CSDB-3-2/01440-66

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ES		12 May 66		
2. WH/C/RR/RE				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

ive was at

for an
315/00656-
ing. See

that he had
IDCDB-315/

izamar,
of the
on 12
telephon
er in Mi

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-4

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

NUMBER

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

FROM
JMWAVE

REPORTING OFFICER
Henry J. SLOMAN

REPORTS OFFICER
Eleanor D. PIMSLER

APPROVING OFFICER
Phillip G. ELMARD
Oliver K Paget for

REPORT NO.
UFG-8241

DATE OF REPORT
4 May 1966

PROJECT

SOURCE CRYPT
AMOT

COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED
OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY

CS DISSEMINATION

TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs	State
1 - DCS	FBI
2 - Port-au-Prince	I&NS
2 - Ottawa	Customs
2 - Kingston	Border Patrol
	USCG

To OUT Pouch

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

DYVOUR/JMPALM

SOURCE: AMOT Source Raul ARANGO de la Noval, in EE-5185, 27 April 1966. ARANGO got the information from Enrique MASFERRER Rojas on 26 April. Please substitute the dissemination number where UFG 8225 is cited in the field comments.

RID: No Index

Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

REPORTS
MAY X 4 1966

FORM 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-64

CS COPY

4 May 66
201-42669

(20)

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A Completely reliable. B Usually reliable. C Fairly reliable. D Not usually reliable. E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: Haiti/Cuba

SUBJECT: Further Activities of Rolando Masferrer Rojas

DOI : Late April 1966

PADA : United States, Miami (27 April 1966)

SOURCE : A member of a group of Cuban émigrés trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. According to Enrique Masferrer Rojas, his brother ~~[illegible]~~ Rolando Masferrer Rojas, former Cuban senator who has been planning action against President François Duvalier of Haiti, left Miami, Florida, for New York on 25 April 1966 to settle several matters pending there. He planned to return to Miami afterward to wait for the right time to invade Haiti.[1]

2. Enrique Masferrer stated that his brother had found somebody who had agreed to transport arms from the United States to a point where the invasion forces were to meet. ~~[illegible]~~ The acquisition of two aircraft to be used in the invasion effort is still pending. Previously, Rolando Masferrer had said that he would buy or lease them in Miami and then locate a place outside United States territory where they could ~~[illegible]~~ land and be loaded with bombs.[2]

3. According to Enrique Masferrer, the Haitian who was in Canada arranging various aspects of the operation, had traveled to the United States in the company of two former colonels of the Haitian Army who allegedly had the support of 80 to 90 Haitian émigrés.[3] The Haitian émigrés were to meet at ~~[illegible]~~ an appointed Site and be picked up by the [illegible] involved in the plan when the time to initiate the plan came about. The former Haitian ~~[illegible]~~ colonels have stated that if they succeed in establishing a beachhead in Haiti with the arms and men ~~[illegible]~~ who currently support them, Duvalier will leave the country within 24 hours.

4. Reportedly, Rolando Masferrer had asked representatives of the Institutos Armados de la Republica de Cuba (Armed Institutes of the Republic of Cuba) to contribute men to the operation. The representatives agreed to ~~[illegible]~~ discuss the matter.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible]-9781

5. Rolando Masferrer again mentioned that his ultimate objective was an attack on Cuba using Haiti # as his base.

[redacted]

Field Comments

1. Rolando Masferrer has been discussing plans for an invasion of Haiti for many months. TDCSDB-315/00658-66 reported the difficulties he was encountering. See, also, ~~UFG-8326~~. CS DB-312/01431-66.

2. Among earlier claims by Masferrer was one that he had already purchased the two aircraft. See TDCSDB-315/00289-66 and ~~UFG-8326~~. CS DB-312/01431-66.

3. The Haitian referred to is probably Henri Vixamar, described earlier as a former Haitian and an official of the Republic of Chad. Vixamar left Kingston for Toronto on 12 April by air. There was a previous report on a telephone conversation between Rolando Masferrer, then in Miami, and "the Haitian in Canada" regarding "Operation Haiti." ~~and UFG-8115.~~
Cf. CSDB-312/01431-66.

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1 Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 4 07 PM '23 2 Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN

FROM:

RID/ AN

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

copy attached

C 528 312/01431-66

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ES		10 May 66		
2. Cont/Trace				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-042669

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

29 April 1966

DOCUMENT NUMBER

UFG 08225

FORM 1-64 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

9966

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

FROM: JMWAVE

REPORTING OFFICER: Henry J. SLOMAN HO
gat

REPORTS OFFICER: John C. TARBELL/bcp

APPROVING OFFICER: Philip G. ELMARD

REPORT NO.: UFG-8225

DATE OF REPORT: 29 April 1966

PROJECT:

SOURCE CRYPT: AMOT

COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED
OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY

CS DISSEMINATION

TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs. 1 - DCS 2 - Ottawa 2 - Kingston 2 - Port au Prince	Miami reps of: State FBI I&NS Customs Border Patrol USCG

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

TYPIC

SOURCE: AMOT report EE-5149, 26 April 1966. Paras. 1 to 3: Raul ARANGO de la Noval, who received the information from Enrique Masferrer. Paras. 4 and 5: AMOT-237 from Basilio Jorge PANEQUE Mulet. Field Comment 2: KNGS-2523.

RID: No Index

REPORTS
MAY X 2 1966
10

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

HQS RI COPY

FORM 7-64 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CS COPY

201-42669
29 Apr 66

(20)

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A. Completely reliable B. Usually reliable C. Fairly reliable D. Not usually reliable E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources 2. Probably true 3. Possibly true 4. Doubtful 5. Probably false 6. Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	**Cuba/Haiti** /	REPORT NO	
SUBJECT	**Activities of Rolando Masferrer Rojas** 201-042667	DATE OF REPORT	**29 April 1966**
		NO. PAGES	**2**
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO	**Mid-April 1966**		
PLACE & DATE ACQ	**United States, Miami (26 April 1966)**		**UFG-8225**

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: **A member of a group of Cuban émigrés trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.**

1. **On 21 April 1966 Enrique Masferrer Rojas said that his brother, Rolando Masferrer Rojas, who was in Miami, had received a telephone call from Canada on an unspecified date from the person who was to be the President of Haiti in "Operation Haiti." The Haitian asked Rolando Masferrer to go to Canada ~~to hold discussions~~ discuss details. Rolando Masferrer replied that he was in a difficult position and could not leave the United States.** The Haitian then asked that Rolando Masferrer send an emissary whom he ~~trusts~~ trusted completely and who was knowledgeable of the ~~[illegible]~~ details necessary ~~to~~ accomplishing the mission in Haiti. An unidentified emissary left for Canada on 18 or 19 April. ~~the mission in Haiti. An unidentified emissary left for Canada on 18 or 19 April.~~

2. On 21 April Rolando Masferrer received a telephone call from his emissary in Canada ~~and the Haitian. Thxx~~ His representative ~~this~~ said that ~~thexHaitianxhasxx~~ he had received a check from the Haitian which was sufficient for their needs.

3. **Rolando Masferrer bought a boat on an unspecified date from the Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (JURE, Cuban Revolutionary Junta) for $25,000. The boat, which is in Miami, was then used as security for a loan of $5,000 which will be used to buy arms. According to Enrique Masferrer, everything that is needed has been obtained, and the operation will definitely be carried out.**

4. **Another Cuban émigré in Miami said that Rolando Masferrer has about 400 men and all of the equipment which is needed for a military operation.**

5. According to the émigre, Rolando Masferrer said ~~that he has the right to fight for his native country, and~~ that he has all the equipment that is needed, including two planes and several boats, to carry out his plans.[3] Rolando Masferrer added that he had been persecuted by authorities of the United States Government. He said that after Fidel Castro Ruz has been overthrown he, Masferrer, will leave for Cuba immediately, with or without permission from U. S. authorities. He plans to follow the example of Francisco Caamano Deno, who, with a small group, stood firm, and became a recognized power in the Dominican Republic.

Field Comments.

1. TDCSDB-315/00714-66 gives information on the Masferrer's plans to invade Haiti.

2. The Haitian may be Henri Vixamar, who has previously been reported to be involved in the plans to invade Haiti. He left Kingston, Jamaica, on 12 April for Toronto, Canada.

3. Source Comment. Masferrer's involvement in a plan to invade Haiti may be a subterfuge for obtaining a military force and equipment which will be prepared for action in the event an internal upheaval occurs in Cuba.

   Field Comment. Masferrer has a tendency to exaggerate, and he is disliked and distrusted by many Cuban émigrés. TDCSDB-315/00658-66 reported on the difficulties he was encountering in trying to complete his plan for an invasion of Haiti.

FBI doc
18 April 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
29 March 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. — 3. DATE
	4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM — 5. DATE OF INFO. — 6. EVALUATION
7. ANALYST — 8. DATE PROCESSED	9. DISSEMINATED IN — 10. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

11. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

12. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

13.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO ARCADIO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF ROLANDO ARCADIO
MASFERRER ROJAS

100-009-014
DBB -42981
28 MAR 66
FBI
P4

R 6604210444

FILE IN 201- 42669

14. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO ARCADIO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

201-350227
DBB-41616
10 MAR 66
FBI
P4

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
< USA
FMR CUBAN SEN WORKING CLOSELY NY W/DANIEL FIGNOLE, INTERIM PRES HAITI 57 REGARDING PLANS OVERTHROW HAITIAN PRES FRANCOIS DUVALIER. ADDITION OTHER ACT THERE WERE 80 MEN ON FARM MEX C OWNED BY SUBJ. FMR MBR CUBAN HOUSE REP. WAS IN MIAMI RECENTLY DISCUSSIN W/RODOLFO MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO'S BROTHER, WAS TRANSFERRING THESE MEN MEX TO HAITI. DOI 28 SEP 65.

R 6604220896

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

FBI doc
10 Mar 66 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

14-00000

(REVISED 4-65)

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-
X REF TO FILE NO
20/21

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ROUTING

1		5
2		6
3		7
4		8

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY (ADVANCE COPY TUBED CS/DO, TIME 2:50, BY D)

INFO: CS/DO,
VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW,
SOD 4, RI/AN, WH/C 8.
D/OCI 2.

S E C R E T 040012Z 4 MAR 02 02Z 66 IN 67457

HZP HTP
DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR PRIN SDOM SNDR MANA TEGU CITE WAVE 9450
HDC HDS NNM/NHT

5P

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. NO PROJECT. SOURCE UOAMBER-6. SUBSOURCES PARA 1 VERA, PARAS 2 AND 4 SANCHEZ, PARA 3 CONSTANZO. SEE ALSO AMEMB PRIN 421 (252215Z) RID INDEX MASFERRER, VIXAMAR, BELT, SANCHEZ.

FILED 040012Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

UFG 7990

HAITI/CUBA

SUBJ: FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN PLANS OF ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR, AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI

DOI: 20 FEBRUARY - 1 MARCH 1966

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (1-2 MARCH 1966)

RW COMMENT:

MICROFILMED
MAR 14 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS DB-315/00914-66

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING I WO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

D 200-9-38

4 MAR 66
201-42669

... USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (REVISED 4-65)

MFG. 1-65

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

IN 67457 PAGE 2

UFG-7990

REF: UFG-7969

SOURCE: FORMER LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WHO MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. SOURCE IS A TRAINED REPORTER AND HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST.

RW COMMENT:

TDCS

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

10-61 3001 CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MFG 11-63

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 67457

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. DURING THE WEEK OF 20 FEBRUARY 1966 IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, eit Cuban & USA FORMER CUBAN SENATOR WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN PLOTTING AGAINST PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER OF HAITI STATED THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT DUVALIER WOULD GIVE BASES IN HAITI TO CUBAN EMIGRES IN ORDER TO STOP THEIR PLOTTING AGAINST HIM.

2. ON 25 FEBRUARY EUSEBIO MUJAS BARNIOL, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES CUBANOS EN EL EXILIO (CTCE, CONFEDERATION OF CUBAN WORKERS IN EXILE) SAID THAT AROUND 20 FEBRUARY MASFERRER HAD MET WITH EUGENE L. MAXIMILIEN, HAITIAN CONCUL GENERAL IN MIAMI. MUJAL SAID THAT WHEN HE HAD QUESTIONED MASFERRER ABOUT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

THE MEETING THE LATTER HAD SAID THAT "OTHERS" HAD MET WITH MAXIMILIEN AND THAT ALTHOUGH HE (MASFERRER) HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT HE HAD DETAILS OF THE MEETING.

3. LATE IN FEBRUARY MASFERRER TOLD ATON CONSTANZO PALAU, CUBAN EMIGRE WHO HAS BEEN REPORTED AS WORKING WITH MASFERRER IN ANTI-DUVALIER PLANNING, THAT HE (MASFERRER) [illegible] HAD TO RETURN TO NEW YORK TO TRY TO GET
MASFERRER ATTEMPT TO GET MORE
IN TOUCH WITH HENRI F VIXAMAR TO GET MONEY TO CONTINUE THE OPERATION
FROM WHERE(?)
AGAINST HAITI. MASFERRER ADDED THAT VIXAMAR HAD LEFT NASSAU FOR NEW YORK. (FIELD COMMENT: SEE TDCSDB-315/00658-66, WHICH REPORTED MASFERRER'S STATEMENT THAT "THE HAITIAN" WHO WAS DIRECTING THE ANTI-DUVALIER ACTIVITY HAD GONE TO NASSAU. VIXAMAR HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED EARLIER AS A FORMER HAITIAN AND FUNCTIONARY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD.)

4. ON 1 MARCH GUILLERMO F BELT RAMIREZ, [illegible] PROMINENT CUBAN EMIGRE IN WASHINGTON AND A FORMER CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, TELEPHONED VIRGILIO SANCHEZ OCEJO IN MIAMI AND TOLD HIM TO GET OUT OF THE PLOT AGAINST HAITI AND TO TELL ALL HIS FRIENDS TO DO THE SAME. BELT ADDED THAT HE WAS GOING TO TELEPHONE OTHER CUBAN EMIGRES AND GIVE
VIRGILIO [illegible]
THEM SIMILAR ADVICE. (FIELD COMMENT: F SANCHEZ OCEJO IS PRESIDENT
CALLED BY GUILLERMO BELT RAMIREZ ADVISING THAT HE GET OUT OF PLOT AGAINST HAITI.
OF THE COMITE PRO-GOBIERNO DE CUBA EN EL EXILIO (CPGCE, COMMITTEE FOR CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE.) (SOURCE COMMENT: SANCHEZ OCEJO HAD ASKED BELT TO APPROACH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS AND INQUIRE REGARDING MASFERRER'S CLAIMS THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD APPROVED HIS PLOT TO INVADE HAITI.)

FORM 1-64 2003 Obsolete Previous Editions of Form 2004a CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

PLACE CONTRC ABOVE TOP BLACK LINE AND BELOW BC .OM BLACK LINE

MFG 6-68 (30)

IN

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, I&NS, AND USG (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE, SANTO DOMINGO, MANAGUA, TEGUCIGALPA.)

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

[illegible] ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-424
X-REF TO FILE NO 201-282033

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

53 SECRET

9

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JM WAVE

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG R. W. Tucker

ACTION WH 8 ☒ ~~RID COPY~~ (ADVANCE COPY TUBED TO CS/DO AT 2215 25 FEB 66 M)

INFO: CS/DO, [illegible] D 4, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA/O 4, CI/PS, FI/SPG, RI/AN, WH/C 8, IW
VR, FILE, [illegible] CA 2, CA PEG, CA PROP, CI/OPS, [illegible] FI/INT
D/[illegible] I 2, D/CNE INDEXED [illegible]

SECRET 252347Z FEB 26 0349Z 66 IN 53139 6P

DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR PRIN SDOM SNOR MANA TEGU CITE WAVE 9346
HTP NDC HDS HNM HHT

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM

UFG-7779

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. NO PROJECT. SOURCE PARA 3 UOAMBER-6 FROM MASFERRER WHO VISITED UOAMBER-6 AT LATTER'S HOME 22 FEB. SOURCE PARAS 5 AND 6 AMOT SOURCE ESIRE-1 WHO ATTENDED MEETING. SOURCE PARAS 7-9 AMOT SOURCE RAUL ARANGO DE LA NOVAL AND ESIRE-1, BOTH OF WHOM ATTENDED. SOURCES REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 UOAMBER-4, UOAMBER-6, AND AMOTS. RE PARA 5 B, SEE WAVE 8587. (IN 38361) INFORMATION FROM UOAMBER-6 AND AMOTS CONFIRMS SECEN NOT INVOLVED. RID INDEX VILABOA, VIXAMAR, ROJAS, SIERRA, HERNANDEZ, PENA, ARIAS, CONSTANZO, LEON. FILED 252347Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

IW COMMENT: NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

MICROFILMED
MAR 1 [illegible]
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TDCS DB-315/00658-66

ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY ☐
BASED ON:
LIAISON:

RELEASING IWO:
DATE DISTRIBUTED:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

8 201-282033

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-42669
26 Feb 66

14-00000

(REVISED 4-63)

DISSEM ☐ YES ☐ NO ____________

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ____________

X REF TO FILE NO ____________

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG ____________

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM:

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, [illegible] 2, FI, [illegible], [illegible]

PAGE TWO [illegible] 53139

HAITI/CUBA

SUBJ: DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR, IN COMPLETING PLANS FOR PROPOSED INVASION OF HAITI.

DOI: 16-23 FEBRUARY 1966

PADA: UNITED STATES, MAIMI (22-23 FEBRUARY 1966)

UFG 7979

SOURCE: (SEE PARAS. 2 AND 4, BELOW)

[illegible]

IW COMMENT:

[illegible]

TDCS

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

FORM 10-63 3001

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MFG. 12-64

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS.

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 63139

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: INFORMATION DATED 20-23 FEBRUARY 1966 FROM THREE SOURCES WHOSE REPORTING IN THE PAST HAS BEEN RELIABLE INDICATES THAT ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR WHO HAS BEEN REPORTED PLANNING AN INVASION OF HAITI IN FEBRUARY USING HAITIAN AND CUBAN EMIGRES, IS HAVING DIFFICULTY RECRUITING MEN TO PARTICIPATE. ACCORDING TO EARLIER INFORMATION, MASFERRER IS DISLIKED AND DISTRUSTED BY MANY CUBAN EMIGRES IN MIAMI.)

2. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW: FORMER LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WHO MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. SOURCE IS A TRAINED REPORTER AND HIS INFORMATION HAS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST.

3. ON 22 FEBRUARY IN MAIMI, FLORIDA, ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS SAID THAT HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY GETTING HAITIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN HIS PLOT TO INVADE HAITI. HE SAID THAT THE ONLY HAITIAN WORKING WITH HIM IS HENRI VIXAMAR. (FIELD COMMENT: VIXAMAR HAS BEEN DESCRIBED EARLIER AS A FORMER HAITIAN AND A FUNCTIONARY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD). MASFERRER ADDED THAT HE WAS STILL ATTEMPTING TO FIND HAITIAN EMIGRES WHO WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE PART.

Subject F cit Haiti & Florida, USA

4. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 5-9, BELOW: A MEMBER OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EMIGRES TRAINED IN THE TECHNIQUES OF INFORMATION COLLECTION. THE GROUP HAS PROVIDED USEFUL REPORTS SINCE 1961.

5. ON 16 FEBRUARY 1966 IN MIAMI MASFERRER MET WITH THE FOLLOWING "STAFF OFFICERS" OF THE PROPOSED Haitian INVASION EFFORT:

Mis-Sems iTP [illegible] in ¶3

cit Cuba?

Florida, USA

A. GENERAL STAFF: ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER, LUIS SIERRA LOPEZ, AND JUAN HERNANDEZ. HERNANDEZ, WHO RESIDES AT 569 SW TENTH STREET, APARTMENT B, MIAMI, HAS BEEN APPOINTED RECRUITMENT CHIEF.

B. CHIEF OF OPERATIONS: VLADIMIR SECEN, WHO WAS NOT PRESENT AT THE MEETING. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE REPORTED LATE THAT MASFERRER HAD APPOINTED VILABOA TO REPLACE SECEN AS CHIEF OF OPERATIONS. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER SOURCE WHO REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST, SECEN HAS TOLD FRIENDS AND CONTACTS IN THE HAITIAN AND CUBAN EMIGRE COMMUNITIES IN MIAMI THAT HE IS NOT INVOLVED IN MASFERRER'S PLOTTING AND THAT HE WILL NOT SUPPORT IT IN ANY WAY.)

Operations of pres? Bosch

CONFIDENTIAL F cit Cuba? - Florida USA

15.A BATTALION COMMANDER: NAPOLEON VILABOA LLERENA.

D. COMPANY COMMANDERS: O:ONIEL PENA ENTENZA, WHO RESIDES AT 1516 SW THIRD STREET, MIAMI; ERIC ARIAS ARIAS; AND ATON CONSTANZO PALAU.

cit Cuba - Florida USA

~~One~~ is a company commander in proposed Haitian Invasion Force.

6. AT THE MEETING ON 16 FEBRUARY ANTONIO ROJAS SAID THAT WEAPONS AS FOLLOWS HAD BEEN ACQUIRED FOR THE INVASION ATTEMPT AND THAT THEY WERE IN FIRST-CLASS CONDITION:

TWENTY OR MORE 30-CALIBER MACHINE GUNS
TEN 50-CALIBER MACHINE GUNS
FOUR 81-MM MORTARS
EIGHT 60-MM MORTARS
FIVE BAZOOKAS
AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF AR-15, M-1, AND M-14 RIFLES
ONE THOUSAND HAND GRANADES
HAND GUNS AND SUFFICIENT AMMUNITION

7. ON 21 FEBRUARY AT ANOTHER MEETING OF ESSENTIALLY THE SAME GROUP, MASFERRER TOLD THOSE PRESENT THAT HE WAS DISGUSTED SINCE HE HAD EXPECTED TO HAVE DEFINITE NEWS THAT DAY. INSTEAD, HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE HAITIAN WHO WAS DIRECTING THE AFFAIR ORDERING A CHANGE OF PLANS. MASFERRER SAID THAT THE HAITIAN (WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY) HAD (A) GONE TO NASSAU; (B) SAID THAT THE OPERATION COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH 125 MEN INSTEAD OF 300; AND (C) ORDERED ALL WEAPONS IN MIAMI AND NEW YORK TRANSFERRED TO THE BAHAMAS. (FIELD COMMENT: MASFERRER UNDOUBTEDLY WAS REFERRING TO

CONFIDENTIAL

HENRI VIXAMAR.)

Mar 7 10 22 AM '65 Mar 8 10 49 AM '65

8. MASFERRER SAID THAT HE HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE HAITIAN IN NASSAU CLARIFYING SOME MATTERS AND REMINDING HIM OF THEIR PREVIOUS AGREEMENT. IF BY 22 FEBRUARY MASFERRER HAD NOT RECEIVED AN ANSWER TO HIS LETTER HE WOULD SEND LUIS SIERRA LOPEZ TO NASSAU TO MEET WITH THE HAITIAN AND "LAY THE CARDS ON THE TABLE". MASFERRER ADDED THAT IN THE MEANTIME ATTEMPTS TO RECRUIT 300 TO 400 MEN MUST BE CONTINUED, AND IN CASE THE HAITIAN EFFORT FAILED THEN THESE MEN COULD BE USED "IN SOME OTHER WAY". MASFERRER SAID THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE DEFINITE NEWS TO ANNOUNCE AT ANOTHER MEETING TO BE HELD ON THE EVENING OF 23 FEBRUARY. (FIELD COMMENT: A CHECK WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES IN MIAMI ON 25 FEBRUARY FAILED TO SHOW ANY RECORD OF RECENT TRAVEL TO NASSAU BY SIERRA).

ci Cuba
a Florida
USA

9. AT THE MEETING ON 21 FEBRUARY MASFERRER ASKED HOMERO LEON FERNANDEZ WHETHER THE LATTER WAS READY TO FURNISH 100 MEN FOR THE INVASION OF HAITI, AS HE HAD PROMISED EARLIER. LEON ANSWERED THAT HE WAS. (FIELD COMMENT: LEON, A CUBAN EMIGRE, IS A LEADER OF THE FUERZAS ARMADAS CONSTITUCIONALES DE CUBA EN EL EXILIO (FACCE, CONSTITUTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF CUBA IN EXILE). FOR EARLIER INFORMATION ON HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH MASFERRER, SEE (CSDB-312/02276-65.)

10. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, I&NS, AND USCG (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE, SANTO DOMINGO, MANAGUA, TEGUCIGALPA).

END OF MESSAGE

FBI doc
19 Feb 66 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
15 Feb 66 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau # 2-154

FBI doc
9 Feb 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
31 Jan 66 (Wash.)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas Bureau #CA-21622

FBI doc
31 Jan 66 (NY)
Re - Haitian Revolutionary Activities

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ .LY ☐ C IAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Revolutionary Planning of Haitian/Cuban Emigre Group

FROM: Sally Jamison WH/7/Ht 3B2630	EXTENSION	NO. CSCI-316/00172-66 ✓ DATE 11 January 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/FI (3B4404)		12/1		
2. C/WH/7	2 JAN 1966			
3. ~~a/le/WH~~ CI/LIA (2C35)	14 JAN 1966		cb	
4.				
5. RID/AN			FN	
6. RID/MIS				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

17 JAN 1966

ABSTRACT X

201-042669

17 Jan 66

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

17 JAN 1966

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Revolutionary Planning of Haitian/Cuban Emigre Group

1. Reference is made to this Agency's dissemination TDCSDB-315/00071-66, dated 7 January 1966.

2. In addition to the information contained in the referenced report, we believe it will be of interest to your Bureau to note that Rolando MASFERRER Rojas said that he (Masferrer) is keeping in constant touch with an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in New York. As you know, Masferrer, a former Cuban senator, is a leader in a Haitian/Cuban emigre group that is plotting the overthrow of Haitian President Francois Duvalier.

CSCI-316/00172-66

DDP/WH/7/Ht/SJJamison:rae (11 January 1966)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI (~~200-9-38~~) 201-042669
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/RCA
2 - WH/7/Ht
1 - WH/FI

BASIC: WAVE-8281 (IN 28264)

PROJECT : NP

LIAISON : *

201-042669

CS COPY

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO 201-042669 ✓
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X REF TO FILE NO
22

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

3050 MFG 1-65

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY (COPY TUBED TO CS/DO AT 1720 BY P)

INFO: CS/DO,
VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW,
SOD 4, CA/O 4, CI, RI/AN, WH/C 8.
D/OCI 2, D/ONE.

S E C R E T 071833Z [illegible] 7 JAN 66 2136Z IN 29176

DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR PRIN CITE WAVE 8305 (INCHURST ACTING) 48
HZP HTP

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. NO PROJECT. UCAMBER-6 FROM ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER. LAST SENTENCE PARA ONE FROM UFG-7504, NOT DISSEMED. INDEX ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER, ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, RODOLFO MASFERRER ROJAS. FILED 071833Z

UFG-7854

13 JAN 66		
28		
ABSTRACT ✓		INDEX ✓

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

HAITI

SUBJ: 1. SHIPMENT FROM NEW YORK TO MIAMI OF ARMS FOR USE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI

2. ATTEMPT BY HAITIAN/CUBAN EMIGRE GROUP LEADER TO HAVE THE INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TO PORTIONS OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

MICROFILMED
JAN 27 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TDCS DB-315/00104-66

ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

7 JAN 66
201-042669

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

[illegible]
ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

IN 29175 PAGE 2

(MIRR) CARRY OUT SABOTAGE ACTIVITY AGAINST HAITI

DOI: 4 JANUARY 1966

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (6 JANUARY 1966)

UFG-7854

SOURCE: FORMER LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WHO MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. SOURCE IS A TESTED REPORTER AND HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST.

[illegible] COMMENT:

TDCS

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING 1 WO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DIST.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

29:76

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL

1. (FIELD COMMENT: THE ACTIVITIES OF ROLANDO MASFERRER
201-042669 cit Cuba r USA.
ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR, AS A LEADER OF A HAITIAN/CUBAN EMIGRE GROUP PLANNING ACTION AGAINST PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER OF HAITI HAVE BEEN REPORTED ON EARLIER. ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER,
cit: Cuba? r Miami, Florida, U.S.A.
HIS COUSIN, HAS BEEN REPORTED, BY THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION BELOW, TO BE THE COORDINATOR IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, FOR THE EMIGRE ACTION AGAINST HAITI.)

2. ON 4 JANUARY 1966, IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER SAID THAT ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS HAD RECENTLY SENT TO MIAMI FROM NEW YORK A NUMBER OF RIFLES, 30-CALIBER MACHINE GUNS,

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR CO

PLACE CONTROLS ABOVE TOP BLACK LINE AND BELOW BOTTOM BLACK LINE.

AND PISTOLS BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) IN NEW YORK WOULD FIND AND CONFISCATE THEM.

3. ANTONIO ROJAS ALSO SAID THAT ROLANDO MASFERRER HAD ORIGINALLLY PLANNED TO HAVE HIM (ANTONIO ROJAS) RECEIVE AND TAKE CARE OF THE WEAPONS IN MIAMI, BUT THAT SINCE MASFERRER NOW BELIEVES THE FBI IS WATCHING ROJAS HE HAS PUT RODOLFO MASFERRER ROJAS, HIS BROTHER, IN CHARGE OF THE WEAPONS. ROLANDO MASFERRER HAD CAUTIONED HIS BROTHER TO STAY AWAY FROM THE PLACES WHERE THE WEAPONS ARE HIDDEN.

cit: Cuba? A Miami Florida, U.S.A for the proposed Haitian invasion

4. ACCORDING TO ROJAS, ROLANDO MASFERRER IS IN TOUCH WITH THE MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR, INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY), A CUBAN EMIGRE GROUP LED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THE MIRR TO CARRY OUT SABOTAGE ACTIVITY AGAINST HAITI. MASFERRER HOPES THIS ACTIVITY WILL SPARK A REVOLUTION IN HAITI.

5. ANTONIO ROJAS SAID THAT ROLANDO MASFERRER HAD TOLD ALL THOSE CONCERNED WITH THE PLOT AGAINST DUVALIER TO PASS THE WORD, SO THAT IT WOULD REACH UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES, THAT NOTHING IS BEING DONE AGAINST DUVALIER AND THAT THE EXILES ARE DISCOURAGED. MASFERRER BELIEVES THIS WILL CAUSE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES TO RELAX THEIR SURVEILLANCE, PERMITTING THE EXILES TO MOVE MORE FREELY.

6. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, I&NS, AND USCG (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE).

END OF MESSAGE

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MASFERRER Y ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-42669
VOL. X

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 JAN 69 THRU APRIL 76

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4:00 4 AUG 78		PAT ORR	
5 AUG 1978		Pat ORR	
1130 7 AUG 1978		ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

MASFERRER Y ROJAS, R.

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO ROJAS	
201-0042669	200-011-009/43
SEX M	CONC-00066/77
	20 SEP 77
	P11

FORMER CUBAN SENATOR AND NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER
MAY 74 WAS ALLEGEDLY OPERATING TRAINING CAMP
IN FLORIDA EVERGLADES

DATE 10 FEB 78 09579153

201-42669

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

28

3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA C 1655

ACTION UNIT LA 7

INFO: RF FILE VR C/LAN, CI4, OPS/NAR2, C/OPS, CCS2, OGC2, DDA SECUR3, COMMO2, CWO2, DDO, SS4,

1	4
2	5
3	6

T c59445 EIA769 PAGE 01 IN 337535

TOR:221651Z APR 76 CARA 29641

SECRET 221614Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29641

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY (FOR LACSS), IMMEDIATE LA/MIAMI.

MHFALSH KMSTONE SGCHART MHABYSS

REF: DIRECTOR 614526

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201- 42669
DO NOT DESTROY

1. FYI, CARACAS DAILY NEWSPAPER ULTIMAS NOTICIAS, 22 APR 76 CARRIES PRENSA LATINA STORY DATELINED HABANA 21 APR TITLED: CIA ACCUSED OF MURDERING ANTI-CASTRO LEADERS. STORY CENTERS AROUND ALLEGED PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH MANUEL DE ARMAS, CLAIMING TO BE A FORMER CIA AGENT, "TELLS ALL" ABOUT "OPERATION ABDALA." DE ARMAS CLAIMS THAT WHILE STATIONED IN NEW YORK IN 1971 HE MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH TWO CIA OFFICIALS (FNU) BLACKENHOUSE WHO HAD RECRUITED HIM TWO YEARS PREVIOUSLY, AND RICHARD TOMLEY OF MCLEAN, VIRGINIA, WHO HAD TAINED HIM AND WHO EVALUATED HIS PERFORMANCE INITIALLY IN OPERATION ABDALA. DE ARMAS ALSO CLAIMS THAT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST VENEZUELAN TOURIST OFFICIALS IN PUERTO RICO WERE COORDINATED WITH THE CIA AND CARRIED OUT BY A PERSON NAMED JUAN DE DIOS IN REPRISAL FOR THE DETENTION OF ORLANDO BOSCH IN CARACAS. FURTHER, DE ARMAS CLAIMS TO HAVE HAD KNOWLEDGE

✓201-0941137

✓201-0[illegible]

B201-299292 B201-335909

SECRET

STAFF

RF FILE VR

T 859445 EIA769 PAGE 02 IN 897535

TOR:221551Z APR 76 CARA 29641

OF PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACKS AGAINST EXILES AND THAT THIS PLANNING WAS BEGUN THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF JOSE DE LA

✓201-335739

TORRIENTE. DE ARMAS SAYS BOB DYNES, A CIA OFFICER, PARTICIPATED IN ABDALA FOR THE SUPPLY OF EXPLOSIVES IN CIA MISSIONS RELATED TO CHILE. DE ARMAS SAID HE SERVED IN THE ABDALA OPERATION ALSO AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN ROBERT BUD MILES AND LAZARO ALVAREZ ✓ FOR THE DELIVERY OF 5 PACKS OF C-4 EXPLOSIVE WHICH WERE USED IN

✓201-43067

THE KILLING OF ROLANDO MASFERRER. DE ARMAS IDENTIFIES MILLS AS A LIAISON OFFICER BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE AND DEFENSE. DE ARMAS REFERRED TO ATTACKS AGAINST CUBAN FISHERMEN AND SAID ROBERTO TUR, ✓ A CIA INFORMANT LIVING ON 12TH AVENUE BETWEEN 4 AND 9 (SIC) IN SOUTHWEST MIAMI, HAS THE MISSION OF LOCATING THE BOATS.

2. DE ARMAS CLAIMS THE CIA IS ENGAGED IN A PLAN TO BRING ABOUT RUPTURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND CUBA, AND THAT FRED DUNCAN DOUGH PHILLIPS, UNDER DIPLOMATIC COVER, ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE PLAN. DUNCAN AND PHILLIPS ARE ALLEGED TO BE USING AN APARTMENT IN THE "MY FLOWER" BUILDING IN CARACAS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS PLAN.

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS CONFERENCE, DE ARMAS IS REPORTED

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO	RF FILE VR	1 4
		2 5
		3 6

T 859445 EI4769 PAGE 23 IN 897535

TOR:221651Z APR 76 CARA 29641

TO HAVE READ A LIST OF CIA OFFICERS WHICH INCLUDED JOHN VALDAVIAN, A CIA OPERATOR IN THE AREA OF LA FLURIDA (SECTION OF CARACAS OF STATE OF FLORIDA NOT CLEAR) AND RICHARD TOMELY, AN OPERATIONS OFFICER IN MCLEAN VIRGINIA SPECIALIZING IN CUBAN OPERATIONS. BOB DYNES IS IDENTIFIED AS BEING IN CHILE, FRED DUNCAN AS AN OPERATOR IN THE CARACAS STATION, DOUGH PHILLIPS AS A LIAISON OFFICER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A. NASS, AN OFFICER OF THE SANTO DOMINGO STATION, AND LUIS DESA SOTO, A CIA OPERATOR IN THE MIAMI AREA.

✓ 201-0877814

ANSELMO ALLIEGRO IS IDENTIFIED AS A CIA AGENT-INFORMANT IN MIAMI.

✓ [illegible]

JUSTO ALFONSO ALIAS EL GALLEGO, ANOTHER AGENT-INFORMANT IN MIAMI.

✓ 201-0355[illegible]

RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, A CIA OPERATOR IN CARACAS, ARMANDO RUIZ, AN AGENT IN CARACAS AND ANTONIO (DE) LEON, AN AGENT IN MEXICO.

4. AS HEADQUARTERS AWARE FRED DUNCAN AND LEE PHILLIPS ARE THE TWO CARACAS DEA DISTRICT OFFICERS. DEA USED SAFEHOUSE IN MAY FLOWER BUILDING TO MEET DE ARMAS. NESS IS (OR WAS) STATE SECURITY IN SANTO DOMINGO.

5. AMBASSADOR HAS DIRECTED NO COMMENT EMBASSY RESPONSE TO ANY INQUIRIES.

6. FILE: 202-120-150, E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1

SECRET

21-)

STAFF 092251Z DIRECTOR 779655

CONF: LA 7 INFO: FILE [illegible], CCS 2, [illegible], [illegible] 3, [illegible] 4-4, Lea 10, [illegible]

0
0
0 PER
0

TO: MIAMI INFO MEXICO CITY.

REAM

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 34771 (IN 763074*)

B. MEXICO CITY 34701 (IN 755634**)

1. SUGGEST HENRY S. PACHANKIS (MOC) DISCREETLY CHECK AMONG CUBAN COMMUNISZITY REGARDING POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP OF MASFERRER TO ALBERTO DEL RIO AGUILERA.

2. PRIORITY CHECK REQUESTED PARA 5 REF A HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO FBI.

3. FILE: 201-0905986; 201-42669. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: *NOTED POSSIBLE DISCREPANCIES IN STORY GIVEN BY CUBAN CHAUFFER, DEL RIO, CONCERNING BOMBING OF CUBAN AMBASSADOR'S AUTO. ALSO REQUESTED LNERGO INFO WHICH MIGHT INDICATE CHAUFFER RELATED TO ROLANDO MASFERRER, WHO WAS RECENTLY KILLED BY AN AUTO BOMB IN MIAMI.
**REPORTED BEBOMBING OF CUBAN AMBASSADOR'S AUTO AND POSSIBILITY HE RELATED TO ROLANDO MASFERRER.

COORD: C/LA/CAR ~~[illegible]~~
C/LA/COG

DATE: 9 DEC 75
ORIG: BILL WAGNER:LF
UNIT: LA/M
EXT: 9041

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-0042669
DO NOT DESTROY

RRConolly
for C/LA

SC/LA/M

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 038658

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

P-1

SECRET

STAFF 160031Z DIRECTOR 763035

CONF: LA5 INFO: FILE IP/AN

0 DISSEM BY: 15
0
0 PER S&P
0 # 111

TO: MEXICO CITY INFO LA/MIAMI.Y

KMSTONE Y

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 779655*

B. MEXICO CITY 34771 (IN 763074**) Y

1. RE REF B REQUEST, FBI TRACES NEGATIVE ON JUAN ALBERTO DEL RIO AGUILERA (201-0905986). LIKEWISE, MASFERRER FBI MIAMI FILE BEARS NO RECORD OF RELATIVES WITH PATRONYM OR MATRONYM DEL RIO.Y

2. FILE: 201-0905986, 201-0042669. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: * ASKS MIAMI HOC TO CHECK AMONG CUBAN COMMUNITY RE POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP OF ROLANDO A. MASFERRER Y ROJAS, CUBAN EXILE KILLED MIAMI, TO ALBERTO DEL RIO AGUILERA, CUBAN EMBASSY CHAUFFEUR.

**STATION REQUEST TO CHECK WITH FBI RE ABOVE INFO FROM TELTAP.

C/LA/COG

C/LA/CAP

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-42669
DO NOT DESTROY

DATE: 16 DECEMBER 1975
ORIG: PJ MCNAMARA/
UNIT: LA/SMS
EXT: 1973

C/LA

C/LA/M

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058658

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ TOTAL COPIES ___ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ___ BY ___ AT ___ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT LA-7

ACTION #

INFO: RF, FILE, VR

T 553815 EIA439 PAGE 01-01 IN 787435

TOR:272021Z JAN 76 LMIK 24149

S E C R E T 271952Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 24149

TO: DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY.

REAM

REF: DIRECTOR 779655

1. HENRY S. PACHANKIS (NOC) DISCREETLY CHECKED AMONG CUBAN COMMUNITY RE POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP OF MASFERRER TO ALBERTO D E L R I O AGUILERA WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. POUCHING CONTACT REPORT.

2. FILE: 201-0285986; 201-0042669. E2, IMPDET.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 42669
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

STAFF 061753Z DIRECTOR 765969

CONF: LA7 INFO: FILE P/AN, C14, CG2, SN/ID C/OPS

DISSEM BY: 22

RETURN TO PER

#

TO : LA/MIAMI. Y

REAM Y

REF: LA/MIAMI 23900 (IN 732419) Y

1. FBI HAS LIAISON REP ADVISED AGENCY OF MAYOR FERRE REQUEST SHORTLY AFTER RECEIPT OF REF. MATTER HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH APPROPRIATE AGENCY COMPONENTS AND DETERMINATION MADE THAT THE AGENCY IS PROHIBITED BY LAW FROM PROVIDING SUCH INFORMATION TO THE MAYOR. IN VIEW INFORMALITY OF REQUEST, THE FBI HAS REP HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO HAVE HIS MIAMI OFFICE GET WORD TO THE MAYOR THAT THE AGENCY IS PREVENTED BY LAW FROM COMPLYING WITH REQUEST. HOWEVER, THE AGENCY WILL BE GLAD TO RUN INDEPENDENT AGENCY NAME CHECK IF MAYOR PROVIDES NAME OF FIRM SUSPECT(S). THE MAYOR WILL BE TOLD TO USE THE FBI AS CHANNEL FOR PASSING SUCH NAME CHECK REQUEST TO THE AGENCY. Y

2. FILE: 201-42669; 19-2-18. E2 IMPDET.

LA/COG/COMMENT: ON 4 NOVEMBER 1975 MIAMI, FLORIDA MAYOR MAURICE FERRE ASKED MIAMI FBI FOR LIST OF ALL CUBANS TRAINED IN DEMOLITION BY CIA. REQUEST BELIEVED BE RESULT OF RECENT BOMBING DEATH OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER MASFERRER on 31 Oct 75.

DATE: 7 NOVEMBER 1975
ORIG: CHRIS HOPKINS/CR
UNIT: LA/COG/CIOS
EXT: 7206/1491

OGC - JOHN GREANEY (TELECOORD)

OPS/LIA - STEVE KUHN (TELECOORD)

8 Nov. 75

201-42669

R. S. Sargent C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/COG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. H. Riefe C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET D 19-2-18

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 025231

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY Q PER ______ TOTAL COPIES [illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA BY 06 AT 0110 Z

ACTION UNIT

LA-7

ACTION

INFO RF FILE VR [illegible] a-s [illegible] 2 [illegible] [illegible]

STAFF PRECEDENCE			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 435231 E1A274 PAGE 01-01 IN 732419

TOR:0421272 NOV 75 LMIM 23900

S E C R E T 242253Z NOV 75 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 23900

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

1. FBI/MIAMI NOTIFIED STATION ON 4 NOVEMBER THAT ON THAT DATE MIAMI MAYOR MAURICE FERRE HAD ASKED FOR LIST OF ALL CUBANS TRAINED IN DEMOLITION BY BKHERALD. REQUEST APPARENTLY RESULTED FROM RECENT BOMBING DEATH OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ROLANDO MASFERRER. MAYOR FERRE APPARENTLY BELIEVES LIST OF BKHERALD TRAINEES WILL HELP ASSIST APPREHENSION OF KILLERS OF MASFERRER AND PERPETRATORS OF OTHER RECENT BOMBINGS.

2. HQS WILL PRESUMABLY BE QUERIED SINCE ABOVE REQUEST WILL BE FORWARDED TO FBI HQS.

3. FILE DEFER. E2, IMPDET.

[illegible]		[illegible]	
	☒	[illegible]	
		[illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]	
		[illegible]	
		[illegible]	
		[illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]	

SECRET

RECORD COPY

4 Nov. 75

201-42669

FBI doc
9 May 75 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Masferrer Rojas
Bureau #100-344127

14-00000

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 007622

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

LA 12

ACTION #

INFO FILE, VR, DDO, PS/EG2, IP/AN, IW, CPS/INT 2, CI/OP 2, SS 4, OSG/IC.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 084321 EIA208 PAGE 01 IN 531141

TOR:241716Z MAR 75 PACY 31894

SECRET 241644Z MAR 75 INTEL

HZP-13,384

CITE PANAMA CITY 31894 (SANCHEZ ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL ZRWAHOO

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR HQS REVIEW. PLS REVIEW SOURCE COMMENT.
FLOYD H. MCNERTN2P (NOC) FROM SUBJECT OF 201-8927762.
INDEX: ORGALLEZ. NOT FOR PASSAGE TO LIAISON.
OD OBJECTIVE: C.1. FILE: 19-5-41. CL BY 235100.

FILED: 241644Z

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 24 MARCH 1975
IN 531141
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

The following Report, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Directorate of Operations before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

COUNTRY: PANAMA/CUBA

DOI : MID-MARCH 1975

SUBJECT: JOINT CUBAN-PANAMANIAN SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN EXILE VISITING PANAMA CITY

ACQ : PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (22 MARCH 1975)

FIELD NO. HAP-13,384

SOURCE : AN EMPLOYEE OF THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT WHO HAS CONTACTS IN THE PANAMANIAN SECURITY SERVICE. HE IS BELIEVED TO BE A RELIABLE REPORTER. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM AN EMPLOYEE OF A SECURITY SERVICE.

201-0819452

1. IN MID-MARCH 1975, LIEUTENANT COLONEL MANUEL NORIEGA, THE G-2 OF THE NATIONAL GUARD (GN), ASSIGNED LIEUTENANT CLETO ✓HERNANDEZ, A MEMBER OF THE G-2, TO WORK WITH MANUEL ✓ORGALLEZ FERRER, WHO IS LISTED AS THE CHAUFFEUR OF THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN PANAMA, TO CONDUCT A SURVEILLANCE OF ROLANDO ✓MASFERRER, A CUBAN EXILE

201-0772112
201-0921946
201-064117

SECRET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-042669
DO NOT DESTROY

14-00000

FORM 3007 USE PREVIOUS
4-73 EDITIONS

IN 531141

TDFIR

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

(classification) (dissem controls)

VISITING PANAMA CITY. MASFERRER IS A RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. IN PANAMA CITY HE STAYED IN ROOM 405 OF THE CONTINENTAL HOTEL. HERNANDEZ AND ORGALLEZ, WORKING AS A TEAM, LOCATED MASFERRER AT HIS HOTEL SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AND KEPT HIM UNDER CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE UNTIL HE DEPARTED PANAMA ON 21 MARCH. ACCORDING TO ORGALLEZ, MASFERRER WAS A WELL KNOWN CUBAN GUNMAN AND AN EXILE TROUBLE MAKER. (SOURCE COMMENT: ORGALLEZ' DESCRIPTION OF MASFERRER IS NOT TRUE. HE IS THE SON OF A PROMINENT MEMBER OF THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN MIAMI.) (FIELD COMMENT: HZP-13,367, TDFIRDB-315/01842-75, FROM THE SAME SOURCE, REPORTED THAT IN JANUARY 1975 THE GN G-2 DETAINED A CUBAN EXILE IN COOPERATION WITH THE CUBAN EMBASSY.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY (AMBASSADOR ONLY), CINCSO (GENERAL ROSSON ONLY) AT PANAMA CITY.

REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO	
201-C042669	201-0209258
SEX M	08D-81252
	25 SEP 74
	FBI
	P2

USA, FLA, MIAMI. MAX LESNICK /201-0209258/ CLAIMS SUBJ IS WAGING A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AGAINST HIM.

DATE 28 JAN 75 09234230

201-42669

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

[redacted]

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

94

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 162311Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 611615

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE RI/AN, OPS/NARZ, C/DIS

DISSEM BY: 45

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 FILE

DOC. MICRO. SER.
[illegible] 11 1974
MICROFILMED

2P

TO: ASUNCION INFO LA/MIAMI, CARACAS, PANAMA CITY.

REAM MHABYSS

REFS: A. ASUNCION 16391 (IN 384848)

B. LA/MIAMI 22536 (IN 386045)

1. SUBJ REFS POSSIBLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH ROLANDO ARCADIO MASFERRER Y ROJAS (201-0042661) CUBAN EXILE RESIDING 2000 W FLAGLER ST., MIAMI, FLA. MASFERRER, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR AND NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER, WAS INDICTED AND CONVICTED 28 FEB 1968 AFTER ABORTIVE ATTEMPTED INVASION HAITI 1967. SUBJECT UNSUCCESSFULLY APPEALED CASE FEDERAL COURT, AND BEGAN SERVING FOUR YEAR SENTENCE SEPT 1970. AS OF MAY 1974 HE ALLEGEDLY OPERATING TRAINING CAMP IN FLORIDA EVERGLADES WITH INTENT PBLANNING RAIDS AGAINST CUBAN SHIPPING AND POSSIBLY CUBAN MAINLAND.

2. HQS UNABLE VERIFY MASFERRER'S ASSOCIATION WITH RAINBOW SALES CORPORATION. FIRM ADDRESS, ACCORDING TO MIAMI PHONE LISTING: 2416 NW 72 AVE., MIAMI (592-5805).

3. ABOVE INFO MAY BE RELINQUISHED ORALLY TO DEA.

4. NO ADDITIONAL HQS TRACES ROLANDO MASFERRER.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

D-200-11-11/3

201-0042669

17 Oct 74

RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 51-1437

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2 2

SECRET

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

61615

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 FILES #

BETANCOURT.Y

5. FILE: 201-0042669; 200-11-11/3. E2 IMPDET.R

(Not a U.S. citizen)

LA/COMMENT - REF REQUESTED TRACES ROLANDO MASFERRER, PRES. RAINBOW SALES CORP., RECENTLY ARRIVED IN ASUNCION TO ESTABLISH CONTRABAND TRADE FROM PANAMA TO PARAGUAY.

LA/NARC - HOWARD ORR (DRAFT)

DDO/OPS/NAR J.J.Piper

SELA/COG - TOM CLINES (DRAFT)

DATE: 17 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG: KAREN JONES/SEL
UNIT: LA/SB/UP/IA
EXT: 1839

C/LA/NW J Kennedy

C/LAD

RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/CAM Paul A. [illegible]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

K. Lasu C/LA/SB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 51-1437

Coast Guard cables –
① 1 July 74
② 5 July 74
③ 23 May 74
④ 21 May 74
⑤ 20 May 74

State Dept Cable
16 May 74 (# 102137)

Coast Guard cables –
① 10 May 74

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO	
201-0042669	100-009-014
SEX M	CBD-78295
	31 JUL 74
	FBI

FORMER CUBAN SENATOR HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN NUMEROUS ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN PAST INCL INVASION ATTEMPTS

DATE 20 AUG 74 09158053

201-042669

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-~~062669~~ 42-669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
< USA, FLORIDA
COOPERATING WITH TORRIENTE PRIOR TO SEP 70
TO OVERTHROW CURRENT CUBAN GOV PRESENTLY IN
FEDERAL PENITENTIARY IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA

201-335909
DBC -98648
09 NOV 70
FBI

R 7012090138

FILE IN 201-~~062669~~ 042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

PRIORITY

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-0042669
SEX M

019-012-200
DBD-74101
14 MAY 74
FBI

REPORTEDLY TRAINING PERSONNEL WHO PLANNING
ATTACK AGAINST CUBANS TRAINING IN FLA EVERGLADE
ATTACK PLANNED TO OCCUR IN JUN 74

DATE 24 MAY 74 09114145

201-042669

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

PRIORITY

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-0042669
SEX M

201-0299292
DBD-67951
16 JAN 74
FBI
P4

WARNED BY ORLANDO BOSCH /201-0299292/ TO STOP RADIO EDITORIALS AGAINST HUBERT MATOS. SUBJ NOT INTIMIDATED.

DATE 31 JAN 74   09059788

201 042669

SECRET   E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (*Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable*)

MASFERRER-ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?
CIT ?
OCC ?

100-009-016
DBD -53739
02 APR 73
FBI

FIRST MET AND DISCUSSED POLITICAL SITUATION IN HAITI WITH JACK SIMMONS HORGER BEFORE 67

R 7304280885

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 042669

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-60)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

201-292423
DBD -52594
16 MAR 73
FBI
P4

R 7304100736

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 42669

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MASFERRER, ROLANDO /CR/
201-042669 100-009-016
SEX M DOB ? DBD -49749
24 JAN 73
CIT ? FBI
UCC ? P2
ACTIVE AS AN HAITIEN EXILE ASSOCIATED WITH
JACK S. HORGER. AN EXILED CUBAN

R 7302201152

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 42669			

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(7-60)

SS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

[illegible]	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO ARCADIO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
ASSOCIATE OF FATHER JEAN BAPTISTE GEORGES
/201-270455/.

100-009-C16
DBD -47229
08 DEC 72
FBI

R 7212250360

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 042669			

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution. Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO ARCADIO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN INVASION PLANS RE HAITI.

201-270455
DBD -39687
10 JUL 72
FBI

R 7207260332

Indicate The Subject, Project Or
201 File No. In Which This
Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 042669 1

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

12-665

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MASFERREP RCJAS, RCLANCC
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
< USA, ILL., MARICA

1CC-CC9-016
CEC -38589
02 JUN 72
FBI

R 72C71CC264

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 042669

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(7-46)

MASFERRER, ROLANDO

CUBA

BP

SD. Sunday Advocate News, Bridgetown, Barbados, W.I
27 SEP 1970 3

Ex-Senator Is off to Jail

● MIAMI, Florida: FBI agents lead handcuffed Rolando Masferrer from the FBI building recently. Masferrer, former Cuban senator and newspaper publisher, was arrested for his part in an abortive attempt to invade Haiti in 1966 and will begin serving a three-year sentence. Masferrer was arrested on the basis of a bench warrant issued in June for failure to surrender to the United States marshal to begin serving his sentence after an appeal was denied.

En manos del FBI

EX SENADOR y ex editor de periódicos en Cuba, Rolando Masferrer está ahora en serias dificultades con el FBI en USA. En 1966 se puso a la cabeza de un intento de invasión de Haití. Sorprendido por las autoridades, fue sometido a juicio y condenado a tres años de prisión. Al fracasar sus apelaciones mientras estaba en libertad condicional, trató de rehuir la acción policial y finalmente fue derrocado por las fuerzas del FBI. A mediados de septiembre, Masferrer fue arrestado en Miami, Florida.

APRESADO MASFERRER
Pudo más el FBI

Presidente con mellizo

SOLO una persona se opuso abiertamente a su nombramiento. Cuando Edward Hambro, de Noruega, fue propuesto como Presidente de la Asamblea General de la NU, que se celebrará en octubre, su señora comentó:

—¿Y por qué quieres ser Presidente? Es muy aburrido oír tantos discursos. Sólo puedes tener una razón: vanidad.

Sin embargo, no hubo dudas para la elección. Era el turno de Europa para la presidencia, y —dentro del continente— los delegados se inclinaron por este noruego de 59 años, cuatro hijos, jefe de la delegación de su país desde 1966.

Para salvarse de las sesiones especialmente aburridas puede echar mano de un recurso arriesgado pero eficaz: usar como sustituto a su hermano mellizo Cato, tan idéntico a él mismo que para la misma familia resulta difícil decir quién es quién.

Precauciones de alto vuelo

AVENTURARSE en la Amazonía brasileña es un riesgo para cualquier viajero: las comunicaciones son erráticas, no hay seguridad para las combinaciones aéreas —en viejos aviones de bélico— y por tierra el viaje es todavía un sueño. Un Presidente de la república, naturalmente, no tiene estos problemas. Pero tiene otros. El general Emilio Garrastazú Médici —que el 11 de octubre irá a la fiesta del Círio de Nazaret, en Belem, aprovechando la oportunidad para recorrer varias localidades del interior del Brasil durante cuatro días— ha provocado un despliegue logístico de la Casa Militar y del Grupo de Transportes Especiales de la FAB. Según cuenta la revista *Veja*, se empezó por estudiar cuidadosamente los mapas de la poco explorada zona. Luego el avión presidencial (un *One eleven* británico), más una flota de *Avros* para la comitiva, fueron enviados a hacer previamente el itinerario exacto del viaje.

Debido a que los pequeños aeropuertos locales no cuentan con medidas de seguridad, antes de la llegada de la nave-presidencial se enviará un Hércules C-130 con un carro-bombas con dotación completa y un equipo de expertos en rescate aéreo, con su propio helicóptero.

El 14, el *One eleven* debe regresar a su base en Brasilia. Dos semanas después debe decolar nuevamente. Esta vez, su itinerario será menos riesgoso: el Presidente Garrastazú quiere animar con su presencia el partido de fútbol entre las Selecciones de Brasil y México, en Maracaná.

Cincuenta hombres

¿CUANTAS legiones tiene el Papa?, preguntó una vez José Stalin. Hoy podrían contestarle: exactamente cincuenta hombres: los guardias suizos. Con una sorpresiva decisión Paulo VI abolió todos sus cuerpos armados y conservó sólo a los pintorescos guardias de colorido uniforme. (Según la leyenda inconfirmada, el diseño corresponde al propio Miguel Angel.)

"Todo lo que rodee al sucesor de Pedro —explicó el Papa— debe manifestar claramente la naturaleza religiosa de su misión."

La medida afectó a 700 hombres. Algunos, como los miembros de la gendarmería pontifical, trabajaban jornada completa para el Vaticano y probablemente podrán pasar a otras dependencias. Otros prestaban servicios meramente honoríficos, como la guardia palatina y la guardia de honor de Su Santidad.

Un vocero del Vaticano explicó que la disolución de las fuerzas armadas fue decidida antes de la protesta vaticana por mejores sueldos. Simbólicamente su anuncio coincidió con el 20 de septiembre de 1970, cuando se conmemoró un siglo del término del poder temporal del papado. ■

PAULO VI CON LOS GUARDIAS SUIZOS
Unicos sobrevivientes

Ercilla, Santiago, Chile 6 Oct 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Biographic Information Division

MASFERRER y Rojas, Rolando **CUBA**

Former Cuban Senator Rolando Masferrer is now living in exile in Miami, Florida, where he is a leader in counter-revolutionary activities against the Castro government. Masferrer typifies the worst elements in the former regime of Fulgencio Batista. In Cuba, his name connotes ruthlessness, assassination, torture and extortion. Allegedly a member of the Communist Party from 1933 to 1945, Masferrer later became a staunch anti-Communist and organized the so-called Revolutionary Socialist Movement (MSR), which was noted principally for its terrorist acts and gangsterism. Despite his violent nature, he has been described as cultured, intelligent and very able. Masferrer, who still considers himself to be a Marxian Socialist, has been a virulent critic of the U. S. in the past.

Born in Holguín in the Province of Oriente, Cuba on January 12, 1918, Masferrer obtained a law degree from the University of Havana and later taught school, practiced law and worked as a newspaperman. He joined the Cuban Communist Party (PSP) in 1933, worked for the Party newspaper Hoy and fought with the International Brigade in Spain between 1937 and 1939. Masferrer was assistant editor of Hoy from 1939 to 1945, when he was expelled from the PSP. At that time, he founded a weekly news magazine Tiempo en Cuba (Time in Cuba) with a pro-Batista, anti-Communist and anti-U. S. orientation. Tiempo, which later became a daily newspaper, was described as the worst newspaper in Cuba, with a reputation for yellow journalism, complete irresponsibility and corruption.

After leaving the Communist Party, Masferrer furthered his own ends by organizing the MSR, which was active in the abortive invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1947. Within this organization, he organized a group of personal bodyguards known as the "Tigers" which constituted the nucleus of his own private army. Masferrer was elected to congress during the presidential campaign of Carlos Prío Socarrás in 1948, but when Prío was ousted, he turned up at Batista's side. He was elected to the Senate in 1954 and, in September 1955, formed the Movimiento Sindicalista Radical, a labor movement designed to extend his influence over Cuban workers. Masferrer remained in Cuba until the end of the Batista regime, although Batista allegedly accepted his support principally because he feared the opposition of Masferrer and his "hoodlums."

Masferrer is married and has a son and a daughter. He speaks English fluently.

CONFIDENTIAL

372/21 February 1960

MAS FERRER, Rolando

GUYANA GRAPHIC
19 SEPT 70

F B I arrest Masforrier

3F

MIAMI: Rolando Masferrer 52-year old one-time feared "tiger" of pre-Castro Cuba, was arrested by FBI agents here Thursday night in his home in the little Havana section.

Masferrier disappeared three months ago when he lost an appeal against a four-year jail sentence for attempting to lead an invasion against President Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier's Haiti in 1967.

The move was foiled when Masferrier and a group of Cuban and Haitian exiles were raided by police at a house in the Florida keys.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MASFERRER, ROLANDO /DR/
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
LDR OF UNE NOUVELLE VIE

100-009-016
DBF -38837
22 JUN 72
FBI
P6

R 7207100004

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 042669

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(7-46)

State Dept. name trace
6 Oct '72
Subject: Marquez, Alcides

DISPATCH

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Tegucigalpa

INFO Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT Political/General - Rolando MASFERRER

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HHTA-6426, 30 August 1972

1. Headquarters has an extensive file on Rolando MASFERRER Rojas (201-042669). There is no indication that Headquarters has been in touch with Subject at anytime; however, Subject's son has been a source of information to WODISH on several occasions.

2. Subject's 201 indicates that he was imprisoned in 1970 for his part in an abortive attempt to invade Haiti in 1966. There is no indication in the file when Subject was released from prison. Subject's contacts are within the Cuban exile community and elsewhere in Latin America along with his own private holdings whereby he would not have needed assistance in resettling in Honduras.

3. To assist Station in any inquiries they may receive on Subject, the following is a background sketch:

> Subject is a former Cuban Senator who was living in exile in Miami, where he was a leader of the counter-revolutionary activities against the Castro government. Subject allegedly typifies the worst elements in the former regime of Fulgencia Batista. In Cuba, his name connotes ruthlessness, assassination, torture and extortion. Allegedly a member of the Communist Party from 1933 to 1945, Subject later became a staunch anti-Communist and organized the so-called Revolutionary Socialist Movement (MSR), which was noted principally

(continued)

Distribution:
2 - COS, Tegucigalpa
1 - COS, WH/Miami

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HHTW-3074

DATE: 4 OCT 1972

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-042669

Distribution:

1 - WH/2/H
1 - WH/COG/CHRONO
1 - WH/COG/OS
1 - Originator

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/COG/OS
OFFICER: Vivian Bartyiak
TYPIST: 9/29/72
EXT.: 4163

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG	[illegible]	Lawrence Sternfield
WH/2/H	2 Oct	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: AC/WH/2
DATE: 10/3
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: William J. Murray, Jr.

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

for its terrorist acts and gangsterism. Despite his violent nature, he has been described as cultured, intelligent and very able. Subject, who still considers himself to be a Marxian Socialist, has been a virulent critic of the U.S. in the past.

Subject was born in Holguin in the Province of Oriente, Cuba, on January 12, 1918, obtained a law degree from the University of Havana and later taught school, practiced law and worked as a newspaperman. He joined the Cuban Communist Party (PSP) in 1933, worked for the Party newspaper Hoy and fought with the International Brigade in Spain between 1937 and 1939. Subject was assistant editor of Hoy from 1939 to 1945, when he was expelled from the PSP. At that time, he founded a weekly news magazine Tiempo en Cuba (Time in Cuba) with a pro-Batista, anti-Communist and anti-U.S. orientation. Tiempo, which later became a daily newspaper, was described as the worst newspaper in Cuba, with a reputation for yellow journalism, complete irresponsibility and corruption.

After leaving the Communist Party, Subject furthered his own ends by organizing the MSR, which was active in the abortive invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1947. Within his organization, he organized a group of personal bodyguards known as the "Tigers" which constituted the nucleus of his own private Army. Subject was elected to congress during the presidential campaign of Carlos Prio Socarras in 1948, but when Prio was ousted, he turned up at Batista's side. He was elected to the Senate in 1954 and, in September 1955, formed the Movimiento Sindicalista Radical, a labor movement designed to extend his influence over Cuban workers. Subject remained in Cuba until the end of the Batista regime, although Batista allegedly accepted his support principally because he feared the opposition of Subject and his "hoodlums".

Subject is married and has a son and daughter. He speaks English fluently.

Wanda F. BREMSON

201-42669

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP/ADB.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

FROM:

IP/

McCARTHY ROB
IP/AN
EXT. 4239

GU-333
GA-50
TUBE GTZ

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. ~~C/WH/2~~				
2.				
3.				
4. WH/2/HS				
5. J/				
6. AC/WH/COG		11 SEP 1972		JS
7. C/COG/TRR				
8. COG/OS		20 Sep	20 Sept	
9. Vivian				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. IP/FI				

COMMENTS

Son: Rolando Armas - Guat. U.S. Cit.

Pres. father: Leonel Armas sentenced in 1970 in 3 yrs. in U.S. in exile violating Haiti arms. fugitive then caught.

COPY DETACHED - WH/COG

~~Action~~ JS

7-8 Question is whether we had anything to do with mysterious "resettlement." We have no info on it.

8-9 P/S. Check out Traced

201 called for answered. VAL

DCS - no involvement in resettling father. Costa Rica

Jerry Miller 2265 P/S is a source of DCS [illegible]

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-042669

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 30 Aug 72

DOCUMENT NUMBER HHTA 06426

FORM 6-71 610a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Tegucigalpa

SUBJECT
POLITICAL/GENERAL - Rolando MASFERRER Reportedly to Arrive in Honduras

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Enclosed is an unsourced newspaper article from "El Cronista" announcing the expected arrival in Honduras of Rolando MASFERRER. It is said that he's coming to stay indefinitely. Further, the article asks mysteriously what powerful forces have brought about this resettlement. Any information Headquarters can offer on this matter would be appreciated since the Station no doubt will be asked about him.

Joseph E. Ragalie
Joseph E. RAGALIE

Attachment:
Newspaper article H/W

Distribution:
3 - C, WHD

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)] (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Imp Det
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HHTA-6426

DATE
30 August 1972

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
~~37-500~~ 201-042669

Se Espera Llegada a Honduras del TIGRE MASFERRER

ROLANDO MASFERRER, que se dice arribará próximamente a vivir en nuestro país.

● **Un delincuente público llamado Rolando Masferrer, de nacionalidad cubana y que se hizo tristemente célebre en la Perla Antillana, está por llegar a Honduras con el fin de quedarse a vivir por tiempo indefinido.**

● Masferrer, quien después de cumplir una condena en los Estados Unidos de América pretende venir a radicarse en Honduras, es una de las más odiadas figuras que durante mucho tiempo trabajó con el ex Presidente de Cuba

—SIGUE EN LA PAGINA 11)

SE ESPERA.................

Fulgencio Batista. Durante esa época organizó y dirigió un "ejército particular" integrado por pandilleros, quienes alternaban el crimen político con el delito común.

● **Ese grupo de malhechores públicos se hacían llamar "LOS TIGRES DE MASFERRER", quienes fueron desintegrados cuando cayó el gobierno de Batista derrocado por el Doctor Fidel Castro Ruz. Masferrer logró huir hacia los Estados Unidos de América, mientras que la mayor parte de sus "TIGRES" cayeron en poder de la Revolución Cubana que los juzgó, sentenció y fusiló públicamente en los famosos paredones, por los innumerables crímenes que habían cometido contra el pueblo.**

● Desde aquella fecha a esta parte, el cubano ha permanecido la mayor parte de su exilio en las cárceles norteamericanas. Su última condena le fue aplicada por comandar una frustrada invasión contra Haití. En esa ocasión se le sentenció a seis años de cárcel pero se le conmutó la pena a cuatro años bajo la condición de abandonar el territorio de Estados Unidos de América.

● **Ahora que este malhechor ha sido puesto en libertad, tenemos informes que piensa radicarse en Honduras quién sabe con qué propósitos nefastos, y actualmente hace todos los trámites necesarios para lograr dicho objetivo.**

● Conociendo la secuela de delitos cometidos durante toda su vida por este sujeto, sumamente intrigados nos preguntamos: ¿Qué intereses poderosos se están moviendo para que Masferrer radique en Honduras y qué personas están detrás de todo ésto que bien podría ser una nueva conspiración internacional encabezada por quien una vez dirigió una banda de criminales llamados "LOS TIGRES DE MASFERRER".

● **Desde este momento formulamos un llamado de alerta al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores para que no se deje sorprender por las argucias practicadas por este individuo.**

● **Asimismo, informamos que en los archivos de EL CRONISTA existe un amplio y bien documentado historial sobre Rolando Masferrer, que si consideramos necesario, le daremos a conocer con todos sus detalles.**

"El Cronista"
26 August 1972

H/W Att #1 to HHTA-06426

CS COPY

201-042669

(LS)

ORIG: LEE SIDAS
UNIT: WH/2/G
EXT: 1946
DATE: 29 FEBRUARY 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16-32

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 41 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 5 INFO: FILE VR, C/I/OPAN, C/CI, C/

DOC MICRO SER.
MAR 22 1972
MICROFILMED

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

3P

SECRET

30FEB72 13 29z

CITE DIRECTOR 237901

TO GUATEMALA CITY INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR-235174 *

1. CARLOS MONTIEL OF REF PROBABLY IDEN WITH ONE CARLOS FEDERICO MONTIEL REINERS (201-763777), BORN 8 NOV 39, SANTIAGO DE CUBA. SUBJECT RECRUITED BY BKTRUST IN MIAMI NOV. 1965 AS PM INFILTREE AND TERMINATED AMICABLY 31 MAY 69 IN CARACAS, BUT NOT RECOMMENDED FOR REUSE. LAST INDICATION OF BKTRUST CONTACT IS 12 NOV 69 AT WHICH TIME HE ADVISED HE WORKING FOR CROWN INTERNATIONAL EXPORT AND IMPORT COMPANY OF MIAMI TRAVELLING AS A COMPANY REP THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. THERE IS NO INDICATION IN HIS FILE OF HIS PRESENT WHEREABOUTS.

2. FOLLOWING ARE HQS TRACES ON ALSELMO ALLIEGRO JR. WHO IS PROBABLY IDEN WITH ANSELMO LEON ALLIEGRO, SON OF FORMER CUBAN SENATOR UNDER BATISTA, DR. ANSELMO ALLIEGRO MILA (201-274030):

29 FEB 1972
201-842669

A. LNERGO DOCUMENT 28050, 29 OCT 65, REPORTED AN INTERVIEW WITH THE SECURITY OFFICER AT SHORTER COLLEGE, ROME, GEORGIA, WHO

B201-763666

CS COPY

CONTINUED .....

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

B201-274030

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 237901

TO

PAGE 2

ADVISED AS FOLLOWS: ANSELMO LEON ALLIEGRO ATTENDED THAT COLLEGE DURING WINTER AND SPRING SEMESTER 1965. COLLEGE APPLICATION INDICATED DPOB, 11 APR 45, HAVANA. SECURITY OFFICER ADVISED THAT SUBJECT LET IT BE KNOWN TO HIM AND MANY STUDENTS THAT HE HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN TEACHING COUNTER ESPIONAGE IN THE DOM REP PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION IN THAT COUNTRY AND THAT HE WAS PAID BY LNLUTE. WHEN THE REVOLUTION BEGAN HE REPORTED THAT HE LEFT THE DOM REP AND RETURNED TO THE U.S. WHERE HE WAS STILL EMPLOYED BY LNLUTE AT $300 PER MONTH. BEFORE LEAVING SHORTER COLLEGE HE INDICATED HE PLANNED GO NEW YORK, THEN MIAMI, THEN RETURN TO THE "ISLANDS" (PRESUMABLY DOM REP OR CUBA), TO RESUME ESPIONAGE OR COUNTER ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES. SUBJECT CARRIED A 357 MAGNUM REVOLVER AND CAMERA WITH HIM ON MOST OCCASIONS.

B. ANSELMITO ALLIEGRO, SON OF ANSELMO ALLIEGRO, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR WHO IS DECEASED, WAS INVOLVED IN PLANS FOR ACTION AGAINST HAITI. HE WAS TO COVER ANY COSTS WHICH EXCEEDED THE FUNDS PROVIDED BY FATHER JEAN BAPTISTE GEORGES, PROMINENT HAITIAN EMIGRE.

CONTINUED .....

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY________PER________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

~~SECRET~~

CITE DIRECTOR 237901

TO

PAGE 3

ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR UNDER BATISTA, WAS THE HEAD OF THE GROUP WHICH PLANNED TO INVADE HAITI. (UFG-8589, 12 OCT 66)

3. NO HQS TRACES ON ROLANDO MASFERRER JR., ALTHOUGH IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT HE IS THE SON OF ROLANDO ARCADIO MASFERRER ROJAS (201-042669), WHO INVOLVED IN ANTI-CASTRO MOVEMENTS.

4. FILE: 201-042669; 201-763666; 201-274030.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *ADVISED THAT TRACES WOULD BE PROVIDED ON CARLOS MONTIEL, ANSELMO ALLIEGRO JR., AND ROLANDO MASFERRER JR., OSTENSIBLY INVOLVED IN ARMAMENT SALES TO GUATEMALA.

A C/WH/COG Rod Marshall for

JAMES E. FLANNERY
AC/WHD

FRANCIS C. MACDONALD
AC/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution. Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

```
MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO ARCACIO
201-042669                              201-270455
SEX M DOB ?                             DBD -35104
                                        18 APR 72
CIT ?                                   FBI
OCC ?                                   P25
ACTIVE IN HAITIAN AFFAIRS

                                  R 7205041236
```

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 042669			

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-66)

State Dept doc
19 Jan 72
Re-Cuban Exiles Request Permission
to Demonstrate Guns in Guatemala

14-00000

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR C/IP/AN, C/FI 2, C/CI, C/CA 3, C/SOD 3 ODP, ADDP, CS/DO

ACTION NO 835

S E C R E T 022007Z MAR 72 CITE WH/MIAMI 13975

2 Mar 72 IN 551128

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 237406

B. WH/MIAMI 13919 (IN 545838)

C. GUATEMALA CITY 13675 (IN 542763)

1. LNERGO/MIAMI FORWARDED REPORT TO ITS HQS 29 FEB RE REF MATTERS. SUBJECT OF REPORT IS "CARLOS FEDERICO MONTIER REIMERS, INTERNAL SECURITY - GUATEMALA," FILE NO. 105-22456. ASSUME REPORT WILL BE PASSED LNGOLD. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION MIAMI TO STATION AND LNYAPA/MIAMI ONLY.

2. REPORT REPEATS MUCH OF BACKGROUND INFO IN REF C AND NOTES THAT ROLANDO MASFERRER K AND ANSELMO ALLIEGRO, WHO REPRESENT PARABELLUM CORPORATION IN MIAMI, RECENTLY OFFERED TO DEMONSTRATE FIREARMS TO REPS OF GUATEMALAN GOVT. DEMONSTRATION AUTHORIZED BY GUAT GOVT AND PLANNED FOR LATE FEBRUARY 1972. AUTHORIZATION RESULTED FROM DEMONSTRATION GIVEN GUAT GOVT REPS IN MIAMI IN LATE 1971 BY MASFERRER AND ALLIEGRO. LATTER DEMONSTRATION RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE PRESS COVERAGE IN SPANISH NEWSPAPERS MIAMI AREA. LNERGO SOURCE ASSUMES

CHRONO

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #____

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 13975 SECRET

CARLOS MONTIEL LEARNED OF AVAILABILITY OF ARMS FROM PARABELLUM THROUGH SUCH PRESS COVERAGE. MONTIEL BELIEVED TO HAVE GIVEN OLIVERIO CASTANEDA PAIZ INFO RE WEAPONS AVAILABLE AND CASTANEDA MADE TRIP TO MIAMI TO SEE THEM. ON RETURN TO GUATEMALA SMALL GROUP OF CONGRESSMEN, OF WHICH HE MEMBER, FORMULATED THE LEGISLATIVE DECREE AUTHORIZING GUAT CONGRESSMEN TO IMPORT WEAPONS FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION. THIS DECREE NOT ACCEPTED OR REGISTERED WITH ENTIRE CONGRESS AND THUS NOT BINDING DECREE.

3. LNERGO SOURCE (PROBABLY LNYAPA) SAID SEVERAL GUAT CONGRESSMEN CMAE TO MIAMI APPROXIMATELY TWO OR THREE WEEKS AGO AND ORDERED SEVERAL FIREARMS FROM PARABELLUM TO BE SHIPPED TO GUATEMALA. AMONG WEAPONS ORDERED WERE THOSE CITED REF C. MASFERRER AND ALLIEGRO TOOK THIS ORDER TO COLONEL RAFAEL ARRIAGA, GUAT CONSUL GENERAL MIAMI, WITH EXPLANATION THEY DID NOT WISH DO ANY BUSINESS WITH THE CONGRESSMEN IF IT NOT WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE AND DESIRES OF GUAT GOVT. ARRIAGA TOLD BY GUAT PRESIDENT CARLOS ARANA THAT HE DOES NOT WANT THE ARMS SOLD TO THE CONGRESSMEN. ARRIAGA RELAYED THIS INFO TO MASFERRER AND ALLIEGRO WHO ASSURED HIM THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD THEY SELL ARMS TO THESE CONGRESSMEN; THAT THEY WOULD MAKE EXCUSE THAT FACTORY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY _____ AT _____ Z

DISSEM BY _____ PER _____ #

ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO

PAGE 3 WH/MIAMI 13975 S E C R E T

COULD NOT PROVIDE THE ARMS. ARRIAGA SAID HE BELIEVES MASFERRER AND ALLIEGRO WANT TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE GUAT GOVT AND THAT THEY WILL NOT MAKE ANY ARMS AVAILABLE TO THE CONGRESSMEN.

4. ALL ABOVE INFO EXCERPTED FROM LIERGO/MIAMI REPORT CITED.

5. FILE: DEFER. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE • TOTAL COPIES 11

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY 1835 Z

DISSEM BY 13 PER SIP #125 (EIO)

ACTION UNIT dict 4

FILE, VR DCI DDP ADDP. CS/RF

ACTION NO. 680

EYES ONLY

S E C R E T 221719Z FEB 72 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 13675

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR 22FEB 72 542763

RYBAT

1. AMBASSADOR BOWDLER REQUESTS FOLLOWING BE PASSED TO HURWITCH.

"TELEGRAM TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: ALLEGED ARMS SMUGGLING TO GUATEMALA

FROM AMBASSADOR TO DEPT. ASST. SEC. ROBERT HURWITCH.

"1. AFTERNOON FEBRUARY 21 MINDEFENSE VASSAUX ASKED DCM AND CIA STATION CHIEF TO HIS HOUSE AND SAID GOG URGENTLY NEED HELP OF U.S. IN STOPPING IMMINENT ILLEGAL SHIPMENT OF ARMS FROM MIAMI TO GUATEMALA. ARMS DEALER ALLEGEDLY CUBAN EXILE RESIDENT MIAMI, CARLOS MONTIEL. VASSAUX HAD NO DETAILS ON ADDRESS. ARMS IN QUESTION ARE: 25 INGRAHAM .45 CALIBER SUB MACHINEGUNS EQUIPPED WITH SILENCERS; 125 MAGAZINES FOR THESE WEAPONS; 2 MAC COUNTER-SNIPER RIFLES, 7.62 CALIBER, WITH SILENCERS AND TELESCOPES; 2 MAC 12/22 SILENCED RIFLES WITH STRAIGHT STOCKS; AND 2 MAC 10/22 SILENCED RIFLES WITH FOLDING STOCK AND TELESCOPES. VASSAUX SAID HE HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION BUT THAT GOG WOULD APPRECIATE ANY HELP WE COULD GIVE IN STOPPING THIS UNAUTHORIZED SHIPMENT.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 13675 S E C R E T

"2. SUBSEQUENTLY, SAME AFTERNOON, VASSAUX CALLED DCM TO HIS OFFICE AND SAID SOMEWHAT SHEEPISHLY THAT HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT ARANA OF EARLIER CONVERSATION [illegible] AND THAT ARANA HAD TOLD HIM "STOP THE FOOLISHNESS" AND GIVE US THE WHOLE STORY. WHEREUPON VASSAUX EXHIBITED A "LEGISLATIVE DECREE" (ACUERDO LEGISLATIVO) SIGNED BY PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS MARIO SANDOVAL AND PRESIDENT OF THE INTERIOR COMMITTEE OF THE CONGRESS AUTHORIZING THE PURCHASE OF THE ABOVE LISTED WEAPONS FOR USE OF CONGRESSIONAL BODYGUARDS. VASSAUX SAID THIS TYPE OF "ACUERDO" DID NOT HAVE TO BE ACTED UPON BY THE WHOLE CONGRESS, BUT HAD PROBABLY BEEN SEEN ONLY BY SANDOVAL AND A FEW OF HIS CLOSE FOLLOWERS. VASSAUX ALSO NOTED THAT THE DOCUMENT WAS NOT A VALID ONE FOR THE IMPORT OF ARMS INTO GUATEMALA, AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE WAS ONLY AGENCY THAT COULD AUTHORIZE SUCH IMPORT.

"3. VASSAUX SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT ARMS OF TYPE SOUGHT BY SANDOVAL WERE NOT REPEAT NOT DESTINED FOR USE BY BODYGUARDS, BUT THAT PRESIDENT ARANA FEARED THEY WERE TO BE USED BY SANDOVAL AND OTHER MLN LEADERS LIKE CONGRESSMAN OLIVERIO CASTANEDA TO REINITIATE CAMPAIGN TO ELIMINATE LEFTIST OPPOSITION. ARANA, ACCORDING TO VASSAUX DEEPLY CONC[illegible]ED BY THIS POSSIBILITY A[illegible]ANTED TO AVOID

RETURN TO TYPE OF VIOLENCE THAT PREVAILED IN 1970. HE ALSO WANTED TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH SANDOVAL ON THIS ISSUE NOW IF POSSIBLE, HENCE HIS ASKING OUR ASSISTANCE IN STOPPING IT AT SOURCE.

"4. [illegible] SAID HE BELIEVED SANDOVAL'S PLAN WAS TO CHARTER A PLANE TO GO TO CUBAN EXILE RALLY IN HIS HONOR SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN MIAMI IN NEAR FUTURE AND BRING THE WEAPONS BACK WITH HIM ON THAT PLANE. AS PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS HE WAS IMMUNE FROM CUSTOMS SEARCH AND THUS COULD EASILY BRING THE WEAPONS INTO THE COUNTRY. ATTEMPT TO SEARCH HIS BAGGAGE ON ARRIVAL WOULD BE MOST DELICATE MATTER AND WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS CONFRONTATION, WHICH PRESIDENT WISHED TO AVOID. CONSEQUENTLY, PRESIDENT HOPED WE COULD HELP BY INVESTIGATING MONTIEL AND STOPPING SHIPMENT AT MIAMI END.

"COMMENT: ARANA SEEMS DETERMINED KEEP ILLEGAL VIOLENCE BY RIGHT TO MINIMUM AND IS BEING QUITE OPEN WITH US ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS. HE HAS DELICATE SITUATION WITH SANDOVAL ON THIS PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH WE REALIZE ARANA IS, IN EFFECT, ASKING US TO PULL HIS CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE RATHER THAN FACING THE PROBLEM HIMSELF, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR MUNITIONS CONTROL LAWS AND TO OUR INTEREST IF WE COULD HELP HIM STOP ARMS SHIPMENT AND AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH SANDOVAL AT THIS POINT. ACTION REQUESTED:

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ___ ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ___ AT ___ Z

DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ #

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 GUATEMALA CITY 15675 S E C R E T

THAT DEPARTMENT ARRANGE FOR INVESTIGATION OF CARLOS MONTIEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO AS TO DETERMINE IF HE IS PLANNING SELL ARMS, AND IF SO TAKE NECESSARY LEGAL STEPS TO PREVENT THEM FROM BEING DELIVERED TO SANDOVAL IN MIAMI. SHOULD MONTIEL OR OTHERS ATTEMPT LEGALIZE TRANSACTION BY APPLYING FOR EXPORT LICENSE ON BASIS OF REQUEST BY GUATEMALAN CONGRESS, APPLICATION SHOULD BE DENIED..

BOWDLER"

2. FOR HQS ONLY: NO STATION TRACES MONTIEL. NO FILE. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 7

NAME: ROBERT FAMBRINI
UNIT: C/WH/2/G
EXT: 1946
DATE: 22 FEBRUARY 1972

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 41 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH8 INFO FILE VR. C/PLAN, DDP, ADDP, CSDO, C/FIDS, C/CI, C/FI2

(classification) (date and time filed)

SECRET 22FEB72 21 35z

CITE DIRECTOR 235174

235174

TO GUATEMALA CITY INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT

REF: GUATEMALA CITY-13675 (IN-542763)*

1. FOLLOWING INFO FOR STATION USE ONLY FROM IUSTEER-1, A WOTACK SOURCE WHO RECEIVED INFO FROM IDENTITY ON 5 FEBRUARY 1972.

"ON SATURDAY 5 FEB 72 DURING THE TAPING OF AN INTERVIEW WITH MARIO SANDOVAL ALARCON, ONE OF THE MINISTERS OF THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT, AT THE HOTEL EVERGLADES IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, THE SOURCE (IDEN) OBSERVED AND OVERHEARD A CONVERSATION BETWEEN SANDOVAL AND ANSELMO ALLIEGRO JR. ALLIEGRO, TOGETHER WITH ROLANDO MASFERRER JR., REPRESENTS IN FLORIDA TWO FIRMS ENGAGED IN THE SALE OF ARMAMENTS: MILITARY ARMAMENT CORP. AND PARASELSUS CORP., WITH OFFICES AT EDIFICIO JOSE MARTI ON S.W. 8TH STREET AND 3RD AVENUE. SANDOVAL WAS GIVING ALLIEGRO DOCUMENTS ~~IN~~ UNDER THE LETTERHEAD OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF GUATEMALA, AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF SALVADOR WITH DETAILS AS TO AN OFFER FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARMS. APPARENTLY (AS GATHERED BY THE SOURCE

CONTINUED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
BY________PER________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________
CONF: INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 235174

TO

PAGE 2

FROM THE CONVERSATION: THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT IS PURCHASING ARMAMENTS FOR ITSELF BUT ALSO FOR THE SALVADOREANS. THERE WAS REFERENCE IN THE CONVERSATION TO GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN THE PETEN AREA IN GUATEMALA AND TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ORGANIZATION "MANO BLANCA", AN EXTREMIST GROUP, IS IN REALITY A BRANCH OR SECRET ARM OF THE CURRENT GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT."

2. IN CONNECTION WITH ABOVE REPORT AND SUBJECT REF, SUGGEST STATION REVIEW RCI-04721, 16 FEB 72 AND PREVIOUS RELATED TRAFFIC. IT ALSO POSSIBLE SUBJ OF DIRECTOR-226079 MAY BE CONNECTED WITH SUBJ REF.

3. FORWARDING HQS TRACES ON MONTIEL, ALLIEGRO AND MASFERRER BY SEPARATE CABLE.

4. NO FILE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * COPY OF REFERENCE ATTACHED.

SOD/AB

JAMES E. FLANNERY
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

FRANCIS C. MACDONALD
AC/WH/2

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SOURCE
1USTEER-1

C01 - 72

February 15,1972

SUBJ: Arms and Gunships for the Republics of Guatemala and Salvador.

SOURCE: Andial Vivanco, cameraman Channel 23 TV News. Date acquired: Feb.5/72

INFORMATION:

On saturday Feb.5th 1972,during the taping of an interview with Mario SANDOVAL Alarcon,one of the Ministers of the Guatemalan Government, at the Hotel Everglades in Miami,Florida,the source observed and overheard a conversation between Mr Sandoval and Antonio Alliegro Jr. [illegible] EAST DESK [illegible] Alliegro,together with Rolando Masferrer Jr. [illegible] THREE [illegible] operate in Florida two firms engaged in the sale of armaments: Military Armament Corp,and Armamentos [illegible] Corp. with offices at Edificio Jose Marti on S.W. 8th Street and 3rd Avenue. Sandoval was giving Alliegro documents in the letterhead of the Ministry of Defense of Guatemala,and the Ministry of Defense of Salvador with details as to an order for the purchase of arms.Apparently(as gathered by the source from the conversation) the Guatemalan Government is purchasing armaments for itself but also for the Salvadoreans. There was reference in the conversation to guerrilla activity in the Peten area in Guatemala and to the effect that the organization "Mano Blanca" ,an extremist group,is in reality a branch or secret arm of the current Guatemalan Government.

The source may travel to Guatemala for a Report ordered by his employer,on or about February 20th.

The home address of Rolando Masferrer Jr is 2111 N.W.North River Dr,Miami,Fla.

Brothers Alliegro and Masferrer may have been selling arms to some Cuban exiles who have engaged in commando actions to Cuba recently.

[illegible] D/ [illegible]

W. DuThie
..0 9173

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MANSFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
MENTIONED IN REPORT ON SUBJ /201-299292/

201-299292
DBD -05569
27 JAN 71
FBI
P4

R 7103020601

[illegible]
[illegible]

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

67-403

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

201-291123
316 -0354670
11 DEC 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
SECEN /201-291123/ INFORMED THAT HE HAD BEEN OFFERED A POST AS MILITARY ADVISOR TO AN EXPEDITION BEING FORMED BY SUBJ FORMER CUBAN SENATOR TO DEPOSE PRESIDENT DUVALIER OF HAITI

R 7101190584

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED TO
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MANSFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
INTRODUCED SUBJ 201-282105 TO SUBJ
201-273015

201-273015
DBD -04108
20 JAN 71
FBI

R 7102170527

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-40)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO ARCADIO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
MENTIONED IN WARRANT FOR SUBJ OF 201-272271

201-272271
DBD -02898
21 DEC 70
FBI

R 7101280532

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

14-00000

ORIG: ROs [illegible]:211
UNIT: WH/[illegible]/SA
EXT: R-1323
DATE: 20 May 1970

S-E-C-R-E-T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR. C/WH/SD, C/CI, ADDP, DDP, CS/DO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 20 23 09z May 70 CITE DIRECTOR 035842

TO WH/MIAMI

DESENSITIZED TYPIC

AN SO | PR | PS | DS | ABSTRACT | INDEX | WH/C/SA

REF: WH/MIAMI 7577 (IN 084297)

1. ANTONIO LEON ROJAS CITED REF IS ONE OF DEFENDENTS INDICTED IN NOVEMBER 1967 TRIAL OF MASFERRER.

(IN 61162)

2. JMWAVE 1467 REPORTING SENTENCING DEFENDENTS LISTS NAME OF ANTONIO LEON. NUMEROUS FBI REPORTS CITE NAME AS IN PARA ONE ABOVE.

3. FILE: 201-042669.

END OF MESSAGE

William V. Broe
C/WHD

CS COPY

W. Flannery
James E. Flannery
C/WH/COG

20 MAY 70

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

201-042669

MICROFILMED
NOV 2 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO 201-42669
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH
DESTROY ☒ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CD

DISSEM BY 37

ACTION c/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 2245Z BY m

INFO FILE, VR, CS/RF, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, DCI (Goodwin), CS/DO, C/WH/COG 5, C/CA 2, C/CI

S E C R E T 042117Z CITE JMWAVE 4885 WAVE

4 Jan 67 IN 71168

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

NO NIGHT

SENSITIZED

[illegible] DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF: JMWAVE 4887 *

RID/Cl-s

2P

1. FOLLOWING TO JMWAVE OFFICER FROM KEY WEST OFFICIAL ON HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. AFTERNOON 3 JANUARY ROLANDO MASFERRER FROM KEY WEST JAIL MADE TWO TELEPHONE CALLS TO NEW YORK CITY. ONE TO PERSON NAMED "ALEX" WHO NOT THERE. SECOND TO PERSON WITH NAME "FATHER MONTREAL" (POSSIBLY MONTREAL OR DONTREAL). FROM FRAGMENTS OF OVERHEARD SPANISH LANGUAGE CONVERSATION SOURCE, WHO UNDERSTANDS SPANISH FAIRLY WELL, BELIEVED THAT MASFERRER TOLD MONTREAL THAT LATTER SHOULD ARRANGE TO GET MASFERRER OUT OF JAIL, THAT HE SHOULD "TELL WOFACT THAT IT HAD BETTER GET HIM OUT OR HE WOULD TELL ALL TO NEWSPAPERS". SOURCE STATED THAT MASFERRER APPEARED FURIOUS AND WAS TALKING WILDLY. MASFERRER LATER MADE REFERENCE TO SOMEONE GETTING IN TOUCH WITH "LANG" OR "LONG", APPARENTLY IN CONNECTION WITH ARRANGING MASFERRER RELEASE. SOURCE COULD NOT DETERMINE LOCATION OF LANG OR HIS AFFILIATION OR SIGNIFICANCE IN CURRENT AFFAIR.

A Key West, the

(201-042669) cf. Cuba

and

to

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized:
Signed: [redacted]
R.O. #1 - Unit
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

SECRET

OVER →

4 Jan 67

Over →

201-42669

2. JMWAVE CAN NOT IDENTIFY ALEX, MONTREAL OR LANG. PER ELMARD[2]-PONCHAY[3] TELECON 3 JANUARY UNDERSTAND HQS CAN NOT IDENTIFY. JMWAVE DESCREETLY CHECKING RE PHONE CALLS. HOPE BE ABLE IDENTIFY SUBSCRIBERS.

3. PER PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS CONSIDER IT QUITE POSSIBLE MASFERRER WILL TRY SURFACE WOFACT[1] NAME IN CONNECTION

HIS TRAIL, EITHER CLAIMING THAT WOFACT[1] ACTUALLY OR TACITLY APPROVED HIS VENTURE, OR THAT WOFACT[1] DIRECTLY, OR THRU ITS AGENTS INHAITIAN AND CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITIES, SABOTAGED OR BETRAYED HIS PLOT. NO INFO RE THIS TOPIC HAS YET EMERGED. HOWEVER INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT ON CHANNEL 10 TV BROADCAST NIGHT 3 JANUARY REPORTER QUESTIONED ONE OF ARRESTEES WHETHER GROUP SUPPORTED BY WOFACT[1]. ARRESTEE (UNIDENTIFIED) SAID NO, THAT NEITHER WOFACT[1] NOR LNERGO[4] HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH PLOT. ANOTHER ARRESTEE, PHILIPPE CHARLEMAGNE, STATED THAT PLOT WAS WORK OF HAITIAN AND CUBAN EXILES ONLY. SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

* Not received in Cable Sec. as of 2300z-4 Jan.

NNNN

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

WH CD

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED

C/WH

BY: D AT 2115 Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT: C/WH8 | FILE, VR C/RI/SO C/FI2 C/CI DDP ADDP CSDO OGC2

ACTION NO.: 389

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 152020Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7577 (NEBECKER ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

WMIM

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC

DESENSITIZED

REF: DIRECTOR 034263

ABSTRACT | INDEX

IN 004297

4

1. NO INFO AT PRESENT TIME ON WHEREABOUTS SUBJECTS REF. STATION RECEIVED REQUEST FROM LOCAL LNYAPA APPROX TWO WEEKS AGO FOR INFO ON MASFERRER AND PASSED REQUIREMENT TO AMOTS AT THAT TIME. TO DATE HOWEVER, AMOTS UNABLE DEVELOP INFO ON WHEREABOUTS MASFERRER OR OTHER TWO INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED REF. NO STATION TRACES ANTONIO LEON ROJAS. PLS ADVISE REASON FOR INTEREST IN HIM.

2. FILE: 201-042669 AND 201-732000. GP-1

S E C R E T

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: De-sensitize

Signed: Nancy S. Sutz

R.O. #173 - Unit WH/COG

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

MICROFILMED
JUN 16 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

15 May 70

CS COPY

201-732000

SECRET

201-042669

Betty please send to 201-042669

[illegible] OF THE [illegible] ATTEMPTING TO LAUNCH AN INVASION OF HAITI FROM THE FLORIDA COAST IN 1966.

THE FBI FINALLY LOCATED HIM IN MIAMI YESTERDAY -- THREE MONTHS AFTER A WARRANT WAS ISSUED FOR FAILURE TO [illegible]

MASFERRER WAS CONVICTED ON FEB. [illegible] OF [illegible] TO EXPORT ARMS, AMMUNITION AND IMPLEMENTS OF WAR. HE APPEALED THE CONVICTION BUT THE APPEAL WAS TURNED DOWN THIS YEAR.

5/13--SE1141A

J
70

Betty-for Masferrer 201 ops please — send to RI

12-41

[illegible] Rolando Masferrer [illegible] Castro Cuba, was arrested here [illegible] than three months after he fled [illegible] avoid a [illegible]-year [illegible] time to invade Haiti [illegible]

[illegible] of smuggling arms, ammunition [illegible] to invade Haiti. The invasion [illegible] Miami [illegible] Masferrer [illegible] sentenced [illegible]

[illegible] Masferrer commanded a private army, the Tigers, [illegible] which moved against [illegible]

[illegible] moved against enemies of President Fulgencio Batista [illegible]

[illegible] Masferrer commanded a private army, the Tigers, [illegible] moved against enemies of President [illegible] Batista [illegible]

201-142669

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		5	
		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: KGratz:fll
UNIT: WH/COG/SA
EXT: R-1325
DATE: 14 May 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 25 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, C/PI/SD, ADDP, DDP, CS/DO, C/CI, C/OGC 2

14 22 43Z MAY 70

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

2P

CITE DIRECTOR 034262

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC ~~[illegible]~~

SD 2
ABSTRACT
WH/C/SA INDEX

REF: DIRECTOR 033862*

1. REQUEST ~~[illegible]~~ (STATION) ATTEMPT DISCREETLY DETERMINE PRESENT WHEREABOUTS ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, JULIO ATON CONSTANZO PALAU, AND ANTONIO LEON ROJAS, ACCORDING RECENT INFO MASFERRER HAS BEEN ACTIVELY TRAINING EXILE GROUP AT CAMP NEAR ANDYTOWN. ANY CLUE TO WHEREABOUTS OF SUBJECTS URGENTLY REQUESTED.

2. FYI ONLY: AFTER MASFERRER APPEAL DENIED, U.S. MARSHALL ORDERED TAKE MASFERRER INTO CUSTODY TO BEGIN SERVING SENTENCE. EFFORTS TO SERVE WARRANT UNSUCCESSFUL SINCE MASFERRER AND OTHERS INVOLVED HAVE APPARENTLY GONE INTO HIDING. INCARCERATION OF MASFERRER MIGHT RESULT IN DISCOURAGING MILITANT ANTI-CASTRO GROUPS OPERATING IN MIAMI AREA.

MICROFILMED
JUN 16 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONTINUED

14 May 70

CS COPY

B 201-732000

201-042669

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ____________ PER ____________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR

TO 3. FILE: 201-042669 AND 201-732000. 034263

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG COMMENT: *C/WH/COG policy cable on Cuban exile activities.

af

19 JUN 70

OGC Mr. Greaney (telecon)

William V. Broe
C/WHD

James E. Flannery
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 35/30 PER ________

[illegible]IFIED MESSAGE [illegible]TOTAL COPIES

23

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR SUSPENSE WH, CDO, RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, FI3,

ACTION NO. 069 FI/D, IW, CI, CI/OPS, CI/SO, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, SOD 6,

S E C R E T 132150Z APR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7150 (SADELLY ACTING)

WH/MIAMI

DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO

MPS/PEG 2, CI/PS, DO 4

TYPIC AMOT

1. AMOTEX-43 HAS PROVIDED REPORT (OTA-2111) 13 Apr 061778

THAT PLOT BEING HATCHED BY ROLANDO MASFERRER FORCES TO OVERTHRO[illegible] DOMINICAN PRESIDENT BALAGUER. INFO, WHICH STILL SKETCHY, OBTAINED FROM FELIPE GONZALEZ SARRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF "LIBERTAD," LOCAL RIGHT-WING PAPER.

2. ACCORDING GONZALEZ, MASFERRER, SANTIAGO REY PERNAS, FORMER MINISTER OF INTERIOR UNDER BATISTA, AND ROLANDO MERUELO BALDARRAIN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF "LIBERTAD," ARE INVOLVED IN PLOT WITH DOMINICAN VICE PRESIDENT FRANCISCO AUGUSTO LORA, GENERAL ELIAS WESSIN Y WESSIN, AND GENERAL JOSE IMBERT BARRERAS. REY IS ALLEGED MASTERMIND OF PLOT AND PUT MASFERRER AND MERUELO IN CONTACT WITH DOMINICANS. "LIBERTAD" OF 3 APRIL SAID MERUELO WAS VISITING PUERTO RICO ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE PAPER.

AN
AB
DES FD
WH

3. MASFERRER PLANS TO FLEE TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IF HE LOSES HIS APPEARL TO THE SUPREME COURT. (FYI MASFERRER IS FREE ON BOND PENDING AN APPEAL TO THE U.S.

CS COPY

SECRET

13 Apr 70

201-042669

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 7156

SUPREME COURT OF HIS CONVICTION AND SENTENCING IN 1966 TO FOUR YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR ATTEMPTING TO LEAD AN INVASION OF HAITI.) FBI REPORT DATED 31 MARCH AT MIAMI SAID MASFERRER HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN FUND RAISING AND MILITARY TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE MOVEMENT LED BY JOSE DE LA TORRIENTE DURING FEBRUARY AND MARCH.

4. ATTEMPTING SUBSTANTIATE E-43 INFO AND OBTAIN MORE DETAIL FOR POSSIBLE INTEL DISSEM. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669 201-335909
SEX M DOB ? DBC -78202
10 APR 70
CIT ? FBI
OCC ? P4
IN JANUARY 70, MAKING PLANS TO ESTABLISH
A MILITARY TRAINING CAMP NEAR ANDYTOWN,
BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA

R 7004230445

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-61 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 10 Apr 70 (7-40)

FBI doc
31 Mar 70 (Miami)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau# 2-156

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

mli

FROM.

RID/

RID/AN
EXT. 4239

GA 50
TUBE GT-7

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/CI/H/C		20 MAR 70		✓
2. DDH/COG/RR				
3. Linda			4 April	
4. McTighe				
5. Jim				
6. Cooke				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-042669

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
13 Mar 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFAA 01866

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

65209

14-00000

C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT: TYPIC Rolando MASFERRER Rojas

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFAA-1750, 2 February 1970

Forwarded herewith are AMOT reports, OTA-1966, OTA-1986 and OTA-1987 concerning the activities of Subject, for inclusion in his 201 file.

Albert K. DANZIGER

Attachment:
1. OTA-1966
2. OTA-1986
3. OTA-1987

Distribution:
3 - C/WH w/atts h/w

MAR 13 1970

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

100

COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFAA-1866

DATE: 9 March 1970

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-042660

SECRET

VIA: I-1

FROM: J/EMIG

TRANS: I-57

AGENT: E-10 (please, protect)

OTA1986

SUBJECT: Activities of Rolando MASFERRER Rojas

SOURCES:
1. Rolando MASFERRER Rojas
2. E-10 (personal knowledge)

REF:
A. Foxtrot #1235, 19 February 1970
B. OTA-1966, 17 February 1970
C. OTA-1901, 29 January 1970
D. OTA-1743, 19 November 1969
E. OTA-1695, 5 November 1969
F. OTA-1556, 22 September 1969

1. The following information was obtained by E-10 in a conversation with Rolando MASFERRER Rojas on 20 February 1970. This conversation took place in the building occupied by "Libertad" newspaper, located at 2000 W. Flagler Street, Miami.

2. MASFERRER asked E-10 once more to join his operation with the "Green Berets" and offered E-10 an operational fund of five thousand dollars. MASFERRER told E-10 that this money would be the petty cash to be used by E-10 to solve minor problems when he were already operating with him (MASFERRER).

3. MASFERRER said that the chief of recruitment of his group is Alfredo RUIZ Maldonado, who resides at 690 East Eighth Lane, Hialeah, telephone number 888-0255. MASFERRER also said that the training camp is on the outskirts of Fort Lauderdale (see comments attached).

4. E-10 said that on 22 February 1970, Francisco GUZMAN Pastrana, aka "Paquito GUZMAN" and/or "Paquito NEGRIN," joined MASFERRER's group, following instructions from the dissident faction of the MDC, for the purpose of obtaining information. GUZMAN joined the group through Ivan ROJAS, son of Antonio ROJAS, who is related to MASFERRER.

EMIG COMMENTS

1. Attached hereto is a copy of the article entitled "Nixon on Kennedy's Road," written by Alfredo RUIZ Maldonado.

2. E-10 will continue in his efforts to obtain the information requested in Foxtrot #1235, 19 February 1970. E-10 will join MASFERRER's plan.

03 [illegible]

H/w att 1 To UFAA 1866 , 1.

14-00000

S E C R E T

OTA1987

FEB 24 1970

TO: I-1

FROM: J/ZEZO

THRU: I-57

AGENT: E-10 (please, protect)

SUBJECT: Activities of the dissident faction of the Cuban Christian Democratic Movement in Exile (MDC).

SOURCE: E-10 (personal knowledge)

REF:
A. OTA-1942, 9 February 1970
B. OTA-1778, 5 December 1969.
C. OTA-1757, 1 December 1969
D. OTA-1726, 12 November 1969
E. OTA-1670, 27 October 1969
F. OTA-1520, 30 September 1969

1. The following information was obtained by E-10 at a meeting held by the dissident faction of the Cuban Christian Democratic Movement in Exile (MDC) on 22 February 1970. This meeting was held in a house located on Fifth Street between 11th and 12th Avenues, Miami, Florida. The following persons were among those who attended the meeting: Angel HERNANDEZ Rojo, aka "Baby;" Marcos RODRIGUEZ Menendez; Mario RODRIGUEZ Menendez; Juan Bautista MARQUEZ Hernandez and Diego VARONA Abdala.

2. According to E-10, it was agreed at the meeting to ask RECE (Cuban Representation in Exile) to join the dissident faction of the MDC which is better prepared to fight Fidel CASTRO Ruz because it is trusted and assisted by other anti-Castro groups in exile.

3. It was also agreed at the meeting to appoint Marcos RODRIGUEZ Menendez as political chief of the organization and to have him meet with Ernesto FREIRE Varona for the purpose of discussing with him the agreements reached by the group.

4. Marcos RODRIGUEZ Menendez and Angel HERNANDEZ Rojo, aka "Baby," instructed Francisco GUZMAN Pastrana, aka "Paquito NEGRIN" and/or "Paquito GUZMAN," to join Rolando MASFERRER Rojas' group and to obtain information. This decision was supported by all the persons who attended the meeting.

FEB 2 [illegible] 1970

LIBERTAD, VIERNES 9 DE ENERO DE 1970 Pag. 14.

Nixon En El Camino De Kennedy

POR ALFREDO RUIZ MALDONADO

El pueblo de Cuba libre, disperso por el mundo, pero residiendo en forma provisional y en mayor número en Estados Unidos que en otra parte, alienta la esperanza de que la presente administración de este país aproveche la coyuntura de una convulsión en gran escala en Cuba e intervenga allí "manu militari" para restablecer las libertades secuestradas por los rusos y sus títeres nativos.

Pero el tiempo que transcurre, sin una sola señal objetiva, inconfundible, de que el presidente Richard M. Nixon tiene una posición distinta en la cuestión cubana a la de sus antecesores demócratas en la Casa Blanca, está erosionando esa esperanza. Y tememos los cubanos que se nos esté tomando el pelo en forma cruel.

Algunos afirman que existe en el Departamento de Estado y en el de Defensa en Washington, una decisión tomada en favor de la vuelta de nuestro país al concierto democrático del hemisferio.

En todo caso, esto es un secreto al que contradicen los hechos, que son muy tercos y que no desaparecen porque se esgrima con maestría la palabra que genera esperanzas.

No ha disminuido la represión de las actividades armadas de los patriotas contra Fidel Castro desde los Estados Unidos.

Las agencias federales, Aduanas, Buró Federal de Investigaciones, Guardacostas, Agencia Central de Inteligencia, Agencia de Inteligencia de la Defensa, Patrulla de Fronteras, siguen manteniendo el elevado número de agentes para impedir que salga un solo bote con un fusil de la Florida hacia Cuba, que ordenó desplegar aquí el fallecido presidente John F. Kennedy, en los mismos momentos en que prometía, sin que le creciera la nariz, como a Pinocho, cada vez que decía una mentira, que devolvería pronto en La Habana libre, la bandera que le entregó en un acto público, la Brigada 2506, a la que él traicionó en forma vil, que no olvidaremos jamás los cubanos.

Hoy hay más cubanos presos o viviendo clandestinamente porque se les persigue con saña, solo porque ellos han intentado que renazca la vida digna y desaparezca el terror y la miseria en Cuba.

No solo Orlando Bosch es privado del derecho que se reconoce a los homicidas, violadores, asaltantes de bancos, secuestradores, comunistas incendiarios, alborotadores negros y traficantes de drogas, sino que en el norte está preso Ignacio Novo y aquí, la amenaza de un largo encierro en la cárcel de Atlanta, pende sobre la cabeza del ex-senador Rolando Masferrer y seis amigos suyos que trataron de atacar a Castro desde la República de Haití.

También está preso en Fort Elgin, nuestro amigo Sergio Freijo y tres compañeros suyos.

Por añadidura, se sabe que el grupo de cubanos, altamente entrenados que mantenía comunicación constante con Cuba, en misiones secretas con el respaldo de la CIA, ha sido dispersado.

Y que de 266 cubanos que formaban parte, como oficiales, de los distintos cuerpos armados de Estados Unidos, algunos habiendo servido honrosamente en Viet Nam, donde murieron o fueron mutilados para siempre algunos de gran valía, solo permanecen 50 en servicio activo.

En contraste con esto, se sabe que siguen cobrando un sueldo miserable que debía quemarle las manos, por viles, una caterva de canallas, que en mala hora nacieron en nuestro país, cuya única misión es la de Judas, que delatan cualquier esfuerzo de los grupos de acción por hacer llegar a Cuba su mensaje de solidaridad con los que allá, en condiciones de extremo peligro, mantienen enhiesto el lábaro de la rebeldía contra la opresión.

Estos son hechos que se dan de cachetes con la esperanza de que Nixon se conduzca con nosotros en forma mejor a como se condujeron Kennedy y Lyndon Johnson.

Ayúdenos Norte América como ayuda la Unión Soviética a los árabes y al Viet Cong, o como sostiene Fidel Castro a los guerrilleros de Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia, Brasil, Argentina y Guatemala. Haga cumplir los acuerdos internacionales y la resolución conjunta del Congreso, que se comprometió ayudar a la libertad de Cuba. Desista del grave error de habernos amarrado las manos antes de 1959 y vendido en pública almoneda a los rusos durante la crisis de octubre.

Demuestre Nixon que él es distinto. Y hágamos sí.

3

SECRET

VIA: I-1

FROM: J/EMIG

TRANS: I-57

FEB [illegible] 1970

AGENT: E-10 (please, protect)

SUBJECT: Activities of Rolando MASFERRER Rojas.

SOURCE: Rolando MASFERRER Rojas.

REF:
A. OTA-1901, 29 January 1970
B. OTA-1743, 19 November 1969
C. OTA-1695, 5 November 1969
D. OTA-1556, 22 September 1969

1. The following information was obtained by E-10 while he was having lunch with Rolando MASFERRER Rojas on 15 February 1970.

2. MASFERRER asked Marcos RODRIGUEZ Menendez to incorporate the dissident faction of the Cuban Christian Democratic Movement in Exile (MDC), and all the persons who have joined this group or faction, into the operation which MASFERRER has organized with officers of the U.S. Green Berets.

3. MASFERRER told RODRIGUEZ Menendez that if he agreed to join the operation of the Green Berets, he would have enough money to devote all of his time to anti-Castro activities.

4. RODRIGUEZ Menendez promised MASFERRER that he and the other members of the dissident faction of the MDC would study and discuss MASFERRER's offer.

cc in 201

4

201-042665

FBI doc
26 Feb 70 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau# 2-156

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

WEAVER VAL [illegible]-129
RID/AN GA 50
EXT. 4[illegible] TUBE GT-7

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		10 FEB 1970 Bruch	[illegible] 1970	
2.				
3. Burke		16		
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
FEB 13 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

22020

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

2

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-42669

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 06 Feb 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFAA 01750

FORM 1-65 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
Exile Activity

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. AMOT report OTA-1901, from AMOTEX-10 (please protect), who obtained the information from conversation with Rolando MASFERRER Rojas on 28 January 1970, follows:

a. MASFERRER said that two officers belonging to the Green Berets had promised him to give special military training to his friends. This training will start in February 1970 and will be conducted on weekends in the Everglades. (MASFERRER did not mention the names of these two officers, or where in the Everglades the training will be conducted).

b. According to MASFERRER, these two officers also promised to standardize their weapons by furnishing M-16 rifles and other war materiel to them.

CIT CUSH

c. MASFERRER also said that, during the week of 19-24 January 1970, the two officers had taken Alfredo MUNIZ to a Green Beret camp located in the northern part of Florida. MUNIZ, according to MASFERRER, is a former member of the Cuban National Police and was involved in the killing of some students at 7 Humboldt St., Havana. MUNIZ is now connected with MASFERRER. subject C/201-342669

2. The Station has determined that Company D and C of 20th Special Forces Group, are armed with M-16s, with Hqs. in Jacksonville, comprised of 66 men split between Tampa and Miami. Army policy is to allow reserve units to lease their own training space without keeping track of where this space is.

3. There are no Station traces on Alfredo MUNIZ. AMOT traces on Alfredo A. MUNIZ Mussa indicate travel Havana-Madrid, 19 June 1967, Cuban passport PP-37878, source: Iberia passenger list.

MICROFILMED
FEB 13 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Albert K. Danziger
Albert K. DANZIGER

Distribution:
3 - C/WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-1750

DATE
FEB 6 1970
2 February 1970

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
~~201-325875~~
201-42663

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

201-273002
DBC -73176
20 JAN 70
FBI
P5

CIT ?
OCC ?
A SERIES OF ARTICLES APPEARED IN THE LOCAL CUBAN NEWSPAPER LIBERTAD PUBLISHED BY CUBAN EXILE SUBJ TO THE EFFECT A COUP WAS BEING PLANNED IN THE DR

R 7002090571

FILE IN 201-42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

20 Jan 70

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
		1. RI FILE NO.			
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED TO		11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO ARCADIO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
VICTIM OF KIDNAPPING CONSPIRACY FOR
WHICH SUBJ OF 201-272271 WAS ARRESTED

201-272271
DBC -73443
12 JAN 70
FBI

R 7002090078

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 65-403

14-00000

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

RID/

[illegible] VAL [illegible]-129
RID/AN GA 50
EXT. 4229 TUBE CT-7

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		Wheeler 8 DEC 1969		
2. Ennis				
3.				
4.				
5. Piccolo		9 Dec		
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. Sulc				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-042669

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 28 Nov 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFAA 01518/02

49320

FORM 1-65 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

SECRET

VIA: I-1

FROM: J/EMI

TRANS: I-57

AGENT: E-10 (Please, Protect)

OTA 1

OCT 27 1969

UFAA-1518 2

28 Nov 69

SUBJECT: Activities of Rolando MASFERRER Rojas, editor of "Libertad" newspaper.

SOURCE: Rolando MASFERRER Rojas

REF: OTA-1520, 10 September 1969.

1. The following information was obtained by E-10 on 25 October 1969 and reported on 27 October 1969.

2. Rolando MASFERRER Rojas told E-10 that Engineer Jose Elias de la TORRIENTE Ajuria, aka "Pepe," is the only person who is involved in a serious activity in favor of the freedom of Cuba. MASFERRER added that TORRIENTE had met Cuban Communist leaders in Vienna (Austria) and Mexico. (MASFERRER did not mention any names or dates).

3. MASFERRER also said that the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) had nothing to do with Cuban affairs and that the latter are in the hands of the Pentagon.

4. MASFERRER said that he was sorry to say it but that the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Autentico) is the only group which is effective both in Cuba and in exile.

CS COPY

28 Nov 69

201-042669

FBI doc
25 Sep 69 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau #2-156

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/
ELMORE, ETHEL EJ 562
RID/AN GA50
EXT. 4239 TUBE GT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Copy detached BB

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C/Ops/Records	26 JUN 1969			
2. SJLC				S
3.				
4. ORTMAN				
5. GRATZ				✓
6.				
7. DC/WH/COG		30 JUN 1969		
8.				
9. WH/COG/PP				
10. WH/COG/RR		[illegible]	3 JUL	
11.				
12.				
13. WH/CA M. GRATZ				mg
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

to RI - copy detached for 201-266348 on permanent charge to WH/COG/SA

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | INDEX X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-042669 ✓

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 20 Jun 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFAA 01008 ✓

FORM 9-65 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO
-

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/AMOT Libertad Attacks on CIA and Collaborators

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFAA-1014, 18 June 1969

1. Forwarded herewith are numerous clippings from Libertad, a weekly newspaper, published in Miami by Rolando MASFERRER Rojas, (201-042669) concerning attacks on CIA and its collaborators. Although Libertad does not get wide circulation in Miami it undoubtedly is received in Cuba and allows the DGI to focus on targets.

2. AMOTEX-36 reported (OTA-1212) on a conversation he had with Juan MORENZA Abreu, managing-editor of Libertad, in which MORENZA told him of a meeting on 7 February 1969 of some of the members of the staff of Libertad. The following were present: Jose NOGUEROL, General Manager (probably Jose Felix NOGUEROL y Conde); Juan GONZALEZ Andino, aka "Nano", who was then assistant director of Libertad, until 21 February 1969; Juan MORENZA Abreu, and Rolando MASFERRER Rojas, editor in chief. NOGUEROL, GONZALEZ and MORENZA told MASFERRER that they were dissatisfied and displeased with Libertad's constant attacks against CIA and its collaborators. MASFERRER explained at this meeting that Libertad had started publication with $3,000.00, advanced by Rolando NOVOA (201-294243), which was depleted and more funds were needed. He said experience had taught him that the only way of achieving something in journalism was to follow a "hard line" in its pronouncements, whether they adjust to the exact truth or not. According to MORENZA, all of the articles concerning CIA and its collaborators have been written by Rolando MASFERRER.

3. On 8 June 1969, MORENZA visited AMOTEX-30 to ask the latter to help him find a job in New York as he was planning to quit his job with Libertad. MORENZA seemed restless and worried. He told AMOTEX-30 of Rolando MASFERRER's plan to devote the next three or four issues of Libertad to a ruthless attack on CIA and its collaborators mentioning both Americans and Cubans. He said that MASFERRER has compiled quite a bit of information, including names

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD w/atts (h/w)

1 att

CS COPY

JUN 2? 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-292688 201-291555 201-328685 201-269100	UFAA-1008	19 June 1969
201-287314 201-266348 201-234983	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-042669 19-6-3/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-1008

and background data on CIA, and that he was looking for photographs of some of the persons whom he would mention in the articles. MASFERRER plans to mention activities of the past as though they were currently taking place. MASFERRER hopes in this way to increase collection of funds to enable continued publication of Libertad.

4. AMOT comments that since Libertad was first published, MASFERRER has used blackmail to obtain operating funds from affluent exiles and exile businessmen. Also, MASFERRER's desperate attacks against CIA could be the fact that on 19 June 1969 the New Orleans Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals will hear the appeal presented by MASFERRER's attorney, Gino NEGRETTI, regarding the sentence imposed by a Federal Court which sentenced MASFERRER to a few years of imprisonment. MASFERRER could possibly wish to make a deal with CIA offering to stop attacks in return for a favorable decision on his attorney's appeal.

5. The article of 6 June 1969 issue of Libertad refers to Luciano MARTINEZ Ortega (201-292688), Arturo CASTRO Rodriguez (201-328685), and Rafael LLANEZA Gomez (201-291555), who were involved in reporting on the Haitian Invasion Plan which was headed by Rolando MASFERRER. Vicente Rafael ZORRILLA (201-269100) was not involved in the case though he is mentioned in the article. The principal source of information was AMFIX-1, who was reporting directly to AMOTEX-15. It is noteworthy that AMOTEX-15's name is the only one missing in the article. After the arrest of personnel involved and the pick-up of their equipment by U.S. authorities, directed mainly by AMSWIRL-1, AMFIX-1 received a reward. AMFIX-1 did not appear as a witness against MASFERRER.

6. A number of the articles are allegations against Joaquin SANJENIS (201-266348).

7. AMOT-31 (201-287314), who was terminated after an investigation of his activities (UFGA-21388, 11 May 1965), as well as his close friend AMCONCERT-1 possibly could be involved in providing material to Libertad.

Albert K. DANZIGER

14-00000

SECRE

[illegible]

POR IGNOTUS

is de maxima lab
nes de fusilamient
a, se destacaba co-
biosa fiera sedienta
n tenientico desca-
cido solo por Raul.
en sus faenas, dan-
gracia a los fusila-
andose sadicamente
, asegurandoles que
el ultimo en que

tiempo, este crimi-
con una señora de
pe, cuyos hermanos
pietarios de la ruta
numero 33. Vivian
Paraiso, en El Co-
de La Habana. La
mada por su madre,
gar a Miami. Pronto
. Algunos de los pre-
ecieron su maldad y
peran para darle un
cibimiento.

xxx

Cuba: No te hemos
s porque no conse-
a pluma ni un lapiz.
, te escribimos en pa-
ver.
hace casi imposible
sa uno la vida persi-
boniatico, un plata-
ajiros que antes pe-
ropa de uso para en-
calabaza, un pedazo
ahora se conforman
co de aguardiente o
os. Pero estos tam-
n.

xxx

rto que el trato a las
las que se tiene por
al regimen, se ha he-
duro por parte de
s de chivatos. Hasta
terias con los que vie-
Estados Unidos en los
Varadero.
de que todos admiten
al ocurrir un vuelco.
n tohallas, como en

Fracasaron dos intentos de dar muerte a Fidel Castro en Santa Clara.

Un "jeep" del ejercito, en la entrada de la capital villareña desde el oeste, abrio fuego de ametralladoras contra la caravana de autos del verdugo. Cuando huia, entro en la ciudad en direccion contraria al trafico y choco con un carro de la policia, provocando el vuelco de este. Los disparos fueron escuchados por cientos de personas. Finalmente, abandonaron el vehiculo y escaparon por las lomas del Capiro rumbo al Escambray.

Otro: Con motivo de un mitin que se celebraba en Santa Clara, un hombre al que se habian amputado ambas piernas y se movia en una silla de ruedas, reclamo ver a Castro, simulando ser un entusiasta partidario suyo. Ya muy proximo a la tribuna, fue registrado. Llevaba una enorme carga de explosivos. Fue fusilado.

xxx

Y hablando de la ciudad de Marta Abreu: el hospital es un antro de horrores a cargo de un medico desalmado llamado Benito Remedios. Cuando caiga la bestia, enfermos y empleados lo mataran a puñaladas. Se dice alli: "todos tenemos un matavacas despalmado..."

Una publicación que trae su sal y su mojito en cada noticia, es el colega "Vanguardia" de Nueva York, que edita Luis González Lalondry, ex dirigente juvenil anticomunista de Santiago de Cuba y combatiente de Playa Girón.

En su última edición le recuerda al médico "Pinin" Pintado que tiene cuentas pendientes con el ayuntamiento de Puerto Padre, donde fue alcalde antes de 1959. Tremendo palo.

Dice también, que Manuel Ar-

[illegible] en la NOTA

EN EL YMCA. Mañana sábado festival juvenil. Comenzara a las 8:30 para terminar a las 12. En el 53 SW 15th Avenida. Sound Display y Shuffling Kingse disputarán mejor repertorios y ritmos. Fiesta de Primavera. Donación: $1.50. Para ampliar mejoras y entretenimientos para jóvenes.



COMITE HEBREO-Cubano. *En plena actividad para la recaudación destinada al Fondo de Emergencia de Israel de 1968. Inicialmente un éxito. La contribución alcanzará la meta. La acción personal de Bernardo Benes, permite anticipar que el Comité logrará su noble empeño. Todos a incorporarse. Con Benes figuran: León Sockman, Miguel Braslawsky, Abraham Zachoisky, Samuel Belfond, Sender Wolson. Además Rabbi Dov, Dr. Gidalio Feldekris, Presidente y Naum Rozenwaig, Secretario.*



[illegible] EN EL DESTIERRO

POR ANTONIO [illegible]

En Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, encorvada y haciendo agua, sus bodegas repletas de viveres podridos, se halla la goleta "Maria Constanza", de la isla "La Margarita". En ella pensaban llevarse seis toneladas de armas, donadas por un general del ejercito venezolano a los anticastristas cubanos para iniciar operaciones en el mar contra los comunistas. Esta empresa, que debio inaugurar al "Ejercito Libertador" que nacio en el "Orange Bowl" de Miami, en medio de las mayores esperanzas, fue frustrada por la CIA por los incapaces jefes del EL y por un par de chivatos cubanos de la Digepol venezolana. Tambien se esfumaron $26,000 de los que no se supo jamas. Pagina para la historia vergonzosa del destierro.

xxx

"Manolito" Artime fue vapuleado fuertemente en sus afanes de elegir a un protegido suyo, Edgardo Buttari, en los comicios de los veteranos de la Brigada 2506. Se le vio muy activo por la calle Flagler, protegido por su "guardia mora", como le dicen los chuscos a sus guardaespaldas. Artime despedia un fuerte olor a coñac, a pesar de lo temprano del domingo.

xxx

Tan lucrativo ha sido su negocio de construcciones en Puerto Rico, que el ex-presidente Carlos Prío, cuando liquido su parte a "Michi" Labrada, le solto la friolera de un millon de dolares, limpios de polvo y paja. Labrada, que ahora se dedica a los negocios de tierra en la Florida, fue un antiguo correcanela de la UIR y se vio envuelto en la muerte a tiros de Juan Blanco, en el club Nautico de Marianao, en tiempos de Grau San Martín.

xxx

Y casi sin excepciones los patronos cubanos resultan los peores explotadores de sus empleados, obreros o [illegible].

Un afan de enriquecimiento torticero se ha apoderado de los emigrados. Se burlan las leyes sociales, se venden articulos y se prestan servicios de mala manera.

Muchas de las victimas dicen: el dia que caiga Castro y que estemos seguros de que nos vamos, le vamos a dar una paliza a estos perros insolentes. Evidentemente, vinieron para aca porque Castro no los hizo capataces de sus campos de concentracion.

xxx

La CIA habia reducido casi a cero a sus cuadros de inteligencia y subversion cubanos que en años atras habian demostrado arrojo y discrecion, entrando y saliendo a Cuba en misiones peligrosas.

De hace un tiempo a la fecha, se hacen nuevos planes, se desarrollan los "teams", se intensifica el adiestramiento, se mejoran los equipos.

Algo se cocina. Y de signo positivo.

xxx

Un amigo de los muchachos que se hallaban presos en Nueva York, acusados de colocar bombas contra los comunistas, visito a un criollo de esos que en silencio hacen cuanto pueden por la patria: si no sueltan a mis amigos yo me declarare responsable e ire a cumplir por ellos. Necesitamos dinero para la fianza y el abogado. Dijo el camagueyano de la estirpe de Hidalgo Gato: Aqui esta mi contribucion de $500. Pero le ruego que no se me haga publicidad.

Ejemplo que debian imitar muchos millonarios que en diez años no han tirado un chicharo en la lucha por el regreso.

[illegible]

xxx

Un ciudadano negro que venia de Santa Clara para Estados Unidos, fue provocado soezmente por un grupo de hampones en una oficina castrista. El negro, harto de las groserias, le aplasto la nariz de un contundente piñazo a uno de los rufianes, a quien hubo que ponerle en su sitio, en medio de la sangre, los huesos cuadrados. El negro fue condenado a 20 años de carcel.

[illegible] hombres y un banquete en su restaurant "Vizcaya" de Miami para sus electores, si ganaba las elecciones de la Brigada su protegido Edgardo Buttari, de la mano de cuyo papá pensaba ligarse a los republicanos.

En otra parte afirma que Luis Conte Agüero tiene una nutrida escolta nocturna para su seguridad personal.

Y no se escapa de sus pimentosos comentarios el mayor del ejército de los Estados Unidos Erneido Oliva, de quien dice que ha abandonado en sus dificultades al ex mayor Tomás Cruz.

xxx

Esta seccion puede ser acusada, practicamente, de cualquier pecado, menos de entusiasta por los tres grandes del destierro Batista, Prio y la CIA.

No pasa apenas una semana sin que, por turno, los pongamos donde merecen.

Pero siempre hemos aclarado que cualesquier posicion correcta de estos en relacion con la causa del regreso, seriamos los primeros en aplaudirla.

Esto se llama objetividad. O justicia. Y se basa en la presuncion de que nadie es tan malo que no tenga remedio.

Recibimos de Nueva York, una hoja de un amigo de LIBERTAD que tambien lo es de Batista, Manuel J. Benitez, que incluye unas declaraciones enviadas al maestro de periodistas que es Enrique Pizzi de Porras, editor internacional del diario "El Tiempo", fijando su posicion sobre el debatido tema de las elecciones en el exilio

Las reproducimos y las aplaudimos.

"Ninguna persona o colectividad determinada en el exilio, por fuerte que parezca, tendra autoridad politica o moral para hablar en nombre de Cuba a individuos, entidades, instituciones o gobiernos en el extranjero.

Lo importante es la composicion de una genuina representacion cubana en el exilio, una organizacion que hable y actue, no como grupo, sino como pueblo".

xxx

AYUDAR

A LIBERTAD

SECRET

UN AGASAJO. Se organiza al médico "saguero" honorario Carlos Carrigas, del staff de la Clínica Cubana. Se fijará este fin de semana fecha del festejo. También el lugar donde será homenajeado el distinguido cirujano cubano.



EDIFICIO JOSE Martí, de 8 calle y 3 Avenida. Inauguradas Oficinas de Business Consultants Services. Nueva oportunidad para cubanos y latinos. De los profesionales [illegible] Mario V. González, Baldomero Guasch Subirana y Baldomero Guasch López. Un esfuerzo digno de anotarse.

MAÑANA a las doce del día, almuerzo de confraternidad del Comité Auxiliar Hispano Católico en el Dupont Plaza, que tantos beneficios proporciona a la colonia cubana. Gestionar fondos para la continuidad de los servicios en ese Centro.

ESTUDIANTES Cubanos. En ciclo de conferencias. Sobre temas: Cuba, hoy y mañana, en la Universidad de Miami, Student Union Fla. De Haig School. Organizadores fijarán la próxima semana nueva cita.

La aduana de Miami acaba de confiscar un barco de 28 pies que "Manolito" Artime dio a sus compañeros de la brigada, Matias y Fenton, a los que acusan de estar ayudando al movimiento democratico haitiano contra el enloquecido "Papa" Doc Duvalier. Lider de este nuevo empeño haitiano, es el ex-maestro de Port de Paix, Henri Vixemar, residente en Africa y Paris, que estos dias andaba por Miami. Algunos creen que Vixemar es agente de la CIA. Pero lo acusan de cosas peores sus enemigos haitianos.

xxx

El abogado puertorriqueño Manuel Gonzalez Suarez, quien se hizo famoso como criminalista, defendiendo a sus paisanos nacionalistas que intentaron matar al presidente Harry Truman, estaba el lunes en la carcel federal de Atlanta, Georgia, entrevistandose con Orlando Bosch.

Gonzalez Suarez, hombre muy rico, residente en Nueva York, intenta defender a Bosch, haciendo que se repita su juicio, pero en Puerto Rico

xxx

Dos jovenes pajaros de cuenta de los extraviados democratacristianos cubanos que militan en una cosa obrerista llamada CLASSC, en Caracas, Venezuela, estan de lleno metidos en las diligencias para que Castro vuelva a la OEA y las naciones del hemisferio restablezcan relaciones con el verdugo de La Habana.

Se llaman Jesus Planas y Carlos Mory.

Tome nota el destierro.

xxx

Se supone que hay unos dos mil negocios, propiedades de renta y comercios cubanos en el area de Miami.

xxx

Dijo Rolando Novoa: "Yo trabajaba con "Perico" Suarez y "Chiri" Mendoza en el casino de juego del hotel Hilton en La Habana. Aquello lo pagaban los puntos americanos. Muy pocos cubanos y de esos, solo los ricos se acercaban al tapete verde. Era un negocio redondo. Excepto que la mordida de Palacio no era carne. Yo mismo entregaba $25,000 mensuales para la primera dama de lo que producian los traganiqueles. Yo creo que si Batista reintegra nada mas que lo que se apuñaleó con el juego, [illegible] soluciones contra Fidel Castro".

Sin comentarios.

xxx

Mauro Folgosa era "autentico" en tiempos de los "autenticos" y batistiano despues del 10 de marzo. Nunca nadie se metio con el Director de Rentas del Ministerio de Hacienda. Ni antes ni ahora. Y Mauro es de los que esta comodo. Ahora esta asociado con Batista en negocios de tierras. Se ve con frecuencia con el en España.

Decimos nosotros: A quien Dios se lo dio, San Pedro se lo bendiga.

TICKET DE TRAFICO A DELAGE

Un policia de Nueva York, de vacaciones en la Florida, le dio un "ticket" por infraccion de las leyes del "trafico" al editor del colega "Show".

Esto ocurrio en un restaurant de la calle Flagler a la hora del almuerzo.

Tanto se impresiono "Pepe" Delage con la energia del hombre de Nueva York que los parroquianos que presenciaron el incidente, temieron por su salud. Pues lo mas comun es una "embolia" despues de yantar a manteles una excelente langosta del golfo.

14-00000

LIBERTAD SECRET

JUN 6 1969 Pag. 11

DOS EN MEXICO
VAN "WATERS"

8 años.
de Re-
de Mia-
gara de
lirector

ba a su mo-
que han su-
de los fa-

cial de refu-
desde Es-
iciados solo
4 años, los
sde Madrid
dres.

de Cubanos
se funciona
o estan re-
s listas a los
18 años, que
tos a entrar
os y que sus
podido lle-
, y que fa-
n reclaman-
amite espe-
os doctores
: Tornoz,
nocal, Car-
inio Pendas,
do Pavos y
niñas de la
cen sus ges-
nas pronta
es y niños
venida Ma-
692. Meji-
radican las
Asociacion
banos.

Notas Sueltas

Hablaban unos borrachos el pasado lunes en la barra del elegante restaurant "Vizcaya" de la calle 8: "Nosotraos tenemos infiltra todas las organizaciones revolucionarias del exilio. Aqui no se mueve nadie que nosotros no queramos. La expedicion de Masferrer contra Haiti, nos produjo 8 mil pesos como premio que nos dio la Aduana por su captura. El gallego Zorrilla dio un "down payment" para una casa con ese dinero. Sanjenis no cogio nada porque a el le sobra la plata. Estabamos informados de todo por Llaneza, Luciano Martinez y el "Pelon". Hicimos que "Gatillo" les dijese que la casa de Cocoa Plum Key, que era una casa de seguridad de "la compañia" la podian alquilar. En lo de los barcos que compro el cura haitiano tambien le garamos una buena comision a la Aduana. Y al Masferrer ese lo meteremos en la carcel. Ese no puede ir a Cuba porque alli es capaz de acusarnos a nosotros". Y se tomaron otra botella de Felipe II y se comieron dos raciones de bacalao al pil pil.

Por estos rufianes Castro esta en el poder.

Este es el destierro de los chivatos los soplones y los dobles agentes.

La jesticia tarda pero llega.

.......decimos nosotros.

Echaron a Stanley Ross como editor en jefe de "El Tiempo" de Nueva York. 7,030 números dominicales.

Su lugar fué ocupado por su archienemigo Juan Angel Bras, boricua, que fué director del canal 47 de TV. Parece que ha salido también de alli Diego (Tendedera) González, que pese a lo que se diga de él, era el columnista más leido de "El Tiempo".

El ex-coronel Esteban Ventura, representante de "El Tiempo" en Miami, tiene registrado el titulo aqui, a nombre suyo. Dice que al presente, se están vendiendo a 20 centavos.

xxx

El hospital para tubervulosos de Lantana, en West Palm Beach donde hay muchos enfermos cubanos, es un antro de horrores Sucio. Mala alimentacion. Suspendieron las funciones de cine. Hay quinientos internados. En las salas de 72 hombres solo hay cuatro tazas en los servicios sanitarios. Y cuatro duchas y lavamanos. Abundan los borrachos y los delincuentes. Los enfermos dicen que mejor morirse de una vez. O fugarse del tal hospital. Y esto es una institucion federal....

201-042669

ACTIVIDAD REDOBLADA. El Buró Ejecutivo de los Municipios Cubanos Independientes se encuentra constituido en sesión permanente, en atención a los importantes hechos que en la isla mártir se están produciendo, decididamente encaminados a obtener, por medio del triunfo de las armas redentoras, la total liberacion de la patria y la expulsión definitiva de su suelo, del comunismo, que alli tiene como titere suyo al chacal Fidel Castro.

En los importantes cambios de impresiones efec-

FACILIDADES DE PAGO
PLAN LAY AWAY
ALMACEN FELIX GONZALEZ
2600 S.W. 8 ST. TEL. 642-5666
Liquida su departamento de Ropa de Hombres
TRAJES - ZAPATOS ESPAÑOLES
CAPAS DE AGUA - SOMBREROS
TODO A PRECIOS INCREIBLES
Ya recibimos la REINA AFRICANA en pasta de madera y ojitos de cristal con su oración.

LANGUAGES LABORATORY
Laboratorio de Idiomas
P.O. Box 81
Riverside Station
Miami, Fla. 33135
Phone 642-4343 887-0778

PHARMACY
3038 N.W. 7th ST.
Teodulo Ortiz
TELS. 448-5397
448-6009

Att 1 – UFAA 1008 CS COPY

ro. Este
gran los
rmeras su
on diver-
sia de St.
memoria
la clase.
ofrenda
de Jose
. Interna-
mida de

ico cuba-
, Secre-
cion del
greso In-
grafo y
que se
le sema-
ro, Bra-
special
ante las
o Infor-
sector
os gene-
a Cuba;
nos del

CUBA EN EL DESTIERRO

POR ANTONIO ROJAS

La noticia es definitiva: acaba de comenzar su exilio Luis Conte Aguero. Porque hasta ahora, este aprovechado "postalón" había vivido como un pashá en Estados Unidos, gracias a una fabulosa entrada de billetes verdes que le llegaba de Washington cada fin de mes con religiosa puntualidad. Se especula sobre el monto del dinero que el hombre de los "dientecitos y las medallitas de oro para comprar armas para defender a Fidel Castro del imperialismo", le costó al Tio Samuel. Algunos sostienen que en sus momentos de opulencia, Luis Conte, que no ha producido una sola idea, ni dado una galleta a un chino, ni tiene dos seguidores en Cuba, ni nadie lo toma en serio en ninguna parte, recibia la friolera de diez mil del ala. Otros, que esto le fué reducido progresivamente a 5 a 3 y a 1 y medio y que finalmente le han cortado "al rente", el tubo del potaje. Ahora veremos al elegante Luisito "acurralando" en una factoria. Ahora sabrán los yanquis lo que son cajitas de guayaba. Le acompaño en el sentimiento...

xxx

Tres de los cubanos que no desmayan en la emigración, en la lucha por el regreso digno, estuvieron hospitalizados en Miami la pasada semana. Los tres están ya felizmente en sus casas y en la breza por la patria: Pelayo Hidalgo, uno de los pilares del municipio libre de Holguin; Marcelino Garcia, el ejemplar gallego del MIRR de Orlando Bosch y Barredo, ex-sargento de la policia de La Habana, militante del "Club Tony Zarba" de Nueva York.

Que les lleguen nuestros saludos regocijados.

Caras conocidas, de los que hacen declaraciones y firman manifiestos, habian muy pocas en el desfile por las proximidades de la casa veraniega del Presidente Richard M. Nixon en Key Biscayne.

Anotamos: Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, "Lulú" Camacho, Gustavo Perdomo, Luis Conte Aguero, en tremendo "Imperial", Lincoln Rodón, José M. Rodriguez Maceo, Facundo Pomar, Zorrilla, recién llegado de Cuba, y Cuco León.

xxx

El 19 de los corrientes se vera en la corte de apelaciones del quinto circuito en Nueva Orleans, el recurso contra la sentencia de un tribunal federal que nos echo meses y años de prision por una supuesta violacion de la ley de neutralidad y la de municiones cuando intentamos montar una base de operaciones contra Castro y sus amos fuera de los Estados Unidos.

El formidable alegato, destruyendo minuciosamente la sentencia, ha sido redactado por Gino Negretti, brillante letrado, a cuyo nombre esta asociada la historia del destierro anticomunista cubano. Ningun otro abogado norteamericano ha sacado de la prision a tantos luchadores anticastristas como el sonriente Gino.

Los condenados somos Rolando Masferrer, Juan Bautista George Rene Leon, Martin Casey y este pobre cura. Amen de un caballero cuyo nombre he olvidado. Quizas, Orlando Bosch no este sólo mas tiempo en la carcel federal de Atlanta. En todo caso, Gino Negretti sabe lo que hace. Y tambien el Tio Samuel, que tantas satisfacciones ha dado a Fidel Castro.

Mayo 2-1969

SECRET

CLINICA PARA
ION A VISITANTES

a AIP (Agencia
ma version de
de la clinica Ap-
que utiliza el re-

e los clientes de la
netti y los de los de-
les, es que en aquella
en niños prematuros.
n otros hospitales el
s alto, debido a la ma-
ción de las futuras
l trabajo "voluntario"
obligadas a realizar
tado.
ningún caso de ane-
las parturientas de la
netti —dice la señora
ández— mientras que
las madres que dan a
os hospitales padecen
en uno u otro grado."
o —finaliza Hermina
ández— confirma que
y una nueva clase. la
s funcionarios del ré-
os asesores extranje-
a clase que tiene to-
echos, hasta el de no

nemia, sufrir partos
s y estar sometida a
te régimen alimentí-
se a la que pertenecen
s del pueblo, es la in-
bandonada."

LA ACADEMIA DE MARIA GRAJALES

En los cursos de piano de la profesora Maria Grajales, directora de esa catedra en el Instituto Arte America, fueron examinadas, obteniendo altas notas, en la National Organization of Piano Teachers USA, las alumnas Olga Besil, Ana Besil, Daisy Menendez, Zenaida Sanchez Omaira Rua, Mayda Gonzalez, Marilyn Maqueira, Joan Goberna y Mercedes Perez. Un nuevo grupo de alumnas se presentaran proximamente. La Academia Privada de la profesora Grajales funciona en el 827 N.W. 5 St.

CONVENCION: De Antiguas Alumnas de las Teresianas. Hoy hasta el 4 de mayo sesionarán en la Iglesia St Peter y St Paul. De 2 a 5 p.m. viernes. Ofrecimientos de Flores a la Virgen, 4 p.m. Sábado en San Juan Bosco. Hablará el Padre Valiña. Clausura en la Convención Centro Vasco con un almuerzo.

LA MESA Ejecutiva del CNP ofrece esta noche un ágape a los colegas Joaquín de Posada, Presidente de la Delegación del Colegio de Puerto Rico; Mario Caïro Jr. y nuestro Salvador Romani, de Venezuela.

AUTO. LUZA

MIAMI, FLORIDA

Cartas al Director

eo enviar por estas line-
que nada, una sincera
n, por la magnifica y
formacion de tu perio-
bertad", y por lo bien
que es, ya que es muy
cuanto sale, tener la
hacerse de uno, ya que
en muy rapido.
deseo tambien agradecer
y gentil que has sido
en tener informado al

publico sobre mi obra, mi vida y el "Mural Panamericano". Gracias por todo, Dr. Masferrer, y que Dios le de salud, para que "Libertad" tambien sea en un proximo futuro, un nuevo faro en la prensa de Cuba Libre.

Tu amigo que te quiere y admira,

Tosk Carreno.

ANOTE
NUEVA
ZARZA ROTATIVA
893-0441
FARMACIA MARTINEZ

RIESGO Y VENTURA DE SANCHEZ

POR ROLANDO NOVOA

Aureliano Sanchez Arango, rispido ex-ministro de Estado y Educacion del ex-presidente Carlos Prio Socarras, salio por un momento de su largo silencio y descargo un brulote contra "la unidad hipocrita en que cada grupo monta su tinglado con caracteristicas bochornosas de comite de barrio, destinado a explotar colectas y fabricar falsos lideres para vivir parasitariamente".

En otra parte, afirma sin encomendarse al diablo, que el presidente Richard Nixon y su politica se parecen a Chamberlain en Munich.

¡Campanudo!

Todo esto, a nombre de una organizacion fantasmal con el pomposo titulo de largo metraje de "Frente Nacional Democratico Triple A", de la cual el es, desde luego, el secretario general.

Lo de los falsos lideres que parasitan en el destierro, es una especie de imprudente "boomerang" que ha ido a dar sobre la cabeza fatigada del septuagenario dirigente del ala izquierda estudiantil. Pues, como se sabe, este caballero lleva, bien contados, cuatro años de exilio bajo el gobierno de Gerardo Machado, siete bajo el de Fulgencio Batista y diez largos bajo el de Fidel Castro.

Y que se sepa, nadie ha visto jamas de que color es su tarjeta del "Social Security". Quiere decir que Sanchez esta peleado a muerte con el trabajo.

Ya sabemos como se llaman los que no sudan la camisa ni se ganan el pan de cada dia en la brega de los periodicos o las catedras o las oficinas: parasitos.

Aunque gentes menos sofisticadas les dicen irrespetuosamente. botelleros.

Es inconcebible que el antiguo protegido del rector Rodolfo Mendez Peñate, ex-funcionario del Ministerio de Comercio en tiempos en que el coronel Batista era hombre influyente por los años 35, se atreva a mentar la soga en casa del ahorcado.

Y que no nos venga este jacobino de clara con limon a decirnos que el es profesor de la escuela de "Pepe Tacones" Figueres en Turrialba, ni consejero de Don Romulo Betancourt porque tambien sabemos que estas bien retribuidas canongias no son de las que dignifican a nadie. Especialmente porque en la escuela de Costa Rica, anda la mano de los munifices de la CIA.

En cuanto a lo del munichismo del señor Nixon, sospechamos que Sanchez respira por la herida de sus frustraciones cuando entro con otros sapos de notoria jettatura, Aracelio Azcuy entre ellos, en un comite de barrio para elegir al izquierdista Hubert Humphrey, a quien Nixon dio tremenda tunda en las urnas.

El "kennedismo" de Sanchez le fue de mucho provecho. Lo llevo al picaron y bien pagado comite de barrio del Frente y el Consejo, del que se marcho airado, solo cuando no lo escogieron a el como el numero uno, en lugar del periclito Jose Miro Cardona.

Antes, le habia parecido bien que un policia del "State Department" escogiese en el cuarto de un hotel del aeropuerto de Miami a media docena de ganapanes sin clientela para gobernar a Cuba cuando bajasen los "marines".

Todavia esta por definir que cosa es un lider falso.

Y que cosa una unidad hipocrita. Como se mide al autentico y la sincera.

Las expresiones son de estereotipia, lugares comunes en cuya circulacion en la literatura politica no entra para nada la imaginacion. Clisses de moda cuando Sanchez, hace mas de medio siglo, era un desmelenado lider revolucionario junto a Gabriel Barcelo, Pablo de la Torriente Brau, Ruben Martinez Villena y Jose Elias Borges.

Sanchez no aprende.

Los años lo privan de la escasa lucidez que tuvo, que como no se tradujo jamas en triunfos politicos ni liderazgos reales, tiene que haber sido de relumbron. Porque todo el mundo sabe en los mentideros de la politica criolla, que si Prio no lo coloca graciosamente en Educacion y en Estado, donde se porto como el clasico elefante en la loceria, Sanchez, no hubiera dado, de si propio, ni para concejal de Caimito del Guayabal.

SECRET

erta de Fidel Castro
lo saca del pozo, como
ɔdo trapo.

lado vocero The New
los que piden en Nor-
s de La Habana, sea
a Organización de Es-
on mande a la capital
Wall Street", sino que
no de víveres y maqui-
ertos cubanos, salván-
do, justamente en el
gado al cuello.

n bien coordinado que
Habana sino en Moscú
s necesidades presente
a cuando su destino
peligro. Moscú debe
amos a un arreglo glo-
nos las espaldas en el
a. Nuestros países sa-
aun cuando todavía
en Europa, cosa que
ecoslovaquia. Pero si
stras fuerzas en el Le-
umanos y yugoslavos,
mania Occidental, se
predecir hasta dónde

os Unidos pudiera in-
o.

mano a Alemania Oc-
le intrigar en Centro
acesiones a Norteamé-
oridad para Washing-
on la presente ayuda
que te regalamos gra-
cual Cuba comunista
ías estarían contados.
el poder y la vida es
n".

n tonto.

mortal peligro, Que es
tablero de la política
grafía y la política en
torres, reyes y reinas,
l, de casilla en casilla.
otas, a los tontos de la
s seso-huecos de Nor-
nado yanqui, al pode-
uien se dice en justicia
rior de este gran país,
residente Richard M.
fin, que lo salven de
cil.

ingo, el Times, con la
partamento de Estado,
descarada el cese del
a quien le atribuye,
l más amplio respaldo
uba y cuyos esfuerzos,
ubanos" a los que a la
e y la opresión. Poco
nidos no puede permi-
tirano chorreante de
ue América Latina se
sitúa que algunos exi-

esista de la exigencia
a subversión en el he-
res con Moscú.

acho atrevido comenta
del pueblo cubano de
Ni se molesta propo-
un proceso eleccionario
a Castro. En resumen,
el cuchillo en la mano,
de todos, gobernando

Continúa en la Pag. 15

DISTURBIOS En Cuba

PACTO CON LOS CONSPIRADORES

En la llamada "comunidad de inteligencia" de Miami, que tras haber cesado virtualmente en sus actividades sobre Cuba, excepto la recogida de información ha vuelto a vigorizarse, se estima que ha tenido lugar un acuerdo secreto entre el gobierno de Estados Unidos y elementos influyentes en la vida militar y los organismos del estado comunista cubano para reconocer como el gobierno legítimo de Cuba, en forma temporal y hasta tanto se celebren elecciones, a un grupo de oficiales que produjesen el golpe en una o todas las tres regiones militares que existen al presente en el país.

Losconspiradores, algunos de los cuales, como precio para su participación en la conjura se han hecho depositar fuertes sumas de dinero en bancos norteamericanos o europeos, han exigido garantías de que "los exilados no entrarán armados en Cuba para poner en peligro, con sus acciones, la nueva situación que surgiría del "putsch".

Estados Unidos se ha comprometido a "tomar bajo custodia de protección" a centenares de activistas de las organizaciones anticastristas de la emigración para que no entren clandestinamente en Cuba.

En Miami se ha sabido que un grupo cubano que actúa con la CIA bajo el mando de Joaquín Sanjenís, ha estado intentando penetrar con agentes encubiertos todas las organizaciones de acción para conocer sus planes y hacer un estimado de su potencial de hombres armados que intentarían entrar en Cuba para influir en la situación que se cree allí.



NIXON



Secretario de Defensa Laird.

SOLO OFICIALES CUBANOS

Es un secreto mal guardado que unos 150 cubanos, la mayor parte de los cuales fueron oficiales del ejército de los Estados Unidos en alguna época, muchos antiguos prisioneros de Bahía de Cochinos, han celebrado reuniones privadas con jefes militares norteamericanos a fin de ofrecer su disposición si fuesen llamados para acompañar a tropas de los países miembros de la organización de Estados Americanos que entrarían en Cuba si la situación que se establece allí pidiese reconocimiento y ayuda de la CIA.

A estos factores se les ha informado que se impedirá a toda costa un vuelo masivo del exilio sobre Cuba.

Gentes enteradas afirman que el conocimiento por parte de Fidel Castro de que la Unión Soviética ha sido advertida por parte de Norteamérica de que si ocurre una insurrección popular en Cuba no tolerará una masacre como la de Budapest, Hungría, ha creado un gran desasosiego entre los jefes del régimen de La Habana. Y que esto los ha llevado, por consejo de la URSS a intentar gestionar un arreglo de sus diferencias con Estados Unidos.

Ello explica las declaraciones del sub secretario de Estado para Asuntos Latino Americanos, Charles Meyer, en el sentido de que

"Estados Unidos estaría dispuesto a escuchar a Castro si éste quiere hablar"

En el mundo diplomático esto se interpreta como que ya Castro está hablando. Y probablemente haciendo concesiones a los mandos norteamericanos. Con eso, como ocurre con todo régimen de fuerza, sólo logra precipitar el estallido interno.

Y Estados Unidos está dispuesto a ocupar al país en 72 horas como ocurrió en República Dominicana cuando el alzamiento comunista del coronel Francisco Caamaño y Juan Bosch.



SECRET

Estaría de 224 AADC que incluye problemas de cruzar ríos.

Lib. 6 12-1967

SECRET... EL DESTIERRO

POR ANTONIO ROJAS

S seran entre-
ies. Ganados
Poetico. Del
lios Cubanos
, Florida. En
l premio fue
ose Antonio
iami. Por su
o a la bande-
tides Sosa de
ne Selles, de
el Jurado.

PA

mpresas. En
er diserto el
Campa, eje-
mara de Co-
Hablo de la
l sector den-
en economi-
presa. Y del
o de l. Flo-
tancia de la
ercio Latina.
tes mercanti-
s de Miami.
eya presento
te.



ROMERO

la campaña
sico R...
CNP. Esta no-
Centro Vasco.
odistas y diri-
os. Por la dele-
Nueva York y
y, asiste Willy
rdinador gene-
yer a esta ciu-

¿Tan desgraciado es el pueblo de Cuba que no tiene otros hombres a que ligar su suerte que Castro y Batista?

Hubiésemos querido no tener que decir estas cosas amargas que podrían lastimar a algunos que por mal entendida lealtad a uno a quien importa un bledo el sufrimiento ajeno, se sientan batistianos.

Esa lealtad, propia de perros, no cuadra a un pueblo viril y erguido que tiene obligaciones con sus hijos y sus nietos. Y más aún, con los que nos dieron libre la patria, trás décadas de sacrificio y abnegación. Para que nosotros, la perdiésemos con nuestro pecado. Por favor, Batista, está bueno ya.

Vino Juan Moreno de la isla del Encanto, donde se ocupaba de asuntos electorales del colegio de periodistas, donde él es un "trabuco" de Carlos Romero.

Comenta: "Van pocos LIBERTAD a Puerto Rico, pero allí todos lo conocen. Los escasos ejemplares que llegan se los pasan de mano en mano. El periódico ha pegado allí entre los exilados que aplauden su línea política independiente".

oOo

En Nueva York se está organizando un grupo que tiene todas las características de representar al "tercer equipo" comunista de Cuba que trata de tomar el poder aprovechando la crisis de orden público, seguridad y autoridad que ocurrirá a la caída, la muerte, la prisión o la fuga de Fidel Castro.

Se reunen con periocidad. Afirman que habrá que mantener toda la legislación confiscatoria de la propiedad y que lo que conviene allí es una dictadura popular a través de un partido militante. Y nada de elecciones.

Discuten, a estas alturas, si convendría que ese grupo, que quizás sigue orientaciones de Moscú, debe llamarse "Vanguardia".

Por añadidura, son opuestos a toda forma de unidad del destierro. Y afirman que no hará falta ninguna actividad armada desde el exterior para apoyar a los patriotas que pudieran lanzarse a las calles y despedazar a los rojos. De todo esto quedan dos consignas que recuerdan a su autor original: Elecciones . . . ¿para qué? Armas . . . ¿para qué?

Está en Nueva York en una factoría, el brillante periodista cubano Armando Cruz Cobos, que trabajó en "El Tiempo" de La Habana y en "Mundo Americano" de Nueva York. Hace poco figuraba como jefe de redacción de "La Tribuna" de Lima, el órgano del APRA de Haya de La Torre.

Quizás venga a Miami a trabajar en la TV en español de Joaló y Aramis del Real. No podrían hacer mejor adquisición.

oOo

También en Miami, en un hotel de la playa labora Fernando Alloza, exilado republicano anticomunista español que trabajó muchos años como columnista muy leído de "Información" de Santiago E. Claret en La Habana.

Lástima que su talento no sea mejor aprovechado. Aquí donde hay cada burro emborronando cuartillas, que mete miedo . . .

oOo

Un cubano de valía, Francisco Lima Delgado, antiguo ganadero y maderero de Victoria de las Tunas, es quizás el cubano más influyente en la hermana república de Honduras, donde ha montado gran industria de madera.

Don Pancho, como se le llama allí, deja una huella de su bondad humana entre la gente pobre que trabaja con él, en la forma de caminos, escuelas, asistencia médica. Y lo que es más raro, su prosperidad no lo ha convertido en un egoista de esos que en la opulencia, olvidan a la patria.

oOo

Luis Tornes, que acaba de ganar las elecciones de la Brigada 2506 en Nueva York, Nueva Jersey y Puerto Rico, tiene una brega dura por delante en Miami con la candidatura de Juan José Peruyero, que es apoyada por el comandante del ejército norteamericano Erneido Oliva y su segundo Morales Cruz. Basta decir . . .

El pasado martes, cuando corrió como un reguero de pólvora por Miami la "bola" del alzamiento en Camagüey, la fuga de Castro, un grupo de jóvenes y "medio tiempos" de la localidad se reunió con sus AR15 y mil balas declarando su disposición a volar enseguida para cualquier lugar donde estuviese batiéndose el cobre en la isla.

En otra parte, pero al alcance

yer a esta ciu-

del Pino.

•••

GOGOS cubanos
noche diplomas
pantes del curso,
guras de Cuba y
, desarrollado
urso en el Kou-
. Roberto Allen,
iguez Molina y
pinosa, portado-
pergaminos. A
la Universidad
del Colegio de

•••

mericano Erneido Oliva y su segundo Morales Cruz. Basta decir que le echarán encima los votos de los 30 brigadistas que reciben 300 dólares mensuales como beca de estudios en la Universidad de Gainsville, Florida.

Todo lo cual actualiza la consigna que hizo famoso Antonio Prío cuando aspiró vanamente a ganar la alcaldía de La Habana con el apoyo de su hermano el Presidente de la República: "ahí viene la aplanadora . . . de los 'Johnnies' . . ."

oOo

Está a punto de llegar a Miami en los vuelos de Varadero un conocido oficial del ejército castrista que estuvo dando "tiros de gracia" a los cientos de patriotas fusilados en los fosos de la fortaleza de La Cabaña hasta hace poco.

Ya está aquí su esposa.

Nada, que el hombre, entre cuyas víctimas están Eufemio Fernández y Humberto Sori Marín, "Nongo" Puig y "Francisco", acaba de descubrir que "aquello es comunismo".

Ya verá como la CIA lo pone en la nómina y hasta se permite ejercer el veto en cualquier gestión unitaria.

[illegible] el cobre en la isla.

En otra parte, pero al alcance de la mano aguardaban armas más pesadas. Y también un par de aviones C46.

Un ejemplo de conmovedor patriotismo: acuartelamiento de 12 horas. Movilización espontánea. No hubo que llamar a nadie para recordarle su compromiso. Y nada de alardes. Ni cheques de la CIA.

Los "Tigres" tardan, pero llegan.

Formidable la definición del brillante Orestes Ferrara, más allá de los 90 años, pero en plena lucidez intelectual en su exilio romano: Fidel Castro es el hombre más malo del mundo.

La experiencia prueba que el coronel del ejército libertador, notable internacionalista, senador, profesor eminente y profundo escritor, no exagera: Hasta Hitler y Stalin hicieron algunas cosas positivas por sus respectivos países, a pesar de su locura y su crueldad.

La Bestia de Birán sólo ha hecho daño. Aún a sus propios seguidores. Y ha entregado el país a los explotadores imperialistas extranjeros.

*

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

Libertad · Pag 7
Abril 12-1969 SECRET

Libertad
MIAMI, FLORIDA

Cartas al Director

Leo su columna todas las semanas. Lo felicito por la veracidad de sus informaciones, y sobre todo porque Ud. toca siempre algunas de las lacras del exilio, y lo hace con elegancia, sin estridencias, ni calumnias, ni palabras soeces.

Nosotros somos un grupo de cubanos que residimos en Coral Gables, y todas las noches nos reunimos en algun sitio para cambiar impresiones y estudiar la conducta del exilio. Muchas veces tenemos deseos de salir a la palestra y acusar a tantos bribones que estan viviendo con el sudor de muchos que trabajan de dia y no pierden un solo minuto para realizar algo por nuestra liberacion, frente a tantos que se pasan la vida en los periodicos, hablando de fantasticos planes de invasion y siempre con las manos extendidas, pidiendo dinero y mas dinero. Jamas vemos ninguna realizacion y se desconoce el camino de esas recaudaciones, que por lo regular se convierten en automoviles de ultimo modelo, edificios de apartamentos y francachelas.

Hay que decir algunas verdades de las organizaciones fantasmas, y sobre todo de las que se aprovechan del exceso del bondad o de la ignorancia de la mayoria del exilio para continuar en sus propagandas personales. Ahi tiene Ud. a los Municipios, el fracaso mayor del exilio, la frustracion de la mejor y mas practica organizacion, de no haber caido en manos de elementos a sueldo de la CIA y para muestras tiene Ud. al llamado Sinsonte Maniguero Holguinero, y anonimo durante toda la vida, y aqui manicheando junto a la Sra. Crespi, con un tal Cabrera Kiesgo, que venida pescado, y ya es un hombre adinerado, un tal Cañal, famoso porque formo parte del Directorio con Miro, bien aprovechado, y asi, un grupo que, observe, que no pasan de diez, son los mismos de siempre. Alli solo hay una representacion del sector femenino: la Sra. Crespi. Podriamos hacer una larga historia de la conducta de esta buena señora, pero lo dejamos a su investigacion, junto con todas las mujeres de las seis provincias, que se retiraron de los Municipios cuando ella comenzo su dictadura. Pregunte, investigue y luego haga el favor de hacer una buena publicidad, para ver si los demas Municipios que de verdad estan en plano de lucha por nuestra liberacion, se alejan de ese grupito malsano, que no hace mas que exhibicionismo diario, por ellos y nada por Cuba.

Creemos que nuestro compatriota y amigo Rolando, podria dar un paso al frente. Tiene moral para llamar a la lucha y aqui se cree y confia en el, cuanto podria decir de muchos falsos lideres.

Su amigo,

Antonio Manduley Perez.

xxx

En la edicion de "Libertad", correspondiente al 28 del pasado mes de febrero de este año, fue publicado un articulo titulado, "Millonarios en Pocos Años".

Cuando se habla de la Cuba de ayer, son muchos los que, olvidandose de un pasado lleno de gloria, arremeten en forma inmisericorde de muchos de los personeros de aquel regimen, que tuvo como guia y mentor al Mayor General Fulgencio Batista.

Refiriendome a otro cubano digno, tengo que confesar, sin que me cause sonrojo, que fui amigo personal del Dr. Andres Rivero Aguero, de cuya confianza disfrute durante mucho tiempo, llamando en forma rara mi atencion, que en la lista a que se hace mencion, no aparezca el Dr. Rivero Aguero ni Ud., distinguido compatriota, que tanto se merece, por sus luchas sin doblesces, frente al comunismo mendaz y despiadado.

No me extraña, que en la lista que publico "Revolucion", tampoco aparezcan los nombres de Ud. y del Dr. Rivero Aguero, pues ello tenia que ser asi, porque ese libelo esta siempre a la caza de destruir reputaciones y por tanto, hubieran sentido dolor y envidia al hablar, haciendole justicia a Ud. y a el.

Esto quiere decir que ustedes no fueron ladrones.

Aqui, estoy al
de accion que no
de luchar por la
de Cuba.

Anticipandole la
la atencion que pre
neas, le saluda y af
riable amigo.

Adelfo Gonzalez.

xxx

He recibido tod
cos. Te felicito. En
hay una llamarada
un grito de guerra;
de conciencias y
de verdades. Esta h
cha objetividad. De
leo, los regalo. Lo
sar, pues desearia co
pero me duele que
nos no lo puedan le
gue a diario.

Deseo le envies
plares a mi cuñad
con la hermana de C
na, a Silver Spring.
colonia como de 4.0
Existe una bodega
venden las revistas
cubanos. Yo hable c
las semanas los llev
ga. La direccion es:
Jr. 8408 Woodcliff
Spring, Md. 20901.

Tambien envíaselo
vas Calvo, que esta
en Syracuse Univer
Department, Syracus

La señora de Orla
esta muy agradecida
el tambien sepa aprec
do he hablado por t
ella, me ha hecho
las cosas que has pu
bre Orlando en el

Pedro Yanez, Nueva Y

xxx

Con mucho agrado
da semana el periodi
tad", que Ud. dirige y
complacencia veo la
parcial que el period
trazado en pro exclu
de la causa de Cuba. L

Me ha agradado m
bien, la campaña que
te ha llevado a cabo s
en favor del cubano
trabajadores, al denuncias

SECRET

., Inglaterra, Fran-
Japon.
ual se traduce en
eces para Cuba en
meses.



HAY ARROZ NI FRIJOLES EN
ABANA

mes esenciales en
ieta popular de los
m, los frijoles y el
saparecido virtual-
entros de distribu-
itos en todo el pa-

recien llegado de
s los vuelos origi-
dero, ha dicho que
nte barrio de El
pital cubana, han
na panaderia fun-
la calle Primelles.
tian en Palatino,
les y la calzada de
s sido cerradas an-
le harina y grasas

algunos meses, el
oductos derivados
ales como las pas-
y la harina en si
a usada en la con-
dices, se obtienen
ndancia. Esto per-
r el hambre y aun
personas se mos-
a pesar de la falta
mentos contenien-

precario alivio ha

curre con el arroz
a mayor parte de
a importados de
s antigua produc-
a sido reducida a
s.

artes se hacen co-
lta voz contra el
olitica de produc-
imiento de viveres
a las propias fuer-
a lo mas altos
el regimen.
contempla como
goria en el ham-

a la Pag. 15

RADAR

Esta fue la tonica de los tres compatriotas que hablaron la tarde del pasado domingo, cabe los frondosos pinos y uveros de caleta de Crandon Park, en Miami, a menos de dos millas del lugar donde se hallaba, el dia de Pascuas de Resurreccion, el presidente Richard M. Nixon.

En Cuba va a ocurrir una insurreccion popular o un golpe de importantes factores militares en activo. Mas probablemente, las dos cosas en forma simultanea.

Es mas que posible, que las fuerzas armadas de Estados Unidos, en representacion de la OEA, ocupe el pais. Ojala sea por poco tiempo.

Es inevitable que alli, por meses o por años, ocurran convulsiones y desordenes.

Esa es la resaca inevitable de las guerras civiles y las revoluciones.

Quizas haga falta el concurso armado de los factores combatientes del exilio para ayudar a decidir la crisis por el camino democratico, en el mas breve tiempo posible.

Habra que ahorrarle al pais la caida en un barranco de agitacion e inseguridad como ocurrio en Republica Dominicana.

Para eso necesitamos instrumentos electorales vigorosos, un parlamento fuerte y una vigilancia popular constante para que todo el proceso no desemboque en un espadon, ejerciendo una "democracia dirigida" ni una dictadura seudo nacionalista.

Seria una ironia triste.

Para eso, la juventud de la emigracion debe reunir armas y aprestarse a saltar el charco y pelear en las azoteas y las esquinas de La Habana.

Y desde ahora, debe hacerse conciencia en la prensa y la radio en esta direccion. Para eso ha salido a la calle LIBERTAD. Por eso, esta publicacion se mantiene a igual distancia de los tres poderosos oportunistas que aspiran pescar todas las ganancias en el rio revuelto de la guerra civil: Batista, Prio y la CIA.

El pueblo de Cuba se merece un mejor destino. Pero necesita sus instrumentos politicos, militares y de propaganda, libres de ataduras onerosas. Echemos ahora los fundamentos de las libertades publicas futuras en Cuba.

¡Aprobado!

CRIXO

Libertad - Pag. 16
abril 12-1969

SECRET

las mejores inten-
lte aunque sea so-

una agresion arte-
que no debia ense-

o escribir para las
: sus lideres es mas
a. O que siente un
s no tienen que ser
. coraje, espiritu de

pentido", que pro-
e la clandestinidad
erdad: yo vine aqui
, andaba por la Sie-
os cuales aqui son
me veto el Consejo.
ian echado años de
o porque de cuando
ennedy y a los "pe-

blejo, a quien deseo
mi consejo anterior:

vas, ex senador
o de Agricultura
residente Carlos
na radial. Ponti-
Suárez Rivas es
: que lo libran de

caiga Castro un
anto y la limosna

pupitre senatorial
s don Eduardo no
de moda que los
n desde una po-
rteamericana, na-
in o Gamal Abdel

de uniforme o de

inistradores de la

an baratos. Y sin
reses de la patria

itemente haciéndo-
res, los Bosch, los
?

resubido la parada
an en Guatemala,
na.

grandes potencias tienen que usar sus superiores medios con cautela. Y que es privilegio de las pequeñas naciones usar la fuerza con temeridad".

Rogers

Nada dijo el campanudo Secretario, cuyos puntos de vista en relacion con la politica internacional se califica como de cuasi pacifista "paloma", de los 31 jovenes militares que perecieron en la artera agresion.

Los que esperaban que el presidente Richard M. Nixon, quien en la campaña electoral condeno en forma enfatica las vacilaciones del presidente Lyndon B. Johnson en las gestiones para el rescate de la tripulacion del barco "Pueblo", se han quedado con dos palmos de narices por la pusilanime actitud de su Secretario de Estado frente al odioso crimen de los comunistas norcoreanos.

Todo parece indicar que los norcoreanos, alentados por la debil reaccion norteamericana en el caso de "Pueblo", se sintieron estimulados para ametrallar en el espacio, sin previo aviso y sin darles la alternativa de la captura, al avion de reconocimiento.

Poco importo a los bandidos comunistas que el avion estuviese volando sobre las aguas internacionales del mar del Japon, a mas de cien millas de la costa coreana.

IRONIA

Representa una ironia sangrienta, que no ha pasado desapercibida para el publico, que fueron aviones de combate Migs, de fabricacion rusa, los que mataron a los 31 muchachos ame-

El energico anti-comunista, Mendell Rivers, de la comision de asuntos militares de la Cama-

que Norte America no es un ti-

Pase a la 7

RADAR

Luis Torres, aspirante con los mejores títulos que era a la presidencia de la asociación de veteranos de la Brigada 2506 renunció aduciendo que iba a ser aplastado por un escandaloso fraude en los sufragios.

Siendo presidente de la Asociación Salvador Madruga, se anunció que iba a ser organizado un "ejército libertador". Se hicieron alistamientos, se recaudaron fondos. Y después, ni se dijo qué destino cupo al dinero ni se le mostró un arma a nadie, ni se realizó una sola operación contra Castro. Del "ejército libertador" nadie volvió a acordarse.

Según parece, la candidatura que apoyó la Agencia Central de Inteligencia que aparece hasta en la sopa de los exilados cubanos, ha ganado los comicios.

Su presidente Juan José Peruyero, ha dicho que "solo los americanos pueden hacer efectiva la lucha contra Castro".

Nosotros no compartimos esa paladina declaración de indefensión de Peruyero. Creemos que eso nos condena a ser enterrados en suelo extraño. Nos hace impotente. Porque los americanos no lucen nada interesados en echar a Fidel Castro y los rusos de Cuba.

Ya antes de todas estas desgracias que han destruido, a todos los fines prácticos al grupo desterrado de mayor potencial combatiente y que ahora es un instrumento más de la política de Estados Unidos, que no tiene planes contra Castro, la pobre Brigada recogió algunas armas y las entregó a un plan de acción conocido por "la coordinación". Nada salió de aquello y las armas, supuestamente, están enterradas en un arenal de las Bahamas.

No tenemos por qué ocultar nuestra tristeza y decepción con la gloriosa Brigada. El egoismo sórdido, la incapacidad, la soberbia arrogante, el sometimiento al que paga, han parado en este espectáculo miserable.

Castro debe saber, mejor que nosotros mismos, que inerme estamos. Que torpes y malos somos.

Con lo numeroso y lo rico del destierro, si hubiese más sentimiento patriótico y hombres más firmes en la adversidad, podriamos mandar al cuerno al departamento de estado y la CIA y pegar a Castro duro y con eficacia.

Pero esta visto que no damos la talla. No servimos.

CRIXO

Libertad - Pag. 16
abril 18 - 1969

SECRE

DEBIL REA

N.

E

Abril 18-1969

Póngale el Cuño



Por [illegible] PERALTA

Algunos fariseos se escandalizaron por un par de fotos tomadas de las influyentes revistas "Newsweek" y "Time" y reproducidas junto con un resumen de una informacion tomada de estos influyentes semanarios conservadores sobre una obra de teatro obsceno, "Che", que se ofrecia en un teatro del Village de Nueva York.

Recomendamos a esta gente pacata que no compren la edicion del 14 de abril de "Newsweek", cuya informacion mas amplia se titula "El Sexo y las Artes", con ilustracion muy audaz, en colores, en la portada.

Y si de veras algunos gazmoños sufren de alferesia con estos temas tan de actualidad en la vida americana de hoy, que de ninguna manera pongan sus ojos pudibundos en las revistas "Evergreen" ni "Ramparts". Porque esas si que son calientes.

Hace unos pocos años los aduaneros confiscaban las copias de los libros del expatriado Henry Miller que llegaban a estas costas donde el espiritu modesto de los "Pilgrims" libraba una batalla destinada a perderse contra los temas y el lenguaje escabroso en la literatura: Pero la Corte Suprema se decidio por el hombre de "Tropico de Cancer".

Hoy Miller no asombra a nadie. Es un burgues cualquiera que echa sus ultimos años en su retiro de Big Sur en California, incapaz ya de escandalizar a ninguna tranquila ama de casa.

Y los "best sellers" de la literatura ligera yanqui son Irwin Wallace, James Jones, Harold Robbins y Eliza Kazan, que cultivan el sexo pelado.

Nada ganamos con negarnos a admitir la existencia de un fenomeno que nos alcanza a todos. Siquiera sea para medir cuanto hay de pornografia desnuda y cuanto de arte atrevido en cada expresion suya. Porque eso esta ahi. Y parece que para quedarse.

Lo raro es que gentes de un pueblo alegre y sensualista que hizo presidente a Carlos Prio Socarras y senador a Virgilio Perez, y elevo a los primeros planos de influencia a "Chicho Pan de Gloria", al "Chino Wissi" y a Segundo Curti, venga ahora a rasgarse las vestiduras, horrorizados por una foto que casi no enseña nada, tomada de un periodico del "establecimiento".

xxx

Me escriben una carta llena de groserias, solo porque dije aqui que Jorge Roblejo Lorie "hablaba con faltas de ortografia". Agregue que quizas era un patriota movido por las mejores intenciones en su afan de lograr que Fidel Castro suelte aunque sea solo un preso politico.

Nadie puede ver en este comentario inocente una agresion artera al elegante Roblejo. En favor de el, dijimos que no debia enseñarse.

Se puede hacer labor patriotica sin hablar o escribir para las masas que descubren, de momento, que uno de sus lideres es mas bruto que un arado. O que no fue a la escuela. O que siente un desprecio olimpico por el idioma. Los soldados no tienen que ser [illegible] Basta conque tengan coraje, espiritu de

El Secret
iam P. Roge
prensa, con
discrecion e
la Fuerza A
Norte a un
mericano, d
grandes pu
usar sus su
cautela. Y e
las pequeñ
fuerza con e

[illegible]
cuerpo y buena punteria.

Mi corresponsal me acusa de "fidelista arrepentido", que probablemente estaba "chivateando a la gente de la clandestinidad cuando el desembarco de Giron". Esto no es verdad: yo vine aquí el primero de enero de 1959. Y dos años antes, andaba por la Sierra Maestra tras los "barbudos", muchos de los cuales aquí son ahora mis camaradas. No fui a Giron porque me veto el Consejo. Pero me aliste. Despues, los americanos me han echado años de prision como si yo fuese un paquidermo. Solo porque de cuando en cuando, digo botija verde a la CIA, a los Kennedy y a los Perros de Sanjenis".

Finalmente, no tengo mala voluntad a Roblejo, a quien deseo toda clase de bienandanzas y a quien, repito mi consejo anterior: No vaya a la television. No escriba. Estudie...

xxx

Escuchamos a Eduardo Suárez Rivas, ex senador liberal, ex senador auténtico, ex ministro de Agricultura durante el corrompido gobierno del presidente Carlos Prío Socarrás. Hablaba en un programa radial. Pontificaba. Daba consejos. Lo que no dá Suárez Rivas es dinero, que no le falta en proporciones que lo libran de estrecheces.

En sus temores de que cuando caiga Castro un jefe militar afortunado se alce con el santo y la limosna del poder y le cierre el camino al pupitre senatorial o la poltrono ministerial, sin los cuales don Eduardo no concibe la vida, dijo que "ahora esta de moda que los soldados en América Latina gobiernen desde una posición de izquierda, reformista, antinorteamericana, nacionalista del tipo Juan Domingo Perón o Gamal Abdel Nasser".

¿Qué importa que gobierne uno de uniforme o de civil?

Lo trascendente es que los administradores de la cosa pública sean honrados.

Y si es posible, que también sean baratos. Y sin arrogarcias, que antepongan los intereses de la patria a los del extraño poderoso.

¿No estaba Washington permanentemente haciéndole gracia a los Betancourt, los Figueres, los Bosch, los Haya de la Torre, los Muñoz Marín?

Bueno, pues los soldados les han resubido la parada en el Perú. Y quizás pronto lo hagan en Guatemala, en Venezuela y República Dominicana.

Nada di
cretario, c
en relacion
nacional se
si pacifista
jovenes m
en la artera

Los que
sidente Ric
en la campa
en forma e
nes del p
Johnson en
rescate de
co "Pueblc
con dos p
la pusilanir
cretario de
so crimen d
coreanos.

Todo p
norcoreano
debil reacci
el caso de
estimulado
el espacio.
darles la a
ra, al avio

Poco i
comunistas
se v[illegible]**ndo**
nacionales
mas de cie
reana.

IRONÍA

Represe
grienta, qu
percibida
fueron avio
de fabrica
taron a los

SECRET

Abril. 25-1969

POR DENTRO

POR IGNOTUS

s llamados Tribuna- muerte al joven de DES, y a reclusión stro-comunista esti- e 17 años RENE

N CUBA

Iglesias, Eduardo Pérez, vecinos de mia de actividades nen de la Habana zar sabotaje contra sición de los Tribu-

sion, un capitan-delega- ision especial. El ha en- salido al pais varias ve- s seguro de que pronto se el corojo" alla.

que la CIA que tiene s" de armas y municio- s seis provincias no se ga al ELN?

gentes han realizado la rte de los sabotajes que dido la isla en los ulti- s.

no quieren publicidad.

xxx

s poderosamente la aten- s Fidel Castro, rompien- yes costumbre, no lan- re uno de sus famosos s con motivo del 17 de versario de Playa Giron.

sabia donde andaba el gran charlatan. Pero ne que despues que si- s a la "parca impia" sus sucias barbas, en Hilton, hace un mes, ha escurrir el bulto a to- digros.

a este puerco tambien pronto su San Martin.

xxx

de los dueños de la fa- [illegible] Bosque" del 3360 la calle 7 en Miami, es Ortiz, ex-oficial de la e Santa Clara, quien per- su cuerpo durante 25

"El coronel Cornelio el jefe, era un caballero,

MAMI en la NOTA

A TOMA de posesión. Del CNP (e) llegará mañana sabado 26, el admirado Laurentino Rodriguez, Editor de Noticias en Español del Canal 47. En New Jersey. Es Presidente de la Delegación del Colegio en Nueva York-N.J. Lo acompañan el colega Celestino Lamarque Vice Presidente del CNP y Mario Ciria de EL TIEMPO.

Serán agasajados.

LAURENTINO RODRIGUEZ

APERTURA. De nuevo local de la oficina del Seguro Social de Hialeah. Un "open-house" a las 2:30 p.m. hoy viernes. En 925 West 49 Calle. Edificio Médico Dental y Profesional. 203 segundo piso. La gráfica funcionarios y empleados del Segurity.

DIPLOMA. De honor a la institución Community Agency Services. Por sus beneficios en favor de cubanos no protegidos por el Refugio. Solidaridad Cubano-Americana entregará pergamino el próximo día 30. Invitaciones para el Auditorium de la iglesia San Juan Bosco. A las ocho y media p.m. Circulados por Manuel Capablanca y Arturo Suárez.

CUBA EN EL DESTIERRO

POR ANTONIO ROJAS

"Manolito" Artime, ex-teniente castrista, ex-niño mimado de los hermanos Kennedy, que lo hicieron rico, esta realizando los mas ingentes esfuerzos por ligarse a los republicanos. Eso explica el fervor conque defendio la aspiracion a presidir la asociacion de veteranos de la Brigada 2506, de Edgardo Buttari, cuyo padre del mismo nombre tiene negocios con "Bebe" Rebozo, el intimo amigo del presidente Richard M. Nixon.

Artime vino de Nicaragua, donde tiene florecientes negocios, el pasado sabado y el domingo convoco para las primeras horas de la mañana a su antigua gente del difunto MRR para su palacete de la 10 avenida y la calle 89 del N.W. Alli los recogio como un rebaño y los llevo a votar por Buttari.

Muchos se sintieron ofendidos y votaron por otros aspirantes. Creian, inocentemente, que el "golden-boy" los habia llamado para hacerle la guerra a Castro.

xxx

Las 15 momias ilustres del destierro se reunieron en sesion extraordinaria para leer una carta renuncia de Guasimodo, abandonando al comite de carcamales porque Lincoln Rodon y "Felo" Guas le estan zarrando la badana a los americanos. Y Emilito es mas americano estos dias, que el pastel de manzana. Al final, decidieron no hacer publica la carta donde Nuñez Portuondo afirma que el "tiene compromisos con Nixon".

He aqui otro vivales que sueña que los "marines" lo van a instalar graciosamente en Palacio.

Estaban presentes Nabucodonosor, Assurbanipal, Ramses II, Nefertiti y Tutankamen.

xxx

[illegible] de un ga- jarraco de apellido Rodriguez, que en un programa de TV, de pesimo gusto, en un emisora en español, la noche del pasado sabado, dijo que "el camino del regreso a Cuba era muy largo".

Se parece mucho a lo que di-

vos", con oficina y cuartel en la calle 27 del Noroeste y Dimas Mir, comerciante bolitero, propietario de la tienda "Santa Catalina" de Hialeah.

Cuando faltan hombres de coraje y honor, hay unos pocos hombres que tienen el honor y el coraje de muchos hombres, decia Marti.

xxx

Cuando Raul Castro cruzo la carretera central por Gladys y La Torcaza, cerca de Palma Soriano, el 4 de septiembre de 1957, rumbo a Sierra Cristal, llevaba 120 hombres.

Pero ya hacia un año que estaba en el llamado Segundo Frente, un jefe de los alzados con 200 hombres. Este guajiro de Mayari, pronto advirtio que la insurreccion tenia caracter tipicamente comunista. En los primeros meses, despues que cayo sobre Cuba, la "cortina de chuc rre", el guajiro, que ya era comandante, tuvo que refugiarse en una embajada y salir al destierro, donde no dejo de luchar. Sus antiguos compañeros tienen fe en el.

Y nosotros tambien.

Wait and see...

xxx

Vino de Madrid el ex-capitan Joaquin Labrada, que fue del SIM y del servicio domestico del ex-presidente Fulgencio Batista en su palacete campestre de "Kukine".

Dijo a sus amigos en Miami: "Nadie nos puede quitar el poder en Cuba cuando caiga Fidel Castro. Pero no todos los que estaban con nosotros van a volver a ser ministros. Ahora vamos a poner solamente a los de la casa, que se han mantenido fieles".

Todo lo cual confirma nuestras anteriores informaciones sobre las quimeras del ex-general. Porque si alguien lo sabe, ese es Lebonda, que tiene acceso a los momentos mas intimos del "[illegible] luchador que con [illegible] negacion y sacrificio ha estado pasando sin desmayos y sufriendo toda clase de privaciones en su destierro español".

No me hagan reir que tengo el labio partido...

hiciera un "paquete" a
lo era flojo en la repre-
to era justo. Y con mu-
uencia, compasivo con
hechos de mala cabeza,
an el juego a los comu-
es daba consejos sanos
le sus padres. Le inven-
a historia de atrocidades
Santa Clara nadie creyo.
otes hicieron un docu-
exonerandolo de las fal-
iciones. Lo traicionaron
que estan aqui y que se
asar por amigos suyos,
os momentos en que iba
i una lancha por la playa
échita".

p. Teodulo Ortiz: "En
a Cuba con un fusil a
con mi deber, aunque
ngo 20 años"

xxx

ha se esta escribiendo
dias un libro inacaba-
podria titularse "Elogio
jo esclavo", del que es
mismo que produjo "La
me absolverá" y que, sin
una, ha sido ya conde-
tes de pasar a la hi-

*



UN COLEGA. "El Sol de Hialeah", nueva publicación dirigida por el joven Raúl L. Martinez. Primogénito de "Chin". Es el primer periódico latino de la ciudad que progresa. Su confección tipográfica magnífica. Un órgano más para la causa cubana.

SUBASTAS. Por el Canal 2 TV. Iniciada el 21 hasta el 26 de abril Pinturas, Esculturas, en venta. Para ayudar a la WTHS (canal 2) en el programa Educacional del Condado de Dade. En su servicio comunal. Convocados expertos de Arte. Para discutir los trabajos de arte y el talento artístico de donantes.

o-O-o

DE INTERES. Para los pequeños comerciantes cubanos refugiados. Damos la noticia reiterada sobre los beneficios que pueden derivarse del sistema SCORE Este organismo (Administración de Pequeños Negocios), que son los negocios de menos de 25 empleados ofrece ayuda económica y orientación. Bajo ciertas condiciones. Las oficinas en el Room 912, Federal Office Bldg., 51 S W. y Primera Avenida. Miami, Fla.

oOo

de Fidel Castro [illegible] que moriran sobre la nieve en el destierro de Estados Unidos o seran enterrados bajo las arenas de Miami".

Los productores de TV, radio y prensa escrita deben vigilar que no se produzcan corrientes desmoralizadoras en tan poderosos vehiculos de publicidad.

xxx

Hablaba el desplumado "sinsonte maniguero de Potrerillo", hoy recipiente de miserable pitanza en los establos de Augias de la "compañia" en Miami: "Esa defensa de LIBERTAD a los "municipios llamados libres" [illegible] a hacer sus inscripciones. Once no puede luchar contra la CIA. Aqui, el que se ponga frente al Departamento de Estado "queda" por porfiado"...

Un amigo de la casa, que lo escuchaba, respondio al "sinsonte con espuelas y papada doble": "Usted es un comecheque. Aqui se hace pasar por revolucionario izquierdista y hasta quiso que los comunistas lo hicieran "comisionado municipal en Holguin" cuando la vispera andaba de cachanchan de Anselmo Alliegro, haciendo discursos picuos en Banes. Yo lo muerdo bien. Andese con ciudado, que anda una galleta por el aire...".

El paniaguado, que sirvio de instrumento para dividir a los municipios, a cambio de los 30 dineros, hizo mutis por el foro...

xxx

He aqui a dos cubanos de Miami que no descansan en sus afanes por el regreso honorable: Zacarias Acosta, ex-alcalde de Regla y jefe de los "Pinos Nue-

xxx

El ex-general Batista, en su afan de venir a Estados Unidos, hizo que su hijo Jorge, que nacio aqui, optase por la ciudadania americana, a fin de que lo reclamase para que pudiese entrar aqui. Pero cuando le rechazaron la solicitud al muchacho, el general hizo que renunciase a la ciudadania recien adquirida.

xxx

Grave daño le esta haciendo a los cubanos que operan una planta de TV en español, que trasmite 40 horas a la semana en Miami, el rumor de que detras de ellos esta Batista

Las gentes prefieren los vehiculos publicitarios independientes, libres de compromisos con los "papaupas" de la [illegible]

xxx

Muy bien la decision, un poco tarde, de Enriquito Huertas, ofreciendo el dinero del misterioso banco "Jose Marti" para "empeños serios" en la lucha contra Castro.

Se le olvido decir de que tamaño es el guanajo. Pero aun esta a tiempo. En cuanto a lo de "empeños serios", le aconsejamos al presidente de los medicos en el exilio, que pida planes y proyectos a las organizaciones y lideres, sin dejar fuera a nadie. Y que en una especie de "Clearing House", a cargo de conocedores del asunto y previa audiencia de aquellos que hayan dicho algo que valga la pena o [illegible]

Pasa a la Pag. 15

suficientes
s.
ijuria,

el automóvil,
ero,
os,

todo

ago,

s cancillerías.
; el sindicato.
las academias,

destruidas,

r de todas
s
urdia,

s
s,

istoria.

to,
lvo.

en cielo falsos

nte,
atria.
ada
os...!
ierro
orras,
os
ndo:

...!

Espiritistas, brujos, curanderos.
Y astrólogos que ven en las estrellas
(de la bandera yanqui, desde luego),
claro el futuro de la patria. Y éstos
ganapanes de hoy, serán mañana
los "redentores" de aquel pobre pueblo?

En todas partes la turba opinando,
tomando acuerdos, buscando [illegible]
y editando novelas, por entrega.
Y hablando de volver, pero no haciendo
otra cosa que hablar, porque no quiere
dar por la patria, ni siquiera un hueso.

Y al Stadium la turba, porque dicen
que ahora las cosas sí que van en serio,
porque ha llegado un plenipotenciario
de Bolivia, con orden de Barrientos
para canjear las cenizas sangrientas
del "Che" Guevara, por cubanos presos.

Y en tanto en Cuba los presos se pudren
y acá muy pocos se acuerdan de ellos,
y más importa el overtime a muchos
que aquellos presos que se están pudriendo,
Barrientos sigue con su circo al hombro
y la turba detrás. Sigue el destierro
hoy lo mismo que ayer, y los estómagos,
como islotes parásitos, creciendo.

Y en la América hispánica, la turba
de indios y de mestizos, en acecho,
mientras sus infelices gobernantes,
son más que tales, unos limosneros,
que por medrar con la sangre de Cuba,
hasta traicionan a sus propios pueblos.

La capa de Cortés y la sotana
del Padre de Las Casas, en conventos,
universidades y cancillerías,
bajo el oprobio de la turba, ardiendo.

Y en esta América de acá, lo mismo:
El "solar" yanqui contra el rascacielos,
el hombre negro contra el hombre blanco,
y el hombre blanco contra el hombre negro,
y la turba incendiando y gobernando
en el uno y el otro, porque ambos
llevan la turba, desatada, dentro.

Ya en Misisipi, en Dallas y en Los Angeles
han muerto, juntos; dos blancos y un negro
frente a los pelotones que ellos mismos
armaron en la turba, por supuesto.

A los dos blancos sobre todo, un día,
para hallarlos culpables o absolverlos,
los juzgará la Historia, y ya es seguro
que al iniciarse apenas el proceso,
irrumpirá BAHIA DE COCHINOS,
¡Para que puedan acusar sus muertos...!

La turba acaba de invadirlo todo:
las almas, las conciencias, los cerebros,
y en territorio norteamericano,
¡ya han comenzado los fusilamientos!

MIGUEL GONZALEZ
Hialeah, Fla. 29 de Junio de 1968.

[illegible] en Washington, Nueva York y Miami, que [illegible] la misteriosa CIA tiene un pacto secreto con factores importantes del regimen castrista para mantener a un grupo de oficiales golpistas por un tiempo en el poder en Cuba. No se excluye la posibilidad de que se den igualmente, garantias solicitadas por Moscu, para sus viejos amigos comunistas cubanos, a los cuales previsoramente han ordenado que hagan ostensible su inconformidad con Castro, a fin de hacerlos respetables si Castro es muerto, preso o se fuga al extranjero. Como parte de este acuerdo, Estados Unidos se comprometeria a impedir que los exilados armados, procedentes de este pais, saltaran a la isla y constituyeran una amenaza para la nueva situacion. Se cree pues, que los exilados que intenten ir a Cuba por cuenta propia, serian arrestados en Estados Unidos, como ocurrio cuando la expedicion de Bahia de Cochinos con Rolando Masferrer y otros desterrados no afectos al llamado Consejo de Jose Miro Cardona, al que se intento torpemente imponer como gobierno en Cuba.

Identicas provisiones parecen haberse tomado con los presos politicos, a los que tambien temen los golpistas que aun forman parte del gobierno de La Habana.

No se descarta la posibilidad, segun estas fuentes, de que un numero limitado de cubanos, pero en caracter de militares norteamericanos en activo, acompañen en funciones administrativas y de enlace, a las fuerzas armadas de este pais y de algunas naciones de la Organizacion de Estados Americanos, que envian tropas a Cuba, como ocurrio cuando la guerra civil en la Republica Dominicana.

Marzo 7, 1969 Pagina 7

TRAJINES POLITICOS

En estas averiguaciones estuvo en Washington la pasada semana, el ex-presidente Carlos Prio Socarras. Y en identicos trajines, con vista a lograr una posicion de influencia en el futuro politico cubano, se han movido en la capital, Emilio Nuñez Portuondo, Antonio Maceo, Manolo Reyes y otros.

BUEN HUMOR

POR NO HACER CASO A LA CIENCIA

El dentista regresó a casa y su mujer le hizo esta confesión:

—En la casa de la esquina, la mujer estaba pelando las papas cuando volvió el marido. El se le acercó callandamente por detrás, le vendó los ojos con las manos. Asustada, ella se volvió, le clavó el cuchillo en el pecho...

Ella, distraída, el [illegible]

p.m. 443-8775
stery
S DE CALIDAD
27th AVE.
LA.

URGE EL CONTROL DE LOS ALQUILERES

SECRET

Usted hace una demanda a la oficina del control de los alquileres en Nueva York y en horas, tiene allí la visita de un inspector que pone las cosas en orden.

Esto no sucede en Miami, donde no hay una agencia que se ocupe de tan serio problema para la gente de ingresos modestos.

El alza en los precios de arrendamiento de casas y apartamentos, los [illegible] propietarios [illegible]. Y algo debe hacerse de inmediato. [illegible] de la prensa [illegible] en español y la constitución [illegible] de un organismo que [illegible]

SECRET

pier-
ades
s a
om-
po-
ana
ciu-
son
pan-
titu-
ico-

de
ver-
lar-
a a
ra-
la
pa-
su
esa-
sólo
su
nen-

ente
ba-
de
del
ber-
tido
laba

del
Hol-
co-
AM
con
las
acia
el
acia

han
nes
ien-
nte
cio-
en

MIAMI en la NOTA

MAÑANA, sábado 8, homenaje de los Médicos, Enfermeras, Empleados y Miembros de la Florida Cultural y Clinica Cubana a sus Ejecutivos: Don Benjamin León, Lourdes Merino, Rosa Liber, Marta León y al colega Carlos Gómez, de Relaciones Públicas.

oOo

LA COMISION organizadora del agasajo la integran los doctores Rodolfo Sotolongo, Armando Fernández, Luis Bustamante, Fernando Salas, Carlos Cagigas, José L. Alcover y Candila Medina. Lugar: Centro Vasco. A las siete y media de la noche.



oOo

DE INTERES. 'El doctor Jack McKenzie, Director de Servicios Médicos del Refugio, reitera a los cubanos, separen sus turnos para el Dispensario Médico, dejando simplemente los datos. Nombre completo. Su C.F. y C.P. Su edad. Llamar a los teléfonos 352-3277; 352-3378 y 352-3379.

oOo



[illegible] EN EL DESTIERRO

POR ANTO[illegible]

Carlos Prio Socarras dio una fuerte suma para ayudar a la eleccion del desvergonzado comunista Juan Bosch en Santo Domingo.

Antes, habia contribuido ampliamente para Accion Democratica, de Romulo Betancourt, en Venezuela.

Ahora, el acaudalado Alberto Inocente Alvarez, en cuya casa en Miami Springs, pernocta en sus viajes a Estados Unidos, el enano Jose (Pepe) (Cachuca) Figueres, de Costa Rica, ha hecho una contribucion que algunos estiman en mas de dos millones, para poner al antiguo apologista de Fidel Castro en la presidencia de su país.

¿Cuanto dan estos campeones para luchar por reconquistar la patria?

Cero.

¿Cuanto dieron para llevar a los barbudos al poder?

Ocho millones.

* * *

Muy concurrida la asamblea del pasado domingo, celebrada por los periodistas cubanos de los colegios exilados para formalizar la unidad. Todos los oradores hicieron votos porque mas nunca haya desunion en la casa.

Decimos nosotros con todo respeto: la unidad se mantendra hasta que de nuevo llegue la gente del "ring ring" con el maletin de billetes. Que es lo que ocurrio antes con los periodistas, con los municipios y con las organizaciones combatientes del destierro.

Una vez dijo el general mexicano Alvaro Obregon: "No hay general de la revolucion que aguante un cañonazo de veinte mil pesos".

Parodiamos: si casi ninguna organizacion profesional, clasista o de cualquier orden de la

Anda por esas calles de Dios un titulado "comandante Gómez" del ejército rebelde, que no le cede a un general de opereta colocando "checks" sin fondo en los comercios de Miami.

Una de sus víctimas más recientes fue la bodega criolla de la calle 23 y 27 Court en el Noroeste.

A cogerlo...

* * *

Dicen que "se tira" el capitán Vicente Méndez, que fue del ejército rebelde en Las Villas. Un poco publicado el plan, lo cual supone riesgos de que los bandidos comunistas lo estén esperando.

Pero en todo caso, dicen que Méndez es hombre que cumple su pelabra y que no lo detiene nadie. Si esto es así, el exilio todo, independiente de militancia sectaria, debe ayudarlo con medicinas, balas, víveres y dinero.

* * *

El domingo 30 de marzo a las 10 y media de la mañana, en el canal 10 de TV, "Panamericana" que dirigia Alberto Gandero y ahora está a cargo de Manolo de la Torre, camagüeyano de la USIA, se hará una entrevista a representativos del "Comité de los 100". Este organismo, como se sabe, gestiona la libertad de un grupo de presos políticos cubanos.

De la Torre ha invitado a nuestro director Rolando Masferrer a la entrevista televisada.

* * *

Habla Orlando Piedra con Juan Gonzalez Andino: "Estoy muy bravo con Rolando. No debio decir que Eira Aleida Batista se casaba. Rolando no tiene donde ir en politica, excepto con nosotros. Le dice a todo el mundo que no lea LIBERTAD.

Respuesta de Masferrer: "El

Dr. J. McKenzie

oOo

QUIZAS. De los Barberos. [illegible] con que el Pelo Largo afecta el negocio. La moda masculina de dejarse crecer el pelo causa la baja de trabajos. 15 barberias del S.W. (mayoria latinas) son los protestantes. Si se cambiara la costumbre se volveria a normalizar los pelados. Parece que los barberos elevarán el precio de $2.25 a $2.50. Eso sí es grave.

oOo

oOo

HOMENAJE *a la prensa. Por la unidad de la clase. Organizado por los "cardenenses". En la fecha de la fundación de la Cuidad Bandera. A las ocho de la noche de mañana sábado. En el local social del 127 S.W. 22 Avenida. Se entregarán diplomas a los dirigentes Mario Barrera y Díaz Versón. Además a otros colegas.*

oOo

LOS CARDENENSES *en su fecha conmemorativa darán un documento al Director de "Patria", colega Armando García Sifredo. En reconocimiento a su labor desarrollada. También a otras publicaciones, Radio Cuba, Fabulosa. Nos informó Rafael Palmer, secretario de Prensa.*

oOo

CONVOCAN *Contadores. Para elegir nueva directiva. Admitirán candidaturas hasta el 21 de marzo. Elecciones el 23, de 9 a.m. a 4 p.m. En el local del 1592 West Flagler St. Convocan: Francisco Tovar y Francisco Rodríguez.*

emigracion. Y por eso esta Fidel Castro en el poder despues de diez años de injusticias y locuras.

●●●

Escribe "Pancho" Varona. Dice que viene de las cortes de Cuba. Que el director de LIBERTAD estaba en Nueva York pegandose la gran vida, mientras el era torturado y preso por Castro en Cuba. Que Rolando Masferrer fue a España, mandado por los comunistas, a ahorcar curas y monjas. Que el (Panchon) no es de la CIA. Que tampoco es un intelectual. (Lo cual es evidente). Que no quiere polemizar. (Lo cual es logico). Que la esperanza de Cuba son los analfabetos.

Respuesta de RM: a) ¿Donde trabaja Pancho? b) Desde 1959 llevo una vida de perros. c) Nunca he ahorcado a nadie. Y dudo que ningun soldado antifascista en la guerra de España, haya ahoracado a un fraile o a una hermanita de la Caridad, entre los que tengo queridos amigos. Lastima que Pancho simpatice con Franco. Fui alumno de los Escolapios en Guanabacoa. Hice la primera comunion. Voy a la iglesia en secreto. d) Pancho no debe tener ojeriza a los intelectuales porque el no quiso ir a la escuela. Pero no comparto su entusiasmo por los analfabetos. Mucho menos cuando van a la television o escriben articulos o hablan en publico. Entonces son insoportables.

Mi consejo sin ironias: Todavia Pancho puede ir al Lindsey Hopkins, excelente escuela para adultos. Ya ve que no lo quiero mal. Ademas recuerdo a su hermano "Toño". Gran amigo. Gran cubano. Gran tipo humano".

periodico le hizo un gran servicio a la hija de Batista diciendo que se casaba. Esto debia entenderlo Orlando. En cuanto a lo de mi destino politico: cuando pacte con Batista, yo era el lider del PRC en la Camara y Carlos Hevia, que era una persona decente, me habia seleccionado para presidir este cuerpo colegislador en su gobierno. Batista recibio mas de mi, que yo de el. Nada le debo. No hago leña del arbol caido, pero no rehuiria una polemica publica sobre este y otros extremos. Lo que pasa es que a todos no nos fue igual ni nos propusimos identicos fines en su gobierno".

"Quizas un dia, sin herir a Piedra, que es una persona bastante buena, hagamos un reportaje o una serie de articulos sobre estos asuntos. Estoy seguro que seria de interes de los lectores, empezando por Piedra. No creo que Piedra tenga una influencia que inquiete al jefe de circulacion de LIBERTAD, cuando aconseje que no nos lean", concluyo RM.

●●●

Delfin H. Pupo, ex-embajador de Cuba en Canada, tiene siembras de malanga y boniato en el area de Miami en sociedad con Coronel. Cientos de acres. Y sigue en su pleito con Stanley Ross con motivo de sus inversiones en el "Tiempo" de Nueva York.

●●●

Se va para Honduras, dentro de unas semanas, Anselmito Alegro. Se impone probar su mano en la busqueda de oro en el rio Patuca. De paso, dara gusto a su "hobby", matando algunos pumas y tapires.

Adrian NOVIAS
2347 BISCAYNE BOULEVARD TEL. 377-3147

SECRET

MANIOBRAS EN GUANTANAMO

Viene de la primera

ordenado a presentarse inmediatamente, es interpretado en Washington como "que su especialidad en desembarco y en combate son necesarios en la CIA en los proximos meses".

Igualmente, como un signo positivo en la politica norteamericana para Latino America, se interpreta la designacion como Sub-Secretario de Estado para asuntos hemisfericos del ejecutivo de Sears and Roebuck y de la United Fruit Company, de Charles Meyers.

En resumen: en Cuba todos esperan el desplome del gobierno de Fidel Castro.

oUo

Sin la omnipresente CIA, que es el brazo despi
dado que impone la política de Washington contra
acción armada del pueblo cubano en el destierro; s
las actitudes de sabrosones Pilatos que viven en
opulencia indiferentes a la tragedia de Cuba, estarí
lloviendo bombas sobre la cabeza de Fidel Castro.

"Los tres poderosos" se reserven para reinar sob
las cenizas de la isla. Esperan que el fruto podrido l
caiga en las manos.

No entienden que esa corriente arrolladora de
historia que no remonta de regreso la montaña
tiempo y las hondas transformaciones sociales de
revolución es propia para hombres más jóvenes, rob
tecidos por los grandes ideales, que no alientan en
corazones endurecidos y fríos.

oOo

¿Quienes puedan sustituir en las próximas jorna
de enconada pelea y en los días ulteriores de la reco
trucción a la CIA, a Batista y a Prío como canali
dores de la vida cubana que han acumulado experi
cias y conocimientos con los cuales construir los pa
dos políticos madurados en la emigración, la cland
tinidad y la prisión política?

La nación cuando caiga Castro, va a quedar cur
de providencialismos y extremistas revolucionarios.

Devolverá la confianza en los que la hicieron gra
en el pasado. Le mostrará las espaldas a los tren
distas con sus formulas catastróficas de falso refor
mo que solo produce convulsiones y miserias.

Hay en el destierro cien líderes regionales de
buena política de limpios expedientes en las admi
tracions locales, en el congreso y en los ministerios.

La virtud no es un privilegio de ninguna facción
pasado. Ni la corrupción era monopolio de nin
partido.

[illegible] Marzo 22-69

RADAR

En los ultimos años, el Departamento de Estado norteame-
ricano ha desalentado sistematicamente toda actividad del exi-
lio contra la tiranía comunista cubana.

La Agencia Central de Inteligencia, que no hace la política
exterior de Estados Unidos, pero que la aplica, respondiendo
fielmente a cada viraje, uso a sus paniaguados cubanos para
delatar expediciones e infiltraciones a Cuba. Y ordeno a sus
plumiferos y locutores sin pudor ni patriotismo, pero con
sueldo, que melificaran sus ataques a Castro y no estimulasen
las acciones armadas de las organizaciones militantes. Asi se
cancelaron programas radiales y se colocaron censores en las
estaciones.

De hecho, todos los cubanos que cobraban mensualmente
del gobierno de este país, a traves de sus miles de organizacio-
nes pantallas, algunas de las cuales aparecen como latinoame-
ricanas, alemanas o españolas, y hasta muy respetables, pero
que reciben subsidios solo en la medida que siguen sus orien-
taciones, han estado sirviendo de eficaces protectores de Fidel
Castro.

Con una tenacidad digna de mejor causa, la CIA metio su
sucio dinero en las organizaciones profesionales o regionales
del exilio para que se tratara, sistematicamente, todo intento
de usar estas corporaciones para la lucha armada contra los
rojos.

Muchos activistas, asustados o comprados, porque la CIA
tambien mete en la carcel a los rebeldes que no se les some-
ten, abandonaron la lucha.

Asi fue asesinado el espiritu de lucha de la inmigracion.
Y no se produjeron mas incursiones a la costa de Cuba, ni
bombardeos a los ingenios, ni expediciones. Y los periodicos
locales hicieron la triste cronica de las prisiones que se impu-
sieron de los que no se vendian ni se alquilaban.

Quizas esto cambie mañana, como cambio ayer. Hasta
Bahia de Cochinos y un poquito despues, la CIA, aplicando
la politica del Departamento de Estado, ayudo a golpear al
bandido con ametralladoras y explosivos.

Pero la cronica en que aparecen los alquilones, los chivatos,
los que se prestaron, por los miserables treinta dineros, a divi-
dir a los veteranos de Bahia de Cochinos, a los abogados, a los
periodistas, a los municipios, no se ha publicado aun. Pero se
publicara.

Aspiramos a hacerlo nosotros. Ya trabajamos en la relacion
de los que se prostituyeron en vez de tomar el camino honroso
de las factorias.

[illegible] Marzo [illegible]

CRIXO

---

en su [illegible]
ma. Con Manolito será distinto. Tema inagotable para
la chirigota y la corbafleta.

Nada amenaza su destino político. A menos que
aparezca el niño Bastelo, o la Pudibunda Flor de
Yateras.

Pero confiemos en el nuevo líder.

Libertad Marzo [illegible]

CRIXO

MANIOBRAS EN GUANTANAMO

Viene de la primera

ordenado a presentarse inmediatamente, es interpretado en Washington como "que su especialidad en desembarco y en combate son necesarios en la CIA en los proximos meses".

Igualmente, como un signo positivo en la política norteamericana para Latino America, se interpreta la designacion como Sub-Secretario de Estado para asuntos hemisfericos del ejecutivo de Sears and Roebuck y de la United Fruit Company, de Charles Meyers.

En resumen: en Cuba todos esperan el desplome del gobierno de Fidel Castro.

oOo

Sin la omnipresente CIA, que es el brazo despi dado que impone la política de Washington contra acción armada del pueblo cubano en el destierro; s las actitudes de sabrosones Pilatos que viven en opulencia indiferentes a la tragedia de Cuba, estarí lloviendo bombas sobre la cabeza de Fidel Castro.

"Los tres poderosos" se reservan para reinar sob las cenizas de la isla. Esperan que el fruto podrido caiga en las manos.

No entienden que esa corriente arrolladora de historia que no remonta de regreso la montaña tiempo y las hondas transformaciones sociales de revolución es propia para hombres más jóvenes, rob tecidos por los grandes ideales, que no alientan en corazones endurecidos y fríos.

oOo

¿Quienes puedan sustituir en las próximas jorna de enconada pelea y en los días ulteriores de la reco trucción a la CIA, a Batista y a Prío como canali dores de la vida cubana que han acumulado experi cias y conocimientos con los cuales construir los pa dos políticos madurados en la emigración, la cland tinidad y la prisión política?

La nación cuando caiga Castro, va a quedar cur de providencialismos y extremistas revolucionarios.

Devolverá la confianza en los que la hicieron gra en el pasado. Le mostrará las espaldas a los trem distas con sus formulas catastróficas de falso reform mo que solo produce convulsiones y miserias.

Hay en el destierro cien líderes regionales de buena política de limpios expedientes en las admin tracions locales, en el congreso y en los ministerios.

La virtud no es un privilegio de ninguna facción pasado. Ni la corrupción era monopolio de nin partida.

Marzo 22-69

RADAR

La radio de La Habana ha mostrado su regocijo estos días ante el divertido espectáculo que le ofrecen algunos exilados en Miami lanzando la candidatura presidencial del inolvidable "Niño Pilón" de la CMQ de La Habana.

Lejos de desalmidonarse, el antiguo muchacho prodigio, ante la burla chabacana de los comunistas admitió no solo que él era el mismo mozo de calzones cortos que aparecía en las pantallas de la TV de la capital cubana anunciando la sabrosura del último buchito, sino que sus méritos para dirigir a la zarandeada nación cubana en el futuro estaban robustecidos por el hecho de que el había vendido pirulíes en la plaza del Polvorín.

Conque no quieren al niño Pilón, pues ahí viene Antón el Pirulero.

Mal hueso para roer se han buscado los pelafustanes de la propaganda comunista con Manolito.

Quizás el Departamento de Estado Norteamericano que según Manolito "lo baquea" con un entusiasmo del que no gozó ni el boricua Luis Muñoz Marín en los tiempos de la dientusa Eleanora Rosevelt, después de tantos fracasos en la selección de sus futuros gobernadores del estado libre asociado de Cuba, ha acertado con Manolito.

Los revolucionarios traicionados se llevaron la plata de la CIA. Se retiraron a sus refugios recoletos en los claustros universitarios o en las fincas de reciente adquisición. Nadie los recuerda. Quizás no daban material, en su seriedad de burros, para el chascarrillo y la broma. Con Manolito será distinto. Tema inagotable para la chirigota y la cuchufleta.

Nada amenaza su destino político. A menos que aparezca el niño Bustelo, o la Pudibunda Flor de Yateras.

Pero confiemos en el nuevo líder.

Libertad - Marzo 22-69

CRIXO

fenso de los
'inner Key".
s y latinos
ce Lesesque

cha del Decoro"
llivan, han de-
ren ciertamente
el inicio de una
ical del poder
enes aspiran a
defensa de los
mismos quieren
Tales conceptos
mo de alto sen-
lidad.

bración de lo
"Orange Bowl".
ndrán la opor-
r a numerosos
kie Glesson en
meros de mú-
s melodías.

ERY

FLA.

PICA

RE
RE

ALAZN

SAS

A 9

28

29c

Lovesque

La cita que se ha realizado para la "Marcha del Decoro", asegura que estarán presentes 50 mil jóvenes de los 70.000 registrados. Aparte de las representaciones de países que vendrán al "Orange Bowl" el domingo próximo. Culminará el acontecimiento para fortalecimiento del principio moral cristiano y marcará el inicio de una era de rectificaciones de orden religioso, cultural y artístico.

Viene de la Pag. 3

CUBA EN EL DESTIERRO.

En los últimos tiempos del gobierno del presidente *Fulgencio* Batista se conservaban una apreciable cantidad de cocaína en un *departamento* de la policía de la Habana. *Se* trataba de una prueba de convicción que debía *presentarse* a un juicio *contra* traficantes de drogas que habían sido *arrestados* cuando introdujeron de contrabando un valioso cargamento procedented e *Ecuador*. La vista se posponía *con sospechosa* frecuencia. *Algunos* temían que la cocaína se transformase en bicarbonato de soda, que era uno de los *milagros* que producían ciertos *avisados* alquimistas en la capital cubana.

droga desapareció *como por arte* debirlibir lo que las autoridades norteamericanas del buró de narcóticos, que habían estado al tanto del escándalo, no las tenían todas *consigo con* ciertos oficiales policiacos *que* pudieron haber metido *en el* mercado la *cocaína. A los diez años* del hecho, *continúan* las averiguaciones. Pero en *Miami.*

oOo

Emulando los triunfos [illegible] del famoso play boy dominicano Porfirio Rubirosa, un ex general cubano dedica sus horas de asueto a practicar el elegante deporte del polo, inventado por los rajahs de la India hace siglos.

Contrario [illegible] batallas que en vez de [illegible] a la [illegible] Marcha [illegible] comunidades, se [illegible] al [illegible] de los [illegible] de [illegible]

POR ROLANDO NOVOA

Tres poderosas fuerzas influyen en forma negativa en el esfuerzo del destierro por ayudar al estallido interno que todos esperan en Cuba: Fulgencio Batista, Carlos Prío y el gobierno de los Estados Unidos.

Las tres actúan como una poderosa retranca que impide que una corriente continua de factores humanos y materiales llegue cada día por vía clandestina a Cuba estimulando la acción de la gente brava de la resistencia.

Si estas tres potencias económicas y políticas se coordinasen para reforzar el frente interno, se acortaría el período de sufrimientos y angustias que aún tienen por delante el pueblo mártir de Cuba.

Ahora mismo varios grupos de desterrados, en lugares distintos unos de otros, están impulsando la vertebración de un organismo único de dirección de la emigración en la lucha por el regreso a la patria. Pero si Batista, *Prío* y el Departamento de Estado Norteamericano se mantienen ausentes del loable empeño, este fracasará.

No es grato reconocer esta realidad política del exilio. Pero ella no va a desaparecer porque nos neguemos a verla. ¿Es que acaso existen fórmulas para forzar a los millonarios ex-presidentes que hicieron sus fabulosas fortunas entrando a saco en los fondos públicos con pasmoso desenfado a que concurran al esfuerzo del pueblo para recuperar sus libertades?

Desde luego que sí.

Pero son las fórmulas dramáticas, de la sangre y el fuego, sin las cuales no son posibles las revoluciones ni las guerras, que siguen siendo, no importa lo odioso del nombre que postuló esta verdad, las parteras de la historia.

Unanse los grupos de acción. Armense. Y golpeen sin descanso ni compasión al enemigo allá, y aquí, a los sabrosones, los gozadores, los indiferentes y los traidores. Se verá como aún Batista, *Prío* y la Agencia Central de Inteligencia de Estados Unidos, respetarían al destierro y asumirían una posición positiva en la lucha contra la opresión y el crimen castrista.

Los ricos pueden esperar.

Ellos no tienen prisa.

Están convencidos de que cuando caiga la tiranía, que caerá, a pesar de todo, se organizará un proceso electoral, y ellos, con sus dineros mal habidos, entrarán en el Senado, quizás en Palacio, como si ni hubiese pasado nada.

Porque Batista ni gana en las urnas el sólo contra un solo partido adversario.

Ni *Prío* tampoco.

Pero si la Cuba de mañana, en alguna forma refleja la atomización del exilio de estos días, que es un corte vertical en lo ideológico, lo clasista y lo partidista, de lo que será la isla mañana y van a la puja de sufragios diez o veinte partidos, puede ganar Batista o Prío. Qué poderoso caballero es don dinero.

Hagámosle un juicio público cada día a estos caballeros de riñón cubierto que sienten un desprecio olímpico *por* los combatientes de las organizaciones militantes. Que creen que no necesitan a nadie. Y que cuando los necesiten, los comprarían. Y hasta a bajos precios.

Pongámoslo, cada día, *por* su indolencia, en la picota pública de la denuncia.

Demandémosle, que lo que tienen a buen recaudo en *los* bancos de Europa y Estados Unidos, que no es de ellos, debe ser puesto al servicio de la patria ahora mismo.

Radicalicemos el exilio librándonos de los "papanpas" de la *emigración* con sus *edificios* de apartamentos, sus *grandes negocios*, su insultante opulencia. No tenemos *porque* guardarle consideraciones a quienes no la guardan a los que sufren por sus culpas.

LA LEGIONERA

SECRET RAD-33-0

Mayo 11-1969

LIBERTAD Pagina

SECRET

Agresion

Póngale el Cuño



Por ARCADIO PERALTA

Conversacion en Madrid: "Cuando "Cuqui" vuelva a ser presidente, el jefe del ejercito sera Roberto. para que no se repita lo que nos hicieron los Tabernilla. Rafaelito ya fue subsecretario de Obras Publicas. El debe ser el ministro. Asi no nos pasara lo que con "Lin" y Gabriela".

Dijo el "general": "Estrecharemos relaciones con este pais que nos ha acogido. Los barcos y los autobuses que ha comprado Castro aqui, seran mantenidos en Cuba. Algo aprovecharemos de los comunistas. Yo estoy arraigandome aqui. He traido la Merrill Lynch".

Y agrego: "Salas Humara y Rafaelito Saladrigas no debieron hacer esa tremenda inversion en tierras en Fort Lauderdale. Debieron invertir en Marbella o en la Costa del Sol. Ya yo he ordenado que me vendan el "elefante" de la quinta avenida y la 42 de Nueva York".

Sin comentarios...

oOo

El comandante del ejercito de Estados Unidos, Erneido Oliva, ex-teniente del ejercito de Batista y ex-oficial de la reforma agraria de Fidel Castro, esta llamado, segun los enterados, a ser el jefe militar de Cuba libre.

Se ha pulido mucho en sus relaciones con los jefes militares del Pentagono y en especial con Joseph Califano, su enlace con la Casa Blanca.

Estos dias, el comandante Oliva, que viste con elegante correccion y que suda optimismo sobre el futuro de Cuba, se vio en el aeropuerto de Miami, arropado en un bien cortado abrigo de cachemira.

oOo

Esta es la candidatura que se ha levantado frente a "la aplanadora de mister Lee" en las elecciones para el ejecutivo de la asociacion de la brigada 2506:

Luis Tornes, Roberto Carballo, Antonio Fernandez, Carlos Palacios, Jesus Vazquez, Pedro Garcia, Angel Murgado, Felix Ruiz, Raul Granja, Edwin Rojas, Hector Ponce, Jose M. Rebozo, Mario Cruz, Antonio Garcia, Ramon Orozco, Pedro Perez.

Sus enemigos les dicen, "los pone bombas del *Ejercito Secreto*"

oOo

El artículo de Rolando Novoa dejando en zapatillas a los tres más poderosos obstáculos que tiene ante si el destierro en el camino de la unidad para la acción armada: el departamento de estado americano, Carlos Prío Socarrás y Fulgencio Batista, ha levantado ronchas.

Estas especies de nefandas "Rebecas" de las que todos hablan, todos padecen y sienten, pero nadie ve, son para mucha gente superficial en asuntos de prensa y política, los "tabus" que no deben ser atacados jamás, porque son muy fuertes y se irritan sus parciales.

Lo que conviene es todo lo contrario: destruir el inmerecido respeto que sus respectivas conductas de oportunistas y logreros, merecen para algunos infelices

Cu

HERIDO ALM

Este semanar
varias semanas c
ros cripto-comu
"Al Fatah", no
conoce a los c
tinos que llevan
terroristas contr
recibiendo entre
gares secretos de

La pasada se
El Cairo y las
cionales de pre
ticia de que "el
Mayor del Ejerc
bia resultado h
compañaba a lo
bes es una inc
rael".

Aun cuando
talles que perm
al jefe cubano,
frecuencia se ca
mandantes milit
do médica que e
resultar Juan A

Edgar
2 Cub

Desde el
Octubre,
combatientes
Rojas y Ram
sición preve
mazmorra d
Son los dos
aquel grupo
gos, en N
detenidos
acusación de
misteriosos "
Siete log
provisional
patriótico de
de gente
aportación
generosos—
pueden cont
de la manc
constituyeron

que más bien muestran la perversión de las sensaciones que caracterizan a los masoquistas.

oOo

Sin la omnipresente CIA, que es el brazo despiadado que impone la política de Washington contra la acción armada del pueblo cubano en el destierro; sin las actitudes de sabrosones Pilatos que viven en la opulencia indiferentes a la tragedia de Cuba, estarian lloviendo bombas sobre la cabeza de Fidel Castro.

"Los tres poderosos" se reservan para reinar sobre las cenizas de la isla. Esperan que el fruto podrido les caiga en las manos.

No entienden que esa corriente arrolladora de la historia que no remonta de regreso la montaña del tiempo y las hondas transformaciones sociales de la revolución es propia para hombres más jóvenes, robustecidos por los grandes ideales, que no alientan en sus corazones endurecidos y fríos.

oOo

¿Quienes puedan sustituir en las próximas jornadas de enconada pelea y en los días ulteriores de la reconstrucción a la CIA, a Batista y a Prío como canalizadores de la vida cubana que han acumulado experiencias y conocimientos con los cuales construir los partidos políticos madurados en la emigración, la clandestinidad y la prisión política?

La nación cuando caiga Castro, va a quedar curada de providencialismos y extremistas revolucionarios.

Devolverá la confianza en los que la hicieron grande en el pasado. Le mostrará las espaldas a los tremendistas con sus formulas catastróficas de falso reformismo que solo produce convulsiones y miserias.

Hay en el destierro cien líderes regionales de la buena política de limpios expedientes en las administracions locales, en el congreso y en los ministerios.

La virtud no es un privilegio de ninguna facción del pasado. Ni la corrupción era monopolio de ningún partido.

*

[illegible] y pero
cantidad suf
uno a uno,
encarlados.
esfuerzos , d
comentamos
espacio hace
Pero el es
envolver a l
por igual, ha
Comité se le
de verdader
andan preocu
de sus compa
futuro de la
no quedan p
ni persona
acudir, ni
esgrimir
conciencias d
quedado esc
sujetos al
carcelario
empedernid
comunes.
Sobre el
Hombres-Mis
queda por
golpear en
preferimos a
curioso— y a
bastante trist
ciertas act
actividad de
cinco meses
voleo, de di
de los periodi
En lo
anuncios de
entrada grat
Siete cenas
mismo 28
restaurant
cubierto, la
su variedad
discursos. Sei
tantos cuba
ellos por una
nadie conoce.
trofeo a prec
méritos
pergamino de
de una. Asoc
sus desvelos y

SECRET

14-00000

marzo 11-1969

SECRET

POR [illegible]

POR IGNOTUS

medico Alberto Chomat estido de miliciano y con stola al cinto, metiendole a todo el mundo por las de La Habana. Se desemomo jefe de la clinica que n los empleados de la anompañia de electricidad devila.

galeno malo, que tamace de las suyas, es Antoto) Acosta, quien, como t, fue por años, enemigo el Castro, pues ambos mien el grupo de Mario ria, quien se halla en la y al borde de la muerte, a los malos tratos a que mete.

---

un tiempo, el tenebroso Valdes esperaba a un de supuestos exilados cuque simularian salir desde para una incursion conosta cubana. Se retirarian cias y las lanchas patrue convendria un acuerdo s para que infiltrasen la cambio de eso, se les ria sacar algunos presos, s familiares en Estados se les pediria dinero a Tambien se les darian neros que saldrian en la cubana para que ganasen sos a los boliteros. Y deso, se les concedia una en el cochino negocio drogas, que vienen de Cu- U.

impidio el viaje. Pero stuvo listo. Y las autorinorteamericanas estan en n de todos los detalles de nallada.

---

un tiempo, vino a E.U. teniente castrista que se otorio con sus palizas a sos en La Cabaña. Aqui utado por la CIA y llevo supuestamente, varias mi- Cuba. Ahora anda fres- por las calles de La Ha- se sabe que el regimen lo tremenda casa. Nadie la CIA, que le paso al nte, cuyo nombre nos re- s, por si acaso. Porque cosas demoniacas en el o mundo de los espias

[illegible] EN LA NOTA

Carlos J. Arboleya.

HOMENAJE AL SR. ARBOLEYA

El próximo lunes 24 a las seis y media de la tarde, tendrá lugar un homenaje de confraternidad al señor Carlos J. Arboleya, recientemente ascendido a Presidente de "Fidelity National Bank" de Coral Gables. Este agasajo lo ofrece la Cámara de Comercio Latina de la que es el señor Arboleya uno de sus más caracterizados miembros. A este homenaje han sido invitadas personalidades cubanas y latinas. LIBERTAD se suma a este merecido acto por los méritos y personalidad desta-

EMILIO MILIAN. De las voces más cotizadas en el ambiente radial. Es uno de los que cubren

EN EL DESTIERRO

POR ANTONIO ROJAS

Recibimos una hoja impresa, anonima, contra Luis Tornes, viejo amigo de las luchas anticomunistas en Oriente. Tratan de demostrar su peligrosidad como "gangster, terrorista y esbirro", que pudiera ser elegido para presidir la asociacion de veteranos de la Brigada 2506. En la publicacion apocrifa, se le compara con otros aspirantes que, supuestamente, tienen el apoyo norteamericano, bien de dependencias del gobierno o del partido republicano. Se propone que se vote por cualquiera, menos por el santiaguero Tornes.

Nos convencio la hojita que lo mas que convendria a "los veteranos", seria elegir a Tornes, "que pone bombas y milita en el ejercito secreto y tiene problemas con la policia", segun dice el cobarde anonimo.

Basta del dominio, tras bambalinas, de la gente del "ring ring". Esta bueno ya de la ominosa dependencia del destierro, de las mentiras del Departamento de Estado, y los oficiales cubanos, del ejercito norteamericano, que viven y viajan como potentados. La libertad de Cuba, si algun dia va a venir, tendra que ocurrir por accion de los cubanos. Que es a nosotros a quienes nos duele. Quizas haya llegado, en buena hora, el fin de los soplones, los cipayos y los que se comen los cheques.

Un jurado federal que juzga a un grupo de cubanos, acusados de integrar una organizacion dedicada a la venta de drogas en Miami, hallo culpables a Jose (Cheo) Morell y a Jose Rodriguez.

El primero figuraba como vendedor de automoviles de una conocida casa, dedicada a este giro, en la calle 8 del suroeste. El segundo era empleado del restaurante "Vizcaya", tambien de la calle 8 del suroeste. Este establecimiento, segun algunas gentes, es propiedad de Manuel Artime Buesa, acaudalado hombre de negocios que en el pasado fue escogido por la administracion del presidente John F. Kennedy para encabezar un gobierno cubano a la caida de Fidel Castro.

El restaurante "Vizcaya", que

Muy bien Glauco Vallant defendiendo la eleccion de un "comite de mandatarios del pueblo cubano libre" en la TV dominical de Manolo de la Torre. Lucio sincero y desprendido. Se seleccionaran, por correos, 21 hombres. De esos, el destierro elegira 7.

Nos parece mas realista elegir 50 y que estos escojan 5. Asi habria congreso del exilio y ejecutivo del congreso. La palabra gobierno, produce santo horror en algunas zonas.

Comentario de Rolando Masferrer: "Vine de Cuba hace mas de 10 años en un barco viejo con 26 hombres. Evidentemente, no eran 26 amigos. Ni 26 compañeros. Quizas, ni 26 hombres. Menos de 10 merecen el titulo de amigos, patriotas, compañeros y hombres. Algunos, como "El Indio" y Rilde, ya murieron peleando. A Kiri lo mato la enfermedad y la angustia. Los mas, se han olvidado de sus deberes. Algunos, hasta de los muertos de su familia. De sus presos. No asisten a reuniones. Le temen al FBI y a la CIA. Pudieron haberse quedado alla. En cambio, nos acompañan en las tareas revolucionarias, 10 años despues, cientos de personas, a las que conocimos aqui. Muchos de ellos vienen del campo contrario. Mañana debemos tener esto presente. A la hora del triunfo".

Si usted desea poner su granito de arena en la lucha por el regreso a Cuba Libre, milite en alguna parte. Contribuya. Compre armas y balas. Done dinero cada semana. Integrese en alguna parte. No sea un emigrado que vino a este pais en busca del "ham and eggs". Sea un hombre entero. Sea distinto a los traficantes, a los "vive bien". No sea un vegetal que no siente ni padece como propios los dolores de sus hermanos. Tenga militancia.

Todas las organizaciones son buenas. Siempre que se desvelen por Cuba. Aunque solo sea con una pedrada, lastime al enemigo que lo ha tratado como a una oOo

rió en Holguín a la edad años el señor José Gon- Urbino, jefe de prestigio- nilia y padre de Carlos. lo, Manolo, "Pepe" Fau- Rosa, a quienes hacemos nuestro mensaje de con- ia los que laboramos en semanario.

oOo

ió en La Habana, el com- Ignacio Piñero, autor uavecito", 'La Cachimba n Juan", "Esas no son as" y "Entre Preciosos res".
ciones y música popular lables de Cuba Libre . . .

oOo

cubano recién llegado a por los vuelos de Va- dijo:
le preparé un doble fon- un maletín, a un miem- el comité central del par- Escondió allí 50 mil dó- en billetes americanos. ijo confidencialmente que o se cae sin remedio..."

UDANZAS
STIMADOS GRATIS
dad y Garantía
Llegadas y Seguros
DANZAS DESDE $1
gelio García
EL: 371-1393

todos los programas de WBQA, Radio Cuba. Especialmente se escucha por el Noticiero de Juan Amador Rodríguez. Es redactor deportivo y de mayor audiencia en el sector. Por su aptitud y labor continua en Radio Cuba, ocupa las primeras líneas en la locución. Por su impecable dicción y objetividad. Todo uno de la clase. Saludos.

ESTA NOCHE. Reunión del Comité Político que apoya la candidatura de Carlos Romero como Decano del CNP (e). Convocatoria a las ocho y media en los salones de la Asociación Fraternal Latinoamericana de Flagler y 22 avenida. También cita a la Comisión de Propaganda del ficid de Romero. La integran René A. Leyva, José Luis Massó y nuestro Juan Morenza. Definirán planes de la campaña electoral.

• • •

Planean una reunión fuera de Miami con los amigos de LIBERTAD para avanzar en el camino de una edición diaria nuestro director Rolando Masferrer. Lugar: Las Vegas, Nevada, donde hay cerca de doscientos caballeros "dealers" cubanos que no olvidan a Cuba y donde nuestro semanario es un tiro cada "week end". Con Rolando Masferrer irán Rafaelito Rodríguez Sánchez y Rolando Novoa. Después, un "mitin" en el vecino Los Angeles. Arriba corazones . . .

prospero fenomenalmente, debido a su excelente comida y su bello decorado interior, ha sufrido un fuerte golpe, debido a que se le uso como centro de distribucion de estupefacientes por mucho tiempo, por gente inescrupulosa, que desacredita al destierro. Aun al presente, la presencia continuada en el bar del "Vizcaya", de gente misteriosa, a la que algunos atribuyen la condicion de funcionarios del buro de narcoticos, mantiene a los parroquianos, ausentes del restaurante, con grave daño para la empresa y los empleados.

Se espera que el empleado del "Vizcaya" y Morell, reciban una sentencia de mas de diez años de prision.

En su carta a LIBERTAD, el ex-vice-presidente "Felo" Guas dice que los abogados estaban unidos hasta que la CIA rego el vil metal y los dividio.

Lo mismo ocurrio a los periodistas: entraron en la nomina Mario Barrera y Ramiro Boza. Y surgio el colegio de Salvador Diaz Verson. Pero resulta que don Salvador cobra por la FIOP, agencia alemana pagada por la CIA. Y, Barrera, por la ORIT, que es una organizacion pantalla del Departamento de Estado americano.

¿Pueden ser independientes los que cobran de un país que no es el suyo?

Antes de votar en los proximos comicios, abogados, periodistas y tambien los brigadistas, debian hacer profesion de fe independiente: "que me expulsen si sigo ordenes del extranjero. Que me lapiden si cobro".

¿Quien tira la primera piedra?

raza

Cada domingo a la una de la tarde (en punto) nos reunimos los orientales y muchos que no lo son, pero que tenemos una proxima cita en Santiago, con un fusil en la diestra. Ayudenos. Reunase con nosotros. Lugar: Flagler 2000. Telefono: 467-2155.

Hablaba Roberto Fernandez Miranda, ex-general, cuñado del ex-presidente Fulgencio Batista: "Yo he sufrido muchas ingratitudes en el destierro. Se me acusa de que soy uno de los hombres mas ricos de la emigracion. Pero comparado con "Lin" Arroyo, soy un pobrete. Cuando Alberto Ardura me tumbo medio millon, me dejo en carne..."

Sin comentarios.

Tan fabuloso ha sido el negocio de construccion del ex-presidente Carlos Prio en Bayamon, Puerto Rico, que cuando rompio con su socio Labrada, este recibio un millon contante y sonante. Ahora Labrada esta asociado a otro millonario cubano, peso de la batisteria, en una enorme inversion de tierra en Miami.

Que lo gocen...

Hay por ahi un pajaro de cuenta, disfrazado de jacobino, que fue procesado bajo el gobierno de Batista por haberse llevado el santo y la limosna de la caja de un retiro de los trabajadores graficos. Lo que hacen los gangsters, los hampones y los pillos de derecho comun en todas partes.

Continua en la Pagina 6

SECRET

Libert
Pag.
marzo 1
11-69

CUBA POR DENTRO

POR IGNOTUS

Camaguey sigue a la cabeza de la rebeldia. Incendios, explosiones, interrupcion de la luz electrica, destruccion de alcantarillas, letreros en las paredes, llamando a la rebelion. Y fusilamientos.

Ahora el comunismo quiere llevar a miles de comunistas habaneros a Camaguey, con el pretexto de que la region no esta debidamente poblada. Los camagueyanos los rechazaran. No les dirigiran la palabra. Le haran sentir su desprecio.

* * *

El discruso de Castro con motivo del 13 de Marzo, fue de desesperacion: no hay tecnicos. No hay disciplina. En alza la "delincuencia juvenil".

Trono amenazador: clausurare la Universidad de La Habana. Declarare mayores de edad a los niños de 16 años. Fusilare a los rebeldes.

Caligula en accion.

En secreto, surgen las organizaciones de la resistencia en pequeñas celulas de gentes que desean acabar con tanto horror. En el exilio, todo el espectro politico, desde la izquierda del Alfa 66 a la derecha sin nombre, pero con militancia, se aprestan a ayudar a los de adentro con armas y municiones.

El pasado domingo asisti a una reunion en el corazon de Miami. Se entrego, pagada peso a peso, una flamante ametralladora calibre 30 a un grupo incursionista. Antes, le habian donado granadas de mano. Y cada uno de los asistentes en edad militar, cuelga a la cabecera de su cama, un famoso AR-15 y mil balas. Se rompera el corojo.

* * *

La medida de la confusion de animos y de temor al derrumbe, lo da una conversacion de Haydee Santamaria con una amiga intima: "Armandito ha caido en un pesimismo negativo. No le ve salida a esto. Dice que la intriga de los comunistas viejos sobre los jovenes oficiales, educados en Rusia, podria causar un golpe interno".

Esta señora y su esposo, Ar-

El medico Alberto Chomat anda vestido de miliciano y con una pistola al cinto, metiendole miedo a todo el mundo por las calles de La Habana. Se desempeña como jefe de la clinica que hicieron los empleados de la antigua compañia de electricidad en Capdevila..

Otro galeno malo, que tambien hace de las suyas, es Antonio (Toto) Acosta, quien, como Chomat, fue por años, enemigo de Fidel Castro, pues ambos militaban en el grupo de Mario Salabarria, quien se halla en la prision y al borde de la muerte, debido a los malos tratos a que se le somete.

* * *

Hace un tiempo, el tenebroso Ramiro Valdes esperaba a un grupo de supuestos exiliados cubanos, que simularian salir desde Miami para una incursion contra la costa cubana. Se retirarian las milicias y las lanchas patrulleras. Se convendria un acuerdo con ellos para que infiltrasen la CIA. A cambio de eso, se les permitiria sacar algunos presos, a cuyos familiares en Estados Unidos se les pediria dinero a cambio. Tambien se les darian los numeros que saldrian en la loteria cubana para que ganasen unos pesos a los boliteros. Y desde luego, se les concedia una porcion en el cochino negocio de las drogas, que vienen de Cuba a E. U.

Algo impidio el viaje. Pero todo estuvo listo. Y las autoridades norteamericanas estan en posesion de todos los detalles de esta canallada.

* * *

Hace un tiempo, vino a E.U. un ex-teniente castrista que se hizo notorio con sus palizas a los presos en La Cabaña. Aqui fue reclutado por la CIA y llevo a cabo, supuestamente, varias misiones a Cuba. Ahora anda frescamente por las calles de La Habana y se sabe que el regimen le regalo tremenda casa. Nadie sabe en la CIA, que le paso al ex-teniente, cuyo nombre nos reservamos, por si acaso. Porque ocurren cosas demoniacas en el

MIAMI en la NOTA



Carlos J. Arboleya.

HOMENAJE AL SR. ARBOLEYA

El próximo lunes 24 a las seis y media de la tarde, tendrá lugar un homenaje de confraternidad al señor Carlos J. Arboleya, recientemente ascendido a Presidente de "Fidelity National Bank" de Coral Gables. Este agasajo lo ofrece la Cámara de Comercio Latina de la que es el señor Arboleya uno de sus más caracterizados miembros. A este homenaje han sido invitadas personalidades cubanas y latinas. LIBERTAD se suma a este merecido acto por los méritos y personalidad desta-

EMILIO MILIAN. De las voces más cotizadas en el ambiente ra-mundo más, son del [illegible], del [illegible], y del PC.

oOo

Fusilaron en Ciego de Avila a tres patriotas cubanos que estaban listos para alzarse en armas en la cordillera de El Escambray. Uno de ellos vendía refrescos en un camión en el Teatro Iriondo y el club Atlético de Ciego. La prensa censurada de Cuba no ha dicho una palabra de este nuevo crimen.

oOo

La radio comunista de La Habana se deshace en elogios del general golpista peruano Juan Vázquez Alvarado, olvidando que los militares peruanos mandaron a mejor vida ha-

---

Todo el mundo recuerda las promesas fantásticas del dictador cubano en los primeros meses de su chapucera revolución en el poder: Cuba exportaría arroz, frutos menores, aves y huevos, sobrantes de la reforma agraria. Y desde luego, montaría tremenda industria textil, usando como materia prima el kenaff. No se olvidó declarar, que vista la enorme producción de bagazo de caña, que se utilizaba "torpemente" por el imperialismo y sus títeres como combustible en los ingenios, él convertiría a Cuba, en poco tiempo, en el más grande productor de papel, por encima de Finlandia y Canadá.

Hoy Cuba es un país dedicado al monocultivo cañero y en forma nada eficiente, a pesar de que el Estado ahora es el patrón y el obrero único y no hay que distribuir utilidades con el excelente

peligroso mundo de los espías dobles.

oOo

Murió en Holguín a la edad de 92 años el señor José González Urbina, jefe de prestigiosa familia y padre de Carlos, Marcelo, Manolo, "Pepe" Paula y Rosa, a quienes hacemos llegar nuestro mensaje de condolencia los que laboramos en este semanario.

oOo

Murió en La Habana, el compositor Ignacio Piñero, autor de "Suavecito", "La Cachimba de San Juan", "Esas no son cubanas", y "Entre Preciosos Palmares".

Canciones y música popular inolvidables de Cuba Libre . . .

oOo

Un cubano recién llegado a Miami por los vuelos de Varadero dijo:

"Yo le preparé un doble fondo en un maletín, a un miembro del comité central del partido. Escondió allí 50 mil dólares en billetes americanos. Me dijo confidencialmente que aquello se cae sin remedio..."

MUDANZAS
ESTIMADOS GRATIS
•Seguridad y Garantía
•Rapidez y Seguros
MUDANZAS DESDE $10
[illegible] García
TEL: 371-1393

dial. Es uno de los que cubren todos los programas de VIDA, Radio Cuba. Especialmente se escucha por el Noticiero de Juan Amador Rodríguez. Es redactor deportivo y de mayor audiencia en el sector. Por su aptitud y labor continua en Radio Cuba, ocupa las primeras líneas en la locución. Por su impecable dicción y objetividad. Todo uno de la clase. Saludos.

ESTA NOCHE. Reunión del Comité Político que apoya la candidatura de Carlos Romero como Decano del CNP (e). Convocatoria a las ocho y media en los salones de la Asociación Fraternal Latinoamericana de Flagler y 22 avenida. También cita a la Comisión de Propaganda del ticket de Romero. La integran René A. Leyva, José Luis Masó y maestro Juan Morenza. Definirán planes de la campaña electoral.

• • •

Planean una reunión fuera de Miami con los amigos de LIBERTAD para avanzar en el camino de una edición diaria nuestro director Rolando Masferrer. Lugar: Las Vegas, Nevada, donde hay cerca de doscientos caballeros "dealers" cubanos que no olvidan a Cuba y donde nuestro semanario es un fino cada "week end". Con Rolando Masferrer irán Rafaelito Rodríguez Sánchez y Rolando Novoa. Después, un "mitin" en el vecino Los Angeles. Arriba corazones . . .

Libertad

Libertad - Mayo 14-1969 Pag 1

OS
'er

por los tribunales
ciones de las leyes
mas y municiones,
llaman "la amante

para condenar a un
a es algo a lo que

on siquiera arresta-
unismo de Cuba.

numerosos los pai-
sion de delitos co-
osos del trafico de

es de este pais son
mil leguas de la re-

der ejecutivo en la
se hacen efectivas
ue luchan contra el
a paradoja, de que
iet Nam como sol-
a quien la politica
con diabolica ener-

nio personal. Ojala
propaganda opor-
de Bahia de Cochi-
en el Departamento
serable, de esos que
us paisanos que ac-
que yo "intentaba
aprovechando la ex-
bia organizado con
Inidos queria impo-
ondicionales suyos,
or orden del Depar-
da con ello. Lo mis-
fuera como soldado
ente.
ole Emmett Choate,
s de Washington que
ar a nadie y que de-
ion de alguna ley

a en la Pagina 15

Portaviones a Guantanamo

MANIOBRAS EN GUANTANAMO Y PUERTO RICO

MOVIMIENTO GENERAL DE TROPAS EN CUBA

Fidel Castro ordeno una discreta movilizacion militar en todo el pais el pasado sabado.

La noticia no se hizo publica en la prensa, por temor a que se creara un estado de panico en el pais, que dislocase las labores de la zafra azucarera, que se halla en grave estado de retraso, agudizado por el comienzo de las lluvias, que han vuelto intransitables muchos caminos, esenciales para el tiro de la caña hacia los ingenios.

El trafico de tropas en camiones, el traslado de tanques y artilleria en las proximidades de Santiago de Cuba, Guantanamo, Holguin, Manzanillo, Victoria de las Tunas, Cienfuegos, Trinidad, Isabela de Sagua, Caibarien y la costa norte de la provincia de Pinar del Rio, dio pabulo a todo tipo de especulaciones en esos centros urbanos.

Los puentes mas importantes en la carretera central, que corre de Oriente a Occidente, a lo largo de la isla, asi como los del ferrocarril, fueron puestos bajo severa vigilancia por tropas regulares del ejercito castrista de cien mil hombres.

En La Habana ocurrieron constantes reuniones del Comite Central del Partido Comunista, los jefes militares y los encargados de la represion.

Durante noches enteras han montado vigilancia los "comites de chivatos" en todas las localidades del pais. Y se vieron el sabado y el domingo, aumentar sus patrullas por las oscuras calles de las poblaciones.

EN MIAMI

Gentes enteradas dijeron en Miami la mañana del domingo que altos funcionarios de la CIA, de Estados Unidos, que en años anteriores, estuvieron a cargo de las actividades de los exilados contra Cuba comunista, vinieron de Washington y se han radicado aqui, por tiempo indefinido. Se interpreta por ellos, que de nuevo, el gobierno norteamericano ha decidido acelerar la lucha contra Castro.

Aun cuando no se conocio en sus detalles la naturaleza de los hechos que podrian estar teniendo lugar en Cuba y que habia llevado al regimen a ordenar un estado de emergencia para su dispositivo de defensa, el ajetreo en los medios de la CIA aqui, coincidia con las alarmantes noticias de Cuba.

El domingo se aseguro en la "capital del exilio" que los funcionarios de la CIA que tienen a su cargo la cuestion cubana, se entrevistaron con el presidente Richard M. Nixon en su residencia de Key Biscayne para ponerlo al corriente de los "acontecimientos que podrian estarse desencadenandose en la isla".

MANIOBRAS DE DESEMBARCO

Noticias procedentes de Puerto Rico, sostienen que a pesar de las condiciones desfavorables del tiempo en el mar, estan teniendo lugar maniobras de desembarco en la isla de Vieques. (Esto ocurrio tambien antes del desembarco de Bahia de Cochinos). Intervienen en los ejercicios, por lo menos, dos batallones norteamericanos de Infanteria de Marina y uno de "Rangers" de las fuerzas armadas del Brasil. Cada una de estas unidades, altamente entrenadas, tiene efectivos de 1,500 hombres.

Se relaciona con esta noticia el hecho de que una embarcacion comercial norteamericana de gran tonelaje, embarranco en un arrecife sumergido a la entrada de San Juan. El buque sufrio un enorme boquete en un costado, que amenazo su seguridad. Aparentemente, iba cargado de explosivos y municiones y fue remolcado con muchas precauciones a la isla de Vieques para su reparacion por la flota norteamericana.

Dos modernos porta-aviones de Estados Unidos entraron en la base naval de Guantanamo el pasado viernes. Poco despues, se colocaron a 12 millas de la costa cubana en zafarrancho de combate. Y sus aviones emprendieron vuelo.

Quizas esto provoco la alarma de los comunistas, a los que se vio en gran actividad al otro lado de la cerca que rodea la base.

EL SUBSECRETARIO Y EL SEGUNDO DE LA CIA

La designacion por el presidente Richard M. Nixon del general de Infanteria de Marina en activo, Robert Cushman, como jefe de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia, relevandolo de la jefatura de una division anfibia, en operaciones e Viet Nam y

Pase a la página 14

Marzo 21

EN EL DESTIERRO

POR ANTONIO ROJAS

:DAGOGO. Hoy
n nuevo aniver-
alicio del educa-
, Alfredo M.
el exilio, hace 7
amemora la fe-
lesia de San Juan
ctuo anoche una
uerdo de las al-
gogos fallecidos.
o efecto un Cul-
l en la Primera
na.

E habra una so-
, dedicada a la
gran educador
Koubek Cen-
n el 2705 S.W.
Universidad de
numeros artis-
ga de diplomas
es John Berry,
, Michael J. Da-
desores Robert
Rodriguez Mo-
Espinosa. Pre-
s Pedagogos, in-

•••

El Internal Revenue Service esta investigando las finanzas de algunos mercados de víveres operados por cubanos en los que sabe que algunos "Cresos" de la bolita tienen la mayor parte de las acciones. Pero muy en secreto. Porque el dinero del juego debe pagar impuestos de utilidades como cualesquiera otras ganancias.

A un avisado criollo que acumuló tremenda fortuna en el juego ilícito en Cuba le atribuyen los agentes más de cinco millones de dólares acumulados en Miami en las narices de la policía.

oOo

El ex ministro de Defensa de Carlos Prío, Rubén León, que se hizo famoso cuando siendo sub de Educación, cuando Ramón Vasconcelos era ministro, tiene una especie de ejército secreto con generales y todo con los que piensa ocupar a Cuba. El pobre Napoleón inédito ha hecho concurrir a un jardinero norteamericano vistiendo shorts a las reuniones y lo ha hecho pasar por el coronel Sam el Kale del ejército de Estados Unidos.

Vaya pasatiempo inocente.

Carlos Márquez Sterling, ex-Presidente de la Cámara de Representantes, ex-Ministro del Trabajo, ex-Presidente de la Asamblea Constituyente de 1940, profesor de economía de la Universidad de La Habana, historiador, periodista y abogado notable, y ex-candidato presidencial en 1957, es al presente, catedrático en el Queens College de Nueva York.

Con 70 años, conserva su energía de siempre en su estilo pausado, en una tenacidad admirable como un exilado que no desmaya en defensa de la causa de Cuba.

Estos días, recibimos una fina carta suya: "Estoy de acuerdo con LIBERTAD en que lo de Cuba se precipita. Pero hay que sacudir el árbol para que caiga el fruto. Ultimamente, he sido invitado a recorrer algunas ciudades. Y comencé por Boston".

He aquí un ejemplo que podrían imitar ciertos supuestos líderes que gozan de las delicias de Capua, sentados en sus montañas de oro que no heredaron

---

El hombre de mayor intimidad personal y su consejero de inversiones privadas del presidente Richard M. Nixon, es el antiguo cubano "Bebe" Rebozo. Son vecinos en Key Biscayne y acompañante invariable del Presidente en sus días de descanso en Miami. Afirma gente enterada que cuando el Presidente le ofreció que escogiera un cargo diplomático o administrativo en el nuevo gobierno, Rebozo, que además de capaz financiero y caballero sin tacha es sincero y alegre, le dijo: "Me conformaría con ir a Cuba bajo tu gobierno en un week end".

Le respondió Nixon: "Bajo mi gobierno Cuba será libre. Y un fin de semana iremos tu y yo allí en un barco, como dos turistas cualquiera".

oOo

Y hablando del mismo tema: "El ex ministro de Comercio en el gabinete del presidente Ramón



Ciudadanos Ma-
uni, ha sido pro-
r el alcalde Ste-
en la fecha del
». En su procla-
le a los ciudada-
zada edad "co-
tegral del Gran
ienes, mediante
autonomos, eje-
ios comunitarios
ladanos mayores.

●●●

ibado 29, en un
aurante de Mia-
o de los aspiran-
los y de la Mesa
l CNP (e) y Con-
inario de apoya
rlos Romero de
cafe de campa-
en la propagan-
lidatura 2, Rene
ose Luis Masso,
ez, Paquito Go-
y nuestro Juan

---

te, los candida-
mero 1, que lle-
rson de decano,
en el sector de
dvierte entusias-
dos lineas que
dirigencia del
del exilio en el

"Tito" Mesa, uno de los grandes beneficiarios del escandaloso racket de los campamentos del MRR en Nicaragua y Costa Rica, donde fungia como pagador en represetnación del "golden boy" de los hermanitos Kennedy, Manolito Artime, antiguo teniente de la reforma agraria de Fidel Castro, es uno de los magnates de las construcciones en Miami.

oOo

Don Sixto, que fue propietario de las minas de hidrocarburos de Jarahueca, en Las Villas, acaba de obtener permiso para levantar una lujosa mole de apartamientos solo para ricos, en el exclusivo Key Biscayne, donde tiene su "Casa Blanca" de verano, el presidente Nixon.

Precio de los bohios del inclito patriota: 100 mil dólares. Número de apartamentos: 139. Ya tiene vendidos 100.

¡Viva la pepa . . !

Esta seccion le zurro la badana, la pasada semana, a ciertos oficiales cubanos del ejercito norteamericano que estan gozando el picadillo burocratico en viajes por el hemisferio.

Pero nos falto destacar, que son muchos mas los que se combaten en Viet Nam y estan alli al mismo enemigo que aspiramos matar mañana en Cuba.

Ante estos, nos quitamos el sombrero.

Como ante los que perteneciendo a la misteriosa CIA, hacen incursiones a Cuba, jugandose la vida y a veces yendo a dar frente al paredon.

A quienes fustigamos son a los perros de Sanjenis y otros soplones que cobren pero no pelean. Y chivatean, pero se mantienen ocultos, penetrando las organizaciones de accion del destierro.

[illegible] ri Pa[illegible] a pesar de su precaria salud, hace el esfuerzo por el republicanismo en los paises [illegible]. Estos días estrechó su amistad con "Bebe" Rebozo con quien tiene relaciones de negocios en un centro comercial de la calle 22, en Miami.

Con mucho secreto, ha dicho Buttari a sus íntimos: "Yo creo que los próximos meses ocurrirán hechos decisivos en Cuba. Y me afirmo en mi creencia de que Nixon, que no es Kennedy, los aprovechará hasta el máximo por restablecer el régimen democrático en Cuba".

oOo

Uno a quien no se le han escapado estas señales es el acaudalado Manolito Artime quien disfrutó generosamente de la protección de los hermanitos Kennedy.

Por eso está respaldando con todos los "hierros" la aspiración a presidir a los veteranos de la brigada 2506 a un hijo de Buttari, que quien a buen árbol se arrima buena sombra lo cobija.

oOo

Agradecemos a nuestros lectores las notas que nos han enviado con los nombres de los cubanos de mala ley en la nómina de la CIA en la que actúan en los detestables menesteres de correvediles y soplones a cambio de unos pesos [illegible] que no les ayudan ni para vivir con decoro.

Aunque los hay que reciben chequecitos más sustanciosos. Que bien administrados les permiten montar negocios, desde joyerías hasta revistas, restaurantes y edificios de apartamentos.

Cuando hayamos completado la nómina, la haremos pública, para regocijo de la buena gente de las factorías y los hoteles que sudan la camisa.

Libertad

[illegible]

LIBRE, [illegible]

GNOTUS

desde Cuba: "Una
ombres y mujeres
vinculados a los
del pais con fre-
ndo grandes canti-
ares y libras ester-
onoce por los doce
son gente promi-
publico. Pero se
un ex-capitan lla-
o" Bonet, de Ba-
anillo, casado con
gua familia Tarafa.
amiga de Marta
Batista, que con-
erte accionista a
de la "Fiat" en

e Castro tiene mas
s a buen recaudo

spirantes a la pre-
Asociacion de la
an dos caballeros
lo el cobre en la
Castro, sin permiso
Y a veces pagando
ismo, el precio de

s es Ramiro de la
por un tribunal
o años de carcel
de apoderamiento
para usarlo en un
ontra la fortaleza
ba.
Luis Tornes, que
linea dura aqui
los indiferentes y
lo cual le ha crea-
con la "guardia
ai..."
as los conocereis...

xima semana, ten-
la informacion in-
este semanario, el
Portocarrero, bri-
culto penalista e
experto en legis-
quien en el pa-
sentante a la Ca-
ro del gabinete.

IREZ, valeroso ex-
e El Escambray.

MIAMI en la NOTA

EN YMCA Internacional "José Martí", festival bailable mañana sábado, 8 p.m., en su local 450 S.W. 16 Avenida. Es parte de su Campaña de Socios para 1969. Con dos afamadas orquestas. La Suffiing Kind y la Sound Display. Se destinan los beneficios a atenciones de la juventud en sus proyectos educativos. Donación de $1.00. Informes: 358-3257.

* * *

TROFEOS. El domingo 23 a la 1 de la tarde serán entregados los trofeos donados por Errol T. Ballafonte, Director del Centro de Refugiados Cubanos al equipo atlético Golden Eagles, ganador del campeonato 1969 de la Liga de Soft Ball de la Libertad. Contendieron Atléticos de Nuevitas, Hill Brothers. Los ganadores son supervisores y empleados del Programa para Refugiados Cubanos. El acto en Centro Vasco.

* * *

CITA CON CUBA. Será un Show de Gala. Organizado por Latin American Review, de Ida M. Ficher Community School de Miami Beach, de la que es directora la joven Martha Alvarez. El festival el 24 de Febrero 8 p.m. En conmemoración del Grito de Independencia.

* * *

BALLET. Lidia Díaz Cruz presentará función de Ballet el próximo 28, en el Dade County Auditorium. Invitados a 20 niños cubanos refugiados. Serán acompañados por Mrs. Dorothy McCray, directora del Child Welfare.

* * *

DIPLOMA. Solidaridad Cubano-Americana otorgó Diploma de Reconocimiento a Christian Community Service Agencia of Dade County Inc.

CUBA EN EL DESTIERRO

POR ANTONIO ROJAS

Conversación entre Max Lesnick y Rolando Masferrer en WQBA, terminada la charla radiada del pasado domingo: "Tú podías haber sido el jefe de la oposición armada. El 10 de Marzo fuiste a la Universidad y trataste de hacer resistencia al golpe. Eras más conocido que Fidel".

"Mire, Lesnick, los estudiantes se asustaron cuando vieron llegar los "scouts cars" del ejército En su miedo comenzaron a decir que yo no era estudiante, sino un politico. Cuando llamé a Palacio para que Prío ordenase la entrega a nosotros de las armas de San Ambrosio, se me dijo que no lo intentara. Y que desde luego no fuera a Palacio. Se dieron órdenes en el SIM, creo que por el coronel Ramón Cruz Vidal, de perseguir sólo a dos hombres, a Eusebio Mujal y a mí. Y cuando traté de refugiarme en la embajada de Méjico porque no hubo ningún movimiento popular en respaldo del gobierno de Prío, éste y Aureliano Sánchez Arango, que ya estaban allí, le dijeron al embajador que no me aceptara.

"Y dónde estaba Fidel Castro?". preguntó el director de "Réplica". "Castro se escondió en la florería "Le Printemps" en el Vedado", dijo R. M.

Pero déjeme seguir: "Yo no creo que hay diferencias fundamentales entre Batista y Prío. Los dos perseguían idénticos fines en el gobierno: el aprovechamiento personal. Los dos salieron muy ricos. Pero creo que ambos hicieron contribuciones efectivas al desarrollo de la nación. Yo hubiera combatido la insurrección comunista de la Sierra si Prío hubiese sido el Presidente. Después de todo sólo hay un presidente a la vez en cualquier parte. Y yo no podía poner en su lugar al cardenal Arteaga . . ."

Diálogo radiado del pasado domingo en WQBA entre Abilio Felipe y Rolando Masferrer:

"Yo me hice ciudadano americano porque creo que es la forma más eficaz de ayudar a la liberación de Cuba. Pero no renuncio mis sentimientos de Cubano. Creo que podemos influir con el voto en la elección de congresistas que se comprometan a apoyar nuestra causa. Yo hago una distinción entre ciudadanía y nacionalidad . . ."

Respuesta: "Cambiar de ciudadanía es repudiar la nacionalidad que Dios nos dio. La ciudadanía es el aspecto jurídico de la nacionalidad. Para mí es oportunista abandonar la de la tierra en que hemos nacido y que hemos perdido por nuestros errores y culpas y asumir la de una sociedad de más nivel cultural y desarrollo que la nuestra. No sería tan grave si nos hiciésemos ciudadanos de Haití o el Paraguay que son naciones más atrasadas que Cuba.

"Quizás yo arrastre un sentimiento antiyanqui que heredé de mi padre, un coronel del ejército libertador, rubio de ojos azules que decía que se dejaba bigotes para no parecer norteamericano. Y de mi abuelo materno, general del ejército libertador que perdió el [illegible] de

14-00000

" de [illegible]
mas capaces y co-
jefes de la [illegible]
munista de la con-
. Merejo Ramirez
muñado de patri-
: decenas de mi-
castristas con [illegible]
teza" del Escam-
inalmente, siem-
etirarse hasta la
naguey.
e Miami no se
ebeldes los equi-
y cayo la renu-
Ramirez, con la
mpesinos y per-
legar a Estados
e.
enezuela, donde
1961, Merejo
pertenecio a la
ible Osvaldo Ra-
riado jamas, la
ha por el sepe-

trinchera de la
complace en
no de los suyos.

UNAS IT

UA

AVENUE,
ESPERAMOS

HIS AVE.

[illegible] los beneficios y ayuda a refugiados cubanos que no reciben beneficios del Programa. Además por la cooperación que diera al Comité de Solidaridad, que funcionaba en el edificio de la Agencia. Fijarán fecha de la entrega del Diploma.

• • •

ELECCIONES. Para el día 23 de Marzo los Contadores Públicos y Privados (e) efectuarán comicios para elegir nueva Directiva. En su local social del 1552 West Flagler St. Votación de 9 a.m. a 4 p.m. Comisión Electoral integrada como Presidente Francisco Rodríguez, Secretario, Francisco Tovar.

• • •

ANUARIO de Familias Cubanas. Joaquín de Posada, distinguido colega y Presidente de la delegación del CNP (e) en Puerto Rico, se encuentra desde hace días en Miami, ultimando detalles de su original Libro, donde aparecerán más de 15,000 familias cubanas. II Edición extra del Anuario. Será un éxito.

• • •

BODAS de Plata. Serán celebradas con gran pompa y solemnidad en Caracas, Venezuela. En homenaje a Monseñor Eduardo Boza Masvidal, Obispo Auxiliar de la Habana, residente en la capital venezolana y activo fustigador de la tiranía de Cuba. Reunión de sacerdotes y admiradores desde el 24 al 28 de Febrero.

• • •

[illegible]
París y que nunca perdonó a los americanos el desaire y la injusticia que hicieron a Calixto García en la toma de Santiago".

• • •

La pasada semana, esta sección informó equivocadamente, que el ex-presidente Fulgencio Batista era dueño del Banco "España" en Madrid.

Rectificamos. El es dueño de un banco de prestamos (garrote o loan) situado en la calle Alcalá.

Efectivamente, allí trabaja Gaston Godoy y un joven abogado conocido por "Buby" Otero, quien estuvo casado con una hija de Carlos Saladrigas y ahora lo esta con Yolanda Suero, de una familia de millonarios cubanos.

Interes del banco: 7%.

Tremenda gabela.

El mayor de los hijos del segundo matrimonio de Batista, Jorge, trabajo allí por algun tiempo.

• • •

Los "tiburones" de la CIA en el mar estan moviendose. Se ponen las aletas natatorias. Se anima el cotarro.

Pero inexplicablemente, hay muchos cubanos condenados por tratar de hacer con medios propios lo que dicen los "cialeros" que van a hacer con recursos abundantes del prodigo tio de las barbas.

Y los muchos combatientes impacientes que no son de la nomina de los "spooks", se mantienen bajo la vigilancia de los perros de Sanjenis.

Explicacion que dan los poderosos: Minimis [illegible] non praetor curare.

El pretor no se ocupa de las cosas menores...

• • •

Aquí se publicó la pasada semana que el alcalde fabricante de tabacos, Orlando Padrón, había sido miembro de los tribunales de bandidos analfabetos que con violación de las mas elementales normas de la ley penal y el procedimiento, asesinaron a cientos de cubanos a raíz de la toma del poder por los comunistas en Cuba. Dijimos en la nota, que el comentario lo había hecho el ex-alcalde municipal de Cabañas, Pinar del Rio, Alfredo Abella, quien es propietario de un comercio de viveres en Miami.

El colega "Replica" ha aclarado que Padron era oficial del ejercito rebelde y no miliciano. Ninguno de estos extremos fue mencionado por Abella ni repetido por nosotros. Lo que dijo Abella es que Padron había sido miembro de los tribunales terroristas.

Parece que toca a estos caballeros poner las cosas en claro.

Decían los romanos: Justitia est constans et perpetua volunta suum cuique tribuere.

• • •

El viejo PT convertido, de 110 pies, propiedad de "Alberico" Fernandez, hijo de Don Fico, propietario del "Central America" en Oriente, ha cambiado de manos. Uno que lo financio en su reacondicionamiento, ejecuto una hipoteca naval y es ahora su dueño.

El "Texana II", con una hermosa historia en la lucha en el mar contra el pirata Fidel Castro, quizas termine sus días pescando langostas.

LIBERTAD - FEB. 21-1969 Pag. 3

Libertad Feb 14-1969 Pag 15

[LIBER]TAD, Enero 31 de 1969

Recado que recibimos de Pradito, antiguo "hombre rana" de la CIA: "Anden con ciudado que los traficantes de drogas a los que ustedes han denunciado en sus criminales manejos, han contratado a dos asesinos que matan por dinero para que los ataquen a ustedes. Lo unico que puedo decir es que los dos fueron oficiales del ejercito de Castro".

Decimos nosotros: "¡Huy, que miedo! ..."

●●●

un dia habra que hacer pu-
la relacion completa de los
cubanos que por los misera-
30 dineros de Judas se han
ido a denunciar a sus compa-
s que luchan por cuenta pro-
contra la opresion en su pa-

uien parece ser jefe en Miami
sta miserable patulea de dela-
s es un pajaro de cuentas de
apellido Sanjenis que segun los enterados, lleva a cabo escandalosos bacanales para gentes que parecen hombres, en su retiro recoleto de Fort Lauderdale.

Este y los de apellidos Llaneza, Arango, Villafaña, Morales, Gonzalez (el pato), Sierra y otros, hasta el numero de 300, parecen no tener mas mision que denunciar depositos de armas y barcos destinados a golpear a Castro. En su descoco se han atrevido a concurrir a los tribunales federales a acusar a sus compatriotas.

Probable boda: Ela, la bella hija del ex presidente Batista con Carlos Alberto Cadía, artista de cine y TV, veterano de Bahía de Cochinos. Ambos en segundas nupcias. Romance tórrido.

oOo

No hay derecho a usar el formidable recurso de la TV, que podría usarse para robustecer la conciencia nacionalista de los cubanos, para ventilar inmundos líos familiares, chismes de aldea, como cuando se lava el arroz en la pila del solar habanero.

Y entre vulgares lamentos por la hija raptada por el novio, y la queja plañidera del esposo burlado o la mujer con necesidad del psiquiatra, un hombre gordo engullendo chorizos y bacalao.

* * *

"Pancho" Varona es un buen
guajiro de Consolacion del Sur,
Pinar del Rio. Vendia salsas de
tomate de los hermanos Ferro.
Hizo sus pininos en la politica
"autentica". Y ha sabido conec-
tarse con la bolsa provida de la
CIA, como otros tantos avisa-
dos paisanos que sienten un san-
to horror por la factoria.

Pero Varona tiene dificulta-
des para expresarse, como mu-
chos hijos de vecino que no han
ido a la escuela. Que se comen
las eses y las erres; que se pier-
den en el trabalenguas y los z-
pizapes. Los que lo mandaro
al radio el pasado martes, n
son sus amigos. No lo quiere
bien.

No todo el mundo tiene fa-
cultades para la tribuna y la me-
sa de conferencias. Ese afan de
los cubanos por escribir, por re-
tratarse, por hablar en publico
nos hace poco favor a los ojo
de otros latinoamericanos mas
discretos.

LIBERTAD, Febrero 14, 1969 Pagina 11

SUSTITUYEN EN EL CANAL 10 A GANDERO


Gandero

El programa de Alberto Gandero en el canal 10 es ahora el programa de Manolo de la Torre.

Hacia unos dias, los gerentes del canal habian informado a Gandero que el tiempo se le duplicaria a una hora y que esperase un aumento de sueldo.

Ocurrio todo lo contrario.

Gandero no es un opositor sistematico de la politica norteamericana para Cuba comunista. Pero se permitia opiniones independientes y hasta criticas.

De la Torre es empleado de la USIA (agencia de informacion de Estados Unidos), algo asi como un criollo del "ring ring" a quienes dirigen por telefono los "spooks" de la CIA.

Equivaldra el cambio a una mordaza para los cubanos desterrados?

¿Nos querran meter por la cabeza otro consejo de paniaguados en que "El Niño Pilon" o "El Corredor Kresto" sustituirian a Miro Cardona como presidente titere de Cuba libre?

We shall wait and see...

Libertad - Oct 21-1969 Pg 16

Por [illegible]

En los mentideros del Departamento de Estado en Washington, se rumora que en los proximos meses se articulara un organismo de exilados cubanos al que se daria apoyo economico y politico para restablecer un regimen democratico en Cuba.

Algo asi como el tristemente celebre Consejo de Jose Miro Cardona y "Tony" Varona.

No es malo, sino todo lo contrario, recibir ayuda de Estados Unidos o del diablo y su abuela para echar a los rusos y sus lacayos de nuestro pais.

Despues de todo, los rusos y Fidel Castro estan en el poder en Cuba, gracias a la ayuda del Departamento de Estado, de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia, de Romulo Betancourt, de Luis Muñoz Marin y de "Pepe" Figueres.

Sin ellos, no se hubiese dictado el embargo de armas al ejercito de la Republica, ni hubiesen llegado aviones y barcos repletos de armas para la insurreccion comunista a Oriente, Las Villas y Camaguey.

Muchos de ellos, como el C-46 que llevo Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz y Hubert Matos a Cienaguilla, en la Sierra Maestra, fueron pagados por la CIA, al socaire de la "campaña del bolivar".

Los exilados, no hemos tenido un Roy Rubbottom, ni un William Wieland, ni un Herbert Matthews para "desfacer el entuerto que estos fizieron".

Pero volvamos: ¿No seria mejor que los cubanos en el exilio eligiesemos democraticamente a 50 hombres, como un congreso de la emigracion y que estos delegasen en un ejecutivo de 5 para hacer la guerra?

No existe otra forma de asegurar el acatamiento de los dirigentes.

No nos engañemos.

Nosotros no somos el estado libre asociado de Puerto Rico. Preferimos seguir siendo una nacion independiente que elija a sus gobernantes y administradores.

●●●

La bola que corre por los corrillos del State Department sobre el regreso a esa politica de "ayuda a la lucha contra Castro", ha llegado a Miami. Ojala no sea una bola de humo.

Como era de esperar, media docena de tragaldabas esta dando carreras y moviendo peones para ser cada quien el elegido (the chosen instrument) como les llaman los "spocks" (agentes de la CIA) que se ocupan de estos menesteres.

Antes de Bahia de Cochinos, cuatro norteamericanos misteriosos que ni siquiera tuvieron la cortesia de identificarse, reunieron en el cuarto del hotel "Congress Inn", proximo al aeropuerto de Miami, a unos cuantos "vivos" cubanos y les dijeron: "You are the chosen instruments for the liberation of Cuba". Y les llenaron los maletines de billetes de a mil. En seguida, cien periodistas y escribidores comenzaron a proyectar al "viejo Miro", a Manuel Artime y a Varona a las paginas de los diarios y revistas y las pantallas de television. Se abrieron suntuosas oficinas y los futuros gobernantes de Cuba se hicieron rodear de secretarias y guardaespaldas. Se mudaron para residencias lujosas y viajaron mas que Magallanes, ocupando hoteles de lujo y comiendo como principes.

De momento, la lampara de Aladino dejo de hacer milagros.

A punto de lanzarse el ataque armado, fueron arrestados sin miramientos y mantenidos en el campo de Opa Locka como delincuentes comunes. Sobre la marcha, se habia decidido por los hermanitos Kennedy que el "golden boy" Artime, con el cerebro minusculo de los mosquitos, seria el "hombre fuerte de Cuba".

Como si pudiese ganarse el campeonato de boxeo por recomendacion.

Estos prohombres fueron olvidados, con excepcion de Artime, que aun tuvo oportunidad de embolsillarse unos milloncejos en estos trajines. De Miro y de Varona, sin las muletas de los billetes de banco de alta denominacion, apenas se habla.

●●●

Que los aviones que vuelan hac
Unidos lleven a las azafatas más s
le opong sus camitas a los as

que el capitán, cuando despeg
el avión va cargado de gentes er
con cualquier susto.

Que se provea de una trampa j
conduce a la cabina de los pilotos
dido llegue allí sea lanzado al esp

Que se inunde la cabina de p
dispositivo secreto, de gas paraliz

Que se haga viajar en cada a
hombres armados de escopetas de
las diligencia del antiguo oeste.

Que se pague un premio a cual
un asaltante.

Que se haga público que los cu
gresar a Cuba puedan usar los a
día a Varadero a traer a los ref
castrista.

Lo del premio al que capture al
gratis a Varadero son mantenidos

Pero muchos de los asaltantes
norteamericanos. De ellos muchos
hippies.

Nosotros proponemos esto: una
cidad en todo el país alentando a
dores del campo de esclavos cuban
isla o no, a marcharse a Cuba en
cada ciudad importante de Estad
buró que proveería de ticket para v
quisiera ocupar un asiento en lo
cada día.

En Isla de Pinos es cada día mayor el adoctrinamiento comunista a niños cubanos, con el pretexto de intensificar la "educación de la niñez y la juventud". Hasta ahora pasan de miles, los niños que el régimen de Cuba mantiene bajo vigilancia externo, de los cuales dos mil son de enseñanza primaria. La agencia AP ofrece en sus [illegible]

14-00000

Libertad - Feb 21-1969 - Pag 10

os la Primera
al de Médicos
ó lugar en el
Four Ambos-
comprendidos
ulio. Trabajará
odesto Mora,
, José S. Las-
alver, Agustín
ique Huertas,
Juan Lamas.
a Prensa: Vi-
z —editor-di-

EA Legislativa
n memorable
ció el Derecho
de los cuba-
r la libertad y
siones hemis-
apoyo. Costa
cuanto ha po-
io de los cu-
Núñez Pérez.

o visitas en
a. Abierto a
s. Un Museo
la historia de
s musicales,
jos de músi-
te de la co-
o de música
Está alojado
" conectados.
ma del N.W.
ge Bowl.

ciclo de Con-
cinados por
va. Sobre Pla-
scomunización
a de la Escue-
República li-
Diez Sesiones
cativos parti-
lidades espe-
e Cauce, titu-
cerró el ciclo.
n discurso re-
el tema: "Ha-
por la Educa-
dora general,
arbonell.

Optimist Club
as en 2341 N.
7. Lo informa
"Bebo" Azpia-

BIBLIOTECAS. El Departamento de Planificación del Dade ha propuesto la construcción de un nuevo edificio principal en el centro de Miami más otras cuatro bibliotecas. También expansión de las bibliotecas ambulantes y creación de centros en barrios pobres. Y cierre de otras. En el presente la Biblioteca de Biscayne registra centenares de visitantes cubanos y latinos.

oOo

En cambio el "Venus", tambien antiguo guerrero del mar, de la flota de Estados Unidos, donado por los munifices de la CIA a Manolito Ray cuando su "ballyhoo", en el que empezaria la guerra a plazo fijo en Cuba, es ahora propiedad de "Nino" Diaz, ex-comandante castrista de Oriente. Esta en excelentes condiciones, habiendose gastado la bicoca de $[illegible]0.000 en su arreglo. Los cubanos residentes en Puerto Rico y Nueva York abrieron su bolsa a "Nino", heroe del desembarco del "Santa Ana" en la costa de Guantanamo-Baracoa cuando Bahia de Cochinos. "Nino" ha andado por Costa Rica. Y afirma que "esta vez se tira" aunque se desplomen las esferas.

Tantum nomine nullum par elogium...

oOo

EL PADRE López reitera la continuidad de la "Campaña por la Salvación de Cuba". En su plan espiritual y religioso. Por la Libertad de la Patria.

Hace un año, los holguineros de Miami celebraron varias asambleas [illegible] a organizarse en lo que prometía ser la fuerza regional mas grande del destierro. En el area viven mas de diez mil coterraneos del glorioso Calixto Garcia.

El "Club Patriotico Bobby Fuller", que habia venido funcionando discreta, pero eficientemente, formado casi totalmente por holguineros y cuyo principal objetivo era el acopio de armas y municiones, se unio al esfuerzo y hasta entrego sus fondos para la apertura de un local social que facilitase el contacto y los trabajos. Pronto, empleados a sueldo de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia, con instrucciones de impedir que "la casa de Holguin" se dedicase a tareas con propositos armados, dividieron a los holguineros, empujandolos a constituirse en un organismo inutil con fines de recreo.

Han pasado los meses y ahora "la casa de Holguin" no existe y si existe, nadie se entera de ello. En cambio, el "Club Patriotico Bobby Fuller", ha mejorado sensiblemente sus arsenales. Y sus reuniones de cada domingo estan mas nutridas que nunca, porque todos ven los resultados. Lugar: 2,000 West Flagler, a la una de la tarde. Telefono: 642-2155. El mismo de LIBERTAD donde la mayor parte de los periodistas son holguineros.

La CIA y sus perritos perdieron su dinero y su tiempo...

Libertad

OPINIONES

"Respeto a todos los hombres que quieran encauzar su propio destino. Pero yo estoy entre aquellos que piensan que a Cuba hay que darle nuestro concurso para volver a hacerla una Patria grande, digna y generosa. Cuba requiere de todos y cada uno de sus hijos. Trabajar siempre, no desmayar en la lucha y reforzar con verdadera fe su voluntad en el esfuerzo y en el trabajo. Por eso me siento orgulloso de mis compatriotas. Siempre debemos saludar la noche, como si fuéramos a regresar mañana. Regresaremos para salvar a aquella Cuba que vive dentro de nosotros".

Reinaldo Cruz Pino.

* * *

"No haremos concesiones a los comunistas. Sólo cederemos ante aquellos que están del otro lado y desean retornar para colaborar con nosotros. A ellos estamos dispuestos a reservarles una solución honorable. No podemos aceptar ni el abandono de territorio alguno, ni la presencia de los comunistas aquí". - NGUYEN VAN THIEU, *Presidente de Vietnam del Sur.*

* * *

123
CAMEL
WINSTON
Restaurant MONTERITO

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 08/07/69

X-REF. SHEET

X-REF.	SYM NUMBER	DOC. DATE	CLASSIFICATION
201-042669	DBB -68921	12 JUN 69	201-042669

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT (S) IS CROSS REFERENCED
TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.

12 Jun 69
201-42669

12 Jun 69

201-042669

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

8 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
ATTN: Chief, Personnel Security Division

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECTS: MASFERRER Rojas, Rolando Arcadio
MONTERO, Lucila

1. Reference is made to your requests dated 4 April 1969 concerning Subjects. The files of this office contain voluminous information concerning Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER Rojas, reports on whose activities have been given broad dissemination throughout the Intelligence Community. You are referred to numerous disseminations already sent to your office; two of the more pertinent of these are attached for your convenience.

2. The files of this office contain no additional information regarding Lucila MONTERO to that on your trace request.

3. It is suggested that you may wish to query the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service directly for additional information concerning Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER Rojas.

CSCI-316/01559-69

Encl. 3 name checks
2 attachments as stated above

RID/CE: JKS/NDH/nkc
BASED ON: 201-042669* (Husband)
201-094478* (Ex-Wife)
FILE IN: 201-042669

201-042669

CS COPY

SECRET

8 May 69

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

FILE IN 201-042669*

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

U S army name trace request
Subject - Montero, Lucila
4 Apr. '69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. ANALYST

3. DATE PROCESSED

4. RI FILE NO.

5. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

6. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER. ROLANDA
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
< USA, FLA, MIAMI RE HAITIAN EXILE ACTIVITIES
IN USA

100-009-016
DBC -47859
09 APR 69
FBI
P2

R 6904210140

201-042669

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

9 April

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
1.	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
FORM CUBAN SENATOR AND SELF-ADMITTED FORM COMMUNIST. QUITE ACTIVE DURING THE EARLY 60S IN VARIOUS ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES US. RECENTLY SERVED FOUR AND ONE-HALF YR PRISON SENTENCE RECEIVED US DISTRICT COURT, FOR VIOLATION US NEUTRALITY LAWS.

201-273015
DBC -44545
25 FEB 69
FBI
P9

R 6903240466

FILE IN 201-42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

Date: 07/11/01
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10176-10073
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : 201 FILE OF PROTECTABLE SOURCE.
DATE : 00/00/
PAGES : 341
SUBJECTS : JFK DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/22/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK64-12:F4A 1998.05.22.08:03:47:560082: RELEASE DELAYED UNTIL DEATH OF SUBJECT.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PROJECT
[illegible] Project

SOURCE
[illegible]

SUBJECT
[illegible]
[illegible]

DATE OF INFORMATION
[illegible] 3

DATE ACQUIRED
[illegible] 3

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE [illegible]
GRADE [illegible]
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTICN
DATE
GRADE [illegible]
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT [illegible]
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S
[illegible]

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
[illegible]

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

[illegible] TO [illegible]

[illegible] SAS

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Visit of Michel Chartrand, Canadian Communist, to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City

DATE OF INFORMATION
Dec 63

DATE ACQUIRED
27 Dec 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8288
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jet

C S
3/573,305

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/ Cuba/Canada

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See CS report for changes made and for headquarters comment added.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 689 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT No Project	DATE OF INFORMATION Dec 63	FIELD NO.
	DATE ACQUIRED 27 Dec 63	REPORT HMM-9283 CABLE IN
SOURCE LITAMIL-9	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 16 Jan 64 GRADE B-2 TO	RI NO.
		REPORTS OFFICER PLS/jct
SUBJECT Mexican-Cuban Relations	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE B-2 TO	CS 3/572,775 EVAL. REQUESTED
		AREA Mexico, Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See CS report for changes made.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
2 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8291
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S
No Dissem.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/USSR

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. Source (Tass Rep) access to info doubted.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59.82 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(20)

PROJECT

No Project

SOURCE

LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT

Efforts of Mexican Students to Get Cuban Scholarships

DATE OF INFORMATION

Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED

16 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 23 Jan 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE B-2

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT

CABLE HMM-8334

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

RLS/jct

C S

3/572,776

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA

Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
[illegible]

SOURCE
[illegible]

SUBJECT
[illegible]

DATE OF INFORMATION
[illegible]

DATE ACQUIRED

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT

CABLE [illegible]

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S
[illegible]

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
[illegible]

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

[illegible]

[illegible] S.S.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT LIENVOY
No Project

SOURCE
Para. 1 - LITAMIL-9
Para. 2 - LIENVOY

SUBJECT
Planned Travel to Cuba from Mexico in Connection With Activities of the Casa de las Americas in 1964

DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 64
DATE ACQUIRED 14 & 16 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 24 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE ~~[illegible]~~
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8340
CABLE
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER PLS/jct
C S 3/573,559
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See report for changes made and headquarters comments added.

FORM NO 688 1 JUN 51 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
XXX [illegible] Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Additional Assignments for Members of the Cuban Embassy Staff in Mexico City

DATE OF INFORMATION
18 Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE Descr
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8426
CABLE
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
C S 3/575,185
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible]

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Technical Problems at the Nicaro Nickel Plant in Cuba; Decision of Cuban Government to Base Cuban Economy on Sugar

DATE OF INFORMATION
17 Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8428
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S
X/D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No Dissem. Previously reported. Per SAS

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59.92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT LIENVOY
No Project

SOURCE
Para 1 - LIENVOY ✓
Para 2 - LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Possible Return to Cuba of
Silvanio Reyes, Cuban Medical Student

DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 64
DATE ACQUIRED 30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE C-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8429
CABLE
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
CS N.D.
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Mexico Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

No dissem - by SAS. Not significant.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 58-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (24)

3

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Dismissal of Homosexuals from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE 3-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8430
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S
ED

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. by WH/SA. Marginal

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE 3-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT ~~HMM 8430~~
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

This report, previously not disseminated, was added as a comment to the dissem of UFG 4920, CSDB 3/660,810

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LI[illegible]-2

SUBJECT
Mexican Cultural Movement, Pro-Cuba/
Mexican Youth Organization

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE B-2
TO XXXXXX

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8431
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

CS
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASC 4 FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No Dissem. No intel value to customers.

No identifiable traces on Tovar or Hernandez. One Jose Tovar (citizenship not stated) was ~~report~~ included in a list of people who collaborated with the Cuban Embassy in Quito, Ecuador, in November 1960. (F-3)

Aguilar may be identical with Rafael AGUILAR Talamantes mentioned in HMM ~~1907~~ 7237, June 63, DBA 17439 and DBA 39315. Rafael AGUILAR included in list in HMM-1907. Copies of the last three documents mentioned being forwarded. Can the Station determine whether the Aguilar mentioned in HMM 8431 is in fact AGUILAR Talamantes?

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
LIFEAT / SP

SOURCE
LIFEAT ✓
LICAKIL-9 ✓

SUBJECT
Cooperation Between the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and the University of Michoacan

DATE OF INFORMATION
26-27 Feb 64

DATE ACQUIRED
28 Feb - 1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 & 12 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8535 ✓
CABLE 8564
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
HLB/jct

C S
3/577,388

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOR IGN DISSEM

Two reports combined for dissemination.

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
5P

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Possible Travel to Cuba of Genia Marin Hernandez, Mexican Teacher

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT [illegible]-3536
CABLE
IN
FS NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jct

C/S
SD

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

/

PROJECT KP

SOURCE LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT New Guinean Ambassador to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION 1 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED 1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 4 Mar 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT [illegible]-8537

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER FLS/jct

C S No Dissem

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico Cuba Guinea

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
EP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Invitation to Dr. Ruben Pareja, Bolivian Physician to Visit Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8541
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
RD

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba/Bolivia

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(21)

3

PROJECT
LIENVOY/EP

SOURCE
Para 1: LIENVOY
Para 2: LITAMIL-9 ✓

SUBJECT
Ismael COSIO Villegas, now President of the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations

DATE OF INFORMATION
19 Feb - early Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
20 Feb - 10 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 25 Feb/19 Mar
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE [illegible]-8482, 8611 ✓
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jet

C S
3/577,327

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2 Reports combined for dissemination.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 53-62 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of Jose Rafael Padrino Lopez, / Venezuelan, to go to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
2 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
10 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 19 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8612
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/JCt

C S
3/577,390

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS. (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
E.P.

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Jose HERRERA Pena; Efforts to go to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
19 Mar 63

DATE ACQUIRED
20 Mar 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 2 Apr 63
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8673
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jet

C S
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT KP	DATE OF INFORMATION 24 Mar 64	FIELD NO.
SOURCE LITAMIL-9	DATE ACQUIRED 1 Apr 64	REPORT HMM 8679 CABLE MEXI 8566 IN
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 2 Apr 64 GRADE ~~XXXX~~ Toner TO	RI NO.
SUBJECT Comments of Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, on the trial of Marcos RODRIGUEZ Alfonso	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE 2 Apr 64 GRADE [illegible] TO	REPORTS OFFICER CS TD 3/577,544 EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by I&G

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
7 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT KP

SOURCE LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT Efforts of the Cuban Embassy to Increase Its Knowledge on Pro-Cuban Mexican Personalities

DATE OF INFORMATION 2 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED 1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE ~~14 Apr 64~~

GRADE ~~B-2~~

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO. 4

REPORT

CABLE ~~HMM 8705~~

IN 8704

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S H.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. by WH/SA. Marginal interest.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92
JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Restrictions on Cuban Government Scholarships

DATE OF INFORMATION 24 Mar 64
DATE ACQUIRED 1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE Descr
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 May 64
GRADE Descr
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8705
CABLE
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
C S 3/580,295
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by WH/SA.

See comment on Source Record Card for HMM 8721 for source description for LITAMIL-9.

Cy attached

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59.92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
~~[illegible]~~

X cy

SUBJECT
Prensa Latina Offices,
Habana, Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION Late March 1964
DATE ACQUIRED Early April 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 April 1964
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8721
CABLE
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
C S
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Disseminated.

While we realise that [illegible] is merely an interrogator, he is, nevertheless, the direct source and should be shown as such in the source description—followed by the appropriate subsource description. The approved description for him is "A Cuban exile in Mexico who is in touch with local Cuban exiles and anti-Castro organizations."

Also, please note that when LITAMIL-9's reporting is on Cuba, his description should read "Latin American official in Mexico City who has regular contact with Cuban Embassy personnel; he has been a reliable reporter for about a year and a half." "Person(s) (B)" is not acceptable for SA reports.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59.32 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
HP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plans of the Algerian Government to Establish Diplomatic Relations with Latin American Countries

DATE OF INFORMATION
Late March 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-3706
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

CS
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba/Algeria

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. Inaccurate. Possibly "open embassies" was meant, rather than "establish diplomatic relations". Both Spain and Brazil have ambassadors in Algiers, and have had for some time. Algeria has announced that it planned to open embassies in several countries, including Brazil and Argentina.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[illegible] - Algeria [illegible]	6/5/64	KAB
2	Attn: A. [illegible]		
3	Bob		W
4			
5			
6	[illegible]		

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

1-6: Recommend that no dissem be made of this. Zirout probably mean that Algeria would soon

Per telcon the conversation.

open up embassies in these countries, rather than "establish diplomatic relations". Both Spain and Brazil have embassadors in Algiers, and have had for some time. A Cairo MENA item 6 April 64 announced that Algeria planned to open embassies shortly in several countries, including Brazil and Argentina. Our Embassy in Algiers confirmed this on 21 April - xxxxxxx and the Brazilian Amb in Algiers said that as far as he knew no changes had been made in these plans in spite of the fall of the Goulart

[illegible]

over

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[illegible]anshaw x5110	6/5

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
2-61

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O—587282

government.

As for Zirout's remarks about his choosing Cuba would seem the natural thing for him to say when talking to the Cubans.

SUBJECT
MP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plan of Mexican Government Not to Vote for Admission of Communist China to the United Nations

DATE OF INFORMATION
Late Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2 for reportorial accuracy
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8709, 8711
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jcb

C S 3/591,227

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/China/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Two reports were combined for dissemination.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
EP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plans of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City to Buy Three Ford Automobiles

DATE OF INFORMATION
24 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE -2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8712
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jct

C S CI
3/781,307

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Information in this report was disseminated asa CSCI to ODENVY and to a Bureau of ODACK.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Cuban Embassy Information Bulletin

DATE OF INFORMATION
10-13 Apr 64

DATE ACQUIRED
10-13 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 28 May 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE HMM 8912
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jct

C S
K.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: [illegible] AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem - by WH/SA. Marginal.

This report should have carried the source description for Cuban information.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
NONE

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Disillusionment of Mexican Leftists After A Visit to the USSR

DATE OF INFORMATION
April 1964

DATE ACQUIRED
10 April 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 20 May 1964
GRADE B-3
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-3
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8925
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jet

C S 3/563,597

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/USSR

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Disseminated.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
NP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plans to Invite the Cuban Aragon Orchestra to Perform in Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Jun 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Jun 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 11 Jun 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8991
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
ND

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND ... SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. Marginal.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
NONE

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Mexican Cultural Movement, Pro-Cuban Youth Organization

DATE OF INFORMATION
June 1964

DATE ACQUIRED
1 June 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 June 1964
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HM 6996
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
[illegible]/a
0224-64

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

dissemd as received

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

1

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of Cuban Cultural Attache to Implement Cuban-Mexican Cultural Exchange [illegible]

DATE OF INFORMATION
~~[illegible]~~ 9 & 24 June 64

DATE ACQUIRED
19 June 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 July 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE [illegible]
GRADE [illegible]
TO —escription

FIELD NO.
REPORT [illegible] 9092
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
KPR

C S [illegible]
EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by WH/SA.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-82
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Reaction of Cuban Embassy in Mexico to Freezing of Dollar Accounts of the Banco del Atlantico, S.A.

DATE OF INFORMATION
20 July 64

DATE ACQUIRED
23 July 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 23 July 64
GRADE Lexcr
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE 23 July 64
GRADE Lexcr
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 9121
CABLE MEXI 0357
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jct

C S TD
314/00964

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (STATUS ... CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by IMOG.

Ref Source Record card for HMM 8943. Freezing of these accounts resulted from the attachment to that report which was passed to ODACID.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
LIENVOY

SOURCE
LIENVOY
LITAMIL-9 ✓

DATE OF INFORMATION
26 July, 14 Aug 64

DATE ACQUIRED
17 Aug 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 25 Aug 64
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 9149
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
KPR/m

C S
311/03160-64

EVAL. REQUESTED
[illegible]

XREF

SUBJECT
Views of Yugoslav Ambassador to Mexico and Mexican Personalities on Mexican Support of Cuba at the Meeting of the Organization of American States, January 1964

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Did station in fact mean to say OAS meeting in JANUARY 1964 or does this report refer to the July 64 meeting? Have presumed to change January to July in the title and in the body of the report. If January is correct please let us known and we will issue a correction.

Source description: para one unchanged. Para 2: Pro-Cuban Mexican (-) with good access to Cuban circles in Mexico. Appraisal of Content: Para 2: 2. pls see source eval on HMM 9162 re LIENVOY sourcing.

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT: EP

SOURCE: LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT: Postponement of A Trip to Cuba by David ALFARO Siqueiros; Fear of Expulsion from Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION: 30 Oct 1964

DATE ACQUIRED: 5 Nov 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE: 7 Nov 64

GRADE: B-2

TO:

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE:

GRADE: B-2

TO:

FIELD NO.

REPORT: HMM-9339

CABLE: MEXI-1503

IN:

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C.S. ~~-3FF/~~ 05971-64

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA: Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

This cable was referred to the desk. It was disseminated as a CS report.with minor editorial changes.

The comment was re-written to include more information from the referenced report, which will show that he probably plans to paint another mural in Cuba.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 JUN 55

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPORT PROCESSING RECORD

CITE: MEXI 1503

IN NO.: 10312

NON-INTEL FORMAT

PRECEDENCE:

ACTION DIV.:

FIELD REPORT NO.: HMM 9339

TDCS

RECEIVED

NOV 7 64 NOT DISSEMINATED

DISSEMINATED

COMMENTS

OUR SOURCE CARD FOR LITAMIL-9 ENJOINS IW TO MODIFY WH/1'S APPROVED SOURCE DESCRIPTIONS ONLY ON CONSULTATION X WITH THE DESK. THE FIELD BYLINE IS CONSPICUOUSLY DIFFERENT FROM THE TWO HQS BYLINES IN THAT THE ~~FIXE~~ FIELD OMITS MENTION OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY. THEREFORE (AT 2 A.M.), TO WH/1 FOR ACTION.

Besides, didn't warrant cable dissem!

R.

RECEIVED | NOT DISSEMINATED | DISSEMINATED

FORM 8-64 1736 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(13-2C)

PROJECT No Project

SOURCE [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible]

DATE OF INFORMATION [illegible] 3

DATE ACQUIRED [illegible] 3

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE [illegible]

GRADE [illegible]

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE [illegible]

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT [illegible]

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S [illegible]

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA [illegible]

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

[illegible]

[illegible] by BAS

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

1

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Visit of Michel Chartrand, Canadian Communist, to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City

DATE OF INFORMATION
Dec 63

DATE ACQUIRED
27 Dec 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WAS -. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8288
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
3/573,305

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/ Cuba/Canada

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See CS report for changes made and for headquarters comment added.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 683 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Mexican-Cuban Relations

DATE OF INFORMATION
Dec 63

DATE ACQUIRED
27 Dec 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8287
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C/S
3/572,775

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico, Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See CS report for changes made.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
2 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT H M-8291
CABLE
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER

C S
No Dissem.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/USSR

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. Source (Tass Rep) access to info doubted.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of Mexican Students to Get Cuban Scholarships

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
16 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 23 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT [illegible]-8334
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
3/572,776

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT [illegible]

SOURCE [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible]

DATE OF INFORMATION [illegible]

DATE ACQUIRED

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT

CABLE [illegible]

IN [illegible]

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S [illegible]

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA [illegible]

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

[illegible]

[illegible] S.S.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT LIENVOY
No Project

SOURCE
Para. 1 - LITAMIL-9
Para. 2 - LIENVOY

SUBJECT
Planned Travel to Cuba from Mexico in Connection With Activities of the Casa de las Americas in 1964

DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED 14 & 16 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 24 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE 1 Feb ~~[illegible]~~
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8340
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER RLS/jct

CS 3/573,559

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See report for changes made and headquarters comments added.

FORM NO 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(26)

2

PROJECT [redacted] [redacted] Project

SOURCE LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT Additional Assignments for Members of the Cuban Embassy Staff in Mexico City

DATE OF INFORMATION 18 Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED 30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 13 Feb 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE Descr

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT HMM-8426

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S 3/575,185

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible]

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Technical Problems at the Nicaro Nickel Plant in Cuba; Decision of Cuban Government to Base Cuban Economy on Sugar

DATE OF INFORMATION
17 Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8428
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S
N/D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No Dissem. Previously reported. Per SAS

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
LIENVOY
No Project

SOURCE
Para 1 - LIENVOY ✓
Para 2 - LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Possible Return to Cuba of
Silvanio Reyes, Cuban Medical Student

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE [illegible]
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT [illegible] 8429
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

No dissem - by SAS. Not significant.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (24)

3

PROJECT NP

SOURCE

LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT

Dismissal of Homosexuals from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations

DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED 30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 13 Feb 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT HMM 8430

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S ND

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem, by WH/SA. Marginal

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT [illegible] NP

SOURCE

LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED 30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 13 Feb 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT ~~HMM 8430~~

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

This report, previously not disseminated, was added as a comment to the dissem of UFG 4920, CSDB 3/660,810

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LI[illegible]D-2

SUBJECT
Mexican Cultural Movement, Pro-Cuban
Mexican Youth Organization

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE B-2
TO XXXXXX

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8431
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASC . FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No Dissem. No intel value to customers.

No identifiable traces on Tovar or Hernandez. One Jose Tovar (citizenship not stated) was xxxxx included in a list of people who collaborated with the Cuban Embassy in Quito, Ecuador, in November 1960. (F-3)

Aguilar may be identical with Rafael AGUILAR Talamantes mentioned in HMM ~~1907~~ 7227, June 63, DBA 17489 and DBA 39315. Rafael AGUILAR included in list in HMM-1907. Copies of the last three documents mentioned being forwarded. Can the Station determine whether the Aguilar mentioned in HMM 8431 is in fact AGUILAR Talamantes?

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
LIFEAT / [illegible]P

SOURCE
LIFEAT
LI[illegible]-9 ✓

SUBJECT
Cooperation Between the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and the University of Michoacan

DATE OF INFORMATION
26-27 Feb 64

DATE ACQUIRED
28 Feb - 1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 & 12 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8535 ✓
CABLE 8584
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
RLS/jct

C S
3/577,383

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Two reports combined for dissemination.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
5P

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Possible Travel to Cuba of Genia Maria Hernandez, Mexican Teacher

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-3536
CABLE
IN
FR NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jct

C 3
XD

EVA. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
New Guinean Ambassador to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 4 Mar 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT HMM-8537

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jct

C S
No Dissem

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico Cuba Guinea

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT KP	DATE OF INFORMATION 1 Mar 64	FIELD NO.
SOURCE LITAMIL-9	DATE ACQUIRED 1 Mar 64	REPORT E 4-8541 CABLE IN RI NO.
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE B-2 TO	REPORTS OFFICER PLS/jct
SUBJECT Invitation to Dr. Huben Pareja, Bolivian Physician to Visit Cuba	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	C S ED EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Mexico/Cuba/Bolivia

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59.92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (21) 3

PROJECT
LIENVOY/RP

SOURCE
Para 1: LIENVOY
Para 2: LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Ismael COSIO Villegas, now President of the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations

DATE OF INFORMATION
19 Feb - early Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
20 Feb - 10 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 25 Feb/19 Mar
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE [illegible]-6402, 8611
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
[illegible]/jet

C S
3/577,327

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2 Reports compiled for dissemination.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 53-82
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
HP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of Jose Rafael Padrino Lopez, / Venezuelan, to go to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
2 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
10 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 19 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8612
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/JCt

CS 3/577,390

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
N.P.

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Jose HERRERA Pena; Efforts to go to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
19 Mar 63

DATE ACQUIRED
20 Mar 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 2 Apr 63
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8673
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jet

C S
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT HP	DATE OF INFORMATION 24 Mar 64	FIELD NO.
SOURCE LITAMIL-9	DATE ACQUIRED 1 Apr 64	REPORT [illegible] 8679 CABLE MEXI 8686 IN
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 2 Apr 64 GRADE ~~XXXX~~ Tower TO	RI NO.
SUBJECT Comments of Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, on the trial of Marcos RODRIGUEZ Alfonso	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE 2 Apr 64 GRADE ~~[illegible]~~ Tower TO	REPORTS OFFICER CS TD 3/577,544 — EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by IACG

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(26)

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of the Cuban Embassy to Increase Its Knowledge on Pro-Cuban Mexican Personalities

DATE OF INFORMATION
2 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE ~~14 Apr 64~~
GRADE ~~B-2~~
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO. 4
REPORT
CABLE ~~HMM 8704~~
IN 8704
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
C S N.D.
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. by WH/SA. Marginal interest.

ORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92
UN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Restrictions on Cuban Government Scholarships

DATE OF INFORMATION 24 Mar 64
DATE ACQUIRED 1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE Descr
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 May 64
GRADE Descr
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8705
CABLE
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
C S 3/580,295
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by WH/SA.

See comment on Source Record Card for HMM 8721 for source description for LITAMIL-9.

Cy attached

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
KP

X cy

SOURCE
AMSPUR-1

SUBJECT
Prensa Latina Offices, Habana, Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION Late March 1964
DATE ACQUIRED Early April 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 April 1964
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8721
CABLE
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
C S
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Disseminated.

While we realize that AMSPUR-1 is merely an interrogator, he is, nevertheless, the direct source and should be shown as such in the source description—followed by the appropriate subsource description. The approved description for him is "A Cuban exile in Mexico who is in touch with local Cuban exiles and anti-Castro organizations."

Also, please note that when LITAMIL-9's reporting is on Cuba, his description should read "Latin American official in Mexico City who has regular contact with Cuban Embassy personnel; he has been a reliable reporter for about a year and a half." "Person(s) (B)" is not acceptable for SA reports.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT NP

SOURCE LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT Plans of the Algerian Government to Establish Diplomatic Relations with Latin American Countries

DATE OF INFORMATION Late March 64

DATE ACQUIRED 1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE [illegible]-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8706
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER PLS/jct

C S N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba/Algeria

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Not dissem. Inaccurate. Possibly "open embassies" was meant, rather than "establish diplomatic relations". Both Spain and Brazil have ambassadors in Algiers, and have had for some time. Algeria has announced that it planned to open embassies in several countries, including Brazil and Argentina.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59.92 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 JUN 55

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[illegible] - Algeria [illegible]	6/5/64	KAB
2	Attn: A. [illegible]		
3	Bob		W
4			
5			
6	[illegible]		

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

1-6: Recommend that no dissem be made of this. Zirout probably mean that Algeria~~s~~ would soon
[illegible]

open up embassies in these countries. rather than "establish diplomatic relations". Both Spain and Brazil have embassadors in Algiers. and have had for some time. A Cairo MENA item 6 April 64 announced that Algeria planned to open embassies shortly in several countries, including Brazil and Argentina. Our Embassy in Algiers confirmed this on 21 April - xxxxxxx and the Brazilian Amb in Algiers said that as far as he knew no changes had been made in these plans in spite of the fall of the Goulart
[illegible]
over

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[illegible]anshaw x5110	6/5

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O-[illegible] government.

As for Zirout's remarks about his choosing Cuba would seem the natural thing for him to say when talking to the Cubans.

JECT

MP

SOURCE

LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT

Plan of Mexican Government Not to Vote for Admission of Communist China to the United Nations

DATE OF INFORMATION
Late Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2 for reportorial accuracy
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8709, [illegible]11
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
3/5[illegible]1,227

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/China/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Two reports were combined for dissemination

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
NP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plans of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City to Buy Three Ford Automobiles

DATE OF INFORMATION
24 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE -2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8712
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jct

C S CI 3/781,307

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Information in this report was disseminated as a CSCI to ODENVY and to a Bureau of [illegible].

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Cuban Embassy Information Bulletin

DATE OF INFORMATION
10-13 Apr 64

DATE ACQUIRED
10-13 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 28 May 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE HMM 8912
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jct

C S
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON [illegible] AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem - by WH/SA. Marginal.

This report should have carried the source description for Cuban information.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT NONE	DATE OF INFORMATION April 1964	FIELD NO. REPORT HMM 8925 CABLE IN
SOURCE LITAMIL-9	DATE ACQUIRED 10 April 1964	RI NO.
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 20 May 1964 GRADE B-3 TO	REPORTS OFFICER PLS/jct
SUBJECT Disillusionment of Mexican Leftists After A Visit to the USSR	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE B-3 TO	CS 3/583,597 EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Mexico/USSR

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Disseminated.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
NP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plans to Invite the Cuban Aragon Orchestra to Perform in Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Jun 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Jun 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 11 Jun 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 6991
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
ND

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND ..., SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. Marginal.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 39.92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
NONE

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Mexican Cultural Movement, Pro-Cuban Youth Organization

DATE OF INFORMATION
June 1964

DATE ACQUIRED
1 June 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 June 1964
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HM 6996
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
3[illegible]9/a
0224-64

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

dissemd as received

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

1

PROJECT
EP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of Cuban Cultural Attache to Implement Cuban-Mexican Cultural Exchange [illegible]

DATE OF INFORMATION
[illegible] 9 & 24 June 64

DATE ACQUIRED
19 June 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 July 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE [illegible]
GRADE [illegible]
TO [illegible]scription

FIELD NO.
REPORT [illegible] 9092
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
KPR

C S [illegible]

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by WH/SA.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-32
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (24)

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Reaction of Cuban Embassy in Mexico to Freezing of Dollar Accounts of the Banco del Atlantico, S.A.

DATE OF INFORMATION
20 July 64

DATE ACQUIRED
23 July 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 23 July 64
GRADE Lescr
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE 23 July 64
GRADE Lescr
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 9121
CABLE MEXI 0357
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jct

C S TD
314/00964

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (ATTACH [illegible] CONSUMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by IWOG.

Ref Source Record card for HMM 8943. Freezing of these accounts resulted from the attachment to that report which was passed to ODALCB.

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 59.92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
LIENVOY

SOURCE
LIENVOY
LITAMIL-9 ✓

DATE OF INFORMATION
26 July, 14 Aug 64

DATE ACQUIRED
17 Aug 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 25 Aug 64
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE HMM 9109
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
KPR/m

CS
311/03180-64
XREF

EVAL. REQUESTED
[illegible]

SUBJECT
Views of Yugoslav Ambassador to Mexico and Mexican Personalities on Mexican Support of Cuba at the Meeting of the Organization of American States, January 1964

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Did station in fact mean to say OAS meeting in JANUARY 1964 or does this report refer to the July 64 meeting? Have presumed to change January to July in the title and in the body of the report. If January is correct please let us known and we will issue a correction.

Source description: para one unchanged. Para 2: Pro-Cuban Mexican (.) with good access to Cuban circles in Mexico. Appraisal of Content: Para 2: 2. pls see source eval on HMM 9162 re LIENVOY sourcing.

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 53.92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
EP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Postponement of A Trip to Cuba by David ALFARO Siqueiros; Fear of Expulsion from Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION: 30 Oct 1964
DATE ACQUIRED: 5 Nov 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE: 7 Nov 64
GRADE: B-2
TO:

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE:
GRADE: B-2
TO:

FIELD NO.
REPORT: HMM-9339
CABLE: MEXI-1503
IN:
RI NO.:
REPORTS OFFICER:
C.S. ~~-3FF/~~ 05971-64
EVAL. REQUESTED:
AREA: Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

This cable was referred to the desk. It was disseminated as a CS report with minor editorial changes.

The comment was re-written to include more information from the referenced report, which will show that he probably plans to paint another mural in Cuba.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24) 3

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPORT PROCESSING RECORD

CITE: MEXI 1503
NON-INTEL FORMAT:
PRECEDENCE: [illegible]
ACTION DIV.: [illegible]
FIELD REPORT NO.: HMM 9339
IN NO.: [illegible]
TDCS:

[illegible] RECEIVED
NOV 7 [illegible] 64 NOT DISSEMINATED
DISSEMINATED

COMMENTS

OUR SOURCE CARD FOR LITAMIL-9 ENJOINS IW TO MODIFY WH/1'S APPROVED SOURCE DESCRIPTIONS ONLY ON CONSULTATION ~~X~~ WITH THE DESK. THE FIELD BYLINE IS CONSPICUOUSLY DIFFERENT FROM THE TWO HQS BYLINES IN THAT THE ~~FIXE~~ FIELD OMITS MENTION OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY. THEREFORE (AT 2 A.M.), TO WH/1 FOR ACTION.

Besides, didn't warrant cable dissem!
R.

RECEIVED
NOT DISSEMINATED
DISSEMINATED

FORM 8-64 1736 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(13-20)

SECRET

6 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Mr. John M. Whitten

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101331

With reference to your memorandum dated 22 April 1964, requesting a report on the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject, a memorandum setting forth this information was forwarded to your office on 15 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA and was again forwarded to your office for your retention on 27 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA a second time without comment on 11 December 1963, whereupon it was filed in Subject's folder in this office. No further approval action has been taken in this matter for the reasons explained in the memorandum.

[redacted]
Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

SECRET

6 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Mr. John M. Whitten

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101331

With reference to your memorandum dated 22 April 1964, requesting a report on the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject, a memorandum setting forth this information was forwarded to your office on 18 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA and was again forwarded to your office for your retention on 27 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA a second time without comment on 11 December 1963, whereupon it was filed in Subject's folder in this office. No further approval action has been taken in this matter for the reasons explained in the memorandum.

[redacted]
Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

22 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : [redacted]

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
(C-101331)

It is requested that a report be sent to the Mexico Desk regarding the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject. The OA was initially requested on 24 June 1963.

John M. Whitten
C/WH/3

SECRET

22 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION [redacted]

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
(C-101331)

It is requested that a report be sent to the Mexico Desk regarding the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject. The OA was initially requested on 24 June 1963.

John M. Whitten
C/WH/3

SECRET

7 November 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9 (C-101,331)
201-329609

REFS: A. HMMW-11983, 4 October 1963
B. MEXI-6696 (In 49286)

1. At the request of the Chief, CI/OA, reference A was forwarded to Mexico City Station requesting the Station to attempt to clarify certain derogatory information which had been reported on LITAMIL-9. Reference B contains the Mexico City Station attempt to clarify this matter.

2. It is requested that the processing of an OA for the use of LITAMIL-9 be resumed.

[redacted]
AC/WH/3

Distribution:
O&1 - Addressee
1 - 201 File

Not accepted by CI/OA

7 November 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9 (C-101,331)
201-329609

REFS: A. HMMW-11988, 4 October 1963
B. MEXI-6696 (In 49286)

1. At the request of the Chief, CI/OA, reference A was forwarded to Mexico City Station requesting the Station to attempt to clarify certain derogatory information which had been reported on LITAMIL-9. Reference B contains the Mexico City Station attempt to clarify this matter.

2. It is requested that the processing of an OA for the use of LITAMIL-9 be resumed.

[redacted]
AC/WH/3

Distribution:
O&1 - Addressee
1 - 201 File

Not accepted by CI/OA

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

22 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, SAS 8, OS 2, RF, VR

SECRET 282304Z

29 OCT 63 IN 49286

DIR CITE MEXI 6696

DIA

PBRUMEN

REF: HMMW 11988 [redacted]

1. SUGGEST KUS CONTACT LIWOZZLE AT PENTAGON FOR ASSESSMENT RELIABILITY 1959 REPORT FROM [redacted] THAT LITAMIL-9 BELIEVED TO BE COMMUNIST SINCE THIS CONFLICTS WITH NUMEROUS REPORTS RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES MORE CLOSELY RELATED TO L-9. STATION RELUCTANT CONTACT [redacted] WHO NOW [redacted] LEST THIS FLAG INTEREST IN L-9. ODIBEX OFFICERS REPORT THEY HAVE LITTLE CONTACT WITH [redacted] RECEIVED ALMOST NOTHING OF INTEL VALUE FROM HIM IN PAST.

2. BELIEVE ANY EFFORT LCFLUTTER L-9 THIS TIME WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF AGENT WHO, WITH IMPENDING RETIREMENT LITAMIL-7, REPRESENTS ONLY PENETRATION PBRUMEN EMBASSY AND WHO SHOWING INCREASING SIGNS STRAIN OF DOUBLE EXISTENCE. STATION FULLY APPRECIATES VALUE LCFLUTTER PROCESS AND REVIEW OF RECORDS WILL SHOW HEAVY USE THIS INVESTIGATIVE MEASURE MEXI. L-9 HAS BEEN SUBJECT CLOSE AND CONTINUAL ASSESSMENT SINCE RECRUITMENT. PAST AND PRESENT CASE OFFICERS, WHO OFTEN DISAGREED, BOTH ASSESSED L-9 INDEPENDENTLY AS SINCERE PBRUMEN PATRIOT WHO GENUINELY ANTI-AMTHUG, ANTI-COMMUNIST.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

BOTH CASE OFFICERS AGREED ANY ATTEMPT PUT L-9 ON LCFLUTTER WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE HIM TO QUIT. L-9 NOT LIKELY EVER DEVELOP INTO STRONG ACTION AGENT OWING TO FEAR OF COMPROMISE BUT SERVES AS INVALUABLE EYES AND EARS INSIDE TARGET ESTABLISHMENT. HIS DATA VALUABLE BASIS FOR MOUNTING MORE PRODUCTIVE OPS INSIDE SAME TARGET. STATION HAS NEVER DETECTED ANY DECEPTION HIS PART.

3. EVEN ASSUMING L-9 HAD ONCE BEEN COMMUNIST, WHICH STATION DOES NOT ASSUME, FEEL OPERATION SHOULD BE ALLOWED PROCEED AS RUNNING IN-PLACE DEFECTOR ON SAME BASIS RUNNING HYPOTHETICAL IN-PLACE SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL WHO KNOWN CP MEMBER.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

22 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, SAS 8, OS 2, RF, VR

SECRET 282304Z

23 Oct 63 IN 49286

DIR CITE MEXI 6696

PBRUMEN

DIA

REF: HMMW 11983 [redacted]

1. SUGGEST HQS CONTACT [illegible] AT PENTAGON FOR ASSESSMENT RELIABILITY 1959 REPORT FROM [redacted] THAT LITAMIL-9 BELIEVED TO BE COMMUNIST SINCE THIS CONFLICTS WITH NUMBEROUS REPORTS RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES MORE CLOSELY RELATED TO L-9. STATION RELUCTANT CONTACT [redacted] WHO NOW COMMANDING [redacted] LEST THIS FLAG INTEREST IN L-9. ODIBEX OFFICERS REPORT THEY HAVE LITTLE CONTACT WITH [redacted], RECEIVED ALMOST NOTHING OF INTEL VALUE FROM HIM IN PAST.

2. BELIEVE ANY EFFORT LCFLUTTER L-9 THIS TIME WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF AGENT WHO, WITH IMPENDING RETIREMENT LITAMIL-7, REPRESENTS ONLY PENETRATION PBRUMEN EMBASSY AND WHO SHOWING INCREASING SIGNS STRAIN OF DOUBLE EXISTENCE. STATION FULLY APPRECIATES VALUE LCFLUTTER PROCESS AND REVIEW OF RECORDS WILL SHOW HEAVY USE THIS INVESTIGATIVE MEASURE MEXI. L-9 HAS BEEN SUBJECT CLOSE AND CONTINUAL ASSESSMENT SINCE RECRUITMENT. PAST AND PRESENT CASE OFFICERS, WHO OFTEN DISAGREED, BOTH ASSESSED L-9 INDEPENDENTLY AS SINCERE PBRUMEN PATRIOT WHO GENUINELY ANTI-AMTHUG, ANTI-COMMUNIST.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

BOTH CASE OFFICERS AGREED ANY ATTEMPT PUT L-9 ON LCFLUTTER WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE HIM TO QUIT. L-9 NOT LIKELY EVER DEVELOP INTO STRONG ACTION AGENT OWING TO FEAR OF COMPROMISE BUT SERVES AS INVALUABLE EYES AND EARS INSIDE TARGET ESTABLISHMENT. HIS DATA VALUABLE BASIS FOR MOUNTING MORE PRODUCTIVE OPS INSIDE SAME TARGET. STATION HAS NEVER DETECTED ANY DECEPTION HIS PART.

3. EVEN ASSUMING L-9 HAD ONCE BEEN COMMUNIST, WHICH STATION DOES NOT ASSUME, FEEL OPERATION SHOULD BE ALLOWED PROCEED AS RUNNING IN-PLACE DEFECTOR ON SAME BASIS RUNNING HYPOTHETICAL IN-PLACE SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL WHO KNOWN CP MEMBER.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/OA for LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. MEXI 1506, 26 July 1962

B. DIR-18912, 19 Feb. 1963

C. MEXI 3497, Para 11, 19 Feb 1963

D. MEXI 5015, 14 June 1963

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paras 6 and 7.

1. Although PRQ, Parts I and II, for LITAMIL-9 have been submitted by the Station to Headquarters along with results of Station traces , we have not been able to obtain an OA for Subject as requested because of the derogatory information on Subject which was reported in para 2 of MEXI 1506. (Ref A).

2. In Reference B, Headquarters requested the Station to clarify the derogatory information that was reported in MEXI 1506. This clarification was requested by KUDESK prior to the granting of a POA.

3. The Station replied to this request per Ref C. KUDESK granted a POA only for training of Subject on 20 Feb 1963.

4. KUDESK, however, deferred granting of an operational approval for Subject pending satisfactory resolution of the derogatory information on Subject which was contained in MEXI 1506.

(Continued)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-11988	17 OCT 4 October 1963
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-329609

ROUTING | INITIALS
RID/... | M
1 - RI
1 Chrono
~~RID/PS~~
~~RID/FI~~
WH3/MEX
~~DESTROY~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	H.E. Mulloy;dc	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OA	9 Oct 63	Mr. Brown

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	14 OCT 1963	J. C. KING

FORM 7-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

KUDESK does not consider that this was accomplished by the Station's answer contained in Ref C.

5. KUDESK has informed the desk that an OA for LITAMIL-9 cannot be granted until their request to resolve the derogatory information as reported by ODIBEX from a Mexican Army G-2 officer in MEXI 1506 has been resolved to their satisfaction.

6. It is requested, therefore, that the Station again attempt to resolve the DI on LITAMIL-9 by debriefing the Mexican G-2 officer re his info on Subject either through the ODIBEX office or directly if this is possible and if the Mexican officer is available. In a further effort to resolve the problem, it is also requested that LITAMIL-9 be LCFLUTTERED ASAP.

7. Please cable the results of your efforts re the above request so that the processing for an OA for LITAMIL-9 can proceed.

END OF DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: PERUMEN/OA for LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES:
A. MEXI 1506, 26 July 1962
B. DIR-18912, 19 Feb. 1963
C. MEXI 3497, Para 11, 19 Feb 1963
D. MEXI 5015, 14 June 1963

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paras 6 and 7.

1. Although PRQ, Parts I and II, for LITAMIL-9 have been submitted by the Station to Headquarters along with results of Station traces , we have not been able to obtain an OA for Subject as requested because of the derogatory information on Subject which was reported in para 2 of MEXI 1506. (Ref A).

2. In Reference B, Headquarters requested the Station to clarify the derogatory information that was reported in MEXI 1506. This clarification was requested by KUDESK prior to the granting of a POA.

3. The Station replied to this request per Ref C. KUDESK granted a POA only for training of Subject on 20 Feb 1963.

4. KUDESK, however, deferred granting of an operational approval for Subject pending satisfactory resolution of the derogatory information on Subject which was contained in MEXI 1506.

(Continued)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11988

DATE: 17 OCT 1963
4 October 1963

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-329609

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/ / ~~RI~~ 1 RI	
1 ~~RID~~ Chrono	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/RI~~	
WH3/MEX	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: WH/3/Mexico/ OFFICER: H.E. Mulloy;dc
H E Mulloy
EXT: 5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OA	9 Oct 63	Mr. Brown Brown

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	14 OCT 1963	J. C. KING

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

KUDESK does not consider that this was accomplished by the Station's answer contained in Ref C.

5. KUDESK has informed the desk that an OA for LITAMIL-9 cannot be granted until their request to resolve the derogatory information as reported by ODIBEX from a Mexican Army G-2 officer in MEXI 1506 has been resolved to their satisfaction.

6. It is requested, therefore, that the Station again attempt to resolve the DI on LITAMIL-9 by debriefing the Mexican G-2 officer re his info on Subject either through the ODIBEX office or directly if this is possible and if the Mexican officer is available. In a further effort to resolve the problem, it is also requested that LITAMIL-9 be LCFLUTTERED ASAP.

7. Please cable the results of your efforts re the above request so that the processing for an OA for LITAMIL-9 can proceed.

END OF DISPATCH

SECRET

1 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Wayne Carley

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum dated 10 July 1963. Same Subject.

1. This is the second request of CI/OA's asking for an answer to our memorandum of 10 July 1963. Because of the sensitivity of this case, it is imperative that the oft-requested reply be forwarded.

2. It is to be noted that the Subject continues to be used without an Operational Approval per PRQ Part II dated 17 June 1963. It is further noted in Section VI, 4, that "Subject is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements", a most sensitive area.

3. Again, we ask for an answer to the referenced memorandum.

Edward P. Brown
EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

1 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Wayne Carley

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum dated 10 July 1963. Same Subject.

1. This is the second request of CI/OA's asking for an answer to our memorandum of 10 July 1963. Because of the sensitivity of this case, it is imperative that the oft-requested reply be forwarded.

2. It is to be noted that the Subject continues to be used without an Operational Approval per PRQ Part II dated 17 June 1963. It is further noted in Section VI, 4, that "Subject is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements", a most sensitive area.

3. Again, we ask for an answer to the referenced memorandum.

Edward P. Brown

EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
X ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO
Chief, SAS; Chief of Station, WAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Contact Report/LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PBRUMEN LITAMIL 9

Attached herewith are contact reports of meetings with LITAMIL-9 on 17 and 29 July 1963.

Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/2/att
2 - C/SAS w/a/att
2 - COS WAVE w/2/att
3 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA 21849	31 July 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 330173

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

TO	Chief, WHD
INFO	Chief, SAS; Chief of Station, WAVE
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT	Contact Report/LITAMIL-9
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
X ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

PBRUMEN LITAMIL_9

Attached herewith are contact reports of meetings with LITAMIL-9 on 17 and 29 July 1963.

Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/2/att
2 - C/SAS w/2/att
2 - COS WAVE w/2/att
3 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA 21849	31 July 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 330173

[illegible] introduced to the [illegible] Day by (the) [illegible] [illegible]).

(c) [illegible] the new [illegible], [illegible] because he has done much [illegible] [illegible] Nations.

(d) [illegible] also reported that the [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] trouble obtaining newsprint.

(e) [illegible] said that when he was in [illegible] he had trouble with the climate -- [illegible] to be sent to some other European [illegible] -- was surprised at the suddenness of his transfer to [illegible].

(f) [illegible] made a [illegible] as to who should be [illegible] [illegible] Embassy [illegible] about [illegible] might be [illegible], but [illegible] he [illegible] assumed I [illegible] would never ask [illegible] San Juan de Letran [illegible] -- might be approachable there.

(g) Only the Cubans were invited to the French Ambassador's residence on Bastille Day (14 July) -- [illegible]. Each [illegible] separately but [illegible] Ambassador's [illegible]. The [illegible] clearly [illegible] with the French -- [illegible] is a close friend of the French Military Attache to whom he introduced [illegible] -- and the [illegible] kept [illegible] by his side during the [illegible] -- [illegible] good French. At this affair, [illegible] the Soviet [illegible] a superficial [illegible] of international [illegible] and it became clear that the Cuban [illegible] the Soviets in the city [illegible]. [illegible] remarked that he would be leaving soon [illegible] would be replaced with "another young man, [illegible] as I am." [illegible] and the Amb agreed that current American policy for Latin [illegible] designed to give the [illegible] that such governments [illegible] the new one in Argentina represent a democracy [illegible] in fact they are fronting for the military.

(h) [illegible] youth named Ulises ESTRELLA was in the Embassy [illegible] -- spoke with [illegible]. [illegible] a group [illegible] writers in Ecuador [illegible] trying to go to Cuba [illegible] probably get there. He has a moustache and beard -- brought a book as a gift for [illegible].

(i) [illegible] is busy working on the forthcoming Congress of [illegible] which is to take place in Havana. [illegible] is dealing principally with a man named [illegible] on this [illegible]. [illegible] says that the US Government has been [illegible] pressure to have the seat of the congress [illegible] to some other country -- without success. A check for [illegible] dollars, representing [illegible] subscription fee paid by Mexican delegates to the congress, has been sent to Havana.

(j) [illegible] in the Embassy seems unduly upset by the restrictions [illegible] currency transactions with Cuba.

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR [illegible]

FROM : [illegible]

SUBJECT : [illegible] -9, 17 July 19[illegible]

1. [illegible] held [illegible] July -- [illegible] [illegible]rsity National [illegible] at 2100 [illegible] place at 2105 [illegible] of Gutenberg and [illegible] -1 -- but as [illegible] said, in English, [illegible] -9 got in [illegible] the mystery was [illegible] -9 explained [illegible] about 2030 hours [illegible] probably be back [illegible] hour -- I [illegible] (from the pay phone [illegible] saw [illegible] pass by [illegible] around the [illegible] around by this [illegible] had [illegible] the word that I [illegible] that night -- [illegible] coincide[illegible] explained [illegible] (party [illegible] he was [illegible] better pick up [illegible] was made [illegible] scheduled [illegible] (with -1). [illegible] Hotel there [illegible] vicinity of [illegible] Field. L-9 was dropped off at 2325 hours.

2. L revealed [illegible] pattern [illegible] the new ambassador and [illegible] are [illegible] dangerous. He [illegible] a complete [illegible] were explained [illegible] schedul[illegible] and [illegible] burning -- and [illegible] made in [illegible] out the details.

3. L reported [illegible] Cuban [illegible] to inaugurate an [illegible] of [illegible] at the [illegible] de [illegible] night of 10 [illegible] leave [illegible] July -- return about 21 [illegible] Cuban Consulate [illegible] -- [illegible] two weeks.

4. He reported [illegible] additional developments:

(a) A [illegible] of the 26th of July [illegible] will be held in [illegible] of Tampico. This celebration -- sponsored [illegible] -- will take place in the [illegible]. The principal spe[illegible] [illegible]. The event will take place at [illegible]

L-9 [illegible] might want to have a photographer there and might [illegible] to drop a stink bomb or [illegible].

(b) [illegible], who was introduced [illegible] Jacqueline K[illegible] during the President's trip to Mexico [illegible] supporter [illegible] and who apparently [illegible] his interest [illegible] Kennedy, has been [illegible] in the United States and [illegible] planning to go there. L has no further details.

Att #2 To HMMA 21849 CS COPY

201-329609

(c) I turned over to B (for return) a [illegible] la [illegible] de [illegible] 20 [illegible] 1963, explaining that [illegible] Fidel Castro to act as sponsor of the 1958-[illegible] graduating class. Copy attached.

(d) I turned over a pornographic cartoon (for return) distributed by pro-Castro elements in Tampico. Copy also attached.

(e) [illegible] of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that [illegible] has a sister [illegible] in [illegible], [illegible] married to an American of Mexican descent. [illegible] to the border to visit her sister soon — or her sister may take the trip — details not clear.

5. L-9 reports that he is very well "in" with the new [illegible] — seems to respect him [illegible] and [illegible] for his [illegible]. He is also getting along very nicely with his new boss, [illegible]. His information gathering method is [illegible] to keep his eyes and ears open and ask no questions — thus he often gets only fragments — while questions or direct [illegible] might fill in detail he is extremely wary lest he arouse any suspicion.

6. While he [illegible] might want to toss a few stink bombs at the engraving exhibit on the 20th in Tampico and the subsequent exhibition of the 26th in Ciudad Madero — he was also concerned lest any disruption might get him in trouble since he is the principal organizer of both affairs — felt that the Mexican Government might think the disruption was engineered by the Castro Cubans themselves, to throw suspicion on the anti-Castroites.

7. L-9 is really worried about his security and it will be up to me to take every practical precaution to protect him. He loves to talk — quite a conversationalist — [illegible] needs constant encouragement and cheering-up. He is [illegible], [illegible] inclined to pat himself on the back quite often and wait for a further pat from his case officer (which B is always quick to add). This characteristic comes out in his conversation when he stops and says, "I did very well [illegible], didn't I?" or "That was a good [illegible] idea I had, wasn't it?" or "I think my ideas on handling such-and-such are pretty clever, don't you?"

8. For the present it has been decided to keep holding meetings in B's car — always at night. [illegible] pick up point has been abandoned in favor of a mobile pick up — L will start at the corner of Thiers and Melchor Ocampo at the prescribed hour and walk slowly up the street to Thiers and Gutenberg — then, without turning, will work his way back down the opposite side of the street to Melchor Ocampo — B will cruise by in his car and make the pick up while L is walking. Other modus details will be worked out at the next meeting.

Lawrence F. [illegible]

SECRET

201-329609

SECRET

10 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION: Wayne Carley

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

1. With reference to your memorandum dated 24 June 1963 attaching FRQ Part II and requesting an Operational Approval for Subject's use, your attention is directed to derogatory information forwarded by Station Mexico to the effect that an ODIBEX report dated 25 August 1959 stated that Col. Arturo CORONA, Mexican Army G-2, believed Subject to be a Communist and one of the most influential members of the Cuban Embassy staff.

2. On 18 September 1962 we requested SAS, which then had Headquarters responsibility for this case, to request Station Mexico City to determine the basis for Mexico G-2's allegation, to obtain any evidence substantiating the allegation, and to conduct such investigation as was possible to determine the truth or falseness of the allegation. It was further agreed that SAS would determine whether the Station had direct access to Subject and would recommend polygraphing him if it were feasible. We have no indication that any of this has been accomplished or attempted.

3. On 20 February 1963, because of the exigencies of the situation at that particular time, a Provisional Operational Approval was granted only for training of Subject. The Provisional Operational Approval specified that approval for operational use of the Subject was deferred pending satisfactory resolution of the derogatory information, which CI Staff did not consider to have been accomplished. The FRQ Part II on Subject clearly shows that he has been used operationally for the past year without any approval.

4. Operational Approval for Subject's use cannot be granted until there has been compliance with our previous request to resolve the derogatory information as reported by ODIBEX from Mexican G-2.

Edward P. Brown
EDWARD P. BROWN
Acting Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

10 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION: Wayne Carley

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

1. With reference to your memorandum dated 24 June 1963 attaching PRQ Part II and requesting an Operational Approval for Subject's use, your attention is directed to derogatory information forwarded by Station Mexico to the effect that an ODIBEX report dated 25 August 1959 stated that Col. Arturo [illegible], Mexican Army G-2, believed Subject to be a Communist and one of the most influential members of the Cuban Embassy staff.

2. On 18 September 1962 we requested SAS, which then had Headquarters responsibility for this case, to request Station Mexico City to determine the basis for Mexico G-2's allegation, to obtain any evidence substantiating the allegation, and to conduct such investigation as was possible to determine the truth or falseness of the allegation. It was further agreed that SAS would determine whether the Station had direct access to Subject and would recommend polygraphing him if it were feasible. We have no indication that any of this has been accomplished or attempted.

3. On 20 February 1963, because of the exigencies of the situation at that particular time, a Provisional Operational Approval was granted only for training of Subject. The Provisional Operational Approval specified that approval for operational use of the Subject was deferred pending satisfactory resolution of the derogatory information, which CI Staff did not consider to have been accomplished. The PRQ Part II on Subject clearly shows that he has been used operationally for the past year without any approval.

4. Operational Approval for Subject's use cannot be granted until there has been compliance with our previous request to resolve the derogatory information as reported by ODIBEX from Mexican G-2.

Edward P. Brown
EDWARD P. BROWN
Acting Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, WAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Cuban Diplomatic Personnel in Mexico/Luis *ALBERU Souto

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

TYPIC PBRUMEN

Reference:
(A) DIR 28665
(B) MEXI 0444
(C) MEXI 0511
(D) MEXI 1467
(E) MEXI 1626
(F) MEXI 2904
(G) MEXI 2967
(H) MEXI 2998
(I) MEXI 3006
(J) MEXI 3012
(K) MEXI 3035
(L) MEXI 3066
(M) MEXI 3078
(N) MEXI 3178
(O) MEXI 3199
(P) MEXI 3217
(Q) MEXI 3245

personal details

1. FULL NAME: Luis *ALBERU Souto [illegible] CIT: Cuba OCC: Diplomat
DIPLOMATIC OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE: Cultural Attache. PP number D/62/80
PLACE OF BIRTH: Oviedo, Spain
DATE OF BIRTH: Circa 1915
PASSPORT NUMBER: D/62/80
FAMILY MEMBERS: Mother: Josefina *SOUTO - Self
Sisters: Xenia *ALBERU Souto
Marilus *ALBERU Souto
Brothers: Leonel *ALBERU Souto
Alfredo *ALBERU Souto
CIT: Cuba of Luis ALBERU SOUTO 201-329609 Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico City
RESIDENCE: Michelet 7 - 301
Mexico D.F. Mexico
PHOTOGRAPH: Attached
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST: Date of entry into Mexico unknown, prior to Dec 1949, however. Has been employed with the Cuban Government since June 1959.

2. See cited references and the LITAMIL-7 and LITAMIL-9 Contact Reports for further information on Subject.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C CURTIS

Attachment:
Photo

Distribution:
✓2 - C/WHD w/att 1cc: [illegible] WH/3
2 - COS WAVE w/o/att
3 - Files

[illegible]

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

201-329609

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21622

DATE
27 June 1963

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief of Station, WAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Cuban Diplomatic Personnel in Mexico/Luis *ALBERU Souto

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

TYPIC PBRUMEN

Reference:
(A) DIR 28865
(B) MEXI 0444
(C) MEXI 0511
(D) MEXI 1467
(E) MEXI 1626
(F) MEXI 2904
(G) MEXI 2967
(H) MEXI 2998
(I) MEXI 3006
(J) MEXI 3012
(K) MEXI 3035
(L) MEXI 3066
(M) MEXI 3078
(N) MEXI 3178
(O) MEXI 3199
(P) MEXI 3217
(Q) MEXI 3245

✓1. FULL NAME: Luis F*ALBERU Souto 201-329609 CIT: Cuba OCC: Diplomat
DIPLOMATIC OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE: Cultural Attache. PP number D/62/80
PLACE OF BIRTH: Oviedo, Spain
DATE OF BIRTH: Circa 1915
PASSPORT NUMBER: D/62/80
FAMILY MEMBERS: Mother: Josefine F*SOUTO - self
Sisters: Xenia F*ALBERU Souto - self
Marilcz F*ALBERU Souto
Brothers: Leonel F*ALBERU Souto
Alfredo *ALBERU Souto
CIT: Cuba of Luis ALBERU Souto 201-329609 Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico City
RESIDENCE: Michelet 7 - 301
Mexico D.F. Mexico
PHOTOGRAPH: Attached
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST: Date of entry into Mexico unknown, prior to Dec 1949, however. Has been employed with the Cuban Government since June 1959.

2. See cited references and the LITAMIL-7 and LITAMIL-9 Contact Reports for further information on Subject.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Photo

Distribution:
✓2 - C/WHD w/att 1cc to AH/3
2 - COS WAVE w/o/att
3 - Files

GROUP 1
[illegible]

CS COPY

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA 21622

DATE: 27 June 1963

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

SECRET

CS COPY

201-276609

ATTACHMENT HMMA 21622

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SECRET

photo & true name



Luis
ALBERU
Souto

SECRET

CS COPY

201-129609

ATTACHMENT HMMA 21622

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SECRET



Luis ALBERU Souto

SECRET

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
C-101331
201-329609

Attached is the PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Transmittal of PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: OA on Subject

There are attached three (3) copies of PRQ Part II on Subject and operational approval is requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
PRQ Part II

Distribution:
✓3 - C/WHD, w/att, 3 copies
2 - Files

201-329609

CS COPY

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Encl-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
17 June 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21557

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
P - 6079

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.
HMMA 21557

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM
LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case Officer (Clyde K SHRYOCK) was introduced to Subject on 15 May 62 by LITAMIL-3, who was recovering from a gall stone operation in the hospital. The CO made contact with the Subject, a PBRUMEN diplomat, to debrief and use as a penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico. See MEXI 1467 re initial meeting.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subj speaks English and French as well as Spanish.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knows Clyde K SHRYOCK, his Case Officer, by true name. SHRYOCK will introduce Lawrence F. BARKER to Subject during the week of 16 June 1963.

FORM NO. 1 NOV 56 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-95a WHICH MAY BE USED.

1

SECRET

(4-20)

att to HMMA-21557

201-329609

SECRET

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the West. He is anti-Communist.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico could reveal Subject's activities to the PBRUMEN government.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and Case Officer meet clandestinely in darkened areas of the city at night.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as an employee of the PBRUMEN Embassy obtains his information from his fellow workers and contacts.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Subject know he is working for PBPRIME Intelligence.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have had any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE
Subject's brother, Leonel, resident in Mexico
Jose CARRAL Escalante
LITAMIL-3 probably suspects Subj is in contact with CO

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning and intelligent and has made great strides on his own since first contact with his Case Officer.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would probably collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime if it should come to power.

SECRET

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subj provided a few intelligence items through LITAMIL-3 before direct contact was made with the Case Officer.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from members of the PBRUMEN Embassy and friends of PBRUMEN with whom he deals.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject has been told that the information he provides is forwarded to Washington.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's FI activities are directed toward the penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy of which he is part and the contacts of the Embassy. Subj is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is going on salary as of 15 June 63 at the rate of 4000 pesos ($320.00 U.S.) monthly. Andrew S. FARMERS and Edward D. KNAPMAN are known to Subject under assumed names.

SECTION IX

QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is an artist

SECTION X

COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

As of 15 June 1963, Subject will be paid a monthly salary of 4000 pesos.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

No commitments or promises but it is assumed that KUBARK will assist Subject to leave the country if this is necessary because of his activities on KUBARK'S behalf.

SECTION XI

CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files.

Close friends of Subject such as LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-7 LICOZE-1 and many other contacts of the Cuban Embassy.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

See para 1

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Submitted 27 July 1962 EMMA 19455

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. Sincere, extremely security conscious, reliable, punctual and highly intelligent. A cosmopolitan type, somewhat arty, yet cogniscent of what it takes to get a job done, i.e. KUBARK's job.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with CUYCKS is known to Jose CARRAL Escalante and Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE per MEXI 3450. CARRAL and de EYCHENNE are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII

SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS; GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. Subj is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1- INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1- INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. - EXPLAIN.

Subject is a European type, but because of his Cuban accent would probably recognized as such.

2- INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Parts 1 and 2 was obtained through research, files, agents, and direct questioning.

3- IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (*Also see para. 43b, supra*)

No problems are envisaged in terminating agent.

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1- GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, SITE WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject is in possession of CO's telephone number (home) and CO's office phone. CO can make contact with Subject at his home or at the PBRUMEN Embassy if necessary. Subjectand CO use the name AGUILAR on the telephone.

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

Subject, who is well deposed toward PBPRIME, is anxious to remain a long term agent for ODYOKE. His intelligence, coupled with his contacts in leftist and Communist circles, makes him an excellent prospect.

DATE 17 June 1963	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER Clyde K SERIOCK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Finance Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memorandum of Oral Commitment - LITAMIL/9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are copies of a Memorandum of Oral Commitment on LITAMIL/9.

Willard C. Curtis

Attachment
As stated (h/w)

Distribution
~~2~~ - Finance w/att
1 - WH w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
17 June 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-3842

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

DATE: 13 June 1963

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project [illegible] OPS and is chargeable to [illegible]. The effective date of the oral contract is 15 June 1963 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA. Date Requested 27 July 1962 HCs 19455

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid $4,000.00 M.N. per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 320 dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to a month's salary. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Birthdays, holidays, ~~[illegible]~~ with approval of COS.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (x) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner:

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expenses:

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject ( ) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimbursed:

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation:

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

SIGNED: Clyde K. [illegible]
Case Officer

REVIEWED:
Contract Approving Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

Joseph B. [illegible]

SECRET

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
C-101331
201-329609

Attached is the PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Transmittal of PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: OA on Subject

There are attached three (3) copies of PRQ Part II on Subject and operational approval is requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
PRQ Part II

Distribution:
✓3 - C/WHD, w/att, 3 copies
2 - Files

201-329609

CS COPY

DATE TYPED
17 June 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21557

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
P - 6079

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Encl -1

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.
HMMA 21557

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM
LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case Officer (Clyde K SHRYOCK) was introduced to Subject on 18 July 62 by LITAMIL-3, who was recovering from a gall stone operation in the hospital. The CO made contact with the Subject, a PBRUMEN diplomat, to debrief and use as a penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico. See MEXI 1467 re initial meeting.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subj speaks English and French as well as Spanish.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knows Clyde K SHRYOCK, his Case Officer, by true name. SHRYOCK will introduce Lawrence F. BARKER to Subject during the week of 16 June 1963.

FORM NO. 1050a 1 NOV 56 REPLACES FORM 51-95a WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4-20)

att to HMMA-21557

201-329609

SECRET

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the West. He is anti-Communist.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico could reveal Subject's activities to the PBRUMEN government.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and Case Officer meet clandestinely in darkened areas of the city at night.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as an employee of the PBRUMEN Embassy obtains his information from his fellow workers and contacts.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Subject know he is working for PBPRIME Intelligence.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have had any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE
Subject's brother, Leonel, resident in Mexico
Jose CARRAL Escalante
LITAMIL-3 probably suspects Subj is in contact with CO

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning and intelligent and has made great strides on his own since first contact with his Case Officer.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would probably collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime if it should come to power.

SECRET

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subj provided a few intelligence items through LITAMIL-3 before direct contact was made with the Case Officer.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from members of the PBRUMEN Embassy and friends of PBRUMEN with whom he deals.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject has been told that the information he provides is forwarded to Washington.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's FI activities are directed toward the penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy of which he is part and the contacts of the Embassy. Subj is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is going on salary as of 15 June 63 at the rate of 4000 pesos ($320.00 U.S.) monthly. Andrew S. PARMERS and Edward D. KNARMAN are known to Subject under assumed names.

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is an artist

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

As of 15 June 1963, Subject will be paid a monthly salary of 4000 pesos.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

No commitments or promises but it is assumed that KUBARK will assist Subject to leave the country if this is necessary because of his activities on KUBARK'S behalf.

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files.

Close friends of Subject such as LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-7 LICOZE-1 and many other contacts of the Cuban Embassy.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

See para 1

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Submitted 27 July 1962 EMMA 19455

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. Sincere, extremely security conscious, reliable, punctual and highly intelligent. A cosmopolitan type, somewhat arty, yet cogniscent of what it takes to get a job done, i.e. KUBARK's job.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with CDTOKE is known to Jose CARRAL Escalante and Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE per MEXI 3450. CARRAL and de EYCHENNE are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. Subj is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1- INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1- INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. - EXPLAIN.

Subject is a European type, but because of his Cuban accent would probably recognized as such.

2- INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Parts 1 and 2 was obtained through research, files, agents, and direct questioning.

3- IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

No problems are envisaged in terminating agent.

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1- GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W; WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject is in possession of CO's telephone number (home) and CO's office phone. CO can make contact with Subject at his home or at the PBRUMEN Embassy if necessary. Subjectand CO use the name AGUILAR on the telephone.

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

Subject, who is well deposed toward PBPRIME, is anxious to remain a long term agent for ODYOKE. His intelligence, coupled with his contacts in leftist and Communist circles, makes him an excellent prospect.

DATE

17 June 1963

SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

Clyde K SERIOCK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Finance Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memorandum of Oral Commitment - LITAMIL/9

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are copies of a Memorandum of Oral Commitment on LITAMIL/9.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

Attachment
As stated (h/w)

Distribution
2 - Finance w/att
1 - WH w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
17 June 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-3842

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

DATE: 13 June 1963

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project [illegible] OPS .and is chargeable to [illegible] . The effective date of the oral contract is 15 June 1963 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA . Date Requested 27 July 1962 [illegible] 19455

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid $4,000.00 M.N. per month . The approximate equivalent of this amount in PEPRIME currency is 320 dollars. Subject (X) will ( )will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to a month's salary . Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Birthdays, holidays, with approval of COS.

5. TAXES: Subject ( )is (x)is not subject to PEPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PEPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner:

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( )will (X)will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expenses:

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject ( )will (X)will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject ( )will ( )will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimbursed:

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation:

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

SIGNED: Clyde K. Shrunk
Case Officer

REVIEWED:
Contract Approving Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

RETURN

[illegible] **SECRET**

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1615 14 JUN DH)
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, S/C 2

S E C R E T 141903Z

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 5715

IN60150

14 JUN 1963

PBRUMEN LITAMIL-9

STATION HAS NO RECORD POA LITAMIL-9. PLEASE ADVISE. NO INDEX.

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~

Field was never notified that POA for training only was granted. Derog info still not resolved to CI/OA's satisfaction.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDING FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

[illegible] **SECRET**

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1615 14 JUN OH)
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, S/C 2

S E C R E T 141903Z
PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 5715
PBRUMEN LITAMIL-9

IN60150

14 JUN 1963

STATION HAS NO RECORD POA LITAMIL-9. PLEASE ADVISE. NO INDEX.

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~

field was never notified that POA for training only was granted. Derog info still not resolved to CI/OA's satisfaction.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDING FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

S E C R E T
Classification

JFK MICROFILM FILE SUMMARY

SUMMARY; REEL 12, FOLDER(S) 4A & 5 CREATED by
Bryant Rogers

SUBJECT OF FOLDER: LITAMIL-9

201 NUMBER, IF ANY 329609

INCLUSIVE DATES OF FILE MATERIAL JULY 62 THROUGH AUGUST 72.

RELEVANCE OR NON-RELEVANCE TO OSWALD & JFK ASSASSINATION:
NONE

REASON OR ASSUMED REASON FOR INCLUSION IN THIS COLLECTION:
In the HSCA testimony of Silvia Duran she indicated that she knew him and he was the Cultural Attache at the Cuban Consulate when she was there. This info was not in the 201 file.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION WITHIN FILE:

LITAMIL-9 was recruited by the Mexico City Station in late 62 while he was assigned to the Cuban Embassy as Cultural Attache. He provided the Station intelligence while he was in this assignment. He was deactivated in March 1965 when he returned to Cuba and was seen only occasionally after that. His contract was terminated in 1970 because of his lack of access. Only one relevant document was found which indicated that Proenza, who worked at the Cuban Embassy, believed that the strong objection to the Mexican Government by the Cuban Embassy over the Duran's detention was a diplomatic error. This document was processed for release.

CIA/US. GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP:
AGENT

PAGES OF NON-JFK-RELATED MATERIAL: 491

Third agency
document on
LITAMIL-9

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

Jack Stewart

TO:

WH/1 -- W.J. Kaufman -

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

DATE 21 December 1965 jab

C NO. C - 101331

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I		
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
		XX	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss your request of 16 December 1965.

This was to advise that it is not CI/OA practice to issue POAs for 6 months under these circumstances. However, this is no bar to handling the agent as we proposed in our memo of

Jack Stewart

To be handled as hostile agent

No POA

201

FORM 8-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/OA

SUBJECT : Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9

1. The Provisional Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9 (C-101331) is due to expire 8 January 1965.

2. In discussions with the field case officer for this operation, WH/1/Mexico has found that there is no way to determine when, or whether, LITAMIL-9 will again leave Cuba. For reasons of personal security, LITAMIL-9 has not been able to function as a reporting source since his return to Cuba in early March 1965. Letters to his brother, LITAMIL-17, and reports from occasional Cuban official travelers transiting Mexico indicate that LITAMIL-9 is well and is employed by the National Cultural Council.

3. LITAMIL-9 is now an inactive agent. The Station has recently proposed that his salary cease accumulating as of 30 June 1966. If and when he again manages to leave Cuba, he will be contacted and a full assessment of his future usefulness will be made. Owing to the fact that his sister-in-law is a secretary to Fidel Castro it is expected that he will be a valuable source of information, at least for an initial debriefing period.

4. It would be appreciated if the POA on LITAMIL-9 could be extended for six months. If at the end of that time he has not left Cuba, it will be proposed that the POA be allowed to expire.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - (201-329609)
1 - C-101331

WH/1/Stewart:nre 16 Dec 65

Jane

PAR AVION

НР БЪЛГАРИЯ

ST 20
NR BULGARIA

Кyба, Habana
Гр. Comp. Luis Alberú
ул. № 11, nº 25509
Rpto Parcelación Zayas
Fontanar
La Gran Habana
Cuba

ВАРНА - VARNA
Местността „Побити камъни"
Le lieu „La forêt de pierres"
Die Gegend „Versteinerter Wald"

Querido Luis ¿cómo está Ud.?

Antes de salir yo le llamé para preguntar su dirección y, claro está, para decir el último adiós (por 3 meses!) pero Ud. no estaba. Seguramente Ud. estuvo de cara al campo después del ciclón. Si es así, le deseo que Ud. sube como durante la Guerrilla de Girón, eso le sienta muy bien!

Hace ya 3 días que estamos en Bulgaria: un día en Sofía y dos - en Varna, en la casa de descanso del MINREX búlgaro. El viaje pasó bien, pero muy fatigante; no pudimos dormir porque no había la noche - a las 9 se ocultó el sol y a las 12 salió de nuevo. En Praga estuvimos un día, esperando. Del avión [illegible] vimos unos [illegible] de Luxemburgo en un [illegible]. En Sofía todo está bien. Hace bastante calor durante el día, pero las noches son muy frías. Aquí en Varna la misma historia, pero todas las playas están llenos de turistas que se ponen calientes y se bañan en el mar frío. Nosotros no nos bañamos [illegible] [illegible]. Igualmente [illegible]

Translation of a post card from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The card was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Dear Luis, how are you? Before leaving I called you to verify your address and, of course, to say "the last goodbye" (for three months!), but you weren't there. Surely you had your mind on the countryside after the hurricane. If you did, I wish that you could climb like during the fifteen days of Girón, that would suit you very well.

We have been in Bulgaria for three days now: one day in Sofia and two in Varna in the guest house of the Bulgarian [illegible]. The trip went fine, but it was very fatiguing; we couldn't sleep because it wasn't night -- at 9 the sun set and at 12 came out again. In Prague we spent one day while waiting for the plane to Sofia. We are living like Counts of Luxembourg in a luxury hotel. In Sofia everything is fine. It is quite hot during the day, but the nights are very cold. Here in Varna it's the same story, but all the hotels are full of tourists who get brave and go swimming in the cold sea. As for us, we haven't gone swimming yet. And generally after Cuba I am indifferent to the sea. Luis, until later.

Kira KOSOVSKA

Avia RE

NR BULGARIA
TOKYO 1964

Куба, Хавана
Camp. Luis Alberú
Departamento de Relaciones Culturales
Consejo Nacional de Cultura (CNC)
Palacio del Segundo Cabo
O'Relly y Tacón, La Plaza de Armas
11
La Habana
Cuba

СОФИЯ - SOFIA
Джамията
La mosquée
Die Moschee
Снимка: Стр. Добрев

¡Buenos días, Luis! ¿C[illegible] andan? ¡Nosotros estamos bien, recordamos frecuentemente a La Habana y a nuestros amigos (yo – a un hombre „aburrido" también). Después del Mar Negro estuvimos una semana en Sofia, y la semana siguiente descansamos en la casa turística de la Radio-Sofia (antes de salir para Cuba yo trabajaba en la Radio-Sofia), situada en la montaña Vitosha, cerca de Sofia. Los búlgaros llaman esa montaña „pulmones de la capital". Es un lugar muy bonito. Nosotros viviendo en las ciudades, olvidamos frecuentemente las alegrías simples – acostarnos en la hierba y mirar el cielo, escuchar el silencio – ¿verdad? En Vitosha recordamos todo eso. Ahora estamos en Sofia preparándonos para continuar nuestro turismo por las montañas. A mí me gusta mucho andar y ahora tengo esta posibilidad. Pensamos subir al pico más alto en Bulgaria – Mus-alá (2925 m.) No es difícil – no es tan alto. ¡Qué buen país es Bulgaria, pero según mi opinión le faltan hombres contemplativos, – sí, verdad – todos son demasiado prácticos. ¡Hasta luego, Luis!

ФОТОИЗДАТ АКЛ-2128 13 ст

Translation of a post card from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The card was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Good morning, Luis! How are you? We are well. We frequently think of Havana and of our friends (I - of a "bored" man too). After the Black Sea we spent one week in Sofia, and the following week we relaxed at the Radio Sofia tourist house (before leaving for Cuba I worked for Radio Sofia), located on the Vitusha, near Sofia. The Bulgarians call this mountain "lungs of the capital". It's a very lovely place. Living in cities, we frequently forget simple pleasures -- lying down in the grass and looking at the sky, listening to the silence. Isn't that true? On Vitosha (sic) we remembered all that. We are now in Sofia, preparing to continue our tour through the mountains. I like to walk a lot, and now I have the opportunity. We plan to climb the highest peak in Bulgaria -- Mus-ala (2925 meters). It isn't difficult -- it's not very high. What a good country Bulgaria is, but in my opinion she lacks contemplative men. Yes, yes, that's true. They are all too practical. Until later, Luis!

Kira KOSOVSKA

ПО ВЪЗДУХА
PAR AVION

НРБЪЛГАРИЯ
10
NR BULGARIA
ST 20
NR BULGARIA

VARNA 20.6.66-11

RE



Гр. с. Куба, Хаба

Ул. № Comp. Luis Alberti
Departamento de Relaciones
Culturales con el extranjero
Consejo Nacional de Cultura
(CNC)
Palacio del Segundo Cabo
O'Relly y Tacón,
La Plaza de Armas
La Habana
Cuba

¡Buenas noches, Luis!
¡Cómo ha estado Ud.? Como siempre, ¿trabajando mucho? Qué hacer – de dos opiniones sobre el trabajo („y caballos mueren del trabajo" y „el trabajo creó al Hombre") es mejor seleccionar la segunda, ¿verdad?

Todavía estamos en Varna, más exacto – a unos 15 km de la ciudad de Varna, eso no importa porque todo aquí es la zona de playas, hoteles etc. El tiempo hizo bueno, y ahora nosotros nos bañamos y tomamos sol, pero lo hacemos sin afán – somos mimados para siempre por las playas Santa María y Atlántico y por el sol cubano! Al mismo tiempo es muy agradable – que aquí no hay tiburones y se puede nadar dondequiera.

Durante 2 años nosotros olvidamos muchas cosas y ahora nos admiramos del clima, de la naturaleza etc. Es verdad – aquí el aire mismo es absolutamente distinto. fresco, sano, lleno de olores de la hierba y de los árboles. A unas 300-400 m de la costa comienzan las montañas, cubiertas de bosques. Lamento mucho de que Ud. Luis, no pueda ver todo eso, pero soy optimista y estoy segura que tarde o temprano Ud. visitará Bulgaria. ¿Sabe lo que cuentan acerca de la formación del país? - Cuando Dios dividía la Tierra entre los ingleses, franceses y otros, el búlgaro no pudo venir porque estaba trabajando. Entonces cuando vino, ya no había tierra. Dios le regañó, pero tuvo que hacer algo. Entonces él tomó un cuchillo y cortó para el búlgaro un pedazito del paraíso.

No exagero - en realidad la costa del Mar Negro en Bulgaria es muy bonita. Ahora aquí están de descanso cerca de 25-30 miles de extranjeros. Y lo que es muy interesante - la mayoría de los países capitalistas. A cada paso se oye el francés, alemán, sueco. Tenemos un conocido - director de uno de los hoteles; él, por ejemplo, dice que en su hotel viven por 28 días algunas familias de Suiza y de Bélgica y que todos están muy contentos, diciendo que el descanso en Bulgaria es agradable y barato al mismo tiempo, más barato que en Nice o en Italia. Así Bulgaria desarrolla intensivamente el turismo internacional y, claro está, gana mucho.

¡Pero qué cosas aburridas escribo yo! Estoy segura que Ud. ya tiene sueño. De ninguna manera quiero que Ud. piense que son los ejercicios del español para no olvidarlo. Simplemente quiero contar algunas de mis impresiones y observaciones y Ud., un hombre tan bueno y fino, puede comprenderlo, ¿verdad?

Una cosa interesante más acerca del servicio turístico aquí. Están abiertos algunos restaurantes típicos nacionales donde se manifestó la fantasía búlgara. Por ejemplo, uno representa un lugar, donde están ovejas (no sé como se llama en español), es un patio grande dividido en patios pequeños, todo como en el pueblo; hay un foco de piedra en el suelo, donde hierva algo en un cesto grande, hay cocina de piedra tambien con el fuego dentro, hay algunas construcciones de campo

– todo verdadero. Para que el cuadro sea completo en uno de los patios pequeños se encuentra un burro, en otro 1 algunas ovejas y... todos respiran un olor terrible! Pero todos están contentos y sacan fotografías etc. Los camareros están vestidos en trajes nacionales y toca la orquesta nacional también. ¿Imagina Ud., Luis? Es muy simpático!

El otro restaurante, por ejemplo, representa el interior de (no sé en español, en francés – le moulin) hay la piedra para moler, hay sacos llenos donde se sienta etc., etc. La comida se sirve en platos nacionales... pero no hablemos de la comida: hay todo en abundancia. Después de las primeras admiraciones („qué sabrosas cerezas!" „qué grandes melocotones!" etc.) yo descubrí un gran peligro en todo eso para mí. Si, por ejemplo, Anguel sube, 2-4 libras no hacen problema, pero para mí es problema # 1!

Así termino. Para terminar le cuento un chiste (conveniente!) Una familia se acostó una noche. De pronto se oyó un ruido fuerte – el gato chocó algo en la cocina. Pero la mujer asustada gritó: „Cierre, mi marido viene!" Y su esposo, asustado también, salió ~~d~~ corriendo por la ventana en pijama.

Hasta luego, Luis. Le estrecho la mano. La carta – entre nous
[illegible]
Kira

Translation of a letter from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The letter was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Good evening, Luis! How have you been? Working a lot, as always? Which to choose -- of two opinions on work ("horses die from working" and "work created Man") it is better to choose the second, isn't it?

We are still in Varna, more exactly some 15 kilometers from the city of Varna; this doesn't matter because everything here is the area of beaches, hotels, etc. The weather improved, and now we go swimming and sunbathing, but we do so without eagerness -- we are spoiled permanently by the Santa María and Atlantic beaches and by the Cuban sun! At the same time it is very nice that here there are no sharks and one can swim anywhere one wants.

In the course of two years we forgot many things and now we are enjoying the climate, nature, etc. It's true -- here even the air is absolutely different: fresh, healthful, full of the odors of grass and trees. Some 300 - 400 meters from the coast the mountains, covered with forests, begin. I am very sorry that you, Luis, cannot see all this, but I am an optimist and I am sure that sooner or later you will visit Bulgaria. Do you know what they say about the formation of the country? When God was dividing the Earth among the English, the French, and others, the Bulgarian could not come because he was working. Then when he came, there was no land left. God scolded him, but he had to do something. So he took a knife and cut a little piece of paradise for the Bulgarian.

I am not exaggerating -- really the coast of the Black Sea in Bulgaria is very pretty. Now there are about 25 - 30 thousand foreigners here on vacation. And what is very interesting -- the majority from the capitalistic countries. At every step one hears French, German, Swedish. We have an acquaintance -- the manager of one of the hotels; he, for example, says that some families from Switzerland and from Belgium have been living in his hotel for 28 days, and that all are very happy, saying that the vacation in Bulgaria is pleasant and inexpensive at the same time, less expensive than in Nice or Italy. Thus Bulgaria is developing international tourism intensively and, of course, is bringing in a lot of money.

But what boring things I'm writing! I'm sure that you are already sleepy. Not by any means do I want you to think that these are exercises in Spanish so as not to forget it. I simply want to relate some of my impressions and observations, and you, a man so good and fine, can understand, can't you?

One more interesting thing about the tourist service here. There are some typical national restaurants open where Bulgarian fantasy is represented. For example, one represents a place where there are sheep (I don't know what it is in Spanish). It's a large patio divided into small patios, everything like in a town. There is a stone hearth in the floor, where something boils in a big basket. There is a stone stove, also with a fire inside. There are some farm buildings, everything true to life. To make the picture complete, in one of the small patios there is a burro, in another, some sheep, and ... they all have a terrible odor! But everybody is happy and taking pictures, etc. The waiters are dressed in national costumes and the national orchestra plays too. Can you imagine it, Luis? It's very nice! The other restaurant, for example, represents the interior of (I don't know in Spanish, in French -- the mill). There is the stone for grinding, there are filled sacks where you sit, etc., etc. The food is served in national dishes ... but let's not talk about food -- there is everything in abundance. After the first admirations ("what delicious cherries!", what big peaches!", etc.), I discovered a great danger for me in all this. If, for example, Anguel gains 2 - 4 pounds, it's no problem but for me it's problem #1!

I'll close now. Before closing I'll tell you a joke (appropriate!). A family went to bed one night. Suddenly a loud noise was heard -- the cat knocked something over in the kitchen. But the frightened woman cried: "Run, my husband is coming!" and her husband, frightened also, jumped out of the window in his pajamas.

Until later, Luis. I give you my hand. The letter -- between us, is that all right?

Kira KOSOVSKA

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/LITAMIL-9/Operational Progress Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA 26552, 8 July 1965

1. LITAMIL-9 seems to be trapped inside PBRUMEN. On 18 August the Case Officer met with LITAMIL-17 (L-9's brother) to review two letters received from L-9. One of these, dated 15 July and mailed at Gander, Newfoundland (presumably by an airline crew member), used the term "de lo mas bien." This is an indicator meaning "I expect to leave within a year." In another (undated) letter L-9 reports that he has been promoted to "Secretario de Segunda."

2. L-9 asked for a large quantity of art supplies and mentioned that he is doing a lot of painting since he has not yet gone back to work. The quantity of material requested indicates that he expects to remain inside for some time.

3. The C/O asked L-17 to phone L-9, ostensibly to request further detail on how to ship the art supplies. In the course of the conversation L-17 was to ask L-9 how long he expected to remain in PBRUMEN. L-17 reported on 28 August that he had spoken with L-9. L-9 said he did not expect to leave for "a long time."

4. With the recent defections of AMWASP-1 and a PBRUMEN Ambassador in Europe it may be difficult for L-9 to obtain a foreign post. It is not likely that he could seriously be considered politically reliable by the PBRUMEN Government. With the return of his mother and sister from Spain he no longer has an excuse to request permission to visit Madrid. The only bright spot on the horizon is his sister-in-law's close relationship to AMTHUG. L-17 feels that it is to her advantage to have L-9 abroad so L-9 can send her consumer goods which are unobtainable in PBRUMEN.

5. At present the Station has no reason to believe L-9 will be able to leave PBRUMEN any time soon.

Lawrence F. Barker
for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
4 - Files

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded [illegible]

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 27048

DATE
1 September 1965

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609 (P-6079)

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

Relaciones Culturales
con el Extranjero

Marianao, Agosto 19 de 1965

Compañero Félix Guerrero
Director de la Orquesta
del Teatro Lírico
Teatro García Lorca, Habana.

Estimado compañero:
Por este medio le comunicamos que con motivo de la Fiesta Nacional de la R.P. de Bulgaria se ha confeccionado entre la Embajada de la R.P. de Bulgaria y este Consejo Nacional de Cultura la "Semana de la Cultura Búlgara" que se efectuará [illegible] de Septiembre próximo.

Como parte de la programación figuran un concierto por radio y televisión para el 3 de Septiembre próximo, y un concierto para el 7 de Septiembre próximo en el Palacio de Bellas Artes; tomando parte en ambos programas artistas búlgaros y cubanos;

Por lo cual le solicitamos atentamente el permiso que se acostumbra en estos casos a fin de que los compañeros artistas cuyos nombres damos a continuación, puedan cumplimentar sus actuaciones en los dos programas a que nos hemos referido.

El permiso para el prof. León Suruyón es para el día 3 de Septiembre próximo y los permisos para Alexander Neinek, León Suruyón, Nicola Borov y Nicola Danev para el día 7 también de Septiembre próximo.

Agradeciendo la valiosa colaboración que preste a este fin, quedo de usted con saludos revolucionarios de Patria o Muerte,

Por la Dirección de Relaciones Culturales con el Extranjero

Luis Alberú.-

el 6 y el 7 no pueden ser prestados
están con Copelia en Varadero (información Agost. 24)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memorandum of Oral Commitments - LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached are three authenticated copies of a Memorandum of Oral Commitments for LITAMIL-9.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-5699

DATE
19 August 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TYPE AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project [illegible] and is chargeable to LIKAVTE. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 March 1965 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA in process. Date ______.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The subject will be paid 5000 Pesos per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in KUBARK currency is 400 dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's pay. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Small Christmas, birthday gifts may be give. No commitment.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to KUBARK income taxes. If Subject to KUBARK income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner: ______.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expences: None.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expences for which Subject will be reimburse: Any minor operational expense approved by the Case Officer such as transportation to meeting site. Note: Subject has never submitted a claim for any such expense to date.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation: Subject may have to be provided safe haven if his government become aware of his activities for ODYOKE. This does not imply [illegible].

9. No acommitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

10. Comment: This MOC submitted because Subject's salary was raised from $4000 to $ 5000 a month effective 1 March 1965. Authority: DIR 89922 (IN [illegible]) of 5 March 1965.

SIGNED: ______
Case Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

VERIFIED: ______
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TYPE AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project [illegible] and is chargeable to [illegible]. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 March 1965 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type PCA in process. Date ______.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The subject will be paid 5000 Pesos per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 400 dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's pay. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Small Christmas, birthday gifts may be give. No commitment.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner: ______.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expences: None.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimburse: Any minor operational expense approved by the Case Officer such as transportation to meeting site. Note: Subject has never submitted a claim for any such expense to date.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation: Subject may have to be provided safe haven if his government becomes aware of His activities for ODYOKE. This does not imply asylum in PBPRIME.

9. No acommitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

10. Comment: This MOC submitted because Subject's salary was raised from $4000 to $ 5000 a month effective 1 March 1965. Authority: DIR 89922 (IN 5455) of 5 March 1965.

SIGNED: ______
Case Officer

APPROVED: ______
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

APPROVED: ______
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TYPE AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project LIRAVINE and is chargeable to LIRAVINE. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 March 1965 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA in process. Date ______.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The subject will be paid 5000 Pesos per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 400 dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's pay. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Small Christmas, birthday gifts may be give. No commitment.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner: ______.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expences: None.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimburse: Any minor operational expense approved by the Case Officer such as transportation to meeting site. Note: Subject has never submitted a claim for any such expense to date.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation: Subject may have to be provided safe haven if his government becomes aware of his activities for ODYOKE. This does not imply asylum in PBPRIME.

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

10. Comment: This MOC submitted because Subject's salary was raised from $4000 to $ 5000 a month effective 1 March 1965. Authority: DIR 89922 (IN 5455) of 5 March 1965.

SIGNED: ______
Case Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

CONCURRED: ______
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 2 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/Operations/LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AC REQ: See para 2

1. A Provisional Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9 as a reporting source in PBRUMEN has been granted as of 8 July 1965.

2. Since the PRQ Part II for LITAMIL-9 in our file dates from June 1963, and in view of his changed mission, Headquarters would appreciate the thoughtful preparation of a revised PRQ Part II for LITAMIL-9. This should reach Headquarters perhaps sixty days prior to the expiration of this POA on 8 January 1966.

Anthony R. POMCHAY

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-128/3

FILE IN 201-239609

Distribution:
O & 1 -COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-13795

DATE
12 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]
[illegible] SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-128/3
201-329609

ВЪЗДУШНА ПОЩА
PAR AVION

НР БЪЛГАРИЯ

NR BULGARIA 20

Куба, Хавана

гр. Comp. Luis Alberú

ул. № 11, nº 25509

Rpto Parcelación Zayas
Fontanar

La Gran Habana
Cuba

ВАРНА · VARNA
Местността „Побити камъни"
Le lieu „La forêt de pierres"
Die Gegend „Versteinerter Wald"

Querido Luis, ¿cómo está Ud.?

Antes de salir yo le llamé para precisar su dirección y, claro está, para decir el último adiós (¡por 3 meses!), pero Ud. no estaba. Seguramente Ud. estuvo de zafra al campo después del ciclón. Si es así, le deseo que Ud. sude como durante la Quincena de Girón, así le sienta muy bien!

Hace ya 3 días que estamos en Bulgaria: un día en Sofía y dos – en Varna, en la casa de descanso del MINREX búlgaro. El viaje pasó bien, pero muy fatigante, no pudimos dormir porque no había la noche y a las 9 se ocultó el sol y a las 12 salió de nuevo. En Praga estuvimos un día, esperando del avión para [illegible]. Vivimos como "reyes de Luxemburgo" en un hotel-lux. En Sofía todo está bien. Hace bastante calor durante el día pero las noches son muy frías. Aquí en Varna la misma historia, pero todos los días todos están llenos de turistas que se ponen valientes y se bañan en el mar frío. Nosotros no nos bañamos [illegible] [illegible] alrededor de Ud. – [illegible] el mar. [illegible] luego. [illegible] igualmente en [illegible]

Translation of a post card from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The card was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Dear Luis, how are you? Before leaving I called you to verify your address and, of course, to say "the last goodbye" (for three months!), but you weren't there. Surely you had your mind on the countryside after the hurricane. If you did, I wish that you could climb like during the fifteen days of Girón, that would suit you very well.

We have been in Bulgaria for three days now: one day in Sofia and two in Varna in the guest house of the Bulgarian MINREX. The trip went fine, but it was very fatiguing; we couldn't sleep because it wasn't night -- at 9 the sun set and at 12 came out again. In Prague we spent one day while waiting for the plane to Sofia. We are living like Counts of Luxembourg in a luxury hotel. In Sofia everything is fine. It is quite hot during the day, but the nights are very cold. Here in Varna it's the same story, but all the hotels are full of tourists who get brave and go swimming in the cold sea. As for us, we haven't gone swimming yet. And generally after Cuba I am indifferent to the sea. Luis, until later.

Kira KOSOVSKA

NR BULGARIA

A/a RE,

Куба, Хабана

Camp. Luis Alberú

Departamento de Relaciones Culturales
Consejo Nacional de Cultura (CNC)
Palacio del Segundo Cabo
O' Reilly y Tacón, La Plaza de Armas
s d
La Habana
Cuba

СОФИЯ - SOFIA
~~Джамията~~
La mosquée
Die Moschee
Снимка: Стр. Добрев

¡Buenos días, Luis! ¿C[illegible] andan?
¡Nosotros estamos bien, recordamos frecuentemente a La Habana y a nuestros amigos (yo – a un hombre „aburrido" también). Después del Mar Negro estuvimos una semana en Sofia, y la semana siguiente descansamos en la casa turística de la Radio-Sofia (antes de salir para Cuba yo trabajaba en la Radio-Sofia), situada en la montaña Vitosha, cerca de Sofia. Los búlgaros llaman esa montaña „pulmones de la capital". Es un lugar muy bonito. Nosotros viviendo en las ciudades, olvidamos frecuentemente las alegrías simples – acostarnos en la hierba y mirar el cielo, escuchar el silencio – ¿verdad? En Vitosha recordamos todo eso. Ahora estamos en Sofia preparándonos para continuar nuestro turismo por las montañas. A mí me gusta mucho andar y ahora tengo esta posibilidad. Pensamos subir el pico más alto en Bulgaria – Musalá (2925 m.) No es difícil – no es tan alto. Qué buen país es Bulgaria, pero según mi opinión le faltan hombres contemplativos – sí, verdad – todos son demasiado prácticos. ¡Hasta luego, Luis!

ФОТОИЗДАТ
Акт 2128 10 ст

Translation of a post card from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The card was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Good morning, Luis! How are you? We are well. We frequently think of Havana and of our friends (I - of a "bored" man too). After the Black Sea we spent one week in Sofia, and the following week we relaxed at the Radio Sofia tourist house (before leaving for Cuba I worked for Radio Sofia), located on the Vitusha, near Sofia. The Bulgarians call this mountain "lungs of the capital". It's a very lovely place. Living in cities, we frequently forget simple pleasures -- lying down in the grass and looking at the sky, listening to the silence. Isn't that true? On Vitosha (sic) we remembered all that. We are now in Sofia, preparing to continue our tour through the mountains. I like to walk a lot, and now I have the opportunity. We plan to climb the highest peak in Bulgaria -- Mus-ala (2925 meters). It isn't difficult -- it's not very high. What a good country Bulgaria is, but in my opinion she lacks contemplative men. Yes, yes, that's true. They are all too practical. Until later, Luis!

Kira KOSOVSKA

PAR AVION

N.R. BULGARIA

20.6.65-11

VARNA

RE



Куба, Хава

Comp. Luis Alberú
Departamento de Relaciones
Culturales con el extranjero
Consejo Nacional de Cultura
(CNC)
Palacio del Segundo Cabo
O'Relly y Tacón,
La Plaza de Armas
La Habana
Cuba

¡Buenas noches, Luis!
¿Cómo ha estado Ud.? Como siempre trabajando ¿mucho? Qué hacer – de dos opiniones sobre el trabajo („y caballos mueren del trabajo" y „el trabajo creó al Hombre") es mejor seleccionar la segunda, ¿verdad?

Todavía estamos en Varna, más exacto – a unos 15 km de la ciudad de Varna, eso no importa porque todo aquí es la zona de playas, hoteles etc. El tiempo hizo bueno, y ahora nosotros nos bañamos y tomamos sol, pero lo hacemos sin afán – somos mimados para siempre por las playas Santa María y Atlántico y por el sol cubano! Al mismo tiempo es muy agradable que aquí no hay tiburones y se puede nadar dondequiera.

Durante 2 años nosotros olvidamos muchas cosas y ahora nos admiramos del clima, de la naturaleza etc. Es verdad – aquí el aire mismo es absolutamente distinto: fresco, sano, lleno de olores de la hierba y de los árboles. A unas 300-400 m. de la costa comienzan las montañas, cubiertas de bosques. Lamento mucho de que Ud. Luis, no pueda ver todo eso, pero soy optimista y estoy segura que tarde o temprano Ud. visitará Bulgaria. ¿Sabe lo que cuentan acerca de la formación del pays? - Cuando Dios dividía la Tierra entre los ingleses, franceses y otros, el búlgaro no pudo venir porque estaba trabajando. Entonces cuando vino, ya no había tierra. Dios lo regañó, pero tuvo que hacer algo. Entonces él tomó un cuchillo y cortó para el búlgaro un pedazito del paraíso.

No exagero - en realidad la costa del Mar Negro en Bulgaria es muy bonita. Ahora aquí están de descanso cerca de 25-30 miles de extranjeros. Y lo que es muy interesante - la mayoría son de los países capitalistas. A cada paso se oye el francés, alemán, sueco. Tenemos un conocido - director de uno de los hoteles; él, por ejemplo, dice que en su hotel viven por 28 días algunas familias de Suiza y de Bélgica y que todos están muy contentos, diciendo que el descanso en Bulgaria es agradable y barato al mismo tiempo, más barato que en Niza o en Italia. Así Bulgaria desarrolla intensivamente el turismo internacional y, claro está, gana mucho.

¡Pero qué cosas aburridas escribo yo! Estoy segura que Ud. ya tiene sueño. De ninguna manera quiero que Ud. piense que son los ejercicios del español para no olvidarlo. Simplemente quiero contar algunas de mis impresiones y observaciones y Ud., un hombre tan bueno y fino, pueda comprenderlo, ¿verdad?

Una cosa interesante más acerca del servicio turístico aquí. Están abiertos algunos restaurantes típicos nacionales donde se manifestó la fantasía búlgara. Por ejemplo, uno representa un lugar, donde están ovejas (no sé como se llama en español), es un patio grande dividido en patios pequeños, todo como en el pueblo; hay un foco de piedra en el suelo, donde hierve algo en un cesto grande, hay cocina de piedra también con el fuego dentro, hay algunas construcciones de campo

– todo verdadero. Para que el cuadro sea completo en uno de los patios pequeños se encuentra un burro, en otro 1 algunas ovejas y todos respiran un olor terrible! Pero todos están contentos y sacan fotografías etc. Los camareros están vestidos en trajes nacionales y toca la orquesta nacional también. ¿Imagina Ud., Luis? Es muy simpático!

El otro restaurante, por ejemplo, representa el interior de (no sé en español, en francés – le moulin) hay la piedra para moler, hay sacos llenos donde se sienta etc., etc. La comida se sirve en platos nacionales.. pero no hablamos de la comida – hay todo en abundancia. Después de las primeras admiraciones („qué sabrosas cerezas!", „qué grandes melocotones!" etc.) yo descubrí un gran peligro en todo eso para mí. Si, por ejemplo, Angel sube 2-4 libras no hacen problema, pero para mí es problema #1!

Así, termino. Para terminar le cuento un chiste (conveniente!) Una familia se acostó una noche. De pronto se oyó un ruido fuerte. – el gato chocó algo en la cocina. Pero la mujer asustada gritó: „Corre, mi marido viene!" Y su esposo, asustado también, salió corriendo por la ventana en pijama.

Hasta luego, Luis. Le estrecho la mano. La carta – entre nous, ¿está bien?

Translation of a letter from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The letter was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Good evening, Luis! How have you been? Working a lot, as always? Which to choose -- of two opinions on work ("horses die from working" and "work created Man") it is better to choose the second, isn't it?

We are still in Varna, more exactly some 15 kilometers from the city of Varna; this doesn't matter because everything here is the area of beaches, hotels, etc. The weather improved, and now we go swimming and sunbathing, but we do so without eagerness -- we are spoiled permanently by the Santa María and Atlantic beaches and by the Cuban sun! At the same time it is very nice that here there are no sharks and one can swim anywhere one wants.

In the course of two years we forgot many things and now we are enjoying the climate, nature, etc. It's true -- here even the air is absolutely different: fresh, healthful, full of the odors of grass and trees. Some 300 - 400 meters from the coast the mountains, covered with forests, begin. I am very sorry that you, Luis, cannot see all this, but I am an optimist and I am sure that sooner or later you will visit Bulgaria. Do you know what they say about the formation of the country? When God was dividing the Earth among the English, the French, and others, the Bulgarian could not come because he was working. Then when he came, there was no land left. God scolded him, but he had to do something. So he took a knife and cut a little piece of paradise for the Bulgarian.

I am not exaggerating -- really the coast of the Black Sea in Bulgaria is very pretty. Now there are about 25 - 30 thousand foreigners here on vacation. And what is very interesting -- the majority from the capitalistic countries. At every step one hears French, German, Swedish. We have an acquaintance -- the manager of one of the hotels; he, for example, says that some families from Switzerland and from Belgium have been living in his hotel for 25 days, and that all are very happy, saying that the vacation in Bulgaria is pleasant and inexpensive at the same time, less expensive than in Nice or Italy. Thus Bulgaria is developing international tourism intensively and, of course, is bringing in a lot of money.

But what boring things I'm writing! I'm sure that you are already sleepy. Not by any means do I want you to think that these are exercises in Spanish so as not to forget it. I simply want to relate some of my impressions and observations, and you, a man so good and fine, can understand, can't you?

One more interesting thing about the tourist service here. There are some typical national restaurants open where Bulgarian fantasy is represented. For example, one represents a place where there are sheep (I don't know what it is in Spanish). It's a large patio divided into small patios, everything like in a town. There is a stone hearth in the floor, where something boils in a big basket. There is a stone stove, also with a fire inside. There are some farm buildings, everything true to life. To make the picture complete, in one of the small patios there is a burro, in another, some sheep, and ... they all have a terrible odor! But everybody is happy and taking pictures, etc. The waiters are dressed in national costumes and the national orchestra plays too. Can you imagine it, Luis? It's very nice! The other restaurant, for example, represents the interior of (I don't know in Spanish, in French -- the mill). There is the stone for grinding, there are filled sacks where you sit, etc., etc. The food is served in national dishes ... but let's not talk about food -- there is everything in abundance. After the first admirations ("what delicious cherries!", what big peaches!", etc.), I discovered a great danger for me in all this. If, for example, Anguel gains 2 - 4 pounds, it's no problem but for me it's problem #1!

I'll close now. Before closing I'll tell you a joke (appropriate!). A family went to bed one night. Suddenly a loud noise was heard -- the cat knocked something over in the kitchen. But the frightened woman cried: "Run, my husband is coming!" and her husband, frightened also, jumped out of the window in his pajamas.

Until later, Luis. I give you my hand. The letter -- between us, is that all right?

Kira KOSOVSKA

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/LITAMIL-9/Operational Progress Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 26552, 8 July 1965

1. LITAMIL-9 seems to be trapped inside PBRUMEN. On 18 August the Case Officer met with LITAMIL-17 (L-9's brother) to review two letters received from L-9. One of these, dated 15 July and mailed at Gander, Newfoundland (presumably by an airline crew member), used the term "de lo mas bien." This is an indicator meaning "I expect to leave within a year." In another (undated) letter L-9 reports that he has been promoted to "Secretario de Segunda."

2. L-9 asked for a large quantity of art supplies and mentioned that he is doing a lot of painting since he has not yet gone back to work. The quantity of material requested indicates that he expects to remain inside for some time.

3. The C/O asked L-17 to phone L-9, ostensibly to request further detail on how to ship the art supplies. In the course of the conversation L-17 was to ask L-9 how long he expected to remain in PBRUMEN. L-17 reported on 28 August that he had spoken with L-9. L-9 said he did not expect to leave for "a long time."

4. With the recent defections of AMWASP-1 and a PBRUMEN Ambassador in Europe it may be difficult for L-9 to obtain a foreign post. It is not likely that he could seriously be considered politically reliable by the PBRUMEN Government. With the return of his mother and sister from Spain he no longer has an excuse to request permission to visit Madrid. The only bright spot on the horizon is his sister-in-law's close relationship to AMTHUG. L-17 feels that it is to her advantage to have L-9 abroad so L-9 can send her consumer goods which are unobtainable in PBRUMEN.

5. At present the Station has no reason to believe L-9 will be able to leave PBRUMEN any time soon.

Lawrence F. Barker
for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
4 - Files

CS COPY

[illegible]

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 27048

DATE
1 September 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609 (P-6079)

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

Relaciones Culturales
con el Extranjero

Marianao, Agosto 19 de 1965

Compañero Félix Guerrero
Director de la Orquesta
del Teatro Lírico
Teatro García Lorca, Habana.

Estimado compañero:

Por este medio le comunicamos que con motivo de la Fiesta Nacional de la R.P. de Bulgaria se ha confeccionado entre la Embajada de la R.P. de Bulgaria y este Consejo Nacional de Cultura la "Semana de la Cultura Búlgara" que se efectuará del [illegible] de Septiembre próximo.

Como parte de la programación figuran un concierto por radio y televisión para el 3 de Septiembre próximo, y un concierto para el 7 de Septiembre próximo en el Palacio de Bellas Artes; tomando parte en ambos programas artistas búlgaros y cubanos;

Por lo cual le solicitamos atentamente el permiso que se acostumbra en estos casos a fin de que los compañeros artistas cuyos nombres damos a continuación, puedan cumplimentar sus actuaciones en los dos programas a que nos hemos referido.

El permiso para el prof. León Suruyón es para el día 3 de Septiembre próximo y los permisos para Alexander Neinek, León Suruyón, Nicola Barov y Nicola Danev para el día 7 también de Septiembre próximo.

Agradeciendo la valiosa colaboración que preste a este fin, quedo de usted con saludos revolucionarios de Patria o Muerte,

Por la Dirección de Relaciones Culturales
con el Extranjero

Luis Alberdi.-

Il el 6 y el 7 no pueden ser prestados
~~[illegible]~~ con [illegible] a Varadero (información Agost. 24)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memorandum of Oral Commitments - LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached are three authenticated copies of a Memorandum of Oral Commitments for LITAMIL-9.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-5699

DATE
19 August 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of [illegible]-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project [illegible] and is chargeable to LIRAVINE. The effective date of the oral contract is [illegible] subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA in process. Date ________.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The subject will be paid 5000 Pesos per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is [illegible] dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's pay. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Small Christmas, birthday gifts may be give. No commitment.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner: ________.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expenses: None.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimburse: Any minor operational expenses approved by the Case Officer such as transportation to meeting site. Note: Subject has never submitted a claim for any such expense to date.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation: Subject may have to be provided safe haven if his government becomes aware of his activities for ODYOKE. This does not imply [illegible].

9. No accommitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

10. Comment: This MOC submitted because Subject's salary was raised from $4000 to $ 5000 a month effective 1 March 1965. Authority: DIR 89922 ([illegible]) of 5 March 1965.

SIGNED: ________
Case Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

CERTIFIED: ________
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TYPE AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project [illegible] and is chargeable to LIRAVINE. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 March 1965 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type PCA in process. Date ________.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The subject will be paid 5000 Pesos per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 400 dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's pay. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Small Christmas, birthday gifts may be give. No commitment.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner: ________.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expences: None.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimburse: Any minor operational expense approved by the Case Officer such as transportation to meeting site. Note: Subject has never submitted a claim for any such expense to date.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation: Subject may have to be provided safe haven if his government becomes aware of his activities for KUBARK, this does not imply asylum in PBPRIME.

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

10. Comment: This MOC submitted because Subject's salary was raised from $4000 to $ 5000 a month effective 1 March 1965. Authority: DIR 89922 (IN 5455) of 5 March 1965.

SIGNED: ________
Case Officer

APPROVED: ________
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

APPROVED: ________
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TIME AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project LIRAVINE and is chargeable to LIRAVINE. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 March 1965 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA in process. Date ________.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The subject will be paid 5000 Pesos per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 400 dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's pay. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Small Christmas, birthday gifts may be give. No commitment.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner: ________.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expences: None.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimburse: Any minor operational expense approved by the Case Officer such as transportation to meeting site. Note: Subject has never submitted a claim for any such expense to date.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation: Subject may have to be provided safe haven if his government becomes aware of his activities for ODYOKE. This does not imply asylum in PBPRIME.

9. No acommitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

10. Comment: This MOC submitted because Subject's salary was raised from $4000 to $ 5000 a month effective 1 March 1965. Authority: DIR 89922 (IN 5455) of 5 March 1965.

SIGNED: ________
Case Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

APPROVED: ________
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/Operations/LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AC REQ: See para 2

1. A Provisional Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9 as a reporting source in PBRUMEN has been granted as of 8 July 1965.

2. Since the PRQ Part II for LITAMIL-9 in our file dates from June 1963, and in view of his changed mission, Headquarters would appreciate the thoughtful preparation of a revised PRQ Part II for LITAMIL-9. This should reach Headquarters perhaps sixty days prior to the expiration of this POA on 8 January 1966.

Anthony R. PONCHAY

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-128/3

FILE IN 201-239609

Distribution:
O & 1 -COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-13795	12 July 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	~~[illegible]~~ ~~XXXXXXXXX~~ SECRET	50-6-128/3 201-329809

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LITAMIL-9/Operational Progress Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LITAMIL-9 remains in PBRUMEN. On 19 June 1965 the C/O met with L-9's brother who reported he had talked with L-9 by telephone about 1 June. At that time L-9 was in good health and spirits and key words in his conversation indicated that he had not been bothered in any way by the PBRUMEN Security Service since his return. L-9 said that he expected to take it easy for about 3 months at which time he would probably be given a new assignment. He did not reveal whether he expected this to be a foreign assignment.

2. A PRQ Part II on L-9's brother was recently submitted with a request for Operational Approval. As noted therein, it is contemplated that he will be used only as a channel for communications to/from L-9.

3. Any new developments in this operation will be reported promptly.

Lawrence F. Barker
for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

CS COPY

20-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA 26552	8 July 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201 - 329609

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/1/Mexico - R. E. Scutt

NUMBER
C - 101331

SUBJECT
MITAMIL/9

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
19 April 1965

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

For use as a reporting source from within Cuba.

PRQ II
2d June 65

17 JUL 1965

Hmmd

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Edward P. [redacted]

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	8 July 1965

FORM 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1-64

SECRET

(9)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
6 PERUMEN/LITAMIL-9 Operational Progress Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: (A) MEXI2967, 31 March 1965
(B) HMMA 25761, 1 April 1965

well . Good.

1. On 6 May 1965 the brother of LITAMIL-9 (Subject of reference B), contacted the case officer. A meeting was held in Mexico City on the night of 7 May. L-9's brother turned over a postcard dated 25 March and a letter dated 8 April, both from L-9. These had been mailed in Mexico City on 20 April, presumably by a PERUMEN Airline pilot.

2. The card and letter revealed that L-9 is still on vacation and unmolested by PERUMEN Security forces. His mother and unmarried sister returned to PERUMEN from Madrid on 22 March and will presumably remain in PERUMEN. L-9 does not know when he will be leaving PERUMEN or where he will be stationed but the tone of his letter conveys the impression that he will be posted abroad.

3. In the letter L-9 again used a code phrase indicating that the regime appears to be leaning away from the Communist bloc.

4. A PRQ, Part II, will be forwarded soon on L-9's brother.

Lawrence F. Barker
for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

[illegible]

CS COPY

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26080	12 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-329609

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

ALBERU SOUTO, LUIS
201-329609
SEX M DOB ?

050-009-012
UFGA-21493
10 MAY 65
#19-6-95/4

CIT ?
OCC ?
CULTURAL ATTACHE.
SUBJ HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED BACK TO CUBA FROM CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO.

R 6505171276

LITAMIL-9

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: HMMW 13,549 15 April 1965

1. The Station is puzzled by the statement of references that operational reporting on the LITAMIL-9 operation has been "consistently neglected".

2. Using 1 January 1964 as a point of departure, the files of the Station reflect the following dispatches transmitting detailed reports [illegible]

Dispatch	Covering Meetings
HMMA22768, 17 January 64	27 December 63
	6 January 64
HMMA22831, 30 January 64	16 January 64
HMMA 23018, 4 March 64	30 January 64
	5 February 64
	1 March 64
HMMA 23268, 23 April 64	11 March 64
	28 March 64
	2 April 64
	13 April 64
HMMA 23691, 16 June 64	8 May 64
	27 May 64
	8 June 64
HMMA 23786, 30 June 64	28 April 64
	19 June 64
HMMA 23878, 14 July 64	7 July 64
HMMA 24015, 30 July 64	16 July 64
	21 July 64

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Cs Cy files 50-6-105/3 fol.-# 66-4/10

(continued)

GE 53

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA- 25938

DATE
23 April 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

HMMA 24254, 3 September 64	12 August 64
	27 August 64
HMMA 25001, 19 January 65	30 November 64
	7 December 64
	20 December 64
	22 December 64
	29 December 64

Note: This dispatch explained why reports had not been forwarded since HMMA 24254, see above- in accordance with Headquarters request that contact reports not be forwarded in the future. HMMA 25001 explained that henceforth 1 copy only of LITAMIL-9 CR's would be forwarded to WH/SA, attention Urquhart and Labanow. Both of these officers had specifically requested that LITAMIL-9 CR's be forwarded to WH/SA. In the interim, between September and January, CR's for the following meetings were placed in Station files: 10 September 64, 21 September 64, 1 October 64, 4 October 64, 23 October 64, 29 October 64, 5 November 64, and 16 November 64.

HMMA 25238, 28 January 65	7 January 65
	18 January 65
HMMA 25408, 18 February 65	26 January 65
	28 January 65
	1 February 65
	2 February 65
	9 February 65
	11 February 65
HMMA 25670, 23 March 65	12 February 65
	17 February 65
	19 February 65
	26 February 65
	2 March 65
	3 March 65
	8 March 65
	10 March 65
	Commo Plan

3. It is realized that an operational progress report and a contact report are two different items; however, in view of the detailed nature of the LITAMIL-9 CR's the Station has felt that their submission has satisfied the requirements of operational reporting. The criticism of reference is all the more puzzling since such visitors to the Station as Chester D. Dainold, Chief, WHD; Morton A. Woolley, erstwhile Chief of Operations, WHD; and Thomas W. Lund, present Mexico Branch Chief, have all expressed their approval of the detailed operational reporting on this operation during visits they have made to the Station at which time the reports in question have been brought to their attention.

4. When LITAMIL-9 next exits PERUMEN, the Station will begin to prepare formal operational progress reports on the operation.

5. As for the questions raised in paragraph 2 of reference regarding operational security, advance information on LITAMIL-9's recall came from LIENVOY but he was not informed of the imminence of his transfer until it was reported routinely by LITAMIL-7 and was generally known by his colleagues. As for the implication that LITAMIL-9 was informed of the Station's capability to intercept Embassy telephone conversations, a careful reading of the Memorandum under critique will show that no such acknowledgement was made. LITAMIL-9 was informed that "we have a good chance of being told about such a conversation by one of our friends," i.e. that word will probably get around in Embassy circles that LITAMIL-9 is about to travel to such-and- such a point.

(continued)

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMA-25938

As for the speculation that LITAMIL-9 suspects that Embassy phones are tapped, he has indicated his belief that this is the case ever since he was taken over by the present C/O. In fast, he is prone to say " I called so -and-so on such-and-such a matter, using the phone instead of the inter-com so you could hear it." In cases wherein he has spoken this way, he has beem told that chances are we will never hear about the matter discussed unless he reports on it specifically in his meetings with his C/O.

Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

19 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/OA

SUBJECT : Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9

1. An Operational Approval is requested for LITAMIL-9, who has recently returned to Cuba, and has accepted an FI mission from Mexico Station. The Station has expressed its reluctance to interview a Mexican officer who alleged in 1959 that LITAMIL-9 was a Communist, since this course of action would unnecessarily draw attention of this officer to our interest in LITAMIL-9. WH/1 has concurred in this decision, and considers that this unevaluated derogatory information on LITAMIL-9 is far outweighed by his performance record.

2. Realizing the risk involved in working with any Cuban national, WH/1 feels that LITAMIL-9's excellent record of cooperation, plus his acceptance of the idea of continued cooperation in a denied area favor consideration of an Operational Approval. Additionally, we have had audio coverage through the telephone in LITAMIL-9's office for the past two years or more, and during this time the Station has used the installation for spot checking his information, and is satisfied that there are no reasons to question his veracity and security or suspect that he is under control of the Cuban service.

3. Attached for your review are several contact reports of LITAMIL-9, as requested by Mr. Lally. Their prompt return will be appreciated. This office will be pleased to cooperate in any further review of this case which will facilitate the OA.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief WH/1

Attachments:
Reports of LITAMIL-9

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - 201-329609
1 - C 101331

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NCR NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR : See Paras 3 and 4

REF: HMMA-25,670 dated 23 March 1965

1. We are pleased that Barker has prevailed upon LITAMIL-9 to return to Cuba and even more important, of course, to agree to be alert to service the cause and again, still better, to agree to the use of a communications system. Considering LITAMIL-9's known reluctance for this sort of thing we understand that Barker had to be quite convincing with his arguments and also very possibly had to resort to some arm-twisting.

2. Nevertheless, lacking operational progress reports and therefore not knowing the full background of Barker's procedures, we did note that in paragraph 3.ii, page 4, of the C/R attached to reference, the Station tipped off LITAMIL-9 that he would probably be requested to return to Cuba. We assume that the tip came from the LIENVOY or LIFEAT take, and, to complete the record here, would appreciate a note as to the origin of the information that LITAMIL-9 was to be transferred. We further note from paragraph 3 of the Memorandum for the Record dated 11 March, also attached to reference, that, in essence, apparently a further acknowledgement was made to LITAMIL-9 that the Station has the capability to intercept Cuban Embassy telephone conversations.

3. While there may be a simple explanation for this report we are constrained to make known our concern that such apparent revelations, however well-intentioned, obviously could cause unpleasant repercussions and are regarded under normal circumstances as basically unsound violations of operational compartmentation and procedure.

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

201-321609

(CONTINUED)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-13,549

DATE
15 April 1965

15 APR 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-321609

RI
Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE
WH/1

OFFICER / TYPIST
N.J.Kaufman:mep

EXT
4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL
C/WHD

DATE

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HDSM-13,549

4. This all, of course, again raises the practical difficulties encountered in trying to provide meaningful support to the Station when proper operational reporting is consistently neglected as in the case in the LITAMIL-9 op. Consistency has virtue only when in the right direction. While we are on it, please note that Cuban op dispatches should be addressed to C/WH; the branch will see that all items reach other interested components.

Chester D. DAINOLD

CS COPY

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

CP

ORIG.: R. Scutt
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 4 March 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM

27 SECRET/KAPOK

16 ROUTING

1	1	5	FI
2		6	Reg
3		7	
4		8	

TO: MEXICO CITY PRIORITY

[illegible] 16 2
PRIORITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 6

INFO: DDP, ADDP, DC/WH/C5, C/CI, VR, FILE

TO MEXI PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 89922

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REF: MEXI 2577 (IN 15123)

File 201 LITAMIL-9

1. INCREASE LITAMIL NINE SALARY AUTHORIZED. ALSO SUGGEST PAYMENT OF BONUS UP TO FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS IN RECOGNITION EXCELLENT PAST WORK AND AS INCENTIVE FUTURE COOPERATION.

2. APPRECIATE LITAMIL NINE RELUCTANCE ACCEPT SW, BUT ASSUME MEXI WILL CONTINUE STRESS IMPORTANCE OF COMMO. AS MINIMUM MEXI SHOULD ESTABLISH OPEN CODE ARRANGEMENT THROUGH BROTHER, SUCH AS DESCRIBED IN MEXI 3633 (IN 78021), 2 MARCH 1963.

3. NEED CURRENT BIOG DATA AND STATION TRACES ON BROTHER LEONEL TO PROCESS OPERATIONAL APPROVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/FI/J. Sherwood (phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH/D
RELEASING OFFICER

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET/KAPOK

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

3 SECRET

BY ☐ COPY ☑ RUN

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH 6

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, ADDP, DC/WH/C 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED MAR 4 7 37 AM '65

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH

TIME 1745 DD

1	1	5	
2		6	RID
3	FI	7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 031950Z

3 MAR 65 IN 15123

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 2677

KAPOK PBRUMEN

1. LITAMIL-9 HAS BEEN RECALLED PBRUMEN ON APPARENT PCS TRANSFER. IS WILLING COMPLY AND PLANS LEAVE 8 MARCH.

2. AMBASSADOR TOLD L-9 HE SHOULD CONSIDER KEEPING MEXI APARTMENT "SINCE, WHO KNOWS, YOU MAY BE BACK HERE IN SIX MONTHS."

3. L-9 FEELS RECALL MAY HAVE BEEN ENGINEERED BY SISTER-IN-LAW IN CONNECTION WITH REFUSAL OF L-9 SISTER TO OBEY RECALL FROM PBRUMEN EMBASSY MADRID ALLEGING MEDICAL REASONS. L-9 FEELS POSSIBLE SISTER-IN-LAW MAY ARRANGE L-9 EVENTUAL TRANSFER TO MADRID WHERE SISTER AND L-9 MOTHER BOTH RESIDING. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT L-9 BEING CALLED BACK FROM HOME LEAVE FOR WHICH HE NOW ELIGIBLE ALTHOUGH AMB SAID ORDERS APPEARED PCS.

4. C/O WAS INTRODUCED TO L-9 BROTHER NIGHT 2 MAR. HE WILL BE CHANNEL OF COMMO TO/FROM L-9. AS BEFORE, L-9 REFUSES TAKE ANY S/W MATERIAL INTO PBRUMEN OR WRITE $\overset{S\ W}{\text{0/8}}$ ONCE THERE. BELIEVES IF HE CAUGHT HARM MIGHT COME TO HIS RELATIVES. WILL BE STAYING AT HOME OF BROTHER AND SISTER-IN-LAW. LATTER, ONCE AGAIN SECRETARY TO AMTHUG-1, WILL BE PRIME SOURCE OF INFORMATION. IN VIEW POSSIBILITY

L-9 MAY BE SUBJECT TO THOROUGH INVESTIGATION BY SECURITY SERVICES, STATION IS NOT PRESSING S/W MATTER SINCE DELAYS IN RECEIVING INFO FROM HIM WILL BE MORE THAN OVERCOME BY QUALITY OF INFO HE WILL BE IN POSITION TO OBTAIN.

5. L-9 FEELS CERTAIN HE CAN ARRANGE TRIP OUTSIDE PBRUMEN IN NEXT FEW MONTHS. MEETING PLANS FOR POSSIBLE DESTINATIONS ARE BEING SET UP.

6. L-9 BRIEFED THOROUGHLY ON POSSIBILITY DSE PROVOCATION ONCE HE INSIDE AND BEING GIVEN GUIDANCE ON HANDLING SELF IN SUCH EVENT.

7. IN VIEW L-9 CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH AMTHUG SECRETARY, REQUEST HQS CABLE PRIORITY INFORMATION COLLECTION BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS. BRIEFING WILL BE HANDLED BY C/O. L-9 REFUSES MEET ANY OTHER PERSONS IN VIEW EXTREME CONCERN FOR HIS SECURITY.

8. STATION PLEASED BY L-9 DECISION RETURN. HE DOING THIS FOR KUBARK AS WOULD PREFER QUIETLY MELD INTO MEXI SCENE. STATION WOULD APPRECIATE HQS CABLED AUTHORIZATION INFORM L-9 THAT HIS SALARY BEING RAISED ADDITIONAL ONE THOUSAND PESOS MONTHLY TO NEW TOTAL FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS. BELIEVE WORK TO DATE FULLY JUSTIFIES THIS EIGHTY DOLLAR RAISE AND BOOST WILL HELP HIS MORALE AT TIME WHEN MOST NEEDED. HAS NOT HAD RAISE SINCE BEGAN COOPERATING WITH STATION. SALARY

[illegible]

WILL BE HELD BY STATION DURING HIS STAY IN PBRUMEN.

SECRET

CFN



1 2 3

From AMTREDGE/1 See SGA to UFGA 18495, 4 Nov 1964

filed in WH/SA/MOB

LEFT TO RIGHT:

1. Julio Antonio ALVAREZ , MINREX and DSE
2. Evelio PEREZ Quintero, MINREX and DSE
3. LITAMIL-9
4. Antonio NUNEZ JIMENEZ, Pres, Cuban Academy of Science

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1
2
3

ACTION: WH 8

INFO :

DDP, CI/OA, WE 4, SAS 5, S/C 2

SECRET 241225Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE MADR 8430

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

25 MAY 1963

IN 46431

REF MEXI 4621 (IN 41326)

1. REGRET MADR HAS NO FACILITIES LOCATE EMPLOYMENT FOR L-9 SISTE ALONG LINES OUTLINED PARA 1 REF.

2. IF SHE IS QUALIFIED ENGLISH-SPANISH TRANSLATOR AND COULD BE CLEARED WE COULD POSSIBLY USE IN QUWEB ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, SALARY NO EXCEED ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS A MONTH.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *L-9 REQUESTED CO. MAKE EVERY EFFORT FIND EMPLOYMENT FOR HIS SISTER.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ORIG : WAYNE CARIEY
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 23 May 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY MADRID
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, SAS 5, WE 4, S/C

24 MAY 63 19

DEFERRED SIG CEN
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO MADR CITE DIR 42325

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

REF MEXI 4621 (IN 41326)*

1. IN VIEW LACK INFO HDQS ON SISTER LITAMIL-9, SUGGEST MEXI OBTAIN MORE DETAILED INFO ON SISTERS PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES, POLITICAL ORIENTATION, RECRUITABILITY, ETC, PRIOR INVOLVING MADRID STATION IN REF PROPOSAL.

2. INASMUCH AS LITAMIL-9 DOES NOT CURRENTLY RECEIVE ANY SALARY FROM ~~[illegible]~~ KUBARK, MEXI SHOULD CONSIDER POSSIBILITY PUTTING HIM ON SALARY IN ORDER HELP SUPPORT MOTHER AND SISTER. THIS WOULD ALSO SUPPLY CONTROL FACTOR OVER AGENT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref requested Hqs and Madrid comments on possibility of obtaining employment in Spain for the sister of LITAMIL-9 with an American firm.

SAS/EOB Bryant (by phone)
f-C/WE/5 NA
WH/COO
WH/COPS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

C SIFIED MESSAGE

22/30 SECRET

1			
2			
3		6	

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DOP, CI/OA, WE 4, SAS 5, S/C 2

S E C R E T 171750Z

MADR DIR CITE MEXI 4621

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

18 MAY 1963 IN41326

1. ON 16 MAY 63, LITAMIL-9 REPORTED THAT HIS MOTHER WROTE BROTHER MEXI STATING (IDEN A) PLANS GET MARRIED SEPT 63 AND FUTURE HUSBAND (BELIEVED SPANISH) WHO EMPLOYED BAYER COMPANY INSISTS SHE RESIGN POST AT CONSULATE, WHICH SHE WILL DO. MOTHER DESIRES STAY SPAIN WITH OTHER DAUGHTER AND REQUESTED FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM SONS MEXI. ACCORDING L-9, HIS MOTHER NOT ABLE LIVE MEXI VIEW HEART CONDITION AND HE AND BROTHER MEXI NOT ABLE FINANCIALLY SUPPORT MOTHER AND SISTER SPAIN. VIEW ABVOE PROBLEM L-9 REQUESTED CO MAKE EFFORT FIND EMPLOYMENT FOR HIS SISTER SPAIN (IDEN B) PREFERABLY WITH PBPRIME FIRM, POSSIBLY IN PUBLIC RELATIONS WORK.

2. MOTHER SAID WOULD ALSO WRITE L-9 RE PROBLEM. INFO PARA 1= FIRST IMPRESSIONS PROBLEM AS SEEN BY L-9 THROUGH LETTER SENT HIS BROTHER. LIKELY OTHER ALTERNATIVES WILL ARISE AS MORE DETAILS KNOWN. REQUEST DIR MADR COMMENTS RE POSSIBILITY ASSISTANCE OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT PER PARA 1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

46 SECRET

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, WE 4, SAS 5, S/C 2

SECRET 171750Z

MADR DIR CITE MEXI 4622

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

18 MAY 1963

IN41344

REF MEXI 4621 (IN 41326)

IDEN A - MARILUZ ALBERU SOUTO - CONSUL, VIGO

IDEN B - XENIA ALBERU SOUTO - ABOUT 38 YEARS OLD. BORN CUBA, ATTRACTIVE, WELL EDUCATED, ACCOMPLISHED VIOLINIST.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☒
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-329609
X-REF TO FILE NO.
SIGNATURE

201-329609

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, SAS 5, OP, S/C 2

SECRET 172306Z

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 4629

REF A. MEXI 4607 (IN 42375)

B. DIR 40146*

18 MAY 1963

IN41759

LITAMIL-9 CASE OFFICER ON LEAVE UNTIL 26 MAY. SUGGEST TDYER BEAR ABOVE IN MIND RE TRAVEL MEXI.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADVISE RE TDY.

RI COPY

RI COPY

RI COPY

Litamil-9

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	91
RID/MIS	
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

201-329609

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

21 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

2

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, S/C 2

SECRET 222240Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4258 IN23005 22 APR 1963

REF MEXI 3872. (IN 90763)

ON 20 APR 63, BROTHER LITAMIL-9 REPORTED THAT L-9 EXPECTED ARRIVE MEXI 22 OR 26 APR 63. NOT KNOWN WHETHER L-9 REASSIGNED MEXI AS LATEST INFO FROM HAVA TO MEXI FROM L-9 RELATIVES INDICATED HE BEING CONSIDERED FOR PARIS POST. ON 21 APR L-9'S BROTHER RECEIVED LETTER FROM FUTURE DAUGHTER IN LAW IN WHICH SHE STATED GAVE L-9 PACKAGE AND LETTERS TAKE MEXI.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

SUBJECT Regulations of Mexican Government on Travel Between Mexico and Cuba

REPORT NO. CS -3/540,193

DATE DISTR. 13 March 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. February 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City 25 February 1963

BY CABLE

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Para. 1: Person (B) with good contacts in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.
Para. 2: European businessmen (F).
Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. Since mid-February 1963 Mexican immigration authorities have placed stamps in the passports of travellers to and from Cuba which read "Arrived from Cuba" and "Left for Cuba". The stamps are placed on the page with the picture.[1]

2. All requests for Mexican tourist visas in Cuba must be approved in Mexico before they are issued in Habana.[2]

Field Comments

1. Cuban visas are often issued on a separate piece of paper and not stamped in the passport, so that the passport would not show that the bearer had travelled to Cuba.

2. This regulation was first noticed in February 1963.

Documentation for travel from Mexico to Cuba does not differ from that needed for travel to other Latin American countries. The traveller must have a passport or other travel document, with a valid visa. Mexican citizens within the specified age group must also carry a cartilla militar.

Mexican security services do not screen applications for travel to Cuba. Although the Mexican Government has taken no action to prevent travel to Cuba, it has discouraged government employees from accepting invitations to Cuban-sponsored activities. It also appears to want to avoid recognition of Cuban Government activities by not sending government-sponsored delegations. These steps, plus the bothersome baggage searches, photographs, and questioning by Mexican immigration authorities have probably curtailed travel to Cuba.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	AID	
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #								TREAS	X	FBI	3	USIA	X	I&NS	X

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/CA/P	1	WH/6	1	WH/MEXI	1	MEXI-3617 IN-77675, NO PROJECT (LITAMIL-9) CS-3/540,193
CA/PROP	1	WH/FI	1	WH/3/CAX	1	WH/COPS/CCO	1	
SAS/R	11	WH/1	1	WH/PACY	1			
SAS/WAVE	1	WH/2	1	WH/3/C&S	1			
WH/R	1	WH/5	1	WH/3/M	2			

TOTALS DISSEM SEC 1, IE 2, CI 3, FI 3, CA 1, SAS 11 (1), WH 12 (2). BY CABLE

LIAISON * (in draft)

COORDINATING SAS/R

RELEASING LNG VR/mw

FORM 3-62 1 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico/Cuba/Mali	REPORT NO.	CS-3/539,466
SUBJECT	Request of Cuban Government To the Republic of Mali for a Resident Ambassador	DATE DISTR.	7 March 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	18 February 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (20 February 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-7045

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paras. 1,3: Person (B) with good contacts in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.
Para. 2: A neutralist diplomat (C) in Mexico City, from Sori Coulibaly.
Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. On 18 February 1963 Sori Coulibaly, the Ambassador of the Republic of Mali to the United Nations and to Cuba,[1] and Mamadou Traore, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Mali Mission to the United Nations, arrived in Mexico from Habana, Cuba. Coulibaly told members of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City that he had spoken with Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister, who asked Coulibaly to take steps to have the Government of Mali send a resident Ambassador to Cuba.

2. Coulibaly said that the Cubans had put pressure on him to open an office in Habana and that they had in fact given him a building for this purpose. However, Coulibaly said that he did not see how Mali could afford to open an office in Habana, in view of the fact that he had hardly enough money to operate the Mali Mission to the United Nations.[2]

3. Coulibaly and Traore left Mexico City on 20 February for New York. Coulibaly carried Mali diplomatic passport No. 23; Traore carried diplomatic passport No. 42.

[1] Headquarters Comment. Coulibaly presented his credentials in Cuba on 13 February 1963.

[2] Source Comment. Coulibaly confided that he had requested 50 million Mali francs (about $203,000.00) as an annual budget for the operation of the Mali Mission to the United Nations; that he had been allotted only one-tenth of that amount for the first quarter of 1963; and that he had not received even that.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

STATE #	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	FBI	3
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #										TREAS	X	USIA	X	I&NS	X

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	AF/BAKO	1	WH/CA/PROP	1		CX-164 DRHARK
FI/SPOG	2	AF/SPS	1	WH/FI	1		HMM-7045
AF/345/R	3	SAS/R	11	WH/3/M	2	NO PROJECT	(LITAMIL-9)
AF/COP/CA	1	SAS/WAVE	1	WH/MEXI	1		CS-3/539,466
AF/3	1	WH/R	1	WH/PACY	1		
TOTALS	DISSEM SEC 1, IE 2, CI 3, FI 5, AF 6 (1), SAS 11 (1), WH 5 (2), PRIORITY					LIAISON #	COORDINATING RELEASING AF/3/R LNG FI/SPOG VR;dc SAS/R (draft)

FORM 3-62 1 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

REPORT NO. CS-3/539,464

SUBJECT Mexicans on the Mailing List For the Cuban Embassy Information Bulletin

DATE DISTR. 7 March 1963

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. February 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (4 February 1963) FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-6991

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Person (B) with good contacts in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Appraisal of Content: 2.

The following Mexicans, all described as painters, sculptors, writers, newspapermen, or intellectuals, and who belong to an independent, pro-Cuba group in Mexico City known as the Jose Marti Group, have requested copies of the Cuban Embassy Information Bulletin:

Dr. Leopoldo Ancona, 5 de Febrero No. 90, Mexico D.F., President of the Jose Marti Group;
Prof. Manuel Duarte Guille, Alondra 45, Colonia El Rosedal, Coyoacan, Mexico, D.F.;
Lic. Enrique Arceo, Sur 69-A, No. 510 Colonia Justo Sierra, Mexico, D.F.;
Dr. Bernardo Ba[illegible]z, Apartado 2641, Mexico, D.F. 13;
Lic. Javier Lopez Clares, Juan de la Barrera No. 78, Colonia Condesa, Mexico, D.F.;
Profa. Rosa Maria Perez Rosal, Rhin 8-2, Colonia Cuauhtemoc, Mexico, D.F.;
Lic. Alfonso Rodriguez Contreras, Corona 224, Colonia Industrial, Mexico, D.F.;
Prof. Virgilio Camacho Paniagua, Sur 101-A, No. 430, Colonia Prado Churubusco, Mexico, D.F.;
Dr. Daniel Nieto Roaro, Tabasco 301, Colonia Roma, Mexico, D.F.;
Dr. Silvestre Delgado, 5 de Febrero No. 90, Mexico 1, D.F.;
Dra. Rebeca Diaz Canales, Ave. Dos No. 74, San Pedro de los Pinos, Mexico, D.F.;
Dr. Horacio Gonzalez Martinez, Holbein No. 133-32, Colonia Napoles, Mexico, D.F.;
Prof. Agustin Gonzalez Lopez, Ave. Independencia 18, Mexico, D.F.;
Prof. Leonardo Curzio, Vicente Suarez No. 150, Colonia Condesa, Mexico, D.F.;
Dr. Luis Ganiochiri Carabajal, Beisbol No. 205, Mexico 21, D.F.;
Prof. Mauricio Magdaleno, Cuicuilco 89, Colonia Vertiz Narvarte, Mexico, D.F.;
Ing. Rogelio Valenzuela C., Sur 69-A No. 511, Colonia Justo Sierra, Mexico, D.F.;
Sr. Antonio Perez Henriquez, Ave. Cuauhtemoc 655-5, Mexico 12, D.F.;
Prof. Marco Arturo Montero, Garcia Conde 33, Tacubaya, Mexico, D.F.;
Prof. Raimundo Ramos, Sur No. 51 - No. 255, Mexico 13, D.F.;
Lic. Gregorio de Luna Esparza, Prolongacion Opalo No. 33, Mexico 14, D.F.;

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S E C R E T

STATE # X | ARMY # X | NAVY # X | AIR # X | FBI # 3 | AEC | NSA X | OCR X
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB # | TREAS | X DIA | X USIA # X | I&NS # X
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

EE	SR	CI/ICG	1 WH FI	1 WH/PACY	1	HMM-6991	
FE	WE	CA/PROP	2 WH/COPS/CCO 1			NO PROJECT	LNG
NE	WH	WH/R	1 WH/3/M	1 SAS/R	11	(LITAMIL-9)	VR;mw
SE	IO	WH/CA/P	1 WH/MEXI	1 SAS/WAVE	#1	CS-3/539,464	

TOTALS DISSEM SEC 1, IE 2, CI 3, FI 3, CA 2,
WH 5 (2), SAS 11 (1).

LIAISON: *
Co-ordinated with: SAS/R
(in draft)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

22/35

DATE : 6 MAR 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 2000, 5 MAR)EP

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SR 4, C/WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2	LOB	5	
3		6	

MAR 6 0055Z 63

PRIORITY

IN 79811

PRITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3653

RYBAT TYPIC LITAMIL-9

REF A. MEXI 3633 (IN 78071) *

B. DIR 18853

IN79811

1. LITAMIL-9 LEFT MEXI ON 4 MAR 63 FOR HAVA VIA CUBANA AIRLINES. (LIFIRE/2)

2. CO HELD LAST MTG L-9 EARLY MORNING 4 MAR. L-9 REFUSED TAKE S/W EQUIPMENT ANY KIND OR PHYSICAL BONAFIDES. WILLING ACCEPT CONTACT AFTER THREE MONTHS HAVA. MTG SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT BOOK STORE CITED REF A AFTER 1600. FUMASOLI OR PERSON KNOWN TO FUMASOLI (NOT CUBAN) SHOULD APPROACH "DE PARTE DEL SR FUMASOLI". L-9 WILL ACCEPT PERSON'S BONAFIDES VIEW FACT MTG AT BOOK STORE AND USE FUMASOLI NAME. SEES NO POSSIBILITY PROVOCATION.

3. L-9 WILL SENT LTR MEXI "DROP" AFTER APPROX ONE MONTH HAVA. WILL WRITE BROTHER ABOUT EVERY TWO WEEKS. OPEN CODE TO BROTHER WILL PROVIDE ANSWERS GENERAL QUESTION REF A AS WELL EXISTENCE SOVIET ROCKETS, AND POLITICAL POSITION RAUL ROA. L-9 BRIEFED AGAIN RE REQUIREMENTS REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *STATED POSSIBILITY REMAINS LITAMIL-9 WILL TAKE S/W PENCIL OR GREEN LEAD ONLY FOR EMERGENCY USE.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWN-
GRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No

[illegible] DIR CITE MEXI 3653

TYPIC LITAMIL-9

REF: A. DIR 19992

B. MEXI 3559 [illegible]

1. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS LITAMIL-9 OP AS FOLLOWS: L-9 READILY AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY ACCEPTED FOL MEXI ACCOMODATION ADDRESS: FERNANDO JIMENEZ APARTADO [illegible], MEXICO [illegible], D.F., WHICH HE HAS MEMORIZED. POSSIBILITY REMAINS HE TAKE S/W PENCIL OR GREEN LEAD ONLY FOR EMERGENCY USE VIA ACCOMODATION ADDRESS. WILL MAIL LTR ORDER CHECK MEXI ADDRESS WITHIN TWO WEEKS. BROTHER'S LETTER FROM MEXI WILL ADVISE HIM ARRIVAL JIMENEZ LTR THROUGH OPEN CODE.

2. L-9 PLANS WRITE BROTHER ABOUT EVERY TWO WEEKS, LTRS WILL CONTAIN SOME OPEN CODE PREVIOUSLY AGREED UPON CO AND L-9, I.E., "PAPA DECAIDO" MEANING CASTRO ACCEPTING COMMUNIST ADVICE AND REGIME PLANS CONTINUE ACCEPTING COMMUNIST SUPPORT. "PAPA ANIMADO" MEANING CASTRO TRYING RID COUNTRY COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ETC.

3. L-9 PREFERS NO PERSONAL CONTACT HAVA DURING FIRST THREE MONTHS, AFTER THIS TIME WILLING TALK WITH [illegible] FUMASOLI, SWISS DIPLOMAT, FORMERLY ASSIGNED SPAIN AND POSSIBLY STILL THERE. L-9 AND FUMASOLI

[illegible] FRIENDS AND NO PROBLEM "COVER" FROM HAVA. L-9 FREQUENTS BOOK [illegible] OWNED BY SR. GELASIO KITTY CORNER POLICE STATION AND BESIDE [illegible] CAFE ACROSS STREET FROM PALACIO BELLAS ARTES. CAFE AND BOOKSTORE [illegible] ARCADE. L-9 HAS BEEN GOING BOOKSTORE FOR YEARS USUALLY BETWEEN [illegible] DAILY. REQUEST PRESENT LOCATION FUMASOLI AND POSSIBILITY HIS USE THIS OP. L-9 WILL BE GIVEN PHYSICAL BONA FIDES VERBAL RECOGNITION SIGNALS PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR EMERGENCY USE. L-9 POSITION RE PERSONAL CONTACT HAVA SAME THAT HIS LAST MTG PARMERS AND CO.

4. CO MET BROTHER L-9 NIGHT 1 MAR AND CONTACT PLANS ESTABLISHED. BROTHER APPEARED WILLING COOPERATE FULLY WHEN CALLED UPON. WILL POUCH PRQ-I SOONEST.

5. NIGHT 1 MAR L-9 IN GOOD SPIRITS AND CONFIDENT WILL RETURN MEXI WITHIN THREE MONTHS. ALL AVENUES WILL BE EXPLORED DURING NEXT MTG COME UP WITH MOST EFFICIENT COMMO SYSTEM WITHIN L-9 LIMITATIONS AND LEVY REQUIREMENTS FOR "OPEN CODE" ANSWERS. L-9 LEAVING FOR HAVA ABOUT 1400 ON 4 MAR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REF [illegible].

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

201-329609

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
SAS - H.E.Mulloy

NUMBER
C-101331

SUBJECT
LITAMIL/9

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
25 July 1962

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA is granted only for training of Subject.

Approval for operational use of Subject is deferred pending satisfactory resolution of derogatory information, which CI Staff does not consider to have been accomplished.

MEXI-1506

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	20 Feb 1963 pro

FORM 7-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

19 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9, C - 101331

The FBI report entitled Foreign Political Matters Cuba and sent to this Agency on 28 December 1961, could not be located in RID or SAS files. Three such reports dated 29 December 1961 with the same title were obtained, but the Subject was not referred to in any of the three reports.

Desmond FitzGerald
C/SAS

Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - SAS/INTEL/OPS SPT
1 - 201-329609

SECRET

[illegible]

18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Chief, Covert Training/Operations School
Chief, [illegible] Training

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training of Luis ALBERU Souto

1. It is requested that full time covert training be provided at Mexico City, Mexico for approximately ten days beginning on or about [illegible] February 1963 for Luis ALBERU Souto.

2. The objective of the training is to provide the subject with the basic principles of clandestine tradecraft to better prepare him as an FI agent operating inside a denied area.

3. In addition to the basic tradecraft, training should emphasize reporting techniques and include appropriate secret writing instruction, as arranged by the case officer with TSD.

4. Subject is a PBRUMEN cultural attache in the Embassy in Mexico City. A Provisional Operational Approval was requested on 20 July 1962 and the status is being checked. (C-[illegible]; DPOB: 1925, Oviedo, Spain)

5. Responsible Headquarters case officer for the training is R. K. Malley, extension 4172.

OSCAR D. M[illegible]
Training Officer/SAS

APPROVED:

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

18 F[illegible]
Date

CONCURRENCE:

21 Feb

Counter Intelligence Staff — Date

21 Feb

DDP Training & Qualifications Review Officer — Date

Distribution:

[illegible]
1 - C/[illegible]/TSO
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP/TSO
1 - C/SAS
1 - SAS/TSO

DDP/SAS/TSO/[illegible]McCollum:cls (18 Feb. 1963)

~~CLASSIFIED MESSAGE~~ 201-329609 AL

SECRET

ROUTING 201-329609

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ATE : 12 JAN 63

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : MEXICO CITY

CTION: WH 8* (WH COPY SLOTTED 1550 12 JAN 63)

NFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, ~~CI, CI/OPS, FI,~~ FI/INT 2, TFW 5, S/C 2

JAN 12 20462 63

☐ Destroy.
☒ RI file this copy as indicated
☐
Marked ☐
☒ None required
Signature:

PRIORITY

PRITY DIR INFO WAVE SAGO CITE MEXI 3078 (OUSLER ACTING) IN49031

REF MEXI 3052 (IN 47807) *
GYROSE LITAMIL-9

1. ON 11 JAN 63, COTY SOLORZANO VDA DE RAMIREZ, SISTER IN LAW GRAL LAZARO CARDENAS, TOLD LITAMIL-9 THAT CUBAN EMB SHOULD HAVE CAR WITHOUT DIP PLATES ON OCCASIONS LIKE AFTERNOON 10 JAN WHEN CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA WENT VISIT GRAL LAZARO CARDENAS. COTY SOLORZANO SAID THAT CARDENAS HOUSE UNDER SURVEILLANCE AND USE CAR RAMON SINOBAS WAS NOT WISE. L-9 REPORTED THAT LECHUGA AND SINOBAS LEFT WREATH LAYING CEREMONY RE JOSE ANTONIO MELLA ABOUT 1145 ON 10 JAN IN SINOBAS' CAR. LIKELY THEY ON WAY VISIT CARDENAS AT THAT TIME.

2. COTY SOLORZANO TOLD L-9 THAT ASSIGNMENT SINOBAS AS CHIEF MISSION MEXI IN ABSENCE LECHUGA POOR JUDGMENT PART CUBAN GOVT. HE NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARED DO JOB ETC. SOLORZANO GODMOTHER SINOBAS CHILD. SOLORZANO SAID THAT CUAUHTEMOC CARDENAS AGREES HER THIS POINT AND HAS ASKED HER WHAT L-9 AND EUSEBIO AZCUE "DOING", IMPLYING HIS OPINION EITHER ONE OF TWO SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN POST.

3. ON MORNING 11 JAN LECHUGA TOOK L-9'S GIFT FOR HIS SISTER FROM L-9 BUT TOLD HIM HE NOT LEAVING FOR HAVA UNTIL 14 JAN. LECHUGA AND SINOBAS ARRIVED EMBASSY ABOUT 2000 ON 11 JAN PROBABLY RETURNING

201-329609

LITAMIL-9

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3		6	

RI FILING (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RI INDEXING (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

PAGE 2

IN 49031

FROM TELLO LECHUGA MEETING CITED REF.

4. ON 11 JAN 62, JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, CUBAN ARRIVED MEXI FROM HAVA WITHOUT MEXI VISA EN ROUTE CHILE. LOPEZ TOLD L-9 AND BENIGNO CASTELLAR WHO MET HIM AIRPORT THAT HE CARRYING 4000 DOLLARS CASH. SAID PLANNED CARRY PROPAGANDA BUT FEARFUL WOULD BE CONFISCATED MEXI. LOPEZ SCHEDULED LEAVE FOR SAGO VIA CANADIAN PACIFIC NIGHT 11 JAN 62.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR GYROSE NOT USED.
**INTEL RPT RE SCHEDULED INTERVIEW BETWEEN MANUEL TELLO AND CARLOS LECHUGA.

RI COPY

201-329669

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT: GIPOSE/LITAMIL-9 CONTACT REPORTS

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 050 006 105 /03

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-20472 *

4. DATE 08 JAN 63

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-334249

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

SINOBAS CASADO, RAMON (201-334249)
WAS DELIGHTED WITH THE RECEPTION GIVEN BY PRES LOPEZ MATEOS ON 3 JAN AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. SINOBAS TOLD L-9, ANDRES ARMONA AND MANUEL SANCHEZ, WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM TO THE PALACE (SANCHEZ AS CHAUFFEUR), THAT PRES. LOPEZ MATEOS DID NOT GIVE HIM A CHANCE TO SEND GREETINGS FROM THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T BUT RATHER INTERRUPTED HIM TO SAY TRASMITA MIS SALUDOS A FIDEL CASTRO AND PRES. DORTICOS. SINOBAS SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION LOPEZ HAD PREPARED THIS MESSAGE AND WAS WAITING FOR HIM. L-9 SAID THAT HE NOTICED THAT MOST OF THE DIPLOMATS WERE MERELY SHAKING HANDS AND SAYING A FEW WORDS, HOWEVER, IN THE CASE OF SINOBAS HE REMAINED WITH LOPEZ LONGER THAN MOST OF THE OTHER DIPLOMATS. AT ANY RATE, SINOBAS WAS TICKLED PINK BY WHAT LOPEZ MATEOS TOLD HIM. ON THE WAY TO THE AIRPORT SINOBAS WHO IS A DIPLOMATIC SNOB TOLD ARMONA AND L-9 THAT THE CHANGES TO TAKE PLACE IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE WOULD MEAN THAT THEY (ARMONA AND L-9) WOULD NO LONGER BE DIPLOMATS AS SUCH, I.E. WHILE IN HAVANA THEY WOULD LOSE THEIR DIPLOMATIC STATUS. HE SAID THAT L-9 WOULD FALL UNDER THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. CULTURAL SECTION AND WOULD THEREFORE BE A DIPLOMAT ONLY IN A FOREIGN POST. THE SAME WITH ARMONA, WHO FALLS UNDER THE FOREIGN COMMERCE DEPT. L-9 SAID THAT SINOBAS IS ALWAYS TRYING TO IMPRESS OTHER MBRS OF THE EMB STAFF WITH HIS RANK AND THIS WAS ANOTHER EXAMPLE. L-9 CAN'T STAND SINOBAS BECAUSE OF HIS HAUGHTY EGOTISTICAL AIR, BUT IS SATISFIED WITH HIS FLIGHT BECAUSE HE FEELS THAT SINOBAS IS TAKING HIM INTO HIS CONFIDENCE MORE AND MORE AS TIME GOES ON. L-9 DESCRIBED SINOBAS' WIFE AS STRICTLY LOW CLASS WITH NOTHING TO OFFER JAN 63.

LITAMIL-9

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-334249

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10 (TFW COPY SLOTTED AT: 1550 21 DEC/AM)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

DEC 21 1906Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDI

IN 39430

OPIM DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 29[illegible]

201-329609

GYROSE LITAMIL-9 LITAMIL-7 201-330173

REF DIR 86518

1. IN SEPT 62. GUILLERMO LEON ANTICH. CUBAN DIP. WHILE MEXI ON ROUT POST CHILE (?) TOLD CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, CUBAN AMB MEXI IN PRESENCE LITAMIL-9 THAT CUBAN FOREIGN OFFICE PLANNED RECALL ALL AMBASSADORS FOR CONSULTATION RE INNOVATIONS FOREIGN OFFICE BASED SUGGESTIONS BLOC DIPS HAVA. SINCE THAT TIME, HOWEVER, NO INFO AVAILABLE L-9 INDICATING DIPS BEING RECALLED.

2. TRANSFER CUBAN DIPS MEXI AND BELIEVED REASONS FOR SAME AS FOLLOW CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, LEFT MEXI 26 OCT 62 FOR HAVA TAKE POST U.N. DELEGATION NEW YORK. LECHUGA EXPECTED RETURN MEXI 22 DEC WHERE WILL AGAIN TAKE UP AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES PROBABLY AFTER GOING HAVA REPORT U.N. DEVELOPMENTS. JOSE ANTONIO GARCIA LARA LEFT MEXI 23 NOV 62 FOR HAVA. RETURN HAVA STRAIGHTEN OUT COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS, TAKE EXAM AND POSSIBLY REPORT IN PERSON ON CONTACT KUBARKER MEXI. RETURN UNCERTAIN. RAMON CUENCA MONTOTO LEFT MEXI 22 SEPT 62 FOR HAVA. DEFECTION PEDRO ROIG ORTEGA AND POOR ADMINISTRATION COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROBABLY ACCOUNT FOR TRANSFER. ANA MARIA BLANCO TABRAUE LEFT MEXI 12 DEC FOR OTTAWA. LECHUGA "LOVE" AFFAIR BELIEVED REASON

B 201-330173

RECORD COPY

201-329609

21 DEC 62

TABRAUE

BLANCO TABRAUE. RADULFO PAEZ PEREZ LEFT MEXI 17 DEC FOR HAVA. PAEZ SPENT OVER YEAR MEXI AND TRANSFER NOT UNUSUAL ALTHOUGH POSSIBLY NEW MODE SYSTEM INTRODUCED CUBAN EMB AND THIS UNKNOWN TO HIM. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED PAEZ REPLACED BY PEDRO LARA MUNOZ WHO SPENT YEAR MOSCOW.

3. ON 19 DEC 62, LITAMIL-7 REPORTED THAT ONLY RAMOS CUENCA AND ANA MARIA BLANCO OF ABOVE GROUP HAVE BEEN "DROPPED" OFFICIALLY FROM CUBAN DIP LIST MEXI. OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION PAEZ EXPECTED SHORTLY. GARCIA AND LECHUGA STILL ON LIST. CO HAS SCHEDULED MEETING 21 DEC WITH LITAMIL-7 AT WHICH TIME EXPECTS HAVE REPORT ON NEWLY DRAWN UP CUBAN DIP LIST FOR PASSING FOREIGN OFFICE WHICH DUE FIRST OF YEAR. L-7 OPINION THIS WILL REVEAL FUTURE STATUS DIPS IN QUESTION PARTICULARLY GARCIA LARA.

4. ON 18 DEC 62 ALBERTO MANUEL FERRER, CUBAN DIP PP 62/593 ARRIVED MEXI FROM HAVA. LITAMIL-9 BELIEVES HE MEXI INSPECT AMB ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATES WITH RAMON SINOBAS CASADO, MANUEL VEGA AND PEDRO LARA ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY. ON 19 DEC L-7 REPORTED SHE INTRODUCED TO RODRIGUEZ FNU A MYSTERIOUS CHARACTER WHO LIVING AT EMBASSY. STATION BELIEVES RODRIGUEZ AND FERRER IDENS. FERRER SCHEDULED RETURN HAVA ON 21 VIA CUBANA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR GYROSE USED.

[illegible]
[illegible] Fernandez, [illegible] Castro's [illegible]retary. [illegible] was
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] was the Secretary to Eduardo Chibas, one of the most
eminent political leaders of Cuba during the last 20 years.
[illegible] was an avowed anti-communist. [illegible] used to be a
[illegible] of Chibas political party, [illegible] when he
came to power, he appointed Mrs. [illegible] his Secretary.
Chibas committed suicide on or about [illegible].

I do not know subject personally.

11/13/62.-

Married to Luis' brother Alberto

6

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-19455

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
27 July 1962

SUBJECT
Luis ALBERU Souto

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
POA on Subject

REFERENCES
GYROSE
MEXI-1506

MICROFILMED
AUG 2 1962
DOC. MICRO. SER.

There are attached copies of a PRQ, Part I on Subject. A POA is requested.

Willard Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

25 July 1962

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
2 - C/Task Force W w/2 att
2 - C/WHD w/2 att ~~[illegible]~~ 2cc w/att to WH/3
2 - Files

INDEX - H

Encl-1

CS COPY

201-329[illegible]

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET

58

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA".
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-19455

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) (Nee)
Luis ALBERU Souto

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

MICROFILMED
AUG 2 1962
DOC. MICRO. SER.

5. DATE OF BIRTH
Circa 1915

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
Oviedo, Spain

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

No known immoderate vices.

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)

Not known

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

9a. SEX ☒ M ☐ F	9b. AGE 47	9c. APPARENT AGE 47	9d. HEIGHT FT. 6 IN. –	9e. WEIGHT 170	9f. COMPLEXION	9g. FACE (Shape) Round
9h. COLOR OF HAIR Black	9i. COLOR OF EYES		9j. TEETH		9k. BUILD	9l. POSTURE

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Has pock marks on face.

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING, AND PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

CS COPY

GROUP 1

FORM 7-60 1050 [illegible] 19455

SECRET

201-329609

SECTION II

CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 1.): Spanish

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant): Michelet 7 - 301

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 3.)

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)

Cuba - Dec. 1961 - Visit relatives and for business reasons.
until March 1962

SECTION III

OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION: Diplomat

2. TITLE: Cultural Attache

3. SALARY (Per annum): About 450.00 Us per month or $5400 US per annum

4. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)

SECTION IV

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Not known

SECTION V

EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X				X		X	
French	X				X		X	

SECTION VI
SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Not known

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Artist

SECTION VII
MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
Not known					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

1	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) June 1 '59	2. EMPLOYER Cuban Government	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK Diplomatic	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 300 PER month	6. REASON FOR LEAVING (approx.)
2	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
3	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
4	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
5	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX

MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK ONE: SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☒ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Sur) (Last)
Née
Klara Vera Kacz Stross M ALBERU SOUTO

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 8 Dec 1949

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Mexico City, Mexico

6. DATE OF BIRTH: DOB 17 July 1926

7. PLACE OF BIRTH: POB Vienna, Austria

SEX: F CIT: ?

8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: British

9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

Wife of Sub of 201-329609

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased): Not known

Bio data

SECTION X

CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
None					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI

FATHER

1. FULL NAME: Maximino Alberu

2. YEAR OF BIRTH:

3. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cognac, France

4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: French

5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

6. OCCUPATION: Engineer

7. PRESENT RESIDENCE: Havana, Cuba

SECTION XII

MOTHER

1. FULL NAME: Josefina Souto

2. YEAR OF BIRTH:

3. PLACE OF BIRTH: La Coruna

4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Spanish

5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

6. OCCUPATION: Housewife

7. PRESENT RESIDENCE:

SECRET

[illegible] and [illegible]ification

SECTION XIII

BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Leonel Alberu Souto	X				
Alfredo Alberu Souto	X				
2 Sisters					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XIV

RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Concepcion Fernandez de Alberu (sister-in-law), employed by Cuban Government.

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

Sister - Cuban Consul in Vigo, Spain.

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV

PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Teresa Proenza Proenza - Cuban Cultural Attache

SECTION XVI

MISCELLANEOUS

Carried Cuban Diplomatic Passport #D/59/543

DATE

25 July 1962

SIGNATURE

Clyde K. SHRYOCK

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 567
25 JUL 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 FI
2
3
4 OPS SPT
5
6

JUL 26 0127Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 34586

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1535

GYROSE

REF DIR 19359 (Out, 98021)
MEXI 0946 (IN 13837)
MEXI 0444 (IN 12825)

1. LUIS ALBERU SOUTO CUBAN CULTURAL ATTACHE MEXI. BORN CIRCA 1915 OVIEDO SPAIN. FATHER: MAXIMINO ALBERU BORN COGNAC FRANCE. MOTHER: JOSEFINA SOUTO BORN LA CORUNA SPAIN. FATHER LIVING HAVA. NO FURTHER DATA MOTHER. IN 1949 MARRIED KLARA VERA KACZ STROSS BORN VIENNA AUSTRIA, BRITISH CITIZEN. DIVORCED 1956. NO CHILDREN. OCCUPATION: ARTIST. HAS BEEN EMPLOYED CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE SINCE JUNE 1959. SALARY DEC 60 INCLUDING REPRESENTATION ALLOWANCES: $292.03 "TAKE HOME" PAY. PRESENT ADDRESS: MICHELET 7 301, MEXICO, D.F. BROTHERS: ALBERTO MARRIED CONCEPCION "CONCHA" FERNANDEZ, CASTRO SECRETARY, LEONEL NOW LIVING MEXICO FORMERLY EMPLOYED BY CUBAN GOVT. HAS TWO SISTERS NOW LIVING VIGA WHERE ONE CUBAN CONSUL THAT CITY. SPEAKS SPANISH FRENCH. (SOURCES: LIKAYAK-2, LIMUD-1, LITAMIL-13 B/2).

2. STATION TRACES REVEAL AMSTOKE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-7 ALL CONSIDER ALBERU ANTI-COMMUNIST. ODIBEX (LINOZZLE)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPORT DATED 25 AUG 59 STATES COL ARTURO CORONA, G-2 MEXICAN ARMY BELIEVES ALBERU COMMUNIST AND ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS CUBAN EMB STAFF. POUCHING PRQ PART I 27 JULY 62.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADVISE STATUS ALSO TRACES FOR PCA PROCESSING.

LITAMIL-9

SECRET

201-329607

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 127398

DATE 25 JULY 1962

TO CHIEF, FI/D

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Luis ALBERU Souto C-101331

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
1915, Oviedo, Spain

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico

Residence - Michelet 7301, Mexico

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME J. Moughan
OFFICE DESIGNATOR TFW/OPS SPT
ROOM, BUILDING GE 5512
EXTENSION 76.6

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Klara Vera Kacz Stross, born Vienna, Austria, British citizen. Married 1949, Div. 56

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Father Maximino ALBERU, born Cognac, France Mother Josefina SOUTO, BORN LA CORUNA, SPAIN

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

ALL PERTINENT XXX INFORMATION

AUG 10 2 11 PM '62

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D.

FORM 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SEE CSI 10-7

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

TO: J. Moughan

10 Aug 62
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. ☒ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 25 JULY 1962

TO:
- X CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
- Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM:
J. MOUGHAN
TFW/OPS SPT
GH 5512

SUBJECT: (True name) Luis ALBERU Souto

PROJECT: JMATE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LITAMIL/9

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

[illegible]

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

FI ASSET MEXICO

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRO AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRO I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRO II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRO II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	~~127398~~	LIST ATTACHED, NO: 127398

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		PLS SEE ATTACHMENT FOR FIELD TRACES
	NOT initiated (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
H.E. MOLLOY	7606	WILLIAM K. HARVEY

FORM 1-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

PRQ PART I

Name	Luis ALBERU Souto
DPOB	1915, Oviedo, Spain
Citizenship	Cuban
Residence	Michalet 7301, Mexico
Occupation	Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico
Father	Maximino ALBERU, born Cognac, France
Mother	Josefina SOUTO, born La Coruna, Spain
Wife	Klara Vera Kaca Stross, born Vienna, Austria, British citizen. Married 1949, Divorced 1956.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

26 JULY 1962

FIELD TRACES

LUIS ALBERU SOUTO

MEXICO STATION TRACES REVEAL THAT AMSTOKE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3 AND LITAMIL-7 CONSIDER ALBERU TO BE ANTI-COMMUNIST. AN ARMY REPORT DATED 25 AUGUST 1959, STATED THAT COLONEL ARTURO CORONA, G-2 MEXICAN ARMY, BELIEVED ALBERU TO BE A COMMUNIST AND ONE OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY STAFF. THIS WAS REPORTED IN MEXI 1506, DATED 26 JULY 1962.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
CHIEF
TASK FORCE W

SECRET

201-329609

S-E-C-R-E-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER

ALBERU Souto, Luís

CUBA

Cultural Attaché, Embassy at Mexico City

Cultural Attaché Luis Alberu arrived in Mexico in October 1959, the first Cuban representative since the fall of Batista. Early in 1962 he was transferred to the United Nations section of the Foreign Ministry but returned to Mexico on 16 March 1962 because "conditions were terrible in Cuba." He is reported to be mistrusted by other members of the Embassy.

In 1953 Alberu was identified as an artist residing in Mexico. He is possibly the brother of Mariluz Alberu Souto, Consular employee in Vigo, Spain.

July 1962

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ORIG : H. E. MULLOY:jd
UNIT : TFW/FI
EXT : 6172 1623
DATE : 26 JUNE 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 58081

TO MEXI INFO WAVE CITE DIR 19359

GYROSE LITAMIL/9

RE: MEXI 0946 (IN 43954)*

1. PLS ADVISE STATUS LITAMIL/9. ALSO CABLE RESULTS LOCAL TRACES AND PRQ, PART I INFO FOR POA PROCESSING IF STATION PLANS PROCEED THIS OP.

(END OF MESSAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *LITAMIL-3 STILL IN TOUCH WITH LITAMIL-9 BUT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE ARRANGE MTG WITH CO.

C/TFW/FI
C/WH/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
CHIEF, TASK FORCE W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

C/TFW

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief, Task Force W; Chief, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/GYBCSE
Luis ALBERU Souto/Traces on Cuban Diplomat

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: See Para. 2
REFERENCE: MEXI 444, dated 2 April 1962

1. JMWAVE files contain no information on Subject not on file at Mexico Station.

2. We would appreciate being kept informed of developments in Mexico Station's proposed exploitation of Subject including receiving any target personality data on Cuban diplomats and government officials in general which may be obtained from Subject.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2-Mexico City
2-Chief, Task Force W
2-Chief, WHD

19-120-40

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
3 April 62

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 4 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-3708

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-32

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

[illegible], Luis (Conte)

201-2[illegible]587 [illegible] CSCI-3/750,116	Cultural Atta[illegible] at Cuban E[illegible] [illegible] himself only with his work. Not involved in any [illegible] sary)
HMM-[illegible] [illegible] CS-3[illegible],977	[illegible] permis[illegible] de [illegible] in [illegible] had been [illegible] fm [illegible] to know files [illegible] B-2) [illegible] files. ([illegible],
UFGA-3708 4 Apr 62 19-120-32	To COS, MexC JMWAVE files contain no info on [illegible] not on file Mex Station. Requests be kept informed of developments Mex's proposed exploitation of Subj. incl. receiving any target personality data on Cuban dips and govt officials in general which may be obtained fm Subj.
HMM-6396 CS-3/511, 215 25 June 62	Subj., Cultural Att of Cuba[illegible] reported by other sors [illegible] (AMS[illegible]-1, F-2)

GARCIA, Antonia (Lara) 201-328386

HMM-6501 13 July 62 CS-	Subj, Commercial Attache of Cuban Embassy in MexC, arr'd in Mexi 23 April 1962. Before coming to Mexi, Subj held important positions with Cuban Govt in Habana. Subj is member of Cuban G-2 but did not attend Cuban G-2 school. (LI[illegible] fm AMSTET-1) B-2) aka Nico GARCIA.

[illegible], Luis Cuba

[illegible]

[illegible] 30 Dec 61.

Subj entered office of [illegible], a high-ranking official in the Cuban Ministry of Government. [illegible] source stated that [illegible] entered immediately unannounced and [illegible] received in spite of the fact that there were some twenty persons waiting in the outer office who had arrived prior to [illegible].

Jose Antonio [illegible], Cuban Amb., outlined duties of subj. at staff meeting of Emb. Mexi. on [illegible] Apr. '62. Subj is working Cultural affairs - lectures & publications. ([illegible], 1 May '62, [illegible])

[illegible] reported on 29 Mar 62 that subj, Cuban Cultural Attache Mexi, did not return Cuba where he has been assigned to United Nations section of Foreign Office. Subj, who arrived Mexi from Cuba on [illegible] Mar said that conditions terrible in Cuba and he will remain in Mexi. ([illegible] Cuba, [illegible], 6 Apr 62)

AL[illegible]RU Souto, Luis Cuba

Subj is Cultural Attache of the Cuban Emb in Mexico, is mistrusted by other mbrs of the Emb.
(HMM-6396, 22 May 62, Source AMSTOKE-1)

ANIVERSARIOS NACIONALES DE LOS PAISES SOCIALISTAS

4 - Abril.	Hungría, Día de la Liberación (en 1945)
9 - Mayo.	Checoeslovaquia, Fiesta Nacional.
11- Julio.	Mongolia, Victoria Nacional de un Pueblo (en 1921)
22- Julio	Polonia, Día de la Liberación Nacional (en 1944)
23- Agosto.	Rumania, Día de la Liberación Nacional (en 1944)
2 - Sept.	Vietnam, Aniversario de la Independencia.
9 - Sept.	Bulgaria, Día de la Liberación (en 1944)
9 - Sept.	Corea, Día de la Fundación de la República (en 1948)
I - Oct.	China, Aniversario de la Proclamación de la República (en 1949)
7 - Oct.	R.D.A., Fiesta Nacional.
7 - Nov.	URSS, Día de la Revolución de Octubre.
29-Nov.	Yugoeslavia, Proclamación de la República (en 1945)

Celebración de Semanas de Cultura

Checoeslovaquia, celebrada el 3-9 Mayo 1965

R.D.A.	Oct. de 1965
URSS.	Nov. de 1965
Hungría.	pendiente de fecha en 1965
Bulgaria	Septiembre de 1965
Vietnam	Diciembre, con motivo cración FIN
Corea.	pendiente de condiciones(1965 ó 66)

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

Planes Culturales

PAISES SOCIALISTAS

República Popular de Albania

Proyecto de Plan para 1965-1966
Se encuentra en el MINREX pendiente de firma.

República Democrática Alemana

Plan para 1965-1966
Fue firmado en la RDA en Marzo de 1965

República Popular de Bulgaria

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en La Habana en Abril de 1964
Protocolo Adicional al Plan de 1964-1965
Fue firmado en La Habana en Marzo de 1965
El de 1966-67 hay q. firmarlo en Sofia este año-

República Democrática Popular de Corea

Proyecto de Plan para 1965-1966
Se encuentra en el el MINREX pendiente de firma.

República Socialista de Checoslovaquia

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en La Habana en Febrero de 1964
Protocolo Adicional al Plan de 1964-1965
Fue firmado en La Habana en Febrero de 1965
el de 1966-67 hay que firmarlo en Praga en octubre

República Popular China

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en La Habana en Enero de 1964
Protocolo Adicional al Plan de 1964-1965
Presentado Proyecto del CNC.
Se encuentra pendiente de aprobación por la parte China.
el de 1966-67 hay q. firmarlo en China este año

República Popular de Hungría

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en Budapest en Marzo de 1964

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

República Popular de Mongolía

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en Ulan Bator en Junio de 1964

República Popular de Polonia

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en Varsovia en Octubre de 1964

República Popular Rumana

Plan para 1965-1966
Se encuentra en el MINREX pendiente de firma

Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas

Plan para 1965
Fue firmado en Moscú en Mayo de 1965

República Democrática de Viet-Nam

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en Hanoi en Marzo de 1965
Está ejecutándose.

República Socialista Federal de Yugoslavia

No se ha hecho Plan
Existe solamente Convenio
Se han realizado algunos intercambios de artistas y exposiciones.

Compañero:

E[illegible] con el interés del joven tunecino que Vd. nos tr[illegible], el cual desea venir a Cuba a estudiar Música, le [illegible] lo siguiente:

El Plan de becas de la Escuela Nacional de Arte no considera hasta ahora, becados extranjeros que vengan de otros países para estudiar en ese Centro.

El MINED sí tiene, a través de Convenios, becados de países del campo socialista que vienen a estudiar según planes del referido Ministerio.

Como Vd. recordará hubo el caso de un grupo de estudiantes de Ghana que vinieron por el MINED a estudiar Idiomas y solicitaron además estudiar Música. Eso se resolvió manteniéndolos como becados de Educación (alojamiento, ropa, manutención y enseñanza del Idioma Español) y matriculándolos en uno de los Conservatorios de La Habana, donde asisten los días y horas en que tienen sus clases.

Esa sería la forma de tratar el asunto que Vd. nos plantea, asegurando ustedes en primer lugar con el MINED que ellos lo absorberán como becado; aunque en este caso no se puede resolver por Convenio ya que el interesado no procede de un país del campo socialista.

Revolucionariamente,

Dra. Carmen Pérez Poncet,
Jefe del Dpto. Nacional de
Enseñanzas Especiales.-

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA: __________

DE: 1 Dr. Corona
A: __________
ASUNTO

([illegible] redacción)

en su trabajo

Estimado compañero:

Con el fin de estimular a la "Agrupación de Intelectuales Españoles Amigos de Cuba", sugerimos que por parte de Uds, se les envíe una comunicación, en ese sentido, a nombre del compñaero Ricardo Martínez.

Al mismo tiempo recordamos, que dicha comunicación. nos la envíen a nosotros (no directamente), para hacerla llegar a su destino a través de la Embajada; así como el materiàlque como parte del convenio se les remita, libros, discos, etc.

Fraternal y revolucionariamente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.

X copias a UNEAC a Fayad Jamis,
X Casa de las Américas. — Gutiérrez
X ICAIC, Tomás G. Alea,
Univesidad de la Habana Dept. de Filosofía, Jesús Díaz.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 15 de Junio de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Co. Aurelio Martínez,
Director del I.C.R.
Edificio Radio Centro.
Vedado. [illegible] 23 M:258

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de acompañar a esta comunicación, copia de una carta y un ejemplar impreso titulado "Rose d'Or de Montreux, 1966".

Dicha carta y el ejemplar de referencia, me han sido remitidos por el Embajador de Suiza con motivo del [illegible] concurso internacional (el 7mo. de la serie), que tendrá lugar en Montreux, Suiza, del 21 al 29 de Abril del próximo año, y en el que por primera vez serán presentadas en el mismo emisiones de televisión a colores.

Le ruego que cualquier decisión que tome en relación a dicho concurso, nos lo comunique.

Con gracias anticipadas, aprovecho esta oportunidad para quedar de Ud. con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

Fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona
Director.-

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

(es copia)

La Habana, 21 de Mayo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimada compañera:

Tengo el gusto de trasladar a Ud. una copia traducida, de carta dirigida a nuestro Agregado Cultural en Londres, por el Sr. Bernard G. Mullins de aquella ciudad.

En dicha carta el Sr. Mullins, que representa la firma "Hutchinsons Publishing", se interesa y pide información sobre la posibilidad de publicar obras de poesía y ficción latino-americanas, traducidas al inglés.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud.

Fraternalmente,

Luis Alberú,
Resp. de Protocolo

EXO: una copia de carta del
Sr. Bernard G. Mullins,
de Londres, Inglaterra.

La Comp. Marcia Leiseca,
Casa de las Américas.
G y Tercera, Vedado.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

INTERPRETES

ICAP 32-3521
32-5588 Espinosa , quien designó a Jorge León de países socialistas, y este a su vez a Nelson Fleites, guía e intérprete de ruso. Hotel Habana Libre ICAP Tel 30-5011

ANA YAVTUJOVITCH, tel. vecino 80-9003

solicité su servicio a Mercy Martínez, MINREX 30-5031

El C.N.C., tiene un plan de becas en el exterior cada año.

El Dept. de Enseñanzas Especiales (Pérez Ponset) [illegible] 2.86.67 recibe las necesidades de becas de C.N.C. las cuales se pasan al JUCEPLAN y allí se aprueban o se modifican.

C.N.C., no tiene planes para recibir becados extranjeros tiene que ser a través del Ministerio de Educación, que sí las recibe (Dr. Eduardo Lara, Relaciones ~~Exteriores~~ Externas Educación, atiende las peticiones

para las becas del Ministerio de Educación , MINREX sirve como intermediario a través de las misiones diplomáticas.

Túnez, desde el punto de vista político ~~peee~~ escasa importancia para Cuba.

[illegible] 15 días

consejo nacional de cultura

H. del [illegible]

SOFIA SUCANIENA
HOTEL HABANA LIBRE
HAB. 2119

Waldemar Rostanes [illegible]
7-8410 Vizcaino EXT
[illegible]

No. 1.- Organizar 3 conferencias (2 en fábricas y 1 en la Universidad). Tema de las Conferencias: Panorama Cultural Soviético.

9 No. 2.- Visita al Museo Hemingway. Fernando Campoamor

6 No. 3.- Recorrido por la Ciudad. ---

No. 4.- Visita al Museo Napoleónico.← 791460 791412 791347

[illegible] a Domingo [illegible] 7-49-01 act. 12 7-81-25

12 No. 5.- Visita al Museo Nacional ← 61-39-15

día 10 Camilo Cienfuegos
No. 6.- Visita a una fábrica de tabaco. Waldemar Rostanes CTC

8 No. 7.- Visita a una granja cerca de la Habana. CNC

No. 8.- Visita a la Unión de Periodistas. [illegible]

(14) No. 9.- Visita a la UNEAC. Juan Blanco

2.17 No. 10- Visita a la Academia de Ciencias. [illegible] y a la [illegible]

(16) No. 11- Visita a la Universidad de la Habana. Vizcaino [illegible]
[illegible] H. del Arte. [illegible]

(17) No. 12- Visita a [illegible]erca.

795 NOTA: Le interesa el teatro y el cine. Yelin [illegible]
(18) Experimentales [illegible]
(19) [illegible]

[illegible]

Compañero Dr. Corona:

En relación a los $100.00 que en fecha [illegible] de Diciembre Ud. me entregó para atenciones a los compañeros mexicanos Carlos [illegible] y Sra., y Alejandro Jodorouski; tengo el gusto de adjuntarle comprobantes que justifican el empleo de dicha cantidad.

OMPAÑEROS:

Las Organizaciones de Masa del Consejo Nacional de Cultura, en saludo al VI Aniversario de la Federación de Mujeres Cubanas, presentarán a la cantante norteamericana BARBARA DANE el próximo viernes 19 a las 4:30 pm.

La Sra. Dane que se encuentra en Cuba invitada por nuestro organismo viaja acompañada del folklorista y editor —— IRWIN SILBER. Ambos han burlado las leyes del Dpto. de Estado norteamericano que prohibe a los ciudadanos de ese país - viajar a Cuba. Han llegado con la idea de conocer por ellos mismos nuestra Revolución.

Es compromisos de todos nosotros como revolucionarios - recibir dignamente a estos ciudadanos norteamericanos representantes de la más valiosa clase artística de su país.

Al finalizar la presentación se ofrecerá un brindis a invitados y empleados.

ORGANIZACIONES REVOLUCIONARIAS.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

Eexcelentísimo Embajador de los E.U. Mexicanos, Sres. Miembros del Cuerpo Diplomático

Sras y Sres.

Es para mi un honor que en ocasión como esta, represente al Consejo Nacional de Cultura en que se inaugura la exposición "Caleidoscopio Fotográfico" del artista mexicano Nacho López.

Creo sinceramente, que el gran artista Nacho López, no necesita presentación, su arte es muy conocido en Cuba a través de revistas internacionales y periódicos que con frecuencia reproducen su trabajo artísitico; además no es la primera vez que tengamos el gusto de tenerlo entre nosotros así como a otors tantos mexicanos ilustres que nos ham visitado desde el triunfo de la Revolución.

Aquí en esta sala encontraremos un exponente gráfico de lo que tan acertadamente nos dice en su introspectiva el artista que nos ocupa.

"El placer en sí - más no la diversión - de producir imágenes que despierten ideas y emociones en el espectador, pretendo hacerlo concientede que el mundo no son cuatro paredes, trabajo y familia; sino que hay otras formas bellas y horribles, otros rostros que tambien viven, respiran y mueren, en busca de las mismas necesidades eternas: trabajo, vestido, comida y dignidad.

La exposición que nos disponemos a admirar estrecha aún más los lazos que nos une con el gran país hermano México, y no quisiera dejar de destacar en esta oportunidad, la satisfacción que nos produce cooperar con la Embajada de México que ha hecho posible la exposición que se ofrece conjuntamante con la Sociedad Cubano-Mexicana de Relaciones Culturales y el Consejo Nacional de Cultura (Delegación Provincial)

Muchas gracias,

Luis Alberú,
Responsable de Protocolo.


RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES
DR. CORONA
MANUEL VEGA
MANUEL E. VEGA
DR. ELPIDIO HERNANDEZ
ALBERY
DEPARTAMENTO DE ASUNTOS JURIDICOS
WALDO AGÜERO
OFICINA DE LA PRESIDENCIA
LOLITA — MARILU
PROYECTOS Y CONSTRUCCIONES
AZCUE
JOSE LUIS POSADA
MARTA GONZALEZ
Miguel Alfonso
do → ROLANDO MASVIDAL
ción única
SECTORIAL DE ACTIVIDADES
NELIO CONTRERAS
Dpto. Control Plan de Actividades
ODILIO URFE
CÉSAR ~~SENTENA~~
Dirección Nacional de MUSICA
MARTA ARJONA
Dirección Nacional de ARTES PLASTICAS
JOAQUIN MIRABAL
Dirección Nacional de TEATRO Y DANZA
NILO OTERO
SECTORIAL DE SERVICIOS
Registro de la Propiedad Intelectual
M. T. FREYRE DE ANDRADE
Dirección Nacional de BIBLIOTECAS
GLORIA PEREZ
Dirección Nacional de DIVULGACION Y PUBLICACIONES
ABELARDO MORENO
Dirección Nacional de ZOOLOGICOS Y ACUARIOS
REDENTO MOREJON
SECTORIAL DE ECONOMIA
MANUEL TERAN
JORGE AMARO
Dirección Nacional de COORDINACION Y DESARROLLO ECONOMICO
Empresa Grabaciones y Ediciones Musicales
Dirección Nacional de SERVICIOS GENERALES
Empresa de Suministro
MARIO MARTINEZ
DELEGACIONES PROVINCIALES
MIGUEL ANGEL BOTALIN — ORIENTE
GIORDANO RODRIGUEZ — CAMAGÜEY
EVELIO FERNANDEZ — LAS VILLAS
ANAIS CALLADO — HABANA
RAMON MARAGOTO — PINAR DEL RÍO
JOSE ALEMAN — MATANZAS

4MM

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST	*NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

TO : RID/201 Section

DATE [illegible]

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

FROM: [illegible]

ROOM NO. [illegible]

PHONE [illegible]

HECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

. 201 NO. [illegible]

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

. NAME *(Last)* [illegible] *(First)* [illegible] *(Middle)*

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME	*(Last)*	*(First)*	*(Middle)*	VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA

. DATE OF BIRTH: M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH [illegible]

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible]

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

. AFFILIATION CODE B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

53 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION *(Clear text)*

19. ORG/GROUP CODE

. OCCUPATION/POSITION *(Clear text)*

CUBAN CULTU[illegible] [illegible]

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION [illegible]

. ACTION DESK [illegible]

23. CODE 019

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

. CRYPTONYM [illegible]

27. PSEUDONYM

. COMMENTS

. SIGNATURE

30. IDN-

201- [illegible]

831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(30)



1 Julio Alvarez Ojeda o Carlos Perez Quint.
2 Carlos Perez Quintero - Julio Alvarez Ojeda
3 Juan Albere Soto
4 Antonio Ramirez Jimenez

Fotos de la Comision Cubana en Mexico

Source ? received in envelope from up for filing 8 may 75

201-0329609





SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

ALBERU SOUTO, Luis

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED 30 July 62

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 101331.

LITAMIL-9

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-329669

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT ALBERU Souto, Luis	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT
OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 101331

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-329609

867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/C [illegible] THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201 [illegible]

ALBERU-Souto, Luis

201-529609

WH/1/M

THERE IS A RESTR[illegible] CI/O[illegible] FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201 [illegible]

FORM 11-54 44C OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

LITAMIL-9

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 52 96 09

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

HMMA-34623
10 May 1968
19-120-13/1

201-328691

E. PBRUMEN Official Involved in State-Run Tourist Activities: At Headquarters' request, the station contacted LITAMIL-9 to obtain information on Subject on a trip to Canada (see MEXICO CITY-4955). LITAMIL-9, who had previously reported that he thought Subject might be willing to cooperate with LNHARP if properly approached, refused to make any effort to contact him. The Station suggested that the cooperation of Subject's ex-wife, now residing in the JMWAVE area, be enlisted and that she visit him in Canada with their child.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

SSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 1/2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

INFO
FILE WH/COG 8, EUR 8, SB 8,
CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT

S E C R E T 261630Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4925

PRIORITY JMWAVE, OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

REFS A. DIRECTOR [illegible] 85742

26 Mar 68 IN 78317

B. OTTAWA 5308 (IN 76477)

1. UNABLE LOCATE MACIQUES. NPA FLIGHT REF B FULL BUT MACIQUES NOT ON PASSENGER OR STANDBY LIST. OTHER MONTREAL FLIGHT AERONAVES FLIGHT 442 MAR 26 DOES NOT SHOW MACIQUES. STATION CONTINUING ATTEMPT LOCATE MACIQUES AND WILL ADVISE. WAS NOT ON CUBANA MANIFEST 22 MARCH, OR 25 MARCH.

2. LITAMIL-9 CONTACTED LATE EVENING 25 MAR BUT COULD NOT ADD TO PREVIOUS ASSESSMENT BECAUSE HAS NOT SEEN MACIQUES. EVEN IF KNEW WHERE MACIQUES STAYING WOULD NOT GO SEE HIM BECAUSE AS REPORTED IN MEXI 2751 LITAMIL-9 DOES NOT WANT BECOME INVOLVED IN OPS.

3. OTTAWA: PLEASE ADVISE IF MACIQUES TURNS UP MONTREAL SO STATION CAN STOP LOOKING FOR HIM. ACCORDING OTTA 4331 SEP 67 MACIQUES LIVED 6630 SHERBROOKE ST WEST, APT 2001, MONTREAL.

S E C R E T

BT

WNH file:
LITAMIL-9
201-329609
WK

SECRET

WK

ORIG: Will, Korbe/sas
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 25 March 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 25 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 6, EUR 7, CI, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CPS 3

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 35742

TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY JMWAVE INFO: OTTAWA

TYPIC

REFS: A. OTTAWA-5308 (IN 76477)*

B. JMWAVE 6305 (IN 30599), 28 MARCH ~~KK~~ 67 **

C. DIRECTOR 85178. 20 MARCH 67 ***

1. REQUEST MEXICO CITY TRY DETERMINE WHERE MACIQUES STAYING PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE REF A AND NOTIFY JMWAVE. ALSO PLEASE PROVIDE SUITABLE PRETEXT TO COVER EX WIFE'S CALL TO PROTECT SMABOVE SOURCE. LITAMIL-9 REPORTED IN REF C THAT MACIQUES WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING COOPERATE WITH LNHARP IF APPROACHED. CAN LITAMIL-9 OBTAIN CURRENT ASSESSMENT PER MEXI 2751.

2. FOR JMWAVE: UPON RECEIPT PARA 1 INFO IF MACIQUES EX WIFE STILL RESIDING HIALEAH FLORIDA PER REF B SUGGEST SHE BE CONTACTED AND DETERIME IF SHE ABLE TELEPHONE MACIQUES MEXICO CITY ASKING HE MEET WITH HER~~M~~ THERE ON HIS RETURN FROM MONTREAL.

END OF MESSAGE

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY__________ PER__________ #__________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO__________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE , VR .

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica)
(reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85742

TO

PAGE TWO

WH COMMENT: *Abraham MACIQUES Maciques departing Mexico City 26 March for Montreal
**Amots identified MACIQUES ex wife as Ellen Louise Macique.
***LITAMIL-9 ~~being~~ believes MACIQUES willing cooperate if contacted.
**** LITAMIL-9 willing provide assessment of MACIQUES if latter returns/Cuba.

C/WH/COG/OPS Mr. Rothwell (in draft)

C/E/BC/C Mr. Howley (by phone)

CI/OPS Mr. Tansing (by phone)

5
4
3
2
1

WILLIAM B. BROE
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
C OA for LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

Reference: HMMA-33865, 19 January 1968

This is to notify the Station that LITAMIL-9 was granted a full Operational Approval on 7 February 1968 for limited use as an informant in Mexico.

Laura J. UPSTINE

Distribution

2-COS/Mexico City

CS COPY

201-329609
FEB 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-16115

DATE
12 February 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609

ORIGINATING

OFFICE
WH/1

TYPIST

EXT.
4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

AN PO
WH/1
ABSTRACT
INDEX

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH/1	12 Feb 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
MFG. 1-66

(40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

No. 201-329009

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1

ATTN: W. Kerbe

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of LITAMIL/9 ____________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated 6 February 1968.

Limited to use as an informant in Mexico.

W 2/7/68

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 7 February 1968 aal

FORM 1-67 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(8)

6 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. Lally

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-9
201-329609

Attached are two copies of a PRQ Part I on Subject and a copy of the PRQ Part II. An Operational Approval is requested.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

Attachments:

PRQ I - 2 cys
PRQ II- 1 cy

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 26 January 1968 aaa

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1/M

ATTENTION : Jane F. Zerance

201 329609
C

The file on LITAMIL/9 is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

Edward P. Brown

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

FORM 6-65 691a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(9)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM 1P

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/OA for LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 1.

Reference : HMMW-15933, 16 November 1967

1. Forwarded as Attachment One, herewith, is a PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9. Forwarded as Attachment Two, under separate cover, is the Part I of the same PRQ. As previously reported, Station meets very infrequently with LITAMIL-9, who is very busy, spends most of his time outside Mexico City, and is largely out of touch with PBRUMEN and LIRING. He has, for example, only visited LIRING twice in the last six months. Contacts which LITAMIL-9 made during a recent trip to Europe with PBRUMEN officials stationed in that area were unproductive. Since occasional contact is still desired, however, it is requested that a new OA be processed on LITAMIL-9 to cover his use as outlined in the Part II of the PRQ.

2. Traces were rerun on Subject through LNPURE and the Station, and no derogatory information was turned up except for that mentioned in HMMW-11988, which cannot be resolved any further than the Station's comments in MEXICO CITY-3497 of 19 February 1963.

MICROFILMED
FEB 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Raymond A. Tracy
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
1. PRQ Part II (h/w)
2. PRQ Part I (u/s/c) 31 Jan 68

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 3 copies Att #1; 4 copies Att #2)

2AN

CS COPY

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 33865

DATE
19 January 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609

58

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA".
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-33865

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) Luis (Middle) (Last) ABREU Souto (Nee)

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: NA

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.): NA

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

NA

5. DATE OF BIRTH: Circa 1915

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Oviedo, Spain

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

No known immoderate vices

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

Not known

MICROFILMED
FEB 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX ☒ M ☐ F	b. AGE 53	c. APPARENT AGE 53	d. HEIGHT FT. 6 IN. --	e. WEIGHT 170	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape) Round
h. COLOR OF HAIR Black	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH		k. BUILD	l. POSTURE	

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Has pock marks on face

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

See Att #2 HMMA 33865 w/ att

201 - 33[illegible]

SECTION II

CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*
Spanish

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*
Mexico

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*
Cuba - December 1961-March 1962 (To visit relatives and for business reasons)
Cuba - March 1965-late 1966 (To work)

SECTION III

OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION

17. TITLE

18. SALARY *(Per annum)*

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V

EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	x		x		x		x	
French	x				x		x	
English					x			

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Not known

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Artist

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	[illegible]		UNIT	RANK	[illegible]*
	FROM	TO			

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1 June 59-Mar 65	b. EMPLOYER Cuban Government	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK Diplomatic	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Returned Cuba PCS
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) Mar 65-late 1966	b. EMPLOYER Cub Nat. Cultural Council	c. ADDRESS Havana, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK Cultural	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Return to Mexico
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) Late 1966-	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS Mexico
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☒ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) Klara (Middle) Vera (Nee) NEE X Kacz Stross (Last) [illegible]

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 8 Dec 1949

35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Mexico City

KLARA Vera X ABREU SoTo

36. DATE OF BIRTH: DPOB 17 July 1926

37. PLACE OF BIRTH: Vienna, Austria

SEX F

38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: British

39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS: [illegible] of 20-344607

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased): Not known

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
None					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME: Maximino Alberu

42. YEAR OF BIRTH:

43. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cognac, France

44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: France

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

46. OCCUPATION: Engineer

47. PRESENT RESIDENCE: Havana, Cuba

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME: Josefina SOUTO

49. YEAR OF BIRTH:

50. PLACE OF BIRTH: La Coruna

51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Spanish

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

53. OCCUPATION: Housewife

54. PRESENT RESIDENCE:

SECTION XIII

BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
201-773321 Leonel ALBERU Souto	x				
201- 3328[illegible] Alfredo ALBERU Souto	x				
2 sisters					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV

RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Concepcion Fernandez de Alberu (sister-in-law), employed by Cuban Government

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

One sister-Cuban Consul to Vigo, Spain, in 1962

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV

PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI

MISCELLANEOUS

DATE

SIGNATURE

201-329609

5P

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.
HMMA-33865

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM
LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I

CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Clyde K. SHRYOCK, the first Case Officer, was introduced to Subject on 18 July 1962 by LITAMIL-3.

MICROFILMED
FEB 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subject also speaks good French and poor English.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knew Clyde K. SHRYOCK by true name. The next Case Officer, Lawrence F. BARKER, took over in June 1963. Subject was turned over to his present Case Officer, Raymond A. FRADYER, following his return from PBRUMEN in the fall of 196~~8~~.
7

FORM 7-55 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

ATT #1 HMMA 33865

CS COPY

SECRET

(4-20)

201-339609

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the West. He is anti-Communist and anti-AMTHUG.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control, explain.)*

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and his Case Officer meet as acquaintances.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as a former member of LIRING, still has contacts in the PBRUMEN community in Mexico.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

With a WOLADY intelligence service.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE
Leonel ALBERU
Jose CARRAL Escalante
LITAMIL-3 probably suspects LITAMIL-9 is still engaged in intelligence activities.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning, intelligent, and has an aptitude for the work.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime if it should come to power.

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subject has been an active asset of the Mexico City Station since 1962. First he provided information on LIRING; after his return to Mexico in late 1966 as a private citizen he still provided some info on LIRING personnel and on the PBRUMEN community in Mexico.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

From members of LIRING and the PBRUMEN community. Also from old friends and acquaintances living in Mexico or PBRUMEN.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject knows that his information goes to ZRMETAL.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's current use is to pass on any information which comes to his attention which he thinks may be of interest. He is occasionally debriefed for any info he can provide on PBRUMENERS or their contacts the Station thinks he may know or have known. There is no current active direction of his activities, and his usefulness is at present close to marginal.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is no longer paid any salary. He must be considered an operational contact. In addition to his three case officers, he has known Andrew S. PARMERS and Edward D. KNAPMAN under assumed names.

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is an artist.

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject is not paid a salary.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

No commitments or promises have been made to Subject.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station and LMPURE files. No derogatory information.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

POA was granted .

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

8 May 1967

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. He is sincere, reliable, intelligent, and very security conscious.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with ODYOKE is known to Jose CARRAL Escalante and Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE per MEXICO CITY 3450; they are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. He is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECTION XIII **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is basically European, but because of his Cuban accent he would probably be recognized as Cuban.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Parts I and II was obtained through research, files, agents, and direct questioning.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

No problems are envisaged when Subject may be terminated.

SECTION XV **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W; WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject could be contacted by phone (his number is in the Mexico City phone book) using the name of one of the WOFIRM officers he has been in contact with as bona fides.

SECTION XVI **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

DATE

SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

201-329609

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Submission of PRQ Parts I and II

Reference: HMMW 15832

The Provisional Operational Approval for Subject expired on 8 November 1967. Please submit PRQ Parts I and II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, the POA will be automatically cancelled.

Helen B. NOTHDURFT

Distribution:
2 - COS/Mexico City

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO

RI
CHRONO

~~23 [illegible]~~	
~~[illegible]~~	C/WH/1
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15933

DATE
16 November 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Gloria dePerignat	jab	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH/1	16 Nov 67	W. J. Kaufman, C/WH/1

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-64

DISPATCH

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: [illegible] November 1967 Bpk

TO: WH/1/M Jane P. Zerance

C NO. 201- 329609

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I		
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
		☒	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired on 8 November 1967. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

FORM 9-65 889a

SECRET

(20)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Expiration of POA for LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Submission of PRQ Parts I and II

Reference : HMMW-15481, 1[illegible] May 1967

The Provisional Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9 will expire 8 November 1967. In order that Headquarters may request an Operational Approval, it is requested that the Station please prepare and submit PRQ Parts I and II on him.

Laura J. UTHFINE

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW - 1583[illegible]

DATE
19 OCT 1967
11 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609

RI
Chrono

ORIGINATING
OFFICE WH/1
OFFICER
TYPIST
EXT. 4267

COORDINATING
OFFICE SYMBOL
DATE
OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL C/WH/1
DATE
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE W. J. Kaufman

PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 32/21

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, [illegible]

S E C R E T 290020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2961 LANGDON ACTING
MADRID PARIS INFO DIRECTOR JMWAVE BRUSSELS THE HAGUE
PBRUMEN

29 SEP 67 IN 61985

FYI MEXICO STATION CONTACT LITAMIL-9 (IDEN) SCHEDULED LEAVE MEXICO 25 SEPT ON VACATION TRIP MADRID, BARCELONA, PARIS AND POSSIBLY THE HAGUE AND BRUSSELS. LITAMIL-9 WILL DEFINITELY CALL ON CUBAN OFFICIAL REPS MADRID, BARCELONA AND PARIS. CLOSE FRIEND OF HIS IN PARIS IS ALEJO CARPENTIER BELMONT. LITAMIL-9 WILL REPORT ANY INFO ELICITED FROM OFFICIALS HE CALLS ON.

PLANS RETURN LATE OCT.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

WH/1 File
201-329609
K.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ~~[illegible]~~

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☒ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 41/53

ACTION WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR8, WH/COG8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2

SECRET 290020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2962 LANDDON ACTING

MADRID PARIS INFO DIRECTOR JMWAVE BRUSSELS THE HAGUE

PERUMEN

29 SEP 67 IN 61974

REF MEXICO CITY 2961 (IN61965)

IDENTITY: LUIS ALBERU SOUTO.

SECRET

SECRET

WH/ File
201-329609

LITAMIL-7

SECRET

28 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : Traces on Luis ALBERU-Souto
201-329609

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum dated 15 June 196

1. Per your referenced request, the FBI documents were located and reviewed with the following results:

a. The first document dealt with a Luis SOTO who was appointed Commercial Attache of the Dominican Embassy, Madrid. This is not our Subject.

b. All documents referenced Luis ALBERU-Souto's assignment as Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico City, his residences, telephone numbers, and his relationships with the Spanish Communist group in Mexico.

c. The next three items deal with a Luis SOTO, a member of the PPS of Mexico. This is not our Subject.

2. Subject was a Cuban defector in place, and his activities per paragraph 1.b are well known to this Agency. These activities were considered to be in line with his assignment and are not presently considered to offer a threat to operational security.

3. PRQ Parts I and II will be forwarded your Office upon receipt from the Station.

J. H. V. Fisher
Acting Chief, WH/1

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - CI/OA
① - 201-329609
LITAMIL-9

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
15 June 1967 jab

TO:
WH/1/M - Jane F. Zerance

C NO.
201 - 329609

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT:
ALBERU-Souto, Luis

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review the listed FBI documents. Then, please forward your findings to CI/OA relative to the operational security of using the Subject.

To obtain these reports, contact Miss Dolores Brown, RID/Files, Extension 4127.

Sent Liz 27 JUN 1967

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

ALBERU (SOUTO), Luis
#279 089

5 June 1967

On 2 June 1967, the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were searched in the name of Luis (SOUTO) ALBERU, born in 1925 at Oviedo, Spain, and revealed the following information:

1 — Refer to data regarding Dominican Situation which was sent your Agency on 5-–-66, page 1. NOT MY SUBJ.

2 Refer to data regarding Foreign Political Matters-Cuba which was sent your Agency on 12-19-61, page 4; 5-28-62, page 2; and 12-15-60, page 1. APMT W/ CUB EMB M. C.

3 Refer to data regarding Student Strike, School of Economy, University of Guadalajara, Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, November 14/18, 1966, which was sent your Agency on 12-5-66, page 4. NOT MY SUBJ.

4 Refer to data regarding Partido Popular Socialista (Popular Socialist Party) State of Nayarit which was sent your Agency on 11-29-65, page 2. NOT MY SUBJ

5 Refer to data regarding Instituto De Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso (Mexican-Russian Institute of Cultural Exchange), Guadalajara, Jalisco, which was sent your Agency on 6-22-66, page 32; 10-13-63, page 5; and 3-15-63, page 3. NOT MY SUBJ

JRG/akm

DBF-97388 19 Dec 61
cultural att. Cub Emb
MC - adviser

DBA-11277, 25 May 62. Cultural
att. Cuban Emb M.C. Contact
with Spanish Commie Group
in Mexico

SECRET

[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LITAMIL-9 POA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Submission of PRQ Parts I and II on Subject.

LITAMIL-9 was granted a Provisional Operational Approval on 8 May 1967 for contact only when specific needs for information arise and the possibility exists that he has or could obtain information on Cuban activities or personalities. It is requested that you please prepare and submit to Headquarters copies of PRQ Parts I and II in order that we may request a full Operational Approval.

[illegible]

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-329609

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15481

DATE
18 MAY [illegible]
15 May [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS FILE NUMBER
201-329609

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT
INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/1
OFFICER: J. Zerancen
TYPIST: sas
EXT. 4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
RETAINED		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WH/1
DATE: 5/15
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/1/M - J. F. Zerance

NUMBER
201 - 329609

SUBJECT
ALBERU-SOTO, Luis

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
5 April 1967
18 April 1967 cy

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

As requested in paragraph # 3 of your memorandum of 5 April 1967.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward F.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	8 May 1967

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

Embajada de Cuba: 112847.-
21 abril 67.-
M 18, L 11 .-
0940 - 1310.-

001. Entradas sin contestación.- 014.-

014. Entrada 0940.-MF búlgara explica a Alina que su esposo - Angel Kosowski es el Agregado Cultural de Bulgaria en La Habana, que hoy regresan a Cuba, pero como han tenido informes de que necesitan la visa de entrada, eso les parece extraño, pues existe un convenio Cuba-Bulgaria de régimen sin visa. Alina: que llame al 250795 y pregunte por Cepeda ó Miraval.-042. ---

042. Salida al 357900.-0958.-Alina pregunta por su esposo Copero y MF informa que fué al aeropuerto a esperar el vuelo.64.

064. Entrada sin contestación.- 071.-

071. Salida al 141326.-Alina al no encontrar a Sicar, pide a-- Pedro que si lo vé, le diga que llamó. Pedro: bien.- 078. --

085. Salidas al 251899.-1037.-HD con HF para decirle que son- $ 76.25 y no $ 65.25. HF: que lo pague y luego él le dará.107.

107. Entrada 1041.-MF con Alina quien pide se espere un momentico. MF acepta y luego cuelga.- 114.-

114. Entrada 1121.-José Noria pregunta si llegó algo para él- y Alina dice que nó.- 125.-

UTAMIL-9

WH/1 FILE 201-324669

125. Entrada 1124.-HF pregunta si llegó el permiso para la -- señora María Cerafina Naranjo Méndez y Alina dice que nó.143.

7007

Embajada de Cuba: 250795.-

21 abril 67.-

N 13. L 19 .-

0945 - 1336.-

002. Entrada 0945.- La esposa de Angel Kosowski, Agregado Cultural de Bulgaria en La Habana, explica que hoy regresan a - Cuba, pero fueron informados que necesitan pasar por la embajada para recoger las visas y quisieran saber si es necesario, pues su esposo dice que entre Cuba y Bulgaria hay un régimen- sin visas. Copoda: que pueden viajar sin visas y no es necesario que pasen a la embajada. MF: perfecto.- 015.-

015. Entrada sin contestación.- 020.-

020. Salida al 198647.-1006.-Chelo Esperón al no encontrar a- Mery y Tere, pide a Emilia les diga que no es seguro que vaya hoy porque tiene que salir con Conchita Peraza. MFacepta.048.

048. Salidas sin contestación y ocupado.- 058.-

058. Entrada 1019.- El Lic.y Profesor Ramón Ramirez Gómez,de- la Universidad, con Chelo quien dice que el Embajador no ha - llegado, que tan pronto esté le recordará y lo llamará.-064.-

File WH/1

066. Salidas al 196648 a las 1022 y 1025.-Chelo y Conchita -- platican sobre diversos temas familiares.- 098.-

201-329609

098. Salidas ocupado y sin contestación.- 127.-

LITAMIL-9

127. Salida al 198647.-Chelo pide a Emilia le diga a la señora Chelo que sí irá a comer con ellos y Emilia acepta.-133.--

0587

Embajada de Cuba: 250795.-
19 abril 67.-
M 13. L 13 .-
0845 - 1244.-

LIENVOY
50-6-75/4
HMMA 31487
22May67

001. Salida 0845 (Volkswagen de México) Abreu al no encontrar a Pondermeden, queda de volver a llamar.- 010.-

010. Salida al 145789.-0852.-Abreu con Enrique, quien cuelga. 017.

024. Salidas ocupado y sin contestación de afuera y de adentro.

062. Salida al 145789.-Abreu después de enterarse de que Enri que ya va a salir, pide a MF le diga a Escartín que tiene que llevar a los compañeros al aeropuerto y MF acepta.- 068.-

068. Entrada 0906.-Unos búlgaros que viven en La Habana preguntan por su amigo Luis Alberú y HD pide llame al 141326. MF acepta y pide salude al Embajador de parte de Vega. HD: bien. 85.

LITAMIL-9

085. Salidas ocupado y aparato muerto ?.- 102.-

102. Entrada.-María Pérez explica que tiene 7 años de vivir - aquí y su pasaporte ya está vencido, pero desea ir a Miami, - quisiera saber qué trámites tiene que hacer porque no tiene - ningún papel y HD le sugiere pase al Consulado y MF acepta. 121.

121. Entrada sin contestación de afuera y salidas sin contestac

FILE WH/1 201-329609

152. Salida 1020 (Naciones Unidas) El Embajador con Moscarola para decirle que han recibido juegos para la Conferencia de - Caracas y los recibió inmediatamente, pero como el organismo- que está trabajando intensamente quisiera saber si podría --

0089

Embajada de Cuba: 141326.-
19 abril 67.-
H 30. L 31 .-
0814- 1410..-

002. Salida al 145789.-0814.-Pedro pregunta a HF qué pasa con Abreu que no ha llegado y HF acepta y dice que es un descarado.

021. Salida al 422194.-0841.-Pedro pide le manden un saco de papás y HF queda de enviárselo.- 029.-

029. Salida al 670665.-0846.-Pedro hace pedido de comestibles a nombre de Elio y HF queda de enviárselos mañana.- 080.-

083. Salida al 175300.-0854.-Pedro haciéndose pasar por Jorrin pide comestibles para Elio y HF acepta.- 111.-

111. Salida al 466164.-0856.-Guillermo Salgado y Ernesto Ferrer se comunican a la Cubana de Aviación y confirman su pasaje de México a Kingston; posteriormente pide a HF lo deje pendiente porque ellos ya lo tienen y HF acepta.- 132.-

132. Entrada 0909.-La señora de Angel Kosowski, Agregado Cultural de la Embajada de Bulgaria en La Habana, al no encontrar a su amigo Luis Alberú, del Consejo Nacional de Cultural y quien se encuentra aqui trabajando, pide a HD le diga que están alojados en el Hotel Regente, habitación 207 y que los llame al 404699. HD:que lo localizará y le dará su recado.

176. Entrada.-Dolores de la Mora solicita hablar con Cepeda, pero como tarda en contestar, cuelga.- 213.-

213. Entrada 0930.- HF de la....... pregunta la dirección de la embajada porque tienen que ir a recoger una firma.Pedro la dá

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 18 April 1967

TO:
- xxx CI OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Jane Zerance
WH/1/Mexico 3 B 4406
x 4167

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis Xxxxxx ALEXRU-Souto

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-329609

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

XX	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
XX	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Subject would be contacted only when specific needs for information arise and the possibility exists that he has or could obtain information--on Cuban activities or personalities.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		x
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		x
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	x	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		x

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? XX YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	XX	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	XX	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: # 174318

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	XX	DEROGATORY xxxxxxCI/OA IS IN possession

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	XX	DEROGATORY xxxxxxxCI/OA is in possession

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	XXX	DEROGATORY xxxxxx CI/OA is in possession
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER Jane Z. Zerance	EXTENSION 4167	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SUBJECT: Luis
[illegible] ALBERU-Souto

DPOB: 1915 in Oviedo, Spain

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban
Presently Cuban exile residing in Mexico City

OCCUPATION: professional artist
diplomat

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:
HEIGHT: 6 feet tall
WEIGHT 170 to 175 plus
HAIR black

[illegible] [illegible]
1949 in Mexico City. They were divorced in 1956. She was born on 17 July 1926 in Vienna, Austria.

PARENTS: FATHER: Maximo ALBERU born 1889 in Cognac, France.
Cuban citizen, engineer, residing Cuba.

MOTHER: Josefina SOUTO, born La Coruna, Spain.

(Father and Mother are divorced and she is presently residing in Madrid, Spain.)

BROTHERS: Leonel born 1917 and Alfredo

SISTERS: Xenia born circa 1928 and Mariluz born circa 1929.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 171315

DATE 18 Apr 67

TO [redacted]

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME Jane F. Zerance
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/1/Mexico
ROOM, BUILDING 3 B 4406
EXTENSION 4167/68

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☒ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Luis ~~[illegible]~~ ALBERU-Souto 201-339119

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
1915 in Oviedo, Spain

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Cuban exile in Mexico City

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
professional artist
diplomat

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Subject was previously Cultural Attache ------	Mexico City	
who returned to Cuba in March 1965 and worked for the Cuban National Cultural Council until --	Cuba	
his return to Mexico in October 1966 as a Cuban exile. He will assist his brother in running a plant which extracts oils from coffee beans in Mexico. He is also a stockholder in this venture.		

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
6 feet	170-175 plus		black		

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME) Married Klara Vera KACZ-Stros-de ALBERU-Souto in Dec 49 in MexCity. They were divorced in 1956. No children. She was born on 17 July 1926 in Vienna, Austria.

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF NAMED ... FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES FATHER: Maximo ALBERU born 1889 in Cognac, France. Cuban cit, engineer, residing Cuba. MOTHER: Josefina SOUTO, born La Coruna, Spain. They are divorced and she is living in Madrid. BROS: Leonel, born 1917 and Alfredo. SISTERS: Xenia born circa 1928 and Mariluz born circa 1929.

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

SEE PREVIOUS GREENLIST 127398 dated 26 July 1962.

APR 21 1967

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

TO: Jane Zerance

3 May 67
DATE

FROM: FI/D [redacted]

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

*EXCEPT

D. XXXX FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

*Previous green list ~~TFW~~/OpsSpt, 26 July 1962, Dossier.

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

5 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
201-329609

1. LITAMIL-9 returned to Mexico from Cuba in October 1966. On 8 November he was contacted and debriefed by Mexico City Station. Throughout the month of November he debated the question of whether or not he should return to Cuba. In the first week of December 1966, he decided to remain in Mexico.

2. Since it was believed that LITAMIL-9 would have little access to LIRING or to persons of interest in Mexico, he was terminated and the balance of his escrow account was paid to him on 9 December 1966. However, it has since become apparent that from time to time it would be valuable to WOFACT to contact LITAMIL-9 for information on PBRUMEN personalities. He is acquainted with a large number of persons who themselves are of interest to WOFACT or who could supply information on third persons on whom information is needed.

3. Therefore, provisional operational approval and subsequent operational approval for such occasional contact with LITAMIL-9 is requested. It is not planned to pay him a salary or formalize an agent relationship. LITAMIL-9 would only be contacted when specific needs for information arise and the possibility exists that he has or could obtain the information.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

SECRET

4 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OPS/Hughes

SUBJECT : LIRAVINE Project Renewal

1. Reference is made to your Staff Review (Form 826) of the LIRAVINE Project Renewal Request. In response to your requests, attached are one copy of the report on the 3-6 June 1966 debriefing of Morris Z. UXFELT and one copy of the results of his 7 June 1966 [illegible]. Copies of these reports are being forwarded to CI/OA with a request for clearance for UXPELET's current use in Mexico.

2. A request for operational approval for LITAMIL-9 was submitted on 16 December 1965, but was not granted because of derogatory information which could not be resolved. However, LITAMIL-9's location and use have changed since that time and a new request for operational approval for his current use will be submitted.

3. A request for operational approval was submitted for LIRING-3 on 27 May 1966. Approval was not granted and he is being handled as a double-agent.

4. LIRING-4 is not recruited or used in any operational capacity and no operational relationship is contemplated.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/1/Chrono
1 - LIRAVINE file

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION
XXX
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief WH Division

INFO.
Chief, WH/COG and Chief of Station, JMWAVE

[illegible]

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LITAMIL-9 and the Latin American Writers Congress in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

1. Forwarded attached is a memorandum covering a succession of meetings held with LITAMIL-9 in connection with the Latin American Writers Congress in Mexico and it's Cuban delegation.

201-344217

2. In addition to the meetings mentioned in the attached memorandum, the Case Officer, Raymond A. FRADYER, also met L-9 on 28 March. He knew from LIENVOY that Ambassador Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas was having a reception that night at the Cuban Embassy in honor of Alejo CARPENTIER Belmont. He also knew that CARPENTIER had agreed to meet L-9 earlier that day. FRADYER therefore assumed that L-9 had probably been invited to the Embassy affair. FRADYER had spent some time at his last meeting with L-9 briefing the latter on elicitation techniques and how he felt L-9 would safely bring up the subjects of the Vietnam war and French-Cuban relations, two topics on which CARPENTIER could provide interesting information. FRADYER was disappointed when L-9 told him that he had left his house that morning at 7A.M. and had been at his brother's plant in Toluca the entire day. L-9 added that he would have to spend the next day in Toluca and thus would be unable to talk to CARPENTIER before the latter left.

CONTINUED . . .

Attachment:
MFR HEREWITH

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att
1 - C/WH/COG w/o att
1 - COS/JMWAVE w/att
6 - FILES

MICROFILMED
APR 10 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-31703	31 March 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET/KAPOK	50-300-8

GROUP 1
[illegible]

3. FRADYER is very much aware of Headquarters interest in L-9. Although he plans to meet L-9 regularly, he doubts (as previously mentioned to Clyde K. SHRYOCK when the latter recently visited Mexico) that L-9 will live up to Headquarters expectations. ~~As mentioned by L-9 himself:~~

A. He is acting as the general manager of the coffee grounds to edible oil plant in Toluca in which he and his brother own shares. Not only is this a new firm, but the raw material and process used to make the oil are somewhat of a novelty. The plant is deeply in the red (L-9 has yet to receive a salary and commutes to Toluca by bus) and requires close and time consuming attention. With the best of will, it is and will be difficult for L-9 to get away whenever he is needed by this Station.

B. As pointed out by L-9 himself, L-9 has now been in Mexico for some six months and has succeeded in obtaining from Gobernacion his reinstatement as a resident alien. It must be increasingly evident to the Cubans (despite L-9's request for extended leave from his job in Cuba) that the latter will probably not go back to Cuba. In other words, the Cubans probably view him more and more as an exile.

C. Because he spends most of his time away from Mexico City and because his Cuban friends are becoming more reserved with him, L-9 has less and less contacts with visiting Cubans. In fact, only one, the Subject of Mexico City 0783, has phoned him when visiting Mexico since L-9's return to this country. L-9, who senses that he is now an exile in the eyes of many of his friends in Cuba, is even reluctant to write to them. He feels, for example, that little would be accomplished by writing to Esebio *AZCUE Lopez, as the latter would probably not leave Cuba because of his young wife and child, even though he is fed-up with the Castro regime. On the contrary, L-9 feels that he might not be doing AZCUE any favor by writing to him as the latter who is not known for being an enthusiastic supporter of the regime may be under some observation from the Cuban authorities.

4. Information obtained by L-9 from CARPENTIER, Lizandro *OTERO and Nicolas *GUILLEN indicates

A. Together with information from other sources that the Cubans probably prearranged to take over the Congress of Latin American Writers with the help of the other Communists and use it for political purposes.

B. That Cintio *VITIER is obviously not trusted by the Castro regime and may be in trouble.

C. That the Cubans are making a major effort, in line with their pro-French policy to show themselves in Paris under the best light possible.

D. That CARPENTIER obviously enjoys the confidence of the regime. His trip to Hanoi had certainly nothing to do with cultural affairs. It is regretted that L-9 did not elicit further information from CARPENTIER on his visit to North Vietnam.

CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET/KAPOK	HMMA-31703

5. L-9 did not come in contact with Roberto FERNANDEZ Retamar. LICRAFT-1 who knows FERNANDEZ was unfortunately on vacation at the time of the Writers Congress.

Raymond A. [illegible]
for Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET/KAPOK

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

SECRET

28 March 1967

MICROFILMED
APR 1? 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9P

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-9 and the Latin American Writer's Congress in Mexico

1. The undersigned reviewed the list of delegates attending the Latin American Writer's Congress with L-9 on 19 March 1967. The latter indicated he knew all the members of the Cuban delegation - Alejo CARPENTIER Balmont, Roberto FERNANDEZ Retamar, Lizandro OTERO, Nicolas GUILLEN and Pablo NEREDA, a Chilean writer whom he first met some 25 years ago and saw again about 1962. L-9 stressed he did not know the Cuban delegates to the point of calling anyone of them a personal friend as his dealings with them had been confined to professional contacts when he worked for the National Cultural Council. He had never been invited to their homes or invited them to his. The delegate he felt most at ease with was Alejo CARPENTIER with whom he felt he had more in common than with the others. CARPENTIER who has a French father and white Russian mother lived many years in France and spent some time in South America. L-9 considered him to be an intellectual of definite "bourgeois" background and tastes. Not only is CARPENTIER well known

att #1 to HMMA-31703 CS COPY 201-329609

for his novels (L-9 recalled that his name had once been mentioned in connection with the Nobel Prize for literature) and his journalistic writing (L-9 still remembered some of the articles regularly written by him in Paris for the "El Mundo" daily in the pre Castro era), but he is also an established music critic and a connaisseur of modern painting, all in all a talented and most impressive man now in his sixties.

2. L-9 had on many occasions offered to help WOFACT in any way possible. The undersigned pointed out that he now had a unique opportunity to do this with the Writer's Congress. WOFACT was interested in assessing the Cuban representatives at this Congress to determine their possible vulnerability to recruitment. It was also interested in hearing from the Cuban delegates what they thought of the Congress and it's accomplishments since it was apparent that the great majority of it's members were Communist sympathizers and would probably use the Congress for political purposes. Any information on the situation in Cuba and on Cuban Government organizations, particularly on the incorporation of the National Cultural Council into the Ministry of Education would be appreciated. It would also be interesting to know why Cintio VITIER who was scheduled to come to the Congress did not show up. L-9 said he was willing to help but was extremely busy with his brother's edible oil business in Toluca. It would be

difficult for him to find time to talk with the Cuban delegates, he felt in addition, that it would be difficult for him to simply walk in on the delegates if he could not be invited, officially, to the Congress or to a social affair connected with it. Finally, L-9 pointed out that he had now been in Mexico for nearly six months, that "everyone" knew that he had no intention of returning to Cuba and that, for these reasons, the Cuban delegates to the Congress might not be anxious to talk to him. After a long "pep" talk by the undersigned and some discussion it was decided that L-9 would call the next morning on Ambassador Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas who had just returned from Cuba. L-9 would pay his respects and find out if the Embassy planned some social function at which he could openly meet the Cuban delegates (he felt he might wrangle an invitation to such an affair either directly from the Ambassador or from Heberto JORRIN, the ex-Embassy portero whom he has known for years). It was further decided that L-9 would concentrate on CARPENTIER with whom he felt he had the best rapport and who was in his view the delegate with the most "bourgeois" background.

3. At a meeting held on 21 March L-9 related that he had seen Ambassador HERNANDEZ earlier that morning (the delegates to the Writer's Congress which had been held for the last few days in Guadalajara were scheduled to return the next day). He had found the Ambassador nervous and pre-occupied. The latter told him almost mechanically that

everything in Cuba (political and economic situation, sugar harvest, etc) was fine. He informed L-9 that he did not have the opportunity to see L-9's sister-in-law and that he had given a letter, which L-9 had asked him to deliver to her for passage to the National Cultural Council, to Marta GONZALEZ of the International Relations Bureau of the Council. L-9, in this letter, asked that his three month leave from the Cultural Council be greatly extended. The Ambassador said he ignored what reaction the Cultural people had to his letter. He explained that the Cultural Council is now part of a Bureau headed by Lisandro OTERO in the Ministry of Education. (LISANDRO IS V-P OF CNC - how would he head a Bureau over the CNC?) ? ? Carlos LECHUGA Hevia, the previous head of the council has been reassigned to the Tri-Continental conference as a member of the Secretariat of that organization. He was replaced as the heau of the council by fnu MUZIO, ex rector of the University of Oriente. The Ambassador insisted that, in spite of this, the National Cultural Council still kept some degree of autonomy. He was rather evasive when L-9 mentioned his desire to call on the Cuban delegates to the Writer's Congress. He said that he did not think that a party would be held at the Embassy for the delegates and did not offer to put L-9 in contact with the people he wanted to see. Since he did not seem to have gotten anywhere with the Ambassador, the undersigned asked L-9 to call the next morning on the Congress delegates at the Del Prado Hotel where they were staying. ~~The next morning~~ L-9 seemed reluctant at first, but finally agreed to do this if he did not have any more luck in contacting the Cuban delegates some other way. L-9 proposed to visit the Embassy the next day and talk to JORRIN about the Congress. The Latter might be able to place him in contact with the Cuban visitors.

4. The undersigned met L-9 again on 22 March. L-9 stated that he had visited the Cuban Embassy early that day but had to wait for JORRIN who was out for about 20 minutes. The latter was ~~too~~ so busy after his return that L-9 had only a few minutes of conversation with him. JORRIN confirmed that the Embassy would not have a party for the Congress delegates "because of the Semana Santa," and said he did not know exactly when the delegates would drop in the Embassy following their return from Guadalajara. Upon leaving JORRIN, L-9 went to the Del Prado where he was told that the Congress delegates would only return to Mexico late that day. A few blocks from the hotel L-9 ran into Nicolas GUILLEN who greeted him by saying "here is L-9 in his ambiente Mexicano." The two men walked together back to the Del Prado. GUILLEN turned down L-9's invitation for a cup of coffee saying he had to visit someone. He did mention that the Congress, as far as he was concerned, was "una basura" and told L-9 that he had flown from Guadalajara

to Mexico City (he did not say why) ahead of the other Cuban delegates who were returning by road later that day. GUILLEN told L-9 that he would be in the same neighborhood early next day and would be glad to have coffee with him if L-9 could meet him then. Anyway, he added, he would be staying in Mexico for another two weeks at the request of the Ambassador. They could see each other again later on before he left. As they were about to cross a busy street shortly before parting, L-9 took GUILLEN by the arm in a friendly gesture. The latter pulled away and L-9 had the feeling that GUILLEN did not want to let L-9 be friendly with him.

5. The next meeting with L-9 was held on 24 March. L-9 said that he had not been able to call on the Cubans at the Del Prado until earlier that day. He had run into Licandro OTERO while in the lobby. The latter told him he was about to leave. When L-9 said "already?" OTERO pointed out that he had been in Mexico for two weeks already. L-9 repeated the derogatory remarks made about the Congress by GUILLEN. OTERO said that, on the contrary, this had been a successful meeting. A letter of protest had been sent to President Johnson and the Congress had taken a firm position against the "Imperialists." After relating the above, L-9 recalled that a rumor circulated in Havana, shortly before his departure from Cuba, to the effect that

Marcia LEISECA, OTERO's wife (a woman of about 34 who worked at the Casa de las Americas) was about to divorce OTERO to marry Osmani CIENFUEGOS. L-9 added that Marcia had relatives in Mexico whom she visited in 1962 and 1965. After leaving OTERO, L-9 phoned CARPENTIER and was told by the latter to meet him the next day.

6. L-9 and CARPENTIER met for breakfast on 24 March. When L-9 asked him for news about the National Cultural Council, CARPENTIER said that L-9 knew certainly more about that then he did as he had been in France since last November. CARPENTIER claimed that he had been called in by DORTICOS last October and told that Baudilio CASTILLANOS, the current Cuban Ambassador in Paris, had requested his nomination to the Paris Embassy as Minister Concellor. CARPENTIER said he tried to get out of this two year assignment which he found too long, but was told by DORTICOS that there was no way out of it. The Cuban Government, said DORTICOS, was out to make it's representation in Paris "an absolutely first class Embassy". DORTICOS added that CARPENTIER would not be so busy in Paris that he would not find time to write. Whether he found time to write CARPENTIER did not say. What he did say was that the Ambassador, who was doing a very good job, did an enormous amount of work and usually worked late at night. He also mentioned that while in Paris or shortly before arriving there he had gone to Hanoi

on an official mission. CARPENTIER gave no details other than to say that that horrible war was probably going to last, and that U.S. planes had flown right over his head during his stay. L-9 did not press him for more information but gathered that CARPENTIER remained in North Vietnam two or three weeks.

7. L-9 asked why VITIER had not attended the Congress. CARPENTIER replied that VITIER was "in a special situation in Cuba" as he was not in accord with the revolution. He had been given the opportunity to go to Spain for the Cuban Government but had refused to go. VITIER undoubtedly knew, from the background of the delegates, that the Writer's Congress in Mexico would be a leftist affair. CARPENTIER guessed that he probably declined to come because of this. Talking about himself, CARPENTIER said (without further details) that he would be going to Moscow in May. He announced that a film based on his novel "Los Pasos Perdidos" would be made this year, probably half in France and half in Cuba (negotiations with the French are still going on). Finally, he mentioned that he was trying to convince the Cuban Government to create a centralized publishing department and that as Director of the Cuban National printing office, before leaving Cuba, he had succeeded in getting some 70 million books printed. He mentioned, incidentally,

that his publisher in Mexico is Arnaldo ORFILA, ex director of the Mexico City Fondo del Cultura Economica whom CARPENTIER said he was on his way to see to collect royalties. CARPENTIER said he would leave Mexico on 29 March via SABENA and agreed to get together with L-9 on 27 March.

1 Oct 66 - 31 March 67

B. LITAMIL-9. LITAMIL-9, who some years ago worked at LIRING, has now been back from PBRUMEN for about six months and has been reinstated by the Mexican authorities as a resident alien in Mexico. Although LITAMIL-9 has no intention to go back to PBRUMEN, he has done his best to keep the PBRUMEN door open. He has for example requested that his leave from his job in PBRUMEN (originally for three months) be extended to allow him to attend to [illegible] business in Mexico. The fact is that with each week that goes by LITAMIL-9 looks more and more like an exile in the eyes of the LIRING staff. Of the people who served with him at the

CLASSIFICATION PAGE NO.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-31777, 10 apr 67

PBRUMEN Embassy the Ambassador, the ex portero and one of the employees from the Commercial Section are left. Although LITAMIL-9 can still visit the Embassy and talk with the Ambassador, it is clear that his rapport with the LIRING staff will be more and more reserved.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~FROM~~ BY 25/

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH8, FI/INT2, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 212327Z CITE JMWAVE 6198 (INGHURST ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

24Mar67 26902

TYPIC MHAPRON

REF: DIRECTOR 65178

1. STATION FILES CONTAIN FOLL TRACE ABRAHAM (MACIQUEZ) MACIQUEZ IN ADDITION INFO CITED REF: BORN CA 1936 MARRIED U.S. CITIZEN BUT SEPARATED (WHEREABOUTS OF WIFE UNKNOWN). RESPONSIBLE TO CASTRO FOR MANAGEMENT ALL TOURIST FACILITIES IN CIENEGA DE ZAPATA. LOYAL TO CASTRO. (REPORT DATED 1961 FROM WH/CUBA/CE CARD.)

2. SUBJ MENTIONED JULY 66 AMOT STUDY ON STRUCTURE OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT AS FOLLOWS: ITIT OFFICIAL; FROM RANKS OF 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT; FOLLOWER OF FIDEL CASTRO. AMOTS QUERIED FOR UP-TO-DATE TRACES SUBJ; WILL FORWARD ANY ADDL PERTINENT INFO.

3. STATION UNABLE IDENTIFY SUBJS EX-WIFE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CB

C716

Embajada de Cuba: 141326.-

22 feb. 67 .-

M 30. L 31 .-

1502 - 2110.-

002. Entrada 1502.- Alború después de enterarse de que Jorrin no está, pregunta dónde podría localizar a Ismael Paz y Pedro pide lo llame al Hotel Agnes al 255290.- 015.-

018. Entrada 1553.-Bordes pregunta por Jorrin y Arturo informa que no está.- 027.-

027. Entrada 1558.-Electa pregunta por Mercedes y HD indica que no está.- 039.-

039. Salidas sin contestación y preguntando la hora.- 044.-

044. Entrada.-Marcela pregunta por Abreu. Pedro:no está.48.

048. Entrada.-Acevedo,de Prensa Latina, pregunta por Jorrin y Pedro dice que no está.- 054.-

054. Salidas sin contestación y proguntando la hora.- 061.-

064. Salida al 348020.-1723.-HD pide la ext.48 y queda de llamar a su amor Aurea a las 6½ a su casa y ésta acepta.079.

081. Salida al 112662.-1726.-Wilfredo Vasalle pregunta por Wuenceslao Roses y su esposa,y HP informa que no están.087.-

087. Salida ocupado.- 090.-

L.TAMIL-9

090. Salida al 182753.-1740.-HD pregunta por el Ing.Cuenca y HP dice que no ha llegado.- 102.-

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

[redacted]

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : R. HARRINGTON:aic
UNIT : WH/COG/FI/OD
EXT : 5061
DATE : 17 FEB 1967

☐ FILE RID
☒ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-120-50

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG 8 INFO: VR . FILE ☒ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 17 1908 Z CITE DIRECTOR 76150

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LITAMIL/9

1. REQUEST QUERY LITAMIL/9 RE STATUS EUSEBIO AZCUE LOPEZ. PER LITAMIL/9 REPORT OF AUG 66 AZCUE REMOVED FROM RESPONSIBLE POSITION PBRUMEN/EXPO STAFF; CONSEQUENTLY, AZCUE BITTER AND REPORTEDLY PLANNED DEPART PBRUMEN CIRCA DEC 66 OSTENSIBLY FOR MEDICAL OPERATION MEXICO CITY.

2. HQS EXTREMELY INTERESTED PBRUMEN PARTICIPATION EXPO 67. [redacted] FEEL CERTAIN AZCUE, IF AVAILABLE, WOULD PROVE BE GOOD SOURCE FOR INFO [redacted] CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

END OF MESSAGE

File LITAMIL-9 201

Jacob D. Esterline
JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 094- file AT. 3rd DEC By WH/CCG
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 47 PER ______ #

ACTION WH#6

INFO

☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

TOTAL COPIES 094

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

UNIT	TIME	BY

FILE, VR, C/WH/CCG 5

ACTION CHANGE

MEXICO CITY 9483 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 52268 A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : WH/CCG (DIVISION)

TO : WH (DIVISION)

BY : MR BELT (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : MR STEWART (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

L-9 [illegible] Jim

LITAMIL-9
201-329609

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
DISSEM BY 22

ACTION
WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/04, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2,

S E C R E T 072222Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9533

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

7 DEC 54862

TYPIC LITAMIL

REF: DIRECTOR 55121 *

1. LITAMIL-9 SAW ANTONIO CARRILO ONLY ONCE AT HAVA RECEPTION. L-9'S TWO SISTERS IN SPAIN LIVED IN MADRID IN APT ABOVE CARRILLO'S SOME YEARS AGO BUT TOLD L-9 VERY LITTLE ABOUT HIM OTHER THAN HE QUOTE NICE PERSON UNQUOTE. L-9 KNEW NOTHING OF CARRILLO'S RECENT OUSTER UNTIL TOLD BY STATION.

2. L-9 FEELS SOME HIS COMMENTS ABOUT CARRILLO MAY HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED BY WOFACT. DID NOT SAY CARRILLO WAS ONE OF FIDEL'S MOST TRUSTED COLLEAGUES, BUT QUOTED HIS SISTER IN LAW TO SAY THAT SINCE HE NOT A PARTY MAN CARRILLO MUST BE PERSONALLY TRUSTED BY FIDEL TO BE APPOINTED VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THIS IN L-9'S OPINION IS OPINION WHICH WAS SHARED BY NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN CUBA. VICE MINISTER APPT WAS GENERALLY KNOWN IN HAVA FUNCTIONARY CIRCLES SOME THREE MONTHS BEFORE BECAME OFFICIAL. IN L-9'S OPINION REAL POWER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY IS OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WHO IS PARTY MAN.

S E C R E T

BT * REQ INFO ON CARRILLO OUSTER.

SECRET

INDEX ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-329609
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

76

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
DISSEM BY 22
ACTION
WH/COG 8
☒ RID COPY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT TIME BY
INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PEG CA/14 CI, CI/OPS CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2,

MEXI

S E C R E T 272223Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9538

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE
UFG

TYPIC LITAMIL

REF: DIRECTOR 55121 *

MICROFILMED
JAN 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN 34
PS 55
ABSTRACT X
WH/C/ES
INDEX X
54082

18

1. LITAMIL-9 SAW ANTONIO CARRILLO ONLY ONCE AT HAVA RECEPTION. L-9'S TWO SISTERS IN SPAIN LIVED IN MADRID IN APT ABOVE CARRILLO'S SOME YEARS AGO BUT TOLD L-9 VERY LITTLE ABOUT HIM OTHER THAN HE QUOTE NICE PERSON UNQUOTE. L-9 KNEW NOTHING OF CARRILLO'S RECENT OUSTER UNTIL TOLD BY STATION.

2. L-9 FEELS SOME HIS COMMENTS ABOUT CARRILLO MAY HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED BY WOFACT. DID NOT SAY CARRILLO WAS ONE OF FIDEL'S MOST TRUSTED COLLEAGUES, BUT QUOTED HIS SISTER IN LAW TO SAY THAT SINCE HE NOT A PARTY MAN CARRILLO MUST BE PERSONALLY TRUSTED BY FIDEL TO BE APPOINTED VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THIS IN L-9'S OPINION IS OPINION WHICH WAS SHARED BY NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN CUBA. VICE MINISTER APPT WAS GENERALLY KNOWN IN HAVA FUNCTIONARY CIRCLES SOME THREE MONTHS BEFORE BECAME OFFICIAL. IN L-9'S OPINION REAL POWER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY IS OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WHO IS PARTY MAN.

S E C R E T

BT *REF INFO ON CARRILLO OUSTER.

SECRET

LITAMIL 9

201-329609
7 Dec 1966

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted]

DISSEM BY 2
ACTION

DC/WH/COG 5
INFO

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

FILE VR, C/WH 6, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 040400Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9483

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LITAMIL-9

4 DEC 65 IN 52268

1. AFTER MUCH SOUL SEARCHING AND LENGTHY TALKS WITH HIS BROTHER AND FRIENDS, LITAMIL-9 HAS DECIDED NOT RETURN CUBA.

A. L-9 FEELS HAS VERY LITTLE TIME LEFT TO PROVIDE FOR OLD AGE. HE MOST INTERESTED IN ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN GROWING EDIBLE OIL FROM COFFEE GROUNDS BUSINESS ESTABLISHED IN MEXICO BY BROTHER AND FRIENDS IN WHICH OWNS 8 PER CENT OF STOCK. HAS GOOD CHANCE BECOME MANAGER OF OIL FIRM IF REMAINS MEXICO.

B. L-9 BELIEVES HAS NO GUARANTEE HE COULD RETURN MEXICO IF WENT TO CUBA. JOB IN CUBA DOES NOT PROVIDE POSSIBILITY TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY.

C. LIFE IN CUBA AND RESULTING MENTAL STRAIN HAVE NOT ALLOWED L-9, A PROFESSIONAL ARTIST, TO DEVELOP HIS TALENT.

D. L-9 VERY MUCH AWARE HE GOING NOWHERE CAREER-WISE IN CUBAN CULTURAL MINISTRY. ALSO REALIZES HE PROVIDED WOFACT LITTLE INFO OF TYPE (MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC) IT REALLY INTERESTED IN.

SECRE

2. CONSIDERABLE TIME HAS BEEN SPENT BY STATION REVIEWING WITH L-9 HIS ACCESS TO INFO AND POSSIBILITY INCREASE HIS PRODUCTIVITY TO MAKE HIS RETURN TO CUBA WORTH WHILE.

A. ALTHOUGH L-9 LIVES IN CUBA WITH BROTHER AND BROTHER'S WIFE WHO WOULD LOGICALLY SEEM HAVE ACCESS TO SOME INTERESTING INFO, BOTH ARE VERY RESERVED IN WHAT THEY TELL HIM. ALTHOUGH L-9 BELIEVES HIS BROTHER IS BAS/CALLY ANTI COMMUNIST, LATTER HAS NEVER MADE ANY REAL ANTI REGIME COMMENT OR DISCLOSED ANY SENSITIVE INFO TO HIM. BROTHER AND SISTER-IN-LAW SELDOM DISCUSS THEIR CONTACTS IN MINISTRIES AND GENERALLY LIMIT SELVES TO NON CONTROVERSIAL TOPICS.

B. L-9 LIVED VERY LONELY AND SHELTERED LIFE IN CUBA AND HAD NO REAL FRIENDS. FEW GOOD SOCIAL CONTACTS HE HAD IN COMMIE EMBASSIES REFRAINED FROM DISCUSSING ANYTHING SENSITIVE WITH HIM. L-9 COMMENTED THAT "ALTHOUGH I CAREFULLY NEVER SAY ANYTHING AGAINST REGIME EVERYONE KNOWS I AM A BOURGEOIS INTELLECTUAL AND NOT A SYMPATHIZER."

C. L-9 SEES NO HOPE FOR HIM TO TRANSFER TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXTERNAL TRADE OR OTHER TARGET MINISTRY. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE CUBAN GVT WOULD SEND HIM WITH EMBASSY ABROAD TO FILL POST

SECRET

SIMILAR TO THAT HE OCCUPIED IN MEXICO.

3. L-9 RECENTLY APPROACHED LOCAL CUBAN AMBASSADOR AND ASKED HIM TO CONTACT HIS SUPERIOR IN CULTURAL MINISTRY IN HAVANA TO OBTAIN ONE YEAR EXTENSION HIS LEAVE WITHOUT PAY IN ORDER ATTEND TO PERSONAL BUSINESS IN MEXICO. AMBASSADOR DID NOT SAY WHETHER WOULD COMPLY WITH REQUEST POINTING OUT THAT YEAR FROM NOW L-9 WOULD PROBABLY AGAIN FACE SAME PROBLEM. L-9 NOW INTENDS PHONE SISTER-IN-LAW AND ASK HER INTERVENE HIS FAVOR. WILL APPLY IN EARLY DEC AT GOBERNACION FOR PAPERS ALLOWING HIM REGAIN AT END SIX YEARS MEXICAN RESIDENT STATUS WHICH LOST AFTER STAY IN CUBA.

4. ALTHOUGH HE DOING UTMOST STAY IN GOOD RELATIONS WITH CUBAN GVT AND EMBASSY IN MEXICO DOUBT L-9 WILL BE OF MUCH HELP IF, AS HE INTENDS, HE REMAINS MEXICO. L-9 CURRENTLY SPENDS VERY LITTLE TIME AT EMBASSY AND IN OWN WORDS ONLY KNOWS AMBASSADOR [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~. DESPITE STATION URGING, HE HAS BEEN OF LITTLE HELP PROVIDING DETAILS ON LOCATION AND DUTIES OF EMBASSY STAFFERS NEEDED BY STATION IN CONNECTION WITH LISAMPAN.

5. L-9 VERY APOLOGETIC HIS DECISION, HOPES WILL NOT BE MISINTERPRETED BY WOFACT HQS. IN VIEW PARA 2 ABOVE, HOWEVER,

SECRET

FEEL LITTLE WOULD BE GAINED BY FORCING HIM GO BACK CUBA. L-9'S INTEL POTENTIAL NOT WORTH HARDSHIPS HE WOULD HAVE TO SUFFER AND RISK HE WOULD HAVE TAKE NOT BE ABLE LEAVE CUBA AGAIN.

6. OIL EXTRACTING FIRM, L-9 AND HIS BROTHER INTERESTED IN, CURRENTLY INCREASING ITS CAPITAL. L-9 WOULD LIKE TO INVEST WHATEVER IS LEFT IN WOFACT ESCROW ACCOUNT REQUEST HQS ADVISE AMOUNT AND AUTHORIZE PAYMENT THIS AMOUNT TO HIM. PLS ADVISE

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Managua

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: TYPIC/LIRESORT/LITAMIL/Transmittal of Publication and Two Boxes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith for Chief of Station, Managua are two boxes, one from LITAMIL-9 and the other from LIRESORT-1. Also attached is a copy of the Honduran "Diario del Norte". LITAMIL-9 felt that the article on the back page concerning a new distillery recently installed in Honduras by his brother may be of interest to Chief of Station, Managua.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Publication & 2 boxes HEREWITH

Distribution:
2 - COS/Managua w/att
1 - C/WHD w/o att
3 - FILES

LITAMIL-9
201-

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-30753

DATE
2 December 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-322753

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/EUR4, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 012200Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9456

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, OSLO

RYBAT TYPIC AMADAGE

1 DEC 66 50769

REFS: A DIRECTR 54631

B. JMWAVE [illegible] (IN47847)

1. WITH HIS USUAL INTUITIVENESS LITAMIL-9 CONVINCED AMADAGE-1 NOT PRO CASTRO BUT CAN ONLY PROVIDE FOLLOWING TO BACK UP HIS CONVICTION:

A. A-1 IS WELL EDUCATED INTELLECTUAL (HE ATTENDED THE SORBONNE) OF BOURGEOIS ORIGIN WHO LOST PROPERTY AFTER CASTRO TAKE OVER AND DEFINITELY NOT REVOLUTIONARY TYPE.

B. A-1 AND WIFE APPEARED VERY ANXIOUS LEAVE CUBA AND GO NORWAY.

2. L-9 STATES A-1 FAR TOO INTELLIGENT AND DISCREET TO MAKE ANTI REGIME STATEMENTS EVEN TO CLOSE FRIENDS. L-9 HEARD FROM HIS SISTER IN LAW WHO USUALLY WELL INFORMED THAT A-1 GOING BACK TO CUBA IN DEC 66 TO STAY. L-9 DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER A-1 ASKED TO RETURN OR IS BEING RECALLED. HAS NO IDEA WHETHER A-1, IF RECALLED, WOULD DEFECT RATHER THAN GO BACK.

3. L-9 COULD NOT PROVIDE NAMES OF A-1 RELATIVES OR

SECRET

FRIENDS IN WEST WHO COULD BE USED FOR RECRUIMENT APPROACH.
L-9 FELT THAT IN A-1'S CASE RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT USING WOFACT
STAFFER WOULD PROBABLY PROVIDE BEST RESULTS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dissem By [illegible]

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 010828Z CITE OSLO 5459

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, MEXICO CITY 1 DEC [illegible] 49926

TYPIC MHAPRON AMADAGE SALUTE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 54681

B. JMWAVE 4321 (40749)

SALUTE 14 ADVISED MAGAVERO 30 NOV THAT AMADAGE-1 DID SUFFER SERIOUS HEART ATTACK EARLY IN OCTOBER. HE HAS NOW BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL, IS RECUPERATING AT HOME, IS NOT WORKING AT OFFICE, AND MAY BE SLIGHTLY PARALYZED IN ONE LEG AS IS WALKING WITH CANE.

S E C R E T

SECRET 1 of Rybat

BT

Jam

LITAMIL-9

201

Slw

TOTAL COPIES: 27

ORIG: . BELT:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 30 NOV 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-329609

SECRET

X ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY / PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG-8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WH/8, FI, FI/INT-2

CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CA-2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICK)

SECRET 1 15 18Z CITE DIRECTOR 56121

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

TYPIC

201

ABSTRACT

1. PLS SOLICIT OPINION LITAMIL/9 ON REASONS UNDERLYING OUSTER ANTONIO CARRILLO AS VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ON BASIS REMARKS BY MEMBERS OF CUBAN HEIRARCHY LITAMIL/9 REGARDED CARRILLO AS ONE OF FIDEL CASTRO'S MOST TRUSTED COLLEAGUES.

2. REQUEST LITAMIL/9 FOLLOW UP THIS MATTER INCLUDING REACTIONS LIRING PERSONNEL.

END OF MESSAGE

201-329609
30 Nov, 1966

C/WH/COG/FI
C/WH/COG/MO for
WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

1-1

08

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: O TYPIC/OPERATIONAL Receipt from LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded, under separate cover, is a receipt for 6500 pesos, which Clyde K. SHRYOCK received from LITAMIL-9 on 9 November 1966.

Clyde K. SHRYOCK

201-329609

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico

Attachment: usc

28 NOV 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-15037

DATE: 23 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-329609

Distribution:
1 - WH/1
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - WH/C/FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/COG/FI Thomas Hazlett pfd EXT. 2625

COORDINATING

WH/1 25 Nov 66

ED

RELEASING

C/WHD 6/5/6 William V. Broe

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-329609
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
DISSEM BY 22

ACTION
WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH7, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S E C R E T 212225Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9324

MEXI

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, FRANKFURT, BONN, BERLIN, PARIS, MADRID

TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR [illegible]

21 Nov 66 IN 43820

LITAMIL-9 HAS NEVER MET RAMON CASTRO, KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT POSSIBILITY HE MAY TRAVEL OUTSIDE BLOCK. L-9 HEARD RUMOR IN CUBAN OFFICIAL CIRCLES THAT QUOTE RAMON IS NOT WITH REVOLUTION UNQUOTE BUT COULD NOT ATTRIBUTE RUMOR TO ANYONE SPECIFIC OR ELABORATE. L-9 GUESSED THAT RAMON MAY HAVE BECOME DISSATISFIED WHEN LOST PERSONEL PROPERTY AFTER FIDEL TOOK POWER.

S E C R E T

BT REQ COMMENTS RAMON CASTRO.

SECRET

201-329609
21 Nov. 1966

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 9

ORIG : MARVIN FRANCIS
UNIT : WH/COG/FI/TC
EXT : 2625
DATE : 22 NOV 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-327902

SECRET

[redacted]

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY 4/52 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG 5 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/L, C/EUR 4, C/CI, C/FI 2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 25 16 54 Z CITE DIRECTOR 54681

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE, OSLO

RYBAT TYPIC MHAPRON SAWELL SYPINGPONG

1. LITAMIL/9 IS CLOSE FRIEND OF AMADAGE/1 (IDENTITY FOR MEXICO CITY ONLY). REQUEST, THEREFORE, OBTAIN COMPLETE LITAMIL/9 ASSESSMENT OF AMADAGE/1 INCLUDING IDENTIFICATION FRIENDS OR RELATIVES IN WEST WHO COULD BE USED FOR RECRUITMENT APPROACH. FYI ONLY: SENSITIVE RELIABLE OSLO STATION SOURCE INDICATES AMADAGE/1 CONVINCED WILL BE REASSIGNED PBRUMEN LATE 66 OR EARLY 67. ALSO INDEVOUT/3 WHO HIGH LEVEL SOURCE REPORTED NOVEMBER 66 THAT AMADAGE/1 SOON TO BE RECALLED PBRUMEN. ON 15 OCT 66, SENSITIVE HAGUE STATION SOURCE INDICATED AMADAGE/1 HAD RECENTLY SUFFERED VERY BAD HEART ATTACK AND WAS HOSPITALIZED.

2. FYI: JMWAVE IN CONTACT WITH AMADAGE/1'S BROTHER LEON WHO SENT SHORT LETTER TO AMADAGE/1 ON 14 OCT 66 BUT AS YET HAS REPORTED NO RESPONSE.

END OF MESSAGE

Jane

RELEASING OFFICER 23-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 5468

TO PAGE TWO

C/WH/COG/FI
WH/COG/MO
WH/1
EUR/IB/C
EUR/N
EUR/BNL/N

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCT BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFI S PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
DISSEM BY 22
ACTION
WH/C 8
☒ RID COPY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT TIME BY
INFO
FILE, VR, WH7, CUR 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S E C R E T 212225Z CITE MEXICO CITY 93?4

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, FRANKFURT, BONN, BERLIN, PARIS, MADRID

TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR [illegible]

21 [illegible] 40826

LITAMIL-9 HAS NEVER MET RAMON CASTRO, KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT POSSIBILITY HE MAY TRAVEL OUTSIDE BLOCK. L-9 HEARD RUMOR IN CUBAN OFFICIAL CIRCLES THAT QUOTE RAMON IS NOT WITH REVOLUTION UNQUOTE BUT COULD NOT ATTRIBUTE RUMOR TO ANYONE SPECIFIC OR ELABORATE. L-9 GUESSED THAT RAMON MAY HAVE BECOME DISSATISFIED WHEN LOST PERSONEL PROPERTY AFTER FIDEL TOOK POWER.

S E C R E T

BT

XREF COMMENTS RAMON CASTRO.

SECRET

Jane

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

ORIG: WILLIAM MURRAY
UNIT: DC/WH/COG/FI
EXT: 2625
DATE: 16 NOV 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 8 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , EUR 8, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS
CI/IC 2 FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 18 18 18 Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 53030

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE, FRANKFURT, BONN, BERLIN, PARIS, MADRID

TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR 52165 (RELAYED MEXI)

REQUEST MEXICO QUERY LITAMIL-9 FOR HIS COMMENTS AND ASSESSMENT RAMON CASTRO WHO PRESENTLY TRAVELLING ON COMMERCIAL MISSION.

END OF MESSAGE

Jane

C/WH/COG/FI
WH/COG/MO
E/G Dick T[illegible] (by phone)
E/F [illegible] (by phone)
E/IB/C Leo T Retz (by phone)
WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Earl J. Williamson
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

Earl J. Williamson
THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

18-13

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

115

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Deputy Chief WH/C

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
C TYPIC/LIRAVINE/LITAMIL/Transmittal of Extracts from LITAMIL-9's files

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
PASS TO SHRYOCK

Attached are forwarded to Headquarters per SHRYOCK's request.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
a/s in Subject HEREWITH

Distribution:
2 - DCWH/C w/att for SHRYOCK
1 - C/WHD w/o att   CC To [illegible]
2 - FILES

1 ATT

CS COPY

DEFERRED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-30589

DATE
15 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

[illegible] MEXICO CITY TEGUCIGALPA 6/66 [redacted] [illegible] ACTING [redacted]

DIRECTOR INFO [illegible], MEXICO CITY [redacted]

PBPRIMEN LITAMIL [redacted]

15N[illegible] 38407

REFERENCE: [redacted] DIRECTOR 5174[illegible]

1. [illegible] ARRIVED 14 NOVEMBER 66 1715 HOURS TEGUCIGALPA. [illegible] 2000 HOURS SAME DAY PER REQUEST OF REF. ACCORDING [illegible] TO ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS PICKED UP BY STATION 14 [illegible] 1966, SUBJECT OF REF PLANNED MEET BARKER SAME DAY TONCONTIN AIRPORT, TEGUCIGALPA, PER PRE-ARRANGED CONTACT PLANS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

LITAMIL-9

[illegible]. Salida al [illegible].-[illegible].-Alberú le [illegible] de que no le llegó el licenciado, [illegible] le recuerda la cita del lunes y ésta acepta.- [illegible].-

[illegible]. Salida al [illegible].-[illegible].- Carbelo pide a Meroy y Hugo -- vayan para la embajada porque ya va a empezar el círculo y - Meroy acepta.- [illegible].-

[illegible]. Salida sin contestación.- 141.-

141. Salida al 255296.-1000.-MD se comunica al Hotel Agnes - y pregunta si se encuentra hospedada la señorita Clara Díaz-García Lima y MF dice que estuvo hace como una semana, pero-- ahora no ha llegado.- 156.-

156. Entradas sin contestación.- [illegible].-

171. Salida al 111573.-1019.-Alberú pregunta por Coty y MF-- dice que fué al salón y como a las 11 irá a la gasolinera.180.

180. Entrada 1020.-Hugo pide a Echemendía cuelgue bien el -- teléfono porque están hablando de La Habana y MD acepta.-187.

187. Entrada 1023.-Un estudiante de la Universidad pregunta si le pueden dar folletos y Jorrín pide pase el lunes.-193.-

193. Entrada 1025.-El Dr.Jordán pregunta por el embajador y- Jorrín pide le hable al 144237.- 201.-

201. Salidas al 111348.-1040.-Luis Alberú recuerda al Lic. - Ignacio Acosta la cita del lunes y éste está de acuerdo que- se vean a las 1100 h. en el mismo lugar; pregunta si le cancelaron su M-2 (ó FM-2) y Alberú dice que sí.- 238.-
(2.-291.- 29 Oct.66).-

file
LITAMIL-9
201

file
Luis Alberu 201

Source LIENVOY
HMMA 30549 (50-6-75/4)
14 NOV 66

[illegible] invitados a Chapultepec, luego tiene una sesión con- [illegible] persona y por la noche tiene una mesa redonda en la Calle de San Carlos a las 7½. María le propone que después de las 5 la llame para ver si es posible que primero vayan a Filomeno Mata y luego a la Academia de San Carlos, y Orlando está de acuerdo.- 166.-

166. Entrada 1092.- Mary y Chelo Esperón platican sobre diversos temas familiares.- 216.-

216. Salida al 299000 Ext.273.-1040.-Alberú pregunta por [illegible] Serrano y IP dice que llega a las once.- 236.-

236. Salida al 262165.-1055.- Orlando Suárez al no encontrar al pintor Marín [illegible], queda de volver a llamar porque le trajo una carta de Cuba y IP acepta.- 248.-

248. Salida al 465590.-1110.-Orlando Suárez pregunta a García Cantú si hay alguna noticia en relación con el libro de los murales y Cantú dice que nó porque la comisión editorial no se reunirá hasta dentro de 10 días, pero cuando tenga -- alguna decisión de la Junta, se la comunicará, pero si gusta puede hablarle el viernes de la semana entrante. Orlando acepta, aclara que se marcha el día 11 y pregunta si lo de la conferencia en la Casa del Lago es posible que no se realice y Cantú indica que le dió una lista de conferencias al coordinador y éste irá a verlo hoy ó mañana para organizarlas porque ayer se inauguró la exposición de pintura. -- Orlando está de acuerdo y comenta que la inauguración estuvo muy bien, pues fueron algunos artistas. Cantú: que como tuvieron consejo universitario, no pudieron ir, pero que lo que llame el viernes. Orlando: bien.- 286.-

(2.-113.- 20 Oct.66).-

[illegible] Salida al 299800 ext.273.-1112.- Luis Alberú con MF --- sin aviso que le dará la 272 porque la otra no funciona. - Alberú acepta y al enterarse de que Carlos Serrano todavía-- no llega, para de volver a llamar a Relaciones.- 322.-

1117 h.

322. Entrada.-El Dr.Domínguez Loyo,Subdirector General de Población, al no encontrar a Carbelo, explica que tienen detenido a René Machín Valdez, cubano, y le están avisando de -- la Estación Migratoria donde lo tienen detenido, que ya tiene su pasaporte. Chelo pide se espere para que hable con - Abreu, quien le informa que hoy se vá....SE CORTA por una - L.D. y Domínguez queda de volverlo a hablar.- 354.-

354. Entrada 1127.- MF de parte del Dr.Domínguez Loyo pregunta por Abreu y Chelo pide se espere un momentito....SE CORTO.36 MF vuelve a llamar y Chelo pregunta su teléfono porque no -- encuentra a Abreu y MF indica que es el 354435. Chelo toma nota y posteriormente comunica a Domínguez Loyo que efectivamente Abreu tiene el pasaporte de Machín, pero además -- quisiera platicar con él; que en caso de que lo localice lo comunicará. Domínguez se dá por enterado y acepta.-431.

431. Salida al 299800.-1128.-Alberú se comunica a Relaciones Exteriores y pide la ext.273. MF:está ocupada.- 445.-

446. Salidas al 135887.-1218.- Chelo pide le manden dos milhojas papel blanco tamaño oficio para mimeógrafo y MF queda de llevárselas.- 473.-

473. Entrada 1226.- MF pregunta el nombre del embajador y -- Chelo se lo dá.- 475.-

(3.-L13.- 28 Oct.66).-

[illegible]. Salida al [illegible].-[illegible].- Olga [illegible] que Morey ayer hizo el arqueo, le platica que perdió [illegible] de los 300 para [illegible] y Morey dice que hablará con [illegible].- 1074.-

1074. Salida al 203327.-1055.-Olga pregunta por el Embajador Madero y MP pide marque al 299000 ext.142.- 1096.-

1096. Salida al 299000 Ext.142.-1056.- El Embajador le platica al Embajador Madero que Luis Alberú es funcionario del Consejo Nacional de Cultura, quien viajó con pasaporte especial equivalente al oficial para ellos; que ha tenido contactos con la Opic y una serie de cosas para desolver las relaciones culturales con algunos organismos y además con algunas galerías públicas; que se solicitó [illegible] extensión de su visa y Guzmán opinó que fuera a Gobernación; que fué allí y le acaba de informar que el Oficial Mayor, Sr. Ojeda, le dijo que eso correspondía a la Dirección del Servicio Diplomático de Relaciones Exteriores, por lo quisiera saber si Alberú pueda pasar a verlo para que le explique. Madero: que se ocupará de todo eso con mucho gusto. Armas dá las gracias.- 1155.-

- -

(6.-136.- 28 Oct.66).-

ORIG: J. STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 14 November 1966

☐ FILE
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TOTAL COPIES (21)

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY 55 PER ___ #___

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , WH/C8, C/CPS, C/OA, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

N 22 00Z CITE DIRECTOR 51748

TO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY TEGUCIGALPA INFO MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA

PERUMEN LITAMIL

REF MANAGUA 5341 (IN 32131)

1. PLEASE SEND FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO LEONEL ALBERU, HOTEL COLOMBIA, SAN PEDRO SULA: SIENTO NO PODER VISITAR FABRICA. TODO ARREGLADO. SALUDOS. RICARDO.

2. NO NEED FORWARD AGUILAR CORRESPONDENCE PER PARA 2 REF. ABOVE TELEGRAM SHOULD CLOSE OUT REF CASE.

SECRET

TAMIL-9

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER J. STEWART/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER T.J. HAZLETT

J. THEN (TELECOORD)/WH/2/N

J. THEN (TELECOORD)/WH/2/HONO

RELEASING OFFICER EARL WILLIAMSON FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

0103

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 25-07-95.
10 noviembre 66.- M13-L13.
10.00-13.26hs.

01-31.- Entradas sin contestación.- Salida equivocada.

31.- Salida al 275364.--- 10.00hs.- Olga con MF por el Ing. Janus.- MF que no está.- Olga: Deja invitación para la cena del sábado en la casa de Sergio Martínez, para Janus y Salus.- MF dice que en este momento está llegando Janus.-- MF que después lo confirma.--- 61.

83.- Entrada a las 1114hs._ MF de la Librería Madero con Curbelo le dice que ya están allí los dies sesani que les pidió.- Curbel que el pasa a recogerlos.--- 89.

115.- Entrada._ MF el Dr. González Rentería por Curbelo.- Chelo que en este momento está en el consulado que le llame al 112847.--- 151.

152.- Salida al 299000 Ext.273.-- 1136hs.- HM Luis Alberú con MF Hernandez Serrano le dice que lo molesta en relación a las pinturas.- Serrano que hoy las entragan.--- 175.

176.- Salida al 263381.- 1150hs.- Chelo con su ahijada y luego con MF la guera.--- Asuntos personales.- Chelo con presión alta.--- Chelo que dpspués lo llama.--- 193.

194.- Salida al 299000.- 1153hs._ Alberú con Hdez. Serrano le dice que el embajador dice haber recibido quinientos catálogos en vez de los mil que habían anunciado; que el embajador pensaba hacer una reperatición de los catálogos a la embajadas, pero que si lo hace se queda sin nada para enviar a Cuba; que si sería posible que le mandaran mayor cantidad.--- Hdez. Serrano: que mandaron hacer mil, pero que solamente les han entregado quinientos. Que en este momento estaba tratando de comunicarse con usted para decirle que ya está la expo

LIENVOY
HAVA 17 nov 66
30614

File Jose Z

LITAMIL-9
201-

sición lista, que si la mandan a la embajada.- Alberú: que dí que la manden a la embajada.- Serrano: que en una hora estará.--- Que en cuanto a los catálogos entregarán los otros quinientos el lunes y que de esos quinientos él se quedará con doscientos.--- 224.

237.- Salida al 357900.- 1159hs.- Cholo con García le pregunta que si hay pasajes disponibles de la orden 35465 a disposición de la embajada.-- García: que quedan siete disponibles.--- 258.

272.- Entrada.- HF del consulado del Ecuador por Curbelo.- Cholo que le llame al 112847.--- 275.

276.- Entrada a las 1210hs.- HF del consulado General de Colombia con Cholo le dice que Curbelo recogió un mimeografo el 20 de octubre para destinarlo al Cuerpo Consular, pero que en el Cuerpo Consular no existe ese aparato y que desea que Curbelo informe donde se encuentra para reintegrarlo a su destino.--- Cholo: que Curbelo no está pero que al llegar le pasará su recado para que se comunique con el.--- 298.

336. Entrada a las 1333hs.- HF el Profesor González Ramírez por el embajador.- Cholo: que no está que salió a Relaciones y que regresará como a las 2.30pm.--- Ramírez: que luego llama.--- 348.-

349.- Salida al 198647.- 1336hs.- Cholo con MF Yola.- Enfermos.-- Cholo pasará a visitar a la enferma -abuelita de Yola-.---- 377.

378-387.- Entradas sin contestación.

. . . .

mírez.- Jorrín que le llame al 144237.--- 251.-- 257.

285.- Salida al 195000.- 1226hs.- MD Estola con MF Yolanda Popoca para confirmar cita a las 15 horas.-- Estola le pregunta que donde puede comunicarse con el Dr.Duyos.- Yolanda que al Hospital Infantil, que llame al 175500.--- Yola: que pregunta que si ya mandaron de la embajada los paquetes de Rojas porque en esos paquetes están dos paquetes de Gloria.- Estola que va a preguntar.---- 332.

385.- Salida al 299000 Ext.273.- 1238hs.- MD Luis Alberú por Fernandez Serrano.- MF que está en la dirección en estos momentos.--- Alberú: que es en relación a las pinturas de Fanny Rabel, que si le puede informar algo.- MF que le va a poner con la secretaria.- 412.- Alberú con MF le dice que quería hablar con Fernandez Serrano.- MF que el está en la dirección, pero que con respecto al empaque de la señora Fanny, que se está terminando.- Alberú: que cuando mandan lo empacado.- MF que ella cree que mañana.-- 425.

487.- Entrada a las 1323hs.- MF con Jorrín que le dijo Orlando Suárez que le podía dejar un recado: que es de parte de Alberto Híjar, que nos vemos mañana a las siete de la noche en el Talle de Gráfica Popular.--- 500.

501.- Entrada?- MF con Jorrín le dice que le habla María, que les diga que el barco sale el día quince.--- 507.

530.- Salida al 287113.- 1349hs.- MD con MF Medina le pregunta que si va a estar allí.- Medina que sí.- MD que pasa a verlo.--- 600.

621.- Entrada.- Mirabal por Araceli le pregunta que como le fué.- Araceli: que tuvo que firmar como cuatro o cinco pasaportes de cortesía a los turistas y que les dijo que mañana vinieran a las diez.- Mirabal: que si le llamó Roblejo.---- Araceli que por suerte no.--- 666.

712.- Salida al 05.- 1425hs.- Jorrín reporta el teléfono

LITAMIL-9

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-329609

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑ WH/1

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY

Dissem 12 - 2 slm

ACTION

WH/C8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2,

WH/1

S E C R E T 102125Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9195 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR

TYPIC PBRUMEN LITAMIL

REF: MEXICO CITY 9168 (IN 35292)

10 Nov 65 IN 37303

1. LITAMIL-9 DEBRIEFED FIVE HOURS 6 NOV AND SIX HOURS 9 NOV WHICH RESULTED CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT INTEL, PARTICULARLY IN FIELD CULTURAL ACTIVITIES, RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATION. RQMS CULTURAL FIELD AND OTHERS PARTIALLY FULFILLED WITH EXTENSIVE DOCUMENTATION IN CASE FORMER. L-9 BROUGHT WITH HIM NINE FOLDERS CONTAINING MEMORANDA AND CORRESPONDENCE DEALING WITH CNC ACTIVITIES. L-9 NOT AWARE CUIS ACTITITIES WITHIN CNC BUT ASSIGNMENT MANUEL VEGA PEREZ AS DIRECTOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITHIN CNC CERTAINLY SIGNIFICANT.

2 L-9 AGAIN FACED WITH DILEMMA RETURN CUBA OR REMAIN MEXICO TO WORK AS ADMINISTRATOR MEXICAN COMPANY WHERE BROTHER PRESENTLY EMPLOYED. CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE BEING PUT ON L-9 BY BROTHER AND WEALTHY MEXICAN BENEFACTOR WHO OWNS COMPANY. L-9 GETTING ALONG IN YEARS (52)[redacted]., HEALTH BEGINNING FAIL, SUFFERING MENTAL STRAIN, NOW ANXIOUS SETTLE DOWN MEXICO AND TAKE JOB ABOVE WHICH AMOUNTS SINECURE. THIS WILL ALLOW HIM PAINT AND DO THINGS HE HAS ALWAYS WANTED TO IN TWILIGHT CAREER. L-9 PATHETIC FIGURE TORN BETWEEN

SECRET

201-329609

10 Nov 66

NOV 16 3 56 PM '66

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9195 S E C R E T

LNFORT AND MEXICAN BENEFACTOR. NIGGARDLY EXISTENCE (250 PESOS MONTHLY) PBRUMEN, WHERE TRAINED WITH MILITIA AND CUT CANE, DECTATE AGAINST HIS RETURN PBRUMEN GO THROUGH SAME AGAIN. ALTHOUGH L-9 UNSELFISHLY STATED WOULD RETURN PBRUMEN IF LNFORT REALLY FELT HE THAT IMPORTANT IT OBVIOUS HE PUTTING HIMSELF AT MERCY LNFORT. CO PLANS MAKE FOL PROPOSAL FOR HIS CONSIDERATION NIGHT 10 NOV. RETURN PBRUMEN WHERE HE WILL HAVE THIRD COUNTRY EMBASSY CONTACT FOR COMMO CHANNEL. DEPENDENT ACCEPTANCE THIS COMMO ARRANGEMENT SALARY WILL BE 732 DOLLARS MONTHLY IN ESCROW WITH REVIEW END SIX MONTH PERIOD FOR READJUSTMENT IF NECESSARY BASIS PRODUCTION. STATION BELIEVES THAT UNLESS COMMO CHANNEL ARRANGED L-9 SHOULD NOT BE REQUESTED RETURN. CO DOUBTS L-9 WILL ACCEPT ABOVE OFFER BUT WISHES GIVE HIM OPPORTUNITY MAKE FINAL DECISION. AT ANY RATE, L-9 STILL "CLEAN" WILL PROVIDE STATION WITH LIMITED ACCESS PBRUMEN ACTIVITIES MEXI.

3. DOCS AND DETAILED NOTES INTEL AND OPS DEBRIEFING BEING POUCHED HQS. PLAN INTRODUCE L-9 TO FRADYER MORNING 11 NOV.

S E C R E T

BT

Memorandum for the Record

9 November 1966

Subject: Meeting with LITAMIL-9

PER telecon on the morning of 8 November, the undersigned met with LITAMIL-9 at 2100 at the Gutenberg/Thiers' glorieta. L-9 was taken to the home of Gene F. BRADDOCK, where the meeting was held. The meeting lasted until 0200 on 9 Nov 66. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS NOTED.

An interesting and fantastic incident occurred on the night of 7 Nov. L-9 said he saw the undersigned walking by his apartment when for some unknown reason he got up to look out the window. The undersigned did, in fact, walk by L-9's apartment on the night of the 7th at about 2300. L-9 was, of course, very impressed with this quirk of fate as was the undersigned. Three years in time, a city of 5 million people etc. At approximately 2245, the undersigned called L-9 and a woman answered the phone. Nothing was said by the undersigned and the phone was hung up. It is possible that this call, if the number was correct, had some influence on his appearance at the window. However, L-9 made no mention of a woman at his place but said he had been reading and got up to look out.

PERSONAL PROBLEMS:

L-9 is very concerned about having lost his Mexican residence permit. [illegible] According to L-9, the Mexican Govt took away his residence permit because he broke Mexican laws. L-9 travelled to Cuba several times without advising the proper authorities during the last several years. L-9 always travelled to Cuba as a Cuban diplomat and not as a Mexican resident therefore there was no record of his travel. This was obviously against the rules and L-9 has to pay for it. L-9 went to see Coty SOLORZANO re this problem and she told him to get in touch with Ignacio "Nacho" ACOSTA Lagunas. ACOSTA took L-9 to Gobernacion but he was unable to see the Oficial Mayor, GALVEZ, fnu. They talked with another official who gave them little hope. ACOSTA said he would go to see GALVEZ, himself, on the following Monday but again, he was unable to get to see GALVEZ. (Lic. Carlos GALVEZ Betancourt).

File - 201 - Litamil-9

cont.

L-9 went to see Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas after ACOSTA failed to help him and HERNANDEZ told him he would talk with Ing. Jorge TAMAYO, that TAMAYO was the man who would be able to help. L-9 is pretty shook up about this problem because he was told at Gobernacion that he would have to reapply again and therefore go through the same XXXXXXX red tape as before, i.e. five years, restricted travel etc. L-9, of course, has new hope with his contact with us but XXXXX XXX he was told that only as a last resort would the U.S. get involved in order to protect the operation.

L-9 again went into the business of his brother's request and that of his friend in the Lomas, who is financing the deal, for him to remain in Mexico as the company's administrator. L-9 stated as he has done in the past that he is being pulled in both directions, i.e. toward Mexico by his brother etc and XXXXX toward Cuba by the U.S. Govt. He did not make it clear which of the two pressures he expects to succumb to. The undersigned did not push the issue at this meeting hoping to get into this matter at a later meeting.

L-9, just before he got out of the car, mentioned that he was in need of money and wanted to get spare parts etc to sent back to Cuba with Orlando SUAREZ, who is scheduled to leave for Habana on Monday. The undersigned said he would get L-9 some money for the next meeting.

L-9 was in good spirits, very proud of his files and anxious to to please. HE described himself during the last year or so in Cuba as "un soldado en su puesto" ready to serve when the time came. He was pleased,of course,to have contact again with ODYOKE and indicated he was a little shook up because his brother was "all over the place" and therefore not a good contact point. He was concerned about how hewas going to make contact.

L-9's post with the Consejo is: Jefe de Protocolo and Liaison officer with the Foreign embassies in Habana.

7. Manuel VEGA Perez - VEGA was named to his present post in the Consejo by Carlos LECHUGA. VEGA, although not a cultured man, has a "boy faced" charm about him that gets him through. I mentioned to L-9 that VEGA was formerly G-2 in Mexico and he agreed but gave little attention to this in terms of his new role.

8. Eduardo CORONA - L-9 said that the removal of CORONA from his post was looked upon very critically by members of the dip corps. CORONA, an extremely well educated and knowledgable type was replaced by Manuel VEGA Perez. CORONA, acc L-9, was removed from the post in order to give him more time to work on the new Constitution. CORONA is also a prof at the U. of Habana. L-9 changed CORONA's despedida address because, acc L-9, the way CORONA had written it, it looked a though CORONA had been fired. L-9 commented thusly to CORONA.

9. Carlos LECHUGA - L-9 said LECHUGA is very happy in his job and [illegible] his wife is a different woman. She is very much at ease, apparently the marital problems have been solved etc. She is writing articles for "El Mundo". LECHUGA, acc L-9 was appraently scheduled to go to Paris but CASTELLANOS went in his stead. LECHUGA was actually studying French for the job. LECHUGA comments often on the personnel who were in Mexico and are now in the CONSEJO. [illegible] L-9, Jose Luis POSADA, Manuel VEGA, LECHUGA etc. , among others.

10. Jose Luis POSADA - POSADA is inthe Consejo de Cultura and will fill in for L-9 while he is away.

11. Raul ROA Garcia - ROA is away down on the totem poleof power and has enemies throughout the govt. ROA was operated on by Dr. SANTAMARIA, fnu for prostate trouble.

L-9 said he "bumped into" LITAMIL-3 on the street and L-3 has been trying to talk with him. L-9 said he is somewhat embarrassed and asked about the propriety of getting in touch with him. He was told to go ahead but to merely discuss the amenities of life and not get into ~~[illegible]~~ discussion to which he agreed heartily.

L-9 explained how he requested "leave without pay" etc through Manuel VEGA but this is spelled out in docs L-9 provided us on ~~8~~ 3 November. Copies of all these docs re L-9's departure, militia etc will be copied.

12. Carlos FRANQUI - L -9 knows nothing about FRANQUI but did comment that when Wilfredo LAM, colored painter, arrived in Habana for the TRICON, FRANQUI was at the airport and in an aside told LAM that he should avoid getting ~~[illegible]~~ involved with Marty FRAIDE because she was ~~[illegible]~~ outspokenly anti-regime.

13. Marta FRAILE - FRAILE, acc L-9, is known to be anti-CASTRO and she makes no bones about it.

14. Fidel CASTRO - CASTRO, acc L-9, is in trouble but his security forces keep things under control. ~~[illegible]~~ CASTRO says, according CONchita FERNANDEZ that he has to depend on his young scholarship students. He can't trust anyone else. He is obviously turnigg toward sugar after having turned twoard industry etc. Graciela BISBE, demonstrated a bit of anti-CASTRO feeling when at 26 July fiesta the crowds applauded CASTRO. BISBE commented in a sarcastic tone: "Aplaudiran", aplaudiran" . L-9 recalls that CASTRO was operated on for rectum trouble but he does not recall when. He believes Dr. RORDIGUEZ Diaz was the surgeon.

PERSONALITIES

1) Teresa PROENZA - L-9 said that when PROENZA left Mexico for Habana she was very unhappy and was cursing everybody. When L-9 arrived in La Habana he was told that PROENZA had been involved in "un asunto grave" with ORDOQUI and that she was being held. He said the latest information, about 2 months ago, is that she is under house arrest at Santa Maria del Mar, a beach resort outside Habana. Little comment is made re PROENZA in Habana.

2) Joaquin ORDOQUI and his wife, Edith BUCHACA de O. - ORDOQUI is still being held but his wife is allowed to go out on the street, accompanied by someone.

3) Marcia LEISECA - According to L-9, LEISECA and Lisandro OTERO are now divorced and rumors have it that LEISECA is going to marry Osmani CIENFUEGOS. LEISECA, acc L-9, is an important personality, particularly in the cultural field, i.e at the Casa de las Americas.

4. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas - HERNANDEZ has been very friendly with L-9 since the arrival of the latter. HERNANDEZ acc L-9 is much more at ease now than when L-9 was here last. He is relaxed and sure of himself.

5. Pablo ALDAMA Acosta - ALDAMA was fired from MINREX and he was very unhappy about it. He does not have a job but is on govt payroll. ALDAMA told L-9 he was "teed off" and name Luis GOMEZ B. as the man who was getting the breaks and that GOMEZ did nothing for the revolution etc.

6. Evelio CASTRO Rodriguez - Acc L-9, CASTRO's name was brought up by Augusto ARCOS, a cousin of Gustavo, when he was with Conchita FERNANDEZ XXX A. ARCOS said it was known that CASTRO was going to "jump" and yet he was allowed to leave with his family for some unknown reason. A real enigma.

15. Gustavo ARCOS - Nothing except he arrested. Will query again re ARCOS.

16. Mercedes MORALES Carrillo - SecGen of the Casa Cuba/Mexico in Habana. MORALES acc L-9, cut him L-9 out of the Mexican picutre.

17. Cmn. Fernando PAMANES - PAMANES is very close to Hilda de FRANCO in more ways than one. It is the talk of the town. In fact, it was rumored that PAMANES was going to marry Hilda PEREZ de F. He is with here frequently and in public.

18. Celia SANCHEZ - Acc L-9, SANCHEZ plans on inviting Coty SOLORZANO to Cuba sometime around end of year.

19. Haydee SANTAMARIA - SANTAMARIA, it is rumored, will take over Carlos LECHUGA's post at some time in the near future. At least, that's the rumor.

20. Agustin GUERRA Piedra - GUERRA went to Spain recently with his wife, who is going blind. Acc L-9, Dr. BARRIQUE, fnu, of Barcelona told PIEDRA he couldn't do a thing for his wife, and GUERRA returned. Acc GUERRA, he wanted his daughter to accompany them to Spain but the Cuban Govt would not grant permission. GUERRA is anti-CASTRO completo, but he's going to stay through it all.

21. Mariano RODRIGUEZ - RODRIGUEZ is apainter who recently went to Rome . THE Casa de las Americas suggested he go Spain, France etz to make contact with friends of Cuba but Consejo turned the suggestion donw. It was then given to the Forieng office and they approved the travel.

22. Xiomara SANCHEZ - SANCHEZ has been fired from MINREX and she is not happy about it.

L-9 has contact with the following Embassies in Habana:

Italy - Santoro and Roqui (sic) - Very good relations here.

Francia - Lecuye sic)

Beligica - FORMER Amb.

Canada - Amb/ McClean - Svoboda (not fond of Svoboda)

Hungaros - Actay (sic)

Czechos -

Polish - Koboito - Second Sec/Cultural Att.

British - BELL

Rumanian -

L-9 said his relations with Italians is excellent. He has never been invited to the Sov Embassy , in fact, it's the only one.

The Casa/Cuba-Mexico

President: Juan MARINELLO V.
XXXXXXXXXX Secreat Executiva - Mercedes MORALES C.

L-9 said the President of the Instituto in Merida was in Cuba, in July 66.

22 November 1966

Memorandum for the Record

SUBJECT: Fidel CASTRO Ruz

On 9-10 November 1966, LITAMIL-9 reported the following re Fidel CASTRO Ruz:

a) LITAMIL-9 was not aware of any problem that CASTRO might have had during the period May-June 1966, wheh he failed to appear publicly. L-9 believes that he would have heard about any serious problem through "Conchita" FERNANDEZ had there been one. On this score, L-9 said that we should not pay much attention to reports that CASTRO is losing power or turning it over to the Party because, although he remains out of the limelight for a time, he bounces back bigger and more popular than ever. L-9 did recall that CASTRO was operated on by Dr. RODRIGUEZ Diaz, fnu , Bor a rectal problem but he beliefes this was in 1966.

b) CASTRO has changed his mind about voluntary labor and now feels that those assigned to the tasks given them should get the job done without voluntary assistance. L-9 believes that Celia SANCHEZ reflected this policy when she recently told "Conchita" FERNANDEZ not to volunteer her services. L-9 believes that CASTRO has recognized his folly in the case of voluntary labor and realizes now that this merely provokes his minions into creating problems in areas where they should not be, i.e. lack of personnel in times when they needed in specific job. L-9 believes Cubans are taking advantage of voluntary labor to be missing frrom own assigned tasks in a form of clandestine subtle sabotage operattion. It is this that CASTRO is also beginning to realize.

c) CASTRO termination of militia courses per memo also shows a switch in attitude of CASTRO, who may also see conterproductive results of indoctrinating Cubans across the board. This happened about two months ago.

d)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-329609

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

DISSEM BY 3

ACTION

WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABSTRACT X

wh/c/FI

C PD

mexi

SECRET 081712Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9168 (EASBY ACTING)

8 NOV 66 IN 35292

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

SHRYOCK CONTACTED LITAMIL-9 MORNING 8 NOV. MEETING SCHEDULED FOR EVENING 8 NOV.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-329609

8 Nov. 1966

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
[illegible]

ACTION
WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO TIME 03/57 BY [illegible]

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C8, CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 042035Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9122 [illegible]

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (ATTN: FRADYER) INFO MANAGUA

NO NIGHT ACTION

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

REF: DIRECTOR- 49183 [redacted] (NOT SENT MANAGUA)

1. DUE PROLONG STAY LITAMIL-17 HONDURAS, STATION BEGAN ATTEMPTS CONTACT LITAMIL-9 THROUGH LITAMIL-3 WHO AWARE L-9 IN TOWN FROM LITAMIL-7. INITIAL ATTEMPTS CONTACT UNSUCESSFUL BUT LITAMIL-7 INFORMED LITAMIL-3 ON 2 NOV THAT LITAMIL-9 WISHED SEE HIM URGENTLY. LITAMIL-3 AGAIN ATTEMPTING CONTACT LITAMIL-9.

2. THROUGH LITAMIL-7, STATION AWARE THAT GOBERNACION HAS NOT GRANTED PERMISSION LITAMIL-9 REMAIN IN MEXICO FOR THREE MONTH PERIOD REQUESTED. PBRUMEN DIPLOMATS ONLY ALLOWED 10 DAY STAY MEXICO ON TDY WITHOUT REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR LONGER STAY FROM GOBERNACION. LITAMIL-3 CLAIMS CAN ARRANGE FOR LONGER STAY THROUGH CONTACTS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY AND HAS TOLD LITAMIL-7 TO INFORM LITAMIL-9 OF SAME. LITAMIL-9 SITUATION CRITICAL FROM POINT OF OVERSTAYING 10 DAY LIMIT BUT NEGOTIATIONS STILL TAKING PLACE BETWEEN LIRING AND FOREIGN MINISTRY.

SECRET

201

8

3. IF HQS CONCURS, LITEMPO-8 CAN BE REQUESTED AUTHORIZE LITAMIL-9 EXTENSION PERMIT STAY MEXICO. IN ABSENCE CURTIS, BENADUM WOULD CONTACT LITEMPO-8. THIS WOULD MEAN LITEMPO-8 AND PROBABLY LIRAMA WOULD THEN BE AWARE LITAMIL-9 AFFILIATION WOFACT. ADVISE SOONEST. ACTION COULD BE COVERED BY LITAMIL-3 CLAIMING HE ARRANGED EXTENSION.

4. RESERVATIONS CONFIRMED AT GENEVE FOR SHRYOCK.

5. WILL ADVISE ANY ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS LITAMIL-9 SITUATION.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 72

ORIG: J SHRYOCK
UNIT: WH/1
EXT :
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 8 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , WH/C 8, FI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

15 30 Z CITE DIRECTOR 49536

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER)

DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRAVINE

REF MEXICO CITY 9122 32477

HQS PREFERS NOT USE LITEMPO-8 GET LITAMIL-9 EXTENSION PERMIT STAY MEXICO, EXCEPT IN LAST RESORT. SINCE L-9 HAS ALREADY OVERSTAYED 12-DAY LIMIT BY 18 DAYS AND SINCE NEGOTIATIONS STILL TAKING PLACE BETWEEN LIRING AND FOREIGN MINISTRY, HEADQUARTERS BELIEVES PREFERABLE ACCEPT RISK MEXICAN AUTHORITIES BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS AND ORDERING L-9 OUT PRECIPITATELY. IN LATTER CASE STATION CAN ATTEMPT ARRANGE L-9 EXTENSION AS SUGGESTED PARA 3 REF. SUGGEST HOLD FURTHER ACTION IN ABEYANCE PENDING ARRIVAL SHRYOCK NIGHT 6 NOV.

S E C R E T

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

IG:
IT:
T:
TE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1	
2	
3	
4	

ISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

CM: DIRECTOR

RF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: WR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 49536

TO

WH COMMENT: REF GAVE BACKGROUND UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS CONTACT LITAMIL-9 THROUGH LITAMIL-3 AND SUGGESTED USE LITEMPO-8 TO AUTHORIZE EXTENSION L-9 PERMIT STAY MEXICO.

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER J STEWART WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER T HAZLETT WH/C/FI
RELEASING OFFICER T FLORES FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

ET

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
By 8

ACTION
WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/OPS, C/CA, FI

S E C R E T 031623Z CITE MANAGUA 3841

TEGUCIGALPA INFO DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

3 Nov 60 IN 32131

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 6753 (~3,47)

1. APPRECIATE PROMPT SERVICE. REF ADDRESS SENT TO LITAMIL-17.

2. PLS OPEN ANY LETTERS RECEIVED FROM HIM AND ADVISE HEADQUARTERS, ATTN LAWRENCE F. BARKER, OF CONTENTS. L-17 WILL USE ALIAS PEDRO AGUILAR FOR RETURN ADDRESS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

[redacted]

LITAMIL-9

201-329609

[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ORIG: J STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 3 NOV 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-339608

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/C 3, CCS 3, C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

3 22 13 Z CITE DIRECTOR 49415

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MANAGUA INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER), MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRAVINE LITAMIL

REF MANAGUA 5340 (IN 31353)

FYI HQS PLANNING WITH CONCURRENCE MEXICO CITY SEND CLYDE K. SHRYOCK MEXICO CITY 6 NOVEMBER ASSIST STATION REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT EFFORTS ESTABLISH CONTACT LITAMIL-5. REQUEST BARKER TAKE NO ACTION REF CASE.

S E C R E T

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER J. STEWART WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER W. CINI WH/C

A. PORN (TELECOORD) WH/2/M

RELEASING OFFICER W. CINI FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18 [redacted]

ORIG: J. STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 3 NOV. 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ZC PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/C 8

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 48786

TO

31457R
062

S E C R E T

~~CABLE SECRETARIAT~~

PLEASE RELAY TEGUCIGALPA 6753 (IN 31457) PRIORITY TO JMWAVE FOR INFO FRADYER.

S E C R E T

WH/C/COMMENT TEGUCIGALPA FURNISHES ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR LITAMIL-17 IN HONDURAS.

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER J STEWART WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER T HAZLETT (DRAFT) WH/C/FI
A WISNOWSKI FOR WH/C/MO
RELEASING OFFICER W CINI FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

BT

LITAMIL-9

8

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 3 [redacted]

ORIG: J. STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 3 NOV 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 1 PER #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: VR, FILE WH 8 CCS-3 CS/PS

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) c/o/r (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 49183

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER)

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

REF A MANAGUA 5840 (BEING RELAYED) IN 31353
B TEGUCIGALPA 6753 (BEING RELAYED) IN 31457

1. PER FRADYER CONVERSATIONS HQS AND WITH CONCURRENCE MEXICO CITY STATION, CLYDE K SHRYOCK (P) PLANS ARRIVE MEXICO CITY 6 NOVEMBER 1966 BY EAL FLIGHT 905. NO NEED MEET BUT WOULD APPRECIATE RESERVATIONS MADE IN TRUE NAME AT GENEVE OR SIMILAR HOTEL.

2. PURPOSE TRIP REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT EFFORTS REESTABLISH CONTACT LITAMIL-9 WITH STATION AND FRADYER (WHO HOLDING RESERVATIONS RETURN MEXICO CITY NIGHT 4 NOVEMBER FROM MIAMI).

S E C R E T

Stewart

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT :
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE ,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 49183

TO

WH/COMMENTS: A. LITAMIL-17 (BROTHER LITAMIL-9) ASKED BARKER MEET HIM SAN PEDRO SULA, AND MANAGUA ASKED TEGUCIGALPA FOR ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR L-17 INHONDURAS AND ASKED MEXICO CITY FOR LATEST ON LITAMIL-9

B. TEGUCIGALPA FURNISHED ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR LITAMIL-17 IN HONDURAS.

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER J STEWART WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER T HAZLETT (DRAFT) WH/C/FI

S WISNIOWSKI FOR WH/C/MO (DRAFT)

RELEASING OFFICER W CINI FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 13

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
DISSEM CY 30/M

ACTION
WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/OPS, C/OA,

S E C R E T 022135Z CITE TEGUCIGALPA 6753 (DEHORN ACTING)

MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

2 Nov 65 IN 31457

REFERENCE: MANAGUA 5840 (IN 31333) *

1. FOLLOWING ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IS PROVIDED PER REFERENCE REQUEST:

SR. RICARDO MARTINEZ MEJIA
RDO. JAIME AGUILAR BLANCO
APARTADO 528, TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS

*REQUESTED ADDRES
FOR LITAMIL-17,

2. SUGGEST LITAMIL-17 BE TOLD TO USE FICTIOUS RETURN ADRESS. LETTERS NOT BEARING RETURN ADRESS FREQUENTLY PICKED UP BE SWINEHERD-3, UNILATERAL STATION ASSET WHO RUNS MAIL INTERCEPT OPERATION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Jane

LITAMIL-9

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 8

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

~~FROM~~ Ray 15

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

ACTION

2 Nov 66 IN 37353

SECRET 021815Z CITE MANAGUA 5840

MEXICO CITY, TEGUCIGALPA INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

1. LITAMIL-17 PHONED BARKER FROM SAN PEDRO SULA, HONDURAS, 31 OCTOBER USING ALIAS AND INNOCENT BUSINESS PHRASEOLOGY. SAID WISHED HAVE BARKER VISIT HIM IN SAN PEDRO SULA BEFORE 20 NOVEMBER. FOR SECURITY REASONS DID NOT MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT LITAMIL-9.

2. BARKER TENTATIVELY PLANS STOP-OVER TEGUCIGALPA EN ROUTE BACK FROM ANNUAL COS MEETINGS PROBABLY ABOUT 14 NOV. WILL ASK L-17 TO FLY THERE FOR MEET. MEXI PLS ADVISE LATEST ON L-9 AND WHAT INSTRUCTIONS IF ANY WISH BARKER TO PASS TO L-17.

3. FOR TEGUCIGALPA: L-17 IS BROTHER OF L-9 WHO AGENT RESIDING IN PBRUMEN AND EXPECTED OUT SOON. PLEASE CABLE TO MANAGUA ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN TEGU TO WHICH L-17 COULD SEND LETTER CONFIRMING MEETING PLANS.

SECRET

BT

[illegible]

Ne chrono

Jane

LITAMIL-9

La Habana, 5 de octubre de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Comp. Jesús Durán
VICEMINISTRO DE ADMINISTRACION
Ministerio de Comercio Exterior
Ciudad.

Compañero:

Por este medio tengo el gusto de informarle que con motivo de realizar un viaje a Méjico, en misión cultural, debidamente autorizado por el Consejo Nacional de Cultura, donde ostento el cargo de Jefe de Protocolo de la Dirección de Relaciones Internacionales; solicito de usted la debida autorización para poder llevarme algunos libros y revistas de mi propiedad, que tratan sobre pintura. Estos libros los he adquirido aquí, y me son necesarios para realizar mi trabajo como pintor. Asimismo, llevaría conmigo una máquina de escribir portátil que traje cuando vine de Méjico; en cuyo país ocupaba el cargo de Agregado Cultural de nuestra Embajada.

Desearía también llevar unos tabacos, para lo cual le estoy solicitando la autorización correspondiente.

Le adjunto la relación de los libros que deseo llevarme, notificándole que saldré del país el próximo viernes, día [illegible], en el vuelo No. 464, para Méjico.

Con saludos revolucionarios,

Luis Alberú Souto

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
De DE [illegible]

MEMORANDUM

FECHA: 4 de octubre de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

DE: Luis Alberú [illegible],
Jefe de Protocolo.

A: al Comp. Manuel [illegible],
Director de R. Internacionales.

ASUNTO: SOLICITUD DE LICENCIA

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de dirigirme a Ud, al efecto de solicitar de su amable atención, se me concedan 2 meses de licencia sin sueldo a partir del día 4 de Noviembre del corriente

Dicha licencia, es para poder terminar los cuadros que tengo empezados en mi estudio de ciudad México.

Agradeciendo de antemano, la atención que pueda prestar a esta solicitud, me reitero de Ud, con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

fraternalmente,

Luis Alberú

Luis Alberú,
Jefe de Protocolo
y Relaciones Culturales con Europa
Occidental.

4-10-66
825

LITAMIL/9

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
D. DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

MEMORANDUM

FECHA: 4 de Octubre de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

DE: I Comp. Manuel E. Vega,
Director.

A: al Comp. Héctor Quintero,
Jefe de Personal.

ASUNTO

Estimado compañero:

Debido a las necesidades de trabajo de esta Dirección, fué necesario posponer la fecha solicitada para las vacaciones del compañero Luis Alberú Souto.

Por lo cual al mismo tiempo le informamos, que dichas vacaciones pueden comenzar a surtir efecto, a partir del 5 de Octubre del corriente.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS"

fraternalmente,

Manuel E. Vega,
Director.-

4-10-66
828

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

~~FROM~~
DISSEM BY 30/g

ACTION
DC/WH/C5 (☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/CI, C/CCS3, C/FI2,

10 SEP 65 Ⓘ 93133

S E C R E T ~~[illegible]~~ 1092319Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8513

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LITAMIL-9

REF ~~MEXICO CITY~~ 8467 (IN 90300)

~~1/C2~~	
~~/S~~ DEST	WH/C
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX

1. LITAMIL-9 NOT ABOARD FLIGHT 9 SEPT. NEXT SCHEDULED FLIGHT 17 SEPT. IN VIEW NO RESPONSE TO REF AND UNCERTAINTY L-9 ARRIVAL, BARKER MET WITH LITAMIL-17 AGAIN 9 SEPT TO SET UP CONTACT PLAN WHEREBY L-17 WILL MAKE FIRST CONTACT WITH L-9 ON BEHALF WOFACT. THIS PLAN WILL FREE BARKER TO PROCEED MANAGUA DEPARTING MEXI 17 SEPT.

2. L-17 WILL BE IN HONDURAS FROM 10 TO 25 SEPT. NIGHT 9 SEPT WILL LEAVE INNOCUOUS TEXT NOTE WITH LUIS EYCHENNE PIN, LONGTIME L-9 CLOSE FRIEND WHOM L-9 WILL AUTOMATICALLY CONTACT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARRIVAL. NOTE WILL TELL L-9 THAT "ROBERTO" (BARKER) WILL PROBABLY BE OUT OF TOWN UPON L-9 ARRIVAL, L-9 SHOULD AWAIT RETURN L-17 TO MEXICO AT WHICH TIME STOCKHOLDERS MEETING CAN BE SET UP. L-9 WILL THUS NOT GO TO CLANDESTINE CONTACT POINT NIGHT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING RETURN AS PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED WITH HIM. BELIEVE BEST LET HIM SETTLE IN AT LIRING SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE CONTACT SINCE HE MIGHT BE UNDER AMSTAFF SURVEILLANCE. L-17 CAN THEN MAKE SECURE

SECRET

CONTACT WITH L-9 AND LAY ON DATE FOR L-9 PICK UP BY C/O. COMPLETE CONTACT PLAN PLACED IN L-9 FILE ENABLING C/O CONTACT L-17 AND L-9. AGAIN STRONGLY SUGGEST SHRYOCK OR BARKER MAKE INITIAL CONTACT SINCE EXPOSURE L-9 TO ANY OTHER OFFICER MIGHT PREJUDICE CHANCES TALKING ~~HI~~ IN TO RETURN PERUMEN.

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

ORIG: Jack Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 9 September 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 8 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, DC/WH 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CCS 3, C/CSPS

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 10 1455Z (REFERENCE NUMBER) CITE DIRECTOR 34241

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE MANAGUA

KAPOK TYPIC LITAMIL-9

REF MEXICO CITY [illegible] (IN [illegible])

1. SHRYOCK AVAILABLE FOR SHORT TDY ASSIST STATION INITIAL RECEPTION LITAMIL-9.

2. HQS PREFERS NOT DELAY BARKER DEPARTURE FOR MANAGUA. SHOULD LITAMIL-9 ~~ARRIVE~~ ARRIVAL BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER 17 SEPTEMBER REQUEST STATION ARRANGE CONTACT PLAN SO SHRYOCK CAN MAKE CONTACT EVEN IF LITAMIL-17 OUT OF COUNTRY WHEN LITAMIL-9 EVENTUALLY ARRIVES. SHRYOCK WILL MAKE INITIAL CONTACTS AND TURN LITAMIL-9 OVER TO ANOTHER STATION CASE OFFICER.

END OF MESSAGE

HQS COMMENT: Reference reported LITAMIL-9 coming MEXICO mid-Sept for approximately three month stay to complete certain projects he involved in when MEXICO on PCS.

Flores for
William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/C/FI
WH/1 (Mr. Stewart by phone)
WH/C/MO (Mr. Chiocca in draft)
WH/2 (Mr. Terrell by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

13 SEP 1966

FROM
DISSEM BY 33 7

ACTION
DC/WH/C 5

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EUR 4,

S E C R E T 061932Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8467

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, MADRID, MANAGUA

6 SEP 66 IN 90306

ANC/LEZ
PG
ABSTRACT
WH/C

KAPOK TYPIC LITAMIL-9

1. LITAMIL-17 REPORTED 2 SEP THAT LITAMIL-9 WILL COME TO MEXICO MID-SEPTEMBER FOR APPROX 3 MONTH STAY TO COMPLETE CERTAIN PROJECTS HE INVOLVED IN WHEN HERE PCS. NO PRECISE DATE GIVEN. L-17 RECEIVED NEWS IN LETTERS FROM L-9 AND FROM THEIR FATHER.

2M L-17 TOLD BARKER HE HOPES BE ABLE/CONVINCE L-9 REMAIN IN MEXICO WHERE L-17 CAN SET HIM UP IN JOB. IN INTEREST HARMONY WITH L-17 C/O DID NOT COMMENT ON THIS DESIRE ALTHOUGH HOPEFULLY L-9 CAN BE INDUCED RETURN PBRUMEN TO COOPERATE IN PLANCE.

3. L-17 TRAVELING ALMOST CONSTANTLY PAST YEAR SETTING UP INDUSTRIAL PLANTS. PRESENTLY IN SAN PEDRO SULA, HONDURAS. MAY NOT BE IN MEXICO WHEN L-9 ARRIVES. BARKER HAS CONTACT PLAN WITH L-9 AND STATION BELIEVES HE SHOULD REMAIN MEXICO UNTIL CONTACT EFFECTED ALTHOUGH HAS TENTATIVE PLANS DEPART FOR MANAGUA 17 SEP.

4. REQUEST SHRYOCK STAND BY TO TAKE OVER CASE ONCE CONTACT EFFECTED. SINCE L-9 AVERSE TO MEETING ANY NEW WOFACT PERSONNEL (COMPLAINED TO C/O THAT WAS EXPOSED TO TOO MANY PEOPLE BEFORE AND AFTER PREVIOUS PBRUMEN TRIP), BELIEVE BEST IF CONTACT CAN BE CONFINED TO **SECRI**

Same for L-9

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-329609
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 33

Bu 49

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted]

~~DISSEM~~ BY Z.
ACTION
WH/C 8
INFO

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

FILE, VR, EUR 8, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 311237Z CITE MADRID 9016

MADR

31 Aug 66 IN 86883

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL AMCRASH

REF DIRECTOR 28220

1. AMCRASH 1 MET 30 AUG. FLT DEPARTURE FROM HAVANA DELAYED TO SOLVE EXCHANGE PROBLEMS OF FRENCH INVITEES RETURNING TO THEIR COUNTRY.

2. AMCRASH 1 SAID LITAMIL 9 GOOD FRIEND BUT DOES NOT HAVE FREQUENT INTIMATE CONTACT. CONTACT IS NATURAL AND THEY HAVE VISITED EACH OTHERS HOMES ON PURELY FRIENDLY BASIS. AMCRASH 1 SAW LITAMIL 9 AT AIRPORT JUST BEFORE DEPARTURE THIS TRIP, PURELY ACCIDENTAL. CAN CONTACT LITAMIL 9 AT ANY TIME WITHOUT RAISING ANY SUSPICIONS.

3. AMCRASH 1 IN ANSWER TO QUESTION ESTIMATED LITAMIL 9 MOTIVATION AND SUPPORT OF GOVT AS UNENTHUSIASTIC AND FOR SURVIVAL ONLY. BELIEVES LITAMIL 9 WORKING IN FOREIGN MINISTRY CONNECTED WITH CULTURAL AFFAIRS.

4. MADRID BELIEVES OPEN CODE PLUS SW WITH DEVELOPMENT INSTRUCTIONS IN BOOK AS SUGGESTED IN DIRECTOR 25242 EXPOSES BOTH AMCRASH 1 AND LITAMIL 9 TO UNNECESSARY DANGER. AS LITAMIL 9 IS UNKNOWN QUANTITY SINCE HIS RETURN TO CUBA WE WISH GIVE MAXIMUM PROTECTION TO

LITAMIL-9

201-329609
31 Aug 1966

for L-9

RECEIVED MIS
OCT 10 1 10 AM '66
RID/MIS
OCT 13 8 21 AM '66

PAGE 2 MADRID 9215 S E C R E T

AMCRASH 1 [illegible] RECONTACT PLAN AND OFFER FOLLOW SUGGESTION:

A. AMCRASH 1 KNOWS PERSON MEXICO WHO GOOD FRIEND LITAMIL 9. AMCRASH 1 DOES NOT RECOLLECT NAME BUT WILL FURNISH NAME LATER.

B. FRIEND MEXI COULD SEND UNCOMPROMISING LETTER TO LITAMIL 9 WITH AMCRASH 1 AS "UNWITTING" COURIER. COULD USE PERSON PARA 4A ABOVE OR OTHER MORE APPROPRIATE SUGGESTED BY HQS OR MEXICO.

C. IF FIRST LETTER EXCHANGE GOES SMOOTHLY THEN SECOND SEALED LETTER COULD CONTAIN RECONTACT MESSAGE FCOM HQS CASE OFFICER. AT THIS POINT AMCRASH 1 CAN STILL CLAIM DENIAL ANY KNOWLEDGE CONTENT OF MESSAGES LEAVING HIM CLEAN IN CASE THERE EXPOSURE BY LITAMIL 9 OR ANY OTHER SOURCE.

D. IF LITAMIL 9 ACCEPTS RECONTACT CAN CONTINUE TO USE AMCRASH 1 AS COURIER OR UNTIL ALTERNATE METHOD FOUND THRU USE SW, RADIO, OR OTHER.

5. AMCRASH 1 SGSWIRLED ON 30 AUG 66. NO EVIDENCE DECEPTION.

S E C R E T

BT

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
D. DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

MEMORANDUM.

FECHA 19 de Agosto de 1966

al Comp. Manuel E. Vega, Director de
A la D. de Relaciones Internacionales.

DE: Luis Alberd

ASUNTO SOLICITUD DE LICENCIA

Estimado compañero:

Por medio de la presente tengo el gusto de dirigirme a Ud, al efecto de exponerle que con motivo de mis vacaciones, quisiera aprovechar esa oportunidad, para solicitarle se me conceda licencia para viajar a la ciudad de México por el término de tres meses y a partir de la primera quincena del próximo mes de Septiembre, al objeto de terminar los cuadros que se encuentran inconclusos en mi estudio de aquella ciudad, en razón de mi traslado a Cuba y de estar desempeñando funciones en el Consejo Nacional de Cultura, que con gran satisfacción para mi modesta persona, me han sido encomendadas a los fines de mejor servir a la Revolución.

Aprovechando el tiempo que por vacaciones me pueda corresponder, le ruego atentamente, considere dar curso a esta solicitud, no sin antes según tengo entendido, si el tiempo solicitado no cubre totalmente las vacaciones que actualmente me puedan corresponder, se tenga en cuenta un anticipo, en base de las que me correspondan en el futuro próximo.

Al mismo tiempo deseo exponerle tambien, que los gastos relativos a mi estancia, no serían un obstáculo, dado que en México cuento con familiares directos y nacidos en aquel país. Quisiera que si se accede a mi solicitud, se me facilitaran o me indicaran los trámites usuales a realizar para poder pagar el pasaje de ida y vuelta en moneda nacional, así como la autorización correspondiente para poder llevar unos libros que he comprado, los cuales utilizaría para terminar los cuadros de referencia.

Con gracias anticipadas por la atención que preste a esta solicitud, me reitero de Ud, con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

fraternalmente,

Luis Alberd,
Jefe de Protocolo.-

SE ER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AN OTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Thomas Hazlett Martin Graves		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	X	INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

These two books have been found unsuitable for use with system #99 ink, However, the book "Maceo",which I have retained, gives excellent results. The first two pages of the book "Maceo",which are a blank page followed by a title page,would be ideal for placement of SW.

Dave Brammer
CCG/WH

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 1 APR 55 Replaces Form 30-4 which may be used. (40)

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1955—O-342531

ORIG: MARTIN GRAVES:ak ☐ FILED
UNIT: WH/C/FI/IO ☐ INDEX
EXT: 3553 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE: 17 AUGUST 1966 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-772854
201-329609

TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 7 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/C5 ☑ RID COPY

TO: VR, FILE · C/RI/SD C/WH 6 C/EUR 4 C/CI C/FI 2 C/CA 2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

18 12 10Z CITE DIRECTOR 28686

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE MADRID wsr

KAPOK TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL LICOBRA

REF: MEXICO CITY 8221 (IN 74964)* (NOT SENT MADRID) wsr

1. APPRECIATE CONSTRUCTIVE REF SUGGESTIONS. COMMENTS RE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS, I.E., HOSTILE INTERROGATION, ETC., IN USE AMCRASH/1 MOST PERTINENT. APPEARS IT AGREED THERE ALMOST INSOLUBLE QUANDRY IN THAT LITAMIL/9 TO BE REACTIVATED AND HANDLED ONLY VIA PERSONAL CONTACT, AND L/9 LIKELY INTERPRET ANY SUCH EFFORT AS BREACH OF FAITH.

2. IN ATTEMPT DERIVE PRINCIPLES FOR BEST SOLUTION THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM OFFER FOLLOWING THOUGHTS RE REF. HQS ASSESSMENT L/9 THAT HE BASICALLY DISTRUSTS LATINS AND RESPONSE TO LICOBRA/2 NOT LIKELY BE MUCH BETTER THAN PBRUMEN NATIONAL. BELIEVE IT CRUCIAL ALLOW TARGET RECEIVE PITCH PRIVATELY WITHOUT FEELING ANYONE ELSE WITTING EVENT AND HIS SECURITY IN JEOPARDY. BOOK/LETTER PROPOSAL LEAVES L/9 FREE WITH OPINION ONLY LITAMIL/17 INVOLVED BUT PROBABLY UNAWARE DETAILS. RENEWED WOFACT INVOLVEMENT WOULD GROW SLOWLY WITH TARGET ABLE CONTROL

RELEASING OFFICER 16-10 1530

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED)

(ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA) 28686

CITE DIRECTOR

TO PAGE TWO

SPEED OF EVENTS AND PONDER EACH STEP SEPARATELY. THIS LIKELY GIVE L/9 FEELING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY. ~~WITH [illegible]~~ BY L/2 AS SUGGESTED REF PRESENTATION OF LETTER, L/9 FACED WITH TOTALLY UNEXPECTED "MOMENT OF TRUTH" IN SITUATION WHERE HE MUST ASSUME L/2 KNOWS CONTENTS. BELIEVE THIS COMPOUNDS NEGATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT AND PRESENTS TARGET FAIT ? ACCOMPLI "BREACH OF FAITH".

3. AS FURTHER CONSIDERATION, BELIEVE CONTEMPLATED CUTOUT/COURIER RELATIONSHIP WOULD HAVE TO REASSURE L/9 OF SECURITY AND PROFESSIONAL WOFACT SPONSORSHIP. OUTSIDE OF DIFFICULTY OF L/2 NATIONALITY, THERE POTENTIAL PERSONALITY CLASH IN MIDST THIS SENSITIVE CONTACT BETWEEN L/2, REPORTEDLY OBSESSED MILITARY MATTERS, AND CULTURALLY MINDED L/9.

4. RE PARA 4 REF, ENVISAGE TRIGGERING LETTER AS INNOCUOUS APPEARING, BUT CLEARLY WORDED, CASUAL REFERENCE TO "MUTUALLY ENJOYABLE" PASSAGE IN "EL LIBRO DE TOMAS". FURTHER COVER COULD BE PROVIDED BY EQUATING SIMILARITY OF INCIDENT DESCRIBED IN PASSAGE TO COMMON EXPERIENCE OF BROTHERS.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

[redacted]

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

[redacted]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

INFO: VR , FILE

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) SECRET [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA) 28686

CITE DIRECTOR

TO PAGE THREE

5. NOT CONFIDENT AMCRASH/1 BETTER ABLE PROVIDE REASSURING ATMOSPHERE REQUIRED PROPOSED COURIER ROLE, BUT AT LEAST THIS ALTERNATIVE HAS ADVANTAGE PIGGY-BACKING WHAT WE HOPE LONG STANDING FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP. SUGGESTION VALID ONLY IF CONTACT ROUTINE AND CLOSE ENOUGH TO COVER MEETS. BEFORE ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION USE A/1 GIVEN, MUST DETERMINE DETAILS NATURE A/1 - L/9 PAST ASSOCIATION. SEPARATE CABLE TO MADRID THIS TOPIC.

6. HQS FILES REFLECT LAST CONTACT LITAMIL/17 IN AUGUST 1965. BELIEVE CURRENT MEETING MIGHT PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHT PRESENT STATUS/FRAME OF MIND OF L/9 WHICH WOULD BE CRUCIAL PROPOSED OP.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/COMMENT: *Mexico City Station's view after careful consideration.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

[redacted]

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT :
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

	ROUTING		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE ,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 28686

TO

PAGE FOUR

E/IB/C

C/WH/C/PI

J Flores for WH/C/MO

WH/C/RR/MHAPRON Le Maistre

WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

J Flores
THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTIO_ BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE _ PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

(52)

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 33

BB

PD

ORIG: R. MARTY GRAVES ☐ FILE RID
UNIT: WH/C/FI ☐ INDEX
EXT: 3553 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE: 13 AUGUST 66 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. B-201-772091

SECRET

201-329609

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 52 PER ____ #____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE RI/AN, EUR 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

FI/INT 2, ADDP

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

16 20 37 Z CITE DIRECTOR 28220

TO MADRID INFO: MEXICO CITY, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL AMCRASH 1P

REF: DIR 25242*

13 August 1966

RI/FI
INDEX
ABSTRACT

MICROFILMED
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS REF PROPOSAL CONCLUDE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY DETERMINE DETAILS EXACT NATURE AMCRASH/1 - LITAMIL/9 RELATIONSHIP. LOOK FORWARD FIRST AVAILABILITY A/1 FOR FULL DEBRIEFING/ELICITATION THIS TOPIC.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/Comment: Proposal for reactivation LITAMIL/9

C/WH/C/FI T. Hazlett (in draft)

Mike AMCRASH/1

B-201-772091

for WH/C/MO [illegible]

WH/C/RR/MHAPRON C. Lemaistre

WH/1

E/IB/S

201-329609
16 August 1966

C/EUR/LOPS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

15-4

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

1402

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 60/53

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 122100Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8221 12 AUG 66 IN 74964

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL AMCRASH LICOBRA

REF DIRECTOR 25242 *

* HQS PROPOSAL RE SECURE REACTIVATION LITAMIL-9.

1. FOLLOWING STATION VIEWS AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION REF PROPOSAL.

2. ANY CONTACT INITIATED WITH LITAMIL-9 INSIDE PBRUMEN WILL BE INTERPRETED BY HIM AS A BREACH OF FAITH. STATION AGREES SUCH ACTION JUSTIFIED, HOWEVER, IN VIEW HIS PROBABLE ACCESS AND HAS BEEN EXAMINING MEANS EFFECT CONTACT. FEEL HE SHOULD NOT BE CONTACTED THROUGH PBRUMEN NATIONAL.

3. BELIEVE L-9 SHOULD COMMUNICATE THROUGH SOMEONE NOT SUBJECT TO ARREST. IF AMCRASH-1 USED AND PICKED UP FOR ANY REPEAT ANY REASON HE COULD BE BROKEN. L-9 WOULD BE DOOMED. WORKING ALONE L-9 WILL HAVE CHANCE SURVIVAL. AS MEMBER PBRUMEN NET OR WHATEVER CHOOSE TO CALL L-9/A-1 ASSOCIATION L-9 IS ENDANGERED UNDULY. STATION STRONGLY AGAINST ANY OPERATIONAL CONTACT WITH L-9 WITH ANY OTHER PBRUMEN NATIONAL. C/O WHO HANDLED L-9 1963-1965 BELIEVES L-9 WILL FEEL SAME WAY. STATION HAS UNEASY FEELINGS ABOUT AMMOON AGENTS IN VIEW CLOSE MHGUILE ATTENTION TO THEM. DESPITE A-1 SGSWIRL BELIEVE

SECRET

Jane

TOO DANGEROUS EXPOSE L-9 TO HIM.

4. PARA 3 REF GIVES L-9 OPTION REFUSE OFFER IN COMMUNICATION BY OPEN CODE TO BROTHER (L-17). BUT NOT CLEAR FROM REF HOW L-17 CAN "SECURELY DRAW ATTENTION" TO ALTERED PASSAGE IN BOOK.

5. MOVING FROM NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE, ONE POSSIBILITY REESTABLISH CONTACT LIES IN USE LICOBRA-2 WHO IN NO WAY SUBJECT TO ARREST. ALTHOUGH L-2 HAS NEVER BEEN ASKED DO ANYTHING OF SORT, C/O FEELS HE MIGHT BE WILLING HELP OUT. L-2 HAS OWN COURIER WHO CAN CARRY SEALED NOTES WITHOUT PUTTING THEM INSIDE DIPLOMATIC POUCH. AS DIP COURIER HE NOT SUBJECT TO SEARCH.

6. L-9 COULD ARRANGE VISIT L-2 IN EMBASSY AFTER LETTER FROM L-17 OR PERHAPS PHONE CALL FROM L-2. FACT THAT L-9 RESIDED 18 YEARS MEXICO FURNISHES AMPLE COVER FOR VISIT AS L-9 COULD BE INQUIRING ABOUT RETENTION INMIGRADO STATUS. ONCE INSIDE, L-9 COULD BE GIVEN NOTE FROM C/O. FIRST LINE OF NOTE WOULD BE WARNING NOT SAY ANYTHING COMPROMISING SINCE EMBASSY PROBABLY BUGGED BY MHGUILE. NOTE WOULD CONTAIN PITCH FOR REACTIVATION AND OUTLINE COMMO ARRANGEMENTS. L-9 COULD MAKE WRITTEN REPLY AND GIVE TO L-2 FOR TRANSMITTAL TO C/O.

7. IF L-9 WILLING COOPERATE, COULD ARRANGE BECOME ACTIVE MEMBER MEXICAN/PBRUMEN CULTURAL SOCIETY FOR WHICH HAS EXCELLENT

SECRET

SECRET

COVER. THIS WOULD ENABLE HIM KEEP IN TOUCH WITH L-2.

8. BELIEVE C/O COULD ARRANGE HAVE L-2 AGREE GIVE L-9 ASYLUM IN CASE L-9 SITUATION EVER PRECARIOUS. THIS PLUS REVELATION TO L-9 THAT HE HAS 4,800 DOLLARS IN ESCROW AND PROSPECTS ADDING SIGNIFICANTLY TO THIS NESTEGG MIGHT HELP TIP SCALES IN FAVOR L-9 RENEWED COOPERATION IN PLACE.

9. PROPOSE PAY OFF L-2 BY ARRANGING FOR PROMINENT WOLADY VINICULTURIST TO VISIT L-2 VINEYARDS ZACATECAS ON ALL EXPENSE PAID (BY WOFACT) TRIP TO ADVISE L-2 HOW TO INCREASE YIELD AND QUALITY HIS GRAPES. NO MONEY WOULD BE PAID TO L-2 THUS PRESERVING HIS DIGNITY.

10. ALL ABOVE PREDICATED ON (A) SPECIFIC AGREEMENT BY HQS TO VIOLATION LNGOLD RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE MEXICAN DIPLOMATS, AND (B) ESTIMATE BY STATION THAT L-2 WOULD NOT TELL MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT OPERATION. BELIEVE FLAP POTENTIAL COULD BE LESSENED BY HAVING BARKER DO PITCHING OF L-2 ON TDY TRIP AFTER LEAVING MEXICO PCS. OP WOULD THUS HAVE NON-MEXICO BASE WHICH COULD LESSEN CHANCES BLOWBACK TO STATION AND CHIEF LNPURE.

11. HQS COMMENTS WOULD BE APPRECIATED. SECRET

SECRET

BT

NNNN

Additional Point: to alleviate L-9 initial scare, the cover story (& possibly for hypothetical "bug" on line) include innocuous & realistic sounding explanation receiving note from L-2

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~

a. I.E. L-9 so hypersensitive he will not stand thought of "insane Mexican" ~~[illegible]~~ being knowledgeable of ~~any~~ any L-9 ~~[illegible]~~ activity out of ordinary. L-2 must appear to L-9 to be "unwitting".

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: >4

ORIG: Martin Graves/jp
UNIT: WH/Cuba/FI/IO
EXT: 3553
DATE: 2 August 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-772091 201-329609

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	TC —	5	MO
2		6	CI
3	[illegible]	7	C
4	[illegible]	8	[illegible]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY 56 PER ______ # ______

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/C 5 RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE UR1/SD, C/WH 6, C/EUR 4 C/CI, C/FI 2, C/OPSER

SECRET

3 21 32 Z CITE DIRECTOR 25242

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: MADRID JMWAVE

RYBAT TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL AMCRASH

REF: DIR 89222 (18 MARCH 1966)*

1. VIEW DECREASING LIKELIHOOD LITAMIL-9 TRAVEL ABROAD AND HIS CONTINUING USEFUL ACCESS INSIDE PBRUMEN, ESPECIALLY AS BROTHER-IN-LAW FORMER AMTHUG PERSONAL SECRETARY, WISH INITIATE SECURE METHOD REACTIVATION. REQUEST COMMENTS FOLLOWING PROPOSAL.

2. CLYDE K. SHRYOCK, FORMER MEXICO CO WHO RECRUITED L-9, IN POSSESSION SEVERAL BOOKS RECEIVED FROM HIM AS PERSONAL GIFTS. WOACRE HAS EVALUATED FIRST TWO BLANK PAGES OF ONE BOOK AS IDEAL S/W CARRIER. THESE TWO PAGES COULD CARRY DETAILED PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM SHRYOCK URGING L-9 RENEWED ASSISTANCE AND REASSURING HIM THAT SECURE COMMO METHOD AVAILABLE. IN VIEW WELL-KNOWN L-9 FEAR COMPROMISE AND REFUSAL EVEN DISCUSS S/W TRAINING, PITCH NEED BE CAUTIOUS AND CAREFULLY TAILORED. MESSAGE WOULD INSTRUCT

RELEASING OFFICER 3-2 0545

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 25242

TO L-9 MAKE AGREEMENT RENEWED COOPERATION KNOWN THROUGH OPEN CODE MESSAGE TO LITAMIL-17, A BROTHER RESIDENT IN MEXICO.

3. ORDER AVOID NEGATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF RECEIVING OPEN TEXT DIRECTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT FROM THIRD PERSON OR THROUGH OPEN MAILS, WOACRE WOULD REMOVE PAGE FROM BOOK AND REPLACE WITH ONE IDENTICAL IN APPEARANCE BUT CONTAINING SMALL CHANGE IN TEXT. CHANGE WOULD REQUEST L-9 TREAT BLANK PAGES TO REVEAL PERSONAL MESSAGE. PROPERLY TIMED LETTER FROM L-17 WOULD SECURELY DRAW BROTHER'S ATTENTION THIS PASSAGE.

4. FOR SOLUTION PROBLEM DELIVERING TAMPERED BOOK TO L-9, RECOMMEND USE OF AMCRASH-1. POSSIBLE SEND BOOK INTERNATIONAL MAILS OR HAVE INTERNAL MAILING BY THIRD PERSON WITH ~~NO CHANCE~~ MINIMUM CHANCE DISCOVERY, BUT USE OF A-1 WOULD BE FIRST STEP DEVELOPMENT COURIER SYSTEM WHICH TO BE BACKBONE L-9 COMMO. A-1 FRIEND OF TARGET AND PLAUSIBLY COULD HAND-CARRY BOOK L-9. IF A-1 RELUCTANT MAKE PERSONAL CONTACT, OR THIS APPROACH CONSIDERED AT TIME UNNECESSARY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG
UNIT
EXT
DATE

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

PAGE THREE

CITE DIRECTOR 25242

TO

EXPOSURE A-1, HE COULD MAKE INTERNAL MAILING WITH SHORT SHRYOCK EXPLANATORY NOTE ENCLOSED. IF A-1 AGREES PERSONAL DELIVERY, STORY COULD BE THAT HE APPROACHED BY UNKNOWN WHO ASKED HE CARRY BOOK TO L-9 FROM OLD FRIEND "TOMAS" (TRUE NAME BY WHICH SHRYOCK KNOWN TO AGENT).

5. CRUCIAL FACTOR WOULD BE TESTING AND CONTROL A-1 DURING DELIVERY OF BOOK. REQUEST MEXICO AND MADRID ASSESSMENTS A-1 BONA FIDES THIS TASK. THOROUGH SGSWIRL ADVISABLE BOTH BEFORE BRIEFING AND ON NEXT TRIP OUT, PRIOR TO L-17 TRIGGERING LETTER. FIRST STEP IN WHOLE SEQUENCE WOULD BE ELICITING AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY A-1 ADMISSION FRIENDSHIP WITH L-9.

6. AT PRESENT JUNCTURE L-9 OP HOLDS LITTLE PROSPECT SUBSTANTIVE PRODUCTION. BELIEVE LITTLE COULD BE LOST IN ABOVE PROPOSAL, AND RISK TO BOTH PARTIES MINIMAL. HQS ASSESSMENT THAT BEST CHANCE ACQUIRE L-9 COOPERATION INSIDE PBRUMEN IF CONTACT PERSONAL AND NO PHYSICAL EVIDENCE INVOLVED, I. E., CARBONS, PADS, ETC. IF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 25242

PAGE FOUR

REACTIVATION SUCCESSFUL AND CAREFULLY PLANNED COURIER SYSTEM INITIATED, THIS CONSIDERABLE STEP FORWARD PBRUMEN RESIDENT AGENT ACTIVITY.

END OF MESSAGE

*Hqs wishes reiterate need protect LITAMIL-9 until all factors AMCRASH-1 contact with L-9 weighed.

AC/WH/C/FI H. Mahoney (in draft)
WH/C/MO E J Chiocca
WH/C/RR/MHAPRON J. U. Roberts
E/IB/S
WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 27 de Junio de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

Como sabemos en su poder las bases y propósitos de la recion integrada "Agrupación de Intelectuales Españoles Amigos de Cuba" le sugerimos que, como primer paso, escriban Uds. a los mismos; estimulándolos en su labor.

Le rogamos no envíen las comunicaciones directamente sino a través de esta Dirección, e igual procediento debemos seguir para el envío de los materiales que la institución que Ud. representa envía a los mencionados intelectuales de acuerdo con el plan trazado por los mismos.

La documentación que ellos remitan vendrá a esta Dirección y la haremos llegar a Ud. de inmediato.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE" "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

Al Comp. Jesús Díaz,
Dpto. de Filosofía de la Universidad de la Habana.
Habana.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

ORIG: RAY SWIDER:sck
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 17 JUNE 1966

☐ FILE NO.
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 15 PER #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/8, FI, FI/INT 2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 20 15 47Z

CITE DIRECTOR 13687

(ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC

REF. DIR 12012

SUGGEST STATION HAVE BROTHER QUERY LITAMIL-9 RE VERACITY REF REPORT. APPRECIATE SECURITY PROBLEMS BUT FEEL THAT CAREFULLY WORDED OPEN LETTERS MAY RESULT VALUABLE INFO THIS CASE AND FUTURE CASES.

END OF MESSAGE

416 Cnce

WH/C/MO

C/WH/C/FI T.J.Hazlett (in draft)

C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

20-2

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

IRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 7 de Junio de 1966

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de referirme a su atenta communicación No. [illegible].S.957/65, dirigida al compañero Carlos Lechuga, Presidente del Consejo Nacional de Cultura.

En relación a dicha comunicación, la cual trata sobre Aniversarios de Personalidades Eminentes y Acontecimientos Notables que la Unesco deberá conmemorar internacionalmente en el bienio 1967 - 1968.

La Dirección Nacional de Bibliotecas, sugiere los nombres de:

Madame de Staël, escritora francesa, 1766-1817.
Tristan Bernard, 1866-1947.

Al mismo tiempo tambien le trasladamos las sugestiones de la Comición Nacional de la Academia de Ciencias, de las Direcciones, Nacional de Artes Plásticas, de Teatro y Danza, y de Música; así como la del Departamento de Literatura.(las cuales aparecen en los anexos que se adjuntan).

NEXOS: listas sobre Aniversarios de Personalidades
Eminentes y acontecimientos notables para el
bienio 1967-1968.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

Fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

Comp. Manuel Corrales, Secretario Permanente
de la Comisión Nacional Cubana de la Unesco.
Ave. Kohly No. 151. Nuevo Vedado.

(para el bienio 1967-1968
se preparó otra, con la participación de todas las Direcciones
incluyendo la Biblioteca. Las
copias se encuentran el el archivo de esta Dirección.

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

(Anexo a la Nota No.________)

ANIVERSARIOS CULTURALES
PARA CELEBRAR EN 1966

Nombres y Apellidos.	Datos Biográficos.	Fecha del Aniversario.
Miguel de Cervantes	1547-1616 escritor español	350 aniversario de su muerte.
Rubén Darío.	1867-1916, escritor y poeta nicaragüense.	cincuentenario de su muerte.
Roman Rolland.	1866-1944, escritor francés. Premio Nobel.	centenario de su nacimiento.
Erasmo de Rotterdam.	1466-1536, humanista holandés.	500 aniversario de su nacimiento.
G.W. Leibtnitz.	1646-1716, filósofo, matemático y físico alemán nacido en Leipzig.	250 aniversario de su muerte.
Sun Yat Sen.	1866-1925, hombre político, ex-Presidente de China.	centenario de su nacimiento.
Gerge Cosbuc.	gran poeta rumano. 1866-1918.	100 aniversario de su nacimiento.
Shota Reustaveli.	gran poeta georgiano, 25 de Septb. 1166.	800 aniversario de su nacimiento.
Pentcho Slevikov.	27 de Abril de 1866 22 de Mayo de 1912 gran poeta búlgaro.	centenario de su nacimiento.
John Dalton.	1766-1844 Físico-Químico y Naturalista inglés.	bicentenario de su nacimiento.
Erik Satie.	compositor francés. 1866-1925.	centenario de su nacimiento.

(estas en su mayoría, son recomendadas, por el Movimiento por la Paz)

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 13 de Abril de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de acusarle recibo de la comunicación No. R.S.294 de fecha 5 de Mayo del corriente; la cual acompaña documentación del Consejo Internacional de Música, Rotterdam, Países Bajos.

En relación a dicha documentación, esta nos ha sido remitida con fecha 5 do Mayo; resultando por lo tanto demasiado tarde para cumplimentar la invitación que se nos hace.

Para haber participado era necesario enviar primoramente con fecha de antes del 1ro. de Abril, un informe sobre actividades cubriendo los años 1965-1966.

Nos interesa poder concurrir a un evento como este, pero necesitamos ser informados con tiempo suficiente.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director,-

Comp. Manuel Corrales.
Secretario Permanente de la Comisión Nacional
Cubana de la Unesco.
Ave. Kohly 151 esq. a 32. Nuevo Vedado.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA ____________________

DE: ____________________ A: ____________________
ASUNTO

Compañero Dr. Corona:

Informa el Dr. Corrales en conversación que sostuve con él en la tarde de ayer que, se pagaron $ 800.00 (dólares) en la forma que se describe a continuación:

A.I.A.P. (Artes Plásticas)	$ 150.00	año 1964
I.T.I. (Teatro)	$ 250.00	" 62 y 63
C.I.M. (Música)	$ 400.00	" " "
Total pagado	$ 800.00	

---

se deben:

A.I.A.P.	$ 10.00	año 1963
"	$ 150.00	" 1965
	$ 160.00	
hay que planificar este año para 66, es necesario pagar lo atrasado lo más pronto posible; al finalizar 1966 se deberán	$ 150.00	
	$ 310.00	

I.T.I.	se deben	$ 200.00	año 1964
	"	$ 200.00	" 1965
	pendientes	$ 200.00	para 66
	Total	$ 600.00	

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
SEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA ____________________

DE: ____________________ A: ____________________

ASUNTO

C.I.M. se deben ———————— $ 200.00 año 1964
$ 200.00 " 1965
pendiente $ 200.00 para 66
Total ———————— $ 600.00

---

el PEN CLUB no ha pasado la cuenta del
año pasado la cual asciende a ———— $ 22.00
más ———————— $ 22.00 para el año 66
Total ———— $ 44.00

I.C.O.M.O.S. (Monum. y
lugares Hist.) tiene una cuota
anual de $20.00., y debe 20.00 año 1965
más ———— $ 20.00 para el año 66
Total ——— $ 40.00

I.C.O.M. (Museos) tiene una cuota anual
de $36.00., y debe ———— $ 36.00 año 1963
$ 36.00 " 1964
$ 36.00 " 1965
más ——— $ 36.00 para el año 66
Total ——— $ 144.00

Alberú
Feb. 10/66.

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

Marianao, 8 de Diciembre de 1965
"AÑO DE LA AGRICULTURA"

Comp. María T. Freyre de Andrade,
Directora de la Biblioteca Nacional
"José Martí", Plaza de la Revolución,
Habana.

Estimada compañera:

[illegible] solicitarle la colaboración de la Biblioteca "José Martí" que usted dirige, a fin de componer en la parte, en la que esta Biblioteca nos pueda ayudar: una lista de ANIVERSARIOS, CONMEMORACIONES Y ACONTECIMIENTOS NOTABLES.

La lista debe contener proposiciones de conmemoraciones que estime aconsejable se celebren, incluyendo personalidades y acontecimientos de relevancia mundial, tanto nacionales como internacionales. También dichas proposiciones deberán contener breves noticias de las personalidades y los acontecimientos señalados.

Esta colaboración servirá para confeccionar el calendario bienal de celebraciones de la Unesco, que debe prepararse en 1966, por lo cual le rogamos nos remita sus proposiciones a más tardar el [illegible] de Enero de 1966.

Con gracias anticipadas por la colaboración que nos pueda brindar, quedo de usted con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS"

Fraternalmente

Dr. Eduardo Corona
Director.

Con copia a -
✓ Pérez [illegible] -
✓ [illegible] -
✓ [illegible]
✓ [illegible] -
✓ M. T. Freyre de Andrade B.N. -

[illegible] informe aquí.-

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA Noviembre 24 de 1965
AÑO DE LA AGRICULTURA.

DE: ______________________ A: ______________________

ASUNTO

En relación con el Proyecto ORIENTE-OCCIDENTE, de la UNESCO, la Dirección General de Música del Consejo Nacional de Cultura, aclara que esta Dirección no ha sido invitada a participar en ese proyecto. Que sepamos, la única actividad relativa a la misma fué el ciclo organizado por la Comisión Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO, en la Biblioteca Nacional sobre diversos aspectos de las culturas orientales, incluyendo una conferencia ilustrada sobre la música del Oriente por Edgardo Martín. Todos los datos en este respecto obran en poder de la Comisión Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO; Los conciertos dirigidos por el director chino Li Te-lun y otras actividades relacionadas con la cultura de países orientales, no fueron en su oportunidad anunciados como parte del Proyecto Oriente-Occidente.

intervinieron
Carlos López
Fariñas
Pérez Sentenat
Edgardo Martín
Gilberto Rodríguez

preguntar si tambien debemos reflejar la divulgación de la cultura cubana en esos países de Oriente.

informa Raquel Guillén
que no se informe [illegible]
pues nos informan
ellos a nosotros.

CONFIDENCIAL

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

La Habana, 22 de Septiembre de 1969
"AÑO DE LA AGRICULTURA"

Compañero, Dr. Raúl Roa García
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores,
Vedado.

Estimado compañero:

En relación a su Nota No. 1444 del 17 de Septiembre del corriente; me place informarle que la Dirección de Relaciones Culturales con el Extranjero tiene conocimiento de que los libros están en Ciudad Méjico desde hace unos días.

Alberto Martínez, de Cubartimpex se comunicará hoy con el compañero de Cubartimpex en Méjico, para averiguar si han [illegible] el permiso. El año pasado no dieron la autorización necesaria no obstante que los libros llegaron a tiempo.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", me repito de usted,

Fraternalmente

Presidente del Consejo
Nacional de Cultura.

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 15 de Diciembre de 1969

Sr. [illegible], Consejero
[illegible] Embajada de la R.P. de
[illegible]
Calle [illegible] No.252 esquina a 11,
Vedado

Estimado Consejero y amigo:

En relación a la conversación que en fecha reciente tuve el gusto de sostener con usted; me es grato remitirle dos paquetes conteniendo libros.

Los libros de referencia tratan diferentes aspectos sobre la literatura y la historia de mi país.

Siendo los deseos de esta Dirección y el mío propio haberlo complacido, aprovechamos esta oportunidad para expresarle nuestros saludos revolucionarios.

Fraternalmente

Luis Alberú
J. Protocolo

[illegible] DE [illegible]
NACIONAL DE CULTURA
[illegible]

La Habana, 16 de Mayo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

[illegible]

[illegible] el gusto de remitir a Ud. un programa [illegible] acto celebrado en el Teatro "[illegible]" [illegible] del corriente, para conmemorar el centenario [illegible] del gran poeta búlgaro [illegible]; el cual [illegible] bajo los auspicios del Consejo Nacional de Cultura, [illegible] Comisión Nacional Cubana de la [illegible] y la [illegible], [illegible] de Bulgaria.

[illegible] el acto el compañero Félix Pita Rodríguez, quien [illegible] palabras se refirió a la vida y obra del [illegible], ofreciéndose a continuación un programa artístico [illegible] de los bailarines [illegible], Vera Kirova y Asen [illegible], y destacados músicos búlgaros que se encontraban en nuestro país. El programa contó [illegible] con la colaboración de los cantantes cubanos Armando Pico [illegible]; Loipa Araujo y Azari Plisetski del Ballet [illegible] y cuyas obras interpretadas así como la de los cantantes y la de los bailarines mencionados, aparecen en el programa que se anexa.

Entre los concurrentes que llenó el teatro totalmente [illegible] lugar el Cuerpo Diplomático, al [illegible] Embajador de Bulgaria, [illegible] quien asistió con toda la misión diplomática [illegible] país en Cuba; es de destacar [illegible] a los técnicos [illegible] al Embajador de Checoslovaquia [illegible] Suiza, de [illegible] de Yugoeslavia. [illegible] ral [illegible]; al Director de la [illegible] Secretario [illegible] Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO, respectivamente.

Continúa en la hoja 2

el compañero [illegible] Moreno, Secretario del Movimiento por la Paz; representaciones de [illegible]; y por la D. de Relaciones Internacionales del [illegible] el compañero [illegible] y el que informa, asistiendo también [illegible] número de becados que con su presencia contribuyeron [illegible] plano de fraternal recordación en que se desarrolló el homenaje al gran poeta búlgaro a que nos hemos referido.

[illegible] revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", [illegible] de Ud.

o: Un programa [illegible]
centenario del poeta búlgaro
Pentcho Slaveikov.

Fraternalmente,

es de anotarse entre los concurrentes al Consejero y al Jefe del Frente de Vietnam del Sur; así como al Embajador de México, el Embajador de Corea y el de Mongolia.

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

Comp. Ernesto [illegible], Embajador de Cuba en la R.P. de Bulgaria.
Embajada de [illegible] Sofía.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
DC/WH/C

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
O PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/LITAMIL-9/Operational Progress Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-27048, ~~1~~ Sep 65

1. LITAMIL-7 reported on 6 May 1966 that Identity A told her a few days earlier that LITAMIL-9 is well, has put on some weight, and is working hard at Identity B where he works for Identity C. This information came as a result of LITAMIL-7 having asked Identity A about how LITAMIL-9 was getting along. The general tone of Identity A's remarks about LITAMIL-9 indicated that she seems to be favorably disposed toward him.

2. The Station has had no recent contact with LITAMIL-17 who is LITAMIL-9's brother. It is assumed that should he hear anything of interest concerning LITAMIL-9, he will report it promptly to the C/O.

3. It is recalled that when LITAMIL-9 left Mexico for PBRUMEN in March 1965 he told his C/O he would, by hook or by crook, find some way to get back to Mexico within 23 months lest he lose his inmigrado status in Mexico. It is assumed that he is exploring every angle to make his escape and one possibility that comes to mind is that he might try to wangle a connection with the PBRUMEN pavilion at the 1967 Canadian International Fair in an effort to break out. Owing to his well-known non-Communist beliefs, it would seem that he has almost no chance to secure a diplomatic assignment.

Lawrence F. Barker
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment: (under separate cover)
Identities

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 8 JUN 1966

Distribution:
2 - WH
1 - DC/WH/C

1 att

CS COPY

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28953	17 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-329609

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment
to HMMA-28953

Identities:

A - Mercedes MORALES de LE RIVERAND, Official of the Cuban National Cultural Council, in Mexico on business since April 1966.

B - The Cuban National Cultural Council.

C - Carlos LECHUGA Hevia.

Distribution:
2 - WH
1 - DC/WH/C

SECRET

S/C ATT. 1 TO HMMA 28953

CS COPY

201-329609

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

[illegible]

La Habana, 16 de Mayo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

[illegible]

[illegible] el gusto de remitir a Ud. un programa-invitación [illegible] al acto celebrado en el Teatro "Amadeo Roldán" [illegible] del corriente, para conmemorar el Centenario [illegible] del gran poeta búlgaro Pentcho Slaveikov; el cual [illegible] bajo los auspicios del Consejo Nacional de Cultura, [illegible] Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO, la UNEAC, el Pen Club [illegible] Embajada de Bulgaria.

Abrió el acto el compañero Félix Pita Rodríguez, quien a [illegible] breves palabras se refirió a la vida y obra del poeta búlgaro, [illegible] ofreciéndose a continuación un programa artístico con interpretaciones de los bailarines [illegible] Koldamova, [illegible], Vera Kirova y Asen Gavrilov, y destacados músicos búlgaros que se encontraban en nuestro país. El programa contó [illegible] colaboración de los cantantes cubanos Armando Pico y Humberto Díaz; Loipa Arango y Azari Plisetski del Ballet Nacional de Cuba y cuyas obras interpretadas así como la de los cantantes y la de los bailarines mencionados, aparecen en el programa [illegible].

Entre los concurrentes que llenó el teatro totalmente anotamos [illegible] en primer lugar al Cuerpo Diplomático, al Excmo. Embajador de Bulgaria, Atanás Kalbov quien asistió con toda la Misión diplomática de ese país en Cuba;; es de anotarse tambien a los técnicos de ese país; al Embajador de Checoeslovaquia, de Suiza, de la RAU así como el de Yugoeslavia. Al Consejero Cultural de la Embajada de la URSS; al Director de la Nacional y al Secretario de la Comisión Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO, respectivamente;

Continua en la hoja 2

al compañero Martínez Moreno, Secretario del Movimiento por la Paz; representaciones de masas; y por la D. de Relaciones Internacionales del CNC el compañero Alberú y el que informa, asistiendo también [illegible] número de becados que con su presencia contribuyeron al [illegible] clima de fraternal recordación en que se desarrolló el homenaje al gran poeta búlgaro a que nos hemos referido.

[illegible] revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", [illegible]

n programa-invitación sobre el
centenario del poeta [illegible]
Pencho Slaveikov.

Fraternalmente,

e de anotarse entre los con
urrentes al Consejero y al Jefe
[illegible];
í como al Embajador de [illegible]
Embajador de [illegible] y el de
[illegible].

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

• Ernesto Meléndez [illegible] Embajador de Cuba en la Rep. de Bulgaria.
Embajada de Cuba [illegible] Sofía.

([illegible])

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 30 de Mayo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

Tenemos el gusto de informarle que con motivo del 1ro. de Julio, Fiesta Nacional del Canadá, se llevará a cabo con la Embajada de ese país, el programa que se detalla a continuación.

Junio 27, 9:p.m. - Teatro "Amadeo Roldán", interpretación por la Orquesta Sinfónica Nacional de la obra "Trois Pièces", del compositor canadiense Jean Papineau Couture. (esta obra se interpretará en Cuba por primera vez).

Junio 28, 9:p.m. - Transmisión por T.V. de parte del programa del "Amadeo Roldán", que incluye "Trois Pièces".

Junio 30, 8:p.m. - Palacio de Bellas Artes, inauguración de la exposición de "Grabados Esquimales"

Junio 30, 9:p.m. - Teatro del Palacio de Bellas Artes, proyección con películas canadienses.

El programa de referencia se organizó de acuerdo con las previas conversaciones llevadas al efecto con el Sr. Embajador Leon Mayrand.

El Sr. Embajador Mayrand, quien se muestra muy complacido, nos ha expresado su deseo de asumir como contribución personal suya, los gastos que ocasionen los derechos de autor de la obra que se interpretará "Trois Pièces", mencionada en el programa.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

Fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

Compº. Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada,
Director de la Dirección Regional I (América)
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Vedado.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 2 de Junio de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de dirigirme a Ud. al efecto de remitirle [illegible] con esta comunicación, los programas y artículos de prensa [illegible] hasta el presente con motivo de la Exposición de [illegible] Rumana Contemporánea.

Dicha exposición cumplimenta el punto 19 del Convenio Cultural, y se organizó bajo el patrocinio conjunto del Consejo Nacional de Cultura y la Embajada de la República Socialista de Rumanía; quedando inaugurada el 27 de Mayo próximo pasado.

La Embajada ofreció un cóctel, y entre los asistentes a la inauguración señalamos a los Embajadores de Rumanía, Corea y de los Países Bajos; Consejero Cultural de la Embajada de la URSS, Funcionarios de las Embajadas de Indonesia y China; el Jefe del Dpto. de Países Balcánicos del Minrex, compañero Mario Betancourt y la responsable de Rumanía del propio Minrex compañera Melba Arce; los pintores Portocarrero, Martínez Pedro, Vidal, Sandú Darié y muchas personas más.

Pronunciaron breves palabras, Vasili Avram, Jefe de Exposiciones del Comité Estatal para las Relaciones Culturales con el Extranjero de la Rep. Soc. de Rumanía y Miguel Collazo por el CNC respectivamente, estando presentes los compañeros responsables de la Dir. Nacional de Artes Plásticas así como también los compañeros de la Dirección de Relaciones Internacionales del CNC, Dr. Elpidio Hernández, Luis Alburú y el que informa.

NEXO: 1 tarjeta invitación, 1 catálogo de la Exposición, 1 hoja con recortes de periódicos y 1 artículo de prensa.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud, Fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

Comp. Manuel E. Yepe Menéndez,
Embajador de Cuba en la R. S. de
Rumanía.
Embajada de Cuba en Rumanía, Bucarest.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 29 de Junio de 1966

Muy estimado compañero Embajador y amigo:

Deseo comunicarle que, en los próximos días cesaré en mis funciones como Director de Relaciones Internacionales del Consejo Nacional de Cultura. Labores [illegible] que se me han asignado en la Universidad de La Habana de la que soy profesor de Derecho Internacional, me obligan a dejar el cargo que por dos años he tenido el alto honor de desempeñar.

Deseo expresar a Ud. y por su conducto a los compañeros [illegible] de esa Embajada vinculados con nuestro trabajo, mi satisfacción por las relaciones que hemos mantenido y las actividades que hayamos podido realizar en conjunto.

De Ud. con la mayor consideración y aprecio,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.

Excmo. Sr. Bat-Ochirin Dotob,
Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario
de la República Popular de Mongolia.
Calle 15 No. 812, esq. a 4. Vedado.

[illegible]UBA

[illegible] INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 13 de Julio de 1966

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de dirigirme a Ud, para informarle de dos actividades culturales que se llevaron a cabo recientemente por este Consejo, con motivo del 1ro. de Julio, Fiesta Nacional del Canadá.

Dichas actividades culturales se realizaron conjuntamente con la Embajada de ese país, como las tarjetas-invitación que se anexan lo indican, interpretándose por la Orquesta Sinfónica Nacional y en el Teatro Amadeo Roldán, en el concierto dedicado a la festividad de referencia, la obra Trois Pièces, del compositor canadiense Jean Papineau Couture.

Además y con dicho motivo, se halla actualmente y en una de las salas del Palacio Nacional de Bellas Artes, una exposición de Grabados Esquimales, la cual fué inaugurada el 1ro. de Julio por el Encargado de Negocios a.i., de la Embajada del Canadá, Mr. Alan McLaine, y quien gentilmente destacó en su alocución su contento por la realización de las dos actividades de referencia. En su intervención, el compañero Dr. [illegible], a la sazón Director de esta Dirección, expresó, [illegible] a la fecha de celebración que estas dos [illegible] de arte y cultura, estrechan las relaciones culturales entre los dos países.

El Cuerpo Diplomático, fué especialmente invitado, y recordamos entre los que estuvieron presentes, tanto en el concierto como en el acto de inauguración, al diplomático canadiense Mr. [illegible], de quien nos hemos referido; a los Embajadores [illegible] Bajos, y de Yugoeslavia; a los Encar-

sigue en la hoja 2

l Comp. [illegible], Embajador de Cuba en el Canadá.
[illegible]

a los [illegible] del Estado de Israel, y de la [illegible] de la Santa Sede y a los Agregados Cultu[illegible] Embajadas del Canadá, Polonia, Alemania, [illegible] Checoslovaquia, los que, acompañados de [illegible] la presencia de los compañeros, [illegible], Alejo Carpentier, [illegible], Natalia [illegible], [illegible] y Margarita Ruiz, así como también el Dr. [illegible] Hernández y Luis Alberní de esta Dirección, [illegible] compañeros de nuestro mundo intelectual que, [illegible] nuestras instituciones revolucionarias y cultu[illegible].

Por Televisión y en programa dedicado al efecto, se repitió parte del programa del Amadeo Roldán y que incluyó la obra [illegible]. Para la inauguración de la exposición de los [illegible], la Embajada ofreció un cóctel, proyectándose a continuación y en el teatro que se halla en el mismo edificio, un documental a colores con temas esquimales, a la que concurrió la mayoría del público que estuvo en dicha inauguración.

La Embajada, se muestra complacida por las atenciones recibidas en ambas actividades culturales señaladas, las que seguramente serán, un incentivo, para el acrecentamiento de las relaciones culturales entre Cuba y el Canadá.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

Fraternalmente,

Manuel Vega,
Director.-

ANEXO: 3 hojas con anuncios
y artículos de prensa,
así como 2 folletos o
programa, que tratan
de la Exposición y del
Concierto, a que nos
hemos referido.

Comp. Américo Cruz Fernández Embajador de Cuba en el Canadá.
Embajada de Cuba. Ottawa, Canadá.

[illegible]
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION D[illegible] [illegible]ACIONALES

La Habana, 29 de Julio de 1965

Muy [illegible] Sr. Embajador:

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a Ud, al objeto de [illegible]rle información, sobre el próximo programa a real[illegible] la Exposición de Grabados Suecos.

Por tal motivo, nos place poner a su disposición, [illegible] programa o itinerario para el tercer trimestre, [illegible] provincia, para que por medio de las galerías de arte allí existentes, se vaya dando una mayor difusión [illegible], de la excelente obra de los artistas grabadores suecos.

- Galería de Matanzas, 8 - 28 de Agosto.
- [illegible] de Santa Clara, 5 - 25 de Septiembre.

Al mismo tiempo, no quisiera [illegible] presar[illegible], la satisfacción que nos [illegible], esta nueva [illegible] que se nos ofrece, de cooperar [illegible] la divulgación [illegible], de esta excelente muestra, [illegible]

[illegible] con la más alta consideración,

Manuel Vega,
Director.-

l Excmo. Sr. [illegible], Embajador Extraordinario y
Plenipotenciario [illegible] Reino de Suecia.
Infanta No. [illegible], [illegible] piso. Ciudad.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 20 de Julio de 1966

Muy estimado Sr. Embajador:

Conociendo su amabilidad, me permito solicitarle atentamente y en calidad de préstamo, por [illegible] días, el documental cinematográfico "Jardines de la Infancia".

Dicho documental, es para ser utilizado por los instructores de arte, que pasan cursillo en la Escuela Nacional de Dirigentes de Pioneros.

Excusándonos de antemano por esta molestia, le agradecemos Sr. Embajador, la atención que pueda prestar a esta solicitud.

Quedo de Ud, con la más alta consideración,

Manuel Vega
Director.-

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE [illegible] INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 12 de Agosto de 1966

Muy estimado Sr. Consejero:

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a Ud, al objeto de ofre[illegible] información de las actividades culturales realizadas [illegible] exposición fotográfica "La Comedia Francesa", gentil[illegible] proporcionada por esa Embajada.

HABANA

Lugar: Museo de Artes Decorativas
Fecha: Abril 22 - Julio 30, 1965.
Visitantes: 4,023

PROVINCIA DE SANTA CLARA

Lugar: Casa de la Cultura de Yaguajay
Fecha: 10 de Dic. - 12 de Enero, 1966.
Visitantes: 800

Lugar: Biblioteca de Santa Clara
Fecha: 26 de Febrero - 26 de Marzo, 1966.
Visitantes: 2,577. Tambien la profesora de Artes Manuales, Aida Ida Morales, ofreció una charla a los alumnos del Círculo de Interés de la Secundaria Básica "Antonio Pino Machado".

En cuanto al material que forma la exposición, este se encuentra al cuidado del Director del Museo de Artes Decorativas, Sr. Angel Martí, quien lo tiene a la amable disposición de Ud, en el Museo.

Al mismo tiempo le agradecemos Sr. Consejero, la cooperación que siempre nos brinda, y nos es grato de comunicarle la [illegible]facción de esta Dirección, al haber mostrado la exposición [illegible]rencia, que de manera gráfica, dió a conocer al público [illegible] que la visitó, la [illegible] representativo del [illegible] de Francia.

De Ud, con la más alta consideración,

Manuel [illegible]
Director

Al Sr. René [illegible] Consejero de la
Embajada [illegible] República de Francia.
Calle [illegible], Vedado.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 12 de Agosto de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

En relación a su atenta Nota No.310 [illegible], de Junio [illegible] de 1966.

Tenemos el gusto de informarle, que con fecha [illegible] de Julio del corriente, le remitimos a través del Minrex, [illegible] conteniendo libros de niños, editados por la Editora Juvenil.

Tambien, y con fecha de hoy, le estamos enviando [illegible] folletos (iguales) mimeografiados, que son un extracto informativo sobre dichos libros. Una vez examinados por Ud, el contenido de los folletos, si los cree útil para la Embajada, [illegible] tomar uno o dos ejemplares.

Con los ejemplares de referencia, se cumplimenta la solicitud del caricaturista Shankar Pillai, hecha por medio de esa Embajada, y por la cual estamos invitados a participar en la International Childrn's Books Exhibition, que se celebrará en el mes de Noviembre de este año, New Delhi, India.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

fraternalmente,

Manuel E. Vega,
Director.-

1 Comp. [illegible] Mora Martínez, Encargado de Negocios a.i.,
de la Embajada de Cuba en la India.
Embajada de Cuba. Nueva Delhi, India.

RELACION DE TELEFONOS DIRECTOS Y EXTENSIONES DE PIZARRA DEL CNC

DIRECTOS

80-8661	Presidencia
80-8649	Sectorial Ext. Cultural
80-8666	Sectorial de Actividades
80-8664	Sectorial de Economía
80-8665	Sectorial Servicios (Divulgación)
61-2405	R. Relaciones Internacionales
80-8665	Dir. Divulgación

PIZARRA

Rotativo ------------- 80-3920 al 80-3929

Rotativo ------------- 80-3940 al 80-3944

EXTENSIONES

110	Divulgación (Coordinadora
111	Pizarra
112	Personal (Responsable del Dpto.)
113	Dir. Sectorial Economía
114	Puerta Principal (Información)
115	Relaciones Internacionales
116	Dir. Sectorial Ext. Cultural
117	Dpto. Abastecimiento Nacional
118	Literatura e Investigaciones Socio Culturales
119	Teatro Infantil
120	Promoción
121	Prensa (Divulgación)
122	Medios Básicos (Divulgación)
123	Coordinación de Planificación
124	Radio y Electricidad
125	Dirección de Artes Plásticas
126	Registro de Entrada
127	Aficionados
128	Dibujantes
129	Dirección Nacional de Escuelas
130	
131	Dtor. Sectorial de Actividades
132	Promoción (invitaciones)
133	Dirección de Teatro y Danza
160	Personal Teatro y Danza
161	Presidencia

162	Finanzas (Presupuesto)
163	Finanzas (Responsable)
164	Abastecimiento Organismo Central
165	Dirección de Música
166	Música
167	Artes Plásticas
168	Dirección de Artes Plásticas
169	Dirección de Teatro y Danza
170	Extensión Cultural
171	Dirección Sectorial de Servicios
172	Dirección Relaciones Internacionales
173	Personal
174	Servicios Administrativos
175	Divulgación
176	Servicios Administrativos (Responsable)
177	Caja (Finanzas)
178	Coordinación CNC Mined
179	Organización y Comprobación
181	Archivo General

Servicios Administrativos
16-5-66

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 3 de Mayo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Comp. Rolando Masvidal
Jefe del Sectorial de Actividades
Edificio.

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de trasladar a Ud. para su conocimiento dos libros con la versión en inglés y alemán de la obra "Persecución y Asesinato de Jean Paul Marat".

Su autor el dramaturgo Peter Weiss, es posible que nos visite por lo cual es conveniente que dicha obra sea conocida por la Dirección de Teatro.

Tan pronto tengan conocimiento de dichos libros, le rogamos se devuelvan a esta Dirección.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

Fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ALBERU SOUTO, LUIS
201-329609
SEX M DOB ?

201-741674
ACCR-08228
19 APR 66

CIT CUBA
OCC CULTURAL ATTACHE
< MEXICO
WAS PAINTER IN MEXICO SINCE ABOUT
1953. NON-COMMIE THO KEEPS POSITION
WITH REGIME.

UFG

R 6605030036

LI-TAMIL-9

FILE IN 201-329[illegible]-9

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

LITAMIL/9
file 201

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES
1 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM [illegible]

ACTION [illegible] ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE [illegible]

ACTION

19 MAR 66 99677

S E C R E T 191122Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE ACCR 8228

RYBAT TYPIC AMZOO

REF DIR 95175

1. FOLLOWING INITIAL ITEMS MAY BE OF INTEREST:

A. ORAMAS, CHARGE ALGIERS APPOINTED AMBASSADOR CONAKRY.

B. "CUCO" CALZADILLA, CHARGE MADRID IS SECURITY OFFICER ACCORDING AMIMP/1. [illegible] LITAMIL/9

C. AMZOO/1 FRIENDLY WITH MARILU ALBERU WHO WORKED MADRID EMBASSY. SHE LONG TIME AWAY FROM CUBA AND NON-COMMIE. FATHER OWNED TWO DISTILLERIES WHICH TAKEN AFTER REVOLUTION. BEFORE THAT MOTHER DIVORCED AND TOOK CHILDREN MEXICO AND LATER SPAIN.
CHILDREN GOT 500 DOLLARS MONTH FROM FATHER TO LIVE ON OUTSIDE CUBA. SOMEHOW ALL GOT FOREIGN MIN JOBS UNDER CASTRO. MARILU WORKED VIGO CONSULATE THEN MADRID EMBASSY. WHEN AMZOO/1 SAW HER NOV 64 SHE TALKING SERIOUSLY OF MARRYING SPANIARD AND TRYING ARRANGE FOR HER SISTER XENIA TO TAKE HER EMBASSY JOB. BROTHER LUIS ALBERU IS CULTURAL ATTACHE MEXICO. WAS PAINTER MEXICO SINCE ABOUT 53. RECENTLY IN CUBA FOR TRICONTINENT CONF. LIKE SISTERS HE NON-COMMIE, BUT HARD WORKER SO KEEPS JOB EVEN THOUGH DENOUNCED BY OTHERS.

Jane

SECRET

PAGE 2 ACCR 2228 SECRET

D. ENRIQUE RODRIGUES LOHECHES, AMBASSADOR RABAT SINCE ABOUT 1963, IS CONSIDERED REACTIONARY BY ALMOST EVERYONE. WAS D TORIO MEMBER IN UNIVERSITY BUT NO OTHER "APPROVED" CONNECTIONS KNOWN. WIFE HAS MANY RELATIVES LIVING IN EXILE SPAIN AND SHE HAS BIG INFLUENCE ON LOHECHES. AMZOO/1 WORKED WITH WIFE'S SISTER, NELLA LNU, IN FORN MIN 61. NELLA NOW IN USA WITH HUSBAND AND CHILD. AMZOO/1 SAYS NO ONE CAN UNDERSTAND HOW LOHECHES KEEPS HIS JOB.

2. EMBASSY HAS ONLY ABOUT 300-400 CEDIS IN ITS ACCOUNT AT GHANA COMERCIAL BANK. COURIER WILL BRING CHECK 22 APRIL. CUBA OWES GOG MORE THAN 100,000 CEDIS. UNDER TERMS THEIR MONETARY EXCHANGE AGREEMENT CUBAN GOVT GIVES LOCAL MONEY TO GHANA EMBASSY HAVANA FOR ALL THEIR EXPENSES AND VICE VERSA. AMBASSADOR THOUGHT AGREEMENT WOULD BE NO GOOD IF GHANA CLOSED THEIR EMBASSY HANANA, THUS ASSUMED CUBA WOULD CLOSE DOWN IN GHANA RATHER THAN RUN UP EVEN BIGGER DEBT WITH GOG OR SWITCH TO FUNDING EMBASSY ACTIVITIES WITH HARD CURRENCY. HOWEVER ON 14 APRIL AMBASSADOR GOT [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] CABLE SAYING HAVANA CONSIDERED AGREEMENT EFFECTIVE EVEN IF GOG CLOSED DOWN THEIR EMBASSY UNILATERALLY. THIS CABLE CAME AS BLOW TO AMBASSADOR SINCE HE READS INTO IT IDEA THAT CUBA DOES NOT WANT CLOSE ACCR EMBASSY

3. NO ONE IN ACCR EMBASSY KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED TO CHE GUEVARA.

PAGE 3 ACCR 8228 SECRET

AMZOO/1 ASKED AMIMP/1 SPECIFICALLY AFTER AMIMP/1 RETURNED FROM TRICONTINENTAL CONF AND AMIMP/1 SAID ONLY THERE MANY RUMORS ABOUT HIM LEADING GUERRILLAS IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

4. INDEX CALZADILLA, ALBERU AND LOHECHES.

SECRET

CFN 8228 95175 OROMAS, ALGIERS CONAKRY "CUCO" CALZADILLA MADRID AMIMP/1 AMZOO/1 MARILU ALBERU MADRID CUBA NON-COMMIE 500 DOLLARS CUBA MIN CASTRO MARILU VIGO MADRID AMZOO/1 NOV 64 SPANIARD XENIA LUIS ALBERU MEXICO MEXICO 53 CUBA NON-COMMIE ENRIQUE RODRIQUES LOHECHES RABAT 1960 DICTORIO NO OTHER AMZOO/1 NELLA LNU 61 NELLA USA AMZOO/1 NO ONE LOHECHES 300-400 CEDIS GHANA 22 APRIL CUBA GOG 100,000 CEDIS CUBAN GOVT GHANA HAVANA NO GOOD GHANA HAVANA CUBA GHANA GOG 14 APRIL HAVANA GOG CUBA NOT WANT ACCR NO ONE ACCR CHE GUEVARY AMZOO/1 AMIMP/1 AMIMP/1 AMIMP/1 CALZADILLA ALBERU LOHECHES

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA 24 de Marzo

DE:

ASUNTO

A:

Compañero Dr. Hernández:

A continuación traducción por Ud. solicitada de la carta escrita en inglés, y la cual tiene fecha 14 de Febrero de 1966.

Estimado Sr.

Nos tomamos la libertad de dirigirnos a usted sobre un asunto por el cual sentimos vivo interés.

Somos una Compañía, cuyo negocio consiste en comprar derechos, para producir obras, presentar actores, promover y llevar adelante Festivales en los cuales toman parte artistas extranjeros e israelíes.

Por lo cual le estaríamos muy agradecidos si nos expresa su opinión sobre que artistas cubanos podríamos invitar para que visiten Israel y actúen aquí. Nosotros podríamos encontrar la forma viable para intercambiar cantantes, músicos etc, y así ampliar las Relaciones Culturales entre Israel y Cuba, algo que mucho nos concierne.

Como para la próxima Primavera estamos planeando un Festival Internacional de Folklore, mucho le agradeceríamos su pronta respuesta.

Su seguro servidor,

A. Timmor
Secretario General

(traducción libre de Alberd)

Lo traduje [illegible]
misma fecha [illegible]
se me ent[illegible]

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA 1ro. de Julio/66

DE:

A: [illegible]

ASUNTO (Traducción)

Se conta para hacer la traducción.

Québec, Canadá, 24 de Marzo de 1966

Estimado Dr. Corona:

Le ruego me excuse por mi tardanza en enviarle esta carta de agradecimiento a Ud. por el esfuerzo que realizó, e hizo posible pudiésemos tocar para su pueblo.

Aun conservamos plenamente, un vívido y feliz recuerdo del viaje. Las cajas de tabacos que Ud. nos dió en el aeropuerto, fueron sumamente apreciadas por mi maestro Efren Zimbalist, quien ha sido por años un apasionado del tabaco habana.

Para el próximo verano estamos planeando regresar al Japón, para una gira de conciertos, y la Sociedad de Amistad Japón-Cuba en Tokyo, nos ha ofrecido organizar la gira.

Me parece que si Ud, pudiese escribir una carta de recomendación o endorsement, con las impresiones de Ud. sobre nuestras actuaciones en Cuba, sería de gran valor para nosotros, para que la gira en el Japón se haga posible.

Le rogamos haga llegar a su familia, nuestros más cálidos saludos y muy especialmente para Elpidio.

Confiamos en que ya Ud. sea un orgulloso abuelo.

Estamos esperando por su carta muy pronto.

Al mismo tiempo, reciba nuestros mejores parabienes y sentimientos de aprecio.

Muy sinceramente suyo,

ZEYDA Y HIDERATO SUZUKI
2202 CHEMIN STE-FOY
QUEBEC 10, P.Q. CANADA

RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 18 de Marzo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de remitirle junto con esta comunicación; una lista de publicaciones programadas por la FAO para 1966 y 1967.

La lista de referencia creemos les sea de utilidad, dado el material informativo que la misma contiene.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

Fraternalmente,

Dr. Elpidio Hernández,

Jefe del Departamento
de Planes y Convenios
Culturales.

A Comp. Abelardo Moreno, Director Nacional
del Zoológico y del Acuarium. Nuevo Vedado.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

☐ DESTR ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

G: VINCE DALY ack
T: WH/C/FI/TC
T: R. 1271
TE: 18 MARCH 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-

48 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

18 MAR 66 23 13 2

: MADRID INFO: MEXICO, JMWAVE

OM: DIRECTOR

F: WH/C8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WE 8, WH 8, CI/OA, FI,

MADR INFO MEXI WAVE CITE DIR 89222

TYPIC AMMOON MHAPRON

REFS: A. MADR 7506 (IN76355)
B. MEXI 6571 (IN77325)

1. SUBJ REF HEREAFTER AMCRASH/1 (201-772091). POA IN PROCESS.

2. HQS CONCURS REF B PROPOSAL AND WISHES REITERATE NEED PROTECT LITAMIL/9 UNTIL ALL FACTORS A/1 CONTACT WITH L/9 WEIGHED. SUGGEST MADR FIRST ASK A/1 FOR NAMES ANTI-GOC OFFICIALS HE KNOWS. IF L/9 NAME NOT SURFACED SUGGEST THEN PROCEED WITH PARA 2 REF B AT NEXT MEET.

END OF MESSAGE

Dave - a copy of this should go to LITAMIL-9 201. If we don't have 201 - please send to RI [illegible]
LITAMIL-9

C/WH/C/FI
C/WH/C/MO
WH/1
WE/Cuba

C/WE/X

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER 18-26

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 17 de Marzo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimada compañera:

Tenemos el gusto de referirnos a su atenta comunicación de fecha 17 de Noviembre/65; la cual trata sobre la solicitud de becas desde el extranjero, para realizar estudios de música en nuestro país.

La Dirección General de Música ni el Departamento Nacional de Escuelas han recibido orientación alguna al respecto; no obstante en cualquier caso que se presentare alguna solicitud , se considera que es necesario antes de conceder dichas becas, aportar para el estudio de las mismas en los Departamentos correspondientes, los siguientes datos.

1ro.- Edad.
2do.- Nivel de estudios generales.
3ro.- Conocimientos musicales, si los tiene y el nivel de los mismos.
4to.- Instrumentos u otra especialidad que desee estudiar.
5to.- Si tiene o nó y en que grado conocimientos del idioma español.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

Fraternalmente,

Dr. Elpidio Hernández
Jefe del Departamento
de Planes y Convenios
Culturales.

A la Comp. Raquel Montero Alvarado, Jefe del Departamento de
Control de Becas para el Extranjero.
Ministerio de Educación. Ciudad Libertad.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES 20

24 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	05
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Mexico City

ACTION C/WE-3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH-5, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 161800Z

MADR INFO DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6571

KAPOK PBRUMEN AMMOON

AMCRASH/1

REF MADR 7506 [illegible]

17 Mar 65 77325

1. AFTER SUBJ HAS SETTLED INTO NEW AGENT ROLE AND HIS BONA FIDES ESTABLISHED, MEXI WOULD APPRECIATE IF HE COULD BE QUERIED ON PRESENT ACTIVITIES OF MEXI AGENT LITAMIL-9 (IDEN BY SEPARATE CABLE).

2. FYI, L-9 RETURNED PBRUMEN MARCH 1965. L-9 AND RELATIVES INSIDE HAVE USED SUBJ AS COURIER TO POST LETTERS IN MEXI. SUBJ BELIEVED TO BE GOOD FRIEND OF FAMILY. L-9 NAME SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN LIST OTHER PERSONS SO AS NOT TO PINPOINT KUBARK INTEREST. SUBJ NOT AWARE L-9 ODYOKE CONNECTION. MEXI PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ANY INDICATION L-9 MAY BE PLANNING LEAVE PBRUMEN EVEN FOR SHORT TRIP.

3. POSSIBILITY EXISTS SUBJ COULD EVENTUALLY BE USED TO SET UP OPERATIONAL CONTACT WITH L-9 BUT BELIEVE BEST NOT PURSUE THIS UNTIL SUBJ HAS PROVEN OWN WORTH AND RELIABILITY AND ALL HAZARDS OF ATTEMPTING REACTIVATE L-9 CAREFULLY ASSESSED.

S E C R E T *Requested POA And Assignment Capt*

SECRET

CFN 6571 7506 LITAMIL-9 FYI L-9 1965 L-9 L-9 NOT TO KUBARK NOT AWARE L-9 ODYOKE L-9 L-9 NOT PURSUE L-9

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	TT	5	RR
2		6	OS
3	FE	7	CI
4	MO	8	CI

FROM Mexico City

ACTION C/WE-3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WHC-5, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 171821Z

MADR INFO DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6572

17[illegible] 77295

KAPOK PBRUMEN AM[illegible]OON

REF MEXI 6571 [illegible]

IDEN: LUIS ALBERU SOUTO, FORMER CULTURAL ATTACHE, CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXI. NOW WORKING FOR NATIONAL CULTURAL COUNCIL, HAVA.

S E C R E T

CFN, 6572 6571 LUIS ALBERU SOUTO HAVA

SECRET

BT

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

ANEXO a la Nota No.____________

60, Ennismore Gardens
London, S.W. 7

Febrero 18 de 1966

Sr. Agregado Cultural
de la Embajada de Cuba.
22, Mount St.
London, W. 1

Estimado Sr.

Estoy representando la Hutchinsons Publishing, la cual está de lo más interesada en las posibilidades de publicar traducciones de obras de poesía y ficción.

Estas traducciones aparecerán regularmente bajo una denominación - posiblemente, "The Latin American Library", y con la continuación de series como la "Library" lo desea, creemos dará una coherencia a las publicaciones de Literatura Latino-Americana, de la cual carece al presente.

Por lo momento estoy tratando de recppilar tanta información como séa posible. Le estaré de lo más agradecido por cualquier ayuda que me pueda dar. Preferentemente desearía los nombres de destacados autores cubanos - clásicos y contemporáneos - títulos de las obras de ficción y de poesía, y una información que indique hasta que punto pueden ser traducidas al inglés.

Doy a Ud. las gracias anticipadas por su cortesía y ayuda.

De Ud. sinceramente,

Bernard G. Mullinge

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

COMISION CUBANA
EXPOSICION DE MONTREAL

La Habana, 29 de enero de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Co.Director de Inmigración,
Ministerio del Interior,
La Habana.

Compañero:

Por la presente le ruego se sirva expedir un permiso de Salida del país al ciudadano canadiense Sr.Guy Parent, el cual se encuentra actualmente en nuestro país hospedado en el Hotel Habana-Riviera.

El Sr. Parent tiene un pasaporte expedido en Ottawa, Canada con número SP-21741 y deberá partir el próximo lunes 31 de enero en el vuelo de la Compañía Cubana de Aviación por el Aeropuerto Nacional "José Martí".

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE" quedo de Ud. atte.,

L.A

Luis Alberu
Jefe del Protocolo
Dir.Rel. Internacionales
Consejo Nacional de Cultura

Date: 07/11/01
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10176-10075
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : 201 FILE OF PROTECTABLE SOURCE.
DATE : 00/00/
PAGES : 152
SUBJECTS : JFK DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/22/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK64-12:F5 1998.05.22.10:14:03:840082: RELEASE DELAYED UNTIL DEATH OF SUBJECT.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HRG Record Print

Printed on: 7/11/2001

ID: 1998.05.22.10:14:03:840082
File Title: JFK
Job Num: 80T01357A
Location: HRG
Box Num: JFK64-12
Vol/Folder: F5

Title: 201 FILE OF PROTECTABLE SOURCE.

Title Res: N
Date of Document: 0/0/0
Status: DIF
From:
From Res:
To:
To Res:
Pages: 152
Orig. Classification: S
Originator: CIA

Last Reviewer:
Review Date:
Exemptions: 1A 1B 1C 2 3 4 5

Medium: PAPER
Last Inputter: ramsayr
NARA Comments: RELEASE DELAYED UNTIL DEATH OF SUBJECT.

Agency Comments: PER ARRB DECISION OF 13 MAY. AGENCY REQUIRED TO DETERMINE STATUS ANNUALLY.

Release:
Release Date:
Doc Num: Res:
Keywords: 201-329-609 Res: Y
LITAMIL-9 Y

Duplicate Document Of:

Component Review Info

COMPONENT DATE TASKED DATE REVIEWED RESPONSE APPEAL DATE DECISION

Sent to NARA: Y
Agency Name: CIA
Agency Number: 104
Disk Number: 10176
Control Number 10075

SECRET

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

DATE SET UP: 27 April 1967 jep

201 #: 329609

DATE ORIG. REQ.: 18 April 1967

TRUE NAME: ALBERU-Souto, Luis

SO#279039

☒ POA ☒ OA ☐ CNC ☐ SP. IN

VARIATIONS:

CRYPTONYM: LITAMIL-9

PSEUDONYM:

PROJECT:

DATE OF BIRTH: 1915

PLACE OF BIRTH: Oviedo, Spain

CASE OFFICER: Jane F. Zoranca

DIVISION: WH/1/M

EXTENSION: 4167

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
P.O.A.	✓ JL	WH/1	8 MAY 1967	Records on RIS Agents Checked in CI/R&A, Date: 27 April 1967 Results: OK cy 1 May 67
O.A.	Ltd. JL	WH/1	7 FEB 1968	
Case Cancelled		WH/1/M	SEP 1971	
CASE CANCELLED	✓	WH/1/M	26 JAN 1968	
PRO I	BIO ✓		12 FEB 1968	
PRO II	✓		12 FEB 1968	
174318 GREEN LIST	NTLT	JL	8 MAY 1967	
RI TRACES	DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA			
CPS & DIV TRACES	DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA			See memo of [illegible]
FIELD TRACES	DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA			
S.O. INDICES	See OS att 8 May 67 cy 8 May 67			
XX FBI INDICES				
FBI CORD. REQUESTED				
FBI CORD. COMPLETED				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION	See memo of 29 Aug. 1967. JL			
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				
CCS/NC NOTIFIED				
CCS/NC COMPLETED				

FORM 8-63 126 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Office of Security Report

& liaison material

S.O. INVESTIGATION	[illegible] 27 Dec. 1967 K				
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT					
CCS NO NOTIFIED	/				

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 31 AUG 1972	CASE NO. 201 329609

☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ SPD	AREA:

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST U.S. COMINT TRACE RESULTS
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ EXTENDED POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ SEGMENTAL REPORT
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐ CNC NOTICE TO DIVISION ☐ HOSTILE ☐ NON-HOSTILE
✓ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (*No notice to Division*) 31 Aug. 1972	✓ FILE memo + A-S-R
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (*Reason checked below,* or see remarks*)	☐ TICKLE
☐ REQUEST IP TRACES (*Incl. COMINT*)	☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES (*Incl. COMINT*)	☐ SRD NOTICE TO DIVISION
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES	
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	

☐ POA EXPIRED ____________________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

1 SEP 1972 BC

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

SIGNATURE

FORM 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-72

SECRET

E2, IMPDET

CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible]

(21)

SECRET

24 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : [redacted]

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-7 (201-329609)

1. During a review of Station files, it was noted that LITAMIL-7's Operational Approval, which was granted on 7 February 1968, is still active. This is to advise you that Mexico City Station terminated contact with LITAMIL-7 in 1970.

2. Attached herewith is a copy of a Memorandum for the Record regarding Subject and the Agent Termination Report.

3. Please retire Subject's CI/OA File.

[redacted]
Chief,WH/1

Attachment: herewith

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: [redacted]
WN-SISM

SECRET

SECRET

22 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-7

1. According to Gerald D. FAHLANGER, LITAMIL-7, who [redacted] LITAMIL-3 in approximately 1966-67. Although Subject was never a very productive asset, [redacted] provide information on activities of the installation and individuals working therein. In approximately 1969-70, Subject was retired by the PBRUMAN Embassy, ending her previous usefulness [redacted] In spite [redacted] loss of access to the embassy, she did continue to maintain contact with [redacted] the personnel. including the ambassador. For this reason [redacted] maintained contact with her through LITAMIL-3. However, this too was not very productive because she felt she had been treated fairly upon retirement. and felt a certain degree of loyalty to them. This was somewhat incongruous. since she did not feel such loyalty when she was working in the embassy.

2. Subject met FAHLANGER. as [redacted] approximately six times in [redacted] home. The last time she was told that in view of [redacted] retirement. which resulted in the loss of access to the embassy, our relations with [redacted] would be terminated. However, if [redacted] reestablished contact with the personnel, or was recalled to work part or full time, we would, of course, consider contact again. This, of course, never happened.

3. While Subject was not paid a regular salary, [redacted] did receive spot payments for the information [redacted] submitted. [redacted] also received occasional small gifts at Christmas time and on her birthday. The

E2, IMPDET, WN-SISM
CL BY: [redacted]

SECRET

termination was amicable, and Subject agreed to notify LITAMIL-3 if she had any information of value to report.

4. Attached is the Agent Termination Report on Subject.

[redacted]
WH/1/IA

SECRET

Attachment to ________________

15 August 1972

Agent Termination Report

1.	AGENT CRYPTONYM:	LITAMIL-7
2.	PROJECT IDENTIFICATION:	LITAMIL
3.	AGENT RECRUITED BY:	LITAMIL-3
4.	CAPACITY IN WHICH AGENT SERVED:	Penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico City
5.	RATE OF PAY:	Spot payments based on information she submitted. Average was approximately $20.00 U.S. per month
6.	OTHER COMMITMENTS:	None
7.	AGENT DISMISSED BY:	Gerald D. FAHLANGER
8.	SECURITY RISKS:	None
9.	IS AGENT RECOMMENDED FOR RE-USE:	No
10.	REASON FOR AND MANNER OF DISMISSAL:	She retired from [redacted] position in the embassy. Termination by FAHLANGER was done at a meeting with her.
11.	LETTER OF TERMINATION SIGNED:	No. [redacted] was not witting of her role for LNBUZZ, and was not receiving a specific monthly salary.

E2, IMPDET, WN-SISM
CL BY: [redacted]

SECRET

ORIG: [redacted]/sas
luc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 25 March 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 25 PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR WH/COG 8, EUR 8, CI, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CPS 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85742

TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY JMWAVE INFO: [redacted] 201-329609

TYPIC

REFS: A. [redacted] (IN 76477)*

B. JMWAVE 6305 (IN 30599), 20 MARCH ~~68~~ 67 **

C. DIRECTOR 85178, 20 MARCH 67 ***

1. REQUEST MEXICO CITY TRY DETERMINE WHERE MACIQUES STAYING PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE REF A AND NOTIFY JMWAVE. ALSO PLEASE PROVIDE SUITABLE PRETEXT TO COVER EX WIFE'S CALL TO PROTECT SMABOVE SOURCE. LITAMIL-9 C-101331 REPORTED IN REF C THAT MACIQUES WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING COOPERATE WITH LNHARP IF APPROACHED. CAN LITAMIL-9 OBTAIN CURRENT ASSESSMENT PER MEXI 2751.

2. FOR JMWAVE: UPON RECEIPT PARA I INFO IF MACIQUES EX WIFE STILL RESIDING HIALEAH FLORIDA PER REF B SUGGEST SHE BE CONTACTED AND DETERIME IF SHE ABLE TELEPHONE MACIQUES MEXICO CITY ASKING HE MEET WITH HER ~~HERE~~ THERE ON HIS RETURN FROM MONTREAL.

26 MAR 1968

END OF MESSAGE

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY__________PER__________#__________

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO__________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85742

TO

PAGE TWO

WH COMMENT: *Abraham MACIQUES Maciques departing Mexico City 26 March for Montreal

Tramots identified MACIQUES ex wife as Ellen Louise Maciques

***LITAMIL-9 ~~being~~ believes MACIQUES willing cooperate if contacted.

**** LITAMIL-9 willing provide assessment of MACIQUES if latter returns Cuba.

C/WH/COG/OPS [redacted] (in draft)

C/E/BC/C [redacted] (by phone)

CI/OPS [redacted] (by phone)

[redacted]

WILLIAM B. BROE [redacted]
C/WHD

[redacted]
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

No. [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [illegible]
ATTN: W. [illegible]

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of [illegible] ______________________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated [illegible] February [illegible].

Limited to use as an informant in Mexico.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 7 February 1963 sal

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 1-67 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(9)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

DATE: 7 February 1965 sal

SUBJECT : C#
SO# [illegible]
201# [illegible]

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY): 1
PRQ Part 1

[redacted]

CHIEF, CI/OA

FORM 2-65 2413

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(40)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 7 FEB 1968	CASE NO. 201- 329659

☐	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐	SET UP FOR OA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐	ORSD	AREA:

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
✓	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☑ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE a H. 1
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION
☐	POA EXPIRED ________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
☐	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

To: WH/1

Attn: [redacted]

Limited to use as an informant in Mexico.

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 5-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
LITAMIL-9

FROM: WH/1/Mexico/France	EXTENSION 4167	NO. DATE 6 Feb 68

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/1[redacted]	6 Feb.		LK	
2.				329609
3.				
4.				
5. DCWH/1				
6.				
7.				
8. CI/OA				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

6 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION: [redacted]

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-9
201-329609

Attached are two copies of a PRQ Part I on Subject and a copy of the PRQ Part II. An Operational Approval is requested.

[redacted]
Chief, WH/1

Attachments:

PRQ I - 2 cys
PRQ II- 1 cy

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: *1. Write clearly.*
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA."
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Nee)*

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

5. DATE OF BIRTH

6. PLACE OF BIRTH

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

No known immoderate vices

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)*

Not known

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

a. SEX ☐ M ☐ F	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE *(Shape)*
h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES		j. TEETH		k. BUILD	l. POSTURE

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

[illegible] pock marks on face

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 2-61 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(4-20)

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

[illegible]

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION	17. TITLE	18. SALARY *(Per annum)*

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO

English

X

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

[illegible] known

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

26.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): [illegible]
b. EMPLOYER: [illegible]
c. ADDRESS:
d. TYPE OF WORK: [illegible]
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING: [illegible]

27.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): [illegible] 58-late [illegible]
b. EMPLOYER: [illegible], Cultural
c. ADDRESS: [illegible], Cuba
d. TYPE OF WORK: Cultural
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING: [illegible] to Mexico

28.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): [illegible]
b. EMPLOYER:
c. ADDRESS: [illegible]
d. TYPE OF WORK:
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING:

29.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To):
b. EMPLOYER:
c. ADDRESS:
d. TYPE OF WORK:
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING:

30.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To):
b. EMPLOYER:
c. ADDRESS:
d. TYPE OF WORK:
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING:

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Nee) (Last)

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
36. DATE OF BIRTH	37. PLACE OF BIRTH
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. [redacted]	42. YEAR OF BIRTH	43. PLACE OF BIRTH [redacted]	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [redacted]
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION [redacted]	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE [redacted]	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME [redacted]	49. YEAR OF BIRTH [redacted]	50. PLACE OF BIRTH [redacted]	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [redacted]
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION [redacted]	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

[redacted] RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

56. [redacted] FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE

SIGNATURE

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-33865

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is *not* to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM
LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I

CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Clyde K. SHRYOCK, the first Case Officer, was introduced to Subject on 18 July 1962 by LITAMIL-3.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subject also speaks good French and poor English.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knew Clyde K. SHRYOCK by true name. The next Case Officer, Lawrence F. BARKER, took over in June 1963. Subject was turned over to his present Case Officer, Raymond A. FRADYER, following his return from PBRUMEN in the fall of 1968.

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as 'anti-communist'.)*

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the West. He is anti-Communist and anti-AMTHUG.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and his Case Officer meet as acquaintances.

[illegible] IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as a former member of LIRING, still has contacts in the [illegible] community in Mexico.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

With a [illegible]OLADY intelligence service.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

[redacted]

LITAMIL-3 probably suspects LITAMIL-9 is still engaged in intelligence activities.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning, intelligent, and has an aptitude for the work.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime if it should come to power.

SECTION VI.

OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subject has been an active asset of the Mexico City Station since 1962. First he provided information on LIRING; after his return to Mexico in late 1966 as a private citizen he still provided some info on LIRING personnel and on the PBRUMEN community in Mexico.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

From members of LIRING and the PBRUMEN community. Also from old friends and acquaintances living in Mexico or PBRUMEN.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject knows that his information goes to ZRMETAL.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's current use is to pass on any information which comes to his attention which he thinks may be of [illegible]. He is occasionally debriefed for any info he can provide on PBRUMENERS or their contacts the Station thinks he may know or have known. There is no current active direction of his activities, and his usefulness is at present close to marginal.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

SECTION VII

PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII

AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is no longer paid any salary. He must be considered an operational contact. In addition to his three case officers, he has known Andrew S. PARWERS and Edward D. KNAPMAN under assumed names.

SECRET

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

[redacted]

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject is not paid a salary.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

No commitments or promises have been made to subject.

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station and LN[illegible] files. No derogatory information.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

POA was granted.

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

8 May 1967

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. He is sincere, reliable, intelligent, and very security conscious.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with CUYOAH is known to [redacted] and [redacted] per MEXICO CITY 3450; they are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. He is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECRET

SECTION XIII **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is [redacted] but because of his Cuban accent he would probably be recognized as Cuban.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Parts I and II was obtained through research, files, agents, and direct questioning.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (*Also see para. 43b, supra*)

No problems are envisaged when Subject may be terminated.

SECTION XV **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject could be contacted by phone (his number is in the Mexico City phone book) using the name of one of the WOFIRM officers he has been in contact with as bona fides.

SECTION XVI **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

DATE

SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE ____________________

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible]

ATTENTION : [illegible]

201 ____________
C ______________

The file on ____ is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

[redacted]

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

FORM 6-65 691a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(8)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE [illegible]

CASE NO. 201- 329609

☐ SET UP FOR POA
☐ EXPEDITE INDICES
DATE
☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES
DATE

☐ SET UP FOR OA
☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY
☐ COVERT NAME CHECK
☐ ORSD
AREA:

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*
☑ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II

☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ FILE
☐ TICKLE
☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ____________________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☑ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

26 JAN 1968

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

V

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 8-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 8 [illegible]
TO: [illegible]	C NO. [illegible]
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA [redacted]	SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
XX	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired on [illegible]. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

FORM 9-65 889a SECRET (20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE	CASE NO. 201- 329609

☐	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	
☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE			
☐	SET UP FOR OA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	ORSD	AREA:			

USE.

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ [illegible] ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE: ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

✓	POA EXPIRED 8 Nov. '67 . PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.
☐	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(24)

C-101331

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

32/21

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, WH/COG 5, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 292220Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2961 LANGDON ACTING

[redacted] INFO DIRECTOR JMWAVE [redacted]

PBRUMEN

C-101331

29 SEP 67 IN 61965

FYI MEXICO STATION CONTACT LITAMIL-9 (IDEN) SCHEDULED LEAVE MEXICO 28 SEPT ON VACATION TRIP MADRID, BARCELONA, PARIS AND POSSIBLY THE HAGUE AND BRUSSELS. LITAMIL-9 WILL DEFINITELY CALL ON CUBAN OFFICIAL REPS MADRID, BARCELONA AND PARIS. CLOSE FRIEND OF HIS IN PARIS IS ALEJO CARPENTIER BELMONT. LITAMIL-9 WILL REPORT ANY INFO ELICITED FROM OFFICIALS HE CALLS ON. PLANS RETURN LATE OCT.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

29 SEP 1967

SECRET

DATE: [illegible] August [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C#
SO# [illegible]
201# [illegible]

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY): [illegible]

/s/ [redacted]

CHIEF, CI/OA

FORM 2-65 2413

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(40)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Traces on Luis ALBERU-Souto

FROM: WH/1 [redacted]			EXTENSION 4167	NO.
				DATE 28 August 1967
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/WH/1		8/29		329 609
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. CI/OA [redacted]				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				2[illegible] AUG 1967
11.				
12.				
13.				Copy to OS.
14.				
15.				

AUG 29 8 38 AM '67

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

28 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : [redacted]

SUBJECT : Traces on Luis ALBERU-Souto
201-329609

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum dated 15 June 1967

1. Per your referenced request, the FBI documents were located and reviewed with the following results:

a. The first document dealt with a Luis SOTO who was appointed Commercial Attache of the Dominican Embassy, Madrid. This is not our Subject.

b. All documents referenced Luis ALBERU-Souto's assignment as Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico City, his residences, telephone numbers, and his relationships with the Spanish Communist group in Mexico.

c. The next three items deal with a Luis SOTO, a member of the PPS of Mexico. This is not our Subject.

2. Subject was [redacted] and his activities per paragraph 1.b are well known to this Agency. These activities were considered to be in line with his assignment and are not presently considered to offer a threat to operational security.

3. PRQ Parts I and II will be forwarded your Office upon receipt from the Station.

[redacted]
Acting Chief, WH/1

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
[illegible]

C NO.
[illegible]

TO:
[illegible] [redacted]

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/[redacted]

SUBJECT:
[illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRO I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRO II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review the [illegible] 6 [illegible]. Then, please forward your findings to CI/OA relative to the operational security of using the subject.

To obtain these reports, contact [redacted] RID/Files, Extension 4127.

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 1[illegible]967

CASE NO. 201- 329609

☐ SET UP FOR POA ☐ EXPEDITE INDICES DATE ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES DATE

☐ SET UP FOR OA ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK ☐ ORSD AREA:

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL

☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL

☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION

☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I

☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*

☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*

☐ REQUEST RI TRACES

☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES

☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES

☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II

☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST

☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW

☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION

☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION

☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA

☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA

☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ FLUTTER REPORT

☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE

✓ FILE 201

✓ TICKLE 15 July.

☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL

☐ ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

Proc. U.

Pls. make copy of attached FBI document listings and send to WH/1.

To: WH/1

Pls. locate and review the listed FBI documents. Then pls. forward your findings to CI/OA relative to the operational security of using the subject.

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE: 27 April 1967 jep

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - 329609 SO# 279089

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: WH/1/M Mexico

TYPE OF REQUEST: ☒ POA ☒ OA ☐ CSC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date) 2 May 1967

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date) ✓

USE OF SUBJECT: FI informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD
	DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA	DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA	DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☒ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE 5/3/67

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☑ 1. OS Indices results: ~~No Data since~~ see remarks

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	ECUA	OSI	I & N		
☐	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☒	☐	☐

☐ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached FBI

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, _______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS

noth subsequent to July 1963 except cable dated 29 Oct 1963 in # 49[redacted]

DEPUTY

SECRET

C-101331

ORIG: [redacted] mak
UNIT: WH/COG/FI/OD
EXT: 5061
DATE: 20 MARCH 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ___ PER ___ # ___

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 329609

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, [illegible]

SECRET (classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 21 00 05 Z CITE DIRECTOR 85178

21 MAR 1967 File

OVER

TO

MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

TYPIC

1. AT 15 MARCH MEETING WITH SHRYOCK AND FRAYDER, LITAMIL-9 REPORTED THAT ABRAHAM MACIQUES, CUBAN OFFICIAL INIT AND HIS FRIEND, MADE CONTACT BY PHONE AT 2300 NIGHT BEFORE HE LEFT FOR CUBA. LITAMIL-9 SAW MACIQUES AT HOTEL AGNES NEXT DAY FOR FEW MINUTES BEFORE MACIQUES LEFT FOR AIRPORT. BELIEVE L-9 GAVE MACIQUES FEW ITEMS FOR HIM TAKE TO CONCHITA FERNANDEZ. ACCORDING L-9, MACIQUES WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING COOPERATE WITH LNFORT IF APPROACHED. MACIQUES FORMERLY MARRIED TO AMERICAN WHO NOW IN U.S. WITH TWO CHILDREN. MACIQUES WHO HEBREW NOW MARRIED TO CUBAN MULATTO. HE BROTHER PEDRO MACIQUES. MACIQUES TOLD L-9 HE EXPECTED RETURN MEXI EN ROUTE EXPO 67 IN ABOUT MONTH. POSSIBILITY USE BROTHER L-9 (IDEN) AS ENTREE MACIQUES DISCUSSED WITH L-9 WHO FELT THIS BEST APPROACH VIEW BROTHER's BUSINESS BACKGROUND AND FRIENDSHIP. HOWEVER, SAID WOULD HAVE TO QUERY BROTHER RE HIS ACCEPTANCE PLAY OPS ROLE. LITAMIL-9 WAS ALSO ASKED TRY AND FIND OUT CONTINUED///

C-101331

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85178

TO ETA MACIQUES MEXI ORDER GET LEAD TIME LAY ON OP.

2. CUBANA AIRLIST SHOWS ABRAHAM MACIQUES MACIQUES, PP D/66/392, LEFT HABANA FOR MEXI 22 AUGUST 66 EN ROUTE EXPO. CUBANA AIRLIST ALSO SHOWS MACIQUES, PP D/66/392, LEFT MEXI FOR HABANA ON 8 FEB 67. FBIS REPORT SHOWS MACIQUES IN CHARGE CUBAN FOOD AND BEVERAGE COMMITTEE AT EXPO.

3. REQUEST MEXI ASCERTAIN SOONEST AMENABILITY BROTHER PLAY ROLE OP AND TAKE STEPS GET ETA MACIQUES MEXI. FOR WAVE: REQUEST STATION AMOT TRACES MACIQUES AND EX-WIFE. ALSO ADVISE SOONEST ANY INFO RE DEPARTURE MACIQUES FOR MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted] WH/1

[redacted]

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

[redacted]
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG: [redacted]/db
UNIT: WH/COG/FI/OD
EXT: 5061
DATE: 20 MARCH 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 46 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-320609

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR , WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 21 00 05 Z CITE DIRECTOR 85177

TO MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

PBRUMEN TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR 85178

[redacted] WHO NOW CUBAN EXILE MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

21 MAR 1967

[redacted] WH/1 [redacted]

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[redacted]
C/WH/CCG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,

NUMBER

SUBJECT

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

[illegible]

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ [redacted]

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	

FORM 8-63 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE [illegible] 67

CASE NO. 201- 329669

☐ SET UP FOR POA
☐ EXPEDITE INDICES DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA
☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY
☐ COVERT NAME CHECK
☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES DATE
☐ OOSD AREA:

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
✓ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL
✓ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION Form # 501
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below,* or see remarks)
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II

☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ FILE
☐ TICKLE
☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ OOSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

To: WH/1

As requested in para # 3 of your memo of 5 April '67.

[redacted]

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE [illegible]

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - [illegible]

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

TYPE OF REQUEST				OS INDICES RESULTS BY	FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
☐ POA	☐ OA	☐ CSC	☐ SI	(Date)	(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS *(Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)*

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

GREEN LIST INITIATED		ATTACHMENTS		
☐ YES	☐ NO	☐ PRQ - PART I	☐ PARTIAL PRQ	☐ OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA
FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

DATE 5/3/67

☐ 1. OS Indices results: see remarks

MAY 8 [illegible] AM '67

nth subsequent to July 1963 except
cable dated 29 Oct 1963 in # 41286
WP

FORM 3-64 693

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE [illegible]

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - [illegible]

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

[illegible]

TYPE OF REQUEST

☐ PSA ☐ SA ☐ CSC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY

(Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY

(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

[illegible]

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI [illegible]	DIVISION [illegible]	FIELD [illegible] IN CI/OA

GREEN LIST INITIATED

☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS

☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

/s [redacted] J.F.L.

CHIEF, [illegible]

ENDORSEMENT

FORM 3-64 693

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 25 Apr 61

CASE NO. 201- C-101331

✓ SET UP FOR POA

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES — DATE: 2 May

☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES — DATE

✓ SET UP FOR OA

☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY

☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

☐ ORSD — AREA: Mexico

USE

FI informant

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
✓	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ✓ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE 201
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

V

APR 25 10 35 AM '61

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO. 929164
WE/1/[redacted] 3 D 4406	4167	DATE 18 Apr 67.

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WE/1/[redacted]		19 Apr		
2.				
3.				
4. DCWE/1		4/19		
5.				
6.				
7. CI/OA				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 18 April 1967

TO:
- xxx CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: [redacted]
WH/1/Mexico 3 B 4406
x 4167

SUBJECT: (True name) [redacted]

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-329609

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

XX	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
XX	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
Mexico City

3.
Subject would be contacted only when specific needs for information arise and the possibility exists that he has or could obtain information--on Cuban activities or personalities.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		x
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		x
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	x	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		x

APR

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? XX YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	XX	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	XX	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: # 174318

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY	XX	DEROGATORY xxxxxxxCI/OA is in possession

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY	XX	DEROGATORY xxxxxxx CI/OA is in possession

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	XXXX	DEROGATORY xxxxxxx CI/OA is in possession
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE: [redacted]

EXTENSION: 4167

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: [redacted]

FORM 8-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: [redacted]

DPOB: 1915 in Oviedo, Spain

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban
Presently Cuban exile residing in Mexico City

OCCUPATION: [redacted]

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:
HEIGHT: 6 feet tall
WEIGHT 170 to 175 plus
HAIR black

MARITAL STATUS: [redacted] 1949 in Mexico City. They were divorced in 1956. She was [redacted]

PARENTS: FATHER: [redacted].
MOTHER: [redacted]
(Father and Mother are divorced and she is presently residing in Madrid, Spain.)

BROTHERS: [redacted]

SISTERS: [redacted]

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: A

201-329609

SECRET

ORIG: [redacted] pfd
UNIT: C/WH/COG/FI
EXT: R1457
DATE: 17 MARCH 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 7/ PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

SECRET

10 00 01Z

CITE DIRECTOR 84699

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, JMWAVE

NO NIACT

PBRUMEN TYPIC

REFS: A MEXI 0711 (IN 23299)

B WAVE 6098 (IN 23524)

C MEXI 0718 (IN 23582)

File in 201
31 Mar 67

1. HQS PREFERS TRAVEL AMSNAKE-1 (311329) BE DELAYED UNTIL UPDATED ASSESSMENT OBTAINED FROM LISAVOY-1 (S14C55) (PARA 1 REF A) AND POSSIBLY OTHER SOURCES MEXI (LIKRAFT, (C-106595) [redacted] AND POSSIBLY LITAFFY-1).

2. "EL SOL" MEXI DAILY 16 MAR REPORTED DELEGATES CONGRESS NOT SCHEDULED RETURN MEXICO CITY UNTIL 23 MAR AFTER VISITS GUANAJUATO AND GUADALAJARA. HQS OPINION IF PITCH MADE SHOULD BE MADE MEXICO CITY WHERE BETTER POSSIBILITY EXISTS ISOLATE HIM FROM OTHER MEMBERS HIS DELEGATION. HOWEVER, UNLESS HARD INFO DEVELOPED INDICATING OTERO RECRUITABLE HQS OPINION LITTLE CHANCE SUCCESS VIEW SKOTH REPORT WHICH REVEALED HE NAMED VICE PRESIDENT OF CULTURAL COUNCIL ON 18 FEB AND LITAMIL-9 INFERENCE FROM CONVERSATION WITH FERNANDEZ PER REF A THAT OTERO STAR ON

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | SECRET | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

CONF:

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: PAGE TWO

FILE , VR

(classification) SECRET (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

TO

CITE DIRECTOR

RISE. IN ADDITION, PRESTIGE FACTOR WHICH FINDS OTERO AMONG MOST ILLUSTRIOUS DELEGATION WRITERS CONGRESS, I.E. CARPENTIER, GUILLEN AND FERNANDEZ ALSO MILITATES AGAINST SUCCESSFUL RECRUITMENT.

3. REQUEST MEXICO ASCERTAIN AS NEAR AS POSSIBLE ITINERARY AND DATES TRAVEL CUBAN DELEGATION PARTICULARLY ITS RETURN MEXICO CITY AND PROBABLE LENGTH STAY.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH/D

RELEASING OFFICER

WH/[redacted] (by phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[redacted]

C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: [redacted]
WH/1/Mexico

EXTENSION: 4167

NO.

DATE: 5 April 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/1				329609 C-10133 APR 5 10 36 AM '67 7 APR 1967 – Discussed w/A. Lockenberg, WH/1 He will extract new 772, G.L. up-dated traces – and alert [illegible] that current PF. It will be necessary prior to expiration of POA, if possible. JK T – 14 April
2.				
3.				
4. [redacted]				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

5 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : [redacted]

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
201-329609

1. LITAMIL-9 returned to Mexico from Cuba in October 1966. On 8 November he was contacted and debriefed by Mexico City Station. Throughout the month of November he debated the question of whether or not he should return to Cuba. In the first week of December 1966, he decided to remain in Mexico.

2. Since it was believed that LITAMIL-9 would have little access to LIRING or to persons of interest in Mexico, he was terminated and the balance of his escrow account was paid to him on 9 December 1966. However, it has since become apparent that from time to time it would be valuable to WOFACT to contact LITAMIL-9 for information on PBRUMEN personalities. He is acquainted with a large number of persons who themselves are of interest to WOFACT or who could supply information on third persons on whom information is needed.

3. Therefore, provisional operational approval and subsequent operational approval for such occasional contact with LITAMIL-9 is requested. It is not planned to pay him a salary or formalize an agent relationship. LITAMIL-9 would only be contacted when specific needs for information arise and the possibility exists that he has or could obtain the information.

[redacted]

Chief, WH/1

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

Case expired 19 Jan '66.

new 772, up-date

RI
Ops + H.J.
Field traces
} since Aug. '62

new Source list —

What is his status w/Cuban govt? — quit the country

Where are wife + child?

→ POA
infrequent

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ? TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

24 C-101331

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 7

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/CA, FI,

SECRET 221842Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0789

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

IN 37663

PBRUMEN

JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS RETURNED FROM CUBA 18 MARCH.
C-101331
LITAMIL-9 WHO CALLED ON HIM 21 MARCH AT STATION DIRECTIVE FOUND HIM NERVOUS AND PREOCCUPPIED. AMBASSADOR NEVERTHELESS LAUDED CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION CUBA AND SAID HAD FINE VACATION.

SECRET

BT

file

28 MAR 1957

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

PRECEDENCE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADV 12

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT WH/COG TIME 1947 BY J

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT

S E C R E T 161738Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0711 16MAR67 IN 23299

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC PERUMEN

REFERENCE: A. DIRECTOR 83192

B. MEXICO CITY 0689 (IN 22402)

1. ACCORDING TO MEJIA SANCHEZ, LISANDRO OTERO AND ALEJO CARPENTIER ARRIVED MEXI MORNING 15 MAR. OTERO PROBABLY ARRIVED FROM EUROPE WITH CARPENTIER. CHECKING AIRLISTS.

2. DELEGATES TO CONGRESS LEFT MEXICO NIGHT 15 MAR AND MORNING 16 MAR FOR GUANAJUATO AND GUADALAJARA WHERE CONGRESS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL SUNDAY, 19 MAR, AT WHICH TIME DELEGATES WILL RETURN MEXICO CITY WHERE MEETINGS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL 25 MARCH.

C-101331 - 9 L

3. NIGHT 15MARCH, LITAMIL-9 REPORTED THAT IN RECENT TELECON WITH CONCHA FERNANDEZ LATTER GAVE HIM UNDERSTAND THAT LISANDRO OERO REPLACED CARLOS LECHUGA AS HEAD CULTURAL COUNCIL HAVANA.

4. MORNING 16 MAR CO MET MEJIA SANCHEZ FOR FIVE MINUTE SESSION DURING WHICH TIME MEJIA TOLD GET BEST READING POSSIBLE ATTITUDE OTERO DURING CONGRESS. CO GAVE SUBJ MOST RECENT BOOK OTERO WHICH

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2711 S E C R E T SECRET

HE GLAD RECEIVE AS WILL USE GET DEDICATORY SIGNATURE AND GET CLOSE OTERO. CO AT MEJIA SANCHEZ HOUSE WHEN CARLOS SOLORZANO CAME BY PICK HIM UP AT 0808 EN ROUTE GUANAJUATO. MEJIA OSTENSIBLY WORRIED POSSIBILITY SOLORZANO SHRYOCK CONFRONTATION. MEJIA ARRIVED HOME FROM CONGRESS AT 2300 HRS ON 15 MAR AND MTG SET UP FOR 0800 MORNING 16 MAR VIEW SCHEDULED 0900 DEPARTURE FROM HOUSE. MEJIA MENTIONED AT 0800 MTG THAT ONE OF CONGRESS SECRETARIES TOLD HIM NICARAGUAN WRITERS REFUSED ATTEND CONGRESS BECAUSE IT COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED.

5. RESULTS 4 HOUR MTG WITH MEJIA NIGHT 14 MAR FAVORABLE. WILL REPORT IN DETAIL UPON ARRIVAL HQS. MEJIA INVITED CUBA TO ATTEND RECENT "ENCUENTRO CON DARIO" AND ANXIOUS GO. WENT TO SEE FRIENDS LUIS ECHEVERRIA, MIN GOVERNACION, AND ENRIQUE GONZALEZ CASANOVA WHO WORKS AT PRESIDENCIA RE ADVISABILITY TRIP AND BOTH TOLD MEJIA NOT RISK TRAVEL CUBA VIEW HIS RESIDENT STATUS. MEJIA HAS RETAINED NICARAGUAN CITIZENSHIP AND THEREFORE VULNERABLE MEXI GOVT ACTION. PLAN LOOK INTO POSSIBILITIES GET MEXI GOVT PROTECTION TRAVEL. VIEW INABILITY GO CUBA MEJIA SENT 3 COPIES PAPER RE DARIO WITH MARCO ANTONIO MONTES DE OCA FOR JOSE ANTONIO PORTUONDO, ROBERTO FERNANDEZ RETAMAR AND CINTIO VITIER. LATTER, ACCORDING MONTES DE OCA DID NOT GET PAPER BECAUSE HE NOW IN MENTAL INSTITUTION.

SECRET

SECRET

6. MEJIA HAS ACCESS MANY STATION TARGETS, INCLUDING FEDRO GUILLEN MEXICAN WHO INTIMATE FRIEND. GUILLEN, ACCORDING LIREBEL-1, IN CHARGE MEXI OF CLANDESTINE TRAVEL CUBA FOR TRAINING. MEJIA COOPERATIVE RE REQUIREMENTS CONGRESS. HE SCHEDULED ATTEND SEMINAR AT SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIV IN CARBONDALE, ILLINOIS DURING PERIOD 19-25 APRIL. CO SCHEDULED MTG WITH MEJIA FOR THAT TIME.

SECRET

SECRET + RYBAT

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REASON UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, C/OPS, C/CA

S E C R E T 241912Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2573

DIRECTOR

TYPIC LITAMIL-9

4 Mar 67 14181

REF: DIRECTOR 18156
C-101331

1. LITAMIL-9 HAS NOT HEARD FROM OR ABOUT EUSEBIO (AZCUE) LOPEZ SINCE L-9 LEFT CUBA.

2. ALTHOUGH AZCUE DEFINITELY ANTI CASTRO AND WOULD LOVE RETURN MEXICO WHERE PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS CONSUL, HIS PERSONAL SITUATION IS COMPLICATED BY FACT HE ATTACHED TO 25 YEAR OLD SECOND WIFE, WHO IN NO HURRY LEAVE CUBA, AND THEIR SMALL CHILD.

AZCUE not L-9.

S E C R E T

ET

✗ REQUESTED STATUS AZCUE

SECRET

NNNN

ORIG: [redacted]ak
UNIT: WH/COG/FI
EXT: 5061
DATE: 27 FEB 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 44 PER ______ # ______

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR WH 8, EUR 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) reference number (pica)

SECRET

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE, [redacted] 27 23 06 Z CITE DIRECTOR 78668

TYPIC MHAPRON

REF: JMWAVE 5743 (IN 08375) (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY)

28 FEB 1967

File

1. HQS PURSUING LEAD [redacted] INVOLVING POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT [redacted]

2. HQS PLANNING [redacted] FOR FURTHER ASSESSMENT AND BONA FIDES LETTER FOR USE [redacted] HAVE [redacted]

3. REQUEST LITAMIL-9 C-101331 BE CONTACTED SOONEST FOR ASSESSMENT DATA [redacted] REF PROVIDED FAVORABLE ASSESSMENT [redacted]. NOW LIVING JMWAVE AREA.

4. [redacted]

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

EUR/IB/CUBA [redacted] (in draft)
WH/1 [redacted] in draft)

[redacted]
C/WH/COG

File reviewed 7 March 67
by A. Ladenburg - WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

[redacted]

ORIG:
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 14 November 1963

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 55 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , WH/C8, C/CPS, C/OA, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

14 22 00Z CITE DIRECTOR 51748

TO SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY [redacted] INFO MEXICO CITY [redacted]

~~PERUMEN LITAMIL~~ -9 ? C-1-12-

[redacted]

REF MANAGUA 5241 (IN 32131)

Hale

1. PLEASE SEND FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO [redacted] [redacted] SIENTO NO PODER VISITAR FABRICA. TODO ARREGLADO. SALUDOS. RICARDO.

2. NO NEED FORWARD AGUILAR CORRESPONDENCE PER PARA 2 REF. ABOVE TELEGRAM SHOULD CLOSE OUT REF CASE.

SECRET

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER [redacted]

[redacted] (TELECOORD)/WH/2/N

[redacted] (TELECOORD)/WH/2/HONO

RELEASING OFFICER [redacted]LIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 30/N

ACTION WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2.

S E C R E T 102135Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9195 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR 14 NOV 1965

TYPIC PBRUMEN LITAMIL

REF: MEXICO CITY 9168 (C-101531)

10 NOV 65 IN 37303

1 LITAMIL-[redacted] DEBRIEFED FIVE HOURS 8 NOV AND SIX HOURS 9 NOV WHICH RESULTED CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT INTEL, PARTICULARLY IN FIELD CULTURAL ACTIVITIES, RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATION. RQMS CULTURAL FIELD AND OTHERS PARTIALLY FULFILLED WITH EXTENSIVE DOCUMENTATION IN CASE FORMER. L-9 BROUGHT WITH HIM NINE FOLDERS CONTAINING MEMORANDA AND CORRESPONDENCE DEALING WITH CNC ACTIVITIES. L-9 NOT AWARE CUIS ACTIVITIES WITHIN CNC BUT ASSIGNMENT MANUEL VEGA PEREZ AS DIRECTOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITHIN CNC CERTAINLY SIGNIFICANT.

2 L-9 AGAIN FACED WITH DILEMMA RETURN CUBA OR REMAIN MEXICO TO WORK AS ADMINISTRATOR MEXICAN COMPANY WHERE BROTHER PRESENTLY EMPLOYED. CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE BEING PUT ON L-9 BY BROTHER AND WEALTHY MEXICAN BENEFACTOR WHO OWNS COMPANY. L-9 GETTING ALONG IN YEARS (52)[redacted]., HEALTH BEGINNING FAIL, SUFFERING MENTAL STRAIN, NOW ANXIOUS SETTLE DOWN MEXICO AND TAKE JOB ABOVE WHICH AMOUNTS SINECURE. THIS WILL ALLOW HIM PAINT AND DO THINGS HE HAS ALWAYS WANTED TO IN TWILIGHT CAREER. L-9 PATHETIC FIGURE TORN BETWEEN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9195 SECRET

LNFORT AND MEXICAN BENEFACTOR. NIGGARDLY EXISTENCE (250 PESOS MONTHLY) PBRUMEN, WHERE TRAINED WITH MILITIA AND CUT CANE, DICTATE AGAINST HIS RETURN PBRUMEN GO THROUGH SAME AGAIN. ALTHOUGH L-9 UNSELFISHLY STATED WOULD RETURN PBRUMEN IF LNFORT REALLY FELT HE THAT IMPORTANT IT OBVIOUS HE PUTTING HIMSELF AT MERCY LNFORT. CO PLANS MAKE FOL PROPOSAL FOR HIS CONSIDERATION NIGHT 10 NOV. RETURN PBRUMEN WHERE HE WILL HAVE THIRD COUNTRY EMBASSY CONTACT FOR COMMO CHANNEL. DEPENDENT ACCEPTANCE THIS COMMO ARRANGEMENT SALARY WILL BE [illegible] DOLLARS MONTHLY IN ESCROW WITH REVIEW END SIX MONTH PERIOD FOR READJUSTMENT IF NECESSARY BASIS PRODUCTION. STATION BELIEVES THAT UNLESS COMMO CHANNEL ARRANGED L-9 SHOULD NOT BE REQUESTED RETURN. CO DOUBTS L-9 WILL ACCEPT ABOVE OFFER BUT WISHES GIVE HIM OPPORTUNITY MAKE FINAL DECISION. AT ANY RATE, L-9 STILL "CLEAN" WILL PROVIDE STATION WITH LIMITED ACCESS PBRUMEN ACTIVITIES MEXI.

3. DOCS AND DETAILED NOTES INTEL AND OPS DEBRIEFING BEING POUCHED HQS. PLAN INTRODUCE L-9 TO FRADYER MORNING 11 NOV.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM

DISSEM BY 3

ACTION

WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 081712Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9158 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR

8 NOV [illegible] 35292

TYPIC

C-101331

SMRYOCK CONTACTED LITAMIL-9 MORNING 8 NOV. MEETING SCHEDULED FOR EVENING 8 NOV.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

9 NOV 1963

File

JL

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 72

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1
2
3
4

DISSEM BY 9 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE . WH/C 8, FI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

[illegible] 15 [illegible] Z CITE DIRECTOR 40536 (1

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER)

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

REF MEXICO CITY 9122

34977 [illegible]

C-101331

HQS PREFERS NOT USE LITEMPO-8 GET LITAMIL-9 EXTENSION PERMIT STAY MEXICO, EXCEPT IN LAST RESORT. SINCE L-9 HAS ALREADY OVERSTAYED 10-DAY LIMIT BY 18 DAYS AND SINCE NEGOTIATIONS STILL TAKING PLACE BETWEEN LIRING AND FOREIGN MINISTRY, HEADQUARTERS BELIEVES PREFERABLE ACCEPT RISK MEXICAN AUTHORITIES BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS AND ORDERING L-9 OUT PRECIPITATELY. IN LATTER CASE STATION CAN ATTEMPT ARRANGE L-9 EXTENSION AS SUGGESTED PARA 3 REF. SUGGEST HOLD FURTHER ACTION IN ABEYANCE PENDING ARRIVAL SHRYOCK NIGHT 6 NOV.

S E C R E T

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1	4
2	5
3	6

ISSUED BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY INFO: VR , FILE ,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 49536

TO

WH COMMENT: [illegible] GAVE BACKGROUND UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS CONTACT LITAMIL-9 THROUGH LITAMIL-3 AND SUGGESTED USE LITEMPO-8 TO AUTHORIZE EXTENSION L-9 PERMIT STAY MEXICO.

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/C/FI
RELEASING OFFICER [redacted] FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

ET

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO TIME 0315 BY

dissem ... 23

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 040035Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9122 IN 32491

40

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (ATTN: FRADYER) INFO

[redacted]

[illegible]

NO NIGHT ACTION

DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRAVINE

REF: DIRECTOR- 49183 (NOT SENT MANAGUA)

OVER

1. DUE PROLONG STAY LITAMIL-17 (773351) HONDURAS, STATION BEGAN ATTEMPTS CONTACT LITAMIL-9 (C-151331), THROUGH LITAMIL-3 (C-37764) WHO AWARE L-9 IN TOWN FROM LITAMIL-7 (C-101663). INITIAL ATTEMPTS CONTACT UNSUCCESSFUL BUT LITAMIL-7 INFORMED LITAMIL-3 ON 2 NOV THAT LITAMIL-9 WISHED SEE HIM URGENTLY. LITAMIL-3 AGAIN ATTEMPTING CONTACT LITAMIL-9.

2. THROUGH LITAMIL-7, STATION AWARE THAT GOBERNACION HAS NOT GRANTED PERMISSION LITAMIL-9 REMAIN IN MEXICO FOR THREE MONTH PERIOD REQUESTED. PERUMEN DIPLOMATS ONLY ALLOWED 10 DAY STAY MEXICO ON TDY WITHOUT REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR LONGER STAY FROM GOBERNACION. LITAMIL-3 CLAIMS CAN ARRANGE FOR LONGER STAY THROUGH CONTACTS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY AND HAS TOLD LITAMIL-7 TO INFORM LITAMIL-9 OF SAME. LITAMIL-9 SITUATION CRITICAL FROM POINT OF OVERSTAYING 10 DAY LIMIT BUT NEGOTIATIONS STILL TAKING PLACE BETWEEN LIRING AND FOREIGN MINISTRY.

SECRET

3. IF HQS CONCURS, LITEMPO-8 CAN BE REQUESTED AUTHORIZE LITAMIL-9 EXTENSION PERMIT STAY MEXICO. IN ABSENCE CURTIS, BENADUM WOULD CONTACT [illegible] LITEMPO-8. THIS WOULD MEAN LITEMPO-8 AND PROBABLY LIRAMA WOULD THEN BE AWARE LITAMIL-9 AFFILIATION WOFACT. ADVISE SOONEST. ACTION COULD BE COVERED BY LITAMIL-3 CLAIMING HE ARRANGED EXTENSION.

4. RESERVATIONS CONFIRMED AT GENEVE FOR SHRYOCK.

5. WILL ADVISE ANY ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS LITAMIL-9 SITUATION.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ORIG: [redacted]
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 3 NOV 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: ☐ RID COPY
INFO: VR, FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

3 22 13 Z CITE DIRECTOR 49415

TO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MANAGUA INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER), MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRAVINE LITAMIL

REF MANAGUA 5343 (IN 31353)

FYI HQS PLANNING WITH CONCURRENCE MEXICO CITY SEND CLYDE K. SHRYOCK MEXICO CITY 6 NOVEMBER ASSIST STATION REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT EFFORTS ESTABLISH CONTACT LITAMIL-9. REQUEST BARKER TAKE NO ACTION REF CASE.

C-101331

SECRET

4 NOV 66

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/C

[redacted] (TELECOORD) WH/2/M

RELEASING OFFICER [redacted] FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM 3
TOTAL COPIES: 7

ORIG: [redacted]
UNIT: WH/1
EXT :
DATE: 3 NOV 66

○ FILE RID
○ INDEX
○ NO INDEX
○ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 1 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WHK 8 CCS-3 C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 49183

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER)

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

REF A MANAGUA 5840 (BEING RELAYED) 31353
B TEGUCIGALPA 6753 (BEING RELAYED) 31457

1. PER FRADYER CONVERSATIONS HQS AND WITH CONCURRENCE MEXICO CITY STATION, CLYDE K SHRYOCK (P) PLANS ARRIVE MEXICO CITY 6 NOVEMBER 1966 BY EAL FLIGHT 905. NO NEED MEET BUT WOULD APPRECIATE RESERVATIONS MADE IN TRUE NAME AT GENEVE OR SIMILAR HOTEL.

2. PURPOSE TRIP REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT EFFORTS REESTABLISH CONTACT LITAMIL-9 (2-101331) WITH STATION AND FRADYER (WHO HOLDING RESERVATIONS RETURN MEXICO CITY NIGHT 4 NOVEMBER FROM MIAMI).

SECRET

4 NOV 1966

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

[redacted]

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ________
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE ,

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (REFERENCE NUMBER) (ELITE) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 49183

TO

WH/COMMENTS: A. LITAMIL-17 (BROTHER LITAMIL-9) ASKED BARKER MEET [redacted] AND ASKED MEXICO CITY FOR LATEST ON LITAMIL-9

B. [redacted] ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR LITAMIL-17 [redacted]

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER [redacted] (DRAFT) WH/C/FI
[redacted] FOR WH/C/MO (DRAFT)
RELEASING OFFICER [redacted] FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

BT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~FROM~~ By 15

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

3 NOV 1965

S E C R E T 021815Z CITE [redacted]

File

2 Nov 65 IN 31352

MEXICO CITY, [redacted] INFO DIRECTOR

①

wh

PERUMEN LITAMIL

773321

1. LITAMIL-17 PHONED BARKER FROM SAN PEDRO SULA, HONDURAS, 31 OCTOBER USING ALIAS AND INNOCENT BUSINESS PHRASEOLOGY. SAID WISHED HAVE BARKER VISIT HIM IN SAN PEDRO SULA BEFORE 20 NOVEMBER. FOR SECURITY REASONS DID NOT MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT LITAMIL-9.

C-101331

2. BARKER TENTATIVELY PLANS STOP-OVER TEGUCIGALPA EN ROUTE BACK FROM ANNUAL COS MEETINGS PROBABLY ABOUT 14 NOV. WILL ASK L-17 TO FLY THERE FOR MEET. MEXI PLS ADVISE LATEST ON L-9 AND WHAT INSTRUCTIONS IF ANY WISH BARKER TO PASS TO L-17.

3. [redacted] L-17 IS BROTHER OF L-9 WHO AGENT RESIDING IN PBRUMEN AND EXPECTED OUT SOON. PLEASE CABLE TO [redacted] TO WHICH L-17 COULD SEND LETTER CONFIRMING MEETING PLANS.

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dissem by 2

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 311237Z CITE [redacted] 9016 31 Aug 66 IN 86883

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL AMCRASH

REF DIRECTOR [illegible] 222691

1. AMCRASH 1 MET 30 AUG. FLT DEPARTURE FROM HAVANA DELAYED TO SOLVE EXCHANGE PROBLEMS OF FRENCH INVITEES RETURNING TO THEIR COUNTRY.

10331

2. AMCRASH 1 SAID LITAMIL 9 GOOD FRIEND BUT DOES NOT HAVE FREQUENT INTIMATE CONTACT. CONTACT IS NATURAL AND THEY HAVE VISITED EACH OTHERS HOMES ON PURELY FRIENDLY BASIS. AMCRASH 1 SAW LITAMIL 9 AT AIRPORT JUST BEFORE DEPARTURE THIS TRIP, PURELY ACCIDENTAL. CAN CONTACT LITAMIL 9 AT ANY TIME WITHOUT RAISING ANY SUSPICIONS.

3. AMCRASH 1 IN ANSWER TO QUESTION ESTIMATED LITAMIL 9 MOTIVATION AND SUPPORT OF GOVT AS UNENTHUSIASTIC AND FOR SURVIVAL ONLY. BELIEVES LITAMIL 9 WORKING IN FOREIGN MINISTRY CONNECTED WITH CULTURAL AFFAIRS.

4. MADRID BELIEVES OPEN CODE PLUS SW WITH DEVELOPMENT INSTRUCTIONS IN BOOK AS SUGGESTED IN DIRECTOR 25242 EXPOSES BOTH AMCRASH 1 AND LITAMIL 9 TO UNNECESSARY DANGER. AS LITAMIL 9 IS UNKNOWN QUANTITY SINCE HIS RETURN TO CUBA WE WISH GIVE MAXIMUM PROTECTION TO

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

EACH December 21

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE RI WH8 [illegible]

S E C R E T 291945Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8080

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

29 JUL 66 IN 66598

TYPIC 8796

Jack

1. LITAMIL 3 ARRANGED MEXICAN VISA FOR ADAMINA AMALIA (FEREIRA) MARRERO, ADDRESS ISIDORO QUINTANA 153, ALDABO, HAVANA, TO COME TO MEXICO CITY TO VISIT SICK BROTHER DOCTOR OSCAR (FEREIRA) MARRERO, OWNER OF CLINICAL LABORATORY. ADAMINA WILL BE RETURNING CUBA ABOUT 10 AUGUST. PLANS EXIT CUBA AS1 AUG 1966 REFUGEE LATER.

2. ADAMINA IS GOOD FRIEND OF CONCHITA FERNANDEZ (201-332858) OFFICE MANAGER AT INRA. BECAUSE OF THIS FRIENDSHIP SHE KNOWS LITAMIL-9. L-3 HAS BEEN COACHED TO CAREFULLY ELICIT INFORMATION FROM ADAMINA ON L-9, SHOWING NO UNDUE INTEREST. NAME WILL BE INCLUDED WITH THOSE OF OTHER MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCES. HOPE FIND OUT JUST WHAT L-9 DOING, HOW HE IS, IF AND WHEN HE PLANNING COME OUT, WHAT HIS OSTENSIBLE POLITICAL LEANINGS ETC.

10/33

3. ACCORDING ADAMINA CONCHITA FERNANDEZ HAS LOST MUCH INFLUENCE IN REGIME.

4. APPRECIATE TRACES ADAMINA.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 19 JAN 1966	CASE NO. 201- C -101331
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES — DATE
☐ SET UP FOR CA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA
USE			
☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST	
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW	
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION	
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM	☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA	
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐ ATTACHMENT ☐	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA	
✓ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED - *(No notice to Division)*	Connection of 19 JAN 1966	☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA	☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LEFLUTTER REPORT
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*		☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE	
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES		☐ FILE	
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		☐ TICKLE	
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES		☐ NOTICE	☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
REQUEST	☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐ OTHER	
☐ POA EXPIRED ______. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.			
☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.			

REMARKS

See M/R — of 19 JAN 1966

19 JAN 1966
CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY/Edward P. Brown

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
10 January 1966 jab

TO:
WH/1/Mexico - W.J. Kaufman

C NO.
C - 101331

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT:
LITAMIL/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss your request of 16 December 1965. POA expired 3 January 1966.

19 JAN 1966 - Disc'd w/J. Stewart. their only reason for asking for extension was that they were under the impression they could not pay him without a POA. The error of this thinking was pointed out to him. He is going to let POA expire which it has already done.
Jh

FORM 8-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 10 Jan 66

CASE NO. 201- C-101331

☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE		☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK		☐ ORSD	AREA:

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ [illegible]	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below,* or see remarks)	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓	TICKLE 26 Feb 66
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

✓ POA EXPIRED 8 Jan 66 * ~~[illegible] POA WILL BE [illegible]~~

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

* Please come to CI/OA to discuss your request of 16 Dec 1965.

275

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 8-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(11)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
21 December 1965 jab

TO:
WH/1 -- W.J. Kaufman

C NO.
C - 101331

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT:
LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss your request of 16 December 1965.

FORM 8-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 21 DEC 1965	CASE NO. 201- C-101331

☐	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	
☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE			
☐	SET UP FOR OA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	ORSD	AREA:			

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE att.
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓	TICKLE 21 Jan.
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION
☐	POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
☐	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

To: WH/1

Pls. come to CI/OA to discuss your request of 16 Dec. '65

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/WH/1

EXTENSION: 4506

NO.

DATE: 16 December 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/1/Stewart	16 Dec			
2. DC/WH/1	12/16			
3. CI/OA				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/OA

SUBJECT : Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9

1. The Provisional Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9 (C-101331) is due to expire 8 January 1965.

2. In discussions with the field case officer for this operation, WH/1/Mexico has found that there is no way to determine when, or whether, LITAMIL-9 will again leave Cuba. For reasons of personal security, LITAMIL-9 has not been able to function as a reporting source since his return to Cuba in early March 1965. Letters to his brother, LITAMIL-17, and reports from occasional Cuban official travelers transiting Mexico indicate that LITAMIL-9 is well and is employed by the National Cultural Council.

3. LITAMIL-9 is now an inactive agent. The Station has recently proposed that his salary cease accumulating as of 30 June 1966. If and when he again manages to leave Cuba, he will be contacted and a full assessment of his future usefulness will be made. Owing to the fact that his sister-in-law is a secretary to Fidel Castro it is expected that he will be a valuable source of information, at least for an initial debriefing period.

4. It would be appreciated if the POA on LITAMIL-9 could be extended for six months. If at the end of that time he has not left Cuba, it will be proposed that the POA be allowed to expire.

Dec 17 3 09 AM '65

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MEXICO

ACTION WH/7

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WH

TIME 1115

INFO FILE VR, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], CI/OA

SECRET 211655Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 4731

PBRUMEN

21 SEP 65 IN 56450

REF: DIR 44181 (IN 05143)

1. POLICE RAID EARLY MORNING 18 SEP SEIZED TWO SUB-MACHINEGUNS AND ONE AUTOMATIC PISTOL. GARCIA ARRESTED, QUESTIONED BY FISCAL POLICE, CONSIGNED TO GOBERNACION WHICH CONSIDERING DEPORTING HIM TO CUBA.

2. PENETRATION AGENT REPORTS POLICE SEARCH POORLY DONE. LARGE BOX OF "WHITE POWDER" WAS WASHED DOWN DRAIN AFTER POLICE LEFT. DOCUMENTS AND PHOTOS BURNED FOR HOURS. QUANTITY OF DYNAMITE REMOVED FROM PREMISES.

3. ON 20 SEP STATION PREPARED LIST QUESTIONS TO BE POSED TO GARCIA. EXPECT ANSWERS SOON. SUBJ APPARENTLY STILL BEING HELD INCOMMUNICADO.

4. TARGET STUDY WAS INFORMAL STATION STUDY, NOT SENT TO HQS. MEXI 4770 WAS LAST CORRESPONDENCE ON CASE. SUBJ [illegible] ON LIENVOY AND IN REPORTS BY LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3 AND LITAMIL-5 SINCE THEN. AIMONET HAD LITAMIL-2 DO SPECIAL REPORT ON SUBJ SEP 64.

C-95535 [illegible] [illegible]

5. CORRECT 201 NOTED. HAD PICKED UP OTHER NUMBER FROM HMMW 11470.

SECRET

File

23 SEP 1965

SECRET

IN-50458-[illegible]

6. WILL KEEP HQS ADVISED DEVELOPMENTS BY CABLE. NO PUBLICITY ON CASE TO DATE.

S E C R E T

CFN 4781 44131 2514 18 SEP GARCIA GOBERNACION 20 GARCIA NOT SENT HQS 4770 LIENVOY LITAMIL -2 LITAMIL-3 LITAMIL -9 64 221 11470

,9 07736:856

25

SECRET

+ Hqs requested to be kept advised latest developments of case

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/1/Mexico - [illegible] Scott

NUMBER
C - 101331

SUBJECT
LITAMIL/9

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
19 April 1965 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

For use as a reporting source from within Cuba.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

APPROVAL

Edward P. Brown
BY
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

DATE
8 July 1965

FORM 5-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 8 JUL 1965	CASE NO. CI/OA C-101331
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES — DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
✓	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE att.
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

☐ POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

To: WH/1

For use as a reporting source from within Cuba.

John F. Cally

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(21)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ TERNAL
E ONLY ☐ CON DENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/1/R.E.Scutt

EXTENSION: 4507

NO.

DATE: 19 April 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/1		19 APR 1965		
2.				
3.				
4. C/CI/OA	20 APR 1965			
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

19 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/OA

SUBJECT : Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9

1. An Operational Approval is requested for LITAMIL-9, who has recently returned to Cuba, and has accepted an FI mission from Mexico Station. The Station has expressed its reluctance to interview a Mexican officer who alleged in 1959 that LITAMIL-9 was a Communist, since this course of action would unnecessarily draw attention of this officer to our interest in LITAMIL-9. WH/1 has concurred in this decision, and considers that this unevaluated derogatory information on LITAMIL-9 is far outweighed by his performance record.

2. Realizing the risk involved in working with any Cuban national, WH/1 feels that LITAMIL-9's excellent record of cooperation, plus his acceptance of the idea of continued cooperation in a denied area favor consideration of an Operational Approval. Additionally, we have had audio coverage through the telephone in LITAMIL-9's office for the past two years or more, and during this time the Station has used the installation for spot checking his information, and is satisfied that there are no reasons to question his veracity and security or suspect that he is under control of the Cuban service.

3. Attached for your review are several contact reports of LITAMIL-9, as requested by Mr. Lally. Their prompt return will be appreciated. This office will be pleased to cooperate in any further review of this case which will facilitate the OA.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief WH/1

Attachments:
Reports of LITAMIL-9

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

2 SECRET

RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

VR. FILE DDP WH/C 8 Files

SECRET 151745Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2777

C-10133)

15 MAR 65

IN 22918

PBRUMEN

LITAMIL-9 DEPARTED MEXI FOR PBRUMEN 12 MAR.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

File

JL 18 MAR 1955

13 April '65 – R. Scott, WH/1, says subject has agreed to work for Station upon his return to Cuba. Scott will supply tech. ops. info. on L-9 in hopes that we might be able to resolve Subj's bona fides. This was at my suggestion since it came to my attention by independent reading of previous cables that such an installation existed. Yet WH/1 did not (or refused to) divulge such info to [redacted] CI/OA. JL.

Subj's brother, L-17, to be used as commo channel. Being processed for POA/OA.

TOTAL COPIES 1 RUN BY ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION
[illegible]

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO
VR, FILE, [illegible]

S E C R E T 042353Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2407

8 FEB 196 File

AQUATIC PBRUMEN

5 FEB [illegible] IN 74047

REF MEXI 2235 (IN 63840)

c-10/331

1. REF FURNITURE HAS BEEN RETURNED PBRUMEN EMBASSY AND PLACED IN MUSIC ROOM WHICH LITAMIL-9 REPORTS IS USED BY AMBASSADOR FOR CLOSED DOOR SESSIONS WITH IMPORTANT VISITORS. TRANSMITTER WORKING WELL AND RESPONDS TO ON/OFF SWITCHING FROM LIONION BASE. LIONION-1 MONTIRING AND RECORDING TAKE. FIRST TAPE RECORDED CONVERSATION BY AMBASSADOR AND MONDRAGON IN WHICH THEY DISCUSS FURTHER UPHOLSTERY WORK BY MONDRAGON WHO NOW HAS SEVERAL SMALL CHAIRS IN SHOP TO BE RECOVERED. PRELIMINARY STATION DETERMINATION IS THAT THESE DO NOT WARRANT BUGGING AS WILL PROBABLY BE PUT IN SAME ROOM.

2. STATION CLOSELY MONITORING EMBASSY/MONDRAGON NEGOTIATIONS. FEEL LIKELY HE WILL RECEIVE ADDITIONAL BUSINESS THUS ENABLING STATION MAKE ADDITIONAL TECH PENETRATIONS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

HW

MESSAGE FORM

9 SECRET

ORIG: HFSWENSON:vap
UNIT: C/WH/SA/CI
EXT: 6471
DATE: 19 JUNE 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-268919

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

OPERATIONAL Z

IMMEDIATE

TO: CITE BRUSSELS PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/SA 8 [illegible]

INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WE 6, WH 7, VR

TO OPIM OPIM
BRUS PARI

INFO ROUTINE
MEXI

CITE DIR

Copy in each file.

File

29570

19 JUN 1964

TYPIC LICOOZE

1. LICOOZE CASE REVIEWED THOROUGHLY BY SHRYOCK WHO HANDLED IN MEXI. SHRYOCK COMMENTS FOLLOW: LICOOZE WAS DIFFICULT TO HANDLE BECAUSE WHILE TRUTHFUL IN ANSWER TO ANY SPECIFIC QUESTION HE SELDOM ELABORATED, SELDOM VOLUNTEERED INFORMATION AND GENERALLY WAS RELUCTANT TO FURNISH INFO WHICH DID NOT CONCERN PEOPLE WHOM HE CONSIDERED COMMIES.

per Cont
2-101331

2. REVIEW ESTABLISHED THAT LICOOZE AT TIME WHEN HE SAW FERNANDO AVILA AT HABANA AIRPORT SENT MESSAGE THROUGH LITAMIL-9 TO AMBASSADOR ANTONIO PORTUONDO THAT AVILA WAS AN AMERICAN AGENT. THIS INFO CAME FROM LITAMIL-9 WHO IS CONSIDERED COMPLETELY RELIABLE. GRANTING MEMORY LAPSE ON PART OF LICOOZE AS RESULTS OF PASSAGE OF TIME AND PSYCHIATRIC DIFFICULTIES, IT STILL IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT HE DID NOT RECALL ABOVE WHEN DISCUSSING AVILA CASE. DO NOT REPEAT NOT RECOMMEND STOCKWOOD MENTIONING ABOVE

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER 19-2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG
UNIT
EXT
DATE

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF. INFO

PAGE TWO

TO INFO: CITE DIR 29510

BECAUSE LI-9 IS SENSITIVE CURRENT SOURCE, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE STOCKWOOD REVIEWING INFO ON AVILA AND ASKING WHETHER LIOOZE KNOWN CASTRO GOVT REPRESENTATIVES WERE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT AVILA AND WHETHER LIOOZE EVER HAD FURNISHED ANY INFO CONCERNING HIM.

3. REGARDLESS OF LICOZE REPLY TO ABOVE HE SHOULD BE VALUABLE SOURCE IN EUROPE. CLOSE CONTROL PROVIDED BY RUS BRUS STATION CAPABILITIES PLUS PLANNED COVERAGE HIS APARTMENT SHOULD PERMIT VERIFICATION HIS INFO AND BONA FIDES. IN VIEW OF PARA 1 UNDERSTANDING SHOULD BE REACHED WITH LICOZE THAT KUBARK EXPECTS HIM TO DISCLOSE FULLY ALL INFO OF INTEREST TO KUBARK WITHOUT NEED OF DETAILED QUESTIONING. SUGGEST HE BE TOLD THAT KUBARK INTERESTS COINCIDE WITH BEST INTERESTS OF CUBAN PEOPLE BUT THAT KUBARK NEEDS FULLEST INFO IN ORDER TO BE HELPFUL WHETHER OR NOT INFO IN HIS OPINION IS OF LEGITIMATE INTEREST TO KUBARK. AS A LAST RESORT HIS TAPED COMMENTS COULD BE REVEALED TO HIM AS CONTROL OR MEASURE ALTHOUGH IT IS HOPED THAT CONFIDENCE IN AND RAPPORT WITH STOCKWOOD PLUS CHANGED

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO PAGE THREE

TO INFO: CITE DIR 29510

SITUATION IN CUBA AND LICOZE'S OWN OPPOSITION TO PRESENT REGIME AS WELL AS TO COMMUNISM WILL LEAD HIM TO COOPERATE FULLY.

4. IN GENERAL HQS ~~BELIEVES~~ FEELS THAT STOCKWOOD SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON CURRENT REQUIREMENTS RATHER THAN DELVE FURTHER INTO PAST LICOZE ACTIVITIES WHICH ALREADY HAVE BEEN COVERED IN SOME DETAIL AND IN WHICH LICOZE APPEARS HONESTLY TO HAVE FORGOTTEN. SHRYOCK IN REVIEWING LATEST INFO FROM LICOZE FOUND IT TO CORRESPOND WITH INFO KNOWN TO HIM DURING TIME HE WAS IN CONTACT WITH LICOZE.

5. HQS WILL PROVIDE REQUIREMENTS AND WILL ENDEAVOR TO SUGGEST MEANS WHICH CAN BE USED TO ENHANCE LICOZE REPUTATION WITH CUBAN INTEL SERVICE SO AS TO INCREASE HIS ACCESS AND VALUE IN FUTURE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1/Mexico
WH/SA/MOB
WH/SA/EOB
WE/2
WE/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM O'RYAN
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: [redacted]

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: LIAISON & OFFICE OF SECURITY

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
11:25 4 AUG 78		ED LOPEZ	Edwin Juan Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

THIS FOLDER IS NOT TO BE RELEASED OUTSIDE OF CI/STAFF. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH THIS FOLDER MUST NOTIFY CI/OA(5077) IMMEDIATELY IF IT IS TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER GROUP WITHIN CI/STAFF SO THAT IT MAY BE RECHARGED TO THE PROPER PERSON, AND SO THAT THE FOLDER CAN BE READILY LOCATED AT ANY TIME AS [illegible]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

37 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI, SAS 8, VR

3 JAN 1964

File
jk

~~SECRET~~ 233822Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7613 (EASBY ACTING)

2 JAN 64 IN 91186

[redacted]

C-101331

1. [redacted] REPORTS THAT TERESA PROENZA WAS SUMMARILY FIRED FROM HER JOB AS RESULT OPEN CABLE FROM FOMIN RAUL ROA RECEIVED ABOUT TEN OR TWELVE DECEMBER. (PLS NOTE ATTACHMENT TO HMMA 22634 GIVING DATE 1 DECEMBER.)

2. [redacted] SAYS THAT FIRING EVIDENTLY RESULT OF PROENZA REMARK TO SISTER IN LAW OF ROA TO EFFECT THAT STRONG ROA NOTE TO GOM REGARDING DETENTION OF SILVIA DURAN WAS DIPLOMATIC ERROR. BACKING THIS UP IS REMARK TO [redacted] BY COTY SOLORZANO ABOUT 8 DEC TO EFFECT PROENZA SHOULD WATCH HER STEP AND BE MORE FRIENDLY WITH SISTER OF ROA'S WIFE. [redacted] WAS ALSO WITNESS TO PROENZA CRITICISM OF ROA NOTE IN CONVERSATION WITH PRO-CASTRO OFFICIAL OF FINE ARTS INSTITUTE.

3. PROENZA HARD HIT BY FIRING. [redacted] ROA PROBABLY ORDERED DISMISSAL BECAUSE SHE IS COMMUNIST AND ROA IS NOT. PROENZA VISITED GENERAL HERIBERTO JARA IN VERACRUZ TO PLEAD CASE AND REPORTED JARA FURIOUS AT INJUSTICE. ON 24 DEC PROENZA SHOWED UP AT EMBASSY DINNER, APPEARED SLIGHTLY DRUNK, SAID SHE HAD JUST COME FROM VISIT WITH GENERAL LAZARO CARDENAS. SHE DID NOT STAY AT EMBASSY FOR DINNER.

4. [redacted] SAYS HER DISMISSAL KNOWN BY EMBASSY PERSONNEL BUT NOT BEING

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

TALKED ABOUT. PROENZA SHOWS UP ALMOST DAILY, REMAINS FEW MINUTES, LEAVES. RECENT [redacted] REVEALS CALLERS BEING STALLED OFF WITH REPLY PROENZA NOT IN OR PERHAPS DUE TOMORROW.

5. NO EVIDENCE THIS DISMISSAL DUE TO [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

?

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

33 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/CA, FI, SAS 8, VR

3 JAN 1964

File

SECRET 030002Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7613 (EASBY ACTING)

2 Jan 64 IN 91186

PBRUMEN

C-101331

1. LITAMIL-9 REPORTS THAT TERESA PROENZA WAS SUMMARILY FIRED FROM HER JOB AS RESULT OPEN CABLE FROM FOMIN RAUL ROA RECEIVED ABOUT TEN OR TWELVE DECEMBER. (PLS NOTE ATTACHMENT TO HMMA 22634 GIVING DATE 1 DECEMBER.)

2. L-9 SAYS THAT FIRING EVIDENTLY RESULT OF PROENZA REMARK TO SISTER IN LAW OF ROA TO EFFECT THAT STRONG ROA NOTE TO GOM REGARDING DETENTION OF SILVIA DURAN WAS DIPLOMATIC ERROR. BACKING THIS UP IS REMARK TO L-9 BY COTY SOLORZANO ABOUT 8 DEC TO EFFECT PROENZA SHOULD WATCH HER STEP AND BE MORE FRIENDLY WITH SISTER OF ROA'S WIFE. L-9 WAS ALSO WITNESS TO PROENZA CRITICISM OF ROA NOTE IN CONVERSATION WITH PRO-CASTRO OFFICIAL OF FINE ARTS INSTITUTE.

3. PROENZA HARD HIT BY FIRING. TOLD L-9 ROA PROBABLY ORDERED DISMISSAL BECAUSE SHE IS COMMUNIST AND ROA IS NOT. PROENZA VISITED GENERAL HERIBERTO JARA IN VERACRUZ TO PLEAD CASE AND REPORTED JARA FURIOUS AT INJUSTICE. ON 24 DEC PROENZA SHOWED UP AT EMBASSY DINNER, APPEARED SLIGHTLY DRUNK, SAID SHE HAD JUST COME FROM VISIT WITH GENERAL LAZARO CARDENAS. SHE DID NOT STAY AT EMBASSY FOR DINNER.

4. L-9 SAYS HER DISMISSAL KNOWN BY EMBASSY PERSONNEL BUT NOT BEING

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

TALKED ABOUT. PROENZA SHOWS UP ALMOST DAILY, REMAINS FEW MINUTES, LEAVES, RECENT LIENVOY TRAFFIC REVEALS CALLERS BEING STALLED OFF WITH REPLY PROENZA NOT IN OR PERHAPS DUE TOMORROW.

5. NO EVIDENCE THIS DISMISSAL DUE TO AMROD OP BUT CONSIDER THIS POSSIBILITY.

?

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 11 Dec 63

CASE NO.: C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE: AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-67 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(44)

[redacted]

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 11 Dec 63	CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE
SET UP FOR: OA · SP INQUIRY · GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:	
ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"	
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW	
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION	
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM	SECURITY OFFICE · DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA	
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA	
CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA	
CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE	
REQUEST RI TRACES		[✓ FILE]	
REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE	
REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE	FIRST · SECOND · THIRD AND FINAL
REQUEST · PRQ I · PRQ II		OTHER	

REMARKS

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-57 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ ERNAL ONLY ☐ CONI ENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/OA

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 27 November 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, WH/3/Mexico ATTN: B. REICHART				
2. CI/OA J. Lally				Is attached correct? No changes made as agreed c/ WH/3/Mex
3.				
4. Chief, WH/3/Mexico.				2 to 4: This is for your retention.
5.				
6.				
7.				Returned to CI/OA Dec. 11, for second time, by WH/Mexico.
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/OA

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 27 November 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, WH/3/Mexico ATTN: B. REICHART				
2. CI/OA J. Lally			JL	Is attached correct? No changes made as agreed c/ WH/3/Mex
3.				
4. Chief, WH/3/Mexico				
5.				2 to 4: This is for your retention. JL
6.				
7.				
8.				Returned to CI/OA Dec. 11, for second time, by WH/Mexico.
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/CA

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 18 November 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, WH/3/Mexico ATTN: Mike Mulloy				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

18 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/Mexico

ATTENTION : Mike Mulloy

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

1. Pursuant to a meeting held on 14 November 1963 amongst personnel of WH/3/Mexico, B. Reichart, R. Scott, H. Mulloy, J. Manning and of CI/OA, E. P. Brown and J. Lally, it was agreed that the case of LITAMIL/9 comes under the purview of CSI-F No. 10-5, Section 18a. As such, this requires Headquarters approval, i.e. that of WH Division, for the recruitment of a government official of a denied area country.

2. As described in MEXI-6696, LITAMIL/9 "serves as invaluable eyes and ears inside target establishment" reporting on information received in his government position. It was agreed such activity does not require a Provisional or Operational Approval since LITAMIL/9 is a government official of a denied area country. Under these conditions, the processing of an Operational Approval should not and will not be effected.

3. It was also agreed that if LITAMIL/9 should be employed for operational use other than reporting information received in his government position, the usual Operational Approval or Provisional Operational Approval procedure will apply.

4. It was agreed that CI/OA would take no further processing action at this time based on the above information. However, as in similar cases, CI/OA will forward to the desk such information made available to it which might aid the Station in its handling of LITAMIL/9.

Edward P. Brown
EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/CA

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE 18 November 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, WH/3/Mexico ATTN: Mike Mulloy				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

18 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/Mexico

ATTENTION : Mike Mulloy

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

1. Pursuant to a meeting held on 14 November 1963 amongst personnel of WH/3/Mexico, B. Reichart, R. Scott, H. Mulloy, J. Manning and of CI/OA, E. P. Brown and J. Lally, it was agreed that the case of LITAMIL/9 comes under the purview of CSI-F No. 10-5, Section 18a. As such, this requires Headquarters approval, i.e. that of WH Division, for the recruitment of a government official of a denied area country.

2. As described in MEXI-6696, LITAMIL/9 "serves as invaluable eyes and ears inside target establishment" reporting on information received in his government position. It was agreed such activity does not require a Provisional or Operational Approval since LITAMIL/9 is a government official of a denied area country. Under these conditions, the processing of an Operational Approval should not and will not be effected.

3. It was also agreed that if LITAMIL/9 should be employed for operational use other than reporting information received in his government position, the usual Operational Approval or Provisional Operational Approval procedure will apply.

4. It was agreed that CI/OA would take no further processing action at this time based on the above information. However, as in similar cases, CI/OA will forward to the desk such information made available to it which might aid the Station in its handling of LITAMIL/9.

Edward P. Brown
EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

8 OCT 1963

Ed,

I don't consider this an accurate or inclusive dispatch as was agreed to in our mtg. with c/o.

a. No mention that they are using man without approval of any kind (the POA granted for tour only automatically expired at the completion of tour session.)

b. No mention that he is deep in the LAURICLE requirements of the Station.

c. Para #6 should read LCFLUTTER is a must.

Would like your comments.

HMMW-11988
4 Oct. '63

8 OCT 1963

Ed,

I don't consider this an accurate or inclusive dispatch as was agreed to in our mtg. with c/o.

a. No mention that they are using man without approval of any kind (the POA granted for Tony only automatically expired at the completion of Tour-session.)

b. No mention that he is deep in the LAURICLE requirements of the Station.

c. Para #6 should read LCFLUTTER is a must.

Would like your comments.

HMMW-11988
4 Oct. '63

SECRET

1 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WE/3

ATTENTION : Wayne Carley

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum dated 10 July 1963. Same Subject.

1. This is the second request of CI/OA's asking for an answer to our memorandum of 10 July 1963. Because of the sensitivity of this case, it is imperative that the oft-requested reply be forwarded.

2. It is to be noted that the Subject continues to be used without an Operational Approval per PRQ Part II dated 17 June 1963. It is further noted in Section VI, 4, that "Subject is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements", a most sensitive area.

3. Again, we ask for an answer to the referenced memorandum.

EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

CI/OA/JFL:aal

SECRET

SECRET

1 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Wayne Carley

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum dated 10 July 1963. Same Subject.

1. This is the second request of CI/OA's asking for an answer to our memorandum of 10 July 1963. Because of the sensitivity of this case, it is imperative that the oft-requested reply be forwarded.

2. It is to be noted that the Subject continues to be used without an Operational Approval per PRQ Part II dated 17 June 1963. It is further noted in Section VI, 4, that "Subject is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements", a most sensitive area.

3. Again, we ask for an answer to the referenced memorandum.

EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

CI/OA/JFL:aal

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 29 AUG 1963	CASE NO. 329609

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST FI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	✓	TICKLE 12 Sept 63
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS.

~~WH/3~~

WH reply to 10 July 63 CI/OA memo.

Leonard W. Tate

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (21)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 29 AUG 1963	CASE NO. 329609

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☑	TICKLE 12 Sept 63
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS.

WH/3

WH reply to 10 July 63 CI/OA memo.

Leonard W. Tate

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

OD

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE 11 July 1963 jew

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: WH/3

SUBJECT: 201 - C-101331, SO#179089 ALHERU Souto, Luis

TYPE OF REQUEST: ☐ POA ☒ OA ☐ CNC ☐ SO

CS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS: RI | DIVISION | FIELD

JUL 12 1 48 PM '63

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

DATE 26 AUG 1963

☒ 1. OS Indices results: see below

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☒	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

☐ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached ____________

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS

data contained in OS indices were furnished CI/OA by this office (OS) in memo dated 30 Aug 63.

CLOSED

23 AUG 1963

James E. Mackey Jr.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY, IOS

FORM 8-63 693a

SECRET

30 August 63

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE: 11 July 1963 jev

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: WH/3

SUBJECT: 201 - C-101 31, SO#179089 ALBERU Souto, Luis

TYPE OF REQUEST:

PCA	SA	CNC	SS
	☒		

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS: PI / DIVISION / FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: YES ☐ NO ☐

ATTACHMENTS: PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER ☐

REMARKS

JUL 12 1 48 PM '63

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE 26 AUG 1963

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☒ 1. OS Indices results: see below

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☒	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

☐ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached ______

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS

Data contained in OS indices were furnished CI/OA by this office (OS) ~~in~~ in memo dated 30 Aug 63.

CLOSED

23 AUG 1963

James E. Mackey
DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY, IOS

FORM 8-63 693a

SECRET

30 Aug 63

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 10 JUL 1963

CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE

☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE

SET UP FOR: ☒ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

USE AREA:

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL

☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL

☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION

☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE

☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED:
[illegible]

☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)*
(See "Remarks" for reason)

☐ REQUEST RI TRACES

☐ REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES

☐ REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES

☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II

☐ REQUEST "GREEN LIST"

☐ REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW

☐ REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION

☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION

☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA

☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA

☐ [illegible]

☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE

☒ FILE attached

☐ TICKLE

☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

☐ OTHER

REMARKS

Edward L. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 10 JUL 1963	CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	X OA · SP INQUIRY · GOV'T N. CHK		USE: AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM · SECURITY OFFICE · DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: [illegible] division)		[illegible]
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES	X	FILE attached
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE · FIRST · SECOND · THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST · PRO I · PRO II		OTHER

REMARKS

Edward L. Brown

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
C-101331
201-329609

Attached is the PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

JUN 26 9 41 AM '63

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION	PRQ NO. DISPATCH NO. HMMA 21557

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12c and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM

LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I. CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case Officer (Clyde K SHRYOCK) was introduced to Subject on 18 July 62 by LITAMIL-3, who was recovering from a gall stone operation in the hospital. The CO made contact with the subject, a [illegible] diplomat, to develop and use as a penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico. See MEXI 1467 re initial meeting.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subj speaks English and French as well as Spanish.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knows Clyde K SHRYOCK, his Case Officer, by true name. SHRYOCK will introduce Laurence F. BARKER to Subject during the week of 16 June 1963.

FORM NO. 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-85a WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 NOV 56

SECRET

(4-20)

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the West. He is anti-Communist.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico could reveal Subject's activities to the PBRUMEN government.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and Case Officer meet clandestinely in darkened areas of the city at night.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as an employee of the PBRUMEN Embassy obtains his information from his fellow workers and contacts.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work, (Is working).*

Subject know he is working for PBPRIME Intelligence.

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have had any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE
Subject's brother, Leonel, resident in Mexico
Jose CABRAL Escalante
LITAMIL-3 probably suspects Subj is in contact with CO

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning and intelligent and has made great strides on his own since first contact with his Case Officer.

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would probably collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime if it should come to power.

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subj provided a few intelligence items through LITAMIL-3 before direct contact was made with the Case Officer.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from members of the PBRUMEN Embassy and friends of PBRUMEN with whom he deals.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject has been told that the information he provides is forwarded to Washington.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's FI activities are directed toward the penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy of which he is part and the contacts of the Embassy. Subj is also aware of the Station's LURICIE requirements

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is going on salary as of 15 June 63 at the rate of 4000 pesos ($320.00 U.S.) monthly. Andrew S. PARMEES and Edward D. KNAPMAN are known to Subject under assumed names.

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is an artist

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

As of 15 June 1963, Subject will be paid a monthly salary of 4000 pesos.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

No commitments or promises but it is assumed that KUBARK will assist Subject to leave the country if this is necessary because of his activities on KUBARK'S behalf.

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files.

Close friends of Subject such as LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-7 LIOOZE-1 and many other contacts of the Cuban Embassy.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

See para 1

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Submitted 27 July 1962 HMMA 19455

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. Sincere, extremely security conscious, reliable, punctual and highly intelligent. A cosmopolitan type, somewhat arty, yet cognizant of what it takes to get a job done, i.e. KUBARK's job.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with ODYOKE isknown to Jose CARRAL Escalante and Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE per MEXI 3450. CARRAL and de EYCHENNE are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. Subj is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1- INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1- INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is a European type, but because of his Cuban accent would probably recognized as such.

2- INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Parts 1 and 2 was obtained through research, files, agents, and direct questioning.

3- IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

No problems are envisaged in terminating agent.

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1- GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject is in possession of CO's telephone number (home) and CO's office phone. CO can make contact with Subject at his home or at the PBPRIME Embassy if necessary. Subjectand CO use the name AGUILAR on the telephone.

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

Subject, who is well deposed toward PBPRIME, is anxious to remain a long term agent for ODYOKE. His intelligence, coupled with his contacts in leftist and Communist circles, makes him an excellent prospect.

DATE 17 June 1963	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER Clyde K SHRYOCK

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 17 MAY 1963	CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE					EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE
SET UP FOR		CA		SP INQUIRY		GOV'T N. CHK	USE : AREA:	

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to division)*		[illegible]
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE attached
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Destroy tickles

To Archives

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CI/OA		
2	2 B 11		
3	Attn: Mr. Ed Brown		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	[illegible]	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	X	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	X	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Ed; Inclosed is Memo re our problem case, LITAMIL 9, prepared by the OTR training officer who recently met him in Mexi. FYI and retention or destruction. Mike

C-101331

File
EPB
4 Mar 63

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
H. E. Mulloy R146	28 Feb

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O--587282

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
C-101331
201-329609

Attached is the PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

Jun 26 9 47 AM '63

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA 21557

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM: LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM:

SECTION I. CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case Officer (Clyde K SHRYOCK) was introduced to Subject on 18 July 62 by LITAMIL-3, who was recovering from a gall stone operation in the hospital. The CO made contact with the subject, a [illegible] diplomat, to [illegible] a penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico. See MEXI 1467 re initial meeting.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subj speaks English and French as well as Spanish.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knows Clyde K SHRYOCK, his Case Officer, by true name. SHRYOCK will introduce Laurence F. BARKER to Subject during the week of 16 June 1963.

FORM NO. 1 NOV 56 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-95a WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4-20)

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the West. He is anti-Communist.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico could reveal Subject's activities to the PBRUMEN government.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and Case Officer meet clandestinely in darkened areas of the city at night.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as an employee of the PBRUMEN Embassy obtains his information from his fellow workers and contacts.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work, (Is working).*

Subject know he is working for PBPRIME Intelligence.

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have had any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE
Subject's brother, Leonel, resident in Mexico
Jose CARRAL Escalante
LITAMIL-3 probably suspects Subj is in contact with CO

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning and intelligent and has made great strides on his own since first contact with his Case Officer.

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would probably collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime. if it should come to power.

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subj provided a few intelligence items through LITAMIL-3 before direct contact was made with the Case Officer.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from members of the PBRUMEN Embassy and friends of PBRUMEN with whom he deals.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject has been told that the information he provides is forwarded to Washington.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's FI activities are directed toward the penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy of which he is part and the contents of the Embassy. Subj is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is going on salary as of 15 June 63 at the rate of 4000 pesos ($320.00 U.S.) monthly. Andrew S. PARGLES and Edward D. KNAPMAN are known to Subject under assumed names.

SECTION IX

QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is an artist

SECTION X

COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

As of 15 June 1963, Subject will be paid a monthly salary of 4000 pesos.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

No commitments or promises but it is assumed that KUBARK will assist Subject to leave the country if this is necessary because of his activities on KUBARK'S behalf.

SECTION XI

CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files.

Close friends of Subject such as LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-7 LICOZE-1 and many other contacts of the Cuban Embassy.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

See para 1

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Submitted 27 July 1962 HMMA 19455

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. Sincere, extremely security conscious, reliable, punctual and highly intelligent. A cosmopolitan type, somewhat arty, yet cognizant of what it takes to get a job done, i.e. KUBARK's job.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with ODYOKE isknown to Jose CARRAL Escalante and Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE per MEXI 3450. CARRAL and de EYCHENNE are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII

SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. Subj is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECTION XIII	**AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV	**GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is a European type, but because of his Cuban accent would probably recognized as such.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Parts 1 and 2 was obtained through research, files, agents, and direct questioning.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

No problems are envisaged in terminating agent.

SECTION XV	**EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject is in possession of CO's telephone number (home) and CO's office phone. CO can make contact with Subject at his home ar at the PBRUMEN Embassy if necessary. Subjectand CO use the name AGUILAR on the telephone.

SECTION XVI	**MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

Subject, who is well deposed toward PBPRIME, is anxious to remain a long term agent for ODYOKE. His intelligence, coupled with his contacts in leftist and Communist circles, makes him an excellent prospect.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
17 June 1963	Clyde K SHRYOCK

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 17 MAY 1963	CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE attached
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Destroy tickles

To Archives

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI[illegible]TION ON TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CI/OA		
2	2 B 11		
3	Attn: Mr. Ed Brown		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	[illegible]	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☒	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☒	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Ed; Inclosed is Memo re our problem case, LITAMIL 9, prepared by the OTR training officer who recently met him in Mexi. FYI and retention or destruction. Mike

C-101331

File
EPB
4 Mar 63

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
H. E. Mulloy R146	28 Feb

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

(40)

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

28 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-9, Report of TDY, Andrew S. Parmers

1. During 21-26 February 1963, Andrew S. PARMERS travelled from Headquarters to Mexico City on TDY to train LITAMIL-9 on various clandestine, operational, techniques, including SW. Upon arrival in Mexico City PARMERS ascertained that LITAMIL-9 allegedly became of moral inhibitions, was unwilling to receive training and also unwilling to accept the SW systmes Headquarters had issued for him, and which PARMERS had carried to Mexico City. Nevertheless, PARMERS met LITAMIL-9 three times to determine the agents precise objections and to overcome them if possible. Although the agents general resistance was not overcome, PARMERS did review with LITAMIL-9 clandestine methods and techniques in a general way.

2. The first meeting was held at the Station case officers home, with the Case Officer present. LITAMIL-9 explained his reasons for refusing to be trained and for not being willing to communicate in SW with KUBARK while in Cuba. Generally LITAMIL-9 claimed that he is very nervous, and incapable of performing clandestine tasks without having a nervous breakdown and at the same time getting himself caught in the act because of his general incompetancy. Also, LITAMIL-9 was planning to stay at his brothers home in Cuba, and felt it would be unethical and immoral for him to be communicating clandestinely with KUBARK while accepting the hospitality of his brother and sister-in-law who are staunch supporters of the Castro regime. These agreements obviously had already been presented to the Case Officer who had already concluded that LITAMIL-9 could not be moved from his position. The agent furthermore, felt that there was no need for training or SW since he would be returning to Mexico after only three months in Cuba. He displayed a cable he had just received from his father answering LITAMIL-9's query as to what might be his next assignment. The cable stated that LITAMIL-9 would most likely return to his present post in Mexico. The agent therefore felt that upon his return to Mexico City, he could be debriefed by his Case Officer. LITAMIL-9 rejected all attempts to convince him of our need for current info from inside Cuba. He was adamant when we pointed out that he might not return to Mexico City as hoped, but might have to remain in Cuba, having no means of contact. If this happens he plans to resign his position and return to Mexico as a private citizen, since he already is a registered "resident" of Mexico.

SECRET

3. On Friday, 24 February, PARMERS spent most of the day visiting alone with LITAMIL-9 at the latter's apartment. By the end of the day LITAMIL-9 had softened a little and had revealed some of the personality traits mentioned below. LITAMIL-9 also agreed to communicate with his Case Officer through open code in letters to his brother in Mexico City. He also was willing to meet inside KUBARK, preferably if the contact was a diplomat but not Cuban. He agreed to take a set of cuff links as bona fides. As a suggestion, he mentioned that his friend, The Swiss Ambassador, now serving in Madrid, Spain, would be an ideal contact. In revealing how such a contact could be performed and in discussing LITAMIL-9 modus vevendi in Cuba, there was considerable discussions concerning operational Security and clandestine procedures LITAMIL-9 can apply while in Cuba.

PARMEN ?

4. LITAMIL-9 during this meeting also presented, in logical sequence, his reasons for believing that he will return to Mexico City. Basically, he feels that between the fact that he has many contacts in Mexico City (where he has lived and worked for many years) and the fact that his sister-in-law in Cuba has a responsible position with considerable influence in the Castro Government, he LITAMIL-9 will be reassigned to his present post in M··xico City after three months of leave, consultations, and training in Cuba.

5. The third meeting ocurred in the evening of 25 Februar·, in a car pick up situation, with the Case Officer present. This time, LITAMIL-9 was less willing to communicate with KUBARK while in Cuba than he had been during the previous meeting, but with some reluctance, agreed to the use of open code and to be contacted by some diplomat. This meeting, therefore, was a routine operational meeting, with his Case Officer in charge.

6. Based upon their three meetings, PARMERS formed the following opinions of LITAMIL-9: He is a shrewd opportunist, willing to colloborate with KUBARK against the Castro Government, but not to the point where his personal security is endangered. He dislikes the Castro Regime because it has fumbled so badly, and because the current Cuban officials are crude and incompetant. He greatly admires the American people, but definitely feels that we are merely concerned about our own national security and well-being. LITAMIL-9 owes his first loyalty to the fine arts, has little Patriotic feelings towards Cuba, since he has lived in Mexico for so many years, and has declared himself to be a resident of Mexico. He is now serving the Cuban Government simply because he had an opportunity (through his sister-in-law) to achieve official status and income and still remain in Mexico where most of his

[illegible]

personal friends reside.

7. Although at first appearance, and according to his own opinion statements, LITAMIL-9 appears to be extremely nervous because of his clandestine activities in behalf of KUBARK and against Cuba, after some discussion it was apparent that he actually relishes these clandestine actions that he would have engaged in them long before he did, and that he would have continued a covert relationship with KUBARK even after Castro falls, serving either in Mexico (where he has many contacts of interest to KUBARK) or in Cuba in some post in some future government. He has excellent rapport with his present KUBARK case officer. He states that as long as KUBARK remains willing to accept that he has definite personal limitations, (since he can perform only those clandestine tasks related to his cover and cannot be trained or induced to do anything else) he will gladly continue collaborating with KUBARK as long as desired.

8. Actually, PARMERS feels that LITAMIL-9 would do most anything we would desire if KUBARK would someday establish some control over him. His present remarks concerning his moral qualms are artificial. He has great appreciation for shrewdness and double play, and openly admits having engaged in it all his life. On many occasions he admits that he has accomodated himself to a situation for profit or because he knew that he could turn the tables eventually on his adversaries. When he is off-guard he admits to being a cool operater who can scheme and work behind his adversaries' backs. He shows many signs of enjoying doing what he does for and with his present KUBARK case officer.

9. In summary, although LITAMIL-9 did not accept training or SW in the standard sense, PARMERS believes that the agents reluctance was based on his desire to take few risks. The agent is competent, his moral inhibitions are probably faked. He is convinced that he will return to Mexico soon, and desires to continue serving KUBARK if no greater risk is involved. Since KUBARK at present has no clear control (monetary or ideological) over LITAMIL-9, it was difficult to impose KUBARK's will over him. But he is very willing to perform for KUBARK within the limitations he sets, and if someday we can satisfy some personal need he might have, he has the potential of becoming a good controlled agent for KUBARK. He is intelligent and by nature he seems to instinctively conduct his clandestine operations in a secure manner.

Andrew S. Parmers
OTR Training Officer

GROUP 1
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

C# 101331

Close file

18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Chief, Covert Training/Operations School
Chief, TSD Training

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training of Luis ALBERU Souto

1. It is requested that full time covert training be provided at Mexico City, Mexico for approximately ten days beginning on or about 19 February 1963 for Luis ALBERU Souto.

2. The objective of the training is to provide the subject with the basic principles of clandestine tradecraft to better prepare him as an FI agent operating inside a denied area.

3. In addition to the basic tradecraft, training should emphasize reporting techniques and include appropriate secret writing instruction, as arranged by the case officer with TSD.

4. Subject is a PBRUMEN cultural attache in the Embassy in Mexico City. A Provisional Operational Approval was requested on 26 July 1962 and its status is being checked. (C-101331; DPOB: 1915, Oviedo, Spain)

5. Responsible Headquarters case officer for the training is H. E. Mulloy, extension 6172.

FEB 25 10 63

OSCAR D. MCCOLLUM
Training Officer/SAS

APPROVED:

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONCURRENCES:

Counter Intelligence Staff — Date

DDP Training & Qualifications
Review Officer — Date

C# 101331

Please file

18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Chief, Covert Training/Operations School
Chief, TSD Training

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training of Luis ALBERU Sonto

1. It is requested that full time covert training be provided at Mexico City, Mexico for approximately ten days beginning on or about 19 February 1963 for Luis ALBERU Sonto.

2. The objective of the training is to provide the subject with the basic principles of clandestine tradecraft to better prepare him as an FI agent operating inside a denied area.

3. In addition to the basic tradecraft, training should emphasize reporting techniques and include appropriate secret writing instruction, as arranged by the case officer with TSD.

4. Subject is a PBRUMEN cultural attache in the Embassy in Mexico City. A Provisional Operational Approval was requested on 26 July 1962 and its status is being checked. (C-101331; DPOB: 1915, Oviedo, Spain)

5. Responsible Headquarters case officer for the training is H. E. Mulloy, extension 6172.

FEB 25 10 [illegible] 63

OSCAR D. MCCOLLUM
Training Officer/SAS

APPROVED:

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONCURRENCES:

Counter Intelligence Staff — Date

DDP Training & Qualifications
Review Officer — Date

15 March 1963
SAS 63-108

MEMORANDUM TO: WH/3/Mexico

ATTENTION : Mr. Wayne Corley

FROM : SAS/EOB

SUBJECT : Transfer of official 201 files

Transmitted herewith for your retention, action, and disposition are the following listed official 201 files:

LITAMIL-7	201-330173
LITAMIL-9	201-327609
AMSHOW-1	201-352935
AMTRASH-1	201-352934

H. E. Mulloy
SAS/EOB

MAR 15 4 32 PM '63

Distribution:
- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - SAS/EOB
- 1 - SAS/SECRETARIAT
- 1 - OPs SUPPORT
- 1 - WH/COP/CCO
- 1 - C/WH/REGISTRY
- 1 - C/CI/OA
- 1 - RID/FILES

Files for
Mr Sarins
JAB

This illegible ~~[illegible]~~ form merely transfers responsibility for this case from SAS to WH/3/MEXICO.

SECRET

15 March 1963
SAS 63-108

MEMORANDUM TO: WH/3/Mexico

ATTENTION : Mr. Wayne Carley

FROM : SAS/EOB

SUBJECT : Transfer of official 201 files

Transmitted herewith for your retention, action, and disposition are the following listed official 201 files:

LITAMIL-7	201-330173
LITAMIL-9	201-32[illegible]609
[illegible]-1	201-352985
[illegible]-1	201-352984

[illegible] E. Malloy
SAS/EOB

Mar 15 4 32 PM '63

Distribution:
1 - Addressee
1 - SAS/EOB
1 - SAS/SECRETARIAT
1 - OPs SUPPORT
1 - WH/COP/CCO
1 - C/WH/REGISTRY
1 - C/CI/OA
1 - RID/FILES

Files for
M Barnes
GAB

This illegible ~~[illegible]~~ form merely transfers responsibility for this case from SAS to WH/3/MEXICO.

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: J. M.
J. MOUGHAN
SAS/OPS SPT
3E 14

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 25 Feb 63

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 11				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

19 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9, C - 101331

The FBI report entitled Foreign Political Matters Cuba and sent to this Agency on 28 December 1961, could not be located in RID or SAS files. Three such reports dated 29 December 1961 with the same title were obtained, but the Subject was not referred to in any of the three reports.

Desmond FitzGerald
C/SAS

FEB 26 3 01 PM '63

Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressee

File
EAB
1 MAR 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: J. M.
J. MOUGHAN
SAS/CPS SPT
GJ 14

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 25 Feb 63

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 11				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

19 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9, C - 101331

The FBI report entitled Foreign Political Matters Cuba and sent to this Agency on 28 December 1961, could not be located in RID or SAS files. Three such reports dated 29 December 1961 with the same title were obtained, but the Subject was not referred to in any of the three reports.

Desmond FitzGerald
C/SAS

FEB 26 3 01 PM '63

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee

File
EAB
1 MAR 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
[illegible]

NUMBER
C-101331

SUBJECT
LITAMIL/9

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
25 July 1962

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA is granted only for training of Subject.

Approval for operational use of Subject is deferred pending satisfactory resolution of derogatory information, which CI Staff does not consider to have been accomplished.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	20 Feb 1963 pre

FORM 7-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
[illegible]

NUMBER	C-101331
SUBJECT	LITAMIL/9
REFERENCE:	Your Memorandum, Dated 25 July 1962

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA is granted only for training of Subject.

Approval for operational use of Subject is deferred pending satisfactory resolution of derogatory information, which CI Staff does not consider to have been accomplished.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	20 Feb 1963 pre

FORM 7-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 20 FEB 1963	CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE

SET UP FOR: OA | SP INQUIRY | GOV'T N. CHK | USE : AREA:

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM: SECURITY OFFICE; DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
REQUEST RI TRACES	FILE
REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	TICKLE
REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	NOTICE: FIRST; SECOND; THIRD AND FINAL
REQUEST: PRQ I; PRQ II	OTHER

REMARKS

POA is granted only for training of Subject.

~~as granted~~ ~~for~~ Approval ~~for~~ ~~[illegible]~~ for operational use of Subject is deferred pending satisfactory resolution of derogatory information, which CI Staff ~~has not yet~~ does not ~~accomplished to the satisfaction of CI Staff~~ consider to have been accomplished.

Edward L. Brown

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (21)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 20 FEB 1963	CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR ☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK			USE : AREA:
☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

POA is granted only for training of Subject.

~~[illegible]~~ Approval ~~for~~ ~~[illegible]~~ for operational use of Subject is deferred pending satisfactory resolution of derogatory information, which ~~has not yet been~~ CI Staff does not ~~accomplished to the satisfaction of CI Staff~~ consider to have been accomplished.

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (21)

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

JUL 28 0127Z 64

ROUTINE

IN 34536

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1536

CYROSE ✓

REF ✓ DIR 19359 (Out 98071)

✓ MEXI 2946 (IN 43354)

✓ [illegible] (IN [illegible])

1. LUIS ALBERU SOUTO CUBAN CULTURAL ATTACHE MEXI. BORN CIRCA 1915 OVIEDO SPAIN. FATHER: MAXIMINO ALBERU BORN COGNAC FRANCE. MOTHER: JOSEFINA SOUTO BORN LA CORUNA SPAIN. FATHER LIVING HAVA. NO FURTHER DATA MOTHER. IN 1949 MARRIED KLARA VERA NACZ STROSS BORN VIENNA AUSTRIA, BRITISH CITIZEN. DIVORCED 1956. NO CHILDREN. OCCUPATION: ARTIST. HAS BEEN EMPLOYED CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE SINCE JUNE 1959. SALARY DEC 63 INCLUDING REPRESENTATION ALLOWANCES: $292.80 "TAKE HOME" PAY. PRESENT ADDRESS: MICHELET 7 301, MEXICO, D.F. BROTHERS: ALBERTO MARRIED CONCEPCION "CONCHA" FERNANDEZ, CASTRO SECRETARY, LEONEL NOW LIVING MEXICO FORMERLY EMPLOYED BY CUBAN GOVT. HAS TWO SISTERS NOW LIVING VIGA WHERE ONE CUBAN CONSUL THAT CITY. SPEAKS SPANISH FRENCH. (SOURCES: LIMAYAN-2, LIMUD-1, LITAMIL-10 3/2).

details about agents family history

2. STATION TRACES REVEAL AMTONE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-7 ALL CONSIDER ALBERU ANTI-COMMUNIST. ODIBEX (LINOTILE)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

REPORT DATED 25 AUG 59 STATES COL ARTURO CORONA, G-2 MEXICAN ARMY BELIEVES ALBERU COMMUNIST AND ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS CUBAN EMB STAFF. POUCHING PRQ PART I 27 JULY 62.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADVISE STATUS ALSO TRACES FOR POA PROCESSING.

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: TFW 10
INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, WH 7, S/C 2

[illegible] 26 0127Z [illegible]

ROUTINE

IN 34536

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1536

CYROSE

REF A DIR 19359 (Out 92[illegible]1)
B MEXI 2946 (IN 43354)
C MEXI 2444 (IN [illegible])

1. LUIS ALBERU SOUTO CUBAN CULTURAL ATTACHE MEXI. BORN CIRCA 1915 OVIEDO SPAIN. FATHER: MAXIMINO ALBERU BORN COGNAC FRANCE. MOTHER: JOSEFINA SOUTO BORN LA CORUNA SPAIN. FATHER LIVING HAVA. NO FURTHER DATA MOTHER. IN 1949 MARRIED KLARA VERA HACZ STROSS BORN VIENNA AUSTRIA, BRITISH CITIZEN. DIVORCED 1956. NO CHILDREN. OCCUPATION: ARTIST. HAS BEEN EMPLOYED CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE SINCE JUNE 1959. SALARY DEC 63 INCLUDING REPRESENTATION ALLOWANCES: $292.80 "TAKE HOME" PAY. PRESENT ADDRESS: MICHELET 7 301, MEXICO, D.F. BROTHERS: ALBERTO MARRIED CONCEPCION "CONCHA" FERNANDEZ, CASTRO SECRETARY, LEONEL NOW LIVING MEXICO FORMERLY EMPLOYED BY CUBAN GOVT. HAS TWO SISTERS NOW LIVING VIGA WHERE ONE CUBAN CONSUL THAT CITY. SPEAKS SPANISH FRENCH. (SOURCES: LIKAYAK-2, LIMUD-1, LITAMIL-10 3/2).

2. STATION TRACES REVEAL AMTORE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-7 ALL CONSIDER ALBERU ANTI-COMMUNIST. ORIDEX (LINOZZLE)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

REPORT DATED 25 AUG 59 STATES COL ARTURO CORONA, G-2 MEXICAN ARMY BELIEVES ALBERU COMMUNIST AND ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS CUBAN EMB STAFF. POUCHING PRQ PART I 27 JULY 62.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADVISE STATUS ALSO TRACES FOR POA PROCESSING.

SECRET

18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Chief, Covert Training/Operations School
Chief, TSD Training

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training of Luis ALBERU Souto

1. It is requested that full time covert training be provided at Mexico City, Mexico for approximately ten days beginning on or about 19 February 1963 for Luis ALBERU Souto.

2. The objective of the training is to provide the subject with the basic principles of clandestine tradecraft to better prepare him as an FI agent operating inside a denied area.

3. In addition to the basic tradecraft, training should emphasize reporting techniques and include appropriate secret writing instruction, as arranged by the case officer with TSD.

4. Subject is a PBRUMEN cultural attache in the Embassy in Mexico City. A Provisional Operational Approval was requested on 26 July 1962 and its status is being checked. (C-101331; DPOB: 1915, Oviedo, Spain)

5. Responsible Headquarters case officer for the training is H. R. Malloy, extension 6172.

OSCAR D. MCCOLLUM
Training Officer/SAS

APPROVED:

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONCURRENCES:

Counter Intelligence Staff — Date

DDP Training & Qualifications
Review Officer — Date

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/TSD/TRO
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP/TRO
1 - C/SAS
1 - SAS/TRO

DDP/SAS/TRO/ODMcCollum:clo (18 Feb. 1963)

SECRET

18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Chief, Covert Training/Operations School
Chief, TSD Training

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training of Luis ALBERU Souto

1. It is requested that full time covert training be provided at Mexico City, Mexico for approximately ten days beginning on or about 19 February 1963 for Luis ALBERU Souto.

2. The objective of the training is to provide the subject with the basic principles of clandestine tradecraft to better prepare him as an FI agent operating inside a denied area.

3. In addition to the basic tradecraft, training should emphasize reporting techniques and include appropriate secret writing instruction, as arranged by the case officer with TSD.

4. Subject is a PBRUMEN cultural attache in the Embassy in Mexico City. A Provisional Operational Approval was requested on 26 July 1962 and its status is being checked. (C-101331; DPOB: 1915, Ovieda, Spain)

5. Responsible Headquarters case officer for the training is H. E. Mulloy, extension 6172.

OSCAR D. MCCOLLUM
Training Officer/SAS

APPROVED:

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONCURRENCES:

Counter Intelligence Staff — Date

DDP Training & Qualifications
Review Officer — Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/TSD/TRO
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP/TRO
1 - C/SAS
1 - SAS/TRO

DDP/SAS/TRO/ODMcCollum:clo (18 Feb. 1963)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 29 August 1962 mu
TO: TFW Attn: H.E. Mulloy	C NO. C-101331
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA [illegible] Carroll, Jr.	SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	BI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	[illegible]	☐	[illegible]
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/CA to discuss results of Field traces.

Joe

201-329604

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 29 August 1962 mm
TO: TFW Attn: H.E. Mulloy	C NO. C-101331
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA [illegible] Carroll, Jr.	SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	BI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	[illegible]	☐	[illegible]
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/CA to discuss results of Field traces.

je

201-329604

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 4 September 1962 mu

TO: TFW

Attn: E. E. Mulloy

C NO. C-101331

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☒	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICES: [illegible]

REMARKS:

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment and advise CI/OA of significence of the information.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 4 September 1962 mm

TO: TFW

Attn: E. E. Mulloy

C NO. C-101331

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☒	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICES: [illegible]

REMARKS:

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment and advise CI/OA of significence of the information.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 8-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

Chief, CI/OA 20 AUG 1962

Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

C-101331
#279 089

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 July 1962 wherein Provisional Operational Approval interest, only, was indicated for possible use of Subject as an agent in Mexico by TFW under Project JMATE.

2. On 31 July 1962 your office was advised telephonically that Office of Security indices contained no record of the Subject.

3. On 17 August 1962 you were advised that the FBI has not conducted an investigation on the Subject, However, the FBI made reference to data re "Foreign Political Matters-Cuba" which was sent to this Agency on 28 December 1961. The date of said report is not given, however, it is known that the FBI has provided this Agency with numerous reports so captioned, on a continuous basis. Office of Security indices were searched for the above referenced report received on 28 December 1961, with negative results. Therefore, it is assumed it is available in RID, TFW or WH Division files.

4. No further action is contemplated in this case unless otherwise requested by your office.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert L.
f Victor R. White

SECRET

SECRET

Chief, CI/OA

30 AUG 1962

Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

C-101331
#279 089

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 July 1962 wherein Provisional Operational Approval interest, only, was indicated for possible use of Subject as an agent in Mexico by TFW under Project JMATE.

2. On 31 July 1962 your office was advised telephonically that Office of Security indices contained no record of the Subject.

3. On 17 August 1962 you were advised that the FBI has not conducted an investigation on the Subject, However, the FBI made reference to data re "Foreign Political Matters-Cuba" which was sent to this Agency on 28 December 1961. The date of said report is not given, however, it is known that the FBI has provided this Agency with numerous reports so captioned, on a continuous basis. Office of Security indices were searched for the above referenced report received on 28 December 1961, with negative results. Therefore, it is assumed it is available in RID, TFW or WH Division files.

4. No further action is contemplated in this case unless otherwise requested by your office.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert L. Hunting
f Victor R. White

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 4 September 1962
TO: TFW Attn: E. Z. Mulloy	C NO. C-101331
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☒	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment and advise CI/OA of significance of the information.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 4 September 1962 mm

TO: TFW

Attn: E. E. Mulloy

C NO.: C-101331

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☒	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment and advise CI/OA of significance of the information.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

[illegible]

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 31 AUG 1962	CASE NO. C-10/331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ CA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	✓	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST #1 TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment & advise CI/OA of significance of the information.

Note to Proc. Unit:

Pls. attach copy of S.O. memo.

Thomas Carroll, Jr

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 31 AUG 1962	CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	OA · SP INQUIRY · GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM · SECURITY OFFICE · DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	✓	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE · FIRST · SECOND · THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST · PRQ I · PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment & advise CI/OA of significance of the information.

Note to Proc. Unit:

Pls. attach copy of S.O. memo.

Thomas Carroll, Jr

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (23)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

SECRET

T20 aug

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 30 AUG 1962

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SUBJECT: C-101331
#279 089

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 July 1962 wherein Provisional Operational Approval interest, only, was indicated for possible use of Subject as an agent in Mexico by TFW under Project JMATE.

2. On 31 July 1962 your office was advised telephonically that Office of Security indices contained no record of the Subject.

3. On 17 August 1962 you were advised that the FBI has not conducted an investigation on the Subject. However, the FBI made reference to data re "Foreign Political Matters-Cuba" which was sent to this Agency on 26 December 1961. The date of said report is not given, however, it is known that the FBI has provided this Agency with numerous reports so captioned, on a continuous basis. Office of Security indices were searched for the above referenced report received on 28 December 1962, with negative results. Therefore, it is assumed it is available in RID, TFW or WH Division files.

4. No further action is contemplated in this case unless otherwise requested by your office.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert L. Heinbaugh
f Victor R. White

AUG 30 2 59 PM '62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

SECRET

Troay

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 30 AUG 1962

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SUBJECT: C-101331
#279 089

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 July 1962 wherein Provisional Operational Approval interest, only, was indicated for possible use of Subject as an agent in Mexico by TFW under Project JMATE.

2. On 31 July 1962 your office was advised telephonically that Office of Security indices contained no record of the Subject.

3. On 17 August 1962 you were advised that the FBI has not conducted an investigation on the Subject. However, the FBI made reference to data re "Foreign Political Matters-Cuba" which was sent to this Agency on 26 December 1961. The date of said report is not given, however, it is known that the FBI has provided this Agency with numerous reports so captioned, on a continuous basis. Office of Security indices were searched for the above referenced report received on 26 December 1962, with negative results. Therefore, it is assumed it is available in RID, TFW or WH Division files.

4. No further action is contemplated in this case unless otherwise requested by your office.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert L. Heinbaugh
for Victor R. White

AUG 30 2 59 PM '62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 29 August 1962

TO: TFW
Attn: H.E. Mulley

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

C NO. C-101331

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☑	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	NI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss results of Field traces.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
29 August 1962

TO:
TFW
Attn: F.E. Mulley

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

C NO.
C-101331

SUBJECT:
LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss results of Field traces.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 22 Aug '62

CASE NO.: C - 101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE

☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE

SET UP FOR: ☐ OA ☐ SP ENQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

USE :
AREA:

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED:	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II	☑	OTHER

REMARKS

Please come to CI/OA to discuss results of field traces.

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 22 Aug '62

CASE NO.: C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR ☐ OA ☐ SP ENQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK	USE: AREA:
☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED:	☐ REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES	☐ FILE
☐ REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐ TICKLE
☐ REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II	☑ OTHER

REMARKS

Please come to CI/OA to discuss results of field traces.

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
CI/OA

NO. 101331

DATE 10 August 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. TFW		17 Aug 62	J.M.
2.			
3. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 16		22 Aug '62	
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

To 1:

In accordance with the requirements of Para. (a) 5a (2) CSI 10-
dated 16 September 1958, please re
the attachments or dossier o
Subject in FI/D and advise CI/OA i
writing as to the significance o
the information and your opinion a
to its effect on the use of th
Subject in the operational capacit
requested.

[redacted]

1-3 DOSSIER ON SUBJECT WAS REVIEWED BY THE UNDERSIGNED IN FI/D AND FOUND TO BE NON-DEROGATORY. FYI COLLATERAL REFERENCES WERE ALSO REVIEWED AND FOUND TO BE NDI.

J. Maughan
17 August 1962

AUG 17 3 14 PM '62

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

GPO 1961 O-593066

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

CI/OA

NO. 101331

DATE 10 August 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. TFW		17 Aug 62	J.M.
2.			
3. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 16		23 Aug '62	
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

To 1:

In accordance with the require-
ments of Para. (a) 5a (2) CSI 10-7
dated 16 September 1958, please re
view the attachments on dossier o
Subject at FI/D and advise CI/OA i
writing as to the significance o
[illegible]
to its effect on the use of th
Subject in the operational capacit
requested.

[redacted]

1-3 DOSSIER ON SUBJECT WAS REVIEWED BY THE UNDERSIGNED IN FI/D AND FOUND TO BE NON-DEROGATORY. FYI COLLATERAL REFERENCES WERE ALSO REVIEWED AND FOUND TO BE NDI.

J. Moughan
17 August 1962

AUG 17 3 14 PM '62

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

GPO 1961 O-597066

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: TFW/CPS/Support
GE 5512

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI/OA 2B 16				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

0 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

GPO 1961 O-[illegible]

SECRET

6 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : **Luis ALBERU Souto C-101331**

Attached herewith for your retention are two copies of PRQ Part I prepared on the above listed subject.

William K. Harvey
Chief
Task Force W

Attachments:
As Stated

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att

AUG 6 4 32 PM '62

File
9 Aug 62
EB

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: TSD/CPS/Support
GE 5512

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. CI/OA 2B 16				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
2.				

0 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

GPO 1961 0-[illegible]

SECRET

6 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : **Luis ALBERU Soutc C-101331**

Attached herewith for your retention are two copies of PRQ Part I prepared on the above listed subject.

William K. Harvey
Chief
Task Force W

Attachments:
As Stated

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att

AUG 6 4 32 PM '62

File
9 Aug 62
EB

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-19455

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Luis ALBERU Souto

ACTION REQUIRED
POA on Subject

REFERENCES
GYROSE
MEXI-1506

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

DATE
27 July 1962

RE: "43" - CHECK "X" ONE
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

C-101331

There are attached copies of a PRQ, Part I on Subject. A POA is requested.

Willard C. CURTIS

25 July 1962

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
2 - C/Task Force W w/2 att
2 - C/WHD w/2 att
2 - Files

201-329609

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET

DUPLICATE

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

RI NO.

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. *Write clearly.*
2. *Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"*
3. *Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.*

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Sex)*

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

5. DATE OF BIRTH
[illegible]

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
[illegible]

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

No known immoderate vices.

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)*

Not known

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

9a. SEX ☐ M ☐ F	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION	9g. FACE *(Shape)*
9h. COLOR OF HAIR [illegible]	9i. COLOR OF EYES	9j. TEETH	9k. BUILD	9l. POSTURE		

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Has pock marks on face.

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING; ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS IF OBTAINABLE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

FORM 7-58 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(4-88)

SECRET

SECTION II	CITIZENSHIP
1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP [illegible]	2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1.)* [illegible]
3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*	
4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 3.)*	
5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED	
6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)* [illegible] - Dec. [illegible] - visit relati[illegible] [illegible] business reasons. [illegible] 1962	

SECTION III	OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA	
1. PRESENT OCCUPATION [illegible]	2. TITLE [illegible]	3. SALARY *(Per annum)* [illegible]
4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)* [illegible]		

SECTION IV	ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS
1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS	
2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS Not known	

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	Y						[illegible]	
[illegible]	x							

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

SECRET

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Not known

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
[illegible]					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

1
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]
2. EMPLOYER [illegible]
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK [illegible]
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]

2
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

3
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

4
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

5
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECTION IX.

MARITAL STATUS

1- CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2- STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3- NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Nee) (Last)
[illegible]

4- DATE OF MARRIAGE: [illegible]

5- PLACE OF MARRIAGE: [illegible], Mexico

6- DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

7- PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

8- NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: [illegible]

9- SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

10- PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)
[illegible]

SECTION X

CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
None					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI

FATHER

1- FULL NAME: [illegible]

2. YEAR OF BIRTH:

3- PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

4- NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: French

5- SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

6- OCCUPATION: [illegible]

7- PRESENT RESIDENCE: [illegible]

SECTION XII

MOTHER

1- FULL NAME: [illegible]

2. YEAR OF BIRTH:

3- PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

4- NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: [illegible]

5- SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

6- OCCUPATION: [illegible]

7- PRESENT RESIDENCE:

SE

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Leon[illegible] Albe[illegible]					
[illegible]					
2 Sisters					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1- NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Concepcion Fernandez de Albere (sister-in-law), employed by Cuban Government

2- RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

Sister - Cuban Consul in Vigo, Spain.

3- NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

4- NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1- LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Teresa Proenza Proenza - Cuban Cultural Attache

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

Carried Cuban Diplomatic Passport #D/59/543

DATE	SIGNATURE	
25 [illegible] 1962	Clyde K. SHRYOCK	GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 27 July 62 cjb

TO : Deputy Director of Security

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT : C 101331

PROJECT: JMATE

1. TYPE OF REQUEST

X	POA	☐	OA	☐	SPEC. INQ.	☐	CSC

2. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY (Date)

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY
8 Aug 62

4. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT
TFW - Mexico

5. USE OF SUBJECT
agent

6. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION	X	
B. C.I.A. INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION		X
C. SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM	X	
D. SUBJECT AWARE OF C.I.A. INTEREST IN HIM		X

E. LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT
None

F. SUGGESTED "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

G. REASON FOR NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA (Explain fully)

7. RI TRACES
NDI

8. DIVISION TRACES
NDI

9. FIELD TRACES
see attached

10. GREEN LIST INITIATED	X	YES	☐	NO
11. ATTACHMENTS	☐	PRQ PART I	X	PARTIAL BIO. ☐ OTHER:

12. REMARKS

P.O.A.
CI/OA Advised ____________
Date ____________

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

INITIALS Tcb

FORM 8-61 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET.

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 26 July 68

CASE NO.

SET UP FOR P.O.A. ✓

(✓) EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE 8 Aug 68	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE
SET	SP INQUIRY	GOV'T N. CHK	USE: AREA:
ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"	
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW	
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION	
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM	SECURITY OFFICE / DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA	
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA	
[illegible] (No notice to division)		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA	
CANCEL PER CI/OA (Notice to division) (See "Remarks" for reason)		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE	
REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE	
REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE	
REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE	FIRST / SECOND / THIRD AND FINAL
REQUEST	PRQ I / PRQ II	OTHER	

REMARKS

Area — Mexico
Use — agent.

Please make
1 thermo

K Jr.
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (11)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19455

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
27 July 1962

SUBJECT
Luis ALBERU Souto

RE "43 3" — CHECK "X" ONE
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
POA on Subject

REFERENCE(S)
GYROSE
MEXI-1506

C-101331

There are attached copies of a PRQ, Part I on Subject. A POA is requested.

Willard C. CURTIS

25 July 1962

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
- 2 - C/Task Force W w/2 att
- 2 - C/WHD w/2 att
- 2 - Files

201-329609

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET **DUPLICATE**

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: *1. Write clearly.*
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Sex)*

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

5. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]

6. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

No known immoral vices.

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)*

Not known

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

9a. SEX M ☐ F ☐	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT FT.	IN.	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION	9g. FACE *(Shape)*
9h. COLOR OF HAIR [illegible]	9i. COLOR OF EYES		9j. TEETH		9k. BUILD		9l. POSTURE

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Has pock marks on face.

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS IF OBTAINABLE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

FORM 7-59 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(4-BDE

SECRET

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1.)* [illegible]

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 3.)*

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

[illegible] - [illegible], [illegible] - Visit relative [illegible].
[illegible] 1962

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION [illegible]

2. TITLE [illegible]

3. SALARY *(Per annum)* [illegible]

4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

[illegible]

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Not known

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X							
[illegible]	X							

Excluded from automatic downgrading

SECRET

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES. ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Not known

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
Not known					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

1	1- INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]	2- EMPLOYER [illegible]	3- ADDRESS
	4- TYPE OF WORK [illegible]	5- SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6- REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]
2	1- INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2- EMPLOYER	3- ADDRESS
	4- TYPE OF WORK	5- SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6- REASON FOR LEAVING
3	1- INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2- EMPLOYER	3- ADDRESS
	4- TYPE OF WORK	5- SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6- REASON FOR LEAVING
4	1- INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2- EMPLOYER	3- ADDRESS
	4- TYPE OF WORK	5- SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6- REASON FOR LEAVING
5	1- INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2- EMPLOYER	3- ADDRESS
	4- TYPE OF WORK	5- SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6- REASON FOR LEAVING

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECTION IX. MARITAL STATUS

1- CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2- STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3- NAME OF SPOUSE (*First*) (*Middle*) (*Nee*) (*Last*) [illegible]

4- DATE OF MARRIAGE [illegible]	5- PLACE OF MARRIAGE [illegible], [illegible]exico
6- DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]	7- PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]
8- NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible]	9- SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

10- PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Last residence, if deceased*) [illegible]

SECTION X CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			
[illegible]					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (*Identify child and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XI FATHER

1- FULL NAME [illegible]	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3- PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]	4- NATIONALITY AT BIRTH French
5- SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6- OCCUPATION [illegible]	7- PRESENT RESIDENCE [illegible]	

SECTION XII MOTHER

1- FULL NAME [illegible]	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3- PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]	4- NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible]
5- SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6- OCCUPATION [illegible]	7- PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SEC[illegible]

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Leon [illegible]					
[illegible]					
? Sister					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1- NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Concepcion Fernandez de Albere (sister-in-law), employed by Cuban [illegible]

2- RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

Sister - Cuban Consul in Vigo, Spain.

3- NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

4- NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1- LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Teresa Proenza P oenza - Cuban Cultural Attache

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

Carried Cuban Diplomatic Passport #D/59/543

DATE [illegible]

SIGNATURE Clyde H. SHRYOCK

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 27 July 62 cjb

PROJECT: JMATE

TO : Deputy Director of Security

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : C 101331

ND.

1. TYPE OF REQUEST: ☒ POA ☐ OA ☐ SPEC. INQ. ☐ CRC

2. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY (Date)

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY: 8 Aug 62

4. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT: TFW - Mexico

5. USE OF SUBJECT: agent

6. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION	X	
B. C.I.A. INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION		X
C. SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM	X	
D. SUBJECT AWARE OF C.I.A. INTEREST IN HIM		X

E. LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT: None

F. SUGGESTED "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

G. REASON FOR NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA (Explain fully)

7. RI TRACES: NDI

8. DIVISION TRACES: NDI

9. FIELD TRACES: see attached

10. GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

11. ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ PART I ☒ PARTIAL BIO. ☐ OTHER:

12. REMARKS

P. O. A.
CI/OA Advised
Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

INITIALS TCJ

FORM 8-61 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET.

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 26 July 62	CASE NO.

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

( ) EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE 8 Aug 62	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET P [redacted] ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T H. CHK	USE : AREA:
☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ [illegible] waiver (No notice to division)	☐ REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA (Notice to division) (See "Remarks" for reason)	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES	☐ FILE
☐ REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐ TICKLE
☐ REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐ OTHER

REMARKS

Area — Mexico
Use — Agent.

Please make
1 thermo

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (21)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: J.M.
J. MOUGHAN
TFW/OPS SPT
GH 5512

NO.

DATE 26 JULY 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 11				DEADLINE 8 AUG 62
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 25 JULY 1962

TO:
☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM:
J. MOUGHAN
TFW/OPS SPT
GH 5512

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis ALBERU Souto

PROJECT: JMATE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LITAMIL/9 ✓

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: MEXICO

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE:

FI ASSET MEXICO

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	XXX398	LIST ATTACHED, NO: 127398

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

☐ LIST SOURCES CHECKED PLS SEE ATTACHMENT FOR FIELD TRACES

☐ NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: H.E. MULLOY H. Mulloy

EXTENSION: 7616

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: WILLIAM K. HARVEY

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 1-62

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

PRQ PART I

Name	Luis ALBERU Souto
DPOB	1915, Oviedo, Spain
Citizenship	Cuban
Residence	Michelet 7301. Mexico
Occupation	Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico
Father	Maximino ALBERU, born Cognac, France
Mother	Josefina SOUTO, born La Coruna, Spain
Wife	Klara Vera Kacz Stross, born Vienna, Austria, British citizen. Married 1949, Divorced 1956.

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: J.M.
J. MOUGHAN
TFW/OPS SPT
GH 5512

NO.

DATE 26 JULY 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 11				DEADLINE 8 AUG 62
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

GPO 1961 [illegible]

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 25 JULY 1962

TO:
☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: J. MOUGHAN
TFW/OPS SPT
GH 5512

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis ALBERU Souto

PROJECT: JMATE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LITAMIL/9 ✓

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒ PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐ COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐ COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS
☐ PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐ PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐ COVERT NAME CHECK
☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
MEXICO

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

FI ASSET MEXICO

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒ PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED
☐ PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED
☐ PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
XXX398N LIST ATTACHED, NO: 127398

6. RI TRACES

☐ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☒ NON-DEROGATORY ☐ DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☒ NON-DEROGATORY ☐ DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐ NO RECORD
☐ NO DEROGATORY INFO.
☐ LIST SOURCES CHECKED
☐ NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*
☐ WILL FORWARD
☐ DEROGATORY ATTACHED

PLS SEE ATTACHMENT FOR FIELD TRACES

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: H.E. MULLOY HE Mulloy

EXTENSION: 7616

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: WILLIAM K. HARVEY

FORM 1-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

PRQ PART I

Name	Luis ALBERU Souto
DPOB	1915, Oviedo, Spain
Citizenship	Cuban
Residence	Michelet 7301. Mexico
Occupation	Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico
Father	Maximino ALBERU, born Cognac, France
Mother	Josefina SOUTO, born La Coruna, Spain
Wife	Klara Vera Kacs Stross, born Vienna, Austria, British citizen. Married 1949, Divorced 1956.

SECRET

SECRET

22 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
(C-101331)

It is requested that a report be sent to the Mexico Desk regarding the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject. The OA was initially requested on 24 June 1963.

John M. Whitten
C/WH/3

MAY 4 [illegible]

Tele fm E.P.B.
6 May 64
emc

SECRET

SECRET

22 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
(C-101331)

It is requested that a report be sent to the Mexico Desk regarding the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject. The OA was initially requested on 24 June 1963.

John M. Whitten
C/WH/3

MAY 4 12 [illegible] PM '64

File for E.P.B.
6 May 64
emc

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

26 JULY 1962

FIELD TRACES

LUIS ALBERU SOUTO

MEXICO STATION TRACES REVEAL THAT AMSTOKE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3 AND LITAMIL-7 CONSIDER ALBERU TO BE ANTI-COMMUNIST. AN ARMY REPORT DATED 25 AUGUST 1959, STATED THAT COLONEL ARTURO CORONA, G-2 MEXICAN ARMY, BELIEVED ALBERU TO BE A COMMUNIST AND ONE OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY STAFF. THIS WAS REPORTED IN MEXI 1506, DATED 26 JULY 1962.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
CHIEF
TASK FORCE W

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

26 JULY 1962

FIELD TRACES

LUIS ALBERU SOUTO

MEXICO STATION TRACES REVEAL THAT AMSTOKE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3 AND LITAMIL-7 CONSIDER ALBERU TO BE ANTI-COMMUNIST. AN ARMY REPORT DATED 25 AUGUST 1959, STATED THAT COLONEL ARTURO CORONA, G-2 MEXICAN ARMY, BELIEVED ALBERU TO BE A COMMUNIST AND ONE OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY STAFF. THIS WAS REPORTED IN MEXI 1506, DATED 26 JULY 1962.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
CHIEF
TASK FORCE W

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1 ~~file~~	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT:1305, 4 JUN 64 LMG)

INFO : DDP, CI/CA, WE 6, WH/SA 8, VR

File

5 JUN 1964

S E C R E T 041616Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO HAGU CITE MEXI 9736

PBRUMEN

4 JUN 64 IN 98318

110133

REF DIR 25582

1. WHEN QUERIED BY C/O LITAMIL-9 REPORTED 1 JUNE FIRM CONVICTION MARISTANY COULD BE RECRUITED, EXPRESSED GREAT SURPRISE ODYOKE HAD NOT RECRUITED HIM YEARS AGO, SUGGESTED CARLOS PRIO WOULD MAKE EXCELLENT RECRUITER. ACCORDING L-9 MARISTANY HAS NO TAINT OF COMMUNISM, IS CULTURED PERSON OF DIFFERENT BREED FROM LATTER DAY CUBAN DIPLOMATS AND PROBABLY FEELS REVULSION FOR REGIME.

2. ACCORDING LITAMIL-3, WHO HAS GOOD ACCESS, MARISTANY AND WIFE NOW VACATIONING ACAPULCO.

3. WIFE IS MEXICAN CITIZEN, COUPLE EXPECTED REMAIN IN MEXICO APPROX ONE MONTH. MEXI CAN PITCH SUBJECT THROUGH LITAMIL-3 OR CAN USE L-3 TO SET HIM UP FOR OUTSIDE RECRUITER. IN LATTER CASE SUGGEST RECRUITER TRAVEL MEXI SOONEST. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT:1305, 4 JUN 64 LMG)

INFO : DDP, CI/CA, WE 6, WH/SA 8, VR

File

5 JUN 1964

(101331

4 JUN 64 IN 98318

S E C R E T 041616Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 9736

PBRUMEN

REF DIR 25688*

1. WHEN QUERIED BY C/O LITAMIL-9 REPORTED 1 JUNE FIRM CONVICTION MARISTANY COULD BE RECRUITED, EXPRESSED GREAT SURPRISE ODYOKE HAD NOT RECRUITED HIM YEARS AGO, SUGGESTED CARLOS PRIO WOULD MAKE EXCELLENT RECRUITER. ACCORDING L-9 MARISTANY HAS NO TAINT OF COMMUNISM, IS CULTURED PERSON OF DIFFERENT BREED FROM LATTER DAY CUBAN DIPLOMATS AND PROBABLY FEELS REVULSION FOR REGIME.

2. ACCORDING LITAMIL-3, WHO HAS GOOD ACCESS, MARISTANY AND WIFE NOT VACATIONING ACAPULCO.

3. WIFE IS MEXICAN CITIZEN, COUPLE EXPECTED REMAIN IN MEXICO APPROX ONE MONTH. MEXI CAN PITCH SUBJECT THROUGH LITAMIL-3 OR CAN USE L-3 TO SET HIM UP FOR OUTSIDE RECRUITER. IN LATTER CASE SUGGEST RECRUITER TRAVEL MEXI SOONEST. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

6 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Mr. John M. Whitten

SUBJECT : [illegible]/o
C-101331

With reference to your memorandum dated 22 April 1964, requesting a report on the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject, a memorandum setting forth this information was forwarded to your office on 18 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA and was again forwarded to your office for your retention on 27 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA a second time without comment on 11 December 1963, whereupon it was filed in Subject's folder in this office. No further approval action has been taken in this matter for the reasons explained in the memorandum.

EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

CI/OA/EPB:jas

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Mr. John M. Whitten

SUBJECT : [illegible]
C-101331

With reference to your memorandum dated 22 April 1964, requesting a report on the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject, a memorandum setting forth this information was forwarded to your office on 18 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA and was again forwarded to your office for your retention on 27 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA a second time without comment on 11 December 1963, whereupon it was filed in Subject's folder in this office. No further approval action has been taken in this matter for the reasons explained in the memorandum.

EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

CI/OA/EPB:jes

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH/SA 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/CA, FI, TSD 6, WE 4, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 232238Z

6 APR 1964

IN 53965

DIR CITE MEXI 8933

TYPIC

REF DIR 89271

File

C-101331

1. ON 9 MAR A MADAME BOYER AND UNIDEN MAN CALLED ON RAUL APARICIO, CUBAN CULTURAL COUNSELOR. BOYER TOLD APARICIO SHE RECENTLY CAME FROM CUBA, PLANNING 4 MONTH TRIP THRU ALL COUNTRIES LATIN AMERICA TO COMPILE INFO FOR BOOK SHE PLANNING PUBLISH. WANTED TO READ BOOKS ABOUT EACH COUNTRY BEFORE GOING AND ASKED APARICIO HELP OBTAINING THEM. PLANNED RETURN CUBA SOON WITH BOOKS. APARICIO NOT INFORMED THAT BOYER COMING MEXI BUT OFFERED ASSISTANCE INTRODUCED HER TO LITAMIL-9 AND AMBASSADOR'S WIFE.

2. BOYER SAID SHE BORN UNITED STATES, MARRIED FRENCHMAN, NOW DIVORCED BUT HAD FRENCH NATIONALITY. MAIDEN NAME HUNGARIAN "K[illegible]SSAN" (PHONETIC). MOTHER RUSSIAN, GRANDPARENTS CAME TO U.S. BEFORE WAR (SIC). BOYER LIVED PARIS AND 7 YEARS ITALY. SPEAKS SPANISH WITH ACCENT AND SOME DIFFICULTY. (SOURCE: DELAYED MXTRAP TRANSCRIPT).

3. CUBANA MANIFEST SHOWS ONE BOYER KATZANDER, FRENCH TURISTA WITH SAME PASSPORT DEENA BOYER LEFT MEXI FOR HAVA 15 MAR. WILL

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

PLACE ON WATCHLIST AND QUERY LITAMIL-9. IF BOYER RETURNS MEXI, STATION CAN PROVIDE ASSET TO APPROACH. ASSUME HQS DESIRES RECRUITMENT PITCH BUT REQUEST MORE DETAILS.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED IF THERE IS ANY CHANCE STA CAN LOCATE AND IDENTIFY. (DINAH BOYERE).

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH/SA 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, TSD 6, WE 4, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 232238Z

6 APR 1964

IN 53965

DIR CITE MEXI 3933

File

TYPIC

C-101331

REF DIR 29271

1. ON 9 MAR A MADAME BOYER AND UNIDEN MAN CALLED ON RAUL APARICIO, CUBAN CULTURAL COUNSELOR. BOYER TOLD APARICIO SHE RECENTLY CAME FROM CUBA, PLANNING 4 MONTH TRIP THRU ALL COUNTRIES LATIN AMERICA TO COMPILE INFO FOR BOOK SHE PLANNING PUBLISH. WANTED TO READ BOOKS ABOUT EACH COUNTRY BEFORE GOING AND ASKED APARICIO HELP OBTAINING THEM. PLANNED RETURN CUBA SOON WITH BOOKS. APARICIO NOT INFORMED THAT BOYER COMING MEXI BUT OFFERED ASSISTANCE INTRODUCED HER TO LITAMIL-9 AND AMBASSADOR'S WIFE.

2. BOYER SAID SHE BORN UNITED STATES, MARRIED FRENCHMAN, NOW DIVORCED BUT HAD FRENCH NATIONALITY. MAIDEN NAME HUNGARIAN "KASSAN" (PHONETIC). MOTHER RUSSIAN, GRANDPARENTS CAME TO U.S. BEFORE WAR (SIC). BOYER LIVED PARIS AND 7 YEARS ITALY. SPEAKS SPANISH WITH ACCENT AND SOME DIFFICULTY. (SOURCE: DELAYED MXTRAP TRANSCRIPT).

3. CUBANA MANIFEST SHOWS ONE BOYER MATZANDER, FRENCH TURISTA WITH SAME PASSPORT DEENA BOYER LEFT MEXI FOR HAVA 15 MAR. WILL

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

PLACE ON WATCHLIST AND QUERY LITAMIL-9. IF BOYER RETURNS MEXI, STATION CAN PROVIDE ASSET TO APPROACH. ASSUME HQS DESIRES RECRUITMENT PITCH BUT REQUEST MORE DETAILS.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED IF THERE IS ANY CHANCE STA CAN LOCATE AND IDENTIFY (DINAH BOYERE).

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT, WH 7, VR

5 MAR 1964

SECRET 031929Z

DIR CITE MEXI 8478 C-101331

TYPIC AMROD

IN 31542

1. FOLLOWING FROM LITAMIL-9 NIGHT 1-2 MARCH.

2. RAMON SINOBAS, WIFE, TWO CHILDREN ARRIVED MEXI 1 MARCH EN ROUTE TAKE UP NEW POST EMBASSY SANTIAGO CHILE. WIFE DESCRIBED AS COMMON, "CHEAP".

3. ELENA VASQUEZ GOMEZ, "LOVER" OF TERESA PROENZA HAS RETURNED FROM CUBA, SAYS TERESA WILL PROBABLY WORK IN CUBA BUT MAY MAKE TRIP TO MEXI SOON.

4. ENRIQUE GONZALEZ CASANOVA BACK FROM CUBA, SAYS HE SAW TERESA AT PARTY ATTENDED BY RUAL ROA AND JOAQUIN ORDOQUI AMONG OTHERS.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

x

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT, WH 7, VR

5 MAR 1964

SECRET 031939Z

DIR CITE MEXI 8478 C-101331

TYPIC AMROD

IN 31542

1. FOLLOWING FROM LITAMIL-9 NIGHT 1-2 MARCH.

2. RAMON SINOBAS, WIFE, TWO CHILDREN ARRIVED MEXI 1 MARCH EN ROUTE TAKE UP NEW POST EMBASSY SANTIAGO CHILE. WIFE DESCRIBED AS COMMON, "CHEAP".

3. ELENA VASQUEZ GOMEZ , " LOVER" OF TERESA PROENZA HAS RETURNED FROM CUBA, SAYS TERESA WILL PROBABLY WORK IN CUBA BUT MAY MAKE TRIP TO MEXI SOON.

4. ENRIQUE GONZALEZ CASANOVA BACK FROM CUBA, SAYS HE SAW TERESA AT PARTY ATTENDED BY RUAL ROA AND JOAQUIN ORDOQUI AMONG OTHERS.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

LIRING-3

Vol. VI

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LIRING-3 VOL VI
201-0798301

INCLUSIVE DATES: 7 Jan 1969 -- 10 May 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO

ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
17 JUL 1978		Edwin J. Lopez	Edwin Juan Lopez
20 Dec.		Edwin J Lopez	Edwin J Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

OTHER AGENCY
1 DOC ENCLOSED

201-0798301

VOL 6 TO SecState
FROM AmEmb Mexico City Wash. D.C.
Unclassified Telegram 1631

3627 PEEL OFF LABEL AND REUSE ENVELOPE 29/3/69

Re Visa application

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

1. Forwarded herewith for Headquarters information and files is an Agent Service Record on LIRING-3.

2. As Addressees are aware, Wallace P. ROWTON recruited and formerly handled LIRING-3 for the Mexico City Station. Prior to ROWTON's PCS departure from Mexico City in July 1969, it was decided, after some discussion, to effect a turnover of LIRING-3, rather than terminate him. Although LIRING-3 apparently had been well "burned" with the Cubans, he seemed to have maintained good contacts with members of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) of Guatemala. In addition, in May and June of this year, he had begun to develop access to some Panamanian revolutionaries of interest. It was therefore decided to run LIRING-3 on a trial basis to determine whether he could be used effectively against Central American revolutionary targets, despite his problems with the Cubans.

3. ROWTON introduced Leonard S. TORMET, in alias, to LIRING-3 on 1 July 1969. Although ROWTON had represented himself to LIRING-3 as a Greek businessman, it was decided that it would be preferable to "clear the air" somewhat with LIRING-3, at least by making it

......Continued

Attachments:
1. Agent Service Record - Herewith
2. IDENTITY Sheet - Under Separate Cover

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 3 [illegible]

Distribution:
(2) C/WHD, w/att 1, 3 cys (h/w); w/att 2 (u/s/c)
1 - COS, Guatemala City, w/att 2 only (u/s/c)

2 atts:

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-37739

DATE
21 August 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-795301

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-37739

clear that he was in touch with a WOLADY organization. Nonetheless, no specific explanation was given LIRING-3 of his sponsor and he requested none. LIRING-3 was told that TORMET would be seeing him for some months, since ROWTON was leaving the country for an indefinite period.

4. LIRING-3 was told that although TORMET was trusted by ROWTON and collaborated with him, he represented a different organization. LIRING-3 was also told that although he had in the past been receiving between 3,000.00 and 3,500.00 Mexican pesos per month on an informal basis, TORMET's organization felt that 1,500 Mexican pesos per month ($120.00) would be a fair salary at this stage of the operation. TORMET explained that he was aware of LIRING-3's past activities directed against the Cubans, and the resultant problems which had arisen. It was explained that TORMET's interest was in Central American revolutionary activities. In order to deal with LIRING-3's virtual "burned" status with the Cubans, he was directed to tell any Central American contacts that the Cubans no longer trusted him, and that he therefore was no longer directly involved with any revolutionary groups or activities. Nonetheless, LIRING-3 was directed to offer any assistance which he could provide to any revolutionaries, on the basis of his leftist beliefs and the friendships which he had made with FAR members while in prison in Guatemala. It would then be a matter of time before we could learn whether LIRING-3 was completely blacklisted in all revolutionary circles because of his problems with the Cubans or whether he could provide information of value.

5. LIRING-3 throughout the meeting seemed in good spirits and he seemed to accept the turnover without any qualms. Indeed, he pointed out that the Cubans had lost trust in him only after he had been given various tasks to do by ROWTON which he had known and warned in advance would cause suspicion. It was agreed that LIRING-3's troubles were not of his own making, but that at this stage all that could be done was to attempt to circumvent the existing problems.

6. LIRING-3 was given a Station non-attributable telephone number and false name to ask for (Identity) to set up meetings with TORMET. Only the meeting time was to be set by phone, and a prearranged pickup point was decided upon. It should be noted that TORMET's QP vehicle was used for this first meeting with LIRING-3, which means it was of course exposed to LIRING-3.

7. Subsequent to this meeting, LIRING-3 never initiated contact with the Station. Although he might have lost the new telephone number he was given to use with TORMET, there is no indication he ever again tried to call ROWTON, who was in Mexico for at least three weeks after the 1 July turnover to TORMET.

8. The Station assumes that for whatever reasons, LIRING-3 has in effect terminated himself. Given the nature of this case--the fact that LIRING-3 was denounced in Cuban official circles as a RVROCK agent, the fact that LIRING-3 in over two years was never very productive and now the apparent decision of LIRING-3 to break off contact--it has been decided to make no effort to reestablish contact with him.

for Horace E. PRALLETT

201-73821

SECRET

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. Agent Cryptonym: LIRING-3

2. Project: LIRAVINE

3. Agent Recruited By: Wallace B. ROWTON

4. Capacity in Which Agent Served: Access agent to Cuban Embassy; Informant on Central American revolutionary groups and activities.
5. Rate of Pay: Did not receive regular salary, but was given between 3000 and 3500 Mexican pesos per month. (Equivalent to $240 to $280).
6. Other Commitments: None

7. Agent Dismissed By: Leonard S. TORNET. Dismissal effective 1 July 1969.

8. Reason for Dismissal: Agent in effect terminated himself, since he failed to initiate contact with Station after being turned over to TORNET by ROWTON.

9. Security Risks: LIRING-3 was not made witting of KUBARK interest in this case. He knew both ROWTON and TORNET in alias. No safehouses were exposed to LIRING-3. LIRING-3 was met once in TORNET's QP vehicle.

10. ~~Security Risks:~~

11. Manner of Dismissal: As stated above, no direct dismissal was made, since LIRING-3 broke off contact with the Station.

12. Letter of Termination Signed: No

13. Cost of Termination: None

14. Station Case Officer: Leonard S. TORNET Leonard S. Tornet
(Signature in Pseudonym)

15. Acting Chief of Station: Horace E. F[illegible]
(Signature Pseudonym)

SECRET

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-37739

IDENTITY:

14-54-49, "Sr. Zuniga"

CS COPY

SECRET

S/C ATT 1 TO HMMA 37739

201-798501

14-00000

34

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 2 - 79830
X-REF TO FILE NO. 2 - 812145
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM 40

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, 8006, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

SECRET 040003Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2372

MEXI

4 Aug 67 IN 25197

1P

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PHOTO LEONARDO (CASTILLO) HOHNSON, CHIEF SAN MARCO GUERRILLA AREA, GUATEMALA, SHOWN LIRING-3 WHO DID NOT RECOGNIZE. LIRING-3 STATED HOWEVER THAT MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL TOLD HIM 31 JULY THAT CASTILLO HAD BEEN KILLED. OROZCO ALSO IMPLIED DAVID (CASASOLA) MEJIA ALSO DEAD.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

AR/ FI

ABSTRACT ✓

201-798301

201-812145

REJECTED FOR MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
AUG 30 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B 201-812145

201-798301

4 AUG 67

LIRING-3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

JURADO, CARLOS
201-798301
SEX M DOB ?

050-009-016
HMM -13035
10 MAY 72
P2

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO MBR OF THE COALITION OF REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS OF MEXICO. HAS INITIATED CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF THE CURRENT LEFTIST STUDENT STRUGGLE.

R 7206051060

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 798301

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-60)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY WH/1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-798301

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 4 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH/COG8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO WHS, RI/AN

S E C R E T 271602Z SEP 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9511

GUAT

27 SEP 68 IN 01147

C

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 36584

1. MEXICO CITY 7555 NOT RECEIVED BY GUATEMALA CITY.

2. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

AN ee
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~DX~~
~~DES~~ ~~MFD~~
~~FI~~

WH/1

CS COPY

SECRET

201-798301
27 Sept 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET 23

ORIG: Marvin Francis/lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 4167:1973
DATE: 4 October 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 46 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR, DI/AN, WH/COG8, CI, CI/OPS, FI2

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 38881

TO GUATEMALA CITY INFO: MEXICO CITY 04 20 23 Z OCT 68

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY 9517 (IN 02560)*

B. DIRECTOR 36584**

WH/6 file: LIRING-3 201 WC

1. APPRECIATE REF A RESPONSE. AGREE WE DO NOT WANT SURFACE WOFIRM INTEREST LIRING-3 OR WIFE TO GUATS IF CAN BE AVOIDED.

2. REF B WAS SENT FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH LIRING-3'S CASE OFFICER, ROWTON WHO STILL TDY HQS. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH ROWTON, HOWEVER, WE PREFER GUAT STATION TAKE NO ACTION ON REFERENCE B REQUEST UNTIL ROWTON RETURNS MEXICO. HE CAN THEN ATTEMPT OBTAIN UPDATED READING ON LIRING-3 STATUS FROM LIRING-4 OR OTHER SOURCE, AFTER WHICH ROWTON AND MEXICO CITY STATION CAN DECIDE IF ESMAJOR-20 INTERVENTION WARRANTED.

3. INDEX 201-248917, 201-798301.

END OF MESSAGE

6
4
3
2
1

201-798301

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: Marvin Francis/lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY________PER________#________
CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

PAGE 2

CITE DIRECTOR 38881

TO

WH/1 COMMENT: *Indicated liaison contact [illegible] could attempt intercede on LIRING-3's behalf to learn when his trial would take place or possibly to obtain his release. Station reluctant surface WOFIRM interest however without Mexico City Station concurrance.

**Headquarters commented on fact LIRING-4 recently took up residence in Cuban Embassy, Mexico City because lacked funds pay rent. Also asked Guatemala Station if could arrange for early release LIRING-3 and associate from jail through high level Guat official.

SM

DEC 4 72

WH/COG/[redacted]

WH/2/G

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Calvin H. Smyth
for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

24 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: WH/1 (Marvin Francis)

SUBJECT: 17 September 1968 discussion with DRISCOLL re LIRING/3 & LIRING/4.

PARTICIPANTS: DRISCOLL, KERBE, FRANCIS and Laurence PIPER (C/WH/2/G).

1. LIRING/4 is still very concerned about the imprisonment of LIRING/3. LIRING/4 will not travel to Cuba until she is assured of the safety of LIRING/3. DRISCOLL has thoroughly discussed L/3 with L/4 and has pointed out the danger of attempting to intercede on L/3's behalf through business contacts. L/4 contacted the Cubans for assistance but they stated there was nothing they could do. They have assisted L/4 with small amounts of money. L/3 has devised an open code which he uses in letters to let L/4 know how he is. The letters are grim reading because L/3 keeps stating he is unable to hold out much longer. Fellow prisoners have warned L/4 not to let the Guats transfer him to another prison as this usually ends in the prisoner being shot "while escaping." One good result from the continued imprisonment of L/3 is that both he and L/4 are furthering their bona fides with the Cubans.

2. L/4 is in telephone contact with the Third Secretary of the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala. He has made inquiries about L/3 with the Guats on behalf of Foreign Minister CARRILLO Flores. A few weeks ago (prior to the assasination of the U.S. Ambassador) the Third Secretary told L/4 there were three possibilities, the first which he considered out of the question was that L/3 would be shot, the second was that L/4 would come to trial and be released within a few weeks, and the third was that he would receive a sentence of two or three years. Just prior to departing Mexico on this current trip, DRISCOLL attempted to arange a meet with L/4 in the usual means by slipping a typed note under her apartment door. She did not make the meeting. DRISCOLL later learned through phone tap material that she called the Cuban Embassy and informed them the

SECRET

201-798501

Mexican authorities had notified her she was being fined 500 pesos. The purpose of the payment was not identified. Later she made a call from the Cuban Embassy which indicated she was staying there until she could get the funds to pay the Mexicans. DRISCOLL, therefore, concluded she had not returned to her apartment and did not get the note to make their meeting. DRISCOLL said SUAREZ (the visiting Cuba Cultural type) has a key to L/3's apartment and might see the note but would be unable to identify the sender since DRISCOLL uses a meaningless sc[illegible] as a signature.

3. DRISCOLL now plans upon his return to Mexico to recontact L/4 to get the latest reading on L/3's status in Guatemala. If the Mexican Charge is unable to obtain L/3's release in behalf of the Mexicans and if it appears he will be held indefinately, DRISCOLL wants to explore the possibility of our doing something to get L/3 out so the operation can become active again.

4. In the above regard L/3 was discussed with Mr. PIPER of the Guatemala desk. Mr. PIPER believed the Station has a high enough contact with the Guats (ESMAJOR/20-Presidents brother) to arrange to get L/3 and his Mexican compatriot out of prison and back to Mexico with a minimun security risk. DRISCOLL said he would initiate the cable upon his return to Mexico after he has talked with L/4. DRISCOLL felt he should possibly travel to Guatemala and have a preliminary meet with L/3 before Guat Station makes any all out effort to officially request L/3's release. If, after seeing L/3 DRISCOLL is satisfied that L/3 is still an ally and is willing to cooperate after his release then DRISCOLL believes we should attempt to have the Station intercede with ESMAJOR/20. Hopefully, ESMAJOR/20 will arrange the release so that all involved believe it has been done at the request and urging of the Mexican Government. DRISCOLL, however, would like L/3 and L/4 to believe he (DRISCOLL) had something to do with the release in order to raise his status with both for the sake of future operational tasks he will levy on them.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 49 PER R-BAT

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☐ F.ID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CI/OPS, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 042307Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7486

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

5 Oct 68 IN 06501

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 36584

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9517 (IN 02560)

C. HMMA 35522 PARA 5

WH/C fb: LIRING-3 201 WC

1. STATION WISHES TO REITERATE ONCE MORE ITS RELUCTANCE TO SOMEHOW TRY TO FREE LIRING-3 FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA CITY BY GOING TO LIAISON AND EXPOSING HIS WOFIRM CONNECTION. MEXICO CITY STATION IN AGREEMENT WITH REF B STATEMENT THAT MORE TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE IF LIRING-3 WILL NOT BE RELEASED IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE WITHOUT INDICATING WOFIRM INTEREST. AS STATED IN REF C SUCH INDICATION IF IT LEAKED (AND STATION ASSUMES THIS POSSIBLE IN GUATEMALA) OR IF IT ATTRACTED SUSPICION GUAT REBELS, MEXICAN LEFTISTS OR PBRUMENERS WOULD RENDER FURTHER OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4 PROBLEMATIC. IT MIGHT EVEN PROMPT GUAT REBELS TO TAKE REPRISALS AGAINST LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4. FURTHERMORE STATION NOT AT ALL SURE THAT FREEING LIRING-3 THROUGH INTERVENTION LIAISON MIGHT NOT JEOPARDIZE ROWTON SECURITY.

2. IF LIRING-3 RELEASED AFTER NORMAL TRIAL WITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE STATION ASSUMES BOTH HE AND LIRING-4

SECRET

201-798201

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7486 SECRET

WILL HAVE INCREASED OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL. IF LIRING-3 NOT RELEASED IN NEAR FUTURE LIRING-4 MAY FIND ONLY WAY OUT HER CURRENT PREDICAMENT IS AT LEAST TEMPORARY RETURN TO PBRUMEN. SHE MIGHT AT THAT POINT BE AMENABLE UNDERTAKE MISSION SIMILAR TO THAT SHE PREVIOUSLY AGREEABLE ATTEMPT FOR WOFIRM.

3. STATION WOULD NATURALLY BE WILLING RE-EXAMINE ITS POSITION RE LIRING-3 IF GUATEMALA CITY STATION COULD DETERMINE BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPROACH OF JUDGE THROUGH LIAISON WOULD NOT LEAK. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION GIVE SUCH ASSURANCE?

4. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

ORIG: J.W. MERTZ
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 30 SEPT 68

SECRET

104

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2	1	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	2	10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY G PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR WH8

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

01 18 21 z OCT 68

CITE DIRECTOR 99476

TO CABLE SECRETARIAT

GUATEMALA CITY

WH/COG:
CIRING-3
201

PLS RELAY MEXICO CITY-7335 (IN 99476) TO GUATEMALA CITY FOR INFO. CY CABLE ATTACHED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG Paul Roberts
C/WH/2/G

Calvin H. Smyth
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

201-79830

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

K

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-12,647	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Leonard [illegible]. TORMET	DATE OF REPORT 22 June 1971	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Oliver N. SINDONE	PROJECT KDLADDER	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Roger T. KINGMAN	SOURCE CRYPT KDLADDER-2	TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
3 Headquarters (w/mats) 1 Guatemala City	State (Political Section)

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

HF= 35-4-3
FF= 35-4-100

This report was done to follow pattern of HMM-12,183 and same source description was used. The reference to the RGG has to indicate in some way a different source, since the description used on it is different. Not passed liaison.

RI please index the following:

BALCARCEL	- 201-160430
CARDOZA	- 201-042366
ALVARADO	- 201-065125
SOLORZANO	- 201-072176
RODRIGUEZ	- 201-244191
DIAZ	- 201-787386
PEREYRA	- 201-798301
ILLESCAS	- 201-764855
GOMEZ	- 201-251494
CAPUANO	- 201-086191
CACEREZ	- 201-874524
LANDA	- 201-824363

Chrono
35-4-100

CS in 35-4-3

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201-798301

FORM 1467

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. CS

DATE DISTR.

COUNTRY Guatemala/Mexico

DOI June 1971

SUBJECT Organization of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) in Mexico

ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (11 June 1971) FIELD NO. HMM-12,647

SOURCE A member of the PCM who has good contacts with Guatemalan Communists in Mexico. Much of the information which he has provided has proved accurate.

1. The highest-ranking body of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) organization in Mexico is the "Delegation of the Central Committee." This body consists of Huberto Alvarado Arellano, Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar, and Jose Luis Balcarcel Ordonez. (Field Comment: CS-311/03973-70 (HMM-12,183), from the same source as this report, reported on the make-up of the PGT organization in Mexico as of April 1970. Cardoza and Balcarcel made up the "Delegation of the Central Committee" at that time. TDCS-314/ -71 (HGG-), from a reliable source, provided the information that Alvarado, the Third Secretary of the PGT, planned to reside in Mexico for the immediate future.)

2. Balcarcel also heads the "Directive Committee" of the PGT organization in Mexico, which is responsible for determining what activities the local PGT organization will undertake and who will carry them out. The other members of the "Directive Committee" are Alfonso Solorzano Fernandez and Julio Rodriguez Aldana. (Source Comment: There has been no change in the membership of the "Directive Committee" since April 1970. Although Rodriguez occupies this leadership position, he has been relatively inactive in PGT affairs.)

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

3. There are currently two active cells under the guidance of the "Directive Committee:"

a. A "Propaganda Cell" headed by Carlos Caceres Ruiz, which also includes Solorzano and Horacio Landa Castaneda; and

b. A "Finance Cell" headed by Rodriguez, which also includes Elisa de Balcarcel, Mercedes de Pereyra, and Carlos Illescas Aguirre.

4. Ernesto Capuano del Vecchio, who was formerly a member of the "Finance Cell," now works directly under the "Directive Committee" and is not formally a member of the "Propaganda Cell," submitted his resignation from the PGT in April 1971. Raul Diaz Ramirez, who was also formerly a member of the "Propaganda Cell," has been temporarily separated from active participation in the [illegible].

5. Field Dissem: State (Also sent Guatemala City)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 32 PER

ACTION WHB ☐ RID COPY

358

[illegible]SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3/

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/CA, FI2, FI/D4

[illegible]TING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 080031Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0125

MEXI

DIRECTOR

8 May 69 IN 53298

M

TYPIC LIRING-4

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 9830 (IN 34397)

B. MEXICO CITY 4343, 16 FEB 68

1. FATHER LIRING-4 DIED 21 APRIL. LIRING-4 FEELING VERY BAD ABOUT FACT SHE DID NOT SEE FATHER BEFORE DEATH HAS NOW APPLIED FOR VISA TO VISIT HER MOTHER IN CUBA. IF VISA GRANTED PLANS STAY ONLY ONE OR TWO WEEKS.

2. ROWTON HAS KEPT AWAY FROM LIRING-4 SINCE LIRING-3 RELEASED FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA AND LIRING-3 HAS TOLD HER HE OUT OF CLANDESTINE BUSINESS. IF HQS SO DESIRES HOWEVER ROWTON COULD TRY RENEW CONTACT WITH HER TO SEE IF SHE WILLING ASSESS SOME HER "FRIENDS" LISTED IN PARA 1A THROUGH 1F OF REF B OR AT LEAST COLLECT UP TO DATE BIO INFO ON THEM. (STATION HAS SUBJECT PARA 1C REF B PARTICULARLY IN MIND.) THIS IN RETURN FOR FINANCIAL HELP IN MAKING TRIP. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

[illegible]	pk
AB	k
IN	
PS	
BX	
DES	NED
FI	
10 M/C/OB	

CS COPY

SECRET

201-798301
8 May 69

Mexi City 0690
0690
19 Jun 69

Sent to
RID/FI
for reprocessing of
defective apertures

Mexi City
0690

CMS
6/aug/69

14-00000

2P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City HGG-A3

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
JUN 2 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-36408, 11 February 1969

1. Forwarded attached as attachment #1 are ten contact reports written by Wallace B. ROWTON dated 11, 14, 15, and 19 February, 27 March, 8, 11, 21, and 25 April. and 5 May on the latest developments of the LIRING-3 operation.

2. The high points of ROWTON's reports are as follow:

a. LIRING-3 is intermittently in contact with "Romulo," whom he identified from a photograph produced by the Station as Mario Augusto FR MENDEZ. (201-850751)

Continued.....................

re: connection with 201-798301

Attachments:
1. Reports (10), h/w
2. Surveillance report, h/w
3. Identity sheet, u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each atts 1 and 2; 3 copies att 3)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each atts 1 and 2; 2 copies att 3)

3 atts:

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 37136	14 May 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

b. "Romulo," who made at least one trip "out of town" from 17 February to 2 April 1969 (possibly to Guatemala) during the period covered by ROWTON's reports, appears to belong to a faction of the Guatemalan FAR family disillusioned with PBRUMEN.

c. The only real service asked LIRING-3 by "Romulo" during the period under review was to put up an unidentified "comrade" scheduled to come to Mexico at a date which "Romulo" said he could not determine exactly. This "comrade" was not the young Guatemalan who dropped in on LIRING-3 for a couple of days mentioned in the report dated 25 April.

d. LIRING-3 continues to collect clear evidence that LIRING has done its best to denounce him as a suspicious element definitely not to be trusted (see reports dated 15 and 19 February).

3. Several attempts to tail "Romulo" did not produce particularly significant results. A pretext investigation of apartment 102 of Calle Coahuila, where LIRING-3 met "Romulo," produced the results contained in the Spanish language report dated 26 February forwarded as attachment #2. There were no traces on the Ines X*BASTON de X*PIMENTEL family. sex:F cit: Mexico A: Mexico

4. There is little question at this point that LIRING-3 is close to persona non grata with LIRING. Hence, his further usefulness against the PBRUMEN target is very limited. ROWTON has kept away from LIRING-4 since LIRING-3's release from prison in Guatemala. Although LIRING-4, following her father's death (see MEXICO CITY-0125), may visit her mother in PBRUMEN, she has no particular love for LIRING or the PBRUMEN authorities. On the Guatemalan side of this operation, the Station is, as it has done many times in the past, waiting for LIRING-3's Guatemalan contacts to make the next move.

Raymond A.
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment #1 HMMA-37136

11 February 1969

MICROFILMED
JUN 2 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1100, 11/2/69; Camino Real
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 14/2/69; same place.
4. Reports/Information Submitted by Agent:

LIRING/3 told Rowton that there had been little or no developments since he last saw Rowton (21/1/69), just before Rowton had left on his business trip to Monterrey. He commented that he had felt it wiser not to take any initiative in seeking out his FAR friends or revisiting the LIRING office until Rowton had returned. He stated that his old Guatemalan friend, Jacobo Rodriguez Padilla, had called on him once in the company of Carlos Vega, but nothing significant had emerged from the casual conversation. Vega, at several points in the conversation, had mumbled something to Rodriguez about the "crisis" but nieher gave an explanation. L/3 told Rowton that he assumed that this remark referred to the current factionalism in the Guatemalan revolutionary struggle.

LIRING/3 then identified the attached photo of Mario Augusto Mendez Aguilar immediately at the first glance as that of "Rómulo", aka "Mario Mendez" and "Pavel." LIRING/3 did not recognize the photo Rowton showed him of Mario Otoniel Mendez Molina.

5. Guidance/Information Given to Agent:

Rowton told L/3 that according to the very sketchy information he had concerning Mario Augosto Mendez Aguilar it appeared that the latter belogged to a strongly anti-PBRUMEN faction and that this would perhaps explain the turn-about of the LIRINGs after he, L/3, had indicated to LIRING/9 that he was in contact with "Pavel."

Rowton urged L/3 to seek out "Rómulo" at the calle Coahuila 221 safehouse, and, failing this, to recontact Humberto González Vega at his home on calle Manzanillo, in the hope that the latter could arrange a recontact with Mendez.

Wallace B Rowton
Wallace B Rowton

h/w att: 1
HMMA-37136

CS COPY

201-798301

14 February,1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 14/2/69; Camino Real Restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: 1100, 15/2/69; same place.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE: LIRING/3 told Rowton that his friend, Berta Wigisser has rented a furnished apartment that can be used by him and Rowton as a safehouse as soon as it is vacated by its present occupants. L/3 explained that these occupants are relatives of sra Wigisser who are visiting from Argentina but who are expected to return to their own country within the next ten days.
5. REPORTS/INFORMATION GIVEN BY AGENT:

L/3 told Rowton that "Rómulo" (whom he identified from a photo as Mario Augosto Mendez Aguilar) visited him at his home unannounced at about 2000 on 11 February and stayed until almost midnight.

According to L/3 Rómulo apologized for not having seen L/3 for so long (last date reported was 3/1/69) explaining that he was very busy. He then stated that he had recently seen and talked with Rodolfo Sandoval Alegría in the(Lucumberri)prison and was pleasantly surprised to learn that Sandoval knew L/3 and spoke very highly of him. Rómulo then went on to say that he had known Sandoval many years and had actually been his deputy in Guatemala. Rómulo recalled that when he was last arrested (he explained parenthetically that he had been arrested four times in all) he was tortured in an effort to make him reveal the whereabouts of Sandoval. He claimed to L/3 that he finally,to avoid execution, gave a false address- that of one of Sandoval's relatives.

L/3 told Rowton that he then took the occasion to tell Rómulo of the harrassment he was being subjected to by various persons whom he felt were being inspired by the Chief LIRING. L/3 told Rowton that Rómulo then asked him what the false charges brought against him were. L/3 told Rómulo the truth, saying that he kept getting reports that he was regarded as a LCFIRM agent. According to L/3.Rómulo exclaimed that he should pay no attention to that sort of slander since the LIRING office was always trying to neutralize persons and groups not acting under their control. He added that the people who really count in the struggle were used to such nonsense and were aware of what the LIRINGs were up to. He added that as soon as Sandoval got out of prison he would "straighten some of those people out" since he was personally aware of L/3's motives and activities before his trip to the border. When L/3 mentioned his contacts with Carlos Vega (always at the latter's initiative),Rómulo described him as "Pastelito, a very sectarian sneaky pro-LIRING bastard". He said he would like L/3 to arrange a meeting with Vega so that he could burst in and confront him with the facts. Regarding Humberto González Vega, Rómulo said that he was a good "elemento" and had suffered a great deal for the cause, but at the moment was more or less out of the picture. He saw no need for L/3 to be in contact with him. When L/3 expressed a desire to have some way of contacting Rómulo, the latter promised to give him his home address as soon as he move to a better place. He explained that at the moment he was living in a furnished room.

At the end of the talk,when Rómulo asked when they could get together again, explaining that he might have to go down to Orizaba over the week-end, L/3 told Rowton that he made a date for 1900 on 14/2/69. L/3 then suggested that they meet outside so as not to involve his wife (L/3 told Rowton that he did this so that Rowton would have a chance to observe Rómulo in some public place), and Rómulo agreed but said he had a better suggestion. He then stated that he knew a Mexican family very well and could arrange that they meet at their home and have dinner. He added that he might bring along a Brother ("hermano") and would come by L/3's home at 1900 to pick him up. L/3 agreed,saying that he had no objection to the brother coming along.

M B Rowton

15 February,1969.

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1100, 15/2/69; Camino Real restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 19/2/69; same place.
4. Reports/Information Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported that he met again with "Rómulo" but under circumstances somewhat different from that anticipated. L/3 related that when he arrived at his apartment about 1850 the previous eveningin the company of his wife (after having dropped off his daughter at the home of his ex-wife) he found a note from "Rómulo" asking him to meet him at apartment 102 of Calle Coahuila 200.
L/3 continued that since his wife was present when he read the note he felt he had to ask her to come along (and in addition she had been upset that afternoon and did not want to be left alone). They therefore both proceeded to the address given by Rómulo and found him there in the midst of a rather large number of persons, apparently of the same family residing in the apartment. After about fifteen minutes of social chatter, Rómulo suggested that they go to a nearby restaurant to talk more privately. Romulo then took L/3 and his wife to the restaurant Kuku at Calle Coahuila 223 where they had dinner. L/3 told Rowton that because of his wife's presence he was not able to discuss anything substantive with Romulo and had to leave the questions he wanted to ask him re FAR/PBRUMEN activites until a subsequent meeting. L/3 added that in the course of conversation, Romulo stated that Rodolfo Sandoval Alegría hoped to be released from prison in March,1969. Romulo also stated that he worked in a newspaper office, but L/3 felt he could not securely ask the name of the newspaper at that time.
L/3 told Rowton that Romulo agreed to another meeting on 18 February and asked L/3 to met him again at apartment 102 of Coahuila 200 shortly after 1900, inasmuch as he generally leaves his place of employment a little before that time. Romulo,L/3 and his wife then took in a movie.
L/3 then told Rowton that after he had left Rowton the previous day he had another very disturbing experience (he appeared to Rowton nervous and suffering from lack of sleep). L/3 explained that when he dropped into the Salón de la Plástica Mexicana about 1300 on 14/2/69, he ran into an old friend, Fanny Ravel, a Mexican artist with whom he had worked very closely in PBRUMEN some years ago. L/3 continued to Rowton that despite their

past friendship, Fanny Ravel treated him in an obvious cold manner. L/3, feeling that he could not this pass unnoticed, got Fanny in the corner and asked what was up. She replied that for some time she had been hearing "disturbing reports" about L/3. Under further questioning by L/3 she specified thatoriginally, some 7-8 months previously she had been told by a LIRING official that L/3 "was not to be trusted". Fanny continued that she did not pay too much attention to this, since the official was rather "low-level", but more recently she was told the same thing by an "unimpeachable source" and could not challenge it despite her high personal esteem for L/3.
L/3 commented to Rowton that the "unimpeachable source" must be the Chief LIRING, inasmuch as Fanny Ravel as always been a close personal friend of his and possibly even one of his mistresses. L/3 continued that LIRING had several times commented to him (when L/4 was working in the LIRING office) that Fanny Ravel was infrequent telephone contact with the Chief.

5. GUIDANCE Given to Agent:

Rowton told L/3 that he was more convinced than ever that the LIRING office had mounted a slander operation against him because of his contacts with the Camilo Sanchez group (León Barrios brothers and Romulo) which PBRUMEN was apparently attempting to isolate in their own interest. When L/3 appeared a little consoled at this, Rowton continued that he felt L/3 should, at the 18 Feb meeting with "Rómulo", tell the latter that he knew the game the LIRINGs were up to and ask "Rómulo" point blank whether he knew to what extent the LIRING office was trying to sabotage FAR because of its nationalistic anti-PBRUMEN position. Rowton asked L/3 to entice "Rómulo" into such a discussion in the hope that "Rómulo" would ask him, L/3, to help discover any unilateral operations PBRUMEN might be planning. Rowton continued that L/3 should tell Romulo that although he was virtually cut off from the LIRING office, he still had a great many PBRUMEN friends (e.g.) from whom he could possibly get useful information to help Romulo's faction. Rowton suggested that L/3 could also propose to Romulo that they both put the squeeze on Carlos VEga (apparently a LIRING provocation) to obsome preliminary information on the intentions of the LIRING operation.

W. B. Rowton

19 February, 1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 19/2/69; Camino Real Restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: Same time, same place, 21/2/69.
4. Reports/Information Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported that "Rómulo" appeared unannounced at his apartment on the late afternoon of 17/2/69 and consequently he did not go to meet him at apartment 102 of 200 Coahuila St. on 18/2/69 as originally planned. LIRING/3 told Rowton that "Rómulo" promised to see him again about 1900 on 20/2/69, coming to pick him up at his apartment.

LIRING/3 then stated that on the morning of 17/2/69 he had run into Anna Godoy, the wife of Jorge, at Gobernación and was so disturbed at the cool reception that he looked up Jorge Godoy later that day to find out what was going on. Jorge Godoy was quite frank with him telling him that the LIRING office had advised him to keep clear of LIRING/3 because he was not to be trusted. Godoy continued that a LIRING official had told him that LIRING/3 was being used (perhaps unconsciously at first) by some counter-revolutionary organization and that the LIRING Office based it assertion on the following three points: (1) LIRING/3 had been in touch with a foreignor who pretended to be a businessman but who did not do any business with PBRUMEN, (2) LIRING/3 had access to information that could come only from a police source (3) LIRING/3 was responsible for the arrest of Identity A and had undertaken the mission to Guatemala to get information against the revolution.

According to LIRING/3, Horge Godoy told him that it was difficult to belive all this, especially in the light of L/3's relatively long imprisonment, but he had to take it seriously in view of the source of the charges. L/3 ~~thx~~ told Rowton that he went over each point in rebuttal on a matter of principle despite the fact that Godoy's mind obviously was already made up.

LIRING/3 told Rowton that when he talked later that day with "Rómulo" he related what had happened with Godoy. "Rómulo" replied that those LIRING allegations were not to be taken seriously. He commented: "We have already looked into them and do not believe them." He explained that for one thing if L/3 had been a spy he certainly would have continued (with the approval and connivance of the authorities) on up the the mountains where he could get useful information, instead of permitting himself to be arrested just after stepping across the border. "Rómulo" aggreed with L/3 that the LIRING office probably does not want L/3 to help his ("Rómulo$s") faction and have done everything possible to isolate L/3 from his normal social contacts. Rómulo added that the only important point in the whole affair was that there were "certain elements" among the Guatemalan revolutionaries that might believe the LIRING charges and possibly do harm to L/3 and or his wife. Rómulo urged L/3 "to be careful" and for that reason di not encourage the idea of a confrontation with Carlos Vega at this time. He continued that if, however, L/3 insisted he would be glad to have it out with Carlos Vega to find out who had sent him to provoke L/3. Rowton agreed that little or nothing could be accomplished in pursuing this matter.

L/3 continued that when he told Rómulo that he felt frustrated and helpless in the face of the LIRING action, Rómulo told him that he must, as a good revolutionary, have courage and patience in confronting these problems. He continued that he himself hoped to continue to see L/3 and he was sure that things would work out. He stressed that he and his faction value the friendship and loyalty of individuals such as L/3 whereas the LIRING establishment is interested only in groups and organizations that can further their own interests.

5. GUIDANCE/INFORAMTION given to agent:

Rowton encouraged L/3 to continue his efforts to find steady employment since he was most vulnerable to both the LIRING agents as well as FAR in the matter of his financial resources. L/3 told Rowton that he had already been promised an appointment to some teaching position by Xavier Espinosa, private secretary to Yañez, the Secretary of Education. L/3 commented that Espinosa is at heart a "good progressive" and has been very sympathetic to him since his return to Mexico. L/3 also stated that he intends to look up Heracleo Zepeda in the hope that the latter can place him somewhere in CONASUPO or arrange a job with his Chiapas newspaper ("Renovación").

Rowton also urged L/3 to continue to elicit information from "Rómulo" concerning his faction of the FAR and any knowledge he might have concerning the independent operations being planned by PBRUMEN in Guatemala.

Wallace B. Rowton

27 March,1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 27/3/69; Camino Real Restaurant
3. Next Meeting: Same place and time, 3/4/69.
4. Information/Reports Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported that unfortunately "Romulo" (Mario Augosto MENDEZ Aguilar) had not reappeared since his last meeting with him (17/2/69) and that he felt he could do nothing but wait for him to initiate the recontact. LIRING/3 continued that on his own initiative he had dropped by the LIRING offices on 21 March, feeling that he should not continue to remain in isolation despite the unfavorable rumors against him apparently originated by that office. He told Rowton that unfortunately he did not find anyone of importance in the offices at that time, but was told by the gatekeeper that "they wanted to see him" and that he should return early the following week. LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that instead of returning to the office he decided to telephone LIRING/9 at his home. He did so on the morning of 25/3/69 but was told by a woman with a Mexican accent (obviously the maid)that neither LIRING/9 nor LIRING/2 was at home. LIRING/3 then left his name and asked the woman to inform either of them that he had called. LIRING/3 continued that about 1200 that same day (25/3/69) his old friend **Identity B** appeared unannounced at his appartment. L/3 told Rowton that although it was obvious that **Iden B** had appeared in response to the telephone message that L/3 had left for LIRING/9, **Iden B** did not refer to it, explaining simply that he had dropped around to see how LIRING/3 and his wife were doing. He did mention subsequently in the conversation that he was now living with LIRING/2 and LIRING/9 and LIRING/13 in their "very ample" apartment. **Iden B** continued that he hoped to remain in Mexico until July 1969 and that he was planning to marry a Mexican divorcée with three children (boys) whom he had originally met many years ago in a visit to Mexico City. LIRING/3 told Rowton that **Iden B** was surprisingly cordial, regretting the fact that they had not seen each other for some time and encouraging LIRING/3 to keep in touch in the future. He invited L/3 to lunch on 29/3/69 but asked him to telephone to confirm. He gave L/3 the telephone number of LIRING/9's residence, apparently forgetting that L/3 already had the number. **Iden B** then told LIRING/3 not to be disturbed over the rumors circulating about him, since he himself had been subjected to much the same treatment several years previously in PBRUMEN. He then stated that in any case the PBRUMEN Chief would not be returning to Mexico, and that this should make L/3 happy. To console L/3, **Iden B** continued that the LIRING Chief was not popular with the staff, since he was considered to formal and snobbish, and somewhat petty in his vindictiveness. **Iden B** agreed with L/3 that the LIRING Chief had done much to harm LIRING/3's reputation,and probably acted from purely personal motives (under the influence of Carmen Lozada's father and husband).

Iden B did not tell L/3 who would replace the LIRING Chief. He commented that for some time back he had withdrawn from politics and tried to mind his own business, earning his living by giving lectures on his own initiative.

On the domestic situation in PBRUMEN, **Iden B** commented that things were "very bad" both politically and economically. He explained that PBRUMEN currently found itself in a squeeze play between the big powers and was genuinely fearful of a Soviet/Nixon rapprochement, at their expense, of course. On the economic side **Iden B** commented that he was happy to be in Mexico but added weekly that there was every hope that things would get better by 1970. When L/3 countered that everyone had been singing that tune for many years, **Iden B** did not defend his position.

LIRING/3 then told Rowton that he took the occasion to mention to **Iden B** that a certain Carlos Vega (akaCarlos Enrique LOPEZ Garcia) had been pestering him in the hope of finding someone traveling to PBRUMEN who would be willing to carry some packages to some of his friends (including the son of Turcios). When L/3 asked **Iden B** whether he would be willing to meet this Carlos Vega before consenting to carry over his packages, **Iden B** replied; "Sí,como no. Con mucho gusto."

LIRING/3 commented to Rowton that he brought up the name of Carlos VEGa as a sign of good faith both vis-avis the latter as well as the LIRING office since he felt it highly probable that Vega was reporting regularly to the LIRING couple either directly or indirectly and that in fact Vega had possibly been sent to check on LIRING/3 and his wife. LIRING/3 continued that he planned to recontact Jacobo Rodríguez Padilla and ask him to pass along the message to Carlos Vega that LIRING/3 was anxious to see him again since he felt that he had resolved Vega's "problem."

LIRING/3 also told Rowton that he had expressed the desire to **Iden B** to revisit PBRUMEN some time in the future. **Iden B** replied that he would do everything he could to expedite the visa, which he said he felt present no problem.

LIRING/3 also told Rowton that LIRING/4 had received a letter from her mother asking her to attempt to obtain a 30-day visitor's visa for her to come to Mexico on vacation. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he and LIRING/4 had already made formal application for the visa, although they were not optimistic that Gobernación would grant it. LIRING/3 added that he did not mention this development to **Iden B** ,although he might possibly mention it in passing at his next chat. LIRING/3 commented to Rowton that he felt LIRING/4's mother might have some interesting gossip but could not be expected to tell him and LIRING/4 anything startling. He added that he had applied for the visa more out of courtesy that in earnest and actually hoped that the visa would not be granted, since this would give him and LIRING/4 a good pretext to make another trip to PBRUMEN for purely personal reasons.

Wallace B. Rowton

8 April, 1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 7/4/69; restaurant of Camino Real hotel.
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 9/4/69; same place.
4. Information/Reports Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported that at long last "Rómulo"(Mario Augusto Mendez Aguilar) had reappeared at his apartment, on the afternoon of 2 April, without prior notice, as usual. LIRING/3 told Rowton that "Rómulo" apologized for not having been able to revisit LIRING/3 before that date, and explained that he had been "out of town". According to L/3 "Rómulo" did not give any explanation of his absence since mid-February and L/3 felt he could not ask for such explanation. "Rómulo" promised to keep in touch with LIRING/3 by dropping in to his apartment "whenever he could". LIRING/3 told Rowton that he made a discreet effort to get from "Rómulo" a telephone number or address through which he could be contacted.

LIRING/3 also reported that he had met with Iden B twice during Easter week, but as yet had been unable to get into his residence, as he had hoped. He stressed that his relationship with Iden B was improving steadily and he felt this a good sign, inasmuch as he felt certain that Iden B would not take the initiativeof recontacting LIRING/3 without prior consultation with LIRING/9 and LIRING/2.

LIRING/3 then told Rowton that LIRING/4 had received a very pessimistic letter from a certain Echemendía, a uncle residing in Brooklyn, New York, who stated that LIRING/4's father was dying of cancer of the throat and was unable to leave his home. LIRING/3 continued that he had just discovered that LIRING/4 on her own initiative had rushed to the U.S. Consulate and requested a visa. As she subsequently told LIRING/3, LIRING/4 was informed by a consular official that her case would have to be "investigated carefully by JCPACT" and that she was required to pay 125 pesos for a telegram to Washington, D.C. to expedite the case. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he felt LIRING/4's action had been precipitous and could cause him additional embarrassment with the LIRING office. He added that he did not think a visa would be granted, but asked Rowton to do whatever he could to make certain that LIRING/4's request was turned down. He continued that in view of this unexpected development, he felt it wise

to recontact LIRING/9 and tell him about LIRING/4's application for the visa. Rowton agreed that this would be the best course of action, especially since LIRING/3 had originally mentioned LIRING/4's desire to visit her sick father and the problem this represented for him, when he first talked to LIRING/9 after his return from Guatemala.
LIRING/3 told Rowton that he felt this would also constitute a good pretext to sound out LIRING/9 about his personal feelings toward LIRING/3 and his own situation in the LIRING Office. Rowton suggested that LIRING/3 take this occasion to mention casually that he was still in occasional contact with the Guatemalans and to give LIRING/9 the names of "Rómulo" and Carlos Vega, if L/9 asked for details.

Wallace B Rowton

11 April, 1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 11/4/69, Camino Real restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: Same time, place, 1000, 14/4/69.
4. Information/ Reports Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported that he received an unexpected visit on 9/4/69 from Rogelio Aguirre, brother of Jerjes Aguirre, whom both he and LIRING/4 have known for many years (from their work together in PBRUMEN). LIRING/3 told Rowton that he was surprised at the visit since both Rogelio and Jerjes Aguirre were close friends of Teresa Lozada and her husband, Carlos Persabal. L/3 explained to Rowton that both Rogelio and Jerjes are employed in the Secretaría de Educación where Teresa Lozada worked for several years.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that Rogelio, without making any reference to the Persabal family, asked LIRING/3 to do him an important favor. He went on to state that, as LIRING/3 knew, **Identity C**, was currently living in her home town in PBRUMEN(the same area that LIRING/4 comes from) and was hoping to visit them in Mexico City in the near future. Rogelio continued that he hoped that LIRING/3 could have a check from a Canadian bank and immigration documents hand-carried to **Iden C** so that she could pay for the ticket and present the Mexican visa locally in PBRUMEN. LIRING/3 told Rowton that although he felt a bit mystified at this request, he told Rogelio Aguirre that he would do what he could to find someone who was planning a trip to PBRUMEN in the near future.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that the name of his friend **Iden B** immediately came to his mind, and he attempted to telephone him at the apartment of LIRING/9. He, however, found that the telephone was not in service, and felt that he had an excellent pretext to visit the apartment about 1500 on that same day (11/4/69) explaining to **Iden B** (and/or LIRING/2 or /9) that he had to get in touch urgently to pass on the request of Rogelio Aguirre. LIRING/3 agreed with Rowton that he could take this occasion to ask the LIRING office to attempt to obtain information on the state of health of the father of LIRING/4 through the LIRING office in New York City. LIRING/3 agreed that there was little chance of this request being honored, but it would serve to reveal his lack of any other channels to LIRING/4 's father and stress the legitimacy of LIRING/4's concern for the health of her father(an application for a visa to visit him).

LIRING/3 then stated to Rowton that he suspected the telephone of the LIRING/9 apartment was tapped. He explained that generally when he had called in the past, there was an unexplained interruption in the line before the party could reply. He stressed to Rowton that this was his own personal observation, and that Idon R , when he met with as recently as 9/4/69 did not make any comment about the telephone service in the apartment.

LIRING/3 promised Rowton that when he visited the apartment that afternnon he would take as good a note as possible of the lay-out and furnishings and ascertain the identity of the maid.

Wallace B Rowton

21 April,1969

CONTACT REPORT

A. Agent: LIRING/3

B. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 21/4/69; Camino Real Restaurant.

c. Next Meeting: Same time, place; 25/4/69

D. Reports/Information Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 apologized for not having been able to make the last scheduled meeting with Rowton, 1000 on 18/4/69. He explained that his friend, **Iden B** , had unexpectedly dropped in to see him at that time and he felt it more important to see him again than to make the meeting with Rowton (he subsequently left a message with Rowton's answering service).

LIRING/3 continued that he explained to **Iden B** the emotional strain that LIRING/4 was undergoing as a result of the bad news concerning her father's health. He then asked **Iden B** to attempt to ascertain the true state of his health through the LIRING Office in New York and gave **Iden B** the name and telephone number of the aunt of LIRING/4 who appeared to be the best source. **Iden B** , according to LIRING/3 promised to send a message with the next pouch and hoped to have news for LIRING/3 within the next ten days.

According to LIRING/3, **Iden B** then suggested that LIRING/3 think about moving to PBRUMEN for a "lengthy stay, perhapw indefinitely." He explained that he felt he understood LIRING/3's problems, the calumnies, the subtle persecution and the resultant increasingly difficult financial situation he found himself in, and he felt there was no real solution in Mexico. In PBRUMEN, however, he could manage much more easily for his wife and child, since most of his basic financial problems would be solved. He added that he was sure that he could find LIRING/3 some sort of work in the cultural field as soon as he returned to PBRUMEN and then arrange an invitation. LIRING/3 told Rowton that although he regarded this proposition as encouraging (since he was certain that **Iden B** had prior approval from the LIRING Office), he took a natural and logical approach in replying to **Iden B** He stated that he told **Iden B** that in principle he agreedbut he had to face the realities of the situation. First he was not at all certain that he could convince his wife to make such a move, and second, he was not optimistic that **Iden B** could arrange a good position for him in PBRUMEN that would permit him to work seriously and, of course, make enough money to meet his living expenses. **Iden B** replied that he felt it quite possible to arrange something for LIRING/3 and for that reason had brought up the idea at this point.

Rowton told LIRING/3, in reply to his query, that such a trip to PBRUMEN would be interesting to him only if LIRING/3 was offered a position in the cultural field with good access to PBRUMEN intellectuals and government officials. LIRING/3 agreed, commenting that he knew **Iden D** and such young rebels well enough to develop good contact with them, provided he was given a reasonably serious job. In any case he promised to work on LIRING/4 in the hope of persuading her to go along with him, when and if **Iden B's** proposal materialized.

LIRING/3 continued that **Iden B** then offered to arrange an exposition for LIRING/3 at **Iden F** in Cuernavaca, stating that he could do so without difficulty through the Director of the galleries (female) who was a close friend of his. LIRING/3 accepted this apparently genuine offer and arranged to travel to Cuernavaca on the morning of 22/4/69 to talk the matter over with the director of the art galleries.

LIRING/3 then reported to Rowton that "Rómulo" had again visited him at his apartment late on the evening of 18/4/69 (thus anticipating the meeting for 1830 in front of Woolworth's for the following day,as originally planned). According to LIRING/3, "Rómulo" (Mario Augosto Mendez Aguilar) told him that he had taken the liberty of coming that evening to LIRING/3's apartment since he wanted to talk in private of "something that LIRING/3 could do to help his friends". "Rómulo" then went on to explain that one of his comrades was expected to arrive in Mexico City "in the near future" and would need a secure place to live, at least until he could find a place of his own. "Rómulo" stressed that this person, whose identity he himelf did not as yet know, would be traveling "clandestinely" and could not risk renting a room on his own until he had established himself in the area. LIRING/3 replied that he,of course, would do his best, but pointed out that he himself was not in a good position to protect anyone. He finally agreed that this person might be able to use his kitchen as temporary living quarters, entering and leaving the apartment throught the back(service)entrance. LIRING/3 pointed out to "Rómulo" that the back door to the apartment house was locked at 1700 every day and that therefore it would be necessary for the person using that entrance to return to the apartment for good every night before 1700. "Rómulo" was apparently satisfied with this offer of LIRING/3 and promised to let him know when the person arrived in Mexico City.

+"Rómulo" then mentioned to LIRING/3 that **Iden E** was currently in the

PBRUMEN capital and that he himself ("Rómulo") was in more or less regular touch with the mother of "El Chino",(whom LIRING/3 understood to be Yon Sosa). "Rómulo" also mentioned in passing that he works for two or three hours a day in the accounts office of Ovaciones and also does some part time work at a golf club in Mexico City.

E. Information/Guidance Given to Agent:

Rowton asked LIRING/3 to continue to press **Iden B** formore specific information about his proposed assistance to LIRING/3 in obtaining a job in PBRUMEN; AND some indication as to the extent of the knowledge and backing of the LIRING office. Rowton did not encourage LIRING/3 to take such a proposal seriously until he could get more concrete data from **Iden B**.

With regard to "Rómulo's" request for assistance, Rowton stated that he would be much more interested in this development, when and if LIRING/3 could get the identity of the comrade of "Rómulo" whom he was to provide a safehouse for. Rowton suggested that LIRING/3 put this person up when he appeared for a few days, long enough to permit Rowton to get a look at him and identify him. A determination could then be made as to the best course of action for LIRING/3 with regard to this person. In reply to LIRING/3's query, Rowton thought that it would be best to reinsure with the LIRING office regarding this matter by casually mentioning to **Iden B** that he was performing this service for his FAR friends. LIRING/3 agreed, commenting that he hoped that he would not again be caught in the crossfire between the LIRING Office and the nationalist faction of the FAR.

Wallace B. Rowton

25 April, 1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 25/4/69; Camino Real Restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 28/4/69; Robbin Restaurant.
4. Reports/Information Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he went to Cuernavaca early on the morning of 22/4/69 alone, since **Iden B** backed out of the trip at the last minute, saying he had to remain in Mexico City. LIRING/3, however, was able to talk to the Director of the Art Gallery of **Iden F** himself and arranged an exposition for 7 June, 1969.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that when he returned home late that same night he found a note from his wife informing him that she had gone out to telephone long distance and would not be back until late that night. When she returned she informed him that she had received a telegram informing her that her father had died at 2030 on the previous evening (21/4/69) and that she had been attempting to telephone her mother in PBRUMEN but had not been able to get through.

LIRING/3 continued that his father-in-law was buried on 24/4/69 and that his wife was still in a state of depression and grief, especially since she had been unable to see her father before his death or attend the funeral.

LIRING/3 also reported that at about 1030 on 23/4/69 a Guatemalan, aged about 25, poorly dressed and somewhat resembling Carlos Vega, had appeared unannounced at his apartment with a small piece of paper on which were written LIRING/3's name and address. He introduced himself without name simply as a "friend of the León Barrios brothers from Guatemala City," and asked LIRING/3 to put him up for a few days.

LIRING/3 told Rowton that he agreed after some reluctance, suspecting that this was the person referred to by Mario Mendez ("Rómulo"), although the young Guatemalan did not mention "Rómulo" by name. LIRING/2 told Rowton that before promising to put the Guatemalan up, he commented to him that although he had a great deal of personal respect for the León Barrios brothers he was disappointed that neither they nor their mother had written to him for the past several months, apparently because they believed the calumnies spread against him by Carlos Perzabal, . According to LIRING/3, the young Guatemalan told him that his friends back in Guatemala City continued to have confidence in LIRING/3, but "had to respect the opinions of others,and had no alternative but to discontinue correspondence with LIRING/3,at least for a respectable period." He continued that LIRING/3 should realize that their organization in Guatemala City was in no position to check out various and sundry charges made against their friends and had to let time take care of most of their problems of this nature.

LIRING/3 told Rowton that he finally gave the unexpected house-guest a cot to sleep in in the room of his child, moving the latter to his studio. He then asked the guest to remain as inconspicuous as possible,informing him that he expected a number of children that afternoon for an art lesson in the apartment. The Guatemalan promised to be out of the apartment during the day and to return late at night. LIRING/3 told Rowton that in fact he did not reappear until about 2300 that night,and left before 0700 the following morning. When he returned at about 2200 on the night of 24/4/69 he informed LIRING/3 that he would be leaving the apartment the next morning early and would not have to return. He thanked LIRING/3 profusely the next morning (25/4/69) and left at about 0900 without telling LIRING/3 where he intended to go.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that at about 1930 on 23/4/69,when he returned to his apartment, he found "Rómulo" (Mario Mendez Aguilar) in his living room having coffee with his wife. LIRING/3 took the occasion to tell Rómulo about the unexpected houseguest. According to LIRING/3 "Rómulo" appeared genuinely surprised and asked for the identity and physical description of the person. When LIRING/3 told him as much as he knew, "Rómulo" stated that he could not identify the person as a friend of his. He speculted that the unannounced guest had been sent to check on LIRING/3 and advised him to be cautious and as normal as possible in his routine while the person remain in the house. He said that he did not exclude the possibility that this person had been sent by the LIRING office "to check on LIRING/3's private life". "Rómulo" then offerred LIRING/3 a revolver for his self-defense, but LIRING/3 turned it down, saying that he was not worried to that extent. According to LIRING/3, "Rómulo" stated that he himself preferred to avoid meeting the young Guatemalan since he could not identify him. He reassured LIRING/3 that his own comrade who might also be in need of a saferoom would not appear unannounced in such a manner, adding that to date he did not have any definite word on this person's ETA in Mexico City.

LIRING/3 told Rowton that he expects "Rómulo" to revisit him at his home sometime during the late evening of 26/4/69. He told Rowton that it occurred to him that he might invited **Iden B** to the apartment on the same night in the hope that he could witness a face-to-face meeting with "Rómulo" and **Iden B.** He felt that this would serve to keep his hands as clean as possible in the eyes of the LIRING office, since he was certain that **Iden B** would report promptly of his meeting with "Rómulo." Rowton agreed, feeling that it was important for LIRING/3 to bring his occasional meetings with "Rómulo" fully to the attention of the LIRING office, on the off-chance that they already did not know about them, and that **Iden B** would be the best channel for this.

Wallace B Rowton

5 May,1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 5/5/69; Robin Restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 7/5/69; same place.
4. Reports/Information Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 announced with apparent pleasure that at long last the commo channel with the FAR had been reopened. He stated that he had just received a letter from the elder of the two León Barrios brothers (Miguel and Juán) indicating that in his mind the long period of "probation" was over ~~txxt~~ and that closer contact could be expected in the near future. LIRING/3 then showed Rowton a letter dated 28 April,1969,in the handwriting he stated he recognized as that of Miguel/León Barrios, in which the writer, who signed the letter as "Julio Antonio", informed LIRING/3 that he had just been released from prison ("sanatorio") and was planning to leave town until things cool off for him. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he understood the double-talk of the writer to mean that he needed money (Q.100) to travel to Mexico where he hoped to visit LIRING/3. Rowton's photostat and translation of the letter is attached herewith.

The envelope, postmarked Guatemala City,2/5/69, is addressed to LIRING/4 (as previously requested by LIRING/3) and bears the return address J. Antonio Medina, 24 Calle 1-65,Zona 1,Guatemala, and was sent special delivery. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he did not recognize the return address,and assumed that it,as well as the sender's name, Medina, was notional. He added that "Violeta" was the code word for operational contact with anyone arriving on behalf of the León Barrios brothers, and that Doña Luisa referred to Marta, the mother of the León Barrios brothers.

When Rowton agreed that LIRING/3 should send some money,no more that 1,000 pesos (Q 80) with a cover letter from LIRING/4 (ostensibly) but in his own handwriting, explaining in double-talk that fortunately he is doing fairly well financially and that LIRING/4 is now working in an art gallery and expects to inherit money from her father who recently passed away. LIRING/3 promised to have the cover letter and envelope ready when he met with Rowton on 7/5/69 so that he could insert the money order. L/3 told Rowton that he felt it best to send the money order in the name of Elsa, the eldest of the León Barrios sisters, rather than to the mother (Marta) as requested in the letter. He explained that the last money order (actually certified bank check) in Elsa's name, sent by LIRING/4, arrived safely and apperently was cashed without difficulty. Rowton suggested that LIRING/3 send the letter, registered with receipt requested, just to be sure that the letter arrived at its destination.

Wallace B. Rowton

SECRET Attachment #2 HMMA-37136

México D. F. a 26 de Febrero de 1969.

MICROFILMED
JUN 2 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

4P

ASUNTO. COAHUILA Nº 200 altos 102

A quien corresponda.

PRESENTE:

Me permito informar el resultado de la investigación en la dirección anotada.

El día de hoy estuvímos de visita en el departamento Nº 102 de las calles de Coahuila de la colonia Roma D. F.

En ese lugar viven la Señora INES BASTON DE PIMENTEL, su MAMA, una hija como de 15 años de edad, una niña como de 8 años, un hijo como de 17 años y 3 estudiantes que tienen de huespedes.

La persona que funge como jefe de casa es un sobrino de la Sra. INES de nombre JORGE CARAM HAIRAM que trabaja como agente de ventas y por lo regular siempre anda viajando.

INES BASTON DE PIMENTEL, su familia y los huespedes que tienen son VERACRUZANOS y tienen de vivir en ese departamento 3 años, tienen el teléfono Nº 64-69-34.

La Sra. INES y su familia son muy atentos y amables, pero cuando la Sra. INES se enoja es mucho muy grosera.

Cuando estabamos platicando con Ella, se enojo con su hijo y lo puso VERDE BLACO Y COLORADO de Majaderías.

Cuando le preguntamos por su Esposo, nos contesto categoricamente, NI ME PREGUNTEN POR ESE HIJO DE SU .... MADRE , por lo que ya no quizimos ahondar las preguntas.

La Sra. INES es medio blanca con un poco de paño en la cara, ojos negros, pelo negro lacio pintado, nariz recta, boca regular, mentón oval, frente regular, estatura como de 1.68 mts. y de 65 a 7o kilos de peso, viste de

H/w att: 2
HMMA-37136

CS COPY

SECRET

201-798301

ATT #2 HMMA-32136

negro a causa de la muerte de una hermana suya que hace 3 meses murió, -- La Sra. INES tiene 50 años de edad, según su propio dicho.

La casa se compone de sala comedor, cocina, baño, 3 recámaras y cuarto de planchado que tambien lo ocupan como recámara, los muebles son muy modestos, no tienen Imágenes Catolicas y solamente en una de las paredes del comedor hay un cuadro que representa un florero con unos claveles.

ATENTAMENTE K-10 y K-23

14-00000

Guatemala, 28 April,1959

Dear **LIRING-4**:

I am very happy to be able to write to you. Excuse me for not having been able to do so until now, but it was only last week that I was able to leave the sanatorium. My departure from such a place was quite a relief. My health was declining and I almost had a relapse. Everyone at home celebrated. My brother sends you his best.

My letter has two purposes: first to excuse myself for not being able to get to your home; it's becasue, since I am still not recovered, the doctor has told me to recuperate in the country, and, to avoid problems these days, I'm planning to go to uncle Tío's farm. In any case they'll be coming to see you on behalf of Violetta since they are still talking about the business here and are/very interested. That should take place any day now.

My other purpose in writing to you is to bother you for a favor. I should tell you that I have married Liz and she is now expecting a baby. (Finally I was able to follow your advice). Now that I am leaving for the farm, she will be left alone and with some financial difficulties. Since you had invited both of us there, and this is not possible, I hope you will be able to send her something. I think she could ~~use~~ put about Q. 100 to very good use. If you could send it to Doña Luisa - she and I would be very much obliged.

Everything else is going very well. I am

as ever your friend,

/s/ Julio Antonio

Guatemala 28 de abril de 1969.-

Querida LIRING-4:

Es para mí mucho el gusto de poder escribirte.- Perdona que lo haga hasta ahora pero recién la semana pasada pude salir del sanatorio.- La salida de tal lugar se me dificultó sobremanera.- Mi salud andaba muy mal y estuve a punto de tener una recaída.- Te cuento que en la casa sé dio de fiesta.- Mi hermano te manda saludes.- Mí carta tiene dos motivos: el primero pedirte disculpas pués yo no voy a poder llegar a tu casa.- Resulta que como todavía estoy un poco mal, el doctor me recomendó que me restableciera en el campo.- Como ya no quiero tener problemas en estos días marcho a la finca de Tío Pablo.- De todas maneras van a llegar a verte de parte de Violeta, aquí ya platique del negocio y están muy interesados. Esto va a ser en estos días.- El segundo motivo de mí carta es para pedirte una molestia.- Te cuento que me casé con ML y que ella está esperando baby.- Por fín pude seguir tu consejo.- Ahora con mi salida para la finca se queda sola y con algunas dificultades económicas.- Como tu querías que los dos fueramos por allá y esto no es posible te suplico le mandes alguna ayuda economica.- Yo pienso que unos Q100 le pueden servir mucho.- Se los puedes mandar a donde Doña Luisa.- Ella y yo, te estaríamos muy agradecidos.- Por lo demás todo anda muy bien.- Se despide tu amigo de siempre.

Julio Antonio

1P

SECRET

Attachment #3 to
HMMA-37136

MICROFILMED
JUN 2 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Identity Sheet

Identity A: Francisco LARA

Identity B: Orlando *SUAREZ cit: Cuba?

Identity C: the wife of Jerjes *AGUIRRE

Identity D: Heberto *PADILLA cit: Cuba!

Identity E: Cesar *MONTES (201-303518)

Identity F: the Casino de la Selva

SECRET

S/c att: 3
HMMA-37136

CS COPY

201-798301

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

IG: SEARS:mamd
IIT: WH/COG/OPS
T: 1255
TE: 8 MAY 69

S E C R E T

110

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
76 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, C/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 08 23 06 z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 00136

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY-0125 (IN 53298)

1. VIEW PBRUMEN APPARENT SUSPICIONS OF LIRING-3, PREFER ROWTON NOT LEVY ANY REQUIREMENTS ON LIRING-4 OR OFFER ANY AID. HOWEVER, SHOULD OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF OR ELICIT DEVELOP AFTER TRIP, WOULD WELCOME SAME.

2. FILE 201-798301, 201-818842.

END OF MESSAGE

AN	
AB	X
IN	
PS	X WH
BX	4
DES	UFD
FI	

MICRO. SER.
JUN 30 [illegible]
MICROFILMED

C/WH/COG Paul Esterit

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Charles M Baunle
WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

B-201-818842

201-798301
8 May 69

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Guatemala City

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

JMTRAK/LIRING/Humberto GONZALEZ Vega

REFERENCE: HMMA-36603, 27 February 1969

1. Attached for Addressees is a translation of a report received from LINLUCK on 28 February 1969 on Humberto GONZALEZ Vega (201-845437), Guatemalan Communist exile in Mexico who has been in contact with LIRING-3 (201-798301). The report was submitted by LINLUCK in response to the query for additional information on GONZALEZ mentioned in paragraph 2 of reference.

2. It will be noted that LINLUCK's information tends to confirm earlier reporting that GONZALEZ is connected with the PGT rather than the FAR -- though he would appear to have some contacts with the latter organization. While LINLUCK's report is based in part on details dredged up from the past, it is believed that his comments may be of interest to Addressees.

3. LINLUCK has promised to provide any additional information on GONZALEZ which he may be able to develop.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1 translation of report

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS/Guatemala City w/att
2 - C/WHD w/att

HMMA-36680

10 March 1969

CS Copy

S E C R E T

IN → 201-845437
201-798301

S E C R E T

ATTACHMENT TO HMM-20680

(Translation of report from [illegible] on Humberto GONZALEZ Vega)

1. The business card used by Humberto GONZALEZ Vega is printed with the legend: "Salvat Editores Mexicana, S.A., Telephone 46-27-47, Madrid 21, Mexico 6, D.F. . GONZALEZ' name and -- "Division Medicina" have been added to the card.

2. GONZALEZ recently (date not known) obtained a Guatemalan passport at the Guatemalan Consulate in Mexico City. When applying for the passport, GONZALEZ indicated it would be used to travel to Venezuela on behalf of his company (Salvat). One may have doubts about this story of travel to Venezuela. GONZALEZ is a long-time member of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT). When he joined the PGT in 1952 he was [illegible] section of the Ferrocarriles de Guatemala. In 1954 he went to Buenos Aires as an exile, and -- along with other Communists -- was imprisoned in the jail of Villa Devoto on orders of General PERON. (It is only just to add that there was no valid reason for jailing them). Years later GONZALEZ returned to Guatemala where he has a wife and several children that he claims to support. He is separated from his wife (who is still in Guatemala) and lives with another woman in Mexico.

3. In any event, GONZALEZ is still a member of the PGT, and has spent many months in jail because of his Communist activities. On one occasion he was jailed during the regime of Miguel YDIGORAS Fuentes, and again when Colonel Enrique PERALTA Azurdia was in power. GONZALEZ has lived in Mexico as a political asylee, but has returned clandestinely to Guatemala on several occasions, only to be expelled from that country again. In Mexico he has almost always been the "responsable" (one in charge) of the Guatemalan Communists living in Mexico... that is the representative of the PGT in Mexico. At least the visible representative. Even while Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ Garbin was alive, and GUTIERREZ died in 1966, GONZALEZ had a responsible position. Among his functions was keeping an eye on GUTIERREZ.

4. It is possible that GONZALEZ' perseverance in seeking a Guatemalan passport, and it took him nearly two years to get it, is because of a desire to go to Cuba or one of the Iron Curtain countries. Or again, it may be that he wants to go to Venezuela as he claims. He gives the impression that he receives a salary from the PGT, and his employment (with Salvat) -- if he is employed there -- is nothing more than a cover for his political activities.

.../

S E C R E T

5. GONZALEZ' nickname is "El Gato" (the cat) -- a nickname applied to him because of his light colored eyes. He is about 5'7" in height, has light colored skin, strong build, and has a stoop. He has a large head and a closely trimmed moustache. His most distinctive features are his large cheeks. He is what you might call puffy-cheeked. When he walks he struts. Undoubtedly the Security service in Guatemala have numerous photographs of Gonzalez, as well as a more accurate physical description. The description I have given is largely from memory.

6. As the writer and GONZALEZ have known each other for many years (and the writer also gave him some help in getting his passport), GONZALEZ, at a recent (no date) chance meeting, invited the writer for coffee. Naturally he [illegible] much information of importance, but he did say the following:

> "Guerrilla warfare is not the revolutionary line to be followed in Guatemala. The guerrillas were knocked out, and the only result (of guerrilla warfare) was that it demoralized the masses and has set back the revolutionary movement several years. The Central Committee of the PGT committed a grave error when it allowed the "jovenes" (here refers to the young violent revolutionaries) to assume a role of importance. Many of these "jovenes" were trained in Cuba. (What happened was) that the PGT Central Committee was on the verge of being completely replaced by the youth leaders. To avoid this, the Central Committee found it necessary to include some of the youth leaders in the Central Committee. This naturally led to a change to the "guerrilla line". Most of the capable political leaders of the Party have died uselessly for this cause."

Later in the conversation GONZALEZ became quite agitated and said:

> "And to think that I just met with some guerrilla leaders and some other young men who just came to Mexico from Guatemala who want aid, money, and recruits in order to reorganize the guerrilla bands in the interior of Guatemala and continue the fight. This would serve no purpose and I refused to give them my aid. The only thing I told them was that this was the wrong approach."

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, Mexico City HMM		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Guatemala City		MICROFILM
SUBJECT PBRUMEN/LIRING-3 Operation		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Please see Paragraph 3.

REFERENCES : A. HMMA-36184, 17 January 1969
B. HGGA- 9766, 28 January 1969

1. It is suggested that LIRING-3 be shown a photo of Carlos Enrique LOPEZ Garcia (201- 840852), who may be identifiable with the Carlos LOPEZ met by LIRING-3 on 24 December 1968. The photo of LOPEZ was forwarded with HGGA- 9768, 30 January 1969.

X 2. Attached for Mexico City and Headquarters is a photo of Carlos Enrique LOPEZ Arevalo, which may also be shown to LIRING-3 for possible identification. Liaison reported on 13 February 1969 that LOPEZ Arevalo travelled to Havana, via Mexico, on 12 January 1962 and 12 November 1965. The following biographic data on LOPEZ Arevalo was taken from his Passport Application, dated 19 October 1965:

a. DPOB 12 July 1943; La Gomera, Guatemala
b. Father Timoteo LOPEZ Cit: Guatemala
c. Mother Nicolasa AREVALO Δ: Guatemala
d. Color of Eyes Black

MICROFILMED
MAR 10 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment: Herewith
Photo

Distribution:
2-Mexi w/att H/W 1 cy
2-C/WHD w/att H/W 1 cy

FEB 27 1969

CS COPY

h/w att'd

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HGGA- 9803	24 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-798301

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HLCA-9803

e.	Color of Hair	Black
f.	Color of Skin	Dark
g.	Height	1.62
h.	Marital Status	Single
i.	Occupation	Farmer
j.	Passport No.	169687

3. Photographs of Mario Augusto MENDEZ Aguilar and Mario Otoniel MENDEZ Molina were forwarded to Station Mexico City (Reference B) with the request they be shown to LIRING-3 for possible identification. It would be interesting to learn whether either of the above is the true name of the individual known to addressees as Javier CONTRERAS.

Amy J. STRUMNESS

ATT TO
HGGA - 9803

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

SECRET

Wu'stt:1
HGGA - 9803
Chief, WH Division

CS COPY

201-798301

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LIRING/JMTEAK/Humberto GONZALEZ Vega

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2

REFERENCE : HMMA-36114, 27 December 1968

1. Headquarter's files contain the following information on a Humberto GONZALEZ and Humberto GONZALEZ Vega who is probably identical with the GONZALEZ described by LIRING/3 in reference.

a. In September 1954 one Humberto GONZALEZ, in company with other exiles, was deported from Guatemala to Panama. On 9 September this exile group arrived in Panama on board an Argentine military aircraft. It was further reported that on 10 September, this same group departed for Argentina via Guayaquil, Lima, and Santiago. GONZALEZ, described as a Guatemalan national, utilized safe conduct pass #1292 or #12925, which listed his occupation as being a railroad worker [illegible] was 2 October 1921. (Source: HZP-1160, 17 September 1954)

b. In early May 1957 one Humberto GONZALEZ Vega was reported as being a member of the Alianza de la Juventud Democratica de Guatemala (AJDG), a Communist youth group. This group was active in the preparation and distribution of propaganda which was being directed against the Guatemalan Government. GONZALEZ was further identified as an individual who had previously taken asylum in the Argentine Embassy, had a known Communist background, and was presently employed as a salesman for the NICOL Company in Guatemala City. (Source: HGG-965, 24 May 1957, ESCONSON/2 from ESCONSON/10)

c. On 25 April 1959 one Humberto GONZALEZ Vega attended a meeting at which plans for May Day celebrations were discussed. This same report contained the Field Comment that GONZALEZ was a member of the PGT. (Source: GUAT-259, 28 April 1959)

/Continued/

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - COS, Mexico City
2 - COS, Guatemala City

30 January 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-17056

DATE
3 FEB 1969

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

ORIGINATING

OFFICE [illegible] OFFICER [illegible] TYPIST [illegible] EXT. [illegible]

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/2/G	30-1-69	[illegible]
AC/WH/2		[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/2	3/2/69	[illegible] J. [illegible]

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(40)

DISPATCH

d. In May 1959 one Humberto GONZALEZ Vega was reported as being a member of the Batallon Guatemala. This group had been recruited to join the Nicaraguan revolutionary forces in trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government of President Luis SOMOZA Debayle. This same report indicated that GONZALEZ had been involved in the Nicaraguan Revolutionary movement, was a member of the PGT, and worked as sales manager for the Amalia de NICOL Company. The address for this company was reported as 6th Avenue and 10th St. Zone 1, Guatemala City. (HGG-1331, 22 May 1959, ESGEM/1 from ESGEM/15)

e. In late July 1960 one Humberto GONZALEZ was reported as being a leftist who was financing a group which had prepared plans for a coup. (Source: HGG-1766, 2 August 1960, ESDEW/1 from ESRECESS/3)

2. Headquarters would appreciate any additional information on GONZALEZ that might be developed by addresses.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

14-00000

3P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-36114, 27 December 1968

1. Forwarded herewith as attachment #1 are eight reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the latest developments of the LIRING-3 operation. The most important of these are reviewed below.

a. "Romulo," who later described himself as Mario*MENDEZ, appeared on the scene as the liaison man between LIRING-3 and the Guatemalan FAR. Humberto*GONZALEZ Vega, whom MENDEZ called "El Gato," apparently made initial contact with LIRING-3 on his own initiative. MENDEZ said that "El Gato" was a "good element" but emphasized that he (MENDEZ) would be the person LIRING-3 would deal with on FAR matters. A copy of the sketch of MENDEZ drawn by LIRING-3 was shown by the Station to LIREBEL-2. The latter, without any hesitation, identified it as Javier*CONTRERAS, leading FAR representative

Continued......................

re: Connection with (201-798301)

Attachments:
1. Reports (8), h/w
2. Documents (7), u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each)

MICROFILMED
FEB 6 [illegible]
DOC. MICRO. SER.

S/c att: 1
h/w att: 1

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 36184	17 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

in Mexico and a suspected PBRUMEN contact. The Station had the LIEMBRACE team cover the entrance of the building where MENDEZ and other FAR members have an apartment they use for clandestine meetings with LIRING-3. Despite the fact that the team knows LIRING-3 from previous surveillance and that a copy of LIRING-3's sketch of MENDEZ was also provided, the LIEMBRACEs spotted neither man. The Station naturally plans to cover another meeting and is also exploring the possibility of determining who rented the apartment and from whom. It is of some interest to note that MENDEZ, although he gave LIRING-3 the agreed upon recognition signal, may still not be the "Pavel" LIRING-3 was told he would meet. LIRING-3 was shown a photograph of Oscar Arturo PEREZ Ramirez (known to have serviced a letter drop in Mexico City used by Michelle Jeannette FIRK before her death in Guatemala). LIRING-3 thought it looked like a poor print of a photograph of "Pavel" shown to him while still incarcerated. (201-841522)

b. LIRING-3 is apparently still suspicious in the eyes of the PBRUMENers. He has received several letters (see paragraph 2) from members of the FAR in Guatemala warning him that adverse rumors (some of them calling him a WOFIRM agent) have been circulated in that country by Carlos PERZABAL Marcue. Knowing that PERZABAL's father-in-law is a close friend of Chief, LIRING, LIRING-3 sourced the rumors to the LIRING headman. He first took up the matter of the accusations made against him with LIRING-9. The latter said there was nothing to this, but, and there was a but, LIRING-9 reminded LIRING-3 that in the past he had been connected "with a person of mysterious and suspicious affiliations," a clear reference to ROWTON, LIRING-3's Greek friend. When LIRING-3 insisted he wanted to discuss the matter of the allegations made against him directly with Chief, LIRING, LIRING-9 promised to make an appointment for him. This appointment, however, never materialized. That Chief, LIRING may have spread the allegations made against LIRING-3 by PERZABAL was confirmed by Rolando SUAREZ (see ROWTON's report dated 31 December). LIRING-3 also took up the matter of the PERZABAL denunciations with MENDEZ, who told him that the FAR had paid no attention to them and even accompanied LIRING-3 to PERZABAL's house. LIRING-3, however, made the mistake of giving his name when asked who was calling. The result, as could be expected, was that PERZABAL was "not in." MENDEZ agreed to accompany LIRING-3 to LIRING to talk to its Chief, but he warned LIRING-3 not to make accusations without proof. MENDEZ, incidentally, does not appear to be pro-PBRUMEN. This is interesting in view of the fact that CONTRERAS, with whom he may be identical, is a suspected contact of the PBRUMENers.

c. So far, it does not seem that the FAR has been greatly disturbed by the accusations made against LIRING-3. In fact, MENDEZ and the two other FAR members LIRING-3 met on 1 January have urged LIRING-3 to join them in the hills of Guatemala, where guerrilla warfare, they said, will soon be

CS COPY

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 36184

intensified. They did not hide that their purpose was to broadcast LIRING-3's name and the fact that a Mexican had joined their fight. This was apparently to appeal to the Mexican left and gain their support. While LIRING-3 has declared himself ready to go back to Guatemala (if this was what ROWTON wanted him to do), he did not need ROWTON to decide that broadcasting his name from the jungles of Guatemala was not a thing he wanted anyone to do. At Station directive, LIRING-3 pointed out that after his recent imprisonment he had to take care of his wife before doing any more for the cause. The best way to do this was to take LIRING-4 to PERUMEN and leave her with relatives. This led LIRING-3 to ask what, if anything, he could do for the FAR in Mexico. So far, however, his FAR friends have not risen to the bait.

2. Forwarded under separate cover as attachment #2 are the following documents:

a. A copy of a letter from Oscar Moises *ROLDAN Espinoza. (201-843303)

b. A translation and a copy of a letter, dated December 1968, from Marta *BARRIOS. sex: F

c. Translations and copies of letters from Marta BARRIOS to LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 dated 29 December and from "Violeta" dated 17 November.

[illegible] Alvarado

d. Copies of two letters and two postcards received by LIRING-3 from Rafael and Rigoberto *ARGUETA Alvarado dated 10 December (see ROWTON's report of 19 December).

e. A copy of the letter sent by LIRING-3 to Carlos *PERZABAL Marcue with copies for the Mexican and Spanish Communist Parties. This letter is dated 25 December.

f. A copy of an article written by LIRING-3 and published in a Mexican magazine. The date, number, and name of the magazine are marked on the copy.

10804

g. A copy of the note written by Jacobo *RODRIGUEZ Padilla (a longtime member of the Guatemalan Communist Party living in Mexico) introducing Carlos *LOPEZ (who was an important FAR leader in Guatemala until he came to Mexico in late 1968). cit: Guatemala

h. A copy of an article which appeared in a Chiapas newspaper announcing LIRING-3's release.

for Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3 of 3

14-00000

Attachment #1
HMMA-36184
19 December, 1968

13P

1. LIRING/3 gave Rowton two letters dated 10 December, 1968, from Rafael Argueta A. and Rigoberto Argueta A. (Alvarado) in which former states he working in Chiquimula and gets home only every fifteen days. ~~former~~ Latter states among profuse greetings and best wishes that "Juán José y Miguel ~~[illegible]~~ tienen un año para hacerle fuerte al destino" which L/3 interprets to mean that León Barrios brothers intend resume activity on behalf FAR as soon as they released.

2. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he hopes one or both brothers will come to Mexico after release and asked Rowton whether he could determine probable date of release so that he could be prepared receive them. LIRING/3 will reply to letters ~~[illegible]~~ hoping that "los leones" will come to visit him when they leave their cage.

MICROFILMED
FEB 6 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

W/att:1
HMMA-36184

CS COPY

201-798301

23 December,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact by "Pavel" of FAR.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1000 on 23/12/68 at the restaurant in the Camino Real Hotel that at long last the FAR contact promised by the León Barrios brothers had appeared. LIRING/3 told Rowton that at about 1900 on 19 December a Guatemalan came to his apartment and introduced himself as "a friend of Violeta." L/3 invited him in but asked him not to discuss anything sensitive in the presence of his wife. After about ten minutes of chit chat in the apartment, L/3 and the Guatemalan, who gave his name simply as "Rómulo", went to a nearby restaurant to talk privately.

2. According to LIRING/3, the Guatemalan stated that he had been ordered by FAR to maintain contact with L/3. When queried by L/3 regarding the Humberto González Vega whom he had met previously, "Rómulo" explained, "Oh, you mean 'El Gato' - he's a good element, but he will not be your FAR contact. I have been entrusted with that mission." "Rómulo" also stated that he knew Francisco Lara well and had worked with him in Guatemala City some time ago until Lara was arrested. "Rómulo" added that unfortunately Lara's mother had betrayed him to the police and he barely escaped arrest at that time. "Rómulo" confirmed that Lara had been under a cloud as far as his superiors were concerned and had made the ill-fated trip in order to attempt to clear himself of charges against him.

3. When LIRING/3 told "Rómulo" that he had been in touch with the LIRING office since his return, the latter exclaimed,"But what have the LIRING people to do with us?" This gave L/3 the definite impression that "Rómulo" himself was not in touch with a PBRUMEN representative in Mexico City,and, in any case, did not like the LIRING establishment.

4. He then asked L/3 to give him a summary report of the arrest and detention. L/3 told Rowton that he balked at this at first, protesting to "Rómulo" that he had already given the details to the León Barrios brothers and"Cebollito" who he was sure had passed on the report to the FAR in Guatemala. When "Rómulo" explained that he would appreciate an oral report on the spot since he was not fully informed because of communications problems, LIRING/3 told Rowton that he went over the whole episode for "Rómulo's" benefit. "Rómulo" then asked to see LIRING/3 again at 1100 on 21 December to continue their discussion. He promised to meet L/3 on the street in front of his apartment house at the appointed time.

5. LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that much to his surprise and indignation he received a letter on the following day(20/12/68) from Martha, the mother

of the León Barrios brothers, in which, among other things, she stated that "the man on the bicycle", which L/3 explained to Rowton meant Carlos Persabal had written a letter containing grave charges against LIRING/3. The letter, which L/3 read aloud to Rowton, went on to assure L/3 that these charges were not believed but constituted a source of annoyance to the writer's friends.

6. LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that he felt so indignant and shocked at this unpleasant development that he decided to see the Chief LIRING and have it out with him. L/3 explained that since the Chief LIRING is on very friendly terms with the father-in-law of Persabal he might be aware of the letter and even possibly encourgaged Persabal to write it. L/3 told Rowton that he then got in touch with LIRING/2 by telephone and made a date to meet him at the LIRING establishment at 0930 on 21/12/68. When he arrived at the gate at that time he was told that LIRING/2 had not yet arriveed. After a wait of some twenty minutes, LIRING/2 appeared but asked LIRING/3 to wait a little longer since he was very busy. After another annoying wait, LIRING/9 appeared instead of LIRING/2 and talked with LIRING/3 on the patio. LIRING/3 explained that he wanted urgently to talk with the Chief LIRING since something had come up with regard to Persabal. He reminded LIRING/9 that he originally had exppressed a desire to have a face-to-face confrontation with Persabal in the LIRING office so that he could present his report on the arrest in his presence. LIRING/9, according to LIRING/3, brushed this off again with the comment, "But as I told you before, you're making a mountain of a molehill. You're exaggerating the whole business."

7. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he then took out Martha's letter and insisted that LIRING/9 read it. The latter expressed amazement at the revelation of Persabal's action but did not agree with LIRING/3 that the Chief LIRING would be able to shed light on it. LIRING/3 then told LIRING/9 that he did not like the games that everyone seemed to be playing with him, and asked LIRING/9 point blank what it was that motivated him to ask for a written report of the arrest and, after L/3 complied with the request, to drag his feet. L/3 continued that he felt he had been frank with the LIRING office, whereas on the other hand they were not honest with him in telling him what they thought of him. L/9 then assured L/3 of his confidence inhim and added that in the past certain persons, including Hugo, the assistant to LIRING/11, had felt thatLIRING/3 had been connected with a person of mysterious and suspicious affiliations. L/3, understanding this to be a clear allusion to Rowton, admitted to having known this person in the past and having had

a few business transactions with him, including the sale of a number of his paintings, but insisted with some annoyance that this had not bearing on his political activity. LIRING/9 agreed and added that it was really a thing of the past that should not bother LIRING/3. He promised to make an appointment for LIRING/3 to see the Chief LIRING sometime the following week.

8. LIRInG/3 continued that when he met with "Rómulo" later that morning he also showed the letter from Martha to him. According to L/3, "Rómulo" became indignant and suggested that they talk to Persabal together to get to the bottom of the matter. L/3 and "Rómulo" then took a taxi to the residence of Persabal in the hope of finding him in at the time. When L/3, however, rang the outside bell he was told by a woman (who he suspects was either Persabal's wife or sister-in-law) that Persabal was not at home. L/3 noted the woman's astonishment in her tone of voice when he stated his name at her request. "Rómulo" who was present later commented that L/3 should not have given his name since it was obvious that Persabal was at home but did not want to see LIRING/3.

9. According to L/3, "Rómulo" at the second meeting stated that "several" friends of his were planning to return to Guatemala to continue their work for the FAR and that he hoped that LIRING/3 might be able to help in this mission. "Rómulo" did not specify what kind of assistance he expected from LIRING/3 but promised to give him details when the time came for action in this matter. He promised to see L/3 again at 1600 on 24 December,1968.

10. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he planned to insist on seeing the Chief LIRING IN THE HOPE of determining his reaction to the charges by Persabal in view of the Chief's friendship with the in-laws of Persabal.

Wallace B Rowton

26 December,1968

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date and Site of Meeting: 1100, 26/12/68; Camino Real Restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: 1100, 28/12/68; " " "
4. Reports/Information Passed by Agent:

a) Contact of Carlos López: L/3 reported that about 1430 on 24 December as he and his wife arrived at their apartment, they found a "chaparito" who introduced himself as Carlos López, a Guatemalan friend of Jacobo Rodríguez(Padilla), and gave L/3 a note of introduction from that person. L/3 gave Rowton the original letter, which is attached herewith. L/3 told Rowton that López stated that he was anxious to send various items, including medicines, to PBRUMEN,and appealed to L/3 since he "understood" that L/3 and his wife had contacts through which he could send the items. López, according to L/3 appeared very interested to be reassured that L/3 really did have good contacts with the LIRING establishment. When L/3 assured him that he did see LIRING respresentatives, López went on to refeal that he was a friend of Carlos Perzabal and that he was fully informed concerning the recent "tragic situation" of both Persabal and LIRING/3. This bomb shell shock L/3 badly and he felt obliged to launch into a diatribe against Perzabal. When López commented that "naturally we have to take Perzabal's word against yours,since he know him better," L/3 told Rowton that he demanded an explanation of who the "we" were. López simply replied that it meant "important" persons in Guatemala and Mexico. He added that,"as you know", Persabal was known even to César Montes. L/3 retorted, "But Montes has been stripped of his authority,as you should know." This led L/3 to the counterclaim that he also had good friends in Guatemala and Mexico who could testify on his behalf.

LIRING/3 told Rowton that he then showed López a photostatic copy of the attached letter which he had written to Perzabal demanding an explanation of the calumnies he was known to be spreading against him, and which he/(L/3) ~~had~~ already sent to the CP Mexico and Spain. He asked López to keep the copy and tell his good friend Perzabal where he got it and under what circumstances.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that he had to cut short the rather heated exchange with López since he had a date at 1600 that same day with "Rómulo" outside his apartment house.

b) Contact with "Rómulo": LIRING/3 told Rowton that he again saw Rómulo, the FAR liaison, outside his apartment house at about 1610 on 24 December, as prearranged. In view of what had transpired a ~~fax~~ short time earlier that afternoon, he told Rómulo about the comments made by Carlos López. Rómulo, according to L/3, did not indicate that he knew Lopéz at all, but agreed with L/3 that the accusations of Perzabal must be met head-on. He suggested the following course of action: L/3 should wait for the reply from Marta (mother of León Barrios brothers) as to the exact charges made by Perzabal before taking up the matter with the Chief LIRING. He tended to agree with L/3 that the LIRING establishment might have inspired Perzabal's letter, but felt it would be better if L/3 had a statement from Marta before accusing the PBRUMENers of bad faith with him. Rómulo added that in the meantime he would try to arrange a confrontation with Perzabal in the presence of three "important FAR officials in Mexico", including a certain "Julio" also known as "Buda". Rómulo felt that Buda could lure Perzabal to a private meeting sinne the latter ~~ixxx~~ already had interviewed him some time ago and would be anxious to see him again. This would provide a good pretext for a confrontation between Perzabal and LIRING/3 to clear up the whole matter.

C) Proposed Meeting with LIRING Chief: LIRING/3 told Rowton that he felt it essential to see the LIRING Chief on the morning of 27 Dec even if he does not receive a reply from Marta by that time. He explained that he felt he could get some sort of statement from the LIRING Chief, either affirming or denying his knowledge of the Perzabal letter so that he could use this in a possible meeting with the latter in the presence of Rómulo and his colleagues. He said that he felt this important in view of a possible invitation to PBRUMEN that he might receive momentarily.

5. Information/Guidance Given to Agent: Rowton cautioned L/3 against jumping the gun in accusing the LIRINGs of inspiring the Perzabal letter, pointing out that it could just as easily and logically have come from such Guatemalan exiles as Navarette, Capuano, or even persons of the César Montes group, who are expected to be close to the LIRINGs and the CPM as well as possibly the PTG.

WB Rowton

CS COPY

30 December,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Identification of "Rómulo" Reported FAR Lisaison.

1. At 1100 on 28 December,1968, LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at the Camino Real restaurant that he had again met briefly with "Rómulo" in front of his (L/3's) apartment house about 1600 on 27/12/68. On this occasion "Rómulo" identified himself as Mario Mendez and promised to give LIRING/3 a telephone at which he could be contacted in the future.

2. With regard to the Perzabal accusations, "Rómulo" again cautioned LIRING/3 against jumping the gun with the Chief of LIRING (i.e. accusing him of having inspired the charges), since if the LIRING Chief called his bluff, L/3 would have no proof. "Rómulo" recommended that L/3 wait until he received a reply from Marta giving details of the accusations before proceeding further. He added that at that time he and his colleagues would gladly confront Persabal and clear up the matter.

3. LIRING/3 described "Rómulo" as a Guatemalan of about 28 years of age, 5'6", 125 lbs,sraight black thinning hair, small eyes,clipped moustache. L/3 added that "Rómulo" frequently squints his eyes, either from a nervous habit,or some physical defect. LIRING/3 drew Rowton a rough sketch of "Rómulo" as he recalled him from the three brief meetings he has had with him to date.

4. LIRING/3 also gave Rowton the original of the letter from Marta xxxxx postmarked 18 December,1968, in which mention was made of the Perzabal charges. L/3 reminded Rowton that Perzabal is referred to in the letter as "el hombre de la bicicleta", and that the León Barrios brothers (sons of Marta) as "los patojos."

5. LIRING/3 also gave Rowton the original letter of Xxxxxx Oscar Moisés Roldán Espinoza dated 27 November,1968, which LIRING/3 had received on 1 December,1968. The envelope bears the same return address as that of 7 November,1968. Roldán encloses the negative of a snapshot of himself as a "recuerdo." The letter contains general greetings and a plea for whatever help L/3 can manage to give Roldán.

6. LIRING/3 asked Rowton's approval to send 500 pesos to Marta (via her sister) to encourage her to continue writing him and keeping him informed of what develops, especially if and when her sons are released. Rowton agreed but stressed that L/3 should explain that he had managed to have this extra money as a result of his recent exposition and to regret that he could not send more.

WBRowton

Wallace B Rowton

Yllano Mendez. (PAVEL?)



25-30 años
1.68
56 Kilos
ojos chinos
[illegible]

vestido Corduroy
"Pana"

31 December, 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting with FAR Members in Mexico City.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at the Robin Restaurant at 1700 on 30/12/68 that when he returned to his apartment at about 1200 on 28/12/68 he found Mario Mendez (aka "Rómulo") waiting in the company of another FAR member, whom L/3 described as "very fat" aged about 28 with a dropping moustache. L/3 told Rowton that since he did not wish to involve his wife in conversation with these persons, invited them outside to a nearby restaurant.

2. According to LIRING/3 Mario Mendez and his friend told him that FAR had decided finally to withdraw all its forces from the cities and to regroup in the mountains, in view of the increasing "repression" and the virtual impossibility of effective action in the urban areas of Guatemala. They stated that they and a number of their comrades in Mexico were planning to return to Guatemala and join the FAR forces in the mountains. They then invited LIRING/3 to accompany them on their return trip, feeling that in that way he could contribute more to the struggle. In reply to L/3's queries they did not specify how L/3 was to survive another trip and in fact be of any use to them in the mountains. They simply said that they felt it would be useful to give wide publicity to L/3's presence in the mountains, once he reached that area. L/3 told Rowton that he reacted to this somewhat startling proposal in as logical a way as possible, saying that he would have it give it careful thought, inasmuch as it raised a number of very serious problems with him and his family. Mario Mendez and his friend concluded with a rousing cheer for the "real revolutionaries" who put aside all thoughts of personal safety and comfort and rush into the battle. When L/3 pointed out that they themselves after all had withdrawn from the action they replied that precisely for that reason they intended to return and do their share for the cause.

3. LIRING/3 also reported that he and his wife spent the 29th of December with Orlando Suarez in Cuernavaca and had lunch with him and Jorge Godoy. Suarez remarked privately to L/3 that he had visited the LIRING offices on 24-25 December and was "not pleased" with comments he had heard concerning LIRING/3. He recommended that L/3 see the Chief LIRING "as soon as possible" to put the record straight concerning the circumstances surrounding his arrest and especially his subsequent release. Suarez intimated that the Chief LIRING apparently favored the version given by Perzabal, with whose in-laws he was on very close personal terms. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he planned to try again to meet privately with the Chief LIRING on the morning of 31 December, 1968.

4. In reply to Rowton's questions concerning the identity of the following names that appear in the letters to him from Marta Barrios de León, LIRING/3 made the following clarifications:

1) "Los cabchitos" and "Los patojos" refer to Juan and Miguel León Barrios.
2) "Elsa" is the true name of the eldest León Barrios sister (apparent age 25).
3) "La negra" is a León Barrios sister aged about 14.
4) "La chiquita" is a six-year-old sister of the León Barrios brothers.
5) "Felissa" is the novia of Juán José León Barrios.
6) "Yuri" is a child, probably of Maria Elena, who is a close friend and possibly relative of the León Barrios family.
7) "La gordita" and "Cari" whose identity L/3 never learned are both active members of FAR who frequently visited the León Barrios brothers and acted as FAR couriers.

5. LIRING/3 told Rowton that as regards the ~~[illegible]~~ proposed revisit to Guatemala, he was prepared to discuss this with Rowton and would be willing to undertake the hazardous mission, "if there were no other alternative", but that in any case careful plans would have to be worked out especially with regard to commuuications, if Rowton hoped to profit by L/3's renewed involvement with FAR in Guatemala.

Wallace B Rowton

1 January,1969

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting at FAR Safehouse.

1. At 2100 on 1/1/69 at the Robin Restaurant LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he went, as requested by "Rómulo", to Calle Coahuila 221 (across from Woolworths near the corner of Insurgentes Sur) and found "Rómulo" in apartment 12 in the company of two other persons, previously unknown to LIRING/3. Both appeared younger than "Rómulo" and one could easily be his brother because of the physical resemblance. The other, apparent age 25, light skinned, who was introduced simply as an Ecuadorian, had a good Guatemalan accent, and revealed in his remarks an excellent knowledge of Guatemala. The Ecuadorian, who had the most pleasant personality of the three, remarked during the conversation that he had been imprisoned in the old penitentiary in Guatemala City and subsequently "thrown" over the border to Salvador.

2. LIRING/3 told Rowton that the small apartment contained nothing that he could see but a table and several chairs and was obviously a safehouse rather than a residence. "Rómulo" later confirmed this when he told L/3 that they would have to meet there in the future only by appointment since they did not live there but came only from time to time to talk. As a result, LIRING/3 made a date with them for 1600 on Friday, 3/1/69, at which time he, L/3, would come to the apartment. "Rómulo" promised to wait for him at the entrance to the apartment building so that L/3 would not have to ring the bell and wait outside the door unnecessarily.

3. During the friendly discussion that ensued in the apartment, L/3 took the line previously agreed on with Rowton with apparent success. The young Ecuadorian showed his approval by nodding his head several times, when L/3 outlines his reasons for not accepting at once the proposal to return to Guatemala. "Romulo" was less sympathetic, and when L/3 stated that he felt it necessary in any case to travel first to PBRUMEN to get his wife settled "Rómulo" shrugged his shoulders, remarking, "But can't she get by herself." L/3 then offerred to be of any service while in PBRUMEN, but did not receive any positive reaction. "Rómulo" responded simply with a "Yes, we'll see." L/3 made sure to drop the statement that he was planning as a matter of fact to see LIRING/9 the following morning to talk about the trip which L/9 himself had already volunteered to arrange.

4. When the subject of Ferzabal's calumnies against L/3 came up toward the end of the conversation, "Rómulo" told L/3: "Don't worry about that any more. A guatemalan, whom you don't know, will take care of that matter 'de una vez' L/3 told Rowton he felt this remark was too full of foreboding for him to ask for details. He agreed to come again to the apartment at 1600 on 3/1/69.

WBL//

14-00000

1 January,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Address of Mario Mendez,aka "Rómulo".

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1000 on 1/1/69 at the Robin Restaurant that he had not succeeded in seeing the Chief LIRING as he had hoped the previous morning since the latter did not appear at his office by 1000, when LIRING/3 had to leave to make the contact with "Rómulo" at his apartment. LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that when he arrived at his apartment about 1015 he found a note from "Rómulo" asking him to come to the following address ~~at~~ between 1130-1200 the following day (1 January,1969):

Calle Coahuila 221.

2. Rowton therefore made another date with LIRING/3 for that same evening at 2100 at the Robin Restaurant in order to get L/3's report of this meeting. Rowton showed LIRING/3 the two pictures passed to him by the Station of persons suspected of being "Rómulo" and the fat colleague. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he could see no resemblance to either person, but he felt that the photo of the stout person corresponded to the description of the "Pavel" he was supposed to meet. He recalled that at the time the León Barrios brothers told him they would arrange for "Pavel" to contact him in Mexico City upon his return, they showed him a rather poor reproduction of a picture of Pavel that had appeared in the local press following a gunfight that Pavel had had on the border while crossing into Mexico.

3. Rowton then expressed to LIRING/3 his grave reservations concerning ~~any~~ the proposed travel of L/3 to Guatemala in the company of his new FAR friends. Rowton pointed out that such a trip would be extremely risky for L/3 personally with little hope of any worthwhile production for Rowton. LIRING/3 agreed and said that he felt he would have to continue to stall, even at the risk of alienating the affections and confidence of his new contacts. Rowton suggested that L/3 tell them that before he could possibly consider such a return trip he would have to visit PBRUMEN with his wife and child to get them settled there so that they would not again be exposed to the difficulties they suffered during his last trip - financial as well as psychological. This would give L/3 at least another month before he would be faced with the trip. Rowton added that L/3 should offer to do "everything possible" in Mexico for his friends, reviewing for them his knowledge and experience of the border areas, his service in the navy as well as his reasonably good knowledge of photography.

4. Rowton then stressed that L/3 should assume that everything,at least in summary form, that he discussed with the FAR officials he was in contact with would directly or indirectly be reported to the LIRING office,and that hence he should "play it straight" with both sides.

8 January,1969

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Allegation of WOFIRM Affiliation.

1. At 1000 on 7 January,1969, at the restaurant of the Casino Real Hotel LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had just received three letters from Marta Barrios de León, the mother of the León Barrios brothers (Miguel and Juán) whom he had originally met during his confinement in Guatemala City. He gave the original letters, Rowton's translation of which is attached, to Rowton to copy and study. LIRING/3 appeared genuinely shaken at the revlation in the second paragraph of the letter,dated 29/12/68, that the "man on the bicycle" (Carlos Perzabal) had written in his letter to Marta that LIRING/3 was "working for another company (WOFIRM) and that Marta should not confide in anything LIRING/3 might write to her." LIRING/3 told Rowton that he had suspected that Perzabal had accused him of perhaps causing the arrest, but he never dreamed that Perzabal would go so far as to accuse him outright of being a WOFIRM agent.

2. LIRING/3 then speculated that Perzabal could not have done such a serious thing of his own initiative, but must necessarily have been inspired by some outside source, most probably the LIRING establishment. He continued that he therefore felt it more necessary than ever to put the LIRING Chief "up against the wall" and force him to admit his complicity. LIRING/3 added that he had seen "Rómulo" on 3 January as planned and had told him about the letter from Marta and Perzabal's treachery. According to LIRING/3 "Rómulo" became indignant and volunteered to accompany LIRING/3 to the LIRING establishment to have the whole thing out once and for all. LIRING/3 appeared so disturbed at the unexpected news that Rowton found it impossible to check with him on the exact time and place he allegedly met "Rómulo" on Friday, 3/1/69. When Rowton stated that he felt it very important to identify "Rómulo" positively (Rowton alleged that he had access to the Gobernación "mug file" of persons wanted by the Guatemalan Government and given to the Mexicans for identification), LIRING/3 volunteered to arrange to meet "Rómulo" somewhere in public as soon as possible so that Rowton could get a good look at him (as he had pretiously done in the case of "Garcia").

3. Rowton advised LIRING/3 not under any circumstances to attempt to lure "Rómulo" to any public place, especially since the latter had established a pattern of meeting with him in a safehouse, but simply to tell Rowton the next time he was invited to visit the safehouse and Rowton would cover the place from as convenient a spot as possible (e.g. Woolworth's across the street). Rowton also encouraged LIRING/3 to talk again with LIRING/9 rahher than the Chief LIRING IN THE hope of more production.

X

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Guatemala City

Chief of Station, Mexico City

PERUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-36114, 27 December 1968

1. Forwarded herewith as attachment #1 are eight reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the latest developments of the LIRING-3 operation. The most important of these are reviewed below.

a. "Romulo," who later described himself as Mario *MENDEZ, appeared on the scene as the liaison man between LIRING-3 and the Guatemalan FAR. Humberto *GONZALEZ Vega, whom MENDEZ called "El Gato," apparently made initial contact with LIRING-3 on his own initiative. MENDEZ said that "El Gato" was a "good element" but emphasized that he (MENDEZ) would be the person LIRING-3 would deal with on FAR matters. A copy of the sketch of MENDEZ drawn by LIRING-3 was shown by the Station to LIREBEL-2. The latter, without any hesitation, identified it as Javier *CONTRERAS, leading FAR representative

Continued.........................

Attachments:
1. Reports (8), h/w
2. Documents (7), a/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each)

in Mexico and a suspected PBRUMEN contact. The Station had the LIEMBRACE team cover the entrance of the building where MENDEZ and other FAR members have an apartment they use for clandestine meetings with LIRING-3. Despite the fact that the team knows LIRING-3 from previous surveillance and that a copy of LIRING-3's sketch of MENDEZ was also provided, the LIEMBRACEs spotted neither man. The Station naturally plans to cover another meeting and is also exploring the possibility of determining who rented the apartment and from whom. It is of some interest to note that MENDEZ, although he gave LIRING-3 the agreed upon recognition signal, may still not be the "Pavel" LIRING-3 was told he would meet. LIRING-3 was shown a photograph of Oscar Arturo *PEREZ Ramirez (known to have serviced a letter drop in Mexico City used by Michelle Jeannette FIRK before her death in Guatemala). LIRING-3 thought it looked like a poor print of a photograph of "Pavel" shown to him while still incarcerated.

b. LIRING-3 is apparently still suspicious in the eyes of the PBRUMENers. He has received several letters (see paragraph 2) from members of the FAR in Guatemala warning him that adverse rumors (some of them calling him a WOFIRM agent) have been circulated in that country by Carlos PERZABAL Marcue. Knowing that PERZABAL's father-in-law is a close friend of Chief, LIRING, LIRING-3 sourced the rumors to the LIRING headman. He first took up the matter of the accusations made against him with LIRING-9. The latter said there was nothing to this, but, and there was a but, LIRING-9 reminded LIRING-3 that in the past he had been connected "with a person of mysterious and suspicious affiliations," a clear reference to ROWTON, LIRING-3's Greek friend. When LIRING-3 insisted he wanted to discuss the matter of the allegations made against him directly with Chief, LIRING, LIRING-9 promised to make an appointment for him. This appointment, however, never materialized. That Chief, LIRING may have spread the allegations made against LIRING-3 by PERZABAL was confirmed by Rolando *SUAREZ (see ROWTON's report dated 31 December). LIRING-3 also took up the matter of the PERZABAL denunciations with MENDEZ, who told him that the FAR had paid no attention to them and even accompanied LIRING-3 to PERZABAL's house. LIRING-3, however, made the mistake of giving his name when asked who was calling. The result, as could be expected, was that PERZABAL was "not in." MENDEZ agreed to accompany LIRING-3 to LIRING to talk to its Chief, but he warned LIRING-3 not to make accusations without proof. MENDEZ, incidentally, does not appear to be pro-PBRUMEN. This is interesting in view of the fact that CONTRERAS, with whom he may be identical, is a suspected contact of the PBRUMENers.

c. So far, it does not seem that the FAR has been greatly disturbed by the accusations made against LIRING-3. In fact, MENDEZ and the two other FAR members LIRING-3 met on 1 January have urged LIRING-3 to join them in the hills of Guatemala, where guerrilla warfare, they said, will soon be intensified. They did not hide that their purpose was to broadcast LIRING-3's name and the fact that a Mexican had joined their fight. This was apparently to appeal to the Mexican left and gain their support. While LIRING-3 has declared himself ready to go back to Guatemala (if this was what ROWTON wanted him to do), he did not need ROWTON to decide that broadcasting his name from the jungles of Guatemala was not a thing he wanted anyone to do. At Station directive, LIRING-3 pointed out that after his recent imprisonment he had to take care of his wife before doing any more for the cause. The best way to do this was to take LIRING-4 to PBRUMEN and leave her with relatives. This led LIRING-3 to ask what, if anything, he could do for the FAR in Mexico. So far, however, his FAR friends have not risen to the bait.

2. Forwarded under separate cover as attachment #2 are the following documents:

a. A copy of a letter from Oscar Moises *ROLDAN Espinosa.

b. A translation and a copy of a letter, dated December 1968, from Marta *BARRIOS.

c. Translations and copies of letters from Marta BARRIOS to LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 dated 29 December and from "Violeta" dated 17 November.

d. Copies of two letters and two postcards received by LIRING-3 from Rafael and Rigoberto *ARGUETA Alvarado dated 10 December (see ROWTON's report of 19 December).

e. A copy of the letter sent by LIRING-3 to Carlos *PERZABAL Marcue with copies for the Mexican and Spanish Communist Parties. This letter is dated 25 December.

f. A copy of an article written by LIRING-3 and published in a Mexican magazine. The date, number, and name of the magazine are marked on the copy.

g. A copy of the note written by Jacobo *RODRIGUEZ Padilla (a longtime member of the Guatemalan Communist Party living in Mexico) introducing Carlos *LOPEZ (who was an important FAR leader in Guatemala until he came to Mexico in late 1968).

h. A copy of an article which appeared in a Chiapas newspaper announcing LIRING-3's release.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment #2A
HMMA-36184

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM


4c
CORREO AEREO

S/c att. 1
HMMA-36184

CS COPY

201-298301

14-00000

Attachment #2B
HMMA-36184

Envelope addressed to Señor Carlos Jurado
Edificio Condesa A.6
Pachuca y Veracruz
Mexico, DF

No return address
Sender's initials: M.B.

Postmarked 18 December, 1968, Guatemala.

Guatemala, December, 1968.

Dear Carlos:

Excuse me for not having replied to yours of 12 November until today, but the affairs of the "patojos" keep me on the go and besides I have been sick and upset and I keep forgetting everything. That's the reason I haven't put a date on this letter; you won't believe it but I write two letters that never got off, but it's true. We hope that you are as well as ever with your family.

I have to tell you that the "hombre de la bicicleta" wrote me last week and that I am a little peeved at him because he speaks ill of you. You should move cautiously, but don't think that it's a problem with us - we don't believe it. We feel that it's from fear. I lost his address and for that reason don't intend to write to him.

"El vigotudo" sends you regards; La negra a warm embrace; la chiquita a kiss; Elsa.FelisaCari,Maria Elena,Guri and the "patojos" many regards and embraces for the Chirstmas holidays. The "patojos" are still in the "pina" so they couldn't come. We'll see whether they can be with us the 24th; if not we'll have to go there to be with them. In any case I'll let you know when they come here.

So long with many best wishes and congratulations to you and your wife and children. Excuse the long and boring letter.

So long Carlos,
/s/ Marta



CORREO AEREO [illegible]

14-00000

14-42-37

ATTACHMENT #2C
HMMA-36154

Gautemala, 29.December,1968.

Carlos,

I'm writing this after returning from the farm where I had a chat with "los canches"; your three xxx letters came the same day, as well as the postcard which is very attractive. Thanks for all your trouble. In yours of the 20th you ask me to send a letter to the "E.C." but I don't understand where you mean, and to whom,since I don't recognize those initials. Please explain to me clearly what you mean so that I can comply.

As to the letter from the "man on the bicycle", I mislaid it since I didn't like what it said, but if I can locate it I'll send it to you, as the "patojos" told me to from the beginning, so that you can have an exact account of it. I, however, thought the weight they gave to it exaggerated. In any case he wrote to tell me that you were working for another company (CIA) and for that reason I shouldn't confide in anything that you might write to me. But I'm very sincere in that respect and for that reason I got very angry. Consider this, that when you both were here, the mother of that person was very nice to me, lavishing flattery and gifts on me, for which I am sincerely grateful and do not forget, but his action doesn't seem (honest) to me. We all have to be loyal and faithful to our convictions and not be shameless with respect to our comrades; we have to be responsible in all our actions.

I haven't been able to write until today since I'm running around town arranging things. All this must be boring to you. Receive greetings from Miguel, chiquita, negra, Maria,Felisa, my grandson, Elsita,Gorditaand Cari. Also my own "abrazos" and good wishes.

/s/ Marta

Carlos: Lesbia ("La Negrita") sends you fond remembrances. Excuse the red pen and the bad handwriting. Imagine! you fooled all of us since we thought you had made the Christmas card yourself -since you paint so well, but you'r not going to believe that. I'm writing you just a few lines because mamá didn't leave me much space. Greetings to your wife and children, even though I haven't had the pleasure of meeting them. So long,

/s/ Lesbia

Guatemala, 29 December, 1965

Dear Chichai,

This letter is to send you greetings in the hope that you are well together with your husband and children.
I was happy to learn that the person who wrote to me was you; it was quite a practical joke xxxxxxxxxxxxxx when I found out that it was really Carlos who was writing. Tell him that the letter he sent with the clippings has not yet been received.
Many "abrazos" and endearments from your friend

/s/ Marta.

Carlos: I'm writing simply to send you my best wishes for a prosperous and happy new year. /s/ Elsa.

Guatemala. 17/11/62

Carlos,

I send you my best, wishing that you and your family are well. Everything here is the same as when you were with us. We learned that your trip was good in all respects.
You can settle with the "Chino" the accounts you left here. He's going to send you two postcards that are very interesting. I trust you'll appreciate how difficult it was for us to find them among so many attractive cards we have here.
You can write to Doña Luisa. Greetings and "hasta pronto."

/s/ Violeta

The above is one of the many oversights of Doña Luisa. Excuse it.
(Handwriting of Marta)



Señor Carlos Zarate
Edificio Condesa A. 6
Pachuca y Av. Veracruz
Mexico D. F.

CORREO AEREO AIR MAIL PAR AVION

GUATEMALA 17/11/68

CARLOS:

TE ENVIO CALUROSOS SALUDOS.- DESEO QUE TE ENCUENTRES BIEN EN UNION DE TU FAMILIA.- POR AQUÍ TODO SIGUE IGUAL QUE CUANDO, ESTABAS TU.- SUPIMOS QUE TU VIAJE FUÉ DEL TODO BIEN.- LAS CUENTAS QUE AQUI DEJASTE LAS PUEDES ARREGLAR CON EL CHINO.- EL TE VA A MANDAR DOS POSTALES MUY INTERESANTES.- ESPERO SEPAS APRECIAR EL TRABAJO QUE HA COSTADO BUSCARLAS ENTRE TANTAS Y TAN LINDAS QUE AQUI TENEMOS.- PUEDES ESCRIBIR A DOÑA LUISA.- SALUDOS Y HASTA PRONTO.-

TE RECUERDA

VIOLETA

Este fué uno de los tantos olvidados. Doña Luisa [illegible]



Renata I de L.
Guatemala, C.A.

30 DIC

Señor Carlos [illegible] CORREO AEREO
Edificio [illegible] A-6 VIA AIRMAIL
[illegible] y Avenida Veracruz
México 11, D.F.

Correo Aéreo

Guatemala, 29 de Diciembre de 1968:

Carlos: al escribir esta la hice al regreso de la finca despues de platicar con los muchachos, tus cartas vinieron el mismo dia las tres y la tarjeta que esta muy linda muchas gracias por todas tus finezas. En la que viene con fecha 20 me mandas a decir que le envie una carta a la E C. pero no te entiendo a donde es o a quien, pues no conosco esas iniciales, hasme el favor de explicarme bien con eso cumplo con lo que me pides. La carta del hombre de la bicicleta como me desagrado tanto la destruí pero si la encuentro te la mando pues los patojos me lo dijeron desde un principio para que tu te dieras cuenta exacta de ella pero yo creí muy exajerada la medida. El me mando a decir que estabas trabajando en otra compañia (CIA) por lo tanto no me confiara en lo que tu me mandabas a contar. pero yo soy muy sincera a ese respecto y por lo mismo me enojé mucho. Toma en cuenta que cuando Ndos estuvier aquí. la mamá de él se portó muy bien conmigo. pues me llenó de alagos y regalos lo cual agradezco de Todo corazón y no lo olvido pero la acción de él no me parece que nosotros debemos de ser leales fieles a nuestras convicciones y no ser sinvergüenzas con nuestros compañeros, para ser responsables en todos nuestros actos. Te escribo hasta hoy porque salgo en la calle vivo arreglando el asunto. Esta ya te ~~abur~~ aburrió con seguridad, recibe recuerdos de Miguel, la. chiquitica, la negra, Marie, Felisa, el nieto, la Elsita la gordita de la Cari y de mi muchos abrazos y felicidades.

Marta

Tulas: Te escribe cariñosamente y recordándote siempre Serina (la negrita). Perdona que te escribí con rojo y tan mala letra. Fíjate que nos [illegible] a todos pensamos que la [illegible] mandaste la debías hecho tú, porque como tuviste también [illegible] por eso no te vayas a creer mucho. Te escribo poco porque [illegible] me dejó mucho que hacer. Saludos a ti y a tu señora y niños aunque no tengo el gusto de conocerlos [illegible].

Correo Aéreo

Guatemala, 24 de Dic de 1963

Estimada Chichai

La presente es para saludarla deseando que se encuentre bien de en unión de su esposo e hijos.

Me dio mucho gusto al saber que la que me escribía era Ud, pero me hizo bien la inocentada cuando vi que era Carlos el que me escribio, dígale que la carta que me mando con los recortes no la recibí.

Resiba muchos abrazos y cariños de su amiga

Marta

CARLOS:

TE ESCRIBO UNICAMENTE PARA DESEARTE A TI Y A LOS TUYOS DICHA Y PROSPERIDAD EN EL AÑO NUEVO. ELSA

Attachment #2D
HMMA-36134



Señor:
Gustavo [illegible] Mex.
Edificio Condesa A-6
México 11 Distrito Federal



Remit: [illegible] Agosto [illegible]
27 [illegible] 37-43 [illegible] 12

Guatemala, 10 de diciembre de 1965

Señor:

Carlos Del Mar.

La presente es portadora de mis saludos deseando te encuentres gozando de buena salud al lado de tu señora y tus hijos. Carlos es para mí mucho gusto escribirte estas sinceras palabras no como amigos si no como hermanos, aunque muy poco tiempo tuvimos la oportunidad de tratarnos, pero tú sabes que entre nosotros bastó conocernos para querernos como hermanos, [illegible] la alegría que nos embargó al saber que [illegible] ya se encontraban en casa y deseo de todo corazón que pasen una feliz navidad y un próspero año nuevo al lado de tus seres queridos, te mando una postal de mi bello país para que te acuerdes de este tu hermano que siempre te recuerda. Qué más puedo yo decirte hermano si no que descanses buenamente y que seas feliz en tu hogar.

Te cuento que Juan José y Miguel [illegible] este año para [illegible] el [illegible].

Bueno [illegible] recibe saludos de mis padres mi señora y en especial de tu hermano Rigoberto Aguilar A. Saludos a [illegible].

Guatemala 10 de diciembre de 1.961
Señor:
Carlos del Mar.

Estimado Carlos al recibir la presente deseo se encuentre gozando de buena salud al lado de su querida esposa e hijos y les deseo de todo corazón una feliz navidad y un prospero año nuevo 1.961.

Carlos perdone que la felicitación le va un poco tarde pues fíjese que no estoy en la capital me encuentro trabajando en Chiquimula y no me ha quedado tiempo pero llego cada quince días a mi casa, me saluda a Carlos P. y dígale que le deseo muchas felicidades en esta navidad y que que tenga un venturoso año nuevo al lado de su querida familia.

Reciba saludos de mis padres mis hermanos y no pierdo las esperanzas de conocer ese su grande y hermoso país que cada día se agiganta más me saluda a su esposa e hijos y U.d. reciba un apretón de manos de su amigo y hermano que siempre lo recuerda, reciba saludos de mi esposa le mando una. Bella postal de mi hermoso país.

siempre lo recuerda.

Rafael Argueta A.

[redacted]

2a. av. # 27-43 zona 12.

10 de diciembre de 1968
Como un recuerdo de
mi querida Guatemala
para Ud. Carlos
de su amigo y hermano
Rafael Augusto Alvarado.

No 401 Distribuidora Librería "PRIXIMA" 5a AV. No. 16-42 ZONA 1

Guatemala 10 de diciembre de 1968
Como un recuerdo de mi bella
Guatemala esta tarjeta postal
para ti y tu señora hermano
de tu amigo y hermano
Rafael Augusto Alvarado

Lago Atcan
Lake Atcan
GUATEMALA, C.A.

ATTACHMENT #2E
HMMA-36184

México, D.F. a 25 de diciembre de 1962

Sr.
Carlos Ferrazabal Marcué
Presente.

Ferrazabal:

Juntos tuvimos una dura experiencia; las causas que la ocasionaron TU LAS CONOCES MEJOR QUE NADIE y sabes perfectamente que hay personas y organismos que se enteraron de todo en su oportunidad.

Ahora, por motivos de índole personal, familiar y probablemente para cubrir errores de los que NO SE TE ACUSA, estás deformando los hechos y me estás difamando.

Tu actitud no es honesta. Tengo en mi poder pruebas CONCRETAS de tus calumnias y como no soy un mártir ni un franciscano las haré públicas. Considero muy grave la situación que estás provocando. Si tú dispones de elementos concretos y definidos que confirmen lo que estás divulgando, te sugiero que también lo hagas. Así tanto tú como yo nos atendremos a las consecuencias.

Carlos Jurado
Carlos Jurado.

c.c. a organismos competentes y personas interesadas.

SIEMPRE #810 — ATTACHMENT #2F
HMMA-36184
1 JANUARY 1969

[illegible]

Sr. director:

En el No. [illegible] correspondiente al 27 de noviembre del presente año, fue publicada en su excelente revista una carta mía sobre la "granja penal Pavón" en Guatemala, lugar donde estuve confinado por unos meses. En el No. [illegible] del 18 de diciembre, la señorita Gloria Menéndez Mina, agregada de Prensa —me imagino que de la embajada de Guatemala en México— responde a ella.

Consideramos que su respuesta no se apega a la realidad, pues lógicamente un funcionario como la señorita Menéndez no puede hacer otra cosa que elogiar al régimen del cual depende, me permito hacer algunas aclaraciones que por cierto ella me pide en su carta. Por lo tanto ruego a usted de la manera más atenta se sirva dar a la publicación las siguientes líneas.

Srita. Gloria Menéndez Mina
Agregada de Prensa de Guatemala.

Evidentemente que nadie que sufre prisión saldrá de ella hablando maravillas, pero de esto a falsear la realidad hay una gran diferencia. Quiero aclararle que no fui a Guatemala en plan de reformador como usted dice. Los motivos de mi detención son ya plenamente conocidos y no voy a repetirlos ahora. Sólo debe usted saber que fui ABSUELTO de los delitos que se me imputaban. ABSUELTO quiere decir libre de cargos y dicha absolución me concedió libertad inmediata; es decir, que no se encontraron pruebas del falso delito del que la policía me acusó. Por lo tanto el adjetivo de "reformador" no me corresponde.

Sostengo que la "granja penal Pavón" es un campo de concentración y que no reúne ni una sola de las condiciones de una prisión común y corriente. Lo que escribí sobre ella es real y no exageré en nada. Usted dice que la "granja" sustituye a la antigua Penitenciaría que fue demolida. Eso es cierto, pero ni se llegó improvisadamente a su establecimiento. Probablemente los planes de sus constructores así como la opinión de los penalistas que menciona, contemplaban el establecimiento de granjas penitenciarias auténticas pero si es que tuvieron esa idea no la hicieron realidad.

En esa "granja" no existe ninguna ventaja sobre la vieja penitenciaría. Las condiciones de vida son infrahumanas y, como dije antes, sostengo lo escrito en mi anterior carta. Le propongo que el gobierno de su país permita la visita de periodistas y fotógrafos extranjeros (en ningún otro país se opondrían a que visitaran sus centros de reclusión) así como de la Cruz Roja Internacional, para que sean ellos quienes opinen y den a conocer al mundo la realidad de lo que llaman "Granja Penal".

Es una lástima que la revista SIEMPRE! no circule libremente en Guatemala. De ser así con toda seguridad que mucha gente de su país refutaría sus aseveraciones sobre que esta "granja" es una prisión modelo.

Usted me pide que concrete nombres y fechas de personas secuestradas y asesinadas en la carretera de la "granja". Por ahora le daré dos: El 6 de abril de 1968 fueron secuestrados y asesinados por la policía los señores René Orellana e Ignacio [illegible] Cruz. Nunca dije que en Guatemala no hay presos políticos; existen unos 100 aproximadamente en todas las prisiones del país. Son en cambio más de 4,000 los asesinados por el actual régimen. Sobre estos muertos y la violencia que priva hoy hay suficiente información y la [illegible] información a la Comisión por los Derechos Humanos de la ONU, donde existen numerosas quejas y datos muy concretos.

Sobre que "personajes como yo" son los que ponen en entredicho la buena amistad y las relaciones entre pueblos y gobiernos, yo creo que exagera. Salí absuelto y no soy "un redentor" ni un "sacrificado" como usted me nombra. El fallo de las leyes de su país confirma esto.

Atentamente:

Carlos Jurado.

ATTACHMENT #26
HMMA-36184

Estimado Carlos:

Recibí tu recado y para [illegible] [illegible] a tiempo

para mí tomo la suerte de saludarte.

Te presento al amigo [illegible] quien es de toda confianza y tiene esta para pedirte un favor. Es un muy amigo de alguien a quien conozco bien y podrá explicarte lo que digo. Te agradecería si está en tus posibilidades le ayudaras en lo que te explicará.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para desearles a la niña Zum Zum (me da mi recuerdo) Chichay y tú muchas felicidades para el año que viene y disfruten las fiestas de fin de año. Un abrazo

P.D. no lo hago personalmente porque estoy hace 23 [illegible] vacaciones.

[illegible] en la [illegible] de Acalá. Se nos informó que dichos trabajadores —entre otros más— fueron contratados

[illegible] bajadores no fueron [illegible] de [illegible] de los propiciados delictivos del in-

[illegible] barte las [illegible] pues sin estas últimas [illegible]

[illegible] al acercarse a sus padres.

Sin hacernos solidarios de

[illegible] a quien corresponda las responsabilidades [illegible], en protección de las familias damnificadas.

ATTACHMENT #24
HMMA-36161

RENOVACION

AÑO I Tuxtla Gutiérez, Chis., Martes 22 de Octubre de 1968 NUMERO 13

VIET-NAM

SAIGON, 21 de octubre.—Los Estados Unidos devolvieron hoy a 14 soldados de las fuerzas de liberación. Expresaron la esperanza que la acción conduzca a poner en libertad más prisioneros. Los liberados fueron conducidos a tierra en pequeñas embarcaciones, mientras se suspendían en ambos lados las acciones militares.

PELIGRO DE GUERRA

BELGRADO, 21 de octubre.—El peligro de una nueva guerra mundial está muy cerca y no se excluye la posibilidad de que las grandes potencias empleen armas atómicas, dijo hoy el presidente Josif Tito hablando hoy en dos pueblos sudorientales servios durante una gira especial.

Carlos Jurado fué absuelto

En un cable procedente de Guatemala, la AFP informa que la Corte de Apelaciones de la República vecina, declaró absueltos por falta de pruebas a los profesores mexicanos, Carlos Jurado y Carlos Manuel Perzábal, quienes se encontraban presos en un campo de concentración guatemalteco desde el pasado 14 de abril, supuestamente acusados de actividades conectadas con el movimiento guerrillero.

La noticia alegrará sin duda los círculos intelectuales de nuestro Estado, ya que Carlos Jurado es un chiapaneco distinguido que a través de su gran calidad artística como pintor y grabador, ha hecho grandes aportaciones a la cultura nacional. Como ciudadano el pintor Carlos Jurado ha desempeñado con verdadera pasión difíciles tareas en el Instituto Nacional Indigenista, en varios de sus centros. En el de San Cristóbal fue fundador, junto con Rosario Castellanos y Marco Antonio Montero, del extraordinario teatro guiñol "PETUL", que en lengua tzeltal desarrollara una gran labor entre la población indígena de los altos de Chiapas.

La injusta encarcelación de los profesores Jurado y Perzábal (este último profesor de la Facultad de Economía de la UNAM) movilizó a amplios grupos de intelectuales mexicanos que a través de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de nuestro país, exigió al Gobierno de Guatemala respeto a la vida de ambas personalidades y demandaron un juicio apegado a la Ley. Entre las numerosas peticiones en este sentido se destacó la hecha por el Colegio de Abogados de Tuxtla Gutiérrez.

Ambos detenidos estaban acusados por supuestos actos de "propaganda subversiva", realizados el día 17 de abril: es decir tres días después de haber caído presos cuando se dirigían, en un viaje turístico a la República de El Salvador.

El cable de la AFP infor forma que ambos profesores fueron trasladados desde la cárcel hacia el aeropuerto, donde abordaron un avión

LA SITUACION EN PANAMA

PANAMA, 21 de octubre.— El llamamiento para una huelga general por 72 horas hecha por la Federación Estudiantil de Panamá, en protesta por el reciente golpe de estado militar, tuvo poco éxito hoy. Informes procedentes de la ciudad nos dicen que se verificaron aislados incidentes de violencia.

Algunos comercios permanecieron cerrados y el tránsito pareció más rápido que el usual.

Salieron de Checoslovaquia

BUDAPEST, 21 de octubre.—Las primeras unidades militares húngaras que abandonaron checoslovaquia llegaron hoy a este país, cruzando la frontera por tres puntos. Este es el primer contingente militar que parte de tierras checas, después de ser ratificado el tratado checo-soviético, respecto a la permanencia o retiro de las tropas del pacto de Varsovia.

EL APOLO VII CUMPLIO SU PROGRAMA

CABO KENNEDY, 21 de octubre.— Los astronautas del Apolo—VII hicieron hoy su última trasmisión por televisión a la tierra y mantuvieron la nave en una órbita menor, para iniciar el descenso a la tierra el día de mañana en el Atlántico Occidental.

Minutos después de la trasmisión apareció en las pantallas de los televisores el Director del vuelo, quien expresó que la misión del apolo VII había conseguida todo lo que se había propuesto, la inyección del motor principal del Apolo, situándolo en una órbita más baja, colocándolo en la posición propia para la misión completa

14-00000

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION　　CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　　TOTAL COPIES 16　　ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
When Filled In

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY　　AT　　Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 76　　PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO　　BRANCH ☐　　DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. CI/AN, CI/OPS, FI 2

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

338

S E C R E T 162323Z JAN 69 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9997

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

16 Jan 69 IN 73418

REF A. HMMA 36174

B. HGGA 9709

1. PER PARA 1 REF A, FAR CONTACT KNOWN TO LIRING/3 AS "ROMULO" AND "MARIO MENDEZ" MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH MARIO AUGUSTO (MENDEZ) AGUILAR. STATION TRACES MENDEZ DESCRIBE HIM AS PGT ARMED ACTIVIST WHO ILLEGALLY ENTERED MEXICO JULY 1966. MENDEZ PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FITS THAT GIVEN REF A. PHOTO OF MENDEZ REQUESTED FROM LIAISON, AND WILL BE POUCHED ADDRESSEES WHEN RECEIVED, WITH FULL STATION TRACES.

2. PER HMM-10576, LIREBEL/1 IN PERSONAL CONTACT WITH MENDEZ IN JULY 1966. IF LIREBEL/1 AVAILABLE, SUGGEST SHOW HIM LIRING/3 SKETCH OF "MARIO MENDEZ" FOR POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION.

S E C R E T

With f.6
LIRING 3
201

WC

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, WH/COG

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Activities Against PBRUMEN Targets in October and November 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 13.

Reference : HMMA-35591, 10 October 1968

1. Personnel: There were no changes in personnel in the PBRUMEN Section of the Station during October and November. Wallace B. ROWTON returned from his TDY on 15 October. Leslie I. HENDRIQUE was at the Station TDY 26 through 30 November in connection with the LISAGA case. Henry J. SLOMAN was at the Station TDY on 8 November to debrief AMSTRUT-16. Leonard S. TORMET visited the Station during the last week of November in connection with the LIRING-3 case.

Continued....................

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD
2 - C/WH/COG

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 36185	DATE 15 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-120-130

Liring/3

2. Operations in PBRUMEN and Against Visiting PBRUMEN Officials:

A. LIAGILE-1: LIAGILE-1 came to Mexico on 19 October and returned to PBRUMEN on 1 November, but he did not contact the Station. (See MEXICO CITY-7974.)

B. LICARD-1: LICARD-1 returned from his TDY to Madrid in October. His mission was unsuccessful. The Madrid Station provided detailed reports on this operation.

C. LISAGA-1: LISAGA-1 returned to Mexico on 25 November 1968. He remained in Mexico to receive special training and to undergo debriefing by a Headquarters TDYer until 9 December, when he returned to PBRUMEN.

D. Subject of MEXICO CITY-6266: LIADLIB-1 finished his debriefing of Subject during this period. (See HMMA-35618)

E. HAGLIDER-1: HAGLIDER-1 did not return to Mexico during this period.

F. YJWAIT-2: YJWAIT-2 did not return to Mexico during this period.

G. Subject of MEXICO CITY-7595: Subject defected to the Mexicans during the Olympics. The Station arranged for a press conference through LITAMIL-3. LITAMIL-3's debriefing revealed that Subject did not have any intelligence of value. (See also MEXICO CITY-7621.)

H. AMWILLOW-1: AMWILLOW-1 arrived in Mexico on 22 November and returned to PBRUMEN on 2 December. FRADYER could not meet him as he was at Headquarters on TDY. (See MEXICO CITY-8215 and -8335.)

Jude Blin

3. Active Leads to Prospects in PBRUMEN:

A. Subject of MEXICO CITY-5442: LICOMET-2 received a call from Subject on 24 November asking him to take care of two friends who were visiting Mexico from PBRUMEN. During the same call, Subject indicated he would be coming to Mexico City soon on vacation and would notify LICOMET-2 of the exact date and details.

B. AMICARUS-1: After enlisting the cooperation of AMICARUS-3 in Veracruz, the Station is awaiting the arrival of AMICARUS-1, scheduled to transit Mexico City from PBRUMEN, to re-establish contact between the two and have AMICARUS-3 develop AMICARUS-1. (See MEXICO CITY-8136, et cetera.)

C. AMCAJOLE-2: Per MEXICO CITY-7451 and -7453, AMCAJOLE-1 was scheduled to visit Mexico from PBRUMEN. However, his father at the last minute reportedly "blocked" his departure. (See also MEXICO CITY-7574 and -7622.)

D. LIALMANAC-1: LIALMANAC-1 told ROWTOX on 23 November that he is a close, long-time friend of the Subject of HMMA-36016. He says now he believes he can develop a close relationship with QUMOON, Mexico City.

E. Subject of MEXICO CITY-7946: The Station is cooperating with LNERGO in preparing for the arrival of Subject's son in Mexico. The Station has assisted in getting a Mexican visa for the son. The son arrived in Mexico on 2 December, but it has not yet been determined whether he is willing to be contacted and, hopefully, debriefed.

4. Legal Travelers to PBRUMEN:

A. LIRING-4: According to LIRING-3, LIRING-4 is in no condition to accept any assignment or instructions for a trip to PBRUMEN. There is, however, some possibility that LIRING-3 may go to PBRUMEN on a "cultural" mission, at which time he will report directly to PBRUMEN officials on his activities in Guatemala. LIRING-9 has reiterated that he wants both LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 to go. but has not suggested dates for this travel. (See MEXICO CITY-8159 and -8228.)

B. LIRENO-2: LIRENO-2's papers are finally in order, and she has indicated that she is still willing to travel to PBRUMEN. However, the recent death of her mother, as well as the recent incarceration of her son (in a frame-up by his employer - see MEXICO CITY-8182), has brought her to a physical and psychological low. The Station is allowing her time to recuperate before raising the question again.

C. LIANKLE-1: LIANKLE-1 has not yet settled in Mexico City. There was no contact with her during this period.

D. LIARM-1: Per MEXICO CITY-7433, LIARM-1 was met during the Olympics, but did not have access to much information of value. (See MEXICO CITY-7563 and -7741.) In spite of the fact that he was in daily contact with PBRUMEN participants, some of whom spent considerable time with him, he came up with virtually nothing. The Station, at present, has no contact with LIARM-1, who has returned to the Monterrey area.

E. Subject of MEXICO CITY-5853 (News contact of LITAMIL-3): Subject has been reapproached about making a trip to PBRUMEN now that the Olympics are over. He has indicated his willingness to make such a trip now. LITAMIL-3 is arranging a meeting between Subject and a Station Case Officer.

F. LIRENO-8: On 17 October LIRENO-8 was instructed to actively arrange for a trip to PBRUMEN, and, if he goes, to see about taking some courses in that country. (See MEXICO CITY-7738 and HMMA-35593.) In the meantime, he has become completely integrated into the PBRUMEN Consulate and cultural institute in his town. In this capacity he will be in a position to report on PBRUMEN activities in that area.

G. Subject of HMMA-35516: The Station is still planning to have ROWTON explore the feasibility of approaching Subject and using him as an eventual source in PBRUMEN, where, by the nature of his function, he still maintains contacts. (See HMMA-35516.)

H. AMSTRUT-16: Subject traveled to PBRUMEN on 18 October 1968 and returned on 1 November. On her return to Mexico she was debriefed by Henry J. SLOMAN, who came to Mexico on TDY for this purpose. The results of this debriefing were received in UFAA-355.

I. Subject of MEXICO CITY-8319: LITAMIL-3 was contacted by Subject, who returned from PBRUMEN on 2 December. Subject was debriefed by a Station Case Officer on the current status of the relationship between his organization and the PBRUMEN Government, and on other requirements given him before his departure for PBRUMEN. The most promising factor in this operation is the fact that four of his subordinates will be coming out for a conference in April 1969. Subject promised to give the Station access to any or all of these individuals.

5. Technical Penetration and Coverage of LIRING and the Residences of LIRING Personnel:

A. MKTRAP in Chief, LIRING's Residence: MEXICO CITY-7982 reported on the difficulties encountered in trying to have a LIRISK unit installed in the LIHACK-4 LP. The Station made its own LIRISK installation on 23 November. (See MEXICO CITY-8182.) All attempts to activate the MKTRAP have so far been unsuccessful. (See MEXICO CITY-8303.)

B. LISAMPAN: LISAMPAN coverage of BAKER continued. EASY was lost on 9 October as a result of a routine installation in the same building by the LIRISK company. Attempts to activate EASY from LISARI were unsuccessful. (See MEXICO CITY-7598 and -8232.)

C. LIENVOY: LIENVOY coverage has remained unchanged. The LIRING Commercial line still has not been reconnected.

D. LIFEAT: LIFEAT coverage of LIRING-21 was discontinued on 15 November for security reasons. The coverage was renewed on 6 December.

E. LIONION: LIONION-1 continued to perform his photographic and audio duties. His ability now to identify people by name by monitoring DOG is particularly useful.

F. LIROSIN: LIROSIN-1 was kept on full salary during the period. In late November he was given the assignment of renting a new LP which was spotted by LITAINT-2. He successfully rented this LP on 4 December, after LIRENO-1 laid the groundwork, and will move into it on 18 December 1968. This will be the base for an audio operation against LIRING-2, LIRING-9, and LIRING-13.

G. Trash Operation: The trash operation was not reactivated during this period.

H. Audio Against the Residences of LIRING-21 and LIRING-24: Via LIREALM-1 the Station located empty apartments in the same buildings where these two LIRING officers live. Attempts to rent at least one of these for an audio operation proved difficult in view of the need for a cosigner and finding suitable people to move in. LIROSIN-1 was going to attempt to make some arrangement when the LP described in subparagraph 5F turned up. The Station decided the latter was of higher priority and discontinued its efforts to rent the apartments next to LIRING-21 and LIRING-24.

6. Physical Penetration and Coverage of LIRING:

A. PBRUMEN Deputy in Merida: This target left PCS on 15 November 1968. (See MEXICO CITY-8148.)

B. LITAMIL-7: The Station had no contact with LITAMIL-7 during this period. She was, however, seen chatting with LIRING members on several occasions. She was not observed visiting LIRING.

C. Female Access Agent (Subject of MEXICO CITY-5988): No contact was established during this period.

D. LIRING-3/LIRING-4: On 29 October ROWTON met LIRING-3 after his release from jail. The results of the initial debriefing were cabled in MEXICO CITY-7900. LIRING-3 indicated that LIRING-4 was very nervous and upset, and that he wanted all his own activity and association with ROWTON to be kept from her. LIRING-3 has been meeting fairly frequently with LIRING-9, who has been debriefing him on his encarceration in Guatemala. (See MEXICO CITY-8159 and -8228.)

E. PBRUMEN Maids: The Station decided to mount an operation against the PBRUMEN maids, and selected LIEMBRACE-3 as a suitable access agent. (See MEXICO CITY-7861.) The Station is in the process of turning LIEMBRACE-3 over to LIREALM-1, who will be the outside Case Officer on this operation. (See also MEXICO CITY-8124.)

F. Chief, LIRING: The Station has corresponded with Headquarters about a false flag cold approach against Chief, LIRING. This still is in the exploratory stages. (See MEXICO CITY-8242.)

7. Harassment of LIRING: There were no new Huarache leaflets put out during this period.

8. LICOMET Debriefing Center: MEXICO CITY-8066 reported that the charitable sponsorship covering the overt activities of the debriefing center ended on 31 October 1968 and that the extra financial cover for the office space would end 30 November. Headquarters' assistance was requested in resolving this problem. (See also MEXICO CITY-8179 and -8287.) HMMA-35887 forwarded more detailed LICOMET-2 reports on the LICOMET cover problem.

9. QUMOON: There were no operations against QUMOON during this period. QUMOON's activity in Mexico remained normal.

10. Double Agents: LISASSY-1 returned from his European trip on 17 November and was recontacted by LIRING-9, who levied requirements on him as reported in MEXICO CITY-8339. LISASSY-1 continues to have difficulty satisfying LIRING-9 requests for information on the activities of the PBRUMEN community in Mexico City and Miami. The CI aspect of the LISASSY-1 operation was virtually at a standstill for two reasons: first, at one time or another, either LIRING-9 or LISASSY-1 was out of Mexico; and second, the Station has been unable to come up with information which LISASSY-1 could pass to LIRING-9. In this last respect, LISASSY-1 continues to be an excellent channel of WOFIRM-controlled information to the PBRUMEN Government via LIRING-9.

11. Operations Against PBRUMEN Subversive Activities in Latin America:

A. LIRING-3: See MEXICO CITY-7900 for RONTON's initial debriefing of LIRING-3 on conditions in Guatemala. MEXICO CITY-7945 reported that LIRING-3 received a letter from Guatemala which he interpreted as a check on a new commo channel between the Guatemalan rebels and him. LIRING-3 reported at length to LIRING-9 on his contacts with FAR members while in jail. At LIRING-3's suggestion, LIRING-9 may send LIRING-3 to PBRUMEN to make a personal report on this. (See MEXICO CITY-8159.) More detailed reports were forwarded in HMMA-35905. HMMA-35904 forwarded a report of LIRING-3's imprisonment in Guatemala.

B. Letter Drops: The PBRUMEN letter drops being covered by the Station only produced one interesting letter during this period. (See HMMA-35873.) The Station suggested that Headquarters follow up on the lead provided.

C. LIRING-7: LIRING-7 continued to see his Mexican leftist student "friends" during this period. (See HMMA-35823.) He also escorted a high-ranking member of the Orthodox Church during a visit to Mexico. One intelligence dissemination was made on the basis of information produced by LIRING-7 during this visit.

D. LIHACK-4: When he was in jail in mid-November, LIHACK-4 was approached by some Mexicans arrested in connection with the student disturbances. He was asked to take a walkie-type radio into jail for their commo, and was asked if he would be willing to assist them with his ham radio equipment for direct commo between the revolutionaries and PBRUMEN, since going through LIRING was not satisfactory. The Station is taking a wait-and-see attitude to see how this develops. (See MEXICO CITY-8213.)

E. Subject of HMMA-35872: Via LIFEAT, LIENTRAP, and the LIEMBRACEs, the Station identified a Mexican student contact of LIRING. Background information on this person, including photos, was passed to the LITEMPOs on 21 November 1968 with a suggestion that they arrest and interrogate the person. (See HMMA-35872 for details.)

12. Miscellaneous:

A. AMBOOK-3: AMBOOK-3 is employed by a local Mexican television station and apparently does not intend to return to PBRUMEN. The Station had no ops contact with AMBOOK-3 during the period of this report. He planned to travel to the United States to cover the Apollo/8 launching at Cape Kennedy in late December 1968, but this was not definite.

B. Travel Control Information: LIFIRE, LICOMET, and LITEMPO continued to provide this type of information.

C. PBRUMEN Fishing Fleet: There was no activity against this target. Several fishing boats, however, did seek shelter at Isla Mujeres, and on each occasion several crew members sought asylum. The LICOMETs were alerted each time to try to obtain debriefings of these men. (See MEXICO CITY-8039.)

D. MHVIPER: The LICOMETs continued to provide QUMOON cargo manifests, and LIRENO-1 provided crew and ship manifests. The manifests were pouched to JMCOBRA and Headquarters for processing. (See HMMA-35912.)

E. AMDESTINE-1: AMDESTINE-1 was terminated per Headquarters direction. See MEXICO CITY-7664, DIRECTOR-42579, and MEXICO CITY-7739.

F. AMDAUB-1: On 17 October AMDAUB-1 asked for assistance from LNPURE. (See MEXICO CITY-7709.) On 25 October he left Mexico for Miami, where he was met and handled by WH/Miami. (See JMCOBRA-1427.)

G. LIAMATOL-1: LIAMATOL-1 was met on 17 October 1968 and agreed to cooperate with the Case Officer by furnishing information on the activities of the PBRUMENers in the Veracruz area. LIAMATOL-1 requested that his main line of communication with the Station be through LIRENO-1 for security reasons. (See HMMA-35913 and -35917.)

H. Subject of MEXICO CITY-7515: The Station notified Headquarters of the arrival in Mexico of a person on the list of "40." The Station was asked to contact this Subject's brother to determine the present status of Subject. This was done, and the report submitted in MEXICO CITY-7754 indicated that he was content with his life in PBRUMEN and was not interested in contacts, even with his own brother, if there was to be pressure applied for him to remain outside PBRUMEN.

I. During a baseball game between PBRUMEN and the United States during November, the PBRUMEN players attacked several spectators. Through LITAMIL-3 the Station is trying to arrange to have one of those attacked sue a LIRING employee. (See MEXICO CITY-8044, -8048, -8078, and -8285.) However, the Station-cleared lawyer ran into difficulties with the Mexican Government. Court authorities who passed the lawyer a transcript of the original charges against the LIRING employee advised the lawyer he would be wasting his time on this case because orders from an unidentified high Mexican Government official indicated that the planned charges against the employee would not be accepted for trial.

J. AMSTET-1: AMSTET-1 sent a letter to the home of AMSTRUT-8, who in turn notified the Station to come and pick it up. The contents of the letter were forwarded to Headquarters in MEXICO CITY-8130. This is a Headquarters case in which the Station participates only as a letter drop via AMSTRUT-8.

13. As can be seen, all the above has been previously reported to Headquarters. In view of this, and the fact that the PBRUMEN Section, in addition, submits regular quarterly progress reports on its projects, it is felt that reporting on the Station's activities against the PBRUMEN target is adequate. Therefore, the Station once more suggests that formal PBRUMEN Section monthly or bimonthly reports be discontinued. Please advise.

Raymond

for Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
of Station, Guatemala City

SUBJECT
LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQ:

nce: HMMA-36114, 27 December 1968

. The "Humberto GONZALEZ Vega" mentioned in reference is probably ical with Angel Humberto GONZALEZ Vega. The only Station trace on atter individual was forwarded with HGG-3098, 14 June 1963, from a of undetermined reliability. In this report GONZALEZ was listed ng active in the peace movement of the Guatemalan Communist Party . GONZALEZ's date of birth was given as 2 October 1927. Biographic and a photo of GONZALEZ have been requested from liaison and will be rded to addressees when received.

. According to Station information, Gustavo COLINDRES Barrios was ted on 3 July 196[illegible] by the Guatemalan authorities. He was described is time as a member of "the supply network of the Rebel Armed Forces ". Although no further information is available in Station files, DRES was apparently consigned and sent to El Pavon.

. In reference to the names mentioned to LIRING-3 by GONZALEZ dov[illegible] Alegria, Jorge Torron and Avecillas"), Guatemala City feels probably refer to Hector SANDOVAL Alegria, Jose Samuel TORON os, and Ricardo Israel VALLECILLOS Perez. All of these individuals reportedly arrested by the Mexican authorities in May 1968 for an [illegible]. (MEXICO CITY 5590, 17 May 1968). In addition, it is y that the "Nunez" mentioned later by GONZALEZ is identical with Roberto NUNEZ Sanchez, a Guatemalan Rightist who was also reportedly ted with SANDOVAL, TORON, and VALLECILLOS.

(continued....)

Distribution:
- Mexico City
- Chief, WHD
- Files

JAN 15 1969

CROSS REFERENCE

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HGGA - 9721

DATE
14 January 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-[illegible]98301

Guatemala City agrees that GONZALEZ is apparently the FAR contact
blished for LIRING-3 in Mexico. Whether or not LIRING ever seeks to
the services of LIRING-3, the maintainence of his contact with
ALEZ might lead the FAR to utilize LIRING-3 in some support capacity
exico City. Such an opportunity could provide WOFIRM with a valuable
ght in a difficult and worthwhile target.

Leonard S. TORMET

[illegible]

[illegible] PATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
of Station, Guatemala City

SUBJECT
LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

R ence: HMMA-36114, 27 December 1968

. The "Humberto GONZALEZ Vega" mentioned in reference is probably
i ical with Angel Humberto GONZALEZ Vega. The only Station trace on
t atter individual was forwarded with HGG-3098, 14 June 1963, from a
s of undetermined reliability. In this report GONZALEZ was listed
active in the peace movement of the Guatemalan Communist Party
(. GONZALEZ's date of birth was given as 2 October 1927. Biographic
d and a photo of GONZALEZ have been requested from liaison and will be
fo rded to addressees when received.

. According to Station information, Gustavo COLINDRES Barrios was
a ted on 3 July 1967 by the Guatemalan authorities. He was described
a is time as a member of "the supply network of the Rebel Armed Forces
(". Although no further information is available in Station files,
C DRES was apparently consigned and sent to El Pavon.

. In reference to the names mentioned to LIRING-3 by GONZALEZ
(" doval Alegria, Jorge Torron and Avecillas"), Guatemala City feels
t probably refer to Hector SANDOVAL Alegria, Jose Samuel TORON
R os, and Ricardo Ismael VALLECILLOS Perez. All of these individuals
w reportedly arrested by the Mexican authorities in May 1968 for an
a [illegible]. (MEXICO CITY 55[illegible], 17 May 1968). In addition, it is
l y that the "[illegible]" mentioned later by GONZALEZ is identical with
I Roberto [illegible] Sanchez, a Guatemalan Rightist who was also reportedly
a ted with SANDOVAL, TORON, and VALLECILLOS.

(continued....)

[illegible]:
- [illegible], Mexico City
- Chief, WHD
- Files

JAN 15 1969

[illegible]UMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HGGA - 9721
DATE
14 January 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
HQS FILE NUMBER
201-[illegible]301

SECRET

[illegible] NOT TO BE RELEASED OUTSIDE OF [illegible]
[illegible] CHARGED WITH THIS FOLDER
NOTIFY CI/OA/STAFF IMMEDIATELY IF IT IS
[illegible]

i. Guatemala City agrees that GONZALEZ is apparently the FAR contact
olished for LIRING-3 in Mexico. Whether or not LIRING ever seeks to
the services of LIRING-3, the maintainence of his contact with
ALEZ might lead the FAR to utilize LIRING-3 in some support capacity
exico City. Such an opportunity could provide WOFIRM with a valuable
ght in a difficult and worthwhile target.

Leonard S. TORMET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

FROM:

RID/

WERDEN, PHILENA
RID/AN
~~EXT. 4239~~

DV-152
GA-50
~~TUBE GT-7~~

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

201-Copy Detached

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/1		3 MAR 1969		
2. CC				
3.				
4. Kravcov				K
5.				
6.				
7.				
8. C/WH/C/		Krav 27 1969		K
9. ENNIS			7 Apr	
10. WH/1		8 Aug 8		
11. Kravcov				K
12. RID/AN		16		VB
13. WH/1				
14. RID/AN		17 1969		
15. RID/ED1				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

PROCESSING SUSPENDED
by RID for [illegible] reason
☐ [illegible]
☐ [illegible] orig. indexing
[illegible] pending file
☑ Project subject
☐ [illegible] [illegible] or [illegible] clarification

Route to RID/AN, 2A GA-50
for final processing.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

✓ ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
[redacted]

~~REFERRED~~

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
11 Feb 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HMMA 36408

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X No index
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-36184, 17 January 1969

1. Forwarded attached are the two last contact reports written by Wallace B. ROWTON on LIRING-3 before ROWTON's departure on TDY in late January 1969. These reports are dated 15 and 22 January. Also forwarded is another report by ROWTON, dated 28 November 1968, which the Station somehow failed to forward.

2. That LIRING has forwarded information to the Mexican Communist Party casting suspicion on LIRING-3's past activities did not come as a great shock. Heraclio ZEPEDA is known to the Station as a previous teacher at the University of Jalapa who said in 1960 that he would accept a teaching position in PBRUMEN, a country he has visited on several occasions at the invitation of its government. ZEPEDA also spent some time

Continued....................

Attachments:
1. Reports (3), h/w
2. Identity Sheet, u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy att 1; 3 copies att 2)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy att 1; 2 copies att 2)

AT U/S
IS X
FI

s/c att: 1
h/w att: 1

CS COPY

~~DEFERRED~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 36408

DATE
11 February 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-778301 [redacted]

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 36408

in 1965 in the U.S.S.R., where he was described as Foreign Correspondent of La Voz de Mexico, an official organ of the Mexican Communist Party (see HMMA-27727, 24 November 1965). ZEPEDA apparently also visited Communist China. He appears to be well acquainted with LIRING-9. In view of the above, the Station instructed ROWTON to ask LIRING-3 to refrain from attempting to use ZEPEDA to obtain a "bootleg" copy of the LIRING letter to the Mexican Communist Party. The Station feels a copy of this letter would add little to the known fact that LIRING-3 is a person that LIRING continues to view as "suspect." LIONHEART has been asked for up-to-date information on ZEPEDA's Party position. Any information passed by LIONHEART will be forwarded to Headquarters.

Raymond A. Frazer

for Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

SECRET

Attachment #1
HMMA-36408

28 November,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting with LIRING/9.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 0915 on 27/11/68 that he had met with LIRING/9 at the LIRING establishment from about 1745 until 1900 on 26/11/68. He stated that he gave LIRING/9 his written report on his recent experiences in Guatemala and the conclusions he drew from talking with FAR members there. L/3 also stated that he did his best to assure L/9 that, although he sympathized with the laments of the León Barrios brothers, he was really on the PBRUMEN side and offered to do all he could to assist the LIRINGs in their attempts to assist the revolutionary forces. The following is Rowton's reconstruction of the conversation, based on LIRING/3's report:

L/3: "I'm sorry to be late, but I had to finish the report."

L/9: "Alright. I've been waiting here at the gate so there wouldn't be any further delay. Let's go to my office so we can talk privately."

Upon entering office, L/9 removes jacket and offers L/3 a seat in the office.

L/3: "Well, here's my report. I must apologize that it's in rough draft form. I had to write it rather hurriedly when my wife was not around. It's really just a series of badly organized thoughts and ideas but I'll be glad to explain. There's a great deal more, of course, that I could explain on the subject. Do you wish me to read it?"

L/9: "No, that's alright.

L/9 glances through the report and continues:

"I'll read it carefully later. I really didn't expect such a long report. I appreciate it. In the meantime, how are you doing in your personal affairs?"

L/3: "Well, as I told you last time, I'm very much up in the air at the moment. My exposition has started but is not going as well as can be expected - as well as I had hoped. You know, these things have their up's and down's. I'll sell some things, at least to cover my current expenses, but I'll really have to get better organized financially in the near future. The first problem that I'm really worried about is my wife, and I frankly feel that I must appeal to you for help.

L/9: "Of course. Well, what is the problem?"

L/3: "As you know, some time ago my wife and I had a series of unpleasant situations that almost led to a separation.."

L/9: "Is that right! Was it that serious?" "anything political?"

L/3: " No, absolutely not. It was purely a domestic misunderstanding. Now I feel that I must be very frank with you. I was probably responsible

Encl att. 1
HMMA-36408

CS COPY SECRET

[redacted]

Att #1 10000-36408

because of an affair I had with ~~the~~ Carmen, - you know, the daughter of the doctor we just said hello to as we came in, the one talking with LIRING/2. "

L/9: "Is that so? I had no idea!"

L/3: "Well I assumed you knew, since Carmen's father is a close friend of your Chief. In any case, it's over now, and I don't expect any trouble from that quarter. However, I feel that I should explain that I have an obligation to my wife for all that she did not me while I was in jail with no help from anyone, as you well know."

L/9: "Yes, it was difficult for her."

L/3: "You see, my wife is a sincere revolutionary, but she really doesn't want any part of the activity that a revolution demands. She's like so many others, including my former cell-mate and his famous uncle, who talk a great revolution, but fall apart when the chips are down."

L/9: "Yes, we know plenty of those types."

L/3: "Well, anyway, my wife wouldn't approve of my reinvolvement and keeps pressing me to take a "respectable" job which she knows I could obtain through my friends. What I really wnat to do is to somehow calm her down and arrange things so that she won't have any idea of my political plans. As you know her father is very ill in New York, and she is anxious to see him before he dies. I can arrange an exposition in Montreal and then ask the father to come up to see us there. That would get around the problem of a U.S. visa, which I'm sure neither of us could get."

L/9: "No. I'm sure you couldn't."

L/3: "The only problem is transportation. Air passage is too expensive and unfortunately there are no boats going from here. They all stop at New York. Don't you have regular ship traffic to Montreal, so that we could go that way?"

L/9: "Yes we do. I'm sure that could be arranged. I see no problem."

L/3: " We could then kill two birds with one stone, by stopping off at the PBRUMEN capital enroute."

L/9: " Yes, there's really no problem."

L/3: "I hope you understand my problem. I'm in a very serious way financially at the moment, and couldn't possibly solve this problem myself without your help."

L/9: "Well, how are you doing otherwide - I mean in meeting living expenmses?"

L/3: "Just getting by. You know we live on a very modest - day to day basis.

Att#1 HMMA-36408

29 November, 1968

"The exposition is not going as well as I expected. But the problem I'm really concerned about is that of my wife."

L/9: "Let her go to PBRUMEN."

L/3: "What do you mean? I don't understand."

L/9: "Well, I mean with you, when you go."

L/3: "Oh, yes, I see. Of course. She can see her relatives and there won't be a problem. You know my wife was getting pretty desperate about seeing ~~L/9XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ her father and she even talked of going to the Northamerican Ambassy for a visa so that she could go to New York. Imagine that! I told it would be no use - just a waste of time since she woiulnd get the visa."

L/9: "For heaven's sake, tell her not to go! That would create no end of interrogations in the PBRUMEN capital. Calm her down by all means.

L/3: "Getting back to my report, as I said, many points can be expanded."

L/9: "Yes. Let's meet again on, say, Monday, at a time convenient for you."

L/3: "You know I have plenty of time now. I'm up in the air, as I said, not doing much - just the exposition. On the other hand you're a busy man. You set the time."

L/9: " I think about 1000 would be good. Is that okay with you?"

L/3: " Yes. I'll be back."

L/9: "I'm gald you covered the important point as to what the FAR thinks of us. This is very important to us. Also you say that you expect a contact with one of them here?"

L/3: "Yes, with a certain 'Pavel' but I don't know when. I am in contact as you can see. They have been writing me more or less regularly since my departure." (L/3 takes two letters from pocket and shows them, but L/9 makes no move to take them or read contents.)

L/9: "Well, I'll be waiting for you at 1000 on Monday."

2. LIRING/3 told Rowton at a subsequent meeting (1100,28/11/68) that when he returned home the previous evening, he found to his surprise a note slipped under the door from LIRING/9 asking him not to forget to come by at 1000 on Monday, 2 December, 1968.

W B Rowton

SECRET Att #1 HMMA-36408

13 January 1969

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Activities for the Period 7-13 January, 1969.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/3 at the Camino Real Restaurant at 1000 on 10 and 13 January. He reported the following developments in connection with the accusations made against him to Marta Barrios de León by Identity A

(a) On the evening of 8 January, 1969, Identity B called on him at his home unannounced and made an effort to smooth over the hard feelings that had arisen between LIRING/3 and her husband. She denied any knowledge of charges made by her husband against L/3 and claimed that she could not believe them in any case. When L/3 stated that he had definite proof in the form of a letter Identity B insisted on seeing it. L/3 (who had given the original letter to Rowton) stalled promising to produce the letter on 10 January in the presence of her husband. L/3 told Rowton that when he attempted to contact Iden B and her husband by phone on the morning of 10 January, he found the phone constantly busy and suspects that the receiver was left purposely off the hook.

(b) On the evening of 12 January, 1969, Arturo Serrano of the CPM, visited LIRING/3 at his home and told him that the Central Committee of the CPM had discussed his feud with Identity A, in response to the letter LIRING/3 had sent to it alleging that Iden A was maligning him unjustly. Serrano continued that the CC of the CPM had found the letter too vague to make any sense, but in any case could not take Iden A seriously. Serrano told L/3 that Iden A and Identity B had been recently formally expelled from the party for ideological reasons, but still had a number of friends willing to vouch for them. On the other hand Serrano stated that the CC of the CPM had received information "some time ago" from the LIRING office alleging that LIRING/3 had been acting in a suspicious manner, especially with regard to certain information he had provided concerning Julián López that "could not have come from a source other than the police." Serrano continued that although the CPM had no love for the LIRING office it nevertheless had to take such a report into consideration and the burden of proof was really on LIRING/3.

SECRET

SECRET

Att #1 HMMA-36405

22 January, 1969

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Address of Guatemalan Refugees in Mexico City.

1. At 1000 on 21/1/69 LIRING/3 told Rowton that his old Guatemalan friend Jacobo Rodriguez Padilla was residing at Calle Veracruz 14, apartment, and that the Carlos Vega, whom Jacobo had sent to LIRING/3's home with a note asking L/3 to help Vega, was living in the azotea (servant's) room belonging to Jacobo's apartment.

2. L/3 also reported that Carlos Vega again called on him unannounced at his apartment on 20 January, and asked him to arrange through his PBRUMEN friends to send a package of medicine to a son of Turcios who was living in the PBRUMEN capital. Vega also asked L/3 to send two "very important" letters to PBRUMEN through friends who could bypass the usual censorship. L/3 promised to do what he could and asked Vega to deliver the letters tohim on 25 January.

3. Because of the obvious possibility of provocation in this rather unexplained behavior of Carlos Vega (he originally told L/3 that he was a close friend of Identity A), Rowton agreed with L/3 that no attempt should be made to open the letters and that they should be delivered promptly to the LIRING office for whatever disposition that establishment might wnat to make of the letters. L/3 promised to note carefully the addressees of the letters.

4. Rowton told L/3 that he would have to leave town for a visit to Monterrey and was not certain when he would be able to finish his business there. He made at date, however, for 1000, 3 February, at the Camino Real restaurant, and asked L/3 to return to the same place at 1000 on 7 February in the event that Rowton did not appear at the first time and date.

Wallace B. Rowton

SECRET

201-778301

Att #1 HMMA-36408

Serrano, as a friend, advised L/3 to "take the bull by the horns" and send as much data as possible to defend himself to all "important progressive" organizations. He volunteered to pass a copy of the letter from Marta Barrios to the CPM and L/3's version of the arrest and detention as soon as he had prepared it.

2. In response to Rowton's query as to any other friends L/3 might have in the CPM who might be able to obtain a copy of the original letter from the LIRING Office, LIRING/3 recalled that an old acquaintance from Chiapas, Heraclio Zepeda, had recently invited him to dinner and appeared anxious to re-establish contact with him. L/3 told Rowton that he had known Zepeda in the PBRUMEN capital some six years previously and recalled that Zepeda had traveled and studied in Communist China and the Soviet Union before returing to Mexico. Zepeda recently told L/3 that he was employed in CONASUPO and that he had written several articles favorable to L/3 in "Renovación" a daily newspaper he controlled in Tuxla-Gutierrez, Chiapas. L/3 told Rowton that he later learned thatthe newspaper was actually owned by Hank González, general director of CONASUPO, who apparently had political ambitions.

TR 8025 2

3. Rowton suggested that L/3 get in touch with Zepeda not only to determine why he had recontacted L/3 after so long a time, but to ascertain his current relationship with the CPM and the LIRING office, if any.

4. LIRING/3 stated that he had not been recontacted by "Rómulo" and promised to advise Rowton in advance of a future meeting so that Rowton could cover it in the hope of getting a good look at the FAR representative.

WRL
Wallace B Rowton

SECRET

Attachment #2
HMMA-36408

Identity Sheet

Identity A: Carlos PERZABAL

Identity B: Teresa LOZADA de PERZABAL

SECRET

s/c att: 1
HMMA - 36408

CS COPY

201 - 798301
[redacted]

☐ CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: DKS PER

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

508

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29

174

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE VR. RI/AN. CI/OPS WH2. FI2 IW. CAS, CA/PROP.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 280045Z JUN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 2826
MECI

PANAMA CITY, INFO DIRECTOR 28 JUN 69 IN 91228

PBRUMEN

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 8498 IN 85341
B. MEXICO CITY 2744 IN 88360
C. PANAMA CITY 2510 IN 86266

MICROFILMED
JUL 17 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. LIRING-3 (IDENTITY) REPORTED 27 JUNE THAT HAD TALKED WITH LELIS AMADEO (RODRIGUEZ) ANGULO (201-306789) 25 JUNE. IN CONNECTION LIRING-3 EFFORT GET RODRIGUEZ WORK AT CIDOC, LIRING-3 ABLE QUESTION RODRIGUEZ ON PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION AND SURFACE REQUIREMENTS LEVIED REF C.

2. RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING-3 VANGUARDIA DE ACCION NACIONAL (VAN) IMPORTANT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION WITH POLITICAL LINE PARALLEL TO PANAMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. RODRIGUEZ STATED VAN ONLY PANAMANIAN PARTY "VIEWED WITH FAVOR" BY CUBANS. RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING-3 CHIEF OF VAN IS JORGE TURNER (201-48393), WHO RECENTLY ARRIVED MEXICO CITY AFTER RELEASE FROM PRISON. RODRIGUEZ STATED TURNER HERE TO CONFER WITH CUBANS IN ATTEMPT GET CUBAN ASSISTANCE FOR VAN.

3. RODRIGUEZ STATED HE TRYING FIND TURNER PLACE TO STAY AND ASKED LIRING-3 IF HE COULD PUT UP TURNER FOR FEW DAYS. RODRIGUEZ TO

15 PW
13 X
15 X
11 4
WH/1

B201-3373
B201-48393
B201-306789

CS COPY
SECRET

201-798301
28 JUN 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ____ JUL 10 AT 3 55 PM '63 Z

DISSEM BY ____ RECEIVED PER ____

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0826 SECRET

INTRODUCE LIRING-3 TO TURNER 28 JUNE.

4. ACCORDING RODRIGUEZ, THELMA KING (201-003373) IS PANAMANIAN WITH STRONG NATIONALIST POLITICAL ORIENTATION. HE STATED KING NOT MEMBER OF COMMUNISTS PARTY BUT HAD WIDE CONTACTS AMONG VARIOUS LEFTIST GROUPS. HE ALSO STATED KING IN TOUCH WITH NORTHAMERICANS, WHO HAVE APPARENTLY HELPED IN TAKING CARE HER DAUGHTER WHO SICK WITH LEUKEMIA. RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING-3 CUBANS DO NOT TRUST KING AND HAVE ASKED PANAMANIAN EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS BE CAREFUL IN DEALINGS WITH HER. HOWEVER, RODRIGUEZ STATED PANAMANIAN LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS FEEL KING USEFUL TO CERTAIN POINT, ALTHOUGH MANY MEMBERS FELL SHE "PLAYING BOTH SIDES".

5. RODRIGUEZ STATED HE NOT MEMBER ANY ORGANIZATION, ALTHOUGH HE FORMERLY IN PANAMANIAN CP. HE STATED HE AUTHORIZED BY "VARIOUS EXTREMISTS GROUPS" GO COSTA RICA AND ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH PANAMANIAN REFUGEE GROUPS THERE. RODRIGUEZ STATED "FACTION" MEXICAN POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY (PPS) HAD ALREADY SET UP CONTACT FOR HIM IN COSTA RICA TO ENABLE HIM OBTAIN ARMS THERE FOR SHIPMENT PANAMA.

6. LIRING-3 INSTURCTED ALLOW TURNER STAY WITH HIM, IF TURNER AGREEABLE, AND TO USE OPPORTUNITY ATTEMPT LEARN PROGRESS TURNER'S TALKS WITH CUBANS. LIRING-3 WILL ALSO ATTEMPT LEARN WHO IN PPS IN CONTACT WITH RODRIGUEZ

SECRET

14-00000

☐ CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY: ____ PER ____

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR,

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 0806 SECRET

7. DEFER TO ADDRESSEES ANY FORMAL DISSEM ABOVE INFORMATION. LIRING-3 CONSIDERED UNTESTED SOURCE, WHO KNOWN BE IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS LEFTIST AND REVOLUTIONARY FIGURES.

8. REQUEST ANY REQUIREMENTS ADDRESSEES MAY HAVE FOR LIRING-3 USE IN CONVERSATIONS WITH TURNER.

9. NO INDEX. FILE: 50-322-1. CROSS REF TO 201'S INDICATED.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: DKB PER ______ #

ACTION: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

507

SIFIED MESSAGE 20 TOTAL COPIES 24

40 SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE VR. R/AN. Ci/ClOps. Ci/IC2. FI2. IW.

CAS: CA/PROP

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 280046Z JUN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 2807

MEXI

PANAMA CITY, INFO DIRECTOR

28 JUN 69 IN 91233

PBRUMEN

REF MEXICO CITY 0806 [IN 91228]

1. IDENTITY: CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR - MEXICAN ARTIST AND POLITICAL ANARCHIST WHO IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS OFFICIALS CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY. HE ALSO IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN LEFTISTS, INCLUDING MEBERS OF THE REBEL ARMED FORCES (FAR) OF GUATEMALA.

2. NO INDEX. FILE 56-300-1.

S E C R E T

AB	PW
AB	X
~~X~~	
PS	
BX	4
D/S	N/D
~~X~~	
WH/1	

MICROFILMED
JUL 17 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B 201-3373
B 201-48393
B 201-306789

CS COPY

SECRET

201-798301
28 JUN 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 33

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY 1/2

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ✓ PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, FI2, ADDP, DDP, CS/DO, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, SODC, CS/SGO,

ACTION NO. 563

S E C R E T 192233Z JUN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 2690 (Mexi)

HZP PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY HGG

REF A. MEXICO CITY 2389 (IN 67732)

B. PANAMA CITY 0258 (IN 68597)

C. HZPA 17529

19 JUN 69 IN 85321

JP

1. ON 16 JUNE LIRING-3 IDENTIFIED PHOTO OF LELIS AMADEO (RODRIGUEZ) ANGULO (201-306789) FORWARDED REF C AS AMADEO RODRIGUEZ KNOWN TO HIM.

2. LIRING-3 CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING ARRANGE FOR RODRIGUEZ GET FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM CENTRO INTERCULTURAL DE DOCUMENTACION (CIDOC), HEADED BY FATHER IVAN ILLICH (201-327833) AND LOCATED CUERNAVACA, MEXICO. LIRING-3 SPOKE WITH PERSONAL FRIEND CARMEN (201-143911) MOLINA, LEFTIST WHO WORKS CIDOC, AND MOLINA PROMISED ATTEMPT HELP RODRIGUEZ. LIRING-3 FOLLOWED SUGGESTION WALLACE P. ROWTON AND TOLD RODRIGUEZ PREPARE DETAILED PAPER ON REVOLUTIONAY SITUATION PANAMA, FOR WHICH HE COULD BE PAID BY CIDOC. (RODRIGUEZ CLAIMS NEEDS MONEY TO TRAVEL COSTA RICA.) RODRIGUEZ TO DATE NOT KNOWN TO HAVE MADE ANY OTHER FRUITFUL CONTACTS AMONG LOCAL REVOLUTIONARIES.

XCP sex: F

AN	
AB	X
IH	X
PS	
BK	3
DF	
FI	
WH/1	

3. LIRING-3 PREPARED ASK RODRIGUEZ QUESTIONS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION PANAMA, BASED RODRIGUEZ' PAPER. REQUEST ANY REQUIREMENTS AND

MICROFILMED
AUG 14 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

CS COPY

8 201-306789

19 June 69
201-798301

JUN 25 6 37 AM '69

JUN 24 9 26 AM 69

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2690 S E C R E T

GUIDANCE PANAMA CITY MAY HAVE TO BE PASSED LIRING-3 FOR USE IN CONVERSATIONS WITH RODRIGUEZ.

RID/EDI

3. INDEX MOLINA. FILE: 56-4-100. CROSS REF TO 201'S INDICATED.

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

7F SECRET

MEXICO CITY
ACTION WH/SA 8
INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH 7, CI/IPS, CI/IC 2

☐ ☐ ☐

S
E C R E T 032130Z
DIR CITE MEXI 2126
TYPIC LICRAFT
REF DIR 75551

8 JAN 65 IN 56516

1. FOLLOWING FROM LICRAFT-1: JOAQUIN MIRABAL IS NOT BROTHER OF FORMER CONSUL MEXI, HAS ONLY ONE SIBLING, SISTER. OFFICIAL TITLE IS DELEGADO DEL MINISTRO DEL INTERIOR EN LA PROVINCIA DE LA HABANA. HAS AUTHORITY REPRESENT RAMIRO VALDES, ENTER ANY SECURITY OFFICE IN HABANA PROVINCE, ISSUE ORDERS UNDER VALDES AUTHORITY. WEARS ARMY CAPTAINS UNIFORM AND INSIGNIA. IN 1961 WAS SECOND IN COMMAND OF G-2 HQS AT QUINTA AVENIDA AND CALLE 14. MAN IN COMMAND THEN IS NOW POLICE CHIEF HABANA.

Alfredo MIRABAL DIAZ

2. MIRABAL CLOSE FIREND VALDES SINCE LONG BEFORE CASTRO TAKEOVER. IS FROM HABANA. MOTHER REPORTED TO BE OLD TIME COMMUNIST. FAMILY HOME WAS ON CALLE GOSS, VIBORA, HABANA. IS ABOUT 35 YEARS OLD. LICRAFT FIRST MET IN 1957 AT WHICH TIME MIRABAL WAS CUSTOMS AGENT IN HABANA WORKING FOR UNCLE ALSO NAMED MIRABAL. FIRM HAD SEARS ROEBUCK ACCOUNT, MAY HAVE HAD WOOLWORTH ACCOUNT. MIRABAL ADMITTED TO LICRAFT THT HE WAS MAKING LOTS OF MONEY SMUGGLING LIQUOR. PRIOR TO 57 HAD HAD A FLING AS POPULAR SINGER, HAS VERY GOOD VOICE. WAS VERY FRIENDLY WITH GUSTAVO

SECRET

IN 56516 Pg 2

CIS WHO IS NOW WELL KNOWN CUBAN CHOREOGRAPHER. MANY OF [illegible] ASSOCIATES THIS PERIOD WERE SUSPECT HOMOSEXUALS. ONCE MIRABAL [illegible] LICRAFT TO VISIT BAR JUST ESTABLISHED BY ROIG. LICRAFT WALKED OUT WHEN APPARENT PLACE WAS HOMOSEXUAL HANGOUT.

3. AFTER CASTRO TAKEOVER MIRABAL WAS ASSIGNED AS CUSTOMS OFFICIAL HABANA PORT, LATER WAS ASSIGNED TO AIRPORT. WAS IN SECURITY WORK AT LEAST BY 1960, PERHAPS EARLIER. VERY CLOSE FRIEND OF LABOR MINISTER MINISTER MARTINEZ SANCHEZ. WIFE WORKED FOR MARTINEZ SANCHEZ.

4. " CHICAGO" INFORMANT OF LICRAFT IS MRS. ALBERT RECIO, [illegible] WELL STREET, GARY, INDIANA, PHONE 938-5355. SHE IS SISTER OF MIRABAL WIFE. DISLIKES MIRABAL INTENSELY BUT DOES NOT WISH ANY HARM TO COME TO HER SISTER. WOULD BE COOPERATIVE IF APPROACHED AFTER ALERTING PHONE CALL FROM LICRAFT. NEW YORK INFORMANT IS VENITA GARCIA [illegible], FRIEND OF MRS. RECIO AND OF LICRAFT, USED TO HAVE SENORA [illegible] THAT USED BY LICRAFT. LICRAFT WILL OBTAIN HER PRESENT ADDRESS.

05,08

08

05

05

05

5. SUGGEST HQS ARRANGE TO INTERVIEW MRS. RECIO BUT NOT BEFORE LICRAFT PHONES HER. PLS CABLE NAME TO BE USED BY INTERVIEWING OFFICER.

6. LICRAFT WILL PREPARE STUDY ON MIRABAL. PLS CABLE SPECIFIC POINTS WISH COVERED.

SECRET

5/BR

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 4 Feb 1954

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS

NO. HCSA-825

DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. WH	Quarters Eye	15 FEB 1954	15 FEB 1954	EB	[illegible]
2. Bri		15 Feb 54		fo	COPY DETACHED - logged
3. Ungprod		15 FEB 1954	15 FEB 1954	mje	
4. Rozycki		FEB 1954 15	FEB 1954	pr	
5. Killough			17 FEB	DKG	Copy detached
6. Holman		FEB 1954			
7. Admin/~~Lynch~~ Newton		23 Feb	24		
8. [illegible]					
9. CWH				jck	
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. RI/FI JUN 8 1967	1409 L				

FI

ABS ✗

201-088764

15	6	3	950
ABSTRACT	✗	INDEX	

DATE 10 FEB 1954

201-088764

FORM NO. 51-10 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED
1 NOV 53

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL 16-61136-3 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE UNCLASSIFIED
(40)

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HCSA-825

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 4 February 1954

FROM : Chief of Mission, Santiago

SUBJECT: GENERAL— KUGOWN Operational

SPECIFIC— Termination of Paul D. LANGEVIN

REF: SAGO 903 dated 10 October 1953

1. Attached are a) statement of termination signed by subject and b) agent's service record. Submission of these items has been delayed pending receipt of Field Instruction 236-1. Since this instruction has not been received we are submitting the enclosures to close the record on this case. He was!

2. Paul D. LANGEVIN may be used for recruiting tasks before his permanent departure from Chile in April 1954. His security is not questioned and he has expressed a willingness to perform such tasks.

3. He also requests arrangements for the payment of income tax on his earnings during 1953. This matter will be handled by cable in view of time element.

4. The following explains the timing of LANGEVIN's termination: he had been advised that he would be terminated one month after all advances had been liquidated. This would have been 30 September 1953. This date was also chosen since it was expected that COKENIUS would take over FURIOSO "C" at about that time. COKENIUS did take over the project early in October. However, LANGEVIN did no work during the month of September for which he would be entitled to payment, although he presumably was available for duty. The last payment of $357.44 for the period 1 through 31 August 1953 was in addition to the liquidation of his advances although it did not cover a full month from the date of such liquidation which must have occurred sometime in August. LANGEVIN accepted this as the lst payment coming to him so there did not seem to be any point in forcing another $500 on him for a period during which he did no work.

James O. Collett
James O. Collett

Attachments:
2 as ~~st~~ated.
2 ATTS

2 ENCL

JOC/ejr
2 February 1954

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

CLASSIFICATION

201-088764

RI COPY

14-00000

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. AGENT CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM Paul D. Langevin (FULMINATOR-1)

2. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION "FURIOSO "C" (PBGROVEL)

3. AGENT RECRUITED BY Jerome C. Dunbar DATE about August 1950 (Contract signed 25 January 1952) ALL OF 52 MOST OF 53

4. CAPACITY IN WHICH AGENT SERVED Contract agent

5. RATE OF PAY $500 per month

6. OTHER COMMITMENTS See contract dated 25 January 1952

7. AGENT DISMISSED BY James G. Collett DATE 31 August 1953

8. REASON FOR DISMISSAL Loan to subject liquidated. No further need for him since FURIOSO "C" taken over by Martin J. CORMNIUS

9. SECURITY RISKS Agent knows various present and past staff officers. Had some headquarters training. Loyalty unquestioned.

10. IS THE AGENT RECOMMENDED FOR REUSE Only in special circumstances for minor tasks such as cutout work or recruiting.

11. MANNER OF DISMISSAL Agent advised at least sixty days in advance that his services would be terminated as soon as financial obligation to KUBARK liquidated.

12. LETTER OF TERMINATION SIGNED Yes

AN	FI
PS	

MIDDLE ICLAEL SCRIPT. [illegible]

(P)

SECRET

ATT #1 TO HCSA 825

201-022769

1 October 1953

1. The undersigned hereby acknowledges receipt of US$357.44 payed to his bank account during September 1953 and agrees that with this payment all financial obligations to him under his contract dated 25 June 1952 have been liquidated.

2. The undersigned further acknowledges that information of a security nature received by reason of his association with the organization shall never be revealed to unauthorised persons under any circumstances.

0

ATT #2 TO HCSA 825

HCSA 825
Encl 2
201-088764

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 4 FEB 54

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTIAGO

ACTION: WH 4

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

SAGO 008 (IN 15654) 21362 4 FEB 54 ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR CITE: SSAGO

RE: DIR 36856 (OUT 68009)

PSYCH

1. LANGEVIN IN SAGO. DEPARTING WITH FAMILY FOR NEW YORK VIA EUROPE ON 16 APRIL 54. TENTATIVELY PLANS TO RESIDE IN LOS ANGELES.

2. LANGEVIN CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN RECRUITING TASK AS EXPLAINED IN HCSA 526 DATED 4 FEBRUARY. WE PREFER THIS TASK NOT BE INTERRUPTED FOR TWO MONTHS. FURTHERMORE THIS TASK MIGHT BLOW HIM FOR USE ELSEWHERE.

END OF MESSAGE

3	FI	
3	~~RI~~	
~~ABSTRACT~~ X	~~INDEX~~	

201-088764

1	6	3	961
ABSTRACT	✓	INDEX	1
ENCL.			
DATE 17 FEB 1954			

CS COPY

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE. Copy No. 4 February 1954

201-088764

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : J.W. [illegible]
UNIT : WH/BR.I
EXT : 3834
DATE : 3 FEBRUARY 1954

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : SR. REP. SANTIAGO
FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA
CONF: WH 4
INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 36856 (OUT 68009) 2050Z 3 FEB 54 ROUTINE PRECEDENCE

TO: SSAGO CITE: DIR

LANGEVIN

1. LANGEVIN BEING CONTEMPLATED TEMPORARY OPERATIONAL USE SPECIAL PROJECT OUTSIDE YOUR AREA.

2. MAKE EVERY EFFORT DETERMINE HIS WHEREABOUTS. INFORM HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

AS	FI	
~~PS~~	~~OBSP~~	
ABSTRACT X		

201-088764

ABSTRACT X	INDEX
DATE	FEB 1954 ✓

ENCL

J.C. King
J. C. KING
C/WH

CS COPY

RAFORD W. HERBERT
C/WH/BR.I

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

201-088764
3 FEBRUARY 1954

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

FORM NO 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 26965

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP SANTIAGO SAGO

ROUTINE

ACTION: WH 4

0400Z 17 OCT 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

SAGO 938

TO: DIR CITE: SSAGO

ADMIN [illegible] LANGEVIN

REF: DIR 23210 (OUT 94507)

1 0 LANGEVIN TERMINATED 31 AUGUST 53. DISPATCH EXPLAINING CHANGE FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

FI
~~DESK~~
~~FB~~
ABSTRACT X

201-088764

739

21 OCT 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

17 OCT 53
201-088764

SECRET 7f

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

MICROFILMED
JUN 17 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

XAAZ-15277

FROM:

TO: TCS/PRQ/5 WH/2

DATE: rc'd 10 March '50

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Dan NWC		MAR 1 0 1950		nwd	
2. Miss Clayfool			14 March	mje	CID checked 14 Mar. 50-3-12-5
3.					nonrecord archives 14 Mar.
4. RI/MIS					
5.					assigned Phantom I
6.					1-CS-A-967
7. [illegible]					
8. RI/PS					
9.					
10.					
11.					[illegible]
12. RI/FI/SP			mf		
13.					
14.					
15.					201-33432

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1949

SECRET

YAA2 15877

/PRO/ 5

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

MICROFILMED
JUN 17 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Instruction: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If que
not apply, write "not applicable"
3. Attach blank pages if additional sp

1. Full Name David Atlee Phillips
First Middle Last

2. Name in native script

3. Name at birth (if different from 1.) (not applicable)

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.) In the year 1942 the last name was dropped, for stage purposes-other actor in same show with same name- in N.Y.

5. a. Date of birth Oct. 31,1922 b. Place of birth Fort Worth, Texas

6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate U.S. White

7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.) (not applicable)

8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) Los Castanos 353, Viña del Mar, Chile Tenant

9. Permanent address (if different from 8.) 714 Neil P. Anderson Bldg. Fort Worth, Texas

10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.) Publisher and editor of The South Pacific Mail. No salary

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate granted.)

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship) Venan Allessandroni, friend, 60 E. 42 St. New York
Employees (see question 17). Others too numerous to mention.

201-88764

~~201-33432~~

13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

Edwin Thomas Phillips, lawyer, deceased, born [illegible], Texas about 1890, U.S. citizen, no other nationalities. Last residence in Fort Worth, Texas.

14. Mother - same information as 13.
Mary Louise Young Phillips, executive, deceased, born in Temple Texas about 1892. U.S. citizen, no other nationalities. Last residence in Fort Worth, Texas.

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.) Helen Haasch Phillips, Helen Florence Haasch, born March 25, 1919 in (?) Wisconsin, married June 5, 1949 in Fort Worth, Texas, U.S. citizen only, present address: Los Castanos 333, Vina del Mar, Chile. Previously married to Lt. Com. John [illegible]illey, U.S.N. and divorced 1945. (This date may not be absolutely correct.) Subject was previously married to Joan Hildebrandt, Bloomington, Ill. and divorced in September 1943.

CIT U.S.A.

NEE H

WIFE OF DAVID ATLEE Phillips (201-88764)

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Maria Louise Phillips, female, born August 9, 1949 in Santiago, Chile. Chilean citizen at birth but registration at American Consulate in Chile will give her dual citizenship. Los Castanos 333, Vina del Mar, Chile.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Edwin Thomas Phillips, Jr. male, born about 1917 in Fort Worth Texas, U. S. citizen domiciled at Neil P. Anderson Bldg. Fort Worth, Texas.
James Young Phillips, male, born about 1918, Fort Worth, Texas 4804 Washburn, Fort Worth. U.S. citizen.
James Olcott Phillips, male born about 1920 in Fort Worth, Texas U.S. citizen, address 714 Neil P. Anderson Bldg. Fort Worth.

~~201 33433~~

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

(not applicable)

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity. Carnet of Identity for Foreigners, No. 3013727 issued in Chile. Valid indefinitely. Other papers drivers license, birth certificate, army discharge, etc. but they are not with me at the time this questionaire is being filled out.

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

Protestant (Episcopalian). Moderate practive. No religious orders.

21. Present and past political affiliations

Support Democratic Party in principle but have no special interests or affiliations.

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited. In 1943 and 1945 traveled through Africa, Italy, Yugoslavia, Germany, France, etc. but always because of military service. Also traveled extensively in Mexico in 1947 as a tourist.

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va. drama and English, no degree, in the year 1940.

Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas, English major, no degree in the year 1941.

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language Spanish Speak Good Read Good Understand Good

Language French Speak Poor Read Good Understand Fair

Language German Speak Poor Read Poor Understand Fair

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war. Entered U.S. Air Force in Feb. 1943 served in N. Africa, Italy with the 453th Bomb Group. Staff Sergeant, armorer-gunner on B-24, Air medal, Purple Heart. Discharged October 31, 1954 on points.
Prisoner of War, Captured b German troops in May 29, 1944 in Yugoslavia after parachuting from crashing plane. Taken to Stalag Inft. I.I in Poland. Later moved to Stammlager Inft. XIII near Nuremburg, Germany. Liberated by American forces about middle of April 1945. Returned to Camp Lucky Strike in France.

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.) Actor's Equity, Author's Guild, short membership in Kappa Sigma fraternity at William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va.

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)
athelétics, typing, photography, painting writing.

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property
Present business is new, a newspaper and there is no way to estimate what the profits will be. Bank account in Fort Worth National Bank, Fort Worth, Texas. Income of about $100 per month from real estate in Texas. Mostly from royal interest in oil producing land.

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.
actor, average salary $100 per week. (Employers include Camp Shows Inc. and Interstate Players, New York and Austin Texas respectively.) From 1941 through 1943. Various stock companies in New York and New England. (Most work done as a free lance writer, however.)

~~201 33432~~

29. (Continued)

30. **Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.** Yes, newspaper work generally and playwriting specifically. No plays published but one Teh Snow Job produced. Also written under contract for radio.

31. **List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.** No other persons living at same address. Close associates include the British and American diplomatic personnel in Santiago and Valparaiso, Chile Also newspaper man and various friends, many representatives of foreign concerns in this country.

32. **List five character references.**

Guy Price, vice President Fort Worth National Bank, Fort Worth
Gilson Blake, American Consul General in Valparaiso, Chile.
Venan Alessandroni, lawyer, 60 E. 42 St. New York, N.Y.
William [illegible]alden, President, Chamber of Commerce, Fort Worth
David E. Trammel, lawyer, Fort Worth National Bank Bldg. Fort Worth

[illegible]/PRQ/ 5.

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age	27	Posture	Good
Apparent age	30	Weight	185
Height	6 Feet	Teeth	Even, good condition
Eyes	Blue	Hair	Blond
Face - shape	Regular	Scars	Under left eye, very small
Complexion	Fair	Build	Stocky
Sex	Male		

General appearance Nondescript

Prominent features None

Other identifying features None

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

Came to Chile in 1948 to attend school. At this time, however, publishing and English language paper in Valparaiso, Chile.

(At the moment this questionnaire is being filled out, the subject is away from his home and office, without access to papers and documents. Consequently all answers may not be absolutely correct so far as dates are concerned.)

FILE NO 201-288764

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

440 CWT/DLD/DG

DATE 15 SEP 1959

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : C/WH 2

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

RI/FI (check one)

No CS Record Value - Destroy. ☐

RI file this copy as indicated ☑

Branch copy filed as indicated ☐

RI Indexing (check one)

Marked ☑ None required ☐

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 16 08 22 Z 1959

[illegible] SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 25737

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 2650

RYBAT

RE: DIR 41815 (OUT 90126)*

Re. Gustavo de los Reyes in connection with contacts with Michael M. Choaden

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/[illegible]	
DESTROY	

201-288764

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1958 O—465030

(35)

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: N.F.

NO. TCS-4-1741

DATE 28 Nov 1951

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Claypool		5 Dec 5		mic	4 Dec 51
2. McKellar		7 Dec			
3. Smyser					
4. Pierce					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					7 Feb. cable [illegible]

RECLASSIFIED
RI/AM ER
RI/MIS
RI/Files

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

16—61155-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

14-00000

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECURITY INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO TCS-A-1741

SECRET-[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 28 November 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, Santiago

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational Matters

SPECIFIC— ZACACTUS, Chile

REF: Sago-360

[illegible]
per [illegible]

1. Pursuant to the verbal statements of Dennis K. COPELAND at the Lima Conference of certain Station Chiefs, pertaining to ZACACTUS Operations in Chile, the following suggestions are advanced for Headquarters' consideration:

a) Cover for Chile, Official:

The Air Attache, Col. William ROSS, talked at length with General ACKERMAN, Assistant A-2, AFGS, while attending the Panama Service Attache Conference, on the question of providing a replacement for the Air Officer who had originally been scheduled for Santiago Air Attache Office to handle ZACACTUS. ROSS, who is a very intelligent, capable officer, with excellent intelligence experience, told ACKERMAN that he would appreciate being considered for this assignment in addition to his regular duties, as he was keenly interested in this type of endeavor. He was of the opinion that he could devote as large a share of his time to this work as would any other officer so assigned to his office. Furthermore, due to the size of his staff, three officers, he felt he could assign the bulk of his Air duties to his assistants and concentrate his efforts on ZACACTUS matters, which he thought were of greater importance in Chile. General ACKERMAN, according to ROSS, was not adverse to this proposal but stated he would await contact from ZACACTUS Headquarters before considering the matter further.

This Station has high regard for ROSS and is of the opinion that he would apply himself in a very diligent and intelligent manner to the duties of handling ZACACTUS in Chile. He is fully aware of the necessity for discretion, as he had been briefed on this at the time the former ZACACTUS candidate had been considered for the Air Attache Office.

b) Covert field cover:

RESTRICTED TO WH/1/Chile

This Station highly recommends Headquarters' consideration of FULMINATER-1 as the principal ZACACTUS operator in Chile on a permanent basis. This person is well known to this Station and has demonstrated his ability in handling FULMINATER-2 and the publication of the posters/stickers for the

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET-[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

Removed from Project Furioso-C
CS Classification: none
JCS # 63-364/38
Box: 22 [illegible]-55 76 C
~~201-334132~~

UN-ECOSOC propaganda effort. His assets are generally as follows:

1) Cover: He is publisher and editor of a fairly successful weekly newspaper in Chile. Although he is at the moment considering the possibility of selling this newspaper, he has been encouraged to defer such action for thirty days pending Headquarters' decision on his case. This paper has its own printing presses and is capable of handling large printing orders of all types. This activity could be regulated in such a manner that it would only require a minimum amount of FULMINATER-1's time and would provide him with an excellent cover for his ZACACTUS activities.

2) Ability: He is a writer, playwrite, publisher and editor. Those qualifications plus his initiative, imaginativeness, ingenuity and broad intellectual background should qualify him for ZACACTUS operations. He, of course, has an excellent command of Spanish as well as French and German.

3) Contacts: Due to his professional status in Chile, he is on excellent personal terms with all other newspaper publishers, correspondents and editors. He also conducts a radio program and is accordingly well informed in this field and has many radio contacts. In view of the fact he originally published his newspaper in Valparaiso, he has many contacts on the coast as well which should be important in this work.

4) Personality: He is considered exceptional both in appearance and personality and has easily acquired the confidence and friendship of Chileans and Americans alike. Due to his wide interests, he is considered very well informed and cultured. His demeanor is always that of a gentleman, yet he is capable of courageous action as evidenced by his war experience and his conduct of assignments for this Station as indicated below.

5) Intelligence experience: He was originally approved operationally to handle the complex Soviet espionage case of FULMINATER-2. His conduct of this case was considered excellent, and he displayed resourcefulness, tact and ability to handle himself in difficult circumstances.

During the LCACTING operations of this Station involving the printing of the posters, stickers, handbills and the "Communist Pig", this Station called on FULMINATER-1 to do the job. It will be recalled that Headquarters was very pleased with the printing job in this project which FULMINATER-1 had done. This particular project revealed FULMINATER-1's ability to handle ZACACTUS work effectively and with discretion as borne out by the fact that the local Communists were never able to trace the origin of this material.

c) Modus operandi:

1) Diplomatic cover: It is suggested that ROSS be designated as the control

201-88764 /

~~201-33432~~

officer for ZACACTUS in Chile and that he maintain the official files, funds and communications with ZACACTUS Headquarters.

2) ZACACTUS Field Operator: It is suggested that FULMINATER-1 be employed on a regular State-side salary basis and that he be authorized a small staff to assist him in the actual handling of all field projects. He should have one officer assistant in a covert capacity and two stenographers, all of whom would be in his overt cover office, presumably as his regular employees.

3) Cut-outs, agents, etc.: FULMINATER-1 should be authorized to develop such cut-outs, agents, etc. as required to carry out his objectives in Chile.

2. This Station is of the opinion that with the exception of possibly Mexico and Venezuela, Chile is one of the most important PW targets in Latin America. The Communist influence in Chile is unquestionably a serious political factor, and their propaganda is growing steadily throughout the country with extremely little if any opposition. The present Communist drive towards nationalization of the copper industry is gaining adherents daily and should be considered a potentially serious matter from the standpoint of our reliance on Chilean copper. Thus, it is the view of this Station that PW work is important in Chile and that its initiation on a larger scale should not be unduly delayed. It is also believed that considerable time, effort and money would be saved by utilizing the talent now in Chile, such as ROSS and FULMINATER-1, who already have their feet on the ground and are ready to start.

3. In the case of ROSS, if Headquarters is interested, it should approach General ACKERMAN direct in A-2. Regarding FULMINATER-1, a very tentative approach has been made to sound him out, and he reacted very favorably although no commitments were made as to salary or exact nature of the work. The moment for a decision in his case is very opportune, as he is planning to sell his newspaper and leave Chile for the United States or some other country. Recognizing the value his paper and presses would have to his cover and his work, he was asked, as mentioned above, to postpone selling his paper for thirty days. It is believed that he would be an excellent person for ZACACTUS in Chile and for future consideration as a Staff Officer. It is not believed that he would be interested in any salary less than $5,000 per year although again, this subject has not been discussed with him to date. It is urged, however, that Headquarters cable this Station as early as practicable if there is any interest in obtaining FULMINATER-1 as proposed above.

Jerome C. Dunbar

Dist: 3 Washington
2 Files
osm

201-88764
~~201-33432~~

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/201--E. Nickerson

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE: 20 Sept 63

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/[illegible]/Mr. Schaffer 3 B 4404		Initialed 10/[illegible]		Attached are two 201's (201-88764 and 201-10731) which were brought to the attention of the 201 section by Mrs. Roberts of the Chilean desk. She requested that the 201 numbers be cancelled since both men are staff employees. 201-10731 is the Deputy Chief of WH and 201-88764 is a staff employee currently in Mexico. The 201 section may not cancel 201s without prior approval of the RI; these are being sent to you for review. The 201's may be either retained by the interested desk on permanent charge or may be cancelled by notifying the 201 Section, removing the operational material and sending the non-OS material to the Office of Personnel for retention in [illegible] personnel file. If the decision is made to retain the file on permanent charge, please notify RID Locator, x-4324. Jean Nickerson (hand-written note) Have examined both 201's, majority of whose contents is operational. Doubt anything would be served by recalling retired ops, distributing material, & re-retiring them. Please leave as is. (Initialed.)
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. RID/201 E. Nickerson				
10.				
11. Original routing sheet filed in 201-10731. These files [illegible] request of Julian Goldberger, WH/RAD				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

201-88764

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible] ADEN

VIA. A
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

47-1-4

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, NEA

DATE 6 May 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Beirut

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative

SPECIFIC— Request for Official Travel - Michael M. CHOADEN and Family

References: A. FR 22-100, Para 8.a.
B. NEBA-6479

It is requested that Travel Orders be issued for Michael M. CHOADEN who is returning to Headquarters for resignation. The following information is submitted in accordance with instructions contained in reference regulation:

1. Name and position of traveler: Michael M. CHOADEN, staff agent attached to the Beirut Station.

2. Purpose of travel: Return to Headquarters for resignation.

3. Destination: Fort Worth, Texas, residence of subject, with stop-off in Washington for resignation.

4. Estimated date of departure: 5 August 1958.

5. Approximate duration of travel: Three weeks.

6. Desired mode of transportation: Sea.

7. Desired route and stop-overs enroute: American Export Lines from Beirut to Marseilles. Thirteen day stop-over there, on leave. S.S. Constitution, also of American Export Lines, from Cannes to New York. New York to Washington by air.

8. Name and age of dependents who will accompany:

Helen, wife, 39
Maria, daughter, 8
David, son, 6
Atlee; daughter, 5
Christopher, son, 1

[illegible]

[illegible] MAY 1958

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

9. Excess baggage: Normal amount requested.

10. Shipment or storage of effects: Subject plans to ship effects to Havana, Cuba. Subject is not absolutely positive when he and family will go to Cuba, but he prefers to have effects in storage there rather than in U.S.

11. Other items or conditions: Subject may need advance for steamship deposits.

12. Not applicable.

Oscar W. Fieseler
Oscar W. Fieseler

APPROVED:
for Philip O. Wark
Chief of Station, Beirut

29 April 1958

Distribution:
5 - Hqs

9 MAY 1958

SECRET

SECRET

15 April 1958
NE-7/L&S/58-399

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Mr. David A. Phillips

1. The attached dispatch from the Chief of Station, Beirut, covers the proposed resignation of Mr. David A. Phillips from CIA. The matter was discussed with the Chief of Station during his recent visit to Headquarters, and he feels that Mr. Phillips' decision to return to South America is irrevocable.

2. Mr. Phillips, as you are aware, was in Havana until the spring of 1957, at which time he accepted a staff agent position in Beirut. His primary responsibility was the establishment of a radio and television production center in addition to providing a variety of covert programs in the psychological field. Mr. Phillips was instrumental in the establishment of a clandestine radio broadcasting station in the area in addition to the more direct responsibilities of his Beirut assignment.

3. The Chief of Station indicated that Mr. Phillips did a highly commendable job while in Beirut and feels his departure from the Middle East is regrettable; however, he was unable to dissuade Mr. Phillips from his desires to leave CIA. Headquarters has been equally impressed by Mr. Phillips' services and feels he performed in an exemplary manner, utilizing his mature judgment and excellent PP sense in attaining the objectives which led to his assignment in Beirut.

Eugene Milligan
for NORMAN S. PAUL
Chief,
Division of Near East
and Africa

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET

Retyped from NLBA - 6479

SUBJECT: Future Resignation from CIA of David Phillips

1. In a recent meeting with the Chief of Station, David Phillips, the PECTATE case officer, informally announced his intention of resigning from CIA in the near future. At that time Phillips requested that Headquarters be informed by the Chief of Station. The decision to resign has been made informally, in order for the Station and Headquarters to have as much advance notice as possible. Actually, Phillips does not expect to leave his Beirut assignment for about four months, or sometime in the month of July. Phillips reports that the PECTATE building will have been finished and occupied by PECTATE staffers long before that time.

2. In the above-mentioned meeting, and in a Memorandum for the Record submitted to the Chief of Station, Phillips has emphasized that his decision was reached after careful though and has been prompted solely by personal considerations. Specifically the reasons are:

a. The necessity of Phillips' return to Latin America to take care of personal business problems, mainly the sale of his newspaper in Chile. He has been negotiating for this sale for many months, but he feels that an advantageous agreement would be impossible to reach by mail from such a distance.

b. Phillips' desire to inaugurate a business firm in Cuba.

3. The Chief of Station has discussed this matter with Phillips in detail. Phillips has reiterated--and has requested that Headquarters be so advised--that his decision is purely personal. There is no question of dissatisfaction with CIA, or of a morale problem. On the contrary, Phillips has expressed his regret that circumstances prompt him to terminate what he has described as a most rewarding association with CIA.

4. Phillips' plans for leaving the Beirut assignment bring up the problem of future CIA control of PECTATE. Phillips has submitted to the Chief of Station his personal recommendations on this score, which have been considered in preparing a separate dispatch.

GHOSN ZOGBY
Chief of Station
Beirut

24 March 1958

SECRET

AIR SECRET [illegible]-4251

FILE

Jun 18

PECTATE PERSONNEL (CHADEN.)

Chief of Station, Beirut

Chief, NEA

CHOATER's Chilean Newspaper
Newspaper's Treatment of Klein-Saks Mission

ACTION REQUIRED: As requested in paragraph 1.

1. Please advise CHOATER of the following, which has been received by Chief, WH Division, from the COS, Santiago, regarding CHOATER's newspaper.

2. "...The newspaper owned by CHOATER has been engaging in an all-out campaign against the Klein-Saks Mission and their economic program for Chile. While the newspaper in itself is not terribly important, the Embassy has become disturbed because of the newspaper being owned by an American. Recently the Ambassador called in the local editor of the newspaper and asked for an explanation. He replied that he was himself in complete accord with the Klein-Saks program but that his hands were tied as he was acting upon instructions from his publisher. Personally, I think that that was probably not true but was simply a means of passing the buck to extricate himself from a difficult situation. I do not believe that CHOATER is very much au courant with the activities of the newspaper and that its policy is left pretty much in the hands of the local editor. Unfortunately, the Air Attache, who has been here for a considerable period, mentioned to the Ambassador that he thought I might be able to throw some light on the situation due to the fact that he, himself, knew CHOATER had some sort of connection with KUBARK. I stated if there was such a connection, I was not cognizant of it. Nevertheless, I think that the most circumspect thing that could be done would be to apprise CHOATER of what is going on on his newspaper, so that he could correct the situation if he so desires. I understand the Ambassador intends to write a very strong letter directly to CHOATER. A strong statement in reply could very well avoid embarrassment at a future date for KUBARK."

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-26

SECRET

3. [illegible] may find it more desirable to postpone his strong letter of reprimand to his editor in Chile until he actually receives a letter on this matter from the Ambassador, unless he can feasibly explain the anti-American attitude of his Chilean newspaper through overt sources.

NORMAN S. PAUL

19 December 1957

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Addr.
  1 - CNEA
  2 - NE-7I&S
  1 - Chile Chrono

NE-7/I&S/RGoralski:jr

(Signed) [illegible]

DD/P	C/WH	CNE-7	CNEA

PROCESSED BY RID/20T

SECRET

RYBAT

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

14-00000

6 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, PLANS

SUBJECT : David A. PHILLIPS - Current Attitude of Newspaper in Chile owned by;

1. It is recommended that the attached be brought to the attention of David A. PHILLIPS, with an expression of HQS' views on the situation.

2. David A. PHILLIPS is a KUBARK Staff agent presently serving overseas and most probably is, as Rafford W. HERBERT suggests, NOT aware of the current attitude of the paper (SOUTH PACIFIC MAIL - weekly English Language newspaper); however, it is believed that if the situation were brought to his attention, and copy of the attached self explanatory letter forwarded to him, he would be able to correct it promptly by a letter to the editor outlining the policy he, the owner, wishes the paper to follow.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachment:
2 cys of Ltr - RYBAT

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

C O P Y

HCSA - 5109

15 November 1957

Dear J. C.*

This is to advise you of a situation that might possibly become embarrassing for KUBARK. In recent months the newspaper here owned by David A. Phillips*, has been waging an all-out campaign against the Klein-Saks Mission and their economic program for Chile. While the newspaper in itself is not terribly important, the Embassy has become disturbed because of the newspaper being owned by an American. Recently the Ambassador called in the local editor of the newspaper and asked for an explanation. He replied that he was himself in complete accord with the Klein-Saks program but that his hands were tied as he was acting upon instructions from his publisher. Personally, I think that that was probably not true but was simply a means of passing the buck to extricate himself from a difficult situation. I do not believe that Phillips is very much "au courant" with the activities of the newspaper and that its policy is left pretty much in the hands of the local editor. Unfortunately, the Air Attache, who has been here for a considerable period, mentioned to the Ambassador that he thought I might be able to throw some light on the situation due to the fact that he, himself, knew that Phillips had some sort of connection with KUBARK. I stated that if there was such a connection that I was not cognizant of it. Nevertheless, I think that the most circumspect thing that could be done would be to apprise Phillips of what is going on on his newspaper, so that he could correct the situation if he so desires. I understand the Ambassador intends to write a very strong letter directly to Phillips. A strong statement in reply could very well avoid embarrassment at a future date for KUBARK.

Rafford W. Herbert*

* - Pseudonym used in original
letter received from field.

C O P Y

14-00000

30 Nov 51

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry

FROM: IR

NO. TQS-A-1759

DATE

MICROFILMED
JUL 25 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECD	DATE FWD	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. WHD.	QTRS "Eye"			MC	
2. NWC	DEC 11 1951				COPY DETACHED PHILLIPS, DAVID ATLEE
3. Claypool		11 Dec	11	mjc	
4. McKellops		11 Dec			
5. Smyser					Fulminator-1
6.					
7.					
8. MJC		12 Dec		mjc	
9. ~~Cushing~~					
10. RI/CO	MAY 18 1957. PROCESSED THRU RI/CO				201-55764 ~~201 33432~~
11. RI/FI					
12.					
13.					
14. INDEX					
15. IR	1409	CS COPY			

INTELLIGENCE
DEC 7 1951
RECORDS

ABSTRACT ☑ INDEX ☑

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

14-00000

SECURITY INFORMATION

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TCS-A-1759

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 30 November 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, Santiago

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational Matters

SPECIFIC— ZACACTUS, Chile

REF: TCS-A-1741

MICROFILMED
JUL 25 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Enclosed herewith is the current issue of the weekly newspaper edited and published by the subject of referenced dispatch.for Headquarters' possible interest.

Jerome C. Dunbar

Dist: 3 Washington
2 Files
osm

INDEX

1 Encl. N.S.M.

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

IR COPY

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
CS COPY

30 Nov 1951

201-[illegible]

~~201-83498~~

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 25324 A

DATE

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE)

DAVID [illegible] [illegible]
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS: William B. Bromell

SECRET

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 25324 B

DATE

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) Michael M. [illegible]

MICHAEL M. [illegible]
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS: William B. Bromell

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment to HKHB-114

Source of Income for Tax Form 1099

Donald M. Turner Associates

1615 Court Square Building

Baltimore, Maryland

14-00000
104-10177-10134
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of Army

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201 88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

FROM: AIR ATTACHE MEXICO CITY ROUTINE

TO: DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE 10 NOV 48

ACTION: DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE IN 17654

INFORMATION: ADSO (1), COPS (2), NEG (3), AEC (4)

AIR GRAM

TO: CS USAF

FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTS 200 GRAMS URANIUM OWNED BY DAVID PHILLIPS OF PROVEEDORA MUNDIAL MEXICO CITY IS ON DEPOSIT IN VAULTS OF BANCO CONTINENTIAL OF MEXICO CITY. PHILLIPS REPORTEDLY CONNECTED WITH SALE OF MERCURY TO JAPANESE DURING WORLD WAR II AND WAS BLACKLISTED IN MEXICO. SOURCE REPORTS RUSSIAN MIL ATTACHE IN MEXICO IS NEGOTIATING FOR PURCHASE OF THIS URANIUM.

ACTION: OIN

INFO: ODC

CAF IN 9 6 7 (17 NOV 48) DTG 102355Z

TOR: 1710Z 24 NOV 48

not believed to be identical with David Atlee Phillips.

IT'S NOT! DAP 14 Feb 1975

201-88764

~~201-33432~~

SECRET

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO
Unnumbered

DATE
[illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				[illegible]

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 DEC 55

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

No 202

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

TO: Chief, FE (Russell)

Provisional Operational Clearance is hereby granted for the use of FULMINATOR/1.

Limitations: Fulminator Project as outlined in TSC-A-967.

This clearance is valid for only 90 days and must be reviewed before the expiration of that time.

STAFF C/
Operational Clearance Officer
for Assistant Director, Special Operations

Date MAY 2 1958

Copy 1 of 2 copies

~~201 33432~~

201-83761

FROM:

ACTION

CABLE

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Copy of [illegible] 23,749
Accession No.
Date Received SA [illegible] 016

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Received	Forwarded		
1. NWC	Claypool		15 May		
2. Hassell			15 May		
3. Vandervoort			15 May		
4. Heitman			14 Ma		Fulminator-1
5. Morris					MAY 15 10 39 AM '50
6. RI/ED		PROCESSED THRU RI/CO 2 AUG 1957			
7.					
8.					
9.					PHILLIPS, David Atlee
10. Cable desk					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer designations should be used in *To* column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to registry.
For officer designations see separate sheet.

201-56764
~~201-33432~~

ABSTRACT ☐ INDEX ☐
DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-19
JAN 1947 (1663)

FORM NO. 35-5
DEC. 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM: SANTIAGO ROUTINE

TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 12 MAY 50

ACTION: FDT (1-2) IN 25749

INFORMATION: ISO (3-4), STA (5), STC (6), IID (7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (I) 60A AR-380-5

SAGC 016

TO: WASHF CITE: SAGOF

1. FOLLOWING IN REPLY WASH 4717 (OUT 55415):

(A) REF PARA 1: PRESENT PLANS ARE AWAIT BRITISH CONTACT, THEREAFTER FULMINATER-1 WOULD APPROACH HOLZER DIRECT. IF BRITISH FAIL CONTACT HQS BY 1 JUNE 50, THIS STATION PLANS TO PLANT FULMINATER-1 NAME ON HOLZER AS THE AMERICAN AGENT IN CHILE WITH EXPECTATION HE WILL ENDEAVOR ESTABLISH CONTACT AND PENETRATE FULMINATER-1 WHO WOULD USE NORMAL DISCRETION ALLOWING HOLZER BELIEVE HE HAD PENETRATED U.S. SERVICE BY HIS OWN EFFORTS.

(B) REF PARA 2: HOLZER NOW UNDER CLOSE SURVEILLANCE BY FULLNESS PER TSC 1085. CONSIDER PENETRATION UNLIKELY WITHOUT IMMEDIATE DETECTION.

(C) REF PARA 3: ASIDE NORMAL PRECAUTIONS STATION HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY ALERT SINCE INCEPTION THIS CASE. FULMINATER PROJECT DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL PROTECTION IN ADDITION TO EXPLOITATION.

2. REQUEST APPROVAL ABOVE. IF JANDA REMAINS LONG ENOUGH IN ECUADOR PERHAPS FULMINATER-1 NAME COULD BE PLANTED ON HER WHILE THERE THROUGH ECRATIC.

2121Z 12 MAY 50

201-88764

TOR:

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

~~201-33432~~

FROM: CABLE

CONFIRMATION

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Wash - 5067

Copy of ~~Wash~~ out 55730

Accession No.

Date Received SA ~~Oct 55~~

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. NWC	Claypool			mjc	
2. Howell			15 May		
3. Vandervoort			18 May		
4.					
5.					
6. Morris					Fulminator-1
7. RI/CO		PROCESSED THRU RI/CO 2 AUG 1957		ed	
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					PHILLIPS, David Atlee

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer designations should be used in *To* column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to registry.
For officer designations see separate sheet.

201-58764

~~201-33432~~

ABSTRACT ~~INDEX~~

DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-18
JAN 1947

(1882)

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To:	SANTIAGO	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	16 MAY 50
Confirmation:	FDT (1-2)	OUT 55780
Information:	ADSO (3-4), ASTA (5), STC (6), FDB (7), IID (8), S/C (9-10-11)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 5067

TO: SAGOF CITE: WASHF

RE: SAGO 016 (IN 25749).

1. APPROVAL GRANTED PARAGRAPH ONE.

2. WE DO NOT AGREE WITH PLAN INVOLVING JANDA.

J. ANGLETON	WKH WJS JMH	W. WHEELER
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0400Z 17 MAY 50

SECRET

COPY NO. 201-88764

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

~~201 33432~~

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-62325-1

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				RI
15.				201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

DATE 31 May 1950

TO: OSO Budget Officer

THROUGH: STB

SUBJECT: Project Sub-Allotment

1. This AN ☒ ORIGINAL ☐ AMENDEND SUB-ALLOTMENT TO PROJECT FULMINATER-1 FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 June 1950 TO 30 June 1951

FISCAL YEAR 1949-50 FISCAL YEAR 1950-51

AMOUNT $65 U.S. AMOUNT $780 U.S. TOTAL $845 U.S.

$50 per month
+ $12.50 expenses

2. EXPENDITURES FOR THIS PROJECT WILL BE CHARGED AGAINST THE BUDGET OF Santiago, Chile, AND UNDER THE FOLLOWING CRYPTONYM(S):

FULMINATER-1

3. IF THIS IS AN AMENDED SUB-ALLOTMENT, IT REPRESENTS:

☐ AN INCREASE IN AMOUNT FROM TO

☐ A DECREASE IN AMOUNT FROM TO

☐ A TERMINATION SUB-ALLOTMENT

CASE OFFICER	CHIEF, FOREIGN DIVISION T
THE ABOVE BUDGET ☐ DOES ☐ DOES NOT CONTAIN SUFFICIENT FUNDS.	PROJECT APPROVAL CERTIFIED
OSO BUDGET OFFICER	STB
DATE	DATE 201-58764

FORM NO. 51-91
FEB 1950

SECRET

201-33432

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO.
Copy of TCSA-1064

DATE
10 Jul 70

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-55764

ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-4-9-8

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

AIR

TCS-A-1064

Chief, Foreign Division T and
Chief, Finance Division

10 July 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Operational Matters
Bank Accounts - United States

1. The following bank account addresses are forwarded herewith for the use of the Finance Division in making appropriate payments in the United States as previously authorized:

a) FULMAR:

Bank - National City Bank of New York
Jackson Heights Branch
Roosevelt Avenue and 81st Street, New York, N.Y.

Amount - $100.00 per month

Schedule - July to be paid 1 August 1950
August to be paid 1 September 1950
September to be paid 1 October 1950
October to be paid 1 November 1950

b) FULMINATER-1:

Bank - Fort Worth National Bank
Fort Worth, Texas

Amount - $50.00 per month

Schedule - First payment to be made 1 August 1950 and to be continued on the first of each month thereafter until further notice.

c) FULMINATER:

Bank:- Mercantile Trust Company
Redwood and Calvert Streets, Baltimore, Maryland

Amount - $50.00 per month

Schedule - First payment to be made 1 August 1950 and to be continued on the first of each month thereafter until further notice.

~~201-33432~~
~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~
DATE APR 12 1955
201-88 164

SECRET

d) **FULFILLER:**

Change - Due to his absence from Chile from 15 July to 15 October 1950, all payments during this period should be suspended. Payment should be made however for half of the month of July 1950, due to the overlap of 15 days in July in which he assisted FULMAR in taking over all the agents.

2. Future operational duty reports submitted on the first of each month will reflect the above changes.

Jerome C. Dunbar

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO.
Copy of TCSA-1137

DATE
28 Aug 58

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

ORIGINAL FILED IN 15 8 K-17

201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AJP TCS-A-1137

SECRET

Chief of Foreign Division T 26 August 1950

Chief, of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

Ref: TCS-A-1064

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of July 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

~~201-33432~~

ABSTRACT ☐ INDEX ☐

DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

201-58761

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201 55764

FORM 610 1 DEC 55 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

JF TCS-A-1137

SECRET

Chief of Foreign Division T 26 August 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

Ref: TCS-A-1064

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of July 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

~~201-33432~~
~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~
~~DATE APR 12 1955~~

SECRET

201-88761

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

WHD

NO. Copy of TCSA-1171

DATE 15 Sep 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-7-6-136

201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AIR

TCS-A-1171

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

SEP 27 1950

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of September 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1, now inactive

Jerome C. Dunbar

~~201 33432~~
~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~
~~DATE APR 12 1955~~

201 60764

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				✓ 201-58761

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

No. 692

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

To: Chief, FDT/NWC

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of FULMINATOR/1.

Limitations: FULMINATOR Project as outlined in TSC-A-967. TCS ✓

STAFF C/ John C. Bonnet
Operational Clearance Officer for
ADSO

Date OCT 3 1950

Copy 1 of 2 copies

Dithy TCS-A-11715

Relating current discussion [illegible] [illegible] collateral
payment in U.S. [illegible] [illegible] stated
Fulminator-I is inactive. Please check this

SECRET

~~201-33432~~
201 [illegible] 761

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO
Unnumbered

DATE
[illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201 88761

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Chief, Finance Division 23 October 1950

Chief, FDT

Restoration of Salaries for FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1

It is requested that the salaries of FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 be restored effective 1 October 1950. Both these individuals are to receive £50.00 per month to be deposited in their respective bank accounts (see TCS-A-1064).

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

SECRET

201—33432

201-58701

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO: Unnumbered

DATE: [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				bw 201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Fulminator-1 26 October 1950

Viña del Mar, Chile

31 October 1922 - Ft. Worth, Texas

U.S.A.

U.S.A.

present wife Helen Haasch born 25 March 1919 ?, Wisconsin; divorced from Lt. Comm. John Alley USN in 1945. Subject previously married to Joan Hildebrandt, Bloomington Illinois and divorced her in September 1943.

Child - Maria Luisa, female, born 9 August 1949 in Santiago. Dual Citizenship.

Publisher and Editor of the South Pacific Mail, No salary.

Spanish, French, German

none known

Still in reserve for future action

c. Fulminator - business activities

Fulminator-1 - newspaper business

d. Desire to serve against the communist menace.

Need of additional sources of income.

e. None - it is anticipated he will respond fully, once approached.

f. Contact only with Fulminator - (no contact as yet)

g. Fullmineator - Fulminator 2 - Fullminator 3

Fullness ?

h. none

i. -

3.

a. To provide a false operation to channelize and control Soviet efforts to penetrate U.S. Intelligence Service in Chile.

b. through deceptive leads would investigate and report on Soviet/communist activities in Chile.

4. COST OF PRO[illegible]

201—33433

Currently inactive / when active $50.00 U.S. per month

no

close coordination with H.Q. - Also with Station Lima on transmittal of written material.

Cannot be evaluated as yet. No action

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1214

DATE 2/14/70

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	REC'D	FWD'D		
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

156-3-175

201-85764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

AIR

TCS-A-1216

Chief, Foreign Division T

27 October 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

1. I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties the entire month of October 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

2. For authorization of reactivation of FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 see WASH 17632 dated 19 October 1950.

Jerome C. Dunbar

R1 [illegible] 15-6-3-173

201 [illegible]432
ABSTRACT [illegible]
DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

201-88764

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO. TCS-9-1235

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. FDT NWC		NOV 29 1950		DM
2. Claypool		30 Nov	30	mjc
3. Christensen		30 Nov		JC
4. Wheeler		13 Dec '50		WW
5. Claypool			14 Dec	mjc
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10. Morris				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

BY HAND

KAPOK

request in last paragraph authorized?

OK-WW

TCS-W-1108
13/12/50

Fulminates-1

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-26

201-88764

~~201~~ 33432

ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX

DATE APR 12 1955

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

10-61155-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TCS-A-1235

[illegible] POK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 17 November 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, Santiago

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational Matters
SPECIFIC- ACQUISITION SAFE-APARTMENT: FULMINATER-1

1. Due to the exigency of providing safe quarters for the polygraphic examination of FULMINATER-2, this Station acquired a safe-apartment for FULMINATER-1 to bring FULMINATER-2 to the polygraph team. The authority for this action was believed to have been construed in WashF-19400. The following details pertain to this apartment:

Location: Calle MacIver 272, ninth floor, apartment 915.

RENTAL: Monthly rent: P/3,800. According to local custom it was necessary to pay an advance over and above the initial month's rent also paid in advance. Therefore, P/3,800 was paid for one month, 12 November - 12 December 1950, and P/2,566 was paid as the advance guarantee for twenty days.

Renter: Juan SIVORI, same as FULLNESS safe-apartment, arranged for by FULLNESS.

Negotiator: FUMARIC handled all the negotiations between SIVORI and the owner, whose name is not immediately available at this writing.

Description: The apartment is completely furnished according to Chilean customs and consists of one living/dining room combination, a bathroom and a small kitchen.

Control Status: This apartment is known as FULMINATER-1's apartment and aside from FULLNESS, FUMARIC, the polygraph team, FULMINATER-2 and Maria JANDA, no one else directly or indirectly connected with this Station will have knowledge of or access to this apartment.

Use: Present: The apartment has been used by the polygraph team to conduct its examination of FULMINATER-2 and Maria JANDA. The translater of the team, resided in the apartment during his stay in Santiago.

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

1. 28 764
01 33432

14-00000

Use: continued
Future: It is desired to retain this apartment as long as required in order to provide a safe meeting place for [illegible]-1 and [illegible]-2.

2. In order to clarify this Station's authority to retain the above safe-apartment and to assume the expense of same, it is requested that Headquarters so authorize this Station accordingly as early as practicable.

Jerome C Dunbar

201 88764
~~201 33432~~

AIR

ICS-A-1235

KAPOK

Chief, Foreign Division T

17 November 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Operational Matters
ACQUISITION SAFE-APARTMENT: FULMINATER-1

1. Due to the exigency of providing safe quarters for the polygraphic examination of FULMINATER-2, this Station acquired a safe-apartment for FULMINATER-1 to bring FULMINATER-2 to the polygraph team. The authority for this action was believed to have been construed in WashF-19400. The following details pertain to this apartment:

Location: Calle MacIver 272, ninth floor, apartment 915.

RENTAL: Monthly rent: P/3,800. According to local custom it was necessary to pay an advance over and above the initial month's rent also paid in advance. Therefore, P/3,800 was paid for one month, 12 November - 12 December 1950, and P/2,566 was paid as the advance guarantee for twenty days.

Renter: Juan SIVORI, same as FULLNESS safe-apartment, arranged for by FULLNESS.

Negotiator: FUMARIC handled all the negotiations between SIVORI and the owner, whose name is not immediately available at this writing.

Description: The apartment is completely furnished according to Chilean customs and consists of one living, dining room combination, a bathroom and a small kitchen.

Control Status: This apartment is known as FULMINATER-1's apartment and aside from FULLNESS, FUMARIC, the polygraph team, FULMINATER-2 and Maria JANDA, no one else directly or indirectly connected with this Station will have knowledge of or access to this apartment.

Use: Present: The apartment has been used by the polygraph team to conduct its examination of FULMINATER-2 and Maria JANDA. The translater of the team, resided in the apartment during his stay in Santiago.

201 88764

~~-201—33432~~

Uses continued
Future: It is desired to retain this apartment as long as required in order to provide a safe meeting place for FULMINATER-1 and FULMINATER-2.

2. In order to clarify this Station's authority to retain the above safe-apartment and to assume the expense of same, it is requested that Headquarters so authorize this Station accordingly as early as practicable.

Jerome C Dunbar

201 · 88764
~~201-33432~~

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1244

DATE 25 Nov 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-6-2-189

201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AIR

ICCA-1244

Chief, Foreign Division T

23 November 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative

Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of November 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMHATER	50.00
FULMHATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-157

~~201-[illegible]~~

ABSTRACT INDEX

DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

201-88764

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSW-1108

DATE 13 Dec 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

ORIGINAL FILED IN: 15-6-3-200

201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

Air

SECRET

TCS-W- 1108

Chief of Station, Santiago

DEC 13 1950

Chief, Foreign Division T

Operational

Safe Apartment, FULMINATER-1

Ref: TCS-A-1235

You are authorised to retain the safe-apartment described in reference document as long as required for use as a safe meeting place for FULMINATER-1 and FULMINATER-2. The expense may be charged to FULMINATER-1.

MJC/djm
4 Dec. 1950

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.

By Martha Jane Claypool

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-200

Staff B

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.

~~201-33432~~

~~ABSTRACT X INDEX~~

DATE APR 12 1955

1108

201-88764

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1277

DATE [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				15-6-3-204
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				BV 201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

AIR

TCS-A-1277

SECRET

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

23 December 1950

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of December 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULFILLER	125.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-204

201 [illegible]
ABSTRACT [illegible]
DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

201-82764

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

WH D

NO.

Copy of TCSA-1171

DATE

27 Sep [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	REC'D	FWD'D		
1.				[illegible] FILED IN 15-7-0-176
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201 ES764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AIR

TCS-A-1171

Chief, Foreign Division Y

SEP 27 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of September 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1, now inactive

Jerome C. Dunbar

~~201 33432~~
~~ABSTRACT ☐ INDEX ☐~~
~~DATE APR 12 1955~~

[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

No. 692

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

To: Chief, FDT/NWC

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of FULMINATOR/1.

Limitations: FULMINATOR Project as outlined in TCS ~~TSC~~-A-967. ✓

STAFF C/ John C. Bonnet
Operational Clearance Officer for
ADSO

Date OCT 3 1950

Copy 1 of 2 copies

Dithy

TCS-A-1171

[illegible] current [illegible] [illegible] payment in U.S. [illegible] Fulminator-1 is inactive [illegible]

SECRET

~~201-33432~~
[illegible]

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE 24 Jul 64

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201 88 764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Chief, Finance Division 23 October 1950

Chief, FDT

Restoration of Salaries for FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1

It is requested that the salaries of FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 be restored effective 1 October 1950. Both these individuals are to receive $50.00 per month to be deposited in their respective bank accounts (see TCS-A-1064).

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	REC'D	FWD'D		
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				bV [illegible] 85764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

Fulminator - 1 26 October 1950

Viña del Mar, Chile

31 October 1922 - Ft. Worth, Texas

U.S.A. U.S.A.

present wife Helen Haasch born 25 March 1919 ?, Wisconsin divorced from Lt. Comm. John Alley USN in 1945.
subject previously married to Joan Hildebrandt, Bloomington Illinois and divorced her in September 1943.

Child - Maria Louisa, female, born 9 August 1949 in Santiago. Dual citizenship.

Publisher and Editor of the South Pacific Mail. No salary.

Spanish, French, German

none known

Still in reserve for future action

Fulminator - business activities

Fulminator - 1 - newspaper business

Desire to serve against the communist menace.
Need of additional sources of income.

None - it is anticipated he will respond fully, once approached.

Contact only with Fulminator - (no contact as yet)

Fullness ?

Fullminator - Fulminator 2 - Fullminator 3

none

To provide a false operation to channelize and control Soviet efforts to penetrate U.S. Intelligence Service in Chile.

through deceptive leads would investigate and report on Soviet/communist activities in Chile.

201—33437

currently inactive / when active $50.00 U.S. per month

no

close coordination with H.Q. -- also with Station Lima on transmittal of written material.

Cannot be evaluated as yet. No action

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1214

DATE 21 Oct 70

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				156-2-175
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14				
15.				201-33 7(4 42 ✓

FORM 4-DEC 55. 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

AIR

TCS-A-1214

Chief, Foreign Division T

27 October 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

1. I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties the entire month of October 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

2. For authorization of reactivation of FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 see WASH 17632 dated 19 October 1950.

Jerome C. Dunbar

RI Copy filed in [illegible]

~~201 - 33432~~
~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~
~~DATE APR 12 1955~~

SECRET

[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1244

DATE 28 Nov 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-6-2-189
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201 83764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AIR

TCS-A-1244

SECRET

Chief, Foreign Division T

28 November 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative

Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of November 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-167

SECRET

~~201-33832~~
~~ABSTRACT~~ INDEX
DATE APR 12 1955

201-83744

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSW-1108

DATE 13 Dec 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				[illegible] 15-6-2-200
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				FV 201-8[illegible]764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

Air

SECRET

TCS-W- 1108

Chief of Station, Santiago

DEC. 13 1950

Chief, Foreign Division T.

Operational

Safe Apartment, FULMINATER-1

Ref: TCS-A-1235

You are authorized to retain the safe-apartment described in reference document as long as required for use as a safe meeting place for FULMINATER-1 and FULMINATER-2. The expense may be charged to FULMINATER-1.

MJC/djm
4 Dec. 1950

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.

By Martha Jane Claypool

RI AM21 [illegible] 15-6-3-260

Staff B

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.

~~201 – 33432~~

ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX ☐

DATE APR 12 1955

1108

201 [illegible]8764

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1277

DATE 22 Dec 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

15-6-3-204

FV

201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AIR TCS-A-1277

SECRET

Chief, Foreign Division T 28 December 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of December 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULFILLER	125.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

N1 copy filed in 15-6-3-204

~~201-38432~~
~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~
~~DATE APR 12 1955~~

201-58714

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1325

DATE 31 Jan 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWDD	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-1-1-757
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

C
O
P
Y

AIR

SECRET

TCS-A-1325

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

31 January 1951

Administrative

Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of January 1951, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULFILLER	125.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

/s/ Jerome C. Dunbar

RI copy filed in 15-1-757

~~201-33432~~

~~[illegible] INDEX~~

~~DATE [illegible] 1955~~

SECRET

201 6 - 164

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1432

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-58764

ORIGINAL FILED IN: 15-4-4-665

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

-00000

TCS-A-1432

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY **CHILE** PERIOD COVERED **JAN-MAR 1951** CRYPTONYM **FULMINATOR-1**

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: **Cut-out between FULMINATOR and FULMINATOR-2. Responsible for the direct handling of the latter as required by this Station. In addition to this function, Subject has performed services for this Station in the fulfillment of BRGHYTHE-LCACTING directives.**

SALARY: **$50 U.S. per month; terminated 28 February 1951. Paid $100 U.S. for special services pertaining to LCACTING project.**

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: **A very serious, conscientious and loyal American, who has demonstrated his willingness to serve his country in the above capacity. It is believed that he will be of future value in matters pertaining to BRGHYTHE-LCACTING in Chile.**

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED: **Not applicable.**

OTHER FACTORS: **Security of Subject under FULMINATOR project considered satisfactory. On the BRGHYTHE-LCACTING project Subject is handled by FINARIO under satisfactory security conditions.**

COMMENTS: **Subject provided a useful service to this Station under deep cover conditions in the handling of FULMINATOR-2. It is contemplated that latter agent will be deported from Chile in the immediate future and that FULMINATOR-1 will then be available for other duties related to the BRGHYTHE-LCACTING objectives in Chile.**

RI copy filed in 15-4-4-665

4(a)

SECRET

~~201 33432~~

201-88764

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1432

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-4-11-665
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-58761

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

TCS-A-1432

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY CHILE PERIOD COVERED JAN-MAR 1951 CRYPTONYM FULMINATOR-1

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: Cut-out between FULMINATOR and FULMINATOR-2. Responsible for the direct handling of the latter as required by this Station. In addition to this function, Subject has performed services for this Station in the fulfillment of BRGHYTHM-LCACTING directives.

21 April fld in 15-4-4-665

SALARY: $50 U.S. per month; terminated 28 February 1951. Paid $100 U.S. for special services pertaining to LCACTING project.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: A very serious, conscientious and loyal American, who has demonstrated his willingness to serve his country in the above capacity. It is believed that he will be of future value in matters pertaining to BRGHYTHM-LCACTING in Chile.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED: Not applicable.

OTHER FACTORS: Security of Subject under FULMINATOR project considered satisfactory. On the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING project Subject is handled by FUMARIC under satisfactory security conditions.

COMMENTS: Subject provided a useful service to this Station under deep cover conditions in the handling of FULMINATOR-2. It is contemplated that latter agent will be deported from Chile in the immediate future and that FULMINATOR-1 will then be available for other duties related to the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING objectives in Chile.

4(8)

SECRET

~~201-33432~~

201-88764

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSW-1182

DATE 28 Feb 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-63-224

RQ

FDI 88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Air Pouch

SECRET

Chief of Station, Santiago

Chief, Foreign Division T

Administrative

Payments to Agents

Fulminator-1 E

RI Copy filed in 15-6-3-224

1. Headquarters records reveal that dollar payments to allottees in the United States are being made for the following agents used by your station:

FULFILLER	$125 per month
FULLER/CR	$100 " "
FULMINATOR	$ 50 " "
FULMINATOR-1	$ 50 " "

2. This process has become so cumbersome in view of world-wide requirements, that it has become necessary to ask field stations to make salary payments locally, either in dollars or local currency, whenever possible. Please advise by return pouch whether it will be possible to make the above-listed payments locally.

3. It is further requested that you clarify the status of FULMINATOR, FULMINATOR-1, and FULMINATOR-2. The most recent exchange of cables (SAGO-160 and WASH-79448) left headquarters with the impression that the entire FULMINATOR project was about to be discontinued, in which case, it is presumed, dollar payments for FULMINATOR and FULMINATOR-1 should be discontinued. Please advise by pouch.

DMC/djm
19 Feb. 1951

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.
By Dale M. Christensen

Staff B

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.

~~201-33432~~
~~ABSTRACT~~ ~~INDEX~~
~~DATE APR 18 1955~~

201-85764
1152

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSW-1182

DATE 28 Feb 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

15-6-3 R24

FI

[illegible] 761

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Air Pouch

TC... 11...

SECRET

FEB 26 1951

Chief of Station, Santiago

Chief, Foreign Division T

Administrative

Payments to Agents

Fulminater-1

1. Headquarters records reveal that dollar payments to allottees in the United States are being made for the following agents used by your station:

FUTILLER	$125 per month
FULLBACK	$100 " "
FULMINATER	$ 50 " "
FULMINATER-1	$ 50 " "

2. This process has become so cumbersome in view of world-wide requirements, that it has become necessary to ask field stations to make salary payments locally, either in dollars or local currency, whenever possible. Please advise by return pouch whether it will be possible to make the above-listed payments locally.

3. It is further requested that you clarify the status of FULMINATER, FULMINATER-1, and FULMINATER-2. The most recent exchange of cables (SACO-160 and WASH-77948) left headquarters with the impression that the entire FULMINATER project was about to be discontinued, in which case, it is presumed, dollar payments for FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 should be discontinued. Please advise by pouch.

X - 1 Copy filed in 15-63-224

DMC/djm
19 Feb. 1951

Wm. H. Wheeler, Jr.
By Dale M. Christensen

Staff B

Wm. H. Wheeler, Jr.

~~201-33432~~
~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~ ☐
~~DATE APR 18 1955~~

201-[illegible]764

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1398

DATE 17 Mar 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	REC'D	FWD'D		
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-6-3-227
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-88764

FORM 3 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AIR

TCS-A-1398

Chief, Foreign Division T

19 March 1951

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative

Payments to agents; [illegible] Project

Reference: TCS-W-1282

1. Pending preparation of a chronological review of the recent developments of the [illegible] Project since submission of TCS-A-1257, Headquarters is advised that this Station desires the termination of payments to [illegible] and [illegible]-1 as of 28 February 1951 and that no payments be made for the month of March 1951 or henceforth until further notice.

2. Due to the anticipation of an early termination of this project and the absence of any further need for the [illegible] Safe Apartment, this Station has allowed its control on same to lapse as of 10 March 1951.

3. It is anticipated that the abovementioned review will be ready for submission to Headquarters in the next available pouch. Meanwhile for Headquarters information the control over [illegible]-2 has passed to [illegible] who will handle the [illegible] debriefing and deportation as early as practicable.

Jerome C. Dunbar

afc

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-227

~~201-33432~~

~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~

~~DATE [illegible] 1[illegible] 1955~~

COPY

201-88764

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO Copy of TCSA-1398

DATE 17 Mar 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
	REC'D	FWD'D		
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

[illegible] FILED IN 15-6-3-227

201-35764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

AIR

TCS-A-1398

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

13 March 1951

Administrative

Payments to agents; FULMINATER Project

Reference: TCS-W-1182

1. Pending preparation of a chronological review of the recent developments of the FULMINATER Project since submission of TCS-A-1257, Headquarters is advised that this Station desires the termination of payments to FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 as of 28 February 1951 and that no payments be made for the month of March 1951 or henceforth until further notice.

2. Due to the anticipation of an early termination of this project and the absence of any further need for the FULMINATER safe apartment, this Station has allowed its control on same to lapse as of 10 March 1951.

3. It is anticipated that the abovementioned review will be ready for submission to Headquarters in the next available pouch. Meanwhile for Headquarters information the control over FULMINATER-2 has passed to FULMERS who will handle the former's debriefing and deportation as early as practicable.

Jerome C. Dunbar

cfc

RI COPY filed in 15-6-3-227

~~33432~~

~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~

~~DATE APR 1 1955~~

201-88764

COPY

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO Unnumbered

DATE 10 Oct 51

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	REC'D	FWD'D		
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Finance Division
ATTN : Mr. George
Chief, FDT

10 April 1951

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 have been terminated as of 28 February 1951. Therefore, it is requested that no further payments be made to their respective accounts.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

SECRET

~~201-33438~~

201-[illegible] 761

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO Unnumbered

DATE 10 Apr 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201 18711

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Finance Division
ATTN : Mr. George
Chief, FDT

10 April 1951

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 have been terminated as of 28 February 1951. Therefore, it is requested that no further payments be made to their respective accounts.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

SECRET

~~201-33432~~

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Copy of TCSA-1564

DATE 17 Jul 57

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-43764

157-3-168

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

TCS-A-1564

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY **CHILE** PERIOD COVERED **APR/JUN 1951** CRYPTONYM **FULMINATOR-1**

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: **Functions as cut-out for FULMINATOR and FULMINATOR-2 discontinued with the departure from Chile of FULMINATOR-2. Performs service for this Station in the fulfillment of the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING projects.**

SALARY: **None at the present time as inactive.**

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: **No change**

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED: **Not applicable**

OTHER FACTORS **No change**

COMMENTS: **None**

Prepared by: Kenneth J. Tendler

RI copy filed in 15-7-3-168

SECRET

201-33432

201-22764

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Copy of TCSA-1564

DATE 17 Jul 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

[illegible] FILED IN 15 7-3 168

201-66764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY **CHILE** PERIOD COVERED **APR/JUN 1951** CRYPTONYM **FULMINATOR-1**

TCS-A-1564

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: Functions as cut-out for FULMINATOR and FULMINATOR-2 discontinued with the departure from Chile of FULMINATOR-2. Performs service for this Station in the fulfillment of the BRGHYTHM-LEACTIBO projects.

SALARY: None at the present time as inactive.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: No change

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED: Not applicable

OTHER FACTORS No change

COMMENTS: None

Prepared by: Kenneth J. Tendler

RI copy filed in 15-7-3-168

SECRET

~~201 33433~~
201-88764

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Copy of TCSA-1685

DATE
23 Dec 57

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201 [illegible] 764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

TCS-A-1685

SECRET

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY Chile PERIOD COVERED Jun/Sept '51 CRYPTONYM FULMINATED-1

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: **In a position to cooperate with this Station in carrying out the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING projects.**

SALARY: **None at present time. Paid on a piece-work basis for work performed.**

EVALUATION OF SERVICES:

No Change

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED:

Not applicable.

OTHER FACTORS **It is believed that FULMINATED-1's value to this Station's operations will increase in proportion to the increased ZACACTUS operations in this area.**

COMMENTS:

SECRET

201 copy filed in 15-# 4-763

201 83761

201 33433

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Copy of TCSA-1685

DATE 23 Oct 51

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-4-4-763

W

201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

TCS-A-1685

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY Chile PERIOD COVERED Jun/Sept '51 CRYPTONYM FULMINATER-1

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: In a position to cooperate with this Station in carrying out the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING projects.

SALARY: None at present time. Paid on a piece-work basis for work performed.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES:

No Change

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED:

Not applicable.

OTHER FACTORS It is believed that FULMINATER-1's value to this Station's operations will increase in proportion to the increased ZACACTUS operations in this area.

COMMENTS:

SECRET

201 copy filed in 15-4-76/3

201-85764

201 33432

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE 21 Nov 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	REC'D	FWD'D		
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				21 [illegible] 7-1

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PLANS

26 November 1951

Acting Chief, WHD

FULMINATER-1

1. The FULMINATER Project, in which FULMINATER-1 was used on several occasions, did not develop and was not formalized. FULMINATER-1 is therefore not active currently, but is being held in reserve status for future use in other projects.

2. In the future, there will be no charges made against FULMINATER or FULMINATER-1.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

This info sent to Plans 7 Dec. 1951

SECRET

~~201 33433~~

201 35761

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE 26 Nov 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	REC'D	FWD'D		
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
DEC 55

☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PLANS 26 November 1951

Acting Chief, WHD

FULMINATER-1

1. The FULMINATER Project, in which FULMINATER-1 was used on several occasions, did not develop and was not formalized. FULMINATER-1 is therefore not active currently, but is being held in reserve status for future use in other projects.

2. In the future, there will be no charges made against FULMINATER or FULMINATER-1.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

THis info sent to Plans 7 Dec. 1951

SECRET

~~201-33432~~

FORM NO.
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

PAGE NO.

FROM:	SANTIAGO	ROUTINE
TO:	OSO/OPC	10 MAR 52
ACTION:	WHD (1-2-3)	IN 26322
INFORMATION:	IR (4-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), S/C (8-9-10), DDP (11)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

SAGO 413

TO: WASHFG CITE: SAGOFG

RE: A: WASH 29903 (OUT 60513)
B: TCS-A-1887

1. RE REFERENCE A, INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED BY F 1. HE USING RESERVATIONS STATLER HOTEL AS OF 25 MARCH 52.

2. F-1'S ITINERARY AS NOTED REF B BUT HIS ARRIVAL NEW YORK TO BE 25 MARCH NOT 26 MARCH.

1919Z 10 MAR 52

201-88764

TOR:

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

201 33432

14-00000

SECRET

2[illegible] JUL 1954

TO : PI/STC/SPB

ATTENTION:

FROM : Chief, Special Security Division

SUBJECT : JO-8142
#40696

1. **Reference is made to your memorandum dated 23 July 1954 requesting a covert security clearance to permit Subject's use in the United States in preparing reports and furnishing contacts in the newspaper and lecture field in the United States and abroad. He will work closely with PP/CRTV Office.**

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances," a covert security clearance is granted for the covert use of the Subject as described in your request set forth in paragraph 1 above.

3. The Subject is not to represent himself as, nor is he to be represented as, an employee of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-9. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

Robert H. Cunningham

SECRET

201-37764

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TO : PP/Admin 30 July 1954

Willis F. Hawley

FROM : FI/STC/SPB

SUBJECT: David Atlee Phillips

1. Your request for clearance to use Subject dated 23 Jul 54 was processed and transmitted to the Chief, Special Security Division, for final action.

2. The results of this action are attached.

Attachment:
Memo dtd 30 Jul 54

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 59-86
FEB 1953

(47)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO.
Copy of TCSA-1091

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				15 8 1-17
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				✓
15.				201-83761

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Air TCS-A-1091

SECRET

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative

Duty Status Reports

Reference: TCS-A-1064

1. I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of July 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

2. Re sub-paragraph (d) of referenced message, I certify that FULFILLER having worked through the 15th of July 1950 should receive payment for half the month of July 1950.

/s/ Jerome C. Dunbar

~~201-33438~~

DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

201-88764

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

Copy of TCSA-1091

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FW'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				[illegible]

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Air TCS-A-1091

SECRET

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative

Duty Status Reports

Reference: TCS-A-1064

1. I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of July 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

2. Re sub-paragraph (d) of referenced message, I certify that FULFILLER having worked through the 15th of July 1950 should receive payment for half the month of July 1950.

/s/ Jerome C. Dunbar

SECRET

~~201 - 33432~~

~~[illegible]~~

DATE APR 12 1955

[illegible]

Expired CSE

SECRET

12 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

VIA : CI/OA

SUBJECT : PHILLIPS, David Atlee JG-8142 #40696

Please cancel the covert security clearance issued 30 July 1954 on subject. Mr. Phillips isnow a Staff Employee.

JEANNE K. LETELLIER
Chief of Administration
Psychological and Paramilitary
Operations Staff

PP/ADMIN/DEW:dew

Distribution:
- Addressee - Orig & 1
- CI/OA - 1
- PP/Admin - 2
- FI/RI/AN - 1

SECRET

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO JG 8142	SOURCE CI/OA	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
SUBJECT PHILLIPS, David Atlee born 31 Oct 1922 in Ft Worth Texas			DATE 25/7/55 mts csc

PERTINENT INFORMATION

RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON ABOVE IN RI/AR FILES

APR 17 1956

MICROFILMED

CROSS-REFERENCE FORM

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

201 88764

FORM NO. DEC 1952 59-34

14-00000

SECRET
(When filled in)

Expired Cv. Cl.

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

Date 25/7/55

TO : Chief , PP/OPS

ATTENTION:

FROM : [redacted] CI/OA

SUBJECT : PHILLIPS, David Atlee
JG 8142 # 40696-

1. The action checked below concerning Subject of this memorandum is hereby cancelled:

a. Operational Clearance No. ____

b. Provisional Operational Clearance No. ____

c. Covert Security Clearance dated 30/7/54

d. Covert Name Check dated ____

e. Other ____

2. This cancellation action is taken because of:

a. Memorandum dated 12/7/55

b. Termination of Project ____ ☐

c. Removal of Subject from Project ____ ☐

d. Other ____

3. Before Subject can be used operationally in the future, it will be necessary to furnish an up-to-date clearance request to [redacted] CI/OA

INITIALS

MTS

201-88764

SECRET

FORM NO. 59-62 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED
1 JAN 54

(9)

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. Signal Center Cable Archives	SOURCE: Out 54554 Wash 3895	DATE OF DOCUMENT 2 May 50	ANALYST
SUBJECT			DATE 24 Aug 56

PERTINENT INFORMATION

CROSS REFERENCE FORM	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.			
		KCI	EE-R.4	

FORM NO. 137 REPLACES FORM 59-34
1 AUG.54 WHICH MAY BE USED

(35)

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. Signal Center Cable Archives	SOURCE: Out 69926 Wash 17632	DATE OF DOCUMENT 19 Oct 50	ANALYST
SUBJECT			DATE 24 Aug 56

PERTINENT INFORMATION

CROSS REFERENCE FORM

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.			
	201	F 10	

FORM NO. 137 REPLACES FORM 51-34
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED

(35)

14-00000

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. Cable Archives Signal Center	SOURCE: In 48648 Sago 122	DATE OF DOCUMENT 8 Nov 50	ANALYST
SUBJECT			DATE 24 Aug 56

PERTINENT INFORMATION

CROSS REFERENCE FORM	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.
	[illegible]

FORM NO. 137 REPLACES FORM 55-21 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 AUG 54

(35)

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED **CONFIDENTIAL** **SECRET**

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

20 April 1950

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/Files	TELEPHONE	NO TCS/PRQ/5 (Part II) DATE ~~30 AUG 1956~~

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D			
1. RI/CO	PROCESSED THRU RI/CO	DEC 5	1956	JC		Close Case See: 201-88764 PHILLIPS, David Atlee
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						
8.						
9.						
10.						
11.						
12.						
13.						
14.						
15. RI/FI	1400H					

201-88764

~~201-[illegible]~~

ABSTR. ~~CT~~ ~~INDEX~~ X

DATE 30 Aug 1956

LLB

FORM NO. 610 REPLACES FORM 51-10 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 APR 55

SECRET **CONFIDENTIAL** **UNCLASSIFIED**

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—61155-4

(40)

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO. TCS/PRQ/5 (Part II)

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. Vandervoort		24 April		BMC	
2. Claypool		26 Apr		mjc	
3. Hansell			26 Apr	[illegible]	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8. [illegible]					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

TCS /PRQ/ 5

Part II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to Items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym FULMINATER -1

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed? Not contacted to date but has been a social acquaintance of Agency personnel for several years.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Probably. To whom? Any staff officer or approved cut-out.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation Desire to serve against the Communist menace and probably is in need of additional sources of income.

201-58764

201 33432

SECRET

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject? Local agency and police records.

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased? None. It is anticipated that he will respond fully once approached.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information? He would be informed that he would be working with the American Government and no more.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service. None known.

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received. None. Once employed he would act as cut-out only.

201-28764

~~201-33432~~

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain. Cut-out. See TCS-A-967

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.
No. He will be oriented and trained in the duties of a cut-out once he is employed.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?
See TCS-A-967

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities. $50. USC per month salary.

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.
None

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.
No.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.? Middle class

201 - 88764

~~201 33432~~

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers? Believed moderate in all respects.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security. Believed discreet, security conscious and dependable.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future? As a cut-out for other operations in the event proposed project does not materialize.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Not immediately available.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

By the agency. Subject completed Part I upon request without asking questions nor being told what it was for except that the Agency requested it.

201 - 88764

~~201 33438~~

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

None

Case officer
Jerome C. Dunbar

201-88764
~~201 33432~~

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

TCS /PRQ/ 5

Part II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the case officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym FULMINATER -1

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?
Not contacted to date but has been a social acquaintance of Agency personnel for several years.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Probably. To whom? Any staff officer or approved cut-out.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation Desire to serve against the Communist manace and probably is in need of additional sources of income.

201-28749
~~201-33432~~

SECRET

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject? Local agency and police records.

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased? None. It is anticipated that he will respond fully once approached.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information? He would be informed that he would be working with the American Government and no more.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service. None known.

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received. None. Once employed he would act as cut-out only.

201-88764
~~91-33432~~

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain. Cut-out. See TCS-A-967

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

No. He will be oriented and trained in the duties of a cut-out once he is employed.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

See TCS-A-967

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities. $50. USC per month salary.

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

None

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

No.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.? Middle class

201-88764
~~201-33432~~

[illegible]/PRQ/ 5

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers? Believed moderate in all respects.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.

Believed discreet, security conscious and dependable.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future? As a cut-out for other operations in the event proposed project does not materialize.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Not immediately available.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

By the agency. Subject completed Part 1 upon request without asking questions nor being told what it was for except that the Agency requested it.

201-88764
201 33432

___/PRQ/___

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

None

___________________ Case officer
Jerome C. Dunbar

51-88767
~~51-33432~~

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Copy of TCSW-1440

DATE
20 Nov 51

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Air Pouch

TCS-S- 1470

28 Nov. 1951

(CD)

Chief of Station, Santiago

Acting Chief, WHD

Operational

Termination of Projects

1. In order to formalize headquarters records, the appropriate staffs have been notified of the termination of the FULMINATER Project, and have been informed that in the future no charges will be made against the FULMINATER Project, or against FUL[illegible]l. If this agent is used temporarily in the future and not in connection with an approved project, please charge any expenses incurred to Other Operational Activity.

2. Notice of the termination of FULMADO has also been furnished the headquarters Staff, and any charges for future information from him should also be charged to Other Operational Activity.

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-376

MJClaypool/mec
26 November 1951

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

By Martha Jane Claypool

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

H. J. McKellops, Jr.

SECRET

~~201-33432~~
ABSTRACT ☐ INDEX 1470
DATE APR 12 1955

201 55764

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

RE-PUNCH

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

29 JUL 1965

ACTION: ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

FROM:

ROOM NO:

TELEPHONE:

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE ☐
NONSENSITIVE ☐

201 NO (1): 88764

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ML

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): PHILLIPS, DAVID ATLEE

SEX (3): [✓ M] F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME (2)	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

PHOTO (4): [✓ YES] NO

BIRTH DATE (5): 31 10 22

COUNTRY OF BIRTH (6): USA

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH (7): FORT WORTH, TEX

OTHER IDENTIFICATION (8): 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION POSITION: PUBLIC REALATIONS

OCC/POS CODE (9): NEWS

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM:

PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE (10): C19 CUBA

ACTION DESK (11): C15

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST (12):

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST (12a):

COMMENTS: CIT: USA

PUNCHED

MIS Processed

CS COPY

VERIFIED

201- 88764

PERMANENT CHARGE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

RESTRICTED FILE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

SIGNATURE: 2ac

Form No. 831 Use previous editions
1 Oct 56

(38)

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

SOUTH PACIFIC

MAIL

JEANNE CRAIN

Photo by Larry Bulle

November 30th
1951

An Erskine Caldwell Story

10 PESOS
No. 2[illegible]

kly Report
from

Peter Warwick

S. P. M.
Correspondent



MILESTONE

A most important gentleman had an unusually important day this week. Charles Philip Arthur George, son of Princess Elizabeth and Prince Philip, and England's future king, became three.

It was a happy day all round. For not only did Bonny Prince Charles enjoy to full measure the usual delirium of the small boy's birthday, but the King felt fit enough to attend the party and invite a Press photographer.

The King's rapid recovery to the point where he can walk unaided and move with no apparent strain has astonished and delighted the nation. The TIMES photographer - the first member of the public to see him since his operation - reported in some amazement that the King showed no sign of illness, laughed and chatted happily and seemed altogether out of character for a man so recently at grips with major surgery.

The Prince's birthday began, as every such day should, with eager opening of many parcels. He was then taken for his usual outing in St. James's Park - that delightful playground that he can never fully enjoy. For, as a royal prince he must not sail boats in public ponds or feed ducks, or ride on the swings. Still, he seems happy enough as his nanny pushes the pram between admiring strollers, followed by bulky men stamped Scotland Yard all over. He's a friendly child with a democratic tendency to talk and wave to everybody as he clutches two grubby lead soldiers. He's a firm had the spirit

On his third birthday, he shows many of the qualities of warmth, manliness and downright commonsense that he [illegible] so much. He spends much of his time with adults and is well past the baby-talk stage; he is bright, interested in everything and very obviously no cissy. He has had to learn to bear long absences from his parents and conduct himself with dignity in public. London, the world's most critical judge of royalty, awards him top marks all round in its third Report on Progress, and heartily wishes him very many happy returns.

—oOo—

TRAP

Londoners face a new hazard, another pit in the treacherous bog of regulations that surrounds today's law-respecting citizens.

This week, careful sidesteppers along the narrow pathways of rectitude learned that the phone may lead to a fine.

In our public telephone boxes are two buttons: after the money has clicked into the box and some sort of response been evoked the caller presses Button A so that the other end can hear him. If he gets the wrong number or none at all he presses Button B and gets his money back, usually. Sometimes, the mechanism appears to develop an unusual contrition in its behaviour and pours out a shower of coins wildly in excess of the Button B presser's due. Till now, this pleasant quirk has invested the dull business of telephoning with a certain sporting quality. No call is complete without a hopeful lunge at Button B.

The other day, it seems, a youth trying to phone his girl-friend was getting no reply, which is trouble enough, anyway. Pressing Button B, he was rewarded with eightpence, five more than he was entitled to. If there's one soul in the whole of London's ten million who wouldn't have pocketed that extra fivepence it certainly wasn't our young swain. Unfortunately, somebody spotted his transaction and the lad eventually found himself in court as wrong a number as anyone ever got.

They fined him ten shillings, saying that he should have returned the other fivepence to the box or a post-office. The authorities explain that people who forget to press Button B to regain their money claim on the Post Office and, therefore, anyone pocketing money thus hurled at them is robbing the Postmaster General. There may possibly be people who claim for the odd forgotten threepence, but this column has never met even a remote friend of one.

So something of the sport has gone out of life. And a lot of people are congratulating themselves on a narrow escape from disgrace. There, but for the grace of God. The lad seems to have had less than a generous deal from Fate. London hopes he at least enjoyed the consolation of a plausible explanation by his girl-friend.

—oOo—

HOPE

Among the more frightening visions floating in the mind's eye just now is one of cohorts of plump ladies standing purposefully on their heads. For somebody has discovered that this unedifying caper produces a reduction in weight.

Britain's amateur bantam-weight boxing champion had a spot of business up at Wembley this week which necessitated his checking in overweight so he took a hot bath and jogged about a bit and had another shot. No matron ever registered more disappointment on a weighing machine - he was still overweight. A bystander, who might have been a witch-doctor but who was a more than ordinarily knowledgeable gymnast, suggested the dejected bantam-weight should stand on his head. Surprisingly, instead of giving the know-all a clip on the ear for ill-timed levity, the boxer did as he was told. They weighed him again and he had lost the surplus six ounces. The story ends happily enough, as he won his fight a few hours later.

Now, there's another fight in progress between the "experts." Some doctors refused to believe it, like the man who first saw the giraffe. Others say that standing on the head couldn't have had any effect; it was something else. From Harley Street comes the theory that being upside down disturbs a body's air content and sends some of it higher; this reresults in a temporary loss of weight. But this isn't among

Whatever the explanation, the trick has fascinated London which, in the privacy of its homes, is spending more time than usual upside down, in test runs. Whether this is the answer to the middle-aged ladies' prayer for an easy slimmer isn't yet clear, but it's certainly due for a thorough going into. More than ever, the Atomic Age woman needs a good head on her shoulders - preferably with a flat top.

—oOo—

TAIL END

There'll be no extra food at Christmas, says the new Food Minister. More time for devotion and somewhat less for digestion this year.

—oOo—

An enquiry reveals that electric bulb manufacturers have been running price rings to prevent competition. Could this be the light fantastic we hear about?

American Country Day School
TEACHERS WANTED
"NIDO DE AGUILAS"

Due to an increase in the number of courses and the intensifying of English teaching, there is opportunity for additional teachers who can teach grade subjects in both English and Spanish.

—oOo—

Ramón Laval 1470, Tobalaba, Casilla 2761
Micro No. 4 Estadio Francés - Tobalaba

MATRICULATION OF PUPILS WILL BE OPEN FROM OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 15th.

ENJOY
Agreeable HOLIDAY
IN THE BEST CORDILLERA RESORT THAT OFFERS THE HEALTHIEST CLIMATE IN CHILE COMFORTABLE HOTEL



BALNEARIO
JAHUEL
SANTIAGO: Soc. Anónima Jahuel (Oficina General Huérfanos 979 — Of. 212 — Tel. 88055.
Banos Jahuel — Teléfono 127.
SAN FELIPE: Administrador Balneario Jahuel.

Ferretería Francesa
AHUMADA 118 — CASILLA 1856 — TELEPHONE 62268
THE HARDWARE STORE
Preferred by the British and American Colonies
The best selection in Household utensils, tools and construction materials, and fishing tackle, etc., etc.
BAUDET & BONNEFOY LTDA.
SANTIAGO

IF YOU WANT TO HAVE YOUR HOUSE PAINTED
Or any part of it
speak to Ronald Cooper
Work done quickly and efficiently.
DIEZ DE JULIO 825 — PHONE 69263.

VISIT THE PAGODA
CHIARANDA
OPEN DAY AND NIGHT
INTERNATIONAL KITCHEN
YRARRAZAVAL 2501 CORNER P. DE VALDIVIA
PHONE: 492137.

ALWAYS ASK FOR
"RAFF"
PEPTONISED COCOA

SOUTH PACIFIC MAIL

Telephone 66628.
Printing Shop — San Francisco 465
ALL CORRESPONDENCE
Casilla 1250 — Santiago
Publishers:
DAVID A. PHILLIPS — J. TAYLOR COLLINS.
Associate Editor . . . . . . Edmond K. Bannon
Literary Editor . . . . Oswald Hardey Evans
Technical Adviser . . . . Jose F. del Rey
Advertising Staff
Victor A. Parker
Leonor Trewhela — Robert Hansen

First published as the "Chilean Times", August 1, 1851.

FRANCE IN MOROCCO

THERE has always been discussion about the peculiar trait of human nature which finds expression in a feeling of pleasure in contemplating the misfortunes of others. The great Lucretius in his poem "De rerum natura" tells of the satisfaction enjoyed in witnessing, from the safety of the shore, the shipwrecked mariners struggling in the sea; but he does not seem to have found anything reprehensible in the sentiment. Nowadays we should, of course, indignantly deny any such baseness in ourselves, though we may not be so sure about "the other fellow" who is quite capable of putting a banana—skin on the path for our special benefit. However this may be, it cannot be ignored that the "foreign" press tends to gloat over the difficulties of Great Britain, formerly in India and Palestine, now in Iran and Egypt, conveniently forgetting the fact that no country in the world with international responsibilities can hope, in present world circumstances, to evade situations dangerous to national prestige.

Just twenty years—no more—have passed since a magnificent "Exposition Coloniale" was held in the Parisian suburb Vincennes, which attracted visitors from all parts of the world and was proudly pointed to in many countries, as being convincing evidence that the great nations of Europe, and the United States with them were in no way disposed to accept the concept of "the twilight of the West" or to renounce their "mission civilistrice".

How stands that Colonial Empire today? It has to be remembered that France, as a colonial power had a great asset shared by no other Western nation—the absence of a rigid colour bar. The extending to "native" peoples of the full rights of French citizenship went beyond legal formulae; mixed unions are not frowned on and "a touch of the tar brush"—or of yellow paint in the Far East, conveys no stigma, whatever other handicaps may have to be overcome. Moreover, colonial France has called forth the energy, and in not a few cases, the genius of great soldiers and administrators, second to none, and whatever may happen in the future their place in history is secure. Nevertheless, though the tricoleur still flies over many lands and over millions of many races, all of them, potentially if not actually, overseas Frenchmen, the wave of nationalism rising to full tide after the disasters of the second world-war has swept away many land-marks that seemed to have their foundations firmly based in tradition. Syria and Lebanon, with their great French Crusader castles, speaking still of warriors and heroes of the past who left their giant bones from Antioch to the Gulf of Aquaba and beyond-all gone. On Indo-China and Annam, Tonquin and Madagascar, we see French dominion fighting there for very life, and fate hangs daily in the balance. Now the interest and anxiety concentrates on Morocco, a question that really concerns all French Africa, north and central.

In Morocco the position is peculiar. Less than fifty years ago, though so near Europe, Morocco was very little known and foreigners were not welcomed there. The mutual jealousy of European powers helped to perpetuate this situation until it became intolerable, and in return for the usual shady agreements not to interfere with the ambitions of others elsewere, France was given a free hand to go ahead. By 1912, it was possible to speak of "pacification," and since that date, with a shadowy native ruler in nominally supreme authority, the civilizing of Morocco had gone far enough by 1913 for that country to have its "pavilion" in the Exhibition. But under the surface nationalism fermented, raising difficulties for the Sultan as well as for French military and civil authorities. These difficulties have now become acute, and have been raised in the United Nations by the representative of Irak, in a form that led the French representative to leave the Mandate Commission during the hearing. It is not only Great Britain that has to struggle with problems in the Mediterranean area!

[illegible]



Dear Sir,

Last week's pin up was certainly amongst your best . but tell me who writes the captions for the photographs? I presume you import them but do you adhere to the original description. I always have an uncomfortable feeling that my leg is being pulled yet I should not be so bold as to say that you tamper with the text. However, I find it more than difficult to believe that a girl with a name like Daphne Codd should be selected by the International Pearl Divers' Association (A.F.L.) as the "GIRL WITH WHOM WE WOULD LIKE TO SHUCK OYSTERS". One other point! Is there an International Pearl Divers' Association and would they be affiliated with the American Federation of Labour.

Sincerely yours,

"Doubtful"

The captions for S. P. M. pin ups are invariably rewritten by the staff not, however, to stretch credulence but to fill space. Miss Daphne Codd was not only selected by the International Pearl Divers' Association as the "GIRL WITH WHOM WE WOULD LIKE TO SHUCK OYSTERS" but stood as a candidate for the title "MISS BEACH-MINDED 1951, in which contest she failed to place: This fact was, therefore, omitted in order not to unnecessarily strain readers' doubts. Finally to the best of the editors' knowledge there is an International Pearl Divers' Association and Mr. Murray (president of the A. F. L.) would assuredly welcome them to the A. F. L. ED.



All of these qualities contribute to the world renowned reputation of

CAPSTAN

NAVY CUT CIGARETTES



KOREAN CEASE FIRE LINE RATIFIED IN PLENARY SESSION: CESSATION OF LAND FIGHTING REPORTED

Into the chilly, rain-soaked, roadside tent at Panmunjon this week swept a gust of accord. United Nations and Communist delegates set a thirty day deadline for concluding a truce as they, at the same time, came to an agreement on the second item of the peace agenda—the location of the cease fire line.

Agreement came just five months to the day after Soviet Deputy to the United Nations, Jacob A. Malik, proposed that both sides open negotiations for a cessation of hostilities based on the thirty-eighth Parallel.

In those five, weary, bloody months proposal after ill-fated proposal flailed the negative air of Communist obduracy and U. N. insistence. Meanwhile, the fighting had gone on, savage and costly. And ridge by dreary ridge had fallen, taking their toll of thousands of lives.

And what of the final settle~~ment? It clearly defined~~ a U N territorial victory:

The present battle line—now from ten to forty miles inside North Korea—will become the permanent truce line if agreement is reached within thirty days on outstanding agenda items. If the agreement is forthcoming the armies will surrender any territory gained in the next month's fighting. If there is no accord the discussions will go on and a new line will be drawn up along the points of battle contact at the time the peace is finally signed.

Ratified by a plenary session of negotiators after lower echelon groups had debated for days the topographical details, the line that will separate the two armies extends from a point south of Kosong on the east coast to the mouth of the Imjin river on the western seaboard. Extending along the length of the twisting line is a neutral corridor two and a half miles deep, which includes Panmunjom, site of the armistice negotiations for the past month but falls by several miles to encompass Katsong, former peace city.

But three multi-pronged problems of the five-point peace agenda remained to be settled. In order of scheduled appearance these are the three questions:

(1) SUPERVISING THE ARMISTICE: Each side distrusts the other and each fears that the other might use the lull for reinforcement and re-equipment with new weapons. To obviate difficulties and to allay suspicions some sort of inspection system is called for. The United Nations Command proposed a joint policing team, free to travel anywhere in Korea. The Communist proposal calls for a joint armistice commission responsible for armistice arrangements and supervision. Never ones to tolerate unauthorized nosing in their own backyard, the Communist plan made no mention of inspection behind the lines.

(2) EXCHANGE OF WAR CAPTIVES: In United Nations prison compounds are 168,346 prisoners—148,736 North Koreans and 19,610 Chinese. Just how many U. N. prisoners the enemy is holding is not known since neither North Korea nor Communist China is a member of the Geneva convention on war prisoners, therefore does not report them. Currently missing are 10,871 U. N. troops and 88,390 South Koreans. At Tuesday's plenary session, when the cease fire line was ratified, Admiral Charles Turner Joy, chief of the United Nations delegates, suggested each side prepare statistics on prisoners to speed that issue when it comes up for debate. The senior delegate proposed that each side prepare the latest available information on names, nationalities and other identification of all war prisoners and the location of all prisoners of war camps.

3 RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED: Never a clear point, this vaguely worded item results from a U. N. refusal to put on the agenda the withdrawal of troops from Korea. The U. N. insists that troop withdrawals form part of a political aspect and have no part in armistice discussions.

At week's end came a blurred report from the battle front that all land warfare had ceased and that only the sea and air warfare was still going on. Correspondents reported large fires along the Communist front and complete tranquillity.

It was not clear from where the cease fire order had emanated but from Key West, Florida, where President Truman is taking his winter vacation, came a vigorous denial from Presidential Press Secretary Joseph Short. Said he: "There can be no cease fire in Korea until an armistice has been signed."

EAST AND WEST CONTINUE VERBAL CLASH IN U. N.

East and West were still poles apart and no move yet made in the spacious chambers of the Palais de Chaillot, where the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly is convening, seemed capable of bridging the yawning hiatus of suspicion and tension now so much a part of East-West relationships.

Disarmament was still the number one issue on the business like agenda and the Big Two (Soviet Russia and the U. S. A.) were no closer to agreement now than they had been at the outset.

But now there was a new point of friction, which Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky raised last week. It concerns a provision in the American Mutual Security Act, which became law last October. The provision authorizes the President to spend up to $100 million out of military aid funds "for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from" Russia and the satellites "either to form such persons into elements of the military force supporting the North Atlantic Treaty organization or for other purposes.." The sponsors of the provision claim that "other purposes" provides an opening for them to aid underground forces behind the Iron Curtain

The Russians protested that the Mutual Security Act was designed to "finance subersive activities of persons and armed groups . . . (to) finance traitors and war criminals who fled from their countries" They branded the $100 [illegible] exchanged by President Roosevelt and former Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvanoff in 1933 when the United States formally recognized the Soviet state.

The pledges were made at the insistence of Washington which had a wary eye on the Comintern, predecessor of the Cominform. In the exchange each side promised not to sanction efforts at "bringing about by force . . . a change in the political or social order" of the other country.

Washington and the rest of the West conceded the move to Russia, it was an astute piece of diplomacy and one more step in a long-range plan—a peace propaganda battle.

At week's end the West took the initiative and simultaneous announcements from Washington, London and Paris declared that the Western Big Three were prepared to confer secretly with Russia and Luis Padilla Nervo, president of the United Nations General Assembly in an effort to reach an agreement on a common proposal for disarmament and the abolition of atomic weapons.

Taken off guard Foreign Minister Vishinsky asked for time to consider the proposal.

THE PROBLEM OF WEST GERMANY'S SOVEREIGNTY

Three facts were tangling the issues of West German sovereignty last week, all vitally interlocked and all hinged to a none-too-clear future.

How was the (West) German Ferderal Republic with its huge Ruhr industries and technical resources to be welded to the West and how was it to be fused into the Atlantic Community and its potential military manpower tapped so that it would flow into Community channels?

Last week the Western Big Three Foreign Ministers and the Bonn Government made an approach to solve these problems. U. S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman met with Bonn Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Paris. They approved an agreement which moved Chancellor Adenauer to remark with rhetoric flavour: "An historical event which has brought Western Germany forever into the Western camp."

The essentials of the agreement are:

Bonn occupation will end but Allied troops will remain on West [illegible] and foreign affairs. The Allies will reserve certain rights in specific fields. The Allies will have the right to intervene and [illegible] some control of the [illegible] in any emergency wh[illegible] their own position is endangered, and make decisions on the [illegible] question of West [illegible] German unity.

The new Allied-Bonn arrangement would await agreement on a European army. That is a multi-national army composed of units from France, Germany, Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg.

The uncertainties surrounding the agreement stem from three sources. First of these is the political situation in West Germany where Dr. Adenauer's stength has been weakened by losses in recent by-elections to extreme Rightist parties and especially to the powerful, well-disciplined Socialist party of Dr. Kurt Schumacher. The Socialist party leader has accused Dr. Adenauer of a "sell-out" to the Allies. He is inflexibly opposed to the European army proposal and insists that Germany rearm as a national equal with the Atlantic Pact countries or refrain from participation.

The second factor is French distrust of Germant rearmament for which reason they piloted the European army idea into prominence in an effort to head off any independent German rearmament plan.

The third factor, and perhaps the most important of all, is the dazzle of unity, long the hope of all Germans and recently brought to the fore again by an East German invitation to West Germany to participate in nation-wide elections.

However the issues were resolved even the most guileless optimist would not predict full West German membership in the N. A. T. O. before 1953.

Have yours at

THE VIOLIN GITANO

Huérfanos 757

TEA ROOM AND



NEWS AND VIEWS

Ercilla

GUILTY CROSS

"The Colonial tower of San Francisco—the cause of humorous polemics between the Mayor of Santiago and the Prior of the Franciscan Fathers—has upset local painters. In accordance with an order from the Mayor reconstruction work has begun on the outside walls of the church and tower. Taking advantage of the ascent to the bell towers the Prior ordered that the tilted cross be straightened—the cross is 30 metres above the street and was struck by a strong bolt of lightening during a storm. Local painters have always liked to go into the green gardens of the Order, and from there paint the picturesque tower with ancient tilted cross. But now that they have seen the new position of the cross they have countered with bitter statements: "Now we must remake all our paintings because of the cross".

EL DIARIO ILUSTRADO.

"A headline in a local paper says that our transportation and traffic problems will be studied in Europe.

But along with this way of fixing things, they'd better bring along some European mentality."

LA NACION

"The world-famous cancer specialist, Dr. George Pack, who only recently operated on Eva Duarte de Perón in Argentina and several years ago treated the Maharaja of Kapurtala, has arrived in Santiago He told reporters. "Friday I shall operate in the clinic of Dr De Amesti It will be a modest contribution to the success of this Congress (of Cancer Specialists)."

.....

"Simply by answering a question concerning the yearly export of Chilean nitrate, Professor Charles K. Ranson and his wife have won a free trip throughout South America. The fortunate couple arrived yesterday in Santiago. The luck began on a radio program called "Your Tropical Trip" Professor Ranson was called before a jury and asked about the annual exportation of nitrate from Chile. He answered that it was a million tons a year (he had only ten seconds to answer). His answer was closest to the fact: the actual figure is 690,000 tons per year.

Only last year Professor won another radio prize, a trip to Honolulu, on a program called "Earn Your Vacation"

The Ransoms will stay in Santiago about ten days".

EL MERCURIO

TO THE AUTOMOBILE THIEF

who stole my automobile No. B. V. 39 from my home, 751 Dr. Cadiz Street, leaving it abandoned at dawn last Sunday at Lo Encalada on the corner of Crescente Errázuriz, you are requested to come by the same spot to carry off the rest of the car that you left behind, after removing the wheels, radiator, etc., in order that I may collect my insurance since so long as there is anything left of the vehicle I can collect nothing. The automobile is still where you left it. Your cooperation will be much appreciated.

THE OWNER

. . .

Editor's Note: At press-time the automobile mentioned above had not been re-stolen. The owner of the car has been identified by the local press as Gustavo Campaña, newspaperman and radio script writer. Señor Campaña's insurance contract carried a clause stating that if the automobile reappeared before the end of ninety days no damages could be collected.

This week's pin-up feature Miss Laurette Greutner, lovely French mannequin, currently visiting the U. S. In a few short months Miss Greutner has managed to pocket the following titles: "Queen of Rising Star, Texas", "Miss Agricultural Products of 1951" and "The Girl We'd Most Like to Change a Tire With", by the Montana Auto Association.

Apply to
EXPRINTER
FOR PASSAGES TO
VALPARAISO,
SANTIAGO,
BUENOS AIRES.

S. SACK
IRON WAREHOUSE
SANTIAGO
SAN PABLO 1179 —
— MORANDE 817

LIQUOR STORE
DELICATESSEN
"LAS CONDES"
E' ALCALDE 923
Phone: El Golf (438) 302
QUALITY COLD MEATS & CONSERVES.

WINES & LIQUORS -
NATIONAL AND IMPORTED
OF THE BEST BRANDS.

DELICATESSEN OPEN
SUNDAYS AND HOLIDAYS
UNTIL 2 P M

RAPID HOME DELIVERIES.
ENGLISH SPOKEN

VENDEMOS por orden de uno de nuestros mandantes

14 espléndidos chalets

EN CALLE PIRINEOS PASADO ALCANTARA!

A corta distancia de trolebuses EL GOLF. Micro en la esquina. Frente al Colegio nuevo de los RR. PP. Alemanes. A 2 cuadras del Villa María Academy.

Primer piso: vestíbulo y hall, living-comedor, dormitorio de servicio, toilette de servicio, cocina con muebles, terraza.

Segundo piso: 3 dormitorios con closets, hall, baño.

Losa de concreto. Parquet en los dos pisos

Desde $ 850.000 a $ 895.000, incluyendo impuestos de transferencia y gastos de escritura.

($ 200.000 al contado y saldo en cuotas trimestrales de $ 100.000. Se aceptan operaciones por Cajas).

Entrega en Febrero

BANCO SUD AMERICANO
COMISIONES [illegible] CONFIANZA
Morandé 246 - 4.o Piso

PublPRESS

One of the advantages we have over most readers of the S. P. M. is that we can see what goes into print before publication and if we feel like commenting can do so at once without waiting for next week's edition. Thus we can acknowledge "Chatter Box's" comment on our column of the week before. We had asked for examples of words, which like "innings", have a singular form along with an "s" termination. Chatter Box came up with "series" and it is a good example—the dictionary states clearly that is serves both as singular and plural. Chatter Box also mentions that the headline "STIX NIX CRIX PIX" from "Variety" would produce blank despair on the face of any Englishman that came across it. It would do the same to 99 out of one hundred Americans. Probably ninety percent of those who do grasp the translation live, or have lived, within a one mile radius of Times Square. Although it will be comparable to translation from the Urdu (we used to speak it, but now have forgotten; you know how it is when you don't keep a language up) we shall attempt to clarify the meaning. First of all the strict meaning, in the terse language of Broadway: Stix means sticks, Nix is "says no to". Crix is critics and Pix is pictures. In other words the movie fans who live in the country do not swarm to the box office when a film that has been highly praised by reviewers arrives at the local flicker-house. WALL STREET LAYS AN AGG is, obviously, a reference to the crash of '29. "To lay an egg", when one is not speaking of a bird, means to drop a brick or put your foot in your mouth.

• • •

Words are fun, even the serious study of serious words. If you find yourself in the house some rainy afternoon without a game of canasta to fill your time pick up the dictionary and browse through it. The dictionary, etymologically speaking, is a fascinating tome. Take the word "shibboleth," for instance. Today it means "password, watchword; a party slogan." Its original meaning in Hebrew was "ear of corn or stream in flood". Its present usage stems from the time Jephtha used it as a battle-line password to distinguish his men from the fleeing Ephraimites —who could not pronunce it correctly. The same idea is used in today's warfare. English speaking troops often employ words that cannot be pronounced easily by the opposition. The idea even went further in an anecdote published in these pages a few weeks ago. American soldier to unknown: What are the words of "The Star Spangled Banner"? Answer: "Damned if I know them". Soldier: "Advance American soldier, and be recognized."

• • •

"Buncombe", also known as bunkum, was the name of a U. S. Congressman who made a pointless speech to impress his constituents. "Chauvinism", the practise of blind patriotism, comes from the name of Chauvin, a soldier who was continually boasting of Napoleon's glory. "Cabal", an intrigue, is a word composed of the initial letters of the names of five English gentlemen who conspired against authority. With these words we have hardly started in an investigation that can be as exciting as reading detective stories. But if the history and use of words is an interesting study, the observation of the mis-use of words is even more fun. We blush to say that we have an Aunt who "blurshes" when she is excited and often remarks on the "beautiful revenue of trees" in front of her house. Aldous Huxley once wrote a delightful story about a young man who thought the word "carminative" meant red, of or pertaining to that color. Huxley recounts how the fellow bandied the word about in an intellectual manner, and, most of the time got away with it since none of his listeners knew the difference. Actually the word describes a remedy for flatulence. And now we are going to stop before association makes someone think of descriptive words for this twittering.

D. A. P.

¡NO TE HAGAS ILUSIONES!
PARA ELIMINAR UNA DE LAS POSIBLES CAUSAS DEL MAL ALIENTO CEPÍLLESE LOS DIENTES TRES VECES AL DIA CON CREMA DENTIFRICA COLGATE!
GRACIAS DOCTOR! DESDE HOY SEGUIRÉ SU CONSEJO.
Y DESPUES DE LAVARSE LOS DIENTES DISUELVA EN SU BOCA UN POCO DE LA MISMA CREMA DENTIFRICA CON UN SORBO DE AGUA Y HAGA BUCHES. LUEGO ENJUÁGUESE. NOTARÁ ASÍ SU BOCA REALMENTE LIMPIA Y FRESCA
QUE MARAVILLA! LA ESPUMA ACTIVA Y PENETRANTE DE CREMA DENTIFRICA COLGATE SE INTRODUCE ENTRE DIENTE Y DIENTE, CON LA AYUDA DEL CEPILLO LIMPIANDOLOS A FONDO. ELIMINA ASI LAS PARTICULAS DE ALIMENTOS QUE SON UNA DE LAS CAUSAS DEL MAL ALIENTO. CREMA DENTIFRICA COLGATE MANTIENE MI ALIENTO PURO... PERFUMADO, Y MIS DIENTES BLANCOS Y BRILLANTES!
LA FELICITO SEÑORITA! DESDE EL PRÓXIMO MES SERÁ SECRETARIA DEL GERENTE
USE HOY MISMO CREMA DENTIFRICA COLGATE
RECUERDE Crema Dentifrica Colgate perfuma su aliento mientras limpia y embellece sus dientes!
CREMA DENTIFRICA COLGATE
reconocida por su alta calidad
LAS SONRISAS MÁS BELLAS SON SONRISAS COLGATE

CAFE ASTORIA
AHUMADA 31

Telephones: 39343-34387.

CAFE LUGANO
MATIAS COUSIÑO 62

Offer their distinguished clientele: Watt Jams, Mc. Kay biscuits and Ulmo flower honey.

Specialty: exquisite ice creams. Delivery to your house from 4 kilos.

A few weeks ago I commented that the performances of the Karadura Koncert Kompany, some twenty-five years ago, must have been as corny as their name. One of the organizers of that enterprise, Mr. Bert Gould, has since informed me that they were very good and that furthermore by their efforts were able to raise the sum of one thousand pounds for Earl Haig's Fund. The members of the party were all members of the British Legion and that once more demonstrates my contention that Legion Members of those days were more serious about their membership and the objects of the Legion than the new members of nowadays. To anyone who may feel offended at my comments about the name of the company, I apologise most sincerely, but nevertheless I still consider that the Name, Karadura Koncert Kompany, was a crumby one. Or should I say "krumby"?... Incidentally, the suggestion put forward by "JOE" last week that the apparent lack of enthusiasm on the part of the new members may be attributed to the fact that there are now more ladies who qualify for membership, and so forth, doesn't convince me very much . . . I recall a dinner at the Country Club, two or three years ago, at which the ladies sang the barrack room ballades of the 1939-1945 affray with quite as much gusty enthusiasm as the men . . . And anyone who states that the ladies are not as keen a party as the men prevaricates, and the truth is not in him . . . Mr. Bert Gould, who has always been active in Legion affairs, and for his service in the Second World War was decorated by the Chilean Government and rewarded handsomely by His Majesty's, is still around and very vital. Now that the election of officers is approaching, I emphatically suggest that the members of the Legion couldn't do better than vote for Mr. Albert C. Gould, M. M., as President . . . This is not a paid announcement. It's just the expression of a personal opinion, to which anyone is entitled. Mr. Gould may put his medals on back to front, or the wrong way round, when he attends Church Parade, but, as he says, "What the heck! The Sergeant-Major won't be here"!

• • •

D. A. P. in his "Hell Box" the other week expressed his confusion at vagaries of the English Language as used by the reporter of a Cricket Match. He needn't feel so upset about it, because I am more than sure that there are many Englishmen who would be as equally puzzled by many of the terms . . . And I can't imagine a greater punishment for any Englishmen than to be cast on a desert island with the Sports Section of an American newspaper as a sole companion . . . I have to confess that, even after a residence of some six years in New York, and in spite of the fact that I was a staunch supporter of the Baseball Team formed by the employees of the Bank that had the doubtful honor of counting me among them, I still am unable to explain the finer points of the game . . . Once it was explained to me very carefully by a profound student of the sporting world how Baseball was evolved from cricket, but I can't even recall that interesting point . . . Maybe the fact that the ground which the team used was attached to Tromer's Brewery in Brooklyn, and the liquid refreshment was good and plentiful has something to do with the fact that I didn't pay as much attention to the game as I should have done . . . As for the word "innings", which bothered D. A. P. so much, I was always under the impression that it was one of those peculiar English words with a plural form, but is really singular. Such as "series". The question is one for a philologist to explain, and if there is one in the audience, now's the time for him to step forward and do his stuff . . . Talking of the difference between English as used in England and the United States one must not overlook that famous weekly of show business Variety . . . Such notable headlines as STIX NIX CRIX PIX and WALL STREET LAYS AN EGG are undoubtedly inspirations but I don't think they will produce anything but blank despair on the face of any Englishman who comes across them . . . Yet the fact remains that there are English people who firmly believe that they can understand fully and will be understood amply, in the United States just because they can make sense out of the stories in the Saturday Evening Post and Ladies' Home Journal. It isn't as easy as that believe me!

CHATTER BOX.

LONDON Letter

An underground gasoline tank blew up in the crowded centre of Bristol this week, killing at least seven persons and shattering store fronts in a quarter mile area. Weekend shoppers were bowled over by the blast and persons in nearby houses were trapped as ceilings and walls collapsed . . . Discovery of extensive manganese deposits in the northwestern areas of British Guiana was reported by the Barima Gold Mining Compnay (Canada) Ltd. The report said preliminary tests indicated a large tonnage of rather low grade ore.

• • •

Prime Minister Churchill and the three other ministers who are to accompany him to Washington will depart on the Queen Mary on December 29, for discussions with President Truman, expected to begin January 3rd. The other ministers are Anthony Eden, Lord Ishmay, and Lord Cherwell. On leaving Washington Mr. Churchill will visit Canada at the invitation of the Canadian Government and spend two or three days in Ottawa. The two visits will probably take about a fortnight, after which Mr. Churchill will return home by air.

• • •

Charles Norris, a 24-year-old American in Paris was ready for bed when he saw a picture of Princess Margaret in a newspaper. He was so smitten with her beauty he decided to attempt a meeting. The newspaper reported that the Princess was attending a charity ball that night. Norris put on his tuxedo and borrowed 8,000 francs for a ticket to the ball. Making his way through a knot of admirers around Margaret, he offered his hand. He said: "Excuse me, Your Highness, I should like to present myself. I am an American and my name is Chuck Norris". "I am delighted to meet you," the Princess replied. When Norris asked for a dance, however, she told him that she sorry, but was "booked up".

• • •

Protestant and Roman Catholic churches throughout Britain will offer special prayers and thanksgiving on December 9th for the restoration to health of King George VI. The King, recovering from a lung operation, celebrates the fifteenth anniversary of his accession to the throne on December 11th . . . When American troops in Korea offered to share their Thanksgiving holiday food supplies with other United Nations troops the offer was politely declined by British units. They explained that they would rather wait for the special rations until A British-type turkey celebration was more in order at Christmas time.

• • •

A move to re-create the Home Guard, the voluntary body of part-time soldiers who stood guard over Britain while her army was fighting abroad in World War II, was approved this week by the House of Commons on its second reading. No vote was taken, although Labour party members questioned the necessity for the measure and said that it would offer amendments to it in the committee stage of consideration that will follow the second reading.

MEDIAS NYLON
Laban

Reinforced, "Tourist" type $ 98.-
Fine thread, $ 138.- & 118.-
Super Fine, "Celofan" type 175.-
Super Fine, "Supreme" type 195.-
Super Fine, without seam 145.-

THERE ARE TWENTY TYPES MORE IN 51, 54 & 60 GUAGE

Fifteen colours by type, including mourning and half mourning. There are also BROWN HEEL, SHADED HEEL, BLACK HEEL, BLUE HEEL & GREEN HEEL

WHITE STOCKINGS FOR NURSES.

WHOLESALE AND RETAIL SALES.

CASH ON DELIVERY, SAME DAY WITH PURCHASE OF THREE PAIRS.

OPEN ALL DAY ON SATURDAY

INDUSTRIA NACIONAL DE MEDIAS [illegible]

READERS

This one finds the Mail amusing...

Perhaps some feel this way about the Mail...

This one is rather shocked ..

And this man has just had his name mispelled in the Social News for the third straight week...

But together, Mail readers constitute a class market that can afford to buy your product. It pays to advertise in the S.P.M.

"THE SOUTH AMERICAN HANDBOOK" 1951

Price $ 100.— per copy.

ENLARGED EDITION
Obtainable from the offices of the "South Pacific Mail" and offices and agents of The Pacific Steam Navigation Company.

Dr. MARCOS EMILFORK
Modern Dentistry
ENGLISH SPOKEN
Condell 1210 - Telephone 7267
VALPARAISO

ARTURO EWING
LAWYER
Prat 865 — Phone 4633
P O BOX 388.

OCULIST
DR TUYL
Ear nose and throat
CONSULT
BLANCO 1341
[illegible]

NEW YORK Notes

BUSINESS DEPT., Francis J. Whitehair, the Under Secretary of the Navy, conferred with President Truman who suddenly asked him: "One of your ancestors was the chief of the Osage tribe, wasn't he?" . . . "Yes, Mr. President," said Mr. Whitehair . . . "And didn't he trade 5,000 acres of choice Kansas farmland for a carload of whiskey?" said the President . . . "Yes, sir," said Mr. Whitehair... The President smiled at the Under Secretary and said: "Don't you go trading any carriers without talking to me."

SCHOOL DEPT.: On Thursday afternoon, in New Haven, there was a meeting of university presidents. One of the attendants was Dr. Franklyn Murphy, the new head of the University of Kansas, who is only 35 years old—the youngest head of a major university. The 35-year-old Murphy said to Whitney Griswold, the president of Yale: "I've become somewhat of a curiosity—being pointed out, the youngest, etc. I think I should have my hair pulled out or else dye it gray" . . . "Just wait two years," the 40-year-old Griswold replied. "Two more years at the job—and your hair will fall out."

PHOTO DEPT.: Dr. Albert Einstein continues to rank among those whose photo is published most frequently. A visitor at Princeton said to Einstein: "You are a scientist, mathematician, teacher, author—if you were asked to give your profession, what would you say?" . . . "My profession?" said Einstein, "photographer's model."

ART. DEPT.: Tom Benton, whose home is in Kansas City, decided to use his talents as a painter to help the victims of the recent flood. He therefore prepared lithographs depicting the plight of the flood-sufferers, struck off enough copies for Congress and mailed the lithographs to the Congressmen in the hope of inducing them to legislate increases in relief funds . . . Most of the Congressmen, unaware of the worth of a Benton lithograph, ignored it. Rep. Dick Bolling and his staff visited the offices of his colleagues, retrieved the Benton lithographs from their waste-baskets, took the lithographs to Kansas City and sold them at auction for the benefit of flood victims.

SCHOOL DEPT.: Michael DiSalle, the Price Stabilizer, was invited to make the commencement address at St. Mary's, in South Bend, Ind. DiSalle's daughter, a pupil at that school, is a member of the graduating class. In his letter of acceptance, DiSalle told the head of the school: "Thanks for your invitation. I was going to be there anyway."

Mike Todd has become the jumping jack of show business Before he came to Broadway he won and lost several fortunes, and a series of hit shows made him rich again. Then he gambled it away, made another fortune and lost that too. Now he and Lowell Thomas have been devoting their time to the production of tri-dimensional movies. Sir Alexander Korda saw a sample, spread the word that it would revolutionize movie-making and again Todd is riding high, with capital gain offers which can net him several millions. "I'll come back to Broadway only when I have enough not to worry about a review," said the producer. "I'll produce a show only when I feel that my life doesn't go with it."

The Overseas Press Club, which invited the Mayor to be guest of honor at a luncheon to discuss and be questioned about his recent trip abroad, received no reply. They withdrew the invitation . . . Sen. Bricker hears that Michael DiSalle's official announcement of his candidacy for the U. S. Senate will be made on Feb. 15 . . . The Associated American Artists, which developed a ceramics business for its 20 artists, now is venturing into another field—fabrics. They'll be featured at Macy's . . . As of last night, Dan Topping says he still hasn't heard from Joe DiMaggio about next year's plans.

MACARIO BRIONES Y CIA.
Martillero Público y de Hacienda.
Calle Blanco 119 — Telephone 2514 — Casilla 1577
VALPARAISO
AUCTIONS — CONSIGNMENTS — PRIVATE SALES

NEWSLETTER FROM CHILE

A Concise Report of Economic and Political Development For the Business Man Interested in the South American Market Send for a sample copy without obligation

CASILLA 1250 — SANTIAGO.

[illegible]

THE WINDFALL

BY

ERSKINE CALDWELL

WHEN Waldo Murdock, whose trade, when he felt like working at it, was rendering creatures, came into the unexpected inheritance, there had been no commotion in Brighton to equal it since the time when, eleven years before, one of the Perkins brothers, with no more forewarning than a stroke of summer lightning, ran away in broad daylight with the resident minister's second wife.

As for the townspeople none of them, not even Aunt Susie Shook, who told fortunes by reading tea leaves or coffee grounds if necessary, had ever had the remotest idea that anything in the nature of sudden wealth would fall into Waldo Murdock's scrawny lap, while at the same time, of course, people were quick to say that if he had not been sitting down, as usual, instead of being up and doing, there would have been no lap of his for it to fall into; and certainly Waldo himself, even though he daydreamed about almost everything else under the sun, had never entertained such a farfetched thought in his mind.

Waldo did not even know he had a brother in Australia and, even if he had known it, he would never have imagined that he would be remembered in a will. From Bangor to Burlington, all the Murdocks especially the home-owning branch of the family, were known throughout the entire region north of Boston for their trait, which relatives-by-marriage and other outsiders called cussedness, of not acknowledging kinship with one another. And so it was, it was all Waldo could do to force himself, after having cast aside pride of long standing, publicly to admit blood relationship with another Murdock, even if he had lived in Australia, long enough to go to the bank in Waterville and cash the check the lawyer from Portland had handed him.

"Pay no mind to what the people say," he told the clerk in the bank. "There may be others in the State of Maine bearing the name of Murdock, but there's not a single drop of mingling blood that I would own to. I'd sooner claim kinship with my old black cow than I would with a so-called Murdock."

Dessie, Waldo's wife, was, at the beginning, the most levelheaded of all. She maintained her mental balance, if only at the start, much better than Waldo and some of the townspeople. Dessie, although afterward she regretted not having gone along, even remained at home and tended the house chores while Waldo was away in Waterville cashing the check. There was only one thing she did out of the ordinary that forenoon, and that was to make Justine, the hired girl, air the parlor and shake out the scatter rugs, even if it were not Saturday.

During all that time the neighbors were ringing her up on the phone and asking what she was going to do with all that money, but that, too in the beginning, failed to veer the even measure of her thoughts.

"When the check is cashed, if it's not worthless, and it'll be a wonder if it's not, there'll be ample time at hand for me to go out of my way to think about it," she told them. "Right now, and likely forever after, it's nothing but a scrawl and a promise on a slip of paper."

Dessie went back to work with her lips a little tighter each time she finished talking to one of the neighbors on the phone. She was not exactly worried, she told Justine, but she was feeling impatient. Waldo failed to come home at the noon hour for dinner, and it was not long after that before she, like everybody else in Brighton who was working himself into a frenzy over Waldo's sudden windfall, began thinking what could be done with the money.

Late that afternoon Waldo drove up to the dooryard and left the automobile standing there instead of putting it away in the shed where it belonged.

Justine came running to tell her. [illegible] of several [illegible] when Justine, who was as excited as she [illegible] ran into the room where she was.

"Mr. Murdock's back!" Justine cried, twisting her fingers.

"He'd better be!" Dessie said. "If he hadn't got home when he did, he could have just kept on traveling, for all the concern I'd ever have."

"I guess Mr. Murdock has the real money," Justine said, looking over her shoulder. "He looked like he was feeling good about it when he got out of the auto."

Dessie leaped to her feet.

"Go on about your tasks, whatever they be, Justine," she said crossly. "It's none of your money, if there is any, anyway."

Justine went to the kitchen and watched Waldo come along the path to the side door.

Waldo came in, throwing his hat on the table. He looked at Dessie for a moment, cocking his head a little to one side. His coat pocket sagged heavily.

Neither Dessie nor Waldo spoke for a while.

Presently Dessie walked up to him and held out her hand.

"Guess I'll take charge for the time being, Waldo," she said stiffly. "Hand it over."

Waldo reached into his coat pocket, drawing out a mostly empty bottle and handing it to her. She stepped back, looking at it severely. Then, without a word, she grabbed the bottle by the neck and slung it with all her might across the room. It struck the wall, shattering into dozens of pieces.

"I might have known it, and I would have, if I had only had the sense God has given most people!" she said, raising her voice. "I've got only myself to blame!"

Waldo reached for a chair.

"Now, there's no cause for a human to take on so, Dessie," he said. "Everything turned out, from here to there and back again, like it was made to order."

[illegible] pocket and [illegible] of greenbacks [illegible] tightly around the [illegible] with a piece of heavy twine. Dessie forgot her anger the instant she saw the money. The scowling lines on her face disappeared completely while she watched Waldo bounce the roll up and down in his hand.

"All I've got to say," she began, "is that I never thought I'd live to breathe the air of the day when a deceasing Murdock would have the decency to do the honorable thing with his money, even if he couldn't find means of taking it along with him when he went, which would be a wonder if he didn't try to do, and he probably did, anyway."

Waldo leaned back and let her talk to her heart's content. He felt so good himself that he wanted her to have a good time, too. He let her speak what came to mind without uttering a single grumble.

"Have you any more blood relations that we've neglected to remind ourselves of, Waldo?" she asked, leaning toward him. "It seems to me that I recall your second cousin in Skowhegan saying once some years ago that a Murdock went to California at the end of the Spanish-American War and prospected for gold. It might be that he struck it rich out there, which a lot of people did, so I've read, if reading can be believed. If we'd been more particular about your blood relations in the past, we wouldn't have to sit here now and wrack our brains trying to call them to mind at a time like this."

"Guess I have no blood relations of the name of Murdock," Waldo said firmly.

Dessie drew a deep breath and looked longingly at the large roll of greenbacks bouncing up and down in her husband's hand.

Suddenly she leaned forward and grasped the roll desperately.

Waldo snatched it from her.

"This is Murdock money, woman," he said quickly. "A Murdock made it, and a Murdock shall spend it."

Dessie sat up decisively.

"Well, anyway, we'll be sensible," she said calmly. "We won't thro it away on trifles like a lot o people would who I could mentio if I had a mind to."

"I've got it all settled, Dessie," Waldo told her, smiling as kindly feeling came over him. "Guess we can afford to have good time now at our age. Mayb we won't be lingering here much longer, which would be a sham if we hadn't taken full advantag of it by the time we wen Wouldn't be no sense in hoardin it only to have to pass it alon to somebody else after we ar gone."

Dessie nodded approvingly, he spirits rising again.

"I've always wanted a fur neck piece, Waldo," she said, her fac bright with hope.

Dessie did not sleep a singl wink that night. For an hour afte they had gone to bed, she la silently tense, listening. Waldo di not stir. He lay on his back listening to Dessie's labored breathi

Just before midnight Dessie g up as quietly as she possibly coul and tiptoed to the foot of the bed where Waldo had laid his pants over the back of a chair. It was dark in the room with the shades drawn, and she took care in feeling her way to the chair. She was trembling nervously when she touched it, and the jerking of her breath had started a pain in her chest. Without losing any more time she slid her hand into the pants pocket.

"Get your hand out of my pants, Dessie," Waldo said, rising up in bed. "Leave that money be."

Dessie dropped the pants without having touched the money, and went back to bed without a word. Neither of them spoke as she lay down again and tried to

Swan Pens

Express your personality

SOLE IMPORTERS

ENI SOCIEDAD ANONIMA DE REPRESENTACIONES

Compañía 2046 — Santiago — Casilla 2051

All For The Comfort Of Your HOME!

RADIOS

WASHING

MIXERS

WAXERS

HEATERS "WINTER"

REFRIGERATORS

Credit

DIRA

DISTRIBUIDORA DE RADIOS LTDA.

MERCED 709 esq. MAC IVER

[illegible] the room.

Just as dawn was beginning to show the first signs of break of day, Dessie slid carefully from the bed and crawled on her hands and knees toward the chair. As she was rising up to reach the pants, Waldo sat up erectly.

"Don't want to have to mention again about you putting your hand in my pants pocket," he said. "Leave that money be, Dessie."

Dessie dropped the pants and went to the window. She stood there watching a red dawn break in the east. After a while she began dressing, and as she was leaving the chamber she heard Justine starting a fire in the kitchen stove.

While she and Justine were preparing breakfast, she began to realize how uneasy she really was about the money. She had spent a sleepless night worrying over the wealth, and she was afraid she would not get a chance to spend a single penny of it herself.

"Mrs Murdock," Justine said, coming and standing beside her. "Carl and I could get mated right away if we had the money for a chamber suite."

"Let Carl Friend make his own money," Dessie said sharply, turning on the girl. "Me and my husband have worked hard all our lives for what we possess. It won't hurt Carl Friend to do the same for you, if he wants a family."

"I couldn't sleep much last night for staying awake wondering if you and Mr. Murdock wouldn't want to help me out," Justine said persistently. "Especially because I've worked here for you six years without asking favors, and I didn't think you'd miss a little of all that big inheritance from Australia."

"Mind your own affairs, Justine!" she said sharply. "Besides, Carl Friend can get the money from his own family if he wants to furnish a house for you. Those Friends have made plenty of profit in roof-tinning in the past."

"They won't help any, Mrs. Murdock," Justine said sadly. "And Carl and I don't want to have to wait and wait and wait."

"You don't have to hurry the marriage for any reason, do you?" Dessie asked suspiciously.

Justine looked at her for several moments her thoughts racing through her mind.

"Not exactly," she admitted at [illegible]

"Well, then," Dessie said, turning away, "in that case, you can afford to wait."

In turning abruptly she almost walked headlong into Waldo. He had come into the kitchen and [illegible] empty coffee can and left, going through the kitchen and out the door without a word being spoken. Dessie watched him leave, wondering what he was about to do. She went to the window and watched as he walked to the tool shed and came out a moment later carrying a spade. With the coffee can in one hand and the spade over his shoulder, he disappeared out of sight behind the barn.

It was not until almost ten minutes had passed that Dessie realized what Waldo was doing behind the barn.

Just as she was opening the door to run out there and observe him from the corner of the barn, Waldo walked into view. He came toward the house, carrying the spade but not the coffee can. Dessie's heart sank. He had buried the can, and the money with it, and she had failed to get out there in time to see where the wealth had been hidden. She walked back into the kitchen and placed breakfast on the table.

Waldo came in a few minutes later washed his hands at the pump, and sat down at his place. He began eating as though nothing out of the ordinary had taken place out behind the barn. Neither she nor Waldo had anything to say to each other during the whole twenty minutes they were at the table. When he finished eating, he got up and put on his hat.

"Have some affairs to attend to in the village," he said shortly. "Will be away for the forenoon, the whole of it."

Dessie nodded. She had to grip her hands tightly in order to hide her impatience. She waited until Waldo had got into the car and driven over the hill out of sight, and then she grabbed Justine by the arm and pulled her through the door. Pushing Justine ahead, Dessie ran as fast as she could to the tool shed, where she quickly snatched up two spades, and then hurried toward the back of the barn.

She set Justine to digging right away, while she looked the ground over carefully, hoping to find evidence of a freshly covered hole. She searched for nearly half an hour without finding a single trace of the hole she was positive Waldo had dug, and after that she went to work, digging methodically.

After several hours Justine slumped to the ground, completely exhausted. Dessie was tired, too, and the blisters on her hands made digging so painful that she could hardly bear to hold the [illegible] Justine [illegible] tried to push the blade of the spade into the stony earth. She wanted to beg Dessie to let her rest some more, but when she glanced up and saw Dessie's closely clamped lips she knew it would be useless to ask.

Dessie stopped for a moment to ease her back. When her eyes were raised from the ground, she saw Fred Paxton leaning over the stone wall beside the road a hundred feet away.

"Going fishing, Dessie?" he called. "See you're digging fishing worms."

Dessie thrust her hand against the small of her aching back and straightened up a little more.

"Thought I might," she said slowly. "It's been a long time since I went."

"Now that you and Waldo have all that money to falute on," Fred said, "I guess you and him can afford to spend all your time doing nothing but fish, if you have a mind to."

"Maybe," she said, tightening her lips.

The mere mention of the money inflamed her thoughts until she could not see clearly. She bent over the spade, thrusting the blade into the rough, stony ground with all her might. She kept doggedly at it until she was certain Fred had walked out of sight over the hill.

Later she sent Justine to the kitchen for some bread and potatoes left over from breakfast, and when Justine returned, Dessie sat down in the shade of the barn and ate hurriedly.

"While I was in the house, Mr. Murdock phoned and said he wouldn't be back in the forenoon," Justine said. "He told me to tell you he would be away in the afternoon, too, the whole of it."

Dessie leaped to her feet.

"Why didn't you tell me right away when you came back a minute ago?" she said angrily.

Justine glanced at the stony ground.

"We're not going to dig out here the whole afternoon, too, are we, Mrs. Murdock?" she inquired pleadingly. "My hands are raw with blisters, and—"

"Never mind that," Dessie said firmly. "We are going to dig this afternoon, the whole of it!"

"But, Mrs. Murdock—"

"Shut up, Justine, and do as you are told!"

When Dessie fell on the bed at dusk that evening, she had never before in all her life felt so thoroughly miserable. Not only had she spent the entire day digging in the stony ground behind the barn, but, moreover, [illegible]

Once up on the bed, she moved her body carefully, easing herself into a prone position. Justine had gone out earlier in the evening with Carl Friend and Waldo still had not returned. Dessie felt so tired and lonely that she wanted to cry. Just as she felt tears coming into her eyes, the phone began to ring. She lay motionless, listening to it ring for several minutes hoping all the while that it would stop so she could begin crying.

The phone did not stop, and it sounded as if it never would as long as she lived. She got to her feet, pressing her hands over her ears in order to keep out the sound, and stumbled painfully to the hall. There she sat down in the chair beside the stand and lifted the receiver.

"Hello," she said unsteadily.

"Is this Waldo Murdock's wife?" a voice boomed.

"Yes," she answered, wondering who it could be.

"Then you'd better bestir yourself and fetch Waldo home where he belongs before it's too late. This is Charles Mason. Waldo is over here at my place, in the east part of town, annoying my household, and if he was a Democrat, I'd shoot him myself, instead of turning the job over to his wife. I've never in my life seen a man behave like he's doing. I guess it's public knowledge by now, otherwise I wouldn't be repeating it that sudden wealth has gone to his head, but that's still no excuse for the way he's doing."

"What's Waldo doing?" Dessie asked, shouting impulsively into the phone.

"He's befudding Miss Wilson, the schoolteacher who boards at my house, into going away with him. He says he's going to set sail for Australia or somewhere."

"But he can't do that!" Dessie protested.

"That's what any average, normal, level-minded human being would think, too, but I don't know what's going to stop Waldo if you don't come and get him right away, because he's already befuddled Miss Wilson into going to Boston with him tonight, and starting out again from there the first thing in the morning. He's got Miss Wilson believing everything he says, the lies along with the common truth. Looks like she would be on her guard, knowing she's associating with a newlyrich, but she's too far gone now to listen to reason. Waldo pulls out his wealth every few minutes and waves it in front of her, and the sight of that big roll of greenbacks acts on her just like chloroform [illegible]

[illegible] you say Waldo has a big roll of money?" she asked. "Greenbacks tied with a string around the middle?"

"He surely has, Mrs. Murdock. It's the biggest roll of money I've seen on a man since the Democrats took over."

Dessie who had risen from the chair until she was almost erect, sat down, hard.

"Let him be!" she said coldly. "I don't want part or parcel of him. He had me digging in stony ground all day looking for that money in a coffee can, and it wasn't there at all. Let the schoolteacher take him. I've had my share and more of suffering, and now I'd be comforted to see somebody else have a goodly portion of it. Sudden wealth will show up a man's true nature every time, and I'm glad I found out the true size and shape of Waldo Murdock's nature before I wasted another single day of my life on him."

"You mean you're not going to try to stop Waldo from going away to the other end of the world with Miss Wilson?"

"No!" Dessie said emphatically. "Waldo Murdock has a free hand from now on!"

She hung up the receiver. A moment later she slumped brokenly in the chair. She called Justine several times before remembering that Justine had gone out with Carl Friend.

After that she hurried into her clothes and went back to the phone. She rang up Thornton Blanchard, her lawyer, and told him to come right away. He lived only a few miles distant, and he promised to be there within fifteen minutes.

While waiting for Thornton Blanchard, Dessie paced up and down the hallway, her face grim and determined. Her mind was made up, and she knew the sooner she acted the better she would feel.

After a few more minutes, he drove up to the house and stopped his car in the dooryard. Dessie went to the step, holding the door open for him. Thornton Blanchard hurried inside and went directly to the table in the center of the living room.

"Is there something wrong, Mrs. Murdock?" he asked anxiously.

"There is now, but it won't be much longer," she said, sitting down at the table, "not after I set things right I should have attended to twenty years ago."

Blanchard sat down and opened his brief case, slipping out a pad of ruled yellow writing paper and a pencil. He watched Dessie's face, waiting for her to begin.

To be continued next week

POLLA
4 Millions
2nd OF DECEMBER
WHOLE TICKET $ 400.- TWENTIETH $ 20.-
(TAX INCLUDED)

ALGARRORO
LA MEJOR PLAYA, BALNEARIO DE MODA
HOTEL DEL PACIFICO
El Mejor Hotel — : — Abierto Todo el Año
INFORMES Y RESERVAS
UNION AMERICANA 176 — FONO 93647
Horas de Atención 3 a 6 — Dirección Telegráfica
PACIFICO — ALGARROBO
Teléfono Algarrobo 1.

Growing Popularity of Rugby League Football

by

Walter Pilkington

Sports Editor of the "Lancashire Evening Post" and contributor to leading sports publications in Britain

TWELVE months ago a French Rugby League team visited Britain and lost by nine points to 14 at Leeds, North of England centre of an area more attached to this offshoot of the rugby game than to Association football. Since then the French converts to the Rugby League code have become international champions. Thus the return visit to Yorkshire by France for a match at Hull against Other Nationalities (comprising ten Australians, two Scots and one New Zealander, all of them players with English Rugby League Clubs) was a recent attractive feature of a crowded programme spiced this winter by the tour of New Zealand Kiwis.

These visits and the French tour of Australasia this year when they broke crowd records nearly everywhere they went have proved the ever growing popularity of the Rugby League professional game.

Enthusiasts for the code are not without hope of inspiring a liking for the game in the United States American National Football League. Sunderland's idea is to encourage the formation of a pioneering team to visit the English centres in the same way that Jean Gallia's Frenchmen first came 17 years ago, learn the game and return to encourage others to take it up. The French learned so well that an international championship which included France was formed in 1935.

AUSTRALIAN TOUR

Although travel tired after playing 22 games with only two defeats in the recent Australian tour the Frenchmen went to New Zealand and lost only one of seven matches. To show how the game is thriving in Australia the Sydney cricket ground was packed, when the third and deciding Test Match was played, by 67,000 spectators. Winning by 35 points to 14, the Frenchmen inflicted a more overwhelming defeat than any suffered by an Australian test team in the long history of Rugby League in that country. The speedy clever Frenchmen taught lessons which will be taken to heart by the selectors in choosing a young team for a return tour of England and France next year.

This girdling of the globe by a comparatively new game is amazing when one reflects that it was enduring a struggling infancy at [illegible] lovers for [illegible] Association. The [illegible] secession in England of the North from Rugby Union in 1895 with 22 clubs drawn exclusively [illegible] in Lancashire and West Yorkshire. Three years later unrestricted professionalism was introduced. The inevitable break away from strictly amateur rugby followed. In 1906, 13 players a side instead of 15 was tried. Other milestones were the first visit of a New Zealand team in 1907, the first England v. Australia Test match the following year, the first visit of a United Kingdom team to Australia in 1910, the changing of the title from Northern Union to Rugby Football League in 1922, and the First Cup Final in London seven years later.

The capital regarded this intrusion of the northern rugby hosts with disdain and indifference so that the modest attendance largely comprised followers of the Cup [illegible] in Lancashire and Yorkshire [illegible] But the power, stamina, speed, [illegible] and expert football of the Rugby League men eventually won the support of a more cosmopolitan public with the result that the Cup Final crowds became comparable with those seen at Wembley Stadium on great Association football occasions. Last year record receipts of £24,782 were taken at the stadium on the most eventful day in the Rugby League calendar.

HAD TO FIGHT FOR EXISTENCE

Yet it is well within the memory of many people how great clubs like Wigan, the Lancashire stronghold of the game, came into being. Wigan, since World War II, has won the League title three times in six seasons and taken the Cup twice in the last four. The club has been Lancashire champions and Cup winners every year since 1945 and 13 times altogether [illegible] 50 years ago Wigan [illegible] to fight for existence. The ch poor and almost penniless leas a field from the railway compan The ground was raised and leve led by paid and voluntary wor ers and the first match took pla in September 1902. The play themselves helped in groun improvements. At first there we no dressing rooms. The grad progressive changes which mac Wigan renowned as a club hav marked the development of th game in other towns and countrie

In England it is thriving i Lancashire and Yorkshire, th counties which gave it birth, an gaining a greater hold in sout Wales. The time will come whe it will spread to the north-eas midlands and south, and th winter's visit of the fifth team o New Zealand Rugby League play ers to go to England and of th touring Frenchmen cannot fail t stimulate wider interest.

Make soup the easy way

and see your guests enjoy it

CALDOX

productos del petróleo

Gasolinas — Kerosene —
Aguarrás Petróleos Diesel
Combustibles Aceites y
Grasas lubricantes.
Solventes
Parafina — Asfaltos
Productos químicos

productos del hogar

Insecticidas
Cera para pisos
Lustra muebles.
Limpia vidrios
Desmanchadores.

COPEC
M. R.

STORANDT PUBLICIDAD

Neumáticos cámaras y baterías Insa
Neumáticos agrícolas e industriales Goodyear
Productos de caucho Goodyear
Accesorios para automóviles

productos del caucho

Tractores a orugas y a ruedas "Oliver"
Maquinarias e implementos agrícolas
Camiones Volvo
Maquinaria para construcción de caminos
Maquinaria industrial

maquinarias

SOCIAL NOTES

Col. and Mrs Herbert C Chambers were hosts at a cocktail-buffet supper last Saturday night at their home The guest list included Ambassador and Mrs. Claude Bowers, Mr. and Mrs. H Gerald Smith, Col and C. W. Bennett, Mrs. T. F. Van Natta, Sr. Pedro Dela Maggiora and Sra., Col and Mrs. William Ross, Maj and Mrs. Leonard Pratt, Maj. and Mrs. Arthur Gaston, Col. and Mrs. James Wray, Col and Mrs. Horace Hatch, Capt and Mrs. Gerald Mann, Major and Mrs. Fred Nelson, Captain and Mrs. Edward Southwick, Mr. and Mrs. Armando Chellew, Mr. and Mrs. Stanley Burke, Maj. and Mrs. James H. Carroll, Mr. and Mrs. W. W Bitting, Mr. and Mrs E. J. Campbell, Mr. and Mrs. John Stoddard, Mrs. J. G. Thomann, Mrs. Carlos Hall, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Glover, Miss Margaret Barnard, Miss Netta Lauder, Mr. Anthony Vaughan and Mr. Philip Davenport.

—oOo—

Mrs. Arthur Trevena Sr., of Viña del Mar, left Santiago Monday for Buenos Aires where she will stay until her boat leaves for England about December 3rd. Mrs. Trevena plans to spend a year in England, visiting her children, relatives and friends.

Mr. and Mrs. Albert Haney were guests of honor at a despedida given last Thursday night by Mr. and Mrs. David McMorris. The guests included: Mr. and Mrs. John Stoddard, Maj and Mrs Arthur Gaston, Mr. and Mrs. Stanley Burke, Mr. and Mrs. George Littlejohn Cook, Mr. and Mrs H. Gerald Smith, Mrs. Carlos Hall, Mr. and Mrs Felix Caffarena, Mr. and Mrs. Jack Mac Rostie, Mrs Robert Taylor, Mr. and Mrs. F. R. M. Elton, Mr. and Mrs Donall Daughters, Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Davidson, Mr. and Mrs. John Trevená, Mr. & Mrs. Richard Fallon and Mr. Keith Eggers.

—oOo—

Sr. Jean Luis de Berthet and Sra. Sonia Edwards de Berthet returned to Santiago last Friday after an extensive honeymoon in Europe.

The North American Institute celebrated Thanksgiving with a turkey dinner last Thursday night. The staff, members of the board of directors and members of the Institute attended. Impromtu entertainment was enjoyed by all.

—oOo—

Sr. Javier Valdés will return to Santiago Sunday after a business trip to New York and Río de Janeiro.

SAINT ANDREW'S SOCIETY OF SANTIAGO

28th. Annual Dinner

to be held at the P. W. C. C.

on Saturday 1st. December at 9 p. m.

Tickets can be obtained from members of the committee and at

CASA MACKENZIE

Ahumada 89

Violin GITANO

HUERFANOS 757 · FONO 30500

A CORDIAL WELCOME

Your Friends Deserve the Best. Entertain them in Chile's finest atmosphere.

THIS WEEK'S FLOORSHOW FEATURES:

Debut de:

GEORGE ROOS
French Crooner

EVA FLORES
THE CUBAN DOLL OF GOLD

ELDER BARBERO
THE SENTIMENTAL VOICE

MARION PONTES
ELECTRIFYING CARIOCA DANCER

ALEJANDRO LIRA
THE POPULAR CHILEAN HUMOURIST

LORENZO D'ACOSTA
CHILE'S FINEST ORCHESTRA

PABLO CID
AND HIS RHYTHM GROUP

[illegible] Mrs [illegible], Mrs Ma[illegible] [illegible] wives of U. S. Consul [illegible] Mrs. Edward Southwick, Mrs. E. S. Tewksbury, Mrs Octavio Mendez, Sra. Teresa Concha de Walker, Sra Josefina Val de Walker, Mrs W. J. M Paterson, Mrs Joseph Cussen, Mrs [illegible] de Atall, Mrs H. Gerald Smith, Miss Muriel Lee, Mrs. Helen [illegible], Mrs Carlos Hall, Mrs Horace Graham, Mrs Dudley Homer, Mrs C W. Bennett, Mrs Robert Glover, Mrs. Arthur Gaston and Miss Patricia Bowers.

—oOo—

Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Lewis and son returned from the U. S. by way of Buenos Aires on Monday.

Mrs. Geofrey [illegible] and son, Donald Roy, left for their home in Chuquicamata after a month's visit with her mother-and father-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. I. Berkwood Hobsbawn, of Santiago.

—oOo—

Mrs. Felix Caffarena was hostess at a bridge-canasta tea for Mrs. Albert Haney, who, with Mr. Haney, is leaving Chile on December 12th. The guests were: Mrs. Guy Beaudry, Mrs. Kenneth Davidson, Mrs. David McMorris, Mrs. Armando Chellew, Mrs. Donall Daughters, Mrs. Jack Mac Rostie, Mrs. Jorge Howard, Mrs. Stanley Burke, Mrs. William Whotherspoon, Mrs. John Stoddard, Mrs. F. Elton, Mrs. Cedric Henderson and Mrs. Nick Liberatore.

DUNALASTAIR

The annual Prize-giving will be held on Friday 30th, November at 5.45 p. m. in the grounds of the Country Club, Tobalaba. Parents and friends of the School are cordially invited.

BIRTH

To Graciana (nee Paulsen) and Hector E. Karstegl in Hospital del Salvador, a son ERIC JUAN.

—oOo—

BIRTH

To Mr. and Mrs. Peter Turgoose, a son, Philip Norman, on November 19th.

OPTICA
PINCUS
Moneda 1033

HOTEL SCHUSTER
VALDIVIA

[illegible]

[illegible] have flown as far as the Haggis which arrived for the Santiago Society last Saturday.

By kind courtesy of Mr. Robert Taylor, Manager of British Overseas Airways, Santiago, the haggis for Saturday's dinner at the Country Club was flown out from Scotland and was ceremoniously received at Cerrillos by a group of four Kilted Scots (2) and the President of the Santiago Society, Mr. Alex Macdonald C. B. E.

On delivering his charge, the skipper of the Argonaut Speedbird was presented with a bottle of whisky, in appreciation of his services in bringing with him the first "Great Chieftain of the Pudding race" to have reached Chile by air.

(1) Usually made in the large stomach-bag of a sheep, or one of the smaller bags called the king's hood, and composed of a mixture of oatmeal, the lights, the liver and the heart.

(2) Messrs., Reid, McLean, Ruxton and Murray.

YOUNGER SET

Leslie Joan Pollock, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Alex Pollock, celebrated her second birthday on Friday with a party for friends. Among those present: Ian Bruce Irwin, Eric Dale Hobsbawn, Brian David Hobsbawn, Donald Roy Hobsbawn, Maria Louise Phillips and Linda Fay Crowder.

— :: —

Last Saturday Peter Firmin celebrated his 7th birthday with a party at the home of his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Douglas Firmin. The guests played games for prizes (and all of them won a prize!) Those present were: Patricia and Teddy Gandy, Irene and Bobby Meyringh, Maria Cecelia Fones, Buzzy and Johnny Stevenson, Eleonor Stevenson, Rodrigo Briones, Carol Tewksbury and Bobby Glover.

PETRIZZIO

the most important
DRUG STORE

Prove it yourself with a personal visit.

ESTADO 93.

SANTIAGO.

RAMIS CLAR

The finest Tea Room in Chile.

Wonderful Orchestra.
Delicious Cakes.

Everything of the very best

VALPARAISO

THE
KLEIN
TRUSTWORTHY
PHARMACIES

HUERFANOS 1059

Ahumada esq. Huérfanos

Teléfono 68018.

SANTIAGO.

SUMMER CAMP FOR GIRLS AT OLMUE

Mrs. Garvin's girls' camp opens on January 8th next. Riding, swimming, hiking, camp fire parties, theatricals, basket weaving, pottery-work.

For further particulars apply by letter or telegram to

M. G. GARVIN, Amancai, OLMUE.

CONCHA Y TORO

CHILE'S FINEST TABLE WINES
ON SALE EVERYWHERE.

SANTIAGO AND PROVINCES:

CASILLA 213
TELEPHONE 52072

ORDERS: VALPARAISO, VIÑA AND DISTRICT:

TELEPHONE 2605
CASILLA 3345

Morgan — Francisco Wedding



LEFT: THE BRIDE, MISS MARY LOU FRANCISCO, ENTERS THE CHURCH ON THE ARM OF THE U. S. AMBASSADOR TO CHILE, CLAUDE BOWERS. CENTER: THE BRIDE AND GROOM GIVE THEIR UNDIVIDED ATTENTION TO THE PRIEST DURING THE CEREMONY. RIGHT: THE HAPPY COUPLE POSE FOR A MOMENT IN THE ACT OF CUTTING THE CAKE.

Hill — Kidman Wedding

LEFT: THE BRIDE, MISS JOAN KIDMAN, AND GROOM, MR. WILLIAM HILL, PAUSE FOR A MOMENT LEAVING THE CHURCH AFTER THE CEREMONY. RIGHT: AT THE RECEPTION LATER AT THE HOTEL CRILLON THE SMILLING COUPLE CUT THE CAKE WHILE THE FAMILY OF THE BRIDE AND FRIENDS LOOK ON (PHOTOS BY "FOTO EVA")

TEATRO PRINCIPAL

THE GAY FESTIVAL (from Friday to Thursday this week)
FOR ADULTS AND CHILDREN
COLOR CARTOONS · The delight of old and young

Muebles Cromados
Palacios Izquierdo
Alameda 319
Ltda.

AL FESTEJAR A UN AMIGO
O PERSONA DE SU AGRADO,
ELIJA EL LUGAR DONDE SU
INVITADO CELEBRARÁ SU
BUEN GUSTO...
Nuria
Y LA MAXIMA ATRACCIÓN DE
Don Roy Y SU ORQUESTA
LE DEJARÁN EL RECUERDO DE UNA
Noche inolvidable!
Don Roy
Nuria
COCINA DE GRAN PRESTIGIO
AMBIENTE DISTINGUIDO

SOCIAL NOTES

BRITISH LEGION

The Committee for the year 1st November 1951 to 31st October 1952, is as follows:

Mr. Allen Price, Hon. President.
Rev. Edgar Pearson, Hon. Chaplain.
Mr. T. A. Moodie, Chairman.
C. O. Hardy, Vice-Chairman.
D. Madden, Hon. Treasurer.
R. W. Jeffery, Hon. Secretary.
H. P. Rushforth; D. M. King; and Miss K. McLean.

—oOo—

Among those who came down from Santiago for the cricket weekend we noticed Mr. and Mrs. Ian McLean, Mr. and Mrs Dorien Cooper and Mr. Ivor Davies.

—— :: ——

Mr. and Mrs. K. T. Russell spent the weekend in Viña, returning by road on Monday.

—— :: ——

Mr. A. Forbes Robertson was a visitor to Viña del Mar and is returning this week to Buenos Ai-

—oOo—

All members of the Women's Diocesan Union of St. Paul's Church, Cerro Concepcion wish to thank all the ladies who attended their recent Bridge-Canasta Tea; also those who contributed cakes, flowers etc., which helped to make the afternoon such a success.

—— :: ——

On Friday, December 14th, a Xmas Sale will take place at the residence of Mrs. Allen Price, wife of H. B. M. Consul General, Calle 6 Poniente No. 50, Viña del Mar.

There will be plum puddings, Xmas cakes, candy, cookies, Xmas gifts and two fortune tellers. From 2.30 p. m. to 7.30 p. m.

....

The American Women's group are having their monthly sale at the Instituto Chileno Norte Americano, Wednesday, December 5th from 3.30 p. m. to 7.30 p.m.

Miss Monica Whitty celebrated her 15th birthday last Saturday with a most delightful party, which took place at her home, in Viña. Those present were:—

The Misses Jaqueline and Maria Biggs, Valerie Birrel, Mr Olivos, Ana Sanchez, Maria Olea and María Angelica Segovia, Joyce Powditch, Elena Sureda, C Silva, Alice Porter, J Avayu, Ximena Lancien, Gloria Lacquaniti, E. Calderón, Silvia Fabiane, Nadine Ciffiet, Noemí Ossandón, Ximena Guarda, Isabel Marchetta and Laura Romani and Messrs C Cross, M. Barry, J. Gayán, A. Anker, A. Silva, R. Pollmann, A. Castilla, S. McCall, P McCall, G. Villalobos, O. Garcia, H. Vicencio, J. Caviere, A. Velarde, P. Garcia, E. Purcell, J. Quintana, J Porter, D. Costa, E. Rogers, R. Perez A. Vercellino, L. Guerra, E. Fischer, R Thomas, P. Plaza, O. Soto, E. Madden, F. Aranda, D. Murdoch, P. León, R. Aranda, C. Naylor, I. Lagerborg and O. Olivos.

....

TOC H BIRTHDAY FESTIVAL—

This year Toc H Cradock Branch and Toc H. (Women's Section), Valparaiso, celebrated their Birthday Festival during the week-end November 24th - 25th. The following members from Santiago attended:— Mesdames C. T. Henry, Grace Jones, Isabel Holloway and the Misses Margaret Cater, Sally Fuenzalida, Tatiana Antipaff, Otila Bozza, Jane Plunkett and Margaret Henry.

On Saturday evening there was a short service in the Union Church at which the Rev. Murdoch MacLeod officiated and Mr. Albert Turner played the organ. The Rev. Edgar Pearson gave a most interesting and appropriate sermon, and specially mentioned the valuable help that Toc H were giving to the Seamen's Mission.

After the Service a delightful cold supper was served in the adjoining hall. The Hon. Commissioner, Mr. David Blair, then welcomed the Santiago members and friends who had come to spend the evening with Toc H.

This cricket match was played at the Prince of Wales Country Club on Saturday [illegible] of November and resulted in a win for St Peter's by 23 runs.

The Grange won the toss and as is usual in these one innings games put St Peter's in. By lunch time at 1.15 P.M. the score was 7 for 49 runs, St Peter's having lost 3 wickets for 3 runs and 4 wickets for 11 runs. But Naylor's 20 was a very useful help to their side and the innings closed for 59. For the Grange, Vigli had 6 wickets for 21 runs and Henderson and Stringfellow each got 2 wickets. The fielding was mediocre; although 3 catches were held, several were dropped and the ground fielding needs a lot of practice and improvement.

The Grange started their innings equally badly losing 3 wickets for 9 runs and with no one except Shearman, who scored a "shaky" 10 runs, making double figures - they were all out for 36, leaving St. Peter's the winners by 23 runs.

Naylor and **Wilkins** bowled unchanged for St. Peter's, the former taking 3 for 18 and Wilkins 7 for 13. In fact it is fair to say that these two boys won the match for their side.

St. Peter's fielding was also only mediocre and several catches were dropped, but undoubtedly the better side won.

SEAMEN'S INSTITUTE

We are informed that Mr. Henry Boys has been appointed resident Layman of the Valparaiso Seamens' Institute as from the 1st December next.

[illegible] on November 11th last at Wallasey, Liverpool. Mr. Hallam was sixty-seven years of age.

In Chile he worked in the Accounts Department of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company up to the year 1931 when he returned to England. In 1935 he left this country to serve in the first World War, joining the Royal Engineers, "D" Company Signalling Corps. In August of that year he was sent to France, where he was engaged in communications work. [illegible] worked for the Admiralty in Liverpool.

In Chile he will long be remembered as a keen football player, and before the first War as one of the best half-backs of the "Valparaiso" Football Club. He took part in several Intercity and International Matches.

Mr Hallam leaves a widow and one daughter now resident in Wallasey; his many friends in Chile will join us in extending to them our deep sympathy.

SUNDAY SCHOOL PICNIC

The picnic will be held in the Parque del Salitre, El Salto, on Saturday the 8th of December.

TRANSPORTATION. — There will be 4 buses (blue) starting from the following places:

From Plaza Sotomayor, Valparaiso, at 9 a. m., stopping at: Brasil corner Bellavista; Brasil corner Avda. Francia; Barón; Yolanda; Portales; Sauce; Limache in front of Valdés Vergara (Chorrillos) and thence to Parque del Salitre.

From Recreo, leaving from foot of 18 de Septiembre at 9.20, stopping at Capuchinos; Viña Station; Almacén Sulzo; Railway Crossing Chorrillos, and thence direct to Parque del Salitre.

From Agua Santa, leaving corner Avda. España at 9.40, stopping at Traslaviña; Plaza Parroquia - Viña; Bolivar (La Lora); Almacén Sulzo (Puente Ocoa); Railway Crossing Chorrillos; Limache in front of Valdes Vergara; El Salto station; and thence to Parque del Salitre.

From St Margaret's School at 9.20, stopping at Quillota corner 8 Norte, 8 Norte corner Libertad; Libertad corner 4 Norte; Libertad corner 1 Norte, proceeding along this Avenue to Chorrillos, stopping at corner Quillota, corner Castaños, Ocoa Bridge, Lusitania Bridge; and thence to Parque del Salitre.

MEALS.—Participants should take their own lunch but soft drinks and tea will be provided. Coca Cola and Nobis lemonades will be on sale.

RACES.—The races will commence at 15.15. Prizes will be distributed after Tea.

TICKETS. — These may be obtained at $ 10.— adults $ 5.— children, from the following: Rev. Edgar Pearson, Miss Mary Turner, Miss Inez Taylor, Mr. A. D. McKenzie, Mr. Mallandaine, Mr. Turgoose and Mr. John Sánchez (West Coast Cable).

INVITATIONS.—The invitations for the young people on the Church Registers will be handed out immediately after the morning services next Sunday.

ANNOUNCEMENT

Mrs. Diamond wishes to remind her friends and acquaintances that she is receiving guests at her home in Villarrica. Her home is on the beach-front with a full view of beach and lake activities. Bathing, boating, fishing and lounging are yours.

Address: **MRS. HARVEY DIAMOND L.**
Villarrica.
Phone: Villarrica 53.

Have you visited the **White Elephant sales** held at the Instituto Chileno-Norteamericano de Cultura.

PLAZA ANIBAL PINTO 1177

New and slightly used clothing and articles for sale. The next sale will be held December 5th at 4 P. M.

MALETAS de cuero y extralivianas para avión. Chequetas de cuero y gamuza - Portadocumentos —Billeteras — Artículos Deportivos.

CASA LEON

Condell 1353 — Fono 2243
Fabricación propia.

MICROSCOPES
WILD
(HEERBRUCC)

BINOCULAR MICROSCOPES WITH BLUE APROCHROMATIC LENSES AND PHASE CONTRAST AS HIGH AS 2.280 — SPENCER MICROSCOPES WITH ONE AND TWO EYE PIECES. — TACHOMETER T1. — LEVELS N2 — LARGE STOCK OF GOWLAND INGL DIAGNOSTIC SETS — JAVAL ELECTROSHOCK OPHTHALMOSCOPE. — LARGE SUPPLY OF SUN GLASSES.

Ray - Ban - Calobar - willsonite - Cruxite

OCULISTS' PRESCRIPTIONS FILLED

OPTICA MAIER
AGUSTINAS 853

ENAMELS
PAINTS
VARNISHES
WATERPROOFING
INSULATING
MATERIAL

"CERESITA"

PINTURAS
CERESITA LTDA.
CHILE

Oficinas:
Tel. 30131 2-3;
P. O. Box 237

Fábrica:
Tel 61816
SANTIAGO.

Kiddies Carousel

The Little Man Of The Chimes

Once upon a time there was a Very Old Lady who lived by herself in a small brown house. She had a rocking chair, a thick storybook, and a clock that chimed. Every day the Very Old Lady sat in her rocking chair beside the window. Slowly she rocked back and forth and read stories from the thick book. There was a story about a white-topped mountain in Japan, one about a gray castle in Spain with a thousand rooms. And one was a story of a golden horse in Africa that could run faster than the wind.

At the end of each hour, as the Very Old Lady read from the thick story book, the clock played its chimes. They were as sweet as the song of a bird in Springtime, as sweet as a babbling brook rippling over the pebbles, as sweet as a baby cooing to its mother.

The Very Old Lady was happy, for she loved the clock and her thick storybook and her rocking chair.

But one day when the Very Old Lady sat reading, the chimes in the clock sounded tired. Every hour, as they rang out, the notes came more slowly. Finally, at six o'clock, the chimes did not ring at all. The only sound from the clock was its soft ticktock.

The Very Old Lady opened the glass door that covered the face of the clock. She took down a key and wound the spring. She tapped the clock very gently. Then she sat down in the rocking chair to wait.

The hands of the clock told the Very Old Lady that it was seven o'clock. But again no chimes sounded. Only the quiet ticktock of the clock could be heard. The Very Old Lady waited for another hour. But at eight o'clock the chimes did not play. At nine the Very Old Lady put away the thick storybook, turned out the light, and went to bed. She thought and thought about the chimes and wondered what could have happened to them. She wondered whether they would ever play again.

The Very Old Lady was almost asleep when she thought she heard a queer sound in the room. It was close to her ear. She sat up in bed and lighted the lamp. She got up and looked in all the corners of the room. There was no one there. She looked behind the door. There was no one there.

"It must have been the wind in the trees," said the Very Old Lady. And she turned out the light and went back to bed.

She closed her eyes. But just as she was drifting to sleep, she thought she heard the queer sound again.

The Very Old Lady sat up in bed and lighted her lamp. She got up and looked in all the corners of the room. There was no one there. She looked under the bed. There was no one there. She looked behind the door. There was no one there.

"It must have been a dog barking outside," said the Very Old Lady. And she turned out her light and went back to bed.

"Don't turn out the light! I can't see," commanded a tiny voice.

The Very Old Lady sat up and lighted the lamp. And there on a post of her bed stood a wee man no taller than the Very Old Lady's thumb. He was wearing a little brown hat, brown trousers, and a jacket as green as the grass in the meadow. On each of his boots glittered a golden buckle.

"My goodness!" exclaimed the Very Old Lady. "Who are you?"

"I'm Chymer," said the wee man. "I play the chimes in your clock."

"But the chimes didn't play tonight," said the Very Old Lady.

"I know!" said Chymer. "I'm tired of playing them. Every hour of every day for years and years I've played the chimes. I want a vacation. I want to travel. I want to see tall forests and gray castles and white-topped mountains and blue oceans. I'm going to go places and see all these things!"

The Very Old Lady smiled and nodded her head. "Yes," she said. "They are beautiful. But those things are all many miles away. How will you travel so far?"

"I'm going to walk," replied Chymer. He pointed to his feet. "See my shiny new boots!" he said proudly. "They have thick soles; so they won't wear out."

"But you're so tiny!" exclaimed the Very Old Lady. "You will be stepped on. Dogs will growl at you. You'll soon be hungry and cold and tired if you start out to see all those things."

Chymer's face grew sad.

"Oh, dear!" he said. "I didn't think of that! Perhaps I'd better not go after all. But I can't play the chimes for you when I'm not happy. And I'll never be happy again until I learn all about the beautiful places and things in the world."

The Very Old Lady was silent for a few moments. She was thinking of the chimes that sounded like the song of a bird in springtime and a babbling brook and a cooing baby. She was thinking about the wee man who wanted to travel to tall forests and white-topped mountains and blue oceans. At last she spoke.

"I go traveling every day," she said. "Every day I read my thick story book. It tells me about many beautiful places and things in the world. If you will stay and play the chimes in my clock, I will read to you from my book. Then, in imagination, we can travel together all over the world."

And that is just what happened. Every day after that the Very Old Lady sat in her rocking chair by the window, with Chymer perched on her shoulder. The Very Old Lady read to him from the thick storybook. She read about the whitetopped mountain in Japan, the gray castle in Spain with a thousand rooms, and the golden horse in Africa that could run faster than the wind.

After that every hour, day after day, Chymer climbed into his home in the clock and rang the chimes—chimes as sweet as the song of a bird in springtime, as sweet as a babbling brook rippling over pebbles, as sweet as a baby cooing to its mother.

A Christmas Gift For Dad

Your father would rather have a gift you made than the most expensive present you can buy. Here is something you can make that will surely please him. Ask Mother to buy you a small pocket comb. Now lay this on a piece of paper, and trace carefully around it. By drawing another line 1/2 cm outside this line, you have a pattern for a comb case, just a little larger than the comb. Using this pattern, cut two pieces of felt. (Perhaps Mother has an old felt hat she doesn't want anymore. It can be washed and pressed, if it is dirty.)

Now, stitch the two pieces together carefully around the edge, using bright yarn. (Don't forget to leave one end open, so that the comb can slide in.) Tie a small strip of felt around the last tooth of the comb, to make a little handle for pulling the comb from the case. There. It's all finished, and doesn't it look nice?



AUNT KITTY WISHES MANY HAPPY RETURNS TO FRANCIS REES, MICHAEL COLLELA, PETER FIRMIN, MARGARET CASTELAARS LESLIE POLLOCK AND DAVID VALDES

AUNT KITTY'S LETTER

Today is the very last day of November, and do you know what that means, children It means that in only 25 days, old Saint Nicholas will come creeping down the chimney with his pack full of toys. Have you made out your Christmas list, Bonnie? And you, Peter and Michael, it's time to start being very good boys so that Santa will bring you more than a bundle of sticks! And all of you had better start thinking about making presents for your friends and families, because Christmas will soon be here!

The Land Of Story-Books

by **Robert Louis Stevenson.**

At evening when the lamp is lit,
Around the fire my parents [illegible]
They sit at home and talk and sing.
And do not play at anything.
Now, with my little gun, I crawl
All in the dark along the wall,
And follow round the forest track
Away behind the sofa back.

— :: —

There, in the night, where none can spy,
All in my hunter's camp I lie,
And play at books that I have read
Till it is time to go to bed

— :: —

I see the other far away,
As if in firelit camp they lay,
And I, like to an Indian scout,
Around their party prowled about
So, when my nurse comes in for me,
Home I return across the sea,
And go to bed with backward looks
At my dear land of Story-books



DO YOUR SHOPPING
IN YOUR
OWN DISTRICT

BARRIO ALTO and PROVIDENCIA



YOU CAN FIND ALL
THE NECESSITIES
OF LIFE



REVIENS

Bacarat-Lamps and
Plated Bronze
Chippendale Cabinets
for Record-players
D & Y Electric Trains
Hearing Aids, with
repair and spare parts.
PROVIDENCIA 2309

HOLIDAY MAKERS

TENTS, WOOLEN SLEEPING BAGS, PARKAS, WINDBREAKER JACKETS, ANORAKS, GLOVES ETC.

MADE TO MEASURE FOR LADIES, GENTS & CHILDREN.

Providencia 2085 - Phone 492029

Casino del Portal

M. C. R.
PROVIDENCIA BRANCH
H. PINAUD & CIA.
PROVIDENCIA corner Lyon
CONFITERIA & PASTELERIA
Specializing in Caramels,
Desserts, and Fine Ices.
Providencia 2203
Telephone 493746.

Bodega Corona Ltda.

Phones: 43878 — 40523
PROVIDENCIA 1851
25 years of prestige
Rapid home deliveries.
CHICKEN FOOD
Mashfood — Grain.
Mashfood for chickens.
COMPLETE FOOD FOR HENS
New formula.
DOG FOOD

AS YOU KNOW, AT

"La Mallorquina"

PROVIDENCIA 2015

You will find the best in cold meats, preserves and cheeses.
HOME DELIVERY
Phone 491400

GEORGIA

Sumar-Hirmas knitting wool of cotton. Uniforms. Plastic articles.

Working gloves. Balloons and toys of Plastic Latex.

AV. PROVIDENCIA 2075.

MONNA LISA

AV. PEDRO DE VALDIVIA 020

Fine Handmade Blouses

Beachwear — Sun Suits

Shorts — Gifts.

DRY CLEANING

A LA BOULE DE NIEGE

WE Genuinely dry clean in 48 hrs. without extra charge.
Specialize in invisible mending in 24 hrs.
Mend ladies' hose to order.
Collect and deliver — no extra charge.
PHONE 493604 OR VISIT US.
PROVIDENCIA 2217
YOU WON'T REGRET IT
Branches in South of France

"BLUE JEANS"

Dungarees — cowgirl skirts —
Canadian type shortie coat —
bright plaids — cowboy shirts.
Made to measure.
Exclusive patterns for Ladies, Men, and Children.
LYON 1976

VERNEY

Gift Shoppe — Novelties

Articles of copper and brass

ORREGO LUCO 13

Providencia
TELEPHONE 490360

FERRETERIA

WAGNER LANGDON Y CIA.

Av. Pedro de Valdivia 28.

Phone 41121.

HOME AND GARDEN

SHOES La Argentina

Exclusive Styles in Fine Footwear for Men, Women and Children.
PROVIDENCIA 2031
Call 40048 — Casilla 3959
ENGLISH SPOKEN

M R.

Yarns SWEATERS

PROVIDENCIA 2112

CASA CUBANA

PROVIDENCIA 1977.
Telephone 43416.

Haberdashery - Toys - Book Store.

Extensive selection in gift articles.

Imported toys, recently arrived.

HUCKE Pastries and Candies HUCKE

AVDA. EL BOSQUE 125 open all day Sundays & Holidays. TELEFONO 41606

Call at

Gladys Folch

European Beauty Parlour
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 028
Telephone 493360
for
Perms and hair dyeing
Shampoo and setting, Manicure.
(Using genuine Helene Curtis)
Prices Reasonable.
ENGLISH SPOKEN

C. I. C. PRODUCTS

Providencia 2035 — Call 48528
Furniture for homes, terraces, and gardens.
Mattresses and bedsteads
Complete Home Decoration
Bicycles in all sizes and models.
Delivery tricycles. Refrigerators
Philips Radios.

"EL PASAJE"

Barber Shop

Men and Children
Av. Providencia 1998.
at Pedro de Valdivia
Local N.° 6 - Call 47488
Attended by its owners from the ex-"Oriente"
Alejandro Villalobos — Mario Gajardo — José Valderrama — Luis Durán.

EL CONSORCIO NACIONAL DE PRODUCTORES DE AVES VENDE EN SU PUESTO DE:

AVDA PROVIDENCIA 1259 - TELEFONO 45769

Los huevos clasificados por tamaño y calidad a los más bajos precios de plaza.

Se venden puestos a domicilio sin recargo de precio.

AMERICAN EXCHANGE

SLIGHTLY USED CLOTHING FOR LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. BRING IN THE THINGS YOU WISH TO DISPOSE OF. TRY THE EXCHANGE FOR YOUR NEEDS AT FAVOURABLE PRICES.

HERNANDO DE AGUIRRE
(EX-VILLASECA) No 13
ON PLAZA SAN CARLOS

TELEPHONE 41826
SANTIAGO
CASILLA 3941

CARNICERIA

"LAS 3 PALMERAS"
Suecia 361
High Class Meats

Veal — Lamb — Beef
Tongue — Brains
etc.
FREE HOME DELIVERY
Call 43858

LA FOCA

SOCIEDAD FABRICA DE HELADOS
A. M. MONTT 018

Call 47451 and your order will be immediately executed.
All our ice creams are made with real fruit.
We deliver containers of 5 litres packed in ice for $200

JAMES P. DUNCAN

SERVICENTRO ESSO

Filling Station - Oils
Washing And Greasing
Tires, Batteries and
Atlas Accessories.
PROVIDENCIA 2348
Telephone 494242

"CINES UNIDOS"

BRING TO THE PUBLIC OF THE BARRIO ALTO THE FINEST MOTION PICTURES IN THEIR THEATRES:

"DANTE"
PLAZA ÑUÑOA
RELEASES SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH METRO THEATRE

"RIALTO"
AVDA. P. DE VALDIVIA
No 3346

"HOLLYWOOD"
AVDA. IRARRAZAVAL
No 2900

"ÑUÑOA"
AVDA. IRARRAZAVAL
No 2726

MOTHERS!

La Cigüeña

offers you the first diaper washing service in Chile

Washing, ironing, sterilizing and delivering your diapers in 48 hours

PROVIDENCIA 1357

BOTILLERIA EUROPEA

(Magnolfi)
of MANUEL VENEGAS P.
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 20 — Tel. 43620
WINES
LIQUORS
CHAMPAGNES
NATIONAL AND IMPORTED
Open all day Saturday, Sundays and Holidays until 1 p. m.

WEST COAST NEWS

ANTOFAGASTA

THE retiring British Ambassador, Sir Bertrand Jerram, K. C. M G., arrived at Antofagasta in the M. V. "Sarmiento" on November 13th en route to England. His Excellency was met by the British Consul, Mr. Thomas Bates, O. B. E. As the vessel was to load minerals at Mejillones on the following day, Sir Bertrand accepted the invitation of Mr. L. V. Duff to stay overnight at Antofagasta. This allowed him sufficient time to enjoy a motor run towards the pampa, visit the Auto Club and to call upon the Intendente of the Province

On re-visiting Antofagasta, the Ambassador took the opportunity to present the Insignia and Warrant of Appointment of membership of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire to the British Vice Consul, Mr. Stuart E. Sword. The presentation ceremony was celebrated at the English Club in the presence of the Dean of the Consular Corps, Don Max de la Fuente Locker, Consul General of Peru; the British Consul, Mr. Thomas Bates, O. B. E., don Ramón Yoma, Presidente of the Chamber of Commerce; Mr. Mansel McMahan, Vice Consul of the United States; and Mr. J. G. Macfarlane, President of the English Club. Among others who were present were the Rev. J. B. D. Cotter, and Messrs. Malcolm E. Sword, E. McLean, P. Williamson, J. R. W. Stansfield, W. R. James, W. Hughes, L. V. Duff, A. P. Sexton, T. J. K. Barber, S. Dacre, D. J Dakin, J. L. Hill, C. F. Ferrand, C. Wood, R. Ferrand, J. W. Balshaw, W. E. Mitchell, G. W. Craig, Captain Wardale of the "Sarmiento" and Captain Rice of the "Salamanca".

— :: —

Punctually as the clock struck noon, the Ambassador was conducted into the room by the Consul and spoke as follows:— "It " is with peculiar pleasure that, " as my very last act as Ambassador in Chile, I obey His Ma- " jesty's command to deliver a " decoration to so loyal and long- " standing a member of the British Consulate at Antofagasta " Mr. Vice-Consul Sword has been " performing valuable duties at " this Consulate, of which he has " often been in charge, for a " great many years, and is a " highly respected member of the " British community. Stuart Elliot " Sword:— I am commanded by " His Majesty the King to deliver " to you personally, not by way " of investiture, but in an official " and ceremonious manner, the " badge of a Member of the Civil " Division of the Most Excellent " Order of the British Empire " which the King was graciously " pleased to confer on the occasion of His Majesty's last " Birthday in recognition of your " long and valuable services I " am commanded at the same " time to hand to you the Grant " of Dignity signed by the Queen " Mother and bearing His Ma- " jesty's sign manuel."

Following the ceremony cocktails were served and the health of Mr. Sword was drunk by the assembly.

— :: —

Sir Bertrand Jerram, acompanied by the Consul, proceeded to Mejillones by car at 10.00 a. m. on Wednesday to rejoin the "Sarmiento". His Excellency was attended by Mr. John Hopwood, M C., and others before bidding farewell to Chilean soil.

[illegible] Armistice, [illegible] at D. Pedro [illegible] Ranch, which had been most kindly conceded for the occasion

— :: —

In accordance with time-honoured custom, the majority of the ex-servicemen mustered at the English Club and, so far as is known, only one member failed to answer "Here!" to his name and escaped the ensuing operations. He may have deserted by air, as he was not observed either wriggling across no-man's land on his stomach, or swimming from the wreck to a Carley float.

At the bugle's call, the troops were transported in mechanised vehicles of 1914 to 1945 vintage to the Rancho, where the roll call was taken and the survivors of the initial skirmishes were found to comprise the following veterans:— R Ferrand, President, C. Wood, Vice - President, A. J. Brown, Secretary, R L. Davies, Treasurer, D. H. Maird, J. W. Balshaw, T. J. K. Barger, J. K. Benson, M. M., D. J. Dakin, A. F. Daniell, E. S. Dyer, C F. Ferrand, J. L. Hill, E. H. Holmes-Brown, J. Hopwood, M. C., I. McDowall, M. C, E McLean, W. E. Mitchell, R. Pocock, R. P. Perez, R. A. C Pritchard, H. F. Rooke, J. Slater, S E. Sword, M. B. E., E. N. Thomas, also in representation of the Chuquicamata Branch:— A. F. Swain, M. B E D S C, and E. W. Witcombe, M B E. The British Consul, Mr. T Bates, O. B E., the American Vice-Consul, Mr. M. McMahan, and Mr. A. Grondys of the Dutch Forces had been recruited as guests.

Little time was lost in sounding "Come to the cook-house door, boys", to which there was a ready response. Since the close of the campaign some of the brave lads have been heard to opine that the rations were of such quality that the reply of the senior hand of the mess to the enquiry of the officers of the day was a satiated "No complaints, Sir". However, such was the confusion created in the ranks by thrust and counter thrust that it is difficult to determine precisely of what those rations consisted. Since an important feature of the general tatical strategy had seemed to consist of their being thoroughly washed down, it is possible that is was the iron rations that had been dished out.

The serious stage of the manoeuvres included the individual firing off of toasts, executed by numbers in Bisley-like perfection by R. Ferrand who gave "The King", C. Wood who welcomed the "Visitors", S. E. Sword who recalled a host of "Absent Friends" and A. J. Brown who spoke of "Sweet-hearts and Wives"; but a Big Bertha blast was exploded by E. W. Witcombe. The force of the blast apparently knocked out the Sergeant Major, for he proved incapable of reporting exactly what it was all about. A wounded straggler who limped in imagines that the rollicking Major dealt with such confused subjects as Montgomery and Mossadegh; the triangle of [illegible] and love's [illegible] song, pinching [illegible] on a lengthy retreat and what Gladstone said in 1861, plus an expression of his opinion as to whether [illegible] boys should wear jodhpurs or [illegible]

[illegible] held up [illegible] outs every now and then to say [illegible], but more [illegible] they were [illegible] with rifle butts before they could say it again



A rallying call of "Up, Guards, and at 'em" saw all ranks jump to it as they did at Waterloo. "It" being the hospitable Rancho Bar, behind which were ranged the invitingly grinning sappers who had valiantly blazed a way for the advancing suppers The movement developed into a brisk general action that became further enlivened when a piano, which had been cunningly camouflaged in its dark retreat, was spotted and commandeered Relentlessly frog-marched to the canteen, it was promptly stripped of every removable piece of equipment and clothing by the M. P. It threatened to collapse with shell-shock upon being displayed in all its pristine nakedness, but made a startling recovery when copiously lubricated with whatever class of medicine, strictly of a liquid nature, that came to the hand of the Sick Berth Attendants. The timely arrival of scouts with a prisoner, Bob Condit of the American Legion, saved the critical emergency that had arisen from developing into a military disastre Bob proceeded to do his stuff, and if Santiago Branch failed to hear the responses of the rank and file gathered around the camp fire, it was not the fault of the Antofagasta troops.

So continuous became the roar of barrack-room voices [illegible] a startling feint by enemy skirmishers passed almost unobserved. They wormed their way to the rear, cleared the breach of land-mines, and ambushed comrade John Hopwood whom they carried off in triumph to their base at Mejillones, despite the stout resistence he offered, a prisoner

[illegible] in [illegible], and the roar of [illegible] became ever louder. Small wonder then that the troops were hazy as to the hour at which the determining phases of the action occurred, or who were the directing strategists of this historic military event. Let us imagine then that the good old hanging steel crowbar had clanged 2 00 a. m. and that unconquerable Arthur Swain and [illegible] Brown figured among the plotting General Staff We would even amend the stricken hour to 2 30 if thereby we could escape court-martial for unseemly exaggeration In any case, the expert scrounging of a sticky - fingered batman "won", from heaven knows where, a silver cup of fantastic proportions and unfathomable capacity The order "Fall in" was given— and the phalanx almost did fall into it, for it brimmed with an insidious brew concocted of every liquid ingredient stocked in the canteen or in any neighbouring camps. Beer was betrothed to whiskey, liqueur linked with pisco, cognac coquetted with vermouth and each with one another; the falsified frivolling with the imported. This was just a han[illegible] conceived, get-together, one-a[illegible] all-united, one-for-the-long-long-road loving-cup dram. Obedient to command and willing to serve every man did his duty and partook That probably was what finally ensured the hard-won victory, with its compensating glory for the maimed and wounded of the cheers of the welcoming homefolk when they reached their billets in time for breakfast. In short, as we stated at first, we celebrated another British Legion armistice dinner at Antofagasta

(The editors are happy to welcome a new Antofagasta correspondent, Mr. T. Gathering, well-known resident of the Port City. We feel sure that readers will join us in the wish that Mr. Gathering's reports become a weekly feature of these columns —ED.).

POSTAL TUITION
DIRECT FROM LONDON
AUTHORITATIVE—RELIABLE—UP-TO-DATE

WHICH OF THESE SUBJECTS INTERESTS YOU?

Accountancy
Advertising
Aero Engineering
Agriculture
Architecture
Article Writing
Auto Engineering
Banking
Book-keeping
Building
Carpentry & Joinery
Chemical Engineering
Commerce
Commercial Art
Cost Accountancy
Diesel Engineering
Draughtsmanship
Electrical Eng.
Foremanship
Forestry
General Education
Journalism
Maintenance Eng.
Mineralogy
Mining Eng.
Mine Management
Office Subjects
Marine Eng.
Mathematics
Mechanical Eng.
Plastics
Production Eng.
Radio & T/V.
Refrigeration
Reinforced Concrete
Reporting
Retail Shop Management
Rubber Technology
Salesmanship
Sanitary Eng.
Secretaryship
Structural Eng
Surveying
Textile Technology
Timber Technology
Works Management
Fuel Technology
Workshop Practice
Geology
Metallurgy
Telecommunications
Time and Motion Study
Welding
Welfare

PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL EXAMS.:
A.M.I.Mech.E., A.M.I.C.E., F.R.I.C.S.,
A.R.I.B.A., Society of Engineers, L.I.O.B.,
M.R San.I., City and Guilds of London,
A.M.I.Struct.E., A.M.I.Chem.E., M.I.M.I.,
A.F.R.Ae.S., General Cert. of Education,
A.C.I.S., A.A.C.C.A., A.C.W.A. B.Sc. (Econ.)

British Institutes Group, the largest and most successful organisation of its kind in the world, offers expert Postal Tuition, direct from London, in any of the subjects or examinations here listed. We have secured *thousands* of examination successes and enrol every Student under the terms of a unique "NO PASS—NO FEE" GUARANTEE. All text-books are provided free of extra charge and remain the property of the Student.

If you would like to know more about our Special Overseas Service, tell us what subject or exam. interests you, and we shall be pleased to send you full details together with an interesting Handbook dealing with your subject—FREE and without obligation.

Moderate, inclusive fees

ANY ONE OF THESE VALUABLE CAREER-BOOKS FREE!

Tell us what subject interests you and write today!

BRITISH INSTITUTES GROUP
G 353, SHAKESPEARE HOUSE, 17-19, STRATFORD PLACE
LONDON, W.1., ENGLAND

DRY CLEANING
DYEING

For your SPRING CLEANING SYSTEM

YOUR CLOTHES
RUGS, FURNITURE
AND CURTAINS
ARE RETURNED
TO YOU
MOTH - PROOFED
AND STERILIZED
AT NO EXTRA CHARGE

LAVATEX
BASCUÑAN 44 TELEPHONE 91646
FREE PICK-UP AND DELIVERY SERVICE

Mrs. Ann Macleay and children Mark and Diana left by air for Buenos Aires on the 18th September, from whence they left by the "Hornby Grange" for New Zealand. They expect to be absent from Punta Arenas for about six months

— :: —

We deeply regret to record the death, which took place recently in Santiago, of Mrs Kenneth Cara, an old resident of Punta Arenas, and take this opportunity of expressing our sympathy with Mr Cara in his sad loss.

— :: —

Mr. and Mrs Cecil Wells returned by air to Punta Arenas recently, after a holiday in Canada. We understand that in the autumn they will again leave Punta Arenas to take up permanent residence in Canada.

— :: —

The Commander in Chief of the Chilean Navy, Rear Admiral don Carlos Torres Hevia, recently presented to the British Club a painting of the Cruiser "Chacabuco". The presentation was effected by Rear Admiral Carmona, Chief of the 3rd Naval Division, on behalf of the donor, at an informal Cocktail Party in the Club Rooms, and the President of the Club, Mr. A. D. King, made a speech in which he asked Admiral Carmona to convey the sincere thanks of the Committee and Members to Admiral Torres for his generous gesture. Among those present at the ceremony was Rear Admiral don Olegario Reyes del Rio, who served as a midshipman in the "Chacabuco" in 1901.

— :: —

On the 14th July a very enjoyable party took place at the Rio Seco Staff House, in aid of the Golf Club. The guests were requested to wear something reminiscent of the "Gay Nineties." Some of the get-ups were extremely clever, and greatly added to the hilarity of the evening. The "Tennis Girl" dancing "Boogie Woogie" with the "Churchwarden" was quite a sight to behold. On the 8th of September a similar party took place at the Staff House, the proceeds this time being divided between the Golf Club and Rio Seco Charities. The guests were asked to wear "Hidden Book Titles," and prizes were given for those who guessed the largest number of titles within a given time. These were won by Miss Leslie Stirling and Mr. I. C Saunders respectively. Among the cleverest representations were those of Mr. Eric Davies-"The Enemy Within," Miss M. Harper-"Great Expectations," Mr. and Mrs. I. C. Saunders-"We Took to the Woods," Mr. J. Price-"Cheaper by the Dozen," Mr. S. B. Robson-"The Seats of the Mighty," and Mr. E. I. Clifford - "Britannia Mews."

— :: —

Among those who spent the Diez-y-Ocho holidays in camp were Mr. and Mrs. E Buchan, who were guests of Mr. and Mrs K O Maclean at "Rio Verde," and Mr. and Mrs. J. Price, who were the guests of Mr. E. I. Clifford at Estancia Punta Delgada

— :: —

Several Members had an "indoor picnic" at the Golf Club on Diez-y-ocho, those present being Mr. and Mrs. J. McElroy, Mr. and Mrs. A. R. King, Mr. and Mrs. A. D. King, Mr. and Mrs. G. Crew, Miss L. Stirling and Mr. F. P. Arthur.

— :: —

During the winter months fortnightly "hops" were held at the British School, in aid of the Golf Club, the total profit thereon being in excess of $ 10 000 —.

— :: —

Among those who came in from camp to attend the recent party at Rio Seco were Mr. E. I. Clifford, Mr. and Mrs. K. Maclean, Mr. and Mrs. Eric Davies and Mr. and Mrs. W. Macleay.

— :: —

Last week a "Lyonair" plane brought nine racehorses to Punta Arenas.

— :: —

Mrs. Noel Donaldson returned by air recently from a holiday in Córdoba with Mr. and Mrs. K. C Ross

[illegible] the power is frequently cut off during the day

— —

The sector of the town which has been without telephone service for nearly ten months-since the hurricane of November last-has now had that somewhat mixed blessing bestowed upon it once again. Mixed is the blessing indeed -on the day our 'phone was connected we were rubbing our hands in glee, and wondering to whom to give the honour of our first call, when we received our first call, which turned out to be... "wrong number." After that the blessed instrument went on strike, and for the next ten days, though it rang on an average of once every ten minutes, we could speak to nobody, not even the exchange. We understand that a representative of Erikssons is now in Punta Arenas, trying to come to an agreement with the local authorities which would enable automatic telephones to be installed, but up to the present nothing definite seems to have been arranged.

— :: —

News has just been received of the death, which took place in England, of Mr. P. A. de Bruyne, father of Mr. H. B. A. de Bruyne, of Estancia Rio Verde.

— :: —

The territory lost another of its pioneers recently when don José Menendez Behety lost his life in a motoring accident near Buenos Aires. His two sons, José and Arturo, who were with him, were injured, but we understand that both are progressing favourably.

An improvement in the weather has taken [illegible] and it continues to rain at intervals with brief periods of sunshine which is badly needed for the crops

—oOo—

Alcalde don Jerman Saelzer Balde returned from a visit to the Capital where in company with the Parliamentary representatives he visited the various Ministerial Departments with promising results.

It is announced that the construction of the new railway station in Calle Anibal Pinto has been definitely resolved, though nothing is stated about the initiation of its construction.

Promises of funds for the construction of the Intendencia Building which will house the Post and Telegraphs, the Corte de Apelaciones and the offices and private dwelling of the Intendencia, have also been made to the extent of Seven Millions which sum will be augmented when the work is advanced.

—oOo—

The 25th anniversary of the Cruz Roja de Hombres, Valdivia Branch, and of the Club Aéreo de Valdivia 13th anniversary were celebrated during the week. There was also an imposing ceremony in the Plaza on Friday last when the ladies and members of the Cruz Roja de Señoras processed through the principal streets and speeches were made from the bandstand

—oOo—

On Tuesday last Alfonso Montecinos gave a pianoforte recital in the Cervantes Theatre which was attended by a moderate audience in spite of adequate advertisement. His programme included works of Bach, Beethoven, Chopin, Liszt and the modern works of Debussy, Ravel and Allende

—oOo—

On Thursday there was a recital of dances by pupils of Herbert Belkner in the Cervantes Theatre which attracted a large audience of parents, relatives and friends of the pupils.

—oOo—

On Saturday last the engagement of Mr. George Schuler López and Srta. María Eugenia Contreras Bertoglio took place in the house of the Contreras Bertoglio family and was celebrated by a large gathering of relatives and friends of the parties concerned.

—oOo—

The first regattas of the season were held on Sunday morning with the participation of the five clubs of the Association. They were of special interest owing to the innovation of regattas Single and Double Sculls and attracted an enormous crowd of spectators to the river front. The Arturo Prat obtained first place in points followed by Centenario and Phoenix-Valdivia, the last named senior crew participating in the respective event.

—oOo—

On Sunday aftenoon the Nacional F. C. beat the Magallanes F. C. by 2-1 in a closely contested football match in the Municipal Park which was witnessed by a large crowd of spectators.

The Club is now the proud possessor of two handsome trophies, one, a Quaich, having been presented by Mr F. D. Paton, to replace the one lost in the fire, which had been presented many years ago by him and the late Mrs Paton. The second of these trophies, the Warwick Cup, has been presented by Mr. W. C. Warwick, to replace the trophy presented by him on the occasion of his visit to Punta Arenas some years ago.

On the 4th. inst, the official inauguration of the new Club House at the Golf Course took place, and the opening ceremony was largely attended. Mr. K. C. Ross, the new President, declared the building open, and then handed to Mr. Jorge Claude a silver ashtray from the Members, as a token of their gratitude for his kindness in designing and overseeing the construction of the new building, at the same time he presented a bouquet to Mrs. Claude.



The most genuinely useful medicine for all climates
ALWAYS KEEP A BOTTLE HANDY

Dr. J. Collis Browne's
CHLORODYNE

ORIGINAL and ONLY GENUINE
OVER 100 YEARS WORLD - WIDE REPUTATION
Safe and reliable family Medicine
Acts like a Charm in
Diarrhoea Colic Dysentry
and other Bowel Complaints.

Well-known medicine for
Influenza Asthma Bronchitis
Coughs Colds Catarrh

Checks & arrests FEVER-CROUP AGUE.

Basis constituents— Alcohol, Chloroform, Opium and Aromatic Syrup.

Always ask for a "Dr. COLLIS BROWNE".
Of all chemists Prices in England 1/3 3/
THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE.

CROSSWORD - - - By Eugene Sheffer


7-25

HORIZONTAL
1 silent
6. most serious
13 beyond
14 sumptuous entertainer
15 cheek bone
16 source of phosphorus compounds
17 quite
18 one who entitles
20. put on
21. purge
23 pale
24 impel
25 confine to one locality
27 cap
29 indigent
30 central part
34 at an end poetic
36 quieter
37. soft mineral
40 S American wood sorrel
42 subsist
43 Luzon savage
44. jump
46. a beverage
47. of the people
49 adjudge
51. heighten
52. flower part
53 connected
54. white poplar

VERTICAL.
1 S A. marmoset
2 sea-ear
3. compare critically
4 yellow bugle
5 sea bird
6 pasture grass
7 regret
8 culture medium
9 large vessel
10 ignore
11 counter-irritant
12 tend
19 beard of grain
22 a wine
24 trivial
26 cereal grass
28 milkfish
31 mock
32 divers
33 foot lever
35 revolve
36 balloon basket
37 small wax candle
38 corn mush (Mex.)
39 part of coat
41 felt concern
44 lath
45 bark-cloth
48 pulpy fruit
50 network

Answer to last week's puzzle.

C	H	A	I	R		A	S	S	O	R	T	
H	E	N	C	E		R	E	A	P	E	R	S
A	N	G	E	L		I	N		A	D	I	T
		E	D	I	T	S			L	A	T	U
C	O	L		T	R	E	S	S		N	E	B
A	K	U	M		U	N	I	O	N			
R	E	S	I	D	E		E	L	A	T	E	D
			L	I	S	T	S		P	E	R	I
M	A	L		S	T	A	T	E		N	A	G
O	L	I	O			S	A	T	E	S		
A	L	A	S		A	T		U	N	I	T	E
T	O	N	S	U	R	E		D	O	L	O	R
	T	E	A	S	E	D		E	W	E	R	S

7-25

Average time of solution 27 minutes
Distributed by King Features Syndicate

BRIDGE

NORTH
S 6 2
H 8 6 4
D K Q 10 9
C 9 7 6 3

WEST
S 8
H J 10 9 7 5
D 8 4
C A K 10 8 4

EAST
S 9 7 5 4
H Q
D J 7 6 5 3 2
C J 2

SOUTH
S A K Q J 10 3
H A K 5 2
D A
C Q 5

The bidding

South	West	North	East
2 spades	Pass	2 no trump	Pass
3 spades	Pass	3 no trump	Pass
4 spades	Pass	Pass	Pass

Opening lead: king of clubs

An attempt to deceive the opposition is untimely when the facts speak for themselves.

South reached the perfectly sound contract of four spades and saw that fulfillment would be difficult if hearts failed to break, which on percentage rated to be the case. West cashed the king and ace of clubs and shifted to the jack of hearts, drawing East's queen and South's ace. Burying his head in the sand, declarer, in ostrich like fashion, proceeded to lead all his trumps but one in the hope that someone would fall into the error of unguarding the hearts so that the king and another heart would establish the fourth card of that suit. This was the height of futility because the cards spoke for themselves and no player out of incarceration could hold onto diamonds and let go hearts.

Declarer would have been better advised to attempt to visualize the adverse holdings and he might have hit upon a scheme to win the hand without resort to chicanery. Declarer should start extracting trumps. When West shows out on the second round, he pulls one more, leaving East with the nine. Declarer cashes the ace of diamonds and then plays the king of hearts. If East ruffs he has nothing but diamonds to return, permitting declarer to dispose of his two losing hearts. If East refuses to ruff, declarer simply plays the three of trumps and forces East to win with the nine. This is a Greek gift for the forced diamond return puts an end to the contest.



Komaromy
COUTURIER

MEANS

- Distinction and personality in women's clothes.
- Artistic interpretation of Parisian models by a French ex "copyist".
- Professionally perfect hand-made work: suits two-piece dresses, coats, frocks, made to measure.
- Careful selection of imported materials for the well-dressed woman.

We have started our "haute couture" department: for copying originals, made to measure.
We take orders.

KOMAROMY FASHIONS
HUERFANOS 718
across from the Rex theatre.

No deje
que sus cabellos
la traicionen

IMEDIA
REINA
DE LAS TINTURAS
PARA EL CABELLO

ST. ANDREW'S
(Anglican)
CHURCH

Av. Holanda N.° 151
SANTIAGO

8 30 a. m. Holy Communion
9 30 a. m. Sunday School
10 45 a. m. Morning Prayer and Sermon.

1st Sunday in Month.
11.55 a. m. Holy Communion

All visitors warmly welcomed

Chaplain: Rev. James A. Craig
Av. Holanda 25 Tel. 44976
Casilla No 3655

[illegible]

BEAUTY AND YOU

DO YOU RUN LIFE.. OR DOES IT RUN YOU

By JOSEPHINE LOWMAN

Few of us run our lives. Our lives run us. If we are to lead responsible full lives this has to be so to a certain extent. However, over and over again I am impressed with the fact that few people consciously make choices. Few are firm in their determination to get from life that which has greatest meaning for them. Most persons go along in the usual groove with only a sideways glance at the things they long to accomplish; the things which have always held great interest for them.

We fail to realize that we should have an energy budget just as we have a money budget. We have only so much energy to spend without nervous exhaustion.

We should budget it in order to have time for the realization of some of those dreams and the accomplishment of some purely personal interests.

Women are supposed to run houses but most houses run women to death. In this, as in all activities, you must choose what is really important to you. Is it more important to have a perfectly kept house, or a home where everyone is comfortable and you are gay and everyone is happy? Is it important to you to entertain formally and flawlessly or to have enough energy left to enjoy your guests when they arrive?

I am not advocating a messy house. This leads to fatigue and hecticness. Charm of atmosphere and a certain amount of order are certainly essential.

Myriad small wastes in energy add up to fatigue. If your kitchen work table is not the correct height for you it will be a handicap. If you stand when you could sit that is another. If you plan your grocery lists carelessly those mad dashes to the store are tiring and hectic.

You can safely bet that those women you know who accomplish so much and still seem to have time and energy to enjoy life have learned to avoid many such small wastes in their energy budget. You can recoup your energy larder with short periodic ten minute rest periods

LONDON FASIONS

An afternoon dress with full skirt, natural shoulder line and three-quarter sleeves designed by Rembrandt.

[illegible] nylon [illegible]

The city of San Francisco, California, looms largely as the background of films we saw during the week, and very nice it looks, too, although a friend of ours who once lived there complained bitterly of the fog—and he was a Liverpudlian, at that. In THREE HUSBANDS (Tres Esposos) Emlyn Williams, for his first Hollywood picture, if we are not mistaken, abandons his predilection for playing psychopathic murderers as in Night Must Fall and phthisical coal miners as in The Citadel and breaks out as a polished Oxonian who oozes charm all over the place. What he was doing in San Francisco isn't made quite clear in the [illegible], but he has a very modern establishment and entertains handsomely. He is very friendly with three married couples and has a cardiac condition, which is medicalese for a weak or diseased heart. As is not infrequent with such patients, he dies suddenly, but as he is a tireless prankster he leaves with his lawyer three letters, addressed to each of the husbands of the couples with whom he has been friendly, to be delivered to the addressees on the day of the funeral. In these letters he makes the simple statement that the relations between himself and the wives have been more than just simple friendship, and the film deals with the effect the news has on the husbands and we are shown in flash-backs that Mr. Williams had innumerable opportunities for developing the relations at which he hints.

It is all played with great skill, and the ladies concerned, Miss Ruth Warrick, Miss Vanessa Brown and the incomparable Miss Eve Arden, are provocatively charming. The dialogue is entertaining, adult [illegible] bright, Mr. Emlyn Williams [illegible]doubtedly the type for whom the ladies wouldn't mind leaving home, and the picture is very neatly directed by Mr. Irving Reis, we think, though we wouldn't swear to that name on oath.

The other side of life near the Golden Gate is portrayed in SHAKEDOWN (Extorsión) where Mr. Howard Duff turns up as a taker of pictures for the newspapers. Funny the professions these Duffs get into We know of only two others and one is a Bank Manager and the other an Insurance Man. Perhaps Howard Duff is in the most respectable business. It's practically a certainty that he rakes in more shekels for his efforts.

In the course of his free-lancing, Mr. Duff gets one or two shots that are really good news-pictures, and is hired by a paper, despite the fact that the editor, Mr. Bruce Bennett doesn't care for the Duff fellow as a type. In the pursuit of his reportorial duties Mr. Duff obtains some more pictures that would definitely incriminate one or two of the local gang-leaders if they were published. These he holds on to and approaches the gangster with proposals that amount to nothing else but blackmail. One thing leads to another and he eventually finishes up pumped full of bullets by a gentleman who dislikes him considerably, but Mr. Duff has the presence of mind to press the camera bulb before he kicks the bucket and so leaves a picture of his assassin for the record, though it didn't really matter-there were scores of witnesses present.

The film is quite exciting in spots and gives a close-up of one way of earning a living, but it is, perhaps, wiser to stick to either Banking or Insurance.

—oOo—

Miss Ginger Rogers, in the course of her long career in the movies, has possibly not had a tougher job to tackle than her part in STORM WARNING task to [illegible] that she does it well, though we [illegible] sisters are apt to be bothered by the memory of her dancing cheek to cheek. We recall being in the audience in the old Palace Theater of Vaudeville in New York when Phil Baker, a headline comedian with an accordion and a stooge in a box, spot-lighted Miss Rogers in the audience and described her as a Little Girl with a Great Big Future. He invited her up on the stage to sing, and she accepted. Mr. Baker was the embarrassed one: she wanted to sing "I Got Rhythm" and it taxed his ingenuity to produce a satisfactory accompaniment on his accordian. That was many years ago, and we think it may safely be said that Mr. Baker's prophecy of those day has come true.



In the film Miss Rogers is the model who accompanies a travelling dress salesman on his expeditions, and while on their way to some Southern Center in the U. S. she stops off at some small town 'Way Down South to visit her married sister. No sooner is she off the bus than she witnesses a rather brutal butchering by the Ku Klux Klan and two of the members of that inspiring organisation have been silly enough to leave off their hoods. She sees them, of course, and troubles begin when she arrives at her sister's and discovers that her brother-in-law is one of the unhooded hoodlums she has seen. What would you do? Your duty to the community at large by bearing witness against your brother-in-law and causing your sister endless distress, or keep quiet? That's the problem poor old Ginger has to face and it's made all the more difficult when she finds that Ronald Reagan is the District Attorney. It isn't very difficult for a girl to fall in love with Mr. Reagan, so there you are. After a series of unpleasantnesses, among them the whip-lashing of Miss Rogers by the Ku Klux Klan in solemn conclave, the thing is finally worked out, but it definitely leaves an unpleasant taste in one's mouth.

A foreword to this picture states that the goings-on recorded in the picture do not necessarily give an authentic picture of happenings in the United States, and we hope to goodness that is so. Nevertheless the producers must bear in mind the 99% of the people who see the picture will not take the trouble to read all the rigmarole that precedes the actual photographs and will come away from the movie with the fixed notion that these things do take place in the United States. It's regrettable, but we can't see the situation any other way.

W. G. R.

"TRY AND GET ME," NEW FILM, RELEASED IN SANTIAGO TODAY

The important paper of the motion picture industry "Showmen's Trade Review," published the following comments about the film "TRY AND GET ME" (La Justicia Injusta"), which opens to-day at the Florida Theater, of Santiago city, through United Artists release:

"This is an engrossing, realistic melodrama; a fast-moving, exciting, suspenseful story that deals with mob violence and the terrific effect of lawlessness on all people. Splendidly acted and directed, it [illegible] its emotional grip from [illegible] to finish, and since no effort has been made to glamorize either the people or the surroundings, it is startlingly real. Frank Lovejoy, as the unemployed man caught in the web of circumstances because of his inability to get work to support his family, scores in a performance that not only rings true but wins sympathy. Lloyd Bridges, an extremely versatile actor, handles the role of the megalomaniac killer with his customary, efficient ability. Kathleen Ryan a newcomer, is very good in a characterisation that calls for true understanding to be convincing. Impressive in supporting roles are Richard Carlson, Adele Jergens and Katherine Locke. Director Cyril Endfield demonstrates his ability to ensnare the true aura of off-beat situations of the American scene with his handling of the mob scenes; and his direction throughout is practically flawless. The storming of the jail by the mob (actually filmed on location in Phoenix, Ariz. with townspeople and police participating) is one of the tensest, most gripping sequences the motion picture camera has captured in a long time. The film's story premise-an appeal for judgment by reason rather than by emotion, is clearly something to provoke discussion and thus build patronage through word-of-mouth. Some people may declare that the picture is too much for them, but they'll go right on talking about it and thus excite the curiosity of others who won't be able to wait until they, too, can go see it. Robert Stillman deserves plaudits for an outstanding production."



3 ELEMENTS VITAL TO THE ORGANISM!

My husband, my children and myself all depend on FITINOL, the triple action cerebral tonic. Easy to take. FITINOL returns to the body the phosphorus needed to combat nervous breakdown and counteract mental fatigue.

FITINOL.

Insist on it at your pharmacy

CAMP WAKONDA—SUMMER, 1952

For English - speaking boys, 8-14 years old.
Swimming, riding, hiking, campfires, games, etc.
Season: January 5 to February 28; at Olmué.

For further details, write to:
Donald M. Decker, Casilla 166-D, Santiago.

TANNER & CO.

Members of the Valparaiso Stock Exchange
TEL. 7213 — 2395 — VALPARAISO — CASILLA 825
4th Floor Bolsa Building
BONDS — SHARES — FOREIGN EXCHANGE — BANK OF AMERICA TRAVELLERS CHEQUES
Correspondents: LONDON — NEW YORK — ZURICH — PARIS — MONTREAL (CANADA) — SANTIAGO — BUENOS AIRES — LIMA — MONTEVIDEO
CABLES: TANCAR, VALPARAISO

HUDSON & RUSSELL

Members of the Santiago Stock Exchange
Correspondents in London, New York, Paris, etc.

STOCKS & BONDS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Calle Bandera 75 Casilla 646 Cables: HUDEL
Office N.° 101 SANTIAGO Telephone 87059

VICTOR G. ROWE & CO. LTD.

Bandera 52 — Edificio Caja Amortización — Office N.° 108.
Entrepiso — Telephone 65797.
BONDS AND SHARES —— FOREIGN EXCHANGE
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. TRAVELLERS CHEQUES
Correspondents: LONDON - NEW YORK - B. AIRES, ETC.
Cables: VIRGOW - SANTIAGO.

AUSTRALIAN "UNITED KINGDOM" GIFT HAMPERS

Your relatives and friends will welcome your gift at all seasons of the year
Apply for Prospectus to

ROBERT K. GIBBONS — Casilla 879. — SANTIAGO

Cricket

INTER-CITY MATCH IN VIÑA

The Inter-City match played at Viña last week-end was interesting enough to merit a commentary from R. C R-G or E. W. Swanton. However, yours truly must suffice. The weather was fine. Lucky Chilean cricketers, as last year's Wisden pointed out to find this unexceptional.

Wonderful to relate the players were nearly all ready to start, as the secretary had ordained, at 10.30 a. m. sharp. However, nobody seemed to have faith in this coincidence and the game duly started at 11 a. m. Santiago won the toss and chose to bat. One Viña optimist was heard to remark that this was defeatism, choosing to play for a draw. But by lunch-time with Santiago 90 odd for one and Meredith seeing the ball football size there were some signs of complaisance amongst the Santiago players. Manning had by this time been exasperating the bowlers with his smothering tactics which effectively closed up one end while Meredith made hay. Even so it had not been fast moving and it looked as if the draw-prophecy was not without foundation. Jones had made a useful if lucky 26, Meredith was clear of his 50 and Manning was well, still there. Manning, incidentally, was using a substitute run getter.

From Viña's point of view, the lunch interval, always a stiff hurdle for the batsmen, worked wonders. It awoke Manning, who spluttered fitfully with a four like golden-rain fire-works and then went out played-on to Ness. It made Meredith careless and had him bowled by Freestone. Thereafter the score-sheet shows a steady fall of wickets until the end of the innings. Santiago were unlucky to lose Hobsbawn, run out on his own call, who had been shaping up well, but apart from him and Tienken there had been no other serious attempts to stop the rot. Ness had taken 6 wickets for 55 and Freestone 2 for 15 when Stuart's wicket fell caught at the wicket by Fairbrass off Maxwell at 3:30 p. m. Paine with 5 maidens out of 8 overs had been bowling with a consistency that was to be rewarded in the second innings. Apart from a few muffed catches the fielding had been keen and it was anybody's game. Although on paper it was then to be expected that Viña would be able to put on over 200 in reply and leave Santiago to make up the difference in their 2nd innings.

But the fates in cricket are no respectors of paper probabilities and Viña wickets fell with alarming rapidity. An overeager Paine played late and outside a fatally straight ball from Tienken. Sutton lost an L. B. W. suit to Meredith. Tienken teased Fairbrass into passing a fly-ball to Knowles and Freestone allowed Marshall to knock off his bails. Maxwell and Reid were in together after tea and looked as if they might pull the game out of the fire but Maxwell, the safer of the two, played a weak forward stroke to a good length ball from Meredith to be bowled. Then it was Yeomans' turn to go nibbling at Marshall and missing. And Moodie was out to the last ball of the day, being caught and bowled off a half-hearted stroke to a ball from Meredith. Reid was still there with 53 but there was Saturday night to come.

On Sunday it was not long before the Viña tail lay down and died and the scores stood at 135 to 146 still anybody's game.

In their 2nd innings Santiago were off to a bad start when Paine had Meredith caught at the wicket for O.

Then came Manning, and the bowlers heaved a sigh of resignation, but 17 was a welcome stimulus to his team's fortunes and he left with 3 boundaries to his credit when once again played on to Ness. Then Paine bowled Jones who at 39 looked dangerous and the games' complexion changed perceptively. Knowles played some pretty strokes for his 14 but never looked safe, which is a safe commentary since he confesses to never having felt safe, but Busbridge scarcely gave himself time to settle down. Paine also removed Macqueen and Marshall winkling them out as it were with the sharp pin of a consistent good length.

Once again Hobsbawn & Tienken held back the flood of Viña impatience, but once again Hobsbawn overestimated his fleetness of foot. "Getting too fat" he was heard to say in excuse although he had hurled himself headlong as bravely as any ball player making a base. His 25 runs had been well deserved and welcome to his side. The last two wickets fell to Paine bringing his bag up to 8 with an average of 5.9. Good winkling!

Set only 130 to get at a rate of about a run-a minute looked well within Viña's capabilities but again the first 3 batsmen failed to come off. This time it was Fairbrass who had to hold the side together and his canonical 66 was delightful to watch. Yeomans and Reid played 1st and 2nd end stoppers while Fairbrass-Hamlet spoke his monologue. The ghost was played by Freestone who though down as No. 7 was not allowed to bat. The cousins Hardy divided the match though which it was who made the winning hit your correspondent is unable to relate since he was then relaxing under a shower. Tienken had bowled consistently with little luck and Meredith aggressively with some. Marshall was unusually dissatisfied with himself but seemed greatly improved on last season.

There had been two full days of interest and excitement.

Viña del Mar, Nov. 24,25.

P. W. C. C. 1st. In.

S. B. E. Jones, b. Ness	26
W. Manning, b. Ness	9
W. N. Meredith, b. Freestone	83
J. Knowles, b. Ness	3
J. A. Busbridge, b. Ness	3
W. A. Macqueen, b. Freestone	8
D. Marshall, b. Ness	0
E. J B. Hobsbawn, run out	10
A. Tienken, b. Ness	10
R. G. S. Stuart, c. Fairbrass b Maxwell	0
H Unwin, not out	0
Extras	3
TOTAL	155

Bowling:	O.	M.	W.	R.
Freestone	15	3	2	65
Paine	8	5	0	8
Ness	17	2	6	55
Maxwell	8 3	0	1	43

V. C. C. 1st In.

C Maxwell, b Meredith	26
M. Paine, b. Tienken	0
J. B Sutton (Capt.), l bw Meredith	3
P. C Fairbrass, c Knowles, b Tienken	3
S J Freestone, b Marshall	8
R. Reid c Busbridge b Meredith	53
D Yeomans, b Marshall	3
T Moodie, c & b Meredith	21
H P. Hardy, c Macqueen b Marshall	4
C. O. Hardy, b. Tienken	4
A G. Ness, not out	5
Extras	11
TOTAL	146

Bowling:	O.	M.	W.	R.
Tienken	19.1	3	3	45
Meredith	16	6	4	24
Marshall	18	6	3	43
Manning	5	1	0	23

P. W. C. C. 2nd In.

S. B. E. Jones, b. Paine	39
W. N. Meredith, c. Fairbrass, b Paine	0
W. Manning, b. Ness	17
J. Knowles, b. Paine	14
J. A. Busbridge, c. Maxwell, b. Paine	2
W. A. Macqueen, c. Ness, b. Paine	5
D Marshall, b. Paine	0
E. J B Hobsbawn, run out	25
A Tienken, b. Paine	7
R. G. S. Stuart, not out	6
H Unwin, b. Paine	1
Extras	5
TOTAL	121

Bowling:	O.	M.	W.	R.
Freestone	4	2	0	11
Paine	24 2	7	8	47
Ness	15	4	1	47
Maxwell	7	2	0	11

V. C. C. 2nd In.

C Maxwell, c & b. Meredith	10
M. Paine, c. Marshall, b. Meredith	12
J B. Sutton, c Unwin, b. Meredith	6
P. C Fairbrass, c. Tienken, b. Marshall	66
D Yeomans b Meredith	9
R Reid, c. Macqueen, b. Marshall	13
T. Moodie, b. Tienken	1
H. P Hardy, not out	4
C O Hardy, not out	3
Extras	9
TOTAL for 7 w.	123

Messrs: S. J Freestone and A G. Ness did not bat

Bowling:	O.	M.	W.	R.
Tienken	17	2	[illegible]	64
Meredith	10	1	[illegible]	[illegible]
Marshall	6	0	2	[illegible]

VALPARAISO C. C. won by 3 wickets

By SAM SNEAD

Start your downswing in the form pictured here and you'll be doing all right. You can see this player is perfectly balanced on his feet and he has that straight left arm in there to guide the club-head down in a wide full circle.



And his right elbow is under the shaft so that he can pull his hands down toward his right pocket permitting the hip and shoulder pivot to supply the necessary outward swing of the club head so that clubhead meets ball from an inside-out swing and passes slightly across the direction line.

Because of that straight — but not locked — left leg — his head is going to remain in fixed position throughout the downswing so there will be mechanical precision in the swing and as a result a straight, far-flying ball.

IN the first division of the English League the first [illegible] maintained their positions. A start was made in the [illegible] round of the F. A. Cup. Portsmouth beat [illegible] the League match by 2-0 and Arsenal were too good for Bolton Wanderers. Newcastle United, playing away, were too good for Manchester City.

RESULTS:

DIVISION 1

Arsenal	4	Bolton	2
Aston Villa	2	Middlesborough	0
Blackpool	4	Stoke	3
Chelsea	0	Preston N. E.	[illegible]
Derby	3	W. Bromwich A.	1
Burnley	3	Huddersfiel	1
Liverpool	0	Manchester Un.	0
Newcastle	3	Manchester City	2
Portsmouth	2	Tottenham	0
Sunderland	2	Fulham	0
Wolverhampton	2	Charlton	0

DIVISION 2

Blackburn	2	Leicester	1
Barnsley	0	Brentford	0
Leeds	2	Bury	1
Coventry	3	Southhampton	1
Notts For.	4	Hull	1
Luton	1	Rotherham	[illegible]
Notts County	1	Cardiff	[illegible]
Birmingham	2	Queens P. R.	0
Sheffield Un.	2	Doncaster	1
Sheffield Wed.	2	Swansea	1
West Ham	3	Everton	3

F. A. CUP FIRST ROUND

Chester	2	Accrington	1
Wat'bo	5	Aylesbury	[illegible]
Bangor	2	Southport	2
Barnstaple	2	Folkestone	2
Chesterfield	2	Barrow	0
Workington	5	Blackhall Col.	2
Blyth Spartan	2	B ship Auck.	1
Bradford City	6	Carlisle	1
Bristol City	2	Brighton	1
Bristol Rov.	3	Kettering	0
Colchester	3	Port Vale	1
Lincoln	4	Crewe	2
Gillingham	1	Crystal Pal.	0
Grimsby	4	Darlington	0
Guildford	4	Hereford	1
Hartlepools	2	Rhyle	0
Rochdale	2	Kilkeston	1
Leyton	3	Chippenham	0
Leyton Or.	2	Gorleston	1
Leytonstone	2	Shrewsbury	0
Millwall	1	Plymount	0
Oldham	4	Nelson	0
Newport	4	Barry	0
Norwich	3	Northampton	2
Southend	3	Bournemouth	1
Stockport	2	Gateshead	2
Stockton	1	Mansfield	1
Swindon	2	Bedford	0
Tonbridge	6	Aldershot	0
Torquay	3	Bromley	[illegible]
Witton	2	Gainsborough	[illegible]
Wrexham	3	Halifax	0
York	1	Bradford	1

Tendrá más luz en casa si limpia sus ventanas con Vidrex
Vidrex
Vidrex
LIMPIA SIN DAÑAR VIDRIOS, CRISTALES, ESPEJOS, METALES, ETC.
M.R.

CLIFFORD M. MILLER

PROPIEDADES

BOLSA DE COMERCIO OFS. 226 7-8
FONOS 86701 84694
CASILLA 3203 SANTIAGO CHILE

"For sales purchases, rents or lets of all kinds of properties and land consult this office where you will find an expert staff always at your disposal".

Graduated [illegible]

INJECTIONS
MASSAGES

AV. EL BOSQUE 71 — TEL. 490671

SANTIAGO

TO LET

APARMENTS

Completely Furnished Equipped With Telephone and Frigidaire Maids Service and Management Included

EDIFICIO CALEDONIA
Av. Bulnes 185 — Santiago.

Australian cook offers his services in private home or with diplomats First class recommendations speaks various languages
J. K. Nowsal, 6430 Principe de Gales con Larrain.

In private family (English) two rooms with or without furniture; board; garage. House has garden and telephone.

"CAMPOS DE SPORT" street
PHONE: 42912.

FOR RENT

Well-furnished house December to July. Two storeys
First Floor: Hall with bar, living with fireplace, dining room, maid's quarters, frigidaire, garage and garden with fruit trees.
Second Floor: Two bedrooms, two bathrooms, study, sitting room, small hall, closets. Also gas heating.
Calle Clemente Fabres 814-B, near Bilbao Telephone 47792

FOR SALE OR EXCHANGE

Against wardrobes and chest-of drawers, the following: 4 small canvas deck chairs, canvas camp bed, wardrobe truck and old [illegible]ks, 2,000-watt transformer, [illegible]kdown chicken houses (3 x 3 mt.), wooden batteries for young chicks (adaptable for rabbits), etc.

LARRAIN 7540.

Urriola 142 Of. 405; Tel. 3647

LAWYER

Eduardo Harmsen Bradley
VALPARAISO

TO LET

Two very nice furnished rooms to share with another young man, reasonable prices. Another nice furnished room for married couple or two young girls from 1st January in English home,
Calle Barcelona 2018, corner of Pedro de Valdivia, one block in from Union Church.

BOOKS
MAGAZINES
STATIONERY & FANCY GOODS.
SUTTON'S SEEDS
Casilla 151 — Valparaiso
Successor to
HEGGIE & MACKENZIE Ltd.

TO LET

Unfurnished Bed-room.
Inclusive Terms

Breakfast and Luncheon

Los Capitanes 1424

Telephone 40398

TO LET

Comfortably furnished rooms with baths—Modern house. Excellent board. Telephone 47209, Triana 871 (Providencia Block 700)
Santiago

TO LET EN PROVIDENCIA

$ 12.000.—

COMFORTABLE FURNISHED CHALET

4 BEDROOMS, DINING - ROOM, LIVING - ROOM WITH FIRE-PLACE, GARAGE AND NICE GARDEN.

AVENUE HOLANDA 925—SANTIAGO

WANTED

for British Girl's School in Lima, Perú.
MATRON-HOUSEKEEPER
to take charge of small boarding-house (15 - 18 girls) to be opened by.
COLEGIO SAN SILVESTRE in April 1952
Applications to the Headmistress
(by airmail)
COLEGIO SAN SILVESTRE — DOS DE MAYO 114.
MIRAFLORES — LIMA — PERU.

FARM MANAGER

Chilean born Englishman, 45 years of age, married, seeks position as manager for farm, preferably in provinces of Nuble, Bio Bio, Malleco or Cautin. Life-long experience in general farming expert in mechanized farming on a big scale. Moderate salary. Open for immediate engagement and up till April 1952. Retiring from present position due to termination of contract and liquidation of agricultural company. First class references offered.
Please adress to "FARMER" c/o Messrs. STEEL HNOS.
CASILLA [illegible] — CONCEPCION.

Visite
TERMAS
MINERALES
DE
TOLHUACA
CURACAUTIN

El Balneario de las aguas radioactivas y milagrosas. La Temporada se inicia en Diciembre.

LA ZONA MAS BELLA DE CHILE, POR SUS LAGOS, PESCA Y CAZA

Las Termas Minerales de Tolhuaca, cuyos manantiales de aguas calientes brotan en el interior de una gruta situada en la base de un cerro y al costado de una quebrada, es, por su clima, el lugar indicado para una convalecencia y un grato reposo.

Las inhalaciones de vapores sulfurosos naturales, barros minerales provenientes de las fuentes de aguas minerales y finalmente, sus aguas radioactivas consideradas entre las mejores del mundo, señalan a las TERMAS DE TOLHUACA como la fuente recuperadora de salud para sus dolencias y malestares.

INFORMES:
En todas las Oficinas de informaciones de los FF. CC. del Estado

BLUE STAR LINE

FIRST CLASS ONLY

REGULAR SERVICE FROM

BUENOS AIRES to LONDON

CALLING AT

MONTEVIDEO - SANTOS - RIO DE JANEIRO, LISBON, TENERIFFE, AND LAS PALMAS

For full particulars sailings, and fares apply to Agents:

KENRICK Y CIA LTDA.

VALPARAISO:
Blanco 737
Teléfono 7637

SANTIAGO:
Bandera 84, Of. 11ª
Teléfono 61240

ROYAL NETHERLANDS STEAMSHIP CO.

Next Sailing to Antwerp

Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Bremen.

s. s. "BREDA" due Valparaiso December 17th.

DUNCAN, FOX & CO. LTD.

General Agents in Chile & Peru.

P.S.N.C.

COMPAÑIA INGLESA DE VAPORES

M/V. "KENUTA" arriving Valparaiso about 26th November. Will receive cargo for Liverpool.
M/V "LAGUNA," arriving Valparaiso about beginning December. Will receive cargo for Antwerp and London
M/V. "CUZCO," arriving Valparaiso first half of December. Will receive cargo for Hull, Antwerp and Liverpool.
M/V. "FLAMENCO," arriving Valparaiso 1st. half of January. Will receive cargo for Liverpool.

EXCELLENT PASSENGER ACCOMMODATION AVAILABLE TO EUROPE AND INTERMEDIATE PORTS CABINS WITH AND WITHOUT PRIVATE BATH.

THE PACIFIC STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY

Agents for the
The British Overseas
Airways Corporation
Royal Mail Lines Ltd.,
Cunard Steamship Company Limited.

VALPARAISO:
Blanco 659

SANTIAGO:
Agustinas 1062-6

LIGHTER VEIN

One of financier Bernard Baruch's friends spoke so often about his love for hunting that Baruch finally invited him to his South Carolina plantation for a turkey shoot. The friend tramped for two days shooting madly, but he failed to hit a single turkey.

Mr Baruch made no comment. The next morning, however, the friend was ambling along a path near the house when he saw a fat gobbler sitting motionless in a tree. He crept up close, fired point-blank, and was overjoyed when the turkey fell at his feet. It was only when he picked it up that he noticed a card tied around its neck. The card read, "With the compliments of Bernard Baruch."

* * *

"Have you been to any other doctor before coming to me?" asked the grouchy physician.

"No, sir," replied the meek patient. "I went to the druggist."

"You went to a druggist!" exclaimed the doctor. "That shows how much sense some people have. You went to a druggist. And what idiotic advice did he give you?"

"Why, he told me to come and see you," replied the patient.

* * *

Two would-be sportsmen from the city decided to rough it for a season and rented a cabin in the North Woods. Neither had done any hunting before, but they were well-supplied with equipment and enthusiasm.

The day of their arrival, Bill, who was particularly eager to get on with the hunting, said to his companion. "You make the fire, Joe. I'll go shoot a bear for dinner."

He had walked only a few hundred feet from the cabin when he saw a large black bear. Taking careful aim, he fired. When the smoke cleared, he saw he had made a direct hit. But the bear was not dead; wounded and enraged, she was charging Bill.

Dropping his gun, the amateur hunter made for the open cabin door, the bear in hot pursuit. Just before he reached the safety of the cabin, however, the hunter tripped and fell. The wounded bear, unable to slow down, went charging right on into the cabin where the hapless Joe was struggling to get a fire started.

Bill rose and brushed himself off. Strolling over to the door, he shouted, "Okay, Joe. You skin that blighter. I'll go get another one.

FRENCH LINE

CIE. GENERALE TRANSATLANTIQUE - PARIS.

Regular service of cargo vessels, with limited passenger accommodation between France, Belgium, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile.

CHERBOURG due in Valparaiso second half December, loading for Antwerp & French ports

GENERAL AGENTS FOR CHILE:

A. J. BROOM & CO. S. A. C.

VALPARAISO:
Urriola 51 - Casilla 9
Casilla 910
Teléfonos: 3942-2990

SANTIAGO:
Miguel Cruchaga 920.
Oficina 504
Teléfonos: 64209-64211
Casilla 448

Cables: "TRANSAT".

JOHNSON LINE

Next sailing for ANTWERP, HAMBURG, DENMARK SWEDEN & FINLAND, via Perú, Ecuador, Colombia, Panamá and Curacao.

"ARGENTINA" — November 30th from San Antonio. December 1st (Optional) from Valparaiso.

"BOLIVIA" — January 4th from Valparaiso.

Luxurious accommodation for 24 passengers.
All outside staterooms with private bath.

General Agents for the West Coast of South America:

COMPAÑIA CHILENA DE NAVEGACION INTEROCEANICA

SANTIAGO: Nueva York 53 — Casilla 4246 — Teléfono 84523.

VALPARAISO: Plaza Justicia — Casilla 1410 — Teléfono 7721.

ITALIA

"A. Usodimare"

10th of December

From Valparaiso to Antofagasta, Iquique, Arica, Callao, Guayaquil, (Puná), Buenaventura, Cristóbal, Curacao, La Guayra, Las Palmas, BARCELONA and GENOA
and
CONNECTIONS WITH MIDDLE EAST PORTS.

FREIGHTS AND PASSAGES.

VALPARAISO:
Av. Errázuriz 401
Telephone 7385

ITALMAR

Huérfanos 1247
SANTIAGO:
Telephone 68649

General Agents.

GRACE LINE

Valparaiso — New York, via Panama Canal

WEEKLY SAILINGS WITH COMBINATION PASSENGER-CARGO VESSELS CARRYING 52 PASSENGERS. AIR-CONDITIONED ACCOMMODATIONS EACH WITH PRIVATE BATH, OUTDOOR TILED SWIMMING POOL AND BEACH DECK, MOTION PICTURES, ETC., AND FORTNIGHTLY SAILINGS WITH CARGO VESSELS 12 PASSENGERS.

FROM NEW YORK:	FROM VALPARAISO, via SAN ANTONIO:
SANTA CECILIA, Nov. 23.	SANTA LUISA, Dec. 5
SANTA MARGARITA, Nov. 30.	SANTA CECILIA, Dec 12.
SANTA ISABEL, Dec. 7.	SANTA MARGARITA, Dec 19.

Valparaiso -- U. S. Pacific Ports

TWICE MONTHLY SAILINGS WITH CARGO SHIPS CARRYING 12 PASSENGERS IN OUTSIDE CABINS WITH PRIVATE BATHS:

FROM NEW YORK:	FROM VALPARAISO, via SAN ANTONIO:
SANTA INES, Nov 30	SANTA INES, Dec 20

FROM SAN FRANCISCO:	FROM VALPARAISO, VIA SAN ANTONIO
SANTA ADELA, Nov 30.	SANTA FLAVIA, Dec 18
SANTA ELIANA, Dec. 14	SANTA ELIANA, Jan 17

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONSULT.

GRACE & CIA. (CHILE) S. A.

KNUTSEN LINE

M/S "GJERTRUD BAKKE"

Loading in Valparaiso about 29/30th November
San Antonio about 1/3rd December
Talcahuano about 4th December
Tomé about 5th December
Valparaiso about 6th December
Coquimbo about 7th December
Tocopilla about 10/13th December

for Antwerp, Bremen, Hamburg and Scandinavian ports via Peru, Ecuador and Panamá.

Excellent accommodation for twelve passengers in single and double cabins each with private bath. Stewardesses especially for the attention of passengers.

GENERAL AGENTS:
WILLIAMSON, BALFOUR & CO. S. A.
Sub-Agents in Santiago.
JOHN CAMERON REID & SONS.


BLONDIE
by
CHIC YOUNG
BATH IN ABSOLUTE PEACE AND QUIET
HEY, CAN'T A MAN EVEN CALL HIS BATH WATER HIS OWN?
WE'RE JUST SAILING BOATS
WE'LL COME BACK IN IF WE HAVE TO CLIMB THRU THE WINDOWS
SCRAM
I'VE LOCKED EVERY WINDOW AND DOOR, AND I'LL SPRINKLE MARBLES ON THE STEPS
NO HUMAN ALIVE COULD GET THRU THIS BARRICADE
RING
OH, NO! THE FRONT DOOR-BELL
I FORGOT A BARRICADE WORKS BOTH WAYS
OH-H-- THE MARBLES
RING
IT'S BLONDIE'S RING--- I'LL HAVE TO OPEN THAT DOOR IF I DO IT WITH MY LAST BREATH
I FORGOT MY POCKETBOOK, DEAR
I'LL NEVER TAKE ANOTHER BATH AS LONG AS I LIVE!
3-4
Copr. 1951, King Features Syndicate, Inc., World rights reserved.

S.P.M. SPOTLIGHT



JOHN HARDBOTTOM

(Singed in the Great San Francisco fire)

"For some time I have read and enjoyed your weekly feature which "Spotlights" various members of the English-speaking community. Interesting reports, but hardly typical. While most of the characters you have written of have lived rich, full lives and experienced everything from flood to famine, the average S. P. M. reader is not this type at all. The average S.P.M. reader is, in fact, as dull as glazed glass. May I describe him for you?

His name is John Hardbottom. He lives in a two-room apartment in Los Leones, not under a flat rock, as one would be led to believe from his appearance. He was educated in a private school and, to the infinite surprise of his parents, won his colours in ping-pong, a sport which he has since given up as too strenuous.

His first sex experience was when he stubbed his toe on a thick volume of Freud, and he has had nothing to do with the subject after this unhappy accident.

He has met his share of disasters. He was in Santiago during the great Chillan earthquake and was [illegible] his, only seven months after the Great Fire. "Just think", Mr Hardbottom says, "If Aunt Minnie had died a few months earlier I might have been singed".

Mr Hardbottom claims to have no special eccentricities, although he does admit, with a guilty grin, to a liking for hard-boiled eggs. He decries hobbies in general as a waste of time although in his youth he had a collection of paper napkins "borrowed" from hotels. He engages in no special sports, but enjoys a brisk walk around the living room every morning before breakfast.

When asked just what he did do with time, Mr. Hardbottom replied that he is an enthusiastic linguist. "I have only been in Chile for 57 years", he says proudly, "and I am going to start using the past tense in my Spanish any day now". He also plays bridge, and often recounts the occasion when, in 1922, he bid a small slam. (Noble effort, but he went down three tricks). Mr. Hardbottom is candid in admitting that he likes to play for stakes, usually as high as one cent (avo) per hundred.

Hardbottom's cardinal virtues. He uses the same razor blade half a hundred times and hasn't changed toothbrushes in years. "I understand," he told us, "that they are making the things of nylon these days." He buys his copy of "El Mercurio" from the same boy every morning of the world and the customer-seller relationship has grown through the years. "I've literally watched that boy as he grew a beard," Hardbottom reports. Also an avid reader of the S.P.M., he never fails to read a copy at the house of Dura Hardbottom, his spinster sister.

Present plans for Hardbottom include a trip to the country, possibly as far as Melipilla. "Too much hustle and bustle for me in the city", he reports. "It's the pace of life. I've had my share of excitement, now I just want to relax".

That, Dear Editor, is the typical S.P.M. reader, not the glamorous creatures that have been adorning your back cover.

Sincerely,

H. V. S.
Santiago.

EUROPEAN CUISINE
EXQUISITE SEA-FOODS

DINE AND DANCE IN THE OPEN AIR CHATHAM CLUB THE ONLY GARDEN RESTAURANT IN THE CENTRE OF SANTIAGO.

Danubio Azul

BUY
BLUNDELL
PAINT
THE
BEST

Grant's
BEST PROCURABLE
Scotch Whisky
PRODUCE OF SCOTLAND
BOTTLED AND GUARANTEED BY
William Grant & Sons Ld
DISTILLERIES
THE GLENFIDDICH AND BALVENIE-GLENLIVET, DUFFTOWN, SCOTLAND

IDEAL – DRYCLEANERS
OF ALL CLOTHING
CURTAINS, CARPETS
FURNITURE
without removing covers
IDEAL – RAPID DELIVERY
without charge
IDEAL – HOME SERVICE & PHONE 45266
LA IDEAL your DRYCLEANERS
VALENZUELA CASTILLO 1210

FOX Hnos. S.A.C.
Brasil 1303
VALPARAISO

CADILLAC

BUICK

CHEVROLET

SPARE PARTS
and
SERVICE STATION
Telephone 7941
VALPARAISO

EL LICOR MAS SANO
PURO DE UVA
PISCO
UNA COPITA EN EL BAR
UNA BOTELLA EN EL HOGAR

VERMOUTH
CINZANO
VERMOUTH

GILBEY'S
GIN

YES

I WANT A SUBSCRIPTION TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC MAIL.

ENCLOSED FIND CHEQUE OR MONEY ORDER FOR

SEND THE S P M TO

NAME

ADDRESS CITY

In Chile: $140 pesos per year. North and South America, $500 pesos per year. Europe and Asia, $560 pesos per year

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT PROJECT FURIOSO C	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. Job #61-1013/80 [redacted] [redacted] Box 14 [redacted]
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. ----
	4. DATE ----
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM ----
	8. DATE OF INFO. ----
	9. EVALUATION ----
5. ANALYST C. McNew	6. DATE PROCESSED 28 Nov 61
10. DISSEMINATED IN ----	11. DATE ----

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

X	12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

~~Project portion has been~~ removed and sent to RI/AR. For review of file, contact RI/AR x-2471 using RI file number indicated above.

FULMINATOR-1 201-88764

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201- 88764

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO RID/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-66 2593

(7-13)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO RID/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: X-REPRODUCED DOCUMENTS TO PHILLIPS, DAVID ATLEE 201 FILE. (THE DOCUMENTS, THREE PROJECT OUTLINE FOLDERS)

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1952 TO 1975

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/2/78	3/2/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

14-00000

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: X-REFERENCED DOCUMENTS TO PHILLIPS, DAVID ATLEE 201 FILE. (THE DOCUMENTS, THREE PROJECT OUTLINE FOLDERS)

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1952 TO 1975

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: ______

ROOM: ______

DELETIONS, IF ANY: ______

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/2/78	3/2/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

KAPOK SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Briney 6

Air Pouch

TCS-A-1801

Chief, WHD
Acting-
Chief of Station, Santiago

29 December 1951

ZACACTUS, Chile.

Fulminator-1's Pro-Forma Contract

Reference: TCS-W-1465

1. Attached herewith please find a pro forma contract which has been prepared for Fulminator-1's signature. He has stated that he is in agreement with its provisions. If this contract is satisfactory please return it for his signature at such time as his clearance is obtained.

2. FULMINATER-1 has shown himself to be very enthusiastic regarding the proposed employment with this Organisation and is anxious to start the tasks to be assigned to him as soon as his clearance is obtained and the necessary instructions are forwarded to this Station.

3. To carry out the covert propaganda aspect of FULMINATER-1's duties he has highly recommended the use of Victor POBLETE Ortega. The latter is a Chilean, about 58 years of age, who is foreman of FULMINATER-1's printing shop. He also lives on the premises and would be the only person who would have to know if the presses are used at night. He is not a member of the printers' labor union and his past actions have indicated to FULMINATER-1 that he is 100% anti-Communist. He has been employed many years by MacKenzie and Co., a British firm which shared the print shop facilities with FULMINATER-1's presses. However, FULMINATER-1's equipment is entirely separate from MacKenzie's and if the covert work is done at night as is anticipated it is FULMINATER-1's opinion that POBLETE could run off the work without any possible interference from other individuals. Another of POBLETE's advantages is the fact that he is able to perform all the printing operations which will be necessary to put out normal propaganda and similar material and this would eliminate the need to use other persons in the preparation of the propaganda material.

4. POBLETE has been closely connected with English and Anglo-Chilean officials of MacKenzie & Co. for many years but it is believed logical to presume that if he is paid generously for his work in this connection, with the understanding that the work is of a completely confidential nature and of a long-term basis, that he will agree to complete secrecy regarding the work. Amount of payment to POBLETE will have to be determined when there is some indication as to the amount of work to be done. A local investigation of this person has been initiated and the results will be forwarded as soon as possible. No derogatory information on this person appears in this Station's files.

✓ 4. In line with the authorisation received in TCS-W-1465, FULMINATER-1 will be

KAPOK SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

paid from other operational funds the peso equivalent of his salary beginning 1 January 1952. It was considered necessary to begin his payments as of that date in order to insure his continued stay in Chile. This Station would appreciate clarification of JBEDICT-Chile to which, according to TCS-W-1465, this expense could be charged for a limited time.

6. ~~5.~~ FULMINATER-1's weekly newspaper is 51% owned by him, and as indicated in attached contract, he has agreed to keep the paper for at least two years. The other owner, who has taken no active interest whatsoever in the operation, management or policies of the paper, apparently plans to sell his share. The prospective buyer is not known but in any event FULMINATER-1 will retain the controlling interest.

7. ~~6.~~ FULMINATER-1 is willing to spend the necessary time in Washington for training and will be ready to depart immediately when so advised. However, his wife is expecting a baby around 30 December 1951 according to her doctor's calculations, and FULMINATER-1 would prefer to remain in Santiago for at least a few days after the child is born. He is certain that the birth will take place within a week's time and it is hoped that his presence in Washington will not be required prior to 15 January 1952. As a cover story for his trip, FULMINATER-1 has advised that an option has been bought on one of his plays and that a trip to New York to discuss the play with the prospective producer is completely logical. Further, he has an estate in Texas which is in litigation and which could logically require his presence there. FULMINATER-1 asked that he be allowed to spend a day or two in Texas either on his trip up or back to settle this estate and it is recommended that he be allowed to do so in order to provide his cover story with more basis in fact.

8. ~~7.~~ FULMINATER-1 has been told that he must pay United States income tax on his salary received from this Organization. He is at a loss, however, to know how this added income can be satisfactorily and securely explained to the Department of Internal Revenue. In accordance with the contents of Field Regulations 50-13, this matter is being brought to Headquarters attention with a request for instructions as to how this matter is to be handled.

Acting Chief of Station
Kenneth J. Tendler

efc

Attachment: TCS-A-1301

SECURITY [illegible]

Pro Forma Contract With Fulminator-1

We hereby contract you to perform services as required under the following conditions:

1) You agree to remain in Chile for at least two years from the date of this contract and you also agree not to sell during this period your share of the South Pacific Mail of which, it is understood, you are a part owner and maintain the controlling interest. (51%)

2) It is agreed by you that this Organisation will not become involved in any way, financially or otherwise, in the South Pacific Mail.

3) You will carry out the duties assigned to you by the appropriate official to the best of your ability devoting as much time to them as is reasonably possible, taking into consideration your obligation to manage the South Pacific Mail as the overt reason for your residence in Chile.

4) You will be paid the sum of U. S. $5,940 per annum for your services to this Organization, and you agree, in accordance with subsequent instructions, to pay the United States income tax which will be due on this amount. Your salary will be paid monthly.

5) You agree to make yourself available to travel to Washington for about a one month's stay to undergo training as required. Travel and living expenses during this trip will be paid by this Organization. It is not known when this trip will take place but it is believed that it will be in the near future.

6) You will be granted paid vacations during the period of your employment in Chile in accordance with applicable Chilean laws.

7) Should local travel be required by this Organization, your travel and living expenses while away from Santiago will be made available.

8) Reasonable entertainment expenses, after prior consultation with this office, will be reimbursed.

9) It is agreed by you that you will not expect sick leave benefits to accure to you under the terms of this contract; and it is understood that your employment by this Organization will not entitle you to retirement and other similar benefits of United States Government employees.

10) It is understood by you that the terms of this contract are

SECRET [illegible]

Attachment: TCS-A-1801

provisional upon the satisfactory clearance of your name by the appropriate officials.

11) The effective date of this contract is the date on which your satisfactory clearance is received and the term shall be indefinite.

12) The termination of this contract may be effected at any time upon written notice, but without advance notice, by this Organization, such termination to be effective upon receipt of the notice. The termination of this contract will not release you from any provisions of security oaths which you may be required to take.

14-00000

SECRET

Project Outline Clearance Sheet

Project Title PB GROVEL Amendment No. ________ Project No. ________

Developed by: B. A. Moffett ________ WHD ________ 29/1/52
Case Officer ________ Organization ________ Date

Reviewed by: N. M. Singer ________ ________ Date ________ Division Chief ________ 1 Feb 52
Foreign Branch Chief ________ Date ________ Division Chief ________ Date

Concurrences: J. M. Caldwell [illegible] for Project Coordinator ________ [illegible] 1952
Date

WH/CPO ________ 31 Jan '52
Date

A. J. Rowland OS/C ________ 9 Feb 52
Date

________ Date

________ Date

________ Date

Approved subject to conditions below: ADDPC ________ 12 Feb '52
Date

Conditions of approval: ________

____

____

____

____

____

OPC Form No. 1103 (Rev)
23 April 1951

3, 40

1 4

SECRET

PROJECT OUTLINE

Project PBGROVEL Amendment No. ______

Type Operational

I. AUTHORIZATION

A. Establishment "in the immediate future" of mechanism capable of conducting psychological and political warfare aimed at the accomplishment of WHD missions (a) and (b) in Chile; as set out in Section II (paragraph 2.b.) of Annex B to the WHD/OPC Strategic Plan dated 1 November 1951. This task is assigned priority one in Phase I (1 Jan - 30 June 52) in the aforementioned Plan.

II. REFERENCES

A. Budgetary data for this Project. (ANNEX A)

B. Field dispatch (TCS-A-1801) outlining the terms of this Project. (ANNEX B)

C. Headquarters cable authorizing recruitment of FULMINATOR-1 for this Project as a contract agent. (ANNEX C)

III. PROPOSAL

A. Statement

It is proposed to undertake the development in Chile of a group or committee composed of Chilean nationals which will engage overtly and actively in anti-Communist work and will function as a WHD mechanism for the accomplishment of WHD missions (a) and (b) in Chile, as set forth in Paragraph I above.

As the first step in implementing the development of that committee, it is proposed to engage the services of a high-calibre American national in Chile as a contract agent at an annual salary of $6,000.00 to

1. Spot, recruit, and manage a qualified indigenous Chilean who will act as organizer of the aforementioned committee, and
2. Act as cut-out and principal agent for WHD, in the operations of the committee.

At such time as development of the committee warrants, the necessary steps will be taken to place the committee in the proper relationship with the DTHABEAS foundation for purposes of cover and support.

B. Background

The American national in question is a former WHD/OSO agent (FULMINATOR-1) of proven ability, courage and discretion.

FULMINATOR-1's present occupation in Santiago, Chile, provides him with excellent contacts and cover for carrying out the tasks proposed for him above.

He is part owner of, and holds the controlling interest (51%) in a Santiago printing and publishing establishment that publishes an English-language newspaper, The South Pacific Mail, which FULMINATOR-1 edits. His establishment is well equipped to handle a great variety of printing jobs.

C. Current Status

On 23 January 1952, WHD Headquarters authorized its Santiago Field Station to hire FULMINATOR-1 as a contract agent for a period of at least two years (See ANNEXES B and D). In his agent capacity, FULMINATOR-1 will undertake to develop the committee referred to above in Paragraph A of this Outline.

At such time as that development warrants, an Amendment to this Project containing a statement of all new requirements, will be submitted to competent authority for approval.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

That there be allotted to this Project funds in the amount of $4,700.00 to provide salary for FULMINATOR-1 for the remainder of Fiscal Year, to cover the cost of bringing him to Washington for a period of covert training, provide his per diem allowance while here, and transport him back to Santiago, Chile following that training period.

V. OPERATIONAL DETAILS

A. Area of Operation

Chile

B. Operational Control

1. WHD Headquarters will exercise final control of this Project, and act as its support unit.

2. The WHD Field Station, Santiago, Chile, will exercise field control of Project operations in accordance with instructions from Headquarters.

C. Personnel Required

One cleared, witting agent to act as Project principal agent and cut-out (FULMINATOR-1).

D. Communications Plan

Available WHD pouch and cable facilities between Headquarters and the Santiago Field Station.

E. Support Plan

1. Training

The Project's principal agent will receive approximately one month of covert training in Washington, D. C., and return to Chile. All expenses in connection with this training are to be borne by WHD.

F. Reports Procedure

Progress reports will be submitted to WHD Headquarters by the Santiago Field Station in accordance with Headquarters directives.

G. Cover and Security

1. Cover

FULMINATOR-1 will remain in Chile in his present business position. As a cover story for his trip to Washington for covert training, FULMINATOR-1 has advised that an option has been bought on one of his plays and that a trip to New York to discuss the play with the prospective producer is completely logical.

2. Security

On 10 January 1952, WHD received an CPC Operational Clearance on FULMINATOR-1.

Communications between FULMINATOR-1 and the Santiago Field Station will at all times be carried on by means of a secure cut-out.

Since FULMINATOR-1's cover is his overt business situation in which he is already established, and since that situation provides him with printing and publishing facilities, it is believed that good operational security can be maintained with a minimum of effort in this Project.

VI. BUDGET DATA

See ANNEX A. (OPC Form No. 404).

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: OD/OP/Comms

NO.

DATE 4 February 1952

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. WHD					three extra copies attached.
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

10—61155-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

4 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: WHD

SUBJECT: OPC Project PBGROVEL

1. Subject project has been reviewed by this office and no communications facilities beyond those already existing will be required in support of the project.

2. It is intended that this memorandum shall constitute the Communications Annex for PBGROVEL.

James L. Fisher
JAMES L. FISHER
OD/OP/Commo

OD/OP/JLF/mhj

Distribution:
- Addressee - orig & 3
- OD/OP/Carpenter - 1
- OD/OP/Fisher - 2
- SD/RE - 2

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

SECRET

Branch I, WHD Records 1 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Meeting with Agent, Paul D. LANGEVIN on 29 April 1952

1. The sense of the following text was obtained during an afternoon meeting with Agent LANGEVIN. Participating in the talk were Messrs. Smyser and Dutton and Agent LANGEVIN. Four major topics were discussed and will be presented here in the order in which they were developed.

2. Printing Plant Problem: Mr. LANGEVIN indicated that in two and a half to three months certain financial obligations would come due. These consisted entirely in making an $8,000 payment arising from the purchase of equipment for his printing establishment. This equipment, which cost about $10,000 when purchased late in 1951, consists of an Italian-made press, linotype machine, Speed Graphic cameras, type, etc. The market value of this equipment (partly new and partly used) is estimated to be at least $10,000. The sum of $8,000 represents the total indebtedness of LANGEVIN's plant and is owed to a Mr. MACKENZIE of Casa Mackenzie. Mr. LANGEVIN may meet this payment by either (1) securing a loan from a Fort Worth, Texas, bank using his share in family oil interests as collateral, (2) taking on a Chilean partner, (3) getting the money from a Chilean bank (which would involve an 18% interest rate) or (4) getting the money elsewhere. Common agreement was expressed on the undesirability of taking on a Chilean partner since this would be a security hazard in any future PW work, and would also eliminate the possibility of using the plant as cover for another agent. Mr. LANGEVIN, asked about his previous statement about leaving Chile after two years, replied that now there was no definite plan or desire in that direction. He indicated he would have some idea about the possibility of assistance from a Texas bank within a few weeks. Mr. LANGEVIN also suggested that he would gladly use his earnings for the next two years from the agency ($6,000 per year) if the Agency could put up the $8,000 in a lump sum. The printing firm is now making a profit above the salary which LANGEVIN takes out.

3. Briefing on the Committee: Mr. SMYSER discussed the overall tasks which LANGEVIN is expected to perform. Much emphasis was placed on the need for security in explaining this type of PW activity, particularly if and when DTHABEAS is

SECRET

SECRET

brought in. Mr. LANGEVIN indicated that his cover for contacting the Embassy was good, and further indicated that no unauthorized person in Chile knew of his U. S. Government activities.

4. Information on FUMBLER: When questioned about the discretion of FUMBLER, LANGEVIN indicated complete confidence, stating that she was very efficient and would be useful in assisting him in PM work. LANGEVIN was thoroughly briefed on the fact that FUMBLER must never know of DTHABEAS or its connection with the committee.

5. Words and Deeds: Mr. LANGEVIN stated that the format, paper, type and photoengraving of this pamphlet was far above Chilean standards. He said that Chile had only one printing house capable of producing such work, and no artists of the caliber exhibited in the pamphlet. He suggested a Spanish or French attribution on poorer paper. The reproduction of positives is also not done in his plant, but must be contracted for at a Santiago photoengraver's.

6. Bank Details: Mr. LANGEVIN has opened an account at the Chemical Bank and Trust, 74th Street and Madison Avenue, New York City. All future monthly payments will be made to that bank, beginning with the payment for April.

Leo E. Patton

SECRET

SECRET

COPY OF CABLE

TO: SANTIAGO ROUTINE

FROM: OPERATIONS 16 MAY 52

OUT 77204

WASH 41154

TO: SAGOG CITE: WASHG

1. INFORM LANGEVIN HEADQUARTERS ATTEMPTING OBTAIN LOAN.

2. REQUEST LANGEVIN NOTIFY HEADQUARTERS BEFORE COMPLETING ANY LOAN ARRANGEMENTS.

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere

NO.

DATE 28 May 1952

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Mr. Britt		28 My	28	[illegible]	
2.					
3. Mr. Gusham		29 My		HG	
4.					
5. Mr. Washington				mw	
6.					
7.					
8. Colonel King		29 May '52		JCK	
9.					
10. Lt. Deane OP/CO		16 June 1952	2030	"K"	
11.					
12. CM		18 Jun	25 June '52	PLS. RB.	
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

15—61136-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F-887

28 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: OD/CO

ATTENTION: Mr. William Rowland

SUBJECT: Project PBGROVEL, Amendment No. 1

1. Forwarded herewith are the original and two copies of subject amendment plus an extra copy of OPC Form 404a.

2. It is respectfully requested that approval of subject amendment be expedited as the Project Financial Data, Form 404a, indicates that payment of eight thousand ($8,000.00) dollars to PAUL D. LANGEVIN must be made on or about 20 June 1952.

3. Subparagraph six of the Proposal indicates that as a prerequisite to issuance of a loan to LANGEVIN the latter will be required to submit a complete nameplate inventory of all machinery and equipment involved in the loan transaction, its physical existence in his custody, his title to the property, and an approximate evaluation of its worth (as determined by WHD station personnel). WHD will be prepared to do this shortly after Amendment No. 1 is approved and the necessary funds are available for payment.

4. Subparagraph five of the Proposal indicates that details of the loan contract and selection of the appropriate legal instrument to secure a lien on the machinery and equipment will be arrived at through joint agreement of WHD, CCC and the Legal Division. These financial details will be arranged subsequent to approval of the amendment in question and will comprise the financial plan governing the expenditure of the funds requested.

J.C. King

J. C. KING
CWH

JCK
WHD/JCK/SWW/VLG/HB/jc

Distribution
Orig: OD/CO✓
cc: Special Contracting Officer (Mr. J.L. Bischoff)
CM (Mr. Ernest W. Pittman)
Chief, Branch I
Project File PBGROVEL WHD/P&O
Chrono WHD/P&O

25 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Project PBGROVEL, Proprietary, WHD

1. CM concurs in making a loan of U. S. $8,000 with interest at 4 percent per annum to contract agent Paul D. Langevin (pseudo). This loan is to be fully secured by a chattel mortgage, or whatever other legal instrument is recognized by the appropriate Chilean Court as establishing a first lien on the machinery and equipment, valued at approximately U. S. $10,000, against which the loan is being made. Principal and interest are to be amortized in monthly installments of U. S. $500, which represents the total salary accruing each month to the agent. The term of the loan will be for the time required to liquidate principal and interest in full.

2. The contract agent will submit a complete name-plate inventory of all machinery and equipment involved as collateral for the loan along with his proof of title to and its physical existence in his possession.

Preston L. Sutphen
PRESTON L. SUTPHEN
Chief, Commercial Division

CM/RDOD/rs

Distribution:
- orig & 2 - Addressee
- 1 - DDA
- 1 - WHD
- 3 - CM
- 2 - RI/FI

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: WHD/Br.I

NO.

DATE 7 July 1952

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. LEPatton		7 July	7	Lep	
2. JANoel		7 July	7	jan	
3. DCWH/PC		JUL 8	1952		
4. OD/CO					
5. ADPC					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD

Security Information

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ADPC
VIA : OD/CO
FROM : C/WH

DATE: 7 July 1952

SUBJECT: Information on Paul D. LANGEVIN principal agent of Project PBGROVEL

1. Paul D. LANGEVIN is the principal agent of subject project, approved 12 February 1952. Project PBGROVEL contemplates the establishment in Santiago of an indigenous anti-communist committee which, when developed, will be placed under DTHABEAS.

2. Subject agent was granted an OSO clearance 3 October 1950, and proved his usefulness as a cut-out and in a DYCLAVIER printing operation. Subject was granted an operational clearance for DYCLAVIER work 14 January 1952, and received covert training in New York City in April. Since his return to Santiago, subject has engaged in spotting and recruiting an indigenous principal agent who will in turn organize the anti-communist committee.

3. Subject is the Texas-born 30 year old, owner and publisher of the English-language weekly "South Pacific Mail" of Santiago. Subject has also had acting and writing experience since his completion of wartime service in the U. S. Air Force. Subject has been in Chile since November 1949 and at present has a two year contract as agent for this agency, signed 25 January 1952. Subject has indicated on several occasions a continuing interest in obtaining a permanent position with this agency.

4. Due to the Subject's travel to New York for training, several officers of WHD have had an opportunity to observe and evaluate subject. Opinion on subject has been consistently favorable and he has impressed all as a person of high intelligence and personal integrity. Subject has had a varied occupational background, excellent education, and exhibits exceptional poise and a good appearance.

for J. C. KING

Security Information

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: DD/P

NO. ER-3-0947

DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. Project folder - PBGROVEL					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

10—61155-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING

SECRET

EA 3-0947

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Project PBGROVEL, Amendment No. 1

1. Amendment No. 1 to Project PBGROVEL proposes the loan of the sum of $8,000 at 4% interest per annum to a contract agent in Santiago, Chile, in order that this agent may complete payment on machinery and equipment recently installed on the premises of the printing establishment of which said agent is sole proprietor.

2. The propriety of CIA lending funds for this purpose has been reviewed by Opc/ERI who is of the opinion that in principle there should be no objection. The question of operational use by Opc has been raised with the WH Division and it has been stated that this equipment, consisting of the press, linotype machine, Speed Graphic cameras, etc., can be used for Opc propaganda production purposes.

3. The question of control of the contract agent was discussed and it has been determined that the General Counsel's Office is being requested to establish legal means whereby the lien or mortgage on this equipment will be held in the name of a cut-out. In the event of any untoward action on the part of the contract agent or disagreement between the agent and CIA, action can be taken to assume control of the machinery.

4. As is indicated in the attached memorandum from the Chief, WH Division, the contract agent is considered to be an individual of high intelligence and personal integrity. For this and the above listed reasons, it is recommended that Amendment No. 1 to PBGROVEL be approved in the amount of $8,000.

FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY
Acting Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

OPC/CD/CO/WFR/mhj

Distribution:
  PRC - Orig. & 5
  DD/P - 2
  Project Folder - 1
  CD/CO - 1
  OPC/EI/FI - 2

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: OPC

NO. ER-3-0947

DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. DD/P Mr Tofte		16 July	21		
2.					
3. ~~PRG~~					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
13.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

16—61153-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

ER-3-0947

JUL 15 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Project PBGROVEL, Amendment No. 1

1. Amendment No. 1 to Project PBGROVEL proposes the loan of the sum of $8,000 at 4% interest per annum to a contract agent in Santiago, Chile, in order that this agent may complete payment on machinery and equipment recently installed on the premises of the printing establishment of which said agent is sole proprietor.

2. The propriety of CIA lending funds for this purpose has been reviewed by Opc/SRI who is of the opinion that in principle there should be no objection. The question of operational use by Opc has been raised with the WH Division and it has been stated that this equipment, consisting of the press, linotype machine, Speed Graphic cameras, etc., can be used for Opc propaganda production purposes.

3. The question of control of the contract agent was discussed and it has been determined that the General Counsel's Office is being requested to establish legal means whereby the lien or mortgage on this equipment will be held in the name of a cut-out. In the event of any untoward action on the part of the contract agent or disagreement between the agent and CIA, action can be taken to assume control of the machinery.

4. As is indicated in the attached memorandum from the Chief, WH Division, the contract agent is considered to be an individual of high intelligence and personal integrity. For this and the above listed reasons, it is recommended that Amendment No. 1 to PBGROVEL be approved in the amount of $8,000.

Franklin A. Lindsay

FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY
Acting/Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

APPROVED:

DD/P Date

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO. ER 3-1119

DATE 18 July 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. OD/CO					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

16—61130-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

ER 3-8119

SECRET
Security Information

13 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Project Review Committee

SUBJECT : Project PBGROVEL, Amendment No. 1

1. This will advise you that DD/P approved the above today in the amount of $8,000.

2. This sum is actually a loan to a principal agent at 4% interest per annum, repayment to be effectuated in $500 monthly installments out of the contract agent's salary with the agency, which amounts to $6,000 per annum.

3. The agent is located in Santiago, Chile. Proper arrangements in connection with the above will be made by CCC and the General Counsel's office. This matter was cleared with the latter prior to approval.

HANS V. TOFTE
Acting Chief of Plans
Office of DD/P

HVT:eh
13 July 1952
Dist:
Original & 5: Secretary, PRC ✓
1 cc: Project Folder, OD/CO ✓
1 cc: Misc. Projects Folder, DD/P
1 cc: ER
1 cc: DD/P Chrono
2 cc: OPC/RI

SECRET
Security Information

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECURITY INFORMATION

DD/P Project Approval Sheet

Project Cryptonym PBGROVEL Amendment No. 1

Sub-Project Cryptonym

Originating Division WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

Approved -- Disapproved Frank G Wisner 18 July 52
DD/P Date

Comments:

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECURITY INFORMATION

Project Outline Clearance Sheet

Project Title [illegible] Amendment No. 1 Project No. ______

Developed by: Lee E. Patton (Case Officer) WHD/OPC Br.1 (Organization) 23 May 1952 (Date)

Reviewed by: (Foreign Branch Chief) 5/27/52 (Date) J C King (Division Chief) 29 May 1952 (Date)

Concurrences: DC/WH/PC 29 May 1952 (Date)

CM- Preston L. Sutphen 6/25/52 (Date)

______ Date

______ Date

______ Date

______ Date

Approved subject to conditions below: F A Lindsay (CPO) 14 July '52 (Date)

Conditions of approval: ______

OPC Form No. 1103 (Rev.)
23 April 1951

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

Project Title____________ Amendment No.__________ Project No.__________

The Following Line and Staff Officers of the Western Hemisphere Division Have Signed and Concurr With This Project.

Concurred: Psychological Warfare Officer WHD__________________ ________ Date

Political Warfare Officer WHD__________________ ________ Date

Economic Warfare Officer WHD__________________ ________ Date

Sabotage Warfare Officer WHD__________________ ________ Date

Countersabotage Officer WHD__________________ ________ Date

Paramilitary Officer WHD__________________ ________ Date

Plans Officer P & O WHD__________________ ________ Date

Budget Officer P & O WHD Wm. E. Byrne 28 MAY 1952 Date

Project Coordinator WHD__________________ 28 May 1952 Date

Chief P & O WHD__________________ 28 May 1952 Date

Conditions of Approval____________________________________

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

PROJECT OUTLINE

Project PRGFCVEL Amendment No. 1

Type Financial

I. AUTHORIZATION

Same as Project PRGFCVEL.

II. REFERENCES

A. Same as Project PRGFCVEL.

B. Budgetary data for this amendment (Annex A).

C. Memo on meeting with Agent Paul D. LANGEVIN (Annex B).

D. Cable to Santiago Station on the loan to LANGEVIN (Annex C).

III. PROPOSAL

A. Statement

1. It is proposed that the Agency lend the sum of $3,000 in U. S. currency, at 4% per annum, to contract agent, Paul D. LANGEVIN, in Santiago, Chile, in order that this agent may meet contractual obligations without endangering his present cover.

2. The proceeds of this loan would be used to complete payment on machinery and equipment recently installed in the leased premises of the printing establishment of which LANGEVIN is now sole proprietor.

3. The principal and interest of the loan would be amortized from the entire proceeds of LANGEVIN's salary from the agency of $6,000 per year, at the rate of $500 per month.

4. The loan would be guaranteed by a chattel mortgage, or whatever legal instrument is customarily employed in Chile to establish a lien on the assets against which the loan would be made.

5. Details of the loan contract and selection of an appropriate legal instrument to secure a lien on the machinery and equipment would be arrived at through joint agreement of WHD, CCC and the Legal Division. The existing agent

contract with LANGEVIN would also be reviewed jointly by representatives of these divisions with a view to incorporating any modification which might be necessary as a result of the agent's entering into a loan agreement with the agency.

6. As a prerequisite to the issuance of a loan, LANGEVIN would be required to submit a complete name-plate inventory of all machinery and equipment involved in the loan transaction and its physical existence in his custody, his title to the property, and an approximate evaulation of its worth would be determined through WHD station personnel.

B. Background

Contract agent, Paul D. LANGEVIN, is the sole owner and editor of the English-language paper, South Pacific Mail, which is published weekly in Santiago, Chile. The printing of this publication was formerly done by an outside firm. Desiring to handle both his own printing requirements and to engage in job printing, LANGEVIN obtained equipment from an individual who expected to be compensated through a partnership in the business. However, serious illness has prevented the prospective partner from entering the business, and has forced LANGEVIN to meet the financial obligation alone. The repayment of this obligation will require LANGEVIN either (1) to accept a Chilean partner in his business, or (2) to obtain a loan. The requirements of security and the need for flexibility of operation militate against bringing in a partner. Moreover, a loan obtained locally through ordinary commercial channels, i.e. banks, would entail exorbitant interest rates. In addition, since a bank loan would almost certainly be of short-term duration, there would exist the constant threat of loss of the cover business through a possible refusal to renew the loan.

LANGEVIN has contacted a bank in Texas in an attempt to secure a loan, offering as security his share of a family interest in oil-producing lands. It appears doubtful that the Texas bank will grant the loan.

C. Current Status

LANGEVIN was advised, while in the United States for training, that Headquarters would investigate the possibilities of an

Agency loan (See Annex A). After consultation with the Commercial and Legal Divisions, WHD advised LANGEVIN by cable, after his return to Chile, not to complete any loan arrangements without notifying Headquarters (See Annex B). It was decided that a loan from the Agency, under the terms outlined in the proposal, presented the best solution for the Agency from the standpoint of security, and that such a loan would give the Agency even greater control over the agent than now exists.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the sum of $8,000 be made available as a loan, at 4% interest, to contract agent, Paul D. LANGEVIN, the loan to be secured by a lien on machinery and equipment valued at approximately $10,000; interest and principal to be amortized at the rate of $500 per month, the full amount of agent's salary.

V. OPERATIONAL DETAILS

Same as Project PBCROVEL.

VI. BUDGET DATA

See Annex A. (OPC FORM No. 404a)

SECRET

PROJECT FINANCIAL DATA

(This data may not exceed SECRET classification)

Project Cryptonym PBG[illegible] Fiscal Period Covered 1 June 1952
through 30 June 1952

L. E. Patton
Case Officer

WHD/OPC Branch 1
Responsible Staff or Division

A. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

(Indicate number and type of personnel required and estimated total compensation for salary, allowances, travel, and related employee benefits.)

Type	Number	Estimated Total Compensation
Staff Employees		
Staff Agents		
Career Agents		
Agents		None
Consultants		
Detailed Personnel		
Miscellaneous		
TOTAL		$

B. SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, AND SPECIAL SERVICES

(Indicate the type and estimated cost of materials and special services required to support the project. Attach a list of special equipment requirements, if available.)

None

Total Estimated Cost $

C. OTHER OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

(Indicate volume and nature of such expenses, such as (1) maintenance of two operational houses abroad, (2) hire of approximately 10 foreign nationals for procurement of information, (3) spot purchase of information, etc.)

None

Total Estimated Cost $

OPC Form No. 404a
9 November 1950

SECRET

D. SUBSIDY OR PROPRIETARY PAYMENTS

(If funds are to be turned over to individuals or groups in large lump sums to be expended by the individuals or groups at their discretion to accomplish an agreed-upon objective, explain the type of financial accounts, factual verification, or statements, if any, other than a receipt for the lump sum, which will be obtained from such individual or group.)

The sum of $8,000.00 is to be paid to contract agent Paul D. LANGEVIN in the form of a loan at 4% interest, both interest and principal to be amortized at the rate of $500.00 per month. The loan will be evidenced by a loan contract signed by LANGEVIN and the agency.

Total Estimated Cost $ 8,000.00

E. FUNDING REQUIREMENTS

(Show approximate dates funds will be required, if known, and indicate whether funds will be required in U. S. dollars, specific types of foreign currency, checks, bonds, gold, or some special type of negotiable instrument. Indicate any special security requirements or special methods of transmission anticipated in connection with funding the activity.)

The above amount (US$8,000.00) shall be paid in a lump sum to the borrower, preferably by check deposited in the Chemical Bank and Trust, 74th Street and Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y., on or about 20 June 1952.

F. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

(Within security limitations, list any other facts or circumstances which will enable Special Support Staff to lend adequate logistic support to this project. Indicate specifically the "Rush" or "Time" factors involved.)

Full amount must be paid on or about 20 June 1952

G.

Funds required for use in Field	$ 8,000.00
Funds required for use by Hq.	$
Total (this amount is also total of A, B, C, and D above)	$ 8,000.00

SECRET

PROJECT FINANCIAL DATA

(This data may not exceed SECRET classification)

[illegible]

Project Cryptonym ____________ Fiscal Period Covered 1 June 1952
through 30 June 1952

[illegible] Patton — Case Officer

[illegible] Branch 1 — Responsible Staff or Division

A. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

(Indicate number and type of personnel required and estimated total compensation for salary, allowances, travel, and related employee benefits.)

Type	Number	Estimated Total Compensation
Staff Employees		
Staff Agents		
Career Agents		
Agents		None
Consultants		
Detailed Personnel		
Miscellaneous		
TOTAL		$

B. SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, AND SPECIAL SERVICES

(Indicate the type and estimated cost of materials and special services required to support the project. Attach a list of special equipment requirements, if available.)

None

Total Estimated Cost $ ____________

C. OTHER OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

(Indicate volume and nature of such expenses, such as (1) maintenance of two operational houses abroad, (2) hire of approximately 10 foreign nationals for procurement of information, (3) spot purchase of information, etc.)

None

Total Estimated Cost $ ____________

OPC Form No. 404a
9 November 1950

SECRET

D. SUBSIDY OR PROPRIETARY PAYMENTS

(If funds are to be turned over to individuals or groups in large lump sums to be expended by the individuals or groups at their discretion to accomplish an agreed-upon objective, explain the type of financial accounts, factual verification, or statements, if any, other than a receipt for the lump sum, which will be obtained from such individual or group.)

The sum of $8,000.00 is to be paid to contract agent [illegible] in the form of a loan at 4% interest, both interest and principal to be amortized at the rate of $200.00 per month. The loan will be evidenced by a loan contract signed by [illegible] and the agency.

Total Estimated Cost $ 8,000.00

E. FUNDING REQUIREMENTS

(Show approximate dates funds will be required, if known, and indicate whether funds will be required in U. S. dollars, specific types of foreign currency, checks, bonds, gold, or some special type of negotiable instrument. Indicate any special security requirements or special methods of transmission anticipated in connection with funding the activity.)

The above amount ($ 8,000.00) shall be paid in a lump sum to the borrower, preferably by check deposited in the Chemical Bank and Trust, 74th Street and Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y., on or about 20 June 1952.

F. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

(Within security limitations, list any other facts or circumstances which will enable Special Support Staff to lend adequate logistic support to this project. Indicate specifically the "Rush" or "Time" factors involved.)

Full amount must be paid on or about 20 June 1952

G. Funds required for use in Field $ 8,000.00
Funds required for use by Hq. $
Total (this amount is also total of A, B, C, and D above) $ 8,000.00

OPC Form No. 404a
9 November 1950

14-00000

Santiago
March 8, 1953

(OTHARTAS)

Dear Sirs:

During a recent visit to the United States, I had the opportunity of speaking with a gentleman who gave me the name of your organization as one which, in certain cases, was able to cooperate with international anti-totalitarian groups.

In Santiago, where none exists, there is a small band of people who are enthusiastically interested in launching such a group, with particular interest in the revival of "Por Chile", a weekly newsmagazine once printed here. This publication was devoted to the lower classes and editorially fought against Communism. A large group of local businessmen contributed to its success with their backing and support, a group which could be called upon again.

The director of the publication, , a distinguished journalist, is available to carry on this work again, but unfortunately does not have the necessary financial backing. Would it be too much to hope that your organization might help in this matter? A sum of about $10,000 dollars ayear would be required to insure success. This amount roughly represents the yearly loss of the previous publication, plus a certain consideration for increased costs. All other basic expenses would, of course, be met from advertising and circulation revenues.

myself, and other interested friends are preparing a detailed report on the expenses mentioned above, indicating how such money would be used, and with what expected results. We would be happy to send this report to you if you indicate any possible support of our idea.

Please forgive the vagueness of this request, but as we are not sure to what extent your cooperation is possible, we await further word from you.

Sincerely yours,

(FUNEBRIAL)

April 9, 1963

[illegible]

Dear Sir:

This is to acknowledge with thanks receipt of your letter of March 5, 1963. The executive board of our foundation has read and considered your proposal and we find your contemplated activities most interesting. Your idea of reviving an anti-totalitarian news-magazine seems a highly desirable activity with which to initiate your group's activities. Our foundation, as you have been told, is more than willing to assist accredited groups such as yours in developing and carrying forward a genuine anti-totalitarian program.

While we are most interested in seeing your group successfully launched the Foundation's support of its activities would of course be contingent upon receipt of as complete details as possible on the personnel, resources, and aims of your group and the board's approval of the group's objectives and program.

In order that the board may arrive at definite conclusions concerning any assistance which it might be able to provide, we request that you furnish the following information:

a. Submit a report, as you suggest, setting forth your plans for revival of the magazine and include information on your resources and the amount of assistance which you would wish the Foundation to supply.

b. Inform us as to whether your group is, or could be, in a position to formulate a program of additional anti-Communist activities. We would like all possible information including an estimate of probable cost.

c. Since your group is very evidently composed of influential and high-minded people such as yourself, we believe that it might have the capability of eventually developing into an organization which could well become the focal point for anti-Communist activities throughout Chile and might be the vehicle through which aid could be channelled to other worthy civic, social, business or religious organizations which also may be aware of the Communist menace and which may wish to combat it actively. Your views concerning such a possibility would be welcomed by us.

d. In order to further the work of your group, will it be possible to obtain financial assistance locally from business, social and civic organizations? Such support is obtained in many instances, in other countries, by reputable organizations engaged in efforts similar to those which you have embarked upon.

In conclusion, may we reemphasize our great interest in your suggested publication. We shall be most happy to receive an early answer which will permit prompt consideration of possible support for this endeavor.

Very truly yours,

(DIMAKRAS)

April 29, 1953

Rec'd May 26, 1953

DTHABEAS

Dear Mr.

Thank you for your letter of April 9th, 1953. I am sure you will understand that the delay in answering has been due to my efforts to gather the information needed for a detailed response to your questions. I have had several conversations with don , the editor of the publication we wish to revive, as well as other interested parties, and my answers are based on the results of these conversations.

a. "Submit a report....setting forth plans....etc.". The plans are to revive the weekly publication "Por Chile", of 20 pages, tabloid size. It would be printed on Thursday afternoon and be dispatched by air to the North (nitrate and copper areas) and by rail to the South (coal mining and textile factories). Thus the review would be sold as workers left their factories for the week-end, insuring Saturday and Sunday reading for the family. Our objective is to reach employees and workers in order to form a mass conscience. Many industrial concerns would purchase the publication for resale to employees at a lower cost. An example: during the previous publication period the Carbonifera Lota (Lota Coal Mining Company) began with a subscription of 400 copies. That number, due to interest of the readers, was quickly increased to 1,800. The newspaper, as in the past, would be backed by the organization "Propaganda for Chile". The sum needed to re-establish this group would be about two to two and a half million pesos. Of that amount one million pesos would be raised locally, from the old society and any new sources available. That would mean you would be called upon to support our group to the extent of one or one and a half million pesos for a minimum period of one year.

b. "Inform (possibility of)....additional anti-Communist activities ....etc.". The publishing of a weekly newspaper would not be the extent of our group's activities. I quote verbatim from the ideals expressed in the legally incorporated organization in 1947:

> "The object of the society will be the exploitation of newspapers, radio and other means of propaganda destined principally at the defense of our regime of constitutional democracy and our sovereignty against the Marxist forces, Soviet communism, and any other form of totalitarianism. In its newspaper, publications and other means of propaganda the society will stir the patriotism of the citizens and show to the public conscience the tragic reality of the Soviet regime; it will fight for clean government and the betterment of the working classes on the basis of the correct application of social laws and conditions. The Society wil

utilise for its ends all legal methods of the expression of ideas and principally it will editer reviews, books, pamphlets, handbills and posters and will make all kinds of publications, radio broadcasts and projection of films. The society will also give aid to all groups or organisations with similar aims and will utilise all the means of thought necessary by the Board of Directors in order to carry out its ideals".

c. "....(the channeling)....of aid to other worthy civic, social, business or religiousorganisations....". Naturally, our group would be delighted to aid others (see above).

d. "....will it be possible to obtain financial assistance locally?" At the present time it is impossible to say definitely how much financial assistance could be obtained here. But it is interesting to note that the sum first ascribed for the incorporation of the old association was $600,000 pesos. This sum was almost doubled from spontaneous donations, etc., once the group had become a reality.

I hope the above will be sufficient for the present. We are presently waiting a detailed estimate of printing costs for "Por Chile" and studying the problems involved--a serious shortage of paper, for instance. But I honestly feel that this organisation and its official organ "Por Chile", plus a small number of younger people who are interested in fighting Communism, would be the firm beginning of a great work in this country, which might some day spread throughout Latin America.

Sincerely and cordially,

(FUNEBRIAL)

June 17, 1953.

(FURGBRIAR)

Dear Sir:

This is to acknowledge with thanks receipt of your informative letter of April 29, 1953 which arrived by steamer mail. We regret that an earlier reply has not been possible, but the time elapsed has been well spent in giving your latest report and your proposal of March 5, 1953, the serious consideration which they deserve. We might suggest that your future correspondence be sent to us by airmail.

The executive board of the Foundation has studied your report of April 29, 1953 and appreciated your comprehensive response to our request for further information. The objectives and contemplated activities of your group certainly seem to be highly consistent with the general aims of the Foundation and as such would merit careful consideration of financial assistance as you have indicated would be necessary.

As above indicated, your proposal of March 5, and report of April 29, have met with the sympathetic interest within the Foundation; of particular interest are the indications of strong local support in the past, as evidenced by the [illegible]00,000 peso initial incorporation subscription, plus an almost equal amount in subsequent donations for the ("P.F.C.") organization. However, we would like to know to what extent the 1947 figures, which you cited in your letter of April 29, might serve as a realistic basis for a 1953 estimate of support which might be obtained locally.

If, in the light of information at hand and any additional information which you may furnish on the personnel, resources, and needs of your group, your proposal should prove to constitute the feasible and desirable activity which it now appears to be, we will endeavor to lend our support to you in every way possible.

The Foundation will not be in a position to frame a definitive answer to your proposal until we are in receipt of, and have reviewed, your promised estimate of printing costs for ("P.C.").

Very truly yours,

(DTHAPEAS)

July 14, 1953

(DTHABEAS)

Dear Mr,

Thank you very much for your letter of June 16th, 1953, explaining that you are still considering the possibility of aid for our group.

First, I want to apologize for the error which resulted in my last letter being sent sea-mail. Of course all future correspondence will be via air-mail.

Attached find one of the 15,000 pamphlets which were recently distributed to Chile's University students in Santiago, Valparaiso and Concepcion. We think it is a graphic example of the kind of work our group can do. Funds for the project were raised by "Por Chile".

We are hoping to send you more complete details at the earliest possible moment.

(depend ?)

In spite of the local economic system we feel that we can/on much support locally for any such project of the group, and will re-affirm possible capitalization in our next letter.

There is no question that there is a great deal of work to be done here. The pamphlet, for instance, originated from the students involved and was produced with our aid.

Hoping that we may hear from you soon again. Regards, and thanks for your interest.

Very truly yours,

(FUNKBRIAL)

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

Air HCSW-345

Chief of Mission, Santiago

Chief, WHD

KUGOWN Matters

FURIOSO-C

REFERENCES: (a) HCSA-434; (b) SAGO-848; (c) DIR 16626; (d) DIR 17648

1. This is to confirm and amplify reference (d), that Headquarters has prepared the initial letter from DTHABEAS to Martin J. COKENIAS. This letter, which requests COKENIAS to act as the "honorary" DTHABEAS representative in Chile, is being sent air-mail to the COKENIAS residence in Santiago.

2. As an attachment to this dispatch we are forwarding the draft of a suggested reply to be sent by COKENIAS to DTHABEAS, via air mail. COKENIAS need not use our suggested letter verbatim, as long as he does incorporate in his reply the ideas contained in our draft.

3. Upon receipt of the letter of acceptance from COKENIAS, DTHABEAS will send COKENIAS a letter of introduction to FUNEBRIAL. DTHABEAS will also, at the same time, alert FUNEBRIAL to the anticipated contact, asking him to put COKENIAS in touch with FUNEBRIAL-1.

4. For security reasons ver are not enclosing copies of the initial DTHABEAS letter to COKENIAS. It is suggested that station make its own file copies of the letters sent directly to COKENIAS.

5. In his contacts with FUNEBRIAL and FUNEBRIAL-1, COKENIAS will naturally not disclose a greater knowledge of the DTHABEAS-FUNEBRIAL relationship to date than would logically be available to him through his own correspondence with DTHABEAS. In order to facilitate understanding between COKENIAS and the FURIOSO-C group, however, the next letter from DTHABEAS to COKENIAS will include, in addition to the letter of introduction, copies of the FUNEBRIAL-DTHABEAS correspondence to date. Headquarters realizes that this correspondence is already available to COKENIAS, since copies were pouched with HCSW-274, but it is believed that COKENIAS will be in a firmer position vis-a-vis FUNEBRIAL if he can produce his own copies of such correspondence, direct from DTHABEAS.

6. Since DTHABEAS/

J. C. KING
CWH

NED P. HOLMAN, JR.
DC/FR I/AH

DAVID W. SMYSER
C/FR I/AH

SECRET

SECRET

6. Since DTHABEAS has written to COKENIAS on the basis of a "previous acquaintance", it now becomes imperative for COKENIAS to be briefed on DTHABEAS and certain of its personnel. Headquarters would therefore like to know the extent of COKENIAS' present knowledge of DTHABEAS, in order that we may supply him with whatever background information he may need to be convincing in his role as an old friend of a DTHABEAS director.

7. Headquarters will forward comments requested in paragraph 4 of HCSA-409 subsequent to the actual introduction of COKENIAS into the FURIOSO-C picture.

J. C. KING
CWH

Attachment:
Draft of suggested reply of COKENIAS
to DTHABEAS

31 August 1953

Distribution:
3 - Santiago
2 - WH/RR.I
1 - WH/Mail Room
1 - RI

WHD/IVEbert/mw

SECRET

D
R
A
F
T

Attachment to:
HCSA-345

Dear __________

I have received and considered your kind letter of ___ ______ and am sincerely flattered that you should be willing to place such confidence in me. I would be proud to serve as an "honorary" representative of the Foundation, and pending receipt of the necessary further details, I will be happy to accept.

You were entirely correct in assuming that I have maintained an active interest in the good work of the Foundation. In fact, my interest, rather than diminishing since I left the U. S., has greatly increased in view of my observations and experiences here in Chile. There is a great need down here for just such activities as you have mentioned in your letter, and I would welcome an opportunity such as you have presented, whereby I can contribute to the Foundation's program of assistance.

In conclusion may I say that I shall look forward to meeting and working with FUNERIAL and FUNERIAL-1 as soon as you can furnish me with the letters of introduction to these gentlemen. I agree that the task at hand is not one to be measured in terms of salary, and I shall consider the satisfaction I expect to derive from this work as ample remuneration.

Thanking you again for your expression of confidence in me, I am

Very truly yours,

C
O
P
Y

SECRET
Security Information

October 6, 1953

Dear FUNEBRIAL:

It is my privilege, by means of this letter, to introduce to you my good friend, Mr. COKENIAS, who has recently, and very graciously, consented to act as the Foundation's personal representative in Chile.

I have taken the liberty of asking Mr. COKENIAS to serve in this capacity primarily because the statutes of our Foundation require that we seek the services of a U.S. citizen to represent us in any foreign country in which one or more Foundation grants may be operative. In addition, however, I earnestly believe this arrangement will serve to strengthen the very promising relationship already established between us and to stimulate those activities which are of mutual interest to us. I had not mentioned this stipulation in our previous correspondence, but I do so now in view of the possible imminence of a formal agreement between Propaganda Por Chile and the Foundation. Our receipt of your promised printing cost estimates would pave the way for approval and detailed planning of an actual grant of assistance.

It is my hope and expectation that Mr. COKENIAS will call upon you in the near future to present his respects and ours. As our representative he is authorized and prepared to discuss all matters of mutual concern. Mr. COKENIAS has been instructed to extend to you, to Sr. ___________ (to whom, I trust, you will introduce Mr. COKENIAS), and to your group as a whole, every possible courtesy and assistance. It is my sincere desire that this personal contact will prove to be of common benefit.

Enclosed you will find a copy of my letter of this date, to Mr. COKENIAS. At the same time, I am sending Mr. COKENIAS a copy of this letter to you, as well as copies of our previous correspondence, so that he may familiarize himself with developments to date.

Trusting that you and Sr. ___________ will receive Mr. COKENIAS as our representative in the same spirit with which he has offered to serve, and hoping that this arrangement will mark the beginning of a worthwhile and enduring association, I remain,

Very cordially yours,

DTHABRAS

cc: COKENIAS

SECRET
Security Information

C
O
P
Y

Santiago, 31 de Octubre de 1953

DTHABEAS
My apreciado senor ___________:

He tenido el placer de conocer al Senor COKENIAS. El me ha dicho que no es necesario que mis cartas sean escritas en ingles, lo que facilitara nuestra correspondencia pues mis conocimientos de la lengua inglesa son tan rudimentarios que me veia precisado cada vez, a buscar un amigo americano, de buena voluntad y confianza, que me tradujera las cartas que le he estado enviando. Achaques de salud hand contribuido a no responder oportunamente, como hubiera sido mi deseo, sus cartas.

Ya estamos en contacto con el Senor _____________ y esperamos llegar muy luego a un entendimi ento para proseguir con nuestro proyecto de reeditar el periodico, "Por Chile".

El senor COKEÑIAS le enviara muy pronto un resumen de lo que estamos acordando.

Se despide muy afectuosamente, S.S.

FUNEBRIAL

(Above letter by FUNEBRIAL acknowledges that he has been introduced to COKENIAS and that the latter will send to DTHABEAS shortly a resume of the PPC plans.)

S-E-C-R-E-T

Project Outline Clearance Sheet

Project Title FURIOSO C (P[illegible]ROVE) Amendment No. 2 Project No. ____

Developed by: John W. [illegible] WH/[illegible].I 18 December 1953
Case Officer Organization Date

Reviewed by: Raford W. Herbert 12/20/53 J C King 12 Jan '54
Foreign Branch Chief Date Division Chief Date

Concurrences: 1/12/54
CPP/WH Date

Fred R. Youngblood for C/FE/PLANS/COVER 14 Jan. '54
Date

Thomas Carroll Jr. STC/SPB 20 Jan. '54
Pure subsidy - requires no C. participation Date

H. Lewis Stephens 5 Feb. 1954
C/Commercial Div. Date

(PP/Press - concurred on #2, 29 Jan. '54)
Date

(PP/PAD - concurred on 3, 27 Jan. '54)
Date

* (BUDGET DIV. - see note below from #2, 10 Feb. '54)
~~Approved subject to conditions below:~~
~~** (CFO [illegible] note below from~~
CFO

(DD/P-ADMIN - concurred on # 2, 12 Feb. '54)
Conditions of Approval:

* "funds available"

J C King - for CPP - 19 Feb '54

S-E-C-R-E-T

VEB
#1

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

(PBGROVEL)
Project Title FURIOSO C Amendment No. 2 Project No. ________

The following Line and Staff Officers of the Western Hemisphere Division have signed and concurr with this project.

Concurred: Psychological Warfare Officer WHD David U. Groves DEC 1953 22 Date

Economic Warfare Officer WHD ________ Date

Sabotage Warfare Officer WHD ________ Date

Countersabotage Officer WHD ________ Date

Paramilitary Officer WHD ________ Date

Labor Officer WHD ________ Date

Logistics Officer WHD ________ Date

Budget Officer P&O WHD ________ Date

Plans Officer P&O WHD R P Crenshaw Jr. 22 Dec 53 Date

Project Coordinator WHD 12 Jan 54 Date

Chief, P&O WHD ________ Date

Conditions of Approval ________

S-E-C-R-E-T

PROJECT OUTLINE

Project: FURIOSO-C (PBGROVEL) Amendment No.2.

Type: Operational

I. AUTHORIZATION

A. Basic Program Authorization

1. Basic project PBGROVEL was approved on 12 February 1952 for the establishment of a mechanism capable of conducting KUGOWN activities aimed at the accomplishment of WHD missions (a) and (b) in Chile; as set out in Section II (paragraph 2 b) of Annex B to the WHD/KUGOWN Strategic Plan dated 1 November 1951. This task was assigned priority one in Phase I (1 Jan. - 30 June 1952) in the aforementioned plan. Funds in the amount of $4,700.00 were allotted to this Project, to provide salary for contract agent Paul D. LANGEVIN (FULMINATOR-1) for the remainder of FY 52, to cover the cost of bringing him to PBPRIME for a period of covert training, provide his per diem allowance while here, and to transport him back to Santiago, Chile, following completion of training.

2. Amendment No.1 to basic project PBGROVEL was approved on 14 July 1952 for the amount of $8,000 (later reduced to $6,000) to be made available as a loan, at 4% interest, to contract agent Paul D. LANGEVIN; the loan to be secured by a lien on machinery and equipment valued at approximately $10,000; interest and principal to be amortized at the rate of $500 per month, the full amount of the agent's salary. Authorization for PBGROVEL Amendment No.1 was the same as that for the basic project PBGROVEL.

3. The 1954 WH Operational Program, approved by Chief, KUBARK on 10 August 1953, authorized a maximum expenditure of $10,000 for this project during FY 1954.

II. REFERENCES

A. Same as for basic Project PBGROVEL

B. Budgetary data for this amendment (Annex A)

C. DTHABEAS - FUNEERIAL correspondence (Annex B)

D. HCS-W-345, with attachment (Annex C)

III. THE PROPOSAL

A. Statement of the Proposal

1. In basic project PBGROVEL, it was proposed to undertake the development in Chile of a group or committee composed of Chilean nationals which would engage overtly and actively in anti-BGGYPSY efforts and would function as a WHD mechanism for the accomplishment of WHD missions (a) and (b) aforementioned. As the first step in implementing the development of the committee, it was proposed to engage the services of a PBPRIME national in Chile as a contract agent whose task was to select, and exercise subtle guidance over a qualified Chilean, the latter to act as the organizer of the committee. It was further stated that at such time as development of the committee warrants, the necessary steps would be taken to place the committee in the proper relationship with the DTHABEAS foundation for purposes of cover and support. The provisions of the foregoing are now revised in accordance with the proposal of this amendment as set out below. The overall objective of the basic project remains unaltered.

2. It is proposed, in this Amendment No.2 to Basic Project PBGROVEL, that WHD furnish technical and financial support, not to exceed $10,000 during Fiscal Year 1954, to an indigenous group of Chileans for the purpose of aiding the group in its overt anti-BGGYPSY and anti-BIGHT KUGOWN-type activities. WHD support will be specifically designed to assist in the re-activation of the group along its original lines and to foster by support periodically advanced, the revival of the group's official organ, a weekly news magazine. It is anticipated that the indigenous group will eventually also serve as a mechanism for the channeling of WHD support to other worthy groups with similar aims. (See Annex C).

B. Background

1. In 1947, a group of influential Chilean business and intellectual leaders formed a legally chartered organization dedicated to an overt and active anti-BGGYPSY and anti-BIGHT program through use of all types of KUGOWN media. The group published an anti-BGGYPSY weekly news magazine designed for the working class audience. The activities of this group, including publication of its official organ, were later suspended as a result of financial difficulties, public solicitation and subscriptions being, at the time, the only source of funds.

2. Through the encouragement and subtle direction by

Mission Santiago, working through contract agent Paul D. LANGEVIN, FUNEBRIAL, an unwitting Chilean with excellent contacts in business and intellectual circles, has succeeded in re-activating the former organization, and has recently approached DTHABEAS with a request for support for the group's activities.

C. Current Status

1. The provisions of basic project PBGROVEL and of Amendment No.1 have been fulfilled. Contract agent Paul D. LANGEVIN has accomplished his mission, that of selecting and subtly guiding a Chilean citizen as the indigenous organizer of the committee. The loan to LANGEVIN, provided under the terms of Amendment No.1, has been paid in full, and the services of the contract agent, for this project, were terminated as of 31 August 1953.

2. The present committee, composed of influential Chilean citizens, has been in touch with the DTHABEAS foundation since March, 1953. The initial contact and subsequent correspondence with DTHABEAS have been handled by FUNEBRIAL, who, while not a member of the original (1947) group, is an outstanding caricaturist and satirist with abundant experience in journalism and publishing, and who has taken the initiative in re-forming the once-active committee.

3. DTHABEAS is currently awaiting receipt, from FUNEBRIAL, of a detailed estimate of financial support needed, to include printing costs of the group's weekly news magazine. The publication itself will be published and edited by FUNEBRIAL-1, a dynamic anti-BGGYPSY individual who also published the official organ of the 1947 organization. Upon receipt of the abovementioned estimates, and pending their review and approval by WHD, DTHABEAS should be prepared to extend technical and financial support up to the amount of $10,000 per annum. It is understood that such WHD support, channeled through DTHABEAS will supplement at least an equal amount which is to be raised locally by the FUNEBRIAL committee.

4. Contract agent Paul D. LANGEVIN has been replaced, as the cut-out and principal agent for WHD, by Staff Agent Martin J. COKENIAS. The latter is presently being introduced into the operation as the Chilean representative of the DTHABEAS foundation; this is being done by means of correspondence between DTHABEAS, FUNEBRIAL, and Martin J. COKENIAS. Once WHD support to the FUNEBRIAL group is actually extended by DTHABEAS, COKENIAS, through the exercise of subtle guidance made possible by his capacity as a DTHABEAS representative,

will exert at least indirect control over the activities of the group.

D. Advantages to be derived by KUGOWN

1. By supporting the activities of the FUNEBRIAL organization, WHD will obtain the services of a secure mechanism unwitting of ODYOKE interest, capable of conducting extensive KUGOWN activities on an overt and indigenous basis.

2. In addition to execution of its own KUGOWN type program, the FUNEBRIAL group will serve as the focal point for funding and direction of other KUGOWN activities carried on by other indigenous groups having similar aims. By extension of support to other such groups, the FUNEBRIAL organization could thus become the nucleus of a secure KUGOWN network, requiring no direct contact by WHD/KUGOWN personnel under ODACID cover.

3. Since this operation would be funded by WHD headquarters, through the WHD mechanism DTHABEAS, and since control will be exercised by DTHABEAS through its Staff Agent representative in Chile, Mission Santiago will be relieved of all but a monitoring and reporting responsibility. This is in accordance with the WHD plan of removing direct control of, and attribution for, KUGOWN operations from the official station.

E. Risks Involved

Risks involved in establishing the KUGOWN channels envisaged in this project should be minimal. The indigenous individuals concerned have been recruited on an unwitting basis and will be handled by Martin J. COKENIAS directly. The FUNEBRIAL group, as an existing legal entity, has good natural cover and can accept direct attribution for its KUGOWN activities. No Station personnel will be involved and the possibility of ODYOKE interest being disclosed will be further minimized by securely funding the group and backstopping both Martin J. COKENIAS and the group's activities by DTHABEAS. FUNEBRIAL will be unwitting of the original source of his funds and of ODYOKE interest.

IV. THE RECOMMENDATION

That the funds currently approved for this project under the WHD Operational Plan for FY 1954 in the amount of $10,000 be authorized for the implementation of the proposal outlined in this amendment. This support is not to exceed $8,000 during the remainder of FY 1954. Funds used in furthering the revised plans for this project will be provided periodically to the DTHABEAS funding mechanism after receipt of statements from FUNEBRIAL as to the proposed use of the monies.

V. OPERATIONAL OUTLINE

A. Area of Operation

1. Geographic area

a) Chile

2. Specific target groups

a) Business and intellectual circles

b) Working class reader audience

B. Operational Control

1. Control exercised by Headquarters

WHD/KUGOWN will exercise operational control through DTHABEAS which will disburse funds to the FUNEBRIAL group in accordance with specific WHD instructions. Control will be effected through the allotment of funds on the basis of budgeted need, through DTHABEAS, to the FUNEBRIAL group upon evidence of satisfactory performance of the missions assigned to this organization.

2. Control exercised by the Field

Chief of Mission, Santiago, will exercise indirect control through Staff Agent Martin J. COKENIAS. By means of independent checking and reporting procedures, Mission Santiago will keep headquarters informed of the FUNEBRIAL group's activities. Should the group fail to provide satisfactory performance, Mission Santiago will advise headquarters to withdraw financial and technical assistance.

C. Duration of the Project

It is anticipated that this project, if approved for FY 1954, will be continued in the future by means of a re-allotment of funds obtained through the yearly Operational Programs.

D. Possibility of Overlapping Jurisdiction

It is anticipated that FUNEBRIAL may eventually be used to channel support to other groups in Chile, either existing or contemplated, which groups may fall within the province of other WHD/KUCOWM projects in Chile.

E. Personnel Required

1. FUNERIAL and FUNERIAL-1, both unwitting Chilean officials of the FUNERIAL organization, are immediately available as Principal Agent and sub-agent, respectively.

2. Martin J. COKENIAS, a WHD Staff Agent, will be the field Case Officer for this Project.

F. Communication Plan

1. The present direct correspondence between DTHABEAS and FUNERIAL will be supplemented by correspondence between DTHABEAS and Martin J. COKENIAS.

2. Existing facilities will suffice for communications between Headquarters and Mission Santiago and between Mission and Martin J. COKENIAS.

G. Support Plan

1. Support to be furnished by Headquarters

Support furnished by headquarters will consist primarily of operational, propaganda, and technical advice, as well as the provision of funds.

2. Support to be furnished in the Field

Mission Santiago will observe covertly the activities of FUNERIAL's group to assess the effectiveness of such of their activities as are related to this project.

3. Funding

a. At the present time the specific financial requirements of the FUNERIAL committee cannot be given, nor can any firm schedule of disbursements to the committee be set forth in this amendment since these requirements will be met on a day-to-day and month-to-month basis depending on the needs of the committee.

b. Disbursements from funds authorized under this amendment will be controlled as follows. Periodically, every few months, the FUNERIAL committee will submit a budget to DTHABEAS for the funds it requires for the succeeding quarter.

Upon approval of this budget by Headquarters, the funds will be placed to the account of Staff Agent Martin J. COKEHIAS, who will be accountable for their disbursement in accordance with Confidential Funds regulations. COKEHIAS will disburse such funds in the smallest amounts possible, consistent with maintaining the operating efficiency of the project. He shall not, moreover, make additional disbursements until he has received tangible evidence of expenditure (receipts) for previous disbursements. Ordinary disbursements should not exceed $1,000.00 and should be covered by receipts within thirty days. Where the Staff Agent is certain that receipts cannot be obtained for large disbursements and where the expenditures cannot be authenticated with certainty by the Staff Agent, an amendment to the project should be prepared and a proposed administrative plan should be forwarded to Headquarters for approval. Staff Agent Martin J. COKEHIAS shall take all reasonable precautions to insure that he maintains complete control of the financial phases of this operation at all times and that all disbursements adhere to the Confidential Funds Regulations and the objectives authorized in this project and its amendments.

H. Reports Procedures

In granting financial aid to FUNEBRIAL's group, DTHABEAS will request periodic reports of activities and expenditures. These reports will be covertly checked by Mission Santiago.

I. Coordination

No coordination will be required beyond WHD.

J. Cover

As a completely overt and legitimate local organization, with an avowed anti-BGGYPSY program, the FUNEBRIAL group has natural cover. WHD support will be covered by channeling funds through the secure DTHABEAS mechanism. Martin J. COKEHIAS is a Staff Agent under unofficial cover in addition to which his relationship with the FUNEBRIAL group will be carried out in his capacity as the local representative of DTHABEAS.

K. Security

All indigenous personnel involved in this project are unwitting of ODYOKE interest. Funding, control, and guidance of the FUNEBRIAL group will be handled in such a way that ODYOKE interest will not be disclosed to indigenous or unauthorized persons. Attribution for the group's activities can and will be accepted by the group. The original source of funds will not be known by the group.

14-00000

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

PROJECT FINANCIAL DATA

*MAY NOT EXCEED SECRET CLASSIFICATION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM
[illegible]ICSO C (Amendment 2)

FISCAL PERIOD COVERED
December 1953 THRU 30 JUNE 1954

RESPONSIBLE STAFF OR DIVISION
WE/EE.I

CASE OFFICER
John W. Isaminger

A. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Indicate number and type of personnel required and estimated total compensation for salary, allowances, travel and related employee benefits. Include everyone paid from project.

TYPE	NUMBER		ESTIMATED COMPENSATION		
	U. S. PERSONNEL	FOREIGN NATIONAL	BASE SALARY	ALL OTHER	TOTAL
STAFF EMPLOYEES		▨			
STAFF AGENTS	1	▨	C*	200 (travel, etc.)	200
CAREER AGENTS					
CONTRACT AGENTS					
CONTRACT CONSULTANTS					
DETAILED PERSONNEL		▨			
FIELD AGENTS	▨	5	3,000	500	3,500
MILITARY		▨			
ALL OTHER	*Salary paid from Station T/O Allotment				
TOTAL A.	1	5	$3,000	$700	$3,700

B. SUPPLIES, MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

Indicate amount required in applicable spaces. Attach complete supporting list for each.

COMMO $	CHEMICAL $	QUARTERMASTER SUPPLIES $	OTHER SUPPLIES $ 200
MEDICAL $	ORDNANCE $	SPECIAL DEVICES $	OTHER EQUIPMENT $

TOTAL B. $200

C. OTHER OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

Indicate volume and nature of expenses such as (1) maintaince of two operational houses abroad (2) spot purchase of information, etc.

Office, rental and utilities	$1,200
Publication equipment and supplies (locally purchased)	2,000
Local reimbursement for repair, printing, and similar services	900

TOTAL C. $4,100

D. SUBSIDY OR PROPRIETARY PAYMENTS

If funds are to be turned over to individuals or groups in large lump sums to be expended by the individuals or groups at their discretion to accomplish an agreed-upon objective, explain the type of financial accounts, factual verification or statements, if any, other than a receipt for the lump sum, which will be obtained.

None anticipated

TOTAL D.

TOTAL FUND REQUIREMENTS (A + B + C + D) $ 8,000

FORM NO. 59-25
JUN 1952

SECRET

(1)

E. FUNDING REQUIREMENTS

ROXIMATE DATES AND AMOUNTS OF MONEY REQUIRED

December 1953	$500
January 1954	2,000
February 1954	1,500

March 1954 and each succeeding month through June 1954 $1,000 each.

FORM REQUIRED

☒ U. S. DOLLARS ☐ FOREIGN (SPECIFY) ☐ NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (SPECIFY)

SPECIAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OR METHODS OF TRANSMISSION

None known

F. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

(Within security limitations, list any other facts or circumstances which will enable Special Support Staff to lend adequate logistical support to this project. Indicate specificationally the "RUSH" or "TIME" factors involved.)

Expeditious approval is requested so that money can be expended as soon as the **FUNEBRIAL** group submits to **DTHAREAS** its concrete cost estimates for setting up offices and equipment.

Project [illegible] FURIOSO/C [illegible] 2

Sub-Project [illegible]

Originating Divi[illegible] WH

Approval [illegible] Richard Helms for 19 Feb. '54

Remarks

No additional funds are [illegible] $8,000.00 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] SEP [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, SPECIAL SECURITY DIVISION

THROUGH : FI/STC/SPB

SUBJECT : Request for Badge--David Atlee PHILLIPS

1. It is requested that a limited badge be issued to Mr. David A. Phillips, covert Agent for PP/CT, working in the newspaper and lecture field. The limited badge should include access to the Admin. Building, 2210 "E" Street, I, J, K, and L Buildings.

2. Mr. Phillips' needs to have access to these buildings because of his frequent contact with various officials to better equip him for his future assignment. It is anticipated that he will be assigned to this Agency for one year.

3. For further information, contact W. F. Hawley, PP/Security Officer, room 1412 K Building, extension 3606.

(SIGNED) COLWELL E. BEERS
FOR
JOHN E. BAKER
Acting Chief
Psychological and Paramilitary Operations Staff

PP/ADMIN/WFHawley:dmw, 26 August 1954

Distribution:
- Addressee - Orig. & 1
- FI/STC/SPB - 1
- PP/Admin - 2
- FI/RI/An - 1

INDEX

CHARGED FROM IP/CRS

871

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

PROJECT
FURIOSO C

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. Job #61-1013/80 Box 14

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. ----

4. DATE ----

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM ----

8. DATE OF INFO. ----

9. EVALUATION ----

5. ANALYST C. McNew

6. DATE PROCESSED 28 Nov 61

10. DISSEMINATED IN ----

11. DATE ----

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☒ 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

☐ 13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Project portion has been removed and sent to RI/AR. For review of file, contact RI/AR x-2471 using RI file number indicated above.

x-ref 201-88764 FULMINATOR-1

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

DIAG

THE BAY CITY TIMES
DAILY AND SUNDAY
BAY CITY, MICHIGAN

IRS 75-4978

AUG 18 12 58 PM '75

David A. Phillips
Reporter
Aug. 5, 1975

Assistant Attorney General
In charge of Freedom of Information Act Inquiries
Department of Justice
Washington D.C.

Dear Sir,

In accordance with the amendment to the Freedom of Information Act that took effect February, I request information on any file the Central Intelligence Agency may have on The Bay City Times.

I understand the amendment requires the CIA to respond to all inquiries within ten days of receipt.

My request for information on any file the CIA may keep on this newspaper was sent to your office as I was unable obtain a mailing address to the CIA.

Thank you

14-00000

[redacted]

25 August 1975

David A. Phillips Request on The Bay City Times

75-4978

"CS" RECORD MATERIAL

DUE DATE
15 Feb 78

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO RID/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM GE-58, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION ________.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 12-62 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

3. UH/Chile M. Caprero			2
4. IP/EIS GA-10 D. Isaac			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. RETURN TO: RID/ARD/RCU G-E-58			

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 61-1013 BOX 14
450740

To Requester:

Please return this reference to RID/ARD/RCU immediately after use.

RECORDS CENTER

JOB NO. 61-1013/80

SPACE NO. ~~90713~~ 450740

FILE NO. ________

DOCUMENT ________

FOLDER NO. 2

BOX NO. 14

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OP-61 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

"CS" RECORD MATERIAL

DUE DATE
[illegible]

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO RID/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM GE-58, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION ________.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 12-62 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

3. W.H. White M. Caparaso			✓	To Requester: Please return this reference to RID/ARD/RCU immediately after use.
4. IP/EIS GA-70 D. Isaac				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				RECORDS CENTER
9.				JOB NO. 61-1013/80
10.				SPACE NO. ~~[illegible]~~ 450740
11.				
12.				
13.				FILE NO.
14.				DOCUMENT FOLDER NO. 3
15. RETURN TO: RID/ARD/RCU G-E-58				BOX NO. 14

450740
61-1013
Bx 14

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OP-61 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

"CS" RECORD MATERIAL

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO RID/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM GE-58, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION ________.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 12-62 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

DUE DATE
5 Feb 85

3. WH/Chile M. Capraro			✓
4. IP/EIS GA-10 D. Isaac			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. RETURN TO: RID/ARD/RCU G-E-58			

450740

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 61-1013 BOX 14

To Requester:

Please return this reference to RID/ARD/RCU immediately after use.

RECORDS CENTER

JOB NO. 61-1013/86

SPACE NO. ~~9-0773~~
450740

FILE NO. ________

DOCUMENT ________

FOLDER NO. 1

BOX NO. 14

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OP-61 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO RID/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 4 NOVEMBER 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINES DC-8
NEAR BARBADOS, WEST INDIES, OCT.6,
1976, NEUTRALITY MATTERS - CUBA -
WEST INDIES

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR,
FBI)

14-00000

SECRET

21 MAY 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REPRESSIVE MEASURES AGAINST CUBAN EXILES

REF: HZPA-21247, 21 April 1976

1. All names in ref dispatch were traced, as much as possible, and interested desks were notified of Subject's past or present ops interests.

2. Following is the information retrieved from the traces:

A. GARCIA Vasquez, Orlando. (WKTANGO-1) Notified the Venezuelan Desk, they in turn will notify the field.

B. HUERTAS, Enrique (Medical Doctor) (201-279389)-AMING-2. After more than five years of service as a JMWAVE psychological warfare agent A-2 was amicably terminated on 30 November 1965.

C. PEREZ Alamo, Duney (201-0331081) alias Capt. Alamo. AMLUNT-2. Recruited Dec 65 for use as MHARRON recruiter. He received agent and team training which included demolition. Subject was terminated 31 Dec 66 due to inability to establish operational contacts.

D. MORALES Navarette, Ricardo. Resides in Venezuela, no ops interest.

E. PUENTE Blanco, Jose (201-163893). Was of interest to Caracas Station, informed the desk.

F. PUENTE Blanco, Roberto (201-126313). CIFENCE-7. Was of interest to Caracas Station, informed the desk.

G. BUSTILLOS, Antonio. Possibly Subject of 201-756656, AMWAX-2. Recruited in 1964 and terminated November 1966. Reason was cancellation of Operation SAMSON and economy in operations.

H. MARTINEZ Castro, Pedro (201-346051), No ops interest.

I. ESTEVEZ, Angel (201-732176). No ops interest.

J. JIMENEZ, Caspar. No 201.

SECRET

201-331081

SECRET

K. VASQUEZ, Jose AKA "Pepe". Not identified.

L. MILERA, Raul de la. No 201.

M. FONT, Ramon. Not identified.

N. LORENZO, Carlos. Not identified.

O. GARCIA, Rigoberto. Possibly Subject of 201-319634, SLAPJACK-30. Was initially contacted Jan/Feb 1962. On OA was granted 7 Jan 74 for SLAPJACK-30's use as a radio operator for project SLAPJACK. Could not find any indication that Subject has been terminated.

P. HERNANDEZ, Carlos. Not identified.

Q. MIRON, Jose. No 201.

R. BERDAGUER, Guillermo AKA VERDAGUER. (201-231514) No ops interest.

S. CALATAYUD, Antonio. Possibly Subject of 201-297795. OA was requested 31 Mar 61 for use as a PM trainee. File does not indicate if OA given or if he was ever used.

T. ALONSO, Marcos. No traces.

3. LA/COG has been notified of the inclusion of former COG assets on this list and will take whatever action is deemed appropriate. The Venezuelan desk is taking action in the cases of GARCIA and PUENTE.

Juan Ortiz
LA/PNC/PA

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. - 56-5-21 w/cy of dispatch
① - LA/COG w/cy of dispatch
1 - LA/PNC/V w/cy of dispatch
1 - chrono

SECRET

SECURE STORAGE
IN FIELD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

[illegible]
X INDEXING REQUESTED
NO INDEXING
APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO Chief, Latin America Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, Panama City

SUBJECT Panamanian Repressive Measures against Cuban Exiles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: See para 5.

1. A compilation of information reported by Station penetrations of the local service (i.e. HYEPOCH-5, HYEPOCH-11, HYRAVEN-11) indicates that the local security service is assuming an increasingly hostile posture against Cuban exiles traveling to Panama. The reporting sources coincide in their information that this attitude is directed primarily against Cuban exiles residing in Miami. It appears that this development may be the result of the reporting of HYGRUFF-1's agent in Miami, Salvador ALDAREGUIA. ALDAREGUIA continues to report from Miami alleging cooperation between Cuban exiles and Panamanian exiles in Miami who are opposed to the regime of General Omar TORRIJOS Herrera.

2. HYGRUFF-1 recently submitted a watchlist of Cuban exiles to Tocumen International Airport (TIA) and other Panamanian ports of entry ordering the recipients to deny entry into Panama to all those persons on the watchlist. HYEPOCH-5, the most alert of all Station penetrations commented that in his opinion the list contained Cuban Embassy input because his service did not have the capability to collect sufficient data on all the persons listed to be able to make a meaningful evaluation of which ones are dangerous. The Station has not been able to confirm HYEPOCH-5's suspicions.

3. For the record, the Cuban exiles on HYGRUFF-1's watchlist are the following:

(continued)

Distribution:

2 - C/LAD

E2 IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HZPA-21247

DATE
21 April 1976

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
56-5-21

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HEPA-21247

[illegible] Venezuela [illegible] [illegible]

a. GARCIA Vasquez, Orlando. Resides in Venezuela.

b. HUERTAS, Enrique (Medical Doctor). AMING-2 201-0

c. PEREZ Alamo, Duney, alias Capt. Alamo. AMLUNT-2 201

N/D/I — d. MORALES Navarrete, Ricardo. Resides in Venezuela.

e. PUENTE Blanco, Jose. 201-0163893

f. PUENTE Blanco, Roberto. CIFENCE-7 201-01263

g. BUSTILLOS, Antonio. possible 201-0756656

h. MARTINEZ Castro, Pedro. 201-0346051 - no ops int.

i. ESTEVEZ, Angel. He is well known to Floyd H. McNertney (HOC). He is a criminal. 201-0 no ops interest

j. JIMENEZ, Gaspar

k. VASQUEZ, Jose, aka "Pepe". no ident.

No 201 — l. MILERA, Raul de la.

m. FONT, Ramon. no ident.

n. LORENZO, Carlos. no ident

o. GARCIA, Rigoberto possible SLAPJACK-30 201-0319634

p. HERNANDEZ, Carlos alias "El Aura". no ident

No 201 — q. MIRON, Jose.

r. BERDAGUER, Guillermo aka VERDAGUER. - 201-023151

s. CALATAYUD, Antonio. McNertney thinks the last name is a garble. pos 201-0

t. ALONSO, Marcos.

4. Of the persons listed above, MCNERTNEY knows Orlando GARCIA Vasquez well. GARCIA was born in Cuba, became a naturalized U.S. citizen when he fled from Cuba to the United States. He eventually settled in Venezuela where he became a close friend and confidant of Carlos Andres PEREZ, now president of Venezuela. Aside from Venezuelan diplomatic posts he has held abroad he was at one time Chief of Operations of DIGEPOL. MCNERTNEY commented that if the Panamanians ever had the temeri to mistreat GARCIA that PEREZ' reaction against TORRIJOS would undoubtedly be fierce.

5. We defer to Headquarters to name check these individual ascertain if BKHERALD has any operational interest in any of th and advise the responsible component to take precautionary measures in the event any movement of these individuals involves travel to or transiting Panama. In exploiting this information please protect the sources.

Algernon. O. FORTYUNE

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

PEREZ ALAMO, DUNEY
201-0334081
SEX M

C56-005-021
HZPA-21247
21 APR 76
P2

ALIAS ALAMO /CAPT/
CUBAN EXILE-POSSIBLE TRAVEL TO PANAMA SEC SERVICE PANA TAKING HOSTILE POSITION AGAINST CUBAN EXILES TRAV TO PANA. ATTITUDE DIRECTED AGAINST CUBAN EXILES RES OF MIAMI. MAY BE ALLEGED COOPERATION BETWEEN CUBAN EXILES AND PANA EXILES MIAMI WHO OPPOSED TO REGIME GEN TORRIJOS

DATE 17 MAY 76 09401544

201-334081

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 8 MAY 1975

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: DUNNEY PIO PEREZ ALAMO

FBI FILE NO: 105-4953 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 3 DECEMBER 1974

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: DUNNEY PIO PEREZ ALAMO

FBI FILE NO: 105-4953 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 31 JULY 1974

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (CUBAN ACTION) (AC)

FBI FILE NO: 105-21947 (MIAMI)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP 012034Z
CITE DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 581828

CONF: C/118 INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: WH/MIAMI. Y

REAM Y

REF: WH/MIAMI 22236 [IN 321933] Y

1. HQS TRACES REPLY ON DUNNEY PIO PEREZ ALAMO (201-334081):
PEREZ RECRUITED DEC 65 FOR USE AS MHAPRON RECRUITER. HE RECEIVED AGENT AND TEAM TRAINING WHICH INCLUDED DEMOLITION. PEREZ WAS TERMINATED 31 DEC 66 DUE TO INABILITY TO ESTABLISH LOCATION OF OPERATIONAL CONTACTS. Y

2. NO CURRENT INFO ON PEREZ. Y

3. FILE: 201-334081. E2 IMPDET.

INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILMING
FILE

IP/FI

RECORD COPY

DATE: 1 AUGUST 1974
ORIG: CAROL BARR/JR
UNIT: WH/COG/CI
EXT: 1819

C/WH/COG

201-334081
1 AUG 74

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/7
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054555

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 18 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 14-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____ S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT WH 8 ACTION #	INFO	~~RF~~ FILE VR	1 2 3	4 5 6

T 308114 EIA797 PAGE 01-01 IN 321933

TOR:3122202 JUL 74 WMIM 22236

S E C R E T 3119102 JUL 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 22236 (ENNIS ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

REAM

1. FBI/MIAMI REQUESTS TRACES ON DUNNEY PIO PEREZ ALAMO, DPOB 11 JULY 1937 CUBA, RESIDES MIAMI AT 2479 N.W. 29TH STREET, ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. A12 440 516, HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN SEVERAL CUBAN EXILE MILITANT GROUPS.

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

IP/EDI	☒	REQUEST PROGRAM
		ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/ITC		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/FN		FILM
ISS/DCD		CODE NO "2,3,4"
		DIRECT REST. CODE
		CABLE EXP. (I)
		DPD (S)
IP/FILES		FOR FILING

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

201-334081
31 JUL 74

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 26 JULY 1974

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: DUNNEY PIO PEREZ ALAMO

FBI FILE NO: 105-1953 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 9 JULY 1974

CLASSIFICATION: AIUO

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM
DIRECTOR, FBI)

SUBJECT: BOMB EXPLOSION IN FRONT OF CUBAN
EMBASSY, PARIS, FRANCE, JULY 3, 74

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 15 PER TOTAL COPIES 14-1 BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR [illegible]

T 308134 EIA797 PAGE 01-01 IN 321933

TOR:312020Z JUL 74 WMIM 22236

JUL 31 '74 ACTION COPY

SECRET 311910Z JUL 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 22236 (ENNIS ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

REAM

AMLUNT/2
201-334081

1. FBI/MIAMI REQUESTS TRACES ON DUNNEY PIO PEREZ ALAMO, DPOB 11 JULY 1937 CUBA, RESIDES MIAMI AT 2479 N.W. 29TH STREET, ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. A12 440 516, HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN SEVERAL CUBAN EXILE MILITANT GROUPS.

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

FI
CI /
CA
RR
NO DIST
CHRONO

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 27 FEBRUARY 1974

SUBJECT: DUNNEY PIO PEREZ ALAMO

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

FBI FILE NO: 105-4953 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 6MARCH 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: RAFAEL COLON - EXPLOSION AT OASIS MOTEL, AVRAINVILLE, FRANCE, AUGUST 2, 1973
FBI BILE NO: 105-21596 (MIAMI)

DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20202 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 16 JANUARY 1974

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: MM 105-20202 (MIAMI)

DATE: 24 AUGUST 1973
CLASSIFICATION: AIUO
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 14 AUGUST 1973
CLASSIFICATION: AIUO
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

DATE: 26 JUNE 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO
FBI FILE NO: 105-20202 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO
FBI FILE NO: 105-20913 (MIAMI)

DATE: 21 OCTOBER 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20202 (MIAMI)



120733 01 PEREZ ALAMO EMILIO T 11 29

CUBAN MASTER LIST NO 19 B GROUP 1 BIRTH MO YR

3-14-67

Filed in 201-334081 (Bro Luis)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/SI FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

PEREZ Alzzo, Dancy [redacted] 201-334081

4 Oct. 1965 pca WE/C [illegible] Mills 7646

THERE IS A RESTRICTED FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

FORM 44C 11-58 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 33 40 81

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FORM G-325 A REV. 4-1-67

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 43-R436

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

(FAMILY NAME)	(FIRST NAME)	(MIDDLE NAME)		BIRTHDATE (MO-DAY-YR.)	NATIONALITY	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO.
Martinez	Celeste	M.	☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE	7-12-37	Cuban	(IF ANY) A 13 362 227

ALL OTHER NAMES USED	CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
	Camaguey Cuba	(IF ANY) 262 92 8587

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER			Sta Cruz del Sur Cuba	Miami
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)			"	Miami

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
Pérez	Dunney	7-11-37	Baire Cuba		

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE)

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
2479 N W 29 St.	Miami	Fla	USA	1	68	PRESENT TIME	
914 N W 34 Ave	"	"	"	1	65	1	68
3121 N W 22 Ct.	"	"		8	61	1	65
						NP11	

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE. (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE.) 28 May 68

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS. (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
				PRESENT TIME	
Filed in 201-334 081	(husband)				

LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE. (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE.)

30 MAY 68

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☐ NATURALIZATION ☒ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
☐ OTHER (SPECIFY):

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

IF YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IS IN OTHER THAN ROMAN LETTERS, WRITE YOUR NAME IN YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IN THIS SPACE:

4-27-68
DATE

(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

FORM G-325 A REV.

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 43-R436

(FAMILY NAME) Perez	(FIRST NAME) Dunney	(MIDDLE NAME)	☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (MO-DAY-YR) 7-11-37	NATIONALITY Cuban	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO (IF ANY) A 12 440 516
ALL OTHER NAMES USED			CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH Baire Cuba			SOCIAL SECURITY NO 265 74 6889

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER			Asturias Spain	Cuba
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)			Holguin Cuba	Cuba

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
Martinez	Celeste	7-12-37	Camaguey Cuba		

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE)

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
2479 N W 29 St.	Miami	Fla	U S A.	1	68	PRESENT TIME	
914 N W 34 Ave	"	"	"	1	65	1	68
3181 N W 22 Ct.	"	"	"	8	61	1	65

201 PEREZ-ALAMO, DUNNEY PIO

28 MAY 1968

Dob: 11 July '37 Cuba Oriente

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE)

201-334081 *

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
Self Employed Painter			68	PRESENT TIME	
Boner Box		1	57	4	68
Dimensional Plastic Hialeah		6	65	1	67
R d Sunset Enterprise Miami		6	62	6	65

20 MAY 1968

LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE)

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☐ NATURALIZATION ☒ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT

IF YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IS IN OTHER THAN ROMAN LETTERS, WRITE YOUR NAME IN YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IN THIS SPACE:

4-27-68
DATE

(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA

FROM: (Division) (Case officer) (Extension) WH/COG/CICS/CS O. Williams 5136

SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used) Dunney Pio PEREZ Alamo

NAME SHOWN IS ☒ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☐ CRYPT

CI/OA NO.

201 NO. 201-334081

PROJECT

DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH

AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

Subject is no longer of Operational interest to the Station.

REF: UFGA-26926, 8 February 1967

201-334081

DATE 14 February 1967

SIGNATURE

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-55 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN

FEB 10 3 11 PM '67

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/Reg C		14 FE		Wa
2. C/WH/C/I/CS			14 Feb 67	
3.				
4. C/WH/C/MO			16 FEB 1967	
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-334081

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 8 Feb. 1967

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFCA 26926

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

Att. #3 to UFGA-26926

SECRET

	STATION	INVENTORY - NON STAFF PERSONNEL		
	1	2	3	4
A	ARBITRARY NO.	SUBJECT'S 201 201- 334081	OTHER FILE NO.	
B	SURNAME AMLUNT-2	1ST NAME / PERSONALIA	OTHER GIVEN NAME TELECODE	TYPE OF NAME
C	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	NATURALIZED-US *(yes or pending)*
D	COUNTRY CURRENTLY RESIDES	CITY CURRENTLY RESIDES-YEAR	MARITAL STATUS *(most recent)*	SEX *(M or F)*
E	OVERT OCCUPATION	LANGUAGE	LANGUAGE	LANGUAGE
F	MILITARY SERVICE-COUNTRY	BRANCH OF SERVICE	INCLUSIVE DATES	
G	COUNTRY AREA KNOWLEDGE	COUNTRY	COUNTRY	
H	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY *(limit to 62 spaces)*			CODE
I	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY *(limit to 62 spaces)*			CODE
J	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	TYPE EMPLOYEE TYPE A OR B	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE WIFE	FULL, PART TIME OR WAE
K	MAINTENANCE/SERVICE	CONSULTANT	PROPRIETARY OR SUBSIDY	CAREER AGENT
L	FIELD AGENT	HQS. FF OR USF	INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR	MOC/MOA
M	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	POA / STATUS	STAFF CLEARANCE	CSA/PCSA
N	HQS COMPONENT RESPONSIBLE	FIELD STATION RESPONSIBLE	PROJECT	COVER
O	ENTRY ON DUTY DATE	YEARLY SALARY	DATE LAST PAY CHANGE	
P	PART OF A RETIREMENT PLAN - SPECIFY *(limit to 62 spaces)*			
Q	DATE TERMINATED 31 December 1966	REEMPLOYABLE	STAFF CEILING SPACE	
R	REMARKS *(re: termination, etc.)* *(limit to 62 spaces)*			ATTITUDE

FORM 4-65 2457

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(9-51)

att #3 to UFGA-26926

CS COPY

201-334081

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE HKD

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/AMLUNT-2
O Termination of Subject of 201-334081

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Cancel OA and MOC

Transmitted herewith are copies of the Agent Service Record, Damage Report and Form 2457 on Subject, who was terminated 31 December 1966, due to an inability to establish the location of operational contacts.

for
Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments:
#1 - Agent Service Record 2cys h/w
#2 - Damage Report 2cys h/w
#3 - Form 2457 2cys h/w

Distribution:
~~3~~ - WH/COG w/atts #1,#2 & #3 h/w

FEB -8

CS COPY

201-334081

3 atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26926

DATE
6 February 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-334081

Att. #1 to UFGA-26926

SECRET

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. Agent's cryptonym or pseudonym: AMLUNT-2
2. Project identification: AMTRUNK
3. Agent recruited by: Reuben HANNULA
4. Capacity in which agent served: Planned to use him as' MHAPRON-Recruiter
5. Rate of pay: Gross $331/Month-$279.40/Month (Net)
6. Other Commitments: None
7. Agent dismissed by: George H. RAMSKILL
8. Reason for dismissal: Inability to establish location of operational contacts.
9. Security risks: Subject received some Agent and Team Training, but there are no unusual security risks.
10. Is agent recommended for re-use: Yes - When and as operational situation requires.
11. Manner of dismissal: Amicable - Subject given 2 months notice during which he was free to seek other employment.
12. Letter of termination signed: Yes

SECRET

att. #1 to UFGA-26926 CS COPY 201-334081

14-00000

[illegible] #2 to UFGA-26926

SECRET

DAMAGE REPORT

NAME: AMLUNT/2 Last date SGSWIRLED: 12 January 1966

Safehouse and Training Areas Exposed/Cover Companies Exposed

S/H #206
#296
#316
#328
#342
Firing Range
Maritime Training Site
Red Sunset Enterprises, Inc.
Isolation
Isotropic

Indigenous Agent Personnel Exposed

AMAKA-1 -	True Name
AMSTALK-1 -	True Name
AMTRUNK-21-	True Name
AMTRUNK-24-	True Name
AMAROMA-2 -	True Name
AMTRUNK-7 -	Alias
AMRIB-1 -	Alias
AMSKIRT-1 -	Alias
AMHINT-56 -	Alias
AMLILAC-29-	Alias

att #2 to UFGA-26926 CS COPY 201-334081

Operational Areas Exposed

None

Loading Sites and Vessels Exposed

None

Internal Assets Exposed

None

SECRET

WOFACT Personnel Exposed

Reuben A. HANNULA as "Fred Folsom"
Carl M. BERSCHIUSKI as "Gene"
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as "Dewey"
Wilfred O. CLOWER as "Matt"
Charles B. WEISINGER as "Ray"
Daniel R. HOSKIER as "Fred"
Keith D. WINETT as "Bob"
John H. HEMMING as "George"
Gary T. BERNARD as "Bob"
Clayton D. HEIPPERT as "Don"
Merritt R. TOOVEY as "Warren"
Daniel V. GUSSOW as "Bill"
John H. HEMMING as "George"
Austin DETLOFF as "Bill"
John K. TARTARILLO as "John"
George RAMSKILL as"Harold"
Leland COBFIELD as "Paul"

Indigenous Instructors Exposed

AMSWING-1
AMTERRY-1
AMHINT-18
AMHINT-19
AMTABBY-56
AMCLEVE-6
AMPHODARCH-11

SECRET

Relatives in WOLADY

Wife

Daughter

Relatives in PBRUMEN

Brother

Sister

COMMENTS

None

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

RID/

C

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
WH/C/ES				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16				
17. RID FI				

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE TITLE [illegible]

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-334081

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE [illegible] 65

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFGX CC37C/12

FORM 1-61 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

18719

26 Au

UFGX-00070/12

Attachment to UFGA-25747

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

TO : Chief, WH Division

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Amendment to Memorandum of Oral Commitment for 201- 334081 (AMLUNT-2)

Please amend Paragraph 4 of the Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Subject to read as follows:

> 4. COMPENSATION. Effective 1 May 1966, Subject will be paid compensation at the rate of $331.00 per month. Such payments to be made following completion of satisfactory service.

SIGNED: ______________________
Field Contracting Officer

REVIEWED: H. G. Allsworth (signed)
Contract Approving Officer

REVIEWED: Dow N. Lustcher
Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

CS [illegible]

201- 334081

Group 1 - Excluded from Automatic Downgrading & Declassification

ATTACHMENT #2

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-334081

TRAINING REPORT

TEAM/GROUP: PBRUMEN II
(211 hours, full-time)

11 July - 13 August 1966
(Date)

Student: **FELIPE**

COURSE OBJECTIVE AND CONTENT

This course is designed to train indigenous personnel in paramilitary resistance activities and intelligence collection operations in denied areas. Approximately 70% of the student's time is devoted to practical work and field exercises and 30% to the theoretical aspects essential for a logical understanding and application of training covered during the course.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

* U - Unsatisfactory	Performance is so low in relation to requirements of the work as to be unequivocally below minimum standards.
W - Weak	Achieved minimum standards, but less than adequate (in terms of indigenous personnel participating in the program).
A - Adequate	Has achieved the basic level required. Satisfactory, characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	More than satisfactory. Has acquired a solid beginner's proficiency. This rating may be interpreted as representing "average" on our rating scale.
S - Strong	Exceptional proficiency, characterized by thoroughness, initiative, originality, and an exceptional student understanding and application of paramilitary resistance activities.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of other students doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

* Modification of the Office of Training standard rating scale at the specific request of JMWAVE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-334081

		HOURS	RATING
1.	MAP READING (ABILITY TO REPORT LOCATIONS USING GRID COORDINATES)	12	A
2.	NAUTICAL CHARTS	8	A
3.	WEAPONRY (U.S. & FOREIGN)	31	P
4.	CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT	-	-
5.	RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS	20	A
6.	AMBUSH TACTICS AND OPERATIONS	24	P
7.	RAID TACTICS AND OPERATIONS	24	P
8.	CACHING	20	P
9.	CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT LINES (E&E)	-	-
10.	OBSERVATION AND REPORTING TECHNIQUES	40	P
11.	LEADERSHIP TRAITS AND CAPABILITY	See Comments	
12.	OPERATIONAL PLANNING ABILITY	See Comments	
13.	SKETCHING	12	W
14.	SABOTAGE (SEE ATTACHED STB REPORT)	-	-
15.	TARGET PHOTOGRAPHY	-	-
16.	AIR RECEPTION ACTIVITIES	20	P

17.	WEAPONS QUALIFICATION (TEST RESULTS ATTACHED)	Pistol	Non-Applicable
		Rifle	Marksman
		SMG	Marksman

OVERALL PERFORMANCE

RATING LETTER

P

Rating takes into account trainee's effectiveness, such as performance in operational skills, tactics, techniques, leadership, planning, teamwork, motivation and limitations.

The ratings above, and narrative comments hereunder, are derived from a synthesis of all evaluations submitted on each respective trainee by the instructor staff.

Overall performance ratings of all students in this class were as follows:

WEAK 0 ADEQUATE 0 PROFICIENT 6 STRONG 0 OUTSTANDING 0

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

FELIPE was handicapped to some degree by his weakness in English language. FELIPE's attitude throughout the course was cooperative and congenial. His participation in lectures, plans, and field exercises suffered from a lack of concentration and thoroughness. He appeared to have only a partial grasp of many of the topics presented. He was inclined to rush a bit in planning exercises and was also somewhat hasty in his execution of field work (Mapping, Recons, tactical movement in Raid and Ambush Exercises).

In his leadership assignment, he planned reasonably well, but his execution of the plan was weak and he lacked good control of the group.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

PREPARED BY:

Jerome W. Greiner
JEROME W. GREINER
Project Officer

APPROVED AND FORWARDED:

Joseph M. Hudacek
JOSEPH M. HUDACEK
Chief Instructor

8/30/66
Date

FILIPE - Filipe has had no previous demolition training but indicated he had worked with explosives against Government units. His practical work was a little sloppy, not from lack of care but because he was not able to work too well with his hands. The practical work did not show any progress from commencement to completion of the course but his placements were well made and effective. He seemed to understand all subject matter covered and always answered test type questions correctly. Whenever crimping detonators, his hands were very shaky but he did not seem to be nervous at any other time during the course. Close supervision was required when he was crimping detonators. He was a cooperative, interested student who reacted well to correction. He seemed to enjoy the training and offered several new methods of attack based on personal experience. Filipe was rated overall as proficient.

W.U.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

[ ] ~~ESTROY~~ ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☒ FILE RID
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

1 MAR 66 16 55z

ORIG : R. ULLERY/jln
UNIT : WH/C/RR/OS
EXT : 7646
DATE : 28 FEBRUARY 66

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-334081 ✓

24 SECRET

TO : JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH/C-8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY Commo-7, CI/OA,

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 83943

ABSTRACT X

TYPIC AMTRUNK COMMO

REFS: A. UFGW-5824*
B. UFGA-24588**

OA GRANTED AMLUNT/2 ON 8 FEB 66. WAVE ADVISED REF A. AMENDED PER REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/Comments: *Advised WAVE OA granted A/2.
**Amend POA to include commo.

201-334081

1 Mar 66

C/WH/C/MO R. Ortman (phone)

O/C-AD C. Baumler (phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

for JOHN T. FLYNN
A/DCWHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

1-5

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY No.

SECRET

201 No. 334081

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ~~WH/C/RR/OA W. Ullery~~
WH/C/MO

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of AMLUNT/2, for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows.

Subject's OA is herewith amended to permit commo training as requested in your memorandum of 24 February 1966.

File

Field Advised

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 28 February 1966 dlr

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

201-334081

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 8-65 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (9)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1 Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2 Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

MAR 1 10 37 AM '66

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

RID/AN

RL

	TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1	WH/C/ES	3	Mar 66		
2.	WH/Pers				
3.	WH/B&F				cb
4.	C/WH/SS				
5.	WH/C/MO	[illegible]	7 MAR 1966		
6.					
7.	C/CPD/5-E-69			9 Mar	
8.	O/F			3/10	
9					
10.					
11					
12					
13.					
14					
15.					
16					
17	RID/FI				

Copy detached

copy detached

#4 For Signature U/S/Catt 3 Mar 66

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-334051

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 25 Feb 66

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFGA 24567

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE 34

SUBJECT TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
0 Transmittal of Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Identity A

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Action Required: FYI

Reference : DIR 60919, 26 November 1965

Transmitted herewith are three (3) copies of Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Subject of 201- 334081. Identities are being sent under separate cover. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 February 1966.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments:
1 - MOC h/w
2 - Identities u/s/c ATT'D RID/AN

Distribution:
3 - WH/C w/att #1 h/w and #2 u/s/c

201-334081

CS COPY

DATE TYPED
16 Feb 66

DATE DISPATCHED
FEB 25 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA- 24567

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-334081

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

2 ATT'S

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] 08-041

1. [illegible] will continue until terminated by either party upon written [illegible] notice.

2. [illegible]: the appropriate security approval, [illegible] POA granted 15 October [illegible] dated 23 November [illegible].

3. CITIZENSHIP: The subject is a Cuban national and was born on 11 [illegible] in [illegible], Cuba and resides in [illegible].

4. COMPENSATION: Commencing on the effective date of this agreement, Subject will be paid compensation at the rate of $ 307.43 per month. Such payments to be made following completion of satisfactory service.

5. TAXES: Subject will be obligated to pay U.S. income taxes. Taxes will be withheld from the above stated paid compensation. Subject [illegible] eligible for Social Security [illegible]. Subject is married and has a total of [illegible] dependents other than himself. Subject's dependents [illegible] residing in the U.S., possessions, Canada, Mexico, the Canal Zone, or the Republic of Panama.

6. QUARTERS/SUBSISTENCE: The Subject will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: When properly authorized, Subject will be reimbursed for:

a. Operational travel including mileage claims for official use of his personal automobile.

b. Operational hotel expenses, meals, telephone calls, etc.

8. [illegible]:

[illegible] With prior approval of the Chief of Station, a bonus may be paid for outstanding performance in the line of duty. The amount of the bonus will be commensurate with the risks taken and the results achieved; amount not to exceed $100.00 per [illegible] payment.

9. [illegible] with prior approval of the Chief of Station, Subject will be entitled to the [illegible]

REVIEWED: FEB 2 [illegible] 1966

Special Contracting Officer

Frederick J. [illegible]

COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-334081

Att #1 to UFGA 24567

ATT #2 to UFGA 24567

IDENTITIES:

A. [illegible] PEREZ [illegible]

B. [illegible] NW 8th Ave., Miami, Fla.

C. SS# 2[illegible]5-74-0339

CS COPY

S/C ATT #2 to UFGA 24567

201-334081

SECRET

24 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~[illegible] CI/OA~~

SUBJECT: AMLUNT/2
201-334081

1. It is requested that Subject's OA be amended by 28 February 1966 to permit commo training.

2. Please advise Wendell Ullery, extension 7646, when the amendment has been approved.

John T. Flynn
Acting Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/RR/OS
✓1 - 201-334081

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-334081

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ES	24	Feb	66	
2. WH/C/RR/OSOA	24	Feb.	'66	
3.				
4. WH/C/HO/FI	1	MAR 1966		
5.				
6				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17 RID/FI				

Copy Detached — Reg. amendment via mano 24 Feb. 66.

"TELETAPE"

Amended 28 Feb. 66 Field Advised

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-334081

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 23 Feb 66

DOCUMENT NUMBER: FGA 24588

FORM 610a

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
CHIEF, WH DIVISION

INFO

FROM
CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/AMTRUNK/COMMO
REQUEST AMEND AMLUNT-2 POA

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

PLEASE AMEND POA BY 1 MARCH 1966

A. DIR-50920, POA GRANTED SUBJ, 15 OCT 65

B. UFGA-24438, PRQ PART II FOR SUBJ, 2 FEB 66

PLEASE AMEND POA FOR AMLUNT-2 TO INCLUDE PERMISSION TO TRAIN IN OWVL AND MEDIUM SPEED TRANSMISSION.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

CA was granted 8 Feb 66.

[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION
BY TAPE
3 - WH/C

201-334081

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-24588	DATE 23 FEBRUARY 1966
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-334081

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
C AMLUNT/2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA-24438

An Operational Approval was granted Subject on 8 February 1966.

EDGAR N. VASSALOTTI

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - JMWAVE

201-334081

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGW-5824 [illegible]

DATE: [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-334081

1 - WH/C/RR/OS
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - 201-334081

RL

X

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT.
WH/C/RR/OS	M. Olejarz	jln	11 Feb. 66	7646

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/RR/OS	11 Feb 66	J. Moughan J. Moughan
WH/C/MO/PM		B. Mills (phone)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
A/DC/WHD/C	11 Feb	John T. Flynn

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

201 No. 334081

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/C/RR/OA - Michael H. Olejarz

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of

AMLUNT/2, for the purpose specified in your request

dated 7 February 1966.

UFGA 24431

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 8 February 1966 jab

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

201-334081

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

copy attached

Answered UFGW-5824 16 Feb 66

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ES	7 Feb	66		
2. DONNA WH/C/RR/OSOA	7	Feb	66	RLS
3.				
4. WH/C/MO		10 FEB 1966	[illegible]	
5.		[illegible]	[illegible]	
6. WH/C/FI			11 F	
7.				
8. WH/C/CICS			14 Feb	
9. Al Ansari				
10.				
11. WH/C/MC	16 FEB 1966		16 FEB 1966	
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-339081

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

23 J 1966

DOCUMENT NUMBER

UFGA 24438

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief, WH Division
INFO	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE
SUBJECT	TYPIC/Operational/AMTRUNK PRQ Part II, AMLUNT-2

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED - Please Grant OA

REFERENCE - DIR-50920, POA Granted 15 Oct 65

Transmitted herewith are three (3) copies of PRQ Part II for Subject. Request Headquarters grant OA.

Philip G. ELMARD

ATT: PRQ Part II, 3 cys

Distribution
3 - WH/C w/att

CS COPY

1 OA

201-334081

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-24438	DATE FEB 2 1966 31 January 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-334081

7 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

SUBJECT: **AMLUNT/2**
201-334081

Attached for your retention is one copy of Subject's PRQ Part II. An Operational Approval is hereby requested.

John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WH/C

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w att.
1 - WH/C/RR/OS
✓1 - 201-334081

201-334081

S E C R E T GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect 2 on back Detach back flap and forward to RID 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation	If file no and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

RL

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ES			11-9-66	SH
2.				
3. [illegible]				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7				
8				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14				
15.				
16				
17 RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

[illegible]

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

[illegible] 66

DOCUMENT NUMBER

UFGA-24294/02

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] Division

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

[illegible] LCFLUTTER/[illegible]

[illegible] of LCFLUTTER Results

Action: None Required

1. Forwarded herewith (RYBAT) are the ~~following~~ LCFLUTTER reports with below list of IND numbers, and if available, 201 numbers and cryptonyms:

IND NUMBERS	201 NUMBERS	CRYPT
(72663)	(788737)	( )
(72666)	( )	( )
(72668)	( )	([illegible]/21)
✓(72669)	(334081)	(AMLUNT/2)
(72671)	(787126)	( )

2. The identities of the above reports are forwarded as a separate cover attachment.

UFGA 24294/02

FREDRICK J. INGHURST

Attachments:
A. Reports (RYBAT)
B. Identities (RYBAT)

COPY

201-334081

Distribution:
- C/WH/SA w/att. A 1-5 h/w; B/1-5 u/s/c
✓ 2 - [illegible] w/o [illegible]

13 Jan 66

JAN 17 1966

UFGA 242[illegible] /02

SECRET

2 ATTs

SECRET

UFGA 24294/2

72669
12 January 1966

Subject: Iden A

AMLUNT/2 was interviewed and tested on 4 January 1966 at a safe site in the Miami area. The interview was requested by Reuben A. HANNULA and it was conducted in Spanish. AMSHID/1 served as interprater.

AMLUNT/2 is being recruited as a potential infiltration team member.

RESULTS

AMLUNT/2 has never taken part in any activity which he regarded as communist. He was a member of the 26th of July movement but did not believe it to be communist at the time.

He has not cooperated with any Castro Intelligence or Security service since leaving DIER in 1959. He has had no contact unknown to KUBARK with any Castro agents since 1960. (In this connection see WAVE 8248, dated 8 September 1962). He has no connection or agreement with the government of any country other than PBPRIME.

He is not obligated to any of the Cuban Exile groups.

He has been essentially truthful in regard to his personal history and he does not believe that he is liable to blackmail. He has not used or trafficked in narcotics.

Unless otherwise noted below, he has not told any unauthorised persons of his involvement with KUBARK.

DETAILS

AMLUNT/2 has been LCFLUTTERed by ODIBEX.

AMLUNT/2 has told his wife that he is involved with KUBARK but he has not been specific regarding his assignment. He stated that Iden B had also tried to join a KUBARK unit so he certainly knows that AMLUNT/2 is involved. AMLUNT/2 stated that other friends probably suspect but he has said nothing to confirm their suspicions.

Keith D. WINETT

CS COPY

Att #1 to 24294/02

SECRET

201-334081

[redacted]
SECRET

UFGA 24294/2

72669
13 January 1966
IDENS

Idem A Dunney PEREZ Alamo
DPOB: 11 July 1937
Baire, Oriente, Cuba

201-334081

Idem B Francisco VENEGAS, who lives at Belle Glades, Florida

CS COPY

[redacted]
SECRET

UFGA 24294/02

201-334081

14-00000

SECRET

CL

RECORD NO.

INVENTORY - NON STAFF PERSONNEL

	1	2	3	4
A	ARBITRARY NO.	SUBJECT'S 201 201- 334081	OTHER FILE NO.	
B	SURNAME AMLUNT-2	1ST NAME / PERSONALIA	OTHER GIVEN NAME/TELECODE	TYPE OF NAME C
C	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	DATE OF BIRTH 11 Jul 37	CITIZENSHIP Cuba	NATURALIZED-US (yes or pending)
D	COUNTRY CURRENTLY RESIDES USA	CITY CURRENTLY [illegible] YEAR Miami, 66	MARITAL STATUS (most recent) Married	SEX (M or F) M
E	OVERT OCCUPATION Construction Worker	LANGUAGE Span, R,W,S	LANGUAGE	LANGUAGE
F	MILITARY SERVICE-COUNTRY Cuba	BRANCH OF SERVICE Rebel Army	INCLUSIVE DATES 57/61	
G	COUNTRY AREA KNOWLEDGE Cuba	COUNTRY	COUNTRY	
H	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces) Infiltration Team Member			CODE PM
I	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces)			CODE
J	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	TYPE EMPLOYEE TYPE A OR B	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE WIFE	FULL, PART TIME OR WAE
K	MAINTENANCE/SERVICE	CONSULTANT	PROPRIETARY OR SUBSIDY	CAREER AGENT
L	FIELD AGENT Yes	HQS, FF OR USF USF	INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR	MOC/MOA MOC
M	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	POA / STATUS Yes	STAFF CLEARANCE	CSA/PCSA
N	HQS COMPONENT RESPONSIBLE WH	FIELD STATION RESPONSIBLE JMWAVE	PROJECT	COVER Non Off
O	ENTRY-ON-DUTY DATE 1 Dec 65	YEARLY SALARY $3700.00	DATE LAST PAY CHANGE	
P	PART OF A RETIREMENT PLAN - SPECIFY (limit to 62 spaces) USSS			
Q	DATE TERMINATED	REEMPLOYABLE	STAFF CEILING SPACE	
R	REMARKS (re: termination, etc.) (limit to 62 spaces)			ATTITUDE

FORM 4-65 2457

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

(9-61)

14-00000

M112

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-334081
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. mm HC

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

30 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OA

24 Nov 65 IN 01451

SECRET 241812Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7470

TYPIC AMTRUNK MHAPRON

REFS A. UFGA-23252

B. UFGA-23254

REQUEST STATUS POA REQUEST FOR AMLUNT-2.

SECRET

CFN 7470 UFGA-23252 UFGA-23254 POA AMLUNT-2

ST

201-334081

201-334081
24 Nov. 1965

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/C/SR/OA - M. H. Olejarz

NUMBER 201 - 334081

SUBJECT AMIUNT/2

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 1 October 1965 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	15 October 1965

FORM 1-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

201-334081

(9)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : M. OLEJARZ/db
UNIT : WH/C/RR/OA
EXT : 7646
DATE : 15 OCT 65

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-334081

30 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : JMWAVE

15 Oct 65 21 58z

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH/C8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, CI/OA

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 50920

TYPIC

REF: UFGA 23252*

POA GRANTED PEREZ 15 OCT 65. 201-334081.

END OF MESSAGE

ABSTRACT X

WH/C/Comment: Requested PRITY POA Dunney PEREZ Alamo.

201-334081

15 Oct 65

WH/C/MO/PM

f/ WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

15-15

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

f/ JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LE   RS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)

Duney PEREZ Alamo

201-334081 C1/CA

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 162867

DATE 1 October 1965

TO CHIEF, FI/D

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

11 July 1937, Bairo, Oriente, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP

Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Unknown
RESIDES: 1883 SW 11th Street
Miami, Florida

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

Former Cuban Army Captain

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME Michael H. Olejarz
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/C/RR/OA
ROOM, BUILDING GG 14
EXTENSION 7646

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)

☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)

☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Cuban Rebel Army Captain	Cuba	1956-1961

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION	(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
X	5'10"	178 lbs.	Brown	Brown	Cauoc.	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

Celeste MARTINEZ

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6 61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

SECRET

201-334081

SECRET

11 October 1965

~~MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, CI/OA~~

SUBJECT: Dunney PEREZ Alamo
201-334081

ODENVY traces on Subject submitted by JMWAVE was surfaced from DD/P Records Center. The material was reviewed by Michael H. Olejarz of WH/C/RR/OA and found to be non-derogatory.

John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WHD/C

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/RR/OA
1 - 201-334081

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-334081

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 3 copies of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 1 October 1965

TO:	X	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
		CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
		CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Michael H. Olejars
WH/C/RR/OA
3D 14
7646

SUBJECT: (True name) Dunney PEREZ Alamo

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: AMLUNT/2

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 334081

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A*		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Cuba

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Subject will be utilized as a team leader for MHAPRON Infiltrations into Camaguey Province .

ODENVY traces cited by JMWAVE are currently in Recodds Center and your office will be notified by this office on their contents .

12 October 1965 DLs

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. None

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? X YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 162867

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO. UFGA 23252 -24/9/65		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 7-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(3)

SECRET

PRQ PART I

NAME	: Dmey [illegible] PEREZ Alamo
DPOB	: 11 July 1937, Baire,Oriente,Cuba
CIT	: Cubah
RESIDENCE	: 1883 SW 11th Street Miami, Florida
OCCUPATION	: Unknown

SECRET

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

OCT 1 1 17 PM '65

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

RID/

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ES	5	Oct	65	
2. WH/C/RR/OSOA		7 Oct 65		
3.				
4.				
5.				
6. WH/C/MO		8 OCT 1965	9 OCT 1965	
7.				
8				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COPY DETACHED

MICROFILMED
OCT 8 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-334081
	INDEX	X	

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 28 Sept 65

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFGA 23254

FORM 1-65 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
PRQ Part I - Duney PEREZ Alamo

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED - Grant POA

REFERENCE - UFGA-23252

Transmitted herewith are four (4) copies of Subject's PRQ Part I. Priority POA by 15 Oct was requested in ref.

Philip G. Hamlin

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment - PRQ Part I
4 copies

Distribution
3 - WH/C w/att

MICROFILMED
OCT 5 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-334081

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
23 Sept 65	SEP 28 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23254

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-334081

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 att

S E C R E T

7 October 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~Chief, CI/OA~~

SUBJECT : Duney PEREZ Alamo
201-334081

Attached herewith for your retention are two copies of a PRQ Part I on the above-listed Subject.

f/- John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WHD/C

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Addressee w/att.
1 - WH/C/RR/OA
1 - 201-334081

S E C R E T GROUP I EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

201-334081

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

5P

PRJ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS
1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA."
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO. UFGA-23254

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) Duney (Middle) (Last) PEREZ (Nat) Alamo

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: Same

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than item 1.): NA

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

NA

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 July 1937

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Baire, Oriente, Cuba

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

No bad habits observed.

MICROFILMED
OCT 5 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

Tried for political offenses in 1957 and 1959

1957 - Batista era, political

1959 - Arrested and tried in Huber Matos trial but absolved of guilt.

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
X M ☐ F	28	32	FT. 5 IN. 10	175	white	square
h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES		j. TEETH	k. BUILD		l. POSTURE
Brown	Brown		Good	Strong		Erect

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: Scar on left forearm

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE: Healthy

o. PROMINENT FEATURES: Subject wears a mustache

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES: None

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 2-61 1050 [illegible] UFGA 23254 CS COPY 201-334081 (4-20)

SECTION II — **CITIZENSHIP**

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP Cuban	11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 10.) NA

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)
914 N.W. 34th Avenue, Miami, Fla. Tenant

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 12.)
NA

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED
N/A

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)
Subject has not travelled outside of the continental limits of the United States since his arrival from Cuba in August 1961.

SECTION III — **OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA**

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION Laborer	17. TITLE None	18. SALARY (Per annum) $75.00 per week

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)
Subject is dependent upon his salary. No outside earnings.

SECTION IV — **ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS**

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Roman Catholic

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
26th of July in Cuba until 1961. EJERCITO LIBERTADOR and JURE in exile during period 1961 thru 1964.

SECTION V — **EDUCATIONAL DATA**

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Academia Minerva Contramaestre, Ote. Cuba	Primary	1946	1955	8th Gr

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

NA

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

None

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
Cuba	1956	1961	Rebel Army	Captain	1956 to 59 2nd in Command, 9th Column, Camaguey Province.

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

1959 - Chief, DIER, Camaguey Prov.
1960-61 - Chief of Inspectors, Peoples Stores, Camaguey, Prov

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

26	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) Aug 64/present	b. EMPLOYER Benner Bock	c. ADDRESS Simpkins Rd & 28th St., Miami
	d. TYPE OF WORK Box wrapper	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 75.00 PER week	f. REASON FOR LEAVING NA
27	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) Jan/June 64	b. EMPLOYER Dim Plastics Corp.	c. ADDRESS Miami, Fla.
	d. TYPE OF WORK Plastics worker	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 90.00 PER week	f. REASON FOR LEAVING to join JURE
28	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) Celeste (Middle) X (Nee) MARTINEZ (XXX) (Mat) X De la Vega de Perez

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE 26 Dec 1959

35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE Santa Cruz del Sur, Camaguey, Cuba

36. DATE OF BIRTH DOB 12 July 1937

37. PLACE OF BIRTH POB Santa Cruz del Sur, (Camaguey) Cuba

38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cit Cuban Self

39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS NA

wife of Duney Perez Alamo

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased) 914 N.W. 34th Ave., Miami, Fla. USA

201-334031

SECTION X CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Teresa de los Angeles		X	1961	Camaguey City, Cuba	Cuban

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

NA

SECTION XI FATHER

41. FULL NAME Emilio PEREZ Suarez

42. YEAR OF BIRTH 1903

43. PLACE OF BIRTH Spain

44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Spanish

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS Cuban

46. OCCUPATION Merchant

47. PRESENT RESIDENCE Montreal #154 Camaguey City, Cuba

SECTION XII MOTHER

48. FULL NAME Feliberta ALAMO Fernandez

49. YEAR OF BIRTH 1911

50. PLACE OF BIRTH Holguin, Oriente, Cuba

51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuba

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS NA

53. OCCUPATION housewife

54. PRESENT RESIDENCE Montreal #154 Camaguey City, Cuba

SECTION XIII — BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Emilio	X		1932	Omaja, Oriente, Cuba	Cuban
Jose	X		1934	" " "	"
Mirtha		X	1936	" " "	"
Omar	X		1944	" " "	"

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

NA

SECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

NA

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

Subject's brothers Jose and Omar PEREZ Alamo are also living in the United States.

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

NA

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

NA

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Evelio CAPOTE, Eloy LOPEZ and Claudio LOZADAGO

SECTION XVI. — MISCELLANEOUS

Subject has signed Secrecy Agreement.

DATE

SIGNATURE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

Sep 23 4 40 PM 65

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO

FROM:

RID/ AN

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Copy Detached

3. 5. 7: POA requested w/12 Oct 65 Deadline. M.H.O.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ES		28-9-65		ZA
2.				
3. Mike: WH/C/RR/OA		30/9/65	1/10/65	MHO
4.				
5. WH/C/MO/PM				91
6.				
7. WH/C/RR/OS-MHAPRON				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17 RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST ~~1 0 1 1 19 31~~ ABSTRACT INDEX X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-334081

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 24 Sept. 1965

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFGA 23252

FORM 1-64 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
CHIEF, WH

INFO.

FROM
CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
REQUEST PRIORITY POA - DUNEY /PEREZ/ ALAMO

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES
GRANT POA BY 15 OCT 65 AND FORWARD HQS TRACES ON NON-PRIORITY BASIS

A. UFGA-5641, 7 SEPT 62
B. WAVE-8248, 6 SEPT 62

1. REQUEST PRIORITY POA FOR DUNEY /PEREZ/ ALAMO, BORN 11 JULY 37, BAIRE, ORIENTE, CUBA, SON OF EMELIO /PEREZ/ SUAREZ, BORN C1903 IN SPAIN, AND FELIBERTA /ALAMO/ FERNANDEZ BORN C1911, HOLGUIN, ORIENTE. SUBJ IS MARRIED TO CELESTE /MARTINEZ/ DE LA VEGA, BORN 1937, SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR, CAMAGUEY. FROM 1956 TO 1959, SUBJ WAS 2ND IN COMMAND OF 9TH COLUMN OF REBEL ARMY IN CAMAGUEY PROVINCE WHICH WAS COMMANDED BY HUBER /MATOS/. IN 1959 SUBJ WAS CHIEF DIER, CAMAGUEY PROV. AND IN 1960-61, CHIEF OF INSPECTORS, PEOPLES STORES, CAMAGUEY.

2. JMWAVE AND LOCAL ODENVY TRACES - SAS/CE CARD - DBA-594, MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS CUBA, 23 JAN 62. DIR-39547, MEETING WITH 'EJERCITO LIBERTADOR' REPRESENTATIVE, 29 SEP 62. WAVE-9309, AMDENIM-11 OPS, 1 OCT 62. WAVE-3890, REVIEW AMLUNT FILES, 28 JAN 63. UFGA-9676, BI ON CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA, 4 JULY 63. WAVE-4453, WAVE ATTEMPT LOCATE SUBJ, 16 SEP 63. DIR-65471, HQS INTEREST CUBAN AMB ALGI, 31 AUG 63. DBA-60217, ODENVY INVESTIGATION OF ELOY /LOPEZ/ VIAMONTE, 2 JAN 64. DBA-62256, ODENVY INVESTIGATION OF MANUEL /DUASSO/, 21 JAN 64. DBA-62340, ODENVY, 'EJERCITO LIBERTADOR DE CUBA', 3 FEB 64.

3. PER REF A WHICH TRANSMITTED PRQ PART I ON SUBJ, IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED FROM JMWAVE FILES WHETHER SUBJ WAS EVER GRANTED A POA. IF SUBJ HAS BEEN GRANTED PREVIOUS POA, PLEASE REINSTATE. IF NOT, PLEASE GRANT POA.

What record

4. PRQ PART I FOLLOWS BY SEPARATE DISPATCH.

5. SUBJECT'S INTENDED USE IS FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

ATTACHMENT - INTENDED USE
DISTRIBUTION BY TAPE
3 - WH/C W/ATT.

1 att.

CS COPY

201-334081

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-23252	24 SEPTEMBER 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-334081

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | SECRET | S/C ATT TO UFGA-23252

SUBJECT, AMLUNT-2 IS TO BE USED AS A TEAM LEADER FOR MHAPRON INFILTRATION OPERATIONS INTO CAMAGUEY PROVINCE. PLEASE NOTE THAT PER REF B, AMLUNT-2 WAS INVOLVED IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE AMLUNT-1 OPERATION. HOWEVER HE WAS CUT OUT AND BYPASSED FROM ANY SUBSEQUENT CONNECTION WHEN A JMWAVE CASE OFFICER TOOK OVER DIRECT CONTACT WITH AMLUNT-1.

END

CS COPY

Att. 1 UFGA - 23252

201- 334081

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION. CLASSIFICATION ☐ CONTINUED PAGE NO.

FORM 3020
7-71 MFG. 7-74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER SOP 111 TOTAL COPIES 8-2 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT: C/LAS 5
ACTION #
INFO: ~~RF~~ FILE VR. Clidems

T 165665 EIA686 PAGE 01 IN 402871

TOR:131724Z SEP 77 [MANA] 13110

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP 21-22
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. #511 - Unit LA/SC/PA
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

S E C R E T 131715Z SEP 77 STAFF

CITE [MANAGUA] 13110 16-22

TO: DIRECTOR.

[redacted]

Thru Request Paneque

1. ON 12 SEPTEMBER 1977 THE LOCAL PEACE CORPS DIRECTOR (PCD) TOLD [THE COS] 27 THAT ONE VICTOR P A N E Q U E BATISTA APPROACHED A VOLUNTEER IN BLUEFIELDS, NICARAGUA, IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS A "CIA OPERATIVE", AND ATTEMPTED TO RECRUIT HER AS AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT. THE PCD SAID THE RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT WAS MADE AROUND 29 AUGUST 1977.

2. THE PCD SAID THAT THE VOLUNTEER FIRST MET PANEQUE WHEN SHE WAS ASSIGNED TO BLUEFIELDS IN APRIL 1977 AND RENTED A HOUSE FROM HIM. THE PCD ALSO SAID PANEQUE DRINKS HEAVILY AND THAT WHEN HE IS DRUNK HE TELLS PEOPLE HE IS A "CIA AGENT" AND A BAY OF PIGS VETERAN.

4. THE [STATION] 16-22 HAS TWO CARDS ON AN INDIVIDUAL WITH THE ABOVE NAME:

A. THE SUBJECT OF 201-0286382 - [MANAGUA] 16-22 00364, 11 APR 1973, NO LONGER AVAILABLE IN [STATION] 16-22 FILES.

B. IDENTIFIED AS A CUBAN CITIZEN AND THE "SOURCE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RECORD COPY

13 Sept 77
201-286382

X

6/90

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR. 9-10

ACTION #

T 105665 EIA686 PAGE 02-02 IN 400871

TOR:131726Z SEP 77 21-22 [MANA] 13110

OF INFO CONCERNING MDC ACTIVITIES". UFG-05576 AND WAVE 09715. NO LONGER AVAILABLE IN 16-22 [STATION] FILES.

5. REQUEST HQS TRACES ON PANEQUE.

6. DEFER FILE. E2. IMPDET.

[illegible] OCT 05 77

S E C R E T

2/90

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 152041Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 095686

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE, VR/OPS, C/FPS/FC 2, C/PCS, C/PCS/LSN,

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 FILE

DISSEM BY: 7

Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RETURN TO CIA

16-22

TO: [MANAGUA] Y

[redacted] Y

16-22

REF: [MANAGUA] 13110 |IN 400871| Y

Trace reply to Mana 13110

1. SUBJECT REF IS AMRUG■-5: BORN 22 SEPTEMBER 1918 IN HOLGUIN, CUBA. FORMER MEMBER CASTRO FORCES WHO LEFT CUBA CLANDESTINELY IN 1960 FOLLOWING RAUL CASTRO'S PURGE OF UNSYMPATHETIC/RIGHTIST■ PERSONNEL WITHIN CUBAN MILITARY. DURING VISIT TO MIAMI I&NS OFFICE IN SEPTEMBER 1960, SUBJECT GAVE RESIDENCE OF DR. ORLANDO BO■SCH AS ■■■■■■■HIS ADDRESS IN STA■TES. BECAME ACTIVE WITH ANTI-CASTRO GROUP IN FLORIDA AND INFILTRATED INTO CUBA TO SET UP FIGHTING FORCES PRIOR TO BAY OF PIGS INVASION. PARTICIPATED CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK AREA IN EARLY 1962 AND LATER REGISTERED IN ISR TO DEPT OF ARMY IN AUGUST 1962■ (DROPPED WITHOUT PREJUDICE ON 18 NOVEMBER 1963). IN 1964 SUBJECT WAS MEMBER MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTANO (CUBAN EXILE GROUP - MDC) INFILTRATION TEAM. RECRUITED BY MIAMI STATION AS RADIO OPERATOR/INFILTREE AND FAVORABLY SWIRLED ON 5 AUGUST 1964. POA GRANTED 13 NOV 64. PAID $275 MONTHLY BEGINNING 1 SEP 64. ■■■■■■■■■TRAINED

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized:
Signed:
R.O. #11 -

RECORD COPY

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS - LA/CAR/

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

15 Sept 77
201-286312

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

NOTE: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate

E 2 IMPDET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

SECRET 14

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE 095686

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

BY CUBAN AGENTS IN MIAMI BUT NEVER USED OPERATIONALLY. AMICABLY TERMINATED 1 OCT 65 AND RECOMMENDED FOR RE-USE ON BASIS HIS CONTACTS INSIDE CUBA. REPORTED IN 1969 AS CONDUCTING CLANDESTINE TRIPS INSIDE CUBA ON BEHALF OF EXILE GROUP KNOWN AS "JUNTA MILITAR DE CUBA". LATEST INFO REPORTED SUBJECT TRAVELED MIAMI FROM MANAGUA ABOARD PRIVATE PLANE OF CUBAN BORN GUATEMALAN INDUSTRIALIST DOMINGO MOREIRA MARTINEZ ON 3 APRIL 1973. THERE NO RECORD OF AGENCY CONTACT WITH SUBJECT SINCE 1965 TERMINATION. Y

2. 201 FILE CONTAINS COPY OF I&NS "ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS" REQUEST FILED BY SUBJECT ON 7 SEPTEMBER 1967. PER REQUEST FORM, SUBJECT LISTED AS CUBAN NATIONAL WITH U.S. ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. A11 877 601. THERE NO RECORD FINAL DISPOSITION OF SUBJECT'S REQUEST OR I&NS DECISION. Y

E4

3. PLS BRIEF AMBASSADOR (ONLY) THIS CASE. 03

L

~~3.~~ 4. FILE: 201-0286382. E2, IMPDET. A

ORIG: LA/MCA/CNH {PAYNE X1069} 03; COORD: PCS/LSN ( ), LA/SEC (SWANN), C/LA/COG {~~LATRASH~~ WINTERS} 03 C/LA/OPS {Thomas}; AUTH: C/LA/MCA {HAWKINS}; REL: C/LA {WARREN}.

DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 1977
ORIG: E. CHARLES PAYNE/JS
UNIT: LA/MCA/CNH 03
EXT: 1069

E2p PCS/LSN 03
LA/SEC 03
C/LA/COG 03
C/LA/OPS Thomas
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/MCA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

7/90

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MEROLA, JOSEPH R.
201-257804

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1959- 1977

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LSN/ISR

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
	[illegible] 6	Hornbeck	

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

MEROLA, Joseph R.
201-257804

201 - 257804

MATERIAL FILED IN THIS FOLDER
IS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

FBI DOCUMENTS:

DATE: 1 OCTOBER 1959
SUBJECT: CARIBBEAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES - CUBA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE #: NONE GIVEN

DATE: 1 JUNE 1959
SUBJECT: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FILE #: MIAMI 97-261 BUREAU 105-75663

AGENCY DOCUMENT CONTAINING FBI INFORMATION
DATE: 16 JUNE 1959
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

FBI REPORTS:

DATE: 11 MARCH 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-PANAMA
FBI FILE #: 109-12-225 (BUREAU)

DATE: 30 SEPTEMBER 1958
SUBJECT: JOSEPH MEROLA; B. LEONARD BIRD;
ROBERT DILLARD: UNKNOWN PILOT
FBI FILE #: 97-230 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 1 JUNE 1959
SUBJECT: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE#: MM 97-261

DEPT OF ARMY DOCUMENT
DATE: 13 MAY 1959
SUBJECT: JOSEPH R. MEROLA (SD 7083-A) (C)
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FILE #: ACSI-CO

FBI DOCUMENTS (SOME NOT COMPLETE)

DATE: 22 APRIL 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - PANAMA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: 109-12-223

DATE: 21 APRLL 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - PANAMA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: 109-12-223

DATE: 20 APRIL 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - PANAMA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: 109-12-223

DATE: 17 APRIL 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - PANAMA
FILE: 109-12-223
CLASSIFICATION: NONE

DATE: 10 APRIL 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE #: 109-12-223

DATE: 2 April 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTER - PANAMA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: SAC, MIAMI (109-43)

DATE: 5 MARCH 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
INTERNAL SECURITY - PANAMA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: 109-12-223

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 77-2335
11 April 1977

David M. Curry, Esq.
First Assistant U.S. Attorney
Western District of Pennsylvania
633 U.S. Post Office and Courthouse
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Dear Mr. Curry:

Re: Joseph Raymond Merola

In response to your letter of March 10, 1977 I wish to advise you that the Central Intelligence Agency had one meeting with Joseph Raymond Merola prior to August 1961. In late 1960 Joseph Raymond Merola made several telephone calls to a CIA office offering his assistance in a general way in connection with Cuban matters, which was refused. However, on 6 February 1961 Merola claimed to have information on a Latin American senator who was a "close friend and confidant" of "Che" Guevera. Since Guevera was listed as being the subject of foreign intelligence requirements, the CIA employee agreed to meet with Mr. Merola. The meeting took place on 6 February 1961 and is the only meeting with Merola prior to his incarceration which you stated in your letter began in August 1961.

Mr. Merola was not employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. His contact with the CIA could not be described as an undercover Government informant as alleged in the Writs of Error Coram Nobis by Victor Carlucci and Daniel Hanna. This one contact on 6 February 1961 by Merola with the CIA was voluntary on his part.

Mathew McVane, an employee of the CIA, did testify in San Diego in November 1975 concerning CIA contacts with Joseph Raymond Merola. The citation we have for that case is U.S. v. Dalton C. Smith, et al. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, No. 74-2277-GT.

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

The testimony given in that trial is not inconsistent with the response given above. It is true that after Merola was released from prison he again volunteered information to the CIA. Merola was a voluntary source of foreign intelligence.

I hope this provides sufficient information for you to file your response. If not, please call me at (AC 703) 351-7531.

Sincerely,

John K Greaney

John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

cc: John Martin, Esq., Dept. of Justice

OGC/JKG/

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Joseph Raymond Merola

FROM:
Maurice A. Sovern
O/SA/DO/O
2D0109

EXTENSION: 1542

NO.

DATE: 8 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. Raymond Warren C/LA 3C2019 Hqs.	11 APR 1977			
2. DC/LA	11 APR 1977			
3. SA/LA	14			
4. File - 201				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

FOR CIA OFFICIALS ONLY

LITIGATION

8 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John K. Greaney
Special Assistant to the
General Counsel

FROM : Maurice A. Sovern
O/SA/DO/O

SUBJECT : Joseph R. Merola

REFERENCE : Assistant United States Attorney,
Pennsylvania Letter, 10 March 1977,
Subject as Above

1. The question in reference is the nature of any involvement of Merola with CIA prior to August 1961.

2. The Directorate's first recorded contact with Joseph Raymond Merola prior to August 1961 occurred on 6 February 1961. It followed a series of telephone calls over a period of several months (late 1960 - early 1961) in which Merola had expressed interest in offering his assistance in connection with Cuban matters. Our officer had declined contact until 6 February when Merola claimed to have information on a Latin American senator who was a "close friend and confidante" of "Che" Guevera. Because Guevera was the proper subject of foreign positive intelligence collection requirement our officer agreed to a meeting.

3. The last recorded contact, except for the litigation outlined below, with Merola was a telephone contact with Merola in late July 1975 when he volunteered additional foreign positive intelligence.

4. At the end of August 1975, Merola contacted a staff officer to ask for testimony in the criminal fraud trial in San Diego, California (U.S. v. Joseph R. Merola, et al, Southern District of California, CR 74-2277-GT) which we subsequently

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012860

FOR CIA OFFICIALS ONLY

provided on 13 November 1975.

5. Subject is characterized as a voluntary occasional source of foreign positive intelligence who was in sporadic contact with us.

6. We greatly appreciate the Assistant United States Attorney's concern for the confidentiality of our information. The information above may be made available to the AUSA and the court as appropriate without further restriction.

/S/
Maurice A. Sovern

O/SA/DO/O:MASovern:kaw (1542)

Distribution
Orig & 1 - OGC
1 - C/DCD
1 - C/LA
2 - SA/DO/O

14-00000

SPEED LETTER

REPLY REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DATE [illegible]

LETTER NO.

TO: ISS/PICG
ATTN: Frederic McCann

FROM: Crocky [illegible]
SA/LA

SUBJECT: Joseph R. Merola-Litigation
REFERENCE: ISS/PICG Memo dtd 17 March 1977

A review of the files confirms that the DDO was not in any way involved operationally with Joseph R. Merola prior to 1961. However, it should be noted that subsequent to his release from prison in November 1962, Merola was in contact with members of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico, an anti- Castro organization of interest to this Agency.

SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE

SIGNATURE

RESPONDER'S FILE

1831

☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Litigation: Joseph L. Merola

FROM:
Frederic McCann
ISS/PICC

EXTENSION: 1520

NO.

DATE: 17 March 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. SA/LA/EICO HI-3				read Bill: The Merola file is charged to MAS. When you're done drop it off in RI(1F) and cancel my charge, please. Maurice. [illegible]
2. [illegible]	3/21	3/21	[illegible]	
3. CRG/CIES				
4.				
5. [illegible]				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

17 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/LA/EICO
DCD

FROM : Frederic McCann
ISS/PICG

SUBJECT : Litigation: Joseph R. Merola

1. Attached herewith is an unclassified memorandum received from OGC which requests information on the "extent and nature of any involvement of (Joseph R.) Merola with federal agencies prior to August 1961".

2. A review of 201-257804 reveals that Mr. Merola may have been in contact with WH/Miami in 1961 and was in contact with DCD prior to 1961.

3. Please review your files and provide whatever information is pertinent to paragraph 1., above. No information will be released outside of CIA without your concurrence.

4. 201-257804 is attached to the SA/LA/EICO copy of this memorandum. Please return it with your reply by 1 April 1977.

Frederic McCann
Frederic McCann

Attachments: a/s

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

DEPT OF JUSTICE DOCUMENT
SUBJECT: JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA
DATE: 10 MARCH 1977
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: NONE

trial, "actively engaged in the service of the government."

Irving Green, attorney for Carlucci and Hanna, said the prosecutors, Herbert I. Teitelbaum and Daniel J. Snyder, knew Merola was a government agent and therefore "perpetrated a fraud upon the trial court."

Teitelbaum and Snyder are now federal judges in Pittsburgh and have not commented about the action filed by Green, which is still pending. But an official familiar with their position said the two judges will, if necessary, swear they did not know Merola was a government agent.

Cuban Connection

"The answer to this whole thing revolves around Cuba," said this official.

Green, who represents Mannarino's son-in-law, said he didn't think Merola's testimony in Chicago had been particularly "helpful" to the prosecution. A "more logical assumption" is that Merola was freed from prison because of what he could do for the government in Cuba, he said.

"This guy works anywhere he wants to," said Green. "The government has protected him in California, Chicago and everywhere else. He still has to be of value to the government."

One thing is certain: Merola is well known in the Miami Cuban community and among those who have been linked to alleged Castro assassination attempts.

"Joe was an undercover agent, he was closely associated with the government," Frank Sturgis, of Miami, told The Bulletin. "He did have an association with the CIA."

Sturgis, who gained notoriety as one of those convicted in the Watergate burglary, was a top Castro lieutenant during the revolution who served as a double agent for the CIA. He later worked against Castro in the Bay of Pigs operation and has admitted plotting to kill Castro.

"I know Joe was involved with the revolutionaries," said Sturgis. "I know he had an association with the CIA, but because of compartmentalization, you don't know what they're doing."

Tied to Burglar

A source close to the House Assassinations Committee said Merola was "a good friend" of Eugenio (Rolando) Martinez, another of those convicted of the Watergate burglary. Martinez was associated with the CIA in the Bay of Pigs effort and in other anti-Castro moves.

"Joe's place in Miami Beach was on the water and it was used by anti-Castro groups to smuggle arms to Cuba," this source said. "Martinez was one of them."

"I can't recall," Martinez said, when asked by The Bulletin about using Merola's dock. "Really, I can't tell you anything about it.

"He was connected with helping people here in Miami against the dictatorship of Batista. He might have been in some other branch that I don't know about."

Alfredo Borges, a Miami business consultant and a Bay of Pigs veteran, told a Bulletin reporter inquiring about Merola to "please write me a letter."

"I don't know who you are," Borges said. "I cannot talk over the telephone."

One investigator interested in Merola said the matter is "very sensitive, records are hard to come by."

"He seems to fit everything," this investigator said. "He's a pilot, he speaks Spanish, he knows Cuba and he's connected. But nobody wants to cooperate."

A Scared Man

Records indeed are hard to come by. Official and unofficial attempts to obtain complete records of Merola's arrests proved fruitless. So did efforts to determine what encounters he might have had with officials responsible for watching the nation's borders.

But despite the belief of some that Merola enjoys the protection of the government while at the same time being welcomed by organized crime, those who know him say that is not the case.

"Joe has got a little money," said one Florida acquaintance. "I don't know where he gets it. But he's an informer and they hate informers. The man is concerned.

"He goes around Dade (County), but he is very, very careful where he goes. Joe is scared."

TO: [illegible]

SUBJECT: Court Appearance on 13 November 1975, San Diego, California

1. On 13 November 1975, Matt MacVane appeared as a witness for the defense at the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, 325 West F Street, San Diego, California. The case was the United States of America V. Dalton C. Smith, et al. MacVane was called to testify by E. Mac Amos Jr., attorney for defendant Joe Merola. In honor of the subpoena MacVane appeared at the court. On 13 November 1975 at approximately 16:30 hours San Diego time MacVane was called to the witness stand.

2. Mac Amos, attorney for defendant Joe Merola began questioning after MacVane was sworn in as a witness. Amos asked how long MacVane had been employed by the CIA? He asked if MacVane knew defendant Merola? He asked if MacVane were told by Merola about a shipment of surplus helicopter parts going to the country of El Salvador? He asked MacVane if Merola had volunteered other information to the Agency? He then asked if Merola were ever paid for such information? Amos also tried to establish the value of surplus parts in Latin America compared to the US. This was objected to by attorney Robert Thaller, prosecutor in the case. The judge sustained the objection and MacVane did not have to answer the question. Amos finished his questioning and Thaller began a short cross examination. Thaller asked if MacVane ever heard Merola mention stocks? He also asked if MacVane knew the name of the corporation that Merola represented? He then pointed out that even if some stock fraud were occurring, MacVane would not be witting because MacVane was not an investigator, but rather a collector of foreign information. The cross examination then ended. All questions were answered to the best of MacVane's ability and knowledge.

3. There appeared to be little purpose in the appearance of MacVane because it was obvious that MacVane knew nothing of any value concerning the case. MacVane's total time on the witness stand was about 10 minutes. After completion of his testimony MacVane was released.

Bruce E. Mainwaring
BRUCE E. MAINWARING

MCMacVane:ljh

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-110

GORDON THOMPSON JR.
GORDON THOMPSON
DISTRICT JUDGE

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr Barnes	6/XI	
2			
3	Mr. Young		Y
4			
5			
6	[illegible]		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Any results of the meeting?

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Lee 6 Nov 75	

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

SECRET

6 November 1975

MEMO FOR RECORD:

RE: MEROLA, Joseph R.
201-257804
U.S. Citizen Registered to DEA/MIAMI Dec 74

FYI:
Today, Randy Daugherty, DCD case officer, asked to borrow subject 201 because he wanted to take it to Office of Genl. Counsel for Mr. John Greany.

There is to be a meeting today between Mr. Greany, Bob Starling, DCD COPS, and Matt McVane, DCD man in Miami who is visiting Hqs. McVane has an interest in MEROLA.

Told Randy that MEROLA was DEA source and that matter should be coordinated with NARCOG.

This transpired during lunch hour - Randy was in a hurry and I gave him file. He said he would tell Mr. Greany that Subj. was DEA source.

L.

SECRET

OGC 75-4073

5 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Joseph Raymond Merola

1. On 3 November I talked to Mr. Matt McVane, DCD officer stationed in Miami, and he said that he had received the subpoena from E. Mac Amos, Jr. to appear as a defense witness in the trial in San Diego on 11 November. Mr. McVane agreed to come to Headquarters on 6 November to discuss the information in the files and Mr. Robert Starling of DCD agreed to join in the meeting. Mr. McVane told me that Lt. Colonel Douglas W. Haldane, who had previously been on detail to the DCD Miami Office, had returned to the Army and was currently assigned somewhere in Europe and that his address was Headquarters, USAREUR, APO New York, New York 09403.

2. Since this Office had received a letter from Mr. Amos with a request for the current address of Colonel Haldane, I called Mr. Amos on 4 November and explained to him that Colonel Haldane was no longer with the Central Intelligence Agency and it was our understanding that Colonel Haldane was stationed in Europe. Mr. Amos did not want the current address of Colonel Haldane. He did state, however, that Mr. McVane would not be needed in San Diego until Wednesday morning, 12 November. As things stood now, Mr. Merola was the fifth defendant and it would be that length of time before Mr. McVane's testimony would be needed.

3. Mr. McVane told me that he had been called by Mr. Robert Thaler of the U.S. Attorney's Office in California. I told Mr. McVane that I would contact Mr. Thaler. I called Mr. Thaler who is a a member of the Organized Crime Strike Force, Department of Justice, Room 2307, 300 North Los Angeles Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, telephone No. (AC 213) 688-5808. Mr. Thaler was pleased to hear that Mr. McVane

was being made available to testify and explained that he thought Mr. Amos had already prepared a motion to dismiss if Mr. McVane was to be denied as a witness for the defense. I explained to Mr. Thaler that Mr. McVane was coming to Headquarters on Thursday, 6 November, and said that we would call him to discuss the role Mr. McVane played in receiving information from Mr. Merola.

4. If this case runs parallel to many criminal prosecutions, the defense may never put Mr. McVane on the stand when he actually shows up as this may prove detrimental to their defense. However, we should be prepared for his testimony if, in fact, it does take place.

John K Greaney
John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

cc: Chief, DCD
Matt McVane

OGC/JKG/eh
Distribution:
Original - OGC SUBJ: LITIGATION CRIMINAL
1 - JKG Signer
1 - Chrono

HOLT, RHOADES AND HOLLYWOOD
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
1010 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 1712
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101

Area 714
Telephone 238-1712

John T. Holt
John Skyrstead Rhoades
Harrison R. Hollywood
Douglas R. Reynolds
David W. Ault
Michael L. Neil
Dan H. Deuprey
Thomas H. Ault
E. Mac Amos, Jr.
Thomas M. Dymott

October 28, 1975

Office of the General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Sir:

Our firm represents Mr. Joseph Merola who is presently on trial as a defendant in the Southern District of California in an action entitled United States of America v. Dalton C. Smith, et al. (No. 74-2277-GT). In order to properly defend Mr. Merola, we need to utilize the testimony of Mr. Matt McVane and possibly the testimony of Col. Douglas Haldane. We understand that Mr. McVane is employed by the Central Intelligence Agency and works out of the Miami office. We also understand that Col. Douglas Haldane is employed by the Central Intelligence Agency but we do not have an address for service upon Col. Haldane.

Enclosed you will find copies of Subpoenas issued for Mr. McVane and Col. Haldane. These Subpoenas require the attendance of the individuals in the Southern District of California at San Diego, California on November 11, 1975 at 9:00 a.m. Enclosed you will also find a copy of the Order signed by Judge Gordon Thompson authorizing the issuance of the Subpoena for Mr. McVane. Since we do not have an address for Col. Haldane at this time, the court has not approved the issuance of a Subpoena for him in which the government would be responsible for all of the expenses and costs.

We have been informed by Mr. McVane that it is necessary for him to obtain the approval of your office before he can testify in this matter. Accordingly, we request that he be granted the necessary approval in order to allow him to testify in this matter. In addition, we request that we be provided with an address for Col. Haldane and that he also be allowed to testify in this case. We would appreciate being advised as soon as possible with respect to whether these persons will be available for testimony. If we can provide any additional information with respect to this case, please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned. Thank you for your courtesy and cooperation.

Very truly yours,

HOLT, RHOADES & HOLLYWOOD

By

E. Mac Amos, Jr.

EMA/db
Enclosures

United States District Court

FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DALTON C. SMITH, et al.	No. 74-2277-GT

To MATT McVANE

You are hereby commanded to appear in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California at 325 West E Street in the city of San Diego on the 11th day of November 19 75 at 9:00 o'clock A. M. to testify in the above-entitled case.

This subpoena is issued on application of the¹ defendant.

October 23, 1975.

WILLIAM W. LUDDY, *Clerk.*

SEAL

By JOSSIE GALLAGHER, *Deputy Clerk.*

E. MAC AMOS, JR.
Attorney for defendant MEROLA
1910 Second Ave., Suite 1712
Address San Diego, CA 92101

RETURN

Received this subpoena at on and on at I served it on the within named by delivering a copy to and tendering² to the fee for one day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law.

By

Service Fees

Travel $
Services
Total $

---

¹ Insert "United States," or "defendant" as the case may be.

² Fees and mileage need not be tendered to the witness upon service of a subpoena issued in behalf of the United States or an officer or agency thereof, 28 USC 1825, or on behalf of a defendant who is financially unable to pay such costs (Rule 17 (b), Federal Rules Criminal Procedure).

United States District Court

FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DALTON C. SMITH, et al.

No. 74-2277-GT

To
COL. DOUGLAS HALDANE

You are hereby commanded to appear in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California at 325 West F Street in the city of San Diego on the 11th day of November 19 75 at 9:00 o'clock A. M. to testify in the above-entitled case.

This subpoena is issued on application of the[1] defendant.

October 23, 19 75

WILLIAM W. LUDDY
Clerk.

SEAL

[illegible] GALLAGHER
Deputy Clerk.

E. MAC AMOS, JR.
Attorney for defendant MEROLA
1010 Second Ave., Suite 1712
Address
San Diego, CA 92101

RETURN

Received this subpoena at on
and on at I served it on the within named
by delivering a copy to and tendering[2] to the fee for one day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law.

Service Fees

By

Travel ______ $
Services ______
Total ______ $

---

[1] Insert "United States," or "defendant" as the case may be.

[2] Fees and mileage need not be tendered to the witness upon service of a subpoena issued in behalf of the United States or an officer or agency thereof. 28 USC 1825, or on behalf of a defendant who is financially unable to pay such costs (Rule 17 (b), Federal Rules Criminal Procedure).

E. MAC AMOS, JR.
HOLT, RHOADES & HOLLYWOOD
1010 Second Avenue, Suite 1712
San Diego, CA 92101
(714) 238-1712

Attorneys for Defendant
JOSEPH R. MEROLA

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
1010 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 1712
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101
PHONE 238-1712

FILED

OCT 22 1975

CLERK, US DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
By DEPUTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH R. MEROLA, et al.,
Defendants.

NO. CR 74-2277-GT

ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS

This court having considered the application of defend Joseph Merola, and the supporting affidavit of E. Mac Amos, Jr. for issuance of subpoenas directed to Edward Stanton and Matt McVane and having found that good cause exists for the issuance of said subpoenas,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the clerk of this court issu subpoenas requiring the attendance of Matt McVane and Edward Stanton on November 11, 1975 at 9:00 a.m. in this court and, further, that all costs and fees in relation to the attendance o said witnesses shall be borne by the United States under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act.

DATED: OCT 22 1975

BY: GORDON THOMPSON, JR
GORDON THOMPSON
DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFOR

24 October 75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Joseph Raymond Merola

1. On 23 October, Mr. Robert Starling of DCD called to say that Matthew McVane (phonetic), a DCD officer who is stationed in Miami, Florida, had received a telephone call from a San Diego attorney saying that he was mailing a subpoena to him. The attorney, E. Mac Amos, Jr., is a member of the law firm of Holt, Rhodes and Hollywood at 1010 Second Avenue, San Diego, California 92101, telephone No. (AC 714) 238-1712. Mr. Amos advised Mr. McVane that the subpoena was for his appearance on behalf of Mr. Merola who was on trial in San Diego.

2. Mr. Starling indicated that the charges against Merola had something to do with exporting airplane parts without a license. I called Mr. Clyde Bryant, Office of Munitions Control, Department of State, to determine if this prosecution was related to 22 U.S.C. 1934. Mr. Bryant called back and said that Merola was one of seven defendants being tried on criminal fraud charges for having engaged in a flimflam operation against the Salvadorian government. The scheme was to establish a facility in Salvador to assemble and service helicopters. The group had assembled a collection of Army surplus parts for helicopters and was in the process of shipping them without an export license and they were seized by U.S. Customs officers on 21 February 1974. Mr. Bryant indicated that the Assistant U.S. Attorney in San Diego in charge of the prosecution was a Mr. Robert Thaller, telephone No. (AC 714) 293-5668. Mr. Bryant also indicated that an individual by the name of Henry Maierhoffer was also one of the defendants and it was Mr. Bryant's recollection that Maierhoffer had some previous connection with CIA.

3. I called Mr. Starling and reported this information to him and he said that Mr. Merola was a real operator in the Miami area, always involved in some scheme to buy and sell weapons but that he had volunteered information to the DCD Office, some of which was useful. I asked Mr. Starling to have Mr. McVane call me when he got the subpoena but that he would not have to go unless they furnished the travel funds.

John K Greaney

John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

cc: Chief/DCD

Distribution - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

30 Jan 1975

201 File on U.S. Citizen

The 201 file on Merola (surname) (201 number indicated below) can be most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

___ should be closed.

___ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

___ potential witting collaborator; date opened ____________ OI Code A2.

___ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

___ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

___ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

X all others. OI Code A6. ISR

Signed ____________ C/LSN/ISR ____________
(name) (title) (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ____________ ____________ 1975
(initials) (date)

This document in a permanent part of this file.

201-257804

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 002216

OUTGOING MESSAGE 17-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES 1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
S E C RE T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 091910Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 641466

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE (P/AN, LSN/MIL, OPS/INT, C/OPS, OPS/NAR2, LSN/ID,

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 32

TO: LA/MIAMI INFO CARACAS, PORT AU PRINCE, BOGOTA. Y

MHABYSS PBRAMPART Y

REF: A. LA/MIAMI 22730 (IN 432300*) (NOT NEEDED CARACAS, PORT AU PRINCE, BOGBOGTA)

B. DIRECTOR 630872 (**) (NOT NEEDED CARACAS, PORT AU PRINCE, BOGOTA) Y

1. ① JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA (201-257804) WAS REGISTERED IN ISR TO DEA/MIAMI ON 18 DEC 74 AS A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL FOR USE IN HAITI AND COLOMBIA. IT IS REQUESTED THAT LA/MIAMI ADVISE DEA/MIAMI TO CONTACT THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON MEROLA. Y

2. FOR CARACAS, PORT AU PRINCE, BOGOTA: IN JUNE 74, DEA HQS INFORMED BKHERALD THAT MEROLA WAS OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST. DEA REQUESTED TRACES AND STATED MEROLA REPORTEDLY WORKED FOR BKHERALD IN LATE 1950'S. WE REPLIED THAT MEROLA HAD NEVER WORKED FOR BKHERALD, ALTHOUGH WE WERE AWARE THAT HE HAD MADE SUCH CLAIMS ON NUMBER OF PREVIOUS INSTANCES. Y

3. FILE: 201-257804. E2, IMPDET.H

LSN/ISR

9 JAN 75

201-257804

* REF A REQUESTED TRACES & REGISTRATION OF MEROLA

** REF B FORWARDED TRACES.

DATE: 8 JANUARY 1975
ORIG: DARYL GEISLER:LH
UNIT: LA/CAR/CARI
EXT: 1249

LA/NARC
DDO/NARCOG
LSN/ISR
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

ALFONSO SPERA
C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 010116

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)
REGISTRATION REQUEST

FROM:
OPS/LSN/INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER BU-5

EXTENSION
1064/
5045

NO
ISRM 39170

DATE
10 DEC 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/AIS HT-3	12/11		mnb	Hit!
2.				
3. IP/EIB DW-7				
4.				
5. IP/RMS DW-6				
6.				
7. IP/LDI GT-6				
8.				
9. LSN/ISR BU-5				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FILE NO. 201-0257804

DOCUMENT DATE

ABSTRACT ☒

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

NAC's Conducted
July 1972 - FBI/P
Oct 1972 - State/P
CSC - N
DCDCI - N

17 DEC [illegible]

SECRET (When Filled In)

ISR LOG

16 DEC 1974

NAT. FILE NO.:
DATE: [illegible]

☐ NEW ☐ RE-REGISTRATION
☐ UTILIZATION ☐ RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCD
TO: SECURITY ✓
TO:
TO:
ISRM NO. [illegible],170
201 NO.

NAME

FORM 1797 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
2-74

SECRET 11 DEC 1974 (4-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

ISR LOG

No Objection to Registration. DCS reserves the right to [illegible] in accordance with its [illegible] DCID 2/5 [illegible] NSCID 2, [illegible] this right by mutual agreement if his intended use so requires.

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Support Branch/Operational Support ~~Section~~
Room 900, Key Building - ext. 2268

NAT. FILE NO.:
DATE: 9 Dec 7[illegible]

☒ NEW ☐ RE-REGISTRATION
☐ UTILIZATION ☐ RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCD
TO: SECURITY
TO:
TO:
ISRM NO. 39,170
201 NO.

NAME

13 DEC 1974

FORM 1797 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
2-74

SECRET (4-38)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPS [illegible] GX-703
2-[illegible] 79-5

REQUEST FOR REGISTRATION IN THE INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER

REQUESTER: Daryl KMKX Geisler LA/CARI

DATE SUBMITTED: 9 Dec 1974

ORIGINATING FILE NUMBER: DEA

201- 257804

DATE RECEIVED IN ISR: 9 Dec 74

XX NEW ☐ RE-REGISTRATION ☐ RE-CHECK

RECORD COPY
OPERATIONS STAFF/DDO

UTILIZATION:

NAME (Last, First, Middle): MEROLA, Joseph Raymond

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS:

SEX: M

DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct 1925

PLACE OF BIRTH: NEW JERSEY

CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

RESIDENCE: 135 Dupont Plaza, Miami, Fla

PRESENT EMPLOYER:

OCCUPATION: Pilot

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA (including references):

Based on LA/Miami 22730 IN 432300, 3 Dec 74 (attached)
Traces sent DIRECTOR 630872, 6 Dec 74 (attached)
Send cards to UFP 872 HVC HLB HTP

IP/AIS TRACE RESULTS

FNAS LISTED REF [illegible]

IP/EIB REMARKS

NAI TO THAT KNOWN TO THE REQUESTER (OUTGOING CABLE) (630872)

16 DEC 1974

ISR REPLY TO REQUESTER:

DATE: 18 Dec 74

ISRM NUMBER: 39,170

1. Nothing in addition to that mk known by the requester. Exxxp For possible further information you are referred to the FBI and the Department of State.

2. The ISR has no record of a current operational interest in Shxxxt Subject who is hereby registered in the ISR to DEA Miami.

EVB

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Classified by 002216
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: 5B.(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

FORM 1797

SECRET

FORM 3020
1-71 MFG 3-74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY glr PER Sep 103 TOTAL COPIES 15-1 RUN BY [illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED C/LA BY A AT 1835 Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/LA 6

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR DDO, C/LO/AN, C/OPS/NAR 2 C/OPS
C/LSN/NIL

T 617399 EIA292 PAGE 01 IN 432300

TOR:032226Z DEC 74 LMIN 22730

Ruth ✓

Dill

Dan ✓ (action)

S E C R E T 032214Z DEC 74 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 22730

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

~~RYBAT~~ FLMHABYSS PBRAMPART

REF: UFPS-1727, 25 OCT 74

1. PLEASE PROVIDE PRIORITY TRACES ON THE FOLLOWING DEA NARCOTICS SOURCE AND REGISTER IN THE INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER (ISR):

JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA (201-257804)

DPOB: 9 OCT 25 IN NEW JERSEY

U.S. CITIZEN

OCC: PILOT

ADD: 135 DUPONT PLAZA, MIAMI, FL.

LOCATION OF USE: COLOMBIA AND HAITI

2. PER REF, ATT. NO. 2 PLS PROVIDE PRIORITY TRACES ON DEA NARCOTICS SOURCE ORLANDO BATISTA VIERA, AND ADVISE IF REGISTERED IN ISR.

3. FILE: 200-11-11; 200-11-11/17. E2, IMPDET

IP [illegible] deck — Merola 201

Sec

[illegible] 222

S E C R E T

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MEROLA, JOSEPH RAYMOND
201-0257804 200-011-011/19
SEX M DOB 09 OCT 25 LMIM-22730
POB USA, NJ 03 DEC 74
CIT USA
OCC PILOT

RES USA, FLA, MIAMI, 135 DUPONT PLAZA. TRACES
DEA NARCS

DATE 05 MAR 75 CORS CARD 09231716

201-0257804

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

12 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lucien E. Conein
Acting Chief, Special Operations and
Field Support Staff
Office of Intelligence
Drug Enforcement Administration

VIA: Mr. John Warner
Chief, International Intelligence Division

SUBJECT: Name Trace

REFERENCE: Memorandum, Same Subject, SEC-IGI-74-0037, dated June 5, 1974

1. The matter of Joseph R. Merola (Reference) has been discussed between Mr. Richard Kobakoff of your office and Mr. Stanley Archenhold of this office. Mr. Merola has never worked for this Agency, although we are aware he has made such claims on a number of previous instances.

2. It is suggested that you contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation for information concerning Merola.

Seymour R. Bolten
Seymour R. Bolten
Special Assistant for
Narcotics Control Operations

DONC 74-052

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED ABROAD OR
OUTSIDE THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE RECEIVING AGENCY
WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE ORIGINATOR

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 5 B (2)
DECLASSIFICATION DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE
CLASSIFIED BY 003604

201-257534

SECRET

DONC 74-052

DDO/OPS/NARCOG:S.Archenhold:el

COORDINATION: /s/ (622)
WH/NARC

12 [illegible]
DATE

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/NARC
1 - 201-257804
1 - DDO/NARCOG DONC File

DEPT OF JUSTICE DOCUMENT
DATE: 5 JUNE 1974
SUBJECT: NAME TRACE
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FILE #: NONE GIVEN

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, San Salvador

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
AMEMB SAN SALVADOR 0048, 5 February 1974

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Headquarters requested LNERGO traces on Larry A. Carr, because of his business association with Joseph R. Merola. Trace results were negative.

MAD
Marilyn A. DAKOSKI

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. & 1 - COS, San Salvador

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 031685

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HSSW-3154	DATE typed 1 April 1974
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-257804

1 - Chrono
1 - IP/AN

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/2/GS	Patti Burke	mll	1454

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/2/GS		George Colman

RELEASING	
AC/WH/2	James M. Lawler

DISPATCH

14-00000

F-7-2849

033-539-74
22 March 1974

Chief, WH/2
ATTN : David L. Smock

Chief, Domestic Collection Division

Joseph E. Merola

REF : Your Memorandum of 11 March 1974

1. For your information, subject has been a volunteer source since 1961. DCD is aware of his unsavory record, but he has from time-to-time produced information of interest.

2. DCD wishes to advise you, however, that we have broken off contact with Merola. Should he contact DCD again, we are obligated to listen politely, take down his information for transmittal to the appropriate area desk, and make absolutely no promises for future contact.

3. Please direct further inquiries to Mr. Evan B. Ames, DCD/Support Branch/Operational Support Section, Room 910, Key Building, extension 2263.

JACKSON R. HORTON

EVAN B. AMES/b
cc: Services Branch (Control)

FILE: HH-25826

SLO

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT
DATE: 19 MARCH 1974
SUBJECT: PATTERSON CORPORATION (CENTRAL
AMERICAN AEROSCAPE)
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
NO FILE # GIVEN

[illegible]

MEROLA

11 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Domestic Collection Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Shaun P. Ryan

SUBJECT: Joseph R. MEROLA

REFERENCE: WH 25826, 8 January 1974

1. On 10 January 1974 the WH/2/GS desk received the referenced memorandum from the Domestic Collection Division indicating the Miami field office had been in contact with one Joseph R. MEROLA. MEROLA had just returned from a business trip to El Salvador; and he reported that a friend of his had identified a Mr. Gremillion in the Political Section of the American Embassy in San Salvador as a suspect CIA representative. Headquarters traces on Joseph R. MEROLA indicated that on several occasions in the past MEROLA had claimed that he was a CIA agent. The Chief of Station, the Mr. Gremillion referred to above, was recently questioned regarding any Embassy contact with MEROLA while the latter was in San Salvador. The COS stated that both within the Embassy community and at social functions MEROLA had frequently referred to his contact with the CIA, past and present. He also volunteered this information to a former Station contact.

2. In light of the above, it would appear that MEROLA had taken advantage of his agency contacts in an inappropriate manner to the potential embarrassment of the San Salvador Station. We would, accordingly, appreciate that this be given due consideration in your assessment of the advantage of your continued contact with him.

David L. Smock
C/WH/2

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 509407

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE

TO: LWH | 2 | GS - Patti

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:

Reply from
State

FROM: OPS/LSN

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

SPEED LETTER

REPLY REQUESTED: X YES ☐ NO

DATE: 6 February 1974

LETTER NO.

TO: OPS/LIAISON

ATTN:

FROM: WH/2/GS

Request Dept. of State Passport Office biographic information on Larry A. CARR, U.S. citizen, currently in El Salvador negotiating on behalf of the Patterson Corp. to build a helicopter plant.

Patti Burke WH/2/GS

SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 5-67 1831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT (PASSPORT DIVISION)
DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1974
SUBJECT: LARRY ALTON CARR
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE #: NONE

STATE DEPT DOCUMENTS:

DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1974
SUBJECT: PATTERSON CORPORATION (CENTRAL AMERICAN AEROSPACE)
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
NO FILE # GIVEN (DOC #: SAN SALV. 0568)

DATE: 5 FEBRUARY 1974
SUBJECT: PROPOSED HELICOPTER/AIRCRAFT PLANT (PATTERSON CORP.)
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
NO FILE # GIVEN (DOC #: SAN SAL. 0048)

DATE: 5 FEBRUARY 1974
SUBJECT: PROPOSED HELICOPTER/AIRCRAFT PLANT (PATTERSON CORP.)
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
NO FILE # GIVEN
DOCUMENT #: SAN SALVADOR 0448

Patti,

We have sent a private channel letter to the COS on this matter, ~~notingxatxtxxxxxx~~ asking at the end for comments as to whether M[illegible]ROLA is "embarrassing" the Station or CIA generally by talking so much about his CIA connections. If his reply is in the affirmative, ~~I~~ it will probably be best for you to draft a note to ~~[illegible]~~ DCD suggesting that he somehow be silenced, perhaps by their withdrawing from contact with them since it is obviously something that he brags about and otherwise tries to take advantage of

gtc.

Matt MacVane, DCD officer in Miami, met with Joseph R. MEROLA on 15 January 1974; at which time MEROLA identified the friend in San Salvador who had identified Mr. Gremillion in the American Embassy in San Salvador as a CIA representative. [redacted] MEROLA also provided the names of two women employed in the Embassy who were ~~xepaxxtex~~ involved in compromising situations with both Americans and local nationals. MEROLA identified the two women as Nancy SHALLOT and Delia OBESA. MEROLA was met again on 17 January 1974 ~~xnxaffarxxtaxdatarminaxanyxatharxpossibiex~~ at which time he provided the name of a third woman in the Embassy, Gloria, who has also been involved in compromising situations. Upon ~~qaxtex~~ inquiring Headquarters personnel who had recently returned from San Salvador, the above identities were confirmed; all three are American citizens assigned to the Embassy in San Salvador.

Above is a note dated 24 January 1974 from Patti Burke, WH/2/GS/IA, based on information received orally from DCD.

SECRET

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO	DATE 23 January 1974	LETTER NO. OSS-172-74

TO : Chief, WH/2/GS (3 B 4402 Hqs.) ATTN: Patty Burke	FROM: DCD/SB/OSS SPRyan/ds

SUBJECT: Case 61401 - Joseph Merola

On 18 January 1974, our Miami Field Office advised us of the name of a third person reportedly involved in potentially compromising situations who works at the Embassy. This person was identified as "Gloria" by our source. This information passed verbally to El Salvador Desk Officer on 18 January 1974.

E-2 IMPDET CL B 010650

SHAUN P. RYAN Evan [illegible] for

SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE

SECRET

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 5-67 1831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

STATE DEPT DOCUMENT
DATE: 22 JANUARY 1974
SUBJECT: PROPOSED HELICOPTER/AIRCRAFT PLANT
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
DOCUMENT #: SAN SALV 0256

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Case 61401 - CIA Operative in El Salvador

FROM:
DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Support Branch/Operational Support Section
Room 900, Key Building - ext. 2268
Mr. Shaun P. Ryan

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE
18 January 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/2/GS Attn. Patty Burke 3 B 4402 Hqs.				The attached is for your information and possible interest. (OSS-142-74)
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				E 2 IMPDET CL BY 00[illegible]22
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET/SENSITIVE

OSS-142-74
18 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Case 61401 - CIA Operativo in El Salvador

REFS : A.) MIM-006-74, 4 January 1974
B.) TWX DCD/Washington 96860, 16 January 1974
C.) Ryan/MacVane telecon 16 January 1974
D.) Ryan/MacVane telecon 17 January 1974
E.) Ryan/Mainwaring telecon 17 January 1974
F.) TWX DCD/Miami 12475, 17 January 1974
G.) TWX DCD/Miami 12476, 17 January 1974

1. One of our sources in Miami, Joseph Merola, revealed the name and position of an individual reported to be an Agency official in El Salvador to Matt MacVane during the course of an interview on 21 December 1973. This was reported in MIM-006-74 4 January 1974. This report was forwarded to the El Salvador Desk on 8 January 1974. On 16 January 1974 the Desk requested that DCD obtain the name of the individual mentioned in this memorandum who said he knew a CIA officer in the Embassy. This request was passed by telecon and TWX to MacVane by Ryan on 16 January 1974. The El Salvador Desk also questioned the reliability of our source, Joseph Merola, at this time and requested we query Miami as to his reliability.

2. On 17 January 1974 at the request of MacVane, Ryan visited the El Salvador Desk to ascertain their objections to our source, known to us as a convicted felon. Desk objections stemmed from a 1964 report which indicated that Merola had informed persons that he was a "CIA agent". Further conversation elicited the fact that Merola had again made this statement in 1973 at an Embassy function. We advised the Desk that DCD was well aware of Merola's criminal background but that he had provided DCD with reliable reports in the past unrelated to his own "pursuits".

3. The El Salvador desk confirmed the fact that the individual mentioned by Merola's informant as being a CIA officer was in fact such. Ryan advised MacVane of this per telecon on 17 January 1974. MacVane and Mainwaring told Ryan they were sending two cables relating to this case. The first would provide the name of the person who reportedly knew the CIA official. The second provided the names of two women employed in the Embassy who were reportedly involved in

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

SECRET/SENSITIVE

compromising situations with both Americans and local nationals. This latter cable was requested after the El Salvador desk officer advised that all avenues and possible leads were to be pursued to determine who leaked the information relating to the CIA official. These two names (phonetically spelled) were provided in the second cable by Miami. All of the information received in these cables was passed via secure phone to the El Salvador desk by Ryan upon receipt.

4. MacVane advised Ryan via telecon that he anticipated meeting with Joseph Merola at 1300 on 17 January to address further matters concerned with this case. MacVane advised Ryan that he would forward such information as soon as possible.

SEAN P. RYAN

cc: Miami Field Office
cc: WH/2/GS
cc: Sensitive Control Officer

S E C R E T 171845Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 12476

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: SUPPORT BRANCH/OSS (S.RYAN)

SUBJ: CASE 61481

REF : OOA(S) 322/02566-74

JAN 17 1 51 PM '74

THE IDENTITIES OF THE TWO GIRLS WHO WERE THE SUBJECT OF OUR TELECON ARE:

NANCY SHALLOT

DELIA OBESA

BOTH SPELLINGS ARE PHONETIC, BUT SHOULD BE IDENTIFIABLE. ONE IS SUPPOSEDLY SECRETARY TO MR. TAYLOR. E2 IMPDET CL BY 210650

S E C R E T

SECRET

JAN 17 1 51 PM '74

S E C R E T 171845Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 12476

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: SUPPORT BRANCH/OSS (S.RYAN)

SUBJ: CASE 61421

REF : OUA(S) 322/02566-74

THE IDENTITIES OF THE TWO GIRLS WHO WERE THE SUBJECT OF OUR TELECON ARE:

NANCY SHALLOT

DELIA OBESA

BOTH SPELLINGS ARE PHONETIC, BUT SHOULD BE IDENTIFIABLE. ONE IS SUPPOSEDLY SECRETARY TO MR. TAYLOR. E2 IMPDET CL BY 010652

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE 12-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 G 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 172306Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 502254

CONF: WHS INFO: FILE 11/ [illegible], DCD,

☐ INDEX DISSEM BY: 29
☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO PER
☐

TO: PRIORITY SAN SALVADOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

REFS: A. SAN SALVADOR 20685 (IN 134584*)

B. WH/MIAMI 20664 (IN 135313**)

C. WH/MIAMI 20685 (IN 137730***)

1. FOLLOWING INFO IN ADDITION TRACES REF B: JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA (201-257804). PER DBA 62712, 13 APR 64, SUBJ CLAIMED HE CIA AGENT AND ALLEGED CIA OBTAINED PRESIDENTIAL PARDON FIVE YEAR PRISON SENTENCE FOR RUNNING GUNS CUBA. IN ADDITION CLAIMED CIA ISSUED PASSPORT IN NAME MICHAEL JOSEPH MEROLA FOR TRAVEL CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. PER HQS RECORDS, MEROLA NOT CIA AGENT, BUT HAS BEEN DCD CONTACT SINCE EARLY SIXTIES.

3. 21 DEC 73 MEROLA CONTACTED DCD MIAMI TO ADVISE HE RECENTLY SPOKE WITH FRIEND IN SAN SALVADOR WHO WORKS FOR ANSESAL. FRIEND ADVISED MEROLA NOT GO US EMBASSY SAN SALVADOR TO SEE A MAN NAMED GREMILLION BECAUSE GREMILLION, WHO US EMBASSY POLITICAL SECTION OFFICER UNDER SURVEILLANCE ON SUSPICION OF BEING CIA REP SAN SALVADOR. MEROLA TOLD FRIEND HE NEITHER KNEW NOR WOULD HAVE CAUSE TO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-257804
17 Jan 74

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 031685

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

502254

SEE SUCH A MAN. FRIEND TOLD MEROLA HE ONLY TELLING HIM FOR HIS OWN GOOD BECAUSE IF MEROLA SAW GREMILLION, MEROLA WOULD BECOME A SUSPECT CIA AGENT AS WELL.

4. DCD MIAMI RECONTACTED MEROLA 15 JANUARY DETERMINE ~~ABOVE~~ IDENTITY "FRIEND" IN SAN SALVADOR. FRECDIEND IDENTIFIED AS (POSS. ALSO SUBJECT 201-873126) GUILLERMO R O BFE D E R, PRESIDENT INSAFI, MARRIED TO SECRETARY AT US EMBASSY IN SALVADOR CURRENTLY ON MATERNITY LEAVE.

1c

pb

5. MEROLA TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFO AT MTG WITH DCD MIAMI 17 JAN 74. WILL ADVISE.

6. FILE: 201-257804. E2 IMPDET.H

WH COMMENT: *REQUESTED HQS TRACES JOSEPH MEROLA, WHO CELAIMED TO BE AERONAEUTICAL CONSULTANT WITH PATTERSON AIRCRAFT COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

**WH/MIAMI TRACE REPLY

***NEGATIVE SLIGO ETRACES

DATE: 17 JAN 74
ORIG: PATTI BURKE pb
UNIT: WH/2/GS
EXT: 1868

HDCD SHAUN RYAN (DRAFT)
WH/PERMS W. LAYBOURNE (DRAFT)
C/WH/COG O. BATHE (DRAFT)

James E. Flannery
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 011685

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 1 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 16-1 RUN BY ______

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION #

INFO: RF. FILE. VR. c/plan/ c/ops ops/NAR-2

T 809803 PAGE 01-01 IN 137730

TOR:151451Z JAN 74 WMIM 20685

S E C R E T 142112Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 20685

TO: SAN SALVADOR INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: A. SAN SALVADOR 20665 (IN 134684)

B. WH/MIAMI 20654 (IN 135313)

1. NO ADDITIONAL SLIGO TRACES ON JOSEPH M E R O L A.

2. FILE: 200-11-11/3. E-2, IMPDET.

[illegible]/2/3

Cid.

R

CL

II

M

IR

S E C R E T

STATE DEPT DOCUMENT
SUBJECT: PROPOSED HELICOPTER/AIRCRAFT PLANT
DATE: 17 JANUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
DOCUMENT #: SAN SALVADOR 00193
NO FILE # GIVEN.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 42 PER   TOTAL COPIES 16-2 RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS P

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

STAFF

ACTION UNIT WH 8

I [illegible]

N

F OPS/NAR 2

O

T 923593   PAGE 01   IN 135313

TOR:1121192 JAN 74   WHIM 20664

S E C R E T 1120592 JAN 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 20664

TO: SAN SALVADOR INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: SAN SALVADOR 20685 (IN 134684)

1. JOSEPH R. MEROLA, DPOB 9 OCT 1925, TURTLE CREEK, PA. STATION CARDS FROM PERIOD 1959-1963 INDICATE HE EX-CONVICT, NOTORIOUS SMUGGLER, GUNRUNNER AND GENERAL TROUBLE-MAKER. CARDS TO LNERGO REPORTS INDICATE HE WAS INVOLVED IN PANAMA INVASION PLAN IN 1959, ANDIN HAITIAN INVASION PLANS IN 1958 AND 1963. IN 1959, HE WAS UNDER INDICTMENT IN PA. FOR INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN ARMS. IN 1960, HE WAS PRINCIPAL IN PROPOSED CUBAN COUNTERFEIT PESC DEAL. LNERGO WAS CONTACTED IN 1961, AND INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD LONG RECORD, HE UNDOUBTEDLY COULD SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. ALSO IN 1961, HE WAS INTERESTED IN PROVIDING CONTRABAND WHISKEY TO A BRAZILIAN SENATOR, AND ATTEMPTED HAVE LIFTED A "TRAVEL RESTRICTION" WHICH PLACED ON HIM AFTER CONVICTION FOR [illegible] CLADESTINELY BRINGING IN TO U.S. THE SON OF [illegible] DICTATOR

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY O
ISSUING OFFICE IS P

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 803593 PAGE 02-02 IN 135313

TOR:112119Z JAN 74 WHIM 20664

FULGENCIO BATISTA, OR FOR CHARGE THAT HE INVOLVED IN THEFT OF GUNS FROM NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY."

2. SUBJECT NOT LISTED 1973 MIAMI TELEPHONE BOOK. LATEST ADDRESS IN CARDS IS: 2818 NORTH BAY RD, MIAMI BEACH, FLA. HE WAS VISITED AT THIS ADDRESS IN 1961 BY MBR OF SLIGO ORGANIZATION, WHO DESCRIBED HOME AS "PALATIAL".

3. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO RECENT INFO ON SUBJECT, SUGGEST THAT HIS PLANS ESTABLISH HELICOPTER PLANT IN SAN SALVADOR MAY HAVE SHADY SIDE, POSSIBLY SMUGGLING ARMS OR LUCRATIVE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC.

4. SINCE SUBJ IS U.S. CIT, REQUEST AGOVE INFO NOT BE PASED LIAISON OR OTHER U.S. GOVT AGENCIES WITHOUT HQS APPROVAL.

5. WILL FORWARD PERTINENT SLIGO TRACES.

6. FILE: 200-11-11/3. E-2, IMPDET.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 12 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______ S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IP/AN

1		4
2		5
3		6

T 802260 PAGE 01-01 IN 134684

TOR:111322Z JAN 74 SALV 20685

S E C R E T 102325Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE SAN SALVADOR 20685

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

201-0357804

1. REQUEST TRACES ON MR. JOSEPH R. MEROLA, AGE 48, BORN PENNSYLVANIA. RESIDENCE OS MIAMI SHORES, FLORIDA. MEROLA CLAIMS BE AERONAUTICAL CONSULTANT WITH PATTERSON AIRCRAFT COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA. HE SUPPOSEDLY TRYING NEGOTIATE DEAL TO ESTABLISH HELICOPTER PLANT EL SALVADOR. DURING TALKS AT SOCIAL PARTIES WITH EMBASSY PERSONNEL HE INDICATED PREVIOUS WORK WITH BKHERALD.

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

K Svc'd

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

201-357804
11 Jan 74

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

CIA Operative in El Salvador

FROM: DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Support Branch, Operational Support Section
Room 900, Key Building - ext. 2263
Mr. Shaun P. Ryan

EXTENSION:

NO. HH-25826

DATE 8 January 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/2/GS Attn. Kathy Maurer 3 B 4402 Hqs.	10 JAN 1974		WH/2/B	
2.				
3. DC/WH/2	11 JAN 1974			
4.				
5. C/WH/2	11 JAN 1974	11 Jan.		
6. C/WH/2/GS				
7. WH/2/GS/Patti				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

The attached Memorandum HHM-006-74, is for your interest and retention. Please advise us at your earliest convenience of any additional interest or requirements in this matter. Thank you.

cc: CI/OP/WH

— action —

(a) pls call DCD to find out who Mesola is — job, etc.

(b) ~~send~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ask them to ask Mesola who the secret service man is

(c) then send ~~memo~~ [illegible] FYI to Station.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

3:5+6 Suggest we discuss the matter.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

MIM-006-74

TO : Chief, Domestic Collection Division

DATE: 4 January 1974

ATTN : Support Branch/OSS (JGross)

FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

SUBJECT: CIA Operative in El Salvador

MURAWSKI ??

Cleared by DCD
Granville
pol section

1. Joe Merola contacted the Miami Office on 21 December 1973 to explain that he recently had spoken with a friend of his in San Salvador, El Salvador. The friend, who allegedly works for the El Salvadoran Secret Service, told Merola that when he (Merola) comes to El Salvador not to go to the US Embassy to see a man named Vermillion. The friend told Merola that Vermillion is the Commercial Attache at the embassy and is under surveillance because he is suspected of being the CIA man in San Salvador. Merola told his friend that he did not know a man named Vermillion, nor would he ever have cause to see such a man. The friend then told Merola that he was only telling him for his own good, and that if he (Merola) were to see this Vermillion that Merola would become a suspected CIA agent as well.

2. Merola said that he was passing this information to us in case we did indeed have a man in San Salvador by the name of Vermillion. Merola has been a contact of the Miami Field Office for some ten years, and during that period he has passed to this office some very reliable information.

BRUCE E. MAINWARING

mM
MCMacVane:paw

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

CONFIDENTIAL

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SECRET

4 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Branch

FROM: Greg Maruca

SUBJECT: 785

1. Reference

2. Individuals Contacted: Lt. Van Buskirk, Metro Intelligence

3. Purpose of Contact: To pass info and receive advice.

4. Time and Place of Contact: 0930 hours, 4 Feb 64, telephonically

5. Discussion

Lt. Van Buskirk advised that Clifford V. CONNELL, who was arrested about two months ago for illegal possession of about 1½ tons of dynamite will claim as his defense that he was performing a patriotic service for his country by working with Joseph Raymond MEROLA who has on numerous occasions claimed to be working for KUBARK. The trail date has not yet been set. Others involved the same case: Remer Estuez ODOM, and Harold WIDDEN. MEROLA was born 10/9/25, Pittsburgh, Pa. and posseses FBI #4989299. Van Buskirk wanted to know if any of the above are working for KUBARK. Results of Station traces are attached.

Charlie McKay said "Joe has been of interest on intelligence level, informant type not an agent, not on payroll and not in position claim employment". McKay does not want to lose this source of info. He said one John Alie, French National, trying to overthrow Duvalier govt Haiti which might account for dynamite cache.

Advise OO. Advise Van Buskirk that the above individuals are not working for KUBARK.

OO advised 1515 hrs 4 Feb by C.O.S. C/OO said to tell police Subject (Merola) has been of interest in past as informant - not

Greg Maruca
Greg Maruca

Metro

SECRET

Associated with KUBARK and we are not aware Subject's present activities.

VANBUSKIRK advised [illegible] of above. by Alhandas 1600 hrs. 4 Feb 64 Van Buskirk said we should be prepared have somebody in court from OO office ready to deny claim of Connell as he intends use this as defense. C.O.S. was so advised.

From Mitch Lawrence
Regarding Joe Merola: Information passed on to Lt. Van Buskirk per our discussion. Van Buskirk advised that we should have somebody ready to go to court and to deny the claim of Connel that he was working on our behalf. The date for the trial is not as yet set and Van Buskirk said there is no hurry, but he would like to know whether or not we would have somebody there in as much as this person intends to base his defense on the basis of his working for us.

1645

SECRET

[illegible]

PAGE 01

[illegible] MAY 77

SECRET 021322Z APR 77 STAFF

file

CITE CARACAS 32956

TO: DIRECTOR.

Tur: WX
FBI

WNINTEL RYBAT [illegible] FUDHILL AKBOXER

LAUDER FROM [illegible]

1. AS [illegible], ON 2 MARCH 1977 MR. E U G E N E M. P R O P P E R, ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND E. LAWRENCE B A R C E L L A, ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF DISIP AND REQUESTED WHATEVER LEADS AND INFORMATION VENEZUELAN INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES COULD PROVIDE IN ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORLANDO B O S C H AVILA AND THE ASSASSINATION OF FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR AND CABINET MINISTER ORLANDO L E T E L I E R.

2. [illegible] REPORTED ON 29 APRIL THAT [illegible] G A R C I A, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS OF DISIP, HAD HEARD THAT [illegible] HAS EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH THE LACK OF ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO HIM IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE LETELIER INVESTIGATION. DISIP OFFICIALS WERE SURPRISED AND UNHAPPY WITH [illegible] ALLEGED STATEMENT, SINCE DISIP OFFICIALS HAD EXTENDED COURTESIES, COOPERATION, TIME AND INFORMATION TO PROPPER DURING HIS VISIT IN

SECRET

Ricardo Morales / 201

CARACAS. DISIP OFFICIALS HAD FACILITATED PROPPER'S INTERVIEW AND DEBRIEFING OF ORLANDO BOSCH AND THEY HAD PROVIDED PROPPER WITH ONE PEICE OF EVIDENCE WHICH PROPPER APPARENTLY WAS SEEKING EAGERLY, A MAP OF THE UNITED STATES DELINEATING AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO INDICATE THAT GUILLERMO NOVO, AND IGNACIO NOVO, CUBAN EXILES, ARE TO HAVE JURISDICTION FOR CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C., WHERE THE LETELIER ASSASSINATION OCCURRED. PROPPER WAS CONCERNED THAT A MAP INDICATING AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITIES WOULD DISCLOSE SOMEONE ELSE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT AREA, AS THE NOVO BROTHERS WERE PROPPER'S PRIME SUSPECTS.

3. GARCIA ALSO SAID THAT RICARDO MORALES, A FORMER DISIP OFFICIAL, HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY PROPPER TO APPEAR IN COURT AS A WITNESS. MORALES WAS CONCERNED THAT ONCE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS, HE COULD BE CHARGED WITH UNSPECIFIED VIOLATIONS; THUS, MORALES, WHO IS IN THE U.S., HAD GONE INTO HIDING.

4. WE ARE SENDING THIS INFORMATION VIA THE [illegible] CHANNEL BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE SENSITIVITY CONCERNING REFERENCE TO ALLEGED ACTIVITIES OF A U.S. OFFICIAL. IF HQS DOES NOT PERCEIVE ANY SUCH SENSITIVITY, WE OF COURSE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO REMOVAL OF THIS CABLE

S E C R E T

STAFF

INFO

T 615550 EIA493 PAGE 02-03 IN [illegible]

TOR:0237222 MAY 77

FROM THE PLVKCADET CATEGORY.

5. FILE: 75-2-20/3, 200-12-208/1. E2, IMPDET.

14-00000

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 7-76

24

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 41 PER
TOTAL COPIES 21-2 RUN BY

SECRET

*REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

ACTION UNIT 4LA 8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR 9IDDMS, DDO4, 9CI4,
9EPS/EG2

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 812745 EIA826 PAGE 01 IN 266922

TOR:2922342 APR 77 CARA 32949

S E C R E T 292205Z APR 77 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 32949

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI

RYBAT WNINTEL REAM

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 0 2 1977
MICROFILMED

2P

ABSTRACT
CI

1. ON 28 APRIL 1977 WKDIET-5 REPORTED THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE (SUBJECT OF 201-0285923), AKA "EL MONO", IS RUMORED TO HAVE KILLED IN MIAMI A CUBAN EXILE BY THE NAME OF ROBERTO PARSONS. WKDIET-5 SAYS THAT PARSONS WORKED FOR BKHERALD AND UNDERTOOK SEVERAL CLANDESTINE TRIPS TO CUBA. HE SAID AT TIMES PARSONS HELPED GET PEOPLE OUT OF CUBA FOR A PRICE. PARSONS HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE DECEMBER 1976. THE EXACT REASON FOR HIS ALLEGED MURDER IS UNKNOWN.

Kathy Skiba
Tube EU2

2. FOLLOWING ARE TRACES ON ROBERTO PARSONS: ACCORDING TO JMWAVE-1302, 16 FEBRUARY 1968, AN AMCLEVE-15 MIAMI CONTACT WAS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ROBERTO PARSONS RAMIREZ, BORN 12 JULY 1930 IN GUANTANAMO. PARSONS WAS A BKHERALD AGENT FROM 1965 THROUGH 1967 WHEN HE WAS TERMINATED ON 30 NOVEMBER WITHOUT PREJUDICE. HE WAS USED IN EXFILTRATION AND INFILTRATION OPERATIONS AND OCCASIONALLY REPORTED GRATUITOUSLY

201-779687

SECRET

RECORD COPY

B201-779687

29 Apr 77

201-285923

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY __________ PER __________ TOTAL COPIES __________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

RECEIVED

INFO FILE VR

77

T 810745 EIA898 PAGE 02-02 IN 266922

TOR: 292234Z APR 77 CARA 32949

ON THE DSE AND DGI.

3. INDEX PARSONS. FILE: ~~75-120-28.~~ 201-0285923.

E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 55

ESQUIRE
MARCH 1977

The Incident

by Taylor Branch and John Rothchild

How two mild-mannered reporters, on the trail of a Washington bomber, landed in Caracas and ran afoul of the Venezuelan secret service, warring Cuban terrorists, the Miami police, the State Department, the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and the most dangerous man alive—all this, and their mothers didn't know a damn thing about it

Are There Pay Phones in Caracas?
They are on the Pan Am night flight to Caracas, three hours away from at least a hundred murder stories and a lot of steaming intrigue.

"What are our chances of getting through this alive?" asks Rothchild.

"Well, that all depends on who you talk to and how paranoid they are," says Branch. "Our friends in Washington used to be simple journalists and policy analysts. Now they are three-pay-phone men. That means you can't call them without using three pay phones. You call them up and all they'll say is 'phone number one.' Then they go to pay phone number one and you call them again. Then they ask you for the number of *another* pay phone near yours, and they call you on that one."

"What do you talk about?"

"Things like pay phones and letter bombs and whether the Feds can be trusted. The last time I called they told me we would be walking into four nests of known killers: the Cuban exiles in Venezuela, the Venezuelan secret police, the C.I.A. and the Chilean secret police."

"Is that true?"

"Well, it's true that all those people are down there," Branch says, "but I don't think they would be after us."

Rothchild does not look reassured. He does not like the way Branch reels off the life histories of all the C.I.A. Cubans he has known, especially since the point is always that the situation is too complicated for words. "Tell me," Rothchild says gravely, "did you tell your mother you were going to Venezuela?"

Branch squirms at the cruel question. He wants to appear as knowledgeable and confident as possible, because he has dragged Rothchild into this adventure on less than a day's notice. "No, I didn't tell her," he admits. "It's too complicated. But I think we'll only have one point of danger."

"When's the point of danger?"

"Well, we may get into the prison and get our answers," Branch replies, "or we may get them from people in the Venezuelan government. Either way, we'll know who did the murders and who paid the killers and what other murders they've done. That's what we hope, anyway. If we get that information, we'll be hot until we get rid of it. We'll have to phone it out of

[illegible]

continued



Orlando Bosch *Ricardo Morales*

there and then run like bandits."

Branch looks out the airplane window and pictures Orlando Letelier lying in the middle of Massachusetts Avenue, his legs blown off at the thigh, his torso pulverized, detectives all around. On the curb nearby sat his passenger Ronni Moffitt, her eyes frozen, holding her throat. The bomb in Letelier's car had blown a sliver of metal through Ronni Moffitt's carotid artery, and she was drowning in her own blood. Her husband sat nearby, suffering from shock, watching his wife die. She was twenty-five. The killers were the kind of people who would machine-gun a whole crowd of people in a public square just to hit their mark. They wouldn't care about the others. Ronni Moffitt could just as easily have been half the people Branch knew in Washington. The next day Jerry Ford rode right over the bloody spots in the road on his way to a reception for the president of Liberia; he never said a word about Washington's first gangland-style political assassination. Unwise to talk about it, especially if the force behind the murders is most likely the government of Chile. The military junta there overthrew Salvador Allende with a big boost from the C.I.A., which is still thick as thieves with the generals. Letelier was ambassador to the United States under Allende, then foreign affairs minister, interior minister and defense minister. He had been jailed and tortured by the generals after the coup, then, a year later, deported, and in September of last year he was stripped of his citizenship.

From the day of the murder, Branch had been pondering the bomb he thought was used on Letelier—C-4, a white, odorless dough resembling Silly Putty. Branch had heard many Cubans tell tales about C-4 and its predecessor, C-3. It was the C.I.A.'s favorite substance for sabotage in the war against Castro, and thousands of Cubans were trained in its use. Branch had not been surprised when evidence came out that Cuban exiles might have pulled the Letelier job, but he was surprised by tips he received that they had also killed hundreds of others on a big spree in the Caribbean. God, there is something big going on, he had thought. And all his sources and his instincts told him the answers were in Venezuela, of all places.

It was now October 21, one month to the day since the Letelier murder.

"So you decided to take a little trip to Caracas too, I guess." It is Hilda I n, a reporter for *The Miami News*, standing in the aisle, looking down at us. She is a specialist on Latin terrorism in Miami.

"Looks like it," says Branch, shrugging. So much for the secret trip. Yet he is inclined to trust Inclán, even though he and Rothchild had met her only that day, while going through clips at the morgue of the *News*. The three work out a way to make contact in Caracas. Branch is embarrassed at being a little reserved. Inclan is candid, her face cheerful and open.

Inclán leans over and whispers, "Listen, I think you should be careful. There's something strange going on. This flight is crawling with cops and prosecutors from Miami."

Branch and Rothchild turn their heads in unison, and their necks sink down into their shoulders. There are two young Latin men in the back with neatly trimmed beards, unisex hairdos and brightly colored shirts. There are several men in the front who do not look like ordinary passengers. Rothchild decides there might not *be* any ordinary passengers.

"What are they doing here?" Branch asks bluntly.

"Who knows?" says Inclán. "I know these guys from Miami. They give me tips sometimes. But now they aren't giving me the time of day. I don't understand them, so I'm going to act just like they are. I don't think you should let them in on what you're up to, either."

"Those cops are Cubans, aren't they?" Branch asks.

Inclán nods. Branch worries. Cubans on the Miami police force are a strange lot, he has heard. The cops want to infiltrate Cuban terrorist groups and drug-running organizations, but sometimes it turns out that the terrorists and drug runners are infiltrating the cops.

Branch and Rothchild exchange signs of bewilderment as Inclán drifts back to her seat. "Jesus Christ,

Orlando Letelier's bombed car, Washington, D.C.



continued

John," Branch mutters. "I figured we'd be in for some scrapes, but I never thought it would start before we even got there." Then he's all business. "I've got to give you a quick briefing on our main man while we have the chance. We may not have as much leisure time as we expected."

Branch pulls down their dinner trays and spreads out a pile of notes and news clippings. Then he pulls out a police mug shot. "Meet Orlando Bosch," he says.

Rothchild stares incredulously at a porcine Cuban man with a thin moustache and thick lips. "He looks like the headmaster of a military school."

"I know," Branch says, "but he's a killer. He's also a pediatrician. This whole thing's like that—yin and yang, Boston Strangler and Mad Hatter all mixed up." Branch eyes the mass of clippings and notes, wondering where to begin. "It would take all night to go through what I've heard about Bosch, so I'll get you up to Letelier as quick as I can for now. The background is simple: Bosch has been a political terrorist—what they call an action man—ever since the late Forties in Cuba. He worked for Castro, then for the C.I.A., and then he denounced the C.I.A. He has been an anti-Castro outlaw since the mid-Sixties, always telling the Miami Cubans not to trust the C.I.A. in their war against Castro. Now most of the hard-line Cubans believe him. Bosch is the patriarch of Cuban terrorism."

Branch pauses, then flips briskly through the clippings. "Bosch got arrested and indicted pretty regularly all through the Sixties. He usually got off. The witnesses against him tended to sweat a lot and forget things on the stand, if they even showed up. In general, Bosch had a threefold operation: first, political terror against Castro sympathizers; second, ordinary crimes like extortion from rich people and companies to finance the political terror; and third, all kinds of wars and feuds with his terrorist rivals. Finally, Bosch got nailed in 1968 for shelling a Polish freighter in Miami harbor. He got ten years, but he was paroled in 1972. That brings us to his international period."



John Rothchild Hilda Inclán Taylor Branch

Branch picks up one particular clip and holds it in readiness. "Bosch went underground two years after his parole and the pace of Miami bombings escalated. So did terrorist bombings against Castro's embassies all over the world. Then, in 1974, important Cubans started getting knocked off in gangland-style murders. A lot of groups, including Bosch's, took credit for them. The word was that C.I.A. stooges were being eliminated. Bosch became a phantom. Mysterious figures with names like Ernesto would pop up in the Miami press to speak for him. Here's a *Miami News* clip from this period. It's headlined 'Bosch Declares War on Castro.' Hilda wrote it. She's the last American reporter to interview Bosch. Shortly after it came out, Bosch slipped out of the country."

While Rothchild studies the clips, Branch continues. "He got arrested in Venezuela about two years ago. The Justice Department decided not to ask for his return to the United States despite all he's wanted for. That's weird. Then the Venezuelans turned him loose and he left with a bunch of Chilean bodyguards and a big pile of money. I heard all kinds of stories about Bosch being down in Chile with the Pinochet junta there, bargaining. Now the stories jump to February of last year, when Bosch got arrested in Costa Rica right before Kissinger visited. The rumor is that he was plotting to assassinate Kissinger. Bosch got out of Costa Rica somehow, and pretty soon there was a secret meeting in the Dominican Republic of all the major Cuban terrorist groups, which the Dominicans allowed, of course. There was a negotiated truce, and the terrorists united under Bosch in an umbrella group called CORU, supposedly with the support of several juntas in Latin America.

"Now in the last month there has been the Letelier murder," Branch continues grimly. "The terrorists showed that they were not afraid to kill in the United States, right in the capital. They have even threatened to kill one of the F.B.I. agents on the Letelier case. And his fiancée. The anonymous threats show they have collected a lot of intelligence about the agent's life. The F.B.I. is upset. Then, two weeks after Letelier was killed, terrorists blew up a Cuban plane near Barbados, killing seventy-three people. Castro blamed the C.I.A. and canceled the anti-skyjacking treaty. The terrorists loved it: Castro and the Americans getting

continued

mad at each other. Then Bosch got arrested in Venezuela again, along with a whole bunch of Cuban exiles. Stories have been seeping out in the Venezuelan press linking Bosch with both Letelier and the Cuban plane. I picked up similar stories in Miami. My sources there tell me the Cubans in jail are almost all former C.I.A. men, F.B.I. informants and a few veterans of the Venezuelan secret police, the DISIP. Some people say DISIP has tortured the hell out of these guys, but other people say DISIP is in bed with them—holding them under protective custody till the heat blows over. It's the biggest damn mess you ever saw."

"You folks wouldn't mind telling me who you are and what you're up to, would you?"

Rothchild and Branch look up at the man standing in the aisle. He wears a leisure suit with a flashy shirt opened to his sternum, showing a lot of tan and some tufted chest hair.

"Well," says Branch, "I'm not sure. What are you doing? We're just thinking about racetracks and Cubans and stuff like that."

"Come on now. You can tell me," the man urges.

"Don't tell him anything," says Hilda Inclán from behind. She is laughing as if it were a game, but her eyes signal a warning.

Branch is way off-balance. "I'll take the fifth. Why don't we start with you?"

"Okay," says the man, smiling. "I'll play it your way, friend. My name's George Yoss. I'm an assistant state's attorney out of Miami." He flashes an ID card. Branch and Rothchild can't believe it. He seems more like a condominium salesman who wishes he could be a golf pro. "Is that right, Hilda?" Branch asks.

"Yeah, but he's being a bad boy tonight," she replies. "Tell him to mind his own business, whatever that is."

"Okay," says Yoss, "I'm going to give you one more chance. I know you're a journalist. Why don't we start with who you work for?"

Branch looks down and notices that his hands have been covering up the news clippings unconsciously. "These gave me away, eh?" he says weakly. "I'll tell you what. You've got me a little paranoid. Why don't you give me the name of your hotel and I'll call you when we get our feet on the ground? We can talk this over."

"Why don't we start with who you work for?" Yoss persists. He is still kidding, but there is an edge to it. "You may need me down here. You never know. This is a strange country and you guys could find yourselves on the next plane out. I'll give you one more chance."

"I think I'll lay low for the moment," Branch says. Yoss makes a few more thrusts, then saunters off.

"Maybe I was too set on getting into the country on the sly," Branch says. "That sure didn't work out. This flight's like a goddamn convention! Tell me, Hilda. None of the Cuban cops is named Raúl Diaz, I hope?"

"That's Diaz right behind you," she replies.

"Oh, shit!" says Branch. He turns slowly in his seat and finds himself staring at one of the handsome Cubans.

"You must be Taylor Branch," Raúl Diaz says with a smile.

"And you're Raúl." Branch gives him a limp handshake and slumps down in his seat. Hilda Inclán shakes her head and walks off.

"Who's Raúl?" asks Rothchild.

"He's Rolando Martinez' son-in-law. One of the Watergate guys. I spent a lot of time with him in Miami."

"What's so bad about that?" asks Rothchild.

"I don't know. It's just that he probably knows who my Cuban contacts are, and I don't know what the hell he's up to. You see, some of the people who have been telling me about the terrorists are right-wingers and some of them are left-wingers. I don't care about anything except the Letelier murder, but I think it would be healthy for us if we could keep the two groups separate. The only way we can do that is to stay kind of incognito."

"You're doing great so far," Rothchild says. His mind has been wandering over the Bosch briefing. "What makes you think we can get into the prison to see Bosch and his friends?" he asks. "And why would they want to talk to us?"

"It's a long shot," Branch answers. "But Bosch is in a tough spot. The Castro government wants him, and Bosch knows that would mean curtains for him. He also knows that he could get killed any day in Venezuela by either his friends or his enemies. He may figure that his best chance to survive is to come to the United States. What we hope is that he wants to get some of his story out in the American press to force the government to turn the screws and get him back in the States. That's what I hear from some of our Venezuelan contacts. I don't know if it's true, but they are pretty high up. Now even if we can't talk to Bosch and the other prisoners directly, we might get stuff indirectly from the Venezuelans."

"What happens if all the Venezuelan contacts turn out to be flaky?"

"Then we'll just have to poke around," says Branch. "I have a lot of names. There's only one guy I know down here personally. He's a Cuban named Ricardo Morales. I interviewed him back in 1974, just before he came to Venezuela. People in Miami tell me he's way up high in the DISIP, the secret police. I don't know what he's doing now, but he might be a good fallback if nothing else works out."

Rothchild is encouraged. At least Branch knows one real person. "What's he like?"

"He's one of the most cynical people I've ever met," Branch replies, "but I liked him anyway. He doesn't have any illusions about the business he's in, and he makes fun of all the people who do. Ricardo is an old operator, even though he's only in his late thirties. He worked for Castro's secret police. Then he worked for the C.I.A. as an explosives expert. He fought for the Agency in the Congo in the mid-Sixties, and then became an F.B.I. informant. *He's* the guy who got Bosch convicted in 1968. Small world, isn't it? He surfaced in court with everything on tape. Then all hell broke loose. Morales' car was blown up. He survived but blamed Bosch for trying to kill him. Morales himself was indicted for first-degree murder, but he got off. He's a survivor if there ever was one."

"So he must hate Bosch, then," says Rothchild.

"Well, yes," says Branch.

continued

"It sounds like Bosch and Morales have tried hard enough to kill each other." Branch hesitates and then decides not to tell Rothchild that some of the old C.I.A. Cubans in Miami believe Bosch and Morales have patched things up. Branch does not believe it and it would make things too gnarled. "It's amazing that the Venezuelans would have a guy like Morales high up in their security apparatus," he says absentmindedly. "I mean he's a Cuban, and he has worked for Castro, the C.I.A., and the F.B.I., and he's a veteran of gangland-type warfare. It's like finding a West German high up in the C.I.A. and then discovering that he has also worked for the KGB and the Shah of Iran. But from what I hear, that's a pretty common background to have down here. There are Cubans all over Latin America."

Branch begins packing up the newsclips. "I'm paranoid as hell about this plane," he says. "We're supposed to get a call at the hotel around midnight. That gives us an hour to get through customs and get settled. I want to hustle away from these guys and make sure we're on time."

A Greeting from Rómulo

Rothchild and Inclán notice a huddle of shady five-footers lurking in a dark corner beside the airport entrance. They must be a Venezuelan tour group, Rothchild thinks, waiting for a bargain flight out of the country. *I'm not going to get paranoid about everything I see.* But the group stares at the passengers; their suits blend so well into the shadows that all you see are their mirror sunglasses. They look like a display of Foster Grants at the back of an unlighted drugstore.

They stop looking only when the Miami assistant state's attorneys and cops, the same ones who have been bugging Branch on the plane, go over and give some of the men in the shadows warm, Latin embraces. Inclán thinks it is a meeting between the Miami law-enforcement contingent and the Venezuelan secret police. She catches up in the line and says she has recognized one of the people in the police huddle as Ricardo Morales, the mysterious Cuban who is supposed to be Branch's fallback contact in Caracas. Branch is stunned. First he is reading clips about Cubans and cops, and the Cubans and cops start fingering him on the airplane. Now Morales.

"Give me your papers and follow me!" a voice booms suddenly. It belongs to a man in a turtleneck sweater and leather jacket. A flunky moves next to each reporter in the line. There is nothing to do but hand over the passports and follow.

Turtleneck and his gang herd the reporters into a special room at the back of the airport. He disappears into another office, leaving them alone with an old man seated behind a desk. There is furious typing coming from the adjacent room into which Turtleneck has disappeared. His flunkies keep running back and forth from one room to the other.

In about ten minutes, Turtleneck returns and hands each of the reporters a *citación*—in triplicate. Rothchild, translating for Branch, doesn't remember the legal definition of the word *citación*. He does, however, recognize a word farther down in the document—*cárcel*. *Cárcel* means jail. The reporters are being summoned to attend some kind of meeting in a sinister-sounding room, D-034, in a building somewhere in Caracas at nine a.m. the following day. The letterhead belongs to DISIP.

Turtleneck keeps saying it is all routine—just sign the *citación* and everybody can get a good night's sleep. While Rothchild struggles to understand the fine print, Inclán tells him she thinks it might be a mistake to acknowledge the summons. It might conceivably be construed as an admission of something, and the reporters don't know what it is for. Inclán decides to try an offensive to get information. She whips out her notebook as if to write a traffic ticket and asks Turtleneck what his name is. He doesn't answer. She repeats the question and finally he mumbles, "Inspector Rómulo."

"That's all there is to it?"

"Yeah. Just Rómulo."

"Who ordered you to do this?"

"I don't know. I can't say. It's just a procedure."

"Why is this happening to us?"

"It is so because it is so."

Inclán writes that down.

Branch, whose rudimentary knowledge of Spanish often led him to offend the Cuban community in Miami—where he would mean to say "what a grand wedding this is" and end up saying "what tremendous tits you have"—is getting a headache trying to keep up with the conversation. "Isn't there somebody who speaks English here?" he keeps asking.

"That's all right," says Rothchild. "The guy isn't saying a damn thing in Spanish, either." Inclán agrees.

The reporters get nowhere. Police keep circling, and an evasive Rómulo keeps cracking his knuckles, pacing back and forth between rooms, thrusting pens into the reporters' hands like a door-to-door salesman pushing magazine subscriptions. Inclán asks him if they will go to jail for not signing. Rómulo says, "No, you won't go to jail for that, and I don't care what you do. My orders were to hand you this *citación*, and that I have done. The rest is entirely up to you."

Inclán decides to accept the summons but not to sign it, based on Rómulo's assertion that it remains in force no matter what. Branch and Rothchild go along after a brief huddle. Rómulo is definitely peeved. He hands each of them a summons in an envelope and tells them to leave.

"I don't understand how they picked us out," says Inclán in the cab. "Especially you, John. You're not even coming as a reporter. They couldn't have gotten us off our documents." The only logical explanation is that someone on the plane tipped off the Venezuelans. But why?

Branch thrashes around in his spy world for answers. Nothing seems to fit. The three of them theorize all the way to the hotel, and they can only settle, like Alexander Haig, on a sinister force. Branch is still sure that the summons will be lifted as soon as he can talk to his friendly contacts in Venezuela. Rothchild keeps looking out the window for a tail.

A Visit to a Small Hotel

The taxi drops them off at the Anauco Hilton, where Inclán is staying. Branch offers to carry Inclán's bags. The lobby, amazingly, is filled with the same DISIP lurkers; they have managed to move their whole scene intact. They are leaning against walls and sitting on the couches. Branch looks toward the elevator in time to see the Miami attorneys and cops scurrying to get inside, frantically pushing buttons to get the door to close. They are as jittery about seeing the reporters as the reporters are about seeing the Venezuelan goons. And the most jittery of all, in the middle of the elevator, is Ricardo Morales himself. Morales is staring at the ceiling, trying to avoid eye contact, and Branch has the feeling that Morales is scared. It is the first time he has seen fear on the face of this hardened veteran of Congo wars and Castro plots and murders. Seeing Morales scared makes Branch scared. He warns Inclán not to go anywhere or do anything—just to call him when he arrives at his hotel, the Avila.

Back in a taxi Branch is going through another run of Cuban politics. "I don't know, John," he says. "Maybe Morales *is* behind all this, but I can't figure out why he's doing it. He sure looked as if he's in trouble. He could have been making some secret deal with those cops. Something he knows about one of those bombings in Miami. Morales might not know that we were on the flight by accident. He might think we were tailing the cops."

Rothchild is trying not to listen. The only sure contact he thought Branch had has suddenly turned into a potential enemy. Rothchild is petrified by the thought that Branch has gotten in over his head. "I think we are in more trouble," he says. "Look behind you."

This time there is a tail. The other car is right on their bumper as they wind up the back streets of Caracas. "They aren't even pretending not to be following," Rothchild says. "I don't think that's a good sign."

Branch, overwhelmed, keeps looking at the car behind them. "You know," he says with a smile, "this is the first time I've ever been tailed." Rothchild feels as if he is being cranked through the roller of Graham Greene's typewriter.

They reach the Hotel Avila, a Casablanca-type place at the top of a hill. It seems deserted until Rothchild looks down from a balcony near their room. There are people pulling into the driveway in small cars, and they have walkie-talkies and revolver bulges at the waists of their plain dark suits. They station themselves around the hotel entrance and even in the flower beds. They have the place surrounded.

There have been no phone calls—or at least that is the word from the desk. Branch paces nervously around the room. He thinks that something he already knows about C.I.A. Cubans and terrorism must be the key to what's happening, but he doesn't know what it is. He tells everything he knows to Rothchild, going all the way back through Prio and the pre-Castro student movement. Rothchild thinks Branch has lost his mind. It is fear, he figures. Branch realizes that Rothchild is lying down on the bed pretending not to be awake, that he has fallen into a stupor. It is fear, Branch figures.

Then a call comes through, but it is not the contact Branch awaits. It is Inclán, who has been denied a room at the Hilton (even though she had a reservation) and she can't reach anybody at the U.S. Embassy. She wonders what the hell is going on. Branch tells her the situation at the Avila, but she decides to come over; there are lots of rooms and at least the reporters can show some solidarity.

It takes a long time, too long, for Inclán to show up. Branch wanders downstairs; Rothchild waits by the phone for calls that never come. There is an uproar at the desk. The clerk is telling Inclán there are no rooms available even though the bank of keys is behind him in full view. He holds that position for about five minutes, then retreats to "there is some problem with you people. I can't give you a room." He seems scared. Everybody seems scared. Denying a woman a room at three a.m. in Venezuela is a serious violation of the chivalric code. The three reporters talk about it, but they can't sit down or move around without being followed, almost mimicked, by cops. There are now at least six of them in the lobby at all times. Inclán decides she will sleep on a couch in the lobby, and she wonders if she should put on her nightgown for the goons. She sets her bags beside one couch, and the bellhop directs her over to a better one with a gracious flourish; he could have been opening the door to the wedding suite.

After vainly scouring the lobby for pay phones, the reporters agree that they have to make a move for the room so they can talk near a phone. The three make their way up the stairs like Cary Grant tiptoeing between bedrooms. To their relief, no one stops Inclán.

Branch offers Inclán his bed, saying he will sleep on the floor. Rothchild doesn't say anything, but his paranoia tells him it is foolish to give the Venezuelans a chance to arrest them under the pretext of immoral conduct. Rothchild keeps opening the door because of his paranoia; Branch keeps closing it because of his. He doesn't want to be listened in on. Branch and Rothchild are not communicating much with each other by now. Each is worried that whatever he says the other will think it is crazy.

Inclán tries to phone her editor in Miami, but it becomes clear after about an hour of excuses that the desk clerk isn't going to put through her call. Local lines still seem to be available, but whom to call? Branch has his list of connections, but these people are in their own delicate situations and Branch doesn't want to blow their covers by calling at four a.m. on what is certainly a tapped line. Inclán can't get an answer at the U.S. Embassy. Rothchild has nobody to call, and that is one of his problems. Since he is so unconnected with the story, he is sure that the police will figure he is the heavy—a deep-cover C.I.A. man out of retirement from the Everglades.

By elimination, the reporters can think of only one person in Venezuela that they could contact. Inclán has figured out, from her visit to the Anauco Hilton, what floor Ricardo Morales is staying on and she thinks she knows what his room number is. Her plan is to call him directly. It is clearly a desperation move. Inclán rings up Morales at the Anauco Hilton, apologizes for the hour and begins to explain her predicament, but it is clear things are not going well. Morales apparently is denying that he is Morales. "You aren't Ricardo Morales?" Inclán asks incredulously. "You know me and I know you. I talked to your nephew in Miami yesterday. His family is fine and he sends his warmest regards."

There is a pause and Inclán begins to sound like a panelist on *What's My Line?*. "You've never heard of a Morales? Who are you then? Your voice sounds familiar. You're not a Venezuelan. You sound Cuban. Are you a Cuban?" Morales says he is tired of being interrupted in his sleep; he hangs up the phone.

An air of resignation has settled over the room. It is almost morning and the goons are still standing by the bushes. The reporters are under some kind of house arrest and they feel caged. They wonder why Morales has just denied being himself. Maybe all this is happening because they know who he is and Morales fears they will ruin his cover identity. Or maybe Morales doesn't want Branch to reveal his background to anybody in Venezuela. The reporters kick this notion around, but it doesn't fit. It seems preposterous that the Venezuelans don't know about Morales' previous lives, which are talked about all the time in the Miami rumor mill.

Branch paces around the room, trying to make his mind catch up with his fears. He even asks Inclán whether she is guarding some secret that might have caused the trouble. Inclán says no and politely doesn't return the question. The reporters already trust each other instinctively, but the spy world threatens to swallow them up, too. They decide there is nothing to do except try anything to reach the outside world in the morning before getting shuttled off to the DISIP.

Inclán goes off to the lobby for some sleep on her couch. Branch tells Rothchild the rumor about the rapprochement between Morales and Bosch, saying he'd even heard Bosch had been staying in Morales' apartment. But it doesn't make any sense. Nothing does. Branch babbles on until he finally runs out of nervous energy. "Well, John," he says, smiling thinly as he sinks onto the bed, "I was right about one thing. I told you it wouldn't be a boring weekend."

Lefty was here
ZIEGLER

Morales Takes Over

It is five-thirty a.m. and somebody is pounding on the door. Rothchild, a light sleeper, jumps out of bed. He opens the door just a crack, and then the door is thrown back so hard it bangs against the wall like a gunshot. A man in a green suit with a long walkie-talkie hanging from his belt bursts past Rothchild, throwing on all the lights.

continued

"Pack!" he yells. In half a second he is all the way across the room. "Pack!" Branch sits up straight in bed and in the most plaintive voice Rothchild has ever heard him use, a mixture of recognition, terror, disappointment, confusion and pleading, says just one word: "Ricardo?"

It is Morales all right. Branch watches him snatch back the curtains to check the balcony, then dart around the chairs. "Pack!" There is a rhythm to his order. He is moving like a cat, frenzied but in total control. Rothchild feels the energy coming off him in waves. He slips into the bathroom to piss just to get away from Morales, but he is so scared that nothing comes.

More orders come out in staccato bursts—"Get those bags closed! Give me your passports! Give me your airline tickets!" Branch and Rothchild are convinced that he wants to destroy the documents before he kills them. Morales leaves the room within two minutes, but his performance leaves so much afterlife that Rothchild and Branch don't do anything once he has left. They don't call anybody, they don't sneak off the balcony, they don't even say a word to each other.

Both of them jump off the floor when the phone rings, then look dumbly at each other. Branch picks up the receiver, grunts, and puts it down. "All the guy said was, 'He is waiting,'" he tells Rothchild. Branch's own voice sounds far off to him.

Inclán has had rough going downstairs, maybe rougher than the other two because she is alone and also because she is not yet a U.S. citizen. Morales wakes her up with the same staccato commands. She thinks maybe he is going to take her away and have her deported back to Havana. She is so scared that she locks herself in the bathroom and doesn't come out until she hears the other two reporters stumbling downstairs with their bags.

Morales twists the knife with a little humiliation. "Pay your bill!" he yells. Branch doesn't think he should have to pay for the hospitality he has received, but he pulls out his wallet without a second's hesitation. "Pick up your bags! Let's go!" The reporters are hustled out of the lobby, past a squadron of sunglasses. Morales is already ahead of them, barking orders on his walkie-talkie. It is still dark.

The reporters are put into the back of a car. Morales and a driver are up front. Nobody is talking much. Branch is wearing his best suit, which he does not remember putting on during Morales' brutal prodding. Now he thinks maybe something deep in his unconscious had ordered him to look his best. Rothchild is terrified that they are traveling in a private car instead of an official police car. His fear of being officially detained is rapidly being replaced by a fear of being unofficially bumped off. He keeps looking back at the car full of goons that is following close behind as they careen down the mountain at one hundred twenty kilometers an hour.

The car is heading out of town now, t the populated areas and into those sts where executions and accidents take place. Branch is desperately trying to make contact with Morales. He mentions some people from Miami that he and Morales had once talked to together. But every time Branch drops a name, Morales turns the volume up on the radio. He leaves it that way, blaring, until the questioner gives up and sits back in his seat. But desperation creates another question, another try, which ends in another mambo blast. Branch gives up on the name-dropping and even tries some spy-world guilt production. "Rip would not like what you are doing to us," he says. "Rip would be ashamed." Rip Robertson was Morales' gun-toting case officer in the Congo operations. Rothchild thinks Branch is foolish to bring up the Congo and remind Morales how little he cares for human life. Morales says nothing. He just gives the radio knob another twist.

Inclán is taking the personal route again, talking about this nephew she has seen, mentioning other relatives of Morales who live in Miami. Morales isn't answering her, either. He is getting tired of the radio. Now he just leans his head over against the door to get some sleep. Watching Morales nod, the fury turned off like a light, Branch's mind is filled with memories of Miami Cubans telling stories of legendary agents who would drop off to sleep just before landing in Cuba on a C.I.A. commando raid. He never quite believed the stories, but he thinks Morales' nap is very effective theater. Rothchild is also watching the nap. Every time Morales nods, Rothchild thinks he is ducking so that the bullets from the car behind won't hit him. Rothchild ducks, too.

After about twenty minutes of driving, the road flattens out and the reporters can see the airport in the distance. Morales mentioned "airport" once back in the hotel lobby, but the reporters were never sure he intended to take them there. If he were just planning to expel them, it would seem that he could afford to be more communicative, more curious about what the reporters were doing, more worried about the kind of story they might write about him. But Morales asked no questions. Rothchild knew from Branch's incessant briefings that Morales wore a lot of hats: terrorist as well as informant, mercenary as well as cop, bomber as well as representative of a government. It might be more paranoia to think he would kill them, but all last night's paranoia had come true.

The reporters know one thing: they have stumbled onto a story that is big enough and sensitive enough that top people in the Venezuelan DISIP are interrupting their sleep and risking diplomatic reprisals to scare the hell out of them. It isn't routine in Venezuela, one of the few South American countries left with any sense of freedom of the press. There is something big going on, and the reporters don't know, as they speed through Cara whether they will ever get to find out what it is. Nobody, after all, knows where the reporters are, and the only thing on their side, besides some vestigial compassion that might reside somewhere even in goons, is the sense that world opinion would be on Morales' back if they did get tortured or killed. But that's just the point—world opinion was on the terrorists' backs about the Cuban airline crash and about Letelier and Moffitt. They killed them anyway. They didn't give a damn.

The car pulls up at the airport. It is less than eight hours since the reporters entered the country, and they have talked to nobody except Morales, the goons and each other. Their best guess is that Morales plans to keep it that way.

Breakfast at Ricardo's

Morales marches the group through part of the airport lobby and then up some back stairs, past the meteorology room and into the tower section. They arrive at a locked, knobless door with a small pass-through window, and Morales has to knock before it is opened from the inside. They have arrived at the goon control center. There is a four-drawer cabinet where the DISIP police file their guns and bullet clips like memos. There is an old couch, a few desks, and in an adjoining room some bunk beds. All the people from the night shift are still there, including Rómulo, in the same turtleneck and the same leather jacket. The most impressive new lurker is a character they call "El Largo," or "The Long One."

It is clear now that the plan is not torture, it is deportation, but the reporters sense that the plan could easily be changed. Morales is stalking between rooms, giving orders and making calls, and when he looks at the reporters he seethes with anger. Inclán and Branch are directing more questions at him from the couch. He answers only with contemptuous looks.

No one is prepared for what happens next. Morales walks out with a wide grin on his face. He clasps his hands together like a waiter and cheerfully addresses the reporters: "Is anybody hungry? Are you ready for some breakfast?"

The reporters follow Morales dumbly down the maze of corridors. They decide there is something oriental about recent developments, and they are convinced Morales could show them great courtesy one moment and yank out their toenails the next. They follow Morales down the corridors until they come to a small dining room that appears to be reserved for airport personnel. Branch gives fleeting thought to the idea of making a scene, but he decides Morales would not have brought them here unless he controlled the area. Besides, Branch realizes, he does not have the courage to make a scene in front of Morales, who still has the reporters nearly paralyzed with fright.

Morales lays his big walkie-talkie down on the table and snaps for a

continued

waiter. "What will you have?" he asks graciously.

The reporters had figured breakfast was probably a ruse, so they think about food for the first time. It is a struggle. Rothchild's stomach is filled with embalming fluid. He feels queasy looking at the menu. Branch asks only for coffee and an order of toast. Rothchild follows suit. Morales looks disappointed and urges them to eat more heartily. Inclán orders eggs and Morales looks pleased. He orders a sumptuous breakfast for himself. It arrives promptly.

"Well," he asks grandly, "who do you think will win your election, Carter or Ford?"

The reporters exchange the look, familiar by now, that signals their agreement that absurdity has reached new heights. They mumble offhand answers as Morales listens intently.

"You don't really have much choice, do you?" he asks. "I mean, you have two guys who don't have any ideas and don't have any backbone, right? And neither one of them can command anything or stop anything, so it doesn't make any difference, right? At least that's what I get from *Time* magazine."

Inclán tries to change the subject. She asks Morales about his position in the DISIP and gets no response. She mentions Morales' nephew, whom she knows in Miami, and Morales parries the remark. Suddenly a cloud comes across his face.

"What's the matter with you?" he demands. "Why aren't you eating?" He points down at the dry toast, which Branch and Rothchild have been picking at like wafers at Communion. "Aren't you hungry?"

Branch nods yes; Rothchild nods no. "You told me you hadn't gotten any breakfast, so I give you breakfast," Morales declares angrily, waving his arms. "If you are not hungry, you are liars! What's the matter with you?"

The reporters are exasperated. "We are afraid and confused," says Inclán, "because nobody will tell us why this is happening to us. I am a reporter like all the other reporters down here. I want to interview Orlando Bosch like I did once before . . ."

"Never heard of him," interrupts Morales. He gives us an exaggerated shrug and a quizzical look.

Inclán shakes her head in despair. "Oh, come on. You testified against him eight years ago in Miami and now he's the most famous prisoner in Latin America. He's in your jail."

"Did he make *Time* magazine?" asks Morales.

"Yes," says Branch.

"I guess I missed it," says Morales. He pauses, then turns to Inclán. "You should not be running around asking so many questions," he says sternly. "You are a woman. Women should be at home having babies and making their men happy. Nothing else."

Inclán is ruffled. "I can work as well as most other reporters," she says.

Morales shakes his head vigorously. "No you can't. You are a hundred miles away from reality." He looks off and says it again.

"I don't think so," says Inclán. "I think you are."

"No," says Morales. "You are a hundred miles from reality, and I am a hundred *years* from reality. You understand the difference?"

"I don't know what I understand," says Inclán. "I know something about you. Taylor says he talked to you about your background in Miami and you talked to him like a friend. He says you were nice and now you are . . ."

"I am *not* nice," snaps Morales. "You know what I used to do in Cuba when I was a kid? I sent anonymous death wreaths to my friends. All the time. Is that nice?"

Branch does not like this subject or the faintly homicidal look he sees before him. He decides to make another stab at levity. "Look, Ricardo," he says, "I'm upset that you and your men have kept me from seeing anything about the last game of the World Series last night."

"The World Series," he says, his eyes opening wide. "Let me tell you about the World Series. It is just like the world everywhere: the Reds are winning and the Yanks are losing!" Morales breaks into laughter. Something snaps in the reporters and they laugh, too, uncontrollably. Fear floats out of their mouths and they feel better.

Branch wades in to reestablish contact. "Look, Ricardo," he says gamely, "I can't help thinking this is some kind of mistake. I want to be straight with you. All I'm interested in is the murder of Orlando Letelier. That's what I came down here for, and I want . . ."

"He's the guy who got blown up in Washington, right?" Morales breaks in. "I think I saw that in *Time*."

"That's right. He was blown up right around the corner from my apartment."

"Well, what are you doing in Venezuela if he was killed in Washington?" Morales demands.

"Because I think the people who conspired to kill him are here. That's what my sources say, and it has even been in some of the Venezuelan newspapers."

Morales looks disgusted. "You shouldn't read the newspapers," he says tightly. "They lie. And you should investigate that murder in Washington instead of coming halfway around the world."

Branch tries another tack. "I don't understand what's behind this, Ricardo. You aren't like you were the last time I saw you, in 1974. Don't you remember? It was at night in Miami Beach, and you brought your girl friend over to the house I was staying in. And Fotingo Silva was there. And Tamayo was there. We talked almost all night about the Congo. Why have you changed? Is there something . . ." Branch stops because of what he sees on Morales' face.

"You are lying!" he explodes. "I have never heard of Ricardo Morales! This is the first time I have ever met you, and it is the first time you have met me! Understand? I have never seen you before in my life! If you say different you are lying! And bad things happen to liars!"

Inclán comes to Branch's rescue. "I have seen your picture," she says, "and I'm sure who you are. If you're not Morales, then what is your name?"

"I don't answer personal questions," Morales says, smiling, trying to look shy.

"I think maybe you figure there's a little spy conspiracy here," Branch observes, stabbing in the dark. "But there isn't. John and I are old friends, but we just met Hilda yesterday. She is interested in Bosch and his friends because of the bombings in Miami and the Cuban plane. We are interested in them because of Letelier. The three of us just happened to come down here on the same plane."

"Oh, really?" says Morales dubiously. "I guess you are good friends now."

"I guess we've gone through something together," says Rothchild.

"Now you have something in common," he nods, feigning tenderness. "Let's see, what else is there? Have you all been married?" The reporters nod. "How about divorced?" The reporters nod again. "Once?" They nod again.

Morales holds up three fingers. "I have been divorced three times," he says, "after four kids. I haven't seen them in seven years." This hangs in the air.

"Do you miss them?" asks Inclán.

"Not the children," Morales says softly. "Just the wives sometimes. I don't miss much. You know I haven't slept in two years." The reporters give each other significant looks, like shrinks attending a primal-therapy session.

"If you are going to kick us out of the country, you should at least let us call our families," Inclán says. "My editors are going to be worried. We

continued

have appointments and those people don't have any idea where we are. Why can't you let us make at least one phone call?"

Morales has shed his melancholy and slipped into a new persona. He is eager. "You're right," he says. "I'll call them. Anybody you want. Tell me who your appointments are with." He pulls out a pen in a flash. Branch blinks. He is startled by how fast Morales moves and how fiercely he snaps the point down.

The reporters glance knowingly at each other. They share a vision of Morales hauling their contacts down to DISIP's welcome wagon. We're not that dumb, they think.

Inclán tells Morales to call her editor at *The Miami News*, a safe, serious call. Morales spells out the name letter by letter as he writes on his napkin like a schoolboy taking down his homework. He is putting on a show. He looks at Branch.

"Tell Orlando Bosch it doesn't look as if I'll be able to make it this trip," Branch says. "He's in the DISIP prison."

The reporters giggle, but Morales deadpans. "T-e-l-l O-r-l-a-n-d-o B-o-s-h..."

"You've spelled Bosch wrong," says Inclán. "It's B-o-s-c-h."

"I'm sorry," says Morales.

Morales keeps writing. "You are a funny one," he says jovially. He looks up. "Anybody else?"

"Yes," says Branch. He has been trying to think of one of his contacts in Venezuela who would not be vulnerable to Morales but whose clout might impress him. Any name is a risk, but he decides to take one. "Tell the governor of Caracas that I won't be able to see him. His name is Diego Arias. Do you know him?"

Branch studies Morales for a reaction, but there is none.

After breakfast, as the procession goes by a pay phone, Inclán suddenly announces, "I'd like to make one call to the American Embassy." She breaks step and marches toward it, the first sign of overt resistance. Morales freezes Branch and Rothchild with a malicious glance and walks with her, shaking his head. Support goons appear from around corners. They seem relaxed. Morales fingers his walkie-talkie. Inclán gets to the phone and starts fumbling for Venezuelan change and her phone numbers. Morales leans up against the wall near the phone. He looks amused. His body seems to twitch a little under his suit, as if he might need some exercise.

Branch and Rothchild keep telling themselves that Inclán is making a futile gesture, but they admire her. "She's got more guts than we do," whispers Rothchild.

Branch and Rothchild watch her lift the phone from the cradle, but they don't think she has the change or the number. She is nervous. She looks Morales in the face, which is probably a mistake. He stares at her, shakes his head, and hangs up the phone gently.

An hour later, Morales suddenly mobilizes his entire office. Some of his men grab the reporters' suitcases and vanish. Others take off for unknown destinations. The rest fall in around the reporters and Morales leads them briskly out the door.

Rothchild figures they have just enough time to make the ten a.m. flight to Miami that he had seen posted on a board some time earlier. He senses an end coming and feels some relief. But when the entourage emerges on the airport's main concourse, Morales turns toward the exit into Caracas, not toward the planes.

"I thought you were putting us on the plane," says Branch. "Where are we going?"

"To the other airport," says Morales. His mind is elsewhere.

"What happens if we make a fuss when you put us on the plane?" Inclán asks. "What then?"

Morales' face is taut but breaks into a tour-guide smile. "You will either leave Venezuela nice and happy, or . . ." He pauses. "Or you will leave nice and happy." He delivers the last line with a lilt, as if making a rhyme. The reporters absorb the menacing smile and fall silent.

Several cars screech up to the curb. Once loaded, they take off at the usual torrid pace. Branch feels panic opening trapdoors under his lungs and he leans over to Rothchild. "Holy shit, John," he whispers. "I don't think there is another airport in Caracas."

After racing a quarter mile down the road, the cars turn abruptly into a parking lot. The reporters are baffled by the rush and the short trip but relieved to be staying near the airport. They figure they are headed for a plane from a different direction, but Morales leads them through another maze of corridors and into a new holding room. It has a big waiting area with two rooms partitioned off on the side. The doors are metal with no handles. They lock from both sides.

Morales vanishes, leaving Rómulo and El Largo in charge. Rómulo's fingertips do push-ups on his desk while he looks on, stone-faced. Rothchild gets the impression that Rómulo likes to stare at blank walls more than at people. El Largo, who seems to be a notch above Rómulo in the pecking order, moves into one of the partitioned offices and stays almost continuously on the phone. He reminds the reporters of his presence from time to time by loudly sucking phlegm up his long spiny nose.

After about ten minutes, Branch starts pacing away from Rómulo. "Goddamn it," Branch spurts, "I don't think we *know* enough about Morales to make him do all this. He's going to a lot of trouble to seal us off from Venezuela, but it doesn't make sense that he would do it just because we know who he is."

"Why not?" asks Inclán.

"Because," says Rothchild, "what we already know is going to come out anyway if he kicks us out of the country."

"I think maybe Morales is more worried about what we might find out if we ever get out of his clutches," says Branch. "I think maybe it's the fact that this terrorism is organized internationally. Bosch moves around on illegal passports and has fancy fund-raising dinners with supposedly respectable people in lots of countries. He's supported by at least part of a lot of governments. And this stuff looks cross-national—Cubans killing Chileans and so forth. Now look at how Venezuela fits in. It's kind of an entrepôt for everybody on all sides. The government is in a real pickle. It has to get along with the military juntas that have taken over most of Latin America, and it also has to get along with Castro. This country is filled with left-wing Chilean exiles and right-wing Cuban exiles. Letelier is buried here, which is a tilt to the left, but the people who helped conspire to kill him might well be right in the DISIP, which is full of Cubans like Morales. President Pérez [Carlos Andrés, of Venezuela] has got his own little Watergate here, because his own government is tangled up with both the terrorists and the anti-terrorists. This whole country is like a tinderbox. The government is making little gestures to both sides, trying to keep the lid on.

"Okay," Branch continues. "Let's assume that Morales is not bootlegging us out of the country on his own. That seems stupid to me. Let's assume that at least the people in the interior ministry know what's going on. And let's assume they're afraid we'll get into the country and find a story that goes something like INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION HEADQUARTERED IN VENEZUELA. OPERATIVES MOSTLY CUBAN. EXILES WITH CIA AND FBI TIES. VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT PLAYING BOTH SIDES. And we go on to say that Bosch has brought a lot of Latin governments around to his position, which is that it's better to trust each other than to trust the C.I.A. Now, what I'm saying is that a story like that would really screw up the Venezuelans, especially if it's fleshed out. It's the last thing the government here needs right now."

"So what side is Morales on?" asks Rothchild.

"I think he's on both sides," says Inclán.

"I think so, too," says Branch, "just like the government. Morales is in the underworld of both sides."

Inclán thinks for a moment. "There's only one big problem," she says. "If they're so afraid of a story like that, why do they let other reporters stay and just throw us out? Why do they pick on us?"

"I don't know," Branch sighs. "I don't know much about the correspondents here. They're getting some stuff out, but my impression is that they cover nine countries and just fly in for the coups and earthquakes. That still doesn't make us so special. But maybe we are to Morales. We know him. He knows Hilda knows a lot about Bosch and Miami connections. He knows that I got pretty deeply into the C.I.A. Cubans. Then he sees us with the prose-

continued

cutors. That may have been too much for him to take chances with us. I don't know. Maybe he thinks we're C.I.A."

Swords on the Runway

El Largo picks up the three passports off Rómulo's desk and points them toward the locked door like a baton. "Vamos," is all he says.

The metal door is unlocked by El Largo, and once again the DISIP cortege appears from nowhere. They escort the reporters down another staircase and cut toward an immigration stall in a large room that is completely isolated. It is a busy part of the day at a major airport, but the DISIP keeps finding these empty halls and empty rooms to stick the reporters in.

Something about approaching this immigration stall, which is not attended, and knowing he will pass through it and get on an airplane and not find Letelier's murderer starts to galvanize Branch. There is a tiny passage to go through and El Largo is motioning them to walk on, but Branch is having these visions of the bombed car outside his apartment and he is getting mad. The madder he gets, the slower he walks. "We can't just get on this plane," he says to Rothchild. "We have to at least do *something*." He and Rothchild, and then Inclán behind them, go into a stall—not a complete stop, but they are slowing it way down. Morales might have clamped down on this little insurrection in a second, but El Largo seems merely agitated. He is getting in front of the reporters, pleading and begging, pulling with his arms as if they are all connected by an invisible rope.

In complete exasperation, he starts sputtering threats. "If you don't move through here, I am going to use *the force!*" Two guards go running down to the end of the room, apparently to go find *the force*, which turns out to be four young soldiers in green fatigues and paratrooper boots.

With the army behind them, the reporters continue their shuffle. Two move ahead a few feet and one hangs back. Then the members of the armed forces plus the DISIP people surround the straggler, prodding him along, while one of the other two breaks away to the same spot the straggler just vacated.

Out of a picture window the reporters can see the plane being gassed up. It is VIASA, the Venezuelan airline, and not Pan Am. Inclán, finally expressing some paranoia herself, says, "Well they could blow us up on the plane, but they wouldn't sacrifice a Venezuelan plane. They don't have that many of them."

They have been dragging on this walk for almost forty minutes now, and they can see the busloads of tourists being flushed back out from their vacations. The buses are stopping at the back stairway of the plane. Then Branch gets his idea. "In here where there is nobody to see us we can't do much," he tells Rothchild. "But out there, in front of all those tourists, we can get some help. Let's go." Rothchild and Branch huddle with Inclán. They [illegible] the plan and agree. Then all [illegible] abandon their shuffle, to the surprise of the herders, who have been pushing all along. Suddenly they see their quarry running off in front of them. El Largo doesn't catch on right away, but he knows that whatever the reporters want to do, it must be the wrong thing. So he starts running after them, yelling, "Stop!" Branch and Rothchild hit the double glass door with Inclán and El Largo and the army just behind. They all pour out onto the runway to the curious looks of hundreds who are lined up to get on the plane.

For the first time since they landed in Venezuela, Inclán is visibly upset. She rushes out to the line of passengers, screaming in Spanish and English that she is a woman reporter whose dignity has been trampled on by the secret police. The police, who are massing behind her in greater numbers than ever before, don't know quite how to deal with this. The passengers don't know whether to accept her as a lunatic traveler whom they don't want with them on the plane, or to believe what she is saying, which would be unpleasant. Most of them pretend that nothing is happening and go on up the ramp.

Branch, meanwhile, has planted himself on the stairs that lead to the front cabin of the plane. He is sitting down and his hands are clenched to the rails like a Quaker chained to the White House fence. Rothchild is sitting on the steps just below Branch, and they are being surrounded by a brigade of reinforcements, the sword company. The men in brown uniforms have circled them, and they pull the swords a few inches out of their long scabbards ready to hog-stick Rothchild and Branch into the airplane. Behind them officials and police seem to be pouring out of the doors and official jeeps are screeching up and screeching off, and Rómulo has even showed up again.

The captain of the airplane, a Venezuelan, comes down the same ramp on which Branch and Rothchild have been doing their sit-in, and he has a scowl on his face. Venezuela has enough trouble developing tourism and here is his plane being held up and his passengers' last memory of Venezuela will be these goons with swords and blackjacks prodding Americans up the ramp. He steps over Branch and goes right down to the huddle of secret police, where the current brains of the operation, Rómulo and El Largo, are standing. The captain proceeds to chew them out, tell them that they are idiots to pull a show like this and that he will not take passengers on his airplane if they are loaded by force. The security risk, for one thing. If these people are that dangerous, then why should they be flying alone on his airplane?

El Largo and Rómulo don't quite know how to handle this sudden obstacle. They get a let's-talk-this-one-over-buddy look on their faces and go into a huddle with the captain. They also defer to even higher authority, a beefy cop named Camargo, who is wearing a short-sleeve shirt. Camargo arrives in the middle of the scene, looking like the frust[illegible] director of a runaway cast. There are now dozens of DISIP men in plain clothes, a few representatives from about four different military detachments, frantic jeep drivers, airline authorities, pilots and ground-crew personnel, all crowding around to watch or take part in the action. Camargo looks skyward, thinking under pressure, and gets his idea. "Why don't you let me go with these people?" he asks the pilot. "If I take them to Miami, I guarantee there won't be any funny stuff on your plane." Rothchild thinks this is a little ironic. The reporters come down to investigate one plane bombing and return under guard so that they can't pull one off themselves.

The pilot doesn't think too much of Camargo's idea. "Do you have a U.S. visa?" he asks Camargo. "No." "Then, do you know what they will do to you when you get to Miami? Much worse than whatever you have done to them here." Camargo doesn't like the way that sounds. He scraps the plan, and the captain returns to the plane.

The reporters aren't sure of what they have just done. They have scored a theatrical victory—just look around at all these cars and soldiers and distressed officials—but they don't like the prospect of lunch with Ricardo Morales. Nobody seems to be running to call the American Embassy or any other outside help, so the plan is a qualified failure.

The three of them head back to the passenger line, where people are still loading, and start writing phone numbers on little scraps of paper—the numbers are of editors in Miami, friends, and even mothers. They try handing them out to boarding passengers. The reporters are received in this effort like Salvation Army collectors at the racetrack. Only a few of the passengers actually take the notes, but just to make sure, the DISIP people are picking them off at the higher end of the line. Some passengers even go out of their way to hand over the notes, with an air of having done their civic duty. It develops into a kind of assembly line, notes in and notes out, the DISIP goons collecting just as fast as Inclán, Branch and Rothchild can scrawl.

It is now, with the plane about to close its doors, that Branch comes up with another plan: send one, leave two. Branch still is hoping he can break the Morales logjam and get out into friendly territory, where his contacts are waiting to help him. Inclán speaks the best Spanish and seems the most adept at handling inspectors and bureaucrats. They will stay and Rothchild is chosen to leave. Branch reminds him, in front of the sword brigade, that he is an "expectant father," but Rothchild needs no encouragement. He instantly calls for the captain and explains that he wants to get on the plane. The captain hesitates, then agrees, and Rothchild runs for the stairs. As he passes Branch and Inclán, Branch sticks one page of phone numbers in his pocket and, as a diversionary tactic, clumsily sticks another note in his hand, this one in full

continued

view of the cops. As the sword carriers are frisking Rothchild, the second note is triumphantly confiscated. They don't know that it says "Joe Morgan" on it. The name of the great Cincinnati second baseman will go somewhere into the DISIP files.

Halfway up the ramp, Rothchild senses that the pressure has somehow been reversed, that now the DISIP wants to keep him on the ground. Several cops are following him as if they want to get ahead and stop him at the door. He scurries inside the plane and rushes back to a seat; they are still following him. He has his seat belt buckled almost before his ass hits the cushion, and the two cops reach out as if to grab him, then change their minds and abruptly leave the aircraft. But they quickly return. They tell Rothchild in a very friendly tone that his friends down on the ground want to have a word with him and that he better unbuckle and come down. Rothchild is so agitated he believes them. He gets as far as the plane entrance, the top of the stairs, when he hears Branch yelling, "Get back." He bowls over a stewardess on the way to his seat.

The cops are not through yet. They return with another ploy: Rothchild has not filled out the necessary papers and he must return to an office in the airport. "Are you sure this isn't a trick?" Rothchild asks. "No, no trick. Just a procedural matter." Rothchild tells them he isn't moving an inch until he talks to the captain.

Out his little window, Rothchild sees further agitation on the runway. They have brought up a car and they are trying to force Branch and Inclán to get into it. Camargo is flailing his arms like a giant windmill, determined to get all three reporters together—on or off the plane. The reporters are equally determined to split up. Branch and Inclán keep telling Camargo that they will not move from the runway until the plane takes off. They want to stay in plain view of all the passengers, fearing that the goons will grab Rothchild once the other two are safely out of view. Branch and Inclán keep encouraging each other and making jokes about how incredible all the commotion has become. Workmen in orange suits are crouched in the shade, smoking cigarettes, and several hundred gawkers are spread out in a semicircle like fans in the bleachers.

Camargo tries a whole string of tricks to get Branch and Inclán out of sight. Will they move into the airport, please? No. He goes off into a huddle and comes back. Will they get in the car so they can get out of the hot sun? No. Will they get in the car if he promises they can watch the plane from there? No. After one huddle, the mood changes and several goons swing little brown blackjacks. Branch and Inclán say a prayer, refuse to move and wave ostentatiously at the airplane. The goons shove and menace but then go off again. Rómulo comes back with his gun pulled, looking like a crazed assassin. Camargo soon yanks him back to the goon huddle. The plane starts taxiing on the runway and Camargo says, "You've won. Let's go." The reporters huddle and say not until it's off the ground. Camargo looks furious and barks a command to his walkie-talkie man. The plane stops immediately and sits in the middle of the airstrip. Camargo controls the tower, the reporters conclude. The game, played by inches and bluffs, goes on for nearly an hour.

Camargo Plays Hardball

Branch and Inclán are spread-eagled against the back-door openings of the goon car, facing each other, when the jet finally takes off. They have held this position for the last fifteen minutes or so of the cat-and-mouse game. The roar of the jet engines sets off tremors in Branch's gut, and he is flooded with relief. He feels tears welling up.

Rómulo is now wearing his gun tucked inside his pants at the navel. His turtleneck is soaked with sweat. He and Camargo and the head blackjack man escalate their nudging again, and extras crowd in behind them. The reporters, talking over the roof of the car, decide that the plane will not be called back. They get in the car. Rómulo sits next to Branch, and Camargo takes the front seat. They peel off down the runway with other cars following.

"How long will it take the plane to get to Miami?" Inclán asks Camargo.

"A little more than three hours," says Camargo. "It has to stop in Maracaibo."

Branch shivers and asks Inclán to translate the Spanish to make sure he heard right.

"I thought you said it was a direct flight to Miami," Inclán says in disbelief.

"It is going direct to Miami, *señora*," replies Camargo, "but it is stopping in Maracaibo."

The reporters discuss with renewed horror the fact that Maracaibo is still in Venezuela; they envision the DISIP people paying a call on Rothchild. Camargo grins at them. His lips slant in one direction, and the upper row of his front teeth slants in the other, making an X. Branch thinks Camargo must file his teeth. He inches away from Rómulo until he is almost in Inclán's lap.

Three hours later, Camargo summons the two reporters to his office after more consultation with Central Caracas. Only one thing has changed, he says graciously. Both their visas have been officially revoked; they are ordered to leave at three-thirty. The reporters ask why, and Camargo shrugs.

Without warning, the session is interrupted when one of the younger goons strolls in and hands Camargo a brand-new Jim Palmer baseball glove and a box of six baseballs. The reporters are astonished.

"Excuse me," says Camargo, who begins to pound his fist in the new glove. He is beaming. He and Branch start talking baseball, with a bewildered Inclán translating. A bond is formed. Camargo lets Branch pound his fist into the glove.

Camargo is now expansive, as if the reporters were guests in his home. He says he knows a lot about the United States and walks over to a corner where there is a stack of framed diplomas on the floor. He flips through them and hands Branch a diploma from the U.S. Army School of Special Warfare. It is signed by General Joseph W. Stilwell, Commandant. Then he hands Branch a certificate from the International Police Academy, a training school for the world's policemen. It has closed after a dose of scandal. Branch wonders if all the DISIP goons have been trained by the Agency; he would like to meet their American contacts.

Rothchild has landed in Miami. He goes straight to *The Miami News* and causes an uproar with his story. The editors there have been worried about Inclán since she missed her check-in call six hours ago. The managing edi-



"Any suggestions on who to get rid of?"

continued

tor calls the American Embassy in Caracas and lifts it off the ground with rage. The embassy promises to investigate immediately. Rothchild begins to reconsider his views on newspaper editors.

Camargo comes into the holding room wearing the look of a man who has just accomplished something.

"Your visas have been officially confiscated," he announces.

The reporters look at him blankly. "What's new about that?" asks Inclán. "You have had them all day."

"Now they are *permanently* confiscated," says Camargo. He shows them a new Venezuelan seal stamped on each one. Over the seals, someone has scrawled, "*Visa fue revocada.*"

Before the reporters have time to figure out what this signifies, Camargo gives the order to move out. He says the plane is late. The goon squads materialize.

Inclán explains to Branch that they are in big trouble. Even if Camargo lets them go, she says, they could be stopped ten feet outside the airport and asked for their papers. They could be slapped in prison for the "*revocada*" on their passports. For the first time they are not on solid legal ground. Branch shakes his head wearily and tells Inclán they have lost a round of hardball.

They follow a triumphant Camargo to the plane.

Epilogue: More Pay Phones

On October 24, two days after the reporters left Caracas, Deputy Interior Minister Marco Tulio Brunicelli talked with the press to clear up the matter. Brunicelli said Hilda Inclán had arrived carrying documents that "did not conform with national norms," and that "she was cordially asked to leave the country because it is necessary to comply with our laws." As for Branch and Rothchild, he declared that they "expressed solidarity with their colleague and decided to leave the country."

That same day, Branch was checking with Cuban sources in Miami to find out why Morales had turned on him. He received worse than a cold shoulder, and some of his best Cuban friends told him to stay out of Miami. The most loyal veterans of the C.I.A.—people who had spent years denouncing and exposing terrorists as a detriment to the anti-Castro cause—now supported the terrorists and expected nothing but opposition from the Agency. "If you don't help the good people fight Castro," said one old C.I.A. Cuban, "then we have to help the bad ones do it. There's nothing left but terrorism." Branch was stunned by how rapidly the anti-C.I.A., pro-terrorist trend had progressed in even the two years since he had left Miami. C.I.A. loyalists were now in very short supply. The last defectors were Cubans whose secret histories stretched back to the Fifties and Sixties, when their anti-Communist movement was in the American mainstream. The C.I.A. trained the Cubans to work by stealth—to lie, smuggle weapons, move illegally in and out of countries, make bombs t strike secretly against Castro targ. Some of them were "official" terrorists, who would stoically accept long jail sentences rather than reveal a C.I.A. secret. Now they were no longer official.

Rothchild was back home in the Everglades. On Monday he received the first of several phone calls from a man identifying himself as a "consultant to the government of Venezuela." He wanted to give Rothchild some money to write about Rothchild's background. Very weird, thought Rothchild. He began to worry that his trip to Caracas would follow him.

Press reports from Venezuela quoted interior ministry officials in Venezuela as saying that Ricardo Morales "did not cause the expulsion of the American journalists." In an official statement on October 26 the ministry said Morales "does not even work for the DISIP."

A few days later, Branch received a letter from someone in Venezuela who was working on the terrorist network. It came by messenger and read like Sherlock Holmes: "The key to this thing—whatever it is—is Morales, and the key to him is something you already know. It seems that something he once told you or knows you know will click with something you would be likely to hear here, or would reveal something here, that he didn't want out. Think."

Branch went to see Eugene Propper, the assistant U.S. attorney in charge of the Letelier investigation. Propper wanted to know about the Venezuela trip because he was thinking of going there himself. The leads pointed there, he said. He asked questions about the Cuban terrorists. Branch outlined what he knew. He took a reading of Propper and was satisfied that he wanted badly to solve the case. Branch only worried that they were both way over their heads. His worries skyrocketed when Propper asked to see a copy of *The Miami News*, which contained articles about Morales and the Venezuela trip.

Propper knitted his eyebrows and scrutinized the *News* as if it were a moon rock. Something gave Branch a sinking feeling. "The *News* and the *Herald* in Miami have an awful lot of stuff about terrorists," he said. "You have all that, don't you?"

"I don't think we get them," said Propper.

"You *have* to have them," Branch pleaded. Propper made a couple of unsuccessful phone calls around the Justice Department and said he would get these newspapers from the Library of Congress as soon as possible.

Branch knew what it must be like to call the police station in the middle of a robbery and find its phone disconnected. He recovered and offered to do anything he could to help, even to go back to Venezuela.

"I've only got one major reservation," he said, "and that is the informant problem. You have to rely on the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. to investigate, and the fact is that most of the suspects and likely witnesses are old C.I.A. and F.B.I. men of some sort."

Pr r said it could be handled. The F.B.I. ople on the case would arrest their own mothers if they had to. The terrorists had threatened to kill an F.B.I. agent. The Bureau had two hundred agents on the case. It was the biggest thing in the F.B.I.

"What about the Agency?" asked Branch. "Look, I don't think the C.I.A. had anything to do with these murders, but the terrorists are *using* their old C.I.A. connections in more ways than one. The Agency is in a bind. It has created a monster. The whole world of secrets in Miami has turned upside down. But I'll bet those old pros over at the Agency aren't about to sacrifice their security and secrecy to help solve a murder."

Propper said he was getting cooperation, reams of stuff in fact. Branch asked him to test it. "Ask them for their file on Luis Posada," he said. "I know they've got one on him. He came into the Agency through the M.R.P. before the Bay of Pigs. Ask the Agency what it has about Posada's involvement with a bootleg assassination attempt against Castro in 1965 involving a guy named Herminio Diaz. Diaz was caught and killed in Cuba. Now, if the Agency doesn't have *anything* on that, they're just giving you a lot of smoke." (Posada is the Cuban detective from the DISIP now held by the DISIP for the Cubana de Aviación bombing.)

Propper agreed. (On a later visit, Propper would say he was getting Agency cooperation but declined to give Branch any details.)

On November 4, the State Department responded to Branch's request for a position statement on the Venezuelan expulsion, which the U.S. Embassy in Caracas had been investigating. A State Department representative read a portion of a press briefing as follows:

Q: What did he (Branch) say and what's the State Department going to do about it?

A: He described the dealings he and two others had with the Venezuelan authorities at Maiquetía Airport when they arrived there last week. I'm not going to discuss details of what he said. That would be for him to do, if he wishes. Our Embassy has expressed our concern over this incident to the appropriate Government of Venezuela officials.

An hour later, an agitated woman from the State Department called back. "Mr. Branch," she said, "I'm afraid there's been a big mistake. That briefing that was just read to you does not constitute the department's public position. It is a guideline."

"What is a guideline?"

"It is a policy draft setting out what the people here are authorized to say in response to inquiries. What you have there is what we *would* have said had we been asked. But it is not what we have said publicly. We have no record of being asked on the record, although some reporters may have inquired privately, in which case we would have responded according to the guideline."

"So what is the State Department's position, then?"

continued

The woman went on to say, in so many words, that State was holding steady at an expression of concern.

That afternoon, Branch met with Propper and the senior F.B.I. agent on the Letelier case. The agent was convincingly determined to solve the murders. Branch sketched out what he knew again. The agent advised him strongly not to return to Venezuela, observing that the DISIP was perfectly capable of chopping off his hands and assembling a dozen Venezuelans within thirty minutes to swear it was an accident. He felt the F.B.I. had to put away the killers, who had come to Washington in order to check the terrorists' boldness. Otherwise Washington could gradually turn into Miami, and Miami could turn into Beirut.

Branch agreed and asked if the F.B.I. was planning a trip to Venezuela. The agent replied that he was not sure of the Bureau's own physical safety there, and that furthermore the F.B.I. did not have jurisdiction for such a trip. He outlined the restrictions on the F.B.I. and C.I.A. as they apply to cases that are both domestic and international, criminal and related to the national security. It added up to catch-22, but it did not destroy the agent's confidence.

Branch's confidence, however, was low. He was just offering to do what he could again when a call came through for Propper. The agent became excited and asked Branch to excuse him. On the way out the door, Branch overheard the salutation: "Is that you, Joe?" asked Propper. "Listen, are you calling from a pay phone? Okay. Give me the number of another pay phone near there and I'll call you back." #

FORM 3020

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY Scy 231 TOTAL COPIES - 3 RUN BY 2Y

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

REPRODUCTI
ISSUING OFF

STAFF AGEN

VR C/P/DMS C/PCS/ITCY C/ MAR 7 7 27 PM '76

ACTION C/S/S/TID

IP/E/S

INFO C/XH8, C/CI4 C/S/ABC C/SIA

ACTION COPY

T 658185 EIA026 PAGE 01

TOR: 072247Z MAR 77

IN 208649

0 072115Z MAR 77
FM UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE HQS (ID/FIB)
TO CIA HQS OPERATIONS STAFF/LIAISON GROUP ATTN: BETTY SANDY-GA-1
INFO USSS LIAISON DIVISION
BT
UNCLAS CITE USSS 2830 07MAR77 1615EST
SUBJECT: NAME CHECKS
FILE: CO2-33115

REFERENCE IS MADE TO TELCOM THIS DATE. HEREWITH ARE NAMES FOR NAMECHECKS. RESULTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO IRS WINNER, THIS DIVIS (634-5862 OR 5310 SECURE). ALL INDIVIDUALS ARE THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN BORN IN CUBA AND TO BE CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY HERE OR ABROAD.

Ref 8/3/77 pd

AGUIAR, FELIX 6-8-52
ALFONSO-RUIZ, HECTOR FRANCISCO 5-12-39 — Refer to FBI
ALVAREZ-LAZARO, JESUS ESTEBEN 12-26-49 — Refer to FBI
ARCE, SIXTO LORENZO 5-9-41 — Refer to FBI
ATIENZA, ORLANDO 7-21-38 — Refer to FBI
BLANCO, HUMBERTO 4-14-40 — NPII 8 mar 77
BOBILLO, ARMANDO 1-4-40
CABRERA-VEGA, HECTOR ALBERTO 7-30-44 — Refer to FBI
CABRERA-VEGA, RAUL ALBERTO 7-7-43 — Refer to FBI
CARBALLO, ROBERTO 12-10-38 — Refer to FBI
CALATAYUD, ANTONIO 10-3-39 — Refer to FBI
CALVINO, WILFREDO 2-14-50 — Refer to FBI
CARBONELL-ARENES, HECTOR AUGUSTO 10-1-40 — ND
CARDENAS-GARCIA, JUAN JORGE 3-29-38 — Refer to FBI
CARRILLO-CALLAS, GUIDO MAXIMILIANO 9-8-42
CARRILLO, LUIS EUGENIO 11-25-30 — NPII 9 mar 77
CASTILLO, GUSTAVO 4-28-46 — Refer to FBI
CASTILLO, PABLO GUSTAVO 4-28-46 — NPII 9 mar 77
CASTRO-PAZ, EULALIO FRANCISCO 6-4-42 — Refer to FBI
CHINEA, RAUL 1-15-42
COLMENARES, ANTONION 6-28-25 — Refer to FBI
CRESPO, LUIS ALBERTO 7-24-41 — Refer to FBI
DECASTROVERDE, WALDO IGNACIO 1-15-41 — Refer to FBI
DELACOVA GONZALEZ-ABREU, ANTONIO RAFAEL 11-27-50 — NPII 9MAR77
DELAKE, RAMIRO — Refer to FBI
DETORRES, BERNARDO 3-26-34 — Refer to DEA
DIAZ-GOMEZ, MIGUEL ANDRES 11-10-45 — Refer to FBI

23

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

201-285923

TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

NON AGENCY MESSAGE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Secret Service Decd.

Thomas Feidler

Aujuan

T 658185 EIA026 PAGE 02 NC 55281

TOR:072247Z MAR 77

ELIAS-NAZIN.JOSE 3-19-20 ref-NPII DR
ENCINOSA.PEDRO 4-27-49 ref-NPII DR
ESPINOSA.MANUEL. REV. 37 YRS. 1940 ref-NPII DR
ESTRADA-ARMANDO LOPEZ 3-15-39 ref-Memo DR
GONZALEZ.FELIPE LUIS 11-10-22 ref Refer to FBI DR
GONZALEZ.AVELINO LAZARO 11-10-50 npi
GONZALEZ.VALIENTE JORGE LUCILO 10-31-41 npi
HERNANDEZ.RAUL ADOLFO 8-9-32; 8-9-41 ref ~~Refer to~~
HERNANDEZ-RAMIREZ. VALENTIN 11-8-42 ref Refer to FBI DEB
IZQUIERDO-DIAZ.NESTOR 3-20-36 ref Refer to FBI DEB
JIMENEZ-ESCOBEDO.GASPAR EUGENIO 10-6-35 ref Refer to FBI DEB
JUNCOSA-PENA.RALPH 1-15-41 ref NPII DEB
LABRADA.RAFAEL GONZALEZ ref Refer to FBI DEB
LAZO-RODRIGUEZ.JESUS 5-7-46 ref Refer to FBI DEB
LOPEZ-AVALOS.ROGELIO 12-30-27 ref Refer to FBI DEB
LOZANO.BIENVENIDO 3-22-44 ref NPII DEB
MANSITO.GIL S. 9-1-43 npi
MARIN-DUARTE.GUSTAVO ref Refer to FBI DEB
MARIZAL.FRANCISCO 10-4-30 ref NPII DEB
MARQUEZ-HERNANDEZ.JUAN BAUTISTA ref Refer to FBI DEB
MENDOZA.ORLANDO ref Refer to FBI DEB
MENENDEZ.GALIS npi
MORALES.RICARDO NAVARRETTE 6-14-39 ref Refer to FBI
MORENO.RAFAEL ref NPII/3
~~MUNIZ.ANTONIO 3-25-48 ref Refer to FBI/3~~ 11 MAR 1977
NOVO-SAMPOL.GUILLERMO 6-6-39 ref CK Refer to the FBI
NOVO-SAMPOL.IGNACIO ROBERTO 6-7-38 ref CK "
OROZCO-CRESPO.RAMON IGNACIO 2-1-34 ref CK "
ORRONDO.CIRO O. 10-21-40 npi
PARENTE.PEDRO ANTONIO 8-16-46 npi
PARSONS.ROBERTO 10-7-30 CK ref Refer to the FBI
PATRICIO.JOSE 7-6-47 ref CK NPII
PAZ-BELLO.EDUARDO ALEJANDRO CK 12-13-52; 10-23-51 ref Refer to the FBI
PEREZ-ALAMO. DUNNEY CK 11-37 ref Refer to the FBI
PEREZ-FRANCO.JUAN CK ref Refer to the FBI
PEREZ.JULIO ref NPII/3
PEREZ VALDEZ.RAFAEL 12- -49 ref NPII/3
PINERO.RAMON 11-27-31 ref Army [illegible]
PINERO.FELIPE ref NPII/3
RODRIGUEZ.FRANCISCO TAMAYO 3-9-32 ref Refer to FBI/3

34 refs
6 npi
8/3
BR.

34

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

FORM 3020
[illegible]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 19-1 RUN BY ______

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED DSM-DDO/DDO BY RD AT 1345 Z
LA

ACTION UNIT LA 8
ACTION #

INFO: RF, FILE, VR, IP/DMS, CI 4, SIA, SIA/FL, EPS/EG 2

STAFF	PRECEDENCE		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 596336 EIA536 PAGE 01-01 IN 184747

TOR:111333Z FEB 77 CARA 32190

SECRET 111326Z FEB 77 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 32190

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,

WNINTEL KMSTONE

REF: CARACAS 32143 (HVC-7589) (IN 177816)

1. FYI: AMBASSADOR WAS UNIMPRESSED WITH EITHER IMPORTANCE OF REF INFO OR URGENCY IN GETTING IT INTO VENEZUELAN GOVT HANDS. HE THINKS REPORT MAY REPRESENT MORE BRAGGADOCIO ON PART OF RICARDO MORALES THAN ACTUAL PLAN OF ACTION AND HE PRIVATELY FEELS EXCITEMENT IN DEPARTMENT OVER THIS SORT OF THING IS BIT OF TEMPEST IN A TEAPOT. NONETHELESS, TO DO OUR PART, HE ASKED STATION TO GIVE GIST OF REF TO WKSCARLET-9 AT NEXT LIAISON MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 11 OR 12 FEBRUARY.

2. FILE: 201-0285923, E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-285923
11 Feb 77

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

12-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	092253Z	DIRECTOR	984274

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE ~~IP/DMS~~, PCS/INT, SIA/FL

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 2P
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS. Y

WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE Y

REF: CARACAS 32143 (IN 177816) (HVC-7589) Y

1. ON 9 FEB, THE ACTING DEPUTY FOR ARA IN STATE INQUIRED RE THE POSSIBILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF PASSING GIST OF REF INTEL TO APPROPRIATE REP OF VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT ON AN URGENT BASIS. Y

2. HEADQUARTERS HAS AGREED TO FORWARD REQUEST TO STATION WITH SUGGESTION THAT THE AMBASSADOR BE CONSULTED AND THAT HE MAY WISH TO HAVE THE EMBASSY PASS THE INFORMATION DIRECTLY TO AN APPROPRIATE VENEZUELAN OFFICIAL AS COMING FROM PERSONS OUTSIDE OF VENEZUELA. Y

3. PLEASE ADVISE ACTION TAKEN. Y

4. FILE: 201-0285923. E2 IMPDET.

9L

ABSTRACT X
INDEX

201-285923
9 Feb 77

DATE: 9 FEB 77
ORIG: T.J.DESMOND:RP
UNIT: C/LA/PNC
EXT: 1033

AC/LA/OPS - J. MATHEUS (DRAFT)

C/LA/RR - L.E. BORING (DRAFT)

C/LA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

T.J.DESMOND (DRAFT)
C/LA/PNC

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007355

FORM 11-76 3005

DISSEM BY IID PER J

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 006687

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LH 11D BY D AT 2162 Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT
LA 10

ACTION #

INFO FILE, VR, [redacted], EPS/EG 2, IP/DMS, IID, PCS/INT 5, ADDO/D, CI 4, CA 4, CA/SOG 4, SIA, SIA/IC, PCS/ITC 4.

T 579185 EIA789 PAGE 01 IN 177816

TOR:042055Z FEB 77 CARA 32143

SECRET 042032Z FEB 77 INTEL TDFIRDB-315/01346-77

CITE CARACAS 32143 HVC-7589

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY LA/MIAMI

WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR SOURCE DESCRIPTION FOR WKDIET-2. SOURCE PARA 2 WKDIET/WKDIET-5 DIRECTLY. SOURCE PARAS 4 AND 5: WKDIET/WKDIET-2 DIRECTLY. NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-0285923. (NOTE: SHOWN TO AMBASSADOR AND FBI AT CARACAS.) CL. BY 035133.

FILED: 042032Z XXXXX

(IID COMMENT: LIFTER CABLE SENT.)

[illegible]	X	[illegible]
		INDEX
[illegible]		PREPARE FOR REVIEW
[illegible]		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]

SECRET

201-285923
4 Feb 77

RECORD COPY

SECRET (When Filled In)

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

● PRIORITY

IN 177816

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE INR [illegible]
(SY/I/PIB,E/TT/OA) SS/ID FBI SECUR I&NS DOA FAA(ACS-20)

Classified by Excepted Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (2)(3) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT
TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIRDB-315/01346-77

DIST 4 FEBRUARY 1977

REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATORS.

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

DOI: LATE JANUARY -3 FEBRUARY 1977

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE ATTEMPT BY RICARDO MORALES TO GAIN THE RELEASE OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH BY FORCE

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (4 FEBRUARY 1977) FIELD NO. HVC-7589

SOURCE: SEE BELOW.

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH 2: A CUBAN EXILE WHO MAINTAINS CLOSE CONTACT WITH OTHER EXILES. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

2. IN LATE JANUARY 1977 RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, A CUBAN-EXILE WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), SAID THAT HE IS PLANNING TO GET CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH OUT OF JAIL BY FORCE. THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT, MORALES SAID, INTENDS TO TRY AND CONVICT BOSCH OF CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER AND INTENDS TO USE BOSCH AS A SCAPEGOAT. MORALES SAID THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ENLISTING THE SUPPORT OF UN-

SPECIFIED CUBAN EXILES TO CARRY OUT HIS PLANS TO GAIN BOSCH'S RELEASE. (SOURCE COMMENT: MORALES DID NOT EXPLAIN WHAT TYPE OF FORCE WOULD BE USED TO GAIN BOSCH'S RELEASE. MORALES IS AN UNSTABLE INDIVIDUAL AND IS CAPABLE OF USING FORCE TO GAIN HIS ENDS.)

3. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5: A VENEZUELAN WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

4. ON 3 FEBRUARY 1977 MORALES SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO LEAVE VENEZUELA FOR MIAMI, FLORIDA, LATER THAT DAY. MORALES SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE IN THE UNITED STATES FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE REASON FOR HIS TRIP IS NOT KNOWN.)

5. MORALES CONTINUES TO RECEIVE HIS DISIP SALARY DESPITE AN EARLIER SCANDAL CONCERNING HIS DISIP STATUS. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON MORALES SEE HVC-7548, TDFIRDB-315//11772-76, OF MID-NOVEMBER 1976, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY.) MORALES HAS RECENTLY RENTED AN EXPENSIVE APARTMENT IN A FASHIONABLE AREA OF CARACAS. THE RENT ON WHICH IS ALMOST EQUAL TO HIS DISIP SALARY.

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

14-00000

FORM 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 177816

TDFIR DB-315/01346-77

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATORS.

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO: STATE, DIA, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, NSA, SWS, TREASURY,
CIA/OPSCEN, SS/ID, FBI, I&NS-DDA,FAA.

SECRET

201-289923

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

	INDEXING REQUESTED
	NO INDEXING
	APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT
0
Ricardo Morales Navarette (201-285923)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. The information provided below is taken from a Santo Domingo Station liaison report transmitted to Headquarters under HDCA-11074, dated 29 November 1976. The information dated 29 August 1976 was received by the liaison service from one of its agents assigned to Miami, Florida. It is being sent to you for information only. All information below was reportedly stated in testimony at the trial of the Cuban terrorist Rolando Otero in Jacksonville, Florida, and Antonio Gonzalez had obtained immunity from prosecution. The declarations he made were corroborated by Cubans Ciro Orizondo and Manuel Revuelta, former comrades of Otero in the Frente de Liberacion Nacional Cubano (FLNC).

2. According to Antonio Gonzalez, there have to be in Miami up to 500 pro-Castro agents operating; that in a supposed plot to kill Fidel Castro in Venezuela, there had been with him and Rolando Otero, a Cuban named Ricardo Morales and infiltrating into the affair, he tried to frustrate the plan. Gonzalez also said that Morales, supposedly worked for the "CIAin the Congo" and actually is an agent of the Government of Venezuela, used to investigate those Cubans who enter and exit from Venezuela. Gonzalez also said that in reality, Morales is a Castro agent.

Lemuel E. GALLAHORN

FILE	X	
		NEW

25 JAN 1977

Distribution:
Orig & 2 COS, Caracas

RECORD COPY

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 007255

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCW-10659	24 January 1977
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-285923

Int. Dist:
1 - Chrono
1 - IP

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
C/LA/PSC/V--Robert N. Andrews:pm			1715

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/LA/PSC	77	Charlotte Bustos-Videla

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

State cable dated 15 Feb 77
State cable dated 1 May 77
State cable dated 22 Nov. 77
State cable dated 22 Nov 77

FBI Report dated 26 April 77.
Re: Ricardo Anibal Morales Navarette
Registration Act

FBI Report dated 21 July 77
Re: Unknown Subjects: Explosion in
Car driven by Orlando Letelier-
Victim (Deceased), etc. 21 Sept. 76

THIRD AGENCY MATERIAL

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES NAVARRETTE, RICARDO	
201-0285923	075-008-019
SEX M	CARA-33792
	27 JUL 77
	HVC-07716
	P4

LOC VENE. FORMER OFFICIAL OF DIRECTORATE FOR SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION /DISIP/. WARNED MBRS OF COORDINATED UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION /CORU/, GUSTAVO CASTILLO AND FRANK CASTRO /201-0742365/ OF DISIP REPRESSION AGAINST CUBANS IN VENE.

DATE 09 SEP 77 09538675

201-285923

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES, RICARDO NAVARRETTE
201-0285923 200-011-009/43
SEX M DCNC-00066/77
20 SEP 77
P11

ENTERED USA LATE 60. RECRUITED AS RADIO OPERATOR AND MBR OF PARAMILITARY INFILTRATION TEAM FOR MISSIONS INTO CUBA BUT NEVER USED.

DATE 10 FEB 78 09579154

201-285923

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

55/42/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (081) INFO: FILE, VR, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS-2, ODPD-D, SE-8, SIA, SIA/FL, (28/W)

---

78 0207450 PAGE 001 IN 0207450
TOR: 112030Z JAN 78 CARA 35189

SECRET 112005Z JAN 78 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 35189

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RNMUM CKLEG WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 144358
B. CARACAS 35019 TOO OLD
C. CARACAS 33784 TOO OLD

1. STATION LIAISON OFFICER MET WITH SUBJECT OF 201-0952786 AS PART OF ASSESSMENT OF SUBJECT'S KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET PERSONNEL AND ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA, AND TO DETERMINE HER POTENTIAL AS POSSIBLE UNILATERAL SUPPORT ASSET AGAINST SOVIET AND BLOC TARGETS.

2. DURING DISUCSSIONS, SUBJECT MENTIONED THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN PAST SHE HAD NOTED ON SURVEILLANCE REPORTS OF CUBAN EMBASSY THAT A VEHICLE BEARING LICENSE PLATE REGISTERED TO MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ENTERED WITH SOME FREQUENCY. HOWVER, ATTEMPTS TO IDENTIFY THE PERSON TO WHOM VEHICLE ALLOCATED ALWAYS WERE RETURND TO HER WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO FORGET THE ENTRY AND TO STOP MAKING REFERENCES TO IT IN HER REPORTS. SHE FINALLY WAS ADVISED THAT THE CAR WAS USED BY (AT THAT TIME) COMISARIO RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE (201-0285923), AND THAT SHE SHOULD REFRAIN FROM MAKING FURTHER INQUIRIES OR FORM INCLUDING THAT LICENSE PLATE IN HER REPORTS. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, SUBJECT WAS REMOVED FROM RESPONSIBILITY OF MONITORING AND ANALYZING CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA AND RESTRICTED TO THE SOVIETS AND SOVIET BLOC.

3. FILE: 201-0952786; 201-0285923. E2, IMPDET.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-285923
DO NOT DESTROY

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

13-2

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
	021635Z	CIA	133734

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/IP/DMS, C/LSN/10, C/C1, C/PCS

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 44
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SCP
0 IP FILES # 132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.Y

ATTENTION: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION Y

SECRET WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED//NO FOREIGN DISSEM Y

CIR-316/04224-77 Y

SUBJECT: RICARDO ANIBAL MORALES NAVARRETE, FOREIGN COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE - VENEZUELA Y

REF: FBI CABLE DATED 221803Z NOV 77, SAME SUBJECT Y

1. YOU ARE ADVISED, IN RESPONSE TO THE REFERENCED QUERY, THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN THE ABOVE SUBJECT. ~~OUR STATION IN CARACAS NOTES THAT THE SUBJECT MIGHT FALSELY CLAIM SOME SORT OF RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AGENCY IF ARRESTED, BUT IN FACT NO SUCH RELATIONSHIP EXISTS.~~ Y

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

CABLE SEC: PLEASE PROVIDE A COPY TO IP FOR FILING IN 201-285923 AND 19-2-18.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 285923
[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TWO	TPE	WRD	DDI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR　DATE TIME GROUP　CITE　MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA 133734.

CONF:　INFO: FILE

0 INDEX　DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO　PER
0 FILES　#

ORIG: LA/CO/CI {FAUST X1325}; COORD: DC/LA/CO {[illegible] ~~[illegible]~~},
C/LA/VCE/V {AMORI}, DC/LA/SR {DISTEFANO}; AUTH: C/LAD {WARREN}.
REF: C/PCS/LSN/ID { KUHN }.

LA, E73
Regina

DATE: 30 NOVEMBER 1977
ORIG: OWEN FAUST
UNIT: LA/CO/CI
EXT: 1325

DC/LA/CO
C/LA/VCE/V
DC/LA/SR Distefano
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/PCS/LSN/ID
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IMPDET
CL BY:

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LAP

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR ______ CI4

EPS/EG 2

C/PCS

1	4
2	5
3	6

375224 EIA259 PAGE 01-01 IN 477336

TOR:281405Z NOV 77 CARA 34827

S E C R E T 251357Z NOV 77 STAFF

CITE CARACAS ~~34827~~

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RNMUM

REF: DIRECTOR 130272

1. THE FBI IS FREE TO ARREST MORALES: WE HAVE NO ORS INTEREST. BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE HE MAY CLAIM RELATIONSHIP WITH RTACTION WHICH, OF COURSE, IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE.

2. FILE: 201-~~0950534~~. E2 IMPDET

90

LA/PNC/V

201-285923

28 Nov 77

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACK CO ACP TUO TPS JURO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

18-1

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	251731Z	DIRECTOR	130272

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, LSN/10, C/PCS, C14, EPS/EG2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 44
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS.

UNINTEL RNMUM

REF: DIRECTOR |*| 130271

1. SUBJECT REF IS LIKELY TO BE ARRESTED BY THE FBI FOR FAILURE TO REGISTER UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION ACT. WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE, WE PLAN TO TELL THE BUREAU THAT WE HAVE NO OPS INTEREST IN MORALES. PLS ADVISE.

2. FILE: 201-0950534. E2 IMPDET.

ORIG: AC/LA/VCE (AMORI X1033); AUTH: PCS/LSN (KUHN); REL: AC/LA/VCE (AMORI).

*SIG CENTER: PLS INSERT DIR NUMBER

LA PNC/V

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1977
ORIG: ALBERT/AMORI:CK
UNIT: AC/LA/VCE
EXT: 1033

201-285923
25 Nov 77

AC/LA/VCE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

PCS/LSN
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 007667

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

10-1

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 251731Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 130271

DISSEM BY: ЧЧ

CONF: 1/LA 8 INFO: FILE 4/LSN/10

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER SCP

0 IP FILES # 132

TO: CARACAS.Y

UNINTEL RNMUM Y

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FBI CABLE DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1977. THIS INFO IS FOR ADDRESSEE BACKGROUND ONLY, NOT TO BE DISCUSSED OR OTHERWISE DISCLOSED OUTSIDE RTACTION WITHOUT PRIOR HQS AUTHORIZATION:Y

|SIG CENTER: PLS TRANSMIT ATTACHED FBI CABLE - IN 473160 - BEGINNING WITH "RICARDO ANIBAL MORALES NAVARRETE; FOREIGN. . ."|

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.H

BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBORIG: LA/VCE/V (MORGAN X1715); AUTH: PCS/LSN (KUHN); REL: AC/LA/VCE (AMORI).#

Morales

*COPY ATTACHED

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1977
ORIG: RUSSELL MORGAN:CK
UNIT: LA/VCE/V
EXT: 1715

AC/LA/VCE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

PCS/LSN
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 007667

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

14-00000

5 copies

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 33 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 41-3 BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY 'LA BY 15 AT 1900 Z

STAFF PRECEDENC

ACTION UNIT C/LE 5

ACTION 1 RF FILE VR C/LAS C/NE 6 ADD/[illegible]

~~[illegible]~~

C/CA3 C/CI 4 C/[illegible]2 C/FR 4

T 247823 EIA236 PAGE 01 IN 358141

TOR:261852Z JUL 77 CARA 33796

SECRET 261832Z JUL 77 STAFF

WKBOXER/OPS
75-8-15
Morales Navarette
75-5-9
F-7

CITE CARACAS 33796

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT MHSPIKE WKBOXER

REFS: A. CARACAS 33793 (IN 357055)

B. CARACAS 33793 (HVC-7716) (IN 357051)

1. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS SINCE REFS:

A. WKDIET-5 REPORTS THAT ON 24 JULY WKTANGO-1 STATED THAT, WITH PRESIDENT PEREZ/ BACKING, HE IS DECLARING WAR ON CUBAN EXILES AND IF ANYTHING UNTOWARD HAPPENS, HE WILL TAKE "BLOOD BATH FROM NEW YORK TO CARACAS." HE ALSO MENTIONED AS ADDITIONAL IMPLIED THREAT THAT CUBAN SUPERTHUG, RICARDO MORALEX NAVARETTE, HAS BEEN FULLLY REINSTATED IN DISIP.

B. INFLUENTIAL LOCAL CUBAN EXILES ARE IN SOMEWHAT OF AN UPROAR OVER WHAT THEY REGARD AS POTENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF REPRESSION IN VENEZUELA AND ARE TRYING TO ENLIST SUPPORT OF BOTH COPEI OPPOSITION PARTY AND EX-PRESIDENT BETANCOURT, STAUNCH ANTI-CASTRO-COMMUNIST, TO OFFSET MOVES OF PRESIDENT PEREZ WHOM THEY CONSIDER TO BE IN BED WITH CASTRO. COPEI HAS ALLEGEDLY COME OUT FULLY IN SUPPORT OF LOCAL CUBAN

SECRET

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 247813 EIA236 PAGE 02 IN 358141

TOR:281852Z JUL 77 CARA 33796

EXILE COMMUNITY: BETANCOURT HHAS NOTIFIED THEM THAT HE IS STUDYING THE SITUATION BEFORE REPLYING.

C. AMBASSADOR MET PRESIDENT PEREZ FOR BREAKFAST MORNING 28 JULY. NOTHING WAS MENTIONED ABOUT CUBAN EXILE SITUATION.

2. WHAT WE COULD HAVE AS BASIS OF THIS WHOLE SITUATION IS CUBAN FORGERIES OF LETTERS FROM BOSCH TO BRING PRESSURE ON CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN VENEZUELA WHILE REMAINS ALMOST TOTALLY ANTI-CASTRO. IT IS INTERSTING TO NOTE LETTERS PASSED BY CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO PRESIDENT PEREZ WERE TYPED, NOT HANDWRITTEN, AND ONLY SIGNED BY BOSCH. IN ANY EVENT, AMBASSADOR STRONGLY DISTRUSTS WKTANGO-1 IN ANYTHING INVOLVING CUBAN EXILES AND SUSPECTS THAT RICARDO MORALES IS EMOTIONALLY, IF NOT MENTALLY, UNSTABLE AND A CUBAN AGENT(SO DO WE). COS DISCUSSED GENERAL SITUATION WITH AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING. AS OF NOW, AMBASSADOR DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE ANY INFORMMATION TO VENEZUELANS ON CUBAN EXILES EXCEPT ON ESTABLISHED TERRORISTS AND ADVANCE NOTICE OF IMPENDING TERRORIST ACTIONS, LEAST OF ALL DOES HE WANT US TO DEAL WITH WKTANGO-1 ON THIS SUBJECT.

3. SINCE THERE APPEARS TO BE SEVERAL GAMES WITHIN GAMES BEING PLAYED HERE, AND SOURCE OF REF B IS WKTANGO-1 (ONE OF THE MAJOR

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

STAFF

1	4
2	5
3	6

..T 047813 EIA236 PAGE 03-03 IN 358141

TOR:281852Z JUL 77. CARA 33796

PARTICIPANTS.) RECOMMEND REF B NOT BE DISSEMINATED UNTIL PICTURE IS CLARIFIED.

4. FILE: 75-120-26. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

S E C R E T

STAFF

[illegible] INFO FILE VR [illegible]

T 038993 EIA651 PAGE 01 IN 354509

TOR:252324Z JUL 77 CARA 33784

S E C R E T 252151Z JUL 77 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 33784

TO: DIRECTOR INFO FH/NEW YORK.

WNINTEL RYBAT HEAM .

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 269199

B. CARACAS 33655 (IN 341549)

1. ANY ADDITIONAL INFO WE MAY OBTAIN ON NATURE OF MORALES CONTACT WITH SLFAT-1 WILL BE CABLED TO ADDRESSEES. AT THIS POINT ALL WE HAVE IS INFO PROVIDED IN REF B.

2. WHILE IT POSSIBLE, WE DON'T THINK THAT MORALES' CONTACT WITH SLFAT-1 IS RESULT OF A WKTANGO-1 DIRECTED RECRUITMENT OP. WE ARE MORE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THIS IS SOME SORT OF STRANGE LIAIOSON OR DOUBLE-AGENT OPERATION, PROBABLY SUGGESTED BY MORALES HIMSELF, OSTENSIBLY TO MAKE HIMSELF USEFUL TO WKSCARLET. IT HAS BEEN MENTIONED BEFORE, AND WE HAVE LONG SUSPECTED, WITHOUT ANY HARD EVIDENCE, THAT MORALES MAY BE A CASTRO CUBAN AGENT. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT HE HAS CONNED THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT, OR WKTANGO-1, INTO BELIEVING THAT HE HAS SOME SPECIAL ENTRE WITH SLFAT-1. ALL-IN-ALL, BASED ON OUR PRESENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE CHARACTERS

S E C R E T

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-285923
DO NOT DESTROY

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER   TOTAL COPIES   RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHE
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROH

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED   BY   AT   Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO   RF   FILE   VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 038993   EIA651   PAGE 02-02   IN 354509

TOR:252324Z JUL 77   CARA 33784

INVOLVED AND THE PRESSURES OF THE MOMENT, WE THINK THAT MORALES IS MORE PRONE TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION WITH SLFAT-1 THAN WKTANGO-1 IS OF GIVING A SECOND TRY TO THE RECRUITMENT OF SLFAT-1.

3. FILE: 201-0067860; 201-0328945; 201-0285923.

E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 41 PER

TOTAL COPIES 21-2- RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT 4LAS

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR Adams, DDO4, 9C14, 4EESIEG2

T 810745 E14628 PAGE 21 IN 256922

TOR:292234Z APR 77 CARA 32949

S E C R E T 292225Z APR 77 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 32949

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI

RYBAT WNINTEL REAM

1. ON 28 APRIL 1977 WKDIET-5 REPORTED THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE (SUBJECT OF 201-2285923), AKA "EL MONO", IS RUMORED TO HAVE KILLED IN MIAMI A CUBAN EXILE BY THE NAME OF ROBERTO PARSONS. WKDIET-5 SAYS THAT PARSONS WORKED FOR BKHERALD AND UNDERTOOK SEVERAL CLANDESTINE TRIPS TO CUBA. HE SAID AT TIMES PARSONS HELPED GET PEOPLE OUT OF CUBA FOR A PRICE. PARSONS HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE DECEMBER 1976. THE EXACT REASON FOR HIS ALLEGED MURDER IS UNKNOWN.

2. FOLLOWING ARE TRACES ON ROBERTO PARSONS: ACCORDING TO UMWAVE-1322, 16 FEBRUARY 1968, AN AMCLEVE-15 MIAMI CONTACT WAS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ROBERTO PARSONS RAMIREZ, BORN 12 JULY 1930 IN GUANTANAMO. PARSONS WAS A BKHERALD AGENT FROM 1965 THROUGH 1967 WHEN HE WAS TERMINATED ON 30 NOVEMBER WITHOUT PREJUDICE. HE WAS USED IN EXFILTRATION AND INFILTRATION OPERATIONS AND OCCASIONALLY REPORTED GRATUITOUSLY

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-285923

DO NOT DESTROY

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT	INFO	FILE VR	STAFF
ACTION #			1 4 2 5 3 6

T 810745 EIA003 PAGE 02-02 IN 266922

TOR: 292034Z APR 77 CARA 32949

ON THE DSE AND DGI.

3. INDEX PARSONS. FILE: 75-120-28, 201-0285923.

E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

16:2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

STAFF

042333Z DIRECTOR

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 029666

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE 1 ADMS, CI4, LSN/10, CIPCS,

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 41

TO: CARACAS INFO LA/MIAMI.

UNINTEL KMSTONE

REFS: A. CARACAS 32949 (IN 266922)

B. CARACAS 32958 (IN 268419) (NOT NEEDED LA/MIAMI)

1. PARA 2 BELOW IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE WHICH WAS SENT TO THE FBI ON 4 MAY, BASED ON REFS. PLEASE PASS THE INFORMATION TO THE LEGATT CARACAS:

2. A. ACCORDING TO A VENEZUELAN SOURCE WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED, RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, CUBAN-BORN NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZEN, IS RUMORED TO HAVE KILLED ROBERTO PARSONS, ANOTHER CUBAN EXILE, IN MIAMI, FLORIDA. SOURCE SAID THAT PARSONS HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE DECEMBER 1976 AND THAT THE REASON FOR HIS ALLEGED MURDER IS UNKNOWN.

B. PARSONS IS PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH ROBERTO PARSONS RAMIREZ, BORN 10 JULY 1930 IN GUANTANAMO, CUBA. HE WAS OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST TO THIS AGENCY FROM JULY 1965 UNTIL NOVEMBER 1967.

C. A DIFFERENT SOURCE WHO IS USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTED ON:

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

B 201-779687

201-285423

4 May 77

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RECORD COPY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

029666

29 APRIL 1977 THAT MORALES HAS GONE INTO HIDING IN THE UNITED STATES TO AVOID A COURT APPEARANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DEATH OF FORMER CHILEAN OFFICIAL ORLANDO LETELIER. Y

D. THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE LEGAL ATTACHE IN CARACAS. NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION IS BEING MADE. Y

3. AMONG THE CLOSE ASSOCIATES PARSONS LISTED IN HIS PRQ PART I COMPLETED IN JULY 1965 IS ANTONIO BUSTILLO PEREZ {201-0756656}, A MEMBER OF THE WKTANGO-1 GROUP. {WASHINGTON 026922} Y

4. FILE: 201-0285923; X REF: 201-0779687{PARSONS}. E2 IMPDET.H

COMMENT: REPORTED ABOVE INFORMATION AND STATION TRACES WHICH INDICATED THAT PARSONS WAS OF PREVIOUS OPERATIONAL INTEREST TO JMWAVE.

ORIG: C/LA/PNC/V{ANDREWS}; COORD: [redacted]C/LA/OPS~~{[illegible]}~~ [illegible], LA/COG{LATRASH}, LA/CAR{AMES}; AUTH:DC/LA/PNC~~{DESMOND}~~ BUSTOS; REL: AC/LA {LAUDER}.

DATE: 4 MAY 77
ORIG: ROBERT ANDREWS:PM
UNIT: C/LA/PNC/V
EXT: X1715

AC/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

DC/LA/OPS
LA/COG F Latrash
LA/CAR
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Bustos
DC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

18.2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE TIME GROUP 052304Z CITE CIA MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 030328

CONF: 9LA 8 INFO: FILE 9IP/DMS, 9LSN/ID, 9PCS, 9CI 2, 9PCS/ITC4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 41

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER SOP

0 IP FILES # 132

TO: FBI//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INFO DEPT OF STATE//SY/TAG, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. Y

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR Y

CIR-316/01585-77 Y

O

SUBJECT: RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE Y

ON 25 APRIL 1977

1. [redacted] A VENEZUELAN SOURCE WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED REPORTED THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, CUBAN-BORN NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZEN, IS RUMORED TO HAVE KILLED ROBERTO PARSONS, ANOTHER CUBAN EXILE, IN MIAMI, FLORIDA. SOURCE SAID THAT PARSONS HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE DECEMBER 1976 AND THAT THE REASON FOR HIS ALLEGED MURDER IS UNKNOWN. Y

cl

2. PARSONS IS PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH ROBERTO PARSONS RAMIREZ, BORN 10 JULY 1930 IN GUANTANAMO, CUBA. HE WAS OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST TO THIS AGENCY FROM JULY 1965 UNTIL NOVEMBER 1967. Y

3. A DIFFERENT VENEZUELAN SOURCE WHO IS USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTED ON 29

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

B 201-779687

316/01585-77
201-285923
5 May 77

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE CIA

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF:

INFO: FILE

030328

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

APRIL 1977 THAT MORALES HAS GONE INTO HIDING IN THE UNITED STATES TO AVOID A COURT APPEARANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DEATH OF FORMER CHILEAN OFFICIAL ORLANDO LETELIER. Y

4. THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE LEGAL ATTACHE IN CARACAS. NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION IS BEING MADE. Y

5. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. XGDS-2.H

BASED ON: PARAGRAPHS ONE AND TWO: CARACAS 32949 (IN-266922)
WKDIET (WKDIET-5)
PARAGRAPH THREE: CARACAS 32958 (IN-268419)
WKMAYOR (WKSCARLET-9)

OBJECTIVE: J-1

ORIG: LA/PNC (KENNER X9454); COORD: DC/LA/PNC ~~(DESMOND)~~ BUSTOS; C/LA/COG ~~(LATRASH)~~; C/LA/AN (BEARDSLEY); C/LA/OPS (DI STEFANO); PCS/ITC (WARNER - TELECOORD); AUTH: AC/LAD (LAUDER); REL: C/PCS/LSN (

LA/Reg
ET-3 Regina A
Attn: Isabelle

DC/LA/PNC Busta
C/LA/COG
C/LA/AN
C/LA/OPS
PCS/ITC - (E. WARNER - TELECOORD)
LA/RR C. Bauer

MAY 00 77

DATE: 3 MAY 1977
ORIG: H. KENNER:LW
UNIT: LA/PNC
EXT: 9454

C/PCS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MATLACK, DOROTHE K. (MRS)
LOOSE DOCUMENTS

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Army Document (Third Agency)

Chile

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
1:20 3 AUG 78		BETH LICHTENFELS	Beth Lichtenfels
[illegible] AM 24 AUG-78		SURELL BRADY	Surell Brady
1055 24 Aug 78	SAME	JAMES P. KELLY	James P. Kelly

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

RECORD MATERIAL

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES, RM GA-50, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4598

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 3-77 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

DUE DATE
11 Aug 77

---

3 S. Corbat OG/EER
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15 RETURN TO: IP/ARD/PSU GA-50

To Requester:

Please return this reference to IP/ARD/PSU immediately after use.

RECORDS CENTER

JOB NO. 78-1939

SPACE NO. 325583

FILE NO. Wash-CIA-Pro-384

DOCUMENT

FOLDER NO. 54

BOX NO. 3

E2 IMPDET CL BY: 062147

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Wash. CIA-PRO-384
folder #54

RETURN TO RECORD CENTER IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE

RI/ARCHIVES

C H I L E

Apr. 4, 1952

B R I E F S

WORKERS' HOUSING--An executive message to the Chamber of Deputies asks for the authorization of 120 million pesos for the construction of cheap housing for workers employed by the city of Santiago. The bill will be considered soon by the proper committee. (CE1180 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0030 GMT--R)

TRANSPORTATION APPROPRIATION--The Finance Ministry has dispatched the decree putting 94 million pesos at the disposal of the national transport authority for the acquisition of trolley buses and supplies to the comptroller's office. (CE1174 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0100 GMT--R)

TEACHERS' STRIKE--At the meeting of striking teachers held Apr. 3 it was decided to adopt the following procedural points: 1--To continue the strike indefinitely; 2--to demand that salaries be fixed at a rate equal to that of the minimum paid to private employees, plus 20 percent; 3--to protest the refusal of two Deputies to give their votes to the draft of a bill to readjust the earnings of public officials, which also provides that exonerated Communist professors will be reinstated; 4--to protest an anti-strike editorial published in EL MERCURIO; 5--to meet on Apr. 4 at the University of Chile to determine the course to follow. (CE1174 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0100 GMT--R)

COPPER SITUATION--The Minister of Labor has declared that as long as the Finance Ministry does not solve the problem of exchange, the nitrate dispute cannot be solved. (CE1174 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0100 GMT--R)

FOREIGN MINISTRY--Juan (Marin) has been authorized to continue in his post as Chilean Charge d'Affairs in India, and Juan Guzman Cruchaga in his important Foreign Ministry assignment. (CE1174 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0100 GMT--R)

IMMIGRATION PLAN--The Sociedad Italiana plans to invest 100 million pesos for the purpose of cultivating and exploiting sugar beet crops in southern Chile with colonies of Italian immigrants. The society is collaborating with the Development Corporation and the Agricultural Settlement Fund and will acquire 10,000 hectares in the Province of Cautin for the purpose. (CE1174 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0300 GMT--R)

PRESS FREEDOM COMMITTEE--The President will form a committee for the purpose of studying laws which include repressive measures against the freedom of the press, on Mar. 18 at La Moneda. Press representatives are Emilio Pacul, Juan Honorato, and Mario Vergara. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 17, 1952, 2322 GMT--R)

COAL SITUATION--Reports from the coal region state that the situation is normal and that the workers have decided to work with provincial authorities in trying to reach an agreement after the failure of the Santiago talks. Metallurgical workers at the Lota and Coronel mines have returned to work in accordance with union directives. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 17, 1952, 2325 GMT--R)

CHAMBER PRESIDENTIAL LINE-UP--Since the Chamber of Deputies will meet Mar. 18 to open the special session which will extend to May 21, it is interesting to note the position and strength of its members in regard to the roster of Presidential aspirants: Favoring Arturo Matte Larrain are 33 Liberals, 21 Conservative-Traditionalists, 5 Agrarian Laborites, 2 Liberal-Progressives, and one Independent Democrat, or a total of 63. Favoring Pedro Enrique Alfonso are 42 Radicals, 9 Conservatives and 5 Democrats: total, 56. Carlos Ibanez del Campo: 9 Agrarian Laborites, 5 Socialists, one People's Democrat, and 2 Independent Conservatives; total, 17. Salvador Allende: 6 Socialists and one National Front; total, 7. The only unknown positions and numbers are those of the National Falangists, and the Independent Deputy, Melendez Anfruns. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 16, 1952, 2350 GMT--R)

GATH Y CHAVEZ CLOSING--Gath y Chavez has announced a closing-out of its entire stock of merchandise, thus terminating the career of one of Santiago's best-known business houses. The company closed its doors last Christmas as a result of a strike declared by its personnel. (Santiago, AFP, Mar. 15, 1952, 0000 GMT--R)

IMMIGRATION PROGRAM--The bill drafted by the Government Immigration Committee, presided over by Under Secretary of the Interior Grez, is designed to legislate all matters connected with the immigration of foreigners. The plan proposes the creation of an immigration department or office which will be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and which will be in charge of orienting all immigrants arriving in Chile. Also under consideration is the plan to exempt all immigrants from paying taxes for a period of 5 years. This would include customs duty on their property and machinery as well as income tax. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 14, 1952, 2326 GMT--R)

NAVAL APPOINTMENTS--With the retirement of Vice Admirals Carlos Torres Hevia, Inmanuel Holger, and Horacio de la Fuenta, the Navy will reportedly make some important promotions. Besides raising Naval Capt. Danilo Basi to the rank of Rear Admiral, and raising Enrique Lagreze and Francisco Oyarzun to naval captains, Victor Oelkers has been made rear admiral, and Alberto (Cass) Wigand, Juan Mercado Munoz, and Alfred Lopez have been made naval captains. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 15, 1952, 2310 GMT--R)

FISHING STRIKE--Valparaiso fishermen have joined the Talcahuano fishermen who declared a strike to protest against the Purse Seine fishing enterprises. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 15, 1952, 2320 GMT--R)

U.S. PASTOR--Protestant U.S. Pastor Erickson, whose activities have been attacked in many sectors where he has held public religious meetings, will soon go to Santiago where he will hold meetings in the Caupolican Theater. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 15, 1952, 2335 GMT--R)

MINING TAX--The Government has imposed a one and one-half percent tax on sales made by "small" mining companies. All companies capitalized at less than 5 million pesos fall under this category. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 15, 1952, 2340 GMT--R)

HOUSING CONSTRUCTION--From the total of 200 million pesos allotted for public housing by the Ministry of Public Works, 20 million will go to Iquique and Santiago respectively, 25 million each to Arica and Antofagasta, 30 million to Coquimbo, 40 million to Valparaiso, and 10 million each to Concepcion, Cautin, Magallanes, and Llanquihue Provinces. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 13, 1952, 2334 GMT--R)

HYDROELECTRIC PLANT--Guillermo Moore, manager of the Empresa Nacional de Electricidad has announced that a new central hydroelectric plant will shortly be constructed on Rio Rapel and three more will be constructed in the southern zone. (Santiago /Official/, Diplomatic, Mar. 14, 1952, 1553 GMT--R)

CHILEAN-SWEDISH TRADE--The Minister of Foreign Affairs received the Swedish Minister who proposed negotiations for the drafting of a commercial and cultural treaty. This treaty is designed to increase the exchange of Swedish-manufactured products and machinery for Chilean Agricultural products and minerals. (Santiago /Official/, Diplomatic, Mar. 14, 1952, 1555 GMT--R)

Form No. 35-8
April 1950

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

"SECURITY INFORMATION"

FROM:	FRANKFURT	ROUTINE
TO:	00/OPC/OSO	27 DEC 51
ACTION:	00/CB	IN 49477
INFORMATION:	AD/SO (1), OPS (2), PLANS (3), STC (4), FDM (5-6), OPC (7-8-9-10), S/C (11-12-13), DDP (14)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

FRAN 3173

TO: WASHINGTON (ASHCRAFT) INFO: KARLF
TRANG CITE: FRAN (CRUDEN)

PIPELINE

REUR 446 (OUT 95394)

REF PASSED MOFFETT WHO HAS BEEN EXPLORING WITH CANADIANS. THEY DON'T SEEM INTERESTED. ONLY LIKELY BUYER BELIEVED TO BE ANOTHER S.A. COUNTRY SUCH AS ARGENTINA WITH WHOM WE HAVE NO CONTACTS. WE CERTAINLY NOT ABLE DO ANYTHING HERE WHICH CAN'T BE MORE EFFECTIVELY DONE WESTERN HEMISPHERE WITHOUT EXPENSE MOVING FAMILY BACK TO GERMANY AND THEN ON OUT AGAIN.

TOR 1507Z 27 DEC 51

SECRET

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Form No. 35-6
(Dec. 47)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

SECURITY INFORMATION

To: FRANKFURT

ROUTINE

From: 00/OPC/OSO

20 DEC 51

Confirmation: 00/CB

OUT 95394

Information: AD/SO (1), OPS (2), PLANS (3), STC (4), FDM (5-6), OPC (7-8-9-10), WHD (11), S/C (12-13-14), DDP (15)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

NR 446

TO: FRANKFURT (CRUDEN)   INFO: FRANFG   CITE: WASHINGTON (ASHCRAFT)

PIPELINE

JANNEY OF ZACABIN SAYS HE GAVE ROBINOW BACKGROUND ON AERONAUTICAL ENGINEER AMONG CHILEAN DISPOSAL GROUP AND ROBINOW PROMISED EXPLORE POSSIBILITY GETTING HIM INTO CANADA THROUGH GERMAN CONTACTS. ZACABIN ANXIOUS TO FINISH CHILEAN DISPOSAL OPERATION 15 JANUARY. THIS ONE MAN REFUSES WORK AT ANYTHING EXCEPT AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING, FOR WHICH JOB NOT AVAILABLE CHILE. ADVISE SOONEST WHAT ROBINOW HAS DONE OR WHAT HE CAN DO. ZACABIN THINKING OF MOVING DEFECTOR BACK TO GERMANY, WHERE HE MIGHT LAND IN YOUR LAP.

31-7-4

RELEASING OFFICER

ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0252Z 21 DEC 51

SECRET

Copy No. 2

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

Form No. 35-6
(Dec. 1947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

To:	SANTIAGO	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	30 AUG 51
Confirmation:	WHD (1-2)	~~OUT 7392~~
Information:	IR (3-4), AD/SO (5), OPS (6), PLANS (7), STC (8), FDS (9), FDM (10), S/C (11-12-13)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 06075

TO: SAGOF CITE: WASHF

RE: SAGO 305 (IN 21737), WASH 04807 (OUT 71940)

HEADQUARTERS WAS UNABLE TO STOP DEPARTURE OF SUBJECT, A POLE, WHO LEFT BY PLANE FOR CHILE ON 21 AUGUST, AS OUR INTERAGENCY DEFECTOR COMMITTEE WAS NOT CONSULTED. FULLNESS SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT WE NOT INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. SUBJECT IS NOT A DEFECTOR WITHIN IDCOP NO. 1 REGULATIONS. THEREFORE YOU SHOULD ASSUME NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIM UNLESS HE BECOMES INVOLVED WITH OTHER DEFECTORS IN WHICH CASE IT WOULD PROBABLY BE TO OUR INTEREST AND INTEREST OF PROGRAM. MA IS TO BE ADVISED BY DA THAT RESPONSIBILITY IS HIS.

V L GRESHAM HJU DWS H J MCKELLOPS

RELEASING OFFICER ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 2129Z 30 AUG 51

SECRET

Copy No.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

28 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CIA Defector Committee

FROM: OSO Representative, CIA Defector Committee

SUBJECT: Army Disposal Action on Defector to Chile.

1. On 17 August 1951, CIA received a priority cable (IN 21787) from Santiago advising that the Chilean Consul in Frankfurt, Germany, had requested authority from his Foreign Office to issue an "ordinary visa" to Boguslaw Borowiez, a Russian defector (actually a Polish defector), stating that American Intelligence had requested the visa on the same basis as in the case of earlier defectors. Santiago indicated that Chilean officials did not look on this with favor.

2. On 17 August the undersigned was able to ascertain that Borowiez had defected to the 66th Detachment, CIA, in Germany in late May 1951 and since that time had been held in ECIC.

3. On 17 August CIA queried German Station (OUT 71605) as to why Borowiez had not been placed in the DRC and requested that Borowiez be sent to Chile.

4. On 17 August 1951, the undersigned telephoned Mrs. Dorothy Matlack, G-2, and requested her to have a cable sent to Germany by G-2 forbidding the disposal of Borowiez to Chile. The undersigned provided Mrs. Matlack with the serial number of the pertinent CIC memo. Mrs. Matlack stated that she would do everything possible to have this cable sent even if it required her to come in the next day, which was Saturday.

5. On 20 August CIA advised Santiago (OUT 71940) that it had no knowledge regarding this disposal action and was opposed to any more disposal actions to Chile at this time.

6. On 22 August, CIA received a reply from Germany (IN 22176) stating that this Borowiez matter was entirely within the province of CIC and under the circumstances it was impossible for CIA in Germany to have had the body sent to the DRC. It was also stated that ID EUCOM was arranging for departure on 21 August 1951. The undersigned immediately advised Mrs. Matlack of this ETD and she stated that she was doing all she could to have a priority cable sent at once.

7. On 22 August about 1600 hours, Mrs. Matlack telephoned the undersigned and stated that G-2 did not have a copy of the referenced CIC memo. She requested the undersigned to come over to the Pentagon immediately in order to exhibit the CIA copy of the CIA memorandum, as otherwise G-2 would not send out the desired cable to CIC, Germany. This the undersigned did and such a cable was eventually sent out priority by G-2 to Germany (IN W 23393).

SECRET

SECRET

8. On 27 August 1951, CIA received word from Germany (IN 23698) that on 21 August Borowiec had left by plane for Chile and would apparently require no assistance there since he had his own funds.

Walter C. Janney

SECRET

Jamey

Form No. 35-8
April 1950

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

all WHD

SECRET

Page No.

From: KARLSRUHE — ROUTINE
To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS — 25 AUGUST 51
Action: FDM (1-2-3) — IN 23798
Information: IR (4-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), PLANS (8), S/S (9-10-11), CPP (12) STC (13)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR 380-5

KARL 3118

TO: WASHF   INFO: HEIDF, MUNIF   CITE: KARLF

RE: KARL 3082 (IN 22716)

1. ID EUCOM ADVISES REQUEST TO RICCIO FOR BOROWICZ DISPOSAL CHILE MADE BY ECIC.

2. BOROWICZ LEFT 21 AUGUST FOR CHILE BY PLANE. HAS OWN FUNDS APPARENTLY REQUIRING NO US HELP IN SETTLEMENT CHILE.

3. ID EUCOM RECEIVED DA WASH CABLE AMOUNTING TO REPRIMAND FOR HANDLING BOROWICZ EMIGRATION WITHOUT COORDINATION, ALSO POINTING OUT ZACABAL NOT CONSULTED.

TOR: 0751Z 25 AUG 51

SECRET

Copy No.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Form No. 35-6 (Dec 1947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

To: SANTIAGO ROUTINE

From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 23 AUG 51

Confirmation: SMD (1-2) OUT 72590

Information: IR (3-4), AC/SO (5), PLANS (6), FDS (7), OPS (8), DDP (9), S/C (10-11-12), OPC (13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH [illegible]

TO: SACOF CITE: WASHF

RE: SACO 505 (IN 20501) PARA 2A

Borowiecz

DEPORTATION OF SUBJECT NO INTEREST OR RESPONSIBILITY OF HEADQUARTERS OR YOUR STATION AND WE NOT WILLING ASSUME OBLIGATION OR EXPENSE THIS CONNECTION. SUCH DECISION STRICTLY UP TO FULLNESS.

V.L. GRESHAM HUNCK DRS H.J. MCKELLOPS

RELEASING OFFICER **ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS** **AUTHENTICATING OFFICER**

TOD: 2272 23 AUG 51 **SECRET** **Copy No.** 8

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

[illegible]

14-00000

FORM NO. 35-8
OCT 1949

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[redacted] **SECRET** **PAGE NO.**

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY — PRIORITY

FROM: HEIDELBERG — 22 AUG 51

TO: DEPARTMENT OF ARMY — IN " 23393

ACTION: AD/SO (1), IR (2), OPS (3), STC (4), FDM (5), FDS (6),

INFORMATION: SHD (7), RC (8), S/C (9)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as TOP SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR 380-5

NR: DA 99529

TO: CINCEUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY

FOR DI FROM G2.

SUBJECT IS BOGUSLAW BOROWIEZ. INFO HERE THAT CHILEAN CONSUL RICCIO, FRANKFORT ROSTED CHILEAN FON OFFICE ISSUE ORDINARY VISA TO SUBJECT AS OF 31 JULY, STATED AMER INTEL ROSTED VISA ON SAME BASIS AS PREVIOUS DEFECTORS. CAS ALLEGES THAT THEY NOT NOTIFIED OF BOROWIEZ DEFECTION ALTHOUGH HE IN CUSTODY 66 CIC DET SINCE 26 MAY 51. ROST INFO REF ROLE OF 66 CIC DET IN SUBJECTS DEFECTION AND FURTHER DATA AS TO WHY IDC OPN PROCEDURE NR 1 WAS NOT FOLLOWED. ROST SUBJECT BE NOT RESETTLED WITHOUT CONCURRENCE OF IDC GERMANY ALSO ROST THAT SUBJECT NOT BE RESETTLED IN CHILE IN VIEW OF DIFFICULTIES NOW HAVING WITH PREV DEFECTORS SETTLED THERE.

ORIGIN: G2

DISTR : G2(CIA)

DA 99529 (AUG 51) DTG: 221828Z

2338Z 22 AUG 51

TOR: [redacted] **SECRET** **COPY NO.** 5

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Form No. 35-6
April 1950

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO:

FROM: KARLSRUHE — ROUTINE

TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS — 21 AUGUST 51

ACTION: FDM (1-2-3) — IN 22716

INFORMATION: IR (4-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), PLANS (8), S/C (9-10-11), COP (12), STC (13).

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (I) 60A AR-380-5

KARL 3082

TO: WASHF CITE: KARLF

RE: WASH 04608 (OUT 71605)

1. LATE JULY CIC ADVISED THEY THROUGH WITH DEBRIEFING BOROWICZ WHO WILL BE TREATED AS DISPOSAL CASE FROM 10 AUG ON AND ASKED WHETHER WE INTERESTED IN HIM. MOB ADVISED NOT INTERESTED; BOB ADVISED INTERESTED AND ASKED MOB INTERVIEW HIM, WHICH MOB DID 9 AUG (REPORT IN MGMA 6602 EN ROUTE MUNI TO KARL AND WASH, INDICATES HE OF NO FURTHER INTEREST SINCE CIC FULLY DEBRIEFED AND HD EUCOM WAS ARRANGING HIS EMIGRATION WITH ETD 21 AUG).

2. BOB INTEREST SIMPLY DUE TO ORIGINAL CIC INDICATIONS SINCE BOB PRIMARY BASE FOR DISPATCH SINGLETONS TO POLAND WHILE MOB TRIES SPECIALIZE IN GROUP OPS.

3. PLS REALIZE WE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH B EXCEPT SINGLE INTERVIEW WHICH PRODUCED NO OPS INTEREST IN HIM. RE DRC: IN CIRCUMSTANCES THIS WAS NOT OUR CASE TO ROUTE TO DRC OR ELSEWHERE; ALSO, IT IS NOT SOP FOR PERSONS OF B'S LEVEL AND NATIONALITY TO GO DRC.

4. RE CHILEAN VISA REQUEST: WE INVESTIGATING AND WILL REPORT FACTS SOON.

TOR: 1325Z 21 AUG 51 **SECRET** COPY No.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

Form No. 35-6

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

To: SANTIAGO

ROUTINE

23 AUG 51

From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

OUT 71942

WHD (1-2)

Confirmation: IR (3-4), AD/SO (5), OPS (6), PLANS (7), STC (8), S/C (9-10-11),

Information: FDS (12)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 04807

TO: SAGOF CITE: W:SHF

RE: SAGO 305 (IN 21787)

Borowiez

THIS AGENCY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF PLANS FOR ADDITIONAL DEFECTOR PRIOR RECEIPT SAGO 305. MATTER BEING CHECKED AND YOU WILL BE INFORMED OF CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT HEADQUARTERS WILL OPPOSE SENDING MORE DISPOSAL CASES TO CHILE AT THIS TIME.

V.L. GRESHAM HJU MJC H.J. MCKELLOPS

RELEASING OFFICER ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 1738Z 23 AUG 51 **SECRET** Copy No. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

3 1 4 3 8

Form No. 35-6
(Dec. 1947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To:	KARLSRUHE	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	17 AUG 51
Confirmation:	FDM (1-2)	OUT 71605
	IR (3-4) ADSO (5) OPS (6) PLANS (7) S/C (9-10-11)	
Information:	DDP (12), STC (13)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (i) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 04608

TO: KARLF CITE: WASHF

RE: KARL 2945 (IN 18811)

Baroniey

1. SANTIAGO ADVISES CHILEAN FONOF RECEIVED DISPATCH DATED 31 JULY FROM ITS FRAN CONSUL, RICCIO REQUESTING AUTHORITY ISSUE "ORDINARY VISA" TO SUBJECT STATED AMERICAN INTELL REQUESTED VISA ON SAME BASIS PREVIOUS DEFECTORS.

2. IN VIEW COMPLICATIONS CHILEAN DEFECTOR SITUATION NO DISPOSAL OP TO CENTRAL OR SOUTH AMERICA TO BE INITIATED WITHOUT PRIOR HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL. PLS ADVISE WHO INITIATED REQUEST PARA 1 AND HOLD UP ACTION THIS CASE PENDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM HQ.

3. ADVISE(A) WHY SUBJECT WAS NOT TURNED OVER TO DRC FOR DEBRIEFING PER CURRENT OPERATING PROCEDURES?

(B) SUBJECT'S PRESENT STATUS, LOCATION.

(C) CLARIFICATION 803 INTEREST SUBJECT, SUBSEQUENT MOB ACTION.

4. RE MGSA 4038. NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES ROTNICKI OR TEPLITZ-SEMBLITSKY. ASSUME CIC FOLLOWING UP CE ASPECTS AND ACTIVITIES WEST GERMANY.

H. CUNNINGHAM	VLH WT	W. JANEY
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0102Z 18 AUG 51

SECRET

COPY NO. 6

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Form No. 35-6
April 1950

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM:	SANTIAGO	PRIORITY
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	16 AUG 51
ACTION:	WHD (1-2)	IN 01787
INFORMATION:	AD/SO (3), OPS (4), PLANS (5), STC (6), FDS (7) S/C (8-9-10), DDP (11)	23 Aug 51 D-270064

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

SAGO 305

TO: WASHF CITE: SAGOF

Army
CIC HQ 66 Det
Lt Col. David
Hunter S-2/S-3

1. FULLNESS ADVISED CHILEAN FOREIGN OFFICE RECEIVED DISPATCH FROM ITS FRANKFURT CONSUL, RICCIO, DATED 31 JULY 51, REQUESTING AUTHORITY ISSUE "ORDINARY VISA" TO WAURKCY BOROWICZ Lithuan. BO~~C~~GUSLAV, RUSSIAN DEFECTOR. STATED AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE REQUESTED VISA ON SAME BASIS AS PREVIOUS DEFECTORS.

2. FULLNESS OPINED ENOUGH DIFFICULTY EXISTED OVER PRESENT DEFECTORS WITHOUT ADDING THERETO. HE HAS BEEN ASKED TO HOLD MATTER ABEYANCE HQS COMMENTS.

3. SAGO RECOMMENDS NO NEW DEFECTORS CHILE UNTIL PRESENT PROBLEMS RESOLVED AND FULLNESS ASSURED THAT UNDESIRABLES BE RECALLED. BELIEVE DEFECTORS 47 AND 58 MOST SERIOUS ALTHOUGH INVESTIGATION UNCOMPLETED TO DATE. DEFECTORS 56 AND 42 NOW BELIEVED RECONCILABLE. RECOMMEND FRANKFURT AUTHORITIES HANDLE SUCH MATTERS THROUGH HQS AND THIS STATION.

TOR:
1513Z 16 AUG 51

SECRET

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

TCS-690 dtd 24 Aug 49

Ref: TCS-W-644

Industrial expansion of last few years in Chile reveals shortages skilled welders, automotive mechanics, farm machinery technicians and mechanics, factory mechanics, experienced lathe operaters, die and mould workers, ceramics technicians--skilled labor and technicians in almost every industry in the country.

3p7.9-2

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. OSC Registry 15-6-4	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT 17 Feb 1949	ANALYST Lois Smith
SUBJECT Disposal Questionnaire			DATE 29 November 1955

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Pencilled in file No. 31-7-4-1

CROSS REFERENCE FORM

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.			
Wash	CIA	Pro	354 folder 54

FORM NO. 59-28
DEC 1952

(35)

Dept. of Army document

12 August 1955

Memo For: Dir, CIA, Fm: Collection Div, G-2

Subject: Interagency Defector Committee

Class: Secret

retn to G2-CDOA

THIRD AGENCY

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: McLENDON, GORDON
201-279764

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
16 MAY 78		LESLIE WIZELMAN	Leslie Wizelman

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

6 Jan 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on McLENDON (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☒ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ______ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Sam H. Girardi (name) ______ (title) IP/ANP (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed LL (initials) 6 Jan (date) 1975

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-79764

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET

3 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: John K. McLean

1. On 28 April the undersigned was introduced to Mr. John McLean by Mr. Wallace Lampshire, a staff officer. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Mr. McLean's connection with Mr. Gordon Barton McLendon (201-79764) and Mr. McLendon's stated desire to help his government.

2. Mr. McLean is a former staff officer (DDI/OCI) who resigned to enter the field of finance. He has been a banker, a stock broker (Sade & Co.) and currently is Vice-President and Treasurer of International Ventures, Inc., 888 17th Street N.W., Washington 20006, as well as Vice-President of Riviere & Berens Securities Corp., stockbrokers located at 1832 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

3. Mr. McLendon was born in Paris, Texas 8 June 1921 and now lives in Dallas. According to Who's Who in the South and Southwest, Mr. McLendon is the owner of a number of radio stations and is listed as the president of numerous companies in radio, TV, and motion picture theatre fields. Mr. McLendon is reputedly a multi-millionaire.

4. Mr. McLean and Mr. McLendon have maintained a friendship since their years at Yale. Mr. McLean recently visited Mr. McLendon at his ranch some thirty miles from Dallas. During this visit Mr. McLendon expressed his fears of the future of the dollar and said that he has moved millions of his dollars to Europe where the money has been put into Swiss and French francs, plus German marks. Most of the money is apparently in savings instruments of one kind or another plus a night club that Mr. McLendon has bought in Stockholm. During these conversations, Mr. McLendon wondered if these foreign operations might not be of interest to the Government (read CIA as Mr. McLendon was an ONI officer during WW II and is aware of Mr. McLean's former employment with the Agency.) Mr. McLendon mentioned his night club as a possibility, as it is frequented by persons of many countries, including the USSR.

SECRET

5. Mr. McLean has business interests in Dallas and said that he is willing to explore this possibility with Mr. McLendon if we provide guidance.

6. Mr. McLean himself perhaps offers more potential via International Ventures, Inc. Mr. McLean is seeking venture capital opportunities abroad. For example, he and a Mr. Lincoln Epworth in New York City are working with a Japanese named Ikvo Kasai who is President of Nichimen Co. of Tokyo, a firm seeking to export to the States. Mr. McLean was frank to say that International Ventures is more a dream than a reality in terms of business but the concern is making progress. Mr. McLean offered to be of any assistance.

Comment: I have sent for Mr. McLean's file and upon its receipt I will seek a PCSA.

Frederick Larkin, Jr.
CCS/CFB

FL/ekw

SECRET

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM:
WILCOXEN ELI GE-924
BRANCH CCS/CFB 21CKEY
EXT. 3543 TUBE

DATE 19 April 1972
(for Ms Larkin)

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	24Ap	72	MR
REQUESTER					
R.O/FILES	DT-8	GC52			
REQUESTER					
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7	GA50			
RID/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003			

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS AND NOTES

ENTER NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED ____________

Pending file

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME ✓ GIVEN NAMES

Mc LENDON, Gordon Barton

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED
MAC ✓

201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (*Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.*)
See "Who's Who in the South and Southwest", Eleventh Edition, P. 677

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M	8 June 1921	Paris, Texas	U.S.A.	9300 Douglas Street, Dallas, Texas

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

		COMMENTS
	NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	night club in ~~[illegible]~~ Stockholm FVV'L
✓	CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX CARD REPRODUCTIONS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO RID/FILES.

TO EDIT THE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE CARD REPRODUCTIONS ACCORDING TO CSI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY CARDS: MARK THE CARD REPRODUCTION WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE CARD REPRODUCTIONS IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO RID/AN, VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER.

201 CONSOLIDATION (*SEE CSI 70-20*)

1. IF SUBJECT HAS A 201 FILE, RETURN ONLY THIS FORM TO RID/AN WITH REPRODUCTIONS OF INDEX CARDS MARKED IN GREEN TO REFLECT THE CONSOLIDATION ACTION TAKEN.
2. WHEN SUBJECT HAS NO 201 FILE, BUT MEETS THE REQUIREMENT FOR OPENING A 201 FILE, RETURN THIS FORM TO RID/201 WITH:
    A. A COMPLETED FORM 831;
    B. ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS, EXTRACTS, AND PROPERLY EDITED INDEX CARD REPRODUCTIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF THE FILE BY RID/201.

CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES: REQUESTER SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER TRACING THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WHICH ARE NOT CHECKED BY RID/INDEX (*SEE NAME TRACE HANDBOOK*).

SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED	SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED
CS AREA DESKS			CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE		
RID ARCHIVES			CIA LIBRARY		
COMINT NAME CHECK			OFFICE OF SECURITY		
SD BIOGRAPHICS BRANCH			OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES		
CS TRAVEL (*ZOMNIK-ZOD, AC*)			DOMESTIC CONTACTS SERVICE		
NAME OF BEARER FILE					
CIA APPLICANTS FILE			DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE		
COVERT ACTION STAFF ([illegible])			DEFENSE CENTRAL INDEX		
CENTRAL COVER STAFF			CENTRAL REGISTRY - EUROPE		
FI STAFF: RESERVE OFFICERS FILE			FBI		
FI STAFF: INTERAGENCY SOURCE REG			I & NS		
CI STAFF: CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS			STATE DEPARTMENT		
CI STAFF: [illegible] PROGRAM			SECRET SERVICE		
[illegible]			SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER	DATE	

362

SECRET

MCLENDON, GORDON BARTON

SEX M DOB 08 JUN 21
USA, TEXAS, PARIS
CIT USA
OCC PRES
REF

< USA, TEXAS, DALLAS
MCLENDON BROADCAST SYSTEM.

201-079764*

TYPE NAME T
OCC CODE BUSP

OI CODE ?

4/75
[illegible] to be sent this
to Mike [illegible]

100000000 CORR CARD 6605250198

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BRIEF RECORD OF CASE ACTION

ITEM	DATE	REMARKS	INITIALS

MINUTE SHEET	This MUST be the TOP, unserialized document in File Number 201-

FORM NO. 78 1 AUG 58 REPLACES FORM 30-30 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(13)

19 February 1966
Date

Memorandum For: DO/SEC (for Mr. Beers)

Reference : Request for traces and clearance

Project : [illegible]

Subject : See below

NAME: McLENDON, Gordon Barton
DPOB: 8 June 1921, Paris, Texas
CIT: USA
RES: 9300 Douglas St., Dallas, Texas
OCC: McLendon Broadcast System
ADD: 2104 Jackson St., Dallas, Texas

Trace Results:

No record in addition to 201-79764 which is attached herewith on permanent charge to DO/CO/Beers.

CI/CA file JG-9545 was reviewed and found to contain no information in addition to that contained in Subject's dossier. You will note that a request made by FE Division for a CSC on Subject was denied by the Office of Security on 29 July 1952.

Areas Checked:

RID x Area Division ____ Central Cover Staff x Office of Security ______

OCR: Biographics Register ____ Foreign Installations Branch ____ Library _____

Other ________________________.

Form 772 requesting PCSA/CSA ______ was forwarded __________ to(Security)~~[illegible]~~

A copy of this memorandum has been sent to RID for classification into file ____________________.

Bernice A. Smith
DO/CS

Attachment: 201-79764

Distribution:
Orig.- Addressee
~~xxxxx~~ DO/H - 1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 30 December 1965

TO:
- ☐ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☒ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: DO/OO

SUBJECT: *(True name)* McLENDON, Gordon Barton

PROJECT: WUENTREE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

US

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Subject will be contacted and assessed on a witting basis in support of WUENTREE. Subject is President of McLendon Corporation of Dallas, Texas and is also owner of several radio stations. He was born in Paris, Texas on 8 June 1921. He resides at 9300 Douglas Street, Dallas, Texas and has a ranch in Denton, Texas. During World War II, he served as a Japanese Language Officer in intelligence for the US Navy from 1943-45. He is the author of "The Old Scotchman's Scrapbook"

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		x
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		x
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		x
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		x

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO.

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER Peter Beers	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF William A Royer

4

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	RI FILE NO.
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / DATE
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM / DATE OF INFO. / EVALUATION
ANALYST: C/ / DATE PROCESSED: 12 Oct [illegible]	DISSEMINATED IN / DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☐ CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	☐ TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

[illegible]

[illegible] THIS [illegible] JL-9545

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-79714

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 267, 1 AUG 54 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 MAY 56

SECRET

(7-46)

24 May 1954

RI
ATTN: RI/CC

Chief, FE

Disposition of Files

1. Forwarded herewith for your disposition are thirty-eight (38) files, considered non-restricted by FE, for the following listed persons:

Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth
Mc Lendon, Gordon Barton	about 1922	Atlanta / Texas / Idabelle / Okla

2. Subjects are no longer in use by this office.

Originated by: Ursa T. Sharp

FOR: [illegible] E. [illegible]
Chief, FE

Dist: Addressee - Orig & 2; Subj - 1 ea;
FE-1, CE (Rawlinson) - 1
FE-1 (chrono) - 1

SEE [illegible], Salvatore Bernard's file
Date of Birth: Sept 29, 1910; Place of Birth: N.Y.N.Y.

201-[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM	NO. FE/1
	DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				6 McLENDON, Gordon Barton
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13. RI/CO	PROCESSED [illegible] 27 [illegible]			201-[illegible] NOV 16 1956
14. RI/FI				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

29 JUL 1952

Chief, Staff C
Attention: Staff C/PPB
Chief, Special Security Division

JO 9525
#69488 McLendon, Gordon Barton

1. Reference is made to your request for a covert security clearance for the Subject, who is the president of a company which will provide accreditation in Japan to a contract agent of this organization.

2. This is to advise that the covert security clearance, as requested, is hereby denied.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

Robert H. Cunningham

SECRET
Security Information

27 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, I & S

VIA : FE/PP
STC/SPB

SUBJECT : Gordon Barton McLendon

1. It is requested that the case on Gordon Barton McLendon be closed, since this office has no further interest in Subject.

2. The request for covert security clearance on Mr. McLendon was submitted on 11 February 1953.

LLOYD GEORGE
Chief, FE

FE/III/PC/LSC:lml
Dist: Addressee - Orig. & 1
OPS - 1
FE/PP - 1
STC/SPB - 1
FE/III/PC Chrono - 1
RI - 2

-SECRET-

MEMORANDUM TO: OD/OP/Sec 11 February 1952

FROM: FE/III/PC

SUBJECT: Gordon Barton McLendon

1. Covert Clearance, for use as outlined below, it is requested for Subject, on whom available information is submitted separately.

___Op. Clearance XX Security Clearance ___Op. Support ___Sp. Inquiry

2. Use of Subject: (State in detail the scope and nature of activities to be performed, their duration, the area involved, project involved, etc.)

Subject is the president of a company which will provide accreditation in Japan to a contract agent of this organization. It is not expected that subject will learn of the agent's connection with this organization, however, clearance is requested to so inform subject of the connection if the need may arise at a later date. Subject will know nothing of operations conducted by this agent, only that he is connected with CIA.

3. "Cover" story suggested for investigation: ___Governmental XX Commercial

Details: General Credit ___Other

4. Limits, if any, to investigation: None

5. Is Subject aware that an investigation is in process: Yes___ No X
6. Is Subject aware of CIA interest? Yes___ No X
7. Has Subject been briefed on "cover" story? Yes___ No X
8. Has Subject established "cover" for investigation with probable contacts? Yes___ No X
9. Is Prov. Operational Clearance necessary? Yes___ No X
10. Investigation to be XX Routine __ Expedite
Must be completed by: 1 June 1952
11. REMARKS:

Case Officer Lowell J. Christy

Security Officer

Branch Chief James G.L. Kellis

-SECRET-

SECRET

TO: ASST. DEPUTY (INSPECTION & SECURITY)

Date: ____________

FROM: CD/OP/OPC (Security)

J.G.: ____________

SUBJECT:

1. Necessary covert investigation is requested on Subject on whom all available background data is submitted separately. Information and/or clearance is requested for case category as follows:

Operational Cl. XXSecurity Cl. Sp. Inquiry Operational Support

2. Name of Special Project (if applicable): ~~[illegible]~~ DTMIKADO

3. Investigation to be completed as: XX Routine ____ Expedite by not later than 1 June 1952.

4. Scope and nature of use or activity:

Subject is the president of a company which will provide ~~[illegible]~~ accreditation in Japan to a contract agent of this organization. It is not expected that subject will learn of the agent's connection with this organization, however.

5. Suggested "cover" for investigation: ____Governmental ____Commercial ____ Other
Specific:

6. Limitations, if any, on investigation:

7. Subject HAS/HAS NOT been briefed that investigation is pending.

8. Subject HAS/HAS NOT been briefed on "cover" story to be used in investigation.

9. Subject HAS/HAS NOT indicated to probable investigative contacts investigation pending.

10. Subject HAS/HAS NOT indicated to probable investigative contacts "cover" story to be used.

11. CIA indices checks required for provisional operational clearance by ______________
(date)

12. REMARKS:

JOHN B. BREWER

FORM NO. 59-16 (T151)
AUG. 1951

SECRET

Lou Ll.
Is this correct
or shld. it be Idabelle?
L.

Name- Gordon Barton McLendon
Address-9300 Douglas, Dallas Texas
Place of Birth-Atlanta Texas/Idabelle, Oklahoma—age 30
Military History-1942 Entered Navy Japanese Language School, Boulder, Colo.
1943- Graduated Navy Japanese Lang. School
1944-Commissioned US Navy Assigned as Intelligence Officer, ONI/.
Discharged as Lt(JG)
Education-Graduated Yale University
1946-Attended Harvard Law School
Wife's Name-Gay Noe(Daughter of James A. Noe former Gov. of Louisiana
Subject has four children.
Present Occupation- President of Liberty Broadcasting System.

14-00000

FE

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. JG-9545	SOURCE STC/SPB	DATE OF DOCUMENT XXXX	ANALYST XXXX
SUBJECT McLENDON, Gordon Barton Born: Atlanta, Texas/Idabelle, Oklahoma, age 30 (in 1952)			DATE 26 Jan 55

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THERE IS A RESTRICTED STC/SPB FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD IN RI/AR FILE, WASH-CIA-PERS-4.

CROSS REFERENCE FORM	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.			
		201	79764	

FORM NO. 137 REPLACES FORM 35-36
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(35)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: McVICKAR, JOHN A.
201-33648

WRONG FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1949 - 1976

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4 Apr 78		Bob Genzman	Robert Genzman

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

McVICKAR, John A.

E

201 No.

MATERIAL FILED IN THIS FOLDER IS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
SECRET
(When Filled In)

23 Mar 76
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on Mc VICKAR (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ Should be closed. (If this category applies, affix Records Officer stamp.)

☐ Unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7.
Explanation:

☐ Witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ Potential witting collaborator; date opened:
OI Code A2.

☐ Former witting collaborator (relationship terminated).
OI Code A3.

☒ Potential witting collaborator never contacted. OI Code A4.

☐ Counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ All others. OI Code A6.

Signed Sam H. GIRARDI (name) _____ (title) FR/SRA (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed [illegible] (initials) 04 April 1976 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file. 201-33608

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 061475
(When Filled In)

AUG 24 1966

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

0l
3P

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. WFPA-3489

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, FDW

DATE: 8 November 1949

FROM : Chief, Paris Station LAS

SUBJECT : GENERAL- O John Augustus McVICKAR, Jr. 201-33608
SPECIFIC-

KAPOK MGA

1. Subject is presently employed in Paris by Trans World Airline in the capacity of Special Sales Representative. He is well known to Douglas C. HARE and Eleanor T. HARTWELL, the former having known him socially for a number of years and the latter having dealt with him on transportation problems since his appointment, fifteen months ago, to the position he now occupies with TWA.

2. Subject is also a long-time friend of UNMOVED, who brought him to our attention as a potential recruit and who has provided us with the biographical information contained in the attached personal record form No. 51-67.

3. From what I have been able to gather from UNMOVED, as well as from HARE and HARTWELL, subject appears to be the type of individual which might be ideally suited to fulfill certain valuable operational assignments in France, such as "spotter" for other high-level potential agents, high-level contacts, cut-out, etc. All who know him agree that subject is capable of "doing anything and getting to know anyone" if he so chooses. Apparently subject, despite the "brass" which surrounds his perceptible personality, is a serious-minded, intelligent and patriotic individual who has had much experience along lines which could be of use to this organization, as well as an uncanny knack of being able to introduce and ingratiate himself into practically any milieu of interest to his work or wishes. A partial list of subject's fairly close friends, as reported by UNMOVED on Page 8-a of attachment, shows the variety of people subject knows and sees whenever they are in this area. Undoubtedly, subject himself could add a much longer list of names to those reported herein, particularly with respect to contacts in Europe.

4. I am assured by UNMOVED that subject, despite his ability to make and keep numerous and varied friendships, is far from being a "good time Charlie". He is, on the other hand, one of those characters whom everyone likes and trusts and who goes out of their way to see as often as occasion permits. UNMOVED assures me that subject is a particularly good friend

201 | M'VICKAR, JOHN AUGUSTUS JR
AN
[redacted]
ABSTRACT | X | INDEX

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION

771

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

NFPA-3489
KAPOK

of Alberto DODERO (the Argentine shipping magnate) and who is living in France at the present time.

5. It is our thought that perhaps subject's unusual personality and in the cover-job he now occupies could be exploited to advantage by this Station and the organization as a whole. Subject has absolute freedom of movement outside France (usually by TWA), entree into practically any milieu his assignments might require and is known to be an intelligent, hard-working and patriotic individual.

6. On a recent tour of inspection of the TWA circuit, Warren L. PIERSON, Chairman of the Board of TWA, assured subject he would endeavor to secure for him an additional allotment of funds to supplement his present expense account budget. Due to budgetary restrictions this has not been possible and subject is at present seeking another more remunerative position, since he claims that his present income of approximately $666.00 monthly (including expense account) is insufficient to permit him to live in Paris and maintain the contacts and activity required by his job. According to UNMOVED, subject is at present endeavoring to secure from his good friend Benjamin KATZ(President of the Gruen Watch Co.) the sales agency for Gruen watches in Europe. Meanwhile, however, subject is not contemplating resigning his position with TWA until he has a firm and more remunerative position. UNMOVED states that subject plans to remain with TWA at least until the end of the year, by which time he may have secured something better. Subject has also had talks with James A. FARLEY (on his recent trip to France) concerning the possibility of handling the Coca-Cola agency here. Nothing has come of this possibility to date, but subject appears to be hopeful.

7. UNMOVED is of the opinion that subject would be most receptive to a proposition of doing intelligence work and furthermore believes that if subject could supplement his present income by an additional $200 or $300 per month, he would be willing to remain with TWA, which he likes and is only considering leaving due to his present low total income, much of which is spent in connection with activities required by his position.

8. UNMOVED has, of course, never even hinted to subject anything about his own undercover activities and is sure subject does not suspect that the former is doing anything but his cover work in France. UNMOVED, when questioned as to his opinion concerning subject's potential value as a covert agent, as well as his recruitability, has pointed out very strongly that subject, due to the very nature of his personality, must be given a good deal of operational guidance and be closely controlled. Questioned as to whether some other individual should endeavor to recruit subject, UNMOVED was of the opinion that, should the organization desire to do so, he would be best fitted to exploit subject's potential, since

CS COPY

COPY

201-33608

14-00000

he has known him for a good many years and as a close friend, knows his strong and weak points and could, in general, handle subject to better advantage than another individual who might have only occasional contact with him.

9. We request that consideration be given to the advisability of endeavoring to recruit subject and, in the event of a favorable decision, that provisional operational clearance be given in order that subject may be approached on the subject of engaging in intelligence work. With regard to whom should actually recruit subject, we suggest that HARE might safely make the first approach and, if subject accepts and final security is obtained, he might eventually be turned over to UNMOVED for exploitation.

10. We would appreciate your reactions to the desirability of recruiting subject, as well as your thoughts as to how best exploit his obvious potential.

11. If subject's recruitability is approved in principle and he is given provisional security clearance, this Station would then prepare a field project outline, to be submitted to you for approval.

Dan O. Garner

Dan O. Garner

DOG:jws

Encl: Personal Record Form

Distribution:
FBW 2
Files 2

1.

14P

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

PERSONAL RECORD OF

McVICKAR	John	Augustus, Jr.
Last Name	First	Middle

Place Photograph here
if available

MICROFILMED
AUG 22 1966
[illegible]

DATE 25 October 1949

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

att 1 to
WFPA 3489

CS COPY

ORIG →

201-33608

FORM NO. 51-67
JUL 1948

1. FULL NAME, IN NORMAL SEQUENCE.

   John Augustus McVickar, Jr.

2. NAME IN NATIVE SCRIPT OR OTHER APPROPRIATE CHARACTERS.

3. NAME AT BIRTH (if different from No. 1).

   Same

4. ALL ALIASES (give brief statement of time and place of use).
   (Include Nicknames - Legal Changes.).

   No aliases. Nickname - "Johnny"

5. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH.

   12 February 1909. Long Island, N. Y., U.S.A.

6. NATIONALITY, ALSO RACE (if appropriate).

   U.S.

7. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH (if different from No. 6). INCLUDE ALL NATIONALITIES HELD.

   Same as above

8. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Is he owner, tenant, sub-tenant. At whose home does he live? Telephone?).
   28 Avenue Montaigne, Paris, France.
   Tenant on a monthly basis, subletting from one Fred McAvoy, an Australian.
   Telephone: ELY 46-65

9. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than present residence).

   None

10. PRESENT OCCUPATION (Give full title, indication as to earnings, etc.).

    Special Sales Representative for Trans World Airline in Paris.
    In addition to Paris, sales territory includes the Benelux countries.
    Earnings, including salary, living allowance and expense account, total approximately $666.00 monthly.

11. FATHER'S FULL NAME, NATIONALITY AT BIRTH, PRESENT NATIONALITY, PLACE OF BIRTH, PRESENT RESIDENCE.
Father was born in U.S. and has always held U.S. citizenship. Formerly a member of U.S. Foreign Service. Living at present in retirement on Long Island, N.Y. in the home of his second son, Theodore McVIKAR.
Name: John Augustus McVIKAR.

12. MOTHER'S FULL NAME, NATIONALITY AT BIRTH, PRESENT NATIONALITY, PLACE OF BIRTH, PRESENT RESIDENCE.

U.S. citizen at birth. Now deceased.

13. HUSBAND/WIFE: FULL NAME (include maiden name of wife), NATIONALITY AT BIRTH, PLACE OF BIRTH.

Ruth Maxwell Warner McVIKAR, nee Ruth Maxwell.
U.S. citizen from birth. Born in St. Louis, Missouri, U.S.A.

CIT: USA
POB. USA, MISSOURI, ST. LOUIS
A: FRANCE, PARIS, 28 AVENUE MONTAIGUE
Wife of John Augustus McVICKAR, JR, 201-33605

14. (a) WHEN AND WHERE MARRIED.
(b) NAME CHILDREN, AGE, NATIONALITY, RESIDENCE.

(a) 2 June, 1949 at Alexandria, Virginia

(b) One daughter by a previous marriage. Barbara McVIKAR, U.S. citizen, aged 19, now living with remarried mother in San Francisco, California.

15. NAMES OF BROTHERS/SISTERS, AGES, NATIONALITY, RESIDENCE.

Two brothers - Theodore and Rolph McVIKAR, and one sister, Dorothea DAWSON. All U.S. citizens and all living in U.S.

16. IF SUBJECT, PARENTS, OR HUSBAND/WIFE NATURALIZED, GIVE DATE AND NAME IN WHICH CERTIFICATE WAS GRANTED.

None

17. LIST OFFICIAL IDENTITY PAPERS HELD BY SUBJECT.

U.S. Passport No. 227
French Identity Card
U.S. Social Security No. 091-09-6737

18. GIVE PRESENT AND/OR PAST OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH ANY GOVERNMENT.

None

19. GIVE CONNECTIONS WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, PAST OR PRESENT. HAS SUBJECT EVER BEEN A DOUBLE AGENT? HAS SUBJECT EVER BEEN CONSIDERED THE TYPE OF AGENT WHO SELLS HIS INFORMATION TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER? EXPLAIN.

In 1941-1942, while Assistant General Manager of the Hotel Pierre in New York, furnished information regularly to the FBI concerning persons living in the hotel in whom the Agency was interested. This service was requested by the Agency and no payment was involved.

20. RELIGION, AND DEGREE PRACTICED. (Membership in Religious Orders.).

Protestant. Infrequent attendant at Church.

21. POLITICAL ORIENTATION. TO WHAT CLUBS, ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR UNIONS, PARTIES, OR SOCIETIES HAS HE BELONGED?

Republican. Never a member of any club, organization, union, party or society.

22. SOCIAL STANDING (Aristocracy, upper middle-class, lower middle-class, peasantry, etc.).

UPPER MIDDLE CLASS

23. RECORD OF TRAVEL - OUTSIDE OF COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE. (Under Purpose, list pertinent firms and people visited.).

Country	Purpose of trip	Dates
France British Isles Germany Holland Norway Sweden Denmark The West Indies Brazil	As a member of the Raymond-Whitcomb Cruise Operating Staff while employed by that company (See Employment History)	1932 - 1939
- - - - - - - -		
Australia New Guinea Philippine Islands	With American Red Cross (See Employment History)	1942 - 1944

All youth spent in Europe with family, Father being in the United States Foreign Service.

CS COPY

24. EDUCATION.

Name of School	Course	Degree	Dates
St. Bernard's, New York, U.S.A.			
Harvey School, Paris, France			
McJannet School, St. Cloud, s/o, France	-	No college education.	

25. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS (Check proficiency).

(a)

Language	Read Good-Fair-Poor	Speak Good-Fair-Poor	Understand Good-Fair-Poor
French	Good	Good	Good

(b) ARE HIS LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS SUCH THAT HE COULD PASS HIMSELF OFF AS A NATIVE TO A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN?

Possibly. French is fluent, having been spoken since childhood, but accent might be noted and typical American appearance and mannerisms difficult to disguise.

26. MILITARY SERVICE: Country, Organization, Rank, nature of duty, where service was performed, when discharged, why?

U.S. Red Cross. Club Director. Service in Australia, New Guinea, Philippines. (See Employment History)

27. PRESENT OR PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND CHARITABLE SOCIETIES:

None

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

28. LIST SPECIAL SKILLS, HOBBIES AND ABILITIES. (Radio, Photography, etc.).

No hobbies. Special ability lies in salesmanship and the establishment and maintenance of personal contacts necessary to career.

29. FINANCIAL STATUS: (Earnings, Bank Accounts, Securities, Property).

Paid approximately $666.00 monthly by Trans World Airline.
Bank account with Chemical Bank and Trust Company of New York.
No property or securities outside of Life Insurance Policies.

30. EMPLOYMENT HISTORY. (Include type of work done, dates, employers, and addresses.)

Business career began in Europe. Brought up in France and speaking French, he was appointed, at the age of 18, General Sales Agent for numerous American products including Jantzen Bathing Suits, Three-In-One Oil, the Franklin Motor Car and the Le Baron Motor Car. Successful with these lines, later became General Sales Agent in France for Dusenburg Motor Cars and the Packard Motor Car Company. Almost immediately after taking on Packard sales he accepted a proposition to work exclusively for the Packard Motor Car. Co. Remained with the company in Paris for two years, or until early in 1931. Was then sent to the United States by the company to handle Packard sales in Buffalo, New York where he remained until the autumn of 1932.

At that time he was approached by Raymond-Whitcomb Inc., a leading American travel company, specializing in deluxe tours and cruises, and asked to take over sales in the New York Office due to his knowledge of Europe and his contacts in Europe and the United States who were potential customers for high priced travel offerings. He went to work in the company's principal sales office at 670 Fifth Avenue and remained there until 1940. The travel business became so severely restricted after the outbreak of war in Europe that Raymond-Whitcomb Inc. was obliged to close most of its offices. Sales were at a standstill and, as he was working by his own choice on a commission basis, it was necessary for him to leave. During his eight-year tenure with Raymond-Whitcomb Inc. he wrote on an average of $500,000 worth of business yearly by himself.

After leaving Raymond-Whitcomb Inc., he took a position as Assistant General Manager of the St. Regis Hotel in New York and subsequently transferred to the Hotel Pierre in the same capacity. He remained at the Hotel Pierre until 1942.

(Continued on Page 7 a)

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

31. DESCRIPTION (Use American Standards of measurement).

AGE	40	POSTURE	Erect
APPARENT AGE	40	WEIGHT	183 lbs.
HEIGHT	5'10"	TEETH	Good - even
EYES	Grey	HAIR	Brown - thick
FACE-SHAPE	Round	SCARS	None
COMPLEXION	Fair		
SEX	Male	BUILD	Thick set
GENERAL APPEARANCE			

PROMINENT FEATURES None

DISFIGUREMENTS None

PERSONAL HABITS Normal

ANY TRAITS WHICH DISTINGUISH FROM OTHERS HAVING SAME GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
No

32. HAS SUBJECT DONE ANY WRITING? GIVE DETAILS.

None

33. WAS HE EVER A PRISONER OF WAR? GIVE DETAILS.

No

34. WITH WHAT PEOPLE OR GROUPS DOES HE MOST OFTEN ASSOCIATE? (List several).
Associates most often in France with the "international set", wealthy and prominent persons of all nationalities, many of whom are my customers for air transportation and most of whom are friends of long standing.
In the U.S. his contacts include persons of high social position and leaders in business and industry. This has been brought about partly by the nature of his work in selling deluxe transportation on two continents and partly by family background and early life in Europe.
(See Page 8a for a limited list of persons with whom subject associates)

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

30. EMPLOYMENT HISTORY. (Continued)

Attempting to volunteer for service in the U.S. Armed Forces he was turned down as being overweight. He then approached the U. S. Red Cross, was accepted, and sent immediately to Sidney, Australia as manager of the U.S. Officers' Club in that city. Subsequently, he served in New Guinea, and in Leyte and Manila in the Philippines.

After two and a half years overseas he became eligible for discharge and made application to return to the United States. He went directly to Washington D.C. upon his arrival to operate there the War Service Bureau of the American Optical Company. The Bureau handled that company's business relations with foreign governments and aided implementation of U.S. Army, Navy and Air Corps contracts.

With the war over and the War Service Bureau about to close, he refused a position with the American Optical Company Sales Division, to re-enter the Transportation field. He joined a newly-formed airline called Transair Inc., at that time one of the leading charter companies.

Due to the uncertain position of charter lines within the aviation industry he decided to accept an offer made to him by American Airlines to go to Europe as District Traffic Manager for Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg with headquarters in Amsterdam. He remained with American Overseas Airlines until he had an opportunity to transfer to Trans World Airline which made it possible for him to return to Paris as Special Sales Representative, covering large corporation, government accounts and the motion picture industry. He has now been with Trans World Airline in Paris for fifteen months.

For verification of his employment history the following persons are offered as references. Both are familiar with his business career and have known him personally for years. As is indicated by the above he has been employed by both.

Henry S. WOODBRIDGE Wardman Park Hotel Washington, D.C.	Formerly General Manager of Raymond-Whitcomb Inc. Now Assistant to the President, American Optical Company.
Warren Lee PIERSON	Chairman of the Board Trans World Airline, New York, N.Y.

33628

POTENTIAL LIST OF PERSONAL CONTACTS.

United States:

David Rockefeller
Alfred Gwynn Vanderbilt
Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence Tibbett (Metropolitan Opera)
Spyros Skouras (20th Century Fox)
Robert Topping
Daniel Topping
John Topping
John Ringling North
Baron George Wrangel
Dr. Herman Baruch (ex U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands)
John Snyder (Secretary of the Treasury)
General Carlos Romulo (Philippines)
Serge Oblensky
Warren Lee Pierson (Chairman of Board - TWA)
James A. Farley (ex-Postmaster General)
George B. Wells (ex-President - American Optical)
Nancy Oakes Marigny
Oscar Holcomb (Mayor of Houston, Texas)
Dorothy Spreckels (San Francisco sugar heiress)
Adolph Spreckels
Benjamin Katz (President - Gruen Watch Co.)

France:

Dean Frederick Beekman (American Pro. Cathedral, Paris)
Alberto Dodero (South American shipping magnate)
Baron and Baroness von Seidlitz.
Andre Dubonnet
Pepe Herrera (Venezuelan Minister to Sweden)
Ralph B. Strassburger

A complete list, even of closest contacts, is difficult to compile. It includes well-known persons in the moving picture industry, newspaper people, hotel executives, transportation executives, persons high in government service and in the financial world. Few men have as wide a circle of friends and acquaintances throughout the world.

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

35. IS HE IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH PERSONS OR FIRMS OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE? (If so, list).

PRESUMABLY WITH FAMILY ONLY
SUBJECT IS ALLEGED TO BE A VERY POOR CORRESPONDENT.

36. HAS HE EVER BEEN SENTENCED BY A COURT? (WHEN, BY WHAT COURT, DELINQUENCY, PUNISHMENT. GIVE RECORD OF ARRESTS AND ACQUITTALS.)

Never

37. IF APPLICABLE, GIVE INFORMATION ON DENAZIFICATION - WHETHER COMPLETED, PROPOSED, OR REFUSED.

38. HOW WAS HE FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED?
OLD FRIEND OF SYDNEY P. GLASER

39. COULD SUBJECT BE TURNED OVER TO SOMEONE ELSE FOR HANDLING QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER?
YES

40. WHAT IS THE BEST ESTIMATE AS TO SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION?
NOT YET APPROACHED.

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

41. WITH WHAT AGENCIES AND FILES HAS SUBJECT'S NAME BEEN CHECKED? WHEN? WHAT ELSE HAS BEEN DONE TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT?

TO BE CLEARED BY HQ.
PROVISIONAL CLEARANCE REQUESTED

42. ARE THERE ANY FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO OUR CONTROL OF SUBJECT?

NONE - AT PRESENT

43. DOES SUBJECT KNOW FOR WHAT SERVICE HE IS WORKING OR DOES HE KNOW THE DESTINATION OF HIS INFORMATION?

NOT YET RECRUITED

44. IF POSSIBLE, ATTACH A SAMPLE OF SUBJECT'S HANDWRITING TOGETHER WITH SIGNATURE.

WILL BE SUPPLIED LATER.

45. IS SUBJECT (for example) WELL-INFORMED AND INTELLIGENT__X__; ILL-INFORMED BUT SHREWD______; NOT VERY BRIGHT______; OR:

46. HOW DO YOU EVALUATE HIS CHARACTER, RELIABILITY, SECURITY?

TO BE SUPPLIED LATER,
PROVIDED SUBJECT IS
APPROACHED.

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

47. WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION HAS HE FURNISHED AND WHAT TYPE IS HE EXPECTED TO FURNISH IN THE FUTURE? GIVE AN EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED.

SUBJECT IS IDEALLY SUITED AND LOCATED IN COVER JOB WHICH BRINGS HIM INTO CONTACT WITH MANY POTENTIAL AGENTS AND VALUABLE CONTACTS.

48. IF SUBJECT'S DUTIES ARE OTHER THAN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, SO INDICATE.

SUBJECT WOULD START AS "SPOTTER" AND PERHAPS RECRUITER.

49. HAS HE BEEN GIVEN SPECIAL TRAINING AS AGENT? IF SO, DESCRIBE THE TRAINING.

IF SECURITY CLEARED WILL BE TRAINED IN PARIS.

50. IS SUBJECT INTEGRATED WITH ANY OTHER OPERATIONS?

NOT YET RECRUITED.

51. DO WE KNOW GENERALLY HOW AND FROM WHOM HE OBTAINS INFORMATION?

NOT YET APPLICABLE.

52. IS HE PAID A REGULAR SALARY BY US?_______ AMOUNT:_________

RECOMMEND BETWEEN $200 AND $300 MONTHLY. RETAINER FEE OF $100 RECOMMENDED DURING TRAINING AND BRIEFING PERIOD.

53. HAVE ANY UNFULFILLED PROMISES BEEN MADE TO HIM?

NOT YET APPLICABLE.

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

201-331668

[illegible] 11 34 AM '68

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

54. REMARKS: (IN ESSAY FORM, MAKE ANY COMMENTS ON FACTORS OMITTED WHICH ARE DEEMED BY THE CASE OFFICER TO BE PERTINENT TO THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE PERSONAL RECORD. ADDENDA SHOULD BE MADE TO THIS FORM FROM TIME TO TIME.).

SEE COVERING LETTER.

SUBMITTED BY SYDNEY P. GLASER
(use pseudonym)
VIA Dan S. [illegible]

SECRET
Authorized Staff only

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. WFPA-3724

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, FDW

DATE: 15 December 1949

FROM : Chief, Paris Station

SUBJECT: GENERAL· John Augustus McVICKAR, Jr. 201-33608
SPECIFIC· PARI-4214

NRFOK

1. We regret that circumstances beyond our control prompted us to dispatch PARI-4214 on the off chance that Subject might be of sufficient interest to you as a potential candidate for recruitment, thus bringing to a head a question which normally would have followed its course through the mill. In this case, however, due to Subject's alleged resignation from TWA, we felt that a cable such as the one we dispatched was justified, due to the fact that unless some quick action is taken, Subject will definitely leave his present job with TWA and seek employment elsewhere.

2. On 10 December, Subject had luncheon with HARE and unloaded all his financial troubles. In a casual way HARE asked him if by any chance he would be willing to stay on at TWA if his salary were supplemented. Subject took eagerly to this possibility, since it is well-known that Subject likes his job and desires very much to remain, but is resigning merely for financial reasons. In consultation with UNTOVED and HARE, both of whom knew Subject well, it is apparent that probably $300 monthly would allow Subject to decide to stay with TWA, provided we are sufficiently interested in recruiting him for intelligence activities.

3. Attached hereto is UNTOVED's latest report on Subject, dated 8 December, and prepared prior to HARE's luncheon with Subject. There seems to be some question as to whether Subject has actually submitted his resignation to TWA in writing. According to UNTOVED, he has, whereas Subject denied this to HARE. In any event, it is well known in Paris that Subject is taking terminal leave at present, prior to leaving TWA.

4. We now await your reaction as to whether you feel that in principle McVICKAR is worth recruiting. It is too early, not having had specific and detailed talks with McVICKAR, to submit a project outline, but all here are agreed that the organization could benefit considerably by Subject's extensive contacts in all countries of Western Europe.

McVICKAR, JOHN AUGUSTUS JR

201			
AN		49	
		F.	[redacted]
ABSTRACT		INDEX	

Dan E. Garner
Dan E. Garner

Encl: 1
VC:jrs
Distribution:
File 1

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION

201-33608
15 Dec 49

8 December, 1949

Subject: McVICKAR, JOHN AUGUSTUS JR.

Address: 28 Avenue Montaigne Paris

Telephone: ELY 46-65

Subject is quitting his position as traffic representative with Trans World Airline as of 31 December, 1949. In August, 1949, subject advised his superiors, including WARREN LEE PIERSON, Chairman of the Board of TWA and a personal friend, that he could not continue unless a larger salary and a more liberal expense account were forthcoming. He was informed in due course by Vice President COOKE that it was impossible for the company to give him more money within the present wage structure. Subject therefor decided to seek other employment. On or about 15 November subject was advised by Overseas Manager THORNTON that he could proceed to make new arrangements as of the end of the year. Whether subject actually resigned or was asked to terminate his connection due to his repeated demands for more money is not completely clear to the writer.

Overseas Manager THORNTON was never sympathetic with the subject. According to STANLEY MARKUSEN, TWA Overseas Public Relations Director, THORNTON was jealous of subject's popularity. On the other hand, JOHN WINCHELL, Traffic Manager for Paris, and subject's immediate superior, was, and continues to be, his strong supporter. On the basis of business produced WINCHELL has told the writer that subject is the company's most valuable employe overseas. MARKUSEN concurs in that belief.

Subject is highly regarded by OSCAR HOLCOMB and PALMER BRADLEY, directors of TWA. In addition he is a close friend of PIERSON, Chairman of the Board, who engaged him directly in the first place. None of these, however, seem willing to run counter to the economy drive now in progress within TWA sponsored by new President RALPH DAMON. Unless there is a last minute change in policy subject's termination will stand.

Subject's future is uncertain. He has been in touch with a friend of his in New York named HARVEY DWIGHT. DWIGHT makes frequent business trips to Europe on behalf of his own company which deals in spare parts for airplanes. He has intimated that he might use subject in Europe for six to eight months and then bring him back to the U.S. for employment in Washington. As ofthe above date DWIGHT has made subject no definite offer but has advised him in a letter seen by the writer not to worry about his future.

Ex-Postmaster General JAMES FARLEY, now with the CocaCola Company, was interested recently in hiring subject for work in France but that idea seems now to have been dropped.

CHARLES ROGERS, Paris automobile dealer, has asked subject to work for him but subject has refused.

Subject is hard pressed for money. He has outstanding debts and his former salary from TWA, in the vicinity of $650. monthly, had never been sufficient for his needs. In October, 1949, TWA cut the living allowance paid to employes overseas. According to subject that cost him about $150. monthly and forced him into debt. Subject was

(more)

att 1 to U(F) 3924 CS COPY

201-336-08

A-330

Subject: McVICKAR, JOHN AUGUSTUS JR. (continued)

married in June of 1949 and his expenses have risen sharply. Subject has told the writer that he needs a thousand dollars a month, salary and expense account combined, in order to live in Paris and do a decent job.

....

CS COPY

201-33608

λ F

FORM NO. 35-6
DEC 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To:	PARIS	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	15 DEC 49
Confirmation:	FDW (1-2)	OUT 95459
Information:	ADSO (3-4), STB (5), IID (6), STD (7)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (I) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 5370

TO: PARIF CITE: WASHF

RE: PARI 4214 (IN ..58)

1. ALTHO SUBJECT SOUNDED GOOD IN PRINCIPLE WE UNABLE APPROVE REF PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. PRIOR COMPLETION PRELIM FOUR WAY CHECK PROVISIONAL CLEARANCE UNOBTAINABLE.

B. EVEN IF CLEARED AND DEFINITE TARGET IN MIND, $300 CONSIDERED EXCESSIVE FOR UNTRIED, UNTRAINED (ALTHO WELL PLACED) INDIVIDUAL COMPARED OTHER STARTERS.

2. AS RESIGNATION APPEARS FAIT ACCOMPLI WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT ADVISABLE ATTEMPT PERSUADE SUBJECT RETAIN PRESENT POST THEREBY INCURRING HEAVY MORAL OBLIGATION SUPPORT HIM FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD IN FUTURE.

3. NEW COVER SHOULD STILL GIVE SUBJECT LATITUDE OUR WORK IF HE REMAINS IN EUROPE. WILL SUBMIT RESULTS CHECK AND REQUEST YOU FORMULATE NEW PROPOSAL ON BASIS NEW COVER WHEN WE WILL REEXAMINE AND ADVISE.

FILE IN 201-33608

R. BOULTON	AS	S. H. LEIUNGTON
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0255Z 16 DEC 49

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

FORM NO.
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM:	PARIS	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	11 DEC 49
ACTION:	FDW (1-2)	IN 11158
INFORMATION:	ADSO (3-4), STA (5), STB (6), IID (7)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (I) 60.4 AR-380-5

PARI 4214

TO: WASHF CITE: PARIF

1. UNMOVED REPORTS SUBJECT WFPA 3489 RESIGNED FROM TWA EFFECTIVE 1 JAN.

2. SUBJECT APPEARS OPTIMISTIC RE POSSIBILITY SECURING WORK IN EUROPE, HQ PARIS, WITH HARVEY DWIGHT, IMPORTANT AIRPLANE SPARE PARTS DEALER. IF DWIGHT CONTACT MATERIALIZES SUBJECT WOULD REMAIN PARIS SIX OR EIGHT MONTHS, THEN RETURN STATES TO WORK FOR DWIGHT, POSSIBLY IN WASH.

3. AT LUNCHEON WITH HARE 10 DEC SUBJECT TOLD HARE ALL HIS FINANCIAL TROUBLES AND INDICATED WILLINGNESS REMAIN TWA IF INCOME COULD BE SUPPLEMENTED. UNMOVED CONCURS WITH THIS. SUBJECT STATED (RCVD DEHXEB) TO HARE HE HAD ACTUALLY RESIGNED FROM TWA, STATING HE NOW TAKING TERMINAL LEAVE PRIOR TO RESIGNATION.

4. RE WFPW 3032. IN VIEW DEVELOPMENTS ABOVE WE FEEL DECISION ONE WAY OR OTHER OUR PART MUST BE MADE SOONEST. THEREFORE REQUEST PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE AND YOUR AUTHORITY APPROACH SUBJECT, IN PRINCIPLE, OFFERING SALARY $300 MONTHLY, SUBJECT TO FINAL SECURITY CLEARANCE. THIS IN ORDER PERSUADE SUBJECT REMAIN WITH IDEAL TWA COVER JOB AT LEAST UNTIL WE MAKE FINAL DECISION.

5. TIME, IN THIS CASE, IS OF THE ESSENCE.

IN 201-33608

TOR: 1211Z 11 DEC 49 **SECRET** COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

AIR

WFPW-8032

Chief of Station, Paris

25 November 1949

FDM

Subject of WFPA-3469

McVicker

1. On the basis of the information submitted in reference dispatch, we have initiated an investigation of subject, who appears to have, as you suggest, many facets worth exploiting. We expect this preliminary four-way check to take at least six weeks to complete and in the meantime would appreciate a further list of subject's contacts, sketched briefly at the bottom of page 8a of his personal record form. Since operational clearance is given only for a specific purpose, we also request UNMOVED's preliminary views on exploitation.

2. Subject personal record form (as well as that submitted with WFPA-3506) is unusually complete, which greatly facilitates checking at this end. UNMOVED should be congratulated on his painstaking reporting in this matter.

B. C. Tyndall

201-33608

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FEB 23 1950
DATE

TO: IID - Mr Brady

BUILDING

ROOM NO

REMARKS: For your files.

Mrs. Thompson
Please open 2020
restrict to FDW.
TNB

FROM: Bonnet

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

10 February 1950

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO. WFFA-4114

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. FDW	2036	20 Feb	21	[illegible]/20	This is McVickar – [illegible]
2.					[illegible] [illegible]? Dropped & security inv.
3.					cancelled.
4.					CSO inv. # 40104 – (4-way
5.					check) returned to CSO – No further investigation re-
6.					quired.
7.					
8.					McVICKAR, JOHN AUGUSTUS JR
9.					201 [redacted]
10.					[redacted] FI ☒ INDEX [redacted] ABSTRACT 201-33608
11.					10 Feb 50
12.					
13.					25
14.					OSO Registry FEB 1950
15. 11D	1514				

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. WFPA- 2114

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, FBW

FROM : Chief, Paris Station

DATE: 10 February 1950

SUBJECT : GENERAL- WFPA-3724; WASH-5370
SPECIFIC-

1. UNMOVED has just informed me that Subject has definitely decided not to return to Paris and is now staying at the Hotel Stanhope on 5th Ave., New York. UNMOVED further assures me that Subject is definitely un_employed for the moment and is desperately looking for suitable employment.

2. Apparently Subject has been able to borrow a considerable amount of money, he having sent to his wife who remained behind in Paris a sufficient amount of dollars to cover local debts in French Francs which Subject had accrued at the various Paris hotels, bars, nightclubs, etc. Subject's wife is at present liquidating all these debts, closing up and returning to the owner the apartment in which they lived and plans to depart for New York to rejoin her husband within a few days.

3. UNMOVED has also assured me that Subject is very anxious to return to Europe and, if possible, Paris. UNMOVED has maintained his contacts with other high TWA officials in Paris, who have told him that they are "lost without"Subject and would be very glad to see him back in Paris. It also seems apparent that Subject left TWA under favorable circumstances and would be willing to return (and they would accept him) provided his financial situation were satisfactorily settled.

4. If Subject still interests you, I suggest you endeavor to contact him at his hotel in New York.

Dan C. Garner
Dan C. Garner

DCG:jws

Distribution:

FBW	2
File	1

REGISTRY COPY

CS COPY

S
CLASSIFICATION

201-33608

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: CSO via W/W

BY HAND

NO.

DATE 17 February

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. W/W		17	26	[illegible]	
2.					
3.					Subject now in U.S. - possibly permanently. Therefore no further investigation required
4. CSO		23 Feb		[illegible]	
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. 11.0.		23 Feb		TBB	

MICROFILMED
JUL 20 1956

[illegible]

OSO Registry
... 4 1950 /10
11

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

FDW/[illegible]

TO : Staff C/OSO Attn: Mr. Bonnet [illegible] DATE: [illegible] 1950

FROM : Research Branch, I&S Staff

SUBJECT: McVICKAR, Jr., John Augustus
#40104

In accordance with your request, a covert name check was conducted on the above named Subject. The results are attached.

A review of the information furnished as a basis for this name check indicates that active covert inquiry and/or searches of other public and quasi-public records should be productive. However, in view of the limited nature of your request, no effort to develop such information has been made.

The attached data simply represents the results of inquiry at the designated U. S. Government agencies. Should independent domestic inquiries be required under the provisions of the Director's memorandum dated 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances", we would be pleased to conduct them and furnish the results to you as promptly as possible.

FOR THE CHIEF OF INSPECTION AND SECURITY:

David W. Christensen
for: ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

Attachment
Name check data

1 - Encl.

FORM NO. 39-104
MAR 1949

SECRET

-1

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Staff C/OSO Atten: Mr. Bonnet

TO : Research Branch, I&S Staff

DATE: 1950

FROM : McVICKAR, Jr., John Augustus

SUBJECT: #40104

In accordance with your request, a covert name check was conducted on the above named Subject. The results are attached.

A review of the information furnished as a basis for this name check indicates that active covert inquiry and/or searches of other public and quasi-public records should be productive. However, in view of the limited nature of your request, no effort to develop such information has been made.

The attached data simply represents the results of inquiry at the designated U. S. Government agencies. Should independent domestic inquiries be required, under the provisions of the Director's memorandum dated 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances", we would be pleased to conduct them and furnish the results to you as promptly as possible.

FOR THE CHIEF OF INSPECTION AND SECURITY:

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

Attachment Name check data

FORM NO. 39-104
MAR 1949

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible], Jr., John Augustus

No. 40104

On 27 December 1949, the files of Confidential Government Agency L-2 were checked in the name of Subject with negative results.

On 23 December 1949, it was determined that there was no record of Subject in the files of Confidential Government Agency L-3.

Confidential Government Agency L-1 reported no record of Subject on 6 January 1950.

On 9 January 1950, a representative of Confidential Government Agency L-5 advised that no investigation of Subject has been conducted by that Agency.

On 28 December 1949, it was determined that there was no record of Subject in the files of Confidential Government Agency L-3(a).

The Master Index of the United States Civil Service Commission was checked in the name of Subject on 2[illegible] December 1949 with negative results.

The files of the House Committee on Un-American Activities were checked on [illegible] January 1950 but revealed no record of Subject.

On 30 January 1950, the records of the Passport Division, Department of State, were reviewed in the name of Subject:

Passport No. [illegible] was issued on 17 December 19[illegible] for travel to England, Holland, Norway, Denmark and Belgium on business for the American Overseas Airlines. Subject was employed as District Traffic Manager.

Subject was born on 12 February 190[illegible] at Tarrytown, New York. He resided at 11 East 90th Street, New York, New York and resided in France from 1920 to 1930. His occupation was that of Sales Executive.

Subject registered at Amsterdam, Netherlands on 3 November 1947. He had resided in Amsterdam since 14 January 1947 as a representative of American Overseas Airlines.

Passport was renewed for two years at Paris, France on 2 December 1948. Subject resided at that time at 101 Avenue des Champs Elysees and his legal residence was given as in care of Mrs. Robert [illegible], [illegible] Liberty Street, Westbury, Long Island, New York. At the time of registration, he represented Trans-World Airlines.

[illegible] Paris, France, stated that Subject had a sister ____________, born in St. Louis, Missouri on 12 January 19[illegible], [illegible] their

[illegible] Passport Division [illegible]

This data is property of Inspection and Security Staff, ~~[illegible]~~. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned.

SECRET

Esi. -1 9[illegible]-3608-1

SECRET

[illegible], Jr., John Augustus

NO. 40134

for Subject and his wife on 11 July 1949. It was stated that Subject married on 3 June 1949 at Alexandria, Virginia.

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: FDW/Schlatter

NO.:

DATE: 23 Nov 49

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. W/H		23 Nv	25	AS.	
2.					
3. W/K		23 Nov	25 Nov	RO/B	
4.					
5. CSO		28 NOV		B.	cov. n. ✓
6.					
7. Res. Div 1&5.				✓	
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					[illegible]

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

SECRET

23 November 1949

MEMORANDUM

TO: CSO

FROM: FDW

SUBJECT: Request For Name Check

Name: McVICKAR, John Augustus, Jr.

Nickname: "Johnny"

Present Address: 28 Avenue Montaigne, Paris, France

Date and Place of Birth: 12 February 1909, Long Island, New York

Citizenship: U. S.

Relatives: Father - John Augustus McVikar (sic), U.S. citizen at birth; living at home of Theodore McVikar (sic) on Long Island, New York; former member of U. S. Foreign Service

Mother - U. S. citizen at birth; now deceased

Brothers - Theodore McVikar (sic), living U. S.
Rolph McVikar (sic), living U. S.

Sister - Dorothea Dawson, living U. S.

Wife - Ruth Maxwell Warner McVikar (sic)(nee Ruth Maxwell) Born St. Louis, Missouri; U. S. citizen from birth

Daughter - Barbara McVikar (sic), 19 years of age (daughter by previous marriage); living in San Francisco, California, with remarried mother.

Educational Background:

St. Bernard's New York, U. S. A.
Harvey School, Paris, France
McJannet School, St. Cloud, s/o France
no college education

SECRET

2[illegible]

Present Employment:

Special Sales Representative for Trans World Airline in Paris

Previous Employment:

General Sales Agent in France for various American products, including Jantzen Bathing Suits, Three-in-One Oil, the Franklin Motor Car, the Le Baron Motor Car. (at age 18)

General Sales Agent in France for Dusenberg motor Cars and Packard Motor Car Co.; later exclusively for Packard Motor Car Co. (until early 1931)

Packard Motor Car Co. in Buffalo, New York (until Autumn of 1932)

Raymond-Whitcomb Inc., 670 Fifth Avenue, New York (until 1940)

Assistant General Manager of St. Regis Hotel, New York

Assistant General Manager of Hotel Pierre, New York (until 1942)

American Red Cross (Australia, New Guinea, Philippines)

Operated War Service Bureau of American Optical Company, Washington, D. C.

Transair, Inc.

American Airlines as District Traffic Manager for Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, with headquarters in Amsterdam

Special Sales Representative, Trans World Airlines where subject has been for past 15 months.

Organizations:

Never a member of any club, organization, union, party or society.

Financial:

Bank account with Chemical Bank and Trust Co. of New York

14-00000

SECRET

References:

Henry J. Woodbridge (former General Manager of Raymond-Whitcomb Inc. - now Assistant to the President, American Optical Co.)
Wardman Park Hotel
Washington, D. C.

Warren Lee Pierson
Chairman of the Board
Trans World Airline
New York, New York

Subject holds U. S. Passport No. 227 and Social Security No. 091-09-6737.

SECRET

SECRET

23 November 1949

MEMORANDUM

TO: CSO

FROM: FDM

SUBJECT: Request For Name Check

Name: McVICKAR, John Augustus, Jr.

Nickname: "Johnny"

Present Address: 28 Avenue Montaigne, Paris, France

Date and Place of Birth: 12 February 1909, Long Island, New York

Citizenship: U. S.

Relatives: Father - John Augustus McVikar (sic), U.S. citizen at birth; living at home of Theodore McVikar (sic) on Long Island, New York; former member of U. S. Foreign Service

Mother - U. S. citizen at birth; now deceased

Brothers - Theodore McVikar (sic), living U. S.
Rolph McVikar (sic), living U. S.

Sister - Dorothea Dawson, living U. S.

Wife - Ruth Maxwell Warner McVikar (sic)(nee Ruth Maxwell) Born St. Louis, Missouri; U. S. citizen from birth

Daughter - Barbara McVikar (sic), 19 years of age (daughter by previous marriage); living in San Francisco, California, with remarried mother.

Educational Background:

St. Bernard's New York, U. S. A.
Harvey School, Paris, France
McJannet School, St. Cloud, s/o France
no college education

SECRET

Present Employment:

Special Sales Representative for Trans World Airlines in Paris

Previous Employment:

General Sales Agent in France for various American products, including Jantzen Bathing Suits, Three-in-One Oil, the Franklin Motor Car, the Le Baron Motor Car. (at age 18)

General Sales Agent in France for Dusenberg Motor Cars and Packard Motor Car Co.; later exclusively for Packard Motor Car Co. (until early 1931)

Packard Motor Car Co. in Buffalo, New York (until Autumn of 1932)

Raymond-Whitcomb Inc., 670 Fifth Avenue, New York (until 1940)

Assistant General Manager of St. Regis Hotel, New York

Assistant General Manager of Hotel Pierre, New York (until 1942)

American Red Cross (Australia, New Guinea, Philippines)

Operated War Service Bureau of American Optical Company, Washington, D. C.

Transair, Inc.

American Airlines as District Traffic Manager for Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, with headquarters in Amsterdam

Special Sales Representative, Trans World Airlines where subject has been for past 15 months.

Organizations:

Never a member of any club, organization, union, party or society.

Financial:

Bank account with Chemical Bank and Trust Co. of New York

SECRET

References:

Henry S. Woodbridge (former General Manager of Raymond-
Wardman Park Hotel Whitcomb Inc. - now Assistant to the
Washington, D. C. President, American Optical Co.)

Warren Lee Pierson
Chairman of the Board
Trans World Airline
New York, New York

Subject holds U. S. Passport No. 227 and Social Security No. 091-09-6737.

SECRET

23 November 1949

MEMORANDUM

TO: CSO

FROM: FTSF

SUBJECT: Request For Name Check

Name: McVICKAR, John Augustus, Jr.

Nickname: "Johnny"

Present Address: 28 Avenue Montaigne, Paris, France

Date and Place of Birth: 12 February 1902, Long Island, New York

Citizenship: U. S.

Relatives: Father - John Augustus McVikar (sic), U.S. citizen at birth; living at home of Theodore McVikar (sic) on Long Island, New York; former member of U. S. Foreign Service

Mother - U. S. citizen at birth; now deceased

Brothers - Theodore McVikar (sic), living U. S.
Rolph McVikar (sic), living U. S.

Sister - Dorothea Dawson, living U. S.

Wife - Ruth Maxwell Warner McVikar (sic)(nee Ruth Maxwell)
Born St. Louis, Missouri; U. S. citizen from birth

Daughter - Barbara McVikar (sic), 19 years of age (daughter by previous marriage); living in San Francisco, California, with remarried mother.

Educational Background:

St. Bernard's New York, U. S. A.
Harvey School, Paris, France
McJannet School, St. Cloud, s/o France
no college education

SECRET

Present Employment:

Special Sales Representative for Trans World Airline
in Paris

Previous Employment:

General Sales Agent in France for various American products, including Jantzen Bathing Suits, Three-in-One Oil, the Franklin Motor Car, the Le Baron Motor Car. (at age 18)

General Sales Agent in France for Dusenberg Motor Cars and Packard Motor Car Co.; later exclusively for Packard Motor Car Co. (until early 1931)

Packard Motor Car Co. in Buffalo, New York (until Autumn of 1932)

Raymond-Whitcomb Inc., 670 Fifth Avenue, New York (until 1940)

Assistant General Manager of St. Regis Hotel, New York

Assistant General Manager of Hotel Pierre, New York (until 1942)

American Red Cross (Australia, New Guinea, Philippines)

Operated War Service Bureau of American Optical Company, Washington, D. C.

Transair, Inc.

American Airlines as District Traffic Manager for Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, with headquarters in Amsterdam

Special Sales Representative, Trans World Airlines where subject has been for past 15 months.

Organizations:

Never a member of any club, organization, union, party or society.

Financial:

Bank account with Chemical Bank and Trust Co. of New York

SECRET

SECRET

References:

Henry S. Woodbridge (former General Manager of Raymond-
Wardman Park Hotel Whitcomb Inc. - now Assistant to the
Washington, D. C. President, American Optical Co.)

Warren Lee Pierson
Chairman of the Board
Trans World Airline
New York, New York

Subject holds U. S. Passport No. 227 and Social Security No. 091-09-6737.

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

[illegible]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: OBYEDKOV, Ivan Dmitriyevich
201-779495

INCLUSIVE DATES: AUG. 64 – MARCH 77

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
0746 15 AUG 1978	9:08 am 15 Aug 1978	LOPES	finished reviewing [illegible] Edward Juan Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

OBYEDKOV, Ivan Dmitriyevich

201 NO. — [illegible]

MATERIAL FILED IN THIS FO
IS IN CHRONOLOGICAL

LE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

								PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		

11-2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH	1201472	WASHINGTON	000781

CONF: P-9449   INFO: FILE

0 INDEX ☒
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 49

TO: LONDON.Y

FROM: SE/CI/X INFO SE/X/EU, E/BC Y

SUBJECT: WNINTEL CKTOP JAGUAR/IVAN DMITRIYEVICH OBYEDKOV {201-779495}

REF: LONDON 81224 |IN 2003461 Y

1. OBYEDKOV ACTED AS A GUARD AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY, ALTHOUGH HE APPEARED TO BE BETTER EDUCATED THAN HIS DUTIES AS A GUARD WOULD DEMAND. AMONG HIS MAIN DUTIES, HE TENDED THE SOVIET EMBASSY TELEPHONE, STOOD GUARD DUTY AT THE GATE, TOOK MESSAGES FOR OTHER SOVIETS, NOTIFIED THEM OF MEETINGS, AND ARRANGED APPOINTMENTS. HE ALSO OCCASIONALLY DROVE ONE OF THE EMBASSY CARS ON ERRANDS. DURING HIS TEHRAN TOUR, HE WAS ALSO LISTED AS A GUARD AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY. HE WAS OBSERVED TO BE VERY SECURITY CONSCIOUS. Y

2. ON BOTH PRECEDING TOURS OBYEDKOV APPEARED TO FUNCTION AS A LEGITIMATE GUARD AND WAS NEVER OBSERVED IN THE ACT OF PERFORMING ANY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. BECAUSE A SOVIET IS LISTED AS A GUARD AT A SOVIET EMBASSY, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT HE IS NECESSARILY A KGB OFFICER. SINCE WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION WE WILL NO LONGER CARRY HIM AS SUSPECT RIS, PROBABLY KGB.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

12 Mar 77
201-779495

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:035018

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE
WASHINGTON

CONF: INFO: FILE

000781

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

3. FILE: 201-779495. E2, IMPDET.

ORIG: SE/CI/X {JONSSON, 1911} COORD: SE/X/EU {C. MACNAMARA}, E/B {S. BROWN}, C/SE/CI/X {NOYES} REL: C/E/BC {A. STIMSON}.

DATE: 9 MARCH 1977
ORIG: JONSSON/DTM
UNIT: SE/CI/X
EXT: 19011

C/SE/CI/X

SE/X/EU C Macnamara

E/BC ✓

C/E/BC

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:035018

1-71 MFG 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 3 PER Sp133 TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET R

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION UNIT TPDPS

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 636975 EIA248 PAGE 01-01 IN 200346

TOR:281431Z FEB 77 LOND 81224

SECRET 281359Z FEB 77 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE LONDON 81224

TO WASHINGTON.

FOR: SE/BIO INFO SE/CI

SUBJ: WNINTEL CKTOP JAGUAR

REF: DIRECTOR 719659, 17 JUL 1975

1. JAGUAR NOTES THAT IVAN OBYEDKOV (SUBJECT REF) IS NOW WORKING AS AN ELECTRICIAN AT SOVIET EMBASSY, LONDON. THEY INQUIRING REASONS WHY WE CONSIDERED HIM SUSPECT RIS, PROBABLY KGB AND ALSO ASKING, IF POSSIBLE, FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE FUNCTION HE PERFORMED AS GUARD AT SOVIET EMBASSIES IN TEHRAN AND MEXICO CITY.

2. FILE: 201-779495. E-2 IMPDET

SECRET

28 FEB 1977
201-779495

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

117

ONF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2K	PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE TIME GROUP: 171016Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 719659

CONF: SE 5 INFO: FILE IP/AN. EUR 4

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SOP
0 IP FILES # 111
DISSEM BY: 38

201-0779495
TO: LONDON.Y

CKTOP JAGUAR TRACEY

REF: LONDON 63248 |IN 629248| |*|Y

FOR LIAISON LESS 2014 TRACE REPLY

OBYEDKOV {201-0779495} AND WIFE HAVE SON, VLADIMIR, BORN CIRCA 53. IN 65 OBYEDKOV SPOKE POOR SPANISH. OBYEDKOV WAS A GUARD FOR THE SOV EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY FROM 28 AUG 62 TO 4 AUG 65; AND A GUARD FOR THE SOV EMBASSY IN TEHRAN FROM 15 AUG 67 TO PRIOR APR 71. DURING BOTH TOURS, OBYEDKOV'BS WIFE SERVED AS PRINCIPAL OF SOV SCHOOLS. OBYEDKOV IS CONSIDERED SUSPECT RIS, PROBABLY KGB, BASED ON HIS POSITION. E-2 IMPDET.H

*REQUEST TRACES PCS SOV.

ND 641990

RECORD COPY

17 Jul 75

201-779495

DATE: 15 JULY 1975
ORIG: CHARLIE WOODWARD/CF
UNIT: SE/BIO
EXT: 1079

EURBC
RELEASING OFFICER

SE/CI/X
SE/X/EU
E/BC/UK
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Jackson
C/SE/BIO 15 JUL 1975
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0482962

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 12 PER 50P/11 TOTAL COPIES 12-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

SE5

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IRAN EUR 4

STAFF

1
2
3
4
5
6

T 149631 EIA106 PAGE 01-01 IN 629248

TOR:101040Z JUL 75 LOND 63248

SECRET 100944Z JUL 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 63248

TO: DIRECTOR.

CKTOP JAGUAR TRACE

1. JAGUAR REQUESTS TRACES ON IVAN DMITRIYEVICH OBEDKOV, BORN 28 JUL 27, RYAZANSKAYA OBLAST. WIFE: YELENA LVOVNA OBEDKOVA NEE DMITRIYEVA, BORN 04 MAR 28, MOSCOW. POSTING: TWO YEARS SOVIET EMBASSY REPLACING ANATOLIY IVANOVICH SUKHOV (201-905449). MD#221776

2. FILE DEFER. E2, IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

SECRET

10 Jul 75

201-779495

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB

INFO
Chief, NE

FROM
Chief of Station, Tehran

SUBJECT
REDTOP AEKICK
PCS Departure - Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. For your information, we no longer carry Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495), guard at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, as PCS. He was not listed on ROGWEN's April 1971 Presence List nor their December 1971 list. We assume he has departed PCS.

2. During OBYEDKOV's tour in Tehran his wife, Yelena, served as principal at the Soviet school. His son was apparently in Moscow living with Yelena's mother. On 28 October 1969, ROARC reported the grandmother calling to check with OBYEDKOV regarding a tutor for the child. They discussed the possibility of the tutor coming for three times a week, at five rubles per hour, but OBYEDKOV, after checking with his wife, decided on two times a week. OBYEDKOV seemed to be very fond of his mother-in-law. According to our AESCREEN transcriber, she was the only one that could tell OBYEDKOV what to do.

3. The following are comments made by our AESCREEN transcriber on OBYEDKOV on 8 July 1970:

He is very security conscious, especially in dealing with "official people" or superiors. He mentions his name to his friends freely, but refuses to say his name when he knows that one of the superiors is calling, "this is the duty officer" OBYEDKOV would say several times. He often lectures people when they violate security regulations when talking on the telephone. OBYEDKOV has to be persuaded several times or even

(continued)

ATTACHMENT:

Photo, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:

~~3~~-C/SB, w/att., a/s
2-C/NE, wo/att.

CS COPY

1 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	NITA-25520	7 February 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-779495

begged if someone needs help (getting a vehicle or when asking for a favor), but when he decides to help, OBYEDKOV will stay with the problem until he gets results. Although OBYEDKOVA seems to be more cultured and better educated than her husband, it is certain that only OBYEDKOV makes the final decisions. OBYEDKOV could be very pleasant, helpful and even kind, but it usually depended on his mood.

3. The only Soviet we noted as being friendly with OBYEDKOV during his tour here was Rafik Nazhaf-Ogly ABDULLAYEV (201-808524), Third Secretary, suspect RIS, probable KGB. When speaking to one another they used the familiar "ty". We do not know the extent of their relationship.

4. Forwarded herewith is a photograph, date unknown, received from ROGWEN. We have destroyed the Station file.

Marcia A. BURGOON

201-774495

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

OBYEDKOV, IVAN DMITRIYEVICH
201-779495
SEX M DOB ?

041-008-005
NITA-23060A01
09 DEC 68
P4

CIT ?
OCC ?
CHIEF GUARD, SUSPECT RIS. WIFE YELENA LVNOVNA
IS DIRECTOR, DEPENDENTS SCHOOL.

R 6903190152

FILE IN 201-779495

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB

INFO
Chief, NE

FROM
Chief of Station, Tehran

SUBJECT
REDTOP: Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
SEP 1 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Request traces on:

Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)
born 27 August 1927, Ryazan USSR
passport: S-105042 issued 26 May 1967
wife: Yelena born 1928, Moscow
passport: S-105043 issued 26 May 1967
occupation: guard, Soviet Embassy, Tehran
arrived: 15 August 1967.

DPOB amended

Photocopies of the OBYEDKOVs' passports are attached.

2. According to the 1963 and 1964 Checklists of Soviet Officials Abroad, one Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV (201-121531); born 14 July 1912; wife Yelena; A number 04877, was present in Mexico City since August 1962 as an employee of the Soviet Embassy. The Checklist for 1965 lists one Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495); born 14 July 1912; wife Yelena; A number 41970, as an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City since August 1962. Apparently these two OBYEDKOVs are one and the same and although Subject's birthdate is different we believe he is identical with the OBYEDKOV who served in Mexico City. Recently a conversation was recorded on ROARC during which Subject used several Spanish words and expressions. It is possible Subject acquired a knowledge of Spanish during a previous tour in a Spanish speaking country such as Mexico. Please compare the attached photo of Subject with that of the OBYEDKOV who was assigned to Mexico City to determine if they are identical.

Veronica L. ANIELARKE

RIS INPUT NO. 14

Attachment: As stated, h/w
Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att
1 - C/NE w/o/att

CS COPY

SEP.

201-779495

CROSS REFERENCE TO
1 Att h/w

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
NITA-21,826

DATE
7 September 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO Chief of Station, Tehran	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, SB via Chief, NE		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: REDTOP LCIMPROVE
Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: NITA-21826, 7 September 1967

1. Forwarded herewith are Summary Traces in SPR format on Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495) who is suspect RIS. Paragraph 20 of the Summary is for passage to liaison.

2. Subject is not identical to Ivan Ivanovich OBYLDKOV (201-121531). When Subject first arrived in Mexico in August 1962, he was reported as Ivan Ivanovich and this error was not corrected until May 1965; therefore, two Checklists carried the wrong man PCS in Mexico. When the records were corrected, the Subject's birthdate was not, and the same date was listed for both parties. Headquarters records do not list a wife or other dependents for Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV and, as far as is known, he has not been assigned abroad PCS prior to the date of this dispatch.

R.N.T.
Rita N. TOLJANIC

ATTACHMENT:

"Soviet Personality Report" h/w

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - COS, Tehran w/att., a/s

RIS [illegible] NO. 7

CS COPY

28 NOV 1967

201-779495

1 Att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	NITW-11583	16 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-779495

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SB/O/NE	Betty Given	ji	5604

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CSB/O/NE	20 Nov 67	
SB/CI/K	22 Nov	B [illegible]
SB/CI/G	22 Nov	[illegible]

~~1~~-RID w/att.
1-SB/O/NE w/att.
1-SB/CI/K wo/att.
1-SB/CI/G wo/att.
1-NE/GTI/I wo/att.

AN	PIF	
FS	DEST	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
CNE/GTI/I	[illegible]	

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

PREPARED BY: Rita N. TOLJANIC
DATE: 3 October 1967
201-NUMBER: 201-779495
A NUMBER: A 41970

1. NAME: Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV

2. DPOB: 27 August 1927 or 19 July 1927 in Ryazan

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA:

   a. USSR

   b. Service passport S009260, used while Subject was in Mexico

   c. Service passport S105042, issued 26 May 1967

6. CURRENT POSITION:

   Guard in the Soviet Embassy, Tehran

7. RELATIVES:

   c. spouse - Yelena Lvovna possibly nee DMITRIYEVA, born 1928 in Moscow. She traveled to Mexico on Service passport S009270. She served as the director of the Soviet Primary School in Mexico City and ran the summer camp in Cuernavaca.

   d. children - a son, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1953.

   e. Boris Lvovich DMITRIYEV and Mariya Borisovna DMITRIYEVA, who are probably wife's brother and sister-in-law. During Subject's stay in Mexico they occupied Subject's apartment in Moscow, given as Moscow E-143, Metrogorodok, Otkrytoye Shosse 26, Building 7, Apartment 69, telephone G3-72-34.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AH1 NiTw 11583

201-779495

7. (cont'd)

In May 1964 Subject spoke to "Boris" in Moscow about certain purchases for the apartment, and Subject's wife also spoke to her mother, who apparently lived with Boris and his wife.

8. LANGUAGES:

Russian - native

Spanish - poor

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:

Photo number S010797

[illegible] IVAN DMITRIYEVICH

DPOB: CA 30

WIFE: [illegible] F CA 30

A-41970

S010797.

201-779495

PPT

REF: [illegible]-27030 28 [illegible]



S010797



S010797

10. PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, AND HABITS:

Although Subject acted as a guard at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, he appeared to be fairly well educated and was not subservient to any of the other Soviets, with the exception of Counselor Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV . (201-028975). On one occasion Subject was reported to be helping the daughter of Commercial Counselor Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO with her arithmetic homework. On another, Subject was asked about methods of producing metal wire, a subject on which Subject was well informed as a result of his having once worked for a wire factory.

Subject had a tape recorder at home which he liked to listen to. He also occasionally went fishing with other Soviets.

Subject told "Boris" in Moscow to build a large garage, because he was bringing a big car back with him. He also asked whether Boris had bought a refrigerator and TV for the apartment. On another occasion he was negotiating for a can of paint to take back to Moscow with him to repaint "the Moskvich". Subject and his wife were both buying watches just before leaving Mexico. From the above it appears that Subject was fairly well-off financially, for a guard.

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

Date unknown - Subject reportedly worked at the Serp i Molot (wire) factory in Leningrad.

28 August 1962 - Subject, accompanied by wife and son, arrived PCS in Mexico as an employee of the Soviet Embassy. Subject replaced Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich YEGOROV (201-273431), who is suspect GRU.

6-19 November 1962 - Subject was in the hospital in Mexico City. On the 11th of November he underwent a three hour operation of unspecified nature. The other Soviets had to guard him when he came out of the operating room.

17 August 1963 - Subject stated that he had just returned from a trip with Valentin Vasilyevich BAKULIN (201-261813), who is known GRU. There was no information on where or why the trip was taken.

4 August 1965 - Subject departed Mexico PCS, transiting Belgium on his return to the USSR. He was accompanied by Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052) who is known KGB. Subject was replaced by Ivan Petrovich KARCHIN (201-782164).

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION:

Mexico City Station considers Subject suspect RIS because he appears better educated that his duties as a guard would demand, because he seems financially better off than other Soviet guards and because of his apparent association on equal footing with Soviet RIS officers. DERYABIN in 1955 advised LNERGO that the surname OBYEDKOV was familiar to him as the name of a person who was in the Guards Directorate of the MVD in 1951.

In September 1967 DERYABIN and RASTVOROV said that they neither recognized the face nor the name of the Subject. (Both Ivan Ivanovich and Ivan Dmitriyevich were seen by the defectors and they did not recognize either of them.)

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

There was no intelligence activity noted on the Subject's part while he was stationed in Mexico.

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

Subject primarily handled the main Soviet telephone and took guard duty at the gate. Subject took messages for other Soviets, notified them of meetings, and contacted them for appointments with each other. He occasionally drove one of

201-779495

14. (cont'd)

the Embassy cars on errands. He kept a ledger of the telegrams sent out by the Embassy and notified other Soviets when cables came in for them.

15. CONTACTS:

a. Soviet friends and associates.

1. Valeriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV (201-293945), employee in the Soviet Trade Representation in Mexico from February 1961 to May 1964, suspect RIS. When the ANDRIANOVs left Mexico they were planning to get in touch with Subject's family in Moscow.

2. Aleksandr Mikhaylovich DENISOV (201-726491), Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico from August 1962 to April 1967, known GRU. Subject appeared not to like DENISOV. It also appeared that DENISOV was responsible for reimbursing Subject for the gas Subject used in KUKHARENKO's car.

3. Aleksey Nikolayevich GANIN (201-757775), known GRU officer who visited Mexico 31 July - 14 August 1964.

Subject, along with other Soviets who were known GRU officers, met GANIN on his visit to Mexico.

4. Sergey Semenovich KUKHARENKO (201-260831), chief of the Soviet information Bulletin in Mexico from October 1962 to August 1964, suspect KGB. Subject and KUKHARENKO were the best of friends for a time, but then KUKHARENKO began drinking too much and getting into various scrapes. Subject frequently commiserated with KUKHARENKO's wife over her husband's drinking, automobile accidents, money problems. Subject occasionally used KUKHARENKO's car.

5. Oleg Pavlovich MOSKVICHEV (201-285090), employee in the Soviet Trade Representation in Mexico from March 1961 to July 1964, known KGB. Subject gave MOSKVICHEV his home address in Moscow.

6. Vladimir Nikolavevich RADVANSKIY (201-298171), code clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico from September 1964 to March 1967, known KGB. Subject is not known to have associated with RADVANSKIY; however, Subject's wife and RADVANSKAYA worked together in the school and children's camp, and

15. (cont'd)

RADVANSKAYA took over the camp after Subject's wife left Mexico. RADVANSKAYA asked Subject's wife to tell her (RADVANSKAYA's) daughter to enter the institute when she saw her in Moscow.

7. Vladimir Aleksandrovich ROMANCHENKO (201-727109), Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico from August 1963 to July 1967, no known RIS affiliation. When ROMANCHENKO was in Moscow on leave in May 1964, Subject told "Boris" (believed to be Subject's brother-in-law) to send letters to him through ROMANCHENKO when he came back to Mexico.

8. Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (201-243602), Commercial Counselor in Mexico from July 1962 to circa December 1966, suspect GRU. Subject's wife and Mrs. VISKO taught together in the school and seemed to be good friends. Subject also seemed to be friends with Mrs. VISKO, and he reportedly helped the VISKO's daughter with her arithmetic homework on at least one occasion.

20. TRACES FOR LIAISON:

Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV, born 27 August 1927, accompanied by his wife Yelena Lvovna, and son, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1953, were stationed in Mexico City from August 1962 to August 1965. Subject was a guard in the Soviet Embassy. Subject is suspect RIS.

201-774475

SOME of

I would like to have all the material pertaining to Ivan Dmitriyevich Obyedkov (201-779195) removed from Ivan Ivanovich Obyedkov's file (201-121531) and reclassified into Ivan Dmitriyevich's file.

This material to be removed has Ivan Ivanovich's name on it and refers to his being PCS in Mexico, which he was not, Ivan Dmitriyevich was.

If this note is too confusing and you have further question please call Betty Given, SB/O/NE, Ex 1042.

06 OCT 1967

PROCESSING ACTION

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP - Voice Samples of Soviets in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith for Headquarters retention are voice samples, taken from LIENVOY, of the following Soviets previously stationed in Mexico :

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701)
Yuriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV (201-230429)
Ivan Afanasyevich BEKETOV (201-754500)
Ina Nikolayevna BOLDOVA (201-245416)
Vasiliy Karpovich BUTSEV (201-273883)
Yuriy Aleksandrovich DOMRACHEV (201-297666)
Aleksey Ivanovich GARMASHEV (2010277418)
Vladimir Petrovich GULIN (201-734985)
Viktor Petrovich KALININ (201-735049)
Nikolay Konstantinovich KHLEBNIKOV (201-227420)
Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV (201-101794)
Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)
Sergey Semenovich KUKHARENKO (201-260831)
Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870)
Vladimir Petrovich OBRUBOV (201-731394)
Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)
Aleksandr Petrovich PAVLOV (201-761265)
Georgiy Aleksandrovich SHCHUCHKIN (201-242728)
Vasiliy Vasilyevich SIMONOV (201-735055)
Sergey Iosifovich SOKOLOVSKIY (201-025485)
Gennadiy Fedorovich STROGANOV (201-735036)
Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (201-243802)

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Voice samples

Distribution:
2 - CSB, w/att., H/W
1 - CWH, w/o att.

File Obyedkov
201-779495

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 31217	27 JANUARY 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-8-10/1

OBYEDKOV & WIFE

1.
15-60-55 Dec. 18 ,64 L34-M8-T587 #451to 490
In. 1532 hrs. IRA VISKO &ANDREY SOKOLOV talk to OBYEDKOV in Russian.

2.
15-60-55 18 Dec. 64 L34-M8-T587 #948
Out. 1919 hrs. OBYEDKOV talks to New York in Spanish.

3.
15-60-55 18 Dec. 64 L34-M8-T587 #962
1939 hrs. MF talks to OBYEDKOV in Spanish.

OBYEDKOV & WIFE

4.
15-60-55 26 Dec. 64 L34-M8-T594 #328
In. OBYEDKOV talks to his wife in Russian.



OBYEDKOV
201-779495

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SR Division

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDWOOD - Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

SR TRAVEL INPUT PROGRAM

REFERENCE: HMMA-26177, 28 May 1965

1. LIFIRE reported the departure on 7 July 1965 via Sabena flight 556 for Brussels (and the USSR) of Subject's wife and son. According to LIENVOY, Subject will follow in September. It is not known known whether this travel is PCS or TDY.

2. Travelling on the same flight with Subject was Lyudmila Ivanovna ZHEVTUN (201-754502), who has gone on home leave to the USSR.

3. The Station would appreciate a reply to the Reference, which requested clarification of Subject's identity.

answered HMMW-13233 21 [illegible] 65

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
~~2~~ - CSR
1 - CWH

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

201-779495
~~201-121531~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26658	22 JULY 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
		201- FFN: P-8125

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD - Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HMMA-26824, 10 August 1965
B. MEXI-4485, 19 August 1965

1. Reference A reported the departure of Subject from Mexico on 4 August 1965. The Station now believes that Subject departed PCS, and that he has possibly been replaced by Ivan Petrovich KARCHIN, whose arrival on 14 August 1965 was reported in Reference B.

2. According to LIENVOY, KARCHIN has been answering the telephone at the Soviet Embassy, a duty for which Subject was previously responsible. According to LICALLA, KARCHIN has also been taking guard duty at the entrance gate to the Soviet Embassy, which Subject also had as one of his duties.

3. In addition, LIENVOY reported ~~that~~ on 17 August 1965 that "a new school director" had arrived at the Soviet Embassy. OBYEDKOVA had previously been the director of the Soviet school in Mexico, and the fact that she had been replaced indicates that she will not return to Mexico. The identity of the new school director has not been established, although it may be KARCHINA.

4. The attached Soviet Personality Report (SPR) on Subject represents a summary of Station information on him. It is noted that Subject is listed as suspect RIS, service unknown. his previous designation as suspect KGB was based primarily on his presumed identity with the subject of 201-121531, which has now been established as incorrect.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
SPR Photo retained in B.c

Distribution:
~~1~~2 - CSR, w/att. (2 copies), H/W
1 - CWH, w/att. (1 copy), H/W

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

201-779495

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 27030

DATE
26 AUGUST 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-779495
FFN: P-8125

14-00000

SECRET

CSR

ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-27030

DATED 26 August 1965

SPR PREPARED BY: Jonathan L. WEENING

DATE: 26 August 1965

1. NAME: Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (4).

2. DPOB: ca. 1927-30 (3). Place unknown.

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA:
Soviet service passport no. 009260, used in 1965 (3).

4. ETHNIC ORIGIN: No information.

5. OTHER NAMES USED: No information

6. CURRENT POSITION: Unknown

7. RELATIVES:

a. Wife: Yelena Lvovna OBYEDKOVA (1). Probably nee DMITRIYEVA (3).

DOB: ca. 1928-31 (3).

Soviet service passport no. 009270, used in 1965 (3).
In Mexico 28 August 1962 - 22 July 1965 (2,5). Served as director of the Soviet primary school in Mexico City and also ran the summer camp in Cuernavaca.

b. Son: Vladimir (1,2).

DOB: ca. 1953-56 (3).

In Mexico 28 August 1962 - 22 July 1965. Travelled on mother's passport, (2,5).

c. Boris Lvovich DMITRIYEV and Mariya Borisovna DMITRIYEVA who are probably wife's brother and sister-in-law. During Subject's tour in Mexico, the DMITRIYEVs were staying in Subject's apartment in Moscow, given as Moscow E-143, Metrogorodok, Otkrytoye Shosse 26, Building 7, Apartment 69, telephone G3-72-34 (4). In May 1964 Subject spoke to "Boris" in Moscow about certain purchases for the apartment, and Subject's wife also apoke to her mother, who apparently lived with "Boris" and his wife (1).

8. LANGUAGES: Spanish - poor (1).

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:
Photos of Subject and his wife are attached (7).

CS COPY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

att. #1 - HMMA-27030

201-779995

10. PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, HABITS:

Although Subject acted as a guard at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, he appeared to be fairly well educated and was not subservient to any of the other Soviets, with the exception of Counselor Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV (201-028975). On one occasion Subject was reported to be helping the daughter of Commercial Counselor Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO with her arithmetic homework. On another, Subject was asked about methods of producing metal wire, a subject on which Subject was well informed as a result of his having once worked for a wire factory (1).

Subject had a tape recorder at home which he liked to listen to. He also occasionally went fishing with other Soviets (1).

Subject told "Boris" /paragraph 7c above/ in Moscow to build a large garage, because he was bringing a big car back with him. He also asked whether "Boris" had bought a refrigerator and TV for the apartment. On another occasion he was negotiating for a can of paint to take back to Moscow with him to repaint "the Moskvich." Subject and his wife were both buying watches just before leaving Mexico. (1). /From the above it appears that Subject was fairly well-off financially, for a guard/.

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

(date unknown)	Subject reportedly had worked at the Serp i Molot wire factory in Leningrad (1).
28 August 1962	Subject, accompanied by his wife and son, arrived in Mexico as employee of the Soviet Embassy. Subject replaced Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich YEGOROV (201-273431, /suspect GRU/. (2) In Mexico City Subject and his family lived at Tacambaro 4, reportedly in Apartment 5 in January 1963 and in Apartment 4 in July 1965. (1).
22 July 1965	Subject's wife and son departed Mexico for the USSR (5).
4 August 1965	Subject departed Mexico for the USSR (3). Subject is believed to have been replaced by Ivan Petrovich KARCHIN (no Station traces.)

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION: Suspect RIS.

The Station has no real evidence of Subject's intelligence affiliation; however, because Subject appears better educated than his duties as a guard would demand, because he seems financially better off than other Soviet guards, and because of his apparent association on an equal footing with Soviet officers, he is considered suspect RIS. It is further noted that Subject's predecessor was suspect GRU.

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: Unknown.

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

In Mexico City Subject primarily handled the main Soviet Embassy telephone (1) and also took guard duty at the gate (3). Subject took messages for other Soviets, notified them of meetings, and contacted them for appointments with each other. He also occasionally drove one of the Embassy cars on errands. He kept a ledger of the telegrams sent out by the Embassy and notified other Soviets when cables came in for them (1).

On 17 August 1963 Subject stated that he had just returned from a trip with Valentin Vasilyevich BAKULIN (201-261513) (1). /BAKULIN is an identified GRU officer. The Station has no further information on the nature of this trip, nor any reports of other trips taken by Subject./

From 6 to 19 November 1962 Subject was in the hospital (Sanitorio Reforma) in Mexico City. On 11 November he underwent a three-hour operation of an unspecified nature. The other Soviets had to take guard duty with him in the hospital, and it was stressed that one of the Soviet men should be with him after he came out of the operation. (1).

15. CONTACTS:

Subject is not known to have had any contact with non-Soviets during his tour in Mexico, with the exception of an occasional visit to one of the doctors regularly consulted by the Soviets. Subject's closest Soviet contacts appeared to be the following :

a. Valeriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV (201-293945), employee in the Soviet Commercial Office in Mexico from February 1961 to May 1964, suspect RIS. When the ANDRIANOVs left Mexico they were planning to get in touch with Subject's family in Moscow (1).

b. Aleksandr Mikhaylovich DENISOV (201-726491), Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico since August 1962, known GRU. Subject appeared not to like DENISOV. It also appeared that DENISOV was responsible for reimbursing Subject for the gas Subject used in KUKHARENKO's (see below) car (1).

c. Aleksey Nikolayevich GANIN (201-757775), known GRU officer who visited Mexico 31 July - 14 August 1964. Subject, along with other Soviets who were known GRU officers, met GANIN on his visit to Mexico (6).

d. Sergey Semenovich KUKHARENKO (201-260831), chief of the Soviet Information Bulletin in Mexico from October 1962 to August 1964, suspect KGB. Subject and KUKHARENKO were the best of friends for a time, but then KUKHARENKO began drinking too much and getting into various scrapes. Subject frequently commiserated with KUKHARENKO's wife over her husband's drinking, automobile accidents, money problems. Subject occasionally used KUKHARENKO's car. (1).

e. Oleg Pavlovich MOSKVICHEV (201-285090), employee in the Soviet Commercial Office in Mexico from March 1961 to July 1964, known KGB. Subject gave MOSKVICHEV his home address in Moscow (1).

f. Vladimir Nikolayevich RADVANSKIY (201-298171), code clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico since September 1964, known KGB. Subject is not known to have associated with RADVANSKIY; however, Subject's wife and RADVANSKAYA worked together in the school and children's camp, and RADVANSKAYA took over the camp after Subject's wife left Mexico. RADVANSKAYA asked Subject's wife to tell her (RADVANSKAYA's) daughter to enter the institute when she saw her in Moscow (1).

g. Vladimir Aleksandrovich ROMANCHENKO (201-727109), Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico since August 1963, no known RIS affiliation. When ROMANCHENKO was in Moscow on leave in May 1964, Subject told "Boris" (believed to be Subject's brother-in-law) to send letters to him through ROMANCHENKO when he came back to Mexico. Subject said that ROMANCHENKO could be reached through (fnu) MURAVYEV at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1).

h. Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (201-243602), Commercial Counselor in Mexico since July 1962, suspect GRU. Subject's wife and Mrs. VISKO taught together in the school and seemed to be good friends. Subject also seemed to be friends with Mrs. VISKO, and he reportedly helped the VISKO daughter with her arithmetic homework on at least one occasion. Mrs. VISKO was planning to send some things to Moscow with Subject when he left (1).

16. PAST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AGAINST SUBJECT:

None, with the exception of technical surveillance.

17. OPERATIONAL PLANNING DATA:

Not applicable

18. OPERATIONAL STEPS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN NEXT YEAR:

Not applicable.

LIMITED

28 May 65

KODACK ONLY

PHOTOS

SECRET

HMMA-27030

SECRET

19. SOURCES:

1. LIENVOY, date as given if applicable..
2. MEXI-1850, 31 August 1962
3. HMMA-26824, 10 August 1965, LIFIRE travel report.
4. HMMA-26177, 28 May 1965, LIENVOY information on Subject.
5. HMMA-26658, 22 July 1965, LIFIRE travel report.
6. MEXI-0503, 7 August 1964, LIEMPTY report on GANIN's visit.
7. LIEMPTY photographs, taken in 1965.
8. LILYRIC surveillance reports, 1962-65.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

OBYEDKOV, IVAN DMITRIYEVICH
201-779495
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
LEFT MEXICO PCS DURING 4 AUG 1965.

050-008-010
HMMA-27102
08 SEP 65
P2

R 6509151383

FILE IN 201-779495

14. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ORYEDKOV, IVAN OMITRIYEVICH
201-779495
SEX M DOB ?

201-305052
HMMA-26853
11 AUG 65
P1

CIT ?
OCC ?
TRAVELLIN ON SAME FLIGHT WITH KOSTIKOV WAS SUBJ. SUBJ ASSIGNED AS GUARD AT THE SOV EMB IN MEXICO CITY, RETURNING TO THE USSR.

R 6508251179

FILE IN 201-779495

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

csc 1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
AUG 17 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD - Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LIFIRE reported the departure on 4 August 1965, Sabena flight 556 for Brussels (and Moscow) of Subject. (It is not known whether Subject's travel was PCS or TDY. Subject's wife and son had left Mexico on 7 July 1965).

son?

2. LIFIRE reported that Subject was travelling on Soviet service passport no. 009260; his wife and daughter had travelled on no. 009270. Subject's age was given as 35, that of his wife as 34, and that of his son Vladimir as 9. (Comment: These ages may be as of 1962, when Subject originally entered Mexico.) ~~they~~

cancelled

3. Travelling on the same flight with Subject were Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052) and his family. KOSTIKOV is an identified KGB officer who was returning to the USSR PCS.

RIS INPUT NO. 23

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - CSR
1 - CWH

CS COPY

201-779495

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26824	10 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-779495 FFN: P -8125

14-00000

DISPATCH | SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, SR via Chief, WH

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/Operational
Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA 2617, 28 May 1965

1. Headquarters agrees that Subject is probably not identical with Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV (201-121531) as was earlier believed, and has accordingly assigned Ivan Dmitriyevich 201-779495. A full Headquarters trace under that name turned up no information other than that originating from Mexico City Station, which has now been re-classified into the new file. We are puzzled by the fact that MEXI-1850, dated 1 September 1962, the first piece of correspondence from Mexico City Station on Subject, reported him as Ivan Ivanovich.

2. A photo comparison of the two individuals in this case is not satisfactory proof that they are in fact two people because of the difference in years and exposure in the photographs. The pre-Mexico City traces on Ivan Ivanovich reflect only a date and place of birth as identifying data. It is hoped that Mexico City Station can obtain soon identifying biographic data on Ivan Dmitriyevich in order to firmly resolve the matter.

BHG.
BRUCE H. GINTALAS

Distribution:
Orig & 2-COS, Mexico City

201-779495

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
13843
HMMW ~~13838~~ CS COPY

DATE 29 JUL 1965
21 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-779495

1-RID
1-SR/O/WH
1-WH/3/MEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SR/O/PA	JOHN P. CARLSON	cmg	5523

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/O/WH	23 July 65	
WH/3/MEX		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1		

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRTE

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO : Chief, SR Division

INFO : Chief WH, Division

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDWOOD
Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

OCC
Δ Mexico City, Mexico

1. Douglas J. FEINCLASS has reported that the OBYEDKOV who is in Mexico City is definitely Ivan Dmitriyevich, not Ivan Ivanovich as previously recorded. (Source: LIENVOY tapes.) It is impossible to check the original flight manifest listing OBYEDKOV's arrival in 1962, since this has been destroyed.

2. OBYEDKOV also appears to be much younger than the Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV (201-121531) who was born 14 July 1912 and with whom Subject was assumed to be identical. No date of birth is available for the OBYEDKOV in Mexico City.

3. Subject's wife is Yelena Lvovna OBYEDKOVA. They have a son Vladimir, born roughly in 1953. LICALLA photographs of Subject and his wife are enclosed. According to LIENVOY, Subject's home address in Moscow is Moscow E-143, Metrogorodok, Otkrytoye Shosse 26, Building 7, Apt. 69, telephone G3-72-34. In 1964 the apartment was occupied by Boris Lvovich DMITRIYEV and Mariya Borisovna DMITRIYEVA.

4. Headquarters is requested to retrace Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV and assign a new 201 number if Headquarters agrees that he is not identical with the Subject of 201-121531.

for
Willard C. Curtis

Attachment:
3 photos

Distribution:
2 SRD w/att
1 WHD, w/o att

201-779795

1 Attach

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26177	28 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-

Atta To: HMMA-26177. 28 May 1965

TO: Chief, SR Division

From: Chief of Station, Mexico City

CS COPY

Attach 1 HMMA 26177



HUBARA ONLY

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

OBYEDKOV, I. X. Dmitrievich
201-~~121531~~ 779495 — 050-008-010
SEX M DOB ? — HMMA-26081
14 MAY 65
CIT ? — A01 P1
OCC ?
SUPPORT GROUP. GUARD SUSPECT KGB.
MEMBER KGB REZIDENTURA, MEXICO CITY.

R 6505262121

201-779495

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When [illegible])

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
	2. RI FILE NO.		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

OBYEDKOV, IVAN ~~IVANOVICH~~ DMITRIYEVICH
201-~~121531~~ 779495
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
EMBASSY GUARD. SUSPECT KGB OFFICER.

074-126-060/01
HMMA-25843
16 APR 65
A01 P5

R 6505032159

201-779495

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

DMITRIYEVICH
~~IVANOVICH~~

OBYEDKOV, IVAN ~~DMITRIYEVICH~~
201-~~121531~~ 771495
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
IN A CONVERSATION W/WIFE, SUBJ IMPLIED VLADIMIR A. ROMANCHENKO 201-727109 WAS UNFIT FOR JOB OF NEGOTIATING FOR THE RE-ROOFING OF SOV EMB CAUSE HE WAS INDECISIVE AND VACILLATING.

201-727109
HMMA-25188
22 JAN 65
A01 P2

R 6508121590

771495
FILE IN 201-~~121531~~

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

9 - [illegible]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: OBYEDKOV, Ivan ~~Ivanovich~~ DMITRIYEVICH - Mexico 1964

Subject's photo was shown to Soviet Defectors RASTVOROV and DERYABIN on 18 August 1964 with negative results.

SR/CI/S

201-779495

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

DMITRIYEVICH
OBYEDKOV, IVAN ~~IVANOVICH~~
201-~~121531~~ 779495
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
EMPL GUARD. SUSPECT KGB OFF.

050-008-010
HMMA-24698A01
06 NOV 64
P2

R 6411241378

201-779495

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

Memo for 201 file on

OBYEDKOV, Ivan ~~Ivanovich~~ [illegible]

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST Geo. Finney

6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Sept 64

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Photo of OBYEDKOV was shown to AEDONOV. He did not recognize OBYEDKOV.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201 - 779495

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (TEMPO ISSUED AT 2230 6 AUG)

INFO : [illegible] CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

SECRET 070034Z

DIR CITE MEXI 0492

7 Aug 64 IN 44977

REDCOAT

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF : MEXI 0444 (IN 41779) *

1. ACCORDING 1 AUG LIENVOY SERGEY SEMYONOVICH KUKHARENKO ARRANGED PACKING OF CERTAIN PERSONAL EFFECTS FOR SHIPMENT USSR. (PER OTHER LIENVOY REPORTING AND INFO FROM SUBJ PARA 2 REF DEPARTURE IS FOR HOME LEAVE.) SAME DAY MRS. K TOLD SUSPECT KGB GUARD IVAN [illegible] ~~I~~VANOVICH OBYEDKOV THAT WHEN K TOOK HER HOME THAT AFTERNOON HE PULLED FAST ONE ON HER, " STEPPED ON THE GASS AND DISAPPEARED IN CLOUD OF SMOKE AND DUST. I DON'T KNOW THE PLACE WHERE HE GOES, BUT I KCOW THE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) PERFECTGY." AT [illegible] HOURS SAME EVE MRS. K AGAIN CALLZD OBYEDKOV, TOLDR HIM THAT K RETURNED COMPLETELY DRUNK AND HAD WRECKED HIS CAR. (NOTE: MRS K PLEADED WITH O ON 12 JULY TO PREVENTNK FROM DRIVING CAR THAT DATE SINCE HE DRUNK AND MRS K FEARED WOULD WRECH CAR.)

2. 5 AUG LIENVOY REPORTING CONNECTED ABOVE UNCLEAR, BUT CONTENT SHORT, MRS K-O CONVERSATION INDICATES POSSIBILITY K HAD TO APPEAR AT A GOM OFFICE, AND THAT UNNAMED HIGHER LEVEL SOVIET OFFICER'S PATIENCE EXHAUSTED WITH K. WOULD ALSO APPEAR

201-779495

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

FROM 1 AND 3 AUG LIENVOY THAT INCIDENT OF DRUNKENNESS AND INCIDENT KNOWN THROUGHTOUT EMB.

3. AS HQS AWARE FROM PREVIOUS MEXI TRAFFIC, KUKHARENKO ONE OF STATION'S PRIME TARGETS FOR DEVELOPMENT DUE ERRATIC BEHAVIOR DRUNKENNESS. CONSISTENTLY UNUSUAL INDEPENDENT DEMEANOR, AND HIS EXPRESSIONS DISRESPECT COLLEAGUES AND EVEN AMB.

4. MEXI DEVELOPING ONE AGENT ACCESS AGAINST ((SEE REF) AND INTENDS INJECT LICOOKY-1 AFTER K'S RETURN.

5. GIVEN PARA 1 AND 2 INFO, APPEARS POSSIBLE THAT K MAY NOT BE PERMITTED RETURN MEXI AFTER HOME LEAVE.

6. ACCORDING 5 AUG LIENVOY, K LEAVING 16 AUG. SARBANOV FAMILY AND FEDOTOV ON SAME FLT.

7. ABOVE PRESENTED FOR HQS INFO, AND CONSIDERATION POSSIBLE APPROACH K AT THIS TIME. MEXI RECOMMENDATION IS GAMBLE THAT K RETURNS AFTER HOME LEAVE, DEVELOP MORE ASSETS AGAINST HIM, AND EVENTUALLY MAKE APPROACH IF SUFFICIENT VULNERABILITY INFO OBTAINED.

8. ADVISE.

SECRET

* C/S COMMENT- APPROVALED USE LICOOKY-1 AGAINST KUKHARENYO.

14-00000

SECRET

201-[illegible]

H/W Attachment
NITA-25520
To: Chief, SB
From: Chief of Station, Tehran

CS COPY

H/W ATT#1 to NITA-25520

SECRET



[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible] [illegible] 1959

[illegible] ARE [illegible] AND [illegible].

A. IVAN DMITRIYEVICH [illegible], WIFE [illegible] AND SON [illegible].

B. [illegible] [illegible] AND [illegible].

[illegible] AS REPLACEMENT FOR [illegible]

[illegible] RECENTLY [illegible].

[illegible] YET [illegible] [illegible].

END OF MESSAGE

201-779495

SECRET

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side of form. Type or print. Guide for use of 201 system is contained in CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.

TO: RID/201 Section

TUBE STATION: DW6

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CANCEL ☐

FROM: NAME

BRANCH

ROOM NO.

PHONE

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO.

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)*

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

10. NAME VARIATIONS

TYPE NAME	*(Last)*	*(First)*	*(Middle)*

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

16. ORGANIZATION OR INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION

CODE

17. OCCUPATION *(Clear text)*

CODE

18. ACTION DESK

CODE

19. SECONDARY DESK

CODE

20. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE

21. COMMENTS

[illegible]

22. SIGNATURE

23. IDN-

201-

FORM 11-62 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ODIO, EUNICE
LOOSE DOCUMENTS

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
18 July 1978	18 July 1978	Lopez	Edwin Juan Lopez
21 Sept 1978	21 Sept 78	Lopez	Edwin Juan Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

From: Bogotá   Report No: TLB-1191   Local File No: 7-1

No. of Pages: Two   No. of Enclosures: One (none to Lima)

Report Made By: Wallace H. Madison/mnf   Approved By: Wallace H. Madison

Distribution:

By copy to:	Hdqtrs.	3	Orally to:
	Files	2	[illegible]
	Emb.	1	
	M. A.	1	
	San José	1	Lima 1

Source Cryptonym: Gifola   References: TPL-1186, TBS-929

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

CHARGED FROM IP/CRS

CHARGED FROM IP/FI

CHARGED FROM IP/CRS

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

Xref 200-7-56

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

Classification SECRET

INDEX

FORM NO. 51-59 FEB 1948

RID COPY

SECRET

Subject: Illicit Armament Traffic

Report No: TLB-1191

Date of Information: 29 August - 6 September 1950

Place Acquired: Bogotá

Date Acquired: 12 September 1950

Evaluation: B-Doc.

Date of Report: 18 September 1950

Source: Controlled American Source

On the basis of information communicated to his Government by the Colombian Ambassador in Costa Rica, the National Chief of Detectives, Carlos RODRIGUEZ Tellez, was sent to Costa Rica to investigate reported clandestine movements of armaments in Costa Rican territory which, according to vague reports, might be shipped to Colombia. Reportedly involved in this activity was one Arturo BOTERO, of Colombian nationality, in combination with various Communist elements. A copy of this investigator's report, dated 11 September 1950, is submitted herewith. The following are excerpts of possible interest.

> The detective service in Costa Rica has knowledge of the visits to the Golfito region of the United States citizen Richard BROWN, who at present is in Puerto Limon engaged in arms traffic. We were able to confirm that this man makes frequent trips probably connected with this business. There is another American citizen named Charles LUFBOURW (LUFBORROW), who had a lumber business in this port and later engaged in fishing. He is being watched because he is also engaged in arms traffic. At present he is in Panama.
>
> In the Customs house of the port we were able to inspect the records which are kept there on the movements of foreigners but found that they are very rudimentary and we obtained no exact data of interest.
>
> The Costa Rican authorities have sent some of their best intelligence agents to Golfito to investigate the movements of Arturo BOTERO, alias "El Mocho." An agent informed me that he had been unable to discover the presence of a person by that name among the banana loading workers. This agent stated he was investigating the activities of the American Charles Marion LUFBORROW, C/ owner of the fishing launch "Yolanda Bentin" of United States or Honduran registry, reportedly engaged in arms traffic. It was also reported that in Golfito a Colombian by the name of Carlos VALDES Gonzalez, alias Arturo GONZALEZ Molina, is working.
>
> The region between Palmar and Piedras Blancas is completely infected with Communism. It is reported that at kilometer 44 between Palmar and Golfito a deposit of armament is hidden.
>
> On some of the fincas around the estero of Sierpe it is reported that there are various deposits of armaments. In this region Communists are active.

Classification SECRET

FORM NO. 51-56
FEB 1946

HD 60.71

Jose FIGUERES has 200 machine guns and 600,000 rounds of ammunition as well as other arms stored on his finca La Lucha.

Conclusions. In Costa Rica the existence of a permanent standing Army is prohibited. Thus the nation is a hot bed for political organizations of any kind which convert themselves into a menace to the stability of Costa Rica. Without the backing of a military organization the other institutions are extremely weak and detectivism, police, civil guard, and so forth, are unprepared to carry out the administration of the Government.

Under these conditions and with the authorization of the Colombian Ambassador in Costa Rica, Dr. Fulgencio LEQUERICA Velez, I suggest that the Colombian Government grant five scholarships to young Costa Ricans to study detective work in Colombia for the purpose of aiding Costa Rica to form a technical corps of Police and set up the basis for an organization which will benefit greatly our country since if this became effective Colombia would have in that country an organization which little by little would reflect our own interests and desires in Central America.

FIELD COMMENT: This report adds very little to our knowledge of arms traffic in Costa Rica, but it is believed to be of interest.

SO-29871

Colombia/Costa Rica — 23 October 1950

Colombian Police Report on Clandestine Arms Traffic in Costa Rica — 2

Colombia, Bogota — 1

OF
XXXXXXXX
INFO

29 August - 6 September 1950

x

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

*Documentary

Colombian with good contacts in the National Police.

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a report, dated 11 September 1950, which was prepared by the Colombian National Chief of Detectives following his return from a confidential mission to Costa Rica to investigate the reported clandestine movements of arms in Costa Rican territory, possibly destined for Colombia. The following are excerpts of possible interest.

2. The Colombian investigator reported that the Costa Rican detective service had knowledge of the visits to the Golfito region of the United States citizen Richard Cross, who at the time of the report was in Puerto Limon dealing in the traffic of arms. Another American citizen, Charles Marion Lufborrow, who had a lumber business in Puerto Limon and later engaged in fishing, was being watched because he also was dealing in arms. At the time of the report, Lufborrow was in Panama.

3. The Colombian investigator inspected the records kept in the Customs building at the port on the movements of foreigners, but found them to be very rudimentary and obtained no factual information of interest.

4. The Costa Rican authorities have sent some of their best intelligence agents to Golfito to investigate the movements of one Arturo Rotero, alias "El Mocho", allegedly a Colombian. A Costa Rican agent advised the Colombian investigator that he had been unable to discover the presence of anyone by that name among the banana loading workers. The agent said that he was investigating the activities of Lufborrow, owner of the fishing launch YOLANDA HENTIN of United States or Honduran registry, reportedly engaged in arms traffic. It was also reported that another Colombian by the name of Carlos Valdes Gonzalez, alias Arturo Gonzalez Molina, was working in Golfito.

5. The Colombian investigator reported that he had learned that the region between Palmar and Piedras Blancas is infested with Communism, and that various deposits of armaments were known to be hidden.

6. The investigator concluded that because a permanent standing army is prohibited in Costa Rica, the country was a hotbed for political organizations of all kinds which menaced its stability. Without the backing of a military organization,

the law-enforcement agencies are extremely weak and the detectives, police, civil guard, and so forth, are unprepared to carry out the administration of the government. With the authorization of the Colombian Ambassador to Costa Rica, Dr. Fulgencio Lequerica Velez, the investigator suggests that the Colombian government grant five scholarships to young Costa Ricans to study detective methods in Colombia. This would be for the purpose of aiding Costa Rica to form a technical corps of police and set up the basis for an organization which would benefit Colombia greatly since if it became effective, Colombia would have in Costa Rica an organization which little by little would reflect Colombian interests and desires in Central America.

7. (STATE) It is requested that the attachment be returned within one month of the above date of distribution.

Attachment: 1 copy of report prepared by Colombian National Chief of Detectives, dated 11 September 1950.

SO DB-29871
TLB-1191

AC:MS:VL:sl
23 October 1950

Dist: STATE (Orig.)
ORE
IID (2)
ICS
FDT
FDT-CRO
FDT-MID
FDT-NYC

SECRET

FORM DS-10
2-10-47

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REFERENCE SLIP

DATE
10/27/50

TO: IAD . [redacted]

☐ ADVISE
☐ APPROVE & RETURN
☐ AS YOU REQUESTED
☐ ATTACH FILE
☐ ATTENTION
☐ COMMENT & RETURN
☐ CONSIDER
☐ COPYING
☐ CORRECT
☐ FILE
☐ FOLLOW-UP
☐ FOR YOUR INFORMATION
☐ HOLD
☐ INITIALS NEEDED
☐ INSTRUCT
☐ INVESTIGATE & REPORT
☐ JUSTIFY
☐ KEEP ME ADVISED
☐ LEGAL MATTER
☐ MEMO REQUIRED
☐ NOT INTERESTED
☐ NOTE & DESTROY
☐ NOTE & FILE

☐ NOTE & FORWARD
☐ NOTE & RETURN
☐ PER TELEPHONE TALK
☐ PREVIOUS CORRESPON.
☐ PRIORITY ACTION
☐ RECONSIDER
☐ RECOMMEND ACTION
☐ RECORD
☐ REPLY
☐ RETURN TO SENDER
☐ REWRITE
☐ SEE ME
☐ SIGNATURE REQUIRED
☐ TAKE ACTION
☐ TRANSFER
☐ TYPE
☐ VERIFY
☐ REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

REMARKS:

Returned herewith is the enclosure of CIA Report No. DB-29571 Colombia/Costa Rica entitled "Colombian Police Report on Clandestine Arms Traffic in Costa Rica" dated 29 August - 6 September 1950 as requested in Paragraph 7 of subject report.

FDT

FROM
Walter G. Aalcavich
Compliance Branch
Munitions Division

SECRET

Septiembre 11 de 1.960.

Señor
JEFE DEL DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL
DE INVESTIGACION CRIMINAL
E. S. D.

Ref.: Informe sobre comisión reservada a la
República de Costa Rica.

Atentamente me permito informar a esa Superioridad sobre la comisión que tube de desempeñar en la República de Costa Rica. Recibida que fué la orden verbal del Señor Coronel Manuel Agudelo, Jefe del Departamento, me dispuse a viajar el día 29 de Agosto.

ANTECEDENTES.- Por comunicación de nuestro Embajador en la República de Costa Rica, se tuvo conocimiento de algunos negocios clandestinos de armas que se efectuaban en territorio costarricense y en los cuales participaba activamente un colombiano de nombre Arturo Botero en combinación con elementos de marcada filiación comunista de ese país, cosa que constituiría un peligro para el orden público colombiano ya que dicho armamento y según vagas informaciones podría ser introducido clandestinamente a nuestro país.

DESARROLLO DE LA COMISION.- A las 12 y 30 aterriza el avión que me condujo en San José de Costa Rica. Hago mi presentación oficial al Señor Cónsul de Colombia en Costa Rica, Señor Gamaliel Noriega quien luego de conversar conmigo promete colaborar en todas las gestiones. Hacemos la cita telefónica con el Señor Embajador Fulgencio Lequerica Vélez a las 5 de la tarde de ese mismo día para comenzar mi trabajo y la presentación oficial. Luego de conversar brevemente con el Señor Embajador me ilustra rápidamente sobre la situación y el plan de trabajo a desarrollar conjuntamente con las Autoridades Costarricenses las que me prestan su valiosa cooperación y sin reservas de ninguna naturaleza colaboran en mi trabajo. Quedé citado para el día 31 de Agosto de efectuar una entrevista con el Señor Ministro del Interior, Mayor Bentura y el Señor Mayor Pacheco, el primero Jefe del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública y el segundo Jefe de Detectivismo de Costa Rica. Hemos convenido ya el primer viaje para la investigación. Saldremos el día 1o. de Septiembre en la mañana en un avión de -

"Lacsa" hacia la Costa del Pacífico sitio denominado Golfito. Al efecto tomamos el avión en compañía del Mayor Pacheco quien me acompaña en mi viaje para el reconocimiento de aquellos sitios de la Costa del Pacífico y a los lugares que el Gobierno de Costa Rica considera, se guardan armas, se fomentan reuniones o depósitos clandestinos de elementos bélicos. Se tiene conocimiento en el Detectivismo de Costa Rica, que esa región de Golfito, la visita con frecuencia un ciudadano norteamericano de nombre Richard Brown y quien actualmente se encuentra en Puertolimón dedicado al tráfico de armas. Confrontamos los datos y efectivamente resulta que este señor hace frecuentes viajes probablemente dedicándolos a ese negocio. Hay además otro ciudadano norteamericano de nombre Charles Lufbourw, quien tuvo negocios de madera en este puerto después pasó a un negocio de pesquería y por medio de las Embajadas de Costa Rica en Estados Unidos y Panamá respectivamente, se ordenó su vigilancia, pues es comerciante en armas también; actualmente se encuentra en Panamá. Dicho señor es casado con una dama costarricense de no muy buena conducta y ella hace frecuentes viajes a Panamá y Centro América. En la Aduana del Puerto pudimos revisar los libros que allí se llevan sobre movimientos de extranjeros siendo una ocsa muy rudimentaria y no pudiendo obtener datos exactos para nuestro interés. A las 9 de la mañana volamos sobre la Costa hacia el Norte, llegamos a un sitio denominado Parrita concesión bananera explotada por una poderosa Compañía Norteamericana donde trabajan más de quince mil obreros. La constitución de la Costa es selvática e inhabitada siendo la mayor parte costa baldía. Todo este territorio pertenece a la Provincia de Punta Arenas. A los 25 minutos de vuelo aterrizamos en el Palmar después de volar sobre grandes fincas bananeras; esta región es noventa por ciento comunista. Continuamos el vuelo de reconocimiento en la Costa. La constitución de esta zona es totalmente plana e inhabitada siendo puntos vulnerables para acciones subversivas ya que en cualquier sitio pueda aterrizar un avión enemigo del Gobierno actual de Costa Rica con armas que pudieran ser suministradas a los obreros del banano. El control comercial de esta vasta y bella región, lo tiene la United Fruit Company. En las zonas bananeras de esta parte se han presentado movimientos huelguísticos, pero sin consecuencias de gravedad, pues todo este obrerismo no es amigo del Gobierno Central de Costa Rica. A las 9 y 30 de la mañana aterrizamos en el aerodromo de Golfito. En este sitio las Autoridades Costarricenses han destacado a unos de sus mejores agentes del servicio inteligencia, para localizar los posibles movimientos del Señor Arturo ^by^ Botero alis "El Mocho", colombiano, objeto de mi visita a ese sector. Dicho agente informa que entre el numeroso personal que trabaja dentro de la zona con los cargadores de banano y demás obreros, nunca ha figurado ninguna persona de tal nombre. Dicho agente ha trabajado dentro de las cuadrillas como cargador de banano ya inquirido entre ellos con mucha habilidad por Arturo Botero, sin resultados satisfactorios. Coincide la información de este agente y nos dice que está sobre la pista de un norteamericano de nombre Charles Marión Lufburow, dueño de una lancha pesquera llamada "Yolanda Bentin" de matrícula - norteamericana u Hondureña, de quien se tiene noticias fidedignas que es traficante en armas y significa un peligro debido a la extensión de las Costas Costarricenses. Además se ha informado que la Policía Secreta de la República de Panamá lo está controlando en sus viajes. Sería conveniente que el Gobierno colombiano diera órdenes pertinentes al Cónsul General en Panamá para que se informen sobre sus actividades y su posible paso con su embarcación a aguas del - Pacífico para llegar a Puertos colombianos. Hay además y como dato adicional que en Golfito trabaja un colombiano de nombre Carlos Valdéz González (Armando), - quien se hace pasar por Arturo González Molina, tipo de pésimos antecedentes, - acusado por la Policía de crímenes durante la revolución. La Bahía de Golfito - tiene un muelle para cargue de banano suficiente para estas labores y en tiempo de guerra internacional, los Estados Unidos han aprovechado este Golfo, para resguardar su Flota Submarina, sitio donde puede perfectamente recalar una escuadra de submarinos. El día 2 de septiembre continué mi visita y tuve oportunidad de - inspeccionar los Talleres de Mecánica de la Compañía Bananera Americana, admirablemente instalados, modernos y capaces para atender las necesidades del gran movimiento de los Ferrocarriles Bananeros que llegan hasta Puerto Armuelles en territorio panameño. Desde Golfito hasta Finca Limón, (sesenta kilómetros) la vía férrea de ancho 38 pulgadas y de Finca Limón a Puerto Armuelles, (sesenta kilómetros,) hay que hacer un trasbordo, pues la línea solo tiene 36 pulgadas. Desde - Golfito hacia el Noroeste hay también línea férrea de 38 pulgadas, llegando hasta Palmar Sur atravesando toda esa región Bananera. Los aeródromos de esa región son: Parrita, Palmar, Golfito, La Cuesta, Cañas Gordas "campo particular de un millonario francés de apellido Chulle en donde no pueden aterrizar sino aviones pequeños" y Armuelles en territorio panameño. A las tres de la tarde con el Mayor Pacheco y con el Licenciado Hector Guevara, Jefe del Departamento Legal de la Compañía Bananera, arreglamos el viaje hasta Palmar Sur en Motor Car "Línea Férrea" a cuatro horas por línea férrea de Golfito con el objeto de continuar nuestra - visita a esa región, teniendo entendido, que de Palmar a Piedras Blancas (K.42) está completamente infectada de comunismo. Los medios de comunicación a esta - región se efectúan por medio de las Agencias de Radiocomunicaciones y operan — también los servicios de radio que atienden a las Compañías Aéreas. El 3 de Septiembre salimos en autocar a las 7 menos diez minutos de la mañana por la vía férrea que conduce a Palmar. Hemos atravesado toda la extensa zona bananera. El ferro que nos conduce con el Mayor Pacheco no lo ha puesto a nuestra disposición el Departamento Legal de la Zona Bananera. Las fincas de banano tienen propias construcciones para sus obreros en un trayecto de 80 kilómetros, hay varias estaciones y un servicio muy completo de trenes. En el Palmar nos recibe el Coronel Daniel Gallegos y en su Jeep nos conduce a la casa de huéspedes. Para continuar mi investigación continuamos con el Coronel Gallegos, hasta la orilla del Río Térraba, allí contratamos una canoa para pasar a Puerto Cortéz, Cantón de Osa, Costa Rica. Las peculiaridades de este pueblo son las siguientes: 6 mil habitantes en su mayoría blancos, boteros, comerciantes chinos. Es facil la entrada del Mar por las bocas del Térraba y operan tres embarcaciones de regular tamaño que hacen su servicio de Cabotaje con Punta Arenas. La idiosincrasia de estos habitantes es interesante: son jugadores, tomadores de guaro bebida alcohólica violenta; se suscitan peleas y el servicio policivo, de inmigración es malo. El contrabando se hace sin mayores dificultades, y este es el sitio más peligroso y vulnerable para todo, ya que no hay autoridades de Policía suficientes para el control efectivo del movimiento de personas extrañas. Es un sitio ideal donde residen cómodamente todos los agitadores comunistas que envenenan a los obreros de la zona bananera del Palmar donde existe una fundación muy completa de la Compañía Bananera; hasta Balzar, sobre el Río Térraba hay 8 kilómetros por carretera entre bananeras de regular calidad. Se han hecho las averiguaciones sobre depósitos clandestinos de armas y las informaciones son las siguientes: Entre Palmar y Golfito sobre la línea del ferrocarril en el kilómetro 44 se tiene noticia de la existencia de armamento escondido cuando los gobiernistas de Teodoro Picado fueron derrotados por los revolucionarios de José Figueres. Posiblemente esté enterrado en este sitio.

VISITA A SIERPE.- Con el Señor Coronel Daniel Gallegos, Jefe de la Oficina de Trabajo de toda la zona bananera y con el Mayor Jorge Pacheco, recorrimos todas las fincas de bananos de la C. B. de C. R. (38 en total). Cada finca tiene su Blub House, sus barracones donde habitan los trabajadores, y casas para empleados, distribuídas en tal forma que se asemejan a pequeños pueblitos. Llegamos hasta el estero de la Sierpe, otro brazo de mar comunicando al territorio de La Costa por un pequeño Río. Estos esteros están prácticament incontrolados, pues como caso curioso, pudimos darnos cuenta, en la conversación sostenida con un guarda de este sitio, que hace más o menos 8 meses habí llegado dos chinos, comerciantes, sin papeles ni documentos legales y vivían las bocas del estero, en cultivos de banano, maderas, [illegible], etc. Con el Coronel Gallegos nos informamos ampliamente sobre la existencia de armas y es de opinión que si las hay en algunas de esas fincas y por otra parte se confirma la idea ya antes expresada por varias personas, entre ellas, agentes del Gobierno, de que esta región es un nido de comunismo, de maleantes y de gentes peligrosas. Concluída la visita a los campamentos obreros, regresamos al alojamiento que se nos había alistado en la casa de huéspedes de "Palmar".

DIA LUNES 4 DE SEPTIEMBRE.- Faltando un cuarto de hora para las ocho de la mañana, tomamos el avión, el Mayor Jorge Pacheco y yo, con dirección a San José de Costa Rica para obtener más datos en esferas oficiales y particulares con el fin de investigar las actividades de la famosa Legión del Caribe. A raíz de todos los sucesos políticos centroamericanos la Legión Caribe tuvo una gran actualidad, pero ahora sus miembros se hallan casi todos plegados al Partido Comunista constituyendo una fuerte y peligrosa organización centroamericana de tendencias perfectamente marxistas. Los principales miembros de la Legión Caribe son los siguientes:

JUAN BOSCH, dominicano, actual Secretario General, del Presidente de Cuba; generales MIGUEL ANGEL y JUAN RODRIGUEZ, dominicanos, residentes en La Habana, Cuba.

JOSE FIGUERES, ex-presidente de la Junta Revolucionaria de Costa Rica, costarricense de origen español. Actualmente se encuentra en Israel.

En Guatemala, donde tiene su asiento la Legión Caribe y donde se encuentra la mayor parte de su armamento, residen los mayores Francisco Sánchez (El Indio Sánchez), [illegible], Mario Sosa Navarro, Adolfo Baez Bone, López Godoy, [illegible], Teniente Coronel Jorge Ribas Montes, Doctor Emilio Gómez Revelo (médico), Mayor Francisco Morazán, de quien se dice fué el oficial encargado para asesinar al Coronel Francisco Arana, Ministro de Guerra de Guatemala y candidato a la presidencia, opositor al Coronel Arbenz, actual candidato a la presidencia de la República, quien cuenta con el apoyo oficial. Toda esta oficialidad es de nacionalidad hondureña.

En la Semana Santa última vinieron a San José, en un avión de la armada guatemalteca, Ribas Montes, Sánchez (el indio) y Sosa Navarro, y buscaron al coronel Edgar Cardona, ex-ministro de Seguridad Públiex de la ex-junta revolucionaria de este país y al Mayor Max Cortés, antiguos compañeros de armas en la pasada revolución que derrocó al Gobierno del Lic. Teodoro Picado, y les expresaron que era necesario respetar y cuidar la vida del Jefe máximo del Comunismo en Costa Rica, Lic. Manuel Mora Valverde, agregaddo que ellos habían atrasado la causa comunista. Esta conversación me la refirieron, en días pasados, Cardona y Cortés, quienes son de ideología anti-comunista. De lo anterior se deduce que estos miembros de la Legión Caribe vinieron a Costa Rica con el pretexto de pasar la Semana Santa, a una misión cerca de Figueres que aún se desconoce, pero que se cree tenga la misma relación en pro del Comunismo, pues a su regreso de México, Mora Valverde permaneció en Guatemala alrededor de dos meses, y siempre temió su regreso a Costa Rica. Figueres es de filiación izquierdista.

MANUEL MORA VALVERDE.-

Es el Gilberto Vieira de Costa Rica. Es persona de 36 años de edad, licenciado en derecho, marxista, hábil político, ex-diputado comunista y Jefe del Comunismo en Costa Rica. Estuvo exilado en México después de la caída del Gobierno de Picado y Calderón Guardia, a quienes apoyó durante sus respectivas administraciones y fué figura influyente y decisiva en dichos gobiernos. Recientemente regresó al país y procedió a reorganizar su Partido "Vanguardia Popular" que por Ley No. 1191 de 1o. de Agosto del año en curso ha quedado proscrito en Costa Rica. A pesar de lo anterior, el partido comunista ha organizado, en poco tiempo, 30 sindicatos "independientes" de filiación marxista y el partido está activísimo en todos los sectores del país. Publican clandestinamente su órgano de publicidad "Trabajo" y son numerosas las reuniones que celebran privadamente en casi todas las poblaciones. En ocasiones son descubiertas son puestos en libertad en pocas horas. Actualmente existe, desde hace más de dos meses, orden de arresto contra los dirigentes comunistas Arnoldo Ferreto, Luis Moscoa, Guillermo Marquero y otros más por haberse dictado auto de detención judicial contra ellos y sin embargo dicha orden no ha sido cumplida.

JOSÉ FIGUERES FERRER.-

Es hijo de padre y madre catalánes; pero nacido en Costa Rica. Fué educado en el Colegio Seminario de esta capital y luego en un Colegio de los Estados Unidos de América, sin haber terminado sus estudios. En ese país casó con una dama estadinense con la que tiene dos niños. Regresó a Costa Rica, y desde entonces se consagró a la agricultura y al comercio. Logró mediante su esfuerzo personal cultivar una gran finca de café y fique, al sur de San José, que denominó "La Lucha". De 1.943 para acá figura en la política costarricense, sin haber ocupado ninguna posición oficial hasta la caída del régimen del Lic. Picado, cuando asumió el mando como Jefe de la revolución. Gobernó 18 meses sin Congreso, nacionalizó la banca y creó un impuesto al capital del 10% y lo acusan sus enemigos de haber derrochado alrededor de 350.000.000.00 de colones, de los cuales buena parte entregó a la Legión Caribe que lo ayudó a derrocar el Gobierno del Lic. Picado.

Es socialista, de temperamento autoritario, de vida austera y de trabajo. Cultivó relaciones con el Gobierno del General Franco, pero a la vez permitió que funcionara en San José una Legación del Gobierno rojo, a la cual visitaba frecuentemente. Rompió relaciones con el Perú, República Dominicana y actual Junta revolucionaria de Venezuela, relaciones que finalmente reanudó con la última.

Me refiere el Mayor Figuls, ex-Inspector General de Hacienda y que fué hombre de la absoluta confianza de Figuerres, estando hoy distanciados políticamente, que de los almacenes de su dependencia retiró Figueres 200 ametralladoras "Reising" con la dotación de 600.000 tiros y se dice que con otros armamentos retirados así mismo de los otros almacenes de guerra las llevó a su finca "La Lucha", antes de abandonar el poder, en donde las tiene ocultas.

Me refiere el Coronel Don Edgar Cardona Quirós, su ex-ministro de Seguridad, ahora distanciado del señor Figueres, que cuando se produjo la invasión del Doctor Calderón Guardia al país en diciembre de 1.948, el Presidente de Cuba, doctor Prío Socarrás, obsequió al Gobierno de Costa Rica un armamento muy valioso consistente en rifles, ametralladoras, cañones de montaña, morteros, bombas para avión, etc. etc. y la suma de cien mil dólares, lo que Figueres, según se dice, entregó íntegro a la Legión Caribe. En esa ocasión el señor Figueres se empeñó que los aviones que traían el armamento lo desembarcaran en el aeropuerto de San Isidro del General, al sur de San José y cerca de su finca y donde con anterioridad había enviado a varios miembros de la Legión Caribe para que lo recibieran. El Coronel Cardona, como Ministro de Seguridad, dió orden a los aviones que ya se encontraban volando hacía Costa Rica para que dichos armamentos fueran desembarcados en esta capital, lo que produjo en el ánimo de su Jefe, señor Figueres, seria contrariedad que fué el principio de su distanciamiento, pues el Coronel Cardona era opuesto de manera resuelta, a seguir prestando auxilios económicos y de armas, a los legionarios del Caribe.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para citar otro desagradable incidente que el Coronel Cardona me refirió. Al producirse la invasión del Dr. Calderón Guardia, que antes mencioné, llegaron a su Despacho de Ministro, el General Miguel Angel Ramírez, Jefe de los legionarios del Caribe, en compañía del Doctor Calderon Valdés, Embajador de Guatemala en Costa Rica, a ofrecerle sus servicios como veterano militar, ya que en Costa Rica no había Jefes militares de escuela. El señor Cardona le expresó las gracias, pero el General Ramírez insistió y le manifestó que él tenía 800 hombres disciplinados y listos para repeler la agresión de Calderón Guardia, a quien apoyaba indirectamente al General Somoza de Nicaragua. El Embajador de Guatemala insistió en que se aceptaran por parte de Costa Rica los servicios de Ramírez. El Coronel Cardona volvió a expresar que mucho agradecería al galante ofrecimiento de Ramírez; pero que él no podría aceptar que tropas o militares extranjeros tomaran parte en aquel conflicto nacional. Ante esta rotunda negativa, - Calderón Valdés se exaltó un tanto, al extremo de que el Coronel Cardona, según me lo manifestó, hubo de golpear su mesa y de expresar al inoportuno diplomático guatemalteco que en su despacho él era quien mandaba. La conjetura que hace Cardona es que esas tropas mercenarias, una vez repelida la agresión, se lanzarían contra Nicaragua y habrían envuelto a Costa Rica en un grave conflicto internacional. A muy reducido número de sus amistades ha referido el - señor Cardona estos graves sucesos que culminaron con su separación del Gobierno, ya que Figueres era, y sigue siendo, resuelto partidario de una agresión contra Somoza.

OTROS EMIGRADOS POLITICOS.-

A la caída de los Gobiernos de Calderón Guardia y Picado, - tuvieron que emigrar varios costarricenses de filiación comunista y extranjeros al servicio del Gobierno depuesto, quienes en su mayoría se encuentran en Guatemala, México y Venezuela. Entre ellos figuran los siguientes:

JORGE ISAAC [illegible], alias CHACO, panameño, natural de David, Chiriquí. De vida inmoral.

JULIO LOPEZ MASEGOSA.- Ex-carabinero republicano español. Se dice asaltó y robó un banco en Asturias durante la dominación roja. Llegó a Costa Rica expulsado de Panamá a la caída del Gobierno del doctor Arnulfo - Arias, de quien se dice era íntimo amigo. Casó en este país civilmente con una rica heredera a quien ha despojado en México, de parte de sus haberes. Ahora - ha sido expulsado de México por actividades poco lícitas. Es hombre peligroso por sus ideas extremistas y su falta de moralidad.

JUAN JOSE TAVIO Y SILVA, de nacionalidad cubana, ex-director de policía de Batista. Atrabiliario, inmoral, pistolero. Aquí existen, en los tribunales de Justicia, numerosos procesos en algunos de los cuales se ha dictado sentencia condenatoria contra él por asesinatos, robos y estafas. Casó con una [illegible] rica a quien despojó de sus bienes. Recientemente fué expulsado de Venezuela y se ha radicado, según noticias, en la República Dominicana.

FERNANDO CHAVES MOLINA.- Licenciado en farmacia, químico peligroso agitador comunista. Reside en Venezuela. Costarricense.

JUAN CASTILLO o CASTRILLO, obrero educado en Rusia, habla correctamente el inglés, costarricense, peligroso agitador comunista. Reside en Venezuela.

JOSE MERINO Y CORONADO.- Costarricense, profesor de ciencias físico químicas, peligroso agitador comunista.

CARLOS LUIS SAENZ, costarricense, poeta, escritor, profesor de pedagogía Marxista, residente en la Escuela Normal de Panamá.

CORINA RODRIGUEZ.- Costarricense, profesora, agitadora comunista, residente en Guatemala.

EUNICE ODIO.- Costarricense, poetisa, agitadora, residente en Guatemala.

ROQUE JULIO PINZON [illegible].- Este sujeto de largo historial en Perú, Venezuela, Cuba y Panamá, llegó hace alrededor de tres meses. En días pasados les mostró a varios compatriotas un cablegrama de adhesión irrestricta al Excmo. Señor Presidente de Colombia. Falta saber si en realidad dirigió al Excmo. Señor Presidente algún mensaje de adhesión.

JOSE MANUEL BENITEZ.- Natural de Girardot, se dice periodista y se propone editar un número del periódico "El Mundo", que edita a su vez en Ibagué. Es, según lo ha manifestado adverso al actual orden de cosas en Colombia.

GOLETAS.- Me permito informar que han sido adquiridas por firmas colombianas las siguientes embarcaciones: "CONISPRAY", por la Compañía Marítima

Colombiana Ltda., de Barranquilla y "TONNY GILONI", por los señores Alfredo Rojas C. & Co. Ltda. de Cali, Colombia.

CONCLUSIONES.- La República de Costa Rica por mandato constitucional de ese país, tiene prohibido el ejército como institución permanente. De tal suerte que faltando este fuerte eslabón y pilar de una nación, es campo propicio para allí germinen todas las organizaciones políticas disciplinadas de cualquier íniole, convirtiendose en verdaderas amenazas para la estabilidad y el orden jurídico de la nación costarricense. Es así, como, además y sin el respaldo de una organización militar, las demás instituciones, son extremadamente débiles, pues tiene que improvisar instituciones de la noche a la mañana, en cualquier cambio de Gobierno, como sucede actualmente, que tanto detectivismo, como policía, guardia civil etc., son impreparados para la gestión administrativa y de Gobierno; únicamente son adictos al Presidente Otilio Ulate, y tras de su nombre trabajan y se desenvuelven y transitan por los complejos e intrincados caminos de la justicia, la investigación, la defensa nacional, la administración pública etc.

En estas condiciones y con autorización del Señor Embajador de Colombia en Costa Rica, Doctor Fulgencio Lequerica Vélez, traigo la gestión de solicitar ante el Gobierno Nacional, la consecución de cinco becas para detectives, de jóvenes de Costa Rica, con el objeto de ayudar a esa Nación hermana a la formación de un cuerpo técnico de policía que vaya sentando las bases de una organización, que beneficiaría muy grandemente a nuestro país, ya que si se llega a hacer efectiva esa gestión, Colombia tendría en ese país una organización que poco a poco reflejaría nuestros propios deseos e intereses en América Central.

De esta gestión había necesidad de informar al Sr. Fulgencio Lequerica Vélez, para que él en su calidad de Embajador haga el ofrecimiento ante el Gobierno costarricense por su intermedio y abrir las vacantes correspondientes en la Escuela de Policía, General Santander.

AUTORIDADES COLOMBIANAS EN COSTA RICA.-

Nuestro país está dignamente representado en Costa Rica. El Embajador Dr. Lequerica Vélez, es un gran caballero y magnífico diplomático. Mantiene grandes relaciones con el Gobierno del país y sus conceptos valen y pesan en las esferas diplomáticas. Es muy estimado por el público en general. El Cónsul General Sr. Gamaliel Noriega es una personalidad, trabaja por Colombia y vive alerta para dar oportunamente cualquier información que interese al Gobierno de Colombia. Con él personalmente estuvimos obteniendo datos e informaciones y merced a su acusiosidad me suministró valiosas informaciones sobre la Legión Caribe, política costarricense etc., temas que domina y conoce a la perfección.

Dejo constancia ante el Gobierno Nacional de que estos dos funcionarios diplomáticos, representan a nuestro país, con honor, dignidad y caballerosidad.

CONTRABANDO DE DROGAS.-

Existe una poderosa cadena de contrabandistas en drogas cuya base principal es Cuba, cadena que necesariamente debe tener filiales en Colombia puesto que todo el tráfico de drogas lícitas e ilícitas para Sur América se debe efectuar por nuestro país. Tuve oportunidad de conversar brevemente con el Sr. Jorge Barseló del Departamento de Investigación de la República de Cuba, quien se encontraba en misión oficial también en algunos trabajos encomendados por su Gobierno entre otros el de localizar la red internacional de traficantes ilícitos en drogas heróicas, estupefacientes etc. Además se alcanza a reflejar muy debilmente ante esas Autoridades Centro Americanas la salida de oro, platino, esmeraldas de nuestro territorio, causando grande daño al Fisco Nacional. Sería conveniente que el Gobierno Nacional creara un cuerpo experto en estudio de estupefacientes y contrabandos, localizados para efectuar sus trabajos no en Colombia, sino en Cuba, Panamá, Costa Rica y algunos otros países Centro Americanos, para desde esos sitios tener un mejor control sobre este turbio comercio que afecta hondamente nuestra economía.

VENTA DE ARMAS.-

La venta de armas en Costa Rica es libre. En almacenes que pude observar personalmente se venden revólveres, escopetas, pistolas, fusiles calibre U. munición de 7 milímetros y clandestinamente se consiguen ametralladoras italianas marca "Breda" y "Maicing". De tal suerte que el comercio de elementos bélicos no está bajo el control del Gobierno ni las Autoridades tienen el menor interés en restringirlo ya que como dije anteriormente el precitado comercio es libre.

Dejo en esta forma rendido el informe de la comisión que me fué encomendada.

Atentamente,

CARLOS RODRIGUEZ TELLEZ
Jefe Nacional del Detectivismo.

(Continuación del Informe)

OBSERVACIONES DE CARACTER GENERAL.-

TURISMO.- El país carece de una organización técnica en el Ramo de Turismo. Hay detalles que dejan ver muy claro la falta de propaganda turística que padece Colombia en los Hoteles, Aerodromos, Casinos, Club Houses, etc. Mientras pude observar que países pequeños hacen un gran despliegue de afiches y carteles propagandísticos, Colombia no posee este servicio. En los aerodromos especialmente, hay que colocar leyendas en afiches de colores insinuando al turista que visite a Colombia, y litografiando nuestras bellezas naturales como el Salto de Tequendama, Las Salinas de Zipaquirá, Hoteles de Turismo, Laguna de Tota y mil más, que despierten en el turista el deseo de ver cosas nuevas. Se podrían organizar excursiones de turismo a esos lugares, en combinación con las empresas aéreas, para dar mayores facilidades al turista.

SERVICIO DE POLICIA EN AERODROMOS.-

Pude observar como resalta a la vista la gran diferencia, en cuanto a aseo y presentación personal de la Policía que presta servicios en el aerodromo de Medellín. Mientras en el aerodromo de Tocumen en Panamá, y la Sabana en San José, Costa Rica, tanto el personal de Aduanas como la Policía, está muy bien vestido y limpio y cortéz, en Medellín, se ven los Agentes, sucios, barbados, muy mal vestidos y en posturas nada correctos, como sentados en los descansos para los pasajeros internacionales, o con una pierna sobre las barandas que limitan el campo aéreo.

Estos detalles que al parecer son leves, sería conveniente se corrigieran para impresionar a las personas que nos visitan y que lleven por lo menos mientras esperen en los campos aéreos la salida de sus aviones, un trato agradable y cortéz y una presentación decente.

[illegible]/JEFE CARLOS [illegible]
Jefe Nacional del Detectivismo.

14-00000
104-10177-10226 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

OUTGOING MESSAGE

19-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACE CLM ACP TOO TPE MRO OCI PAGE OF PAGES

CMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

201738Z CIA/DDO 960493

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/IMDAS, C/LSN/ID, C/PCS/INT, C/CI 2, A6C/DDO, C/ESSITE 2, DOMS 2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 27
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SOP
0 IP FILES # 132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION/ATTN: R.K. MCHARGUE/

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISIONY

SECRET/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTIBON OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.Y

FIRCI-312/03777-76Y

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE TRAVEL TO THE U.S. OF RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETEY

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS ACQUIRED BY CIA PURSUANT TO ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE ON FOREIGN ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY.Y

2. ACCORDING TO A SOURCE WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED, RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, A CUBAN EXILE LIVING IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, WHO HAS BEEN MENTIONED IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CUBANA BOMBING AND WHO ~~AND~~ EMPLOYED BY THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION, IS LEAVING VENEZUELA ON 24 DECEMBER 1976 AND WILL RETURN ON 7 JANUARY 1977. THE SOURCE BELIEVES THAT MORALES' DESTINATION IS THE UNITED STATES SINCE HE HAS LEARNED THAT MORALES HAS RECENTLY BEEN IN TELEPHONE CONTACT

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

312/03777-76
20 Dec 76
201-285923

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: ------

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

960423

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

WITH ONE PILAR ALFONZO, WHO LIVES IN FLORIDA, AND WHOSE U.S. TELEPHONE NUMBER IS 305-446-6722. ON HIS RETURN, MORALES WILL MOVE FROM THE ANAUCO HILTON IN CARACAS, WHERE HE HAS BEEN LIVING, TO AN APARTMENT HE IS TRYING TO OBTAIN CLOSE TO THE HOTEL.Y

3. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ALFONZO.Y

4. THE ABOVE INFORMATION HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE LEGAL ATTACHE IN CARACAS. NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION IS BEING MADE.Y

5. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

BASED ON CARACAS 31720 (IN-130856)
SOURCE: WKDIET-2
OBJ: L1
FILE: 201-0285923

C/LA/PNC Desmond

PCS/INT

AGC/DDO

PCS/ITC

C/LA/RR L.E. Brown

CB

DATE: 17 DEC 76
ORIG: HARRIET WEILER:LW
UNIT: C/LA/PNC/R
EXT: 9454

C/PCS/LSN

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007255

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 3 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE TIME GROUP: 172233Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 960161

CONF. C/LA 3 INFO. FILE C/LA/MS, DDO3, DDO/DO, ACDDO, C/CS, [illegible]ITC-4, C/NE 6, C/CI-4, C/EPS/EG 2, C/SIA, C/SIA/FL, C/LSN/ID

0 INDEX DISSEM BY 4
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 FILE #

TO: LA/MIAMI INFO CARACAS. Y

UNINTEL RYBAT KMSTONE MHSPIKE Y

REF: CARACAS 31679 |IN 130856| (NOT NEEDED BY LA/MIAMI) Y

1. FOR STATION INFO, REF REPORTED INFORMATION RECEIVED ON 15 DECEMBER 76 FROM UNILATERAL STATION ASSET WKDIET-2 THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE (201-0285923) IS LEAVING VENEZUELA ON 24 DECEMBER AND PLANS TO RETURN ON 7 JANUARY 77. WKDIET-2 BELIEVES THAT MORALES IS HEADING FOR U.S. SINCE HE RECENTLY HAS BEEN IN TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH ONE PILAR ALFONZO, FLORIDA TELEPHONE 305-446-6722. THERE ARE NO CARACAS STATION OR HQS TRACES ON ALONZO. STATION HAS PASSED THIS INFORMATION TO LEGATT CARACAS, AND IT ALSO IS BEING FURNISHED TO FBI HQS. Y

2. FOLLOWING BACKGROUND IS PROVIDED IN CASE MIAMI STATION NO LONGER HOLDS FULL RECORDS ON MORALES. HE IS CUBAN-BORN, RECENTLY NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZEN WHO IS VERY CLOSE TO ORLANDO GARCIA VASQUEZ, DE FACTO HEAD OF DISIP; SERVED UNDER GARCIA IN DISIP; AND IN EARLY NOVEMBER WAS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN DISIP INVESTIGATION OF 6 OCTOBER BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINER, THOUGH BOTH HE AND

[illegible]
201-285923
17 Dec 76

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255.

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF INFO. FILE

960161

DISSEM BY.

PER

GARCIA HAD CONNECTIONS WITH ORLANDO BOSCH AND OTHER SUSPECTS IN BOMBING. MORALES WAS RECRUITED IN MIAMI IN FEBRUARY 64 FOR USE AS RADIO OPERATOR AND MEMBER OF PARAMILITARY INFILTRATION TEAM, TRAINED IN MIAMI AND AT ISOMETRIC, BUT TERMINATED AUGUST 64 WITHOUT BEING USED IN ANY AGENCY-SPONSORED MISSION AGAINST CUBA. HE VOLUNTEERED, SIGNED UP AND WAS TRAINED TOWARD FOR PM ACTION IN CONGO SEPTEMBER 64, ALTHOUGH THERE IS CONFLICTING INFO IN HIS FILE AS TO WHETHER HE DID IN FACT SERVE IN THE CONGO. HE WAS TERMINATED IN DECEMBER 64. (FOR CARACAS: PLEASE NOTE THIS ~~CORRECTS~~ AMENDS STATEMENT IN DIRECTOR 333153 THAT MORALES DID NOT SERVE IN CONGO.) HE WAS ARRESTED IN MIAMI IN FEBRUARY 68 FOR INVOLVEMENT IN BOMBINGS BY CUBAN POWER GROUP. STATION PASSED PERTINENT INFO ON HIM TO FBI AT THAT TIME. HE HAS BEEN PAID FBI INFORMANT AND IN OCTOBER 72 WAS REGISTERED IN ISR TO BNDD. WAS NAMED AS CIA AGENT IN MANUEL DE ARMAS "PRESS CONFERENCE", APRIL 76, WHICH GIVEN CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY IN CARACAS. UNSCARLET-4, SENSITIVE PENETRATION OF LIAISON, HAS DESCRIBED MORALES AS OBSESSIVELY ANTI-CIA AND DISPOSED TO TURN ANY UNPLEASANT SITUATION OR EVENT (INCLUDING CUBAN AIRCRAFT BOMBING) INTO "CIA PLOT." MORALES HAS BEEN OF CONSIDERABLE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

SECRET

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF INFO FILE

96016/

☐ DISSEM BY:

☐

☐ PER

☐ #

INTEREST TO U.S. JOURNALISTS, AND THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF HIS MAKING ANTI-CIA STATEMENTS TO PRESS CONTACTS IN MIAMI. Y

3. ALTHOUGH IT IS ASSUMED THAT FBI WILL COVER ACTIVITIES OF MORALES IF HE VISITS MIAMI, WILL APPRECIATE YOUR FORWARDING TO CARACAS STATION AND HQS ANY PASSIVELY ACQUIRED INFORMATION THAT COMES TO YOUR ATTENTION. Y

4. FILE: 201-0285923. E2 IMPDET.#

REF - INFO ON MORALES FROM UKDIET-2

C/PCS/LC (FOR INFO)
[redacted]

DATE: 17 DEC 76
ORIG: L.COOLEY:PM
UNIT: LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1715

C/LA/CAR--MR.AMES (INDRAFT)

C/LA/COG--MR.CLAYTON (INDRAFT)

C/LAD

C/LA/PNC

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 37-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

TUBED - LA

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED DSC: DDO/DO BY D ... AC 50 ...

ACTION UNIT C/LA 8

ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR C/IDMS, C/CS N/ID, C/PCS, DDO 3, ACC/DDO, C/PS/ITC 4, C/NE 6, C/EU 4, C/PS/EG 2, C/FR 4,

STAFF

T 460527 EIA653 PAGE 01 IN 130856

TOR: 152049Z DEC 76 CARA 31730

S E C R E T 152235Z DEC 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31732

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT KMSTONE MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 31679 (IN 126234)

1. RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE (CUBAN EXILE WORKING FOR DISIP) IS LEAVING VENEZUELA ON 24 DECEMBER AND RETURNING ON 7 JANUARY 1977. ON 15 JANUARY HE WILL MOVE FROM THE ANAUCO HILTON TO AN APARTMENT HE IS TRYING TO FIND CLOSE TO THE ANAUCO.

2. ABOVE REPORTED BY WKDIET-2 FROM MORALES ON 15 DECEMBER. WKDIET-2 BELIEVES THAT MORALES HEADING FOR THE U.S. SINCE MORALES RECENTLY HAS BEEN IN TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH ONE PILAR ALFONSO, FLORIDA, U.S. TEL. 305-446-5722. NO TRACES ON PILAR.

3. STATION HAS PASSED PERTINENT INFO ABOVE TO LOCAL LNERGO REP, WHO ASKED IT ALSO BE GIVEN T LNERGO HQS.

4. FILE: 201-0285923. E2 IMPDET.

FILE		SAVED PURGEABLE
	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
F,CAT		PREPARE FOR FILMING
P/ID		CONT NO (2,3)
		SPEC FILM CODE
		CABLE RCK (11)
		MFG (8)
[illegible]		FCR/FILMING
[illegible]	✓	

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-285923
15 Dec 76

3005

DISSEM BY IID PER CRS TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 006687

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT
LA 11

ACTION #

INFO FILE, VR, [redacted], EPS/EG 2, IP/DMS, IID, PCS/INT 5, CI 4, CA 4, SIA, SIA/IC, CPS/NAR 2.

T 456736 EIA176 PAGE 01 IN 129362

TOR:141641Z DEC 76 CARA 31700

S E C R E T 141612Z DEC 76 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 31700

TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL

TDFIRDB 315/12548-76
HVC-7556

Ricardo Morales

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR UPGRADING OF RELIABILITY STATEMENT. (NOTE: STRONGLY RECOMMEND WKDIET-3'S RELIABILITY STATEMENT BE UPGRADED. W-3 HAS PROVIDED NUMEROUS REPORTS MANY OF WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIATED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND/OR REPORTING BY OTHER SOURCES.) SOURCE: WKDIET/WKDIET-3 DIRECTLY. SOURCE FIELD COMMENT PARA 3 WKNEED/WKNOBLE-1 FROM WKSCARLET-9. SOURCE FIELD COMMENT PARA 4 WKIDET/WKDIET-2. OD OBJECTIVE: L.1. NO INDEX. FILE: 75-120-28. CL. BY 035133.

FILED: 14/1612Z XXXXX

LIFTER SENT.

SECRET

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO CRS
FBI

ROUTINE

IN 129362

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB 315/12548-76

DIST 14 DECEMBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI: EARLY-DECEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: CUBAN EXILE DENUNCIATION OF THREE VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (10 DECEMBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7556

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HE IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE.

1. IN EARLY DECEMBER 1976 HUMBERTO GIFFUNI, EX-DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PRVENTION (DISIP), SAID THAT CUBAN EXILE GROUPS BASED IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE SUBMITTED INFORMATION TO OCTAVIO LEPAGE, VENEZUELAN MINISTER OF INTERIOR, CLAIMING THAT HIGH-LEVEL VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS ARE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AGENTS. THESE OFFICIALS ARE ORLANDO GARCIA, INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ADVISER TO PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ AND DE FACTO CHIEF OF OPERATIONS OF DISIP; RAFAEL RIVAS VASQUEZ, THE CURRENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF DISIP; AND RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, UNTIL RECENTLY

SECRET

CHIEF OF DISIP'S FOREIGN ESPIONAGE DIVISION. ALL THREE OF THESE MEN WERE ORIGINALLY CUBAN CITIZENS. (SOURCE COMMENT: GIFFUNI DID NOT REVEAL THE EXACT NATURE OF THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE MEN.)

2. THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE CUBAN EXILES ARE ATTEMPTING TO SMEAR THE THREE MEN, BECAUSE OF THEIR PART IN ARRESTING CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH AND LUIS POSADA WHO HAVE BEEN IMPLICATED IN THE CUBANA CRASH. NONETHELESS, ACCORDING TO GIFFUNI, LEPAGE HAS APPOINTED A SPECIAL COMMISSION HEADED BY GIFFUNI TO INVESTIGATE THE CHARGES MADE AGAINST THE OFFICIALS. GIFFUNI ALSO SAID THAT HE IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCREETLY INFORMAING NORBERTO HERNANDEZ CURBELO, CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA, OF THE CUBAN EXILE CHARGES AGAINST THE MEN AND HIS INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE. (FIELD COMMENT: A CHANNEL BETWEEN GIFFUNI ANDHERNANDEZ WAS INITIATED WHEN GIFFUNI WAS DISIP DEPUTY CHIEF. SEE HVC-7380, TDFIRDB-315/04976-76, OF MID MAY, FROM THE SAME SOURCE WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS BEEN SUBSEQUENTLY UPGRADED. GIFFUNI HAS REASON TO HARBOR RESENTMENT SINCE HE AND RIVAS WERE BITTER RIVALS INSIDE DISIP AND SINCE GARCIA AND RIVAS REPLACED HIM AT DISIP. MORALES, IN TURN, IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH GARCIA.)

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 129362

TDFIR DB 315/12548-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED THAT CUBAN EXILES BASED IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE DENOUNCED THE THREE VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS TO LEPAGE. THIS SOURCE ADDED THAT THERE IS SOME SPECULATION THAT THE DENUNCIATION HAD ACTUALLY BEEN MADE BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT'S GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCES.)

4. IN COMMENTING ON MORALES, GIFFUNI SAID THAT MORALES HAD NOT LEFT VENEZUELA AS GENERALLY BELIEVED, BUT RATHER WAS WORKING FOR DISIP IN THE INTERIOR UNDER A FALSE NAME. (FIELD COMMENT: MORALES REPORTEDLY WAS ORDERED OUT OF VENEZUELA WHEN DISCLOSURES CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES BECAME EMBARRASSING TO THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT. A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED THAT HE SPOKE WITH MORALES IN CARACAS IN EARLY DECEMBER AND THAT MORALES ASKED HIM TO KEEP HIS PRESENCE IN CARACAS CONFIDENTIAL.)

FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEA, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

-- SECRET

FORM 3020
7-71 MFG 7-76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ?? PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 32-1 RUN BY ____

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ____

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED C/LA BY D AT 1930 Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/LA 8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/ICDOS C/EUR 6 DDO 3 ADC/DDO C/INTEL C/PCS/ITCY C/PCS

T 448463 EIA636 PAGE 01-01 IN 126234

TOR:1019202 DEC 76 CARA 31679

S E C R E T 1019052 DEC 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31679

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LONDON.

WNINTEL RYBAT KMSTONE MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 31409 (IN 097618)

1. WKDIET-2 (D-2) REPORTED ON 10 DECEMBER THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE (201-0285923) IS BACK IN VENEZUELA. D-2, WHO KNOWS MORALES PRSONALLY, SAW AND TALKKED TO HIM AROUND 2 DECEMBER AT THE ANAUCO HILTON HOTEL WHRE WKTANGO-1 MAINTAINS QUARTERS. MORALES ASKED D-2 NOT TO SAY ANYTHING RE HIS PRESENCE HERE.

2. ABOVE INFO WILL BE INCLUDED IN INTEL THAT FOLLOWS:.

3. FILE: 201-0285923. E2. IMPDET.

LAF/uc/v

201-285923
10 Dec 76

SECRET

RECORD COPY

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

10 /

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

S E C R E T

STAFF 262218Z DIRECTOR 949498

CONF: LA8 INFO FILE IP/DMS

0 DISSEM BY: 45
0
0 PER
0 #

TO: CARACAS. Y

WNINTEL KMSTONE Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 31525 (IN 1090738)

B. CARACAS 31526 (IN 109075)

1. REGARDING PARA 3 REF B, ONE OF TWO CUBANS IS ANTONIO IGNACIO BUSTILLO PEREZ (201-0756656), LISTED IN CARACAS 30526 DATED (IN 000234) 4 AUGUST 1976. HE WAS ALSO LISTED ON PAGE 19 OF "TRIBUNA PUPULAR" IN PARTIAL REPRODUCTION OF 25 JUNE 1976 "GACETA OFICIAL." SUMMARY TRACES ON BUSTILLO WERE FORWARDED IN HVCA-10616 DATED 30 AUGUST 1976. WE CANNOT IDENTIFY "ALVINS." Y

2. FIEL: 201-0285923 AND 75-5-0. E2 IMPDET. H

REF A: HVC 7548, WHICH CONCERNED POTENTIAL EMBARRASSMENT TO GOV ON STATUS OF RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE.

REF B: OPS CABLE TO REF A, EXPLAIN~~S~~ING CIRCUMSTANCES HOW WKDIET-3 OBTAINED HIS INFORMATION.

D 75-5-0

DATE: 24 NOV 1976
ORIG. GRADY VICKERS:PM
UNIT: LA/PNC/V CAO
EXT. 1715

201-285923

26 NOV 76

T. J. Mathews
C/LAD

LA/COG

RECORD COPY

AC/LA/PNC

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

S E C R E T

14-00000

DISSEM BY IID PER COS

30-4/71

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

3 IMPDET
CL. BY: 006687

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

LA-11

ACTION #

INFO FILE, VR, DDO 3, EPS/EG 2, IP/DMS, IID, PCS/INT 5, CA-4, ADDO/P

T 403336 EIA571 PAGE 01 IN 109073

TOR:2320422 NOV 76 CARA 31525

S E C R E T 2319372 NOV 76 INTEL

TDFIRDB-315/11772-76
HVC-7548

CITE CARACAS 31525

TO: DIRECTOR,

WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE

SUPDATA: SOURCE: NP/WKDIET-3 FROM IDEN (BY OPS CABLE) NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: K.1.A. FILE: 75-5-9, 201-0285923. NO INDEX. CL BY 035133.

FILED: 2319372 XXXXX

23 NOV 13 33

S E C R E T

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-285923
DO NOT DESTROY

14-00000

975 EDITIONS

SECRET (When Filled In)

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

IN109073

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO CRS
FBI

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), ⓶ Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB-315/11772-76

DIST 23 NOVEMBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

DOI : MID NOVEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATUS OF RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (19 NOVEMBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7548

SOURCE : A VENEZUELAN WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: INQUIRIES INTO THE STATUS OF RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, A CUBAN-BORN, NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZEN, ARE BEING ACTIVELY PURSUED BY BOTH THE LOCAL AND FOREIGN PRESS. THE MEANS BY WHICH MORALES, WHO ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA IN MARCH 1974, WAS ABLE TO SECURE VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP IN RECORD TIME ARE CURRENTLY BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE LOCAL PRESS AND THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER. FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON MORALES AND HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH CUBAN EXILES AND

THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 CUBANA AIRLINER CRASH SEE HVC-7537, TDFIRDB-315/11216-76, OF EARLY NOVEMBER, FROM THIS AND ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY. A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED THAT MORALES LEFT VENEZUELA FOR EUROPE ON 10 NOVEMBER.)

2. RAMON VELASQUEZ, CHIEF OF THE IMMIGRATION AND IDENTIFICATION DIVISION OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, HAS IN HIS POSSESSION DOCUMENTS CLEARLY INDICATING THAT VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP WAS GRANTED MORALES AT THE DIRECT ORDER OF PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ. FURTHERMORE, VELASQUEZ INTENDS TO USE THESE DOCUMENTS TO HIS OWN ADVANTAGE.

3. THE COVERING DOCUMENTS TO MORALES' PETITION FOR CITIZENSHIP CONTAINS A SHORT, HANDWRITTEN NOTE BY PRESIDENT PEREZ ORDERING THE IMMIGRATION AND IDENTIFICATION DIVISION TO GRANT MORALES VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP. THE ACTUAL ORDER GRANTING CITIZENSHIP BEARS THE PRESIDENT'S INITIALS AND IS SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECRETARY NELLIE ARENAS. (FIELD COMMENT: ONE PAGE OF MORALES' PETITION FOR CITIZENSHIP WAS REPRINTED IN THE 19 NOVEMBER ISSUE OF THE MAGAZINE "ELITE.")

4. IN INVESTIGATING THE MORALES CITIZENSHIP CASE, OCTAVIO

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

LEPAGE, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, ORDERED VELASQUEZ TO INVESTIGATE MORALES' IMMIGRATION FILE. VELASQUEZ SENT LEPAGE COPIES OF THE MORALES DOCUMENTS AND KEPT THE ORIGINALS. IN ADDITION, VELASQUEZ MADE EXTRA COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS WHICH HE IS ALSO MAINTAINING. IN THE EVENT THAT HE IS FORCED TO TURN OVER THE ORIGINALS, VELASQUEZ, WHO HAS HAD CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES WITH LEPAGE AND THE DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY, INTENDS TO USE THESE DOCUMENTS TO MAINTAIN HIS POSITION AS HEAD OF THE IMMIGRATION AND IDENTIFICATION DIVISION.

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATORS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES, RICARDO NAVARETTE	
201-0285923	073-006-046/03
SEX M	CARA-31409
	11 NOV 76

HAS LEFT VENE, POSSIBLY FOR LONDON.

DATE 30 DEC 76 09461584

201-285923

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES NAVARETTE, RICARDO	
201-0285923	075-0C5-009
SEX M	CARA-31373
	08 NOV 76
CIT VENE	HVC-07537

Copy made

RES VENE. CUBAN-BORN. DESPITE VENE GOVM DENIALS SUBJ IS A HIGH-OFFICIAL OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION /DISIP/, AND CURRENTLY ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION OF 6 OCT BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINER SUSPECTS IN WHICH SUBJ HAS HAD PREVIOUS CONTACT.

DATE 15 NOV 76 09450984

201-285923

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

PISTOLEROS Y TERRORISTAS HAN SIDO NACIONALIZADOS

Junto con Ricardo Morales Navarrete, alto funcionario en la Oficina de Fronteras (¡nada menos!) se nacionalizó y trabaja Antonio Ignacio Bustillo Pérez, conocido pistolero traido de Miami por el gang mercenario de Orlando García, "ministro consejero", según el pasaporte con el que hace frecuentes viajes al Caribe, México y Estados Unidos con pasajes y viáticos oficiales

Ricardo Morales Navarrete, en foto de 1968, cuando fuera detenido por terrorista en Miami.

Como ya se ha informado, Ricardo Morales Navarrete, asistente de Orlando García en la Oficina de Fronteras de nuestro país en Caracas (edificio del "Banco del Caribe", Dr. Paúl a Salvador de León, piso 11), fue nacionalizado venezolano el 25 de julio de este año. Morales Navarrete llegó a Venezuela como prófugo de la justicia norteamericana (igual que Orlando Bosch) desde Miami, según lo anunciaron entonces diarios de los Estados Unidos.

Con dos años de permanencia en el país ya es "ciudadano venezolano".

Lo curioso es que en la misma Gaceta Oficial de la República de Venezuela donde se concede la nacionalidad a Morales Navarrete, cubano contrarrevolucionario especializado en la colocación de bombas en Miami, donde estuvo arrestado en 1968 por esa causa, también se otorga idéntico beneficio al pistolero Antonio Ignacio Bustillo Pérez, de igual origen y empleado como Morales Navarrete en la Oficina de Fronteras.

El nombre Bustillo aparece en la Gaceta justamente encima de Morales Navarrete.

Según resolución de la Dirección Nacional de Identificación y Extranjería y por órdenes del ministro de Relaciones Interiores (Dr. Octavio Lepage), de acuerdo con la decisión suscrita por Ramón Ignacio Velásquez B., director del despacho mencionado arriba, se produjo este insólito hecho.

● AGENTES DE LA CIA

No somos nosotros quienes hacemos la acusación de que importantes organismos de seguridad de Venezuela están infiltrados por la Agencia Central de Inteligencia de los Estados Unidos, entre ellos la DISIP y la Oficina de Fronteras, una entelequia esta última cuya función se ignora. Hilda Inclán, del diario "The Miami News", Taylor Branch, de la revista "Esquire" y John Rothchil, devueltos a los Estados Unidos por un incidente en Maiquetía, afirmaron que Morales Navarrete es agente de la CIA y segundo oficial al mando de la inteligencia venezolana.

Fueron inútiles las aclaratorias del MRI y otros despachos sobre estas acusaciones, puesto que Morales Navarrete continua trabajando en la Oficina de Fronteras, con la salvedad de que desde la denuncia pública de su caso se cuida acercarse al edificio del "Banco del Caribe", pero sabemos que está operando desde otra parte.

● LA OFICINA DE FRONTERAS: PANTALLA DE NEGOCIOS SUCIOS

Un conocido personaje caraqueño fallecido recientemente y quien trabajaba en la Oficina de Fronteras, expresaba su inquietud entre su amistades sobre la presencia de Morales Navarrete y Bustillo en ese despacho, pero no sólo por su condición de mercenarios extranjeros y agentes de la CIA, sino también por el desfile diario de prostitutas y contrabandistas del área del Caribe conectados con ellos en extrañas operaciones mercantiles, según este personaje.

"Rangel Abogados" era la placa que ostentaba la misteriosa Oficina de Fronteras. Hace poco quitaron esa placa y pusieron otra con el membrete de "Compañía Arenera".

● LOS VIAJES A BARBADOS Y OTRAS PARTES

El mencionado personaje venezolano fallecido solía referirse también a misteriosos y frecuentes viajes de Morales Navarrete durante 1975 y lo que va de 1976, con pasaporte diplomático y viáticos, a Costa Rica, México, Maimi y Tulsa (EE.UU.). Ostentaba entonces el rango de "Asistente al Ministro Consejero Orlando García Vásquez". ¡Asombroso! ¡Orlando García ministro consejero! ¿Consejero de quién?

Antes del sabotaje al avión comercial cubano en las cercanías de esa isla caribeña, Orlando García y su "curruña" viajaron a ella varias veces. ¿Tienen estos sujetos que ver con la preparación del monstruoso acto terrorista, amparados con pasaportes diplomáticos y pagados con dineros de la nación?

● ZAMURO CUIDANDO CARNE

Los infiltrados de la CIA en los organismos de seguridad venezolanos lograron una pequeña victoria al decidirse que el funcionario enviado a Barbados en busca de los recaudos del avión saboteado por terroristas financiados por la CIA, fuera Orlando Jiménez, jefe de una sección de Extranjería, íntimamente conectado a Orlando García y su gang quintacolumna.

¿Fue a buscar o a destruir pruebas?

La presencia del gang cubano en Extranjería podría ser lo que explique una serie de hechos irregulares en relación con nacionalizaciones prematuras e ilegales a individuos indeseables pero acaudalados.

(CONTINUA EN LA PAGINA 19

MORALES NAVARRETE/R.



ETA OFICIAL

EPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA

Caracas: viernes 25 de junio de 1976 — Número 31.010

IIO

nes Interiores

...ida por el ciudadano Alfiero ... (imprime por error de copia).
...zacion, por los ciudadanos

...nacionalidad venezolana al ciu-

... Condecoración de la "Orden ... pada y Tercera Clase, a ...

mes Exteriores ..

Hacienda

... la firma "Skandia de Venezuela ... de exclusividad la representación de la Skandia Insurance Company ... la aceptación de riesgos en operación lícita necesaria para

...ecto la suspensión temporal de ... de que fue objeto ... Nº 4401 del 17 de julio

... autorización de Corredor de ... Valera, se cancela su Inscripción ... de Seguros, se autoriza ... de la Empresa General de ... Nº 33.069 en el Libro de Re... se lleva en esta Dependencia.

... y legaliza la emisión de ... Licores.

... a la Dirección de Control ... funciones de fiscalización de ... patrimonial de las personas ... contratistas prestan sus ... minera.

... Banco Hipotecario del Zulia ... de cédulas hipotecarias de ga... ella se expresa.

... la Dirección de Crédito Público ... Hernández Alvarado, Sub-

...ento y de Agricultura

... a exportación de los productos ... de Aduanas que en ella ... error de copia).

Educación

titular de la Cédula de Identidad Nº F 010 738 y por cuanto en dicha manifestación se ha cumplido con los requisitos exigidos por la Ley, el ciudadano Ministro ordena su publicación en la GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA

Ramón Ignacio Velásquez B.
Director

República de Venezuela. — Ministerio de Relaciones Interiores. — Dirección Nacional de Identificación y Extranjería. — Caracas, 25 de junio de 1976. — 167° y 118°

Vistas las manifestaciones de voluntad de ser venezolanos, formuladas por las personas que a continuación se nombran y por cuanto en dichas manifestaciones se han cumplido los requisitos exigidos por la Ley, el ciudadano Ministro ordena su publicación en la GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA:

Exp. Nº	Nombres y apellidos	Cédula Nº
204 166	Ivoane María González de Mendoza de Fernández	E- 204 166
276 907	Juan Manuel Polo Sáez de Buruaga	E- 276.907
495 569	Emilio Batista García	E- 495 569
759 907	Mercedes Calero Barreal	E- 759 907
921 847	Carlos Manuel Alvarez Tabío ..	E- 921 847
996 685	María del Carmen Sierra Plasencia	E- 996 685
999 738	María Cristina Otero Méndez de Cardentes	E- 999 738
1 020 968	Lucila Herrera de las Casas	E- 1 020 968
1 021 714	Julio Bruno Cardentey Nicodemus	E- 1.021 714
1 029 717	Isaac Menadjed Milhem	E- 1 029 717
81 052 026	Juan Carlos Lazzaro Gentile	E 81 052 026
81 211.164	Antonio Ignacio Bustillo Pérez ..	E-81.211 164
81 257.158	Ricardo Aníbal Morales Navarrete	E 81 257 158

Ramón Ignacio Velásquez B.
Director

Los dos nacionalizados en la Gaceta Oficial hace unos meses llevan varios años trabajando en la Oficina de Fronteras, a cargo de Orlando García, otro batistero agente de la CIA infiltrado.

(VIENE DE LA PAGINA 18)

¿BASE DE OPERACIONES EN CURAZAO?

Por su cercanía a Venezuela y su condición de estafeta de grandes operaciones comerciales y de otro género, Curazao parece ser un centro operativo del gang de la CIA infiltrado en los organismos de seguridad y altos cargos públicos venezolanos regidos por extranjeros nacionalizados o conectados con ellos.

Se dice que Orlando García estuvo recientemente o está en Curazao. ¿Qué hace allí? ¿O qué hizo? Sería interesante una explicación de los frecuentes viajes de este individuo violador de los derechos humanos en el pasado y traficante de prostitutas y contrabando hoy.

Su poder parece no haber caído después del escándalo donde están involucrados otros apátridas de origen cubano y mercenarios a su servicio, con motivo del criminal atentado contra la nave de "Cubana de Aviación" el 6 de octubre pasado.

Desde hace tiempo Orlando García es rey en los aparatos represivos y de seguridad, tal como lo fueron otros extranjeros fascistas y mercenarios como él.

Es el protector de Morales Navarrete, Bustillo Pérez y demás pistoleros y terroristas que ocupan puestos oficiales en Venezuela. Está en connivencia con Orlando Bosch, uno de los autores intelectuales de la masacre aérea de Barbados, donde 73 personas perdieron la vida

¿Hasta cuándo lo será

¿HASTA CUANDO
SE TOLERARA LA DESCARADA
INTERVENCION DE LA CIA
EN VENEZUELA?



Si tienen derecho los cubanos a luchar contra la tiranía de Castro

DE FELIX MARTINEZ SUAREZ AL PRESIDENTE PEREZ

Es legítima la violencia cuando se la ejerce para lograr la libertad del pueblo

Jamás toleraremos en nuestro país una experiencia socio-comunista "a la chilena"

INSOLENCIA FINANCIADA POR LA EMBAJADA YANQUI

(TITULAR DEL REMITIDO PUBLICADO EN PERIODICOS DEL 10-11-76)

14-00000

MORALES, Ricardo

Venezuela Cuba
Chile Costa Rica

FBI Told of Chilean Plot to U

By Joe Crankshaw
The Miami Herald

MIAMI—The Chilean secret police last February attempted to recruit two alleged Cuban exile terrorists to assassinate the nephew of Chile's late deposed Marxist President Salvador Allende, a ranking South American intelligence official told U.S. authorities.

The intelligence official, Ricardo Morales of the Venezuelan secret police, told FBI contacts that Chile's secret police (DINA) sought the assassination of both Andres Pascal Allende and his companion, Anne Marie Brussier, according to documents made available to The Miami Herald.

Morales, himself a Cuban exile, said the DINA plot, which was never carried out, was reported to him by Rolando Otero, who currently faces trial in Miami on 39 felony charges related to nine terrorist bombings here.

[Suspicions of Chilean secret police involvement in plots against political exiles have been widely expressed in emigre circles. This was the first reported instance of an allegation to the FBI by a high-ranking intelligence official suggesting complicity of the Chilean intelligence service in political assassination activities. Morales had himself been associated with the Central Intelligence Agency and FBI as an operative and informant after fleeing Cuba following Castro's accession to power.]

At the time of Morales' report to the FBI, Otero was a fugitive from a Miami federal grand jury indictment related to the bombings. He was subsequently acquitted of that charge earlier this year at a federal trial in Jacksonville.

Morales quoted Otero as saying DINA had attempted to recruit both Otero and Orlando Bosch for the assassination. Bosch was charged in Venezuela last week with first-degree murder in the sabotage of a Cuban airliner that claimed 73 lives.

Morales quoted Otero as saying DINA offered arms and funds to Cuban exile groups.

Otero refused to do the "favor," left Chile and told the Latin American intelligence official on Feb. 15, then returned to Santiago. He was arrested two weeks later and held until he was handed over to the United States in May.

Bosch was arrested entering Costa Rica with a false passport on Feb. 19. He was charged with plotting to kill U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Andres Pascal Allende and Anne Marie Brussier.

No trial was held and Bosch was later deported. He returned to Santiago and apparently remained there until going to the Caribbean area to organize CORU, a militant anti-Castro group which claimed credit for the Cuban airliner bombing last month.

Morales made the reports to the FBI in an exchange of intelligence with U.S. officials about exiled terrorists' plots.

An FBI spokesman in Washington said Monday the bureau would have no comment on the reported DINA plot. [FBI officials in Caracas had no comment on the case in response to independent inquiries by The Washington Post.]

Information on alleged DINA Cuban exile conspiracy against the surviving Allende family and government members was suppressed during the federal bombing trial of Otero in Jacksonville in September, 1976.

se Cubans to Kill Allende Kin

When Otero started to testify about his activities in Chile, government prosecutors objected that the information was immaterial to the bombing charges.

Otero was found innocent of federal charges that he placed bombs at Miami International Airport in October, and at the Miami FBI office, Social Security Office, State Unemployment Office, two post offices, a bank, the Dade State Attorneys Office and the Miami Police Department Headquarters on Dec. 3-4.

His trial on related state charges was to begin here Monday but was ordered postponed until after the beginning of the year and transferred to Pensacola.

Otero remained in Florida until late December, 1975, when he was told by an FBI informant that the FBI was preparing to have him indicted on the bombing charges.

Otero then went to the Dominican Republic, where he was arrested, then paroled to the custody of Admiral Cesar de Windt, father-in-law of Frank Castro, an Otero friend.

When a Miami federal grand jury returned indictments against Otero in the bombings, Otero flew to Caracas.

Otero had $50 in his pocket when he landed in Venezuela, according to information in FBI reports. He stayed with Morales, a former Cuban political police agent and anti-Castro exile then working with the Venezuelan secret police.

Information contained in the reports alleges that Otero was told that if Venezuelan authorities moved to arrest him, he could receive asylum with the new Chilean ambassador.

While in Caracas, Otero allegedly told Morales that he had committed the bombings in Miami, except for the Miami police department explosion. He said he knew who placed that bomb. Morales sent the information to the FBI.

In early February, Otero flew to Santiago, according to the intelligence reports in the hands of investigators.

Otero told Morales, whom he believed would help in an exiles' plot against Castro later this year, that after arriving in Santiago, he went to DINA headquarters and identified himself and said he was a fugitive from the United States.

At DINA headquarters, Otero said, he was told the secret police supported the Cuban exiles' cause and would provide funds for them in return for a "favor."

"The DINA spokesmen, Otero told the intelligence agent, wanted him to kill Andres Pascal Allende and Anne Marie Brussler in Costa Rica before Feb. 22, 1976.

Allende is the nephew of Salvador Allende, who died when right-wing elements overthrew his Marxist government in September, 1973. The younger Allende is a member of MIR, a Chilean revolutionary group that opposes the junta.

Otero quoted DINA spokesmen as saying Bosch would be a back-up if [illegible] failed in the mission.

On Feb. 15, Otero relayed DINA's quest to the intelligence agent and turned to Santiago where he mained until March 8, when he disa peared.

Chilean authorities later said they had taken him into custody on April 27 and charged Otero with being an undesirable alien. They ordered him deported following a hearing May 21.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 27 PER C 2 (E.O) TOTAL COPIES 16-I

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED C/CI (E.O) BY d AT 2055

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/CI 3

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR DDO 3, OGC, C/ES, C/LA 3, C/EUR 3

T 373861 EIA902 PAGE 01 IN 097618

TOR:112354Z NOV 76 CARA 31429

EYES ONLY

This guy [illegible] dangerous in his state of mind.

SECRET 112020Z NOV 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31409 (CARROLL ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, LONDON.

WNINTEL RYBAT KMSTONE MHSPIKE PLMHBLANKET

REFS: A. CARACAS 31403 (NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON) (IN 097588)

B. CARACAS 31373 (NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON) (IN 093663)

C. DIRECTOR 939719 (NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON)

D. DIRECTOR 932221 (NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON)

1. COURSE OF REF A 10 NOVEMBER 76 MEETING WITH WKSCARLET-9, AGENT REVEALED THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE (201-285923) HAD LEFT VENEZUELA AND WAS SEEN OFF BY WKTANGO-1. WKSCARLET-9 DID NOT KNOW MORALES DESTINATION BUT UNDERSTOOD FROM WKTANGO-1 IT WAS EUROPE, PROBABLY LONDON.

2. WKSCARLET-9 SAID HE HAD NO EXPLANATION FOR MORALES ANIMOSITY TOWARD BKHERALD OTHER THAN HE THOUGHT MORALES BELIVED HE HAD SOMEHOW BEEN MALIGNED BY BKHERALD WHICH HAD RUINED HIS POTENTIAL FOR BECOMING SUCCESSFUL AND WEALTHY IN VENEZUELA AND THAT MORALES WAS SUFFERING SOME KIND OF EMOTIONAL CRISIS. MORALES TOLD WKSCARLET-9 AND WKTANGO-1 THAT MANUEL DE ARMAS EXPOSE WAS A BKHERALD OPERATION DIRECTED

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 27 PER C/CI 2 (E.O) TOTAL COPIES 16-3 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED C/CI (E.O) BY AT 2055

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/CI 3

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DDO 3, OGC, C/SS C/LA 3, C/EUR 3

T 373881 EIA922 PAGE 01 IN 097618

TOR:112054Z NOV 76 CARA 31409

MORALES 201

SECRET 112020Z NOV 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31409 (CARROLL ACTING)

EYES ONLY

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, LONDON.

WNINTEL RYBAT KMSTONE MHSPIKE PLMHBLANKET

REFS: A. CARACAS 31403 (NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON) (IN 097588)

B. CARACAS 31373 (NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON) (IN 093663)

C. DIRECTOR 939719 (NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON)

D. DIRECTOR 932221 (NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON)

1. COURSE OF REF A 10 NOVEMBER 76 MEETING WITH WKSCARLET-9. AGENT REVEALED THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE (201-285923) HAD LEFT VENEZUELA AND WAS SEEN OFF BY WKTANGO-1. WKSCARLET-9 DID NOT KNOW MORALES DESTINATION BUT UNDERSTOOD FROM WKTANGO-1 IT WAS EUROPE, PROBABLY LONDON.

2. WKSCARLET-9 SAID HE HAD NO EXPLANATION FOR MORALES ANIMOSITY TOWARD BKHERALD OTHER THAN HE THOUGHT MORALES BELIVED HE HAD SOMEHOW BEEN MALIGNED BY BKHERALD WHICH HAD RUINED HIS POTENTIAL FOR BECOMING SUCCESSFUL AND WEALTHY IN VENEZUELA AND THAT MORALES WAS SUFFERING SOME KIND OF EMOTIONAL CRISIS. MORALES TOLD WKSCARLET-9 AND WKTANGO-1 THAT MANUEL DE ARMAS EXPOSE WAS A BKHERALD OPERATION DIRECTED

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

STAFF

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 373881 EIA902 PAGE 03-03 IN 097618

TOR:112054Z NOV 76 CARA 31409

FOR HIS FORCED DEPARTURE FROM VENEZUELA ON BKHERALD.

4. FILE: 201-285923. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL OF TDFIR INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** (When Filled In)

10(d)

		ROUTING		
ORIG.	HARRIET WEILER			
UNIT	LA/PNC/V/R	1		4
EXT.	9454	2		5
DATE	9 NOVEMBER 1976	3		6

CONF: LA 12

OPS/INT 5, IID, PS/EG 2, CI 4, SS 4, OSG, FR 4, DDO 3

TDFIR DB-315/11216-76

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 9 NOVEMBER 1976

PRECEDENCE: X ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

C/LA	1			
DC/LA	1			
LA/OPS	1			
LA/RR	1			
LA/REG	1			
LA/PNC/V	3			
LA/COG	4			

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
HVC-7537
CARACAS 31373(IN 093663)
PP 3-4: WKMAYOR (WKSCARLET-17)
PP 6-9: WKDIET(WKDIET-3)
OBJ: K1A

LIAISON: *

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS – PLACE X IN APPROPRIATE SPACE

☐ TO IID:
DISSEM ELECTRICALLY TO:
(List electrical addresses and deliver with extra copy to IID)

☐ ZRWAHOO LIFTER CABLE SENT

☐ EXCLUSIVE FOR
(List addressees)

☐ RELAY CABLE PREPARED
(Deliver with extra copy to Cable Secretariat)

☒ NOT FOR LIAISON

REPORT CLASSIFIED BY: 062063

CS INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Weiler
C/LA/PNC/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
CL BY 007622
E 2 IMPDET

RELEASING OFFICER
C/LA/RR

COPY NO.

FORM 11-73 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(13-20-44-47)

1073 IN [illegible] EDITIONS

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

IN 093663

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO CRS
FBI

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1) (2) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB-315/11216-76

DIST 9 NOVEMBER 1976

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

DOI : EARLY NOVEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: POTENTIAL EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT DUE TO POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF PROOF THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE IS A VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIAL

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (1-4 NOVEMBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7537

SOURCE : SEE BELOW.

SUMMARY: DESPITE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT DENIALS, CUBAN-BORN RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE IS A HIGH OFFICIAL OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP). FURTHERMORE, HE IS CURRENTLY ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 6 OCTOBER BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER AND HE HAS HAD PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH SOME OF THE SUSPECTS IN THE BOMBING. A VENEZUELAN NEWSMAN HAS A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF MORALES' DISIP ASSIGNMENT, WHICH HE IS ATTEMPTING TO HAVE REPRINTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS. VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS BELIEVE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF

THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD PROVE EMBARRASSING TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND, IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTER THIS POTENTIAL DIFFICULTY, HAVE ISSUED A BACK-DATED CIRCULAR OSTENSIBLY RELIEVING MORALES OF HIS DISIP ASSIGNMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PRESS COVERAGE CONCERNING RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE, A CUBAN-BORN, NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZEN. MORALES' STATUS WITH THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT CAME INTO QUESTION WHEN THE FOREIGN PRESS REPORTED THAT MORALES IS A HIGH-LEVEL VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIAL AS WELL AS BEING CONNECTED WITH VARIOUS AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT(USG). VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS HAVE ALTERNATELY DENIED AND ADMITTED MORALES' ASSOCIATION WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS. FOR THIS INFORMATION SEE EMBASSY CARACAS TELEGRAM 12667 OF 26 OCTOBER 1976.)

2. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

3. DESPITE DENIALS BY SOME OFFICIALS OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERN-

MENT. RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE IS CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN ESPOINAGE DIVISION OF THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP). THIS SECTION IS KNOWN AS DIVISION 54. FURTHERMORE, MORALES IS HEADING THE VENEZUELAN INVESTIGATION OF THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. IN THIS CAPACITY, MORALES RECEIVES AND MAINTAINS ALL INFORMATION ON THE CUBANA CASE, INCLUDING INFORMATION WHICH CONNECTS HIM, MORALES, WITH THE CUBAN EXILE MOVEMENT AND INDIVIDUALS IMPLICATED IN THE CUBANA CASE. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON MORALES' CONNECTIONS WITH CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN CARACAS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBANA AFFAIR, SEE HVC-7514, TDFIRDB-315/102656-76, OF 15 OCTOBER, FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.)

4. AS HEAD OF THE INVESTIGATING TEAM, MORALES ISSUES PRESS RELEASES ON THE CASE UNDER THE ALIAS "COMMISSIONER JIMENEZ." IN ORDER TO AVOID DIRECT CONTACT WITH NEWSMEN, MORALES IS NOT UTILIZING HIS USUAL DISIP OFFICES, BUT RATHER MAINTAINS SEPARATE FACILITIES.

5. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 6-9: A VENEZUELAN WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY

HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

6. DURING THE WEEK OF 1 NOVEMBER, DISIP DIRECTOR RETIRED GENERAL RAUL GIMENEZ GAIN[illegible]A SAID THAT MORALES IS STILL WORKING AT DISIP AND IS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE CUBANA INVESTIGATION. IN AN EFFORT TO MITIGATE ANY FURTHER PUBLICITY CONCERNING MORALES AND HIS CONNECTION WITH THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT, GIMENEZ SAID HE HAS OFFICIALLY RELIEVED MORALES AS CHIEF OF DIVISION 54. THE RECORDS ANNOUNCING MORALES' REMOVAL HAVE BEEN BACK-DATED TO 1 OCTOBER.

7. GIMENEZ SAID THAT HE IS AWARE THAT CIRO MEDINA, CHIEF EDITOR OF "BOHEMIA" MAGAZINE, HAS IN HIS POSSESSION A DISIP CIRCULAR ANNOUNCING THE APPOINTMENT OF MORALES AS CHIEF OF DISIP'S DIVISION 54. MEDINA, GIMENEZ SAID, IS ATTEMPTING TO HAVE THE CIRCULAR REPRINTED IN THE VENEZUELAN PRESS, BUT THUS FAR, HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FIND AN OUTLET WILLING TO PUBLISH IT.

8. MORALES, GIMENEZ SAID, WAS APPOINTED TO DISIP ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF ORLANDO GARCIA, A SECURITY ADVISER TO PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ. THE CIRCULAR APPOINTING MORALES IS SIGNED BY GIMENEZ AND ACCORDING TO GIMENEZ, WAS APPROVED BY OCTAVIO LEPAGE, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, AND PRESIDENT PEREZ.

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

N 093663

TDFIRDB-315/11216-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

WHEN INFORMATION ON MORALES APPEARED IN THE LOCAL PRESS, GIMENEZ SAID HE ORDERED THAT ALL COPIES OF THE CIRCULAR ON MORALES BE RECOVERED. UNFORTUNATELY, MANY COPIES COULD NOT BE LOCATED.

9. IF THIS CIRCULAR IS REPRINTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS, GIMENEZ SAID IT WOULD CREATE A HIGHLY EMBARRASSING SITUATION FOR THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AND PARTICULARLY INTERIOR MINISTER LEPAGE, WHO HAS DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF CUBAN EXILES IN DISIP. THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM COMES AT A PARTICULARLY BAD TIME, GIMENEZ SAID, SINCE LEPAGE WILL BE THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF VENEZUELA BEGINNING 15 NOVEMBER WHEN PRESIDENT PEREZ BEGINS A TRIP TO THE UNITED NATIONS, EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION.

10. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER, XGDS-2.

FORM 3005

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY ________

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 006687

24

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO					
LA-10		FILE, VR, [redacted], IP/AN, IID, OPS/INT,	1		4	
ACTION #		CI 4, SS 4, OSG/IC-2, OSG, FR 5, SIA 2	2		5	
			3		6	

T 364505 EIA743 PAGE 01 IN 293663

TOR:082256Z NOV 76 CARA 31373

S E C R E T 062152Z NOV 76 INTEL HVC-7537

CITE CARACAS 31373

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE

SUPDATA: SOURCE PARAS 3-4: WKMAYOR/WKSCARLET-17, SOURCE PARAS 6-9: NP/WKDIET-3 FROM WKNOBLE-24. NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: K.1.A. INDEX MORALES. FILE: 75-5-9. CL. BY 062263.

FILED: 082152Z XXXXX

IID COMMENT: WHEN DISSEMINATED PLEASE ADD DDO-3.

3 Karen

S E C R E T

FORM 9 75 3015 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 8 NOVEMBER 1976
IN 093663
PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

The following report, transmitted from a CIA field station, requires review within the Directorate of Operations before being used in any other document or publication, or released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is provided for your advance information.

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA /Cuba

DOI : EARLY NOVEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: POTENTIAL EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT DUE TO POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF PROOF THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE IS A VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIAL

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (1-4 NOVEMBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7537

SOURCE : SEE BELOW

SUMMARY: DESPITE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT DENIALS, CUBAN-BORN RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE IS A HIGH-OFFICIAL OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP). FURTHERMORE, HE IS CURRENTLY ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 6 OCTOBER BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER, THE SUSPECTS IN WHICH HE, MORALES HAS HAD PREVIOUS CONTACT. A VENEZUELAN NEWSMAN HAS A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF MORALES' DISIP ASSIGNMENT, WHICH HE IS ATTEMPTING TO HAVE REPRINTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS. VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS BELIEVE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 093663

TDFIR

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD PROVE EMBARRASSING TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND, IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTER THIS POTENTIAL DIFFICULTY, HAVE ISSUED A BACK-DATED CIRCULAR OSTENSIBLY RELIEVING MORALES OF HIS DISIP ASSIGNMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PRESS COVERAGE CONCERNING RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE, A CUBAN-BORN, NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZEN. MORALES' STATUS WITH THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT CAME INTO QUESTION WHEN THE FOREIGN PRESS REPORTED THAT MORALES IS A HIGH-LEVEL VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIAL AS WELL AS BEING CONNECTED WITH VARIOUS AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT(USG). VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS HAVE ALTERNATELY DENIED ~~AND~~ AND ADMITTED MORALES' ASSOCIATION WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS. FOR TIS INFORMATION SEE EMBASSY CARACAS TELEGRAM 12667 OF 26 OCTOBER 1976.)

2. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO OFFICIALS REPORTS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

3. DESPITE DENIALS BY SOME OFFICIALS OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERN-

IN 093663

TDFIR

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

MENT. RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE IS CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN ESPOINAGE DIVISION OF THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP). THIS SECTION IF KNOWN AS DIVISION 54. FURTHERMORE, MORALES IS HEADING THE VENEZUELAN INVESTIGATION OF THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. IN THIS CAPACITY, MORALES RECEIVES AND MAINTAINS ALL INFORMATION ON THE CUBANA CASE, INCLUDING INFORMATION WHICH CONNECTS HIM, MORALES, WITH THE CUBAN EXILE MOVEMENT AND INDIVIDUALS IMPLICATED IN THE CUBANA CASE. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON MORALES' CONNECTIONS WITH CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN CARACAS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBANA AFFAIR, SEE HVC-7514, TDFIRDB-315/102656-76, OF 15 OCTOBER, FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.)

4. AS HEAD OF THE INVESTIGATING TEAM, MORALES ISSUES PRESS RELEASES ON THE CASE UNDER THE ALIAS "COMMISSIONER JIMENEZ." IN ORDER TO AVOID DIRECT CONTACT WITH NEWSMEN, MORALES IS NOT UTILIZING HIS USUAL DISIP OFFICES, BUT RATHER MAINTAINS SEPARATE FACILITIES.

5. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 6-9: A VENEZUELAN WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY

HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

6. DURING THE WEEK OF 1 NOVEMBER, DISIP DIRECTOR RETIRED GENERAL RAUL GIMENEZ GAINZA SAID THAT MORALES IS STILL WORKING AT DISIP AND IS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE CUBANA INVESTIGATION. IN AN EFFORT TO MITIGATE ANY FURTHER PUBLICITY CONCERNING MORALES AND HIS CONNECTION WITH THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT, GIMENEZ SAID, HE HAS OFFICIALLY RELIEVED MORALES AS CHIEF OF DIVISION 54. THE RECORDS ANNOUNCING MORALES REMOVAL HAVE BEEN BACK-DATED TO 1 OCTOBER.

7. GIMENEZ SAID THAT HE IS AWARE THAT CIRO MEDINA, CHIEF EDITOR OF "BHOEMIA" MAGAZINE, HAS IN HIS POSSESSION A DISIP CIRCULAR ANNOUNCING THE APPOINTMENT OF MORALES A CHIEF OF DISIP'S DIVISION 54. MEDINA, GIMENEZ SAID, IS ATTEMPTING TO HAVE THE CIRCULAR REPRINTED IN THE VENEUZELAN PRESS, BUT THUS FAR, HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FIND AN OUTLET WILLING TO PUBLISH IT.

8. MORALES, GIMENEZ SAID, WAS APPOINTED TO DISIP ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF ORLANDO GARCIA, A SECURITY ADVISER TO PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ. THE CIRCULAR APOINTING MORALES IS SIGNED BY GIMENEZ AND, ACCORDING TO GIMENEZ, WAS APPROVED BY OCTAVIO LEPAGE, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, AND PRESIDENT PEREZ.

WHEN INFORMATION ON MORALES APPEARED IN THE LOCAL PRESS, GIMENEZ SAID, HE ORDERED THAT ALL COPIES OF THE CIRCULAR ON MORALES BE RECOVERED. UNFORTUNATELY, MANY COPIES COULD NOT BE LOCATED.

9. IF THIS CIRCULAR IS REPRINTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS, GIMENEZ SAID, IT WOULD CREATE A HIGHLY EMBARRASSING SITUATION FOR THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AND PARTICULARLY INTERIOR MINISTER LEPAGE, WHO HAS DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF CUBAN EXILES IN DISIP. THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM COMES AT A PARTICULARLY BAD TIME, GIMENEZ SAID, SINCE LEPAGE WILL BE THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF VENEZUELA BEGINNING 15 NOVEMBER WHEN PRESIDENT PEREZ BEGINS A TRIP TO THE UNITED NATIONS, EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION.

10. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

14-00000

F 71 MFG 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY P PER   TOTAL COPIES 35-5

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT			
C/LA8	INFO	RF, FILE, VR, C/IP/AN, C/NE6, C/OPS, C/OPS/ITG4, C/PS/EG2, IGC/OOO, DDO3, C/OSG, C/SIA2, C/CI4	
ACTION #			

T 315150   EIA742   PAGE 01   IN 074149

TOR:192243Z OCT 76   CAPA 31184

S E C R E T 192254Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31184

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT KMSTONE MHSPIKE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 929165

B. WASHINGTON 920330

C. CARACAS 31137 (IN 070661)

1. WE SHARE HEADQUARTERS CONCERN RE ARREST OF WKSCARLET-3 (W-3) AND POSSIBILITY OF SUSPICION/ADDITIONAL CHARGES BKHERALD CONNECTION WITH BOMBING. IN ADDITION TO INTEL REPORTING, STATION CONTINUOUSLY ASSESSING EVENTS IN RELATION TO MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND WE ARE IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH AMBASSADOR. WE ARE UNABLE TO REPORT ANY FIRST-HAND INFORMATION FROM W-3 OR WKTANGO-1 (W-1) DUE TO LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED BY AMBASSADOR. PRIOR TO BOMBING INCIDENT BRADSPIES ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT W-3 REGARDING APPARENTLY UNRELATED MATTER IN REF B: AFTER INCIDENT AND INITIAL REPORT FROM WKSCARLET-5 FROM WKSCARLET-3, ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT W-3 WERE STOPPED AND LATER WERE PROHIBITED BY AMBASSADOR. AS W-1 NAME BEGAN COMING UP WITH INCREASING

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-285923
DO NOT [illegible]

SECRET

7-71 MFG 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR
ACTION #		

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 315150 EIA741 PAGE 02 IN 074149

TOR:192243Z OCT 76 CARA 31184

FREQUENCY, AMBASSADOR REQUESTED STATION PULL BACK IN LIAISON CONTACT (THIS APPLIED ONLY TO W-1 PERSONAL CONTACT AND NOT TO WKSCARLET LIAISON IN GENERAL).

2. AS YET STATION HAS NO HARD EVIDENCE WHICH DIRECTLY LINKS W-3, ~~EITHER~~ W-1; OR RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE TO THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING. HOWEVER, THEIR REPORTED ASSOCIATION WITH ORLANDO BOSCP AVILA, THEIR BACKGROUNDS, AND W-3'S PRIOR REPORTING ON TERRORIST ACTIONS SUGGEST THAT THEY WERE ALL AWARE TO ONE DEGREE OR ANOTHER OF PLANS FOR THE 6 OCTOBER ACTION AND THAT NONE OF THEM ACTIVELY OPPOSED IT. OF THE THREE W-3 SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MOST LIKELY IMPLICATED THROUGH HIS POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO HERNAN RICARDO LOZANO AND/OR FREDDY LUGO. W-1 AND MORALES MAY HAVE BECOME ACCESSORIES-AFTER-THE-FACT DEPENDING UPON THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF ORLANDO BOSCH IN THE BOMBING AND ITS AFTERMATH.

3. IT MAY BE WISHFUL THINKING BUT DO NOT FEEL THAT W-3 IS IN POSITION REVEAL ANY TRUE INFORMATION WHICH COULD IMPLICATE ANY OF HIS SEVERAL EMBASSY CONTACTS. SINCE CONTACT WITH HIM IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN TO OUR KNOWLEDGE LIMITED ONLY TO VISA ASSISTANCE AND INFORMATION

SECRET

14-00000

7-71 MFG 3/61

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________ BY________ AT________

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF . FILE . VR .	STAFF
ACTION #			1 2 3 4 5 6

T 315150 EIA741 PAGE 03 IN 074149

TOR:1922432 OCT 76 CARA 31184

REPORTING. HE COULD AT MOST REVEAL NAMES AND TELPHONE NUMBERS. WKSCARLET-5 EXPRESSED PERSONAL OPINION THAT W-3, FEARING POSSIBLE RETRIBUTION FROM ORLANDO BOSCH, WOULD NOT DARE FIX BLAME ON BOSCH AND MIGHT, UNDER INTERROGATION PRESSURE, ATTEMPT TO IMPLICATE BKHERALD AS HIS SPONSOR; WE FEEL THIS POSSIBILITY IS RATHER REMOTE.

4. WKSCARLET-9 APPEARS NOT TO BE INVOLVED IN THE ABOVE BUT HIS CUBAN BACKGROUND AND CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH W-1, ESPECIALLY IN RECENT WEEKS, UNDOUBTEDLY HAS BROUGHT HIM SOME NOTICE AND PROBABLY SUSPICION. WKSCARLET-9 HAS NOT BEEN MET SINCE HE MISSED A MEETING IN LATE SPETEMBER; HE CALLED IN THE NEXT DAY TO SAY THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO MAKE IT. HE SUBSECUENTLY CALLED HIS CASE OFFICER'S HOME ONCE WHILE HE WAS OUT BUT HAS NOT CALLED BACK TO SPECIFY A TIME FOR THE NEXT MEETING; HE ALSO HAS NOT RESPONDED TO THREE RECENT RS-708 SIGNALS TO CALL IN AND ONE TO MAKE AN EMERGENCY MEETING ON THE NIGHT OF 8 OCTOBER. STATION HAS DECIDED AGAINST CALLING HIM DURING THIS CURRENT TENSE PERIOD AT HIS ONLY REACHABLE NUMBER--HIS AND WKNOBLE-1'S HOME. WE WILL CONTINUE SIGNALLING AND AWAITING HIS CALL IN. FYI:

SECRET

7-71 MFG 3/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR
ACTION #		

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 315150 EIA741 PAGE 04 IN 074149

TOR:192243Z OCT 76 CARA 31184

WITH WKSCARLET-9'S NEW POST IN WKSCARLET GOES A ROUND-THE-CLOCK ARMED ESCORT WHICH HE HAS TO RID HIMSELF OF BEFORE MAKING A CLANDESTINE MEETING WITH HIS CASE OFFICER. WKSCARLET-9 HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE SECURITY PROBLEMS OF MEETINGS IN HIS CURRENT SITUATION, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE HAS MANY ENEMIES IN, OR UNTIL RECENTLY IN, WKSCARLET WHO WOULD LOVE TO TAR HIM WITH THE BKHERALD BRUSH. SOMEONE WITH HIS CUBAN BACKGROUND, OF COURSE, IS ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE TO THIS CHARGE IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE CURRENT FUROR ABOUT EXILES IN VENEZUELA. WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS WKSCARLET-9 RECONTACT IS ESTABLISHED.

5. STATION FILES CONTAIN NO TRACES TO OLEG GUETON RODRIGUEZ OR CELSA TOLEDO. STATION HAS ONE TRACE TO FRANCISCO NUNEZ, A CUBAN EXILE AND FORMER NAVY OFFICER EMPLOYED BY ZULOAGA AND MACHADO GROUPS. INFO APPEARS IN CONTACT REPORTS DATED 6 AND 8 JUNE 1967, FILED IN AMEMBER-1 FILE WHICH NO LONGER AVAILABLE IN STATION. THERE IS ANOTHER TRACE THAT ONE FRANCISCO E. NUNEZ REPORTED A CASTRO ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT TO A STATION ASSET: UFAA-4022, 7 APR 72, 100-009-014. PROBABLY THE SAME FRANCISCO E. NUNEZ WAS LISTED IN HVCA-8538.

SECRET

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 315150 EIA741 PAGE 05-05 IN 074149

TOR:192243Z OCT 76 CARA 31184

23 AUGUST 1961, AS GENERAL DIRECTOR OF THE COMPANY AISLA. C.A. AND IDENTIFIED AS HAVING FURNISHED A LEAD TO A CUBAN VICE CONSUL WHO WAS PLANNING TO DEFECT.

6. FILE: 200-6-484/3; 201-0303985; 201-0285923; 201-0067860. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

33-5

SIGNAL CENTER USE

1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | ORIG | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 162027Z DIRECTOR 929165

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, C/NE6, DDO3, AGC/DDO, C/ORB/ITG4, C/OPS, C/CI4, C/PS/EG2, C/OSG, DDO/DO

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 28

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS. Y

RYBAT WNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE Y

1. LATE PRESS CLIPPINGS REPORT ARREST OF LUIS POSADA CARRILES, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, OLEG GUETON RODRIGUEZ, CELSA TOLEDO AND FRANCISCO NUNEZ. POSADA AND CARRILES KNOWN TO STATION. PRELIMINARY TRACES ON NUNEZ SHOW HE WEALTHY CUBAN EXILE AND MEMBER OF CORU RESIDENT IN CARACAS. Y

2. WE ARE CONCERNED IN SO FAR AS ARREST OF WKSCARLET-3 MIGHT CAST SUSPICION, AND BRING ON ADDITIONAL CHARGES OF BKHERALD CONNECTION WITH BOMBING, ESPECIALLY SINCE WKSCARLET-3 HAS IN PAST BEEN PUBLICALLY ACCUSED OF BEING BKHERALD AGENT. WE ALSO NOTE HE HAS BEEN SOMETIME CONTACT OF CARACAS LEGATT, AND STATION SUSPICION THAT HE WAS CONTACT OF DAO. Y

3. OF INTEREST IS THAT MUCH OF THE CARACAS END OF INVESTIGATION OF THE AIRLINER BOMBING AND REPORTING IS CONTROLLED BY WKTANGO-1 GROUP. RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETTE IS WKTANGO-1 DEPUTY AND HAS BEEN SERVING AS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT FOR LEGATT. DISIP SUB-INSPECTOR ORLANDO JIMENEZ WHO SENT TO PORT OF SPAIN IS ALSO INCLUDED IN GRBOUP.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 285923
DO NOT DESTROY

15 Oct 76

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

029165

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

(IN 069101)

ACCORDING TO CARACAS 31117 [redacted] UKTANGO-1 AND MORALES NAVARRETTE HAVE ALSO BEEN INCLUDED IN ORLANDO BOSCH/UKSCARLET-3 GROUP. FBI REPORT QUOTING NUNEZ OF PARA 1 ABOVE STATED THAT UKTANGO-1 AND MORALES NAVARRETTE ARE BOTH CONSIDERED TRUSTED PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN COOPERATIVE AND INSTRUMENTAL IN CORU SUCCESSES AND IN OTHER ACTIVITIES. INFORMATION IN CARACAS 31087 [redacted] REPORTING TRUE NAME OF HERNAN RICARDO LOZANO, BEFORE/IT WAS ACTUALLY REVEALED BY RICARDO IN PORT OF SPAIN ON 9 OCTOBER ALSO CAME FROM MORALES NAVARRETTE, INDICATING THAT HE HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE, BUT WHETHER HE KNEW THIS THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING OR INFORMATION HE RECEIVED FROM HIS OWN INFORMANT IS UNKNOWN. PUTTING ALL THIS TOGETHER, #AND IN LIGH#T OF CARACAS 31117 [redacted] INFORMATION, WE CANNOT HELP BUT WONDER IF THERE IS NOT MORE GOING ON THAN IS APPARENT. (IN 064947) CARACAS 31088 ## [redacted] ALSO SEEMED TO SUSPECT THIS AT AN EARLY STABGE. Y

4. WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THE FOLLOWING: Y

A. LIKELIHOOD OF UKSCARLET-3 REVEALING INFORMATION WHICH COULD IMPLICATE ANY OF HIS SEVERAL EMBASSY CONTACTS. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

929165

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

B. POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF UKTANGO-1 AND/OR MORALES NAVARRETTE. Y

WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO HAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THOSE ARRESTED ALONG WITH BOSCH AND POSADA, ON WHOM WE HAVE NO INFORMATION. Y

5. PLS ADVISE WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LEARN THROUGH LIAISON CONTACTS WITH UKTANGO-1 AND UNILATERALLY FROM UKSCARLET-9. Y

6. FILE: 200-6-484/3; 201-0300985; 201-0285923; 201-0067860.

E2 IMPDET.A

C/LA/COG

C/LA/CAR

DATE: 15 OCT 76
ORIG: ROBERT W. ANDREWS
UNIT: C/LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1715

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

S E C R E T

X-REF [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

X-REF TO	SYMBOL NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-[illegible]	[illegible]-31137	15 OCT 7[illegible]	201-[illegible]7560

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT(S) ARE CROSS-REFERENCED TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN. FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF THE FILE CONTAINING THE RECORD COPY DOCUMENT, CALL FILES SECTION, EXTENSION 4127.

14-00000

DISSEM BY 44/41 TOTAL COPIES 241

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

STAFF

ACTION UNIT
C/LA8
ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR C/CI/AN, C/PS/EG2, C/CI4, C/OSG, C/CS, C/SN/10, ADC/000, DDO3

T 326652 EIA947 PAGE 01 IN 070661

TOR:152225Z OCT 76 CARA 31137

S E C R E T 152011Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31137

TO: DIRECTOR,

WNINTEL RYBAT REAM

REF: DIRECTOR 917974

1. FOR STATION INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD PARA 4 REF, WOULD APPRECIATE HEADQUARTERS VIEWS ON "U.S. PERSON" STATUS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, WKTANGO-1, RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE, AND WKSCARLET-3.

2. WKSCARLET-3 SURRENDERED EXPIRED ALIEN REENTRY PERMITS FOR SELF AND WIFE TO CARACAS CONSULAR OFFICER SOME WEEKS AGO; THEY HAVE VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS WITH U.S. VISITORS VISAS. THEY HAVE ONE CHILD, BORN IN U.S. WHO HAS U.S. PASSPORTS. WKSCARLET-3 IS ALSO BELIEVED CURRENT ON U.S. INCOME TAXES.

3. FILE: 201-0067860; 201-2285923; 201-0320985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL OF TDFIR INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** (when filled in)

ORIG.	HARRIET WEILER
UNIT	LA/PNC/V/R
EXT.	9454
DATE	14 OCTOBER 1976

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

#001

CONF: LA 22

INFO: OPS/INT 5, IID, PS/EG 2, CI 2, SS 4, SS/SOG 4, OPS/ITG 5, OSG IC 2, FR 5 DDO 2.

TDFIR DB-315/10256-76

DATE DISTRIBUTED 14 OCTOBER 1976

PRECEDENCE X ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD RPT., PROJ.)
HVC-7514
CARACAS 31117 (IN 069101)
WKMAYOR (WKSCARLET-5)
OBJ: J1

DISSEMINATION

C/LA	1	LA/PNC/C	1		
DC/LA	1	LA/CAR	3		
LA/OPS	1	LA/MCA	3		
LA/RR	1	LA/SB	2		
LA/REG	1	LA/COG	4		
LA/PNC/V	3				
LA/PNC/P	1				

LIAISON: *

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — PLACE X IN APPROPRIATE SPACE

☒ TO IID: STATE, DIA, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, NSA, SUS, CIA/OPSCEN, TREASURY, SS/ID, FBI.

DISSEM ELECTRICALLY TO: (List electrical addressees and deliver with extra copy to IW)

CTID COMMENT: ADVANCE COPY TO SIG CENTER FOR ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION AT 2335 HRS LOCAL.J

☐x ZRWAHOO LIFTER CABLE SENT PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA [redacted] GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO [redacted] SANTIAGO, BOGOTA

☐ EXCLUSIVE FOR (List addressees)

☐ RELAY CABLE PREPARED (Deliver with extra copy to Cable Secretariat)

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

☒ NOT FOR LIAISON

REPORT CLASSIFIED BY: 035133

CS INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
C/LA/PNC/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION **SECRET**

CL BY 007622
E 2 IMPDET

RELEASING OFFICER
C/LA/RR

COPY NO.

FORM 3-73 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(13-20-44)

MCKALES [illegible]

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 069101

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO CRS
{SY/I/PIB} SS/ID FBI SECUR

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

I D

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

S8B

CITE TDFIR DB-315/10256-76

DIST 14 OCTOBER 1976

Vene
Cuba

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

206000 JVE IC4
122200 JVE KUS
123000 V V
W

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI : LATE SEPTEMBER -12 OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN >EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZUELA (SUSPECTED >TERRORIST ON WHOM U.S. ATTEMPTING TO GAIN >EXTRADITION)(W)#

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7514.

SOURCE: A FORMER VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO STILL MAINTAINS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1976 A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH WAS IN VENEZUELA UNDER THE PROTECTION OF VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ. FURTHERMORE, PEREZ HAD APPOINTED HIS SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ADVISER ORLANDO GARCIA TO PROTECT AND ASSIST BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZUELA. FOR THIS INFORMATION SEE HVC-7498, TDFIRDB-315/09834-76. IN HVC-7483, TDFIRDB-315/09430-76.

OF MID-SEPTEMBER, A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED THAT BOSCH ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA ON APPROXIMATELY 13 SEPTEMBER

2. UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, BOSCH WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY GARCIA AND LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA, A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR AND ONE-TIME MEMBER OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENC AND PREVENTION (DISIP), WHO ESCORTED BOSCH TO HIS CARACAS HOTEL. (FIELD COMMENT: WHILE CURRENTLY NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZENS, BOTH GARCIA AND POSADA ARE NATIVE-BORN CUBANS.)

3. SOMETIME FOLLOWING BOSCH'S ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, A BS. 5,000 (APPROXIMATELY U.S. $1,118) A PLATE FUND-RAISING DINNER FOR BOSCH WAS HELD AT THE HOME OF HILDO FOLGAR, A PROMINENT SURGEON AND CUBAN EXILE. IN ADDITION TO BOSCH, AMONG THOSE ATTENDING THE DINNER WERE GARCIA; RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE, GARCIA'S DEPUTY WHO IS ALSO A NATIVE-BORN CUBAN; POSADA; AND AN UNIDENTIFIED HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

4. DURING THE EVENING BOSCH APPROACHED THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL THROUGH GARCIA PROPOSING THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CASH CONTRIBUTION TO HIS ORGANIZATION. IN RETURN, BOSCH AGREED TO GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CUBAN EXILE DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES DURING PRESIDENT PEREZ' PLANNED

NOVEMBER APPEARANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS(UN). (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS BELIEVED THAT BOSCH'S PROPOSITION WAS AT LEAST TENTATIVELY ACCEPTED BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL.)

5. ALSO DURING THE EVENING BOSCH MADE THE STATEMENT THAT, "NOW THAT OUR ORGANIZATION HAS COME OUT OF THE LETELIER JOB LOOKING GOOD, WE ARE GOING TO TRY SOMETHING ELSE." BOSCH DID NOT NAME THE ORGANIZATION NOR DID HE EXPAND ON HIS MEANING. (FIELD COMMENT: THE LETELIER MENTIONED ABOVE IS PROBABLY FORMER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER ORLANDO LETELIER, WHO WAS ASSASSINATED IN THE UNITED STATES ON 21 SEPTEMBER.)

6. A FEW DAYS FOLLOWING THE FUND-RAISING DINNER, POSADA WAS OVERHEARD TO SAY THAT, "WE ARE GOING TO HIT A CUBAN AIRPLANE," AND THAT "ORLANDO HAS THE DETAILS." (SOURCE COMMENT: THE IDENTITIES OF THE "WE" AND "ORLANDO" MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENT ARE NOT KNOWN.)

7. FOLLOWING THE 6 OCTOBER CUBANA AIRLINE CRASH OFF THE COAST OF BARBADOS, BOSCH, GARCIA AND POSADA AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR BOSCH TO LEAVE VENEZUELA. THEREFORE, ON 9 OCTOBER POSADA AND GARCIA ESCORTED BOSCH TO THE COLOMBIAN BORDER, WHERE THE LATTER CROSSED OVER INTO COLOMBIAN TERRITORY.

8. ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM TRINIDADIAN

AUTHORITIES IMPLICATING HIM, POSADA WAS ARRESTED BY DISIP AUTHORITIES ON 12 OCTOBER. HIS OFFICE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RAIDED AND ALL FILES AND EQUIPMENT CONFISCATED.

9. MEANWHILE, PRESIDENT PEREZ HAS ASSURED THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT, THROUGH CUBAN AMBASSADOR NORBERTO HERNANDEZ CURBELO, THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT WILL ENERGETICALLY PURSUE THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CUBANA CRASH. IN RETURN, HOWEVER, CUBA WILL BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT VENEZUELA'S ANTI-TERRORISM POSITION AT THE UN.

10 (EMBASSY COMMENT: THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTS: "THE LEGATT HAS DIFFERENT INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER BOSCH WAS EXFILTRATED OR IS OR IS NOT IN VENEZUELA. GARCIA SPOKE TO LEGATT SUNDAY MORNING, 10 OCTOBER, AND ON THE AFTERNOON OF 12 OCTOBER TOLD HIM "INFORMALLY" THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD SHORTLY ADVISE ME THAT BOSCH WOULD BE TURNED OVER TO US. THIS WAS REPEATED TO LEGATT BY DISIP DIRECTOR RAUL GIMENEZ GAINZA AND OTHER DISIP OFFICIALS (INCLUDING GARCIA) IN A MEETING THE MORNING OF 13 OCTOBER. CONCEIVABLY GARCIA CAN BE PLAYING A DARK GAME, BUT THE DISCREPANCIES ARE NOTEWORTHY. I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL WORD AS TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION.")

11. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, LEGATT AT CARACAS: SENT TO

PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA, REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2,

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO: STATE, DIA, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, NSA, SWS, CIA/OPSCEN, SS/ID, FBI, TREASURY.

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY P PER TOTAL COPIES 34-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA 7500

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR NE8, C14, C/OPS, OPS/ITG4, IP/AN, PS/EG2, AGC/DDO, DDO 3

T 291757 EIA995 PAGE 01 IN 064880

TOR:091457Z OCT 76 POSN 15890

S E C R E T 091425Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE PORT OF SPAIN 15890

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, DIRECTOR.

NIACT CARACAS.

WNINTEL MHSPIKE KMSTONE

REF CARACAS 31087 (IN 064424)

TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILMING
FOR FILING
LA/PMC/V

1. INFO IN REF NOT YET RECEIVED BY EMBASSY FROM LEGATT. PLEASE REQUEST LEGATT TO INFORM US THROUGH STATE CHANNELS VIA NIACT.

2. STATION HAS PREPARED STATE NIACT (EXDIS) FOR CARACAS WITH INFO PROVIDED STATION MORNING 09 OCT THAT DURING INTERROGATION EARLY MORNING HOURS 09 OCT JOSE VAZQUEZ GOMEZ ADMITTED HIS TRUE NAME WAS HERNAN RICARDO LOZANO.

3. REQUEST CARACAS STATION TRACES HERNAN RICARDO LOZANO (OR RICARDO HERNAN LOZANO) AND INDICATION WHAT MAY BE PASSED POLICE.

4. PLEASE SEND REPLY NIACT.

5. MORE DETAILS SEPARATE CABLE.

6. FILE: (201-285923) 200-6-484/3. E2 IMPDET.

No traces per CARA 31094 9 Oct 76

9 Oct 76

RECORD COPY

SECRET

D200-6-484/3

201-285923

14-00000

SECRET

STAFF

PAGE 01

231916Z APR 76

231913Z APR 76 STAFF

[illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY (FOR L[illegible]

[illegible] CHANT KEYSTONE MHABYSS

REF: [illegible] 29[illegible] (285922)

1. PRESS TREATMENT OF DE ARMAS REVELATIONS

[illegible] MAJOR METROPOLITAN NEWSPAPERS MORNING 23 APRIL [illegible] COVERAGE. PUNTO, DAILY NEWSPAPER OF MOVEMENT [illegible] SOCIALISM (MAS), FEATURES HALF FRONT PAGE HEADLINE THAT CIA [illegible] IN HOTEL ANAUCO HILTON; ACCOMPANYING ARTICLE

201-285923

IDENTIFIES SUBJECT AS RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE. ARTICLE IS ACCOMPANIED BY PHOTOGRAPH OF MAYFLOWER BUILDING AND ALLEGATION THAT APARTMENT 34 OF BUILDING WAS USED BY CIA OPERATIVE TO INTERVENE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND VENEZUELA.

2. FYI, MOST RECENT EMBASSY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY LISTS APARTMENT 34 OF MAYFLOWER BUILDING AS RESIDENCE OF DEA/ [illegible] FEMALE EMPLOYEE.

[illegible] STATION ENCOURAGED BY FAILURE MOST PROMINENT [illegible] PAPERS TO PICK UP AND GIVE PROMINENT PLAY [illegible]

[illegible]

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-285923
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

STAFF

RF FILE VR

652991 [illegible] PAGE 02-02 IN 693926

TOR:231816Z APR 76 CARA 29351

[illegible] FOCUS OF ATTENTION ON EMBASSY AS ALLEGED COVER FOR [illegible] EMPLOYEES WAS NOT WELCOME. ALSO, PRESS MANIPULATION OF [illegible] THE PHILLIPS NAME GRADUALLY FROM DOUGH TO DOUGLAS [illegible] PHILLIPS WAS GETTING CLOSE TO POSSIBLE COINCIDENTAL [illegible] USE OF NAME DAVE PHILLIPS.

[illegible] 2 [illegible] E2 IMPDET.

CABLE SEC [illegible] DISSEM TO: C/CI C/CS OGC
IF DESIRED, [illegible] FORM 1034 TO CABLE SEC.
DDA D/SECUR
D/COMMO

SECRET

S E C R E T

LF ... 1810

SPN. CI/L. CPS/WIRE 2

C/EPS. CCS 2. CGC 2. SS 4

554761 EIA201 PAGE 01 IN 658922

TOR:231609Z APR 76 CARA 29652

S E C R E T 231743Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29652 *CABLE SEC SUGGESTS DISSEM TO: DDO, D/SECUR, D/[illegible]
IF DESIRED, SEND FORM 1524 TO CABLE SEC.

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY (FOR LAOSG).

[illegible] FGCHART KMSTONE MHABYSS

REFS: A. CARACAS 29541 (891535)

B. CARACAS 29576 (812817)

1. 22 APR 76 AFTERNOON EDITION CARACAS DAILY [illegible] MUNDO CARRIES RE-RUN OF PRENSA LATINA ITEM (SEE [illegible] REFERENCE AND FRONT-PAGE, ONE INCH HEADLINE STORY THAT DIM INVESTIGATING TWO FUNCTIONARIES OF U.S. EMBASSY ACCUSED OF DIRECTING PLOT TO PROVOKE RUPTURE OF VENEZUELAN-CUBAN RELATIONS. STORY ACCOMPANIED BY PHOTOS OF RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, WKSCOTANE-9 AND SALVADOR ROMANI ORUE. AUTHORSHIP OF STORY ATTRIBUTED TO OMAR ZAMBRANO P. A

201-0? 5265

201-

FOLLOWING POINTS MADE:

A. DIM RECEIVED GOV INSTRUCTIONS 3 WEEKS AGO OPEN AN INVESTIGATION INTO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES OF NORTH AMERICANS DOUGLAS (DICK) PHILLIPS AND FRED DUNCAN. (NO ATTRIBUTION GIVEN BY REPORTER FOR THIS ITEM.)

B. ALTHOUGH REPORTER UNABLE TO OBTAIN OFFICIAL

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-285923
DO NOT DESTROY

S E C R E T

SECRET

STAFF

RF FILE VR

1 2 3 4 5 6

INFO

T 562960 EIA221 PAGE 02 IN 698922

TOR:231609Z APR 76 CARA 29650

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMENT ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS. REPORTER WAS ABLE CONFIRM PRESENCE IN VENEZUELA OF PHILLIPS AND DUNCAN.

C. AN UNIDENTIFIED SPOKESMAN OF THE INFORMATION SECTION OF THE EMBASSY IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT PHILLIPS AND DUNCAN ARE FUNCTIONARIES OF THE EMBASSY IN THE DEPARTMENT WORKING AGAINST DRUGS BUT THEY ARE NOT FUNCTIONARIES OF THE CIA AND DO NOT DO ANY WORK FOR THAT AGENCY. THE SPOKESMAN REFERRED TO 22 ARPIL PRESS INFORMATION AS COMPLETELY FALSE.

D. DE ARMAS ALSO ACCUSED IN HIS REPORT SALVADOR ROMANI AND WKOCTANE-9 OF HAVING CONDUCTED PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS WITH THE SAME OBJECTIVE (DIP RELATIONS BREAK).

E. ROMANI RESPONDED TO THE ACCUSATION AS BEING A STUPIDITY AND POSSIBLY PART OF A MANEUVER BY FIDEL CASTRO.

F. WKOCTANE-9 RESPONDED TO THE ACCUSATION LABELLING IT A VILE CALUMNY AND INDICATING A DISPOSITION TO TAKE THE MATTER BEFORE A COURT.

2. NO STATION TRACES OMAR ZAVARCE P. STATION HAS NOT HAD CONTACT WITH WKOCTANE-9 SINCE LATE 1973. WE ARE CHECKING WITH WKNORTH PENETRATIONS RE ALLEGATIONS OF [illegible] INVESTIGATION.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES

IP/AN

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 662982 EIA221 PAGE 23-23 IN 698922

TOR:231829Z APR 76 CARA 29652

AND WKNORTH-15 HAS DENIED TO STATION THERE ANY TRUTH TO REPORT. PRENSA LATINA ARTICLE AS PRINTED IN MORNING PAPER AND AS RE-RUN IN AFTERNOON PAPER DOES NOT MENTION EITHER ROMANI OR WKOCTANE-9, BUT PRENSA LATINA TELTAP INDICATES NAMES WERE INCLUDED IN ORIGINAL HAVANA DISPATCH. STATION WATCHING DEVELOPMENT THIS EVENT CAREFULLY, AMONG OTHER REASONS, ON CHANCE PL RELEASE WAS INTENDED SERVE AS PEG FOR LOCAL REVELATIONS REPORTER REF B.

3. FILE: 222-120-152. E2 IMPDET

14-00000

28

3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

LA C. 1555

LA 7

RF FILE VR C/LA 2, CI 4, OPS/NARR 2, C/EPS, CCS 2, OGC 2, IDA SECUR 3, COMMO 2, CWO 2, DDO SS 4,

T 559445 E1A769 PAGE 01 IN 897535

TOR:2216512 APR 76 CARA 29641

S E C R E T 221614Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29641

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY (FOR LACSG).
[illegible] STATE-LA/MIAMI.

[illegible]SPALSH KMSTONE SGCHART MHABYSS

REF: DIRECTOR 614506

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-285923
DO NOT DESTROY

1. FYI, CARACAS DAILY NEWSPAPER ULTIMAS NOTICIAS, 22 APR 76 CARRIES PRENSA LATINA STORY DATELINED HABANA 21 APR TITLED: CIA ACCUSED OF MURDERING ANTI-CASTRO LEADERS. STORY CENTERS AROUND ALLEGED PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH MANUEL DE ARMAS, CLAIMING TO BE A FORMER CIA AGENT, "TELLS ALL" ABOUT "OPERATION ABDALA." DE ARMAS CLAIMS THAT WHILE STATIONED IN NEW YORK IN 1971 HE MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH TWO CIA OFFICIALS (FNU) BLACKENHOUSE WHO HAD RECRUITED HIM TWO YEARS PREVIOUSLY, AND RICHARD TOMLEY OF MCLEAN, VIRGINIA, WHO HAD TAINED HIM AND WHO EVALUATED HIS PERFORMANCE INITIALLY IN OPERATION ABDALA. DE ARMAS ALSO CLAIMS THAT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST VENEZUELAN TOURIST OFFICIALS IN PUERTO RICO WERE COORDINATED WITH THE CIA AND CARRIED OUT BY A PERSON NAMED JUAN DE DIOS IN REPRISAL FOR THE DETENTION OF ORLANDO BOSCH IN CARACAS. FURTHER, DE ARMAS CLAIMS TO HAVE HAD KNOWLEDGE

V201-[illegible]

SECRET

STAFF

RF FILE VR

Y 659445 EIA759 PAGE 02 IN 697535

TOR:221651Z APR 76 CARA 29641

OF PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACKS AGAINST EXILES AND THAT THIS PLANNING WAS BEGUN THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF JOSE DE LA 201-335939 TORRIENTE. DE ARMAS SAYS BOB DYNES, A CIA OFFICER, PARTICIPATED IN ABDALA FOR THE SUPPLY OF EXPLOSIVES IN CIA MISSIONS RELATED TO CHILE. DE ARMAS SAID HE SERVED IN THE ABDALA OPERATION ALSO AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN ROBERT BUD MILES AND LAZARO ALVAREZ FOR THE DELIVERY OF 5 PACKS OF C-4 EXPLOSIVE WHICH WERE USED IN THE KILLING OF ROLANDO 201-49667 MASFERRER. DE ARMAS IDENTIFIES MILLS AS A LIAISON OFFICER BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE AND DEFENSE. DE ARMAS REFERRED TO ATTACKS AGAINST CUBAN FISHERMEN AND SAID ROBERTO TUR, A CIA INFORMANT LIVING ON 12TH AVENUE BETWEEN 8 AND 9 (SIC) IN SOUTHWEST MIAMI, HAS THE MISSION OF LOCATING THE BOATS.

2. DE ARMAS CLAIMS THE CIA IS ENGAGED IN A PLAN TO BRING ABOUT RUPTURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND CUBA, AND THAT FRED DUNCAN DOUGH PHILLIPS, UNDER DIPLOMATIC COVER, ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE PLAN. DUNCAN AND PHILLIPS ARE ALLEGED TO BE USING AN APARTMENT IN THE "MY FLOWER" BUILDING IN CARACAS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS PLAN.

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS CONFERENCE, DE ARMAS IS REPORTED

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

INFO	RF FILE VR	1 2 3 4 5 6

T 659445 EIA769 PAGE 03 IN 697535

TOR:221651Z APR 76 CARA 29641

TO HAVE READ A LIST OF CIA OFFICERS WHICH INCLUDED JOHN VALDAVIAN, A CIA OPERATOR IN THE AREA OF LA FLORIDA (SECTION OF CARACAS OR STATE OF FLORIDA NOT CLEAR) AND RICHARD TOMELY, AN OPERATIONS OFFICER IN MCLEAN VIRGINIA SPECIALIZING IN CUBAN OPERATIONS. BOB [illegible] IS IDENTIFIED AS BEING IN CHILE, FRED DUNCAN AS AN OPERATOR OF THE CARACAS STATION, DOUGH PHILLIPS AS A LIAISON OFFICER WITH [illegible] DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A. NASS, AN OFFICER OF THE SANTO DOMINGO [illegible] AND LUIS DEZA SOTO, A CIA OPERATOR IN THE MIAMI AREA.

201-0[illegible]

ANSELMO ALLIEGRO IS IDENTIFIED AS A CIA AGENT-INFORMANT IN MIAMI, [illegible] ALFONSO ALIAS EL GALLEGO, ANOTHER AGENT-INFORMANT IN MIAMI;

201-0[illegible]

[illegible] MORALES NAVARRETE, A CIA OPERATOR IN CARACAS, ARMANDO RUIZ, AN AGENT IN CARACAS AND ANTONIO DE LEON, AN AGENT IN MEXICO.

4. AS HEADQUARTERS AWARE FRED DUNCAN AND LEE PHILLIPS ARE THE TWO CARACAS DEA DISTRICT OFFICERS. DEA USED SAFEHOUSE IN MAYFLOWER BUILDING TO MEET DE ARMAS. NESS IS (OR WAS) STATE SECURITY IN SANTO DOMINGO.

5. AMBASSADOR HAS DIRECTED NO COMMENT EMBASSY RESPONSE TO ANY INQUIRIES.

6. FILE [illegible]. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES NAVARRETE, RICARDO
201-0285923
SEX M

056-005-021
HZPA-21247
21 APR 76
P2

RESIDES VENEZUELA
CUBAN EXILE-POSSIBLE TRAVEL TO PANAMA SEC SERVICE PANA TAKING HOSTILE POSITION AGAINST CUBAN EXILES TRAV TO PANA. ATTITUDE DIRECTED AGAINST CUBAN EXILES RES OF MIAMI. MAY BE ALLEGED COOPERATION BETWEEN CUBAN EXILES AND PANA EXILES MIAMI WHO OPPOSED TO REGIME GEN TORRIJOS

DATE 17 MAY 76 09401546

201-285923

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

OUTGOING MESSAGE 1973

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP
202258Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
810738

CONF: OPS/NAL2 INFO: FILE IPAV, LA7, C/OPS, SS4, PS/EG2

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 29

IMMEDIATE

TO: /CARACAS, BOGOTA, LA/MIAMI.

MHABYSS

1. PARA 2 IS VERBATIM TEXT OF DEA HQS MSG TO THEIR REGIONAL AND DISTRICT OFFICES IN CHARACAS, BOGOTA AND MIAMI WHICH THEY REQUESTED BE SENT BKHERALD CHANNELS. FYI: DEA CONCERNED THAT THE FIVE APPARENTLY UNRELATED CASES INVOLVING CUBAN EXILES MAY, IN SOME WAY, INDICATE THEY TARGET OF COORDINATED PROVOCATION OP.

2. TEXT OF DEA MSG FOR PASSAGE FOLLOWS:

"ARD MACOLINI, CARACAS REGIONAL OFFICE, DEA

"SAIC GONZALEZ, BOGOTA DISTRICT OFFICE, DEA

"ARD COSTA, MIAMI REGIONAL OFFICE, DEA

"SUBJECT: CUBAN EXILES INVOLVED WITH DEA SEC-IGI-76-0062(1)

"NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

"DURING THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS DEA HAS BECOME INVOLVED IN FIVE SEPARATE INCIDENTS INVOLVING CUBAN EXILES WHO MAY HAVE RECORDS OF POLITICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY INTRIGUE. IN FOUR OF THE INCIDENTS CUBANS ARE APPARENTLY BEING RECRUITED AS CIS OR HAVE OFFICIAL LIAISON CONTACT WITH DEA. EOI AND IGI STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT DEA OFFICES

DATE: 20 FEB 76
ORIG:
UNIT:

0285923

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET MAR 11 4 14 PM '76

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MAR 11 10 57 AM '76 MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE 810238

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISCONTINUE ANY CONTACT WITH THESE INDIVIDUALS PENDING FURTHER DETAILED ANALYSIS OF EACH OF THESE CASES. DUE TO THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THIS MATTER, THIS TOPIC WILL BE DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL AT THE RDS CONFERENCE AT HQTRS. ON FEB 23, 1 8976. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE FIVE CASES FOLLOWS:Y

"1. ON JAN 31, 19876, THE CRO REQUESTED CHECKS ON SZB-5-0001, MARIO ELOY JIMENEZ-ROJO. ✓201-0286570 INITIAL RESULTS OF CHECKS WITH VARIBOUS FEDERAL AGENCIES REVEALED THAT JIMENEZ, A CUBAN BORN NATURALIZED AMERICAN RESIDING IN CBARACAS, WAS IN 1949 KNOWN TO THE BATISTA GOVT. AS MEMBER OF REVOLUTIONARY INSURRECTIONAL UNION. JIMENEZ LATER TOLD U.S. OFFICIALS THAT HE WAS VETERAN OF APR 1961 BAY OF PIGS OPERATION. IN 1969, JIMENEZ WAS INVOLVED WITH THREE OTHER CUBANS IN PLAN TO ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO. WHEN INFORMED THAT U.S. GOVT. WOULD NOT SANCTION PLAN AND THAT THE FOUR WOULD POSSIBLY BE SUBJECTED TO FEDERAL PROSECUTION, JIMENEZ STATED THAT HE WANTED NOTHING MORE TO DO WITH THE PLAN. CHECKS ON JIMENEZ CONTINUE.Y

"2. ON FEB 13, 1976, IN GFZB-75-8001 THE CRO REQUESTED CHECKS ON ORLANDO GARCIA VASQUEZ, ✓201-0067360 A CUBAN WHO HOLDS SENSITIVE POSITION WITH

DATE: 20 FEB 76
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061055

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 C

PAGE OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — DATE-TIME GROUP — CITE — MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

810738

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

GOVT. OF VENEZUELA AND HAS MADE LIAISON CONTACT WITH CRO. INITIAL RESEARCH INDICATES THAT GARCIA IS A CUBAN EXILE HOLDING A PROMINENT POSITION IN THE VENEZUELAN INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE AND MAY BE THE HEAD OF SPECIAL GROUP THAT USES FORCE TO REMOVE ENEMIES OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVT. IN OCT 1974, GARCIA REPORTEDLY WAS ACTIVELY RECRUITING CUBAN EXILES IN MIAMI. GARCIA IS BELIEVED TO BE AN INFORMANT FOR ANOTHER U.S. AGENCY AND HAS ALSO HAD CONNECTIONS WITH COSTA RICAN GOVT. OFFICIALS AND ALLEGED TRAFFICKERS. CHECKS ON GARCIA CONTINUE."

"3. ON FEB 12, 1976, IN GFZ8-76-8001, CRO REQUESTED BIO DATA FM MIAMI RO ON RICARDO MORALES PRESENTLY WORKING FOR A SENSITIVE VENEZUELAN GOVT. AGENCY. MORALES HAD LIAISON CONTACT WITH CRO. INITIAL CHECKS INDICATE MORALES FORMER CI FOR DEA AS WELL AS OTHER U.S. AGENCY. MORALES PRIMARILY WORKING FOR GOV ON CUBANS RESIDING IN CARACAS. MORALES, BORN IN CUBA, WAS FORMERLY IN G-2 IN CUBA IN THE 1950'S."

✓ 201-0285923

No 201 / No 201

"4. ON FEB 11, 1976, IN GFGI-8017, JUSTO LAZARO ALFONSO TOLD DEA/MIAMI OF ALLEGATIONS THAT AN UNNAMED COLOMBIAN ARMY GENERAL

DATE: 20 FEB 76
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061066

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

)MF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

810238

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

COULD PROVIDE INFO ON DRUG TRAFFICKING. THE GENERAL WAS ALSO ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN COUP PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOVT. OF COLOMBIA. CI IS CUBAN EXILE WORKING IN MIAMI. U.S. EMBASSY, BOGOTA, ON FEB 12, 1976, NOTED SERIOUS DOUBTS OF VALIDITY OF INFO PROVIDED BY MIAMI CI AND INSTRUCTED THAT CI NOT TRAVEL TO COLOMBIA. HQTS. NOW HAS UNCONFIRMED INFO THAT CI HAS BEEN DETAINED IN COLOMBIA.Y

"5. IN GFGI-76-4015, SI1-0051 IS IN CONTACT WITH MARIA A. BETANCOURT IN CARACAS. BETANCOURT IS ALLEGEDLY THE DAUGHTER OF A FORMER VENEZUELAN AMBASSADOR TO CUBA. SHE ALSO IS ALLEGEDLY (BUT NOT CONFIRMED) THE WIFE OF THE CURRENT CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA. ACCORDING TO THE CI, BETANCOURT ASKED IF CI WOULD CARRY WHITE HEROIN FROM CARACAS TO U.S. ON FEB 12, 1976, BETANCOURT HAD CI INTRODUCED TO THREE SUBJECTS AT CUBAN EMBASSY, CARACAS. THREE SUBJECTS ATTEMPTED RECRUIT CI TO WORK FOR THEM IN THE U.S.Y

✓ 201- 0213120

"ALL DEA OFFICES ARE REQUESTED TO CLOSELY COORDINATE ABOVE CASES AND ANY OTHERS IN WHICH THERE IS POLITICAL INFORMATION WITH SRF COUNTERPARTS. ALL OFFICES ARE TO INFORM HQTRS. OF ANY OTHER CURRENT CASES INVOLVING CUBAN EXILES AS INFORMANTS AND/OR SUSPECTS.Y

DATE:
ORIG: 28 FEB 76
UNIT:
EXT:

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061065

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

810738

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

"DANIEL P. CASEY, ACT ASST ADM FOR INTEL"Y

3. HQS TRACES BEING RUN ON EACH CASE. ONE IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO BKHERALD IS THAT DEA NOT ALWAYS REGISTERING SOURCES OR COORDINATING THEIR OPS INVOLVING U.S.-BASED CIS WHO OPERATING IN LA COUNTRIES. THIS WILL BE SUBJECT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AT HQS LEVEL BUT WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS AS YOU DISCUSS CASES LOCALLY. HQS RECORDS INDICATE MARIO ELOY JIMENEZ-ROJO AND RICARDO MORALES (NAVARETTE) ARE REGISTERED IN ISR. CARACAS AND BOGOTA WILL RECOGNIZE CURRENT CASES, NUMBERS 4 AND 5 IN ABOVE DEA MSG; OTHERS BEING SURFACED FOR BFIRST TIME BY DEA. E 2 IMPDET

DATE: 20 FEB 76
ORIG: LHPIPER/MS
UNIT: DDO/OPS/NARCOG
EXT: 3504/7263

C/LA/NW

AC/LA/COG:

C/LA/OPS/N:

C/LA

C/DDO/OPS/NARCOG

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061066

0326 0A82150
R 172150Z FEB 76
FM: DEA MIAMI FLO R/O
TO: DEA HQS WASHDC
BT
SECRET

HQS ATTN: EOIL
HQS ATTN: PLS PASS TO REG 18 CARACAS R/O

MIAMI SEC-5-76-0-017(A)

SUBJ: VENEZUELA FILE NO. GFZB-75-8001

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO SECRET CARACAS 1678 DATED 12 FEBRUARY 1976, ABOVE FILE TITLE, WHICH REQUESTED BIO INFO ON RICARDO MORALES, PRESENTLY RESIDING IN CARACAS AND WORKING FOR A SENSITIVE GOV AGENCY.

2. MORALES WAS AN EXEMPT C.I. FOR MIAMI R/O. ORIGINALLY ESTABLISHED AS SG1-1-0009 BY S/A OCTAVIO GONZALEZ, PRESENTLY SAIC BOGOTA D/O. C.I. WAS EXEMPTED DUE TO FACT HE WAS AN ACTIVE CI FOR MIAMI FBI WORKING ON CUBAN TERRORISTS, AND WAS PRIMARY WITNESS AGAINST ORLANDO BOSCH IN FAMOUS CUBAN POWER TRIAL IN 1968. C.I.'S NUMBER LATER CHANGED TO SG1-2-0057. C.I. PRESENTLY INACTIVE AT THE MIAMI R/O DUE TO PERMANENT MOVE TO CARACAS TO TAKE UP OFFICIAL POSITION WITHIN GOV WORKING FOR A SENSITIVE GOV COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. C.I. PRESENTLY IN CHARGE OF THE AIRPORT IN CARACAS AND PLANS TO ACQUIRE VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP. C.I. PRIMARILY WORKING FOR GOV ON CUBANS RESIDING IN CARACAS.

3. MORALES IS A WHITE CUBAN MALE, DOB 06/14/39, POB IN CUBA, IS 5 FT 8 INCHES TALL, 170 LBS., WITH DARK HAIR. MORALES FORMERLY IN G-2 IN CUBA DURING 1950'S. C.I. HAS I AND NS NUMBER A12-377-777. C.I. ACTIVATED ON 02/25/71 AT MIAMI R/O, PRIMARILY FOR INTELLIGENCE INFO ON ANGOOC2 VIOLATORS IN MIAMI. C.I. DI D INITIATE G1-71-0015, MANUEL PENABAZ ET AL WHICH LED TO PURCHASE/SEIZURE OF SIX KILOS COCAINE AND ARREST OF SEVEN DEFENDANTS DURING 1972. C.I. ALSO PARTICIPATED IN G1-72-0166, ORLANDO LAMADRID ET AL, WHICH RESULTED IN SEIZURE OF SEVEN KILOS COCAINE AND ARREST OF FIVE DEFENDANTS DURING 1972. C.I. TESTIFIED FOR GOVERNMENT AT BOTH TRIALS.

4. REF. PARA. NUMBER 3 OF CARACAS 1678. NO PHOTOGRAPH OF MORALES AVAILABLE IN REGION 5. C.I. HAS SUPPLIED VOLUMINOUS INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO MIAMI R/O ON AT LEAST 25 DIFFERENT INVESTIGATIONS, THEREFORE COLPIES OF R.O.I.'S WILL ONLY BE FORWARDED TO CARACAS R/O IF DEEMED NECESSARY BY CARACAS R/O.

5. FOR INFO CARACAS R/O. MORALES CONTACTED DEA MIAMI 12 FEBRUARY 1976 AND STATED THAT HE HAD HAD MEETING WITH R.D. BACHRACH IN CARACAS.

6. MORALES WAS EXTREMELY RELIABLE C.I. FOR MIAMI R/O AND ANY UTILIZATION BY CARACAS R/O SHOULD BE WITH CAUTION DUE TO C.S.'S PRESENT STATUS WITHIN GOVERNMENT.

JOHN A LUND JR
REGIONAL DIRECTOR
BT

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER LA #6 TOTAL COPIES 38-2 RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT LA 15

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR OPS/INT, SECUR 4, LSN/ID, OPS/ITG5, IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, DIVD2, C14, PS/EG2,

T 683022 EIA927 PAGE 01 IN 826512

TOR:131848Z FEB 76 CARA 29076

S E C R E T 131818Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29076.

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO, MANAGUA INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI, BUENOS RES.

WNLOFTY MHSPIKE

REFS: A. CARACAS 29063 (IN 424723)

B. SANTIAGO 33711 (IN 425993)

1. USSS HEADQUARTERS HAS FORWARDED TO CARACAS ADVANCE TEAM NOTICE THAT USSS MIAMI REP RECEIVED REPORT ON 12 FEB 76 FROM "EXTREMELY RELIABLE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT" THAT ATTEMPT TO BE MADE ON DR. KISSINGER'S LIFE WHILE HE IN VENEZUELA. INFORMANT DESCRIBED AS "VERY CLOSE" TO ORLANDO ✓201-0299292 BOSCH AVILA (USSS LATER IDENTIFIED SOURCE AS RICARDO ✓201-285923 MORALES NAVARRETE). BOSCH ALLEGEDLY ARRIVED CARACAS FROM MANAGUA TWO DAYS AGO.

2. REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSEES CHECK OF TRAVEL CONTROL FOR POSSIBLE CONFIRMATION BOSCH TRAVEL. CONSIDER MORE LIKELY BOSCH WOULD BE TRAVELING WITH DOMINICAN PASSPORT 086768 IN NAME ✓201-0299292 PEDRO ANTONIO PENA.

3. FYI: WKSCARLET-3, WHO PLANNED CONTACT BOSCH IN SANTIAGO NEXT WEEK, SAID HE SENT TELEGRAM TO SANTIAGO ACCOMMODATION

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-0285923
DO NOT DESTROY

S E C R E T

14-00000

1070b
PG. 10/78

E SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______	TOTAL COPIES	RUN BY
ON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______	SECRET	REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
ICE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z		STAFF '76

ON UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ON #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 683022 EIA907 PAGE 02-02 IN 826512

TOR:131848Z FEB 76 CARA 29076

ADDRESS LAST WEEK ASKING CONFIRMATION BOSCH WOULD BE AVILABLE. NO REPLY YET RECEIVED. ADDRESS TO WHICH TELEGRAM SENT IS:

SRTA. ADRIANA DELGADO
CASILLA 477 CORREO CENTRAL
SANTIAGO DE CHILE

4. FILE: 200-6-495; 75-2-22/4. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

14-00000

1 SECRET

PASSED BY
SSN

PASSED TO	ACTION	INFO
5	V	

IF IMMEDIATE
CALLED: TIME:

INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRIBUTION ✓

FEB 12 11 35 AM '75

~~16H~~ 90

[illegible] 0353
R[illegible] 1673 0431525-SSSS--[illegible]
[illegible]
R 121525Z FEB 75
FM [illegible] CARACAS
TO [illegible] HQS WASHDC
[illegible] /MIAMI REGIONAL ~~OFFICE~~
BT
S E C R E T CARACAS 1673

[illegible] FOR EOIL (HQS PASS MIAMI RO)

[illegible] 11652 GDS
TAGS: [illegible] VE
SUBJ: [illegible] VENEZUELA GFZR-75-8091

1. [illegible] MORALES, [illegible], CUBAN, APPROX 44 YOA HAS BEEN INTRODUCED TO CRO [illegible] CAPACITY REPRESENTING A SENSITIVE GOV AGENCY. MORALES ADVISED THAT HE IS ACQUAINTED WITH S/A CHARLES [illegible].

2. CRO [illegible] MORALES TO BE A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL OF THE CRO. [illegible] CRO WITH CURRENT STATUS, BACKGROUND AND [illegible] COMPLETE DETAILED INFO IS [illegible] WHICH MORALES WAS PRESENTED TO CRO. [illegible] INFO AND CURRENT STATUS FORWARDED [illegible] POUCH, INCLUDING PHOTO.

3. [illegible] COPIES OF ROI'S, CASE PARTICIPATION ETC BE [illegible] MATERIAL. [illegible]ACHRACH
BT
1673

SECRET

SEC-IGS-76-0097 (A)

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES-NAVARETTE, RICARDO
201-0285923 200-011-011/17
SEX M DOB 14 JUN 39 UFPA-01730 A01
29 OCT 74
P3

RES USA, FLA, MIAMI. NARC FINANCIER NARC POLICY MBR VENE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP LOS CAZADORES /THE HUNTERS/ WHO WILL DEPART FOR CARACAS VENE BUT 1ST WANTS TO ELIMINATE MANUEL REBOSO VICE MAYOR OF MIAMI MOVING TO VENE BECAUSE OF FRIENDLY ATTITUDE OF GOVM TOWARDS NARC VIOLATORS SPECIFICALLY THOSE OF CUBAN EXTRACTION

DATE 30 JUN 75 09297814

201-285923

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES, RICARDO	
201-0285923	100-009-004
SEX M	DBD-87380
	09 APR 75
	FBI
	P2

CUBAN EXILE ACTIVE IN CUBAN COMMUNITY. REQUESTED TO PROCEED TO DIST AT END OF NOV, 74 AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO NEW YORK CITY TO CONTACT VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS

DATE 30 APR 75　　　　09275878

201-0285923

SECRET　　E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES NAVARETTE, RICARDO	
201-0285923	201-0299292
SEX M	DBD-57769
	02 JUL 73
	FBI

ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT MADE AGAINST MORALES 25 MAY 73 BY MBR OF ALPHA 66

DATE 05 FEB 75   09239409

201-285923

SECRET   E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES, RICARDO
201-0285923
SEX M

201-0733547
LX-03891
26 JAN 74
P7

RES USA, FLA, MIAMI. G-2 LT IN CUBA, CURRENTLY IN MIAMI WHERE IS LABELED INFORMER TO FBI BY LOCAL CUBANS AND IS BEING HUNTED.
PERSONALITY IN IRVING RICHARD POYLE /201-0733547/ DEBRIEFING JUL 73

DATE 13 DEC 74   09217354

201-285923

SECRET   E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY

SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MORALES NAVARETTE, RICARDO
201-285923 201-299292
SEX M DOB ? DBO -57769
02 JUL 73
CIT ? FBI
OCC ? P3
ASSISSINATION ATTEMPT MADE AGAINST MORALES 25
MAY 73 BY MBR OF ALPHA 66

R 7307120287

Indicate The Subject, Project Or
201 File No. In Which This
Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 285923

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

Based on UFAA 4436, 2 Oct 72
200-11-11/7

Based on: UFAA-4533
8 Nov 72
filed: 200-11-11/7

SECRET

RECORD COPY
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE STAFF

ee Alden
I/ISR
-E-03 Ext. 5045

REQUEST FOR REGISTRATION

DATE SUBMITTED BY SBOR: 13 June 73 WH/C/OS
NATIONAL FILE NUMBER: BNDD
DATE RECEIVED IN ISR: 18 JUNE 1973

X NEW ☐ RE-REGISTRATION ☐ RECHECK ☐ UTILIZATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle): MORALES Navarrete, Ricardo Anibal

ALIASES ~~AND~~/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS:

DATE OF BIRTH: 14 June 1939
PLACE OF BIRTH: Havana, Cuba
CITIZENSHIP: Cuban Paroled into U.S

RESIDENCE: Miami, Florida

PRESENT EMPLOYER: GRAMCO
OCCUPATION: GRAMCO Representative

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA:
BNDD consideres subject in category "Exempt Cal I" which is highly sensitive within their organization. His name is known only to the highest echelons.
SEND FIELD CARDS TO: 872, U FA

TRACE RESULTS

IP/INDEX REMARKS:
STATION WOULD APPRECIATE A RUN-DOWN OF HQS INFO ON SUBJECT BECAUSE OF HIS "SPECIAL CATEGORY".

20/6/73

IP/EIB REMARKS:

NAI WH/NARC Dollie Nickard x4497
PER
26/6/73 RAB

JUN 26 PM '73

TO: WH/NARC & WH/C/OS

RESULTS

TO:	ISRM NUMBER	DATE	201 NUMBER
~~DIV/SECTION/DESK/~~ ~~DATA REGISTRY/~~	37,493	2 July 1973	201-0285923

1. No information in addition to that already known to requestor.

2. ISR has no record of current operational interest in Subject who is hereby registered in ISR to BNDD, Miami.

EVB

21 JUN 1973

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Classified by 002216
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

FORM 11-72 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MORALES NAVARETTE, RICARDO
201-285923
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUMMARY OF INFO

201-299292
DBD -55038
27 APR 73
FBI
P 6

R 7306071448

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 285923

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP/ADB
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

PROPER FILE NO

FROM:

IP/

RAMOS ALBERT
IP/AN
EXT. 4239

HP-885
CA50
TUBE GT7

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

CC Copy destroyed

Re cc for CIRASH-6 file
~~- [illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		20 DEC 1972		
2. Shurletts		12/27		
3. CI		31 Jan 73	Feb 13	
4. WH/WARC - [illegible]		6 Feb		
5. WH/3/Venezuela				
6. MD				md
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. IP/FI				

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

DATE MICROFILMED

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201 285983

DOCUMENT DATE
12 Dec 72

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFAA 04640

SECRET

FORM 6-71 610a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

10432

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/AMDESK-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information

References:
a. UFAA-4533, 8 November 1972
b. UFAW-1590, 17 November 1972

1. COS met with a representative of LNERGO on 22 November 1972 in an attempt to clarify the confusing issue over AMDESK-1 as outlined in reference A. The substance of LNERGO's remarks are as follows: LNERGO ascertained from conversations with AMDESK-1 that the latter had been in Venezuela some time during the summer or early fall of 1972 on Gramco business. During his visit to Venezuela, AMDESK contacted his old friend CIRASH-6. In the course of this contact, CIRASH-6 evidenced an interest in re-establishing contact with BKHERALD in Washington. Subsequently, AMDESK-1, through the good offices of his superior in Gramco, arranged this contact which eventually took place. LNERGO has since been advised by AMDESK-1 that he (AMDESK-1) did not accompany CIRASH-6 to Washington.

2. The problem, therefore, appears to be that AMDESK-1, for reasons not clear to us, reported to LNAGON that he and an unidentified high ranking Venezuelan Government official had been in Washington together, and he (AMDESK-1) met with a BKHERALD officer. LNERGO mentioned that they have always found AMDESK-1 honest and objective, but there is always the possibility that he could have misrepresented the information he passed to LNAGON, perhaps to ~~gain some~~ advantage for himself with that service. In any event, LNERGO prefers not to pursue the matter further with AMDESK-1 as they are reluctant to become involved in

/continued/

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAA-4640	12 December 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285923

what could be a misunderstanding between the Station and LNAGON. The Station also prefers not to raise the issue again with LNAGON as the latter claims AMDESK-1 related the details of his contacts with BKHERALD in confidence, and to pressure him now for more facts would only tend to alienate him with LNAGON.

William P. McSweeney

William P. McSWEENEY

201-285923

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - UFAW-1590
FILE NO - 200-11-11/7--201-285923
DATE - 17 NOVEMBER 1972
INDEX - NO
FILM - NO
TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI
INFO - NONE
FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
SUBJECT - RYBAT TYPIC PLMHABYSS/AMDESK-1
ACTION - SEE PARA 4, BELOW
REFS - UFAA-4533

1. HQS UNABLE IDENTIFY ALLEGED BKCROWN INDIVIDUAL WHO INVITED AMDESK-1 /A-1/ TO VISIT WASHINGTON CIRCA 10-11 OCT 72, NOR CAN WE IDENTIFY ''HIGH RANKING VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL'' A-1 CLAIMS HE ACCOMPANIED TO WASHINGTON. STAFFER BEARING SOME RESEMBLANCES TO IDENTITY B, REF, HAS STATED THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN IN CONTACT WITH A-1 AND STAFFER'S OFFICIAL FILE INDICATES HE NEVER SERVED IN CONGO. WITHOUT MORE EXPLICIT INFORMATION IDENTITY B OF REF CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED.

2. REVIEW OF A-1 FILE INDICATES NO BKCROWN CONTACT WITH A-1 FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND NO INFO RE NEW BKCROWN CONTRACT FOR A-1. IF LNAGON CAN PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS ON ALLEGED CONTACTS AND CONTRACT WE WILL BE GLAD TO CHECK IT OUT.

3. RE PARA 4, REF--SINCE LNERGO AWARE LNAGON HAS REGISTERED A-1 AS SOURCE THIS IS MATTER FOR LNERGO AND LNAGON TO RESOLVE.

4. RE PARA 5, REF--IN ORDER AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING SUGGEST STATION DISCUSS SITUATION FRANKLY WITH LNERGO,

POINTING OUT THAT WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT A-1 IS CLAIMING THAT HE IS IN TOUCH WITH BKCROWN, AND THAT STATION WISHES TO MAKE CERTAIN LNERGO UNDERSTANDS NO SUCH CONTACT EXISTS.

5. E2, IMPDET.

OTIS C. VIGEANT

DISTRIBUTION

3-COS, WH/MIAMI/BY TAPE

Distribution:

1 - C/WH/NARC
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - WH/COG/OS
1 - Originator

ORIGINATED BY William Sturbitts
C/WH/COG/OS

COORDINATED BY E. Andersen(in draft)
C/WH/NARC

RELEASED BY Lawrence Sternfield
C/WH/COG

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

[illegible] 1972

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP/ADB 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

FROM:

IP/

[illegible] 7507

[illegible] 23
[illegible]
[illegible] GT3

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/FEG		1 NOV		
2. C/COG		10 NOV 72		
3. ~~WH/FEG~~				
4. DC/COG		10 NOV 72		
5.				
6. Stubbs		13 Nov		
7. Chris				CH
8.				
9. WH/NARC		4 Dec		
10.				
11. FI/ISR BU-5			6 Jul 73	LA
12. IP/AN3 GT-7				RH
13. FI/ISR				
14.				
15. WH/NARC		31 JUL 1973		
16. Attn: Dollie				
17. IP/FI				

ISR

AN WH
~~AB~~
IN
PS
BE
DES ~~[illegible]~~
FI
FI/ISR

Copy to [illegible] 13 Nov 72 [illegible]

[illegible]

~~201-[illegible]~~

file op

[illegible] to [illegible] for their [illegible]

Answered by telepouch 11/14/72

11 to 12: Please recalssify this document to 201-285923 and return to FI/ISR.

15 - Dollie: Please file this in 201-285923.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 10 1972
MICROFILMED

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	

FILE TITLE: 201-285923

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): ~~[illegible]~~

DATE MICROFILMED:

DOCUMENT DATE: 8 Nov 72

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFAA 04533

FORM 610e OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET TELEPOUCH

RYBAT

3P

DISP NO - UFAA-4533
FILE NO - 200-11-11/7, 201-285923
DATE - 8 NOVEMBER 1972
INDEXING - NO
MICROFILM - NO
TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI
SUBJECT - RYBAT TYPIC PLMHABYSS/AMDESK-1

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 10 1972
MICROFILMED

1. ON 2 OCTOBER 1972 LNAGON/MIAMI REGISTERED AMDESK-1 (A-1) (201-285923) (IDENTITY-A) IN THE NARCOTICS SOURCE REGISTRY AS ITS INFORMANT. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION BY STATION REVEALED THAT A-1 HAS BEEN OF INTEREST TO LNERGO SINCE 1968 WHEN STATION TURNED HIM OVER TO THEM. WHEN THIS FACT CALLED TO LNAGON'S ATTENTION, LATTER COMMENTED THAT NOT ONLY DID THEY REALIZE A-1 WAS LNERGO CONTACT BUT THEY ALSO WERE AWARE THAT A-1 WAS RECENTLY IN TOUCH WITH EKCROWN.

2. LNAGON BASED THIS ASSUMPTION ON INFORMATION WHICH THEY CLAIM A-1 PROVIDED THEM, NAMELY: A-1 ADVISED LNAGON HE WAS INVITED BY EKCROWN AT LATTER'S EXPENSE TO VISIT WASHINGTON ABOUT 10-11 OCTOBER 1972 TO SPEND FEW DAYS THERE. ACCORDING LNAGON, A-1 TOLD THEM HE ACCOMPANIED HIGH RANKING VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (UNIDENTIFIED) TO WASHINGTON. (COMMENT: IF TRUE, OFFICIAL POSSIBLY COULD HAVE BEEN ORLANDO GARCIA VASQUEZ.) WHILE IN WASHINGTON, A-1 CLAIMS HE SAW THE "CHIEF OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DESK" OF EKCROWN (IDENTITY-B). A-1 IS POSITIVE OF IDENTITY-B'S LAST NAME BECAUSE HE SAID HIS LAST NAME IS THE SAME AS HIS. A-1 MENTIONED HE IS SCHEDULED RETURN TO WASHINGTON TO SEE IDENTITY-B AGAIN IN JANUARY 1973. LNAGON UNDERSTANDS A-1

[illegible]
[illegible]

201-285923
~~[illegible]~~

BARGAINING WITH EKCROWN BECAUSE HE WANTS FOUR YEAR CONTRACT WITH EKCROWN INSTEAD OF TWO YEARS AND WANTS EKCROWN'S ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING U.S. CITIZENSHIP. ACCORDING A-1, IDENTITY-B WAS "THE C/O OF THE C/O OF A-1'S GROUP IN THE CONGO IN 1964 OR 1965." LNAGON STATED A-1 USED THE INITIALS "C" AND "O" AND IS NOT SURE IF HE MEANT COMMANDING OFFICER OR CASE OFFICER.

3. ALL ATTEMPTS BY STATION TO AMPLIFY ABOVE HAVE PROVED NEGATIVE. LNAGON IS RELUCTANT TO QUESTION A-1 AGAIN ON HIS ALLEGED CONTACTS WITH EKCROWN AS THEY HAVE IMPORTANT NARCOTICS TRIAL COMMENCING WEEK 6 NOVEMBER 1972 IN WHICH A-1 IS COOPERATING WITH LNAGON AND THEY DO NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING AT THIS TIME THAT MIGHT UPSET HIM. ACCORDING LNAGON, A-1 RELATED ABOVE DETAILS CONCERNING HIS CONTACT WITH EKCROWN IN CONFIDENCE AND THEY BELIEVE THAT TO PRESSURE HIM NOW FOR MORE DETAILS MIGHT ALIENATE HIM WITH LNAGON.

4. AS FOR REGISTERING A-1 IN THE NARCOTICS SOURCE REGISTRY, LNAGON STATED THEY DO NOT INTEND TO CONFER WITH LNERGO AND NEGOTIATE WITH THEM HOW A-1 IS TO BE HANDLED. LNAGON PLANS TO CONTINUE TO UTILIZE A-1 AS THEY HAVE IN PAST. LNAGON COMMENTED IT WAS THEIR UNDERSTANDING THAT WHEN TWO OR MORE U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE SAME INDIVIDUAL THAT EKCROWN'S ROLE IN THE NARCOTICS SOURCE REGISTRY WAS MERELY TO ADVISE THE INTERESTED PARTIES OF THE SITUATION AND IT WOULD BE LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THOSE U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HOW THE MATTER SHOULD BE RESOLVED. STATION LIAISON OFFICER ADVISED LNAGON THAT THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF EKCROWN'S ROLE IN THE SOURCE REGISTRY WAS CORRECT BUT THEY WERE ALSO REMINDED THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE SOURCE REGISTRY WAS TO ELIMINATE INTER-AGENCY COMPETITION OVER INFORMANTS AND

THAT IN ORDER FOR THE REGISTRY TO BE USEFUL IT WOULD TAKE THE FULLEST COOPERATION OF ALL PARTICIPATING AGENCIES, OTHERWISE THE REGISTRY WOULD BE WORTHLESS EXERCISE. LNAGON WAS ALSO ADVISED THAT LNERGO IS AWARE THAT LNAGON HAS REGISTERED A-1 IN THE SOURCE REGISTRY AND IS EXPECTING TO HEAR FROM LNAGON SO THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE WORKED OUT HOW A-1 IS TO BE HANDLED. LNAGON COMMENTED THEY WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE SITUATION IN THEIR OWN WAY. (COMMENT: LNAGON OFFICER ADVISED STATION LIAISON OFFICER THAT LNAGON HAS NO INTENTION TO CONTACT LNERGO.)

5. SINCE A-1 IS SPREADING WORD TO LNAGON THAT HE IS IN TOUCH WITH BKCROWN, IT IS NATURALLY ASSUMED THAT HE HAS DONE SAME WITH LNERGO AND, IF THAT IS CASE, STATION MIGHT BE IN BIT OF A BIND WITH LATTER SERVICE AS STATION HAS NOT DISCUSSED SITUATION WITH THEM. IN ADDITION, SINCE STATION IS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE TALKS BETWEEN A-1 AND BKCROWN, STATION LIAISON OFFICER NATURALLY DENIED THE CHARGE WHEN LNAGON BROUGHT IT UP. IN ORDER PROTECT STATION LIAISON EQUITIES AND MAINTAIN OUR CREDIBILITY, WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS HQS COULD PROVIDE WHICH MAY ASSIST STATION IN THIS MATTER.

WILLIAM P. MCSWEENEY

DISTRIBUTION
VIA TELEPOUCH
3 - C/WHD

E2 IMPDET WN-SISM

S E C R E T

SECRET TELEPOUCH

RYBAT

DISP NO - UFAA-4533

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:

CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

1P

T

IDENTITY-A: RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETZE

IDENTTITY-B: (FNU) MORALES, DESCRIBED BY
AMDESK-1 AS MEXICAN/AMERICAN

E2 IMPDET

SECRET

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 10 1972
MICROFILMED

201-255923

Scan to UFAA
4533

DISPATCH

[redacted]

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

X ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
[redacted]/[illegible]/Transmittal of Memos to LNYAPA and LNAGON with Traces on Their Narcotics Sources

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Refs: A. UFAA-4410
B. UFAA-4430

References forwarded the names of LNYAPA and LNAGON sources to Headquarters with a request for registration and traces. Although references were carded (as drug sources), there is some additional information from the ELIGOS in the attached memos which was not included in references. Therefore, you may want to re-index this information to the memos.

Paula A. HOOTNICK

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 285923

Attachments:
1. CAS/C-023, herewith
2. CAS/D-029, herewith

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/atts 1 & 2 herewith

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]

Signed: [illegible]

R.O. #538 - Unit [illegible]

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

[redacted]

RECORD COPY FILED IN 201-294213

E2 IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAA-4479	25 October 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted] DESENSITIZED	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-244213 ~~200-[illegible]~~ ~~200-[illegible]~~

SECRET

UFAA 4436, 2 Oct 72, 200-11-11/7

Document gives list of names of 7 BNDD sources.

Ricardo MORALES Navarrete
akd "Don Juan"
DPOB 14 June 39, Havana, Cuba
Paroled into U.S.
OCC: Gramco rep.
Area of activity: not stated

"Subject is considered by BNDD in category "exempt" C.I." whichis highly sensitive within their org. His name is known only to the highest echelons. MORALES 201 file indicates he has been known to have advertised FBI and CIA affiliation. We would appreciate a run-down of Hqs info on subj because of his "special" category."

SECRET

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY		

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - If applicable)*

MORALES NAVARRETE, RICARDO
201-285923
SEX M DOB JUN 39
CUBA, HAVANA
CIT USA
OCC GRAMCO REP
AKA DON JUAN
AREA OF ACT-NOT STATED
INFO MUST NOT BE USED IN NAME TRACE W/ OUT
CONSULTING FILE

200-011-011/07
UFAA-04436
02 OCT 72
P2

HDCHZP872 CORR CARD R 7301301320

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)*

201- 285923

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MORALES NAVARRETE, RICARDO
201-285923
SEX M DOB ?

200-011-011/07
HVCA-18943
21 JUL 72

CIT ?
OCC ?
< VENEZUELA
INFO MUST NOT BE USED IN NAME TRACE
W/OUT CONSULTING FILE

UFA872HZP R 7210050862

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 285923

FORM 3-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY 35

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI

ACTION NO 446

21 JUN 72 542128

642128

S E C R E T 211700Z JUN 72 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 19581

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: HVCA-18872

1. SUBJECT OF REF, RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, PRESENTLY IN CARACAS, AND CONTACTED CIFENCE-4. MORALES REITERATED STORY HIS IMPORTANCE IN DRUG OPERATIONS, INCLUDING FACT HIS SALARY RECENTLY DOUBLED.

2. MORALES BOASTING GETTING TO POINT WHERE IT SUSPICIOUS. APPRECIATE WH/MIAMI CONFIRMATION RE EMPLOYMENT MORALES BY EITHER LNERGO OR LNAGON. HE AGAIN TOLD CIFENCE-4 TRUE NAME OF CIGOAL-5 AS BKTRUST AGENT WITH SIFA CARACAS.

3. FILE: 201-284816 AND 201-300985. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AT

FI

CS COPY

SECRET

201-235923
21 June 1972

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1 Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2 Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

SCOTT JUDITH
IP/AN
EXT. 4238

CY-36Q
CA-50
TUBE GTZ.

PROPER FILE NO. /

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		28 JUN 1972		
2. DC/WH/C		22 JUN 1972		
3. Merrill				
4.				
5.				
6. WH/3/V			BS	
7.			BW	
8.				
9. ~~WH/2/Panama~~				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. KATHY			✓	
15.				
16.				
17. (IP) RID/FI				

COMMENTS

Cancelled

—Acc para 4 re McNertney.

McNERTNEY WAS CIGOAL-1

7 TO 14: PLEASE MAKE COPIES FOR:
1) 201-284816 (CIGOAL-5)
2) 201-300985 (CIFENCE-4)
THANK YOU

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST ABSTRACT X INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-285923; 201-

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 9 June 1972

DOCUMENT NUMBER HVCA 18872

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14329

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami		MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas		MICROFILM
SUBJECT: Ricardo MORALES Navarrete		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On approximately 5 March 1972, a Station asset, CIFENCE-4, while acting in his cover capacity had occasion to detain and question one Ricardo MORALES Navarrete, a Cuban resident of Miami.

2. Morales N. told CIFENCE-4 that he, Morales, is employed by LNERGO from whom he receives a salary of US$700 per month. Morales said that he was en route to Colombia on a drug case at the time. During the conversation Morales admitted to CIFENCE-4 having been responsible for a killing in Florida.

3. CIFENCE-4 reported to the Station the above, as well as stating that Morales has an extremely poor reputation in the Cuban community, where he is prone to tell nearly anyone willing to listen of his affiliation with LNERGO, with the implication that his employer sanctions his activities.

4. Morales also told CIFENCE-4 that a Cuban (true name of CIGOAL-5) who works with SIFA in Caracas is an agent of BKTRUST.

5. Attached is a copy of the reentry permit of Morales, as well as a clipping from the Miami press relating to the killing which Morales allegedly confessed to having committed.

6. The above is for the information of Station WH/Miami and further action as deemed appropriate. No coordination with LNERCO in Caracas has been effected due to security considerations involving CIFENCE-4.

EDGAR B. MARTEGANI

Attachments: h/w
1. Newspaper clipping
2. Morales reentry permit (copy) CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - COS, WH/Miami w/ att. - To out Pouch
2 ATT (3) - C/WHD w/ att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
~~[illegible]~~ ~~201-300985~~	HVCA- 18872	9 June 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~DEFER~~ 201-285923

14-00000

Cuarto 1309, Hospital Jackson Memorial, 7.10 P.M. Miércoles Diciembre 4 de 1968.

"Yo, JULIO ATON CONSTANZO PALAU, del 752 S.W. Cuarta calle, Miami, Florida, casado con María Constanzo, la cual está aquí presente, declaro lo siguiente: Nací en Palma Soriano, Oriente, en Cuba, el 22 de Mayo de 1936. Yo tengo 32 años de edad. Me casé el 10 de Marzo de 1963 en Miami, Florida.

Yo no soy un ciudadano de Estados Unidos. Yo soy un residente, y tengo una hija, Elizabeth, la cual cumplirá cinco años de edad el 24 de diciembre, la cual nació aquí en este Hospital, Jackson Memorial.

Mi propósito de hacer estas declaraciones se debe al hecho que la policía ha permitido que pasen varios días, y la gente que intentó quitarme la vida está afuera en la calle, libres.

El 22 de noviembre, alrededor de las 8.30 de la noche, a unas tres cuadras de mi casa, yo estaba caminando y me bajé de la acera en la 7 avenida y la Segunda calle, en la sección del S.W. , cuando oí a alguien llamarme "Atón", y miré para ver quien era, y entonces yo sentí que ellos me disparaban, y yo ví las armas con silenciadores.

Yo ví a Ricardo Morales Navarrete, y él estaba en un Chevrolet impala 1965, de dos puertas, amarillo con dos luces de cola. Estaba situado en el medio de la calle.

Este hombre, Ricardo Morales Navarrete estaba en el asiento de atrás, en la lado izquierdo. El tenía un fusil M-3, con un silenciador, el cual dispara balas calibre 45.

Otro hombre estaba manejando, y yo lo conozco de vista, pero no sé su nombre verdadero. Lo llaman con el apodo de "El Gallego". Este hombre, El Gallego, tenía una pistola que parecía una Beretta, con un silenciador adaptado.

Ambos me dispararon. Yo recibí 15 heridas de bala y 21 perforaciones.

Un tercer hombre estaba en el carro, llamado Francisco Rodríguez al que apodan "El Mejicano", el cual no disparó.

Yo identifico a Ricardo Morales Navarrete como al mismo hombre que testificó para el Gobierno en el juicio de Orlando Bosch.

Dos días antes yo lo ví a él con esta otra persona, El Gallego, observándome en frente de mi casa. Ellos estaban en otro carro, un Polara.

Yo conozco a este Morales Navarrete de La Habana, él era Jefe Asistente de la Sección del G-2 en el Aeropuerto de Rancho Boyeros, Habana, Cuba.

Yo no he hablado con él, pero otro hombre, Eddy Fernández Pla, hace casi dos meses, vino a mi casa a eso de la una de la madrugada para darme un mensaje de Ricardo Morales Navarrete y del Mejicano Francisco Rodríguez Tamayo los cuales no querían ser mis enemigos, que el enemigo era Batista, y que debíamos ser amigos porque las cosas iban a cambiar.

Yo le dije que no quería tener ninguna amistad con gente que trabajaba para Fidel Castro.

La noche que Eddy Fernández Pla vino a mi casa, él estaba con otro hombre, Rogelio Fernández, el cual es un vendedor de la Firestone.

Yo tengo una bala alojada cerca de mi corazón y tiene que ser extraída con un aparato especial, según me dijo el médico.

En estos tres últimos días no me he sentido bien y como tengo todos estos tiros en mi cuerpo sé que estoy en una mala condición y me siento como que voy a morir, y si muero, no quiero morir sin que este gran país castigue a estos asesinos, los cuales son nefastos para toda la sociedad.

Hago estas declaraciones completamente consciente de sus contenidos, sin coacción y de mi propia y libre voluntad.

He tenido atención médica para aliviar el dolor, y no me siento bajo la influencia de ninguna droga, pero me siento muy normal y hago estas declaraciones por las razones antes expuestas".

(firmado) Julio Atón Constanzo Palau

Testigos: César Camacho, Felipe Rive

Estado de la Florida
Condado de Dade
Jurado y suscrito ante mí este día [illegible] de diciembre de 1968 a las 7.30 P.M.
Gino Negretti, Notario Público.

A/watt 1 to HKCA 13872

CS COPY

201-285923

14-00000

17

2.

0371516

NAME Ricardo Morales-Navarrete		A 12
ADDRESS IN U.S. 163 S. W. 80th Avenue Miami, Florida [illegible]		
DATE OF BIRTH June 14, 1939	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY Cuba
EYES Black	HAIR Black	HEIGHT 5 FEET 9 INCHES
VISIBLE SCARS AND MARKS NONE		

VALIDITY OF PERMIT

PERMIT EXPIRES January 25, 1973	VALIDITY EXTENDED TO	VALIDITY EXTENDED TO
DATE AND LOCATION OF ISSUING OFFICE January 25, 1972 Mia	DATE AND LOCATION OF OFFICE	DATE AND LOCATION OF OFFICE
SIGNATURE ISSUING OFFICER	SIGNATURE REVALIDATING OFFICER	SIGNATURE REVALIDATING OFFICER

0371516

3



RESTRICTIONS

VALID FOR ☐ ONE ENTRY ONLY ☒ MULTIPLE ENTRIES

This document is not valid for return to the United States after a temporary absence which involves travel to, in or through any of the following countries unless the restriction is specifically waived with regard to any such country or countries by endorsement hereon.

Communist portions of:

Albania	China
Cuba	Korea
Outer Mongolia	Viet-Nam

The above restriction is waived as to the following

NONE

Apellido [illegible] [illegible]	Segundo Apellido [illegible]	No. de expedición Nº 08206
Nombre Ricardo	Segundo nombre	No. de Cedula
Sexo [illegible] Edad 32 Profesión Vendedor	Nacionalidad Cubana	No. de Pasaporte 0371516
Tipo de Visa Turista Duración 1-30	Autorización M.R.I. [illegible]-00102-5	Lugar de expedición Miami, Florida U.S.A
Firma del expedidor	Dirección en Venezuela Hotel Tamanaco, Caracas.-	
Nombre del expedidor	Aéreo ☐ Marítimo ☐ Terrestre ☐ Transportista Destino	Aéreo ☐ Marítimo ☐ Terrestre ☐ Transportista Procedente
Sello del expedidor REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA	Salida	[illegible] DIEX 02 [illegible] 72 [illegible]-MAIQUETIA Entrada

Also sent to HMCA 1E 872 PS [illegible]

201-285223

CUBA

3

MILITARY TO INVESTIGATE HAVANA CHARGES OF CIA PLOT

Madrid EFE in Spanish 2218 GMT 22 Apr 76 PA

[Excerpt] Caracas, 22 Apr--The Venezuelan Military Intelligence Directorate [DIM] has opened an investigation into the activities of two U.S. Embassy officials in Caracas who were accused in Havana by a former CIA agent of plotting to promote a break in relations between Cuba and Venezuela.

The daily EL MUNDO today publishes a frontpage article that the government of President Carlos Andres Perez 3 weeks ago ordered the DIM to investigate the illegal activities reportedly being carried out in Caracas by Americans Douglas (Doug) Phillips and Fred Dunson. The two men have been indentified by the U.S. Embassy in Caracas as officials of the antidrug agency, but a former CIA agent, Manuel de Armas, said yesterday in Havana that they are CIA agents.

Luis Poso Soto and Ricardo Morales Navarrete (alias "the monkey"), who were also accused by De Armas, are also being investigated.

INFORMATION OFFICIAL SUPPORTS PANAMA ON CANAL ISSUE

Madrid EFE in Spanish 1536 GMT 22 Apr 76 PA

[Text] Caracas, 22 Apr--Venezuelan Minister of State for Information Guido Grooscors today criticized the U.S. press for distorting news regarding the Panama Canal problem. During a course on international communications in which Venezuelan and U.S newsmen are participating, Grooscors declared his country's support for Panama in its hopes of recovering its canal. The course opened Wednesday.

He said: "This is an exceptional opportunity for us Latin Americans here to speak frankly, clearly and precisely to the distinguished U.S. commentators and columnists about the need for a friendly settlement between the United States and Panama in connection with the canal problem."

He added: "This problem transcends the bilateral relations betwen the United States and Panama and has become a problem of continental dimensions on which Latin America has adopted a definite position it wishes to make known to the U.S. public."

INTERIOR OFFICIAL DENIES NIEHOUS-MERCADO LINK

Buenos Aires LATIN in Spanish 1557 GMT 22 Apr 76 PA

[Excerpt] Caracas, 22 Apr--Deputy Minister of the Interior Marco Julio Bruni has denied that there is any connection between the kidnaping of U.S. industrialist William Niehous, which took place here, and the assassination of Colombian labor leader Jose Mercado in Bogota.

Asked by newsmen about alleged links between the two events, Bruni said that so far he has discovered no connection.

FBIS, DR 80 L(LA) 23 Apr 76

Morales Navarrete, Ricardo

17

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 3

ACTION SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, AF7, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

~~10 JAN 67~~ 74855

SECRET 101542Z CITE JMWAVE 4987 (INGHURST ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO KINSHASA

CHAPPIE/WITHRUSH/PPRUMEN

1. DURING DEBRIEFING, JORGE SILVA REVEALED THAT COL. (FNU) DENAP, CO 6TH COMMANDOS TALKED WITH RENE GARCIA (EX WITHRUSH PILOT NOW FLYING WITH AIR CONGO) ABOUT RECRUITING PBRUMEN COMMANDOS SG 7? "/)9":?:ZNB THOSE WHO WOFACT TRAINED. GRACIA REPORTEDLY WROTE RICHARD MORALES, (201-285923), ONCE CONSIDERED FOR WITHRUSH ADMIN/SURVIVAL, TO COMPILE A LIST OF RECRUITABLE PERSONNEL.

2. ABOVE PROBABLY KNOWN BY KINSHASA AND IS FYI.

SECRET * PATN GBLD. BEING SENT.

BT

SECRET

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 5 January 1966 js

file

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, SOD/AB/OPS/3

ATTENTION : R. W. Gambino

201 285923

C

The file on AMDESK/1 (Morales) is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Please refer to CI/OA memorandum dated 18 November 1965.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 18 November 1965 jab

TO: SOD/AF/OFS/3 -- R.V. Gambino

C. NO.: 201 - 285923

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: AMDESK/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☒	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

The POA reinstatement period expired 18 November 1965. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

201-285923

FORM 8-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

WITHRUSH PERSONNEL CABLE LOCATOR

NAME MORALES Navarrete, Ricardo A. WITHRUSH NUMBER 104

201 NUMBER 285923 C NUMBER

ACTION TAKEN	CITE NUMBER	IN NUMBER	DATE
NOMINATED FOR WITHRUSH			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.	WAVE 2901	88650	11 June 1965
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
LOCAL I & N TRACES N.D.	WAVE 3062	92924	17 Jun 1965
LOCAL POLICE AND CREDIT TRACES N.D.			
LOCAL FBI TRACES N.D.	WAVE 3062 WAVE 2901	92924 88650	17 Jun 1965 11 June 1965
CONTRACT SIGNED			
NOTIFICATION OF POA GRANTED			
DEPART U.S.			
ARRIVED LEOPOLDVILLE			
CONTRACT TERMINATION			
RETURNED TO MIAMI			
BANKING INSTRUCTIONS			
LCFLUTTER			

201-285923

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
SOD/AB/OPS/3 - R. W. Gambino

NUMBER
201 - 285923

SUBJECT
MORALES Navarrete, Ricardo Anibal

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
10 June 1965 cra

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Your attention is referred to the request for cancellation memorandum submitted by SOD on 5 May 1965. Subject's amended OA was subsequently cancelled as requested.

A POA is being granted for the use of the Subject in the Congo under Project WITHRUSH for a period of 90 days. Upon receipt of an up-dated PRQ Part II an OA will be processed. The PRQ Part II of record pertains to prior WH/C/RR/OA intended use in CUBA and does not cover SOD utilization in the Congo under Project's WIPEGASUS or WITHRUSH.

POA is reinstated until 18 November 1965.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

201-285923

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	18 August 1965

FORM 1-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(9)

201-285923

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

IG : F.DALY:kas
IT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
T : 4475
TE : 10 June 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

11 Jun 66 15 39z

JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

ROM: DIRECTOR

NF: SOD6 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WH/C8, C/OA, AF6,

WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR 18313

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

ALTHOUGH REALIZE MORALES ALREADY POSSESSES OA FOR FORMER KUBARK USE, HQS PREFERS DISCONTINUE RECRUITMENT ATTEMPTS FOR WITHRUSH PROGRAM. PREFER MAKE GENERAL PRACTICE AVOID RECRUITING PILOTS WHO HAVE HAD ANY FORMER INTELLIGENCE CONNECTION OR WHOSE HISTORY REFLECTS DEROG INFORMATION EVEN IF NOT SUBSTANTIATED AFTER LCFLUTTER EXAMINATION.

END OF MESSAGE

SOD/AB/OPS/3 F Daly
WH/C/MO Joe Mourfian/phone
AF/5 T. Baskett (phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

SECRET

SOD 5-7411

201-285923

[illegible] JUN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : MORALES Navarrete, Ricardo

1. The Subject, who is the Subject of 201-285923, possesses Operational Approval for use by SOD in the Congo for PM activities under Project WIPEGASUS.

2. It is requested that the existing Operational Approval be amended to include use by SOD in the Congo under Project WITHRUSH.

Robert W. Gambino
Security Officer
Special Operations Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Addressee
1 - C/SOD/AB
1 - SOD/SECUR
1 - SOD/AB/OPS/3
1 - 201-285923
1 - SOD/RI
1 - Chron

SOD/AB/OPS/3:L.MURPHY:kas(9 JUNE 1965)

SECRET

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Col. Dietrick DATE: 24 December 1964

FROM : OMS/REG/PRO/COV

SUBJECT: Ricardo Morales (t)

Subject has been evaluated by the OMS and found to be qualified for proposed assignment.

Joe W. Cline
Physical Requirements Officer

SECRET

15 December 1964

Mr. Ricardo MORALES Naravarrete.

Dear Mr. MORALES :

You hereby release and forever discharge the Sponsoring Organization and all its agents, officers, employees and representatives from any and all claims, demands and liabilities in any form or by any party what or whosoever arising from services performed by you for said Sponsoring Organization under your Memorandum of Agreement signed 24 September 1964 12/15/64 64.

Ricardo Morales

15 December 1964

Sr. Ricardo MORALES Naravarrete

Estimado Señor MORALES :

Con este documento firmado por Usted la Organización Patrocinadora con todos sus agentes, oficiales, empleados y representantes queden relevados para siempre de todo y cualquier demandas suyas en cualquier forma o por cualquier partido o persona que surgerían de los servicios suyos hecho por dicha Organización Patrocinadora bajo su Nota de Acuerdo firmado 24 September 1964 12/15/64 64.

Ricardo Morales

SECRET

Dec 64

FITNESS REPORT: Ricardo Morales
SUBMITTED BY: William Robertson

Ricardo was selected for the group because of Case Officer recommendation and personal observation and his training record plus the ability to speak French and English as well as Spanish.

He is particularly bright, and during the preparatory and holding phase, as well as during the phase in which he has been left behind to accompany Alberto Perez home, he performed as required of a good commando.

During the action he showed a surprising leadership capability, taking over effectively a team which needed it at the moment and continuing until he got hit.

During a portion of the action he served as Major Hoare's commo link with aviators whose English was not good.

Ricardo is definitely recommended for special ops in a leadership capacity, but it is mentioned here that his use to KUBARK may be in a broader field and that use as a commando may be wasting his talents.

Ricardo is not now employed at JMWAVE. He is not felt in any way to have after-action security concern.

SECRET

SECRET

2 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

SUBJECTS: AMDESK/1 201-285923
AMDESK/2 201-744305

Please disregard the previous cancellations forwarded to your office on Subjects. Both individuals are currently being utilized by Special Operations Division.

Bruce B. Cheever
DC/WH/SA

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Addressee
1 - [illegible]
1 - WH/SA/IOS
1 - 201-285923
1 - 201-744305

201-285923
201-744305

SECRETO

16 24 Sept 64

MEMORANDUM DE ACUERDO

PARA: Ricardo Anibal MORALES Navarrette

I. Proposito del Acuerdo

Este memorandum establece un mutuo entendimiento entre usted, quien se ofrecio voluntariamente para una tarea peligrosa y arriesgada en el Congo, y la Organizacion Patrocinadora. Este acuerdo especifica las obligaciones y responsabilidades mutuas entre usted, a quien se hara referencia mas adelante como el Voluntario, y la Organizacion Patrocinadora, referida mas adelante como el Patrocinador.

II. Terminos del Acuerdo

A. Seguridad. El Voluntario entiende que sus servicios al Patrocinador pueden cubrir actividad de una naturaleza peligrosa y arriesgada, la cual requerira instruccion clasificada y orientacion para preparar al Voluntario para llevar a cabo su tarea. El Voluntario acuerda no hablar o escribir nunca de esta actividad a nadie y proteger la seguridad y las actividades del Patrocinador en todo momento. El Voluntario acuerda conducirse de una manera respetuosa, discreta y profesional siempre.

B. Ubicacion de la Tarea. El Voluntario entiende que el permanecera en los Estados Unidos por durante todo el tiempo que el Patrocinador considere necesario para prepararlo para su tarea en el exterior. El Voluntario entiende ademas que el sera transportado al y del Congo por los medios proporcionados por el Patrocinador y que el Patrocinador determinara la duracion de su estadia en el Congo dependiendo del tiempo necesario para el cumplimiento de la mision. En adicion, el Voluntario entiende que este acuerdo no le confiere derechos como un empleado del Patrocinador y que este acuerdo invalida cualquier

SECRETO

otro contrato con el Patrocinador durante el periodo de su asignacion cubierto por este acuerdo.

C. Mision. La mision del personal Voluntario en el Congo sera proveer seguridad y equipo que incluira aviones al personal designado; participar en misiones de investigacion y rescate y llevar a cabo otras misiones que el Patrocinador le asigne.

D. Paga y Soporte.

1. El Patrocinador le pagara al Voluntario lo siguiente:

(a) Mientras este en los Estados Unidos $270.00

(b) Mientras este en el Congo (desde la fecha de salida a fecha de regreso) $370.00

2. En adicion a los pagos mencionados arriba, aquellos Voluntarios seleccionados para y participar con exito en otras misiones que el Patrocinador senale como especiales, tanto antes como despues de la mision, se le otorgara un bono a discrecion del Patrocinador por las cantidades desde $100 a $1,000 por mision, dependiendo del riesgo envuelto y el exito obtenido. En caso de muerte del Voluntario como resultado de su participacion en esas misiones especiales, el bono se pagara a su beneficiario que se haya designado.

3. En caso de fallecer el Voluntario en el cumplimiento de su obligacion en el Congo, los beneficios especificados adelante se pagaran si el individuo tiene por lo menos un dependiente. Si no tiene dependientes, el beneficio sera el 50% del especificado.

(a) Dos anos de salario basico, aplicables a ese tiempo, si la muerte es de causas naturales; cuatro anos de salario basico, aplicables a ese tiempo, si la muerte fue causada por accidente.

(b) En caso de que el Voluntario se lesionara, hiriera o se enfermara en el desempeno de su tarea, el Patrocinador proveera beneficios medicos, quirurgicos y facilidades de hospital y transportacion. Se pagara compensacion por una cantidad a la sola discrecion del Patrocinador, con tal de que no exceda los limites maximos senalados arriba por muerte.

(c) El Voluntario puede, si asi lo desea, comprar un seguro opcional por el tiempo en que este acuerdo este en efecto, a un valor reducido como sigue: Seguro de vida (durante su estadia en el Congo) en aumento de $1,000 hasta un maximo de $15,000 con la muerte por accidente siendo el doble del seguro por vida.

4. En caso de que el Voluntario sea aprehendido o declarado desaparecido, el Patrocinador continuara su compensacion al valor especificado en el subparrafo 1, arriba, por un periodo de tiempo que no exceda de 12 meses desde la fecha de su aprehension. El Patrocinador pagara este dinero a un beneficiario designado o sera asegurado para el (Voluntario), segun haya dispuesto el Voluntario.

5. El Patrocinador proveera comida, alojamiento, ropa apropriada para su trabajo, equipo y necesidades basicas personales, durante su estadia en los Estados Unidos, en camino y mientras esta en el Congo.

III. Fin del Acuerdo

A. Durante el periodo en que este acuerdo este en vigor, si el Voluntario no cumple con los terminos del acuerdo, este acuerdo sera terminado por el Patrocinador, al tiempo y a la manera y en el sitio determinados por el Patrocinador.

B. Si el Voluntario escoge terminar este acuerdo, muy bien puede, pero la finalizacion final sera despues que el Voluntario haya sido regresado a los Estados Unidos y se haya convenido una accion mutua y aceptable.

C. La terminacion general de este acuerdo entre todo el personal Voluntario y el Patrocinador se efectuara a su regreso a los Estados Unidos, luego de haberse completado la mision del Patrocinador en el Congo.

D. El arreglo final de la terminacion entre el Patrocinador y el Voluntario consistira solamente de las disposiciones especificadas arriba, i.e., pago final, bonos, si se aplican, asuntos medicos y transportacion al punto de origen.

Ricardo Anibal Morales Navarrete
Ricardo Anibal MORALES Navarrete
Voluntario

9/24/64
Fecha

Wm. A. Robertson
Representante del Patrocinador

24 Sept. 1964
Fecha

Santiago Arguelles
Testigo

24 Septiembre 1964
Fecha

SECRETO

Fecha. 9/24/64

DECLARACION DE BENEFICIARIO

Yo Ricardo Anibal Morales Navarrete nombro a la persona abajo inscrita mi beneficiario legal para recibir del Patrocinador todo pago y beneficios a que tengo derecho en virtud de los terminos del Memorandum de Acuerdo firmado por mi en esta fecha.

BENEFICIARIO

Nombre: MAGDA MORALES

Direccion: 535 S.W. 7-st apt#2. MIAMI, FLA.

Relacion: ESPOSA

Ricardo Morales
Firma

SECRETO

SECRETO

PETICION DE SEGURO

Yo Ricardo A. Morales Navarrete solicito seguro por la cantidad de $15,000 dolares segun se especifica en el Memorandum de Acuerdo firmado por mi en 9/24/64.

Nombre: RICARDO ANIBAL MORALES NAVARRETE

Fecha de Nacimiento: 6/14/39

Beneficiario para el Seguro: MAGDA MORALES

Nombre:

Direccion: 535 S.W. 7 st apt #2 MIAMI, FLA.

Relacion: WIFE

Ricardo Morales

Solicitante

SECRETO

No. 16

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

TO: Ricardo Anibal MORALES Navarrette

I. Purpose of Agreement

This memorandum establishes a mutual understanding between you who have volunteered for a potentially dangerous and hazardous assignment in the Congo and the Sponsoring Organization. This agreement specifies mutual obligations and responsibilities between you, hereinafter referred to as the Volunteer, and the Sponsoring Organization, hereinafter referred to as the Sponsor.

II. Terms of Agreement

A. Security. The Volunteer understands that his services to the Sponsor may involve activity of a dangerous and hazardous nature, which will require classified instruction and orientation to prepare the Volunteer to carry out his assignment. The Voluntoer agrees not to speak to or write about this activity to anyone forever and to protect the security of the Sponsor and its activities at all times. The Volunteer agrees to conduct himself in a respectful, discreet and professional manner at all times.

B. Location of Assignment. The Volunteer understands that he will remain in the United States for such time as the Sponsor regards as necessary to prepare him for his foreign assignment. The Volunteer further understands that he will be transported to and from the Congo by means provided by the Sponsor and that the duration of his stay in the Congo will be as long as the Sponsor deems necessary to accomplish the below stated mission. Furthermore, the Volunteer understands that this agreement confers upon him no rights as an employee of the Sponsor and that this agreement supersedes any other contract with the Sponsor during the period of the assignment covered by this agreement.

C. Mission. The mission of Volunteer personnel in the Congo will be to provide security for designated personnel and equipment to include aircraft; to participate in search and rescue missions and to perform such other missions as the Sponsor may direct.

D. Pay and Support.

1. The Sponsor will pay the Volunteer the following:

(a) While in the United States	$270.00
(b) While in the Congo (date of departure to date of return)	$370.00

2. In addition to payments indicated above, those Volunteers selected for and participating successfully in such other missions as the Sponsor may designate as special, either before or after the mission, will be awarded a bonus at the discretion of the Sponsor in amounts from $100 to $1,000 per mission dependent on the hazards encountered and success attained. In the event the Volunteer expires as a result of participating in such special missions, the bonus will be paid to his designated beneficiary.

3. In the event the Volunteer expires in the

performance of duty in the Congo, the benefits specified below will be paid if the individual has at least one dependent. If he has no dependents, the benefit will be 50% of that specified.

(a) Two years base salary, applicable at the time, if death is from natural causes; four years base salary, applicable at the time, if death is from accidental causes.

(b) In the event the Volunteer is injured, wounded or becomes ill in the performance of duty, the Sponsor will provide medical, surgical, hospital and transportation benefits. Compensation will be paid in an amount at the sole discretion of the Sponsor, provided it does not exceed the maximum limits as set forth above for death.

(c) The Volunteer may, if he elects, purchase optional insurance coverage for the time this agreement is in effect at a reduced rate as follows: Straight life insurance in increments of $1,000 to a maximum of $15,000 with accidental death beirg twice straight life coverage.

4. In the event the Volunteer is captured or declared by the Sponsor as missing in action, the Sponsor will continue his compensation at the rate specified in subparagraph 1, above for a period not to exceed twelve months from date

of capture. The Sponsor will pay this money either to a designated beneficiary or to an escrow account, as directed in advance by the Volunteer.

5. The Sponsor will provide food, housing, operational clothing, equipment and basic personal necessities during the U.S. based phase, enroute, and while in the Congo.

III. Termination of Agreement

A. During the period this agreement is in effect, if the Volunteer fails to abide by the terms of the agreement, this agreement will be terminated by the Sponsor at a time and in a manner and place at the discretion of the Sponsor.

B. If the Volunteer chooses to terminate this agreement, he may so elect, but final termination will be after the Volunteer has been returned to the States and mutually acceptable disposal action is arranged for the Volunteer.

C. General termination of this agreement between all Volunteer personnel and the Sponsor will be effected on return to the U.S. upon completion of the Sponsor's mission in the Congo.

D. Final termination settlement between the Sponsor and the Volunteer will consist only of the arrangements specified above, i.e., final pay, bonus', if applicable, medical clearance and transportation to point of origin.

Ricardo Anibal Morales Navarrete
Ricardo Anibal MORALES Navarrette
VOLUNTEER

DATE 9/24/64

Wm. A. Robertson
SPONSOR'S REPRESENTATIVE

DATE 24 Sept. 1964

Santiago Arguelles
WITNESS

DATE 24 Septiembre 1964.

SECRET

Date 9/24/64

Declaration of Beneficiary

I Ricardo Anibal /MORALES Navarrette designate the person listed below as my legal beneficiary to receive all pay and benefits due me by the Sponsor under terms of [redacted] agreement signed by me this date.

Beneficiary

Name MAGDA MORALES

Address 535 S.W. 7 st apt #2 Miami, Fla.

Relationship WIFE

Ricardo Morales

Signature

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INSURANCE

I RICARDO A. MORALES NAVARRETE request insurance in the amount of $15,000 dollars as specified in the Memorandum of Agreement signed by me on 9/24/64.

Name: RICARDO ANIBAL MORALES NAVARRETE

Date of Birth: 6/14/39

Beneficiary for Insurance: MAGDA MORALES

Name:

Address: 535 S.W. 7 st apt #2 MIAMI, FLA.

Relationship: WIFE

Ricardo Morales
Applicant

SECRET

PERSONAL EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Name of employee in full: Ricardo Anibal MORALES Navarrette

Person to be notified in case of emergency:

Name Magda Morales
Relationship wife
Address 555 South West 7th St., Apt. 2
Miami, Florida
Telephone 371 5141

Designation of Beneficiary:

Name Magda Morales
Relationship wife
Address
Telephone

All insurance policies:

Type of Policy	Company	Policy No.	Coverage	Beneficiary	Contains War Clause? Yes No
Commercial Insurance					
WORLD WIDE with [illegible]			15,000	wife	
Death and Disability Benefits				wife	

Have you completed Last Will & Testament? yes
Date of Will: Location of original:
Copy on file with:
wife Magda has will

Name and address of person holding Power of Attorney:
Subject states wife Magda has access to his bank account

Date
On file SOD
Signature of Employee

FIN DEL CONVENIO

Yo, Ricardo Morales entiendo que mediante la ejecucion de mis deberes he recibido informacion y material de inteligencia y datos concernientes a la seguridad de los Estados Unidos. Esta informacion e inteligencia, junto con los metodos de adquisicion, manejo y diseminacion son clasificados de acuerdo a las normas de seguridad establecidas por el gobierno de los Estados Unidos. Se que la revelacion de esta informacion sin la debida autorizacion esta prohibida por las Leyes de Espionaje (18 USC Secs. 793 y 794), y por el Acta de Seguridad Nacional de 1947, que especificamente exigen la proteccion de las fuentes de inteligencia y metodos contra la revelacion sin autorizacion.

Estoy de acuerdo que ni ahora ni nunca tendre ningun derecho, interes titulo o reclamacion alguna sobre ninguna de la informacion o inteligencia o sobre los metodos empleados para adquirirla o manejarla que han sido de mi conocimiento, pero reconosco siempre el pleno derecho de propiedad de los Estados Unidos sobre estos asuntos.

Juro solemnemente o afirmo que nunca divulgare, publicare o revelare por medio de la palabra, conducta o por cualquier otros metodos esta informacion, inteligencia o conocimiento, excepto cuando sea necesario hacerlo en el cumplimiento oficial de mis deberes y de acuerdo con las leyes de los Estados Unidos, a menos que especificamente sea autorizado por escrito en todos y cada uno de los casos por un representante del gobierno de los Estados Unidos debidamente autorizado.

Entiendo que las disposiciones de este juramonto permaneceran en efecto sobre mi, a pesar de que mi relacion esta siendo terminada.

Estoy de acuerdo de que en caso de ser llamado a testificar en corte, procedimientos administrativos u otra clase de tribunal en relacion a informacion o inteligencia dentro del alcance de este juramento, notificare a un representante de los Estados Unidos debidamente autorizado inmediatamente; tambien dejare saber a la corte o al tribunal de mi juramento al gobierno de los Estados Unidos y presentare una peticion de que la necesidad para testificar sea establecida antes de que se me pida hacerlo.

Entiendo que este juramento sera retenido por el gobierno de los Estados Unidos para su uso futuro en cualquier asunto que este dentro del alcance de este juramento. Acepto esta obligacion libremente, sin ninguna reserva mental o proposito de evacion y en ausencia de presion o coercion.

Ricardo Morales
(Firma)

(Organizacion)

(Titulo)

12/15/64
(Fecha)

Testigo :

TERMINATION UNDERSTANDING

I, ______________________, understand that by virtue of my duties I have been the recipient of information and intelligence material and data which concerns the security of the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting, handling and dissemination are classified according to security standards set by the United States Government. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the Espionage Laws, (18 USC SECS. 793 and 794), and the National Security Act of 1947 which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

I agree that I do not now, nor will I ever, possess any right, interest, title or claim whatsoever in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling it which has come to my attention, but shall always recognize the full and vested property right of the United States in and to such matters.

I do solemnly swear or affirm that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, conduct or by any other means such information, intelligence or knowledge except when necessary to do so in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each and every case by a duly authorized representative of the United States Government.

I understand that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me, even though my relationship is being terminated.

I agree that in the event I am ever called upon to testify in a court of law, administrative proceedings or other tribunal regarding information or intelligence within the scope of this oath, I will notify a duly authorized representative of the United States immediately; I will also advise the court or tribunal of my oath to the United States Government and request that my need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

I understand that this oath will be retained by the United States Government for its future use in any matter within the scope of this oath. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion and in absence of duress.

______________________ (Signature)

______________________ (Organization)

______________________ (Title)

______________________ (Date)

Witnessed by: ______________________

SECRET

201 No. 285923

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/SA/MOB/PM Cal Hicks
cc to SOD/SO J.B. Scanlon

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of AMDESK/1 ______________, for the purpose specified in your request dated 18 September 1964.

1. The current OA for Subject is amended to include use by SOD in the Congo for PM activities under Project WIPEGASUS.

2. Subject of 201-744305 has a POA with an OA pending receipt of a favorable investigation. His POA has been extended and amended accordingly.

3. This will confirm oral amendment of Subject's clearance on behalf of WH/SA/MOB/PM.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 21 September 1964 dlr

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

SOD-4-1091
18 Sep '64

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : Operational Approvals

1. The following individuals listed by C numbers have current Operational Approvals for use by WH/SA:

C-Numbers	201's
90577	297428
98789	321641
103510	327975
84493	282574
SAME	285923
88485	291724
109705	327379
SAME	735496
SAME	737175
SAME	737177
SAME	744303
SAME	744305
84833	281974
102983	297088

2. It is requested that the existing Operational Approvals be amended to include use by the Special Operations Division in the Congo for PM activities under Project WIPEGASUS.

ROBERT W. SAMBENO
Security Officer
Special Operations Division

CONCUR:

Cal Hicks
WH/SA/MOB/PM

SO/SOD/JBS:bk (18 Sep 64)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addee
1 - WH/SA/MOB/PM
1 - SO/SOD
1 - RI/SOD

SECRET

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES NAVARRETE, RICARDO
201-0285923 075-005-000
SEX M CARA-30526
04 AUG 76

COORDINATOR, VEN ID 81.237.158.
MBR OFFICE OF INFORMATION, PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS DISIP CREDENTIALS APPLIED FOR 27 FEB 76 BY SUBJ 201-0057360.

DATE 13 AUG 76 09426487

201-285923

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Warner
Chief, International Intelligence Division
Office of Intelligence
Drug Enforcement Administration

ATTENTION: Mr. Robert Goe

SUBJECT : Cuban Exiles Involved with DEA

REFERENCES : A. SEC-IGI-76-0048(1), 06 February 1976

B. SEC-IGI-76-0062(1), 20 Februa. 1976

C. SEC-IGI-76-0065(1), 25 February 1976

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR RELEASE BY DEA ON 1 APR 94 as sanitized

1. This Agency was requested by DEA to check the backgrounds of five Cuban exiles who have come to the attention of DEA either as potential informants or as liaison contacts. According to preliminary checks conducted by DEA, there were indications that these individuals had past records of "political and revolutionary intrigue." DEA, concerned that it may be the target of a provocation operation by another government, requested this Agency's assessment of the situation. This memorandum contains the results of a check of our Headquarters records on these individuals, followed by a summary of our findings and conclusions. The order of this response is keyed to Reference B.

2. Mario Eloy JIMENEZ-Rojo. DPOB: 03 March 1927, Lajas, Las Villas, Cuba. JIMENEZ was of interest to this Agency in 1960 but according to our records he

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED ABROAD OR
OUTSIDE THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE RECEIVING AGENCY
WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE ORIGINATOR

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 5 (b) 2
DECLASSIFICATION DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE

CLASSIFIED BY 061666
201-285423

[illegible]

was at no time used operationally. Our files contain no additional information on JIMENEZ since 1960 except for a 1969 FBI report dealing with his involvement in a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. (DEA already has a copy of this report.) Although information obtained from a Report of Investigation (ROI) by Alfredo Duncan (DEA/Caracas) dated 01 December 1975 indicates that JIMENEZ is a U.S. citizen, resides in Caracas and has contacts with various GOV officials, we have no information in our Headquarters files to substantiate this information. In November 1975 the Caracas Regional Office (CRO) requested traces from our field representative on JIMENEZ, who was reportedly in contact with the CRO. The following traces were forwarded to our representative in Caracas on 03 December 1975 for passage to DEA: "Following data on Mario Eloy JIMENEZ Rojo taken from his own undated handwritten bio summary which apparently submitted to the anti-Castro Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD) in Miami about 1960, and from an FRD Personnel Form. JIMENEZ was born 03 March 1927 in Lajas, Las Villas, Cuba. He attended the University of Havana and majored in business administration. From 1948 until 1952 (sic) he was 'elected mayor for four years' (of Havana?). JIMENEZ was secretary to the President of Congress in Havana from 1941 (sic) until 1958. He came to the U.S. (Miami) as an immigrant in April 1959. JIMENEZ stated his purpose in coming to the U.S. was to assist in the eradication of the Cuban system. JIMENEZ is married to Dyalma Balasquide. At the time his bio summary was written, he stated he was a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army. (As it highly unlikely that JIMENEZ was secretary to the President of the Cuban Congress at age fourteen and only a little less unlikely that he was a mayor at age twenty-one, as the dates given by JIMENEZ show; suggest DEA ask the Department of Army for further information.)" We also note that a statement on his processing papers for the FRD indicated that JIMENEZ was a former member of the Revolutionary Insurrectional Union (UIR) in Cuba, a Cuban-style mafia which was prominent during the 1940's and 1950's and was under the patronage of anti-Batista political figures. On 12 December 1975 we received a request from the CRO that JIMENEZ be registered in the ISR as a DEA source. (He was formally registered on 29 December 1975.)

[redacted] [redacted]

3. Orlando GARCIA Vasquez. DPOB: 16 June 1927, Havana, Cuba. GARCIA (at one time a naturalized U.S. citizen/18 May 1945 in South Carolina) became a Venezuelan citizen ca 1962. GARCIA has a long history as a political thug since pre-Batista days in Cuba. He was a member of the Union Insurrectional Revolucionaria (UIR) in Cuba along with Fidel Castro and other persons who were involved in political assasinations. He claims to have served with the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division from 1945-47 and to have returned to Cuba thereafter to attend the University of Havana on the GI Bill. About mid-52 Subject left Cuba for Miami because of a scandal in Cuba over a crime allegedly committed by GARCIA. In 1953 he became a bodyguard for Costa Rican President FIGUERES, who introduced him to Romulo BETANCOURT, who was then in exile in Costa Rica. It is believed that GARCIA's fast rise in the Venezuelan government is based on his earlier service to Accion Democratica (AD) exiles in Costa Rica, where he reportedly eliminated several gunmen sent to kill BETANCOURT. When BETANCOURT became president of Venezuela (1959-64), GARCIA was appointed a division chief in the Directorate General of Police (DIGEPOL), now the Directorate for the Services of Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP). GARCIA left Venezuela for Miami in 1964 for health reasons (ulcers) and during this stay in Miami worked at the Venezuelan Consulate. He returned to Venezuela in 1966 and reportedly held positions within the Venezuelan Ministry of Interior (exact positions not known). In August 1969 GARCIA was assigned as First Secretary to the Venezuelan Embassy in Georgetown, Guyana. He returned to Venezuela sometime during 1970 or 1971 and was assigned as Special Assessor (Advisor), Ministry of Foreign Relations, where he was mainly concerned with Venezuelan national border incidents and violations. According to information dated July 1974, GARCIA was appointed to head a special foreign intelligence service within the Ministry of Interior.

In November 1973 our representative in Caracas was queried by DEA Caracas concerning a report which was prepared on 06 September 1973 in Miami by S.A./Michael D. Brom, which accused GARCIA of being involved in narcotics trafficking and of being a CIA informant. DEA Caracas was advised that GARCIA was a former Agency asset and that we have maintained contact with him over the years. Although it is known that GARCIA has associated with known traffickers, no hard facts concerning his direct involvement in narcotics have been uncovered. GARCIA has been described over the years as a political thug, a murderer, a con-man, a pathological liar, and a "bright, aggressive rogue who is ruthless when necessary." GARCIA has apparently always sided with the men in power and seems to have gained the confidence of many leaders in the countries around the Caribbean. A DEA ROI, dated 10 October 1974, written by S.A. Brom at Miami reported that GARCIA was in the United States and was in contact with Ricardo MORALES (see paragraph 4). GARCIA made several trips to the U.S. on behalf of the GOV during 1974-75. Your Agency is referred to the FBI for information concerning GARCIA's activities in the U.S.

4. Ricardo MORALES Navarette. DPOB: 14 June 1939, Havana, Cuba. MORALES took refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Havana in October 1960 and ~~entered the United States as a Cuban refugee at Miami, Florida, on 29 November 1960. He was a self-admitted former G-2 agent. Although MORALES was of interest to this Agency in 1964, he was not used operationally. Information in 1968 indicated that MORALES was a member of "Cuban Power," an anti-Castro terrorist organization, whose policy was to liquidate foreign support for the Castro regime. MORALES was arrested on 14 February 1968 in Miami and questioned regarding a recent bombing incident. On 02 October 1972 DEA/Miami registered MORALES in the ISR as a DEA informant. According to a DEA cable from Miami R/O to Caracas R/O, dated 17 February 1976, MORALES was reported to be an active DEA informant since 25 February 1971 and to have recently left the Miami area to go to Caracas to take up an official position with a sensitive GOV agency. (This Agency has no updated information on MORALES to substantiate this information.) The Miami R/O rated MORALES as being an extremely reliable source and suggested Caracas R/O use caution in utilizing MORALES due to his present status within the GOV.~~ A DEA ROI (dated 10 October 1974) written by S.A. Michael D. Brom at Miami reported that MORALES was

[redacted]

in contact with one Orlando GARCIA, who was in the Miami area recruiting Cubans for use in a Venezuelan Special Forces Unit. Your Agency is referred to the FBI for information concerning the activities of these individuals in the United States.

5. Justo LARAZO Alfonso. A check of our records turned up one Justo Alfonso (no DPOB), a Cuban-exile, who was active in anti-Castro organizations in the late 1960's. Your Agency is referred to the FBI for information on this individual.

6. Manuel De ARMAS. DPOB: 06 November 1947, Havana, Cuba; naturalized U.S. citizen living in Miami. On 17 October 1975 one Manuel De ARMAS contacted our overt Domestic Contact Division (DCD) office in Miami offering his services as a double agent. Following are excerpts from two DCD Reports dated 20 October 1975 and 19 January 1976 based on debriefings of De ARMAS: While in Cuba De ARMAS claimed to have been the neighbor of Raul BETANCOURT, the brother of the former Venezuelan President Romulo BETANCOURT, and his two daughters. Antonieta and Mariela, who was De ARMAS' girl friend. De ARMAS' mother decided in 1962 that Subject should leave Cuba, which he did. In 1975, De ARMAS found out that his two young cousins had been placed in an orphanage in Cuba. He made contact with Mariela BETANCOURT, telling her that he was fed up with the U.S. system of government in order to gain her attention on the matter of taking his cousins out of Cuba. Mariela asked him if he would be willing to work for the Cuban Government and he replied he would if it would help the youngsters. Mariela then told De ARMAS to go to Caracas and meet with her sister Antonieta. De ARMAS went to Caracas on 02 October 1975 and met with Antonieta, but no proposals were made on the possibility of his working for the Cuban Government. On 17 October 1975 De ARMAS again called Mariela and was told that he should return to Venezuela to hold more talks with Antonieta and "other people." After talking with Mariela on 17 October 1975, De ARMAS called our DCD/Miami Office because as a U.S. citizen he claimed that he did not want to get involved with the Cuban Government unless he had this Agency's approval. De ARMAS graciously offered his services as a double agent. He called DCD/Miami on 20 October 1975

[redacted]

and again on 07 January 1976 to resubmit his offer and insisted on a response. He was told that his offer would be forwarded through the appropriate channels. (Note: Our records show that there was no CIA interest in De ARMAS, past or present.) On 13 January 1976 our representative in Miami was told that the FBI Miami office had been in contact with Subject and wished to verify De ARMAS' claim that he was in contact with our DCD Miami office. The FBI also asked whether this Agency had any objection for further FBI contact with Subject on the "same basis they had previously." (Note: The type or length of FBI contact with De ARMAS is not known. Your office is referred to the FBI for additional information.)

On 04 February 1976 DEA Caracas received a DEA message (# 02406) which requested permission for Miami CI Manuel Leonardo De ARMAS to travel to Caracas for a one kilo heroin buy from a Colombian whom De ARMAS had previously met through a Maria A. BETANCOURT. Permission was given and De ARMAS arrived in Caracas on 11 February 1976. No mention of drugs was made on this trip but according to De ARMAS he was taken to the Cuban Embassy in Caracas on 12 February 1976, where he was allgedly approached to work for the Cuban Government in an intelligence capacity. De ARMAS reported these events to DEA Caracas on 12 February 1976; he was advised to return to the U.S. Our representative in Caracas was briefed on the De ARMAS case by SAIC Duncan on 13 February 1976. Caracas Station was very interested in having De ARMAS return to Caracas for use as a possible source on Cuban intelligence activities, and steps were taken to request that DEA turn De ARMAS over to this Agency. A background check was conducted on De ARMAS at that time and on 20 February 1976 the FBI representative in Miami reported the following information: "The FBI has been avoiding contact with De ARMAS for the past couple of months since he was assessed as a 'mentally unbalanced fabricator'. De ARMAS gave a press interview in Miami in early February 1976 in which he claimed an affiliation with virtually every U.S. intelligence agency. He said that he had worked for CIA and had attended a CIA training school. The press interview has thus far not been published, presumably because it is too far fetched. De ARMAS received a bank loan of $1,500 in Miami and has defaulted on some $800 of the amount. The final note on De ARMAS is that he received a general discharge from the U.S. Army with a notation that he had psychological and behavioral problems." The gist of the aforementioned FBI information has been passed to DEA Caracas. All agencies concerned agree that contact with De ARMAS should cease. De ARMAS again contacted S.A. Duncan in Caracas on 26 February 1976 and requested a meeting; he said that the request was not drug related, but concerned the "Cuban matter." S.A. Duncan advised De ARMAS that he was on his own and that DEA would not get involved. As DEA Headquarters is aware, De ARMAS reportedly left for Mexico o/a 26 February 1976. We have no subsequent reporting on his movements.

7. Three of the five aforementioned individuals are known to have had past connections: GARCIA Vazquez and JIMENEZ-Rojo were both former members of the UIR in Cuba at one time and MORALES Navarette, a former Cuban G-2 agent, was in contact with GARCIA in the United States during 1974-75. Although there have been allegations aimed at MORALES and GARCIA over the years accusing them of being Cuban agents and/or of narcotics involvement, these claims have not been substantiated and for the most part are based on circumstantial evidence or guilt by association, which happens frequently among Cubans. As MORALES has been a DEA informant since 1971 and, in fact, was rated as an "extermely reliable" source by the Miami R/O; a desire on his part to continue this relationship in Caracas, we feel, cannot be construed as part of a provocation operation. A check of our records reflected no past intelligence backgrounds for LAZARO Alfonso and De ARMAS. While there is a paucity of background information in our files on Justo LAZARO, in our opinion he is attempting to extort money from the U.S. Government based on a poorly conceived idea of his own. The De ARMAS case appears to have been resolved satisfactorily for all concerned. All Agencies concerned agree he is unstable and contact should be either severed, or if unavoidable, it should be made with extreme caution.

8. Following a review of all information on the foregoing Subjects available at DEA Headquarters and at this Agency's Headquarters, we are of the opinion that there is no data or other evidence to suggest an outside organization is attempting to manipulate these individuals in an operation aimed at discrediting the U.S. Government and DEA. We believe there may be collusion among the three Subjects located in Caracas, probably to assist one another in nefarious schemes to one degree or another; however, the information on hand does not suggest their motivation would go beyond personal, financial or influence objectives. While one cannot absolutely rule out the possibility, for example, that the Cuban Service has run one or more of the aforementioned Subjects at DEA for the purpose of harrassing the U.S. Government, there is no conclusive information in our files to connect them with Cuban intelligence or a Venezuelan entity whose interests are inimical to the U.S.

John P. Kennedy
Special Assistant for Coordination of
Foreign Narcotics Information

DONC-00038/76

DDO/OPS/NARCOG/NLDavis/ms

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - NARCOG CHRONO
1 - IP/AN*

*~~File~~ ~~in~~ 201-0067860
X 201-0285923
X 201-0286570
Index: Justo LAZARO Alfonso, aka Justo Alfonso
Index: Manuel Leonardo De ARMAS

Coordination:

(in draft) 17 March 1976
LA/COG

(in draft) 17 March 1976
LA/NW/V

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: POSADA, LUIS CLEMENTE
201- 300985
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
	8/16/78		

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

This

volume

is

closed

File in Vol IV.

SECRET

THIS SHEET TO BE KEPT ON T[illegible] AGENT FILE.
IT SHOULD ALWAYS BE [illegible].

AGENT CHECK LIST

AGENT PSEUDO OR CRYPT **PHOTO**

WKSCARLET-5

POA 17 January 1972
PRQ I 25 March 1972
PRQ II [illegible] March 1972
OA 17 July 1972
MOC 1 February 1969
(Current)

BRIEF PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF AGENT:

5'11", 175 pounds, black hair, green eyes. Erect posture. has scar on palm of right hand.

ADDRESS: **HOME** Quinta Janet, Ave. Los Caribes, El Llanito, Caracas (Rent)

OFFICE WKSCARLET hqs.

TELEPHONE: HOME 38 52 37 **OFFICE**

REGULAR CONTACT PROCEDURE:

Agent contacts the C/O by phone either at the office or at the C/O's home and the meeting is set up by the hour agreed upon at the Safe House.

RE-CONTACT PLAN:

The agent will recontact the C/O through the above procedure. The C/O can call the agent between 1900 and 2000 daily by Pageboy. Tel # 62.03.41/5 No. C 857. The agent will then call the C/O at home.

EMERGENCY CONTACT PLAN: (To include meeting site, if possible a double-talk description which agent will immediately recognize. Please include all aliases used and circumstances under which each used.)

The agent will call the Embassy and request "Eduardo". the new C/O will state that he is a friend of Eduardo and that they can meet at the usual place at _____ hours. This means the SH. The agent will call in response to the Pageboy buzzer. The agent should not be contacted at home unless the C/O is fluent in Spanish. If so the story again is that the C/O is a friend of "EDuardo" and that a meeting at the usual place is requested.

SECRET

THIS GREEN SHEET INVALID AFTER 30 JUNE 1973
(and is to [illegible]ficer)

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION

NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES 19-1 BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED C/WH BY D AT 1400 Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

ACTION # 570

INFO RF. FILE. VR. C/PLAN, C/CI, C/CCS2

D/SECUR4

T 213559 PAGE 01-01 IN 905535

[illegible] TOR:041348Z MAY 73 CARA 21864

S E C R E T 041343Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21864

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF DIRECTOR 403768

1. STEMERMAN HAS RESERVATIONS HOTEL CONTINENTAL ALTAMIRA, LA CASTELLANA,

2. FILE: 75-2-16/3, 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

Sie & Copy for me, please. Thank you, R.W.

STEMERMAN'S SECRETARY NOTIFIED ON 4 MAY 1973.

SECRET

4 May 73

201-300985

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 161813Z DIRECTOR 397839

CONF: C/WH5 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, C/CI, C/FI, C/WHRC2, DDO, ADDO.

DISSEM BY: PB/7-8

PER SP # 103

TO: CARACAS.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

[illegible] PLEASE, THANK YOU, Bill

REF: CARACAS 21722 (IN 891871*)

1. NO HQS TRACES DOMINGO OBRERO OR "GUAJIRO" TORRES.

2. RONALD CONDON PROBABLY IDENTICAL RONALDO CONDON GIL, BROTHER FRANCISCO CONDON GIL, AKA FRANK CONDON. WAS MEMBER BRIGADE 2506. ARRIVED MIAMI WITH RANSOMED BRIGADE MEMBERS DECEMBER 1962. NO CURRENT INFO ON FILE.

3. SYLA CUERVO POSSIBLY IDENTICAL SYLA ROQUE CUERVO CASTILLO, CUBAN EXILE NOW LIVING MIAMI. SUBJECT BORN 29 OCTOBER 1920 SAN LUIS, PINAR DEL RIO, CUBA. ATTORNEY IN MINISTRY OF LABOR AND MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION 1945-57. WAS ANTI-BATISTA ACTIVIST, LATER JOINED VARIOUS EXILE GROUPS TO FIGHT CASTRO. CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN MEMBER BRIGADE 2506, ALTHOUGH NAME NOT ON LIST THOSE CAPTURED AT PLAYA GIRON. CUERVO WAS ACCUSED OF BEING LEADER OF GROUP MAKING "ANTI-U.S., PRO-NAZI, PRO-SOCIALIST, PRO-COMMUNIST" STATEMENTS WHILE SECOND LIEUTENANT IN U.S. ARMY

CONTINUED....

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CHRONO

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

18 April 73

201-300985

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF

DIRECTOR

397839

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:__________

PER____#__________

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO WH/3/W

0 FILE IN

~~XX~~ CUBAN OFFICERS' TRAINING PROGRAM AT FORT BENNING DURING 1963-64. WAS LATER DESCRIBED AS ANTI-COMMUNIST BUT NOT PRO-U.S., AND AS "OPPORTUNIST". NO MENTION IN HIS FILE OF GAS STATION OR NARCOTICS INVOLVEMENT.

4. INDEX OBRERO, TORRES, CONDON. FILE 75-2-16/3, 201-0300943, 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE.

* Requested traces on subjects whom suspected narcotics trafficker WKSCARLET-3 may have contacted in Miami 9-10 March 1973.

DATE: 18 April 1973 cja
ORIG: Robert J. Austin
UNIT: WH/3/W
EXT: 7271

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Philip F. ...
for C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 064566

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

FOR MICRO. SER.
MAR 5
MICROFILMED

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
HPB, WFA, [illegible]
Chiefs of Station, Buenos Aires, WH/Miami, Bogota

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas JCM for WCC

SUBJECT
0 PLMIASYSS/Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: CARACAS-21349, 8 March 1973

HP

1. Forwarded herewith is a copy of BNDD Report of Investigation written by Jose A. MARIN, S/A assigned to the Miami Regional Office, on 5 February 1973. The report concerns Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles, aka "Bambi:" and Humberto TRUEVA. CIT: CUBA Δ USA FLORIDA, MIAMI
REPORTED NARCOTICS TRAFFIC CONTACT IN USA OF SUBJECT OF 201-C300985, POSADA

2. Also forwarded is a copy of BNDD Caracas telegram 1686 of 26 February 1973 concerning POSADA; BNDD Hqs telegram 1554 of 12 March 1973 concerning the implication of POSADA as a narcotics trafficker and his recent travel from Caracas; and BNDDHqs telegram 1602 of [illegible] March 1973 which summarizes the surveillance of POSADA and Camilo Vicente CUSATI Cusati while the latter two were in Miami.

Gerald R. Gizzi
Gerald R. GIZZI

Attachment:
1. BNDD Report of Investigation, hw
2. Three (3) Telegrams, hw

E 2 IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE

Distribution:
3 - C,WHD w atts
2 - COS, Buenos Aires, w atts
2 - COS, WH/Miami w atts
2 - COS, Bogota w atts

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D75-120-26	HVCA - 19286	15 March 1973
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

ATT 1

DEA
14 MARCH 73
limited official use only
LUIS POSADA AKA BAMBI
BNDD 1622

ATT 2

DEA
12 MARCH 73
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LUIS POSADA AKA BAMBI ZB-73-0001
BNDD1554

ATT3

STATE
26 FEB 73
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ZB-73-0001-LUIS POSADA-CROSS FILE GFT HUMBERTO TRUEVA
CARACAS 1686

ATT #4

DEA
5 FEB 73
UNCLASSIFIED
GENERAL FILE - HUMBERTO TRUEVA- DEBRIEFING OF SG1-9-0006
NO FILE #

ATTS TO HVCA-19286

...LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION　CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　TOTAL COPIES　ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

...SON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH + EUR

BY: AT: 1550 Z

DISSEM BY 2/10 PER SOP .103

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/EUR6　INFO　FILE VR DDO, ADDO, C/IPLAN, C/CI, C/NARC2, C/FI, C/WH6

ACTION NO. 374

S E C R E T 151507Z MAR 73 STAFF　2P

CITE PARIS 37271　860426

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, ROME, CARACAS INFO MADRID, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 18 1973
MICROFILMED

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF CARACAS 21422 (859671)

1. DISCUSSED REF REQUEST WITH DEPUTY DIRECTOR PANELLA MORNING OF 15 MARCH. PANELLA HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MADRID AND ROME SAIC'S AND PROMISED TO KEEP US INFORMED.

F/NO 201

2. WKSCARLET-3 AND CUSATI LEFT MADRID ON 13 MARCH AND ARE PRESENTLY IN ROME WHERE BNDD ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THEM. BNDD LIAISON IN ROME HAS ALREADY FOUND TRACE OF THEIR ARRIVAL AT AIRPORT BUT WHEN CHECKING HOTEL THEY INDICATED THEY WOULD STAY IN POLICE LEARNED THEY DID NOT CHECK IN. AS THERE SEVERAL OTHER VENEZUELAN DIPLOMATS IN SAME HOTEL, IITALIAN POLICE AND BNDD CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL FIND THEIR TARGETS.

AN	
AB	✓
IN	
PS	
BK	3
DES NFD	
PI	
E/RPRC	

3. PANELLA VERY UNHAPPY WITH HIS MIAMI OFFICE WHICH, INSTEAD OF TELEPHONING REGION 17 OF WKSCARLET-3 DEPARTURE FOR MADRID, INSTEAD SENT CABLE THREE DAYS LATER, SO THAT SPANISH POLICE FOUND TRACE OF THEM ONLY AFTER THEY HAD

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985
15 MAR 73

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 PARIS 37271 SECRET

DEPARTED FOR ROME. REGION 17 EXTREMELY INTERESTED AND WILL FOLLOW UP CLOSELY. AT STATION SUGGESTION, PANELLA WILL QUERY FRENCH CNO TO CHECK UP IF THERE HAVE BEEN PREVIOUS TRIPS TO FRANCE BY WKSCARLET-3 AND CUSATI. WILL ADVISE.

√NO 201

4. FILE: 201-300985. CROSS INDEX CUSATI. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIO CLASSIFIED MESSAGE • TOTAL COPIES 1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 2/15 PER SOP.103

ACTION UNIT C/WH6

INFO FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/IPAN, C/CI, C/NARCZ, C/FI, C/EUR6

ACTION NO. 453

S E C R E T 151706Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE MADRID 18645

860594

AV 3 KO
A3
~~IS~~
PS
BI
DSS MFD
FI
WH/3/V

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, PARIS, ROME, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: A. PARIS 37222 (IN 859406)

B. CARACAS 21422 (IN 859671)

1. PLS SEE BNDD MADRID 1339* FOR DETAILS WKSCARLET/3'S MOVEMENTS MADRID. NO UNUSUAL ACTIONS NOTED.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985

15 MAR 1973

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

C/WH

BY D AT 2045 Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER 500

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION # 4671

INFO FILE, VR [illegible] C/CI C/FI [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

PRECEDENCE

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 151935Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21429

TO: PRIORITY ROME, DIRECTOR INFO MADRID, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKSCHRIST

REF CARACAS 21422 (IN 859671)

860750

AN KO

WH/3/V

1. BNDD APPARENTLY DROPPED THE BALL IN SURVEILLANCE OF LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES AND CAMILO VICENTE CUSATI CUSATI IN MADRID AS THEIR COVERAGE BASED ON SECOND HAND INFO AND RECORDS. FOLLOWING SUMMARY BNDD MADRID TELEGRAM 1339 OF 15 MAR 73: SUBJECTS ARRIVED MADRID 11 MAR VIA PAN AM 254. SUBSEQUENT CHECKS ON 14 MAR REVEALED THAT CUSATI REGISTERED AT HOTEL MINDANO, MADRID. POSADA NOT REGISTERED. BNDD AGENTS THEN WENT HOTEL BUT LEARNED THAT CUSATI AND OTHER UNIDENTIFIED MALE (PRESUMABLY POSADA) HAD JUST LEFT HOTEL. AIRPORT CHECK REVEALED THAT SUBJECTS DEPARTED 1145 HRS 14 MAR VIA TWA 900 FOR ROME. POSADA HELD TICKED NO. 164401364874 AND CUSATI TICKET NO. 164401364875.

2. SUBSEQUENT CHECKS AT HOTEL REVEALED THAT CUSATI HAD REGISTERED BY HIMSELF IN DOUBLE ROOM, WHICH OCCUPIED BY

201-300985

15 MAR 1973

CS COPY

15 MAR 1973

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21429 SECRET

OTHER UNIDENTIFIED MALE (PRESUMABLY POSADA). ONE PHONE CALL OF SHORT DURATION MADE, NUMBER UNKNOWN.

3. MADRID BNDD ADVISED ROME BNDD AT 1800 HRS 14 MAR DEPARTURE SUBJECTS FROM MADRID. DELAY DUE DIFFICULTY MAKING PHONE CONNECTIONS.

4. COMMENT: BNDD SHOULD HAVE LITTLE TROUBLE SPOTTING SUBJECTS AS THEY WILL BE IN ROME EXTENDED PERIOD ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS. WOULD APPRECIATE ROME STATION KEEPING US ADVISED DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

5. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

APR 2 9 43 AM '73
RECEIVED
IP/EDI

APR 5 1 05 PM '73
FORWARDED

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16-3 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

4 SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: 1700 Z

DISSEM BY 15/16 PER SOP #103

ACTION UNIT C/WH 6

FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/PLAN, DCI, C/EI, C/NARC 2

ACTION NO. 397

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 151515Z MAR 73 STAFF

860502

CITE CARACAS 21427

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR ROUTINE WH/MIAMI, INFO BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS A. DIRECTOR 382099 (IN 839442)

B. CARACAS 21221 (ONLY SENT DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI) (IN 848386)

C. CARACAS 21298 (ONLY SENT DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI)

D. CARACAS 21408 (IN 858116)

WH/3/V

1. IN REPLY PARA 3 REF A REQUEST, CAN ADD LITTLE THAT NOT ALREADY REPORTED. RECAPITULATE AS FOLLOWS:

A. PER PARA 4 REF B, WKSCARLET-3 ORIGINALLY FINGERED AS NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER BY BNDD SOURCE JOSE GOMEZ.

B. PER PARA 3D REF B, BNDD SPECIAL AGENT PERSONALLY SAW WKSCARLET-3 MEETING WITH HUMBERTO TRUEVA AND JOSE GOMEZ ON 20 FEB 73 IN CARACAS WITH OTHER UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL. IDENTIFICATION BY BNDD SPECIAL AGENT MADE BASIS NEWSPAPER PHOTO OF WKSCARLET-3 SUPPLIED BY STATION.

C. PER PARA 1 REF C, CAR IN WHICH WKSCARLET-3 DROVE TRUEVA, GOMEZ, AND UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL IS A CAR REGISTERED TO WKSCARLET-3.

CS COPY

201-300985

13 MAR 1973

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21427 SECRET

D. ACCORDING BNDD REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY SPECIAL AGENT JOSE A. MARIN, DATED 5 FEB 73, WRITTEN IN MIAMI, WKSCARLET-3 WAS LUIS PORFIRIO HERNANDEZ' PARTNER IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND FOLLOWING HERNANDEZ' INCARCERATION, WKSCARLET-3 HAD TAKEN OVER HERNANDEZ' OPERATION. (POUCHING COPY THIS ROI.)

E. REGARDING ALLEGATION THAT WKSCARLET-3 ALSO TAKING OVER EUGENIO LEAL POZO NETWORK, THIS RECEIVED ORALLY FROM S/A MARIN WHILE HE IN CARACAS ON TDY. REQUEST WH/MIAMI CHECK WITH BNDD MIAMI TO RECEIVE FURTHER DETAILS.

F. PER REF D, BNDD SURVEILLANCE IN MIAMI SAW WKSCARLET-3 IN COMPANY OF ANDRES PURRINOS, DOCUMENTED TRAFFICKER, AND RONALD CONDOM, BROTHER OF FRANK CONDOM.

G. PER BNDD HQS TELEGRAM 1554 OF 12 MAR 73, DEBRIEFING OF BNDD CI (IDENTITY UNKNOWN) REVEALED ONLY THAT WKSCARLET-3 IS CONNECTION IN CARACAS...

2. WILL ANSWER PARA 2 REF A QUERY RE OUR ASSESSMENT OF WKSCARLET-3'S EXPECTED REACTION TO CONFRONTATION BY SEPARATE CABLE.

CABLE SEC. DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY: ________ PER ________ #____

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 21427 SECRET

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 46

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY: 25/7' PER SOP .103

ACTION UNIT: C/WH6

INFO: FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/PLAN, C/CI, C/WREC2, C/FI

ACTION NO. 325

S E C R E T 142050Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI WHMIAMI 17858

859630

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REFS: A. CARACAS 21298 (IN 848386)

B. DIRECTOR 379434

C. CARACAS 21408 (IN 858116)

1. LNAGON TELEGRAM CITED REF C CONTAINS ALL MHABYSS INFO LNAGON/MIAMI HAS ON WKSCARLET-3.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

KO

X

WH/3/V

CS COPY

201-300785

14 MAR 1973

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

C/WH

BY: L AT: 2125

DISSEM BY: 35 PER SOP .103

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

R Y SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 6

INFO: FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/IP/AN, C/FI, C/CI, C/NARC 2, C/EUR 6

ACTION NO: 214

S E C R E T 141950Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21418

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 382423

CO

WH/3/V

1. WKSCARLET-3 ORIGINALLY STATED TRAVEL PLAN WOULD BE ROME VIA NEW YORK, MADRID, WITH SHORT STOP OVER LATTER CITY PRIOR HIS FINAL DESTINATION WHICH WILL BE ROME. HE MUST HAVE CHANGED ITINERARY ENROUTE ROME, WHERE HE WILL HEAD SECURITY TEAM FOR VENEZUELAN DELEGATION GULF OF MARACAIBO TALKS.

2. CAMILO CUSATI CUSATI IS WKSCARLET OFFICER WHO PART ABOVE SECURITY TEAM. WE INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY HE MAY BE DRIVER OF 1966 BLUE FORD AND IS THE UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL WHO INVOLVED WITH TRUEVA AND GOMEZ DURING THEIR STAY CARACAS.

3. FRANK CONDOM PRESUMABLY IDENTICAL WITH FRANCISCO MANUEL CONDOM GIL. PLS SEE DIRECTOR 303867 AND WH/MIAMI 15582 FOR DETAILS. ACCORDING MEXICO CITY 20812 (IN 687982) FRANK CONDON ("N" AS IN NOVEMBER) IN MEXICO CITY

859603

201-300985

14 MAR 1973

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT
INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21418 SECRET

CIRCA AUGUST 72 TO ARRANGE FOR DELIVERY OF NARCOTICS. THIS SUBJECT PERHAPS IDENTICAL WITH FRANK CONDOM SEEN WITH WKSCARLET-3, NO STATION TRACES CONDOM'S BROTHER NOR PURRINOS.

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION · CLASSIFIED MESSAGE · TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

WH

BY: AT: 1500

DISSEM BY: PER 103

APR 1973 MICROFILMED

MICRO. SER.

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 6

INFO: FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/EUR6, C/CI, C/FI

ACTION NO.: 172

C/NARC 2 (c/TPM)

2P

872

SECRET 141315Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21400

859116

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, PARIS, BOGOTA, ROME.

COM VFA HAB OFP WLB DIR

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 21396 (IN 857839) (W857300)

AN	KO
AN	X
IN	Y
PS	
BY	3
DES	NPD
FI	
WH/R/N	

1. ACCORDING BNDD HQS TELEGRAM 1585, OF 13 MAR 73, WHICH REPEAT OF MESSAGE ORIGINATING BNDD MIAMI, LUIS POSADA, SUBJECT REF, AND CAMILO CUSATI ARRIVED MIAMI ON 9 MAR VIA PAN AM 552. PAIR WALKED AROUND DOWNTOWN MIAMI FOR SEVERAL HOURS UNTIL THEY WERE PICKED UP BY ANDRES PURRINOS, DOCUMENTED MULTI-KILO TRAFFICKER. AFTER BNDD SURVEILLANCE LOST TRIO FOR SEVERAL HOURS, POSADA AND CUSATI SEEN CHECKING OUT OF ARROWHEAD MOTEL (WHERE THEY CHECKED IN UPON ARRIVING MIAMI) AND CHECKED INTO SHERATON-FOUR AMBASSADORS ACCOMPANIED BY PURRINOS, WHO REMAINED WITH PAIR UNTIL 0230 HOURS 10 MAR. AT 1230 HOURS 10 MAR POSADA AND CUSATI WERE PICKED UP BY RONALD CONDOM, BROTHER OF FRANK CONDOM, WHO ASSOCIATED WITH NOW ARRESTED MAJOR VIOLATOR FRANK MATTHEWS.

201-300955

14 MAR 1973

CS COPY

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21408 SECRET

CONDOM TOOK PAIR TO AIRPORT WHERE THEY BOARDED PAN AM 254 FOR MADRID.

2. COMMENT: GIVEN ABOVE CONTACTS KNOWN VIOLATORS, THERE LITTLE DOUBT NOW THAT POSADA IS TRAFFICKER. APPARENTLY CUSATI IS ALSO AN ASSOCIATE OF POSADA'S IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. BNDD CARACAS CONTINUES FEEL WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO LET POSADA RUN AND SEE WHERE HE LEADS US. BNDD CARACAS NOT AWARE OF ANY IMMEDIATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION BEING PLANNED AGAINST POSADA BUT HQS MAY WISH DOUBLECHECK THIS POINT WITH BNDD HQS.

3. INDEX CUSATI, PURRINOS, RONALD CONDOM.

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 5126; 1535
DATE: 13 MARCH 1973

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 35/30 PER: SOP # 103

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: C/WH 6 INFO: FILE, VR. 1973 CI 332

DDO, ADDO, C/WH/N, C/FI, C/CI, C/NARC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 382423

TO PRIORITY CARACAS

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21349 (IN 854093) *

1. PLEASE SEE BNDD MESSAGE 1585 SENT 12 MAR 73 FROM BNDD HQS WASHINGTON TO BNDD CARACAS. DID WKSCARLET-3 GIEVE STATION ANY REASON FOR CHANGING REF TRAVEL PLAN?

2. WE CHECKING NAMES GIVEN IN BNDD MESSAGE AND WILL ADVISE RESULTS. PLEASE PROVIDE STATION TRACES.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

AN	KO
AB	X
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~BR~~	
~~DSS~~	~~NED~~
~~PI~~	
WH/3/V	

* Advises travel plan of WKSCARLET-3. BNDD Msg says W-3 going Madrid via Puerto Rico rather than to Rome via New York.

DC/WH/NARC Paul I Taylor
201-300985
DDP/NARCOG
14 MAR 1973

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

CS COPY

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

EX-2 CLASSIFIED BY: ADDR WH - SIM

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: RICHARD L. CONOLLY
EXT: 5337; 1128
UNIT: WH/3
DATE: 12 MARCH 1973

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 29 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, WH, CI/OA, SECURITY

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 362421

TO CARACAS QUITO GUAYAQUIL INFO LIMA

FJDUST SGSWIRL

REFS: A. CARACAS 21383 (IN 855917) (NOT SENT QUITO, GUAYAQUIL)

B. LIMA 24126 (IN 848857) (NOT SENT QUITO, GUAYAQUIL)

1. SUGGEST SGSWIRL OF ASSETS LISTED CARH-21383 AND REF A BE CONDUCTED AT SAME TIME AS ~~SGSWIRL~~ THAT OF WKSCARLET-3 WHICH WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE IN APRIL. HQS WILL SEND SGSWIRL EXAMINER TO CARACAS AT THAT TIME, IF THERE NONE ON ROAD WHO CAN BE DIVERTED.

2. QUITO, GUAYAQUIL: DUE HEAVY TDY LOAD AT HQS, REQUEST SGSWIRL EXAMINERS CURRENTLY ON TDY COMPLETE SCHEDULED ITINERARY INCLUDING RETURN MEXICO, BUT NOT BE DIRECTED TO OTHER STOPS.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

AN X O
AB X
IS
DES NFD
WH/3

DC/WH/1
WH/SEC
C/WH/FI ✓
OS/IRD H. KINNEY

201-300985
14 MAR 1973

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

CS COPY

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

E2 - 2 CLASSIFIED BY:
AFDIR WH - SISM

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15-5

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT. 1535
DATE 13 MARCH 73

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3E/4 PER SCP #105

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: c/WH 6 INFO: FILE, VR, DDO, ADDO, c/Ops, c/CI, c/WCC 2, c/EI,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 382099

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 373942 (NOT SENT BUENOBS AIRES, BOGOTA)*

B. CARACAS 21369 (IN 455389)**

1. AS YOU AWARE, WKSCARLET-3 REPRESENTS SERIOUS POTENTIAL LIABILITY TO BKHERALD AND WE ANXIOUS GET HIM WRUNG OUT AND, IF ALLEGATIONS PROVE TRUE, OUR ASSOCIATION WITH HIM PROMPTLY TERMINATED. WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO MOVE ALONG ORIGINAL GAME PLAN SUGGESTED IN REF A BUT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, OBVIOUSLY WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO ACQUIESCE TO LNAGON REQUEST AND DELAY CONFRONTATION UNTIL WKSCARLET-3 RETURNS FROM ROME.

2. FULLY UNDERSTAND LNAGON DESIRE FOLLOW UP WKSCARLET-3 LEAD. NEVERTHELESS, POINT MUST BE MADE THAT WE HAVE SENSITIVE OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM TOTALLY UNCONNECTED WITH PRESENT PROBLEM AND FOR OUR OWN SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS WE MUST RESOLVE MATTER OF HIS PARTICIPATION IN NARCOTICS ACTIVITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. YOU MIGHT POINT OUT TO LNAGON THAT WHILE WE CANNOT GUARANTEE ANYTHING, IT OUR ESTIMATE THAT WKSCARLET-3, BASED UPON HIS TENURE WITH US,

KO
X
WH/3/V

201-300985

CS COPY

CONTINUED....

13 MAR 1973

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY:
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: ROBERT WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT:
DATE:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #
CONF:
INFO: FILE VR.

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 382099

TO ON CONFRONTATION, WILL LIKELY AGREE TO COOPERATE AND, IF THIS THE CASE, LNAGON INVESTIGATION WOULD BE ENHANCED RATHER THAN HINDERED. REQUEST YOUR ASSESSMENT [redacted] IF (THIS) TRUE.

3. PARA 2 REF B IS FIRST WE HAVE HEARD OF WKSCARLET-3 APPARENT CONNECTION WITH HERNANDEZ AND LEAL POZO. PLEASE ADVISE OF ANY FURTHER INFORMATION LNAGON MAY HAVE PASSED ON THIS SUBJECT. WOULD ALSO LIKE BRIEF REVIEW OF EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT WKSCARLET-3 HIMSELF, RATHER THAN JUST HIS CAR, SPECIFICALLY INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS ACTIVITY.

4. TO RECAPITULATE: APPROVE YOUR AGREEMENT TO DELAY CONFRONTATION UNTIL WKSCARLET-3 RETURNS TO CARACAS AND CONCUR THAT THIS MATTER SHOULD BE FURTHER CONSIDERED JOINTLY WITH LNAGON BUT AS THINGS NOW STAND, PREFER TO GET THIS CASE RESOLVED AND, ~~ID~~ AS NECESSARY, BKHERALD ASSOCIATION WITH WKSCARLET-3 ENDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

CONTINUED...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

E2 IMPDET CLASSIFIED BY
APDIA WH - SISM

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: ROBERT WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY________PER________#______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S ~~ECRET~~ PAGE THREE CITE DIRECTOR 382099

TO

*GIVES GUIDANCE ABOUT HANDLING OF CASE OF WKSCARLET-3, UNILATERAL CARACAS STATION PENETRATION OF LIAISON WHO IS SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTICS.

**SAYS THAT LNAGON IN CARACAS HAS ASKED THE STATION TO POSTPONE ITS CONFRONTATION WITH WKSCARLET-3 BECAUSE OF CONCERN THAT EARLY CONFRONTATION MAY HINDER THE LNAGON INVESTIGATION OF WKSCARLET-3. REQUESTS COMMENTS AND GUIDANCE FROM HEADQUARTERS.

C/WH/4/AR____
C/WH/4____
DC/WH/COG____
C/WH/NARC____
DDP/NARCOG____
DDS/IOS OS____
OGC JOHN GREANEY (TELECOORD)
C/WH/FI____

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
fr C/WHD

R.L. Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

EX-2 CLASSIFIED BY:
APDIR WN - 315M

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 1-3

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______

DISSEM BY: RI3 PER 20 203

4 SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT: c/WHG

INFO: FILE, VR, DDO, ADDO, c/EUR6, [illegible], c/a, c/6, c/WNARC2

ACTION NO: 246

S E C R E T 131350Z MAR 73 STAFF 857854

CITE CARACAS 21397

TO: DIRECTOR, MADRID, ROME, WH/MIAMI INFO BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA, PARIS.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

IDEN

REF: CARACAS 21396 (N857839)

IDEN WKSCARLET-3, A UNILATERAL BKHERALD AGENT WHO HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, ACCORDING TO LNAGON SOURCES. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

AN SO
~~AD~~ X
IN
PS
BX
DFS NFD
FT
WH/3/V

CS COPY

201-300985

13 MAR 1973

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chiefs of Station, WH/Miami, Buenos Aires, Bogota & Rome

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
C PLAHABYSS Luis POSADA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

10

References: A. CARACAS-21369 (Not sent Rome)

B. CARACAS-21349 (Not sent Bogota)

Forwarded herewith is a copy of BNDD Caracas telegram 1981, 8 March 1973, and BNDD HQS telegram 1554, 12 March 1973, both of which concern Subject of References.

Gerald R. Gizzi
Gerald R. GIZZI

Attachment:
Two (2) telegrams, hw

Distribution:
3 - C,WHD w att
1 - COS, WH/Miami w att
1 - COS, Buenos Aires w att
1 - COS, Bogota w att
1 - COS, Rome w att

2 IMPDET CL BY Signer

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 21 1973
MICROFILMED

2 ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D 75-120-26

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCA - 19281

DATE
MAR 1973
13 March 1973

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 201-300985

ATT 1

STATE
8 MAR 73
SECRET
XBX
ZB-73-0001 LUIS POSADA CROSS FILE WITH HUMBERTO TRUEVA, GF
CARACAS 1981

ATT 2

X

DEA
12 MARCH 73
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LUIS POSADA AKA BAMBI ZB-73-0001

ATTS TO HVCA-19281

DEA
12 MARCH 73
CONFIDENTIAL
LUIS POSADA AKA BAMBI ZB-73-0001
BNDD 1585 (MIAMI)

DISSEM BY U PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 007622

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT	INFO	
WH -10	FILE, VR, ADDO, CSDO, IP/AN, IW, FI2, DDO, EUR 5.	
ACTION # 652		

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

HVC-6597

CI

855811

SECRET 092010Z M[illegible] 5 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 21374

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BOGOTA, ROME.

INTEL ZRWAHOO

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR HEADQUARTERS LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SIMILAR TO THAT OF HVC-6539. SOURCE: WKRALLY/ WKSCARLET-3 WHO IS HEADING THE TEAM. KNOWN TO LIMITED NUMBER OF LIAISON OFFICIALS. NO INDEX. THIS REPORT NOT COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. CL BY MICHAEL C. CHOADEN.

FILED: 092010Z

IW COMMENT: WEHN DISSEMINATED ADD CA, CI, CI/PS, CI/OPS, CI/IC AND SOD.

file: WKSCARLET-3

SECRET

SECRET CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 10 MARCH 1973
IN 855811
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Service before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information

THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/COLOMBIA

DOI EARLY MARCH 1973

SUBJECT VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT DECISION TO CONDUCT PROTECTIVE RATHER THAN INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING OPERATIONS AT THE NEXT ROUND OF BORDER TALKS BETWEEN COLOMBIAN AND VENEZUELA

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS FIELD NO. HVC-6597 (9 MARCH)

SOURCE AN EXPERIENCED POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON MATTTERS AFFECTING THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF VENEZUELA. HE REPORTS WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SUPERIORS. HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY INDEPENDENT SOURCES.

1. THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED NOT TO

IMPLEMENT ITS PREVIOUS PLAN TO MONITOR THROUGH A SENSITIVE TECHNICAL OPERATION THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COLOMBIAN DELEGATION TO THE BORDER NEGOTIATIONS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN ROME, ITALY, ON 19 MARCH 1973. THE VENEZUELAN 14-MAN GROUP FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF THE SERVICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), WHICH WILL ACCOMPANY THE VENEZUELAN DELEGATION TO THE TALKS, WILL LIMIT ITS ACTIVITIES TO THE PHYSICAL AND ELECTRONIC SECURITY OF THE VENEZUELAN CONTINGENT. SHOULD THE OPPORTUNITY ARISE TO USE SECURELY A TECHNICAL OPERATION TO MONITOR THE COLOMBIAN DELEGATION, ANOTHER DISIP TEAM OF FROM FOUR TO SEVEN VENEZUELANS WILL BE SENT TO HANDLE THIS. (SOURCE COMMENT: BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT A VENEZUELAN FOREIGN MINISTRY COLDE OFFICER PASSED INFORMATION TO THE COLOMBIANS BASED ON THE VENEZUELAN TECHNICAL OPERATION TARGETTED AGAINST THE COLOMBIAN DELEGATION AT THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS, THE VENEZUELANS FEAR THAT THE COLOMBIANS WILL BE EXPECTING A SIMILAR OPERATION AND MAY TRY TO RECIPROCATE BY MONITORING THE VENEZUELAN DELEGATION. FOR THIS REASON, THE VENEZUELANS HAVE DECIDED TO IMPLEMENT COUNTER-ESPIONAGE RATHER THAN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS DURING THIS SERIES OF TALKS. ALSO,

EDITIONS

IN 855811

TDCS

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

(classification) (dissem controls)

DISIP IS NO LONGER WELL EQUIPPED TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL OPERATIONS BECAUSE THE DIRECTOR OF DISIP IN A FIT OF PIQUE RECENTLY REPLACED THE MOST QUALIFIED DISIP TECHNICIAN, THEREBY SERIOUSLY DAMAGING DISIP'S CAPABILITIES IN THIS FIELD.) (FIELD COMMENT: HVC-6508, CSCI-316/00162-73, FROM THIS SOURCE, GIVES BACKGROUND ON THE CODE OFFICER CASE. HVC-6439, CSCI-316/00333-73, FROM THIS SOURCE, REPORTS THE PREVIOUS VENEZUELAN PLAN TO MONITOR THE COLOMBIAN DELEGATION.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS. SENT TO BOGOTA, ROME.

REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SNESITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/
CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AQTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 2 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 41 PER SOP .103

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 6 | INFO: FILE, VR C/IP/AN C/NARC 2 C/CI C/FI DDO ADDO

ACTION NO. 615

S E C R E T 092120Z MAR 73 STAFF

855389

CITE CARACAS 21369

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALL WKSCARLET

REFS A. DIRECTOR 379434 (NOT SENT BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA)

B. CARACAS 21349 (NOT SENT BOGOTA) (= 854093)

C. CARACAS 21298 (NOT SENT BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA) (= 848396)

1. SUBSEQUENT REF C LNAGON CARACAS REQUESTED WE POSTPONE CONFRONTATION OF WKSCARLET-3 AS LNAGON CARACAS CONCERNED POSSIBILITY THAT EXPOSURE OUR KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITIES WKSCARLET-3 AND HIS NARCOTICS ASSOCIATED COULD PREJUDICE ONGOING INVESTIGATION, POSSIBLY COMPROMISE THEIR SOURCES, AND PRECLUDE FULLER DEVELOPMENT OF HWHAT COULD BE EVEN MORE REWARDING INVESTIGATION. ALL FOREGOING BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT WKSCARLET-3 COULD REACT NEGATIVELY TO CONFRONTATION, REFUSE TO COOPERATE, OR, PRETEND TO BE COOPERATIVE BUT CONTINUE HIS ILLICIT NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES. SUCH FOREWARNING COULD CAUSE HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES TO GO UNDERGROUND, OR AT LEAST BE MORE CIRCUMSPECT IN THEIR ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS, THUS MAKING INVESTIGATION MORE DIFFICULT.

AN KO
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PI~~
~~AI~~
DES ~~IPD~~
~~FI~~
WH/3/✓

201-300885

CS COPY

09 MAR 1973

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

MAR 19 2 04 PM '73

RECEIVED
IP/EDI

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21369 SECRET

2. WKSCARLET-3, ACCORDING LNAGON, SLATED TAKE OVER NARCOTICS NETWORK FORMERLY HANDLED BY LUIS PORFIRIO HERNANDEZ, NOW INCARCERATED AND EUGENIO LEAL POZO, NOW IN A MIAMI JAIL. BY NOT ALERTING WKSCARLET-3 THAT WE AWARE HIS ACTIVITIES AND LETTING HIM CONTINUE HIS ACTIVITIES UNSUSPECTING WE ARE ON TO HIM, LNAGON HOPES THIS WOULD LEAD US TO EVEN BIGGER FISH, SUCH AS A SOURCE OF SUPPLY.

3. STATION WELL AWARE DANGERS TO BKHERALD IN CONTINUING RUN AGENT SUCH AS WKSCARLET-3, HOWEVER, TO FURTHER INVESTIGATION CURRENT DRUG CASE WOULD LIKE ACCOMMODATE LNAGON CARACAS AND THUS PLAN HOLD OFF CONFRONTING WKSCARLET-3 UNTIL LATTER'S RETURN FROM ROME. AT THAT TIME WILL REVIEW STATUS OF CASE WITH LNAGON CARACAS AND MAKE DETERMINATION THEN REGARDING TIMING CONFRONTATION. THIS CONNECTION REQUEST HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS AND GUIDANCE REGARDING BALANCE OF EQUITIES INVOLVED FOR LNAGON, BKHERALD, AND OVERALL ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORT. STERILIZED SUBSTANCE OF ABOVE PARAGRAPHS COORDINATED IN DRAFT WITH LNAGON.

4. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED: WH C/O

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: DJM AT: 2230 Z

DISSEM BY: 37/56 PER: SO? .103

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 6

FILE, VR ODO, ADDO, C/RF/AN, C/FI, C/CI, C/NARC 3, C/EUR 6

ACTION NO. 282

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 082110Z MAR 73 STAFF 85409[3]

CITE CARACAS 21349

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES, ROME.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS A. CARACAS 21298 (IN 848356) (NOT SENT BUENOS AIRES, ROME)

B. CARACAS 21242 (IN 840904) (NOT SENT BUENOS AIRES, WH/MIAMI)

1. WKSCARLET-3 DEPARTING FOR ROME 8 MARCH VIA PUERTO RICO AND MIAMI, THEN CATCHING FLIGHT FROM NEW YORK TO ROME. LNAGON HAS BEEN ADVISED OF HIS TRAVEL AND INSTITUTING SURVEILLANCE ENROUTE. LNAGON HAS NOT BEEN TOLD REASON HIS TRAVEL OTHER THAN THAT IT ON OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN GOVT BUSINESS.

2. ASSUME POSSIBILITY THAT WKSCARLET-3 MAY BE MAKING NARCOTICS CONTACTS PUERTO RICO, WHERE HE OVERNIGHTING, AND MIAMI, WHERE HE WILL SPEND AT LEAST A FEW HOURS. LNAGON NOT PLANNING ANY ENFORCEMENT ACTION AS LACK SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PLUS FACT WKSCARLET-3 TRAVELING DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT.

3. FOR ROME, BUENOS AIRES: WKSCARLET-3 IS UNILATERAL STATION PENETRATION OF LIAISON WHOM WE STRONGLY

AN	K6
	X
IS	
PS	
DI	
D.S.	N.T.
PI	
WH/3/V	

B

201-300985

08 MAR 1973

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21349 S E C R E T

SUSPECT IMPLICATED IN ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTICS.
IF ALLEGATIONS CORRECT, HE WILL BE TERMINATED FORTHWITH
BUT GIVEN OPPORTUNITY AT SAME TO BE LNAGON AGENT.
LNAGON IS INVESTIGATING ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS OF WKSCARLET-3
AND IS AWARE BKHERALD HAS "OPERATIONAL INTEREST" IN
WKSCARLET-3.

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

MAR 19 2 ... PM '73
RECEIVED
IP/EDI

FORWARDED
IP/EDI
MAR 27 12 12 PM '73

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 6 MARCH 73

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 7E/30 PER: SCP #103

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: c/WH6 INFO: FILE VR. DDO, ADDO, c/wh/cog, c/ci, c/narcog, c/EI,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

~~S E C R E T~~ 7 MAR 73 21 06z CITE DIRECTOR

TO: CARACAS, WH/MIAMI 379434

AN KO
~~XS~~ X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~PX~~
~~DISSEM~~
~~PI~~
WH/3/V

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY BEWKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21298 (IN 848386)*

1. CONCUR WITH PARA 4 REF REQUEST.

2. RECENT LNFALL TRAFFIC FROM BOGOTA SAYS COLOMBIAN-VENEZUELAN BORDER TALKS WILL RESUME IN ROME 12 MARCH 73. DOES WKSCARLET-3 STILL PLAN TO GO TO ROME? IF SO, WHAT IS TIMING HIS TRIP AND HOW DOES IT AFFECT STATION PLAN TO CONFRONT HIM?

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. R

*REQUESTS AUTHORITY FROM HEADQUARTERS FOR WH/MIAMI TO TELL BNDD OF OUR INTEREST IN WKSCARLET-3 AND REQUEST ALL THE INFORMATION THAT BNDD HAS ON HIM. IN THE PLANNED CONFRONTATION WITH WKSCARLET-3, CARACAS STATION WOULD APPRECIATE ALL POSSIBLE AMMUNITION AVAILABLE.

C/WH/NARC EDWARD ANDERSON (TELECOORD)

DDP/NARCOG STAN ARCHENHOLD (TELECOORD)

C/WH/COG lawrence Sternfield (Telecoord)

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

~~CS COPY~~ CS COPY

R L Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

201-300985
06 MAR 1973

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

E2 - 2 CLASSIFIED BY: ________
APDIR WH - 5.SM

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 19-2 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

4 **SECRET**
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 15 PER Sop . 63

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/WH 6 INFO FILE, VR DDO ADDP, C/ICEAN, C/CI, C/FI, C/NARC 2

ACTION NO. 388

S E C R E T 021600Z MAR 73 STAFF

848386

CITE CARACAS 21298

TO: DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 373942

B. CARACAS 21221 (839442)

1. NIGHT 28 FEBRUARY STATION VERIFIED CAR DRIVEN BY WKSCARLET-3 SAME CAR SEEN PER REF B PARA 3D.

2. PER REF A HAVE INFORMED LOCAL LNAGON CHIEF OUR OPERATIONAL INTEREST WKSCARLET-3 AND STATION PLAN CONFRONT LATTER. SHOULD WKSCARLET-3 BE UNABLE REFUTE ALLEGATIONS, WILL TRY CONVINCE HIM HIS BEST COURSE WOULD BE COOPERATE WITH LNAGON. IF HE AGREES, WILL ARRANGE INTRODUCTION CHIEF LOCAL LNAGON WHO HAS ALREADY AGREED TAKE HIM OVER.

3. TENTATIVELY PLAN CONFRONT WKSCARLET-3 AFTER RECEIPT LNAGON ~~MIAM~~ MIAMI REPORT THEIR DEBRIEFING JOSE GOMEZ. UNFORTUNATELY, GOMEZ IS UNRELIABLE INFORMANT AND WILL PROBABLY WITHHOLD BITAL DETAILS, ESPECIALLY THOSE INVOLVNG WKSCARLET-3. HOWEVER, REPORT WILL HELP TIE THINGS TOGETHER.

KO

WH/3/V

6

W GOES

201-300985

02 MAR 1973

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

MAR 19 2 04 PM '73

RECEIVED
IP/EDI

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21298 S E C R E T

4. IN LIGHT WKSCARLET-3'S INVOLVEMENT MHABYSS SURFACED MIAMI AREA, REQUEST STATION WH/MIAMI, WITH HQS CONCURRENCE, BRING TO MIAMI LNAGON ATTENTION OUR OPERATIONAL INTEREST WKSCARLET-3 AND REQUEST ALL INFORMATION THEY HAVE ON HIM. IN CONFRONTATION, STATION WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING ALL POSSIBLE AMMUNITION AVAILABLE.

5. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

FORWARDED
IP/EDI

MAR 27 12 11 PM '73

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: R. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: AC/WH/3/V
EXT: 5126/1535
DATE: 1 MARCH 2973

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 13 / 66 PER 500 # / 03

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WHC INFO FILE, VR. ADDP ADDP C/PLAN C/CI C/FI C/NARC

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 377441

TO CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI 273 01 14 2

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKARLLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 373942*

1. PLEASE ADVISE STATUS WKSCARLET-3 CASE.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. A

AN	
AB	
IN	
S	
C	
IS UED	
IT	
W+/3/6	

*SETS FORTH HQS' VIEWS ON HANDLING WKSCARLET-3 CASE.

C/WH/COG LAWRENCE STERNFIELD (TELECORD)
C/WH/NARC EDWARD ANDERSON (TELECOORD)
DDP/NARCOG STAN ARCHENHOLD (TELECOORD)

201-0300985
2 MAR 73

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CLASSIFIED BY 05752

RLConolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

STATE
28 FEB 73
UNCLASSIFIED
DIFFICULTIES IN SALE OF VOTING MACHINES TO VENEZUELA
MEMO OF CONVERSATION (EMBASSY-CARACAS)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 18-4 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 38 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT c/WH8

INFO FILE, VR [illegible] c/WH, cao, c/iclox, c/FI3, c/wl, c/ci, c/ca3, DDP, ADDP, cs/DO, c/ci/sa.

ACTION NO. 086

S E C R E T 222015Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21240 CARA

840903

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

1. WKSCARLET-3 PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON 17 FEBRUARY. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY TWO U.S. LAWYERS FROM MIAMI, SENT TO HIM BY A CUBAN FRIEND IN MIAMI, WHO REQUESTED HIS HELP AS A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL.

2. THE LAWYERS, HEADLEY (FNU) AND SUDDUTH (FNU), WHOSE ADDRESS IS 1703 FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK BUILDING IN MIAMI, WORK FOR VARON, STAHL AND KAY, P.A., ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS, LOCATED AT 2432 HOLLYWOOD BOULEVARD, HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA. THEY ARE REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF LLOYD A. DIXON, JR., AN EMPLOYEE OF THE AVM CORPORATION OF JAMESTOWN, NEW YORK, WHICH RECENTLY GOT THE US. $20,000,000 CONTRACT FOR THE VOTING MACHINES TO BE USED IN THE DECEMBER ELECTION. DIXON IS UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, MIAMI DIVISION, BECAUSE OF CHARGES BY EDUARDO BLANCO URIBE AND HANS J. MAGNIN, APPARENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ELECTIONS

1

WH/3/V

CS Copy

201-300985

SECRET

23 FEB 1973

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT

FILE VR

ACTION NO

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21240 SECRET

SYSTEMS CORPORATION, A GRAND CAYMAN CORPORATION, WHO ARE ACCUSING DIXON OF FAILURE TO PAY THEM THEIR FULL COMMISSIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONTRACT.

3. ACCORDING TO COPIES OF THE FIRST PAGES OF SEVERAL DOCUMENTS BROUGHT BY THE LAWYERS, THE CHARGES AGAINST DIXON INCLUDE VIOLATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE LAWS AND BRIBERY OF VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS WHO ALLEGEDLY AGREED TO ACCEPT PAYMENTS FROM DIXON FOR THEIR HELP IN SECURING THE CONTRACT.

4. THE FIRST PAGE OF AN AFFADAVIT FILED BY FERNANDO ZOZAYA ITURBE, THE AVM CORPORATION LAWYER IN VENEZUELA, STATES THAT ON 4 MAY 1972, ZOZAYA WAS PRESENT WHEN DIXON TENDERED RELEASES TO BLANCO AND MAGNIN WHICH HAD THE EFFECT OF FORFEITING ALL THE COMMISSIONS DUE THEM FOR THE SALE OF THE VOTING MACHINES TO VENEZUELA. BLANCO AND MAGNIN REFUSED TO SIGN THE RELEASES. DIXON TOLD THEM IT WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE AVM CORPORATION WAS UNDERGOING A GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION IN BUFFALO, NEW YORK.

5. THE PURPOSE OF LAWYERS HEADLEY AND SUDDUTH IN CONTACTING WKSCARLET-3 WAS TO OFFER HIM US$50,000 TO PRESSURE

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO

PAGE 3 CARACAS 21240 SECRET

VENEZUELAN LAWYER ZOZAYA INTO SIGNING A DEPOSITION STATING THAT HE NEVER HEARD DIXON OFFER THE COMMISSION TO BLANCO AND MAGNIN. WKSCARLET-3 REFUSED THE OFFER.

6. LAWYERS GAVE WKSCARLET-3 COPIES OF PERTINENT DOCUMENTS WHICH HE GAVE TO WKSCARLET-1 AFTER COPYING FIRST PAGE OF EACH FOR PASSAGE TO STATION. WKSCARLET-1 NOW STUDYING DOCUMENTS WHICH WKSCARLET-3 IS SURE WILL BE PASSED TO PRESIDENT CALDERA.

7. ONE OF DOCUMENTS TURNED OVER CONTAINS DIXON'S CODE AS TO WHOM HE HAD OFFERED WHAT. WKSCARLET -3 WAS TOLD THAT MONEY HAD BEEN PAID WITH EXCEPTION OF MANGIN AND BLANCO. CODE LISTS FOLLOWING:

A. PEOPLES ELECTORAL MOVEMENT (MEP) - US$400,000

B. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN UNION (URD) - US$400,000

C. OMAR RUMBOS, URD LEADER - US$100,000

D. ANTONIO ESPINOZA PRIETO, MEP LEADER - US$100,000

E. DEMOCRATIC ACTION (AD) PARTY - US$470,000

F. MARIO LEONI (STATION UNABLE IDENTIFY BUT

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

RECEIVED
IP/EDI

RECEIVED
IP/EDI

ACTION UNIT: FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 CARACAS 21240 SECRET

POSSIBLY RELATION OF LATE RAUL LEONI OF AD) A US$40,000

G. MANGIN - US$760,000

H. BLANCO - US$760,000

8. DEFER TO HEADQUARTERS FOR APPROPRIATE DISSEM OF ABOVE. AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED AND REQUESTS THAT INFORMATION BE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION OF ED LITTLE IN DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

9. FILE: DEFER E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEN BY 35 PER #

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR 1, AN, EUR6, FI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 181

(C)ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 222025Z FEB 73 STAFF

840904

CITE CARACAS 21242

TO: ROME INFO DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS A. DIRECTOR 368236

B. DIRECTOR 367030

C. CARACAS 21122 (IN 826564)

D. HVC 6540, 29 JANUARY 1973

1. DUE UNCERTAINTY NEXT ROUND GULF MARACAIBO TALKS LOCATION, WKSCARLET-3 HAS NOT YET DEPARTED CARACAS AS REPORTED REFS. WHEN CITY CHOSEN, POSSIBLY AROUND 1 MARCH, HE WILL LEAD AUDIO TEAM TO SITE. HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT CONTACT ROME STATION SHOULD THAT CITY BE PICKED.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

AN
AB
IN
PS
BX
DES / NFD
FI
WH/3/V

201-0300985

22 Feb 73

CS COPY

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY 9 AT: 1745 Z

DISSEN BY 95 PER SP 107

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/WH6

FILE, VR DDP, ADDP, C/IPLAN, C/CI, C/FI, C/NARC2, C/EUR6

ACTION NO 809

839442

S E C R E T 211615Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21221 CARA

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET-3

~~REF: DIRECTOR 372698~~

AN X
AB X
~~IN~~
FS
SX
~~ESC NP~~
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

1. WKSCARLET-3 CONTACTED STATION EVENING OF 15 FEB 73 WHICH FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT HE DID NOT DEPART FOR ROME AS SCHEDULED. AT MEETING FOLLOWING SATURDAY (WHICH CAME AFTER TWO POSTPONEMENTS) WKSCARLET-3 STATED TRIP DELAYED DUE UNCERTAINTY LOCATION OF FUTURE GULF OF MARACAIBO TALKS. TENTATIVELY WKSCARLET-3 AND AUDIO TEAM SCHEDULED DEPART 1 MARCH IF TALK CITY DESIGNATED THAT TIME. IF ROME, WKSCARLET-3 INSTRUCTED NOT MAKE CONTACT WITH ROME STATION. HE MADE NO MENTION MHABYSS MATTERS.

2. HAVE INITIATED INVESTIGATION WKSCARLET-3 AS RECOMMENDED REF. NO INFORMATION THAT HE PRESENTLY ON WKSCARLET ASSIGNMENT INVESTIGATE MHABYSS MATTERS.

3. STATUS PRESENT MHABYSS CASE IN WHICH WKSCARLET-3 ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED AS FOLLOWS

A. HUMBERTO TRUEVA AND JOSE GOMEZ

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985

1-KS-3 22 FEB 1973

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21221 SECRET

ARRIVED CARACAS 1830, 14 FEB 73 AND MET AT AIRPORT BY UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL AND CARLOS CONTRERAS CASTRO. UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL DROVE TRUEVA AND GOMEZ TO CARACAS HOTEL WHERE THEY PRESENTLY UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY CITRAILS AND FIXED SURVEILLANCE BY TDY LNAGON TEAM. CAR DRIVEN BY UNKNOWN TRACED THROUGH LICENSE PLATES AND REGISTERED FEDERAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENT.

B. 15 FEBRUARY SAME UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL WITH SAME CAR WENT HOTEL AND PARKED CAR ILLEGALLY. SUBSEQUENTLY TOWED AWAY. UNKNOWN AND GOMEZ RETRIEVED AUTO. UNKNOWN SHOWED IDENTIFICATION TO POLICE OFFICIAL WHO RETURNED CAR WITHOUT QUESTION. ON RETURN TO HOTEL UNKNOWN USED CAR'S SIREN TO PASS THROUGH RED LIGHTS, AND WAS STOPPED LATER BY METROPOLITAN POLICE FOR DRIVING WRONG WAY ON ONE WAY STREET. CITRAILS OBSERVED POLICE EFFUSIVELY SALUTING OUR UNKNOWN WHO THEN DROVE TO HOTEL WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. FROM THIS IT OBVIOUS OUR UNKNOWN IS HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL METROPOLITAN POLICE. SAME DAY CITRAILS PHOTOGRAPHED GOMEZ AND UNKNOWN. FROM EXCELLENT PHOTOGRAPH IT POSITIVELY DETERMINED THAT UNKNOWN NOT REPEAT NOT WKSCARLET-3. NOW

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 21221 SECRET

CHECKING THROUGH CITRAIL CONTACTS IDENTITY UNKNOWN.

C. SATURDAY THREE ABOVE MENTIONED INDIVIDUALS MET THREE OTHER UNKNOWN. FROM NEWSPAPER FOTO WKSCARLET-3 PASSED LNAGON TEAM, THEY DETERMINED THREE NEW UNKNOWNS NOT WKSCARLET-3.

D. AROUND NOON 20 FEB LNAGON POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED WKSCARLET-3 FROM PRESS FOTO MEETING TRUEVA, GOMEZ AND UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICIAL. ALL FOUR MET AT HOTEL UNDER SURVEILLANCE AND DEPARTED IN WKSCARLET-3'S UNMARKED OFFICIAL CAR. LNAGON NOTED LICENSE NUMBER AND STATION VERIFYING.

E. LOCAL AND TDY LNAGON HAVE NOW CONCLUDED FIRST PART OF OPERATION,E.G., IDENTIFYING PRINCIPAL SUSPECTS AS HAVING MET CARACAS. UNABLE DETERMINE AT THIS TIME WHETHER OR NOT MHABYSS MATERIAL HAS PASSED FROM SELLER TO BUYER. HOWEVER, CURRENT TRIP TRUEVA AND GOMEZ SUPPOSEDLY FOR PURPOSE SETTING UP LARGE BUY NEXT TRIP. DURING NEXT TRIP LNAGON PROPOSES ALL OUT EFFORT IDENTIFY MHABYSS PRINCIPALS IN ACT PASSING GOODS.

4. WKSCARLET-3 ORIGINALLY IMPLICATED THIS CASE FROM INFORMATION SUPPLIED LNAGON BY INFORMANT GONE BAD,

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 CARACAS 21221 SECRET

JOSE
~~TBS~~ GOMEZ (MENTIONED ABOVE). LNAGON WILL REQUEST BIO INFO FROM THEIR OFFICE MIAMI IN ORDER INITIATE BKHERALD TRACES THIS INDIVIDUAL. GOMEZ ALLEGEDLY WH/MIAMI ASSET DURING EARLY SIXTIES. THIS ABOUT SAME TIME WKSCARLET-3 ASSOCIATED WH/MIAMI AND IT POSSIBLE THEY BECAME ACQUAINTED FROM THAT TIME.

5. QUESTION NOW ARISES AS TO HOW SALVAGE OUR ASSET AS HE NOW DEFINITELY IMPLICATED. SHOULD TRUEVA AND GOMEZ BE ARRESTED MIAMI OR CARACAS IT ALMOST ASSURED THEY WILL IMPLICATE WKSCARLET-3. STATION THINKING IS NOW THE TIME CONFRONT WKSCARLET-3 WITH EVIDENCE, POINT OUT HIS POSSIBLE LOSS CHANCE BECOME WODUAL CITIZEN, LOS OF POSITION WITHIN WKSCARLET, POSSIBLE ARREST AND LONG JAIL SENTENCE IN VENEZUELA AMONG CONVICTS HE HELPED CAPTURE AND CONVICT. THEN STRONGLY SUGGEST HE TURN INFORMANT. AT THIS TIME IT STILL POSSIBLE COVER UP HIS MHABYSS CONNECTION AS BEING A LEGITIMATE WKSCARLET CASE IN WHICH HE ACTING ON HIS OWN BECAUSE HE PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH GOMEZ AND HIS KNOWLEDGE WKSCARLET ORGANIZATION NOT INTERESTED MHABYSS MATTERS. CONFRONTATION NOW MIGHT ALSO ENLIST HIS AID ARRESTING TRUEVA, GOMEZ AND UNKNOWN OTHER POLICE OFFICIAL AT TIME OF

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION　　CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　　TOTAL COPIES　　ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ____

ACTION UNIT　　INFO　FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 5 CARACAS 21221 SECRET

BIG BUY.

6. ANOTHER COMPLICATION PRESENT. AS MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY, WKSCARLET-3 ON TAP TRAVEL GULF OF MARACAIBO CONFERENCE CITY. HE WILL TRAVEL WITH VENEZUELAN DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT AND WILL PROBABLY GO THROUGH MIAMI. THIS WOULD BE EXCELLENT TIME CARRY MHABYSS MATERIAL TO TRUEVA AND GOMEZ. IF WKSCARLET-3 AGREES COOPERATE, HE COULD BE USED TO CARRY THIS MATERIAL TO MIAMI AND AT TIME OF TURNOVER TO TRUEVA AND GOMEZ, LNAGON COULD MAKE POSITIVE ARREST.

7. AS STATED, STATION FEELS, DESPITE ABOVE INFO INDICATING WKSCARLET-3 INVOLVED THIS CASE, AGENT WORTH SALVAGING AND WE SHOULD MAKE EFFORT DO SO. IF HQS AGREES REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS AS TO HOW GO ABOUT THIS. STATION COULD SOUND OUT LOCAL CHIEF LNAGON AND FEEL CERTAIN HE WOULD AGREE. HOWEVER, FEEL LNAGON (BNDD) AND LNYAPA (CUSTOMS) AT HQS LEVEL WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IN ON ACT. PLS ADVISE.

8. FILE 201-300-985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

201-300985

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION NO. 845

FILE, VR I/PLAN, SECUR 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA

FI

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 211435Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 17503 (VEAUSELL ACTING) KMIM

839251

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS.

REF: DIRECTOR 373201

1. ACTION REQUESTED REF TAKEN WITH LNYUMA 20 FEBRUARY 1973.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

AN
AB
IN
FS
SX
NFD
FI

CS COPY

SECRET

21 Feb 73
201-300985

ORIG: R. J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 21 FEBRUARY 1973

TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY [illegible] PER [illegible]

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: C/WH 6 | INFO | FILE VR. [illegible]

(elite) (date and time filed) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 373942

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO [illegible] 392

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: A. CARACAS 21193 (IN 635218)*

B. CARACAS 21221 (IN 639442)**

AN +M
AB X
IN
IS
FX
~~[illegible]~~ NMD
HI
~~[illegible]~~
WH/3/V

1. WHILE SYMPATHIZING WITH STATION'S DESIRE SALVAGE WKSCARLET-3, WE CANNOT APPROVE REF B SUGGESTION FOR BAILING HIM OUT.

2. WE HAVE INFORMED LNAGON HQS THAT WE HAVE "OPERATIONAL INTEREST" IN WKSCARLET-3 AND THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN CARACAS WILL DISCUSS CASE WITH CHIEF LNAGON CARACAS.

3. STATION SHOULD DO FOLLOWING:

A. TELL CHIEF LNAGON CARACAS THAT STATION HAS "OPERATIONAL INTEREST" IN WKSCARLET-3, THAT YOU ~~[illegible]~~ are INVESTIGATING REF A ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM TO DETERMINE IF HE IN FACT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING OR IF THESE ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH [illegible] WKSCARLET OPERATION.

B. CONFRONT WKSCARLET-3 DIRECTLY WITH ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CITED REF B. DEBRIEF HIM THOROUGHLY IN ATTEMPT GET ALL THE FACTS. DEPEND-

201-0300785

22 FEB 1973

CS COPY

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

E2 IMPDET CL BY 010525

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ____ PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 373942

TO PAGE TWO

ING ON RESULTS OF DEBRIEFING, WE WILL PROBABLY WANT TO SGSWIRL HIM IN ATTEMPT TO VERIFY [illegible] HIS STORY. WILL AWAIT WORD FROM STATION, HOWEVER, BEFORE SENDING SGSWIRL OPERATOR TO CARACAS.

C. IF IT TURNS OUT THAT UKSCARLET-3 IS INDEED INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES, STATION [illegible] SHOULD TERMINATE HIM [illegible] ~~IMMEDIATELY~~. IF LNAGON WANTS PICK UP UKSCARLET-3 AFTERWARDS, THIS THEY CAN DO ON OWN INITIATIVE.

4. PLEASE KEEP US FULLY (AND PROMPTLY) ADVISED OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS THIS SENSITIVE CASE.

5. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. H

* SAYS UKSCARLET-3 MAY BE INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL TRAFFIC OF COCAINE, SALE OF STOLEN AND SMUGGLED WRISTWATCHES AND DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTERFEIT U.S. DOLLARS. INFO BASED ON LNAGON REPORT TO STATION.

**GIVES RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION INDICATING THAT UKSCARLET-3 IS INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTICS.

C/WH/COG ✓ C/WH/FI [illegible]
C/WH/NARC [illegible]
DDP/NARCOG [illegible]

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/8
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG: PHILIP F. SNARE
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 5126: 1535
DATE: 16 FEBRUARY 1973

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 1352

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 60/56 PER SOP 103

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

C. I. WHG | INFO | FILE, VR. ODP, ADDP, C/IP/AN, C/CI, C/FI, C/WAC2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 372698

17 FEB 73 00 35z

TO CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI

AN/YM
AB ✓
RI
FS
EX
~~DES; NFD~~
FI
~~[illegible]~~
WH/3/V

RYBAT WHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21193 (IN 835218) *

1. WE INTEND WORK ON BASIC PREMISE THAT WKSCARLET-3 IS INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY. WE MUST THEREFORE, WITHOUT REVEALING THIS INFO TO WKSCARLET-3, IMMEDIATELY CONDUCT OUR OWN INVESTIGATION USING ALL INVESTIGATIVE MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL. RECOMMEND THAT ~~X~~ TELTAP, SURVEILLANCE AND OTHER INFO-GATHERING OPS BE INITIATED JUST AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. REALIZE THAT WKSCARLET-3 NOW IN ITALY BUT PERHAPS CERTAIN ASPECTS THIS INVESTIGATION COULD BE MOUNTED PRIOR TO HIS RETURN.

β

2. ULTIMATELY WE WILL WANT SGSWIRL WKSCARLET-3 AGAIN WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ALLEGED NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, SMUGGLING AND DISTRIBUTION COUNTERFEIT U.S. DOLLARS REPORTED REF.

3. WISH EMPHASIZE NEED ACT QUICKLY IN THIS CASE AND GET ALL THE ANSWERS BEFORE SOMEONE ELSE PRESENTS THEM TO US. PLEASE REPORT ALL INFO AS IT DEVELOPS.

201-0300985

CONTINUED. . . .

CS COPY

~~20~~ 17 FEB 1973

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | SECRET | E2 IMPDET CLASSIFIED BY: ATRIB WH - SISM | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: PHILIP F. SNARE
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE VR. IP/EDI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 372698

TO PAGE TWO

4. IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY WKSCARLET-3 COULD BE INVOLVED THESE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH WKSCARLET OPERATIONS?

5. FOR WH/MIAMI: WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FEASIBLE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATIVE HELP YOU COULD GIVE.

6. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

* Reported that BNDD has information to the effect that WKSCARLET-3 is involved in smuggling, drug-running and counterfeit operations involving Venezuela and the U. S.

WH/NARC
DDP/NARCOG
CI/LSN
C/WH/COG

Herbert W. Natzke
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

Philip F. Snare
for RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

E2 CLASSIFIED BY:
AUT ... - SISM

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 5123: 1535
DATE: 15 FEBRUARY 1973

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16 - 2

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY 36 PER ________ # ________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF. WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, plan, secur 4, ci/ops, FI, ci/ca,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 20FEB73 22 31z CITE DIRECTOR 373201

TO WH/MIAMI INFO CARACAS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 368616 *

B. CARACAS 21169 (IN 831931) **

C. WH/MIAMI 17390 (IN 833052) ***

(SKULL SECURITY)

1. ON 15 FEB 73 ~~[illegible]~~ OFFICER TELEPHONED WH/MIAMI SECURITY OFFICER TO REQUEST HIM TO ASK MIAMI LNYUMA TO INFORM LNAGON MIAMI THAT WKSCARLET-3 IS OF INTEREST TO "ANOTHER AGENCY" AND THAT LNAGON OFFICE MIAMI SHOULD THEREFORE CONDUCT ALL-AGENCY TRACES. WH/MIAMI SHOULD TAKE NO OTHER ACTION AT THIS TIME.

pe

2. FOR CARACAS: WISH AGAIN CAUTION THAT YOU DO NOT RPT NOT INDICATE ANY LNAGON INTEREST TO WKSCARLET-3.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

AN
AS
IN
FS
FK
RID
FI

END OF MESSAGE

* Informed Miami and Caracas of LNAGON inquiry to LNYUMA/Miami re WKSCARLET-3. Asked Caracas not to convey info re inquiry to WKSCARLET-3.

CONTINUED. . . .

XS-3
20 Feb 73
201-300985

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER S CS COPY E T AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E2 IMPDET CLASSIFIED BY: ________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY________PER________#________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

MAR 7 4 27 PM '73

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 373201

TO PAGE TWO OF TWO

** Said that Caracas has no idea~~ss~~ to why LNAGON is interested in WKSCARLET-3. Added that they unable query WKSCARLET-3 who presently in Italy.

*** Reported that WH/MIAMI had heard nothing about LNAGON's interest in WKSCARLET-3. Offered to initiate LNAGON traces if Headquarters so desires.

C/WH/3
C/WH/SEC
C/OS/AAS LOU WIENCKOWSKI (TELECOORD)

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

SM

MAR 9 73

C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

E2 [illegible] SIFIED BY:
[illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER SOP .103

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 10 1973
MICROFILMED

ACTION UNIT	FILE, VR
C/WH6	DDP, ADDP, C/IP/AN, C/FI, C/CI, C/NARC 2
ACTION NO.	
124	

872

2P

835218

U

S E C R E T 151705Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21193 CARA

TO: DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT MHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: WH/MIAMI 17390 (IN 573552)

AN	KO
AB	X
[illegible]	X
[illegible]	
BX	2
[illegible]	
FI	
WH/3/V	

1. ON 14 FEBRUARY LOCAL CHIEF LNAGON INFORMED STATION HIS OFFICE HAS INFORMATION THAT LUIS CLEMETE P O S A D A CARRILES, AKA "BAMBY" (201-300985), MAY BE INVOLVED SMUGGLING COCAINE FROM COLOMBIA THROUGH VENEZUELA TO MIAMI. THIS INFORMATION OBTAINED THROUGH LNAGON TELTAPS AND INFORMERS LOCATED MIAMI. ALLEGEDLY POSADA ALSO INVOLVED IN LOCAL SALE STOLEN WRISTWATCHES SMUGGLED INTO VENEZUELA FROM MIAMI AND POSADA ALLEGEDLY MAY BECOME VENEZUELAN DISTRIBUTOR ONE MILLION COUNTERFEIT U.S. DOLLARS.

2K 201-300985

2. ABOVE ALLEGATIONS PASSED VERBALLY TO LOCAL LNAGON CHIEF BY MIAMI LNAGON TDYER. LATTER'S WRITTEN REPORT SHOULD ARRIVE CARACAS BY POUCH NEXT FEW DAYS. STATION WILL CABLE FULL DETAILS ALLEGATIONS WHEN PASSED WRITTEN REPORT.

3. AFTER RECEIPT COPY LNAGON REPORT STATION WILL ALSO CABLE ITS COMMENTS. TENTATIVELY, STATION FEELS STRONG EFFORT

CS COPY

201-300985

15 ~~16~~ FEB 1973

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21193 SECRET

SHOULD BE MADE SALVAGE POSADA IF ABOVE INFO CORRECT AND IN FACT HE HAS NOT ALREADY GONE TOO FAR TO MAKE SALVAGE POSSIBLE. ~~S~~LNAGON NOT AWARE POSADA'S CURRENT CONNECTION WITH STATION.

4. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 31 PER ________

[illegible]ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH/F

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO. 831

S E C R E T 131941Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 17390 WMIM

833052

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 368616

1. STATION HAS RECEIVED NO INFO FROM LNAGON RE INTEREST IN WKSCARLET-3. ALTHOUGH SUBJECT NOT A MBR OF UNION INSURRECCIONAL REVOLUCIONARIA (UIR) GROUP, HIS NAME WAS RECENTLY MENTIONED IN UNSPECIFIED CONNECTION WITH SEVERAL OF THEM, ALL OF WHOM INVOLVED NARCOTICS.

2. PLS ADVISE IF HQS WISHES STATION TO INITIATE LNAGON TRACES ON SUBJECT TO DETERMINE REASON FOR CURRENT INTEREST.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

AN	
AB	X
IN	
FS	
BX	
DES	NFD
FI	

CS COPY

13 Feb 73
201-300985

SECRET

ETARIAT DISSEMINATION | SSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 24 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

VANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 32 PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT WHP | FILE, VR PLAN cubas FI

ACTION NO 619

S E C R E T 122035Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21169 CARA

TO: DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 368616

1. STATION HAS NO IDEA LNAGON INTEREST IN WKSCARLET-3. UNABLE QUERY WKSCARLET-3 AS HE IS IN ITALY FOR FOUR WEEKS. DO NOT BELIEVE IT ADVISABLE QUESTION LOCAL LNAGON.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

83 1931

AN 33	
AB	
IN	
PS	
BX	
DIS	NFD
FI	
447V	

WKScarlet-3

CS COPY

12 Feb 73
201-300985

SECRET

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 6 FEB 73

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3B PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF. WH8 INFO FILE, VR. [illegible], 01, CI/OPS, FI, SECUR 4, WHC 2.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 368616

TO CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

1. ON 6 FEB 73 LNYUMA ~~[illegible]~~ ADVISED THAT LNAGON IN MIAMI ATTEMPTED TO REVIEW WKSCARLET-3 (IDEN FOR MIAMI) OFFICIAL LNYUMA FILE BUT WAS TOLD THAT FILE ~~AT [illegible]~~ LOCATED IN LNYUMA HQS OFFICE. LNYUMA HQS HAS ADVISED ITS MIAMI OFFICE THAT LNAGON CAN REVIEW FILE IN WASHINGTON.

2. WE DO NOT KNOW WHY LNAGON WANTS TO REVIEW FILE NOR ARE WE OBJECTING, SINCE WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT ANY MATERIAL CONNECTING BKHERALD WITH WKSCARLET-3 WOULD BE REMOVED AND LNAGON WOULD SEE ONLY NORMAL LNYUMA FILE. LNYUMA STATED LNAGON WOULD NOT BE SUSPICIOUS BECAUSE WKSCARLET-3 LNYUMA FILE HELD WASHINGTON AND NOT MIAMI, SINCE LNYUMA MAINTAINS MANY FILES IN RESTRICTED STATUS WASHINGTON.

3. WILL APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION CARACAS AND WH/MIAMI MAY RECEIVE WHICH WOULD THROW LIGHT [illegible] ON LNAGON INTEREST ED IN WKSCARLET-3.

4. CARACAS: PLS DO NOT CONVEY THIS INFORMATION TO WKSCARLET-3.

5. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

201-0300985

AN [illegible]
[illegible] IFD
WH/3/V

C/WH/COG

CS COPY

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/OS/AAS LOU WISNCKOWSKI (TELEDOORD)
WH/[illegible] DRAFT

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CLASSIFIED BY: 05751
ADIR WH - SISM

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30-!

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 6 FEB 73

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3B PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE, VR, iplan, ci, ci/ops, fi, secur 4, narc 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 368615

TO WH/MIAMI.

UKRALLY UKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 368616
DIR 368616.

1. IDEN/IS CIFENCE-4.

2. FILE 201-300985 E2 IMPDET.

C/WH/3 R.J. Conolly

AN-i/m
AB
IN
FS
EX
~~DUS~~ NFD
~~FI~~
wh/3/V

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

LAURENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

201-0300985
08 FEB 73

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

E2 - 2 CLASSIFIED BY: ____
AIDIR WH - SISM

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: PHILIP SNARE
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 7 FEB 73

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 25 PER ____ #

☒ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, IP/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS, CSDO

(classification) (date and time filed) 7 2 - 73 ... 1942 (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR

368236

TO: PRIORITY ROME INFO CARACAS.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 367030*

B. CARACAS 21122 (IN 826564)**

1. PREFER ~~[illegible]~~ THAT CONTACT WITH WKSCARLET-3 ~~[illegible]~~ BE KEPT TO ABSOLUTE MINIMUM FOR REASONS GIVEN REF A.

2. FILE 201-300985, 75-2-106/3. E2 IMPDET. H

*REQUESTED THAT THERE BE NO CONTACT BETWEEN WKSCARLET-3 AND ROME STATION IN VIEW OF FLAP POTENTIAL.

**REPORTED THAT WKSCARLET-3 HAD ALREADY DEPARTED CARACAS AND STATION UNABLE TO GIVE HIM THE INSTRUCTIONS.

AN
AB
IN
FS
BI
D S : NED
FI
WH/3/V

C/WH/3 R. B. Connolly

E/I

D 75-2-16/3

C/EUR

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

7 Feb 73
201-300985

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

E2 - 2 CLASSIFIED BY: ______
IMPDET WN - SISM

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA 19246	6 Feb 73	B	2	16	1

DOC. SUBJECT: Weekly Progress Rept 1 Oct - 31 Jan 73

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

18. **WKSCARLET-3:**

During this reporting period WKSCARLET-3 produced eleven disseminations and contributed to four others. As a chief of one of the operations sections of his service, it appeared that he would continue to have excellent access. However, in December WKSCARLET-1 reorganized his service and ostensibly reduced our agent's area of responsibility and access. WKSCARLET-3 was slightly depressed at this occurrence as he believed, and rightly so, that he had not merited this reduction. After the holidays, however, it became apparent that WKSCARLET-1 would continue to use WKSCARLET-3 in special operations and that the reduction in responsibility was solely to take WKSCARLET-3 out of the limelight. Thus, our agent is still able to report on the sensitive operations of his service. As a result of this and his past performance, WKSCARLET-3 was given a salary increase beginning January 1973.

HVCA 19306 Apr 73 Weekly Progress Rpt 1 Feb - 31 March

7. WKSCARLET-3

Although WKSCARLET-3 continued his fine production during this time period, it was MHABYSS activity which produced the real interest. Through other cables and dispatches we have reported his involvement in this irregular activity, which if proved true will end in his termination as a BKHERALD asset. At the present time WKSCARLET-3 is the security team leader for the Venezuelan delegation to the Gulf of Maracaibo talks presently being held in Rome. It is planned that soon after he returns, and if we have sufficient hard facts, we will confront our agent in an attempt to clarify his MHABYSS connection.

I

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last...)

201-

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
6-66

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

DOI: 6 FEB 1973

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA 19346					

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

18. WKSCARLET-3:

During this reporting period WKSCARLET-3 produced eleven disseminations and contributed to four others. As a chief of one of the operations sections of his service, it appeared that he would continue to have excellent access. However, in December WKSCARLET-1 reorganized his service and ostensibly reduced our agent's area of responsibility and access. WKSCARLET-3 was slightly depressed at this occurrence as he believed, and rightly so, that he had not merited this reduction. After the holidays, however, it became apparent that WKSCARLET-1 would continue to use WKSCARLET-3 in special operations and that the reduction in responsibility was solely to take WKSCARLET-3 out of the limelight. Thus, our agent is still able to report on the sensitive operations of his service. As a result of this and his past performance, WKSCARLET-3 was given a salary increase beginning January 1973.

NOTE INFO RE SAME PARA 18 SEE EXTRACT FORM RE HVCA-19246, 6 FEB 73 ON PARA 18 - SAME TEXT

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

WKSCARLET-3

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 9

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY D AT 2040 Z

DISSEM BY 25 PER

ACTION UNIT
WH 8

FILE, VR, IP/AN, EUR6, FI, CI/OPS, CSDO,

ACTION NO.
658

S E C R E T 061925Z FEB 73 STAFF

826504

CITE CARACAS 21122 CARA

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, ROME.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 367030

DOC. MICRO. SER.
FEB 15 1973
MICROFILMED

1. WKSCARLET-3 DEPARTED VENEZUELA MONDAY 5 FEB; STATION RECEIVED REF TOO LATE FOR CONTACT. BELIEVE IN INITIAL CONTACT WKSCARLET-3 AND ROME OFFICER, LATTER STILL MIGHT GRACEFULLY BOW OUT. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, WKSCARLET-3 BELIEVES HE MEETS CARACAS CO AT SOME RISK TO HIMSELF AND CITING RISK FACTOR IN NOT MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH HIM ROME WOULD BE SEVERAL POINTS LOST FOR OUR SIDE. SUGGEST, INSTEAD, THAT CONTACT BE KEPT AT ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AND ONLY WHEN WKSCARLET-3 HAS WRITTEN INFORMATION OF VALUE TO "BRUSH" PASS. CONCEIVABLE THIS WOULD ONLY OCCUR ABOUT TWO TIMES AFTER INITIAL MEETING.

2. FILE: 201-300985, 75-2-16/3. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

AN 0003
AB X
~~IN~~
PS 60
BX 4
DES | NFD
~~PI~~
104/3/V

D 75-2-16/3

201-300985
6 Feb 73

CS COPY

SECRET

ORIG: PHILIP SNARE
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 5 FEB 73

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: SE PER #

CONF: WHE INFO FILE, VR. WH/ [illegible], CI, CI/OPS, CI/CO, FI

MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES: 6

SECRET

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
FEB 16 1973
MICROFILMED

26

S E C R E T 052273 21 972 CITE DIRECTOR 867030

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO ROME.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21092 (IN 823647)*

1. AFTER CAREFUL RECONSIDERATION, BELIEVE IN VIEW CONSIDERABLE FLAP POTENTIAL THAT WKSCARLET-3 SHOULD NOT BE MET IN ROME. REALIZE THAT HE COULD PRODUCE SOME INTERESTING INTEL FROM THIS OP BUT DO NOT FEEL IN THIS INSTANCE THAT TIMELINESS OF REPORTING WORTH RISK INVOLVED.

2. SUGGEST YOU TELL WKSCARLET-3 CONTACT CANCELLED BECAUSE ROME CASE OFFICER [redacted] WHO WOULD HAVE MET HIM EXPECTS BE OUT OF TOWN AT TIME OF WKSCARLET-3'S VISIT AND NO OTHER APPROPRIATE CONTACT AVAILABLE.

3. FILE 201-300985, 75-2-16/3. E2 IMPDET

*REPORTED ON WKSCARLET-3 TRIP TO ROME TO BUG COLOMBIAN DELEGATION TO COLOMBIAN-VENEZUELAN BORDER TALKS.

1P

AN
AB X
IN
FI
EX 4
DE NFD
FI
WH/3/V

E/I MR. PEAKE (TELECOORD)
C/WH/FI [illegible]

5 Feb 73
201-300985

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

75-2-16/3

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY: 057539

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOC. MICRO. SER.
FEB 13 1973
MICROFILMED

30

230

S E C R E T 021610Z FEB 73 STAFF

IN 023647
C

CITE CARACAS 21092

2P

TO: DIRECTOR, ROME.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 365470

B. ROME 27869 (IN 820226)

1. EVENING 1 FEBRUARY WKSCARLET-3 REPORTED HE AND KEY AUDIO TECHNICIANS TRAVELLING ROME IN TRUE NAME USING VENEZUELAN DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS. SITUATION WILL DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT HE ACTUALLY INVOLVED INSTALLING AUDIO AND TELTAPS. WKSCARLET-3 TRAVELLING AS VENEZUELAN DIPLOMAT AND IF FLAP OCCURS FULLY EXPECTS USE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND BE PNG'ED. WAS TOLD THAT "OUR" PEOPLE WOULD STATE IN CASE OF FLAP THAT WE NEVER HEAD OF HIM. HE ACCEPTED OUR POSITION.

2. DURING SAME MEETING PASSED CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS PER REF B. WKSCARLET-3 WILL USE NAME "EDUARDO" WHEN CONTACTING ROME STATION. HE ENGLISH VERY GOOD. CONTACT REQUESTED ENABLE WKSCARLET-3 PASS INFO TO CARACAS ON PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF VENEZUELAN SENSITIVE OPERATION AGAINST COLOMBIAN DELEGATION TO ROME TALKS. AGENT TENTATIVELY PLANS ARRIVE ROME O/A 8 FEBRUARY.

D - 75-2-16/3

CS COPY
SECRET

201-300985
2 Feb 73

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21092 SECRET

3. FILE: 201-300985, 75-2-16/3. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

IP/EDI
FORWARDED
Feb 9 3 35 PM '73

IP/EDI
RECEIVED
FEB [illegible] '73

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	26
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: PHILIP F. SNARE
UNIT: C/WH/3/V
EXT: 7271/1535
DATE: 31 JANUARY 1973

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 12 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO DOC. MICRO. SER. ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

DOC. MICRO. SER.
FEB 13 1973
MICROFILMED

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

1FEB73 15 11z 366470

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO PRIORITY ROME.

UKRALLY UKSCARLET

REF: ROME 27869 (IN 820226)*

1. RE UKSCARLET-3 TRIP ROME, PLS ADVISE:

A. WHAT SORT DOCUMENTATION HE WILL USE.

B. WILL HE BE PART OF ACTION TEAM; WILL HE BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN BUGGING?

C. ANY OTHER ASPECTS HIS INVOLVEMENT THIS EFFORT WHICH MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT USG INTERESTS IF OP WERE TO FLAP. ANSWERS TO FOREGOING WILL BE USEFUL IN ASSESSING RISKS INVOLVED, EVEN THOUGH WE REALIZE THERE LITTLE YOU CAN DO TO PREVENT U-3' PARTICIPATION.

2. ASSUME CARACAS WILL ANSWER REF QUESTIONS RE U-3.

3. FILE 201-0300985, 75-2-16/3. E2 IMPDET.

AN
SAB
IN
PS
EX
~~DES~~ NFD
FI
10H/3/U

*SET UP CONTACT PLAN FOR UKSCARLET-3 IN ROME. ASKED IF HE U.S. CITIZEN AND WHETHER HE SPEAKS ENGLISH. (NOTE: HE IS CUBAN-BORN AND HAS VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP AS WELL AS U.S. RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS. HE SPEAKS ENGLISH.)

1 Feb 73
201-300985

D 75-2-16/3

CS COPY

C/E/I W. William Sinclair (telecoord)

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GARDNER R. HATHAWAY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 057515

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. CSCI-316/00339-73

DATE DISTR. 31 January 1973

COUNTRY Venezuela

DOI 8 December 1972

SUBJECT Reorganization of the Directorate of the Service of Intelligence and Prevention

ACQ Venezuela, Caracas (15 December 1972)

FIELD NO. HVC-6525

SOURCE An experienced police investigator whose position gives him access to information on matters affecting the internal security of Venezuela. He reports without the knowledge of his superiors. His information has been frequently confirmed by independent sources. He provided a copy of the reorganization document.

1. On 8 December 1972 the Directorate of the Service of Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP) was reorganized by its Director, Dr. Remberto Uzcategui Bruzual. (Source Comment: Uzcategui believes DISIP will be in line for criticism during the election year of 1973 and he wants to remove from positions of responsibility any of his controversial section heads.) The gist of the document issued by Uzcategui reorganizing DISIP follows.

2. The Director of DISIP sets the general policy based on instructions from the Ministry of the Interior and has ultimate control of the Services. The Deputy Director assists him in carrying out these responsibilities and substitutes for the Director during his absence. As its supervisory and fiscal units, DISIP has an Inspector General of Services who has the responsibility of disciplining personnel and investigating employees, and an internal comptroller who verifies the administration of the Services.

3. The following are the DISIP executive positions:

a. Secretary General of Services, which has been assigned to Dr. Oswaldo Dominguez.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	XXX	XXX	XX	NSA	XX	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
	FBI							

CI/IC	1	WH/R	1	CLASSIFIED BY: MICHAEL C. CHOADEN		HVC-6525
CI/OP/WH	1	WH/3/R	1			WKRALLY
CI/LS	2	WH/3/V	7			(WKSCARLET-3)
CA/PROP	1	WH/CARA	2			CSCI-316/00330-7
CA/INT	1	CI/PG	1	CI/R&A	1	
Totals	IE 2, CI 8, FI 3, CA 2, WH 9(2), FR 1					WH/AC/

b. Chief of the General Information Division, which has been assigned to Lic. Joaquin Chaffardet.

c. Chief of the General Operations Division, which has been assigned to Commissioner Rodrigo Nieves Zarco.

4. The Chiefs of the Zones and other branches in the interior are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary General of Services. They will handle administrative matters, intelligence and operations directly with the corresponding Divisions and will receive from them the general requirements to be fulfilled.

5. The General Operations Division has nationwide responsibility for all police and operational matters. It will be formed by as many operating divisions as there are specific activities to be fulfilled. The current operating divisions are:

a. First Division (Prevention), headed by Commissioner Adolfo Romero Gomez.

b. Second Division (Agent Control), headed by sub-commissioner Arpad Bango.

c. Third Division (Patrol), headed by Sub-Commissioner Julio Cesar Lanza.

d. Fourth Division (Explosives and Armaments), headed by Commissioner Luis Posada.

e. Fifth Division (Protection), headed by Commissioner Luis Martinez Cuerra.

6. The General Information Division has nationwide responsibility for all intelligence and counter-intelligence matters, with the exception of subversion which is wholly the responsibility of the General Operations Division. The General Information Division will be formed by as many divisions as there are specific activities to be fulfilled. Currently these are:

a. Eleventh Division, headed by Commissioner Jose Vasquez Blanco.

b. Twelfth Division (Archives and Analysis), headed by Dr. Rafael Rivas Vasquez.

c. Thirteenth Division (USSR and Bloc Embassies), headed by sub-commissioner Alejandro Nystor.

7. The Secretary General of Services has responsibility for all administrative matters, including personnel and requests for services, equipment and finances. He also has responsibility for all matters not falling under the jurisdiction of the two general divisions, and in particular for those related to the Divisions of Personnel and Administration.

8. Field Dissem: Embassy at Caracas.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM TION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR IP/AN, EUR6, FI, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO 712

S E C R E T 301730Z JAN 73 STAFF

CITE ROME 27869

820226

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF. CARACAS 21049 (IN 818917)

1. WKSCARLET/3 SHOULD TELEPHONE IDEN. MEETING SITE WILL BE BAR OF HOTEL PACIFIC, 51 VIALE MEDAGLIE D'ORO. MEETING TIME WILL BE ONE HOUR LATER THAN TIME AGREED TO ON PHONE. CASE OFFICER WILL BE READING NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE. WKSCARLET/3 SHOULD ASK IDEN "WHAT BUS WILL TAKE ME TO ST PETERS". CASE OFFICER WILL REPLY, "NUMBER 47 IS BEST BET."

2. DCOS, RUTHERFORD J. LYNER, SEEMS TO REMEMBER WKSCARLET/3 AS WODUAL CITIZEN, SO ASSUME HE SPEAKS ENGLISH. PLEASE CONFIRM. DOES STATION ENVISION THAT WKSCARLET/3 WILL BE PASSING INFO FOR FORWARDING TO CARACAS STATION OR IS PURPOSE CONTACT SO STATION WILL BE ABLE CONTACT HIM IF NECESSARY?

3. FILE: 75-2-16/3, 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 300985

CS COPY FILED IN 75-2-16/3

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATI CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL CC 3/ = 11

ROUTING AND OF INITIALS-SEEN

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR IP/AN, EUR6, FI, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO 711

S E C R E T 301730Z JAN 73 STAFF

CITE ROME 27870

820221
C

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF ROME 27869 (820226)

IDEN: ROBERT RUTH

TELEPHONE: OFFICE - 4674 EXT 456

HOME - 345-2656.

S E C R E T

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 300945

CS COPY FILED IN 75-2-16/3

SECRET

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL BY 007422

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT
WH 10

INFO FILE, VR, ADDP, CSDC, IP/AN, IW, FI 2,
DDP, EUR 5.

ACTION #
522

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

HVC-6539

SECRET 291600Z JAN 73 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 21048

816958
Y

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BOGOTA, ROME.

INTEL ZRWAHOO

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR POSSIBLE HEADQUARTERS LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SIMILAR TO THAT OF HVC-6508. SOURCE WKRALLY/WKSCARLET-3 WHO WILL HEAD THE TEAM. KNOWN TO LIMITED NUMBER OF LIAISON OFFICIALS. NO INDEX. PLEASE ADVISE LOCAL DISTRIBUTION TO BE GIVEN HVC-6508 WHICH FORWARDED IN MEMO FORM VIA DIRECTOR 363601. THIS REPORT NOT COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. CL BY MICHAEL C. CHOADEN.

FILED: 29/1600Z

RELAYED TO DIRTECH PER DIR 363812

IW COMMENT: WHEN DISSEMINATED ADD CA, CI, CI/OPS, CI/TC.

File: WKSCARLET-3

SECRET

SECRET CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 29 JANUARY 1973
IN 818958
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Service before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA / COLOMBIA

DOI: LATE JANUARY 1973

SUBJECT: PLANS OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT A SENSITIVE TECHNICAL OPERATION AGAINST THE COLOMBIAN CELEGATION TO THE NEXT ROUND OF BORDER NEGOTIATIONS

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS VIELD NO. HVC-6539
(26 JANUARY 1973)

SOURCE: AN EXPERIENCED POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF VENEZUELA. HE REPORTS WHITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SUPERIORS. HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY INDEPENDENT SOURCES.

1. IN EARLY FEBRUARY 1973 THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT PLANS TO SEND TO ROME, ITALY, A TEAM OF 16 OFFICIALS OF THE DIRECTORATE OF THE SERVICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) TO MOUNT A SENSITIVE TECHNICAL OPERATION AGAINST THE COLOMBIAN DELEGATION TO THE NEXT ROUND OF BORDER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN

SECRET

EDITIONS

IN 818958

TDCS

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

(classification) (dissem controls)

VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA. THE TEAM WILL CONSIST OF COMMUNICATIONS, AUDIO TECHNICIANS, SECURITY, AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL WHO WILL REMAIN IN ROME FOR AN ESTIMATED SIX WEEKS TO TWO MONTHS. (FIELD COMMENT: THE NEXT SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN ROME SOME TIME AFTER THE EARLY FEBRUARY VISIT OF VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT RAFAEL CALDERA TO COLOMBIA, ACCORDING TO A PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER ARISTIDES CALVANI ON 15 JANUARY. HVC-6508, CSCI-316/00162-73, FROM THIS SOURCE, AND HVC-6523, CSCI-316/ -73, FROM A DIFFERENT USUALLY RELIABLE SECURITY SERVICE SOURCE, ARE REPORTS MENTIONING THE SAME TYPE OF OPERATION CARRIED OUT BY THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT DURING THE LAST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IN ROME WHICH ENDED IN LATE 1972.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS. SENT TO BOGOTA, ROME.

REPORT CLASS SECRET / NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

14-00000

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (*Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable*)

POSADA, LUIS
201-300985
SEX M DOB ?

075-005-000
HVC -06525
16 JAN 73

CIT ?
OCC ?
HEAD C. OF 4TH DIVISION /EXPLOSIVES AND ARMAMENTS/ OF DISIP

x 7302050477

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (*Last, First, Middle*)	201- [illegible] 300985

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-46)

TRANSMITTAL
OF
TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION 04 SECRET (When Filled In)

ORIG. BETTY VAZQUEZ BV	ROUTING				
UNIT WH/3/V/R	1		4		150
EXT 7271/1535	2		5		
DATE 10 JAN 1973	3		6		

CONF: WH-19

INFO: IW, CSDO, FI 5, CA 5, CI, CI/OPS, FR 4, DCI, DDCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF

TDCS DB-315/00238-73

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 10 JANUARY 1973

PRECEDENCE: X ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/REG	1	WH/3/V	9	WH/6	3
WH/FI	1	WH/3/C	2		
WH/CA	1	WH/CARA	#		
WH/RR	1	WH/BOGO	#		
WH/3/R	1	WH/SAGO	#		

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
HVC-6514 CARACAS 20937
(IN-803024)
WKRALLY (WKSCARLET-3)

LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS (Place X in appropriate space. List electrical addresses.)

CABLE SEC
- RECOMMEND EXO ☒
- BASIC DOCUMENT NOT MADE AVAILABLE DCI ☒
- RELAY CABLE ATTACHED ☐
- SHOW IW ☐

IW
- DISSEM ELECTRICALLY ☐ TO:

OTHER
- EXCLUSIVE FOR USIB ☐
- USIB PERSONAL ATTN ☐
- ZRWAHOO CABLE SENT ☐
- NOT FOR LIAISON ☐

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

11 JAN 73 03 41Z

CLASSIFIED BY: MICHAEL C. CHOADEN

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER C/WH/3/R Allen B Cartright	COORDINATING OFFICER(S) WH/6/R in dft
CLASSIFICATION SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	RELEASING OFFICER C/WH/R
	COPY NO.

FORM 3-69 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (13-20-44-47)

WKSCARLET-3

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

IN -803024

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE INR NMCC.MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA TREAS SDO ONE CRS

EXO, DDI

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDCS DB-315/00238-73

DIST 10 JANUARY 1973

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CHILE

DOI EARLY JANUARY 1973

SUBJECT SCHEDULED ARRIVAL IN VENEZUELA OF THREE MEMBERS OF THE CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY FOR CLANDESTINE EXPLOSIVES AND COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING BY THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (27 DECEMBER 1972- 8 JANUARY 1973)

FIELD NO. HVC-6514

SOURCE AN EXPERIENCED POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF VENEZUELA. HE REPORTS WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SUPERIORS. HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY INDEPENDENT SOURCES.

1. THREE MEMBERS OF THE CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) ARE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN VENEZUELA ON 9 JANUARY 1973 FOR SECRET TRAINING BY THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE OF THE SERVICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. THE CHILEANS ARE TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTION IN CLANDESTINE EXPLOSIVES AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES. DISIP

PLANS FOR THE CHILEANS TO ENTER VENEZUELA SECRETLY AT CUCUTA, COLOMBIA, AFTER FLYING TO BOGOTA AND TRAVELLING OVERLAND TO THE VENEZUELAN BORDER. THEY WILL THEN BE TAKEN TO A DISIP FARM IN APURE STATE TO RECEIVE THEIR TRAINING.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: HVC-6485, TDCSDB-315/10481-72, FROM ANOTHER SECURITY SERVICE SOURCE WHO IS USUALLY RELIABLE, REPORTED THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT TO A CHILEAN PDC REQUEST FOR THE SECRET TRAINING OF SELECTED PDC MEMBERS TO PREPARE A SPECIAL CADRE OF ACTIVISTS WHO WOULD PROTECT PDC MEMBERS IN THE EVENT OF A LEFTIST COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE PRIOR TO THE MARCH 1973 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS. AT THAT TIME FIVE TRAINEES HAD BEEN SELECTED. THE NAMES OF THE THREE CHILEANS MENTIONED ABOVE ARE UNAVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS: SENT TO SANTIAGO, BOGOTA.

14-00000

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP ADS 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

FROM:

IP/

BRANDON CHASE
IP/AN
EXT. 4232

HD-857
CA50
TUBE GTZ

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/[illegible]				
2.				
3. WH/3/V				
4. ~~RID~~		11 JAN 1973	11 JAN 1973	
5.				
6. WH/Contracts		Jan 18		
7.				
8. WH/BTF		24 Jan 73		BW 24
9.				
10. OP/CPD	5E69		24/1	
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. WH/3/V	3C627			
15.				
16.				
17. IP/FI				

Copy detached and logged

CIFENCE-4

Copy detached

MOC

Copy detached

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-300985

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
5 Jan 73

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HVCA 19182

SECRET

FORM 610a

46f/

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.:

FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: WKSCARLET-3: New Memorandum of Oral Commitments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are three copies of the new MOC for WKSCARLET-3, effective 1 January 1973.

Nora W. Cobeaga
Nora W. COBEAGA

Attachment:
MOC, 3 copies

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/ att. h/w

E2 IMPDET

CS COPY

1 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HVCA-19182

DATE: JAN 05 1973 3 January 1973

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-300985

SECRET

AMENDMENT OR TERMINATION

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

DATE: 3 January 1973

TO : Chief, Finance Division

VIA : Contract Approving Officer

FROM : Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Oral Commitments: WKSCARLET-3 (Agent)
201-300985

Subject Memorandum, dated 20 August 1968 , has been amended or terminated as indicated below:

1. Compensation. Effective 1 January 1973 , Subject will be paid Bs 2000.00 per month (equivalent to $ 456.62 at exchange rate Bs 4.38/$1.00). No other changes with respect to compensation or other emoluments or benefits as detailed in the original Memorandum have been made.

2. Termination. Subject contract was terminated effective . Appropriate secrecy agreements and acknowledgement that no further claims against contracting entity are outstanding have been obtained insofar as operationally possible and feasible.

3. Other Charges.

SIGNED: Michael C. CHOADEN
Field Contracting Officer
(Chief of Station)

REVIEWED:
Contract Approving Officer

REVIEWED:
Special Contracting Officer

CS COPY

S/W ATT TO HVCA 19182

SECRET

201-300985

ORIG: LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
UNIT: WH/COG
EXT: 7451 R. 1948
DATE: 20 NOVEMBER 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES
SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ #________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

20 NOV 72 [illegible] 59z

CITE DIRECTOR 339436

TO WH/MIAMI MANAGUA

DESENSITIZED

1. REQUEST INFORMATION REGARDING COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OF MANUEL ARTIME FOR PAST FEW YEARS.

2. DO NOT MAKE SPECIFIC INQUIRIES ON SUBJECT BUT ONLY PROVIDE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO YOU AT THIS TIME.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB
IN
FS
BX
FI

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized:
Signed:
R.C. #[illegible] - Unit WH/C
C/WH/COG
Note: If [illegible] reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

201-300985

20 NOV 1972

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 22-1

SECRET

ORIG: GARDNER R. HATHAWAY
UNIT: C/WH/3
EXT: 5337/1128
DATE: 16 OCT 1972

FILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 33 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

WH8 | INFO | FILE. VR. [✓ PLAN] SSB CS/DO FI c/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 16OCT72 21 13z CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY CARACAS

REDTOP

REF: CARACAS 20277 (IN 733406)

325322

1. PLS KEEP US UP TO DATE ON THIS CASE. FYI ONLY, APPARENT SIMILAR CASE IN ANOTHER AREA OCCURRED LAST WEEK.

2. REALIZE THIS WKSCARLET CASE AND STATION NOT CALLING SHOTS; HOWEVER, IF STATION CAN FIGURE WAY DISCUSS CASE (WITHOUT BLOWING WKSCARLET-3), SUGGEST YOU DO SO BEFORE WKSCARLET DECIDES ARREST AND EXPEL 201-0731434. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE WOULD PREFER HAVE WKSCARLET COOPTEE ACCEPT RECRUITMENT (AT LEAST INITIALLY) WHILE WE TAKE HARD LOOK AT 201-0731434 AS AEKICK CASE OFFICER AND AT SAME TIME, EXAMINE POSSIBILITIES OF POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT APPROACH OPERATION.

3. FILE 201-0731434, 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET. Ø

CS COPY FILED IN 201- 731434

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 300958

SB/X/WH

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
for C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GARDNER R. HATHAWAY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA-19067	13 October 1972	75	2	16	3

DOC. SUBJECT

WKRALLY Project: Progress report for 1 July - 30 Sept 1972

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

STATUS OF PROJECT AGENTS:

13. This period showed that while WKSCARLET-3 does have a highly responsible position within his organization, he still is being ordered to do special assignments by the chief of the service. These assignments usually involve out-of-town travel and/or long and unusual working hours. This precludes regular scheduled meetings; however, the agent is contacted on the average of once a week. WKSCARLET-3, along with his normal routine duties, was involved in a number of varied activities during the reporting period which he duly reported to the Station. He continues to investigate all possible leads in the kidnapping case of Carlos Domingues. In August he led a small team to Cucuta, Colombia where they uncovered and destroyed a small printing shop which was engaged in the fabrication of false Venezuelan identity cards. He continues the investigation of the activities of Sergio Pineda Ruiz, the Prensa Latina chief in Caracas. The problem of agent/case officer communications has been somewhat alleviated. The agent now contacts the case officer at the latter's home during the evening hours. This doesn't obviate the need for an RS-708 system, but until the details for a concealment device that will be appropriate for WKSCARLET-3's rather spartan office are worked out, phone contact is necessary. During the reporting period WKSCARLET-3 produced three disseminations and contributed to one other.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) WKSCARLET-3	201-

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES /0 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY dad PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT SB8 | INFO | FILE, VR ~~CI/AN~~ WH8 C/OPS C/OA FI

ACTION NO. 461

S E C R E T 131945Z OCT 72 STAFF 733406

CITE CARACAS 20277

DIRECTOR.

REDTOP

1. WKSCARLET-3 (UNILATERAL) REPORTED 13 OCTOBER SUBJECT OF 201~~[illegible]~~ -0731434 HAS ARRANGED MEETING 0900 14 OCTOBER WITH WKSCARLET COOPTEE EMPLOYED MAIQUETIA AIRPORT. COOPTEE REPORTED ARRANGEMENTS WKSCARLET AND LATTER WILL ATTEMPT PHOTOGRAPH MEETING. REASON MEETING UNKNOWN, HOWEVER, WKSCARLET THINKS MAY BE RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT. IF IN FACT IT IS, PHOTOGRAPHY WILL SUPPORT EVIDENCE OF ATTEMPTED RECRUITMENT AND RESULTANT ARREST SUBJECT 201-0732434. ACCORDING WKSCARLET-3 ARREST PROBABLY WILL NOT TAKE PLACE 14 OCTOBER.

2. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

3. FILE: 201-0731434, 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

CS COPY FILED IN 201-731434

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201-300985

SECRET

DISPATCH | SECRET

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
CIFENCE-4 - Operational Approval

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HVCA-18757, dated 31 March 1972

CIFENCE-4 has been granted full Operational Approval, effective 17 July 1972, for use as a unilateral penetration of CIRASH.

Karen T. GEHRKE

AUG 11 3 PM '72

CLASSIFIED BY 51-1351
EXEMPT FROM [illegible] CLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF [illegible] CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2) [illegible] (one or more)
[illegible] ON
Rydin
[illegible] event)

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCW-9808	31 JUL 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 201-300985

1

1 - IP
1 - Chrono

AN
AB X
ID
PS
RI
DEST SVD
FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/V	Nancy Davis	ss (27 July 72)	9494

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	27 July	Philip F. Snare

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	27 JUL 1972	Gardner R. Hathaway

FORM 1-68 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

27 JUL 1972

DISPATCH

SECRET

No. 201-300985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/V - Nancy L. Davis

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of CIFENCE/4 ________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows: .

Unilateral penetration of CIRASH.

Field notified
27 Jul 72

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

Lee E.

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Acting

Date: 17 July 1972 lg

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

FORM 1-67 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (9)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA-18940	14 July 1972	75	2	16	3

DOC. SUBJECT
CIFLUTE Project - Progress Report for the Period
1 April - 30 June 1972

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

Distribution: 3-WHD

11. In mid-April CIFENCE-4 was placed in charge of yet another of the CIRASH divisions, with added responsibility and importance. This change has allowed him more time in Caracas, and reflects a continually improving position vis-a-vis CIFENCE-1, the CIRASH Director. This coupled with what now appears the likelihood that CIFENCE-1 will retain this present position until the government changes in early 1974, makes the longevity of CIFENCE-4 with CIRASH somewhat more certain. As part of his new responsibilities, CIFENCE-4 has initiated an extensive investigation of Prensa Latina and its Caracas Director, Sergio Piñeda Ruiz. This operation was interrupted in early June by the kidnapping of Venezuelan industrialist Carlos Dominguez, with CIFENCE-4 being placed in charge of the CIRASH investigation of the as yet unresolved case. As of this writing, CIFENCE-4 has been devoting all of his time to this kidnapping case, to the detriment of other operations. Because of the unpredictable work schedule of CIFENCE-4 and the security precautions observed by the Station in contacting him, operational communication has been less efficient than desirable during the reporting period, while security has been maintained. The arrangements have been reviewed and improved, but the Station is looking for a more satisfactory system. The Station tentatively plans to request an RS-708 system for this agent in the near future. CIFENCE-4 contributed to two reports during the April through June quarter.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)
CIFENCE-4

201-

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 8-68

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 ______ PER CI C

ACTION UNIT C/WHG | FILE VR | WH ADDR... CI/ICAN C/CI 2 C/FI C/CI/SO

ACTION 679

S E C R E T 111437Z JUL 72 STAFF WH3V 656946

CITE WH/MIAMI 15163

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

REFS: A. CARACAS 19663 (IN 655195)

B. HVCA-18872

1. SUBJECT REFS, ACCORDING LNERGO/MIAMI, WORKS FOR GRAMCO, AN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CO., AND WAS SENT BY GRAMCO TO CARACAS. LNERGO DOES NOT RPT NOT PURPOSE TRIP. FYI ONLY: SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO LNERGO/MIAMI AND PAID BY LNERGO; HE IS NOT TARGETTED AGAINST TARGETS OUTSIDE OF U.S. AND NOT SENT CARACAS BY LNERGO. CONSIDERED BY LNERGO AS SPECIAL CATEGORY DUE FACT WAS LNERGO'S BEST WITNESS IN ORLANDO BOSCH TRIAL. LNERGO REP SAID SUBJECT RETURNED MIAMI 10 JULY. LNERGO MIAMI AWARE SUBJECT ALSO USED BY LNAGON/MIAMI.

2. LNAGON/MIAMI USES SUBJECT AS CASUAL INFORMANT BUT DOES NOT PAY HIM OR GIVE HIM SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS AS SUCH. LNAGON COMMENTS CAUTIONS: ADMITTED ACCEPT INFO AND TELL HIM REPORT ANYTHING ELSE HEARS ON SUBJECT DRUGS BUT INSISTS HE NOT PAID BY LNAGON AND NOT CONSIDERED CONTROLLED ASSET. FYI: LNAGON/MIAMI AWARE SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO LNERGO.

3. BOTH LNERGO AND LNAGON INFORMED BY STATION THAT SUBJECT TALKING

[illegible]

201-300985

CS COPY FILED IN 201-284816

SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ LOGGED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED

BY AT

DISSEM BY PER

ACTION UNIT FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 15163 SECRET

TOO FREELY IN CARACAS ABOUT HIS IMPORTANCE IN DRUG OPS. WHILE LNERGO ADMITTED SUBJECT PAID BY THAT OFFICE, DENIED KNOWLEDGE SALARY DOUBLED BUT DID NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY GRAMCO MAY HAVE RAISED PAY.

4. NEITHER CIFENCE/4 NOR CIGOAL/5 MENTIONED IN CONVERSATIONS WITH ABOVE OFFICES; REFERRED ONLY TO BKTRUST SOURCES CARACAS REPORTING SUBJECT TALKING AND BOASTING TOO MUCH FOR GOOD SECURITY.

5. FILE: 201-284816; 201-300985. EX-2 APDIR, WN-SISM.

SECRET

SECRET

201-300985

CRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 4-1

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACT COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY 31/ PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH 8

FILE, VR IT/CN, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO.

655195

4

S E C R E T 081610Z JUL 72 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 19663

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: CARACAS 19581 (IN642128)

1. REQUEST REPLY TO REF. EMBASSY LNAGON REP HAS NOW ASKED STATION IF SUBJECT REF BKTRUST CONNECTED DUE HIS RECENT BOASTING OF OPS. LNAGON REP AT SAME TIME SAID SUBJECT REF IS INFORMANT OF LNAGON/MIAMI.

2. FILE: 201-284816; 201-300985. EX-2, APDIR, WN-SISM.

S E C R E T

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- ~~284816~~
300985
CIFENE-4

AN
AB

CS COPY FILED IN 201-284816

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 20 June 1972 lc
TO: C/WH/3/V - N. Davis	201 NO. 201-300985
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT: CIFENCE/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☐	PRQ II	☐	U.S. COMINT TRACES
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES (Incl. COMINT)	☒	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA; DODCI & DFI
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES (Incl. COMINT)	☒	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please review the FBI, DODCI and DFI reports contained in Subject's CI/OA file. Also comment on their significance.

FORM 7-71 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20-38)

DISPATCH | SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO.: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: Ricardo MORALES Navarrete

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On approximately 5 March 1972, a Station asset, CIFENCE-4, while acting in his cover capacity had occasion to detain and question one Ricardo MORALES Navarrete, a Cuban resident of Miami.

2. Morales N. told CIFENCE-4 that he, Morales, is employed by LNERGO from whom he receives a salary of US$700 per month. Morales said that he was en route to Colombia on a drug case at the time. During the conversation Morales admitted to CIFENCE-4 having been responsible for a killing in Florida.

3. CIFENCE-4 reported to the Station the above, as well as stating that Morales has an extremely poor reputation in the Cuban community, where he is prone to tell nearly anyone willing to listen of his affiliation with LNERGO, with the implication that his employer sanctions his activities.

4. Morales also told CIFENCE-4 that a Cuban (true name of CIGOAL-5) who works with SIFA in Caracas is an agent of BKTRUST.

5. Attached is a copy of the reentry permit of Morales, as well as a clipping from the Miami press relating to the killing which Morales allegedly confessed to having committed.

6. The above is for the information of Station WH/Miami and further action as deemed appropriate. No coordination with LNERGO in Caracas has been effected due to security considerations involving CIFENCE-4.

EDGAR B. MARTEGANI

Attachments: h/w
1. Newspaper clipping
2. Morales reentry permit (copy)

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - COS, WH/Miami w/ att. — To [illegible]
2 ATT ③ - C/WHD w/ att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
~~201-284816~~ 201-300985	HVCA- 18872	9 June 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~DEFER~~ 201-285923

file CIFENCE-4

14-00000

Cuarto 1309, Hospital Jackson Memorial, 7:10 P.M. Miércoles Diciembre 4 de 1968.

"Yo, JULIO ATON CONSTANZO PALAU, del 752 S.W. Cuarta calle, Miami, Florida, casado con María Constanzo, la cual está aquí presente, declaro lo siguiente: Nací en Palma Soriano, Oriente, en Cuba, el 22 de Mayo de 1936. Yo tengo 32 años de edad. Me casé el 10 de Marzo de 1963 en Miami, Florida.

Yo no soy un ciudadano de Estados Unidos. Yo soy un residente, y tengo una hija, Elizabeth, la cual cumplirá cinco años de edad el 24 de diciembre, la cual nació aquí, en este Hospital, Jackson Memorial.

Mi propósito de hacer estas declaraciones se debe al hecho que la policía ha permitido que pasen varios días, y la gente que intentó quitarme la vida está afuera en la calle, libres.

El 22 de noviembre, alrededor de las 8.30 de la noche, a unas tres cuadras de mi casa, yo estaba caminando y me bajé de la acera en la 7avenida y la Segunda calle, en la sección del S.W. , cuando oí a alguien llamarme "Atón", y miré para ver quien era, y entonces yo sentí que ellos me disparaban, y yo vi las armas con silenciadores.

Yo vi a Ricardo Morales Navarrete, y él estaba en un Chevrolet Impala 1965, de dos puertas, amarillo con dos luces de cola. Estaba situado en el medio de la calle.

Este hombre, Ricardo Morales Navarrete estaba en el asiento de atrás, en la lado izquierdo. El tenía un fusil M-3, con un silenciador, el cual dispara balas calibre 45.

Otro hombre estaba manejando, y yo lo conozco de vista, pero no sé su nombre verdadero. Lo llaman con el apodo de "El Gallego". Este hombre, El Gallego, tenía una pistola que parecía una Beretta, con un silenciador adaptado.

Ambos me dispararon. Yo recibí 15 heridas de bala y 21 perforaciones.

Un tercer hombre estaba en el carro, llamado Francisco Rodríguez al que apodan "El Mejicano", el cual no disparó.

Yo identifico a Ricardo Morales Navarrete como al mismo hombre que testificó para el Gobierno en el juicio de Orlando Bosch.

Dos días antes yo lo vi a él con esta otra persona, El Gallego, observándome en frente de mi casa. Ellos estaban en otro carro, un Polara.

Yo conozco a este Morales Navarrete de La Habana, él era Jefe Asistente de la Sección del G-2 en el Aeropuerto de Rancho Boyeros, Habana, Cuba.

Yo no he hablado con él, pero otro hombre, Eddy Fernández Pla, hace casi dos meses, vino a mi casa a eso de la una de la madrugada para darme un mensaje de Ricardo Morales Navarrete y del Mejicano Francisco Rodríguez Tamayo los cuales no querían ser mis enemigos, que el enemigo era Batista, y que debíamos ser amigos porque las cosas iban a cambiar.

Yo le dije que no quería tener ninguna amistad con gente que trabajaba para Fidel Castro.

La noche que Eddy Fernández Pla vino a mi casa, él estaba con otro hombre, Rogelio Fernández, el cual es un vendedor de la Firestone.

Yo tengo una bala alojada cerca de mi corazón y tiene que ser extraída con un aparato especial, según me dijo el médico.

En estos tres últimos días no me he sentido bien y como tengo todos estos tiros en mi cuerpo sé que estoy en una mala condición y me siento como que voy a morir, y si muero, no quiero morir sin que este gran país castigue a estos asesinos, los cuales son nefastos para toda la sociedad.

Hago estas declaraciones completamente consciente de sus contenidos, sin coacción y de mi propia y libre voluntad.

He tenido atención médica para aliviar el dolor, y no me siento bajo la influencia de ninguna droga, pero me siento muy normal y hago estas declaraciones por las razones antes expuestas".

(firmado) Julio Atón Constanzo Palau

Testigos: César Camacho, Felipe Rivero.

Estado de la Florida
Condado de Dade
Jurado y suscrito ante mí este día 5 de Diciembre de 1968 a las 7.30 P.M.
Gino Negretti, Notario Público.

H/watt 1 to HKMA 13872

CS COPY

201-285923

14-00000

0371516

163 S. W. 80th Avenue Miami, Florida 331..

DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY
June 14, 1939	Cuba	Cuba
EYES	HAIR	HEIGHT
Black	Black	5 FEET 9 INCHES

VISIBLE SCARS AND MARKS

NONE

VALIDITY OF PERMIT

PERMIT EXPIRES	VALIDITY EXTENDED TO	VALIDITY EXTENDED TO
January 25, 1973		
DATE AND LOCATION OF ISSUING OFFICE	DATE AND LOCATION OF OFFICE	DATE AND LOCATION OF OFFICE
January 25, 1972 Mia		
SIGNATURE ISSUING OFFICER	SIGNATURE REVALIDATING OFFICER	SIGNATURE REVALIDATING OFFICER

037:516

3



RESTRICTIONS

VALID FOR ☐ ONE ENTRY ONLY ☒ MULTIPLE ENTRIES

This document is not valid for return to the United States after a temporary absence which involves travel to, in or through any of the following countries unless this restriction is specifically waived with regard to any such country or countries by indorsement hereon.

Communist portions of:

Albania	China
Cuba	Korea
Outer Mongolia	Viet-Nam

The above restriction is waived as to the following.

NONE

Segundo Apellido		No. de expedicion
...les		Nº 05206
Nombre	Segundo nombre	No. de Cedula
Ricardo		
Sex. / Edad / Profesion	Nacionalidad	No. de Pasaporte
32 / Vendedor	Cubana	0371516
Tipo de Visa / Duracion	Autorizacion M.R.I.	Lugar de expedicion
Turista / 30	[illegible]-5	Miami, Florida U.S.A.
Firma del expedidor	Direccion en Venezuela	
	Hotel Tamanaco, Caracas.-	
Nombre	Aereo ☐ Maritimo ☐ Terrestre ☐	Aereo ☐ Maritimo ☐ Terrestre ☐
	Transportista / Destino	Transportista / Procede
Sello del expedidor		
REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA	Salida	DIEX 12 ... 72 Entrada

Hw att 2 to HVCA 18872

201-285923

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
IP/DPI
GB-12

EXTENSION: x7737

NO. HVCT-05600 ATTN/N

DATE: 5 MAY 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief/WH/Reg.	8 MAY 1972	8 MAY 1972	wa	
2. WH/3	8 May		jd	Copy detached and logged
3. VB	[illegible]	11 May 72	VB	
4.				
5.				
6. WH/7/Guyana			W	
7. WH/3/V				
8.				Pls rtn to Ven desk for file.
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
Venezuelan Security Service Study on the Diamond Fields in the Venezuelan Guyana Territory

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: FYI

Attached is a study in Spanish language prepared by the Venezuelan Directorate of the Service of Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP) in the Ministry of Interior on a diamond field in the Venezuelan Guyana region which may be of interest to the Venezuelan and Guyana Desks. It was provided by CIFENCE-4, a unilateral security source, on 26 April 1972. According to CIFENCE-4, President Rafael Caldera was very interested in the study and excerpted large portions verbatim for one of his weekly press conferences.

Frances M. Barghahn
Frances M. BARGHAHN

Attachment:
As Stated

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCT-05600	2 May 1972
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 165-9-8 ~~No File~~

REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES INTERIORES
DIRECCION DE LOS SERVICIOS DE INTELIGENCIA Y PREVENCION

Caracas, 27 de MARZO de 1972.-

Informe que presentan los funcionarios LUIS POSADA CARRILES, JULIO CESAR LANZA CARVAJAL y EFREN CASTILLO, en relación a las averiguaciones practicadas en el Campo Diamantífero "La Salvación", situado en el suroeste de la Guayana Venezolana.

INFORME:

1. Ubicación y descripción geográfica de la región. Su acceso.-
2. Condiciones de vida y de trabajo de la población minera.-
3. Actuación de las autoridades.-

1. Ubicación y descripción geográfica de la región. Su acceso:

1. 1. El lugar donde se encuentra establecido el Campo minero "La Salvación" está ubicado al Sur Oeste del Estado Bolívar, en pleno corazón de la selva, cercano a las riveras del Río Guaniamo, unas dos horas aproximadamente por vía aérea desde Ciudad Bolívar. El mencionado poblado esta enclavado en una superficie plana cuyos contornos estan sembrados de innumerables elevaciones de tierras que forman parte del macizo Guayanés.

1. 2. La única vía de acceso es aérea, ya que por la naturaleza de la región y su gran distancia de los centros poblados, es prácticamente imposible que se haga por otros medios. A tal fin se

CIFENCIE-4

han construido pequeños e improvisados aeropuertos en las cercanías de la región del Guaniamo y mas pequeños aún en cada una de las minas que van apareciendo y dodde se agrupan temporalmente gran número de personas.-

Puntualizando lo antes dicho existe un aeropuerto que sirva como Base de Operaciones en la región, identificado como Aeropuerto de "La Contella", con una longitud de ochocientos (800) metros de pista de tierra, siendo este el de mayor tamaño y desde donde se hacen los trasbordos en avionetas mas pequeñas que salen a los propios campos mineros, situados en un área no mayor de quince (15) minutos ~~de vuelo~~.

En el caso de "La Salvación", este campamento minero se encuentra exactamente a unos siete minutos de vuelo saliendo del Aeropuerto "La Contella". La pista de aterrizaje es igualmente de tierra con apenas trescientos ochenta (380) metros de longitud, lo que hace sumamente peligroso su utilización, mas aún cuando observamos que se encuentra rodeada de árboles gigantescos que alcanzan 40 y 50 metros de altura. Por las características descritas, en esta pista han ocurrido varios accidentes aéreos causando muertos, heridos y varios aparatos destruidos de los cuales actualmente se pueden apreciar en el sitio cinco totalmente inservibles; igualmente no se utilizan los equipos de radio entre las avionetas y los aeropuertos, existiendo el peligro latente de un accidente por el choque de aparatos tanto en el aire como en la propia pista, ya que generalmente existen nubes muy bajas que apenas permiten ver la pista como un pequeño claro en medio de la selva; esta situación empeora aún mas por la irresponsabilidad de las líneas aéreas y los propios pilotos, quienes buscando mayor beneficio sobrecargan los aviones a veces hasta con el doble del peso permitido, sin que exista ningún control de Comunicaciones para regular tal anormalidad. Un ejemplo claro lo constituye la Línea "ASERCA", que en un año registró trece accidentes en la región.-

2. Condiciones de vida y de trabajo de la población minera:

2. 1. Las condiciones de vida de la población que alcanza aproximadamente a unas 6.000 personas (pero que llegó a tener el año pasado unas 15.000), dejan mucho que desear en el aspecto sanitario, habitacional y moral. Las aguas que corren por el lugar están contaminadas por el esparcimiento indiscriminado de excrementos en las márgenes de las quebradas y pequeños ríos, así como en el interior del propio poblado. Las enfermedades, como el paludismo y amibiasis, se observan con bastante frecuencia por falta de asistencia y control sanitario; las enfermedades venéreas abundan por no existir un riguroso control sobre el gran número de prostitutas que existen en la población. La totalidad de las viviendas estan construidas con cartones, tablas y láminas de zinc, que escasamente protegen a sus moradores de las inclemencias del tiempo, siendo mas grave la situación por la gran cantidad de niños que son llevados por sus padres al lugar, por demás peligroso e inapropiado para ellos, sin que tampoco exista ninguna regulación o control al respecto.-

La prostitución cobra marcado incremento en estas zonas, atrayendo mujeres desde diferentes lugares de la República y de países vecinos como Colombia y Brasil, que se agrupan en improvisados bares situados dentro de la población, provocando hechos reñidos con la moral que se llevan a cabo en presencia de niños y de honestas familias de mineros.-

Prolifera en sus diferentes manifestaciones el juego, siendo los mas comunes la baraja y los dados, bingos, etc., estos últimos son transmitidos por altavoces dandole un aspecto de feria nocturna al poblado.-

2. 2. Generalmente los mineros forman grupos de trabajo constituyendo pequeñas sociedades entre las que se repartirá la ganancia que logren obtener, pero como carecen de recursos indispensables se ven obligados a incluir como socios a personas que les prestan los implementos de trabajo o que financian su alimentación, constituyendo esta forma una especie de explotación si se toma en cuenta que generalmente exageran las cantidades consumidas por los mineros. Los compradores de diamantes aprovechan la necesidad de vender los diamantes encontrados por los mineros, para pagarlos a precios muy por debajo de su valor real y los especuladores aprovechan para elevar los precios de los alimentos, medicinas, etc., llegando en oportunidades de escasêz a vender hasta en Bs 40 un kilogramo de arroz. Actualmente dada la competencia y los constantes viajes que efectuan al lugar las diferentes líneas aéreas, entre ellas: "ASERCA", "AEROVEN", "GATIZSA", "LATINCARGA", "AEROTECNICA" y "COMERAVIA", los precios han dejado de ser tan exagerados.-

3. Actuación de las autoridades:

3. 1. Lakprimera autoridad civil del lugar está representada por un Comisario General de nombre JOSE TOMAS GAONA ESPINOZA, pero el verdadero control sobre la población es ejercido por la Guardia Nacional y para el momento de la presente averiguación estaba constótuida por un grupo de cuatro Guardias, comandados por un Cabo de apellido CARPIO; este grupo es completamente nuevo en el lugar, a raíz de la salida del Teniente LUIS PRIN y de su segundo, un Cabo de apellido PIMATE, quienes fueron sometidos a investigación por su propio Comando a causa de frecuentes denuncias de presuntas irregularidades cometidas en ejercicio de sus -

funciona. Entrevistados algunos comerciantes y mineros del lugar, pudimos obtener información coincidente entre los mismos informantes de las actividades desagradables para ellos desarrolladas por los efectivos de la Guardia Nacional, citando atropellos cometidos por el Teniente LUIS PRIN y el Cabo PIÑATE, destacando entre ellos los siguientes:

Que cuando el Teniente LUIS PRIN VILLEGAS era el Jefe de la Guardia Nacional en "La Salvación", existía el Bar "Bejuquero", cuya dueña aparentemente era la ciudadana PETRA GUAPE, quien era públicamente amante del Teniente PRIN, ya que eran vistos caminar tomados de la mano por el pueblo y el Tte. dormía junto con ella en el local del mismo Bar, lo grave de los hechos, según revelan los informantes, estaba en que a las nueve de la noche el Teniente ordenaba el cierre de todos los demás bares notificandole a los mineros por intermedio de los propios Guardias que si querían seguir tomando podían continuar en el Bar "Bejuquero", donde en varias oportunidades se vió a los Guardias uniformados despachando cervezas a los clientes en el interior de ese Bar, por lo que se generalizó entre los pobladores la idea de que el Tte. PRIN tenía parte en el negocio. Igualmente informan los entrevistados que los Guardias Nacionales que comandaba el Tte. PRIN VILLEGAS, especialmente el Cabo PIÑATE, se daban a la tarea de pedir a los mineros parte de la tierra que sacaban y donde podría haber o nó diamantes; igualmente cobraban una especie de impuesto a las personas que administraban las casas de juegos. Narran las personas entrevistadas que en una oportunidad los mineros, uno de ellos menor de edad, se jugaban de manos en el pueblo, resultando golpeado el menor y que su amigo, quien lo golpeó, sin mala intención, no opuso ninguna resistencia y voluntariamente manifestó a la Guardia Nacional que estaba dispuesto a enviar al médico por su cuenta a su amigo y a pagar un arresto si era necesario, cosa esta que no sucedió pues el Teniente ordenó esposarlo y propinarle cinco planazos en presencia del pueblo para así sentar un precedente de respeto, según expresó.-

Se pudo conocer que el año pasado, por el mes de Noviembre, por orden de la Guardia Nacional se llevó a cabo una reunión en el Bar del Señor ZABALA, y donde asistieron además el Coronel VALDERRAMA y el Tte. Cnel BECERRA, procedentes del Destacamento acantonado en San Fernando de Apure. En esta reunión se planteó la necesidad de que colaborarar los comerciantes de la localidad para la construcción del Comando de la Guardia Nacional en esa mina; los comerciantes aceptaron hacerlo y negocio a negocio fueron visitados dando en 100 y 200 bolívares cada uno; esta colaboración no fué del agrado de los comerciantes, pero por temor a represalias prefirieron colaborar no pudiendo determinar la cantidad recogida, pero se estimaba varios miles de bolívares; con la suma de dinero donada se construyó un galpón de zinc, cercado con alambres de púas que en la actualidad hace las veces de Comando de la Guardia Nacional en "La Salvación".-

Un Mayor de las Fuerzas Aéreas Venezolanas de apellido SEGUIA, se ha hecho en las minas hombre importante en su condición de comerciante. Adquirió junto con otros socios la Línea aérea "ASERCA", piloteando personalmente uno de sus aviones, específicamente el identificado con las siglas: YV-C-ASI-, donde transporta personas y carga, especialmente cerveza traída desde Valencia y Maracay, constituyendose así en el mayor distribuidor de cerveza en la mina; además posée la única fábrica de hielo que existe en el lugar y una planta para tratamiento del agua, la que igualmente vende en la mina.- Estos negocios estan administrados por un hermano suyo, y que las maquinarias de la compañía que fabrica hielo y potabiliza el agua, distinguida con el nombre de SAFER, fueron trasladadas a la mina en un avión de carga de las Fuerzas Aéreas.-

Esta comisión pudo ver personalmente al Mayor SEGUIA en su función de piloto comercial cobrando a los mineros que transportaba; igualmente la comisión le observó en traje civil, pero según informaron las personas interrogadas, este militar frecuentemente ha sido visto con su uniforme de las Fuerzas Aéreas, por lo que se puede deducir de que actualmente se encuentra activo en nuestras Fuerzas Aéreas.-

De la actuación de los Guardias Nacionales que actualmente se encuentran en "La Salvación" al mando del Cabo CARPIO, no hay acusaciones por atropellos, solamente y eso se pudo notar, toleran el juego y protegen algunos bares que permanecen abiertos hasta pasada dla hora normal. Entre estos bares figura uno donde se practica la prostitución y cuya dueña, de nombre ROSA, se jacta públicamente de ser "la primera dama de La Salvación" por el hecho de ser la amante del Cabo CARPIO.-

En conversación sostenida en un plano amistoso con el Cabo CARPIO, éste manifestó a la comisión que ellos aceptaban regalos en dinero de parte de los mineros por el poco sueldo que devengaban en un lugar como ese donde el costo de la vida es tan elevado.

Esta comisión, luego de hablar con las perso--

que han suministrado algunas de estas informaciones, puedo adelantar que los mismos estarán en condiciones de rendir declaraciones escritas si se les exige, pero hicieron la recomendación de que en ese caso había que hacerlo con suma discreción por temor a futuras represalias.-

Es todo cuanto tenemos que informar al respecto.-

LUIS POSADA CARRILES.
Comisario

JULIO CESAR LANZA C.
Sub - Comisario

EFREN CASTILLO.
-Sub-Inspector

/ jrgz.-

A.- DIAMANTES.- Primera Parte

1 SITUACION EXISTENTE EN VENEZUELA

11 Generalidades

En 1970 la producción diamantífera Venezolana alcanzó 508.661 quilates, siendo esta producción la más alta en la historia de esta actividad en el país. Con relación a 1969 la producción ha triplicado según se desprende de los cuadros anexos de producción.

Esta producción ha sido lograda en su casi totalidad bajo el sistema de libre aprovechamiento, sinónimo de sub-desarrollo en los aspectos técnico, social y económico. En el aspecto técnico el sub-desarrollo se manifiesta en los sistemas rudimentarios de explotación que no permiten el cabal aprovechamiento del yacimiento.

En el aspecto social son de todos conocidas las condiciones infrahumanas en que se desenvuelve la vida del minero, con la falta de servicios elementales, vías de comunicación, falta de seguridad personal imposibilidad de lograr una superación personal a través de una comunidad y familia estables.

En el aspecto económico los circuitos de mercadeo existentes hacen que el minero se encuentre a merced de los compradores organizados a quienes venden su producción en las condiciones que le son fijadas.

Por otra parte hay que señalar que el libre aprovechamiento solo puede ser utilizado donde concurren ciertas condiciones físicas como alta concentración del diamante y agua suficiente para las técnicas primitivas de lavado.

CIFENCE- 4

Con el nivel de producción actual y la riqueza potencial existente se hace necesario efectuar modificaciones en la forma de aprovechamiento, introduciendo técnicas industriales de trabajo.

Igualmente es de señalar que la ley y reglamento actuales de Minas datan del año 1944, cuando la producción diamantífera no alcanzaba ni siquiera el 10% de los niveles actuales. Su modificación es imperativa a efectos de introducir nuevas regulaciones cónsonas con las técnicas existentes inclusive en países menos desarrollados que Venezuela.

No se pretende recomendar la eliminación de la explotación del diamante bajo el sistema de libre aprovechamiento por las implicaciones socio-políticas que esta medida tendría, pero sí complementarla con la utilización de métodos industriales de aprovechamiento enmarcada dentro de una legislación actualizada.

El Ministerio de Minas conoce los pormenores de la explotación bajo el libre aprovechamiento desde hace tiempo, recalcada por los Ings. Francisco Izquierdo y Oleg Andreiev, expertos del MMH, en varias oportunidades.

La actividad diamantífera en Venezuela reviste enorme importancia según puede apreciarse en las cifras siguientes, (sobre datos de 1970):

- Representa el 1,5% de la producción mundial, estimada oficialmente en 46 millones de quilates.
- Utiliza una fuerza de trabajo entre 10.000 y 15.000 mineros. De la cifra anterior es difícil determinar el porcentaje de venezolanos y de Extranjeros indocumentados que trabajan en esta actividad.
- * Aporta a la Nación ingresos fiscalizados de 30.millones de bolivares de los cuales el Gobierno percibe en calidad de impuesto de explotación un 3%.

* El informe Daniel-Fairbain estima un valor real para la producción en [illegible] 20.000.000 y un total de 600.000 [illegible] para 197[illegible]

Por información bancaria obtenida extraoficialmente, hemos podido saber que procedentes del exterior fué girada a Ciudad Bolivar una suma cercana a los 70 millones de bolivares destinada a compra de diamantes durante 1970.

- Adoptando una cifra conservadora de 50 millones de bolivares como valor de la producción de diamantes, esto representaría un 10% del aporte que hace el Producto Territorial Bruto el Sector Minero.

- La explotación del diamante determina una serie de inversiones en actividades conexas, altamente remuneradoras por lo general, como por ejemplo las líneas de aviación locales para transporte de mineros como Aerotécnica, Comeravia, Gatic C.A., Tanca, etc.

- Fuente de ingresos para las Municipalidades. El Comercio en el Guaniamo cancela Bs. 15.000 mensuales a la Municipalidad del Distrito Cedeño del Estado Bolivar (sin prestación de servicio alguno hasta la fecha.).

12.- Especificaciones del Diamante venezolano

- Origen

El diamante venezolano proviene de Guayana (Provincia de Roraima y Cuchivero).

Es un diamante de aluvión ó sea que se encuentra en el cauce de los ríos, ó forma en terrazas aluvionales depósitos ubicados a poca profundidad: 3 a 15 metros de acuerdo a la topografía.

En algunas regiones del mundo, los diamantes se encuentran en "chimeneas" ó "pipes"; únicas fuentes primarias de diamantes conocidas- ejemplo: Kimberley (Africa del Sur) - en otras en depósitos aluvionales como en Venezuela ó en las playas del Sur Oeste de Africa; ó en una combinación de ambos - ejemplo : Yakutia, Rusia.

No todas las "chimineas" son productivas y 75% de la producción mundial proviene de aluvión.

La riqueza de los depósitos depende:

- del tenor en diamantes del material extraido
- de la proporción entre los tipos, talla-industrial-bort
- de las características de las piedras (morfológicas y de color)

- Tenor

En Venezuela la cantidad de quilates por tonelada métrica es satisfactoria; para el Guaniamo se puede evaluar en 0,4 - 0,5 quilates por tonelada métrica - cantidad que justifica la permanencia en el sitio del Minero de Libre Aprovechamiento. (1 quilate= 0,2 gramos)

Los valores promedios de los tenores de los yacimientos del grupo De Beers en Africa del Sur son de 0,2 a 0,3 - según se desprende del Informe Anual 1969 de De Beers Consolidated Mines LTD.

✓

COMPARACION ENTRE VENEZUELA Y EL GRUPO DE BEERS EN RELACION CON LA PRESENCIA DE DIAMANTE ENCONTRADO

ACTIVIDAD DIAMANTIFERA DEL GRUPO DE BEERS EN 1.969

Toneladas de material diamantífero extraídas y tratadas = 39 millones

Quilates obtenidos = 9 millones

Costo global = 232 millones de Bs.

Costo por quilate = 26. Bolivares

Tenor del material = 0,23 Qt./Ton.

(Fuente: Informe Anual 1969. DE BEERS CONSOLODATED MINES LTD.)

ACTIVIDAD DIAMANTIFERA DE VENEZUELA EN 1970

(Libre Aprovechamiento)

Toneladas extraídas

$$5.000 \text{ mineros } \frac{\times\ 2 \text{ Ton. } \times\ 300}{\text{minero-día}} \text{ días} = 2 \text{ a } 3 \text{ millones ton. (max)}$$

Quilates obtenidos = 500.000

Costo global = Indeterminado

Costo por quilate = Indeterminado

Tenor del material = 0,4 - 0,5 Quilates/Ton. (maX)

• Proporción Talla - Industrial - Bort

La línea divisoria entre talla e industrial es a veces arbitraria y no absoluta. Generalmente el diamante propio para la talla se caracteriza así:

- está bien conformado
- es blanco o ligeramente coloreado
- pesa más de 1/20 quilates (10 mg.)

Son comunes en nuestros yacimientos unos diamantes triangulares (equilaterales de 2 a 3 mm de lado) llamados "panelas" clasificados como industriales pero que pueden aprovecharse para talla.

El bort, oscuro, sirve para hacer polvo de diamante.

De acuerdo a las estadísticas suministradas por el Ministerio de Minas e Hidrocarburos tenemos que la producción venezolana se distribuye en:

	1969	1970	(Guaniamo)
Talla	61%	25%	
Industrial	30%	35%	
Bort	9%	40%	

Comparado con resultados estadísticos - muy escasos por cierto de otras partes tenemos la siguiente comparación porcentual del diamante de Talla con respecto a la producción total

	Proporción del tipo Talla	
Venezuela	25%	(aluvión)
Sierra Leone	60%	(aluvión)
Wersselton-Kimberley	30%	(pipe)
Mir-Rusia	21%	(pipe)
Udachnaya-Rusia	12%	(pipe)

(Cifras de MMH; Cotty y Wilks, Ingleses; Gnevushev, Bartoshinsky, Zinkov y Sobolev, Rusos).

- Forma

Característica morfológica que define al diamante de talla como un:

- octaedro
- rombo dodecaedro
- cubo
- formas intermedias entre las 3 anteriores

La forma cúbica es la más rara; generalmente en Venezuela hallamos octaedros; muy semejantes a los de Sierra Leone y que aparecen en la hoja - DIAMANTE DE TALLA - DIFERENCIAS MORFOLOGICAS -

Siendo de origen aluvionario se puede apreciar que presentan aristas redondeadas y no nítidas, significativo de un posible arrastre hasta su lugar de extracción.

Los octaedros de "chimeneas" tienen aristas nítidas y perfectas (foto). En la operación de talla, el octaedro es el mas apropiado para la talla americana ó full cut ó corte clásico del brillante.

- Estructura

Característica morfológica que corresponde al modo de cristalización de la piedra, observandose una de las dos particularidades siguientes:

- estrías en las facetas ó
- estratos en el cuerpo de la piedra

Generalmente nuestras piedras presentan estas capas ó estratos, perfectamente observables al microscopio binocular, lo cual puede merecer un cuidado especial en la operación talla.

- Tamaño

Hasta donde sabemos, los diamantes de Venezuela son mayormente pequeños. Examinando un lote al azar en operación de fiscalización Guía No. 00112, observamos la distribución siguiente:

mas de un quilate	24	piedras
menos de un quilate	1951	"
Total	1975	piedras

Las piedras grandes son raras - En 1970 fué descubierta en el Guaniamo una piedra de 57,85 quilates, (adquirida en el sitio por Bs. 65.000 avaluada en 104.000 Bs. por el M.M.H. a los efectos del Impuesto de explotación.)

En esta aspecto el comercio ilícito hace errática toda investigación y solo se dispone tanto en Venezuela como en gran parte de las áreas de producción de datos indicativos relativos al tamaño: por ejemplo en Ghana es frecuente la piedra de más de 2 quilates; en Dutoitspan - Sur Africa, el ritmo de aparición de piedras de 50 a 200 quilates es más frecuente que en cualquier otro sitio (minas controladas por De Beers).

En los placeres aluvionales de playas del sur oeste africano las piedras grandes se encuentran en la desembocadura del río Orange, disminuyendo el tamaño a medida que se aleja uno de la desembocadura (20 piedras/quilate a 200 millas de la desembocadura; explotación en el mar)

- Color

El color es otra característica que se toma en cuenta en la evaluación de la piedra bruta. En la piedra tallada su importancia es menor ya que el valor lo determinan en orden : las proporciones de las facetas, inclusiones, color y peso.

La mayoría de los diamantes son coloreados

Venezuela	Blanco amarillento
Ghana	marrón verdoso muy atractivo
Sur Africa	generalmente verdoso
Premier Mine	marrón ligeramente aceitoso
Mir-Rusia	Blanco
Sierra Leone	blanco verdoso

Conclusión.-

El diamante de talla venezolano en términos generales, es un diamante de aluvión de buen tenor; octaedro bien conformado con estratos; pequeño; blanco amarillento.

¿Como se sitúa nuestro diamante con relación a los demás? (pregunta formulada a negociantes y talladores de New York, Londres, Amberes e Israel)

La respuesta ha sido que no compiten con : Rusia, Africa del Sur Sierra Leone, Africa Central.

Compiten con : Brasil, Guayana, Costa de Marfil y otros.

13.- Comercio del diamante en Venezuela

131.- Legislación:

De acuerdo al artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Ley de Minas, el comercio de oro, diamantes y otras piedras preciosas está permitido solamente a aquellas personas debidamente inscritas en el Ministerio de Minas e Hidrocarburos.

Los comerciantes que tienen formalizada su inscripción ante el Ministerio están en la obligación de suministrar el informe mensual de sus actividades, según lo pautado en el mencionado artículo 137, ordinales 5, 6 y 7.

Al presentar este aspecto legal del comercio estamos repitiendo las frases consagradas que se utilizan para recordar que en Venezuela muchos son los que no cumplen con la Ley.

En el caso del diamante están registrados en el MMH 433 compradores con licencias y como se verá mes adelante las 2/3 partes no cumplen con lo pautado por la Ley.

132.- Circuitos Naciones y nexos con el Exterior

Compradores .-

En base a un fichero de compradores preparado a los efectos de este Estudio se desprende que:

De los 430 compradores con licencia, registradas en el Ministerio de Minas e Hidrocarburos:

* 104 cumplen con la Ley de los cuales :
  41 tienen una actividad permanente en el negocio, dentro del del pais y
  63 tienen una actividad esporádica
* 326 no cumplen con las disposiciones legales vigentes(Artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Ley de Minas)

Grupos.-

La población activa (104) de compradores está distribuída en 4 grupos.

Grupo I TIMOTEO OCHOA
Grupo II ROTH & EDER-MARIANO ALVAREZ
Grupo III BARRADAS - DA SILVA - RODRIGUEZ
Grupo IV INDPENDIENTES (Gutwein, Onn, Gyula etc.)

Circuitos dentro de los grupos.-

GRUPO I

Minero ⇨ Comprador de Campo ⇨ Mayorista Ciudad Bolivar (Ochoa) ⇨ Diamond Distributors, New York

GRUPO II

Minero ⇨ Comprador de Campo ⇨ Mayorista Ciudad Bolivar (Alvarez) ⇨ Exportador Caracas (Roth & Eder) ⇨ Exterior

- Superior Diamand Cutter
  42 West 48 Street - NY 10107

Los manifiestos de Exportación Expedidos por la Administración de Aduanas en Maiquetía, Ciudad Bolivar y Santa Elena de Guairén señalan los destinatarios siguientes:

Destinatario	Expedidor	Licencia
NEW YORK		
• Diamond Distribuitors INC. 539 Fifth Av. N.Y. 10017	T.Ochoa	54-M
• Halpering Shiping Co. INC. 1 Maiden Lane N.Y.	Ludovico Lante	
• Superior Diamond Cutter 48 West 48 Street N.Y.	Elias Roth	122-M
• Leon Tempelsman & Son 529 Fifth Av. N.Y.	Isaac Gutwein	78-M
• Henry Hudson Hotel 58 Street West c/o Gyula David	Gyula David	318-M
• Hotel Pierre 5th. Avenue c/o. José Orlando Luxoro	José Orlando Luxoro	
• Henderson 745 Athol Estado Nevada	Erwin A. Gombo S.	13-M
CANADA		
• Antonio Rossi Yudson Street102 Toronto 18	Antonio Rossi	185-M
BELGICA		
• C H. Brachfeld & Sons 62 Pelicanstraat Amberes	Sicha Onn	2-M
	Gilbert Devos en representación de Gyula David	318-M
• Theo Bloom 70 Pelicanstraat Amberes	Elias Roth	122-M

	Expedidor	Licencia
HOLANDA		
• Jacques Schlezinger Amsterdam, Shobank Sarphatistraat Amsterdam	Rubén Da Silva Danilo Rodriguez Arturo Barradas	68-M 67-M 258-M
• Theo Bloom Algemene Bank N.V Breda	Elias Roth	122-M
• Isaac Gutwein Algemene Bank Sepuistraat 128/150 Amsterdam	Isaac Gutwein	78-M
• J. Bellamy Devos Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank Saphartistraat 47-53	Hugo Di Benedetto	166-M
ISRAEL		
• PITUACH SIAMOND COMP. 3 Jabotinsky Road Ramat Gan	Elias Roth	122-M
• Ramat Gan Diamond LTD Diamond Exchange Building Ramat Gan	Isaac Gutwein	78-M
BRASIL		
• Sin especificar	A. Barradas	258-M
ARGENTINA		
• Guthaman & Klein Banco Rio de La Plata Bartolomé Mitre 841 Buenos Aires	Elias Roth	122-M

Distribucción del mercado

Los circuitos señalados han sido establecidos a partir del fichero de compradores preparado en la encuesta de PLANESA, el cual nos ha servido para conocer -dentro de lo posible- como se distribuyen el mercado los distintos grupos

VENEZUELA

CUADRO DE EXPORTACION DE DIAMANTES POR GRUPOS

Cifras en Bolívares

GRUPOS	Principales	1970 (parciales)	1969	1968	% Promedio del mercado	Destino
I	TIMOTEO OCHOA	7.206.120,00 (hasta Julio)	5.697.118,00	3.689.690,00	35-40	Diamond Distributors INC 539 Fifth Av. NY 10017
II	ROTH & EDER MARIANO ALVAREZ	4.469.980,00 (hasta Sept.)	3.362.095,00	1.117.186,45	25	Superior Diamond Cutter 42 Wew 48 Sr. NY 10017 Theo Bloom-70 Pelikanstr Amberes Pituach - Ramat Gan - Diamond Exch. Bldg. Isra
III	ARTURO BARRADAS RUBEN DA SILVA DANILO RODRIGUEZ	2.439.400,00	3.284.086,00	1.279.[illegible],15	20-25	Jacques SCHLEZINGER Amsterdam Shebank Saphartistraat - Holanda Brasil (s.e.)
IV	INDEPENDIENTES					
	. GYULA DAVID	282.610,00	-	-		USA
	. SINCHA ONN	508.999,50	-	-	20	Bélgica
	. ISAAC GUTWEIN	646.444,55	2.192.727,00	1.463.293,00		Israel
	Total	15.553.554,05	14.536.026,00	7.550.143,60		

(Fuente : Manifiestos de exportación - Ministerio de Hacienda)

133.- Precios

1331.- Precio del diamante en la mina

Durante nuestra visita a las minas del Guaniamo en Octubre de 1970 hemos presenciando numerosas transacciones comerciales entre mineros y compradores instalados éstos en el caserio El Candado, lugar surgido en medio de la selva a 200 kilómetros al sur-oeste de Ciudad Bolivar con motivo de la "bulla" del Guaniamo.

Los precios practicados por los compradores, que por regla general actuan por cuenta de terceros, son variables y dependen de los factores siguientes:

- Del tipo de diamante

Generalmente se distinguen las categorias siguientes:

. Talla de primera	Bs. 300/qt	hasta 1 qt
. Media talla	Bs. 180 - 200/qt	
. Industrial	Bs. 80 - 100/qt	
. "reyers" reject	Bs. 50/qt	
. Bort	Bs. 10/qt	

El numero de clasificaciones puede alcanzar 8 y se observa que la finalidad que se persigue el comprador es de devaluar el lote, mientras que a nivel de fiscalización por el M.M.H. en Ciudad Bolivar el aumento del número de clasificaciones - 11 (once)-tiene por objeto valorizar el lote. No existen pués criterios unificados y sería muy difícil adoptar la misma clasificación ya que al Ministerio llegan lotes reclasificados.

- De las condiciones del mercado

Bajo este concepto podemos enumerar la afluencia de piedras, la experiencia del minero, las instrucciones impartidas desde Ciudad Bolivar, Caracas o el exterior a los compradores.

De las Condiciones de vida del minero

El Minero organizado en grupo de trabajo, tiene ingresos provenientes de:

- una actividad diaria que rinde Bs 100 a Bs 500 semanales por persona.
- una actividad de envergadura consistente en una explotación a mayor escala donde interviene la remoción de "grunas" o bloques de varias toneladas en una quebrada; la apertura de un "telin" o canal de desvío o corte de meandro; actividad que ocupa generalmente a cuatro o cinco mineros y que rinde por ejemplo Bs 20.000,oo en un mes al grupo de trabajo.

Los gastos de existencia del minero son por otro lado muy elevados debidos a las condiciones mismas del sistema de Libre Aprovechamiento o sea aislamiento, hostilidad del medio, etc.

Podemos ilustrar lo costoso de la vida con los precios siguientes:

- un almuerzo (presa de pollo +arepa)	Bs 10,oo
- un fresco	Bs 3,oo
- una cerveza	Bs 5,oo
- un kilo de cambures	Bs 6,oo
- periódico	Bs 2,oo
- pasaje en helicóptero para un vuelo de 5 minutos aproximadamente (equivalentes a trayecto caminado en 6 horas)	Bs 100,oo

Por lo expuesto podemos ver que el minero necesita un nivel aceptable de ingresos para hacer frente al alto costo de la vida que impone el medio, viéndose obligado en esas condiciones a aceptar los precios que se ofrecen por la producción encontrada.

En conclusión la explotación bajo el sistema de libre aprovechamiento hace difícil la determinación de los costos unitarios de producción, los márgenes de utilidad entre intermediarios y en general toda evaluación racional de tipo económico, incluyendo la producción misma.

1332.- Precios a los efectos de liquidación del Impuesto de Explotación.

La Ley de Minas admite que el impuesto de explotación de 3% en el caso del libre aprovechamiento, sea cancelado por el comprador en caso de que el minero no pudiera hacerlo. La liquidación de ese impuesto tiene lugar en Ciudad Bolivar y es generalmente un mayorista que centraliza los diamantes provenientes de varios compradores el que presenta una solicitud de liquidación según el modelo anexo.

Es de hacer notar que el mayorista selecciona las piedras en base a una clasificación impuesta por la fiscalía y que en ninguna manera corresponde a la clasificación adoptada en el momento de la compra en el sitio de explotación.

En base a la solicitud de liquidación el M.M.H. comprueba el valor declarado y generalmente aumenta dicho valor en un porcentaje muy razonable sobre el lote total: 2 a 5% según su composición - La planilla de liquidación es la que sirve a los efectos de la cancelación en las oficinas del Banco de Venezuela que actúa como receptor de fondos nacionales.

En base a las planillas señaladas apuntamos los precios siguientes en bolívares:

Clasificación MMH	Tipo de diamante	Bolivares		
		A	S	C
1.	Talla 1 más de 1 quilate	(300)	320	20
2	menos 1 quilate	(180)	190	10
3	Talla 2 más de 1 quilate	(220)	245	25
4	menos 1 quilate	(110)	115	5
5	Talla 3 más de 1 quilate	(140)	140	0
6	menos 1 quilate	(90)	100	10
7	Talla 4 más de 1 quilate	(100)	100	0
8	Menos 1 quilate	(75)	75	
9	Industrial 1	(50)	50	0
10	Industrial 2	(30)	30	0
11	Bort	(10)	10	0

A) Valores a los cuales el comprador dice haber adquirido las piedras de los mineros.

B) Valor fiscalizado.

C) Diferencia imponible a los efectos del Impuesto Sobre La Renta (Utilidad teórica)

1333.-Progresión del nivel de precios.-

Es difícil establecer la ganancia de los intermediarios.

Se puede aceptar una utilidad de 5% por participante - es decir - que desde el minero hasta el mayorista exportador (dos o tres intermediarios) el precio de una piedra aumentaría en un 10 ó 15%, lo que no parece excesivo.

Son excepcionales las variaciones mayores: del estudio del registro de ventas de los compradores que tienen actualizada su situación en la fiscalía del Ministerio de Minas en Ciudad Bolívar, se pudo ver por ejemplo que en Mayo de 1970 el Sr. Ramón Peña vendió al Sr. Visnel Alvarez en Bs. 9.000,oo un lote adquirido en Bs. - 6.800,oo ó sea realizando una ganancia de 30%. Normalmente este márgen oscila entre 4 y 7%.

En verdad, a través del circuito se opera una selección de las piedras que trae como consecuencia un aumento en el valor de los lotes.

Esto lo apreciamos en el ejemplo del IVIC - Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Científicas - el cual adquiere diamante industrial destinado a la fabricación de las cuchillas de diamante, siendo piedras escogidas.

De cualquier manera, puede apreciarse que los exportadores de dia - mantes aún haciendo una ligera utilidad de 5% en cada operación, dado que ésta se repite muchas veces a lo largo del año, hacen un alto beneficio, proporcional a la rotación de su capital durante el - período.

14.- Aprovechamiento del Diamante en Venezuela.-

Del total de diamantes producido en Venezuela (en 1970 508.000,oo quilates) es ínfima la parte aprovechada en el País.

En lo que se refiere al diamante de talla existen unos pocos talleres que en pequeña escala trabajan la talla del diamante. Tenemos el ejemplo en Ciudad Bolívar del Taller Caroní, con 5 personas donde se talla aproximadamente 400 quilates por año, según información recabada en el Taller mismo. Existen otros talleres en Puerto Ordaz, Caracas y la Colonia Tovar.

Se ha estimado que actualmente no excede de 2.000,oo quilates por año la talla del diamante en Venezuela.

El Gobierno Regional en el Estado Bolívar está impulsando el establecimiento de una escuela de talla en Ciudad Bolívar, habiendo ordenado ya los equipos necesarios. Esta actividad merece todo el apoyo gubernamental con miras a desarrollar en Venezuela los equipos humanos para que estos puedan competir en el Mercado Internacional al cabo de unos años, una vez adquirida la experiencia necesaria, lograda en otros paises en varias generaciones.

Hay que estar conscientes que la talla del diamante es una actividad altamente especializada y competida en Estados Unidos, Europa e Israel. Por ejemplo en este último país existen 12.000 talladoras que devengan en promedio sueldos mensuales de 900,oo $s., determinando esto un costo reducido de talla.

En Israel tuvimos la oportunidad de visitar los Talleres Barik que producen mensualmente 5.000 quilates tallados, variando los costos de la talla entre 15,50 $ y 27,60 $ por quilate.

Con respecto al diamante industrial, con excepción del Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Científicas, practicamente no existe el aprovechamiento de este tipo de diamante. El IVIC aprovecha aproximadamente 200 quilates al año, como se detalla en ficha anexa.

Ejemplo.- Aprovechamiento del Diamante Industrial.-
Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Científicos.-

El IVIC utiliza el diamante industrial nacional para la fabricación de la cuchillas de diamantes, para cortes ultrafinos, según técnica desarrollada por el Científico Venezolano Dr. Humberto Fernández M.

Precio de compra del diamante y circuito del mismo.-

El IVIC aprovecha anualmente 200 quilates de diamantes reseleccionados de tipo industrial, por el cual paga a razón de 80,oo Bs/ quilate.

El circuito de adquisición de estos diamantes es:

Minero ⇨ Comprador de Campo (empleado del mayorista)
⇨ Mayorista de Ciudad Bolívar ⇨ Mayorista Exportador
de Caracas ⇨ IVIC

Mercado Externo.-

Con diamantes de buenas dimensiones y peso inferior a 1 quilate el IVIC fabrica las cuchillas para microtomo de primera calidad las cuales factura así:

. Cuchilla de 2 mm. de ancho, más soporte	120,oo dólares
. Cada 0,1 mm. adicionales	20,oo dólares

El quilate de diamante de este tipo ha sido pagado al minero a razón de 50,oo Bs/quilate. (diamante de primera, panelas), según se desprende de las planillas de declaración del mayorista de Ciudad Bolívar, valor aceptado por el Ministerio de Minas.

Adquiriendo el diamante a 80,oo Bs/Qt. observamos que hay una diferencia de 30,oo Bs/Qt. que viene siendo la utilidad de los intermediarios esta ganancia no puede considerarse excesiva, máxime tomando en cuenta la selección de la piedra, pero al cabo de un año de negocio de esta naturaleza el intermediario puede llegar a un rendimiento de 200 % sobre su capital dependiendo de la frecuencia con la cual su capital sea rotado.

Ejemplo.- Valorización de la piedra al tallarla.-

Durante el transcurso del estudio se pudieron observar varias operaciones de avalúo efectuadas en el laboratorio de gemología del MMH - Ciudad Bolívar, a petición de compradores interesados en conocer el valor de una sortija personal.

El 15/10/70 se efectuó la experticia de una piedra presentada por el Sr. Splendiani de color amarillento, con un peso de 6,27 quilates (peso estimado con tabla "Weight Calculator" ya que la piedra estaba montada en sortija).

En la operación de avalúo se toman en cuenta por orden de importancia:

1.- Las proporciones de la piedra tallada (lupa y microscopio)

2.- La existencia de inclusiones, carbones y accidentes dentro de la piedra (microscopio)

3.- El color

4.- El peso

La piedra en cuestión fué evaluada en 24.000,oo Bs. (de haber tenido mejor color hubiera podido alcanzar Bs. 120.000,oo)

En la operación de talla el rendimiento es de 50% aproximadamente, o sea que la piedra bruta debió pesar 13 quilates aproximadamente.

El costo de la talla es Bs. 100,oo el quilate o sea que en este caso costó Bs. 1.300,oo

Tomando en cuenta el tamaño y calidad de esta piedra, el valor en el sitio de explotación es de Bs. 10000,oo, como máximo, haciendo notar que según la especificación del MMH en la fiscalización habría sido evaluada en un mínimo de Bs. 4.140,oo.

Puede apreciarse en consecuencia la valorización habida por la piedra en el proceso de talla pasando desde aproximadamente Bs. 12.000,oo - revendida por los intermediarios hasta Bs. 24.000,oo evaluación del gemólogo.

OTRAS RECOMENDACIONES

Las recomendaciones que a continuación hacemos guardan relación directa, aunque no aparente, con el objeto mismo de nuestro estudio y estan destinadas a corregir, completar o reconsiderar algunos aspectos de la actividad diamantífera en Venezuela.

Algunas de las recomendaciones no conciernen directamente al Ministerio de Minas e Hidrocarburos.

Liquidación Impuesto Explotación

Sería recomendable estudiar fórmulas que permitan agilizar los trámites y la propia operación de fiscalización sin restarle su debida importancia.

Se ha pensado que se podría contemplar a partir de un estudio estadístico amplio una liquidación en base al peso de los lotes o sea bolívares por quilate sin entrar a considerar calidades.

En efecto si existen 2.500 calidades de piedras, ¿porque entrar a considerar 8 clasificaciones dentro del diamante de talla?, ademas no es raro que la talla malogre la piedra por cambio de color, rotura etc. quedando el concepto de calidad sin fundamento.

El estudio estadístico sobre un gran número de lotes con distinción de Talla - Industrial-Sort, permitiría establecer 3 valores que equivaldrían al actual 3% percibido sobre el valor del lote ó posiblemente superior al 3%.

Concretamente, suponiendo que el cuadro de producción para el año 1970 sea un cuadro standard, observamos lo siguiente (Libre Aprovechamiento).

Talla	131.106,42	qts
Industrial	172.650,77	qts
Sort	204.983,85	qts
Total	508.661,04	qts
Valor para el impuesto	26.217.073,60	Bs.
Impuesto pagado	800.597,42	Bs.

Si se adoptan valores de referencia tales que permitan gravar el producto en la forma siguiente

Talla	5	Bs/qt.
Industrial	1	Bs/qt.
Bort	0,25	Bs/qt.

Obtenemos el cuadro de liquidación siguiente :

Talla	131.106,42	x	5	=	Bs. 655.532,10
Industrial	172.650,77	x	1	=	Bs. 172.650,77
Bort	204.983,80	x	0,25	=	Bs. 51.246,oo
Total Impuesto liquidado					Bs. 879.428,87

Licencias de Compradores

En vista de que las 2/3 partes de los compradores con licencia no cumplen con la Ley, sería conveniente reconsiderar el modo de otorgamiento de dichas licencias.

Ministerio de Hacienda

De acuerdo a la Ley, Artículo 144, las Administraciones de Aduana deben enviar copia de los Manifiestos de Exportación de Diamantes al MMH. Esto no se cumple. El 5 de Junio de 1954 mediante oficio No. 5903 MMH - pidió al Ministerio de Hacienda el cumplimiento de dicho artículo. Sería conveniente reiterar la solicitud.

Control de Lotes de Diamantes en las Aduanas

Parece irrisorio que en las Aduanas de la República no se controle el contenido de las cajitas con diamantes en bruto que se exporten, y - cuando se hace como es el caso en Ciudad Bolívar, se coloque el paquete que puede pesar bruto 100 gramos o menos sobre una balanza TOLEDO, que sirve para pesar bultos de hasta 250 Kilos.

Se recomienda utilizar una balanza adecuada, y lacrar los paquetes para evitar el cambio de su composición.

Disposiciones Arancelarias

Las cifras de importación relativas a piedras preciosas o semi preciosas, recopiladas por la Dirección General de Estadísticas del Ministerio de Fomento son prácticamente inutilizables.

Se debería precisar en el Arancel de Aduanas las preciosas y las semi preciosas; y dentro de las primeras si se trata de brillantes, esmeraldas, rubis, zafiros u otros. El actual Arancel mezcla los varios conceptos.

Recomendaciones de interés industrial

A.- Se recomienda evaluar la riqueza de los materiales ya explotados en los placeres de San Salvador de Paúl, con miras al aprovechamiento industrial del diamante-eventualmente mediante licitación pública-ya que ensayos privados han demostrado la posibilidad de recuperar aproximadamente cien dólares en diamantes por metro cúbico. ?

B.- Se recomienda considerar la posibilidad de aprovechar a mayor escala, la experiencia del IVIC en materia de fabricación de cuchillas de diamante para microtomo; experiencia que a través de doce años le ha válido al IVIC en el exterior un gran prestigio.

SECRET

TO : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division 25 April 1972
ATTENTION : Chris Frederick/ WH/3
FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (A 12 419 708)
Nieves Elina Gonzalez de POSADA (A 12 443 942)
REFERENCE: Your request for Reentry Permit dated________________19_____.

Reentry Permits were issued for subjects on 21 April 1972, and are valid to 20 April 1973. The Permit may be used for unlimited entries into the United States during validity. Validity of Permit may be extended for a maximum period of twelve (12) months only. Extension of Validity of Permit must be made on the attached, "Application for Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States," (I&NS Form I-143). In certain foreign areas U.S. Consuls and U.S. Immigration Officers are authorized to extend the validity date. However, where security or cover considerations warrant, the Permit and Application should be forwarded to Alien Affairs Staff in order to have the validity date extended through cleared liaison with Immigration and Naturalization Service.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Louis Wienckowski
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

Attachment.

Receipt acknowledged for Permits#0375384 and 0375385:

Signature

25 April 72.
Date

File
CIFENCE/4
201

OS/AAS/EStark 25 April 1972

(GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.)

SECRET

15. CIFENCE-4 is currently assigned to the section of CIRASH with basic responsibility for guerrilla activity. As a result he is required to spend between 50 and 75 percent of his time outside of Caracas. While this has made him somewhat less accessible to the Station, he is well placed to obtain advance information with regard to possible plans for urban violence or kidnappings, high on the list of Station priorities. He has contributed to two reports during the period. A change in the Minister of Interior has recently been announced, which could result in changes down to the level of CIFENCE-4, especially should CIFENCE-1 leave his position. In the meantime, CIFENCE-4 continues as a valuable Station penetration of CIRASH.

14 april 72

14-00000

SECRET

13 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : CIFENCE-4 (201-300985)

Please process Subject for Operational Approval for his use as a penetration of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention in Venezuela (DISIP). Attached herewith are updated PRQ Parts I and II.

Nancy L. Davis
WH/3/V

Attachments:
As stated above.

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Memo Chrono
① - 201-300985

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION · CLASSIFIED MESSAGE · TOTAL COPIES 16 · ROUTING AND-OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) · GROUP 1 [illegible]

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 35 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT: WH8 · INFO · FILE, VR RP/AN, SECUR 4

ACTION NO. 381

SECRET 051750Z APR 72 CITE CARACAS 19040 (MYLECHRAINE ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE

5 APR IN 578235

REF: DIRECTOR 248804

1. RE-ENTRY PERMITS CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE SENT HQS PER REF REQUEST VIA TM NO. 256903 ON 5 APRIL.

2. CIFENCE-4 RETURNED FROM 1 DEC 71 TRIP MIAMI ON VIASA 741 MIAMI TO CARACAS ON 9 DEC 71.

3. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

SECRET

AN

AB

WH/S/V

CS COPY

SECRET

5 APR 72

201-300985

C.F. FREDERICK
WH/3/V
9494
28 MARCH 1972

SECRET

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 41 PER ________

WH8 FILE VR, WH/[illegible], CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, SECUR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 29 MAR 72 01 22z CITE DIRECTOR 248804

CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE

REF: CARACAS 18369 (IN 481013)*

1. PLEASE SEND RE-ENTRY PERMITS FOR CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE PLUS TWO CURRENT PHOTOS OF EACH TO ARRIVE HQS BY 10 APRIL 72 SO THAT NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS CAN BE OBTAINED.

2. WE ASSUME CIFENCE-4 HAS RETURNED TO CARACAS AFTER REF TRIP, HOWEVER PLEASE CABLE FOLLOWING INFO FOR PASSAGE TO LNYUMA: NAME OF CARRIER USED ON DEPARTURE, FLIGHT NUMBER, APPROXIMATE TIME OF DEPARTURE, PORT OF DEPARTURE AND DATE OF ARRIVAL AT DESTINATION, WHICH PRESUMABLY CARACAS.

3. FILE 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

AN	✓
AB	X
IN	
FS	
BK	
DSS	MEL
~~FI~~	
WH/3/V	

*Provided specifics of CIFENCE-4 departure for Miami 1 Dec 71 on CIRASH business. Because of the urgency and the nature of his travel to the U.S., CIFENCE-4 had to travel on a Venezuelan passport. Caracas Station was anxious that INS in Miami not learn of CIFENCE-4's US resident alien status and requested WH/Miami monitor his arrival--which accomplished without incident.

CS COPY (CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

29 MAR 72
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-300985
COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

C.F. FREDERICK
WH/3/V

SECRET

APR 5 10 33 AM '72
APR 10 4 22 PM '72

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ☐ FILE IN RECEIVED CP/EDI

INFO FILE VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 278804

PAGE 2

AAS/OS John Rooney (telecoord)

C/WH/COG

JAMES E. FLANNERY
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for C.L. Conolley
GARDNER R. HATHAWAY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Caracas		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
CIFENCE-4: Request for Operational Approval (OA)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HVCN-9636, 24 January 1972

1P

Forwarded herewith and under separate cover are PRQ Parts I and II for CIFENCE-4 as requested in reference. Please process for full operational approval.

Edgar B. Martegani
EDGAR B. MARTEGANI

Attachments:
1. PRQ I, 3 copies, u/s/c
2. PRQ II, 3 copies, H/W

S/C [illegible] /AN
Date 7 APR 1972

Distribution:
(3) - C/WHD w/ att. 2 h/w, and att. 1 u/s/c

3 att S

CS COPY

MAR 31 1972

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA- 18757	DATE 25 March 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

52

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO. HVCA-18757

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM CIFENCE-4 (AMCLEVE-15)	2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

See previous PRQ Part II, UFGA-23189, dated 20 September 1965

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 11 1972
MICROFILMED

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible case officer.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Austin G. DETLOFF - Station copy of previous report not legible

Grover T. LYTHCOTT - Walt Abeln operational alias used by Grover T. Lythcott -

Oscar C. KALBING - true name

Gordon K. RIJOCK - true name

Edgar B. MARTEGANI - true name

FORM 11-68 1050a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4-20)

SECRET

att 2 to HVCA-18757 CS COPY

31 mar 72
201-300155

SECRET

SECTION II **MOTIVATION AND CONTROL**

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist")*

See previous PRQ-II. While not now targeted directly against Cuban affairs, Subject undoubtedly continues in the intelligence field as a result of his former experience and the continued communist/totalitarian domination of Cuba. His opposition to such regimes and individuals associated makes for identity of interest and goals with BKTRUST.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Subject's present position and physical presence in Venezuela would be untenable if his cooperation with BKTRUST became known to the Venezuelan government.

SECTION III **COVER**

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Meetings are clandestine. Plausible denial is based on contact with CO in his official cover capacity.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject accomplishes this in the course of his actual employment.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE (XXXXXXXX *(Is working)*.

BKTRUST

SECTION IV **INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING**

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Same as in previous PRQ-II. In addition, Subject has been employed in Venezuelan DIGEPOL, and CIRASH.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Wife of CIFENCE-4; AMOTEX-54 (former AMIFF-1)

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has had no formal training since being in Venezuela (1967). Records not available here for period when Subject worked for Station WH/MIAMI.

SECTION V **COLLABORATION POTENTIAL**

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would not likely collaborate with any foreign power without permission from LNHARP.

SECRET

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

See previous PRQ II for prior use by BKTRUST in Miami. Subject is known to and cooperated with LNERGO at BKTRUST direction while in the Miami area. Subject has also had contact with LNERGO Venezuela in the course of his official duties as a member of CIRASH.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from CIRASH and its files and informants in the course of his normal work as an official of CIRASH.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject knows from experience that information is disseminated throughout LNHARP

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is a unilateral penetration (FI) of CIRASH.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

None

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Subject is an official of CIRASH. He is not repeat not involved in liaison with BKTRUST.

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

N/A

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is a paid agent. Se page 1 for Agency personnel known to Subject.

SECRET

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is well trained in PM activities including maritime. He is an expert in weapons, and knows demolitions. He is skilled in police and intelligence ops.

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject is paid a regular monthly salary of approximately US$ 335.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None; Subject has been assisted in retaining his permanent resident status.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files. Derogatory info resolved.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

SGSWIRL 3 November 1971. See IRD No. 72501 dated 29 November 1971.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

OA 18 October 1965

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

POA 17 January 1972

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

See previous PRQ-II. Subject continues to demonstrate reliability and use of good security precautions. He appears to be of excellent character.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

All known cases have been previously resolved.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject moderate in use of liquor; others not known.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Hunting, fishing

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is increasingly able to disguise his FSRUMEN accent and pass as a Venezuelan. Among other latins, the accent would be detected in prolonged contact.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

PRQ-I obtained from Subject. PRQ-II from files and personal observation.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (Also see para. 43b, supra)

N/A

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W, WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject could be contacted by any of former case officers, or in name used by former CO's.

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

See previous PRQ-II.

DATE 28 March 1972	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER Edgar B Martegani EDGAR B. MARTEGANI

SECRET

201-300985

64

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PROJ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS
1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

DISPATCH NO. HVCA-18757

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First)	(Middle)	(Last)	(Nee)
Luis	Clemente	POSADA	Carriles

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: Same

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.):

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

[illegible]
(a) Bamby (nickname), Basilio

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 15 February 1928

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Las Villas, CUBA

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

No court record

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 11 1972
MICROFILMED

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT ft.	in.	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
X	44	40	5	11	175	strong	oval

h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE
black	green			erect

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: scar, palm of right hand

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE: neat

o. PROMINENT FEATURES:

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES:



ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 8-61 1050 [illegible] -18757 CS COPY 201-300985 (4-20)

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Venezuelan

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (*If different than Item 10.*)
Cuban

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant*)
Venezuela: Qta. Janet, Ave. Los Caribes, El Llanito, Caracas (rent)

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*If different than Item 12.*)
Miami, U.S.A.

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Countries, dates and purposes*)
See attached list.

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION
Venezuelan Police (MRI)

17. TITLE
Comisario

18. SALARY (*Per annum*)
$1,135/month

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (*Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property*)
$4,000

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
None

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
None (See previous PRQ I)

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Monserrate; Cuba	Elementary	1936	1942	yes
Instituto; Cuba	High School	1942	1947	yes
Padres Dominicos	Chemistry	1947	1950	yes
Havana University	Medicine	1950	1953	---

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(*List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.*)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish (native)	X		X		X		X	
English	X				X		X	

ATTACHMENT PRQ PART I HVCA-18757

DATE	PLACE	PURPOSE
1956	Miami, Florida	Tourist
1961	Mexico	Political exile
Feb 1961	Miami, Florida	Political exile
April 1961	Guatemala	Invasion (Cuba)
May 1961	Miami, Florida	Invasion (Cuba)
1964	Dominican Republic	Cuban Affairs
1964	Puerto Rico	Cuban Affairs
1964	Dominican Republic	Cuban Affairs
1964	Miami, Florida	
Oct 1967	Venezuela	Work
Oct 1967	Miami, Florida	
Oct 1967	Venezuela	Work
1968	Miami, Florida	Tourist
1969	Miami, Florida	Tourist
Mar 1970	Miami, Florida	Reentry Permit
1970	Trinidad, Tobago	Revolution--business
Jun 1970	Bogota	Business
1970	Bogota	Business
May 1971	Aruba	Business
April 1971	Lima, Peru	Business
April 1971	Argentina	Business
April 1971	Brazil	Business
Oct 1971	Portugal	Business
Oct 1971	Rome	Business
Nov 1971	Vienna	Business
Nov 1971	Rome	Business
Dec 1971	Miami, Florida	Business
Dec 1971	Puerto Rico	Tourist

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

good marksman with small arms

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
USA	March 1963	March 1964	197 Brgd. 1st Bn.	2nd Lt.	Ft. Benning, Ga.

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY, INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

USA

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDS ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) / d. TYPE OF WORK	b. EMPLOYER / e. SALARY OR EARNINGS	c. ADDRESS / f. REASON FOR LEAVING
26.	1944-196	Pastora Sugar Mill	San José de las Lajas, Cuba
	Sugar chemist	$ 210 PER month	transfer
27.	1946-1954	San Agustin Sugar Mill	Cruces, Las Villas, Cuba
	Sugar chemist	$ 310 PER month	
28.	1958-1960	Firestone (Cuba)	Havana, Cuba
	Compounds Sec.	$ 325 PER month	Political exile
29.	1961-1963	Firestone	Akron, Ohio USA
	Training program	$ 500 PER month	enlisted in army
30.	1964-1965	USA Army	Ft. Benning, Ga.
	2nd Lt.	330 month $ PER	Cuban affairs

1967-present Venezuelan Govt.

SECTION IX	MARITAL STATUS					
31. CHECK ONE	☐ SINGLE	☒ MARRIED	☐ WIDOWED	☐ SEPARATED	☐ DIVORCED	☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS. SEE [illegible]

Divorced from first wife (Maria Concepción Castañeda) 26 June 1963 in Chicago, Illinois SUBJECT IS DIVORCED FIRST WIFE OF LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES (201-300985)
Reason was mutual agreement for divorce (See previous PRQ I's)

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE	(First)	(Middle)	(Nee)	(Last)
	Nieves	Elina Rcodid	Gonzalez Leyva de	POSADA

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE 13 Aug 1963	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE Columbus, Ga.
36. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Dec 1935	37. PLACE OF BIRTH Cienfuegos, Las Villas, CUBA
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)
Venezuela: Qta. Janet, Ave. Los Caribes, El Llanito, Caracas

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Jorge Luis POSADA	X		1965	Miami, Florida	USA
Janet POSADA		X	1970	Caracas, Venezuela	Venezuelan

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

Same

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME Luis Posada	42. YEAR OF BIRTH Unknown	43. PLACE OF BIRTH Cienfuegos, Cuba	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION Bookstore operator	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE Cienfuegos, Cuba	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME Dolores Carriles	49. YEAR OF BIRTH Unknown	50. PLACE OF BIRTH Cienfuegos	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION Housewife	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE Cienfuegos, Las Villas, Cuba	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Roberto Posada	X		1931	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Raul Posada	X		1934	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Maria Concepción Posada		X	1939	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Unknown (See previous PRQ I)

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

Concha Marina Posada (aunt)
Margot Carriles (aunt)   address unknown

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE
27 March 1972	Edgar B Martegani EDGAR B. MARTEGANI

201-300755

TO	Chief of Station, Caracas
INFO.	
FROM	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
SUBJECT	○ CIFENCE-4 (201-300985)

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See paragraph 2 below.

1. CIFENCE-4 has been granted a POA effective 17 January 1972 for use as a penetration of CIRASH.

2. Please submit updated PRQ Parts I and II in order for Headquarters to process OA.

Karen T. GEHRKE

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCW-9636	26 JAN 1972 typed 24 January 1972
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	✓ 201-300985

1 - IP
1 - Chrono
1 - CI/OA

AN nt
AB X
~~IN~~
~~FS~~
~~FX~~
~~DES~~ STD
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Venezuela:	Nancy Davis ND	:kmg	1535

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	24 Jan	P. F.
CI/OA		Norman K. Ott, Jr. (in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	25 JAN 1972	Gardner R. Hathaway L. Costello for

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

1972

SECRET

HVCA-18640, 19 January 1972

CIFLUTE
July
Operational Report for Period XXXXXXXXthrough December 1971

5. CIFENCE-4 has been handled since August 1971 by Edgar B. MARTEGANI. It was decided for security reasons to take this agent out of the group of agents handled by the Station Officer conducting liaison, and CIFENCE-4 is thus handled as a truly unilateral penetration of CIRASH. During the reporting period allegations arose as to affiliation of CIFENCE-4 with JKLANCE. (See WH/Miami 12203 and Caracas 17730). The Station is aware of this situation and the agent is handled accordingly. CIFENCE-4 successfully passed his ump-teenth SGSWIRL examination on 3 October 1971 and the Station's opinion of this individual continues to be favorable. (See HVCW-9612 for SGSWIRL results). As an indication of the continuing high esteem enjoyed by CIFENCE-4 within the GOV, he was chosen by CIFENCE-1 to accompany the present Venezuelan Minister of the Interior on a month long European vacation in September 1971. It is widely acknowledged that the Minister of the Interior is the leading candidate for the COPEI presidential nomination; should this occur and he be elected the next president of Venezuela, CIFENCE-4 should have a valuable friend. In summation, the Station continues to regard CIFENCE-4 as a valuable Station asset who has an excellent reputation within CIRASH and the GOV. He contributed to two intelligence reports during the reporting period, but his value to the Station lies primarily in operational reporting and his status as a unilateral penetration not known to be in contact with JKLANCE in any way.

CIFENCE-4

SECRET

SECRET

ND [illegible]
[illegible]

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/3/V - N. Davis

NUMBER
201-300985

SUBJECT
CIFENCE/4

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
lc

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Penetration of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention in Venezuela.

PART I & II

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

[illegible], JR.
[illegible]
[illegible]

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	17 January 1972

14-00000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535
[illegible]

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	12-7-71
PREPARED BY (person, office)	Terry-Airport

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) POSADA	First Name Luis	Middle Initial C
COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP Venezuela [illegible] 12-20-71		
UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code) Hotel Savoy		
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL VIASA 746		
Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE Ave 56 #137 Caracas, Venezuela		
BIRTH DATE Feb 15, 1928	BIRTH PLACE Caracas	

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION Miami 1201-71
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION A-2 D/S
DESTINATION Same As Above

NAI- 5 JAN 72-RED

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

cc: CIA

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

FORM I-87
(REV. 8-1-71) Y

201- 300985

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

POSADA Carriles, Luis Clemente		201-300985

WH/3/V ✓

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

FORM 7-58 44 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS — ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

[illegible]-4

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201-300985			

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

1971

SECRET

28 December 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT: CIFENCE/4 (201-300985)

1. It is requested that a POA be granted for Subject's use as a penetration of the Directorate for Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP), a Venezuelan Security Service. Since Subject holds a key position in this organization, he will be able to monitor its intelligence operations as well as Venezuelan political matters.

2. All current traces on Subject are non-derogatory. (See attachment to Form 772 for additional information).

3. Request for Approval, COMINT Name Check and PRQ Part I (dated 28 May 68) are attached. Updated PRQ Part I and Part II will be requested from Station.

Nancy L. Davis
WH/3/V

Attachments:
As Stated Above

WH/3/V:Nancy L. Davis:jev (28 December 1971

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - CI/OA w/atts.
(1 - 201-300985) CIFENCE-4
1 - WH/3/V Memo Chrono
w/o atts.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

COMMENTS RE DEROGATORY TRACES
ATTACHMENT TO FORM 772

1. A POA was requested on Subject in January 1968 for his use as a penetration of Venezuelan General Directorate of Police. Cancellation was requested in February 1968 because of indications that Subject was involved in "clandestine sabotage activity and suspicions that Subject failed to report his activities to CIA. Thereafter, Subject was treated as a "hostile". In the ensuing months Subject was described as "an extremely valuable penetration" because of his important and accurate intelligence information and operational reports. Subject was given a polygraph examination to clear up questions about possible affiliation with Cuban intelligence, unreported association with gangster elements, etc. His responses showed no information which would prevent CIA using him for ops purposes. Request for POA was again requested on 7 September 1968. This POA request was turned down on 15 October due to Subject being an "agent of a foreign power."

2. Since that time Subject has continued to provide verbal and written information reports concerning Communist and subversive elements, guerrilla activities, Soviet activities, sabotage, etc. Subject continues to report accurately and often and has a very pro-U.S. attitude. Subject was again polygraphed on 29 November 1971 (a copy of which is contained in Subject's CI/OA folder). His responses indicated no deception concerning truthfulness of reporting to CIA, no compromise of his U.S. Government connections, non-involvement in illegal arms dealings, etc.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH | SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM W

TO: Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: SGSWIRL Reports on CIFENCE-4 and CIURBAN-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

Attached, for your information, are the SGSWIRL reports on CIFENCE-4 and CIURBAN-1. The Identity sheets to these reports are being sent under separate cover.

J.T.B.

John T. BACHHUBER

Attachments:
As Stated Above h/w
Identity Sheets u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas

CS COPY

2 - IP
1 - Chrono

AN
AD
~~IN~~
PS
SX
DES | NFD
FI
WH/3/V

CROSS REFERENCE TO: B-201-771746

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HVCW-9612

DATE: 8 DEC 1971
typed 2 December 1971

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:
✓201-300985
~~201-771746~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/3/Venezuela
OFFICER: Eric Isenstead:kmg
EXT.: 1535

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	2 Dec	Philip F. Brown

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: AC/WH/3
DATE: 2 DEC 1971
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: R.L. Conolly
Richard L. Conolly

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT WH 8

FILE, VR YPIAN/cloes aloa ⑥

ACTION NO. 630

S E C R E T 011946Z DEC 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 13251

NMIM

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

IN 482038

REF: CARACAS 18369 (IN 481013)

1. CIFENCE-4'S ARRIVAL MIAMI MONITORED AS REQUESTED IN REF. NO PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN
AB
IN
PS
BX
DES NFD
PI
WH/N

CS COPY

SECRET

1 DEC 71
201-300985

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 18-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: ERIC ISENSTEAD
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1971

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE VR. IP/AN [illegible] CS/DO C/OPS also ⑦

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 2 DEC 71 23 40z CITE DIRECTOR 207472

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI

REF: CARACAS 18369 (IN 481013)*

1. RE TRAVEL CIFENCE-4 TO MIAMI: CAN YOU PROVIDE DATE HE EXPECTS RETURN CARACAS AS WELL AS AIRLINE AND FLT NUMBER? THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE USEFUL IN PICKING UP HIS IMMIGRATION FORM WHEN HE LEAVES MIAMI.

2. FILE 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

*Informed us that CIFENCE-4 traveled to Miami on 1 December using Official Venezuelan passport. Since he is a registered resident alien of the U.S., we must arrange to have his entrance and exit documents retrived from Immigration and Naturalization Service.

AN
AR
WH/3/V

AAS/OS Mr. Wienckowski (telecord)

C/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
AC/WH/3

2 Dec 71
201-300985

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: 30 PER #

ACTION UNIT: WH8

FILE, VR IP/AN CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 881

~~S E C R E T 032320Z DEC 71 CITE CARACAS 18403~~

(5)

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR 3Dec IN 484396

REF: DIRECTOR 207472

1. CIFENCE-4 ANTICIPATED ONLY TWO OR THREE DAYS MIAMI; MAY THEREFORE RETURN 3 OR 4 DECEMBER. WHILE NOT CERTAIN HE LIKELY WILL USE VIASA FLT DEPARTING MIAMI DAILY AT 1430 HRS. SUGGEST CHECK VIASA RESERVATIONS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~DX~~
~~DES~~ ~~NFD~~
~~FI~~
12/4/71 ✓

CS COPY

SECRET

3 DEC 71
201-300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 5-1 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 38 PER ______ # ___

ACTION UNIT WHB | INFO | FILE, VR [illegible], c/ops, ci, fi, c/ca,

ACTION NO. 495

8

S E C R E T 302120Z NOV 71 CITE CARACAS 18369

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR 30 Nov IN 481013

1. CIFENCE-4 WILL TRAVEL MIAMI 1 DEC VIA VIASA FLT 740 ARRIVING 1200 LOCAL. TRAVELING IN TRUE NAME WITH VENEZUELAN OFFICIAL PASSPORT WHICH SHOWS HIS DPOB AS CARACAS 17 FEB 1928. CIFENCE-4 SENT BY HIS EMPLOYER TO PURCHASE TWENTY-FIVE NINE MILIMETER PISTOLS FOR USE OF GOV. HE WAS UNABLE TO REFUSE OR EVADE THE ASSIGNMENT.

2. CIFENCE-4 IS A REGISTERED RESIDENT ALIEN OF WOCORK. STATION DOES NOT ANTICIPATE ANY DIFFICULTY EXCEPT IN THE REMOTE POSSIBILITY IMMIGRATION LEARNS OF HIS RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS. HE HAS BEEN ADVISED BY STATION TO SAY NOTHING OF THIS AND STICK TO STORY THAT HE GOV OFFICIAL AS INDICATED IN PASSPORT.

3. IF MIAMI HAS LIAISON CAPABILITY WOULD APPRECIATE MONITOR OF ARRIVAL CIFENCE-4 WITH CAPABILITY TO INTERVENE IF NECESSARY. SENDING IDENTITY CABLE TO MIAMI.

4. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN

FI

CS COPY

30 NOV 71
201-300985

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 5-1

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 38 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT: WHB

INFO: FILE, VR, 1e/an, ci/cilops, c/oa, FI,

ACTION NO: 496

(8)

S E C R E T 302130Z NOV 71 CITE CARACAS 18370

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 18369 (IN 481013)

30Nov IN 481018

1. IDENTITY: LUIS POSADA CARRILES

DPOB: 15 FEB 28, CIENFUEGOS, CUBA

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

SECRET

CS COPY

SECRET

30 NOV 71
201-300985

14-00000

SEC. CL.	ORIGIN	CONTROL NO.
S	OS/IRD	IRDW 72501

DATE OF DOC	DATE REC'D	DATE OUT	SUSPENSE DATE	CROSS REFERENCE OR POINT OF FILING

TO WH/3 3 B 2627
FROM OS/IRD 1 F 16
SUBJ. CIFENCE/4

Rec'd by

Date 1 Dec. 1971

PLEASE RETURN THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT TO 08/IRD 1 F 16.

ROUTING	DATE SENT
WH/3	11/30/71

COURIER NO.	ANSWERED	NO REPLY

2

TO : WH/3 29 November 1971

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT: CIFFNCF/4 IRD# 72501

BACKGROUND:

Subject, CIFENCE/4, is a 43-year-old, male, citizen of IDEN A who has been of continuing interest to JKLANCE since initial contact. He has permanent resident alien status in WOCORK as does his wife. He was last SGSWIRLed on 23 May 1968 with favorable results. Subject claimed that during service with IDEN B and previous service with JKLANCE, he had been SGSWIRLed and estimated the total number of SGSWIRLs he has had at twelve to fifteen.

PROCEDURE:

On 3 November 1971, CIFFNCE/4 was given a SGSWIRL at a covert site in IDEN C. Both the English and Spanish languages were utilized in discussing the SGSWIRL and the Case Officer, Edgar B. MARTEGANI, served as interpreter. During the SGSWIRL, the English language was used. The undersigned was introduced as Mr. Bob MOUNT from WOCORK.

PURPOSE:

The SGSWIRL was requested by Fdgar B. MARTEGANI to determine whether Subject knows if any member of IDEN D and specifically if IDEN E is aware or suspects his current JKLANCE connections; if he has been requested to work against LNLUTE; if since May 1968 he has been in contact with or heard about IDEN F or IDEN G; if since May 1968 Subject has been involved in illegal arms smuggling. Specific questions utilized during the SGSWIRL are given later in this report.

CONCLUSION:

There were no unresolved reactions indicative of deception. It is the opinion of the undersigned that Subject answered all questions truth-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

fully. Apparently Subject is unaware of any compromise of his LNLUTE connections; has been truthful in his reports to JKLANCE; has not been involved in any illegal arms dealings other than smuggling weapons into IDEN A for his personal use and the personal use of other members of IDEN D and related organizations; has not been asked to work against LNLUTE and has received no information from or about IDEN F or IDEN G.

DETAILS:

Subject was co-operative throughout the SGSWIRL and did not hesitate to assist in rephrasing questions and explaining his responses. He seemed open and frank in response to all queries. Subject exhibited a response to the question concerning IDEN F and IDEN G. Discussion of the issue elicited the information that Subject had received some information concerning a son of one of these individuals. He also mentioned that on a trip to IDEN H a few years ago he had spoken by telephone to IDEN I but no mention had been made of IDEN F or IDEN G. Subject also showed a response to the question concerning illegal arms dealing. He explained that when he travelled outside of the country he brought back pistols, rifles, and on one occasion a shotgun. These weapons were for his personal use or were purchased for friends such as IDEN E or members of IDEN D. He stated that the weapons were brought in illegally and that even possession of the rifles (which were for his own use) was illegal. Specific questions concerning these arms dealings were asked. Based on the sessions results, it appears that while Subject has smuggled arms into IDEN A and possesses illegal arms, he has not been involved in smuggling large amounts of arms for personal profit or engaged since May 1968 in smuggling weapons of war into IDEN A.

Specific questions utilized during the SGSWIRL were as follows:

Were you born in IDEN J? Yes

Did you reside in WOCORK? Yes.

Are you concealing the identity of anyone who knows you work for JKLANCE? No

IRD# 72501
Page 3
29 November 1971

Does IDEN E know or suspect your present relationship with JKLANCE in IDEN A? No

Does your wife know you work for JKLANCE? Yes

Have you told IDEN K that you worked for JKLANCE? No

Have you ever been to IDEN L? Yes

Do you suspect that the IDEN M is deliberately giving you information to give to JKLANCE? No

Do you live in IDEN C? Yes

Are you employed by the IDEN M? Yes

Since May 1968, have you been involved in illegal arms smuggling? No

Since May 1968, have you had any information about or contact with IDEN F or IDEN G that you are concealing from us? No

Do you have permanent resident alien status in WOCORK? Yes

Has anyone asked you to work against LNLUTE? No

Would you like to go back to IDEN J to live? No

H. Maxwell Padon II

Distribution:
Orig. - True, Lawrence, Gaynor
1 - Lawrence
1 - CI/OA
1 - WH/3
1 - Field
1 - File

OS/IRD/HMP:lhs

SECRET

IDENTITY SHEET

IRD# 72501

29 November 1971

IDEN A	Venezuela
IDEN B	U.S. Army
IDEN C	Caracas, Venezuela
IDEN D	DISIP, a Venezuelan security service
IDEN E	Dr. UZCATEGUI, CIFENCE/1
IDEN F	Subject's brother, Raul
IDEN G	Subject's brother, Roberto
IDEN H	Columbia
IDEN I	Subject's mother
IDEN J	Cuba
IDEN K	Orlano GARCIA
IDEN L	Miami, Florida
IDEN M	Venezuelan government
IDEN N	police

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 7 December 1971 lc

TO: C/WH/3/V -

201 NO.: 201-300985

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

NO[illegible] K. O.T, JR.
Approval Officer
X-1886 or x-9352

SUBJECT: CIFENCE/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☐	PRQ II	☐	U.S. COMINT TRACES
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES *(Incl. COMINT)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES *(Incl. COMINT)*	XX	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: XXX FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Is Subject currently being used as an operational asset? If so, it is without a proper covert approval. Please advise agent status.

FORM 7-71 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20-38)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION [illegible]SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 13

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 [illegible]

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2	116	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR 1 C/AN, CI/OA

ACTION NO. 367

(5)

S E C R E T 131335Z OCT 71 CITE CARACAS 18079

130CT IN 445046

DIRECTOR

SGSWIRL

REF BOOK DISPATCH 8084, 1 OCTOBER 1971

1. STATION PROPOSES SGSWIRL CIFENCE-4 AND CIURBAN-1.

2. FILE: 201-300985, 201-771746 GP-1

S E C R E T

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JAN 06 1972
MICROFILMED

AN
~~AB~~ ~~X~~
~~IN~~
RS HR
DX 4
~~DES~~ RFD
~~FI~~
WH/3/✓

B201-771746

CS COPY

SECRET

13OCT71

201-300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ~~CL~~ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21-1 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

30

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 21 PER ______ #___

ACTION UNIT WH-8 | INFO | FILE, VR Suspense-WH, CDO, DDP, ADDP, CSDO,

ACTION NO. 496 | CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI-3, IW, RI/AN, EUR-6, C/OPS, CI

S E C R E T 022200Z SEP 71 CITE CARACAS 17845

DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 169864

2 SEP IN 415600

1. MINISTER OF INTERIOR LORENZO FERNANDEZ DEPARTED VENEZUELA EVENING 1 SEPTEMBER FOR EUROPEAN VACATION. REPORTED "EL UNIVERSAL" 27 AUGUST.

2. CIFENCE-4 NOTIFIED 30 AUGUST HE TO ACCOMPANY INTERIOR MINISTER. TRIP ESTIMATED ONE MONTH TO SIX WEEKS, AND CIFENCE-4 MENTIONED SWEDEN, ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE, SPAIN, PORTUGAL AND ITALY AS ON ITINERARY. WHILE TRIP OSTENSIBLY VACATION, IT WIDELY SPECULATED THAT FERNANDEZ TOUCHING BASE FOR POLITICAL REASONS PRIOR TO ANNOUNCING HIS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY UPON RETURN. HE KNOWN TO BE FAVORED CANDIDATE OF PRESIDENT CALDERA.

3. CIFENCE-4 INSTRUCTED TO REPORT ITINERARY, PERSONS CONTACTED, AND TO EXTENT POSSIBLE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.

4. RE REF, THIS ANOTHER STRONG INDICATION CIFENCE-4 NOT KNOWN OR SUSPECTED BY GOV OF JKLANCE AFFILIATION.

5. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN	SW
AD	X
~~IN~~	
~~PO~~	
~~BX~~	
~~DDO~~	~~PED~~
FI	

30 DEC 1971

[redacted]

CIFENCE-4

201-300985

02 Sep 71

CS COPY

SECRET

4. **CIFENCE-4**

CIFENCE-4 continued to be a reliable, steady Station asset who continues to be one of CIFENCE-1's closest and most trusted associates. CIFENCE-1 has a great deal of confidence in CIFENCE-4 and always assigns him the most difficult jobs which he feels none of his other employees can handle. During a great deal of this reporting period, CIFENCE-4 was out of Venezuela on special missions for CIFENCE-1. He travelled to Lima, Peru to send a bomb which would not explode to the home of Perez Jimenez, went to Curacao to conduct a special investigation and spent considerable time on the Colombian border. He contributed to two disseminated intelligence reports dealing with military intelligence about Colombian activities collected by a Venezuelan security service and the reported presence of eleven Venezuelan fishing boats and one warship in Colombian territorial waters. CIFENCE-1 has appointed CIFENCE-4 chief of the division of CIRASH

continued....

201

which is responsible for coordinating all of the activities of the CIRASH offices located outside Caracas. Such a position should offer CIFENCE-4 access to various types of information and targets of interest to JKLANCE. As was said in the last CIFLUTE operational report, the Station continues to think very highly of CIFENCE-4 and looks forward to a continuing productive relationship with him.

30 July 1971

HVCA-18379

ORIG: W.H. WALKER:jcv
UNIT: AC/WH/3/V
EXT: 1535 RED
DATE: 12 AUGUST 1971

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

DOC MICRO. SER.
SEP 20 1971
MICROFILMED

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 35 PER

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XX FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985 & 201-067860.

CONF: WH8 FILE, VR, RI/AN, FI, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12AUG71 22 35z CITE DIRECTOR 169864

CARACAS

REF WH/MIAMI-12203 (IN-395041)*

1. REQUEST STATION COMMENTS ON PARA 1 B REF.

2. FILE 201-300985 AND 201-067860.

END OF MESSAGE

*Paragraph 1 B of reference indicated that official Venezuelan services know that Station agent CIFENCE-4 works for JKLANCE and are feeding him false information.

WH/FI ✓
~~CI/[illegible]~~

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
PS 4R
BX 4
~~DES~~ NPD
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

B201-067860

RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

R.L. Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
AC/WH/3

12 AUG 71
201-300985

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY 1

UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY: 25/[illegible] PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI,

ACTION NO: 589

S E C R E T 052052Z AUG 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 12203 (SHOQUIST ACTING)

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

5 Aug IN 355041 88

1. LOCAL LNERGO PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM A RELIABLE LNERGO SOURCE (WHICH THEY REQUEST THAT WE PROTECT):

A. ORLANDO GARCIA IS PRESENTLY IN MIAMI AND PLANS TO RETURN TO VENEZUELA VERY SOON, POSSIBLY ON 4 AUGUST. GARCIA WAS DESCRIBED BY SOURCE AS BEING A CUBAN IN THE EMPLOY OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AND WHO IS FRIENDLY WITH SEVERAL PROMINENT LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL LEADERS.

B. GARCIA SAID THAT LUIS POSADA, A CUBAN WHO HEADS A VENEZUELAN INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY, WORKS FOR JKLANCE. GARCIA SAID THAT OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICES (UNIDENTIFIED) KNOW THAT POSADA WORKS FOR JKLANCE AND THAT, KNOWING THIS, ARE FEEDING HIM FALSE INFORMATION.

NP

[illegible] 201s are included.

2. WE PRESUME THAT GARCIA AND POSADA ARE RESPECTIVELY IDENTICAL TO ORLANDO GARCIA VASQUEZ (201-067860) AND LUIS POSADA CARRILES (201-300985).

3. FILE: 201-067860 AND 201-300985. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

Chief of Station, Caracas XX

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Transmittal of CIFENCE-4 U.S. Reentry Permits

REFERENCE: HVCT-5177, 27 March 1971

Transmitted by separate cover attachment are revalidated U.S. Reentry Permits for CIFENCE-4 and his wife.

Clement P. DOZOIS

Attachment: U/S/C
Two Reentry Permits

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COS, Caracas, w/att.

28 APR 1971

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

HVCS-3466

SECRET 201-300985

1 - WH/3/V Chrono
w/o att.
1 - 201-300985
w/o att.
1 - WH/Registry
w/o att.

WH/3/V:William H. Walker:jev (23 April 71) 1535

C/WH/3/V A. D. Wedemeyer

AC/WH/3 Richard Conolly

SECRET

TO : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division 16 April 1971
ATTENTION : Chief, WH/3/V - Henry Applebaum
FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECTS : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (A 12 419 708)
Nieves Elina Gonzalez de POSADA (A 12 443 942)
REFERENCE: Your request for Reentry Permit dated 6 April 1971.

Reentry Permits ~~was~~ were issued for subjects on 16 April 1970, and ~~is~~ have been extended valid to 15 April 1972. The Permit may be used for unlimited entries into the United States during validity. ~~Validity of Permit may be extended for a maximum period of twelve (12) months only. Extension of Validity of Permit must be made on the attached, "Application for Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States," (I&NS Form I-143). In certain foreign areas U.S. Consuls and U.S. Immigration Officers are authorized to extend the validity date. However, where security or cover considerations warrant, the Permit and Application should be forwarded to Alien Affairs Staff in order to have the validity date extended through cleared liaison with Immigration and Naturalization Service.~~

THIS [illegible] EXTENDED

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Louis Wienckowski
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

Attachment.

Receipt acknowledged for Permit #0235566 (POSADA) and 0235567: (NIEVES)

Signature 22 April 71 Date

OS/AAS/EStark 16 April 1971

SECRET (GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.)

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2-4

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ~~ISSUED~~ ☐ SLOTTED

WH

C 1635

15/3 SEP. 118(EO)

APR 14 12 40 PRECEDENCE

ACTION COPY

C/WH 2 FILE, VR SDP, ADDP

623

"EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 141546Z APR 71 CITE CARACAS 16913

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LIMA

RYBAT

IN 311053

1. ON 13 APRIL 1971, UNILATERAL AGENT CIFENCE-4 (IDENTITY FOR LIMA) SAID HE AND ANOTHER OFFICIAL OF SERVICIOS ESPECIALES (SE), INTELLIGENCE SECURITY AGENCY OF THE VENEZUELAN MILISTRY OF INTERIOR, WOULD LEAVE CARACAS MORNING 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. THEIR MISSION TO OBTAIN THE HOME ADDRESSES OF MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ AND PEDRO ESTRADA. AFTER OBTAINING THE ADDRESS OF PEREZ HIMENEZ, CIFENCE-4 IS TO SEND A LETTER TO HIM POINTING OUT IN GENERAL TERMS POSSIBLE DANGERS IF HE RETURNS TO VENEZUELA.

2. LETTER SIGNED WITH NAME CARLOS FOSSI A, WHO DESCRIBES SELF AS LOW LEVEL PEREZ JIMENEZ FOLLOWER WHOSE NAME JIMENEZ PROBABLY WILL NOT RECOGNIZE. NO STATION TRACES FOSSI, AND BELIEVE HE PROBABLY FICTITIOUS CHARACTER. LETTER ACCUSES POLITICIANS WHO URGING PEREZ JIMENEZ RETURN OF THINKING ONLY OF PERSONAL AGGRANDIZEMENT AND IGNORING HAZARDS INVOLVED. IT ACCUSES LT. HUGO BARILLAS OF BEING GOV PENETRATION OF CRUZADA CIVICA

FYI

Answered

File CIFENCE-4 201

SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY
	SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1	1	5
		2	6
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	3	7
		4	8

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION UNIT | INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO:

PAGE 2 CARACAS 16913 SECRET

NACIONALISTA. STATION FILES SHOW RETIRED LT HUGO BARILLAS HERRERA, AKA JORGE HUGO BARRILLAS HERRERA, DOB: 1 APRIL 1936, HAD LONG RECORD OF CONSPIRATORIAL ACTIVITIES AGAINST AD GOVERNMENTS. HE WAS HIRED 1959 BY GOV ORGANIZATION COSERI OPERATED BY MINIT UNDER COMMERCIAL COVER TO CONDUCT INTEL AND RELATED ACTIVITIES. PRESUMABLY BARILLAS NOW OUT OF FAVOR WITH INTERIOR MINISTRY AND BEING FINGERED TO PEREZ JIMENEZ. LETTER SAYS IT TO BE DELIVERED BY MUTUAL FRIEND "DR. RAMITO SANDOVAL." NO TRACES ON SANDOVAL.

3. AFTER SENDING THE LETTER CIFENCE-4 IS TO SEND A PACKAGE CONTAINING AN AUTHENIC BOMB THAT IS TO BE ADJUSTED SO AS NOT TO EXPLODE. CIFENCE-4 SAID THE ORDER FOR THIS MISSION WAS GIVEN BY DR. REMBERTO UZCATEGUI, THE DIRECTOR OF SE AND FEELS THE OPERATION IS DESIGNED TO FRIGHTEN PEREZ JIMENEZ. CIFENCE-4 WILL CARRY ALL THE MATERIAL NECESSARY TO ASSEMBLE BOMB IN LIMA. UPON COMPLETION OF MISSION IN LIMA, CIFENCE-4 AND COMPANION TO TRAVEL TO BUENOS AIRES FOR ONE OR TWO DAYS AND THEN TO BRAZIL FOR ANOTHER

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 16913 SECRET

ONE OR TWO DAYS AND THEN RETURN TO CARACAS. CIFENCE-4 SAID ESTRADA ADDRESS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONAL USE AGAINST HIM.

4. CIFENCE-4 SAID HE WILL BE TRAVELLING AS GILBERTO OTERO VILORIA AND WILL USE A REGULAR VENEZUELAN PASPORT. THE TRUE NAME OF THE MAN TRAVELLING WITH HIM IS RAFAEL GUZMAN. CIFENCE-4 SAID HE WISHES TO PERFORM HIS MISSION IN LIMA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND FOR THIS REASON ASKS OF JKLANCE IN LIMA COULD POSSIBLY PROVIDE HIM THE ADDRESSES OF BOTH PEREZ JIMENEZ AND ESTRADA. HE SAID UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN LIMA ON 14 APRIL, HE WILL IMMEDIATELY SEEK OUT CONTACTS WHO POSSIBLY CAN PROVIDE HIM WITH THE ADDRESSES HE WISHES. IF JKLANCE IN LIMA CAN PROVIDE THE ADDRESSES HE SAID HE COULD TELL HIS ASSOCIATE THAT THE ADDRESSES WERE PROVIDED BY ONE OF THE CONTACTS HE MADE ON 14 APRIL. IF JKLANCE CAN PROVIDE THIS ASSISTANCE, CONTACT WITH CIFENCE-4 SHOULD BE MADE BEFORE 9 A.M. ON 15 APRIL. THE PERSON MAKING THE CONTACT SHOULD TELEPHONE THE HOTEL CARRILLON ASK FOR GILBERTO OTERO VILORIO, AND SAY THIS IS NUMBER EIGHT

SECRET

3753

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BY: ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ____

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 CARACAS 16913 SECRET

(8) CALLING. CIFENCE-4 WILL REPLY THAT HE IS NUMBER NINE (9). THESE TWO NUMBERS TOTALLING 17 (SEVENTEEN) WILL INDICATE TO THE CALLER THAT HE ACTUALLY IS TALKING TO CIFENCE-4. CONTACT WITH CIFENCE-4 SHOULD BE MADE FROM A PUBLIC TELEPHONE BOOTH. THE ADDRESSES CAN BE GIVEN TO CIFENCE-4 OVER THE TELEPHONE. IN CASE, HOWEVER, PERSONAL CONTACT IS DESIRED WITH CIFENCE-4, ARRANGEMENT FOR A MEETING CAN BE MADE BY TELEPHONE.

5. THE MATERIALS CIFENCE-4 WILL CARRY TO ASSEMBLE BOMB ARE: ABOUT ONE QUARTER POUND OF PENTOLITE EXPLOSIVE, TWO DETONATORS AND M-1 DELAYING DEVICE. CIFENCE-4 SAID HE WILL PERFORM THIS OPERATION IN LIMA WITH OR WITHOUT THE HELP OF JKLANCE. IF JKLANCE CAN HELP HIM, HE FEELS THIS WILL LESSEN HIS CHANCES OF POSSIBLY BEING ARRESTED IN LIMA FOR SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES.

6. CARACAS STATION RECOMMENDS THAT ADDRESSES NOT BE PROVIDED TO CIFENCE-4 AND CONTACT NOT BE MADE, BUT DEFERS TO HEADQUARTERS IF IT SEES SOME OVERRIDING REASON FOR DOING SO.

3750

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1		1 5
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		2 6
BY ______ AT ______ Z			3 7
DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #			4 8

ACTION UNIT | INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 5 CARACAS 16913 SECRET

7. STATION DISSEMINATING GIST OF ABOVE TO AMBASSADOR ONLY. DISSEM WILL NOT INDICATE ONE OF OUR AGENTS INVOLVED, NOT THAT WE HAVE BEEN ASKED ASSIST. RECOMMEND HEADQUARTERS DISSEM, IF ANY, BE RESTRICTED AS TIGHTLY AS POSSIBLE.

8. FILE: DEFER. GP-1.

SECRET

SECRET

AEW

IG: A.D. WEDEMEYER:jcv
IT: C/WH/3/V
T: 1535 RED
TE: 14 APRIL 1971

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2-1

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
35 PER SC/ISS (2)

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☒ FILE RID

☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-003243

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP

14 20 Z APR 71 "EYES ONLY"

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 130374

IMMEDIATE CARACAS PRIORITY LIMA

RYBAT

REF CARACAS-16913 (IN-311053)*

1. FULLY CONCUR IN YOUR RECOMMENDATION PARA 6 REF. WE SHOULD NOT ASSIST OR BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY WITH THIS SCHEME.

2. FILE 201-003243.

END OF MESSAGE

*Station liaison penetration CIFENCE-4 being sent by CIFENCE service to Lima to assemble bomb to be sent to former Venezuelan dictator Perez Jimenez. Bomb will be authentic but designed not to explode. CIFENCE-4 has requested that Lima Station help him in his mission but Caracas Station recommends no help be given.

File CIFENCE-4 201

James E. Flannery for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. Conolly
RICHARD CONOLLY
AC/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

6 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: AAS/OS

ATTENTION : Mr. John Rooney

SUBJECT : Revalidation of U.S. Reentry Permits of CIFENCS-4 and Wife

REFERENCE : DIRECTOR-120632

1. Attached herewith are Form I-143's and reentry permits for CIFENCS-4 and his wife. CIFENCS-4 is presently employed as an asset of Caracas Station.

2. We would appreciate your having the reentry permits revalidated. A U.S. Postal Money Order for $20 is attached herewith to cover payment of the necessary fees.

3. Please return the revalidated permits to us for forwarding to Caracas Station.

Henry Appelbaum
WH/3/V

Attachments: H/W
1. Form I-143's (2 sets)
2. Reentry Permits (2)
3. Money Order (1)

WH/3/V:Henry Appelbaum:jev (6 April 1971)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/atts.
1 - 201-300985 (CIFENCS-4) w/o atts.
1 - WH/Registry w/o atts.
1 - WH/3/V Memo Chrono w/o atts.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
CIFLUTE/CIFENCE - Transmittal of Permits to Re-enter the United States & Applications for Extension of Permits for CIFENCE-4 & wife

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Extension of Permits

DIRECTOR 120632

Per reference, transmitted under separate cover are the Permits to Re-enter the United States for CIFENCE-4 and his wife and completed and signed applications for extension of these permits. It will be appreciated if Headquarters can complete item 7 on both of these applications. It also will be appreciated if Headquarters can pay the fees which must accompany these applications and TA the cost to the Caracas Station.

Gordon K. Rijock
Gordon K. RIJOCK

ATTACHMENT: Under Separate Cover
Reentry Permits

DISTRIBUTION:
3-C/WHD w/att u/s/c

MAR 2[illegible] 1971

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCT - 5177	DATE 25 March 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

c. CIFENCE-4 The same method for emergency recontact as described for CIHURON-1, but with entirely different locations, will be used for emergency recontact with CIFENCE-4. If all personal contact between CIFENCE-4 and RIJOCK is deemed unwise, another Case Officer or an outside agent handler with proper bona fides and recognition signals will be used to contact CIFENCE-4.

HVCA-18146
19 Mar 71

c. CIFENCE-4 CIFENCE-4 is met clandestinely in a Safehouse or the automobile of either CIFENCE-4 or RIJOCK. Meetings are scheduled at previous meetings or by use of the system described in Attachment 2 of HVCA-17565, dated 21 April 1970. The only change in the system described in Attachment 2 of HVCA-17565 is that the word "peluqueria" has been substituted for "the usual place" (which means the Safehouse) and "costurera" has been substituted for "the location near my home".

HVCA -18[illegible]
19 Mar [illegible]

H. Applebaum:pd
WH/3/V
1535
1535

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

	UTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

37 PER ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

WH8 FILE, VR. c/py secret

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 16 23 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 120632

CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

1. (C) U.S. REENTRY PERMITS OF CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE MUST BE REVALIDATED PRIOR TO 15 APRIL EXPIRATION DATE. IF U.S. CONSUL IN CARACAS CANNOT REVALIDATE, BOTH PERMITS SHOULD BE FORWARDED SOONEST TO HQS. EACH PERMIT SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY COMPLETED AND SIGNED FORM I-143. POUCHING ADDITIONAL FORM I-143'S 19 MARCH.

2. FILE 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB
WH/3/V

201-300985

Alien Affairs Staff Mr. L. Wienckowski (Telecoord)
16 Mar 71

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CS COPY

R. Conolly
RICHARD CONOLLY
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
O Forwarding of Photograph of Subject of 201-300985

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HVCS-3405, 27 January 1971

In compliance with reference request, attached is the photograph of Subject of 201-300985.

Teresa G. FRIGONA

Attachment:
Photograph, ~~h/w~~ c/s/c

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD, w/att, ~~h/w~~ c/s/c

3/c att att'd RID/AN
18 Mar 71

1 Att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA-16115	MAR 12 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

14-00000

SECRET

HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO: HVCA-18115

TO: CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM: CHIEF OF STATION, CARACAS

SECRET

CS COPY

201-300985

S/C att 1
to HVCA 18115



Photographs of C/4 and wife
taken in 1970





14-00000

1970

SUBJ: CIFLUTE Operational Report for Period November thru December 1970
HVCA-18070, 20 February 1971, FILED: 75-2-16/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA - 18070

3. CIFENCE-4

CIFENCE-4 continued to be a reliable, steady Station asset who enjoys the confidence of and has a very close working relationship with CIFENCE-1. During most of the reporting period, he was in charge of the surveillance of the newly arrived Soviet diplomats and was quick to pass to the Station any information coming into his possession which he felt would be of value to JKLANCE. Because most of his time was devoted to coverage of the Soviets, he was unable to give the Station the large variety and number of reports which in the past has been his custom. The Station continues to think very highly of CIFENCE-4 and looks forward to a continuing productive relationship with him.

14-00000

1970

4. CIFENCE-4

CIFENCE-4 continues to be a reliable and steady Station asset who enjoys the confidence of and has a very close working relationship with CIFENCE-1. His recent acquisition of Venezuelan citizenship has increased his stature with CIFENCE-1 and among the Venezuelans with whom he works. He continues on his own to provide information coming into his possession which he feels will be of interest to JKLANCE and also continues to pass to the Station numerous reports from CIFENCE and other security-intelligence agencies. His most valuable contribution during this reporting period was the information indicating that a CIFENCE officer had information which could have led to the discovery by CIFENCE of the Station's CIGRAPE operation. CIFENCE-4 was able to convince this officer in a very discreet, innocuous manner that the information was of no value and should not be brought to the attention of CIFENCE-1. The officer was convinced, and no investigation was conducted. In the meantime, the Station completely disbanded the CIGRAPE operation. At each meeting with his Case Officer, CIFENCE-4 is asked if there is anything new in regard to this case and he has replied there are no new developments and feels the issue is a dead one. The Station feels the original information from CIFENCE-4 is the type that really proves the value of a good asset. Interesting documents provided by CIFENCE-4 during this reporting period include a list of all personnel working in Venezuelan diplomatic missions abroad, a CIFENCE report about the investigation of the purchase of arms in Miami by unknown elements in the Venezuelan Ministry of Defense, a package containing several documents from CIFENCE and other sources about Communist activities in Venezuela, a report dealing with possible conspiring against the GOV by Venezuelan military officers, a list of various subversive organizations located in several different countries, a report about the possible presence in Venezuela of Colonel Caamano Deno,

201 - CIFENCE-4

FORM 1-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. -6-

---

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	SECRET	HVCA - 17920

a report about the reorganization of CIFENCE, a list identifying automobile license plates used by foreign diplomats in Venezuela, a list of personnel employed by CIRASH, a key to the communications code used by CIRASH, the CIFENCE report about the surveillance of YEBALM during his most recent trip to Caracas and copies of CIFENCE reports about the surveillance of the first two Soviet diplomats now in Caracas. In addition, CIFENCE-4 has conducted name traces and identified automobile license plates for the Station and soon will provide unidentifiable license plates for use by the Station on vehicles rented for surveillance and other operational needs.

CIFENCE-4 is chief of the operations section of CIFENCE and, as such, has responsibility for surveillance of Soviet and Bloc personnel in Venezuela. Through him, the Station has the means of monitoring quite closely the movements and activities of these persons. Also, we are able to direct CIFENCE-4 to conduct special surveillances of Soviet and Bloc person who may not be under surveillance by CIFENCE as a routine procedure. The current position of CIFENCE-4 within CIFENCE is very good and should remain so as long as CIFENCE-1 remains as head of CIFENCE. CIFENCE-4 feels there is a good possiblity that if CIFENCE-1 leaves his present position he (CIFENCE-4) will be removed from CIFENCE. Should this happen, the Station will lose access to an important position within CIFENCE and CIFENCE-4 will lose his principal source of income. CIFENCE-4 has said several times he would like to have a career with JKLANCE and would be willing to work in any country of the world for us. If CIFENCE-4 eventually loses his position within CIFENCE and is unable to obtain another position in Venezuela that would provide access of interest to JKLANCE, Headquarters may wish to consider using him in some other country.

1970

See HVCA 17828, 26 October 70, re CIFENCE belief that CIGRAPE/2 is working for CIA. CIFENCE/4 advised the station of this, and ~~will~~ was told to do what he can to initiate a full-scale CIFENCE investigation of CIGRAPE/2, under his own direction, in order to remove the suspicions. He said it would be hard to do this without attracting undue interest, but he will remain alert to the problem and try to take charge of any investigation that may get under way.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Port of Spain

SUBJECT
CIFLUTE/CIFENCE
Possible Future Contact with CIFENCE-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HVCA-17611, 14 May 1970

A.R.: Paragraphs 2 and 3 below

1. I appreciate Caracas' offer for possible future contact with CIFENCE-4 in the event of another emergency situation in Trinidad, a possibility which should not be totally ruled out. I was aware that four or five Venezuelan officials had arrived in Port of Spain shortly after the declaration of a state of emergency, but I had no contact with any of these individuals during their stay here.

2. I agree with CIFENCE-4 that it would have been to the station's advantage to have had contact with him during the period of the Regiment mutiny. To this end, I propose the following contact arrangements. When CIFENCE-4 has arrived in Port of Spain and has gotten himself set up, he should call Identity A on Identity B during normal office hours (0800-1700). One hour after telephonic contact has been made with Identity A, CIFENCE-4 will be picked up in Identity C at Identity D. In order to establish bona fides, the case officer will ask of CIFENCE-4 "Are you a friend of Pedro's?". CIFENCE-4 should respond "Yes, and of Tomas also.". Recognition signals having been exchanged and authenticated, I would feel free to ask CIFENCE-4 to keep me informed of developments from his side as they occurred.

3. Please provide a physical description of CIFENCE-4.

PHILIP K. ARNAYER

attd by RIDAN
23 Jun 70

Attchment: u/s/c
Identities A,B,C,D

CS COPY

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att u/s/c
1 - C/WHD w/att u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO
In file

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HWSA-1473

DATE
JUN 12 1970
Typed: 10 June 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-300985

14-00000

SECRET

S/C Attachment to HWSA-1473

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Port of Spain

IDENTITY A: Mr. Steve Allen

IDENTITY B: 62-25832

IDENTITY C: White Valiant sedan, License #PL 7602

IDENTITY D: N.W. corner of Tragarete Road and French Street in western Port of Spain

CS COPY

S.C ATT. 2 TO HWSA-01473

201-300955

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Port of Spain

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
0 CIFLUTE/CIFENCE - Recent Trip to Trinidad of CIFENCE-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: As Stated Herein

1. CIFENCE-4 (IDENTITY under separate cover for Port of Spain), an agent of the Caracas Station, was in Port of Spain during the periods 21 - 22 April 1970 and 24 April - 3 May 1970. CIFENCE-4 said the purpose of his trip was to protect Venezuelans in Trinidad and to collect information about the situation in Trinidad for the Government of Venezuela. He gave the Caracas Station a copy of the report he prepared for the Venezuelan Government about his activities in Trinidad. A copy of this report is being sent under separate cover to Port of Spain for the information of the Station only.

2. CIFENCE-4 said it was too bad he had no contact with JKLANCE while in Trinidad, as he feels he could have provided timely on-the-spot information. If a situation in Trinidad similar to the previous one again arises, CIFENCE-4 feels he may have to return to Trinidad. If this happens, he is willing to have contact with JKLANCE if so desired. The Port of Spain Station is requested to advise the Caracas Station if this contact would be desired and, if so, to send Caracas a contact plan. Upon receipt of this plan, Caracas will advise the name and recognition signal CIFENCE-4 will use. CIFENCE-4 speaks fairly good English, so there should be no language barrier in communicating with him.

GORDON K. RIJOCK

ATTACHMENTS: Under Separate Cover
1. IDENTITY
2. CIFENCE-4 Report

DISTRIBUTION:
2-COS, Port of Spain, w/atts 1 & 2 u/s/c
← 2-C/WHD w/o atts

S COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCA 17611

DATE
MAY 19 1970
14 May 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 201-300985

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
COS, Caracas

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
0 Transmittal of Re-Entry Permits

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR-028144

Transmitted under separate cover are new Re-Entry Permits for CIFENCE/4 and his wife.

Oliver H. LAFKO

Attachment: as stated above

Distribution:
  3 - COS, Caracas, w/att u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCW-9067	DATE 28 APR 1970 Typed: 28 April 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/V	M. Berger	rr	7271

Distribution:
  1 - Chrono
  1 - RID

AH
AB
~~IN~~
~~DX~~
~~DES~~ RFD
~~SI~~
C/WH/3/V

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	28 Ap. 70	A. D. Wedemeyer
	15 02	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	28 Ap. 70	Alfonso Spera for

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. D. J. Brennan

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : O James Melville HART
Orlando GARCIA
Luis POSADA

MICROFILMED
MAY 4 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Reference is made to the Bureau's memorandum of 13 March 1970 entitled JAMES MELVILLE HART - REGISTRATION ACT - VENEZUELA.

2. Neither James Melville HART nor Orlando GARCIA has any operational relationship with this Agency, although their activities are of interest to us. We are not aware of any contact between them and Luis POSADA, and our Caracas station will attempt, through discreet soundings, to ascertain whether such contact did or does exist.

3. This Agency would appreciate receiving any information which the Bureau may develop concerning HART and GARCIA and the arms traffic in which they are reported to be involved.

~~IN~~
~~AB~~
~~TI~~
PS
DX 4
~~DES~~
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

CSCI-316/01029-70

DDP/WH/3/V/N.Perkins:ljo (8 April 1970)

Based on: CARACAS 4838, 6 April 1970

Distribution:
Original and 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/LIAISON
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/FI
1 - WH/3/V
1 - Chrono
3 - RID/AN
(1 - CIFENCE-4, 201-300985)
(1 - James Melville HART, 201-327674)
(1 - Orlando GARCIA, 201-067860)

CS COPY

B 201-327674
B 201-067860

201 - 300985
22 APR 70

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

ORIG: N. BERGER:ljo
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1335
DATE: 22 APRIL 1970

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 21 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH/4 INFO FILE, VR. NE/HAN, Sec. 4, CI, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 23 0 13 2 APR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 028147

TO CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 018266*

1. PLS ADVISE CIFENCE-4 HIS APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE APPROVED 16 APRIL 1970.

2. POUCHING NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS FOR CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE.

3. FILE: 201-300985

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested CIFENCE-4 and wife complete application forms for new U.S. Re-Entry Permits and Preservation of Residence (CIFENCE-4 only).

AN
AB ✓
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~RI~~
~~DYS/NFD~~
~~FI~~

C/OS/AAS L. Winkowski (telecord)
C/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Spera
ALFONSO A. SPERA
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-300985
24 Apr 70

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

24 April 70

operations smoother. Unfortunately, CIHURON-1's men are already planning a rearguard action to make CIFENCE-3's job as difficult as possible. The net result of this switch, however, has been to somewhat increase efficiency of the two services and to materially increase JKLANCE unilateral access to each. For awhile, this reorganization will be beneficial, but—because of the personalities of CIFASH-17 and CIFENCE-1—we do not expect either CIHURON-1 or CIFENCE-3 to indefinitely have smooth sailing.

2. CIFENCE-4

CIFENCE-4 provided verbal and written information reports about various subjects of interest such as activities of Communist and other subversive elements, guerrilla activities, counterfeiting of money and documents, sabotage, information about and activities of Soviets visiting Venezuela, kidnappings of well-known persons in Venezuela, CIFENCE operations and internal problems of CIFENCE. His position in CIFENCE as Chief of Operations provides him access to practically all written reports and documents prepared and received by CIFENCE. His daring as a dedicated agent for JKLANCE has enabled him to provide the Station with copies of several of these reports and documents. During this reporting period he has provided 119 copies of such reports and documents

Some of the more significant requests levied on CIFENCE-4 during this reporting period include the following: 1) assessment for the Station's SB Section of an employee of the Venezuelan Government's Oficina Central de Informaciones (OCI), 2) for the SB and CP Sections of the Station, collection of information about and assessment of a former employee of the local TASS office in Caracas, 3) provision for the SB Section of a list of the names and license plate numbers of the users of all diplomatic automobile license plates in Venezuela, 4) investigation for the Station's CP Section of the robbery of a large sum of money reportedly destined for financing the clandestine manufacture of arms, and 5) for the Station's Case Officer in charge of student operations, collection of information about and assessment of a former Station asset in whom there is a renewed operational interest.

CIFENCE-4

CIFENCE-4's current Case Officer is Gordon K. RIJOCK who meets with CIFENCE-4 in safehouse number 45 which was obtained during this reporting period. When RIJOCK wants to schedule a meeting with CIFENCE-4, RIJOCK's wife who speaks native Spanish with no American accent, telephones CIFENCE-4's home, identifies herself as "Maria" and asks to speak with the true first name of CIFENCE-4. If CIFENCE-4 is at home, RIJOCK's wife tells him she wants to meet with him at a certain time on a certain date at "the usual place" (which means the safehouse) and asks if the time and date are acceptable to him. If CIFENCE-4 says yes, RIJOCK meets with him at the safehouse. If he says no, RIJOCK's wife asks him to set a time and date. If these are acceptable to RIJOCK, the meeting is thereby scheduled and held. If RIJOCK wants CIFENCE-4 to pick him up in his automobile, "Maria" says she wants to meet him at a certain time on a certain date "at the location near my home". If the time and date are acceptable to CIFENCE-4, RIJOCK then walks to a site a few blocks from his home where CIFENCE-4 picks him up in his private automobile. If the time and date are not acceptable to CIFENCE-4, then "Maria" asks CIFENCE-4 to set a new time and date which, if acceptable to RIJOCK, serve as the schedule for the car pickup meeting. If CIFENCE-4 is not home, "Maria" requests that CIFENCE-4 telephone "Maria" as soon as possible. Upon returning to his home and receiving the message, CIFENCE-4 telephones RIJOCK's home from a public telephone, identifies himself as "Raul" and asks to speak to "Roberto". If RIJOCK is home, he and CIFENCE-4 talk directly and arrange a meeting. If RIJOCK is not home, CIFENCE-4 says "Raul" is calling and either he wants "Roberto" to contact him or he will call "Roberto" later. If the message is for "Roberto" to call him, then "Maria" telephones CIFENCE-4's home and follows the procedure described above. (NOTE: RIJOCK's wife makes all telephonic contact with CIFENCE-4's home, to give the impression to anyone monitoring CIFENCE-4's telephone that a native Spanish speaking "girlfriend" of CIFENCE-4 wants to talk with him.

In the event RIJOCK wishes to contact CIFENCE-4 while he is in his office, "Maria" telephones CIFENCE-4's wife, identifies herself as "Maria", says she wishes to speak with the true name of CIFENCE-4 and asks his wife to tell him to call her at a certain time. CIFENCE-4's wife then telephones him in his office and gives him the message from "Maria". If the time is acceptable to CIFENCE-4, he telephones RIJOCK's home from a public telephone and either arranges a meeting schedule with "Maria" (per prior instructions from RIJOCK) or speaks directly with RIJOCK to

HVCA-17565, 24 April 70

arrange a meeting. If the time is not acceptable to CIFENCE-4, he gives a new time to his wife who immediately thereafter conveys the new time via telephone to "Maria" who in turn conveys it to RIJOCK. If CIFENCE-4 is not in his office, his wife leaves a message for him to call her as soon as possible. In such a case, his wife advises "Maria" that he is not in his office but when he calls her, she will tell him to call "Maria" as soon as possible. A meeting is scheduled when CIFENCE-4 calls and talks to either "Maria" or RIJOCK. If it is urgent for RIJOCK to talk to CIFENCE-4 as soon as possible, CIFENCE-4's wife tells CIFENCE-4 that "Maria" wants to speak to him as soon as possible. If an emergency situation necessitated immediate contact with CIFENCE-4 in his office and his wife was not available to telephone him, "Maria" would telephone him in his office.

In the event RIJOCK and/or CIFENCE-4 do not want to meet in the safehouse and do not want a car pickup at the site agreed upon, a new site is agreed upon during the course of the telephonic contacts described above. For future use, CIFENCE-4 and RIJOCK will make a list of primary and alternate meeting sites and assign numbers to each site selected. During telephonic contacts to establish meetings, only numbers will be used to designate the location of the meetings.

CIFENCE-4 and RIJOCK will discuss and prepare plans for contact under emergency/contingency conditions and for emergency re-contact. These plans will be forwarded to Headquarters as soon as they have been prepared.

SRAC is not used or contemplated for contacts with CIFENCE-4.

File: CIFENCE/4

201

DATE: 24 April 1970

ATTN : ~~Chief, WH/3 - Mike Burgos~~

FROM : Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT: Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (A 12 419 708)

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence concerning this case.

2. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, by letter dated 16 April 1970, has granted the benefits of Section 316(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to cover the subject's absence from the United States from 20 March 1970, to an indefinite period, thereafter, and so long as he remains absent on behalf of the United States Government, with the understanding that he will prove to the satisfaction of the Naturalization Court when he files a Petition for United States Citizenship, five years after entry for permanent residence, that he has been absent during this period for that purpose. The benefits of this Section of the Act also permit subject to count the period of his absence toward both the residence and physical presence requirements for naturalization, provided that, since becoming a permanent resident of the United States and before applying for naturalization, he has completed an uninterrupted period of one year of physical presence in the United States.

3. The letter is being retained in the files of this Office and it is requested you so advise Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles.

Louis Wienckowski
Louis Wienckowski
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

14-00000

SECRET

TO: Chief, WH/3
ATTN: Mike Burger
FROM: Director of Security

21 April 1970

SUBJECT: Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (A 12 419 708) and Nieves Elina Gonzalez de POSADA (A 12 443 942)

REFERENCE: **Your request for Reentry Permit dated** 6 April **19** 70.

Reentry Permit ~~**was**~~ were **issued for subjects on** 16 April **1970**. **and/**~~**is**~~ are **valid to** 15 April **19**71. **The Permit may be used for unlimited entries into the United States during validity. Validity of Permit may be extended for a maximum period of twelve (12) months only. Extension of Validity of Permit must be made on the attached "Application for Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States" (I&NS Form I-143). In certain foreign areas U. S. Con- suls and U. S. Immigration Officers are authorized to extend the validity dat ever, where security or cover considerations warrent, the Permit and Appli should be forwarded to Alien Affairs Staff in order to have the validity date e through cleared liaison with Immigration and Naturalization Service.**

30 00
DOLLARS | CENTS
5,693,081,404
PURCHASER'S RECEIPT
U.S. Postal Money Order
DETACH AND HOLD
FILL IN OTHER SIDE
ISSUING OFFICE STAMP
MIAMI, FL.
MAR 10 1970
PURCHASER ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR FILLING IN HIS NAME AND ADDRESS AND NAME OF PAYEE IN SPACES PROVIDED ON THIS ORDER

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Louis Wienckowski
Acting Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

Receipt for above Permit acknowledged:
#0235566 and 0235567

Signature **Date**

OS/AAS/EStark 21 April 1970

SECRET **(GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading & declassification)**

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

1	5
2	6
3	
4	

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/SO, FI 2

ACTION NO. 635

S E C R E T 082215Z APR 70 CITE CARACAS 4858 (CACR)

DIRECTOR INFO GEORGETOWN, WH/MIAMI

8 APR IN 058848

REFS A. CARACAS 4838 (IN 057022)

B. DIRECTOR 022665

1. CIFENCE-4 DENIES ANY INVOLVEMENT WITH HART AND GARCIA IN SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO VENEZUELA. SAYS HE HAS NEVER MET HART. DURING OCT 69 HE WENT TO MIAMI AT REQUEST OF CIFENCE-1 TO INVESTIGATE STORY THAT HART TRAVELLING TO MIAMI TO PURCHASE *3000,000 DOLLARS WORTH OF WEAPONS. PRIOR TO TRIP HE TOLD CC HIS SEVERAL CONTACTS AMONG CLANDESTINE ARMS DEALERS IN MIAMI WOULD FACILITATE INVESTIGATION. RE GARCIA, CIFENCE-4 SAID HE WAS INTRODUCED TO GARCIA CIRCA MAY 69 AND LAST TALKED TO HIM IN JUNE 69.

2. PERHAPS FBI MIAMI SOURCE IS ONE OF ARMS DEALERS CIVENCE-4 KNOWS AND TALKED TO DURING OCT INVESTIGATION OF HART. IF THIS TRUE, POSSIBILITY EXISTS SOURCE CONNECTED CIFENCE-4 WITH HART. GARCIA 201 FILE SHOWS HE DEALT WITH MIAMI ARMS DEALER IN OCT 63 ON BEHALF OF GOV. CANNOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY THAT GARCIA HAS HAD SUBSEQUENT DEALINGS.

3. FILE 201-300985. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN	
AB	
~~IN~~	
~~BX~~	
~~DES~~	NPD
~~FI~~	
WH/3	

*WILL SVC UPON REQUEST. CS COPY

Cifence-4

201-300985

08 Apr 70

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 39/78 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI 2, CI/SO

ACTION NO. 443

S E C R E T 061954Z APR 70 CITE CARACAS 4838 06APR70 IN 057022

DIRECTOR INFO GEORGETOWN, WH/MIAMI

File 201

NP

REF DIRECTOR 022665

1. TELL LNERGO WE INTERESTED IN HART AND GARCIA ACTIVITIES. HOPE LNERGO WILL DO ALL POSSIBLE MONITOR THEM. THEY IN NO WAY WORK FOR US.

pls consider FBI

2. CARACAS CHECKING FOR ANY POSSIBLE CIFENCE-4 CONNECTION WITH HART AND GARCIA. WILL ADVISE. GP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

4

ORIG: Nancy Perkins
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 7271/1535
DATE: 3 April 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 48 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE, VR, RIAN, CI, CI/OPS, FI2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 03 23 50z APR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 022665

TO CARACAS ~~INFO~~ INFO GEORGETOWN, WH/MIAMI

REF: CARACAS 3891, 28 OCTOBER 69*(IN 74856)

1. FBI INVESTIGATING JAMES HART AND HAS BEEN TOLD THAT IN 1969, HART, ORLANDO GARCIA AND CIFENCE/4 WERE INVOLVED IN SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO VENEZUELA FOR GUYANESE INSURGENTS. FBI MIAMI SOURCE ALLEGED THAT JKLANCE WAS AWARE OF FACTS, THAT CIFENCE/4 WAS OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST TO JKLANCE, AND THAT THE WEAPONS ACTIVITY IS CONTINUING. FBI DISCUSSED FOREGOING WITH WH/MIAMI REPRESENTATIVE WHO CONFIRMED THAT CIFENCE/4 OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST TO JKLANCE.

2. FBI ASKS IF WE HAVE OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN HART OR GARCIA. RE HART, HOW SHALL WE ANSWER?

3. FILE: 201-327674.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH comment: While Station sees no immediate objections to LNERGO interviewing HART if he enters U.S. further developments might make us change our position. Recruitment might be feasible.

WH/COG

C/WH/7

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO. ____

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff
Office of Security

SUBJECT : Request for Double Re-Entry Permits for Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles and Wife and Preservation of Residence for POSADA

1. It is requested that the double Re-Entry Permit arrangement be obtained for Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (hereafter referred to as the Principal Subject) and his wife, Nieves Elina GONZALEZ de POSADA, and that Preservation of Residence also be obtained for the Principal Subject.

2. The Principal Subject was born on 15 February 1928 in Cuba. His spouse was born on 12 December 1935 in Cuba.

3. The Principal Subject was initially employed by this Agency in 1961 and is still employed by the Agency as of the present time. In addition to the salary he receives from his organization, the Venezuelan Ministry of the Interior, he also is paid by this Agency.

4. The Principal Subject will be regularly stationed abroad engaged in activities in furtherance of the national intelligence effort. He will be accompanied by his wife and his son, the latter being a U.S. citizen who travels on a U.S. passport.

5. Attached are the following documents:

a. Two original I-131 forms completed by the Principal Subject.

b. Two original I-131 forms completed by the Principal Subject's spouse

c. One N-470 form completed by the Principal Subject.

SECRET

d. Two signed photos each of the Principal Subject and his spouse.

e. U.S. Postal Money Order for $30 made out to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Alfonso A. Spera
C/WH/3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY S PER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 9 [illegible]

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

II

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN SECUR 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/SO

ACTION NO 031

S E C R E T 201726Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6887 (NEBECKER ACTING)

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 018266

1. CIFENCE-4 AND DEPENDENTS DEPART MIAMI FOR CARACAS 20 MARCH ETA 2200 HRS FLT 741 VIASA. INS FORMS COMPLETED AS PER REF AND SENT AIR MAIL REGISTERED TO DIRECTOR 010144 ADDRESS MORNING 20 MARCH.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

S E C R E T

AMLO7

20 MAR IN 047033

C

AN [illegible]
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PO~~
~~DK~~
~~FNS~~ NFD
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

CS COPY

Fence-4

SECRET

201-300985

20 Mar 70

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

S E C R E T

ORIG: M. BERGER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 18 MARCH 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, SECUR 4, CI, CI/SO, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 19 00 49Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 018266

TO WH/MIAMI INFO CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 6754 (IN 040853)*

B. DIRECTOR 010144**

C. DIRECTOR 009340***

AN
AB
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BY~~
~~DES~~ NFD

1. REF A ENVELOPE RECEIVED 17 MARCH. REF C REQUESTED COUPLE EACH FILL OUT TWO ORIGINAL I-131 FORMS AND EACH PROVIDE TWO PHOTOS SIGNED ON LEFT HAND MARGIN. ENVELOPE CONTAINED ONLY ONE ORIGINAL I-131 FORM FOR EACH PERSON AND PHOTOGRAPHS WERE UNSIGNED.

2. PLS ASK CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE TO EACH COMPLETE TWO MORE ORIGINAL I-131 FORMS. WIFE'S I-131 FORM CORRECTLY FILLED OUT. CIFENCE/4 SHOULD INCLUDE HIS MATRONYM ON NEW FORMS AND SPELL OUT MIDDLE NAME. ALSO REQUEST CIFENCE/4 FILL OUT ANOTHER N-470 FORM CONTAINING SAME INFO AS N-470 FORWARDED IN REF A ENVELOPE EXCEPT FOR QUESTION FOUR WHICH SHOULD NOT BE ANSWERED. ALSO FORWARD TWO SIGNED PHOTOS FOR EACH.

3. AFTER CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE COMPLETE ACTION REQUESTED PARA TWO, THEY MAY RETURN TO CARACAS. ENVELOPE CONTAINING

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

19 Mar 70
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-300985

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ____ PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: INFO FILE, VR, RID: 201

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 018266

TO PAGE TWO

COMPLETED FORMS SHOULD BE SENT TO REF B ADDRESS.

4. FILE: 201-300985

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS JOHN ROONEY (TELECORD)

C/WH/~~COG~~/2 Spera

*Reported that INS forms completed by CIFENCE/4 and wife sent by registered air mail 11 March to Ref B address.
**Provided accommodation address in Headquarters area where completed INS forms should be sent.
***Requested WH/Miami meet with CIFENCE/4 and wife, provided INS forms and gave instructions on how the forms were to be completed.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

FBI
13 MARCH 70
SECRET
JAMES MELVILLE HART - REGISTRATION ACT-VENEZUELA
(NI) 105-193849 (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

I

DISSEM BY 12 PER ____ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 152

S E C R E T 111655Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6754 WHM

11 Mar IN 040853

di

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: CARACAS 4665 (W039385)

1. CIFENCE-4 MET 10 MARCH. INS FORMS COMPLETED AND SENT AIR MAIL REGISTERED TO DIRECTOR 010144 ADDRESS MORNING OF 11 MARCH. AWAITING CABLE NOTIFICATION THAT FORMS IN ORDER SO THAT CIFENCE-4 CAN RETURN CARACAS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

S E C R E T

16550

AN Qm

3

WH/3/V

16551

SECRET

Cifence-4
201-300985
11 Mar 70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY PER

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8
INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2,

ACTION NO. 007

S E C R E T 092255Z MAR 70 CITE CARACAS 4665 CARA

PRIORITY HW/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

SN IN 039385

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: CARACAS 4652 (IN 038624)

1. CIFENCE-4, WIFE, SON DEPARTING CARACAS 0900 HOURS 10 MARCH 70 VIA VIASA FLIGHT 740 WHICH SCHEDULED ARRIVE MIAMI 1100 HOURS, QP MARCH.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~RK~~
~~DES~~ NED
~~PI~~
WH/3/V

CS COPY
SECRET

201-300985
09 Mar 70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY: 3 PER ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

1

ACTION UNIT
WH 8

INFO
FILE, VR CI/OA,

ACTION NO.
918

SECRET 081445Z MAR 70 CITE CARACAS 4652
CARA

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

8 MAR IN 038628

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

1. CIFENCE-4 DEPARTURE DELAYED UNTIL 10 MAR 70. WILL ADVISE TRAVEL ITINERARY.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

SECRET

AN
AB
IP
IS
EX
DNC AFD
FI

COPY

SECRET

201-300985
08 Mar 70

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

ORIG: MSerger:ecw
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: R1535
DATE: 6 March 1970

lh SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8 | INFO | FILE VR. Rilen SECURY CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 06 23 18Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 015164

TO IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 6708 (IN 038146)*

B. DIRECTOR 015088**

1. INS CENTRAL OFFICE ASKED INS/MIAMI (MR. TILLMAN) 6 MARCH TO SMOOTH ENTRY CIFENCE-4 AND FAMILY INTO U.S.

2. CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE SHOULD ENTER U.S. USING ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS (FORM 151) AND NOT "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS." IF ASKED BY INS ABOUT LATTER, COUPLE SHOULD REPLY THEY HAVE NEVER USED THESE PASSPORTS TO ENTER U.S. NOR HAVE THEY EVER OBTAINED U.S. VISAS IN THESE PASSPORTS. THIS REPLY IMPORTANT IN ORDER THAT PERMANENT ALIEN RESIDENT STATUS NOT BE JEOPARDIZED.

AT
~~IN~~
~~P~~
~~BX~~
~~DP~~ NSI
~~PI~~
WH/3/V

3. FYI: LAST TIME CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE WERE IN U.S. WAS IN OCT 1969.

4. FILE: 201-300985.

201-300985

END OF MESSAGE CS Curt

06 Mar 70

OS/AAS - JOHN ROONEY (TELECOORD)

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Spera

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ALFONSO G. SPERA
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

DEC 12 11 36 AM '70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #
CONF:

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO: FILE, VR. RID/EDI .

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 015164

TO PAGE TWO

* Advised INS/Miami not familiar with "Emergency Venezuelan Passport" and would not consider it acceptable in any event without U.S. visa. Mentioned that it presumed that CIFENCE-4 and family have been out of U.S. longer than one year and therefore will be probably questioned by INS/Miami. WH/Miami has contacted INS Inspector in Miami who will handle case discreetly if complications arise after couple enters U.S.

**Reported no problems foreseen when CIFENCE-4 and family enter U.S. and replied to questions from WH/Miami on how couple is to fill out their requests for U.S. reentry permits and CIFENCE-4's request for Preservation of Resident Alien Status.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

ORIG: M. BERGER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 6 MARCH 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 18/21 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WHB INFO FILE, VR. R/AN, SECUR 4, C/OPS,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 06 22 03z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 015088

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

INFO: PRIORITY CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI-6698 (IN 037842)*

B. CARACAS-4636 (IN 037359)**

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DES~~ NFD
~~PI~~
WH/3/V

1. HQS DOES NOT FORESEE ANY DIFFICULTY RE ENTRY CIFENCE-4 AND FAMILY INTO U.S.

2. FOLLOWING REPLIES KEYED TO QUESTIONS REF A PARA TWO:

A. CIFENCE-4 SHOULD LIST CIFENCE AS HIS CURRENT EMPLOYER. RVROCK SHOULD NOT BE MENTIONED.

B. CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE SHOULD SIGN THEIR I-131 FORMS BUT NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO SWEAR FORM BEFORE ANYONE. THIS WILL BE HANDLED BY HQS.

C. CIFENCE-4 SHOULD SIGN HIS N-470 FORM.

D. DO NOT FORWARD I-151 FORMS (WHICH ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS) TO HQS. WE WILL HANDLE THIS REQUIREMENT HERE.

CONTINUED . . . .

201-300985
06 Mar 70

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

11 35 AM '70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

RE 1/ E01

CC (P):

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 015088

TO PAGE 2

3. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

*Reported WH/Miami checking with local INS re re-entry of CIFENCE-4 and family. Also requested priority reply re how CIFENCE-4 should answer certain questions on applications for re-entry permits and form for preservation of residence.
**Advised that CIFENCE-4, wife, and son will arrive Miami 8 March to begin processing for re-entry permits and preservation of residence (CIFENCE-4 only) and that CIFENCE-4 will contact WH/Miami per previous instructions 9 March. Mentioned CIFENCE-4 slightly concerned about possible problem with INS due to family's long absence from U.S.

OS/AAS - L. Winkowski (Telecord)

C/WH/COG

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: 9 AT: 2017 Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ____ #

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PRECEDENCE 1

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR Bilan SECURY c/OPS

ACTION NO. 811

S E C R E T 062016Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6708 (WMIAMI)

IMMEDIATE CARACAS INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

TYPIC CIFLUTE CIFENCE

6 Mar IN 036146

REFS: A. CARACAS 4636 (IN 037359)

B. WH/MIAMI 6507 (IN 024557)

C. WH/MIAMI 6698 (IN 037842)

1. INS/MIAMI NOT FAMILIAR WITH "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORT" AND WOULD NOT CONSIDER IT ACCEPTABLE IN ANY EVENT WITHOUT U.S. VISA. ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS (FORM I-151) NORMALLY WOULD BE ONLY DOCUMENT REQUIRED BY INS IF HOLDERS HAD BEEN BACK TO STATES WITHIN PAST YEAR. SINCE CIFENCE-4 AND FAMILY HAVE BEEN OUT LONGER THAN ONE YEAR (WE PRESUME) WITHOUT RETURN TO STATES, PROBABLY WILL BE QUESTIONED BY INS ON ARRIVAL MIAMI AND, SINCE PAPERS NOT CONSIDERED IN ORDER, CASE WILL BE DEFERRED AND CIFENCE-4 GROUP ALLOWED TO LEAVE AIRPORT WITH INSTRUCTIONS REPORT INS HQS MIAMI 9 MARCH TO CLEAR UP PROBLEM. POSSIBLE THAT INS INSPECTOR AT AIRPORT MIGHT NEGLECT TO ASK WHEN LAST IN STATES AND GROUP WILL BE ADMITTED WITH NO DEFERRAL.

8

AN
~~AB~~
IN
PS
EX
DES
PI
WH C/OP

Cifence-4

W 4/3 ✓ 06 Mar 70

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY PER

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. 12 4 42 PM '70

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 6708 SECRET

2. IF CASE DEFERRED AT AIRPORT, STATION HAS ARRANGED FOR DEFERRAL TO BE HANDLED BY MR. JAMES TILLMAN, SUPERVISORY IMMIGRATION INSPECTOR FOR TRAVEL CONTROL, AT INS/MIAMI HQS OFFICE. TILLMAN WILL HANDLE PROMPTLY AND DISCREETLY. NO STATION OFFICER WILL BE AT AIRPORT SINCE TILLMAN PREFERS NOT TO ALERT INS INSPECTORS AT (I)ARPORT IN ADVANCE AND HAS ASSURED STATION LIAISON THAT DEFERRAL IS THE WORST THAT WILL HAPPEN IN THIS CASE.

3. WILL EXPECT CIFENCE-4 CONTACT 9 MARCH PER REF B.

4. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
WH
BY: C AT: 1440 Z
DISSEM BY: 12 PER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.
X-REF TO CS FILE NO.
☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT: WH8
INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS, SECUR 4
ACTION NO.: 756

S E C R E T 061415Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6698 (WINIM)

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, CARACAS

TYPIC CIFLUTE CIFENCE

6 Mar IN 037842

REF: CARACAS 4636 (IN 037359)

1. CARACAS: CHECKING WITH LOCAL INS ON REENTRY OF CIFENCE-4 AND FAMILY PER REF. WILL ADVISE SHORTLY.

2. DIRECTOR: PLS PROVIDE PRIORITY ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING:

A. ON INS FORMS N-470 AND I-131 CIFENCE-4 MUST ANSWER QUESTIONS AS TO EMPLOYMENT OVERSEAS. SINCE HE OSTENSIBLY WORKS FOR CIFENCE, BUT ACTUALLY WORKS FOR RVROCK, HOW SHOULD HE ANSWER, IF AT ALL?

B. FORM I-131 SHOULD BE (1) SWORN BEFORE INS OFFICER (2) SWORN BEFORE NOTARY, OR (3) SIGNED BY PERSON OTHER THAN APPLICANT. HOW DO WE HANDLE?

C. FORM N-470 CAN BE SIGNED BY APPLICANT OR OTHER PERSON ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT. WHO SIGNS, CIFENCE-4 OR HQS?

D. WHEN SUBMITTING FORM I-131, APPLICANT MUST

WH/C/OP

CIFENCE-4
W+/3 ✓
6 Mar 70
201-300985

CS COPY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

12 11 37 AM '70

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR RID/201

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 6698 SECRET

SUBMIT FORM I-151. SHOULD FORMS I-151 BE FORWARDED TO HQS WITH I-131 APPLICA~~N~~TIONS?

3. WH/MIAMI WILL COLLECT COMPLETED FORMS N-470 AND I-131 AND FORWARD WITH CHECK FOR $30 AND PHOTOS TO ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS OF DIRECTOR 010144 BY REGISTERED LETTER. WILL ADVISE WHEN MAILED.

4. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: dl AT: 2005 Z

DISSEM BY: 1 PER ____ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4			

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT
WHB

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN SECUR W CI/OPS

ACTION NO.
713

5 MAR IN 037359

S E C R E T 051925Z MAR 70 CITE CARACAS 4636 (CARD)

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 010472

B. WH/MIAMI 6533 (IN35205)

C. CARACAS 4472 (IN025595)

D. WH/MIAMI 6507 (IN34557)

1. CIFENCE-4, WIFE AND SON HAVE RESERVATIONS VIASA FLIGHT 744 LEAVING CARACAS 0900 HOURS AND ARRIVING MIAMI 1305 HOURS 8 MARCH 70. CIFENCE-4 WILL CONTACT WH/MIAMI MORNING 9 MARCH AS INSTRUCTED IN REFERENCE D.

2. CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE WILL ENTER U.S. (MIAMI) USING "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS" AND ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS (I-151). PASSPORTS WILL HAVE NO RPT NO U.S. VISAS. SON IS U.S. CITIZEN AND WILL ENTER WITH U.S. PASSPORT.

3. ALTHOUGH CIFENCE-4 FEELS HE AND WIFE SHOULD NOT ENCOUNTER PROBLEM ENTERING U.S. WITH "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS" AND ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS,

AN LWL
WH/3/V

05 Mar 70

CS COPY
SECRET

201-300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1	1	5
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	2	6
BY: AT:	INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO	3	7
DISSEM BY PER #	CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.	4	8
	X-REF TO CS FILE NO.		
	☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH		
ACTION UNIT	INFO FILE, VR		
ACTION NO.			

MAR 10 9 08 AM '70

FORWARDED RID/EDI

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4636 SECRET

HE LITTLE BIT CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE PROBLEM WITH U.S. IMMIGRATION DUE THEIR LONG ABSENCES FROM US. REQUEST WH/MIAMI VIEWS RE SUCH A PROBLEM OCCURRING. IF WH/MIAMI FEELS POSSIBLE PROBLEM MAY ARISE, REQUEST SOMEONE BE AT MIAMI AIRPORT TO ASSIST CIFENCE-4 IF NEED ARISES. IN THIS EVENT, REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTACT AT AIRPORT. PLEASE REPLY BY COB 6 MARCH.

4. AFTER ARRANGING IN MIAMI TO PRESERVE HIS RIGHT TO EVENTUALLY BECOME U.S. CITIZEN, CIFENCE-4 WILL RETURN TO CARACAS WHERE HE WILL APPLY FOR VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP. CARACAS EMPHASIZES IT VITALLY IMPORTANT THE GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA NOT BECOME AWARE OF TRUE REASON FOR PRESENCE IN MIAMI OF CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE.

5. CARACAS STATION PAYING FOR ROUND TRIP TICKETS FOR CIFENCE-4, WIFE AND SON AND PROVIDING THEM TOTAL PER DIEM ~~GM~~ OF FIFTY DOLLARS PER DAY TO COVER THEIR LIVING EXPENSIS IN MIAMI.

6. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

SECRET

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: M. BURGER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 16 FEBRUARY 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, SECURY

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 16 23 16Z FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO CARACAS WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE 010472

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI (IN 025705)*

B. CARACAS 4472 (IN 025395)**

C. DIRECTOR 010144***

1. CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE PRESENCE IN U.S. ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR PROCESSING APPLICATIONS. ALTHOUGH SEE NO OBJECTION COUPLE USING "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS" FOR TRAVEL TO MIAMI AND RETURN CARACAS, THEY SHOULD NOT RPT NOT OBTAIN U.S. VISAS IN THESE PASSPORTS AND SHOULD USE ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARDS (I-151) TO ENTER U.S.

2. APPRECIATE WH/MIAMI OFFER MENTIONED REF A; HOWEVER COMPLETED APPLICATIONS MUST BE SENT HQS FOR PROCESSING.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

AN
~~AB~~
~~IH~~
~~FI~~
~~DX~~
~~[illegible]D~~
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS - JOHN ROONEY (TELECORD)

DC/WH/COG

Cifence-4
201-300985

CONT'D

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

16 Feb 70
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

FEB 26 2 05 PM '70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☑ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☑ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY ____________ PER ____________ ☑ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____________

RID/ED1

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR

TO PAGE TWO

010472

*Advised WH/Miami can meet with CIFENCE/4 week of 8 March and offered to handle papers thru INS in Miami.

**Requested reply if CIFENCE/4 and wife presence in U.S. absolutely necessary. If affirmative, couple can travel to Miami 8 March 1970 if it convenient for WH/Miami.

***Forwarded P.O. Box in Hqs area where couples' completed applications for re-entry permits can be sent.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

I

ACTION UNIT WH 8 INFO FILE, VR RILAN, SECUR 4, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 903

S E C R E T 141529Z FEB 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6533 WAIM (NEBECKER ACTING)

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: CARACAS 4472 (IN025395)

1. NO PROBLEM IN MEETING CIFENCE/4 WEEK OF 14 FEB IN025705 8 MARCH. IF PAPERS CAN BE HANDLED IN MIAMI, NOTE THAT WH/MIAMI HAS GOOD LIAISON WITH LOCAL INS.

d/

2. FILE: 201-300985.

S E C R E T

AN UW
AB
IN
I
EX
DESTROYED
RI
WH C/OP

45687

CS COPY
SECRET

Cifence-4

WH 3 lv

201-300985
14 Feb 70

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IG: M. BERGER
IT: WH/3/V
T: 1535
TE: 13 FEBRUARY 1970

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 28 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

DISSEM: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN, CI/CS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 13 23 32 Z FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR 010144

WH/MIAMI

INFO: CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI-6507 (IN 024557)*

B. DIRECTOR-9340**

1. MAIL COMPLETED FORMS AND CHECK TO:

STANLEY V. ESSMEIR
P. O. BOX 11
SPRINGFIELD, VIRGINIA 22150

2. FILE: 201 300985.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB
~~IN~~
PS
~~BR~~
~~DES~~ NFD
~~PI~~

*Advised WH/Miami officer available to meet with CIFENCE/4, forwarded contact plan, and requested address where CIFENCE/4's complete immigration forms and check can be sent.
**Requested WH/Miami officer meet with CIFENCE/4, provide him with immigration forms, and forward completed forms and check to Hqs.

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery
C/WH/SEC F.F. Bruni

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Cifence-4
201-300985
13/2/70

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

10 SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: 2

DISSEM BY 21 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, Secur-4, CI/OPS,

ACTION NO 264

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

S E C R E T 132132Z FEB 70 CITE CARACAS 4472 CARO

13FEB IN 025395

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 6507 (IN 024557)

B. DIRECTOR 009340

1. FOR SECURITY REASONS, CARACAS STATION WOULD PREFER THAT CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE BE ALLOWED TO FILL OUT APPLICATIONS FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS AND CIFENCE/4 BE ALLOWED TO FILL OUT APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE IN CARACAS. IF THEIR PRESENCE IN U.S. ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY REPEAT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, HOWEVER, THEY CAN TRAVEL TO MIAMI AFTER 4 MAR 70. AFTER THIS DATE, CIFENCE/4 WILL BE ON LEAVE FROM CIFENCE FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS. HE SAID HE CAN TELL CIFENCE/1 PURPOSE OF TRIP TO MIAMI TO ALLOW WIFE SEE HER BROTHER WHO RECENTLY CAME OUT OF CUBA. HE FEELS THE MAXIMUM PERIOD HE CAN REMAIN IN MIAMI IS ONE WEEK. AT PRESENT TIME, STATION FEELS CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE COULD TRAVEL TO MIAMI 8 MAR 70 WHICH WOULD GIVE THEM ENTIRE FOLLOWING WEEK FOR NECESSARY PAPER WORK. IF THIS WEEK ACCEPTABLE TO WH/MIAMI, FIRM TRAVEL PLANS WILL BE

AN

~~FI~~

WH/3 ✓

201-300985

13 Feb 70

CS COPY

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4472 SECRET

FORWARDED. REQUEST WH/MIAMI ADVISE.

2. RE PARA 2 REF B, CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE WILL HAVE TO USE "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS" FOR THEIR TRAVEL TO MIAMI AND RETURN TO CARACAS. WE WOULD NOT WANT THEM TO USE NEWLY ISSUED "PERMITS TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" IN ENTERING VENEZUELA WHEN IT IS THE INTENT OF CIFENCE/4 TO APPLY FOR VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS RETURN TO CARACAS.

3. RE PARA 3 REF B, FOR SECURITY WE AGREE IT BEST CIFENCE/4 AND HIS WIFE REMAIN IN MIAMI DURING THEIR STAY IN U.S. SINCE CIFENCE/4 HAS MANY FRIENDS IN MIAMI AREA, WE TRUST WH/MIAMI WILL TAKE MAXIMUM PRECAUTIONS TO ASSURE THAT TRUE REASON FOR PRESENCE IN MIAMI OF CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE IS KNOWN ONLY BY THOSE PERSONS WITH ABSOLUTE NEED TO KNOW. WE WISH TO PREVENT WORD GETTING BACK TO VENEZUELA THAT CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVENTUAL U.S. CITIZENSHIP.

4. FILE: 201-300985.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

II

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN CI/OPS SECUR4

ACTION NO. 156

S E C R E T 122029Z FEB 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6507 (WMUR)

12 FEB IN 024557

M

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 009340

1. KERSCHEN AVAILABLE TO MEET CIFENCE/4. HAVE HIM CALL AMANSWER (IDEN A) AND IDENTIFY HIMSELF AS IDEN B. HE SHOULD ASK FOR IDEN C AND LEAVE TELEPHONE NUMBER WHERE HE CAN BE REACHED. KERSCHEN WILL RETURN CALL AND ARRANGE MEETING.

2. DIRECTOR: TO AVOID POUCH TIME LAG, PLS FORWARD ADDRESS WHERE WE CAN MAIL REGISTERED LETTER CONTAINING CIFENCE/R'S FORMS AND CHECK.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

S E C R E T

~~DES~~ ~~NFD~~
~~PI~~
WH/3/V

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985

12 Feb 70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES / 6

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY: 3 PER ____ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CI/OPS SEC/R4

ACTION NO. 155

S E C R E T 122029Z FEB 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6508 (WMIA)

12FEB IN 024558

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: WH/MIAMI 6507 (IN-024557)

1. IDEN A: ANSWERING SERVICE AVAILABLE 0900 THRU 1600 HOURS MONDAY THRU FRIDAY. NUMBER 379-9624 REPEAT 379-9624.

IDEN B: MR. CUIS CLEMENTE

IDEN C: MR. GRADY

2. FILE: 201-300985.

S E C R E T

Ale

~~FI~~

HPD

WH/3/V

201-300985

12 Feb 70

CS COPY

SECRET

ORIG: N. BERGER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 11 FEBRUARY 1970

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ✓ PER ___ # ___

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN, C/WOA, C/CS, SECURY

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 23 24Z FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR 069340

TO CARACAS WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 3365 (NOT SENT WH/MIAMI)*
(FORMERLY AMCLEVE/15)

SP

1. HQS HAS LEARNED CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE HAVE PRESERVED THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS.

2. IT NOW NECESSARY AS MENTIONED REF FOR COUPLE COME TO U.S. TO FILL OUT APPLICATIONS FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS AND WHERE CIFENCE/4 WILL FILL OUT APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. HQS MUST REVIEW COMPLETED APPLICATIONS BEFORE SUBMITTING THEM TO INS. AFTER APPLICATIONS REVIEWED BY HQS, COUPLE MAY RETURN CARACAS IF THEY HAVE SOME DOCUMENT WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM ENTER VENEZUELA. IF NOT, THEY MUST REMAIN IN U.S. THE TWO OR THREE WEEKS IT WILL TAKE HQS TO PROCESS APPLICATIONS AND OBTAIN NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS.

AN	
~~AD~~	
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~BK~~	
DES	NFD
~~FI~~	
WH/3/V ✓	

3. ALTHOUGH THIS CASE MIGHT BE HANDLED MORE RAPIDLY IF COUPLE CAME TO HQS AREA FOR PROCESSING, TRIP TO HQS AREA COULD POSE SECURITY HAZARD FOR CIFENCE/4 AS COUPLE WOULD NORMALLY TRAVEL TO MIAMI FOR THIS PROCESSING. ANY INDICATION COUPLE TRAVELLED

Cifence-4 201-300985

11 Feb 70

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 009340

TO PAGE TWO

TO HQS AREA MIGHT CAUSE CIFENCE/4'S SUPERIORS IN CIFENCE TO SUSPECT HE MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH RVROCK; THEREFORE REQUEST WH/MIAMI MEET WITH CIFENCE/4 AND PROVIDE INS FORMS N-470 (CIFENCE/4 ONLY) AND TWO ORIGINAL I-131 FOR EACH TO FILL OUT. COUPLE MUST PROVIDE TWO PHOTOS EACH SIGNED ON LEFT HAND MARGIN AND ONE CHECK TO INS FOR THIRTY DOLLARS. WHEN FORMS COMPLETED THEY SHOULD BE POUCHED TO HQS. AFTER REVIEW HERE, HQS WILL CABLE WH/MIAMI AND THEN COUPLE CAN EITHER RETURN CARACAS OR WAIT MIAMI FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS.

4. FOR WH/MIAMI. PLS ADVISE IF YOU HAVE CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE NEAR FUTURE WHO COULD MEET WITH CIFENCE/4. IF AFFIRMATIVE, PLS FORWARD CONTACT PLAN TO CARACAS. FYI. CIFENCE/4 (IDEN A) WAS WH/MIAMI ASSET FROM LATE MARCH 1965 to SEPT 1967 WHEN HE MOVED TO CARACAS WHERE HE HAS BEEN SERVING STATION AS PENETRATION OF CIFENCE (IDEN B).

CONT'D

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

.G:
IT:
TE:

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

________ PER ________ # ________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 00934O

PAGE THREE

5. FOR CARACAS. IF WH/MIAMI ABLE HANDLE CIFENCE/4, PLS FORWARD COUPLES' ETA.

6. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS - JOHN ROONEY (TELECORD)
C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

*Advised steps necessary to preserve permanent alien resident status of CIFENCE/4 and wife and obtain new re-entry permits for them.

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

201-300985

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

M. BERGER
WH/3/V
1535
TE: 11 FEBRUARY 1970

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ✓ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

NF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN, C/CA, C/OPS SECURY

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 11 23 24z FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR 009341

CARACAS WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 009340

IDEN A - LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES (201-300985)

IDEN B - CENTRAL DOCUMENTATION SERVICE (SCD), A NEWLY ESTABLISHED VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICE SP

END OF MESSAGE

AN/24
~~AB~~ X
~~IN~~
ES
BX
DES NED
~~PI~~
WH/3/V

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

afonce-4

201-300985

11 Feb 70

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ____ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CI/OPS SECUR4

ACTION NO. 156

S E C R E T 122029Z FEB 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6507

12 FEB IN 024557

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 009340

1. KERSCHEN (VICKERS) AVAILABLE TO MEET CIFENCE/4. HAVE HIM CALL AMANSWER (IDEN A) AND IDENTIFY HEMSELF AS IDEN B. HE SHOULD ASK FOR IDEN C AND LEAVE TELEPHONE NUMBER WHERE HE CAN BE REACHED. KERSCHEN WILL RETURN CALL AND ARRANGE MEETING.

2. DIRECTOR: TO AVOID POUCH TIME LAG, PLS FORWARD ADDRESS WHERE WE CAN MAIL REGISTERED LETTER CONTAINING CIFENCE/4'S FORMS AND CHECK.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

cifence-4

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

II

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT: WH8

INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN CI/OPS SECUR4

ACTION NO. 155

S E C R E T 122029Z FEB 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6508 12FEB IN 024558

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: WH/MIAMI 6507 (IN-024557)

1. IDEN A: ANSWERING SERVICE AVAILABLE 0900 THRU 1600 HOURS MONDAY THRU FRIDAY. NUMBER 379-9624 REPEAT 379-9624.

IDEN B: MR. ~~C~~LUIS CLEMENTE

IDEN C: MR. GRADY (Nichols)

2. FILE: 201-300985.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINA[illegible]N CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL C[illegible]S 16 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS 86

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, SECUR 4, CI/OA

ACTION NO. 727

11

S E C R E T 231325Z JAN 70 CITE CARACAS 4332 CARA 23 JAN IN 012086

DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 003365

1. RE-ENTRY PERMITS REQUESTED PARA TWO REF FORWARDED HEADQUARTERS 23 JANUARY VIA TM 658733 IN POUCH NUMBER 3407.

2. FILE: 201-300985

S E C R E T

67726

MICROFILMED
FEB 13 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY
SECRET

201-300985
23 JAN 70

MEMORANDUM [illegible] THE RECORD

FROM: M. Berger, WH/3/V

SUBJECT: Naturalization of CIFENCE/4's Wife

1. John Rooney of OS/AAS informed the Desk on 19 January 1960 that he had been mistaken when he said that CIFENCE/4's wife could be naturalised two years after C/4 receives his naturalisation. C/4's wife will have to wait three years. It is planned to inform C/4 of this change (and the Station) when C/4 comes to the U.S. to process his application.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

24 SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

M. Berger
RO: M. BERGER
NIT: WH/3/V
T: 1535
ATE: 15 JANUARY 1970

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
33 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

INF: WH 8 FILE, VR. RI/AN CI/OA SECUR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 17 00 01z JAN 70 CITE DIRECTOR 033 65

CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. CARACAS 4248 (IN 003688)*

B. DIRECTOR 62906**

1. FOLLOWING STEPS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE PERMANENT ALIEN RESIDENT STATUS OF CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE AND OBTAIN NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS FOR THEM:

A. HQS WILL VERIFY THAT REF A PARA TWO INFO IS IN SUBJECTS' IMMIGRATION FILES. THIS ACTION SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN ONE MONTH.

B. AFTER ABOVE ACTION COMPLETED, SUBJECTS MUST COME TO HQS OR MIAMI FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK WHERE THEY WILL FILL OUT APPLICATIONS FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS AND WHERE CIFENCE/4 WILL FILL OUT APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. PROCESSING PROCEDURE NECESSITATES SUBJECTS' PRESENCE IN U.S. AT THAT TIME. FYI. IN WIFE'S CASE ONLY,

AN 112
AB ✓
~~IU~~
~~DS~~
~~FX~~
~~RES~~ NTD
WH/3/V

CS COPY

cifence-4
201-300985
14 JAN 70

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG:
NIT:
XT:
ATE:

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ION: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 003365

PAGE TWO

IN ORDER FOR PERIOD SPENT OUTSIDE U.S. TO COUNT TOWARD THE STATUARY PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. WHICH SHE MUST ACCRUE PRIOR TO PETITIONING FOR NATURALIZATION, WIFE WOULD HAVE TO BE EMPLOYED BY OR UNDER CONTRACT WITH RVROCK. IF THIS CLAIM CANNOT BE LEGITIMATELY MADE, WIFE WILL HAVE TO WAIT TWO YEARS AND ONE DAY AFTER HUSBAND RECEIVES HIS NATURALIZATION BEFORE SHE CAN RECEIVE HERS. AN EXCEPTION TO THIS WAITING PERIOD WOULD BE IF HUSBAND RECEIVED CITIZENSHIP, CONTINUED TO BE EMPLOYED BY RVROCK, AND RECEIVED ASSIGNMENT ABROAD TO WHICH WIFE WOULD ACCOMPANY HIM.

C. HQS WILL THEN PROCESS APPLICATIONS THRU INS AND RE-ENTRY PERMITS WILL BE FORWARDED TO SUBJECTS IN CARACAS. THESE PERMITS VALID FOR ONE YEAR AND RENEWABLE FOR ONE ADDITIONAL YEAR. PRIOR TO END OF THIS TWO-YEAR PERIOD, HQS CAN OBTAIN NEW ONE-YEAR RE-ENTRY PERMITS WHICH ALSO

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG:
NIT:
T:
ATE:

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y ____ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

ONF: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 003365

PAGE THREE

RENEWABLE FOR ADDITIONAL YEAR. AS THIS ACTION NECESSITATES SPECIAL PERMISSION FROM INS, SUBJECTS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS DETAILS WITH ANYONE.

2. WILL ADVISE WHEN PARA ONE (A) ACTION COMPLETED AND WHETHER SUBJECTS SHOULD COME TO HQS OR MIAMI. PLS ADVISE IF EXPIRED RE-ENTRY PERMITS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SURRENDERED BY SUBJECTS AND IF SO, WHEN AND TO WHOM. IF NOT, PLS FORWARD THEM TO HQS.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS: JOHN ROONEY (telecord)

C/WH/COG

WH Comments *Provided data previously requested concerning names of carriers and flight numbers used by CIFENCE/4 and wife for their travels to and from the U.S. **Requested travel and passport information pertaining to CIFENCE/4 and wife in connection with preserving their U.S. resident alien status and obtaining new re-entry permits.

Spera

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

201-300985

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

1

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY dS PER ____ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH8.

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN. CI. CI/OPS. FI

ACTION NO. 680

S E C R E T 082235Z JAN 70 CITE CARACAS 4248 (CARA)

DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

8 JAN IN 003688

REF: DIRECTOR 62906

1. RE QUESTION PARA 1A REF, CIFENCE-4 DID NOT OBTAIN U.S. VISA FROM CONSULATE CARACAS FOR USE WITH "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORT" BUT ENTERED U.S. IN OCT 69 USING HIS I-151.

2. RE PARA 1B REF, FOLLOWING ARE NAMES OF CARRIERS AND FLT NUMBERS FOR DEPARTURES FROM AND RETURNS TO MIAMI OF CIFENCE-4:

	DEPART FROM MIAMI	RETURN TO MIAMI
A.	14 AUG 67 - PAA 440	27 AUG 67 - PAA 441
B.	23 OCT 67 - VARIG 801	24 NOV 67 - PAA 441
C.	5 DEC 67 - PAA 441	23 JAN 68 - PAA 440
D.	30 JAN 68 - PAA 441	6 JUL 68 - VIASA 740
E.	9 JUL 68 - VIASA 741	9 JAN 69 - VIASA 740
F.	15 JAN 69 - VIASA 741	19 OCT 69 - VIASA 740
G.	24 OCT 69 - VIASA 741	

3. ALSO RE PARA 1B REF, WIFE CIFENCE-4

AN
AB
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~DX~~
~~DE~~ MTD
~~FI~~
WH/3/1

Cifence-4
[illegible]
201-300985
08 JAN 70

CS COPY

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY PER #

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4248 SECRET

DEPARTED MIAMI 26 DEC 67 ON VIASA 740,

RETURNED TO MIAMI 19 OCT 69 ON VIASA 740 AND

DEPARTED FROM MIAMI 24 OCT 69 ON VIASA 741.

4. FILE: 201-300985.

SECRET

SECRET

1969

ORIG: M. Berger
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 23 December 1969

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 38/21 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WHB INFO FILE, VR. BIJAN, CI/OPS, SECUR 4, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

24 18 09z DEC 69

CITE DIRECTOR 62906

TO CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. CARACAS 4167 (IN 01987)*
B. DIRECTOR 58935**
C. CARACAS 4018 (IN 87480)***

1. APPROPRIATE HQS COMPONENT STATES IT POSSIBLE FOR CIFENCE/4 TO BECOME VENEZUELAN CITIZEN AND STILL RETAIN STATUS AS U.S. PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN. IN ORDER ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, HQS MUST FIRST DETERMINE WHETHER CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE HAVE LOST THEIR STATUS AS PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIENS IN VIEW OF CIFENCE/4'S USE OF "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORT" CITED REF A PARA ONE AND WIFE'S FAILURE TO RENEW STATUS AS MENTIONED REF A PARA FOUR. PLS REPLY TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WHICH WILL HELP DETERMINE COUPLE'S STATUS:

A. DID CIFENCE/4 OBTAIN U.S. VISA FROM CONSULATE CARACAS FOR USE WITH "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORT"? IF SO, WHAT TYPE RECEIVED? FYI. IF CIFENCE/4 DID RECEIVE VISA, HE MUST HAVE FILLED OUT FORM I-94 (ARRIVAL-DEPARTURE RECORD) UPON ARRIVAL

CONTINUED.....

AN	
AB	
~~IN~~	
~~RS~~	
BX	
	MFD
~~RI~~	
WH/3/V	

201-300985
24 Dec 69

5
4
3
2
1

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE. VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 62906

TO PAGE 2

MIAMI AND INS WOULD HAVE INTERPETED THIS ACT AS POSSIBLE RENUNCIATION OF PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS. IN ORDER NEGATE THIS INTERPETATION, HQS MAY HAVE TO ASK INS TO AMEND RECORD OF ENTRY. HQS BELIEVES CIFENCE/4 SHOULD HAVE ENTERED U.S. IN OCT 1969 USING HIS I-151 (ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARD).

B. WHAT WAS NAME OF CARRIER AND FLT NUMBER FOR EACH DEPARTURE AND RETURN MIAMI FOR CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE WHICH CITED REF A PARAS ONE AND TWO? ✓

2. IN ORDER FOR COUPLE TO PRESERVE PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS, OBTAIN DOUBLE RE-ENTRY PERMITS, AND PRESERVE CIFENCE/4 RESIDENCE, COUPLE PROBABLY WILL HAVE TO COME TO U.S. FOR ABOUT ONE WEEK.

3. CIFENCE/4 SHOULD BE AWARE THAT UNDER SECTION 329 OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT HE CAN PETITION FOR IMMEDIATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ON BASIS OF HONORABLE SERVICE AND DISCHARGE FROM U.S. ARMED FORCES IF HE JOINED ARMED FORCES WHILE IN U.S. TERRITORY

CONTINUED.....

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) S E C R E T (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 62906

TO PAGE 3

AND IF HE CURRENTLY PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN. WIFE COULD OBTAIN U.S. CITIZENSHIP AFTERWARDS ON BASIS CIFENCE/4 STATIONED REGULARLY ABROAD IN FURTHERANCE OF U.S. NATIONAL INTEL EFFORT AND IT DESIRED THAT SHE ACCOMPANY AS U.S. CITIZEN. WIFE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN AT TIME OF APPLICATION. WISH TO POINT OUT THAT IF STATION AND CIFENCE/4 ELECT THIS COURSE, HQS ESTIMATES IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT AND LENGTHY PROCESS TO OBTAIN NECESSARY SPECIAL PERMISSION WHICH WOULD PERMIT CIFENCE/4 TO HOLD OSTENSIBLE VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP AND U.S. CITIZENSHIP FOR DURATION PRESENT ASSIGNMENT. THEREFORE RECOMMEND COURSE OF ACTION DESCRIBED PARA ONE. WHEN ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RECEIVED, HQS WILL FORWARD INSTRUCTIONS FOR COUPLE.

4. FILE: 201-300985

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Requested Hqs determine status of alien residency of CIFENCE/4 and wife and make arrangements whereby they can become citizens of Venezuela and by so doing not annul their U.S. alien residency status and/or wreck their chances of becoming U.S. citizens.

Continued....

201-300985

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T 8 1 22 PM '70

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 8 15 AM
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☒ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO: RID/EDI FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 62906

TO PAGE 4

**Requested information concerning travel to and from U.S. of CIFENCE/4 and wife.

***CIFENCE/4 may have to accept Venezuelan citizenship for ops reasons and is concerned over how this might jeopardize his future application for U.S. citizenship.

OS/AAS: John Rooney (telecord).

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, C/CI/OPS, SEC/IR 4

ACTION NO. 240

S E C R E T 121810Z DEC 69 CITE CARACAS 4167 CARA

12 Dec 69 IN 01987

DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE AMCLEVE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 58935

B. CARACAS 4018 (IN 87480)

1. IN ANSWER TO PARA ONE REF A, AMCLEVE-15 USED "PERMIT TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" NUMBER 0123265, ISSUED 25 JULY 67 BY INS MIAMI AND WHICH EXPIRED 25 JULY 69, FOR FOLLOWING DEPARTURES FROM AND RETURN TO MIAMI, FLORIDA IN TRAVELLING TO AND FROM VENEZUELA:

	DEPART FROM MIAMI	RETURN TO MIAMI
A.	14 AUG 67	27 AUG 67
B.	23 OCT 67	24 NOV 67
C.	5 DEC 67	23 JAN 68
D.	30 JAN 68	6 JULY 68
E.	9 JULY 68	9 JAN 69
F.	15 JAN 69	

AN
~~AD~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~DK~~
~~DEF~~ NFD
~~VI~~

AFTER DEPARTING FROM MIAMI 15 JAN 69, A-15 DID NOT RETURN MIAMI UNTIL 19 OCT 69 WHICH WAS AFTER DATE EXPIRATION HIS "PERMIT TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES". FOR RETURN MIAMI 19 OCT 69, A-15 USED "EMERGENCY

Luis Clemente Posada Carriles

201-300985
12 Dec 69

E-14

CS COPY

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. OCT 24 11 30 AM 69

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4167 SECRET

VENEZUELAN PASSPORT" WHICH TYPE PASSPORT ISSUED TO CUBANS AND OTHERS IN VENEZUELA WHO NOT CITIZENS VENEZUELA AND WHOSE COUNTRIES HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS IN VENEZUELA. A-15 USED SAME PASSPORT FOR DEPARTURE FROM MIAMI AND RETURN TO VENEZUELA ON 24 OCT 69.

2. ALSO IN ANSWER TO PARA ONE REF A, WIFE OF A-15 USED "PERMIT TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" NUMBER 0125892, ISSUED 13 NOV BY INS MIAMI AND WHICH EXPIRED 13 NOV 69, IN DEPARTING FROM MIAMI FOR VENEZUELA 26 DEC 67, IN RETURNING TO MIAMI 19 OCT 69 AND AGAIN IN DEPARTING FROM MIAMI FOR VENEZUELA 24 OCT 69.

3. BELIEVE QUESTION IN PARA TWO REF A ABOUT NEED FOR A-15 HAVING VALID REENTRY PERMIT ALREADY ANSWERED IN PARA ONE OF THIS CABLE.

4. A-15 MAINTAINS BOTH HE AND HIS WIFE HAVE COMPLETED THEIR FIVE YEARS REQUIREMENT FOR NATURALIZATION AS CITIZENS OF UNITED STATES. ALSO SAYS HE RETURNED TO STATES ONCE A YEAR TO REGISTER WHICH HE SAYS NECESSARY MAINTAIN NATURALIZATION RESIDENCE. HIS TRAVEL RECORD SHOWS THIS TO BE TRUE BUT THAT OF HIS WIFE SHOWS SHE DID NOT RETURN TO STATES BEFORE END OF FIRST YEAR HERE. IF NATURALIZATION RESIDENT STATUS OF A-15 AND WIFE LAPSED, AS HQS INDICATES, REQUEST ACTION BE TAKEN TO REINSTATE STATUS. ALSO

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ 3

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 4167 SECRET

REQUEST EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BE DONE TO FULFILL PARA THREE REF B REQUEST, THAT IS, MAKE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY A-15 AND WIFE BECOMING CITIZENS VENEZUELA WILL NOT ANNUL UNITED STATES NATURALIZATION RESIDENCY STATUS AND WRECK CHANCES THEIR BECOMING UNITED STATES CITIZENS.

5. A-15 STARTED WORKING FOR US ON 22 JAN 68 WHICH WAS LONG BEFORE HIS "PERMIT TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" EXPIRED. IF NOT ALREADY DONE, HQS MAY WISH POINT THIS OUT TO INS AS EVIDENCE HE HAS BEEN WORKING FOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD BE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DETERMINING CURRENT STATUS HIS AND HIS WIFE'S NATURALIZATION RESIDENCE. ALSO HQS MAY WISH ADVISE INS OF HIGHLY IMPORTANT ROLE HE WILL PLAY IN RVROCK OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIETS IN VENEZUELA. IN SUMMARY, WHAT WE WOULD LIKE HQS TO DO IS RESOLVE SITUATION OF A-15 AND HIS WIFE IN WAY THAT WILL BE FAVORABLE FOR BOTH HIM AND THE CARACAS STATION.

6. FILE: 201-300985.

SECRET

SECRET

201-300985

14-00000

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

INFO: FILE VR, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 1500 02 DEC 69 CITE DIRECTOR 58935

TO CARACAS

CIFLUTE AMCLEVE

REF: A) CARACAS 4018 (IN 87480)*

B) DIRECTOR 55078**

1. INS FILE ON AMCLEVE-15 AND WIFE INCOMPLETE AND THERE NO INDICATION EITHER HAVE PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. IT POSSIBLE BOTH MAY HAVE TO RETURN TO U.S. FOR PURPOSE OF FILING PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. BEFORE INS WILL MAKE DETERMINATION WE NEED TO KNOW DATES HE AND WIFE HAVE DEPARTED AND RETURNED TO U.S. FROM 1967 TO PRESENT, PORTS OF EXIT AND ENTRY AND DOCUMENT USED IN EACH CASE.

2. PLS TRY CLARIFY PARA 3 REF A WITH MORE DETAILS SINCE INS STATES VALID REENTRY PERMIT IS REQUIRED ON BASIS INFO WE HAVE.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

CONT.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

S E C R E T

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 58935

TO PAGE 2

WH Comment: ANCLEVE-15 may have to accept Venezuelan citizenship for ops reasons and is concerned over how this might jeopardize his future application for U.S. citizenship. INS Miami refused to renew his reentry permit stating he did not need same.
**Cleared INS official was not available until week of 24 November.

OS/AAS John Rooney (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

S E C R E T

COS, Caracas

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

CIFLUTE

FYI

1. CIVISTA-5's organization (IDENTITY) has been encrypted CIFENCE, and cryptonyms of the following personnel have been changed to reflect their membership in the CIFENCE organization.

2. 201-740849 (formerly CIVISTA-5) - CIFENCE-1
201-857163 (formerly CIVISTA-9) - CIFENCE-2
201-773827 (formerly CIVISTA-7) - CIFENCE-3
201-300985 (formerly AMCLEVE-15)- CIFENCE-4
201-287019 (formerly CIVISTA-8) - CIFENCE-5
201-801643 (formerly CIVISTA-10)- CIFENCE-6

Milton A. CACCAM

Attachment:
Identity Sheet USC

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas

201-740849 ✓300988
-857163 -287019
-773827 -801643

HVCB-8886

Typed: 26 November 1969

S E C R E T

75-2-16/3

WH/3/V R. Gullo rr 7371

Distribution:
1 - Chrono
1 - RID

C/WH/3/V A. D. Wedemeyer

C/WH/3 Alfonso Spera

Attachment to HVCW-8886

IDENTITY - CENTRAL DOCUMENTATION SERVICE (SCD)

21 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Alien Affairs Staff, Office of Security

ATTENTION : Mr. John Rooney

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (201-300985)

REFERENCE : Caracas 4018 (IN 87480) copy attached

1. Caracas Station has requested Headquarters assistance in resolving as quickly as possible a citizenship question concerning Subject. In view of Subject's operational importance to the Station we would appreciate any effort your office could make to obtain a favorable decision in this matter.

2. Subject is an employee of the Directorate for Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP) which is the successor organization to the Directorate General of Police (DIGEPOLO. As the Station Caracas penetration of this organization, Subject holds a key position and is able to monitor intelligence operations conducted by DISIP as well as internal Venezuelan political matters. In this position, Subject is a highly valued asset of the Station. For this reason, the Station desires that his operational position be protected and, at the same time, his future as a U.S. Citizen not be jeopardized.

3. Since Subject actually obtained his own job through a friend in DISIP and made his own travel arrangements, the file does not reflect what type of documentation he has other that an expired reentry permit mentioned in the reference. A biographic data sheet is attached which gives the main points in Subject's background including his U.S. military service.

4. The primary concern at this point is whether accepting Venezuelan citizenship for operational reasons will destroy or jeopardize in any way, Subject's plans to become a U.S.

citizen? It will be appreciated if your office could make a determination on this question as soon as possible, emphasizing to the appropriate authorities our concern for Subject and his operational importance to the U.S. intelligence effort.

Harry J. Archer
WH/3/V

Attachment: H/W as stated above

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Addressee
  1 - Memo Chrono
  1 - 201-300985

RIG: H. ARCHER
NIT: WH/3/V
T: 1535
ATE: 18 NOVEMBER 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 3 PER ___ # ___

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

ONF: WH8 INFO: RYAN FI2 CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 18 22 20z NOV 69 CITE DIRECTOR 55078

CARACAS

CIFLUTE AMCLEVE

REF: CARACAS 4018 (IN 87480)

1. CLEARED INS OFFICIALS QUALIFIED TO GIVE READING ON AMCLEVE-15 SITUATION NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL WEEK OF 24 NOV. WILL ATTEMPT TO GET DEFINITIVE ANSWER AT THAT TIME.

2. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Queried whether taking Venezuelan citizenship would destroy chances for AMCLEVE-15 and wife to become U.S. citizens? Note: Senior I&NS officer in liaison with AAS unexpectedly retired and his deputy is on a hunting trip in a remote area and cannot be reached for comment.

mu
AN
AB
~~Id~~
~~IS~~
~~DR~~
~~DSC~~ NFD
~~PI~~
WH/3/V

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

amcleve-15
201-300985
18 Nov 69

RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH CD

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

WH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

BY: M AT: 2230 Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

PRECEDENCE

DISSEM BY: 33 PER ____ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN SB8 C/OPS C/OA FI2

ACTION NO. 415

S E C R E T 172125Z NOV 69 CITE CARACAS 4018 (CARA)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

17 Nov 69 IN 87480

CIFLUTE AMCLEVE

m

1. AMCLEVE-15 CURRENT IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE POSITION IN GOV OF GREAT OPERATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE VALUE TO CARACAS STATION. ANTICIPATE VALUE A-15 WILL INCREASE WITH ARRIVAL OF SOVIETS, AS HE IN CHARGE OPERATIONS AGAINST BLOC COUNTRIED DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. BOTH A-15 AND STATION CONCERNED, HOWEVER, WITH FACT HE NOT VENEZUELAN CITIZEN AND POSSIBILITY SOMEBODY IN GOV WILL ASK WHY FOREIGNER (CUBAN) IN SUCH HIGH AND SENSITIVE POSITION WITHIN GOV. IF THIS HAPPENS, THERE GOOD CHANCE A-15 WOULD BE REMOVED FROM PRESENT JOB. A-15 SAYS CIVISTA-5 PERIODICALLY ASKS IN JOKING MANNER WHEN HE GOING TO BECOME CITIZEN VENEZUELA. A-15 REPLIES HE HAS READY ALL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED FOR APPLYING FOR VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP AND WILL BECOME CITIZEN IN DUE TIME. STATION FEELS PERHAPS GOOD JOB A-15 DOING FOR C-5 REASON C-5 DOES NOT PRESSURE A-15 INTO BECOMING CITIZEN.

mb

AN
AB x
~~IN~~
~~XX~~
EX
~~DES~~ RID
~~FI~~
J41711

2. BOTH STATION AND A-15 FEEL HIS POSITION WILL BE

201-300985
17 Nov 69

CS COPY

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4018 SECRET

STRENGTHENED CONSIDERABLY IF HE BECOMES CITIZEN VENEZUELA. A-15 PERFECTLY WILLING BECOME VENEZUELAN CITIZEN IF RECEIVES ASSURANCE DOING SO WILL NOT ANNUL HIS AND WIFE'S STATUS AS RESIDENTS UNITED STATES (BOTH HE AND WIFE HAVE FULFILLED REQUIREMENT OF FIVE YEARS CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE IN UNITED STATES) AND DESTROY THEIR CHANCES BECOMING UNITED STATES CITIZENS. HE SAYS FIRST LOVE CUBA AND SECOND LOVE UNITED STATES. SINCE HE CANNOT RETURN CUBA, PREFERS BECOME CITIZEN UNITED STATES. WIFE FEELS SAME WAY.

3. REQUEST HQS ADVISE PRIORITY IF ARRANGEMENT CAN BE MADE WHEREBY A-15 AND WIFE BECOMING CITIZENS VENEZUELA WILL NOT ANNUL UNITED STATES RESIDENCY STATUS AND WRECK CHANCES BECOMING CITIZENS. DURING RECENT TRIP MIAMI THEY APPLIED FOR BUT WERE REFUSED NEW PERMITS TO REENTER UNITED STATES BECAUSE (ACCORDING TO A-15) A-15 IS RESIDING AND WORKING OUTSIDE UNITED STATES AND HAS NO NEED FOR SUCH PERMIT. PERMIT A-15 EXPIRED 25 JULY 1969 AND PERMIT WIFE EXPIRED 13 NOV 1969.

4. STATION STRONGLY URGES HQS DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE

SECRET

1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	/
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 4018 SECRET

RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM SOONEST IN FAVOR OF BOTH A-15 AND STATION.

5. FILE: 201-300985.

SECRET

201-300985

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division; Chief, WH/Miami; Chief of Station, Georgetown		MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Forwarding of AMCLEVE-15 Trip Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None. FYI.

REFERENCE : CARACAS 3954

Forwarded herewith are copies (one for each addressee) of AMCLEVE-15's report on his trip to Miami to check on the Hart arms purchase.

Lapalus

Richard H. LAPALUS

ATTACHMENT:
Report, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
~~2~~ - CH/WHD (w/att, h/w)
2 - CH/WH/Miami (w/att, h/w)
2 - COS/Georgetown (w/att, h/w)

1 att

CS COPY

NOV 7 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA-17126	6 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

14-00000

ATTACHMENT TO HVCA-17126

TO : CH/WHD

FROM: COS/Caracas

NOV 7 19

27 10 69

SCD.- C04

James S. Hart

Investigaciones realizadas.

A

En entrevistas realizadas con el Sr. CONSUL DE VENEZUELA EN MIAMI, Sr. ALBERTO PEREZ PERAZO, me dió a conocer, lo siguiente:

a- Que había recibido una comunicación por escrito del Sr. CARLOS [illegible], Encargado [redacted] de la Dirección Especial de Guayana del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, con fecha 15 de Octubre del corriente, donde le comunicaba que el próximo día 20 viajaría a MIAMI el Sr. JAMES S. HART, con el objeto de buscar su licencia de pilóto comercial que se le había extraviado.
Adjunto copia de la carta.

b- Que segun noticias recibidas del antiguo CONSUL, un americano llamado HENRY [illegible], le había informado que JAMES S. HART vendría próximamente a MIAMI con el objetivo de comprar armas a los traficantes clandestinos.

Ese mismo día 20 de Octubre, solicité la cooperación de las Autoridades Federales de la Aduana de MIAMI para que se chequearan los aeropuertos, esperando la llegada de HART.

La solicitud se la hice al Sr. SHERMAN S. [illegible], Agente Especial y Encargado de la Oficina de la Aduana en MIAMI, el cual me presto su cooperación, poniendo agentes a vigilar los vuelos de Líneas Aereas que venían de VENEZUELA. Así mismo sus agentes chequearon los vuelos de aviones privados y los vuelos de aviones de carga. El chequeo permanece activo en los momentos de redactar este informe.

Fué chequeada la FAA (Federal Aviation Agency). Lu-

CS COPY

N/w att 1 2 HVCA 17126

201-300985

gar donde HART tendría que renovar su licencia de piloto.
Posteriormente me entrevisté con el Sr. [illegible] [illegible] DE WITT cuya dirección es 7211 S. Dixie Hy., West Palm Beach, Fla., su teléfono es el 5021595. La entrevista se realizó en el Hotel Columbus en Miami el 21-10-69 a las [illegible].
El Sr. DE WITT me manifestó que él era amigo de un tal HARRIS STANLEY que vive en JACKSONVILLE, Fla., el cual había tenido una conversación con HART y había quedado en proyecto la compra de un número indeterminado de armas de guerra.
Segun DE WITT, la compra de dichas armas la realizaría HART alrededor de la segunda quincena de Octubre, por lo cual ellos (STANLEY y DE WITT) lo estaban esperando.
El Sr. DE WITT manifestó que HART, compraría armas y equipos de guerra por una suma superior a $ 1000000 (un millón de dollares) y que él en representación de HARRIS STANLEY estaba dispuesto a vender la información de toda la transacción en un millón de dollares. La información segun DE WITT, consiste en dar los nombres de las personas involucradas en la transacción (algunas viviendo en Miami) y entregar toda la información concerniente a la compra y traslado de las armas.
Como me pareció absurda la solicitud de un millón de dollares por una información lo hice observar a DE WITT, primero que no había ningun traficante clandestino de armas capaz de suministrar esa cantidad y segundo que al Gobierno de VENEZUELA, no le interesaba pagar una cantidad semejante por esa información. Quedamos en que en caso que HART volviera por MIAMI o hiciera contactos con él, el me avisaría, llamando al Consul de VENEZUELA en MIAMI y trataríamos de nuevo sobre este asunto.

OBSERVACION

CC—— Es indiscutible que HART haya entrado en comunicación con HART y STANLEY para la compra de armas.

—— Para la compra de cantidades de armas en el mercado clandestino es necesario ver a varios traficantes.

—— Los grandes traficantes de armas en los Estados Unidos se encuentran en New Jersey, N.Y.

201-300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 5 PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

XREF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR, CI/AN, CA, CA/PEOP, CI/OA, CI/IC2, FI2

ACTION NO. 709

S E C R E T 221420Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3859 CACA

AMCLEVE-15

201

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI, ROUTINE GEORGETOWN, DIRECTOR

22 OCT 69 IN 70765

REFS: A. CARACAS 3784 (IN 64664)

B. CARACAS 3815 (IN 67036)

1. AMCLEVE-15 LEFT CARACAS FOR MIAMI 19 OCTOBER TO INVESTIGATE STORY THAT RICHARD HART, BROTHER OF JAMES, TRAVELLING MIAMI TO PURCHASE $300,000 WORTH OF WEAPONS. AMCLEVE-15 HAD NO OTHER DETAILS, STORY CAME FROM MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

2. AMCLEVE-15 PLANNED CONTACT CLANDESTINE ARMS DEALERS IN MIAMI AND SEE HIS FRIEND ALAN YARBROUGH, U.S. CUSTOMS AGENT FOR ASSISTANCE. HE HAD NO INFO RE WHEN HART TO BE IN MIAMI.

3. USDAO CABLE * 0653 OF 22 OCT QUOTES ARMA SOURCE AS SAYING JAMES HART LEFT CARACAS FOR MIAMI 20 OCT WITH $300,000 TO PURCHASE ARMS FROM AMERICAN RIGHTISTS. SOURCE ALSO CLAIMED THAT HART HAS ALREADY BROUGHT IN ARMS FOR RUPUNUNI REFUGEES.

4. FOR GEORGETOWN: ARMA SOURCE OF PARA 3 ABOVE ALSO CLAIMED VEN MILITARY RECEIVED RUMOR THAT GUYANA TO SEND TWO SMALL AIRCRAFT WITH ONE PLATOON GDF TO TAKE ANACOCO

CS C

* Not Received c/s
As of 1445 22Oct69.

SECRET

22Oct69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION　CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　TOTAL COPIES　ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY: ____ PER ____ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT ____ INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO. ____

PAGE 2 CARACAS 3859 SECRET

ISLAND AIRSTRIP, TIMING UNKNOWN. REF B INFO MAY BE RELATED.

5. DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHETHER ABOVE STORIES BASED ON FACT AND HARTS HAVE FUNDS FOR ARMS PURCHAS OR IF THEY FLASE AND BASED ON GOV INFORMATION RE HOLNESS AND STANLEY HARRIS CLAIMS. STATION INCLINED TOWARD LATTER. WE ATTEMPTING MONITOR ANY HART TRAVEL TO U.S. BUT THEY USUALLY FLY IN PRIVATE PLANES WHICH DIFFICULT TRACE. WOULD APPRECIATE ALL POSSIBLE MIAMI EFFORTS TO MONITOR ANY ATTEMPTS TO PURCHASE ARMS, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO HOLNESS AND COMPANY.

6. FILE: DEFER.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

POSADA CARRILES, LUIS
201-300985
SEX M DOB ?

075-005-000
HVCA-16903
05 SEP 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
HEAD OF OPERATIONS DIV OF /SCO/ VENEZUELAN SERVICO CENTRAL DE DOCUMENTACION. ATT NO 1 PAGE 2 PARA 5

R 6910090804

FILE IN 201-300985

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY: PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, [illegible] CI, CI/OPS [illegible]

ACTION NO. 365

S E C R E T 021330Z SEP 69 CITE GEORGETOWN 6560 GCRG

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

2 SEP 69 IN 35035

REF CARACAS 3448 (IN 33258)

1. STATION FILES CONTAIN CARDED NOTATION (SMOTH FROM SLO, TRINIDAD, 31 OCTOBER 1967) THAT MEGAN BETANCOURT (SIC), DOB 1939, CHINESE PASSPORT 26672 ARRIVED TRINIDAD SAME FLIGHT PPP LEADER CHEDDI JAGAN 17 OCTOBER 1967. ACCORDING SPECIAL BRANCH THEY SEEN TOGETHER. SHE ALSO SEEN CONVERSING WITH RONALD HOOLASIE AND BELIEVED BE GIRLFRIEND TAYLHARDAT. LEFT THAT EVENING FOR CARACAS.

AN	B
AB	X
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~BX~~	
~~DIS~~	~~NPD~~
~~PT~~	
WH	7/64

2. HOOLASIE TRINIDAD LEFTIST WHO SOLICITED FUNDS IN TRINIDAD FROM EAST INDIAN COMMUNITY TO ASSIST JAGAN IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

3. FILES ALSO CONTAIN TWO CARDS ON BETTENCOURT (FNU) WHO ELECTED COMMITTEE MEMBER WOMEN'S PROGRESSIVE ORGANIZATION, WOMEN'S ARM OF PPP.

4. BELIEVE NAME PARA 2 REF SHOULD BE RAMLOGAN, NOT RANLOGAM.

5. FILE 201-300985.

S E QUR E T

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985

02 Sep 69

23

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY dds PER ______ # ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO. 254

29 AUG 69 IN 33737

SECRET 291930Z AUG 69 CITE CARACAS 3447 (CARA)

GEORGETOWN INFO DIRECTOR

AMCLEVE

1. AMCLEVE-15, UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF CIVISTA, A GOV SECURITY SERVICE, HAS REPORTED THAT HE AND THREE OTHER CIVISTA AGENTS HAVE BEEN ORDERED BY CIVISTA TO MAKE SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY OF GUYANA EMBASSY IN CARACAS SOMETIME WITHIN WEEK FOLLOWING 27 AUGUST. PURPOSE OF ENTRY IS QUOTE "ANY INFORMATION OF INTEREST."

2. RESULTS OF CIVISTA SEARCH WILL BE CABLED SOONEST.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

SECRET

AN	
AB	X
~~IN~~	
PS	
BX	
DES	NFD
FI	

MICROFILMED
SEP 18 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

D 105-9-8

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985
29 AUG 69

CIGUSTY of Rpts for June 1969

AMCLEVE-15 $335.00

Subject provided information on the following subjects: (a) the GOV "pacification program" and the MIR's reactions to same, (b) the investigative activities and the inner workings of the CIVISTA group, (c) the GOV security plans for the Rockefeller visit and the GOV reasons for cancelling the visit, (d) GOV military coup plans, (e) student riots in Merida and the GOV activities to counter same. All of this information became part of Station intelligence disseminations.

HVCA-16773 [illegible] 18 July 1969 - Filed 25-6-43/3

File: AMCLEVE-15 201

CIGUSTY of Rpts for May 1967

AMCLEVE-15 $335.00

Subject provided detailed information on the GOV guerrilla "pacification" program which became the basis of an intelligence dissemination on the subject. He continues to keep the Station abreast of all CIVISTA activities together with CIVISTA-5's personal feelings regarding his liaison with the Station. AMCLEVE-15 is now chief of CIVISTA's investigative group; as such, it is expected that he will provide an excellent source of information on coup planning within the military.

HVCA-16703 dated 26 June 1967. Filed: 75-6-43/3

File. AMCLEVE-15 201

14-00000

Digest of Rpts for April 1969

AMCLEVE-15 $335.00

During the month AMCLEVE-15 reported on the visit of MIR leader Carlos Betancourt to the office of CIVISTA-5; the recent RECE-sponsored infiltration of Cuba; internal activities of the CIVISTA group; and numerous other matters of interest to the Station. He continues to be an extremely valuable Station asset.

HVCA-16690 dtd 11 June 1969 - Filed: 75-6-43/3

File: AMCLEVE-15 201

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

POSADA CARRILES, LUIS
201-300985 201-261211
SEX M DOB ? UFAA-00885A02
22 MAY 69
CIT ? P4
OCC ?
SUBJ OF 201-320217 HAS A PHOTOSTATIC COPY
OF A LTR SENT FROM VENEZUELA BY SUBJ
TO THE RECE LDR, AUGUSTO VALDES MIRANDA
AKA POLO MIRANDA

R 6906040399

FILE IN 201-300985

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
[redacted] SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Top Secret UMBRA Captured Document in Code

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HVCA 15939

1. After a number of false starts, the attachment to reference was determined to be in code rather than Turkish language as suspected. Returned for your information is the original attachment and the resulting document after the code had been broken. We are advised that this is a fairly unsophisticated system.

Victor I. Crapulli

Victor I. CRAPULLI

ATTACHMENT:
As stated above

DISTRIBUTION:
3 COS Caracas

Reclassify SECRET
when separated from top secret enclosure.

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCW 8466	DATE 13 FEB 1969 12 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION RID/TSCO mt, ... [redacted] SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Vene:	H. Archer	bab 12 Feb 69	9494

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/3/V		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	12 Feb 69	Alfonso Spera

AN	MFJ
AB	X

[redacted]

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
MFG 1-66

1401

DISPATCH

HVCA-16281

13 February 1969

CIGUSTY JANUARY PROGRESS REPORT

AGENT	EXPENDITURE
AMCLEVE-15	$335.00

AMCLEVE-15 continues to provide information generally leading to intelligence disseminations of the following subject and/or areas: CIVISTA-5 and his organization; Erasto Fernandez and the DIGEPOL; Venezuelan guerrilla activities; Haitian exile movements in Venezuela; and miscellaneous GOV political matters.

SECRET

File
[illegible] - 15

INVENTORY - NON STAFF PERSONNEL

	RECORD NO.	1	2	3	4
A		ARBITRARY NO.	SUBJECT'S 201 201- 300985	OTHER FILE NO.	
B		SURNAME POSADA CARRILES	1ST NAME (PERSONALIA) Luis	OTHER GIVEN NAME (TELECODE) Clemente	[illegible] NAME
C		COUNTRY OF BIRTH CUBA	DATE OF BIRTH 15 Feb 1928	CITIZENSHIP CUBAN	NATURALIZED (DATE OR PENDING)
D		COUNTRY CURRENTLY RESIDES Venezuela	CITY CURRENTLY RESIDES-YEAR CARACAS	MARITAL STATUS (most recent) MARRIED	SEX (M or F) M
E		OVERT OCCUPATION ADVISOR TO Venezuela Govt	LANGUAGE Spanish	LANGUAGE English	LANGUAGE -
F		MILITARY SERVICE-COUNTRY U.S.	BRANCH OF SERVICE ARMY	INCLUSIVE DATES MARCH 63 - MARCH 64	
G		COUNTRY AREA KNOWLEDGE CUBA	COUNTRY Venezuela	COUNTRY	
H		FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces) PENETRATION AGENT INTO DIGEPOL			CODE
I		FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces)			CODE
J		CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	TYPE EMPLOYEE TYPE A OR B	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE WIFE	FULL PART TIME OR WAE
K		MAINTENANCE/SERVICE	CONSULTANT	PROPRIETARY OR SUBSIDY	CAREER AGENT
L		FIELD AGENT	HQS. FF OR USF	INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR	NOC NCA
M		OPERATIONAL APPROVAL N/A Subj employed by GOV	POA STATUS	STAFF CLEARANCE	CSA PCSA
N		HQS COMPONENT RESPONSIBLE WH/3/V	FIELD STATION RESPONSIBLE CARACAS	PROJECT CIGUSTY	COVER VA
O		ENTRY ON DUTY DATE 1961	YEARLY SALARY 3446	DATE LAST PAY CHANGE Jan 1969	
P		PART OF A RETIREMENT PLAN - SPECIFY (limit to 62 spaces) N/A			
Q		DATE TERMINATED	REEMPLOYABLE	STAFF CEILING SPACE	
R		REMARKS (re: termination, etc.) (limit to 62 spaces) Copy sent			ATTITUDE

FORM 4-65 2457

SECRET

GROUP 1

(9-31)

HVCA 16243

7 February 1969

CIGUSTY DECEMBER PROGRESS REPORT

Agent	**Expenditure**
AMCLEVE-15 Subject furnished valuable information leading to disseminations and operational cables on the murder of Sosa Borregales and the subsequent arrest of numerous Bravo guerrillas; the implication of Orlando GARCIA Vasquez, a Venezuelan Government official, in the support of the Guyana rebels; the movements of Haitian exiles in Venezuela, and the interrogation of the two Cuban defectors from the Cuban trawler "Alecrin."	$450.00

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY 26 PER ______

ACTION C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

#437

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR, C/RI/SO, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 171925Z JAN 69 CITE CARACAS 1618

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI UFA

17 Jan 69 IN 74220

RYBAT

REF: CARACAS 1552 (IN 67446)

WH/31

1. AMCLEVE-15 RETURNED CARACAS 15 JAN. HE REPORTED THAT IN MIAMI TELEPHONE CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH EDGAR BUTTARI REPOZO, A RICH CUBAN WHO FORMERLY MINISTER WITH PRIO SOCARRAS GOVT, BUTTARI TOLD HIM THAT HE BUTTARI IS CLOSE FRIEND GPVALIANT AND THAT GPVALIANT TOLD HIM THAT ALTHOUGH HE COULDN'T SAY HOW OR WHEN HE WAS GOING TO FIND A WAY TO GET RID OF CASTRO. BUTTARI REPOZO ESTIMATED THAT WITHIN EIGHT MONTHS AFTER GPVALIANT TAKES OFFICE THERE WOULD BE ACTION AGAINST CASTRO.

CIT CUBA
RA U.S.A. FLORIDA, MIAMI

2. AMCLEVE-15 ALSO REPORTED THAT THERE ARE NOW THREE ANTI-CASTRO GROUPS IN MIAMI SEEKING US ASSISTANCE: THE NUNEZ PORTOUNDO GROUP, THE PENABAZ GROUP AND THE BUTTARI GROUP. AMCLEVE-15 ADDED THAT MANUEL ARTIME WAS ASSOCIATED WITH BUTTARI IN HIS Anti-Castro MOVEMENT AND THAT THIS GROUP HAS THE INSIDE TRACK DUE TO BUTTARI'S CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GPVALIANT.

3. INDEX BUTTARI, NUNEZ, PENABAZ AND ARTIME.

FILE: 201-300985.

S E C R E T

MICROFILMED
MAR 4 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

17 JAN 69
201-300985

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

V L

PROPER FILE NO.
AN

FROM:

RID/AN

JONES, MARSHA DY-612
RID/AN CA-50
EXT. 4239 TUBE CT-7

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/3				
2. NP			16 JAN 1969	NP
3.				
4. WH/Contract	3D5324	17 JAN 1969	Feb 11	
5. ~~[illegible]~~				
6. WH/B+F		12 [illegible] 1969 HARRIET	2/12	B ML
7. WH/HEADSET		14 FEB 1969		
8.				
9.				
10. CPD	5E 69		1/2/69	
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16. WH/3/V	3B 2627		Feb	H
17. RI/FI				

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

PLS. SEND 1 CC TO CONTRACTS BRANCH

NA sent 13 Jan 69

copy data [illegible]

P.T.

Pls complete Form 2457 for CSPS, GG-10.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-300985

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
3 JAN 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HVCA 16130

FORM 1-60 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO. Chief, Contracts Branch
Chief, WH/WSHEADSET

FROM Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT AMCLEVE-15

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached are four copies of an amendment to Subject's MOC reflecting a raise in salary from Bs. 1,000 to Bs. 1,500 per month. Station feels that AMCLEVE-15's operational activities and intelligence disseminations over the past six months more than justify this modest raise in salary.

Perry G. Drapkin
Perry G. DRAPKIN

ATTACHMENT:
MOC, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
② - C/WHD, w/att (1 cy), h/w
1 - C/Contracts Br., w/att (2 cys), h/w
1 - C/WH/WSHEADSET, w/att (1 cy), h/w

(ATT

CS COPY

JAN 3 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA - 16130	2 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 300985

AMENDMENT OR TERMINATION

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

DATE: 2 January 1969

TO : Chief, Finance Division

VIA : Contract Approving Officer

FROM : Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Oral Commitments: AMCLEVE-15 (Agent)
201 - 300985

Subject Memorandum, dated 20 August 1968 , has been amended or terminated as indicated below:

1. Compensation. Effective 1 February 1969 Subject will be paid Bs1,500 per month (equivalent to $ 335.00 at exchange rate Bs4.47/$1.00). No other changes with respect to compensation or other emoluments or benefits as detailed in the original Memorandum have been made.

2. Termination. Subject contract was terminated effective . Appropriate secrecy agreements and acknowledgement that no further claims against contracting entity are outstanding have been obtained insofar as operationally possible and feasible.

3. Other Changes.

REVIEWED
S[illegible] Contracting Officer

SIGNED:
Field Contracting Officer
(Chief of Station)

REVIEWED:
Contract Approving Officer
Feb 11, 1969

SECRET

W ATT TO HVCA-16130

CS COPY

201-300985

1968

HVCA 16123
31 Dec 68
CIGUSTY NOV PROGRESS REPORT

The following is a summary of developmental activities and estimated expenditures for Project CITGUSTY during November 1968.

AGENT	**EXPENDITURE**
AMCLEVE-15	$ 450.00

Provided information on Erasto Fernandez, Chief
of DIGEPOL; DIGEPOL; Chief of CIVISTA-5 and
general info on the internal security situation
which led to numerous disseminations.

From: HVCA 15954, 25 October 1968 File: 73-6-41/3

Subject: CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for September 1968

AMCLEVE-15 450.00

Subject attended the International Students Meeting at Merida and provided information which resulted in a dissemination. He continues to provide information on the activities of CIRASH and CIVISTA-5's group. Emphasis during September was placed on information relative to the arrest and interrogation of top-level MIR leaders.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
AMCLEVE-15/Foreign Language Outline

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The attached outline was taken from a confessed guerrilla, recently arrested by CIRASII in the city of Barquisimeto, Venezuela. When interrogated by AMCLEVE-15 and others, the arrestee said he did not know where the outline came from; what language it was in; and, in fact, said it did not belong to him.

2. Various Station officers and assets have studied the outline, and the consensus of opinion is that it is probably Turkish or a middle-eastern language.

3. It is requested that Headquarters contact the appropriate offices in an attempt to ascertain what language the outline is written in, together with a translation of its contents. Although Station personnel contacted felt it unlikely, the possibility exists that the outline is in code.

Perry G. Drapkin
Perry G. DRAPKIN

ATTACHMENT:
Copy Outline, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - C/WHD, w/att, h/w

CS COPY

OCT 23 1968
201- 300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA - 15939	21 October 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 300985

I) [illegible]
1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]
6. [illegible]
7. [illegible]
8. [illegible]

II) [illegible]
1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. " [illegible]
6. [illegible]
7. [illegible]
8. [illegible]

III) [illegible]
1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]

IV) [illegible]
1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]

V) [illegible]
1. [illegible]
2. ~~[illegible]~~
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]

VI) [illegible]
1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]

VII) [illegible]
1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]

VIII) [illegible]
1. [illegible]

HW ATT. TO HVCA-15939

CS COPY

201-3[illegible]

[illegible]
1. [illegible] 66 - 6
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]

[illegible]
1. [illegible] ([illegible]
2. [illegible] ([illegible])

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 15 October 1968 dt

TO: WH/3/V - J. Gover

C NO. 201-300985

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: AMCLEVE/15

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRO I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRO II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Per our conversation, please refer to CSI-F-10-5, Section #19 relative to the meaninglessness of the issuance of a Provisional Operational Approval on the agent of a foreign power. We shall, therefore, be unable to process your POA request.

However, we should be glad to conduct a Covert Name Check since it is assumed that the authorization in DIR 71540 still obtains.

1 Apr 65
Oct 65 OA

11 Jul 67 terminated

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO: Chief of Station, Caracas		MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief, WHD		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Luis POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: FYI

The attached report is forwarded for your information. It would be interesting to learn the identities of Subject's contacts in Miami.

Hume W. TROXELL

Attachment:
DODIIR # 2 753 0028 68, 2 Aug 68

Distribution:
3 - Caracas

AHLEVE-15

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCW-8233	DATE ~~19 SEP 1968~~ 16 September 1968
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/V/C.W.Cox:chd	4521

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/3/V	10/4/68	

AN MES
AB X
IN
DS
DK
DE
FI

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	16 Sep	Spera

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

From : HVCA-15811, 18 Sept 68 75-6-41/3

Subject: CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for Aug 68

AMCLEVE-15 $490.00

Subject continues to provide information of value on the CIRASH-4 and CIVISTA-5 organizations.

13 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OPS

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE-15 (201-300985)

1. Subject, a Cuban now living in Caracas, Venezuela, is a Station Caracas penetration of the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police and of the Special Group, a smaller, somewhat autonomous unit within DIGEPOL. A POA was requested on Subject on 25 January 1968, to use Subject as stated above. On 1 February 1968, WH/3/V requested cancellation of the POA request because of indications that Subject was involved in clandestine sabotage activity and there were suspicions that he had failed to report his activities to CIA or DIGEPOL. Station Caracas was directed to handle Subject as a "hostile." The Station was advised that they could maintain contact with Subject as a source of information on activities of DIGEPOL and the Special Group but that no requirements were to be levied on him. The Station was advised that they could make spot payments for information received from Subject. CI/OPS co-ordinated on these directions to Station Caracas.

2. The Station acknowledged their instructions but demurred on Headquarters' interpretation of AMCLEVE-15's activities. The Station stated, in effect, that assets are often unsavory individuals, who are never under complete control and who seldom disclose the complete range of their activities to their supervisors. The Station added that they were interested in Subject because of his position as a "trusted confidant" of certain highly placed Venezuelan security officials.

3. In the ensuing months the Station came to describe Subject as "an extremely valuable penetration" because of the intelligence information and operational reports he furnished. For example, he reported on the involvement of the Venezuelan military in a Cuban exile plan to attack Cuba. And, he also reported on a plan of Cuban exiles to ship arms from Venezuela

301

as part of an infiltration scheme. He has reported such operational information as a description of the capabilities, layout and equipment of DIGEPOL telephone tap operations. Included in this information was his report that at least on paper, the U.S. Embassy was a target for tap operations. He has also reported on the personalities and workings of the organizations with which he is associated. At the same time the Station had an independent report that Subject was involved in a scheme to obtain "curare poison for approximately forty hypodermic needles." To avoid exposing the source of their information the Station did not query AMCLEVE-15 about the matter. The Station said that they disapproved of his involvement in wild Cuban exile schemes but that Headquarters restrictions in February 1968 prevented the Station from discussing this involvement with him.

4. In May 1968, the Station informed Headquarters that they believed that Subject was collaborating fully with CIA and, further, they believed that he would not expose, inform,or work against CIA. They added that Subject was still capable of engaging in independent Cuban exile activity without informing his Case Officer. The Station also requested a polygraph examination for Subject.

5. Subject was given a polygraph examination to resolve specifically his bona fides, possible affiliation with Cuban Intelligence through relatives, unreported association with gangster elements, thefts from CIA and other questions involving possible derogatory information on Subject. Subject's responses, described as substantially truthful by the examiners, appear to contain no information which would prevent CIA's operational use of Subject. On only one question, that involving Subject's association with an alleged racketeer, Lefty Rosenthal, did sensitivity persist. The examiner commented, "...In fairness to Subject this sensitivity is believed generated by genuine uncertainty over the amount of Para military items which he had been instrumental in getting for Rosenthal from Cuban exile arms supplies."

6. Station Caracas has requested that they be allowed to cease treating AMCLEVE-15 as a "hostile" and that the restrictions cited in Paragraph one, above, be lifted to permit more effective utilization of this well-placed penetration agent. WH Division concurs in this request. CI/OPS concurrence is requested in authorizing full operational use of AMCLEVE-15 as a penetration agent into the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) and as a penetration of Remberto UZCATEGUI's Special Group within DIGEPOL.

Jack Gower
WH/3/V

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 7 September 1968

TO:	☒	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
	☐	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
	☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: JP Oswer
WH/3/Venezuela
3 E 2631;4521b/9494r

SUBJECT: (True name) Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: AMCLEVE-15

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 300985

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Caracas, Venezuela

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

As a penetration agent into the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) and as a penetration of the Remberto UZCATEGUI Brusal special group.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☒	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☒	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO. JMWAVE	☒	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED [illegible] Caracas	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

5 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE-15 (201-300985)

1. Subject, a Cuban now living in Caracas, Venezuela, is a Station Caracas penetration of the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police and of the Special Group, a smaller, somewhat autonomous unit within DIGEPOL. A POA was requested on Subject on 25 January 1968, to use Subject as stated above. On 1 February 1967, WH/3/V requested cancellation of the POA request because of indications that Subject was involved in clandestine sabotage activity and there were suspicions that he had failed to report his activities to CIA or DIGEPOL. Station Caracas was directed to handle Subject as a "hostile". The Station was advised that they could maintain contact with Subject as a source of information on activities of DIGEPOL and the Special Group but that no requirements were to be levied on him. The Station was advised that they could make spot payments for information received from Subject. CI/OPS co-ordinated on these directions to Station Caracas.

2. The Station acknowledged their instructions but demurred on Headquarters' interpretation of AMCLEVE-15's activities. The Station stated, in effect, that assets are often unsavory individuals, who are never under complete control and who seldom disclose the complete range of their activities to their supervisors. The Station added that they were interested in Subject because of his position as a "trusted confidant" of certain highly placed Venezuelan security officials.

3. In the ensuing months the Station came to describe Subject as "an extremely valuable penetration" because of the intelligence information and operational reports he furnished. For example, he reported on the involvement of the Venezuelan military in a Cuban exile plan to attack Cuba. And, he also reported on a plan of Cuban exiles to ship arms from Venezuela

SECRET

as part of an infiltration scheme. He has reported such operational information as a description of the capabilities, layout and equipment of DIGEPOL telephone tap operations. Included in this information was his report that at least on paper, the U.S. Embassy was a target for tap operations. He has also reported on the personalities and workings of the organizations with which he is associated. At the same time the Station had an independent report that Subject was involved in a scheme to obtain "curare poison for approximately forty hypodermic needles". To avoid exposing the source of their information the Station did not query AMCLEVE-15 about the matter. The Station said that they disapproved of his involvement in wild Cuban exile schemes but that Headquarters restrictions in February 1968 prevented the Station from discussing this involvement with him.

4. In May 1968, the Station informed Headquarters that they believed that Subject was collaborating fully with CIA and, further, they believed that he would not expose, inform, or work against CIA. They added that Subject was still capable of engaging in independent Cuban exile activity without informing his Case Officer. The Station also requested a polygraph examination for Subject.

5. Subject was given a polygraph examination to resolve specifically his bona fides, possible affiliation with Cuban Intelligence through relatives, unreported association with gangster elements, thefts from WOFIRM and other questions involving possible derogatory information on Subject. Subject's responses, described as substantially truthful by the examiners, appear to contain no information which would prevent CIA's operational use of Subject. On only one question, that involving Subject's association with an alleged racketeer,Lefty Rosenthal, did sensitivity persist. The examiner commented, "...In fairness to Subject this sensitivity is believed generated by genuine uncertainty over the amount of Para military items which he had been instrumental in getting for Rosenthal from Cuban exile arms supplies "

6. Station Caracas has requested that they be allowed to cease treating AMCLEVE-15 as a "hostile" and that he be processed for POA/OA to permit more effective utilization of this well placed penetration agent.

John P. Gower
WH/3/V

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
x NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT 0 AMCLEVE-15
MOC and Security Clearance

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached are four copies of Subject's MOC.

2. As the Desk is aware, the last word from Headquarters was that AMCLEVE-15 was to be treated as a "hostile" and that full clearance was being withheld pending his SGSWIRL. He has now been SGSWIRLed, and to the Station's knowledge, the test was favorable although an official Headquarters report has not been received. A PRQ Part I was submitted on Subject on 29 May 1968. Therefore, it would be appreciated if the Desk would contact the appropriate Headquarters officials and advise the Station of AMCLEVE-15's official status. We assume that he will be fully cleared and that a POA will be issued followed by an OA after the Station submits PRQ Part II.

3. Headquarters recently inquired as to Station thoughts on including AMCLEVE-15 in the CIFLUTE Project rather than making AMCLEVE a separate project. The Station is completely in accord with this idea although it will probably necessitate funds being shifted from CIGUSTY to CIFLUTE. However, a separate dispatch will be prepared on this subject.

4. The Station realizes that AMCLEVE-15's clearance has been a thorny problem to the Desk and hopes that we can now clear it up once and for all.

Perry G. Drapkin
Perry G. DRAPKIN

ATTACHMENT
MOC, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - C/WHD, w/att, h/w

AUG 21 1968

CS COPY

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA - 15734	DATE 20 August 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 300985

ATTACHMENT TO: HVCA - 15734

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas

Date: 20 August 1968

SUBJECT: Engagement of AMCLEVE-15 as Independent Contractor (201- 300985)

1. Term and Project Charge. The subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under CIGUSTY. The effective date of the oral contract is 2 February 1968, and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. Security Approval. The appropriate security approval for subject's use ~~xxxx xxxx~~ is pending. Type , dated , No. .

3. Citizenship. Subject is / ~~xxxxxx~~ a foreign national.

4. Compensation. Subject will / ~~xxxxxxx~~ be paid a salary of Bs 1,000 per month (equivalent to approximately $ 250.00 at exchange rate B 4.47/$1.00). No raise in this salary is contemplated at this time, nor has any been promised. In accordance with local custom, subject may be given a bonus payment or gift (not to exceed one month's salary) at Christmastime, although no specific commitment has been made to this effect. No other bonuses have been promised, although such a payment may be made at some time during the effective period of this oral contract in recognition of a specific task performed or as an inducement payment. Subject may occasionally be given a gift (whiskey, cigarettes or other similar item) for operational purposes.

5. Taxes. Not applicable.

6. Quarters and/or Subsistence. Not applicable.

7. Operational Expenses. When incurred upon direction and approval of Station,

(a) Subject may be reimbursed for operational travel either on an actual cost basis, or by appropriate per diem payments;

(b) Subject may be reimbursed for operational expenses, which will include any approved expenses subject incurs while acting on assignment by the Station, such as costs of entertainment, transportation to and from meetings or places of assignments, purchase of special supplies, etc.

8. Other Commitments. None

9. Contingent Obligations. Although no other obligations have been incurred with subject, nor implied or promised, it is possible that a bonus may be granted him upon termination of satisfactory service, which payment would be in accordance with local custom.

No commitments other than those expressly stated herein or in attached annexes have been made or implied to subject.

SIGNED: Stephen R.
Field Contracting Officer
(Chief of Station)

VIEWED: ______________________
Contract Approving Officer

CS COPY

201-300985

H/W Att to HVCA-15734

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ 2

DISSEM BY 3 PER ______

ACTION
WH8 ☐ RID COPY

...IFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (15)

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE VR R/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI2,

IND AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 192140Z AUG 68 CITE CARACAS 0384

DIRECTOR

19 Aug 68 IN 73418

REF DIRECTOR 25496

CIRASH

FERNANDEZ TOLD AMCLEVE-15 HIS TRIP TO NEW YORK AND MIAMI WAS FOR PURPOSE SEEING GIRLFRIEND. FERNANDEZ DID NOT MENTION TRAVELLING TO PUERTO RICO. ANY FURTHER INFO OBTAINED THRU LIAISON OR AMCELVE-15 WILL BE FORWARDED SOONEST.

SECRET

BT

CC

Action 15201

SECRET

14-00000

HVCA 15706
14 AUG 65

AMCLEVE-15 220.00

Subject continues to provide valuable information on the CIRASH and CIVISTA-5 organizations.

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
FROM 2L

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

INFO FILE VR, CA-5, CA/REG, CA/PROP, FI-2, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CI,
#549 RI/AN

S E C R E T 122113Z AUG 68 CITE CARACAS 0324 12 Aug 68 IN 69007

Amcleve-15
201

DIRECTOR

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 22253

B. CARACAS 0286 (IN 65406)

1. AT STATION DIRECTION CIHITCH-1, AMCLEVE-15 AND THREE MEMBERS CIVISTA-5 GROUP ATTENDED LATIN AMERICAN STUDENT CONFERENCE SCHEDULED 7 THRU 12 AUG AT MERIDA. FACT THAT CONFERENCE WAS POSTPONED AND RESCHEDULED FOR LATER DATE TOGETHER WITH OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION BEING DISSEMED IN SEPARATE CABLE.

2. IN MERIDA CIHITCH-1 POSED AS JOURNALIST USING NUMEROUS LEGITIMATE CARDS HE HAS COLLECTED OVER YEARS. AMCLEVE-15 AND CIVISTA GROUP DEVELOPED ON-THE-SPOT COVER AS REPORTERS FOR IDEN A AND WERE SUCCESSFUL IN INTERVIEWING AND PHOTOGRAPHING TWO MIR DIRECTORS. AMCLEVE-15 EXPECTS IDEN B TO PUBLISH SOME OF THEIR INTERVIEWS AND PICTURES AND TO FURNISH THEM IDENTIFICATION CARDS AS IDEN A REPORTERS FOR THE SEPT ? LASC MEETING. IF AMCLEVE-15 SUCCESSFUL, STATION WILL DUPLICATE CARD FOR FUTURE INTERNAL AND THIRD COUNTRY USE.

SECRET

Latin American Student Conference

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 0324 S E C R E T

3. IN ANY CASE CIHITCH-1 AND AMCLEVE-15 WILL COVER LASC SEPT MEETING.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 24   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

K   SECRET (When Filled In)   GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO   BRANCH ☐   DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION 186 WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, C/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 071943Z AUG 68 CITE CARACAS 0292

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR

REF JMCOBRA 0497 (IN 64601)   7 Aug 68 IN 66189

STATION HAS HAD COVERAGE FROM AMCLEVE-15 OF HELP GIVEN CUBAN EXILES BY VEN MILITARY. AMPAK-2 UNDOUBTEDLY IN TOUCH WITH SAME GROUP. HE MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE BETTER INFO, HOWEVER, AND STATION PLANS CONTACT HIM. REQUEST ALL PERTINENT PARTS HIS 201 BE FORWARDED CARACAS.

S E C R E T

BT

A cleve -15
201

SECRET

14-00000

HVCA 15652
31 JUL 68

AMCLEVE-15 230.00

Subject continues to be a productive source of information on CIRASH and CIVISTA-5 activities. As soon as the results of his successful SGSWIRL are processed and he is removed from the hostile list, a project will be written.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

8 July 68

POSADA Cariles, Luis Clemente 201-300985

WH/3/V

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201

FORM 7-58 44 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

Amcleve-15

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 30 09 85

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

XKSCARLET-3

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: POSADA, LUIS CLEMENTE
201-300985
VOL. IV

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
	8/16/78		

Luis Clemente POSADA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

When W[illegible] T-3

terminated, inform Fred
Bucci and check with him
on having W-3's file at
14 NS * taken out of current
restricted status. Memo to
Bucci may be needed on
this.

Done R

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 6-3

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH	290015Z	WASHINGTON	920330

CONF: 11/DP 5 INFO: FILE

90

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 27
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 FILES #

PREPARE FOR FILING
FOR FILING
LA/NC/V

TO: CARACAS. Y

FROM: LAPNC/V Y

UNINTEL Y

1. FOLLOWING IS DCD/MIAMI REPORT 00A (S) 322-26419-76 ON

0 TP MEETING BETWEEN SERGIO DIEGUEZ AND LUIS POSADA CARRILES. Y

A. ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1976, U.S. CITIZEN SERGIO DIEGUEZ CALLED THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND REQUESTED TO MEET WITH A SPANISH-SPEAKING REPRESENTATIVE. WE MET WITH DIEGUEZ ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1976. HE TOLD US THAT RECENTLY, WHILE IN VENEZUELA, HE MET WITH LUIS (POSADA) CARRILES, A VENEZUELAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN ORIGIN. HE TOLD US THAT POSADA, ALLEGEDLY A FORMER AGENCY ASSET, HAD REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN OFFERING FOR A PRICE POSADA'S SERVICES TO BKHERALD. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT POSADA HAS CLOSE BCONTACT WITH HIGH RANKING VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIBALS AND COULD PROVIDE BKHERALD WITH VALUABLE INFORMATION. Y

B. DIEGUEZ SHOWED US A COPY OF A LENGTHY DOCUMENT GIVEN TO HIM BY POSADA SPECIFICALLY FOR OUR PERUSAL AS EVIDENCE OF THE TYPE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-300985
29 Sep 76

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE 920330

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

OF INFORMATION TO WHICH HE HAS ACCESS. THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTED OF A LIST OF CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN CARACAS, BIOGRAPHICAL DATA AND ADDRESSES FOR THESE INDIVIDUALS, AND VARIOUS SUNDRY INFORMATION ON JAMAICA, GUYANA, PANAMA, AND ANGOLA. WE DID NOT ACCEPT THE DOCUMENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO HEADQUARTERS BECAUSE IN OUR JUDGEMENT, TO HAVE DONE SO MIGHT HAVE IMPLIED AN AGREEMENT ON OUR PART TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL REMUNERATION AT SOME FUTURE DATE. BY

C. DIEGUEZ ALSO SAID THAT DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT RAFAEL (CALDERA), POSADA WAS A FAIRLY HIGH RANKING OFFICER IN THE DIRECTORATE OF SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP). HE WAS DISMISSED FROM THIS POSITION WHEN CARLOS ANDRES (PEREZ) BECAME PRESIDENT. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT AS A DISIP OFFICIAL POSADA WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE ELIMINATION OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AND STRONGHOLDS. AT THAT TIME, POSADA WAS KNOWN AS "COMISARIO BASILIO".

D. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT POSADA, CURRENTLY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR IN VENEZUELA, LIVES AT CALLE VALENCIA, QUINTA MARIANINA, LAS PALMAS, CARACAS. HIS OFFICE TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE 743232 AND 742057. DIEGUEZ

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACP TOO PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE. 920330

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

ALSO SAID THAT IF BKHERALD IS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING POSADA'S SERVICES, CONTACT SHOULD BE INITIATED THROUGH HIM (DIEGUEZ) AND NOT DIRECTLY TO POSADA FOR "SECURITY REASONS". HOWEVER, IF NECESSARY POSADA CAN TRAVEL TO THE U.S. Y

E. DIEGUEZ WAS TOLD THAT HIS REQUEST IN BEHALF OF POSADA WOULD BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS AND THAT WE COULD NOT PROMISE ANY POSITIVE RESULTS. Y

2. DIEGUEZ WAS BORN 23 OCTOBER 1937, HOLGUIN, ORIENTE PROVINCE, CUBA. NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZEN (INS NO. 7832636) ON 24 JUNE 1959 IN BILOXI, MISSISSIPPI. DIEGUEZ CURRENTLY RESIDES IN CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA WORKING AS A CONTRACTOR IN EXPORTING U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS. HE SERVED IN THE AIR FORCE 6 YEARS, 1956-62. HE ARRIVED IN THE U.S. IN SEPTEMBER 1955 TO JOIN ERNESTO DIEGUEZ, RELATIONSHIP UNKNOWN. NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE. Y

3. REQUEST STATION COMMENTS. Y

4. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. N

DATE: 28 SEPTEMBER 197~~8~~6
ORIG: CATHY LEE WARD cw
UNIT: LAPNC/V
EXT: 1715

201-300985

Matthews
C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Beardsley
AC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

esc... Usted lleva casi todas las de perder, pero no se amilane. Recuerde que un ejecutivo importante debe tener siempre la respuesta exacta para cualquier situacion. Y nosotros estamos aquí para

... centro del secuestro y eso le otorga inmediatamente ciertos privilegios. Póngase los lentes y lea bien para recordar mejor.

—¡No discuta! No va a convencer a nadie de que usted no vale la pena de un se

escapar! Lo más probable es que le vaya peor que antes. No provoque a los secuestradores pues es un riesgo innecesario que se corre con personas desconocidas. ¡Y no los subestime! Recuerde que pueden ser tan inteligentes

podemos garantizar nada.

No tome a broma lo que aquí acabamos de decirle. Un secuestro esta a la vuelta de la esquina en cualquier pais y en cualquier momento. Si no lo cree revise las páginas de su diario. ¡Y buena suerte!

POR EL INDUSTRIAL Carlos Dominguez se pagó el rescate mas caro hasta el momento en nuestro pais: 5 millones de bolivares.

[illegible] 3

Por **ROMULO RODRIGUEZ**
Fotos **ANGEL QUINTERO**

SE ACABO LA VIDA PRIVADA

NO es nada nuevo hoy en dia que una compañia pueda estar vigilada totalmente. Desde el control de sus hilos telefonicos, hasta microfonos escondidos en las salas de conferencias, o en las oficinas de sus principales ejecutivos: tampoco es raro que un señor tome fotos allí mismo con una camara escondida en un maletin, o que a esa empresa le graben conversaciones desde una distancia de 25 metros. Tal es el caso del espionaje industrial o contraespionaje industrial. Investigadores privados intervienen, infiltran gente dentro de una compañia, con el fin de obtener datos secretos y llevarselos a la competencia. O puede ser tambien que los investigadores penetren a la propia compañia para impedir que salgan datos se instala entonces un sistema de seguridad interno.

Y cuando nos referimos a estos hechos no estamos hablando de paises capitalistas foraneos de gran desarrollo industrial, sino a esta tierra tropical y subdesarrollada. En Venezuela muchisimas compañias prestan estos servicios. Una de ellas es la que dirige el señor Luis Posada en una empresa que funciona desde el año 74 "Investigaciones Comerciales e Industriales" (ICI), se basa en la experiencia de su Director Gerente, el señor Posada, quien cuenta con 16 años dedicados a estas actividades de investigacion, repartidos en la policia de Norteamerica, en la DISIP y ahora en funciones privadas.

Conservando el acento de su tierra de origen, Cuba, Posada converso con MOMENTO.

—Nosotros no tratamos investigaciones de adulterio, ni cosas por el estilo. Nuestra funcion no es para los abogados, que son los que se enriquecen con ello. La compañía se dedica a las empresas de seguros, comercios e industrias. El 90% se enfila a robos cometidos en las industrias, cuya culpabilidad se da casi siempre en los propios empleados de estas empresas. También se investigan homicidios e incendios.

—¿Y qué hacen para casos de espionaje industrial?

—Tenemos dos tipos de operaciones: Ofensiva y defensiva. En las primeras, se hace espionaje, y en la otra, contrariamente es para defenderse de ello. Un sospechoso deshonesto puede ser fotografiado cuando hace una entrevista con alguien de la competencia. Puede ser precisado y neutralizado un directivo que se fue de la empresa y se está llevando al personal. Podemos tambien hacer vigilancia a los ejecutivos: desde las personas con quienes almuerza hasta que hace por la noche.

Refiere que uno de los más modernos equipos que tienen es un detector de mentiras, a base de un test, que permite con una cinta grabada de la voz, determinar si el examinado miente o no.

—¿Ha dado resultado este detector?

—Con el aparato descubrimos un desfalco de 200 mil bolivares habido en una empresa, donde grabamos a mas de 50 empleados.

Nos muestra unos grabadores minimos, casi invisibles, que funcionan con baterias que duran ocho dias, o utilizables tambien con corriente directa. Un pequeño equipo de telefonia, intercepta telefonos a sólo tres cuadras de la casa vigilada, sin intervención de la DISIP ni otros cuerpos policiales.

—Tambien hacemos "barridas", esto significa que nosotros localizamos y neutralizamos microfonos que se hayan instalado previamente, cuando en un sitio va a haber una reunión importante y secreta. Es un caso de contraespionaje. Grabamos conversaciones desde una distancia de 35 metros. Desde un maletin podemos hacer fotografias a personas o edificaciones, tambien desde una cartera de mujer.

Expresa que en las oficinas que tienen en Caracas y Valencia cuentan con un personal femenino de siete mujeres. Tambien poseen un archivo, donde fichan los casos que han investigado y otros datos. Afirma Posada que no realizan investigaciones politicas.

Tal como se ve la vida privada, dejo de serlo.

EL SEÑOR POSADA, director de una compania de investigaciones, muestra a MOMENTO los pequeños microfonos utilizados para espionaje y contraespionaje.

Momento
13-19 Sept

Otra de las facetas de la investigación y seguridad, es el espionaje y contraespionaje de empresas y compañias, o bien para instalar sistemas internos o para llevarle los secretos a la competencia.



ESTE MODERNO detector de mentiras, permite saber a traves de una grabacion, si el examinado dice la verdad o no

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Operational Lead - Luis Posada Carriles

FROM: DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION Operations Services Group/OSS 910 Key Bldg. - x-2268		EXTENSION		NO. HH-28363 DATE 15 September 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. LA/NW/V 3B4406	17 SEP 1976		G	
2. LA/C/LA 3D5325			✓	MIM-OO-A(S)-322/26419-76
3. File: WKSCARLET-3/201				
4.				Attached for your information.
5.				20 Sept. asked Jon French for more info on Diego - he will ask Miami - We then have to decide how to handle.
6.				
7.				
8.				E-2 IMPDET CL BY)06875
9.				TP Sent 1 Oct 76
10.				
11.				
12.	SECRET			
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL/WNINTEL/CIA
INTERNAL USE ONLY
REPORT NUMBER: 00-A(S) 322/26419-76
TWX NO.: DCD/MIAMI 13513
COUNTRY: VENEZUELA
SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL LEAD - LUIS POSADA CARRILES

(THIS REPORT IS BELIEVED TO CONTAIN INFORMATION OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST AND MAY NOT BE DISCLOSED TO PERSONNEL OUTSIDE THE DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS WITHOUT THE PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION.)

1. ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1976, US CITIZEN SERGIO DIEGUEZ CALLED THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND REQUESTED TO MEET WITH A SPANISH-SPEAKING REPRESENTATIVE. WE MET WITH DIEGUEZ ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1976. HE TOLD US THAT RECENTLY, WHILE IN VENENZUELA, HE MET WITH LUIS (POSADA) CARRILES, A VENEZUELAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN ORIGIN. HE TOLD US THAT POSADA, ALLEGEDLY A FORMER AGENCY ASSET, HAD REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN OFFERING FOR A PRICE POSADA'S SERVICES TO BKHERALD. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT POSADA HAS CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIGH RANKING VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND COULD PROVIDE BKHERALD WITH VALUABLE INFORMATION.

2. DIEGUEZ SHOWED US A COPY OF A LENGTHY DOCUMENT GIVEN TO HIM BY POSADA SPECIFICALLY FOR OUR PERUSAL AS EVIDENCE OF THE TYPE OF INFORMATION TO WHICH HE HAS ACCESS. THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTED OF A LIST OF CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN CARACAS, BIOGRAPHICAL DATA AND ADDRESSES FOR THESE INDIVIDUALS, AND VARIOUS SUNDRY INFORMATION ON JAMAICA, GUYANA, PANAMA, AND ANGOLA. WE DID NOT ACCEPT THE DOCUMENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO HEADQUARTERS BECAUSE IN OUR JUDGEMENT, TO HAVE DONE SO MIGHT HAVE IMPLIED AN AGREEMENT ON OUR PART TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL REMUNERATION AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

3. DIEGUEZ ALSO SAID THAT DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT RAFAEL (CALDERA), POSADA WAS A FAIRLY HIGH RANKING OFFICER IN THE DIRECTORATE OF SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP). HE WAS DISMISSED FROM THIS POSITION WHEN CARLOS ANDRES (PEREZ) BECAME PRESIDENT. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT AS A DISIP OFFICIAL POSADA WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE ELIMINATION OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AND STRONGHOLDS. AT THAT TIME, POSADA WAS KNOWN AS ''COMISARIO BASILIO''.

4. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT POSADA, CURRENTLY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, IN VENEZUELA, LIVES AT CALLE VALENCIA, QUINTA MARIANINA, LAS PALMAS-CARACAS. HIS OFFICE TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE 743232 AND 742057. DIEGUEZ ALSO SAID THAT IF BKHERALD IS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING POSADA'S SERVICES CONTACT SHOULD BE INITIATED THROUGH HIM (DIEGUEZ) AND NOT DIRECTLY TO POSADA FOR ''SECURITY REASONS''. HOWEVER, IF NECESSARY POSADA CAN TRAVEL TO THE US.

5. DIEGUEZ WAS TOLD THAT HIS REQUEST IN BEHALF OF POSADA WOULD BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS AND THAT WE COULD NOT PROMISE ANY POSITIVE RESULTS. - END -
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668
CONFIDENTIAL/WNINTEL/CIA INERNAL USE ONLY

1. TRACES DIEGUE?
2. ANY INDICATION HE MEMBER OF WKTANGO-1 GROUP?
3. POSADA NEEDS NO ASSISTANCE; HE IS AMICABLY TERMINATED ASSET WHO KNOWS SEVERAL MEANS OF CONTACTING GRAUSPIES DIRECTLY WITH PRACTICALLY NO EFFORT.
4. POSADA DOES NOT NEED MONEY - HE MAKING MINT OUT OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATIONS BUSINESS.
5. "HIGH RANKING" GOV OFFICIALS NOT ACCURATE - HE IS COPEYANO WHO NOT ON GOOD TERMS WITH ADECOS EXCEPT FOR WKTANGO-1. WE KNOW GKNORTH HAS POSADA ON CUKBLEAK.
6. POSADA WAS MEDIUM LEVEL OFFICIAL OF DISIP.
7. PARA 4 BUSINESS OF NO DIRECT CONTACT IS FISHY. THIS COULD BE GOV OP TO DISCREDIT POSADA AND THROW HIM OUT OF COUNTRY.

14-00000

SUNDAY	1000-	Beacon (tracking device) demonstration by Mr. Don Roottle of commercial Co.
MONDAY	0900-	FBI: 9th & Penn; ask for Mr. Robert Birmingham; full day, which should include visit to Quantico.
TUESDAY	0900-1130	US Secret Service: 1800 "G" St., 9th floor; ask for Mr. Lou McClan. Be on time, as there is meeting with Chief at 1000 hrs. Beltsville range included..
WEDNESDAY	0900-1130	Dulles (FAA); ask for Security Officer.
	1330-	Chalk Point (PEPCo.) for tour of nuclear site.
THURSDAY	0900-0930	HQS Bldg; enter thru tunnel & park.
	0930-1200	Computer briefing, 1D 41-05.
	1200-1400	Lunch, Evans Farm Inn.
	1400-1430	Return to HQS, thru tunnel & park.
	1430-1445	Meet DDCI in his office.
	1500-1630	Tech briefing, 2D 03.
FRIDAY	0800-1100	Briefings at Motel on PRC, Sovs & Cubans.
	1200-1245	Travel to Pentagon & park.
	1245-1300	Meet Chief, DIA.
	1300-1530	Carribean briefing; tour NMIC.
SATURDAY		Shopping.
SUNDAY		Return to Caracas.

PY [illegible]

SHOTGUN/RIFLE CONTACTS?

1. ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1976, US CITIZEN SERGIO DIEGUEZ CALLED THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND REQUESTED TO MEET WITH A SPANISH-SPEAKING REPRESENTATIVE. WE MET WITH DIEGUEZ ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1976. HE TOLD US THAT RECENTLY, WHILE IN VENENZUELA, HE MET WITH LUIS (POSADA) CARRILES, A VENEZUELAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN ORIGIN. HE TOLD US THAT POSADA, ALLEGEDLY A FORMER AGENCY ASSET, HAD REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN OFFERING FOR A PRICE POSADA'S SERVICES TO BKHERALD. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT POSADA HAS CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIGH RANKING VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND COULD PROVIDE BKHERALD WITH VALUABLE INFORMATION.

2. DIEGUEZ SHOWED US A COPY OF A LENGTHY DOCUMENT GIVEN TO HIM BY POSADA SPECIFICALLY FOR OUR PERUSAL AS EVIDENCE OF THE TYPE OF INFORMATION TO WHICH HE HAS ACCESS. THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTED OF A LIST OF CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN CARACAS, BIOGRAPHICAL DATA AND ADDRESSES FOR THESE INDIVIDUALS, AND VARIOUS SUNDRY INFORMATION ON JAMAICA, GUYANA, PANAMA, AND ANGOLA. WE DID NOT ACCEPT THE DOCUMENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO HEADQUARTERS BECAUSE IN OUR JUDGEMENT, TO HAVE DONE SO MIGHT HAVE IMPLIED AN AGREEMENT ON OUR PART TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL REMUNERATION AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

3. DIEGUEZ ALSO SAID THAT DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT RAFAEL (CALDERA), POSADA WAS A FAIRLY HIGH RANKING OFFICER IN THE DIRECTORATE OF SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP). HE WAS DISMISSED FROM THIS POSITION WHEN CARLOS ANDRES (PEREZ) BECAME PRESIDENT. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT AS A DISIP OFFICIAL POSADA WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE ELIMINATION OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AND STRONGHOLDS. AT THAT TIME, POSADA WAS KNOWN AS ''COMISARIO BASILIO''.

4. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT POSADA, CURRENTLY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, IN VENEZUELA, LIVES AT CALLE VALENCIA, QUINTA MARIANINA, LAS PALMAS, CARACAS. HIS OFFICE TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE 743232 AND 742057. DIEGUEZ ALSO SAID THAT IF BKHERALD IS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING POSADA'S SERVICE CONTACT SHOULD BE INITIATED THROUGH HIM (DIEGUEZ) AND NOT DIRECTLY TO POSADA FOR ''SECURITY REASONS''. HOWEVER, IF NECESSARY POSADA CAN TRAVEL TO THE US.

5. DIEGUEZ WAS TOLD THAT HIS REQUEST IN BEHALF OF POSADA WOULD BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS AND THAT WE COULD NOT PROMISE ANY POSITIVE RESULTS. - END -

14-00000

3116 x6
7124

DPOB: 23 Oct 32
Holguin, Oriente Prov, Cuba

US Cit 1955 (Nat) 7832636, A[illegible]
24 June 59

Educ. Coral Gables

OC: Businessman - Contractor
American Intl Consultants (Co)

SD: U.S. Export - Pharmaceuticals
C.A.; Vol (OE-324/23116-76)

OS # 679245

FBI - NR
OSI - 6 yrs 56-62 in US AF

Came Sept 55 to join
Ernesto Dieguez

1958
Jaime Rivero, NYC
Lydia Santiago, NYC
Gilberto Cuate NYC
Joaquin B[illegible] NYC
Avelino Martinez NYC
Marino Argote NYC

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

13-2

PAGE OF PAGES
1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
242324Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
875121

CONF: LA6 INFO: FILE SECUR 3, C/OPS, DCI/AA

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 4

TO: CARACAS. Y

ADMIN SECUR Y

REF: CARACAS 30169 (IN 959929) Y

1. SUGGEST YOU COUNSEL WKSCARLET-3 THAT IF NEITHER HE NOR HIS WIFE HAVE ENTERED THE U.S. WITHIN THE PERIOD WHEN THEIR ALIEN RE-ENTRY PERMITS WERE VALID, AND IF THEY DESIRE TO RETAIN THEIR STATUS AS PERMANENT-RESIDENT ALIENS (PRA), THEY MUST MAKE APPLICATIONS FOR RETURNING RESIDENT VISAS WITH THE CARACAS CONSULATE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE VISAS WILL BE ISSUED, SINCE ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO QUOTA NUMBER INVOLVED, THE PROCESSING IS THE SAME AS ANY OTHER IMMIGRANT VISA, WITH THE CONSULAR OFFICER HAVING THE SOLE AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE DETERMINATION AS TO ELIGIBILITY. IF THEY APPLY SOLELY FOR A TOURIST VISA IN THEIR VENEZUELAN PASSPORT, THEY COULD LOSE THEIR PRA STATUS, SINCE APPLYING FOR A TOURIST VISA IS PRIMA FACIA EVIDENCE OF [redacted] ABANDONMENT OF PRA STATUS. IF THEY OBTAIN RETURNING RESIDENT VISAS, THEY SHOULD BE ADVISED TO OBTAIN NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS WHILE IN U.S. Y

2. NO HQS OBJECTION TO ASSIST WKSCARLET-3 OBTAIN VISAS LOCALLY,

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

WKSCARLET-3.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

875121

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

IF YOU FORESEE NO SECURITY PROBLEMS. WKSCARLET-3 IS NOT WATCH-LISTED BY INS. V

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPD ET.A

COMMENT: WKSCARLET-3 DESIRES VISIT US FOR VACATION. ALIEN RE-ENTRY PERMIT HAS EXPIRED, BUT HE HAS VALID VENEZUELAN PASSPORT. STATION ASKED IF COULD ASSIST LOCALLY IN OBTAINING VISA. WHEN RECRUITED AGENT, HQS WOULD HANDLE HIS RE-ENTRY PERMITS, BUT AFTER TERMINATION IT WAS SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF WKSCARLET-3

COORD:

DEF/AA - FRED BUCCI (DRAFT)

LA/SS/SEC ✓

DATE: 24 JUNE 76
ORIG: ROBERT W. ANDREWS
UNIT: C/LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1715

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 3 PER

TOTAL COPIES 132 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT LA6

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR SECWR3 OGE/MA

9ds

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 022071 EIA332 PAGE 01 IN 959929

TOR:2320552 JUN 76 CARA 30169

SECRET 232041Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 30169

TO: DIRECTOR.

ADMIN SECUR

WKSCARLET-3/201

REF: DIRECTOR 538768

1. WKSCARLET-3 PLANS FAMILY VACATION TRAVEL TO CONUS DURING JULY 1976 AND HAS REQUESTED STATION ASSISTANCE OBTAINING VISAS FOR SELF AND FAMILY MEMBERS.

2. WKSCARLET-3 HAS SURRENDERED FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS TO STATION:

A. HIS OWN ALIEN RE-ENTRY PERMIT A12 419 708 WHICH EXPIRED 30 MAY 1975.

B. HIS AND HIS WIFE'S (A12 443 942) ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARDS FORM 1-151.

C. VENEZUELAN PASSPORT V5304069 WHICH INCORRECTLY RELFECTS POB AS CARACAS AND CONTAINS U.S. B-2 NIV VISA.

3. WKSCARLET-3 HAS PRESENTED VALID VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS REFLECTING CORRECT DPOB FOR SELF, WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS ASCERTAIN W-3 NOT WATCHLISTED BY INS, AND YOUR CONCURRENCE TO LOCALLY ASSIST SUBJECT

SECRET

7-71 MPG 2/70

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY_____ PER_____ TOTAL COPIES 16 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED_____

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED_____ BY_____ AT_____ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF, FILE, VR,
ACTION #		

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 022071 EIA332 PAGE 02-02 IN 959929

TOR:2320552 JUN 76 CARA 30169

OBTAIN VISAS.

4. FILE: 201-0300985, E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

QMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 082231Z DIRECTOR 866185

CONF LA 5 INFO: FILE (P/AN,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 22
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER Sop
0 IP FILES # 111

TO: CARACAS. Y

KMSTONE TRACE Y

REF: CARACAS 29953 [IN 939164] Y

1. NO IDENTIFIABLE HQS TRACES ON SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ MENTIONED REF. REVIEW OF THE ZZ TRAVEL LISTINGS BSHOW SEVERAL PERSONS WITH SAME NAME, OR SLIGHT VARIATIONS, AS TRAVELLING ON OFFICIAL PASSPORTS. NO INFORMATION OTHER THAN TRAVEL IS AVAILABLE.Y

2. THE OFFICIAL 201 ON SANTIAGO DIAZ PAZ (201-0801134) DOES NOT SHOW SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ AS AN ALIAS USED BY HIM. Y

3. FILE: 201-0801134; 201-0832894S; 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: STATION REQUESTED TRACES ON SUBJECT WHO CAME TO CARACAS TO INVESTIGATE DISCLOSURES OF CUBANS IN LOCAL CARACAS PRESS.

COORD:

LA/COG

DATE: 8 JUNE 76
ORIG: CATHY LEE WARD
UNIT: LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1715

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
300985
DO NOT DESTROY

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ~~Q~~ PER TOTAL COPIES 8-2 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

LA 5

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 968054 EIA727 PAGE 01 IN 939164

TOR:031144Z JUN 76 CARA 29953

S E C R E T 022051Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29953

TO: DIRECTOR,

REAM TRACE

REF HVCA 20587, 27 MAY 1976

1. DAO COLONEL ROACH TOLD COS ON 1 JUNE THAT AN UNIDENTIFIED DAO CONTACT CLAIMS TO HAVE BUG(NOW INACTIVE DUE BATTERY FAILURE) IN APARTMENT OF SLFAT-1. ROACH TOLD THAT, BEFORE FAILING, BUG REVEALED THAT ONE SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ HAD COME TO CARACAS TO INVESTIGATE DISCLOSURES OF CUBANS IN LOCAL CARACAS PRSS.

2. CARACAS HAS NO SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ LISTED IN CUBAN MACHINE RUNS BUT REF, PARA 2A NOTES ONE SANTIAGO DIAZ ARRIVED CARACAS 13 MAY 1976 FROM MEXICO TO SEE CUBAN AMBASSADOR HERNANDEZ. CUBAN MACHINE RUNS ON A SANTIAGO DIAZ PAZ (201-0801134) LIST HIM AS DGI OFFICER WHO HAS SERVED IN LONDON, LIMA AND GENEVA. REQUEST HQS TRACES SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ.

3. STATION SUSPECTS ROACH'S SOURCE IS WKSCARLET-3 WHO HAS LATELY BEEN ACTIVE IN A PRIVATE INVESTIGATIONS

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 968054 EIA727 PAGE 02-02 IN 939164

TOR:031144Z JUN 76 CARA 29953

COMPANY WITH SUBSTANTIAL MONETARY BACKING. STATION PLANS REACTIVATE CONTACT WITH WKSCARLET-3, WHICH PREVIOUSLY DROPPED DUE SECURITY REASONS, AND INVESTIGATE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF ANTI-CUBAN OPERATIONS IN VENEZUELA.

4. FILE: 201-0801134; 201-0328945; 201-0300985.

E 2, IMPDET.

SECRET

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER TOTAL COPIES 30 2 BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT SE8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR LA7, SSY, AAN, CA

OSG/IC, C/OB R/EGR

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 934.55 EIA556 PAGE 01 IN 926731

TOR:221357Z MAY 76 CARA 29853

S E C R E T 221336Z ~~MAY 76~~ STAFF

TOO MANY ACTION INDICATORS
SEE HHB 80-1 A DOI 10-10

CITE CARACAS 29853

TO: DIRECTOR.

WKSCARLET-3(001)

REAM CKTOP SGCHART

REF: CARACAS 29794 (IN 916831)

1. 19 MAY "EL UNIVERSAL" ARTICLE WITH "NUEVA PRENSA LATINOAMERICANA" AND FELIX MARTINEZ SUAREZ BYLINE "KGB Y DGI OPERAN EN UN EDIFICIO CERCAN A LA EMBAJADA CASTRISTA" LISTS SLFAT-1 AS THE DGI HEAD IN CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS. ARTICLE CLAIMS SAME UNIDENTIFIED SOURCE AS REF ARTICLE AND SAYS SLFAT-1 IS INTERNATIONAL "KEY MAN". ARTICLE CONTAINS PASSPORT PICTURE OF SLFAT-1 AND PURPORTED CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPH OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR KASIMIROV, CUBAN AMBASSADOR HERNANDEZ, CUBAN PRESS ATTACHE GOMEZ, FORMER SOVIET MINISTER COUNSELOR KAZANTSEV, SLTAUNT1 AND LUIS LAZO OF "PRENSA LATINA" MEETING IN SLFAT-1'S APARTMENT NEAR THE CUBAN EMBASSY.

2. PHOTOGRAPH NOTED ABOVE IS COPY OF PHOTO THAT DAO COLONEL ROACH OBTAINED LAST WEEK FROM UNIDENTIFIED MEMBER OF WKSCARLET-3'S INVESTIGATIONS GROUP. APPARENTLY WKSCARLET-3, OR, MORE LIKELY, ONE OF HIS SUBORDINATES, IS MARTINEZ'S SOURCE

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF . FILE . VR .

ACTION #

T 934055 EIA556 PAGE 02-02 IN 926731

TOR:201357Z MAY 76 CARA 29853

FOR CUBAN INFORMATION.

3. ARTICLE GOES ON TO CALL THE LETTER BOMBS THAT THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND "EROTUR" RECEIVED RECENTLY AS A DISINFORMATION PLOY BY CUBANS. ALSO LISTS AN "OPERATION CANAL" (PANAMA) AS A PLAN TO MOVE VENEZUELA AWAY FROM THE US IN WHICH SOVIET UNION IS ALSO INVOLVED. ARTICLE SAYS THAT CUBANS ARE MOBILIZING "PRENSA LATINA" NOW TO INFLUENCE VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS ON 1978 AND AGAIN NAMES SOVIET AMBASSADOR AS KGB HEAD IN VENEZUELA.

4. STATION POUCHING COPY OF ARTICLE TO HQS.

5. FILE: 75-120-28; 201-0294757. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 15 PER LA#6 TOTAL COPIES 97.2 RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/LA15

ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR C/CI/INT, D/SECUR3, C/CS/IP, C/OPS/PROY, C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/IP, C/DIVD 2, C/CI4, C/PS/EG2, C/OSC/IC, C/SS3

T 719245 EIA237 PAGE 01 IN 841160

TOR:280042Z FEB 76 SJOS 19265

S E C R E T 280020Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19265

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: DIRECTOR 814328

1. FOLLOWING ARE PERTINENT QUOTES FROM EXCELSIOR ARTICLE RE PASCAL:

SIXTH PARAGRAPH: "BOSCH, ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES ARRIVED HERE WITH A PASSPORT, PRESUMED TO BE CHILEAN, TO PREPARE A PLOT AGAINST THE LEADER OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), PASCAL ALLENDE".

ELEVENTH (AND FINAL) PARAGRAPH: "THE REVELATION THAT BOSCH HAD ENTERED THE COUNTRY WITH A CHILEAN PASSPORT, APPARENTLY CONFIRMED BY THE RESPONSE OF THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY TO THE SUPREME COURT, WOULD CONFIRM THE THESIS THAT HE CAME HERE WITH INTENTION OF PARTICIPATING IN A PLOT AGAINST PASCAL ALLENDE, POLITICAL SOURCES SAID YESTERDAY".

2. STATION UNWARE ORIGIN EXCELSIOR CONNECTION OF BOSCH WITH PLOT AGAINST PASCAL. SPECULATE THAT SOURCE WAS PROABLY SOMEONE IN LOCAL SECURITY STRUCTURE. CAN EXPLORE WITH HUFABRIC IF THIS

SECRET

C/LA/CW – Talked with DC/CAM today and agreed that para 2 could be answered on Monday, with a let's not. Bill

C/LA/NW/V – Bob [illegible] suggested Galloway [illegible]. Suggest this [illegible] traffic be reclassified [illegible] 2011

Copy of [illegible] traffic [illegible] put in SCAMLET-3/701

let's not

W/C SCAMLET-3/701

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________ /

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	I N F O	RF FILE VR		1		4	
				2		5	
ACTION #				3		6	

T 719245 EIA237 PAGE 02-02 IN 841160

TOR:280042Z FEB 76 SJOS 1V265

DESIRED.

3. BASED STATION KNOWLEDGE THAT HUFABRIC AWARE BOSCH BACKGROUND OF BOMBINGS AND POSSIBLE THREAT TO SECRETARY KISSINGER DURING VISIT, PLUS HUFABRIC KNOWLEDGE THAT PASCAL LIFE MIGHT BE THREATENED, HUFABRIC OR OTHERS COULD HAVE PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER. HUFABRIC CONCERNED FROM ARRIVAL PASCAL HERE ON 2 FEBRUARY THAT SOMEONE MIGHT WISH TO ELIMINATE HIM. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ~~PA~~ PER TOTAL COPIES 19-1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/LA7

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR C/PLAN, C/CI-4, C/PS/EG 2, C/OSG, C/OS

T 882457 EIA204 PAGE 01 IN 906597

TOR:302255Z APR 76 SJOS 19491

S E C R E T 302237Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19491

TO: SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR, CARACAS, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17347 (906509)

1. ON 28 APRIL HUGALLY-1 INFORMED COS THAT COSTA RICAN AMBASSADOR IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (CALLEJAS WHO HUGALLY-1 LABELED AS FIGUERES MAN) ARRANGED FOR ENTRY OF DR. ORLANDO BOSCH INTO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. NO DATES MENTIONED AND NO OTHER DETAILS.

2. FYI WE KNOW FROM LOCAL HUFABRIC LIAISON THAT BOSCH WAS ESCORTED/DEPORTED TO NICARAGUA BY OVERLAND ROUTE ON 26 MARCH 1976. LOCAL PRESS 27 MARCH SPECULATED THAT BOSCH DEPORTED TO OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

LA/FNC/V

RECORD COPY

30 Apr 76

S E C R E T

201-300985

D 201-299292

OUTGOING MESSAGE

2-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET R

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 302054Z
DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 830740

CONF: LA 5 INFO: FILE IP/AN

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 30
111
RCB

TO: LA/MIAMI INFO BOGOTA, ~~INFO~~ CARACAS.Y

MHABYSS TRACE Y

REF: LA/MIAMI 24521 (IN 869006*) (NOT NEEDED CARACAS) Y

1. DEA/MIAMI MAY BE INFORMED THAT OUR RECORDS SHOW NIEVES ELINA GONZALEZ DE POSADA TO BE THE WIFE OF LUIS POSADA CARRILES (IDEN), SUBJECT OF 201-0300985, WHO IS KNOWN TO DEA/MIAMI. THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON GONZALEZ.Y

2. NO HQS TRACES GABRIEL CORREA ECHAVARRIA.Y

3. FOR CARACAS: DEA REQUESTED TRACES ON GONZALEZ AND CORREA WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN COCAINE SMUGGLING FROM COLOMBIA. Y

4. FILE: 201-0300985; 200-11-11/14. E2 IMPDET.H

*DEA/MIAMI REQUESTED TRACES ON GONZALEZ AND CORREA, WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN COCAINE SMUGGLING FROM COLOMBIA.

C/LA/NW

DDO/NARCOG L.H. PIPER (TELECOORD)

30 Mar 76

201-300985

DATE: 29 MAR 76
ORIG: P. BELLAMY
UNIT: LA/CAR/CARI
EXT: 1956

RECORD COPY

C/LA/
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

D 200-11-11/14

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012933

OUTGOING MESSAGE

7-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

R

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — DATE TIME GROUP — CITE — MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 302054Z DIRECTOR 830741

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: J
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER 601
0 IP FILES # 111 . RCS

CONF: LA 5 INFO: FILE IP/AN

TO: LA/MIAMI INFO BOGOTA, ~~INFO~~ CARACAS.Y

MHABYSS TRACE Y

REF: DIRECTOR 830740

1. IDENTITY IS WKSCARLET-3, FORMER CARACAS STATION AGENT WITH WHOM STATION STILL MAINTAINS OCCASIONAL CONTACT. PER WH/MIAMI 20657, 10 JANUARY 74, AND EARLIER TRAFFIC, DEA/MIAMI IS AWARE OF AGENCY ASSOCIATION WITH WKSCARLET-3.

2. FILE: 201-0300985; 200-11-11/00014. E2 IMPDET.H

adg

IP,[illegible]	☒	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP [illegible]		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP [illegible]		CONT. NO. (2, 3)
		[illegible]
		CABLE REF (11)
		[illegible] (2)
IP [illegible]		FOR FILING

C/LA/NW

DDO/NARCOG L.H. PIPER (TELECOORD)

DATE: 29 MAR 76
ORIG: PAT BELLAMY
UNIT: LA/CAR/CARI
EXT: 1956

30 Mar 76

201-300985

RECORD COPY

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

D 200-11-11/14

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012913

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER SOP 111 TOTAL COPIES 8-1 RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT LAS

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR. IA/AN

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 787270 EIA573 PAGE 01-01 IN 869086

TOR:2515362 MAR 76 LNIM 24521

S E C R E T 2515302 MAR 76 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 24521

TO: DIRECTOR, BOGOTA.

MHABYSS TRACE

1. DEA/MIAMI REQUESTS TRACES ON FOLLOWING TWO PERSONS, INCLUDING ANY PAST BKHERALD AFFILIATION. BOTH ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN COCAINE SMUGGLING FROM COLOMBIA. NO STATION TRACES.

A. GABRIEL CORREA ECHAVARRIA, BORN 20 OCTOBER 1943, PROBABLY IN COLOMBIA.

B. and NIEVES ELINA GONZALEZ DE POSADA, BORN 12 DECEMBER 1935 IN CUBA.

2. FILE: 200-11-11/14. E2, IMPDET.

P,300		[illegible] PROGRAM	
		[illegible]	
		[illegible]	
[illegible]		PREPARE FOR FILMING	
P,303		[illegible] (2, 3)	
		[illegible]	
		[illegible] (4)	
		[illegible] (5)	
[illegible]		[illegible]	

alg

NO TRACES PER BOGO-27937 25 Mar 76

RECORD COPY

25 Mar 76

SECRET

201-300985

D 200-11-11/14

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO	OCI		PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1		1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	012138Z	DIRECTOR	815256

CONF: 1/LA-4 INFO: FILE [illegible] 2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 9
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: SAN JOSE INFO CARACAS.

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 814328

B. SAN JOSE 19265 (IN 841160)

1. PREFER THAT STATION NOT REPEAT NOT EXPLORE REF MATTER WITH HUFABRIC. HEADQUARTERS AND CARACAS REMAIN INTERESTED, HOWEVER, IN ANY INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER WHICH OTHERWISE COMES TO YOUR ATTENTION.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

DM

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
IP/EDI	☒	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/CRY		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/MB		[illegible]
IP/PRU		FILMING

LA/NW/1

LA/COMMENT: REF A. IS STATION AWARE ORIGIN GOCR/"EXCELSIOR" KNOWLEDGE OR PRESUMPTION THAT BOSCH INVOLVED IN PLOT AGAINST CHILEAN ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE?

REF B. UNAWARE ORIGIN. SPECULATE SOURCE PROBABLY A COSTA RICAN SECURITY OFFICIAL. CAN EXPLORE WITH HUFABRIC IF DESIRED.

DATE: 1 MARCH 1976
ORIG: ROBERT GULLO:PDL
UNIT: LA/CAM/CRH
EXT: 1946

1 Mar 76
201-300985

RECORD COPY

DC/LA/NW W. DEVINE (TELECOORD)

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAM
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

S E C R E T

14-00000

FORM 3020b
7-73 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER LA/C 6 TOTAL COPIES 35-1 RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/LA 15

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/OPS/INT D/SECUR 3
C/LSN/ID, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DIV 2
C/CI 4, C/PS/EG 2, C/OPS/ITG 2 C/PLAN

T 723980 EIA633 PAGE 01 IN 842949

TOR:012217Z MAR 76 SJOS 19272

S E C R E T 012158Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19272

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: SAN JOSE 19265 (IN 841160)

1. UPON RECEIPT OF DIRECTOR 810829 STATION CONTACTED HUFABRIC (HUGLIB-8) TO ADVISE OF A POSSIBLE THREAT AGAINST THE LIFE OF PASCAL ALLENDE, AS INSTRUCTED BY HEADQUARTERS. HUGLIB-8 SAID THE SAME INFORMATION HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GONZALO FACIO FROM THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT; FACIO HAD ALREADY PASSED THE INFORMATION TO THE HUFABRICS. PRIOR TO HUGLIB-8'S RECEIPT OF THE INFORMATION FROM THE STATION HE HAD ALREADY PERSONALLY VISITED ALLENDE TO WARN HIM OF THE THREAT.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

WK SCARCEF 3/701

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

36-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 272142Z DIRECTOR 814328

CONF: C/LA15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECUR 3, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/ITG 4, C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DWD 3, C/CI 4, C/PS/EG 2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER LA

0 # 6

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS.Y

RYBAT VULOFTY Y

WKSCARLET-3 201

REF: SAN JOSE 19260 |IN 839451| {RELAYED TO CARACAS}Y

1. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER REF "EXCELSIOR" ARTICLE CONTAINS ATTRIBUTION FOR ALLEGATION THAT BOSCH INVOLVED IN PLOT AGAINST ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. IS STATION AWARE OF ORIGIN OF "EXCELSIOR" OR GOCR KNOWLEDGE/PRESUMPTION THAT BOSCH PRESENCE IN COSTA RICA POSSIBLY CONNECTED WITH PLOT AGAINST PASCAL? Y

2. HQS HAS ADVISED SAIC MASTROVITO OF SUBSTANCE REF. MASTROVITO REPORTS THAT SUBJECT OF PASCAL NEVER BROUGHT UP EITHER BY HIM, BY BOSCH OR BY HUFABRICS.Y

3. PLEASE KEEP CARACAS ADVISED OF ALL FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS MATTER. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: SAN JOSE DAILY "EXCELSIOR" CARRIES 26 FEB ARTICLE THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, IN JAIL IN COSTA RICA, WAS INTERROGATED BY NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AGENT. ARTICLE ALSO REPORTS ALLEGATION BOSCH CONNECTED WITH PLOT AGAINST CHILEAN ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, CURRENTLY IN COSTA RICA.

NOTE: U.S. OFFICIAL WHO INTERVIEWED BOSCH WAS SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

DC/LA/NW - WILLIAM DEVINE {DRAFT}
{FOR} C/TFK - LEHMAN SMITH {TELECOORD}
OPS/LSN/ID - CURTIS GLENN {TELECOORD}

DATE: 27 FEB 76
ORIG: ROBERT GULLO:ME
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1966

RLConolly
for C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/BCAM
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

SECRET

2-71 MFG. 10/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER C/x TOTAL COPIES 312 ... BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/LA15

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

T 715098 EIA158 PAGE 01 IN 839451

TOR:261806Z FEB 76 SJOS 19260

S E C R E T 261724Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19260

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT VHLOFTY

REF: SAN JOSE 19240 (831824)

1. Relay to Caracas. Priority

2. Question for SS [illegible]

3. [illegible] - picked up in US press.

[illegible] (Caracas)

1. POLICE AND JUDICIAL PAGE OF LOCAL DAILY "EXCELSIOR" ON 26 FEBRUARY 1976 CARRIED ARTICLE ENTITLED "BOSCH WAS INTERROGATED BY A U.S. AGENT: WHO ARRIVED IN THE COUNTRY WITH KISSINGER." ARTICLE STATES THAT BOSCH WAS VERY DISPLEASED THAT A NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AGENT WHO ARRIVED WITH A DELEGATION THAT ACCOMPANIED KISSINGER HAD INTERROGATED HIM IN A COSTA RICAN JAIL. ARTICLE FURTHER STATES THAT BOSCH SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT ANY COSTA RICAN POLICE OR SECURITY AGENT WOULD INTERVIEW HIM BUT COULD NOT ACEPT accept THE FACT THAT AN AMERICAN AGENT WOULD INTRODUCE HIMSELF INTO THE COSTA RICAN POLICE SYSTEM TO INTERROGATE HIM. ARTICLE FURTHER MENTIONS THAT BOSCH ENTERED WITH ILLEGAL CHILEAN PASSPORT AND ALLEGEDLY CAME HERE IN CONNECTION WITH A PLOT AGAINST ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. POUCHING ARTICLE.

Copy [illegible]

SS [illegible]

2. PLEASE PASS ABOVE TO SAIC MASTROVITO OF THE

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO

RF, FILE VR,

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 715098 EIA158 PAGE 02-02 IN 839451

TOR:261806Z FEB 76 SJOS 19260

SECRET SERVICE.

3. ACCORDING TO HUFABRIC-14 ON 26 FEBRUARY, NO DECISION YET BEEN MADE CONCERNING BOSCH. ON POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE RELEASED AND REMAIN IN COSTA RICA AND THE OTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE DEPORTED.

4. FILE: 201 BOSCH. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 6 PER LA 6 TOTAL COPIES 33-2 RUN BY 2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED LA BY ✓ AT 1315 Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/LA 15

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/OPS/WT, D/SECURITY C/LSN/IO, C/OPS/ITG 5, C/IP/AN, ODD ODD/OO, C/OIV 02

T 707900 EIA128 PAGE 01 IN 836288

TOR:241308Z FEB 76 BUEN 35669

S E C R E T 241300Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 35669

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, CARACAS.

R Y B A T VWLOFTY

6

WKSCARLET-3 201

REFS: A. CARACAS 29162 (IN 834939)

B. SAN JOSE 19250 (IN 434109)

C. BUENOS AIRES 35629 (IN 831978)

1. ON 23 FEBRUARY WE ADVISED WKSCARLET-3 OF CIRCUMSTANCES BOSCH'S ARREST PER REF B. WKSCARLET-3 SOMEWHAT RELIEVED BUT CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL FOR HIS PERSONAL SECURITY TO CONTINUE VISIT SAN JOSE AND ATTEMPT CONTACT BOSCH AT JARDINES DE CASCATAL AS IF HE UNAWARE BOSCH ARREST. ALSO FOR COVER PURPOSES, BEFORE LEAVING BUENOS AIRES, WKSCARLET-3 WILL ATTEMPT ADVISE BOSCH OF HIS (WKSCARLET-3'S) ARRIVAL IN SAN JOSE BY TELEPHONE CALL AND WILL FOLLOW UP WITH TELEGRAM. WKSCARLET-3 CONSIDERS POTENTIAL RISK TO HIM FROM CUBAN EXILES SUFFICIENTLY HIGH THAT HE MUST VISIT BOSCH IN JAIL, IF LATTER HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED WHEN WKSCARLET-3 ARRIVES SAN JOSE ON 27 FEBRUARY.

2. WKSCARLET-3 REPORTED HE WAS CALLED FROM MANAGUA EARLY MORNING 23 FEBRUARY BUT WAS NOT AT HOTEL TO RECEIVE CALL WHICH HE

SECRET

14-00000

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO — RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 707900 EIA128 PAGE 02-02 IN 836288

TOR:241308Z FEB 76 BUEN 35669

BELIEVES COULD ONLY HAVE COME FROM FRANK CASTRO. IF SAN JOSE WANTS CONTACT WITH WKSCARLET-3, PLS PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE 26 FEBRUARY. WKSCARLET-3 WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY WKSCARLET-1 AND WILL STAY AT WHATEVER IS "BEST" HOTEL IN SAN JOSE.

3. FILE: 201-0931810, E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 371

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	231840Z	DIRECTOR	811488

CONF: C/LA 15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECURY, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/ITG 5, C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DCI/D2, C/CI 4, C/OSG

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX 0 RETURN TO PER LA 0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 45

TRAVEL PROGRAM

IP/I 6X

IP/CRV

IP/MB

IP/CWO

LA/NW/V

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS.

RYBAT VULOFTY

REFS: A. SAN JOSE 19250 (IN 834109)

B. BUENOS AIRES 35654 (IN 834057)

1. WKSCARLET-1 AND WKSCARLET-3 ARE PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS WORKING FOR PROMINENT VENEZUELAN WHOSE NAME WAS USED IN RETURN ADDRESS ON LETTER BOMB SENT TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN VENEZUELA IN LATE 1975. W-1 AND W-3 HAVE BEEN COMMISSIONED TO DETERMINE AUTHORSHIP OF LETTER BOMB, AND WHETHER IT WAS CUBAN EXILE EFFORT. W-1 AND W-3 TRAVELS ARE RELATED TO INVESTIGATION. INCLUSION OF SAN JOSE ON ITINERARY DUE TO PRESENCE THERE OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, WHOM THEY PLAN "INTERVIEW" IN CONNECTION WITH LETTER BOMB.

2. IN ORDER TO APPEAR UNWITTING OF BOSCH ARREST IN COSTA RICA, PER REF B W-3 STILL PLANNING DEPART BUENOS AIRES FOR SAN JOSE ON ABOUT 26 FEBRUARY.

3. FILE: 201-0931810; 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: A. ASKS PURPOSE OF W-3 VISIT TO COSTA RICA
B. W-3 ADVISED OF BOSCH ARREST; STILL PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO COSTA RICA

B-201-[illegible]549
B-201-299292

DATE: 23 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: ROBERT GULLO:SA
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1946

C/LA/CAM P. [illegible]
C/LA/NW
AC/LA/SB W. A. Cantrell
COORDINATING OFFICERS

23 Feb 76
201-300985

Robert Gruff
C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/TFK
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER

TOTAL COPIES 16

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT CLA7

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR [illegible]

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 704858 EIA150 PAGE 01-01 IN 834939

TOR:231420Z FEB 76 CARA 29162

S E C R E T 231408Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29162

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO DIRECTOR, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT

REFS: A. SAN JOSE 19250 (IN 834109)

B. CARACAS 29063 (BEING RETRANSMITTED SAN JOSE) (IN 824723)

1. PURPOSE WKSCARLET-3 TRAVEL SAN JOSE REPORTED REF B: WKSCARLET-3 THOUGHT BOSCH WAS IN SANTIAGO BUT LATER DETERMINED HE WAS IN SAN JOSE. SINCE BOSCH NOW UNDER ARREST, WKSCARLET-3 MOST LIKELY CONTINUING TRAVEL PLANS FOR COVER PURPOSES WITH WKSCARLET-1 AND TO TRY DETERMINE WHETHER HE HAS NOW BECOME TARGET OF CUBAN EXILE EXTREMISTS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

SECRET

BR

IP/DCI		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
	☒	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/CR/V		PREPARE FOR FILMING	
IP/MB		CODE NO. (2, 3)	
		RYBAT REST. CODE	
		CABLE WKN (11)	
		NFO (8)	
IP/CRO		FOR FILING	
LH	NW	✓	

23 Feb 76

201-300985

14-00000

FORM 3020
7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER LA#6 TOTAL COPIES 39-2 RUN BY 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/LA15

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/OPS/INT, DKELORY, C/ISM/ID, C/OPS/ITGS, C/IPLAN, DDO, DDO/DD, C/DIVD2, C/OSG, C/CI4, C/PS/EG2,

T 702789 EIA118 PAGE 01 IN 834109

TOR:2122142 FEB 76 SJOS 19250

S E C R E T 2121232 FEB 76 STAFF

Let's leave it up to WKSCARLET 3

CITE SAN JOSE 19250

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ~~CARACAS~~.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: BUENOS AIRES 35654 (C 834057)

1. TELL WKSCARLET-3 THAT, BASED ON INFO PASSED TO LIAISON BY FBI, BOSCH HAS BEEN TARGET OF INTEREST TO LOCAL LIAISON FOR ABOUT ONE YEAR. LIAISON AWARE OF BOSCH BOMBING BACKGROUND AND THEIR INTEREST IN HIM INCREASED AS RESULT SERIES LOCAL BOMBINGS AND IMMINENT VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. THROUGH THEIR INFORMANTS THEY LEARNED THAT BOSCH GETTING SUPPORT LOCALLY (HOUSING, ETC); THAT HE USING NAME CONRADO CORTEZ OR CORTES,HRND, IN EARLY FEBRUARY, THAT HE KNOWN TO BE USING A CHILEAN PASSPORT IN ANOTHER NAME. IN LATE JANUARY THEY PINPOINTED NEIGHBORHOOD IN WHICH HE WAS LIVING AND BEGAN INTENSIVE SEARCH (THEY ALSO HAD REPORTS OF HIS PRESENCE IN DOWNTOWN AREA). THROUGH POSTAL AUTHORITIES AND OTHER LOCAL SOURCES THEY PINPOINTED THE EXACT LOCATION OF HIS HOUSE IN JARDINES DE CASCAJAL AND ARRESTED HIM (THIS DONE BEFORE SAN JOSE STATION WAS ADVISED BY W-3 VIA BUENOS AIRES AS TO HIS EXACT LOCATION). ALL ABOVE CAN BE PASSED TO W-3 AND HE SHOULD

SECRET

WKSCARLET-3
201

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 702789 EIA118 PAGE 02-02 IN 834189

TOR:2122142 FEB 76 SJOS 19250

ALSO BE CLEARLY TOLD HIS INFO DID NOT RESULT IN BOSCH ARREST.

2. RE CONTACT WITH CASTRO IN SAN JOSE, WE CAN ONLY SAY THE FOLLOWING:

A. WE HAVE NEVER DISCUSSED OR MENTIONED CASTRO WITH LIAISON, SO WE DO NOT KNOW IF THEY EVEN AWARE HIS EXISTANCE, HIS BACKGROUND, HIS INTENTIONS, OR THAT HE IN COSTA RICA.

B. IF THEY ARE AWARE OF CASTRO'S PRESENCE HERE, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT THEY MIGHT PICK HIM UP TOO. THAT BEING CASE, W-3 COULD ALSO BE PICKED UP (WHICH AGAIN RAISES QUESTION OF PURPOSE WKSCARLET-1 AND 3 VISIT TO COSTA RICA).

3. FILE: 201- BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

1-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 1 PER LA/H5 TOTAL COPIES 33-2 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA BY: /m AT 1645 Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT LA-15

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR c/OPS/INT D/SEC/R 4 dir/an

desn/ID c/OPS/ITC 5 DDO DDO/ID

c/DIVD-2

T 782450 EIA792 PAGE 01 IN 834057

TOR:211635Z FEB 76 BUEN 35654

S E C R E T 211615Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 35654

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, CARACAS.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

Q B

Comm: WKSCARLET-3/wi

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 810006

B. SAN JOSE 19243 (IN 832155)

C. SAN JOSE 19241 (IN 831949)

1. ON 20 FEBRUARY WE INFORMED WKSCARLET-3 OF BOSCH'S ARREST EMPHASIZING THAT ARREST NOT BASED ANY INFO FROM WKSCARLET-3. REGDARLESS, LATTER WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT BOSCH MOST LIKELY CONSIDERS HE HAS BEEN BETRAYED BY WKSCARLET-3 (NOTE PER PARA 1.C OF REF C, BOSCH WAS APPREHENDED AT SAME ADDRESS HE HAD GOVEN TO WKSCARLET-3 FOR CONTACT IN SAN JOSE). TO BETTER ASSESS EXTENT HIS RISK AND PLAN HIS FUTURE MOVES WITH BOSCH, WKSCARLET-3 HAS REQUESTED WE EXPLAIN CIRCUMSTANCES AND EVENT SURROUNDING BOSCH'S ARREST. BELIEVE ESSENCE OF REF C WOULD SUFFICE AND ALSO HELP CONVINCE WKSCARLET-3 THAT WE DID NOT PASS HIS INFO TO LIAISON FOR BOSCH ARREST. REQUEST SAN JOSE GUIDELINES ON PORTIONS REF C WE CAN PASS WKSCARLET-3.

2. WKSCARLET-3 HAS ALSO ASKED FOR OUR ASSESSMENT OF RISK

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO: RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 722452 EIA792 PAGE 02-02 IN 834057

TOR:2116352 FEB 76 BUEN 35654

TO HIM IN CONTACT WITH FRANK CASTRO IN SAN JOSE. WKSCARLET-3 FEARS CASTRO MAY BE UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY AUTHORITIES IN WHICH CASE WKSCARLET-3 WILL ATTEMPT AVOID CONTACT WITH HIM IN SAN JOSE. WKSCARLET-3 STILL PLANNING DEPART BUENOS AIRES FOR SAN JOSE ON/ABOUT 26 FEBRUARY.

3. FILE: 201-0931810. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 3020
7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY Q PER CA 6 TOTAL COPIES 5/6 RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY BD AT 0040 Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/LA-15

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR 200, 200/00, C/[illegible]-2, [illegible], C/[illegible], [illegible]-4, C/[illegible], C/[illegible]-5, C/[illegible], C/[illegible]-2)

T 697540 EIA005 PAGE 01 IN 832155

TOR:2001202 FEB 76 SJOS 19243

S E C R E T 2000092 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19243

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, DIRECTOR, CARACAS.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: CARACAS 35629 *

1. WE BELIEVE WKSCARLET-3 SHOULD BE INFORMED OF BOSCH DETENTION SOONEST. W-3 SHOULD ALSO BE ~~ADVISAD~~ ADVISED THAT HOUSE WHERE BOSCH ARRESTED HERE IS SAME ADDRESS AS THAT PROVIDED BY W-3 PER REF PARA ONE.

2. PLS ADVISE IF W-3 STILL INTENDS COME SAN JOSE DESPITE ARREST OF BOSCH. BOSCH MAY ALSO BE EXPELLED FROM COSTA RICA PRIOR ARRIVAL W-3 ON 26 FEBRUARY. IF YES, REASON FOR VISIT WILL ENABLE SAN JOSE DECIDE IF CONTACT WITH W-3 HERE DESIRABLE.

3. FILE: 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET

* PORTION SVCD'

Dm

TRAVEL PROGRAM

IP, EDI ☒

IP, CR

IP, MB

(2, 3)

(11)

RECORD COPY

SECRET

B-201-299292

20 Feb 76
201-300985

39-3

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1

SECRET

STAFF 2000032 DIRECTOR 810006

CONF: C/LA 15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECUR 4, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/ITGS, C/IP/AN, DDO, C/IS/CG 2, DDO/DD, C/DIVD 2, C/CI 4, C/OS 6 0 0 0 DISSEM BY: 45 PER LA #6

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, ROUTINE SANTIAGO.

RYBAT VULOFTY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 808822

B. CARACAS 29129 (IN 830506)

C. SAN JOSE 19235 (IN 830494)

D. CARACAS 29135 (IN 830540)

E. SAN JOSE 19237 (IN 830647)

Copy: UKSCARLET-3/201

1. SHARE CARACAS CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF UKSCARLET-3 IF INFO HE RECEIVED FROM CUBAN EXILE SOURCES AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED TO BKHERALD IS REVEALED TO LIAISON SERVICES IN CARACAS AND SAN JOSE, AND THEY TAKE ACTION TO FRUSTRATE PLANNED ASSASSINATION. CUBAN EXILES INVOLVED IN REPORTED ATTEMPT WILL NOT ASK WHERE SERVICES OBTAINED THEIR INFORMATION, BUT LOOK FOR LEAKS IN THEIR MIDST. HOWEVER, BELIEVE DANGER OF COMPROMISE TO UKSCARLET-3 LESSENS WITH PASSAGE OF TIME BECAUSE OF PROBABLE REVELATION OF PLANS TO ADDITIONAL PERSONS. THEREFORE, SUBJECT CARACAS CONCURRENCE SUGGEST THAT SAN JOSE ADVISE HUFABRIC THAT STATION HAS RECEIVED TIP THAT THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. PLACE OF ACQUISITION SHOULD

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019453

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

810006

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

NOT BE REVEALED.Y

2. ALTHOUGH ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA NOT RESULT OF WKSCARLET-3 INFORMATION, WE HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER OR NOT HE SHOULD BE INFORMED OF BOSCH ARREST IN SAN JOSE. WE DEFER TO CARACAS, HOWEVER, TO ADVISE BEST COURSE. IF AFFIRMATIVE REQUEST BUENOS AIRES ATTEMPT CONTACT WKSCARLET-83 AND ADVISE HIM BOSCH ARRESTED, BUT THAT ARREST WAS NOT BASED ON ANY INFORMATION OR ACTION ON OUR PART. HE SHOULD ALSO BE ADVISED TO CONTINUE TRIP TO SAN JOSE AS THOUGH HE HAD NO FOREKNOWLEDGE OF ARREST.Y

3. FILE: 201-0931810; 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: REF A - ADVISES AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY TO DETERMINE POSSIBILITY USE AGENCY INFO TO PREVENT HIGHLY IMPROPER ACTIVITIES SUCH AS PLANNED ASSASSINATIONS.

REF B - ALLENDE WIDOW IN CARACAS. BELIEVE BEST WE COULD DO AND STILL PROTECH WKSCARLET-3 IS ADVISE THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF MEMBER ALLENDE FAMILY IN CARACAS.

REF C - PASCAL STILL IN SAN JOSE. REQUEST PERMISSION ADVISE HUFABRIC OF MURDER THREAT.

REF D - PLEASE ADVISE IF ORLANDO BOSCH ARREST IN COSTA RICA DUE TO PASSAGE OF W-3 INFO. IF SO, SUGGEST NO FURTHER DISSEM OF W-3 INFO OUTSIDE LNBUZZ SINCE RISK OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019453

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE 810006

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

COMPROMISE TO [illegible]-3 RUNNING TOO HIGH.

REF E HUFABRIC HAD ALREADY WATCHED FOR AND LOCATED BOSCH DUE PREVIOUS TIPS (UNRELATED PASCAL) FROM DEA AND FBI. PASSED ONLY INFO THAT BOSCH HAD BEEN SEEN IN CARACAS 7 FEB AND MIGHT TRAVEL COSTA RICA USING DOCS IN NAME "COTTEZ". R

COORD:
C/LA/CAM
A C/LA/SB
C/LA/TFK

DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: ROBERT W. ANDREWS
UNIT: LA/NW/V
EXT: 1535

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/NW
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 22 PER 46 TOTAL COPIES 38-2 RUN BY E D

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/LA 15 ACTION #	INFO	~~RF~~ FILE VR C/SECUR 4, C/OS/INT C/OS/ITG 5, C/ESN/IO, C/IP/AN, DDO DDO/DO, E/DIV D 2, C/CI 4, C/OSG/IC

T 694049 EIA619 PAGE 01 IN 830647

TOR:1901552 FEB 76 SJOS 19237

S E C R E T 182342Z FEB 76 STAFF

9 OH

CITE SAN JOSE 19237

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES. Com: WKSCARLET-3/...

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: CARACAS 29135 (IN 830540)

1. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO FBI IN EARLY 1975. ITINERANT FBI REP FROM MEXICO CITY (CAMAROTA) MENTIONED NAME TO STATION AND IT IS BELIEVED HE DID SAME TO LOCAL SERVICE (HUFABRIC), AND MAY HAVE LEFT SOMETHING IN WRITING WITH THEM. BOSCH NAME ALSO MENTIONED TO STATION BY LOCAL DEA REP BUT IT NOW DETERMINED THIS WAS BASICALLY ON FBI BEHALF.

2. ON OCCASION OF COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ODUBER'S MEETING AT HIS RANCH WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS ON 10 JULY 1975, ITINERANT FBI REP MEXICO CITY CALLED STATION TO WARN COSTA RICANS OF AN ALLEGED CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION OF BOSCH ON PACIFIC COAST TO DISRUPT THAT MEETING. HUGLIB-3, WHO HAD SECURITY FOR THAT MEETING, CHECKED OUT INFO TO NO AVAIL. THIS INFO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED TO STATION BY HQS AND EMBASSY (WHICH RECEIVED IT VIA COSTA RICAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON).

3. AT MEETING WITH CHIEF, HUFABRIC-14 ON 12 FEBRUARY HE

SECRET

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 694049 EIA619 PAGE 02 IN 830647

TOR:190155Z FEB 76 SJOS 19237

REPORTED THAT HIS SERVICE HAD DEFINITELY SPOTTED BOSCH ON TWO OCCASIONS ON OR ABOUT 10 FEBRUARY, HAD LOCATED THE AREA WHERE HE WAS BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED AND HOPED TO GRAB HIM SOON.

4. ON 17 FEBRUARY STATION INFORMED HUFABRIC-14 OF THE FOLLOWING INFO FROM PARA 3 OF CARACAS 29109:

A. BOSCH WAS KNOWN TO BE IN CARACAS ON 7 FEBRUARY.

B. BOSCH MIGHT HAVE LEFT CARACAS SOME TIME AFTER 6 FEBRUARY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA.

C. BOSCH MIGHT BE USING CHILEAN PASSPORT (WHICH THEY ALREADY KNEW) AND MIGHT BE TRAVELLING UNDER NAME CORTEZ. HUFABRIC-14 HOWEVER STATED THAT BOSCH TRAVELLING UNDER NAME HECTOR E. D'AVANZO CINTOLESI, USING CHILEAN PASSPORT NUMBER 26583.

NO OTHER PORTIONS OF CARACAS 29109 OR ANY OF PART OF CARACAS 29110 PASSED TO ANYONE.

5. WE CHECKING WITH HUFABRIC-14 ON DETAILS OF EVENTS LEADING TO ARREST AND WILL ADVISE SOONEST.

6. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

14-00000

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY J PER LAG TOTAL COPIES 38 - 1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT 1129

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT LA15

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR SEC/RY 4, OPS/INT, OPS/ITG 5, CS/HD, IC/AN, DDO, DIV D2, CI 4, OS/HC, DDO/DO,

T 693558 EIA150 PAGE 01 IN 832548

TOR:1821432 FEB 76 CARA 29135

S E C R E T 182135Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29135

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES,

NIACT DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REFS: A. SAN JOSE 19236 (IN 830508)

B. CARACAS 29110 (IN 828721)

C. CARACAS 29109 (IN 828704)

D. CARACAS 29129 (IN 830506)

E. SAN JOSE 19235 830494

1. PLEASE ADVISE IF REF A ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA RESULTED FROM REFS B AND C INFORMATION. IF SO, SUGGEST NO FURTHER DISSEM OF PARA TWO REF C PLOT INFORMATION OUTSIDE LNBUZZ CHANNELS AS RISK COMPROMISE WKSCARLET-3 TO EXILE EXTREMISTS RUNNING TO HIGH.

2. FILE: 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET

WKSCARLET-3/201

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY J PER LA 6 TOTAL COPIES 11-1 RUN BY 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT LA15

ACTION #

INFO RF, FILE, VR, C/OPS/INT, C/SECUR4, C/OPS/INTG 5, ISA/IO, C/PCS, DDO, C/IAVOG, DDO/PG, C/CI4, C/PS/EG2, C/OSG, C/OSG/IC

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 693460 EIA055 PAGE 01 IN 830506

TOR:182041Z FEB 76 CARA 29129

S E C R E T 182030Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29129

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 808822

B. CARACAS 29094 (IN 827361)

1. IN CONTEXT OF ARRIVAL CARACAS HORTENSIA BUSSI DE 201-05790 ALLENDE PER REF B, STATION BELIEVES WE COULD ADVISE LOCAL LIAISON UNILATERALLY THAT WE HAVE TIP THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF MEMBER ALLENDE FAMILY HERE IN CARACAS. FEEL THIS AS SPECIFIC AS WE COULD GET AND STILL REASONABLY PROTECT SOURCE. EVEN THEN THERE IS RISK TO WKSCARLET-3 WHO OBTAINED INFO DIRECTLY FROM SELF-DECLARED PRINCIPAL IN PLOT; WKSCARLET-3 IS ONLY PERSON WE SURE FRANK CASTRO HAS TOLD. POSSIBLY ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ IS NOT YET AWARE VICTIM IDENTITY. IF WKSCARLET-3 COMPROMISED TO EXILE EXTREMISTS, STATION FEELS HIS LIFE WOULD BE IN JEOPARDY.

2. FILE: 201-0300985. E2, IMPDET.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-0300985
DO NOT DESTROY

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY 25 PER LA 6 TOTAL COPIES 33-1 RUN BY

24

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY [✓ ISSUED] SLOTTED LA BY D AT 2050 Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/LA15

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR C/OPS/INT, O/SECUR4, C/LSN/IO, C/OPS/ITGS, C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/OIUP 2

T 693462 EIA057 PAGE 01 IN 830508

TOR:182043Z FEB 76 SJOS 19236

S E C R E T 182030Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19236

G

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CARAS, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

1. HUFABRIC INFORMED STATION OF ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IN SAN JOSE MIDDAY 18 FEBRUARY 1976. CHARGED WITH ENTERING COSTA RICA WITH ILLEGAL DOCUMENTS AND CAN HOLD FOR MINUMUM TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. STATION ENCOURAGING HUFABRIC THAT HE BE HELD UNTIL AFTER SECRETARY KISSINGER DEPARTS.

2. BECAUSE OF SECRET SERVICE, DEA, AND FBI INTEREST IN BOSCH, WOULD APPRECIATE HEADQUARTERS GUIDANCE ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED OR ACTION WE SHOULD TAKE. WE UNDERSTAND BOSCH MAY BE INDICTED FUGITIVE FROM U.S. JUSTICE.

3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER LA# 6 TOTAL COPIES 39-2 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED LA BY AT 2035 Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT LA15

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR OPS/INT, SECURY, LSN/ID
OPS/ITG5, IP/AN, CI4, PS/EG2, DDO
DDO/DO, DIUD2,

T 693416 EIA220 PAGE 01 IN 830494

TOR:1820252 FEB 76 SJOS 19235

S E C R E T 1822002 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19235

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

Copy: WKSCARLET-3

REFS: A, DIRECTOR 808822

B, SAN JOSE 19195 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (IN 812972

C, SAN JOSE 19215 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (IN 818963)

D, SAN JOSE 19227 PARA 2 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (IN 82680

E, DIRECTOR 808856

1. RE PARA 3 REF A AND REF E: REFS B,C, AND D REPORTED ARRIVAL ON 2 FEBRUARY AND PRESENCE OF ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE REPEAT ANDRES PASCAL ALENDE, NEPHEW OF SALVADOR ALLENDE, IN COSTA RICA. AFTER SPENDING DAY IN LOCAL HOTEL HE MOVED TO HOME OF MARXIST DANIEL CAMACHO MONGE, POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR IN POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF UNIVERSITY OF COSTA RICA. CAMACHO HOME LOCATED IN SUBURBAN TOWN OF CURRIDABAT 25 METERS NORTH OF HOME OF FORMER PRESIDENT PEPE FIGUERES. PASCAL KNOWN TO BE AT ABOVE LOCATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY.

2. PASCAL AND GIRLFRIEND MUST REMAIN COSTA RICA FOR SIXTY DAYS AFTER ARRIVAL TO GIVE COSTA RICAN COURTS OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT REQUEST TO EXTRADITE THEM.

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

STAFF	
1	4
2	5
3	6

T 693416 EIA020 PAGE 02-02 IN 830494

TOR:182025Z FEB 76 SJOS 19235

(IN 516963)

3. SOURCE SAN JOSE 19215 HAS HUCOD-1.

4. IN VIEW KISSINGER VISIT, ADVISE IMMEDIATE PERMISSION DISCUSS MURDER THREAT WITH LOCAL LIAISON (HUFABRIC).

5. FILE: 201-931810. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11 - 2

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 181423Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 808822

CONF: LA 7 INFO: FILE, 11/AN, 056, C/OPS

0 DISSEM BY: 27
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, INFO SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

REF: CARACAS 29109 (IN 828704).

1. IN ORDER AVOID CRITICISM OR ALLEGATIONS THAT AGENCY FAILED IN SOME RESPONSIBILITY REGARDING HIGHLY IMPROPER ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS PLANNED ASSASSINATIONS, THE AGENCY MUST EXAMINE SUCH ACTIVITIES TO DETERMINE IF IT IS POSSIBLE OR PROPER TO USE AGENCY INFORMATION TO DIVERT OR ARREST THE ACTIVITY. IN SOME SITUATIONS NOTHING CAN BE DONE EITHER BECAUSE NO CHANNEL EXISTS TO AFFECT THE SITUATION OR THE SOURCE CANNOT BE PROTECTED.

2. REF PARA TWO REPORT FROM WKSCARLET-3 ~~[illegible]~~ ON ALLEGED PLOT ~~[illegible] AMERICAN CITIZEN [illegible]~~ TO KILL ALLENDE'S NEPHEW IN EXCHANGE FOR UNSPECIFIED HELP FROM CHILEAN GOVERNMENT, IS THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY WHICH MUST BE EXAMINED PER ABOVE TO SEE IF THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF USING WKSCARLET-3'S REPORT TO MITIGATE THE PLANNED ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER YOU BELIEVE WKSCARLET-3'S REPORT CAN BE PASSED TO APPROPRIATE VENEZUELAN LIAISON, OR OTHER FOREIGN LIAISON SERVICES, WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING WKSCARLET-3'S IDENTITY AND SAFETY.

3. SAN JOSE: LATEST HQS INFO IS THAT LUIS ALLENDE RESIDES IN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

IP, CDI ☒ ABSTRACT
INDEX
IP, CR V PREPARE FOR FILMING
CODE NO. (2, 3)
IP, MB RYBAT REST. CODE
CABLE IDEN (11)
NFO (8)
FOR FILING
R.R. ✓

18 Feb 76

201-300985

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019453

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR · DATE-TIME GROUP · CITE · MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

808822

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

SAN JOSE. PLEASE CONFIRM.

4. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: WILLIAM J. DEVINE
UNIT: LA/NW
EXT: 1128

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/NW
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019453

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER LA #6 TOTAL COPIES 33 -3 RUN BY 4

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

(TUBED) ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED LA BY C AT 1800 Z

ACTION UNIT LA 15 ACTION #

INFO FILE VR OPS/INT, SECURITY, LSN/ID, OPS/ITG 5, IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO

17 FEB 75 [illegible]

ACTION CL DIV D 2,

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 089349 EIA032 PAGE 01 IN 828704

TOR:171757Z FEB 76 CARA 29109

SECRET 171722Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29109

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY.

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REFS: A. CARACAS 29029 (BEING RELAYED ALL ADDRESSEES LESS SAN JOSE, BUENOS AIRES) 818997

B. CARACAS 29076 (BEING RELAYED ALL ADDRESSEES LESS SAN JOSE) 826512

C. CARACAS 29110 (HVC-7327)

1. WKSCARLET-3 LOCATED ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IN SAN JOSE 16 FEBRUARY AND SPOKE BRIEFLY BY TELEPHONE WITH HIM TO ARRANGE INTERVIEW IN SAN JOSE FOUR OR FIVE DAYS HENCE. WKSCARLET-3 LEAVING CARACAS WITH WKSCARLET-1 FOR BUENOS AIRES AFTERNNON 17 FEB AND ANTICIPATES STAYING BUENOS AIRES FOR ABOUT THREE DAYS BEFORE GOING SAN JOSE. WKSCARLET-3 CAN BE CONTACTED IN EITHER BUENOS AIRES OR SAN JOSE BY TELEPHONE CALL FROM NATIVE SPANISH SPEAKER IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS "RAMIREZ." HE WILL BE STAYING SHERATON HOTEL IN BUENOS AIRES BUT DOES NOT YET KNOW NAME OF HOTEL IN SAN JOSE. AT BOTH LOCATIONS HE WILL BE ALERT FOR CALL

9

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

/

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	STAFF			
ACTION #			1		4	
			2		5	
			3		6	

T 689349 EIA032 PAGE 02 IN 828704

TOR:1717572 FEB 76 CARA 29109

FROM "RAMIREZ" BETWEEN 0800 AND 0900 DAILY. CAUTION NATIVE SPANISH SPEAKER MUST MAKE CALL IN ORDER AVOID AROUSING EXTREMELY SUSPICIOUS NATURE WKSCARLET-1 WHO MAY ANSWER TELEPHONE AND IS UNWITTING WKSCARLET-3 CONTACT WITH BKHERALD. IN ORDER VERIFY BOSCH EXACT MOVEMENTS DURING VWLOFTY, SUGGEST SAN JOSE MAY WISH FORWARD CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS TO BUENOS AIRES FOR PASSING TO WKSCARLET-3.

2. WKSCARLET-3 HAD NO INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE REPORT OF BOSCHS INTENTIONS ON LIFE OF CUBAN AMBASSADOR OR SECRETARY KISSINGER IN CARACAS. WKSCARLET-3 DID SEE FRANK CASTRO AT VENEZUEL'S MAIQUETIA AIRPORT ON 16 FEB. CASTRO TOLD WKSCARLET-3 THAT HE WAS HERE TO KILL LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, A RELATIVE OF FORMER PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE, AND THAT HIS SPONSOR WAS THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. CASTRO SAID ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ WOULD BE HELPING HIM AND INDICATED HE EXPECTED OTERO TO ARRIVE IN VENEZUELA WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR SO. WKSCARLET-3 INTERPRETS CASTRO'S CLAIM OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP TO MEAN QUASI-GOC SPONSORSHIP: POSSIBLY MILITARY. CASTRO SAID THIS ACTION WAS BEING PERFORMED IN EXCHANGE FOR UNSPECIFIED HELP THAT BOSCH, CASTOR OR CALATAYUD (FNU), ANOTHER ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO CUBAN, HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THE GOC.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 689349 EIA032 PAGE 03-03 IN 020704

TOR:171757Z FEB 76 CARA 29109

3. USSS SECRET SERVICE REP CARACAS ADVISES THAT CARACAS LEGATT HAS INFORMATION FROM RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETTE (ALLEGEDLY FROM TELTAP) THAT BOSCH WAS IN CARACAS ON 7 FEBRUARY 1976 AND LEFT FOR CENTRAL AMERICA USING CHILEAN PASSPORT. SINCE WKSCARLET-3 HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO ASK FOR "CORTEZ" WHEN HE TELEPHONED BOSCH IN SAN JOSE ON 16 FEB, SUGGEST BOSCH MAY HAVE ENTERED COSTA RICA SOMETIME AFTER 6 FEBRUARY USING CHILEAN PASSPORT IN NAME OF CORTEZ.

4. ABOVE INFOR ON WHEREABOUTS BOSCH, OTERO AND CASTRO PASSED SECRET SERVICE AND LEGATT AT CARACAS.

5. FILE: 200-6-495; 75-2-20/4. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 43 PER LA 6 TOTAL COPIES 40-1 BY 4

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA/5

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

T 692289 EIA954 PAGE 01-21 IN 829113

TOR:160205Z FEB 76 SJCS 19233

S E C R E T 172348Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19233

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO CARACAS, DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY.

VLDOFTY MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 29109 (IN 82[illegible]704).

1. PER PARA ONE OF REF, REQUEST STATION QUESTION WKSCARLET-3 FOR TELEPHONE NUMBER SAN JOSE OR OTHER DETAILS HIS PHONE CONVERSATION WITH BOSCH ON 16 FEBRUARY.

2. PLS ADVISE WKSCARLET-3 TRAVEL PLANS TO SAN JOSE AND HOTEL IF KNOWN, WILL FORWARD CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS UPON RECEIPT.

3. FILE: 202-6-495, 75-2-22/4. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

7-71 Mfg. 10-75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER LA 6 TOTAL COPIES 70-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED LA BY D AT 2230 Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT LA 15 ACTION #	INFO	RF FILE VR OPS/INT, SECOR 4, LSN/ID OPS/ITGS, IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, DIUD2 CI 4, OSG, RS/EG2

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 690183 EIA771 PAGE 01-01 IN 829064

TOR:172222Z FEB 76 CARA 29120

S E C R E T 172210Z FEB 76 STAFF

29109

CITE CARACAS 29120

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY.

NIACT BUENOS AIRES

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REF: BUENOS AIRES 35610 (IN 828981)

1. IDENTITY OF REF REFQUEST IS: LUIS CLEMENTE P O S A D A.

2. FILE: 200-6-495; 75-2-22/4. E2 IMPDET

Kk

[illegible]		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
	☒	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
[illegible]		PREPARE FOR FILMING	
[illegible]		CODE NO. (2, 3)	
		RYBAT REST. CODE	
		CABLE IDEN (11)	
		NFD (3)	
[illegible]		FOR FILING	
[illegible]	V		

RECORD COPY

SECRET

17 Feb 76

201-300985

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

9-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

SECRET

STAFF 192034Z DIRECTOR 809591

CONF: CCS 2 INFO: FILE LA 6

0 DISSEM BY: 27
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: CARACAS.Y

JBCENT

REF: CARACAS 29065 |IN 824942| Y

WKSCARLET/3 CHECKS TOTALING $743.00 RECEIVED AT HQS ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS. TAX MATTERS ARE FINALIZED AND STATION CAN CONCLUDE TERMINATION. E2 IMPDET.#

WKSCARLET-3 201

LA/NW/B

LA/BF

CTC 2956T
DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: S. E. GROFT:LCP
UNIT: CCS/CSB
EXT: 9059R/3140X66

J. Albert Hoover
C/LA/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CCS/CSB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 063851

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER LA #6 TOTAL COPIES 38-2 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT LA 15

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR OPS/INT, SECUR 4, LSN/ID, OPS/LTG5, IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, DIV D2, C14, PS/EG2

T 683022 EIA987 PAGE 01 IN 826512

TOR:131848Z FEB 76 CARA 29076

S E C R E T 131618Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29076

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO, MANAGUA INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REFS: A. CARACAS 29063 (IN 824723)

B. SANTIAGO 33711 (IN 825993)

1. USSS HEADQUARTERS HAS FORWARDED TO CARACAS ADVANCE TEAM NOTICE THAT USSS MIAMI REP RECEIVED REPORT ON 12 FEB 76 FROM "EXTREMELY RELIABLE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT" THAT ATTEMPT TO BE MADE ON DR. KISSINGER'S LIFE WHILE HE IN VENEZUELA. INFORMANT DESCRIBED AS "VERY CLOSE" TO ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA (USSS LATER IDENTIFIED SOURCE AS RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE). BOSCH ALLEGEDLY ARRIVED CARACAS FROM MANAGUA TWO DAYS AGO.

2. REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSEES CHECK OF TRAVEL CONTROL FOR POSSIBLE CONFIRMATION BOSCH TRAVEL. CONSIDER MORE LIKELY BOSCH WOULD BE TRAVELING WITH DOMINICAN PASSPORT 086768 IN NAME PEDRO ANTONIO PENA.

3. FYI: WKSCARLET-3, WHO PLANNED CONTACT BOSCH IN SANTIAGO NEXT WEEK, SAID HE SENT TELEGRAM TO SANTIAGO ACCOMMODATION

SECRET

FORM 3120b
7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________ BY________ AT________ Z

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 683222 EIA907 PAGE 02-02 IN 826512

TOR:131848Z FEB 76 CARA 29076

ADDRESS LAST WEEK ASKING CONFIRMATION BOSCH WOULD BE AVILABLE. NO REPLY YET RECEIVED. ADDRESS TO WHICH TELEGRAM SENT IS:

SRTA. ADRIANA DELGADO
CASILLA 477 CORREO CENTRAL
SANTIAGO DE CHILE

4. FILE: 200-6-495; 75-2-20/4. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER

TOTAL COPIES 25-1

RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT CCS2

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IPAW AMGINOC3

LA7

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 679376 EIA363 PAGE 01-01 IN 824942

TOR:121808Z FEB 76 CARA 29065

S E C R E T 121759Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29865

TO: DIRECTOR.

JBCENT WKBOXER

REF: CARACAS 28295 (N709274)

1. WKSCARLET-3 HAS PROVIDED STATION WITH COPIES OF HAND WRITTEN NOTES DATED 20 OCTOBER 1975 AND 12 NOVEMBER 1975 SENT TO ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS ALONG WITH COPIES OF DOLLAR CHECKS TOTALLING 743 DOLLARS. HE CLAIMS HAVE RECEIVED LETTER OF RELEASE FROM IRS. PLEASE CONFIRM SATISFACTION TAX LIABILITY SO STATION CAN CONCLUDE TERMINATION OF AGENT PROCEDURES.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

14-00000

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY 1L PER TOTAL COPIES 22-3 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

DVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED LA BY C AT 1630 Z

CTION UNIT LA 7

CTION #

INFO RF FILE VR WH/AN OPS/ITG 4 C/OPS CI4 OSG PS/EG 2

T 679200 EIA993 PAGE 01 IN 624723

TOR:121625Z FEB 76 CARA 29063

SECRET 121605Z FEB 76 STAFF

answer required

CITE CARACAS 29063

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES, LA/MIAMI INFO PANAMA CITY.

CS 13/2/76 pouchings

WKBOXER SECURE MHSPIKE

REF: HVC-7280, 4 DEC 75

1. WKSCARLET-3 (FORMER UNILATERAL ASSET) CONTACTED STATION 11 FEB 76 TO ADVISE HE AND WSKCARLET-1 PLAN TRAVEL SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES AND POSSIBLY MIAMI DURING WEEK 15 FEB. PURPOSE IS INVESTIGATION OF ATTEMPTED LETTER BOMBING CUBAN AMBASSADOR CARACAS.

2. BOMBING INCIDENT SURFACED WHEN CUBAN AMBASSADOR NORBERTO HERNANDEZ CURBELO REPORTED TO WKSCARLET ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO ALLEGED RECEIPT OF BOMB. WKSCARLET-10 DEACTIVATED DEVICE WHICH CONTAINED IN LARGE MANILA ENVELOPE BEARING RETURN ADDRESS DR. GUSTAVO A. VOLLMER. WKSCARLET-1, FORMER WKSCARLET CHIEF IS SECURITY CONSULTANT TO VOLLMER AND HE HAS RETAINED WKSCARLET-3, A FORMER WKSCARLET OFFICER NOW OPERATING COMMERCIAL INVESTIGATIONS SERVICE, TO DETERMINE WHO USED VOLLMER'S NAME. WKSCARLET-3, CUBAN EXILE, RETAINS SIGNIFCANT CONTACTS WITH EXTREMIST EXILES AND HAS REGULAR CORRESPONDENCE WITH ORLANDO

SECRET

WKSCARLET-3/201

·71 MFG. 10/75

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO: RF FILE VR
ACTION #	

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

BOSCH AVILA IN SANTIAGO.

3. IN A LETTER APPROXIMTELY THREE MONTHS AGO BOSCH TOLD WKSCARLET-3 HE HAS MADE AGREEMENT WITH EXTREMIST GROUP IN ARGENTINA (WKSCARLET-3 THINKS GROUP CONNECTED WITH OR IS ERP) FOR MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE ACTION; I.E. (ACCORDING WKSCARLET-3) IF BOSCH GROUPS WANTS SOMEONE KILLED WHERE IT DOES NOT HAVE ASSETS, THE ARGENTINE GROUP WILL TAKE ACTION IF IT HAS THE ASSETS, AND IF THE ARGENTINE GROUP WANTS THE SAME THING ANY WHERE ELSE INCLUDING PUERTO RICO, HIS GROUP WILL TAKE ACTION. WKSCARLET-3 SAID TI WAS ON BASIS THIS AGREEMENT A PAST ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ASSASSINATE CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES.

4. WKSCARLET-3 PLANS INTERVIEW BOSCH AND OTHERS IN SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES AND POSSIBLY MIAMI IN ATTEMPT LEARN WHETHER CARACAS LETTER BOMB WAS EXILE EFFORT OR POSSIBLY DGI COVERT ACTION OPERATION.

5. PLEASE ADVISE ANY ADDRESSEE STATIONS INTEREST CONTACT WITH WKSCARLEY-3.

6. FOR DIRECTOR: STATION HAS OBTAINED LETTER BOMB VIA WKSCARLET LIAISON. EXPLOSIVE CONSISTS OF COILED PRIMA CORD. DETONATOR HAS BEEN REMOVED AND OBTAINED SEPARATELY. WOULD LIKE

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

I N F O — RF FILE

ACTION #

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 679200 EIA993 PAGE 03-03 IN 824723

TOR:1216252 FEB 76 CARA 29063

EXPERT OPINION RE ORIGIN OF MATERIALS USED: PLEASE ADVISE SHIPPING INSTRUCTIONS.

7. FILE: 75-2-20/3. E2. IMPDET.

[illegible] SECUR D/CMS

IF DESIRED SEND FORM 1604 TO CABLE SEC.

RETURNED TO DIVISION PER DS 806385

S E C R E T

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO
Chief, WOGAME

INFO
Chief, Latin America Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
JRCENT -- WKSCARLET-3 Tax Administration

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

File. WKSCARLET-3 201-

REFERENCE: CARACAS 28295

At the meeting cited in Reference, WKSCARLET-3 turned in a copy of correspondence he has received from IRS, which is being forwarded under separate cover.

Frederick C. BRADSPIES

Distribution:
2 - C/WOGAME W/ATT U/S/C T/N
1 - C/LAD W/O ATT

Attachment:
Correspondence, as described herein, U/S/C T/N

E2IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCT 6766	9 October 1975
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-300985

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 46 PER

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

TOTAL COPIES 23-1 RUN BY 8

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

CCS 2

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR IP/AN, LA7, CMG/NOC 3, OSG, C/OPS, PS/EG 2, CI 4

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 370615 EIA044 PAGE 01-01 IN 709274

TOR:0821222 OCT 75 CARA 28295

S E C R E T 0821132 OCT 75 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 28295

TO: DIRECTOR.

JBCENT

REFS: A. CARACAS 28188 (IN 695713)

B. DIRECTOR 583069

1. WKSCARLET-3 CONTACTED 8 OCTOBER AND ASKED INTENTIONS RE PAYMENT TAX OUTSTANDING $743.78. WKSCARLET-3 SAID HE INTENDS PAY BUT WILL HAVE TO DO SO IN TWO INSTALLMENTS-- ONE HALF AT END OCTOBER, OTHER AT END OF NOVEMBER. SAID WOULD MAIL CHECKS TO REF B ADDRESS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

AC

LA/NW/IV

201-300985
08 oct 75

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER TOTAL COPIES 15 RUN 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT CCS 2

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IP/AN, LA7, CM9/NOC 3

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 333753 EIA198 PAGE 01-01 IN 695713

TOR:2421322 SEP 75 CARA 28188

S E C R E T 242120Z SEP 75 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 28188

TO: DIRECTOR.

JBCENT

REF: DIRECTOR 746473

1. STATION ADVISED WKSCARLET-3 PER HVCS-4308 OF HIS OUTSTANDING TAX PAYMENT $743.78. SUBJECT WAS SHAKEN AS HE HAD ANTICIPATED RESOLUTION OF TAX SITUATION WITH SOME BALANCE OF UNPAID COMPENSATION IN HIS FAVOR OR AT VERY LEAST TO BREAK EVEN. HE ASKED FOR TIME TO GIVE MATTER CONSIDERATION. HE IS PRESENTLY AWAY FROM CARACAS AND HAD PLANNED TO RECONTACT STATION 29 SEPTEMBER FOLLOWING HIS RETURN. WILL ADVISE.

2. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET

IP,IDX ☒ TRAVEL PROGRAM
RESTRICT
IP CP V
IP,MS
FOR FILING
~~IP,FI~~
LA/NW/U

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

201-300985
24 Sep 75

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Caracas

WKSCARLET-3 ✓
201
make copy
for Chrono

Chief, WOGAME

JRCENT - WKSCARLET/3 - Tax Administration

REFERENCES:
A. HVCS-4263 dated 1 April 1975
B. HVCT-6682 dated 17 June 1975
C. CARACAS 25040
D. DIRECTOR 583069

1. Based on a reconciliation of WKSCARLET/3's 1971, 1972, 1973 and 1974 Federal income tax returns, it has been determined that he has an excessive tolerance (underpayment of tax) in the amount of $512.00 for 1971, $549.00 for 1972, $769.00 for 1973 and $425.00 for 1974. Attached, under separate cover, is a sealed envelope containing copies of each reconciliation which have not been classified so that they may be handcarried to him for review. If security permits, this envelope should be opened only by WKSCARLET/3. The Station is requested to treat these documents as classified and they should be destroyed or retained in a sealed envelope by the Station.

2. The $1,860.47 due WKSCARLET/3 per Paragraph 2 of Reference C should have been reduced by $349.25 (per Paragraph 1 of Reference A) representing underpayment of 1969 and 1970 taxes. Attached is Headquarters T/A # CC-0140 in the amount of $1,511.22, representing the 1971 tax due of $512.00, 1972 tax due of $549.00 and a portion of the 1973 tax due of $450.22. The collection of these taxes will liquidate the final payment due WKSCARLET/3. The balance of tax due must be paid by WKSCARLET/3.

3. Please advise WKSCARLET/3 to mail his personal check in the amount of $743.78 to the accommodation address forwarded by Reference D. This amount represents the remaining portion of the 1973 taxes due of $318.78 that were not liquidated by his final payment and the 1974 taxes due of $425.00. The check should be made payable to himself without endorsement on the reverse. Also, please advise WKSCARLET/3 that the cashier's check for $147.00 and his original 1971 through 1974 tax returns were mailed to the IRS Philadelphia Office on 30 June 1975.

Attachments:
1. Reconciliations (4), u/s/c
2. T/A # CC-0140, h/w

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COS, Caracas w/atts

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

E2 IMPDET

HVCS-4303
9 July 1975

S E C R E T

~~1~~ - LA/NW/V (wo/atts)
1 - CTC 2956T

CCS/CSB
CJAustin:lcp
9059

LA/NW/V

LA/BF

BY 063051
C/LA/SS

14-00000

CAUTION - THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Chief, WOGAME

Chief, Latin America Division

Chief of Station, Caracas

JDCENT -- WKSCARLET-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HVCW 10351, 1 May 1975
B. HVCS 4263, 1 April 1975
C. HVCW 10293, 31 January 1975

1. Forwarded under separate cover are 1971, 1972, 1973, and 1974 Federal Tax Returns prepared by WKSCARLET-3. Subject avers that he prepared these to the best of his ability and recollection with few, if any, retained records to work from.

2. Also forwarded under separate cover is a cashiers check in the amount of $147.00 toward payment of balance of taxes due.

3. Termination documents for WKSCARLET-3 will be forwarded as soon as the matter of his tax liabilities has been settled.

Frederick C. GRADSPIES

Distribution:
2 - C/WOGAME W/ATTS U/S/C T/N
① - C/LAD W/O ATTS

Attachments:
Federal Tax Returns, U/S/C T/N
Cashiers Check, U/S/C T/N

E2 IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCT 6682	17 June 1975

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

S-E-C-R-E-T

19 May 76

SUBJECT: [illegible]/Status of Station Liaison Relationships

REF : CARACAS 29841 dated 18 May 76

The following information on WKSCARLET-3 was contained in the above referenced telepouch:

CONFRONTED WITH EVIDENCE THAT LNFALL PERSONNEL WERE IN FACT BEING FOLLOWED, WKTANGO-1 SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHO WOULD BE CONDUCTING THE SURVEILLANCE BUT SUSPECTED IT MIGHT BE THE PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE BEING OPERATED BY WKSCARLET-3. HE COULD OFFER NO MOTIVE BUT ALLEGED THAT WKSCARLET-3 WAS RECEIVING HUGE SUMS OF MONEY FROM AN UNKNOWN SOURCE TO FINANCE AN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATION ON THE BULGARIAN EMBASSY, SURVEIL CUBAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND THAT WKSCARLET-3 WAS ALSO ACQUIRING DATA ON INDIAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL. (IN FEBRUARY 1976 STATION ASKED WKSCARLET-3 FOR ALL WKSCARLET MATERIAL ON INDIAN EMBASSY. RESULTING "STUDY" PREPARED BY WKSCARLET WAS PASSED UNILATERALLY TO STATION AND OFFICIALLY TO WKNORTH. WE SUSPECT THAT EXTENT WKSCARLET-3 ACQUISITION OF DATA ON INDIANS LIMITED TO HIS POSSESSION OF THIS STUDY.) WKTANGO-1 WAS UNABLE TO OFFER ANY LOGICAL EXPLANATION FOR SUCH A WIDE RANGE OF INTERESTS ON THE PART OF WKSCARLET-3 SPONSOR. HE DID SEEM SINCERE IN HIS DENIAL THAT WKNOBLE-24 WAS RUNNING ANY SURVEILLANCE ON LNFALL PERSONNEL, AND ON 12 MAY CONTACTED THE STATION TO ADVISE THAT HE HAD REPORTED THE SURVEILLANCE TO THE PRESIDENT WHO HAD ORDERED AN IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION. PROOF OF GOV INTEREST IN WKSCARLET-3 ACTIVITIES WAS OBTAINED BY THE STATION COINCIDENTALLY WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS; AMONG THE WKBLEAK TAPES OBTAINED FROM WKNORTH DURING THE LAST WEEK OF APRIL WAS ONE MISLABLED TAPE WHICH THE STATION WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY AS THE PRODUCT OF A TAP ON WKSCARLET-3's INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.

18 May 76

201-0300935

TOTAL COPIES 134

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT				
9 LA10	INFO	RF. FILE. VR. 9 [illegible] 9 [illegible] 9 [illegible]	1	4
ACTION #			2	5
			3	6

T 036376 EIA137 PAGE 01 IN 576351

TOR:092252Z MAY 75 RECORDS OF PACY 32430

The following action authorized: Dissemination

Signed: [illegible]

R.O. [illegible] LA/CA/4

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate

S E C R E T 092209Z MAY 75 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 32430

TO: DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO CARACAS.

[illegible] KMSTONE HYEPOCH (IN 561989)

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 32235 (NOT SENT OR NEEDED SAN JOSE AND CARACAS)

B. DIRECTOR 689085 (NOT SENT OR NEEDED SAN JOSE AND CARACAS)

1. FYI FOR SAN JOSE/CARACAS: CASE INVOLVES 0ARREST IN PANAMA BY GN/G-2 OF JORGE ROBRENO MARIEGES, CUBAN EXILE, PROBABLY AT INSTIGATION OF CUBAN EMBASSY PANAMA. REFS CITED ABOVE CONCERN REPORT FROM DAVID PERE, PANAMANIAN AMBASSADOR IN SAN JOSE, TO HYGRUFF-1 REPORTING ON ROBRENO. INFO IN PERE'S REPORT SOURCED TO MIGUEL MERINO MARQUEZ WHO WALKED INTO PANAMANIAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE RECENTLY. STATION OFFICER MET HYGRUFF-1 ON 6 MAY 75 AND USING INFO REF B, BURNED MERINO AS INTELLIGENCE PEDDLER POSSIBLY OPERATING UNDER CUBAN DGI CONTROL.

2. ON 8 MAY 75, HYGRUFF-1 PASSED TO STATION COPY OF ANOTHER REPORT, SAME SUBJECT, ALSO RECEIVED FROM COSTA RICA. THIS REPORT DATED 5 MAY 75 WAS PREPARED BY ONE LUIS SIMON FOR LUIS BURSTIN. HYGRUFF-1 REFUSED TO DIVULGE HOW HE

0 201-3[illegible]71
0 201-301137
0 201-0289418
0 201-0774575
0 201-[illegible]

RECORD COPY

9 May 75
201-751639

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY 2

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	1		4	
ACTION #			2		5	
			3		6	

T 026376 EIA137 PAGE 02 IN 576351

TOR:0922522 MAY 75 PACY 32430

ACQUIRED COPY SIMON REPORT BUT IT LIKELY IT ALSO FORWARDED BY PERE FROM COSTA RICA. SIMON POSSIBLY IDENTIFIEABLY WITH LUIS ANGEL ANTONIO SIMON GARCIA GOWPZAPEPOOEULM PER STATION RECORDS SIMON'S STATION 201 WAS FORWARDED TO HQS 13 DECEMBER 1966.

3. SIMON REPORT, PREPARED ON "EXCELSIOR DE COSTA RICA" LETTERHEAD PAPER, STATES THAT MERINO AND FERNANDO MELO ARE CUBAN EXILES AND CIA AGENTS. SIMON ALLEGES THAT MERINO IS ROBRENO'S FRIEND AND THE LATTER UNDER DETENTION IN PANAMA CHARGED WITH CONSPIRACY AGAINST LIFE OF TORRIJOS. PER SIMON, ROBRENO'S MOTHER IS NOW IN SAN JOSE ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT JOSE FIGUERES AND PRESIDENT ODUBER. SHE INTENDS REQUEST THEIR INTERCESSION WITH TORRIJOS TO SECURE ROBRENO'S RELEASE. MRS. ROBRENO THREATENS TO CREATE PUBLIC SCANDAL FOR TORRIJOS IF FIGUERES AND ODUBER REFUSE TO HELP HER. SHE THREATENS PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OF ILLEGAL DETENTION OF ROBRENO BY PANAMANIANS AT INSTIGATION OF CUBAN EMBASSY IN PANAMA. SHE CONFIDENT "LA NACION" AND OTHER COSTA RICAN NEWSPAPERS WILL ASSIST AS WELL AS URBINA PINTO (SIC) OF MOVIMIENTO COSTA RICA LIBRE. NO STATION TRACES MELO OR

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

			STAFF	
ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 006076 EIA137 PAGE 03 IN 576351

TOR1092252Z MAY 75 PACY 32430

URBINA PINTO.

4. IT STATION OPINION POSSIBILITY EXISTS SIMON REPORT COULD BE CUBAN PLANT BECAUSE ITS CONCLUSIONS COINCIDE WITH CUBAN THEREMS USED ON HYGRUFF-1 TO INDUCE HIM TO MOVE AGAINST ROBRENO. SIMON'S CONVLUSIONS ARE:

A. CIA WILL INCREASE USE OF CUBAN EXILES AS KEY FACTOR TO PERPETUATE STATUS OF CANAL ZONE AND ZONITES BY RESORTING TO TERRORISM (AGAINST PANAMANIANS);

B. THE UNITED STATES WILL BE RELUCTANT TO "CEDE" JURISDICATION OVER CANAL ZONAK/AFTER THEIR DEFEAT IN VIETNAM;

C. AN ATTEMPT AGAINST TORRIJOS' LIFE WOULD CHANGE ENTIRE PIORAMA;

D. ATTEMPT ON TORRIJOS LIFE COULD BE MADE BY CUBAN EXILES BECAUSE MANY ARE AVAILABLE, WILLING AND ABLE TO TRY IT. REPORT MENTIONS BY NAME MERINO, MELO, ROBRENO, LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA, RICARDO PEDRAZA AND FNU MERUELOS AS LIKELY CANDIDATES. REPORT IDENTIFIES POSADA AS CIA AGENT IN VENEZUELA AND PEDRAZA IN HONDURAS. FYI, NO IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES POSADA, PEDRAZA, MERUELOS.

5. HANWRITTEN ADDENDUM TO REPORT STATES SIMON IDENTIFIED

S E C R E T

201-[illegible]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR,

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 036076 EIA137 PAGE 04 IN 575351

TOR:092252Z MAY 75 PACY 32430

GUSTAVO L O R A, OWNER OF CONANSA (COMPANIA DE CONCRETO ASFALTICO) ON CALLE BLANCO (SAN JOSE?) AS CIA AGENT. MELO FURTHER DESCRIBED AS CUBAN EXILE AND CLOSE FRIEND OF "DANIEL" VERY DANGEROUS ~~[illegible]~~, TALENTED AND WELL FINANCED" (SIC). ADDENDUM ALLEGES CONTACTS EXIST BETWEEN CUBAN EXILES AND "ZONITES" TO CREATE PROBLEMS IN PANAMA AND THAT ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO FORCE FIGUERES AND ODUBER TO INTERCEDE IN BEHALF OF ROBRENO'S RELEASE. FYI, LORA MENTIONED ABOVE POSSIBLY IDENTIFIABLE, PER STATION FILES, WITH GUSTAVO SATURNINO L O R A HERNANDEZ, CUBAN CITIZEN BORN 1925 RESIDING IN SAN JOSE WHERE HE OPERATES BROUCA RESTAURANT. DEA INFO INDICATES HE SUSPECTED OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.

6. REQUEST ADDRESSEE TRACES ON INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED ABOVE EXCEPT MERINO AND ROBRENO WHO WELL KNOWN TO STATION. IN REPLIES PLEASE INDICATE PORTIONS RELEASABLE TO HYGRUFF-1 (LIAISON) SHOULD STATION OPT TO REFUTE SUBSTANCE REPORT DESCRIBED ABOVE.

7. FILE: 201-0751639. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

[illegible]
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 12/1 RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____

ACTION UNIT 9LA10 ACTION #	INFO	RF FILE VR 9IPKW 9DS 9CI/03

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 019937 EIA614 PAGE 01 IN 581898

TOR:152155Z MAY 75 CARA 27286

S E C R E T 152123Z MAY 75 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 27286

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, DIRECTOR.

RYBAT KMSTONE HYEPOCH

REF: PANAMA CITY 32430 (576351)

1. SUBJECT PARA 4D REF IDENTIFIED AS BKHERALD AGENT IN VENEZUELA IS, IN FACT, WKSCARLET-3, WHO IN CONTACT CARACAS STATION SINCE FEBRUARY 1968. HE WAS OF INTEREST TO STATION AS PENETRATION LOCAL SECURITY SERVICES AND HAD PREVIOUSLY WORKED WITH JMWAVE FROM MID-60'S O OPS INTEREST IN WKSCARLET-3 WANED WHEN HE LOST ACCESS LAST YEAR AND STATION ONLY MAINTAINING INFREQUENT CONTACT WITH HIM FOR PURPOSE RESOLVING ADMINISTRATIVE TAX PROBLEMS. FINAL TERMINATION SESSION EXPECTED OCCURE NEXT 60 TO 90 DAYS.

2. YOU CAN TELL HYGRUFF-1, IF YOU OPT DO SO, THAT SUBJECT IS CUBAN EXILE FORMERLY ACTIVE IN MIAMI AREA WHO WORKED WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND IN 1974 FOUNDED PRIVATE SECRUITY AGENCY IN CARACAS WHICH SERVES COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL CLIENTS. NOT KNOWN BE CURRENTLY ACTIVE IN EXILE ACTIVITIES.

3. FILE: 201-300985, 201-0751639. E2 IMPDET

B 201-751639

RECORD COPY

LA/AN/V 85-4
15 May 75
201-300985

SECRET

Chief of Station, Caracas

Chief, WOGAME
JLCLIENT
WKSCARLET/3 - Tax Administration

REFERENCES: A. HVCT-6601 dated 3 March 1975
B. Caracas 25040 (17 July 1974)

1. Based on a reconciliation of WKSCARLET/3's 1969 and 1970 Federal income tax returns, it has been determined that he has an excessive tolerance (underpayment of tax) in the amount of $151.25 for 1969 and $198.00 for 1970. Attached is Headquarters T/A #CC-0057 for the total amount of $349.25 that should be collected from the final payment due WKSCARLET/3 per Paragraph 3 of Reference B. Attached in a sealed envelope are copies of each reconciliation which have not been classified so that they may be handcarried to him for review. If security permits, this envelope should be opened only by WKSCARLET/3. The Station is requested to treat these documents as classified and they should be destroyed or retained in a sealed envelope by the Station.

2. Please advise Headquarters when we may expect to receive copies of WKSCARLET/3's Federal tax returns for tax years 1971 through 1974. (A copy of his [illegible] tax return is not required, since his [illegible] income for tax year was under $3,600, which qualifies him to be administered under the provisions of HR 20-100). To ensure confidential and timely handling of an individual's tax returns and related correspondence, an Administrative (T) dispatch should be directed to Chief, WOGAME, for all JLCLIENT tax material. Please see Book Dispatch 9711 dated 5 October 1974 for detailed instructions.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

Attachments - h/w
1. Reconciliations (2)
2. T/A #CC-0057

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - COS, Caracas

E2 IMPDET

HVCS-4263 1 April 1975

SECRET

✓1 - LA/SW/V
1 - CCS/CSB #2956 T

CCS/CSB CJAustin:lss 9059

WKSCARLET-3

LA/SW/V

LA/EP

14-00000

DISPATCH | SECRET

INDEXING REQUESTED
NO INDEXING
APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO

FROM
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT
WKSCARLET-3

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Our records show that WKSCARLET-3 was terminated 30 June 1974. We realize that at this time there is a pending tax problem with WKSCARLET-3 but would appreciate at your earliest convenience a termination record i.e., ASR, Secrecy Agreement.

Norris Z. GERVENOT

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas

RECORD COPY

WKSCARLET-3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCW 10293	DATE 31 January 1975
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
LA/NW/Venezuela:	Ramon E. Gonzalez:	klt	7271

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/LA/NW/V		Laura Cooley Laura Cooley

Distribution:
1 - Chrono
1 - IP

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/LA/NW	31 Jan 75	Richard Conolly

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

30 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Alien Affairs Officer,
OPS/LSN

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

1. On 30 June 1974 Luis Clemente POSADA's employment with the Agency was terminated by mutual consent. At that time he was establishing a private investigative agency from which he expected to earn his livelihood. The Immigration and Naturalization Service file on POSADA, therefore, may now be decontrolled. As of 27 January 1975, POSADA is still located in Caracas, Venezuela.

2. On 12 June 1974 Caracas Station advised that POSADA had been informed of and fully understands the effect that termination of his Agency employment will have upon his resident alien status and eligibility for U.S. citizenship. We have not yet received termination records on POSADA, probably because the Station is still meeting with him regarding settlement of his outstanding U.S. tax liabilities.

Ramon E. Gonzalez
LA/NW/V

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 013978

FORM 3020a
21 MAR 3/74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 32 PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 17-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ___ BY ___ AT ___ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO		STAFF			
CCS2	RF FILE VR IP/AN, LA10, LSN/ID, OPS/INT,		1		4	
			2		5	
ACTION #			3		6	

T 739679 EIA498 PAGE 01-01 IN 477045

TOR:272149Z JAN 75 CARA 26471

SECRET 272111Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 26471

TO: DIRECTOR.

JBCENT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 621463

B. HVCT 6555, 7 JAN 75

1. WKSCARLET-3 HAS RECEIVED FORM 10-601 FROM IRS ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF REF B CORRESPONDENCE DATED 16 DECEMBER 1974.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

201-0300985
27 Jan 75

CAUTION - THIS FORM REQUIRES
SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

INDEXING REQUESTED
NO INDEXING
APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO
Chief, Office of Finance

INFO.
Chief, Latin America Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
ADMIN/JBCENT -- Correspondence of WKSCARLET-3 to the IRS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Key. Copy for WKSCARLET-3 201 [illegible]
G1

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 621463

Forwarded under separate cover true name is a copy of a letter dated 16 December 1974 from WKSCARLET-3 which was sent via registered mail to the Internal Revenue Service. WKSCARLET-3 has received no response from the IRS.

Frederick C. BRADSPIES

Distribution:
2 - C/OF W/ATT U/S/C T/N
2 - C/LAD W/ATT U/S/C T/N

Attachment:
One letter, as described herein, U/S/C T/N

E2IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCT 6555	DATE 7 January 1975
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 32 PER   TOTAL COPIES 20-1   RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED   BY   AT   Z

ACTION UNIT CCS2

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IP/AN, OGC2, LAB

cmg/nxc3, cmg/ms,

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 545640   EIA580   PAGE 01-01   IN 406078

TOR:051755Z NOV 74   CARA 25907

S E C R E T 051748Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 25907

TO: DIRECTOR,

JBCENT WKRALLY

REFS: A, DIRECTOR 604241

B, DIRECTOR 583868

1. WKSCARLET-3 SAID HE WROTE IN AUGUST, PER REF B, TO THE DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF IRS REQUESTING COPIES OF HIS FEDERAL TAX RETURNS. AS YET, HE HAS HAD NO RESPONSE FROM IRS. HE IS ANXIOUS GET MATTER SETTLED, AS HE HAS URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR ANY MONIES DUE HIM. STATION WOULD ALSO LIKE TO CONCLUDE THIS MATTER FOR SECURITY REASONS. CAN HEADQUARTERS TAKE ANY ACTION TO HAVE IRS EXPEDITE REPLY TO WKSCARLET-3 REQUEST FOR COPIES?

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-0300985
5 Nov 74

OUTGOING MESSAGE 19-1 62

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — DATE TIME GROUP — CITE — MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 302332Z DIRECTOR 604241

CONF: CC S2 INFO: FILE IP/AN WH8 CMG/NOCY OGC 2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 47
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: CARACAS.Y

O JBCENTY

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 565631 1P

B. DIRECTOR 583068

1. PLS FURNISH HQS A COPY OF WKSCARLET-9'S ~~[illegible]~~ 1973 FEDERAL TAX RETURN AND INFORMATION OUTLINED FR 20-18 ATTACHMENT 2. Y ~~[illegible]~~ Re

2. REF B ADVISED WKSCARLET/3 CORRESPOND IRS AND OBTAIN COPIES U.S. TAX RETURNS FOR TAX YEARS 1968 THROUGH 1973. HAS HE COMPLIED? IS STATION MAINTAINING CONTACT UNTIL TAX MATTERS FINALIZED? PLEASE ADVISE. E2 IMPDET.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 22 1974
MICROFILMED

B 201-0278759

CTC 1297 & 2956

DATE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1974
ORIG: CCS/CSB
UNIT: CHARLES E. BRISKEY/EG
EXT: 9059GN3140X6

RECORD COPY

201-0300985
30 Sep 74

WH/3/4 R.J. Conolly

WH/BF

C/WH/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CCS/CSB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 063851

OUTGOING MESSAGE

18

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 052139Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 583068

CONF: CCS2 INFO: FILE WH8, C/WG/NOC4, OGC2

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 50

TO: CARACAS.Y

ADMIN JBCENTY

REFERENCE: CARACAS 25040 (IN 309514)

1. IF WKSCARLET/3 (W/3) CANNOT LOCATE COPIES HIS FEDERAL TAX RETURNS FOR TAX YEARS 1968 THROUGH 1973, REQUEST HE CORRESPOND WITH INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CENTER WHERE HE FILED ORIGINAL TAX RETURNS AND OBTAIN NECESSARY COPIES. WITHOUT THESE TAX RETURNS HEADQUARTERS CANNOT ACCURATELY COMPUTE W/3'S TRUE TAX LIABILITY FOR THOSE YEARS.Y

2. HEADQUARTERS WOULD APPRECIATE STATION MAINTAINING CONTACT W/3 UNTIL TAX MATTERS FINALIZED. DIRECT CORRESPONDENCE W/3 REGARDING THIS MATTER WOULD BE CUMBERSOME, SINCE HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE SKHERALD COVERT TAX PROCEDURE. SHOULD STATION HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TERMINATE CONTACT, IDENTITY ADDRESS IS PROVIDED FOR HIS USE CORRESPONDING WITH HEADQUARTERS. 83833333333

3. COPIES VENEZUELAN TAX FORMS ARE NOT REQUIRED. E82IMPDET.A

file WKSCARLET-3

201-

CTC 2956 T

DATE: 1 AUGUST 1974

ORIG: CHARLES E. BRISKEY/EG

UNIT: CCS/CSB

EXT: 6697R9059

WH/3

WH/BF

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/SS

RELEASING OFFICER

C/CCS/CSB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 053351

OUTGOING MESSAGE 18-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

	MSG	CCI	ACP	TOG	TPE	URO
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	052139Z	DIRECTOR	583069

CONF: CCS2 INFO: FILE WH8, C/G/WOCY, OGC2

0 INDEX DISSEN BY: 80
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: CARACAS.Y

ADMIN JBCENTY

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 583068

IDENTITY ADDRESS: SAMUEL G. PETERSONY
P.O. BOX 61Y
FALLS CHURCH, VA. 22046Y

E2 IMPDET.

CTC 2956 T

DATE: 1 AUGUST 1974
ORIG: CHARLES E. BRISKEY/EG
UNIT: CCS/CSB
EXT: 6697R9059

file WKSCARLET-3 201

WH/3

C/WH/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/BF
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CCS/CSB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 063351

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 35 PER ________ TOTAL COPIES 96-1 RUN BY CP

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT WH8	INFO	FILE VR 1Ø/ SECURY	STAFF	
ACTION #			1 2 3	4 5 6

T 267762 EIA620 PAGE 01-01 IN 308518

TOR:162148Z JUL 74 CARA 25033

S E C R E T 162113Z JUL 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 25033

TO: DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 574544

1. WKSCARLET-3'S REENTRY PERMITS WILL BE POUCHED 17 JULY AS SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HVCA-19935 WHICH POUCHED 12 JULY.

2. FILE 201-2300985, E2 IMPDET

302

☒		[illegible]
ISO DCO		[illegible]
WH/3	✓	

RECORD COPY

SECRET

201-300985
16 July 74

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP/ADB.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

RITCHIE ROHE HC-247
IP/AN GA-50
EXT. 1933 TUBE GT7

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 006087

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/3		19 JUL 1974		
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6. WH/3/V	22	July	74	RCB
7. Laura				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. IP/FI				

Delivered to OS/AAS 22 July 74.

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE TITLE Scarlet-3

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-300955

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 11 July 74

DOCUMENT NUMBER HVCA 19935

FORM 610a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CAUTION - THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS PROCESSING INDEXING REQUESTED ☐ NO INDEXING ☐ APERTURE CARD REQUESTED ☐

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO:

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Caracas D

SUBJECT: O WKSCARLET-3 Reentry Permits

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HVCW-10177

Forwarded under separate cover via true name pouch are WKSCARLET-3's old reentry permits, which were received from him in exchange for his new ones.

J. T. Bachhuber
John T. BACHHUBER

Attachment:
Reentry permits u/s/c via T/N pouch

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att u/s/c via T/N pouch

RECORD COPY

E2 IMPDET

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA-19935	DATE 11 July 1974
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 201-300985

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 35 PER

TOTAL COPIES 27-3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY

ACTION UNIT ccs 2	INFO	FILE VR TPAN, WH 8, CMG/MS, CMG/NOCY, PS/EG4, SECURY
ACTION #		

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 185196 EIA327 PAGE 01 IN 279251

TOR:122325Z JUN 74 CARA 24700

S E C R E T 122158Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24700

TO: DIRECTOR,

WKRALLY WKSCARLET JBCENT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 553713

B. DIRECTOR 556718

1. IN LIGHT REF A THAT REENTRY PERMIT WOULD NOT BE RECEIVED UNTIL SOMTIME JUNE, STATION DECIDED NOT TERMINATE WKSCARLET-3 UNTIL 30 JUNE. STATION SEES NO PARTICULAR SECURITY PROBLEM IN THIS SINCE WKSCARLET-3 "CASE" HAS NOT COME UP SINCE LAST "ELITE" ARTICLE WHICH PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. STATION TAKING NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES IN SEEING HIM ONCE EVERY TWO TO THREE WEEKS.

2. REENTRY PERMIT AND NATURALIZATION PER REF B HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO WKSCARLET-3 AND WILL BE DISCUSSED AGAIN AT NEXT MEETING, WHEN WE HOPE TO BE IN POSITION TO GIVE HIM NEW REENTRY PERMITS, AND AT TERMINATION MEETING.

3. IN DISCUSSING HIS TERMINATION, WKSCARLET-3 SAID THAT HE HAD EXPECTED TO BE TERMINATED DUE TO HIS LACK OF ACCESS. HE ASKED IF HE WOULD BE CALLED UPON ON PART-TIME

~~SECRET~~

RECORD COPY

201-300985
12 Jun 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO: RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 185196 EIA327 PAGE 02 IN 279251

TOR:122325Z JUN 74 CARA 24700

BASIS TO DO INVESTIGATIONS THROUGH HIS PRIVATE INVESTIGATION COMPANY. HE WAS TOLD THAT NO SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD OR COULD BE MADE. HE ASKED IF HE WOULD BE GIVEN A RECONTACT PLAN IN THE EVENT HE OBTAINED JOB IN NEW NATIONAL POLICE, WHICH YET TO BE ESTABLISHED, AND WAS TOLD THAT IF HE WERE TO GET JOB IN DRUG SQUAD, WE WOULD CONSIDER REESTABLISHING RELATIONSHIP. (BOTH STATION AND WKSCARLET-3 CONSIDER IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL BE OFFERED JOB ONCE NATIONAL POLICE ESTABLISHED.)

4. ON THE WHOLE, WKSCARLET-3 TOOK NEWS OF TERMINATION WELL. STATED THAT HIS COMPANY NOW HAS ENOUGH CONTRACTS TO PAY FOR OVERHEAD AND THAT ANY FURTHER CONTRACTS WOULD BE "GRAVY."

5. WKSCARLET-3 MENTIONED THAT HE HAD BEEN PAYING U.S. TAXES ON HIS WKSCARLET SALARY BUT HAS NOT DONE SO FOR 1972 AND 1973. HE HAS NEVER PAID U.S. TAXES ON HIS BKHERALD SALARY, AND NOT FILED FORM 10-40 IN PAST TWO YEARS. STATION WOULD APPRECIATE READING ON WKSCARLET-3'S TAX SITUATION. ASSUME HE MUST FILE BACK TAXES ON BKHERALD SALARY IN ORDER ADHERE TAX LAW. GIVEN PLANNED 30 JUNE TERMINATION PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT	I N F O	RF FILE VR
ACTION #		

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 185196 EIA327 PAGE 03-03 IN 279251

TOR:122325Z JUN 74 CARA 24700

6. FILE 201-0320985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA 19915	June 74				

DOC. SUBJECT
Semi Annual Operations Report

SOURCE INFORMATION

EVALUATION

(4) WKSCARLET-3. WKSCARLET-3 was granted a POA effective 17 January 1972 and an OA effective 17 July 1972. He was first brought to the attention of the Station by WH/Miami. It is difficult to tell from our files exactly when contact was initiated, but as early as 1965, Subject was being used by BKHERALD. WKSCARLET-3 is currently in the process of establishing a private investigative company in Caracas. From January through March 1974, when the new government took over and WKSCARLET-3 was asked to leave his job, he was the Chief of Gov Div of Security of WKSCARLET, and reported on all aspects, operations, etc. of that unit. He is now in the process of being terminated, effective 30 June 1974, by his case officer, BACHHUBER, due to his lack of access and high profile. WKSCARLET-3 currently receives compensation in the amount of Bs2,000 per month. Subject was last successfully given an SGSWIRL on 8 May 1973. Since March 1974, his profile has been relatively high. There have been two articles in the local press naming him as a BKHERALD agent. Since those two articles, none have appeared; however, he has several high powered personal enemies in the current government and could come under political attack at any time. The Station does not feel that WKSCARLET-3 presents or will present a security threat. He has been well treated during his long relationship with BKHERALD which he realizes and is thankful for. Meetings to carry out the termination are being conducted with strict regard for security. A safehouse used for part of the period (S/H 45) and costing about $950, was terminated in March 1974. The only special commitment with WKSCARLET-3 is a termination payment of Bs6,000.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) WKSCARLET-3	201-			

FORM 867 SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (7-60)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 16-8 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — DATE-TIME GROUP — CITE — MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 202055Z DIRECTOR 565632

CONF: CCS2 INFO: FILE cms/woc4, WH8,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 38
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: CARACAS.

ADMIN JODENTY

REF: CARACAS 24700 (IN 279251)

1. REF STATES UKSCARLET/3 (U/3) NEVER PAID U.S. TAXES ON BKHERALD COMPENSATION. AS A RESIDENT ALIEN, U/3'S ENTIRE BKHERALD COMPENSATION IS SUBJECT U.S. TAX RETROACTIVE INITIAL MOC EFFECTIVE 2 FEBRUARY 1968.

2. U/3 SHOULD CONTINUE FILING TAX RETURN DIRECTLY I.R.S. REPORTING HIS UKSCARLET SALARY. HE IS NOT TO REPORT ANY BKHERALD COMPENSATION BON HIS OVERT TAX RETURN. ANY TAXES OWED ON BKHERALD COMPENSATION WILL BE HANDLED THROUGH BKHERALD TAX SYSTEM. U/3 MUST PROVIDE HQSB COPY TAX RETURNS FOR TAX YEARS 1969 THROUGH 1973 AND TAX YEAR 1974 WHEN DUE AND FILED SO THAT WE CAN ESTABLISH AMOUNT BACK TAXES DUE THOSE YEARS. HQS MUST BALSO BE PROVIDED BREAKDOWN GROSS TAXABLE COMPENSATION, BY MONTH AND IN U.S. DOLLARS, PAID U/3 WHILE UNDER MOC AT YOUR STATION.

3. SINCE U/3 1974 OVERT TAX RETURN NOT DUE UNTIL NEXT YEAR, REQUEST HE FURNISH 1974 ESTIMATE NON-BKHERALD TAXABLE EARNINGS

DATE: 18 JUNE 1974
ORIG: C.E.BRISKEY:LSS
UNIT: CCS/CSB
EXT: 6697/9059

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION — REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 063851

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE TIME GROUP | SITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

565632

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

(WKSCARLET EARNINGS, INTEREST, DIVIDENDS, RENTAL, ETC.), FILING STATUS AND NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS, SO HQS CAN ESTABLISH COVERT TAX LIABILITY THROUGH DATE TERMINATION. ONCE HE PROVIDE HQS COPY 1974 TAX RETURN, WE WILL RECONCILE TRUE TAX POSITION AND DETERMINE WHETHER SUFFICIENT TAX WITHHELD OR WHETHER HE DUE REFUND PORTION TAX COLLECTED BASED ON ESTIMATE.Y

4. IF STATION PLANS DISCONTINUE CONTACT WITH DD W/3 AFTER TERMINATION, HQS CAN PROVIDE ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS WHERE HE CAN CORRESPOND WITH HQS TO RESOLVE ANY OUTSTANDING TAX MATTERS.

E2 IMPDET.H

WH/3/D
WH/BF

DATE: 18 JUNE 1974
ORIG: C.E.BRISKEY:LSS
UNIT: CCS/CSB
EXT: 6697/9059

C/WH/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Stanley E Goff
C/CCS/CSB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

[illegible]
INDEX REQUESTED
NO INDEXING
APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
WKRALLY WKSCARLET
Transmittal of Reentry Permits for WKSCARLET-3 and his Wife

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. DIRECTOR 556718
B. DIRECTOR 553713

1. Transmitted under separate cover are the new reentry permits for WKSCARLET-3 and his wife, both valid to 30 May 1975.

2. Please inform WKSCARLET-3 that he must surrender his and his wife's expired reentry permits, which must be pouched to Headquarters for delivery to Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Ronald L. JUNGQUIST

Attachments:
2 Reentry permits u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas w/atts

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCH-10177

DATE
11 June 1974

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 01 201-300985

1 - IP
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Venezuela	Felipe Acevedo	lm	7271

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	11 June 74	Lloyd C. Burnett

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	11/6/74	Richard L. Conolly for

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

TO : WH/3/Venezuela
ATTENTION: Laura Cooley
FROM : Alien Affairs Office, OS

4 June 1974

SUBJECT: Luis POSADA-Carriles (A 12 419 708)
Nieves Elina GONZALEZ De POSADA (A 12 443 942)

REFERENCE: Your memorandum of request dated 17 May 1974.

Reentry Permit(s) issued for subject(s) on 31 May 1974, valid to 30 May 1975, may be used for unlimited entries into the United States during validity. Validity of Permit may be extended for a maximum period of twelve (12) months only. In certain foreign areas U. S. Consuls and U. S. Immigration Officers are authorized to extend the validity date. However, where security or cover considerations warrant, the Permit and Application for Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States, Form I-131, should be forwarded to Alien Affairs Officer in order to have the validity date extended through cleared liaison with Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Frederick F Bucci
Frederick F. Bucci
Alien Affairs Officer

Receipt acknowledged for Permit(s)#0459040 and 0459041:

Signature	Date

As Subject scheduled for termination 30 June 74, Agency will not be involved renewal.

2 [illegible] 060904

OUTGOING MESSAGE 2 N

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ADF	CDI	ACP	TOO	TPS	BRO	PAGE OF PAGES
0	0	0	0	0	0	1

ONF

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	221700Z	DIRECTOR	553713

CONF. WH8 INFO: FILE IP/AN CI/KPZ SECUR4 PSLEA4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY 7
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: CARACAS.Y

WKRALLY WKSCARLET Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 24468 (IN 2558106)

B. DIRECTOR 552723

C. CARACAS 24203 (IN 225142)

D. DIRECTOR 538768 Y

1. IN CONNECTION PROPOSED TERMINATION WKSCARLET-3 BY 31 MAY 74 (REFS A AND B), WISH ADVISE STATION THAT WE DO NOT EXPECT RECEIVE NEW REENTRY PERMITS FOR WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE BEFORE 30 MAY AT EARLIEST, SO STATION SHOULD PLAN TO MEET WKSCARLET-3 AT LEAST ONCE DURING JUNE TO DELIVER NEW PERMITS. IF VENEZUELAN RESIDENCE VISAS OF WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE ARE STAMPED IN EXPIRED REENTRY PERMITS (WHICH WE ASSUME WAS REASON FOR REF C REQUEST THAT THEY BE ALLOWED RETAIN EXPIRING PERMITS AT TIME OF APRIL VISIT MIAMI), WKSCARLET-3 WILL NEED TO HAVE VISAS TRANSFERRED TO NEW PERMITS AND THEN MEET STATION C/O AGAIN TO SURRENDER EXPIRED PERMITS, WHICH MUST BE POUCHED HQS FOR DELIVERY TO I&NS. Y

2. WITH REGARD TO POSSIBILITY OF WKSCARLET-3 NEED TO LEAVE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

201-300985
22 May 74

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 013978

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE 553713

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 FILE #

VENEZUELA HASTILY FOR COOLING OFF PERIOD, PLEASE NOTE THAT HE SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO VISIT U.S. BEFORE RECEIPT OF NEW REENTRY PERMITS. AS INDICATED REF D, IT WOULD NOT BE ADVISABLE FOR HIM TO ENTER U.S. ON HIS VENEZUELAN PASSPORT WITH U.S. TOURIST VISA. THEREFORE, IF HE MUST LEAVE VENEZUELA DURING NEXT FEW WEEKS, RECOMMEND HE GO TO OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY UNTIL ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE TO DELIVER NEW PERMITS TO HIM.Y

3. FURTHER COMMENTS FOLLOW RE WKSCARLET-3'S U.S. RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS AND CITIZENSHIP ELIGIBILITY AS RELATED TO HIS PENDING TERMINATION AND FUTURE PLANS.Y

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.H

REF A - EVALUATION OF SECURITY RISKS IN CASE OF WKSCARLET-3. STATION CONSIDERING TERMINATION 31 MAY INSTEAD OF 30 JUNE. LAYING GROUNDWORK FOR POSSIBLE HASTY DEPARTURE FROM VENEZUELA FOR COOLING OFF PERIOD.

REF B - CONCURRED IN STATION CONSIDERATION OF EARLY TERMINATION.

REF C - RE VISIT MIAMI TO APPLY FOR NEW REENTRY PERMITS. ASKED THEY BE ALLOWED RETAIN OLD PERMITS. MENTIONED POSSESSION VENEZUELAN PPT WITH VALID U.S. TOURIST VISA.

REF D - RECOMMENDED WKSCARLET-3 NOT USE VENEZUELAN PPT ON ENTRY MIAMI.

DATE: 22 MAY 74
ORIG: L. COOLEY
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

OS/AAS ERVAN E. KUHNKE (IN DRAFT)

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODU[illegible] Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS P[illegible]D E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPS	SHD	SCI		PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1		

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	301944Z	DIRECTOR	556718

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE (IP/AN) CI/OPS SECURY PS/EG4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 9

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: UPRIORITY CARACAS.Y

UKKALLY UKSCARLET Y

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 553713

B. CARACAS 24489 |IN 258600|Y

1. IN COURSE OF TERMINATING UKSCARLET-3, STATION SHOULD MAKE CERTAIN THAT HE UNDERSTANDS EFFECT TERMINATION MAY HAVE ON HIS RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS AND ELIGIBILITY FOR NATURALIZATION AS U.S. CITIZEN. PLS ADVISE UKSCARLET-3 THAT UPON TERMINATION OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BY AGENCY, HIS PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE WHILE ABROAD IS SIMULTANEOUSLY TERMINATED. IN ORDER TO RETAIN HIS CURRENT ELIGIBILITY FOR NATURALIZATION, HE MUST RETURN TO U.S. BEFORE ELAPSE OF ONE YEAR FROM DATE OF EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION TO AVOID A BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF HIS RESIDENCEU REQUIREMENT. SHOULD BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF RESIDENCE OCCUR, SUBJECT WILL START A NEW PERIOD WITH 364 DAYS, AND HE WOULD THEN BE ELIGIBILE FOR NATURALIZATION FOUR YEARS AND ONE DAY FROM DATE OF RETURN TO U.S., PROVIDED ALL OTHER BASIC REQUIREMENTS ARE MET. HE SHOULD CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT REENTRY PERMIT DOES NOT [illegible] PROTECT CONTINUITY OF HIS RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

201-360985
30 MAY 74

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 013978

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

556718

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

2. WITH RESPECT TO UKSCARLET-3'SQ WIFE, IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO GIVE A FIRM POSITION AS TO WHEN SHE WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR NATURALIZATION. SHE DID NOT HAVE A PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE WHILE ABROAD, SINCE SHE WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR THIS BBENEFIT, AND OUR FILES DO NOT REFLECT ANY VISITS TO U.S. BETWEEN MAY 70 AND APRIL 74. COUNTING FROM HER LAST VISIT TO U.S. IN APRIL 74, SHE SHOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR NATURALIZATION IN APRIL 78 IF SHE RETURNS TO U.S. BEFORE ONE YEAR HAS ELAPSED. THIS COULD BE SOONER IF HER HUSBAND WERE TO BE NATURALIZED IMMEDIATELY UPON THEIR RETURN, AS SHE WOULD ONLY HAVE TO WAIT THREE YEARS INSTEDAD OF FOUR.Y

3. SUBJECTS SHOULD ALSO BE ADVISED THAT THEY NOW HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING THEIR REENTRY PERMITS CURRENT. IMPRESS UPON THEM THAT THEY ARE NOT TO MENTION TO ANYONE FACT THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO GET SREENTRY PERMITS IN 72 WITHOUT RETURNING TO THE U.S. IN THAT INSTANCE THEY WERE BENEFICIARIES OF [illegible]"DOUBLE DEAL" ARRANGEMENT [illegible]WHICH HQS HAS WORKED OUT WITH I&NS HEADQUARTERS.Y

4. NEW REENTRY PERMITS OF UKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE SHOULD BE READY WITHIN FEW DAYS. CONTRARY TO STATEMENT PARA 2 REF A, IF SUBJECTS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 — PAGE 3 OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — DATE-TIME GROUP — CITE — MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

556718

SHOULD HAVE REASON VISIT U.S. BEFORE RECEIPT NEW PERMITS, THEY CAN ENTER ON ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARDS (FORM I-151).

5. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

REF A - NEW REENTRY PERMITS CANNOT BE OBTAINED BEFORE PROPOSED DATE WKSCARLET-3 TERMINATION. W-3 SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT VISIT U.S. BEFORE RECEIPT NEW PERMITS. COMMENTS TO FOLLOW RE EFFECT TERMINATION ON CITIZENSHIP ELIGIBILITY AND FUTURE PLANS.

REF B - RE PROPOSED TERMINATION OF WKSCARLET-3 AND HIS TENTATIVE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT PLANS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE RETURN TO U.S.

OS/AAS FRED BUCCI (DRAFT)

DATE: 30 MAY 74
ORIG: L. COOLEY
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 013978

S E C R E T

14-00000

DISSEM BY [illegible] TOTAL COPIES [illegible]

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

2Y

STAFF PREC[illegible]

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED WE BY X AT 1935 Z

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/IP/AN, C/PS/PG, C/PS/EG3

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 126605 EIA301 PAGE 01 IN 258600

TOR:211923Z MAY 74 CARA 24489

S E C R E T 211907Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24489

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. CARACAS 24468(IN 255816)

B. DIRECTOR 552369

C. DIRECTOR 552723

D. CARACAS 24481(IN 257573)

1. WKSCARLET-3 DOES NOT INTEND LOOK FOR NEW JOB. HE IS ESTABLISHING PRIVATE INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY FROM WHICH HE EXPECTS EARN LIVELIHOOD. HE HAS RECEIVED A FEW SMALL CONTRACTS AND THINKS THAT HE CAN DO WELL IN THAT FIELD, IF ERASTO FERNANDEZ WILL LEAVE WELL ENOUGH ALONE. SHOULD ERASTO CONTINUE CAUSE HIM PROBLEMS, WKSCARLET-3 WILL TAKE ACTION AS INDICATED REF A. WKSCARLET-3 HAS COPIES OF RECEIPTS WHICH ERASTO SIGNED DURING FIVE YEAR COPEI GOVERNMENT PROVING THAT ERASTO WAS PAID BS. 10,000 MONTHLY FROM WKSCARLET'S SECRET BUDGET (HE OBTAINED THE RECEIPTS FROM WKSCARLET-1 WHO PAID ERASTO.) HE INTENDS TO WARN ERASTO FIRST IN ATTEMPT REACH SOME AGREEMENT WITH HIM. IF HE UNSUCCESSFUL, HE WILL HAVE THE STORY AND RECEIPTS PUBLISHED IN ONE OF THE MAJOR DAILY NEWSPAPERS.

SECRET

RECORD COPY FILED IN 75-2-16/3

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-300985

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 126605 EIA301 PAGE 02 IN 258600

TOR:211923Z MAY 74 CARA 24489

2. AS REPORTED REF D, 24 MAY EDITION OF "ELITE" WHICH HIT STREETS 20 MAY, CARRIED TWO PAGE STORY REGARDING "WATERGATE CRIOLLO" STATING THAT ERASO FERNANDEZ IS IN CHARGE OF INVESTIGATION BEING CARRIED OUT TO DETERMINE LEVEL OF POLITICAL ESPIONAGE CARRIED OUT DURING CAMPAIGN AGAINST WKNOBLE-11. WKSCARLET-3 WAS NOT MENTIONED IN STORY.

3. MORNING OF 21 MAY, WKNOBLE-8 TOLD COS THAT ERASTO IS OUT TO GET WKSCARLET-3 AND WKTANGO-1 FOR REASONS STATED REF A.

4. WKSCARLET-3 HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR TERMINATION SINCE ELECTION WHEN IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT HE WOULD LOSE JOB IN WKSCARLET AND MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO GET JOB IN AREA WHERE STATION HAD INTEREST. STATION HAS KEPT RELATIONSHIP GOING IN ORDER GIVE HIM CHANCE TO GET JOB AND IT BEGAN TO APPEAR, AFTER HIS TRIP TO MIAMI, THAT HE MIGHT GET JOB WITH WKNOBLE-8. OR NATIONAL POLICE WHEN IT FORMED. STATION THINKS IT UNLIKELY THAT WKSCARLET-3 WOULD TURN OUT TO BE SECURITY PROBLEM. OTHER THAN GETTING PRIVATE INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY OFF THE GROUND, HE CLAIMS TO HAVE OTHER IRONS IN THE FIRE: RETURNING TO MIAMI WHERE HE HAS FRIENDS (NOT DRUG RELATED) AND A JOB OFFER IN SPAIN. THIS WILL NOT BE WKSCARLET-3'S FIRST TERMINATION AND HE IS FIRST TO RECOGNIZE THAT HE MUST HAVE ACCESS TO CONTINUE

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 126505 EIA301 PAGE 03-03 IN 258600

TOR:2119232 MAY 74 CARA 24489

WITH BKHERALD.

5. STATION'S PLANS WERE TO GIVE WKSCARLET-3 UNTIL 30 JUNE TO GET JOB WITH WKNOBLE-6 OR IN OTHER AREA OF INTEREST. FAILING THAT, TERMINATE HIM, GIVING HIM BS. 6.000 (THREE MONTHS SALARY) AS TERMINATION PAYMENT. COMMENT REGARDING EXTRA MONTHS PAY IN REF A MADE SINCE HE WOULD NORMALLY HAVE BEEN PAID JUNE SALARY. SINCE HE WILL PROBABLY BE TERMINATED 31 MAY, WOULD ADD JUNE SALARY TO BS. 6,000 THUS BRING TOTAL TERMINATION PAYMENT UP TO BS. 8,000. WKSCARLET-3 NOT PROMISED ANY TERMINATION PAYMENT, NOR HAS HE RAISED SUBJECT. STATION FULLY EXPECTS TERMINATION TO BE AMICABLE AND DOESN'T ANTICIPATE ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS.

6. FILE: 75-2-16/3; 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 1 PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 27-3 RUN BY 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED WH BY MJ AT 1731 Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT Chief 8

ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR C/IP/AN DDO C/CI/OPS C/OPS/INT-2 C/PS/EG-3 C/OSG C/OSC/ST C/SB 5

~~T 126170 EIA075 PAGE 01 IN 258432~~

TOR:211729Z MAY 74 CARA 24483

S E C R E T 211618Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24483

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

RYBAT WKNUGGET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 552855

B. CARACAS 24453 (IN 254992)

{bottom SAFE}

WKSCARLET-3

WKSTANGO-1

FERNANDEZ 201-324359

1. AS OF THIS TIME STATION HAS MADE NO MENTION OF SUBJECT REFERENCES TO AMBASSADOR AND UNLESS THERE CHANGE IN SITUATION AND ACTUAL COMPROMISE TAKES PLACE OR IS SERIOUSLY THREATENED, WOULD MUCH PREFER NOT TO DO SO. HOWEVER, SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY STATION WILL LEVEL WITH HIM, TELLING HIM ALL FACTS HE NEEDS TO KNOW AS WELL AS COVER STORY STATION USES OR PLANS USE WITH LIAISON. AS OF THIS TIME THERE NO FURTHER INDICATION GOV PURSUING INVESTIGATION.

2. COS HAD MEETING WITH WKNOBLE-8 MORNING 21 MAY. LATTER, WHO NOW CLAIMS HE HAS NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR TELTAP OP BUT ADMITS THAT GOV (UNDER RESPONSIBILITY MINISTRY OF INTERIOR) NOW TAPPING ABOUT 30 TELEPHONES (WKSCARLET-9 SAYS 38 LINES). WKNOBLE-8 SAYS THAT RECENT PRESS CHARGES ON WIRETAPPING WHICH REPORTED OUR RECENT CABLES ON SUBJECT OF WKNUGGET OP WERE INSTIGATED BY ERASTO FERNANDEZ AND THAT THERE CURRENTLY BATTLE OF SORTS GOING ON BETWEEN FERNANDEZ

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 126178 EIA875 PAGE 02 IN 258432

TOR:2117292 MAY 74 CARA 24483

AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR WHO FEELS FERNANDEZ IRRESPONSIBLE AND SIMPLY TRYING GET BACK AT HIS COPEI AND OTHER ENEMIES. ACCORDING WKNOBLE-8, FERNANDEZ BROUGHT WKSCARLET-3 AND WKTANGO-1 TO VENEZUELA FROM EXILE AND GAVE BOTH EMPLOYMENT. HOWEVER, BOTH STAYED WITH COPEI AFTER 1968 ELECTION AND FERNANDEZ HAS NEVER FORGIVEN THEM. HE SAYS FERNANDEZ' REAL OBJECTIVE IS TO KICK BOTH OUT OF VENEZUELA AND HE FEARS FERNANDEZ MAY SUCCEED.]

3. WKNOBLE-8 MADE NO MENTION OF MINISTRY DISCOVERY OF WKNUGGET TELTAP BUT DID SAY THAT THEY HAD UNCOVERED ONE BELONGING TO WKSCARLET-2, WHICH HE ALLOWED WKSCARLET-2 MAY HAVE BEEN RUNNING FOR COPEI BUT HE, PERSONALLY, THINKS WKSCARLET-2 JUST TRYING MAKE SOME MONEY IN PRIVATE BUSINESS OF HIS OWN. WKNOBLE-8 DID NOT LET ON EVEN THAT THEY HAVE DISCOVERED TAPS WHICH MAY BELONG TO STATION BUT DID SAY THAT BY CAREFUL CHECK OF FRAMES IN CENTRALS IT NOT DIFFICULT DISCOVER TELTAPS.

4. STATION AGAIN URGED HIM DISCUSS NEED FOR EARLY RESUMPTION TAPS ON SOVIETS WITH MINISTER AND HE AGAIN PROMISED HE WOULD DO SO. STATION SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF RUNNING JOINT TELTAP OP AGAINST SOVIETS, LIBYIANS AND OTHER TARGETS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND BLE-8 APPEARED GENIUNELY INTERESTED. SAID HE THOUGHT SUCH A

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ N BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

STAFF

ADV COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

UNIT

ACTION #

INFO

RF. FILE. VR.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 126178 61A875 PAGE 03-03 IN 258432

TOR:211729Z MAY 74 CARA 24483

PROPOSITION WOULD BE APPROVED IMMEDIATELY BY THE MINISTER. COS COMMENTED THAT IF IDEA APPEALS TO THEM THEN WE WOULD EXPLORE FURTHER AT A LATER DATE.

5. FILE: 75-6-55/3. E2 IMPDET

* C/S SUGGESTS ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO D/SECUR

** RELAYED TO DIRTECH
PER DIR 553198

SECRET

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CNF 0 0 0 0 0 0 15-1 1

SECRET

STAFF 202016Z DIRECTOR 552723

CONF: c/WH8 INFO: FILE c/WPlan, c/wh/re, c/ws/co3,

0 RID RY:
0
0 RETURN TO PER
0 #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS.

RYBAT WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. CARACAS 24468 (IN 255816)

B. DIRECTOR 552369

1. APPRECIATE REF A EVALUATION WKSCARLET-3'S SITUATION. CONCUR STATION CONSIDERATION OF EARLY TERMINATION. ASSUME COMMENT PARA 4 REF A RE POSSIBLY PAYING FOR EXTRA MONTH, IF NECESSARY, REFERS TO EXTRA PAY IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER TERMINATION BENEFITS DUE WKSCARLET-3. IN THIS CONNECTION, WOULD APPRECIATE DETAILS RE STATION PLANS FOR HIS TERMINATION AND BENEFITS CONTEMPLATED.

2. WOULD APPEAR TO US THAT WKSCARLET-3 MIGHT HAVE DIFFICULTY LOCATING NEW JOB AND COULD FIND HIMSELF ~~[illegible]~~ WITH VERY LIMITED RESOURCES OVER FAIR PERIOD OF TIME. THIS BEING CASE, HE COULD WELL TURN OUT TO BE SECURITY PROBLEM, ESPECIALLY IF HE REMAINS IN VENEZUELA. THUS, BELIEVE IT BEHOOVES US TO ENSURE THAT TERMINATION AMICABLE EVEN IF THIS NECESSITATES TERMINATION BENEFITS BEYOND THOSE ACTUALLY PROMISED OR DESERVED. YOUR COMMENTS REQUESTED.

RECORD COPY FILED IN 75-2-1613

DUPLICATE COPY FOR CROSS FILING INTO 201-300985

3. FILE 75-2-16/3; 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

REF A - EVALUATION OF SECURITY RISKS IN CASE OF WKSCARLET-3. CONSIDERING TERMINATING 31 MAY INSTEAD OF 30 JUNE.

REF B - "WATERGATE CRILLO" STORY IS OMINOUS. ASKED IF STATION COULD ARRANGE FOR HIS QUICK DEPARTURE FROM VENEZUELA FOR COOLING OFF PERIOD.

DATE: 20 MAY 74
ORIG: L.C. BURNETT
UNIT: WH/7/V
EXT: 1535

C/WHD 3

C/WH/3

SECRET

17 May 1974

201

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff
Office of Security

SUBJECT : Request for New Reentry Permits for Luis C. Posada Carriles and Nieves Elina Gonzalez de Posada

1. It is requested that new reentry permits be obtained for Luis C. Posada Carriles and his wife, Nieves Elina de Posada, whose previous reentry permits expired on 20 April 1974. Attached are completed Forms I-131, "Application for Issuance or Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States," for Mr. Posada and his wife, together with two photographs of each and a check for $20.00 payable to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

2. As you know, when Mr. and Mrs. Posada visited Miami in April 1974, just prior to the expiration date of their old permits, they were permitted to retain the expiring permits for use in reentering Venezuela. It is understood that the expired permits are to be pouched to Headquarters for delivery to I&NS as soon as the new permits have been delivered to Mr. and Mrs. Posada.

Laura Cooley
WH/3/Venezuela

Attachments:
See above

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 50 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 25 ____ RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ____

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR [illegible], C/OPS, OSG/OC
C/OPS, PS/EG4, SSS

T 118245 EIA182 PAGE 01 IN 255816

TOR:182243Z MAY 74 CARA 24468

S E C R E T 182212Z MAY 74 STAFF

PRECEDENCE

CITE CARACAS 24468

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 552369

1. STATION CAREFULLY CONSIDERED RISK IN MEETING WKSCARLET/3 TODAY BUT IN VIEW OF GOV DISCOVERY OF WKNUGGET TELTAP OP FELT IF NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TAKEN (AND THEY WERE) IN ARRANGING MEETING, WKSCARLET-3 MIGHT POSSIBLY BE ABLE SHED SOME LIGHT ON WHETHER OR NOT STORY ON HIM RELATED IN ANYWAY TO GOV "SPY SEARCH EFFORT". WKSCARLET-3 NOT CONCERNED ABOUT STORY AND ON 16 MAY DISCUSSED IT WITH FRIENDS IN WKSCARLET-3. ACCORDING TO WKSCARLET-3, WKSCARLET NOT CONCERNED AND HE NOTES NO SURVEILLANCE AND NO APPARENT INTEREST IN HIS ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS. HE CLAIMS THAT STORY WAS PLANTED BY ERASTO FERNANDEZ. FERNANDEZ 20RIGINALLY HIRED HIM BUT SINCE 1969 HAS BEEN UNFRIENDLY TOWARD WKSCARLET-3. THIS UNFRIENDLINESS APPARENTLY CAUSED BY WKSCARLET-3'S DEFECTION TO COPEYANOS (WORKING FOR WKSCARLET FOR PAST FIVE YEARS) AND IN 1973 FAILED LEAVE COPEYANOS AND WORK FOR ADECO VICTORY. WKSCARLET-2 SAID NIGHT 16 MAY HE FELT CERTAIN STORY IS PURE PRESS SENSATIONALISM, AND WKSCARLET-3 SAYS THAT IF [illegible] FURTHER

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-300985

RECORD COPY FILED IN 75-2-16/3 SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	I N F O	RF. FILE . VR .	1		4	
			2		5	
ACTION #			3		6	

T 118245 EIA182 PAGE 02 IN 255816

TOR:180243Z MAY 74 CARA 24468

APPEARS OF A SIMILAR NATURE HE PLANS GO DIRECTLY TO FERNANDEZ, ACCUSE HIM AND DEMAND PERSECUTION BE STOPPED. HE SAYS NAME "COMISARIO BASILIO" USED BY WRITER (FERNANDEZ) FOR FERNANDEZ LACKS PROOF OF HIS CHARGES AND IF HE HAD USED TRUE NAME OR PICTURE OF WKSCARLET-3, FERNANDEZ WOULD BE OPEN FOR LIBEL. WKSCARLET-3 CLAIMED THAT A FRIEND AND REPORTER ON STAFF OF "EL MUNDO" WAS INVITED TO MIRAFLORES PLACE (13 MAY) ALONG WITH REPORTERS FROM OTHER NEWS PAPERS TO "BE GIVEN THE STORY". "ULTIMAS NOTICIAS" WAS ONLY NEWSPAPER WHICH CARRIED STORY.

2. BRADSPIES HAD REGULARLY SCHEDULED MEETING AT NOON TODAY WITH DEPUTY CHIEF WKSCARLET AND SUBJECT OF "BASILIO" ARTICLE CAME UP. DEPUTY SAID WKSCARLET ATTACHES NO IMPORTANCE TO ARTICLE, CONSIDERS IT PERSONAL ATTACK ON WKSCARLET/3 OR JUST PRESS SENSATIONALISM, AND THAT HE PERSONALLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT WKSCARLET/3 WORKING FOR EITHER WKHERALD OR LNERGO. DEPUTY SAID HE BELIEVES IT UNLIKELY THAT GOV WILL PURSUE "BASILIO" CASE FOR GOV INTENDS USE TELTAPS EXTENSIVELY AND WISHES AVOID ANY PUBLICITY WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN EMBARASSMENT TO IT.

3. APART FROM ABOVE, WKSCARLET/3 HAS REPORTED SEVERAL RECENT MEETINGS WITH WKNOBLE-6 IN EFFORT ARRANGE JOB ON ONE OR MORE PROJECTS WKNOBLE/6 TRYING GET UNDERWAY. WHILE WKNOBLE/3, WHO

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE . VR .	1		4	
			2		5	
ACTION #			3		6	

T 118245 EIA182 PAGE 23-03 IN 255816

TOR:1822432 MAY 74 CARA 24468

MENTIONED WKSCARLET/3 TO COS ONE ONE RECENT OCCASSION (ASKING WHAT STATION'S OPINION OF WKSCARLET/3 WAS), COMMITTED HIMSELF TO JOB FOR WKSCARLET/3. THE LATTER BELIEVES THAT SINCE PUBLICATION OF ARTICLE IT MOST UNLIKELY WKNOBLE/8 WILL HIRE HIM.

4. RELIZE THAT ALL THE FACTS NOT YET IN BUT ON BALANCE WE BELIEVE "BASILIO" ARTICLE OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE AND POSSIBLY NOT RELATED TO GOV DISCOVERY OF WKNUGGET TELTAP OP NOR OF DISCOVERY OF WKSCARLET/2'S TAP. HOWEVER, WE WILL LAY GROUNDWORK SO THAT WKSCARLET/3 CAN MAKE HASTY DEPARTURE FOR COOLING OFF PERIOD SHOULD THAT BECOME NECESSARY. AT SAME TIME WE WISH AVOID CONTACT WITH HIM AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FOR DEVIOUS REASONS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. IN FACT, STATION HAD PLANNED TERMINATE HIM EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE AS THUS FAR HE HAS BEEN UNABLE LAND JOB WITH ACCESS OF INTEREST. IN VIEW OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, WE WILL CONSIDER POSSIBLE TERMINATION AS OF 31 MAY 74 AND PAY FOR EXTRA MONTH IN VIEW OF SHORT NOTICE IF NECESSARY.

5. FILE: 75-2-16/3 AND 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE 1⁄2-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

STAFF 172329Z DIRECTOR 552569

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE (R/BW, c/ops, osc/oc, c/ops, 555

0 0 0 RETURN TO PLN

0 DISSEM BY: 6

0 #

TO: IMMEDIATE NIACT CARACAS.Y

WKRALLY WKSCARLET Y

REF: CARACAS 24453 (IN 255137)Y

1. REF STORY RE BKHERALD AND LNERGO IS [illegible] OMINOUS, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW RECENT WKNUGGET DEVELOPMENT.Y

2. WE CONCERNED THAT IF ARRESTED WKSCARLET-3 LIKELY TO REVEAL DETAILS OF RECENT BKHERALD RELATIONSHIP AND EVEN EMBELLISH HIS ACTIVITIES IN OUR BEHALF. WE BELIEVE CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO POSSIBILITY OF HEADING OFF HIS BEING PICKED UP BY GOV AUTHORITIE OR EXPOSURE TO PRESS. TO THIS END, COULD STATION ARRANGE FOR QUICK DEPARTURE FROM COUNTRY FOR COOLING OFF PERIOD? [illegible] YOUR COMMENTS REQUESTED.Y

3. WE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT STATION MEETING WITH WKSCARLET-3 DURING CURRENT SITUATION. PLEASE CONTINUE USE EXTREME CAUTION.

4. FILE 75-2-16/3 AND [illegible] 201-300785. E2 IMPDET.R

REF - ULTIMAS NOTICIAS PUBLISHED STORY REGARDING "WATERGATE CRIOLL ON 014 MAY. BOTH IN HEADLINE AND IN STORY WKSCARLET-3 MENTIONE USING ONLY HIS WKSCARLET ALIAS.

RECORD COPY FILED IN 75-2-16/3

DATE: 17 MAY 74
ORIG: L.C.BURNETT
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

C/WH/CA

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-300985

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 43 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR. [illegible] ASIEG4 c/ops2 [illegible] c/ci/s

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 042692 EIA735 PAGE 01 IN 227671

TOR:1823512 APR 74 CARA 24235

SECRET 1822222 APR 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24235

TO: DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: A. DIRECTOR 500819

B. CARACAS 24106 (IN 208147)

1. STATION INTENDS TERMINATE WKSCARLET-3 EFFECTIVE 1 MAY IF HE HAS NO JOB IN WKSCARLET, PTJ NARC SQUAD, OR WITH WKNOBLE-8 IN TELTAP OP BY THAT DATE. STATION EXPECTS NO PROBLEMS WITH TERMINATION AS WKSCARLET-3 AWARE THAT WITHOUT ONE OF ABOVE JOBS HE OF LITTLE USE TO US.

2. AFTER 1 MAY TERMINATION, STATION WILL OFFER PUT WKSCARLET-3 IN CONTACT WITH DEA PER REF A.

3. WKSCARLET-3 TERMINATION PAYMENT WILL BE THREE MONTHS SALARY, BY6,000 (US$1,402). FUNDS FOR TERMINATION INCLUDED IN REF.

4. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

201-300985

18 Apr 74

SECRET

RECORD COPY

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER TOTAL COPIES 26-2 RC

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY 7 AT

ACTION UNIT	INFO		STAFF			
WH8		RF FILE VR IPAN, SSS, PSIEG4, CIIOP2,	1		4	
ACTION #		OSGIOC, OSGIST, 9OPS	2		5	
			3		6	

T 116477 EIA467 PAGE 01 IN 255137

TOR:171540Z MAY 74 CARA 24453

S E C R E T 171343Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24453

TO: DIRECTOR

WKRALLY/WKSCARLET

1. EULTIMAS NOTICIAS PUBLISHED STORY REGARDING "WATERGATE CRIOLLO," (PAGE 44) ON 14 MAY, BOTH IN HEADLINE AND IN STORY WKSCARLET-3 MENTIONED USING ONLY HIS WKSCARLET ALIAS.

2. ACCORDING TO STORY, WKSCARLET-3, A CUBAN WHO WORKED FOR BKHERALD AND LNARGO IN PAST AND HAS VAST INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND, BROUGHT VARIOUS SPYING DEVICES INTO VENEZUELA: BINOCULARS WITH WHICH ONE CAN READ LICENSE PLATES AT 1000 METERS, A MECHANISM TO LOCATE ROUTES OF CARS, AND OTHER OBJECTS TO TAP TELEPHONES.

3. SUPPOSED PURPOSE OF EQUIPMENT WAS TO OBTAIN PRE-ELECTION INFORMATION FROM TORRE DE LAS DELICIAS WHERE OFFICES OF CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ WERE LOCATED WHILE HE CAMPAIGNING FOR PRESIDENT.

4. STORY ATTRIBUTED TO "A SOURCE" AND ACCORDING TO "THE AUTHORITIES" THE CASE WOULD BE TAKEN TO COURT WITH

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

201-300985
17may74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY ______

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

I N F O   RF   FILE   VR

ACTION #

T 116477   EIA467   PAGE 02-02   IN 255137

TOR:171540Z MAY 74   CARA 24453

PROOF WHICH WILL CONFIRM ACTS OF POLITICAL ESPIONAGE.

5. STATION HAS NO FURTHER DETAILS. CASE OFFICER HAS MEETING SCHEDULED WITH WKSCARLET-3 TODAY AND WILL TAKE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS PRIOR TO AND DURING MEETING TO DETECT SURVEILLANCE. ACCORDING WKSCARLET-9 ON 16 MAY, WKSCARLETS KNOW NOTHING OF THIS BUT HE WILL CHECK AND ADVISE. THERE HAVE BEEN NO FOLLOW-UP STORIES TO THIS DATE. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

6. FILE: 221-0300985. E2 IMPDET

08 JUN 1974

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief WH 17 April 1974

ATTENTION : Edward A. Cahill

SUBJECT : **LETTER ADDRESS ACTIONS**
590 966

1. With reference to your verbal request of 15 Apr 74 the following action was taken concerning facility P.O. Box 4540
Brookland Station
Washington, D.C. 20017

"This is a Catch-all box used by several components of this Agency"

______Cancelled

__XX__ Added as co-addressee

Reinaldo J. FIALLO

__XX__ Deleted as co-addressee

Edmond A. SAKIN

2. Any inquiries concerning the above action should be directed to the Office of Security, Special Facilities Desk.

Given to WKSCARLET-3
for use in sending in
Applications for New
U.S. Reentry Permits.
Supposed to be one-time
use only.

Robert W. Gambino
Deputy Director of Security
Personnel Security & Investigations

FORM 10-73 3236a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (5-25)

WKSCARLET-3 201

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

15-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
1 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP
162117Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
538768

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE P/A, SECURITY

0 INDEX . DISSEM BY: 55
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: IMMEDIATE NIACT CARACAS INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 2[illegible]203 IN

1. RE PARA 2 REF. STRONGLY RECOMMEND WKSCARLET-3 NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO OR SHOW HIS VENEZUELAN PASSPORT TO U.S. IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES. SHOULD EXHIBIT ONLY U.S. REENTRY PERMIT.

2. FYI: IMMIGRATION SERVICE WILL BE ALERTED.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

REF - REQUESTS HQS HAVE I&NS ALLOW WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE RETAIN EXPIRING REENTRY PERMITS. POSSIBLE PROBLEM IF I&NS ASKS TO SEE SUBJECTS VENEZUELAN PASSPORT, WHICH CONTAINS U.S TOURIST VISA.

OS/AAS FRED BUCCI (DRAFT)

ADC/WH/COG

201-300985
16 Apr 74

DATE: 16 APRIL 74
ORIG: L. COOLEY
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 013978

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 32 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 25-1 RUN

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED WH BY D AT 1940 Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION #

INFO RF, FILE, VR, IP/AN, LSN/ID, C/OPS, SECUR4, CCS2, DCD,

T 235810 PAGE 01-01 IN 225142

TOR:161929Z APR 74 CARA 24203

S E C R E T 161910Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24203

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 530655 (NOT SENT WH/MIAMI)

B. DIRECTOR 538452

1. WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE WILL TRAVEL VIASA FLT 750 ON 17 APRIL DEPARTING CARACAS 0930 AND ARRIVING MIAMI 1300. PLS HAVE I&NS MIAMI ALLOW THEM RETAIN THEIR REENTRY PERMITS.

2. ONLY PROBLEM WHICH STATION CAN SEE MIGHT ARISE IS IF I&NS REQUESTS TO SEE WKSCARLET-3'S PASSPORT AND REENTRY PERMIT. WKSCARLET-3 TRAVELS ON VENEZUELAN PASSPORT WHICH STATES HE BORN IN VENEZUELA RATHER THAN CUBA AND PASSPORT CONTAINS VALID U.S. TOURIST VISA.

3. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-300985

16 Apr 74

OUTGOING MESSAGE

24-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 152226Z DIRECTOR 538452

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN LSN/ID CI/OPS SE/ZW/24 CCS 2

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 33

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO ROUTINE WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. CARACAS 24186 (IN 222753)

B. WH/MIAMI 21528 (IN 222896)

1. WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE WILL NOT BE ABLE OBTAIN NEW REENTRY PERMITS IN MIAMI AS THEIR FILE HELD IN WASHINGTON. I&NS MIAMI NOT AWARE SUBJECT AND WIFE SPECIAL CASES. NECESSITY FOR VISIT MIAMI IS THAT OLD PERMITS MUST SHOW SUBJECTS REENTERED U.S. BEFORE PERMITS EXPIRED AND ALSO THAT APPLICATION FOR NEW PERMITS MUST BE INITIATED IN PERSON IN U.S. WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE SHOULD OBTAIN AND FILL OUT FORMS I-131 AND MAIL THESE FROM MIAMI, TOGETHER WITH TWO PHOTOS OF EACH AND DOLLAR CHECK OR MONEY ORDER PAYABLE TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FOR TOTAL OF $20, TO FOLLOWING (ACCOMMODATION) ADDRESS:

REINALDO J. FIALLO
POST OFFICE BOX 4540 (FOUR FIVE FOUR ZERO)
BROOKLYN STATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20017

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

201-300985
15 Apr 74

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 013978

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF . 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

538452

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

WE WILL FILE APPLICATIONS WITH I&NS HERE AS SOON AS RECEIVED. REF B NAME AND PHONE NUMBER SHOULD BE GIVEN WKSCARLET-3 FOR USE ONLY IF SOME PROBLEM ARISES.Y

2. AS OLD REENTRY PERMITS ARE SO CLOSE TO EXPIRATION, IT NORMAL FOR I&NS TO PICK THEM UP WHEN WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE ENTER U.S. ARE VENEZUELAN VISAS IMPRINTED IN REENTRY PERMITS, AND IF SO WILL SUBJECTS HAVE ANY PROBLEM REENTERING VENEZUELA WITHOUT THEM? IF PROBLEM EXISTS, WE CAN HAVE I&NS MIAMI ALERTED IN ADVANCE OF SUBJECTS' ARRIVAL AND REQUEST I&NS ALLOW THEM RETAIN PERMITS. IF THIS NECESSARY, PLS ADVISE SOONEST AND PROVIDE SUBJECTS' FLIGHT NUMBER AND TIME OF ARRIVAL MIAMI. Y

3. FILE 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.Y

REF A - WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE TRAVELLING MIAMI 17 APRIL TO RENEW REENTRY PERMITS. STATION ASSUMES I&NS AWARE THEY SPECIAL CASES SO WILL HAVE NO TROUBLE WITH RENEWALS, BUT REQUESTS MIAMI STATION PROVIDE EMERGENCY PHONE CONTACT.
REF B - NAME AND PHONE NUMBER PROVIDED BY WH/MIAMI.

C/WH/COG

C/WH/SEC E. CAHILL (DRAFT)

OS/AAS FRED BUCCI (DRAFT)

DATE: 15 APRIL 74
ORIG: L. COOLEY
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
C. BY: 0139[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

15 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: OS/Special Facilities

SUBJECT: Request of P.O. Box

1. This will confirm telephonic request to your office on 15 April 1974 for a Washington, D.C. P.O. Box to receive one letter from Luis Clemente Carriles Posada. The box should be serviced daily commencing 23 April 1974 until that one letter is received.

2. This will also confirm you provided the following for the request contained in paragraph one:

Reinaldo J. Fallo
P.O. Box 4540
Brooklyn Station
Washington, D.C. 20017

3. The letter should be sent to WH/Registry for Laura Cooley, WH/3/V, 3 B 2627 on extension R1535. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Edward A. Cahill
C/WH/SECURITY

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/3/V/L. Cooley
1 - WH/Chrono
1 - WH/File

DDO/WH/SEC/EACahill:rv (15 Apr 74)

CONFIDENTIAL

2 063768

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER

TOTAL COPIES 16 RUN

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO RF FILE VR IP/AN, IP/AN, OSG/OC

c/OPS

ACTION #

T 028991 PAGE 01-01 IN 222753

TOR:121559Z APR 74 CARA 24186

S E C R E T 121600Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24186

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 530655 (NOT SENT WH/MIAMI)

1. WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE PLAN TRAVEL MIAMI AT OWN EXPENSE TO RENEW UNITED STATES REENTRY PERMITS ON 17 APRIL.

2. STATION ASSUMES THAT INS AWARE THAT WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE SPECIAL CASES AND THEREFORE THEY WILL HAVE NO TROUBLE RENEWING REENTRY PERMITS. HOWEVER, IN EVENT THERE SHOULD BE SOME PROBLEM, REQUEST WH/MIAMI PROVIDE TELEPHONE NUMBER AND NAME OF CASE OFFICER FOR WKSCARLET-3 TO CONTACT.

3. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET

WKSCARLET-3
201-300985
12 Apr 74

SECRET

RECORD COPY

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 272025Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 530655

CONF: LA/18 INFO: FILE ~~[illegible]~~, SECUR 4, OPS/NARC 2, C/OPS

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 35
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
IP FILES #

TO: CARACAS. Y

UKRALLY UKSCARLET Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 23508 (IN 136741)

B. DIRECTOR 393224 Y

1. WISH TO ADVISE STATION THAT UNITED STATES REENTRY PERMITS FOR UKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE WILL EXPIRE 20 APRIL 74. SINCE THIS REPRESENTS END OF SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH I&NS ON THIS CASE (TOTAL OF 4 YEARS), NEXT APPLICATION MUST BE MADE IN PERSON IN U.S. WHILE APPLICANTS NEED NOT WAIT IN U.S. FOR APPLICATIONS TO BE PROCESSED, THERE NO WAY AVOID MINIMUM ONE DAY TRIP TO U.S. (CAN BE DONE IN MIAMI) IF NEW REENTRY PERMITS TO BE OBTAINED. Y

2. WE REALIZE UKSCARLET-3'S FUTURE UNCERTAIN FOR REASONS EXPLAINED REF A AND THAT EXPIRATION REENTRY PERMITS IN APRIL MIGHT FURTHER COMPLICATE MATTER. WISH POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT IF PERMITS EXPIRE, SUBJECTS WILL HAVE TO MAKE APPLICATIONS FOR RETURNING RESIDENT VISAS WITH NO ABSOLUTE GUARANTEE THAT VISAS WILL BE ISSUED BY CONSULAR OFFICER. ALTHOUGH NO QUOTA NUMBER INVOLVED, PROCESSING IS SAME AS ANY OTHER IMMIGRANT VISA WITH CONSULAR OFFICER HAVING THE SOLE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

UKSCARLET-3
201-300985
27 Mar 74

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER · COORDINATING OFFICERS · AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 013978

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOE	TPE	MRO		PAGE	OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0		2	2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR   DATE-TIME GROUP   CITE   MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

530655

AUTHORITY TO MAKE DETERMINATION AS TO ELIGIBILITY.Y

3. [illegible]STATION MAY ALREADY HAVE THIS TIME FACTOR IN MIND IN CONSIDERING ITS FUOOTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH WKSCARLET-3. IF, HOWEVER, DECISION CONCERNING HIS DISPOSITION NOT REACHED BY MID-APRIL, WOULD SUGGEST WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE BE PERMITTED TRAVEL MIAMI TO APPLY FOR NEW REENTRY PERMITS IN ORDER AVOID PROBLEMS OUTLINED PARA TWO ABOVE. PLS ADVISE.Y

4. FILE 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.H

REF A - STATION PLANNING TO OFFER WKSCARLET-3 TO DEA AS SOURCE ON NARCOTICS IF HE DOES NOT OBTAIN JOB IN NEW NARCOTICS OFFICE BEING ESTABLISHED BY GOV. IF DEA NOT INTERESTED, STATION WOULD TERMINATE W-3.

REF B - NOTIFICATION OF EXPIRATION OF REENTRY PERMITS IN APRIL 1973.

OFFICE OF ALIEN AFFAIRS F. BUCCI (DRAFT)

PS
APR 11 74

DATE: 27 MARCH 74
ORIG: L.C.BURNETT
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: ■

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ TOTAL COPIES ___ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

WH8

FILE VR DAW, SB8, C/OP2

ACTION #

T 871

PAGE 01 IN 162867

TOR:091404Z FEB 74 CARA 23718

SECRET 091353Z FEB 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 23718

TO: DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY SCARLET REDLEG AELEO

1. 30 JANUARY AT MEETING BETWEEN CORRO AND AELEO, CORRO PROVIDED AELEO WITH DOCUMENT CONCERNING WKSCARLET-3'S BACKGROUND (PASSED WITH WKSCARLET ACQUIESENCE). AELEO HAD ASKED CORRO TO DETERMINE WHO "BASILIO" IS AND PROVIDE SOME BACKGROUND ON HIM. "BASILIO" IS WKSCARLET-3'S WKSCARLET ALIAS. AELEO ALSO ASKED IF WKSCARLET-3 HAS ANY BROTHERS. CORRO ANSWERED "NO". WKSCARLET-3 DOES HAVE BROTHER IN CUBA AND ONE IN WEST GERMANY.

2. ACCORDING WKSCARLET-3 (ON 7 FEB), THE DOCUMENT PROVIDED TO AELEO INCLUDED HIS DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CURRENT FUNCTION IN WKSCARLET, FACT THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN BAY OF PIGS OPERATION AND USUAL SCHOOLING INFORMATION.

3. IT IS NOT CLEAR AT THIS POINT WHAT EXACTLY AELEO AFTER. HOWEVER, POSSIBILITY THAT HE CONSIDERING WKSCARLET-3 AS RECRUITMENT TARGET NOT OUTSIDE REALM OF POSSIBILITY.

4. STATION WILL MONITOR THIS CASE AND KEEP YOU ADVISED

SECRET

RECORD COPY FILED IN 201-881289

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING
INTO 201-300985

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT ____ FILE VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION # ____

T 671983 PAGE 02-02 IN 162867

TOR:091404Z FEB 74 CARA 23718

OF ANY OTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

5. [illegible] : 201-881289, 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-1 PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE TIME GROUP: 152028Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 500819

CONF: C/WH6 INFO: FILE C/WH, DDO, DDC/DO, C/OPS/NARC-2, C/PPS

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 47
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SOP
0 IP FILES # 103

TO: CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT MHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 23508 (IN 136741)

1. CONCUR STATION PLANS PARA 3 REF CONCERNING FUTURE USE WKSCARLET-3.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

REF - ACCORDING TO WKNOBLE-8, NEW VENEZUELAN GOVT INTENDS SET UP NATIONAL POLICE FORCE WHICH WOULD PROBABLY INCLUDE NARCOTICS SECTION WITH NATIONWIDE RESPONSIBILITIES. STATION BELIEVES WKSCARLET-3 HAS CHANCE OBTAINING JOB IN THIS SECTION. HOWEVER, IF HE DOES NOT GET JOB BY 31 MARCH 74, STATION PLANS OFFER W-3 TO DEA.

WH/NARC HOWARD ORR (DRAFT)

C/WH/COG J. SKURA (TELECOORD)

DDO/NARCOG STAN ARCHENHOLD (TELECOORD)

WH/3/V BC-4

DATE: 15 JAN 74
ORIG: L.C.BURNETT
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

201-300985
15 Jan 74

RECORD COPY

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 013937A

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 11 PER 57-2103 TOTAL COPIES 14

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED WH BY AT 1740 Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/WH6

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/H/AN DDC C/OPS/NAR 2 C/OPS

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE

T 807440 PAGE 01 IN 136741

TOR:141648Z JAN 74 CARA 23508

WH/3/V BS-4

S E C R E T 141640Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 23508

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT MHABYSS

REF: DIRECTOR 499853

1. WKSCARLET-3 WILL NOT MAKE TRIP TO MIAMI AT THIS TIME. HE WILL TRAVEL PUERTO RICO ON PERSONAL BUSINESS ON 14 JANUARY ON VIASA FLT 792 DEPARTING CARACAS AT 1715.

2. RE PARA 2 REF. WKSCARLET-3 HAS ALMOST NO CHANCE OF REMAING IN WKSCARLET. WHILE STATION HAS NO INFORMATION AS TO WHO WILL REPLACE WKSCARLET-1, RUMORS HAVE IT THAT ERASTO FERNANDEZ MAY GET JOB FOR FIRST THREE MONTHS OF NEW ADMINISTRATION IN ORDER "CLEAN" OUT WKSCARLET. WKSCARLET-3 AND FERNANDEZ ARE, TO SAY LEAST, NOT BEST OF FRIENDS AND FERNANDEZ HAS TOLD WKSCARLET-9 THAT WKSCARLET-3 MUST LEAVE WKSCARLET. WKSCARLET-3 HAS ALSO TOLD STATION THAT HE DOES NOT THINK HE CAN STAY IN WKSCARLET.

3. ACCORDING TO WKNOBLE-8, NEW GOVERNMENT INTENDS SET UP NATIONAL POLICE FORCE WHICH WOULD PROBABLY INCLUDE A NARCOTICS SECTION WITH NATIONWIDE RESPONSIBILITIES. STATION

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

201-300585
14 Jan 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 837440 PAGE 02-02 IN 136741

TOR:141648Z JAN 74 CARA 23508

HAS URGED AKSCARLET-3 TO TALK TO HIS FRIENDS AND CONTACTS IN ORDER OBTAIN MEDIUM OR HIGH LEVEL JOB IN THAT SECTION AND HE HAS AGREED. STATION FEELS HE HAS AT LEAST EVEN CHANCE OF OBTAINING SUCH A JOB. IF HE DOES NOT GET JOB BY ABOUT 31 MARCH 74, STATION PLANS OFFER HIM TO DEA AS SOURCE OR TERMINATE HIM IF THEY HAVE NO USE FOR HIM.

4. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS, IF ANY.

5. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOIN MESSAGE 14

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 — PAGE 1

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	112329Z	DIRECTOR	499053

CONF: C/WH6 INFO: FILE DDO, DDO/DO, C/CI/OPS, C/OPS/NAR 2, C/OPS

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 48
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SP/03
0 IP FILES #

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS {NIACT} INFO: IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT MHABYSS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 499379

B. CARACAS 23476 (IN 133902)

WH/3/V B-4

1. MUST ADVISE THAT UNDER PRESENT GROUND RULES WE SIMPLY CANNOT PERMIT OUR CONTROLLED AGENTS TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ILLICIT NARCOTIC ACTIVITIES IN U.S. WHICH COULD RESULT IN DOMESTIC LEGAEL ACTION. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, THEREFORE, SHOULD UKSCARLET-3 PROVIDE FALSE PASSPORT FOR ABREU OR CONTACT WH/MIAMI STATION FOR PURPOSE OUTLINED REF B WHILE HE UNDER BKHERALD DIRECTION.

2. IN VIEW OF SERIOUS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR AGENT INHERENT IN USE PROPOSED REF B, WE PREFER THAT UW-3 WITHDRAW FROM CASE COMPLETELY. THIS BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT U-3 CONTINUES AS VALUABLE, LONG RANGE ASSET TO STATION. IF, HOWEVER, STATION OF OPINION THAT U-3 DOES NOT HAVE MUCH FUTURE WITH UKSCARLET AND THAT HIS USEFULNESS TO STATION IS LIMITED, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO ~~OFFER TO~~

{CONT'D}

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

201-300985
11 Jan 74

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	CDI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO		PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0		2		2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

177853

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO   PER
0 IP FILES   #

TURN HIM OVER TO DEA TO WORK FULL TIME ON NARCOCITIC MATTERS. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT ONCE TURNOVER MADE, IT WOULD BE PERMANENT AND THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER OKHERALD ASSOCIATION.

3. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR DECISION IN THIS MATTER.

4. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

REFS: A. SEITUATION PRESENTS KNOTTY PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE LEGAL INVOLVEMENT. HOPE TO HAVE DEFINITE ANSCWER LATER TODAY.

B. REPORTED THAT WKSCARLET-3 (UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF DISIP) RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM DOMINGO ABREU (WELL DOCUMENTED CUBAN VIOLATOR IN MIAMI AREA) ASKING IF W-3 COULD PROVIDE HIM [illegible] WITH VENEZUELAN PASSPORT.

OCG MR. GREANEY (TELECOORD)
DDO/NARCOG S. ARCHENHOLD (TELECOORD)
DC/WH/NARC H. ORR (DRAFT)
C/WH/COG J. SKUPA (TELECOORD)
C/WH/4 K. Scofield (Draft)

DATE: 11 JANUARY 1974
ORIG: L. BURNETT
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R L Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE 16-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 111803Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 499379

CONF: C/WH 6 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/CPS/WR 2, C/CPS

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES # 103

DISSEM BY: 32

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS INFO IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO BOOROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT MHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 23476 (IN 133902) (BEING RELAYED BUENOS AIRES)

1. REF SITUATION PRESENTS KNOTTY PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE LEGAL INVOLVEMENT WKSCARLET-3 IN NARCOTICS CASE, IMPLICATIONS OF WHICH WE STILL TRYING TO CLARIFY. HOPE TO HAVE DEFINITE ANSWER FOR YOU LATER TODAY. IF TIME RUNS OUT ON US, YOU SHOULD ADVISE WKSCARLET-3 NOT TO PROVIDE BLANK VENEZUELAN PASSPORT AND NOT TO ~~CONTACT [illegible]~~ GO TO MIAMI AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

22 JAN

WH/NARC - HOWARD ORR (IN DRAFT)

DDO/NARCOG - ARCHENHOLD (TELECORD)

DATE: 11 JAN 74

ORIG: R.L. CONOLLY

UNIT: C/WH/3

EXT: 1128

201-300985

11 Jan 74

C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RECORD COPY

C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY:

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4/1 PER $-103 TOTAL COPIES 20

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/WHG

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/IRAN DDO C/OPS C/OPS/NARZ C/FRG

T 800692 PRECEDENCE PAGE 01 IN 134114

TOR:1021242 JAN 74 WHIM 20657

C/ KO

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
P/ID	☒	ABSTRACT
		[illegible]
P/[illegible]		[illegible]
P/[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		CABLE [illegible]
		[illegible]
P/[illegible]		[illegible]
WH/3M		BS-4

S E C R E T 102111Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 20657

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, CARACAS, FR/NEW YORK.

RYBAT MHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 23476 (IN 133902)

1. DEA/MIAMI ADVISES:

N°301 AND ANDRES MARIANO PURRINO

A. DOMINGO A B R E U IS UNDER CONTINUING INVESTIGATION BY DEA. WARRANT FOR HIS ARREST WAS ISSUED LATE 1972. EFFORTS LOCATE AND ARREST HIM AT THAT TIME PROVED FUTILE. ON 29 MARCH 1973 PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN BNDD AND U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IN MIAMI, ARREST WARRANT CANCELLED. REASON NOT INDICATED IN DEA FILE.

N°301

B. ANDRES MARIANO P U R R I N O IS ALSO UNDER CONTINUING INVESTIGATION BY DEA. HIS ADDRESS IS 401 N.W. 49TH AVENUE, MIAMI. STATION RECORDS SHOW REF TELEPHONE NUMBER IS REGISTERED TO A-1 AUTOMOTIVE PARTS, 6625 W. FLAGLER ST., MIAMI.

2. AS ALTERNATIVE TO REF CONTACT PLAN, STATION SUGGESTS THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO CUTTING IN DEA/MIAMI ON REF OP SINCE DEA IS AWARE OF BKHERALD ASSOCIATION WITH WKSCARLET-3 AND STATION WH/MIAMI DOES NOT HAVE SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

201-300985
10 JAN 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 800692 PAGE 02-02 IN 134114

TOR:102124Z JAN 74 WMIN 22657

NOR CHARTER TO CONDUCT LOCAL NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS. WKSCARLET-3 COULD THEREFORE BE PLACED IN CONTACT WITH DEA/MIAMI IF AND WHEN HE ARRIVES HERE. STATION OFFICER WOULD CASE OFFICER OP. IF HQS AND STATION CARACAS CONCUR, STATION COULD BRIEF DEA/MIAMI HIGHLIGHTS OF REF AND WORK OUT CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS LOCALLY WITH THEM. ALSO REMIND ADDRESSEES THAT WKSCARLET-3 IS WELL-KNOWN TO DEA/MIAMI AND UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD COME UNDER IMMEDIATE SURVEILLANCE BY THEM SHOULD HE ENTER AREA. WKSCARLET-3 HAS BEEN UNDER SURVEILLANCE DURING PREVIOUS TRIP MIAMI AREA.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E-2, IMPDET.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY h PER SCP 103 TOTAL COPIES 20/ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO		STAFF		
o/WHG	~~RF~~ FILE VR [illegible] DDO C/OPS		1		4
	C/OPS/NARZ [illegible]		2		5
ACTION #			3		6

T 800822 PRECEDENCE PAGE 01-01 IN 134173

TOR:102246Z JAN 74 CARA 23488

S E C R E T 102232Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 23488

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI INFO FR/NEW YORK.

NIACT WH/MIAMI

RYBAT MHABYSS

REF: WH/MIAMI 20657 (IN 134114)

1. CONCUR REF PARA 2 PLAN.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

X

WH/3/V BS-4

RECORD COPY

SECRET

201-300985

10 Jan 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 85 PER SOP #103 TOTAL COPIES 14-6 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED WH BY AT

ACTION UNIT C/WH6

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR DDO, IP/AN, C/OPS/NAR2, C/OPS

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 800180 PAGE 01 IN 133902

TOR:1017402 JAN 74 CARA 23476

S E C R E T 1017262 JAN 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 23476

PRECEDENCE

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI. FR NEW YORK.

RYBAT MHABYSS

1. DURING MEETING LATE 9 JANUARY, WKSCARLET-3 SAID HE RECEIVED LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CALL FROM NEW YORK FROM DOMINGO ABREU. ABREU ASKED IF WKSCARLET-3 COULD PROVIDE HIM WITH VENEZUELAN PASSPORT. WKSCARLET-3 TOLD ABREU THAT HE COULD PROBABLY DO SO. ABREU TOLD WKSCARLET-3 THAT HE COULD NOT BE REACHED IN NEW YORK BUT PROVIDED WKSCARLET-3 WITH NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IN MIAMI THROUGH WHICH HE COULD BE CONTACTED: ANDRES PURRINO, TEL: 261-4581.

2. FOLLOWING ARE STATION TRACES ON ABREU AND PURRINO:

A. ABREU, DOMINGO: AKA CHINO; WELL DOCUMENTED CUBAN VIOLATOR IN MIAMI AREA. (HVCA-18943A0".

B. PSMRINO,HYNDRES: DOCUMENTED MULTI-KILO TRAFFICKER (CARACAS 21408,* 14 MARCH 74).

W1/3/0 BS-4

3. NO ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR TRANSFER OF PASSPORT, HOWEVER, WKSCARLET-3 WILLING TRAVEL MIAMI WITH BLANK, VALID PASSPORT, CALL PURRINO, AND DELIVER IT. WKSCARLET-3 SAID HE

SECRET

201-300985

10 Jan 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

T 800180 PAGE 02 IN 133902

TOR:101740Z JAN 74 CARA 23476

IS GOING TO MAKE TRIP TO PUERTO RICO 12 JANUARY BUT COULD POSTPONE TRIP UNTIL 14 OR 15 JANUARY. STATION WILL PHOTOGRAPH PASSPORT AND FORWARD COPIES TO ADDRESSEES.

4. UPON ARRIVAL MIAMI, WKSCARLET-3 WOULD CONTACT STATION AND HOPEFULLY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE NAME TO BE USED IN PASSPORT. HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO ILLICITE ANY INFO REGARDING PURRINO/ABREU DEALINGS.

5. PITFALLS IN ABOVE PLAN ARE MANY, PARTICULARLY IF PURRINO AND/OR ABREU DEA SOURCES, OR UNDER INVESTIGATION, OR UNDER INDICTMENT, AND PASSPORT AT ANY TIME USED AS EVIDENCE, SINCE ABREU AND PURRINO COULD TIE WKSCARLET-3 TO VENEZUELAN PASSPORT.

6. ALTERNATIVE (WHICH STATION DOES NOT RECOMMEND) WOULD BE TO HAVE WKSCARLET-3 CALL PURRINO FROM PUERTO RICO OR MIAMI AND TELL HIM THAT HE COULD NOT OBTAIN PASSPORT BUT OFFER TO BRIEF PURRINO ON CURRENT SITUATION IN VENEZUELA. WKSCARLET-3 WOULD ATTEMPT THROUGH TALKS WITH PURRINO TO FIND OUT WHAT PURRINO AND ABREU UP TO.

7. FOR WH/MIAMI: PLEASE CHECK WITH DEA TO DETERMINE STATUS PER PARA 5 OF PURRINO AND ABREU. DEA CARACAS AWARE ABOVE AND

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY________

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED________ BY________ AT________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR .	1		4
			2		5
ACTION #			3		6

T 820180 PAGE 03-03 IN 133902

TOR:1017402 JAN 74 CARA 23476

THAT WH/MIAMI WILL CONTACT DEA MIAMI BUT DOES NOT PLAN TO INITIATE ANY CORRESPONDENCE RE WKSCARLET-3 TRAVEL.

8. IN ANY EVENT, WKSCARLET-3 PLANS TRAVEL PUERTO RICO AND IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE WILL HAVE TO BE ADVISED SINCE HE TRAVELING ON OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN PASSPORT WITH U.S. VISA AND HE IS U.S. RESIDENT.

9. STATION WILL PROVIDE FLT NUMBER, DATE OF TRAVEL, ETC., AS SOON AS KNOWN. WKSCARLET-3 ALWAYS TRAVELS VIASA WHICH FLIES CARACAS, PUERTO RICO, MIAMI.

10. SUBJECT DIRECTOR CONCURRENCE, WOULD WH/MIAMI PROVIDE CONTACT PLAN FOR WKSCARLET-3, AND ARRANGE SURVEILLANCE TO FOLLOW UP ANY LEADS OBTAINED BY HIM.

11. PLEASE ADVISE BY NOON 11 JAN.

12. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

* APPARENTLY MARCH 73. IN NO. WILL BE FURNISHED ON REQUEST.

SECRET

201-300985

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA-19426	2 Nov 73				

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
WKSCARLET-3		

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

7. WKSCARLET-3 -- WKSCARLET-3 is being met on a weekly basis in a safehouse. While his access remains unchanged, his reporting has dropped off during this reporting period due mostly to the fact that his energies are being directed against guerrillas and since the capture of Gabriel Puertas and Carlos Betancourt, the WKSCARLETs have had little success in this field. WKSCARLET-3's division is currently working against Gordo Mansania, Solo Suarez, Tito Herrera, and Elias Eljury. During the period he produced no disseminations, however, information reported by him was used for one field comment.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201-

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(7-46)

DISPATCH | SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
WKSCARLET-3 SGSWIRL Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a copy of the report on the SGSWIRL examination given WKSCARLET-3 on 8 May 1973.

CTR

Christine T. RATHWICK

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas

Attachments:
a. SGSWIRL Report h/w
b. Idens for Att. a. u/s/c

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 058903

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
IP/DBI
TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
INDEX
IP/FIS
IP/PN
ISO/DCD
~~IP/FILES~~
WH/3 ✓

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCW-10041

DATE
1 AUG 1973

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-300985

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: WH/3/V
OFFICER: Laura Cooley
TYPIST: bw (30 July 1973)
EXT.: 7271

COORDINATING
OFFICE SYMBOL: AC/WH/3/V
DATE:
OFFICER'S NAME: Thomas Doolittle

Distribution:
1 - IP
1 - Chrono

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WH/3
DATE: 31 JUL 1973
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: for Philip [illegible]
Richard L. Conolly

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA-19475	17 July 73				

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
WKScarlet-3		

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

3. From a negative point of view, WKNUGGET coverage of the home phone of WKSCARLET-3 was useful in that it did not reveal any indications that he was involved in narcotics trafficking. Since he also successfully passed his SGSWIRL, and satisfied the Station in a debriefing that he was not trafficking in narcotics, the WKNUGGET coverage of WKSCARLET-3 was discontinued.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201-

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-48)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HMMA-19452					

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
wk scarlet-3	3/7/73	

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

7. WKSCARLET-3

WKSCARLET-3 continued his normal rate of production during this period. The questions regarding his "irregular [illegible] activities and contacts" were resolved through confrontation and a successful SGSWIRL.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201-			

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA-19470					

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
wkscarlet-3	3/7/73	

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

14. As Headquarters is already aware, WKSCARLET-3 passed his SGSWIRL with flying colors on 8 May. Based on the SGSWIRL and his earlier debriefing concerning his alleged involvement in narcotics, it seems that WKSCARLET-3 was only guilty of having the wrong kind of friends. LNAGON Caracas was advised on 15 May regarding our conclusions based upon the debriefing and SGSWIRL of WKSCARLET-3. LNAGON Caracas agreed with our conclusions and now regards the case as being closed. WKSCARLET-3 agreed, and we so advised LNAGON, that WKSCARLET-3 would help out with narcotics leads he might come across. We told LNAGON that such assistance would only be on an ad hoc basis subject to our other priorities as well as WKSCARLET-3's security.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201-			

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

SECRET

TO : WH/3/V 29 June 1973

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT: WKSCARLET/3 - IDENTITY A IRD# 72501
201-300985

BACKGROUND:

Subject of this report is a KMSTONE born citizen of IDEN B who has permanent resident alien status in WODUAL. Subject was granted a renewed OA on 17 July 1972 and he was last SGSWIRLed on 3 November 1971 with favorable results. Subject estimated that he has been SGSWIRLed approximately ten times by BKHERALD and two or three additional times by the WODUAL Army.

PURPOSE AND PROCEDURE:

On 8 May 1973, in IDEN C, Subject was again SGSWIRLed at the request of his Case Officer, Gabriel J. LABRENZ. The session was conducted in order to determine if Subject has ever been involved in the illegal drug traffic as alleged by a LNAGON source and also whether Subject knows anyone involved in the illegal drug business. Subject has a good command of the English language and the entire session was conducted in English. All of the test questions were coordinated with LABRENZ in advance and he remained in an adjoining room within hearing range. This examiner was introduced to Subject as Bill JOHNSON from WODUAL.

RESULTS:

No indications of deception.

SGSWIRL results supported Subject in his contentions as follows:

1. that, excluding what he told us (See DETAILS), he has not used drugs for non-medicinal reasons.

2. that, excluding IDEN D, he is not acquainted with anyone who he knows is involved in the illegal drug traffic. (See DETAILS for those he "suspects.")

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 417322

SECRET

3. that, excluding what he told us (See DETAILS), he has never received money or been involved in the sale, purchase, or smuggling of drugs.

4. that, excluding what he told us (See DETAILS), he has never been asked to participate in the illegal drug traffic.

DETAILS:

During the pre-test discussion, Subject stated that he personally has smoked marijuana on three or four occasions and he has sniffed cocaine on approximately five occasions in the past ten years. Subject asserted that on each occasion, he was attending social gatherings with KMSTONE friends and he felt socially compelled to indulge in order to please the other participants. He estimated that he knows approximately thirty-five people who use cocaine or marijuana. Subject asserted that his last use of cocaine was last month when he visited WODUAL. SGSWIRL supported Subject's claim that his personal use of drugs has not been more extensive.

During the pre-test discussion, Subject asserted that he was not acquainted with anyone who he knew for certain was involved in drug trafficking. Subject did list the following IDENS when asked if he knew anyone who he "suspected" was involved in trafficking drugs: IDENS D, E, F, G, H and I. Subject asserted that his suspicions were based on rumor and these people have never talked to him about illegal drugs. After recording reactions to the test question, "Are you concealing the identity of anyone who you know is involved in the sale or smuggling of drugs?" (Ans. No), Subject acknowledged that his concern for the question was due to the fact that he more than merely "suspected" IDEN D was involved and he was "90% certain."

During the pre-test discussion, Subject stated that in 1954 or 1955, while in KMSTONE, he and a friend sold a non-dangerous drug to a buyer who believed it to be cocaine. Subject asserted that he made $25.00 from this transaction. Also, while in KMSTONE at the same time, Subject stated that a friend, IDEN J, asked him if he wished to participate in the smuggling of cocaine out of Peru. Subject advised that he declined the offer. As previously noted, SGSWIRL results supported Subject's contentions that his involvement with dangerous drugs has not been more extensive.

John M. Sandels

Distribution:
Orig. - Jones, Dempsey, Gaynor
1 - Dempsey
1 - CI/OA
1 - WH/3/V
1 - Field
1 - File

OS/IRD/JMS:lht

14-00000

SEC DISSEM BY 8 PER

TOTAL COPIES 23-1

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED DDO

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT 2235

ON UNIT

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION 17 | INFO | RF. FILE. VR

T 266131 PAGE 01-01 IN 928984

TOR:242208Z MAY 73 CARA 22054

S E C R E T 242145Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 22054

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, OTTAWA INFO WH/MIAMI.

REAM SLALARM WKSCARLET WKRALLY

REFS: A. OCOA-17700

B. CARACAS 21985 (IN 920774)

C. DIRECTOR 413095

1. REGRET WKSCARLET-9 TRIP TRECA SEMINAR CANCELED BY WKSCARLET-1 DUE LACK WKSCARLET INTEREST.

2. IDEA FOR TRIP GENERATED BY IDEN REF B WHO, ACCORDING WKSCARLET-9, EITHER WANTED FREE TRIP NORTH OR WAS REQUESTED BY GOVERNMENT PARTY, COPEI, TO ATTEND. IF LATTER THE CASE, WKSCARLET-9 SPECULATES THAT COPEI WANTED REPRESENTATIVE AT SEMINAR BUT DID NOT WANT EXPEND PARTY FUNDS FOR TRIP.

3. FILE 201-901757 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 300985

RECORD COPY FILED IN 201-901757

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 13 PER [illegible] TOTAL COPIES 16-1 BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT
[illegible] 6

ACTION #
926

INFO RF. FILE. VR. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 250757 PAGE 01-01 IN 926079

TOR:221728Z MAY 73 CARA 22021

S E C R E T 221510Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 22021

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WHMIAMI.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 410692

1. LNAGON CARACAS ACCEPTED RESULTS OUR DEBRIEFING AND SGSWIRL. LNAGON SAIC STATED WOULD CABLE HIS HQS AND MIAMI OFFICE THAT AS FAR AS CARACAS CONCERNED CASE AGAINST WKSCARLET-3 NOW CLOSED.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

AN
AB
IN
PS
BX
~~SES-NSD~~
~~SI~~
WH3

201-0300985
22 MAY 73

SECRET

RECORD COPY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE TIME GROUP: 181922Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 410692

CONF: C/WH 6 INFO: FILE DDO, ADDO, C/IP/AN, C/CI, C/NARC 2, C/FI,
DISSEM BY: 38/4
PER SCP # 103

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO WH/3/V
0 IP FILES

TO: CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT O MHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. CARACAS 21885 [IN 909807]

B. CARACAS 21919 [IN 913409]

C. DIRECTOR 407370

1. IN 17 MAY MEETING WE GAVE LNAGON HQS OFFICERS GIST REFS A AND B. THEY APPEARED ON SURFACE ACCEPT OUR REASONING FOR BELIEVING WKSCARLET-3 NOT INVOLVED NARCOTICS ACTBIVITBY AND REQUESTED WE SEND GIST REFS A AND B TO THEM OFFICIALLY, WHICH WE DOING.

2. PLEASE ADVISE REACTION OF LNAGON CARACAS TO RESULTS OF WKSCARLET-3 DEBRIEFING AND SGSWIRL.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

EAN
AB ~~X~~
IN
FS
BX
~~ESS NFD~~
~~PI~~
WH/3/V ✓

REF A- RESULTS OF DEBRIEFING OF WKSCARLET-3 ABOUT HIS POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.
REF B- WKSCARLET-3 UNDERWBENT SGSWIRL 8 MAY 73 WITH NO INDICATIONS OF DECEPTION.
REF C- AGREEMENT OF HQS FOR CONTINUED USE OF WKSCARLET-3 AS A UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF WKSCARLET. LNAGON SHOULD BE ADVISED OF THE RESULTS OF HIS DEBRIEFING AND SGSWIRL AND BE CONVINCED OF HIS NON-INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.

RECORD COPY

201-0300985
18 MAY 73

DATE: 18 MAY 1973
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: AC/WH/3/V
EXT: 1535/5126

AC/WH/NARC Paul Tagh
DDO/NARCOG S. Caldwell
C/WH/COG
C/WH/FI ✓
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

Philip Shore
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 064566

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 29 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 13-1 RUN BY ______

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

WH8

ACTION #

627

INFO RF. FILE. VR. IP/AN, FI, CI/OPS

T 250239 PAGE 01-01 IN 923076

TOR:1820422 MAY 73 WHIM 18537

S E C R E T 181717Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 18537

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

KMSTONE

REF: CARACAS 21985 (IN 920774) NR

1. NEITHER STATION NOR SLIGOS HAVE ANY INFO ON INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS CUBANS. DEFER TO HQS FOR ANY RQMS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

AN
AB
TI

RECORD COPY

18 May 73

201-300985

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

14-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
162231Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
409708

CONF. WH8 INFO: FILE RP/AN C/SO CCS2

DISSEM BY: 33

PER ___ #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

TO: CARACAS

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21938 (IN 916111)

1. REVALIDATED PERMITS FOR WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE BEING POUCHED 18 MAY 73.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. #

REF - ASKS FOR STATUS REPORT ON REVALIDATION OF "PERMITS TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" FOR WKSCARLET-3 AND HIS WIFE.

AN
AB
IN
RS
RX
~~DES~~ MBD
~~PI~~
WH/3/V

201-0300985
16 MAY 73

DATE: 16 MAY 73
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

RECORD COPY

Philip Freeman
for C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 064566

4-00000

SECRET

TO : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division 11 May 1973
ATTEN : Bob Weatherwax, WH/3/V
FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT: Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (A 12 419 708)
Nieves Elina Gonzalez de POSADA (A 12 443 942)
REFERENCE: Your request for Reentry Permit dated ________ 19__.

Reentry Permits ~~was~~ were issued for subjects ~~on~~ 21 April 1972, and ~~is~~ have been extended /valid to 20 April 1974. The Permit may be used for unlimited entries into the United States during validity. ~~Validity of Permit may be extended for a maximum period of twelve (12) months only. Extension of validity of Permit must be made on the attached, "Application for Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States," (I&NS Form I-145). In certain foreign areas U. S. Consuls and U. S. Immigration Officers are authorized to extend the validity date. [illegible] where security or cover considerations warrant, the Permit [illegible] tion should be forwarded to Alien Affairs Staff in order to have the validity date extended through cleared liaison with Immigration and Naturalization Service.~~

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Louis Wiencke
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

Attachment.

Receipt acknowledged for Permits #0375384 and 0375385 :

Signature Date

OS/AAS/EStark 11 May 1973

File: 201-3009[illegible]
([illegible])

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACO ECI ALP TOO TPO DRO

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP
1023482

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
407370

CONF: C/WH6 INFO: FILE DDO, ADDO, C/IPAN, C/CI, C/NARCZ
C/FI

DISSEM BY: 27/28

PER # 163

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO. WH/3/V
0 IP FILE

TO: CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT MHABYSS UKRALLY UKSCARLET

REFS: A. CARACAS 21885 |IN 909807|

B. CARACAS 21919 |IN 913409|

1. AGREE THAT STATION SHOULD CONTINUE USE UKSCARLET-3 AS UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF UKSCARLET ORGANIZATION. HOWEVER, IT IMPERATIVE TO PROTECT 10N BKHERALD POSITION IN THIS MATTER THAT LNAGON BE ADVISED OF RESULTS DEBRIEFING AND SGSWIRL AND BE CONVINCED OF W-3'S ~~[illegible]~~ PERSONAL NON-INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. ADDITIONALLY, URGE ~~[illegible]~~ THAT STATION REMAIN ~~[illegible]~~ ALERT TO ANY FUTURE INDICATIONS THAT UKSCARLET-3 IS IN ANY WAY PARTICIPATING IN THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY.

RECORD COPY

AN
AC X
IN
PS
BX
DES NFD
PI
WH/3/V

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

REF A REPORTS THE RESULTS OF THE DEBRIEFING OF UKSCARLET-3 ABOUT INDICATIONS THAT HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THE ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTICS.
REF B SAYS THAT UKSCARLET-3 UNDERWENT AN SGSWIRL ON 8 MAY 1973 WITH NO INDICATIONS OF DECEPTION. HE WAS EXAMINED IN REGARD TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS, HIS POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN THE NARCOTICS TRADE AND HIS ASSOCIATION WITH NARCOTICS PERSONALITIES MENTIONED IN BKHERALD AND LNAGON INVESTIGATIONS OF HIS RECENT ACTIVITIES.

DATE: 10 MAY 1973
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: AC/WH/3/V
EXT: 1535/5126

C/WH/FI
AC/WH/NARC
C/WH/COG
DDO/NARCOG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

201-0300985
10 MAY 73

H. W. Natzke
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 064566

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 36/ PER 50P1 TOTAL COPIES 16-A US

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT c/WH6

ACTION # 312

INFO RF. FILE. VR. DDO. ADDO. c/iclops, c/cl, c/NARC2, c/FI,

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 225643 PAGE 01 IN 913409

TOR:091606Z MAY 73 CARA 21919

S E C R E T 091525Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21919

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS A. CARACAS 21885 (IN 909807)

B. DIRECTOR 399617

C. CARACAS 21753 (IN 895109)

1. WKSCARLET-3 UNDERWENT SGSWIRL 8 MAY 73 WITH NO INDICATIONS DECEPTION. EXAMINED HIS KNOWLEDGE OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS, POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT NARCOTICS TRADE AND ASSOCIATION NARCOTICS PERSONALITIES MENTIONED OUR AND LNAGON INVESTIGATION HIS RECENT ACTIVITIES. EXAMINATION FACILITATED THROUGH WKSCARLET-3'S OWN WRITTEN REPORTS ON NARCOTICS-LINKED PERSONALITIES AND HIS OBVIOUS EFFORT BE FRANK AND FORTHCOMING ON ALL SUBJECTS RAISED.

D

B

AN
AB
IN
PS
RX
~~DEO~~ NFD
~~PI~~
WH/3/V

2. GIVEN RESULTS SGSWIRL AND DEBRIEFINGS, STATION REASONABLY CONVINCED WKSCARLET-3 INNOCENT NARCOTICS INVOLVEMENT. BELIEVE ALSO CAN CONVINCE LNAGON HIS INNOCENCE. PENDING ANY NEW EVIDENCE HE IS IN FACT INVOLVED NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, DESIRE CONTINUE WKSCARLET-3 AS UNILATERAL PENE-

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

201-0300985
09 MAY 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 225643 PAGE 02-02 IN 913409

TOR:091606Z MAY 73 CARA 21919

TRATION WKSCARLET ORGANIZATION.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 35/7 PER 30/10 TOTAL COPIES 15-3 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT
WH/C
ACTION #
819

INFO RF. FILE. VR. 000, A000, C/N/AN. C/FI, C/CI, C/NARC 2

T 216872 PAGE 01 IN 909807

TOR:051426Z MAY 73 CARA 21885 C

SECRET 051330Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21885

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT MHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET NF REFS A. DIRECTOR 399617

B. CARACAS 21753 (IN 895109)

1. AS SUGGESTED REFERENCE A, GABRIEL J. LABRENZ AND WILFRED O. CLOWER MET WKSCARLET-3 NIGHT OF 2 MAY IN TWO HOUR CONFRONTATION WHICH IN REALITY WAS DEBRIEFING HIS ASSOCIATION WITH ALLEGED NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. DURING MEETING WKSCARLET-3 VERY FORTHCOMING, FRANK AND CONVINCING IN HIS DENIAL OF BEING INVOLVED NARCOTICS TRAFFIC. AT END DEBRIEFING AGREED TO BE SOSWIRLED DURING WEEK BEGINNING 6 MAY.

2. BEGIN DEBRIEFING HIS ASSOCIATION WITH HEMBERTO TRUEVA, WKSCARLET-3 STATED HE INTRODUCED TRUEVA THROUGH HIS CASUAL ASSOCIATION WITH JOSE GOMEZ. (GOMEZ IS LNAGON MIAMI SOURCE WHO CONSIDERED BY THEM TO BE LESS THAN RELIABLE). GOMEZ ORIGINALLY MET WKSCARLET-3 THROUGH THEIR MUTUAL FRIEND RAMON ESCARDA RUBIO AKA MONGO. (ESCARDA IS PETTY

AH
AB
IN
FS
BX
~~DES/NFD~~
~~FI~~
WH/3 ✓

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-0300985

05 MAY 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 216872 PAGE 02 IN 989887

TOR:0514262 MAY 73 CARA 21885

CROOK WHO ALWAYS TRYING MAKE A "DEAL" WHICH USUALLY TURNS OUT TO BE SHADY). WKSCARLET-3 STATED HE MET TRUEVA ONE TIME AT HOTEL CLUB AMERICANA AND HAS NOT SEEN OR HEARD FROM HIM SINCE. NO BUSINESS OF ANY KIND DISCUSSED. THEY SIMPLY HAD A FEW DRINKS AND SPOKE OF MUTUAL CUBAN FRIENDS. (IT AT CLUB AMERICANA WHERE LNAGON SURVEILLANCE TEAM SPOTTED WKSCARLET-3 MEETING TRUEVA, GOMEZ AND FREDDI MANUAL BALBOA SOLIDES.)

4. BALBOA WAS UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL, WHO LATER IDENTIFIED BY WKSCARLET-2 FROM PHOTOGRAPH. BALBOA WORKS AS CHIEF, RETEN DE LA VEGA PRISON. DURING 2 MAY MEETING WKSCARLET-3 ADMITTED MEETING BALBOA, BUT COULDN'T REMEMBER NAME ONLY THAT HE WORKED FOR DR. LUGO LUGO, WHIEF OF THE PREFECTURA, WHOSE COMMAND INCLUDES THE RETEN DE LA VEGA PRISON.

5. WKSCARLET-3 WAS THEN ASKED RETELL HIS TRIP TO MIAMI VIA PUERTO RICO. THIS HE DID AND WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS MIRRORED THE TWO LNAGON SURVEILLANCE REPORTS IN STATION HANDS. EXCEPTIONS WERE THE MEETING OF ANDRES PURRINOS IN MIAMI AND JOAQUIN CASONA IN

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE . VR .

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PUERTO RICO. WKSCARLET-3 KNOWS PURRINOS BY THE NAME OF DOMINGO ABREU, WHO HE MET IN VENEZUELA ONE YEAR AGO AND WHO IS CASUAL FRIEND SHARING MUTUAL INTEREST IN HUNTING AND FISHING. CASONA HE MET AS "EL GALLO", ON ONE BRIEF OCCASION. (STATION COMMENT: WKSCARLET-3 BELIEVES IT WAS EL GALLO WHO ALERTED MIAMI AS TO ARRIVAL DATE AND TIME OF OUR AGENT.) WKSCARLET-3 CONSIDERS EL GALLO AS PETTY CROOK WHO WOULD SELL OWN MOTHER IF PRICE RIGHT.

6. IN MIAMI WKSCARLET-3 MET DOMINGO ABREU, RONALD CONDOM-GIL, SILA CUERVO AND RAIMONDO TORRES. HE CATEGORICALLY DENIES SUBJECT OF NARCOTICS EVER DISCUSSED WITH THESE INDIVIDUALS. DID HOWEVER, DISCUSS WITH ABREU AND CONDOM-GIL FACT HE BEING SURVEILLED. BOTH EXPRESSED LITTLE CONCERN ABOUT THIS SUBJECT.

7. STATION NOW LEANING TOWARD BELIEF WKSCARLET-3 VICTIM OF HAVING WRONG KIND OF FRIENDS. IF SGSWIRL SUPPORTS HIS DENIALS, STATION TENTATIVELY BELIEVES EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE CONTINUE HIS USE AS BKHERALD ASSET UNTIL AND UNLESS THERE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE HE INVOLVED IN DRUGS. IF

201-0300985

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________ PER__________ TOTAL COPIES __________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED __________ BY __________ AT __________ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 216872 PAGE 04-04 IN 909887

TOR:0514262 MAY 73 CARA 21885

SGSWIRL NEGATIVE AND HEADQUARTERS AGREES BELIEVE WE COULD SATISFY LNAGON WITH THIS RATIONALE.

8. FILE: 201-300985 E2 IMPDET

RECEIVED
IP/EDI

MAY 9 10 03 PM '73 MAY 16 4 37 PM '73

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP: 022337Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 403768

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE C/KPM, C/CI, D/SCUR 4, C/CCS 2,

DISSEM BY: 38

PER #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO ~~WH/3/V~~
0 IP FILES

TO: CARACAS.

RYBAT D UKRALLY UKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 401972 |*|

1. SGSWIRL EXAMINER MARK D. STEMERMAN PLANS ARRIVE CARACAS 7 MAY 73 AT 2000S HOURS ON PAA 217. NO NEED ~~TO~~ MEET. PLEASE ARRANGE ~~MAKE~~ MODERATE ACCOMMODATIONS AT HOTEL NEAR LNFALL AND ADVISE.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

LN RJ
X
WH/3/V

* SAYS SGSWIRL EXAMINER PLANS ARRIVE CARACAS 7 MAY 73 FOR PERIOD OF TEN DAYS TO TWO WEEKS. ALSO SAYS HEADQUARTERS WILL ADVISE TRAVEL DATA IN SEPARATE CABLE.

6

DATE: 2 MAY 1973
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 5126; 1535

WH/Sec [illegible] · 2 MAY 1973 201-0300985

OS/IRD HARRY A. KINNEY (TELECOORD)

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JAMES E. FLANNERY
AC/WHD

Philip F. [illegible]
for RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER / AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 064566

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____ RUN BY ____

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED wm BY C AT 1545

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT
WH8

ACTION #
771

INFO RF. FILE. VR. [illegible]

T 198010 PAGE 01-01 IN 902476

PRECEDENCE TOR:271540Z APR 73 CARA 21810

S E C R E T 271540Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21810

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

RYBAT WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS A. DIRECTOR 400956

B. CARACAS 21803 (N 901669)

1. WKSCARLET-3 CONFRONTATION SCHEDULED FOR WEEK BEGINNING 29 APRIL. DEPENDING ON OUTCOME, SGSWIRL EXAMINER MAY OR MAY NOT BE NEEDED. IN ADDITION, MEETING WITH WKSCALE-3 PROBABLY DELAYED UNTIL AFTER 7 MAY AND SGSWIRL NOT NEEDED FOR HIM UNTIL AFTER THAT DATE. IF EXAMINER SCHEDULE PERMITS, REQUEST DELAY HIS ARRIVAL CARACAS UNTIL 7 MAY.

2. FILE 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET

DM
13X
N
S
NFD
LH/3/V

27 APR 1973

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

201-300985

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

16-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 272334Z

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 401972

CONF: C/WH 8

INFO: FILE C/WH/AN. C/CI. D/SECUR 4 DDC/DO.

DISSEM BY: 78

PER ___ # ________

0

0

0

0

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS

RYBAT UKRALLY UKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21810 (IN 902476)

1. SGSWIRL EXAMINER PLANS ARRIVE CARACAS 7 MAY 73 FOR PERIOD TEN DAYS TO TWO WEEKS. WILL ADVISE TRAVEL ~~ITINERARY~~ DATA IN SEPARATE CABLE.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. H.

REF - REQUESTS SGSWIRL EXAMINER WHO WILL HANDLE UKSCARLET-3 AND UKSCALE-3 CASES TO DELAY HIS ARRIVAL IN CARACAS UNTIL 7 MAY 73.

OS/IRD HARRY A. KINNEY (TELECOORD)

AN CJ
AB X
IN
FS
EX
DES NFD
FI
WH/3/V

DATE: 27 APRIL 73

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX

UNIT: WH/3/V

EXT: 1535

201-0300985

RECORD COPY

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 064566

FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX TYPE THE WORD ALIGN TO REGISTER HERE → ALIGN

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	252357Z	DIRECTOR	400956

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE EI/PLAN C/CI D/SECUR 4 C/CCS 2

DISSEM BY 43

0 0

0

0

PER ___ # ___

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS

RYBAT D UKRALLY UKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 397601

B. DIRECTOR 399617

1. UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY, SGSWIRL EXAMINER MARK D. STEMERMAN PLANS ARRIVE CARACAS 30 APRIL 73 AT ~~000~~ 2005 HOURS ON PAA 217. PLEASE ARRANGE MODERATE ACCOMMODATIONS AT HOTEL NEAR LNFALL AND ADVISE PRIOR COB 27 APRIL.

2. FILE 862201-0300985. E2 IMPDET. d.

REF A - ASKS WHEN A SGSWIRL EXAMINER SHOULD ARRIVE IN CARACAS TO HANDLE THE EXAMINATION OF UKSCARLET-3 AND ANY OTHER STATION SGSWIRL REQUIREMENTS THAT TIME WILL PERMIT.

REF B - ASKS AGAIN WHEN THE SGSWIRL EXAMINER SHOULD ARRIVE IN CARACAS.

OS/IRD HARRY A. KINNEY (TELECOORD)

WH/Sec Mr. Sullivan telecoord

AN LJ
AB X
IN
FS
RC
DES NFD
RI
WH/3/V

DATE: 25 APR 73
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: ~~6666~~ 1535

25 APR 1973

201-0300985

R L Conolly

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 014511

14-00000

TRANSMIT OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** (When Filled In)

#167

ORIG	BETTY A. VAZQUEZ B
UNIT	WH/3/V/R
EXT.	7271/1535
DATE	20 APRIL 1973

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

CONF: WH-14

SA 3, SA/PEG, SA/PROP, DDO/DO, FI 5, IW, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, SOD, FR 4.

TDFIR-314/03534-73

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 20 APRIL 1973

PRECEDENCE: ☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/REG	1	WH/3/V	7
WH/CA	1	WH/CARA	2
WH/FI	1		
WH/RR	1		
WH/3/R	1		

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)

HVC-6680 CARACAS 21745
(IN 893854)
WKOMEGA (WKOMEGA-7)
(F.C. PARA 1 WKNOBLE/
LIAISON: * WKNOBLE8-12

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ AIR ☐

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS (Place X in appropriate space. List electrical addresses.)

CABLE SEC
- RECOMMEND EXO ☐
- BASIC DOCUMENT NOT MADE AVAILABLE DCI ☒
- RELAY CABLE ATTACHED ☐
- SHOW IW ☐

IW
- DISSEM ELECTRICALLY ☐ TO:

OTHER
- EXCLUSIVE FOR USIB ☐
- USIB PERSONAL ATTN ☐
- ZRWAHOO CABLE SENT ☐
- NOT FOR LIAISON ☐

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

21 APR 73 03 482

CORRECTION TAPE USED ON FORM 1K-2

CL BY: MICHAEL C. CHOADEN

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER: C/WH/3/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S):

CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER: C/WH/RR

COPY NO.

3ο 183

File: WKSCARLET-3

FORM 5-69 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (15-20-44-67)

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
STATE/INR NMCC/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA TREAS SDO ONE CRS

● ROUTINE

IN 893854

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine D of Automatic Declassification.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR-314/03534-73

DIST 20 APRIL 1973

COUNTRY VENEZUELA

DOI MID-APRIL 1973

SUBJECT VENEZUELAN MILITARY REACTION TO THE VOTING MACHINE SCANDAL

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (16 APRIL 1973)

FIELD NO. HVC-6680

SOURCE

A SENIOR VENEZUELAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS A LEADING ARMY COMMANDING OFFICER. HE IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE. THE FOLLOWING IS HIS PERSONAL ASSESSMENT.

1. ALTHOUGH THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CURRENT WIDELY PUBLICIZED SCANDAL OVER ALLEGED BRIBING OF VENEZUELAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY LEADERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONTRACT FOR VOTING MACHINES FOR THE DECEMBER 1973 ELECTION, NO ACTION OF ANY KIND IS CONTEMPLATED IN THIS CONNECTION. THE EXPOSE IS LOOKED UPON BY THE MILITARY AS JUST ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF HOW THE POLITICIANS HAVE FAILED THE PEOPLE. WHILE

2
1

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

MOST MILITARY OFFICERS DO NOT DOUBT THAT BRIBES WERE INVOLVED, AND POSSIBLY TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN AS YET ANNOUNCED. FEW THINK THAT THE GOVERNING SOCIAL CHRISTIAN (COPEI) PARTY IS IMPLICATED BECAUSE IT OPPOSED THE PURCHASE OF THE MACHINES. THERE IS EXTENSIVE MILITARY COMPLAINING ABOUT AND DISCUSSION OF THE SCANDAL BUT THIS IS CONFINED TO CONVERSATIONS WITH FELLOW OFFICERS, FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES. IN GENERAL, THE MILITARY BELIEVES THE VOTING MACHINE CONTROVERSY IS OUTSIDE ITS PROVINCE AND CONCERN, AND THERE IS NO INCLINATION TOWARD MILITARY INTERFERENCE. (FIELD COMMENT: CARACAS EMBASSY TELEGRAM 3155 OF 12 APRIL GIVES FULL BACKGROUND ON THE VOTING MACHINE CONTROVERSY. INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY HAVE REPORTED THAT BOTH COPEI AND THE MAJOR OPPOSITION DEMOCRATIC ACTION (AD) PARTY ARE WORRIED ABOUT MILITARY REACTION TO THE SCANDAL.)

2. (FIELD COMMENT: THE EMBASSY COMMENTS AS FOLLOWS: FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER MARTIN GARCIA VILLASMIL AND SOME NON-AD/COPEI POLITICIANS HAVE CLAIMED THERE IS SERIOUS PREOCCUPATION AMONG THE MILITARY OVER THE VOTING MACHINE SCANDAL, BUT INFORMATION FROM MILITARY SOURCES LEADS

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

THE EMBASSY TO AGREE WITH THIS REPORT THAT THE ARMED FORCES ARE NOT PARTICULARLY UPSET BY THE MATTER.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY. DEFATT AT CARACAS.

5 4 3 2 1

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE CDI ACP TOO TPS MDO PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 211836Z DIRECTOR 399612

CONF: C/WH6 INFO: FILE DDC, ADDO, D/IP/AN, C/CI, C/NARC2, C/FI, DISSEM BY: ~~[illegible]~~13

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX PER ~~[illegible]~~ 103

0 RETURN TO

0 IP FILES

AN K.O
AR X
~~IX~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DESTROYED~~
~~FI~~
UN/3N

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET REPLY TO

REF: CARACAS 21753 (IN 895109)

1. CONCUR WITH REF PLAN FOR CONFRONTATION OF WKSCARLET-3 WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS. RE PARA 2C, FEEL ONE OF OUR STRONGEST CARDS IN SECURING WKSCARLET-3'S COOPERATION ON THIS MATTER IS IMPLIED THREAT OF OUR REPORTING HIS NARCOTICS INVOLVEMENT TO GOV AND POSSIBLE RESULTANT LOSS HIS WKSCARLET JOB. RECOGNIZE PROBLEM OF PERHAPS PROVOKING VIOLENT REACTION BY APPLYING TOO MUCH PRESSURE BUT IF WE DON'T USE THIS THREAT, BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE WEAK HAND INDEED. ALSO, SUGGEST THAT W-3'S CASE OFFICER BE ACCOMPANIED TO MEETING BY SECOND OFFICER. FEEL THAT PRESENCE OF SECOND OFFICER AS WITNESS WILL INDICATE TO WKSCARLET-3 SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEW ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM AND ALSO WILL ~~[illegible]~~ SERVE AS INHIBITION, SHOULD HE BE TEMPTED RESORT TO PHYSICAL VIOLENCE. GOOD ~~[illegible]~~ CANDIDATE FOR THIS ROLE WOULD BE YOUR FORTHCOMING VISITOR, ROBERT F. STONTWIST. IF FOR SOME REASON STATION PREFERS NOT USE STONTWIST, SUGGEST WILFRED O. CLOWER, WHO DUE TO LEAVE CARACAS PCS THIS SUMMER.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-300985

21 APR 1973

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 064566

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	RCP	TOO	TPE	WRD		PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	FORWARDED IP/EDI	2		2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE TIME GROUP MAY 10 4 44 PM '73

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

39467

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:________

PER ____ #________

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO ________
0 IP FILES

PLEASE ADVISE WHAT YOU PLAN TO DO.

2. ADDITIONALLY, IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, ~~URGE~~ STATION SHOULD CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF WKSCARLET-3, AS NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZEN, GOING TO WKSCARLET-1, OR OTHER INFLUENTIAL GOV OFFICIAL AFTER CONFRONTATION, SAYING BKHERALD "BELIEVES" HE HAS BEEN WORKING AS PENETRATION OF WKSCARLET BUT HE REALLY HAS NOT (OR SOME VARIATION THIS THEME); AND TELLING WKSCARLET-1 THAT NOW BKHERALD ACCUSING HIM OF BEING INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES TO COERCE HIM INTO GREATER COLLABORATION. ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY THIS MAY BE REMOTE POSSIBILITY, ~~XXX~~ URGE STATION TO ~~THINK ABOUT IT AND~~ MAKE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR POSSIBLE BLOWBACK OF THIS TYPE. ~~WE KNOW THAT WKSCARLET-1 HOLDS WKSCARLET-3 IN HIGH REGARD BUT AT THIS POINT CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON HIS REACTION TO SUCH A STORY BY WKSCARLET-3.~~

3. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN SGSWIRL EXAMINER SHOULD ARRIVE CARACAS.

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

REF - OUTLINES THE CARACAS STATION'S PLAN FOR CONFRONTATION WITH WKSCARLET-3.

DATE: 20 APR 73
ORIG: R.J.WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 16535

C/WH/NARC
C/WH/4
C/WH/COG
DDO/NARCOG
C/WH/FL

RECEIVED
IP/EDI

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY: 3B/R PER SCP1 TOTAL COPIES 10-3 RUN

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT		INFO				
clwh6	I	RF. FILE. VR. DDO, ADDO, c/wh/? c/cl,	1		4	
	N	c/wmc2, c/EL.	2		5	
ACTION #	F		3		6	
029	O					

T 183902 PAGE 01 IN 896501

TOR:202343Z APR 73 WMIM 18287

AN/ING
AB X
IN X
FS
BT 12
DES UFD
FI
WH/3/V

3P

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAY 21 1973
MICROFILMED

S E C R E T 202047Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 18287

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, BUENOS AIRES.

HVC HAD

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21722 (IN 891871)

1. FOLLOWING ARE STATION AND SLIGO TRACES SUBJECTS REF:

1. A DOMINGO OBRERO: NO STATION TRACES.

PROBABLY IDEN WITH SUBJECT OF 201-300943

B. SYLA CUERVO: PROBABLY IDEN WITH SYLA ROGUE

201-300943 ; <TRACE REPLY: POSSIBLY LEADER OF ANTI-U.S. GROUP>

FR CUERVO CASTILLO, DPOB 29 OCT 1920, SAN LUIS, PINAR DEL RIO, CUBA. HE IS LAWYER AND WORKED FOR CUBAN MINISTRY OF LABOR 1945-57; AT NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION CORPS 1959-60. HE WAS MEMBER OF 26 JULY MOVEMENT IN CUBA AND IN NOV 59 WAS DESCRIBED BY CUBAN PRESS AS INTERVENTOR OF HAVANA METROPOLITAN BUSES. SUBJ ARRIVED IN U.S. APRIL 61. IN MIAMI HE BECAME MEMBER OF BAY OF PIGS FORCE, AND HAS BELONGED TO OTHER ANTI-CASTRO EXILE ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER, LNERGO REPORTED IN OCT 64 THAT HE POSSIBLY A LEADER OF GROUP ACCUSED OF ANTI-U.S., PRO-NAZI, PRO-SOCIALIST AND PRO-COMMUNIST STATEMENTS.

AN
AB
IN
UFD
WH/3/V

C. "GUAJIRO" TORRES: PROBABLY IDEN WITH RAIMUNDO BRUNO TORRES REYMON, DPOB 6 OCT 21, CANAJUANI, LAS

PROB IDEN WITH

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

21 Ap 73
201-300985
~~201-300943~~
300985

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 183902 PAGE 02 IN 896501

TOR1202343Z APR 73 WMIM 18287

VILLAS PROVINCE, CUBA. HE WAS SELF-EMPLOYED AUTOMOBILE SALESMAN IN HAVANA UNTIL AUGUST 64. ARRIVED U.S. NOV. 64. AND WAS DEBRIEFED BY STATION AT THREE MEETINGS FOR INFO ON PERSONALITIES OF INTEREST. HE WAS ACTIVE IN ANTI-CASTRO EXILE ORGANIZATION, MOVEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY RECUPERATION (MRR), HEADED BY MANUEL ARTIME. PER REFUGEE SOURCE, TORRES WAS LIVING IN MIAMI 1965, BUT RESIDED CARACAS MAY 70. AS OF MAY 72, HE WORKED IN MASSAGE ROOM OF FOUR AMBASSADORS HOTEL. INFO FROM 1969 INDICATED HE KNOWN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER. HE WAS ON IRS LIST FROM MID-72 OF PERSONS TO BE INDICTED FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.

CIT CUBA

N0531 DPOB 3 APR 40, CUBA, HAVANA

(201-290322)

D. RONALD CONDON-GIL, WITH HIS BROTHER FRANCISCO CONDON-GIL WAS ARRESTED EARLY MARCH 73 FRO COCAINE TRAFFICKING. THEY RECEIVED COCAINE FROM PERUVIAN CONTACT OF RONALD AND FRANCISCO CONDON GIL, HILDA LANDEO, WHO SERVING 10 YEAR SENTENCE ON SAME CHARGE. RONALD WAS BORN 3 APRIL 40, HAVANA. IN 1960, HE BELONGED TO RESCATE, ANTI-CASTRO GROUP OPERATING WITHIN CUBA. HE WAS ARRESTED 1961 AND SENTENCED TO SIX YEARS BY CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL, CHARGED WITH ESPIONAGE AND POSSESSION EXPLOSIVES. ENTERED U.S. AT MIAMI ON 24 DEC 62 (ALTHOUGH NOT A MEMBER OF BAY OF PIGS INVASION FORCE, HE WAS RELEASED ALONG WITH ITS MEMBERS). FRANCISCO WAS TAKEN PRISONER

N0531

CIT PERU
SEX: F

S.E.C.R.E.T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER______ TOTAL COPIES______ RUN BY______

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED______ BY______ AT______ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 183922 PAGE 03-03 IN 896501

TOR:222343Z APR 73 WNIM 18267

DURING BAY OF PIGS, LATER RELEASED.

2. FILE: 201-2320985, E-2, IMPDET.

		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
RI/CDI	X	ABSTRACT	
	X	[illegible]	
~~RI/FS~~		PREPARE FOR FILING	
RI/A	X	[illegible]	
ISO/DCC	X	[illegible] (2,3,4)	2
		[illegible]	075
		[illegible] (11)	
		[illegible]	8
~~[illegible]~~		~~[illegible]~~	
WH/3/V		BU-1	

S E C R E T

201-300943

14-00000

FORM 3020
5-71

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 43 PER Sup/COS TOTAL COPIES 16 - 3 RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT c/WH6

ACTION # 357

INFO: RF, FILE, VR, DDO, ADDO, c/PLAN, c/CI, c/6, c/NARCZ.

T 180174 PAGE 01 IN 895109

TOR:191628Z APR 73 CARA 21753

S E C R E T 191445Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21753

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF DIRECTOR 397601

1. HAVE CONSULTED WITH SAIC MERRING AND HE CONCURS CONFRONTATION.

2. STATION NOW PLANNING MEET WITH WKSCARLET-3 AFTER EASTER, AS HE SPENDING SEMANA SANTA AT THE BEACH WITH FAMILY. SCENARIO FOR DISCUSSION AS FOLLOWS:

A. WILL STATE HAVE RECEIVED SOME VERY DAMAGING ALLEGATIONS FROM LNAGON IN MIAMI. ALLEGATIONS CONCRN HIS CONTACTS WITH KNOWN DRUG TRAFFICKERS BOTH MIAMI AND CARACAS. NAMES OF TRAFFICKERS WILL BE GIVEN WKSCARLET-3. STATION OFFICER WILL THEN STATE THAT IF WKSCARLET-3 WILLING DISCUSS FULLY HIS ACQUAINTANCE THESE INDIVIDUALS, WE READY TO LISTEN. IF HE UNWILLING, HE WILL BE TOLD THAT BKHERALD CANNOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH SUSPECTED DRUG TRAFFICKER AND THAT THIS NOW

AN
AB X
IN
PS
BX
DSS
PN
4/13/N

201-300985

19 APR 1973

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

HAS BECOME TERMINATION MEETING.

B. STATION WILL ONLY REVEAL NAMES HIS DRUG CONTACTS IN ORDER NOT INFORM WKSCARLET-3 EXTENT OUR KNOWLEDGE HIS ACTIVITIES. THIS WILL PRECLUDE HIS PUMPING STATION OFFICER OUR KNOWLEDGE OF HIM AND HIS CONTACTS. THUS, WKSCARLET-3 MUST TELL US WHAT WE ALREADY KNOW, AND PERHAPS, SOMETHING OF WHICH WE DO NOT KNOW.

C. IN ADDITION, STATION OFFICER WILL PREFACE DISCUSSION WITH OUTLINE STATION POSITION CONCERNING WKSCARLET-3'S ALLEGED ACTIVITIES. BRIEFLY, THIS WILL BE A STATEMENT THAT BKHERALD NOT IN ENFORCEMENT BUSINESS AND THAT WE IN NO POSITION INFORM WKSCARLET-1 THAT HIS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN BKHERALD AGENT. THUS, IF WKSCARLET-3 UNWILLING TO TALK, HE CAN WALK OUT OF SAFE HOUSE A RELATIVELY FREE MAN. HE MUST, OF COURSE, REALIZE THAT THIS POSITION DOESN'T PRECLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT ANOTHER POLICE SERVICE MAY HAVE SUFFICIENT INFO TO ARREST HIM. THIS STATEMENT AND THE FRIENDSHIP WHICH HAS EVOLVED BETWEEN THE

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY________

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________ BY________ AT________ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 180174 PAGE 03-03 IN 895109

TOR:191628Z APR 73 CARA 21753

CASE OFFICER AND WKSCARLET-3, SHOULD KEEP THE LATTER FROM USING HIS ALWAYS PRESENT .45 ON THE FORMER.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER
TOTAL COPIES
RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION # 602

INFO RF. FILE. VR. WH SECUR 4

T 174449 PAGE 01-01 IN 892900

TOR:171909Z APR 73 CARA 21730

S E C R E T 171855Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21730

TO: DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF DIRECTOR 393224

1. POUCHING 18 APRIL BY TM 275565 FORMS FILLED OUT BY WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE, ALSO MONEY PAY REVALIDATION FEE. AS AGENT DID NOT RETURN CARACAS UNTIL 14 APRIL, WE UNABLE POUCH COMPLETED FORMS EARLIER.

2. ALTHOUGH STATION ASSISTING RENEWAL, WE PLAN RETAIN REVALIDATED PERMITS PENDING OUTCOME INVESTIGATION INTO AGENT'S ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

AN JM
~~AB~~
IN
FS
RI
~~DBS~~ NFD
~~PI~~
WH/3/V

201-0300985
17 APR 73

SECRET

RECORD COPY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-2

PAGE OF PAGES 1 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
172337Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
397601

CONF: c/WH6 INFO: FILE DDO, ADDO, c/plan, c/cl, c/WHRC2, c/FI,

DISSEM BY: 36/21

PER SCP# 103

0 MORE 0 NO MORE
0 RETURN TO ________
0 IP FILES

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT O PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: A. CARACAS 21703 (IN 890115*)

B. CARACAS 21722 (IN 891871**)

1. B CONCUR WITH REF B PLAN FOR CONFRONTATION OF WKSCARLET-3. HOWEVER, AFTER CONSULTING WITH SAIC HERRING AND PRIOR TO CONFRONTATION, PLEASE CABLE OUTLINE OF INFORMATION THAT WILL BE USED IN CONFRONTATION. WE WILL REVIEW AND FORWARD ANY COMMENTS WE FEEL WILL ASSIST THE STATION IN THIS DELICATE OPERATION.

2. SGSWIRL EXAMINER MARK D. STEMERMAN (IDEN FOR CARACAS) WILL BE AVAILABLE DURING PERIOD 30 APRIL - 13 MAY 73 TO HANDLE WKSCARLET-3 AND ANY OTHER STATION SGSWIRL REQUIREMENTS THAT TIME WILL PERMIT. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST DATE EXAMINER SHOULD ARRIVE.

B

3. FILE 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.H

*PROPOSES CARACAS STATION TERMINATE WKSCARLET-3 WITHOUT CONFRONTATION OVER HIS NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES.

AN	Fm
AS	X
IP	
RS	
SX	
~~DES NFD~~	
PT	
ISH/3/V	

(CONTINUED)

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-0300985

17 APR 73

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 064566

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO

0 IP FILES

357601

**SAYS WKSCARLET-3 RETURNED TO CARACAS ON 13 APRIL 73 AND TOLD HIS CASE OFFICER ON 14 APRIL 73 THAT HE HAD BEEN UNDER SURVEILLANCE IN MIAMI. ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THIS "INVESTIGATION" (SURVEILLANCE) OF WKSCARLET-3 CAN BE USED AS A PEG TO CONFRONT HIM WITH THE ALLEGATIONS THAT HE IS INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS.

C/WH/NARC E. ANDERSON (IN DRAFT)

C/WH/4

C/WH/COG

DDO/NARCOG S.

OS/IRD HARRY A. KINNEY (TELECOORD)

DATE: 17 APR 73

ORIG: R. WEATHERWAX

UNIT: AC/WH/3/V

EXT: 1535

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY

RELEASING OFFICER C/WHD

RICHARD L. CONOLLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER C/WH/3

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 064566

A ◄— ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX. TYPE THE WORD "ALIGN" TO REGISTER HERE —► ALIGN

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACK COI ACP TOO TPE MRO 14-1

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
172337Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
397602

CONF: c/WH6 INFO: FILE DDO, ADDO, C/PLMH, c/CI, c/NARC2, c/FI,

DISSEM BY: 58/[illegible]

PER SC# 103

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO ________
0 IP FILES

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS.

RYBAT O PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 397601

IDEN: TO DIR 397601 JOHN M. SANDELS. E2 IMPDET.H

B

C/WH/NARC E. ANDERSON (IN DRAFT)

C/WH/4 [illegible]

C/WH/COG [illegible]

DDO/NARCOG ✓

AN
AB X
IN
FS
HX
~~YES NED~~
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

DATE: 27 APR 73
ORIG: R. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: AC/WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

201-0300985
17 APR 73

RECORD COPY

RWeicher
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
RELEASING OFFICER C/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RLConolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER C/WH/3

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY PD/28 PER SCP1 TOTAL COPIES 18-3

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT C/WH 6

ACTION # 420

INFO RF. FILE. VR. C/IP/AN, C/CI, C/FI, C/NARC 2

DDO, ADDO,

T 172027 PAGE 01 IN 891871

TOR:162254Z APR 73 CARA 21722 K

S E C R E T 162235Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21722

TO: DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI INFO BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMAHBYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET-3 SURVEILLED

REF: CARACAS 21703 (IN 890115)

1. WKSCRALET-3 RETURNED CARACAS FRIDAY 13 APRIL AND CONTACTED CASE OFFICER SAME DAY. SAFEHOUSE MEETING ARRANGED FOR FOLLOWING DAY. DURING MEETING WKSCARLET-3 MOST ANXIOUS DESCRIBE HIS LAYOVER MIAMI (9 TO 10 MARCH) DURING WHICH HE WAS TAILED FROM AIRPORT CUSTOM'S BAGGAGE INSPECTION TO HIS DEPARTURE TWENTY HOURS LATER. ACCORDING WKSCARLET-3, SURVEILLANCE DONE BY ONE PERSON WHO VERY OBVIOUS, SO MUCH SO THAT WKSCARLET-3 BELIEVES IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN PROVOCATION.

2. WKSCARLET-3 DISCUSSED HIS SURVEILLANCE WITH RONALD CONDON, MIAMI BAIL BONDSMAN AND BROTHER OF FRANK CONDON WHO CONNECTED WITH FRANK MATHEWS (SEE CARACAS 21428). IT ALSO POSSIBLE HE DISCUSSED "TAIL" WITH DOMINGO OBRERO (RUNS A NUMBERS BANK), SYLA CUERVO (GAS STATION OWNER), AND "GUAJIRO" TORRES (RUNS GYM AT FOUR AMBASSADORS HOTEL). WKSCARLET-3 MENTIONED NO OTHER

AN KO
AB X
~~IN~~
~~FS~~
~~EX~~
~~DSS~~ NED
~~FI~~
WH/3 N

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-300985

16 APR 1973

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 172027 PAGE 02 IN 891871

TOR:162254Z APR 73 CARA 21722

NAMES (ACCORDING LNAGON REPORT OUTLINED CARACAS 21408 WKSCARLET-3 MET ANDRES PURRINOS, DOCUMENTED TRAFFICKER).

3. WKSCARLET-3 STATED HE STILL AT LOSS EXPLAIN WHY HE TAILED IN MIAMI. FOR A TIME THOUGHT IT WAS C.I.A. SURVEILLANCE, BUT NOW BELIEVES THAT IT TOO UNPROFESSIONAL FOR THEIR WORK. HE SPECULATED DURING MEETING THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN WORK OF A MIAMI DETECTIVE AGENCY, BUT FOR WHAT PURPOSE HE DOES NOT KNOW. HE ONLY KNOWS THAT VERY FEW PEOPLE KNEW HE ARRIVING MIAMI 9 MARCH, AND HE HAD TO CALL MIAMI FRIENDS TO LET THEM KNOW HE IN TOWN.

4. CASE OFFICER FEIGNED SURPRISE DURING RECOUNTING OF EVENTS THEN STATED HE WOULD CABLE MIAMI AND REQUEST THEIR ASSISTANCE IN DISCOVERING WHY WKSCARLET-3 SURVEILLED. BELIEVE WE CAN USE THIS "INVESTIGATION" AS PEG TO CONFRONT WKSCARLET-3 WITH ALLEGATIONS HE INVOLVED NARCOTICS. CONFRONTATION COULD TAKE PLACE AS EARLY AS WEEK 22 APRIL.

5. REF THINKING WAS STATION DID NOT WISH PREJUDICE LNAGON INVESTIGATION BY CONFRONTING WKSCARLET-3 PREMATURELY AND THEREFORE WE RECOMMENDED AN "AMICABLE" TERMINATION HOWEVER, FAULTY SURVEILLANCE MAY HAVE BLOWN WKSCARLET-3'S

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 172027 PAGE 03-03 IN 091071

TOR:1622542 APR 73 CARA 21722

USEFULNESS TO HEMBERTO TRUEVA, ET AL. AND MAY HAVE PREJUDICED ENTIRE LNAGON CASE. THEREFORE, NOW BELIEVE HAVE NOTHING TO LOOSE BY CONFRONTING WKSCARLET AND CLEARING AIR OVER ALLEGATIONS. DEPENDING WKSCARLET-3 REACTION DURING CONFRONTATION; WOULD APPRECIATE SGSWIRL TOYER STANDING BY WEEK BEGINNING 29 APRIL.

6. HQS COMMENTS REQUESTED.

7. FOR WH/MIAMI: HAVE ONLY INFORMED LOCAL LNAGON WKSCARLET-3'S RETURN CARACAS: NOTHING PASSED CONCERNING MIAMI EVENTS. HOWEVER, PLAN CONSULT WITH SAIC HERRING PRIOR CONFRONTATION. WOULD APPRECIATE STATION AND SLIGO TRACES. OBRERO, CUERVO, TORRES AND CONDON.

8. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 53/31 PER 3 TOTAL COPIES 7-3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT C/WH 6

ACTION # 207

INFO RF. FILE. VR. DDO ADDO C/NARC 2 C/CI C/FI C/IP/AN

T 167268 PAGE 01 IN 890115

TOR:132218Z APR 73 CARA 21703

S E C R E T 132010Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21703

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF DIRECTOR 380299

1. TO RESOLVE WKSCARLET-3 SITUATION QUICKLY AND WITH LEAST RISK PREJUDICE LNAGON INVESTIGATION, STATION PROPOSES WE TERMINATE HIM WITHOUT CONFRONTATION OVER HIS NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES. SUGGEST WE TERMINATE HIM ON SOME PRETEXT WHICH WE WOULD TELL HIM WAS MATTER OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DOES NOT REFLECT ADVERSELY ON HIM, E.G. BKHERALD BUDGETARY/MANPOWER CUTS? IN THIS TERMINATION SCENARIO, WE WOULD MAKE TERMINATION AMIABLE, SAYING IT REGRETTABLE BUT UNAVOIDABLE, AND THEN TRY STEER CONVERSATION TOWARDS INDUCING HIM TO QUERY US AS TO POSSIBILITY HE WORKING FOR ANOTHER LNBUZZ AGENCY. WE WOULD BE RESPONSIVE SUCH A QUERY; AND SUGGEST FACT SINCE HE CUBAN, HE MIGHT BE ABLE DEVELOP INFO ON CUBANS WHO WELL KNOWN BE INVOLVED TRAFFICKING. IF HE BITES, WE

AN
AB X
IN
RS
RX
DES NFD
FI

SECRET

201-0300985

13 APR 73

CS COPY

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 167268 PAGE 02 IN 898115

TOR:132218Z APR 73 CARA 21703

COULD SUGGEST REFEREING HIM TO LNAGON. IF HE DOESN'T BITE, NOTHING HAS BEEN LOST, AS WE WOULD NOT HAVE REVEALED OUR KNOWLEDGE HIS NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES. THIS HAS ADVANTAGE OF SECERING OUR POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS RELATIONSHIP, NOT PREJUDICING LNAGON INVESTIGATION, AND GIVING HIM OPPORTUNITY VOLUTNEER BECOME LANGON SOURCE.

2. IN MEANTIME, WOULD OF COURSE CONTINUE OUR INVESTIGATION HIS ACTIVITIES. ABSENCE WKSCARLET-3 FROM CARACAS HAS TEMPORARILY DRIED UP POTENTIAL LEADS BUT EXPECT THAT UPON HIS RETURN AND PRESUMED RESUMPTION NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES THAT MORE LEADS WILL BECOME AVAILABLE.

3. ASSUMING HQS AGREEABLE ABOVE, QUESTION CONFRONTATION BECOMES ACADEMIC. WE DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE NOT TO CONVINCE WKSCARLET-3 THAT WE REALLY HAVE GOODS ON HIM. NOR DOES LNAGON HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR INDICTMENT. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HIS TENURE WITH US WOULD BE SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER______ TOTAL COPIES______

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED______ BY______ AT______ Z______

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 167268 PAGE 03 - 03 IN 898115

TOR:132218Z APR 73 CASA 21783

AS TO HIS COOPERATION IN ANY CONFRONTATION, HIS REACTION WOULD BE ONE IN TERMS SELF-INTEREST AND WHAT WOULD BE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO HIM: CONTINUED BKHERALD SALARY OR MORE LUCRATIVE EARNINGS FROM NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. WHAT WOULD PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE HIS COOPERATION IS PROBABILITY ARREST AND LOSS WKSCARLET JOB. WITHOUT MORE SPECIFICS THAN WE HAVE NOW, WKSCARLET-3 WOULD NOT NECESSARILY FEEL TRHEATENED IN CONFRONTATION, KNOWING WKSCARLET-3, ONLY IF HE FELT HE WERE BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE WOULD HE AGREE COOPERATE.

4. THEREFORE, SINCE OUR INTERESTS LIE IN TERMINATING HIM AND NOT NECESSARILY IN CONFRONTING HIM, REQUEST HQS VIEWS TERMINATING WKSCARLET-3 ON CONTRIVED PRETEXT AND WITHOUT CONFRONTATION. PLAN TO DO SO SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN, AS HIS PRESENT CASE OFFICER DEPARTING END MAY AND WE DO NOT DESIRE INTRODUCE NEW CASE OFFICER TO HIM

5. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

201-0300985

HISTORY OF VOTING MACHINE ISSUE RECOUNTED

Caracas Radio Continente Network in Spanish 0300 GMT 11 Apr 73 P

[Text] The president of the Supreme Electoral Council, Luis A. Pietri, has denied the charges made regarding the collection of commissions on the sale of voting machines. Just as this station has reported, Pietri has ordered a thorough investigation in order to establish responsibilities. The announcement was made by Pietri during a press conference held tonight at the headquarters of the Supreme Council. Speaking for himself, Pietri said that he would have filed suit against those implicated in the commissions deal. He said that he would have started the suit if he had known which persons were involved in the affair.

The statement made by Antonio Espinoza Prieto regarding a supposed reduction in the contract for the purchase of the voting machines is completely false, said the comptroller general, Manuel Vicente Ledesma. The report was published in local newspapers. According to the papers Antonio Espinoza Prieto said that Mr Dixon, former president of the Automatic Voting Machines [AVM] Company, had come to Venezuela to negotiate a reduction in the price of the contract. [Words indistinct] Prieto said that the reduction was in the nature of $3,050,000, but the comptroller general of the republic denied the information because his office never had any knowledge of Prieto's assertion.

The affairs of the collection of commissions on the purchase of voting machines has turned into a real scandal. It will be recalled that the proposal to purchase the voting machines in the first place was a sensation. On that occasion the representatives of the various parties represented in the Supreme Electoral Council were divided. The opposition insisted that machines had to be used in the next elections because the laws specified this. The Social Christian Party [COPEI], the Democratic National Front [FND] and an independent party were opposed to the purchase because it meant a disbursement of millions of bolivares. Subsequently the matter was submitted to a vote and the opposition parties won.

Contacts were begun with the machine supplier and more disagreements arose. The opposition wanted to purchase the machines from AVM, while COPEI and FND wanted to purchase them from another company. The opposition won again because it was in the majority and it was decided that AVM would supply the machines. The U.S. representatives arrived: the owners, the salesmen, and the commission agents of the company. The contract was drafted and it specified that Venezuela would not pay more than 1 percent of the total transaction in commissions. The transaction was for 180 million bolivares.

At this stage a ghost appeared to pursue the AVM in the United States in the form of the Election Systems Company, which sued the AVM, alleging that the AVM negotiated directly in Venezuela without going through the Elections Systems Company. The latter demanded its commission and last week won the suit. This is how the scandal broke: The AVM said that it could not pay commissions to the Election Systems Company because these commissions had been paid directly to Venezuelan politicians. The AVM defended itself and its representatives said at the trial what they had to say, which is precisely what Pedro Segnini La Cruz told the papers today. The People's Electoral Movement [MPE] was accused of having received $40 per machine which, multiplied by 10,000, amounts to $400,000, or 1.8 million bolivares.

File: WKSCARLET-3

MILITARY COURT QUESTIONS BLANCO PARTY LEADER

Paris AFP in Spanish 1453 GMT 11 Apr 73 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Excerpts] Montevideo, 11 Apr--Reliable sources today reported that the military court has asked Blanco Party national leader Omar Murdoch for information about a declaration issued 2 weeks ago in which the Blanco Party strongly criticized President Bordaberry and the military authorities.

The military court is trying to establish whether the Blanco Party leader committee a violation of military regulations. It also asked Murdoch whether he concurred with the terms of the Blanco Party declaration.

It was reported that the alleged violation concerned the military regulation which prevents retired officers from participating in or formulating political declarations during the 4 years following their retirement.

According to reliable sources, Murdoch--a retired navy captain--will be brought before the military tribunal if the violation is confirmed.

The military court's action agitated the political atmosphere and the Blanco Party leaders will meet this evening to discuss the situation. A Blanco Party member expressed the opinion that instead of looking into the political attitudes of retired officers, the military court should try those military men on active duty who have in effect formed a political party.

It was revealed in parliamentary circles that opposition legislators will demand in parliament that the defense minister explain the true motives which led to the proceedings initiated by the military court.

ARGENTINE AUTHOR RELEASED FROM URUGUAYAN PRISON

Paris AFP in Spanish 1445 GMT 11 Apr 73 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Montevideo, 11 Apr--Argentine writer and journalist Eduardo Galeano was released yesterday by a military court after a 1-week detention. Galeano himself confirmed his release today and said that he was in perfect health and that he had been well-treated during his detention.

He was arrested at Carrasco Airport on his return from a visit to several Latin American countries. Galeano, who has been living in Uruguay for a long time, is a journalist of the leftist weekly MARCHA and was recently appointed director of the Argentine review CRISIS.

The reason for his arrest is unknown. Several circles not only in Uruguay and Argentina but also in several Latin American countries protested the arrest of the author of the book "The Opened Veins of Latin America."

In addition, the representative of the MSP, Antonio Espinoza Prieto, received 450,000 bolivares. The same arrangement was made for the Democratic Republican Union [URD] and Omar Rumbos, another one of the representatives of the opposition on the Supreme Electoral Council. Rumbos and his party received similar amounts to those received by the MPS and Espinoza Prieto. Democratic Action [AD], which was also accused, was supposed to receive more than the others, that is, 2,115,000 bolivares. The distribution also included several lawyers, one Mr (Hans), and others named Eduardo Blanco and Leoni.

According to the same document released by Segnini La Cruz today, the AVM representative said that he unknowingly signed a commission invoice for $305 per machine. This means there is a $2 commission per machine, the recipient of which the AVM representative said he did not know. As spokesmen for public opinion, we are obliged to inform the Venezuelan people about the content of Segnini La Cruz' document. In the meantime, it is up to those involved to explain the scandal of the collection of commissions for the purchase of the voting machines.

The comptroller's office has never had any information to the effect that the former president of the AVM came to Venezuela to negotiate a reduction in price. Manuel Vicente Ledesma made the explanation in connection with a report published in the local newspapers and attributed to Antonio Espinoza Prieto. Prieto said that Mr Dixon had come to Venezuela to reduce the selling price of the voting machines by $3,050,000. From another quarter, Ledesma said that the tools and supplies which will be used to manufacture the machines will remain in Venezuela. In addition, the country will take possession of the voting machines in a domestic port and not abroad.

BRIEFS

FNTA POSTS--The Social Christian Party has obtained seven posts and the Democratic Action Party has won two on the executive board of the National Federation of Agricultural and Livestock Workers (FNTA). FNTA held its convention in Barquisimeto with the participation of 135 delegates from approximately 19 labor unions. [Caracas EL NACIONAL in Spanish 5 Apr 73 p C-14 P]

GUERRILLA LEADER CABANAS CLAIMS KIDNAPING ROLE

Paris AFP in Spanish 0443 GMT 11 Apr 73 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Acapulco, 10 Apr--Lucio Cabanas, top guerrilla leader of the country, appears as signatory of a press communique in which he claims responsibility for kidnaping a rich cattle breeder, Franciso Sanchez Lopez, on 7 March in Texpan, Guerrero State.

The document was published today, Tuesday, by the newspapers LA VERDAD and EL GRAFICO issued in Acapulco with a picture of five masked men in uniforms and with Mexican Army guns surrounding someone who seems to be Sanchez Lopez.

Lucio Cabanas added to his alleged signature the title of head of the executing peasant brigade of the Poor People's Party, in the name of which he accused Mexican society of being capitalist and of exploiting the people and said, that for this reason, this society must be eliminated.

He added that the kidnaped cattle breeder, of whom nobody has heard since his disappearance, is a bourgois who exploits the people whose land he has seized by means of usury and unlawful maneuvers.

He called the government a bloody murderer of peasants and stated that, for this reason, the executing brigade applies the law of retaliation in kind and justly retaliates by means of executions and kidnapings as well as bank and company holdups. After urging peasants and students to join the movement, Lucio Cabanas said, in conclusion: Our basic method is that of arms.

OPPOSITION PARTY LEADER CHARGES POLICE PERSECUTION

Paris AFP in Spanish 1055 GMT 11 Apr 73 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Mexico City, 11 Apr--Jose de Jesus Martinez Gil, head of the local branch of the National Action Party (PAN--rightist opposition party), said Tuesday that PAN propaganda distributors are being persecuted by the police. According to Martinez Gil, the police in one electoral district removed and destroyed the propaganda printed by the opposition party and threatened to arrest those who were distributing the propaganda.

Martinez Gil added that in other areas of the city the police arrested several PAN militants when they--using loudspeakers--were asking the people to vote for the PAN. Elections will be held in the country in July to choose all members of the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress.

BRIEFS

NEW NAVAL COMMANDER--Mexico City, 5 Apr--The Navy Department's recently promulgated organic law has designated Cmdr Enrique Baltanas Hope chief of the four naval zones on the Pacific Coast. The new official will be in charge of the Guaymas, Mazatlan, Salina Cruz and Acapulco naval commands with headquarters in the port of Acapulco. A similar command has been established for the Gulf of Mexico with headquarters in the port of Veracruz but its commander has not been named. Baltanas, who was commander of the Tampico naval zone on the Atlantic Coast, has stated that with the establishment of the new post it will be possible for the first time to provide real protection for the country's maritime resources. [Havana PRELA in Spanish 1351 GMT 5 Apr 73 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 60/7 PER 53F 13 TOTAL COPIES 16-2 RUN ~10

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT 1WHG

ACTION # 619

INFO: RF. FILE. VR. 000, A000, C/VR/AN, C/CI, C/FI, C/WBRC 2

T 158419 PAGE 01 IN 886605

TOR:102116Z APR 73 CARA 21667

872

S E C R E T 102045Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21667

TO: DIRECTOR, BOGOTA, WH/MAIMI INFO BUENOS AIRES.

HAB UFA HAB

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REFS A. CARACAS 21427 (IN 860502)

B. BOGOTA 21841 (IN 876212)

C. BOGOTA 21863 (IN 882076)

D. BNDD HQS 2310, 10 APR 73 NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC.

E. CARACAS 21462, HVC 6613 (IN 865032)

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY REF D:

A. MARIA CHRISTINA F L E A L, WIFE EUGENIO L E A L POZO, ADVISED S/A SHORT THAT SERRANO WAS AT BARRANQUILLA PHONE NUMBER 44-910 RALPH F S E R R A N O WAS AT BARRANQUILLA PHONE NUMBER 44-910 FEB 73. PER MARIA CHRISTINA LEAL

B. FROM ABOVE NUMBER SERRANO CALLED MIAMI NUMBER 634-9532. THIS LISTED TO TONI J. F J E W E T TN 3055 NW 13TH ST. IN MIAMI CALLED BY SERRANO SHE WIFE OF HUMBERTO F T R U E V A, WHOSE 1971 OLDSMOBILE, LICENSE 1WW-40758, SEEN AT HIS THIS ADDRESS. 3055 NW 13TH ST., MIAMI

2. STATION COMMENTS:

2P

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAY 21 1973
MICROFILMED

D

AN	
AB	X
IN	X
PX	
BX	3
~~DES~~	NFD
~~FI~~	
WH/3	✓

SECRET

CS COPY

D 75-120-26

Jewett-3
201-0300985
10 APR 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 158419 PAGE 02-02 IN 886685

TOR:102116Z APR 73 CARA 21667

A. ABCVE FURTHER REENFORCES SUSPICIONS LINKS BETWEEN TRUEVA AND SERRANO. BY EXTENSION, THIS MIGHT ALSO LINK WKSCARLET-3 TO SERRANO.

B. WE SPECUALTE ABOUT POSSIBLE LINK OF LUIS ENRIQUE JARAMILLO, SUBJECT REF E. TO SERRANO AND WKSCARLET-3. THIS BASED FACT JARAMILLO RESIDENT IN BARRANQUILLA, WHERE SERRANO WAS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY LOCATED, AND JARAMILLO'S SUSPICIOUS CONTACT WITH UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL IN CARACAS. HYPOTHESIZE THAT UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL WHO MET WITH TRUEVA, HOSE GOMEZ, AND WKSCARLET-3. JARAMILLO MET WITH POLICE OFFICIAL LATE FEBRUARY, WHICH ABOUT TIME GOVEZ AND TRUEVA LEFT CARACAS.

POSSIBLE LINK TO SERRANO

C. ALL ABOVE DISCUSSED WITH BNDD, WHO CONCURS.

3. FOR BOGOTA: MAY WE PASS REF C TO BNDD?

4. INDEX LEAL, SERRANO, JEWETT, TRUEVA, JARAMILLO.

FILE 201-300985, 75-102-26. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

15-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1

E U B B S E C R E T

STAFF 062202Z DIRECTOR 393224

CONF WH 8 INFO: FILE HAN SEWR4

DISSEM BY 33

PER ____ #________

0 0

0

0

TO: CARACAS.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

1. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT "PERMITS TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" FOR WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE EXPIRE 20 APRIL 73. IF WKSCARLET-3 CLEARED OF ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM, FOLLOWING WOULD HAVE TO BE POUCHED TO HQS TO EXTEND PERMITS FOR ADDITIONAL YEAR:

A. PERMITS WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE CURRENTLY ~~HAVE~~ HOLD.

B. "APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF PERMIT TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES"

(I&NS FORM I-143) - WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE HAVE TO COMPLETE SEPARATE APPLICATIONS WHICH CAN BE OBTAINED FROM U.S. CONSULATE IN CARACAS.

C. CHECK FOR 20 DOLLARS (10 DOLLARS EACH FOR WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE.)

2. SUGGEST RENEWAL OF ABOVE PERMITS COULD BE USED AS ONE MEANS OF ~~COERCING~~ CONVINCING WKSCARLET-3 TO COOPERATE IN FORTHCOMING CONFRONTATION, IN EVENT HE BALKS AND REQUIRES PROMPTING.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

B

AN
AB X
DN
PS
EX
PI
WH/3/V

DATE: 6 APRIL 703
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

201-0300985
06 APR 73

OS/AAS FRED BUCCI(TELECOORD)

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

CS COPY

R L Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 064566

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2/13 PER SOP# 5 TOTAL COPIES 12-1 RUN

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT 9WH6

ACTION # 872

INFO RF. FILE. VR. DDO, ADDC, CI/OPS, CI, C/NARC2, C/FI, C/EUR6

T 146272 PAGE 01-01 IN 881527

TOR:051558Z APR 73 CARA 21619

S E C R E T 051345Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21619

TO: ROME, MADRID, DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, BUENOS AIRES, WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21468 (IN 865173)

1. ACCORDING UNILATERAL WKNUGGET TAP HOME PHONE LUIS POSADA, MRS POSADA PHONED HER HUSBAND AT HOTEL CLUB, ROME, PHONE NUMBERS 480878 OR 479292 CIRCA 28 MAR. POSADA TOLD HER THAT HE WOULD BE TRAVELING TO MADRID AFTER LEAVING ROME. POSADA ALSO SAID HE WOULD BE ARRRIVING VENEZUELA EARLY APRIL. (COMMENT: POSADA LAST KNOWN TO REGISTERED HOTEL KING, ROME.) IN ANOTHER CONVERSATION, MRS. POSADA TOLD ANOTHER PERSON THAT POSADA WOULD BE TRAVELING TO MADRID WITH ANOTHER PERSON, NAME UNKNOWN.

2. ABOVE PASSED TO BNDD CARACAS. ADDEES MAY DO LIKEWISE.

3. ANY NEWS ROME RE POSADA?

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

AN Ko
~~AB~~
IN
PS
EX
DES ND
FI
WH/3/V

SECRET

CS COPY

201-300985

05 APR 1973

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45/56 PER SOP/03 TOTAL COPIES 6-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/WH C

ACTION # 603

INFO RF. FILE. VR. MO ADD E1PDX C/CI C/FI (C/KAR 2)

T 147367 PAGE 01-01 IN 882076

TOR:0522312 APR 73 BOGO 21883

S E C R E T 052140Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 21883

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLNHABYSS

REF: BOGOTA 21841 (876212)

1. BOGOTA PHONE NO 358-461, CITED PARA 2 REF, INSTALLED IN APT 902, CALLE 64, NO 7-18, IN NAME OF ISMAEL ACEVEDO CERON, OWNER OF APT BUILDING. PRETEXT CALL REVEALED THAT FAMILY SURNAMED LEAL ACTUALLY RESIDES IN APT 902. IT UNKNOWN WHETHER LEAL FAMILY RELATED TO EUGENIO ANTONIO LEAL POZO (201-890270). NO STATION TRACES ACEVEDO.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

AN Ko
RB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~EE~~
~~DESTROYED~~
~~FI~~
WH/3/CO

S E C R E T

CS COPY

201-300985

05 APR 1973

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

TO
Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

XX

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
O PLMHABYSS/Forwarding of BNDD Documents Regarding Luis POSADA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: CARACAS-21539

1. Forwarded herewith are two BNDD ROIs and one telegram regarding Luis POSADA. The first ROI prepared by S/A Jose Marin and dated 6 February 1973 is based on a debriefing of a BNDD source who identifies POSADA aka "Bambi" as being a source of supply for narcotics in Venezuela. The CI also claims that POSADA, along with Jose Gomez and Humberto TRUEVA, have been involved in other illegal activity such as dealing in stolen merchandise, counterfeit money, and contraband.

2. The other ROI, prepared by S/A Charles R. Schaming and dated 13 March 1973, concerns a debriefing of a source who does not believe that POSADA is involved in narcotics.

3. The third document is BNDD Headquarters telegram 1846 of 23 March 1973 (repeated from Miami BNDD) concerning the debriefing of Jose GOMEZ, the BNDD CI who went sour. GOMEZ' debriefing adds little and in the opinion of the Station and BNDD Caracas, GOMEZ is either lying and/or not telling the whole truth. GOMEZ lists a number of names of persons he claims to have met while in Caracas which we do not consider worth a follow up except that of Colonel Freddie BALBOA. BALBOA may possibly be the unidentified police/security official so frequently seen with GOMEZ et al.

Gerald R. Gizzi

Gerald R. GIZZI

Attachments:
1. Two (2) ROIs, hw
2. One (1) Telegram, hw

Distribution: E2IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE
3 - C,WHD w atts
2 - COS, WH/Miami w atts
2 - COS, Buenos Aires, wo atts

S Att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA - 19310	5 April 1973
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 201-300985

STATE DEPT DOCUMENT

STATE CABLE FROM AMEMBASSY CARACAS (CARACAS 2866)

DATE: 4 APRIL 1973

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: LETTERS ROGATORY IN CASE OF ELECTIONS SYSTEMS CORP. VS. AVM CORP.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER [illegible] TOTAL COPIES [illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT [illegible]

ACTION # 266

INFO RF. FILE. VR [illegible]

T 137431 PAGE 01-01 IN 877680

TOR:0215492 APR 73 CARA 21584

S E C R E T 0215302 APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21584

TO: BOGOTA INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: BOGOTA 21841 (IN 874212)

1. IF BNDD BOGOTA TRAFFIC SENT BNDD CARACAS, WE CAN OBTAIN SAME LOCALLY. HOWEVER, PLS RELAY ANY BNDD BOGOTA INFO THAT IS NOT SENT TO BNDD CARACAS.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

AN
AP
I
F
B
D
WH/3

201-0300985
02 APR 73

CS COPY

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY c/WH6 PER SO /03 TOTAL COPIES 16-3 4

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT c/WH6

ACTION # 147

INFO RF. FILE. VR. DDO ADDO C/CI/AN c/CI c/NARCO c/FI

DOC. MICRO. SER.
[illegible]
MICROFILMED

T 133753 PAGE 01 IN 876212

TOR:302233Z MAR 73 BOGO 21841

872

S E C R E T 302207Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 21841

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR. HVC

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET ATTEMPT TO LOCATE

REFS: A. CARACAS 21534 (872287)

B. BOGOTA BNDD 2397/26 MAR 73

C. BOGOTA BNDD 2479, 28 MAR 73 (NOT SENT CARACAS)

AN
AB X
IN X
FI
EX 3
DES
FI
WH

1. ON 12 MAR 73, BOGOTA BNDD REP SENT INVESTIGATOR TO BARRANQUILLA, COLOMBIA, TO LOCATE RALPH SERRANO. AS STATED IN REF B, INVESTIGATOR TOLD BOGOTA BNDD REP THAT SERRANO HAD RESIDED IN APARTOTEL ESLAIT FURNISHED APARTMENTS, CARRERA 53, NO. 72-27, FROM APPROX 15-27 FEB 73. TELEPHONE 44910 IS SWITCHBOARD NUMBER OF ESLAIT BUILDING.

2. FYI ONLY, NOT FOR CARACAS BNDD: INVESTIGATOR, AN OFFICIAL OF COLOMBIAN ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS), IS ALSO IN CONTACT WITH BOGOTA STATION. HE GAVE STATION OFFICER FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO: SERRANO HAD BEEN RESIDING IN APARTMENT NO 3-C, APARTOTEL ESLAIT, UNDER NAME "LAURO SERRANO". HE HAD DOMINICAN PPT NO. 200640 AND CALIMED BE DOMINICAN CITIZEN RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM CARACAS. SERRANO'S ALLEGED WIFE, LOURDES SERRANO,

CS COPY

S E C R E T

201-300985

30 MAR 1973

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY_______ PER_______ TOTAL COPIES_______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED_______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED_______ BY_______ AT_______ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 133753 PAGE 02 IN 876212

TOR:302233Z MAR 73 BOGO 21841

DPB: APPROX 1950, HAD DOMINCAN PPT 230441 AND WAS STAYING IN ROOM 27, DEL PRADO HOTEL, BARRANQUILLA. IT UNCLEAR WHETHER SERRANOS MOVED TO DEL PRADO AFTER LEAVING ESLAIT OR WHETHER THEY NOT LIVING TOGETHER. IN ANY AEVENT, RALPH SERRANO'S CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. IN ADDITION PHONE NOS CITED REF A, SERRANO ALSO CALLED BOGOTA 358-461. STATION ATTEMTPING DETERMINE SUBSCRIBER AND LOCATION. INVESTIGATOR ALSO DETERMINED THAT SERRANO'S LAWYER IN COLOMBIA IS AKA "GUILLERMO F L A N K". STATION BELIEVES THIS LAWYER IDENTIFIABLE WITH MIGUEL GUILLERMO F L A M K VALENCIA RPT LAMK VALENCIA, LAWYER OF ARABIC ORIGIN WITH OFFICE AT CALLE 9, NO 4-25, CUCUTA, COLOMBIA, PHONE 7948 RPT 7948. ACCORDING STATION ASSET GIDARK-1, F LAMK USES GUILLERMO AS FIRST NAME AND IS LAWYER F[illegible] OR FERNAND B E R T A G N I N I, SUSPECTED COCAINE TRAFFICKER.

3. REF C STATED THAT MEDELLIN PHONE NO 774-872 (CITED REF A) REGISTERED TO GUSTAVO G I L SALGADO, CARRERA 50-1 NO. 33-61, ITAGUI, ANTIOGUIA, DEPT., COLOMBIA. REF C FURTHER ADVISED UNAVAILABILITY OF INFO ON SUBSCRIBER OF MEDELLIN PHONE NO 422-022. FYI: NO STATION TRACES GIL. ITAGUI IS SMALL TOWN NEAR MEDELLIN.

4. BNDD IS RUNNING SERRANO CASE FROM BOGOTA END. IF CARACAS

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________ SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________ BY________ AT________ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

I N F O RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 133753 PAGE 03-03 IN 876212

TOR:302233Z MAR 73 BOGO 21841

DEEMS IT NECESSARY, STATION BOGOTA CAN RELAY BNDD INFO DEVELOPED THIS CASE. ADVISE.

5. INDEX SERRANO AND LAMK. FILE:201-300985. E2, IMPDET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER [illegible] TOTAL COPIES [illegible] RUN BY 4

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT C/EUR8

ACTION # 718

INFO RF. FILE VR [illegible] C/CI C/FI C/NARC2

DDO ADDO C/WH6

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 129082 PAGE 01-01 IN 874153

TOR:2911352 MAR 73 PARI 37717

T

S E C R E T 2910192 MAR 73 STAFF

CITE PARIS 37717

TO: ROME INFO CARACAS, DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI, MADRID, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLAHABYSS

REF CARACAS 21536 (872333)

1. FROM DISCUSSION WITH REGION 17 DEPUTY DIRECTOR PANELLA STATION LEARNED THAT SOME DAYS AGO ITALIAN SURVEILLANCE TEAM REPORTED THAT LUIS POSADA HAD TAKEN COUNTER SURVEILLANCE PRECAUTIONS AND HAD BECOME AWARE OF HIS ITALIAN POLICE SURVEILLANTS. ITALIANS APPARENTLY PUT NEW TEAM ON HIM.

2. ROME: WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF STATION COULD ARRANGE GET ORAL RUN DOWN APPROX ONCE A WEEK FROM SAIC IN ROME ON THIS INVESTIGATION BECAUSE BNDD CABLES AND ROI'S OFTEN FAIL TO REPORT DETAILS OF INTEREST.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

AN	X
AB	X
IN	
PS	
HK	
I [illegible]	NFD
I	
E/NARC	

con/s/r

S E C R E T

CS COPY

201-300985

29 MAR73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 56 PER R 1-3 TOTAL COPIES 23-2 BY 4

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/WH 6

ACTION # 558

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE . VR . ADDO, DDO, C/CI/AN, C/CI C/FI, C/NARC 2, C/EUR 6,

T 124748 PAGE 01 IN 872323

TOR:272142Z MAR 73 CARA 21536

SECRET 272040Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21536

TO: DIRECTOR, ROME INFO PARIS.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET CUSATI ~~[illegible]~~ PHONE CALLS IN ITALY

REF CARACAS 21468 (IN 865173)

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY BNDD ROME TELEGRAM 2364 OF 27 MAR 73:

A. SLAERNO NUMBER CALLED BY CUSATI LISTED TO ALFONSO GREICO, BORN SALERNO 23 OCT 32, RESIDING VIA LUNGOMARE COLOMBO 39, SALERNO. INP REPORTS GREICO COFFEE IMPORTER WITH NO CRIMINAL RECORD. NO TRACES ROME BNDD.

B. ON 26 MAR 73 CUSATI CALLED CARACAS NUMBER 45-24-70. ON 27 MAR HE DEPARTED ROME FOR NAPLES WITH PROPOSED STAY OF THREE DAYS.

2. CARACAS NUMBER LISTED TO GENARO CATALDO SATURNO, PUENTO HIERRO, AVDA. 3, LAS FLORES. CHECKING DETERMINE PRESENT USER THIS NUMBER AND WILL ADVISE. NO

AN KO
AB X
IN
FS
FA
DES NFD
FI
WH/3/V

B

SECRET

CS COPY

201-300985

27 MAR 1973

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________ PER__________ TOTAL COPIES __________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED __________ BY __________ AT __________ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE . VR .

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 124748 PAGE 02-02 IN 872323

TOR:272142Z MAR 73 CARA 21536

PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES CATALDO NOR GREICO.

3. FILE 201-300985, E2 IMPDET

SECRET

14-00000

LE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER [illegible] TOTAL COPIES [illegible]

ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT WH6

ACTION # 576

INFO ~~RF.~~ FILE, VR, [illegible] DDO ADDO

T 124786 PAGE 01-01 IN 872348

TOR:272154Z MAR 73 CARA 21539

S E C R E T 272040Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21539

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF CARACAS 21298 (NOT SENT BUENOS AIRES) (848386)

1. STATION HAS COPY BNDD MIAMI DEBRIEFING OF JOSE GOMEZ AS SUMMARIZED IN BNDD (# NO RECORD IN C/S) HQS TELEGRAM 1846 OF 23 MAR 73. GOMEZ ADMITTED MEETING LUIS POSADA IN CARACAS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BUT DENIES DISCUSSING NARCOTICS WITH POSADA OR ANYONE ELSE. SAID POSADA DISCUSSED IMPORTING RAWHIDE SKING TO US FOR LEATOER PRODUCTS. BOTH STATION AND BNDD CARACAS OF OPINION THAT GOMEZ NOT TELLING TRUTH. THEREFORE GOMEZ DEBRIEFING ADDS LITTLE FOR OUR PLANNED CONFRONTATION. POUCHING TELEGRAM.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

CS COPY
SECRET

201-300985
27 MAR 1973

WH/3/V

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER [illegible] 3 TOTAL COPIES 2-2-3

S-E C R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT [illegible]

ACTION # 515

INFO ~~RF.~~ FILE. VR. [illegible] C/CI C/FI C/WHC2 DDO ADDD C/WR6

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAY 7 1973
MICROFILMED

T 124685 PAGE 01 IN 872287

TOR:272122Z MAR 73 3P CARA 21534

872

S E C R E T 272042Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21534

TO: BOGOTA, DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, OTTAWA.

HLB UFA HAB OCO

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF CARACAS 21369 (NOT SENT OTTAWA) (855389)

AN KO
~~AB~~
IN
PB
EX 2
DSS SFD
FI
WH/3/V

1. LEAD FROM BOGOTA BNDD SUGGESTS POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION ANOTHER MEMBER HUMBERTO TRUEVA, JOSE GOMEZ, LUIS POSADA GROUP.

possibl [illegible] [illegible] (+ [illegible] in c/s)

ACCORDING BNDD BOGOTA TELEGRAM 2397 OF 26 MARCH, US FUGITIVE RALPH SERRANO TELEPHONED HOTEL CLUB AMERICANA (71-44-11) IN CARACAS FROM BARRANQUILLA, COLOMBIA, DURING APPROXIMATE PERIOD 15FEB-27 FEB 73. SERRANO WAS IN BARRANQUILLA DURING AFOREMENTIONED PERIOD AT RESIDENCE WHOSE PHONE NUMBER IS 44910. SERRANO ALSO CALLED 32-24-50 IN CARACAS; 634-9532 IN MIAMI, AND 42-20-22 AND 77-48-72 IN MEDELLIN.

[illegible]

2. COMMENT: INTERESTING ASPECT HOTEL CLUB AMERICANA CALL IS THAT TRUEVA AND GOMEZ WERE STAYING AT HOTEL AT TIME CALL MADE. CAN

SECRET

CS COPY

201-300985

27 MAR 1973

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

INFO: RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 124685 PAGE 02 IN 872287

TOR:272122Z MAR 73 CARA 21534

THEREFORE SPECULATE SERRANO WAS CALLING TRUEVA/GOMEZ. SERRANO IS DOCUMENTED TRAFFICKER WHO WAS LAST KNOWN BY STATION TO BE DEALING FROM MONTREAL. SERRANO KNOWN TO BE ASSOCIATED

ZR 201-0951133

WITH ROLANDO LUCAS GONZALEZ NUNEZ AND

R201-0854070

EUGENIO LEAL POZO. ALTHOUGH LATTER TWO DISLIKE SERRANO. IN MAY 72 BNDD SPECULATED THAT PHONE CALLS BY SERRANO FROM MONTREAL TO CARACAS INDICATED NARCOTICS DEAL WITH GONZALEZ. WE ALSO AWARE TRUEVA TRAVELED TO COLOMBIA AFTER DEPARTING CARACAS. WHICH LENDS FURTHER WEIGHT HYPOTHESIS OF LINK TO SERRANO.

numerous ref

3. 32-24-50 LISTED TO JUAN VICENTE HERNANDEZ, AVENIDA 4 BETWEEN 6TH AND 7TH TRANSVERSALS, ALTAMIRA, QUINTE HERLAND, CARACAS. NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES. ATTEMPTING DETERMINE ACTUAL RESIDENT THIS ADDRESS. ALSO ATTEMPTING DETERMINE PHONE CALLS MADE BY TRUEVA/GOMEZ

E

FROM HOTEL. WOULD APPRECIATA ANYTHING BOGOTA STATION MIGHT ADD RE SERRANO, SUCH AS CONFIRMATION

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 124685 PAGE 03-03 IN 872287

TOR:272122Z MAR 73 CARA 21534

HIS PRESENCE COLOMBIA, DATES ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE, ITINERARY, ETC.

4. ALL ABOVE MAY BE DISCUSSED WITH BNDD.

5. INDEX SERRANO. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28/1 PER SCP .103

ACTION UNIT c/WH6

INFO FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, c/WH/CI, c/CI, c/FI, c/NARCZ

ACTION NO. 958

S E C R E T 231856Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI WMIMI 17977

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

868761
M

REF: CARACAS 21427 (IN 860502)

1. BNDD/MIAMI STATES INFO RE ALLEGATION THAT WKSCARLET-3 TAKING OVER EUGENIO LEAL POZO'S NETWORK RECENTLY SENT BNDD/CARACAS. IN ORDER AVOID DUPLICATION, THEY REQUEST STATION CARACAS CONSULT BNDD REP TO OBTAIN DETAILS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

AN
AB X
IN
PS
EX
DES / NFD
PI
wH/3/V

CS COPY

201-300985

23 MAR 1973

SECRET

BNDD DOCUMENT

BNDD HQS TELEGRAM 1846
DATE: 23 MARCH 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: LUIS POSADA ZB-73-0001
BNDD FILE NO: NONE GIVEN

BNDD DOCUMENT

BNDD CABLE FROM BNDD HQS WASHDC (BNDD 1847)

DATE: 23 MARCH 1973

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: LUIS POSADA ZB-73-0001

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 0 / | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 6/ PER SOP.103

ACTION UNIT C/WH6 | INFO FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/IP/AN, C/CI, C/EI, C/WARC2
ACTION NO 555 | C/EUR6

866411

S E C R E T 212050Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 17954 (WMIM)

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, PARIS, ROME, MADRID, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REFS: A. CARACAS 21468 (IN 865173)

B. PARIS 37356 (IN 863806)

1. STATION HAS CONTINUING INTEREST REF INVESTIGATION HOWEVER NO NEED SUMMARIZE BNDD TRAFFIC AS THEIR REPORTS AVAILABLE LOCALLY.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E-2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

AN X O
PT
WH/2/N

6

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985

21 MAR 1973

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22 — ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 23 PER .103

ACTION UNIT C/WH6

INFO FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/PLAN, C/CA, C/FI, C/NARC 2, C/OPC

ACTION NO 426

S E C R E T 211544Z MAR 73 STAFF

866087

CITE ROME 28631

TO: CARCAS, DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, WH/MIAMI, MADRID,

BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 21468 (865173)

CARA-21468

1. ROME STATION HAS CONTINUING INTEREST REF TRAFFIC.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

AN KO

AB X

ES

WH/3/V

CS COPY

201-300985

21 MAR 1973

SECRET

14-0000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION . . CLASSIFIED MESSAGE . TOTAL COPIES 24

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER SOP.103

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/EUR6

FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/IP/AN, C/FI, C/CI, C/NARC2, C/WH6

ACTION NO 983

S E C R E T 211610Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE MADRID 18687

866153

TO: PARIS, CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: A. PARIS 37356 (IN 863806)

B. CARACAS 21468 (IN 865173)

1. LOCAL BNDD AWARE POSSIBILITY SUBJECTS REFS MAY RETURN CARACAS VIA MADRID.

2. STATION RECEIVING ALL BNDD TRAFFIC. NO NEED CONTINUE RECEIVING SUMMARIES.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

AN X
AB X
~~FN~~
~~FS~~
~~EX~~
~~DEF LLD~~
~~FI~~
WH/3 V

CS COPY

SECRET

21 Mar 73

201-300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 32-3 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY 29/30 PER SOP . 103

ACTION UNIT C/WH 6 — INFO FILE, VR 000, A000, C/IPLAN, C/CI, C/NARCO, C/FI, C/EUR6

ACTION NO. 306

S E C R E T 201925Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21468 CARA

865173

TO: DIRECTOR, ROME, PARIS INFO WH/MIAMI, MADRID, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REFS: A. CARACAS 21429 (IN 860750)

B. DIRECTOR 383866

C. ROME 28609 (IN 863762)

D. PARIS 37356 (IN 863806)

KO
*
WH/3/V

1. ASSUME ALL ADDEES (EXCEPT WH/MIAMI) HAVE SEEN BNDD ROME 2088 OF 16 MAR 73 WHICH REPORTS ARRIVAL LUIS POSADA AND CAMILO CUSATI ROME ON 14 MAR. FOLLOWING SUMMARY THIS TELEGRAM: PAIR STATED THEY WOULD BE STAYING CLARIDGE HOTEL, VIA LIEGI 62, ROME, BUT DID NOT DO SO. PAIR RESIDING HOTEL KING, VIA SISTINA, ROME, IN COMPANY VEN DIPLOMAT ADOLFO EMILIO REYES-MEJIAS, DPOB 6 OCT 43 CARACAS. PAIR HAVE STAYED KING HOTEL PREVIOUS OCCASION. CUSATI MADE PHONE CALL TO 53-52-20 LISTED TO MONSIGNORE CAMILO FORTE,

6

201-300985

20 MAR 1973

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION　CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　TOTAL COPIES　ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21468 SECRET

VIA FALCONIERE 82, ROME, SINCE CHECKING IN HOTEL.

2. ACCORDING BNDD ROME TELEGRAM 2141, [illegible] MAR 73, REYES CALLED CARACAS PHONE NUMBER 69-21-41. OUR RECORDS REVEAL THIS LISTED TO DR [illegible] PEREZ PEROZO, SAN ANTONIO, LOS ALTOS, LOS CASTORES, AVDA FRATERNIDAD, QUINTA RIBEA. NO IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES PEREZ. FOREGOING SUBSCRIBER INFO PASSED TO BNDD CARACAS, WHICH WILL REPORT SAME INFO THROUGH ITS CHANNELS. CUSATI ALSO CALLED SALERNO, ITALY NUMBER 089-354359 WHICH BEING CHECKED OUT BY BNDD ROME.

3. COMMENT: REYES IS SUBJECT OF 201-835921. NO INDICATION SO FAR THAT HE INVOLVED IN ANY ILLICIT ACTIVITIES AND PRESUME UNTIL EVIDENCE TO CONTRARY THAT REYES CONNECTION WITH POSADA:CUSATI HAS NO NARCOTICS SIGNIFICANCE.

4. PER REF D QUERIES, STATION PUT BOGOTA ON DISTRIBUTION BECAUSE POSSIBLE CONNECTION WITH NETWORKS ONCE HANDLED BY EUGENIO LEAL POZO AND LUIS PORFIRIO HERNANDEZ. BELIEVE ALL

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 21468 SECRET

ADDEES SHOULD CONTINUE HAVE INTEREST THIS CASE AS SUBJECTS MAY RETURN CARACAS BY SAME ROUTE: I.E. MADRID, MIAMI, SAN JUAN. WOULD APPRECIATE ADDEES COMMENTS HOWEVER, WHETHER THEY WISH CONTINUING RECEIVE SUMMARIES BNDD TRAFFIC OR WHETHER ADDEES ARE ASSURED BNDD WILL PASS TRAFFIC THIS CASE TO ADDEES.

5. FILE 201-330985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3	/	7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER Jav # 10

ACTION UNIT C/WH6 | INFO | FILE, VR [illegible] C/CI C/FI C/[illegible] DDO ADDO

ACTION NO. 026 | C/EUR6

S E C R E T 191730Z MAR 73 STAFF 863762

CITE ROME 28609

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI, MADRID, PARIS.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 21429 (IN 860750)

1. LOCAL BNDD HAVE ARRANGED FOR THEIR LOCAL LIAISON (GUARDIA DI FINANZA) COVER POSADA AND CUSATI WHO ARE LIVING AT HOTEL KING, VIA SISTINA. OHTER FIVE VENEZUELANS (ANDRES PEREZ; JOSE RODRIGUEZ; HECTOR GONZALEZ; VICTOR BIANCO VASANEL AND BIANCO ARPAD) ALL LIVING AT HOTEL CLARIDGE.

2. LOCAL BNDD WILL KEEP PARIS RDO AND BNDD CARACAS INFORMED.

3. FILE: 201-300985, E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

RN KO
AB X
WH/3/V

6

201-300985

SECRET

19 MAR 1973

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22-1 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

24

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BY: ______ AT: 13 Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER SEC 103

ACTION UNIT C/WH 6

FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/ELAN, C/CI, C/FI, C/NARC 2, C/AR 6

ACTION NO. 044

S E C R E T 191640Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE PARIS 37356 PARI

TO: CARACAS, DIRECTOR INFO ROME, MADRID, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

863806

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 21329 (IW 850513)

1. ROME EMBTEL 2088* DATED 16 MARCH IS FIRST BNDD REPORT FROM ROME ON POSADA MOVEMENTS, AND SHOWS THEY ON TOP OF SITUATION. BNDD FOUL UP RE MADRID COVERAGE EXPLAINED IN PARIS 37271. NOTE THAT BNDD NOT PUTTING BOGOTA ON DISTRIBUTION. PLS ADVISE IF HQ WISHES US SUMMARIZE BNDD ROME CABLES OR IF WE CAN MERELY CONTINUE TO FLAG BNDD TRAFFIC ON THIS CASE OR IF HQ CAN ARRANGE TO RECEIVE TRAFFIC ON THIS CASE AUTOMATICALLY THRU BNDD HQ. ALSO PLS ADVISE IF ALL ADDEES CONTINUE TO HAVE INTEREST THIS INVESTIGATION.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

AN	KO
AB	X
IB	
PS	
BI	
D	
F	
WH/3/V	

B

*NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT

201-300985

19 MAR 1973

BNDD DOCUMENT

CABLE FROM BNDD HQS WASHDC (BNDD 1688)

DATE: 16 MARCH 1973

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN (RE INFORMATION ON POSADA AND TRUEVO)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 15 MARCH 73

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 21/3C PER SOP #103

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/WH6 INFO: FILE, VR. DDO, ADDO, C/PLAN, C/CI, C/NARC 7, C/EI
C/EUR 6

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number) 303006

SECRET 16 MAR 73 21 17z CITE DIRECTOR

TO PRIORITY PARIS, MADRID, CARACAS INFO ROUTINE, ROME, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

KO
ABX

RYBAT PLMHABYSS EWKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. PARIS 37222 (IN 859406)*

B. CARACAS 21422 (IN 859676)**

1. CONCUR WITH REF B THAT YOU SHOULD TRY OBTAIN FULL REPORT REGARDING WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN SPAIN AND NOT RPT NOT QUERY WKTALENT-1 ON THIS SUBJECT. ALSO INTERESTED ANY INFO ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS IN ROME.

WH/3/V

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

*ASKS IF HQS WANTS THE STATIONS IN MADRID OR PARIS TO ASSURE THAT A FULL REPORT IS OBTAINED FROM BNDD ON WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN SPAIN AND ASKS IF WKTALENT-1 SHOULD BE QUERIED ABOUT THIS CASE.

**SAYS THE CARACAS STATION WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER PARIS AND/OR MADRID COULD DO TO ENSURE THAT WE OBTAIN A FULL CCCREPORT REGARDING WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN SPAIN AND PREFERS THAT WKTALENT-1 NOT BE QUERIED ABOUT THIS CASE.

201-300985

16 MAR 1973

C/WH/NARC
E/EUR/NARC
C/WH/4
C/WH/COG
C/E/F
C/E/IB
DDP/NARCOG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/EUR
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

E2 - 2 CLASSIFIED BY:
APDIR WN - SISM

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

BNDD DOCUMENT

CABLE FROM BNDD HQS WASHDC (BNDD 1657)

DATE: 15 MARCH 1973

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: LUIS POSADA AKA BAMBI - ZB-73-0001

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP/ADB
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

IP/
CHAMBERS LOIS
IP/AN
EXT. 7715

GC-59B
CA30
TUBE CT-

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICERS INITIALS
1. WH/3/V		27 MAR 1973	28 MAR 1973	
2.				
3. BV				BV
4. ND				nd
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. IP/AN	6 APR 1973			
10.				
11.				
12. WH/3/V	3B-2627			nd
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. IP/FI				

FILE WKSCARLET-3
201 FILE

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 27 1973
MICROFILMED

201-300985

~~75-120-26~~

~~9) plz classify to 75-120-26 in addition to the 201 file. WH/3/V~~

plz file WKSCARET-3 201.

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	X

FILE TITLE: WKSCARLET-3

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-300985

DATE MICROFILMED:

DOCUMENT DATE: 15 March 73

DOCUMENT NUMBER: DND 00683 BNDD

FORM 610n OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

13272

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 27/CI PER SCP .103

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/WH 6

INFO FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/PLAN, C/CI, C/NARC 2, C/FI, C/EUR 6

ACTION NO. 318

S E C R E T 141517Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE PARIS 37222

859406

TO: CARACAS, DIRECTOR INFO MADRID, ROME, WH MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 21396 (IN 857839)

1. NOTE BNDD HQ CABLE 1622 DATED 13 MARCH WHICH PROVIDES DETAILS ON WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN MIAMI AND WHICH ADVISES REGION 17 THAT HE DEPARTED FOR MADRID ON 10 MARCH. WITH CARMILO VINCENT CUSATI VEN DIP PP-686.

2. ASSUME MADRID REGIONAL OFFICE WILL GET SPANISH POLICE TO PUT WKSCARLET-3 UNDER SURVEILLANCE. PLS ADVISE IF WISH STATION MADRID OR PARIS TO ASSURE THAT FULL REPORT IS OBTAINED FROM BNDD ON WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN SPAIN.

3. UNLESS THERE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT WKSCARLET-3 AND CUSATI PLAN CONTINUE TO ROME SUGGEST FUTURE TRAFFIC NOT BE SENT TO ROME AS NOTE THAT BNDD MESSAGE DID NOT GO TO ROME EITHER.

4. HQ AND CARACS: PLS ADVISE IF WISH STATION TO

AN
AR
IN
FS
SX
DES+NFD
FI
E/NARC

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985

14 MAR 73

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: MAR 16 11 03 AM '73

DISSEM BY: PER RECEIVED

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, IP/EDI

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 PARIS 37222 SECRET

QUERY CITIZEN I RE HIS EVENTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF WKSCARLET-3 AND HIS TRAVEL COMPANION.

5. FILE: 201-302985. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

FORWARDED
IP/EDI

MAR 21 1 23 PM '73

SECRET

CABLE SECRET DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 16-1 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 35/30 PER SOr.103

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/EUR 6 | INFO | FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/IP/AN, C/FI, C/CI, C/WARC 2

ACTION NO. 324

S E C R E T 142135Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21422

TO: PARIS, DIRECTOR, MADRID INFO ROME, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF PARIS 37222 (IN 859406)

859671

1. WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER STATIONS PARIS AND/OR MADRID COULD DO TO ENSURE WE OBTAIN FULL REPORT REGARDING WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN SPAIN.

2. BELIEVE FURTHER TRAFFIC THIS CASE SHOULD BE SENT ROME AS ROME ULTIMATE DESTINATION AND PURPOSE HIS TRAVEL.

3. RE PARA 4 REF REQUEST, PREFER WKTALENT-1 NOT BE QUERIED RE THIS CASE.

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

AN
AS
IN
FS
RK
DES NFD
PI
E/N ARC

CS COPY

201-300985

14 MAR 73

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 23

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

4 SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER 103

ACTION UNIT c/WH6 | FILE, VR DDO. ADDO. c/EUR6 c/WH/ c/CI c/6 c/NARC2

ACTION NO. 945

S E C R E T 131350Z MAR 73 STAFF 857839

CITE CARACAS 21396

TO: DIRECTOR, MARDRID, ROME, WH/MIAMI INFO BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA, PARIS.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS POSADA TRAVEL PLANS

REFS A. CARACAS 21349 (NOT SENT BOGOTA, MADRID, PARIS) (N 854093)

B. CARACAS 21369 (NOT SENT ROME, PARIS, MADRID) (N 855389)

1. ACCORDING BNDD HQS TELEGRAM 1554, WHICH ORIGINATED MIAMI BNDD, LUIS POSADA (IDENT), SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE MIAMI 9 MAR VIA PAN AM 552 FROM SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO. FROM MIAMI HE TICKETED TO NEW YORK THEN MADRID. (NO MENTION MADE ROME.) POSADA CARRYING VENEZUELAN DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT NO. 65 AND TRAVELING WITH CAMILO POLALI OR PUSALI. BNDD MIAMI PLANNING SURVEILL POSADA WHILE IN MIAMI.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

Acaulet 3

201-300985

13 MAR 1973

CS COPY

SECRET

BNDD DOCUMENTS

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, FROM MIAMI, FLORIDA
DATE: 13 MARCH 1973
CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RE POSADA
BNDD FILE NO: XB-73-0001

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, FROM MIAMI, FLORIDA
DATE: 6 FEBRUARY 1973
CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF SGI-9-0006
BNDD FILE NO: GENERAL FILE - TRUEVA, HUMBERTO

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: POSADA, LUIS CLEMENTE
201-300985
VOL. V

INCLUSIVE DATES: __________

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: __________

ROOM: __________

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
	8/16/78		

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

KSCARLET/3

Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

201-300985

STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS

DATE: 25 AUGUST 1977 FROM AMEMBASSY CARACAS (CARACAS 8438)
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: GOV CHARGES "CUBANA AIRLINER: DEFENDANTS WITH MILITARY CRIMES

FROM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
DATE: 9 MARCH 1977
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AND THE LETELIER ASSASSINATION
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

FBI DOCUMENT CABLS FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 8 JUNE 1977

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA; ESPIONAGE - CUBA - PANAMA

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN

FBI Document
Date: 15 February 1977
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS (CORU)
NEUTRALITY MATTERS - CUBA (ANTI-CASTRO).
No File Number

State Department Cable
Date: 22 January 1977
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: CHARGE THAT POSADA IMPLICATED IN CIA PLOT TO KILL
CASTRO PUBLISHED
CARACAS 0680

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

POSADA CARRILES, LUIS
201-0300985 022-009-028
SEX M CIOL-00445/76
23 DEC 76
P4

SUMMARY OF INFO TO FBI AND ARMY
INTELL-TERRORIST PLOTTING BY CUBAN EXILES.

DATE 29 JUL 77 09526970

201-300985

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

S E C R E T

CIA

CONF: [illegible] INFO: FILE [illegible]

132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,

U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORT MEADE, MARYLAND//ATTN: MIIA-SO.Y

CIOL-0485-76 Y

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.Y

SUBJECT: TERRORIST PLOTTING BY CUBAN EXILES; INFORMATION RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF U.S. ARMY MAJOR JUAN ARMAND MONTES Y

REFERENCES: CIOL-0426-76 OF 11 DECEMBER 1976, SUBJECT AS ABOVE; FIRCI-312/03635-76 OF 6 DECEMBER 1976, SUBJECT "COOPERATION MAINTAINED BY CERTAIN DOMINICAN MILITARY OFFICERS AND ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILES."Y

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS ACQUIRED BY CIA PURSUANT TO ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE ON FOREIGN ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE DOMINICAN SOURCE WHO RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM A DOMINICAN AIR FORCE COLONEL, U.S. ARMY MAJOR JUAN ARMAND

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

SECRET

[illegible] CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE

962167

0 DISSEM BY:

0

0 PER

0 #

MONTES ATTENDED A MEETING OF ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILES IN SANTO DOMINGO IN EARLY NOVEMBER 1976 AT THE HOME OF A FORMER SENATOR OF THE BATISTA GOVERNMENT. MONTES CAME TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO ACQUIRE DOMINICAN SUPPORT FOR THE "CRUSADE AGAINST CASTRO" AND NOTED THAT CUBAN EXILES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND DOMINICAN MILITARY AND CIVILIANS WERE WILLING TO COOPERATE. THE LIAISON MAN BETWEEN THE VARIOUS ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILES IS JUAN (OR JOSE) ANTONIO PRAT WHO APPARENTLY RESIDES IN MIAMI. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: PRAT MAY POSSIBLY BE ANTONIO PRAT BARROSO, A VETERAN OF THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.)

2. ACCORDING TO THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE COLONEL, A MEETING TOOK PLACE WHEN ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST LEADER, STILL LIVED IN SANTO DOMINGO TO DISCUSS VARIOUS TERRORIST PLANS. THE LATTER INCLUDED PLACING BOMBS ON CUBAN AIRCRAFT AND AT CUBAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS; SABOTAGING CUBAN AND SOVIET SHIPS; KIDNAPPING THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONA~~L~~S AND KILLING HIGH-LEVEL CUBAN OFFICIAL CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ IN LISBON (SIC). PARTICIPANTS AT THIS MEETING INCLUDED BOSCH AVILA;

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE

912167

☐ DISSEM BY:

☐

☐ RETURN TO PER

☐ #

JUAN EDUARDO PEREZ FRANCO, A CUBAN EXILE; EX-BRIGADIER GENERAL SALVADOR LLUBERES MONTAS, FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE; COLONEL ABREU (FNU) OF THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE; JOSE BBBB ADURRI (PHONETIC); FERNANDO MUNIZ, A DOMINICAN; RAUL (OR RUBEN) SLINDER (PHONETIC), A DOMINICAN; AND LUIS POSA (OR PEZA OR POSADA). PETER (OR PEDRO) MARTINEZ WAS MENTIONED AS A COORDINATOR OF ONE OF UTHE PLANNED TERRORIST ACTS.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: AIR FORCE COLONEL ABREU MAY BE EITHER COLONEL JUAN DISLA ABREU, COMMANDER OF THE NORTHERN ZONE, OR GENERAL ELADIO MARMOLEJOS ABREU, COMMANDER OF THE SAN ISIDO AIR FORCE BASE WHO IS A CLOSE FRIEND OF FORMER GENERAL LLUBERES MONTAS. FERNANDO MUNIZ IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH THE RIGHTIST DOMINICAN LABOR LEADER OF THIS NAME.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: JOSE BADURRI IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH JUAN JOSE BUTTARI CRESPO, BORN 22 NOVEMBER 1933, HAVANA, A VETERAN OF THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. PETER MARTINEZ MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH PEDRO CELESTINA MARTINEZ GARCES, BORN 19 MAY 1924,

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

8 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4

SECRET

CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE

962467

0 DISSEM BY.

0

0 PER

0 #

BATABANO, CUBA, CAPTURED DURING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION AND SUBSEQUENTLY LIBERATED. LUIS POSA MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH LUIS POSADA CARRILES WHO WAS ARRESTED BY THE VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES WITH BOSCH AVILA FOR HIS INVOLVEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBANA CRASH OFF BARBADOS AND ~~WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED~~.]Y

Wrong

4. THIS AGENCY CONTINUES WILLING TO ASSIST IN WHATEVER ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY WISH TO TAKE. PLEASE ADVISE US OF THE RESULTS OF YOUR INVESTIGATIONS.Y

5. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.#

BASED ON: SANTO DOMINGO 17932 [IN 132125]

SANTO DOMINGO 17938 [IN 132364]

SOURCE: EMKAGO: EMFIST-1 FROM COLONEL USINO GUZMAN LIRIANO

FILE: 22-9-28 AND 201-742365.

ADC/LA/COG - C. Monell (telecord)

C/LA/CAR

C/LA/OPS

DATE: 22 DEC 76

ORIG: VIVIAN CARDELLA

UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH/R

EXT: 1349

AC/CI/OG/A1

AGC/DDO

PCS/ITC - Easton Wagner (telecord)

C/PCS/LSN

C/LA/PHC

CHIEF, CI

AC/LAD

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

DIF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR · DATE TIME GROUP · CITE 36-1 · MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 222338Z DIRECTOR 962064

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/Plans/ C/NE6 DDO 3, DDO/DO, ACC/DDO C/Pcs C/Cs/[illegible]4, C/CI-4 C/EPS/EG 2, C/SIA C/SA/RL, C/LSN/ID

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: LA

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 FILES #

TO: CARACAS, SANTO DOMINGO. Y

UNINTEL RYBAT MHSPIKE Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 31765 |IN 136339|

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17938 |IN 133384| Y

1. WE HAVE NOT YET DETERMINED IF LUIS POSADA CARRILES {201-0300985} IS A U.S. PERSON. THIS IS A COMPLICATED ISSUE AND REQUIRES FUTHER INVESTIGATION AT HQS. OUR LATEST INFO FROM I&NS IS THAT HIS RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS WAS TERMINATED AT OUR REQUEST BECAUSE OF HIS 30 JUNE 1974 DECISION TO STAY IN VENEZUELA. Y

2. DUE TO COMPLEXITY OF SITUATION INVOLVING POSADA AND CUBAN EXILE MATTERS IN VENEZUELA, HQS FEELS INVESTIGATION OF POSADA {UNILATERAL OR LIAISON} MIGHT CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR CARACAS STATION. THEREFORE REQUEST CARACAS TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS TIME ON REF B REQUEST. Y

3. FILE: 200-6-484; 201-0742365; 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: POSADA IS FORMER UKSCARLET-3, CABAN AGENT WITH VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP, WHO WAS A HIGH-LEVEL DISIP {CIVILIAN INTEL} OFFICIAL. HE HAS BEEN ADDOCIATED WITH PERSONS IMPLICATED IN CUBANA BOMBING OF 6 OCTOBER.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-300985
DO NOT DESTROY

DATE: 22 DEC 76 (GV)
ORIG: G.VICKERS:PM
UNIT: LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1719

AC/LA/CAR--L.THERRY {DRAFT}

AGC--TONY GOLDEN {DRAFT}

COG [illegible]

LA/CPS

AC/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 32-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY

ACTION UNIT: c/LA8

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR c/ADDMS c/NE2 ALL/DDO2 DDO3 c/PCS/ITG4 c/CI4 c/EPS/EG2 c/SIA/FL c/SIA c/OCD3 c/PCS

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 474960 EIA015 PAGE 01-01 IN 136339

TOR:212241Z DEC 76 CARA 31765

S E C R E T 212234Z DEC 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31765

TO: DIRECTOR, SANTO DOMINGO.

WNINTEL RYBAT MHSPIKE

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17938 (IN 133384)

1. WE CAN TASK WKNORTH-6, LIAISON PENETRATION, WITH REF REQUIREMENT. HOWEVER, SINCE LUIS POSADA ✓ 201-300985 CARRILES MAY BE U.S. PERSON, WOULD LIKE TO DEFER TO HQS FOR READING UNDER E.O. 11905.

2. FILE: 200-6-484; 201-0742365. E2, IMPDET.

in/pnc/v EV-2

SECRET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-300985 DO NOT DESTROY

3

SS 1 79

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH[illegible] ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT[illegible]

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO		STAFF	
LA/E	RF FILE VR [illegible]		1	4
	[illegible]		2	5
	[illegible]		3	6

T 456855 EIA292 PAGE 01 IN 133384

TOR:171936Z DEC 76 SDOM 17938

S E C R E T 171916Z DEC 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17938

TO: DIRECTOR, CARACAS

WNINTEL RYBAT MHSPIKE

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17932 (IN 132125) (NOT NEEDED CARACAS)

201

1. RE PARA 1 E, REF, STATION UNILATERAL ASSET ENCLIPPER-1 REPORTS THAT VENEZUELAN CITIZEN LUIS POSADA ARRIVED SANTO DOMINGO FROM CARACAS ON VIASA FLIGHT 4 JUNE AND DEPARTED 7 JUNE 1976. POSADA TRAVELLED ON A TOURIST CARD. POSADA MATRONYMIC UNCLEAR. ENCLIPPER-1'S BES[redacted] GUESS IS "GARRIDO" OR "CARRIDO" BUT HE THINKS THIS COULD BE WAY OFF.

2. CARACAS: REF REPORTED ON PARTICIPANTS IN MEETING (DATE UNKNOWN) OF CUBAN EXILE TERRORISTS IN SANTO DOMINGO. NAME OF ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS WAS REPORTED AS "LUIS POSA, PEZA OR POSADA". STATION ASSUMES THIS IS LUIS POSADA CARRILES. IF POSSIBLE, WILL APPRECIATE CARACAS CHECK TRAVEL OF POSADA ON 4 JUNE. NO OBJECTION CHECKING WITH LIAISON.

3. FILE: 200-6-434 201-742365. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

17 December 1976

File LKSCARLET-3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

As a result of the request in CARACAS 31137, a check of I&NS records revealed the following regarding U.S. person, status of

1. Orlando Garcia
Became U.S. citizen on 11 October 1954.
Lost U.S. citizenship when he became a citizen of Venezuela on 31 August 1962

(2.) Luis Posada Carriles
I&NS files contains a letter from CIA terminating his resident alien status because of his 30 June 1974 decision to stay in Venezuela

3. Ricardo Morales Navarrete
Last admitted to US August 1, 1976 with a visitor's visa. (Address to be visited given as 8100 SW 4th St., Miami, Fla.)
Does not have resident alien status.
Was never naturalized.

[redacted] hw

FBI DOCUMENT

CABLE

DATE: 4 NOVEMBER 1976 (FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: UNSUBS: BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINES DC-8 NEAR BARBADOS, WEST INDIES, OCTOBER 6, 1976, NEUTRALITY MATTERS - CUBA - WEST INDIES

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN

14-00000

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Information Regarding Anti-Castro Figures Possibly Involved in Neutrality Or Other Violations of Federal Law

REFERENCE : Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Director, CIA, Dated 26 November 1976, Same Subject

The referenced memorandum requested complete CIA information on some 92 principal anti-Castro figures who are of investigative interest to the FBI. Attached herewith are CIA traces on seven individuals mentioned in the FBI listing. Data on the remaining 85 will follow separately and incrementally as traces are completed.

CIR-316/04881-76

Classified by 09560. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption Category 5B (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

201-[illegible]

DDO/LA/OPS/W.Carley:lch (7 Dec 76) (1173)

Distribution:
[illegible] - FBI

Copy [illegible] Karen [illegible] [illegible] #6.

S E C R E T

1. NOVO Sampol, Guillermo. There is no information available on him beyond that provided this Agency by the FBI. There is no current or previous operational interest in this individual.

2. NOVO Sampol, Ignacio. There is no information available on him beyond that provided this Agency by the FBI. There is no current or previous operational interest in this individual.

3. LUGO Alejandrina, Freddy. There is no information available on him. There is no current or previous operational interest in this individual.

4. RICARDO Lozano, Hernan. There is no information available on him. There is no current or previous operational interest in this individual.

5. BOSCH Avila, Orlando. This Agency was in contact with BOSCH in Miami from approximately January to November 1962. He was under consideration as an "external coordinator" in the Evelio Duque exile group. BOSCH was to assist the Agency and Duque in formulating operational plans for infiltration (into Cuba) teams. BOSCH did obtain safehouses and procured food supplies for the teams. Available information does not indicate any Agency contact with BOSCH for this purpose subsequent to November 1962. Later, on 31 October and 1 November 1963, a representative of this Agency met in New York City with BOSCH twice. These two meetings were in connection with efforts by BOSCH to secure financial backing for air strikes (mounted from Central America) against Cuba. BOSCH at this time was the General Coordinator of the Insurrectional Movement of Revolutionary Recovery (MIRR). BOSCH was informed through an intermediary on either 2 or 3 November 1963 that no financial backing would be forthcoming. There is no available information to indicate any Agency contact with BOSCH subsequent to 1 November 1963.

6. POSADA Carriles, Luis. POSADA arrived in the U.S. in February 1961 as a political refugee. Shortly after his arrival, he joined the 2506 Brigade and received paramilitary training in Guatemala under Agency auspices in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion. POSADA received at least rudimentary familiarization training in demolitions, and was trained in usage of various hand-held weapons, in Guatemala. From March 1963 until March 1964 POSADA was in the U.S. Army at Fort Benning, Georgia, finishing up as a Second Lieutenant

and Commanding Officer of a weapons platoon in a Ranger battalion. In the latter function, POSADA would very likely have received demolitions training. In March 1965 POSADA was recruited by the Agency to serve as a Maritime Training Branch instructor in Florida. Information at that time indicated that he already was reported to be a "demolitions expert". POSADA also was used as a source of information on Cuban exile activities. In 1965 POSADA was involved with Luis SIERRA Lopez who was working with Roberto ALEJOS Arzu, a Guatemalan who was attempting to overthrow the Guatemalan Government. POSADA was of interest to the SIERRA/ALEJOS group because of his knowledge of demolitions and weapons. POSADA reported to the Agency ~~and later~~ to the FBI, on his involvement in and the activities of this group (and subsequent other Cuban exile activist organizations with which he became affiliated). As of August 1966 he was used solely as an informant on the activities of the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE), a Miami-based exile group. POSADA was formally terminated in July 1967. In August 1967 he was mentioned in a Havana Radio broadcast as a liaison man between the Agency and RECE. In August 1967 POSADA moved to Caracasand secured a position with DIGEPOL, the Venezuelan security service (now known as DISIP). The Agency's Caracas Station hired POSADA as an informant on DIGEPOL/DISIP activities, with secondary use as a source on Cuban exile activities in Venezuela. He functioned in this capacity until 1974 when a change in Venezuelan Government administration resulted in the loss of his job with DISIP. He was formally terminated by Caracas Station on 30 June 1974; however, occasional contact was maintained with him at his initiative because of certain outstanding U.S. Federal Income Tax problems POSADA had because of his (then) status as a Permanent Resident Alien of the U.S. In mid-February 1976, POSADA recontacted Caracas Station to volunteer a report on the whereabouts of Orlando BOSCH Avila, Frank CASTRO Paz, and on a threat to the life of Salvador ALLENDE's nephew in Costa Rica. The final contact between the Agency and POSADA occurred on 22 June 1976 when he contacted the Caracas Station to request visa assistance for his wife and himself; the assistance was denied.

7. CARBALLO Diaz, Roberto. CARBALLO received Agency paramilitary training as a member of the 2506 Brigade in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion. He was captured at the Bay of Pigs, and subsequently was released by the Cuban Government. Apart from the 2506 Brigade service, there is no available information to indicate any subsequent contact between the Agency and CARBALLO.

SECRET

8. Agency traces on additional persons mentioned in the 26 November 1976 FBI memorandum to the Agency will follow separately.

SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

INDEXING REQUESTED

NO INDEXING

APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO

Chief, Latin America Division

INFO

FROM

Chief of Station, Quito

SUBJECT

RYBAT KMSTONE VWNOCK/NOC Byron W. GUTRADT's Past Contacts with Orlando Bosch and WKSCARLET-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES & METHODS INVOLVED

1. We understand from press accounts that Orlando Bosch, WKSCARLET-3 and several other Cuban exiles were recently arrested and charged with the sabotage of a Cubana Airlines airliner on 6 October. After having read these accounts NOC Byron W. GUTRADT reported, for the record, that he once knew Bosch and WKSCARLET-3 in the early 1960's. GUTRADT met WKSCARLET-3 in 1964 when both were enrolled in OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia. GUTRADT at that time had already terminated his relationship with BKHERALD. While at OCS GUTRADT was not particularly close to WKSCARLET-3 but WKSCARLET-3 was generally knowledgeable of GUTRADT's background and past BKHERALD activities. GUTRADT has not seen WKSCARLET-3 since 1964 after completion of the OCS course and doubts seriously that WKSCARLET-3 would remember him.

2. GUTRADT met Bosch circa 1963 in Miami when GUTRADT was training Bosch in a BKHERALD-sponsored program. Bosch only knew GUTRADT in alias. GUTRADT has not seen Bosch since completion of this training.

3. Given the length of time that has elapsed plus the lack of closeness to either WKSCARLET-3 or Bosch, GUTRADT and the Station do not believe that their knowledge of his past BKHERALD activities presents any security problems today. GUTRADT, of course, was unwitting of their alleged current activities and was surprised to hear of the bombing of the Cubana airliner.

Gerald R. GIZZI

Distribution:
3-C/LAD

E2 IMPDET

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

B 201-299292

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HEQA-09809

DATE

15 Nov[redacted]76

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-300985

DO NOT DESTROY

FORM [illegible]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 29 /PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 24-3 RUN BY [illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY [✓ ISSUED] SLOTTED LA BY CDO AT 1947 Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/LA 8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/CI/AN, C/CI 4, C/OPS, C/PS/EG 2, C/OSG, C/SIA 2, DDO 3

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 367182 EIA351 PAGE 01 IN 094881

TOR:091943Z NOV 76 CARA 31380

SECRET 091901Z NOV 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31380

WKSC [illegible]-3/201

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT WKBOXER

REF: DIRECTOR 939719

1. EVENING 8 NOVEMBER 1976 WKSCARLET-1 (W-1) MADE SURPRISE VISIT TO CONSULATE REQUESTING SEE BRADSPIES. IN TYPICALLY DEMANDING FASHION, WKSCARLET-1 SAID HE WANTED TO BE PUT IN CONTACT WITH MICHAEL C. CHOADEN AND WANTED BRADSPIES HELP IN OBTAINING BUSINESS VISA FROM CONSULATE. W-1 PREFACED HIS FIRST REQUEST WITH STATEMENT HE HAD BEEN PROMISED BY CHOADEN WHEN HE LAST VISITED THE HEADQUARTERS AREA THAT A BKHERALD REPRESENTATIVE WOULD CONTACT HIM FOLLOWING HIS RETURN TO CARACAS, AND THAT NO ONE HAD CONTACTED HIM. (FACT OF MATTER IS W-1 HAD EARLIER TOLD US THAT FOR SECURITY REASONS HE SHOULD ONLY BE CONTACTED AT HIS OFFICE. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM VISIT, HE CLOSED THE OFFICE AND DID NOT RESPOND TO ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT HIM.) W-1 ALSO SAID HE HAD TRIED TO GET HELP FROM LEGATT IN OBTAINING VISA BUT HAD BEEN TOLD "LEGATT NOT AVAILABLE".

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____ RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEC

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF, FILE, VR,	1 2 3 4 5 6
ACTION #			

2. W-1 WAS TOLD THAT WE DID NOT KNOW THE PRESENT LOCATION OF CHOADEN AS HE HAD RETIRED BUT WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER. W-1 INDICATED HE WANTED THE VISA IMMEDIATELY (CONSULATE WAS OBVIOUSLY CLOSED WITH CHAR FORCE IN FULL SWING) AND WAS ASKED THE NATURE OF HIS BUSINESS VISIT. HE SEEMED TO RESENT THIS INQUIRY AND SAID NEVER MIND, HE WOULD VISIT THE CONSULATE HIMSELF ON 9 NOVEMBER AND MAKE HIS OWN APPLICATION. BRADSPIES ASKED IF W-1 WOULD INDICATE A TIME FOR HIS PROPOSED VISIT AND VOLUNTEERED TO BE AVAILABLE TO PERSONALLY RECEIVE HIM. THPS SEEMED TO ANNOY W-1 EVEN FURTHER; HE THEN AROSE AND WALKED OUT OF THE CONSULATE WITHOUT ANOTHER WORD.

3. AS HEADQUARTERS AWARE, W-1 HAS IN PAST RETAINED PRIVATE INVESTIGATIONS FIRM OF LUIS POSADA TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS FOR W-1 AS SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE GUSTAVO VOLMER INDUSTRALIST GROUP. WE HAVE SEEN OTHER AGENCY INFO THAT W-1 IS ACTUALLY A SHAREHOLDER IN POSADA'S INVESTIGATIONS FIRM, BUT POSADA NEVER LISTED W-1 AS AMONG PARTNERS HE IDENTIFIED TO US DURING OUR LAST FEW CONTACTS WITH HIM. WKNORTH-17 BELIEVES W-1 IS A BUSINESS PARTNER OF POSADA AND HAS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF . FILE . VR .	STAFF
ACTION #			1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6

T 367182 EIA351 PAGE 03 IN 094881

TOR:0919432 NOV 76 CARA 31380

ALLEGED TO US THAT W-1 IS IN PART RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CUBANA AIRLINES BOMBING ON 6 OCTOBER. WE THINK THIS ALLEGATION WAS PART OF THE GOV INTENT TO TIE THE COPEI PARTY INTO THE BOMGING, BUT DO NOT KNOW WHAT EVIDENCE GOV MAY HAVE.

4. AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON PARA 1 AND 2 ABOVE. HAS STATED HE DOES NOT WANT STATION INVOLVED VISA MATTER AND IS INSTRUCTING CONSULATE ON HOW TO HANDLE.

5. ONLY EXPLANATION FOR W-1 CONDUCT WHICH IMMEDIATELY OCCURS TO US IS THAT HE WAS STILL SMARTING FROM IMAGINED SNUB BY LEGATT (LATTER IS NO DOUBT GUN-SHY ABOUT GIVING VISA ASSISTANCE AFTER THE HERNAN RICARDO LOZANO EPISODE) WHEN HE CONTACTED STATION. HE MAY BE IN A HURRY TO LEAVE VENEZUELA DUE FEAR IMMINENT ARREST (SEE REF) AND WAS COUNTING ON IMMEDIATE GRANT OF BUSINESS VISA WHICH WOULD FACILITATE PROLONGED STAY IN U.S.

6. ABOVVE IS FYI AS W-1 MAY ATTEMPT HIGH LEVEL AGENCY CONTACT NEXT TIME HE IS IN HEADQUARTERS AREA.

7. FILE: 201-0740849. E2, IMPDET.

** S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 25 PER ________ TOTAL COPIES 33-2 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA8 ACTION #	INFO	RF. FILE . VR IPLAN, NE8, DDO3, AGC/DDO, OPS/ITG4, C/OPS, CI 4,

T 352499 EIA048 PAGE 01 IN 088993

TOR:031743Z NOV 76 CARA 31326

SECRET 031722Z NOV 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31326

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL MHSPIKE KMSTONE

REF: CARACAS 31255 (IN 081811)

INDEX

FOR FILING

MO (8)

LCPAC/V

1. FYI. CARACAS NEWSPAPERS MORNING 3 NOVEMBER 1976 REPORT FOLLOWING RESULTS 2 NOVEMBER JUDICIAL HEARING ON INVESTIGATIN OF CUBANA AIRCRAFT BOMBING:

O

A. JUDGE ORDERED CONTINUED DETENTION OF HERNAN RICARDO LOZANO, FREDDY LUGO, LUIS POSADA CARRILES AND ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA.

B. HERMES ROJAS PERALTA, GUETON OLEG RODRIGUEZ DE LA SERRA TRETIACOFF, WILLIAM WOLF FIGUEREDO AND FRANCISCO NUNEZ VALLEJO WERE SET FREE BUT WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUBJECTED TO FURTHER INVESTIGATION.

C. ALFREDO RAFAEL MAZINI (MASSINI) PEREZ AND CELSA MARY TOLEDO ALEMAN WERE ABSOLVED OF ANY TIES TO THE CASE.

2. IN COMMENTING ON DECISION, JUDGE SAID ALL FOUR DETAINEES HWD VIOLATED ARTICLES 408 AND 275 OF THE CRIMINAL

~~SECRET~~

RECORD COPY

201-300985
3 Nov 76

B 201-299292

14-00000

FORM 30209
7-71 MPO 2/78

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________ BY________ AT________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 352499 EIA048 PAGE 02-02 IN 088993

TOR:031743Z NOV 76 CARA 31326

CODE AND WERE ALLEGEDLY GUILTY OF "VQUALIFIED HOMICIDE" AND MANUFACTURE AND USE OF WEAPONS OF WAR. BOSCH AND POSADA WERE ACCUSED AS AUTHORS OF THE BOMBING. BOSCH WAS ALSO CHARGED WITH VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 320, 323 AND 327 OF CRIMINAL CODE FOR USE AND FABRICATION OF FALSE IDENTIFICATION. JUDGE COMMENTED THAT COURT HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROSECUTE.

3. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 7-6

C/CI

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 01

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR [redacted]

DATE-TIME GROUP 030008Z

CITE CIA/DDO

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 937064 mek

CONF: C/CI *

INFO: FILE DDO3, DDO/DO

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER SOP

0 IP FILES # 132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION/INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. Y

CIOL - 0367-76 Y

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR Y

SUBJECT: REPORT RECEIVED BY PANAMANIAN NATIONAL GUARD ON ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILES POSSIBLY INVOLVED IN TERRORISM Y

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM AN OFFICIAL OF A PANAMANIAN SERVICE WHO IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. HE PROVIDED THE INFORMATION WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SERVICE OR GOVERNMENT. THE INFORMATION IS VERY SENSITIVE, AND NO ACTION BASED UPON IT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THIS AGENCY. Y

2. ON 22 OCTOBER 1976, THE G-2 SECTION OF THE PANAMANIAN NATIONAL GUARD (GN) RECEIVED A HANDWRITTEN DOCUMENT WHICH APPARENTLY WAS OBTAINED FROM A NEW GN G-2 SOURCE IN MIAMI. ALTHOUGH THIS SOURCE IS NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME IN THE DOCUMENT, THE WRITER APPEARS TO BE THE PROPRIETOR OF "PASCO'S SEA FOOD," 1030 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET, HIALEAH, WITH TELEPHONES 885-7344 (OFFICE), 888-6267 (HOME). THE DT

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT: *CABLE SEC SUGGESTS ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO: C/LA, C/CPS/ITG, ACC/DDO
EXT:

POSITION 201

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA/DDO

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
SE 0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

937064

PHONE NUMBER 854-4031 FOLLOWED BY NOTATION "MY HOUSE." ALSO APPEARS ON DOCUMENT. THE WRITER IS ASKING US.S $10,000 FOR HIS SERVICES.

3. PRESUMABLY TO ESTABLISH HIS BONA FIDES AND SUBSTANTIATE HIS ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT, THE WRITER SUBMITTED A LENGTHY REPORT ON ALLEGED RECENT CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITIES ACCOMPANIED BY A LONG LIST OF CUBAN EXILE ACTIVISTS. THE DOCUMENT CONTAINS AN ALLEGATION OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN THIS ACTIVITY. THE DOCUMENT STATES THAT ORLANDO BOSCH IS UNDER ARREST IN VENEZUELA TOGETHER WITH LUIS POSADA CARRILES ALIAS "EL BAMBI." BOSCH WAS TRAVELING ON A COSTA RICAN PASSPORT AND ALSO HAD NICARAGUAN, DOMINICAN, AND CHILEAN PASSPORTS. DT

4. THE REPORT LISTED BOSCH'S CONTACTS AS MANUEL PORRO IN NICARAGUA, (DESCRIBED AS BEING CLOSE TO GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA) ORLANDO NUNEZ IN COSTA RICA; AND MARIO RIVADILLA IN SANTO DOMINGO. POSADA IS DESCRIBED IN THE REPORT AS A FORMER U.S. ARMY RANGER, WHO WORKED FOR THE VENEZUELAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF POLICE (DIGEPOL) FOR EIGHT YEARS AND THEN ORGANIZED A PRIVATE DETECTIVE AGENCY WHICH EMPLOYS OVER 1,000 MEN. POSADA, ACCORDING

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

937064

TO THE REPORT, DIRECTED ALL VIOLENT ACTIONS IN VENEZUELA AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS. HIS ALIASES WERE "INSPECTOR BASILIO" AND "EL CALICHE." THE RECENT OPERATION AGAINST THE CUBANA PLANE WAS MOUNTED BY POSADA, ASSISTED BY ALDO VERA. THE WRITER OF THE REPORT CONTINUES THAT BOSCH'S RECENT TRIP TO VENEZUELA WAS AN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN "ALDO'S GROUP" AND THE "COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS" (CORU). BOSCH'S MISSION WAS SUCCESSFUL AS IT APPEARS CORU AND ALDO'S GROUP WILL UNITE. ALDO VERA IS REPORTEDLY IN PUERTO RICO. THE WRITER ADDS THAT ALDO'S GROUP WILL ENTER VENEZUELA IN NOVEMBER 1976 TO MOUNT A SERIES OF ATTACKS AGAINST CUBAN EMBASSIES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA. Y

5. IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR FROM THE REPORT, BUT IT APPEARS THAT THE WRITER IS REQUESTING THAT VIVIAN FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO, POSSIBLBY JAILED IN CUBA, BE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL TO PANAMA SINCE SHE HAS ALREADY SERVED HER SENTENCE. FERNANDEZ WOULD THEN TRAVEL FROM PANAMA TO MIAMI WHERE SHE WOULD BE OF SERVICE TO THE WRITER. Y

6. THIS AGENCY PROVIDED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO THE FBI

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

937064

SHOULD BE CIR?

ON LUIS POSADA VIA CIR-294-76 ON 12 OCT 1976. NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON MANUEL PORRO. ORLANDO NUNEZ MABY BE IDENTICAL TO ORLANDO NUNEZ PEREZ, WHO ACCORDING TO THE RECORDS OF THIS AGENCY, IS A CUBAN EXILE RESIDING IN COSTA RICA AND SERVING AS PRESS SECRETARY OF COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT JOSE FIGUERES AS OF MARCH 1971. MARIO RIVADILLA MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH MARIO RIVADULLA CARCEDO, DPOB: CIRCA 1930, CUBA. IN 1952 A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE SAID THAT HE WAS A COMMUNIST MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE ORTHODOX CUBAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (PPC) AND CHIEF OF THE PROPAGANDA BUREAU OF THE ORTHODOX YOUTH, AN ARM OF THE PPC. IN A 1970 PRESS ARTICLE BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH RIVADULLA, HE CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED IN CUBA FROM 1961 TO 1967 FOR ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES. HE LEFT CUBA IN 1970. IN A 1972 NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW, RIVADULLA CLAIMED TO BE A JOURNALIST LIVING IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SINCE 1970 AND A MEMBER OF THE INTER-AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION WORKING FOR THE FREEDOM OF NEWSMEN IMPRISONED IN CUBA. IN ANOTHER INTERVIEW IN 1972 HE CLAIMED TO HAVE ACTIVELY OPPOSED THE FULGENCIO BATISTA REGIME AND BACKED FIDEL CASTRO, BUT BECAME

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

0MF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE OF PAGES 5

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

937064

DISILLUSIONED WITH THE CASTRO REGIME. IN 1974 HE WAS REPORTED TO BE A RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMENTATOF IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. IN NOVEMBER 1975, A WOMAN LIVING IN MIAMI WHOSE SON IS CURRENTLY A PRISONER IN CUBA ADVISED A CONTACT OF THIS AGENCY THAT RIVADULLA ALLEGEDLY HAD BEEN IN PRISON WITH HER SON. THEY HAD PROMISED EACH OTHER THAT THE FIRST ONE TO BE RELEASED WOULD DO ALL IN HIS POWER TO OBTAIN THE FREEDOM OF THE OTHER. IN THIS CONNECTION, RIVADULLA FURNISHED TO THE MOTHER OF THE PRISONER THE NAME OF A WOMAN IN NEW YORK CITY WHO PROMISED TO GET THE SON OUT OF JAIL IN RETURN FOR PAYMENT OF U.S. $25,000. THE WOMAN IS MARTA JIMENEZ MARTINEZ, WHO IS DESCRIBED IN AGENCY RECORDS AS VERY CLOSE TO FIDEL CASTRO, AN OPPORTUNIST, IRRATIONAL, AND UNPREDICTABLE. HER ESTRANGED HUSBAND, BERNAL JAMIS FAYAD, IS REPORTEDLY A CUBAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) OFFICER. in the [illegible] JIMENEZ IS ATTACHED TO THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND IS FREQUENTLY A DELEGATE TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. [redacted] FBI REPORT SJ-105-14608, DATED 27 JUNE 1974, CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RIVADULLA. NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON VIVIAN FERNANDEZ

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

937064

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DE CASTRO. V

7. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. CLASSIFIED BY 007255.

FILE: 56-8-11; 56-2-9/3; 201-281694; 201-281197; 201-876630; 201-784065; 201-920333; 201-299292.

AC/LA/PNC
AC/LA/COG William J. Murray
AC/LA/M&CA
C/LA/CAR
C/LA/OPS
P&CS/ITG
AGC/DDO
CI/OG
CI/R&A

DATE: 1 NOVEMBER 1976
ORIG: DAVID F. THOMPSON:MEH
UNIT: LA/PNC/PA/R
EXT: 1454

C/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

POSADA CARRILES, LUIS
201-0300985 075-008-015
SEX M CARA-31189
20 OCT 76
CIT VENE HVC-07522

RES VENE. NATIVE BORN CUBAN, GOVM HOLDS SUBJ DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR 6 OCT 76 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. WILL REQUEST VENE GOVT REVOKE HIS VENE CITIZENSHIP AND TURN HIM OVER TO THEM FOR PROSECUTION. CUBAN GOVM INTENDS TO LIQUIDATE SUBJ EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW

DATE 01 NOV 76 09446975

201-300985

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

15-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	301935Z	DIRECTOR	935878

CONF: LA5 INFO: FILE IP/AN, NE4, ofs/itg4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: P
NO INDEX
34 RETURN TO PER SOP
0 IP FILES # 111 91

RID: X ABSTRACT
INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILMING
FOR FILING
LAPNC/V ✓

TO: CARACAS.Y

UNINTEL MHSPIKE KMSTONE Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 31198 (IN 076710)

B. DIRECTOR 93359

C. CARACAS EMBTEL 12805, 28 OCTOBER 1976 Y

1. DIEGO ARGUELLES OF REFS A AND B RETRACED UNDER LAST NAME ARGUELLO AS RECEIVED REF C. ONE CARD REF FOUND TO A DIEGO LAZARO ARGUELLO LASTRES, DOB CA. 36, MEMBER OF CUBAN NATIONAL POLICE IN EXILE, ADDRESS 1785 N.W. 29 STREET, MIAMI. SPECIAL SEARCH HAS BEEN REQUESTED FOR SOURCE DOCUMENT, UFGA-8043, DATED 12 MARCH 63. WILL ADVISE IF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LOCATED.Y

2. NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES ON MARIA INES VEGA OR PAULA VALLADARES OF REF C.Y

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: A. DIEGO ARGUELLES BELIEVED TO BE ASSOCIATE IN INVESTIGATION FIRM OF LUIS POSADA.
B. NO HQS TRACES ARGUELLES
C. PRESS REPORTED ARREST OF ARGUELLO, VEGA AND VALLADARES.

DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: L. COOLEY:MEH
UNIT: LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1715

C/LA/COG W K SCARLET
201-300985
30 OCT 76

C/LA/OPS

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

45 21-2

SECRET

ACTION UNIT c/LA8

INFO RF . FILE VR ARLAN c/OPS/INT c/CI 4

c/IS/EG3 DDO3

STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

T 336956 EIA075 PAGE 01 IN 082793

TOR:281515Z OCT 76 SJOS 20051

S E C R E T 281502Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 20051

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, CARACAS.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 35352 (IN 081609)

B. SAN JOSE 19715 (NOT SENT CARACAS) (IN 978498)

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS RE PARA 2 OF REF A ARE BEING REPEATED FOR CLARIFICATION.

2. PER PARA 1 OF REF B, IT WAS COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ODUBER QUIROS WHO APPARENTLY CONJURED UP INVOLVEMENT OF ORLANDO BOSCH IN THE ARMS MOVEMENT STORY DISCUSSED BETWEEN COSTAN RICAN FOREIGN MINISTER GONZALO FACIO AND CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO COSTA RICA JORGE ARANDA PARRA. "CONFIDENTIAL FUNCTIONARIES OF THE U.S. EMBASSY" (ACTUALLY U.S. AMBASSADOR USING STATION INFO) WHO ADVISED THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT OF AN ULTRA-RIGHTIST PLOT DID NOT REPEAT NOT MENTION THAT BOSCH WAS INVOLVED IN ANY WAY WITH THIS PLOT, AND STATION HAS NO INFORMATION INDICATING THAT BOSCH WAS INVOLVED.

3. ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF BOSCH WAS APPARENTLY PURE INVENTION BY PRESIDENT ODUBER AND FOREIGN MINISTER FACIO AND THEY TOLD INVENTION

SECRET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-300985
DO NOT DESTROY

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF , FILE , VR

STAFF

1 2 3 4 5 6

T 336956 EIA875 PAGE 02-02 IN 082793

TOR:281515Z OCT 76 SJOS 20051

TO ARANDA POSSIBLY TO STRENGTHEN THEIR CASE SINCE BOSCH TRAVELLED ON CHILEAN PASSPORT.

4. FILE: 201-300985, 200-12-200/1. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 35-1 RUN B

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ____

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____

ACTION UNIT C/LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR C/IPAN, DDO3, C/NEG
AGC/DDO, C/OPS/IC4, C/CI4
C/PS/EG2, dOPS, dSS/SOG3,

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 334460 EIA466 PAGE 01-01 IN 081802

TOR:272033Z OCT 76 CARA 31254

S E C R E T 272020Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31254

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 31218 (077924)

1. FYI, ACCORDING WKSCARLET-5 WHO OBTAINED FROM DISIP OFFICER, EVIDENCE WHICH IMPLICATES SUBJECT 201-300985 IN 6 OCTOBER 1976 CUBANA AIRCRAFT BOMBING INCLUDES AIRLINE BILLING INVOICE SIEZED IN RAID ON ICICA OFFICES IN CARACAS. BILLING IS TO ICICA FOR AIRLINE TICKETS USED BY HERNAN RICARDO LOZANO DURING BOMBING OPERATION.

2. FILE: 201-0300985, E2, IMPDET.

IP/CDR		[illegible] PROGRAM
	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/CRY		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/MB		CODE NO. (2, 3)
		RYBAT REST. CODE
		CABLE IDEN (11)
		NEO (8)
~~IP/ERU~~		FOR FILING
LAPNC/V		

WKSCARLET-3
201-300985
27 Oct 76

SECRET

RECORD COPY

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

POSADA, LUIS
201-0300985 075-005-009
SEX M CARA-31174
19 OCT 76
CIT CUBA HVC-07521
P2

RES VENE. FORMER OFFICER OF DIRECTORATE FOR SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION /DISIP/ CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINER 6 OCT 76. TRAVELED TO COSTA RICA IN SEPT TO MEET WITH ORLANDO BOSCH /201-0299292/.

DATE 27 OCT 76 09446116

201-300985

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15-1 PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 262350Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 933599

CONF: LA 5 INFO: FILE IP/AN, CFS/ITC 4, A C 4

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0

DISSEM BY: [illegible]

LA/PNC/V

TO: CARACAS. Y

UNINTEL MHSPIKE KMSTONE Y

REF: CARACAS 31198 |IN 076710| Y

1. NO HQS ■TRACES ON DIEGO ARGUELLES. Y

2. HQS FILE ON CIVISTA-6 INDICATE HE BORN 6 OC■TOBER 1943 IN CARACAS. HE ATTENDED COLEGIO CARMELITANO DEL NORTE IN SAN ANTONIO PAMPLONA, COLOMBIA, 1959-1961, HE WAS A PLASTIC WORKER 1962-1965 AND IN 1966 WAS ACCEPTED AS AGENT/INVESTIGATOR WITH THE JUDICIAL POLICE (PTJ). WKSCARLET-1 REQUESTED TRAINING FOR CIVISTA-6 IN JUNE 1968 IN FLAPS AND SEALS. HOWEVER, FOR SOME UNKNOWN REASON, WKSCARLET-1 LOST INTEREST IN TRAINING CIVISTA-6 AND HIS POA WAS CAN■■CELLED. LATEST DOCUMENT IN HQS FILE, 6 MARCH 1969, HVCA-16340, STATED THAT CIVISTA-6 HAS NEVER BEEN CONTACTED ■BY STATION PERSONNEL NOR HAS HE BEEN GIVEN BKHERALD TRAINING. Y

3. FILE: 201-0300986; 201-0835021. E2 IMPDET.

REFERENCE ADVISED THAT THERE NO STATION TRACES ON ALFREDO GUTIERREZ OR OLEG GUETON RODRIGUEZ DE LA SERRA TRETISCOFF. IN ADDITION STATION ADVISED THAT DIEGO ARGUELLES AND CIVISTA-6 ARE BELIEVED TO BE ASSOCIATES IN INVESTIGATION FIRM OF LUIS POSADA CARRILLES.

201-300985
26 OCT 76

DATE: 26 OCT 76
ORIG: CATHY LEE WARD clw
UNIT: LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1715

RECORD COPY

C/PCS/ITC (FOR INFO)
C/LA/COG (FOR INFO)

J. A. Matthews
C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

B 201-835921

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 33-2 RUN BY ____

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

S E C R E T

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] DDO 3 [illegible] CI 4 [illegible] [illegible]

STAFF

T 329742 EIA926 PAGE 01 IN 079612

TOR:261257Z OCT 76 CARA 31229

S E C R E T 261224Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31229

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT N-SPIKE KMSTONE

REFS: A. WASHINGTON 920330

B. CARACAS 31186 (074978)

C. CARACAS 31224 (078286)

1. WE HAD HOPED RESOLVE QUESTIONS RAISED BY APPROACH OF SERGIO DIEGUEZ, OSTENSIBLY ON BEHALF LUIS POSADA, THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH POSADA. POSADA IS NO LONGER ACCESSIBLE.

2. WKNORTH-17 RECENTLY SHOWED STATION OFFICER A CATALOG OF INTELLIGENCE TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PRODUCED BY AUDIO INTERNATIONAL DEVICES (AID) OF FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA. INSIDE THE CATALOG COVER WAS A SMALL POCKET CONTAINING THE BUSINESS CARD OF SERGIO DIEGUEZ, REPRESENTING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS, INC., MIAMI. WKNORTH-17 SAID HE HAD GOTTEN THE CATALOG INDIRECTLY AND THROUGH THE VENEZUELAN NATIONAL GUARD; THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW DIEGUEZ PERSONALLY.

3. THE THOUGHT OCCURS THAT DIEGUEZ MAY HAVE BEEN HE

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-300985
DO NOT DESTROY

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY ______

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	STAFF			
ACTION #			1		4	
			2		5	
			3		6	

T 329742 EIA906 PAGE 02-02 IN 079612

TOR:2612572 OCT 76 CARA 31229

SUPPLIER OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR ICICA. POSADA'S PRIVATE INVESTIGATIONS COMPANY IN CARACAS AND MAY HAVE HAD A SUSTAINED CONTACT WITH POSADA FROM WHICH HE OBTAINED INFORMATION WHICH HE RECOGNIZED AS OF PROBABLE INTEREST TO BKHERALD. SINCE POSADA HAD PREVIOUSLY SUPPLIED BKHERALD WITH INFORMATION ON EXILE PLANS FOR ASSASSINATION AND BOMBING, ONE WONDERS IF PERHAPS DIEGUEZ MAY HAVE HAD INFORMATION OF THIS TYPE FROM POSADA WHICH, IN ADDITION TO THAT MENTIONED REF A, HE WAS TRYING TO PEDDLE. DIEGOEZ' APPROACH WAS PRIOR THE 21 SEPTEMBER ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER AND THE 6 OCTOBER DESTRUCTION OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. SUGGEST HEADQUARTERS MAY WISH TO RECONTACT AND DEBRIEF DIEGUEZ OR SUGGEST SAME TO LNERGO.

4. FILE: 220-6-484/3; 201-0302985. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

37-4.

9

AC/LA/[illegible]

Ven-File F-7

DDA [illegible] 553 [illegible]

T 322482 E1A526 IN 277524

[illegible] CA FILE [illegible]

TOR:201[illegible]Z OCT 76 GGRG 21369

CHRONO
DO NOT REMOVE

SECRET 201925Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE GEORGETOWN 21369

TO: DIRECTOR INFO LONDON.

WNINTEL RYBAT

REF: A. GEORGETOWN 21356 (IN 071334)

B. GEORGETOWN EMBTEL 2276 (NC 30242)

1. FOR PAST TEN DAYS ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING OUR EMBASSY HAS BEEN ONE OF APPREHENSION. REVIEWING EVENTS:

Ver

A. ON 11 OCTOBER FORMIN FRED WILLS ISSUED STATEMENT WHICH REFERRED TO DESTABILIZATION IN CONTEXT OF CUBANA CRASH. EMBASSY WAS PEACEFULLY PICKETED 13 OCTOVER BY TWO GROUPS, ONE (YSM) WITH GOVERNMENT APPROVAL. THERE FOLLOWED TWO TELEPHONE THREATS TO EMBASSY 14 OCTOBER.

B. ON 15 OCTOBER STATE DEPT MADE DEMARCHE TO GUYANESE CHARGE HALDER OF WHICH KEY PHRASE FOCUSSED UPON BY GOG WAS THAT GOG WAS "STRAINING US PATIENCE." EMBASSY DID NOT RECEIVE ACTUAL TEXT OF DEMARCHE, BUT SECRETARY LEURS, IN TELECON WITH CHARGE BLACKEN, DENIED THAT PHRASE WAS USED. NEVERTHELESS, THIS HEIGHTENED BURNHAM'S EMOTIONAL BROODING OVER CRASH AND THERE FOLLOWED BURNHAM'S SPEECH (SEE TEXT REF B).

NOTE LAST PAGE re WKSCARL 5-3

[illegible] CA PROP ~ 28OCT76

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 323461 EIA624 PAGE 02 IN 077504

TOR:221246Z OCT 76 GORG 21369

C. ON 18 OCTOBER BARBADIAN CRICKET TEAM LEFT GUYANA PREMATURELY, REPORTEDLY AFTER RECEIVING BOMB THREAT. ON 19 OCTOBER BOMB SEARCHES WERE CONDUCTED AT BANK OF GUYANA AND LOCAL AUTO/ELECTRONICS DEALER, GEDDES GRANT.

D. ON HEELS OF BURNHAM SPEECH DEPT ADVISED CHARGE HE TO BE RECALLED FOR CONSULTATION AFTER DELIVERING US PROTEST. COINCIDENTALLY, WE RECEIVED GOG LETTER REQUESTING CESSATION OF ONGOING AID PROJECT DUE AID ALLEGED FAILURE TO FOLLOW APPROVED PROCEDURE; AND EMBASSY'S UNCLASSIFIED POUCH WAS DETAINED AT AIRPORT.

E. CHARGE DELIVERED ORAL PROTEST TO WILLS EVENING 19 OCTOBER AND WAS LATER CALLED TO MEET WITH BURNHAM.

2. PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE MORNING 20 OCTOBER CHARGE TOLD COS BURNHAM WAS UNAPOLOGETIC OVER SPEECH AND DID NOT REACT TO OUR PROTEST (WHICH WAS MILDER THAN WILLS AND WE EXPECTED). BURNHAM WAS PARTICULARLY ANGRY AT BARBADIAN POSITION ON CRASH, BLAMING US FOR THAT POSITION AS WELL AS FOR SUPPORT OF CUBAN EXILES WHO PERPETRATED CRASH. BURNHAM NOW SEEKS VENGENCE THROUGH DEATH OF SUSPECTS. HE SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT USG ASSISTANCE IN BRINGING THEM TO "JUSTICE" WOULD REESTABLISH OUR CREDIBILITY. RASALT/3 CONFIRMED

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

T 323482 EIA624 PAGE 03 IN 077504

TOR:221248Z OCT 76 GORG 21369

THIS AS BURNHAM'S VIEW.

3. AFTER BURNHAM'S SUNDAY SPEECH NEITHER RASALT/3 (R/3) NOR RATROJAN/3 (T/3) WERE AVAILABLE, APPARENTLY DUE TO HEIGHTENED GOG MEETING ACTIVITY. AFTER MISSING 16 OCTOBER CONTACT, R/3 CHECKED IN MORNING 20 OCTOBER. MEETING SET FOR SAME NIGHT. ON VOIE LINK RXE COMMENTED THAT CRASH GAVE RISE TO GREAT DEAL OF EMOTION WHICH FOR BURNHAM WAS VERY STRONGLY REINFORCED BY DISCOVERY OF JOE LEO'S NAME IN SUSPECT'S DIARY. FOR BURNHAM THIS INDICATED A PRESENT USG ASSOCIATION WITH SUSPECTS EVEN IF WE WERE NOT INVOLVED IN AIR CRASH. R/3 SAID THAT IN MEETINGS PRIOR TO BURNHAM'S SPEECH FORMIN WILLS WAS NOT ANXIOUS FOR CONFRONTATION WITH US. HOWEVER, IN HIS AND WILLS' ATTEMPTS TO DISCUSS BURNHAM'S SPEECH APPROACH, BURNHAM WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF AS TO HOW FAR HE WOULD GO. R/3 THINKS THAT BURNHAM WENT JUST AS FAR AS HE INTENDED, AND WAS EVEN SOMEWHAT RESTRAINED EMOTIONALLY. EXPECT MORE DETAIL IN DEBRIEFING R/3; PARTICULARLY ON WILLS' ROLE DURING THIS CRISIS, AND CUBAN OR OTHER ROLES IF ANY. GNCOIN ALSO ATTEMPTING CONTACT T/3 FOR READING ON SITUATION.

4. WE HAVE SEEN NO MEASURABLE CHANGE IN OPERATIONAL CLIMATE AS YET. WILLS TOLD CHARGE THAT PARA 1 POUCH AND AID-LETTER INCIDENTS

14-00000

FORM [illegible]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1	4
2	5
3	6

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF . FILE . VR .

T 323481 EIA504 PAGE 04-04 IN 077504

TOR:221245Z OCT 76 GCRG 21369

WERE DUE TO COINCIDENCE, AS THERE IS NO GOVERNMENT PLANS TO HARASS US. HE ALSO PROMISED INCREASED "VIGILANCE" ON BEHALF US MISSION PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC. R/3 REQUESTED FACE-TO-FACE MEETING SAYING THAT HE SEES NO CHANGE IN SEUCRITY SITUATION. STATION WILL CONTINUE WITH SCHEDULED MEETING ARRANGEMENTS, BARRING CHANGE FOR WORSE. IN THIS CONTEXT OPS CLIMATE COULD DETERIORATE IF ANY PLAUSIBLE EVIDENCE IS DIVULGED LINKING USG OR BKHERALD DIRECTLY TO CUBANA BOMB SUSPECTS. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY THIS WOULD PROBABLY SERVE AS CONFIRMATION OF BURNHAM'S PARANOIC SUSPICIONS OF US. CANNOT PREDICT NATURE OF HIS REACTION. HOWEVER, HQS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT ONE OF ARRESTEES IN CARACAS, LUIS POSADA CARRILES, WAS FORMERLY HANDLED BY GABRIEL J. LABRENZ CIRCA 1972.

5. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

OCT 27 7 32 PM '76

ACTION COPY

S E C

7 42

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY ISSUING OFFICE IS

STAFF

ISSUED - LA
DSS-DOCKET 1655

ACTION UNIT LAS

INFO FILE VR ILBAZ, OPS/INT 4, DDO 2, ACC/DDO, NE 8, SS/SOG 4, SS 4, PS/EG 2, CI 4, CI/OPS

T 324264 EIA565 PAGE 01 IN 277924

TOR:221651Z OCT 76 CARA 3121

SECRET 221636Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31218

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 31208 (IN 069408)

1. DURING 22 OCTOBER MEETING WITH WKNORTH-17, HE PLACED TELEPHONE CALL TO OFFICE OF WKNOBLE-24 AND PRSONALLY VERIFIED THAT ORLANDO GARCIA HAD NOT BEEN ARRESTED. IT OPINION OF WKNORTH-17 THAT PRESS ALLEGATION IS RESULT OF CONFUSION NAME ORLANDO GARCIA WITH ORLANDO BOSCH. WKNORTH-17 ALSO SAID HE HAS NO INFORMATION THAT FRANCISCO NUNEZ HAS OR HAS HAD IN THE PAST ANY CONNECTION WITH VENEZUELAN "SECRET POLICE".

2. WKNORTH-17 HAD TIME ONLY BRIEFLY TO DISCUSS BOMBING CASE; INFO BEING FORWARDED BY HVC. CONCERNING THE PRESS ALLEGATION THAT POSADA'S "FORTIFIED RESIDENCE" HAD BEEN SEARCHED, WKNORTH-17 SAID THIS WAS UNTURE AND ONLY THE ICICA OFFICE HAD BEEN RAIDED. WKNORTH-17 ADDED THAT SOME ITEMS OF BOMB PARAPHERNALIA FOUND IN THE ICICA OFFICES WERE CONSIDERED EVIDENCE IMPLICATING POSADA IN THE 6 OCTOBER

SECRET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-300985
DO NOT DESTROY

14-00000

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

	INFO	RF FILE VR	1	4
			2	5
			3	6

T 324264 EIA565 PAGE 02-02 IN 077924

TOR:221651Z OCT 76 CARA 31218

DOWNING OF THE CUBANA AIRCRAFT.

3. FILE: 201-067660; 201-0300985. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

7-71 MFG 2/9

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY P PER Sg0111 TOTAL COPIES 12-2 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY [✓ ISSUED] SLOTTED LA BY [illegible] AT 1805 Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT

LAS

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR Liplan, C/Ops/ITG4

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 321023 EIA429 PAGE 01 IN 076710

TOR:211801Z OCT 76 CARA 31198

S E C R E T 211718Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31198

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REF: DIRECTOR 930282

1. NO STATION TRACES ALFREDO GUTIERREZ OR OLEG GUETON RODRIGUEZ DE LA SERRA TRETISCOFF.

2. POSADA ASSOCITES IN INVESTIGATIVE FIRM ARE BELIEVED BE DIEGO ARGUELLES (NO STATION TRACES) AND CIVISTA-6: THE LATTER MAY HAVE HAD HIS INTEREST IN THE FIRM PURCHASED BY POSADA AND ARGUELLES A FEW MONTHS AGO. WKSCARLET-1 HAS BEEN ALLEGED BY WKNORTH TO BE A PARTNER OF POSADA IN THE FIRM BUT WE HAVE NO INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS. POSADA DID TELL STATION THAT HIS FIRM HAD DONE WORK FOR WKSCARLET-1 AS A CLIENT. THE ALLEGED PARTNERSHIP CONNECTION WOULD BE VALUABLE FACT IN ANY GOV EFFORT SHOW CONNECTION OF POSADA ACTIVITIES WITH COPEI. STATION HAS NO RECENT INFORMATION ON CIVISTA-6 . WE ARE AS YET UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE 11 OTHER PERSONS CONNECTED WITH ICICA BUT , IF THIS FIGURE CORRECT, SUSPECT THAT FREDDY LUGO AND RICARDO HERNAN LOZANO MAY FIGURE AMONG THE ELEVEN.

SECRET

RECORD COPY

21 Oct 76

201-300985

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ TOTAL COPIES ___ RUN BY ___

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ___ BY ___ AT ___

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	1	4
ACTION #			2	5
			3	6

T 321023 EIA429 PAGE 02-02 IN 076710

TOR:211801Z OCT 76 CARA 31198

3. FILE: 201-0300985, E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

FORM 3020c
7-71 MFG 2/70

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 3 8-4 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ______

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED [illegible] AT [illegible]

ACTION UNIT C/LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DDO3 AGC/ADDO C/CI/TG4 C/NE4, C/OPS/INT, C/CI4 C/PS/EG2 C/IP/AN

T 317069 EIA647 PAGE 01 IN 074978

TOR:201359Z OCT 76 CARA 31186

S E C R E T 201322Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31186

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT MHSPIKE KMSTONE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 930240

B. DIRECTOR 875121

C. WASHINGTON 920330

1. THE AGENCY HAS HAD NO, REPEAT NO. RELATIONSHIP WITH LUIS POSADA'S INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY OR ANY OTHER BUSINESS VENTURE HE MAY HAVE HAD IN CARACAS.

2. DECISION TO TERMINATE RELATIONSHIP WITH POSADA WAS TAKEN IN EARLY 1974, ALMOST TWO YEARS PRIOR HOS FORMAL TERMINATION ON 13 FEBRUARY 1976. OUR ONLY REASON FOR CONTINUING THE CONTACT BEYOND DATE OF THAT DECISION IN 1974 WAS TO RESOLVE CERTAIN OUTSTANDING FEDERAL COVERT INCOME TAX MATTERS, AND WE TRIED TO KEEP THESE SESSIONS AS INFREQUENT ASPOSSIBLE. AS SOON AS TAX SITUATION WAS SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED, WE PRECEEDED WITH FORMAL TERMINATION SESSION IN FEBRUARY 1976. BECAUSE POSADA HAD HIGH LOCAL PROFILE, WE HAD NO REALLY COVERT MEANS TO CONTACT HIM AND

X

LAPNC/V

201-300985

30 Oct 76

SECRET

RECORD COPY

FORM [illegible]
7-71 MFG 2 [illegible]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO: RF FILE. VR.
ACTION #	

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 317069 EIA647 PAGE 02 IN 074978

TOR:2013592 OCT 76 CARA 31186

WE WAITED FOR HIS PERIODIC, NON-SCHEDULED CALL-INS TO RECEIVE AND CONVEY ANY NEWS CONCERNING TAX MATTERS.

3. CONTACTS WITH STATION SUBSEQUENT TO FORMAL TERMINATION SESSION WERE AT POSADA OWN INITIATIVE AND WERE FOR PURPOSE VOLUNTEERING INFORMATION ON SIGNIFICANT EXILE EXTREMIST PLANS, TO SOLICIT AID FOR RETENTION OF HIS RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS AND FOR HELP IN OBTAINING U.S. VISITORS VISAS FOR SELF AND FAMILY. POSADA WAS NOT TASKED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION BEYOND SPECIFICS OF EXTREMIST PLANNING WHICH HE HAD REPORTED ON OWN INITIATIVE.

4. POSADA RECONTACTED THE CARACAS STATION ALMOST IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS FORMAL TERMINATION TO VOLUNTEER REPORT ON WHEREABOUTS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, FRANK CASTRO AND THE THREAT TO LIFE OF SALVADOR ALLENDE'S NEPHEW. HE WAS CONTACTED A DAY OR SO LATER (19 FEBRURARY 1976) BY STATION BUENOS AIRES TO DEBRIEF FOR ANY POSSIBLE INFORMATION CONCERNING SECURITY OF SECRETARY KISSINGER VISIT. AT THIS TIME POSADA WAS TRAVELLING WITH FORMER DISIP CHIEF REMBERTO UZCATEGUI (HIS CLIENT) AND INVESTIGATING THE AUTHORSHIP OF A LETTER BOMB SENT TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN

FORM 3020
7-71 MFG 2-76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER______ TOTAL COPIES______ RUN BY______

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF, FILE VR	STAFF
ACTION #			1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6

T 317069 EIA647 PAGE 03 IN 074978

TOR:2013592 OCT 76 CARA 31186

CARACAS: THE BOMB ENVELOPE BORE RETURN ADDRESS OF WEALTHY VENEZUELAN INDUSTRIALIST GUSTAVO VOLMER WHOEMPLOYS UZCATEGUI AS SECURITY ADVISTOR. FOLLOWING HIS TETURN TO CARACAS FROM THIS TRIP POSADA CONTACTED THE STATION AND SAID SOMEWHAT ACCUSINGLY THAT HE HAD VERY NEARLY BEEN IRREDEEMABLY COMPROMISED WITH THE EXILE EXTREMEISTS WHEN BOSCH WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE AND THE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE THREAT TO ALLENDE'S NEPHEW WAS LEAKED.

5. ON 22 JUNE 1976 POSADA AGAIN CONTACTED THE STATION, REPORTED INFO TDFIRDB-315/06286/76 CONCERNING POSSIBLE EXILE PLANS TO BLOW UP A CUBANA AIRLINER LEAVING PANAMA, AND REQUESTED VISA ASSISTANCE REPORTED CARACAS * (IN) 30169. THE LAST CARACAS STATION CONTACT WITH POSADA WAS A FEW DAYS LATER TO COUNSEL HIM PER REF B. AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CONTACT POSADA ON 7 OCTOBER 1976 IN CONNECTION REF C;

6. THE STATION HAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOURCE OF TDFIRDB-315/10256 DELIBERATELY DELAYED PASSING ON BOSCH'S AND POSADA'S REMARKS ABOUT HITTING A CUBAN PLAN UNTIL AFTER THE INCIDENT. WHEN POSADA MADE THE STATEMENTS TO THE SUBSOURCE HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC AS TO ANY TIME OR PLACE FOR THE INCIDENT. WHEN

SECRET

*Pre date in Number
furnished upon Request.

201-300985-

14-00000

FORM 3020R
7-71 MFG 2 76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF . FILE . VR .	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 317069 EIA647 PAGE 04-04 IN 074978

TOR:201359Z OCT 76 CARA 31186

THE SUBSOURCE REPORTED THIS INFORMATION TO THE SOURCE. THE SUBSOURCE HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THE INFORMATION WOULD BE PASSED ON BY THE SOURCE TO AGENCY AS HE IS UNWITTING OF THE SOURCE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AGENCY.

7. FILE: 201-0300985, E2, IMPDET.

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

C/LA [illegible]
DC/LAD
C/OPS
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET 201332Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31186

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT MHSPIKE KMTONE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 930240
B. DIRECTOR 875121
C. WASHINGTON 920330

1. THE AGENCY HAS HAD NO. REPEAT NO. RELATIONSHIP WITH LUIS POSADA'S INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY OR ANY OTHER BUSINESS VENTURE HE MAY HAVE HAD IN CARACAS.

2. DECISION TO TERMINATE RELATIONSHIP WITH POSADA WAS TAKEN IN EARLY 1974. ALMOST TWO YEARS PRIOR HQS FORMAL TERMINATION ON 13 FEBRUARY 1976. OUR ONLY REASON FOR CONTINUING THE CONTACT BEYOND DATE OF THAT DECISION IN 1974 WAS TO RESOLVE CERTAIN OUTSTANDING FEDERAL COVERT INCOME TAX MATTERS. AND WE TRIED TO KEEP THESE SESSIONS AS INFREQUENT AS POSSIBLE. AS SOON AS TAX SITUATION WAS SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. WE PROCEEDED WITH FORMAL TERMINATION SESSION IN FEBRUARY 1976. BECAUSE POSADA HAD HIGH LOCAL PROFILE. WE HAD NO REALLY COVERT MEANS TO CONTACT HIM AND WE WAITED FOR HIS PERIODIC. NON-SCHEDULED CALL-INS TO RECEIVE AND CONVEY ANY NEWS CONCERNING TAX MATTERS.

3. CONTACTS WITH STATION SUBSEQUENT TO FORMAL TERMINATION SESSION WERE AT POSADA OWN INITIATIVE AND WERE FOR PURPOSE VOLUNTEERING INFORMATION ON SIGNIFICANT EXILE EXTREMIST PLANS. TO SOLICIT AID FOR RETENTION OF HIS RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS AND FOR HELP IN OBTAINING U.S. VISITORS VISAS FOR SELF AND FAMILY. POSADA WAS NOT TASKED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION BEYOND SPECIFICS OF EXTREMIST PLANNING WHICH HE HAD REPORTED ON OWN INITIATIVE.

4. POSADA RECONTACTED THE CARACAS STATION ALMOST IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS FORMAL TERMINATION TO VOLUNTEER

[illegible] S E C R E T

[illegible] REPORTS OF ORLANDO B O S C H AVILA, PLANS [illegible] THREAT TO LIFE OF SALVADOR A L L E N D E [illegible] [illegible] 10 LATER [illegible] STATION [illegible] ALERT TO MERIDA FOR ANY POSSIBLE INFORMATION CONCERNING SECURITY OF SECRETARY KISSINGER VISIT. AT THIS TIME POSADA WAS TRAVELLING WITH FORMER DISIP CHIEF REMBERTO U Z C A T E G U I (HIS CLIENT) AND INVESTIGATING THE AUTHORSHIP OF A LETTER BOMB SENT TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN CARACAS. THE BOMB ENVELOPE BORE RETURN ADDRESS OF WEALTHY VENEZUELAN INDUSTRIALIST GUSTAVO V O L M E R WHO EMPLOYS UZCATEGUI AS SECURITY ADVISOR. FOLLOWING HIS RETURN TO CARACAS FROM THIS TRIP POSADA CONTACTED THE STATION AND SAID SOMEWHAT ACCUSINGLY THAT HE HAD VERY NEARLY BEEN IRREDEEMABLY COMPROMISED WITH THE EXILE EXTREMISTS WHEN BOSCH WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE AND THE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE THREAT TO ALLENDE'S NEPHEW WAS LEAKED.

5. ON 22 JUNE 1976 POSADA AGAIN CONTACTED THE STATION, REPORTED INFO TDFIRDB-315/06286-76 CONCERNING POSSIBLE EXILE PLANS TO BLOW UP A CUBANA AIRLINER LEAVING PANAMA, AND REQUESTED VISA ASSISTANCE REPORTED CARACAS 30169. THE LAST CARACAS STATION CONTACT WITH POSADA WAS A FEW DAYS LATER TO COUNSEL HIM PER REF E. AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CONTACT POSADA ON 7 OCTOBER 1976 IN CONNECTION REF C.

6. THE STATION HAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOURCE OF TDFIRDB-315/10256 DELIBERATELY DELAYED PASSING ON BOSCH'S AND POSADA'S REMARKS ABOUT HITTING A CUBAN PLANE UNTIL AFTER THE INCIDENT. WHEN POSADA MADE THE STATEMENTS TO THE SUBSOURCE HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC AS TO ANY TIME OR PLACE FOR THE INCIDENT. WHEN THE SUBSOURCE REPORTED THIS INFORMATION TO THE SOURCE, THE SUBSOURCE HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THE INFORMATION WOULD BE PASSED ON BY THE SOURCE TO AGENCY AS HE IS UNWITTING OF THE SOURCE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AGENCY.

7. FILE: 201-0300985. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

14-00000

574

CIRC [illegible]

OCT 20 1 12 PM '76

OPERATIONS CENTER

A [illegible]

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT 1 21 PM '76

TRANSMITTED BY

RECEIVED BY

FROM: (Name, Office, Extension)

Raymond A. Warren, Chief, Latin America Division, x7763

SUBJECT OF MESSAGE

Data for Inclusion in Draft Memorandum to Secretary of State

CLASSIFICATION/CONTROLS	NUMBER OF PAGES
SECRET	two

LDX TO	DELIVER TO	EXTENSION	ROOM NUMBER
Dept of State	Mr. Francis DeTarr ~~INR/DDC/OPS~~	22285	6635

REMARKS

FORM 3624 (12-75)

WKSCARLET-3

SECRET

20 October 1976

SUBJECT: Data for Inclusion in Draft Memorandum
To Secretary of State

REFERENCE: LDX-0714, 19 October 1976

1. In response to the queries posed in the Reference, there follows below amplification of information concerning Luis Posada.

2. The Agency has had no relationship with Luis POSADA's Investigative Agency or any other business venture he may have had in Caracas.

3. The decision to terminate the relationship with Posada was taken in early 1974. Our only reason for continuing the contact beyond date of that decision in 1974 was to resolve certain outstanding federal income tax matters, and we tried to keep these sessions as infrequent as possible. Because Posada had a high local profile, we waited for his periodic non-scheduled call-ins to receive and convey any news concerning tax matters.

4. Contacts with him subsequent to February 1976 were at Posada's own initiative (except as indicated below) and were for the purpose of volunteering information on significant exile extremist plans, to solicit aid for retention of his resident alien status, and for help in obtaining U.S. visitors visas for self and family. Posada was not tasked to provide information beyond specifics of extremist planning which he had reported on his own initiative.

5. Posada recontacted the Caracas Station in mid-February 1976 to volunteer a report on the whereabouts of Orlando BOSCH Avila, Frank CASTRO, and the threat to the life of Salvador ALLENDE's nephew. He was contacted a day or so later by Station Buenos Aires to debrief him on any possible information concerning the security of Secretary Kissinger's visit. At this time Posada was travelling with former DISIP Chief Remberto UZCATEGUI (his client) and investigating the authorship of a letter bomb sent to Cuban Ambassador in Caracas.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

6. On 22 June 1976 Posada again contacted the station and requested visa assistance, for his wife and himself.

7. The Caracas station has no reason to believe that the source of TDFIRDB-315/10256 deliberately delayed passing on Bosch's and Posada's remarks about hitting a Cuban plane until after the incident. When Posada made the statements to the subsource he was not specific as to any time or place for the incident. When the subsource reported this information to the source, the subsource had no reason to believe the information would be passed on by the source to this Agency as he is unwitting of the source's relationship with the Agency.

Frances DeTARR
INR/DDC/CPS

20 October 1976

SUBJECT: Data for Inclusion in Draft Memorandum
To Secretary of State

REFERENCE: LDX-0714, 19 October 1976

1. In response to the queries posed in the Reference, there follows below amplification of information concerning Luis Posada.

2. The Agency has had no relationship with Luis POSADA's Investigative Agency or any other business venture he may have had in Caracas.

3. The decision to terminate the relationship with Posada was taken in early 1974. Our only reason for continuing the contact beyond date of that decision in 1974 was to resolve certain outstanding federal income tax matters, and we tried to keep these sessions as infrequent as possible. Because Posada had a high local profile, we waited for his periodic non-scheduled call-ins to receive and convey any news concerning tax matters.

4. Contacts with him subsequent to February 1976 were at Posada's own initiative (except as indicated below) and were for the purpose of volunteering information on significant exile extremist plans, to solicit aid for retention of his resident alien status, and for help in obtaining U.S. visitors visas for self and family. Posada was not tasked to provide information beyond specifics of extremist planning which he had reported on his own initiative.

5. Posada recontacted the Caracas Station in mid-February 1976 to volunteer a report on the whereabouts of Orlando BOSCH Avila, Frank CASTRO, and the threat to the life of Salvador ALLENDE's nephew. He was contacted a day or so later by Station Buenos Aires to debrief him on any possible information concerning the security of Secretary Kissinger's visit. At this time Posada was travelling with former DISIP Chief Remberto UZCATEGUI (his client) and investigating the authorship of a letter bomb sent to Cuban Ambassador in Caracas.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

6. On 22 June 1976 Posada again contacted the station and requested visa assistance, for his wife and himself.

7. The Caracas station has no reason to believe that the source of TDFIRDB-315/10256 deliberately delayed passing on Bosch's and Posada's remarks about hitting a Cuban plane until after the incident. When Posada made the statements to the subsource he was not specific as to any time or place for the incident. When the subsource reported this information to the source, the subsource had no reason to believe the information would be passed on by the source to this Agency as he is unwitting of the source's relationship with the Agency.

State Department Cable
Date: 20 October 1976
Classification: Confidential
SUBJECT: OMANG QUERY ABOUT POSADA
STATE 259140

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY 32.1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP 192253Z
CITE DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 930240

CONF: C/LAS INFO: FILE C/IPLAN, C/NE6, 0003, OPO/OO, AGC/DDO, C/OPS/ITG4, C/CI4, C/PS/EG2, C/OPS/INT

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 25
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS.Y

NIACT RYBAT WNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE Y

1. DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS LEVIED BELOW REQUIREMENTS ON US FOR USE IN BRIEFING OF DR. KISSINGER. WOULD APPRECIATE STATION RESPONSE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE MORNING 20 OCTOBER. WE RECOGNIZE THAT SOME OF INFO ALREADY AVAILABLE HERE, BUT WOULD LIKE DEFINITIVE STATEMENTS BY STATION ON BELOW QUESTIONS. Y

2. HAS THE AGENCY HAD ANY RELATIONSHIP WITH LUIS POSADA'S INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY OR ANY OTHER BUSINESS HE MAY HAVE HAD? Y

3. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE CONTACTS THE AGENCY HAD WITH POSADA AFTER HE WAS TERMINATED? WHAT DID THE CONTACTS HAVE TO DO WITH CUBA? Y

4. WHO WAS THE VISA FOR THAT POSADA APPROACHED THE AGENCY AND THE DEFENSE ATTACHE ABOUT IN JUNE 1976? Y

5. DOES THE AGENCY BELIEVE THAT THE SOURCE OF TDFIRDB-315/10256 DELIBERATELY DELAYED PASSING ON BOSCH'S AND POSADA'S REMARKS ABOUT HITTING A CUBAN PLANE UNTIL AFTER THE INCIDENT? Y

6. FILE DEFER. E2, IMPDET.

94

X

LAPNC/V

DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: WAYNE CARLEY:LH
UNIT: LA/OPS
EXT: 1244

LA/COMMENT: CONCERNING CUBANA PLANE CRASH NEAR BARBADOS 6 OCTOBER.

RECORD COPY

201-300985
19 Oct 76

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

L. Ro
C/LA/OPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/P&NC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

7 71 MFG 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY P PER   TOTAL COPIES 35-5

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED   AT

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT	INFO	
C/LA8	RF FILE VR	LIP/AP, C/NE6, C/OPS, C/OPS/ITG4, C/PS/EG2, AGC/DDO, DDO3, C/OSG, C/SIA2, C/CI4
ACTION #		

T 315150   EIA742   PAGE 01   IN 074149

TOR:192243Z OCT 76   CARA 31184

S E C R E T 192054Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31184

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT KMSTONE MHSPIKE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 929165

B. WASHINGTON 920330

C. CARACAS 31137 (IN 070661)

1. WE SHARE HEADQUARTERS CONCERN RE ARREST OF WKSCARLET-3 (W-3) AND POSSIBILITY OF SUSPICION/ADDITIONAL CHARGES BKHERALD CONNECTION WITH BOMBING. IN ADDITION TO INTEL REPORTING, STATION CONTINUOUSLY ASSESSING EVENTS IN RELATION TO MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND WE ARE IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH AMBASSADOR. WE ARE UNABLE TO REPORT ANY FIRST-HAND INFORMATION FROM W-3 OR WKTANGO-1 (W-1) DUE TO LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED BY AMBASSADOR. PRIOR TO BOMBING INCIDENT BRADSPIES ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT W-3 REGARDING APPARENTLY UNRELATED MATTER IN REF B: AFTER INCIDENT AND INITIAL REPORT FROM WKSCARLET-5 FROM WKSCARLET-3, ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT W-3 WERE STOPPED AND LATER WERE PROHIBITED BY AMBASSADOR. AS W-1 NAME BEGAN COMING UP WITH INCREASING

S E C R E T

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-300985
DO NOT DESTROY

F-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 315150 EIA741 PAGE 02 IN 074149

TOR:1922432 OCT 76 CARA 31184

FREQUENCY. AMBASSADOR REQUESTED STATION PULL BACK IN LIAISON CONTACT (THIS APPLIED ONLY TO W-1 PERSONAL CONTACT AND NOT TO WKSCARLET LIAISON IN GENERAL).

2. AS YET STATION HAS NO HARD EVIDENCE WHICH DIRECTLY LINKS ~~EITHER~~ W-3, W-1, OR RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE TO THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING. HOWEVER, THEIR REPORTED ASSOCIATION WITH ORLANDO BOSCP AVILA, THEIR BACKGROUNDS, AND W-3'S PRIOR REPORTING ON TERRORIST ACTIONS SUGGEST THAT THEY WERE ALL AWARE TO ONE DEGREE OR ANOTHER OF PLANS FOR THE 6 OCTOBER ACTION AND THAT NONE OF THEM ACTIVELY OPPOSED IT. OF THE THREE W-3 SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MOST LIKELY IMPLICATED THROUGH HIS POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO HERNAN RICARDO LOZANO AND/OR FREDDY LUGO. W-1 AND MORALES MAY HAVE BECOME ACCESSORIES-AFTER-THE-FACT DEPENDING UPON THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF ORLANDO BOSCH IN THE BOMBING AND ITS AFTERMATH.

3. IT MAY BE WISHFUL THINKING BUT DO NOT FEEL THAT W-3 IS IN POSITION REVEAL ANY TRUE INFORMATION WHICH COULD IMPLICATE ANY OF HIS SEVERAL EMBASSY CONTACTS. SINCE CONTACT WITH HIM IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN TO OUR KNOWLEDGE LIMITED ONLY TO VISA ASSISTANCE AND INFORMATION

SECRET

F-71 MFG 2/70

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF, FILE, VR

ACTION #

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 315150 EIA741 PAGE 03 IN 074149

TOR:1922432 OCT 76 CARA 31184

REPORTING. HE COULD AT MOST REVEAL NAMES AND TELPHONE NUMBERS. WKSCARLET-5 EXPRESSED PERSONAL OPINION THAT W-3, FEARING POSSIBLE RETRIBUTION FROM ORLANDO BOSCH, WOULD NOT DARE FIX BLAME ON BOSCH AND MIGHT, UNDER INTERROGATION PRESSURE, ATTEMPT TO IMPLICATE BKHERALD AS HIS SPONSOR; WE FEEL THIS POSSIBILITY IS RATHER REMOTE.

4. WKSCARLET-9 APPEARS NOT TO BE INVOLVED IN THE ABOVE BUT HIS CUBAN BACKGROUND AND CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH W-1, ESPECIALLY IN RECENT WEEKS, UNDOUBTEDLY HAS BROUGHT HIM SOME NOTICE AND PROBABLY SUSPICION. WKSCARLET-9 HAS NOT BEEN MET SINCE HE MISSED A MEETING IN LATE SPETEMBER; HE CALLED IN THE NEXT DAY TO SAY THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO MAKE IT. HE SUBSECUENTLY CALLED HIS CASE OFFICER'S HOME ONCE WHILE HE WAS OUT BUT HAS NOT CALLED BACK TO SPECIFY A TIME FOR THE NEXT MEETING; HE ALSO HAS NOT RESPONDED TO THREE RECENT RS-708 SIGNALS TO CALL IN AND ONE TO MAKE AN EMERGENCY MEETING ON THE NIGHT OF 8 OCTOBER. STATION HAS DECIDED AGAINST CALLING HIM DURING THIS CURRENT TENSE PERIOD AT HIS ONLY REACHABLE NUMBER--HIS AND WKNOBLE-1'S HOME. WE WILL CONTINUE SIGNALLING AND AWAITING HIS CALL IN. FYI:

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY_______ PER_______ TOTAL COPIES_______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED_______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED_______ BY_______ AT_______

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF . FILE . VR .

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 315150 EIA741 PAGE 04 IN 074149

TOR:1922432 OCT 76 CARA 31184

WITH WKSCARLET-9'S NEW POST IN WKSCARLET GOES A ROUND-THE-CLOCK ARMED ESCORT WHICH HE HAS TO RID HIMSELF OF BEFORE MAKING A CLANDESTINE MEETING WITH HIS CASE OFFICER; WKSCARLET-9 HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE SECURITY PROBLEMS OF MEETINGS IN HIS CURRENT SITUATION, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE HAS MANY ENEMIES IN, OR UNTIL RECENTLY IN, WKSCARLET WHO WOULD LOVE TO TAR HIM WITH THE BKHERALD BRUSH. SOMEONE WITH HIS CUBAN BACKGROUND, OF COURSE, IS ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE TO THIS CHARGE IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE CURRENT FUROR ABOUT EXILES IN VENEZUELA. WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS WKSCARLET-9 RECONTACT IS ESTABLISHED.

5. STATION FILES CONTAIN NO TRACES TO OLEG GUETON RODRIGUEZ OR CELSA TOLEDO. STATION HWS ONE TRACE TO FRANCISCO NUNEZ, A CUBAN EXILE AND FORMER NAVY OFFICER EMPLOYED BY ZULOAGA AND MACHADO GROUPS. INFO APPEARS IN CONTACT REPORTS DATED 6 AND 8 JUNE 1967, FILED IN AMEMBER-1 FILE WHICH NO LONGER AVAILABLE IN STATION. THERE IS ANOTHER TRACE THAT ONE FRANCISCO E. NUNEZ REPORTED A CASTRO ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT TO A STATION ASSET; UFAA-4022, 7 APR 72, 100-009-014. PROBABLY THE SAME FRANCISCO E. NUNEZ WAS LISTED IN HVCA-8538,

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

T 315150 EIA741 PAGE 05-05 IN 074149

TOR:1922432 OCT 76 CARA 31184

23 AUGUST 1961, AS GENERAL DIRECTOR OF THE COMPANY AISLA, C.A. AND IDENTIFIED AS HAVING FURNISHED A LEAD TO A CUBAN VICE CONSUL WHO WAS PLANNING TO DEFECT.

6. FILE: 200-6-484/3; 201-0300985; 201-0285923; 201-0067960. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

1. State Department Cable
   Date: 19 October 1976
   Classification: Confidential
   CARACAS 12401
   SUBJECT: Press Queries re Bosch/Cubana Case

2. State Department LDX
   Date: 19 October 1976
   Classification: Secret
   SUBJECT: Additional Questions
   LDX MESSAGE NO. 0714

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 162027Z DIRECTOR 929165

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, C/NE6, DDO3, AGC/DDO, T C/OR/ITG4, C/OPS, C/CI4, C/PS/EG2, C/OSG, DDO/DO

0 DISSEM BY: 2P
0
0 PER
0 #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS.

RYBAT
WNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE

1. LATE PRESS CLIPPINGS REPORT ARREST OF LUIS POSADA CARRILES, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, OLEG GUETON RODRIGUEZ, CELSA TOLEDO AND FRANCISCO NUNEZ. POSADA? AND CARRILES? KNOWN TO STATION. PRELIMINARY TRACES ON NUNEZ SHOW HE WEALTHY CUBAN EXILE AND MEMBER OF CORU RESIDENT IN CARACAS.

2. WE ARE CONCERNED IN SO FAR AS ARREST OF WKSCARLET-3 MIGHT CAST SUSPICION, AND BRING ON ADDITIONAL CHARGES OF BKHERALD CONNECTION WITH BOMBING, ESPECIALLY SINCE WKSCARLET-3 HAS IN PAST BEEN PUBLICALLY ACCUSED OF BEING BKHERALD AGENT. WE ALSO NOTE HE HAS BEEN SOMETIME CONTACT OF CARACAS ~~LEGATT~~ LEG, AND STATION SUSPICION THAT HE WAS CONTACT OF DAO.

3. OF INTEREST IS THAT MUCH OF THE CARACAS END OF INVESTIGATION OF THE AIRLINER BOMBING AND REPORTING IS CONTROLLED BY WKTANGO-1 GROUP. RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETTE IS WKTANGO-1 DEPUTY AND HAS BEEN SERVING AS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT FOR LEGATT. DISIP SUB-INSPECTOR ORLANDO JIMENEZ WHO SENT TO PORT OF SPAIN IS ALSO INCLUDED IN GROUP.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-300985
DO NOT DESTROY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

029165

(IN 069101)

ACCORDING TO CARACAS 31117 [redacted] WKTANGO-1 AND MORALES NAVARRETTE HAVE ALSO BEEN INCLUDED IN ORLANDO BOSCH/WKSCARLET-3 GROUP. FBI REPORT QUOTING NUNEZ OF PARA 1 ABOVE STATED THAT WKTANGO-1 AND MORALES NAVARRETTE ARE BOTH CONSIDERED TRUSTED PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN COOPERATIVE AND INSTRUMENTAL IN CORU SUCCESSES AND IN OTHER ACTIVITIES. INFORMATION IN CARACAS 31087 [redacted] REPORTING TRUE NAME OF HERNAN RICARDO LOZANO, BEFORE IT WAS ACTUALLY REVEALED BY RICARDO IN PORT OF SPAIN ON 9 OCTOBER ALSO CAME FROM MORALES NAVARRETTE, INDICATING THAT HE HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE, BUT WHETHER HE KNEW THIS THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING OR INFORMATION HE RECEIVED FROM HIS OWN INFORMANT IS UNKNOWN. PUTTING ALL THIS TOGETHER, AND IN LIGHT OF CARACAS 31117 [redacted] INFORMATION, WE CANNOT HELP BUT WONDER IF THERE IS NOT MORE GOING ON THAN IS APPARENT. CARACAS 31088 (IN 064447) [redacted] ALSO SEEMED TO SUSPECT THIS AT AN EARLY STAGE. Y

4. WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THE FOLLOWING: Y

A. LIKELIHOOD OF WKSCARLET-3 REVEALING INFORMATION WHICH COULD IMPLICATE ANY OF HIS SEVERAL EMBASSY CONTACTS. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED IMPDET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

929165

B. POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF WKTANGO-1 AND/OR MORALES NAVARRETTE. Y

WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO HAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THOSE ARRESTED ALONG WITH BOSCH AND POSADA, ON WHOM WE HAVE NO INFORMATION. Y

5. PLS ADVISE WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LEARN THROUGH LIAISON CONTACTS WITH WKTANGO-1 AND UNILATERALLY FROM WKSCARLET-9. Y

6. FILE: 200-6-484/3; 201-0300985; 201-0285923; 201-0067860.

E2 IMPDET.

C/LA/COG

C/LA/CAR

DATE: 15 OCT 76
ORIG: ROBERT W. ANDREWS
UNIT: C/LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1715

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

SECRET

X-REF. SHEET S-E-C-R-E-T DATE [illegible]/1[illegible]/76

X-REF.	CRYPT. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-0300985	CA-A-31137	15 OCT 76	201-0757560

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT(S) ARE CROSS-REFERENCED TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN. FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF THE FILE CONTAINING THE RECORD COPY DOCUMENT, CALL FILES SECTION, EXTENSION 4127.

S-E-C-R-E-T

E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FILE IN 201-0300985

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Incoming Pouch Message

FROM: NYART ISABELLE
IP/AN
EXT. ~~0104~~ 1446
SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 005937

GR-219
~~3B5334~~
TUBE ET-3

EXTENSION

NO. HVCA-21673

DATE 14 Oct 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CLA/PNC	1 Nov		B	
2.				ACTION COPY
3. LAPNC/V			g	Chrono Detached
4. ~~EV~~				
5. LC				
6. File				201-
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610A ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

CAUTION - BLANK FORM REQUIRES
SECURE STORAGE
IN FIELD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS PROCESSING
INDEXING REQUESTED
NO INDEXING
APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO
Chief, LA Division

INFO.

FROM
LLB
COS, Caracas

SUBJECT
O WKMAYOR/WKSCARLET--Termination of WKSCARLET-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Forwarded herewith is an agent service record for WKSCARLET-3 who was amicably terminated on 13 February 1976. Forwarded as a separate cover attachment is the termination secrecy oath executed by WKSCARLET-3 at the time of termination.

Frederick C. Bradspies
Frederick C. BRADSPIES

Attachment:
Agent Service Record, h/w
Termination Secrecy Oath, usc/tnp

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/LA, w/atts a/s

Se

SEARCH PROGRAM
ABSTRACT X
INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILMING
CODE NO (2, 3)
RIGHT INST. CODE
CABLE DTG (11)
MFD (8)
I.D FILING
LAPM V

E2,IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

2 Atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA-20673	14 October 1976
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-0300985

SECRET

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. AGENT: WKSCARLET-3

2. PROJECT: WKHAYOR

3. AGENT RECRUITED BY: Perry G. DRAPKIN DATE: 2 February 1968

4. CAPACITY IN WHICH AGENT SERVED: Penetration of WKSCARLET

5. RATE OF PAY: Bs 2,000.00 or U.S.$466.62 at recruitment.

6. OTHER COMMITMENTS: None

7. AGENT DISMISSED BY: Frederick C. BRADSPIES DATE: 13 February 1976

8. REASON FOR DISMISSAL: Loss of access of interest.

9. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS: On 13 October 1976 Subject was arrested by Venezuelan security agents on suspicion of involvement with others in the destruction of a Cubana aircraft near Barbados on 6 October 1976. Chief, NVIDEA Caracas has prohibited any Station contact with Subject until further notice.

10. IS AGENT RECOMMENDED FOR REUSE? Depending upon resolution of question as to involvement in above cited incident. Suggest no further use of Subject.

11. MANNER OF DISMISSAL AND ATTITUDE AT DISMISSAL: Subject was amicably terminated by Caracas Station officer.

12. LETTER OF TERMINATION OBTAINED? Yes SECRECY AGREEMENT: 13 Feb 76

13. OTHER COMMENTS: None

SECRET

RECORD COPY

H/W att. 1 to HVCA- 20673

201-300985

14-00000

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, Luis Clemente Posada C. , am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of our country. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of our government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims I may have against the Organization or our government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of the Organization concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

5. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to our government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalities of the espionage laws of our government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and our government, and that

SECRET

[illegible] 2 to [illegible]-30673

RECORD COPY

201-300985

it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 13th day of February 19 76.

~~Signature~~ (SEAL)

~~Witnessed by me this day of 19~~

at Caracas, Venezuela.

Luis Posada
Signature

Witnessed by me this 13th day of February, 1976

at Caracas, Venezuela.

Neyle C. Theriault

201-300985

14-00000

-076 1565

S E C R E T

13 OCT 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Previous Agency Association With Persons Allegedly Responsible for Bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight

1. On 6 October a Cubana airlines flight crashed shortly after takeoff from Seawell airport at Barbados. Seventy-eight persons aboard were killed in the crash. The passengers were mostly Cuban, but also included a North Korean delegation and the wife of the Guyanese DCM in Havana.

2. Following the incident the Trinidad and-Tobago police detained two Venezuelan citizens who they believe are connected with the bombing. The suspects are Jose VAZQUEZ Garcia and Freddy LUGO, both holders of Venezuelan passports. On subsequent interrogation by the Trinidadian police it was learned that Vazquez is an alias used by Hernan Ricardo Lozano.

3. There are no Headquarters traces on Lugo, Lozano, or the alias Vazquez. According to the Legal Attache in Caracas, however, both Lugo and Lozano are employed as investigators by an industrial security firm operated by Luis POSADA Carriles. Posada is a former salaried agent of the Agency. He is a Cuban exile, naturalized Venezuelan, who was formerly head of the counter-intelligence division of the Venezuelan civilian security service. Posada lost his job with the security service in March of 1974 and was amicably terminated by the Caracas Station in June of 1974. The Station continued in occasional contact with Posada pending resolution of problems concerning his U.S. income taxes. His last reported contact with the Station was in June 1976 when he unsuccessfully sought Station assistance with a visa problem.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2,IMPDET
CL BY 9560

S E C R E T

4. Salvador ROMANI ORUE Garcia, a Cuban exile who is a journalist in Caracas, has been reported by an untested Caracas Station source to be suspected by Cuban Embassy officials as involved in the plane crash. Their suspicion is based on the fact Romani was seen surveilling a Caracas hotel occupied by members of a Cuban fencing team, who subsequently were killed in the crash. Romani was employed by Caracas Station from September 1960 until December 1966 as a writer and press placement asset in the Station's anti-Castro propoganda campaign. His termination was somewhat less than amicable, but in March of 1967 Romani was paid a termination bonus and signed a quit claim.

5. Caracas Station and Headquarters have no further information of Agency association of any of the other individuals thus far mentioned in connection with the Cubana crash.

signed
Raymond A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren

cc: DDCI

CONCUR:

[illegible]
/ Deputy Director for Operations

13 OCT 1976
Date

SECRET

SUBJECT: Previous Agency Association with Persons Allegedly Responsible for Bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight

DDO/DC/LA/OPS/N/D.Winters:lch (13 October 1976) (x1175)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Ex Reg
2 - DDO
1 - ADDO
2 - C/LA
1 - LA/OPS
1 - LA/CAR
1 - LA/PNC/V

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 29 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 20-1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO: RF. FILE VR IPAN, CI4, C/OPS, PS/EG2, OSG, OSG/OC

T 299644 EIA693 PAGE 01-01 IN 067846

TOR:132220Z OCT 76 CARA 31115

S E C R E T 132216Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31115

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL AKULE

1. FYI. STATION HAS RECEIVED REPORTS FROM SEVERAL SOURCES WHICH INDICATE ALMOST CERTAINLY THAT WKSCARLET-3 WAS ARRESTED BY DISIP 12 OCTOBER AND IS BEING DETAINED UNDER SUSPICION OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE 6 OCTOBER DESTRUCTION OF CUBANA AIRCRAFT NEAR BARBADOS. ALSO, THAT WKSCARLET-3'S OFFICE WAS RAIDED AND ALL FILES CONFISCATED MORNING 13 OCTOBER.

2. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

INDEX PROGRAM

LHPNC/V

201-300985

13 Oct 76

RECORD COPY

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY 12-2

CMr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 122244Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 926531

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/IPAN, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 48
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER CSSP
0 IP FILES #132

TO: IMMEDIATE FBI//INTELLIGENCE DIVISON.Y

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS Y

Copy F-7

SUBJECT: TRACES ON PERSONS INVOLVED IN 6 OCT 1976 CUBANA CRASH Y

CIR-294-76 Y
SHOULD BE CIRA-

1. THIS AGENCY HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF THE NAMES OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 CRASH OF THE CUBANA AIRLINES FLIGHT OFF THE COAST OF BARBADOS. WE HAVE NO CIA TRACES ON HERNAN RICARDO LOZANO, ~~LOZANO~~, AKA HERNAN ~~RICARDO~~ LOZANO, ALIAS JOSE VAZQUEZ GARCIA; FREDDY LUGO; OR E. SEALY.Y

2. WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT THIS AGENCY HAD A RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE PERSON WHOSE NAME HAS BEEN MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE REPORTED BOMBING: Y

LUGO'S EMPLOYER IN CARACAS IS LUIS POSADA CARRILES, FORMER HEAD OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), THE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

WKSCARLET-3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012913

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — DATE TIME GROUP — CITE — MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF. INFO: FILE 926531

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

VENEZUELAN CIVILIAN SECURITY SERVICE. POSADA IS A FORMER AGENT OF CIA. HE WAS AMICABLY TERMINATED IN JULY 1967 BUT CONTACT WAS RE-ESTABLISHED IN OCTOBER 1967. HE LOST HIS POSITION WITH DISIP IN MARCH 1974 AS A RESULT OF A CHANGE IN THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AND WAS AMICABLY TERMINATED. WE CONTINUED OCCASIONAL CONTACT WITH HIM. HIS LAST REPORTED CONTACT WITH US WAS IN JUNE 1976 WHEN HE UNSUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT ASSISTANCE REGARDING A VISA PROBLEM.

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.Y

No [illegible] ?

DATE: 12 OCT 76
ORIG: LEN THERRY:RB
UNIT: LA/CAR
EXT: 9156

D. Winters
LA/COPS

C/PCS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTIC Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROH ED E 2 IMPDET

14-00000

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG 2-70

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 25 ✓ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 21-1 ____ BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/LA 4

ACTION #

INFO: RF, FILE, VR, C/I/PA 3, C/CI 4, C/ISG 2, C/DS 9, C/OPS/INT, C/OPS/ITG 4, DDO 3

1		4
2		5
3		6

T 291926 EIA161 PAGE 01 IN 064944

TOR:091836Z OCT 76 CARA 31100

S E C R E T 091826Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31100 (HACKELING ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

NIACT DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT KMSTONE

REF: DIRECTOR 926098

1. REF CORRECT THAT CRYPTONYM IS WKSCARLET-3 WHICH RECEIVED INCORRECTLY DUE TO ERROR IN TRANSMISSION (FIGURE AFTER NUMBER 3 WAS OPEN PAREN). AMBASSADOR BRIEFED ON FORMER STATION RELATIONSHIP WITH WKSCARLET-3 WHO TERMINATED ON 13 FEBRUARY 1976.

2. STATION HAS NO FIRM INFORMATION INDICATING WKSCARLET-3 INVOLVEMENT EXCEPT FOR SPECULATIONS OF LEGAL ATTACHE. CIRCUMSTATIAL EVIDENCE IS BASED ON APPARENT ASSOCIATION OF TWO SUSPECTS DETAINED IN TRINIDAD WITH WKSCARLET-3 AND ITEM FROM RICARDO MORALES TO LEGAL ATTACHE (WHOSE ACCURACY WE CANNOT JUDGE) TO EFFECT THAT WKSCARLET-3 ALSO LEAVING VENEZUELA.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

X

7,23

LAPN E / ✓

SECRET

201-300985

9 Oct 76

B 201-282136

RECORD COPY

26-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1

SECRET

STAFF 091622Z DIRECTOR 926098

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN DDO3 ODO/DO C/CI4 C/PS/EG2 C/OS9 C/OPS/INT C/OPS/ITG4

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 25 ✓

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS. Y

NIACT CARACAS Y

WNINTEL RYBAT KMSTONE Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 31088 (IN 064447)

B. CARACAS 31087 (IN 064424) Y

1. REF A INDICATES THAT YOU HAVE BRIEFED AMBASSADOR ON SALVADOR ROMANI'S FORMER EMPLOYMENT BY AGENCY. IT APPEARS FROM REF B AND OTHER INFO REPORTED BY LEGATT CARACAS THAT WKSCARLET-3 ALSO PROBABLY IMPLICATED IN BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINER. THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT, IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, YOU BRIEF AMBASSADOR ON WKSCARLET-3'S PAST CONNECTION WITH AGENCY AND CURRENT RELATIONSHIP ~~ON RECENT STATION CONTACTS WITH HIM~~, IF ANY. PLEASE ADVISE. Y

BOB

2. CRYPTONYM IN PARA 2 REF B RECEIVED AS WKSCARLET-36. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER WE CORRECT IN ASSUMING WKSCARLET-3 WAS MEANT. Y

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.#

B 201-282136

REF A - PLVWCADET/MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR TO ASST SECY SHLAUDERMAN

REF B - INFO RE CUBAN AIRLINES BOMBING RECEIVED BY LEGATT.

DATE: 9 OCT 76
ORIG: L. COOLEY/PK
UNIT: LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1715

LA/COG W. MURRAY (DRAFT)

☒ INDEX

LA/PNC/V

201-300985
9 Oct 76

C/LA/PNC
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 008492

14-00000

SIGNAL CENTER ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | PAGE 1

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	091622Z	DIRECTOR	926098

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/IPAN DDO3 ODO/DO C/CI4 C/PS/EG2 C/OS9 C/OPSINT C/OPS/IT64

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 35
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS. Y

NIACT CARACAS Y

WNINTEL RYBAT KMSTONE Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 31088 |IN 064447|

B. CARACAS 31087 |IN 064424| Y

1. REF A INDICATES THAT YOU HAVE BRIEFED AMBASSADOR ON SALVADOR ROMANI'S FORMER EMPLOYMENT BY AGENCY. IT APPEARS FROM REF B AND OTHER INFO REPORTED BY LEGATT CARACAS THAT WKSCARLET-3 ALSO PROBABLY IMPLICATED IN BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINER. THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT, IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, YOU BRIEF AMBASSADOR ON WKSCARLET-3'S PAST CONNECTION WITH AGENCY AND CURRENT RELATIONSHIP, ~~ON RECENT STATION CONTACTS WITH HIM~~, Be. IF ANY. PLEASE ADVISE. Y

2. CRYPTONYM IN PARA 2 REF B RECEIVED AS WKSCARLET-36. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER WE CORRECT IN ASSUMING WKSCARLET-3 WAS MEANT. Y

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.H

REF A - PLVWCADET/MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR TO ASST SECY SHLAUDEMAN

REF B - INFO RE CUBAN AIRLINES BOMBING RECEIVED BY LEGATT.

DATE: 9 OCT 76
ORIG: L. COOLEY/PK
UNIT: LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1715

LA/COG W. MURRAY (DRAFT)

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-282136
DO NOT DESTROY

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 008492

SECRET

Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (201-300985)

WKSCARLET-3 (formerly AMCLEVE-15, CIFENCE-4)

DPOB 15 February 1928, Cienfuegos, Cuba

U.S. Permanent Resident Alien (PRA) at least until 30 May 75. Possibly has lost status as result of allowing his reentry permit to expire, but this not clear. We protected his PRA status while he worked for us in Caracas--until termination June 74.

Also holds Venezuelan passport.

Entered U.S. as exile 28 February 1961.
Served U.S. Army as 2nd Lt. Fort Benning March 63 - March 64.
Member of JURE to early 65.

April 65 - granted POA and recruited by JMWAVE as instructor working for Training Branch and as source of info on exile activities in Miami area. OA Oct 75. 65?

Aug 66 - being used by JMWAVE CI Branch to report on activities of "Central Junta" being organized to govern activities of RECE, Comandos L, MRTN, and AVBC. Subject associated with RECE.

June 67 - Subject known to FBI and Department of Justice as CIA employee. Cooperating with FBI/Miami in investigation of Frank "Lefty" Rosenthal.

July 67 - Amicably terminated by JMWAVE. Continuing to cooperate with FBI.

Aug 67 - Mentioned as CIA agent in broadcasts from LASO conference.

Oct 67 - Having obtained job in DIGEPOL, Caracas, Subject picked up by Caracas Station as unilateral penetration of DIGEPOL. Held several responsible positions--Chief of 4th Division, Explosives & Armaments, and Chief of CI section. Continued working for DISIP, successor to DIGEPOL, during COPEI administration and was used by DISIP Chief, Dr. Remberto UZCATEGUI XXXXXXXXXXX on various sensitive operations.

March 73 - Suspected by DEA of involvement in narcotics trafficking. (He was in Europe on DISIP business at the time.) May 73 "passed" polygraph on this subject.

March 74 - Dismissed from DISIP, along with many others, when AD administration inaugurated. Terminated 30 June 74 due to loss of access. Salary at time of termination $450 per month.

Contact with Subject continued because of outstanding problem re U.S. taxes, which was finally settled February 76. At that time Subject was informing Station re movements and activities of Orlando BOSCH. Occasional contact continued at least through June 76.

Agency protected Subject's PRA status from March 1970 until his termination June 1974. In January 1975, memo was sent to Alien Affairs Officer telling him that I&NS file could be "decentralized."

SECRET

wkscarlet 3 (F6

WKSCARLET-3

October 1961	Employed at Firestone International Div. in Akron, Ohio.
1963	U.S. Army Platoon leader (2nd Lt) Fort Benning, Ga.
19 Aug 63	Polygraphed in connection with investigation for attendance at intelligence course. passed.
March 64	Released from active duty
May 64	Subject in charge of group setting up training camp in Polk County, Fla. Was also an instructor.
June 64	Resided in Miami, was member of JURE
Jan 65	Subject assigned to M/V Venus and one of the plotters to take command of the M/V Venus, a 110-ft Panamanian vessel belonging to Manuel Ray Rivero, leader of JURE. Subject dispatched to Miami by Jose Ricardo Rabel Nunez, one of the chief plotters.
14&23 March 65	Subject approached by 281386 re using subject as weapons instructor in ~~Mxxxxxi~~ Mexico ?, connection with planned coup. Station advised subject accept offer and report findings to WAVE
26 Mar 65	Recruited by JMWAVE/as training instructor and reporter on exile activities in the Miami area.
April 65	POA granted
20 Apr 65	Team leader of Cuban exile recruits for operational teams to participate in an attempt to overthrow the Guatemalan government.
15 Apr 65	Polygraphed on 1) whether he had withheld anything re his knowledge of Roberto Alejos Arug (Subject had withheld

info on a U.S. military uniform mentioned in a conversation related to the plan to overthrow Guatemala)

2) fact that Subj in contact with the group planning a revolution in Guatemala; that Subject had been recruited to transport arms for the group from N.Y. (place of purchase) to Miami, that Subj had told no one of his connection with CIA; that he was not reporting to anyone other than CIA.

3) Fact that he never took part in any communist party activity; never worked for any Castro intell or security service and that apart from Cuba, he had no connection or agreement with the government of any other country.

21 Apr 66 Polygraphed to verify that 1 Subject was not cooperating in any way with the govt. of any country other than U.S. and was not obligated to any Cuban exile group. 2. He never did anything on purpose to cause an operation to fail and never ~~xxx~~ took CIA equipment or cargo without authorization.

3. Did not assist in the training of any unauthorized persons since working for CIA.

4. Did not recall having discussed the details of his operational activities with any unauthorized person.

20 July 66 Subject requested permission to accept a position (military leader) as part of a collective Junta set up to govern the activities of joint forces working collectively in activities against Cuba.

26 Jun 67 In U.S. Dept of Justice investigation of Lefty Rosenthal, Subject was revealed as "attached to CIA" and as supplier of 240 lbs of C-4 explosives. The Dept had a report from its Security Squad which stated that Subject was CIA agent in a ~~MxS~~ GS status.

6 July 67	Justice Dept requested have Subject recontact Rosenthal for meetings for purpose of arresting Rosenthal for possession of goods passed to him by Subject.
11 July 67	Subject terminated amicably by JMWAVE at Hqs instructions for loss of access (resigned from his position as a military coordinator/member of RECE) and security reasons (involved with Miami gambler Frank Rosenthal.
1 Aug 67	Subject informed KICOBALT-1 that he had offered his services to Bolivian Consul in Miami as interrogator/guerrilla fighter in Bolivia, offered $800 (Hqs in no way involved) Proposed to organize a group of Cuban guerrilla training officers. He left the impression that he departing soon
10 Aug 67	Traveled Caracas seek employment through an old friend who resided there.
17 Aug	JMWAVE advised that no contact with subject be made because he mentioned as CIA agent on radio & TV LASSO conference and also involved shaby deals in Miami.
28 Aug 67	Returned to Miami obtain proper visa enable him work in Venezuela. Said he obtained job with DIGEPOL through Rafael Tremolst Gustavo Ortiz Faez
11 Sept 67	Subject's contract held in abeyance until he in place. Subject to be re-contacted by Station when he returne Caracas and starts new job.
28 Oct 67	Subject picked up as unilateral penetration of CIRASH and CIRASH-4.
1 Nov 67	Subject began working with DIEGPOL.

28 Jan 68	POA requested on Subject for use as DIEGPOL penetration but cancelled because of his involvement in clandestine sabatage activities and failure to report complete stories of his activities. Subject handled as hostile until his motives completely ascertained.
22 May 68	Polygraphed ~~sx~~ Purpose: To determine conclusively that he broke off completely with Lefty Rosenthal group and that he not currently involved in any illegal activity which could cause embarrassment to US Gov. and 1) Status of his relationship with his brothers 2) degree of his involvement ~~with~~ in theft and disposal of demolition and other sabatoge devices. 3) past illegal activities or association with gangster elements make him vulnerable to blackmail. 4) that he not engaged in activities hostile to to U.S. government. Subject was willing and eager to ~~Paxx~~ take SWIRL. passed SWIRL exam 23 May with satisfactory clarification on all points of ~~xxxxxx~~ concern.
7-12 Aug 68:	Attended Latin American student conference at Merida 40 yrs. old?
17 Jan 69	Subject returned to Caracas (from Miami?-not clear in 201)
29 AUG 69	Subject ordered by CIVISTA to make surrepitious entry of Guayana Embassy in Caracas to get "any info of interest".
19 Oct 69	Left Caracas for Miami to investigate purchase of $300,000 worth of weapons by Richard Hart.
17 Nov 69	Subject making efforts preserve rights to become U.S. citizen while becoming citizen of Venezuela (which might be necessary for ops reasons i.e., to maintain his high position in GOV). Sought Station's help who, through Hqs was able solve problem.
18 Mar 70	Subject & family in Miami to process application for U.S. re-entry permits. Returned Caracas 20 March.
14 Apr 71	Subject sent by CIFENCE service to Lima to assemble bomb to be sent to former Venezuelan dictator Perez Jimenez. Subject requested Lima Station's help in mission. Station recommended against it.

1 Sept 71	Subj notified that he to accompany Venezuelan Minister of Interior (Lorenzo Fernandez) on a 4 to 6 week trip to Europe. Trip speculated to be Fernandez' touching base for political reasons prior announcing his presidential candidacy upon return.
28 Nov 71	OA requested for use as penetration of DISIP.
29 Nov 71	Subject polygraphed to determine if DISIP and/or CIFENCE-1 had knowledge of Subject's connections with Station; if he was ever requested to work against U.S.; if he contacted either of his brothers since May 68; if he involved with illegal arms smuggling. Result: answered truthfully, no indication of deception.
1 Dec 71	Travelled to Miami by his employer to purchase 25 nine milimeter pistols for GOV use. (unable to refuse or evade assignment).
17 July 72	OA granted.
Apr 72	Subject placed in charge of another CIRASH division with more responsibility and importance. Initiated extensive investigation of Prensa Latina and its Caracas Director and the kidnapping of Venezuelan industrialist Carlos ~~Domin~~ dominguez.
5 Feb 73	To Rome to aid in audio operation
12 Feb 73	Name mentioned in unspecified connection with several members of the UIR who involved with narcotics.

22 Feb 73 Subject refused a $30,000 bribe (from 2 U.S. attorneys) to influence Venezuelan government officials to drop charges against a representative of a New Jersey corporation. The New Jersey Corporation (AVM) was instrumental in getting a $20,000 contract for the U.S. for the voting machines to be used in the December 1973 elections.

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM

7 September 1966

TO : C/Cover

WCI- 1492

THRU : C/CI

Distribution

FROM : CI/FLUSTIKOFF

1- Cov
1- CI
1- 201-300985
1- Reg

SUBJECT: Cover Status of Luis POSADA Carriles (201-300985)

REF : WCV-1056, 25 October 1965

On 1 August 1966 Luis POSADA began employment with RECE, a Cuban exile organization located in Miami. He is a salaried employee of RECE (and is also being paid by 24 WOFACT to report on the activities of RECE.) For security reasons, POSADA can no longer claim (Tri-State Engineering 24 Service) as his place of employment. Therefore, it is requested that his resignation from (Tri-State Engineering 24 Service) be recorded and made effective 31 July 1966.

GROUP I - EXCLUDED FROM
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

3|PJ

I made an application for buy a house at 6346 S.W and 29 St. I made my application thorough Roso Realty that is located at 8345 Coral Way. I have to pay $ 100 down by the VA plan or $ 300 down by FHA plan and a monthly payment of $ 75.00. I have to use my cover of (Tri State) for my credit references. I fill my aplication and put in there that I was working for this Company for two years, that my salary was $ 120 a week, and that my posistion in this Company is like an electronic technician. Would you please advise them of all this matter in order that when they will receibe the papers from VA or FHA fill them the right way ?
I can not use RECE for the application of this credit because an exile group corporation is no good for this kind of credit references. As I told you I am not going to use (Tri State) any more but it is an exception.

29

COVER notified, they will handle. EI 20 September 1966

RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce

[illegible]

([illegible] SINCE [illegible] FL[illegible])

29

4. (Tri-State Engineering Service, Inc.) is located at 08 (800 First National Bank Bldg., Miami 32, Fla.) The local mailing address is (P.O. Box 3737, Miami 1, Fla.) 06 The telephone number is 08 (377-0003 (cover phone located in Cover Branch.)) (Mr. Peter T. Fay) 06 is President of the firm. The firm is engaged in the general practice of engineering in all its branches with particular emphasis in the fields of Marine engineering, including marine salvage, underwater research, underwater communications, underwater demolition, and off-shore petroleum and mineral exploration and development.

[illegible]

7/PJ

25 October 1965

MEMORANDUM

WCV-1066

TO : Chief, Training Br

FROM : Chief, Cover Br

SUBJECT : Cover for Luis POSADA Carriles and Alberto de Jesus ALBERTY Garcia

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - TR
1 - REG
1 - 201-262136
1 - 201-300985
2 - Cov

REFERENCE : Memo from C/Tr to C/Cov dtd 17 Sept 1965, Subj: Action & Status Cover for Subjects

1. In accordance with the request contained in Reference, action and status cover with Tri-State Engineering Service, Inc. has been arranged for Subjects.

2. Luis POSADA will be acknowledged as a Technical Supervisor at a salary of $400 per month. This employment will be acknowledged as of 1 September 1965.

3. Alberto ALBERTY will be acknowledged as a Technician/Instructor at a salary of $425 per month. This employment will be effective 13 September 1965. Mr. Alberty's previous employment with Radio & Electronics Equipment Company is terminated as of 10 September 1965.

4. Tri-State Engineering Service, Inc. is located at 800 First National Bank Bldg., Miami 32, Fla. The local mailing address is P.O. Box 3737, Miami 1, Fla. The telephone number is 377-0083 (cover phone located in Cover Branch.) Mr. Peter T. Fay is President of the firm. The firm is engaged in the general practice of engineering in all its branches with particular emphasis in the fields of Marine engineering, including marine salvage, underwater research, underwater communications, underwater demolition, and off-shore petroleum and mineral exploration and development.

5. It is requested that the Case Officer brief Messrs. Alberty and Posado on the cover story as outlined in paragraph 4 above. A copy of this memorandum is attached for inclusion in the individual's 201 files.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief, Cover Branch

THRU : Chief, Maritime Training Section
Chief, Training Branch

FROM : TSG/TREADESS

SUBJECT: Action and Status Cover for
Luis POSADA Carriles and
Alberto de Jesus ALBERTY Garcia

17 Sept 1965

MTB-1033

Distribution
2 - C/CCS w/att.
2 - TSG (201's) w/att.
1 - TSG Chrono w/o att.
1 - FEG Chrono w/o att.

ACTION REQUIRED: Provide cover

29

1. Request that action and status cover of (Tri-State Engineering) be given to Luis POSADA Carriles and Alberto de Jesus ALBERTY Garcia. Both Subjects have recently been assigned to the Maritime Training Base. POSADA is presently under no cover arrangement. ALBERTY was given cover of (Radio & Electronics 29 Equipment Company, Inc.,) as of 14 June 1965.

2. Biographic data on each Subject is attached. Please advise effective date of cover.

2|PJ

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NAME	Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles
DOB	15 February 1928 - Cuba
EMPLOYER	(Tri-State Engineering) 29
DATE EMPLOYED	1 September 1965
POSITION	Technical Supervisor
SALARY	$300.00 net per month ACTUAL $400.00 net per month COVER
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT	Jewlry Salesman
ADDRESS	730 N. W. 15th Street; Miami, Fla.
TELEPHONE	337-0971
MARITAL STATUS	Married

VPN

208/OJ/OT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 4 MAY 1959

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [LUXEMBOURG] 15-A

ACTION: WE 6

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 5 17 03:59

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 12839

TO DIR INFO CITE [LUXE] 0097
20-19

20-19
REF: [LUXE] 0094 (IN 10377); DIR 24181 (OUT 98923)
01

1. HAD ALREADY ASKED [QJBANNER 1] GET DESCRIPTION, DETAILS, ETC BUT SINCE HE UNABLE DO WITH CLARITY RABNEY UNDER [HBFINCH COVER] QUESTIONED SUBJ 4 MAY. SUBJ STATES FOLLOWING IS ALL HE KNOWS BUT CONSIDER PROBABLE HE KNOWS MORE THAN TELLING OR INVOLVED SOME DEAL FOR WHICH HOPES PROTECT SELF AGAINST LEGAL ACTION BY STATING WORKING FOR AMERICANS.
24

2. ARMAND DELACOUR, RESIDENT 28 RUE ERARD (ALSO RCVD EMARD), PARIS AND THREE TIME CONVICT, APPROACHED SUBJ MID-APRIL WITH OFFER FIRST REF. STATED TWO SICILIANS LIVING PARIS ALREADY SUCCESSFULLY ENGAGED THIS TRAFFIC, ONE OF WHOM RECEIVED 50 KILOS OPIUM HONG KONG AND DELIVERED PERSONALLY IN STATES, ENTERING VIA CANADA. DELACOUR GAVE NO DETAILS OTHER THAN THAT CHICOMS PROVIDE OPIUM GRATIS ON CONDITION DELIVERY STATES. WHEN SUBJ ASKED RE ENTRY STATES DELACOUR REPLIED CAN FOR U.S.$200 GET FULL FRENCH DOCUMENTATION NEEDED FOR AMERICAN VISA.

3. DELACOUR ALSO USES NAME DELAMARE, AGE 47, HEIGHT 175CMS, WEIGHT 70 TO 72 KILOS, BROWN HAIR BALDING, OVAL FACE, BROWN EYES, CROOKED NOSE, THICK LIPS, HEAVY CIGARETTE SMOKER. BORN BASQUE

SECRET

5 MAY 1959

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. - Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

5/pd

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 4 MAY 1959

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE -2-

15-19 IN 12839
LUXE 0097

TO INFO CITE

COUNTRY. SMUGGLED NARCOTICS BEFORE AND AFTER WAR FROM NORTH AFRICA. LAST RELEASED FROM JAIL DEC 58, THEFT CHARGES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *SUBJECT SAID INVITED BY DELACOURT TO JOIN RING WHICH RECEIVING "GRATIS" FROM CHICOMS LARGE AMOUNTS OPIUM TO BE SMUGGLED TO U.S.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

1/m

8515

PICO Ramon, Rainaldo [illegible] Cuba

PICO RAMON, RAINALDO

PRO I	bio			P.O.A.	✓	14 Oct 60	[illegible]
PRO II							
104566 GREEN LIST	NR	[illegible]	29 Sept 60				
RI TRACES	ndi			O.A.			
OPS & DIV. TRACES	ndi			P.C.S.A.			
FIELD TRACES	ni of v			C.S.A.			
S.O. INDICES	NR	[illegible]	28 Sept 60	P.P.A.			
				PROP. APP.			
FBI INDICES	[illegible]	[illegible]	10 Oct 60	C.N.C.			
ORAL NOTICE				CCD/NC NOTIFIED			
S.O. INVESTIGATION				COORD COMPLETED			
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION				TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT			

CASE OFFICER Joseph Piccolo

DIVISION wh/4/c

EXTENSION 8565

COMMENTS

COMMENTS

* No add'l data subsequent to that previously sent.

No FBI refs came up in RI check per Al Rinori 14 Oct 60 (Name probably never indexed [illegible].)

14-00000

X [illegible], Elvis [illegible]; SANCHEZ, Jesus [illegible]

[illegible]31

[illegible]

DATE OF BIRTH	[illegible] July 1932	PLACE OF BIRTH	[illegible], Havana, Cuba	
CASE OFFICER	[illegible]	DIVISION	[illegible]	EXTENSION 7646

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
		[illegible]/SA	15 JUN 1964	
P.O.A.	[illegible] Ext	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible] [illegible] Jun 65	Records on LIS Agents Checked in CI/SIA, date: [illegible] 1965 Results: NR [illegible]
O.A.		[illegible]	4 Feb 66	
CNC				
CASE CANCELLED	✓	[illegible]	15 Jun 65	
PRQ I	bio. 16 Feb 65	 [illegible]		
PRQ II	16 Feb 65	[illegible]		
152512 GREEN LIST	NFR	[illegible]	11 June 64	
RI TRACES	NDI			
OPS & DIV TRACES	NDI			
FIELD TRACES	NDI: JMWAVE			
S.O. INDICES	No pertinent data	[illegible] [illegible]	12/10/60 11 Jul 64	
Miami FBI INDICES	NDI	jev	2 June 1964	
FBI CORD. REQUESTED				
FBI CORD. COMPLETED				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION	7 Aug. 65	[illegible]		
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT	✓	[illegible]	16 Aug 64	
[illegible] NOTIFIED				
[illegible] COMPLETED				

[illegible] 120 SECRET

224653

PICO Ramos, Reinaldo

Male 224628

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

PRESLEY, Elvis (operational); GARCIA, Luis (operational)

CRYPTONYM
AMICE/31

DATE OF BIRTH
21 July 1933

PLACE OF BIRTH
Regla, Havana, Cuba

CASE OFFICER
Henry A. Ozga

C/CA/B4

6774

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
P.O.A.				RECORDS ON RIS AGENTS CHECKED RESULTS: NR 3 Oct 69 [illegible]
O.A.	XX	WH/C/RR/OA	4 Feb 1966	
ORSO				
CNC				
CASE CANCELLED	✓	CA/B4	11 DEC 1969	
PRO I	16 Feb 1965			
PRO II	16 Feb 1965			
GREEN LIST	FORWARDED BY DIVISION			ASKED B. BOWER OF DESK REVIEW DOSSIER 14/10/69 ALSO REMINDED DESK FT'S OUTSTANDING.
RI TRACES	ND			
CPS & DIV TRACES	ND			
FIELD TRACES	WILL BE FORWARDED			
S.O. INDICES	N/a additional data since 23 Jul 65		13 Oct 69	
XX FBI INDICES	See 693	MSS	12 Dec 69	
FBI CORD. REQUESTED				
FBI CORD. COMPLETED				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION	NR [illegible] 2 Dec 69	[illegible]	[illegible] 30 Dec 69	
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				
CCS [illegible] NOTIFIED				
[illegible] COMPLETED				

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/SA/IOS - W. ULLERY

NUMBER
201-284658

SUBJECT
PICO Ramon, Reinaldo

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
2 June 1964

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when the investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by your office/division ceases.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SIGNATURE
/s/ Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

DATE
15 JUNE 1964

FORM 12__ [illegible]

SECRET

Office of Security Polygraph

2 Office of Security Investigations

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

10 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2	28	7	46 58
3		8	
4		9	
5	71-216/3		

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

CSDO

BY D AT 0025 Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

CAS ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR R/AN CSDO CA/PEG WH8 CI/OA

412

SECRET

S E C R E T 162245Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3820

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

CIDORIC JMDEVIL

16Oct69 IN 67171

REF: DIRECTOR 46526

1. FIELD TRACES FIVE NO NEW INFORMATION SAVE FOR LOCAL ADDRESS AND TOUTED MEDIA CONNECTION PER WH/MIAMI 4639; OTHER GENERAL, NONDEROGATORY TIDBITS.

(1/7 05005)

2. REGRET DELAY DETERMINING AMICE-31 CURRENT STATUS REGARDING CLASC. PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN LOCATING HIM FIRST THROUGH AMCLEVE-15, BOTH BEING MUTUAL FRIENDS, TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ACCESS AND STATUS CLASC AFFAIRS MERITING STATION DIRECT FOLLOW-UP. SUBJECT REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN CHURCH FUND RAISING WORK AND SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME AWAY FROM HOME. WILL ADVISE SOONEST BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES AMCLEVE-15 HAS HAD MERELY IN REACHING SUBJECT SINCE RECEIPT HVCW-8792, HAVE DOUBTS ON PROSPECTS FOR MISSION.

128 46 58

130 09 85

3. FILE: 201-284658, X-REF: 200-124-192/3.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE 2 Oct 1969 sav

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - 284658 SO - 224428

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: CA/B4 Venezuela/Ecuador

TYPE OF REQUEST: UPDATE	UPDATE	CSC	SS	OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date) 8 October 1969	FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

FI Reporting Source

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI ND	DIVISION ND	FIELD WILL FORWARD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

Please bring Subject's POA/OA investigation up to date based on the 1965 bio data already in your file. RI and Div traces are N.D. and current Field traces will be forwarded. Subject is reported as currently employed in Caracas at the Office of the Coordinator of Economic Affairs. Subject carries S.O.# 224428 and was first processed for POA in 1960.

/S/ John E. Howard R.R

CHIEF, CI/OA

T/N: PICO Ramos, Reinalde

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE 8 Oct 69

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☒ 1. OS Indices results: NC ADD. DATA SINCE 23 Sept 65

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OGI	I & N		
☒	☒	NOT SUBJ [illegible]	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐

☒ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached I & N

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS

OU 2/

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

10 SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

28 46 58

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED CSDO

BY D AT 0025 Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

71-2763

RECORD

ACTION CAS ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CSDO CA/PEG WH8 CI/OA

412

S E C R E T 162245Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3820

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

DIDORIC JMDEVIL

16 Oct 69 IN 67171

REF: DIRECTOR 46526

1. FIELD TRACES FIVE NO NEW INFORMATION SAVE FOR LOCAL ADDRESS AND TOUTED MEDIA CONNECTION PER WH/MIAMI 4639; OTHER GENERAL, NONDEROGATORY TIDBITS.

(1, 05005)

2. REGRET DELAY DETERMINING AMICE-31 CURRENT STATUS REGARDING CLASC. PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN LOCATING HIM FIRST THROUGH AMCLEVE-15, BOTH BEING MUTUAL FRIENDS, TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ACCESS AND STATUS CLASC AFFAIRS MERITING STATION DIRECT FOLLOW-UP. SUBJECT REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN CHURCH FUND RAISING WORK AND SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME AWAY FROM HOME. WILL ADVISE SOONEST BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES AMCLEVE-15 HAS HAD MERELY IN REACHING SUBJECT SINCE RECEIPT HVCW-8792, HAVE DOUBTS ON PROSPECTS FOR MISSION.

128 46 58

30 09 85

3. FILE: 201-284658, X-REF: 200-124-192/3.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE 2 Oct 1969 sav

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
CA/B4 Venezuela/Ecuador

SUBJECT: 201 - 284658 SO - 224428

TYPE OF REQUEST: UPDATE | UPDATE | CNC | | ST

OS INDICES RESULTS BY: 8 October 1969 (Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY: (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT
FI Reporting Source

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI ND	DIVISION ND	FIELD WILL FORWARD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

Please bring Subject's POA/OA investigation up to date based on the 1965 bio data already in your file. RI and Div traces are N.D. and current Field traces will be forwarded. Subject is reported as currently employed in Caracas at the Office of the Coordinator of Economic Affairs. Subject carries S.O.# 224428 and was first processed for POA in 1960.

T/N: PICO Ramos, Reinaldo

/S/ John E. Howard R.R
CHIEF CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA
DATE 8 Oct 69
FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☒ 1. OS Indices results: NO ADD. DATA SINCE 23 Sept 65

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☒	☒	[illegible]	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐

DEC 8 11 [illegible] AM '69

☒ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached I&N

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS

FORM 693 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 8 December 1969

CASE NO. (CI/OA): 28 4658

☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPECTED BY INDICES: DATE
☐ SET UP FOR CSE	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ ORSD: RFLA

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS FBI DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW FBI COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
✓ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED 5 December 1969 (No notice to Division)	☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below,* or see remarks)	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES	☐ FILE
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐ TICKLE
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐ ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ * FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

11 DEC 1969

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) 25 46 58

FROM: CA/B4/Support H.Stilson 3 D 0119	EXTENSION 4383	NO	DATE 15 December 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CA/B4 H.Stilson			KHS	releasing
2.				
3. CI/OA Attn: Mr. Ruffner 2 B 11 OT-5				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				J.U. ✓
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE
TO:	C NO.
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT:

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

CARACAS.

the

V

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 17 November 1964	CASE NO. 7-14- 284658

SET UP FOR POA		EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
SET UP FOR OA		SPECIAL INQUIRY		COVERT NAME CHECK	CRSO	AREA:

USE

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*		REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
	REQUEST FI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		ORSO NOTICE TO DIVISION

POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

CA/PR 4 · HELEN STILSON

Station traces, Caracas, have not been received as yet by CI/OA nor the answer as to whether Subj's present employer, the Office of the Coordinator for Economic Affairs, is an organ of the Venezuelan government or of the United Nations.

If [illegible] have ~~or~~ undertaken this clearance action and if you no longer have an operational interest in subject, please request cancellation.

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CI/OA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

my cut

28 46 58

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: (18)

ORIG: Barbara Bowen
UNIT: CA/B4
EXT: 6952
DATE: 15 October 1969

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: CA5 INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN, CA/PEG, WH 8, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

TO PRIORITY CARACAS 15 20 02z OCT 69 CITE DIRECTOR 46526

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

Dick R.

REF A: HVCW-8792

REF B: DIR-42602

1. IN VIEW IMMINENCE QUITO MEETING CITED REF A, AND PROVIDED CARACAS DECISION IS AFFIRMATIVE ON FEASIBILITY OF HANDLING AMICE-31 ([redacted]) REQUEST PRIORITY FIELD TRACES TO UPDATE A-31'S OA AS REQUESTED REF B.

28 46 58 (SEE PARA 3 [redacted] REF A)

2. FILE: 200-124-192/3.

C/CA/B4

WH/3/V

WH/CA

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C/CA
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

1314
7131[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☑ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)
201-204658 28 46 58

FROM
CI/OA

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE
14 Oct 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CA/B-4			13 Oct 69
2. ATTN - [illegible] BARBARA BOWEN			BB
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7 CI/OA 2-B-11			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

To 1:

In accordance with the requirements of CSI No. 10-7, Para. 4 C, dated 23 June 1961, please review the ~~attachments or~~ dossier on Subject at FI/D and advise CI/OA in writing as to the significance of the information and your opinion as to its effect on the use of Subject in the operational capacity requested.

(ANOTHER SUBJECT: RESULTS OF FIELD TRACES NOT RECEIVED IN CI/OA AS YET.)

2-7. FID file contained information concerning Subject's requests for visas to travel to Latin America at various times since 1964. All visas were granted. Travel was in connection with Subject's trade union work. Information is not derogatory and will not effect the use of Subject in operational capacity requested.

Helen Stilson
CA/B4

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - SO -

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

TYPE OF REQUEST

☐ PDA ☐ OA ☐ CSC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS

RI

DIVISION

FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED

☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS

☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results:

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

: Deputy Director Security, IOS
ROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

SUBJECT: 201 - SO -

TYPE OF REQUEST

☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CNC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED

☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS

☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

[illegible]

/S/ Jonn E. Howard R.R.

CHIEF CI/OA

T/N. PICO RAMON, REINALDO

ENDORSEMENT

FORM 693 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

ATT: 2 October 1969		CASE NO. 284658	
SET UP FOR POA	✓ EXPEDITE INDICES	ATT: 8 Oct 1969	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES / DATE
SET UP FOR CA	SPECIAL INQUIRY	SUBJECT NAME CHECK	ORSD / AREA: Venezuela/Ecuador

USE: FI Reporting Service

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see reverse)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

EXPEDITE

POA EXPIRED __________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT

REMARKS

SO. - Are bring Subj's POA/OA investigation up to date based on the 1965 ~~on~~ bio data already in your file. RI and Div traces are OK. Any current field traces will be forwarded. Subj is reported as ~~to~~ currently employed in Caracas at the Office of the Coordinator of Economic Affairs. Subj carries SO # 224420 and was first processed for POA in 19[illegible].

(Note for File - Called Barbara [illegible] this date to ask whether if current [illegible] check being run. She called back to say Helen [illegible] the office had sent request to [illegible] 8 Sept 69.)

FORM 707

SECRET

14-00000

28 46 58

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

ORIG: Barbara Bowen
UNIT: CA/B4
EXT: 6723
DATE: 30 September 1969

SECRET

1	/	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY 2 PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: CA 5 | FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH 8, CA/PEG, DO 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO CARACAS 01 15 49 Z OCT 69 42602

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

REF: HVCW-8792 (19 SEPTEMBER 1969)

28 46 58

1. AMICE/31 OA NOW FOUR YEARS OLD. APPREICATE ~~RUBOCK~~ STATION TRACES SOONEST FOR UPDATING.

2. AMICE/31 ALLEGEDLY NOW EMPLOYED "OFFICE OF COORDINATOR OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS" IN CARACAS. IF TRUE, IS THIS A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT BODY OR PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS?

3. FILE: 200-124-192/3 AND 201-284658.

END OF MESSAGE

C/CA/B4
WH/3/V
WH/CA ✓

C/WH

C/CA

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)

28 44 58

FROM:
Chief, Branch 4
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION: 6774

NO.

DATE: 30 September 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/3/V BS-4 ATT: Mr. R. Allenbach	1 Oct 69		AW	
2.				
3. WH/COG DU-3 ATT: Mr. J. Sears		1 oc		
4.				
5. CI/CA CT-5 ATT: Mr. Rufner				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

30 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

VIA: WH/COG

WH/3/V

SUBJECT: AMICE/31 (201-284658)

1. It is requested that responsibility for AMICE/31 be transferred from WH/COG to CA/B4, and that his OA be amended for a one-time reporting mission on the 20 - 24 October 1969 Quito meeting of the Council of the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions.

2. Caracas is being asked for unilateral traces and for determination as to whether AMICE/31's present employer, the Office of the Coordinator for Economic Affairs in Caracas, is an organ of the Venezuelan government or of the United Nations.

HENRY A. OZGA
Chief, Branch 4
Covert Action Staff

CA - 69 - 933

SECRET

SECRET 24 Sept 1969

Memo for the Record

Talked to Tom Dollar (x1498), CA/4, and John Sears (x1255), WH/COG, re this case 23 & 24 Sept 1969. CA/4 had prepared dispatch to Caracas which opened by stating OA valid for travel and op use planned. (This op use detailed in the 15 Sept '69 dispatch to Caracas in file.)

~~[illegible] Also~~ The CI/OA file on Subj showed, however, that WH/COG had OA for use in labor activities in Miami. Per the telephone call to John Sears (~~[illegible]~~ above), it developed that WH/COG no longer had any op interest in Subj. ~~[illegible]~~ In the telephone conversation with Tom Dollar, he had talked with me earlier re Subj and had asked ~~if~~ the equivalent of whether or not CA/B4 could ride piggyback on WH/COG's clearance and levy requirements through WH/COG. My answer had been yes, if WH/COG agreed. This was the basis for the statement in the ~~dis~~ proposed dispatch to Caracas that Subj's OA was valid.

Per a telephone call with Barbara Bowen (x1254) of CA/B4 this date, I asked her to prepare a memo ~~request~~ to CI/OA requesting that responsibility for the case be transferred to CA/B4 and that it be amended to authorize the [illegible] use desired. She agreed to do this, routing the memo through WH/COG.

SECRET

SECRET Page 2

also asked him to request Caracas traces, run a new G ~~E~~ check and to determine if Subj's present employer, The Office of the Coordinator of Economic Affairs, is U.N connected. ~~I pla~~

I plan to amend the OA for this one-shot use once the necessary checks have been run – assuming no derog info is developed.

24/9/64

SECRET

14-00000

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Caracas
[illegible]
[illegible], London for LCPIPIT; COS, London

Chief, [illegible]

[illegible]

ACTION: See Paragraph 3

1. Headquarters is anxious to have coverage of the Eleventh Council meeting of the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (CLASC), scheduled for [illegible], [illegible] October 1969. We are particularly interested in what transpires in the following areas:

a. CLASC plans for cooperation and "unity of action" with the [illegible] Congress for Latin American Trade Union Unity ([illegible]), with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), [illegible] Trade Union Internationals, and the Cuban Central Union of Revolutionary Workers (CTC-R)--in connection with [illegible], Headquarters is in the process of disseminating a recent report on Maspero's proposal to send a mission to Cuba;

b. [illegible] delegation attending part or all of the [illegible] Congress in [illegible] October 1969 (CLASC's [illegible] wants to send a delegation despite [illegible] from [illegible] parent organization, the World Confederation of Labor ([illegible]) in Brussels);

c. Financing of [illegible] from other than European Christian sources;

d. A proposed 1970 CLASC campaign for the "defense of trade union rights."

2. Caracas and Miami will recall that AMICE-31 covered the CLASC Council meeting in Dominican Republic, May 1968, and produced some useful and disseminable intelligence. According to a recent [illegible] report from Miami, AMICE-31 is now employed in Caracas at the Office of the Coordinator of Economic Affairs. We are checking into the status of his OA.

3. Meanwhile, perhaps Caracas Station would be considering the feasibility of contacting AMICE-31 to find out if he plans to attend the Quito conference and whether or not the Station could handle such a one-shot reporting assignment for AMICE-31, assuming his OA can be up-dated. We will cable his OA status as soon as possible.

Peter A. DALLEY

[illegible]:
2 - C[illegible], Caracas
1 - [illegible]
1 - C[illegible]
1 - COS, London for [illegible]
1 - COS, London

[illegible] - 4792 13 September 19[illegible]

SECRET 200-124-183/3

DDP/CA/4: E. [illegible] 6723

HQS DISTRIBUTION:

1 - WH/3
1 - CA/4
1 - EUR/BC/UK

DC/CA/4

WH/3

C/WH

28 46 58

SECRET
(When Filled In)
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY 7 AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 9 PER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2

070

S E C R E T 241605Z JAN 69 CITE CARACAS 1674

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR 24 JAN 69 IN 78844

JMDEVIL

REFS A. DIRECTOR 68107

B. WH/MIAMI 2455 (IN 76310)

27 JAN 1969

File

1. BASED COMMENT IN REFS, JUDGE FOLLOWING ARE OUR PRESENT OPTIONS:

176813

A. SHELVE (EDUARDO) GARCIA MOURE.

284658

B. HOLD FURTHER ACTION ON AMICE-31 IN W36-,CE AS APPEARS WHILE COULD BE USEFUL ALSO COULD BE HANDLING PROBLEM.

C. BEGIN SPADEWORK HERE FOR LOCAL APPROACH TO JOSE DE JESUS PLANA. C-2868

D. SIMULTANEOUSLY, ACCEPT REF B OFFER RECONTACT FJBABE-1, TO DETERMINE HIS CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH CLASC AND EMILIO MASPERO AND BASED ON WH/MIAMI FINDINGS. EVALUATE POTENTIAL FOR HIM TO REJOIN MASPERO/CLASC HERE. NOTE WE NOT PREPARED COMMIT OURSELVES ON CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BUT WISH MERELY DETERMINE WHETHER FJBABE-1 COULD REATTAIN POSITION

278135

S-E-C-R-E-T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO. FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 1674 S E C R E T.

CLOSE TO CLASC HEARTBEAT SUCH AS HAD IN CHILE. RECOMMEND GEORGE J. COPSIDAS MAKE RECONTACT SINCE HE HAS ADVANTAGES OF EXPERIENCE IN BOTH SANTIAGO AND CARACAS. COPSIDAS SHOULD USE QUESTIONS GIVEN IN CARACAS-1594. HQS NOTE WE APPRECIATE OFFER, BUT NO ACTION BY RUBASH REQUIRED SINCE DOPSIDAS CAN MAKE MOVES TO RELOCATE FUBABE-1 STARTING NOW.

2. ANY OTHER LEADS INTO CLASC TARGET ADDEES DREDGE UP WILL BE APPRECIATED. SUGGEST HQS RELAY HVC-5090 TO WH/MIAMI.

3. FILE: 36-4-17, 201-766313, 201-275947, -1-279135.

S E C R E T SERVICED

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 15

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 125

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 43/53

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐

ACTION NO. 151 | ACTION UNIT WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR. RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI2

SERVICE

CARACAS 1674 | 24 JAN 69 | 78844-A
STA & NR | DATE | IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

PARA 1 B READS

"ACTION ON AMICE-31 IN ABEYANCE AS APPEARS WHILE"

SECRET

14-00000

28 46 58

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ________ AT ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

DISSEM BY 3 PER ________

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI 2

630

S E C R E T 211936Z JAN 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 2455

22 JAN 1969

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

21 JAN 69 IN 76310

JMDEVIL EVMULE

REF CARACAS 1594 (IN 71598)

1. CONCUR YOUR ASSESSMENT RE LIKELIHOOD JMDEVIL WILL TAKE ON RENEWED IMPORTANCE IN VIEW COPEI ELECTION VICTORY AND MAY BECOME PROBLEM TARGET FOR WOFIRM. BELIEVE BOTH AMICE-31 (284658) AND FUBABE-1 (278135) WORTH CONSIDERATION AS JMDEVIL PENETRATIONS.

2. PER PARA 2 REF, WE RECALL THAT STAFFER LOUIS J. SOCKWELL, FORMER CARACAS C/O WHO NOW SANTIAGO, CONTACTED EITHER GARCIA OR PLANAS OR BOTH IN 1965 BUT THAT RELATIONSHIP DID NOT PROSPER. THERE WAS ANOTHER ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO CONTACT PLANAS THROUGH JACOB L. VAVRICK IN EITHER LATE 67 OR EARLY 68.

3. SUGGEST FOLLOWING POINTS IN WOFIRM'S OPS RELATIONSHIP WITH AMICE-31 WHICH MIGHT BE SUITABLE AS BONA FIDES:

A. PERSON MAKING CONTACT COULD USE NAME "MR JOHNS" WHICH WAS ALIAS USED BY FORMER JMWAVE C.O.

B. SINCE AMICE-31 WITTING, COULD USE "REPRESENTATIVE OF ORGANIZATION WHICH PAID HIM $300 MONTHLY SALARY."

4. DEFER TO HQS FOR LATEST INFO ON FUBABE-1 AND HIS

SECRET

ADVANCE ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 2455 SECRET

PRESENT RELATIONSHIP WITH JMDEVIL. MOST RECENT INFO IN STATION 201 IS ALMOST TWO YEARS OLD. SUGGEST HQS RELAY DIRECTOR CABLES 82534 AND 75995 (11 MARCH AND 17 FEB 67 RESPECTIVELY) TO CARACAS FOR GOOD BACKGROUND AND ASSESSMENT FUBABE-1. WH/MIAMI COULD PROBABLY FIND OUT CURRENT STATUS AND ADDRESS FUBABE-1 THROUGH AMICE-34, ONLY LABOR/CD TYPE WITH WHOM WE STILL IN TOUCH, BUT WE RELUCTANT INDICATE RENEWED INTEREST IF HQS ALREADY HAS THIS INFO ON FILE. STATION WILL HAPPILY TRY RE-CONTACT FUBABE-1 IF CARACAS AND HQS SO DESIRE.

5. FILE: 201-278135 AND 200-124-52.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED [illegible] TOTAL COPIES / ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET

(When Filled In)

284658

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

BY [illegible] AT [illegible] Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

DISSEM BY N PER [illegible]

FILE RID RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY [illegible] RI/AN, WH/COG8, EUR6, CI/OPS

201: CI/OA, FI2

S E C R E T 091445Z JAN 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 2294

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR SANTO DOMINGO PORT AU PRINCE PARIS KINGSTON

EVMUL [illegible] 9 JAN 69 IN 68106

REF: CARACAS 1545 (IN 66735)

284658

1. PARA 3 REF ASSUMPTION CORRECT. SUBJECT IS AMICE-31.

2. STATION POUCHING PERTINENT DOCS FROM HIS 201. AMICE-31 HAS OA AND RECEIVED $300 MONTHLY SALARY VIA AMICE PAYROLL UNTIL PROJECT TERMINATED IN 1967.

3. NO ONE PRESENTLY AT WH/MIAMI KNOWS SUBJECT. HOWEVER, HENRY RUBASH, LAST JMWAVE AMICE CASE OFFICER, WHO NOW HQS ON CONSULTATIONS, MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE PERSONAL ASSESSMENT AMICE-31 FOR CARACAS.

4. FILE: 201-284658.

S E C R E T

JACK LALLY FYI

13 [illegible] 1969

SECRET

ORIG: R. [illegible]LENBACH
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 22 JANUARY 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES
SECRET 20

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN, CAS, CA/PROP, FI2, CI/[illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 22 23 35 Z JAN 69 CITE DIRECTOR 68107

TO CARACAS, WH/MIAMI

DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

For use in Miami area

23 JAN 1969

REF: CARACAS 1594 (IN 71593)*

284658

1. RUBASH DESCRIBED AMICE-31 AS VIRILE AND VAIN; WIFE LEFT A-31 AND HE LITERALLY KIDNAPPED HIS OWN SON TO CARACAS IN MAY-JUNE 1968 BECAUSE DIDN't WANT WIFE TO HAVE BOY. POSSIBILITY THERE ARE KIDNAP CHARGES AGAINST HIM. MILITANT ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS HARBOR SOME ILL WILL TOWARD A-31 SINCE HE WENT BACK ON WORD TO RETURN CUBA AS MEMBER PRISONERS-EXCHANGE COMMISSION.

2. A-31 [redacted] WAS ONE OF TWO LEADERS OF CUBAN DELEGATION TO CLASC CONGRESS IN DOM REP IN MID-1968. RE BONA FIDES, RUBASH USED NAME OF DOUGLAS POMROY WITH A-31, RUBASH [redacted] WAS AMERICAN WHO SENT A-31 [redacted] TO SANTO DOMINGO FROM MIAMI IN 1968. A-31 [redacted] KNEW PREVIOUS CONTACT AS PABLO.

CONTINUED . . . .

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG: R. ALLENBACH
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 22 JANUARY 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 68107

TO

PAGE TWO

3. RUBASH ALSO COMMENTED ON FUBABE-1 (201-278135), EDUARDO GARCIA MOURE (201-766813), AND JOSE DE JESUS PLANA (201-275947). ~~SAID FUBABE WAS PART OF AMICE~~ COMPLEX WHO MORE CAPABLE THAN A-31. FUBABE WAS SECRETARY TO MASPERO IN CHILE AND CONSIDERED QUITE-FAVORED DISCIPLE OF MASPERO.

4. RUBASH DISPARAGING REMARKS AGAINST GARCIA MOURE INCLUDED HE VERY ANTI-AMERICAN WHO HAS THREATENED SOME WOFIRM PERSONNEL WITH EXPOSURE. DESCRIBED AS A MASPERO LIEUTENANT WHO CAME TO MIAMI TO DO MASPERO BIDDING.

5. PLANA IS DEVOTED TO SOCIAL CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT WHO CONCERNED WITH WORKERS EDUCATION. DESCRIBED AS QUIET, STUDIOUS; GOES TO NEW YORK OCCASIONALLY.

6. 201'S REVIEWED AND SHOWED GARCIA MOURE GRANTED POA 26 APRIL 1965 TO BE USED AS POLITICAL ACTION AGENT IN CLASC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. HE RELEASED STATEMENT 1965 EXTREMELY CRITICAL U.S. UNILATERAL INTERVENTION IN DOM REP. AT FIRST MEETING 4 MAY 65 WITH SOCKWELL, HE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES HE NOT ANTI-U.S. BUT

CONTINUED . . . .

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: R. ALLENBACH
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 22 JANUARY 1969

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		5	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 68107

TO

PAGE THREE

SIMPLY AGAINST CERTAIN ASPECTS U.S. POLICY. CARACAS ASSESSMENT OF MOURE INDICATED (HVCA-12814) THAT OPERATIONAL WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH MOURE NOT FEASIBLE. HEADQUARTERS COUNTERED (HVCW-6736) WITH SUGGESTION STATION CONTINUE CONTACT AS HE WAS INSIGHT INTO MASPERO LINE OF CLASC. NO OA EVER OBTAINED. INDICATION THERE WAS INS DEPORTATION CASE AGAINST MOURE IN NOV 1967. CASE NOT RESOLVED PER FILE.

7. JOSE DE JESUS PLANA GRANTED POA 10 MAY 1960 FOR USE AS PROPAGANDA PREPARATION AND TEACHER OF POTENTIAL LABOR LEADERS. OA OBTAINED 27 JUNE 1960, AMENDED 13 APRIL 1965 FOR USE AS POLITICAL ACTION AGENT AND SOURCE INFO ON CLASC. ACCORDING HVCW-7089, AMENDED OA STILL VALID.

8. FUBABE-1 GRANTED POA 25 AUG 64 TO WORK WITH CHILEAN BRANCH OF DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL IN ITS ANTI-CASTRO CA ACTIVITIES. OA GRANTED 2 NOV 64 FOR CONSIDERATION TO USE SUBJECT AS FUNDING CHANNEL TO CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC LEADERS FOR

CONTINUED . . . .

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG: [illegible] ALLENBACH
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4321
DATE: 22 JANUARY 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 | 5
2 | 6
3 | 7
4 | 8

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY ________ PER ________ # ________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF:

FILE, VR.,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 68107

PAGE FOUR

TO

CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, AND FOR PROP PURPOSES. WE TERMINATED FUBABE AMICABLY LATE 1966 DUE OUR DOUBT THAT HIS CLASC EMPLOYMENT WOULD PROVE PERMANENT IN MIAMI. HE PUT IN TOUCH WH/MIAMI. NO INDICATION OA TERMINATED. FUBABE DISAPPOINTED THAT WOFIRM DOUBTED HIS ABILITY TO CARVE FUTURE IN CLASC FROM MIAMI.

9. RUBASH GOING MIAMI FIRST PART FEBRUARY. EXPRESSED HIS AVAILABILITY TO CONTACT FUBABE, WHOM HE DOES NOT KNOW, ON ONE SHOT BASIS IF NEED ARISES.

10. FILE: 30-4-17
201-766813
201-275947
201-278135

END OF MESSAGE

*Comment: Station plans fresh approach to CLASC and Haitian exile activities in Venezuela. Asked for overall assessment.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH/D

ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

C/WH/COG

CA/B1 Barbara Bowen (In Draft)

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

284658 ok

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPY 6

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3	NR	8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

BY ________ AT ________ Z

X REF TO FILE NO

DISSEM BY #1 PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR WH 8 CI/CA CA 2 CA/PEG

CA/PROP CI CI/IC 2 MPS/BG 2

S E C R E T 051543Z JUNE 68 CITE CARACAS 9800

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

5 JUN 68 IN 25149

JMDEVIL AMICE

REF JMWAVE 2626 (IN 24511)

284658

JACK LALLY FYI

STATION CARACAS ESTIMATES AMICE-31 WOULD REQUIRE $500 PER MONTH PLUS HOUSING AND EDUCATION ALLOWANCES OVER AND ABOVE JMDEVIL OFFER IN ORDER ENABLE HIM LIVE EVEN MODESTLY HERE. ATTEMPTING COVER MONETARY SUPPLEMENT THIS MAGNITUDE COULD BE DIFFICULT. WHILE WE DO HAVE INTEREST IN MONITORING JMDEVIL, IT IS RELATIVELY LOW PRIORITY IN TERMS LOCAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATION WILL TAKE IT ON ONLY IF HQS BELIEVES IT CONSTITUTES OVER-RIDING NATIONAL PRIORITY. PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN COSTS AND COVER CONSIDERATIONS, HOWEVER, IS BALPA.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

3	284658	6	
4		9	
5		10	/

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY: Y PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION
CA 5 ☒ RID COPY
C/PEG, C/WH, WH/COG
C/I, C/TIRA, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/IC 2.

S E C R E T 241534Z MAY 63 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 5684

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE, BUENOS AIRES INFO MONTEVIDEO, LA PAZ

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

24 MAY 63 .. 17902

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0663 (IN 15743)

284658

27 MAY 1963

1. STATION INITIATED CONTACT WITH AMICE-31 ON 24 MAY FOR SHORT DEBRIEFING. DUE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS NO ADDITIONAL CONTACT TO BE MADE. AMICE-31 TO PROVIDE COMPLETE DOCUMENTATION FROM CLASC EVENTS ON ARRIVAL JMWAVE 27 MAY.

2. MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT MEETINGS ACCORDING AMICE-31 COORDINATED EFFORT COMMENCING JUNE, WHICH FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO[illegible]), TO DEMAND RELEASE ALL LABOR AND POLITICAL PRISONERS IN LATIN AMERICA. CLASC ALREADY SENT CABLE TO BARRIENTOS IN BOLIVIA DECRYING HIS TREATMENT ORGANIZED LABOR. THESE EFFORTS TO CONTINUE DURING ENTIRE ANNIVERSARY YEAR OF ILO AND PER AMICE-31 COULD WELL BE SOURCE OF DISCOMFORT TO MAJORITY LATIN GOVERNMENTS.

3. SINGLE CENTRAL OF LABOR DISCUSSED AT MEETINGS BUT NOT YET FIRMED UP. PERMANENT COMMITTEE FOR CENTRAL TO BE ESTABLISHED, PROBABLY IN CARACAS WITH PRATAS OF URUGUAY AS

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE. VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 SANTO DOMINGO 5604 SECRET

HEAD. MASPERO LIKELY TO BE NAMED AS SECRETARY GENERAL FOR COMMITTEE. AMICE-31 SAID THAT INCLUSION COMMUNISTS IN CENTRAL NOT BROACHED AND HE DOES NOT BELIEVE IT LIKELY IN LIGHT STRONG ATTACK MADE BY MASPERO AGAINST COMMUNISTS DURING SESSIONS. AT ANY RATE, EMPLEMENTATION THIS CONCEPT DOES NOT APPEAR IMMINENT.

4. AMICE-31 COMMENTED THAT MOST OUTSPOKEN OPPONENTS OF U.S. DURING GATHERINGS HAVE BEEN RAIMUNDO ONGARO OF ARGENTINA AND GALLO OF URUGUAY; HOWEVER, BASIC TENOR ENTIRE GROUP STRONGLY ANTI-US.

5. FOR BUENOS AIRES: POUCHING TAPE 19 MAY TV SHOW IN WHICH ONGARO VIOLENTLY ATTACKED U.S. WHILE PRAISING CUBA.

SECRET

BT

*BEING SIUD

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT ______

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 7 PER ______ #

ACTION CA 5 ☑ RID COPY

INFO. FILE , CA/PEG, WH 8, WH/COG 2, CI/OPS, C/IC, FI/INT 2, CI/IC 2

SERVICE

SANTO DOMINGO 5624 PARA 1	24 MAY 68	17932
STA & NR	**DATE**	**IN NR**

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"LABOR ORGANIZATION ([illegible]), TO DEMAND RELEASE"

SECRET

284658

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 3

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION
WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 042028Z JUN 68 CITE JMWAVE 2626

4 JUN 68 IN 24511

CARACAS DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

JMDEVIL AMICE

1. DURING NINTH CONGRESS IN SANTO DOMINGO EMILIO MASPERO RENEWED AN OFFER TO AMICE-31 OF A POSITION IN THE CLASC OFFICES IN CARACAS AT A SALARY OF $400 PER MONTH AND ONE WAY AIR FARE. AMICE-31 TOLD MASPERO THAT SALARY WAS NOT ENOUGH IN VIEW HIGH COST OF LIVING IN CARACAS BUT THAT HE WOULD THINK IT OVER AND GIVE ANSWER BY EARLY JUNE.

284658

2. IT IS NOT CLEAR JUST WHAT AMICE-31 FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY WOULD BE BUT THIS SEEMS TO PRESENT WOFIRM AND OPPORTUNITY TO MONITOR CLOSELY CLASC PLANNING AND DAY TO DAY ACTIVITIES. REQUEST ADDEES COMMENT ON OPERATIONAL NEED AND POSSIBILITY OF STATION CARACAS OFFERING AMCIE-31 SOME FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN MOVING FAMILY TO CARACAS AND SOME REGULAR SUPPLEMENTARY INCOME IF AND WHEN HE IN PLACE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

384658

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

SECRET

ORIG: Porter J. Goss jam
UNIT: CA/B4
EXT: 6728
DATE: 10 May 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: [illegible] PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: CA-5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, CA/Reg, WH-8, WH/COG-8, CA/PROP, C/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/INT-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

MAY 10 1900 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 98637

TO SANTO DOMINGO INFO: JMWAVE

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

Zile

13 MAY 1968

REF: A. SANTO DOMINGO 5472 (IN 05023)

B. JMWAVE 2310 (IN 05038)

384658

1. HQS ENDORSES AMICE-31 TRAVEL AND SANTO DOMINGO STATION EFFORTS NOTED REF A TO COVER CLASC MEETINGS.

2. REQUEST CABLED REPORT ANY SIGNIFICANT HIGHLIGHTS PARTICULARLY ANY EVIDENCE OF MEANINGFUL ~~[illegible]~~ CLASC PLANS TO PROMOTE JOINT ACTION WITH COMMUNISTS IN LATIN AMERICAN LABOR CIRCLES.

/4,

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG [illegible] Pellegrino (Mr. Winters)
C/WH/7 [illegible]
WH/CA ✓
AC/CA/B4 [illegible]

C/WH [illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/CA [illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

284658

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 3 PER ______

ACTION WH/COG8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, C/CA/PS, CA/IC2, CA/[illegible]
G, ELINT, COS, CA/PROP, WPS/BG2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 262117Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2310 MAY 1968

7 May 68 IN 05038

SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR, CARACAS

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCES: A. JMWAVE 2309 (IN 05035)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 5099 (IN 59355)

284658

1. AMICE-31 WILL ATTEND CLASC CONSEJO BEGINNING 13 MAY IN SANTO DOMINGO. WILL FORWARD ETA WHEN TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS FIRM.

2. IT IS AMICE-31 UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL DELEGATES TO BE HOUSED TOGETHER IN INFA. IF SO, THIS FACT, COUPLED WITH PROBABILITY THAT SEVERAL PBRUMEN EXILES WILL TRAVEL AND STICK TOGETHER (SEE REFERENCE A), MAKES IT DIFFICULT LAY ON CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FROM THIS END. REQUEST THAT SANTO DOMINGO STATION PROVIDE TELEPHONE NUMBER AND NAME BY MEANS WHICH AMICE-31 CAN INITIATE CONTACT. AMICE-31 WILL GIVE HIS NAME SAYING HIS "AMIGO DE MAIRO EN MIAMI". FYI AMICE 31 SPEAKS NO ENGLISH.

3. AMICE 31 BELIEVES THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN EXPLAINING SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR TRAVEL. EACH CLASC AFFILIATE RESPONSIBLE FOR FINANCING DELEGATE TRAVEL AND IN PRACTICE THIS

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR

PAGE-2 JMWAVE 2310 SECRET

MEANS THAT HERE EACH DELEGATE IS MAKING HIS OWN PRIVATE COLLECTION AMONG FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES, AND CONCERNED PBRUMEN EXILES. JMWAVE PLANS TO PROVIDE AMICE-31 WITH $250 TO INCLUDE ROUND TRIP TRAVEL AND ALL EXPENSES.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

284658

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | SITED MESSAGE F | TOTAL COPIES 37 | RING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION CA5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. CA/PEG, WH8, WH/COG8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC2, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT2, ADDP, DDP

S E C R E T 062243Z MAY 68 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 5472

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

6 MAY 68 IN 05023

MHSPAWN ~~DTDORIC~~ PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFS: DIRECTOR 77850

SANTO DOMINGO 5099 (IN 59355)

7 MAY 1968

1. PLEASE ADVISE STATUS AMICE/31 (284658) ATTENDANCE CLASC COUNCIL MEETING SET FOR 13 TO 17 MAY AND FIRST "SINDICAL" CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA FROM 20 TO 24 MAY IN SANTO DOMINGO. STATION IN FAVOR HIS ATTENDANCE DUE TO RELATIONSHIP WITH MASPERO AND FACT THAT NO STATION CONTROLLED ASSETS TO ATTEND MEETINGS.

2. SANTO DOMINGO MOST WILLING HANDLE AMICE/31 WHILE HERE AND WILL FORWARD CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS IF DECISION MADE TO SEND HIM.

3. EMDAM/3 (777370) AND EMFIST/1 (793238) COVERING MEETINGS IN COVER CAPACITIES BUT THEIR ACCESS LIMITED TO FINAL RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT BENEFIT KNOWLEDGE IN-FIGHTING AND NECESSARY COMPROMISES MADE BY DELEGATIONS. STATION ENDEAVORING SECURE INDIRECT COVERAGE THRU EMHELIX/1 (275190) AND EMHABIT/5 (748610).

S E C R E T

ET

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 34

SECRET

RIG: Lee G. Mestres:pah
NIT: AC/WH/7/DR
XT: 4537
ATE: 26 February 1968

		6	
		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 32 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR . WH/COG 8, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, DDP, ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pico) (reference number)

SECRET FEB 26 23 17 Z CITE DIRECTOR 77850

27 FEB 1968

PRIORITY
TO JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO INFO: CARACAS

201-284658

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFS: A. JMWAVE 1346 (IN 55924)*
B. CARACAS 8993 (IN 54407)**
C. SANTO DOMINGO 5082 (IN 56151) (NOT SENT JMWAVE OR CARACAS)

1. HQS HAS ACTIVE INTEREST CLASC MEETINGS AND BELIEVES IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE HAVE AMICE-31 ATTEND CLASC COUNCIL MEETING OF REFS. (SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS RE MEETING AND BACKGROUND IN COMPLIANCE REF C.) AS OF TWO YEARS AGO AMICE-31 QUITE CLOSE TO MASPERO AND MAY BE ABLE GIVE US GOOD ACCESS TO INNER MASPERO CLIQUE FOR INTEL PURPOSES. NATURALLY WE WOULD NOT WANT HIM TAKE ACTIVE PART IN SUPPORT OF MASPERO'S POSITION AT CONGRESS. JBDELAPSE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR AMICE-31's EXPENSES UP TO 500 DOLLARS.

2. FOR JMWAVE: COULD AMICE-31 PLAUSIBLY EXPLAIN SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR HIS TRAVEL?

3. FOR SANTO DOMINGO: ALTHOUGH WE IN FAVOR AMICE-31's ATTENDANCE, LEAVE FINAL DECISION TO YOU. HIS HANDLING IN SANTO DOMINGO WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE CLOSE; HIS BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING IN JMWAVE AREA BEFORE AND AFTER CONGRESS WOULD BE OF GREATER IMPORTANCE.

4. FYI ALL ADDRESSEES: AMICE-31 WAS ONE OF TWO WOFIRM REPORTING SOURCES ATTENDING FIFTH CLASC CONGRESS HELD PANAMA OCT 66. STATION PANAMA CITY THEN FOUND AGENT COOPERATIVE AND GOOD REPORTER.

END OF MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 77858

TO

PAGE TWO

*AMICE-31 invited to be delegate at ninth CLASC Consejo planned for May 13-17 in Santo Domingo. A-31 could be useful as reporter and/or action agent since he is opposed to CLASC alliance with Marxist groups and in opposition to Emilio Maspero.

**Based on recollection of A-31's previous performance at Bogota CLASC meeting, in which AMICE-31 seemed inclined to Maspero, Caracas sees little point in WOFIRM subsidizing A-31's trip this time, but defers action to Hqs and Santo Domingo.

C/CA B H Tovar
CA/BF Lo Healy
WH/CA ✓
CA/B/4 P. Goss (Telecoord)
WH/COG F. Ames (Telecoord)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

PAUL V. HARWOOD
C/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

284658

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 60

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 30

ACTION CAS ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, WH/COG 8, REP, SAVA 2, EUR 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CA/PEG, DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, FI, FI/INT, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 271755Z FEB 68 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 5099 27 FEB 68 IN 53355

DIRECTOR INFO SAIGON, JMWAVE, ~~LCPIPIT,~~ LONDON, CARACAS

MHSPAWN DTDORIC TUMIX PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 77850

B. DIRECTOR 77134

C. SAIGON 8927 (IN 55474)

D. SANTO DOMINGO 5081 (IN 56156)

28 FEB 1968

NC 284658

1. WELCOME ATTENDANCE AMICE/31 PER REF A. JMWAVE PLSE CABLE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS PLUS SUMMARY BRIEFING GIVEN PRIOR DEPARTURE JMWAVE AREA.

2. RE REFS B AND C; WE HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS REGARDING PROPOSED ATTENDANCE AS OBSERVER OF TUMIX/5. C-31926 AT BEST HE WOULD BE EXTRA-CONTINENTAL FACTOR WITHOUT VOTE AND LITTLE VOICE ON CENTRAL ISSUE OF MASPERO LINE. LATTER ADVOCATES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY EXPLOIT TUMIX/5'S PRESENCE TO INJECT INTO DISCUSSIONS U.S. POSITION VIET NAM, WHICH NOT GERMAIN TO CLASC PROBLEMS AND NOT AN ISSUE IN CONTEXT DOMINICAN POLITICS, DESPITE EFFORTS BY DOMINICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES THROUGH PROP EVENTS LIKE "VIET NAM WEEK" AT UNIVERSITY ABOUT YEAR AGO (WHICH BACKFIRED BECAUSE COMMIES RAISED COMMUNIST FLAG HIGHER

SECRET

PAGE 2 SANTO DOMINGO 5099 SECRET

THAN DOMINICAN FLAG ON TOP UNIVERSITY BUILDING). THEREFORE WE REQUEST TUMIX/5 TURN DOWN INVITATION, USING REF B SUGGESTION THAT NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS PREVENT HIS ATTENDANCE CLASC MEETING. IN A NUTSHELL, COMMIES HAVE TRIED TO INTERJECT VIET NAM INTO THIS SITUATION WITHOUT SUCCESS, BUT DO NOT DESIRE AT THIS TIME TO GIVE THEM FREE RIDE ON MERRY-GO-ROUND IF WE CAN HELP IT.

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE D TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C-8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/INT-2, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA/O-4

S E C R E T 072006Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1171 10 OCT 1966

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

7 Oct 66 12485

JMDEVIL

REF: PANAMA CITY 1119 (IN 07778) 984658

1. AMICE-31 ETA COSTA RICA 9 OCT. HAD NO TROUBLE AT CLASC CONGRESS PARTICULARLY SINCE GUTIERREZ DOES NOT ENJOY MASPERO FAVOR.

2. A-31 COOPERATIVE, HELPFUL AGENT. ONLY PROBLEM WAS HIS DIFFICULTY IN LEAVING CONGRESS SITE ALONE WHICH PREVENTED FREQUENT CONTACT. THIS NO FAULT OF HIS. LAST CONTACT SCHEDULED 8 OCT. APPRECIATE JMWAVE ASSISTANCE.

S E C R E T *Amice-31 Alerted 30 Sept re Possible

BT Attack. SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT, CA 2
CA/PROP, CA/O 4

S E C R E T 011745Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1119

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 201-284658

JMDEVIL

1 Oct 65 IN 07778

REF: A. PANAMA CITY 1105 (IN 07300)

B. DIRECTOR 59752 7.6

C. JMWAVE 5341 (IN 07380)

1. AMICE-31 ALERTED 30 SEPTEMBER RE POSSIBLE ATTACK. HE CONFIDENT GUTIERREZ COULD ONLY MAKE OBVITUS CHARGES MENTIONED REF C. BELIEVES REAL SOURCE OF PROBLEM IS PERSONAL. A-31 DISLIKES GUTIERREZ WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS TOO SOFT ON COMMUNISTS. APPARENTLY THIS DISLIKE IS MUTUAL.

2. A-31 CONFIDENT HE WILL HAVE SUPPORT OF OTHER CUBAN DELEGATES AND MASPERO WHO HE CONSIDERS A PERSONAL FRIEND. ALSO FEELS IT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SUPPORT OTHER CONGRESS DELEGATES, BUT DOES NOT BELIEVE PROBLEM WILL BE SERIOUS. SAYS HE WILL BE PREPARED TO DEFEND HIMSELF.

SECRET

3. NEXT CONTACT WITH A-31 EXPECTED 3 OR 4 OCTOBER DEPENDENT HIS JUDGEMENT OF SITUATION.

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSEM BY 25

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, [illegible], CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, FI/SPI

S E C R E T 302313Z CITE JMWAVE 3341

30 SEP 6[illegible] 07380

IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC JMDEVIL

REFERENCE: PANAMA CITY 1109 (IN 07300)*

AGREE PACY STATION PLAN TO ALERT AMICE-31 SOONEST OF PARA 1 REF REPORT IN ORDER ADVISE HIM PREPARE DEFENSE AND OBTAIN POSSIBLE SUPPORT OTHER DELEGATES. AMICE-31 AND HIS ORGANIZATION OFFICIALLY AFFILIATED TO JMDEVIL, AND WITH HIS RECEIVING LEITIMAIE INVITATION TO ATTEND CONGRESS BELIEVE HE IN POSITION REBUT POSSIBLE CHARGES. SPECIFIC EXPOSE INFORMATION POSSIBLY POSSESSED BY GUTIERREZ NOT KNOWN AT JMWAVE. OBVIOUS CHARGES WOULD PROBABLY EXPOSE AMICE-31 AS PERUMEN EXILE LABOR LEADER, AND AMICE COLLABORATOR AND WHOSE ORGANIZATION IS MEMBER OF AMICE, WHICH GENERALLY VIEWED AS WOLADY-SUPPORTED ORGANIZATION.

S E C R E T

BT

*REPORTED FITC SEC/GEN KNEW JMDEVIL CONGRESS PENETRATED BY US.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
WH CD

DISSEM BY ZZ

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT
TIME 2115Z
BY D

INFO
FILE, VR, CS/DO, WH/C8, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/SPG, FI/INT, CI/OA

S E C R E T 302044Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1109

30 SEP 66 IN 07300

IMMEDIATE JMWAVE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

REF: JMWAVE 3273 (IN [illegible])

1. STATION SOURCE REPORTED FITC SEC/GEN, DIOGENES GUTIERREZ, STATED JMDEVIL CONGRESS PENETRATED BY US. SPECIFICALLY NAMED AMICE-31 SAYING A-31 WILL BE UNMASKED FROM CONGRESS PODIUM (ASSUMEDLY AT CONGRESS INAUGURATION 2 OCTOBER).

2. STATION HAS NO INDICATION WHAT EVIDENCE GUTIERREZ MIGHT POSSESS. A-31 CONTACTED STATION OFFICER BY PHONE EVENING 29 SEPTEMBER SAYING ONLY THAT HE WITH FRIENDS AND WOULD HAVE TO CALL AGAIN 0600 FOLLOWING MORN. DID NOT CALL FOLLOWING MORN (POSSIBLY DUE TO INOPPORTUNE SITUATION OF DELEGATE LODGING). NO MEETING WITH STATION YET EFFECTED.

3. EXPECT A-31 CALL AGAIN EVENING 30 SEPT. BELIEVE WE SHOULD WARN A-31 OF GUTIERREZ PLAN AND ADVISE HIM PREPARE DEFENSE WITH SUPPORT OTHER DELEGATES. HOWEVER WILL AWAIT JMWAVE CONCURRENCE BEFORE TAKING THIS COURSE. ALTERNATIVE IS TO HAVE A-31 WITHDRAWN FROM CONGRESS POSSIBLY SUFFERING

SECRET

SECRET

ATTACK IN ABSENCIA. PLEASE ADVISE BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE CABLE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

XREF RYBAT

14-00000

[redacted]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

xxxxxxxx/xxxxxxx/Exxxx

ORIG : MR THOMAS J. FLORES ☐ FILE RID
UNIT : C/WH/C ☐ INDEX
EXT : ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 30 SEPT 1966 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 25/M PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WH 8, C/CA, CA 2, CI/OPS, CA/4

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 39752

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

JMDEVIL

REF PANAMA CITY 1109 (IN 07300)

SUGGEST AMICE-31 BE WARNED OF PLAN ATTACK HIM AND THAT HE PREPARE DEFENSE AS SUGGESTED REF. HOWEVER DEFER TO WAVE IF OTHER ALTERNATIVE APPEARS PREFERABLE.

S E C R E T

RELEASING OFFICER MR THOMAS J. FLORES C/WH/C

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted] By 7

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C8 CI/OPS CI/OA

S E C R E T 281547Z CITE JMWAVE 3272

PRIORITY PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: PANAMA CITY 1070

Internal File 201-284658

1. AMICE/31 WILL MAKE CONTACT PER INSTRUCTIONS IN PARA ONE REF.

2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF AMICE/31 AS FOLLOWS: AGE 33 YEARS, BROWN EYES, BLACK HAIR, HEIGHT 5' 7", WEIGHT 155 POUNDS, SOLID BUILD, LIGHT SALLOW COMPLEXION, EVEN FEATURES. AMICE/31 FORMED JUVENTUD OBRERA CATOLICA, AND SERVED AS OFFICER IN NATIONAL TRANSPORT FEDERATION. WAS MEMBER 26 JULY MOVEMENT UNTIL 1960 WHEN JOINED ANTI-CASTRO UNDERGROUND AND CAME INTO EXILE. AMICE/31 IS ADHERENT OF CLASC POLICIES AND PRACTICES, AND IS CONSIDERED BE PRO-MASPERO, WHOM HE VIEWS AS STRONG, EFFECTIVE LEADER.

AGE 33

S E C R E T

BT

29 SEP 1968

20 Sep [illegible] 68435

SECRET

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted]

DISSEM BY 2

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 271449Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1070

27 SEP 66 IN 04387

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

REF: A. DIRECTOR 37751

B. JMWAVE 3243

1. PREFER NOT TO CONTACT AMICE-31 AT REF IDEN B ADRESS DUE POSSIBLE SECURITY RISKS. REQUEST JMWAVE DIRECT AMICE-31 PHONE (PANAMA) 35551, IDENTIFY SELF AS "RAMON" AND ASK FOR "LUCHO". LUCHO WILL TELL RAMON THAT HE (LUCHO) IS A FRIEND OF PABLO AND ARRANGE MEETING. SUGGEST AMICE-31 CALL LATE EVENING OR EARLY MORNING HOURS.

2. ALSO REQUEST JMWAVE PROVIDE AMICE-31 DESCRIPTION AND PERTINENT DATA.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM CY 30/M

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/A, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/O 4, WH/C 8.

S E C R E T 262302Z CITE JMWAVE 3243 27 SEP [illegible] 5

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 37751 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE)

B. DIRECTOR 37762 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE)

1. AMICE/31 (IDENTITY A) ARRIVING PANAMA CITY 29 SEPTEMBER AT 1230 HOURS ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT 511. A/31 ALERTED TO TELEPHONE CALL AT IDENTITY B ADDRESS FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING SELF AS "FRIEND OF PABLO". IF STATION WISHES MAKE OTHER CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS, PLS CABLE INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO 29 SEPTEMBER.

2. A/31 BRIEFED PER REFERENCE B GUIDELINES AND WILL SUBMIT REPORT UPON RETURN TO JMWAVE 20 OCTOBER. AMICE/31 PLANS SPEND 10-22 OCTOBER IN SAN JOSE TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH COSTA RICAN TRANSPORT WORKERS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 30/4

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION
WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/04, WH/C8

SECRET 262322Z CITE JMWAVE 3244

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE

27 SEP 63 03094

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3243 [illegible]

IDENTITY A. REINALDO (PICO) RAMON, PRESIDENT OF ORGANIZACION REGIONAL DE TRANSPORTE (ORT - CLASC AFFILIATE) AND MEMBER FORDC.

IDENTITY B. FEDERACION INTERAMERICANA DE TRABAJADORES CRISTIANOS
AVENIDA 7, CENTRAL 2420
EDIFICIO PREMIER, FIRST FLOOR.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

284658 -

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

ORIG: MM PALMER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 18 AUG 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 3 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 29138

18 22 12Z

TO CARACAS INFO JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS-7605 (IN 34009)* 284658

1. NO HQS TRACES ON JOSE LUIS ARAGON GARCIA.

2. FOR JMWAVE: REQUEST STATION AND AMOT TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * Requested POA for ARAGON TO DIRECT Barquisimeto net.

COORD: WH/COG

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : PHYLLIS EDWARDS
UNIT : C/WH/2/CR & N
EXT : 4438
DATE : 14 MARCH 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

3 SECRET

TO : MANAGUA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR . FILE ☐ RID COPY , DDP, DC/WH 3, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 3, CI/IA

TO MANA INFO CITE DIR 87733

REFS: A. MANA-5622 (IN73409)

B. MANA-5623 (IN73411)

OVER

1. VISUALIZE VALUE OF IDEN OF REFS AS POSSIBLE STATION PENETRATION AGENT ONLY IN EVENT HE REMAINS IN NICARAGUA. SINCE VISA REFUSED ON BASIS INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES AND LOSS OF SCHOLARSHIP LOGICALLY EXPECTED TO RESULT IN STRONG RESENTMENT AGAINST ODYOKE. ADVISE EXTREME CAUTION IN CONTACT AND APPROACH.

2. ALTHOUGH HQRS NOT SANGUINE FOR ABOVE REASON, NO OBJECTION STATION CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT FOR EVENTUAL XXXXX RECRUITMENT AS HOSTILE BODY WITH ALL PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES LAID ON FOR PLAUSIBLE DENIAL PBSWING INVOLVEMENT. POA NOT REQUIRED PER CSI-F PARA 16. OAC INITIATED. NO HQSS TRACES.

3. RECOMMEND AN INITIAL MEETING UNDER PRETEXT INTERVIEW

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ TROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO :

5 March 66

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO MANA INFO CITE DIR 87763

BE USED TO ASSESS SUBJECT, ELICIT BIODATA, DRAW OUT RE FUTURE PLANS AND REASONS FOR DESIRE STATESIDE STUDY, ETC., WITHOUT INDICATING VISA MAY BE REFUSED.

END OF MESSAGE

16 [illegible]

File

201-284654

WH COMMENT: *Luis Hueto Garcia who Communist youth at Univ School of Engineering applying for US scholarship grant. Station requests POA and proposes recruitment attempt.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

E M Terrell
EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

No.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of ____________________

______________________________, for the purpose specified in your request

dated ____________________________.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: ____________________________

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

SECRET

FORM 6-63 124 [illegible]

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

4 - FEB 1955

234653

SET UP P/I POA	EXPEDITE INDICES		NAME CHECK INDICES
SET UP 201 OA	SPECIAL INQ.	NAME CHECK	CRSD. AREA

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQ FOR GREEN LIST
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RESULTS OF CONSIDERED REVIEW
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REVIEW FI D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ EVALUATED REPORT
CANCEL PER CI OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCES, ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
REQUEST RI TRACES	FILE
REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	TICKLE
REQUEST FIELD TRACES	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	CRSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II, ETC. WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT

REMARKS

707

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7 ✓

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM BOGOTA

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI

12 JAN 1966

S E C R E T 112101Z · 12 JAN 66 IN 31540

WAVE CARA INFO DIR CITE BOGO 6736

AMICE

REF BOGO 6775*

1. FOR WAVE: AMICE/31 WROTE THREE CABLES TO LETTER DROP PROVIDED BY WAVE AND FIRST TWO WERE RETURNED WITH NOTICE THAT NO ONE LIVING AT GIVEN ADDRESS. THIS IS TO ALERT STATION IN CASE ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE EXPECTED AT THAT DROP.

2. FOR CARA: AMICE/31 PLANS DEPART MEDELLIN 15 JAN AND EXPECTS ARRIVE CARA APPROXIMATELY 24 HOURS LATER THAN ANTICIPATED BECAUSE PLANS TRAVEL WITH VENEZUELAN DELEGATION IN CUCUTA, COLOMBIA, PRIOR TO GOING TO CARA. AS STATED REF, AMICE/31 APPEARS BE STRONG PARTISAN FOR JMDEVIL/1. AMICE/31 CLAIMS HE INSTRUMENTAL IN GETTING CLASC COUNCIL TO DENOUNCE TRI CONTINENTAL CONF IN HAVANA (SEE BOGO 6717, (IN 78___) SENT DIR ONLY).

SECRET

*NO RECORD CABLE SEC AT 7070 11 JAN

CFN 6736 REF 6775 AMICE/31 NO ONE /31 15 JAN 24 HOURS CUCUTA COLOMBIA /31 JMDEVIL/1 /31 CLASC HAVANA 6717

BT

*NCY

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 55

24 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM BOGOTA

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

INFO FILE, VR, WE-8, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA/O-4, EE-6, WH/C-8, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CA/PEG, CI/OA, AF-7

S E C R E T 131822Z

DIR INFO PALP BONN CMNY ROME SAGO LIMA CAPA WAVE CITE BOGO 6725

11 JAN 1966

DYVOUR JMDEVEL

10 JAN 66 IN 30551

REFS A. DIR 59025

3. BD 5275

211284

All Marked

1. ON 7 AND 8 JAN DUBOLD/1 WAS MET IN MEDELLIN FOR APPROX ONE HOUR EACH TIME AND REPORTED INFO SET FORTH BELOW, EXCEPT IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE IT IS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT AMICE/31 IS SOURCE. LATTER WAS CONTACTED ON 8 JAN FOR ONE HOUR DEBRIEFING. KRUSKALL RETURNING TO MEDELLIN ON 12 JAN FOR FURTHER DEBRIEFINGS. ADDEES PLS NOTE THAT DUBOLD/1 APPEARS BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO JMDEVIL/1 WHILE AMICE/31 APPEARS BE STRONG PARTISAN OF JMDEVEL/1.

2. INFO ON CONFERENCE:

A. CONFERENCE STARTED ONE DAY LATE DUE TO DELAYED ARRIVAL OF MANY DELEGATES. AS OF 8 JAN THERE WERE 52 DELEGATES, 38 OF WHOM HAVE VOTES. BRITISH HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA DID NOT SEND DELE-

SECRET

IN 30531 P2

NICS. CISC, MISEREOR AND INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ARE REPRESENTED BY HELMUT PALLA WHO IS THERE AS OBSERVER AND APPARENTLY IS NOT MIXING IN.

B. CONFERENCE HAS BROKEN UP INTO FOUR COMMISSIONS WHICH ARE DRAFTING OR DISCUSSING VARIOUS PROGRAMS TO BE SUBMITTED TO FORTHCOMING CONGRESS: POLITICAL COMMISSION IS HEADED BY EMILO MASPERO; COMMISSION ON DOCTRINE BY JOSE GOLDSACK; COMMISSION ON STATUTES BY EDUARDO GARCIA; AND DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES BY FULGENCIO BARREIRO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR ATLANTIC STATES.

3. POST CONFERENCE PLANS:

A. ACCORDING TO DUBOLD/1, CISC HAS SENT SEVEN TICKETS WITH NAMES LEFT OPEN FOR COUNCIL DELEGATES TO GO TO BRUSSELS TO DISCUSS MATTERS TO BE RESOLVED. DUBOLD/1 STATES THAT DELEGATES NOT PRESENTLY ON EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WILL BE INCLUDED ON TRIP TO BRUSSELS. AMICE/31 STATED THAT ENTIRE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WILL GO TO BRUSSELS.

38 4655

B. AFTER DELEGATES RETURN FROM BRUSSELS, A CONFERENCE OF CARIBBEAN AFFLILIATES IS SLATED TO TAKE PLACE IN GUATEMALA UNDER DIRECTION OF AUGUSTO BONILLA.

C. QUESTION OF WHERE CONGRESS WILL TAKE PLACE NOT YET RESOLVED. BOTH AGENTS HAD HEARD THAT SANTO DOMINGO HAD BEEN PICKED AS SITE

FORTHCOMING CONGRESS AND BOTH AGREED TO WORK BEHIND SCENES TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING. AMICE/31 CITED PANAMA, CARACAUTGR SANTIAGO AS SITES WHERE CONGRESS WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE. BOTH AGREED THAT IT IS SCHEDULED FOR MAY 65. HONOR OF BEING HOST TO CONGRESS IS MITIGATED BY FACT THAT HOST AFFILIATE MUST PAY AT LEAST 30 ? PER CENT OF CONFERENCE COST.

4. SIGNS OF DISSENSION IN CLASC: DUBOLD/1 STATES THAT JMDEVIL/1 AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ARE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE AT COUNCIL MEETING.

A. JMDEVIL/1 HAS APPARENTLY ALIENATED LEADERS OF A NUMBER OF AFFILIATES. ACCORDING TO DUBOLD/1, CHILEAN REPS HAVE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE THAT JMDEVIL/1 ~~IS~~ LIVING BEYOND HIS SALARY AND THEY ARE THINKING OF ACCUSING HIM OF HIGH LIVING AT EXPENSE OF FUNDS PROVIDED TO CLASC BY CISC. HE APPARENTLY HAS BOUGHT A HOUSE AND OWNS A CAR, AND THIS IS RESENTED.

B. ACCORDING TO DUBOLD/1, HELIO APONTE WHO REPRESENTS CUSIC, OPENLY ACCUSED MASPERO OF TURNING AGAINST HIS OLD FRIENDS IN CLASC SUCH AS GOLDSACK.

C. PRO MASPERO ARE: MEXICAN AND ALL CARIBBEAN AFFILIATES FOR TOTAL OF 14 VOTES. REP OF VENEZUELAN COMITE UNITARIO DE

IN 30551-/24

SINDICALISTAS APPARENTLY ALSO PRO MASPERO, AS IS COLOMBIAN DELEGATE HELIODORO AGUEDELO.

D. ANTI MASPERO FORCES ARE: SOLID BLOC OF NINE CAMPESINO VOTES, MOST OF DELEGATES FROM SOUTH AMERICAN AFFILIATES AND ESPECIALLY ACTIVE IN HELPING DUBOLD/1 ARE LUIS QUIROGA AND JUAN ARCO FROM CHILE, ANTONIO CARDOZ FROM URUGUARY AND JOSE LARA SALCEDO FROM BOLIVIA. ALSO ANTI MASPERO IS HELIO APONT OF VENEZUELA.

5 4. PROPOSED MOVE OF SECRETARIAT: JMDEVIL/1'S DESIRE TO MOVE SECRETARIAT FROM SAGO TO CARA APPARENTLY MOTIVATED BY DESIRE RID HIMSELF OF PRESENT SECRETARIAT MEMBERS AND STRENGTHEN HIS HAND. SUCH A MOVE WOULD ENABLE HIM GET RID OF JOSE GOLDSACK WHO, DUE TO EXPENSE INVOLVED IN MOVING LARGE FAMILY, WOULD BE UNABLE MAKE MOVE TO CARA. JMDEVEL/1 WOULD LIKE REPLACE HIM AND OTHER MEMBERS OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WITH EDUARDO GARCIA, JOSE DE JESUS PLANAS, HENRI MOLINA FROM SDCM AND AMICE/31. (COMMENT: THIS PROBABLY EXPLAINS AMICE/31 PARTISANSHIP FOR JMDEVIL/1.) OTHER JMDEVIL/1 REASON FOR SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE TO BE PHYSICALLY NEARER TO AFFILIATES WHO ARE GIVING HIM SULL SUPPORT; I.E., CARIBBEAN AFFILIATES. DUBOLD/1 STATES THAT THIS PROPOSED MOVE WILL BE OPPOSED BY SOLID BLOC OF CAMPESINOS AND MOST DELEGATES FROM SOUTH AMERICAN AFFILIATES

SECRET IN 36051

AD HENCE WILL PROBABLY BE DEFEATED. DUBOLD/1 BELIEVES SEAT OF SECRETARIAT WILL REMAIN IN SAGO, AND IF NOT THERE, HE WILL PROPOSE IT MOVE TO LIMA,

6. FUTURE FINANCING OF AFFILIATES:

A. MATTER OF HOW FUNDS FROM CISC, MISEREOR AND IIS WILL BE HANDLED HAD NOT BEEN TABLED BY 8 JAN, BUT AMICE/31 STATED THAT SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE OVER THREE YEAR PERIOD FOR EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES BY THE THREE FUNDS. METHODS AND MEANS OF FUNDING ADDITIONAL ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS TO CLASC AFFILIATES FOR OVERHEAD APPARENTLY WILL BE DISCUSSED IN BRUSSELS MEETING.

B. DUBOLD/1 LEARNED FROM ANDRES MERCAU THAT JMDEVIL/1 IS TRYING OBTAIN FUNDS FROM LIBIO LABO, PRESIDENT OF ACLI. MERCAU ALLEGED THAT ACLI LEADERS ALSO IN CONTACT WITH AFRICANS (AND SPECIFICALLY CONGOLESE GROUP) AND WERE PUTTING OUT FEELERS TO ASIAN LABOR GROUPS, AND THAT JMDEVIL/1 PUSHING THIS AS HOPES TO OBTAIN MOST FINANCIAL HELP FROM ACLI.. (COMMENT: CIFW 24790 IS OF SPECIAL INTEREST AS REGARDS CLASC ATTEMPTS SEEK FINANCIAL HELP FROM ACLI.)

SECRET

SECRET

IN 35557

7. MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL INFO: DUBOLD/1 IS ATTEMPTING ASCERTAIN WHICH DELEGATES RECEIVED THEIR TICKETS TO MEDELLIN MEETING FROM CLASC SECRETARIAT AND WHICH RECEIVED THEIRS FROM CISC OR OTHER SOURCES. THIS INFO WOULD BE INDICATIVE OF WHICH DELEGATES ARE PRO MASPERO. FOR EXAMPLE, AUGUSTO CIPRIANI FROM PERU RECEIVED HIS TICKETS DIRECTLY FROM CISC. DUBOLD/1 CLAIMS THAT HIS DELEGATION RECEIVED FORMAL INVITATION TO ATTEND THE COUNCIL MEETING ONLY A FEW DAYS BEFORE IT OPENED.

8. FOR DIR PALP: IF WORD COULD REACH DUBOLD/1 AND HIS COHORTS THAT CISC AND GPASHEN NOT BACKING DOWN ON FUNDING ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED IN 19 NOV LETTER, IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY STRENGTHEN THEIR HAND IN OPEN OPPOSITION TO JMDEVIL.

9. FOR SAGO: ~~IS DI~~ IF DH:C CONCURS AND SAGO ABLE TO PLACE ARTICLE INSINUATING THAT JMDEVIL/1 LIVING ABOVE HIS INCOME, BELIEVE IT WOULD PROVIDE FUEL FOR THE FLAMES BEING SPREAD BY DUBOLD/1 AND GROUP OPPOSED TO JMDEVIL/1.

10. FOR LIMA, WAVE, CAPA: OPS CABLES FOLLOW.

11. LIST OF DELEGATES WILL BE MAILED TO ALL ADDEES.

SECRET

14-00000

S E C R E T   SECRET   IN 30551 7

[illegible] 6129 A 69905 P ID 5275 7 P [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] 12 PLS /1 JIDYVIL/1 /31 /1 [illegible] 52 03 [illegible] [illegible]
NICARAGUA NOT SENT CISC MISEPET [illegible] FALLA NOT [illegible] [illegible]

MASPERO JOSE GOLDSACK EDUARDO GARCIA FULGENCIO PAREIRO /1 [illegible]

/1 NOT PRESENTLY /31 A GUATEMALA AUGUSTO ZONILLA NOT YET SANTO

DOMINGO /31 PANAMA CARACAS SANTIAGO 65 37 PERCENT CLASC /1 /1

/1 A /1 CHILEAN /1 CLASC CISC A A 1 [illegible] APONTE [illegible]

[illegible] MASPERO 14 COMITE UNITARIO DE SINDICALISTAS [illegible]

[illegible] ANTI SOUTH AMERICAN /1 LUIS QUIROGA JUAN ARCO ANTONIO

CARDOZO URUGUARY JOSE LARA SALCEDO BOLIVIA [illegible] A JOSE GOLDSACK

/1 EDUARDO GARCIA JOSE DE JESUS PLANAS HENRI MOLINA /31 /31

/1 /1 A I E /1 CAMPESINOS STUTH AMERICAN /1 NOT THERE LIMA

CISC MISEREOR NOT BEEN 8 /31 CLASC /1 ANDRES [illegible] /1

[illegible] LABOR ACLI ACLI /1 ACLI CIPW 24733 CLASC ACLI /1 CLASC

[illegible] AUGUSTO CIPRIANI PERU CISC /1 A /1 CISC NOT [illegible]
[illegible] /1 /1 /1 /1 OPS

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CA 2, CA/O 4, C/OA, FI,

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

71 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

SE C R E T 042124Z

PRIORITY BOGO INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 8213 (INGHURST ACTING)

DYVOUR JMDEVIL PBRUMEN

4 Jan 65 IN 26417

REF A. BOGO 6698 (IN 26107)

B. WAVE 7069 (IN 88240)

C. DIR 69005

D. WAVE 8379 (BEING RELAYED BOGO CARA) (IN 21016)

E. WAVE 8132 (IN 23524)

1. RE REF A, AMICE/31 IS IDEN A OF REF B. ALTHO HIS GROUP IS JMDEVIL AFFILIATE, AMICE/31 HAS NO OFFICIAL JMDEVIL POSITION. PER REF E, AMICE/31 INSTRUCTED CABLE MEDELLIN ADDRESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WAVE WILL ADVISE BOGO PRIORITY WHEN INFO RECEIVED. IN INTERIM BOGO MAY WISH ATTEMPT CONTACT CARE OF IDEN.

2. AMICE/31 WAS BRIEFED ON BASIS REF C PRIOR HIS 2 JANUARY BOGO DEPARTURE.

3. REF D, WHICH CONTAINS WAVE ASSESSMENT OF AMICE/31, BEING RELAYED FOR INFORMATION BOGO AND CARA.

211284

SECRET

201-

CFN: 8213 INGHURST ACTING 6698 7069 69005 8379 8132 RE A AMICE/31 A B AMICE/31 NO OFFICIAL E /31 MEDELLIN /31 C 2 D /31

SECRET

5 JAN 65

[illegible] ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM
JMWAVE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

7/ SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH/C8, CA 2, CA/04, C/CA FI

S E C R E T 042124Z

PRIORITY BOGO INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 8214 (INGHURST ACTING)

DYVOUR JMDEVIL PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 8213 (IN 26417)

IDEN: HELIODORO AGUEDELO

CALLE 70 A, NO. 51-70

MEDELLIN

4 JAN 66 IN 26411

S E C R E T

CFN: 8214 INGHURST ACTING 8213 HELIODORO AGUDELO CALLE 70 A NO. 51-70 MEDELLIN.

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

4/15 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM BOGOTA

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OA

SECRET 041444Z

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE BOGO 6698

4 Jan 66 IN 26107

26107

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL

PLS REPLY BOGO 6685. (IN 24114)*

SECRET

* REQUESTED TRUE NAME & POSITION OF AMICE/31 201-284658

CFN : 6698 PLS REPLY BOGO 6685.

BT

SECRET

4 JAN 1966

R. POLLARD
ORIG : J. DISTEFANO:bv
UNIT : WH/CA-CA/4
EXT : 5006
DATE : 30 DEC 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TOTAL COPIES 37

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : JMWAVE, LIMA, MEXICO CITY, BOGOTA, SANTIAGO, CARACAS, LCPIPIT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY, WH/C8, WE8, CA2, CA/O4, CA/PROP, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2

TO WAVE LIMA (PRIORITY) INFO MEXI BOGO SAGO CARA CITE DIR 69005
PALP (ROUTINE)

JMDEVIL/LIRAZZ

REF: A. PALP 4997 (IN 94537)(NOT SENT WAVE)
B. HMMA-27843 (NOT SENT WAVE)
C. WAVE 8136 (IN 23509) (NOT SENT OTHER ADDES)
D. LIMA 8202 (IN 23469) (SENT BOGO, SAGO ONLY)

~~LIRAZZ-1~~

1. FOLLOWING INTENDED PRIMARILY FOR WAVE AND LIMA BRIEFINGS/ REQUIREMENTS OF ~~DUBOLD-1~~ AND AMICE-31, BUT WILL ALSO SERVE OTHER ADDEES AS INTEL REPORTING GUIDELINE FOR JMDEVIL MEDELLIN MTG.

2. MOST SIGNIFICANT RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN JMDEVIL FIELD IS DECISION BY ZRGAMIN TO FUND JMDEVIL AFFILIATES DIRECTLY, THUS DEPRIVING JMDEVIL-1 OF HIS MOST WEIGHTY CLUB FOR KEEPING AFFILIATES IN LINE AND STIFLING ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO JMDEVIL-1 AND HIS POLICIES.

Do we have anything?

3. CURRENT INDICATION IS THAT ZRGAMIN STILL HOLDING TO REF A POSITION, THOUGH ~~JMDEVIL-1~~ XEXS CONTINUES ACT LIKE HE HAS FINAL SAY IN ALLOCATION OF ZRGAMIN FUNDS TO AFFILIATES. IN ABSENCE ANY HARD INTEL THAT ZRGAMIN HAS CHANGED ITS STANCE, WE CONCLUDE JMDEVIL-1 IS BLUFFING, BIDING TIME, XXXXXX MANEUVERING TO CREATE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

MESSAGE [illegible]
TOTAL COPIES:

XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

S E C R E T

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 69005

PAGE TWO

SITUATION AT MEDELLIN MTG WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY FORCE ZRGAMIN TO RETURN TO OLD PRACTICE OF FUNDING JMDEVIL AFFILIATES VIA JMDEVIL HQS.

4. NEW PROPOSED STATUTES THAT JMDEVIL WILL SUBMIT AT MEDELLIN (ATT TO REF B) CONTAIN SEVERAL TWISTS THAT APPEAR AIMED AT LIMITING AFFILIATE AUTHORITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION, PRESSURING ZRGAMIN TO REVERSE ITS REF A STAND, AND STRENGTHENING JMDEVIL-1 EXECUTIVE CONTROL. WE VIEW FOLLOWING AS MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGES THAT ASSETS SHOULD OPPOSE:

A. ARTICLE EIGHT G STIPULATES THAT ONLY JMDEVIL CAN REPRESENT AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS IN RELATIONS WITH HEMISPHERIC AND INTERNATIONAL ENTITITES. STRICTLY INTERPRETED, THIS ARTICLE BLOCKS DIRECT AFFILIATE RELATIONS WITH ZRGAMIN, THE GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (THRU THE INSTITUTE FOR INT. SOLIDARITY) AND THE GERMAN BISHOPS (THRU THE MISEREOR FUND). IF THIS ARTICLE APPROVED JMDEVIL-1 WOULD HAVE BASIS FOR ARGUING THAT ZRGAMIN RESCIND ITS DECISION TO FUND [illegible] AFFILIATES DIRECTLY, FOR SUCH ACTION [illegible] JMDEVIL [illegible]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER S E C R E T AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO   INFO   CITE DIR 65005

PAGE THREE

B. ART 15 CALLS FOR ALL AFFILIATES TO ACT IN CONSONANCE WITH THE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF JMDEVIL AS WELL AS THE DECISIONS OF THE CONGRESS, COUNCIL AND EXEC COMMITTEE. FAILURE TO COMPLY CAN RESULT IN SUSPENSION OF AFFILIATE BY ACTION OF EXEC COMMITTEE PENDING FINAL DECISION OF NEXT COUNCIL OR CONGRESS. EXEC COMMITTEE COULD PRESUMABLY SUSPEND AFFILIATE FOR DEALING WITH OR ACCEPTING SUBSIDY FROM INT ORGANIZATIONS IF ARTICLE EIGHT C APPROVED.

C. ARTICLE NINE A IMPLIES THAT CAMPESINO ORGANIZATIONS CANNOT EXIST AS ORGANICALLY SEPARATE ENTITIES. ARTICLE 12 APPEARS PERMIT THE EXISTENCE OF LIRAZZ WITHOUT NAMING IT, BUT ONLY IF ITS AFFILIATES ARE PART OF NATIONAL [illegible] AND THUS ALREADY AFFILIATED TO JMDEVIL. IN [illegible] THE [illegible] PROVISIONS APPEAR BE TO LIMIT LIRAZZ IN [illegible] WHICH VERY SORE POINT WITH [illegible]

D. ARTICLE 44 PROVIDES THAT [illegible] (WHICH INCLUDES LIRAZZ SEC GEN AND ASST SEC GEN) [illegible] RESIDE IN CITY WHERE JMDEVIL SECRETARIAT [illegible] LOCATED. [illegible] AIM

RELEASING OFFICER   S E C R E T   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUT NO			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 69005

PAGE FOUR

THIS ART IS TO CLOSE DOWN LIRAZZ OFFICES IN MEXICO CITY, BRING ITS OPERATIONS AND LEADERSHIP UNDER REPRESSIVE WING OF SECRETARIAT. JMDEVIL-1 TRIED THIS ONCE BEFORE AND FAILED. REAL BATTLE EXPECTED DEVELOP ON THIS ISSUE.

E. ARTS ONE AND TWO PROPOSE SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN STATUTES. NO MENTION IS MADE OF CHRISTIAN NATURE OR INSPIRATION OF AFFILIATES. IT WOULD NOW SUFFICE TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLES, PROGRAMS, AND STATUTES OF JMDEVIL TO GAIN AFFILIATION. IF APPROVED DOOR MIGHT BE OPENED TO X ASSORTED LEFT-LEANING GRPS WITHOUT CHRISTIAN LABEL.

5. FOLLOWING REPORTING OF PRIORITY INTEREST:

A. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT JMDEVIL-1 PLANNING OUST JMDEVIL PRESIDENT AND TREASURER. JMDEVIL-1 CHOICE AS NEW PRESIDENT WAS IDEN A BUT OPPOSITION TOO GREAT AND IDEN B (WHO REPORTEDLY GOOD MAN) NOW APPEARS HAVE INSIDE TRACK. IF IDEN B BECOMES PRESIDENT HE EXPECTED ASSIST [illegible] CARA. HQS BELIEVES CHANGE WILL MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE [illegible] POSTURE AS LONG AS JMDEVIL-1 [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 69005

PAGE FIVE

B. LISTING OF AFFILIATE LEADERS PRO AND CONTRA JMDEVIL-1. IF ZRGAMIN SUBSIDIZES INDIVIDUAL AFFILIATES BETWEEN NOW AND HOLDING OF CONGRESS (TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR MAY) CAN WE EXPECT NATIONAL LEADERS TO ORGANIZE FULL BLOWN CAMPAIGN TO DEPOSE JMDEVIL-1? IS THERE ~~XXXXXX~~ ANY ONE LEADER RECOGNIZED AS HEADING OPPOSITION TO JMDEVIL-1?

C. ARE LIRAZZ LEADERS GENERALLY MORE MILITANT IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO JMDEVIL-1 AND HIS POLICIES THAN OTHER AFFILIATE LEADERS? HOW STRONG IS CAMPESINO LEADERS' BELIEF THAT SPECIAL RURAL LABOR ~~D~~ PROBLEMS DEMAND HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY WITHIN JMDEVIL?

D. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WILL PROBABLY CONFER WITH ZRGAMIN LEADERS IN EUROPE FOLLOWING MEDELLIN MTG. DETAILS OF AGENDA, JMDEVIL-1 PLANNED TACTICS IN LIGHT OUTCOME MEDELLIN MTG REQUESTED.

E. JMDEVIL-1 ATTEMPTING REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON ZRGAMIN AND GERMANS. IS HE ATTEMPTING DEVELOP FRENCH, ITALIAN, OTHER SOURCES?

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXXXX

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 69005

PAGE SIX.

F. WHAT IS CONSENSUS OF AFFILIATE LEADERS RE DETERMINATION ZRGAMIN FUND AFFILIATES DIRECTLY? IF ZRGAMIN BACKS DOWN AND REVERTS TO OLD SYSTEM OF FUNDING THRU JMDEVIL HQS, WILL SOME AFFILIATES BE LIKELY DISAFFILIATE? WHICH ONES?

G. DID JMDEVIL PAY FOR TRAVEL AND ACCOMMODATIONS OF ALL DELEGATES TO MEDELLIN? IF SO WHAT IS SOURCE OF MONEY IN VIEW REPORTS JMDEVIL SUFFERING SERIOUS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND ZRGAMIN OPPOSED TO HOLDING MEDELLIN MTG?

H. DATE AND PLACE OF JMDEVIL CONGRESS?

6. WAVE: LYNER REGRETS UNABLE TRAVEL WAVE FOR BRIEFING AMICE-31.

7. BOGO OR CARA: WOULD BE MOST USEFUL OBTAIN DEBRIEFING AMICE-31 SOON AFTER TERMINATION MEDELLIN MTG, SINCE HE WILL BE ATTENDING MTGS IN CARA AFTER MEDELLIN AND WILL NOT RETURN WAVE UNTIL END JAN.

END OF MESSAGE

C/CA/4

JACOB D. ESTERLINE, C/WH

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

2 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Bogota

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C 8 CI/OA FI FI/INT 2

S
E C R E T 301719Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE BOGO 6685 201-284658 wh/c

30 DEC 65 IN 24114

PBRUMEN/JMDEVEL

REF: WAVE 8132 (23534)

1. REQUEST TRUE NAME AND POSITION IN CLASS OF AMICE-3.

2. STATION WILL CONTACT AMICE/3 IN MEDELLIN AS PER PARA 2 OF REF,

S E C R E T

CFN 6685 REF 8132 CLASS AMICE/31 3. MEDELLIN 2

BT

SECRET

3 JAN 1966

File

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

6 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
Bogota

ACTION
WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 3, CI/CA, CA 2, CA/O 4

S E C R E T [illegible]

WAVE INFO DIR CITE BOGO [illegible]

30 DEC 65 IN 23967

201-284658

JMDEVIL LIRAZZ

REF DIR 67459 *

PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T CFN

* ~~Re~~ AMICE-31 PARTICIPATION CLASC MEETING, HQS HAS NO OBJECTION BOGO CONTACT AMICE-31. DEFERRED TO WAVE FOR CONCURRENCE.

[illegible] 6688 REF DIR [illegible] PLS [illegible]

SECRET

3 JAN 1966

BT

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - SC#229427

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

TYPE OF REQUEST
☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CSC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY
(Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (*Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.*)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED
☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS
☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

/s/ Edward P. Brown RER
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

FORM 693 SECRET

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/C/RR/OA - W. Ullery

NUMBER
201- 284658

SUBJECT
AMICE/31

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated

CRM

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an ~~individual~~ as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Subject's POA is herewith extended until 30 September 1965 to allow additional time for the completion of the OA investigation.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Edward E. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	29 June 1965

FORM 1-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 29 JUN 1965

CASE NO.: 25465 8

SET UP FOR POA	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	EXPEDITE FBI INDICE / DATE
✓ [SET UP FOR OA]	SPECIAL INQUIRY	COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA

USE

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
✓	EXTEND POA ~~[illegible]~~ UNTIL 30 SEPT 65		REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
✓	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE: ☐ ATTACHMENT ☑ PRQ I		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*		REVIEW AT CI/OA: ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LEFLUTTER REPORT
	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE: ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE PRQ I & II
	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FIELD TRACES		NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
	REQUEST: ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

WH/C/RR/OA - W ULLERY

SUBJECT'S POA IS HEREWITH EXTENDED UNTIL 30 SEPT 1965 TO ALLOW ADDITIONAL TIME FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE OA INVESTIGATION.

SIGNATURE

☐ [illegible]

FORM 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(23)

SECRET

16 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMICE/31
201-284658

Attached herewith are two copies of Subject's PRQ Part I and one copy of a PRQ Part II. An OA is requested.

Joseph L. Moughton
for John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

FEB 17 5 4H '65

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att.

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

201 NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA".
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) (Nee)

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

[illegible]

5. DATE OF BIRTH

[illegible]

6. PLACE OF BIRTH

[illegible]

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

[illegible]

FEB 17 11 53 AM '65

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

[illegible]

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX ☐ M ☐ F

b. AGE

c. APPARENT AGE

d. HEIGHT FT IN

e. WEIGHT

f. COMPLEXION

g. FACE (Shape)

h. COLOR OF HAIR

i. COLOR OF EYES

j. TEETH

k. BUILD

l. POSTURE

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

[illegible]

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPHS AND FINGERPRINTS IF AVAILABLE

FORM 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10)*

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION

17. TITLE

18. SALARY *(Per annum)*

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

[illegible]

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
[illegible]	[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]			

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES. ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT*

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX				MARITAL STATUS							
31. CHECK ONE:	☐	SINGLE	☐	MARRIED	☐	WIDOWED	☐	SEPARATED	☐	DIVORCED	☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
36. DATE OF BIRTH	37. PLACE OF BIRTH
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*

SECTION X CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI FATHER

41. FULL NAME	42. YEAR OF BIRTH	43. PLACE OF BIRTH	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII MOTHER

48. FULL NAME	49. YEAR OF BIRTH	50. PLACE OF BIRTH	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

[illegible]

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

[illegible]

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

[illegible]

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

[illegible]

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE

SIGNATURE

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE **PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION**	PRQ NO. DISPATCH NO

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 5a 9, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I **CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT**

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Contacted by Keith C. Gonsiero in May 1964 when Subject was debriefed after his trip to Venezuela for May 1st celebration and [illegible] Congress.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject can be turned over to any Spanish speaking case officer

FEB 17 11 '65

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knows [illegible] as Mr. [illegible], and [illegible] in true name.

FORM 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(14-20)

SECRET

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. (*Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use only a comment such as "anti-communist".*)

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. (*If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.*)

[illegible]

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

[illegible] house.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

[illegible] member of [illegible] since 1947 and always [illegible]

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE (*Will work*) (*Is working*) [illegible]

[illegible] he is working for.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS (*Agents, relatives, friends*) WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

[illegible]

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

[illegible]

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

[illegible]

SECRET

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

[illegible] information [illegible] possible [illegible].

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

If employed [illegible] international labor organization or [illegible] of [illegible], he can supply information regarding its organization, personalities, inter-relationships, etc. [illegible] in an official capacity in liberated [illegible].

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

[illegible] in the labor field. [illegible]

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE.

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY.

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E., TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY. AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

SECTION IX	QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS
1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.	
SECTION X	COMMITMENTS
1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.	
2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)* [illegible]	
SECTION XI	CE AND SECURITY
1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS. [illegible] files.	
2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.	
3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED
5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE. [illegible]	
6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT. [illegible]	
SECTION XII	SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS
1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.	

SECTION XIII — AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

SECTION XIV — GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

[illegible]

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para 43b, supra)*

SECTION XV — EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, [illegible] WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE. WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/SA/IOS - W. Ullery

NUMBER
201 - 284658

SUBJECT
PICO Ramon, Reinaldo

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
22 January 1965 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA reinstated until 26 April 1965 to allow for submission of PRQ Part I and PRQ Part II on Subject per WH/SA/IOS request of 22 January 1965.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	26 January 1965

FORM 125

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 26 JAN 1965	CASE NO. 201- 284658

☐	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	
☐	SET UP FOR CA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
✓	REINSTATE POA FOR 90 DAYS UNTIL 26 APR 1965	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER
☐	POA EXPIRED __________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
☐	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

WH/SA/105-

POA REINSTATED UNTIL 26 APRIL 1965 TO ALLOW FOR SUBMISSION OF PRQ PARTS I & II ON SUBJ PER WH/SA REQUEST OF 22 JAN 1965.

SIGNATURE

☐

FORM 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

22 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT: Reinaldo PICO Ramon
201-284658
C-85445

Please reinstate Subject's POA for 60 days. A PRQ Part I and II was requested from the Field on 22 January 1965 via cable.

Joseph [illegible]
for John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WH(SA)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee

JAN 22 [illegible] '65

SECRET [illegible]

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 15 January 1965 Jb

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WH/SA/ICS

ATTENTION: Wendell Ullery

C# 201 - 284658

The file on PICO Ramon, Reinaldo is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		TO: 17 DEC 64	NO: 284658
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES · DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA
USE			

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ FLUTTER REPORT
✓	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE. ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER
☐	POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
✓	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 09 TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT		

REMARKS

15 JAN 1965

CANCELLED
[illegible] SECURITY

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SIGNATURE ☐

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 15 JUN 1964	CASE NO. [illegible] 284658	
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐ SET UP FOR CA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA
USE			

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☒	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ [illegible] REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

☐ POA EXPIRED ________________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

SO #224428

Leonard W. Tate

SIGNATURE

FORM 707 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK	DATE
TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS **FROM:** Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division	PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
SUBJECT: 201 -	

TYPE OF REQUEST								OS INDICES RESULTS BY	FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
☐	POA	☐	OA	☐	CNC	☐	SI	*(Date)*	*(Date)*

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS *(Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)*

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED				ATTACHMENTS					
☐	YES	☐	NO	☐	PRQ - PART I	☐	PARTIAL BIO	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE 10 JUN 1964

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results:

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 -

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

TYPE OF REQUEST: ☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CSC ☐ SI

CS INDICES RESULTS BY
(Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

d

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

4 JUN 1964

CASE NO.: C-55445

☒	SET UP FOR POA	☒	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE 11 June 64
☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES			DATE
☐	SET UP FOR OA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ AGENT NAME CHECK

AREA: Miami Area

CSI: PA/PROP asset

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER
☐	POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
☐	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

OS - Miami FBI no derogatory info
(Subject had POA previously)

Leonard W. Tate

FORM 707

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always hand carry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 2 June 1964

TO: XX C/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM:
Wendell Ullery
WH/SA/IO
G G 14

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Reinaldo PICO Ramon

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI OA FILE NO. C-85445

RI 201 FILE NO. 284658

SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL (RENEWAL)		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

JMWAVE area

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

PA/PROP asset - for use in Covert Action ops.

(DEADLINE - 11 June 64)

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. None

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? X YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 152512

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO. JMWAVE & MIAMI FBI		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Jerry Ott	7646	Bruce B. Cheever

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

PRQ PART I

NAME : Reinaldo PICO Ramon
DPOB : 21 July 1933, Regla, Havana, Cuba
OCCUPATION : Businessman
RESIDENCE : Miami, Fla.
SPOUSE : Carmen Marcela Pino
FATHER : Regino PICO
MOTHER : Maria de la Paz Ramon
PAST ACTIVITIES : Member of Brigade 2506; Member of the Prisoners Exchange Commission. Subject refused to return to Cuba after the negotiations failed.

SECRET

1 May 1961

Due to the cessation of JMATE activity CI/OA is suspending all processing of these cases until new interest is apparent.

THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4/C

Attn: Joseph Piccolo

NUMBER: C-85445

SUBJECT: Reinaldo PICO Ramon

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA originally granted on 14 Oct 1960 is hereby extended for a period of 180 days until 14 Oct 1961.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	18 April 1961 jfd

FORM 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE: 12 Apr 61	CASE NO. 25945

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR: ☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
X	EXTEND POA FOR 180 DAYS UNTIL 14 Oct 61		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM *(See "Remarks" for Reason)*		REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
	PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW		PREPARE —— COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
	FILE		NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
	TICKLE FOR:		OTHER

REMARKS:

SIGNATURE

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4/Cuba
Attn: Joseph Piccolo

NUMBER
C-85445

SUBJECT
Reinaldo PICO Ramon

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
21 September 1960

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Thomas Carroll Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	14 October 1960 ada

FORM 5-57 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 14/6-60

CASE NO. C-85445

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR: ☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
✓	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM *(See "Remarks" for Reason)*		REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
	PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW		PREPARE ---- COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
	FILE		NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
	TICKLE FOR:	✓	OTHER

REMARKS:

(POA-granted)

SIGNATURE

S E C R E T

DATE: 28 September 1960 ada

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C 85445
OS: 224428

Thomas Carroll Jr.

THOMAS CARROLL, JR
Chief, CI/OA

ATTACHMENTS. (if any) copy WH/4 memo dtd 26 Sept 60

S E C R E T

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 28 Sept 60

CASE NO.: C-35445

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitation or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR:
☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RI TRACES
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST FIELD TRACES
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES	REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
✓ FORWARD ~~ATTACHMENT~~ copy WH/4 memo TO SECURITY OFFICE	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM *(See "Remarks" for Reason)*	REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES	PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW	PREPARE —— COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
✓ FILE WH/4 memo dtd 26 Sept 60	NOTICE ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
TICKLE FOR:	✓ OTHER

REMARKS:

T - 5 Oct 60

SIGNATURE

SECRET

26 September 1956

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Drew Kohler

FROM : WH/4/Ops Support

SUBJECT : Reinaldo PICO y Ramon
C-85445

1. The following is the birth date of Subject received in correspondence subsequent to the original request for clearance that was forwarded to your office. It is requested that this information be included in your files.

(a) Date of birth: 21 July 1933

(b) Place of birth: Regla, Cuba

SEP 26 4 33 PM '56

Jacob D. Esterline
C/WH/4

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee

J. Piccolo/ds

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 21 Sept 60 per

PROJECT:

TO : Deputy Director of Security
ATTEN: Mr. Ralph Tobiassen 2625 e I"
FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : C 85445
NO.

1. TYPE OF REQUEST: only ☒ POA ☐ OA ☐ SPEC. INQ. ☐ CRC

2. METHOD OF HANDLING: ☐ EXPEDITE ☐ ROUTINE

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY: 22 Sept 60

4. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY (Date): 27 Sept 60

5. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT: WH/4/Cuba

6. USE OF SUBJECT: PM Agent

7. INVESTIGATION NOT TO REVEAL INTEREST OF: ☐ U. S. GOVERNMENT ☒ CIA ☐ SEE REMARKS

8. COVER SUGGESTED FOR INVESTIGATION: ☐ OFFICIAL ☐ COMMERCIAL
OTHER:

9. RESULTS OF TRACES

FIELD TRACES: ni of w

RI TRACES: ndi

DIVISION TRACES: ndi

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ-PART 1 ☒ OTHER: bio

12. REMARKS

JMARC

P.O.A.
EXPEDITE
CI/OA Advis:
Date:

Thomas Carroll Jr.
INITIALS

FORM 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 21 Sept 60	CASE NO

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

✓ SET UP FOR POA only ☑ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES [illegible] Sept ☑ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES 27 Sept 60

SET UP FOR:
☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RI TRACES
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST FIELD TRACES
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES	REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM *(See "Remarks" for Reason)*	REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES	PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW	PREPARE —— COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
FILE	NOTICE ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
TICKLE FOR	✓ OTHER

REMARKS:

Use: PM Agent

PRIORITY

2605 - I ([illegible])

H/C

JMARC

SIGNATURE

FORM 707

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form.)

DATE: [illegible]

TO:	☒	CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
	☐	Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: [illegible] J. Gorbare, Jr.
[illegible]
2115 Barton Hall
[illegible]

SUBJECT: (True name) Reinaldo PICO Ramon

PROJECT: JMARC

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Cuba

FULL DETAILS OF USE:

For use in JMARC PM Activities program.

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☐	YES	☒	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION:

None

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 104536

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☒	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED WITH EVALUATION	☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

NO RECORD	☒	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☐	NO RECORD	☒	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Reinaldo PICO Ramon

1934

Cuba

Cuban

Formerly held high office in Bus Worker's Union.
To be used in JMARC PM activities program.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

ORIG: Robert Bladergroen:new
UNIT: OGC
EXT: 7331
DATE: 30 June 1967 R-1835

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

RS SEC

CONF: OGC 2 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR . C/WH/COG 5, C/WH 6
C/CI, ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR

30 15 49Z

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE 15915

KAPOK TYPIC
AMCLEVE-15
REF DIRECTOR 15805

1. REQUEST STATION TRACES ALBERT LARRAIN MAESTRE.

2. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ADVISES HE A FUGITIVE UNDER NARCOTICS INDICTMENT AND ALLEGEDLY ADMITTED TO AMCLEVE-15 HIS INVOLVEMENT IN BOMBINGS WITH ROSENTHAL. REQUEST STATION COMMENT AMCLEVE-15 EVER RECEIVE SUCH ADMISSION FROM LARRAIN MAESTRE.

3. NO HQS TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED LCH CS

FROM 30

ACTION C/WH/COG 3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐

INFO FILE, VR, CSDO, C/WHG, C/CI, CA 2, ADDP.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

30 Jun 67 02 28

02284

S E C R E T 302022Z CITE JMWAVE 7953

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE/15

REFERENCE: A. DIRECTOR 15805

B. DIRECTOR 15915

1. ANSWERS KEYED TO QUESTIONS IN REF A AS FOLLOWS:

A. AMCLEVE/15 DID NOT VOLUNTEER SELF TO LOCAL FBI. HE DID REPORT TO JMWAVE, WHICH IN TURN INFORMED FBI. FBI THEN APPROACHED AMCLEVE/15 ON THEIR OWN DURING LATE JULY 65 AND QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT JULY 65 DEAL.

B&C. JMWAVE INFORMED FBI ON 24 JULY 65 (SEE A ABOVE)

D. SINCE AMCLEVE/15 FAILED TO REPORT OCT 66 TRANSACTION TO JMWAVE UNTIL 9 JUNE 67, FBI NOT NOTIFIED UNTIL 15 JUNE 67. (AMCLEVE/15'S EXPLANATION FOR NOT REPORTING OCT 66 TRANSACTION WAS THAT HE "JUST FORGOT")

E. SEE PARA 2 BELOW.

F. SOURCES WERE LOCATED IN THE MIAMI AREA ONLY.

G. AMCLEVE/15 CLAIMS HE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY MONEY FOR OCT 66 TRANSACTION; ONLY MONEY AMCLEVE/15 EVER REPORTED

SECRET

SECRET

RECEIVING WAS $500 FROM ROSENTHAL DURING JULY 65. ROSENTHAL HAD INSISTED AMCLEVE/15 TAKE $500; TO AVOID ANY ROSENTHAL SUSPICION OF AMCLEVE/15, LATTER WAS INSTRUCTED BY JMWAVE TO TAKE THE MONEY. AMCLEVE/15 WAS ALLOWED BY STATION TO KEEP THE $500.

2. AMCLEVE/15 UNABLE TO RECALL ALL DETAILS OF JULY 65 DEAL. AMCLEVE/15 CLAIMS HE ONLY PASSED TO DIEGO (BORGES) TORRES (201-284161) 6 GRENADES WHICH AMCLEVE/15 OBTAINED FROM HERMINIO (DIAZ) SANDALIO (201-203040). BORGES IN TURN PASSED THEM TO ROSENTHAL. (BORGES AND NORMAN ROTHMAN WERE ACTING AS AGENTS FOR ROSENTHAL). FRANCISCO (RODRIGUEZ) TAMAYO (201-293114) MADE SILENCERS. RODRIGUEZ AND AMCLEVE/15 JOINTLY DELIVERED THEM TO BORGES. JMWAVE RECORDS DO NOT SHOW WHERE DIAZ OBTAINED THE GRENADES.

3. AS REPORTED IN REF AMCLEVE/15 IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE FBI AND FOLLOWING THEIR INSTRUCTIONS RE ROSENTHAL.

4. ~~RE REF B. NO JMWAVE TRACES LARRAIN. AMCLEVE/15~~
REPORTED
~~LARRAIN INFO TO FBI 2W TO JMWAVE ON 27~~ JUNE 67 ~~7,3 67~~ OL STATING ~~HOWEVER THAT~~
~~IT WAS ONE DOMINGO (ECHEMENDIA)~~
~~ESCALANTE (201-297940)~~ ~~WHO HAD SAID THAT~~ LARRAIN WAS IN CHARGE
2 9 US 55 5-5)-44-8, 2- 8, : -4&3

PARA 4

"AMCLEVE/15 REPORTED LARRAIN INFO TO FBI AND TO JMWAVE ON 27 JUNE 67 STATING, HOWEVER THAT IT WAS ONE DOMINGO (ECHEMENDIA) ESCALANTE (201-297940) WHO HAD SAID THAT"

SECRET

PAGE.
0-83 3 JMWAVE 7953 S E C R E T

OF BOMBINGS AND ROTHMAN WAS THE BOSS.

5. WOULD APPEAR HQS JUSTICE QUERIES BASED ON FBI REPORTING FROM MIAMI. WOULD IT BE OF ANY HELP IF WE GOT TOGETHER WITH BUREAU HERE TO RESOLVE IN LOCO (INFO HQS) ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

S E C R E T

BT

* PORTION GARBLED BEING SVCD

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

KAPOK DESENSITIZED

WH/COG

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC
AMCLEVE/15 Contact with Frank "Lefty" ROSENTHAL

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: JMWAVE-7900, 27 June 1967.

Transmitted under separate cover per reference are copies of three JMWAVE memoranda to the FBI dated 24 July and 11 August 1965, and 15 June 1967. Subject: Procurement of Arms and Munitions by American Group.

Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachments - USC
Memos (3)

Distribution:
3/- WH/COG

CS COPY FILED IN 14-2-4

File in
201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFCA-27903

DATE
JUN 30 1967
29 June 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DESENSITIZED KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-132-5-192/4

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 6

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: R.A. Ortman:jeb
UNIT: WH/COG/MO
EXT: 7451
DATE: 29 June 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR C/CI, OGC 2, C/WH/6
ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

29 23 07 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 15805

TO JMWAVE

PRIORITY KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE/15

REF: JMWAVE 7900 (IN 00397)

1. FOLLOWING QUERIES FROM JUSTICE DEPARTMENT HAVE EMERGED FROM MEETINGS WITH OFFICE GENERAL COUNSEL. REQUEST REPLIES SOONEST.

A. DID AMCLEVE/15 VOLUNTEER HIMSELF TO LNERGO OR DID THEY APPROACH HIM INITIALLY. DATE FIRST AMCLEVE/15 CONTACT LNERGO.

B. WHO INFORMED LNERGO OF JULY 1965 DEAL. AMCLEVE/15 OR JMWAVE.

C. ON WHAT DATE WAS LNERGO INFORMED.

D. SAME INFO B AND C ABOVE FOR OCTOBER 1966 TRANSACTION.

E. WHAT WERE AMCLEVE/15'S SOURCES FOR ITEMS OR COMPONENTS.

F. WERE THOSE SOURCES WITHIN OR WITHOUT STATE OF FLORIDA.

G. JUSTICE HAS INFO TO EFFECT THAT AMCLEVE/15 MADE PROFIT ON OCTOBER 1966 TRANSACTION WHICH HE ATTEMPTED TURN IN

-CONTINUED-

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________ #________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 15805

TO

TO "THE COMPANY" WITHOUT SUCCESS. PLEASE COMMENT.

2. ALSO PLEASE ELABORATE ON STATEMENT PARA 2 REF THAT "PER JMWAVE INSTRUCTIONS AMCLEVE/15 COOPERATED WITH BORGES AND ROSENTHAL BY ACTING AS INTERMEDIARY IN PASSING SILENCERS AND GERNADES."

3. JUSTICE HAS SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY USE AMCLEVE/15 TO ASSIST ROSENTHAL OBTAIN ADDITIONAL MATERIAL AS BASIS FOR ARREST OF ROSENTHAL FOR HAVING POSSESSION OF SUCH MATERIALS. APPRECIATE JMWAVE COMMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

OGC Mr. Bladergroen (draft)

C/WH/COG/CICS Mr. Mahoney (draft)

by Jacob D. Esterline
William V. Broe
C/WHD

Earl J. Williamson
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION B[illegible]HER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS P[illegible]ITED.

COPY

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-284161
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION
RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME 1845 | BY

INFO
FILE [illegible] OGC 2

AN | PD | WH/COG
~~PS~~ | ~~DESS~~ |
ABSTRACT X | INDEX

S E C R E T 272015Z CITE JMWAVE 7980

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED

~~KAPOK~~ TYPIC AMCLEAVE/15

28 Jun 67 IN 00397

REF DIRECTOR 14671

1. AMCLEVE/15 CURRENTLY COOPERATING WITH LOCAL FBI IN INVESTIGATION OF FRANK "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL.

2. AMCLEVE/15 INITIALLY BECAME INVOLVED WITH ROSENTHAL IN JULY 65 WHEN DIEGO EMILIANO (BORGES) TORRES (201-284161) INTRODUCED HIM TO ROSENTHAL AND NORMAN ROTHMAN. (BORGES WAS AGENT FOR ROSENTHAL IN PURCHASE OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES). PER JMWAVE INSTRUCTIONS AMCLEVE/15 COOPERATED WITH BORGES AND ROSENTHAL BY ACTING AS INTERMEDIARY IN PASSING SILENCERS AND GRANADES FROM HERMINIO (DIAZ) SANDALIO (201-203040) AND FRANCISCO (RODRIGUEZ) TAMAYO (201-293114) TO BORGES WHO IN TURN PASSED THE MATERIAL TO ROSENTHAL.

3. LOCAL FBI WAS NOTIFIED AT THE TIME BUT AFTER ABOUT ONE WEEK JMWAVE INSTRUCTED AMCLEVE/15 TO WITHDRAW HAVING DISCOVERED THAT GROUP WITH WHICH

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Desensitize
Signed:
R.O. # WH/COG
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

AN | ~~PI~~ | WH/FE6C
~~PS~~ | ~~DESS~~ |
ABSTRACT X | ~~INDEX~~

201-284161
28 June 67

HE WAS IN CONTACT WAS COMPOSED OF GANGSTER ELEMENTS.

4. FROM JULY 65 TO CIRCA OCT 66 AMCLEVE/15 NOT INVOLVED WITH ROSENTHAL ALTHOUGH AT VARIOUS TIMES ROSENTHAL CALLED AMCLEVE/15 AND ASKED HIS HELP OBTAIN WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES WHICH AMCLEVE/15 REFUSED. AROUND OCT 66 ROSENTHAL CONTACTED AMCLEVE/15 AT LATTERS RESIDENCE AND THREATENED HIM BECAUSE EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY BORGES TO ROSENTHAL WAS FAULTY. AMCLEVE/15 THEN MADE AND GAVE ROSENTHAL 120 PENCILS AND 50 FUSE DEVICES WHICH SEEMED TO SATISFY ROSENTHAL.

5. AMCLEVE/15 DID NOT REPORT PARA FOUR ABOVE TO JMWAVE UNTIL 9 JUNE 67 AFTER ROSENTHAL HAD AGAIN CONTACTED HIM ON 6 JUNE 67, THREATENED HIM AND ASKED HIM FOR MORE EQUIPMENT. LOCAL FBI WAS ADVISED BY JMWAVE ON 15 JUNE 67 OF AMCLEVE/15 ROSENTHAL CONTACTS OF OCT 66 AND 6 JUNE 67.

6. AS REPORTED IN PARA 3 OF REF AMCLEVE/15 CURRENTLY TRYING TO SUPPLY ROSENTHAL UNDER INSTRUCTIONS LOCAL FBI. FBI HAS PROMISED MAXIMUM SECURITY AND

PROTECTION FOR AMCLEVE/15. FBI HAS NOT NOTIFIED LOCAL POLICE DUE POSSIBILITY POLICE PENETRATED BY GANGSTER ELEMENT.

7. AMCLEVE/15 CLAIMS NONE OF MATERIAL PREVIOUSLY SUPPLIED ROSENTHAL WAS OF WOFACT ORIGIN; HE ALSO CLAIMS HE NEVER SUPPLIED ROSENTHAL WITH C-4 EXPLOSIVES.

8. NO ADDITIONAL JMWAVE INFO ROSENTHAL AND ROTHMAN. NO OPS INTEREST BORGES RODRIGUEZ. DIAZ DECEASED.

9. POUCHING HQS COPIES OF JMWAVE MEMOS TO FBI UFGA-27888.

S E C R E T

BT

201-254161
2 June 67

SECRET

28 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luis Clemente POSADA-Carriles

REFERENCES: a. Memo for Record, 26 June 1967, by LRH, same subject
b. Williamson/Henze Telephone Conversation, 28 June 1967

1. In my meeting with the Department of Justice today, I confirmed that POSADA-Carriles was our man. I outlined the preliminary information we had developed on the transactions between him and one Lefty Rosenthal.

2. Justice was advised that our information disclosed that POSADA-Carriles had passed silencers and grenades to Rosenthal during July 1965, and that in October 1966 he had furnished pencils and fuses. I also stated that it was our understanding that POSADA-Carriles was in contact with FBI/Miami and that it had been advised of these dealings. Justice was told that the items involved were not of Agency origin. It was emphasized, however, that this was our preliminary conclusion and that we would undertake to verify it.

3. Justice acknowledged that FBI reporting disclosed POSADA-Carriles as its contact but apparently the details are somewhat vague. To make a federal case against Rosenthal because of his suspected involvement in the bombings, it will be necessary to show that the items used were obtained through interstate commerce. A preliminary reading suggests prosecution under Title 18 Section 837. Out of concern for the allegation of entrapment, Justice asked that

but it after [illegible]
not the same [illegible]
[illegible]

we supply answers to the following: (a) did POSADA-Carriles volunteer himself to the FBI or did it approach him initially; (b) who informed the FBI of the July 1965 deal - the Agency or POSADA-Carriles; (c) on what date was this information given; (d) similarly as regards the October 1966 transaction, the date the information furnished and by whom; (e) what were POSADA-Carriles sources for the items or their components; (f) were these sources within or without the State of Florida? And incidentally were we aware that supposedly POSADA-Carriles realized a "profit" for furnishing the October 1966 items and that he tried without success to turn it into the "company"? While I agreed to undertake to obtain the information requested, I suggested that much of it might be readily available from the FBI. Justice conceded this and intends to have further discussions with it.

4. During the course of the meeting the interesting hypothesis was suggested to the effect that POSADA-Carriles might have been "moonlighting" for Rosenthal, and only when he began to feel the pressure did he start reporting to the Agency and the FBI.

5. Under strictly controlled conditions with POSADA-Carriles acting as a conduit, Justice is considering the possibility of assisting Rosenthal to obtain his needed items, whereupon he will be arrested immediately for possession. I told them while we might be willing to have POSADA-Carriles so used we were understandably concerned over the adverse comment that our employee's involvement could generate.

6. On a matter that may be related: one Albert LARRAIN Maestre is alleged to have admitted to POSADA-Carriles that he has been involved in the bombings with Rosenthal and to have said more explosives were needed. LARRAIN Maestre is a fugitive under a narcotics indictment having formerly resided at 153 East 57th Street, New York, New York. Do we have any information on this person?

ROBERT J. BLADERGROEN
Assistant General Counsel

OGC:RJB:mej
Distribution:
Original - Subject
1 - Signer
1 - Chrono

WILLIAMSON NOTES ON
28 JUNE TELECON W. HENZE

AMCLEVE/15 currently cooperaing FBI

Became involed R July 65

On station instructions cooperated as intermediary in passing stuff--
silencers and grenades--at that FBI informed

Instructed to withdraw

Until Oct 66 -- was threatened -- asked to make or obtain

At this point he made certain things 150 pencils. Did not tell
station until fairly recently

Then put in touch with LNERGO 6 June told 9 June told FBI 15 June
$350.00

FBI man called up north

15 wants their assistance "to disappear"

Probably not losing a great deal

RE DRAFT

28 June 1967

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation - Williamson/Hense, 1015 hours, 28 June 1967

NoT
28 Ju

1. Station reply sent 1640 hours 27 June (JMWAVE 7900).

2. AMCLEVE/15 currently on Station roles at $350 per month. He has been cooperating with FBI.

3. During July 1965, 15 introduced to Rosenthal by third party. On Station instructions he cooperated with Rosenthal acting as intermediary in passing to him silencers and grenades. FBI informed.

4. In accordance with Station instructions, 15 broke off contact with Rosenthal.

5. On October 1966, 15 recontacted by Rosenthal. Rosenthal demanded he make or obtain additional items threatening him with bodily harm and also complaining previous items faulty. Whereupon 15 furnished Rosenthal 150 pencils and some fuses. Station only recently advised of this transaction and 15 put in contact with FBI.

6. Items furnished July 1965 and October 1966 transactions not Agency origin.

7. On 6 June, 15 again contacted by Rosenthal.

8. On 9 June, 15 reported Rosenthal contact to Station.

9. On 15 June, Station advised FBI.

RE DRAFT

10. 15 wants Station assistance in doing a disappearing act.

11. 15's FBI contact now in Washington for discussions re this case.

12. Re proposal para 3 DIR 14671, Henze's immediate reaction this probably OK and we not using much but would want to check it further.

ROBERT J. BLADERGROEN
Assistant General Counsel

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ORIG: Robert Ortman:now
UNIT: WH/COG/PO
EXT: 7451/1948
DATE: 26 June 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ____ #____

CONF: C/WH/COGS ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CA
CICS
MO
CI/OS
RR
CI/PI
SS
RS
ESEC

INFO: FILE , VR c/WH6, c/ci, c/FI2, c/FI/INT, DDP, ADDP, OGC2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

SECRET 27 00 00Z CITE DIRECTOR 14671

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE

RYBAT AMCLEVE-15

IMMEDIATE HANDLING

1. DEPARTMENT JUSTICE INVESTIGATING ONE LEFTY ROSENTHAL BELIEVED TIED IN WITH MIAMI CRIME FIGURES AND INVOLVED IN SEVEN RECENT BOMBINGS MIAMI AREA.

2. ROSENTHAL ALLEGEDLY APPROACHED U.S. CITIZEN NORMAN ROTHMAN IN DOMREP WHO PUT HIM IN TOUCH AMCLEVE-15 WHOM ROSENTHAL KNOWS TO BE AFFILIATED WOFACT. ROSENTHAL CLAIMS AMCLEVE-15 SUPPLIED HIM WITH CAPS PRIMERS AND C-4 EXPLOSIVES ALSO CLAIMS OFFERED TO DISCUSS BACKGROUND BOMBINGS, WHO INVOLVED, AND WHY, WITH AMCLEVE-15 BUT LATTER INDICATED NO INTEREST.

3. ROSENTHAL REPORTEDLY ASKING AMCLEVE-15 TO SUPPLY 240 POUNDS C-4 WITH CAPS AND PRIMERS BY 1 JULY 67.

4. LOCAL POLICE INVESTIGATING SEVEN BOMBINGS BUT NOT AWARE FOREGOING DETAILS RELATIVE AMCLEVE-15.

5. APPRECIATE PRIORITY COMMENTS INCLUDING ~~[illegible]~~ ANY POSSIBILITY MATERIAL GIVEN ROSENTHAL COULD BE WOFACT ORIGIN.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 14671

TO

6. PREFER NO DISCUSSION WITH LOCAL LNERGO AT THIS TIME.

7. NO IDENTIFIABLE HQS TRACES ROSENTHAL. NUMEROUS LNERGO REPORTS CITE ROTHMAN FOR GAMBLING, GUN RUNNING AND OTHER SHADY ACTIVITIES IN U.S., CUBA AND MEXICO INCLUDING EFFORTS ESTABLISH ANTI-CASTRO BASE IN YUCATAN.

END OF MESSAGE

by

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WH/COG/MO

OGC (Mr. Bladergroen in draft)

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

26 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luis Clemente POSADA-Carriles

1. The Department of Justice has been investigating one Lefty Rosenthal whom they believe to be tied in with key members of organized crime in the Miami area and who also they believe has been involved in seven recent bombings in the Miami area. According to the information the Department has gotten so far, Rosenthal went to a United States citizen named Norman Rothman in the Dominican Republic and through him directly or indirectly through a person known as Diego, Rosenthal was put in touch with Luis Clemente Posada-Carriles, Alien Registration Number A-12419708, 263 S.W. 26th Street, Miami. Rosenthal understands that Posada-Carriles is attached to CIA and claims that Posada-Carriles supplied him with caps, primers and C-4 explosives. Rosenthal is reported to have offered to talk to Posada-Carriles about the background of the bombings and who was involved and why, but Posada-Carriles said he had no interest in the background.

2. Rosenthal is reported to be asking Posada-Carriles to supply 240 pounds of C-4 explosives with caps and primers by Saturday and has told Posada-Carriles that twenty more bombings are scheduled. The local police are investigaging the seven bombings which have taken place and do not know this other background material.

3. Justice would very much like to have Rosenthal prosecuted and accordingly would like to have the explosives delivered to Rosenthal but to have 99% of it faulty and have the state prosecute him on the possession of the 1% of valid explosives. The Justice Department has a report from the

Bureau's Security Squad reporting to the Bureau's Organized Crime Division which states that Posada-Carriles is a CIA Agent in a GS status.

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

Luis Posada Carriles
2 Feb 61 to Mexico, entered US 28 Feb 61 as
exile from Argentine embassy
18 april 61 to Guat for 2506 training
27 april 61 ret to US via Guantanamo

Dec 64 gunner on M/V Venus based Puerto Rico
target was raid on Oriente

1964-65 Santo Domingo
Mar 63 - Mar 64 Fort Benning, Ga - 2nd Lt
May 64 in Polk City Fla as instructor at Juro Toro

April 65 employed by JMWAVE instructor in
Maritime training, informant Alejos - Guat

SECRET

TO : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO: Chief of Station, London
: Chief, European Division

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC [illegible] AMRIVER [illegible]
: Declining Importance of MINCEX In Cuban Government

4 P

During JMWAVE debriefing on 11 April 1967, AMRIVER-1 provided the following information on the above subject:

1. As of March 1967, the role of MINCEX in the Cuban Government, including the Commercial Office in London, was less important than it had been two years earlier. During those two years, MINCEX lost a substantial portion of its functions and operating elements. Beginning early in 1966, Cubana de Aviacion made its own purchases abroad without the assistance of the MINCEX Commercial Offices. CUBATABACO, formerly an operating element of MINCEX, was abolished late in 1966 and its functions were taken over by an independent enterprise called Empresa Cubana del Tabaco with headquarters in Havana. In April 1967, CUBARTIMPEX, an operating element of MINCEX, was scheduled to be abolished and replaced by Instituto del Libro with headquarters in Havana. In January and February 1967, the CCC was studying the feasibility of transferring CUBAZUCAR, an operating element of MINCEX, to the Sugar Ministry.

SOURCE COMMENT: This trend of events appears to indicate that in the future MINCEX functions will be further reduced and possibly even eliminated completely.

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - WH/COG
2 - Chief, EUR Division
2 - COS, London

CS COPY

DATE TYPED 26 Apr 67	DATE DISPATCHED MAY 3 1967
CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-747424	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27448
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 10 - 120 - 31

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

2. During 1966 and early 1967 various GOC enterprises sent their own purchasing missions to London thereby eliminating the need for the Commercial Office to make purchases for them. For example, the Basic Chemistry Mission headed by Francisco *CORRAL Pico and Rafael *CASTILLO (not Unk) arrived in London late in 1965 to make chemical purchases. Late in 1966, the Cuban Telephone Company sent Roberto *POSADA Carrilos to shop in London for telephone equipment and supplies. In February 1967, a mission from the Ministry of Construction arrived in London to purchase heavy construction equipment. This mission was headed by Fernando *POMARES Hernandez.

3. The chain of events which heralded the reduction in importance of the Commercial Office in London began with the assignment of persons of a much lower level of competence than those who preceded them. Examples of persons recently assigned to the Commercial Office in London who had only six or seven years of schooling and little or no experience in foreign trade or business are Marcos *PEREZ Puig, representative of CUBAZUCAR; Orlando *ROMERO Crespo, representative of MEDICUBA, QUIMPORT and acting representative of CUBATEX and CONSUMIMPORT; and Ruben *GUAL Yero, representative of MAQUIMPORT and FERRIMPORT. The qualification of PEREZ apparently was that he was a member of the Communist Youth organization, and the qualifications of ROMERO and GUAL apparently were that they were Communist Party members.

4. Significant JMWAVE Traces:

Marcos PEREZ Puig: AMOT report //AA-4487 67: In October 1966, Subject was a Regional Director of the National Institute of Hydraulic Resources.

Orlando ROMERO Crespo: Traces provide no additional significant information.

Ruben GUAL Yero: AMOT report EE-6285 17 January 1967; according to the official Gazette Subject was assigned to the following positions: Manager Hoffman Machine Company 20 November 1961 to 21 March 1962; Manager Hardware Unit H-24 March 1962 to August 1962.

Francisco CORRAL Pico: AMOT reports AA-4237, 14 October 1966: Subject was Supply Chief of the Consolidated Basic Chemical Enterprise. He went to England and France in November 1965 as a member of a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Industry to buy raw materials. PCC member. Fanatic supporter of the regime.

Roberto POSADA Carrilos: AMBLAST-13 debriefing report of 20 April 1967- In March 1967 Subject was Chief of the Special Area of the Cuban Telephone Company in charge of classified and sensitive telephones.

Fernando POMARES Hernandez: No identifiable traces.

Rafael CASTILLO: OSMA-16398, 13 Dec 1963: Regime supporter employed at the Havana telephone plant.

Mark F. ENFIELD

CONTINUATION OF [illegible]
[illegible]

S E C R E T

[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS: [illegible] "ACTION" [illegible]

SURNAME [illegible]	GIVEN NAME Marcos	MIDDLE NAME [illegible]	201- [illegible]
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION [illegible]	RESIDENCE	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: In October 1966 Subject was a Regional Director of the National Institute of Hydraulic Resources.

Member of Communist Youth organization is Subjects only apparent qualification for this job. [illegible]

SURNAME [illegible]	GIVEN NAME Orlando	MIDDLE NAME [illegible]	201- [illegible]
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH [illegible]	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP [illegible]	OCCUPATION [illegible]	RESIDENCE	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN) [illegible]			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [illegible]

Appears to be qualified for this position because he is a Communist Party Member. This is only apparent qualification.

SURNAME [illegible]	GIVEN NAME Ruben	MIDDLE NAME [illegible]	201- 815 [illegible]
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION [illegible] and [illegible]	RESIDENCE	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [illegible]

Member of Communist Party seems to be only qualification for job.

~~According to the official Gazette Subject has held following positions: Manager [illegible] Machine Company, 20 Nov 61 - 21 Mar 62, Manager [illegible] - 24, [illegible] Aug 62.~~

SURNAME [illegible]	GIVEN NAME Francisco	MIDDLE NAME [illegible]	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION Supply Chief of [illegible]	RESIDENCE	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN) [illegible]			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Subject went to England and France in November 1965 as a member of a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Industry to buy raw materials. PCC member. Fanatic supporter of the regime.

SURNAME [illegible]	GIVEN NAME Roberto	MIDDLE NAME [illegible]	201- [illegible]
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [illegible] Construction which arrived in London to purchase [illegible] construction equipment [illegible]

[illegible]

S E C R E T

[illegible] of 4

SECRET

SURNAME | GIVEN NAME | MIDDLE NAME | 201-
[illegible] Fernando

SEX | DATE OF BIRTH | COUNTRY OF BIRTH | CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M

CITIZENSHIP | OCCUPATION | RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES • STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
In February 1967, a mission from the Ministry of Construction arrived in London to purchase heavy construction equipment. This mission was headed by Subject.

SURNAME | GIVEN NAME | MIDDLE NAME | 201-760-201
CASTILLO Rafael

SEX | DATE OF BIRTH | COUNTRY OF BIRTH | CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M | | [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP | OCCUPATION | RESIDENCE
| [illegible]

OTHER NAMES • STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION [illegible]
Arrived in London late in 1966 to make chemical purchases.
Regime supporter employed at the Havana telephone plant.

SURNAME | GIVEN NAME | MIDDLE NAME | 201-

SEX | DATE OF BIRTH | COUNTRY OF BIRTH | CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP | OCCUPATION | RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES • STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

SURNAME | GIVEN NAME | MIDDLE NAME | 201-

SEX | DATE OF BIRTH | COUNTRY OF BIRTH | CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP | OCCUPATION | RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES • STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING
ACTION
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSERVE/YOCARD/Operational
Debriefing of Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: YOCARD Input

3

1. Attached herewith is a debriefing report received from AMFAST/13 on 20 April 1967 containing information on the following:

a. Roberto *POSADA Carriles: a DSE agent and Cuban Telephone Company employee; supervisor for "Area Norte" which is responsible for Havana City and employed at "Area Especial".

b. Pedro *DIEU: a DSE agent and Cuban Telephone Company employee; chief of installations and maintenance of "Area Norte" which is responsible for Havana City.

c. Jesus *BELTRAN: a DSE and PCC member, employed as an installer and repairman at "Area Especial" of the Cuban Telephone Company in Vedado, Havana.

d. Information on "Area Especial" department of the Cuban Telephone Company in Vedado, Havana.

2. The source of the report, Lazaro Armando *HERNANDEZ Perez, A 17 405 510, arrived in the United States from Cuba via the airlift on 14 April 1967. Source was employed as an installer and repairman of telephone equipment for the Cuban Telephone Company in Havana City from January 1959 to 6 February 1967.

3. JMWAVE trace results are as follows:

a. Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez: no traces

b. Roberto POSADA Carrilles: Cuban Telephone Company employee since 1952. He is the brother of AMCLEVE/15 and the Subject of a JMWAVE PERS file.

CS COPY

Attachments - herewith
1. Debriefing Report
2. Input Forms

Distribution
3 - WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO
19-5-30

DATE TYPED
25 Apr 67

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 27 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27444

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
019-120-10-71/4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	SECRET	UFGA-27494

c. Pedro DIBU: no traces.

d. Jesus BELTRAN: no traces.

4. The information concerning the "Area Especial" department of the Cuban Telephone Company was passed to the Reports Branch of JMWAVE for possible dissemination.

5. Eight machine input forms are attached herewith.

for Gary L. Fleutchoff
Mary F. EFFIELD

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27444

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME HERNANDEZ Perez	GIVEN NAME Lazaro	MIDDLE NAME Armando	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 17 December 1937	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Artemisa
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION Refugee		RESIDENCE Elizabeth, NJ

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Arrived US from Cuba via the airlift on 14 April 1967; [illegible]

2

SURNAME POSADA Carriles	GIVEN NAME Roberto	MIDDLE NAME	201-
[redacted] M	DATE OF BIRTH ca 1930	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Las Villas Prov.
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION Cuban Tel. Co. official		RESIDENCE Marianao, Havana

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
DSS [illegible], supervisor for "Area Norte" which is responsible for Havana City and is employed at "Area Especial" located at 19th St. corner of B St., Vedado, Havana.

3

SURNAME DIEU	GIVEN NAME Pedro	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH ca 1917	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION Cuban Tel Co. employee		RESIDENCE Havana

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
DSS agent, chief of installations and maintenance of "Area Norte" which is responsible for Havana City. PCC member.

4

SURNAME [illegible]LTRAN	GIVEN NAME [illegible]	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH ca 1921	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION Cuban Tel Co. employee		RESIDENCE Marianao, Havana

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
[illegible] and PCC member; emplyed as an installer and repairman at "Area Especial" of the Cuban Telephone Company in Vedado, Havana.

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

ATTACHMENT TO UFGA-27444

Debriefed = 17 April 67
Report = 20 April 67
page 1

(7)

8 P

SUBJECT: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Province
Alien Registration #A17-405-510

1.- Debriefer contacted HERNANDEZ, instructed by C/O, to find out if HERNANDEZ could provide information on one Roberto POSADA Carriles.

2.- HERNANDEZ arrived in Miami, on 14 April 1967, via US sponsored airlift.

3.- HERNANDEZ was claimed by his wife's aunt, Amparo MARTINEZ Cavia, who arrived in the US in circa 1951 and resides at 1659-West, 3rd. Avenue, Hialeah, Fla.

4.- HERNANDEZ is married to Esther Consuelo MIGUEL Martinez (DPOB: 14 September 1939, Havana, Havana Province). They are temporarily residing at 1659-West, 3rd. Avenue, Hialeah, phone number 885-2327. HERNANDEZ will depart (date not set yet) for: c/o (sister) Elvira HERNANDEZ Perez, 364-Williamson street, Elizabeth, New Jersey.

5.- Since 1958 up to April 1967, HERNANDEZ resided at Santa Irene #26, Santos Suarez, Havana.

6.- On 22 October 1957, HERNANDEZ started to work for the Cuban Telephone Company in Havana employed as laborer. During August 1958, after undergoing a training sponsored by the enterprise, HERNANDEZ was promoted as assistant-installer-repairman of telephone equipment within the telephone company. In early 1959, he was promoted as "operador" (installer and repairman of telephone equipment) position which he held up to 6 February 1967. HERNANDEZ claims that even though he had presented his application to leave the country since 18 May 1966, he did not inform the telephone company of his plans to leave until 4 February 1967. On 6 February 1967, HERNANDEZ resigned from the telephone company.

7.- As a telephone company worker, HERNANDEZ operated from "area norte" (north area-which includes all Havana city) with offices at 19th street corner of B street, Vedado. HERNANDEZ claims that as installer and repair-man he never was involved in "bugging" or installment of any kind of special equipment, because this task was assigned to another group that operates from "area especial" (special area) which is located at 19th street corner of C street, Vedado. Since 1963 up to 1965, HERNANDEZ was assigned to work at Plaza Civica (now Plaza de la Revolucion) where he repaired and installed telephones for: MININD, INRA, Ministry of Communication, Ministry of Transportation, MINCONS and for the Public Library. In early 1966, before the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the MININT, were moved to the Plaza Civica, HERNANDEZ was told that if he wanted to keep his job, at Plaza Civica, he had to become fully integrated with the G-2, when HERNANDEZ refused he was transferred and assigned to service private residences.

8.- Since 1956 up to January 1959, HERNANDEZ was a 26th of July member, in the propaganda section, selling bonus and delivering propaganda.

(over to 2)

8.(Continued)
SUBJECT: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration #A17-405-510

9.- HERNANDEZ claims that he never belonged to any GOC organization.

10.- In April 1961, during the Bay of Pigs Invasion, HERNANDEZ was detained for 11 days at Principe prison in Havana, for not been pro-GOC. On 18 September 1962, HERNANDEZ and seven others were caught when they stole an INIT boat and attempted to escape from Cuba by Guanabo beach, Guanabacoa, Havana. This time, HERNANDEZ was detained (together with his companions) for a month and a half at DSE offices, Quinta corner of Catorce street, Miramar, and then they were released after they were given a lecture that the Revolution was sending them free because it was a generous revolution. (Debriefer's note: By that time the GOC was not sentencing to prison terms persons who were caught escaping). During 1964 HERNANDEZ was detained for four days when he had a fist fight with a CDR member in his neighborhood, this time HERNANDEZ was aided in getting out of jail by his sister, Andrea HERNANDEZ Perez, who is pro-GOC. In early 1966, HERNANDEZ was detained for two days accused of playing domino (betting).

11.- HERNANDEZ' sister: Andrea HERNANDEZ Perez (DPOB: circa 1935, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Province). CDR-member and GOC sympathizer. Works at "Salud Publica" with offices at 17 street ([illegible]) between 2 and 4 streets, Vedado, employed as office clerk. During March 1967 was punished to work for "Flota Pesquera" at Havana docks, packing fish, when she refused to do voluntary work. During 1965 she was married to (fnu) CANCIO (mat unk.) (DPOB: circa 1927, Havana, Havana Province who is employed as Director Physical Fitness at Havana University, and who is a staunch GOC supporter and a militiaman. Andrea and his husband reside at Calle San Miguel (# unk.) corner of Marques Gonzalez, Havana city.

12.- HERNANDEZ provided the following info of CI interest:

a) Roberto POSADA Carriles; DSE-agent, Supervisor for "Area Norte" (which includes all Havana city) of the Telephone Company and employed at "Area Especial" (Special Area) of the Telephone Company. Attachment #1

b) Pedro [illegible] (mat unk.); DSE-agent, Chief of Installations and Maintenance of "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company and employed at "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company. CP member. Attachment #2

c) Jose (pat [illegible] mat unk.) Aka: "Pepe"; DSE and CP member and installer and repairman for "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company. Attachment #3

d) [illegible] BELTRAN (mat unk.); DSE and CP member and installer and repairman for "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company. Attachment #4

e) General Information of CI interest. Attachment #5

(over to 3)

Debrief - 19 April 67
Report - 20 April 67
Page 3

(Continued)
SUBJECT: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration A17-405-510

COMMENT: HERNANDEZ talked freely and was very cooperative. He appears to Debriefer as being clear regarding CI interest and also a reliable source of information.

(over to 4)

Debrief = 19 April 67
Report = 20 April 67
V-
(T)
page 4

ATTACHMENT #1

SUBJECT: Roberto POSADA Carriles.
DSE agent, Supervisor for "Area Norte" (which includes all Havana City) of the Telephone Company and employed at "Area Especial" (Special Area) of the Telephone Company.

SOURCE: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez.
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration #A17-405-510

1.- HERNANDEZ met POSADA in early 1966 when POSADA was appointed as Supervisor for "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company at 19 Street corner of D Street, Vedado, Havana. POSADA had been transferred from "Area Oeste" to this job at "Area Norte" position which he is still holding.

2.- Also upon his arrival, POSADA was assigned to work at "Special Area" of the Telephone Company which is located at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado. HERNANDEZ claims that since that time it was known that POSADA was a DSE agent, as it was known that all the personnel working for "Area Especial" were DSE agents (they use to brag about it) since their job is to install and repair telephone equipments for DSE, Military and all GOC big shots. HERNANDEZ claims that he does not know what position POSADA holds within "Area Especial", since only "Area Especial" personnel is allowed to enter the premises.

3.- HERNANDEZ claims knowledge that since circa 1942, POSADA was a Cuban Telephone Company employee.

4.- HERNANDEZ claims that even though POSADA'S position at "Area Norte" is that of Supervisor he never works as such, and only works as Telephone Technician (work unk.) when he is needed at "Area Especial". HERNANDEZ claims that POSADA'S real work at "Area Norte" is to check all the employees, mainly those who are not pro-GOC, so they work hard and to avoid sabotage.

5.- HERNANDEZ claims that POSADA wears military uniform most of the time and carries side arm even when wearing civilian clothes. HERNANDEZ also claims that he had heard POSADA when talking with other "Special Area" personnel, and that they brag a lot about being DSE agents. They also talk about when they are assigned to install any kind of telephone equipments for a GOC personality (ex: CASTRO, Celia SANCHEZ etc.).

6.- During mid 1966, POSADA traveled for some six months to East Germany, and it was said that he had gone to buy new equipment for the Telephone Company. But HERNANDEZ claims that time went by after POSADA'S return to Cuba, and nobody saw nor heard about any new equipment for the Telephone Company.

7.- HERNANDEZ saw POSADA for the last time at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company, on 6 February 1967.

8.- PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: DPOB: In circa 1930, unk., Las Villas Province; caucasian (fair skin); straight black hair (crew cut); dark eyes (wears sunglasses); long face; good teeth; 6'1 in height and 175 slender build. Married (names unk.) Resides at (address unk.) Marianao, Havana. DSE agent, Supervisor of "Area Norte" and member (position unk.) of "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company.

(over to 5)

14-00000

Debriefed = 19 April 67
Report = 20 April 67
V- page 5
(7)

ATTACHMENT #2

SUBJECT: Pedro DIBU (nat.unk.)
DSE agent, Chief of Installations and Maintenance of "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company and employed at "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company; CP member.

SOURCE: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration A17-835-510

1.- HERNANDEZ saw DIBU for the first time during 1950, but never met him until circa 1954 at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company.

2.- HERNANDEZ claims knowledge that DIBU was a Cuban Telephone Company employee since circa 1937.

3.- DIBU is the Chief of Installations and Maintenance of "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company and also works (position unk.) for "Area Especial" at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, so it was known that DIBU was a DSE agent since he was an employee of "Area Especial".

4.- HERNANDEZ claims that DIBU besides bragging about being a DSE agent with other "Special Area" employees, tells everybody that he is very proud of being a CP member.

5.- HERNANDEZ claims that DIBU together with Roberto POSADA Carriles is always checking on the "Area Norte" employees in the task of avoiding sabotages.

6.- HERNANDEZ also claims that DIBU only works as a Telephone Technician (work unk.) when he is needed at "Area Especial" or when there is a "estado de alarma" (national alert set by CASTRO) that DIBU has a "Special Area" member is assigned to install telephone lines for Army-Trenches along the Island or wherever needed.

7.- HERNANDEZ saw DIBU for the last time during early 1967, at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company.

8.- PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: DPOB: Circa 1917, unk.; light mulatto; straight black grayish hair; crew cut; hazel eyes (wears corrective lenses); round face; good teeth; 5'8" in height and 180# heavy build. Married (name unk.). Resides at (address unk.) Havana. DSE agent; CP member, Chief of Installation and Maintenance of "Area [illegible]" [illegible] of "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company.

(over to 6)

Debrief = 19 April 67
Report = 20 April 67
V- page 6
(T)

ATTACHMENT #3

SUBJECT: Jose (pat and mat unk.) Aka: "Pepe"
DSE and CP member and Installer and repairman
for "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company.

SOURCE: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration #A17-405-510

1.- HERNANDEZ met Jose during 1957 when they both started to work for the Cuban Telephone Company in Havana.

2.- Up to circa 1962, Jose was employed as installer-repairman for "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company at 19 Street corner of B Street, Vedado, Havana.

3.- In circa 1962 Jose was assigned to work as repairman and installer of telephone equipments for "Area Especial" at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, and since then it was known that Jose was a DSE agent, as every other "Area Especial" employee.

4.- Jose as all other "Area Especial" personnel brags a lot about being a DSE agent. He wears military uniform always, showing no rank and is always side armed.

5.- In early 1966, Jose was elected to become member of the Cuban Communist Party in an assembly to elect new CP members at his place of employment.

6.- In the performance of his job, Jose installs and repairs telephone equipments at: Offices of Ministers, DSE offices, Military Headquarters, GOC personalities' offices and homes, etc.

7.- HERNANDEZ saw Jose for the last time in early 1967 at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company.

8.- PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: DPOB: Circa 1937, unk.; caucasian (brunette); wavy black hair; dark eyes (wears sunglasses); round face; good teeth; 5'9" in height and 160# strong build. Married (names unk.). Resides at (address unk.) Havana. DSE and CP member, installer-repairman of Telephone equipments for "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, Havana.

(over to 7)

ATTACHMENT #4

SUBJECT: Jesus BELTRAN (mat unk.)
DSE and CP member, installer-repairman for
"Area Especial" of the Telephone Company.

SOURCE: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration #A17-405-510

1.- HERNANDEZ met BELTRAN during 1956, when they were both Cuban Telephone Company employees in Havana.

2.- HERNANDEZ claims knowledge that prior to 1959, BELTRAN was an active 26th of July Movement member in Havana.

3.- HERNANDEZ claims knowledge that prior to his (HERNANDEZ') arrival to the Cuban Telephone Company, BELTRAN (date unk.) was a Cuban Telephone Company employee.

4.- Up to circa 1962, BELTRAN was an installer-repairman of telephone equipments at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company at 19 Street corner of B Street, Vedado, Havana.

5.- In circa 1962, BELTRAN was assigned to work as repairman and installer of telephone equipments for "Area Especial" at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, and since then, it was known that BELTRAN was a DSE agent as every other "Area Especial" employee.

6.- BELTRAN wears military uniform, showing no rank, most of the time and is always side armed, even when wearing civilian clothes. He also brags a lot about being a DSE agent.

7.- In early 1965 BELTRAN was elected to become member of the Cuban Communist Party in an Assembly to elect new CP members at his place of employment.

8.- In the performance of his job, BELTRAN installs and repairs telephone equipments at: Offices of Ministers, DSE offices, Military Headquarters, GOC personalities' offices and homes, army trenches (when needed), etc.

9.- HERNANDEZ saw BELTRAN for the last time during February 1967 at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company.

10.- PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: DPOB: Circa 1931, Havana, Havana Prov. Caucasian (brunette); straight grayish black hair; green eyes; (mustache); round face; good teeth; 5'9" in height and 150, slender built. Married (names unk.). Resides at (address unk.), Marianao, Havana. DSE and CP member, installer-repairman of telephone equipments for "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, Havana.

(over to 8)

ATTACHMENT #5

SUBJECT: General Information of CI interest:

SOURCE: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration #A17-405-510

A) AREA ESPECIAL (SPECIAL AREA) OF THE TELEPHONE COMPANY

HERNANDEZ claims that in early 1960, the GCC stablished a new department within the Cuban Telephone Company, this department was called "Area Especial".

As site for "Area Especial" was chosen a building located at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, Havana, that is in the opposite corner of the same block that "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company is located (19 Street corner of B Street). Prior to being taken by the GCC, the building was the local of "Colegio Sepulveda" (Sepulveda private school).

HERNANDEZ claims that since "Area Especial" was organized, all of its members that had to deal with installations or repairments of telephone equipments had to be DSE agents (by that time DIER, later on G-2).

Even though only the acredited members of "Area Especial" can enter the premises, HERNANDEZ claims that it is common knowledge among telephone employees that the functions of the members of "Area Especial" is to install, service and maintain telephone equipments for: Offices of Ministers, DSE offices, Ministry of the Armed Forces, MININT, GCC personalities' homes and offices (including CASTRO'S), DGTI and any other GCC entity requiring security measures. It is also a main function of "Area Especial" personnel to establish telephone equipments and lines among trenches of the Cuban Army whenever needed (ex: October crisis of 1962).

Note: Debriefer had been previously informed by Eusebio Pio RIVERO Valdes-Castro, on debriefing carried out at Freedom House on 7 April 1967, that a telephone cable had been installed (underground) from 2 Street corner of 13 Street, Vedado, (place with RIVERO referred to as "Unidad Militar-Military Unit") up to 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado (place which RIVERO referred to as: Telephone Company sub-plant of Vedado area). RIVERO at that opportunity told Debriefer that this operation was done in late 1962 after the October crisis, and that he thought that this was some kind of "bugging operation". Asked by Debriefer, HERNANDEZ confirmed that during late 1962 after the October crisis, a telephone cable (underground) was installed at "Area Especial" and that it was said that the DSE was installing a "new" switchboard at "Area Especial". (No further info).

B) Asked by Debriefer HERNANDEZ stated that he had no knowledge of anybody by the name of Alfonso REY Alvarez within the Telephone Company.

03

ORIG: [Sylvester Farroll]
UNIT: AF/4/N
EXT: 6963
DATE: 28 April 1968

TOTAL COPIES: 1

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 4 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/AF4 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/EURS, C/CI

CS/DO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 28 14 30 Z CITE DIRECTOR 95088

TO IMMEDIATE [LAGOS] 12-20 INFO: PRIORITY [ADDIS ABABA] 12-21 [FRANKFURT] 15-20

RYBAT 12-20

REF: [LAGOS] 9878 (IN 99696)

1. CONCUR REF PROPOSAL. PLEASE ADVISE RESULT AND INCLUDE FULL IDENTIFYING DATA FOR FURTHER TRACES SUBJECT WITH LNERGO.

2. LNERGO TRACES MUSGAQUE OR NILDFR OIL COMPANY NEGATIVE.

END OF MESSAGE

03

CSDO NOTE: Prepared and released at the request of [Sylvester Farrell], AF/4/N.

DESENSITIZED
per DOI 70-17

CI Staff Dick Ober (Telecord)

03

[Normand Poulin]
Normand Poulin
CLANDESTINE SERVICE DUTY OFFICER

RECORD COPY

25 Apr 68
201-0532132

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

7/18R

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

NCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C TSD/AB/PDS 212 Central Building			EXTENSION 2835	NO AB Memo No. 9605 DATE 24 April 1968
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/TSD/AB	25 APR 1968	✓		
2.				
3. C/TSD/AGG	26 Apr 68			
4.				
5. TSD/COP	25 APR 1968	29		
6.				
7. TSD/REG	30 Ap 68			Dear Tom; FYI Since I understand you originated this Rpt. you might be interested in the result. - Sid Thank you
8. DD/P 3 C 34 Hqs.	30 APR 1968	1 may		
9. DDP/CI Attn: Mr. Richard Ober 2 C 43 Headquarters	2 MAY 1968			
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-1532132

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CD;P H'49

AB Memo No. 9605
24 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/CI

ATTENTION : Mr. Richard Ober

SUBJECT : Identi-Kit Composite of James Earl Ray

1. In response to your request of 20 April 1968, an Identi-Kit composite of the subject was completed on that date, and the coded information was communicated to you for dissemination. The composite was assembled by the undersigned with the cooperation of Mr. Joseph Baglio, of this office. 03

2. We are forwarding, for your information, a copy of the composite, along with the photographs and list of stations received from your office.

03

Edward M. Sudol
EDWARD M. SUDOL
TSD/AB/PDS

Attachment: (1 env., h/w)
As stated

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee (W/Att.)

[illegible]

201-0532732

218R

SECRET

SECRET

TO: DDP/CI
ATTN: Mr. Richard Ober
FROM: TSD/AB/PDS
Attachment h/w to AB Memo No. 9605
DATED: 24 April 1968

SECRET

201-0832732



H50 C32x2 E31 D82 N35x2 L28x2

Photograph shows left ear stands away from head in pronounced manner, and it should be noted eyes were drawn in since they were closed when photograph was taken. According to description subject is 5'10" tall, weighing from 163 to 174 pounds. Subject is said to have a small scar on forehead, exact location not stated, and another scar on palm of right hand.

✓ Asuncion
✓ – Bogota
– Brasilia
✓ – Buenos Aires
– Caracas
– Georgstown
– Guatemala City
– Guayaquil
– Kingston
✓ La Paz
– Lima
– Managua
✓ Montevideo
✓ Panama City
– Port au Prince
– Port of Spain
– Porto Alegre
– Quito
– Recife
✓ Rio de Janerio

– San Jose
San Salvador
✓ Santiago
Santiago De Los Caballeros
✓ Santo Domingo
✓ Sao Paulo
✓ Tegucigalpa

99

VBR

104-10178-10112

— Barcelona
✓ Berlin
— Bern
— Brussels
✓ Copenhagen
✓ Frankfurt
— Geneva
✓ The Hague
— Hamburg
— Helsinki
✓ London
✓ Madrid
— Lisbon
✓ Munich
— Oslo
[illegible]
✓ Paris
✓ Rome
✓ Stockholm
✓ Vienna
✓ Zurich

99

VBR

104-10178-10112

Hong Kong

Manila

Tokyo

99

Beirut

New Delhi

Rawalpindi

99

218R

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

SECRET

ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CI/OP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 22 April 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 32 PER ORIK #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/CI 3 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF,
C/EUR, C/WH, C/FE, C/NE, CSDO,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 22 23 47 Z CITE DIRECTOR 93538

TO BOOK CABLE

PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, HELSINKI, HONG KONG, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE, RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH

99

RYBAT WOMUSE

REF: DIRECTOR 93162 *

DESENSITIZED
per DOI 70-17

X
CABLE [illegible] (11)
FOR FILING

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/BR

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

1		6
2		7
3		8
4		9
5		10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY__________PER__________#__________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO__________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 93538

TO

1. LNERGO FINGERPRINT FORMULA FOR JAMES EARL RAY: 16, M OVER M, 9 OVER 4, U OVER W, O OVER I, O OVER O, O OVER I, 12 RPT 16, M OVER M, 9 OVER 4, U OVER W, O OVER I, O OVER O, O OVER I, 12.

2. PLEASE PASS TO LIAISON.

*LNERGO (1) has positively identified accused assassin as James Earl Ray.

DC/CI

C/WH

C/EUR

C/FE 03

DDP for C/NE

CI/OP/DO

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

UBR

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CIOP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 20 April 1968

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 29 PER: ORIGINATOR #
CONF: C/CI 3 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, DCI, DDCI, DDP, A/DDP, C/EUR, C/NE, C/WH, C/FE

S E C R E T (classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 93260

PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES,
COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, THE HAGUE, HONG KONG, LA PAZ, LONDON,
MADRID, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, MANILA, MUNICH, PANAMA CITY,
PARIS, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO, SAO PAULO,
STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH

99

KYBAT WOMUSE

REF: DIR 93162

1. REQUEST ADDRESSES CONSTRUCT IDENTIKIT COMPOSITE OF JAMES EARL RAY FOR USE PRIOR RECEIPT PHOTOS NOW EN ROUTE.

2. CODE: H 50 C 32 X 2 B 31 D 82 N 35 X 2 L 28 X 2.

3. NOTE: SCAR ON FOREHEAD MENTIONED REF OMITTED FROM COMPOSITE AS EXACT LOCATION NOT KNOWN. LEFT EAR PROTRUDES MORE THAN RIGHT.

		INITIAL PROGRAM
	X	RESTRICT
		INDEX
		PREPARE FOR FILING
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]

DESENSITIZED
per DOI 70-17

END OF MESSAGE

20 apr 68
201-0832132

DDP Richard Ober
by direction.

CI/OP/DO Richard Ober

RECORD COPY

RAY
cc Assassin

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/BR

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

ORIG: Richard Obar
UNIT: CIOP/DO ✓
EXT: 6537
DATE: 19 April 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 PER ORIGINATOR

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/CI 3 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF, C/EUR, C/WH, C/FE, C/NE,

(classification) 20 01 41 Z (date and time filed) (reference number) (pick)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 93162

TO PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, HELSINKI, HONG KONG, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE, RAWALPINDI, RIO DE XX JANERIO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH

99

RYBAT WOMUSE

DESENSITIZED
per DOI 70-17

REF: DIR 92664

1. LNERGO HAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED ACCUSED ASSASSIN AS JAMES EARL RAY, BORN 10 MARCH 1928 IN ILLINOIS; HEIGHT XXXXXX FIVE FEET TEN INCHES; WEIGHT 163-174 POUNDS; BLUE EYES;

RECORD COPY

19 Apr 68
201-0832732

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

File. AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Ray
Richards
→ Wesson

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/90

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 93162

TO

BROWN HAIR. SMALL SCAR ON CENTER OF FOREHEAD AND SCAR ON PALM OF RIGHT HAND. IN ADDITION TO ALIASES CITED REF HAS ALSO USED NAMES JAMES McBRIDE, JAMES WALTON, W.C. HERRON, AND JAMES O'CONNOR. SERVED IN U.S. ARMY FROM FEBRUARY 1946 TO DECEMBER 1948; DISCHARGED AS INEPT AND UNABLE TO ADJUST. ONCE CONFINED TO MENTAL HOSPITAL. HAS BEEN EMPLOYED AS BAKER, LABORER, AND "COLOR MATCHER". A DRIFTER WITH LONG CRIMINAL RECORD FOR BURGLARY, ARMED ROBBERY, AND FORGERY. HAS BEEN MISSING FROM MISSOURI STATE PENITENTIARY SINCE 23 APRIL 1967. CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

2. PHOTOS OF RAY (LABELED GALT PRIOR TO IDENTIFICATION) BEING POUCHED FOR LIAISON.

END OF MESSAGE

DDP Richard Ober by direction

CI/OP/DO Richard Ober

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPROD ON BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFF PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: V

ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CIOP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 18 Apr 68

DOI

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 78 PER ORIGINATOR

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/CI ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, CS/CF, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/EUR, C/WH, C/FE, C/NE

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica)
(reference number)

SECRET 19 01 32 Z CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION

BOOK

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, HELSINKI, HONG KONG, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE, RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH

99

RYBAT WOMUSE

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY LNERGO CONCERNING SUSPECTED ASSASSIN OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. NAME ERIC STARVO GALT, ALIAS HARVEY LOWMYER, ALIAS JOHN WILLARD, BORN 20 JULY 1931, HEIGHT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TO

RECORD COPY

15 Apr 68
RAY
201-0532432 .. Assassin .. CS?O

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1/90

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________ #________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO

FIVE FEET ELEVEN INCHES, WEIGHT 160-175 POUNDS, MEDIUM BUILD, BROWN HAIR, PROBABLY CUT SHORT, BLUE OR HAZEL EYES, MEDIUM COMPLEXION, RACE WHITE. OCCUPATION: HAS CLAIMED EMPLOYMENT AS SEAMAN. REMARKS: NOTICEABLY PROTRUDING LEFT EAR; REPORTEDLY IS A LONE WOLF; ALLEGEDLY ATTENDED DANCE INSTRUCTION SCHOOL; HAS REPORTEDLY COMPLETED XXXX COURSE IN BARTENDING; CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

2. WILL POUCH PHOTO OF GALT TO ANY ADDRESSEE DESIRING IT. ADVISE.

3. GALTS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHILE HAVE NO REASON BELIEVE GALT HEADED FOR YOUR AREA, DESIRE COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES MAKE EVERY EFFORT DETERMINE IF GALT IS OR HAS BEEN IN YOUR AREA. NNEXXX INFORMATION PARA ONE SHOULD BE PASSED TO LIAISON AND ANY OTHER LIKELY SOURCES.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO

LNERGO REQUESTS THAT ANY INFORMATION REPORTED BE EVALUATED AS TO RELIABILITY AND THAT AS ~~MS~~ MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE BE PROVIDED. CABLE ANY POSITIVE REPLY PRIORITY TO HQS AND PASS TO LEGAL ATTACHE IF ANY IN YOUR COUNTRY.

DC/CI (in draft)
(Mr. Hunt)
E/COPS

WH/FI (by phone)
(Mr. Smyth)
DC/FE (by phone)
(Mr. Smith)

201-0 532732

DDP Richard Ober by direction/SH.

for C/NE R Ober

CI/OP/DO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/NE Attn: [illegible]		
2	ct 1340		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1. Reference DIR 92664 sent to certain of your stations (list enclosed) by direction of the DDP on 18 April.

2. C/CI requests that you send one of each of the two attached photographs of Subject of reference to each station which received a copy of our DIR 92664 by the most expeditious means possible.

BY HAND

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
CI/OP Richard Ober x 6537 R 9477	19 Apr

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/FE Attn: [illegible]		
2	d 1345		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1. Reference DIR 92664 sent to certain of your stations (list enclosed) by direction of the DDP on 18 April.

2. C/CI requests that you send one of each of the two attached photographs of Subject of reference to each station which received a copy of our DIR 92664 by the most expeditious means possible.

BY HAND

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
CI/OP Richard Ober x 6537 R 9477	19 Apr

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

NE Addressees of DIR 92664

12-18
☑ **Beirut**
☑ **New Delhi** 12-22
☒ **Rawalpindi** 12-23

X = no identikit

211-0832732

FE Addressees of DIR 92664

✓ = have. identi kit

✓ Bangkok 13-5
✓ Hong Kong 13-14
✓ Manila 13-1
✓ Tokyo 13-3

4/80

104-10178-10137

X = no candidate

WH Addressees of DIR 92664

- ✓ Asuncion
- ✓ Bogota
- ✓ Brasilia
- ✓ Buenos Aires
- X Caracas
- X Georgetown
- X Guatemala City
- X Guayaquil
- X Kingston
- ✓ La Paz
- X Lima
- X Managua
- ✓ Montevideo
- ✓ Panama City
- X Port au Prince
- X Port of Spain
- X Porto Alegre
- X Quito
- X Recife
- ✓ Rio de Janerio
- X San Jose
- X San Salvador
- ✓ Santiago
- X Santiago De Los Caballeros
- ✓ Santo Domingo
- ✓ Sao Paulo
- ✓ Tegucigalpa

99

1920

X = no [illegible]

EUR Addressees of DIR 92664

- X Barcelona
- ✓ Berlin
- X Bern
- X Brussels
- ✓ Copenhagen
- ✓ Frankfurt
- X Geneva
- ✓ The Hague
- X Hamburg
- X Helsinki
- ✓ London
- ✓ Madrid
- X Lisbon
- ✓ Munich
- X Oslo
- [illegible]
- ✓ Paris
- ✓ Rome
- ✓ Stockholm
- ✓ Vienna
- ✓ Zurich

99

201-5832732

490

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WH Attn: Marlin		
2	1310		
3	19 APR 1968		
4			
5			
6			

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

1. Reference DIR 92664 sent to certain of your stations (list enclosed) by direction of the DDP on 18 April.

2. C/CI requests that you send one of each of the two attached photographs of Subject of reference to each station which received a copy of our DIR 92664 by the most expeditious means possible.

BY HAND

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
CI/OP Richard Ober x 6537 R 9477	19 Apr

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/EUR Attn: Hulse		
2	1403		
3			
4			
5			
6			

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

1. Reference DIR 92664 sent to certain of your stations (list enclosed) by direction of the DDP on 18 April.

2. C/CI requests that you send one of each of the two attached photographs of Subject of reference to each station which received a copy of our DIR 92664 by the most expeditious means possible.

BY HAND

[illegible] 533732

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
CI/OP Richard Ober x 6537 R 9477	19 Apr

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: POSADA, LUIS CLEMENTE
201-300985
VOL. II

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
15 AUG 2.	30	PAT ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

ESCARLET - 3
Formerly CIFENCB-4)

Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

201-300985

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
Raul and Roberto POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

NO201 NO801

✓ 1. AMCLEVE-15 recently received a letter from his mother in Cuba, in which she gave him news of Raul and POSADA CARRILES Roberto POSADA Carriles.

2. Raul spends most of his time in Cienfuegos because he is directing the installation of a thermoelectric plant in the area. A snapshot of Raul was enclosed, and we are enclosing a blow-up of Raul for your information.

3. Roberto is apparently in Havana (at least not in Cienfuegos), and the only comment about him was that he is suffering from back trouble.

Oscar C. Kalbing
Oscar C. KAIBING

ATTACHMENT:
As stated para 2 (2 copies)

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - CH/WHD (w/att, h/w)

AMCLEVE-15

33 CC.Y

JUN 28 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA-15572	DATE 28 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

Snapshots of
Raul POSADA Carriles sent
by mother from Cuba to
Luis POSADA Carriles.
201 - 300985
Att to HVA - 15572,
21 June 68

Raul POSADA Carriles
bro. of AMCLEVE-15.

June 21, 1968



1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE HFG

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/AMCLEVE-15 - Report from Cuban Exile

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See below.

1. Forwarded herewith for your information is a report furnished by AMCLEVE-15 on 26 June 1968. AMCLEVE-15 received the information from Jorge MAS Canosa, who got it from Johnny Alvart, who recently arrived in Miami from Cuba. NO201

[illegible]

2. The report names Jorge Norate as a Cuban lieutenant who studied rocketry in the USSR for three years. It states that Norate is disaffected with the Castro regime and sells things on the black market that the Russians bring into Cuba. The report also mentions that "El Gallego" Fernandez, chief of a squadron of MIG's at the Olguin Air Base, is also disaffected with the Castro government and used to give Alvart information about the base. Fernandez told him that in April 1968 there were severe fuel restrictions on the air base which limited the MIG flights.

3. JMWAVE may wish to contact Alvart if it has not already done so.

Oscar C. KALBING

MICROFILMED
JUL 11 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ATTACHMENT:
As stated para 1

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - COS/JMWAVE (w/att, 1 cy, h/w) - To cut pouch
1 - CH/WHD (w/att, 1 cy, h/w)

1 att

CS COPY

JUN 28 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA-15571	28 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER [illegible] 300985

AMCLEVE-15
26 Jun 68

FECHA: [illegible]

ST-6[illegible]

25[illegible]

ASUNTO: Información sobre Oficiales del Gobierno de Cuba.

FUENTE: Jhonny Alvart.

VALOR: C

El cubano JHONNY ALVART, recientemente llegado de Cuba a MIAMI por los Vuelos de la Libertad, le confió a JORGE MAS CANOSA la siguiente información:
El cubano JORGE MORATE, que tenía los grados de Teniente en el Ejército Rebelde, fué a la Unión Soviética ha recibir cursos sobre cohetería, allí pasó tres años en esos cursos, hassu llegada a Cuba y ya experto en estos asuntos dicho sujeto fué nombrado en una alta posición, que es algo com Encargado de la Costa Sur de Oriente, es el cubano con mas alta jerarquía. Este elemento sostenía mucha amistad con JHONNY ALVART y se dedicaba entre otras cosas a la bolsa negra en Cuba, comerciando con artículos, que traían los rusos de la Union Soviética. Tambien informa ALVART que MORATE era desafecto a el Gobierno y que se podía hablar de cualquier cosa con él.
También era amigo de ALVART un individuo llamado EL GALLEGO FERNANDEZ que es Jefe de Escuadrila de los aviones MIG de la Base aerea de Olguin. Dicho individuo también según ALVART era desafecto a el gobierno, y le daba informaciones de la Base de Olguin; una de esas informaciones es que en el mes de Abril habia una gran restricción de combustible q limitaban los vuelos de los MIG.

MICROFILMED
JUL 11 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

JUN 28 1968

CS COPY

Att 1 UFGA-15571

[illegible]

FROM: HVCA-13519, 7 June 1968 75-6-43/3

SUBJECT: CICUSTY Operational Reporting for May 1968

AMCLEVE-15	440.00

Subject continues to provide valuable information on CIRASH and CIVISTA-5. He took an SGSWIRL examination which successfully cleared up some points that had been of concern to Headquarters.

SECRET

1X-3321

TO : WH/COG

7 June 1968

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE/15 -- IDEN A
201-300985

IRD #72501

BACKGROUND:

Subject is a 40-year-old PBRUMEN male who has been of continuing WOFIRM interest since initial contact with JMWAVE and more recently with the Caracas Station as a penetration of the IDEN B organization.

PURPOSE/PROCEDURE:

Subject was SGSWIRLed at the request of the Caracas Station because of several issues which tended to question Subject's bona fides, possible affiliation with PBRUMEN intelligence through relatives, unreported association with gangster elements, thefts from WOFIRM, plus other items specified in questions listed below. The interview was conducted in the home of Oscar C. KALBING in both English and Spanish. (Subject's English is quite good, however, during actual testing Spanish was used to avoid ambiguity or misunderstanding of the question content.) KALBING did the translating.

RESULTS:

Subject remains sensitive to one question which is related to his past dealings with IDEN C but in fairness to Subject this sensitivity is believed generated by genuine uncertainity over the amount of items which he had been instrumental in getting for IDEN C. Sensitivity initially recorded in other areas was resolved through post-test discussion and responses to all other questions are regarded as substantially truthful. Subject was most cooperative and candid throughout the entire interview.

DETAILS:

Because of the numerous issues which were believed in need of clarification, a three phase test was structured prior to the interview and rehearsed with Subject completely before any testing took place. Discussions, as noted, were in both English and Spanish. Specific questions asked of Subject and answers given by him are as follows:

SECRET

CS COPY

201-300985

SECRET

Have you used any name besides IDEN A? Answer: No, except for nicknames and aliases used with WOFIRM.

Have you ever travelled to Washington, D. C.? Answer: Yes. Once several years ago.

Have you ever been to the Soviet Union? Answer: No.

Are any of your relatives members of the Communist Party? After some discussion Subject felt it probable that they were. Those specifically mentioned were his two brothers IDEN D and IDEN E and also possibly a sister named IDEN F who is also in PBRUMEN and married to a Captain in the Militia. When the question was prefaced with the words: "Is it your belief that any of your relatives are members," Subject's answer was always yes. He based this belief on the fact that both brothers hold highly responsible positions in key industries in PBRUMEN and hence must be members. He also noted that prior to his leaving PBRUMEN, he (Subject) and his two brothers had many discussions about politics and their views differed from Subject's. As for his brother IDEN E, Subject regarded him as the "brain" in the family and originally a very religious person who attended Catholic services daily. He later evinced distrust for the clergy in PBRUMEN and blamed them for the downfall of the church. When Castro made his move, IDEN E was in complete sympathy with him and remained with him despite his apparent conversion to Communism, although IDEN E never acknowledged that he had been a Communist and would usually retort with a comment that he (IDEN E) was a "humanist."

Are any of your relatives working for PBRUMEN Intelligence? His answer was that he felt that at least one of them was according to what KALBING inferred during his discussion with Subject the day before the SGSWIRL test. This was his brother IDEN D, but he also wondered about his brother IDEN E who might also be with PBRUMEN intelligence because according to what his mother mentioned in a letter some time ago, IDEN E had been in the USSR receiving training of some sort. This training lasted for a full year and occurred in 1962 to the best of Subject's memory. Subject was reasonably sure of this date because of the "Missile crisis" and President Kennedy's death which occurred later.

SECRET

After this discussion the question read: "Is it probable that your relatives (brothers) are working for PBRUMEN intelligence? Answer: Yes."

Did you know your brother (IDEN D) was working with IDEN G before we told you? Answer: No. But again had some suspicions.

Besides the letters we asked you to send to your brothers have you communicated with anyone in PBRUMEN? Answer: Yes. His mother about two or three times a year and with an aunt named IDEN H which was the person to whom he actually addressed the letter to his brother which WOFIRM asked him to write. This letter incidentally was posted in 1967 (a few months before coming to Caracas) and not 1966 as noted in Station files. Since arrival in Caracas, Subject has written his mother only once and had the letter posted from Miami to prevent anyone knowing his exact whereabouts. (In addition to these contacts, Subject has sent one telegram to his mother soon after the IDEN I just to let her know he was alright.) It was about this time that IDEN E wrote to him and criticized his participation in IDEN I.

Have you seen either of your brothers since 1961? Subject answered no. Last saw IDEN E at the airport in the distance but there were employees from IDEN E's place of employment present and IDEN E was apparently reluctant to go near the plane. Since 1961 Subject has not seen any member of his family and as time goes on does not miss them as much. The persons he claims to have been closest to were his aunt and grandmother and addresses comments to them personally when he does write to his mother. When further discussing his brothers on this question, Subject was somewhat complimentary despite their differing political views and generally considered them as hard-working energetic types with good school records.

Do you have a secret means of contacting anyone in PBRUMEN? Claims he knows of friends who have used telegrams to transmit coded messages but he has never engaged in such activity. These messages were directed against the PBRUMEN.

Have you ever been in Communist China? Answer: No.

Have you ever worked for the intelligence service of any country besides IDEN J and LNHARP? Answer: No.

Have you ever received intelligence training in PBRUMEN? Answer: No.

Have you ever been a member of any Communist guerrilla group? Answer: No. Later explained sensitivity to the question as emanating from current work with two former Communist guerrillas named IDEN K and IDEN L both of whom are now with IDEN B.

Have you told anyone in PBRUMEN that you are working with WOFIRM? Answer: No. This question led to a discussion of broadcasts from PBRUMEN which identified Subject as a member of WOFIRM. These broadcasts occurred in October 1967 according to Subject and the man fingering him was IDEN M. The latter was not officially in Subject's WOFIRM group before his capture in PBRUMEN hence Subject does not know why it was that he was specifically named. When it was later suggested that this announcement would probably have some effect on his family, Subject said he just didn't know what effect it would have and has heard of none. He agreed that it was quite ironic that one side of the family was working with an intelligence service which was diametrically opposed to the side to which another member of the same family was affiliated and in fact because of his present IDEN B employment he was actually in the business of hunting them down. Subject agreed that it was indeed ironic but felt his convictions differed from his brothers' and that was that.

Have you told anyone in IDEN N that you are working for WOFIRM? Noted that some knew of his past affiliation hence the question was qualified to mean his present affiliation. Later after reactions were recorded, Subject noted that his wife is fully witting of his WOFIRM employment as is IDEN O. He also mentioned that a PBRUMEN type, IDEN P, whom he knows from childhood has been kidding him constantly in Caracas that he is still with WOFIRM until Subject finally told him in an offhand way, "Sure I'm with WOFIRM," but he does not know what effect this had on IDEN P or whether he has told anyone of his suspicions of Subject's WOFIRM involvement. He specifically denied that anyone other than these three persons were knowledgeable.

Does anyone in IDEN B know you have this meeting with us today? Answer: No.

Have you ever been asked to perform any task or mission against the LNHARP? Answer: No.

Have you ever performed any task or mission on behalf of IDEN G? Answer: No.

Has anyone told or instructed you on what to report to us? Answer: No.

Have you had contact with IDEN C since 1967? Answer: No. Continued reactions to this question which necessitated a breakdown test to isolate the reason for his sensitivity to the topic. He repeatedly denied that he had had any contact with IDEN C since the IDEN Q told him not to but acknowledged a physical revulsion to the mention of the man's name, and a long discussion ensued regarding the extent of Subject's involvement with the man. Subject contended that the contact began quite innocently in 1965 and was what Subject initially thought was a deliberate provocation to see what Subject's reaction would be. Subject immediately reported the contact to JMWAVE handlers who guided him through continued contacts and instructions from IDEN Q. Subject was instructed to sell IDEN C "silencers" (guns with silencers attached--about six or seven to the best of his recollection) in order to find out his true identity. Subject furnished physical descriptions and license numbers to JMWAVE and continued to report on contact with IDEN C. He offered Subject $500 US which JMWAVE told Subject to keep since it was merely a bonus given him for his work as an intermediary. IDEN C continued to force contact with Subject and once came to his home in shorts and made veiled threats which were answered with counter threats of violence from Subject, and an outright threat that Subject would kill IDEN C if he threatened him again. In 1967 while with the IDEN R, Subject gave IDEN C some "pencils" to keep him away which Subject did not then report to WOFIRM but later did. He gave him about 120 altogether. Subject had promised IDEN C some 500 pounds of C/4 explosives, M-2's, sub-machine guns, etc. but all was intended to bait IDEN C for arrest and none was ever supplied to him. Later Subject noted after reacting to a break-down question that he had supplied him with pencils, silencers, and also some grenades and pentolite. But these he claims should be a matter of record with JMWAVE. The grenades were typical military type and numbered about 24 to 48 altogether. Again, however, Subject noted that he acted only as intermediary between IDEN C and another individual who is now deceased in PBRUMEN and did not physically handle any munitions shipments. As noted above, continued sensitivity to the question of the amounts or types of equipment furnished IDEN C is believed attributable to uncertainty of Subject's part as to exactly what he did arrange for shipment to IDEN C. As to the basic question about contact with him since 1967 (or when he was told by IDEN Q to no longer have contact with IDEN C), Subject insisted that he never re-established contact of any kind but always checks at IDEN S to determine if IDEN C is around.

Do you now have in your possession any arms, munitions or articles of demolition which was once the property of the LNHARP? Only those items which were discussed during a pre-test debriefing, viz., items brought to Caracas by him in a suitcase and consisting of the following: 3 or 4 smoke grenades; 6 or 7 booby traps (army type); 1 piece of delay fuse about 100 feet long; one primer cord about 100 feet; 2 or 3 MK2 grenades; about 10 pencils (some regular open market supply items and some of the "company" variety); demolition pliers; knife; compass; metascope (infra-viewer worth about $50 used). These items he said were taken while with the IDEN R and with the knowledge of IDEN T although IDEN T did not know exactly what he had taken. Subject was using these items frequently in training courses and they were not to the best of Subject's knowledge the property of LNHARP at that time although it is possible that some of these items were at one time LNHARP and possibly WOFIRM items. But he explained further that these items are plentiful in the Miami area and can easily be obtained through gun dealers. During a later conversation Subject noted that he has heard of many places where munitions could be obtained very easily especially in New Jersey, in California and in Miami, but he denied being personally involved in any such dealings.

Have you ever stolen equipment of any type from WOFIRM? Answer: Yes. About 5 gallons of gas once from a launch boat. Other than this, nothing.

Do you know the identities of persons who stole arms and equipment from LNHARP? Answer: No.

Break-down questions dealing with IDEN C:

Did you have contact with IDEN C from 1965 through 1967? Answer: Yes.

During this time did he give you $500 for equipment which he wanted? Answer: Yes.

Did you receive more than $500 from him? Answer: No.

Is it correct that you received threats from him? Answer: Yes.

Besides the pencils, silencers, grenades and pentolite did you give him any other items? Answer: No. (as noted continued sensitivity which is unexplained except in the examiner's conclusion)

Did IDEN Q tell you to stop contacting him in October or November 1967? Answer: Yes.

Did you contact IDEN C after November 1967? Answer: No. (Slight sensitivity but explained as relating to constant checking on his whereabouts to avoid contact.)

Has your employer contacted him since November 1967? Answer: No, not to his knowledge. On this question Subject noted that his employer can easily obtain guns and supplies from European sources cheaper than LNHARP. Also Subject noted that the few guns (small calibre snub nose weapons) which he has brought to Caracas with him from Miami are merely for the personal use of some of his fellow employees in IDEN B, and he breaks no laws in bringing them with him on the few trips he has made between 1967 and the present. He feels he has perhaps brought a total of 6 such small sidearms to Caracas and also one sport rifle (AR-15) which he was asked to bring back by IDEN U. The rifle was a gift to IDEN U. The weapon was not automatic per Subject.

The only other items which Subject could think of which could link WOFIRM with his organization are the silencers which he reported on in Miami some months back which his organization took from captured guerrillas and which were probably issued to a group which went to PBRUMEN and were lost. Subject is positive they were WOFIRM issue but purportedly the serial numbers which he submitted could not be checked.

One additional item which was cleared up dealt with the pentolite which had been reported seen in Caracas. Subject voluntarily mentioned that he had seen such a supply under the bed of a friend. The supply was attached to magnets which were to be used to attach the charge to the underside of a ship in Caribbean waters of IDEN V or IDEN W nationality. The charge was to discourage further shipments between these latter IDENs and PBRUMEN. Subject said he detached the magnets from the pentolite and intended using it in training classes for students with his present employer. The person who brought it to Caracas was IDEN X. Subject does not know how he got it here, but knows that his employer could facilitate such deliveries.

Raymond J. Ryglel

Distribution:
Orig - Ladner, Floyd & Gaynor
1 - Floyd
1 - CI/OA
1 - WH/COG
1 - Field
1 - File

OS/IRD/RJR:hjd

SECRET

IRD #72401

IDENTITY LIST

IDEN A	Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles
IDEN B	DIGEPOL
IDEN C	Lefty ROSENTHAL
IDEN D	Roberto
IDEN E	Raul
IDEN F	Maria
IDEN G	Castro's Intelligence service
IDEN H	Angelia POSADA
IDEN I	Bay of Pigs invasion
IDEN J	Venezuela Government
IDEN K	Hugo Alencar Tovar (aka: David)
IDEN L	Coco ELIAS
IDEN M	LAUSERICA "El Poeta"
IDEN N	Venezuela
IDEN O	Antonio COMELLAS
IDEN P	Aldo HERNANDEZ
IDEN Q	FBI
IDEN R	RECE Organization
IDEN S	Customs in United States (Miami office Mr. Allen Jarbough)

SECRET

IRD #72501

IDENTITY LIST -- Continued

IDEN T	Jorge MAS (A leader in RECE Organisation)
IDEN U	Orasto FERNANDEZ
IDEN V	English
IDEN W	Japanese
IDEN X	Rafael TREMOL

201-300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLAS D MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2 ROU AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☒ NO COPY

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 052207Z JUN 68 CITE CARACAS 9808

Amcleve 15 201

JMWAVE DIRECTOR

REFS A. CARACAS 9758 (IN 21250)

B. JMWAVE 2600 (IN 23543)

6 JUN 68 IN 25390

M

1. AMCLEVE-15 MET WITH LUGO AND RODRIGUEZ AT CIRASH-4'S DIRECTION AND HIS REPORTS LED TO THEIR ARREST. UNFORTUNATELY CIRASH-4 DID NOT COVER AMCLEVE-15 AND RODRIGUEZ IS CONVINCED HE FINGERED THEM AND HAS SWORN KILL AMCLEVE-15 AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

2. WHILE CARACAS UNDERSTANDS LNERGO WOULD NOT HAVE GREAT INTEREST THIS CASE, IS IT EQUALLY TRUE THAT NEITHER LNERGO NOR LNYUMA COULD ARREST RODRIGUEZ FOR LEAVING COUNTRY ILLEGALLY AND TRAVELLING ON FALSE DOCUMENTS? WE ANXIOUS PROTECT AMCLEVE-15 AND WONDER IF JMWAVE CAN PREVAIL ON LNERGO OR LNYUMA TO ACCEPT RETURN OF LUGO AND RODRIGUEZ FOLLOWED BY IMMEDIATE ARREST AND INTERROGATION.

3. CIRASH-4 PLANS DEPORT THEM TO MIAMI ON 8 JUNE ON VIASA. WILL ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN FLIGHT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

6 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE-15 (201-300985)

Forwarded herewith are two copies of a current PRQ I on Subject.

John P. Gower
WH/3/Venezuela

c/WHD

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, CARACAS		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE			MICROFILM

SUBJECT D AKULE PBRUMEN AMOT Operational
Letter Sent to RECE from Venezuela by Luis POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
JUN 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REFERENCE: UFGA-30112, 23 May 1968

1. Attached hereto is AMOT Report DD-2279, dated 22 May 1968, and its' attachment, which is a copy of a letter sent to a Miami based Cuban exile organization, Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE), by Luis POSADA Carriles.

2. FYI: Luis POSADA Carriles was associated with RECE in Miami from July 1966 to June 1967.

Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachment: H/W
AMOT Rpt. DD-2279 w/att.

AMCLEVE-15

Distribution:
3 - COS/CARACAS w/att. - autpek
② - C/WHD w/att.
2 - WH/COG w/att.

JUN 3 1968

CS COPY

1 Att.

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D 19-300-18	UFGA-30142	29 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

14-00000

H/W Att. to UFGA-30142

57

S E C

FROM: SE (I-27) DD-2279

AGENT: I-111 22 May 68

VIA: I-1

SUBJECT: Letter sent to RECE from Venezuela by Luis POSADA Carriles.

SOURCE: Augusto PINEDA (mat. unk.).

SUB-SOURCE: Aguedo LUGO (mat. unk.).

1. On 22 May 1968 I-111 obtained the following information from Augusto PINEDA (mat. unk.).

2. On 19 May 1968 PINEDA was visited at home by Aguedo LUGO (mat. unk.) who had returned from a trip to Venezuela.

3. During their conversation, LUGO showed to PINEDA a photostatic copy of a letter which had been sent from Venezuela by Luis POSADA Carriles to Augusto VALDES Miranda, aka "Polo MIRANDA," a RECE leader. LUGO had delivered this letter to VALDES Miranda by hand.

4. At a moment when LUGO was not looking, PINEDA took the photostatic copy of this letter, which is attached to this report. In this letter POSADA mentioned the following matters:

a. The aid which had been given to the Association of Bay of Pigs Veterans (Brigade 2506) by the Venezuelan Army and the reasons why this aid was stopped.

b. Possibility of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior of becoming involved in a plan to help Cuban exiles fight against the Castro regime.

c. RECE should do everything possible so that RECE will be the Cuban exile organization to receive this aid (see preceding paragraph 4.b.), with POSADA offering to help RECE in this respect.

MICROFILMED
JUN 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

H/W Att. 1 to UFGA-30142

CS COPY

201-300985

REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES INTERIORES
DIRECCION GENERAL DE POLICIA

DIRECCION

No.________

Dr Polo Miranda
[illegible] FR1-1722
oficinas del Rece -
1784 W. Flagler.

Dear friend Palo,

This is the third letter that I am sending you. Since I am sending this letter by messenger, I can explain more.

The Government here assisted a group of Cubans called the Brigade. The Department of Defense (Army) provided this assistance without consulting the Ministry of the Interior. When the Minister of the Interior found out, he demanded an explanation from the military men and they stopped the assistance.

There are strong possibilities that a plan will be developed for Cuba, which will involve the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior and which will be assigned to a group of serious persons. I believe it is highly important that I go to Miami urgently or that some of you come here. This is urgent.

If you want me to go, send my fare to this address:

San Juan Bosco Avenue
Mayflower Bldg. Apt 24
Altamira, Caracas Venezuela

On the other hand, ERASTO FERNANDEZ is being summoned by Congress. He is accused of being too severe with the Communists. Send a telegram as soon as possible, expressing solidarity with his attitude, in the name of the Cubans in RECE. If possible, mention me in the telegram.

The address is: Police Headquarters
Las Colinas Av, Las Bribas Bldg
Los Chaquaramos, Caracas, Venezuela

Some organization (I do not know the name) has already sent telegrams. ERASTO can be of great assistance to us.

When you send the telegram, do not mention me by name. Word it something like this " Greetings from our fellow countryman, who is fighting beside us" or words to that effect.

My telephone is 321506

Regards to all your friends.

Juan Pasid

1-3-60

Estimado amigo Polo:

Es la tercera carta que te llega, en esta como que te la mando con un propio te puedo explicar mas.

El gobierno de aquí le dió ayuda a un grupo de cubanos con el nombre de la Brigada, esto lo hizo el Departamento de Defensa (Ejercito) sin contar con el ~~Dep~~ Ministerio del Interior, por esta causa el Ministro del Interior se enteró y llamó a los militares a contar y ~~debido~~ la ayuda cesó para ellos.

Existen grandes posibilidades de que se haga un plan para Cuba en que intervengan el Ministerio de Defensa y el Ministerio del Interior y que se lo den a un grupo de personas serias, yo creo que es de suma importancia que yo vaya a Miami urgentemente o que alguno de Uds. se traslade aquí. Esto es urgente..

Si quieren que yo vaya me mandan el pasaje a la dirección esta.

Avenida San Juan Bosco -
Edificio MAYFLOWER APT. 24
ALTAMIRA, CARACAS VENEZUELA.

Por otro lado, ERASTO FERNÁNDEZ está siendo interpelado por el Congreso, acusado de mano dura en contra de los comunistas, hay que a la mayor brevedad posible, le envien un telegrama, diciendo que se solidarizan con su actitud, en nombre de los Cubanos del Rece, si es posible me nombran a mi en el Telegrama - La dirección es.

Dirección General de Policía -
Avenida Las Colinas, Edificio Las Brisas,
Los Chaguaramos. Caracas, Venezuela.

Alguna organización (no sé el nombre)

los mandan ya telegramas. Esto nos puede ser de mucha ayuda.

Cuando envíen el telegrama, no pongan mi nombre al mencionarme, sino algo por este estilo "saludos a nuestro compatriota que lucha a su lado" o algo así.

Mi teléfono es 321506

Un abrazo a todos tu amigo

Juan Pablo

110

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
0 PRQ Part I on Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

MICROFILMED
JUN 5 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See below.

Forwarded herewith is an up-to-date PRQ Part I which was filled in by Subject on 23 May 1968.

HVCA 14475
6 Dec 67

Oscar C. Kalbing
Oscar C. KALBING

ATTACHMENTS:
B As stated (4 copies)

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - CH/WHD (w/4 atts, h/w)

MAY 29 1968

1 ATT

CS COPY

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCA-15488

DATE
28 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

5P

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PROJ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) Luis 201-300985 (Middle) Clemente (Last) Posada Carriles (Nee)

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: Same

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.): Same

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

Bambi (nickname)

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 15 February 1928

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

No record

MICROFILMED
JUN 5 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
☒ M ☐ F	40	37	FT. 5 IN. 10	180	Normal	
h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES		j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE	
Black	Green		All	Strong	Normal	

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Scar, right-hand palm

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE: Normal

o. PROMINENT FEATURES: None

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

H/ FORM 1050 ATT 4 to HVCA-15488 CS COPY (4-20)

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 10.)

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)
Rent - Edif Mayflower, Apt 24, Ave. San Juan Bosco, Caracas, Venezuela

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 12.)
Miami, Florida

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)
1964 - Dominican Republic - working for J.U.R.E organization (exiles affairs)

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION: Ministry of Internal Relations

17. TITLE

18. SALARY (Per annum): Bs 1800 mo.

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)
None

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
None

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Political - Frente Revolucionario Jose A. Echevarria - 1960 in Cuba
Political - J.U.R.E. - 1963-1964
Political - Rece - 1967

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Monserrate Cienfuegos, Cuba	Elementary	1963	1942	Yes
Instituto Cienfuegos, Cuba	S. High School Bachelor	1942	1947	Yes
Padres Dominicos Cienfuegos, Cuba	Sugar Chemist	1947	1950	No
Havana University	Medicine	1950	1953	No

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	COMPETENCE							
	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	
English	X		X		X		X	

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

None

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Hunting (good shot)

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
USA	1963	1964	197 Brgd 1st Batallion	2nd Lt.	F. Benning, Ga.

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

None

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1944-1945	b. EMPLOYER Pastora Sugar Mill	c. ADDRESS San Jose de Las Lajas Las Villas, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK Chemist	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 210 ** month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Transfer
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1946-1954	b. EMPLOYER San Agustin Sugar Mill	c. ADDRESS Cruces, Las Villas Cubs
	d. TYPE OF WORK Chemist	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 310 ** month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Studying
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1956-1958	b. EMPLOYER Self -(Fumigadora)	c. ADDRESS Cienfuegos Las Villas, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK Fumigation	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 250 ** month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1960-1963	b. EMPLOYER Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.	c. ADDRESS Havana, Cuba, and Akron, Ohio
	d. TYPE OF WORK Supervisor	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 500 ** month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Army
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1963-1964	b. EMPLOYER U.S. Army	c. ADDRESS Fort Benning, Ga.
	d. TYPE OF WORK 2nd Lt.	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 380 ** month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Cuban affairs

SECTION IX **MARITAL STATUS**

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

Married December 1956: Divorced 26 June 1963 from
Maria Concepcion Castaneda: Reason - incompatibility.

10 201

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Nee) (Last) nee
Nieves Elina ~~XXXXXX~~ Gonzalez y [illegible]

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 13 Aug 1963

35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Colombus, Ga. - Muscogee County

36. DATE OF BIRTH: DPOB 13 Dec 1935

37. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

STY:F WIFE of SUBJECT 201-300985

38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Cuban

39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)
Edf. Mayflower, Apt 24, Avenida San Juan Bosco, A! Caracas, Venezuela

SECTION X **CHILDREN**

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Jorge Luis Posada	X		1966	Miami, Florida	American

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

None

SECTION XI **FATHER**

41. FULL NAME: Luis Posada

42. YEAR OF BIRTH: Unknown

43. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Cuban

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

46. OCCUPATION: Book Store

47. PRESENT RESIDENCE: 4110 Ave. 56, Cienfuegos, Cuba

SECTION XII **MOTHER**

48. FULL NAME: Dolores Carriles

49. YEAR OF BIRTH: Unknown

50. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Cuban

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

53. OCCUPATION: Housekeeper

54. PRESENT RESIDENCE: Same as for father

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			
Roberto Posada	X		1931	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Raul Posada	X		1934	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Maria Conchita Posada		X	1939	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

None

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Roberto Posada - Telephone co. - Cuba
Raul Posada - Electric & Power Co. - Cuba

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

Augusto Val Des Miranda (friend)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

I have aunts (2) and cousins (2) who are American citizens.
I do not know anything of certificates.

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE

23 MAY 68

SIGNATURE

Luis Posada

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: _____ AT: _____ Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER _____ #

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO _____

X-REF TO FILE NO. _____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, C/OA

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SEC/IA 4

S E C R E T 271613Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 9725 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

19272

REF: JMWAVE-2475 (IN 15683)

27 May 68 IN 19272

1. AMCLEVE-15 PASSED SGSWIRL EXAM 23 MAY WITH SATISFACTORY CLARIFICATION ALL POINTS OF CONCERN TO HQS. POUCH FOLLOWS.

2. WISH THANK JMWAVE FOR REF WHICH MOST USEFUL IN PRE-TEST DISCUSSIONS WITH SGSWIRL OPERATOR.

S E C R E T

BT

amcleve-15
201 file

SECRET

C/WHD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, CARACAS

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AKULE PERUMEN Operational
O Forwarding of AMCLEVE/15 201 File

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR : None, FYI

REF: JMWAVE 2475, 21 May 1968

1. Attached hereto, as Attachment 1, is a copy of the cryptonym portion of AMCLEVE/15's 201 file.

2. Forwarded under separate cover, as Attachment 2, is a copy of the true name portion of AMCLEVE/15's 201 file.

3. Also included in the attachments are pertinent AMCLEVE/15 contact reports and a JMWAVE Personality file pertaining to his brother, Roberto.

Gary L. Flustikoff
Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachments

1. Cryptonym portion of file
2. True name portion of 201 file

Distribution:

3 - COS/CARACAS w/att. #1 h/w & #2 usc to out pouch
② - C/WHD w/o atts. 2cc fwd w/1 / 1 w/o att
2 - WH/COG w/o atts.

CS COPY

MAY 20 1968

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-30136

DATE
24 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY 24/21 PER ______

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE VR. WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI/INT-2

UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 222222Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 9686(LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

22 MAY 68 IN 16569

PBRUMEN

1. AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS FOLLOWING CUBAN SUSPECTED BY CIVISTA-5 TO HAVE ENTERED VENEZUELA RECENTLY AS CUBAN AGENT:

ALBERTO ANTONIO (ORIZONDO) E IGUZQUIZA
DPOB 13 JUNE 1925, HAVANA
PASSPORT 43570 , CEDULA 793295

2. NO STATION TRACES. REQUEST HQS, JMWAVE AND AMOT TRACES.

SECRET

BT

CL ——

retain or destroy

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 2/ | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR. WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 212253Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2475

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

22 MAY 68 IN 15683

AKULE PBUMEN

~~MEN~~ AMCLEVE

ACTION

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 01313

B. CARACAS 9646 (IN 13549)

WH/COG

File - AMCLEVE-15 201

1. FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS ON AMCLEVE-15:

A. AMCLEVE-15 INSTRUCTED BY JMWAVE TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CORRESPONDENCE WITH BROTHERS RAUL AND ROBERTO. THIS DONE LATE 1966 AFTER IT LEARNED ROBERTO HAD TRAVELLED ENGLAND ON GOC PURCHASING MISSION (JMWAVE 3182, SEPT 66). IN APRIL 1967, STATION ADVISED AMCLEVE-15 THAT ROBERTO WAS SUPERVISOR TELEPHONE COMPANY WHICH INFO OBTAINED FROM RECENTLY ARRIVED REFUGEE (UFGA-27444, APRIL 67.) AMCLEVE-15 TOLD FORMER CO HE LAST SAW BROTHER (ONE OR OTHER) AT HABANA AIRPORT PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR MEXICO FEB 61.

B. AMCLEVE/15 WAS PRIMARILY USED BY STATION TO REPORT ON EXILE ACTIVITIES MIAMI AREA. HAD CONTACTS WITH MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING EX STATION ASSETS, SELF STYLED EXILE LEADERS AND GANGSTERS. DURING ROSENTHAL

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 2475 SECRET

CASE MID-1967, AMCLEVE-15 FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS OF LNERGO AND STATION AT GREAT PERSONAL RISK AND INCONVENIENCE TO SELF AND FAMILY.

2. STATION WILL FORWARD COMPLETE FILES ON AMCLEVE-15 TO CARACAS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

SECRET

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3	/	8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: K. GARDINER
UNIT: C/WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 20 MAY 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 26 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/CI/PS

F1

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET Mr 20 19 23 Z CITE DIRECTOR 01312

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REFS: A. CARACAS 9646 (IN 13549)* (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

B. DIRECTOR 99409** (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

C. CARACAS 9588 (IN 08516)*** (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

FILE AMCLEVE

1. WISH ASSURE STATION THAT HQS DOES NOT HAVE DEROGATORY INFO ON AMCLEVE-15 WHICH HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO STATION. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED IN ORDER FOR STATION OBTAIN PERMISSION LIFT RESTRICTIONS ON AMCLEVE-15 OPERATIONAL USE.

2. RE SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED IN REF A:

A. IN PRQ'S I DATED 1961, 1965 AND 1966 AMCLEVE-15 MENTIONED BOTH BROTHERS IN "BROTHERS AND SISTERS" SECTION BUT ONLY LISTED RAUL AS EMPLOYED BY GOC. RAUL WAS DESCRIBED AS "ADMINISTRATOR FOR AN ELECTRICAL COMPANY" OR "ELECTRICAL ENGINEER BELIEVED TO BE EMPLOYED BY GOC." FOR ADDITIONAL INFO ON BROTHER ROBERTO SEE ATTACHMENT TO HVCW-7776, 4 DECEMBER 1967. HQS HAS NO

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 01313

TO

PAGE TWO

DETAILS ON JMWAVE REQUEST THAT AMCLEVE-15 INITIATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROBERTO. IN ANY CASE BELIEVE POINT OF SGSWIRL IS TO RESOLVE ANY DOUBT THAT CONFUSION OVER BIOGRAPHIC DETAILS ANY MORE THAN NORMAL OVERSIGHT AND THAT AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT COMMUNICATED WITH BROTHERS (OTHER THAN 1966 EPISODE) SINCE DEPARTURE FROM CUBA.

13

B. HQS CONCERN THAT AMCLEVE-15 MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN THEFT OR DISPOSAL OF WOFIRM DEMOLITION OR SABOTAGE GEAR WAS CAUSED BY ATTACHMENT TO HVCA-14975, 5 DECEMBER 1967, WHICH STATED AMCLEVE-15 SHOWED CIRASH-15 SOME STUFF HE HAD TAKEN FROM MIAMI INCLUDING FUSES, BOOBY-TRAP SWITCHES, DETONATING CORD, INFRARED SIGNAL DEVICES AND TIME PENCILS. HQS HAS NO PROOF THIS GEAR STOLEN FROM WOFIRM BUT BELIEVE NATURE OF EQUIPMENT (PARTICULARLY INFRARED SIGNAL DEVICES) IS SUCH THAT AMCLEVE-15 SHOULD AT LEAST BE QUESTIONED AS TO WHETHER HE HAS EVER STOLEN OR

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTI BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE I OHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 91313

TO

PAGE THREE

KNOWINGLY RECEIVED EQUIPMENT STOLEN FROM WOFIRM.

C. HQS HAS NO DETAILS ON ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND GANGSTER ASSOCIATIONS OF AMCLEVE-15 NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO STATION AND JMWAVE. PURPOSE OF SGSWIRL QUESTION WOULD BE DETERMINE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE HAS BROKEN OFF COMPLETELY WITH LEFTY ROSENTHAL GROUP AND THAT HE NOT CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN ANY ILLEGAL ACTIVITY WITH ERASTO FERNANDEZ AND GUSTAVO ORTIZ GROUP WHICH COULD CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT TO U.S. GOVT, SUCH AS SMUGGLING BETWEEN MIAMI AND CARACAS.

3. REQUEST JMWAVE ADD ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS WHICH COULD USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO AMCLEVE-15 SGSWIRL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/

WH Comment: *Asked for further details on topics on which Hqs desired AMCLEVE-15 be tested.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ #

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 01313

TO

PAGE FOUR

WH Comment: **Agreed SGSWIRL for AMCLEVE-15, suggesting he be tested on possible involvement in theft or receipt of stolen WOFIRM equipment and whether past involvement in illegal activities make him vulnerable to blackmail.

***Asked permission SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15. Stated testing would be restricted to whether he had in past or was currently involved in activity hostile to WOFIRM.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUC N BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFIC PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY______ AT ________

DISSEM BY 30 PER ______

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.________

X-REF TO FILE NO.________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO
FILE. VR. WH/COG 8 CI CI/OPS CI/OA
SEC 4/6

S E C R E T 172050Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 5646 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR

17 May 68 IN 13549

REF: DIRECTOR-99409

1. ALLEGATIONS AND SUSPICIONS AGAINST AMCLEVE-15 DISCUSSED WITH HIM BY CASE OFFICER AND HE DENIES THEM ALL AND IS COMPLETELY WILLING, EVEN EAGER, TO TAKE SGSWIRL IN ORDER CLEAR HIS RECORD.

2. THE 201 FILE ON AMCLEVE-15 FORWARDED BY JMWAVE IN SEPT 1967 WAS APPARENTLY STRIPPED DOWN VERSION AND NO PART I PRQ'S EVER RECEIVED; THEREFORE, WE DO NOT HAVE THE FACTS ON HIS FAILURE LIST BROTHER ROBERTO AS GOC EMPLOYEE. THIS POINT DISCUSSED WITH HIM, HOWEVER, AND HE STATES THAT HE DID NOT TRY CONCEAL HIS BROTHER'S STATUS BUT MERELY THOUGHT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AS LOW-LEVEL AND NON-GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ARE TECHNICALLY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. IN ANY CASE, HIS ONLY COMMUNICATION WITH ROBERTO SINCE HIS DEPARTURE FROM CUBA IN FEB 1961 WERE TWO LETTERS SENT IN 1966, AT JMWAVE'S REQUEST, WHICH WERE NEVER ANSWERED. REFERENCE TO SEEING BROTHER IN APRIL 1961 WAS OBVIOUSLY CONFUSION OF EXACT DATES AFTER FIVE AND HALF YEARS. AMCLEVE-15

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY_______ AT _____________ Z

DISSEM BY__________ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ___________

X-REF TO FILE NO ___________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9646 S E C R E T

WAS IN GUATEMALA TRAINING CAMP PREPARING FOR BAY OF PIGS IN APRIL 1961.

3. WE WERE NOT AWARE THAT AMCLEVE-15 WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING STOLEN WOFIRM DEMOLITION AND SABOTAGE ITEMS. WE DID NOT ASSUME FROM HVCA-14975, ON ALLEGED POSSESSION OF SOME SUCH ITEMS BY AMCLEVE-15, THAT HE HAD STOLEN THEM FROM WOFIRM. DID HQS SO ASSUME, OR IS THERE OTHER INFO IN THIS REGARD WHICH CARACAS HAS NOT RECEIVED? WHAT WAS DATE OF ALLEGED THEFT? SUBSEQUENT TO LAST SGSWIRL IN APRIL 1966? AMCLEVE-15 TOLD CASE OFFICER THAT HE BROUGHT TO CARACAS SMALL SUITCASE OF SUCH ITEMS WHICH HE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY RECE ORGANIZATION AND WHICH TO HIS KNOWLEDGE WERE COMMERCIAL ITEMS, NOT WOFIRM.

4. AMCLEVE-15 STATES HAS NOT ENGAGED IN PAST ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND ONLY ASSOCIATIONS WITH GANGSTER ELEMENTS WERE AT SPECIFIC REQUEST JMWAVE (AS CONFIRMED BY JMWAVE-8866) AND WERE ALL FULLY REPORTED TO JMWAVE. AGAIN WE ASK, DOES HQS HAVE SOME INFO IN THIS REGARD WHICH WE DO NOT?

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 9646 SECRET

5. IT APPEARS FROM REF AND REVIEW OF TRAFFIC SINCE START OF CONSIDERATION OF USE AMCLEVE-15 IN CARACAS THAT HQS IN POSSESSION DEROGATORY INFO NOT KNOWN TO CARACAS. WE SUGGESTED THIS IN HVCA-14978 AND REQUESTED THAT WE BE PROVIDED WITH ANY SUCH INFO. DIRECTOR-56598 OF 2 DEC 1967 HINTED AT SUCH INFO HELD BY HQS AND PROMISED DISPATCH "WITH HQS COMMENTS OTHER ASPECTS THIS CASE," BUT DISPATCH NEVER RECEIVED. SGSWIRL OPERATOR STATES IT DIFFICULT TO RUN MEANINGFUL EXAM ON SPECIFIC POINTS OF CONCERN TO HQS WITHOUT ALL FACTS. THEREFORE, REQUEST:

A. DETAILS OF WHAT AMCLEVE-15 DID LIST RE HIS BROTHERS ON PRQ, AND REQUEST BY JMWAVE TO INITIATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROBERTO AND RESULTS.

B. DATE AND DETAILS OF THEFT ON WOFIRM ITEMS.

C. DETAILS OF ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND GANGSTER ASSOCIATIONS OTHER THAN THOSE UNDERTAKEN AT SPECIFIC WOFIRM REQUEST

D. ANY OTHER DEROGATORY INFO OR ALLEGATIONS KNOWN TO HQS OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT BEEN APPRISED.

6. PLEASE REPLY IN TIME FOR SGSWIRL, SCHEDULED FOR 22 MAY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

SECRET

ORIG: [redacted] L. A. Gerainer
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 13 MAY 1968

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER ____ # ____
CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
C/OPS, SECUR 4

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: 14 F3 31 Z . WH/COG 8, CI/OA,
(date and time filed)
99409 (reference number)

~~PRIORITY~~ IMMEDIATE
TO CARACAS

CITE DIRECTOR

copy to Amcleve 15 201

REF: CARACAS 9588 (IN 08516)

1. CONCUR SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15. IN ADDITION AREAS OUTLINED REF BELIEVE AMCLEVE-15 SHOULD BE TESTED ON FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

A. STATUS OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS BROTHERS, IDEN A AND IDEN B. IDEN B IS BELIEVED TO BE A DSE AGENT AND IS TRUSTED BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD. NOTE AMCLEVE-15 CONSISTENTLY FAILED TO LIST IDEN B AS EMPLOYED BY CUBAN GOV IN PRQ'S FILLED OUT IN 1961, 1965, AND 1966 ALTHOUGH IDEN B WAS EMPLOYED BY CUBAN TELEPHONE COMPANY DURING THIS PERIOD. AFTER PHONE CALL FROM FAMILY IN HAVANA IN SEPTEMBER 1966, AMCLEVE-15 TOLD STATION JMWAVE OF IDEN B AND SAID HE HAD LAST SEEN HIM IN APRIL 1961. THIS AT VARIANCE WITH 1961 PRQ I WHICH SAYS AMCLEVE-15 ARRIVED IN U.S. IN FEBRUARY 1961.

B. REALIZE STATION WISHES AVOID QUESTIONS CONCERNING AMCLEVE-15'S EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES WHICH DO NOT DIRECTLY RELATE TO HOSTILE ACTIVITY AGAINST WOFIRM. HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL ~~LY~~ TO CLARIFY DEGREE TO WHICH AMCLEVE-15 INVOLVED IN

CONT...

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

GARDINER

SECRET

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO [illegible]

BY: PER. #

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

PAGE 2

99409

THEFT AND DISPOSAL OF DEMOLITION AND OTHER SABOTAGE DEVICES UNIQUE TO WOFIRM BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL HARM OF THESE ACTIVITIES TO WOFIRM. ALSO BELIEVE STATION SHOULD ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN WHETHER HE FEELS PAST ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OR ASSOCIATIONS WITH GANGSTER ELEMENTS MAKE HIM VULNERABLE TO BLACKMAIL.

2. HQS PREPARED CONSIDER LESS RESTRICTED USE OF AMCLEVE-15 IF SGSWIRL REVEALS NO DECEPTION.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: CI/OPS/Mr. Hughes F. W. Hughes

OS/IRD/Mr. Bednar J.B. Bednar

WH Comment: Requests permission SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15, restricting test to points designed determine that he has not, is not, and does not plan engage in activities hostile to WOFIRM.

William V. Broe
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

L Sternfield
LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY N

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG: K. GARDINER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 13 MAY 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER ____ #

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RI

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM: FILE , VR , WH/COG 8 CI/OA, CI/OPS, SECUR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number) 99410

CITE DIRECTOR 99410

TO IMMEDIATE CARACAS

REF: DIRECTOR 99409

IDEN A: RAUL POSADA CARRILLES

IDEN B: ROBERTO POSADA CARRILLES

END OF MESSAGE

K

File AMCRAVE-15 201

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

AMCLEVE-15 220.00

Subject continues to provide excellent information on the activities of CIRASH and CIVISTA-5.

FROM: HVCA-15438, 13 May 1968

SUBJECT: CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for April 1968

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 14 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

1	3	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE. VR. WH/COG 8, C/OPS, C/OB

FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 102037Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 9588

10 MAY 68 IN 08516

DIRECTOR

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 71540

B. HVCA-15159

fil AMCLEVE-15 201

1. AMCLEVE-15 HAS PROVED EXTREMELY PRODUCTIVE AND VERY VALUABLE SOURCE SINCE PICKED UP BY CARACAS STATION FEBRUARY 1965. WE BELIEVE HE COLLABORATING FULLY WITH WOFIRM AND WOULD NOT EXPOSE, INFORM ON OR WORK AGAINST WOFIRM. THIS DOES NOT MEAN HE MIGHT NOT ENGAGE IN SIDE ACTIVITIES OF HIS OWN UNRELATED TO WOFIRM ACTIVITIES WITHOUT INFORMING WOFIRM.

2. BELIEVE GOOD TRADECRAFT REQUIRES HE UNDERGO SGSWIRL AT THIS TIME. ALSO WE WOULD LIKE REGULARIZE HIS STATUS, REINSTATE HIS CLEARANCE AND REMOVE HIM FROM "HOSTILE" LIST SO WE CAN WORK WITH HIM MORE CLOSELY, LEVY REQUIREMENTS, AND THEREBY REAP FULL BENEFIT HIS POTENTIAL.

3. WE WOULD PROPOSE LIMIT EXAMINATION TO POINTS DESIGNED DETERMINE THAT HE HAS NOT, IS NOT, AND DOES NOT PLAN ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES HOSTILE TO WOFIRM. OUR ONLY REAL CONCERN IS TO BE ASSURED HE NOT WORKING AGAINST US. SINI CE MUCH OF HIS VALUE TO CIRASH-4 IS BASED ON HIS OTHER ACTIVITIES AND HIS CONTACTS

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________ 2

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY: ________ PER ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE ________ VR.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9588 SECRET

IN MIAMI, AS POINTED OUT REF B, AND SINCE WE ARE OBLIGED TO MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH CIRASH-4, WE WOULD PROPOSE NOT CONDUCT DIRECT QUESTIONING ON THIS ASPECT HIS ACTIVITIES.

4. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15, BUT WISH MAKE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT PROPOSE USE EXAMINATION TO PROBE POINTS RAISED REF A; RATHER ONLY TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WORKING FOR AND NOT AGAINST US.

SECRET

BT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT
DATE: 8 MAY 1968
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AID TO CUBAN ANTI-CASTRO EXILES
REPORT #: 2 753 0015 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 21 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ________ AT ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

DISSEM BY 30 PER ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION
C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH6, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/SOD 3, C/CI/ES, C/CS/SGO,

S E C R E T 302055Z APR 68 CITE CARACAS 9497

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC

REF CARACAS 9387 (IN 92196)

Fil. AMCLEVE-15 201

6

1 [illegible] 01396

M

1. AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS AGEDO LUGO IN CARACAS, APPARENTLY ON GANGSTER MISSION FOR CHUCHU FERNANDEZ, VENEZUELAN MILLIONAIRE IN MIAMI. LUGO TOLD AMCLEVE-15 THAT LNERGO INSTRUCTED HIM BE ON LOOKOUT FOR PRESENCE IN CARACAS OF FOLLOWING CUBANS SENT FROM CUBA TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT RAUL LEONI:

A. FRANCISCO LINARES, ALIAS PANCHO. NO STATION TRACES.

B. COMANDANTE WILLIAM GALVES. NO STATION TRACES. MAY REFER TO CUBAN COMANDANTE WILLIAM REPORTEDLY KILLED WITH DOUGLAS BRAVO GUERRILLAS.

C. ABELARDO COLOME, ALIAS FURRY. THIS IS ABELARDO COLOME IBARRA, ALIAS CAPTAIN FKCRY (201-297702) WHO REPORTEDLY IN VENEZUELA FOR TWO YEARS TRAINING GUERRILLAS AND WHO RETURNED CUBA MARCH 1965 AFTER BEING WOUNDED.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO.
FILE VR.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9497 SECRET

D. ORESTES GUERRA. PROBABLY ORESTES GUERRA GONZALEZ, CUBAN REPORTED WITH BRAVO GUERRILLAS IN SEPTEMBER 1967.

2. NOT DISSEMING DUE UNRESOLVED STATUS AMCLEVE-15 SOURCE WHO CLAIMS BE LNERGO INFORMANT. INFO RE RECENT ARRIVAL FROM CUBA OF ORESTES GUERRA AND COMANDANTE WILLIAM UNCONFIRMED BUT BY NO MEANS IMPOSSIBLE. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS, JMWAVE, AND AMOT TRACES ON LUGO AND CONFIRMATION FROM LNERGO IF HE THEIR AGENT. ALSO, TRACES ON LINARES AND GALVES AND ANY INDICATION TRAVEL OF ANY ABOVE FOUR MEN. PRESUME IF LNERGO HAD INFO RE ASSASSINATION PLOT AGAINST LEONI SUCH INFO WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE WOFIRM.

SECRET

BT

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION #171 **SECRET**

ORIG. A. Cutright	ROUTING				
UNIT WH/3/V	1		4		
EXT. 4521	2		5		
DATE 25 April 1968	3		6		

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 8

TDCS DB-315/01471-68

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 3, DO 5, CSDO, WH/COG 9 DCI, D/DCI, DDP, A/DDP, CS/RF

DATE DISTRIBUTED
25 April 1968

PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/Reg	1	WH/3/V	4
WH/CA	1	WH/COG	9
WH/R	1	JMWAVE	#
WH/FI	1		

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
CARACAS 9453 (IN 97611)
HVC-4762
N. P. (AMCLEVE-15)
FC, Para 1 (AMIFF-1)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

RECOMMEND FOR EXO

BASIC DOCUMENT HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO DCI.

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
AC/WH/3/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/COG/RR (by phone)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/R

COPY NO.

FORM 6-67 3005 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 97611

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SDO	ONE	CRS
					DDI		EXO	XXXX	XXX	XXXX	XXX	XXXX	XXXX

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET

CITE TDCS DB-315/01471-68

DIST 25 APRIL 1968

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI 29 FEBRUARY - 23 APRIL 1968 25 23 12Z

SUBJECT INVOLVEMENT OF THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY IN A CUBAN EXILE PLAN TO ATTACK CUBA

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (24 APRIL 1968) FIELD NO. HVC-4762

SOURCE AN EXPERIENCED POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF VENEZUELA. HE REPORTS WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SUPERIORS. ALTHOUGH HE IS A NEW SOURCE, HIS INFORMATION TO DATE HAS BEEN FOUND FREQUENTLY TO CONFIRM INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED INFORMATION ON SECURITY MATTERS. SOURCE HAD ACCESS TO DETAILS OF THE INVESTIGATION.

SUMMARY: AN INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION BY THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF POLICE (DIGEPOL) ON CUBAN EXILE PLANS TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON CUBA HAS REVEALED THAT MEMBERS OF THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY, WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED. THE VENEZUELANS HAVE PROCURED ARMS FOR THE PLOTTERS AND HAVE HELPED THEM BRING IN ARMS BY BOAT. THE PLANNED ATTACK HAS BEEN CANCELLED BECAUSE DIGEPOL'S INVESTIGATION HAS REVEALED DETAILS OF THE OPERATION. HOWEVER, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO INTEREST ITSELF IN AIDING CUBAN EXILE PLANS. END SUMMARY.

1. IN FEBRUARY 1968, THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF POLICE (DIGEPOL) BEGAN AN INVESTIGATION OF REPORTS THAT VENEZUELANS WERE PROCURING ARMS FOR A CUBAN EXILE GROUP IN VENEZUELA WHICH PLANNED TO ATTACK CUBA. INITIAL REPORTS IDENTIFIED TWO CUBANS INVOLVED IN THE CASE: SALVADOR ROMANI-ORUE-GARCIA, WHO ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA AS AN EXILE FROM CUBA IN 1959, AND REINALDO BONIFACIO GONZALEZ-LEON GARCIA, WHO IS A CLOSE FRIEND OF ROLANDO MASFERRER AND WHO TOOK PART IN THE BAY

OF PIGS INVASION ATTEMPT. (FIELD COMMENT: AN INDEPENDENT AND UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED IN NOVEMBER 1967 THAT GONZALEZ-LEON WAS THEN APPROACHING THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY WITH REQUESTS FOR ARMS AND BOATS TO BE USED IN AN ATTEMPT AGAINST CUBA.)

2. BY APRIL 1968 DIGEPOL'S INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION HAD IDENTIFIED NINE MORE CUBAN PARTICIPANTS AND HAD REVEALED THAT TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY, AN ARMY COLONEL AND A MAJOR, WERE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE PLAN. THE TWO VENEZUELANS HAD PROCURED ARMS FOR THE GROUP AND HAD ALSO HELPED TO ARRANGE THE ARRIVAL IN VENEZUELA IN EARLY 1968 OF TWO BOATS CARRYING ARMS. THE BOATS WERE DOCKED AT CLUB PUERTO AZUL AND AT PUERTO CABELLO.

3. UPON LEARNING THAT THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY WAS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE PLAN AND THAT THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAMON FLORENCIO GOMEZ KNEW THAT VENEZUELAN MILITARY AID WAS BEING GIVEN TO THE CUBAN PLOTTERS, THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CONFRONTED THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ON 23 APRIL WITH THE ACCUMULATED EVIDENCE COLLECTED ON THE CASE. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ADMITTED ITS INVOLVEMENT.

(SOURCE COMMENT: NO HOSTILITY TOWARD, OR CRITICISM OF, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WAS SHOWN DURING THE CONFRONTATION BECAUSE INTERIOR IS AFRAID OF DEFENSE. INTERIOR MERELY REQUESTED INFORMATION ON WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED.)

4. WHEN IT BECAME OBVIOUS TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE THAT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WAS FULLY INFORMED ON THE DETAILS OF THE CUBAN PLAN, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO CANCEL THE OPERATION. THE CUBANS WERE TO BE INFORMED OF THE CANCELLATION ON 24 APRIL. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO STUDY THE "GENERAL CONCEPT OF AID TO A CUBAN EXILE ATTACK ON CUBA FOR THE FUTURE."

5. THE FOLLOWING CUBAN PARTICIPANTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY DIGEPOL: LEONEL GOMEZ; MELITON (LNU); ANIBAL JUSTO POZO; CESAR LA MADRID; ELADIO ROMAN BAS TORRIENTE; ANTONIO FERNANDO MALLO LOPEZ; JUAN ALBERTO MORA CHAVEZ; SALVADOR MADRUGA; AND CAROL (FNU).

[illegible]

[illegible]

NO DISSEM ABROAD

[illegible]

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
(classification) (dissem controls)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR MILGROUP CINCSO CINCLANT.

7. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN JUNE 1967, A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT LEADERS, INCLUDING THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR, FAVORED FORCEFUL ACTION AGAINST CUBA. THIS ACTION WOULD INVOLVE COMMANDO RAIDS AND AERIAL BOMBARDMENTS. SEE TDCSDB-315/02094-67.)

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/ NO DISSEM ABROAD

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ORIG: A. CUTRIGHT
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 25 APRIL 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 48 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG 8, FI, FI/INT 2,
IW,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pico) (reference number)

25 23 10 Z CITE DIRECTOR 94578

TO

CARACAS, REP/LANT, PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 9453 (IN 97611) HVC-4762 (ZRWAHOO)

REFERENCE DISSEMINATED TDCSDB-315/01471-68 WITH ADDITION OF PARAGRAPH 7 AS FOLLOWS: "(HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN JUNE 1967, A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT LEADERS, INCLUDING THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR, FAVORED FORCEFUL ACTION AGAINST CUBA. THIS ACTION WOULD INVOLVE COMMANDO RAIDS AND AERIAL BOMBARDMENTS. SEE TDCSDB-315/02094-67.)"

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: C/WH/R

Thomas Polgar
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

... defense of the United States within the meaning of the E... Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is ...

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CUBA

PAGE ... PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

REPORT NO. CS-311/03646-68

DATE DISTR. 18 April 1968

COUNTRY Cuba

DOI 17 February 1968 and December 1967

SUBJECT Identification and Location of Political Prisoners

ACQ . Spain, Madrid (11 March 1968) FIELD NO. OSM-8876

SOURCE A member of a group of Cuban emigres who have been trained in the techniques of information collection and who have provided useful reports since early 1962. The information was obtained from the Cuban emigres identified below.

Subsource of paragraphs 1, 2, and 3: CC-3572, Bernabe Eugenio Yanez Pelletier, a Cuban refugee and former resident of Havana City who left Cuba on 19 February 1968. Yanez was imprisoned for six years and eight months and was released from La Cabana on 8 January 1967. His brother, Jesus Yanez, former aide to Fidel Castro, is serving 15 years at La Cabana; subsource last visited his brother on 17 February 1968, on which date he was held in galera 34.

1. As of 17 February 1968, the following were among the prisoners held in galera 34 of La Cabana prison:

Jose Luis Gallareta
Fernando Sanchez Amaya
Rafael del Pino Siero
Enrique Arrate
Ernesto de la Fe
Sosa Chabau (fnu)
Juan Valdes Morejon
Gonzalo Miranda Garcia
Santiago Verdeja
Alberto Blanco
Orlando Castro
Alberto Cruz
David Salvador
Rafael Menendez Aponte
Luis de Posada
Mario Salavarria
Kirvy Long (U.S. citizen, serving 30 years)

2. Except for Mario Salavarria, who has a nearly useless leg, all of the above were in good health. The prisoners in

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
DCS	FBI 2							

CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for March 1968

HVCA - 15368, 17 April 1968 75 - 6 - 43/3

AMCLEVE-15	220.00

Subject has proven to be an extremely valuable penetration of CIRASH, passing to the Station all the documents which he can, and providing timely information on the activities of CIRASH and CIVISTA-5.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 24 PER ______

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

LASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
[illegible]

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE. VR. WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/INT-2

OUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 162056Z APR 68 CITE CARACAS 9387

16 APR 68 IN 92196
B

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

1. AMCLEVE-15 WORKING ON CIRASH CASE INVOLVING POSSIBLE SMUGGLING FROM MIAMI TO VENEZUELA. ONE OF THOSE INVOLVED IN MIAMI IS AGEDO LUGO, ALIAS EL NEGRO LUGO. IN MEMO TO CHIEF CIRASH TO GIVE HIS BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE OF PEOPLE INVOLVED, AMCLEVE-15 DESCRIBED LUGO AS NEGRO WHO INFILTRATED BY LNERGO INTO BLACK POWER GROUPS IN MIAMI.

2. HQS MAY WISH BRING TO ATTENTION LNERGO THAT POSSIBLY ONE OF THEIR AGENTS KNOWN TO AMCLEVE-15 AND THEREBY PROBABLY OTHER CUBANS IN MIAMI.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY D AT 2300 Z
DISSEM BY 98 PER
ACTION C/WH6 ☒ RID COPY

C[illegible] MESSAGE H TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
INFO. FILE. VR. CS/DO, C/WH/COG5, C/CI C/FI2

[illegible]ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 152209Z APR 68 CITE CARACAS 9376 (LYNER ACTING)

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT

15 APR 68 IN 91426

REFS A. CARACAS 9356 (IN 88953)

B. CARACAS 9364 (IN 89759)

C. GUATEMALA CITY 521

201 10

AMCLEVE-15

IN VIEW REF C WE ANXIOUS PIN DOWN WHETHER ILLICH CARACAS. BELIEVE POSSIBLE GO TO CIVISTA-5 WITHOUT BLOWING AMCLEVE-15 INFO REF B. CAN WE GO TO CIVISTA-5 WITH STORY THAT MEXICO CITY STATION HAS ADVISED THAT ILLICH MAY BE TRAVELLING LATIN AMERICA AND THEY BELIEVE HE PLANS STOP VENEZUELA IN ADDITION OTHER COUNTRIES? WE WOULD TELL CIVISTA THAT WOFIRM INTERESTED BEING ADVISED SHOULD ILLICH APPEAR ON SCENE. WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL GIVE CIVISTA-5 SOME BACKGROUND ON ILLICH. IF AGREEABLE, WOULD APPRECIATE ILLICH BACKGROUND FROM MEXICO CITY BY 1500 HOURS LOCALTIME 16 APRIL TO PERMIT ROGOVER RAISE AT SCHEDULED MEETING WITH CIVISTA-5.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

ORIG: J. GOWER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 12 APRIL 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 15 PER

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

13 16 09 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 91348

TO

CARACAS INFO: GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY AMCLEVE -

REF: CARACAS 9364 (IN 89759)*

HQS HAS NO RECORD OF ANY TRAVEL BY ILLICH TO GUATEMALA. NAMES OF THOSE TRAVELLING TO BLOC FROM SEPTEMBER 1967 TO FEBRUARY 1968 AND NAMES OF THOSE TRAVELLING TO CUBA SINCE 1962 ALSO CHECKED. RESULTS NEGATIVE IN BOTH CASES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Reported arrival of Illich in Venezuela; requested information whether Illich was in Guatemala in recent months.

COORD: C/WH/1 W. J. Kaufman
D C/WH/2/G J. Desmond
L. E. Piper

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO Chief of Station, JMWAVE			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Caracas			ABSTRACT
SUBJECT Guerrilla Course in Cuba			

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. CSMA-23303, 7 December 1967
B. UFGA-29461, 8 February 1968

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of seven folders which comprise the notes taken by Mario Cannella at a guerrilla course he attended in Cuba from December 1966 through October 1967. Copies of these notes were received from unilateral penetration agent of CIRASH, AMCLEVE-15.

2. The course was particularly heavy on explosives, with the first three volumes being devoted to it exclusively. Volumes 4 and 6 are also mostly on explosives, with the first part of each being on photography and Marxism, respectively. Volumes 5 and 7 deal with such subjects as tradecraft, infiltration-exfiltration operations, security, safehouses, recruitments, sabotage operations, etc.

3. No copies of the attachments are being sent to JMWAVE; we defer to Headquarters as to whether it would be worthwhile to reprint some of the courses for distribution to JMWAVE or others.

Oscar C. KALBRING

ATTACHMENTS:
One copy each of seven folders described in paragraph one

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - CH/WHD (w/att, h/w)
1 - COS, JMWAVE (w/o att)

75-4-124

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA-15345	10 Apr 68 9 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

From: CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for February 1968

HVCA-15894, 22 March 1968 75 - 6 - 43/3

AMCLEVE-15 224.00

He is the Station's new penetration of CIRASH and has provided excellent information on the activities of CIRASH, CIRASH-4 and CIVISTA-5. He has been put on a salary of Bs 1,000 per month, to start.

From: CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for January 1968
HVCA-15293, 22 March 1968   75 - 6 - 43/3

AMCLEVE-15 **None**

He was picked up as a penetration of CIRASH at the end of January and will be put on a salary beginning 1 February 1968.

1013 Mrs. Stanfield
ROOM NO. | BUILDING
W #K6

REMARKS
cc 16
Mr. Gremillion
saw the
Original

FROM:
ROOM NO. | BUILDING | EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 30-4 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGW-6380
FILE NO - 75-120-22
DATE - 1 MARCH 1968
INDEX - NO
[illegible] - NO
TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE
INFO - NONE
FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
SUBJ - GUSTAVO ERNESTO ORTIZ FAEZ
ACTION - SEE PARA 1
REFS - HVCA 15198 /POUCHED/ T.M. NO. 208722

1. REQUEST JMWAVE PROVIDE ANY AVAILABLE INFO CONCERNING ACTIVITIES GUSTAVO ERNESTO /ORTIZ/ FAEZ WHILE VISITING MIAMI AREA LATE JANUARY EARLY FEB 1968 HQS DULY CONCERNED OVER APPARENT INVOLVEMENT AMCLEVE-15 IN ORTIZ PLANS TO OBTAIN QUOTE "CURARE POISON FOR USE IN HYPODERMIC NEEDLES" UNQUOTE. IN VIEW SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS NEEDED PROTECT UNILATERAL STATUS CIRASH-15, STATION CARACAS NOT IN POSITION QUERY AMCLEVE-15 DIRECTLY. HQS HOPEFUL STATION JMWAVE MAY BE IN POSITION OBTAIN SUFFICIENT LEAD INFORMATION WHICH MAY MAKE DIRECT APPROACH AMCLEVE-15 POSSIBLE.

2. JMWAVE REQUESTED QUERY LNERGO FOR INFO ON ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS ORTIZ WHILE VISITING MIAMI. STATION SHOULD PASS WRITTEN MEMO TO LNERGO ADVISING THAT QUOTE "UNIDENTIFIED CUBAN EXILE" UNQUOTE REPORTED THAT ORTIZ ATTEMPTED OBTAIN QUOTE "LETHAL POISONS" UNQUOTE WHILE IN MIAMI AT END OF JANUARY. STATION REQUESTED PROVIDE HQS WITH COPY OF MEMO PASSED TO LNERGO SO THAT APPROPRIATE NOTICE MAY BE PROVIDED.

LNERGO AT HQS LEVEL.

3. AS STATION AWARE, THIS SITUATION DEEPLY COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT AMCLEVE-15 CLOSE INTIMATE FRIEND OF CIRASH-4 AND CIRASH-6, THE LATTER A FORMER CUBAN EXILE, FORMER U.S. CITIZEN AND NOW VENEZUELA CITIZEN. STATION FILES SHOULD HAVE DETAILED INFO ON BACKGROUND ORTIZ WHO ALSO SUBJ OF SEVERAL LNERGO REPORTS.

XG GERALD L. GARDYNE

DISTRIBUTION
3: TAPE 3-COS,JMWAVE

ORIGINATOR:

AC/WH/COG/OPS William Murray

COORDINATION:

WH/3/ Mr. Sternfield

RELEASING:

C/WH/COG David A. Phillips

DISTRIBUTION:
1-RID
1-WH/REG/C
1-WH/3
1-WH/COG/OPS
1-Originator

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

GROUP 3X

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 282015Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 9019

28 FEB 68 IN 60225

ROME INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE

1. LIAISON PENETRATION AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS VENEZUELAN CONSULATE ROME GRANTED TOURIST CARD 99977 ON 14 FEB 1968 TO ITALIAN COMMUNIST MARIO PETRUCCI, DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL AGENCY ITALNORD.

2. REQUEST STATON TRACES PETRUCCI. NO LIAISON.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM
3

.SSIFIED MESSAGE f TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	5	5	✓
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME 0225

INFO FILE, VR, DCI, DIDCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CF, CS/DC, DDP/SSU, C/CI, C/CI/I, C/FI2, C/FI/D4, D/SECUR 4, C/TSD 3, C/WH/COG 5.

S E C R E T 282317Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 9025

DIRECTOR

RXD XG

CC

ACTION

29 FEB

RYBAT

REF CARACAS 2922 (IN 50020)

Embassy is number one target * on list of phone taps.

1. LATEST INFO FROM AMCLEVE-15[1] ON LNPURE[2] PHONE TAP WHICH HE FOLLOWING UP:

A. ALTHOUGH LNPURE[2] AT TOP OF TARGET LIST HE SAW IT AMCLEVE-15[1]'S IMPRESSION THAT COVERAGE IS SPOTTY AND LNPURE[2] MAY NOT AT THIS MOMENT BE COVERED.

B. CIRASH[3] HAS 36 LINES COVERED. MAN IN CHARGE OF TAPS TOLD AMCLEVE-15[1] THAT WHEN ALL LINES NOT BEING USED ON SPECIFIC TARGETS, "AS IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1967," ANY EXTRA LINES PUT ON LNPURE[2].

C. CIRASH[3] HAS ONLY THREE RECORDERS FOR THESE 36 LINES, EACH RECORDER COVERING 12 LINES EVEN THOUGH MORE THAN ONE CONVERSATION MAY THEREFORE BE FEEDING INTO IT AT GIVEN MOMENT.

SECRET

Baloney – any organization using only 3 recorders + no line is not using dial recorders

Ly.

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9025 SECRET

D. THREE SHIFTS COVER LINES 24 Hours ~~HOAMS~~ A DAY. ALL COVERAGE TAKEN BY RECORDERS; NO LIVE LISTENING.

E. CIVISTA-5[4] TOLD AMCLEVE-15[1] THAT CIRASH[3] PLANS BE ABLE COVER 100 LINES AND HAS ALREADY REQUESTED 100 RECORDERS TO HANDLE EACH LINE SEPARATELY.

F. DIAL RECORDERS BEING USED (QUANTITY UNKNOWN).

2. ABOVE INDICATES PRESENT LNPURE[2] COVERAGE PROBABLY POOR AND CONFUSING. WHILE THIS MEANS DANGER LESS THAN WE SUPPOSED, WE STILL TAKING PRECAUTIONARY STEPS OUTLINED IN REF.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED XX

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WH Division

FROM

Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT

Venezuelan Security Services Technical Capabilities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AMCLEVE-15

REFERENCE: HVCS-2610

1. Headquarters' request to review the contents of the attachment to Reference was received at a time when the Station was unable to produce current data to make a meaningful contribution to updating subject matter. Since receipt of Reference, the Station has unilaterally recruited a telephone technician who is knowledgeable of SIFA telephone taps. This Subject has not been used as yet, nor has he received his first months salary and ROXOVER is not yet prepared to probe Subject on SIFA taps. With regard to DIGEPOL technical operations, the Station has only recently been able to obtain unilateral type information through AMCLEVE-15 who is only now getting to know the man in charge of the DIGEPOL telephone operation.

2. Within the next two months the Station should be in a position to provide a more detailed and specific report on GOV technical operations.

3. The following is all the information currently available to the Station on SIFA/DIGEPOL technical operations.

a. SIFA telephone taps are monitored in the building housing the Ministry of Communications, which is located alongside SIFA headquarters. According to the telephone technician, they have a capability to intercept 50 lines, but only a dozen are in operation at any given time. The monitoring section consists of 2-3 persons. Because of this personnel shortage many tapes are not replayed and even less are transcribed. SIFA offices in the interior have been reduced and it is doubtful that a telephone program is in operation.

b. The DIGEPOL telephone intercepts are now directly under command of the Minister of Interior and all intercept requests must have his approval. According to CIGIRO-1 in conversations with the COS, the former claims a telephone capability of 50 lines, not including 3-4 lines he has running directly into his office. (Plans call for completion of an additional 100 lines by the end of February 1968.) These are monitored in the building of Ministry of Interior. The staffing pattern, production and utilization of the take is unknown to the Station. Since a capability of this extent involves running a cable to the monitoring post, it is most probable that the actual taps are on the frame at the main telephone exchange in Caracas.

Distribution: 3 - Chief, WH	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA-15308	DATE 23 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 75-2-13/3 75-2-14/3

c. The Station is unaware of any capability of the GOV may have to place transmitters in telephones and it is doubtful that they have considered this type of operation during the past year.

d. A recent development, too early for the Station to report on as yet, is the formation of a Special Group under CIVISTA-5. It is known that CIVISTA-5 has been in the throes of developing a clandestine unit to run true intelligence type operations. In keeping with his plans he ordered a large amount of technical equipment from Germany. This equipment arrived on 14 February with one of his agents who had been receiving intelligence training in Germany. As yet the equipment has not been unpacked, but it is believed to contain material more of a photographic nature rather than audio type material. It is believed that CIVISTA-5 has also placed an order for audio equipment with a firm in the United States.

4. As can be seen from the above, the best GOV capability is to be found in the telephone intercept program, and as has been indicated, the Station will have much better information on this and other technical operations within the next few months.

Matthew R. HOOVER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
ANCLEVE-15

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HVCA-14975
B. HVCA-15159

1. CIRASH-15 reported that ANCLEVE-15, shortly after the latter's return from Miami on 30 January 1968, asked CIRASH-15 if he could obtain curare poison for "approximately forty hypodermic needles." ANCLEVE-15 said that the request had been made by Gustavo ORTIZ Faez, who was still in Miami at that time. ORTIZ returned to Caracas during the second week of February, and on 15 February he personally contacted CIRASH-15 and reiterated the request. CIRASH-15 has so far been unable to determine for what purpose ORTIZ wants the curare.

2. We have not heard anything about this from ANCLEVE-15 and will not ask him in order not to expose CIRASH-15. This is possibly another one of the goon squad activities tentatively planned for Caracas mentioned in Reference A, but more likely it has to do with some wild Cuban exile scheme in Miami, since ANCLEVE-15 told CIRASH-15 when ORTIZ was still in Miami that ORTIZ wanted the curare shipped to him there via a Viasa pilot.

3. As was stated in Reference B, we do not approve of these activities and would like to discuss them with ANCLEVE-15, pointing out that they could jeopardise his employment here with CIRASH-4; but our present relationship with ANCLEVE-15 precludes such discussions. Meanwhile, the case officer will wear his special armored shirt to all meetings with ANCLEVE-15.

Oscar C. KALBING

Ancleve-15
201 file

DISTRIBUTION
3 - C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA-15198	19 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	

SECRET

FROM: COX CHARLES
WH/1/V
EXT. 4521

UW-628
3B7631
TUBE BS-4

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 13 Feb 68

RID CONTROL NO.: 122 FEB21 68

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-6		[illegible]	[illegible]	
REQUESTER			20 Feb	65	① [illegible]
RID/FILES	DT-6				[illegible]
REQUESTER					③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7				
RID/201	GU-5				
RID/INDEX	DT-5				

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

RECEIVED RID/IN
FEB 19 1:03 PM '68

VERIFIED

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: PARSONS - Ramirez

GIVEN NAMES: Roberto

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED: ZN | SN

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 779687

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M	10 July 36	Guantanamo, Oriente, Cuba	Cuba	Miami, Florida

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS: 19 Feb 68 RK

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: YES ☐ NO ☐

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/AFD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7277.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG8, CI/OPS, CI/IC2,

SECRET 162331Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1302 YC Vos CC — W

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR 16 FEB 68 IN 53017

AKULE PBRUMEN AMCLEVE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 4769 (IN

1. NO STATION TRACES ROBERTO PARDON.

2. REF AMCLEVE-15 MIAMI CONTACT IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ROBERTO (PARSONS) RAMIREZ, DPOB 10 JULY 1930, GUANTANAMO, ORIENTE, CUBA. CITIZEN OF CUBA CURRENTLY RESIDING MIAMI AS PAROLEE. WAS WOFIRM AGENT FROM 1965 THRU 1967. TERMINATED 30 NOVEMBER 1967 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. PARSONS USED IN EXFIL-INFIL OPS AS REPORTED BY AMCLEVE-15 BUT HE ALSO OCCASIONALLY REPORTED GRATUITOUS AND MOSTLY UNSUBSTANTIATED INFO ON DSE AND DGI.

SECRET

SECRET x MORE THAN YEAR OLD

No WH/3/V traces.
RI + COG requested.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

~~FROM~~ A
ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, WH/COG 8, C/CI 2

SECRET 150950Z FEB 68 CITE THE HAGUE 3810

ACTION

15 FEB 68 IN 51467

A

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

CIWRIT

REF CARACAS 8893 (IN 47506)

TCC 188 FROM HANK. DODGE NOT KNOWN HERE AS OWNER TAXI LINE OR OTHERWISE. INTRIGUED BY STORY, ESPECIALLY LINK SABA. APPRECIATE LEARNING FURTHER DETAILS.

SECRET

WG
JG
AMCLUE-15
info.

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG: C. COX
UNIT: WH/1/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ___ PER ___ #
CONF. WH 8 ☐ NO COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET FEB 15 18 25 Z CITE DIRECTOR 75107

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 8895 (IN 49509)*

RE PARA 1 A REF: NO HQ TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Requested HQ traces on Giuseppe MATTESSICH Marcuzzi suspect CUIS contact in Caracas who carries Italian passport, and on his wife Maria Luisa PEREZ Hernandez de Mattessich who has Cuban passport.

COORD: WH/COG Earl Williamson

Tom Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — SECRET — GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY: 25 PER

ACTION

WH 8

☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2-V

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 142247Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1269

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

15 FEB 68 IN 51208

PBRUMEN AMCLEVE

REF CARACAS 8895 (IN 49509)

vc
56
cl

1. NO STATION OR AMOT TRACES GIUSEPPE (MATTESSICH) MARCUZZI.

2. NO IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES MARIA LUISA (PEREZ) HERNANDEZ DE MATTESSICH. ACCORDING CUBAN PRESS, 18 NOV 1960, GOC FINANCE MINISTRY AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE OF MARIA L. (PEREZ) HERNANDEZ FROM CUBA. SHE BENEFICIARY UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY AND RETIRED UNDER SCHOLASTIC PROGRAM (AMOTS).

SECRET

BT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
	2. RI FILE NO.		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Feb 14, 1968

POSADA Carriles, Luis	Clemente Faustino	201- 300985

WH/3/V

THERE IS A RESTRICTI ER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201

FORM 7-58 44 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

THERE IS A RESTRI OLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 41

ACTION

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
ZC

ACTION
WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, ADDP, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI/D 4, FI/INT 2, IW, EUR 8

SECRET 122236Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 8895

Git
KG ✓
CC Traces pls.

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

13 FEB [illegible]

REF: CARACAS-8894 (IN 49508)

1. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF 9 FEBRUARY MEETING WITH AMCLEVE THAT NOT INCLUDED REF:

A. DIGEPOL SUSPECTS CUBAN G-2 OPERATING OFFICE UNDER COVER BOOK STORE IN CARACAS. ALLEGED CONTACT WITH CUBANS FOR THIS OP IS GIUSEPPE (MATTESSICH) MARCUZZI, DPOB 9 OCTOBER 1892, BORGO ERIZZO, ITALY. VEN FOREIGNERS CEDULA E-752002, ITALIAN PASSPORT 2067532 ISSUED BY ITALIAN CONSULATE HAVANA 14 APRIL 1956. HIS WIFE IS MARIA LUISA (PEREZ) HERNANDEZ DE MATTESSICH, DPOB 13 MAY 1902, PINAR DEL RIO, CUBA. VEN FOREIGNERS CEDULA E-798883, CUBAN PASSPORT 30088 ISSUED HAVANA 5 JULY 1956. NO STATION TRACES. REQUEST JMWAVE, HQS, AND AMOT TRACES.

B. CUBANS RUN INFILTRATION OP THROUGH CURACAO TO BRING CUBANS AND VENEZUELANS INTO VENEZUELA IN PUERTO CABELLO AREA. MAN IN CHARGE IN CURACAO IS ONE FNU DODGE WHO OWNS TAXI LINE. (WILL CHECK WITH CIWRITS.)

C. DIGEPOL JUST OBTAINED COMPLETE URBAN

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 3395 SECRET

TERRORIST PLANS OF FALN FOR MARCH AND APRIL. AMCLEVE-15 WILL ATTEMPT GET FULL COPY FOR STATION; ONLY DETAIL KNOWN TO HIM NOW IS THAT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ WAS ON ASSASSINATION LIST.

D. AMCLEVE-15 MENTIONED AGAIN, AS HE HAS AT PREVIOUS TWO MEETINGS, THAT DIGEPOL IS UNBELIEVABLY DISORGANIZED. HE HAS FREE HAND TO DO WHATEVER HE LIKES BECAUSE HE AT LEAST WORKS AND HAS INITIATIVE. HE HAS BEEN COMPILING DOSSIERS ON LEADING SUBVERSIVES, A THING WHICH DIGEPOL INCREDIBLY DOES NOT HAVE.

2. ABOVE INFO OF INTEL VALUE BEING DISSEMINATED.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES VC

SECRET

ACTION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
ZC

ACTION
WH 8

ⓔ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, CI/IA, SOD 6, CI/PS
CA 5, CA/PEG, CS/SGO

EW
KG
JG
CC
charly note last para

S E C R E T 122233Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 8894

13FEB68 IN 42506

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

PBRUMEN AMSHADY AMCLEVE

REF: JMWAVE-1213 (IN 48140)

1. ORIGINAL SOURCE FOR DIGEPOL ON REF INFO RE CUBANS COMING VENEZUELA MAY HAVE BEEN AMCLEVE-15. ON 9 FEBRUARY AMCLEVE-15 INFORMED STATION THAT UNKNOWN NUMBER CUBANS MAY SOON BE INFILTRATED VENEZUELA, AMONG THEM TONY CASTELLS AND FNU CLADERIN. AMCLEVE-15 HAD RECEIVED THIS INFO FROM ROBERTO PARDON DURING AMCLEVE-15'S VISIT MIAMI LAST WEEK ~~AUGUST~~ JANUARY. AMCLEVE-15 DESCRIBED PARDON AS EX-WOFIRM AGENT WHO USED EXFILTRATE PEOPLE FROM CUBA AND STILL ENGAGED THIS ACTIVITY ON OWN. (REQUEST JMWAVE TRACES.) AMCLEVE-15 DID NOT MENTION SUSANA, BUT STATION FILES SUGGEST SHE MAY BE GUIOMAR (YEPEZ) PATINO, BRAVO FALN SUPPORT AGENT AND MEVAER member YEPEZ PATINO FAMILY ALMOST ALL OF WHOM ACTIVE SUBVERSIVES.

2. AMCLEVE-15 HAS REPORTED TO STATION ON BUILD UP OF URBAN TERRORIST GROUPS AND INCREASED USE OF UCV CAMPUS AS HIDE OUT. AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS THAT ON 7 FEBRUARY DIGEPOL AGENTS CRUISING UCV CAMPUS WERE FIRED ON BY TERRORISTS WHO

SECRET

~~AM~~

PAGE 2 CARACAS 8894 S E C R E T

RECOGNIZED EX-TERRORIST IN CAR WHO NOW INFORMING TO DIGEPOL. CARACAS STATION FEELS THAT IT WOULD DEFINITELY BE ADVANTAGEOUS HAVE AMSHADY-1 ACCEPT DIGEPOL ASSIGNMENT, EVEN IF WOFIRM HAS NO DIRECT ACCESS TO HER. IF WE DO, THAT WOULD BE A BONUS. (WE TRUST THAT HER BEING HIRED BY SHADY CHARACTER SUCH AS GUSTAVO ORTIZ WILL NOT CAUSE CONCERN SIMILAR AMCLEVE-15 CASE.)

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 26

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 5, CA/PEG, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OA, SOD 6, CS/SG 6, CI/PS

S E C R E T 092316Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1213 10 FEB 68 48140

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN AMSHADY

1. ON 5 FEBRUARY 1968 GUSTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ CONTACTED AMSHADY-1 IN MIAMI. ORTIZ INTRODUCED HIMSELF AS EMPLOYED BY DIGEPOL. HE TOLD AMSHADY-1 THAT INSURGENCY IS NOW BUILDING UP IN URBAN AREAS AND WITHIN THE UNIVERSITIES IN VENEZUELA AND THAT CUBANS ARE INVOLVED. HE SAID THAT DIGEPOL HAS INFORMATION THAT CAPTAIN LESTER RODRIGUEZ AND COMANDANTE TONY CASTELLS, BOTH OF THE CUBAN REBEL ARMY, ARE IN VENEZUELA OR EN ROUTE THERE FROM CUBA. HE ADDED THAT THE PROBABLE COORDINATOR OF THE URBAN TERRORISM IS A VENEZUELAN WOMAN WHO IS USING THE WAR NAME SUSANA BUT THAT DIGEPOL HAS BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY HER FURTHER.

2. ORTIZ SAID THAT HE WAS TO BE IN MIAMI ONLY A SHORT WHILE AND HE WANTED FROM AMSHADY-1 WHATEVER INFO SHE HAD OR COULD GET ON CURRENT CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN INSURGENCY IN VENEZUELA. HE ALSO SAID THAT DIGEPOL WAS PLANNING TO TRAIN SELECTED UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, INCLUDING FEMALES, AS PENETRATION AGENTS AND HE ASKED AMSHADY-1 IF SHE WOULD BE

SECRET

INTERESTED IN GOING TO VENEZUELA, TEMPORARILY AT LEAST, AS A TRAINER.

3. AMSHADY-1 MADE IT CLEAR TO THE JMWAVE CASE OFFICER THAT SHE IS WILLING TO COOPERATE IN ANY WAY WITH LEGITIMATE EFFORTS TO THWART CUBAN SPONSORED INSURGENCY INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF TRIPS TO VENEZUELA AND ELSEWHERE ON TRAINING MISSIONS. SHE REPORTED THAT SHE TOLD ORTIZ THAT SHE HAD NO NEW INFORMATION CONCERNING CUBANS IN VENEZUELA AND SAID SHE HAD NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED THE TRAINING OFFER, WHICH SHE FELT TO BE MERELY TENTATIVE. SHE DID AGREE, HOWEVER, TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ORTIZ FOR WHICH PURPOSE HE GAVE AMSHADY-1 A POST OFFICE BOX NUMBER, HIS ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IN CARACAS.

4. JMWAVE REQUEST ADDEES COMMENTS ON THIS DEVELOPMENT AND ANY INDICATION OF OPS INTEREST IN AMSHADY-1 COLLABORATION WITH DIGEPOL ALONG THESE LINES.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW		DATE 9 February 1968 aaa
TO: Chief, WH/3/V	E. Tsikerdanos C. Cox	C NO. 201-300985
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: AMCLEVE/15

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Receipt is acknowledged of your request for cancellation. Please refer to the requirements of CSI F 50-17 (9). It would seem most pertinent in this case.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (20)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
Operational/AMCLEVE-15

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR-71540
B. CARACAS-8748
C. HVCA-14975

1. AMCLEVE-15 was contacted by Oscar C. KALBING again on 2 February 1968. AMCLEVE-15 is willing to provide the Station with any information that comes his way in CIRASH, and the Station has agreed to pay him B 1000 per month for such information.

2. We will, of course, handle AMCLEVE-15 as a "hostile", as requested in Reference A, although we do not share Headquarters' alarm concerning AMCLEVE-15's possible engagement in harassment of communists. This is not the type of activity that we would choose for AMCLEVE-15, of course; and, as stated in Reference C, we had intended to advise him to stay clear of it in order not to jeopardize his position with CIRASH-4. We will not discuss this with him now, however, and risk exposing the source, CIRASH-15, to a "hostile". While we would hope, if we did talk to AMCLEVE-15 about these activities and asked him to desist, that he would comply, we would not be overly surprised if he did not. We are only fooling ourselves if we think that agents, whom we like to consider we "control", are telling us everything they do.

3. At the risk of belaboring the point, it is precisely because he is the kind of person that he is that AMCLEVE-15 is able to become the trusted confidant of people like CIRASH-4, CIRASH-6, Remberto UZCATEGUI and Gustavo ORTIZ, all of whom may be considered somewhat unsavory characters but who, whether or not we like it, run an important part of the security system in Venezuela. And it is precisely because of AMCLEVE-15Is position as such a trusted confidant that we are interested in him.

4. We will attempt to ascertain AMCLEVE-15's motives, as requested in Reference A, but this task will be considerably hampered by our need to handle him as a "hostile", which will preclude the use of some of the basic tools of investigation, such as the SGSWIRL and the levying of requirements.

ATTACHMENTS:
As stated in para. 5 (11 pages)

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - CH-WHD (w/atts, h/w)

FEB 7 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA-15159	DATE 7 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 75-2-13/3

5. We are attaching copies of some of the reports that AMCLEVE-15 passed at his first meeting with a Station case officer on 22 January 1968. At the second meeting he said he would try to obtain for us copies of the interrogation of Antonio ROMERO Celis, of CICLOSE fame, and the report from the CIVISTA agent who recently returned from Cuba (see MADRID-3121 and CARACAS-8318). AMCLEVE-15 is only now really getting deeply into his work with CIRASH, having just settled his family into an apartment on 1 February 1968, and he expects to be able to furnish a great deal more in the near future. In spite of the problems inherent in some of AMCLEVE-15's friendships and peripheral activities, we are hopeful that this is going to be a productive and valuable operation for the Caracas Station.

Oscar C. Kalbing
Oscar C. KALBING

ORIG: C.W. COX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: R-9494
DATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WHP ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, ELINT 2

WH/COG 8, DDP, ADDP, CI, CS/DO, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PRIORITY

CITE DIRECTOR 71540

TO CARACAS

FEB 2 03 03Z

REF: A. HVCA-14978*

B. HVCA-14975**

C. CARACAS 8748*** (IN 36499)

1. IN VIEW REF B WE NOTE WITH ALARM AMCLEVE-15 CONTINUAL TENDENCY BECOME INVOLVED CLANDESTINE SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES, AND HIS FAILURE REPORT COMPLETE STORY TO WOFIRM OR CIRASH OF HIS ACTIVITIES WHICH HE FEELS HE WANTS WITHHOLD FOR WHATEVER REASON. THEREFORE, REQUEST FOR POA FOR AMCLEVE-15 HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND HE IS TO BE HANDLED AS A HOSTILE PER CSI-F 10-5 UNTIL HIS MOTIVES COMPLETELY ASCERTAINED. WE DOUBLY CONCERNED OVER SAME REPORT WHICH LISTS DEMOLITION ITEMS SMUGGLED INTO CARACAS FROM JMWAVE AREA BY AMCLEVE-15 INCLUDING DEVICES PECULIAR TO WOFIRM AND WHOSE USE COULD TIE WOFIRM THIS TYPE ACTIVITY AND BECOME SOURCE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT TO GOV DURING ELECTION YEAR.

2. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO CONTINUED CONTACT AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF CIRASH AND UZCATEGUI ORGANIZATIONS AVAILABLE TO HIM THRU THE NORMAL COURSE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND NO OBJECTION TO PAYMENTS FOR INFO RECEIVED. HOWEVER, THERE TO BE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 71548

TO PAGE 2

NO JOINT OPERATIONS, NOR REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: *Explanation of Caracas station reasons for wanting AMCLEVE-15 as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL.

**Transmittal of CIRASH-15 report on meeting with UZCATEGUI after which CIRASH-15 was introduced to AMCLEVE-15 who disclosed at home of Gustavo ORTIZ Faez that he (AMCLEVE-15) had brought sabotage and infra-red signal devices from Miami (seen by CIRASH-15), and was engaged in conspiracy for sabotage with ORTIZ Faez unknown to Chief, DIGEPOL, CIRASH-4.

***Outlined proposed payments to AMCLEVE-15 and requested HQ expedite POA as penetration agent DIGEPOL.

COORD: CI/OPS Frank Hughes (in draft)

Tom Polgar
WH/F1

by Jacob W. Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

UPDATED BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NAME : Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles (201-300985)

DPOB : 15 February 1928 Cienfuegos, Cuba

MOC : Effective 26 March 1965 as Training Branch Instructor, JMWAVE

TERMINATION : Effective 11 July 1967 as CI informant, JMWAVE

CURRENT OCCUPATION : DIGEPOL employee, Ministry of Interior, Caracas, Venezuela

PRESENT ADDRESS: Caracas, Venezuela

Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles   Army Serial No. O 2 312 445

DOB: 15 Feb 1928   Third Army Control Symbol: AB 517726.

Entered USArmy March 1963.

Released from Active Duty 6 Mar 64.

Served Ft. Benning, Ga as 2nd Lt, Platoon Leader, 2nd Platoon, Co B, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry. Also as Platoon Leader, Weapons Platoon, same Company.

Information desired:

1. Confirmation above information.
2. Dates and status when entering Army, dates entering and graduating Army schools, troop duty assignment changes, promotions, status when leaving Army service, reserve assignments.
3. Current reserve status and extent obligation.
4. Comments on efficiency reports.
5. Anything unusual in file.

[illegible] 4474

Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles   Army Serial No. O 2 312 445 ✓

DOB: 15 Feb 1928   Third Army Control Symbol: AB 517726

Entered USArmy March 1963.

Released from Active Duty 6 Mar 64.

Served Ft. Benning, Ga as 2nd Lt, Platoon Leader, 2nd Platoon, Co B, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry. Also as Platoon Leader, Weapons Platoon, same Company.

Information desired:

1. Confirmation above information.
2. Dates and status when entering Army, dates entering and graduating Army schools, troop duty assignment changes, promotions, status when leaving Army service, reserve assignments.
3. Current reserve status and extent obligation.
4. Comments on efficiency reports.
5. Anything unusual in file.

CIA

14-00000

From: Jim Ludlum CI/LI [illegible]
Luis Posada 3 Jan 68

No [illegible] file
ASN ok birth ok.

Applied for appt as USAR officer
14 Mar 63. On 21 Mar 63
3rd Army Hq advised him
to active duty for ~~[illegible]~~ 6 mos
+ commissioned him 2nd Lt.
Reported 23 March 63 to Infantry.

AGO 21 Mar 63, appt him
2nd Lt USAR.

Schools

(1) Went to Infantry School, at Fort Benning 23 Mar 63 - Student Brigade.

(1a) As of 23 Mar mail address was
Detach 21 2nd Student
Battalion TSC

(2) 19 June 63 he requested ~~[illegible]~~
an Allied Staff Officer Course.
He was then member of Special Officer
Training Program (Cuban),
2506th Cuban Brigade

[Favorable NAC review completed 14 Jun 62.]

Limited Access Clearance

21 Nov 63 he was given LAC to Classified Defense info up to and incl "Secret".

Polygraphed 19 Aug 63 - in connection investigation for attendance at [illegible] Staff Off. Course. Passed.

27 Feb 64 he tendered his resignation to be effective 27 Feb 64 "No plans in US Army to liberate Cuba" His Option he asked be appointed to Stand by reserve

28 Feb 64 he transferred from active duty to standby reserve (US Army Active Reserve) + assigned 5 USA REC Main Station 4100 Aurora St Coral Gables, Fla

11 March 64 assigned to that unit

~~Honorable [illegible]~~

On [illegible] of [illegible]
only course shown is
US Army Infantry School April 63 –
August 63. — Apparently did
not attend Intell officers course.
~~[illegible]~~

~~20 Oct 64.~~
17 Feb 66 he was honorably separated
from Army. He tried to get
commission back but Army
advised him that he did not
meet age requirement which would
not be waived.

SECRET

25 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles 201-300985

1. It is requested that a Provisional Operation Approval be granted for the use of subject as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL and the Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual organization. The Caracas Station has requested that processing be expedited.

2. The Caracas Station has reviewed Subject's file and the documents sent by Headquarters and sees nothing that would preclude the use of Subject as a penetration of DIGEPOL. (copy attached)

3. Significant information in Subject's file concerns his two brothers who are currently in Cuba and his relations with a well known Miami gangster. One brother, Roberto POSADA Carriles, a suspect DSE official, is the Cuban Telephone Company supervisor for Area Norte, including Havana City. Subject has not seen either brother since he left Cuba in 1961. Subject has also been in contact with a well known gangster."Lefty" Rosenthal in the Miami area. Both JMWAVE and the FBI were aware of this contact which was maintained at the latter's request.

E. Tsikerdanos
C/WH/3/Venezuela

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 25 January 1968

TO:		
	☒	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
	☐	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
	☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: E. Tsikerdanos
C/WH/3/V
3B2631

SUBJECT: (True name) Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: AMCLEVE-15

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 300985

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
Venezuela

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE
As a penetration agent into DIGEPOL and the Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual organization.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED		GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 181884

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☒	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☒	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: C. Cox
EXTENSION: R-9494
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF:

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

25 Jan 68

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

Subject : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles 201 - 300985

1. It is requested that a Provisional Operational Approval be granted for the use of subject as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL and the Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual organization. The Caracas station has requested that processing be expedited.

2. The Caracas Station has reviewed Subject's file and the documents sent by Headquarters and sees nothing that would preclude the use of Subject as a penetration of DIGEPOL. (copy attached)

3. Significant information in Subject's file concerns his two brothers who are currently in Cuba and his relations with a well known Miami gangster. One brother, Roberto POSADA Carriles, a suspect FSE official, is the Cuban Telephone Company supervisor for Area Norte, including Havana City. Subject has not seen either brother since he left Cuba in 1961. Subject has also been in contact with a well known gangster "Lefty" Rosenthal in the Miami area. Both JMWAVE and the FBI were aware of this contact, which was maintained at the latters request.

Ernie
CWH/3/V

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 3-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

7

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8 A/DA C/CS FI FI/INT 2 CI/IC 2 SOD 6 CS/SOD CI/OA

S E C R E T 241443Z JAN 68 CITE CARACAS 8748 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. HVCA-14978

B. HVCW-7776

C. DIRECTOR-56598

24 JAN 68 IN 38499

1. AMCLEVE-15 CONTACTED BY STATION OFFICER 22 JANUARY. HE STILL WORKING DIRECTLY WITH CIRASH-4 AND WILL ALSO WORK WITH UZCATEGUI, PRESENTLY INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS ARREST KEY SUBVERSIVES AND HANDLED CASE LEADING TO RECENT ARREST LINO MARTINEZ.

2. IT EVIDENT HE COMPLETELY WILLING WORK WITH STATION AS PENETRATION CIRASH. AT MEETING AMCLEVE-15 TURNED OVER FOR STATION COPYING SEVERAL VALUABLE DOCUMENTS FROM CIRASH PROVIDING OPS LEADS ON KEY TERRORISTS.

3. SALARY NOT DISCUSSED, BUT STATION WOULD PLAN PAY AMCLEVE-15 FROM 1,000 TO 1,500 BS. AMCLEVE-15 LEFT FOR MIAMI MORNING 23 JANUARY. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WILL BE HELD WHEN HE RETURNS CARACAS FOLLOWING WEEK.

4. WE HAVE REVIEWED DOCUMENTS FORWARDED REF B AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 8748 SECRET

SEE NOTHING PRECLUDING AMCLEVE-15'S USE AS PENETRATION CIRASH. REQUEST POA BE EXPEDITED.

SECRET *Section Sixth

SECRET

14-00000

as a source of information on subversive personalities made available to him thru the course of his official duties in DIGEPOL.

as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL and the Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual intelligence organization.

NOTES

1. In a Spanish questionnaire of Personal Information made out in 1961, Subject listed his brother Raul POSADA-Carriles as an administrator of the Narianao Electric Company as a relative in some government service. He did not list his brother Roberto in this section, although he did list Roberto in Para 16, Subject: Brothers and Sisters.

2. In another signed but undated Spanish Personnel Information form of apparently 1965, he again listed both his brothers in Section M, Subject: Brothers and Sisters, and in Section N he again listed his brother Raul, who he stated he believed to be working for the Cuban government as an engineer. He again failed to list his brother Roberto.

3. Concerning his PRQ Part I filled out in March 1965, again no mention of his brother Roberto appears in Section XIV, Subject: Relatives, Acquaintances and Contacts in any Government Service.

4. According to POSADA's own admission in an LC Flutter of 14 April 1965, he had been involved in planning for a Guatemalan coup headed by Roberto ALEJOS-Arzu. This matter later came to the attention of the FBI. There is an FBI report dated 17 May 1965 in the 201. AMCLEVE-15 also furnished information on this Guatemalan coup for JMWAVE, who disseminated this information in July 1965.

5. AMCLEVE-15 informed JMWAVE concerning other independent exile operations into Cuba in July of 1965.

6. His PRQ Part II, Section XI, dated September 1965, says that "Subject is of good character, very relaible and security

conscious. Subject demonstrated good security techniques while reporting on the activities" of Roberto ALEJOS concerning the attempted coup against Guatemala.

7. An FBI report of 30 September 1965 outlines the contacts that had been made by some Americans seeking to purchase pistols, blasting caps, hand gernades and silencers. This is the first indication in the 201 that Subject was involved with Frank Lang "Lefty" Rosenthal, Miami, who had the reputation of gambler and hoodlum associated with other hoodlums and jewel thieves in the Miami area.

8. In a report filled out by Subject on 21 April 1966 to update his employee file, Subject again reported his brother Raul POSADA in government service but failed again to report brother Roberto POSADA.

9. A JMWAVE memo WTR-1299, 21 July 1966, explains a request from AMCLEVE-15 to resign from his job as an instructor in the maritime training section to accept a job on the Junta being set up at that time to govern the activities of RECE, COMMANDOS L, 30 NOVEMBER MOVEMENT and the 2506 BRIGADE. An FBI report of 29 July 1966 and another for 1 August 1966 both commented that Subject had been approved by the exile groups to accept the position of military leader of the newly formed alliance.

10. On 1 August 1966 AMCLEVE-15 was transferred from the Training branch to the CI branch of JMWAVE. He ~~will~~ was to be used to report on the activities of the central Junta.

11. The first mention of Subject's brother Roberto in the 201 is JMWAVE internal memo WCI-1501, dated 21 September 1966. In this memo Subject described his telephone call from his family in Cuba. Subject stated that his mother told him that his brother Roberto was in England on a purchasing mission for the GOC and that some time soon his brother Roberto would travel to Spain. Subject's mother expected Roberto to be out of Cuba for two months. He stated that he last knew his brother to be employed for the Cuban Telephone Company in Havana and in Cienfuegos, Las Villas Province. He said that he last saw his brother Roberto in April 1961. This is at variance with info in the 1961 Questionnaire which stated he came to the U.S. as a political exile 28 February 1961.

12. A. JMWAVE 3182 (IN 01749), 23 September 1966, stated that Madrid-8990 (IN 85265) reported that Roberto arrived in Madrid from Havana 26 August 1966.

B. Only other station traces on Roberto ~~is~~ are in UFGA-20828 (transmittal of Luis POSADA PRQ Part 1) which passed information provided by Subject.

C. AMOT files show Roberto in charge of telephone center at Buenavista, Marianao, according to a telephone company bulletin of June 1964.

D. AMOT-214 in October 1964 reported Roberto had been an employee for the Telephone Company.

13. London 6140 (IN 16675) 13 October 1966, stated Roberto arrived from Madrid 27 August 1966. Landing card indicated Roberto born 12 April 1931, Lasvillas, Cuba. Carries passport EF/66/2258, issued 23 August 1966. Roberto said would stay in UK for one or two months doing business with commercial mission.

14. A Memorandum for the Record, 26 June 1967, by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel, Subject: Luis Clemente POSADA-Carriles, reported FBI information concerning one "Lefty" Rosenthal and concerning U.S. citizen Norman Rothman. Through Rothman, Rosenthal was put in touch with Subject. Rosenthal understood that Subject was attached with CIA and claimed that Subject supplied him with caps, primers, and C-4 explosives. Rosenthal was reported to have asked Subject to supply more explosives and associated materials. The Justice Department sent to the Agency a report from the security section of the FBI which stated that POSADA was a CIA agent.

15. According to index cards, Norman Rothman has a long history of gambling, illegal arms dealing and other shady dealing in the U.S., Cuba, and Mexico. Card dated July 1961.

16. Note for the Record: Subject: Telephone Conversation - Williamson/Henze, 1015 hours, 28 June 1967. This records information about Subject and Rosenthal not otherwise a matter of record in the 201.

17. Memorandum for the Record, 28 June 1967, by Robert J. Bladergroen, Assistant General Counsel, also covers information on Subject and Rosenthal not otherwise mentioned in 201

18. Cable DIRECTOR-15805, 29 June 1967, requested replies to series of questions concerning AMCLEVE-15's activity with ROSENTHAL and FBI. JMWAVE replied in JMWAVE-7953 (IN 02284), 30 June 1967. JMWAVE stated that AMCLEVE-15 had failed to report the October 1966 transactions with Rosenthal until 9 June 1967, and therefore the Miami FBI was not notified until 15 June 1967. JMWAVE stated that AMCLEVE-15's explanation for not reporting the October 1966 transaction was that he "just forgot."

18 ~~19~~. Cable DIR [illegible]805, 29 June 1967, requested replies to series of questions concerning AMCLEVE-15's activity with ROSENTHAL and FBI. JMWAVe replied in JMWAVE-7953 IN 02284, 30 June 1967. JMWAVE stated that AMCLEVE-15 had failed to report the October 1966 transaction with Rosenthal until 9 June 1967, and therefore the Miami FBI was not notified until 15 June 1967. JMWAVE stated that AMCLEVE-15's explanation for not reporting the October 1966 transac~~t~~tion was that he "just forgot."

---

19. In UFGA-28079, dated 31 July 1967, it stated that AMCLEVE-15 planned to seek employment in Caracas, Venezuela, through an old friend who resides there. This information may have been given to JMWAVE in either an 11 July 1967~~a~~ meeting or ~~on~~ during a 21 July ~~June~~ 1967 meeting. DIR-24039 states that KI~~K~~COBALT-1 reported that he met Luis POSADA in Miami the week before. POSADA had informed KI~~K~~COBALT-1 that POSADA had ~~approved/by// been~~ approached ~~by~~ the Bolivian consul in Miami offering POSADA's services as interpret~~or~~er/ guerrilla fighter in Bolivia. POSADA said that a reply had come back from KICHEER-1 saying KICHEER-1 approved the salary of $800 per month and that the MIAmi Bolivian Consul was authorized a $500 advance to PO~~A~~SADA. POSADA left the impression with KICOBALT-1 that POSADA departing for La Pa~~s~~z soon. Cable stated: "~~A~~POSADA is unsavory character who is messed up in shady deals in Miami." KICOBALT-1 and KICOLBALT-2 were depressed at the thought of POSADA being in Bolivia. DIRECTOR-24439, ~~4~~1 August 1967, requested cable content of memorandum KICOBALT submitted to JMWAVE and all other material related to POSADA's Bolivian job.

Check p.5 21 ~~20~~. JMWAVE-8577 IN 24285, 2 August 1967 stated that while AMCLEVE-15 is not a paragon of virtue, he cannot be classified as an unsavory character. His involvement in shady deals ~~d~~ in the past 2 years resulte almost entirely from Sta ns (and (BI) ~~eventually~~) encouragement. He followed directions and reported fairly well."

20 ~~21~~. JMWAVE-8569 IN 24289~~01~~, 2 August 1967, summarized KICOBALT-1's report. KICOBALT-1 met ~~t~~ AMCLEVE-15 on 28 July. AMCLEVE-15 said he was going to Bolivia to help train a special unit in guerrilla warfare. KICOLBAT01 confirmed that AMCLEVE-15 was in touch with the Bolivian consul in Miami and the Bolivian military attache to whom AMCLEVE-15 had made the offer to organize the group of Cuban guerrilla training officers. JMWAVE felt that either AMCLEVE-15/~~gave/up~~/ somehow came up with the idea on his own or some leak occured during initial contacts on this program etc. Since this was in conflict with statement AMCLEVE-15 made to JMWAVE that AMCLEVE-15 was seeking employment in Caracas.

22. JMWAVE-8748 IN 29699, October 1967, sent to Caracas, info director, gave Caracas first information concerning Subject's plans to travel to Caracas on 21 August 1967. ~~EA~~ AMCLEVE-15 stated he hoped to find employment through his friend Ricardo AKA Jose, who is connected to the TV industry in Caracas.

23. Headquarters in DIRECTOR ~~4~~28911, 18 August 1967, reported ~~knew~~ no headquarters traced identifiable with Venturini.

23. JMWAVE Internal Memorandum-1592, 10 August 1967, stated AMCLEVE-15's plans to go to Caracas.

24. CARACAS-7589 IN 32469, 15 August 1967 identified Ricardo Venturini as mentioned in liaison report of January 1967 as a member of the Cuban DSE.

25. JMWAVE-8866 In 34036, 17 August 1967, advised no contact be made by AMCLEVE-15 for two reasons:

1. His name was mentioned as a CIA agent on

GOC radio and TV during Laso conference.

2. He has also been involved in shady deals in Miami, although undertaken at JMWAVE behest might prejudice his effective use.

26. JMWAVE-8997 IN 40592, 28 August 1967: AMCLEVE-15 had just returned to MIami to obtain visa to enable him to work in Venezuela. Reports he obtained job at DIGEPOL through Rafael TREMOLS Fresneda and Gustava ORTIZ Faez.

27. JMWAVE-9080 In 44174, 1 September 1967 states that AMCLEVE-15 now uncertain about returning to Caracas. Says DIGEPOL job would pay only about $250 per month which he claims too little to live in Caracas. AMCLEVE-15 actively seeking job Miami (Case Officer Comment: This seems direct turn-about from Para 2 JMWAVE 8997 sent 3 days before) AMCLEVE-15 now states he would be willing to go back to DIGEPOL or other job in Caracas to work for CIA, but he requires total income approximately $600 per month to cover cost of living. JMWAVE stated that agrees that while working for DIGEPOL AMCLEVE-15 would be a good asset for Caracas station.

28. JMWAVE-9138 In 46714, September 1967, AMCLEVE-15 had previously worked under CIRASH-4. AMCLEVE-15 claims he has job of working for CIRASH-4 on ~~Jamor~~ Major Mienes CROES of Army Intelligence (G-2) Digepol job would be investigative. AMCLEVE-15 received letter 5 September 1967 from friend Rafael TREMOLS Fresneda, DIGEPOL employee, in which TREMOLS told AMCLEVE-15 that AMCLEVE-15's contract to work in Venezuela had been approved by the Department of Works and AMCLEVE-15 should apply to the Miami Venezula consulate for visas.

29. DIRECTOR-34096, 8 September 1967, quoted AMCLEVE"S brother Roberto considered trustworthy by Cuban government to travel overseas

[illegible]

on GOC missoon last 1966, and that AMCLEVE-15's Caracas contact Gustavo Ernesto ORITZ-Faez unsavory characber who involved in political murder of anti-Communist professor at Havana University.

30. RI traces were run 30 August. No derogatory information was surfaced in the RI traces. Concerning AMCLEVE"S-15 brother, Raul, RI traces came up with nothing. Traces on brother Roberto, however, did ~~not~~ surface derogatory information.

1. DSE agent for area Norte, which is responsible for Havana City ~~apd~~ and Cienfuegos.
2. Subject ~~had~~ headed mission from Ministry of Construction which arrived in London to purchase heavy construction equipment in September 1967.

RI ~~traces~~ check of Gustavo Ernesto ORITZ-Faez surfaced derogatory information.

Should it read "no derogatory information"?

31. DIRECTOR-35982, 15 September 1967 discouraged any further JMWAVE encouragement for AMCLEVE-15 to seek a DIGEPOL job.

32. RI traces on Rafael TREMOLS Fresneda, 1 Dec 1967, show previously employed by JMWAVE-AMSPELL organization first as AMBARB-41 and later as CITUTOR-1. This student organization (DRE) was run by WAVE but administered by Caracas. Caracas had attempted to obtain CI information ~~how~~ thru CITUTOR organization. L. C. ~~Flec~~ Flutter revealed CITUTOR-1 to be a loose talker who had revealed his agency affiliation to a number of persons in Caracas.

33. JMWAVE-9802 IN 74926, 18 Oct 67 gave a report on telephone call from Gustavo ORITZ on18 October 1967. ORITZ informed AMCLEVE-15 that CIRASH-4 would be new director of DIGEPOL late October 1967. ORITZ on behalf of Fernandez assured AMCLEVE-15

~~a~~

DIGEPOL employment at proper liveable salary and ~~that~~ stay at home of ORTIZ.

14-00000

Insert A.

London 6170 (IN 16675) 13 Oct 66 stated Roberto arrived from Madrid 27 Aug 1966. Landing card indicated Roberto born 12 April 1931, Las Villas, Cuba. Carries passport EF/66/2258 issued 23 Aug 66. Roberto said would stay in UK for 1 or 2 months doing business with commercial mission.

4 Dec 67

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/LIA

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA - Carriles

[redacted] It is requested that the military 201 file of subject be borrowed from the Department of Army for our review. From records available to us we believe he entered the United States Army in March 1963.

C. W. Cox
WH/3/V

NOTES

1. In a Spanish questionnaire of Personal Information, made out in 1961, Subject listed his brother Raul POSADA-Carriles as an adminsitrator of the Marianao Electric Company as a relative in some government service. He did not list his brother Roberto in this section, although he did list Roberto in Para 16, ~~of~~ subject: Brothers and Sisters.

2. In another signed but undated Spanish Personnel Information form of apparently 1965, he again listed both his brothers in Section M, subject: Brothers and Sisters, and in Section N, he again listed his brother Raul, who he stated he believed to be working for the Cuban government as an engineer. He again failed to list his brother Roberto.

3. Concerning his PRQ Part I filled out in March 1965, again no mention ~~was made of his b~~ of his brother Roberto appears in ~~this~~ section XIV, subject: Relatives, Acquaintances and Contacts in any government service.

4. According to POSADA's own admission in an LC flutter ~~report~~ of 14 April 1965, he had been involved in planning for a Gua~~damaulan~~temalan coup headed by Roberto Alejos-ARZU. ALEJOS-Arzu. This matter later came to the attention of the FBI. There is an FBI ~~out~~ report dated 17 May 1965 in the 201. AMCLEVE-15 also furnished information on this ~~Guadamaulan~~ Guatemalan coup for JMWAVE, who disseminated this information in July 1965.

5. AMCLEVE-15 informed JMWAVE concerning other independent exile operations into Cuba in July of 1965.

6. His PRQ Part II, Section XI, dated September 1965, says that "Subject is of good character, very reliable and security conscious. Subject demonstrated good security techniques while reporting on the activities" of Roberto ALEJOS concerning the attempted coup against ~~Guadamaula.~~ Guatemala. (7) An FBI report of 30 September 1965 outlines the contacts

that had been made by some Americans seeking to purchase pistols, blasting caps, hand gernades and silencers. This is the first indication in the 201 that Subject was involved with Frank LANG ~~"Long Lips"~~ "LEFTY" Rosenthal ~~Rosentahl~~, Miami, who had the reputation of gambler and hoodlum associated with other hoodlums and jewel thieves in the Miami area.

8. In a report filled ~~sent~~ out by Subject on 21 April 1966 to update his employee file, Subject again reported his brother Raul POSADA in government service but failed again to report brother Roberto POSADA.

9. A JMWAVE ~~JMQACW~~ memo WTR-1299, 21 July 1966 explains a request from AMCLEVE-15 to resign from his job as an instructor in the Maritime ~~military~~ training section to accept a job on the Junta being set up ~~14~~ at that time to govern the activities of RECE, COMMANDOS L, ~~Reco Commandos L,~~ 30 November MOVEMENT ~~Government~~ and the 2506 Brigade. An FBI report of 29 July 1966 and another for 1 August 1966 both commented that Subject had been approved by the exiles groups to accept the position of military leader of the newly formed alliance.

10. On 1 August 1966 AMCLEVE-15 was transferred from the ~~[illegible]~~ training branch to the CI branch of JMWAVE ~~JM[illegible]~~. He will be used to report on the activities of the central Junta.

11. The first mention of Subject's brother Roberto in the 201 is JMWAVE internal memo WCI-1501, dated 21 September 1966. In this memo Subject described his telephone call from his family in Cuba. Subject stated that his mother told him that his brother Roberto was in England on a purchasing mission for the GOC and that some time soon his brother Roberto would travel to Spain. Subject's mother expected Roberto to be out of Cuba for two months. He stated that he last knew his brother to be employed for the Cuban telephone Company in Havana and in Cienfuegos, Las Villas Province. He said that he last saw his brother Roberto in April 1961. This is at variance with ~~[illegible]~~ info [illegible]-1961 Questionario which states he ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] the US as a political exile 28 Feb 1961.

9

12. A. JMWAVE 318 IN 1749, 23 September 1966 stated that Madrid-8990 (IN 85265) reported that Roberto arrived in Madrid from Havana 26 August 1966. B Only other station traces on Roberto is UFGA 20828 (Transmittal of Luis POSADA PRQ Part I) which passed information provided by Subject.

~~13.~~ C. ~~14.~~ AMOT files show Roberto in charge of telepone ~~14.~~ Center at Buena Vista, Marianao according to a telephone company bulletin of June 1964. D. AMOT-214 in Oct 64 reported Roberto had been an employee of the Telephone Company of Cuba since 1952.

Insert A. 13.

14 15. ~~14.~~ A memorandum for the record, 26 June 67 by Lawrence R. Houston, General ~~Consul~~ Counsel, Subject Luis Clementi POSADA-Carriles, reported FBI information concerning one "Sefty" Rosenthal and concerning U.S. citizen Norman Rothman. Through Rothman, Rosenthal was put in touch with Subject. Rosenthal understood that Subject was attached with CIA and claimed that Subject supplied him with caps, primers, and C-4 explosives. Rosenthal was reported to have asked Subject to supply more explosives and associated materials. The Justice Department sent to the AGency a report from the security section of the FBI which stated that POSADA was a CIA agent. 15 According to index cards, Norman Rothman has a long history of gambling, illegal arms dealing and other shady dealing in the U.S., ~~CANADA~~/Cuba and Mexico. Card dated July 1961.

16 ~~15.~~ Note for the Record: ~~No further record~~ Subject's Telephone Conversation — Williamson/Henze 1015 hours, ~~Wilson/Mme Hensey 10-15~~-28 June 1967. This records information about Subject and Rosenthal not otherwise a matter of record in the 201.

(17) ~~16.~~ Memorandum For the Record, 28 June 1967, by Robert J. Bladergroen, Assistant General ~~Consul~~ Counsel, also covers iformation on Subject and Rosenthal not otherwise mentioned in 201.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING ZP
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
Operational/AMCLEVE-15

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
DEC 14 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REFS. A. DIRECTOR 56598
B. CARACAS 8417
C. CARACAS 8337

1. The Station desires to explain its viewpoint on AMCLEVE-15 clearly because of what could conceivably be construed to be a tone of impatience in the first line of Reference A. First of all, why do we want to hire AMCLEVE-15? Our objective is to use him as a unilateral penetration of CIRASH and CIVISTA, which controls that organization. Specifically, we would like to penetrate the inner circle surrounding IDENTITY and CIRASH-4. The recent provocation (reported in reference C) which we believe was run by IDENTITY is a clear indication of the need for this type of penetration over and above the normal need for penetration of security services.

2. What we are not trying to do is to make a CIGOAL-1 or AMOT-260 out of AMCLEVE-15: that is, put him on the payroll as an advisor to CIRASH-4. We want to be very clear on this point, since this may be the cause of Headquarters' concern. His role will not be advisory. AMCLEVE-15 is to be used to obtain counterintelligence information to protect the Station and its operations and to get for us that portion of the intelligence available in CIRASH which is not made available to the Station via the liaison channel.

3. From the information available to us, AMCLEVE-15 seems to present an almost golden opportunity to Caracas Station: i.e., a cleared WOFIRM agent (who although terminated still reports to WOFIRM when in the JMWAVE area), who is a well-placed "hombre de confianza" of the chief of CIRASH and the chief of the special investigative unit within CIVISTA which may have monitoring of WOFIRM activities as one of its objectives. We say "seems to present" because, although we have confirmation from CIRASH-15 that AMCLEVE-15 does in fact hold the position described above, we are of an open mind regarding the practicability of his use and we are completely willing to accept any information that would militate against his secure and fruitful employment.

ATTACHMENT: Under Separate Cover
1. Identity

Date: 13 DEC 67

CONTINUED 201-300985

DISTRIBUTION:
3-C/WHD w/att u/s/c

CS COPY

DEC 6 1967
75-2-13/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO D-75-2-15	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA - 14978	DATE 6 December 1967
6- 201-740849	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA - 14978

4. We have chosen to send this communication by dispatch, rather than by cable along with reference B, because we do not want to give wide dissemination to what might be interpreted as a difference of opinion between the Station and its Headquarters Desk. We do feel, however, Headquarters opposition to the use of AMCLEVE-15 has been consistant since his case was first brought to our attention. We assume that Headquarters and JMWAVE have some data concerning AMCLEVE-15 which we have not yet received and which results in Headquarters' view of h his use. If this is the case, we hope that it will be forwarded soon so that we can drop the matter. If on the other hand, Headquarters objects to the concept of the operation, we would like to develop a cordial exchange of views to see if these divergent views can be reconciled.

STEFAN R. LABANOW

201-300955

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

14-00000

1P

SECRET

MICROFILMED
FEB 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT to
HVCA -14978

IDENTITY - Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual

SECRET

MICROFILMED
DEC 14 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

S/C ATT. 1 TO HVCA-14978

CS COPY

201-300985

amcleve - 15

DISPATCH

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief of Station, Caracas

TYPIC CIRASH/CIVISTA/AMCLEVE-15
Activities of Identity of Reference A and Plans to form an Anti-Communist Goon Squad.

REFERENCES: A. HVCA - 14978, dated 5 December 1967

B. HVCA - 14796, dated 26 September 1967

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a report submitted by CIRASH-15 concerning the organisation of Identity of Reference A's office. On 23 November 1967 a meeting was held in Identity of Reference A's office with members of the PTJ who were to work for Identity of Reference A in the special investigative unit he is establishing. Identity of Reference A announced that the director of the PTJ had refused to let his men work in Identity of Reference A's organisation, although the request for their services had come from CIGIBO-1. The men were given until the end of November to decide whether or not they would quit the PTJ to begin work for Identity of Reference A. (We have not yet heard of their decisions).

2. A new member of Identity of Reference A's office who was present at the meeting was AMCLEVE-15. It was CIRASH-15's opinion that AMCLEVE-15 had been brought to Venezuela with the help, of Gustavo ORTIZ Faez, an old friend of CIRASH-4. After the meeting CIRASH-15, AMCLEVE-15 and Identity of Reference A went to ORTIZ's house where ORTIZ showed them some explosives which were to have been used in blowing up an unidentified ship. (The explosives were not used as the operation was cancelled). AMCLEVE-15 showed the group some explosive devises which he had smuggled in from Miami. AMCLEVE-15 said that he was able to smuggle anything into the country because CIRASH-4 would send a CIRASH official car to pick him up at customs.

Attachment:
As Indicated, u/s/c

Distribution:
3, Chief, WHD, w/att, u/s/c
1, COS, JMWAVE

HVCA - 14975

5 December 1967

SECRET

3. AMCLEVE-15 and ORTIZ asked CIRASH-15 to join them in an anti-Communist group which would harass Communists without the knowledge of CIRASH-4. On another visit to ORTIZ's house, CIRASH-15 met two Cubans who had been imprisoned in La Cabaña prison in Cuba and who had apparently been helped out of Cuba by ORTIZ and will work with him in the anti-Communist goon squad. CIRASH-15 also met another Cuban exile in the group whose alias is "Fósforo". CIRASH-15 expects to be able to identify these Cubans in the near future.

4. This type of goon-squad activity is not what we would like AMCLEVE-15 to be mixed up in, and if and when we get in touch with him we will request that he stay away from such activities so as not to antagonize CIRASH-4 or Identity of Reference A.

5. Please assign Identity of HVCA-14778, dated 5 December 1967 a cryptonym in the CIVISTA series.

Oscar C. KALBINO

Caracas, November 27th, [illegible]

This morning, Dr. Uzcátegui phoned up my house and asked me to be in his office at the Ministry of Interior about 11 am. Once I was there, the other people from P.T.J. (mentioned in previous report), and who were supposed to form Uzcátegui's new group of investigation, joined me, and Dr. Uzcátegui talked to them like this:
"....Gentlemen, this is to report you that Dr. OLIVARES BOSQUE (P.T.J. Director), has refused the Ministry of Interior, Dr. LEANDRO MORA, the permission of having you here to work with me. Unless you decide to quit your job in P.T.J. and then join my office, I am afraid it will be impossible for us to work together, at least openly.....I think that Dr. OLIVARES's great fault of cooperation with us, is increasing Dr. LEANDRO MORA's feeling of unfriendliness towards him and myself as well. So, each one of you, shall have time until the 30 of this month to give me an answer as to about the decision to renounce P.T.J. or not; definitely, due to actual conditions, it is not possible to "borrow you" from P.T.J...."
After everybody left, I stood a little more with Dr. Uzcátegui, and he introduced me to a new member of the office: [illegible] Carriles, Luis [illegible], (a) "Eduardo", whose cédula number (found out later) is E-97[illegible]. This guy is Cuban, and has just come-in from Miami-Florida. As far as I could find out later on, the man who helped him into Venezuela is Dr. [illegible] Gustavo (please remember old report about him), a Cuban veterinarian, and an old friend of [illegible], now DIGEPOL Director. The newcomer to Dr. Uzcátegui's group, was [illegible] a Cuban refugee in Miami, since the invasion of Bay of Pigs [illegible] few years ago. The already mentioned "Eduardo", has got into [illegible] friendship with me, and has been very impressed by my silencers ([illegible]), which I have just given to Dr. Uzcátegui. He said that, while in the [illegible], he used to work on silencers and other technical stuff [illegible] called groups [illegible] live there and also in connection with [illegible] to the [illegible].

[illegible] asked Dr. [illegible] to try [illegible] and I [illegible] over to [illegible]. Both of them were very [illegible] of my [illegible], and we started talking a lot about technical material. "Eduardo" showed me some stuff he has taken with him from Miami (fuses, booby-trap switches, detonating cord, infrared [illegible] devices, time-pencils for demo.charges and incendiary devices). It was then when Dr.Gustavo C[illegible] pulled out from underneath the bed a big heavy package and said it was a demo.charge of pentolite,-- fixed with magnets, which was to be used in wrecking a ship. He did not specify what ship it was, how he got the bomb, but he said that he had to cancel the "operation". Of course, I did follow with interest what they talked about, so, in the general talk, Eduardo said that he could pass all that stuff through the Customs, because a prowl-car from DIGEPOL (ordered by Erasto Fernandez) was awaiting for him inside the airport in Maiquetia, that he had his family in Miami,- and, as soon as he could find an apartment, he would go back to Miami, pick up his family and a lot more of "stuff" he has left there, and bring all of it to Venezuela, the same way he did it the first time. On the other hand, Dr.Gustavo C[illegible], whom I know since a long time, helped by his friendship with Erasto Fernandez (who, reports directly to Dr,Leandro Mora), has asked me (Eduardo did as well) if I wanted to help them off to "disturb" [illegible] in Venezuela. But they do not want [illegible] to [illegible], because that could - cause problems to Erasto's activities. In other words, they need my technical advise for future operations against communist leaders, properties, meetings, etc; it's got to be something like a cell, a group formed only, or mostly, by highly trusted and long known anti-communist people. In few words, this is what, up to now, I have been proposed. I have been able to find out that Dr.Gustavo C[illegible], gets, somehow, letters from Cuba; mostly from old friends who want to get a possibility to reach Venezuela. Visiting Dr.Gustavo C[illegible]'s house last week, I met - there a couple of other Cubans who stood a long time in a Cuban prison called "La Cabaña" (after the Bay of Pigs Invasion). I do not know their names so far, but it will not be long before I do. The general topic when I go over there, is that of organizing and creating a group that may cause as much trouble to the reds as possible.

[illegible]

[illegible] ings incendiaries mixture, etc. etc. Last week, Dr. Gustavo ORTIZ, Eduardo and another Cuban called "Fósforo", prepared to sabotage a Communist meeting with a " CS gas-bomb "(please see paper [illegible] attached). Action did not take place because meeting place was too vigilated by communists, and there was no chance for Eduardo to place the 20 minutes delay CS gas-bomb inside the auditorium, while Dr. Gustavo ORTIZ and "Fósforo" played a protection role for Eduardo with automatic pistols ready in their trouser belts. Eduardo is now in Miami, and will be back at the end of this week with his family. In a very confidential way, he's been asked to bring back bullets cal. .32 (Dr. Uzcátegui gave him $100.00 for a silencer cal. 22). He will also take back all the war material he has left in Miami. He will also try to get in touch with links (Cuban and C.I.A.) to get as much stuff as possible, to be used probably here. Dr. Uzcátegui, beside asking Eduardo to buy bullets and a silencer cal.22 for himself, also asked Eduardo, on his way back to Caracas, to stop in Puerto Rico a couple of days for something he had to do there. Dr. Uzcátegui has asked me what I think about Eduardo's capabilities as a member of the office, in the field of sabotage, etc., explosives, etc. I told Dr. Uzcátegui it was good to have people with some background in the mentioned field. On the other hand, Eduardo and Dr. ORTIZ want me to help them with instruccion on the same technical field, but do not want either Dr, Uzcátegui or Erasto Fernandez to know about it. Dr. Uzcátegui has asked me to find people for the office. He needs, for the moment being, some 6 guys, as P.T.J. has refused their own..... Everything is normal for the moment. This is all I have to report.

The Inspector

3 NOV 1967

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

32

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES a-

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG8, CI/OPS, CI/OA,

5 Dec 67 IN 06564

S E C R E T 052352Z CITE JMWAVE 0497

DIRECTOR CARACAS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 56598

B. CARACAS 8417 (IN 05744)

1. ALL PERTINENT INFO RE AMCLEVE/15 CONTACTS AVAILABLE IN HIS 201 FILE WHICH FORWARDED TO HQS WXST OCTOBER SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS REPORTED BY CABLE.

2. AMCLEVE/15 DID NOT GIVE ANY OTHER MEANS FOR CONTACT OTHER THAN ADDRESS IN JMWAVE 9996 (IN 82922) WHICH, ACCORDING TO AMCLEVE/15 IS RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESS (VETERINARIAN CLINIC) OF GUSTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ.

S E C R E T

SECRET

DISPATCH | SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: CARACAS 8398

Action Required: FYI

Per reference the attached documents provide information on the brother of subject and two other cronies of CIRASH-4.

Hume W. TROXELL

Attachment: herewith & Identities u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - Caracas

201-300985

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCW-7776	4 DEC 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

Distribution:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono

AB-FI
DS-
ABSTRACT X INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/V	C. Cox	cs	4521

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	4 Dec.	E. Tsikerdanos

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	4 Dec.	Lawrence M. Sternfield

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

4 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/LIA

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA - Carriles

It is requested that the military 201 file of subject be borrowed from the Department of Army for our review. From records available to us we believe he entered the United States Army in March 1963.

C. W. Cox
WH/3/Venezuela

SECRET

6-65 JWIV

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES (27)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

3

ACTION WH8 ☒ RED COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO. FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, 6, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 042220Z CITE CARACAS 8417

4 DEC 67 IN 05744

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 56598

B. JMWAVE 0422 (IN 02678)

1. FOR REASONS OF COMPARTMENTATION CIGOAL-1 HAS NOT BEEN DIRECTLY QUERIED, BUT HE HAS NEVER MENTIONED AMCLEVE-15 AND STATION BELIEVES THEY DO NOT KNOW EACH OTHER.

2. CARACAS STATION CAN ADD NO BIO DATA ON AMCLEVE-15 NOT ALREADY AVAILABLE HQS. STATION RECEIVED REPORT FROM CIRASH-15, HOWEVER, WHICH CONFIRMS THAT AMCLEVE-15 IS WORKING FOR CIRASH-4 AND UZCATEGUI AS STATED IN REF B.

3. FOR JMWAVE: DID AMCLEVE-15 EVER GIVE WAY TO CONTACT HIM IN CARACAS, OTHER THAN ADDRESS PROVIDED JMWAVE 9996? WOULD PREFER TELEPHONE HIM IF POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FIRST MEETING.

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

ORIG: C. W. COX Secretary
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1967

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: 38 PER ______ # ______

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG 8, CI/OA, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 56593

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE 2 20 21 5Z

REF: CARACAS 8398 (IN 03338)*

1. IF YOU REALLY FEEL THIS IS NECESSARY ~~UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES~~ APPROVE STATION CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 FOR OUR EDIFICATION DOES AMOT-6 KNOW AMCLEVE-15 AND VICE VERSA? FOR ELICITATION INFO ONLY. PLS FORWARD PERIODIC STATUS REPORTS. PROCESSING POA. ADDRESSEES PLS FORWARD UP TO DATE TRACES AND BIO DATA. FOR JMWAVE: FORWARD CONTACT REPORTS SINCE TERMINATION AMCLEVE-15.

2. DOCUMENTS ARE BEING FORWARDED 4 DEC PRIMARILY TO ILLUSTRATE CAUTION TO USE IN DEALING WITH HIM. DISPATCH FOLLOWS WITH HQS COMMENTS OTHER ASPECTS THIS CASE. END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Station reiterates desire have AMCLEVE-15 as agent. Station believes need pay only supplement to DIGEPOL salary. Requested expedite documents and POA.

COORD: C/WH/COG

for Jacob D. Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Maurice J. Grelillion
MAURICE J. GRELILLION
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

~~[illegible]~~ 5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7 TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH8, ci/ops, ci/ca, MPS/BG2

S E C R E T 301738Z CITE CARACAS 8398 (LYNER ACTING) 30 Nov 67 IN 03338

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: A. JMWAVE 0422 (IN 02672)

B. DIRECTOR 47965

6

1. REF A REINFORCES STATION OPINION AMCLEVE-15 WOULD PROVE VALUABLE AGENT. HIS SALARY OF 700 DOLLARS FROM CIRASH SUGGESTS STATION WOULD NEED PAY ONLY SUPPLEMENTARY AMOUNT.

2. HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED DOCUMENTS ON AMCLEVE-15 MENTIONED REF B. PLEASE EXPEDITE THESE DOCUMENTS AND POA.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 2L

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

ACTION

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/PS, SOD-6, CI/IC-2, FI/SP8

S E C R E T 262222Z CITE JMWAVE 0422 W K6 3L 29 Nov 67 IN 02672

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE PBRUMEN

1. AMCLEVE/15 TEMPORARILY IN MIAMI ON PERSONAL BUSINESS.

2. AMCLEVE/15 REPORTS HE WORKING DIRECTLY UNDER ~~CIASHA-4~~ C[illegible]-4 AND ALSO REMBERTO UZCATEGUI IN MININT AT $700 PER MONTH SALARY WITH PROMISE OF RAISE JAN 68.

What of Amcleve-15 + Amot-6 wise assn.?

3. DURING FIRST TWO WEEKS EMPLOYMENT AMCLEVE/15 HAS BEEN INVOLVED FOLL TASKS:

A. RE-INTERROGATION OF MANUEL ESPINOSA DIAZ, CAPTURED CUBAN GUERRILLA. || ?

B. INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION OF ANOTHER CAPTURED CUBAN, SANTIAGO (ASPURU) SAUNDERS AKA GILBERTO MARTINEZ.

C. INVESTIGATION OF HONDURAN CONSUL RAFAEL (GARCIA) NAVARRO, (201-302235).

D. INVESTIGATION OF FIDIAS MARCANO, VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST, WHO, ACCORDING TO DIGEPOL, WILL SOON TRAVEL TO SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO AND RECEIVE CHECK FROM CUBAN

SECRET

IS AGENT. CHECK, IN NAME ARMANDO CAMPOS, WILL BE CASHED IN NATIONAL CITY BANK BY MARCANO AND MONEY USED FOR FUNDING VENEZUELAN GUERRILLAS. AMCLEVE/15 PLANS TRAVEL SAN JUAN 1 DEC AND CONTACT A BANK EMPLOYEE FRIEND. THROUGH FRIEND, AMCLEVE/15 WILL TRY MEET PROPER PERSON EMPLOYED AT NATIONAL CITY BANK WHO COULD ALERT AMCLEVE/15 WHEN TRANSECTION OCCURS THUS MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR DIGEPOL TO INTERCEPT MARCANO WITH MONEY WHEN HE RETURNS CARACAS.

4. AMCLEVE/15 WILL RETURN TO CARACAS DIRECTLY FROM SAN JUAN.

5. DEFER TO HQS FOR PASSAGE OF INFO PARA 3-D TO FCI- NO1.

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 4 TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 4

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TYPED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR DDP, ADDP, CA2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 021356Z CITE CARACAS 8227 2 Nov 67 IN 85222

DIRECTOR

REF DIRECTOR 48508 X

1. APPRECIATE PROMPT HQS ACTION.

2. RUMOR THAT LEANDRO MORA TO SHIFT FROM MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TO BE REPLACED BY MANUEL MANTILLA IS ABOUT A MONTH OLD. WHILE NOT IMPOSSIBLE, BELIEVE SUCH A CHANGE PROBABLY NOT IN WIND.

3. ORLANDO GARCIA MENTIONED PARA 3 REF IS ORLANDO GARCIA VASQUEZ (201-67860) WHO FORMERLY WORKED VERY CLOSELY WITH ERASTO FERNANDEZ IN DIGEPOL. SINCE ERASTO IS REPORTEDLY CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ' CREATURE, GARCIA VASQUEZ COULD HAVE BEEN SENT FOR BY EITHER PEREZ OR FERNANDEZ. MOST PROBABLE THAT GARCIA VASQUEZ IS BEING RECALLED TO FORM PART OF FERNANDEZ' TEAM AS HAS AMCLEVE 15. IT IS NOT BEYOND REALM OF POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER, THAT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ MAY HAVE RECALLED HIM TO HANDLE POLITICALLY ORIENTED WORK REQUIRING GARCIZ VASQUEZ' PARTICULAR TALENTS.

Amcleve 15

X APPARENTLY WRONG REF.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 4

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8 CI/OA

SECRET 311525Z CITE CARACAS 8213 31 Oct 67 IN 83556

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: DIRECTOR 47965

1. WILL NOT CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 UNTIL HAVE HAD CHANCE REVIEW DOCUMENTS BEING POUCHED.

2. IMPOSSIBLE KNOW WHAT AMCLEVE-15 SALARY WILL BE, IF ANY, BEFORE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. PREVIOUS HQS RESERVATIONS THIS CASE WERE BUDGETARY, BUT WE ASSUMED BASIC PROBLEM WAS SOLVED WHEN JMWAVE ADVISED THAT AMCLEVE-15 WOULD BE PAID BY CIRASH THE SALARY HE FELT HE HAD TO HAVE. IT MAY BE THAT STATION WOULD NEED PAY ONLY TOKEN AMOUNT, WHICH COULD BE TAKEN FROM CIRASH BUDGET, BUT ONLY DIRECT TALKS WITH AMCLEVE-15 WILL GIVE US THE ANSWERS.

SECRET

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES (24)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 16098, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI, FI/INT 2

30 OCT 67 IN 82922

S E C R E T 302301Z CITE JMWAVE 9996

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE PBRUMEN

REF: CARACAS 8190 (IN 81988)

1. JMWAVE RECD LETTER FROM AMCLEVE/15 ON 30 OCT 67. AMCLEVE SAYS HE WILL BEGIN WORK ON 1 NOV. ADDRESS IS AVENIDA JOSE FELIX RIVAS, QUINTA CLARITA, CARACAS.

2. ACCORDING AMCLEVE/15 NOMINATION OF CIRASH/4 AS DIRECTOR OF DIGEPOL DELAYED BECAUSE CIRASH/4'S POLITICAL PARTY, ADECO, IS IN TROUBLE.

3. LAWRENCE R. DEROME IS ALIAS OF AMCLEVE/15'S JMWAVE CO.

SECRET

SECRET

ORIG: K. ~ARDINER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 7 SEPT 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 22 PER ______ #______

CONF: [illegible]

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR WH/[illegible] CI/OPS CI/IC 2 CI/SA

FI
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SEP 0 20 41 Z Keith Charlie CITE DIRECTOR 34096

TO CARACAS INFO JMWAVE

REF A. JMWAVE 9138 (IN 46714)*

B. JMWAVE 9080 (IN 44174)** C. CARACAS 7756 (IN 47458)

1. HQS BELIEVES THAT, IN VIEW UNSETTLED DIGEPOL SITUATION AND VAGUE AND UNSUBSTANTIATED NATURE AMCLEVE-15 JOB POSSIBILITIES, NOT ADVISABLE MAKE FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO A-15 TO ENABLE HIM RETURN VENEZUELA. SHOULD A-15 RETURN ON HIS OWN AND CARACAS DETERMINES HE HAS OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL, POSSIBILITY OF WOFACT EMPLOYMENT CAN BE RECONSIDERED.

2. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFO PROBABLY NOT AVAILABLE JMWAVE OR CARACAS AS FOLLOWS:

A. A-15 BROTHER ROBERTO CONSIDERED TRUSTWORTHY ENOUGH BY CUBAN GOVT TO TRAVEL OVERSEAS ON GOC MISSION LATE 1966.

B. A-15 CARACAS CONTACT GUSTAVO ORTIZ FAEZ UNSAVORY CHARACTER WHO WAS INVOLVED IN POLITICAL MURDER OF ANTI-COMMUNIST PROFESSOR AT HAVANA UNIVERSITY.

3. WILL POUCH DETAILS.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT.
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____________ PER ____________ # ____________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica

CITE DIRECTOR 34096

TO

WH COMMENT: *REF gave AMCLEVE-15 PRQ data. Stated JMWAVE had no further info indicating possible security problems other than Havana broadcast during recent LASO conference naming A-15 as CIA agent which WAVE claims has no bearing on ops use as DIGEPOL penetration.

**A-15 stated DIGEPOL job paid about 250 dollars per month which he claims too little to live in Caracas. Would be willing work for DIGEPOL or Station in Caracas if had total income approx 600 dollars per month.

COORD: WH/COG/MO ✓ (in draft)

WH/3/V Uc

5
4
3
2
1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM 12

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	3	5	C
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

ACTION

11 SEP 67 IN 49565

S E C R E T 111655Z CITE CARACAS 7775

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. JMWAVE 9177 (IN 47495)

B. DIRECTOR 34096

1. IN VIEW REF B, STATION WILL HOLD CONTRACT OFFER IN ABEYANCE UNTIL HE IN PLACE.

2. SUGGEST AMCLEVE-15 PHONE OR CABLE ERASTO FERNANDEZ AND OBTAIN DEFINITE COMMITTMENT WHERE HE TO WORK AND EOD.

S E C R E T

BT

Charlie

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
25/21

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CCS 3

SECRET 082146Z CITE JMWAVE 9177

8 SEP 67 IN 48495

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 7756 (IN 47455)

NOT CLEAR IF JMWAVE SHOULD MAKE AMCLEVE/15 REF OFFER OR WAIT UNTIL CARACAS STATION OFFICER ARRIVES MIAMI MID SEPTEMBER. ALSO WHETHER CONTRACT HINGES ON PRIOR OBTAINING A JOB WITH DIGEPOL. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/RYBAT

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMCLEVE/Operational
Forwarding of AMCLEVE/15's 201 File

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Reference: JMWAVE 9138, 6 Sept 1967

1. Attached herewith as Attachment 1 is AMCLEVE/15's field 201 file.

2. Forwarded under separate cover as Attachment 2 is the true name portion of AMCLEVE/15's 201 file.

Gary L. Flustikoff
Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachments -
1. As Stated (H/W)
2. As Stated (U/S/C)

Distribution
3 - C/WH/COG w/atts #1 hw, #2 u/s/c
2 - COS, Caracas w/atts #1 hw, #2 u/s/c

WH/3/V
ert

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/RYBAT

DATE TYPED
7 Sept 67

DATE DISPATCHED
SEP - 8 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28432

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

ACTION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

3

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, ADDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, DO/IB 2, CA 6, CI/INT 2

SECRET 071919Z CITE CARACAS 7756 7 SEP 67 IN 47458

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REF: JMWAVE 9138 (IN46714)

1. STATION WILLING ACCEPT AMCLEVA-15 FOR ONA-QAAR CONTRACT AT SALARY $350 PER MONTH PLUS CARACAS AND RETURN AIR FARE FOR ONE. CONTRACT REVIEWABLE AT ANY TIME. ALSO 30-DAY TERMINATION CLAUSE AT STATION OPTION.

2. WOULD HOPE THAT AMCLEVE-15 CAN REESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP WITH ERAETO FERNANDEZ, AS LATTER MAY SOON BE NAMED NEW DIRECTOR DIGEPOL AND IF NOT, HE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN MININT INVESTIGATIVE APPARATUS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

☐ YES ☐ NO
PY TO FILE NO.
O FILE NO.
☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
☐ SIG.
Y 15 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 026

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

FO

FILE, VR, WH/COG 8

ACTION CHANGE

ACTION

JMWAVE 9138 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 46714-A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

Kurt

FROM : WH/COG (DIVISION)

TO : WH (DIVISION)

BY : A GONZALEZ 7657 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : K. GARDNER 4521 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

Charlie

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES -Y

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM K/7

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI, C/IBS

ACTION

SECRET 051500Z CITE CARACAS 7725 5 SEP 67 IN 45532

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REF: A. JMWAVE 9080 (IN 44174)

B. DIRECTOR 32719

1. STATION CARACAS INTERESTED PROPOSITION CONTAINED REF A.

2. REQUEST JMWAVE FORWARD SOONEST PRQ DATA; EXACT DIVISION IN DIGEPOL FOR WHICH HE WORKING; NAME OF CHIEF AND NATURE OF JOB.

3. STATION OFFICER PLANNING BE IN MIAMI MID MONTH AND WILL INTERVIEW AMCLEVE-15.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION 22 WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI

6 Sep 67 IN 46714

SECRET 062218Z CITE JMWAVE 9138

CARACAS, DIRECTOR

REF A DIRECTOR 32719

B CARACAS 7725 (IN 45532)

1. FOLL IS AMCLEVE/15 PRQ DATA:

A. BORN 18 FEB 1925, CIENFUEGOS. EDUCATED CIENFUEGOS RECEIVED DEGREE SUGAR CHEMISTRY 1950. EMPL AS CHEMICAL ANALYST, EXTERMINATOR CIENFUEGOS 1946 TO 1958. DEPT MANAGER FIRESTONE TIRE CO. HAVANA MAR 1958 TO MAR 1959. THEN UNEMPLOYED AND BECAME POLITICAL ASYLEE ARGENTINE EMB. ARRIVED US VIA MEXICO 28 FEB 1961. REMAINDER OF FAMILY (FATHER, MOTHER, BROTHERS, SISER) STILL IN CUBA. TRAINEE FOR BRIGADE 2506 BUT DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN INVASION. EMPL FIRESTONE TIRE CO. AKRON OCT 1961 TO MAR 1963. MEMBER US ARMY MAR 1963 TO MAR 1964, DISCHARGED AS 2ND LT. EMPL AS EXTERMINATOR MIAMI SEPT 1964 TO MAR 1965.

B. RECRUITED BY JMWAVE MAR 1965 AND USED AS TRAINING INSTRUCTOR AND SUBSEQUENTLY AS REPORTER ON EXILE ACTIVITIES MIAMI AREA UNTIL TERMINATION JULY 1967.

C. HAS PM/MARITIME EXPERIENCE AND IS EXPERT IN WEAPONS

SECRET

AND DEMOLITONS.

D. MARRIED. ONE SON. HAS NATIVE SPANISH AND FLUENT ENGLISH.

2. AMCLEVE/15 DOES NOT KNOW IN WHICH DIVISION OF DIGEPOL HE WOULD BE EMPLOYED, ONLY THAT HE PREVIOUSLY WORKED DIRECTLY UNDER ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) WHO WORKS WITH OR UNDER THE DEFENSE MINISTER. AMCLEVE/15 CLAIMS HE HAS CHOICE OF WORKING FOR FERNANDEZ OR MAJOR NIEVES *(CROES) OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE (G-2). NATURE OF DIGEPOL JOB AS DESCRIBED BY AMCLEVE/15 WOULD BE INVESTIGATIVE.

3. AMCLEVE/15 RECEIVED LETTER 5 SEPT 1967 FROM FRIEND RAFAEL TREMOL, DIGEPOL EMPLOYEE, IN WHICH TREMOL TOLD HIM HIS CONTRACT TO WORK IN VENEZUELA HAD BEEN APPROVED BY DEPT OF WORKS AND HE COULD NOW APPLY MIAMI VENEZUELA CONSULATE FOR VISA.

4. JMWAVE'S RESERVATIONS MENTIONED REF A, INCLUDING FACT AMCLEVE/15 WAS NAMED AS WOFACT AGENT ON HAVANA TV DURING LASO CONFERENCE, HAVE NO BEARING ON OPS USE AS DIGEPOL PENETRATION. STATION HAS NO FURTHER INFO INDICATING POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS.

5. POUCHING 201 FILE.

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ACTION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ROOM 30

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, C/OPS, C/OA, WH/COG 8, CI

Pete Keith Charley

C/ SEPT 6

para 4

SECRET 012138Z CITE JMWAVE 9080

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 7694 (IN41504)

1. AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT DEFINITELY MADE UP MIND TO RETURN TO CARACAS. HIS JOB WITH DIGEPOL (WHICH HE SAYS STILL AVAILABLE TO HIM) PAID ONLY ABOUT 250 DOLLARS PER MONTH WHICH HE CLAIMS TOO LITTLE TO LIVE IN CARACAS. WHILE JOSE VENTURIN MIGHT BE ABLE PROVIDE JOB LATER, HAS NOTHING NOW. THUS AMCLEVE-15 ACTIVELY SEEKING JOB MIAMI.

I am definitely opposed to us picking up another Cuban at this point.
K.

2. AMCLEVE-15 STATES WOULD BE WILLING GO BACK TO DIGEPOL OR OTHER JOB IN CARACAS TO WORK FOR WOFACT, BUT WOULD REQUIRE TOTAL INCOME APPROX 600 DOLLARS PER MONTH DUE CARACAS COST OF LIVING.

3. WHILE AWARE EXTRA WOFACT INCOME COULD CREATE COVER PROBLEM, PERTINENT TO POINT OUT THAT IN YEARS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT BEEN UNDULY CONCERNED ABOUT MONEY PER SE; THUS DO NOT BELIEVE HE PLAYING HARD TO GET. FURTHER, JMWAVE AGREES THAT WHILE WORKING FOR DIGEPOL HE WOULD BE A GOOD ASSET FOR WOFACT.

4. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER CARACAS WISHES PICK UP AMCLEVE-15

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 9080 SECRET

ABOVE BASIS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 25/71

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, [illegible]

ACTION

S E C R E T 082146Z CITE JMWA[illegible] 917[illegible]

8 SEP 67 IN 48495

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 7756 (IN 47455)

NOT CLEAR IF JMWAVE SHOULD MAKE AMCLEVE/15 REF OFFER OR WAIT UNTIL CARACAS STATION OFFICER ARRIVES MIAMI MID SEPTEMBER. ALSO WHETHER CONTRACT HINGES ON PRIOR OBTAINING @ JOB WITH DIGEPOL. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

S E C R E T

ORIG: C. COX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 31 AUG 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 [illegible]
2 [illegible] CI/OS
3 [illegible]
4 [illegible]
5 [illegible]

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 22 PER ______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) SEP 1 22 20Z

CITE DIRECTOR (elite) (reference number) 32719 (pica)

TO CARACAS, JMWAVE

REF: A. JMWAVE 8997 (IN 40592)*
B. CARACAS 7694 (IN 41504)**

1. BASED ON INFO CURRENTLY AVAILABLE HQ NO OBJECTION TO STATION CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE-15 PENDING CONFIRMATION FROM OTHER STATION SOURCES HE ACTUALLY WORKING FOR DIGEPOL AND IN WHAT CAPACITY. IF CONTACT DESIRED AMCLEVE-15 STANDARD CLEARANCE PROCEDURES MUST BE INITIATED. ?

2. CAN CARACAS DISCREETLY CONFIRM DIGEPOL JOB?

3. REQUEST WAVE DUPLICATE FIELD 201 SOONEST AND SEND TO CARACAS AND HQ FOR REVIEW. RE REF. B. DOES WAVE HAVE ADDITIONAL INFO FOR CARACAS SUGGESTING CAUTION IN CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE 15?

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *AMCLEVE-15 reported to Wave he obtained job with Digepol in Caracas and was involved in Digepol operation culminating in capture Espinoza, a Cuban guerrilla, who landed Falcon province July 66 with Luben Petkoff. A-15 stated to Wave he talked with Espinoza day following capture.

Betty - file A-15

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 32719

TO

**Caracas believes to station advantage to have contact with A-15. Rejects Wave objections based on Cuban broadcasts. Requested WAVE tell A-15 Caracas wants contact him. Requested info re return A-15 to Caracas and info for contact.

COORD: C/WH/3/V
C/WH/COG Earl J. Williamson

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[redacted] 28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 111851Z CITE JMWAVE 9205

11 SEP 67 IN 49694

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

REF A JMWAVE 9080 CIN 44174

B DIRECTOR 34096

1. AMCLEVE-15 HAS DEFINITELY DECIDED NOT RETURN CARACAS FOR DIGEPOL JOB WITHOUT ASSURANCE SIMULTANEOUS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT DUE LOW SALARY MENTIONED REF A.

2. WE READ REF B AS INSTRUCTION TO JMWAVE TO TELL AMCLEVE-15 THIS ASSURANCE WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING AND THAT HE CAN INTENSIFY SEARCH FOR MIAMI EMPLOYMENT. PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Keith, we file daily – Victory

Amen!

Charlie — COG got action but we had better originate reply. K.

4-68 JVIU

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
FROM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR [illegible]

S E C R E T 132203Z CITE CARACAS 7805

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

14 Sep 67 IN 51849

REFS. A. JMWAVE 9205 (IN 49699)

B. DIRECTOR 34096

1. CIGIRO 1 REPORTED EVENING 12 SEPT THAT HE HAD NOMINATED ERASTO FERNANDEZ BETANCOURT TO BE DIRECTOR DIGEPOL. CIGIRO 1 SAID PRESIDENT RELUCTANT APPROVE APPOINTMENT DUE FERNANDEZ BAD REPUTATION. CIGIRO 1 CONTINUING PRESS FOR APPROVAL APPOINTMENT ON BASIS HE WILL WATCH FERNANDEZ.

2. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, STATION FEELS AMCLEVE 15 SHOULD PHONE FERNANDEZ TO TRY FIRM UP DIGEPOL JOB; BUT DELAY ACTUAL DEPARTURE TILL HIS POSITION CLARIFIED. THIS BEING SUGGESTED ON ASSUMPTION AMCLEVE 15 MAY NOT IMMEDIATELY LOCATE JOB IN U.S. AND WOULD BE WILLING CONTINUE TRY KEEP VENEZUELAN OPTION OPEN ON CHANCE IT MIGHT WORK OUT.

3. REQUEST HQS CONCURRENCE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

ORIG: K. GARDINER CCG
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 14 SEPT 1967

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 22 PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

FI, FI/INT 2, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

Sep 15 20 12 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 35982

TO

CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REF A: CARACAS 7805 (IN 51649)*

B: DIRECTOR 34096**

1. BELIEVE ANY FURTHER JMWAVE ENCOURAGEMENT AMCLEVE-15 SEEK DIGEPOL JOB MAY BE INTERPRETED BY HIM AS IMPLICIT COMMITMENT OF WOFACT EMPLOYMENT ONCE HE REACHES VENEZUELA. WISH AVOID ANY SUCH MISUNDERSTANDING WITH AMCLEVE-15 SINCE NO ASSURANCE HE WILL BE OF SUFFICIENT OPS POTENTIAL TO MERIT EXPENDITURE STATION TIME AND MONEY. POINTS TO CONSIDER ARE:

A. ACCORDING TO CIRASH-12 DIGEPOL HAS NEITHER PERSONNEL, BUDGET NOR HIGH LEVEL POLICY DIRECTION WHICH WOULD PERMIT IT TO FUNCTION AS EFFECTIVE ANTI-SUBVERSION ORGANIZATION REGARDLESS WHO IS DIRECTOR.

B. APPARENT THAT DIGEPOL (AND, IN VIEW FORMATION OF NEW INTEL ORGANIZATION BY UZCATEGUI, ENTIRE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY) UNDERGOING SHAKEUP. DIFFICULT MEASURE AMCLEVE-15 POTENTIAL AS LOW TO MEDIUM LEVEL PENETRATION DIGEPOL AGAINST POSSIBILITY OBTAINING LOCAL PENETRATION AGENTS UNTIL DUST OF

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ____ PER ____

☐ NO COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

PAGE 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 35782

RECLAMATION ~~RECRIMINATIO~~N SETTLES.

C. HQS STILL BOTHERED BY INHERENT SECURITY PROBLEMS ~~ASPECTS~~ AMCLEVE-15 CASE, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE ~~CONCERNING~~ HIS BROTHER WHO IS ALLEGED TO BE A DSE AGENT. BELIEVE AMCLEVE-15 AS CUBAN IN EMPLOY OF DIGEPOL MIGHT EASILY COME TO ATTENTION OF CUBAN INTELLIGENCE.

2. UNLESS WE HAVE MISSED SOME POINT WHICH MAKES AMCLEVE-15 VITAL TO CARACAS OPS PROGRAM PREFER JMWAVE NOT ENCOURAGE AMCLEVE-15 SEEK DIGEPOL JOB. HOWEVER WE DO NOT OBJECT TO TELEPHONE CALL PER REF A.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Suggests JMWAVE have AMCLEVE-15 telephone Erasto Fernandez Betancourt, who has been nominated as new head of DIGEPOL, to attempt to firm up previous job offer by Fernandez. AMCLEVE-15 should delay actual departure for Caracas until his position is clarified. Requests Hqs concurrence.

**Hqs believes that, in view unsettled DIGEPOL situation and vague and unsubstantiated nature AMCLEVE-15 job possibilities, not advisable make financial commitment to him to enable him to return to Venezuela. If he returns on his own and Caracas determines he has operational potential, possibility of WOFACT employment can be reconsidered.

C/WH/CO:

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

4-65 [illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES (21)

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/CA, CI/PS

S E C R E T 181600Z CITE CARACAS 7841

18 SEP 67 IN 54359

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: DIRECTOR 35982

ACTION

IN VIEW HEADQUARTERS STRONG RESERVATIONS HIRING AMCLEVE-15, STATION DEFERS TO HQS VIEWS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Charlie

Keith

file 201

INC. YES ☐ NO ______
CL SI O FILE NO. ______
X-REF FILE NO. ______
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 027

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______ # ______

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE. VR, WH/COG 8

ACTION

ACTION CHANGE

JMWAVE 9448
(STATION & NUMBER)

IN 59289-A
(IN NUMBER)

AW

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

Charlie

FROM : WH/COG
(DIVISION)

TO : WH
(DIVISION)

BY : Fisher Ames 5106
(NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : E. Tsikerdonos 4521
(NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 32/21

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, SOD 6, FI

SECRET 252203Z CITE JMWAVE 9448

Charlie 25 SEP 67 IN 59289

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

FYI: AMCLEVE/15 REPORTS TELEPHONE CALL FROM GUSTAVO ORTIZ INFORMING HIM THAT ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) BETANCOURT WILL ARRIVE MIAMI ON TDY 27 SEPT 67. ORTIZ STATED FERNANDEZ WILL SEEK INFO FROM CUBAN EXILES MIAMI WHO MAY KNOW OR HAVE INFO ON CUBAN GUERRILLAS VENEZUELA. ORTIZ ASKED AMCLEVE/15 WORX WITH FERNANDEZ DRUING HIS TDY MIAMI; AMCLEVE/15 AGREED.

A bad penny turns up.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

14-00000

E. Tsikerdanos

ORIG: E. TSIKERDANOS
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 27 SEPT 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER #

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI.
FI/INT 2, CI,

(classification) SEP 27 1930 Z (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 38879

TO PRIORITY CARACAS JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 7291 (IN 59861)*

1. IT NOT NECESSARY FOR JMWAVE CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 PER PARA 4 REF AS THERE SUFFICIENT INFO OUR FILES TO APTLY ILLUSTRATE TYPE INDIVIDUAL FERNANDEZ IS AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS WOFACT. STILL WISH AVOID ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING ON PART TERMINATED AMCLEVE-15 THAT WOFACT WOULD SUBSIDIZE HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH DIGEPOL.

2. FERNANDEZ BAD REPUTATION BASED ON FOLLOWING:

A. ACCORDING CIRASH-12 HE TOTALLY IRRESPONSIBLE AS VEN CONSUL MIAMI, WHERE HE DRUNK MOST OF THE TIME, WILL ACQUIRE FURTHER DETAILS FROM CIRASH-12.

B. CIRASH-7 REPORTED 2 DEC 65 (CARACAS 3159) THAT FERNANDEZ IN TROUBLE WITH GOV BECAUSE OF CONDUCT MIAMI AREA AND THAT HE SIX MONTHS IN ARREARS ON FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING.

C. ON 7 OCT 65 CIARK-1 ASKED BY CIRATAL-1 TO LOOK INTO ACTIVITIES OF FERNANDEZ IN MIAMI: THAT HE NEGLECTING HIS JOB AND DEVOTING HIMSELF TO LIFE OF PLEASURE (HVCA-12834, 15 OCT 65).

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG
UNIT
EXT
DATE

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 38873

TO

D. CIRASH-9 REPORTED THAT FERNANDEZ AS DEPUTY CHIEF, DIGEPOL WAS EXPENDING $550 TO $670 FOR A NIGHTS ENTERTAINMENT. EXTRA SOURCE OF INCOME WAS APPROPRIATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY OF COMMUNISTS, RELEASE OF PRISONERS FOR A PRICE ETC. (HVCA-11693, Sept 64).

E. STATION REPORTED IN HVCA-13182, 25 FEB 66 THAT FERNANDEZ SERIOUS TROUBLE WITH THE GOV. WHILE STATION NOT ANXIOUS PROVOKE QUARREL WITH HIM, HIS RETURN TO ANY POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN VEN WOULD MILITATE AGAINST WOFACT INTERESTS.

F. IN UFGA-24884, 5 APRIL 66 AMHARSH-1 REPORTED ON SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES OF FERNANDEZ IN MIAMI AREA AND THE SHIPPING OF WEAPONS TO VEN.

G. WE CAN ALSO CITE HIS POOR HANDLING OF CIURBAN-2 CASE IN WHICH AGENT WAS BLOWN TO MIR WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF TAKEOVER.

H. MONROE B. DIFFENDAL (P) WHO CURRENTLY OUT OF COUNTRY ON TDY TRIP HANDLED FERNANDEZ WHILE LATTER DEP CHIEF DIGEPOL. WHEN HE RETURNS WILL QUERY HIM ON FERNANDEZ. HQS RECOLLECTS ONE PET GRIPES CASE OFFICER WAS THAT FERNANDEZ PASSED STATION INFO TO CIVISTA STATING IT CAME FROM HIS OWN (NON-EXISTENT) AGENT NETS.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ,

PAGE 3 (classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 38873

TO

3. IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR STATION TO WORK WITH FERNANDEZ IF HE APPOINTED CHIEF, DIGEPOL BUT FEEL THAT SENSITIVE OPS SHOULD CONTINUE BE HANDLED WITH CIWOODS OR UNILATERALLY. IT IS TRUE THAT FERNANDEZ COOPERATED WITH STATION DURING HIS PREVIOUS TOUR AND APPEARED NOT BE ANTI-WOFACT BUT HIS GENERAL GREEDINESS AND LACK OF SCRUPLES MAKE HIM AN UNSAVORY PARTNER TO DEAL WITH AT THAT LEVEL.

4. IF STATION DOES NOT HAVE ABOVE DOCUMENTATION HQS WILL FORWARD. WILL DISCUSS FERNANDEZ WITH COS ON HIS ARRIVAL HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *COS, Minit and Erasto Fernandez Betancourt, for DC/Digepol met to discuss colaboration between Station and Digepol. Not clear if Fernandez to be new Chief. While F has bad rep not clear why. Fernandez was cooperative with Station previous time no clear indications he enriched himself by accepting bribes from left. Station would work slowly until full assessment acquired. Asked WAVE to work closely with AMCLEVE-15 during Fernendez stay in Miami to collect info on latter.

COORD: C/WH/COG/MO Robert Ortman (by phone)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

[illegible]
ORIG: C. COX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 30 OCTOBER 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: [illegible] PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR WH/COG 8, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 47965

[illegible] Z

CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 8190 (IN 81988)

1. HQ INITIATING PROCESSING OF POA FOR ASSESSMENT ONLY.

2. WE RECOGNIZE YOUR INTEREST IN AMCLEVE-15, BUT SUGGEST YOU REVIEW CAREFULLY DOCUMENTS WHICH WE ARE FORWARDING BY POUCH.

3. PLEASE FORWARD SALARY INFO. HOW MUCH DOES STATION PROPOSE TO PAY HIM AND WHERE IN OPS BUDGET WILL IT COME FROM?

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Station interested possibility pick up Luis POSADA Carriles as unilateral penetration of DIGEPOL if Erasto Fernandez Betancourt named Director. Requested authorization to contact POSADA for assessment as soon as JMWAVE advises permanent address Caracas.

by [illegible]
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/WH/COG

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

YES ☐ NO
CL... TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 13

SECRET

ACTION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 74

ACTION WH-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/CoG-5, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OA

SW

SECRET 281910Z CITE CARACAS 8190

Gm
vc
cl

O.K. lit, dreams again
ok ask for POA. S

28 Oct 67 IN 81988

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. JMWAVE 9802 (IN 74936)

B. DIRECTOR 32719

1. STATION DEFINITELY INTERESTED IN POSSIBILITY PICKING UP AMCLEVE-15 AS UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF CIRASH IF AND WHEN CIRASH-4 IS NAMED DIRECTOR. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IF HE WOULD BE AS CLOSE AS PAST TRAFFIC SUGGESTS TO CIRASH-4, WHOM NEEDLESS TO SAY WE DO NOT COMPLETELY TRUST.

2. REQUEST HQS AUTHORIZATION TO CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 FOR ASSESSMENT AS SOON AS JMWAVE ADVISES OF MORE PERMANENT ADDRESS CARACAS. PER PARA ONE REF B, IF AMCLEVE-15'S OA CANCELLED, PLEASE REINSTATE

IT BASED ON INFO IN HQS FILES TO WHICH DISPATCH ADD

* ~~11 ,33 9, 8,19 8, 1 18)3 59 2 81 23 :-,,95~~ -$D- AT PRESENT.

3. FOR JMWAVE: WILL APPRECIATE CABLE AS SOON AS AMCLEVE-15 ADVISES PLACE CONTACT CAN BE MADE. IS LAWRENCE R. DEROME TRUE NAME OR PSEUDO?

SECRET

SECRET

* Srcb For Confirmation

25

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 28 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

SERVICE

ACTION

CARACAS 8190
STA & NR

29 OCT 67
DATE

81988
IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"PLEASE REINSTATE IT BASED ON INFO IN HQS"

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3 14 6

FROM 24

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

sd

18 Oct 67 74936

ACTION

KG
CC
BC

S E C R E T 182122Z CITE JMWAVE 9802

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE PBRUMEN

REF CARACAS 7805 (1-51649)

1. AMCLEVE/15 REPORTS TELEPHONE CALL FROM GISTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ ON 18 OCT 67. ORTIZ INFORMED AMCLEVE/15 THE ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) BETABCOURT WILL BE NAMED DIRECTOR OF DIGEPOL LATE OCT 67. ORTIZ ON BEHALF OF FERNANDEZ ASSURED AMCLEVE/15 DIGEPOL EMPLOYMENT AT PROPER LIVABLE SALARY.

2. AMCLEVE/15 PLANS FLY CARACAS 23 OCT 67. WILL STAY TEMPORARILY AT HOME OF ORTIZ. STATION HAS ASKED AMCLEVE/15 TO NOTIFY JMWAVE WHEN HE HAS MORE PERMANENT ADDRESS AND WE WILL ADVISE CARACAS. IF STATION DESIRES CONTACT, PERSON SHOULD IDENTIFY SELF TO AMCLEVE/15 AS FRIEND OF LAWRENCE R. DEROME.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 32/21

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2,

S E C R E T 271923Z CITE CARACAS 7937 27 SEP 67 IN 50958

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

1. REQUEST HQS, JMWAVE AND AMOT TRACES ON GUSTAVO ERNESTO (ORTIZ) FAEZ, BORN HABANA, 20 APRIL 1928. VETERINARIAN BY PROFESSION AND NOW RESIDING LA CASTELLANA AREA OF CARACAS.

2. SUBJECT IS CLOSE FRIEND OF ERASTO FERNANDEZ, POSSIBLE NEW CHIEF OF DIGEPOL. STATION FILES CONTAIN BRIEF NOTE ALLEGING SUBJECT "SUSPECTED MEMBER CUBAN G-2."

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

AMCLEVE-15 friend

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
~~TYPIC/AMCLEVE/Operational~~
AMCLEVE/15 Report on Arrest of Manuel ESPINOSA Diaz and Two Communist Guerrillas

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: JMWAVE-8997, 28 Aug 67

2P

1. Attached herewith is AMCLEVE/15's report concerning the arrest of Manuel *ESPINOSA Diaz and two Communist guerrillas by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967, the slaying of two Communists by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967 and AMCLEVE/15's interview with ESPINOSA.

2. JMWAVE checked the serial numbers of the weapons as provided by AMCLEVE/15 in an attempt to determine if they are of WOFACT/JMWAVE origin with negative results.

GARY L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachment - h/w
  As stated

Distribution
  3 - COS, Caracas w/att
  2 - C/WH w/o att acc to WH/3/V
  2 - WH/COG w/att

MICROFILMED
SEP 13 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1 ATT

CS COPY

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
30 Aug 67

DATE DISPATCHED
SEP 6 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28382

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-5-192/4

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA- 28382

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
✓ FPX [illegible]IAS	Felix		

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M			

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
Venezuela	~~[illegible] guerrilla~~ ~~XXXX~~ ~~deceased~~	Venezuela Urdaneta St., Caracas

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
FPX aka "Comandante Claudio"

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
[redacted]

2

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
X ESPINOSA-Diaz	Manuel	[illegible]	

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M	ca 1934	Cuba	Palma Soriano

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
Cuba	[redacted]	Caracas Venezuela

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
[redacted]

3

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
[illegible]ARRICIO-Aostiguieta	Eliazar	~~[illegible]~~	

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M			

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
Venezuela	~~deceased Communist~~	Venezuela Caracas

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
aka "El Loco"

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
[redacted]

4

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
[illegible]NANDEZ-Vera	Luis	~~Vera~~	

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M			

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
Venezuela	~~[illegible] Communist~~	Venezuela Caracas

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
[redacted]

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

FORM 10-66 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	2

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMCLEVE/Operational
AMCLEVE/15 Report on Arrest of Manuel ESPINOSA Diaz and Two Communist Guerrillas

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: JMWAVE-8997, 28 Aug 67

1. Attached herewith is AMCLEVE/15's report concerning the arrest of Manuel *ESPINOSA Diaz and two Communist guerrillas by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967, the slaying of two Communists by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967 and AMCLEVE/15's interview with ESPINOSA.

2. JMWAVE checked the serial numbers of the weapons as provided by AMCLEVE/15 in an attempt to determine if they are of WOFACT/JMWAVE origin with negative results.

GARY L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachment - h/w
As stated

Distribution
3 - COS, Caracas w/att
2 - C/WH w/o att
2 - WH/COG w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
30 Aug 67	

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28382

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-5-192/4

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA- 28382

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME FARIAS	GIVEN NAME Felix	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP Vene	OCCUPATION Communist guerrilla XXXX - deceased	RESIDENCE Urdaneta St., Caracas	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
aka "Commandante Claudio"

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Subject was killed by DIGEPOL agents near his residence in Caracas on 25 Aug 1967. Subject wanted by the police since 1965.

2

SURNAME ~~XXX~~ ESPINOSA	GIVEN NAME Manuel	MIDDLE NAME Diaz	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH ca 1934	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Palma Soriano
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION guerrilla-captured	RESIDENCE Caracas	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Subject attended guerrilla course in Cuba, infiltrated XXXXXXXXX Venezuela ca. July 1966 with 13 other Cubans. Subject's commander was Luben PETKOFF. On 25 Aug 1967 Subject participated in a bank holdup in Caracas and was XXXX captured by the police.

3

SURNAME FABRICIO	GIVEN NAME Eliazar	MIDDLE NAME Aristiguieta	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP Vene	OCCUPATION deceased Communist	RESIDENCE Caracas	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
aka "El Loco"

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Killed by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967 in Caracas. Subject was Wanted by the police in connection with the killing of Julio IRIBARREN Borges, former director of the Social Securitie, and for the death of a DIGEPOL agent.

4

SURNAME FERNANDEZ	GIVEN NAME Luis	MIDDLE NAME Vera	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP Vene	OCCUPATION deceased Communist	RESIDENCE Caracas	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Killed by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967 in Caracas. Subject was wanted by the police for being involved in an assassination plot against army officers and for subversive activities.

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

CARACAS - 15 AGOST - 1967 -.

I MET MR. ERASTO FERNANDEZ TROUGH. MR RAFAEL TREMOL AND DR. GUSTAVO ORTIZ FAEZ BOTH CUBAN WORKING FOR THE DIGEPOL ERASTO FERNANDEZ WORK WITH THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND WITH THE DIGEPOL, HE WAS FORMER VENEZUELA CONSUL IN MIAMI (1965)

I ASKED HIM (E.F.) FOR A JOB. HE ASKED ME FOR MY NAME FOR INVESTIGATION - THE INVESTIGATION ABOUT ME LAST ABOUT FIVE DAYS. HE TOLD ME THAT I CAN START WORKING WITH THE DIGEPOL - HE DID NOT TELL ME ABOUT MY SALARY, BUT I FOUND OUT THAT WILL BE VERY

LOW ($250). I SHOULD GO OUT OF VENEZUELA AND APPLY FOR A "TRANSEUNTE VISA" BECAUSE WITH A TOURIST VISA I CAN NOT WORK. THEY WILL HELP ME WITH THE GOVERMENT OF VENEZUELA FOR GET THIS VISA.

I STARTED WORKING WITH R. TREMOL AND WITH DR ORTIZ FOR A FEW DAYS 20 AUG 1967, AT THE MAIQUETIA AIRPORT. THE WORK WAS CHECKING ON THE WIFE OF DUGLAS BRAVO AND SOME OTHER COMUNIST FROM CUBA THEY PROBABLY WILL COME TO VENEZUELA TROUGH MEXICO, SPAIN

3 OR SOME OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY - WE DID NOT ANY POSSITIVE IDENTIFICATION -

---

CARACAS 24 THURSDAY AGOST

7 GUNMEN DID A HOLD UP AT MIRANDA BANK "SUCURSAL" ~~AT~~ OF THE INDUSTRIAL ZONE IN CARACAS, ANTIMANO HA WAY - THEY HIT THE MAIN BOX - THEY ABDUCTED THE MANAGER AND ONE OF THE TELLER IN THEIR HOUSES FOR TWELVE HOURS THEY GOT FIRST THE TELLER FRANCISCO GOMEZ MANSO AND THEN THE MANAGER

4 EDGAR PIÑERO BOTH WERE ABDUCTED WITH THEIR FAMILYS.

ABOUT 0700 O'CLOCK 4 GUNMEN WENT WITH THE TWO MEN TO THE BANK - MEANTIME THE OTHERS THREE WERE IN THE HOUSES WITH THE FAMILY OF THE TWO MEN.

THE FOUR GUNMEN GOT IN THE BANK WITH THE EMPLOYEES AND FORCED THEM TO OPEN THE MAIN BOX - THEY TOCK 390,000, BOLIVARS FROM THE BOX. THEN ONE OF THE GUNMEN CAllED THE OTHERS

5 WHO WERE IN THE HOUSES AND TOLD THEM EVERYTHING WAS AllRIGHT AND THEY All LEFT. THE POEOPLE FROM THE BANK LEFT IN A BLACK 1961 CHEVY. THIS OPERATION WAS SIMILAR TO THE VENEZUELA BANK SUCURSAL OF OCUMARE DEL TUY.

CARACAS 25 FRIDAY AGOST

ABOUT 0700 PEOPLE FROM THE DIGEPOL WENT TO THE STREET URDANETA OF CHACAO FOR SEARCHING THE

7

WHEN THEY SAW
COMING FELIX FARIAS
A WANTED MAN.
FELIX FARIAS ALIAS
"COMANDANTE CLAUDIO"
THE POLICE WAS
LOOKING FOR HIM FROM
1965 - THE GUERRILLERO
CARLOS NAVARRO INFANTE
ACCUSED HIM TO KILL
IN THE FIRING SQUAD
IN THE MOONTEN OF
FALCON STATE THE
FOLLOWING PEOPLE:
CONCHITA JIMENEZ 19 YEARS old
HER BROTHER
CRISTOBAL CAMPERO
RAMON JIMENEZ

SECRET

APARTMENT 27 OF
THE PERITE BUILDING
ON ACCOUNT OF
A TELEPHONE CAll
THAT THEY GOT ABOUT
0600 O'CLOCK. THE
INFORMER TOLD THEM
THAT THE CHEVY WHO
TOOK PART IN THE
BANK HOLD UP WAS
THERE. THEY CHECK
THE PLACE FOR ABOUT
A HALF HOUR. (I HEARD
ABOUT THAT IN THE
DIGEPOL)
THEY WERE FOR
ABOUT FIVE MINUTE
OUTSIDE THE BUILDING

SECRET

8

AND HIS OWN BROTHER
JUAN FRANCISCO FARIAS
THE DIGEPOL DID
RECCONOISE HIM AND
STOPED HIM - THE
PEOPLE FROM THE
APARTMENT 27 SAW
THAT AND STARTED
FIRING TO THE
DIGEPOL AGENTS,
FARIS DRAW A 38
SPECIAL REVOLVER
BUT THE DIGEPOL
SHOT HIM DOWN HE
GET 6 SHOTS - THEY
TOOK HIM TO THE
PEREZ DE LEON HOSPITAL
IN PETARE BUT HE WAS

9 DEAD ON ARRIVAl.
IN THE APARTMENT
27 THE DIGEPOL
ARRESTED THREE PEOPLE
ONE OF THEM A WOMAN,
THE OTHER WAS THE
CUBAN MILITIAN MANUEl
ESPINOSA DIAZ; I
HAD THE OPORTUNITE
OF MADE AN INTERROGATION
ON HIM THE NEXT DAY
AND I GOT VERY GOOD
INFORMATION FROM
HIM - IN THE SEARCH
OF THE APARTMENT
AN ARSENAL WAS FOUND
I DID INSPECT All
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

SECRET

10

THE WEAPONS WERE AS FOLLOW -

A FAL CAL 7.62 # 2932 CONVERT —

4 SUBMACH. MADSEN

1 M3A1 WITH SILENCER # 737598

1 M3A1 WITH SILENCER # 732039

IS IMPORTANT TO KNOW. THAT THOSE M3 ARE COMPANY WEAPONS BECAUSE I INSPECTED THEM, AND I AM PRETTY SURE ARE THE TYPE THAT THE COMPANY HAS - WITH THE SERIAL NUMBER, I THINK, IS NO PROBLEM TO KNOW

SECRET

SECRET

"IF THERE ARE WEAPONS CAPTURED BY CASTRO IN CUBA OR IF THEY ARE WEAPONS THAT CUBANS WHO WERE WORKING FOR THE COMPANY SOLD THEM IN MIAMI-

1 30 CAL CARBINE ENFORCE
TYPE M-1 #28662

1 SUB MACH. THOMPSON
COMERCIAL TYPE # 528766

1 SUB MACH. THOMPSON
MOD- 1928 # 817321

1 SUB MACH. HOTCHIS

1 REVOLVER 38 POLICE
SPECIAL # 1192

1 SUB MACH ZK # 00044

1 RIFLE GRENADE

SECRET

9 HAND GRENADES
GT 9 TYPE.
100 FEET DELAY FUSE
200 FEET PRIMA CORD
WHITE
2 ANTI RIOT GRENADES
ONE TEARGAS AND
THE OTHER OFFENSIVE
2 SOAP BOX GELATINE
INCENDIARIES WITH
TWO PENCILS EACH
ONE 4 1/2 HOURS AND
THE OTHER 6 3/4 HOURS
IS VERY IMPORTANT
TO KNOW ABOUT THE
INCENDIARY SOAP BOXES
BECAUSE ARE SIMILAR
TO THE COMPANY
SOAP BOX BUT ARE

13 DIFERENT. THE PENCILS ARE QUITE DIFERENT. I INSPECTED THEM VERY CAREFUL

– ALSO I FOUND SEVERAL NOTES COPY BOOK, ABOUT DEMOLITIONS AND SABOTAGES AND ALL OF THEM ARE BETTER IN SOME ASPECTS TO THE DEMOLITION COURSES THAT WE GOT.

– SOME ARMY UNIFORMS

– BOOTS AND MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT.

– SEVERAL TAGS LICENSES –

IN A DRAWER THEY

N

FOUND SOME 240,000 BOLIVARES, THIS MONEY BELONGE TO THE HOLD UP OF THE MIRANDA'S BANK.

LATTER THE BANK MANAGER AND THE TELLER DID RECONOISSE THE CORP OF FELIX FARIAS AS ONE OF THE GUNMEN IN THE HOLD UP — WHEN I DID INTERROGATE THE CUBAN MANUEL ESPINOSA DIAZ HE TOLD ME, THAT HE DID PARTICIPATE IN THE HOLD UP, HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS THE DRIVER

15

THEY AlSo FOUND IN FELIX FARIA'S BoDy TWO FAlSE I.D. CARDS ONE WITH THE NUMBER # 3094628 UNDER THE NAME OF GABRIEl ELIAS KAMEL ELJURI WITH FARIA'S FHOTO IN IT. THE OTHER I.D. CARD IS FROM THE POLITICAL PARTY "ACCION DEMOCRATICA" WITH THE NAME ALSO OF GABRIEL ELIAS KAMEl "ELJURI"

AT PETARE HOSPITAL THE DIGEPOL TOOK

SECRET

1L

THE FINGER PRINTS TO STABLISH THE IDENTITY OF FELIX FARIAS.

6 SHOTS WERE FOUND IN FARIA'S BODY - TWO IN THE HEAD - TWO IN THE CHEST - ONE IN THE RIGHT TIGHT ONE THE OTHER IN THE BELLY

THE APARTMENT 27 WAS RENTED BY FARIAS THE 25 OF JANUARY 1967 IN A REALTOR GIVEN THE NAME OF GABRIEL ELIAS KAMEL ELJURI

SECRET

SECRET

17 HE PUT LIKE REFERENCES WHEN HE RENTED THE APARTMENT THE FOLLOWING PERSONS:

RAFAEL SUAREZ WHO WAS SALESMAN IN THE CORPORATION "PINTURAS BRISTOL.

RAFAEL ZAMORA

EDDY FERMIN VAZQUEZ

RAMON BORGES

DR HUGO TIRADO.

LIKE NEAREST KIN ANA RAMIREZ DE ARIAS FROM CALLE REAL LA PLANICIE #21

BEFORE LIVING IN THE APARTMENT 27

SECRET

18 FARIAS WAS LIVING AT BUILDING 1 APT 15 IN LA CAPILLA AVE.

- THE CUBAN WAS TAKEN TO THE DIGEPOL OFFICES FOR INTERROGATION BY ERASTO FERNANDEZ WHO CHECK WITH US SEVERAL TIME DURING THE INTERROGATION -

I DID INTERROGATE THE CUBAN NEXT MORNING 26 SATURDAY

25 FRIDAY AUGUST

10 DIGEPOL AGENT WENT TO BOLIVAR STREET ON NAZARENO AREA

19

EST PART OF PETARE.
ONE OF THEM CARLOS
JOSÉ GONZALEZ NOCK
ON THE DOOR ON A
CORNER HOUSE CLOSE
TO THE NAZARENO CHURCH.
NOBODY ANSWERED, SO
HE WENT FOR THE BACK
OF THE HOUSE BUT THE
COMMUNIST SHOT HIM
DOWN. THE OTHER AGENTS
SURRENDER THE HOUSE
WITH SUBMACHINGUN
AND A SHOTING START
FABRICIO (EL LOCO) WAS
IN THE HOUSE HE WAS
FIRING WITH 7.65 PISTOL

SECRET

20
HE HAD SOME HAND GRENADE TOO. IN THE
HOUSE TOO WAS LUIS
FERNANDEZ VERA
BETANCOURT WHO WAS
FIRING WITH A 9MM
~~SUB~~ MADSEN SUBMACHINGUN
LOCO FABRICIO WHOSE
NAME WAS ELIAZAR
FABRICIO ARISTIGUIETA
WAS ONE OF THE KILLER
OF JULIO IRIBARREN
BORGES DIRECTOR OF
THE SOCIAL SECURITIE
HE WAS CHARGED TOO
WITH THE DEATH OF
SOME DIGEPOL AGENT

SECRET

2) I WAS ABLE TO KNOW
IN THE DIGEPOL OFFICE
THA THEY HAVE SOME
EMPTY SHElls WITH THE
FABRICIO'S FINGER PRINTS
IN THE CASE OF THE
MURDER OF IRIBARREN.
BORGES -

LUIS FERNÁNDEZ VERA
BETANCOURT. WHO WAS
ALSO KIlled WAS
ECONOMIC STUDENT AT
VENEZUELA UNIVERSITY
HE WAS WANTED FOR
SUVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
AND FOR AN ASSANATION
COMPLOT AGAINST SOME
ARMY OFFICERS

22

BEFORE THAT L.F.B. USING WOMAN DRESS ESCAPE FROM THE DIGEPOL OFFICE.

15 MINUTES AFTER THE FIRE START ONE OF THE MEN INSIDE THE HOUSE TROW AN MK2 HAND GRENADE.

L.V.B. FELL DEAD WITH SEVERAL BULLETS IN HIS BODY HE WAS USING GREY PANTS AND MAROON SHIRT. HIS BODY HAD 12 BULLET WOUND - HE STILL HAD IN HIS HANDS THE MADSEN SUBMACH. HE WAS USING HIS

23

HAIR TINTED BLONDE

LOCO BABRICIO WAS KILLED FOR TEN BULLETS - HE WAS IN THE ROOF OF ONE OF THE NEIBORHOOD HOUSE WHEN WAS KILLED - HE HAD THE 7.65 PISTOL WITH GOLDEN GRIPS CLOSE TO HIS RIGHT HAND. HE WAS USING GREY PANTS, WHITE SHIRT AND NO SHOES

THE HOUSE WERE THEY WERE HIDEN HAS MORE THAN A THOUSAND HITS. IN THE HOUSE WAS ALSO A 7 YEARS OLD

24 GIRL, WHO WAS ABDUCTED BY THEM. THE NEIGHBOORS SAID THAT THEY SAW TWO WOMEN USING NURSES CLOTHS VISITING THE HOUSE.

---

26 SATURDAY AGOST.

I HAD THE OPORTUNITY TO INTERVIEW THE CUBAN MANUEL ESPINOSA DIAZ.

HE IS ABOUT 5'7" 150 POUNDS - HE SAID HE WAS 33 YEARS OLD AND WAS BORN

25 IN PALMA SORIANO ORIENTE, CUBA - HE HAD A WOUND NO TO SERIUS IN THE BACK OF THE HEAD PROBABLY ~~BEC~~ ON ACCOUNT OF THE INTERROGATION HE WAS VERY COOPERATIVE HE LOOKED VERY HUMBLE HE SAID HE ASKED THE COMMUNIST THAT HE WANTS TO GO BACK TO CUBA - BUT THEY DID NOT LET HIM GO - HE SAID THAT HE CAME FROM CUBA 13 MONTHS AGO, WITH

SOME OTHERS 13
CUBAN. HE SAID
THEY DID NOT TELL
HIM WHERE HE GO
UNTILL HE WAS IN
THE HIGH SEAS. HIS
COMANDER IN THIS
TRIP WAS LUBEN
PETKOFF. THEY
LANDED IN A BEACH
NAMED CHICHIRIVICHE
IN FALCON STATE.
THEY ALL WERE
TRAINED IN CUBA
~~FOR~~ IN GUERILLA
WARFARE. I HAD
THE OPORTUNITY TO

27 SEE ONE OF HIS COPY BOOK, AND THE TRAINING LOOKS TO ME VERY GOOD –

HE SAID THAT HE TOOK PART IN THE MIRANDA BANK HOLDUP. HE SAID HE WAS THE DRIVER THERE.

HE SAID THAT HE WAS IN CARACAS ~~FOR~~ TWO MONTH AGO, HE SAID HE CAME DOWN FROM THE MOUNTAIN BECAUSE HE HAD SOME KIDNEY SICKNESS.

HE SAID HE WAS SARGENT THIRD CLASS

SECRET

28 WITH THE MILITIA -
HE SAID HE WORKED
WITH THE "BATALLONES
DE TRABAJO" IN PINE
ISLAND. HE SAID THAT
IN 1963-1964 HE WAS
IN CHRGE OF THE
17-70 BATALLION AT
CAMAGUEY PROVINCE
THE GUERILLA COURSE
IN CUBA WAS APROX
TWO MONTHS.

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
FROM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/C ☒ RED COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE [illegible]

ACTION

S E C R E T 292210Z CITE CARACAS 7694

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. JMWAVE 8866 (IN 34026)
B. CARACAS 7589 (IN 32469)
C. JMWAVE 8997 (IN 40592)

29 Aug 67 IN 41504

1. IT CLEAR FROM REF C THAT IT TO STATION'S ADVANTAGE HAVE CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE-15 IN CARACAS AS HE COULD HAVE INFORMED US OF CAPTURE OF CUBAN CONSIDERABLY BEFORE WE HEARD OF IT FROM GOV.

2. STATION DOES NOT FEEL REF A OBJECTIONS TO CONTACT ARE VALID, ESPECIALLY WITH AMCLEVE-15 WORKING FOR DIGEPOL. UNLESS JMWAVE HAS FURTHER OBJECTION NOT PRESENTED REF A, REQUEST AMCLEVE-15 BE TOLD STATION CARACAS DESIRES CONTACT HIM. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN AMCLEVE-15 WILL RETURN CARACAS AND HOW HE CAN BE CONTACTED.

S E C R E T SECRET
BT

Gw. [illegible] Charlie

I would like discuss this ad nauseum personally [illegible] + [illegible] Today

Have done so.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[redacted] 28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 13

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, C/OPS, C/CI 2, C/CA, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6

CI

S E C R E T 282207Z CITE JMWAVE 8997 (STEADMAN ACTING) 28 AUG 67 IN 40592

PRIORITY CARACAS INFO ~~DIRECTOR~~

NO NIACT ACTION

REF CARACAS 7668 (IN 39826)

in. Keith ? Pete Bill Charlie Ambrose ?

1. NO IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES EPINOZA. AMOT TRACES PENDING.

2. AMCLEVE-15, WHO HAS JUST RETURNED TO MAIMI TO OBTAIN PROPER VISA TO ENABLE HIM WORK IN VENEZUELA, REPORTS HE OBTAINED JOB WITH DIGEPOL THRU RAFAEL TREMOL AND GUSTAVO ORTIZ FAEZ AND WAS INVOLVED IN ESPINOZA CAPTURE.

3. ACCORDING AMCLEVE -15, DIGEPOL RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL ABOUT 0600 HOURS 25 AUGUST FROM INFORMANT WHO REPORTED BLACK CHEVROLET SOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH 24 AUGUST BANK ROBBERY HAD BEEN SEEN IN URDANETA STREET NEAR PERITE BUILDING, ON ARRIVAL POLICE SAW FELIZ FARIAS, ALIA "COMMANDANTE CLAUDIO", WHO WANTED FOR 1965 FIRING SQUAD MURDER OF SEVERAL PEOPLE. FARIAS DREW REVOLVER AND WAS SHOT DOWN, PEOPLE IN APARTMENT 27 OF PERITE BUILDING BEGAN FIRING ON POLICE. POLICE ENTERED APARTMENT AND ARRESTED ESPINOZA AND TWO OTHERS, FOUND 240,000 BOLIVARES FROM BANK ROBBERY, ARMS, AMMUNITION, GRENADES AND

SECRET

OTHER ITEMS. (AMCLEVE-15 PROVIDED LIST AND PICTURE).

4. AMCLEVE-15 TALKED WITH ESPINOZA 26 AUGUST. ESPINOZA STATED HE 33 YEARS OLD, BORN PALMA SORIANO, ORIENTE. CAME TO VENEZUELA FROM CUBA JULY 1966 WITH 13 OTHER CUBANS UNDER COMMAND LUBEN PETKOFF AND LANDED AT CHICHIRIVICHE BEACH IN FALCON PROVINCE. HAD APPROX TWO MONTHS TRAINING GUERRILLA WARFARE IN CUBA. AMCLEVE-15 SAID ESPINOZA VERY COOPERATIVE. HAD A NOT TOO SERIOUS WOUND IN THE BACK OF THE HEAD "PROBABLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE INTERROGATION".

5. AMCLEVE-15 SAID SOME OF ARMS LOOKED LIKE THOSE ISSUED BY WOFACT. WILL POUCH FURTHER DETAILS, INCLUDING ARMS WITH SEVERAL NUMBERS.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

SECRET

ACTION
WH 7 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

INFO
FILE [illegible]

SECRET 271760Z CITE CARACAS 7668

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

27 Aug 67 IN 30828

(NO NIGHT ACTION)

1. TIMING OF MININT PRESS CONFERENCE 26 AUGUST COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER. TWO DIGEPOL RAIDS OF PREVIOUS DAY GAVE PRESS CONFERENCE ADDED SPICE, BUT PRESENTATION AT PRESS CONFERENCE OF CUBAN GUERRILLA CAPTURED IN RAID 25 AUGUST WAS PARTICULARLY DRAMATIC, GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO VENEZUELAN CASE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION BEFORE OAS.

2. CUBAN IDENTIFIED AS MANUEL ESPINOZA DIAZ, AGE 33, OF PALMA SORIANO, ORIENTE PROVINCE, CUBA, WHO SAID HE WAS SERGEANT IN CUBAN MILITIA BATTALION ~~[illegible]~~ AND CAME TO VENEZUELA TO TEACH GUERRILLA TACTICS. ESPINOZA SAID HE ENTERED VENEZUELA JULY 66 WITH LUBEN PETKOFF GROUP AT CHICHIRIVICHE AND THAT LANDING PARTY INCLUDED 13 CUBANS. THIS SUBSTANTIATES CIURBAN-2 STATEMENT THAT FOTOS WHICH APPEARED IN SUCESOS ARTICLES ON PETKOFF GROUP INCLUDED NUMEROUS CUBANS. COS WHO SAW TV PRESENTATION FOUND ESPINOZA APPEAR BE LOW LEVEL AND NOT WELL INFORMED, ALTHOUGH SHOCK AND FATIGUE COULD HAVE CAUSED HIM TO APPEAR MORE STUPID THAN HE IS.

3. REQUEST HQS AND JMWAVE (TO INCLUDE AMOT) TRACES. WILL POUCH FOTOS ESPINOZA TO JMWAVE FOR POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BY AMUG-1 AND CIURBAN-2.

PAGE TWO CARACAS 7658 SECRET

4. WILL TRY GET TV FILM OF PRESS CONFERENCE.

5. STATION PREPARING DEBRIEFING REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD WELCOME ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FROM HQS AND JMWAVE.

6. AS INTERESTING SIDELIGHT, STATION RECEIVED NO ADVANCE NOTICE OF ESPINOZA CAPTURE FROM MININT PRIOR PRESS CONFERENCE DESPITE ASSISTANCE RENDERED TO FOLLOW THIS SERIES OF LEADS.

SECRET

BT

ATTACHMENT 1. to UFGA-28432

	SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Acting Chief, WHD		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	Operational/PBRUMEN Interrogation of "CIA Agents" at LASO Conference		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

1. The attached is an excerpt from the FBIS Daily Report dated 10 August 1967 (FB 155/67) concerning the interrogation of "CIA Agents" at a special session of the LASO Conference.

2. Your attention is drawn to the indicated paragraph concerning Luis POSADA and the Cuban Exile Organization Representacion Cubana en el Exilio (Cuban Representation in Exile-RECE), POSADA appears identifiable with the Subject of 201-300985.

file

LEONA R. VESTUTO

AUG 23 1967

w/att

Attachment: h/w
1-Excerpt from FBIS Daily
Report, 10 August 1967

Distribution:
3-COS, JMWAVE w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW-6657		DATE AUG 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

[illegible]

[illegible]

Question: What kind of [illegible] for the .22-cal. pistol with silencer?

Lauzerica: Part of the ammunition was conventional bullets and part of it was cyanide-tipped bullets.

Question: Who prepared the bullets with cyanide?

Lauzerica: I prepared them.

Question: What were these bullets prepared for?

Lauzerica: These bullets were prepared over there in Miami. (Tolo--phonetic) Huerta, member of an organization called ([illegible]) asked me to prepare them, in spite of the fact that I know nothing about chemistry, for attempts on lives, to make sure of the death of the individuals against whom these lives attempts were to be made. But they were for specific attempts.

Question: What plans were made in the United States or among the counterrevolutionary circles, what is the main objective sought?

Lauzerica: Well, the physical elimination of the leader of the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro.

Question: The physical elimination of Maj. Fidel Castro?

Lauzerica. Yes, sir.

Question: These counterrevolutionary groups which operate from Florida, from Miami, do they have the approval of the North American Government for their actions?

Lauzerica: Almost entirely. For example the most opportunist elements over there create small groups to obtain dollars from the US Government for their subsistence. But there are close links among all the organizations in exile with the Central Intelligence Agency. We have, for example, the case of ([illegible]) which--through [illegible], who is known by all as a CIA agent--[illegible], that is all the activities of [illegible] on Cuban coasts, actions against merchant ships and so forth, are linked to the CIA.

Question: You say that you had a .22-cal. pistol with poisoned bullets for specific attempts on lives?

Lauzerica: Yes, sir.

Question: I would like you to clarify something more. What specific attacks, against which figures, were these attempts to be made with this type of weapon?

Lauzerica: Well, against the most prominent figures of the revolution according to existing circumstances and according to the individuals who were going to execute them. Specifically, it is to be supposed that if the [illegible] of [illegible] were to take part in [illegible], well then the effort to kill the leader of the revolution would be intensified.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

21

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS

SECRET 212103Z CITE JMWAVE 8896 21 AUG 67 IN 36005

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PERUMEN

REF JMWAVE 8866 (1-34036)

AMOT TRACES NEGATIVE VENTURINI.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

4-63 JUIM

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

FROM 22

ACTION WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR WH/COG8 CA2 CA/PROP CA/14 CI/OPS CI/IC2

W
Pete

S E C R E T 172217Z CITE JMWAVE 8866 17 AUG 67 IN 34036

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF: CARACAS 7589 (IN 32469)

G

1. JMWAVE ADVISES NO CONTACT BE MADE WITH AMCLEVE/15. HIS NAME MENTIONED AS WOFACT AGENT ON GOC RADIO AND TV DURING LASO CONFERENCE. HE HAS ALSO BEEN INVOLVED SEVERAL SHADY DEALS MIAMI WHICH, ALTHOUGH UNDERTAKEN AT JMWAVE/FBI REQUEST, MIGHT PREJUDICE HIS EFFECTIVE USE.

2. STATION TRACES NEGATIVE VENTURINI. AMOT TRACES PENDING.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES (24)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FORM 3

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, [illegible] S, [illegible] Glatz

SECRET 152132Z CITE CARACAS 7559 (LYNER ACTING) 15 AUG 67 IN 32469

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. UFGA-28079

B. JMWAVE-8758 (IN 29699)

a/Pete — Fisher do these traces pls. G

Have

1. FROM REF A. INFO AMCLEVE-15 DID NOT APPEAR OF INTEREST IN HIMSELF TO CARACAS STATION. HOWEVER, CHECK OF HIS FRIEND REVEALED FOLLOWING: AMOT-6 REPORTED THAT RICARDO VENTURINI, CUBAN, EMPLOYEE OF RADIO CARACAS TELEVISION WAS IDENTIFIED IN AL LIAISON REPORT OF JANUARY 1967 AS A MEMBER OF CUBAN DSE.

2. IN VIEW ABOVE INFO AMCLEVE-15 MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE INFO ON A DSE OPERATIVE IN CARACAS. REQUEST JMWAVE, AMOT AND HQS TRACES VENTURINI. ALSO, IF JMWAVE CAN PROVIDE, WOULD APPRECIATE ADDRESS WHERE AMCLEVE-15 CAN BE CONTACTED SHOULD CARACAS DEVELOP ACTIVE INTEREST.

SECRET

BT

answered

WH/COG/CI Olivia Williams — COG has nothing

WH/4/r has nothing

RI has "

ATTACHMENT #1 to UFGA-28432

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

MEMORANDUM FOR AMCLEVE/15's File 14 August 1967

SUBJECT: Salary Misunderstanding

ORIGINATOR: Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

1. AMCLEVE/15 submitted the attached note, written by him, to the writer. In the note AMCLEVE/15 says "he is not asking for anything but wants the records checked regarding his past salary of $325.00 per month." AMCLEVE/15 claimed "Chip" (Grover T. LYTHCOTT, his former CO) told him that effective October 1966 he would be paid $100.00 per month by WOFACT, while the balance would be placed in a bank for him.

2. For the record AMCLEVE/15 was told by the writer and not Chip that effective August 1966 (not October) he would be cut back in his salary to approximately $100.00 per month. He was cut back from $350.00, not $325.00, for reasons of economy and cover and he was agreeable to the cutback. The writer did not tell him that the balance of approximately $212.00 was being saved for him; only that his gross salary would be raised to $350.00 in the event RECE ever stopped paying him his salary. (It was assumed that his RECE employment might be short-lived). For administrative reasons the salary cutback was not effective until September 1966 and from latter date until December 1966 he was paid $111.13. From January 1967 until June 1967 he was paid $110.90 due to a FICA change. During the entire period, September 1966 to June 1967, AMCLEVE/15 was budgeted by JMWAVE in the amount of $350.00 gross with the notation of his voucher of "possibility of paying balance later". Then in June 1967 AMCLEVE/15's salary was increased to $350.00 gross, as so promised, because he was unemployed during most of June.

3. The writer explained the above to AMCLEVE/15 and he seemed satisfied. He told the writer that he had to borrow some money to cover expenses in connection with his trip to Venezuela.

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COPY

14-00000

ORIG: MM PALMER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 17 AUG 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	03	6	
2		7	
3	C1	8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 7 PER ____ # ____

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 28911

10 10 00Z

TO CARACAS

FA

REF: CARACAS-7589 (IN 32469)*

NO HQS TRACES IDENTIFIABLE WITH RICARDO OR JOSE VENTURINI.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * Venturini is AMCLEVE-15's point of contact in Venezuela. Caracas reported that liaison have Venturini listed as a member of Cuban DSE. Requested Hqs, JMWAVE and AMOT traces.

COORD: WH/COG/CICS/OS Olivia Williams (telecoord)
WH/COG ____

for JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

POSADA, LUIS

INTERROGATION OF IA AGENTS' AT LASO SESSION

CUBA

[illegible] August 1967 aaaa 27 LASO CONFERENCE

Havana Domestic Television Service in Spanish 0107 GMT 7 Aug 67

Official Use Only

Question: What kind of weapons did you bring for assassinations?

Laucerica: We brought two Beretta pistols with silencers, a .22-cal. pistol with a silencer, and an M-3 with a silencer.

Question: What kind of ammunition did you bring for the .22-cal. pistol with silencer?

Laucerica: Part of the ammunition was conventional bullets and part of it was cyanide-tipped bullets.

Question: Who prepared the bullets with cyanide?

Laucerica: I prepared them.

Question: What were those bullets prepared for?

Laucerica: Those bullets were prepared over there in Miami. (Polo--phonetic) Miranda, member of an organization called (?El Reco) asked me to prepare them, in spite of the fact that I know nothing about chemistry, for attempts on lives, to make sure of the death of the individuals against whose lives attempts were to be made, but they were for specific attempts.

Question: What plans were made in the United States or among the counterrevolutionary circles, what is the main objective sought?

Laucerica: Well, the physical elimination of the leader of the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro.

Question: The physical elimination of Maj. Fidel Castro?

Laucerica: Yes, sir.

Question: Those counterrevolutionary groups which operate from Florida, from Miama, do they have the approval of the North American Government for their actions?

Laucerica: Almost entirely. For example the most opportunist elements over there create small groups to obtain dollars from the US Government for their subsistence, but there are close links among all the organizations in exile with the Central Intelligence Agency. We have, for example, the case of (?El Reco) which--through Luis Posada, who is known by all as a CIA agent--belongs, that is all its activities of landing on Cuban coasts, actions against merchant ships and so forth, are linked to the CIA.

Question: You say that you had a .22-cal. pistol with poisoned bullets for specific attempts on lives?

Laucerica: Yes, sir.

Question: I would like you to clarify something more. What specific attacks, against which figures, were those attempts to be made with that type of weapon?

Laucerica: Well, against the most prominent figures of the revolution according to existing circumstances and according to the individuals who were going to execute them. Specifically, it is to be supposed that if the idea of counterrevolution were to take root in Havana, well then the effort to kill the leader of the revolution would be intensified.

SO: F315 DR# 155, 10 AUG 67, Q&O

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 38 PER #

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT

INFO:
FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION

SECRET 102265Z CITE JMWAVE 8758

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

cat 10 AUG 67 IN 29698

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF: UFGA-28079

6

FYI: SUBJ PARA 3 REF LUIS CLEMENTE (POSADA) CARRILES (201-300985) PLANS TRAVEL TO CARACAS 12 AUG 67. HOPES FIND EMPLOYMENT THROUGH FRIEND RICARDO (AKA JOSE) VENTURINE WHO CONNECTED TV INDUSTRY CARACAS.

SECRET

BT

Sec: Please stain 201 for me. Thanks.

SECRET

DISPATCH | SECRET

TO Chief of Station, JMWAVE	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Acting Chief, WHD		MICROFILM

SUBJECT Operational/PBRUMEN
Interrogation of "CIA Agents" at LASO Conference

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

FYI

1. The attached is an excerpt from the FBIS Daily Report dated 10 August 1967 (FB 155/67) concerning the interrogation of "CIA Agents" at a special session of the LASO Conference.

2. Your attention is drawn to the indicated paragraph concerning Luis POSADA and the Cuban Exile Organization Representacion Cubana en el Exilio (Cuban Representation in Exile-RECE). POSADA appears identifiable with the Subject of 201-300985.

LEONA R. VESTUTO

Attachment: h/w
1-Excerpt from FBIS Daily
Report, 10 August 1967

Distribution:
3-COS, JMWAVE w/att h/w

1 ATT

CS COPY

CS COPY

2 4 AUG 1967

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW-6657 GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	DATE 10 Aug 67
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

AN	FI	
DEST		
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

Distribution:
1-WH/COG/CICS
1-WH/Reg/O
1-Originator

AN CJ	FI	
BS		
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/CICS	Laura Carberry	bar 16 Aug	5106

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/CICS	17 Aug	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/COG	17/8	

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

Question: What kind of weapons did you bring for assassinations?

Laucerica: We brought two Beretta pistols with silencers, a .22-cal. pistol with [illegible] a silencer, and an M-3 with a silencer.

Question: What kind of ammunition did you bring for the .22-cal. pistol with silencer?

Laucerica: Part of the ammunition was conventional bullets and part of it was cyanide-tipped bullets.

Question: Who prepared the bullets with cyanide?

Laucerica: I prepared them.

Question: What were these bullets prepared for?

Laucerica: These bullets were prepared over there in Miami. (Polo--phonetic) Miranda, member of an organization called (?El Rece) asked me to prepare them, in spite of the fact that I know nothing about chemistry, for attempts on lives, to make sure of the death of the individuals against whose lives attempts were to be made, but they were for specific attempts.

Question: What plans were made in the United States or among the counterrevolutionary circles, what is the main objective sought?

Laucerica: Well, the physical elimination of the leader of the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro.

Question: The physical elimination of Maj. Fidel Castro?

Laucerica: Yes, sir.

Question: Those counterrevolutionary groups which operate from Florida, from Miami, do they have the approval of the North American Government for their actions?

RECE

Laucerica: Almost entirely. For example the most opportunist elements over there create small groups to obtain dollars from the US Government for their subsistence, but there are close links among all the organizations in exile with the Central Intelligence Agency. We have, for example, the case of (?El Rece) which--through Luis Posada, who is known by all as a CIA agent--belongs, that is all its activities of landing on Cuban coasts, actions against merchant ships and so forth, are linked to the CIA.

Question: You say that you had a .22-cal. pistol with poisoned bullets for specific attempts on lives?

Laucerica: Yes, sir.

Question: I would like you to clarify something more. What specific attacks, against which figures, were those attempts to be made with that type of weapon?

Laucerica: Well, against the most prominent figures of the revolution according to existing circumstances and according to the individuals who were going to execute them. Specifically, it is to be supposed that if the idea of counterrevolution were to take root in Havana, well then the effort to kill the leader of the revolution would be intensified.

201-300985
FB 155/67
10 AUG 67

CS COPY

ATT 1 to UFGW 6657

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

10 August 1967

WIO-1592

TO : Chief, IO

THRU : Chief, IO/3

FROM : IO/3/FLUSTIKOFF

SUBJECT: AMCLEVE/15's Plans for Employment - Bona Fides Given for Possible WOFACT Contact in the Future

Distribution
1 - C/IO
1 - 201-300985
1 - IO/3 Chrono
1 - Registry

1. AMCLEVE/15 informed the writer on 9 August 1967 that he plans to fly to Caracas, Venezuela from Miami on 12 August 1967 accompanied by Aldo HERNANDEZ, a friend who is employed as a salesman in Caracas. In Caracas AMCLEVE/15 will seek employment through or with an old friend, Ricardo VENTURINE aka Jose VENTURINE, connected in some way with the TV industry in Caracas. HERNANDEZ is also a friend of VENTURINE.

2. If AMCLEVE/15 finds employment in Caracas, he does not intend to return to Miami and his wife and son will then join him in Caracas.

3. If AMCLEVE/15 does not find employment in Caracas, he intends to go to Puerto Rico from Caracas to look for employment through some of his friends living in Puerto Rico.

4. AMCLEVE/15 was given a recognition signal for establishing bona fides in the event that WOFACT should want to contact him in Caracas or elsewhere. AMCLEVE/15 was instructed that the person would establish bona fides by saying, "I'm a friend of Lawrence". He was also given JMWAVE address Mr. Lawrence R. DEROME, PO Box 390, Main Post Office, Miami, Florida.

5. JMWAVE has no identifiable traces on VENTURINE and HERNANDEZ.

6. AMCLEVE/15 reported that his name was mentioned on the GOC radio on 6 August 1967 in connection with the alleged captured WOFACT agents. He was described by Alberto LAUCIRICA Diaz as the liaison between WOFACT and RECE.

SECRET

GROUP I - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA	FROM: (Division) (Case officer) (Extension) WH/COG/CICS/OS O. Williams - 5136
SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used) Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles	NAME SHOWN IS ☒ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☐ CRYPT

CI/OA NO.	201 NO. 201-300985	PROJECT
DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

Subject is no longer of Operational interest to the Station.

REF: UFGA 28079, 31 July 1967

201-300985

DATE: 8 August 1967

SIGNATURE

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 8-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

SECRET

Carl: 5 August 1967

Please brief me on the final result of the AMCLEVE/ 15 case ?? Was Sam eventually satisfied and is all now calm ??

Thank you,

hm

Harry -

There was no problem with Sam on this case. At Hqs instructions JMWAVE terminated AMCLEVE-15 and the FBI [illegible] (or rather the Justice Dept.) planned to use A-15 to collect evidence against a Miami gambler. However the Dept. of Justice cancelled this plan few weeks later leaving A-15 a free body.

Since then A-15 became involved with KICOSPLT-1 & 2, which has caused a minor stir. I am holding the file until all the dust settles.

Carl

7 AUG 1967

Cal

Thanks - Please retain for his file.

Thank you

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION C/WH/4 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH/COG 5, C/CA, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3

S E C R E T 022306Z CITE JMWAVE 8577 2 AUG 67 IN 24285

DIRECTOR INFO LA PAZ

KAPOK

REF: DIRECTOR 24039

STATION WISHES TO CORRECT THE RECORD AS FAR AS LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH ONE OF REF IS CONCERNED. WHILE AMCLEVE/15 IS NOT A PARAGON OF VIRTUE HE CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS UNSAVORY CHARACTER. HIS INVOLVEMENT IN SHADY DEALS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS RESULTED ALMOST ENTIRELY FROM STATION'S (AND EVENTUALLY FBI) ENCOURAGEMENT. HE FOLLOWED DIRECTIONS AND REPORTED FAIRLY WELL.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CA
FMO
FI
RS
CS

FROM
3

ACTION
c/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐

UNIT ESEC

BY

INFO
FILE VR, c/WH/COG 5, c/ci, c/ci/ps, c/ci/sgo, c/ca2, c/FI 2, c/FI/INT 2

SECRET 022200Z CITE JMWAVE 8569

2 Aug 67 IN 24289

DIRECTOR INFO LA PAZ

KAPOK DYVOUR

REFS: DIRECTOR 24039
DIRECTOR 24439

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF KICOBALT 1 REPORT RECEIVED 28 JULY BY JMWAVE CONTACT:

A. 28 JULY KICOBALT 1 MET AMCLEVE 15 (ERRONEOUSLY REPORTED AMCHEER 15 PER DIRECTOR 24040) WHO SAID HE WAS GOING TO BOLIVIA TO HELP TRAIN A SPECIAL UNIT IN GUERRILLA WARFARE. AMCLEVE 15 CLAIMED TO BE OFFERED EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH AND TO BE LEAVING FIRST WEEK IN AUG AND TO HAVE RECEIVED FIVE HUNDRED DOLLAR ADVANCE.

B. KICOBALT 1 CONFIRMED ABOVE WITH AMDESK 1 WHO IS A FRIEND OF AMCLEVE 15 AND WHO ADDED THAT AMCLEVE 15 WAS IN TOUCH WITH BOLIVIAN CONSULATE IN MIAMI AND A BOLIVIAN MILITARY ATTACHE TO WHOM AMCLEVE 15 HAD MADE THE OFFER TO ORGANIZE A GROUP OF CUBAN GUERRILLA TRAINING OFFICERS. AMCLEVE 15 HAD OFFERED TO TAKE ON AMDESK 1 SHOULD KICHEER 1 APPROVE THE WHOLE PLAN. AMCLEVE 15 CLAIMED CONCEPT OF PLAN AND HIRING

SECRET

OF AMCLEVE 15 HAD BEEN APPROVED BY KICHEER 1 THRU ATTACHE.

2. KICOBALT 1 COMMENTED TO CO THAT SUCH A UNILATERAL GROUP UNCONTROLLED BY WOFACT WOULD DO MORE DAMAGE THAN GOOD; THAT KICOBALT SPONSOR AND COVER WOULD BE BLOWN IF IN FACT OTHER MIAMI CUBANS IN BOLIVIA ON SAME MISSION.

3. RE PARA 4 DIRECTOR 24039 JMWAVE FEELS THAT EITHER AMCLEVE 15 SOMEHOW CAME UP WITH IDEA ON HIS OWN OR SOME LEAK OCCURRED DURING INITIAL CONTACTS ON THIS PROGRAM AND HE NOW FISHING FOR INFO AND HANDLE TO CLIMB ON THE BAND WAGON. STATION HAS BEEN ADVISED BY AMCLEVE 15 THAT HE SEEKING EMPLOYMENT IN CARACAS. HE LEGAL U.S. RESIDENT AND IS IN POSSESSION OF MULTIPLE EXIT AND REENTRY PERMIT VALID ONE YEAR. AMOT 11 DOES NOT KNOW AMCLEVE 15 NOR IS HE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF KICOBALT OPERATION. AMFAST 6 (ANOTHER MEMBER AMOT GROUP WHO KNOWS AMCLEVE 15) REPORTED AMCLEVE 15 HAD TOLD HIM THAT AMCLEVE 15 AND WIFE HAD BEEN ENTERTAINED BY U.S. OFFICIAL (HINTED WOFACT) AND HAD DISCUSSED POSITION IN BOLIVIA.

4. INCIDENT OF COURSE REQUIRES INVESTIGATION AND IS BEING PURSUED. WILL ADVISE ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

EXT 5269

DATE 1 August 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY X PER

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO [illegible] BRANCH

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF. WH 7 ☐ RID COPY INFO FILE VR

1 22 25 Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE DIRECTOR 24430

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO: LA PAZ

REF: DIRECTOR 24039

A. REQUEST PRIORITY ~~PLEASE~~ CABLE CONTENT OF MEMO KICOBALT-1 (AMPOLISH-1) SUBMITTED TO JMWAVE CASE OFFICER AND ALL OTHER MATERIAL RELATED TO REF SUBJECT. UNDERSTAND THAT MEMO IN POSSESSION

B. STATION SINCE 20 JULY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: KICOBALT-1 reported that he met Luis Clements Posada Carriles who informed him he had approached Bolivian Consul in Miami offering his services as Interrogator/Guerrilla fighter in Bolivia.

C/WH/3 L. M. Sternfield

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

EARL WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

5337

31 JULY 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

Zl

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

C/WH-6 ☐ RID COPY INFO. C/WH/C6 5 C/CI, C/FI-2

2/50 23

31 Jul 67

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 24039

PRIORITY LA PAZ INFO: PRIORITY JMWAVE

RYBAT

1. KICOBALT-1 REPORTS HE MET LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES (JEN) CUBAN EXILE IN MIAMI LAST WEEK. POSADA INFORMED HIM HE HAD APPROACHED BOLIVIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI OFFERING HIS SERVICES AS INTERROGATOR/GUERRILLA FIGHTER IN BOLIVIA. POSADA SAID THAT REPLY HAD COME BACK FROM KICHEER-1 SAYING HE APPROVED SALARY OF $800 PER MONTH AND CONSUL AUTHORIZED PROVIDE $500 ADVANCE TO POSADA. POSADA LEFT IMPRESSION HE DEPARTING FOR LA PAZ SOON. POSADA IS UNSAVORY CHARACTER WHO MIXED UP IN SHADY DEALS MIAMI AREA.

2. AS CAN BE EXPECTED KICOBALT-1 AND KICOBALT-2 DEPRESSED AT THOUGHT OF POSADA BEING IN BOLIVIA AND UNDOUBTEDLY SUSPECT WOFACT INVOLVEMENT.

3. WOFACT HAS NO INVOLVEMENT THIS MATTER. REQUEST IMMEDIATE CONTACT WITH KICHEER-1 TO DETERMINE VERACITY OF POSADA'S STORY. IF TRUE MAKE IT CLEAR TO KICHEER-1 THAT WE IN NO WAY ARE INVOLVED IN THIS AND IN VIEW POSADA'S BACKGROUND WE WISH HIM TO CANCEL CONTRACTING POSADA POINTING OUT IT WILL JEOPARDIZE OUR AND HIS OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLAS.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY ________ PER ________ # ________ ☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF. ☐ RID COPY INFO. FILE , VR ,

PAGE TWO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 24039

4. FOR JMWAVE: IF POSADA'S STORY NOT TRUE STRONGLY SUSPECT LEAK IN EXILE COMMUNITY RE WOFACT INVOLVEMENT IN SENDING CUBANS TO BOLIVIA. COULD AMOT-11 OR OTHERS HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT ASSIGNMENTS. PLS PROVIDE YOUR VIEWS SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

RECEIVED

PROPER FILE NO.

/AN

FROM:

RID/AN

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. [illegible]/EEGC		7 AUG 1967			
2.					
3. WH/C/CIOS		7 AUG 1967	8 Aug 67	RD	
4.					
5. WH/C/MO		8 AUG 1967			
6.					
7. WH/C/CICS		10 AUG 1967	10 AUG 1967		
8.					
9. WH/CONTRACTS		11 AUG 1967	22 AUG 1967	JW	copy detached
10. WH/B&F			8/22		
11. C/WH/SS		22 Aug 67			for signature
12. CPD	5E-69				
13. WH/COG/MO	3038	0 AU			
14. WH/C/CICS/OT		31/9			file 201
15. WH/3/V					
16.					
17. RID/FI					

MICROFILMED
AUG 7 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-300985

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 31 July 1967

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFGA 28079

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT.	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
COS, Caracas

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
Termination of AMCLEVE/15

MICROFILMED
AUG 7 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Action Required: See para 7

Reference: JMWAVE-8156, 11 July 1967

1. As reported in reference, AMCLEVE/15 was terminated effective 11 July 1967. AMCLEVE/15 was terminated because he resigned from his position as a military coordinator/member of RECE (Cuban Representation in Exile), a Miami based Cuban exile organization, in early June 1967 and he thus lost access to his target, as AMCLEVE/15 had been reporting on the activities of RECE since 1 August 1966. In addition, JMWAVE does not have a current need or any operational interest in RECE, and the AMOT organization has the capability to penetrate and report on RECE if and when the need should arise. After AMCLEVE/15 resigned from RECE, he was a candidate for employment in the AMOT organization; however, because of his involvement with Frank "Lefty" ROSENTHAL and for other security reasons it was decided that the AMOT organization should not hire him.

2. AMCLEVE/15 began his employment with WOFACT in April 1965 and initially served as an instructor in the Maritime Training Branch of JMWAVE. He was also active in reporting on exile activities. On 1 August 1966, AMCLEVE/15 was transferred to the CI Branch where he was used to report on the activities of RECE until his resignation in early June 1967.

3. Since AMCLEVE/15 was amicably terminated, JMWAVE does not envision any problems at this time. AMCLEVE/15 plans to seek employment in Caracas, Venezuela, through an old friend who resides there.

4. On 21 July 1967 AMCLEVE/15 was given a termination bonus of $650.00, which is equivalent to two months salary, minus FICA and federal income tax. He was paid $549.60 net.

Dale

Continued

Attachments - herewith
1. Agent Service Record
2. Form 2457

Distribution
3 - WH/COG w/atts
2 - COS, Caracas
2 - C/WH w/o atts
Att: Joel N. NEBECKER

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D-19-300-18
201-300985

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
25 July 1967

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28079

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

ATTACHMENT #2 TO UFGA-28079

RECORD NO.

INVENTORY - NON STAFF PERSONNEL

	1	2	3	4
A	ARBITRARY NO.	SUBJECT'S 201 201-300985	OTHER FILE NO.	
B	SURNAME AMCLEVE/15	1ST NAME	PERSONALITY	OTHER GIVEN NAME/TELECODE	TYPE OF NAME C
C	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	DATE OF BIRTH 15 Feb. 1928	CITIZENSHIP Cuba	NATURALIZED-US (yes or pending)
D	COUNTRY CURRENTLY RESIDES USA	CITY CURRENTLY RESIDES-YEAR Miami	MARITAL STATUS (most recent) Married	SEX (M or F) M
E	OVERT OCCUPATION Unemployed	LANGUAGE Spanish, R,W,S	LANGUAGE English, R,W,S	LANGUAGE
F	MILITARY SERVICE-COUNTRY USA	BRANCH OF SERVICE Army	INCLUSIVE DATES 63-64	
G	COUNTRY AREA KNOWLEDGE Cuba	COUNTRY	COUNTRY	
H	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces) Maritime Instructor XXXXXXXXX July 65-Aug 66			CODE SOXXX
I	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces) CI Agent Aug 66-11 July XXXX 67			CODE CI
J	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	TYPE A OR B TYPE EMPLOYEE	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE WIFE	FULL, PART TIME OR WAE
K	MAINTENANCE/SERVICE	CONSULTANT	PROPRIETARY OR SUBSIDY	CAREER AGENT
L	FIELD AGENT Yes	HQS, FF OR USF XXXXXXXXUSF	INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR	NOC/NOA NOC
M	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL Yes	POA STATUS	STAFF CLEARANCE	CSA/PCSA
N	HQS COMPONENT RESPONSIBLE WH	FIELD STATION RESPONSIBLE JMWAVE	PROJECT	COVER NONOFF
O	ENTRY ON DUTY DATE 7 Apr 65	YEARLY SALARY $4200	DATE LAST PAY CHANGE August 1966	
P	PART OF A RETIREMENT PLAN - SPECIFY (limit to 62 spaces)			
Q	DATE TERMINATED 11 July 1967	REEMPLOYABLE Yes	STAFF CEILING SPACE	
R	REMARKS (re: termination, etc.) (limit to 62 spaces) A/15 terminated because he for XXXX lost access to target and/security reasons.			ATTITUDE good

MICROFILMED
AUG 7 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FORM 4-65 2457

SECRET

GROUP 1

(9-51)

CS COPY

AttA-UFGA-28079

201-300985

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-28079

5. AMCLEVE/15 signed a termination agreement/quit claim form and a final secrecy agreement and are being retained by JMWAVE.

6. Attached herewith are copies of AMCLEVE/15's "Agent Service Record" (Form 2457) and the Inventory-Non Staff Personnel Form.

7. Please cancel AMCLEVE/15's OA and MOC.

Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

APPROVED:

WH CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

REVIEWED:

Special Contracting Officer

FORM 5-60 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

14-00000

MICROFILMED
AUG 7 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET ATTACHMENT #1 to UFGA-28079

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1P

1. Agent's Cryptonym or Pseudonym: AMCLEVE/15
2. Project Identification:
3. Agent Recruited by: Grover T. LYTHCOTT
4. Capacity in which Agent Served: Maritime instructor and CI agent, reported on Cuban exile activities in Miami.
5. Rate of Pay: $350.00 per month
6. Other Commitments: none
7. Agent Dismissed by: Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF
8. Reason for Dismissal: Subject lost access to the target and for security reasons.
9. Security Risks: None, at time of termination.
10. Is the Agent Recommended for Re-Use: Not recommended for re-use in the Miami area.
11. Manner of Dismissal: Amicably-informed in person by CO.
12. Letter of Termination Signed: yes

SECRET

CS COPY

QA #1 UFGA-28079

201-330455

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

FROM
22

ACTION
WH/COG 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

CA
MO
RR
FI
RS

CICS
CIOS
CIPT
SS
ESEC

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

SECRET 191832Z CITE JMWAVE 8307 19 JUL 67 IN 15102

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE-15

REF: JMWAVE 8039 (IN 06002)

ON 19 JULY LOCAL FBI INFORMED JMWAVE THAT THEIR HQS HAD CANCELLED ALL PLANS FOR AMCLEVE-15 PARTICIPATION REF OPERATION. SAID OPERATION NOT BEING PURSUED DUE LEGAL PROBLEMS WHICH THEY ENVISIONED MAY ~~A~~RISE.

SECRET

BT

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 11 JULY 67

FILE CLASS:

OUT:

TO INFO CITE

SECRET CITE JMWAVE 8158

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMCLEVE/15

REF: DIRECTOR [illegible]

1. AMCLEVE/15 AMICABLY TERMINATED EFFECTIVE 11 JULY 1967. WILL BE PAID BONUS EQUIVALENT TWO MONTHS SALARY.

2. DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

Request JMWAVE terminate AMCLEVE/15 as Hqs desire is to disassociate from AMCLEVE/15 and have [illegible]/Justice assume direction.

5
4
3
2
1

Donald V. [illegible]
[illegible] Officer
RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Mark F. [illegible]
[illegible]

DIR 15805 (para 3)
Justice Department has suggested possibility use AMCLEV/15 to assist Rosenthal obtain additional material as basis for arrest of Rosenthal for having possession of such materials.

JMWAVE 7953 (para 3)
AMCLEVE/15 is currently working with the FBI and following their instructions re Rosenthal (30 June 1967)

DIR 16167
Headquarters will propose to Justice Department that any further questions arising locally be discussed directly between FBI and Station Rep. (1 July 1967)

JMWAVE 8039
At their request JMWAVE met with local FBI and Justice Dept. attorney on 6 July to discuss future action AMCLEVE/15 case. JMWAVE position was to agree have AMCLEVE/15 aid in case as much as possible without exposing AMCLEVE/15 or his WOFACT employment.

The following proposal:
Justice Dept. attorney requested AMCLEVE/15 recontact Rosenthal and the meet would be covered by FBI. AMCLEVE/15 would ask Rosenthal for money for down payment on material (c-4 explosives) but nothing would nothing would be furnished at that time. Later AMCLEVE/15 would furnish Rosenthal sufficient amount of explosives to constitute violation. When AMCLEVE/15 and Rosenthal separated , Rosenthal would be arrested.
AMCLEVE/15 was to contact Alberto Larrain-Maestre and exhibit requested silencer which would not be furnished. This contact would also be covered by FBI, but action would be taken by local authorities to avoid possible disclosure as to involvement of AMCLEVE/15 in the matter.

JMWAVE was in process of terminating AMCLEVE/15, but in view of FBI need, he would be retained on payroll until 30 Sept.

DIR 13094 (dated 7 July 67)

Headquarters opposed toa any use being made of AMCLEVE/15 that would involve his appearance as a witness for prosecution.

Headquarters requested JMWAVE terminate AMCLEVE/15 before permit ting his use for prosecution. Ex It was Headquarters desire to disassociate from AMCLEVE/15 and have FBI/Justice Dept. assume direction and responsibility for this criminal case.

JMWAVE 8156 (dated 11 July 67)
Station terminated AMCLEVE/15 effective 11 Jul67.

FORM 4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-300985
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

28/CYART

ACTION C/WH/COG 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/MPS/BG, C/CI

WAVE

S E C R E T 112207Z CITE JMWAVE 8156

11 Jul 67 09470

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMCLEVE/15

REF DIRECTOR 18094

AN	FI
~~DS~~	~~RESP~~
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~

1. AMCLEVE/15 AMICABLY TERMINATED EFFECTIVE 11 JULY 1967. WILL BE PAID BONUS EQUIVALENT TWO MONTHS SALARY.

2. DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-300985
July 1967

TERMINATION AGREEMENT AND QUIT-CLAIM

I, THE UNDERSIGNED Luis Posada--, HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE
(print your name)

THAT I HAVE BEEN RENDERING SERVICES TO AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE GOVERNMENT. I ACKNOWLEDGE FURTHER THAT MY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT IS TERMINATED AS OF THE DATE SET FORTH BELOW. I ACKNOWLEDGE FINALLY THAT I HAVE NO CLAIMS OF ANY KIND AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND DO NOT INTEND TO TENDER ANY CLAIMS NOW AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ARISING OUT OF MY PAST RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES.

DATE 11 July-1967 Luis Posada
(write name longhand)

PLACE Miami-Fla-

WITNESSED Henry L. [illegible]

SECRETO

CONVENIO DE SECRETOS

1. YO, Luis Posada - HE RECIBIDO informaciones confidenciales y secretas sobre asuntos relacionados con mis labores en conexion con mi trabajo para el senor.

2. Juro ante Dios que nunca divulgare a nadie informacion que me ha confiado el senor, o cualquier persona colaborando o trabajando con el senor o informacion de que me entere.

3. Tomo esta obligacion libremente sin reservacion mental ninguna.

Luis Posada
FIRMA

11 July-1967
FECHA Y CIUDAD

TESTIGO

SECRETO

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

11 July 1967

WIO-1502

TO : Chief of Station

THRU : DCOS/E
AC/IO

INFO : Chief, Finance
Chief, Cover
Chief, Security

FROM : IO/3/FLUSTIKOFF

SUBJECT: Proposed Termination Bonus for AMCLEVE/15

Distribution
~~1 - 201-300985~~
1 - C/FIN
1 - C/COV
1 - C/SEC
1 - IO/3 Chrono
1 - Registry

1. Pursuant to discussion with DCOS/E and the writer, JMWAVE plans to terminate AMCLEVE/15 effective 11 July 1967.

2. AMCLEVE/15 began employment with WOFACT during April 1965 and served as an instructor in the Maritime Training Section from July 1965 to 1 August 1966 when he was transferred to the CI Branch. AMCLEVE/15 was used by the CI Branch to report on the activities of RECE, a Miami based Cuban exile group, from 1 August 1966 until above termination date.

3. Approval is requested for a total of $650.00; minus FICA and federal income tax. AMCLEVE/15 will be paid $549.60 net.

APPROVED: __________________
Mark F. EFFIELD

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 20

ORIG: Robert Bladergroen:now
UNIT: OGC
EXT: 7531
DATE: 6 July 1967

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
AM
RK
FI
10
RS
ESEC

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: OGC 2 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR . C/WH/COG 5, C/WH 6
C/CI, C/FI 2, DDP, ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 6 17 57Z CITE DIRECTOR 17267

TO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE-15

REF A. JMWAVE 7953 (IN 02284)

B. DIRECTOR 16467

1. HQS AND JUSTICE CONCUR SUGGESTION REF A, PARA 5. MEETING WITH LOCAL LNERGO MIGHT PROVE HELPFUL ITS INVESTIGATION ROSENTHAL. JUSTICE HAS FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT STATION MIGHT WISH CONTACT MR. WALLACE JOHNSON, LOCAL REP, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION. BELIEVE THIS COULD BE HELPFUL TO DETERMINE NATURE AND EXTENT POSSIBLE WOFACT INVOLVEMENT IF AMCLEVE-15 USED AS WITNESS FOR PROSECUTION HOWEVER LEAVE DECISION RE THIS CONTACT TO STATION. JOHNSON'S OFFICES LOCATED FEDERAL COURT HOUSE.

2. NO OBJECTION IF INVESTIGATIVE AND PROSECUTIVE ASPECTS ROSENTHAL MATTER DISCUSSED AT TRIPARTITE MEETING WITH LOCAL LNERGO AND JUSTICE REPS.

3. PLEASE KEEP HQS ADVISED DETAILS OF DISCUSSIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
3

ACTION
C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI2, OGC2, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 062321Z CITE JMWAVE 8039

6 JUL 67 IN 06052

DIRECTOR

Action CT

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE-15

RE DIRECTOR 16467

1. AT THEIR REQUEST JMWAVE MET WITH LOCAL FBI AND JUSTICE DEPT ATTORNEY ON 6 JULY TO DISCUSS FUTURE ACTION AMCLEVE-15 CASE. JMWAVE POSITION WAS TO AGREE HAVE AMCLEVE-15 AID IN CASE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT EXPOSING PROPOSAL WAS REACHED AND AGREED UPON, SUBJECT TO OUR RESPECTIVE HQS CONCURRENCE.

A. JUSTICE ATTORNEY REQUESTED HAVE AMCLEVE-15 RECONTACT ROSENTHAL FOR MEET. MEET TO BE COVERED BY FBI AND POSSIBLY LOCAL AUTHORITIES. AMCLEVE-15 WILL ASK ROSENTHAL FOR MONEY FOR DOWN PAYMENT ON MATERIAL (C-4 EXPLOSIVES) TO BE FURNISHED, HOWEVER, NOTHING WILL BE FURNISHED AT THIS TIME. SUBSEQUENTLY ROSENTHAL WILL MEET WITH AMCLEVE-15, AT WHICH TIME ONLY SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF EXPLOSIVES WILL BE FURNISHED TO CONSTITUTE VIOLATION, AFTER WHICH ROSENTHAL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM AMCLEVE-15, WILL BE ARRESTED.

B. WITH REFERENCE TO ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE, NARCOTICS

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 8039 S E C R E T SECRET

FUGITIVE, AMCLEVE-15 WILL ATTEMPT TO MAKE CONTACT WITH HIM TO EXHIBIT REQUESTED SILENCER, WHICH WILL NOT BE FURNISHED; THIS MEETING WILL BE COVERED BY BUREAU AGENTS AND FUGITIVE SURVEILLED TO DETERMINE RESIDENCE AND/OR ARREST, WHEN SEPARATED FROM AMCLEVE-15.

C. JUSTICE ATTORNEY CONDITIONS THE ACTION B~~E~~y LOCAL AUTHORITIES ON THE BASIS THAT PROSECUTION WILL BE DISMISSED RATHER THAN RISK ANY POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE AS TO INVOLVMENT OF AMCLEVE-15 IN THIS MATTER.

D. FBI ALERTING AMCLEVE-15 TO MAKE ABOVE CONTACTS FOR FIRST PART OF NEXT WEEK.

2. JMWAVE WAS IN PROCESS OF TERMINATING AMCLEVE-15, BUT IN VIEW FBI NEED IN ABOVE OPERATION HE WILL BE RETAINED ON PAYROLL UNTIL 30 SEPTEMBER.

3. DIRECTOR 17267 JUST RECEIVED. GLAD TO SEE THAT WE ALREADY WERE ON HQS WAVE LENGTH.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY #1 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 052

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2	CI	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION C/WH/COG 5

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR. C/WH 6 C/CI C/FI-2 OGC-2 DDP ADDP

SERVICE

JMWAVE 8039 PARA 1 — **STA & NR**

7 JULY 67 — **DATE**

06052 — **IN NR**

ACTION

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

PORTION OMMITTED

"AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT EXPOSING AMCLEVE-15 OR HIS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT. THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL WAS REACHED AND"

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CA | CI/S
MO / | CI/OS
RR REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
FI
RS | ESC

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI2, OGC 2, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 062321Z CITE JMWAVE 8039

ACTION 6 JUL IN 6052

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE-15

RE DIRECTOR 16467

Cable No 5838
Cable ref 9296 1833 Sig Center CT

1. AT THEIR REQUEST JMWAVE MET WITH LOCAL FBI AND JUSTICE DEPT ATTORNEY ON 6 JULY TO DISCUSS FUTURE ACTION AMCLEVE-15 CASE. JMWAVE POSITION WAS TO AGREE HAVE AMCLEVE-15 AID IN CASE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT EXPOSING ** PROPOSAL WAS REACHED AND AGREED UPON, SUBJECT TO OUR RESPECTIVE HQS CONCURRENCE.

A. JUSTICE ATTORNEY REQUESTED HAVE AMCLEVE-15 RECONTACT ROSENTHAL FOR MEET. MEET TO BE COVERED BY FBI AND POSSIBLY LOCAL AUTHORITIES. AMCLEVE-15 WILL ASK ROSENTHAL FOR MONEY FOR DOWN PAYMENT ON MATERIAL (C-4 EXPLOSIVES) TO BE FURNISHED, HOWEVER, NOTHING WILL BE FURNISHED AT THIS TIME. SUBSEQUENTLY ROSENTHAL WILL MEET WITH AMCLEVE-15, AT WHICH TIME ONLY SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF EXPLOSIVES WILL BE FURNISHED TO CONSTITUTE VIOLATION, AFTER WHICH ROSENTHAL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM AMCLEVE-15, WILL BE ARRESTED.

Source?

B. WITH REFERENCE TO ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE, NARCOTICS

SECRET

** PORTION OMITTED. Sentence should read: JMWAVE POSITION WASTO AGREE HAVE AMCLEVE-15 AID IN CASE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT EXPOSING AMCLEVE-15 OR HIS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT. THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL ....

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 8039 S E C R E T SECRET

FUGITIVE, AMCLEVE-15 WILL ATTEMPT TO MAKE CONTACT WITH HIM TO EXHIBIT REQUESTED SILENCER, WHICH WILL NOT BE FURNISHED; THIS MEETING WILL BE COVERED BY BUREAU AGENTS AND FUGITIVE SURVEILLED TO DETERMINE RESIDENCE AND/OR ARREST, WHEN SEPARATED FROM AMCLEVE-15.

C. JUSTICE ATTORNEY CONDITIONS THE ACTION BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES ON THE BASIS THAT PROSECUTION WILL BE DISMISSED RATHER THAN RISK ANY POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE AS TO INVOLVMENT OF AMCLEVE-15 IN THIS MATTER.

D. FBI ALERTING AMCLEVE-15 TO MAKE ABOVE CONTACTS FOR FIRST PART OF NEXT WEEK.

2. JMWAVE WAS IN PROCESS OF TERMINATING AMCLEVE-15, BUT IN VIEW FBI NEED IN ABOVE OPERATION HE WILL BE RETAINED ON PAYROLL UNTIL 30 SEPTEMBER.

Harry — why not on FBI payroll? T

3. DIRECTOR 17267 JUST RECEIVED. GLAD TO SEE THAT WE ALREADY WERE ON HQS WAVE LENGTH.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

CBJ
ORIG: C. TRETTIN:jaf
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 5106
DATE: 1 JULY 67

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	MO	FOS
2	RR	PT
3		
4		
5		

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ____ # ____
CONF: C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO RS BRANCH LCE FI RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR . C/WH 6, OGC 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, DDP, ADDP

SECRET
(classification)

(date and time filed)

(elite) (pica)
(reference number)

1 1650Z

CITE DIRECTOR 16467

TO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE-15

REF: JMWAVE 7953 (IN 02254)

APPRECIATE REF PROMPT RESPONSE. HQS WILL PROPOSE TO JUSTICE DEPT THAT ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS ARISING LOCALLY BE DISCUSSED DIRECTLY BETWEEN FBI AND STATION REP. WILL ADVISE JMWAVE OF JUSTICE RESPONSE.

END OF MESSAGE

DC/WH/COG/CICS CB Williams
OGC(R. BLADERGROEN IN DRAFT)

by J. D. Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

Earl J. Williamson
EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

FID FILES REVIEWED 15 October 1969. Contained following info:

PICO Ramon, Reinaldo name contained in list of cubans traveling to Latin America in document dated 12 Sept. 1967. PICO had requested visa to travel to Honduras.from Guatemala. 15 day Honduran business visa authorized 30 August 1967.

OTHER TRAVEL NOTED IN FILE:

Travel FR/To	Message sent FR/to	Message Date
U.S./Brazil	Miami/Rio	14 August 1965
REMARKS: Visa REquested		
Chile/Venesuela	Caracas/San Juan	9 February 1965
REMARKS: 15 day tourist visa authorized provided he has reentry visa or visa to continue to another country.		
Vene.Chile	Santiago/Caracas	21 Jan. 1965
REMARKS: 15 day temporary resident visa authorized. He is a delegate to Executive Council of Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions to be held in Santiago first two weeks in February.		
U.S./Venezuela	x~~Miami~~ Caracas/ Miami	14 Oct. 1964
REMARKS: 10 day tourist visa authorized at request ofXXXXXXXXXXXX Confederaction Latino Americana de Sindicalistas Christianas provided bhey have re-entry or continuation visas.		
U.S./Dom. Rep.	Santo Dom/Miami	1 Aug 1964
Dominican Visa Authorized.		
U.S./Venezuela	Miami/Caracas	14 Jul 1964
REMARKS: 15 Day tourist visa authorized provided he has re-entry in into U.S. at request of Latin American Christian Trade Union Confederate.		

Travel Fr. To.	Message Sent FR/To	Message Date:
U.S./Venezuela	Caracas/Miami	10 March 1964
REMARKS: 1 Week tourist visa provided he has reentry to U.S.		
U.S./Venexuela	Caracas/Miami	2 March 1967
REMARKS 30 day tourist visa is authroized at the request of La Confederacion de Trabajodores de Venezuela.		

Helen H. Stilson
15 Oct. 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

10 **SECRET** (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
CSDO

BY D AT 0025 Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION
CAS ☐ RID COPY
412

INFO
FILE VR RI/AN CSDO CA/PEG WH8 CI/OA

SECRET 162245Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3820

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

16 Oct 69 IN 67171

DTDORIC JMDEVEL

REF: DIRECTOR 46526

1. FIELD TRACES FIVE NO NEW INFORMATION SAVE FOR LOCAL ADDRESS AND TOUTED MEDIA CONNECTION PER WH/MIAMI 4639 (IN 05005); OTHER GENERAL, NONDEROGATORY TIDBITS.

2. REGRET DELAY DETERMINING AMICE-31 CURRENT STATUS REGARDING CLASC. PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN LOCATING HIM FIRST THROUGH AMCLEVE-15, BOTH BEING MUTUAL FRIENDS, TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ACCESS AND STATUS CLASC AFFAIRS MERITING STATION DIRECT FOLLOW-UP. SUBJECT REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN CHURCH FUND RAISING WORK AND SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME AWAY FROM HOME. WILL ADVISE SOONEST BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES AMCLEVE-15 HAS HAD MERELY IN REACHING SUBJECT SINCE RECEIPT HVCW-8792, HAVE DOUBTS ON PROSPECTS FOR MISSION.

3. FILE: 201-284658, X-REF: 200-124-192/3.

SECRET

SECRET

ORIG: Barbara Bowen
UNIT: CA/B4
EXT: 6552
DATE: 15 October 1969

DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES (18)

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS
1
2
3
4

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 33 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: CAS | INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, CA/PEG, WH 8, C/CA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 46526

TO PRIORITY [illegible] CARACAS 15 20 02Z OCT 69

DYDORIC JEDEVIL

REF A: HVCW-3792

REF B: DIR-42602

1. IN VIEW IMMINENCE QUITO MEETING CITED REF A, AND PROVIDED CARACAS DECISION IS AFFIRMATIVE ON FEASIBILITY OF HANDLING AMICE-31 (PER PARA 3 [illegible] REF A) [illegible] REQUEST PRIORITY FIELD TRACES TO UPDATE A-31'S OA AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. FILE: 200-124-192/3.

C/CA/B4
WH/3/V
WH/CA

3
4
3
2
1

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CA/B4 H. Stilson	3 D 0119	EXTENSION 1254	NO. DATE 30 September 1969

TO (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. FI/D 7 B 44 Tube ES-1		7 OCT 1969	all	
2. CI/OA	15 -	16 OCT 69		– Prev. green list was "operational." —
3. CA/B4 3 D 0119 Tube EW-4 ~~H. Stilson~~				2-3: to attention in your file.
4.				
5.				
6. Detta				rbs file
7.				Rico's 201
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

US/Venezuela   Caracas   2 Mar 67
Miami

30 day transit Visa in [illegible] at the request of La Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela

Travel From-To   Message Sent/To   Msg Date

Remarks

SECRET

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE) PICO Ramon, Reinaldo [illegible]	**REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK** DATE 30 Sep. 1969
2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC. /	TO CHIEF, FI/D
3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 21 July 1933, Regla, Havana	ORIGINATING OFFICER NAME Helen H. Stilson OFFICE DESIGNATOR CA/B4 ROOM, BUILDING 3 D 0119 EXTENSION R1254
4. CITIZENSHIP Cuban	
5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION Correspondent - Carcas Daily "EXCELSIOR"	13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE) ☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED ☐ ADDITIONAL DATA ☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT
6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION Journalist	14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE) ☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY ☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE ☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Former Chief CTC Youth Bureau Officer in National Transport Federation	Cuba	

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

Member 26 July Movement later fought clandestinely against Castro in Cuba.

9. DESCRIPTION	(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
	5'7"	155	Brown	Black	Latin	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

Carmen

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

Father: Regino PICO; Mother: Maria de la Poz PICO

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

Please check for all available information.

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

7 OCT 1969
DATE

TO: H Stilson

FROM: F I/D

Results noted, in dossier
in [illegible]

A. ☒ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

ORIG: Barbara Bowen
UNIT: CA/B4
EXT: 6952
DATE: 15 October 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES (18)

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2
3
4

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 33 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: CAS
FILE, VR. RI/AN, CA/PEG, WH 8, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

TO PRIORITY CARACAS 15 20 02 z OCT 69 CITE DIRECTOR 46526

DTDORIC ~~JMDEVIL~~

REF A: HVCW-8792

REF B: DIR 42602

1. IN VIEW IMMINENCE QUITO MEETING CITED REF A, AND PROVIDED CARACAS DECISION IS AFFIRMATIVE ON FEASIBILITY OF HANDLING AMICE-31 (PER PARA 3 [illegible] REF A) REQUEST PRIORITY ~~FIELD~~ TRACES TO UPDATE A-31'S OA AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. FILE: 200-124-192/3.

C/CA/B4
WH/3/V
WH/CA

C/[illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/[illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

[illegible]

[illegible] 66

5831

AMICE-31

PICO Ramon, Reinaldo 201-284658 C-85445

WU

DPOB: 21 July 33, Regla, Havana

POA req 3 Jun 64 - WAVE 7146 - CA ops.

WH/SA/EOB/PA-PROP (Ott) DL-11 June 64

FLUTTERED ON [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 1964

PRQ Part I	PRQ Part II
UFGA-19701 3 Feb 65	UFGA-19701 3 Feb 65

P. O. A. granted

POA EXTENDED UNTIL 26 April 1965 Date 15 June '64

POA CANCELLED [illegible] 15 Jan 65 [illegible] Field Advised

---

TO : [illegible]

DATE. 17 Sept 65

FROM : [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible] - 31 [illegible]

[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

INDEX ☐ YES ☑ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM Jmwave

ACTION CA/04

INFO VR. FILE, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/OA, WE 6, WH/SA 8, DDP, WH 7, FI

SECRET

31

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

BY ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 252180Z

DIR INFO SAGO PALP CITE WAVE 7479

QRSNIPE PBRUMEN

REF DIR 79563

25 JAN 65 IN 66739

AN		PS	
		FI	DESTROY
ABSTRACT	✓	INDEX	

1. DETAILS AMICE-31 RECRUITMENT AND PRQ DATA BEING FORWARDED UFGA 19590. ASSESSMENT FAVORABLE AND SUBJ RESPONSIVE REF OP.

2. PLAN HANNDLE A-31 INITIAL PERIOD PRIMARILY THROUGH AMICE-3 AND AMOT-20, AMICE OFFICIALS. IF A-31 GETS ONE OF REF TARGET POSITIONS, PROPOSE UNILATERAL HANDLING BY KUBARKER AND GRADUAL SEPARATION FROM AMICE EXCEPT NOMINAL COVER TIES.

3. A-31 LEFT 22 JAN PRIOR RECEIPT REF. DUE IMPORTANCE TARGET GUIDANCE (ESPECIALLY SINCE PRESS AND PROPAGANDA DEPT JOB ONE HE MOST LIKELY BE OFFERED AND ACCEPT DUE PAST AMICE/CLASC DEALINGS); BONGIRNO WILL CONTACT A-31 CARA WHERE LATTER STOPPING EN ROUTE SAGO DISCUSS CIV SHIPPING BOYCOTT. BONGIRNO WILL PASS REF INSTRUCTIONS ON PRETEXT PROP JOB NOT PRODUCTIVE OR INFLUENTIAL.

S E C R E T

CFN

RI COPY

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 35

SECRET

ROUTING
RI

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG William Brown/scr
UNIT CA/B4
EXT 6761
DATE 22 January 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-284658

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☒ FILE RID

TO JMWAVE SANTIAGO PARIS/LCPIPIT

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4 INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, WH 7, DDP, WH/SA 8, WE 6, C/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

RI COPY

TO WAVE INFO SAGO PALP CITE DIR 79561

QRSNIPE PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 79560

AN	C	RS		
		FI		~~DESTROY~~
ABSTRACT		X	INDEX	

IDEN: ENRIQUE VILLARREA (CUBAN)

END OF MESSAGE

WE/PO/D

WESA/MB J Ott coordinated in draft

DC/WH/SA

C/CA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER RI COPY AUTHENTICATING

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 34

46 SECRET

ROUTING R1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : William Brown/scr
UNIT : CA/B4
EXT : 6761
DATE : 22 January 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-284658

22 JAN 65 .. 33 z

TO JMWAVE SANTIAGO PARIS/LCPIPIT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4

INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, WH 7, DDP, WH/SA 8, WE 6, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

TO WAVE INFO: SAGO PALP CITE DIR 9560

QRSNIPS PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 7250 (IN 62274) NOT SENT PALP

1. AGREE IN PRINCIPLE OPS USE AMICE-31 PER REF. REQUEST ASSESSMENT A-31, METHOD OF HANDLING, AND DEGREE HE RESPONSIVE. POA NOW BEING REINSTATED AND REQUEST STA FORWARD PRQ 1 AND 11 SOONEST.

2. IN VIEW NATURE CLASC EXEC MTG DO NOT EXPECT A-31 TO BE IN POSITION INFLUENCE THIS EVENT. FUTURE VALUE WILL DEPEND ON CLASC POSITION OBTAINED. SUGGEST FOLLOWING CLASC TARGETS AS KEY SECTORS FOR PENETRATION: TREASURY DEPARTMENT HEADED BY DI PACCE; OFFICE OF SEC GEN MASPERO; OFFICE OF PRES GOLDSACK. FYI SAGO NOW HAS PENETRATION IN CLASC HQS PRESS AND PROPAGANDA DEPT THROUGH FUBIAS-7 (IDEN) AND DO NOT WISH DUPLICATE THIS CHANNEL. DEFER TO SAGO FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENTS A-31 USE.

3. IN A-31 BRIEFINGS DO NOT INDICATE SCOPE KUBARK INTEREST AND PROGRAMS RE CLASC.

4. REQUEST A-31 DEBRIEFING SAGO MTG. BE FORWARDED WHEN OBTAINED.

END OF MESSAGE

MOB	~~INT~~	SS	SB
	~~JOS~~	PERS	AR
~~PRS~~	RPTH	LOG	CA
~~CI~~	SL	EF	EH
		SEC	BS

WH/PO/B ____________

WHSA/MB J Ott coordinated in draft

DC/WH/SA ____________
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET

C/CA ____________
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM 34

ORIG William Brown/scr
UNIT CA/B4
EXT 6761
DATE 22 January 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO 201-284658

46 SECRET

R ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO JMWAVE SANTIAGO PARIS/LCPIPIT

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4

INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, WH 7, DDP, WH/SA 8, WE 6, C/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

TO WAVE

INFO SAGO PALP

CITE DIR 79561

QRSHIPS PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 79560

IDEN: ENRIQUE VILLARREA (CUBAN)

MOB	INT	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
EOB	RPTS	LOA	CA
CI	SI	[illegible]	[illegible]
		[illegible]	[illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

WH/PO/B ______________

WHSA/MO J Ott coordinated in draft

DC/WH/SA ______________
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

C/CA ______________
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/SA/IOS - W. Ullery

NUMBER
201 - 284658

SUBJECT
PICO Ramon, Reinaldo

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
22 January 1965 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA reinstated until 26 April 1965 to allow for submission of PRQ Part I and PRQ Part II on Subject per WH/SA/IOS request of 22 January 1965.

201-284658

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	26 January 1965

22 January 1965

~~MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA~~

SUBJECT: Reinaldo PICO Ramon
201-284658
C-85445

Please reinstate Subject's POA for 60 days. A PRQ Part I and II was requested from the Field on 22 January 1965 via cable.

John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WH(SA)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/SA/IOS
1 - 201-284658

201-284658

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

44 **SECRET**

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION CA/04

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, WH/SA 8, DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 182223Z

DIR INFO SAGO CITE WAVE 7251

19 JAN 65 IN 62266

DTDORIC ZRGAMIN PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 7250 (IN 62274)

IDEN: REINALDO (PICO) RAMON.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-284
X-REF TO FILE NO 200-124-5-1/49
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH
DESTROY ☐ SIG. William

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
CA/O 4

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE, WH/SA 8, DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, Z/AN, CI/IC 2

INDEXED AND ... COPIES
x of MATCHED N R

1P

S E C R E T 182223Z

19 JAN 65 IN 62274

DIR INFO SAGO CITE WAVE 7250

DTDORIC ZRGAMIN ~~PBRUMEN~~

MICROFILMED
FEB 11 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN		PS	
			FI
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX	

REF DIR 76863 *

1. PAST SEVERAL MONTHS CLASC PROMISING HIRE AMICERS AFTER SOLUTION BUDGETARY PROBLEMS PRESUMALBY AT NEXT EXEC COMMITTEE MEETING. CLASC ALSO INDICATED CERTAIN AMICERS INCLUDING IDEN (ASSIGNED AMICE-31) WELCOME ABOARD NOW IN ANTICIPATION SALARY FUNDS WITHIN FEW MONTHS.

2. PLAN HAVE A-31 ACCEPT OFFER AND ALSO PERSONAL INVITATION ATTEND CLASC EXEC COMMITTEE MEETING SAGO. A-13 WILL BE INSTRUCTED PENETRATE CLASC FOR JOINT AMICE/KUBARK PURPOSES:

A. REPORT DETAILS CLASC STRUCTURE, BIODATA AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS KEY PERSONNEL.

B. ASSESS EXTENT SUCCESS COMMUNIST FAR LEFTIST ATTEMPTS TURN CLASC AGAINST U.S. THEREBY UNDERMINING HEMISPHERIC ANTI-CASTRO SOLIDARITY.

C. MANEUVER INTO POSITION SPOT AND EXPOSE OR NEGATE ADVERSE INFLUENCES AND BRING CLASC MORE IN LINE MUTUAL GOALS.

3. A-31 ETD 21 JAN. INDEX.

* RE OP TO UNDERMINE MASPERO STATURE IN CLASC, AND THUS SET STAGE FOR HIS REPLACEMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

201-284 ...

D-200-124 ...

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 15 January 1965 jb

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WH/SA/IOS

ATTENTION: Wendell Ullery

C# 201 - 284658

The file on PICO Ramon, Reinaldo is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

WAVE 7146

60 day reinstatement requested on 22 Jan 65

201-284658

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

FORM 12-63 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

[illegible]

(9)

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

X

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

TYPIC/AMSAFE
Request for HQ Intercession to Facilitate Entry of Identity A

AR: See Paragraph below

1. Identity A, who is the mother of AMICE/31, a Station asset, has been twice denied permission to enter the United States as a refugee from Cuba. The local ODURGE office has stated that Identity A has been placed on a denied admissions list because of information supplied by ODACID.

2. According to AMICE/31, Identity A applied for admission to the United States with her daughters, Identities B and C. Identities B and C received the necessary authorization on 24 February 1966 from the Swiss Embassy and arrived in the United States by air on 28 February.

3. Identity A was the wife of Identity D, a member of the Cuban Communist Party for some twenty years, at the time of her first application to leave Cuba. Identity D died in October of 1965 and according to AMICE/31 lost his Communist Party membership card about a year prior to his death. According to AMICE/31, Identity A has never joined or been a member of the Communist Party although there is a possibility that her husband may have placed her name on the membership lists. AMICE/31 also stated that she has long been a practicing Catholic and that she is very anti-Communist. Sent as separate cover attachments are two statements from the Bishop of Cienfuegos and the Assistant Bishop of Havana testifying to her good character and to her standing as a practicing Catholic.

- Continued -

Attachments:
1. Identities, USC
2. Letters, USC

Distribution:
3 - WH/C w/atts USC

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

S E C R E T

UFGA 2-861

4. It is requested that Headquarters contact the appropriate ODACID and ODURGE officials for the purpose of removing Identity A's name from the denied admissions list since her close connection with a member of the Cuban Communist Party, which presumably was the basis of the derogatory information, is no longer a fact.

Philip G. ELMARD

A. Maria de la Paz RAMON Rodriguez de PICO
Calle Fomento No. 506 Rpto Palatino, Cerro
Havana, Cuba
DOB: 14 Nov. 1912
POB Lima, Peru
Peruvian citizen

B. Reyes Pico Valiente
C. Sonia Pico Ramon
D Milagros Pico Ramon

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMICE/31

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA-19701

Subject was granted an OA on 4 February 1966.

HOWARD R. COLLEARY

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - JMWAVE

201-284658

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-5818 HS COPY

DATE
[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-284658

1 - WH/C/RR/OS
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - 201-284658

RL

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT.
WH/C/RR/OS	W.J. Ellery	jln	9 Feb. 66	7646

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/RR/OS	9 Feb 66	J. Houghton
WH/C/CA/PP		S. Chacone
WH/C/MO		R. Ortman (draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WHD/C		John [illegible]

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WE

INFO
Chief, WH/SA

FROM
COS, Brussels

SUBJECT
Cuban Travel

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: OBBT-2238, 4 August 1965

Attached is Cuban travel information received from NIGALE during August.

Diana G. WIGZELL

Attachment: As stated above

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WE (w/att)
1 - Chief, WH/SA (w/o att)
2 - Brussels (w/o att)

PROCESSED
BY FOD

201-284658

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OBBT-2275

DATE
3 September 1965

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

HQS FILE NUMBER
FF-5231



AMBASSADE DE BELGIQUE A SANTIAGO DU CHILI
VAN BELGIE TE
de Bélgica a

N°

Modèle 18

BULLETIN DE RENSEIGNEMENTS
POUR L'OBTENTION D'UN VISA DE PASSEPORT

STAAT VAN INLICHTINGEN
TOT HET BEKOMEN VAN EEN PASPOORTVISUM

FORMULARIO DE INFORMES
PARA OBTENER LA VISACION DE UN PASAPORTE

Annexes
Bijlagen
Anejos

Identite de la personne qui sollicite le visa : (Grands Caractères)
Identiteit van de persoon die het visum aanvraagt : (Blokletters)
Identidad del (de la) solicitante (letra de imprenta)

BELG 2412

Nature et durée du visa / **Aard en duur van het visum** / Naturaleza y duración de la visación:

Nom (1) / **Naam** / Apellido: PICO RAMON

Prénoms / **Voornamen** / Nombres: Reinaldo

Lieu et date de naissance / **Plaats en datum van geboorte** / Lugar y fecha de nacimiento: La Havane, Cuba, 21-7-1933

Nationalité d'origine / **Oorspronkelijke nationaliteit** / Nacionalidad de origen: cubaine

Nationalité actuelle / **Huidige nationaliteit** / Nacionalidad actual: cubaine

Etat civil (célibatoire, marié, veuf, divorcé) / **Burgerlijke staat (ongehuwd, gehuwd, weduwnaar, weduwe, gescheiden)** / Estado civil (soltero, casado, viudo, divorciado): célibataire

Nom du père / **Naam van de vader** / Nombre del padre: Regino PICO

né à / **geboren te** / nacido en: La Havane, *le* / **de** / el: 17-7-1909

Nom de la mère / **Naam van de moeder** / Nombre y apellido de la madre: Maria de la Paz RAMON

née à / **geboren te** / nacida en: Lima, Pérou, *le* / **de** / el: 14-11-1912

Voyage-t-il (elle) seul(e)? / **Reist hij (zij) alleen?** / Viaja solo(a)?: oui

Identité du conjoint : (Grands Caractères)
Identiteit van de echtgenoot of echtgenote : (Blokletters)
Identidad del conyuge (letra de imprenta)

Nom (1) / **Naam** / Apellido:

Prénoms / **Voornamen** / Nombres:

Lieu et date de naissance / **Plaats en datum van geboorte** / Lugar y fecha de nacimiento:

Nationalité d'origine / **Oorspronkelijke nationaliteit** / Nacionalidad de origen:

Nationalité actuelle / **Huidige nationaliteit** / Nacionalidad actual:

Date de mariage / **Datum van het huwelijk** / Fecha en que contrajo matrimonio:

Epoux ou épouse, veuf ou veuve, divorcé ou divorcée de
Echtgenoot of echtgenote of weduwe weduwnaar gescheiden van
Casado o casada con, viudo o viuda, divorciado o divorciada de

Nom du père / **Naam van de vader** / Nombre del padre:

né à / **geboren te** / nacido en: *le* / **de** / el:

Nom de la mère / **Naam van de moeder** / Nombre y apellido de la madre:

née à / **geboren te** / nacida en: *le* / **de** / el:

Photographie du conjoint s'il accompagne (A attacher)
Foto van de echtgenoot (de echtgenote) indien hij (zij) medereist (vasthechten)
Reservado para la fotografía del cónyuge si lo acompaña

---

(1) A inscrire en caractères romains. S'il s'agit d'une épouse ou d'une veuve ou d'une divorcée indiquer seulement le nom de jeune fille

(Extract)

Fr 201 - 258658

[illegible]
W[illegible]plaats 1545 S.W. 125t MIAMI, Flor[illegible], E.U.
Res[illegible]

Profession habituelle
Gewoon beroep commerçant
Profesión habitual

Durée du séjour en Belgique
Duur van het verblijf in Belgie 10 jours
Tiempo de permanencia en Bélgica

Motif exact du voyage
Juiste reden van de reis assister au Conseil M[illegible] C.I.S.C.
Finalidad exacta del viaje

Le départ est-il déterminé par une cause politique, raciale ou idéologique?
Vindt het vertrek plaats om politieke, rassenpolitieke of ideologische redenen? non
Es la salida originada por un motivo político, ideológico o racial?

Séjournerez-vous en Belgique comme réfugié politique? Motifs?
Zult U in Belgie verblijven als politiek vluchteling? Redenen? non
Permanecerá en Bélgica en calidad de refugiado político? Indicar los motivos

Avez-vous déjà résidé en Belgique? Quand?
Hebt U reeds in Belgie verbleven? Wanneer?
Ha residido ya Ud en Bélgica? Cuando?

Mode de transport utilisé
Gebruikt vervoermiddel avion
Modo de transporte que se usa

Date d'entrée en Belgique et adresse complète pendant la durée du séjour
Datum van aankomst in Belgie en volledig adres tijdens het verblijf 12 octobre 1965
Fecha de entrada en Bélgica y dirección completa en el tiempo de permanencia en Bélgica
78, Boulevard Poincaré, Bruxelles

Nom, prénoms, adresses complètes des personnes à visiter
Naam, voornamen, volledig adres der te bezoeken personen
Apellido, nombres y dirección completa de las personas que se visitarán
Auguste VANISTENDAEL, 78, Boulevard Poincaré, Bruxelles
Monseigneur J. CARDYN [illegible]

Indication de l'autorité qui a délivré le passeport, date, numéro et durée et validité
Aanduiding der overheid die het paspoort heeft afgeleverd, datum, nummer en geldigheidsduur
Indicar la repartición que ha extendido el pasaporte, fecha, numero y termino de validez
La Havane, Cuba, 18-10-19[illegible].- Nº [illegible]773[illegible]

Prénoms et âge des enfants qui accompagnent
Voornamen en leeftijd der kinderen die medereizen
Nombres y edad de los hijos que lo acompañan

Références (nom et adresse des personnes citées)
Referenties (naam en adres der vermelde personen)
Referencias (nombre y dirección de las personas que cito)
Auguste VANISTENDAEL, Sec. Général de C.I.S.C.
Monseigneur Joseph CARDYN, Assesseur de la J.O.C.

Fait à / **Gedaan te** / Extendido en Santiago-du-Chili *le* / **de** / el 11 août 1965.

(Signature du requérant)
(Handtekening van de aanvrager),
(Firma del solicitante)

Reinaldo Pico

CONSIDÉRATIONS ET AVIS DE L'AGENT DIPLOMATIQUE ET CONSULAIRE
BESCHOUWINGEN EN ADVIES VAN DE DIPLOMATIEKE OF CONSULAIRE AMBTENAAR

A .... *le* ....
Te .... **de** ....

MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE
Ministerie van Justitie

3e Direction Générale
3e Algemene Directie

Administration de la Police des Étrangers
Bestuur der Vreemdelingenpolitie

Nº
Nº

Renvoyé à ....
Teruggezonden naar

Décision
Beslissing

Bruxelles, le .... **19** .
Brussel, de

Au nom du Ministre,
Namens de Minister,
Pour l'Administration de la Police des Étrangers
Voor het Bestuur der Vreemdelingenpolitie.

14-00000

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
~~WH/C/RR/OA - W. Ullery~~
WH/C/CA/PP

NUMBER: 201- 284658

SUBJECT: AMICE/31

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
cra

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Subject's POA is herewith extended until 30 September 1965 to allow additional time for the completion of the OA investigation.

File

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Edward P. Brown

201-284658

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	29 June 1965

FORM 1-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE WH 7, DDP, CI/OPS, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CODE

RI COPY

S E C R E T 091736Z

SAGO INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0537

TYPIC MHVIPER

REF SAGO 9006 (IN 30977)

ABSTRACT

9 APR 65 IN 42032

Pico-Ramon

PREPARATORY SAGO TRIP AMICE-31 CABLED WENCESLAO MORENO AMICE COLLECTING FUNDS AMONG CUBAN EXILES FRO CHILEAN EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS AS DONATION PROPER AUTHORITIES THROUGH HIS FEDERATION. MORENO REPLIED WITH GRATITUDE. FUND APPEAL WILL NOTE 24-HOUR WORK STOPPAGE BY CHILEAN PORT WORKERS 24 FEB IN CONNECTION BOYCOTT MOVEMENT. HOPEFULLY AMICE WILL COLLECT SEVERAL HUNDRED DOLLARS WHICH WAVE MAY SUPPLEMENT TO ASSURE GOOD PUBLICITY ON A-31 ARRIVAL SAGO. WILL ADVISE ETA WHEN FIRM.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

201-284658
9 [illegible] 1965

16 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~Chief, CI/OA~~

SUBJECT : AMICE/31
201-284658

Attached herewith are two copies of Subject's PRQ Part I and one copy of a PRQ Part II. An OA is requested.

John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att.
1 - WH/SA/IOS
✓1 - 201-284658

201-284658

SECRET

201 No. 234658

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ~~WH/C/RR/CA / - Wendell Ullery~~
WH/C/CA/PP

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of

AMICE/31, for the purpose specified in your request

dated 16 February 1965.

F4F + file

Ref: UFGA-19701

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 4 February 1966 jab

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

201-284658

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY AT Z

DISSEM BY PER

ACT ON: WH/COG 8

☑ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR [illegible]

SECRET 051543Z JUNE 68 CITE CARACAS 9800

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

5 JUN 68 IN 25149

JMDEVIL AMICE

REF JMWAVE 2626 (IN 24511)

STATION CARACAS ESTIMATES AMICE-31 WOULD REQUIRE $500 PER MONTH PLUS HOUSING AND EDUCATION ALLOWANCES OVER AND ABOVE JMDEVIL OFFER IN ORDER ENABLE HIM LIVE EVEN MODESTLY HERE. ATTEMPTING COVER MONETARY SUPPLEMENT THIS MAGNITUDE COULD BE DIFFICULT. WHILE WE DO HAVE INTEREST IN MONITORING JMDEVIL, IT IS RELATIVELY LOW PRIORITY IN TERMS LOCAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATION WILL TAKE IT ON ONLY IF HQS BELIEVES IT CONSTITUTES OVER-RIDING NATIONAL PRIORITY. PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN COSTS AND COVER CONSIDERATIONS, HOWEVER, IS BALPA.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION
WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI

OUTGOING ... DISSEMINATED BY
OPS
SA COG REG

SECRET 042028Z JUN 68 CITE JMWAVE 2626 4 Jun 68 IN 24511

CARACAS DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

JMDEVIL AMICE

1. DURING NINTH CONGRESS IN SANTO DOMINGO EMILIO MASPERO RENEWED AN OFFER TO AMICE-31 OF A POSITION IN THE CLASC OFFICES IN CARACAS AT A SALARY OF $400 PER MONTH AND ONE WAY AIR FARE. AMICE-31 TOLD MASPERO THAT SALARY WAS NOT ENOUGH IN VIEW HIGH COST OF LIVING IN CARACAS BUT THAT HE WOULD THINK IT OVER AND GIVE ANSWER BY EARLY JUNE.

2. IT IS NOT CLEAR JUST WHAT AMICE-31 FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY WOULD BE BUT THIS SEEMS TO PRESENT WOFIRM AND OPPORTUNITY TO MONITOR CLOSELY CLASC PLANNING AND DAY TO DAY ACTIVITIES. REQUEST ADDEES COMMENT ON OPERATIONAL NEED AND POSSIBILITY OF STATION CARACAS OFFERING AMCIE-31 SOME FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN MOVING FAMILY TO CARACAS AND SOME REGULAR SUPPLEMENTARY INCOME IF AND WHEN HE IN PLACE.

SECRET

BT

FIA

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE SECRET

TOTAL COPIES

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS AMICE-31

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

BY ___ AT ___ Z

DISSEM BY Y PER

ACTION CA ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE CI/PEG, CA/LHT, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC/A, FI, FI/INT 2, CA/LEG 2

S E C R E T 241524Z MAY 68 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 5604

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE, BUENOS AIRES INFO MONTEVIDEO, LA PAZ

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

24 MAY 68 IN 17032

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0663 (IN 15743)

1. STATION INITIATED CONTACT WITH AMICE-31 ON 24 MAY FOR SHORT DEBRIEFING. DUE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS NO ADDITIONAL CONTACT TO BE MADE. AMICE-31 TO PROVIDE COMPLETE DOCUMENTATION FROM CLASC EVENTS ON ARRIVAL JMWAVE 27 MAY.

2. MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT MEETINGS ACCORDING AMICE-31 COORDINATED EFFORT COMMENCING JUNE, WHICH FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO9II$.070), TO DEMAND RELEASE ALL LABOR AND POLITICAL PRISONERS IN LATIN AMERICA. CLASC ALREADY SENT CABLE TO BARRIENTOS IN BOLIVIA DECRYING HIS TREATMENT ORGANIZED LABOR. THESE EFFORTS TO CONTINUE DURING ENTIRE ANNIVERSARY YEAR OF ILO AND PER AMICE-31 COULD WELL BE SOURCE OF DISCOMFORT TO MAJORITY LATIN GOVERNMENTS.

3. SINGLE CENTRAL OF LABOR DISCUSSED AT MEETINGS BUT NOT YET FIRMED UP. PERMANENT COMMITTEE FOR CENTRAL TO BE ESTABLISHED, PROBABLY IN CARACAS WITH PRATAS OF URUGUAY AS

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
(When Filled In)

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY______ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY______PER ______ #

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

☐ R.I. COPY

INFO

FILE, VR

PAGE 2 SANTO DOMINGO 5604 SECRET

HEAD. MASPERO LIKELY TO BE NAMED AS SECRETARY GENERAL FOR COMMITTEE. AMICE-31 SAID THAT INCLUSION COMMUNISTS IN CENTRAL NOT BROACHED AND HE DOES NOT BELIEVE IT LIKELY IN LIGHT STRONG ATTACK MADE BY MASPERO AGAINST COMMUNISTS DURING SESSIONS. AT ANY RATE, EMPLEMENTATION THIS CONCEPT DOES NOT APPEAR IMMINENT.

4. AMICE-31 COMMENTED THAT MOST OUTSPOKEN OPPONENTS OF U.S. DURING GATHERINGS HAVE BEEN RAIMUNDO ONGARO OF ARGENTINA AND GALLO OF URUGUAY; HOWEVER, BASIC TENOR ENTIRE GROUP STRONGLY ANTI-US.

5. FOR BUENOS AIRES: POUCHING TAPE 19 MAY TV SHOW IN WHICH ONGARO VIOLENTLY ATTACKED U.S. WHILE PRAISING CUBA.

SECRET

BT

X Being SicD

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

PICO RAMON, REINALDO
201-284658
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
DELEGATE TO IX CLASC COUNCIL CELEBRATED IN
SANTO DOMINGO FROM 13-17 MAY 1968

200-124-052
HDCA-07090
15 MAY 68
P10

R 6806030162

FILE IN 201-284658

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-87 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☑ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-284658

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 8 PER RYBAT

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO COG/PP BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/C1, C/F1 2

S E C R E T 101604Z MAY'68 CITE JMWAVE 2352

PRIORITY SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR

10 MAY 68 IN 08270

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: SANTO DOMINGO 5478 (IN 05810)

AMICE-31 (IDEN) ETA SANTO DOMINGO 1715 HOURS (LOCAL) DOMINICANA FLIGHT NO. 301 ON 11 MAY.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER RyPAT

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ ~~RID COPY~~

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 101605Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2353

PRIORITY SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR

10 MAY 68 IN 08272

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 2352 (IN 08270)

IDEN: REINALDO PICO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY 21 PER RYBAT

ACTION C/WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO FILE VR. C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/CA-3

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 0721042 MAY 68 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 5478

7 MAY 68 IN 05810

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

PERUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REF: A. SANTO DOMINGO 5659 (IN 59355)

B. JMWAVE 2310 (IN 50038)

1. INSTRUCT AMICE/31 CALL 94141 EXTENTION 332 AND ASK FOR JOSE. MEETING TO TAKE PLACE ONE HOUR BEFORE TIME MENTIONED ON TELEPHONE AT INTERSECTION GEORGE WASHINGTON AVENUE, WHICH PARALLELS SEA, AND PALO HINCADO. LARGE OBELISK IN MIDDLE GEORGE WASHINGTON AT THIS INTERSECTION. CASE OFFICER TO PICK UP AMICE/31 IN FADED MAROON AMERICAN RAMBLER WITH PRIVATE PLATES. HAVE AMICE/31 CARRY COPY "EL CARIBE", LOCAL MORNING DAILY, IN LEFT HAND.

2. PLS PROVIDE IDENTITY AMICE/31.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

BY ____ AT ____ Z

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

DISSEM BY 3 PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE. VR WH 8 CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, CAS, CA/PROP.

S E C R E T 262217Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2509

IN-05035

7 MAY 68

SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR, CARACAS

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 1346 (IN 55924)

1. AMICE-31 REPORTS THAT FOLLOWING CUBAN EXILES INVITED ATTEND NINTH CLASC CONSEJO IN SANTO DOMINGO:

REINALDO PICO-SECRETARY GENERAL OF CLASC AFFILIATE ORGANIZACION REVOLUCIONARIA DE TRANSPORTE (ORT) AND ALSO REPRESENTING MIAMI-BASED SOLIDARIDAD DE TRABAJADORES CUBANOS (STC). OFFICIAL DELEGATE WITH RIGHT TO FULL PARTICIPATION AND VOTE.

NELSON (DIAZ) FERNANDEZ-SECRETARY GENERAL OF STC. OFFICIAL DELEGATE WITH RIGHT TO FULL PARTICIPATION AND VOTE.

JUAN A. WOODS-FORMER REPRESENTATIVE OF JUVENTUD OBRERA CATOLICA (JOC) NOW RESIDING NEW YORK. FULL PARTICIPATION AND VOTE.

ALBERTO CAO-FORMER JOC MEMBER NOW RESIDING SANTO DOMINGO. TO ATTEND AS FRATERNAL DELEGATE ONLY. NO VOTE.

RAMON (GARCIA) TOME--FORMER JOC MEMBER NOW RESIDING PUERTO RICO. NO VOTE.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE-2 JMWAVE 2309 SECRET

LAZARO MIRANDA-FORMER JOC MEMBER NOW RESIDING NEW YORK. NO VOTE.

EDUARDO (GARCIA) MAURE-ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL OF CLASC. RIGHT HAND MAN OF EMILIO MASPERO.

CARLOS MORIS-MEMBER OF CLASC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

JOSE DE JESUS PLANAS-MEMBER OF CLASC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. CLASC DIRECTOR OF WORKER EDUCATION.

2. THE THREE MEMBERS OF CLASC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WILL HAVE RIGHT TO FULL PARTICIPATION BUT NO VOTE. AMICE-31 SAYS THAT GARCIA AND MORIS ARE UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTERS OF EMILIO MASPERO BUT THAT PLANAS WILL LIKELY REMAIN ALOOF FROM DEBATE. AMICE-31 REPORTS THAT OTHER CUBANS AMONG DELEGATES TEND TO BE ANTI-MASPERO AND THAT THEIR BASIC ORIENTATION IS ANTI-CASTRO AND ANTI-COMMUNIST. THEIR MAIN CONCERN WILL BE THAT CUBAN EXILES ARE NOT UNDERCUT BY ANY CLASC DEAL WITH LA COMMUNIST UNIONS.

3. AMICE-31 FURTHER REPORTS THAT ALL OF THE ABOVE NAMED CUBANS WILL CAUCUS IN SANTO DOMINGO IN EFFORT FIND COMMON BASIS FOR PRESENTING PROGRAM TO CLASC ON BEHALF ALL

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE. VR.

PAGE-2 JMWAVE 2329 S E C R E T

CUBAN EXILES. THIS TO INCLUDE OPPOSITION TO IDEA OF FRENTE SINDICAL LATIONO AMERICANO. CHAIRMAN OF THE CAUCUS WILL PROBABLY BE PLANAS WHO HIGHLY REGARDED AND RESPECTED BY GARCIA MAURE AND MORIS. AMICE-31 DOUBTS POSSIBILITY OF UNANIMITY BUT THINKS THAT ANTI-MASPERO CUBAN CONTINGENT CAN CARRY THE DAY IN THE CAUCUS. AMICE-31 BELIEVES THAT PICO WILL CONTROL VOTES OF DIAZ AND WOODS AND THAT CAO, GARCIA TOME AND MIRANDA WILL PROBALY GO ALONG WITH THEM. THEY ALSO COUNT ON AT LEAST TACIT SUPPORT FROM PLANAS WHO VERY ANTI-COMMUNIST.

4. JMWAVE STATION TRACES AS FOLLOWS:

ALBERTO CAO-PROBALY IDENTICAL WITH ALBERTO (CAO) HERRERA, CUBAN NEGRO WHO ACCORDING AMBLESS-1 DEBRIEFING REPORT WAS LAST PRESIDENT OF JOC IN CUBA. MEMBER OF CATHOLIC LEFT WHO SELECTED TO GO TO ICFTU CONFERENCE IN VIENNA, JULY 1963. CALLED EXPERT IN YOUTH PROBLEMS AND "NICE PERSON WITH PRINCIPLES AND GOOD FAITH".

NELSON (DIAZ) FERNANDEZ-AMOT REPORT OF JULY 1961 LISTS SUBJECT AS INFORMER AND VOLUNTARY COLLABORATOR WITH CASTRO REGIME. AMRAZZ-1 REPORTS OF JULY 1966 LIST SUBJECT

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR,

PAGE-4 JMWAVE 2309 SECRET

AS MEMBER OF LEFTIST CUBAN EXILE GROUP CALLED "NUEVA GENERACION". SOME AMONG GROUP ARE ANTI-U.S., ACCORDING TO AMICE-31.

LAZARO MIRANDA-WORKED WITH MANUEL ARTIME IN SIERRA MAESTRA ACCORDING TO REPORT DATED MAY 1960. WELL THOUGHT OF BY ARTIME. NO TRACES ON JUAN A. WOODS OR RAMON (GARCIA) TOME.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C

TOTAL COPIES (3)

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

BY ______ AT ______ Z

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 3 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH/COG8 ☒ NO COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, C, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/CA, FI, FI/INT, CAS, CA/PROP, MPS/BG2

S E C R E T 062117Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2310

SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR, CARACAS

7 May 68 IN 05038

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCES: A. JMWAVE 2309 (IN 05035)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 5099 (IN 59355)

1. AMICE-31 WILL ATTEND CLASC CONSEJO BEGINNING 13 MAY IN SANTO DOMINGO. WILL FORWARD ETA WHEN TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS FIRM.

2. IT IS AMICE-31 UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL DELEGATES TO BE HOUSED TOGETHER IN INFA. IF SO, THIS FACT, COUPLED WITH PROBABILITY THAT SEVERAL PBRUMEN EXILES WILL TRAVEL AND STICK TOGETHER (SEE REFERENCE A), MAKES IT DIFFICULT LAY ON CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FROM THIS END. REQUEST THAT SANTO DOMINGO STATION PROVIDE TELEPHONE NUMBER AND NAME BY MEANS WHICH AMICE-31 CAN INITIATE CONTACT. AMICE-31 WILL GIVE HIS NAME SAYING HIS "AMIGO DE MAIRO EN MIAMI". FYI AMICE 31 SPEAKS NO ENGLISH.

3. AMICE 31 BELIEVES THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN EXPLAINING SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR TRAVEL. EACH CLASC AFFILIATE RESPONSIBLE FOR FINANCING DELEGATE TRAVEL AND IN PRACTICE THIS

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE. VR.

PAGE-2 JMWAVE 2310 S E C R E T

MEANS THAT HERE EACH DELEGATE IS MAKING HIS OWN PRIVATE COLLECTION AMONG FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES, AND CONCERNED PBRUMEN EXILES. JMWAVE PLANS TO PROVIDE AMICE-31 WITH $250 TO INCLUDE ROUND TRIP TRAVEL AND ALL EXPENSES.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☐ COPY ☐ BOUNT

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
CA/04

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/OA, WE6, WH/SA8, DDP, WH7, FI

Bill Brown.

Arg Fn.

SECRET 252120Z

25 Jan 65 IN 56739

DIR INFO SAGO PALP CITE WAVE 7479

QRSNIPE PBRUMEN

REF DIR 79560

201-311333
Orestes Ruiz Rios

201-288243
Mario Fontela

1. DETAILS AMICE-31 RECRUITMENT AND PRQ DATA BEING FORWARDED UFGA 19590. ASSESSMENT FAVORABLE AND SUBJ RESPONSIVE REF OP.

2. PLAN HANNDLE A-31 INITIAL PERIOD PRIMARILY THROUGH AMICE-3 AND AMOT-20, AMICE OFFICIALS. IF A-31 GETS ONE OF REF TARGET POSITIONS, PROPOSE UNILATERAL HANDLING BY KUBARKER AND GRADUAL SEPARATION FROM AMICE EXCEPT NOMINAL COVER TIES.

3. A-31 LEFT 22 JAN PRIOR RECEIPT REF. DUE IMPORTANCE TARGET GUIDANCE (ESPECIALLY SINCE PRESS AND PROPAGANDA DEPT JOB ONE HE MOST LIKELY BE OFFERED AND ACCEPT DUE PAST AMICE/CLASC DEALINGS); BONGIRNO WILL CONTACT A-31 CARA WHERE LATTER STOPPING EN ROUTE SAGO DISCUSS CTV SHIPPING BOYCOTT. BONGIRNO WILL PASS REF INSTRUCTIONS ON Pre~~BE~~TEXT PROP JOB NOT PRODUCTIVE OR INFLUENTIAL.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

Pico
201-251658

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Santiago

ACTION WH-8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO YR. FILE, DDP, WH/SA-8, CA-2, [illegible]-2, WE-4, CI, CI/OPS, FI

25 [illegible] IN 66678

S
E C R E T 252222Z

WAVE INFO PALP DIR CITE SAGO 8628

QRSNIPE PBRUMEN

CLASC OFFICES GOLDSACK MASPERO AND DI PACCE ARE SMALL ONE-TWO MAN UNITS USUALLY INCLUDING OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE FEMALE SECRETARY. UNLESS AMICE-31 HAS ACCESS TOP LEVEL CLASC OFFICIALS AND STRONG CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC BACKGROUND SAGO DOUBTS IF HE CAN OBTAIN HIGH LEVEL JOB OR INFLUENCE CLASC EXEC MTG. BELIEVE BEST WAIT UNTIL DEBRIEFING AND SEE WHAT TYPE JOB CLASC OFFERS. SAGO CAN MONITOR A-31 ACTIVITIES SAGO THRU FUBIAS-7. IMPORTANT TO NOTe MASPERO VERY SUSPICIOUS ANY PBRUMEN EXILE CONTACT PAST OR PRESENT WITH ODYOKE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 34

4 SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG William Brown/scr
UNIT CA/34
EXT 6761
DATE 22 January 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-284658

TO JMWAVE SANTIAGO PARIS/LCPIPIT

FROM DIRECTOR

25 JAN 1965

CONF: CA/O 4

INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, WH 7, DDP, WH/SA 8, WE 6, C/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

TO WAVE INFO: SAGO PALP CITE DIR 79561

QRSHIPB PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 79560

IDEN: ENRIQUE VILLARREA (CUBAN)

END OF MESSAGE

WE/PO/B ____________

WHSA/MB J Ott coordinated in draft

201-284658

DC/WH/SA ____________
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CA ____________
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM 34

46 SECRET

ORIG : William Brown/scr
UNIT : CA/B4
EXT : 6761
DATE : 22 January 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-284658

RI

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☒ FILE RID

22 Jan 65 23 33z

TO : JMWAVE SANTIAGO PARIS/LCPIPIT

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : CA/O 4

INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, WH 7, DDP, WH/SA 8, WE 6, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

RI COPY

TO WAVE INFO SAGO PALP CITE DIR

QRSNIPE PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 7250 (IN 62274) NOT SENT PALP

AN	E	PS		6 4 164 DESTROY
ABSTRACT		✗	INDEX	

79560

22 January 1965

1. AGREE IN PRINCIPLE OPS USE AMICE-31 PER REF. REQUEST ASSESSMENT A-31, METHOD OF HANDLING, AND DEGREE HE RESPONSIVE. POA NOW BEING REINSTATED AND REQUEST STA FORWARD PRQ 1 AND 11 SOONEST.

2. IN VIEW NATURE CLASC EXEC MTG DO NOT EXPECT A-31 TO BE IN POSITION INFLUENCE THIS EVENT. FUTURE VALUE WILL DEPEND ON CLASC POSITION OBTAINED. SUGGEST FOLLOWING CLASC TARGETS AS KEY SECTORS FOR PENETRATION: TREASURY DEPARTMENT HEADED BY DI PACCE; OFFICE OF SEC GEN MASPERO; OFFICE OF PRES GOLDSACK. FYI SAGO NOW HAS PENETRATION IN CLASC HQS PRESS AND PROPAGANDA DEPT THROUGH FUBIAS-7 (IDEN) AND DO NOT WISH DUPLICATE THIS CHANNEL. DEFER TO SAGO FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENTS A-31 USE.

3. IN A-31 BRIEFINGS DO NOT INDICATE SCOPE KUBARK INTEREST AND PROGRAMS RE CLASC.

4. REQUEST A-31 DEBRIEFING SAGO MTG. BE FORWARDED WHEN OBTAINED.

RI COPY

RI COPY

RI COPY

END OF MESSAGE

WH/PO/B

WESA/MB J Ott coordinated in draft

201-284658
22 Jan. 65

DC/WH/SA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CA

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RI COPY

FORM 1-64 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(35)

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

47 SECRET

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SA/O 4

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE, WH/SA 8, DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, 2/AN, CI/IC 2

Bill Burch

Ant Fr.

SECRET 182223Z

19 JAN 63 IN 62274

DIR INFO SAGO CITE WAVE 7250

DTDORIC ZRGAMIN PBRUMEN

REF DIR 76863 *

1. PAST SEVERAL MONTHS CLASC PROMISING HIRE AMICERS AFTER SOLUTION BUDGETARY PROBLEMS PRESUMABLY AT NEXT EXEC COMMITTEE MEETING. CLASC ALSO INDICATED CERTAIN AMICERS INCLUDING IDEN (ASSIGNED AMICE-31) WELCOME ABOARD NOW IN ANTICIPATION SALARY FUNDS WITHIN FEW MONTHS.

Bill; Per our discussion, be sure you are convinced this guy is right for job + completely trustworthy. [illegible]

Bill

2. PLAN HAVE A-31 ACCEPT OFFER AND ALSO PERSONAL INVITATION ATTEND CLASC EXEC COMMITTEE MEETING SAGO. A-13 WILL BE INSTRUCTED PENETRATE CLASC FOR JOINT AMICE/KUBARK PURPOSES:

A. REPORT DETAILS CLASC STRUCTURE, BIODATA AND INTER-RELATIONSHIPS KEY PERSONNEL.

3. ASSESS EXTENT SUCCESS COMMUNIST FAR LEFTIST ATTEMPTS TRUN CLASC AGAINST U.S. THEREBY UNDERMINING HEMISPHERIC ANTI-CASTRO SOLIDARITY.

C. MANEUVER INTO POSITION SPOT AND EXPOSE OR NEGATE ADVERSE INFLUENCES AND BRING CLASC MORE IN LINE MUTUAL GOALS.

3. A-31 ETD 21 JAN. INDEX.

* RE OP TO UNDERMINE MASFERO STATURE IN CLASC, AND THUS SET STAGE FOR HIS REPLACEMENT.

SECRET SECRET

201-284655

14-00000

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

49 SECRET	RID ☑ COPY ☐	REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION CA/04

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE, WH/SA 8, DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 182223Z

DIR INFO SAGO CITE WAVE 7251

19 JAN 65 IN 62266

DTDORIC ZRGAMIN PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 7250 (IN 62274)

IDEN: REINALDO (PICO) RAMON.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

According to Official File Subject was Textile Union leader in Cuba when Castro took over - Successfully fought Communist in his Union - Eventually left Cuba - became member of CUBAN forces and was captured during Bay of Pigs - One of Prisoners sent to negotiate for tractor deal in exchange for prisoners - defected during negotiation trip - Used by WAVE in PW - member of FORDC - POA expired 15 Jan because of failure to submit PRQ Part II - Jerry ott having POA Reinstated.

CCB

21 Jan 65

Case Cancelled 15 Jan 65
WH/SA/IOS

Failure to submit Part II

WH/4

GG-1903

1154

201-304653

14-00000

[illegible] 201

SECRET

FROM SANTIAGO

ACTION WH 8

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CI/OPS, CA/O, [illegible], WE 6, DO 4, [illegible]

☐ ☐ ☐

S E C R E T 162204Z

IN 82295

DIR INFO WAVE CARA CITE SAGO 5749

REF: DIR 84546

DYVOUR PBRUMEN MHVIPER PSYCH

1. FUBIAS-7 AND AMICE/31 MADE TRIP TO VALPARAISO 13 FEB TOGETHER WITH GUILLERMO MARTINEZ OF CLASC. THEY ARRANGED WITH WENSELAO MORENO AVILA, VICE PRES ORIT AND SEC GEN CONFEDERACION MARITIMA DE CHILE (COMACH) TO HOLD BOYCOTT AGAINST ENGLISH, FRENCH AND SPANISH SHIPPING ON 24 FEB FOR 24 HR PERIOD IN SOLIDARITY WITH CTV. F-7 AND A-31 ARRANGED WITH EMILIO MASFERO, SEC GEN CLASC, TO APPROVE CLASC RESOLUTION JOINING COMACH IN BOYCOTT AND IN SUPPORT CTV.

2. STATION HAS COPY LETTER FROM MORENO TO CTV, OBTAINED THRU [illegible] OFFERING SUPPORT AND GIVING INFO ON BOYCOTT. SAGO PLANS USE LETTER AS PART MEDIA PROP BEGINNING 21 FEB. F-7 CLAIMS MORENO [illegible] BOYCOTT IN ALL CHILEAN PORTS. COMACH CONTROLS APPROX NINETY PER CENT OF MARITIME WORKERS OF CHILE.

3. STATION PROP ASSETS WILL GIVE MAX COVERAGE ORIT CONGRESS RESOLUTIONS PER PARA 2 REF.

S E C R E T

[redacted]

Bell Brown

SECRET

201 [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

TO SANTIAGO	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1 2 3 4		
ACTION CA/O 4	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED		TIME	BY
INFO	VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA8, WH 7, CI/IC 2, CA 2, WE 6			

E. Aviles

SECRET 122225Z

DIR INFO PALP WAVE BUEN CARA RIOD MEXI LIMA CITE SAGO 8737

DTDORIC ZRGAMIN

REF: SAGO 8707 (IN 77121)

12 FEB 65 IN 79831

1. FUBIAS-7 REPORTS AS OF 11 FEB MASPERO AND ALL EXEC SECS PRESENTED THEIR SPEECHES AND THAT DISCUSSIONS PROPOSED RESOLUTIONS NOW BEGUN ONE BY ONE. NO DISSENSION YET APPARENT AND ACCORDING EDUARDO GARCIA, APPEARS MASPERO TRYING TO APPEASE EVERYONE AND WILLING ACCEPT ALL RECOMMENDATIONS. DUE TO SLOW START MTG WILL EXTEND THRU 17 FEB. APPEARS GENERAL ATMOSPHERE CLOSED BUT MOST PROPOSALS ARE OPEN AND YET TO BE DISCUSSED.

2. F-7 SAID VANISTENDAEL CONVERSATIONS WITH MASPERO HAVE HELPED. VAN TOLD M ALL HIS BAD POINTS AND SAID CORRECT THEM OR AID WOULD CEASE. M ACCEPTED CRITICISM AND PROMISED REFORM.

3. FOR WAVE: AMICE-31 NOT SITTING IN ON CLOSED EXEC COMM MTG, ONLY ALLOWED SPEAK TO EXEC COMM ON RESOLUTION ESTABLISH FRATERNAL RELATIONS A-31 UNION AND CLASC. F-7 SAID MASPERO HAS GIVEN CONSENT TO RESOLUTION AND THINKS HIGHLY A-31. A-31 AND F-7 TRAVELING VALPARAISO WITH CLASC LDRS TO ORGANIZE MARITIME BOYCOTT, APPEARS CLASC WILLING HELP. A-31 ETD NOW 18 FEB.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

Ackerman

TOTAL COPIES [illegible] ☑ COPY ☐ [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, [illegible] CA [illegible], C/WH [illegible], WH/7, SAS 6, CI/IC 2, [illegible], [illegible]

S E C R E T 110153Z

SAGO INFO DIR PALP CITE WAVE 8143

11 FEB 65 IN 78079

TYPIC QRSNIPE

REF SAGO 8703 (IN 77077)

1. WILL DEBRIEF AMICE-31 ON EXEC COMMITTEE MTG WHEN RETURNS WAVE.

2. A-31 SECGEN IDEN GROUP AND HIS REMARKS RE AFFILIATION REFER TO IDEN NOT AMICE.

S E C R E T

* AMICE-31 ASKED FUBIAS-7 FOR CONTACTS IN VALPO TO START STRIKE IN FAVOR PBRUMEN EXILES AND BAN PBRUMEN SHIPPING. SAID HE PLANS STRIKE WORK THRU CNIT.

[illegible]

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, CA 2, CA/O 4, WE 6, WH 7, SOD 6, CI/CA 2,

[illegible]

11 FEB 65 IN 78081

S E C R E T 112:53Z

SAGO INFO DIR PALP CITE WAVE 8141

TYPIC QRSNIPE

REF WAVE 8140 (in 78079)

IDEN: ORGANIZACION REVOLUCIONARIA DE TRANSPORTE (ORT).

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES 7 ☑ COPY ☐

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

WH SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Santiago

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH/SA-5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, CA-2, CA/O-4, WE-6, WH-7, SOD 6, C/CI 2

DO-4, DO/H-3, CI/OA

S E C R E T 092216Z

9 FEB 63 IN 77077

WAVE INFO DIR PALP CITE SAGO 8783

REF: WAVE 8029 (IN 55365) *

TYPIC QRSNIPE

ACCORDING FUBIAS-7, AMICE-31 ARVD SAGO 7 FEB AND STAYING HOTEL RITZ, F-7 SAID MASPERO APPARENTLY SENT CABLE AND INVITED A-31 TO ATTEND CLASC EXEC COMM MTG. A-31 TOLD F-7 HE ASKING FOR FRATERNAL AFFILIATION WITH CLASC AND PLANS TRAVEL LA VISITING VARIOUS MARITIME UNIONS AND TRY ENGAGE THEM WITH CLASC. A-31 ASKED F-7 FOR CONTACTS IN VALPO TO START STRIKE IN FAVOR PBRUMEN EXILES AND BAN PBRUMEN SHIPPING, SAID HE PLANS STRIKE WORK THRU ORIT. A-31 LEAVING SAGO 16-17 FEB FOR ANTOFAGASTA, LIMA AND BOGOTA.

S E C R E T

*Re KUBARK relationship with AMICE members

SECRET

201-284656

-4/25 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM SANTIAGO

ACTION WH 8

☐ ☐ ☐

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/O 4, WE 6, DO 4, CI/IC 3,

S E C R E T 022217Z

WAVE DIR INFO [illegible] LIMA [illegible] SGTO [illegible]

REFS: A. SGTO 0621 (IN 66618)

B. WAVE 7253 (IN 62274)

2 FEB 65 IN 72335

TYPIC PBRUMEN

FUBIAS-7 INFOR [illegible] STATION 2 FEB THAT EMILIO MASFERRO, SEC GEN CLASC, TOLD HIM HE HIRING FOUR [illegible] EXILES FROM FORDC TO WORK IN CENTRAL AMERICA GIVING LABOR TRG [illegible] UNDER [illegible] ALSO [illegible] CARIBBEAN AREA. [illegible] SAID HE AWARE [illegible] FOUR WITH KUBARK BUT DUE FACT THEY WILL WORK FOR CLASC AND [illegible] SALARY PAID BY SOMEONE ELSE, M WILL ACCEPT THEM. M MENTIONED [illegible] FRANCISCO TORRES AND [illegible] AMONG THOSE HE PLANS HIRE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM [illegible]

ACTION [illegible]

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH-7, CA-2, CA/O-4, WE-6, CI/OA, CI/OPS, [illegible] DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 070045Z

DIR INFO SAGO PALP CITE WAVE 8329

TYPIC QRSNIPE

REF A. SAGO 8679 (IN 72335)

B. SAGO 8628 (IN 66678)

7 FEB 65 IN 75365

1. MASPERO REF A STATEMENT RE KUBARK RELATIONSHIP FOUR AMICE MEMBERS PROBABLY REFERS IDEN A THROUGH D ON WHOM AMICE AND CLASC IN CORRESPONDENCE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. OF THESE ONLY IDEN A (AMICE-3.) HAS DIRECT KUBARK RELATIONSHIP FOR FORMALIZED RECENTLY FOR QRSNIPE. IDEN B ALSO UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR RECRUITMENT, BUT NEVER CONTACTED. IDEN C NOT CONSIDERED AGENT CANDIDATE. HIS MAIN IMPORTANCE AS MULATTO SHOWN LATIN AMERICAN WORKERS CASTRO-COMMUNISM NOT HOPE OF COLORED PEOPLES. IDEN D OPERATIONALLY PREEMPTED BY OTHER ODYOKE AGENCY.

2. AMICE WAS MEMBER AMBUD WHICH HIGHLY PUBLICIZED AS ODYOKE SUBSIDY AT TIME ITS STORMY DEMISE, AND ONE OF FEW MEMBER ORGS STILL ACTIVE. ON THIS BASIS MASPERO PROBABLY CONCLUDES AMICE FUNDS FROM KUBARK. HOWEVER A-31 BRIEFED TO SAY AMICE OPERATING COSTS AND SALARIES COVERED BY DUES SEVERAL THOUSAND MEMBERS WHO ALSO OCCASIONALLY DONATE DAY'S PAY FOR SPECIAL ACTIVITIES AND

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES

☑ COPY ☐

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

[illegible]

ACTION

WH/SA-5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP WH-7 CA-2 CA/O-4 WE-6 CI/OA CI/OPS CI/IC-2

DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 070345Z

DIR INFO SAGO PALP CITE WAVE 8030

7 FEB 65 IN 75364

TYPIC QRSNIPE

REF: WAVE 8029 (IN 75365)

IDENS: A. REINALDO PICO

B. FRANCISCO DE LA TORRE

C. LUIS MORENO

D. CONRADO RODRIGUEZ

S E C R E T

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROCESSING ACTION	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/JMDEVIL/Operational
Transmittal of letter from Juan Carlos LOUREIRO to AMICE-31

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

AR: None

Forwarded under separate cover for addressees' possible interest is a copy of a letter from Juan Carlos LOUREIRO, secretary-general of the Acción Sindical Argentina (ASA), to AMICE-31, regarding Argentine labor developments in the transport sector.

Philip G. ELMARD

MICROFILMED
JAN 18 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
copy of letter, USC

Distribution
3 - COS, Buenos Aires, w/att., USC
② - C/WH, w/att., USC
2 - WH/C, w/att., USC

CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
11 Jan 67	JAN 12 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26741

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-284658

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

- COPY SEP. COV. ATT: UFGA-26741

Buenos Aires, 10 de Diciembre de 1966
11 Jan 67

Companero
Reinaldo Pico Ramon
P.O.Box#3373
Miami 33101,Fla.

Querido Amigo:

Paso a contestar tu atenta nota de fecha 2 del actual.- Rapidamente, trataré de darte un panorama de lo que ocurre aquí y de algunas ideas para la FLAT.- Para mejor información tuya, te acompaño además un informe sobre la situación interna de la CGT Argentina y algunos problemas que nos afectan muy agudamente a los trabajadores de esta parte de Latinoamerica.-

1.- La huelga general de los obreros del puerto lleva ya al día de la fecha - 53 días de duración.- A pesar de la solidaridad que han recibido de muchos gremios y de todas las fuerzas populares, la situación de estos compañeros es muy dura.- Los motivos de la huelga los encontrarás en el informe adjunto.-

La ITF ha "recomendado" el boycott internacional en apoyo de los portuarios argentinos.- La medida es justa, pero ha resultado bastante limitada ya que no todos los sindicatos adheridos a la ITF lo han puesto en práctica, además en algunos lugares se aplicó mal, pues se boycoteaba a los barcos argentinos, pero no a los de otros banderas que venían con mercaderías de Argentina; esto no es eficaz y se presta a maniobras turbias.- YO ESCRIBI A LA CLASC y a la CISC pidiendo un apoyo decidido a los portuarios argentinos, pero aun no hemos recibido aquí la documentación sobre las medidas que hayan adoptada nuestras centrales internacionales.-

2.- Otro conflicto sumamente grave, es el que enfrentamos en este momento los ferroviarios.- El gobierno ha sancionado por ley un nuevo reglamento de trabajo que nos retrotrae a 50 años atrás en muchos aspectos; además el plan oficial prevé la reducción de los 25 talleres con 51 líneas de producción que existen, a solamente 19 talleres con 31 líneas de producción. Esto significa DESOCUPACION y además, perjudica al sistema ferroviario y al país.-

Es necesario presionar a la Federación Internacional de Sindicatos Cristianos del Transporte de la CISC, y a las organizaciones de base de la FLAT, para que se pronuncien también en este grave conflicto, crucial para el movimiento obrero argentino, YA QUE LA UNION FERROVIARIA ES EL SINDICATO MAS PODEROSO DE LA ARGENTINA.-

3.- La CGT Argentina se ha lanzado ya a un enfrentamiento abierto contra el gobierno militar de Onganía. El proximo miercoles 14 habra un paro general de 24 horas, como protesta contra el escandaloso aumento del costo de vida, contra el "arbitraje obligatorio" y en apoyo de los gremios en conflicto.-

MICROFILMED
JAN 18 1967
DOC MICRO SER

CS COPY

4.- En el aspecto interno de la FLAT, te diré que como secretario general, me he visto totalmente frenado por la falta de recursos, ya que ni para imprimir papel membretado tengo dinero.-

A pesar de esta dificultad, he tratado de hacer algunas tareas mínimas: enviar información a la CLASC y a la CISC sobre los problemas del transporte que existen en Argentina, y mantener un mínimo de cohesión y de organización del grupo de sindicalistas cristianes del transporte que actúa en mi pais.-

Lo que estoy necesitando, son las direcciones de las organizaciones afiliadas a la FLAT. En Panama no las tomé, porque se nos había prometido una lista completa de nombres y direcciones de todos los participantes del Congreso de CLASC; pero esto nunca llego.

5.- Estoy completamente de acuerdo contigo, en la necesidad de presionar al Buró y al Comité Ejecutivo de CLASC, para que pongan en marcha las FEDERACIONES PROFESIONALES.- Tambien deberán solucionar tu situación (es necesario que vengas a Latinoamerica), proveer de algunos recursos mínimos a la FLAT, y CONCRETAR DEFINITIVAMENTE EL CURSO-CONGRESO DEL TRANSPORTE.-

Siempre a tus órdenes, te saluda fraternalmente,

Juan Carlos Loureiro

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-284658

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/INT

PACY

S E C R E T 072230Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1175

RIO DE JANEIRO INFO DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY, SANTIAGO, JMWAVE

JMDEVIL

REF: RIO DE JANEIRO 2153 (IN 07329)*

8 Oct 66 12580

1. AMICE-31 REPORTED CLASC CONGRESS VOTED 6 OCTOBER TO AFFILIATE CSB. AT SAME TIME VOTED DECIDEDLY TO DISAFFILIATE "CIRCULO OBRERO" (A-31 COULD NOT IDENTIFY THIS ORGANIZATION AS CBTC BUT DESCRIBED IT AS "ORGANIZATION WHICH SUPPORTED MILITARY COUP OF CASTELO BRANCO IN BRAZIL"). SAID THEY WERE DISAFFILIATED FOR TAKING THIS POSITION. CIRCULO OBRERO REP ONLY HAD OPPORTUNITY TO PROPOSE CREATION OF A NEW ORGANIZATION WHICH CLASC COULD SUPPORT. WHEN ASKED WHETHER FIGHT ENDUED ON THIS ISSUE A-31 SAID NO. CONGRESS WAS IN AGREEMENT.

2. NO FURTHER DETAILS AT PRESENT. WILL ADVISE WHEN MORE INFO AVAILABLE.

*NOT CBTC DELEGATES TO CLASC CONGRESS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

AN

ABSTRACT

[illegible]

8 Oct 66

201-284658

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 22

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH CD

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT

TIME 2115Z

BY D

INFO FILE VR CS/DO WH/C/CA2 CA/PEG CA/PROP CA/O4 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 FI FI/SPG FI/INT, CA/OA,

S E C R E T 302044Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1109

30 SEP 66 IN 07300

IMMEDIATE JMWAVE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

REF: JMWAVE 3273 (IN 05352)

1. STATION SOURCE REPORTED FITC SEC/GEN, DIOGENES GUTIERREZ, STATED JMDEVIL CONGRESS PENETRATED BY US. SPECIFICALLY NAMED AMICE-31 SAYING A-31 WILL BE UNMASKED FROM CONGRESS PODIUM (ASSUMEDLY AT CONGRESS INAUGURATION 2 OCTOBER).

2. STATION HAS NO INDICATION WHAT EVIDENCE GUTIERREZ MIGHT POSSESS. A-31 CONTACTED STATION OFFICER BY PHONE EVENING 29 SEPTEMBER SAYING ONLY THAT HE WITH FRIENDS AND WOULD HAVE TO CALL AGAIN 0600 FOLLOWING MORN. DID NOT CALL FOLLOWING MORN (POSSIBLY DUE TO INOPPORTUNE SITUATION OF DELEGATE LODGING). NO MEETING WITH STATION YET EFFECTED.

3. EXPECT A-31 CALL AGAIN EVENING 30 SEPT. BELIEVE WE SHOULD WARN A-31 OF GUTIERREZ PLAN AND ADVISE HIM PREPARE DEFENSE WITH SUPPORT OTHER DELEGATES. HOWEVER WILL AWAIT JMWAVE CONCURRENCE BEFORE TAKING THIS COURSE. ALTERNATIVE IS TO HAVE A-31 WITHDRAWN FROM CONGRESS POSSIBLY SUFFERING

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 PANAMA CITY 1139 SECRET

ATTACK IN ABSENCIA. PLEASE ADVISE BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE CABLE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

Oct 17 1 37 PM '66

RID/MI

Oct 19 5 45 PM '66

XREF RYBAT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP –	5	HO
2		6	EI
3	C/WH/C	7	C
4	CA	8	D

DISSEM ~~BY~~ 29/1

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, C/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI/SPG

S E C R E T 302313Z CITE JMWAVE 3341

IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

30 SEP 65 IN 07380

TYPIC JMDEVIL

REFERENCE: PANAMA CITY 1129 (IN 07300)*

AGREE PACY STATION PLAN TO ALERT AMICE-31 SOONEST OF PARA 1 REF REPORT IN ORDER ADVISE HIM PREPARE DEFENSE AND OBTAIN POSSIBLE SUPPORT OTHER DELEGATES. AMICE-31 AND HIS ORGANIZATION OFFICIALLY AFFILIATED TO JMDEVIL, AND WITH HIS RECEIVING LEITIMATE INVITATION TO ATTEND CONGRESS BELIEVE HE IN POSITION REBUT POSSIBLE CHARGES. SPECIFIC EXPOSE INFORMATION POSSIBLY POSSESSED BY GUTIERREZ NOT KNOWN AT JMWAVE. OBVIOUS CHARGES WOULD PROBABLY EXPOSE AMICE-31 AS FORMER EXILE LABOR LEADER, WHO AMCTE COLLABORATOR AND WHOSE ORGANIZATION IS MEMBER OF AMCTE, WHICH GENERALLY VIEWED AS WOLADY-SUPPORTED ORGANIZATION.

S E C R E T

ST

SECRET

* REPORTED FITC SEC/GEN KNEW JMDEVIL CONGRESS INITIATED BY U.S.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP ✓	5	H-TG
2		6	CI
3	CA	7	
4	AID	8	

By 7

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR WH/SA CI/OPS CI/OA

RAW

S E C R E T 281547Z CITE JMWAVE 3272

PRIORITY PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: PANAMA CITY 1070 [illegible] 87

1. AMICE/31 WILL MAKE CONTACT PER INSTRUCTIONS IN PARA ONE REF.

20 SEP 66 IN 05435

2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF AMICE/31 AS FOLLOWS: AGE 33 AGE 33 YEARS, BROWN EYES, BLACK HAIR, HEIGHT 5' 7", WEIGHT 155 POUNDS, SOLID BUILD, LIGHT SALLOW COMPLEXION, EVEN FEATURES. AMICE/31 FORMED JUVENTUD OBRERA CATOLICA, AND SERVED AS OFFICER IN NATIONAL TRANSPORT FEDERATION. WAS MEMBER 26 JULY MOVEMENT UNTIL 1960 WHEN JOINED ANTI-CASTRO UNDERGROUND AND CAME INTO EXILE. AMICE/31 IS ADHERENT OF CLASC POLICIES AND PRACTICES, AND IS CONSIDERED BE PRO-MASPERO, WHOM HE VIEWS AS STRONG, EFFECTIVE LEADER.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

[redacted]
[redacted]

ROUTING

1	C/WH/C	5	MO
2		6	C1
3	CA-PP	7	
4	FI-TC	8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ORIG : MR THOMAS J. FLORES
UNIT : C/WH/C
EXT :
DATE : 30 SEPT 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

DISSEM BY 25/M PER ______ # ______

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WH8, CI/OA, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 39752

TO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

JMDEVIL

REF PANAMA CITY 1109 (IN 07300)

SUGGEST AMICE-31 BE WARNED OF PLAN ATTACK HIM AND THAT HE PREPARE DEFENSE AS SUGGESTED REF. HOWEVER DEFER TO WAVE IF OTHER ALTERNATIVE APPEARS PREFERABLE.

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER MR THOMAS J. FLORES C/WH/C

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-29[illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	FI/TC	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, C/CA, FI, FI/INT, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4

PACY

S E C R E T 011742Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1119

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

1 OCT 65 IN 07778

JMDEVIL

REF: A. PANAMA CITY 1105 (IN 07300)

B. DIRECTOR 39752

C. JMWAVE 3341 (IN 07380)

1. AMICE-31 ALERTED 30 SEPTEMBER RE POSSIBLE ATTACK. HE CONFIDENT GUTIERREZ COULD ONLY MAKE OBVITUS CHARGES MENTIONED REF C. BELIEVES REAL SOURCE OF PROBLEM IS PERSONAL. A-31 DISLIKES GUTIERREZ WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS TOO SOFT ON COMMUNISTS. APPARENTLY THIS DISLIKE IS MUTUAL.

2. A-31 CONFIDENT HE WILL HAVE SUPPORT OF OTHER CUBAN DELEGATES AND MASPERO WHO HE CONSIDERS A PERSONAL FRIEND. ALSO FEELS IT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SUPPORT OTHER CONGRESS DELEGATES, BUT DOES NOT BELIEVE PROBLEM WILL BE SERIOUS. SAYS HE WILL BE PREPARED TO DEFEND HIMSELF.

3. NEXT CONTACT WITH A-31 EXPECTED 3 OR 4 OCTOBER DEPENDENT HIS JUDGEMENT OF SITUATION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

[redacted]

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES:

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: A.B. Outright
UNIT: WH/2/P
EXT: 5421
DATE: 11 October 1966

☐ FILE
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible] ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE [illegible]

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

11 22 06 Z CITE DIRECTOR 42449

TO PANAMA CITY INFO: REP/LANT, CARACAS, SANTIAGO, JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO, LIMA, MEXICO CITY, RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO, LCPIPIT

1190

REF: PANAMA CITY 1050 (IN-13995)

REF ZRWAHOO DISSEMED AS TDCS-314/12911-66 WITH ADDED CONTROL NO FOREIGN DISSEM.

SOURCE DESCRIPTION CHANGED TO READ: "AN ATTENDEE AT THE CONGRESS DESCRIBED BELOW WHO IS A SUPPORTER OF EMILIO MASFERO. HE HAS NOT PROVIDED [redacted] SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO WARRANT A JUDGMENT AS TO HIS RELIABILITY."

END OF MESSAGE

WH/FI B Fuller.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/R

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-2[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C-8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/INT-2, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA/O-4

AN	~~PI~~	
~~PS~~	~~DEST~~	[illegible]
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

PACY

S E C R E T 072006Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1171

7 OCT 66 12485

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

REF: PANAMA CITY 1119 (IN 07778) ✓

1. AMICE-31 ETA COSTA RICA 9 OCT. HAD NO TROUBLE AT CLASC CONGRESS PARTICULARLY SINCE GUTIERREZ DOES NOT ENJOY MASPERO FAVOR.

2. A-31 COOPERATIVE, HELPFUL AGENT. ONLY PROBLEM WAS HIS DIFFICULTY IN LEAVING CONGRESS SITE ALONE WHICH PREVENTED FREQUENT CONTACT. THIS NO FAULT OF HIS. LAST CONTACT SCHEDULED 8 OCT. APPRECIATE JMWAVE ASSISTANCE.

S E C R E T *Amice-31 Alerted 30 Sept re Possible Attack.

BT

Sent to WH/CUBA for RI [illegible]

NNNN

201-2[illegible]
[illegible] 1966

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 3

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-2

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[redacted]

DISSEM BY 2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	MC	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION

WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CA 2, CI/[illegible], CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 271449Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1070 (PACY)

27 SEP 66 IN 04387

RL FI

ABSTRACT

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

REF: A. DIRECTOR 37751

B. JMWAVE 3243

1. PREFER NOT TO CONTACT AMICE-31 AT REF IDEN B ADRESS DUE POSSIBLE SECURITY RISKS. REQUEST JMWAVE DIRECT AMICE-31 PHONE (PANAMA) 35551, IDENTIFY SELF AS "RAMON" AND ASK FOR "LUCHO". LUCHO WILL TELL RAMON THAT HE (LUCHO) IS A FRIEND OF PABLO AND ARRANGE MEETING. SUGGEST AMICE-31 CALL LATE EVENING OR EARLY MORNING HOURS.

2. ALSO REQUEST JMWAVE PROVIDE AMICE-31 DESCRIPTION AND PERTINENT DATA.

S E C R E T

BT.

SECRET

Send to WH/Cuba for RI Marking

B

201-284658

27 Sept 66

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM CY 30/M

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	HO
2		6	CA
3		7	Φ
4	FI	8	X

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/O4, WH/C8.

Swider 14.
Cohen
Forsythe
Alvarez

27 SEP [illegible] 5

S E C R E T 262302Z CITE JMWAVE 3243

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 37751 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE)

B. DIRECTOR 37762 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE)

1. AMICE/31 (IDENTITY A) ARRIVING PANAMA CITY 29 SEPTEMBER AT 1230 HOURS ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT 511. A/31 ALERTED TO TELEPHONE CALL AT IDENTITY B ADDRESS FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING SELF AS "FRIEND OF PABLO". IF STATION WISHES MAKE OTHER CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS, PLS CABLE INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO 29 SEPTEMBER.

2. A/31 BRIEFED PER REFERENCE B GUIDELINES AND WILL SUBMIT REPORT UPON RETURN TO JMWAVE 20 OCTOBER. AMICE/31 PLANS SPEND 12-20 OCTOBER IN SAN JOSE TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH COSTA RICAN TRANSPORT WORKERS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

~~FROM~~

ISSUED BY 30/4

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	WO
2		6	CA
3		7	D
4	EI	8	X

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/O4, WH/C8

S E C R E T 262302Z CITE JMWAVE 3244

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3243 ([illegible])

Swider______
Cohen______
Forsythe ______
Gonzalez______

27 SEP [illegible] 3894

IDENTITY A. REINALDO (PICO) RAMON, PRESIDENT OF ORGANIZACION REGIONAL DE TRANSPORTE (ORT - CLASC AFFILIATE) AND MEMBER FORDC.

IDENTITY B. FEDERACION INTERAMERICANA DE TRABAJADORES CRISTIANOS
AVENIDA 7, CENTRAL 2420
EDIFICIO PREMIER, FIRST FLOOR.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

Phil Holts
ORIG: Phil Holts:res
UNIT: WH/2/Panama
EXT: 5421
DATE: 23 September 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	MO	5	CI
2		6	FI-TC
3	RR-RE	7	D
4	CA-PP	8	

DISSEN BY 6/B PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/C 8, CA/OA, CA 2 CA/PROP, CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

23 20 32Z

CITE DIRECTOR 37751

TO PANAMA CITY XNEOX JMWAVE INFO: LIMA

REFS: A. JMWAVE 3126 (IN-99957)*

B. PANAMA CITY 1039 (IN-01669)**

IN ADDITION EMFEVER-1, SUGGEST PANAMA CITY ALSO CONTACT JMWAVE ASSET AMICE-31 FOR COVERAGE JMDEVIL CONGRESS. FOR PANAMA CITY: PLEASE ARRANGE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS AMICE-31 WITH JMWAVE. FOR LIMA: WILL DUBOLD-1 ATTEND CONGRESS? IF SO, BELIEVE STATION CONTACT WOULD BE USEFUL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comments: *JMWAVE asset AMICE-31 invited to CLASC congress Pacy. JMWAVE plans pay his travel to Pacy and instruct to report congress developments, especially CLASC proposal to create Miami based organization of Cuban workers.
**Contact instructions for EMFEVER-1 in Panama City when he arrives for CLASC congress.

WH/C/MO Magaret Forsythe (by phone)
WH/3/Peru E. Laffin (in draft)
WH/7/DR A. Kida (in draft)
WH/CA

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ETerrell
EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

Dissem by 25/7

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CA2, CA/O4, CA/PROP, FI

S E C R E T 202144Z CITE JMWAVE 3126 INGHURST ACTING

20 SEP 65 IN 99957

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

TYPIC

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3025 (IN 99954)

1. AMICE-31, (IDENTITY A), HAS BEEN INVITED ATTEND REF CONGRESS. UNLESS HEADQUARTERS ADVISES TO CONTRARY, JMWAVE PLANS PAY COST OF AMICE-31 AIR TRAVEL AND WILL INSTRUCT HIM MONITOR AND REPORT ON CONGRESS DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICULARLY JMDEVIL PROPOSAL TO CREATE MIAMI-BASED ORGANIZATION OF CUBAN WORKERS.

2. AMICE-31 JMDEVIL CONTACTS INCLUDE CIHAZEL-1 AND CIHUMP-1 (IDENTITY B), BOTH OF WHOM RECENTLY TRANSITED JMWAVE.

S E C R E T

ST

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE D TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	RP—	5	CA
2		6	C
3	RID	7	D
4	FI-TC	8	Z

DISSEM BY X/M

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, DI/OA, DI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CA 2, CA/O 4, CA/PROP, FI

SECRET 202145Z CITE JMWAVE 3127 INGHURST ACTING 20 SEP 65 IN 99959

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

TYPIC JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3126 (IN 99957)

IDENTITY A. REINALDO (PICO) RAMON, PRESIDENT OF ORGANIZACION REGIONAL DE TRANSPORTE (ORT - CLASC AFFILIATE) AND MEMBER FORDC.

IDENTITY B. JOSE DE JESUS PLANAS

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

RID/AN

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ES	22	July 66		Jo
2. WH/C/CICS				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				

17. RID/FI

SECRET UFGA 24522/05

UFGA-24522/05

C-300

ARCHIVED

PICO Reinaldo

201-284658

0 PICO Ramon, Reinaldo
Parents: Ferino and Maria de la Paz. DPOB: 27 July 33, Regla, Havana. Married to Carmen PICO Herrera. Brothers: Hector, Sonia and Milagros. Address: 2267 SW 16th St., Miami. Address in Cuba: Fomento 516, Apt. 2, Reparto Palatino, Cerro. Arrived at the US on 29 Dec. 60 from Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Passport 35973.
Source: Per/sonal data recruitment form, 17 Jan 61.

26 years old. Married. Cuban. High School Education. Tourist.
Secretary of the AOMRR.
Source: MRR registration form.

Says he will not return with the rest of the Giron prisoners that came in a Commission to try to obtain an exchange of prisoners.
Source: Memo C-300 (from Newspaper "El Popular", 29 July 61).

DPOB: 21 July 33, Regla, Havana. Current address: 1067 SW 8th St. Miami. Joined the military commission on 1st Sept. 61 (Transportation organization) Metropolitan buses. Does not receive pay.
Unemployed.
Source: Form as member of the Revolutionary Organization, Military Commission, 16 March 62.

Born in Regla, Havana on 21 July 33. Address: 1067 SW 8th St. Miami.
Worked for Metropolitan buses.
Source: Revolutionary Transportation Organization. Military Commission, April 62.

DD-231. Meeting between Manuel [illegible] Rivero and several persons in Miami, 29 June 63.

201-284658

UFGA 24522/05

PICO Roman, Reinaldo (cont.)
DPOB: 21 July 33, [illegible] Havana, Cuba. Parents: Pedro PICO Valiente and Maria de la Paz Roman Rodriguez. Married to Alicia Lugo Gonzalez. Sons: Reinaldo Mario and Maria del Carmen PICO Pino (first marriage) and Alex PICO Lugo (second marriage). Bus driver. Address: 1645 SW 12 St. Miami. Passport No. 187738 (expires on 18 Oct. 68) Resident No. A12 445 812. Preparatory course. Took courses with the Catholic Working Youth. Was a delegate to the X Anniversary Congress of the J.O.C. Costa Rica and gave several conferences. Started an underground cell of the 26 of July Movement as Chief of Action and Sabotage in the Havana area. On 3 May 59 was appointed delegate before the official and employers organizations representing the Metropolitan busses Union. At the First Congress of Transportation Workers was appointed President of Comments Commission and later Secretary of Foreign Relations of the National Transportation Federation. Because of the X CTC-R Congress held on Nov. 59 resigned to both posts. When he arrived at Miami joined the FORDC, but left it from April 61 to March 64, when he again joined the FORDC. While he was away from the FORDC he organized the "Organizacion Revolucionaria del Transporte" (ORT) now with the FORDC and also the "Alianza de Trabajadores Cubanos" now also with the FORDC. During 1958 was an activist for the M-26-7, the only organization to which he belonged apart from the JOC. Late 1959 joined the MRR and was National Coordinator until December 1960 when he became an asylee. Currently is only a member of the FORDC. Was a member of Brigade 2506 and was a prisoner at Giron. Was in the Rebel Army at the victory of the Revolution.
Source: P-8, 1[illegible] April 64.

From the Transportation Revolutionary Organizations. Member of the anti-Castro groups called "Los Juramentados" who want to start the Cuban war of liberation and are collecting money for arms and ammunitions. This group is made up by representatives of several organizations.
Source: A[illegible]chives, Inside Info. 19 May 64.

Secretary-general of the Revolutionary Transportation Confederation. Was invited to Venezuela by the Latin American Confederation of Christian Union(CLASC) representing the "Frente Obrero Revolucionario Democratico Cubano (FORDC) in the festivities of the 1st of May.
Source: Newspaper "Miami Herald", 22 May 64.

Appeared in the program "Entrevista Estelar de Prensa" over radio station WFAB, Miami, on 20 June 65.

PICO Roman, Reinaldo
Announces the beginning of the recruitment of a Transportation Battalion.
Source: "Radio Rebelde", Miami, Broadcast, 9 April 62.

PICO [illegible]
Secretary-general [illegible] of the Christian Union Movement. [illegible] a statement [illegible] the "Diario de las Americas" [illegible].
Source: "Diario de las Americas", [illegible]/10/61

PICO, Reinaldo (cont)

Member of the MRDC. Lives at 2267 NW 16th street, Miami.
Source: List of MRDC members, 14 March 61.

Took part in the debates at the MRDC Session, according to the column "Noticias al Oido".
Source: "Diario de las Americas", 14 Feb. 61.

Has taken shelter together with Milton Collazo at the house located at 1930 NW 29th St. because he fears an attack.
Source: C-42, 29 July 61.

While at the offices of the Committee for the Liberation of the Prisoners at Giron said: Fidel told the Commission that came to Miami for the exchange of prisoners that if they did not show up with 6 or 8 millions, there would be no exchange.
Source: C-84, 28 July 61.

Revolutionary person who worked in action and sabotage in the M-26-7 together with Angel Maria Hernandez Avila.
Source: Angel Maria Hernandez Avila, 17 Jan 61.

Alberto Mellado says that Reinaldo Pico told him he would leave for Cuba to take explosives; that he worked for the CIA and was paid $300.00 monthly.
Source: C-5, 12 Dec. 61.

Remained in Miami when he came with other prisoners of Playa Giron to try to obtain his freedom and that of his companions.
Source: C-90, 12 May 62.

DD-505. Function in honor of Jose Ignacio RIVERO Hernandez, in Miami, on 17 Nov. 63.

President of the Revolutionary Transportation Organization. One of the four organizations sponsoring the Workers Training Course.
Source: Newspaper "Miami Herald", 21 Feb. 64.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY ✓

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

RI/AN, WH/COG8, EVR6, CI/OPS

701 CI/OA, FI2

S E C R E T 091445Z JAN 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 2294

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR SANTO DOMINGO PORT AU PRINCE PARIS KINGSTON

EVMULE AMCLEVE

9 JAN 69 IN 68106

REF: CARACAS 1543 (IN 66735)

1. PARA 3 REF ASSUMPTION CORRECT. SUBJECT IS AMICE-31.

2. STATION POUCHING PERTINENT DOCS FROM HIS 201. AMICE-31 HAS OA AND RECEIVED $300 MONTHLY SALARY VIA AMICE PAYROLL UNTIL PROJECT TERMINATED IN 1967.

3. NO ONE PRESENTLY AT WH/MIAMI KNOWS SUBJECT. HOWEVER, HENRY RUBASH, LAST JMWAVE AMICE CASE OFFICER, WHO NOW HQS ON CONSULTATIONS, MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE PERSONAL ASSESSMENT AMICE-31 FOR CARACAS.

4. FILE: 201-284593.

S E C R E T

Pico

SECRET

UFGA 30258
10/7/68

S E C R E T

8 July 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

VIA: Chief, CA

FROM: CA/Henry J. RUBASH

SUBJECT: AMICE Progress Report
1 April - 30 June 1968

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. AMICE-31 was a delegate to the Ninth CLASC Consejo which was held in Santo Domingo from 17-24 May 1968 and he also attended the First Latin American Labor Conference on Development and Integration which took place following the Ninth Consejo. A documented report on these meetings was submitted under UFGA-30216.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE

2. During the fourth quarter of FY 68 a total of approximately $6,787 was spent on the AMICE activity. This amount includes termination payments made to AMICE-3 and AMOTEX-66. The cumulative total of AMICE expenditures for FY 68 is $71,628.

3. AMICE-3 and AMOTEX-66 were terminated amicably as of 30 June 1968. The only remaining active AMICE agent is AMICE-34 who will be retained by JMCOBRA as the labor reporter for the AMHIM Bulletin.

AMICE

C. PROBLEMS

4. There are no problems of an operational nature.

D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER

5. Not applicable.

S E C R E T

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 31

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: JEAN BELL
UNIT: CA/INT
EXT: 4383
DATE: 19 JUNE 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: CAS ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI
FI/INT 2, WH 8, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, CI/IC 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE DIRECTOR 09760

TO JMWAVE INFO SANTO DOMINGO 20 19 25 z JUN 68

DTDORIC INTEL JMDEVIL

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 5604 (IN 17932)

PLS ADVISE IF STATION HAS YET DEBRIEFED AMICE-31 RE CLASC CONFERENCES HELD IN SANTO DOMINGO DURING MAY AND, IF SO, WHEN REPORTS CAN BE EXPECTED HEADQUARTERS. LNGOLD AND LNWIRE HAVE REQUESTED ALL INFO AVAILABLE WHICH NOT REPORTED IN PRESS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/CA -
DC/WH/7/
CA/B4 - TONY HOLLAND (IN DRAFT)

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CA/INT
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

F/CO - 201

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo: Chief of Station, JMCOBRA; Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AKULE/AMICE
C Comments of AMICE-31 on Raimundo ONGARO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: None; FYI

REF: HDCA-7116, 31 May 1968

see B.A. 0663 + S.D. 5604
also 201
NO

1. AMICE-31 had only the following to add concerning Raimundo ONGARO and his activities: After ONGARO had made his violent speech on television in Santo Domingo he was cornered by the Cuban (exile) delegation the members of which were incensed by his allegations concerning Cuban exiles and his misinformation about the Castro regime. According to AMICE-31 their arguments prevailed and ONGARO in the end was quite apologetic and admitted to them (AMICE-31 thought sincerely) that he had been in error. As proof of the sincerity of ONGARO's change of mind on the Cuban question AMICE-31 pointed to the fact that, on behalf of the Cuban delegation, ONGARO approached Juan Luis GALLO Estevez, the intransigent Uruguayan whose negative vote (the only one) doomed the Cuban-sponsored resolution on political prisoners to defeat, and tried to get him to go along with the majority.

2. AMICE-31 called ONGARO basically "un buen muchacho" and non-Communist. He reported that ONGARO was a strong peronista and a "good, practicing Catholic". He added this latter description with some wonderment because he had always placed "good, practicing Catholics" automatically in the pro-U.S., anti-Castro camp.

Henry J. RUBASH

Distribution:
2 - COS Buenos Aires via pouch
2 - COS Santo Domingo via pouch
2 - COS JMCOBRA
2 - C/WH [illegible]
2 - WH/COG

201-284658

~~DEFERRED~~

SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-30217	JUN 21 1968 19 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-124-52

FORM G-325 A REV. 4-1-67

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 43-R436

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

(FAMILY NAME)	(FIRST NAME)	(MIDDLE NAME)	☐ MALE ☑ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (MO-DAY-YR.)	NATIONALITY	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (IF ANY)
LUGO	ALICIA	NONE		12-16-37	CUBAN	[illegible]

ALL OTHER NAMES USED: NONE

CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Habana Cuba

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (IF ANY): [illegible]

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	LUGO	JOSE	(DECEASED)	
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)	[illegible]	FAUSTINA	HABANA CUBA	MIAMI FLA.

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME) | FIRST NAME | BIRTHDATE | CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH | DATE OF MARRIAGE | PLACE OF MARRIAGE

NONE

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE)

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
1173 NW 29 St	Mia	Fla	USA	April	'65	PRESENT TIME	
530 SW 10 St	Mia	Fla	USA		'65	April	'65
1001 SW 4 Ave	Mia	Fla	USA		'63		'65

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE)

[illegible]	Hab	Cuba			[illegible]	May	[illegible]

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
Food Fair Stores - [illegible]	Front End		1965	PRESENT TIME	

File [illegible] 201-287655 [illegible]

LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE)

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
☐ OTHER (SPECIFY) Permanent Resident

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

IF YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IS IN OTHER THAN ROMAN LETTERS, WRITE YOUR NAME IN YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IN THIS SPACE.

DATE

(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

14-00000

DISPATCH | SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

XX

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/JMBLVIL/AMICE
Proposed Travel of AMICE-31

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: FYI

REF: UFGA-25587 dated 25 July 1966

Headquarters has considered the invitations received by AMICE-31 and has reached the following conclusions on his proposed travel:

A. There seems no useful purpose to be served by covering AMICE-31's personal expenses for the trip described in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the referenced dispatch as WOFACT has good coverage from other sources.

B. Headquarters has no interest in AMICE-31's attendance at the meeting described in paragraph 3 but also no objections to his accepting the invitation if Station JMWAVE deems it advisable or considers this will be of value in any of the Station's own operations.

JANE D. ASTRAHAN

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

201-284658

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 19-126-35/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGW-6158

DATE: 22 AUG 1966

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-284658

TYPED: 16 August 1966

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Subj File
1 - CA File
1 - ESEC
1 - WH/C/CA/PP

ORIGINATING

WH/C/CA/PP M Forsythe/ nea 2981

COORDINATING

AC/WH/C/CA

WH/C

WH/CA

(Telecon)

DISPATCH

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 201-244658

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 60/8

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SECUR 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA

AN FI

ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 080213Z CITE JMWAVE 1348

8 JUN 66 IN 32850

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSAFE AMICE

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 09454 *

*HQS STATES BURDEN OF ACTION RE REF CASE NOW LIES WITH AMICE 31 AND KIN.

1. WAVE OFFICER MET WITH COORDINATOR CUBAN AFFAIRS MIAMI AND DEPUTY CHIEF IMMIGRATION OFFICE 7 JUNE FOR DISCUSSIONS ON REF CASE. BOTH OFFICERS AGREED TO ARRANGE ENTRY OF MOTHER AMICE 31 BASED ON OUR INTEREST THIS CASE.

2. CHIEF CCA/M PREPARING LETTER FOR SWISS AMBASSADOR IN CUBA STATING THAT MOTHER'S CASE REVIEWED AND PERMISSION HAS BEEN GRANTED FOR HER ENTRY TO U.S. LETTER WILL INCLUDE REQUEST FOR PRIORITY ACTION BASED ON POOR STATE MOTHER'S HEALTH.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-244658
8 June 1966

Margaret Forsythe:new
WH/C/CA/PP
2981
2 June 1966

S E C R E T

DIR 09454

S E C R E T

JMWAVE

TYPIC AMSAFE AMICE

REFS A. UFGA 24861

B. JMWAVE 1135 (IN 25370)

1. REF B ENTRY REFUSAL FOR MOTHER AMICE-31 PER SECTION 212-A INDICATED DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP. REF A PARA 3 STATES POSSIBILITY DECEASED HUSBAND PLACED NAME ON PARTY ROLES. THERE NO EVIDENCE. IN FILES TO CONFIRM OR DENY AND HQS HAS NO BASIS FOR REQUESTING RE-OPENING OF CASE.

2. KUSODA SUGGESTS IT BEST FOR AMICE-31 AND OTHER RELATIVES OR KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS CONTACT LOCAL ODURGE OFFICE TAKING AFFIDAVITS FROM PERSONS NOT IN WAVE AREA, LETTERS FROM BISHOPS MENTIONED REF A OR ANY OTHER RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, EXPLAINING BACKGROUND AND ASCERTAINING WHAT FURTHER EVIDENCE MAY BE NECESSARY TO SECURE REVERSAL PRESENT DECISION.

3. WAVE MAY BE ABLE ARRANGE FAVORABLE RECEPTION AMICE PRESENTATION THROUGH ODURGE CONTACT OR AT LEAST STEER AMICE-31 TO SYMPATHETIC

SECRET

PAGE TWO

OFFICIAL. HQS WILL FOLLOW UP WITH ODURGE AND ODACID HQS WHEN THERE ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT RE-OPENING DISCUSSION AT THIS LEVEL BUT BURDEN OF ACTION NOW LIES WITH AMICE-31 AND KIN.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: Requests assistance in arranging entry of AMICE-31's mother barred under Section 212A of Immigration Law

C/WH/C/CA ________________

OS/AAS (Mr. Knott by phone)

WH/C/MO (Mr. Chiocca in draft)

WH/C/CA/PP (Mr. Chaconas in draft)

WH/C/CI (Mr. Cantoro in draft)

William V. Broe
C/WHD

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/C

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PRIHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem BY 24

ACTION WHC-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 262100Z CITE JMWAVE 1135 INGHURST ACTING

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSAFE AMICE

26 MAY 66 25370

REFERENCE: UFGA 24861

1. AMICE-31'S MOTHER (IDENTITY A OF REFERENCE), TELEPHONED HIM ON 13 MAY, READING LETTER FROM SWISS EMBASSY WHICH STATED THAT U.S. AUTHORITIES HAD DECIDED THAT SHE WAS INELIGIBLE FOR ENTRY INTO U.S. FURTHER CHECK WITH LOCAL ODACID OFFICE HERE REVEALED AGENT'S MOTHER REFUSED ENTRY ON BASIS OF SECTION 212 A OF IMMIGRATION LAW.

2. PER PARA 4 OF REFERENCE, STATION WOULD APPRECIATE HEADQUARTERS DISCUSSION OF CASE WITH ODACID AND ODURGE.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation

TO ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

FROM:

RID/AN

RL

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1 WH/C/ES		6 april 66		
2 WH/C/CA/PP				
3 WH/CA/ [illegible] 3-8-4466				jd
4. WH/C/AN/RE				
5.				
6. WH/C/MO	13 APR 1966		15 APR 1966	
7.				
8 WH/3 COLOMBIA			18/4	CH
9.				
10 WH/C/CA/PP				
11 Gonzalez				
12.				
13.				
14				
15				
16				
17 RID/FI				

COMMENTS

Copy detached

Note Bongiorno report, for our conversation. Unkorsythe

3-10 - We have pulled one copy of dispatch and attachments for study. jd

U/S/cate
6 apr 66

Copy for chrono

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-284656

DOCUMENT DATE

31 Mar 66

DOCUMENT NUMBER

UFGA 24874

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

	PROCESSING	
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
WH/C

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/JMDEVIL/
C AMICE-31 Production

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Attached is AMICE-31's report on the meeting of the Eighth Continental Council of the Confederacion Latinoamericana de Sindicatos Cristianos (CLASC, Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions), held in Medellin, Colombia, from 5 to 14 January 1966.

2. Since the Station has not received copies of any disseminations that may have been made from information cabled during the meeting at Medellin, no attempt has been made to prepare portions of AMICE-31's report for dissemination. If any of the report is disseminated at Headquarters, the Station would appreciate receiving copies, along with copies of any reports that may already have been disseminated on the meeting at Medellin, and any future disseminations on the CLASC.

3. Also attached, under separate cover, is a copy of a report by Keith G. BONGIRNO which includes a list of AMICE-31's achievements at the meeting and his impressions of and attitudes toward certain delegates and issues.

for Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:
3 - WH w/atts h/w, and u/s/c - Att'd RI/AN
2 - WH/C w/atts h/w, and u/s/c

201-284658

2 Atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
29 March 1966

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-24874

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-284658

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SCA

February 7,1966

PICO'S TRIP TO MEDELLIN

After reading Pico's report and talking to him twice I reached following conclusions :

I ACHIEVEMENTS of Pico

1. Achieved with the cooperation of Edgar Maduro to soften the anti-US line in the Declaration of Principles and elimination of US name which was ~~xx~~ replaced by "imperialisms".

2. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Together with the Venezuelan delegates drafted the motion condemning the Tricontinental Conference. and participated actively in drumming up the support for this motion.

3. Pushed thru the motion condemning Castro's regime.

4. Excercised a strong anti-communist and anti-Castro influence among the delegates.

II PICO'S IMPRESSIONS OF THE MEDELLIN MEETING

1. Pico came back favorably impressed by strongly anti-communist stand of the delegates. He says that even if Maspero would try to cooperate with the commies the rank and file will not let him to do so.

2. Pico noted only three rabid anti-US delegates : Miguel Cardoso(Accion Sindical Uruguaya), Diogenes Gutierrez(Federacion Istmeña de Trabajadores Cristianos -Panamá) and Heliodoro Agudelo Rivera(Accion Sindical Antioqueña) .

3. Pico informs that Henry Molina(Sec.Gen.of Confederacion Autonoma de Sindicatos Cristianos CASC-D.R.) even if highly critical of US intervention in D.R. is an outspoken anticommunist and he recommends him as a material for recruitment.

4. Molina spoke very favorably of Conrado Rodriguez who during his stay in D.R. as FORDC delegate made an excellent impression and became good friend of CASC .

5. It is evident from the briefing instructions received from HQ and cables received from "our man in Medellin" that a strong opposition to CLASC HQ stand (or Maspero's) to the new funding proposal by CISC and ISI was expected. Pico says that he could not discover such opposition and that three national unions which already applied for direct funding according to the instructions received from CISC quickly withrew their application. Pico also did not note any "betrayal" on the part of Federacion Campesina.

Thus I see two possibilities : a) the opposition to CLASC HQ stand that all funding should go thru HQ was exaggerated b) Pico is considered as close friend to Maspero and was not trusted by the opposition.

According to Pico the feeling was quite unanimous the the funding should go thru CLASC HQ and the CISC attempt of direct funding was resented as an effort to undermine CLASC Executive Committee.

ATT 1 TO UFGA 24874 [illegible] MAR 201-[illegible]

6. It looks that our friend who talked to Pico in Medellin and Bogota was disgusted because Pico was satisfied with the results of the meeting. Pico's satisfaction stemmed from the strong anti-Castro stand the Council adopted and it is obvious that the fussing problem so important to us could not ~~x~~ upset him.

7. Pico reports that there is a good chance that Dagoberto Gonzalez(Sec.Gen.of Trabajadores Copeyanos) will be elected as CLASC president at the next CLASC Congress. According to him Jose Goldsack will become Treasurer and present treasurer Alfredo di Pacce will head new CLASC office dedicated to raise funds from the LA affiliates.
Pico considers Gonzalez as a staunch anti-communist and better disposed toward US than Maspero. He thinks that flanked by Gonzalez and Gold sack, Maspero will not have so much to say and his power will be limited. Gonzalez is apparently a much more forceful personality than Goldsack, who doesn't have enough guts to oppose Maspero.

8. Pico believes that Maspero is less aggressive and anti-US as he used to be. He thinks that the pressure from CISC and ISI plus a strong anti-communist posture pf the affiliates accounts for this.

In the cables received from our Colombia office there is a strong criticism of Pico as a sort of Maspero's stooge. After discussiong this topic several times with Pico I think that his opinion of Maspero ~~XXXXXX~~ is :

Maspero is a forceful, dynamic and well ~~prepared~~ educated leader. As an Argentine and ex-peronista he has more drive and is a better organizer than the others in CLASC. Besides he offers CLASC a promise of bringing CTG into an alliance with them, a feat which only he can accomplish. For Pico's taste Maspero is too demagogic and he doesn't like his anti-US and soft of commies attitude, however, Pico claims that Maspero lately is much more aware of commie danger. As Maspero is without doubt the most powerful single individual in CLASC and as Pico positi is weak(his Federation is not created yet and he has to be confirmed as Secretar General) he sees no use of bucking Maspere especially as no organized and strong opposition exists. Pico,however, would see with sympathy Maspero power restricte or it will not bother him al all to see Maspero removed completely. But as long as he exists Pico believes that for his personal good and in order to be able to push strong anti-Castro stand(in which he is mainly interested) he has to work and live with Maspero.

This position impresses me as a sensible one.

III MISC. REMARKS

1. There is some inconsistence in the cables we received. In one of them Romano Tschumi, CLASC Executive Secretary for the Dutch Antilles and President of CEDEU is described as " widely considered insignificant and unimpresive element". In another cable this same Tschumie is quoted as a source (direct source not via Pico as Pico said that he didn't know about campesinos sold out) and as a new CLASC Asst Secretary General(Pico also claims that he doesn't know about it even if he was criticized for before ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ getting his info from such a lousy source as Tschumie).

[illegible] Jan. 1964.

2. Pico reports that in Caracas he met Carl Norden from ISI Bonn office in CLASC office. Carlos Moris(vice-director~~x~~ of Instituto de Estudios Sociales d Caribe), Mariano Benitez(Centro Documentacion - Caracas) Santiago Tortosa(Sec Gen of CODESA), Ezequiel Borges(CIS) were also present. Norden reported that the

US Embassy in Bonn informed them on Sunday Jan.16th in the morning about all important topics discussed, resolutions etc adopted in Medellin. While impressed by the fast work and correct reporting ~~of~~ Norden expressed his curiosity as to how it was possible that the embassy in Bonn was so fast informed (NOTE : I am surprised even more that a blubber-mouth like Norden was informed about such report!). The general consensus of the present was that CIA must have few men infiltrated among the delegates.....

3. According to the new by-laws Pico's Transport Federation(in formation) will hav 3 votes during the next Congress, equal to other L.A. Federations and national delegations. Threfore it is important for us that we continue to work with Pico,

4. Pico should also go to the CLASC meeting in Guatemala in March when the Central American Confederation will be created. CLASC also wants to create Central American Transport Federation and there where Pico's presence is requested.

5. I asked Pico if his CLASC friends don't resent the fact that he works for FORDC. He said that this problem was solved once for ever. CLASC executives know that only two principal currents exists among the Cuban exiled labor : the batistian and the revolutionaries. The Batistianos are the Mujalistas of CTC aided by ORIT and CLASC is against the Mujalistas. They are in favor of the revolutionaries an they are in FORDC, which is the only really active exile labor organization. CLASC leaders know that FORDC is being supported by the US government , but they accept it as a necessity and understand that it is inevitable as neither the batistianos or the communists will support it and CLASC has no funds to do so.

SUMMING UP

By no means I consider that Pico is an ideal agent. He ~~might~~ may be influenced or awed by Maspero. He also is sometimes impulsive and puts his foot in the mouth. On the other hand he is : young, agressive, better educated than average Cuban labor leade He is accepted in CLASC, his organization ORT is a member and he will be the head of the Latin American Transport Federation which will give him following advantages : a) voice and 3 votes at CLASC meetings b) can influence CLASC decision c) will bring strong anti-Castro and anti-communist influence d) will soften up anti-US outbursts e) will report to us, even if we have to take his reliability wit a grain of salt.

NOTE : I forgot to call your attention to the curious little item in Pico's repo

He advises that the Copeyanos gained the control of the Sindicato Portuario in Puerto Cabello wrestling it away from Correa after it was found that 200,000 bolivares were missing from the treasury. Pico also reports that there are widespread rumors that Correa is living it up at the expense of the boycott and that he is blackmailing Spanish, Japanese and British embassies getting hard cash for not boycotting the ships......

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO. Att. # 2 to UFGA-24574

DATE 31 Mar 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

201-284658

SUBJECT: PICO-Ramon, Reinaldo

REPORT (in Spanish) ON MEETING OF LATIN AMERICAN CONFEDERATION OF CHRISITAN TRADE UNION

BULKY

CALL RID/FILES, EXT. 6859
FOR ATTACHMENTS. RECORDS
CENTER JOB NO. 68-28
BOX NO. 4

FORM 7-63 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

Apr 5 1 13 PM '66

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

FROM:

RID/[illegible]

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICERS INITIALS
1. WH/3/EE	13 apr 66			
2. WH/C/MO	14 APR 1966	[illegible]		
3				
4.				
5. WH/Security		4/18/66		
6. WH/C/[illegible]				
7. OS/AAS		19 MAY 1966		
8. ~~[illegible]~~				
9.				
10				
11.				
12				
13				
14.				
15				
16				

COMMENTS

copy attached

2 to 5 can you handle this?

OS/catt
13 apr 66

MICROFILMED
APR 12 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1 copy retained by OS/AAS

5-4 19 MAY 1966

Derog info that one Manuel de la Paz Ramirez Rodriguez, (without the "de Paz") not otherwise identified, and not necessarily identical with our figure, who was CP member in 1951.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

MICROFILMED
APR 1
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMSAFE
Request for HQ Intercession to Facilitate Entry of Identity A

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
AR: See Paragraph 4 below

1. Identity A, who is the mother of AMICE/31, a Station asset, has been twice denied permission to enter the United States as a refugee from Cuba. The local ODURGE office has stated that Identity A has been placed on a denied admissions list because of information supplied by ODACID.

2. According to AMICE/31, Identity A applied for admission to the United States with her daughters, Identities B and C. Identities B and C received the necessary authorization on 24 February 1966 from the Swiss Embassy and arrived in the United States by air on 28 February.

3. Identity A was the wife of Identity D, a member of the Cuban Communist Party for some twenty years, at the time of her first application to leave Cuba. Identity D died in October of 1965 and according to AMICE/31 lost his Communist Party membership card about a year prior to his death. According to AMICE/31, Identity A has never joined or been a member of the Communist Party although there is a possibility that her husband may have placed her name on the membership lists. AMICE/31 also stated that she has long been a practicing Catholic and that she is very anti-Communist. Sent as separate cover attachments are two statements from the Bishop of Gienfuegos and the Assistant Bishop of Havana testifying to her good character and to her standing as a practicing Catholic.

- Continued -

Attachments:
1. Identities, USC
2. Letters, USC

Distribution:
3 - WH/C w/atts USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 24861

DATE
29 March 66

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-284655

4. It is requested that Headquarters contact the appropriate ODACID and ODURGE officials for the purpose of removing Identity A's name from the denied admissions list since her close connection with a member of the Cuban Communist Party, which presumably was the basis of the derogatory information, is no longer a fact.

Sylvia B. [illegible]
Philip G. ELMARD

SECRET

MICROFILMED
APR 12 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

18

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
NO. 1 TO UFGA 24861

Identity A. Maria de la Paz *RAMON Rodriguez de *PICO
Calle Fomento No 506 Rpto Palatino, Cerro
Havana, Cuba
DOB: 14 November 1912 POB: Lima, Peru
Peruvian Citizen
request for Hq intervention to facilitate travel to U.S.

Identity B. Regino Pico Valiente

Identity C. Sonia Pico Ramon

Identity D. Milagros Pico Ramon

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

CS COPY

TRANSLATION

ASSOCIATION OF
CUBANS IN EXILE
"Sevillana" Manor,
Los Almendros Avenue,
San Rafael de la Florida,
Caracas, Venezuela.(Phone:71.33.32)

MICROFILMED
APR 12 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

38

Caracas, March 11, 1966.

Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Gentlemen:

By this means I am pleased to state that I know Mrs. María de la Paz Ramón personally, whose son Reinaldo Pico Ramón worked actively for Catholic Labor Youth in Havana, Cuba. I can assure you that Mrs. Ramón Rodríguez was never a Communist and that due to her opposition to the regime she wishes to leave Cuban territory. She has always had democratic ideals.

Hoping that this information may be of use to you, I remain,

Very truly yours,

(signed) Eduardo Boza Masvidal
Asst.Bishop of Havana, Cuba.

(There is a seal of the
Mission of Our Lady of Charity,
Caracas, Venezuela)

(This is a translation of the attached letter)

14-00000

UNION
DE CUBANOS EN EL EXILIO
[illegible]
[illegible] San Rafael de la Florida
[illegible]
CARACAS VENEZUELA

Caracas, Mayo [illegible]

Departamento de Estado
Washington

Señores:

Confidencialmente me es grato manifestarles que conozco personalmente a la Sra. María de la Paz Ramón Rodríguez, cuyo hijo Reinaldo Pico Ramón trabajó activamente en la Juventud Obrera Católica en La Habana. Puedo asegurar que la señora Ramón Rodríguez nunca fué comunista y que es por oposición al régimen que desea salir de Cuba, habiendo sido ella siempre persona de ideas democráticas.

Esperando les sea útil esta información queda de Uds. muy atentamente

Eduardo Boza Masvidal
Obispo Auxiliar de La Habana

La Habana, 23 de Febrero de 1966

A quien pueda interesar

Yo Monseñor Alfredo Muller Obispo de Cienfuegos por la presente HAGO CONSTAR BAJO JURAMENTO que la señora Maria de la Luz Ramon Rodriguez a la cual conozco desde hace años asi como a sus hijos son de procedencia Catolica y con los cuales hube de tener tratos y conocimientos ya que pertenecian a los Grupos de Accion Catolica de mi Parroquia en el Cerro " El Salvador del Mundo "

Atentamente.

------------------------------------
[illegible]
Obispo de Cienfuegos

3

SECRET

MO

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
CSDO

BY D AT 2025 Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION
CAS
412

☐ RID COPY

INFO
FILE VR. RI/AN CSDO CA/PEG WH8 CI/OA

S E C R E T 162245Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3820
CARA

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

DTDORIC JMDEVEL

16 Oct 69 IN 67171

REF: DIRECTOR 46526

1. FIELD TRACES FIVE NO NEW INFORMATION SAVE FOR LOCAL ADDRESS AND TOUTED MEDIA CONNECTION PER WH/MIAMI 4639; (IN 05005) OTHER GENERAL, NONDEROGATORY TIDBITS.

2. REGRET DELAY DETERMINING AMICE-31 CURRENT STATUS REGARDING CLASC. PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN LOCATING HIM FIRST THROUGH AMCLEVE-15, BOTH BEING MUTUAL FRIENDS, TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ACCESS AND STATUS CLASC AFFAIRS MERITING STATION DIRECT FOLLOW-UP. SUBJECT REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN CHURCH FUND RAISING WORK AND SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME AWAY FROM HOME. WILL ADVISE SOONEST BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES AMCLEVE-15 HAS HAD MERELY IN REACHING SUBJECT SINCE RECEIPT HVCW-8792, HAVE DOUBTS ON PROSPECTS FOR MISSION.

3. FILE: 201-284658, X-REF: 200-124-192/3.

S E C R E T

WH/PS/2
4

MICROFILMED
NOV 3 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

SECRET

D-200-124-192/3

16 Oct 69
201-284658

14-00000

SECRET

30 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

VIA: WH/COG

WH/3/V

SUBJECT: AMICE/31 (201-284658)

1. It is requested that responsibility for AMICE/31 be transferred from WH/COG to CA/B4, and that his OA be amended for a one-time reporting mission on the 20 - 24 October 1969 Quito meeting of the Council of the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions. Clays

2. Caracas is being asked for liaison ~~unilateral~~ traces and for determination as to whether AMICE/31's present employer, the Office of the Coordinator for Economic Affairs in Caracas, is an organ of the Venezuelan government or of the United Nations.

HENRY A. OZGA
Chief, Branch 4
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B4:B.Bowen:bln (30 September 1969)

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee
1 - WH/COG
1 - WH/3/V
1 - 201-284658
1 - CA/CRU
2 - CA/B4

CA - 69 - 933

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: Barbara Bowen
UNIT: CA/34
EXT: 6728
DATE: 30 September 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: CA 5 | INFO | FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH 8, CA/PEG, DO 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO CARACAS 01 15 49 Z OCT 69 42602

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

REF: HVCW-8792 (19 SEPTEMBER 1969)

1. AMICE/31 OA NOW FOUR YEARS OLD. APPREICATE ~~RYBOCK~~ STATION TRACES SOONEST FOR UPDATING.

2. AMICE/31 ALLEGEDLY NOW EMPLOYED "OFFICE OF COORDINATOR OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS" IN CARACAS. IF TRUE, IS THIS A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT BODY OR PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS?

3. FILE: 200-124-192/3 AND 201-284658.

END OF MESSAGE

C/CA/B4 + Lo Flohr
WH/3/V Spera
WH/CA ✓

C/WH C/CA

CS COPY FILED IN - 200-124-192/3

P I C O.

FILE IN 201-284658

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

Ray dossier

DATE : 17 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : C/WH 9

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 18 0208Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 44227

PRITY DIR INFO WASH CITE HAVA 5939

NO NIACT

DESENSITIZED

[illegible]

REF HAVA 6115 (IN 11660)

1. NICOLAS MENDOZA* TOLD HAVA STA 17 NOV THAT HIS BROTHER IGNACIO HAD NOT LEFT HAVA AS PLANNED. IGNACIO NOW PLANS REMAIN HAVA FEW MORE DAYS IN HOPE HE MAY OBTAIN PERMISIION CUBAN GOVT TO LEAVE LEGALLY.

04

Ray Contact with the Hava Station

2. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

FILED 172123Z

END OF MESSAGE

04

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED MENDOZA COMING MIAMI 12 SEPT.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

2/BR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

File copy
AMRUNG-1

SECRET

Ray

8 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact Report on Meeting with AMRUNG-1 201-280613

1. On 5 November at 1130 hours, AMRUNG-1 and [illegible] were met at the Washington Airport by undersigned. They were then taken by taxi to the Mayflower Hotel, where a room had been reserved ... for their use. After having lunch at the hotel, the party adjourned to the room, where AMRUNG-1 was given a short briefing on Francisco Castell, the W/T operator who was scheduled to meet AMRUNG-1 at 1400 hours. 03

2. At 1400 hours, the undersigned went to the lobby of the hotel where Francisco was waiting with Ray Garcia, his escort officer. Garcia was instructed to bring Francisco up to the room. It was agreed in advance of this that all principals would with draw from the room to give AMRUNG-1 an opportunity to talk with Francisco alone. However, it was suggested that Garcia return a half hour before the interview was terminated to clear up any points as to the nature of Francisco's training, or any aspects that AMRUNG-1 might wish to clarify. The interview with Francisco was terminated about 1510 hours, as AMRUNG-1 stated he would be pleased to have Francisco assigned to him. All indications were that a happy rapport was established between the principals and a complete understanding was reached as to the future role of Francisco as the W/T operator for the AMYUM group in Cuba. 03 03 03

3. At approximately 1535 hours, Andy Rogers put in his appearance at the room and was introduced to AMRUNG-1 as Mr. Rodrick. Prior to this meeting, AMRUNG-1 was told that Mr. Rodrick was the coordinator for operations and would like to discuss some of the more specific aspects with him, prior to his return to Cuba. Cecil Cartwright, who had escorted AMRUNG-1 to Washington, asked to sit in on this meeting along with Peters and Rogers, as he felt that WASH should be fully informed on whatever operational matters were discussed with AMRUNG-1 for more effective future coordination between Headquarters and WASH. Rogers indicated no objections to this and stated he was glad to have him sit in at this meeting. 03 03 03 03

4. In substance, Rogers covered most of the highlights dealing with previous attempts to supply the AMYUM group with arms and ammo, and air-maritime operations currently being planned. In this connection, AMRUNG-1 was highly pleased to learn that a 4,000 pound 03

SECRET

9/BK

shipment had been successfully infiltrated to his group during his absence and again urged that more such shipments should be stepped up in the future. 03 Rogers then briefly discussed the SINNFA operation and asked AMRUNG-1 if he didn't think this area for the DZ was already "blown" due to the number of people who already knew of this operation. (This includes 8 other people besides AMYUM-1 and AMRUNG-1.) AMRUNG-1 stated he was not sure, but would investigate this upon his return. However, he felt that this was an excellent DZ site and should be utilized for any subsequent airdrop scheduled in the Pinar del Rio province. 03 Rogers informed AMRUNG-1 that his overlays on various LZ's and DZ's had been received and were being reviewed by the operations people. He complimented AMRUNG-1 on the excellent work of his cartographer and expressed the view that these DZ areas would be put to good use. Finally, he assured AMRUNG-1 that no stone is being left unturned to provide his group with the necessary materiel support which is critically needed and that this support will be stepped up as our infiltration capabilities are increased both by air and sea. In parting, he cautioned AMRUNG-1 not to take any unnecessary chances when he resumed operational activities in Cuba, since his leadership in the AMYUM group was vital to our overall interests. The meeting was terminated about 1720 hours as Rogers and Peters took their departure.
03

5. Some of the more significant highlights of the conversations which took place between AMRUNG-1 and the undersigned prior to his meetings with the W/T operator (Francisco) and Rogers are noted herewith:
03

a. Security: Castro has taken stringent action in tightening up his internal security against counter-revolutionary forces inside Cuba. The militia are being used to search houses for concealed weapons (usually by a block system), and anyone failing to produce proper identification is removed for questioning by the DIER. Hence, AMRUNG-1 and his organization are largely confining their activities to the daylight hours from 0700 to 2000 hours. He considers night operations - particularly on the streets of Havana - as highly dangerous inasmuch as the DIER (security organs) are constantly on the alert to stop individuals on the street to check their identification documents.

b. Documentation of Agents in Cuba: AMRUNG-1 suggested using an identification card issued by the Havana University for their students. He had a sample copy in his possession, which he claims was readily accepted by Castro security forces as being valid. Similarly, a driver's license properly authenicated along with a health certificate were considered to be good "cover" documents for agents operating in the Havana area. A supply of blank identification cards will be turned over to the Station by AMRUNG-1 for transmittal to headquarters for any subsequent documentation of agents who can be passed off as students at the Havana University. (He suggested preparing one for his W/T operator (Francisco).

c. Operational Expenditures: Queried on this aspect, AMRUNG-1 stated his organization would need a minimum of 50 to 60,000 pesos a month to cover their overall operational expenses. These funds are being used for safehouse maintenance, travel expenses, purchase of vehicles and gasoline, allocation of funds to various subdivisions of the AMYUM organization located in various provinces of Cuba, and purchase of food and support of various agents whose families may be in dire need of food and medical supplies.

d. W/T operators: To date, both AMPANIC-14 and AMGLEN-1 have not met the requirements for effective communication with us on AMYUM operations. However, AMRUNG-1 feels that AMPANIC-14 has not been compromised or turned by the DIER and once he gets over his nervous state, it is possible he can still be used. Similarly, although AMGLEN-1 is considered to be a good W/T operator, AMRUNG-1 feels his usefulness to him has been considerably negated by the nature of his assignment at the Naval base and his recent restrictions to this base by orders of the Castro regime. In short, AMRUNG-1 feels communication is the weakest link in his current operations and that direct communications with the Embassy is growing increasingly hazardous, due to the fact that Embassy personnel are under close surveillance by the Castro security forces. For this reason he feels that Francisco will fill a serious void in this respect, once he is infiltrated into the AMYUM organization in Cuba.

e. Support for other anti-Castro groups in Cuba: AMRUNG-1 stated that all materiel support should be funneled directly to his organization for distribution to other anti-Castro groups in Cuba. In his view this would serve as a control factor in unifying the overall effort of the various splinter groups seeking such support in Cuba and would also enhance the prestige of the MRR as the spearhead for the FRENTE. He then went on to add that he was fully aware of our efforts to support other groups in Cuba, which he assumed we were operating with on a unilateral basis. (i.e., he sited Nino Diaz in Oriente). AMRUNG-1 felt this was a serious mistake, as this unilateral support would affect the leadership and direction now being provided by the MRR throughout Cuba. The undersigned told AMRUNG-1 that he agreed on the desirability of a coordinated effort on the part of all counter-revolutionary groups seeking to overthrow Castro using the FRENTE as the rallying center. However, the question of support being directed through one channel namely: his organization in Cuba, was neither feasible nor practical. The fact that Castro had tightened up security throughout the various provinces of Cuba, would make it difficult or impossible for the AMYUM group to ship arms and other equipment from Havana to the eastern most provinces (i.e., Las

Villas, Camaguay or Oriente) without jeopardizing both shipments and personnel. Hence, the need for unilateral action on our part to supply these fighting groups in these provinces. This explanation appeared to satisfy AMRUNG-1, however he still insisted that his organization should at least be appraised of any materiel support provided other groups in Cuba. He was assured that we would take his request under consideration.

f. AMBIDDY-1: AMRUNG-1 feels that no useful purpose would be served in sending his associate to join forces with him in Havana. He feels that AMBIDDY-1 should continue to represent the AMYUM faction in the FRD and when the counter-revolutionary forces are fully prepared to overthrow the Castro regime, AMBIDDY-1 will be brought into the Pinar del Rio to direct the AMYUM forces in this province.

g. Manolo Ray: AMRUNG-1 considers RAY as a highly dangerous individual because of his great ambition to play a prominent role in any subsequent Cuban government following the overthrow of the Castro regime. In his opinion, RAY poses a serious threat to VARONA's leadership and the FRD inside Cuba. He is attempting to draw various dissident groups to his banners and appears to have support from the middle class represented by business interests, politicians, and the professional class. Should RAY be persuaded to join forces with the FRD, AMRUNG-1 thinks he will continue to operate on a unilateral basis while seeking to supercede the FRD with his own organization in Cuba.

h. Tony Varona and the FRD: Although AMRUNG-1 recognizes the need to support the FRD as a political front for rallying counter-revolutionary groups against the Castro regime, he nonetheless feels that the FRENTE and Tony VARONA have lost considerable face in Cuba by inaction and political maneuvering. He further pointed out that he is aware that thousands of dollars had been poured into the FRENTE, but dissident groups in Cuba have seen no evidence of any of this money to support their efforts to overthrow Castro. Hence, confidence in the FRD is at a relatively low ebb among the people in Cuba and a new shot in the arm in the form of materiel and financial support is needed to restore this confidence. According to AMRUNG-1 this support must be forthcoming soon because such people as Manolo RAY are taking the initiative and will soon control the entire counter-revolutionary movement in Cuba.

John D. Peters

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

File

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

03

ORIG: GRACE ROBERTS:dla
UNIT: WH/4/PA
EXT: 8715
DATE: 28 OCT 1960

687

TO: JMASH HAVANA
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 9
INFO: COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

G. R.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED OCT 31 21 49z '60
X ROUTINE U CABLE SECT
PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT 87264
OUT87264

TO MASH INFO HAVA CITE DIR 09095

JMWEST 09095

05,05,05,05

1. POA GRANTED AMBANG, UTRERA VALDES, MORFFI MACHADO, ROS PEREZ, AND HERNANDEZ BETANCOURT.

05 (here)

2. FOR MASH: REQUEST BIOG DATA FOR POA ON JUAN ESTEVEZ RAMIROS. HQS DATA INSUFFICIENT.

END OF MESSAGE

03

R. D. Gahagan for
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. D. ESTERLINE, C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

418R

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

049 JN/JG/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

SECRET

DATE : 16 DECEMBER 1958
TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION : WH 5
INFO : COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, PP 2, PP/PRD, PP/PYD 2, PP/PMD, IOD 4, DD/I, AD/CI, S/C 2

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

DEC 17 07 44 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 38553

TO DIR INFO SACU CITE HAVA 0693

INTEL

DA 16 DEC

APPR: PARAS 1,4 (2) PARAS 2,3 (3) PARAS 5-6

SOURCE: PARA 1 [GEORGE K HARPER,] LAS VILLAS PLANTATION OWNER (F) PARAS 2,3 AMARIA (B) PARA 4 AMBARK-1 (C) PARA 5 6 [HARRY GRAHAM] (F) FROM DR MEMBER (F)

OS

1. ERNESTO GUEVARA HAS MOVED WESTWARD. HIS EXACT LOCATION NOT KNOWN BUT 165 MEN THOUGHT TO BE UNDER HIS COMMAND ARE CAMPED NEAR MANACAS IN WEST LAS VILLAS. GUEVARA IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE BELIEVED TO BE TO CUT OFF CENTRAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC WEST OF SANTA CLARA. FC: AMBARK-2 CONFIRMS THIS REBEL STRATEGY, SAYS MAY BE PLANNING TRY CUT HIGHWAY AT SANTO DOMINGO. SC: HEAVY TRUCKS CANNOT TRAVEL EAST OF SANTA CLARA. BACKROADS CAN BE USED BY AUTOS AND LIGHT TRUCKS.

2. 26TH OF JULY REPLACING CTC LABOR OFFICIALS WITH OWN PEOPLE ON SUGAR CENTRALES WHICH IT CAPTURES. CONRAD BEQUER DIAZ, WITH HQS IN SIERRA MAESTRA, IN CHARGE OF THE PROGRAM.

239271

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

2/60

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

SECRET

DATE : 16 DECEMBER 1958

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

[illegible]

PAGE 2

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

ROUTINE

IN 38553
HAVA 0593

TO INFO CITE

3. MANUEL RAY, MRC CHIEF, IS VISITING SIERRA MAESTRA FOR CONFERENCE WITH FIDEL CASTRO DISCUSS CASTRO DESIRE DISSOLVE MRC AND INCORPORATE IT INTO 26TH JULY.

4. SMALL FEU FORCE ACTIVE NEAR COLISEO IN MATANZAS. ARMS SHIPMENT SEIZED IN CAYO HUESO, FLA WEEK 7 DEC WAS PURCHASED BY FEU FOR USE IN HAVA.

5. BATISTA HAS CONTRACTED FOR SERVICES 2 FRENCH ARMY OFFICERS EXPERIENCED IN GUERRILLA WARFARE TO ADVISE CUBAN ARMY.

20-3

SUPDATA: HQS MAY WISH QUERY [PARI] ON PARA 5.

DISSEM EMB DEF ORALLY.

RELEASED 161830Z

END OF MESSAGE

239698

SECRET

1/80

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief, JMWAVE

SUBJECT GYROSE/AMCONCERT-1
Report on Cira MARTINEZ

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

Attached herewith is an AMCONCERT-1 report on Cira *MARTINEZ, a confidante of Manuel RAY.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment: h/w
Copies of report (2)

Distribution:
3-Headquarters w/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
2 Nov 62

DATE DISPATCHED
NOV 6 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 6460

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-33

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Attach to UFGA-6468

Miami, 8 Oct 62

REPORTING AGENT: AMCONCERT-1

SUBJECT: Cira MARTINEZ, aka: "Cirita", very closely connected to Manuel RAY.

SOURCE: Marta DIEZ Rivas. Married to Dr. Ricardo MACHIN. Has connect in Havana with various anti-Communist organizations.

On a visit I made to source, she told me that she had met Mrs. Cira MARTINEZ in Havana. That Mrs. MARTINEZ used the clandestine pseudonym "Josefina" and was married to architect Frank MARTINEZ. That both subject and her husband were persons in the absolute confidence of engineer Manuel RAY, and "Josefina" had been RAY's secretary for a long time.

Source claims to have learned from "Josefina" that she was dissatisfied with RAY's political actions, to the extent that RAY wanted her to join the executive of the organization J.U.R.E. but she had refused because she did not agree with the/~~[illegible]~~ policies of this organization. That "Josefina" had described this organization as a political movement the same as Castroism, only changing the name of the leader. That she knows the plan of this organization is to organize all anti-BATISTA and anti-CASTRO organizations, under the direction of the J.U.R.E., and develop a nationalistic and especially an anti-American policy in order to be able to group all the elements existing in Cuba that have not figured prominently in the CASTRO regime. After the fall of the CASTRO regime they plan to form a strong political party in Cuba and capitalize on the mistakes committed by the provisional Government. With this objective in mind, they will stay separated from the C.R.C. and from all relations with the U.S. Government in order to be able to carry out their plan freely.

Mrs. Cira MARTINEZ lives with her husband at 1004 NE 17th St., Miami, phone number PL-8-0483 on which they talk to many persons related with RAY's plan.

NOTE: One of RAY's most trusted leaders in Miami is still Osorio DAVILA, former treasurer of the 26th of July Movement and man in the absolute confidence of Haydee SANTAMARIA. For a long time DAVILA was the Chief of the Havana Immigration Department, until he came to the U.S. by boat from the coast of Matanzas. Some days ago I submitted a detailed report on Osorio DAVILA, and also on CISNEROS and many other

8 Oct 62, subj: Cira MARTINEZ (cont.)

known leaders of J.U.R.E., because there is another group of individuals whose names are not advertised but who have command powers in the J.U.R.E. One of these men is Ignacio LEDON, former leader of the 26th of July Movement, private secretary of the Commissioner of Havana Jose LLANUSA, and G-2 delegate in Havana City Hall. LEDON persecuted many persons in the City Hall because he was the one who made the lists of persons who should be watched, to the G-2. He also had close connections with the Minister of the Interior, Jose A. NARANJO, whom he kept informed about the persons under suspicion who worked in the Ministry of the Interior. One time LEDON visited NARANJO and informed him, in the presence of NARANJO's secretary, Lucy ECHEVERRIA, that he should keep Captain Ramon PADILLA, at that time Chief of the Isle of Pines prison, under surveillance. In 1960 PADILLA was preparing the escape of Captain Jorge SOTUS, and thanks to Lucy's warning PADILLA took precautions and the plan could be carried out. Ignacio LEDON lives in Miami but I don't know his home address. Although he later declared himself an anti-Communist, and I think he sought asylum in the Brazilian Embassy, I have no trust in him at all.

[redacted] SECRET

30 Oct. 62

On Sunday, October 28, I met twice with Manolo RAY of the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) at the San Juan Intercontinental Hotel, in San Juan, Puerto Rico. My main objectives were: (1) to elicit from him a list of Cubans, presently associated with the Castro regime, who are critical of Castro and might be considered potential defectors; (2) to obtain a list of Cubans, either inside or outside the island, who could be available, in case of an emergency, to help in setting up some kind of provisional government; and (3) to have his general views on the possibility of an insurrectionary movement.

Since I had arranged to return to Washington on the same day, I did not give Ray much time to do a thorough job. However, he was able to furnish me with a list of names, covering points (1) and (2). He promised to provide me with additional information after checking with some of his associates in New York and Miami. His thoughts on the possibility of an insurrectionary movement will be the subject of a separate memorandum.

LIST I

The persons herein indicated are either in Cuba or are working for the Cuban Government. I add my own comments in parenthesis, based on my conversations with Ray.

A - GENERAL

06 [Regino BOTI] - [Minister of Economy] 08
(Ray feels he is disgusted with the Castro regime. Instructions have gone out to sound him out. No reply as yet.)

06 [Commander Efigenio AIMEJEIRAS]
(Said to hold a key command position in Central Cuba and to be thoroughly disgusted. Could be a key man in a top level revolt.)

06 [Commander Lester RODRIGUEZ]
(Has helped the MRP. His allegiance to Castro has considerably weakened)

06 [Commander Pedro MIRET]
(Very close to Rodriguez. Will most probably follow him.)

Commander Rolando CUBELAS
(Is anxious to leave Cuba)

06 [Rafael BETANCOURT]
(Commands an artillery post. His brother [name unfurnished] is actively against the regime.)

[redacted] SECRET

6/920

[redacted] SECRET

-2-

← To protect identity of Luis Pinedo — suggest we redact "Policia Judicial"

06 [Captain Luis PINEDO Pérez (Terry)]
(Chief of the "Poli
talked against Cast

06 [Commander Faustino PEREZ]
(Former Minister. I ist
views. Probably und man,
in Ray's opinion.)

06 [Commander Antonio E. LUZON]
(Favorable to the MR

06 [Commander Bernabe ORDAZ]
08
(In charge of [Mazorra

06 [José NARANJO]
(Held key position in Havana province. Reported to have expressed strong views against Castro.)

06 [José ASSEF]
(Formerly connected with "Gobernación". Also in opposition to Castro).

06 [Sebastián ARCOS]
(Formerly connected with the Finance Ministry. Known to be critical of regime.)

06 [Enrique IBARRA]
08
(Under-Secretary [of Public Works.] Favorably inclined to the MRP)

06 [Armando FRANCO]
(Present post unknown. Reported to be against Castro.)

06 [Alfredo YABUR]
08
([Minister of Justice.] Conflicting reports as to his Allegiance to Castro.)

06 [Carlos LECHUGA]
11
(Ambassador to [Mexico.] Has recently written to an MRP Friend. Weak willed, might be anxious to defect.)

06 [Enrique RODRIGUEZ Loeche]
11
(Cuban Ambassador to [Morocco.] Presumed to be anti-Castro.)

06 [José PELLON]
(One of the executive members of the "Confederación de Trabajadores Cubanos" - Cuban Workers' Union. Has been in contact with the MRP.)

[redacted] SECRET

18/90

06 José DIAZ (Another labor leader, known to be anti-Castro.)

06 Captain Manuel CARBONEL (Assistant to 06 ALMEJEIRAS. In opposition to regime.)

06 Commander Guillermo GARCIA (Active in the western provinces. The MRP is checking on a report regarding his disaffection.)

06 Antonio ESCOCEMA (Was in command until recently of a naval post in BARACOA. 10 Definitely anti-Castro).

06 José OGLE Colón (Also from Baracoa. In charge of one of the militia regiments.)

06 Manuel PEREZ 08, 10 (Municipal Treasurer, Baracoa. Decidedly anti-Castro.)

06 Taras DOMITRO (Held government position in Oriente. Known to be Anti-Castro.)

06 Captain Duque ESTRADA (Has helped the MRP)

The "Alcaldes" (Mayors) of 10 Guanajuay and 10 San Cristobal are believed to be against the regime.

06 José Angel ROMERO (A former businessman from Baracoa.)

06 Juan GUILLARON (Also from Baracoa. A public accountant.)

06 Elio HARDO (Former mayor of 10 Artemisa)

06
Heriberto DEL PORTO
Erasmo GOMEZ
José SANCHEZ
José MUZA
Danilo MESA
Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt
Manuel DORTA Duque

(Could be helpful in Havana Province.)

08

06 Agustín TORE
(From Camaguey. Former governor in 1959-60.
Trusted by the original revolution.)

06 Osorio DAVILA
(Very respected in Matanzas. Also linked with
the original revolution.)

10

06 Argelio MARTINEZ
(Former commissioner in Matanzas.)

10

06 José DEL RIO Lago
(A respected land surveyor in Pinar del Río.
Former Commander of the July 26 Movement.)
08

The main center of conspiracy within the government against Castro, according to Ray, is the Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación.)

B - TRAINED PERSONNEL

1. The following list includes technicians working for the government under contract or as public officials. Those marked with an asterisk (*) are highly trusted by Ray.

08.

06 Arq. Joaquín SEBARES
Public Works, Oriente Province (Aguilera 558,
Guantánamo)

06 * Arqu Carlos MARURI (Maruri, Jr.)
Municipality of Havana

08

06 * Arqu. Armando PUENTES
Public Works, Havana (Ave. 26 Between 29 & 27
Vedado)

06 * Arq. Marianao DOU Riera
Municipality of Havana
08 Sta. Catalina 360, Víbora, Havana

06 * Arq. Rodolfo SANCHEZ García
Public Works, Havana
25 - #5609, Marianao 08

06 * Arq. Fernando NUÑEZ de Villavicencia
Public Works, Oriente
Ave. 9-A #15007, Rpto. Cinódromo, Marianao, 08

06 * Arq. Gerardo CONLEY Van Der Gutch (Public Works, Habana)
N #408 Between 27 & Jovellar, Havana
08

21/80

06 Arq. Julio ALDECOCEA 08
(Las Villas) Edfi. Retiro Odontológico 1302,
Vedado.

06 ** Arq. José MARZOL Valenzuela
Professor at University of Havana
Soto #50 Corner 1st, Arroyo Narando 08

06 Arq. Antonia SUAREZ
Public Works, Havana
Ave. 11 #4813, Marianao 08

06 ** Arq. Joaquín PELAEZ Canellada,
INRA, Havana
Infanta No. 24 - Apt. 601, Havana 08

06 * Francisco LARA,
88 A - #5307, Marianao 08
Truck business

06 Messrs. Manuel and Mario LOPEZ
194 #6510 - Between 65 y 73 Marianao 08
Foremen in Public Works, Las Villas

06 * Arq. José CANAVES Ugalde 08
Ave. 26 & Zoológico, Havana

2. Other trained personnel, not connected with the government:

06 Arq. Pedro GUKSH (?),
Was in Public Works, Havana

06 * Arq. Felipe GOMEZ Albarrán (
Ex-professor University of Havana and Vilanova

06 * Arq. Carlos MOURIN
Was in Public Works, Havana
Ave. Zoológico 202, Vedado 08

06 Arq. Ricardo COROMINAS Guspert 08
28 No. 270 Bet. 21 and 23 Vedado

06 Arq. Alberto COURIEL 08
Calzada No. 1059 Corn of 14, Vedado

06 Arq. Rodolfo SOCARRAS Sanchez 08
Extension of Maceo, El Llano, [illegible]

06 Arq. Miguel ALCOLADO de la Torre 08
Máximo Gómez No. 3, Guantánamo

06 Arq. Rodulfo IBARRA Perez
President, National College of Architects, 08
15 No. 259, Vista Alegre, Santiago de Cuba.

06 * Arq. Sebastian J. RAVELO, 08
Terraza No. 155, Santiago de Cuba

06 Arq. Emilio CARBO, 08 No. 8610 Between 86 and 88, Miramar, Havana

06 Arq. Everardo GARCIA Fernández, 5a Ave., 6602 08
Marianao

06 * Mr. Anastasio ROSEMOND, Contractor 08
180 No. 4107 - Bet. 41 and 43, Marianao

06 Mr. Manolo RODRIGUEZ, Garage,
26 No. 502, Vedado 08

06 * Mr. Humberto RODRIGUEZ, 08
Plumber 60-A, 2114, Marianao

06 * Mr. Manuel LOBELLA,
Electrician - Marianao.

06 ** Arq. Antonio VIEGO,
Altahabana (Municipality of Marianao) 08

06 * Arq. José Roberto CEOMAT, Ex-Dean University, School of Architecture
3rd Ave. #130 - Bet. 12 & 14, Marianao

October 30, 1962

18/920

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief, Task Force W

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Operational/TYROSE/BUDESK

Debriefing of Miguel Angel ORELLANA Rodriguez [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI

1. Subject was removed from CAC on 3 [illegible] and taken to a safe site where he was debriefed for [illegible]. The [illegible] of the debriefing was to ascertain the Subject's [illegible] Cuba and determining if he had any relationship with the G-2 or any other Security organization.

2. During the course of the debriefing the Subject appeared to be willing to cooperate and there were no indications of any attempt of deception. However, it is believed that the Subject is a sharp operator, an opportunist and an individual who lives by his wits. He is very verbose, loud and attempts to hold the floor at all times.

3. ORELLANA claims that he had no relationship with the Cuban G-2, that he knew Ramiro VALDES, Chief of the G-2, and Manuel PINEIRO, Deputy Chief of the G-2, but that he never conducted any business with them. He stated that he knew many G-2 agents by sight but never knew their names. He is of the opinion that all members of the G-2 are Communists and individuals of very low caliber.

4. Subject was granted asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy on 06, 08 8 April 1962, which was obtained through the [illegible] of [Fernando RODRIGUEZ, leader of the Chauffeurs Union,] who knew the Uruguayan Ambassador. According to Subject he had to seek asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy because he was in danger of being picked up by the Cuban Security Services. He claims that in [illegible] 1961 he was engaged in the transportation of material and personnel from Habana to the "Segundo Frente" in the Escambray Mountains, in the Province of Santa Clara. At that time he was cooperating with 06 06 [Captain (fnu) SALAS, Elio BALMASEDA,] "Benito," "Critico," Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo, [Kiko ANSA,] [Captain Ramiro LORENZO] 06 and [Bernardo PARALTIA.] 06 According to 06 Subject, an individual named "[illegible]" was arrested in March 1962 and during the course of his interrogation

(continued)

Attachment: herewith
History

Distribution:
3 - C/TFW w/att

18 Sept 62

UFGA-5775

SECRET

201-[illegible]

5/RV

by the Security Service, "[illegible]" [illegible] including the Subject. In view of [illegible] had [illegible] of [illegible].

5. [illegible] admitted that during the [illegible] engaged in negotiations for the purchase of [illegible] combat Batista. That during the months of September [illegible] he was in Los Angeles, California where he travelled [illegible] purpose of purchasing arms from a John [illegible] of Los Angeles. He said that he did not purchase the arms from [illegible] but that he did make arrangements for the [illegible] elements to obtain these arms from [illegible]. It is believed that the Subject may have engaged in other [illegible] which he did not mention. This deduction is based on the information he provided in the attached Personal History Statement regarding his travel and the short term jobs he held in the past.

6. Subject also admitted that he was arrested on 26 April 1961 by the DTI because of his connection with a group engaged in the purchase and sale of U.S. currency in the black market. According to Subject he was a [illegible] RAMOS [illegible] who was engaged in the purchase of U.S. currency which he endeavored to take out of the country. Two of RAMOS' associates, Vicente Benito MUSEL Hernandez and Juan [illegible] Herrera, were arrested by the Security Services. Allegedly [illegible] and RODRIGUEZ informed the Security Services that the Subject knew the whereabouts of RAMOS. Subject was arrested and asked to provide the address of RAMOS. Subject denied that he knew RAMOS and after being held for four days he was bailed out by MUSEL and RODRIGUEZ, who were released a few days before the release of Subject.

7. Subject denies any association with the Communist Party, G-2 or any other Security Service. He states that he hates Communism and is willing to do anything in his power to combat Communism and liberate Cuba. Subject [illegible] of [illegible] interest and was returned to [illegible] for [illegible]. [illegible] does not contemplate any future contact with [illegible].

8. JMWAVE traces reflect the following information on some of the individuals mentioned in this dispatch:

a. Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo - Probably identical with Subject of 201-283349; [redacted] [illegible] July [illegible], [illegible] August 1961, [redacted] 1 September 1961; and [illegible], [illegible] 1961.

b. Aurelio SILVA - Probably identical with Aurelio SILVA, former member of Cuban National Police, see [illegible]-[illegible]47, 19 June 1961.

c. Domingo MENDEZ - Probably identical with Domingo MENDEZ mentioned in HKH-05284, 24 September [illegible].

d. General Genovevo PEREZ Davera - believed to be identical with Genovevo PEREZ Damera, one-time chief of staff of the Cuban Army. See HKHA-5580, 20 October 1955.

There are no identifiable traces on all other individuals mentioned in this dispatch.

END OF DISPATCH

ARMS
[illegible]

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In)   CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS   NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

RB Indexing (check one): Marked ☐ None required ☐ Signature:

COUNTRY CUBA
REPORT NO. TDCS -3/490,978.
SUBJECT STATEMENTS OF MANOLA RAY, EXILE LEADER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
DATE DISTR. 24 OCTOBER 1961
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO. OCTOBER 1961 15-1
REFERENCES IN 11257
PLACE & DATE ACQ. [ENGLAND, LONDON] (24 OCTOBER 1961)
APPRAISAL 3
FIELD REPORT NO. [OEL-]30,995 23

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE] FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS". 24

1. MANOLO RAY, EXILE LEADER OF MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT) SAID IN EARLY OCTOBER THAT HE WAS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY INVASION OF CUBA, INSISTING THAT CASTRO'S OVERTHROW WAS TO BE ACHIEVED BY INTERNAL RESISTANCE AND THIS HAD ALREADY STARTED.

2. THE MRP WAS ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND AND SUPPORTED BY ALL CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. IT HAD MEMBERS IN ALL 33 TRADE UNIONS, THE G-2, MILITIA AND THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION. RAY ESTIMATED 80 PERCENT OF POPULATION WERE OPPOSED TO CASTRO, THOUGH MAJORITY WERE NOT ACTIVELY SO. HE CONSIDERED THE MRP AT PRESENT ENJOYED MORE SUPPORT THAN THE ORIGINAL REVOLUTION HAD

SECRET   CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS   NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	EXO	FBI

I&NS TREASURY CINCLANT

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (23)

3/90

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

536 PA

201-239298 Ry
REF 19-11c-22

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 24 OCT 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [LONDON] 15-1

ACTION: IW 2

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O4, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, ~~FI/INT 6, ..., CELL 5,~~ WH 16, WE 7, DD/I(A), DD/I(L), AD/CI, OS 2, S/C 2.

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI-file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ Name required ☐

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 24 2131Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 11257

TDCS -3/490,978

DIR INFO CARA CITE [LOND] 8769 201-1

ANDRE ACTING

INTEL DYVOUR 01

SUPDATA SOURCE [SMOTH] 2

TIME FILED 1310Z

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL [OEL]-30,995 CUBA 23

SUBJ STATEMENTS OF MANOLO RAY

DOI OCTOBER 1961

PADA [ENGLAND LONDON] 24 OCTOBER 1961 15-1 24

SOURCE [OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE] FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS".

RI COPY

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

WH/REG	5	WH/4/PM	2	WE/R	1		TDCS PRECEDENCE
WH/RE	1	WH/PACY	2	WE/O/R	2		
WH/FI	2	WH/1/V	1				
WH/PW	1	OS/SSD	1			XX	ROUTINE
WH/4	2	WE/P	4			23	PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:
EJM Delaney
E.J.M.DELANEY

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
24 OCTOBER 2244 Z 61

BASED ON: [OEL]-30,995
NP [SMOTH] 01
LIAISON: C

SECRET

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

8/20

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

☐ 201-239218 30 **SECRET**

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION: SAS 8 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1735 19 JUN DD)

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, RI/AN, WE 4, WH 7, S/C 2

WAILS AND GREEN COPIES MATCHED

RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce

IN63271

S E C R E T 1
7727Z

KPRITY DIR INFO PRITY MADR SJAN WAVE ROUTINE BRUS CITE PARI 9068

TYPIC

REF A PARI 9008 (IN 61964)* 19 JUN 1963

B PARI 9049 (NOT SENT SJAN BRUS) (IN 63094)

1. RAY CONTACTED BY JERVAY (UNDER IDEN A ALIAS) 17 AND 18 JUNE. IN ADDITION CONTACTS REPORTED PARA ONE PARI 8824 (IN 56769) RAY HAS ALSO BEEN IN CONTACT 02 UNRUMBLE 6, 02 UNPAPIST, AND AT LEAST ONE CONTACT WITH AMSPORT 1. RAY DESIGNATED 02 UNRUMBLE 6 AS HIS CONTACT MAN PARI. JERVAY NOT INTRODUCED BUT WILL CONTACT SHORTLY. STA FEELS THIS IS GOOD MOVE SINCE 02 UNRUMBLE 6 APPEARS BE GOOD MAN AND HAS APPROACHED EMB IN PAST SEPARATELY FROM 02 UNRUMBLE 2 WITH SOME INTERESTING PLANS. STA DID NOT APPROACH HIM DIRECTLY IN PAST BECAUSE DID NOT WANT TO DISTURB RELATIONSHIP WITH 02 UNRUMBLE 2. 02 UNRUMBLE 2 WILL NEVERTHELESS BE WRITING 02 UNRUMBLE 6 CURRENT RELATIONSHIP. RAY WAS DRIVEN AIRPORT BY ALBERTO BAEZ WITH WHOM RAY SPENT MUCH TIME AND WHO SEEMS BE CLOSEST TO RAY AMONG HIS CONTACTS PARIS.

2. CABRERA DID NOT PHONE OR COME PARIS OVER WEEKEND. WILL CONTINUE MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH 02 UNRUMBLE 6.

GROUP 1 EXCLUDING FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

9/PW

3. RAY BELIEVES CABRERA WILL WORK ON ARCOS BUT SAYS MAN WHO COULD REALLY DO THE JOB IS ARCOS UNCLE WHO IN PUERTO RICO AND KNOWN TO RAY. HE COULD NOT REMEMBER NAME OR EXACT RELATIONSHIP BUT PLANS CONTACT HIM ON RETURN AND GROOM HIM FOR TASK. RAY ASKED BE INFORMED WHEN ARCOS RETURNS BRUS.

24

4. KUBARK STAFFER (IDEN B) OF CONGRESS OF CULTURAL FREEDOM MET RAY AT LEAST TWICE. EXCELLENT RAPPORT. HE ARRANGED RAY'S PRESS INTERVIEW WITH GUILLON DE MOULINS (INCORRECTLY REPORTED IN PARA FIVE PARI 8947) (IN 60159) OF LE MONDE. ALSO ARRANGED DINNER 13 JUNE. WAS NONCOMMITAL BUT ENCOURAGING ABOUT JOB POSSIBILITY FOR FRANQUI SHOULD HE DEFECT.

5. RAY SEEMS TO BE CONFIDENT FRANQUI WILL JOIN HIS CAMP IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE AND RELYING ON CABRERA TO CONTINUE WORKING ON HIM. STA NOT SO CONVINCED AND PLANS PROCEED ALONG LINES DIR 48158 AND PARI 9067 (IN 63152) (NOT SENT SJAN BRUS).

08 02 24

6. POSSIBLE REFERENCE TO GUEDE TALK WITH FRANQUI IS IN 8 JUNE UNSOX. AMB GRAMATGES MENTIONS TO SINOBAS THAT MARIO (PRESUMABLY THIRD SECY MARIO GRACIA VARELA) CALLED FROM THE EXHIBITION SAYING THAT SOME ANTI-CASTRO ELEMENTS WERE ABOUT AND THAT FRANQUI ASKED FOR SOME MORE PEOPLE FROM THE EMBASSY TO BE AROUND THE EXHIBITION.

02 02 24 24

ALSO 12 JUNE UNSIERRA UNSNAFU 12 COMMENTS TO UNSNAFU 16 THAT SOME "GUSANOS" WERE AT THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EXHIBITION AND THE FRENCH POLICE WENT BY CUBAN EMB TO ASK IF THEY SHOULD GUARD THE EXHIBIT. HOWEVER THIS LATTER PROBABLY NOT REFERENCE TO GUEDE. OTHER THAN THIS STA HAS NO INDICATION FRANQUI HAS TALKED ABOUT APPROACH TO HIM.

7. RAY FEELS TRIP EUROPE WAS VERY PROFITABLE. DESPITE FACT HE HAS NO FIRM COMMITMENT FROM FRANQUI, CABRERA OR ARCOS HE

SECRET

6/N

SEEMS CONFIDENT THEY WILL JOIN HIM EVENTUALLY. HE FEELS HE HAS TIGHTENED UP AND INSPIRED HIS "ORGANIZATION" PARIS. SAYS HAS GAINED IMPRESSION FROM TALKS WITH CUBANS HERE THAT DISILLUSIONMENT AMONG CUBAN EMBASSIES AND OFFICIALS INSIDE CUBA HAS GROWN CONSIDERABLY. RAY CONVINCED IT POSSIBLE TO OVERTHROW CASTRO CLEANLY AND SIMPLY. WANTS DEVOTE OWN APPARATUS TO IDENTIFYING DISAFFECTED ELEMENTS IN CUBA AND BUILDING UP SUPPLY APPARATUS IN AND OUTSIDE CUBA TO SERVE THEM.

8. RAY ASKED FOR FOLL:

A. UP TO DATE LIST OF PERSONNEL AND ADDRESS OF ALL CUBAN EMBASSIES IN EUROPE TO BE PASSED HIM IN SJAN AND 02 [UN]RUMBLE 6 IN PARIS. HE WANTS BEGIN MAILING PROPAGANDA AND LETTERS TO STIMULATE FURTHER DISAFFECTION PERSONNEL.

B. TRAINING OF HIMSELF IN SJAN AND 02 [UN]RUMBLE 6 PARI IN IDENTICAL SW SYSTEM WHICH THEY CAN USE FOR CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SJAN AND PARI AND ALSO INTO CUBA. STA FELT BOTH THESE IDEAS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AND RAY WAS TOLD COULD BE DONE. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS PROVISION OF ITEM A AND DESIGNATION OF SW SYSTEM.

C. RAY ALSO ASKED WE LINE UP JOB FOR CABRERA AS EUROPE REP SOME PAPER AS DISCUSSED WITH NAUMAN PER PARI 8947. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS FOLLOWUP ON THIS.

9. FEEL ONE SOLID ACCOMPLISHMENT OF RAY'S TRIP WAS RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING RELATION WITH RAY. BELIEVE HE HIT IT OFF WELL WITH NAUMAN GROVERY AND JERVAY AND GAINED CONFIDENCE OUR SUPPORT WHICH MAY ALLEVIATE SOMEWHAT SOME PAST PROBLEMS KUBARK RELATIONSHIP.

10. INDEX.

C/S COMMENT: *RAY DEPARTING PARI AF 015 ARRIVING NY 1300 HOURS 18 JU

S E C R E T

SECRET

2/17V

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

30 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3	NOB	6	3

CI
INTEL
OPS
SOVAR
SO/SB
SPEC
FILES
LOG
FIN
SEC
MARI
TR/O

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION: SAS 8 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1735 19 JUN DO)

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, RI/AN, WE 4, WH 7, S/C 2

S E C R E T I
7727Z

IN63271

KPRITY DIR INFO PRITY MADR SJAN WAVE ROUTINE BRUS CITE PARI 9068

TYPIC

REF A PARI 9008 (IN 61964)*

19 JUN 1963

B PARI 9049 (NOT SENT SJAN BRUS) (IN 63094)

1. RAY CONTACTED BY JERVAY (UNDER IDEN A ALIAS) 17 AND 18 JUNE. IN ADDITION CONTACTS REPORTED PARA ONE PARI 8824 (IN 56769) RAY HAS ALSO BEEN IN CONTACT UNRUMBLE 6, UNPAPIST, AND AT LEAST ONE CONTACT WITH AMSPORT 1. RAY DESIGNATED UNRUMBLE 6 AS HIS CONTACT MAN PARI. JERVAY NOT INTRODUCED BUT WILL CONTACT SHORTLY. STA FEELS THIS IS GOOD MOVE SINCE UNRUMBLE 6 APPEARS BE GOOD MAN AND HAS APPROACHED EMB IN PAST SEPARATELY FROM UNRUMBLE 2 WITH SOME INTERESTING PLANS. STA DID NOT APPROACH HIM DIRECTLY IN PAST BECAUSE DID NOT WANT TO DISTURB RELATIONSHIP WITH UNRUMBLE 2. UNRUMBLE 2 WILL NEVERTHELESS BE WITTING UNRUMBLE 6 CURRENT RELATIONSHIP. RAY WAS DRIVEN AIRPORT BY ALBERTO BAEZ WITH WHOM RAY SPENT MUCH TIME AND WHO SEEMS BE CLOSEST TO RAY AMONG HIS CONTACTS PARIS.

2. CABRERA DID NOT PHONE OR COME PARIS OVER WEEKEND. WILL CONTINUE MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH UNRUMBLE 6.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDING FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3. RAY BELIEVES CABRERA WILL WORK ON ARCOS BUT SAYS MAN WHO COULD REALLY DO THE JOB IS ARCOS UNCLE WHO IN PUERTO RICO AND KNOWN TO RAY. HE COULD NOT REMEMBER NAME OR EXACT RELATIONSHIP BUT PLANS CONTACT HIM ON RETURN AND GROOM HIM FOR TASK. RAY ASKED BE INFORMED WHEN ARCOS RETURNS BRUS.

4. KUBARK STAFFER (IDEN B) OF CONGRESS OF CULTURAL FREEDOM MET RAY AT LEAST TWICE. EXCELLENT RAPPORT. HE ARRANGED RAY'S PRESS INTERVIEW WITH GUILLON DE MOULINS (INCORRECTLY REPORTED IN PARA FIVE PARI 8947) (IN 60159) OF LE MONDE. ALSO ARRANGED DINNER 3 JUNE. WAS NONCOMMITAL BUT ENCOURAGING ABOUT JOB POSSIBILITY FOR FRANQUI SHOULD HE DEFECT.

5. RAY SEEMS TO BE CONFIDENT FRANQUI WILL JOIN HIS CAMP IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE AND RELYING ON CABRERA TO CONTINUE WORKING ON HIM. STA NOT SO CONVINCED AND PLANS PROCEED ALONG LINES DIR 48158 AND PARI 9867 (IN 63152) (NOT SENT SJAN BRUS).

6. POSSIBLE REFERENCE TO GUEDE TALK WITH FRANQUI IS IN 8 JUNE UNSOX. AMB GRAMATGES MENTIONS TO SINOBAS THAT MARIO (PRESUMABLY THIRD SECY MARIO GRACIA VARELA) CALLED FROM THE EXHIBITION SAYING THAT SOME ANTI-CASTRO ELEMENTS WERE ABOUT AND THAT FRANQUI ASKED FOR SOME MORE PEOPLE FROM THE EMBASSY TO BE AROUND THE EXHIBITION. ALSO 12 JUNE UNSIERRA UNSNAFU 12 COMMENTS TO UNSNAFU [illegible] THAT SOME "GUSANOS" WERE AT THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EXHIBITION AND THE FRENCH POLICE WENT BY CUBAN EMB TO ASK IF THEY SHOULD GUARD THE EXHIBIT. HOWEVER THIS LATTER PROBABLY NOT REFERENCE TO GUEDE. OTHER THAN THIS STA HAS NO INDICATION FRANQUI HAS TALKED ABOUT APPROACH TO HIM.

7. RAY FEELS TRIP EUROPE WAS VERY PROFITABLE. DESPITE FACT HE HAS NO FIRM COMMITTMENT FROM FRANQUI, CABRERA OR ARCOS HE

7

SEEMS CONFIDENT THEY WILL JOIN HIM EVENTUALLY. HE FEELS HE HAS TIGHTENED UP AND INSPIRED HIS "ORGANIZATION" PARIS. SAYS HAS GAINED IMPRESSION FROM TALKS WITH CUBANS HERE THAT DISILLUSIONMENT AMONG CUBAN EMBASSIES AND OFFICIALS INSIDE CUBA HAS GROWN CONSIDERABLY. RAY CONVINCED IT POSSIBLE TO OVERTHROW CASTRO CLEANLY AND SIMPLY. WANTS DEVOTE OWN APPARATUS TO IDENTIFYING DISAFFECTED ELEMENTS IN CUBA AND BUILDING UP SUPPLY APPARATUS IN AND OUTSIDE CUBA TO SERVE THEM.

8. RAY ASKED FOR FOLL:

A. UP TO DATE LIST OF PERSONNEL AND ADDRESS OF ALL CUBAN EMBASSIES IN EUROPE TO BE PASSED HIM IN SJAN AND UNRUMBLE 6 IN PARIS. HE WANTS BEGIN MAILING PROPAGANDA AND LETTERS TO STIMULATE FURTHER DISAFFECTION PERSONNEL.

B. TRAINING OF HIMSELF IN SJAN AND UNRUMBLE 6 PARI IN IDENTICAL SW SYSTEM WHICH THEY CAN USE FOR CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SJAN AND PARI AND ALSO INTO CUBA. STA FELT BOTH THESE IDEAS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AND RAY WAS TOLD COULD BE DONE. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS PROVISION OF ITEM A AND DESIGNATION OF SW SYSTEM.

C. RAY ALSO ASKED WE LINE UP JOB FOR CABRERA AS EUROPE REP SOME PAPER AS DISCUSSED WITH NAUMAN PER PARI 8947. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS FOLLOWUP ON THIS.

9. FEEL ONE SOLID ACCOMPLISHMENT OF RAY'S TRIP WAS RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING RELATION WITH RAY. BELIEVE HE HIT IT OFF WELL WITH NAUMAN GROVERY AND JERVAY AND GAINED CONFIDENCE OUR SUPPORT WHICH MAY ALLEVIATE SOMEWHAT SOME PAST PROBLEMS KUBARK RELATIONSHIP.

10. INDEX.

C/S COMMENT: *RAY DEPARTING PARI AF 015 ARRIVING NY 1300 HOURS 18 JUNE

S E C R E T

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

400
ATE : 19 AUG 62

ROUTING
1 TFW/SA 4 PA/PROP
2 5
3 6

O : DIRECTOR
ROM : MEXICO CITY
CTION: TFW 10
IFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

AUG 19 0125Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 47827

DIR INFO SJAN WAVE CITE MEXI 1743

GYROSE

REF DIR 30436 (OUT 66673)*

01, 24

1. JEREMY K BENADUM, WHO HANDLES LITEMPO VISA CHANNEL, BELIEVES PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE GET MEXICAN VISA BY APPROACHING MEXICAN CONSUL MIAMI OR SJAN. PROBLEM IS GETTING GOBERNACION VISA PERMIT. GOBERNACION HAS LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF APPLICATIONS STACKED UP ON WHICH ACTION NORMALLY BUROCRATICALLY SLOW ANYWAY AND ON WHICH GOBERNACION DOES NOT REALLY DESIRE TAKE ACTION, BECAUSE OF DANGER CUBANS WILL BECOME PUBLIC CHARGES. BEST CHANCE IS FOR ANY HIGH LEVEL MEXICAN OFFICIAL IN MEXICO CITY FRONT FOR AMBANG-1 AND FOLLOW UP CASE CLOSELY THROUGH GOBERNACION. NEXT BEST CHANCE IF A-1 HAS NO SUCH HIGH LEVEL CONTACT IS TO USE ANY CUBAN FRIEND OF HIS MEXI WHO HAS SUCH HIGH LEVEL MEXICAN CONTACT. THIS IS USUAL METHOD. USE OF 24, 01 STATION LITEMPO CHANNEL WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BURN ODYOKE INTEREST IN A-1 BECAUSE 24 HIGH LEVEL GOBERNACION OFFICIALS SOMETIMES KNOWINGLY USE 01 24 LITEMPO VISA CHANNEL THEMSELVES FOR "PERSONAL INTEREST" CASES AND MIGHT VERY WELL BE USING 24 THE CHANNEL THEMSELVES 08 IN A-1'S CASE. IF BY COINCIDENCE 08 A-1'S CUBAN FRIEND MEXI HAPPENED TO APPROACH THEM. STATION HAS NOT DISCOURAGED SUCH USE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 47827 MEXI 1743

OF THE [CHANNEL] 24 BECAUSE IT TENDS TO HELP EVERYONE WHO "IN ACT" TO KEEP MOUTHS SHUT AND TO KEEP [CHANNEL] 24 FROM BEING BRANDED AS EXCLUSIVELY [ODYOKE.] 01

2. WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR A-1 TO ~~Z~~TRY ON HIS OWN AS INDICATED BUT [MEXI] 24 CAN AND WILL ON REQUEST INITIATE AND FOLLOW THROUGH ON ACTION. IMPORTANT THING IS THAT ACTION NOT BE CARRIED ON BY A-1 AND [STATION] 24 SIMULTANEOUSLY. THERE WILL BE NO NEED FOR [STATION] 24 TO INTERVENE WITH MEXI CONSUL MIAMI ONCE VISA PERMIT ISSUED IF NO QUESTION A-1 CAN PROVE HIS ABILITY REENTER PBPRIME WITH SOME DOCUMENT. IF SUCH QUESTION ARISES, MEXI CONSUL WILL PROBABLY CONTACT [STATION CASE OFFICER] 24 (IN ODACID [COVER ROLE) 32 ON OWN. IF NOT A-1 CAN SUGGEST CALLING THEIR USUAL ODACID CONTACT MEXI.

3. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE OBTAINING VISA FOR AMBANG/1.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DW
8

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

3 Jan. 64

TSD/CAP MEMO #646
3 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Special Affairs Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. A. Rodriquez

SUBJECT : Radio Switch Equipment for Demolition Firing Purposes

03 1. After our conversation on 03 this subject on 30 December, the question was discussed with Mr. Jay Alpern, TSD/AOB, and Mr. Lee Poole, TSD/QRF. The following information is forwarded for your consideration as a result of our discussions.

2. Mr. 03 Alpern, Audio Operations Branch, recommends two companies as sources of equipment of this nature. These companies have experience, under classified contracts with TSD, in producing reliable equipment for special purposes of this sort. They also, of course turn out commercial equipment of good quality for normal communications needs. These companies are:

29,08
a. Motorola, Chicago, Illinois
b. Kell, Cambridge, Massachusetts 29,08

The TSD VHF radio switch 29,29 equipment for demolition needs was developed for us by Motorola. 'Kell-Com' transistorized sets have been produced to meet the special needs (not for demolition purposes) of other SAS projects.

3. In the opinion of both persons consulted, the expenses noted in our first discussion should have produced a reasonable amount of workable equipment if the source was both capable and reliable. TSD recommends the use of frequencies in the VHF/UHF spectrum for equipment of this sort and crystal tuning control for reasons of reliability, selectivity and rejection of spurious signals.

4. Inexpensive equipment of Japanese or American manufacture in the citizen's band frequency ranges for toys, radio control devices,

6/pJ

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

short range communications, etc., is available from many manufacturers. Our Quick Reaction Facility can produce a small number of radio switches based on these devices with a considerably lesser degree of security from false signal triggering with a lead time of 6 to 8 weeks. Simple mechanical protection against accidental triggering can be gained by inclusion of counting switches, for example, which require a preset number of firing impulses intentionally transmitted to produce the final closure of a relay and firing of a charge.

5. Reliability of operation in terms of response to a transmitted signal of a given power is quite difficult to predict when conditions of antenna length, orientation and exposure cannot be foreseen. Location of the receiver in a target building will also have a strong bearing on 'range' from the transmitter. Building construction, intervening obstacles and interference from other nearby radio frequency sources will affect performance of the set.

6. If you wish to discuss the problems in greater depth, we recommend a conference with audio technicians or engineers. It may serve to clarify the appropriate characteristics which special or m modified commercial equipment should possess to meet the needs of your operation. Problems of camouflaging the explosive or incendiary material to serve operational requirements would be minor compared to the necessary consideration of effects on the receiver switch concealed within which could have important effects on performance.

Austin M. Jones
AUSTIN M. JONES
C/TSD/CAB/SD

03

Distribution:
2-C/SAS

/PJ

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMBANG-1

1. I met with AMBANG-1 on 27 July 1963 in Miami. The following is a resume of the business transacted at that meeting.

a. Request for High Explosives

AMBANG-1 stated that in view of my outline of strategic targets inside Cuba during our last meeting which took place in Washington on 21 June 1963, he had decided to attempt a sabotage operation against the Havana power plant. He informed me that he has a man employed in the power plant in Havana who is capable of launching this operation. In this connection AMBANG-1 asked if we could make available twenty pounds of high explosives as well as six to eight thermite grenades. AMBANG-1 asked if it were possible to have the twenty pounds broken into smaller lots. In our further discussion of this subject, it became apparent that A-1 would be willing to receive the materiel either in San Juan or inside Cuba, but that he definitely preferred the latter if this were possible. Like in most other instances during our conversation, I advised AMBANG-1 that I would need to discuss this matter with my superiors but that I could tentatively assure him of our ability and willingness to furnish the high explosives in San Juan and possibly inside Cuba. At this point I asked AMBANG-1 if he could foresee the need for materiel of this type inside Cuba. I told him that I asked this question because if his group were prepared now or in the near future for meaningful sabotage action inside Cuba it was conceivable that we could begin the caching of needed materiel inside Cuba. AMBANG-1 assured me that they were in a position to sabotage the electrical plant in Havana. (I did not ask, neither did he specify which plant.) He did not promise immediate action, adding that he wanted to assure himself of the details of the planned operation and the safety-odds of the man involved. A-1 then indicated that he would certainly be in a position to accomplish this mission and others in the future and would be most grateful for any materiel we could put in place. I left the matter with him with the understanding that if it were possible we would proceed with caching the high explosives in the general area of Havana. He assured me of their capability to service and retrieve the cache.

b. Request for Contact in Guantanamo

AMBANG-1 asked me if it would be possible for us to arrange some means for Rogelio Cisneros to visit Guatanamo and talk to his brother who is an employee of the Naval Base and another agent of theirs likewise employed there. The reason A-1 gave for the request was that they wished to inform Ramon Cisneros Diaz of the JURE plans to begin the implementation of their plan of resistance and overthrow of the Castro Regime. I advised A-1 that whereas I would look into this matter as I could tentatively tell him that the chances of accomplishing this were remote.

c. AMBANG-1 Political Plans

AMBANG-1 informed me that he was planning at this time to be in New York on or about 10 August and that following this trip he intended to go to Santo Domingo and Caracas. In Santo Domingo he hoped to set up a small base for operations such as a small house on a farm near the shore which could be used for boat travel to Cuba. Once he had made such arrangements he intended to talk to President Juan Bosch telling him of the plan and asking his acquiescence if not support. AMBANG-1 intends to tell Bosch that he will not embarrass him and will go about his business in a secure and professional manner adding that if he should embarrass Bosch, the latter could disclaim him and A-1 would desist from any further activity there.

So far as AMBANG-1's trip to Caracas is concerned, that will be principally devoted to orienting the JURE representation in that city. In addition, AMBANG-1 will attempt to see and talk to Venezuelan Government officials including President Betancourt.

Some time after this trip AMBANG-1 intends to visit Central America principally Costa Rica and if he can procure a visa, Mexico. The purpose of all his travel is the raising of funds, the general tightening of his organization and discussions necessary to coordinate their efforts.

d. Isolation of Cuba.

AMBANG-1 made it exceedingly clear that the lifeline to his assets inside Cuba had been severely restricted when PAA flights were suspended. Nothing could suit AMBANG-1 more than to have these flights resumed. AMBANG-1's obviously great interest in the resumption of these flights was the most eloquent statement yet of his belief that he has a network, or that he can revive a network within Cuba. At least at this stage of JURE operations, AMBANG-1 does not appear to consider the infiltration of manpower as necessary.

AMBANG-1 stated that the use of flights from Spain and Mexico to Cuba was difficult and costly whereas the Miami-Havana run had been most useful in maintaining contact within Cuba. It was AMBANG-1's opinion that the resumption of PAA flights would be an operational boom to JURE and that whereas he could see Castro making some political capital out of the flights, he believed that some appropriate statement such as "there is no political significance but only a humanitarian and compassionate reason for the reestablishment of this link," would be sufficient to negate any political advantage by Castro.

e. AMBANG-1 Phasing Out of his Employment

AMBANG-1 gave me to believe that he is closing shop and giving up his position with the Corporacion de Renovacion Urbana y Viviendas where he is employed as an engineer in charge of building pre-cast concrete houses. AMBANG-1 stated that during the past week Governor Munoz Marin gave final authority for the erection of a plant to produce these houses in Puerto Rica. AMBANG-1 is torn with the thought of leaving this project which he believes will be most successful, and which would assure his livelihood, but he knows that he must devote himself to the fight against Castro. It is obvious to me that AMBANG-1 will within the next two months phase out of this employment to devote full time to the liberation of Cuba.

f. A JURE Radio Link

AMBANG-1 asked me if I would be able to assist him in the establishment of a San Juan-Caracas-Miami radio link. He explained that the JURE has spent a great deal of money on telephonic communications between these points and were most anxious to set up a means of radio communication in order to economize. I guess that AMBANG-1 could tell from my reaction that I was not too sympathetic to his request for he withdrew it almost as soon as he had made it. He went on to say that this was a problem which they could overcome and I presume that he will seek to establish such radio communications without our assistance.

g. Aerial Maps of Cuba

AMBANG-1 informed me that the JURE membership had brought out of Cuba an entire series of maps showing key roads, bridges, industrial plants, et al, which they had copied by the Aero Service Corporation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. AMBANG-1 stated that they had received most of these photos from the Aero Service Corporation but that the 101 were still missing. He gave me the numbers of those missing and asked if we could procure them. I have since informed AMBANG-1 that it would perhaps be best it he could, or his organization, do this instead but that we would pay the travel of one of his men, should this prove necessary. Attached, hereto, is a copy of the missing photos in question.

h. JURE Organization and Strength

AMBANG-1 informed me that the membership of the JURE in San Juan was now at about 500 members and that each of these individuals makes a weekly contributionto the organization.

In addition there are large JURE organizations in Caracas, Venezuela and Dallas, Texas. There are according to AMBANG-1 a total of thirty delegations in Latin America, the U. S. A. and Europe. He cited as an example the delegation in San Francisco which had recently purchased a typewriter through the collection of green stamps. He added that Rogelio Cisneros had travelled to San Francisco some time ago to communicate with that group and to tighten its organizational activities.

i. AMBANG-1 Asks About ARTIME and the Activities in Central America

AMBANG-1 raised the question of Manuel ARTIME's activities in Central America and particularly in Nicaragua. He stated that any association with Somoza would not help in creating the mistique and political coloration necessary to inspire revolution and resistance from the non-Communists elements in Cuba. Whereas, I had expected AMBANG-1 to go into a long harangue as to the positive damage that ARTIME's actions with Somoza could cause, he left the matter at about this point. I agreed that the Somozas did not have a liberal political reputation throughout Latin America, but added that whatever Cubans could do from that or any vantage point against Communism in Cuba would in my estimation be helpful, -- while I am sure AMBANG-1 did not agree with me, he did not say so. In respect to ARTIME and Miro Cardona, whose name entered into the conversation later, AMBANG-1 took a fairly objective view. He stated that Miro had arrived in San Juan and that he wished him the best as he figured he had suffered enough. Insofar as ARTIME was concerned I gathered that AMBANG-1 might feel that the association with Somoza would not do ARTIME any good in a post-Castro Cuba. As AMBANG-1 is convinced that a government after Castro must be of a progressive liberal stripe, ARTIME was not doing himself any good by identifying himself with the Somozas.

j. A List of Cuban Diplomats

As AMBANG-1 had asked for a list of Cuban Diplomats abroad while we were in Paris, I advised him that such a list had been prepared and we would make it available to him. In this connection he asked if we could include the addresses of each of the Cuban installations. Speaking of diplomats, AMBANG-1 wanted to know if Ambassador Gustavo Arcos had returned from Prague. I informed him that I did not know. AMBANG-1 was most interested to learn that Franqui's wife and children had actually come out of Cuba, and indicated that he would intensify his efforts to maintain contact with Cuban Diplomat Cabrera Infante in Brussels as a means toward the eventual recruitment of Franqui.

k. AMBANG-1 Relation with Jorge Volsky

In conjunction with questions regarding propaganda sent to Cuba, and the JURE's general plans in this field, I asked A-1 about his relation with Jorge Volsky. A-1 stated that he considered Volsky to be an extremely able, serious newspaperman. He added that whereas he saw Volsky frequently on his trips to Miami, the latter did not work for him. A-1 stated that Volsky's work was a full-time job which left him little time to do anything else.

A-1 stated that JURE propaganda was produced by a twelve - man board.

A-1 added that the JURE expected to shortly introduce a statement on its position into Cuba.

l. AMBANG-1 Asks about Two Man Underwater Craft

A-1 asked if I knew anything about a two man type craft which travels through the water. I presume A-1 was talking about the "sea-sled." I advised him that I know little about this type craft, but in my opinion its usefulness for the type activity he had in mind was limited. AMBANG-1 would use this craft for the final phase of an infiltration effort. A-1 stated that this craft was being used at the hotel beaches in San Juan as a type of sporting activity. I will advise him that he could pursue this matter himself as all knowledge on this subject is publicly available.

24

m. AMBANG-1 Trained in [Simple Scorch System]

03

A WAVE technician, [Culver Ladd,] under the name of Mr. Lane trained A-1 to use a [simple scorch system] of S/W. A-1

24

3/PN

was given some eighty pills with which he will be able to make the "ink" used in this system of S/W. A-1 was pleased with the system, especially its simplicity. He will use the system to communicate with his chief delegate in Paris and undoubtedly other persons in Cuba as well as in the other JURE delegations.

n. AMBANG-1 is Writing an Article for Cuadernos

At the request of German Arcienegas, the famed Colombian intellectual, A-1 is preparing an article which is to be published in Cuadernos. The article will deal with the problems facing Latin America and how they can be resolved. A-1 will be in select company as Arcienegas has asked a number of prominent Latin American intellectuals for their views.

o. Communication Between AMBANG-1 and Case Officer

AMBANG-1 gave me the following addresses at which he can be reached:

Corporacion de Renovacion
Urbana y Viviendas
PARADA 31
Ponce de Leon,
Hato Rey
Puerto Rico Telephone No. 723-1671

(NOTE: This is not AMBANG's office or home, but that of a friend who is always able to reach A-1.)

Also:

Mr. Jaime Mitrani
1260 W. 61 Place
Hialeah, Florida

AMBANG-1 was given the following means of contacting me:

Mr. Alfred Fernandez
P. O. Box 1104, Main Post Office
Washington, D. C. Telephone No. 737-8294

AMBANG-1 will use the name "Tony" as a signature in mail to me.

2. General Observations

I beleive AMBANG-1 is planning to return to Cuba. He indicated that he would give the matter serious thought to even go in, disguised, as a legal traveller if that road were generally open, i. e., if rather large numbers of travellers were going in via PAA flights. This line seemed a bit out of character for A-1, for it seems unrealistic and somewhat remindful of Macaulay's references to the state of mind that exiles develop. I also detected what we consider to be a somewhat unrealistic appraisal of the Cuban situation in A-1's estimate that Castro has considerably less than 40% of the Cuban people with him. A-1 may be losing more than a little touch with Cuban reality.

A-1 remains convinced that he is on the right track in working for the eventual overthrow of Castro. He is convinced, however, that two to three years is all the time left for actually destroying the Castro regime, believing that there will be a favorable turn in the Cuban economic situation by late 1965. A-1 is likewise convinced that Castro cannot add to the improvement of Cuba, to the contrary that so long as the principal decisions are made by Castro, the general trend will be confusion arising from a failure to concentrate on specific problems until they are corrected.

AMBANG-1 is likewise convinced that the JURE is building a political group and general outlook which will have an impact on Cuba for many years to come. He is especially concerned with the need to carefully consider each position of his group in order to create the lasting impression that JURE knows where it is going and that its leadership is composed of men who know how to "run" a country without the false starts, confusion and chaos identified with the Castro regime.

AMBANG-1 is likewise greatly concerned with the necessity of not creating an impression inside Cuba that the JURE will return to mete out "justice." It is essential, A-1 states, to convince the general populace that the overthrow of Castro will not result in a bloodbath, rather that the sole aim is to save the revolution that has been betrayed. He is anxious that the people inside Cuba see the JURE as a responsible, intelligent and dispassionate group which is capable of bringing to Cuba all that the revolution promised.

Alfonso Rodriguez
SAS/SO

Distribution:
1 - C/SAS 03
1 - SAS/Bolten; Hecksher; [Amori]
1 - Chrono
1 - RAY File

1/pV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

SECRET 032313Z IN 54031

DIR INFO WAVE MAJA CITE SJOS 6699

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD CABLES.

REF: SJOS 5700 (IN 50434)

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD 52

1. UNDER COVER OF ODACID POLIT OFFICER MICHAEL H. MARTUFFI MET IDEN, VISITING "ENGINEERING CONSULTANT", AT HOME PAO ON 2 APRIL. IDEN REQUESTED PRIVATE TALK IN WHICH HE QUICKLY PUT FORTH THE REQUEST THAT MARTUFFI TELL HIM WHAT WAS KNOWN LOCALLY OF MANOLO RAY'S TRAINING EFFORT IN COSTA RICA. HE SAID "OUR GOVERNMENT ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT JURE GROUP DOING HERE" AS IF HE ODYOKE EMPLOYEE. MARTUFFI SAID PBSWING HAS HEARD RUMORS CUBAN ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES PER RECENT SPEECH MANUEL MORA BUT NOTHING DEFINITE. IDEN SAID HE FRIEND MANOLO RAY AND "WE KNOW HE HAS BOUGHT 100 FOOT BOAT WHICH NOW IN PUERTO RICO" BUT DON'T KNOW WHO BACKS RAY FINANCIALLY.

2. IDEN VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION AND FULL-FLEDGED NAME DROPPER. HIS COMPANY RECENTLY SECURED CONTRACT

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

EXITED HAVA AIRPORT [illegible]. SAID HAD [illegible] [illegible] EUROPE IN NEW YORK. VIEW HIS BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES STATION WONDERS IF HE KUBARKER AND IF NOT FOR WHOM DOES HE WORK. APPRECIATE INFO HIS STATUS IF ANY.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

S E C R E T 0303157 IN 54034

DIR INFO WAVE MANA CITE SJOS 6708

DESENSITIZED

S 6693 (IN 54031)

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD

IDEN - ZACHARY DE CASTER OF SMITH AND GILLESPIE ENGINEERS, JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD CABLES.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

46 SECRET

ROUTING
1 2 3 4 5 6
IOS
EOB DDS LOG CA
CI SI BF
SEC NS

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3
INFO : DDP, VR

S E C R E T 270132Z

DIR INFO SJAN CITE WAVE 8556

27 JUN IN 15975

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMBANG

1. ACCORDING AMFAST-6 REPORT 25 JUNE, AMBANG-1 INFORMED PEPE GATILLO (JOSE GARCIA VALDEZ) THEIR DEPARTURE DATE FOR PBRUMEN WOULD BE 1 JULY. BOAT TO BE USED IS UNNAMED RYBOVITCH RENTED IN FORT LAUDERDALE AND SUPPOSED BE AT INTERNATIONAL MARINE DOCK 26 JUNE. BELIEVED BE 31-FOOTER WITH TWO CHRYSLER ENGINES EACH 280 HORSE POWER AND SPEED 35 KNOTS. AMBANG-1, GATILLO AND MECHANIC TO USE RYBOVITCH WHILE 1950 GREEN CHRIS CRAFT, OWNED BY ARMANDO ACOSTA AND NOW AT ANACAPRI PIER, 1884 NW NORTH RIVER DRIVE, MIAMI TO SERVE AS MOTHER SHIP AND BE OCCUPIED BY ARMANDO ACOSTA, ORLANDO "BEBO" ACOSTA SUAREZ, AND BILL CHUS, AMBANG INTEL CHIEF, CHUS TO SERVE AS MECHANIC AND GO ASHORE WITH AMBANG-1.

201-297784

SCHUSS? 201-281273

2. GATILLO TOLD AMFAST-6 THAT HE AND AMBANG-1 TO LEAVE AT 0500 ON 1 JULY AND TO MEET OTHER BOAT AT 0900 SAME MORNING OFF

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

Ambang 1

PBPRIME COAST WHERE CHRIS CRAFT TO SUPPLY RYBOVITCH WITH 200 GALLONS GASOLINE. THEY EXPECT ARRIVE COJIMAR ABOUT 20 HOURS AFTER DEPARTURE.

06, 08

ON THEIR ARRIVAL THEY TO BE MET BY [RAUL PEREZ, AKA "MIRRINGA," CALLE REAL 138, COJIMAR,] WHO TO TAKE THEM HABANA. [PEREZ'] 06 WIFE'S NAME [ROSA.] 06

3. GATILLO BELIEVES AMBANG-1 ACTUALLY PLANS LEAVE BEFORE 1 JULY BUT HE DOES NOT WANT ANYONE KNOW EXACT DATE. HE HAS TOLD ALL THOSE GOING WITH HIM BE READY BEFORE 1 JULY.

4. ON 24 JUNE GATILLO TOLD AMFAST-6 THAT AMBANG-1 WOULD REMAIN PBRUMEN ABOUT 15 DAYS IN ORDER COORDINATE PLAN OF ACTION WITH PEOPLE THERE AND IN ORDER TO SEE CERTAIN PEOPLE CLOSE AMTHUG-1 WHO PLOTTING WITH AMBANG-1. DATE TO RETURN TO PBRUMEN AND PICK UP AMBANG-1 TO BE SET AT TIME AMBANG-1 LANDS PBRUMEN. AMBANG-1 PLANS CALL ALL ORGANIZATION MEMBERS FOR VERY IMPORTANT MEETING AT WHICH TIME HE TO DEPART FOR PBRUMEN INSTEAD. THIS TO BE 27 OR 28 JUNE.

JOSE? 311334

5. GATILLO ALSO TOLD AMFAST-6 ON 24 JUNE THAT NICOLAS SALADO MATA LEFT 23 JUNE FOR WEST PALM BEACH BY TRUCK WITH TRAILERED BOAT WHICH BELONGS AMBANG ORGANIZATION. MOTOR OF BOAT TO BE REPAIRED IN WEST PALM BEACH AND THEN BOAT TO BE SHIPPED PUERTO RICO ABOARD FERRY. GATILLO SAID TWO MEN CLAIMING BE ODENVY AGENTS WENT TO PIER LOOKING FOR SALADO AND BOAT. THEY ANGRY TO FIND BOTH GONE. GATILLO COMMENTED THEY DID NOT LOOK LIKE ODENVY AGENTS AND HE DOUBTS THEY

3/PV

WERE. AMOT TRACES REVEAL JOSE NICOLAS SALADO MATA BORN 15 MAY 25 IN ISABELA DE SAGUA, LAS VILLAS, LEFT PBRUMEN 25 SEPT 61 AND ARRIVED WAVE AREA ON OLGA ON 27 SEPT. ASSIGNED NUMBER A 12 490 730. WAS FISHERMAN AND KNOWS NORTH COAST VARADERO VERY WELL. (SEE (W/13/-62) WAVE 8375, NOT SENT SJAN, FOR ALLEGED REPORT SALADO TOOK ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO PBRUMEN.)

6. ACCORDING AMRAZZ-1 REPORT 24 JUNE, MAX LESNICK SAID ON 23 JUNE THAT AMBANG-1 INVITED NEW YORK BY CHIEF LATIN AMERICAN SECTION TIME MAGAZINE AND THAT HE LEAVING FOR NEW YORK MORNING 24 JUNE. LESNICK SAID AMBANG-1 TOLD HIM HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK CONCERNED PUBLICITY WHICH APPEARED TIME ABOUT HIS ARREST AND TELEGRAM OF PROTEST WHICH HE HAD SENT TO TIME ABOUT FALSENESS PUBLICITY. LESNICK TOLD AMRAZZ-1 HE VERY CONFIDENT AMBANG-1 WOULD LEAVE FOR PBRUMEN WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

7. ON 25 JUNE AMRAZZ-1 SAID ED REINGOLD OF TIME TOLD HIM ON 24 JUNE THAT AMBANG-1 HAD GONE NEW YORK THAT DAY TO MEET WITH HIS BOSS GEORGE DANIELS AND THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY BE BACK WAVE AREA 25 JUNE. REINGOLD DISCLAIMED INTENTION MAKING FUN AMBANG-1 IN HIS ARTICLE. HE SAID HE HAD NOT MENTIONED ANYTHING TO EFFECT THAT AMTHUG-1 MUST BE LAUGHING AT HIM AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN PUT IN BY NEW YORK RE-WRITE MAN WHO DOES NOT LIKE AMBANG-1.

8. ACCORDING AMTAUP-2, IN DD-980 OF 24 JUNE, WHO TALKED WITH AMBANG-1 ON 23 JUNE, AMBANG-1 SAID HE GOING ZRMETAL 24 JUNE. AMOT

AGENT ACCIDENTALLY OBSERVED AMBANG-1 LEAVE HOUSE AT NW 38TH ST AND 19TH AVE AT 9:45 24 JUNE AND PROCEED TO JACKSON BYRONS WHERE HE WAS MORNING 24 JUNE. (WAVE COMMENT: AMBANG-1 MAY HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING LEAK MISLEADING INFO TO PRECLUDE DISCOVERY HIS ACTUAL WHEREABOUTS.)

SECRET

SECRET

6 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Project JMHART

1. Chief, WH/7 has tentatively offered the services of CIA contract personnel assigned to this project--principally those of the Director of the Panamerican Foundation, Mr. Curtis Wilgus--to serve as a channel to ex-President Figueres and Foreign Minister Oduber in promoting the acceptability of AMWORLD and AMBIDDY-1 by the moderate left. Under the terms of the JMHART Project, CIA, through Curtis Wilgus, will be able to influence the composition of the student body of the School for Inter-American Development. It is proposed that Wilgus would tell Figueres and Oduber that it is intended to also enroll Cubans in the school and that in the opinion of Wilgus they should be drawn from exile organizations known to be dedicated to democratic principles, such as Artime's MRR, Manolo Ray's JURE, the MRP and MDC. It is unlikely that Figueres and Oduber would demur. In any case, their demurrals could be overruled. The prominent mention of the MRR as a cradle of democratic ideas and the actual inclusion of students selected by Artime would postulate acceptance of the MRR and of Artime as exponents of a political philosophy acceptable to the moderate left. Any excoriation of Artime for having allied himself with the Somozas would be blunted if the MRR forms a part of the student body (and conceivably the faculty) of the School of Inter-American Development.

2. I intend to suggest to Artime that he pay his respects to Figueres in Cambridge, of course without alluding to the school project. The purpose of the call would, quite frankly, be to butter up Figueres.

SECRET

All the information I have been able to gather suggests that the combination of Munoz Marin/Figueres, as far as Washington is concerned, is unbeatable and that Artime has little choice but to align himself with their way of looking at things--or at least to pay lip service to it.

3. Another angle I would like to explore is President Betancourt. The more I read of his accomplishments as president, the more impressed I am. What would you think of having Artime, armed with a letter of introduction from Figueres, pay Betancourt a call before he relinquishes the presidency. Artime's approach would not be that of a supplicant or solicitor of support, but that of a young man making a pilgrimage, sitting at the feet of a revolutionary who has been successful, absorbing knowledge of how it was done. He could ask Betancourt, after he is out from under the daily grind of government, to address himself to the problems of post-Castro Cuba. He could invite him to chair a seminar attended by the MRR leadership. The objective would, of course, be to involve Betancourt in the affairs of the MRR, without putting his name on the masthead and without asking him to contribute anything but reflections of his lustre as a Latin American leader who bequeathed his country a constitutional and democratic regime. Undoubtedly Artime will have to cast off ideological ballast in order to accommodate his reluctant sponsors (Figueres, Betancourt), but Havana "vaut bien une messe." As a minimum objective, Artime would in any case have to strive to neutralize the latent animosities of the moderate left, denying Manolo Ray an unchallenged ascendancy in monopolizing its support, which he can probably get for the asking.

4. A welcome by-product of the resuscibation of JMHART, is "Combate," an influential periodical with strong readership appeal in Latin America among elements of the moderate left, edited by Monje. A German national named Dr. Erich Herzog who is a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) has been lecturing in San Jose on an "Ideological Inquiry into Communism," his program, indirectly sponsored by the Federal Republic, will be absorbed by JMHART. He wields considerable influence in molding the thinking of Central America's left of center leadership. The First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Guatemala has also been mentioned as influential among the intellectual elite. A Puerto Rican named Santiago Pollante

(President of the Assembly) is Munos Maria's man in sponsoring JMHART, and is quoted as having referred to Figueres as the guiding light, overshadowing all others.

Henry D. Heckcher
SAS/SO

cc: WH/7
SAS/SO/SB
SAS/SO/AR
DC/SAS/MOB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Chief of Base, Munich Xx

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief, EE

PBRUMEN

[Liaison LfV] - PBRUMEN Group in Bavaria
24

REFERENCE: EGMT 8307, 13 August 1963

The information requested in Reference is being sent to you under separate cover. This report, is the latest information 24 available on Subject Resistance Group and may be passed to the [LfV.]

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

PRESTON C. HUYKEN

Attachment: UNDER SEPARATE COVER
As stated above

Distribution:
2 - MOB W/Att USC
2 - COS W/O Att

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification.

EGMW 12348 17 October 1963
23
[ASH-]120-28

03

HQS Distribution:
1 - EE/C/IO
1 - RI
~~1~~ - EE/G/W
1 - EE/G/CI
1 - SAS/EOB

EE/G/W [Ernest A. Lewis] jmy 4282

C/EE/G/CI R. Wagner (Coord in draft)

SAS/EOB

17 Nov. 63

03
C/EE/G/W [WESTON C. PARKER]

with cc to INS

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Francisco RODRIGUEZ Tamayo aka Nicolas DIAZ

REFERENCE: A. Bureau File # 105-77976

B. Miami Field Office File # 105-1391

1. A liaison service 24 in Venezuela 11 has informed our representatives in Caracas 16-17 that Subject was arrested in Caracas/18 Mar 68 on his arrival from Miami, Florida, and is being held by the Venezuelan authorities. The liaison service 24 told our Caracas 16-17 representatives that Subject was in Venezuela to assassinate an unknown target for $15,000.

2. The liaison service 24 added that there is insufficient evidence to prosecute Subject and asked whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation or The Immigration and Naturalization Service had any interest in Subject. The liaison service's 24 intentions are to deport Subject to Miami if there is FBI or INS interest. Otherwise they will release Subject on condition he leaves Venezuela.

CSCI 316/02115-68

7/80

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID

RID/AN
EXT. 4239

CA 30
TUBE GT-7

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/E		23 APR 1970		S
2. Burke				g
3. Vasquez				Bv
4. Ennis				E
5.				
6. Mosier		8 May		Km
7. Burke				g
8.				
9.				
10.				
11. Mary Paul				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Per your request

LA COMPUTER PROCESSED

Per request. See attached sheets.

MICROFILMED
APR 23 1970
DOC. MICRO SER.

08465

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 19-5-42

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 14 Apr 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UNDA 04862 ✓

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

27

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH/COG

INFO
Chief of Station, WH/MIAMI; Chief, Domestic Operations

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMROSE/DOMOPS
Current Analysis of Cuban UN Mission and DGI Center in New York

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. Transmitted herewith are one copy each for C/WH/COG and COS/WH/MIAMI of the April 1970 Cuban Official Presence Listing as prepared by the local LNERGO Cuban Squad. The under-signed has added on the 201 numbers, indicated CUIS affiliation, added two names and deleted one. The departure dates for several CMUN personnel also are noted, The listing, thus, is valid as of 10 April.

2. According to LNERGO, only two CMUN working wives are officially carried on LNERGO records. Maria BERMUDEZ Garcia, wife of Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953), and Consuelo HORTA Larrinaga, wife of (Carlos) Pablo DRAKE Capiro (201-815821). BERMUDEZ, because of the impending departure of the VIERAs on 14 April, can be deleted from the listing. Additionally, other CMUN wives work or have worked in the past on a sporadic basis (such as Teresita FERNANDEZ Arango, wife of DGI Center Chief Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201-330002). However, only BERMUDEZ and HORTA of late have been regular local employees.

3. Addressees will note the preponderance of DGI personnel on the CMUN roster. Of the 18 (excluding Rolando PEREZ Alfonso) personnel on board as of 10 April, 12 are DGI. Interestingly enough, 6 non-DGI personnel is a higher number than has been the rule over the past several years; at one point there were only 3 non-DGI personnel, including the Ambassador/Permanent Representative. Of these,12, two (DRAKE and CADALSO) are code clerks detailed to the DGI Center from the DSE. Two others (REYES Goicochea and SANTIAGO) are the "architect"

Attachment:
As stated - Para 1 - h/w.

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WH/COG, w/att. h/w. ✓
2 - Chief of Station, MIAMI, w/att. h/w.
2 - Chief, DO, w/o att.

1 Att

[illegible] cs copy

CROSS REFERENCE TO 11200-9-52	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UNDA-4862	DATE 13 April 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-500 19-5-42

and the mason assigned here temporarily to work on the CMUN secure rooms and security systems (see previous reporting for details). Thus, 8 personnel are left for espionage operating purposes. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665) probably serves now as the Deputy to Center Chief PRENDES. Allowing for the impending departures of Rolando PEREZ Alfonso, Jose Raul VIERA Linares, and Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin, the DGI Center will now consist of:

✓Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez

✓Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

✓Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez

✓Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz

✓Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez

Ruben Rafael FRANCO Gonzalez ✓

✓Raul REYES Goicochea

✓Roberto SANTIAGO Humet

✓Pablo DRAKE Capiro

Rafael CADALSO Bandomo

LA COORD PROCESSED

4. As will be noted, the departure of Jorge REYES Vega (in March) and the impending departures of VIERA and PINERO will change the complexion of the DGI Center considerably. If they are not replaced for one reason or another (per other reporting), the DGI Center will have but four experienced and competent Case Officers at its disposal. Of these, PRENDES spends by far the bulk of his time inside the office pursuing his role of supervisor/manager. RODRIGUEZ is a handler. GELABERT and SANTANA are mainly concerned with operational support tasks -- GELABERT is the Center's best counter-surveillant, and SANTANA is the technical "expert" of the Center. PEREIRA is a handler, but his abilities are rather limited in this regard, per Base and LNERGO information and observations. Should the departees not be replaced, the Center may be forced de facto into a cutback of operational activity.

5. We shall watch with interest the behavior patterns of the DGI Center in the near future, in light of the above and in light of other recent reporting re the status of the DGI abroad.

Howard G. FIGALAN

14-00000

SECRET 4P

Cuban Mission to the United Nations
6 East 67th Street
New York, New York
April 6, 1970

All members of Cuban UN mission as of 10 Apr 1970

	Pct.
FR ALARCON QUESADA, RICARDO	19
Position (201-347590)	Ambassador
Residence	1175 York Ave., Apt. 6D, NYC
Phone	PL 2-0123
Dependents	MARGARITA PEREZ, wife; (R coded) MARGARITA ALARCON, daughter; BLANCA MAZA PEREZ, mother-in-law
FR ALOM GIL, JULIO	17
Position (201-851731)	First Secretary
Residence	Cuban Mission to the UN 251 E. 51st St., Apt. 10L
Phone	593-0480
Dependents	(R coded) MARIELA LARRAMENDI RODES, wife, born 4/10/36; LENA ROSA ALOM LARRAMENDI, daughter, born 11/22/64; LAURA ESTHER ALOM LARRAMENDI, daughter, born 5/11/67
FR DE SOUZA, ANTONIO (20-354048) 201-UNK	110
Position	Adviser
Residence	83-10 35th Ave., Apt. 6U, Jackson Heights, NY
Phone	TW 9-9282
Dependents	ALICIA MATEOS DE SOUZA, wife; (R coded) ANA MARIA, daughter, born 2/7/54; ALICIA ANTONIA, daughter, born 6/23/51
FR DRAKE CAPIRO, PABLO (201-815821)	19
Position	Attache
Residence	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone	UN 1-5250 (R coded)
Dependents	CONSUELO HORTA LARRINAGA, wife

Detailed DGI - code clerk
arrived October '69

MICROFILMED
APR 23 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

COMPUTER PROCESSED

SECRET

H/w att/to [illegible]

CS COPY

19-5-42

	Pct.
FR FRANCO GONZALEZ, RUBEN RAFAEL	19
DGI Position (201-857465)	Attache
Residence	370 E. 69 St., Apt. 5K
Phone	---
FR GELABERT MARTINEZ, JUSTO CESAR	17
DGI Position (201-839221)	Attache
Residence	61-15 97th St. Elmhurst, NY, Apt. 15M
Phone	699-5526
FR JIMENEZ PADRON, FLORENTINO	10
Position (201-850953)	Attache (chauffeur)
Residence	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone	UN 1-5250 (R coded)
Dependents	AGUEDA MARTINEZ GARCIA, wife, born 4/15/37
FR MORALES CARBALLO, PEDRO A.	17
Position (201-850951)	Counsellor, CMUN
Residence	400 E. 55th St., Apt. 16
Phone	593-2431 (R coded)
Dependents	MARIA ANGELINA DE LOS REYES, wife, born 2/2/41; MARIANELA MORALES DE LOS REYES, daughter, born 11/10/64; PEDRO CESAR MORALES DE LOS REYES, son, born 7/31/69; ISABEL BERMUDEZ DIEZ, born 4/18/07
FR PEREIRA GONZALEZ, ORLANDO F.	19
DGI Position (201-848605)	First Secretary
Residence	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone	UN 1-5250 (R coded)
Dependent	MARIA DE LOS ANGELES LOPEZ CANAS, wife, 3/1/47
FR PEREZ ALFONSO, ROLANDO	19
Position (201-836757)	Attache
Detailed DGI - Codeclerk Residence	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone	UN 1-5250 (R coded)
Dependent	MARIA DE LAS MARTINEZ LARA, wife

Leaving c/A 11 April 1970 — PCS. — [illegible]

SECRET

				Pct.
FR	PINERO EIRIN, PEDRO LUIS			19
DGI		Position	(201-	Third Secretary
		Residence	824376)	401 E. 74th St., Apt. 5K, NYC
Leaving soon		Phone		861-2468 (Recalled)
		Dependent		JUANA CRUZ FERNANDEZ, wife
FR	PRENDES GUTIERREZ, ORLANDO			19
DGI -		Position	(201-	First Secretary
		Residence	330002)	201 E. 66th St., Apt. 7H, NYC
Center Chief		Phone		249-0824 (Recalled)
		Dependent		TERESITA FERNANDEZ ARANGO DE PRENDES, wife
FR	REYES GOICOCHEA, RAUL			19
		Position	(201-	Attache
DGI		Residence	859874)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67th St., NYC
		Phone		UN 1-5250
FR	REYES VEGA, JORGE E.			20
DGI		Position	(201-	Second Secretary
DELETE:		Residence	816437)	15 W. 72nd St., Apt. 17H, NYC
departed PCS on		Phone		787-0544
7 March 1970		~~Dependent~~ [illegible]		MARIETA REYES, daughter
FR	RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO			110
		Position	(201-	First Secretary
DGI		Residence	332665)	Park Plaza Apartments 61-15 97th St., Elmhurst, NY, Apt. 15M
		Phone		699-5526
FR	SANTANA FRAIZ, MIGUEL M.			19
		Position	(201-	Attache
DGI		Residence	816439)	345 E. 81st St., NYC, Apt. 5J
		Phone		UN 1-5862
FR	SANTIAGO HUMET, ROBERTO			19
		Position	(201-	Attache
DGI		Residence	859875)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
		Phone		UN 1-5250

		Pct.
FF VIERA LINARES, JOSE (201-328953) DGI		19
	Position	Counselor
	Residence	305 E. 72nd St., Apt. 2E, NYC
	Phone	AG 9-2877
	Dependents	MARIA BERMUDEZ GARCIA, wife; (Recalled) JULIO ANTONIO VIERA y BERMUDEZ, son; ISABEL BEATRIZ VIERA y BERMUDEZ, daughter.

Leaving PCS 14 April 1970 [illegible]

ADD ON:

FF FERNANDEZ Padilla, Victoria (201-340661)		17
	POSITION	ATTACHE
	RESIDENCE	220 E. 63rd St., Apt. 5 M, NYC
	PHONE	------
	DEPENDENTS	None
FF CADALSO Bandomo (n), Rafael (201-866098)		
	POSITION	Attache
	RESIDENCE	CMUN, 6 E. 67th St., NYC
	PHONE	UN 1-5250
	DEPENDENTS	NANCY GUIROLA MAZAURRIETA, wife; (Recalled) RAFAEL CADALSO GUIROLA, son; MARLEN CADALSO GUIROLA, daughter

Detailed DGI - Code clerk
Arrived early April 1970

10-5-47

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5-9-3

DATE	081 29 MAR 62	JO
TO	DIRECTOR	
FROM	MEXICO CITY	
ACTION:	IW 2	
INFO	DDP, COP, CA 2, ~~CA/PHG, CA/PAG~~, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 6, FI/D, ~~TFW 5, TOD 4, WH 8, DO/I~~ AD/CI 2, S/C 2	

SECRET

3P

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 29 0507Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 10495

TDCS 3/506,346

DIR GUAT INFO PACY LANT CITE MEXI 0408

INTEL

SUPDATA LINLUCK FROM VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ. RE PARA TWO PGT SENT CONGRATULATIONS TO LINLUCK FOR HIS WORK AND OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED FACT HE SHOULD CONTINUE HANDLE EXCLUSIVELY PURCHASE WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT BUT TO BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT HIS PERSONAL SECURITY. FILED 290005Z REPORT CLASS SECRET NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL HMM 6283 GUATEMALA/MEXICO SUBJECT VIEWS OF THE PGT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA DOI 24 MARCH 62 PADA MEXICO, MEXICO CITY 24 MARCH 62 APR 2 PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN GUATEMALAN EXILE CIRCLES IN MEXICO.

MAY 1 1962

INDEX

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

WH/REG	7
WH/3/G	1

TDCS PRECEDENCE

x ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO: JOHN [illegible]ELL	DATE DISTRIBUTED: MAR 29 1503Z 62	BASED ON: HMM 6283 LINLUCK LIAISON 29 Mar 62

SECRET

35-9-9

R[illegible]DUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY GUATEMALA/MEXICO

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/506,346

SUBJECT PGT VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA

DATE DISTR. 29 MARCH 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 24 MARCH 1962

REFERENCES IN 10495

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (24 MARCH 1962)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 6283

APPRAISAL 2

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS AMONG GUATEMALAN EXILES IN MEXICO.

H

1. VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ, HEAD OF THE PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO (PGT-GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY) IN MEXICO, SAID ON 24 MARCH 62 THAT THE PGT IN GUATEMALA REGRETS THE WAY IN WHICH THE GUERRILLA FIGHT HAS DEVELOPED THERE. ACCORDING TO THE PGT, THE RESULTS OF THE GUERRILLA FIGHTING HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP (MEMBER OF THE 13 NOVEMBER 1960 ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT) HEADED BY MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA, IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF THE COMMUNIST STRUGGLE. THE PGT ALSO REGRETS THAT THE COMMUNISTS AND MEMBERS OF THE PARTIDO DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIO (PUR-EXTREME LEFTIST PARTY) HEADED BY CARLOS PAZ TEJADA WERE INTERCEPTED AND

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	FBI

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

29 Mar 62

35-9-8

FORCED TO FIGHT WHEN CONDITIONS WERE NOT ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THEM. ACCORDING TO THE PGT THE RESULTS WERE DISASTROUS, WITH THE LOSS OF "MIDDLE RANK COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS AND NATIONAL LEADERS." THE PGT CONSIDERS IT A "MIRACLE" THAT PAZ TEJADA WAS ABLE TO ESCAPE. HOWEVER, THE PGT STILL BELIEVES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES, PRESIDENT OF GUATEMALA, WILL SOON FALL.

2. THE MAIN HOPE OF THE PGT NOW HINGES ON THE ACTIONS OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP ORGANIZED AND ARMED IN MEXICO. (FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS BEEN REPORTED PREVIOUSLY THAT THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO HAD CROSSED THE MEXICAN/GUATEMALAN BORDER SUCCESSFULLY AND HAD ESTABLISHED A SECOND GUERRILLA FRONT.) THE PGT BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE SURVIVAL OF THIS GROUP "EVEN IF THE POLITICAL CRISIS SHOULD ELIMINATE YDIGORAS". IT BELIEVES THAT THIS GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN THE MOUNTAINS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH AND STABILIZE ANY DEMOCRATIC REGIME. H

3. GUTIERREZ SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ as LOPEZ, [illegible] THIRD SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. RODRIGUEZ TOLD GUTIERREZ THAT "THE PERSON FROM CUBA WHO IS GOING TO TAKE OVER RELATIONS WITH GUATEMALA HERE IN MEXICO, STILL HAD NOT ARRIVED." RODRIGUEZ TOLD GUTIERREZ THAT HE PLANNED TO SEE MAJOR ALFONSO PRERA, A LEADER OF THE NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO, ON 24 MARCH.

subject, Jan 62

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

29 Mar 62

35-9-8

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 16

RI ☐ COPY ☐

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JMWAVE

ACTION: C/WH 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO: VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 4, DC/WH/SA, [illegible]

SECRET 232339Z

EXI[illegible]O DIR CITE WAVE 5149

DESENSITIZED

~~RYBAT~~ DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB ZRKNICK

24 NOV 64 IN 28944

INDEXED AND CONTROL [illegible] MATCHED

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The [illegible] is authorized:

de-sensitize

Signed: [illegible]

R.O. # [illegible] 11/1/06

Note: If [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] if appropriate.

ROUTING	INITIAL
WH/SA/CI	[illegible]

CS COPY

201-332665

23 NOV 64

~~201-330759~~

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

RI COPY

(35)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

C/WH/5

VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, [illegible] Deluxe, [illegible]

S E C R E T 232339Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 5149

~~TYPIC~~ DYVOUR PERUMEN AMKNOB ZRKNICK

REF MEXI 1660 (IN 26958) *

[illegible] IN 26844

1. WAVE TRACES REFLECT SUBJ REF IDENTICAL ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, 201-332665. NO WAVE TRACES CHAIN NUSIN.

2. INDEX.

S E C R E T

* Stated that IDEN was unquestionably Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: desensitize

Signed: Diane [illegible]

R.O. #179 - Unit 10/4/[illegible]

Note: If destruction, cite reason and coordinate if appropriate.

SECRET

201-332665

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. · 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM · 8. DATE OF INFO. · 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST · 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN · 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?
CIT ?
OCC ?
EDSEL USUALLY DRIVEN BY SUBJ, CUBAN DIP AND SUSPECTED G-2 AGENT. MAR 62.

201-067886
MEXI-02883
19 DEC 62
P1

PcZR
1222779

```
00 000 00000000000000
11111111111111 111111
222222222222222   222
333333333333333333333
444444444444444444444
5 5555555555555555555
666666666666666666666
77 7 777777777777   7
888888888888888888888
999 99  999999999999
```

1 222 779

R-7365

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 0-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

7 Sept 1962

13:07 [illegible] de la [illegible] [illegible] en [illegible] con [illegible] responde que no.

22 Sept 1962

13:25 FAVIO RUIZ, de la Universidad Latinoamericana de La Habana, preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ por el compañero VIDOPIA. ROGELIO informó que hoy salió para Cuba en el vuelo regular de Cubana.

VIDOPIA?

27 Sept 1962

17:10 JERRIN, el portero de la Embajada Cubana, reservó pasaje para ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ en el vuelo de mañana en Cubana de Aviación.

17:34 DOLORES DE LA [illegible] pidió a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ le traiga a su regreso de Cuba las "medidas de los zapatos de quien tú ya sabes, porque como le gustan mucho las botas de por acá, yo quisiera regalarle unas". ROGELIO cumplirá el encargo.

Carole

2

om

files

126

EMBAJADA DE CUBA.-
L 30. M 30. Tel. 14-13-26.-
10 septiembre 62.-

1134. Entrada 1535.- HF pregunta por VEGA y HD informa que-- no está; pregunta si quiere darle algún recado y HF dice que sí, que le diga que le habló ALVAREZ (VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ); que el asunto que le encargó el sábado, ya está resuelto, que por favor le avise a Dn. ROGELIO, que éste no tenga pena, porque su asunto ya está arreglado. HD: muy bien.- 1153. -

- -

7365

X RODRIGUEZ Lopez

1-7365

M.-

50-9-3-3

A
~~Win~~
~~Warren~~
~~Jack~~
Reports

7 Sept 62

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

On 6 Sept 62, LITAMIL-7 told LITAMIL-3 that Subject has arrived in Mexico. She added that she was told not to put Subject on the Diplomatic List, orders from Cuba.

Subj arrived inMexico on 3 Sept 62 via Cubana Airlines - (LIFIRE B/2)

CKS

[illegible] EIP III

P

FILE: ~~XXX~~ Rogelio RODRIGUEZ
LOPEZ

P7365

SECRET

6 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR :

FROM :

SUBJECT : Jose Miguel [illegible] LASURTO

REFERENCE : Legal Attache Memorandum dated 6 July 1962, Same Subject

1. Our Mexico City files contain no identifiable reference to subject.

7365

2. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ [illegible], Third Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, contacted one Gabino FERNANDEZ on 26 September 1961 and arranged to meet with him. On [illegible] February 1962 Gabino FERNANDEZ received an invitation from the Cuban Embassy to attend a film showing at the Cuban Cultural Office, Tokio 63. This information is from a sensitive reliable source and should not be disseminated outside your organization.

#5248

P-7365

Orig - Addressee
cc - Liaison with LA
R 1cc - 50-9-3-3 (Index names)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: July 2, 1962

To:

From:

Subject: JOSE MIGUEL ABREU BASURTO

Dan
Goodpasture
Stewart

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

A source has advised that captioned individual, described as a Cuban national, is reportedly a resident of the state of Nevada. He allegedly makes frequent trips to Mexico from Nevada, and on occasions has traveled from Mexico City to Cuba, returning to the United States via Mexico.

While in Mexico City, captioned individual reportedly resides with Lic. GABINO FERNANDEZ, Secretaria de la Presidencia, Berlin, Colonia Juarez, Mexico, DF. The source advised that GABINO FERNANDEZ frequently visits Havana, having made as many as eight to ten trips monthly.

This office would be most appreciative of any information you may be able to furnish concerning the activities of ABREU BASURTO and GABINO FERNANDEZ.

50-9-3-3
Feb 62

105-3013

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
3rd Sec. Cuban Embassy
Contacted Gabino Fernandez
on 26 Sep 61 and arranged
to meet with him.

File 26 Sep 61

(Jose Miguel ABREU
Basurto

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCERPT

DBA-11277

28 May 1962

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

I. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY

.....

EXCELSIOR [Mexico City daily newspaper], May 6, 1962, page 7D, contained a brief article entitled, "Airport," which stated in part that ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, Third Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, returned to Havana, Cuba ..... on May 5, 1962. ..... RODRIGUEZ said that he will remain in his country for a year and will serve the socialist government of Prime Minister FIDEL CASTRO.

.....

14-00000

[illegible]

DATE :

TO :

CITE :

14 May 62

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] RELATIONS [illegible]

[illegible] PREVIOUS [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ED [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] VEGA [illegible]

[illegible] REPORT [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] OF GOOD [illegible]

[illegible] MAN [illegible]

[illegible] OF [illegible] AND [illegible]

[illegible] ALITY [illegible]

[illegible] GATES [illegible]

[illegible] DOES NOT [illegible]

[illegible] AVEL TO [illegible]

ORIG OFF: ______ COORD: ______ RELEASING OFF: ______

DIST: [illegible]

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS MESSAGE.

[illegible]

14-00000



LIFIRE | 20 MAY '61

Rogelio / RODRIGUEZ Lopez

20 MAY 61

P. 1365

"P" Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

Al C. General de Brigada, José Gómez Huerta,
Jefe del Estado Mayor Presidencial,
Los Pinos.

Informe No. 001699

DE: C-4.

TEMA: SALIDA DE UN CUBANO.

FECHA: Mayo 7, 62.

HECHOS:

1.- En el Vuelo # 465 de la Cía. Cubana de Aviación, que salió con destino a la Habana, Cuba el día 4 del actual a las 15.00 horas, salió :

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, con Pasaporte AD/61/164, de 19 años, soltero, cubano, con Visa Diplomática # 334 del 1o/5/62 expedida en la Habana, Cuba.

DATOS OPERATIVOS.

Vigilancia Aereopuerto.

Respetuosamente.

Jefe del Grupo
L.Silveti.

new
P-7365

SECRET

11 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE: Files

FROM:

SUBJECT:

1. On 11 May 1962 BENADUM (P) reported that LITEMPO/1 had said that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ left Mexico (PCS) on 4 May 1962.

2. Manuel E. VEGA Perez replaced Rogelio RODRIGUEZ in the Cuban Embassy, according to LITEMPO/1.

Distribution:
Orig - Rogelio RODRIGUEZ P-
1 - Manuel E. VEGA Perez P-
1 - LITEMPO/Prod.

SECRET P-7365

7 May 62

[illegible]

17:27 JUANITO [illegible] pregunta por [illegible] que hoy salió [illegible] duelo mucho [illegible], pues [illegible], "me dejó [illegible]", es una obra tremenda; ya platicará a [illegible] de qué se trata, puede venir mañana a la Embajada a pasar [illegible] confianza nacional, pero estará solamente un momento, pues "queremos guardar con el mayor respeto posible toda fiesta nacional". JUANITO vendrá a las 10:00 hs.

7 May 62

14:58 Un individuo que se obstina en no dar su nombre, pide comunicarse con [illegible] o con MARCOS su sucesor. SINOBAS manifiesta [illegible] Secretario de la Embajada Cubana y le pide que se identifique y que si quiere hablar con él o pasar [illegible] por la Embajada. El individuo dice que se llama [illegible] y que no puede pasar "sólo necesito decirle que tengo un [illegible] a la otra persona, pues RUFINO ya no había informado que iba a hacer el viaje; entonces con la otra persona, pero debe ser antes de las cuatro; él ya sabe a dónde llamar; dígale que donde hacen los aparatos". SINOBAS pasará el recado.

EXCERPT

REPORT NO. HMM-6343

1 May 1962

CUBAN ASSISTANCE AND INTERVENTION IN THE
GUATEMALAN POLITICAL SITUATION

Appraisal of Content: 2

•••••

2. ..... Fernandez [Osmin FERNANDEZ Concepcion, Cuban Communist] said that he first met with Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, Third Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, and with other trusted members of the Cuban Embassy abd explained the determination of the 13 November group in Mexico to aid the Guatemalan revolution. According to Fernandez, Habana was consulted and Castro gave instructions that assistance be given immediately to the 13 November group and that encouragement should be given to the guerrilla fighters.

•••••

27 April 62

16:28 ENRIQUE ESTEVES, con acento sudamericano, desea ponerse en contacto con el mismo ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, pues le urge saber si ya tiene la autorización de visa para viajar a La Habana. El Portero de la Embajada manifestó que ROGELIO se encuentra en el Aeropuerto, pero que no se va hoy a Cuba sino hasta el próximo viernes.

Report

28 April 62

14:27 JUAN REJANO, con acento gachupín, indicó a MAIZ "P[illegible]", portero de la Embajada Cubana, que necesita hablar con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ urgentísimamente; que si le puede mandar recado. MAIZ dice que ROGELIO ha salido y no sabe a qué hora volverá, pero en cuanto regrese le dirá que vaya a verlo. REJANO le pide que procure mandarle recado a algún sitio, porque es una cosa muy urgente. MAIZ está seguro que ROGELIO no está en su casa porque su mujer se fué ayer a Cuba y él habrá ido a comer a algún lado, pero cree que vuelve por la tarde. REJANO pide le diga en cuanto llegue que se comunique con él, ya sabe a dónde, que tiene urgentísimamente que hablar con él, "pues este hombre parece que se ha olvidado de que teníamos que habernos visto ayer, y de una porción de cosas, y estoy verdaderamente apurado". MAIZ en tono acusativo comenta que "aquí se olvidan muchas veces", pero que en cuanto vea a ROGELIO le dirá que REJANO lo está buscando con verdadera urgencia. (MAIZ siempre contesta en forma ruda a todo mundo e inclusive al mismo personal de la Embajada, pero en este caso se dirige a REJANO llamándolo JUANITO y le habla con mucho comedimiento).

"P"

15:45

2 May 62

11:02 Un individuo del Boletín Diplomático y Consular [illegible] a TERESA PROENZA, de la Embajada Cubana, que se [illegible] solicitado suscripciones para los señores ([illegible]) y ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. TERESA informa que los mencionados ya no se encuentran aquí, pero que ahora que ella hable con el Embajador LECHUGA le planteará ese asunto. El individuo pregunta qué tal es el Embajador. TERESA dice que muy bien, muy entusiasmado y "con grandes planes generales", y ahora sólo están esperando la presentación de credenciales y todo eso.

"P"

Goodpasture

Copy to B-file

290.- Entrada a las 1154hs.- HF Rogelio/ Rodríguez -de la Embajada de Cuba- por Alexandrov.- 357.- HD que Alexandrov está muy ocupado, que él la llamará mas tarde.- Rogelio: que es que el agregado comercial quería tener una cita con Alexandrov y que por eso le llamaba.- HD: enterado.---- 370.-

Lien Voy
25 Apr 62

P-7365

(1)

17 Apr 62

14:36 Desde Cuba, el nuevo Embajador LECHUGA manifestó a su esposa GLADIS, quien junto con la hija de ambos ya se encuentra en México, que para el día 30 estará aquí. GLADIS a su vez le indica que ayer se recibieron las órdenes de traslado de ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y de XIOMARA SANCHEZ, y que ésta última quiere saber a dónde la trasladan, para llevar ropa adecuada; quiere saber si la van a mandar a Rusia. LECHUGA le recomienda decirle que éso no se sabe todavía. (7086)

(7365)

23 Apr 62

(7365)

CUBA
Lunes [illegible] abril 1962.

17:55 El Embajador [illegible] se comunicó a La Habana con el Dr. RAUL ROA. Este le indicó que existen unas medicinas, unos libros, que ahora que [illegible] se los lleve; además que por lo que respecta a [illegible] a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ solo puede decirle que se deben concentrar a La Habana. A continuación ROA pone a LECHUGA en comunicación con PORTUONDO, quien manifiesta que sale a Cuba el día 27. Por su parte LECHUGA dice que él saldrá rumbo a México el día 30.

10:55 De parte de ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ dijeron al Sr. STREMATS de la Imprenta [illegible] que le llega verlo. STREMATS indica que irá por allá como a las 12:30 hs. La mujer dice que a esa hora llega el vuelo de Cubana. STREMATS dice que en ese caso irá en media hora.

25 Apr 62

20:20 Un mesero del restaurante Cire's se quejó con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, en el sentido de que en la mañana les arrojaron unas bombas pestilentes y por la tarde han seguido haciendo lo mismo y arrojando a la vez unas fotografías del Embajador PORTUONDO algo indecentes, por lo que de seguir así las cosas, han acordado no exponer el restaurante a mayores daños. ROGELIO manifestó que ya están acostumbrados a esas pendejadas.

(6474)

20:24 El Ing. MANUEL MARCUE preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que si la reunión tendrá lugar en el Cire's. ROGELIO indicó que en virtud de haber algunas dificultades, se acordó efectuarla en la Embajada Cubana. MARCUE allí estará.

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 14-92-14.
17-abril-62.
M13-L13.-

P-7365

93.- Entrada a las 1024hs.- Rojas con Xiomara le dice que tiene boletos para ella su hija y Rogelio Rodriguez para la Habana.- Rojas le pregunta que si la trasladan.- Xiomara: que sí Rojas: que a donde.- Xiom: que no sabe, que ni el embajador lo sabe; que ella necesita saber porque tiene que llevar bota de miliciana, que no hay, ni pistola.- Rojas: que a poco va de miliciana.- Xiomara: que sí, que a ella le duele muchísimo el traslado porque ella adora aquí porque tiene muchos amigos.- Rojas: que si no se podría arreglar eso y que a quien van a mandar en su lugar.- Xiomara: que no sabe.---- Xiomara: hace la aclaración que Rogelio tiene señora y que está aquí.- Rojas: que no mandan boleto para la señora y que Rogelio necesita que lo arregle luego. Que si a Rogelio también lo trasladan.- Xiomara: que sí.- Rojas: que si tampoco sabe a donde. Xiomara: que tampoco sabe, que a lo mejor es a Cuba. Que ella tendrá que irse con los embajadores.- Rojas: que entonces le diga a Rogelio que arregle lo del boleto de su señora.-------- Rojas: que también tienen orden de pasaje para Ester Gavilán Rosales, para que le avisen.- Xiomara: que Ester Gavilab es la mujer de Rogelio -que dice Berta-.- Rojas: que entonces queda solucionado el problema.------ Rojas pregunta que si está Carrillo porque tiene que hablar con el con urgencia o con alguno de la comisión.----151.- HD Quintana con Rojas le dice que ya sabe que están con el problema del equipaje de ellos que a Cuba no se puede mandar nada por cobrar y que hay que pagar el exceso; que le dijo Carrillo que iba a hablar con alguien en la Habana para ver como solucionaban eso; que hoy recibió un radio y que tiene que contestarlo urgente: que la única manera que tiene que hacer es visarles la cantidad de equipaje que tienen y que con una orden de MINREX puede docum montarse el equipaje pero que para eso necesita saber cuanto equipaje llevan.- Quintana: que la va a decir la cantidad que se pagó por exceso en Peruana que es lo único que le puede decir....que fueron 487 dólares pero que lo dejaron en 365 dólares; que el recibo lo tiene Carrillo; que ese pago se hizo de Guayaquil a México.- Rojas: que cuantas personas eran.- Quintana: que doce.- Rojas: y que si esas doce personas van a viajar juntas ala Habana._ Quintana: que sí.- Rojas: que con esa información va a hacer un cálculo de cuantos kilos son para mandar un radio a la Habana porque hay que mandar una orden de Canje a Minrex para que se pueda usar.- Quintana: que al doctor Carrillo se le puede llamar al teléfono - 14008.- Rojas: que no pueda ser porque deben de ser seis cifras.- Quintana: que es 140008.---- 222.-

---

....

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Operational/LINLUCK's relationship with Cuban [illegible] Concepcion, aka "Oswaldo", concerning Guatemalan guerrilla activities.	RI FILE NO. 50 | 6 | 50/3 DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-18661(HYM[illegible]-1542) DATE 17 Apr. 62 SOURCE CRYPTONYM LINLUCK DATE OF INFO. 13 Apr. 62 EVALUATION [illegible]
ANALYST / DATE PROCESSED	DISSEMINATED IN / DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XX CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ;

(Mentioned page 6, 1st. paragraph)
(Reported to be trusted by Cuban Emb., Mex. City)

P-7365

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. P-7365

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 58 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

11 April 62

13:05 Un individuo que dijo ser de la FUR, preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que si ya puede pasar por las películas a la Embajada Cubana, pues la función es para mañana en la tarde y ya se anunció e inclusive se repartieron invitaciones a los Sindicatos. ROGELIO indica que tiene una y le pide que en cuanto la desocupen se la traiga luego porque tiene que ser pasada el viernes en otro lado. El individuo pregunta que si puede recoger las dos películas que habían quedado, o sea El Ejército Rebelde y Muerte al Invasor. ROGELIO indica que tiene Muerte al Invasor y va a tratar de conseguir El Ejército Rebelde. El individuo dice que habían anunciado las dos, pero que la que importa es fundamentalmente Muerte al Invasor y que entonces a las 17:00 hs. pasará por la Embajada.

12 April 62

(2365)

10:22 ESPEJEL preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ por la película. Este dijo que tendrá que esperar hasta mañana, pues la tuvo que prestar, pero está nueva, no tiene ningún defecto. ESPEJEL pide a ROGELIO la lista de racionamientos. Es mejor se dirija a TERESA PROENZA.

(375)

10:40 MARTA TAMAYO en nombre del Grupo de Mujeres invita a ROSA CASTRO entre otras personas, a una despedida que ofrecen a MARTA DE FORTUONDO el martes 17 a las 18:00 hs. en la casa de TAMAYO

(5986) (6396)

10:58 Del Ceremonial de Relaciones avisaron que el Lic. MARISCAL recibe al Embajador HOKES a las 12:30 hs.

11:07 VERGARA preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ "nuestro amigo podrá llamarme por teléfono?" ROGELIO cree que sí, además él le avisará. VERGARA quiere informarle sobre un asunto.

11:23 RABADAN del periódico "Verdades" preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ cómo le pareció la publicación y que opina de lo de KENNEDY. ROGELIO [illegible] que está bien. RABADAN agrega que desea pasar a ver [illegible]ADO. ROGELIO lo cita para el lunes próximo.

Indica PORTU

17 Apr 62

(6157)

10:29 JORGE [illegible], de la Cubana de Aviación, manifiesta a [illegible] SANCHEZ, de la Embajada Cubana, que ya llegaron las órdenes de pasaje para élla y su hija, así como para ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ y señora. Asimismo pregunta extrañado que si a ROGELIO también lo trasladan. XIOMARA asiente, agregando que parece que a todos van a cambiar.

INDEX

Judith Ferreto Secas 2 Apr 62

9:56 JUDITH, con acento cubano, preguntó a la cubana "TERESA PROENZA qué hay. TERESA responde que hay cantidad de cosas, pero en general todo bien. JUDITH dice que "tenemos que hablar mucho". TERESA espera que sea hoy. JUDITH pregunta cómo está ELENITA y que si recibió su carta. TERESA se la entregó personalmente. Asimismo le pregunta cómo dejó a la familia alla y cómo está el Movimiento. JUDITH responde que toda la familia bien y el Movimiento está magnífico. TERESA le pregunta que cuándo llegó. JUDITH llegó el sábado en la tarde y estuvo tratando de localisarla. TERESA se pasó todo el día en Puebla. Asimismo le pregunta que si conoce a una joven MARTA, costarricense, de Prensa Latina y que está casada con el Primer Secretario "de aquí". JUDITH no la recuerda. TERESA indica que MARTA va a venir pronto, pues ahora está en La Habana esperando un bebé y cuando venga se la presentará. JUDITH pregunta por ROJO. TERESA contesta que a ROGELIO no lo ha visto hoy. A JUDITH le urge mucho hablar con él y le pide a TERESA se lo diga así tan pronto como lo vea. TERESA indica que inmediatamente que venga ROGELIO lo comunicará con JUDITH.

5 april 62

10:30 El Ing. TEODORO ALTAMIRANO pidió a nombre de la Asociación Nueva Generación del Istmo le manden a Chalco núm. 96-17, México, D.F., las publicaciones y revistas que envían de La Habana. ROGELIO tomó nota.

12:27 MAIZ, desde la portería, manifiesta a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que lo busca MAURICIO AREGOLLIE. ROGELIO ordena que lo pasen.

265

12:50 ALBERTO LUMBRERAS pregunta a JORGE L. TAMAYO qué sabe acerca del empleo ese en la Cuenca del Balsas. TAMAYO responde que no ha visto a CUAUHTEMOC, pero seguramente lo verá en estos días. ALBERTO le suplica no deje de tratar al asunto.

12:59 LUIS MACIAS espera a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ en la portería de la Embajada. ROGELIO bajará a verlo.

7 Apr 62

13:10 HUMBERTO H. TREJO OVIEDO reclamó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana qué lo tiene muy olvidado, que está carente de material y que además tiene un asunto muy importante que tratarle. ROGELIO pasará a ver a TREJO a su oficina.

SECRET

DATE: 01 APR 62
CITE: PACY 7711
TO : DIR

PRECEDENCE: RUTINE
IN NUMBER: 7656
INFO: MEXI CARA GUAT

Armando
1020

RYBAT HYAB

REF: A. PACY 7640 (NOT SENT CARA GUAT) ((8IN 7490))
B. PACY 7421 (NOT SENT CARA GUAT) ((IN 6992))

1. HYAB RETURNED PACY FROM MEXI REF TRIP 29 MARCH VIA GUEST FLT 270. CARRIED $5,000 RECEIVED FROM SOVIET EMBASSY MEXI THROUGH MARTINEZ VERDUGO. THESE FUNDS TO BE USED BY PDP FOR TRIPS TO VARIOUS CONGRESS INCLUDING FORTHCOMING KOMSOMOL CONGRESS, WHICH HYAB BELIEVES WILL BE HELD IN MOSCOW. PDP WILL SEND ONE DELEGATE.

2. ON RETURN FLIGHT HYAB HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH DEPUTY EDUARDO MACHADO, LEADING CARA CP LEADER. MACHADO STATED TOP CARA CP REQUIREMENT IS OBTAIN ALL POSSIBLE INFO ON U.S. TRAINING BASES IN CANAL ZONE, PARTICULARLY ANY TRAINING LATIN AMERICANS IN ANTI-GUERRILLA WARFARE WHICH IN PART TO BE UTILIZED AS INSTRUCTIONS VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS AS WELL AS TO UTILIZE INFO TO COUNTER ANTI COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS. 7365

163

"El Rubio" Sept 69

3. HYAB FURTHER IDENTIFIED QUOTE EL ROJO UNQUOTE (REPORTED REF B) AS ROGELIO LNU, CUBAN EMBASSY FUNCTIONARS IN MEXI AND WAS SHOWN CP QUOTE SAFEHOUSE UNQUOTE AT 175 CALLE MONTES DE OCA, APT. 1.

RODRIGUEZ Lopez

4. HYAB ALSO RECEIVED GENERAL BRIEFING ON GUAT CP STRATEGY AND POLICY LINE FROM MARTINEZ VERDUGO, WHO FOLLOWING SITUATION CLOSELY. INTEL CABLE TO FOLLOW. POUCHING DETAILS.

END OF MESSAGE

NOT CLEAR
DID ROGELIO SHOW
HIM THE SAFE
HOUSE?

EOS: 01/2045Z
DIST: SUBJECT FILE
COMMO
CHRONO

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS MESSAGE.

SECRET

200-4-5/5

P-7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE: 081 29 MAR 62

JO

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: IW 2

INFO: DDP, COP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 6, FI/D, ~~TFW 3, [illegible]~~ AD/CI 2, S/C 2

31

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

MAR 29 0507Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 10495

TDCS-3/506,346

DIR GUAT INFO PACY LANT CITE MEXI 0408

INTEL

SUPDATA LINLUCK FROM VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ. RE PARA TWO PGT SENT CONGRATULATIONS TO LINLUCK FOR HIS WORK AND OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED FACT HE SHOULD CONTINUE HANDLE EXCLUSIVELY PURCHASE WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT BUT TO BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT HIS PERSONAL SECURITY. FILED 290005Z REPORT CLASS SECRET NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL (HMM 6283) GUATEMALA/MEXICO SUBJECT VIEWS OF THE PGT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA DOI 24 MARCH 62 PADA MEXICO, MEXICO CITY 24 MARCH 62 APR 2 PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN GUATEMALAN EXILE CIRCLES IN MEXICO.

Rodriguez

Lopez

INDEX

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

WH/[illegible]
WH/3/G

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO: John [illegible]

DATE DISTRIBUTED: MAR 29 1503Z 62

BASED ON: HMM 6283 LINLUCK

LIAISON

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 1

29 March 6[illegible]

14-00000

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In)   CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS   NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY GUATEMALA/MEXICO

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/500,346.

SUBJECT PGT VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA

DATE DISTR. 29 MARCH 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 24 MARCH 1962

REFERENCES IN 10495

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (24 MARCH 1962)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS AMONG GUATEMALAN EXILES IN MEXICO.

1. VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ, HEAD OF THE PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO (PGT/GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY) IN MEXICO, SAID ON 24 MARCH THAT THE PGT IN GUATEMALA REGRETS THE WAY IN WHICH THE GUERRILLA FIGHT HAS DEVELOPED THERE. ACCORDING TO THE PGT, THE RESULTS OF THE GUERRILLA FIGHTING HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP (MEMBER OF THE 13 NOVEMBER 1960 ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT) HEADED BY MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA, IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF THE COMMUNIST STRUGGLE. THE PGT ALSO REGRETS THAT THE COMMUNISTS AND MEMBERS OF THE PARTIDO DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIO (PUR, EXTREME LEFTIST PARTY) HEADED BY CARLOS PAZ TEJADA WERE INTERCEPTED AND

Rodriguez
Lopez
→

SECRET   CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS   NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | USIA | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | OO | DTA

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

29 Mar 62

35-9-8

27 Mar 62

FORCED TO FIGHT WHEN CONDITIONS WERE NOT ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THEM. ACCORDING TO THE PGT THE RESULTS WERE DISASTROUS, WITH THE LOSS OF "MIDDLE RANK COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS AND NATIONAL LEADERS." THE PGT CONSIDERS IT A "MIRACLE" THAT PAZ TEJADA WAS ABLE TO ESCAPE. HOWEVER, THE PGT STILL BELIEVES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES, PRESIDENT OF GUATEMALA, WILL SOON FALL.

2. THE MAIN HOPE OF THE PGT NOW HINGES ON THE ACTIONS OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP ORGANIZED AND ARMED IN MEXICO. (FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS BEEN REPORTED PREVIOUSLY THAT THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO HAD CROSSED THE MEXICAN/GUATEMALAN BORDER SUCCESSFULLY AND HAD ESTABLISHED A SECOND GUERRILLA FRONT.) THE PGT BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE SURVIVAL OF THIS GROUP "EVEN IF THE POLITICAL CRISIS SHOULD ELIMINATE YDIGORAS". IT BELIEVES THAT THIS GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN THE MOUNTAINS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH AND STABILIZE ANY DEMOCRATIC REGIME.

3. GUTIERREZ SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, THIRD SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. RODRIGUEZ TOLD GUTIERREZ THAT "THE PERSON FROM CUBA WHO IS GOING TO TAKE OVER RELATIONS WITH GUATEMALA HERE IN MEXICO, STILL HAD NOT ARRIVED." RODRIGUEZ TOLD GUTIERREZ THAT HE PLANNED TO SEE MAJOR ALFONSO PRERA, A LEADER OF THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO, ON 24 MARCH.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

EMBAJADA DE CUBA.-
M 11. L 11. Tel. 14-42-37.-
29 marzo 62 .-

841. Entrada 1232.- MARTEL con ROGELIO (empiezan a hablar en el número 871) para recordarle que antes de ayer habló con él y le pidió que le llevara una cosa, pero no ha podido pasar porque no tiene tiempo, pero "ellos" quedaron de llamarle ésta mañana a su casa y no le llamaron y el otro asunto está por llegar y quedó pendiente hasta el jueves; que es fundamental que le llamen para arreglar eso. ROGELIO pregunta si no puede pasar por la Embajada y MARTEL indica que nó, que no tiene nada de tiempo; que les diga que le hablen a su casa hoy a las 16.00 h. porque ella sale mañana y no le da tiempo para nada; que lo que ROGELIO le pidió, se lo entregue a la persona que le tiene que llevar la otra cosa. ROGELIO acepta.- 899.-

899. Entrada 1239.- El Sr. VERGARA con ROGELIO para platicarle que ha tenido malas noticias de su familia; pregunta que hay del boletin y ROGELIO indica que todavía no sale, que si gusta le puede llevar algunos números atrazados que él tiene. VERGARA: que sí, porque le urgen, que aunque sea el anterior. ROGELIO acepta y dice que se los llevaría el sábado. VERGARA: que a él le gustaría que fuera hoy mismo. ROGELIO: que tiene muchos compromisos y no puede salir y no se los podría llevar personalmente. VERGARA pregunta si ya sabe lo que le sucedió a su hermano. ROGELIO dice que sí, pero que le gustaría que le contara qué fué lo que le sucedió. VERGARA: que sí, que por eso quería contarle lo que le pasó, por su esposa y todo, además todos los niños cayeron en cama y él creé que no tienen salvación y la cosa es grave; pide vaya a su casa hoy mismo. ROGELIO: que irá como a las 17.00 h. VERGARA está de acuerdo, agregando que así hablará con su hermano y le recomiende "al médico, aquel que me dijo". ROGELIO acepta.- 939.-

P - 365

939. Entrada.- HF con ROGELIO para recordarle que habló con él hace como dos meses pidiéndole unos ejemplares de la Obra

Rogelio Rodriguez L

Revolucionaria, el número 26, del discurso de FIDEL CASTRO; que ya los recibió y le envió acuse de recibo por correo; pregunta si La Obra Revolucionaria ya editó la segunda declaración de La Habana. ROGELIO: que nó, que ellos tienen el boletín de información de la Embajada, en donde está impresa la segunda declaración de La Habana. HF pide le facilite un número igual de ejemplares, es decir 25. ROGELIO acepta y pide su nombre y dirección. HF: JORGE BASURTO, Avenida UNO número 76, Manzana 6, Colonia Educación, México 21. ROGELIO toma nota. BASURTO: que a él le interesaría visitar Cuba, pero no sabe si haya manera de ir a los festejos del 26 de Julio, ya que en ocasiones anteriores se han hecho invitaciones a estudiantes de la Universidad y él quisiera saber si hoy habrá oportunidad de ir. ROGELIO: que él creé que se seguirá el mismo sistema de invitaciones, pues éstas vienen de Cuba y ellos unicamente trasladan al Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos, las peticiones de los que desean ir a Cuba. BASURTO pregunta cuál es el conducto para hacer la solicitud y ROGELIO le sugiere mande una carta a la Embajada dirigida al Embajador. BASURTO agradece la información, agregando que en cuanto le lleguen las revistas, le avisará. ROGELIO acepta.- 984.-

1054. Entrada 1420.- VARGAS solicita hablar con ROGELIO y MD indica que fué a buscarlo a la portería, pero le informaron que ya salió para su casa; que si gusta puede dejarle el recado y VARGAS llame como a las 16.30 h. VARGAS: que le diga que le ha llamado a partir de las 11.00 h. como le indicó, tres veces, que es para el asunto de las revistas, que ROGELIO ya sabe, pero quisiera hablar con él ahora mismo. MD toma nota del recado y pide que hable a las 16.30 h. VARGAS acepta.- 1083.-

- -

M.-

SECRET

CRYPTO SECURITY DOES NOT APPLY: HANDLE AS SECRET CORRES.

DATE: 20 MARCH 1962 PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

TO : DIR GUAT INFO: PACY LANT

CITE: MEXI 0408

TDCS 3/506,346

INTEL

SUPDATA LIMLUCK FROM VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ. IN PARA TWO PGT SENT CONGRATULATIONS TO LIMLUCK FOR HIS WORK AND OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED FACT HE SHOULD CONTINUE HANDLE EXCLUSIVELY PURCHASE WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT BUT TO BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT HIS PERSONAL SECURITY.

FILED 290005Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL HMM-6[illegible]03 GUATEMALA/MEXICO SUBJECT VIEWS OF THE PGT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA DOI 24 MARCH 1962 PADA MEXICO, MEXICO CITY 24 MARCH 1962 APR 2 PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN GUATEMALAN EXILE CIRCLES IN MEXICO.

1. VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ, HEAD OF THE PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO (PGT - GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY) IN MEXICO, SAID ON 24 MARCH THAT THE PGT IN GUATEMALA REGRETS THE WAY IN WHICH THE GUERRILLA FIGHT HAS DEVELOPED THERE. ACCORDING TO THE PGT, THE RESULTS OF THE GUERRILLA FIGHTING HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP (MEMBER OF THE 13 NOVEMBER 1960 ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT) HEADED BY MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA, IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF THE COMMUNIST STRUGGLE. THE PGT ALSO REGRETS THAT THE COMMUNISTS AND MEMBERS OF THE PARTIDO DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIO (PUR - EXTREME LEFTIST PARTY) HEADED BY CARLOS PAZ TEJADA WERE INTERCEPTED AND FORCED TO FIGHT WHEN CONDITIONS WERE NOT ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THEM. ACCORDING TO THE PGT THE RESULTS WERE DISASTROUS, WITH THE LOSS OF "MIDDLE RANK COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS AND NATIONAL LEADERS." THE PGT CONSIDERS IT A "MIRACLE" THAT PAZ TEJADA WAS ABLE TO ESCAPE. HOWEVER, THE PGT STILL BELIEVES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES, PRESIDENT OF GUATEMALA, WILL SOON FALL.

ORIG OFF: ________ COORD OFF: ________ RELEASING OFF: ________

DIST: SUBJ FILE:
COMMO
CHRONO

P-7365

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CRYPTO SECURITY DOES NOT APPLY. HANDLE AS SECRET CORRES.

DATE: PRECEDENCE:

TO : INFO:

9408

CITE: PAGE TWO

2. THE MAIN POINT OF THE PGT NOW HINGES ON THE ACTIONS OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP ORGANIZED AND ARMED IN MEXICO. (FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS BEEN REPORTED PREVIOUSLY THAT THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO HAD CROSSED THE MEXICAN/GUATEMALAN BORDER SUCCESSFULLY AND HAD ESTABLISHED A SECOND GUERRILLA FRONT.) THE PGT BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE SURVIVAL OF THIS GROUP "EVEN IF THE POLITICAL CRISIS SHOULD ELIMINATE YDIGORAS". IT BELIEVES THAT THIS GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN THE MOUNTAINS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH AND STABILIZE ANY DEMOCRATIC REGIME.

7365

3. GUTIERREZ SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, THIRD SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. RODRIGUEZ TOLD GUTIERREZ THAT "THE PERSON FROM CUBA WHO IS GOING TO TAKE OVER RELATIONS WITH GUATEMALA HERE IN MEXICO, STILL HAD NOT ARRIVED." RODRIGUEZ TOLD GUTIERREZ THAT HE PLANNED TO SEE MAJOR ALFONSO FRUHA, A LEADER OF THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO, ON 24 MARCH.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB CINCLANT

END OF MESSAGE

EXTRACT to 4p4

ORIG OFF: FLS COORD OFF: LJB RELEASING OFF: WCC

DIST: SUBJ FILE: 1 - chrono
1 - 200-7-38-1
COMMO
CHRONO

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

24 mar 62

10:45 MAIZ, portero de la Embajada Cubana dijo a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que allí está una persona que quiere verlo. ROGELIO pregunta que quien es. MAIZ dice que no lo conoce, pero que PAEZ dejó dicho que ROGELIO lo atienda. Así se hará.

10:57 (1410) Un individuo con acento sudamericano, tal vez guatemalteco, de nombre HILARIO, indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, que tiene una cosa urgente que darle. Al tratar de convenir un lugar para verse, HILARIO preguntó ROGELIO que "si recuerda el Jardín ó en la Luna". ROGELIO irá hoy a las 20:00 hs.a buscarle. Al despedirse HILARIO insiste en que es urgente. (1451)

26 mar 62

12 [illegible] de la [illegible] salió [illegible] con los paquetes [illegible] se enteró.

27 mar 62

12:20 VERGARA, con acento sudamericano, pidió al cubano ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ le lleve el boletín. ROGELIO manifiesta que no ha llegado, pero que le enviará los materiales "esos que a usted tanto le interesan".

12:49 RICARDO, con acento cubano, indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que ayer lo estuvo esperando. ROGELIO no pudo ir, pero el jueves pasará a verlo.

28 mar 62

13:27 MAIZ, portero de la Embajada de Cuba, anunció a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que allí lo están esperando ROBERTO GAYADA y el señor GARNICA. ROGELIO irá a la portería a recibirlos.

29 mar 62

13:20 La señora MARTEL, con acento argentino, indicó al cubano ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que sale mañana y que por favor le mande "a esa persona las cosas que le falten". ROGELIO lo hará.

15 March 1962

13 19 [illegible] GONZALEZ [illegible] manifiesta a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, que le habla para comunicarle que no ha podido ir porque anden allí, "[illegible] piedras" donde le dijeron a ROGELIO, con LEON y que hoy en la noche hablarán con este último para ver si mañana pueden pasar a la Embajada, y pregunta a ROGELIO que como a qué horas lo pueden encontrar. ROGELIO indica que a las 10 está en su oficina. 15 Mar '62

16 March 1962

17:35 De parte de EDMUNDO JARDOS, piden a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, los sobres para Prensa Latina que hoy trajo de Cuba un Agregado Cultural. ROGELIO dice que el Agregado está charlando con el Embajador, y que posteriormente llevará esos sobres a Prensa Latina

19 Mar '6

16:36 VERGANA dejó recado para ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana en el sentido de que es urgente que se comunique con él. TERESA pasará el recado.

RESUMEN
jueves 22 marzo 1962. 1

10:04 MAIZ dijo a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que ahí en la portería está el señor ISSUE y desea verlo. ROGELIO dice que lo pasen.

11 20 MAIZ, portero de la Embajada Cubana dijo a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que ahí está el venezolano [illegible] y quiere pasar. ROGELIO ordena que lo haga.

23 Mar 62

16:45 Desde la portería MAIZ indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, ambos de la Embajada Cubana, que ahí están ARTURO y LUZ SERRANO. Que pasen.

1

LIENVOY - 13 MAR 62

10:17 ALFREDO, mozo de la Embajada Cubana, desde las oficinas de Prensa Latina dice a TERESA PROENZA que no ha podido recoger el bulto porque la persona que lo tiene no ha llegado. TERESA le ordena que lo espere, y que le diga a JARDON que ROGELIO tiene el material para Panorama Económico y que mande a una persona.

12:22 ✓ MAIZ comunica a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que LUCIO HERRERA está en la portería. ROGELIO irá a verlo.

13:16 MAIZ comunica a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que ahí está un muchacho que dice que viene de la Prepa 7 y desea hablar con él. ROGELIO ordena que lo pasen.

P-7365

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

On XXX 13 March, LITAINT-2 reported that Subject is living at Tacubaya # 74, Apartment# 503. Tel: 25-08-45. Subj is using an Edsel with placas D-314. On occasions Subj leaves his car in driveway and walks to Embassy or takes a cab.

CKS

FILE: Rogelio RODRIGUZ L.

14-00000

S E C R E T

CRYPTO SECURITY DOES NOT APPLY. HANDLE AS SECRET CORRES.

DATE:

PRECEDENCE:

TO :

INFO:

CITE: MEXI 0293
12 Mar 62

TO GUATEMALA. (FIELD COMMENT: IT WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT MEMBERS OF THE PGT IN MEXICO WERE UPSET BECAUSE THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT CONTACTED THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO INSTEAD OF THE PGT.)

4. ACCORDING TO PERERA, CONTACT WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT MESSENGER WAS MADE THROUGH ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, THIRD SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. RODRIGUEZ WENT TO PERERA'S HOME AND SHOWED HIM A SMALL PIECE OF PAPER SIGNED "IBARRA". PERERA SAID THAT IBARRA (FNU), WHO IS MARRIED TO HIS NIECE, RECENTLY WENT TO CUBA TO STUDY. WHEN CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE CUBAN MESSENGER, PERERA SAID THAT THE MESSENGER GAVE HIM THE MONEY AND TOLD HIM CASTRO WAS DELIGHTED TO LEARN THAT THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO WOULD RETURN TO GUATEMALA TO HELP FIGHT. THE MESSENGER TOLD PERERA THAT THE GROUP DID NOT HAVE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MONEY, BUT COULD MAKE USE OF IT FOR PATRIOTIC MILITARY PURPOSES, AND THAT CASTRO HOPED THE GROUP WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL SO THAT HE COULD SEND IT GREATER ASSISTANCE.

5. MORENO, WHO HAS BEEN CHOSEN TO HEAD THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP WHICH WILL GO TO GUATEMALA, HAS DECIDED TO SEND HIS FAMILY TO FRANCE AND WAS GIVEN ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS OF THE CUBAN MONEY TO FINANCE THE TRIP. THE GROUP ALSO PLANS TO GIVE SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS TO [illegible] PIERA ALDANA, GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST LIVING IN MEXICO, TO HELP COVER HIS

ORIG OFF:

COORD OFF:

RELEASING OFF:

DIST: SUBJ FILE:
COMMO
CHRONO

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS MESSAGE

S E C R E T

P-7365

12 de Marzo de 1962
INFORME #

RECTIFICACION DIRECCION SR. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

INFORME: La dirección del señor Rogelio Rodriguez López es Calzada de Tacubaya # 74 Dto. 503, con teléfono 25-08-45.

En el interfón que corresponde a su departamento está el nombre de Diego Giolio.

COMENTARIO: El señor Rogelio Rodriguez López traé el a-utomovil Essel, placa D-314, pero por lo regular va a la Embajada caminando ya que le queda a cuatro cuadras de su domicilio.

Source: LITAINT-2

P-7365
Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

12 de Marzo de 1962
INFORME #

VECINOS DEL SEÑOR ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

INFORME: Los nombres que aparecen en el interfón del edificio marcado con el número 74 de la calzada de Tacubaya son los siguientes;

101	GESSELA	102	SRA. SPINDOLA
103	ARTURO LECARO B.	203	BARRAGAN
204	JOSE ARANDA	302	LEON RIVAS Jr.
304	JUAN HERNANDEZ	401	JUAN SAYAS
403	GUILLERMO MARTINEZ	404	JOSE GIOCOMAN
503	DIEGO GIOLIO	504	TORREZ

Hay muchos departamentos que no tienen nombre están ocupados pero no aparecen los nombres de las personas.

9 de Marzo de 1962
INFORME #

LOCALIZACION DOMICILIO SR.ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

INFORME: El señor Rogelio Rodriguez López vive en el departamento que ocupaba el señor Hector Pascual Gallo, Tacubaya #74 Dto. ~~[illegible]~~ 502 con el teléfono 25-45-08.

COMENTARIO: Junto al departamento ocupado por el señor Rogelio Rodriguez López rentan un departamento, informan sobre él, 10-98-52 señor Joaquín.

7 March 1962

09:56 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ suplica a YURI ALEXANDROV lo disculpe por no poder asistir a la cita que tenían hoy. YURI estará de todos modos todo el día en la Embajada Soviética. ROGELIO, aunque sea tarde, puede pasar a verlo.

20:12 GALINDO OCHOA manifestó a ROGELIO que acaba de leer su crónica "y qué chinga les arrimaste; tú tan decente que eres; chingaste a FIDEL, chingaste a RAUL, chingaste a ALFONSO; no dejaste títere con cabeza". ROGELIO arguye que dejó a los dos buenos nada más. GALINDO dice "no la jodas; tú eres el decente; qué me espera con los demás!". ROGELIO pregunta qué dijeron. GALINDO dice que no dijeron nada, pero no hay que pasar estas cosas por alto "y además son mis cuates". ROGELIO cambia el giro e indica que el General no fué a la clausura. GALINDO dice que no, que la clausuró el señor FERNANDEZ ALBARRAN JUAN. ROGELIO pregunta que si entonces se sujeta a los datos que ya tenía. GALINDO responde que sí, que sólo agregue que fué clausurada a las 20:00 hs. por el Secretario General en representación del Presidente.

8 Mar 62

11:51 ESPEJEL preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, de la Embajada Cubana, si puede pasar hoy a la Embajada a platicar con él, pues tiene algunas cosas interesantes que informarle. ROGELIO lo espera en el curso del día.

12:32 El portero MAIZ indicó que allí está un señor PIERRE buscando a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. Este indica que lo dejen pasar.

13:55 El portero MAIZ indicó que están unos señores de la Revista "Expresión" de Sinaloa que quieren ver a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. Este indicó que no los puede recibir hoy, que vuelvan otro día.

10 March 1962

11:32 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ comunicó a RAMIRO, a la Embajada Cubana en Brasil, que el domingo a las 3:00 hs. por Aerovías VARIG en vuelo 811 salen ENIO BENITEZ y GAUDENCIO IMPERIAL, para que los vayan a esperar. RAMIRO queda enterado.

RESUMEN
martes 6 marzo 1962

preguntó si ya recibió los boletines. RICARDO dice que no y que desea pasar a la Embajada. ROGELIO, después de meditar, manifiesta que mejor lo ve en el lugar de siempre a la misma hora. RICARDO le esperará.

10:34 RICARDO, con acento centroamericano, se comunicó con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, de la Embajada de Cuba. Este inmediatamente le

10:49 MAIZ, desde la portería de la Embajada Cubana, indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que allí están unos señores que vienen de La Normal y lo quieren ver porque traen un recado de ROQUE MENDOZA. ROGELIO indicó que los pase inmediatamente.

11:50 MAIZ, portero de la Embajada Cubana, indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que allí están unas personas que vienen a buscar una película para la Federación Obrera Revolucionaria. ROGELIO le indica que los deje pasar.

P-7365
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ

12:17 MAIZ comunicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que allí está el señor SILVA que quiere hablar con él. ROGELIO indica que lo pase.

13:30 ✓ JULIO CARMONA manifestó al Embajador PORTUONDO que mañana sale para Centroamérica, Honduras, Nicaragua y Guatemala, y desea saber si a PORTUONDO se le ofrece algo. PORTUONDO indica que por el momento no, pero que llame a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ para ver si tiene algo.

14:56 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ indicó a PAEZ que por la tarde como a las 16:30 irán a buscarlo unas personas, "tú ya sabes", y que no va a estar porque tiene que ir al hotel a recoger a la señora de LECHUGA. PAEZ queda enterado.

....

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 14-42-37.
5-Marzo-62.
M11-L11.-

Possibly?
Done
Rafael
aka X SOLIS
Barrio

751.- Entrada a las 1834hs.- HF HILARIO con MD Ana Luisa le pregunta por Rogelio.- Ana: que salió para el aeropuerto, que si gusta dejar recado que ella selo pasará.- Hilario: que le diga que desde en la mañana lo está buscando Hilario y que es una cosa urgente para hoy y que si quisiera hablarle por última vez a donde él ya sabe, que porque es una cuestión que no pueden dejar para otro día.--- 775.-

824.- Entrada a las 1834hs.- HF Hilario con Rogelio le dice que tuvo que hacer uso de esta cosa por una urgencia; que el enfermo que vieron anoche que luego vió el al doctor y que le dijo que como la cosa es urgente y que no va a poder estar después que si era posible que hoy mismo a las ocho de la noche.- Rogelio: que va a ser imprescindible que sea una hora después a las nueve porque el enfermo se agravó hoy por la tarde.- Hilario: que si vió un recado que dejó.- Rogelio: quesí.- Hilario: que si ya sabe -- donde.- Rogelio: que sí, que va a ser una hora después.- Hilario: que entonces va a buscar al amigo, que porque creyeron que era mejor la cosa de cerca y no de lejos.- Rogelio: correcto.- Hilario: que solucionan una serie de cosas que ellos tienen pendientes.---- Rogelio: de acuerdo.---- 847.-

---

....

P 7365
Rogelio Rodriguez

[illegible]

25

[illegible] Marquez led

3/[illegible]/62

P-7365

25

NEGATIVES

"P"_ Rogelio Rodriguez

[illegible] ahora yo estoy [illegible]
en la casa de [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
que [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].
Dile a [illegible] que [illegible]
[illegible] de [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] que esta en la Embajada de
[illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] que [illegible] [illegible].

Saludo.

Socialismo Base de la paz Mundial
Patria o muerte
Venceremos.

CoN CEA O SIN CEA
Venceremos.

Socialismo Base de la Paz
Mundial

25

16 Feb 62

436. Entrada 1127 ~~HF~~ del Banco Nacional de México con -- SIOMARA para avisarle que llegaron las siguientes órdenes - de pago y pueden pasar a cobrarlas; Para el Embajador 635; - Sr. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ 350.80; Sr. LUIS GOMEZ 300.60; SIOMARA 300.60; Sr. CUENCA 408.75; Sr. PEDRO L.ROY ORTEGA 352.99; - Embajada 50; Sr. EUSEBIO AZCUE 224.63; Sr. HECTOR GALLO - 569.55 y Sr. RADULFO PAEZ PEREZ 300.80 dólares. SIOMARA toma nota y dá las gracias.- 459.-

27 Feb 62

10:00 (1047) ESPEJEL, del Sindicato de Electricistas, preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, que si MAIS, el portero, le había entregado lo que le dejó. ROGELIO asintió y a su vez preguntó a ESPEJEL que si ya había hablado con el compañero PAEZ. ESPEJEL dijo que nó, que no ~~lo había~~ visto.

(1379) 6404 (1244) 6404

RESUMEN
miércoles 28 febrero 1962 1 (1651) (E)

8:35 AJA, desde el Hotel Agnes, pidió a MAIZ, el portero de la Embajada Cubana, que diga a RADULFO PAEZ que los dos asuntos que tiene se los lleve ya al Hotel. Asimismo que diga a ROGELIO que se comunique con él desde luego. MAIZ pasará los recados. (1365)

off

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[illegible]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba/Mexico

SUBJECT Travelers Using Cuban Diplomatic Passports

REPORT NO OO- K-3,210,416

DATE DISTR 23 Feb 62

NO PAGES Two

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO Feb 1962 & earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ --, Feb 1962

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national exiled in the US.

Source travels frequently to Central and Latin American countries.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation]

I received a letter from one of my contacts in Mexico City advising of the arrival of travelers from Cuba in Dec 1961 and Jan 1962 bearing Cuban diplomatic passports. My contact has also indicated the names and dates of arrival of the aforementioned travelers as follows:

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ernesto [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Fernando [illegible] Castillo	Cubano	4 Dic.
Konstantin [illegible]	Ruso	8 Dic.
[illegible]	Polaco	11 Dic.
Josef [illegible]	Polaco	11 Dic.
Humberto [illegible] Gutierrez	Cubano	11 Dic.
[illegible] A[illegible] Carrillo	Cubano	11 Dic.
Jose [illegible]	Cubano	11 Dic.
Jorge [illegible] Vigoa	Cubano	11 Dic.
[illegible]	Polaco	11 Dic.
Antonio [illegible] Pena	Mexicana	14 Dic.
[illegible]	Ruso	14 Dic.
Jose [illegible]	Cubano	15 Dic.
~~[illegible]~~	Cubano	15 Dic.
[illegible]	Cubano	15 Dic.
Baly [illegible]	Chino	15 Dic.
[illegible] C. [illegible] Montoto	Cubano	18 Dic.
Zygmunt [illegible]	Polaco	18 Dic.
[illegible] Saito	Japones	18 Dic.
Gloria [illegible]	Cubana	18 Dic.
Gustavo [illegible] Salazar	Boliviano	18 Dic.
Leopoldo [illegible]	Cubano	18 Dic.
Alejandro [illegible]borg	Ruso	21 Dic.
Nicolai [illegible]	Ruso	21 Dic.
[illegible]	Yugoslavo	21 Dic.
Jesus Alonso Garcia	Cubano	21 Dic.
Jesus [illegible] Alum	Cubano	21 Dic.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

[illegible]



Habana 18 de Febrero 1962
"Año de la Planificación"

Sr Rogelio Rodriguez.

Mi querido ahijado, me alegrare que cuando esta llegue a tus manos estén bien en unión de Ester, nosotros bien.

Rogelio mucha alegría me dio que me mandaras el retrato, yo creía que con tanto amor te habías olvidado de mí, pero veo que no es así, lo único que con tu nuevo trabajo no te alcanza el tiempo para escribir, ni a Ester tampoco, te voy a explicar lo del nuevo trabajo, como tu estas recien casado tienes un nuevo trabajo, que se llama amor.

Rogelio le dices a Ester que lo que nosotros hablamos de los aretes el día que reciban una carta por algun compañero luego que vaya para esa, te lo voy a mandar, para que me lo compren así que tengan cuidado al abrir las cartas, sin mas besos de tu abuela que esta loca por verte pues casi hace un año que no te ve querido. podía escribirte muchas cosas como la segunda declaración de la Habana, y lo enfrascado que esta el pueblo en la segunda zafra del pueblo, con decir que de la Habana a salido para Camaguey un batallon de 7.000 obreros, para el corte de caña esos obreros abandonaron su trabajo para ir a cortar caña como voluntarios, de los comerciales te diré que

P. 7365

ha sido la mas grande que ha habido en Cuba porque ahora las carrozas no son comerciales sino la integran los 25 sindicatos de Cuba. ante de pasar la carroza para la comparsa que la integran los obreros a la cual pertenece la carroza, quisiera que pudieras ver a esos obreros bailando al compas de sus orquestas y conjuntos, ya se acabo aquellas comparsas, de negros solos que bailaba con la botella de aguardiente en la mano y se acababa a puñaladas no te canso mas pues te estes muy ocupado, sin mas recibe el cariño de tu tia que te quiere como a un hijo

Fina

Rogelio dice tu padrino que lo unico que quiere, es, que le mandes un retrato tuyo que se vea bien la cara.

saluda a Ester de mi parte no le devia mandar mi saludos tan siquiera en dos meses no ha tenido ni dos letras para mi, saludos de Albito y de Carlito

Francisco Marquez 166 26/2/62

NEGATIVES

24

Angeles Rodriguez Lopez



Rogelio Rodriguez

VIA AEREA

Año de la Planificación

Habana 12 de Febrero 1962

Sr/
Rogelio Rodriguez
Mis Queridos hijos
Deseamos que al recibir
estas líneas se encuentren bien
de salud
nosotros bien
Rogelio recibí tu retrato estás
de lo mas bien
un poco mas delgado pero se
te ve bien
maria me trajo el retrato de
Chela y esta [illegible] muy contenta
y de lo mas satisfecha
dile que se acuerde de escribirme
que si Dios quiere nos vamos
a ver las dos [illegible]
y que se prepare la clase de
[illegible] que le hayan dicho
mándame a decir si [illegible]
[illegible] Chela esta embarazada

23

P-7365



le so ruza de el Padre
no sabo la alegria que
me da el saber que vas
a ser padre
para que tu esposa como
se quieren los hijos
dime como se encuentra
Estar de salud
no te llegas a decir nada
en las cartas a mi de
lo que le paso a Estela
para que no se asuste
sabras que tu hermano
esta de lo mas formal
y estudioso
segun va creciendo se le
pareciendo mas a ti
bueno se despide de todos
su Madre que no se
olvida ni un solo momento
con un abrazo bien fuerte
Lira

23

Patria o Muerte

Venceremos

[illegible] nuestra Revolución

Socialista

23

Francisco Marquez 160

23

26/2/62 [redacted]

NEGATIVES

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

2 February 1962

10:50 (7365) ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, informó a HECTOR ANAYA de Prensa Latina, sobre la llegada del Diputado brasileño JULIAO, quien va de paso para La Habana. Francisco da Paula

(7365)

RESUMEN
domingo 11 febrero 1962 ④ 1

18:15 LEONCIO CABAÑAS MATUS, jalapeño y que dijo ser muy amigo del cubano MANUEL GUILLOT [illegible], supo que éste había llegado hoy a la ciudad de México en el vuelo de Canadian Pacific. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana manifestó que él no sabía que GUILLOT tuviera amigos mexicanos, pero informó que efectivamente GUILLOT se encuentra en México, solo que nó en esos momentos allí en la Embajada. CABAÑAS dejó su domicilio, sito en Lorenzo Boturini # 111 Bajos, casi esquina con I. la Católica, aunque indicó que posteriormente volverá a llamar para ponerse en contacto con GUILLOT. (Este tal vez sea miembro de la Embajada de Cuba que se encontraba en Argentina).

Phillips

[illegible] February 1962

10:44 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba manifestó al Sr. ESTREZATE de la Imprenta Maloro, que es úrgente que hoy por la mañana pase a la Embajada, pues tiene material que entregarle. ESTREZATE estará a las 12:00 hs. (6474)

17 Feb 62

10:32 RAUL NESTOR FUENTES pidió comunicarse con el cubano ROGELIO. ROGELIO de momento no sabe quién es. NESTOR le indica que él debe tener por allí una tarjeta. ROGELIO le pregunta que si es el asunto de los muchachos. NESTOR dice que sí, que él es el encargado de éso. ROGELIO le indica que entonces está todo arreglado. NESTOR pregunta que si llegaron éllos hoy allí, "pues yo llegué a las nueve de la mañana; es que me dieron una misión, un encargo de recoger una documentación". ROGELIO dice "ya fueron a buscarte alla, fué uno de los muchachos". NESTOR contesta "entonces no me muevo yo de la casa porque éso estoy esperando precisamente".

17 Feb 62

16:30 MIGUEL, del Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas, manifestó a [illegible], de la Embajada de Cuba, que le tiene [illegible] que allí le mandó MARIANO. 50-11-3-3

(7365)



ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ F.
Agregado de Prensa EMBAJADA DE CUBA
MEXICO D.F.

Casilla [illegible]
La Paz, Bolivia

JUNTA DE [illegible]
C[illegible]
LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

La Paz, Bolivia 12 de Febrero 19[illegible]

Señor
Rogelio Rodriguez [illegible]
Mexico D.F.

Recordado Rogelito, Por pura casualidad supe donde te encontrabas, por noticias de prensa y me dije le escribo y ahí van mis letras portadoras de inolvidable afecto al hermano [illegible] que tuve en Camiri y donde el destino nos reunió.

Como te encuentras, tu esposa e hijos, imagino muy bien, ya ahora que estas en situación buena, y siempre superando, ahora tienes que pensar en los hijos.

Y te acuerdas de esta tierra, que también fue tuya en momentos buenos y malos, te diré que nada cambió, la misma gente, las mismas dificultades que tú dejaste, la gente siempre boliviana y descontenta.

Yo sigo igual, trabajo en una revista como Sub-Directora, pero ésta sale cada dos meses, estoy preparando un nuevo libro, pero no sé cuando te lo haré llegar, ahora que sé tu destino.

Por lo dado si estas letras llegaran a su destino y si tú me recuerdas, en el final [illegible] me escribes, y no olvides si puedo serte útil ahora que estas en lucha fuerte y decisiva, siempre tu hermana de corazón

22

P7365

Francisco Marquez 166 19/2/62

NEGATIVES

22 "P" Rogelio Rodríguez López

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-18537
TO Chief of Base, Monterrey INFO Chief, WH Division		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-300-3
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 2 February 1962
SUBJECT Jose Arturo DE LA PENA		X MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		
REFERENCES		

1. LIENVOY (B) reported that Jose Arturo DE LA PENA had been trying to reach Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Cuban Third Secretary, on 20 January. Since he was unable to reach RODRIGUEZ, he left a message to the effect that he was leaving Mexico City and on his return he would give the address to which they should send the Information Bulletin of the Cuban Embassy. He said the pressure is a "little strong here, since yesterday (19 January) they were picking up all that left the embassy - newspapers and all that" and for that reason he did not go in. He said that he was taking several copies of No. 4 of the Information Bulletin to Coahuila, but that he also wanted No. 5 which contained information about scholarships.

2. Station would appreciate any information Monterrey may have on DE LA PENA.

Willard C. CURTIS

1 February 1962

Distribution:
- 2 - Monterrey
- 2 - WHD
- 2 - Files
  - 1 - Chrono
  - 1 - 50-9-3-3

DRCassavetis/cme

P-7365

SECRET

11 January 1962

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]S de Prensa Latina, manifestó a ROGELIO [illegible] de la [illegible] de Cubana, que hoy por la tarde irá a la Embajada para charlar con él.

17 Jan. 1962

16:30 7365 ESPEJEL, del Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas, manifestó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba, que tiene una carta que le envió [illegible] de allá, y que dentro de la carta, viene otra dirigida a ROGELIO. Este le pide que se la pase a dejar a la portería.

7286

20 Jan. 1962

16:56 JOSE ARTURO DE LA PEÑA ha estado tratando con insistencia en ponerse en contacto con el cubano ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, y al no encontrarlo le deja recado en el sentido de que le va a escribir para que le manden el boletín de información de Cuba, pues él va a salir fuera de la ciudad, pero cuando regrese le dará la dirección para que se lo manden, porque está la presión un poco fuerte aquí, pues ayer estaban recogiendo todo lo que salía de la Embajada, periódicos y todo éso, y por éso él no entró. Agrega que lleva a Coahuila varios boletines del número 4 de información sobre Cuba, pero que también quiere el número 5 donde viene información sobre las becas. OLGA toma el recado y se lo pasará a ROGELIO.

20 Jan 1962

10:04 7365 HECTOR GALLO pidió a GLORIA que a como dé lugar despierte a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, pues el Embajador PORTUONDO ordenó que "todos estemos aquí y falta ROGELIO". GLORIA cumplirá con el encargo.

26 Jan 1962

11:55 PUENTE, quien ayer llegó de Tamaulipas, Tampico, y que así se lo hizo saber al Lic. LOMBARDO diciendo que ya traía el dinero para comprarle los dos pasajes de ida y vuelta, sábado y domingo próximos respectivamente, informó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que tienen organizada allá una exposición fotográfica con las fotos aquellas que le regalaron en el Palacio Presidencial de La Habana y desea que ROGELIO le proporcione boletines "y otras cosas" para repartirlas allá (Tampico). ROGELIO le indica su conformidad y le pide pase a la Embajada a recogerlas.

SECRET

22 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

FROM: LDPuckett

SUBJ: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (P-7365)

1. Subject was under LIEMBRACE surveillance on 20, 21, and 23 October 1961 (see surveillance reports in P-7365 which should have been routed to COS by Hazlett) with no conclusive results re student contacts.

2. The surveillance was cancelled (see reports) because of the continued presence of Mexican Secret Service agents and vehicles in the area of the Cuban Embassy - a problem which has plagued our surveillance attempts for months. Consequently, the team has not been able to mount a prolonged surveillance at the Cuban Embassy.

3. After 1 Juanuary 1962 the team can make another attempt on subject if so desired by the Chief of Station.

Distribution:
  Orig - P-7365
  1 cc - LITENSOR P-
  1 cc - Cuban Embassy Activities
  1 cc - UNAM
  1 cc - Humberto ROMERO P-

SECRET

P-7365

SECRET

22 December 1961

LW

① Tex
Any reports
(See Tom's notes)
② Scs

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez P-

1. On 2 October 1961 Lic. Humberto ROMERO, private Secretary to President Adolfo LOPEZ Mateos told me that the President was very concerned about a Cuban "from the Cuban Embassy" who spends considerable time at the U.N.A.M. working amongst students there. ROMERO did not name.

See attached memo
LW

2. I asked SHYROCK who said this was probably Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez. The attached concerns ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ Lopez.

3. SHYROCK told me that as of 16 October 1961 Tex would put Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez under surveillance; but, as of 22 December 1961, I have received nothing.

Distribution:
Orig w/att - Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez P-
1 - LITENSOR P-
1 - Cuban Embassy Activities
1 - U.N.A.M.
1 - Humberto ROMERO P-

SECRET

Ann – This is the character [illegible] is looking for, I believe. [illegible] has data and will put him under surveillance on 16 Oct 61

13:15 ✓ Un individuo que dijo ser el Secretario General del Grupo JOSE MARTI, pidió películas, propaganda y boletines para repartir entre los alumnos de la Preparatoria. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, indicó que para hablar de eso es preferible que se llegue a las oficinas de la Embajada. Así lo hará.

11 OCT 61

LIENVOY

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

FBI doc.
19 Dec 61 (Wash)
Re: Foreign Political Matters
no Bufile given

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

[illegible] of this document in [illegible] is prohibited [illegible] permission of the issuing office. All requests for authority to reproduce will be directed to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Classification
UNCLASSIFIED

NOTE: [illegible] affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

COUNTRY MEXICO

REPORT NO. ID

SUBJECT Cuban Diplomat (?) Disarmed

DATE OF REPORT 17 December 1961

NO. OF PAGES One

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO 8 December 1961

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico City, 9 Dec 61

FROM USARMA MEXICO

EVALUATION B-2

PREPARED BY LtCol A.W. Gunn, GS

SOURCE Local Press (Excelsior)

R-SERIES NO. R-308-61

① Stewart

② Dee

SUMMARY:

A young third secretary of the Cuban Embassy was disarmed by an assortment of Mexican law-enforcement personnel. The fracas occurred 8 December 1961 at the International Airport.

③ files

P —

DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: AirA/NA, PolR/Emb, FOL, USARCARIB, 4th Army

1. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, a third secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, was disarmed at Mexico's International Airport on 8 Dec 1961.

2. The fracas apparently started over the documentation of a diplomatic courier, one Fernando ALONSO Castillo, by the emigration agent who was processing Cubana de Aviación's flight 465, outbound for Havana. RODRIGUEZ rushed to "defend" the courier and harsh words ensued. Before it was all over officials of Emigration, special agents of Interior, and the Federal Judicial Police took part. In the melee it was discovered that both Cubans were carrying concealed pistols. The Judicial Police confiscated the weapons. The affair ended with RODRIGUEZ threatening to return armed the following Tuesday and declaring, "We'll see if you take my pistol then."

COMMENT: 1 The following Tuesday (12 Dec) has come and gone with no similar incident reported.

2. The rank and file Mexican is no longer enchanted with his Cuban brother. CASTRO's defiant pronouncement of his true color stripped away the last vestige of respectability his government may have had in the eyes of Mexico's literates. (i.e. politically speaking of)

3. The police probably enjoyed the encounter.

APPROVED:

[illegible] JOHNSON
Brigadier General, GS
Army Attaché

UNCLASSIFIED

P-7365

Jueves 14 diciembre 1961

6-53

17:57 [illegible] dijo a [illegible] de la [illegible] Cuba que allí está el co[illegible] (guatemaltecos) y lo está esperando. [illegible] por el momento no puede ir, sería más tarde. JARDON le pregunta que si quiere que se le comunique para allá ahora, por que trae el tiempo muy limitado y tiene algunas otras cosas que tratar "además de lo de allí de ustedes", a ver si es posible que se vaya mañana. [illegible] lo espera.

18:03 [illegible] manifestó a JARDON que acaba de llegarle el rumor de que el General fué baleado, aunque él espera fervientemente que no se confirme dicho rumor. JARDON pregunta que cuál General. FUENTES responde que cuál General ha de ser, CARDENAS, y le pide que verifique la noticia él que tiene más contacto con esas gentes. Posteriormente JARDON preguntó a [illegible] RIVERA si era cierto que el General había sido objeto de un atentado. RIVERA dijo que era falso, pero al preguntar JARDON que si así podía informarlo a los compañeros de la prensa, RIVERA respondió que mejor lo consultará con el General y posteriormente llamará a JARDON.

copy

P-7493

18:17 El Gral. CARDENAS preguntó a [illegible] JARDON qué hay de la noticia que le dieron. JARDON indica que le hablaron los compañeros del diario La Prensa, preguntándole qué había de un supuesto atentado que CARDENAS sufrió, en el cual había muerto uno de sus ayudantes. CARDENAS dice que inventos de éstos hay todos los días, pues "estamos vivitos y coleando absolutamente y saliendo para todas partes sin que nadie nos moleste". JARDON manifiesta haberle dicho a FUENTES, a quien encargaron que indagara ese asunto, que le parecía absurdo, pero de todas maneras pidió a RIVERA que consultara ésto con el General, para que cuando lo vuelvan a llamar, decirles que es completamente falso. CARDENAS le indica "cuando lo vuelvan a llamar, hay que decirles a éllos que ya habló conmigo y que es conveniente que se les diga a los que están inventando ésto que dónde consideran éllos que yo en lo personal pueda tener algún peligro para ir sin acompañamiento ninguno a esa área; pues si el pueblo quiere éso ni hay ninguna desconfianza de uno para que vayan a creer que se cuida uno de algo; hay que decirles éso a los llamados compañeros de la prensa, porque son [illegible] pero no compañeros". Ambos se ríen. JARDON cambia de tema e indica al General que tiene unos documentos que le interesa conocerlos; que si se los manda o puede venir alguno de sus ayudantes. CARDENAS indicará a [illegible] que vaya ahora a Prensa Latina.

20:15 De Nueva York [illegible] a [illegible] JARDON los siguientes mensajes [illegible], procedentes de Cuba: "[illegible] preguntar 212-9 si llegó [illegible]-42 de familia 227-11. Ojalá nos lleguen todas estas cosas que esperamos como agua de mayo. Sa-

P-7365

P2

13 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM :

SUBJECT: Probable Transfer of Ramiro del Rio Perez

1. On 12 December 1961, LITAMIL-2 told me that Chelo Esperon, Cuban Embassy secretary, had been told by Jose Antonio Portuondo, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, that he had succeeded in getting Subject out of the Cuban Embassy. LITAMIL-2 also reported information from Esperon that Portuondo was arranging a secret meeting with Ricardo Vidal, former Cuban Embassy Counselor, prior to his Mexican defection.

Rogelio

2. Source comment: With the removal of Subject and the possible removal of third secretary, Rodriguez, who was recently involved in a pistol-toting incident at the airport, Portuondo may feel the necessity of discussing the current Cuban Embassy personnel situation with Vidal, who is a veteran Cuban diplomat.

3. Station comment: There is also the possibility that Portuondo may wish to try to use Vidal to obtain oil for Cuba. Portuondo has recently been exhausting all sources in an effort to obtain oil.

Rogelio

Distribution:
1 - P-Ramiro del Rio Perez
1 - P-Jose Antonio Portuondo
1 - P-~~Roberto~~ Rodriguez
1 - P-Ricardo Vidal
1 - JMZIP/III
1 - Cuban Embassy Activities

P-7365

14-00000

Mexico City News
9 Dec 61

CUBA

Two Interior Department agents yesterday had to

CONTINUED ON PAGE 9A

MEXICAN BRIEFS...

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2A

beat two Cuban diplomats into submission during a violent scuffle at the airport when the latter refused to give up their guns.

Claiming diplomatic immunity courier Fernando Alonso and Cuban embassy Third Secretary Ricardo Rodriguez vociferously turned down a request from the Mexican agents to turn in the guns they were brandishing publicly obligating these to use force.

The shouting and scuffling created a near panic among the Havana-bound passengers on Cubana's flight.

The gun-toting Castrenos said all diplomats in Cuba not only are allowed to carry guns but that the Cuban government itself provides them.

A nice, cosy little society.

P-7365

50-9-12

14-00000

cuando acepten algunas sugerencias y reformas substanciales que es necesario introducir. AGUILAR está de acuerdo en éllo y se comunicará la semana entrante con CASTILLO para hacer de su conocimiento lo que resolvió el Comité Nacional.

15:10 El Corl. RANGEL ESCAMILLA informó al Lic. DIAZ ORDAZ que hoy desde las diez horas hubo un paro de los maestros de la Sección 35, en Saltillo, por falta de pago de sueldos. Que dicho paro continuará indefinidamente. Además un incidente que se registró en el Aeropuerto en el que tomaron parte ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba y el Correo Diplomático FERNANDO ALONSO quiénes pretendieron entrar armados. Los agentes de Migración al notar esto, los desarmaron no sin antes tener un forcejeo con éllos. 8 Dec 61

7365

17:20 El Ing. JORGE L. TAMAYO preguntó a su cuñada GELA qué le pareció a su cónyuge JOSE ALBERTO el nombramiento del General CARDENAS, ya que no lo quiere nada ni es santo de su devoción. GELA responde que ya no trata esas cosas con JOSE ALBERTO porque siempre están en desacuerdo. TAMAYO ve este asunto desde muchos ángulos de vista y cree que tiene mucha importancia desde el ángulo de la mala jugada que le hicieron al Gobierno Brasil, Ecuador, Uruguay y Argentina de rajarse a la hora de la votación en la OEA. Entonces el Gobierno necesitaba apoyo y TAMAYO cree que ésa fué la intención del General CARDENAS al aceptar el cargo del Gobierno, porque éso se lo habían ofrecido hace 3 años. GELA dice que sí, y que no se lo habían dado. TAMAYO rectifica en el sentido de que CARDENAS no lo había aceptado, y de la noche a la mañana lo aceptó y entonces a TAMAYO le parece que fué en función de la situación internacional. A GELA le dió mucho gusto, pues le parece que es una de las cosas que necesitaba el Gobierno, un puntalito, porque con el General no se juega. Asimismo le parece que los demás ni fu ni fa. TAMAYO a ese respecto comenta que fué requisito que pidió el General, que llamaran a todos. Claro que a los otros les dieron cosas simbólicas y en realidad el que fué a una posición de importancia fué el General CARDENAS.

7365

17:43 ELENA VILIN secretaria del Lic. AGUILAR dejó recado para la Sra. CLEMENTINA BASSOLS, en el sentido de que hoy a las 20:00 hs en el despacho del Ing. CUAUHTEMOC CARDENAS será la reunión del Comité Nacional.

18:25 FEDERICO BARRERA FUENTES comentó con FRANCISCO GALINDO OCHOA que éste ahora sí tiene mucho material, preguntándole a la vez qué opinión tiene de los nombramientos. GALINDO responde que buena. FEDERICO dice que no hay más que un error de ubicación en el asunto de la pesca, pues éso le quita valor a

(6)

los 20,000. HECTOR contesta que 9,000, pero que tuvieron que recortar lo de quién invitaba. RENATO pregunta que si así les van a servir. HECTOR dice que sí y que se repartieron, pero supone que todavía habrá en Salvador. De todos modos hay que ver éso, porque parece que no se llevaron todo lo que habían hablado. RENATO tiene todavía, y sólo quería informarle qué lugar y qué fecha. El sábado se ven allá.

(59) (3696)

14:22 ELENA VAZQUEZ GOMEZ preguntó a MAIZ, el portero de la Embajada Cubana, que si no ha regresado TERESA PROENZA todavía, porque aquí la están esperando en Fundición, 8, y la señora dice que TERESA iba a ir primero a la Embajada Norteamericana. Que por favor en cuanto llegue, le diga que la están esperando en esa dirección. MAIZ comenta que si TERESA fué a la Embajada Norteamericana, a lo mejor allí ya la degollaron. ELENA se rie de la ocurrencia.

(265)

14:37 El Ing. JORGE L. TAMAYO recomendó a su hijo el Lic. JORGE que ahora que vaya a la casa lo espere, porque quiere hablar con él, pero que procure que la cosa no sea muy ostentosa, pues no quiere que de ésto se dé cuenta su esposa MARTA. Que el Ingeniero irá disimuladamente a su recámara y luego suba JORGITO en la misma forma, pues le urge hablarle.

14:39 El Embajador PORTUONDO puso el siguiente cable a GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI, Embajador de Cuba ante la ONU en Nueva York: "Favor SOLSA espere compañeros TALAVERA y RODAS, Delegados CIES llegarán vuelo 400 Aeronaves México seis horas mañana sábado".

16:11 POSADA, Consul de Cuba en Veracruz, desde el Puerto Aereo dijo a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, de la Embajada Cubana, que dentro de un rato sale a Tampico, a las 18:00 hs., y pregunta que si allí en la Embajada tienen alguna información que llevar para allá manden a alguien con ella y él se encargará de hacerla llegar a aquella gente o que si quieren decirle algo vaya alguno al Aeropuerto a verlo. ROGELIO manifiesta que tratará de ir con otro compañero de allí de la Embajada.

(142)

18:00 De parte de [illegible] preguntaron por el Lic. alonso AGUILAR, manifestando que es urgente. En el despacho de AGUILAR se informó que se encontraba en las oficinas de Salvador [illegible] y se les proporcionó el número de teléfono.

18:52 Un individuo no identificado preguntó a la oficina comercial de la Embajada Cubana, por JOAQUIN [illegible], quien vino de Culiacán para arreglar un asunto allí en la Embajada, según expresó el individuo. Una vez en comunicación, éste recalcó a JOAQUIN que no hubiera ido ni a la Unión, ni al Parti-

P-7765

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
Norman LAINFIESTA

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

RI FILE NO. P-7316

DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
memo from W.M. Scott

DATE 29 Nov 61

SOURCE CRYPTONYM

DATE OF INFO.

EVALUATION

ANALYST

DATE PROCESSED

DISSEMINATED IN

DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☐ CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

☐ TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Contact of Subject, while he, subject was in Mexico.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ P-7365

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

7365

11:55 FUENTE preguntó al cubano ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que si ha habido algo, pues a él lo fueron a buscar de parte de un señor RODOLFO ROMERO de La Habana y FUENTE no sabe si es cierto o le quieren tender una trampa, porque parece que ya le andan pisando los talones, por lo del Movimiento de Liberación, y entonces quiere saber si allí en la Embajada tienen información sobre las personas que llegan, a ver si este señor RODOLFO ROMERO está aquí o vino antier. ROGELIO le sugiere que mejor llame al Consulado de Cuba, aunque desde luego "no sabemos quién sea ese señor". FUENTE mejor va a hablar con el señor de la Cubana de Aviación, además de que va a ponerse más abusado.

12:20 El Lic. AGUILAR manifestó al Ing. HEBERTO CASTILLO que lo ha estado llamando en virtud de que recibió un telegrama de los compañeros de Poza Rica, quienes tienen interés en saber en definitiva quienes van y cuando estarán allá, además de que en el telegrama indican con quien ponerse en contacto allá. AGUILAR agrega que precisamente está aquí ahora NACHO ACOSTA y con él va a precisar los nombres para así telegrafiarles a aquellas gentes, pues parece que son los mismos cinco elementos inicialmente propuestos. HEBERTO dice que parece que se incorpora tambien NACHO AGUIRRE. AGUILAR a su vez manifiesta que ACOSTA indica la posibilidad de que tambien vayan dos o tres petroleros de la Secc. 35, y eso sería muy útil. HEBERTO no puede precisar quienes son, no obstante que el sábado estuvieron tratando ese asunto con los petroleros. AGUILAR dice queel acto será el sábado a las 20:00 hs. HEBERTO le recalca que la comisión estará integrada por el Lic. CALDERON, el Lic. CASTILLEJOS Ing. SANTOS BARCENA, NACHO AGUIRRE, Sra. CASTILLEJOS, el propio HEBERTO y los dos o tres petroleros.

Jesus 395

12:46 El Ing. TAMAYO con una risa servil, dijo al Lic. SILVA HERZOG que vé con agrado que lo aceptaron como colaborador de la revista Política. SILVA asiente agregando que fueron muy gentiles. Cambiando de tema TAMAYO indica que le mandará un ejemplar de la revista Hoy en la que le hicieron una entrevista para contestar a [illegible].

13:04 [illegible], de la CTAL, envió el siguiente telegrama a [illegible] a Xicoténcatl, 111-A en Saltillo Coahuila: "Estamos organizando salida Delegación día 29 por Sabena. Urgenos conocer nombres y número delegados para reservación viaje. Usted y otros delegados deben estar aqui más tardar próximo lunes 27. Saludos".

13:24 [illegible], de la CTAL, envió el siguiente cable [illegible], Secretario de la CTC de La Habana, Cuba: "[illegible] informarnos fecha salida avión especial agradeciéndo-

P 7365

que lo ha obligado a aumentar el tiraje. Efectivamente AGUILAR se había extrañado de ver el nombre de BRAUMONTE en una revista de estas gentes que siempre se han distinguido por sus ataques y su hostilidad, pero no obstante eso acepta escribir el artículo que BRAUMONTE le pide, a petición de JULIO SCHERER GARCÍA.

11:23 Un individuo desconocido pidió a la revista Política que mande un fotógrafo y un reportero a la calle de Norte 46 A, cerca de La Villa de Guadalupe, donde están siendo golpeados unos ferrocarrileros, por granaderos, que trataron de apoderarse de unos furgones para vivir. JOSE LUIS MARQUEZ tomó nota y verá que puede hacer.

(4915) copy to P-1493

11:35 JACINTO LOPEZ, tal como se lo había indicado el Gral. CARDENAS, se reportó con éste para informarle que está ahí con él, una comisión de campesinos que quieren que los reciba. CARDENAS indica que lo hará la semana entrante y lamenta no poder saludar más ampliamente a JACINTO.

11:45 ARROYO CH. citó urgentemente al Corl. RANGEL ESCAMILLA, en su oficina.

(2367) copy to P

11:46 ROGELIO CASTILLO, contacto de JULIO COUTTOLENC con el Sr. P. GONZALEZ Corporation de Los Angeles California, en el asunto de cierta cantidad de arroz que va a comprarse para la Embajada de Cuba, preguntó a URBIETA qué han resuelto sobre el particular. URBIETA indicó que CUENCA necesita tener la muestra.

(2086)

12:15 MIJAILOV de la Embajada Rusa, de acuerdo con la invitación que le hizo [illegible] SANCHEZ para pasar este fin de semana en la casa de COTY, en Cuernavaca, quedó de pasar por élla el próximo domingo a las 09:00 hs.

12:40 De parte del Corl. RANGEL ESCAMILLA transfirieron una comida para el miércoles próximo, entre aquél y el Sr. GABRIEL ALARCON.

(7365)

12:40 El Cubano ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ comunicó que en la Valija diplomática de hoy, ya se fué "eso", que son seis bultos, y va consignado al Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, y los recibirá en el Aeropuerto el Sr. [illegible], Dicr. JARDON a su vez informa que " ya tenemos la entrevista", está picosa. (seguramente se trata de una entrevista con PRIO SOCARRAS).

(5100) Vicente (1671)

12:54 [illegible], argentino contacto del Lic. LOMBARDO TOLEDANO [illegible] Embajada de Cuba, informó a MIJAILOV de la Embajada que ya tiene el teléfono donde lo pueden llamar y es el [illegible]. MIJAILOV tomó nota.

SOURCE : [illegible] (P-?)

DATE: Monday, 23 October, 1961

FILE:

SUBJECT: Surveillance of Rogelio [illegible] Lopez

✓ 0900- On duty at subject's home.

✓ 1027- He came out of home and walked to Cuban embassy, going in through consulate door on Marquez and Zamora.

✓ 1252- Car 446 came out of embassy; SUBJECT and three men in it.

✓ 1256- They arrived at Hotel Agnes on Saltillo street and one of the men went inside.

✓ 1302- Trunk of car was seen to be open...

✓ 1309- Man came out of hotel and they drove off.

✓ 1326- They arrived at International section of airport and took out several bags from trunk of car; they then went into Mexicana de Aviacion ticket counter.

✓ 1405- SUBJECT said hello to red faced man who used to live at hotel on Azueta street; he helped put this man's bags in car 446; man apparently had just arrived...

✓ 1409- SUBJECT and other Cubans went into restaurant; they also had taken bags to car...

✓ 1417- They came out of restaurant and SUBJECT said hello to two Russians who had arrived at airport in car no. 86.

✓ 1419- SUBJECT said hello to three students... They were apparently Cubans also.

✓ 1420- SUBJECT said goodbye, then went into waiting room no. 4.

✓ 1515- SUBJECT came out of waiting room accompanied by one of the Russians; this man was seen at airport with other men and woman, apparently all Russians.

✓ 1517- SUBJECT and Russian drove off in car 86; two men and a woman who had been seen with Russian also left in 1961 Ford, plates 141.

✓ 1539- SUBJECT and Russian arrived at subject's home; SUBJECT got off car and went into home, but came out immediately and walked off. Car 86 drove off... (Russian in it has been seen often in this car- long, blond hair; long nose; horn-rimmed glasses).

✓ 1542- SUBJECT went into small store, "La Jalisiense", Marquez and Zamora. P-7365

✓ 1545- He came out of store, and went into Cuban embassy through main gate; it was noticed at this time that there were two patrol cars in front of embassy, and two other cops on foot in armea... One patrol car left soon after this, and the two cops were also relieved by three new ones...

1615- Off duty; police car was again parked at corner of Marquez and Tacubaya, making dispatching difficult, while three cops on foot roamed area around Marquez street; a dark blue 1955 Dodge, (secret service), plates no. 10-75 was seen cruising by, once on Zamora and the other time on Tacubaya; both times going by Cuban embassy; five men in it, very much the "agente" type...

(No police car was seen at Russian embassy today).

SOURCE: [illegible]

DATE: Saturday, 21 October, 1961

FILE:

SUBJECT: Surveillance of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

0900- On duty at subject's home, Pachuca 153.

1028- SUBJECT came out of home and bought newspaper at corner of Pachuca and Marquez.

1033- He went into Cuban embassy.

1045- SUBJECT came out of embassy accompanied by a young man with very clean-cut features.

1049- They took cab at Marquez and Tacubaya.

1057- They got off at corner of Reforma and D. Guerra.

1058- They went into offices of Cubana de Aviacion. Reforma 56.

1103- They came out.

1110- They took "peso" cab going down town at corner of Morelos and Reforma and were lost when team cars were not in position to follow...
Checked all known addresses with negative results.

1215- On duty at Cuban embassy and at subject's home.

1445- Off duty; SUBJECT was not seen again and now there were two police cars in front of Cuban embassy, making dispatching there extremely difficult.

NOTE: Team leader has noticed police cars on duty at all times at the Cuban, Russian, Check and Dominican Republic embassies... This has been going on for a couple of weeks.

P-7365

14-00000

SOURCE: [illegible]

DATE: Friday, 20 October, 1961

FILE:

SUBJECT: Surveillance of Rogelio [illegible] Lopez

0900- On duty at Pachuca 153 and at Cuban embassy.

0958- SUBJECT came out of no. 153.

1000- He went into store, "La Jalicience", Zamora and Marquez...

1004- He came out with another man.

1005- Other man opened door to consulate office and they both went inside.

1033- SUBJECT and man who lives at Tacubaya 74 came out of embassy.

1035- They took cab at Marquez and Tacubaya and picked up another man at doorway to embassy.

1357- They arrived at international section of airport and went inside, but were lost...

1503- SUBJECT came out of airport with ~~xxxx~~ two men plus another who apparently arrived in a flight... These three drove off in a cab and SUBJECT went back inside.

1505- He met man from no. 74 and another and they all went into restaurant.

1528- They came out and went to American Airlines counter, then walked off.

1618- After just walking around, SUBJECT and othet two came out and drove off in car 385 that was waiting outside.

1640- They arrived at Cuban embassy and went inside.

1749- SUBJECT came out driving car 446 with another man in front seat.

1750- They arrived at gas station, Marquez and Mazatlan.

1754- They drove off.

1817- They arrived at international section of airport again and went inside.

1819- They went into restaurant.

1842- They came out.

1843- They spoke to employee at Real Aerovias Brazil counter.

1844- They went into international platform no. 2.

1850- They came out accompanied by a man and woman; they went to Aerovias Brazil counter again, then walked out.

1855- SUBJECT and other man drove off in car 446; couple drove off in a green Volkswagen with plates no. 10-13-58.

1928- SUBJECT and other man arrived at Cuban embassy and drove inside.

2050- SUBJECT came out of embassy with man from Tacubaya 74; they immediately took cab in front of embassy and were lost.....Team members dispatching did not advise in time.

2100- Off duty. Checked known gun shop with negative results...

NOTE: SUBJECT was lost at 2050 hrs. due to bad dispatching conditions around Cuban embassy; teamhas been forced to dispatch on foot away from cars. Car are left out of sight of embassy, as there is usually at least one police car at corner of Marquez and Tacubaya; there was one at this time... Also, there is usually a cop on foot roaming around area of Marquez corner with Zamora...

7 Oct 61

101. ✓ Entrada.- HP pregunta por ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. SIOMARA: que hablo el lunes.- 104.-

171. ✓ Entrada.- HP de parte de unos compañeros ferrocarrileros, pregunta por ROGELIO. SIOMARA: que hable el lunes. 174.-

11 Oct 61

13:15 Un individuo que dijo ser el Secretario General del Grupo JOSE MARTI, pidió películas, propaganda y boletines para repartir entre los alumnos de la Preparatoria. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, indicó que para hablar de eso es preferible que se llegue a las oficinas de la Embajada. Así lo hará.

17 Oct 61

X Rogelio Rodriguez 7365

1 Entrada a las 0958hs.- HD Villamar pregunta por Roberto Frías. Teresa: que quien es Roberto Frías.- Villa: que así le dijo Rogelio que llamara.- Que si no está del Río.- Teresa: que no sabe.- Villa: que mas tarde llama.--- 63.-

20 Oct 61

010. Salida.- ROGELIO avisa a ELEAZER MORALES de Prensa Latina, que hoy llega la gente a las 6 de la tarde; que los compañeros del Congreso de Arquitectura tuvieron dificultades en La Habana con respecto a la visa y hoy llegaron los arquitectos, los profesores que van al otro Congreso. MORALES pregunta el teléfono de la Real Aerovías Brasil y ROGELIO dice que es el 35-81-60.- 035.-

035. ✓ Salida al 35-81-60.- ROGELIO pregunta a que horas llega el vuelo procedente de Brasil. HF: 18.30 h.- 043.-

11 October 1961

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Pro-Cuban Ceremony at ~~Escuela~~ "Republica de Cuba" - Guero #258
Mexico, D.F.

On 11 Oct 61, LITALUS-1 reported that the ceremony planned at the Escuela "Republica de Cuba" in memory of the "Grito de Yara" was held on this date at 1120. The following people of note were present:

Directora - Elmira ROCHA - Member of the MRM. "Rojilla"

Manuel ~~S.~~ HIDALGO - Rep from the ~~XXX~~ SEP.

Teresa PROENZA - Press Attache Cuban Embassy and Cultural

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez - Asst. Press/Attache Cuban Embassy.

3696

7365

Nothing of a political nature was discussed during the ceremony. After the ceremony PROENZA and RODRIGUEZ met with officials of the school and talked for some time. It is not known what was discussed.

LITEM L-1 reported that DFS Hqs assigned him to find out the whereabouts of Angel FERNANDEZ Casas, "un barbudo" cubano who arrived in Mexico from Habana on 6 Oct 61. The purpose of the DFS request is not known.

I gave L-1 above assignment on the night of 10 Oct 61.

FILE: Cuban Embassy

50-1-3-3

P-7365

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

On 11 Oct 61, I gave Tex Puckett data re Subject for surveillance op to be mounted on 16 Oct 61. LITENSOR interested Cuban dip who in contact Mexican students. I believe XXXXXXX Subject may be man LITENSOR interested in.

CKS

FILE: "P" FILE SUBJECT

22 Sept 61

18:12 [illegible] de la revista [illegible] Libre, preguntó a la [illegible] Cuesta por ROGELIO [illegible], y al no encontrarse éste dejó el [illegible] urgente que se comunique con él. [illegible] el recado. Posteriormente éste dijo a [illegible] de la Embajada que en cuanto llegue ROGELIO le diga que vaya allí a la oficina por que lo tiene [illegible] muy urgente.

29 Sept 61

087. Salida 10.00 h.- ALBERU con la señorita COLAR. Esta se encuentra muy apenada con él, antier lo estuvo esperando, ayer pensaba llamarle, pero estuvo muy ocupada porque tenía que atender a unas chicas de la Universidad Iberoamericana y se le fué el tiempo en su laboratorio porque tenían que hacer una serie de preparaciones y cosas. A ALBERU asíle pasó antier; pregunta si la puede ver. COLAR indica que sí, pero ahorita va a salir para el museo. ALBERU queda de irla a ver allá entre doce y una. COLAR lo espera.- 106.-

LIENVOY

8 Oct 61

292. Salida 15.49 h. al 10-21-71.- ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ pide a SOUSA que de ser posible le mande el traje negro. SOUSA indica que todavía no está.- 315.-

362. Salida 16.46 h. al 46-60-15.- ROGELIO pregunta por ELIEZER MORALES. BORDES informa que no está. ROGELIO indica que aquí está el Presidente de la FEU y querían ver si ELIEZER los podía llevar a la Universidad para que la vieran. BORDES: que se fué con EDUARDO PASCUAL y OSCARES, que en caso de que lleguen les dirá se comuniquen con ROGELIO.- Este acepta, agregando que el lunes lo irá a ver. BORDES está de acuerdo.- 389.-

7284

R-7365

50-9-3-3


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Sr. Joaquín Rodríguez [illegible]
Francisco Márquez # 160
esq. a [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

HABANA, CUBA
OCT
61

La Habana [illegible] de Octubre [illegible]
Año de la Educación

Sr:
Joaquín Rodríguez [illegible]

Espero que cuando reciba esta carta te encuentres bien. [illegible]

2

[illegible] Olivia. [illegible] dice que [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] 5 [illegible]
[illegible] 21 de septiembre

[illegible] el 20 de Octubre. [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] de Roberto [illegible]
[illegible]

21

Francisco Marquez 160 10/11/60.

P-7365

2

NEGATIVES

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez



[illegible] Brigadista [illegible]
Finca la Campana
Pinar del Rio

Año de la Educación
Habana 1 de Octubre 19[illegible]
Sr Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.
Mi querido hijo Dios quiera
que al recibir estas letras te
encuentres bien de salud
Rogelio recibí tu carta de
fecha 15 de Septiembre donde
me dices que tienes que esperar
permiso para venir a la
Habana lo que quiero es que
me mandes a decir 8 dias
antes cuando vengas para pedir
permiso acuerdate de traerme
la cadena que no se te
olvide sabes que quiero la
cadena con un Crusifijo
quiero saber si me puedes mandar
un Compleú de Jorge Negrete
de canciones bonitas mexicanas
estamos en Pinar del Rio
los Brigadistas como la madre [illegible]

20

es donde quiere que uno termina
sole un [illegible] las 10 am
Cuento lo que tenemos en Cuba
cuando escriba el sobre de las
cartas no pongas falta de Ortografia
aunque no se si lo escribiste tu
se despide de ti tu Madre que
no se olvida de ti un solo
momento un beso y abrazo bien
fuerte tu hermano Jorge te
manda igual

Lina

Patria o Muerte

Venceremos

Viva nuestra Revolución

Socialista unica en la
América

20

[illegible] [illegible] 160 10/11/64

NEGATIVES

P-7365

P

File - Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez



Sr Rogelio Rodriguez Lo[illegible]
Francisco Mar[illegible] # 10[illegible]
con Calzada de [illegible]
Colonia Condesa Mexico, D.F.

VIA AEREA

COMPRE AZUCAR

R. [illegible] Lopez Lopez
Calle Capitan [illegible]
[illegible]
Cuba



Año de la Educacion
Habana 2_ de Septiembre 19[illegible]
Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez
Mi querido hijo deseo que a
el recibo de estas letras te encuentres
bien de salud nosotros bien
mi hijo hace 3 semanas que no
recibo carta de ti recibi noticias
tuyas por tu madrina donde me
dice que vendrias en el mes de
Octubre no sabes la alegria que
me dio al recibir esa noticia
me dice que tienes a [illegible]
lo unico que pienso que me
mandes a decir 3 dias antes
cuando tienes para pedir permiso
y tener tiempo para mandarme
hacer un vestido para la boda
de ustedes para pedir 2 dias
de permiso en el trabajo te
mando esta foto para que
veas a tu madre vestida de

19


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

[illegible] escribeme aqui
acuerdate de la cadena
me la compras con un crucifijo
me la traes cuando vengas
no se te olvide tengo muchas
ganas de verte porque tiene muchas
ganas de verte y yo tambien
se despide de ti tu madre que
no te olvida ni un solo momento
un besos y recibe un abrazo bien
fuerte

Patria O Muerte

Venceremos

Viva nuestra Revolucion
Socialista

19

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

14-00000

Ramona Marquez 160

10/2/61

NEGATIVES

P-73-65

19

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

La Habana Sept 18 1961
"Año de la Educación"

Sr.
Rogelio Rodríguez

Cuñado:

La presente es para decirte sobre los trámites que se están corriendo aquí para la Boda de Ustedes, como Lilian es menor de edad y papá está muerto hay que sacar una certificación de defunción para presentarlo en los papeles del matrimonio hoy se fue a pedir ese papel y no sale hasta el 4 de Dic., pero eso no tiene mayor importancia. En caso de no conseguirse pues se hace una declaración jurada ante un notario y cuando ese papel esté se adjunta a los ya archivados en la notaría, la certificación de nacimiento de Lilian y la fe de soltería estarán para el 2 de Oct, mañana a las 10 a. m a Marianao a solicitar la tuya pues eso tiene un trámite de 15 días

14

Mañana va Tana a ver a la Sra. que le arregle la pensión de la madre de Alberto y tratar de ir a [illegible] para ver si ellos pueden sacar el certificado de defunción; me alegro mucho la realización de la próxima boda de Alberto y por suerte ya habrá pedido el extendido para poderse quedar aquí con Queca

Bueno ojalá que pronto estés aquí aunque no tengas el porvenir pues todo tiene su tiempo y lo [illegible] está hecho.

Te abraza la cuñada
[illegible]

Patria o Muerte
Venceremos

18



VIA AEREA

VIA AIR MAIL

Sr.
Rogelio Rodríguez
Francisco [illegible] #160
[illegible]
[illegible]

La Habana 18 de Septiembre 1961
Año de la Educación

Sr.
Rogelio Rodríguez López

Deseo que cuando recibas esta carta te encuentres bien
Mi vida recibí tu carta con fecha del día 9 me
alegro mucho al saber que era culpa del correo y
no tu. [illegible] y hacía cerca de un mes que no te
mandaba noticias. Luego el otro día [illegible] de ti [illegible]
[illegible]. Que me escribiste y [illegible] que tu lo [illegible]
escribió que [illegible] venía dentro de dos meses y
ahora me dices que tu no vienes antes [illegible]
para el cumpleaños de Jorge, y me dices que tenga
los papeles arreglados que si dejan [illegible] vienes en
[illegible] y te casas y nos vamos el lunes ya estoy
solicitando los papeles de inscripción la solicité me la
dan el 2 de octubre y también el papel de soltería que
dura 20 días hábiles y lleva un trámite de unos 15 días
o más. Así que ya solicité el [illegible] también se [illegible]
[illegible] otra [illegible] que no hay problema pero el
problema ahora es la [illegible] de [illegible] que [illegible]
me la dan el 4 de diciembre ya [illegible] te explica mejor
en una carta del problema que hay de todas formas si
no te casas por ahora, como ya [illegible] arreglado
los papeles.

18

P-7365

Si bien [illegible] te dejan hijo y vienes a conocerle ahora
[illegible] en [illegible] la [illegible] la [illegible] tu mamá [illegible]
la [illegible], y [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] luna de miel [illegible]
[illegible] mejor ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] el domingo y nos [illegible] el lunes
[illegible] esta a tu disposición como tu quieras.
Recibe un beso de tu novia que te quiere y no
te olvidará nunca Gates

4

Damian Marquez #160 9/25/61

NEGATIVES

4

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez



Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez
[illegible] 100
[illegible] de Tacubaya
[illegible]
México D.F.

VIA · AEREA

Remite Alejandrina [illegible]
Finca [illegible]
[illegible]
Rancho [illegible]

Año de la Educación
Habana 19 de Septiembre de 1961
Sr. Avelio Rodriguez
Mi querido hijo espero que
al recibo estas letras te encuentres
bien de salud mi hijo Dios quiera
que tengas pronto [illegible]
Nuevos de Berto me dice Berta
que esta en un circulo de
Capacitación Revolucionaria
no te puedes imaginar la alegria
que me da saber que todo en
la casa estan cooperando con
la Revolucion porque esta
es lo mas grande y formal
tu Padre esta con nosotros
pasandose unos dias aqui
te mando la dirección de
[illegible] para que le escribas
[illegible] a tu Cristino que
siempre me dice que tu no le
escribe te mando la dirección
de el

se despide de ti tu madre
con besos y un fuerte abrazo
con toda el alma y corazón
Lina

te mandaré el retrato que
me pediste de Brigadista en
la próxima carta por que es
que los rollos no se encuentran
recuerdate de comprarme la
cadena con el crucifijo tu sabe
que tengo muchos deseos de tener
una cadena esta es la dirección
de Palmira
San Francisco #356
San Juan Puerto Rico

y esta es la dirección de tu Padre

San Rafael 574
Apartamento 501
Habana

17

9/26/61.

Francisco Marquez 166

NEGATIVES

P-7365

f- Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

[illegible]

[illegible] Rosales
[illegible]
[illegible] del Patrón
[illegible]

P-7365

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Querido [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] a Caracota [illegible] por su recepción [illegible] de la familia [illegible]

[illegible] también [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] libros [illegible]

[illegible] ella

[illegible]

[illegible] también [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] que [illegible]
[illegible] la cantidad [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] para que [illegible]
[illegible] tengo que [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]?

[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] por el momento, [illegible]
[illegible] que para [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Francisco Marquez 7160 9/22/61

NEGATIVES

"P" Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

14-00000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

[illegible]

35¢

50 CTS

MEXICO

[illegible] López (Irigo[illegible]
Finca La [illegible]
[illegible], Pinar del Río
Cuba.

P-7365

Sta Alejandrina [illegible]

Mamá [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] porque [illegible]

[illegible]

Sobre la [illegible]

[illegible] aproximadamente [illegible]

[illegible] quedo allá

Te [illegible]

[illegible] pero [illegible] formal que [illegible] echó todo un hombre [illegible]

[illegible] el [illegible] por los [illegible]

[illegible]

¡Patria o Muerte
Venceremos
donde sea!

Francisco Marquez #166 9/22/61

NEGATIVES

Rogelio Rodz-Lopez

11 de Sept. de 1961
INFORME #48

PINTURA ROJA EN MAZATLAN #126

ANTECEDENTES: En las calles de Mazatlan #126 es el domicilio del Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez López, que se encuentra en lugar de Rodriguez Cué. G-2.

INFORME: A la una de la mañana del dia 11 de Sept. se pinto el escudo Ruso en la casa #126 de las calles de Mazatlan y se tiro pintura en la puerta de la mismo.

125(?)

P-7365

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

18 Aug 61

[illegible] En una llamada de larga distancia [illegible] a Veracruz [illegible] SOLE CRUZ [illegible] a POSADA, Cónsul Cubano en [illegible], que aquí en la Embajada están unos agentes [illegible]

D 7365

ción Federal de Seguridad y preguntan por JOSE AGUSTIN RAMIREZ GOMEZ, de 16 años, hijo de uno de los ayudantes del Presidente de la República, de quien se sabe que se casó con una salvadoreña de nombre MARGARITA DALTON, y los dos se fueron para Cuba; que los agentes dicen que el Presidente quiere saber cómo está el asunto. POSADA informa que efectivamente, JOSE RAMIREZ GOMEZ y su esposa MARGARITA se fueron para Cuba en el barco Bahía de Siaguanea y trajeron a Veracruz una recomendación del Embajador P. RYUCHDU quien debe saber todo. POSADA agregó que el ICAP tiene que saber el domicilio en Cuba.

(265)

5 Sept 61

[illegible] de la Embajada Cubana, pidió a [illegible] [illegible]

11:00 En voz muy baja, ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana dijo a GALLO : TELLEZ habló con ALFREDO SILVA FLORES y le dijo que él era del servicio secreto de esta Embajada; además le preguntó que qué venían a hacer ellos a la Embajada, que si venían a buscar ayuda. GALLO comentó : bueno, pues.., nos vemos compañero.

11 Sept

14 Sep 61

19:30 [illegible] de la Embajada Cubana, usando el nombre de [illegible] entrar hoy allí. [illegible] pero insiste en su petición y pide a [illegible] que lo vea [illegible] en su casa, sobre las 10:00 hs." [illegible] asistirá a la cita.

14-00000



Año de la Educación

Habana 10 de Septiembre 1961
Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez
Me [illegible] [illegible] a usted primero que
al recibo esta carta la encuentre
bien en compañía de sus
[illegible] Rogelio [illegible] [illegible]
como un [illegible] que me [illegible]
carta [illegible], [illegible] como
esto de despedida porque no
tengo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible],
que tengo mucho deseo de verte
y de [illegible] parece como
si yo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] cerca este [illegible]
[illegible] que en la casa de nosotros
todo a cambiado [illegible] [illegible]
una [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] nos [illegible] todos
[illegible] un dia [illegible] [illegible]
para todos nosotros [illegible]
que [illegible] de la casa [illegible] [illegible].

P-7365

se despide de ti tu madre
que no te olvida ni un solo
momento con un abrazo bien
fuerte y muchos besos
el Jorge tambien y tu [illegible] Padre

Firma

Patria C. Puente

[illegible]

[illegible]

10

14-00000

Francisco Marquez #160 9/19/61

NEGATIVES

Rodriguez
P - Rogelio Lopez



P7365 5/13



[illegible]

13

Francisco Marquez #166

9/12/61

NEGATIVES

-5-

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

[illegible]

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Francisco Marquez #160
esq.a Calzada de Tacubaya,
Colonia Condesa,
MEXICO D.F.

[illegible]

14

Francisco Marquez 160

NEGATIVES

P-7365 II

P - Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

18 Aug 61

Carlos ARIEL and Julieta were there talking about Human Rights Congress at the Del Prado.

GALLO told Subj they were interested in closer relation with Belice, i.e. mutual collaboration. He talked quite some time on the Cuban Revolution and what is was doing. He told Subj that he was veryinterested in his union and that it affiliate itself as soon as possible with the ~~XXXXXXX~~ Confederacion de Trabajadores Cubanos (CTC), in fact, he asked him to write out (dictate) a letter to Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez re affiliation with CTC. Subj told GALLO that he would discuss this with Edmundo JARDON and that the two of them would come up with something re the CTC. GALLO told Subj that they would like the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) to be the link between the PGT in Guatemala and the CTC in Cuba. GALLO also asked Subj if he knew anything about a military buildup in Puerto BARRIOS. Subj believes that GALLO thinks that there has been a military buildup there. Subj told him he knew nothing about this which is the truth. GALLO also asked about relations between B. H. and British Guiana.

Subj reported that Guillermo TREJO of Prensa Libre went to Toluca on urgent mission on 17 Aug. 61.

Subj said that GALLO, RODRIGUEZ and BORDES talked at some length in Spanish in his presence but he was not able to understand what they were talking about. He cited the following items: something will happen in Mexico whichiwill bring about another situation similar to Guantanamo. CARDENAS mentioned, and name HERNANDEZ of FERNANDEZ on several occasions. Also Oaxaca and Chilpancingo.

P-7365

FILE: Norman [illegible]



[illegible] 20 de Agosto 1961
[illegible] de la Educación

Rogelio Rodríguez López

[illegible]

Sr. Rogelio Rodríguez López
Francisco Marquez #140
esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya,
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO-D.F.

13

[illegible] el [illegible] solamente [illegible]
[illegible] todos los días yo
[illegible] los días largos, y además cuan
[illegible] un [illegible] los tenemos que estos, [illegible]
[illegible] bien [illegible] cosa y [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] de [illegible] Cariño,
[illegible] mayor [illegible] llevar [illegible]
[illegible] esta [illegible]
[illegible] de los [illegible]
[illegible] de las [illegible]
[illegible] la vida, [illegible]
[illegible] antes de esta
[illegible] el [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] a [illegible]
[illegible] a molestar
[illegible]
[illegible] a [illegible]
[illegible] cuando uno se encuentra un poco triste
[illegible] ya es [illegible].

[illegible] en [illegible]
[illegible] y [illegible] a ver [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] de [illegible] y
[illegible] y [illegible] y [illegible]
[illegible] siempre [illegible]

13

14-00000

Francisco Marquez 160

8/28/61.

NEGATIVES

P-7365-3

"P" – Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

DISPATCH SECRET HMMA-17365

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.
Chief, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Gustavo R. MENDOZA

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information

REFERENCES

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-9-12

DATE
11 August 1961

☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

1. LIENVOY (3) reported that on 9 August 1961 Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero, Honduran Communist who lives in Mexico, told Rogelio [illegible] Lopez, Cuban Embassy employee, that he wanted to discuss with him the matter of Gustavo R. MENDOZA, a Venezuelan who is an instructor in the use of farm machinery. He said that MENDOZA, member of the revolutionary group in Venezuela, can no longer return to his country and has been practically dismissed from his teaching job at Chapingo because of his ideology. ZELAYA said that he would send MENDOZA, who has had much experience, to see [illegible].

2. Station has no traces on Gustavo R. MENDOZA.

Willard C. CURTIS

11 August 1961

DISTRIBUTION:
3-Caracas
2-WHD
2-Files

1- chrono
1- 50-9-12

DRCASSAVETIS:gsa

P-7365

53



Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Francisco Marquez #160
Esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO D.F.

[illegible] de la Educacion

[illegible] Rodriguez Lopez

[illegible] esta carta [illegible]

[illegible] casi todos los dias [illegible]

[illegible]

12

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] momento [illegible] de así [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] que el incidente era de arre-
glarlo y [illegible] [illegible] y iniciar las cosas de
la [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] de nuevo [illegible] en un
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] de la [illegible].
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] de la [illegible] de me
[illegible] [illegible] de esperar [illegible] de nunca [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] de mariado [illegible] de
[illegible] [illegible] tiempo me canse de [illegible] y
[illegible] también por mucho tiempo [illegible]
[illegible] de cual forma, y [illegible] de [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] se sido en la mente mia
[illegible] [illegible] esta separación y cual de [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] y [illegible]
[illegible] no se cansa de esperar una [illegible].

[illegible] un [illegible] de tu novia que te [illegible] y
[illegible] le olvida nunca. no se cansa [illegible] de
[illegible] Ester.

P.D. Por favor no le pase mas a las cartas
[illegible] [illegible] que no se entienden [illegible]

12

14-00000

Embajada de Cuba

6/18/61

NEGATIVES

P-7365-2

"P" - Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez



EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MEXICO D F

Sr. Jesús A. [illegible]

EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MEXICO D F

No. 941

28 de julio de 1961
"AÑO DE LA EDUCACION"

Card

Sr. Jesús A. Zentella C.,
República de El Salvador # 7 Dep 4,
México 1, D.F.

Distinguido amigo:

Por encargo del señor Embajador, tengo el gusto de acusar recibo de su atenta carta de fecha 12 del presente.

Agradecemos y estimamos su interés por el proceso revolucionario cubano. El Departamento de Prensa e Información de esta Embajada de acuerdo con su solicitud, le suministrará los materiales de información a medida que se reciban.

De usted con la mayor consideración,

Rogelio R.

Rogelio Rodríguez López
Tercer Secretario

Embajada de Cuba 8/2/64

P-7365

NEGATIVES

"P" Rogelio Rodríguez López

La Habana 27 de Julio 1961
Año de la Educación

Sr.
Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

Deseo que cuando recibas esta carta te encuentres bien.

Cuanto hace una semana que no recibo [illegible] hoy tenia esperanza de recibir carta [illegible] importa porque yo se que no te ~~[illegible]~~ queda tiempo para escribir pero me [illegible] [illegible] al.

Pero el motivo de escribirte hoy no es para decirte que no recibo carta sino que aún te escribo y te digo que me voy a meter a miliciana pero se me olvidó mandarte a decir [illegible] [illegible] el [illegible] y [illegible] que me [illegible] [illegible] en la carta anterior a esta.

Algo [illegible] hoy la llamé por teléfono para ver cuando se iba y me dijeron que [illegible] [illegible] mandado yo quería [illegible] mandar [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] con la [illegible]

Me [illegible] con la gente de aquí la [illegible]

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Francisco Marquez #160
esq. a Calzada de Tacubayo.
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO D.F.

14-00000



Tuve de la Federacion me ello para hacer
un pase a la nacional yo creo que devoes
hacer para meterme en el otro asunto des-
pues que pase para la nacional que te
cres de eso.
Hoy supieron de tu mamá esta con
Jorge en una [illegible].
Recibe un beso de tu novia que te quiere
y no te olvida. Gata

PATRIA O MURTE

VENCEREMOS

VIVA NUSTRA

REVOLUCION

Socialista

11

Embajada de Cuba

8/2/61.

Joan

P-7365

NEGATIVES

"P"

Rogelio RODRÍGUEZ López



Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Francisco Marquez #160
esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya,
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO D.F.



[illegible] en tu [illegible] hoy
[illegible] de tu nombre [illegible]
[illegible] siendo [illegible]

10

14-00000

Embajada de Cuba

7/21/64

NEGATIVES

"P"

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

P-7365

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Francisco Marquez #160
esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO D.F.

La Habana 6 de julio 1961
Año de la Educación

Sr:
Rogelio Rodriguez López

Deseo que cuando reciba esta carta te encuentres bien

Mi vida es la segunda carta que te escribo [illegible] hoy domingo y [illegible]. [illegible] mucho los días [illegible] pasamos juntos. Todo el día algunas veces [illegible] no entiendo el [illegible] que [illegible] pasamos juntos. Hoy [illegible] a mi lado [illegible] con [illegible] a mi lado y [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] que era mejor [illegible].

[illegible] que hoy ya [illegible] [illegible] antes de [illegible] en tu casa y [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] ya era muy tarde y [illegible].

[illegible] está en medio en la [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 26 de [illegible]. [illegible] una [illegible] que [illegible]

9

Aquí estuvo un trío de música el domingo
llegó a [illegible] a las 5 de la tarde y [illegible] la [illegible]
[illegible] también [illegible] no me acuerdo como se [illegible]
de las casas
Yo hoy comí en la cuadra esta en la casa de
Adela te acuerdas cuando [illegible] en la
[illegible] Celia y mamá [illegible] la [illegible] no sé
[illegible] y [illegible] hicieron voluntarios
[illegible] para hacer el censo de la [illegible] y se
[illegible] con unas [illegible] de [illegible] en el
mundo.
Recibe un beso de tu [illegible] y [illegible]
te adora Tater

PATRIA O MUERTE
VENCEREMOS

9

12 de Julio de 1961
Año de la Educación
Cuba territorio libre de America

Dr. Rogelio Rodriguez

Recordado:

Son mis mejores deseos que al recibo de esta te encuentres bien, yo estoy enferma de un oido, y ahora que no me duele te estoy haciendo unas cuantas letras, para que te recuerdes que yo estoy vivo, porque hace tiempo que no me escribes.

Creo que ya por la Prensa de [illegible] te habras enterado de los festejos que se estan preparando [illegible] del 26 de Julio. [illegible] la Habana, con desfile el dia 24 [illegible] Villas, [illegible] y Oriente [illegible] con carrozas, [illegible] flores [illegible] Producción, [illegible] Economía y Conciencia.

[redacted]



En la entrada del capitolio van
a poner el retrato de Fidel y Camilo
y el 26 entra con la paloma blanca
en la Asamblea del pueblo mayor a
la de la Declaración de Habana
[illegible]
[illegible] Alfredo y Jorge [illegible]
para la Sierra de los Organos.
Sin más por el momento se despide
tu amigo
Eduardo

Patria o Muerte
Venceremos.

9

14-00000

Embajada de Cuba

7/22/61

P-7[illegible]5

"P" — Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

Joan [illegible]

Jack

NEGATIVES

9

3 July 61

17:27 De la Embajada De Cuba han estado insistiendo al 24-94-56 que pertenece a Librería Madero, sita en A. Ortega # 1355, que si ya están listas las pruebas de los boletines. Posteriormente un individuo que dijo ser de la Imprenta Madero indicó a TERESA PRUNEDA que ya estaban listas las pruebas, pero esta dijo que mañana pasarían a revisarlas. Más tarde ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana indicó que enseguida iba a revisar esas pruebas de los boletines.

3666 [illegible]

5574 7365

4 July 61

13:39 ESPEJEL indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUZ de la Embajada Cubana que

"ya le tiene todo eso que ROGELIO quería". Posteriormente ROGELIO indicó a MAIS, portero de la Embajada que a la hora que llegue ESPEJEL le franquee la entrada.

7365 6471

13:40 ROGELIO RODRIGUZ de la Embajada Cubana insistentemente ha estado tratando de comunicarse con el Ing. LORENZO CELAYA sin conseguirlo.



Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez López
Francisco Márquez #160
esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya,
Colonia Condesa,
MEXICO D. F.

[illegible]

8

P-7365

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

[illegible]

6

14-00000

Enciclopedia Cubana

6/19/61

NEGATIVES

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez



Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez López
Francisco Marquez #160
esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya,
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO D.F.

7


1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

7



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

[illegible]

7

[illegible]

Embajada de Cuba 6/14/61

NEGATIVES

File —

"P" File = Rogelio RODRIGUEZ
Lopez

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Francisco Marquez # 166
y a Calzada de Tacubaya
Colonia Condesa
México D.F.

La Habana junio 5 de 1961

Año de la Educación

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

Deseo que cuando recibas esta carta te encuentres bien

[illegible] momentos que te escribo [illegible] [illegible] que tu abuelo estuvo en [illegible] ayer se [illegible] de la [illegible] [illegible] ya esta mejor. [illegible] que te [illegible] ayer [illegible] [illegible] que no [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] escribo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] escribo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] siempre los Domingos me [illegible] escribirte fijate el Domingo pasado te [illegible] [illegible] cartas [illegible] de las cartas [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Domingo [illegible] [illegible], por eso [illegible] [illegible] una carta el Sabado [illegible] el Domingo [illegible] [illegible] carta [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] tu carta [illegible] fecha 27 de mayo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] carta me decías que [illegible] [illegible] dos cartas al correo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] las carta [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] sin Bacalao

6

[illegible] un beso de tu mama que te
extraña mucho y no te olvida
[illegible]

No escribo mas esta [illegible] cita [illegible] larga, porque tu solo puedes leer [illegible] recibir carta todos los dias porque yo escribo todos los dias.

[illegible] los sabes cuando menos, pienso meterme en la escuela de [illegible] [illegible] tu medejos, yo creo que me [illegible] [illegible] médico [illegible] el [illegible] ahora [illegible] tu [illegible] pues yo tengo el color es [illegible] en [illegible] que me [illegible] su [illegible].

6

14-00000

Embajada de Cuba

8/10/61

"P"

Rogelio RODRÍGUEZ López

NEGATIVES



[illegible] O [illegible]

[illegible] nuestra Revolucion Socialista

Habana [illegible] de [illegible] 1961 año de la Educación

Sr. [illegible]

mi querido [illegible] que al recibir esta
[illegible]
[illegible] que [illegible] carta [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] que [illegible]
[illegible] estamos esperando
a tu Padre [illegible] a [illegible]
nosotros tuve muchos deseos de [illegible]
[illegible] que no [illegible]
esta mejor que nunca [illegible] de la
Alfabetización ya suma 100,000 [illegible] y todavía
faltan [illegible] mas [illegible] de las
Gobierno [illegible] a la [illegible] por la
[illegible] para [illegible] cuando
[illegible] estar en la Habana para cuando
[illegible] mucho tanto [illegible]
[illegible] y se despide de ti tu madre
que no te olvida ni un solo momento con muchos
besos y un abrazo [illegible]

5

Dinamarca Marquez #166 9/6/61.

NEGATIVES

P-7365

"P" Rogelio Rodríguez Lopez



Rodriguez

Francisco
MAIZ
Alberti

Source - LIFIRE..

May '61

"P"

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez


AÑO DE LA EDUCACION
Habana.

Habana [illegible] de Mayo [illegible]

[illegible] Deseo que
que al [illegible] esta carta te encuentre
[illegible] de salud [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] saber la alegria que me
[illegible] carta que
te estoy escribiendo [illegible]
que recibi una tarjeta del dia
11 y la carta del dia 13 [illegible]
[illegible]
con la direccion que me dio
[illegible] me alegro mucho que estes
bien y que estes contento tu no
sabes los deseos que yo tenia de
que me escribieras [illegible]
[illegible] para [illegible]
[illegible] que saber que ya [illegible]
[illegible] que [illegible]
que [illegible]
aqui todos estamos trabajando

[illegible] lo que tu sabes ya
Tu tía te manda mucho recuerdo
y me puse muy contenta cuando
yo supe [illegible] todo y pase
para [illegible] de la
todos sus familiares te mandan
mucho recuerdo mi hijo acuérdate
de comprarme la cadena.
con uno crucifijo y de traerle algo
a tu hermanito que dice que
lo extraña mucho, lo [illegible]
igual que yo cuídate mucho
[illegible] el [illegible] que
te [illegible] oiga yo todo los día lo
hizo tu madrina como me pre
sta l pasando y luchando mucho.
cuando vuelvas vas a tener alegría
de muchas cosas que están pasando.
Bueno mi hijito se despide de ti
tu madre que no deja de pensar en
ti un momento con un abrazo
muy fuerte y mucho Besos

4

Embajada de Cuba

5/29/61

I

"P" —

NEGATIVES

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

(mother's name:

Alejandrina LOPEZ Lopez


1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

[illegible]

3

[illegible] y [illegible] juntos [illegible] con [illegible] Claro sabes que me contesté las cartas. [illegible] de sacrificarme [illegible] un abrazo de tu [illegible] cuando ahora cuando estas lejos en [illegible] pensamiento [illegible] un beso de tu [illegible]

Recuerdos te manda Ramon y Carmita, Luis

3

14-00000

Embajada de Cuba 5/29/61

"P"

3

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

NEGATIVES

Sr. [illegible] Rodríguez [illegible]

[illegible] # 166

[illegible]

[illegible]

Habana, Cuba, 23 May. 1961
Año de la Educación
Territorio Libre de América.

Sr. Rogelio Rodríguez
Cuñado

Son mis mejores deseos que al recibo de esta te encuentres bien, nosotros bien.

Ayer cuando llegué a la casa me alegró mucho tu carta.

Pero la [illegible] de Escambray, [illegible] oposición [illegible] el instituto tecnológico [illegible] del Escambray, [illegible] y ya estamos [illegible] clases en la escuela de [illegible].

En tu carta me decías que te [illegible] mi [illegible] revolución Socialista de los acontecimientos que han ocurrido en este país. El último es que la [illegible] dos [illegible] partidos gran [illegible] del pueblo, el otro acontecimiento es que te diré lo [illegible] del cambio de Ministros por [illegible] y [illegible] sabes la consolidación de la Revolución que cada día es más fuerte.

Tú sabes que el viernes pasado llamé a Laura por teléfono y me invitó a una fiesta que había en su casa, y me dijo que la fuera a visitar a su casa mientras no se vaya a Alfabetizar.

Se despide de ti tu primo

Eduardo.

Embajada de Cuba

5/27/61

NEGATIVES

2

"P" file - Rogelio RODRIGUEZ
Lopez



[illegible] 23 de [illegible]

[illegible] Rodríguez [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] todos los días [illegible]

[illegible] Tulia [illegible]

[illegible] Rogelio [illegible]

[illegible] extraordinariamente [illegible]

Al [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]

[illegible] las [illegible]

[illegible] Rogelio [illegible]

[illegible] # 160
[illegible] Yucatán
[illegible]
[illegible] D. F.

e rajado =
He Rajado

TULA = TUIA

beco
=
beca

ella


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

[illegible]
[illegible] Caster con [illegible]
[illegible] mas debajo [illegible] los americanos [illegible]
[illegible] movimiento [illegible]
[illegible] junto [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Muchos besos y cariños. Betty
[illegible] y la [illegible]
[illegible]
Betty

Embajada de Cuba

5/27/61

Open new - Cuban Dip.

"P" - Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

NEGATIVES

Memorandum for the Record 31 May 61

Subject: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

In letter dated 23 May 61 from girlfriend following noted for XXX S Ri's file:

Sweetheart's name is Ester, she uneducated , misspellings are many: veca (beca) evajado (he bajado) tulla (Tuya) etc.

Subj has mother in Cuba.

Girlfriend in Habana.

JKS

FILE: P" FILE SUBJECT

P-7365

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE. Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO : RID/201 Section

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

FROM: [illegible]

ROOM NO. [illegible]

PHONE [illegible]

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO. [illegible]

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible]

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

10 TYPE NAME	NAME VARIANT (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION [illegible]

CODE [illegible]

15. CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

16. AFFILIATION CODE P B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

63	64	65		66	67	68	69	70	71		72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION (Clear text)

19. ORG/GROUP CODE

20. OCCUPATION/POSITION (Clear text)
Third Secretary, Cuban [illegible], Mexico City, Mexico [illegible]

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION [illegible]

22. ACTION DESK [illegible]

23. CODE

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

26. CRYPTONYM

27. PSEUDONYM

28. COMMENTS

29. SIGNATURE [illegible]

30. IDN- 201- [illegible]

FORM 7-61 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/AMMUG/Operational; Shipment of explosives to Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: FYI

Following is a translation of a report submitted by AMMUG-1 concerning a shipment of explosives to Mexico:

"The Communist Party of El Salvador had asked me to send them twenty-five one-quarter pound packages of gelatin explosives. They requested that the explosives be sent to Mexico where they would receive them and take them to El Salvador.

'In view of the request, I spoke with Manuel PINEIRO regarding the shipment itself, as well as the amount. PINEIRO answered by telling me to do so.

'During my trip to Mexico (March 1964) I spoke with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez regarding this shipment and he ~~told me that there was no~~ need of my sending the explosives to Mexico as this type of explosive was available in the Embassy. I then told RODRIGUEZ that I would answer the request from El Salvador.

'Upon returning to Cuba I spoke with PINEIRO, who told me not to send the explosives as the orders now were to send nothing but money due to the recent exposure of the arms shipment to Venezuela."

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

P7365

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-12916

DATE
21 SEP [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-749651

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FORN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS CI-316/00714-64
SUBJECT	Esther GAVILAN Rosales	DATE DISTR.	8 September 1964
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	CSCI-3/782,061 29 June 1964
DATE OF INFO.	1964		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Washington, D. C. September 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April ~~1964~~.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Esther GAVILAN Rosales is the wife of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, the Subject of the above referenced report. 1

Headquarters Comment

1. Official travel manifests reveal that Esther GAVILAN Rosales arrived in Mexico City from Cuba on 15 December 1961 and carried a diplomatic passport; departed Mexico City for Cuba on 27 April 1962, carrying Cuban diplomatic passport number D/61-538; and arrived in Mexico from Habana on 8 July 1963, carrying Cuban diplomatic passport number D/63/455.

CS COPY

SECRET
NO FORN DISSEM 201-332665

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	[illegible]	OCR	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT			CINCSO #		I&NS			

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH SA EOB 1	WE 5 R1	CI LIA 1	IE CANADA 1	~~LX-1661~~
WH SA MOB 1	WE MADR 1	CI R&A 3	IE BRITISH 1	No Project (AMMUG-1)
WH SA R 1			L WASH BR 1	CSCI-316/00714-64
WH SA CI 4				
WH WAVE 1		RID AN 1		
TOTALS WH SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1			LIAISON	COORDINATING CI/R&A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS CI-316/00696-6
SUBJECT	Shipment of Explosives to Mexico	DATE DISTR.	25 August 1964
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	1964		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Washington, D. C. August 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Following is a translation of a report which source wrote concerning a shipment of explosives to Mexico:

"The Communist Party of El Salvador had asked me to send them twenty-five, one quarter pound packages of gelatin explosives. They requested that the explosives be sent to Mexico where they would recover them and take them to El Salvador.

"In view of the request, I spoke with Manuel PINEIRO regarding the shipment itself, as well as the amount. PINEIRO answered by telling me to do so.

"During my trip to Mexico (March 1964) I spoke with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez regarding this shipment and he told me that there was no need of my sending the explosives to Mexico as this type of explosive was available in the Embassy. I then told RODRIGUEZ that I would answer the request from El Salvador.

"Upon returning to Cuba I spoke with PINEIRO, who told me not to send the explosives as the orders now were to send nothing but money due to the recent exposure of the arms shipment to Venezuela."

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT CINCSO # I&NS							
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)							

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA/EOB	1'	WE/5/R	1	CI LIA	LIE/CANADA	1		LX-1642
WH/SA/MOB	1	WE MADR	2	CI R&A	3IE/BRITISH	1		NO PROJECT(AMMUC/1
WH/SA/R	1				L/WASH/DR	1		CSCI-316 00696-64
WH SA/CI	4			RID AN	1			
WH/WAVE	1							COORDINATING
TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1							LIAISON	WMK:LD:swk CI/R&A

FORM NO 4-63 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: August 20, 1964

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

From: Clark D. Anderson
Legal Attache

Re: ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Reference is made to your communication of May 26, 1964, that the subject and his chauffeur planned to travel to Nuevo Laredo to pick up a new automobile.

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information on July 24, 1964:

ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, of 160 Uturgas Street, Mexico City, was in Nuevo Laredo on May 27, 1964, to obtain an automobile for the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. A 1964 black Ford Galaxie 500, Serial Number 4B62X150451, was delivered to RODRIGUEZ on May 27, 1964.

RODRIGUEZ appeared to be about 23 years of age, and it is known that he was buying cigarettes and radios during his stay in Nuevo Laredo.

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

The Mexican diplomatic license plates #333 were placed on the above mentioned vehicle.

Now has D-36

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?
CUBA ?
CIT CUBA ?
OCC IS AGENT
Δ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY
DGI OFFICIAL AND COMPLEMENT OF MANUEL VEGA PEREZ /201-334253/.

201-334253
HMMA-24080 E01
11 AUG 64
P12

2141651
JI FR

```
00000000000000000000
111_1_111111111_1_11
222222222222222_2222
33333333333333333333
4__44444444444444_444
55555555555555555555_5
666666_66666666666_66
7777_777777777777777
88888888888888888888
99999999999999999999
```

2 141 651

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

HMMA-24080 EC1 11 Aug '64

EXCERPT

24 July 1964

(info of May 1964)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General : Debriefing Report #126 of AMMUG/1
Specific: Identification of Cuban Passports
and Other Photographs

Source identified the photographs of subjects and gave the following comments:

.....

GAVILAN Rosales, Esther	AMMUG identified subject as the wife of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ [Lopez], a DGI officer stationed in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

.....

Daniel Flores
WH/SA/CI

EXCERPTS

24 July 1964



República de Cuba

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Pasaporte [illegible]

El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, concede Pasaporte Diplomático a favor de

Sra. Esther Gavilán Rosales

para que por la vía que más le convenga se dirija a

Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Esposa del Sr. Rogelio Rodríguez López Secretario adscripto a la Embajada de Cuba en México

Por tanto: en nombre del Sr. Presidente de la República, ordena a las Autoridades de la Nación le faciliten su embarco y le guarden las consideraciones debidas a su rango. **Y ruega y requiere** a las de los países extranjeros por donde transitare, que le presten todo el favor y ayuda que necesite y le reconozcan las inmunidades y prerrogativas que conforme al Derecho de gentes corresponden a los de su clase; haciéndolo así asegurarán la reciprocidad en Cuba en casos análogos.

Habana, a 5 de julio de 1965

Pelegrín Torras

Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores



10 11 12 13

PERSONAS QUE LE ACOMPAÑAN:

[illegible] TIENE QUE SER ENTRE-
[illegible] INMIGRACION
[illegible] A CUBA.



EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

VISA: DIPLOMATICA

NUMERO: 648

Válida para dirigirse a México

LA HABANA, CUBA, 4 JUL 1963

Po. DEL EMBAJADOR

Pedro Irzu

Consejero

MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR ★ INMIGRACION-CUBA ★

SALIDA

8 JUL 1963



República de Cuba

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Pasaporte Diplomático

0/68/-54

201-332665

El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores,
concede **Pasaporte Diplomático** a favor de

Sr Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

para que por la vía que más le convenga se dirija a

Estados Unidos Mexicanos

donde ejercerá las funciones de Secretario adscripto a la Embajada de Cuba

Por tanto: en nombre del Sr. Presidente de la República, ordena a las Autoridades de la Nación le faciliten su embarco y le guarden las consideraciones debidas a su rango. **Y ruega y requiere** a las de los países extranjeros por donde transitare, que le presten todo el favor y ayuda que necesite y le reconozcan las inmunidades y prerrogativas que conforme al Derecho de gentes corresponden a los de su clase; haciéndolo así asegurará la reciprocidad en Cuba en casos análogos.

Habana, a 5 de julio de 1963

Pelegrín Torras

Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores
Dr. [illegible] Luz
[illegible]
[illegible]



PERSONAS QUE LE ACOMPAÑAN:



EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

VISA: DIPLOMATICA
NUMERO: 647
Válida [illegible] a México
LA HABANA, CUBA 24 JUL 1963

P.O. DEL EMBAJADOR

P. Arzunza
PEDRO ARZUNZA
CONSEJERO

MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR * EMIGRACION · CUBA *
SALIDA
JUL 8 1963
BOYEROS

EXCERPT

24 July 1964

(info of May 1964)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General : Debriefing Report #126 of AMMUG/1
Specific: Identification of Cuban Passports and Other Photographs

Source identified the photographs of subjects and gave the following comments:

.....

GAVILAN Rosales, Esther	AMMUG identified subject as the wife of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ [Lopez], a DGI officer stationed in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

.....

Daniel Flores
WH/SA/CI

EXCERPTS

24 July 1964

14-00000



República de Cuba

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Pasaporte Diplomático

[illegible]

14-00000



El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores,

concede **Pasaporte Diplomático** a favor de

Dra. Esther Gavilán Rosales

para que por la vía que más le convenga se dirija a

Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Esposa del Sr. Rogelio Rodríguez López Secretario adscripto a la Embajada de Cuba en México

Por tanto: en nombre del Sr. Presidente de la República, ordena a las Autoridades de la Nación le faciliten su embarco y le guarden las consideraciones debidas a su rango. **Y ruega y requiere** a las de los países extranjeros por donde transitare, que le presten todo el favor y ayuda que necesite y le reconozcan las inmunidades y prerrogativas que conforme al Derecho de gentes corresponden a los de su clase; haciéndolo así asegurará la reciprocidad en Cuba en casos análogos.

Habana, a 3 de julio de 1963

Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores

PERSONAS QUE LE ACOMPAÑAN:

FIRMA DEL PORTADOR

ESTE PASAPORTE TIENE QUE SER ENTREGADO AL FUNCIONARIO DE INMIGRACION A LA LLEGADA A CUBA.



EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

VISA: DIPLOMATICA

NUMERO: 648

Válida para dirigirse a México

LA HABANA, CUBA, 4 JUL 1963

Po. DEL EMBAJADOR

P. Inzunza

PEDRO INZUN

CONSEJERO

MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR ✱ INMIGRACION · CUBA ✱

SALIDA

JUL 8 1963



República de Cuba

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Pasaporte Diplomático

0/63/-454

201-352665

El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores,

concede **Pasaporte Diplomático** a favor de

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

para que por la vía que más le convenga se dirija a

Estados Unidos Mexicanos

donde ejercerá las funciones de Secretario adscripto a la Embajada de Cuba

Por tanto: en nombre del Sr. Presidente de la República, ordena a las Autoridades de la Nación le faciliten su embarco y le guarden las consideraciones debidas a su rango. **Y ruega y requiere** a las de los países extranjeros por donde transitare, que le presten todo el favor y ayuda que necesite y le reconozcan las inmunidades y prerrogativas que conforme al Derecho de gentes corresponden a los de su clase; haciéndolo así asegurarán la reciprocidad en Cuba en casos análogos.

Habana, a 5 de julio de 1965

Pelegrín Torras

Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores

[illegible] la Luz



PERSONAS QUE LE ACOMPAÑAN:



EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

VISA: DIPLOMATICA

NUMERO: 647

Válida para dirigirse a México

LA HABANA, CUBA 24 JUL 1963

P.O. DEL EMBAJADOR

P. Arzunza

PEDRO ARZUNZA
CONSEJERO

MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR ★ INMIGRACION · CUBA ★
SALIDA
JUL 8 1963
BOYEROS

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION 132 SECRET

D[illegible]

JUL 23 21 13 54

ORIG.	B. Brown, [illegible]	ROUTING		
UNIT	WH/SA/Intel Reports	1	4	
EXT.	[illegible]547	2	5	
DATE	23 July 1964	3	6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES

WH/SA [illegible]

TDCS-[illegible]

INFORMATION COPIES

CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, [illegible], CA 2, CA/PEG, DDI, [illegible]

DATE DISTRIBUTED

23 July 1964

PRECEDENCE

☒ ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)

[illegible]-0316 [illegible]

[illegible]-9[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

DISSEMINATION

SA/R	3	SA/31		WH/PA[illegible]	[illegible]	WH/1		[illegible]	#
SA/[illegible]	[illegible]	SA/WA[illegible]		W[illegible]/P	[illegible]	W[illegible]		[illegible]	#
SA/TCF	2	SA/SC[illegible]		WH/[illegible]/P	2			[illegible]	#
SA/CI	[illegible]			WH/2/P	[illegible]	WH/5		[illegible]	#
SA/MOB	1			WH/3/P	[illegible]	W[illegible]			

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER	COORDINATING OFFICER(S) WH/[illegible]/P V. Renshaw [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION SECRET [illegible] (WHEN FILLED IN)	RELEASING OFFICER C/WH/SA/Intel
	COPY NO.

FORM 12-62 [illegible] OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

[illegible]

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA, MEXICO/LATIN AMERICA

TDCS-314/[illegible]-64

DATE OF INFO. 16-21 JULY 1964

DISTR. 23 JULY 1964

SUBJECT

TRAVEL PLANS OF DELEGATES TO THE 26 OF JULY CELEBRATIONS IN CUBA

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (17-22 JULY 1964)

REF IN 33962

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: RESIDENT OF MEXICO WHO HAS REPORTED RELIABLE INFORMATION FOR ABOUT THREE YEARS. SOURCE HAS GOOD CONTACTS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND CUBANA AIRLINES IN MEXICO CITY.

1. ON 16 JULY 1964 ANTONIO HADIK, SELF-IDENTIFIED AS A REPORTER FOR PANORAMA, ARGENTINE MAGAZINE, MADE AN APPOINTMENT AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO SEE ABOUT GOING TO HABANA.

2. THE SAME DAY RAUL COSIO VILLEGAS Y CHAPA, MEMBER OF THE ARTS AND TECHNIQUES COMMISSION OF THE SOCIEDAD MEXICANA DE AMISTAD CON CHINA POPULAR (SMACP - MEXICAN SOCIETY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH PEOPLE'S CHINA), WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN FROM THE CUBAN EMBASSY ANY CONFIRMATION ON HIS PLANNED TRIP TO CUBA.

3. ON 17 JULY A PERUVIAN DELEGATION OF EIGHT TO THE 26 OF JULY CELEBRATIONS IN HABANA WAS AT CUBANA AIRLINES IN MEXICO CITY, WHERE IT WAS ENCOUNTERING SOME FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [illegible] OCI ONE OCR ORR OO FBI INS

4. ALSO, THAT DAY, [illegible], PRO-COMMUNIST RECTOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHOACAN, WAS PLANNING, ALONG WITH ANOTHER UNIDENTIFIED PROFESSOR, TO LEAVE FOR HABANA ON 22 JULY TO ATTEND THE CELEBRATIONS.

5. ON 20 JULY THE CUBAN CONSULATE RESERVED PASSAGES FOR TEN COSTA RICANS ON CUBANA'S FLIGHT OF [illegible] JULY. JUAN DUCH COLLEL, WRITER AND MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA MEXICANO (PCM - MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY), TOLD ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY, WHOM HE WAS TO SEE ON 23 JULY, THAT HE HAD BEEN PUT ON THE WAITING LIST FOR 24 JULY, BUT IT WAS CERTAIN THAT HE COULD LEAVE ON 25 JULY. DANIEL MOLINA, OF POLITICA, MEXICAN MARXIST SEMI-MONTHLY MAGAZINE, ALSO HAD TICKETS TO LEAVE ON 25 JULY. (FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT MOLINA WAS TO ATTEND THE CELEBRATIONS EITHER FOR POLITICA OR AS A DELEGATE OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (MLN - NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT), PRO-CUBA, ANTI-UNITED STATES COMMUNIST FRONT.)

6. ON 21 JULY JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA, THIRD SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY, PROMISED EDMUNDO JARDON ARZATE, DIRECTOR OF PRENSA LATINA, CUBAN NEWS AGENCY, IN MEXICO CITY, TO AID CESAR BALLESTEROS, RADIO OPERATOR OF THE AGENCY, IN GETTING HIS VISA. FERNANDEZ ASKED JARDON IF CARLOS CATALAN FUENTES, REPORTER FOR THE AGENCY, HAD HIS VISA READY. JARDON REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, AND SAID THAT

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(When Filled In)

TDCS -314/00609-6

IN 53962

PAGE 3

A CUBANA RESERVA~~TION HAD~~ BEEN MADE FOR HIM.

7. ALSO, AS OF 21 JULY CUBANA HAD CANCELED ITS FLIGHT OF 22 JULY AND WAS NOT PLANNING ANOTHER ONE UNTIL 25 JULY.

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, FBI, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

participantes ó sean 560 dólares en "nuestra cuenta en el - .... Bank de Washington", pero resulta que recibioron un -- telegrama de Roma diciendo que la fecha límite para ese depósito es el 20 de julio y querían saber si se había hecho el depósito o nó, ya que mediante ese depósito podrían hacerse los arreglos para los boletos de los becarios a Santiago de Chile. Berta pide su teléfono, ya que tiene que hablar con el embajador y Trouppe dice que es el 257550 ext.31. Berta toma nota.- 505.-

505. Entrada 1226.- Novicky, Segundo Secretario de la Embajada de Checoslovaquia al no encontrar a Rogelio Rodríguez, pide a Berta le diga que no se le olvide la cena que tiene hoy con él a las 20.00 h. en su casa. Berta:que está bien.- 536.-

P. 1365.
X

536. Entrada.- HF solicita hablar con Roa y Berta pide llame al 141326.- 550.-

566. Salidas ocupado y equivocado.- 591.-

593. Salida al 186935.-1246.- Berta se comunica a la casa del Dr.Gustavo Baz y pregunta la dirección para mandarle -- una invitación para el 26 de julio y HF dice que es Bravo 14, San Jerónimo.- 610.-

612. Entrada 1317.- HF pregunta a Berta si han sabido algo acerca de la visa para los alumnos becados cubanos y Berta dice que nó, que llame mañana. HF acepta.- 621.-

621. Entradas sin contestación.- 633.-

- -

- - (6.-L36.-17 Julio 64).-

P. 1365

-00000

DUP[illegible]

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: 132 SECRET

JUL 23 21 19 64

ORIG. B. Brownlees	ROUTING			
UNIT WH/SA/Intel/Reports	1		4	
EXT. 5547	2		5	
DATE 23 July 1964	3		6	

TDCS-[illegible]

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH/SA [illegible]

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/[illegible], [illegible], CA 2, CA/PEG, DDP, [illegible], [illegible]

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 23 July 1964

PRECEDENCE: X ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
[illegible]-03[illegible] ([illegible]-33[illegible])
[illegible]-9[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

DISSEMINATION

SA/R	3	SA/SI		WH/FA[illegible]	[illegible]	W[illegible]		[illegible]		#
SA/[illegible]		SA/WAVE	[illegible]	WH/R		W[illegible]		[illegible]		#
SA/[illegible]	2	SA/SC[illegible]	[illegible]	WH/1/R	2			[illegible]		#
SA/CI				WH/2/R	[illegible]	W[illegible]/3/[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		#
SA/MOB	1			WH/3/R	[illegible]	W[illegible]	[illegible]			

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ AIR ☐

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/[illegible]/R V. Renshaw ([illegible])

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/SA/Intel

COPY NO.

FORM 12-62 1B-2 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(15-20-44-4)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO/LATIN AMERICA

TDCS-314/[illegible]-64

DATE OF INFO. 16-21 JULY 1964

DISTR. 23 JULY 1964

SUBJECT

TRAVEL PLANS OF DELEGATES TO THE 26 OF JULY CELEBRATIONS IN CUBA

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (17-22 JULY 1964)

REF

IN 33962

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-9138

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: RESIDENT OF MEXICO WHO HAS REPORTED RELIABLE INFORMATION FOR ABOUT THREE YEARS. SOURCE HAS GOOD CONTACTS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND CUBANA AIRLINES IN MEXICO CITY.

1. ON 16 JULY 1964 ANTONIO HADIK, SELF-IDENTIFIED AS A REPORTER FOR PANORAMA, ARGENTINE MAGAZINE, MADE AN APPOINTMENT AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO SEE ABOUT GOING TO HABANA.

2. THE SAME DAY RAUL COSIO VILLEGAS Y CHAPA, MEMBER OF THE ARTS AND TECHNIQUES COMMISSION OF THE SOCIEDAD MEXICANA DE AMISTAD CON CHINA POPULAR (SMACP - MEXICAN SOCIETY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH PEOPLE'S CHINA), WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN FROM THE CUBAN EMBASSY ANY CONFIRMATION ON HIS PLANNED TRIP TO CUBA.

3. ON 17 JULY A PERUVIAN DELEGATION OF EIGHT TO THE 26 OF JULY CELEBRATIONS IN HABANA WAS AT CUBANA AIRLINES IN MEXICO CITY, WHERE IT WAS ENCOUNTERING SOME FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

4. ALSO, THAT DAY, ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, PRO-COMMUNIST RECTOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHOACAN, WAS PLANNING, ALONG WITH ANOTHER UNIDENTIFIED PROFESSOR, TO LEAVE FOR HABANA ON 22 JULY TO ATTEND THE CELEBRATIONS.

5. ON 20 JULY THE CUBAN CONSULATE RESERVED PASSAGES FOR TEN COSTA RICANS ON CUBANA'S FLIGHT OF 24 JULY. JUAN DUCH COLLELL, WRITER AND MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA MEXICANO (PCM - MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY), TOLD ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY, WHOM HE WAS TO SEE ON 23 JULY, THAT HE HAD BEEN PUT ON THE WAITING LIST FOR 24 JULY, BUT IT WAS CERTAIN THAT HE COULD LEAVE ON 25 JULY. DANIEL MOLINA, OF POLITICA, MEXICAN MARXIST SEMI-MONTHLY MAGAZINE, ALSO HAD TICKETS TO LEAVE ON 25 JULY. (FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT MOLINA WAS TO ATTEND THE CELEBRATIONS EITHER FOR POLITICA OR AS A DELEGATE OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (MLN - NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT), PRO-CUBA, ANTI-UNITED STATES COMMUNIST FRONT.)

6. ON 21 JULY JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA, THIRD SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY, PROMISED EDMUNDO JARDON ARZATE, DIRECTOR OF PRENSA LATINA, CUBAN NEWS AGENCY IN MEXICO CITY, TO AID CESAR BALLESTEROS, RADIO OPERATOR OF THE AGENCY, IN GETTING HIS VISA. FERNANDEZ ASKED JARDON IF CARLOS CATALAN FUENTES, REPORTER FOR THE AGENCY, HAD HIS VISA READY. JARDON REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, AND SAID THAT

A CUBANA RESERVATION HAD BEEN MADE FOR HIM.

7. ALSO, AS OF 21 JULY CUBANA HAD CANCELED ITS FLIGHT OF 22 JULY AND WAS NOT PLANNING ANOTHER ONE UNTIL 25 JULY.

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, FBI, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

participantes ó sean 560 dólares en "nuestra cuenta en el -.... Bank de Washington", pero resulta que recibieron un -- telegrama de Roma diciendo que la fecha límite para ese depósito es el 20 de julio y querían saber si se había hecho- el depósito o nó, ya que mediante ese depósito podrían hacerse los arreglos para los boletos de los becarios a Santiago de Chile. Berta pide su teléfono, ya que tiene- que hablar con el embajador y Trouppe dice que es el 257550 ext.31. Berta toma nota.- 505.-

505. Entrada 1226.- Novicky, Segundo Secretario de la Embajada de Checoslovaquia al no encontrar a Rogelio Rodríguez, pide a Berta le diga que no se le olvide la cena que tiene- hoy con él a las 20.00 h. en su casa. Berta:que está- bien.- 536.-

p. 1365
X

536. Entrada.- HF solicita hablar con Roa y Berta pide llamo al 141326.- 550.-

566. Salidas ocupado y equivocado.- 591.-

593. Salida al 186935.-1246.- Berta se comunica a la casa-- del Dr.Gustavo Baz y pregunta la dirección para mandarle -- una invitación para el 26 de julio y HF dice que es Bravo - 14, San Jerónimo.- 610.-

612. Entrada 1317.- HF pregunta a Berta si han sabido algo- acerca de la visa para los alumnos becados cubanos y Berta- dice que nó, que llame mañana. HF acepta.- 621.-

621. Entradas sin contestación.- 633.-

- -

- - (6.-L36.-17 Julio 64).-

P. 1365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE 15 JUL 64

ROUTINE	PRIORITY	INITIALS		
RRRRRRRR	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PWO	1422052V	1153

TO PRIORITY LIMA INFO MEXI DIR ~~[illegible]~~ 35306

RYBAT DYVOUR

REFS A LIMA 5666 (NOT SENT MEXI)

B. LIMA 5663 (NOT SENT MEXI)

C DIR 34453 (NOT SENT MEXI)

D. ZURC 0227(IN 1033)

1. POA GRANTED [redacted] DUIRON-I (D-1) 14 JULY FOR PURPOSES CONTACT, ASSESSMENT AND LCFLUTTER ONLY.

2. FOLL IS FOR POSSIBLE STATION BACKGROUND USE RE D-I BONA FIDES:

A. JACINTO RENTERIA MACHUCA LISTED DUEBON "NOTA DE INFORMACION" NO 000330 AS EIR ACTIVIST IN JAUJA, LED 29 MAY 62 ATTACK THERE. DOB C. 1937 IN PIURA, WORKS "FERTISA" (NOV. 9163), LIVES AVDA BUENOS AIRES 308, CALLAO, MILITARY CARD A2-54-00863, VOTER CARD 1452140.

B. JUAN/LOPEZ LIZANA SEGUNDO, PERU PP 06617, TRAVELED 5 APRIL MEXI-HAVANA WITH D-I AND RENTERIA.

C. "ROGELIO" ALMOST CERTAINLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, 2ND SECRETARY PBRUMEN EMB MEXI AND IDENTIFIED DIRECCION GENERAL DE INTELIGENCIA (DGI) OFFICER FOR MEXI.

D. (FRANCISCO) CARLOS ACEVEDO MORENO CONFIRMED AS ACCOUNTANT PRENSA LATINA LIVING CALLE MARTI 10-B, MEXI. THIS ALSO IS ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR IDENTIFIED DGI AGENT PANAMA. ACEVEDO TRAVELED MEXI-HAVANA JULY AND AUGUST 1963.

E. "BERNABE" LISTED AS APPRENTICE OF "JORDAN", TRUE NAME FNU JOA, DGI OFFICER FOR PERU, MAY BE SAME IDEN AS IN REF D PARA 1F.

F. NO HQS TRACES ERNESTO AYZA DEL RISCO, BUT IN DECEMBER 196~~X~~2 JUAN AYZA DEL RIESCO (PERU PP 01799) AND JUAN AYZA MERINO (PERU PP 057775) TRAVELED MEXI-HAVANA TOGETHER.

3. D-I RECRUITMENT, TRAVEL AND TRAINING CHECK IN MOST SPECIFICS. FOLL STILL QUESTIONABLE

A. NO FALSE PBRUMEN PASSPORT CARRIED BETWEEN HAVANA AND PRAGUE. THESE NORMALLY ISSUED, COLLECTED PRAGUE, TRAINEES CONTINUE ON SAME OR ANOTHER FALSE NAME ON ANY LA PASSPORT.

B. VIEW D-I HAZY MOTIVE GO PBRUMEN, WHY HE WILLING, ABLE PAY OWN FARE HOME CITY-MEXI? (THIS NORMAL PRACTIVE FOR MOST L. A. TRAINEES.) WHICH AIRLINE USED?

C. TRAINING SESSIONS PBRUMEN NORMALLY THREE TO SIX MONTHS, BUT EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES TERMINATION D-I TRAINING STILL UNCLEAR. REQUEST COMPLETE DETAILS.

D. EXACTLY WHAT DOES RETERIA KNOW OF D-I'S BACKGROUND? PBRUMEN

(CON'T ON PAGE TWOL)

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE:

FILE:

CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

TO INFO CITE

PAGE TWO OF DIR 35306(IN 1153)

NUMBER

OFFICIALS? DO THEY QUESTION HIM RE HIS BACKGOUND? THEY WISH USE HIM IN OTHER THAN GUERRILLAOPS? WHAT IS CURRENT SECURITY STATUS D-I'S KUBARK CONTACTS?

4. D-I HAS HAD CONTACT WITH AT LEAST TWO IDENTIFIED DGI STAFFERS, PLUS ACEVEDO. ABOVE ASSOCIATION, PLUS ODIBEX BACKGROUND AND KNOWN PATTERNS RECRUITMENT JPONG TRAINEES INDICATEPOSSIBLE DGI OPS USE OF D-I. HOWEVER, WISH ADVISE STATION DGI DEPT SPECIAL SCHOOLS RESPONSIBLE ALL GUERRILLA TRAINING PBRUMEN, AND D-I CONTACTS MAY THUS HAVE BEEN LIMITED, PARTICULARLY SINCE INTEL OPS AND/OR OTHER SPECIAL TRAINING OFTEN GIVEN IN 2ND THREE MONTH SESSION. FYI CS 311/00115-64 BEING POUCHED STATION. IS LATEST ON ORG AND METHODS OF DGI.

5. REQUEST STATION:

A. DISPATCH PRIORITY FIELD TRACES PARA 4 REF C. PLUS JOAQUIN SALCUERO, PABLO LA ROSA (NO HQS TRACES.)

B. FURNISH LIST OF MALE RELATIVES DUIRON-I WITH PATRONYM VELARDE, INCLUDING KNOWN WHEREABOUTS.

C. CABLE COMPLETE INFO D-I PAST AND CURRENT STATUS ODIBEX LIMA.

CHRONO DUMY

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

DISTR:

TION:

O:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 15 JUL 64

FILE:

				INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
DEFERRED		PRIORITY				
ROUTINE	RRRRRRR	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	PWO	142205ZV	1153

TO
PRIORITY LIMA

INFO
MEXI

CITE
DIR [redacted] 35306
NUMBER

RYBAT DYVOUR
REFS A LIMA 5666 (NOT SENT MEXI)
B. LIMA 5663 (NOT SENT MEXI)
C DIR 34453 (NOT SENT MEXI)
D. ZURC 0227(IN 1033)

1. POA GRANTED [redacted] DUIRON-I (D-1) 14 JULY FOR PURPOSES CONTACT, ASSESSMENT AND LCFLUTTER ONLY.

2. FOLL IS FOR POSSIBLE STATION BACKGROUND USE RE D-I BONA FIDES:

A. JACINTO RENTERIA MACHUCA LISTED DUEBON"NOTA DE INFORMACION" NO 000330 AS FIR ACTIVIST IN JAUJA, LED 29 MAY 62 ATTACK THERE. DOB C. 1937 IN PIURA, WORKS "FERTISA" (NOV. 9163), LIVES AVDA BUENOS AIRES 308, CALLAO, MILITARY CARD A2-54-00863, VOTER CARD 1452140.

B. JUAN LOPEZ LIZAMA SEGUNDO, PERU PP 06617, TRAVELED 5 APRIL MEXI-HAVANA WITH D-I AND RENTERIA.

C. "ROGELIO"ALMOST CERTAINLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, 2ND SECRETARY PBRUMEN EMB MEXI AND IDENTIFIED DIRECCION GENERAL DE INTELIGENCIA (DGI) OFFICER FOR MEXI.

D. (FRANCISCO) CARLOS ACEVEDO MORENO CONFIRMED AS ACCOUNTANT PRENSA LATINA LIVING CALLE MARTI 10-B, MEXI. THIS ALSO IS ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR IDENTIFIED DGI AGENT PANAMA. ACEVEDO TRAVELED MEXI-HAVANA JULY AND AUGUST 1963.

E. "BERNABE" LISTED AS APPRENTICE OF "JORDAN", TRUE NAME FNU JOA, DGI OFFICER FOR PERU, MAY BE SAME IDEN AS IN REF D PARA 1F.

F. NO HQS TRACES ERNESTO AYZA DEL RISCO, BUT IN DECEMBER 1962 JUAN AYZA DEL RIESCO (PERU PP 01799) AND JUAN AYZA MERINO (PERU PP 05775) TRAVELED MEXI-HAVANA TOGETHER.

3. D-I RECRUITMENT, TRAVEL AND TRAINING CHECK IN MOST SPECIFICS. FOLL STILL QUESTIONABLE

A. NO FALSE PBRUMEN PASSPORT CARRIED BETWEEN HAVANA AND PRAGUE. THESE NORMALLY ISSUED, COLLECTED PRAGUE, TRAINEES CONTINUE ON SAME OR ANOTHER FALSE NAME ON ANY LA PASSPORT.

B. VIEW D-I HAZY MOTIVE GO PBRUMEN, WHY HE WILLING, ABLE PAY OWN FARE HOME CITY-MEXI? (THIS NORMAL PRACTIVE FOR MOST L. A. TRAINEES.) WHICH AIRLINE USED?

C. TRAINING SESSIONS PBRUMEN NORMALLY THREE TO SIX MONTHS, BUT EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES TERMINATION D-I TRAINING STILL UNCLEAR. REQUEST COMPLETE DETAILS.

D. EXACTLY WHAT DOES RETERIA KNOW OF D-I'S BACKGROUND? PBRUMEN

(CON'T ON PAGE TWOL)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE:

FILE:

CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS		INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO INFO CITE

PAGE TWO OF DIR 35306(IN 1153)

NUMBER

OFFICIALS? DO THEY QUESTION HIM RE HIS BACKGOUND? THEY WISH USE HIM IN OTHER THAN GUERRILLAOPS? WHAT IS CURRENT SECURITY STATUS D-I'S KUBARK CONTACTS?

4. D-I HAS HAD CONTACT WITH AT LEAST TWO IDENTIFIED DGI STAFFERS, PLUS ACEVEDO. ABOVE ASSOCIATION, PLUS ODIBEX BACKGROUND AND KNOWN PATTERNS RECRUITMENT JPONG TRAINEES INDICATEPOSSIBLE DGI OPS USE OF D-I. HOWEVER, WISH ADVISE STATION DGI DEPT SPECIAL SCHOOLS RESPONSIBLE ALL GUERRILLA TRAINING PBRUMEN, AND D-I CONTACTS MAY THUS HAVE BEEN LIMITED, PARTICULARLY SINCE INTEL OPS AND/OR OTHER SPECIAL TRAINING OFTEN GIVEN IN 2ND THREE MONTH SESSION. FYI CS 311/00115-64 BEING POUCHED STATION. IS LATEST ON ORG AND METHODS OF DGI.

5. REQUEST STATION:

A. DISPATCH PRIORITY FIELD TRACES PARA 4 REF C. PLUS JOAQUIN SALCUERO, PABLO LA ROSA (NO HQS TRACES.)

B. FURNISH LIST OF MALE RELATIVES DUIRON-I WITH PATRONYM VELARDE, INCLUDING KNOWN WHEREABOUTS.

C. CABLE COMPLETE INFO D-I PAST AND CURRENT STATUS ODIBEX LIMA.

CHRONO DUMY

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

14-00000

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

DATE: 08 JULY 64

INFO:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER 1033
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS JPC	0814552	

TO

CITE

LIMA DIR BERN PARI MEXI ZURC 0227
NUMBER

TYPIC DYVOUR INK

REF PARI 5091 (NOT TO MEXI) ALEJANDRO AUGUSTO * TALIGHI-ARCA

1. FOLLOWING IS SUBJECT REF STORY ON ACTIVITIES SINCE WENT AWOL FROM FORT ORDM

A. UPON HEARING THAT UNCLE AND AUNT SERIOUSLY ILL, SUBJ LEFT BY PLANE VIA MEXICO CITY TO LIMA, ARRIVING 6 SEPT 63. UNCLE ERNESTO VELARDE DIED OCTOBER 63, AUNT ELENA ARENAS DE VELARDE DIED 3 DEC 63. ON HIS PARENTS URGING, SUBJ WROTE PRES KENNEDY IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL LIMA. NOV 63 RECEIVED REPLY VIA COL BENSON, MILATT AT LIMA. HOWEVER DID NOT SEE COL BENSON UNTIL FEBRUARY OR MARCH 64.

B. JANUARY 64 SUBJ ACCIDENTALLY MET LONGTIME FRIEND, ERNESTO AYZA DEL RISCO, DOB CA 38, SPANISH CIT. SUBJ FIRST DISCOVERED THAT AYZA INVOLVED WITH COMMUNISTS IN MARCH 63 WHILE SUBJ WAS VISITING PERU. AT THAT TIME A LIMA POLICEMAN WAS RUN OVER AND KILLED BY SECRETARY GENERAL OF PERUVIAN YOUNG COMMUNIST GROUP WHO WAS DRIVING CAR OWNED BY AYZA. AYZA SUGGESTED SUBJ NOT RETURN U.S. BUT GO CUBA INSTEAD AND INTRODUCED SUBJ TO RENTERIA WHO "WOULD ARRANGE EVERYTHING."

C. BETWEEN JANUARY AND MARCH, SUBJ SAW RENTERIA APPROXIMATELY EVERY TWO WEEKS. AT EACH MEETING RENTERIA CLAIMED PLANS TO GO TO CUBA WERE PROGRESSING. DURING THIS PERIOD SUBJ THOUGHT RENTERIA "JUST MAKING TALK". HOWEVER IN MARCH RENTERIA ANNOUNCED PLANS COMPLETED, AND THEY READY TO GO. THEN INTRODUCED SUBJECT TO CASTRO LAVARELLO, SALOMON BOLO HIDALGO AND GENERAL PANDO.

D. SUBJ AND RENTERIA TRAVELLED TOGETHER TO MEXICO CITY ARRIVING 1 APRIL. RENTERIA CARRIED SEALED LETTER FROM LAVARELLO TO "SENOR JORDAN" WHICH RENTERIA WAS TO DELIVER AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO. AT THIS POINT IN INTERVIEW, SUBJECT VOLUNTEERED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON JORDAN: JORDAN IS G-2 OFFICER. SUBJ BELIEVES THAT JORDAN IS MAN IN CHARGE OF CUBAN PROGRAM TO TRAIN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONALS IN SUBVERSION AND GUERILLA WARFARE. SINCE SUBJ AT NO TIME IN CUBA WAS IN COMPANY OF OTHER THAN PERUVIANS, THIS IS LOGICAL MISUNDERSTANDING. SUBJ MET JORDAN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. HOWEVER JORDAN HELD SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ONLY WITH RENTERIA WHO, DURING ENTIRE TIME AND ON ALL MATTERS, WAS CONSIDERED SUBJ SUPERVISOR AND HANDLER. SUBJ PAID OWN FARE FROM LIMA TO MEXICO. GEN PANDO, THROUGH LAVARELLO, GAVE RENTERIA AND SUBJ EACH 2000 SOLES POCKET

CONT...

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

p-7365

(44)

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

DATE:

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO

INFO

CITE

NUMBER

XXRX ZURC 0227 PAGE TWO
MONEY. RENTERIA LATER TOLD SUBJ THAT HAD HEARD FROM JORDAN
THAT LAVARELLO RECEIVES ONE THOUSAND U.S. DOLLARS FOR EACH
PERUVIAN RECRUIT SENT TO CUBA, BUT APPARENTLY KEEPS MONEY HIMSELF.
PER INSTRUCTIONS, RENTERIA AND SUBJ MADE CONTACT IN MEXICO CITY
8-3146 WITH CARLOS ACEVEDO, DOB CA 1926, MEXICO CITIZEN, EMPLOYEE OF PRESNA
LATINA, RESIDING AT MARTI 10-B TACUBAYA, MEXICO CITY. RENTERIA
AND SUBJ STAYED WITH ACEVEDO UNTIL 5 APRIL WHEN FLEW TO HAVANA.
AT ACEVEDO APARTMENT, THEY MET ANOTHER PERUVIAN, TRUE NAME
JUAN LOPEZ DOB CA 1933 WHO WENT WITH THEM TO CUBA. IN CUBA
LOPEZ ADOPTED ALIAS CARLO SUAREZ. RENTERIA AND SUBJ, ACCOMPANIED BY
ACEVEDO, WHO HANDLED ALL MATTERS WHILE THEY IN MEXICO, WENT TO
CUBAN EMBASSY ONLY ON ONE OCCASION, WHERE WERE INTERVIEWED BY FNU
ROGELIO.

E. 5 APRIL SUBJ RENTERIA AND LOPEZ FLEW TO HAVANA, STAYED
RIVEIERA HOTEL UNTIL 8 OR 9 APRIL. THEN UNTIL 13 MAY STAYED
AT LARGE VILLA ON SEVENTH AVENUE IN MARIANAO NEAR GOLF COURSE ON
WHICH ARMY UNIT WAS BIVOUACKED. THERE THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY
JOINED BY FOURTH PERUVIAN, ALIAS IVAN MENENDEZ, DOB CA 33, ETHNIC
CHINESE, FORMER TAXI DRIVER LIMA. EVENTUALLY TWO OTHER
PERUVIANS JOINED GROUP: ALIAS ENRIQUE DOB CA 40 AND ALIAS ODOM
DOB CA 45. MARIANAO VILLA SEEMED TO BE ONLY STAGING AREA. RECEIVED
NO FORMAL INSTRUCTION, BUT WERE GIVEN GOOKS ON MARXISM AND
GUERILLA WARFARE. WERE RESTRICTED TO HOUSE AND GARDEN. ONE CUBAN
LIVED IN HOUSE WITH GROUP, ALIAS FRANCISO DOB CA 43.

F. 13 MAY SUBJ GROUP SENT TO LAS VILLAS (PRECISE LOCATION
CONCEALED FROM GROUP) WHERE WERE INCORPORATED INTO CUBAN ARMY
BATTALION OF APPROX 500 MEN KNOWN AS "LCB" "LUCHA CONTRA BANDIDOS"
WHICH WAS ENGAGED IN FIGHTING ANTI-CASTRO GUERILLAS. GROUP WAS
TO OBSERVE BATTALION'S ANTI GUERILLA TACTICS. GROUP COVER STORY WAS
THAT THEY PARAGUAYAN STUDENTS AT HAVANA UNIVERSITY. CUBAN INSTRUCTOR
WHO ACCOMPANIED GROUP ALIAS BERNABE DOB CA 42. BATTALION COMMANDER
KNOWN AS CABALLO DE MAYAGUARA, TRUE NAME LIEUTENANT GUSTAVO CASTILLON.

G. 2 JUNE GROUP RETRUNED HAVANA TO ANOTHER VILLA ON SEVENTH
AVENUE IN MARIANAO SEVERAL BLOCKS FROM EARLIER SITE, FOR TRAINING
IN FOLLOWING SUBJECTS. ALL INSTRUCTORS WERE CUBANS.

(1) WEAPONS THEORY (.-1 RIFLE, M-1 M-2 CARBINE, M-3
SUBMACHINE GUN, THOMPSON SUBMACHINE GUN, BELGIAN FAL, SPRINGFILED,
MAUSER RIFLE, 45 CAL PISTOL, BAR, 30 AND 50 CAL AIR COOLED MACHINE
CONTINUED

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

3746

(44)

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

DATE:

INFO:

FILE:

CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DIG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO

INFO

CITE

NUMBER

PAGE THREE ZURC0227 (1033)

GUN. INSTRUCTOR ALIAS JOSE DOB CA 42.

(2) EXPLOSIVES THEORY (C-3 AND C-4 COMPOUNDS, TNT, INSTRUTIONS ON HOW TO PREPARE EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARIES). INSTRUCTOR ALIAS MANUEL DOB CA 04.

(3) GUERILLA TACTIS. NO FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS. WERE GIVEN NINE MINUALS MARKED SECRET, WRITTEN BY "GENERAL BALLO".

(4) COMMUNICATIONS. (CIPHER PREPARATION: LEMON JUICE, MILK, SWEAT, URINE SW: RC-6 AND RC 10 RADIO) INSTRUCTOR DOB CA 27, NO ALIAS USED.

(5) TOPOGRAPHY. INSTRUCTOR DOB CA 38, NO ALIAS USED.

(6) FIRST AID. INSTRUCTOR DOB CA 30, NO ALIAS USED.

H. 24 JUNE GROUP WENT BY TRUCK TO PINAR DEL RIO NEAR VILLAGE SAMOA FOR PRACTICAL WORK WITH EXPLOSIVES. TRAINING SITE REFERRED TO AS A "PETE", CONSISTING OF ONE BARRACK AND MESS HALL.

I. 26 JUNE GROUP WENT TO ANOTHER "PETE" IN PINAR DEL RIO FOR PRACTICAL WORK WITH WEAPONS.

J. 28 JUNE RENTERIA AND SUBJ RETURNED TO HAVANA TO SECOND VILLA IN MARIANAO. REMAINDER OF GROUP REMAINED IN PINAR DEL RIO TO CONTINUE TRAINING. REASON FOR RENTERIA AND SUBJ'S EARLIER RETURN WAS THAT RENTERIA IMPATIENT AND ANXIOUS TO RETURN PERU TO FIGHT. BECAME EXTREMELY AGITATED AT TIME LIMA FOOTBALL STADIUM INCIDENT, WHICH CLAIMS WAS POLITICAL MURDER. RENTERIA WANTS RETURN LIMA TO ASSASSINATE RESPONSIBLE POLICE CHIEF.

K. 30 JUNE SUBJ AND RENTERIA LEFT VIA PRAGUE FOR ZURICH. EACH RECEIVED U.S. DOLLARS 1200 FOR EXPENSES. CUBANS PAID AIR FARE.

2. PER REF SUBJ AND RENTERIA PLAN ENTER PERU OVERLAND FROM CHILE AT ARICA LEGALLY WITH TRUE NAME PERUVIAN PASSPORTS. SUBJ PASSPORT NUMBER 102408 ISSUED LIMA 12 AUGUST 60. NEITHER HAS ALIAS DOCUMENTATION. SUBJ CLAIMS KNOWS NO DETAILS ON FURTHER PLANS OTHER THAN THEY SUPPOSED TO JOIN GUERILLAS IN CUZCO PROVINCE. SUBJ WILL TAKE ALL HIS CUES FROM RENTERIA. INCIDENTALLY, SUBJ REFERRED TO SUBVERSIVE GROUP AS "FIR" NOT "MIR". RENTERIA DID REVEAL IN PARIS THAT HE HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT A MAN NAMED ALAIN ELIAS IN JAUJA. ELIAS ALLEGED TO BE IMPORTANT MAN IN "FIR" WHO HAS HAD FULL YEAR TRAINING IN CUBA.

3. WISH EMPHASIZE THAT SUBJ BONA FIDES NOT ESTABLISHED ALTHOUGH HAVE NO INDICATION HE LYING. IN VIEW RENTERIA PRESENCE PARIS, SUBJ THREE HOUR ABSENCE DEFINITELY MAXIMUM SAFE TIME FOR INTERVIEW. SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF AVAILABLE TIME USED TO MAKE RECRUITMENT PITCH, GIVE SECURITY BRIEFING AND LIMA CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS, PROVIDE COVER

CONTINUED

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

DATE:

INFO:

FILE:

CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO INFO CITE

PAGE FOUR ZURC 0227 (1033)

STORY FOR MEET (WE HAD TO SHOW HIM LOCATION RED LIGHT DISTRICT) REASSURE HIM ABOUT PROBABLE ODIBEX REACTION TO FACT HE NOT TURNING HIMSELF IN AT THIS TIME, ETC. CONSEQUENTLY MANY UNRESOLVED HOLES IN STORY. MOST SIGNIFICANT:

A. SUBJ COULD NOT GIVE CLEAR REASON WHY WENT CUBA AT ALL. WHENEVER ASKED THIS QUESTION, HE SAID THAT HE THOUGH IN ORDER TO FIGH COMMUNISM AND SUBVERSION IT WOULD PE GOOD TO KNOW THE ENEMY. COULD GIVE NO REASON WHY HE DELAYED SEEING MILITARY ATTACHE IN LIMA TILL FEBRUARY OR MARCH WHEN HAD RECEIVED LETTER PREVIOUS NOVEMBER. NOR COULD EXPLAIN WHY SAW MILATT AFTER PREPARATION GO CUBA UNDER WAY WITHOUT TELLING HIM OF THESE PLANS.

B. EARLY TERMINATION RENTERIA AND SUBJ TRAINING DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE UNLESS POSSIBLE CUBANS ASSESSED THEM BADLY.

4. NOT ABLE JUDGE INTEL VALUE ABOVE INFO. DEFER HQS RE DISSEM ANY PART OF ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

09/0343Z

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

14-00000

(44)

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

DATE: 08 JULY 64

INFO:

FILE:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	JPC	081455Z	1033

TO

CITE

LIMA DIR BERN PARI MEXI

ZURC 0227
NUMBER

TYPIC DYVOUR INK

REF PARI 5091 (NOT TO MEXI)

ALEJANDRO AUGUSTO * TALIGRI-AREN

1. FOLLOWING IS SUBJECT REF STORY ON ACTIVITIES SINCE WENT AWOL FROM FORT ORDM

A. UPON HEARING THAT UNCLE AND AUNT SERIOUSLY ILL, SUBJ LEFT BY PLANE VIA MEXICO CITY TO LIMA, ARRIVING 6 SEPT 63. UNCLE ERNESTO VELARDE DIED OCTOBER 63, AUNT ELENA ARENAS DE VELARDE DIED 3 DEC 63. ON HIS PARENTS URGING, SUBJ WROTE PRES KENNEDY IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL LIMA. NOV 63 RECEIVED REPLY VIA COL BENSON, MILATT AT LIMA. HOWEVER DID NOT SEE COL BENSON UNTIL FEBRUARY OR MARCH 64.

B. JANUARY 64 SUBJ ACCIDENTALLY MET LONGTIME FRIEND, ERNESTO AYZA DEL RISCO, DOB CA 38, SPANISH CIT. SUBJ FIRST DISCOVERED THAT AYZA INVOLVED WITH COMMUNISTS IN MARCH 63 WHILE SUBJ WAS VISITING PERU. AT THAT TIME A LIMA POLICEMAN WAS RUN OVER AND KILLED BY SECRETARY GENERAL OF PERUVIAN YOUNG COMMUNIST GROUP WHO WAS DRIVING CAR OWNED BY AYZA. AYZA SUGGESTED SUBJ NOT RETURN U.S. BUT GO CUBA INSTEAD AND INTRODUCED SUBJ TO RENTERIA WHO "WOULD ARRANGE EVERYTHING."

C. BETWEEN JANUARY AND MARCH, SUBJ SAW RENTERIA APPROXIMATELY EVERY TWO WEEKS. AT EACH MEETING RENTERIA CLAIMED PLANS TO GO TO CUBA WERE PROGRESSING. DURING THIS PERIOD SUBJ THOUGHT RENTERIA "JUST MAKING TALK". HOWEVER IN MARCH RENTERIA ANNOUNCED PLANS COMPLETED, AND THEY READY TO GO. THEN INTRODUCED SUBJECT TO CASTRO LAVARELLO, SALOMON BOLO HIDALGO AND GENERAL PANDO.

D. SUBJ AND RENTERIA TRAVELLED TOGETHER TO MEXICO CITY ARRIVING 1 APRIL. RENTERIA CARRIED SEALED LETTER FROM LAVARELLO TO "SENOR JORDAN" WHICH RENTERIA WAS TO DELIVER AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO. AT THIS POINT IN INTERVIEW, SUBJECT VOLUNTEERED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON JORDAN: JORDAN IS G-2 OFFICER. SUBJ BELIEVES THAT JORDAN IS MAN IN CHARGE OF CUBAN PROGRAM TO TRAIN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONALS IN SUBVERSION AND GUERILLA WARFARE. SINCE SUBJ AT NO TIME IN CUBA WAS IN COMPANY OF OTHER THAN PERUVIANS, THIS IS LOGICAL MISUNDERSTANDING. SUBJ MET JORDAN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. HOWEVER JORDAN HELD SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ONLY WITH RENTERIA WHO, DURING ENTIRE TIME AND ON ALL MATTERS, WAS CONSIDERED SUBJ SUPERVISOR AND HANDLER. SUBJ PAID OWN FARE FROM LIMA TO MEXICO. GEN PANDO, THROUGH LAVARELLO, GAVE RENTERIA AND SUBJ EACH 2000 SOLES POCKET

CONT...

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

f-7365

(44)

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

DATE:

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO

INFO

CITE

NUMBER

XERX ZURC 0227 PAGE TWO

MONEY. RENTERIA LATER TOLD SUBJ THAT HAD HEARD FROM JORDAN THAT LAVARELLO RECEIVES ONE THOUSAND U.S. DOLLARS FOR EACH PERUVIAN RECRUIT SENT TO CUBA, BUT APPARENTLY KEEPS MONEY HIMSELF. PER INSTRUCTIONS, RENTERIA AND SUBJ MADE CONTACT IN MEXICO CITY P-3146 WITH CARLOS ACEVEDO, DOB CA 1926, MEXICO CITIZEN, EMPLOYEE OF PRESNA LATINA, RESIDING AT MARTI 10-B TACUBAYA, MEXICO CITY. RENTERIA AND SUBJ STAYED WITH ACEVEDO UNTIL 5 APRIL WHEN FLEW TO HAVANA. AT ACEVEDO APARTMENT, THEY MET ANOTHER PERUVIAN, TRUE NAME JUAN LOPEZ DOB CA 1933 WHO WENT WITH THEM TO CUBA. IN CUBA LOPEZ ADOPTED ALIAS CARLO SUAREZ. RENTERIA AND SUBJ, ACCOMPANIED BY ACEVEDO, WHO HANDLED ALL MATTERS WHILE THEY IN MEXICO, WENT TO CUBAN EMBASSY ONLY ON ONE OCCASION, WHERE WERE INTERVIEWED BY FNU ROGELIO.

E. 5 APRIL SUBJ RENTERIA AND LOPEZ FLEW TO HAVANA, STAYED RIVEIERA HOTEL UNTIL 8 OR 9 APRIL. THEN UNTIL 13 MAY STAYED AT LARGE VILLA ON SEVENTH AVENUE IN MARIANAO NEAR GOLF COURSE ON WHICH ARMY UNIT WAS BIVOUACKED. THERE THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY JOINED BY FOURTH PERUVIAN, ALIAS IVAN MENENDEZ, DOB CA 33, ETHNIC CHINESE, FORMER TAXI DRIVER LIMA. EVENTUALLY TWO OTHER PERUVIANS JOINED GROUP: ALIAS ENRIQUE DOB CA 40 AND ALIAS ODOM DOB CA 45. MARIANAO VILLA SEEMED TO BE ONLY STAGING AREA. RECEIVED NO FORMAL INSTRUCTION, BUT WERE GIVEN BOOKS ON MARXISM AND GUERILLA WARFARE. WERE RESTRICTED TO HOUSE AND GARDEN. ONE CUBAN LIVED IN HOUSE WITH GROUP, ALIAS FRANCISO DOB CA 43.

F. 13 MAY SUBJ GROUP SENT TO LAS VILLAS (PRECISE LOCATION CONCEALED FROM GROUP) WHERE WERE INCORPORATED INTO CUBAN ARMY BATTALION OF APPROX 500 MEN KNOWN AS "LCB" "LUCHA CONTRA BANDIDOS" WHICH WAS ENGAGED IN FIGHTING ANTI-CASTRO GUERILLAS. GROUP WAS TO OBSERVE BATTALION'S ANTI GUERILLA TACTICS. GROUP COVER STORY WAS THAT THEY PARAGUAYAN STUDENTS AT HAVANA UNIVERSITY. CUBAN INSTRUCTOR WHO ACCOMPANIED GROUP ALIAS BERNABE DOB CA 42. BATTALION COMMANDER KNOWN AS CABALLO DE MAYAGUARA, TRUE NAME LIEUTENANT GUSTAVO CASTILLON.

G. 2 JUNE GROUP RETRUNED HAVANA TO ANOTHER VILLA ON SEVENTH AVENUE IN MARIANAO SEVERAL BLOCKS FROM EARLIER SITE, FOR TRAINING IN FOLLOWING SUBJECTS. ALL INSTRUCTORS WERE CUBANS.

(1) WEAPONS THEORY (.-1 RIFLE, M-1 M-2 CARBINE, M-3 SUBMACHINE GUN, THOMPSON SUBMACHINE GUN, BELGIAN FAL, SPRINGFILED, MAUSER RIFLE, 45 CAL PISTOL, BAR, 30 AND 50 CAL AIR COOLED MACHINE

CONTINUED

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

3746

(44)

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

DATE:

INFO:

FILE:

CLASSIFICATION

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DID	INCOMING NUMBER
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO

INFO

CITE

NUMBER

PAGE THREE ZURC0227 (1033)

GUN. INSTRUCTOR ALIAS JOSE DOB CA 42.

(2) EXPLOSIVES THEORY (C-3 AND C-4 COMPOUNDS, TNT, INSTRUTIONS ON HOW TO PREPARE EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARIES). INSTRUCTOR ALIAS MANUEL DOB CA 04.

(3) GUERILLA TACTIS. NO FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS. WERE GIVEN NINE MINUALS MARKED SECRET, WRITTEN BY "GENERAL BALLO".

(4) COMMUNICATIONS. (CIPHER PREPARATION: LEMON JUICE, MILK, SWEAT, URINE SW: RC-6 AND RC 10 RADIO) INSTRUCTOR DOB CA 27, NO ALIAS USED.

(5) TOPOGRAPHY. INSTRUCTOR DOB CA 33, NO ALIAS USED.

(6) FIRST AID. INSTRUCTOR DOB CA 30, NO ALIAS USED.

H. 24 JUNE GROUP WENT BY TRUCK TO PINAR DEL RIO NEAR VILLAGE SAMOA FOR PRACTICAL WORK WITH EXPLOSIVES. TRAINING SITE REFERRED TO AS A "PETE", CONSISTING OF ONE BARRACK AND MESS HALL.

I. 26 JUNE GROUP WENT TO ANOTHER "PETE" IN PINAR DEL RIO FOR PRACTICAL WORK WITH WEAPONS.

J. 28 JUNE RENTERIA AND SUBJ RETURNED TO HAVANA TO SECOND VILLA IN MARIANAO. REMAINDER OF GROUP REMAINED IN PINAR DEL RIO TO CONTINUE TRAINING. REASON FOR RENTERIA AND SUBJ'S EARLIER RETURN WAS THAT RENTERIA IMPATIENT AND ANXIOUS TO RETURN PERU TO FIGHT. BECAME EXTREMELY AGITATED AT TIME LIMA FOOTBALL STADIUM INCIDENT, WHICH CLAIMS WAS POLITICAL MURDER. RENTERIA WANTS RETURN LIMA TO ASSASSINATE RESPONSIBLE POLICE CHIEF.

K. 30 JUNE SUBJ AND RENTERIA LEFT VIA PRAGUE FOR ZURICH. EACH RECEIVED U.S. DOLLARS 1200 FOR EXPENSES. CUBANS PAID AIR FARE.

2. PER REF SUBJ AND RENTERIA PLAN ENTER PERU OVERLAND FROM CHILE AT ARICA LEGALLY WITH TRUE NAME PERUVIAN PASSPORTS. SUBJ PASSPORT NUMBER 102408 ISSUED LIMA 12 AUGUST 60. NEITHER HAS ALIAS DOCUMENTATION. SUBJ CLAIMS KNOWS NO DETAILS ON FURTHER PLANS OTHER THAN THEY SUPPOSED TO JOIN GUERILLAS IN CUZCO PROVINCE. SUBJ WILL TAKE ALL HIS CUES FROM RENTERIA. INCIDENTALLY, SUBJ REFERRED TO SUBVERSIVE GROUP AS "FIR" NOT "MIR". RENTERIA DID REVEAL IN PARIS THAT HE HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT A MAN NAMED ALAIN ELIAS IN JAUJA. ELIAS ALLEGED TO BE IMPORTANT MAN IN "FIR" WHO HAS HAD FULL YEAR TRAINING IN CUBA.

3. WISH EMPHASIZE THAT SUBJ BONA FIDES NOT ESTABLISHED ALTHOUGH HAVE NO INDICATION HE LYING. IN VIEW RENTERIA PRESENCE PARIS, SUBJ THREE HOUR ABSENCE DEFINITELY MAXIMUM SAFE TIME FOR INTERVIEW. SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF AVAILABLE TIME USED TO MAKE RECRUITMENT PITCH, GIVE SECURITY BRIEFING AND LIMA CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS, PROVIDE COVER

CONTINUED

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

DATE:

FILE:

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO INFO CITE

PAGE FOUR ZURC 0227 (1033)

STORY FOR MEET (WE HAD TO SHOW HIM LOCATION RED LIGHT DISTRICT) REASSURE HIM ABOUT PROBABLE ODIBEX REACTION TO FACT HE NOT TURNING HIMSELF IN AT THIS TIME, ETC. CONSEQUENTLY MANY UNRESOLVED HOLES IN STORY. MOST SIGNIFICANT:

A. SUBJ COULD NOT GIVE CLEAR REASON WHY WENT CUBA AT ALL. WHENEVER ASKED THIS QUESTION, HE SAID THAT HE THOUGH IN ORDER TO FIGH COMMUNISM AND SUBVERSION IT WOULD BE GOOD TO KNOW THE ENEMY. COULD GIVE NO REASON WHY HE DELAYED SEEING MILITARY ATTACHE IN LIMA TILL FEBRUARY OR MARCH WHEN HAD RECEIVED LETTER PREVIOUS NOVEMBER. NOR COULD EXPLAIN WHY SAW MILATT AFTER PREPARATION GO CUBA UNDER WAY WITHOUT TELLING HIM OF THESE PLANS.

B. EARLY TERMINATION RENTERIA AND SUBJ TRAINING DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE UNLESS POSSIBLE CUBANS ASSESSED THEM BADLY.

4. NOT ABLE JUDGE INTEL VALUE ABOVE INFO. DEFER HQS RE DISSEM ANY PART OF ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

09/0343Z

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 14-13-26.-
6 julio 64.-
M30-L31.
1540-2108hs.-

13.- Entrada alas 1556hs.- HF Pichardo de la Casa Lechuga por Vega.- Que se le diga a Vega que ya tiene sus piezas y que si ya le hace su nota.- Jorrín: que cuando llegue le dice.- 21.

22.- Entrada a las 1608hs.- MF con Jorrín.- Jorrín que no ha llegado nada; que el recibió carta de su mamá y que todos está bien. Que le llame mañana a las once.--- 33.-

39.- Salida a las 1620hs.- Jorrín con HF le pregunta que si habla al restaurante que está en Niño Perdido y que si tiene reservados.- HF que sí.- Jorrín que si es el restaurante que est junto a la terminal de omnibus.- HF que no, que está en frente. ---- 46.-

61.- Salida al 459764.- 1628hs.- Rogelio Rodríguez habla a la embajada de Indonesia y pregunta por Suprato.- HF que no está Rogelio: que es para la cena de esta noche, que invite al Sr. Soeparti.-- HF de acuerdo.--- 72.-

P-7365

73.- Entrada a las 1648hs.- MF Laura por Wilfredo.- Wilfredo - que ahora mismo va con ella.--- 94.-

142.- Salida al 259100.- 1658hs.- Peregrina por la Srita.Trujil le dice que es sobre la visa.... MF Trujillo que manden por el ----Reforma 305.----Embajada de los Estados Unidos.-- 153.-

154.- Entrada a las 1719hs.- MF de la embajada de Indonesia con Rogelio Rodríguez López le dice que lo molesta de parte de Suprato que dice que el no está seguro donde va a ser la cena qu si en la residencia o en la casa de usted.- Rogelio: que en su casa Baja California 178-3, que es de 8 a 8.30pm.--- 166.-

Pasa a la hoja dos....

P-7365

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 14-13-26.-
6 julio 64.-
M30-L31.
1540-2108hs.-

13.- Entrada alas 1556hs.- HF Pichardo de la Casa Lechuga por Vega.- Que se le diga a Vega que ya tiene sus piezas y que si ya le hace su nota.- Jorrín: que cuando llegue le dice.- 21.

22.- Entrada a las 1608hs.- MF con Jorrín.- Jorrín que no ha llegado nada; que el recibió carta de su mamá y que todos está bien. Que le llame mañana a las once.--- 33.-

39.- Salida a las 1620hs.- Jorrín con HF le pregunta que si habla al restaurante que está en Niño Perdido y que si tiene reservados.- HF que sí.- Jorrín que si es el restaurante que est junto a la terminal de omnibus.- HF que no, que está en frente. ---- 46.-

61.- Salida al 459764.- 1628hs.- Rogelio Rodríguez habla a la embajada de Indonesia y pregunta por Suprato.- HF que no está Rogelio: que es para la cena de esta noche, que invite al Sr. Soeparti.-- HF de acuerdo.--- 72.-

P-7365

73.- Entrada a las 1648hs.- MF Laura por Wilfredo.- Wilfredo - que ahora mismo va con ella.--- 94.-

142.- Salida al 259100.- 1658hs.- Peregrina por la Srita.Trujil le dice que es sobre la visa.... MF Trujillo que manden por el ----Reforma 305.----Embajada de los Estados Unidos.-- 153.-

154.- Entrada a las 1719hs.- MF de la embajada de Indonesia con Rogelio Rodríguez López le dice que lo molesta de parte de Suprato que dice que el no está seguro donde va a ser la cena qu si en la residencia o en la casa de usted.- Rogelio: que en su casa Baja California 178-3, que es de 8 a 8.30pm.--- 166.-

Pasa a la hoja dos....

P-7365

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	**REPORT NO.**	CSCI-3/782,061
SUBJECT	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	**DATE DISTR.**	29 June 1964
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	1964		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Washington, D.C. May 1964	**FIELD REPORT NO.**	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

1. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, who uses the pseudonyms "Eduardo," "Casimiro," and "Jose Antonio," is an officer of the Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI - General Directorate of Intelligence) stationed in Mexico City, Mexico.

2. RODRIGUEZ, who was born in approximately 1940, is five feet eight inches tall, has a husky build, a reddish complexion and blond hair.1,2,3,4,5,6,7

Headquarters Comments.

1. A usually reliable source in a report dated 29 March 1962 stated that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez is the third secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Source also said that RODRIGUEZ had plans to see Major Alfonso PRERA, leader of the 13 November Group in Mexico on 24 March 1962.

2. In a report dated 14 February 1964 Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez was reported to be the second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

5
4
3
2
1

CS COPY

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM 201-332665

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
	REP CINCLANT		CINCSO #	I&NS				

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA/EOB	1	WE/5/R	1	CI/LIA	1	IE/CANADA	1			LX - 1526 NO PROJECT (AMMUG-1) CSCI-3/782,061
WH/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A	3	IE/BRITISH	1			
WH/SA/R	1	WH/1/Mexi	1							
WH/SA/CI	4	WH/MEXI	1	RID/AN	1					
WH/WAVE	1									
TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), WH 1 (1), CI 4, RID 1							LIAISON *		COORDINATING	RELEASING WMK:LD:db CI/R&A

FORM NO. 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

MAR 13 12 47 PM '65

FORWARDED
RID/MIS
MAR 22 3 55 PM '65

3. A fairly reliable source in a document dated 4 March 1964 said that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, at the 18 January 1964 Cuban Embassy staff meeting, was given the assignment as Political Reporting Officer.

4. In a report dated 26 April 1964 it was reported that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, uses the pseudonyms "Chele" and "Gorrin" with his contacts in Mexico.

5. On 28 April 1964 it was reported that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, a known Cuban intelligence service officer, left Mexico for Cuba on 25 April 1964 for a permanent change of station.

6. In the 17 May 1964 issue of Hoy it was reported that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, left Cuba on 16 May 1964 to return to duty in Mexico.

7. A fairly reliable source in a report dated 5 June 1964 stated that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, is the son of a Communist Party member and that he (RODRIGUEZ) previously worked in the Foreign Office on Mexican matters in the Latin American Political Department. Source also said that he thought RODRIGUEZ probably worked for Manuel PINEIRO.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba
REPORT NO. CSCI-3/782,061
SUBJECT Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez
DATE DISTR. 29 June 1964
NO. PAGES 2
REFERENCES
DATE OF INFO. 1964
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D.C. May 1964
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

1. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, who uses the pseudonyms "Eduardo," "Casimiro," and "Jose Antonio," is an officer of the Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI - General Directorate of Intelligence) stationed in Mexico City, Mexico.

2. RODRIGUEZ, who was born in approximately 1940, is five feet eight inches tall, has a husky build, a reddish complexion and blond hair.[1,2,3,4,5,6,7]

Headquarters Comments.

1. A usually reliable source in a report dated 29 March 1962 stated that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez is the third secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Source also said that RODRIGUEZ had plans to see Major Alfonso PRERA, leader of the 13 November Group in Mexico on 24 March 1962.

2. In a report dated 14 February 1964 Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez was reported to be the second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

5
4
3
2
1

CS COPY

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM 201-332665

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
	REP CINCLANT		CINCSO #	I&NS				

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA/EOB	1	WE/5/R	1	CI/LIA	1	IE/CANADA	1			LX - 1526 NO PROJECT (AMMUG-1) CSCI-3/782,061
WH/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A	3	IE/BRITISH	1			
WH/SA/R	1	WH/1/Mexi	1							
WH/SA/CI	4	WH/MEXI	1	RID/AN	1					
WH/WAVE	1									

TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), WH 1 (1), CI 4, RID 1
LIAISON *
COORDINATING
RELEASING WMK:LD:db CI/R&A

FORM NO. 4-63 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

MAR 19 12 47 PM '65

FORWARDED
RID/MIS
MAR 22 3 55 PM '65

3. A fairly reliable source in a document dated 4 March 1964 said that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, at the 18 January 1964 Cuban Embassy staff meeting, was given the assignment as Political Reporting Officer.

4. In a report dated 26 April 1964 it was reported that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, uses the pseudonyms "Chele" and "Gorrin" with his contacts in Mexico.

5. On 28 April 1964 it was reported that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, a known Cuban intelligence service officer, left Mexico for Cuba on 25 April 1964 for a permanent change of station.

6. In the 17 May 1964 issue of Hoy it was reported that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, left Cuba on 16 May 1964 to return to duty in Mexico.

7. A fairly reliable source in a report dated 5 June 1964 stated that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, is the son of a Communist Party member and that he (RODRIGUEZ) previously worked in the Foreign Office on Mexican matters in the Latin American Political Department. Source also said that he thought RODRIGUEZ probably worked for Manuel PINEIRO.

EXCERPT

DST-11954

27 June 1964

FROM : Amembassy MEXICO

SUBJECT: Changes in Soviet Bloc Diplomatic Personnel in Mexico

The Mexico City daily Excelsior reported on June 17 that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Second Secretary of the Cuban Embassy, was given a farewell party by his friends. Rodriguez recently made a trip to Cuba and, at that time, it was rumored that he would be transferred. Instead, he returned to Mexico. The Embassy possesses no other information regarding Rodriguez' possible re-assignment.

•••••

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

Wallace W. Stuart
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

EXCERPT

DST-11954

27 June 1964

FROM : Amembassy MEXICO

SUBJECT: Changes in Soviet Bloc Diplomatic Personnel in Mexico

The Mexico City daily Excelsior reported on June 17 that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Second Secretary of the Cuban Embassy, was given a farewell party by his friends. Rodriguez recently made a trip to Cuba and, at that time, it was rumored that he would be transferred. Instead, he returned to Mexico. The Embassy possesses no other information regarding Rodriguez' possible re-assignment.

•••••

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

Wallace W. Stuart
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

43 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH SA 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WE 6, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 1630?1Z 16 Jun 64 IN 07119

DIR INFO BRUS WAVE CITE MEXI 9836

[TYPIC LIOOZE AMNIP] C/S COMMENT: *REF IS RYBAT.

REF BRUS 9953 (IN 99439) 5 June'64

1. FYI: ROMERO PARA 3 REF IS FERNANDO ROMERO HERNANDEZ (201-225175) LISTED 1963 FEDERAL DIRECTORY AS CHIEF MEXI JUDICIAL POLICE. STATION HAS BEEN AWARE HIS CUBAN AND COMMIE CONNECTIONS, HOPES DEPOSE HIM AFTER INAUGURATION LITEMPO-2. VARELA, PARA 4 POSSIBLY IDEN/ JAIME VARELA CANOSO (201-267743) CUBAN NAVAL ATTACHE MEXI EARLY 60. MARTIN REYES PARA 9 PROBABLY IDEN MARTIN REYES VAYSSADE, FORMER UNAM LAW STUDENT REPORTED FEB 63 BE MEMBER DISSIDENT FACTION PCM. CANNOT IDENTIFY FNU LNU AGENT PARA 5.

2. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ IS SECOND, NOT FIRST SECY.

3. ZOILO MONDEJAR PRESENTLY MEXI. WAS REFUSED PBPRIME VISA. HAS BEEN GIVEN TOKEN DEBRIEFING BY AMSAIL-1 UNIT BUT WITHHELD PERTINENT INFORMATION. THREATENS ENTER PBPRIME ILLEGALLY.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

FORM 1389

~~RI COPY~~ RI COPY

16 June 64

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
~~CLASSIFY TO FILE NO~~
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

43 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH SA 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WE 6, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 1630317

15 Jun 64 IN 07119

DIR INFO BRUS WAVE CITE MEXI 9836

TYPIC LIOOZE AMNIP

C/S COMMENT: *REF IS RYBAT.

REF BRUS 9953 (IN 99439) * 5 June '64

1. FYI: ROMERO PARA 3 REF IS FERNANDO ROMERO HERNANDEZ (201-225175) LISTED 1963 FEDERAL DIRECTORY AS CHIEF MEXI JUDICIAL POLICE. STATION HAS BEEN AWARE HIS CUBAN AND COMMIE CONNECTIONS, HOPES DEPOSE HIM AFTER INAUGURATION LITEMPO-2. VARELA, PARA 4 POSSIBLY IDEN/ JAIME VARELA CANOSO (201-267743) CUBAN NAVAL ATTACHE MEXI EARLY 60. MARTIN REYES PARA 8 PROBABLY IDEN MARTIN REYES VAYSSADE, FORMER UNAM LAW STUDENT REPORTED FEB 63 BE MEMBER DISSIDENT FACTION PCM. CANNOT IDENTIFY FNU LNU AGENT PARA 6.

2. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ IS SECOND, NOT FIRST SECY.

3. ZOILO MONDEJAR PRESENTLY MEXI. WAS REFUSED PBPRIME VISA. HAS BEEN GIVEN TOKEN DEBRIEFING BY AMSAIL-1 UNIT BUT WITHHELD PERTINENT INFORMATION. THREATENS ENTER PBPRIME ILLEGALLY.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

FORM 8-63 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

~~RI COPY~~ RI COPY

16 June 64

feel that FLORES Sanchez was deliberately creating difficulties and putting up roadblocks in connection with Cuban plans to put on an art exhibit in Mexico City. (Perhaps this falling out may be exploitable in the current campaign to discredit APARICIO)

g. On 5 June Hermes CABALLERO and Angel GONZALEZ Drete arrived from Cuba to attend some sort of UNESCO meeting. Staying at the Hotel Montejo. CABALLERO knows Dra. MACHADO of the Embassy. L-9 heard that both of these men have Spanish wives. They are scheduled to return to Cuba about 5 July. GONZALEZ Drete' trip was paid for by UNESCO, not so with CABALLERO. CABALLERO remarked that in Cuba recently one of the visiting Mexican chess players chided him by asking why two militiamen guarded all the busses in town.

P-8360

h. Coty SOLORZANO arrived back on 5 June from Cuba. She brought best regards for L-9 from his sister-in-law and said the s-i-l needs some medicines. This was the first time Coty had met L-9's brother and s-i-l, was very impressed by both -- this reflects favorably on L-9. On 6 June Dra. MACHADO told L-9 that Coty had said lots of nice things about L-9's relatives in Cuba. (This is interesting since MACHADO rarely says anything nice to anyone).

P-8736

i. A staff meeting was held on Saturday 6 June. The Ambassador said that he had been invited by President LOPEZ Mateos to attend the inauguration of a new hospital; remarked that this had happened a few times before but that he had noted that he is invariably the only ambassador in attendance -- apparently LOPEZ Mateos keeps him isolated.

j. INTERIAN did not attend the staff meeting but VEGA and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ were there.

k. The preoccupation with hidden microphones was again evident at this staff meeting -- staff members were warned once again to be careful what they say since the enemy is probably listening.

P-8424

P-8590

l. It was announced that APARICIO had been the target of unfounded accusations (in connection with the Berta ORTEGA de ARROYO case) but that everyone should know that he had acted in good faith in his dealings with this ballerina. The Ambassador then rapped APARICIO's knuckles by saying that from this time on he should keep strictly to cultural matters, that "the next time something like this happens it will be more serious than a ballerina," and that matters pertaining to the chancery should be referred to Dra. MACHADO. Although MIRABAL was not present, the Amb said that the same warning applies to the Consulate -- it should not get involved in things which properly belong to the chancery.

m. APARICIO reported that a planned AMCOSAC social affair (perhaps a dance) would not take place because the organization had run out of money.

P-7364

n. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ was especially friendly to L-9 at this staff meeting, gave him a pack of Cuban cigarettes, chatted amiably, etc.

o. On 8 June a Canadian citizen was visiting APARICIO.

Source [LITAMIL-9]
11 January 1964
P-7365

feel that FLORES Sanchez was deliberately creating difficulties and putting up roadblocks in connection with Cuba's plans to put on an art exhibit in Mexico City. (Perhaps this falling out may be exploitable in the current campaign to discredit APARICIO)

g. On 5 June Hermes CABALLERO and Angel GONZALEZ Drets arrived from Cuba to attend some sort of UNESCO meeting. Staying at the Hotel Montejo. CABALLERO knows Dra. MACHADO of the Embassy. L-9 heard that both of these men have Spanish wives. They are scheduled to return to Cuba about 5 July. GONZALEZ Drets' trip was paid for by UNESCO, not so with CABALLERO. CABALLERO remarked that in Cuba recently one of the visiting Mexican chess players chided him by asking why two militiamen guarded all the busses in town.

h. Coty SOLORZANO arrived back on 5 June from Cuba. She brought back regards for L-9 from his sister-in-law and said the s-i-l needs some medicines. This was the first time Coty had met L-9's brother and s-i-l, was very impressed by both -- this reflects favorably on L-9. On 6 June Dra. MACHADO told L-9 that Coty had said lots of nice things about L-9's relatives in Cuba. (This is interesting since MACHADO rarely says anything nice to anyone).

P-8360

i. A staff meeting was held on Saturday 6 June. The Ambassador said that he had been invited by President LOPEZ Mateos to attend the inauguration of a new hospital; remarked that this had happened a few times before but that he had noted that he is invariably the only ambassador in attendance -- apparently LOPEZ Mateos keeps him isolated.

P-8736

j. [illegible] did not attend the staff meeting but VEGA and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ were there.

k. The preoccupation with hidden microphones was again evident at this staff meeting -- staff members were warned once again to be careful what they say since the enemy is probably listening.

l. It was announced that APARICIO had been the target of unfounded accusations (in connection with the Berta ORTEGA de ARROYO case) but that everyone should know that he had acted in good faith in his dealings with this ballerina. The Ambassador then rapped APARICIO's knuckles by saying that from this time on he should keep strictly to cultural matters, that "the next time something like this happens it will be more serious than a ballerina," and that matters pertaining to the chancery should be referred to Dra. MACHADO. Although MIRABAL was not present, the Amb said that the same warning applies to the Consulate -- it should not get involved in things which properly belong to the chancery.

P-8424

P-8590

m. APARICIO reported that a planned AMCOSAC social affair (perhaps a dance) would not take place because the organization had run out of money.

n. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ was especially friendly to L-9 at this staff meeting, gave him a pack of Cuban cigarettes, chatted amiably, etc.

P-[illegible]

o. On 8 June a Canadian citizen was visiting APARICIO.

Laurence LITAMIL-9

11 June 1964

P-7365

24 May 1964

237. Salidas al 181260.-1253.- Sin contestación. Luego- VEGA separa espacios para el vuelo del próximo día 26 a - Nuevo Laredo a favor de ROGELIO y ALEJANDRO RODRIGUEZ. - MF toma nota y pide que pasen el lunes por sus boletos antes de las 1400 h.- 262.- —Going to pick up new Ford at border.

5577
4927
,7365

26 May 1964

249. Entrada L.D. de Nuevo Laredo a las 2000.- ROGELIO --- RODRIGUEZ con el embajador para decirle que no pudieron - resolver hoy nada del coche porque cerraron las oficinas -- a las 1400 h. y a esa hora ellos llegaron allá, por lo que- esperan mañana resolver todo el asunto. ARMAS: que antes de regresar lo llamen para saber a que horas salen. - ROGELIO acepta.- 262.-

365

24 May 1964

237. Salidas al 181260.-1253.- Sin contestación. Luego- VEGA separa espacios para el vuelo del próximo día 26 a - Nuevo Laredo a favor de ROGELIO y ALEJANDRO RODRIGUEZ. - MF toma nota y pide que pasen el lunes por sus boletos antes de las 1400 h.- 262.- —Going to pick up new Ford at border.

8577
~~4921~~
7365

---

26 May 1964

249. Entrada L.D. de Nuevo Laredo a las 2000.- ROGELIO -- RODRIGUEZ con el embajador para decirle que no pudieron - resolver hoy nada del coche porque cerraron las oficinas -- a las 1400 h. y a esa hora ellos llegaron allá, por lo que- esperan mañana resolver todo el asunto. ARMAS: que antes de regresar lo llamen para saber a que horas salen. ROGELIO acepta.- 262.-

365

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING		
[illegible]	ACTION	ACTION [illegible]
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.
Chief of Station, Mexico

FROM
Chief of Station, Panama

SUBJECT [illegible]/Operations
Contacts in Mexico with Soviets and Cubans

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The Panama Station has completed the preparation of Field Information
Reports based on information provided by LYAB from his contacts
in Mexico with IDENTITY 1 and IDENTITY 2. Such reports did not,
however, include operational details of such contacts, summary
of which follows:

1. LYAB checked into his hotel in Mexico City on a Friday
morning and immediately telephoned IDENTITY 3.making an
ostensibly innocuous inquiry using specific terminology
in line with procedures arranged by IDENTITY 1 during
previous meetings with LYAB in Mexico City. Although
this inquiry was intended to alert LYAB's contact for
a meeting the following day (alternate meeting twenty-four
hours later), the system failed or IDENTITY 1 did not
follow through for unknown reasons. Five days later
(Tuesday), LYAB requested the assistance of IDENTITY 4
in contacting IDENTITY 1. IDENTITY 4 instructed LYAB
to meet him the following night (Wednesday) at 7 p.m.
on the corner of San Luis and Cuatemoc Avenue.
Alternate meeting was fixed for twenty-four hours later.

— what month?

2. IDENTITY 4 did not appear for the first meeting, but did
appear for the alternate meeting on Thursday. He and
LYAB entered a taxi, and drove to the corner of Xola
Boulevard and Bolivar Street in the Colonia Alamos, where
LYAB walked one block while IDENTITY 4 went to determine

Distribution:
2-WHD w/att USC
1-MEXI w/att USC
2-Files

Attachment: Identities, Under Separate Cover

DATE TYPED 2 June 1964	DATE DISPATCHED 10 JUN 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HPPA-14415	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 36-6-14/3	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET KAPOK

P-9365

whether IDENTITY-1 had arrived for the meeting. He returned to LYAB about twenty minutes later and said that the meeting had been postponed until the following day (Friday). IDENTITY-1 did not show for the Friday meeting, and LYAB and IDENTITY-4 agreed that no further effort should be made until Monday. IDENTITY-1 did not appear for the Monday meeting, but on Tuesday IDENTITY-4 instructed LYAB to go to the corner of Toledo and Andalucia in the Colonia Alamos at 8 p.m., to enter a small store there, and drink a soda. IDENTITY-1 whom LYAB would recognize, would pass the store during that interval. This contact plan was carried out as scheduled, with LYAB finally meeting IDENTITY-1 approximately one block from the store in question. The next meeting was fixed for the following day (Wednesday) at 8 p.m. in front of the Mexican Power and Light Building for the purpose of delivering $20,000 to LYAB and for passing of reports from the Party in Panama.

3. The Wednesday meeting took place as scheduled. LYAB and IDENTITY-1 went to a restaurant, where IDENTITY-1 reviewed the reports provided by LYAB and discussed Party matters in accordance with the briefing given LYAB by Party leaders prior to his departure from Panama. At the end of their discussion, IDENTITY-1 told LYAB to go to a nearby corner and wait there for him, that he would return in a few minutes with the funds. LYAB did as he was told. IDENTITY-1 returned to the corner within a few minutes, continued walking a short distance, and turned into a small lane. LYAB followed, and also entered the lane; however, he noted that he was being followed by a car driven by a man of Slavic appearance who stopped his car at the entrance to the lane and dimmed the lights: LYAB feels that this was a surveillance of the meeting by IDENTITY-1's associates, however, there were no further unusual incidents and the funds were passed as planned.

4. LYAB had arranged to meet IDENTITY-4 at 1 p.m. on Thursday at the corner of San Luis and Cuatemoc for a meeting with IDENTITY-2; however, IDENTITY-5 substituted for IDENTITY-4 with the explanation that IDENTITY-4 was busy. IDENTITY-5 said that he would wait with LYAB to introduce him to a Party member (a woman) who would take him to the meeting with IDENTITY-2. IDENTITY-5 said that the meeting would be held at a restaurant in Coyocan, because this would be more comfortable for all concerned. A short time later, the woman appeared driving a car which LYAB entered after being introduced by IDENTITY-5. During the drive, the woman told LYAB that her name is IDENTITY-6. She said that she is a medical doctor who studied in Europe. In France she met some youths who interested her in attending a World Youth Festival. On her return to Mexico, she joined the Mexican Communist Party. She said that she had worked in Cuba and had taken a political training course there. She now works as a political educator for the Party in Mexico. She has a sister,, IDENTITY-7 who works in the women's movement of the Party.

5. IDENTITY-6 said that she had planned to return to Mexico from Cuba on the day that President John Kennedy was assassinated, but because of the assassination her return was delayed. She said that there is much sectarianism and many supporters of a Chinese hard-line position in Cuba; however, the people involved are the least qualified of the Cubans, politically speaking. She said that these people

adore Fidel Castro, and act on the basis of what Castro says, not on the basis of whether or not Castro is right. The old members of the Partido Socialista Popular are in a very difficult position, and are generally disliked.

6. Because of the location of the restaurant in the center of a block in Coyocan, HYAB was unable to provide the name of the street on which it is located. He said that it is a typical Mexican restaurant in a colonial building, and that the employees wear native dress. IDENTITY-2 arrived somewhat late at the restaurant, explaining that they lost their way because they did not know Coyocan. HYAB identified them as IDENTITY-8 and a large heavy-set man whose name HYAB does not know. Following the luncheon, HYAB was driven to the home of a personal friend by IDENTITY-6. The following day (Friday), he returned to Panama.

KAPOK
SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
HZPA-14415
2 June 1964

IDENTITY-1 - A Soviet Embassy representative.
IDENTITY-2 - Cuban Embassy representative.
IDENTITY-3 - Consular Section of Soviet Embassy
IDENTITY-4 - Tzintzun Carranza
IDENTITY-5 - Manuel Terrazas Guerrero
IDENTITY-6 - Rufina Torres or Portes (Phonetic) Rodriguez de la Fuente
IDENTITY-7 - Marta (Lnu) Rodriguez de la Fuente
IDENTITY-8 - Rogelio (Lnu)
Rodriguez of Cuban Embassy

Distribution:
2-WHD
1-MEXI
2-Files

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.
Chief of Station, Mexico

FROM
Chief of Station, Panama

SUBJECT
LYAB/Operations
Contacts in Mexico with Soviets and Cubans

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

The Panama Station has completed the preparation of Field Information Reports based on information provided by LYAB from his contacts in Mexico with IDENTITY 1 and IDENTITY 2. Such reports did not, however, include operational details of such contacts, summary of which follows: — what moved?

1. LYAB checked into his hotel in Mexico City on a Friday morning and immediately telephoned IDENTITY 3 making an ostensibly innocuous inquiry using specific terminology in line with procedures arranged by IDENTITY 1 during previous meetings with LYAB in Mexico City. Although this inquiry was intended to alert LYAB's contact for a meeting the following day (alternate meeting twenty-four hours later), the system failed or IDENTITY 1 did not follow through for unknown reasons. Five days later (Tuesday), LYAB requested the assistance of IDENTITY 4 in contacting IDENTITY 1. IDENTITY 4 instructed LYAB to meet him the following night (Wednesday) at 7 p.m. on the corner of San Luis and Cuatemoc Avenue. Alternate meeting was fixed for twenty-four hours later.

2. IDENTITY 4 did not appear for the first meeting, but did appear for the alternate meeting on Thursday. He and LYAB entered a taxi, and drove to the corner of Xola Boulevard and Bolivar Street in the Colonia Alamos, where LYAB walked one block while IDENTITY 4 went to determine

Distribution:
2-WHD w/att USC
1-MEXI w/att USC
2-Files

Attachment: Identities, Under Separate Cover

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
2 June 1964	10 JUN 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HPPA-14415

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
36-6-14/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET KAPOK

P-7365

whether IDENTITY-1 had arrived for the meeting. He returned to HYAB about twenty minutes later and said that the meeting had been postponed until the following day (Friday). IDENTITY-1 did not show for the Friday meeting, and HYAB and IDENTITY-4 agreed that no further effort should be made until Monday. IDENTITY-1 did not appear for the Monday meeting, but on Tuesday IDENTITY-4 instructed HYAB to go to the corner of Toledo and Andalucia in the Colonia Alamos at 8 p.m., to enter a small store there, and drink a soda. IDENTITY-1 whom HYAB would recognize, would pass the store during that interval. This contact plan was carried out as scheduled, with HYAB finally meeting IDENTITY-1 approximately one block from the store in question. The next meeting was fixed for the following day (Wednesday) at 8 p.m. in front of the Mexican Power and Light Building for the purpose of delivering $20,000 to HYAB and for passing of reports from the Party in Panama.

3. The Wednesday meeting took place as scheduled. HYAB and IDENTITY-1 went to a restaurant, where IDENTITY-1 reviewed the reports provided by HYAB and discussed Party matters in accordance with the briefing given HYAB by Party leaders prior to his departure from Panama. At the end of their discussion, IDENTITY-1 told HYAB to go to a nearby corner and wait there for him, that he would return in a few minutes with the funds. HYAB did as he was told. IDENTITY-1 returned to the corner within a few minutes, continued walking a short distance, and turned into a small lane. HYAB followed, and also entered the lane; however, he noted that he was being followed by a car driven by a man of Slavic appearance who stopped his car at the entrance to the lane and dimmed the lights: HYAB feels that this was a surveillance of the meeting by IDENTITY-1's associates, however, there were no further unusual incidents and the funds were passed as planned.

4. HYAB had arranged to meet IDENTITY-4 at 1 p.m. on Thursday at the corner of San Luis and Cuatemoc for a meeting with IDENTITY-2; however, IDENTITY-5 substituted for IDENTITY-4 with the explanation that IDENTITY-4 was busy. IDENTITY-5 said that he would wait with HYAB to introduce him to a Party member (a woman) who would take him to the meeting with IDENTITY-2. IDENTITY-5 said that the meeting would be held at a restaurant in Coyocan, because this would be more comfortable for all concerned. A short time later, the woman appeared driving a car which HYAB entered after being introduced by IDENTITY-5. During the drive, the woman told HYAB that her name is IDENTITY-6. She said that she is a medical doctor who studied in Europe. In France she met some youths who interested her in attending a World Youth Festival. On her return to Mexico, she joined the Mexican Communist Party. She said that she had worked in Cuba and had taken a political training course there. She now works as a political educator for the Party in Mexico. She has a sister, , IDENTITY-7 who works in the women's movement of the Party.

5. IDENTITY-6 said that she had planned to return to Mexico from Cuba on the day that President John Kennedy was assassinated, but because of the assassination her return was delayed. She said that there is much sectarianism and many supporters of a Chinese hard-line position in Cuba; however, the people involved are the least qualified of the Cubans, politically speaking. She said that these people

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HZPA-14415

adore Fidel Castro, and act on the basis of what Castro says, not on the basis of whether or not Castro is right. The old members of the Partido Socialista Popular are in a very difficult position, and are generally disliked.

6. Because of the location of the restaurant in the center of a block in Coyocan, HYAB was unable to provide the name of the street on which it is located. He said that it is a typical Mexican restaurant in a colonial building, and that the employees wear native dress. IDENTITY-2 arrived somewhat late at the restaurant, explaining that they lost their way because they did not know Coyocan. HYAB identified them as IDENTITY-8 and a large heavy-set man whose name HYAB does not know. Following the luncheon, HYAB was driven to the home of a personal friend by IDENTITY-6. The following day (Friday), he returned to Panama.

SECRET

KAPOK

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
HZPA-14415
2 June 1964

IDENTITY-1 - A Soviet Embassy representative.

IDENTITY-2 - Cuban Embassy representative.

IDENTITY-3 - Consular Section of Soviet Embassy

IDENTITY-4 - Tzintzun Carranza

IDENTITY-5 - Manuel Terrazas Guerrero

IDENTITY-6 - Rufina ~~Torres or~~ Portes (Phonetic) Borquez de la Fuente

IDENTITY-7 - Marta ~~(lnu)~~ Borquez de la Fuente

IDENTITY-8 - Rogelio ~~(lnu)~~ Rodriguez of Cuban Embassy

Distribution:
2-WHD
1-MEXI
2-Files

EXCERPT

HZPW-5835

10 June 1964

TO: Chief of Station, Panama City

FM: Chief, WH/Division

SUBJ: AMMUG-1 Interrogation Results

1. AMMUG-1 has provided the following additional information concerning your area. His information is sketchy because he was not specifically concerned with this area:

.....

c. The following are Cuban Intelligence officers stationed in Mexico:

1) Alfredo Mirabal Diaz (pseudo "Federico") is the Chief CIS officer, Cuban Embassy in Mexico City as of January 1964.

2) Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, CIS officer, Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, uses psuedos "Eduardo", "Casimiro" and "Jose Antonio". He is about 24 years old, 5'8" tall, husky, blond hair and reddish complexion. He is Thelma King's contact.

.....

EXCERPT

HZPW-5835

10 June 1964

TO: Chief of Station, Panama City

FM: Chief, WH/Division

SUBJ: AMMUG-1 Interrogation Results

1. AMMUG-1 has provided the following additional information concerning your area. His information is sketchy because he was not specifically concerned with this area:

.....

c. The following are Cuban Intelligence officers stationed in Mexico:

1) Alfredo Mirabal Diaz (pseudo "Federico") is the Chief CIS officer, Cuban Embassy in Mexico City as of January 1964.

2) Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, CIS officer, Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, uses psuedos "Eduardo", "Casimiro" and "Jose Antonio". He is about 24 years old, 5'8" tall, husky, blond hair and reddish complexion. He is Thelma King's contact.

.....

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

5 SECRET

		ROUTING	SS	SB
1		4		
2	ICS	5	PERS	AR
3	RETS	6	LOG	CA
	CI	SI	BF	HH
			SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BRUSSELS

ACTION : DC/WH/SA 5 (WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT:1335, 5 JUN 64 LMG)

INFO : DDP, ADOP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/WH 5, VR

S E C R E T 051545Z

5 June 64

PRIORITY DIR MEXI INFO PARI WAVE CITE BRUS 9963

IN-99439

SECTION ONE OF TWO

both sections here.

TYPIC LIOOZE AMNIP

EXCERPT

REF A DIR 25283 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE)

B DIR 24961 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE)

IN 93730 ✗

C MEXI 9654 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE)

IN 96496

D MEXI 9695 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE

8. LIOOZE/1 SEEMS TO HAVE HAD HONEST DIFFICULTY RECALLING DETAILS PAST INTEL ACTIVITIES BUT HAS RESPONDED TO PATIENT QUESTIONING PROVIDING MORE DATA EVERY MEETING. AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY HE TOLD OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL EXHAUSTION ON DEPARTURE CUBA. NOW HAS EXPLAINED HE WAS UNDER PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT AND AS SECURITY MEASURE HAD TRIED FORGET INTEL MATTER AND ASSOCIATIONS. HAS GIVEN FOLL INFO OF PRIORITY INTEREST:

.....

12. LIOOZE GOT EUSEBIO AZCUE JOB IN MINISTRY FOREIGN RELATIONS. ARCHITECT WHO FOUGHT IN SPANISH CIVIL WAR. DRINKER AND TALKER. NOT SUITABLE FOR OR CONNECTED WITH INTEL. AFTER SERVING AS CONSUL IN MEXI LEFT FORNOF AND NOW EMPLOYED JUNTA CENTRAL DE PLANIFICACIONES (JUCEPLAN)

13. ROBERTO ROMERO ADAMS HALF BLIND MUSICIAN ACTED AS OOZE INFORMANT ON ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES.

14. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ AKA EL ROJO, SON OF CP MEMBER, PREVIOUSLY WORKED IN FORNOF EXCLUSIVELY ON MEXI MATTERS IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEPT. PROBABLY WORKING FOR PINIERO. NOW MEXI AS FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMB.

15. ELPIDIO INTERIAN IS CP MEMBER PROBABLY WORKING FOR CUBAN INTEL. HIS BROTHER IS DIP COURIER.

.....

EXCERPT

5 June 64

4

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

5 SECRET

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	PERS AR
3		6	LOG CA
CI	SI	BF	HH
		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BRUSSELS

ACTION : DC/WH/SA 5 (WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT:1335, 5 JUN 64 LMG)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/WH 5, VR

S E C R E T 031545Z

5 June 64

PRIORITY DIR MEXI INFO PARI WAVE CITE BRUS 9963

IN- 99439

SECTION ONE OF TWO

both sections here.

TYPIC LIOOZE AMNIP

EXCERPT

REF A DIR 25283 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE)

B DIR 24961 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE)

in 93730 ±

C MEXI 9654 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE)

in 96496

D MEXI 9695 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE

8. LIOOZE/1 SEEMS TO HAVE HAD HONEST DIFFICULTY RECALLING DETAILS PAST INTEL ACTIVITIES BUT HAS RESPONDED TO PATIENT QUESTIONING PROVIDING MORE DATA EVERY MEETING. AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY HE TOLD OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL EXHAUSTION ON DEPARTURE CUBA. NOW HAS EXPLAINED HE WAS UNDER PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT AND AS SECURITY MEASURE HAD TRIED FORGET INTEL MATTER AND ASSOCIATIONS. HAS GIVEN FOLL INFO OF PRIORITY INTEREST:

.....

12. LIOOZE GOT EUSEBIO AZCUE JOB IN MINISTRY FOREIGN RELATIONS. ARCHITECT WHO FOUGHT IN SPANISH CIVIL WAR. DRINKER AND TALKER. NOT SUITABLE FOR OR CONNECTED WITH INTEL. AFTER SERVING AS CONSUL IN MEXI LEFT FORNOF AND NOW EMPLOYED JUNTA CENTRAL DE PLANIFICACIONES (JUCEPLAN)

13. ROBERTO ROMERO ADAMS HALF BLIND MUSICIAN ACTED AS OOZE INFORMANT ON ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES.

14. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ AKA EL ROJO, SON OF CP MEMBER, PREVIOUSLY WORKED IN FORNOF EXCLUSIVELY ON MEXI MATTERS IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEPT. PROBABLY WORKING FOR PINIERO. NOW MEXI AS FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMB.

15. ELPIDIO INTERIAN IS CP MEMBER PROBABLY WORKING FOR CUBAN INTEL. HIS BROTHER IS DIP COURIER.

.....

EXCERPT

5 June 64

MEETING with LIT

1. Attached is

interest is his

2. Next meeting



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

SUBJECT Travel Between Mexico and Cuba

SRI TRAVEL

(39)

REPORT NO. CS-3/542,877

DATE DISTR. 2 June 1964

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES D-ACQ-02389

DATE OF INFO. 16 May 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City 18 May 1964

BY CABLE

SOURCE: Persons (B) with good access to travel information. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Travel data show that the following arrived in Mexico City from Habana by air on 16 May 1964: Cubans: Zoila Diaz Carmona, PP 14931; Octavio [illegible] Marquez, PP 14017; [illegible] Abreu Trujillo, PP 01841; [illegible] Marquez Ramirez, PP 65337; Maria [illegible] Castellanos, PP [illegible]; [illegible] Armenteros, PP 44853; Otero [illegible] Blanco, PP 14145; Catalina [illegible] Culell, PP [illegible]; [illegible] Quezada, PP 00319; Rosa [illegible] Romero, PP [illegible]; [illegible] (sic.), PP 73[illegible]; Maria [illegible], PP [illegible]; [illegible] Alfonso, PP [illegible]; Ricardo Alarcon Rodriguez, PP [illegible]; Gloria Soto Govantes, PP 10178; Ricardo Alarcon Soto, child, PP [illegible]; Carlos Alarcon Soto, PP 223[illegible]; Hortensia Costa Quintana, PP 26146; Angel [illegible] Marti, PP 26193; Hector [illegible] Ballo (sic.), PP [illegible]; Victor de [illegible] Yoerra, PP [illegible]; Dario A. Ojalvo Devesa, child, PP [illegible]; Patricia Ojalvo Devesa, child, PP 01966; Vitali Fidel Ojalvo Devesa, child, PP 29993; Delkis [illegible] Rodriguez, PP [illegible]; Maria J. [illegible] Rodriguez, PP 52[illegible]; Jacobo Ojalvo Arroyo, PP 32117; Maria Arias Llorens, PP 23847; Maria [illegible] Llorens, PP 120189; Antonio Crespo Varona, PP 67976; Isabel [illegible] Rodriguez, PP 00397; [illegible] Lopez, Dip PP D/64/[illegible]; Elena del Pino Valso, Dip PP D/[illegible]; Yamil [illegible], Dip PP D/63/4[illegible]; Juan Guido Licea, Dip PP D/64/250; [illegible] Lopez, Dip PP D/63/454; Esther [illegible], Dip PP D/63/455; Mexicans: Crescenciano [illegible], PP 19872; and Santiago Gutierrez, PP 19/63.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPCINCLANT CINCSO

Gutierrez (Rosales) Esther

14-00000

Bob

Lorna

Trudi

MEMORANDUM

file: P-6605
file: P-7575

3 June 64

MEETING with LITAMIL-3 to debrief on his meeting 2 June with L-7.

1. Attached is a self-explanatory report from L-3. Of special interest is his access to Carlos Maristany, of current ops interest.

2. Next meeting set for 9 June.

F.N.Aimonet

7365

ve por su negocio.

10.- Rogelio Rodríguez, Secretario de Tercera y Alejandro Rodríguez, Chofer de la Embajada, fueron hasta Laredo Tamaulipas, a recoger un automóvil procedente de los Estados Unidos para el uso del Embajador. La Casa vendedora "La Ford Motor". Entró con franquicia.

1365
8579

11.- Max Rojas, Secretario del Instituto de Relaciones Culturales José Martí, tiene asignado quinientos pesos mexicanos de sueldo.

P-8736
P-8591

11.- Existe una situación bastante difícil entre el Embajador y la Dra. Margot Machado; parece ella solicitará su traslado.

L-3

22.- Carlos Maritany. Embajador de Cuba en Holanda, se encuentra en Acapulco en compañía de su señora que es mexicana.

33.- Ana Luisa Salinas, que trabajaba en el Consulado de Cuba en México, en calidad de secretaria, ha sido declarada cesante y al mismo tiempo vejada e insultada por la Dra. Margot Machado. La Salinas amenazó con dar un escándalo en la prensa y por temor la pagaron tres meses de sueldos.

P-8786

44.- Un hombre de la raza negra y de apellido Calambú, con categoría de Auxiliar de Cuarta Clase, con sueldo de cuatrocientos dólares, desempeña el cargo de cocinero de la Emabajada.

P-

55.- El Consúl en Veracruz, Ovidio Samá, se encuentra en México y hace alarde de no haber sido molestado por la autoridades cuando el atentado.

P-8649

66.- Están preparando una gran recepción para el 26 de julio.

77.- El gobierno mexicano negó la franquicia de 16 cajas que llegó por barco ~~xxxx~~ conteniendo libros para propaganda.

18.- Permitieron la entrada en elterritorio de un número de bultos conteniendo propaganda y no se solicitó franquicia.

19.- Interián llamó y sostuvo una larga conversación con Jeronimo Rodríguez, que es el encargado de servir las comidas en las recepciones de la Embajada. Jeronimo, no simpatiza con ellos. Le sir-

3214

ve por su negocio.

10.- Rogelio Rodríguez, Secretario de Tercera y Alejandro Rodríguez, Chofer de la Embajada, fueron hasta Laredo Tamaulipas, a recoger un automóvil procedente de los Estados Unidos para el uso del Embajador. La Casa vendedora "La Ford Motor". Entró con franquicia.

P-7365
P-8579

11.- Max Rojas, Secretario del Instituto de Relaciones Culturales José Martí, tiene asignado quinientos pesos mexicanos de sueldo.

P-

P-8436
P-8591

11.- Existe una situación bastante dificil entre el Embajador y la Dra. Margot Machado; parece ella solicitará su traslado.

12.- Carlos Maristany. Embajador de Cuba en Holanda, se encuentra en Acapulco en compañía de su señora que es mexicana.

13.- Ana Luisa Salinas, que trabajaba en el Consulado de Cuba en México, en calidad de secretaria, ha sido declarada cesante y al mismo tiempo vejada e insultada por la Dra. Margot Machado. La Salinas amenazó con dar un escándalo en la prensa y por temor la pagaron tres meses de sueldos.

P-8786

14.- Un hombre de la raza negra y de apellido Calambú, con categoría de Auxiliar de Cuarta Clase, con sueldo de cuatrocientos dólares, desempeña el cargo de cocinero de la Emabajada.

P-

15.- El Consúl en Veracruz, Ovidio Samá, se encuentra en México y hace alarde de no haber sido molestado por la autoridades cuando el atentado.

P-8649

16.- Están preparando una gran recepción para el 26 de julio.

17.- El gobierno mexicano negó la franquicia de 16 cajas que llegó por barco xxxxx conteniendo libros para propaganda.

18.- Permitieron la entrada en elterritorio de un número de bultos conteniendo propaganda y no se solicitó franquicia.

19.- Interián llamó y sostuvo una larga conversación con Jeronimo Rodríguez, que es el encargado de servir las comidas en las recepciones de la Embajada. Jeronimo, no simpatiza con ellos. Le sir-

EXCERPTS

29 MAY 64

PRIORITY BRUS INFO DIR CITE MEXI 9654 IN 93730

TYPIC LIOOZE AMHIP

REF BRUS 9914 (IN 93451)

1. VOLUMINOUS LIOOZE-1 FILE AT STATION SHOWS MYRIAD CONTACTS IN PERIOD 1959-60. FOLLOWING POINTS PICKED AT RANDOM TO ENABLE DEBRIEFERS GET READING ON WHETHER L-1 ON LEVEL. SUGGEST BE QUERRIED FOR ALL INFO ON:

.....

E. RAMON CUENCA MONTOTO, FORMER CUBAN IS OFFICER MEXI.

.....

.....

3. SUGGEST THOROUGH DEBRIEFING ON CUBAN IS SET-UP MEXI, ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN IS PERSONNEL OUTSIDE EMBASSY. IN EMBASSY INTERESTED IN ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, OSCAR CONCEPCION, ELPIDIO INTERIAN, ALFREDO MIRABAL, LUIS ALBERU, ANTONIO GARCIA LARA, MARGOT MACHADO, PEREGRINA ALONSO.

SECRET

EXCERPTS

29 MAY 64

PRIORITY BRUS INFO DIR CITE MEXI 9654 IN 93730

TYPIC LIOOZE AMHIP

REF BRUS 9914 (IN 93451)

1. VOLUMINOUS LIOOZE-1 FILE AT STATION SHOWS MYRIAD CONTACTS IN PERIOD 1959-60. FOLLOWING POINTS PICKED AT RANDOM TO ENABLE DEBRIEFERS GET READING ON WHETHER L-1 ON LEVEL. SUGGEST BE QUERRIED FOR ALL INFO ON:

.....

E. RAMON CUENCA MONTOTO, FORMER CUBAN IS OFFICER MEXI.

.....

.....

3. SUGGEST THOROUGH DEBRIEFING ON CUBAN IS SET-UP MEXI, ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN IS PERSONNEL OUTSIDE EMBASSY. IN EMBASSY INTERESTED IN ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, OSCAR CONCEPCION, ELPIDIO INTERIAN, ALFREDO MIRABAL, LUIS ALBERU, ANTONIO GARCIA LARA, MARGOT MACHADO, PEREGRINA ALONSO.

SECRET

UFGA-16346/1

Report # CC-658, [redacted], 28 May 64 (cont.)

201-332665

4C RODRIGUEZ López, Rogelio: (DIP PP-D-63/454)

RODRIGUEZ López, Rogelio: Left Mexico on 15 May 61, diplomatic visa. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

Left Mexico on 7 May 62, diplomatic visa. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

In Dec 62 he appears as Third Secretary in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Promoted to Second Secretary and stayed in the Embassy in Mexico City. Was accredited to Mexico as Third Secretary. Was called to Havana and on 5 Jul 63 he returned to Mexico as Second Secretary. Dangerous. Reserved and competent young man. Works with interest. Hard core Communist. (Source: [illegible]-152 [redacted] 30 Jul 63.)

CS COPY

Attach to UFGA-16346

BASIC DOCUMENT FILED IN 50-6-122

28 May 64

201-332665

UFGA 16346/1

SECRET

Report # CC-658, [redacted], 28 May 64 (cont.)

201-332665

4 RODRIGUEZ López, Rogelio: (DIP PP-D-63/434)

RODRIGUEZ López, Rogelio: Left Mexico on 15 May 61, diplomatic visa. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

Left Mexico on 7 May 62, diplomatic visa. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

In Dec 62 he appears as Third Secretary in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Promoted to Second Secretary and stayed in the Embassy in Mexico City. Was accredited to Mexico as Third Secretary. Was called to Havana and on 5 Jul 63 he returned to Mexico as Second Secretary. Dangerous. Reserved and competent young man. Works with interest. Hard core Communist. (Source: [illegible]-152 [redacted] 30 Jul 63.)

CS COPY

Attach to UFGA-16346

-2-

SECRET

BASIC DOCUMENT FILED IN 50-6-12

29 May 64

201-332665

CLASSI[illegible]D MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

☐ COPY ☐ REPLY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
C/WH 5

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TOI UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, DC/WH/SA, R[illegible]
[illegible] VR

S E C R E T 232339Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 5149

24 Nov 64 IN 28944

DESENSITIZED

[illegible] DYVOUR PERUMEN AMKNOB ZRKNICK

INDEXED [illegible]

NOT [illegible]

1P 64

REF MEXI 1665 (IN 26958) *

1. WAVE TRACES REFLECT SUBJ REF IDENTICAL ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ-LOPEZ, 201-332665. NO WAVE TRACES CHAIN NUSIN.

Iden with subject of Mexi 166[illegible]

2. INDEX.

SECRET

MICROFILMED
JAN 8 1965
DOC. MICRO SER.

* Stated that IDEN was unquestionably Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

ROUTING	[illegible]
RID/AN	
RID/[illegible]TS	RSC
RID/PS	
RID/[illegible]	
~~DESTROY~~	

SECRET

201-332665

ABSTRACT ☒	INDEX ☒	
DATE 24 Nov 64		

24 Nov '64

201-332665

CM - [illegible] - 11/23/64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

☒ COPY ☒ DITTO

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

5/ 46/46 SECRET

FROM JMWAVE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION C/WH 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, DC/WH/SA, RI/AN Dummy

DDP: DC/WH/SA 4 [illegible] VR

S E C R E T 232339Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 5149

HMM

24 Nov 64 IN 28944

DESENSITIZED

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMXNOB ZRKNICK

INDEXED AND CONTROL CARDS

NOT MATCHED

18 64

REF MEXI 1665 (IN 26958)*

1. WAVE TRACES REFLECT SUBJ REF IDENTICAL ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ-LOPEZ, 201-332665. NO WAVE TRACES CHAIN NUSIN.

Iden with subject of Mexi 1665

2. INDEX.

S E C R E T

MICROFILMED
JAN 8 1965
DOC. MICRO SER.

* Stated that IDEN was unquestionably Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

ROUTING	
RID/AN	C
RID/WIS	BSC
RID/FS	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

SECRET

201-332665

ABSTRACT ☒	INDEX ☒
DATE 24 Nov 64	

24 Nov '64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

INFO:

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 21 NOV 64

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY			INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	0.20177	3524

TO [illegible] INFO [illegible] CITE WAVE 5105

RYBAT DYVOUR PBRUMEN [illegible]

REF WAVE [illegible](IN 3535)

1. WAVE RCV OF MESSAGE FROM [illegible]/1 DTD 17 NOV WHICH STATED FOLL:

A. 16 NOV [illegible] A/1 CONTACTED PBRUMEN EMBASSY. TALKED WITH [illegible] AND WAS INSTRUCTED CALL EMBASSY 1100 HRS 17 NOV.

B. A/1 WENT EMBASSY AND HAD CONTACT WITH CIS OFFICER CITED PARA 3 REF.

C. CIS OFFICER TOLD A/1 HE STILL WAITING FOR ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM PBRUMEN RE A/1'S TRIP SOON.

D. A/1 INSTRUCTED BY CIS OFFICER RECALL EMBASSY 1500 HRS 19 NOV PURPOSE CHECK IF ANY INSTRUCTIONS RCVD FROM PBRUMEN RE A/1.

2. A/1 MENTIONED FOLL CHANGES PBRUMEN ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS:

A. ELIMINATE IDEN A AND CONTINUE USE IDEN B.

B. IDEN C SUBSTITUTED FOR IDEN A.

3. 18 NOV A/1 SAID [illegible] STUDENTS WHILE PBRUMEN EMBASSY WHO HAD APPOINTMENT FOR INTERVIEW WITH FNU [illegible] (PHONETIC). ONE STUDENT NEGRO, ONE MULATTO AND OTHER TWO WHITE.

4. A/1 SAID CONTINUES PUSH [illegible] FUNDS IN ORDER MAKE TRIP. HOWEVER HAS RCVD ONLY SYMPATHY THUS FAR.

5. NO WAVE TRACES IDEN C OR [illegible]. HOWEVER LATTER MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH IDEN D.

6. INDEX.

END OF MESSAGE

CHRONO FDUNNY

21/2353Z

x 7

R-6079

R-7365

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

INFO:

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 21 NOV 64

FILE:

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS DHD	2120177	3524

TO DIR INFO CITE WAVE 5105
NUMBER

RYBAT DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOR ZRKNICK
REF. WAVE 4050 (IN 3535)

1. WAVE RCV SW MESSAGE FROM AMKNOR/1 DTD 17 NOV WHICH STATED FOLL:

A. 15 NOV 64 A/1 CONTACTED PBRUMEN EMBASSY. TALKED WITH JORRIN AND WAS INSTRUCTED COME EMBASSY 1100 HRS 17 NOV.

B. A/1 WENT EMBASSY AND HAD CONTACT WITH CIS OFFICER CITED PARA 3 REF.

C. CIS OFFICER TOLD A/1 HE STILL WAITING FOR ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM PBRUMEN RE A/1'S TRIP SOON.

D. A/1 INSTRUCTED BY CIS OFFICER RETURN EMBASSY 1500 HRS 19 NOV PURPOSE CHECK IF ANY INSTRUCTIONS RCVD FROM PBRUMEN RE A/1.

2. A/1 MENTIONED FOLL CHANGES PBRUMEN ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS:

A. ELIMINATE IDEN A AND CONTINUE USE IDEN B.

B. IDEN C SUBSTITUTED FOR IDEN A.

3. 15 NOV A/1 SAID OBSERVED FOUR STUDENTS WHILE PBRUMEN EMBASSY WHO HAD APPOINTMENT FOR INTERVIEW WITH FNU PERUF (PHONETIC). ONE STUDENT NEGRO, ONE MULATTO AND OTHER TWO WHITE.

4. A/1 SAID CONTINUED PUSH FOR CIS FUNDS IN ORDER MAKE TRIP. HOWEVER HAS RCVD ONLY SYMPATHY THUS FAR.

5. NO WAVE TRACES IDEN C OR PERUF. HOWEVER LATTER MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH IDEN D.

6. INDEX.

END OF MESSAGE

CHRONO FDUMMY

21/2353Z

PHILLIPS

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

CYS. TO P-6079
P-7365

FILE No

14-00000

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 21 NOV 64

FILE:

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	UTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS [illegible]	212 177	3623

TO MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 5197 NUMBER

REF WAVE 5193(IN 3024)

IDEN A: MARTA ALVAREZ CASTILLO

IDEN B: CARIDAD DE LA [illegible]

IDEN C: JUANA ACOSTA DIAZ, CALLE PRIMERA, NO. 9, ENTRA AYNTAMIENTO Y AYESTARAN, HAVA.

IDEN D: LUIS ALBERU SAUTO, CULTURAL ATTACHE, CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

21/2350Z

~~P-[illegible]~~

P-7365

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

ACTION COPY!

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 21 NOV 64

FILE:

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS PVD	212 ? 17Z	3623

TO MEXI

INFO DIR

CITE WAVE 5107
NUMBER

REF WAVE 5106(IN 3624)

IDEN A: MARTA ALVAREZ CASTANO

IDEN B: CARIDAD DE LA VEGA

IDEN C: JUANA ACOSTA DIAZ, CALLE PRIMERA, NO. 9, ENTRA
AYNTAMIENTO Y AYESTARAN, HAVA.

IDEN D: LUIS ALBERU SAUTO, CULTURAL ATTACHE, CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

21/2350Z

S0022

PHILLIPS

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

CYS. TO

P-7365

FILE No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 21 NOV 1964

FILE:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS [illegible]	2022117

INCOMING NUMBER 3536

TO [illegible] INFO DIR

CITE [illegible] 5078
NUMBER

[illegible] (3539)

[illegible] ON MESSAGE FROM [illegible] DTD 11 NOV 64 WHICH

1. A. [illegible] 7 NOV 64 A/1 HAD APPOINTMENT WITH CIS OFFICER [illegible] 3 [illegible] A AT [illegible]) WITH IDEN A. A/1 OBSERVED HIS CIS OFFICER APPROACHING CONTACT SITE BUT FOR UNKNOWN REASON HE DID NOT ENTER IDEN A OR MAKE CONTACT WITH A/1.

B. WHEN ABOVE CONTACT NOT MADE 7 NOV 64, A/1 PLACED TELCON [illegible] EMBASSY, TALKED WITH [illegible] AND WAS INSTRUCTED COME [illegible] 1700 HRS 9 NOV 64.

C. A/1 WENT EMBASSY AND LEARNED REASON CIS REP DID NOT MEET A/1 [illegible] PAR. ONE A ABOVE DUE FACT CIS REP [illegible] FEELING HE OR A/1 BEING FOLLOWED. A/1 TOLD CIS REP BEST HIS KNOWLEDGE NOT BEING FOLLOWED.

D. A/1 PASSED CIS REP WRITTEN REPORTS RE [illegible]/2 AND A/1'S ITINERARY FOR COMING MONTHS, E.G., WAVE, SJOS, SDOM, AND MADR. CIS REP ACCEPTED REPORTS WITH COMMENTS A/1 SHOULD NOT BECOME [illegible] FRIENDLY WITH [illegible]/2. CIS REP ALSO STATED DESIRED [illegible] A/1 PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR WAVE AREA WEEK 15 NOV 64.

E. RE FOUR MICRO NEGATIVES, A/1 SAID NEGATIVES CONTAINED INSTRUCTIONS ON REPORT WRITING, USE [illegible] CARBON SHEETS, AND NEW [illegible] ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS (UNSPECIFIED BY A/1).

F. CIS REP WAITING INSTRUCTIONS FROM PBRUMEN FOR A/1 AND INSTRUCTED A/1 CALL EMBASSY 1700 HRS 12 NOV 64.

G. A/1 RAISED QUESTION WITH CIS REP RE FUTURE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS AND TOLD CONTINUE USE NAME IDEN B WITH IDEN C WHEN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH EMBASSY.

2. [illegible] F: WAVE CO PLANS ARRIVE MEXI 23 NOV 64 PROVIDING A/1 HAS NOT ARRIVED WAVE AREA PRIOR THIS DATE OR WORD RCVD WAVE [illegible] INDICATES A/1 TRAVEL IMMINENT.

[illegible] MESSAGE

CHRONO DUMMY

DATE: 20 [illegible] 1964

FILE:

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

INITIALS

DTG 2022307

INCOMING NUMBER 3604

TO [illegible]

INFO DIR

CITE WAVE 5973

NUMBER

[illegible]

REF [illegible] 5972 [illegible]

[illegible] LAS [illegible]

[illegible] HUMBERTO SUAREZ

[illegible] (P-83[illegible])

END OF MESSAGE

CS. TO

P 73[illegible]

P-836[illegible]

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FROM:
ACTION:
INFO:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 20 NOV 1964
FILE:

☐ DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
☐ ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS [illegible]	2022307	3604

TO [illegible] INFO DIR CITE WAVE 5973 NUMBER

TYPIC [illegible] PBRUMEN AMMUG

REF [illegible] 5972 ([illegible])

ITEM A CINE LAS AMERICAS

ITEM B HUMBERTO SUAREZ

ITEM C JORRIN (P-8308)

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] ENTRY
21/[illegible]

SCG [illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

CYS. TO P 7316
P AMBARB-24
P-8308
P 5661

el teléfono es 352110, que si gusta puede pedirlas a nombre de Silvia. Raúl toma nota y acepta.- 213.-

228. Salida al 352110.- Raúl después de enterarse del precio de las latas con galletas y de que están en José María Iglesias 51, indica que a MF que pasará el lunes.- 241.-

241. Entrada 1757.- Coty después de enterarse de que Juanito no le ha hablado a Raúl y de que el embajador está durmiendo, pregunta a Raúl si ya se fué el otro embajador y si es simpático para saber si lo podían invitar para ir mañana. - Raúl: que sí, pero es más joven que Hernández Armas, sin embargo creé que puedan ir mañana, pues van a almorzar a la casa de Sol en compañía de Bola de Nieve, Bertica y Rogelio; que precisamente acaba de tener un disgusto tremendo con Bertica, pues ésta le pidió cuenta del coche del Consulado y como Wilfredo llevó a Roa a la tienda para ir de compras, no le pareció y él le paró el alto, que parece que en vez de parirla la madre, la cagó, pues es una cosa de madre y con ella se acabó el mundo, pero como Rogelio y Bertica son uña y carne, la llevó. Coty: que Rogelio y "ella vive juntos, a falta de.....". Raúl: que sí, que eso ya lo han comentado. Coty: que Margot le dijo que Rogelio se divorciaba llegando allá, porque no la quería y era una mierda. Raúl: que eso es mentira y una porquería, pues hablan hasta de la madre que la hizo. Coty le dá la razón y agrega que si el señor pregunta por ella, le diga que pasó, pero que él le dijo que estaba ocupado y que..... Raúl: que eso no importa. Coty: que está bueno.- 291. -

P-7365
P-8604

291. Salida preguntando la hora.- 295.-

296. Salida al 237995.-1830.- Raúl con MF. Esta le platica -

(3.-L31.-21 nov.64).-

P·7365

1569

el teléfono es 352110, que si gusta puede pedirlas a nombre de Silvia. Raúl toma nota y acepta.- 213.-

228. Salida al 352110.- Raúl después de enterarse del precio de las latas con galletas y de que están en José María Iglesias 51, indica que a MF que pasará el lunes.- 241.-

241. Entrada 1757.- Coty después de enterarse de que Juanito no le ha hablado a Raúl y de que el embajador está durmiendo, pregunta a Raúl si ya se fué el otro embajador y si es simpático para saber si lo podían invitar para ir mañana. - Raúl: que sí, pero es más joven que Hernández Armas, sin embargo creé que npuedan ir mañana, pues van a almorzar a la casa de Sol en compañía de Bola de Nieve, Bertica y Rogelio; que precisamente acaba de tener un disgusto tremendo con - Bertica, pues ésta le pidió cuenta del coche del Consulado y como Wilfredo llevó a Roa a la tienda para ir de compras, no le pareció y él le paró el alto, que parece que en vez - de parirla la madre, la cagó, pues es una cosa de madre y - con ella se acabó el mundo, pero como Rogelio y Bertica son uña y carne, la llevó. Coty: que Rogelio y "ella viven juntos, a falta de.....". Raúl: que sí, que eso ya lop han comentado. Coty: que Margot le dijo que Rogelio -- se divorciaba llegando allá, porque no la quería y era una mierda. Raúl: que eso es mentira y una porquería, pues hablan hasta de la madre que la hizo. Coty le dá la -- razón y agrega que si el señor pregunta por ella, le diga - que pasó, pero que él le dijo que estaba ocupado y que..... Raúl: que eso no importa. Coty: que está bueno.- 291. -

P-7365
P-8604

291. Salida preguntando la hora.- 295.-

296. Salida al 237995.-1830.- Raúl con MF. Esta le platica -

(3.-L31.-21 nov.64).-

P. 7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

ISS 1 AR
NPTS LOG CA
S! 35 HH

TIME SEC BY HS

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH 5

INFO VR. FILE DDP, DC/WHISA 5, ADDP, CICI, C/FI.

[redacted]

Miller

S E C R E T 200003Z 20 Nov 64 IN 26958

WAVE INFO DIR CITE MEXI 1669 EASBY ACTING

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB

REF WAVE 4986 (IN 26141) * 19 Nov 64

IDEN E REF UNQUESTIONABLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SECRETARY KNOWN IS. TEL NUMBER LISTED 1964 AS ACADEMIA DE ACORDEON EIZENSTAT CVIKEL, CHAIM NUSIN PROFESSOR, ATLEXCO 132-5. NO STATION TRACES. INDEX NUSIN.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CFN

* RE. S.W. MESSAGES FROM AMKNOB-1

20 Nov 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 17

34 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH 5

INFO

VR. FILE DDP, DC/WHISA 5, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI.

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED		
IOS	FE	AR
RPTS	LOG	CA
SI	BE	HH
TIME	SEC	BY NS

[redacted]

Miller

S E C R E T 200003Z

20 Nov 64 IN 26958

DESENSITIZED

WAVE [illegible] DIR CITE MEXI 1669 EASBY ACTING

[illegible]BAT DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB

REF WAVE 4986 (IN 26141) * 19 Nov 64

IDEN E REF UNQUESTIONABLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SECRETARY KNOWN IS. TEL NUMBER LISTED 1964 AS ACADEMIA DE ACCRDEON EIZENSTAT CVIKEL, CHAIM NUSIN PROFESSOR, ATLEXCO 132-5.

NO STATION TRACES. INDEX NUSIN.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CFN

* RE. S.W. MESSAGES FROM AMKNOB-1

20 Nov 64

1551

107- Entrada.- sin contestacion fuera.- 111-

111- Entrada.- 1716 hrs.- DOLORES DE LA MORA saluda a ROGELIO y pregunta por FERNANDEZ ROA o por VEGA. ROGELIO que hoy se fue VEGA y pregunta que es de su vida. DOLORES dice que ella está en el exilio y que estuvo en Jalisco tres meses y acaba de - regresar, pues allá en Guadalajara está ayudando en la Campaña del Gobernador. ROGELIO que llame a FERNANDEZ ROA mas tarde como a las seis. DOLORES que esta bien y pregunta que sabe de LUIS. ROGELIO que hace tiempo que no sabe de el nada. DOLORES porque eso ya amerita un rompimiento de relaciones diplomaticas.- risas. ROGELIO la invita a tomar un café. DOLORES lo llamara el domingo para ponerse de acuerdo o sea que a las doce le llama y ver si salen juntos. ROGELIO que esta bien porque el esta de soltero. DOLORES podria invitarlo hoy pero tiene que ir al periodico El Dia a pedir una disculpa porque hace mucho que no escribe para ese diario. ROGELIO que esta bien.- 131-

p.8128
p 7365

132- Entrada.-1753 hrs.- NORBERTO saluda a JORRIN y pregunta si le llegó algo. Este dice que no que esta pendiente lo de la visa pero que llame mas tarde como a las ocho. NORBERTO que esta bien porque el de todos modos se va el domingo y quiere pasar a la Embajada para ver lo de las dos revistas que se quiere llevar. JORRIN que esta bien.- 140-

p.8061 →

141- Entrada.- MF por DOMENECH. JORRIN dice que ya salio hace rato.- 142-

ARE EITHER OF THESE HOME PHONES?

143- Entrada.- MF doctora SANCHEZ MORA por el numero del telefono de RAMON SINOBAS porque es quien esta curando a su hijo. BERTA dice que es el 11-21-79.-151- (..3.-L31- 19 nov.64)
O el 14-57-89 ----

P-7365

1551

107- Entrada.- sin contestacion fuera.- 111-

111- Entrada.- 1716 hrs.- DOLORES DE LA MORA saluda a ROGELIO y pregunta por FERNANDEZ ROA o por VEGA. ROGELIO que hoy se fue VEGA y pregunta que es de su vida. DOLORES dice que ella está en el exilio y que estuvo en Jalisco tres meses y acaba de regresar, pues allá en Guadalajara está ayudando en la Campaña del Gobernador. ROGELIO que llame a FERNANDEZ ROA mas tarde como a las seis. DOLORES que esta bien y pregunta que sabe de LUIS. ROGELIO que hace tiempo que no sabe de el nada. DOLORES porque eso ya amerita un rompimiento de relaciones diplomaticas.- risas. ROGELIO la invita a tomar un café. DOLORES le llamara el domingo para ponerse de acuerdo o sea que a las doce le llama y ver si salen juntos. ROGELIO que esta bien porque el esta de soltero. DOLORES podria invitarlo hoy pero tiene que ir al periodico El Dia a pedir una disculpa porque hace mucho que no escribe para ese diario. ROGELIO que esta bien.- 131-

p. 8128
p. 7365

132- Entrada.-1753 hrs.- NORBERTO saluda a JORRIN y pregunta si le llegó algo. Este dice que no que esta pendiente lo de la visa pero que llame mas tarde como a las ocho. NORBERTO que esta bien porque el de todos modos se va el domingo y quiere pasar a la Embajada para ver lo de las dos revistas que se quiere llevar. JORRIN que esta bien.- 140-

p. 8061

141- Entrada.- MF por DOMENECH. JORRIN dice que ya salio hace rato.- 142-

ARE EITHER OF THESE HOME PHONES?

143- Entrada.- MF doctora SANCHEZ MORA por el numero del telefono de RAMON SINOBAS porque es quien esta curando a su hijo. BERTA dice que es el 11-21-79.-151- (..3.-L31- 19 nov.64)
O el 14-57-39 ----

P-7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 17

RUN BY ☐ COPY ☐

4/c/u SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
C/WH 5

INFO
VR, FILE, C/CI, ADDP, [illegible] C/CI, C/FI 2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

S E C R E T 182138Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 4986

19 Nov 64 IN 26141

RYBAT DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB

REF MEXI 1542 (IN 21080) *

1. WAVE RECEIVED TWO SW MESSAGES FROM AMKNOB/1 DATED 4 AND 5 NOV 64.

2. FIRST MESSAGE STATED 3 NOV 64 A/1 FINALLY ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH CIS MEXI VIA TELCON TO PBRUMEN EMBASSY AND WAS INSTRUCTED REPORT EMBASSY 1000 HRS 4 NOV 64. A/1 REPORTED AS DIRECTED AND WAITED EMBASSY RECEPTION OFFICE UNTIL SUMMONED. A/1 OBSERVED MEXICAN WOMAN'S ARRIVAL AND OVERHEARD HER STATE SHE THERE IN BEHALF IDEN A. (Sr. RANGEL) WOMAN IMMEDIATELY ADMITTED INTO OFFICE. A/1 OBSERVED MALE MEXICAN WHO IDENTIFED SELF IDEN B (Fernandez CRUZCC) REQUESTING MEETING WITH IDEN C (Mr DOMENECH). A/1 ALSO OBSERVED SEATED EMBASSY RECEPTION OFFICE MULATTO WITH SPECTACLES WHOSE ACTIONS INDICATED SUBJ PERFORMS SECURITY TASKS E.G., OBSERVING VISITORS.

3. A/1 SUMMONED TO INNTER PATIO BY IDEN D (JORRIN) AND APPROACHED BY IDEN E WHO DID NOT IDENTIFY SELF BY NAME AND AFTER EXCHANGE PLEASANTRIES STARTED DEBRIEF A/1. IDEN E APPEARED FRIENDLY AND GREETED A/1 AS THOUGH OLD FRIENDS. IDEN E BEGAN DEBRIEF A/1 RE

SECRET

19 Nov 65

14-00000

RECENT TRIP WAVE, SJAN, MADR BUT INTERRUPTED SAME BY PASSING A/1 TYPEWRITTEN NOTE INSTRUCTING A/1 PROCEED IDEN F. IDEN E TOLD A/1 HAD RECEIVED CORRESPONDENCE FROM CIS PBRUMEN WHICH COVERS VARIOUS TOPICS WHICH IDEN E WOULD DISCUSS WITH A/1 NEXT MEETING.

4. 5 NOV 64 A/1 PROCEEDED IDEN F CONTACT SITE WHERE IDEN E WAS WAITING. IDEN E DISCUSSED A/1'S RECENT TRIP WAVE, SJAN AND MADR. IDEN E ALSO INTERESTED RE A/1'S KNOWLEDGE ANTI PBRUMEN ACTIVITIES MEXI. A/1 STATED HE HAD NO FIRM KNOWLEDGE THEREOF. IDEN E INSTRUCTED A/1 PRIOR DEPARTING BE SURE TAKE ENVELOPE UNDER IDEN E'S OVERCOAT ON CHAIR. IDEN E TOLD A/1 CONTENTS ENVELOPE WERE CARBON PAPER AND KEYRING HOLDER WHICH CONTAINED NEGATIVES A/1 COULD READ WITH MAGNIFYING GLASS. IDEN E PREARRANGED ANOTHER CONTACT LOCATION IDEN G. A/1 BRIEFED IDEN E RE AMBARB/2 AND WAS INSTRRUCTED PREPARE WRITTEN REPORT RE A/2.

5. A/1 STATED ENVELOPE CONTAINED FIVE SHEETS WHITE CARBON AND KEY HOLDER WITH FOUR 16 MM MICRO FILM NEGATIVES. EACH NEGATIVE REPRESENTED LETTER PAGE.

6. FORTHCOMING SW MESSAGE WILL REFLECT CONTENTS MICRO FILMS.

7. CAN MEXI IDENTIFY IDEN E AND DETERMINE LOCATION/OWNER TELE NUMBER CITED PARA ONE REF. AMMUG-1 BEING ASKED IF CAN IDENTIFY IDEN E THRU DESCRIPTION RENDERED BY AMKNOB-1.

SECRET

Norberto left tel no. for Raul Pereyra call him.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 17

RI ☐ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

4e/1c SECRET

FROM
JMWAVE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION
C/WH 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO
VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, [illegible], C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 182138Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 4986

19 Nov 64 IN 26141

RYBAT DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB

REF MEXI 1542 (IN 21080) *

1. WAVE RECEIVED TWO SW MESSAGES FROM AMKNOB/1 DATED 4 AND 5 NOV 64.

2. FIRST MESSAGE STATED 3 NOV 64 A/1 FINALLY ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH CIS MEXI VIA TELCON TO PBRUMEN EMBASSY AND WAS INSTRUCTED REPORT EMBASSY 1000 HRS 4 NOV 64. A/1 REPORTED AS DIRECTED AND WAITED EMBASSY RECEPTION OFFICE UNTIL SUMMONED. A/1 OBSERVED MEXICAN WOMAN'S ARRIVAL AND OVERHEARD HER STATE SHE THERE IN BEHALF IDEN A. (Sr. RANGEL) WOMAN IMMEDIATELY ADMITTED INTO OFFICE. A/1 OBSERVED MALE MEXICAN WHO IDENTIFED SELF IDEN B (Fernando CROZCO) REQUESTING MEETING WITH IDEN C. (Mr. DOMENECH) A/1 ALSO OBSERVED SEATED EMBASSY RECEPTION OFFICE MULATTO WITH SPECTACLES WHOSE ACTIONS INDICATED SUBJ PERFORMS SECURITY TASKS E.G., OBSERVING VISITORS.

3. A/1 SUMMONED TO INNTER PATIO BY IDEN D (JORRIN) AND APPROACHED BY IDEN E WHO DID NOT IDENTIFY SELF BY NAME AND AFTER EXCHANGE PLEASANTRIES STARTED DEBRIEF A/1. IDEN E APPEARED FRIENDLY AND GREETED A/1 AS THOUGH OLD FRIENDS. IDEN E BEGAN DEBRIEF A/1 RE

SECRET

19 Nov 65

RECENT TRIP WAVE, SJAN, MADR BUT INTERRUPTED SAME BY PASSING A/1 TYPEWRITTEN NOTE INSTRUCTING A/1 PROCEED IDEN F. IDEN E TOLD A/1 HAD RECEIVED CORRESPONDENCE FROM CIS PBRUMEN WHICH COVERS VARIOUS TOPICS WHICH IDEN E WOULD DISCUSS WITH A/1 NEXT MEETING.

4. 5 NOV 64 A/1 PROCEEDED IDEN F CONTACT SITE WHERE IDEN E WAS WAITING. IDEN E DISCUSSED A/1'S RECENT TRIP WAVE, SJAN AND MADR. IDEN E ALSO INTERESTED RE A/1'S KNOWLEDGE ANTI PBRUMEN ACTIVITIES MEXI. A/1 STATED HE HAD NO FIRM KNOWLEDGE THEREOF. IDEN E INSTRUCTED A/1 PRIOR DEPARTING BE SURE TAKE ENVELOPE UNDER IDEN E'S OVERCOAT ON CHAIR. IDEN E TOLD A/1 CONTENTS ENVELOPE WERE CARBON PAPER AND KEYRING HOLDER WHICH CONTAINED NEGATIVES A/1 COULD READ WITH MAGNIFYING GLASS. IDEN E PREARRANGED ANOTHER CONTACT LOCATION IDEN G. A/1 BRIEFED IDEN E RE AMBARB/2 AND WAS INSTRRUCTED PREPARE WRITTEN REPORT RE A/2.

5. A/1 STATED ENVELOPE CONTAINED FIVE SHEETS WHITE CARBON AND KEY HOLDER WITH FOUR 16 MM MICRO FILM NEGATIVES. EACH NEGATIVE REPRESENTED LETTER PAGE.

6. FORTHCOMING SW MESSAGE WILL REFLECT CONTENTS MICRO FILMS.

7. CAN MEXI IDENTIFY IDEN E AND DETERMINE LOCATION/OWNER TELE NUMBER CITED PARA ONE REF. AMMUG-1 BEING ASKED IF CAN IDENTIFY IDEN E THRU DESCRIPTION RENDERED BY AMKNOB-1.

SECRET

* Norberto left tel no. for Raul Pereyra call him.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

RI ☐ COPY ☒ DUMMY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM JMWAVE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION C/WH 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, [illegible] ADDP [illegible], C/CI, C/FI, [illegible]

S E C R E T 180138Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 4987

DESENSITIZED

[illegible] DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB

REF WAVE 4986 (IN 26141) 19 Nov 64

18 Nov 64 IN 26059

1. IDEN A: SR RANGEL
2. IDEN B: FERNANDO OROZCO
3. IDEN C: MR DOMENECH
4. IDEN D: JORRIN
5. IDEN E: CUBAN MALE, APPROX 27-29 YRS OLD, 5'7", WEIGHT 170 LBS, HAIR: LIGHT CHESTNUT TENDING TOWARD BLOND, COMBED BACK WITH LOCK FALLING LEFT SIDE; SKIN COLORED PINK/WHITE, SMALL MOUTH, RED LIPS, MEDIUM BROWN EYES, WEARS THICK CLEAR GREEN GLASSES WITH DARK BONE FRAME, DARK BROWN EYEBROWS WHICH MEET OVER NOSE BRIDGE; HAS CHUBBY ROSY CHEEKS AND APPEARS WELL-FED; SMALL HANDS, WEARS GOLD COLORED WRISTWATCH WITH LEATHER BAND LEFT WRIST; SMOKES EL PRADO CIGARETTES. APPEARS ALERT, INTELLIGENT AND WELL EDUCATED.
6. IDEN F: 1415 HRS 5 NOV 64 VIENNA RESTAURANT 450 INSURRGENTES AVE FRONT CINEMA LAS AMERICAS.
7. IDEN G: 1415 HRS 7 NOV 64 FRONT LAS AMERICAS CAFE.
8. INDEX.

(WILL TRY QUERY CUBAN IS MACHINE FILE LIST GICS)

NOT DONE SEE MEXI-[illegible]

Too long for LACH [illegible] LACH [illegible] years [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

IDENS

18 Nov 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

RI ☐ COPY ☒ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION C/WH 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, [illegible], C/CI, C/FI, [illegible] Dummy

S E C R E T 182138Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 4987

18Nov64 IN 26059

SENSITIZED

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB

REF WAVE 4986 (IN 26141) 19Nov64

1. IDEN A: SR RANGEL

2. IDEN B: FERNANDO OROZCO

3. IDEN C: MR DOMENECH

4. IDEN D: JORRIN

5. IDEN E: CUBAN MALE, APPROX 27-29 YRS OLD, 5'7", WEIGHT 170 LBS, HAIR: LIGHT CHESTNUT TENDING TOWARD BLOND, COMBED BACK WITH LOCK FALLING LEFT SIDE; SKIN COLORED PINK/WHITE, SMALL MOUTH, RED LIPS, MEDIUM BROWN EYES, WEARS THICK CLEAR GREEN GLASSES WITH DARK BONE FRAME, DARK BROWN EYEBROWS WHICH MEET OVER NOSE BRIDGE; HAS CHUBBY ROSY CHEEKS AND APPEARS WELL-FED; SMALL HANDS, WEARS GOLD COLORED WRISTWATCH WITH LEATHER BAND LEFT WRIST; SMOKES EL PRADO CIGARETTES. APPEARS ALERT, INTELLIGENT AND WELL EDUCATED.

6. IDEN F: 1415 HRS 5 NOV 64 VIENNA RESTAURANT 450 INSURRGENTES AVE FRONT CINEMA LAS AMERICAS.

7. IDEN G: 1415 HRS 7 NOV 64 FRONT LAS AMERICAS CAFE.

8. INDEX.

SECRET

WILL TRY QUERY MACHINE LIST CUBAN IS FILE GICS

NOT DONE SEE MEXI-[illegible]

Too long for [illegible] Lucio [illegible] [illegible] ago

SECRET

IDENS

18Nov64

TO	[illegible], Managua		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	[illegible]		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	[illegible] of Photos		MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None

Reference: DIR 60782

1. Transmitted herewith are photographs of Elicio GONZALEZ Moreno at the Mexico City airport in the company of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez and Manuel VEGA Perez of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. RODRIGUEZ is Second Secretary and VEGA is Third Secretary, and both are identified Cuban intelligence officers.

2. The photographs were obtained by the LIEMBRACE team with a concealed camera on 28 October 1964 and may be shown to Liaison. It is hoped that they will be of assistance to the [illegible].

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
Photos - herewith

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att (2 sets)
2 - COS Managua (3 sets)
1 - COS JMWAVE (1 set)
4 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[illegible]	3 November 1964
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201 - [illegible]

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
	[illegible] H. [illegible]	[illegible]	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		Michael C. CHOADEN

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

chrono
P-8849 w/att
P-7021 w/att
P-7365 w/att

DISPATCH



XICA

1. Rogelio Rodriguez
2 Eliecer Gonzalez
3 Manuel Vega

Manuel Vega Perez

Eliecer GONZALEZ
Moreno

Eliecer GONZALEZ
Moreno

1. Eliecer Gonzalez
2 Rogelio Rodriguez

1. Rogelio Rodriguez
2. Eliecer Gonzalez
3. Manuel Vega

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Managua

INFO.: Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: [illegible] Transmittal of Photos

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None

Reference: DIR 60382

1. Transmitted herewith are photographs of Elicio *GONZALEZ Moreno at the Mexico City airport in the company of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez and Manuel VEGA Perez of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. RODRIGUEZ is Second Secretary and VEGA is Third Secretary, and both are identified Cuban intelligence officers.

2. The photographs were obtained by the LIEMBRACE team with a concealed camera on 28 October 1964 and may be shown to Liaison. It is hoped that they will be of assistance to the Managua Station.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
Photos - herewith

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att (2 sets)
2 - COS Managua (3 sets)
1 - COS WAVE (1 set)
4 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA [illegible]	3 November 1964
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201 - [illegible]

chrono
P-8849 w/att
P-7921 w/att
P-7365 w/att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
	Glenna H. PELLEN	ecm.	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		Michael C. CHOADEN

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH



XICA

1. Rogelio Rodriguez
2. Eliseo Gonzalez
3. Manuel Vega

Manuel Vega Perez

Eliseo GONZALEZ
Moreno

Eliseo GONZALEZ
Moreno

1. Eliseo Gonzalez
2. Rogelio Rodriguez

1. Rogelio Rodriguez
2. Eliseo Gonzalez
3. Manuel Vega

14-00000

SSIFI: SECRET   COPIES: 24   RI ☒ COPY ☐

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 7

☐ ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED   TO: UNIT   TIME   BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S E C R E T 292345Z

TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 1416

30 OCT 64 IN 13317

PERUMEN

FYI PER LIENVOY HONDURAN NAMED RAUL BRAUN CALLED CUBAN EMB 22 OCT WANTED TO SEE ABOUT GOING TO CUBA, WAS REFERRED TO CONSUL. ON 25, 26, 27 OCT ASKED FOR ROGELIO (ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ SECOND SECY KNOWN IS). WAS TOLD KEEP CALLING SINCE NOTHING HAD ARRIVED.

S E C R E T

SECRET

30 Oct '64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24 RI COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 7

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED TO: UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S E C R E T 292345Z

30 Oct 64 IN 13317

TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 1416

PERUMEN

FYI PER LIENVOY HONDURAN NAMED RAUL BRAUN CALLED CUBAN EMB 22 OCT WANTED TO SEE ABOUT GOING TO CUBA, WAS REFERRED TO CONSUL. ON 25, 26, 27 OCT ASKED FOR ROGELIO (ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ SECOND SECY KNOWN IS). WAS TOLD KEEP CALLING SINCE NOTHING HAD ARRIVED.

S E C R E T

SECRET

30 Oct '64

MCC

COMMO
CHRONO

28 OCT 64

S E C R E T

P-8849
P-7921
P-7365
Cuban Chrono

XXXXXX

DIR MANA WAVE MEXI XXXV 1487

TYPIC AMMUG

REF: MEXI [illegible] 1342

1. ON MORNING 26 OCT, WHEN BECAME APPARENT LITEMPOS UNABLE PERSUADE GOBERNACION SWITCH PAPERS OF GONZALEZ FOR LATER ARREST, STATION PLACED LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE ON GONZALEZ AT HOTEL ASTORIA. (LIEMBRACE COVERAGE HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN WHEN LITEMPOS FOUND GONZALEZ, AS STATION DID NOT WANT LITEMPOS AND LIEMBRACES TRIPPING OVER EACH OTHER AT ASTORIA). LIEMBRACES DID NOT PICK UP GONZALEZ UNTIL MORNING 28 OCT WHEN HE DEPARTED FOR AIRPORT AND FLEW TO CUBA.

2. CLANDESTINE PHOTOS TAKEN OF GONZALEZ AT AIRPORT BY LIEMBRACES CLEARLY SHOW HIM IN COMPANY OF MANUEL VEGA AND ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, KNOWN DGI OFFICERS. POUCHING COPIES.

3. INDEX ELICIO DARINTO GONZALEZ MORENO/

END OF MESSAGE

M C CHOADEN

S E C R E T

W C CURTIS

14-00000

MCC

COMMO
CHRONO

SECRET

28 OCT 64

P-8849
P-7921
P-7365
Cuban Chrono

XXXXXX

DIR MANA WAVE MEXI XXXV 1407

TYPIC AMMUG

REF: MEXI [illegible] 1342

1. ON MORNING 26 OCT, WHEN BECAME APPARENT LITEMPOS UNABLE PERSUADE GOBERNACION SWITCH PAPERS OF GONZALEZ FOR LATER ARREST, STATION PLACED LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE ON GONZALEZ AT HOTEL ASTORIA. (LIEMBRACE COVERAGE HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN WHEN LITEMPOS FOUND GONZALEZ, AS STATION DID NOT WANT LITEMPOS AND LIEMBRACES TRIPPING OVER EACH OTHER AT ASTORIA). LIEMBRACES DID NOT PICK UP GONZALEZ UNTIL MORNING 28 OCT WHEN HE DEPARTED FOR AIRPORT AND FLEW TO CUBA.

2. CLANDESTINE PHOTOS TAKEN OF GONZALEZ AT AIRPORT BY LIEMBRACES CLEARLY SHOW HIM IN COMPANY OF MANUEL VEGA AND ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, KNOWN DGI OFFICERS. POUCHING COPIES.

3. INDEX ELICIO DARINTO GONZALEZ MORENO/

END OF MESSAGE

H C CHOADEN SECRET W C CURTIS

GHP

COMMO
CHRONO

S E C R E T

26 OCT 64
P-8436
~~P-5644~~ 8544
~~P-7365~~
P-8769
Cuban Chrono

XXXXXXXX

DIR WAVE MEXI [illegible]

TYPIC JMGIN LIFIRE

MARCELINO MINSAL LEFT FOR HAVA 22 OCT. OSCAR CONCEPCION AND ESTHER GAVILAN WIFE OF ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LEFT FOR HAVA 24 OCT. JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS AND FAMILY LEFT FOR HAVA 25 OCT. PER LIENVOY 25 OCT, ARMAS SAID HE WOULD BE GONE ONLY A WEEK.

END OF MESSAGE

P-7365

M C CHOADEN

G R FELLEN S E C R E T W C CURTIS

GHP

COMMO
CHRONO

26 OCT 64
P-8436
P-~~5544~~ 8544
P-7365
P-8789
Cuban Chrono

S E C R E T

XXXXXXXX

DIR WAVE MEXI [illegible]

TYPIC JMGIN LIFIRE

MARCELINO MIESAL LEFT FOR HAVA 22 OCT. OSCAR CONCEPCION AND ESTHER GAVILAN WIFE OF ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LEFT FOR HAVA 24 OCT. JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS AND FAMILY LEFT FOR HAVA 25 OCT. PER LIENVOY 25 OCT, ARMAS SAID HE WOULD BE GONE ONLY A WEEK.

END OF MESSAGE

P-7368

M C CHOADEN

G H PELLEN S E C R E T W C CURTIS

Nombre (s)	Edad	Nacionalidad	Pasaporte
GAVILAN ROSALES ESTHER.	21 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP # D/63/455
CONCEPCION MENDOZA OSCAR.	28 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP.# D/63/403

Llegada	Aerolinea
24	

Salida	Aerolinea	Punto de desembarque
24 DE OCTUBRE DE 1964	CUBANA. VUELO# 465	LA HABANA CUBA.

Visa Mexicana expedida en:

GAVILAN ROSALES ESTER. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 348 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 12 DE MAYO DE 1964.

CONCEPCION MENDOZA OSCAR. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 514 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 8 DE JULIO DE 1964

P-8544

P-7365

EXCERPT

HMMA-24419

30 September 1964

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief, WH/SA

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJ: PBRUMEN/Operational - Initiation of Contact with AMSESS-1

[Meetings: 24 September 1964, AMNIP-1 and AMSESS-1; and 25 September 1964, Lawrence F. BARKER (C/O), AMNIP-1 and AMSESS-1. AMSESS-1 returned to Cuba and did not make subsequent meetings with KUBARK.]

.....

14. On the subject of "M" (Direccion General de Intoligencia), the following exchange took place:

C/O: Who is the "M" chief in the Embassy [in Mexico] ?
A-1: Vega. (Manuel VEGA Perez)

.....

C/O: Who else is with "M"?
A-1: Rogelio (Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez). But he is just a second rater.

.....

RODRIGUEZ Lopez

EXCERPTS

HMMA-24419

30 September 1964

EXCERPT

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief, WH/SA

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJ: FBRUMEN/Operational - Initiation of Contact with AMSESS-1

HMMA-24419

30 September 1964

[Meetings: 24 September 1964, AMNIP-1 and AMSESS-1; and 25 September 1964, Lawrence F. BARKER (C/O), AMNIP-1 and AMSESS-1. AMSESS-1 returned to Cuba and did not make subsequent meetings with KUBARK.]

.....

14. On the subject of "M" (Direccion General de Inteligencia), the following exchange took place:

C/O: Who is the "M" chief in the Embassy [in Mexico] ?
A-1: Vega. (Manuel VEGA Perez)

.....

C/O: Who else is with "M"?
A-1: Rogelio (Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez). But he is just a second rater.

.....

RODRIGUEZ Lopez

EXCERPTS

HMMA-24419

30 September 1964

MAY 64

TARGET PERSONALITY DATA FORM

(Note: [illegible] where space does not suffice)

Source and Comment

A. BASIC BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 201-332665
(P-7365)

1. Full name. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez
2. Name at birth.
3. Aliases, legal changes.
   *Uses pseudos Eduardo, Jose Antonio, and Casimiro (AMMUG-1 25 April 1964)
4. Date and place of birth.
5. Citizenship. Cuban
6. Previous nationality, racial or ethnic background
   White
7. Official identity or travel papers.
   Diplomatic Passport D/63/454 (LIFIRE 8 July 1963)
   Previous Dip Passport D/61/~~[illegible]~~ 164 (LIFIRE 15 May 61)
8. Father. BI data (open new TPD Form if needed)
   Living in Cuba. Appears to spend time away from family but visits them occasionally. (LIMUD 15 Sept 61)
9. Mother: same as 8.
   Alejandrina LOPEZ Lopez
   (see attachment item 9)
10. Spouse: same as 8.
   Esther GAVILAN Rosales PP D/63/455 (LIFIRE 8 July 1963)
   a) born c. March 1943 (LIENVOY 13 Mar 1964)
   b) married Subject after his tour in Mexico began, was a minor at the time. (LIMUD 1961)
      Apparently married summer 1962 (LIFIRE Sept 1962)
   c) home address in Cuba:
      Pepe San Martin #11639
      Alturas de San Miguel del Padron, Habana (LIMUD 15 Sept 61)
   d) father is dead (LIMUD 18 Sept 61)
   e) Esther is not well educated – uses misspelled words; planned to become a miliciana (LIMUD 1961)

*Used name ROBERTO when talking to Guillermo TREJO. (LIENVOY 14 Sept 1961)

Told one VILLAMAR to call him and ask for Roberto SALAS. (LIENVOY 17 Oct 1961)

Uses pseudos [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ with intel contacts. (WAVE 5002 IN 9696 27 Apr 64)

FILE P-7365 (MAY 64)

[illegible] and Comment

11. Children: same as 8.

NONE — or two

12. Siblings: same as 8.

Has little brother named Jorge (LIAUD 24 May 1961)

13. Other relatives by blood or marriage: same as 8.

(see attachment item 13)

14. Religion.

15. Education.

16. Languages.

Spanish

[illegible]

[illegible]

	[illegible] and Comment
17. Military service.	
18. History of Employment.	
a) Subject arrived in Mexico City 10 May 1961 along with 8 other young diplomats between 19 and 25, accompanied by member of Cuban Foreign Office. Purpose was to make known Castro Revolution in Mexico, Chile, Colombia Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil. Subject was Third Secretary.	(LIFIRES 15 May 61) (Excelsior 13 May 61)
b) Assistant Press and Cultural Attache Cuban Embassy, Mexico	(LITALUS 11 Oct 61)
c) Returned to Cuba 4 May 1962. Replaced by Manuel VEGA Perez	(LITEMPO-1 4 May 62)
d) Arrived Mexico 3 September 1962.	(LIFIRE 4 Sept 62)
Orders from Cuba that he not be placed on Diplomatic List.	(LITAMIL-7 7 Sept 62)
Leaving for Cuba 28 Sept 1962.	(LIENVOY 27 Sept 62)
e) Reportedly received a scholarship - not known what kind or where.	(HMMA-21403 21 May 63 (LITAMIL-9)
f) Arrived Mexico 6 July 1963 as Second Secretary	(LIFIRE 9 July 63)

Sources and Comment

19. Record of arrests

Disarmed by Mexican Judicial Police when became involved with emigration agent over documentation of Fernando ALONSO, a diplomatic courier. Was carrying concealed pistol.**

LITEMPO-
LIENVOY 8 Dec 61
USARMA Report
17 Dec 61

20. Physical description

Apparent age
Height
Weight
Build
Face shape
Eyes
Hair
Complexion
Teeth
Scars
Habits of dress
General appearance
Mannerisms
Prominent features

21. Other identifying features

Portrait Parle interleafed?
22. Photographs interleafed?
Fingerprints interleafed?

SECRET

**His pistol was confiscated, but he threatened to return armed again, declaring "We will see if you take my pistol then." Affair noted in press.

B. CURRICULUM VITAE (Chronologically by year from birth to present)

Source and Comment

22. Year	Location	Position	Activity

Source and Comment

C. PERSONAL AND PRIVATE DATA

23. Address & telephone of present residence.
Baja California 178 Apt 3
no telephone

LITAMIL-7 and LIENVOY

24. Nature & description of lodging & surroundings.

25. Floor plans interleaved? ....
Photographs interleaved? ....

26. Owner and/or lessor: BI data.

27. Other residents: BI data.

28. Servants: BI data.

29. Meals: where, when, with whom?

30. Barber: BI data.

31. Tailor: BI data

32. Dentist: physician: BI data.
Dra. fnu GOMEZ Sanchez (Ester's doctor) (LIENVOY 31 Mar 64)

[illegible] interleaved?
[illegible] interleaved?

33. [illegible] BI data.

[illegible]d Comment

33. Shops.

34. Church.

35. Sports, participant: times participating.

36. Sports, spectator: times attending.

37. Time at residence.

38. Theater, cinema; ticket agencies.

39. Night clubs, cafes, pubs.

40. Vacations: how & where spent; mode of travel.

41. Hobbies.

SECRET

Source and Comment

42. Mistresses or lovers: times of meeting; BI data.

43. Personal friends: times of meeting; BI data.

44. Persons who visit residence: same as 43.

Unknown man and Raul Pereyra will meet at Rogelio's house next Saturday — LIENVOY 17 Feb 64

45. Persons visited: same as 43.

Subject and wife went to Nico GARCIA's home for New Year's (LITAMIL-9 7 Jan 64)

Subject and wife invited to lunch at MIRABAL's home (LIENVOY 17 May 64)

46. Mail deliveries: details.

A branch post office (not specified) notified embassy it had parcel and magazine for Subject (LIENVOY 12 June 1961)

47. Dispatch of mail: details

48. Correspondents: details including frequency.

49. Telephone: details of calls.

Source and Comment

50. Tobacco: details.

51. Alcohol: details.

52. Casual sex: details.

53. Other habits.

54. Mode of transportation on different occasions.

Using Edsel D-314 - leaves car in driveway of residence and walks to Embassy or takes cab (LITAINT-2 13 Mar 62)

55. Private automobile: details of make, license, etc.

56. Garage & service stations.

57. Real estate owned: location, description, value.

58. Chattel property: location, description, value.

59. Personal bank accounts: location, amounts.

Banco Nacional de Mexico - order arrived for subject to pick up (LIENVOY 16 Feb 1962)

60. Other property: description, value.

61. Other relevant personal information.

One Sra. D[illegible]CIS's who was subject's landlord at [illegible]zatlan 152 A told Hector GALLO that subject went out one night, left the door open, and she saw single women in his room. Subject also had not notified her he was planning to move. (LIENVOY 6 Sept 61)

Source and Comment

D. POLITICAL DATA

62. Party membership.

63. Party functions.

64. Societies.

65. Labor unions.

66. Lodges & fraternities.

67. Orders, Masonic & other.

68. Degree of political conviction and indoctrination cite evidence.

Subject is 100% pro-regime and dangerous. (LITAMIL-7, 16 July 63)

69. Other political data.

E. JOB DATA

	Source and Comment
70. Job title. Second Secretary	Diario Oficial
71. Official documents & credentials carried.	
72. Rank & salary.	
73. Allowances.	
74. Other income.	
75. Where employed. TID form filed?	
76. Basic duties: description. see attachment	
77. Basic duties: by whom assigned? Bi data. Takes orders from Counselor Hector Gallo I.	(LITALUS-3 1 Aug 61)
78. Basic duties: by whom directly supervised? Bi data.	
79. Special duties: description. Cuban Intel Staffer Given special assignment as Political reporting officer	(AMMUG-1 24 ~~April~~ 1964) (LITAMIL-9 Feb 1964)
80. Special duties: by whom assigned? Bi data.	
81. Special duties: by whom directly supervised? Bi data.	

SECRET

Source and Comment

82. Superiors: degree of intimacy.

83. Subordinates: basic duties; BI data.

84. Subordinates: special duties; BI data.

85. Subordinates: degree of intimacy.

86. Colleagues: functions; BI data.

87. Liaison contacts: functions; BI data.

88. Servants & menials: functions; BI data.

89. T/O interleafed?.........

Flow chart interleafed?.........

90. Telephone contacts: details of calls.
(See attachment item 90.)

SECRET

SECRET

Source and Comment

91. Correspondents: details of correspondence.

92. Work schedule: days of week, hours, location.

93. Work schedule: lunch & rest periods, where & with whom?

94. Work schedule: times, routes, vehicles, companions from lodgings to work.

95. Work schedule: times, routes, vehicles, companions from work to lodgings.

96. Work schedule: regular conferences, times & places.

97. Work schedule: night & holiday work, times & places.

98. Professional travel: details.

(see attached)

99. Telephone number, how used? Uses phone numbers
14-42-37 (Ambassador's office)
14-13-26 (Porteria)

[(LIENVOY)]

SECRET

Sources and Comments

100. Receipt of mail: where, when, how?

101. Dispatch of mail: where, when, how?

102. Intra-office communication: details.

103. Access to safes: location, description.

104. Access to safes: where are keys and combinations kept?

105. Passes carried.

106. Keys carried.

107. Professional reputation.

10[illegible]. Dispatch of mail where, [illegible]

[illegible] communica[illegible]

108. Other relevant job data.

Source and Comment

F. CONTROL DATA

109. Family difficulties

Ester asked subject why he didn't sleep at home last night. He replied that he is coming for lunch. She said there wouldn't be any lunch.

(LIENVOY 11 Feb 1964)

110. Difficulties in office

111. Difficulties with friends

112. Difficulties with mistresses or lovers

113. Political difficulties

114. Black market activity

115. Smuggling activity

116. Acceptance of bribes

SECRET

Source and Comments

117. Persons to whom most attached

118. Property to which most attached

119. Information which could be used to blackmail

120. Information which could be used to check on subject

121. Access to target information

122. Access to target personalities

123. Other relevant control data

Subject is from old commie family in Cuba but is not commie himself. Could be persuaded to work in Mexico for democratic Cuba

(LESNICK from Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo MRID 0436 11 Ap 64)

This info later retracted.

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO TARGET PERSONALITY DATA FORM
ON ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

9. Mother

a) Address: Pasaje Jose 10410 entre 3a y Final,
San Juan de los Pinos, Calzada de San Miguel
del Padron, Habana (LIMOUD 24 May 1961)

b) Mother became a Brigadista. New address Finca de Campana
Cobas, Pinar del Rio (LIMOUD 5 Sept 61)

c) Mother asked subject to send her a crucifix. (LIMOUD 24 May 61 & 18 Sept 61)
Also requested 24 Sept and 8 Oct 61

d) Mother uses many misspelled words, signs letters PATRIA O MUERTE. (LIMOUD)

13. Other Relatives

a) Godmother - Josefina LOPEZ y Lopez at address 9a above (LIMOUD 18 Feb 62)

b) Godfather - name unknown - address: San Rafael 874
Habana Apt 501 (LIMOUD 18 Sept 61)

c) Sister-in-law - Niña - lives in Habana (LIMOUD 18 Sept 61)

d) Brother-in-law - Eduardo aka R. GAVILAN
Address: S. Camaricca
Matzas, Cuba 23 May 61
PATRIA O MUERTE, VENCEREMOS type (LIMOUD 28 Feb 62)
Asked for repair parts for 1957 Buick (LIMOUD 14 Aug 63)

e) Bienve LNU
Address: San Francisco 356
San Juan, P.R.

(Don't know if he is a relative, but his address was sent to Rogelio by latter's mother) (LIMOUD 18 May 61)

f) Iluminada Rosales
Calle 60 #1704
Marianao, Habana (Ester's sister?) (LIMOUD 20 Aug 63)

g) has relative in PERRIME (LESNICK from Eloy Gutéerrez Menoyo ARID 0436 11 Apr 64)

redacted later

23) Addresses (previous)

a) Living at Mazatlan 152 A Tel 250928 (LIENVOY 5 July 61)

b) Lived at Mazatlan 126 - in Rodriguez Cue's place who G-2 (no source)

c) Living at Pachuca 153 (LIEMBRACE 21 Oct 61)

d) Lives at Tacubaya 74 -502 (LITAMIL-2 13 Mar 62)

78) Basic Duties

a) On first tour was in touch with Imprenta Madero re publications, was also involved with films, propaganda and bulletins. (LIENVOY)

79) Special Duties

a) Probably identical with member of Cuban Embassy who spent considerable time among the students at UNAM. (CURTIS Memo 22 Dec 1961)

b) Present at meeting in Cuban Embassy attended by one Alfonso PRERA, at which matter of giving aid to 13 November exiles in Mexico was discussed, in order that they could return to Guatemala to assist the anti- Ydigoras group. (HMMA-18801 17 April 62 RYBAT LINLUCK)

98) Professional Travel (see also under Job History)

a) Went to Veracruz and Merida (LIENVOY 9 July 1961)

b) Traveled to the interior. Guillermo TREJO told subject he knew where Subj had been and said it was urgent they get together. (LIENVOY 30 Nov 1961)

c) Subject went to Veracruz mid April 1964 apparently in connection with shooting incident involving Cuban Consul there. (LIENVOY 16 April 1964)

d) Subject left for Cuba 25 April and returned to Mexico 16 May 1964. Wife preceeded him and returned on same date. (LIFIRE and LIENVOY)

90. Telephone Contacts

a) Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero - Honduran commie in Mexico - sent Gustavo [illegible], to see Subject. [illegible] was Venezuelan instructor in use of farm machinery and member of revolutionary group in Venezuela who could not return to his country and who was practically discharged from his teaching job at Chapingo because of his ideology. (LIENVOY 9 Aug 61)

b) Guillermo TREJO Oviedo of Prensa Latina. (LIENVOY 14 Sept 61)

c) Humberto H. TREJO Oviedo of Prensa Latina. (LIENVOY 22 Sept 61)

d) Lupe LNU - subject arranged to meet her at her home. (LIENVOY 29 Sep 61)

e) Roberto LNU - Esther (subject's girlfriend, later wife) informed subject she didn't know Roberto's address. (LI[illegible] 2 Oct 61)

f) Some "compañeros ferrocarrileros" ask for Subject. Not in. (LIENVOY 7 Oct 61)

g) Seen with Ramiro DEL RIO Perez coming out of Cuban Embassy. (LIEMBRACE 19 Oct 61)

h) One VILLAMAR, lnu, called the Cuban Embassy for Roberto FRIAS who unknown to Teresa PROENZA who answered the phone. VILLAMAR said Subject told him to call. (LIENVOY 17 Oct 61)

i) Subject was driven home from unspecified function in car with license 86. (In 1960-61, license D-86 was registered to Vladimir S. [illegible], a Soviet military attache.)

j) Subject told SAMOKHINE (Vladilen) of the Soviet Embassy that he had good news for him and wanted to come over to tell him. SAMOKHINE preferred to go to see subject and said he would come in a half hour. (LIENVOY 9 Nov 61)

k) Subject is a contact of Norman [illegible]. (W.C.CURTIS memo 29 Nov 61)

l) Edmundo JARDON of Prensa Latina told Subject that a Guatemalan named PARRILLA was waiting for him. (LIENVOY 14 Dec 1961)

m) Enrique BORDES of Prensa Latina coming to see Subject at the Embassy. (LIENVOY 11 Jan 1962)

n) EZEQUIEL, fnu - of the Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas, told Subject he had a letter from Mariano LNU and inside the letter was one for Subject. (FREQUENT CONTACT) (LIENVOY 17 Jan 62)

o) One Jose Arturo de la PENA insists on getting in touch with Subject about the information bulletin. (LIENVOY 20 Jan 62)

p) One FUENTES arrived from Tamaulipas and Tampico and told Subject he had told LOMBARDO he would bring money for two round trip passages. He also wanted photos and bulletins and other things for Tampico. Subject told him to call at the Embassy to pick them up. (LIENVOY 20Jan 62)

q) Teodoro ALTAMIRANO Robles, president of the new generation of ISTMO who are loyal to the Cuban Revolution, wanted materials from the Embassy. Subject asked for his address. (LIENVOY 29 Jan 62)

Costa Rica #57 Miraflores, La Paz, Bolivia. Letter addressed to Rogelio RODRIGUEZ F. (LI[illegible] 12 Feb 62)

(LIENVOY 28 Feb 1962)

u) Hilario LNU looking for Subject urgently. Leaves message about a "sick" person. (LIENVOY 5 Mar 62)

v) One Mr. SILVA wants to speak to Subject. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

w) Julio [illegible] tells the Cuban Ambassador he is leaving for Central America and offers his services. The Ambassador hasn't any need, but says to ask Rogelio. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

x) Ricardo LNU wants to come by the Embassy for bulletins. Subject tells him better to meet at the same place and time. Ricardo has Central American accent. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

y) Some gentlemen from La Normal are bringing a message from Roque MENDOZA and want to see Subject. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

z) Subject tells Yuri ALEXANDROV of Soviet Embassy that he couldn't get to the meeting but will come to see him later. (LIENVOY 7 Mar 62)

aa) Somebody named Pierre LNU is coming to the Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 8 Mar 62)

bb) Some people from "Exrresion" from Sinoloa came to the Embassy to see subject but he not in. (LIENVOY 8 Mar 62)

cc) One Lucio HERRERA came to the Embassy to see Subject and was told to come in. (LIENVOY 13 Mar 62)

dd) Pedro GONZALEZ Ortega coming to Embassy to see Subject. (Person of this name was PP Secretary General in Nayarit and leader of small farmers and workers in coastal area.) (LIENVOY 15 Mar 62)

ee) One VERGARA, fnu left a message for subject that it urgent he communicate with him. (Later contacts - discussed the bulletins and family problems.) (LIENVOY 19 Mar 62)

ff) One ISSUE, fnu, came to Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 22 Mar 62)

gg) A Venezuelan named MENDOZA, fnu came to the Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 22 Mar 62)

hh) Arturo and Luz SERRANO came to the Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 23 Mar 62)

ii) One Hilario, a Guatemalan, urgently wants to see Subject. Hilario asks Subject "que el recuerda el Jardin o en la Luna". Subject will look for him at 8:00 P/M. (Note in file that Hilario may be identical with Rafael SOLIS Barrios, member of PGT).

jj) Ricardo - with Cuban accent - tells Subject he waited for him yesterday. (SEVERAL LATER CONTACTS WITH ONE RICARDO) (LIENVOY 27 Mar 62)

kk) Roberto GAYADA and Mr. GARRICA waiting for Subject at the Embassy. (LIENVOY 28 Mar 62

ll) Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, head of PGT in Mexico, met with Subject who told GUTIERREZ that the person who is going to take over relations with Guatemala in Mexico still had not arrived. Subject planned to see Alfonso [illegible] a leader of the 13 November Group in Mexico. ([illegible] 28 Mar 62)

mm) One MARTEL, fnu visited Subject at the Embassy to deliver something. Later, a Senora MARTEL, Argentinian told subject she leaving and please send things she lacked. (LIENVOY 29 Mar 62)

nn) One VARGAS, fnu, called Subject. (LIENVOY 29 Mar 62)

[illegible] 6002

(LIENVOY [illegible] Feb 1962)

u) Hilario LNU looking for Subject urgently. Leaves message about a "sick" person. (LIENVOY 5 Mar 62)

v) One Mr. SILVA wants to speak to Subject. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

w) Julio [illegible] tells the Cuban Ambassador he is leaving for Central America and offers his services. The Ambassador hasn't any need, but says to ask Rogelio. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

x) Ricardo LNU wants to come by the Embassy for bulletins. Subject tells him better to meet at the same place and time. Ricardo has Central American accent. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

y) Some gentlemen from La Normal are bringing a message from Roque MENDOZA and want to see Subject. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

z) Subject tells Yuri ALEKSANDROV of Soviet Embassy that he couldn't get to the meeting but will come to see him later. (LIENVOY 7 Mar 62)

aa) Somebody named Pierre LNU is coming to the Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 8 Mar 62)

bb) Some people from "Exrresion" from Sinoloa came to the Embassy to see subject but he not in. (LIENVOY 8 Mar 62)

cc) One Lucio HERRERA came to the Embassy to see Subject and was told to come in. (LIENVOY 13 Mar 62)

dd) Pedro GONZALEZ Ortega coming to Embassy to see Subject. (Person of this name was PP Secretary General in Nayarit and leader of small farmers and workers in coastal area.) (LIENVOY 15 Mar 62)

ee) One VERGARA, fnu left a message for subject that it urgent he communicate with him. (Later contacts - discussed the bulletins and family problems.) (LIENVOY 19 Mar 62)

ff) One ISSUZ, fnu, came to Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 22 Mar 62)

gg) A Venezuelan named MENDOZA, fnu came to the Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 22 Mar 62)

hh) Arturo and Luz SERRANO came to the Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 23 Mar 62)

ii) One Hilario, a Guatemalan, urgently wants to see Subject. Hilario asks Subject "que el recuerda el Jardin o en la luna". Subject will look for him at 8:00 P/M. (Note in file that Hilario may be identical with Rafael SOLIS Barrios, member of PGT).

jj) Ricardo - with Cuban accent - tells Subject he waited for him yesterday. (SEVERAL LATER CONTACTS WITH ONE RICARDO) (LIENVOY 27 Mar 62)

kk) Roberto GAYADA and Mr. GARNICA waiting for Subject at the Embassy. (LIENVOY 28 Mar 62

ll) Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, head of PGT in Mexico, met with Subject who told GUTIERREZ that the person who is going to take over relations with Guatemala in Mexico still had not arrived. Subject planned to see Alfonso PERA a leader of the 13 November Group in Mexico. (LIMLOCK 28 Mar 62)

co) [illegible] identified subject as [illegible] subject at the Embassy to deliver something. [illegible] mentioned in [illegible] dated 1962 and not available). ~~([illegible] Mar 62)~~ (MEXI 7711 IN 7650 1 Apr 62)

pp) One caller with a [illegible] accent, asks for [illegible]. [illegible] says she hasn't seen Rogelio today. Judith wants to communicate with him, urgently.
(LIENVOY 2 April 62)

qq) One Mauricio ARGUELLES came to Embassy to see Subject and was told to come in.
(LIENVOY 5 April 62)

rr) Subject will come down to see Luis MACIAS who is waiting for him downstairs.
(LIENVOY 5 Apr 62)

ss) An individual from the FCR asks Subject if he can come by the Embassy for some films.
(LIENVOY 12 Apr 62)

tt) One HABAJA from the newspaper _Verdades_ wants to see Subject.
(LIENVOY 12 Apr 62)

uu) Enrique ESTEVES, with South American accent (sic) wants to contact Subject re a visa.
(LIENVOY 27 Apr 62)

vv) Juan REJANO wanted urgently to speak with Subject. (LIENVOY 28 Apr 62)

ww) A person who refused to give his name asked for Subject or Marcos, his successor. SIMBRAS asked person to identify himself and latter said he is SOLIS. He can't come but has a request to make to the other person. Subject didn't tell SOLIS he was going away. He will meet with the other person who knows where to come. SIMBRAS should tell him "que donde hacen los aparatos". SIMBRAS will pass the message.
(LIENVOY 7 May 62)

xx) One Alvarez (transcriber says is voice of Guatemalan, Victor Maneul GUTIERREZ) leaves message for Subject not to worry because the matter is arranged.
(LIENVOY 10 Sep 62)

yy) Dolores de la Mora asks Subject to bring back from Cuba the shoe sizes of "you know who" because she wants to send gifts.
(LIENVOY 27 Sep 62)

zz) Subject tells SVETSKA of the Czech Embassy that he is again in Mexico. SVETSKA is leaving in 15 days but will introduce Subject to his replacement.
(LIENVOY 12 July 63)

aaa) A student from Preparatoria #6 asks for Subject and wants information bulletins.
(LIENVOY 17 Jul 63)

bbb) Alvarez (voice of Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ) left message for Subject that he waited last night at the same place. Subject's message arrived late and he cannot see Subject but will await him next Saturday.
(LIENVOY 18 Aug 63)

ccc) Czech Press attache, Oldrich NOVICKY, tells Subject that regarding the matter about which Subject asked him, he hasn't yet found the comrade' but is keeping the matter in mind. (Later contacts) (LIENVOY 27 Aug 63)

ddd) Subject tells a Spaniard, Col. Manuel SOUZA that the latter has abandoned him. SOUZA says no, the "pieza" is arranged.
(LIENVOY 31 Aug 63)

eee) Dr. ALVAREZ asks Subject if he has anything. No. Tomorrow is the day of the meeting and Subject will pass by ALVAREZ's office.
(Later contact re lab exams sic) (LIENVOY 3 Sep 63)

fff) Guillermo, from Colombia asks for Subject who not in. Tells VEGA the merchandise leaves tomorrow and now he knows what to do.
(LIENVOY 27 Sep 63)

ggg) TOVAR, fnu and Subject arrange to have lunch. Double-talk re meeting place.
(LATER CONTACTS) (LIENVOY 26 Oct 63)

hhh) One Oscar COMER who has come from Los Angeles asks for Subject and asks him in English if he belongs to the Partido Socialista. Subject cannot understand English and insists COMER come to the Embassy. Someone else gets on the phone and says Oscar has an address which is Manuel AGUILAR, Parque Mariscal Sucre 92, Mexico City. Is told to come to the Embassy.
(LIENVOY 7 Nov 63)

[illegible] Dominican exiles want to speak personally with Subject and are told to come in. (LIENVOY 17 Nov 63)

kkk) A Chilean, Manuel Antonio [illegible], informs Subject that he has arranged [illegible] and ready to go. (LIENVOY 21 Nov 63)

lll) Subject tells Miguel Angel [illegible] of [illegible] in Habana, that [illegible] is going as a delegate to the Seminario Latinoamericano de Estudiantes. (LIENVOY 21 Nov 63)

mmm) Jaime (probably de LEON) from Panama asked for Subject who said nothing had arrived yet. (LATER CONTACTS) (LIENVOY 20 Nov 63)

nnn) One Fabio wanted to contact Subject who not in. Told to come back. (LIENVOY 6 Dec 63)

ooo) One Juan RAMIREZ arranges to meet Subject. (LIENVOY 19 Dec 63)

ppp) Subject received gifts from someone in the Czech Embassy at Christmas. (LITAMIL-9, 27 Dec 63)

qqq) KUZNETSOV of Soviet Embassy called for Subject who not in. (Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, known KGB) (LIENVOY 20 Jan 64)

rrr) Unknown woman tells Subject re "quotations". Subject will pass by the building to pick them up. (AMROD?) (LIENVOY 20 Jan 64)

sss) Ricardo LEON asks for Subject. Has something urgent for him. (LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 21 Jan 64)

ttt) Subject arranges to see [illegible] (Adolf, suspected IS) regarding a problem. (LIENVOY 22 Jan 64)

uuu) Subject told KIBOCK-1 he might have trouble getting Mexican visa to reenter and might have to return to LaPaz via Prague. ([illegible]-7888, 22 Jan 64)

vvv) Subject tells one MORALES, FNU that there is nothing for him and to call in the afternoon. (LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 24 Jan 64)

www) MIJARES from Emigracion calls Subject about some cigars he offered him. (LIENVOY 24 Jan 64)

xxx) FUENTE from Tampico has a message for Subject from Jose Luis. Told to come by the Embassy. (LIENVOY 29 Jan 64)

yyy) ACEVEDO of Prensa Latina tells JORRIN of Cuban Embassy that the girl who is there now will discuss something which SUBJECT knows about. (LIENVOY 31 Jan 64)

zzz) Call from "El Professor" to Subject about unspecified matter. (LIENVOY 1 Feb 64)

aaaa) Maruja LNU tells JORRIN she has an urgent message for Subject and he should wait for her to come after two. (LIENVOY 4 Feb 64)

bbbb) Roberto, LNU asks for Subject who not in. Will call later. (LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 4 Feb 64)

cccc) Lic. DIAZ Galvez asks to speak to Subject who not in, and leaves message to call him at his office. (LIENVOY 6 Feb 64)

dddd) "El Professor" on behalf of the doctor asks Subject if the medicines have been received. More talk about medicine - possibly code. Subject asks "how is our friend El Chino". (LIENVOY 10 Feb 64)

eeee) Thelma King asks for Subject and told to call later. (LIENVOY 11 Feb 64)

ffff) Crescencio LNU asks for Subject and is told to come to Embassy (LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 11 Feb 64) gggg) [illegible] and Subject discuss their friend [illegible]. ([illegible] 12 Feb 64)

hhhh) Subject's name given to Nicaraguan DA for contact at Cuban Embassy.
(14 Feb 64) (HMMA-4716 [illegible])

iiii) Unknown person living at Articulo 123, num 49 has an appointment with subject. (LIENVOY 20 Feb 64)

jjjj) ([illegible]) HARRY (contact of Jaime de Leon) asks subject if anything has arrived for him. [illegible] previously asked subject if HARRY had been to see him. (LIENVOY 29 Feb 64)

kkkk) Juanito wants to see Subject. Latter says he saw him yesterday and to tell him the matter is resolved. (LIENVOY 5 Mar 64)

llll) A Senorita MARTINEZ leaves message for Subject to call her.
(LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 19 Mar 64)

mmmm) Subject and SANCHEZ, fnu, arrange to meet for lunch later in week.
(later contact) (LIENVOY 23 Mar 64)

nnnn) Melva GARCIA leaves message for subject that she is leaving tomorrow.
(Thelma King's contact) (LIENVOY 25 Mar 64)

oooo) One ALLIER recommends Carlos G. BASURTO of Diario de Mexico to Subject.
(LIENVOY 3 April 64)

pppp) One Señorita DOMINGUEZ wishes to see Subject at the same place.
(LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 3 Apr 64)

qqqq) Maria Elena GAYTAN, possibly a student, arranges to meet subject.
(LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 6 April 64)

rrrr) One ESCOBAR called for subject but latter out of town (in Veracruz)
(LIENVOY 17 April 64)

ssss) The "brother of Jacinto" asked subject to take some things with him to Cuba. (LIENVOY 23 April 64)

tttt) Ing. GONZALEZ asks for new appointment with subject since he waited for him and he didn't arrive. (LIENVOY 23 April 64)

uuuu) ROBERTO leaves message for Subject that "the señor is impatient.
(LIENVOY 23 April 64)

vvvv) Mauricio de la SELVA reports to Subject in Mexico.
(AMMUG-1 27 April 64)

wwww) Xiomara SANCHEZ asks if Subject has returned from Cuba and gets his home address. (LIENVOY 17 May 1964)

14-00000

MAY 64

TARGET PERSONALITY DATA FORM

(Note: Interleaf where space does not suffice)

Source and Comment

A. BASIC BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 201-332665
(P-7365)

1. Full name. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez
2. Name at birth.
3. Aliases, legal changes.
*Uses pseudos Eduardo, Jose Antonio, and Casimiro (AMMUG-1 25 April 1964)
4. Date and place of birth.
5. Citizenship. Cuban
6. Previous nationality; racial or ethnic background
White
7. Official identity or travel papers.
Diplomatic Passport D/63/454 (LIFIRE 8 July 1963)
Previous Dip Passport D/61/~~161~~ 164 (LIFIRE 15 May 61)
8. Father: BI data (open new TPD Form if desired)
Living in Cuba. Appears to spend time away from family but visits them occasionally. (LIMUD 15 Sept 61)
9. Mother: same as 8.
Alejandrina LOPEZ Lopez
(see attachment item 9)
10. Spouse: same as 8.
Esther GAVILAN Rosales PP D/63/455 (LIFIRE 8 July 1963)
   a) born c. March 1943 (LIENVOY 13 Mar 1964)
   b) married Subject after his tour in Mexico began, was a minor at the time. (LIMUD 1961)
   Apparently married summer 1962 (LIFIRE Sept 1962)
   c) home address in Cuba:
   Pepe San Martin #11639
   Alturas de San Miguel del Padron, Habana (LIMUD 15 Sept 61)
   d) father is dead (LIMUD 18 Sept 61)
   e) Esther is not well educated -- uses missrelled words; planned to become a miliciana (LIMUD 1961)

*Used name ROBERTO when talking to Guillermo TREJO. (LIENVOY 14 Sept 1961)

Told one VILLAMAR to call him and ask for Roberto FRIAS. (LIENVOY 17 Oct 1961)

Uses pseudos CHELE ~~[illegible]~~ with intel contacts. (WAVE 5662 IN 9696 27 Apr 64)

FILE P-7365 (MAY 64)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO
ty Chief, WH/SA
f, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/DYVOUR/PBRUMEN/JMGIN/AMOT
Cubans Travelling Between Havana and Mexico City

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. Attached herewith are copies of AMOT Reports CC-626, C 29 and CC-630 containing traces on Cubans travelling between Havana and Mexico City on 20, 24, 25 and 28 April 1964.

2. RID: No indexing required for JMWAVE since attachments have already been indexed for Station files.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachments:
AMOT Reports CC-626, CC-628, CC-629, CC-630, h/w

Distribution:
COS, Mexico City, w/atts.
- DC/WH/SA, w/atts.
- C/WHD, w/o atts.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
13 May 64

DATE DISPATCHED
MAY 18 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-15066

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-5-3/4
19-6-95/4

SECRET

Report # CC-623.　　　　　　　　　　30 Apr 64

MEMO FROM [redacted] [illegible] 2

SUBJECT: File Traces on Cubans traveling from Mexico City to Havana via air on 20 Apr 64.

AMEZCUA, Jorge: (Special PP-S-64/82)

[illegible] Rodriguez, Jorge M.: Traveled from Havana to Mexico on 5 Apr 64, Cuban Special PP-64/82. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

CALVO y Rodriguez, Manuel: (PP-2/1001)

CALVO Rodriguez, Manuel: Information reported on this individ- on 1 Apr 64, CC-595, travel file traces.

[illegible]:

Traveled from Havana to Mexico on 23 Mar 64, Cuban PP-27001. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

CARDENAS, Miguel Angel Ca: (PP-26946)

CARDENAS Forcades, Miguel de: Traveled from Havana to Mexico 20 Feb 64, Cuban PP-26946. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

FLORES, Osvaldo: (PP-03107)

FLORES Rodriguez, Osvaldo: Camaguey Province Delegate of the Director, Fabric Warehouses and Similar Consolidated Enterprise /Empresa Consolidada de Almacenes de Tejidos y Conexos/. Replaced Héctor VALLADARES Lima in this position per Resolution #4586, 18 Oct 62, Ministry of Internal Commerce. (Source: Official Gazette #4, 8 Jan 63, page 146.)

GAVILAN Rosales, Esther: (DIP PP-D-63/445)

P-7365

GAVILAN Rosales, Esther: Cuban diplomatic PP-63/455. Traveled from Havana to Mexico City via Cubana Airlines on 24 Oct 63. (Source: passenger list.)

GONZALEZ, Josefina: (DIP PP-D-64/141)

GONZALEZ [illegible], Josefina: Traveled from Havana to Mexico on 27 Mar 64 diplomatic PP-D-64/141. (Source: passenger list from "friends

GONZALEZ, Mario: (Special PP-S-63/856)

GONZALEZ Baroja, Mario J.: Traveled from Havana to Mexico on pr 64, Cuban Special PP-S-63/856. (Source: passenger list from "frien

SECRET

1.

D

7365

from HOY

17 May 1964

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, 2nd Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, leaves Cuba 16 May 1964 to return to duty in Mexico.

from HOY, 17 May 1964

Nombre (s)	Edad	Nacionalidad	Pasaporte
RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ ROGELIO.	22 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP.# D/63/454
GAVILAN ROSALES ESTHER.	21 AÑOS.	CUBANA.	DIP.# D/63/455

Llegada	Aerolinea
16 DE MAYO DE 1964	CUBANA. VUELO #464

Salida	Aerolinea	Punto de desembarque
		MEXICO D.F.

Visa Mexicana expedida en:

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ ROGELIO. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 347 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 12 DE MAYO DE 1964.

GAVILAN ROSALES ESTHER. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 348 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 12 DE MAYO DE 1964.

P-7365

14-00000

13 Feb 64

20:40 El jefe de la Delegación de Estudiantes Chilenos se comunica
con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba. Este manifiest
que el Embajador HERNANDEZ ARMAS le pidió que hablara con ell
para ver que posibilidades había de que dos de sus compañeros
chilenos se quedarán aquí en México hasta el vuelo del sábado,
" porque hay el problema de dos compañeros Diplomáticos que ll
garon de Chile y tienen urgencia de viajar mañana a la Habana'
El jefe de la Delegación de Estudiantes Chilenos indica que pl
ticara con sus compañeros y posteriormente le informará el re-
sultado.

11 Feb 64

69.- Salida al 140263.- 1103hs._ Rogelio con Esther que le dé el número de la última visa que tiene.- Esther que es la 1015 de fecha 18 de octubre de 64.- Rogelio que de 63.- Esther que no que 64.---Esther le reclama porque no fué a dormir anoche a la casa._ Rogelio que pasa a almorzar.- Esther que no porque no hay almuerzo, que se divierta.- Cuelga.--- 94.-

365

361-394.- Entrada._ Thelma King con Rogelio Rodríguez le pregunta que si leyó la prensa ayer.- Rogelio: que por arriba nada mas. Thelma: que si se fué todo ayer.- Rogelio: que sí.- Thelma: que ella se quería ir el sábado.- Rogelio: que el próximo vuelo es el jueves.- Thelma: que entonces el jueves por la mañana le lleva el paquete que hay que llevar.- Rogelio: que si es posible que mejor traiga el paquete mañana por si hay algun cambio en el vuelo.- Thelma que entre diez y once de mañana lo lleva.--407.

7763
7, 7365

195.- Entrada a las 1132hs._ Mr Thelma King por Rogelio.- Jorrin que no está.- Mr que llama mas tarde.-- 203.-

7365
7763

205.- Entrada.- Crescencio por Rogelio.- Jorrín que un momento.- Jorín que pase por la embajada que quiere verlo.- Cres.de acuerdo.--- 232.-

12 Feb 64

356. Entrada 1117.- TOVAR pregunta a ROGELIO cuándo van a cenar y ROGELIO sugiere que sea hoy. TOVAR pregunta si pueden adelantar la hora, unas siete horas de la fijada y ROGELIO dice que pensaba adelantarla una hora. TOVAR: que sería muy conveniente que adelantaran unas siete. ROGELIO después de pensarlo, indica que tenía pensado ir a comer a la casa de "nuestro amigo CARLOS, pero....". TOVAR pregunta si a cenar y ROGELIO dice que sí; pregunta qué le parece y TOVAR comenta que muy bien, pero entonces quedaría mejor a las nueve. ROGELIO acepta y pregunta si el número de la casa es 180 y TOVAR dice que ya se olvidó, porque como la conoce...., pero mejor sería a la misma hora que habían quedado la vez pasada y TOVAR lo esperaría afuera. ROGELIO está de acuerdo.- 383.-

7365
/

10 Jul 64

981. Entrada.- El profesor de parte del doctor pregunta a ROGELIO si ya recibió esas medicinas y éste dice que todavía no ha llegado nada, pero le hace falta que el doctor mañana lo pudiera enviar si tiene algo para ROGELIO. HF acepta. ROGELIO pregunta cómo está "nuestro amigo el chino" y HF dice que está buscando que lo inviten a comer, porque éste solo vino a arreglar un negocio de unos casimires que tiene, ya que viene acá para surtirse, pero le dijo a HF que se va pasado mañana ó un día más; que HF llamó a ROGELIO el sábado y el viernes, pero se aburrió de estarlo llamando, que sobre todo lo hizo por las medicinas esas del doctor, ya que eso es un tedio para HF. ROGELIO pregunta si sería buen día el miércoles. HF "de todas mandras, usted dice que tiene que entregarlo a él un muestrario médico a éste hombre, no ?." ROGELIO: "ajá, entonces me lo manda mañana por aqui". HF: "entonces yo le voy a decir a éste hombre a ver qué, verdad ?". ROGELIO: sí, "entonces yo lo espero mañana por acá". HF pregunta a qué horas estará y ROGELIO dice que toda la mañana. HF:que entonces"él" llegará pasadas las 10.30 h. ROGELIO:correcto.-1027.

1365

095. Entrada.- ESPEJEL pregunta por ROGELIO y JORRIN dice que no ha llegado. ESPEJEL:que entonces irá para la embajada porque quedó de estar con él a las 10.30 h. J. que está bien.- 100.-

1305

1000 h.

100. Entrada.- HF pregunta por RODRIGUEZ y JORRIN dice que no ha llegado y es posible que no [illegible] porque hoy llega avión. HF pregunta por el Embajador y J. informa que no está.- 107.-

6 Feb 64

----• Entrada 2039.- HF amigo de RICARDO LEON pregunta por-- RODRIGUEZ y HD dice que salió a comer hace un ratito. -- HF pregunta sino le dieron su recado de en la tarde y HD -- indica que JORRIN debió habérselo dado con seguridad. - HF:que entonces volverá a llamar mañana. HD:que está -- bien.- 1213.-

1213. Entrada 2046.- HF solicita hablar con RODRIGUEZ y -

0_7365

(11.-L31.-6 feb.64).-

JORRIN indica que RODRIGUEZ le dijo que si HF tenía algo,-- que se lo llevara. HF:que quisiera hablar con RODRIGUEZ mañana en la mañana por teléfono "porque él precisamente -- tenía que contestarme...." JORRIN:que sí, pero le dijo que no tenía nada;que si HF tenía "la receta, se la trajera". HF: "bueno, porque cuando él tenga, vamos a hablar, dígale". JORRIN:que está bien.- 1244.-

865. Entrada 1700.- El Lic. DIAZ GALVEZ solicita hablar con-- ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y JORRIN dice que no está. DIAZ:que-- cuando llegue le diga se comunique con él a su oficina. a- J.que está bien.- 884.-

7365

7 Feb 64

363.- Entrada a las 1115hs.- HF Morales por Rodríguez.- Jorrín que dice Rogelio que no tiene nada para el.- 374.-

P_7365

10 Feb 64

18:58 El amigo de RICARDO LEON, dice a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que " me acaba de llegar otra cotización". ROGELIO le recomienda que se la deje con JORRIN. El amigo, indica que está bien, que se la dejará en un sobre cerrado.

4 Feb 64

290. Entrada [illegible].- [illegible] pregunta si ya llegó ROGELIO Y-- JORRIN después de pedirle que se espere un momento, dice -- que pase a la [illegible]. [illegible]: que era para darle un recado urgente [illegible] pregunta hasta qué horas estará en -- la embajada [illegible] indica que como hasta las 2 y pico. - [illegible]: que ella [illegible] le diga que la espera. JORRIN: que está bien.- 321.-

365.

(3.- L31.-4 feb.64).-

130. Entrada 1012.- ROBERTO pregunta por ROGELIO y JORRIN-- informa que no ha llegado todavía; que llame dentro de media hora. ROBERTO acepta.- 134.-

365

134. Entrada.- [illegible] pregunta por RODRIGUEZ y JORRIN dice que no ha llegado. [illegible]: que le diga que llamó como le dijo, pero que le llamará mañana ó pasado ya que no lo-- pudo encontrar. JORRIN: que está bien.- 151.-

174. Entrada.- El Lic.DIAZ GALVEZ solicita hablar con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y JORRIN después de pedirle que se espere un momento, indica que ROGELIO lo llamará por la tarde.

365

(2.-L31.-6 feb.64).-

6 Feb 64

1108. Entrada 1932.- BUENAVENTURA comunica a ROGELIO que no está ni el Sr.VELA ni el otro señor y ninguna de las señoritas sabe sobre el particular, por lo que dejó el recado para que se lo dieran a "61" mañana por la mañana y la cosa será hasta mañana. ROGELIO: que está bien.- 1131.-

1 Feb 64

622.- Entrada a las 1324hs._ HF "El Profesor" con Rogelio Rodriguez le dice que esa cuestión así como se la propuso, que es bastante difícil, porque ya había estado todo concertado en la otra manera.- Rogelio: que como lo dice que.... HF que que para hacerlo mas para allá y no más para acá que es a lo que se refería; que por otra parte tiene algo que le acaba de regalar uno de los cuates tuyos.- Quedan para las seis.-- 642.

P. 7365

120. Entrada 1956.- ROGELIO pregunta sino lo han llamado y- JORRIN dice que nó. ROGELIO: que si llama ALVAREZ le diga que mañana lo llamo sobre las once, porque quiere hablar con él. JORRIN: que está bien.- 129.-

7365

47.- Salida al 237995.- 1703hs.- Pereyra con Aralia le pregunta lo que hace.-- Que Peregrina se fué a los toros con unas personas del Comercio Exterior, que el no pudo ir porque están preparando un almuerzo para mañana en la embajada.- HF con Pereyra se saludan y Pereyra le dice que para el proximo sabado se van a reunir en la casa de Rogelio.-- 64.-

8535

7365

------------------- --

.... Pasa a la hoja 2.

3 Feb 64

15:43 TEJO OVIEDO pide a JORRIN, portero de la Embajada Cubana, que diga al Embajador o a FERNANDEZ ROA que están esperando a que lleguen para empezar el acto. JORRIN indica que el Embajador tuvo que salir urgentemente a una diligencia, y FERNANDEZ ROA fué a esperar a su señora que llegaba hoy. TEJO dice que si entonces no va a venir nadie; que si el Embajador tenía que salir debió haber nombrado un representante; que ésto es una falta total de atención y que le diga al Embajador que está bastante molesto, pues ya no puede esperar porque tiene allí a todos los invitados y es una cosa bastante penosa que les hagan esa falta de atención. 7365
Acto seguido JORRIN se pone en contacto con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y le hace saber que habló ahora TEJO OVIEDO diciendo que "están esperando a la gente de aca" para empezar el acto, y parece que está disgustado porque no ha llegado nadie; por lo que sería conveniente que ROGELIO se arrancara para allá. ROGELIO acepta la sugerencia y a su vez le pide que diga a la Doctora MACHADO que utili~~zó~~ce el carro para ir "allá".

29 Jan 64

776. Entrada 1350.- PUENTE, de Tampico de La Martí, solicita hablar con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ para darle un recado de JOSE - LUIS. JORRIN después de pedirle que se espere un mo-- mentito, pide que pase mañana a las diez y PUENTE acepta. - 816.-

365

30 Jan 64

441.- Entrada a las 1519hs,- HF Espejol por Rogelio.- Jorrin que no ha llegado.- Espejol que le urge verlo, que llama dentro de media hora.- 475.-

P-7365

707.- Entrada a las 1955hs.- HF El Profesor con Rogelio le pregunta que hay de nuevo.- Rogelio: que mucho. Que si tiene noticia para el.- HF que si, pero que pensaba verlo mañana. Que - quiere que coman con un poeta que es muy importante.- Rogelio

3.-L31.- 30 enero 64.-

244. Salida al 46-60-16.-1216.- JORRIN avisa a CARLOS ACEVEDO de Prensa Latina que ya está ROGELIO y el muchacho está en el Consulado. ACEVEDO: que el muchacho es quien tiene que hablar con ROGELIO, sobre todo con el Cónsul, pues se - trata de un asunto que ROGELIO sabe. JORRIN: que está -- bien.- 256.-

1365

261. Entrada 1227.- OSWALDO pregunta a RAUL qué hay sobre - lo de mañana en la embajada y RAUL después de preguntarlo a ROGELIO, indica que mañana como a las 4 van a trabajar en - ROGELIO,

(3.-L31.-31 enero 64).-

24 Jan 64

231.- P. 7365 Entrada a las 1132hs.- HF Morales con Rogelio Rodríguez. Rogelio le dice que no ha llegado nada todavía, que le llame mañana a la una de la tarde.-- 258.-

162.- 7365 8308 Entrada a las 1740hs.- HF Mijares -de Emigración- por Rogelio.- Jorrín que no está.- Mijares: que se trata sobre unos puros que le ofreció.- Que está por la noche en el aeropuerto en el 22-34-14.--- 192.-

25 Jan 64

1141. 7365 Entrada.- TOVAR pregunta a ROGELIO qué día se pueden ir a tomar una copa y ROGELIO dice que el lunes porque ha habido muchas dificultades. TOVAR: que está bien.- 1155.

28 Jan 64

12:24 El compañero [illegible] (7365) JAIME DE LEON quiere ponerse en contacto con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ para saber si hay alguna respuesta de los estudiantes universitarios de Cuba. [illegible] indica que ROGELIO no está, pero no hay la tal respuesta, y si hay avión, seguramente la habrá.

29 Jan 64

11:06 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ (7365) de la Embajada de Cuba, pregunta a [illegible]RIL, agregado comercial de la Embajada Checa, que "[illegible] el asunto aquél del que hablamos". [illegible] manifiesta que es una cosa regular y no hay ningún problema traspasar todo eso..."pero sería bueno que tu embajador hablara con el mío". ROGELIO se lo comunicará al embajador HERNANDEZ ARMAS.

038. 7365 Salida al 45-27-13.-1106.- RODRIGUEZ pregunta a SVORIE cómo está el asunto aquel de que hablaron y HF dice que es una cosa regular, que no hay ningún problema al traspasar todo eso, pero de todos modos sería una cosa buena hacer el

encargo a "nuestros superiores, van a hablar eso asunto". RODRIGUEZ pregunta si tiene que hablar el Embajador HERNANDEZ ARMAS con el de él y HF dice que sí, porque el de HF lo sabe y lo único que falta es que "ellos" hablen y traten eso para ver si están de acuerdo ó buscarán algunas posibilidades y no habrá ningún problema. RODRIGUEZ: que entonces se lo dirá al Embajador. HF acepta y agrega que ayer habló "con nuestro Cónsul" cuando visitaron el Instituto y dijo que nohabría ningún problema y que se podría arreglar normalmente, ya que "regularmente se puede traspasar todo dentro a las personas que están aqui como nosotros, para explorar la venta libre entonces es necesario esperar esos tres años". RODRIGUEZ repite que se lo transmitirá al Embajador para que éste llame al de HF y se pongan de acuerdo. HF está de acuerdo y ROGELIO dá las gracias por todo.- 066.-

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 221832Z

LAPA INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7333

22 Jan 64 IN 03646

REF LAPA 5261*

1. KIBOCK-1 ARRIVED MEXI 19 JAN AND CONTACTED STA 21 JAN. EXPECTS LEAVE MEXI FOR CUBA 22 OR 23 JAN.

2. K-1 REQUESTED 20 DOLLARS PAY EXTRA BILLS DUE DELAY MEXI. ALSO, ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL, TOLD K-1 MAY NOT BE ABLE GET MEXI RE-ENTRY VISA FOR RETURN TRIP THUS MAY HAVE RETURN LAPA VIA PRAGUE. K-1 NOW HAS 120 DOLLARS BUT MOST PAY MEXI HOTEL AND OTHER EXPENSES.

3. INTEL REPORT FOLLOWS.

4. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 1440 22 JAN 64.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No. 22 Jan 64

[illegible] Jan 64

373. Salida al 45-61-80.-1100.- RODRIGUEZ pregunta a OLDRICH ...... de la Embajada de Checoslovaquia, si puede irlo a -- ver de parte del Embajador para un problema que tienen y -- OLDRICH dice que sí, que lo espera dentro de 10 minutos. - RODRIGUEZ acepta.- 387.-

7365

20 Jan 64

149.- Entrada a las 1351hs.- HF Kuznetsov por Rogelio Rodríguez.- --- Peregrina que Rogelio no está que le va adar el telefono - del consjero cultural que también pertenece a la AMCOSAD.- --- 149214.--- 169.-

7365

186.- Entrada a las 1812hs.- MF por Rogelio le dice que tiene e encargo del Ingeniero de entregarle las cotizaciones, que como le hace para verse.- Rogelio que el pasa a recojerlas al edificio a las 8pm.- MF que lo espera.-- 206.-

21 Jan 64

10:44 El amigo de RICARDO LEON quiere ponerse en contacto con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana. JORRIN pide que le deje recado. El individuo indica que "tengo algo para el". JORRIN, después de consultar, dice que lo llame a las 4 de la tarde. El individuo pide decirle a ROGELIO "que me urge hablar con él.....que si no está, que me deje algún recado". JORRIN toma nota.

7365

(56)

22 Jan 64

327.- Salida al 452713 (Embajada Checa) 1146hs.- Rogelio Rodríguez por Zboril le dice que tiene un problema y que quiere que lo reciba.- Zboril que sí, que si urge mucho.- Rodríguez: que con relación al asunto que le trató el otro día.- Zboril: que lo espera mañana a las nueve.- 357.-

7365



4

1o de Enero 63
'Año de la Economía'

Sr
Rogelio Rodríguez
Mi querido hijo
Con mucho cariño deseo que al recibir estas letras te encuentres bien en compañía de [illegible]
Nosotros bien
Rogelio no sabe la pena que tengo contigo [illegible] que el otro día no pude allá [illegible] hasta la tuya
pero no [illegible] porque [illegible]
encontrado [illegible] y [illegible]
cuando llegó el [illegible] con el [illegible]
hace días que quería escribirte
pero me encontraba mal
Rogelio te escribí una carta que no te llegó porque la dirección no estaba bien por eso te escribo esta dándote la [illegible] de tu padre y de Jorge

Rte Alejandrina López
[illegible] San José [illegible]
[illegible] San Juan de las [illegible]
[illegible] Habana

Sr
Rogelio Rodríguez
Francisco Márquez [illegible]
Calzada de [illegible]
México D.F. [illegible]

VIA AEREA

P- 1365.

La de Jorge es 34 y la de tu
padre 42 de la Cacuna te
dice que tiene que ir al medico
dan luego mandarte la formula
de tu hijo te dice que esta de
lo mas lindo y todo
cuando llega aqui hay que
dejar todo y atenderlo
en cuanto llega al pasaje
empieza a llamarme Aguila
y la tia
En los Reyes le compramos
muchas cosas y lo que le mas le
gusto fue lo que le compro Jorge
un perro de cuerda que brinca
sabes que Jorge le estamos haciendo
los tramites para meterlo en
la Escuela de Oficiales para
sacarlo tecnico
tu padre hoy se encuentra un poco
enfermo de su pierna
Tu Abuela esta desde mas bien
Rosita dile a Estela que
no se olvide de la faja
y dile haber si puede conseguirme
pomo de crema de almendra y
un [illegible] de Perfector
bueno mi hijo dale un fuerte
abrazo a Estela y tu recibe
de tu madre y tu Padre que
no se olvida de ustedes ni un
solo momento
Recuerdo de todos
Jorge Alberto Lina Aguila
te manda un abrazo y beso

Lina

Carula graciosa en alto
[illegible]

Francisca Marquez 160 30/1/64

NEGATIVES

SECRET

7 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Lawrence F. Barker

SUBJECT : Meeting with LITAMIL-9, 6 January 1964

1. A meeting was held with L-9 from 2000 hours until 2320 hours 6 Jan -- pick-up and drop-off were made by car, the meeting took place at B's home with B's wife working the gate.

2. L-9 was unusually depressed -- had just received a letter from Spain indicating that his sister had been forced to leave her work as a result of excessive fatigue and the "never ending round of discussions and study circles" etc. She had not received much sympathy from the Cuban FOMIN and her request for 2 months leave in Spain was denied pending further study. L-9, who is quite fond of his sisters, took this news to heart and it ate away at him and compounded his usual miserable feeling. The first part of the meeting was taken up in a C/O delivered pep talk.

3. L-9 had the following to report:

a. At the evening reception of 2 Jan at the Embassy, the TASS representative remarked that he believed KHRUSHCHEV did not travel to Cuba to attend the anniversary celebrations because of the revelation of an exile plot to bomb Havana -- revelations which came about as the result of the arrest by the US Coast Guard of some war-like Cubans with bombs in their possession. The TASS man said that he believed that KHRUSHCHEV would show up someday in Havana quite unannounced as did CASTRO in the USSR.

To P 3692

b. Teresa PROENZA may be hired back by the Embassy -- APARICIO recently remarked to L-9, "Surely they will re-hire her." It is quite clear that APARICIO doesn't want her in his office again and he expressed the wish that if she were to be rehired she would work in the main embassy building.

c. In regard to the PROENZA firing, ROJAS of Cubana de Aviacion, who is married to Teresa's sister, said that he had written to FOMIN Raul ROA in her behalf but had received no reply.

d. Ambassador HERNANDEZ Armas sent a Christmas present to GOROSTIZA of the Mexican Foreign Office this year -- it was really a New Year's present, sent 31 Dec. L-9 does not know what it was.

4. L-9 was asked what all the ruckus was at the airport on 5 Jan. This drew a blank. B then said he had heard that a phalanx of Embassy officers was out there apparently guarding someone who was on his way to Cuba. L-9 didn't know anything about it. B remarked that two Cuban officials were supposedly on the flight to Havana -- one from the Embassy in Montevideo. At this point, L-9 slapped his forehead and said, "My God, PEREZ! I forgot about him." He then related the details of a conversation he had had with Earle PEREZ Friman at the Embassy on 2 Jan -- details sent to HQS separately by cable. (See MEXI 7659). L-9 was not aware that PEREZ had been on the 5 Jan flight -- he described him perfectly. He was not made aware of KUBARK involvement in the alleged "assault" nor was he told anything about PEREZ' appearance at TPELIDE.

18681

5. L-9 identified a number of persons appearing in the photos taken at the diplomatic reception held at the Embassy 2 Jan. Identifications were noted

SECRET

7365

~~P-6079~~

SECRET

on the photos.

6. L-9 revealed that he had welcomed in the New Year at Nico GARCIA's home -- at Nico's invitation. When Nico picked him up at the Embassy they made a swing by a house at 131 Alejandro Dumas, Polanco, where Nico wanted to drop a couple of bottles off with a friend named Mary, a Cuban. L-9 tried to remain in the car -- was not dressed for calling -- but Nico insisted that he come in. Mary was not there but her sister was -- she had just recently arrived from Cuba. Another Cuban man and woman were there -- anti-Castro types who were very sad at being away from their homeland -- the man was softly crying -- probably a bit liquored up. Nico fit right in -- L-9 says that he is a master at getting along with people, even those on the other side of the political fence. (This tallies with info on file). The Mexican landlady -- an old crone -- tried to put the make on L-9, really flipped for him, and wanted him to stay but he and Nico finally drove off. L-9 does not know who these people are (to be checked out). They then went over to Nico's place where L-9 joined the family for a Cuban dinner. Nico's mother-in-law was there -- she recently came out of Cuba to be with her daughter (Nico's wife) while she has a baby -- due soon. Jorrin appeared soon thereafter and joined in the meal. Nico put on some popular and light classical records, working his way from dance music to Tchaikovsky. When a carload of Embassy people -- Rogelio RODRIGUEZ and wife, Dra. MACHADO, Berta MACHADO, and Buenaventura REYES appeared in front Nico quickly took off the music and put on a record of Fidel CASTRO intoning his Second Declaration of Havana -- the new arrivals were greeted with this as they came in the door. L-9 says that Nico is a superb actor and knew just what to do when the Patria o Muerte types showed up.

7889
8604
8591
7365
9308

7. In response to questioning L-9 revealed that Nico looks upon him as a Fidelista but definitely not a Communist. He says that Nico is very self assured, a calm man who cannot be ruffled. He appears to have no complexes about being a Negro. Asked whether he felt there might be any chance that Nico would cooperate against CASTRO, L-9 said, "Let us face the fact that many people are becoming more and more convinced that the revolution is here to stay. This man GARCIA is one of them. On the other hand, if he could be "got to" he would be invaluable. He would be a great loss to the Embassy. I would say that the chances are slim but it would probably be worth the effort to try to win him over. He has many friends from all walks of life, many of them among the anti-Castro elements."

8. L-9 showed B some documents regarding Cultural plans of the Embassy which did not seem to merit reporting. He turned over two long lists of persons invited to the 2 Jan receptions.

9. L-9 reported that Mr. Dudley THOMPSON, an opposition senator from Jamaica had been in town and he identified THOMPSON from among those photographed at the Diplomatic Reception of 2 Jan. T was in Nairobi, Kenya, two weeks ago and arrived in Mexico from Miami on 1 Jan. He hoped to continue on to Cuba right away but was unable to make the trip since he could not be assured of getting there and back to Jamaica by 6 Jan -- he had to be in Jamaica on the 6th to attend a meeting of those opposing the BUSTAMANTE regime and had to attend another meeting on 10 Jan which was to be attended by Cheddi JAGAN of British Guiana and leaders from Barbados. He hoped to be able to go to Cuba to see Jesus CANIZARES of the INRA in order to brief C about land reform measures in Kenya. He told L-9 that he would probably be back in Mexico in February 1964 to arrange to go to Cuba. L-9 says that T appears to be a very well educated, bright person.

SECRET

DIRECTOR

ROM : [illegible]

CTION : W[illegible]

NFO : [illegible]

S E C R E T 141925Z

IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO DIR SJOS WAVE CITE MANA 4716 14 FEB 64 IN 19935

PBRUMEN

IN 19994
Feb 64

1. FOLLOWING REPORTED BY ERYTHROID/1 ON 13 AND 14 FEB:

IN LATE JAN NIC SECURITY SENT TWO AGENTS TO COSTA RICA TO PENETRATE GROUP LED BY MARCIAL AGUILUZ WHICH PLOTTING TO KILL GEN. ANASTASIO SOMOZA. TWO AGENTS ARE IDEN A AND IDEN B. THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL AND IDEN A REPORTED ON 11 FEB THAT AGUILUZ HAD INSTRUCTED IDEN B GO TO CUBA FOR SPECIAL TRAINING. IDEN B TO GO MEXICO CITY ON 12 FEB, TO REGISTER AT HOTEL CONGRESO, CALLE ALLENDE, AND -- ON FOLLOWING DAY HE TO GO CALLE FRANCISCO MARQUEZ NUMBER 160 (POR TACUBA) WHERE HE TO ASK FOR SEÑOR VEGA OR SEÑOR ROGELIO. WHEN ASKED BY VEGA OR ROGELIO "DE PARTE DE QUIEN", HE TO ANSWER "DE PARTE DE SENOR CANEIRAS" WHO HAD SENT HIM TO ARRANGE HIS PAPERS. AGUILUZ TOLD IDEN B, THAT IF HE UNABLE LOCATE EITHER VEGA OR ROGELIO, HE TO CALL TELEPHONE NUMBER 14-13-26 REPEAT 14-13-26. IDEN B ALSO TOLD THAT IF HE NEEDED SOMETHING (PRESUMABLY WHILE IN (CUBA) HE TO WRITE TO APARTADO 110, SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. HE WARNED, HOWEVER, TO WRITE NOTHING OF SIGNIFICANCE. AGUILUZ TOLD IDEN B HE WOULD BE GIVEN A COMMO SYSTEM IN MEXICO AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY, SO HE COULD LET IDEN A KNOW WHEN HE PLANNING TO RETURN. AGULUZ EXPLAINED THAT IDEN B WOULD RETURN FROM CUBA CLANDESTINELY BY SUBMARINE.

IN 19598
Feb 64

MEXI 822
14 Feb 64

IN 19988
14 Feb 64

ALSO RCVD 1110

2. THIS OPERATION BEING RUN BY ERYTHROID/1 WHO NOT REPEAT NOT AWARE STATION BEING INFORMED BY ERYTHROID/3. STATION OBTAINING ADDITIONAL DETAILS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SOONEST.

3. FOR MEXI: E/3 REQUEST URGENT IDENTIFICATION REGISTRY OF MEXICO CITY TELEPHONE NUMBER 14-13-26. MUST HAVE REPLY BY MORNING 15 FEB IF E/3 TO BE ABLE ADVISE HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICO CITY. IDEN B TO MAKE CONTACT VEGA OR ROGELIO -- OR BY PHONE, BY 17 FEB AT LATEST.

SECRET

14 Feb 1964

14-00000

DIRECTOR

ROM : MANAGUA

CTION : WH 3

NFO : [illegible]

SECRET 141925Z

IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO DIR SJOS WAVE CITE MANA 4716

14 FEB 64 IN 19935

PBRUMEN

v 9994
Feb 64

1. FOLLOWING REPORTED BY ERYTHROID/1 ON 13 AND 14 FEB:

IN LATE JAN NIC SECURITY SENT TWO AGENTS, TO COSTA RICA TO PENETRATE GROUP LED BY MARCIAL AGUILUZ WHICH PLOTTING TO KILL GEN. ANASTASIO SOMOZA. TWO AGENTS ARE IDEN A AND IDEN B. THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL AND IDEN A REPORTED ON 11 FEB THAT AGUILUZ HAD INSTRUCTED IDEN B GO TO CUBA FOR SPECIAL TRAINING. IDEN B TO GO MEXICO CITY ON 12 FEB, TO REGISTER AT HOTEL CONGRESO, CALLE ALLENDE, AND -- ON FOLLOWING DAY HE TO GO CALLE FRANCISCO MARQUEZ NUMBER 160 (POR TACUBA) WHERE HE TO ASK FOR SEÑOR VEGA OR SEÑOR ROGELIO. WHEN ASKED BY VEGA OR ROGELIO "DE PARTE DE QUIEN", HE TO ANSWER "DE PARTE DE SENOR CANEIRAS" WHO HAD SENT HIM TO ARRANGE HIS PAPERS. AGUILUZ TOLD IDEN B, THAT IF HE UNABLE LOCATE EITHER VEGA OR ROGELIO, HE TO CALL TELEPHONE NUMBER 14-13-26 REPEAT 14-13-26. IDEN B ALSO TOLD THAT IF HE NEEDED SOMETHING (PRESUMABLY WHILE IN (CUBA) HE TO WRITE TO APARTADO 110, SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. HE WARNED, HOWEVER, TO WRITE NOTHING OF SIGNIFICANCE. AGUILUZ TOLD IDEN B HE WOULD BE GIVEN A COMMO SYSTEM IN MEXICO AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY, SO HE COULD LET IDEN A KNOW WHEN HE PLANNING TO RETURN. AGULUZ EXPLAINED THAT IDEN B WOULD RETURN FROM CUBA CLANDESTINELY BY SUBMARINE.

ALSO RCVD 1110

v 19598
Feb 64

MEXI 822
14 Feb 64

IN 19958
14 FEB 64

2. THIS OPERATION BEING RUN BY ERYTHROID/1 WHO NOT REPEAT NOT AWARE STATION BEING INFORMED BY ERYTHROID/3. STATION OBTAINING ADDITIONAL DETAILS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SOONEST.

3. FOR MEXI: E/3 REQUEST URGENT IDENTIFICATION REGISTRY OF MEXICO CITY TELEPHONE NUMBER 14-13-26. MUST HAVE REPLY BY MORNING 15 FEB IF E/3 TO BE ABLE ADVISE HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICO CITY. IDEN B TO MAKE CONTACT VEGA OR ROGELIO -- OR BY PHONE, BY 17 FEB AT LATEST.

SECRET

14 Feb 1964

14-00000

Vi

[redacted]

WH/SA 64-364
6 May 1964

ZX-1526

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3 Mexico

VIA: Chief, WH/PO/A (Mr. Horton)

SUBJECT: General: Debriefing Report # 59 of AMMUG-1
Specific: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665)

REFERENCE: OTTA 1611 dated 28 April 1964

1. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez is the Cuban Intelligence Officer (DGI) stationed in Mexico City. He uses the pseudonyms "Eduardo", "Casimiro", and "Jose Antonio".

2. RODRIGUEZ has the following physical description: age approximately 24 years old, 5'8" tall, husky build, blond hair and a reddish complexion.

Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/PO/A (Mr. Horton)
2 - WH/SA/CI (chrono)
1 - WH/SA/Esec

201-332665

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

CS COPY

201-332665

EXCERPTS

2 MAY 64

PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 3363 IN 74652

DYVOUR AMMUG

REF: A. DIR 18730

B. CTTA 1609 (IN 69508)

1. TRACES REF B ..... INCLUDE FOLL ONLY:

A. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA AND ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. FORWARDED IN PACY 3312. (IN 71483)

.....

D. ALEJANDRO GOMEZ MONTANO. HHT-827, 31 JULY 62, REPORTS ONE ALEJANDRO GOMEZ AS A CITIZEN OF HONDURAS INVOLVED IN COMMIE PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES TEGU. HZPA-11329, 9 JUNE 61 REPORTS ALEJANDRO GOMEZ AS NAME ON LIST CARRIED BY IUS DELEGATE.

E. RICARDO MARTINEZ. HZPA-13234, 9 MAY 63, REPORTED RICARDO AUGUSTO MARTINEZ AS SALVADORAN, PDOB SANTA ANA, SALV, 23 JUNE 36, OCCUPATION: BRICK MASON, RESIDENCE INDEPENDENCIA NO. 76, SANTA ANA, AS POSSIBLE TRAVELLER TO IRON CURTAIN COUNTRY MARCH 63.

.....

[illegible]

[illegible]

P-7575
P-6605

[illegible] 64

[illegible] brief him on his meetin[illegible] [illegible]-7

Text: to be [illegible]

1. Attached [illegible] self-explanatory list of comments b[illegible] primarily o[illegible] operational nature. [illegible] cabl[illegible] Hqs see if they [illegible] identify [illegible]CIO.

un ask for
a more complete name

1.- Rogelio Rodríguez, Tercer Secretario, salió el viernes 24 de [illegible] para Cuba. Se cree no regresará por el momento. P-7365

2.- Ovidio Samá, Cónsul [illegible], desapareció de la Embajada. [illegible] salió hacia Cuba o Veracruz. Se [illegible] precaucio- nes alrededor de [illegible]. Temen lo ataque[illegible] P-1649

3.- Se ha participado a la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de México, el nombramiento de un tal Villavicencio. Intervinieron en la redacción de la comunicación [illegible] Lectora Machad[illegible] y Peregrina [illegible]. El mencionado Villavicencio, vendrá a sustituir un funcionario (En el próximo informe se dará su nombre completo y el de la persona que reemplazará.)

4.- Ana Luisa Salinas, Auxiliar del Consulado en México, solicitó un aumento de sus haberes y se le negó. Comentaron que la tenían por pena en el cargo que [illegible] desempeña.

5.- Se recibió un cable del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba [illegible] de sus párrafos decía "Es mejor morir [illegible]ando, que ganar [illegible] pan sin honor"

sin!

6.- [illegible]mente se entablan grandes discusiones entre varios miembros del personal de la Embajada, por los vuelos de reconocimiento de los aviones americanos sobre Cuba. Tienen la certeza que Fidel actuará cuando sea necesario.

7.- Se está tratando de [illegible] con mas clarid[illegible] que [illegible] [illegible]ridio Interior.

8.- [illegible] [illegible]rso [illegible] Berta [illegible] [illegible] vida.

9.- Comprarán [illegible] [illegible] Cultural [illegible] México, [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible]

7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

INT · SS · SW
IOS · FEDS · CA
RPTS · LOG · SH
SI · BP · NS
SEC

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MERIDA

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, DC/WH/SA 5, VR

S E C R E T 292000Z

MEXI INFO DIR WAVE CITE MRID 0457

DESENSITIZED DYVOUR PBRUMEN

30 [illegible] IN 72650

REF MRID 0436 (IN [illegible]) *

1. ON 24 APRIL 64 LESNICK SAID:

A. REFERRED PARA 1 B AND GUTIERREZ COMMENT PARA 2 REF.

B. THIS INFO REFERRED TO ORESTES GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, MEMBER CUBEMB MEXI.

C. RUIZ COUSIN CIRA ANTONIA MUINO RODRIGUEZ, WIFE ANTONIO CARLOS VECIANA BLANCH, FUND RAISER FOR GUTIERREZ.

D. VECIANA WOULD APPROACH RUIZ MEXI ON REQUEST. NEEDS MEXI ENTRY VISA, US EXIT AND REENTRY PERMIT AND EXPENSES.

E. VECIANA SAID RUIZ WOULD PROBABLY NOT REPORT APPROACH TO CUBEMB MEXI.

F. NO FURTHER INFO ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. 201-332665

G. WOULD ADVISE ANY G-2 TARGETS GUTIERREZ MAY BE ABLE SUGGEST (PER WAVE SUGGESTION).

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

2. WAVE HAS INDEPENDENT CHANNEL TO VECIANA. TO AVOID FURTHER CONTACT WITH LESNICK AND GUTIVERREZ, MERTON ARRANGED HAVE LESNICK ADVISE VECIANA THAT SOMEONE MAY CONTACT HIM THIS MATTER "DE PARTE DE CARLITOS."*

3. QUICK CHECK WAVE FILES INDICATED:

A. ORESTES GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ COMMERCIAL COUNCELOR CUBEMB MEXI (AUG 63). GUILLERMO RUIZ, MILITIA MAN, MILITANT RED, CHIEF DEPT CONSTRUCTION EXPENSES STUDIES HACIENDA (UFG 1539, 8 SEP 62); G-2 PENETRATION OA/WORKED HACIENDA/FATHERCOMMIE AND CHIEF BARBERS UNION (HKHW-3506, 17 JUNE 60).

B. VECIANA HAD POA 29 JAN 62; BORN 18 OCT 28; PROFESSION ACCOUNTANT; VARIOUS CONNECTIONS WITH FNE, ALPHA 66, MRP AMBANG-1.

C. MUINO BORN 4 OCT 35 HAVA.

4. DEFER ANY FURTHER ACTION MEXI. COMMENT: SINCE MUINO IS RELATIVE INVOLVED, MIGHT BE DESIRABLE SHE AND HUSBAND MAKE ANY PITCH TOGETHER.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *PROVIDED INFO DATED 5 APR 64 RE ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, G-2 REP CUBEMB MEXI.

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST
NAME CHECK № 150557

DATE 29 April 64

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME Vivian A. Petrowski
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/SA/CI
ROOM, BUILDING GH 43
EXTENSION 6471

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN [illegible]ERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.
pseudo "Chele" - "Gordo"

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
unknown

4. CITIZENSHIP

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
2nd Secretary, Cuban Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Political Reporting Officer, Cuban Embassy Mexico

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☒ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☐ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 1-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

Reply Over:
dated: 18 May 64

TO: Vivien Petrowski

9 May 1964
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. ☒ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

EXCERPT

28 APRIL 64

DIR INFO PACY WAVE CITE MEXI 9201 IN 71640

INTEL JMGEN LIFIRE

SUPDATA SOURCE LIFIRE AIRLISTS. .....

1. TRAVEL DATA SHOWS THE FOLLOWING WENT TO HAVANA FROM MEXICO CITY BY AIR ON 25 APRIL 1964: ..... CUBANS: ROGELIO LOPEZ RODRIGUEZ [sic], DIP PP-D/63/454; .....

EXCERPT

MEXI 9201
IN 71640
28 APRIL 64

14-00000

EXCERPT

28 APRIL 64

PRIORITY OTTA DIR CITE MEXI 9137

IN 71516

DESENSITIZED

KAPOK DYVOUR ZRKNICK

REF A. OTTA 1609 (IN 69508)

B. OTTA 1611 (IN 69843)

C. DIR 17103

1. RE REF B: ALFREDO MIRABAL DIAZ AGE 40 CUBAN CONSUL ARRIVED MEXI 2 SEPT 63. REPORTEDLY DOES NOT KNOW HIS JOB AS CONSUL AND HELD IN CONTEMPT BY HIS STAFF FOR INCOMPETENCE. KNOWS JUAN REJANO AND HAD ONE KNOWN SOCIAL CONTACT OCT 63 WITH PAVEL YATSKOV SOVIET CONSUL MEXI.

2. MANUEL VEGA PEREZ THIRD SECY KNOWN CUBAN IS RETURNED TO MEXI 16 APRIL 64 TO REPLACE ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ FOR UNSPECIFIED TIME.

3. NO TRACES NOEL GUERRERO SINCE NOV 62 WHEN HE REPORTEDLY IN CUBA.

4. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ KNOWN CUBAN IS LEFT FOR CUBA 25 APRIL APPARENTLY PCS. HAD NUMEROUS CONTACTS MEXI WHICH REFLECTED IN TARGET STUDY NOW IN PROCESS. WILL FORWARD.

5. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA CONTACT OF LICOOKY-1 AUG 62, WENT TO CUBA FOR 26 JULY CELEBRATION 62. JAN 64 ENTERED MEXI ILLEGALLY FROM GUAT WITH NO DOCUMENTATION.

6. NO INFO VICTOR OR LAURA. ALL SIGNIFICANT INFO THELMA KING, JORGE TURNER MORALES AND BROTHER DAVID TURNER MORALES PREVIOUSLY FORWARDED HQS.

7. NO TRACES SUBJ REF A.

8. FYI: CHECK FLIGHTLISTS 24 AND 25 APRIL FAIL SHOW CUBA TRAVEL ANY SUBJECTS REFS.

.....

EXCERPT

MEXI 9137
IN 71516
28 APRIL 64

14-00000

/

ACTION:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE: 28APR64

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
RRRRRRRRRRRR	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	LFK	272330Z	9620

DIR OTTA INFO WAVE MEXI SJOS PACY CITE MANA 4847

KAPOK DYVOUR ZRKNICK
REF A DIR 17103 (IN 9616)
B OTTA 1611 (IN 9609)
C OTTA 1609 (IN 9590)

1. STATION FILES CONTAIN REFERENCES TO FOLLOWING PERSONS REFS B AND C:

A. 'ROGELIO' (REF C PARA 1-3): PROBABLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SEC CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. IDEN B OF MANA 4717, AGENT OF NIC SERVICE WHO SENT CUBA VIA MEXI, WAS INSTRUCTED CONTACT ROGELIO BY MARCIAL AGUILUZ (SEE MANA 4716). IDEN B IN CONTACT WITH RODRIGUEZ, WHO USED ALLIAS JCHELE' WITH IDEN B, FROM 14 FEB 64 TO 10 MARCH WHEN IDEN B LEFT FOR CUBA. FROM OTHER TRAFFIC RE THIS CASE, INCLUDING HMMA-3063, HMMA-3032, AND MEXI 8228, APPEARS OBVIOUS INVOLVED INTEL ACTIVITIES MEXI.

B. MANUEL VEGA (REF C PARA 1-E): IDEN B, ABOVE, ALSO GIVEN NAME 'VEGA' AS CONTACT AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXI (MANA 4716). IDEN B UNABLE CONTACT 'VEGA' AND MEXI 8228 REPORTED HE PROBABLY MANUEL VEGA PEREZ WHO NO LONGER MEXI.

C. NOEL GUERRERO (REF B PARA 6-D): UNDOUBTEDLY NOEL GUERRERO SANTIAGO (201-301519), BORN 12 APRIL 1914 AT LEON, NICARAGUA. GUERRERO LONG-TIME NIC COMMUNIST WHO HAS ALSO BEEN MEMBER MEXICAN COMMIE PARTY AND HAS BEEN INVOLVED COMMIE ACTIVITIES SEVERUL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. WAS ACTIVE IN FOUNDING CASTRO/COMMIE NIC EXILE ORGANIZATIONS IN CUBA. IN LATE 62 AND EARLY 63 HE LEADER OF FCENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FLN - COMMIE-DOMINATED AND CUBAN-DIRECTED NIC GROUP) WHICH IN TRUINING IN HONDURAS, AND IN LATE JULY 63 LED GROUP FROM HONDURAS INTO NICARAGUA. HMM-367, WHICH REPORTED ACTIVITIES THIS GROUP IN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA, REPORTED THAT GUERRERO AND FOUR OTHER MEMBERS FLN LEFT NICARAGUA (LEAVING MAIN GROUP BEHIND) IN EARLY AUGUST AND RETURNED TO HONDURAS, REACHING TEGUCIGALPA SOMETIME IN LATE AUGUST. IN FLN, GUERRERO USED PSEUDONYM -- 'EL PATRIARCA'. MOST RECENT INFO AVAILABLE STATION WAS SJOS 6390, 18 NOV 63, WHICH REPORTED HE IN CUBA.

2. STATION HAS NO INFO THELMA KING OR RAMIRO VALDEZ WHICH NOT AVAILABLE HQS AND OTHER STATIONS.

END...

[illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

P-7365

SECRET

P

28 April 1964

Memo to the files

Cuban Lienvoy—Voice identifications

1. P-579 Bulky contains a reel section from M-11 L-36, 9 April 1964, containing conversation at RT 34, between Ricardo (lnu) and Rogelio Rodrigues. It was thought Ricardo mai be the post-box serviceman used by the opposition in the Amrod op.

This speaker seems to be a Mexican

TGURquhart

1365

~~Dave~~
~~Pat~~
~~Lorna~~ lm
Trudi

P-7575
P-6605

to other P files

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ~~FILE~~

27 April 1964

Meeting with LITAMIL-3 to Debrief his meeting with L-7

Next Meeting: 30 April

1. Attached is self-explanatory report from LITAMIL-7. Full of little goodies, all of operational nature.

Floyd N. AIMONET

1.- Manuel Vega será acreditado como Tercer Secretario y viene a sustituir temporalmente al Tercer Secretario Rogalio Rodríguez. Sus funciones en la Embajada:- Preparar valijas, Recibir autoridades y personajes cubanos. No se sabe que tiempo durará sus funciones en México. P-7921

✓ 2.- Rogelio Rodríguez, Tercer Secretario, saldrá para La Habana y según dice permanecerá en dicho lugar más o menos unas cuatro semanas. P-7365

3.- El correo Almara, que regresó del Canadá, dice que el Embajador Américo Cruz, se encuentra en Cuba.

4.- Ovidio Samá, Cónsul en Veracuz, se encuentra aquí en México. No le da importancia al suceso de Veracuz. Está muy seguro que nada le sucederá. Se cree que mañana jueves regresará a Veracruz. P-8649

5.- El nombramiento de Gorotiaza, causó muy buena impresión en la Embajada.

6.- Teresa Proenza, tiene ordenes de visitar lo menos que pueda a la Embajada. No se sabe cuando saldrá hacia Cuba. P-3696

7.- Berta Pino, tiene a su cuidado el Registro de las Visas.

8.- En el Hall de la Embajada, casi diariamente se reune todo el personal de la Embajada para discutir el asunto del Brasil y lo de la Base de Guantanamo.

9.- El mesero Pereira, insiste en hablar con el amigo.

10.- Han enviado a las Embajadas amigas y no amigas copias de "Mimiografos" de las declaraciones de Fidel sobre el problema del Brasil.

P-7365

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

DATE: 27APR64

INFO:

FILE:

S E C R E T

CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
RRRRRRRRRRR	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS LFK	261755Z	9606

TO PRIORITY OTTA INFO DIR MEXI SALV TEGU T SJOS GUATWAVE 5662

NUMBER

TYPIC
REF OTTA 1609 (IN 9590)

WAVE TRACES SUBJS REF FOLL:

1. IBRAHIM (VILA) ABREU: GENERAL MANAGER PRAGUE OFFICE CUBANA AIRLINES (DBA-4761, 19 JUL 63).

2. JULIO (DAMASO) VASQUEZ:

A. LISTED AS MBR CUBAN INVASION FORCE WHICH LANDED PANAMA 25 APR 59: AGE 23; FORMER MEDICAL STADENT AND VETERAN SIERRA MORENO FIGHTING CUBA. (HZP-3054 1 JUNE 59).

B. CIRCA 62 RPTD AS LT IN DSE SECURITY DETAIL MINAS DE MOA, BARACOA, ORIENTE PROV. CLOSE FRIEND RAMON (VAZQUEZ) MONTENEGRO KNOWN CIS OFFICER (AMKARN/1 22 DEC 62).

C. NO TRACE "SERGIO".

3. "CHAIN": PROBABLY IDENT CARLOS SIXTO (CHAIN) SOLER 201-349576, 1ST SEC CUBAN DELEGATION TO OAS WASH DC NOV 61 TO FEB 62. REPORTED MBR MINISTRY INTERIOR WITH RANK CAPTAIN LATE 62 (UFGA 7246 23 JAN 63). WAS NATL COORDINATOR 26 JULY MOV ORIENTE PROVINCE CIRCA 58 AND USED PSEUDO GUSTAVO (TDCS 3/370,313 15 SEP 58).

4. ROGELIO LNU: POSSIBLY IDENT WITH ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ 201-332665 2ND SEC CUBAN EMB MEXI SINCE MID 63. AND IDENTIFIED AS INTEL OFFICER BY AGENTS NICARAGUAN SERVICE. USES PSEUDOS CHELE AND GORRIN WITH INTEL CONTACTS MEXI (HMMA 3033 10 MAR 64).

5. FNU SOSA: POSS IDEN WITH PABLO ARMANDO (SOSA) RAMIREZ DPOB 3 AUG 34. HONDURAN WHO TRAVELED CUBA TO CSR MAY 63 PP 23485 (DST 10599).

6. ROQUE (DALTON) GARCIA: SUBJ 201-215097 DPOB 14 MAY 35 SAN SALVADOR. HEAD OF SALV DELEGATION TO CSR MAR 61. (HSS-1071 9 JAN 61). LATER WORKED AS WRITER IN LA SECTION RADIO HAVA (DBA 11609 14 JUNE 62). UNDER PSEUDO JUAN MONTENEGRO POSS IDENT WITH JUAN (MONTENEGRO) GUASPO CUBAN PP 453 TRAVELLED CUBA TO CSR JAN 63 (OCOA 6422).

7. ALEJANDRO (GOMEZ) MONTANO: HIS PSEUDO RAMON (SEONE) SOLIS LISTED AS CUBAN WHO TRAVELLED CUBA TO CSR SEP 63 PP 14269 (OCOA 7001).

8. NO WAVE TRACES OTHERS.

END...

270019Z

S E C R E T

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

P. 7365

EXCERPT

IN 71483

PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 3312

INFO DYVOUR ZRWICK

DESENSITIZED

REF: DIR 17103

.....

6. ROGELIO NO DOUBT IS ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ PER PARA 1, MANA 4847. HYSAGE-1 CONTACTED ROGELIO BY PHONE AT CUBAN EMB ON 8 FEB 64 DURING HER VISIT MEXI, MAY HAVE SEEN HIM DURING CALL AT EMB ON 16 FEB 64 (MEXI 8171).

.....

EXCERPT

PACY 3312
IN 71483
28 APRIL 64

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

TRAVEL

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

SUBJECT Travel Between Mexico and Cuba

REPORT NO. CS -3/579,744

DATE DISTR. 28 April 1964

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES D-ACQ-02389

DATE OF INFO. 20 April 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City 21 April 1964

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-8892

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Persons (B) with good access to travel information. Appraisal of Content: 2.

Travel data show that the following went to Habana from Mexico City by air on 20 April 1964: Cubans: Miguel Angel de Cardenas, PP 26946; Mireya Vilaseca, Dip PP D/64/142; Josefina Gonzalez, Dip PP D/64/141; Jorge Amezqueta, PP E/64/82; Mario Gonzalez, PP E/63/856; Osvaldo Flores, PP 03107; Fabio Ruiz, PP 03104; Esther Gavilan Rosales, Dip PP D/63/445; Manuel Calvo Rodriguez, PP 2/1001; Mexican: Luisa Rodriguez Urbina, PP 729.

5
4
3
2
1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

STATE #	DIA	ARMY #	NAVY #	AIR #	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI # 3
REPCINCLANT		CINCSO #						I&NS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

[illegible]

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 14-13-26.-
27 abril 64.-
K30-L31.-
1726-2118hs.-

01-25.- Salidas solicitando taxi.-

25.- Salida al 464324.- 1731hs.- Jorrín con MF pregunta por el precio de suscripción a la revista Siempre por un año y por seis meses.- MF que 144 y 72 pesos respectivamente.- 30.

32.- Entrada a las 1750hs.- Dolores de la Mora por Fernández Roa le dice que acaba de llegar.- Enfermedad del niño de Roa.- Roa: que cuando vuelve.- Lola que para el viernes.- Roa que ahora sí se ven.- Lola: que el diez de mayo se va con su mamá a Puerto Vallarta para pasarlo allá con la familia.- Quedan de llamarse mañana para ponerse de acuerdo cuando se ven.- 79.-

P. 8128

82.- Entrada a las 1834hs.- Tovar por Rogelio.- Jorrín que Rogelio no regresa hasta dentro de quince días.--- 86.-

P. 7365

97.- Salida al 230792.- 1840hs.- Roa con Victor Rico Galán le dice que lo espera que va a pasar con el.- Victor de acuerdo.--- 105.-

P. 9554

106.- Entrada a las 1852hs.- Enrique Luengo por García Lara.- Jorrín que no está.- Luengo que repite la llamada.--- 114.

P 7557

115.- Entrada a las 1856hs.- MF por Minsal.- Jorrín que no está.- MF que llame a Rogelio Castillo.--- 120.-

121.- Salida al 216822.- 1859hs.- Minsal con Castillo.- Castillo que que ha habido de nuevo.- Minsal que nada nuevo que solo la conversación y que ahora un cable que tiene sobre la mesa contestándole la conversación que dice que sobre el cable que el vapor cargará [illegible] Coatzacoalcos [illegible] tes y el ajo y que [illegible] hasta completar su cúbico, que han calcula[illegible]

[illegible]

P-7365

14-00000

E X C E R P T

26 APRIL 64

DIR GUAT MEXI WAVE SALV TEGU CITE OTTA 1612 IN 69876

DESENSITIZED

[illegible] TYPIC KUDESK JMGIN

AMMUG-1

1. RODRIGUEZ GAVE FOLLOWING INFO ON PERSONS TRAINED IN CUBA USUALLY FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND IN SOME CASES FOR WORK AS CUBAN INTEL AGENTS ABROAD. .....

.....

3. SALVADORANS:

.....

G. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA, BORN CIRCA 36 IN EL SALVADOR, ... FILE AND SOURCE EXPLANATION MAKE IT APPEAR DALTON IS NOW ASSIGNED PCS MEXI WHERE HE IS IN CONTACT WITH MAURICIO DE LA SELVA. MAURICIO REPORTS TO CUBAN INTEL OFFICER ROGELIO LNU IN MEXI. .....

.....

E X C E R P T

OTTA 1612
IN 69876

26 APRIL 64

EXCERPT

26 APRIL 64

DIR INFO WAVE FACY MEXI MANA CITE OTTA 1611 IN 69843

DESENSITIZED TYPIC KUDESK HYSAGE ZRKNICK

REF: DIR 17081 (NOT SENT MANA FACY)

.....

AMMUG-1

6. INFO FROM RODRIGUEZ RE CUBAN INTEL OPS MEXI:

.....

E. ROGELIO WHO IS CUBAN INTEL OFFICER MEXI HAS THREE PSEUDOS EDUARDO, CASIMIRO AND JOSE ANTONIO. What about "Chale" + [illegible] → ?

.....

G. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA, SALVADORAN WHOSE CUBAN INTEL PSEUDO IS JUAN MONTENEGRO IS IN MEXI NOW. SEE PARA 3 G OF REF A FOR DETAILS.

.....

EXCERPT

OTTA 1611
IN 69843
26 APRIL 64

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE: 25APR64

DEFERRED	PRIORITY		252249Z	9605
RRRRRRRRRRR	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	LYK		

TO IMMEDIATE OTTA

INFO WAVE MEXI SALV GUAT TEGU SJOS

CITE DIR 17021

ATTN: LANGOSCH
RYBAT TYPIC ZRKNICK
REF A OTTA 1602 (IN 9562)
B OTTA 1609 (IN 9590)

FOLLOWING ARE PRELIM TRACE RESULTS FROM ZRKNICK INDICES:
1. SAUL GONZALEZ (REF A, PARA 1, A) SUGGEST POSSIBLY IDEN
JORGE PUENTE BLANCO ALIAS RAUL GONZALEZ AKA "RAULIN", PANAMANIAN
SERVING CUBAN MINREX, WHO ALSO CONTACT HYSAGE-1. PUENTE IN HAVA
MAR 64, WAS ADDRESSEE COURIERED LETTER SENT BY HYSAGE-1 FOR DELIVERY
MANUEL PINEIRO LOSADA IN REPLY INSTRUCTIONS ENTER PANAMANIAN
SOCIALIST PARTY. (PACY-2952, 1 APR 64) PUENTE ALLEGEDLY ALSO INVOLVED
SUBERSION EFFORT LATIN AMERICA AND SCHEDULED BE SENT VENEZUELA
END 63, ALTHOUGH THIS MAY REFER HIS BROTHER JOSE MARIA (PUENTE)
BLANCO, WHO NOW CARA.
2. ROGELIO (LNU) CUBAN IS OFFICER MEXI, (REF A, PARA 1, E
AND REF B, PARA 1, C) UNDOUBTEDLY IDENTICAL ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ)
LOPEZ, SECOND SECY CUBAN EMB MEXI, IDENTIFIED CUBAN INTEL OFFICER,
WHO CONTACTED BY MELVA (GARCIA) ARIAS, HYSAGE-1'S FRIEND AND
COMMUNICATOR ON 14 MAR 64. (MEXI-3709,). ALSO CONTACTED BY
HYSAGE-1 DIRECTLY ON FEB 64 TRIP MEXI. (MEXI-8357, HMMA-22957,
24 FEB 64; MEXI-8171, 11 FEB 64; MEXI-8226, MEXI-8228, 14 FEB 64).
3. JUAN (LNU), SOVIET INTEL ADVISER IN DCI, (REF A, PARA 1,
H AND REF B, PARA 1, A) APPARENTLY IDENTICAL WITH JUAN (LNU)
SOVIET INTEL OFFICER WHO TRAINED HYSAGE-1 IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AND
S/W. WEIGHT AND HEIGHT GENERALLY FIT.
4. NO TRACES IBRAHIM VIALLA, JULIO (DAMASO) VASQUEZ ALIAS
SERGIO, MENTIONED REF B, PARA 1, C.
5. (FNU) SOSA OF REF B, PARA 1, D, POSSIBLY REFERS MARCO
ANTONIO (YON) SOSA AKA "EL CHINO" ALIAS "MAX", GUATEMALAN, LEADER
13 NOV 60 REVOLT, DIRECTOR GUAT GUERRILLAS, AND IDENTIFIED IN
ZRKNICK. (CSDB-3/655,554, 18 JULY 63; HMMW-12110, 15 NOV 63;
GUAT-3537, 18 NOV 63; HGGA-7035, 13SEPT 63; DIR/WRETN 20 AUG 63.)
6. (FNU) CHAIN ALIAS AGUSTO (OR AGUSTO), OFFICIAL MINREX,
OF REF B, PARA 1, C, PROBABLY IDENTICAL CARLOS (CHAIN) SOLER, WHO
WAS CUBAN INTEL OFFICER IN CUBAN DELEGATION TO OAS, WASH., D.C. 1961-
1962. DOB CA 1933, DESCRIBED: HT 65 INCHES; WT CA 130 LBS; SLIM
BUILD; BLACK HAIR. (UFGA-7246, 18 JAN 63.) POSSIBLY IMPLICATED
BOLIVIAN ASPECTS ZRKNICK.
CONT::::::

P-7365

FORM 1303
11-57

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE:

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY		INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		

CITE

PAGE TWO DIR 17081 (IN 9605)

7. ROQUE (DALTON) GARCIA ALIAS JUAN MONTENEGRO, ARMANDO
CABRERA, ETC. OF REF B, PARA 1, D, NO ZRKNICK TRACES. HOWEVER
HE REPORTED OCOA-5475, 23 AUG 62 AS MEMBER SALVADORAN CP, EMPLOYEE
RADIO HAVA, WRITER LATIN AMERICAN SECTION. ALSO REPORTED
REVOLUCION REPEAT REVOLUCION, 19 MAR 63, AS PARTICIPANT LECTURE
SERIES AT CASA DE LAS AMERICAS ON L.A. MYTHOLOGY.
8. OTHERS MENTIONED REF B, PARA 1, D: NO TRACES ON RAFAEL
(ACEVEDO) BLANCO, JOSE LEMBERTO (CARRILLO) CALDERON ALIAS MARCOS A.
(VARGAS) SALGUERO, ETC, ALEJANDRO (GOMEZ) MONTANO ALIAS JOSE
RAFAEL (SARADIA) ALIAS RAMON (SEONE) SOLIS, ALIAS RICARDO MARTINEZ.
9. NO TRACES PEDRO (LNU) OF REF B, PARA 1, E.
10. RE MANUEL ANTONIO (CALERO), SALVADORAN OF REF B, PARA 1, F,
NO ZRANICK TRACES UNDER TRUE NAME. ONE (FNU) AYALLA AND ONE
(FNU) RAMIREZ PER CARDED INFO IMPLICATED JUDITH FERRETO ACTIVITES
MEXI. UNKNOWN IF THIS REFERS CALERO UNDER ALIAS.
L
XEND...

261425Z

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 25 APR 64

FILE:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED PPPPPPPPP	PRIORITY	INITIALS PWO	DTG 251410Z	INCOMING NUMBER 9590
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO INFO CITE OTTA 1509

PRIORITY DIR WAVE MEXI SALV
TEGU SJOS GUAT
TYPIC KUDESK
REF OTTA 1508(NOT SENT TEGU SJOS)(IN 9563)
1. FOLLOWING INFO IS FROM REF RODRIGUEZ, DEFECTED CUBAN IS STAFFER
NOW BEING DEBRIEFED OTTA.
A. INTEL ADVISERS WITHIN DCI ARE SOVS AND NOT FROM SATELLITES.
B. PEOPOSE FROM WH AREA WHO GO CUBA FOR TRAINING, INCLUDING
GUERRILLA TYPE, RETURN THEIR COUNTRIES VIA PRAGUE AND ON DEPARTING
CUBA CARRY TWO PASSPORTS. ONE WHICH IS CUBAN UNDER FALSE NAME IS
SURRENDERED TO CZR SECURITY SERVICE PRAGUE WHICH DOES NOT RETURN TO
CUBA. (COMMENT: AND POSSIBLY RETAINS FOR OWN USE) OTHER FROM ANY
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY UNDER SAME OR ANOTHER FALSE NAME IS USED FOR
ONWARD TRAVEL. CONTACT PLAN IS ARRANGED WITH CZR SECURITY FOR CUBAN
PASSPORT PICK UP BUT CZR SECURITY SERVICE HAS NO ROLE TO LEVY
REQUIREMENTS OR DO ANYTHING ELSE THEN TO RETRIEVE CUBAN PPT.
C. CUBAN INTEL STAFFERS INCLUDE IBRAHIM VIALLA IN PRAGUE;
MAN WHOSE TRUE NAME NOT KNOWN USING JULIO DAMASO VASQUEZ WHOSE
INTERNAL DCI PSEUDO IS SERGIO AND WHO HAS BEEN TRAINED FOR ASSIGNMENT
TO CENTRAL AMERICA IN PARACHUTING, SW CODES AND CIPHERS AND RADIO
BUT WHO UNTIL VERY RECENTLY STILL IN CUBA; MAN, WHOSE TRUE NAME NOT
KNOWN BUT WHO IS DEPUTY TO MANUEL PINIERO IN DCI AND WHO IS CALLED
CHAIN IN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND WHO IS KNOWN UNDER PSEUDO
OF AGUSTO IN DCI; AND ROGELIO LNU WHOSE DCI PSEUDOS ARE EDUARDO, JOSE P. 7365
ANTONIO AND CASIMIRO AND WHO IS ASSIGNED TO MEXI.
D. CUBAN INTEL AGENTS WHILE WORKING OUTSIDE CUBA INCLUDE: FNU
SOSA WHO IS HONDURAN CITIZEN TRAINED BY CUBAN DCI IN RADIO, CODES AND
CIPHERS AND SW AND WHO PROBABLY IN COSTA RICA NOW; ROQUE DALTON GARCIA
WITH SAME DCI TRAINING AS ABOVE WHO IS SALVADORAN NOW IS SALVADOR WHO
HAS USED PSEUDOS JUAN MONTENEGRO, ARMANDO CABRERA AND JOSE OLMIDIO
PRIETO MEDEROS AND WHOSE ACCOMODATION ADDRESS FOR SW IS RAFAEL CHAVEZ
[illegible] CALLE DELGADILLO 22, COLONIA SANTO TOMAS, ZONA 17, MEXICO
D.F.; JOSE REMBERTO CARRILLO CALDERON, SALVADORAN, WHO USES PSEUDO
MARCOS A. VARGAS SALGUERO, ~~REMBERTO CARRILLO CALDERON, SALVADORAN WHO~~
~~USES PSEUDO MARCOS A. VARGAS SALGUERO~~, JUAN CONTRERAS AND ANDRES
CAMILO VELASQUEZ (WHICH IS TRUE NAME OF SALVADORAN TRAINED IN CUBA
GUERRILLA WARFARE); ALEJANDRO GOMEZ MONTANO, SALVADORAN, NOW IN
[illegible] WHO USES PSEUDOS JOSE RAFAEL SARAVIA, RAMON SEONE SOLIS
AND RICARDO MARTINEZ (LAST TRUE NAME SALVADORAN TRAINED IN CUBA IN
GUERRILLA WARFARE).
(CONT'D ON PAGE TWO)

SECRET
INCOMING

P. 7365

(44)

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE:

FILE:

CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO INFO CITE

NUMBER

PAGE TWO OF OTTA 1609(IN 9590)

E. OTHER CASE OF SPECIAL INTEREST IS MALE MEMBER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE GUAT CP WHOSE TRUE NAME NOT KNOWN BUT WHO USES PSEUDO OF PEDRO AND WHO HAD GUERRILLA TRAINING IN CUBA ABOUT SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER 63.

F. ANOTHER CASE OF SPECIAL INTEREST IS MANUEL ANTONIO CALERO, SALVADORAN, NOW IN SALVADOR, WHO USES PSEUDOS MARIANO AYALA PENA, ARMANDO RAMIREZ, AND ALFONSO RAMIREZ CUETO WHO HAD REGULAR GUERRILLA TRAINING PLUS SPECIALIZED TRAINING IN GUN RUNNING AND EXFILTRATION, WHO WORKS PRINCIPALLY IN SALVADOR BUT ALSO IN OTHER COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO.

2. RODRIGUEZ PRODUCES VARIOUS DOCS TO SUBSTANTIATE PARA ONE INFO AND ALSO ON OTHER PERSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA WHO HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN CUBA IN GUERRILLA WARFARE BUT WHO ARE NOT CONSIDERED AGENTS BECAUSE THEY HAVE NEITHER COMMO SYSTEM NOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

3. REQUEST ALL ADDRESSEES CABLE TRACES ON ABOVE TO HQS AND OTTA, TOGETHER WITH ESTIMATE OF ABILITY TO CONTROL MOVEMENTS AND COMMO AND ACCOMODATION ADDRESSES BOTH UNILATERALLY AND THROUGH LIAISON. REQUEST HQS CHECK ZRKNICK INDICES AND CABLE ANY THING PERTINENT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

FORM 1303
11-57

40

DISTR:
ACTION:
INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 24 APRIL 64

FILE:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

		INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
DEFERRED	PRIORITY		1 241510Z	9563
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO INFO CITE OTTA [illegible] NUMBER

PRIORITY DIR INFO WAVE MEXI SALV GUAT PACY MANA SNTO PRIN [illegible]
ROME

REF OTTA 1595 (NOT SENT INFO ADDRESSEES). 2

1. DEFECTED CUBAN INTEL OFFICER VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAHERE GIVEN PRELIMINARY DEBRIEFING BY LANGOSCH NIGHT 23 APRIL. FOLLOWING FROM RODRIGUEZ INDICATES SCOPE HIS KNOWLEDGE:

A. BACKGROUND: 11 YEARS FORMAL SCHOOLING. IN 1957 ENGAGED IN SAB AND PROP ACTIVITIES AGAINST BATISTA ON BEHALF 26 JULY MOVEMENT. [illegible] JULY 57. PRISONER UNTIL FEB 58. ON RELEASE JOINED COLUMN [illegible] OF [illegible] MATOS IN SIERRA MAESTRA. FOUGHT AS PRIVATE UNDER CAPTAIN [illegible] UNTIL BATISTA FELL. THEN MADE LIEUTENANT AND ASSIGNED TO [illegible] SQUAD IN HABANA INVESTIGATION DEPT TO CONTROL GAMBLING ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE CABARETS. END 59 BECAME DEPUTY CHIEF POLICE PRECINCT 1[illegible]. JAN 61 WAS ASSIGNED NATIONAL POLICE HQS ON STAND-BY [illegible]. COLLECTED PAY BUT HAD NO ASSIGNED DUTIES UNTIL TRANSFER TO [illegible] BATTALION. SEPT 61 SENT TO STUDY AT CASTILLO DEL MORO. [illegible]ED STUDENT UNTIL DECEMBER 61 WHEN GIVEN HOLIDAY LEAVE. HE [illegible]ITTED RESIGNATION FROM ARMY IN WHICH HELD RANK FIRST LIEUTENANT [illegible] HOLDING ABOVE JOBS. HE DID NOT REPORT BACK TO DUTY [illegible] WAS [illegible]ICIZED AS DESERTER. THIS MADE REEMPLOYMENT DIFFICUT [illegible] GOT JOB [illegible] MINISTRY OF EXTERIOR COMMERCE 3 APRIL 62 WORKING IN PLANNING AND [illegible]TICAL SECTION OF DEPARTMENT CONCERNED WITH AUTOMOBILE IMPORTS. [illegible]UST 63 GOT JOB IN INTEL THROUGH FRIENDSHIP WITH SAUL GONZALES, CHIEF OR DEPUTY CHIEF OF ILLEGAL SECTION B OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE. THIS SECTION TRAINS AGENTS FOR ASSIGNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

B. INTEL ASSOCIATION: RODRIGUEZ FROM AUGUST 63 UNTIL DEFECTION [illegible] IN SECTION M OF DIRECCION GENERAL DE INTELIGENCIA WHERE [illegible] DESK OFFICER FOR SALVADORAN OPS. HE SUPERVISED ARRANGEMENTS [illegible] SALVADORANS PICKED BY CP SALV TO CUBA FOR GUERRILLA [illegible]ING AND THEN SELECTING THOSE WITH APTITUTE AS AGENTS WHO WOULD [illegible]NED AND RETURNED TO WORK WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF CP. INCIDENTALLY [illegible] BECAME FAMILIAR WITH AGENTS PICKED FOR OPS IN OTHER [illegible]S. TO [illegible] OPS.

C. DIRECCION GENERAL DE INTELLIGENCIA (DGI) IS HEADED BY [illegible] PINEIRO AND COLLECTS INTEL ABROAD. COMPLETELY SEPARATE FROM [illegible] DE SECURIDAD DEL ESTADO (DSE) WHICH HEADED BY ABRA[illegible] [illegible] AND CONDUCTS COUNTERINTEL OPS. BOTH REPORT TO RAMIRO VALDES WHO IS MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND SUPREME CHIEF OF INTEL AND SECURITY. DGI HQS [illegible] WHERE THEY OCCUPY FULL BLOCK SURROUNDED BY 4[illegible], 51, 7[illegible] [illegible] STREETS. DSE HQS ARE IN OLD VILLA BATISTA ON CALLE SAN MIGUEL.

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

P-7365

(44)

FORM 1303
11-57

DISTR:
ACTION:
INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

DATE:
FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO
INFO
CITE
NUMBER

PAGE TWO OTTA 6102

D. RODRIGUEZ KNOWS AGENTS ASSIGNED AS FOLLOWS: 2 IN GUAT, HOND, 2 PACY, 3 SALV, 3 MEXI, 1 NICARAGUA (NOW IN CUBA), 2 SANTO DOMINGO, 1 HAITI (NOW IN CUBA).

E. CUBAN INTEL STAFFERS INCLUDE: ALFREDO MIRABAL WHO CHIEF IN MEXI UNTIL 15 APRIL 64 WHEN WAS TO BE REPLACED BY MANUEL VEGA; TWO OTHERS THERE ARE ROGELIO AND COMMERCIAL ATTACHE; ROBERTO MORO IN ROME WHERE COVER IS FIRST SECRETARY EMB.

F. COMMO BETWEEN DCI AND AGENTS ABROAD: ACCOMODATION ADDRESSES AND SW ARE USED NORMALLY. SW HAS CAUSED PROBLEMS BECAUSE DEVELOPERS DO NOT WORK AT TIME. TWO WAY RADIO ALSO USED BUT OFTEN IS FOR EMERGENCY TRAFFIC.

G. RODRIGUEZ BROUGHT OUT DOCS WHICH HE HOARDED OVER PERIOD TIME TO PROVE HE TELLING TRUTH. THESE ARE NOT FOR DELIVERY TO AGENTS. THEY INCLUDE LEGITIMATE PASSPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OBTAINED FOR USE IN CUBAN INTEL OPS, CUBAN PASSPORTS ISSUED IN FALSE NAMES, LEGITIMATE IDENTITY DOCS AND PHOTOS OF SALVADORANS WHO TRAINED IN CUBA, DCI OPS FILES, FINANCIAL REPORT ON FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL IN NICARAGUA, AND PHOTO COPIES OF DOCS RELATED TO INTEL OPS AND INTERCALATIONS USED IN ENCIPHERING.

H. THERE ARE FIVE SOV BLOC INTEL ADVISERS IN DCI ONE CALLED [illegible] IS SIX FEET TALL, 200 POUNDS WITH GRAY HAIR AND GRAY MUSTACHE.

4. VIEW ABOVE, ALICE N. HADFELLI NOT NEEDED AND WILL RETURN SOONEST. LANGOSCH WILL CONTINUE DEBRIEFING. STATION WILL TRY ARRANGE FOR RODRIGUEZ PROCEED TO U.S. AND BELIEVES LOCAL AUTHORITIES WILLING PERMIT HIM DO SO. RODRIGUEZ EAGER GO U.S. AND COOPERATE.

5. RECOMMEND HQS ARRANGE ENTRANCE UNDER SPECIAL PROCEDURE AS MAXIMUM VALUE CAN BE OBTAINED IF RODRIGUEZ DEBRIEFED SOONEST WHERE REFERENCE CAN BE MADE TO FILES. IF THIS CAN BE DONE IN MATTER DAYS, LCFLUTTER CAN BE GIVEN IN HQS AREA. ADVISE SOONEST ARRANGEMENTS WITH INS. MEANWHILE WILL HAVE RODRIGUEZ APPLY FOR IMMIGRANT VISA AS ALTERNATIVE IF HQS CAN EXPEDITE APPROVAL.

6. WILL CABLE SIGNIFICANT INFO AS DEVELOPS.

[illegible]2340Z

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MERIDA

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CCS 3, WH/SA 8, VR

23 ... IN 63182

S E C R E T 231715Z

MEXI INFO WAVE DIR CITE MRID [illegible]654

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF A. MEXI [illegible] (IN 63189)

B. DIR [illegible]

MERTON ETA MIAMI 24[illegible] FROM MRID BY PAA 5[illegible]. NO NEED MEET.

RETURN MRID ETA 27[illegible]415Z BY PAA 452.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *AUTHORIZED MERTON'S TRAVEL JMWAVE.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

13 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

9

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DOP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/D 4, WH/SA 8, VR

S E C R E T 231611Z

23 Apr 64 IN 67848

PRIORITY MRID INFO DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 9125

PBRUMEN

REF MEXI 8992 (IN 59445)*

SUBJECT OF REF LEAVING MEXI FOR HABANA 24 APRIL APPARENTLY PCS HENCE MERTON MIAMI TRIP NOT REQUIRED AT THIS TIME.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * SUBJECT IS TOP PRIORITY MEXI TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT (OTHER IS CODE CLERK).

201-332665

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

21 April 1964

895.- Entrada a las 1723hs.- Larga Distancia de Canada.- HF
Márquez con Raul Pereyra le dice que SALGADO llega esta noche
en vuelo de Canadian Pacific [illegible], que es el vuelo de sale de
Toronto a las 8.05 de la noche.---- Raul le dice a HF Acosta
que Rogelio se va definitivamente para la Habana el siete.---
Acosta manda saludos para todos los de la embajada.--- Raul -
que Manolo el guajiro que pasó para Chile con Sinobas y Arman
do López.---- Raul que le escribe en esta semana.--- Raul: que
el chino Curvelo pasó para Bolivia.---- 980.-

7365
56 31

23 April 64

25.- Entrada a las 1135hs.- HF por Rogelio Rodríguez López.-
Peregrina que un momento.--- HF que habla el hermano de Jacinto que si por fin se va mañana.- Rogelio que no que sale el lunes, pero que de todas maneras que si tiene la cuestión pues.. HF que le gustaría mandarle algunas cositas pero que pocas para que no cargue mucho y una carta.- Rogelio de acuerdo, que puede pasar a dejarselas hoy o mañana por la mañana.- HF de acuerdo.--- 38.-

7365

18:27 ~~ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ ma~~nifiesta a JORGE ROJAS de la Cubana de Aviacion que no se va mañana a La Habana, sino hasta el lunes. (ROJAS toma nota).

(7365) (6243)

Nombre (s)	Edad	Nacionalidad	Pasaporte
VILASECA GONZALEZ MIREYA.	28 AÑOS.	CUBANA.	DIP. #D/64/142
GONZALEZ GRANDE JOSEFINA.	51 AÑOS.	CUBANA.	DIP. #D/64/141
AMEZQUETA RODRIGUEZ JORGE.	24 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	ESP. #E/64/82
GONZALEZ GARCIA MARCO JOAQUIN.	44 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	ESP. #E/64/85
GAVILAN ROSALES ESTHER.	27 AÑOS.	CUBANA.	DIP. #D/63/455

Llegada **Aerolinea**

Salida	Aerolinea	Punto de desembarque
20 DE ABRIL DE 1964	CUBANA. VUELO # 465	LA HABANA CUBA.

Visa Mexicana expedida en:

VILASECA GONZALEZ MIREYA. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 225 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 23 DE MARZO DE 1964.

GONZALEZ GRANDE JOSEFINA. VISA DIPLOMATICA / 224 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LAHABANA CUBA EL 23 DE MARZO DE 1964.

AMEZQUETA RODRIGUEZ JORGE. VISA OFICIAL # 236 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 25 DE MARZO DE 1964.

GONZALEZ GARCIA MARCO. VISAOFICIAL # 235 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 25 DE MARZO DE 1964.

GAVILAN ROSALES ESTHER. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 1015 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 18 DE OCTUBRE DE 1963.

P-7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH/SA 8, VR

18 Apr 64 IN 64200

SECRET 172253Z

MEXI INFO DIR MRID CITE WAVE 5263

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF MEXI 9044 (IN 63189) *

CONCUR MERTON TRAVEL WAVE.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *STATED MEXI AGREES MERTON TRIP TO MIAMI TO CONFER WITH LESNICK AND GUTEIRREZ, DEFER FOR APPROVAL TO WAVE.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
[illegible]

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG: R. [illegible]
UNIT: WH/[illegible]
EXT: 5940
DATE: 17 Apr 1 64

SECRET

TO : MEXICO CITY INFO MERIDA

17 APR 64 20 53z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-8

INFO: DDP, WH/SA-8, CI/OA, CCS-3

SIG CEN

R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO MRID CITE DIR 15160

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXI 9044 (IN 63189)*

AUTHORIZE MERTON TRAVEL JMWAVE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: COB Merida wishes travel JMWAVE to confer with Lesnick re RODRIGUEZ, G-2 officer, high priority recruitment lead Mexi.

WH/SA/MOB S. Darling (phone)

WH/SA/CI N. Prew (phone)

R.W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

01

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH/SA 8, VR

S E C R E T 170018Z

WAVE DIR INFO MRID CITE MEXI 9344(EASBY ACTING)

16Apr64 IN 63189

PERUMEN

REF MRID 0441(IN 62330)*

MEXI AGREES MERTON QUICK TRIP MIAMI TO CONFER WITH LESNICK AND GUTIERREZ. DEFER TO WAVE FOR APPROVAL IDEA AND DIR FOR AUTHORIZATION TRAVEL.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *VIEW PAST EXPERIENCE WITH LESNICK AND GUTIERREZ, BASE BELIEVES ADVISABLE MERTON MAKE WEEK-END TRIP MIAMI DEAL WITH THEM PERSONALLY.

W 5263
18 Apr 64

[illegible] 15760
17 April 64

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MERIDAN

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH/SA 8, VR

SECRET 152155Z

16 APR 64 IN 62330

MEXI INFO DIR WAVE CITE MRID 0441

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF A MERTON-CHOADEN TELCON 15 APRIL

B. MEXI 8982 (IN 59445)

C. WAVE 5073 (IN 61087)

MERI 9044
16 April 64

1. CONFIRMING TELCON REF A, LESNICK SAID ON 13 APRIL WOULD TRY SOONEST FURNISH MERTON INFO REQUESTED REF B.

2. REF C, VIEW PAST EXPERIENCE WITH LESNICK AND GUTIERREZ, BASE BELIEVES ADVISABLE MERTON MAKE WEEKEND TRIP MIAMI DEAL WITH THEM PERSONALLY: COULD LEAVE APPROPRIATE WAVE OFFICER IN CONTACT. COULD ALSO TAKE ADVANTAGE TRIP TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE UNTAPPED ASSETS PBRUMEN WITH LITAU-6 AND GET QUICK REFRESHER WAVE OPS FROM BASE POINT OF VIEW. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

(1-DD)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

del embajador y tendrá el gusto de asistir.- 116.-

116. Entrada 1057.- MF de la Oficina Sanitaria pregunta por el Dr.NIKITA MUKUCHEV y MIRAVAL indica que no ha llegado. - MF:que en caso de que llegue se comunique a la Oficina Sanitaria al 254880. MIRAVAL toma nota y acepta.- 130. -

130. Entrada 1116.- La señora UGALDE pregunta a MIRAVAL si su hermana que desea ir a pasear a Cuba debe pedir allá la visa ó no es necesario. MIRAVAL:que aquí tiene que -- hacer la solicitud a fin de mandarla allá; pregunta si MF - tiene familiares allá y UGALDE dice que sí, su cuñada la -- señora JUANA UGALDE DE NOYOLA, la viuda de NOYOLA, quien -- hace poco vino y la invitó para pasar sus vacaciones en La Habana. MIRAVAL le sugiere que hable con el embajador, pues quizá por una atención a la familia NOYOLA le conceda la visa, que llame al 144237. UGALDE toma nota y acepta.- 150.-

150. Entrada L.D. de Mérida a las 1124.- GARCIA comunica a MIRAVAL que la embarcación EL JOVEN ANTONIO llegó a Isla - Mujeres, que como él le puso un telegrama para que la reclamara, a ver si puede salir lo antes posible tan pronto llegue el otro barco, el barco a recoger el CARLOS CUARTO y ver si se lo pueden llevar. MIRAVAL pregunta cuándo llegó esa embarcación y GARCIA dice que ayer al mediodía, la matrícula es Batabanó, tonelaje 6.02 bruta y neta, propiedad - Gobierno Cubano, robada en Cuba por 5 sustractores; que hay que rechamarla, que se la entreguen para mandarla conjunta-- mente con el otro barco. MIRAVAL toma nota. GARCIA pregunta si sobre el asunto de Veracruz hay algo y MIRAVAL dice que algunos periódicos han reflejado bien toda la cosa, pero otros nó, pues han dicho que fué un cubano gusano, pero

P. 7365

P. 8088

P- 7365

no fué así, ya que SAMA disparó en defensa, que hasta ahora no hay problema ninguno y ya salió para allá ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y BUENAVENTURA. MARIANO GARCIA:que está bien. MIRAVAL pide que mejor no venga el sábado, pues estará el domingo ocupado, que mejor salga el otro viernes en la noche para que esté aqui sábado y domingo. GARCIA acepta. MIRAVAL pregunta si no ha habido ninguna dificultad aparte de lo que le cuenta en la carta y GARCIA dice que nó; pregunta cómo llegaron los compañeros y MIRAVAL comenta que bien, que ya están tramitando la cosa pero no se podrán ir hoy, sin embargo los acompañará a Gobernación para hacer todo lo posible y se puedan ir. GARCIA esta de acuerdo y pregunta si mañana se dará siempre el acto en el Instituto y MIRAVAL indica que sí, pero hay que tener cuidado para no abusar y sobre todo avisárselo a las autoridades mexicanas y si pueden poner alguna vigilancia sería mucho mejor. GARCIA:que está bien. MIRAVAL:que le diga a LAIN haga un informe sobre ese asunto y cuando vengan el sábado lo traigan y lo dirija a quien GARCIA sabe. GARCIA:que está bueno.- 196.-

196. Entrada L.D.de Guadalajara a las 1154.- HF con MIRAVAL para decirle que es mexicano y su esposa cubana, que hace como un año estando en Veracruz hicieron la solicitud para ir a Cuba, pero hasta la fecha no les han contestado, no obstante que allá ya checaron su nuevo domicilio; que allá tienen familia y dos niños. HD:que él vaya a Relaciones Exteriores y su esposa a Imigración. HF:que está bueno.227.

227. Entrada 1202.- SABARIEGO con MIRAVAL.Este dice que encontró el acta de nacimiento, hizo la nota y hoy saldrá en el avión. SABARIEGO:que está bien.- 236.-

(3.-L11.-16 abril 64).-

16 April 1964

308. 1365 Entrada 1236.- ROBERTO pregunta por ROGELIO y J.dice - que está fueras de México, que llame mañana a la misma hora. R. acepta.- 314.-

26.- 65 1649 1088 Entrada a las 1730hs.- Larga Distancia de Veracruz.- HF Rogelio con el embajador Hernández Armas le dice que ya salió Zamá con fianza de cinco mil pesos que ya se pagó; que mañana tiene que volver de nuevo para prestar declaración. Que el -- ~~Rogelio~~- sale para acá a las cuatro de la mañana.- Armas: -- que si el pueda salir para aca.- Rogelio: que no, que debe de estar 72 horas en Veracruz por si lo llaman o lo citan, pero que si usted desea que el puede ir mañana allá que hará un - viaje rapido.- Armas: que el debe de venir acá pero que no le gustaría que se quedara el consulado solo.- Rogelio: que no que se queda Manolo y Ventura.- Armas: que se apuren a arreglar las cosas y que se vengan mañana, que se acuerde que mañana hay una recepción.- Rogelio de acuerdo.--- 44.-

207. 165 8591 Entrada L.D. a las 1238.- ROGELIO pregunta por el embajador y PEREG.dice que no está. ROGELIO:que estuvieron - conversando con un abogado quien les dijo sin estar muy seguro, que en la Conferencia de Cancilleres efectuada en La-Habana en 1928 se firmó un acuerdo en el que se dice que -- los Cónsules tienen inmunidad total en materia criminal e inmunidad parcial en materia civil, que hacía falta confirmar-eso "porque si eso es así, pues sale inmediatamente", que - esa conferencia fué firmada por México. PEREG.toma nota y pregunta como está "él" y ROGELIO dice que se imagine. PEREG.pregunta cuándo ROGELIO regresa y éste indica que hoy como a las 2000h. PEREG.que hoy hay avión, por lo que están preparando todo. Luego ROGELIO con la Dra.MACHAD para decirle "la situación está bien por aqui, estamos -- tratando de ver si hoy antes de las 2 lo podemos sacar bajo fianza". MARGOT se alegra y pregunta si lo van a traer para México y ROGELIO indica que sí, que él saldrá como a - las 8 y llegará en la madrugada, pues tiene que llevar el - carro al taller. MARGOT:que está bien. ROGELIO - repite lo que le dijo a PEREGRINA respecto a la Conferencia, agregando que como ese es un asunto de tipo criminal, de -- ser así inmediatamente.... pues ya exonerado de toda cosa,- además también está exonerado por la cuestión de que fué... una agresión según la ley mexicana, por lo que creé que no- haya mayor problema. MARGOT está de acuerdo.- 251. -

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-33-65

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/D 4, WE 4, WH/SA 8, VR

RI COPY

SECRET 141704Z

14 APR 64 IN 51087

MEXI INFO DIR MRID CITE WAVE 5073

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF A MRID 0436 (IN 59141) 11 April '64

B MEXI 8982 (IN 59445) * 11 April '64

1. IF CONSONANT WITH MEXI PLANS WAVE CAN CONTACT MAX LESNICK MIAMI FOR FURTHER INFO REF A LEAD. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez HOWEVER WOULD NEED SOME PRETEXT IN KEEPING WITH MERTON/LESNICK RELATIONSHIP. PLS ADVISE.

2. FYI LESNICK LIVES APT 3 1236 SW 36 AVE MIAMI, TEL: HI 3-0886.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUBJECT IS ONE OF TWO TOP PRIORITY MEXI TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT (OTHER IS CODE CLERK)

RI COPY

RI COPY

RI COPY

RI COPY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

FORM 3-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

RI COPY Rodriguez Lopez RI COPY 14 April 64 (33)

13 April 1964

762.- Salida al 460856.- 1222hs._ Rogelio Rodríguez con HF Inzunza le dice que le estaba hablando a Serrano por necesitan dos mesas para escribir a máquina y que le dijeron que estaba en Puebla, que a qué otra persona se puede dirigir para las mesas.- Inzunza: que al Sr.Arazil.------ Inzunza: que ya se cambiaron que ya no están en Reforma, que están en Avenida -- Juárez número 157, esquina frente Monumento Revolución.--796.-

1365

757.- Salida al 222401.- 1616hs.- Rogelio Rodríguez con García Romero le pregunta que a que horas se va el avión.- Romero: - que más o menos como a las cinco.- Rogelio: que hace falta mandar una cosa urgente para la Habana hoy.- Romero: que cuanto se van a tardar porque el avión casi ya está listo, que hay muy poco pasaje.- Rogelio: que llamó a Cubana y que le dijeron que el avión había salido a las cuatro; que si cree que le dará tiempo.- Romero: que si llegan antes de las cinco que el cree que sí porque ya está casi para salir.---- 789.-

1365

1096.- Entrada a las 1607.-hs.- HF Jorge Rojas con Rogelio le pregunta que quien la llama de la embajada._ Rogelio que eran ellos que el problema que hay que es que hay que mandar para la Habana una cosa urgente y que como el vuelo no llegue posiblemente hasta el domingo, que eso tiene que estar en la Habana antes del viernes.- Rojas: que el avión en este momento ya está subiendo a bordo el pasaja ya.-- Rogelio: que es una cosa super urgente y que si las cosas no están en cinco minutos.- Rogelio: que en cinco minutos no pueden estar.- Rojas: que entonces se quedaron, que lo siente en el alma pero que ya está todo mindo a bordo.- Rogelio: que correcto.- Rojas: que para el viernes hay vuelo.- Rogelio: que si no se puede tratar de ..... Rojas: que no que allí está la autoridad que está furiosa porque los tripulantes han demorado que deben de haber salido hace 45 minutos y que tiene la Comandancia encima.- Que mande las cosas pero sin asegurarle que lo van a esperar.--- ----- 1129.-

1365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

RPTS LOG CA
SI BF NH
SEC NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MERIDA

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : DOP, ADOP, C/CI, DC/WH/SA 5, VR

S E C R E T 102122Z

11 Apr 64 IN 59141

MEXI INFO WAVE DIR CITE MRID 9436

WAVE 5073
4/15/64

MEXI 8982
11 April 64

KAPOK REBRUMEN

MRID 0067
30 Apr 64

DESENSITIZED

1. FOLL INFO DATED 5 APRIL 64 RE ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, G-2 REP CUBEMB MEXI:

A. SUBJ NOT IDEN ROGER RODRIGUEZ, FORMER MEMBER SEGUNDO FRENTE DEL ESCAMBRAY, WHO REPORTED WORKING HOSPITAL CUBA AS DOCTOR, COMPLETELY ACCORD CASTRO COMMUNISM.

B. SUBJ FROM OLD COMMIE FAMILY IN CUBA BUT HE HIMSELF IS NOT COMMIE, IS AGAINST CASTRO COMMUNISM AND COULD BE PERSUADED WORK IN MEXI FOR CAUSE OF DEMOCRATIC CUBA.

2. SOURCE ABOVE INFO MAX LESNUCK MENENDEZ FROM ELOY GUTIERREZ

3

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

MENOYO. BASE HAD INQUIRED OF LESNICK, LONG TIME HERTON CONTACT HAVA, IF ROGELIO POSSIBLY IDEN WITH ROGER. GUTIERREZ COMMENTED SUBJ HAS RELATIVE PBPRIME AND ODYOKE APPARRENTLY ALREADY CONSIDERING APPROACH SUBJ.

SECRET

CLA[illegible]FIED MESSAGE

9 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

~~NCB~~	INT	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	~~AR~~
EOB	RPTS	LOG	CA
~~Other~~	SI	BF	HH
		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/D 4, WH/SA 8, VR

11 A[illegible] IN 59445

SECRET 111728Z

MRID INFO DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 8932

PBRUMEN

REF MRID 8436 (IN 5[illegible]) 11 April '64

1. SUBJ REF (Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez) IS ONE OF TWO TOP PRIORITY MEXI TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT (OTHER IS CODE CLERK). STATION PLANNING PITCH SOON.

2. PLS ASCERTAIN ASAP IDENTITY RELATIVE IN PBPRIME AS MEXI PRESENTLY SEARCHING FOR MEANS ACCESS TO SUBJ.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE ELABORATION STATEMENT SUBJ "COULD BE PERSUADED." ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN REF SOURCE VIEWS ON BEST METHOD APPROACH.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *REFERENCE RYBAT.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

11 April '64

6 April 1964

348. Entrada 1242.- MARIA ELENA GAYTAN con ROGELIO. Este pregunta cuándo va por la embajada y MARIA dice que tiene unas cosas, pero hay el problema de que tiene que entrar a la escuela y no..... ROGELIO la interrumpe y pregunta si -- mañana podría ser y MARIA dice que parece que es urgente;-- pregunta si la puede esperar porque sale a las 3 de trabajar y ROGELIO pregunta si no puede ir a las 1600 h. y MARIA indica que sí. ROGELIO:que entonces la espera a esa hora. MARIA:que perfecto, que allá se ven.- 359.-

.7365

705. Entrada 1120.- ESPEJEL avisa a ROGELIO que va para -- allá, que no tarda ni 20 minutos. ROGELIO:que está bien. 721.-

7365

502. Entrada 1050.- SANCHEZ con ROGELIO (empiezan a hablar- en el núm.570) para preguntarle si puede ir hoy y ROGELIO - dice que sí, que irá sobre las 5. S.que está bien.-576.-

1,5

7 apr 64

03.- Entrada a las 1339hs.- HF Crescencio por Rogelio Rodríguez.- Crescencio:.... que no sale y que encantado de escucharle.----- 13.-

P. 7365

8 apr 64

240. Entrada.- La señorita DOMINGUEZ con ROGELIO (empiezan- a hablar en el núm.307) para pregunta si se pueden ver y - ROGELIO dice que sobre las 7½. DOMINGUEZ acepta.- 311.-

.7365

3 / Mar 64

1104. Entrada 1331.- ROBERTO solicita hablar con ROGELIO y - RAUL indica que no está. ROBERTO pregunta sino le dejó ningún recado y RAUL dice que nó, pero que si gusta puede llamarlo más tarde al 144237. ROBERTO toma nota y - acepta.- 1130.-

1365

3 Apr 64

14:26 ALLIER pregunta por ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. No está. ALLIER suplica a JORRIN que cuando llegue le diga que se comunique con CARLOS G. BASURTO al Diario de México, encargado de los asuntos internacionales, pues éste tiene algo importante que decirle " en relación con los últimos acontecimientos".

(8127)

1127.- Entrada a las 1426hs.- HF por Rogelio.- Jorrín que no está.- HF que quería recomendarle el caso de un amigo suyo que es periodista del Diario de México; que a las cinco dela tarde el copañero ese va a estar en la redacción del Diario de México en el 181834, que es Carlos G.Basurto que es el encargado de la Sección Internacional; que se le diga a Rogelio que le habló -- Allier, que si quiere comunicarse con Carlos, que hay una cosa importante relacionado con los últimos acontecimientos.- 1169.

1365

---

4 April 64

446.- Entrada a las 1328hs.- MF la Srita.Domingues con Rogelio le dice que quiere verlo.- Rogelio que si le parece a las --- seis.- MF que bien.- Rogelio que en el mismo lugar.--- 474.-

1365

13:28 La señorita DOMINGUEZ manifiesta a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba, que necesita verlo hoy. ROGELIO dice que si le parece bien a las 18:00 hs. en el mismo lugar que ya conoce. La DOMINGUEZ está de acuerdo.

6 April 64

163. Entrada 0929.- La señorita MARTINEZ pide a J.le diga - a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ se comunique con ella. J.que está - bien.- 167.-

1365

25 mar 64

520. Entrada 1301.- MF pregunta por ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y J.-
indica que no está. MF: que la diga que habló MELBA -
GARCIA, que adelantaron el viaje y se irán mañana, que la -
llame al Hotel Ambassadeur. J. que está bien.- 533.

23 mar 64

360. Entrada 1136.- SANCHEZ pregunta a ROGELIO qué hay de--
nuevo y ésto dice que hasta ahora nada; pregunta si hoy pue
de ir a la comida esa y ROGELIO indica que no será posible-
por lo menos hasta fines de semana ya que está muy ocupado;
pregunta si el compañero llegó bien y SANCHEZ dice que sí.-
ROGELIO: que lo llame por el viernes y SANCHEZ acepta.-381.-

1365

25 mar 64

13:01 MELBA GARCIA deja reoado a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, de la Embajada
de Cuba, en el sentido de que "adelantaron ~~el viaje~~ y salimos
mañana; que por favor me llame al Hotel Ambassador hoy mismo".

31 mar 64

194. Entrada.- MF de parte de la Dra. GOMEZ SANCHEZ pide a -
RAUL le diga a ROGELIO que recuerde que tiene que llevar a-
su esposa a la clínica para que le hagan los análisis. -
RAUL: que está bien.- 199.-

P-1365

199. Entrada 1559.- ESTHER la esposa de ROGELIO pregunta a
NELA si ya le dijeron lo de ésta noche y ésta dice que sí.-
Quedan de verse a las 9 en la embajada. Luego RAUL in-
dica que acaba de hablar la doctora del laboratorio pidién-
dole le recordara a ROGELIO que la tiene que llevar para --
los análisis. ESTHER se dá por enterado y pregunta si-
encargó los refrescos y RAUL indica que eso está resuelto.-
ESTHER pregunta el teléfono de la casa de APARICIO y RAUL -
dice que es el 141299.- 225.-

17 March 19~~70~~ 64

203. Entrada 1155.- HF pregunta por ROGELIO y J.informa --- que no está. HF:que volverá a llamar dentro de 30 minutos para ver si ya llegó y caerle. J.que está bueno.-211.-

7365

211. Salidas sin contestación y ocupado.- 217.-

223. Entrada 1226.- HF con ROGELIO ? (empiezan a hablar en el núm.259). HD pregunta cómo está eso y si siguo el -- problema. HF:que sí, pero creé que para mañana ya esté bien; que necesita mandarle un presupuesto urgentísimo para que se lo apruebe, que se trata del presupuesto de que habían hablado; que quisiera mandarle una persona pero desea saber a qué horas para que lo encuentre con seguridad y lo espere. HD:que lo mande a las 5½;pregunta si lo podría ver mañana a las 1330 h. y HF dice que sí. HD pregunta si "mi amigo ya se fué ó todavía no" y HF dice que se va -- mañana posiblemente. HD:que está bien; que de todas maneras esperará a esa persona ahora, pero quiere ver a HF -- mañana a la una. HF acepta.- 268.-

321. Entrada 1258.- ESPEJEL pregunta si ROGELIO ya está y - J.dice que sí, que lo está esperando.- ESPEJEL:que va para allá ahora mismo.- 325.-

7365

19 Mar 64

157. Entrada.- La señorita MARTINEZ preguuta por ROGELIO -- RODRIGUEZ y BUENAV.informa que no está. MF:que cuando llegue se comunique con ella.- 163.-

365

19 Mar 64

678. Entrada 1407.- La señorita DOMINGUEZ pregunta por --- ROGELIO y J.después de pedirle que se espere un momentito,- dice que por favor mañana le tenga listos los libros, porque ROGELIO irá a recogerlos a la misma hora. DOMINGUEZ:gracias.- 712.-

13 Mar 64

301.- Salida al 140263.-1336.- BUENAVENTURA felicita a ESTHER por haber cumplido 21 años y pregunta si siempre van hacerla comida mañana y ESTHER después de darle las gracias, dice que lo sabrá hasta que llegue ROGELIO y después lo llamará. BUENAV. acepta.- 361.-

1365

585. Salida al 237325.-1635.- J. de parte de ROGELIO pide a MP mande hoy un arreglo floral a la Sra. ESTHER DE RODRIGUEZ a Baja California 178-3. MP toma nota y acepta.- 648.-

328. Entrada.- RICARDO de la Martí de Madero pide a JORRIN le pregunte a ROGELIO a qué horas lo puede recibir porque hoy tiene que salir para allá y J. después de pedirle que se espere, dice que pase a las 1630h. RICARDO acepta. - 358.-

14 Mar 64

500. Entrada 1124.- TOVAR y ROGELIO. Quedan de verse el lunes para ir a cenar.- 529.-

1365

16:19 MALBA GARCIA que dice ser la joven de Panamá, quiere ponerse en contacto con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ a la Embajada Cubana. PEREGRINA dice que no se ~~encuentra ahora~~.- MALBA pide la dirección para ir ahora a la Embajada. PEREGRINA arguye que primero tendría que avisárselo a RODRIGUEZ. MALBA argumenta que "él sabe que yo estoy aquí, pero no nos pusimos de acuerdo cuándo iba a llegar yo, porque estaba por el interior". PEREGRINA le pregunta

3

12 Mar 64

Entrada a las 1125hs._ HF Luis Suárez con Roa.- Le dice que se murió la mujer de Juan, que el ha estado toda la noche en la Delegación hasta que pudieron sacar el cuerpo de allí y que todavía no ha ido a su casa y que ahorita está en la Procuraduría donde ya han obtenido las dispensas y una serie de molestias, pero que no saben si el entierro será hoy o mañana; que si es hoy, le muestre lo hacemos mañana de todos modos y que si es para mañana, que en todo caso se retrasarán dos o tres horas.- Roa: que el no sabía nada del accidente.- Luis: - que fué el domingo y que fueron dos días de Cruz Roja; que le diga al embajador que era amigo de Juan y que el avisará cuando es el entierro; que el cuerpo está en la Agencia Gayosso.- Roa que le diga a Juan que cualquier cosa que necesite que sin pena se la plantee.- Luis: que no necesita nada. Que le avise al embajador, a Aparicio y a Rogelio que son amigos de Juan, que el cuerpo está en la capilla 31.---- 487.-

.4

27

1365

12:54 La señorita DOMINGUEZ manifiesta a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, de la Embajada de Cuba que "quería avisarle que ya le tengo los libros que me pidió; donde lo puedo ver y cuando?". ROGELIO acepta y propone que sea hoy a las 13:00 hs. La DOMINGUEZ está de acuerdo y pregunta que si en el lugar de la otra vez. ROGELIO asiente.

60KY

(1034)

13 Mar 64

148. Entrada 1211.- RICARDO pregunta por ROGELIO y J.informa que no está.- 153.-

191. Entrada 1302.- La señorita DOMINGUEZ solicita hablar con ROGELIO y J.pide que se espere un momentito.SE CORTO.260.

260. Entrada 1312.- La señorita DOMINGUEZ con ROGELIO (empiesan a hablar en el núm.306). Quedan de verse hoy a la misma hora.- 313.-

(J.-L31.-13 marzo 64).-

P-1365

C.TIIS

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba/Mexico

REPORT NO. CS -3/575,185

SUBJECT Additional Assignments for Members of the Cuban Embassy Staff in Mexico City

DATE DISTR. 10 March 1964

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 18 January 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (30 January 1964)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-8426

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Latin American official in Mexico City who has regular contact with Cuban Embassy personnel; he has been a reliable reporter for about a year and a half. [LITAMIL-9]

On 18 January 1964 the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City announced a three-month plan, according to which certain staff members will prepare special reports, in addition to their usual duties. Raul Aparicio Nogales, Consul for Cultural Affairs, will prepare a report on the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM - National Autonomous University of Mexico), which will include the physical layout, activities of the student body, and ways in which the Cuban Government can exert influence there. Luis Albery Souto, Cultural Attaché, was instructed to prepare a similar report on the Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes (INBA - National Institute of Fine Arts). Margot Machado Padron, Consul, will prepare a report on countries which have diplomatic relations with Cuba, emphasizing how contact with their representatives in Mexico will aid the Castro Government. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, Second Secretary, was given an assignment as Political Reporting Officer.

Based on attach to
HMMA-23018
4 Mar 64

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

10 March 64

5 mar 64

541. Salida al 140263.-1400.- J. avisa a ROGELIO que ahí está JU[illegible]ITO. ROGELIO que ya lo vió ayer; que le diga que el asunto ya se resolvió. J. que está bien.- 542.-

365

276. Entrada.- MORALES pregunta por RODRIGUEZ y J. dice que no hay nada, que llame por la tarde. M. acepta.- 284.-

P. 1365

7 mar 64

627.- Entrada a las 1622hs.- HF Harris por Rogelio.- Jorrín que no ha llegado.- que le llame mañana por la mañana.--- 640.-

1365

8 mar 64

11:10 El panameño X ~~HARRIS~~ pregunta a ~~ROGELIO~~ R [illegible] que si ya recibió contestación de su asunto. ROGELIO informa que sí, [illegible] diciéndole que venga a la Embajada de Cuba para ver si se puede ir hoy a la Habana o si no mañana que hay otro vuelo..."porque no te va a dar tiempo". HARRIS manifiesta que prefiere que sea mañana... ..." pues lo más pronto mejor, tú sabes ROGELIO".

10 mar 64

169.- Entrada a las 1725hs.- HF por Rogelio.- Jorrín que no está que si quiere dejar recado.- HF que le diga que lo llamó Crescencio que si va a estar por la tarde que quiere pasar a verlo.- Jorrín: que llame maña a las diez.-- 194.-

P. 1365

11 mar 64

048. Entrada 1012.- RICARDO pregunta si está ROGELIO para irlo a ver y HD informa que todavía no llega.- 052.-

1365

29 Feb 64

399. Entrada.- JAIME DE LEON (el compañero de Panamá) pregunta a ROGELIO si no ha ido HARRIS y ROGELIO dice que nó ni sabe dónde esté alojado. JAIME: que lo anda buscand ara arreglar una cuestión y no le ha sido posible pregunt si no ha habido nada y ROGELIO dice que nó, pero espera qu mañana llegue algo; que lo llame el lunes antes de ir. JAIME acepta.- 418.-

1365

026. Entrada 1933.- HARRIS de Panamá solicita hablar con -- ROGELIO y J. [illegible] que no está. HARRIS pregunta si no llego nada para él y J. dice que nó y ROGELIO no le dejó -- ningún [illegible]. HARRIS: que por su cuenta se dirigió a - Cuba, [illegible] que le llamará el martes para ver si ya le llegó algo. [illegible] que mejor llame mañana como a las 9 porque llegará [illegible]. HARRIS acepta.- 034.- (EL NOMBRE CORRECTO ES HARDY).-

65

3 Mar 64

312. Ent[illegible] [illegible]LES pregunta por RODRIGUEZ y J. [illegible] que no le [illegible] [illegible] y no ha regresado [illegible] sa de [illegible] [illegible] el jueves, pues ahora [illegible] a la comp[illegible] [illegible]; que en cuanto [illegible] guntara si [illegible] hable mañana como a las once [illegible] que RODRI[illegible] lo tendrá informado. [illegible] acepta.- [illegible]

365

5 Mar 64

654. Entrada, 1617.- JAIME DE LEON de Panamá pregunta por - ROGELIO y ROJAS dice que todavía no llega.- JAIME: que - tratará de acercarse un poco a la embajada por si acaso llega, pues quiere hablar personalmente con él. ROJAS: que- está bien.- 684.-

EXCERPTS

from Attachment to HMMA-23018

4 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Lawrence F. Barker

SUBJECT : Meeting with LITAMIL-9, 30 Jan 1964

.....

2. L-9 reported on the following:

a. On Saturday 18 Jan at the usual Embassy staff meeting, several new assignments were passed out. ..... Rogelio RODRIGUEZ was given an assignment as Political Reporting Officer.

.....

1. ..... Danilo PEREZ ~~Rogelio~~ Regalado, a Honduran, visited Cultural Department. ..... Later on he spoke with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ and told L-9 afterwards, "Rogelio doesn't seem to trust me."

.....

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : QDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, RI/AN, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 341914Z

4 MAR 64 IN 32439

PACY INFO DIR CITE MEXI 8494

1. ON 2 MAR PANAMANIAN JAIME DE LEON LEFT MESSAGE AT CUBAN EMB FOR HUMBERTO HARRY OF PANAMA TO CALL LEON AT LATTER'S HOTEL UNPON ARRIVING MEXI. 29 FEB AND 1 MAR, ONE HARRY HAD CALLED CUBAN EMB, ASKED IF ANY MESSAGE. TOLD TO CALL BACK LATER SINCE "HE" HAD NOT ARRIVED. ALSO 1/ MAR HERBERTO JORRIN OF CUBAN EMB CALLED UNIDENTIFIED MAN, ASKED IF ANY MESSAGE FOR HARRY OR MORALES. ANSWER NO.

2. BOTH LEON AND HARRY ASKED FOR ROGELIO, (ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SECY) BUT HE NOT IN. (SOURCE LIENVOY) INDEX.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

4 March '64

EMBAJADA DE CUBA
México, D.F.
No. 138

México, D. F., marzo 4 de 1964.
"AÑO DE LA ECONOMIA EN CUBA"

Sr. Jorge L. Rojas
Gerente de la Empresa
Consolidada Cubana de Aviación
Reforma No. 56,
Ciudad.-

Estimado compañero:

Atentamente solicito de usted se sirva expedir pasaje de ida solamente ~~a~~ de los que esta Embajada tiene a su disposición en esa Empresa, al Sr. Enrique Gonzalez Bogen. ______________________________ quien (es) deberá (n) permanecer en Cuba por un período indefinido.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", me reitero de Usted,

Fraternalmente,

Rogelio Rodríguez López.
SECRETARIO DE LA EMBAJADA

14-00000

FORM 1303
11-57

DIS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

INFO:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 28 FEB 1964

FILE:

PRECEDENCE		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	LTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	XXXX	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS MNS	290020Z	8531

TO

DIR MEXI WAVE

INFO

SJOS

CITE

MANA 4739
NUMBER

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REFS: A. DIR 04121 (IN 8501)
B. MANA 4730 (IN 8427)

1. IDEN A RETURNED MANAGUA FROM MEXICO CITY 27 FEB AND REPORTED IDEN B STILL MEXICO CITY. IDEN B IN DAILY CONTACT WITH CUBAN EMBASSY, BUT HAS NOT BEEN TOLD WHEN HE WILL LEAVE. "CHELE" NOW SAYS POSSIBLE IDEN B WILL GO DIRECTLY CUBA INSTEAD OF MAKING TRIP MIAMI FIRST (THOUGH THIS STILL A POSSIBILITY). "CHELE" TOLD IDEN B NOT WORRY ABOUT COMMO PLAN (REPORTED MANA 4715 -- COMMO [redacted] SYSTEM BETWEEN IDENS A AND B); THAT HE ("CHELE") WOULD SEND INFO RE COMMO SYSTEM TO AGUILUZ.

2. IDEN B SAID HE ACCIDENTLY LEARNED (WHEN HE OVERHEARD PHONE CONVERSATION) THAT "CHELE" IS ROGELIO. (PROBABLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ MENTIONED MEXI 8228).

3. IDEN B NOW CALLS EMBASSY EACH DAY, USUALLY AT 1300 HRS, AND ASKS FOR "GORRIN", ANOTHER NAME USED BY "CHELE".

4. IDEN A PLANS RETURN MEXICO CITY 3 MARCH AND HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY ERYTHROID/3 TO REMAIN THERE UNTIL IDEN B LEAVES.

END OF MESSAGE

29/0223Z

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

14-00000

P-7365

EMBAJADA DE CUBA

México, D.F.

No. 117

México, D. F., febrero 24 de 1964.
"AÑO DE LA ECONOMIA EN CUBA"

Sr. Jorge L. Rojas
Gerente de la Empresa
Consolidada Cubana de Aviación
Reforma No. 56,
Ciudad.-

Estimado compañero:

Atentamente solicito de usted se sirva expedir pasaje de ida solamente a de los que esta Embajada tiene a su disposición en esa Empresa, a los señores? ERASMO FRANCISCO PEÑA; ANDRES MEDARDO BOLIVAR y ATILIO JOSE BARRETO MILIANI.

________________, quien (es) deberá (n) permanecer en Cuba por un período indefinido.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", me reitero de Usted,

Fraternalmente,

Rogelio Rodríguez López.
SECRETARIO DE LA EMBAJADA

24 Jul 63

071. Entrada 1742.- JUAN con ROGELIO (empiezan a hablar en el núm.114) para preguntarle si el viernes recibió algo para él y ROGELIO dice que nó. JUAN: que si algún recado.- ROGELIO: que ninguno. JUAN: porque el amigo que se fué,- quedó de que el viernes le mandaría un recado después de haber hablado con un amigo allá.... ROGELIO lo interrumpe y agrega que espera que llegue éste viernes que viene. - JUAN pregunta si "él" y ROGELIO dice que nó, que el recado. JUAN: que era un poco urgente, que era para un caso relacionado aqui con Prensa Latina y "él" quedó én hacerle la cosa al día siguiente de su llegada y calculaba que el viernes ó el lunes.... pregunta si hoy no vino avión y ROGELIO dice - que nó, que hasta el miércoles ó viernes. JUAN: que entonces se comunicará con ROGELIO el miércoles ó irá a verlo. ROGELIO acepta y agrega que verá si mañana pasará por su - casa para tomar un café, a las 5. JUAN: que mañana nó, - porque desde en la mañana estará todo el día fuera; pregunta si es muy muy urgente y ROGELIO comenta que regular. - JUAN pregunta si lo pueden dejar para pasado, el miércoles- como a las 5 y ROGELIO está de acuerdo.- 127.-

-7365

17:42 JUAN, de acento español, pregunta a ROGELIO/RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, que si ha recibido ~~algo de la Habana que~~. Él. ROGELIO informa que nada. JUAN indica que " el amigo que se fué quedó de que me mandaría un recado después de haber hablado con un amigo allá". ROGELIO dice que tal vez lo haga el miércoles o el viernes que hay vuelo de la Habana. JUAN manifiesta que es un poco urgente, porque es una cosa relacionada con Prensa Latina. ROGELIO dice que mañana irá a su casa a tomar café. JUAN dice que mejor el miércoles, porque mañana va a estar muy ocupado toda la mañana. ROGELIO está de acuerdo.

18 Feb 64

20:47 ANTONIO GARCIA (NICO), de la Embajada de Cuba, se comunica con TELMA KING y le pregunta qué se le ofrece. TELMA responde que le urge mucho hablar con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ o con RAMON CESAR CUENCA hoy mismo en la noche y a la hora que sea, pues debe hacerlo antes de salir de México mañana, ya que a las 08:00 hs. tiene que estar en el Aeropuerto. NICO manifiesta que ha estado tratando de comunicarse con ROGELIO y con CUENCA inútilmente, prometiendo que en cuanto localice a alguno de los dos le pasará el recado.

18 Feb 64

924. Entrada [illegible].- MORALES pregunta por RODRIGUEZ y CORRIN
dice que [illegible] preguntó a RODRIGUEZ y éste le dijo que to-
davía no t[illegible] para él; pregunta si está [illegible]erando una
365 respuesta [illegible] dice que sí. [illegible] que no hay nada que -
mañana llame como a las 11.30 h. MORALES acepta.- 941.-

20 Feb 64

154. Entrada 1145.- HF (acento extranjero) solicita hablar-
con RODRIGUEZ con quien tenía una cita. [illegible] [illegible]és --
de pedirle que se espere un momentito infor[illegible] que [illegible]tá;
365 pregunta si él está en algún hotel y HF dice que no, [illegible] --
vive en un departamento de Artículo 123 núm. [illegible] que --
vuelva a llamar. HF acepta.- 190.-

CL SIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

~~MOB~~	~~TSY~~	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
ROB	~~RPTS~~	LOG	CA
OPS	SI	BF	HR
		SEC	NB

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DOP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 142046Z

IMMEDIATE MANA INFO DIR SJOS WAVE CITE MEXI 8228

PBRUMEN

14 FEB 64 IN 19988

REF MANA 4716 (IN 19935) 14 Feb 64

1. VEGA OF REF PROBABLY MANUEL VEGA PEREZ, KNOWN IS, NO LONGER MEXI. ROGELIO IS UNDOUBTEDLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SECRETARY OF EMBASSY. 14-13-26 IS EMBASSY TELEPHONE FOR RODRIGUEZ, DOORMAN AND OTHERS. ADDRESS IS THAT OF EMBASSY.

2. FYI: PARA ONE NUMBER COVERED BY STATION. WILL ADVISE ANY PERTINENT INFO, INCLUDING DEPARTURE DATES.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14 Feb 1964

FORM 11-57 1304

(44)

ORIG.:
EXT.: CHP
COMMO
CHFO NO - dummy
DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 14 FEB 64

FILE: P-7763
P-7365
~~P-8480~~
NUMBER

DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	CTG.
ROUTINE	XXX	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

TO | INFO. | CITE MEXI 8220
NUMBER

PRITY PACY DIR

RYBAT ZRKNICK HYSAGE-1

REF: MEXI 8199

1. PER LIEMBRACES 13 FEB HYSAGE-1 maDE RESERVATION PAA FOR PACY LEAVING MEXI 0930 SUNDAY 16 FEB.

2. PER LIENVOY 11 FEB, HYSAGE-1 CALLED ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ SECOND SECY CUBAN EMB, ASKED IF EVERYTHING LEFT YESTERDAY. RODRIGUEZ SAID YES. HYSAGE-1 SAID SHE WOULD LIKE TO GO SATURDAY (SIC). ALSO SHE BRINGING PACKAGE TO EMB 12 FEB FOR NEXT CUBANA FLT. (FYI, CUBANA HAD FLT 10 FEB, ANOTHER COMING 14 FEB).

3. NIGHT 12 FEB LIEMBRACES AGAIN SURVEILLED BERNAL AND "DAVID". THEY DROVE TO VICINITY PLAZA MIRAVALLE. BERNAL LEFT CAR WALKED TO PLAZA, TOOK SEAT THEN WALKED TO STREET CORNER WHERE APPROACHED BY UNIDENTIFIED MAN. THEY BOTH LIT CIGARETTES, THEN MAN FOLLOWED BERNAL TO CAR, NOT SPEAKING UNTIL THEY ENTERED CAR AND DROVE OFF. SUBJECTS CHECKING SO CLOSELY FOR SURVEILLANCE, TEAM HAD TO DROP OFF. FOUND THEM AGAIN IN RESTAURANT ON AVENIDA INSURGENTES SUR BUT SUBJECTS CHECKING ALL CARS DRIVING PAST, SO TEAM DROPPED SURVEILLANCE. UNIDENTIFIED MAN DESCRIBED AS "FOREIGN LOOKING, ABOUT 33 YRS, 5'6", 160 LBS, SHORT REDDISH STRAIGHT HAIR, ROUND FACE WITH PROTRUDING CHEEKS, SLIT EYES REDDISH COMPLEXION. LIEMBRACE 13 FEB SAW THIS MAN ENTERING CUBAN EMB. STATION TRYING IDENTIFY AND WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JLN (IIN DRAFT)
M C CHOADEN

G H PERMAN
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING

W C CURTIS
RELEASING OFFICER

21 May 1964

16:25 (2761) RICARDO manifiesta a ROGELIO [illegible], de la Embajada de Cuba que " te queremos ver, ~~cómo a qué horas te~~ sales de la Embajada". ROGELIO indica que hoy no será posible que lo vean. RICARDO insiste diciendo que tiene que ser hoy " porque aquí está mi amigo y te queríamos enseñar algo que acaba de llegar de allá". ROGELIO acepta manifestando que los espera ahora mismo en la Embajada. (36)

22 May 1964

062. Entrada.- COUTTOLENC avisa a MINSAL que ya tiene el -- saco de la muestra conteniendo las patatas. Minsal pregunta si le dieron confirmación a Rogelio sobre lo que hablaron del embarque ésta mañana y COUTT. dice que sí, pero-- acaba de llamarlo y no está. Minsal: que se informe de eso y mañana le diga, porque sobre eso ya le están preguntando de allá, por lo que ya se puede confirmar y se puede -- firmar el contraro y mandar las modificaciones que hay que- hacer. COUT. acepta y pregunta si no llegó nada para -- ellos y Minsal indica que no sabe si haya habido correspondencia, pues la gente hace poco que llegó; que preguntará -- y mañana lo llamará para que le lleve la muestra y la cotización. COUT. está de acuerdo y agrega que en caso -- de que sepa algo, lo volverá a llamar. M. que está bien. 078.-

1.7365

23 May 64

344. Entrada.- La señorita Vargas solicita hablar con Rogelio y J. dice que ya se marchó, que le habla mañana entre - 10½ y 11. Vargas acepta.- 369.-

365

EXCERPT

20 MAY 64

DIR INFO PACY WAVE CITE MEXI 9530 IN 86572

INTEL JMGIN LIFIRE

SUPDATA SOURCE LIFIRE AIRLISTS. .....

1. TRAVEL DATA SHOWS THE FOLLOWING ARRIVED IN MEXICO CITY FROM HABANA BY AIR ON 16 MAY 64: CUBANS: ..... ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, DIP PP D/63/454; .....

EXCERPT

MEXI 9530
IN 86572
20 MAY 64

~~Guy Ht~~
Dias —
Bob —
Lowe —
Trade —

MEMORANDUM

20 May 1964

P-6605
P-7575 xtra copy pls.

TO The Files
FROM Floyd N. AIMONET
SUBJECT Debriefing of LITAIMIL-3 on his meeting with LITAMIL-7
NEXT SCHEDULED MTG.: 27 May, Car pickup on Lerma, Guadalquivir, 0930

1. Once again, our bid to establish a small monthly deposit in the bank for LITAMIL-7 has failed. L-7 appreciates the thoughtfulness but won't accept a cent. No hard feelings and L-7 will continue to help in any way possible. Aimonet has decided against seeing L-7 personally because of the fact that a PBPRIMER's presence in the home of L-7 represents a disturbing factor and we do not want to rattle L-7 now that L-7 is calmed down and producing.

2. Following tidbits from this week's meeting:
   a) A long locked-door session between Lechuga and H. Armas on 18 May
   P-8472 B) Roa officially placed in charge all statements released to Mexican press.
   P- c) The full name of the new diplomat coming is Enrique Villavicencio Argudin. (will send cable requesting traces)
   d) José LAIN, consul Merida, PCS to Habana
   P-7365 e) Rogelio Rodgríguez returned with wife but left child behind Cuba.
   P-7921 f) Vega Perez placed in charge all fares and flights for those invited to Cuba from or through Mexico.
   P-8585 P-8591 g) Mirabal and Dra. Machado have had long daily sessions (meetings, that is.)
   P-7889 h) Ruiz and Garcia Lara have had long closed door sessions recently with Hernandez Armas.
   i) The Cuban ForMinistry cabled all personnel abroad to be "on alert view current rumblings"*(w.t.m.)
   j) On 16 May 16 Mexican chess players left for Cuba, guests of IDER
   k) On 16 and 18 May, total of 13 Colombians left for Cuba with fares paid and separate pieces of paper visas.
   l) Dr. Arturo Barber Orozco (suplente for Lechuga) arrived with Lech

3. LITAMIL-7 finally told off Pereira. He stopped bothering L-7

4. Instructed LITAMIL-3 to tell Mendejar to visit AMSAIL-1 as initial step in showing good faith and establishing bona fides.

*w.t.m. equals whatever that means.

7365

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1	MCB	INT	4	ES	SB
2			5		
3		ICS	6	[illegible]	AR

ROUTING

~~EOB~~	RPTS	LOG	CA
[✓ CI]	SI	BF	HH
		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION : DC/WH/SA 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/WH 5, VR

Pcw

WC

S E C R E T 191445Z

19 MAY 64 IN 86080

DIR CITE SDOM 3022

KAPOK TYPIC AMMUG

DESENSITIZED

REF: DIR 21432

STATION HAS NO INFO THIS TIME RE BROKEN LEG RODRIGUEZ.

S E C R E T

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

19 May 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

24 SECRET

ROUTING
1 ~~WOB~~ INT 4 SS SB
2 ~~ICS~~ 5 ~~PERS~~ ~~AR~~
3 6
~~DOB~~ FITS LCC CA
(CI) SI BF HH
SEC NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PANAMA CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DOP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, DC/WH/SA, VR

Potocki

WC

S E C R E T 182130Z

19 MAY 64 IN 85528

MEXI INFO DIR CITE PACY 3564

C/S COMMENT: *RE HYSAGE/1 MEETING WITH PONCHAY.

DESENSITIZED

HYSAGE ZRNICK

REF: PACY 3458 (in 84816) > not in this file.

1. MEETING HYSAGE-1 15 MAY HYSAGE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHICH APPEARS BE TOTAL HER KNOWLEDGE ALLEGED "ISLA DE MUJERES" MEETING SPOT:

A. DEPARTURE TIME AND TRAVEL TIME ESSENTIALLY AS ORIGINALLY REPORTED. PASSED THROUGH SMALL CITY, HOWEVER, TO ARRIVE AT EMBARCADERO. A LONG SHED-LIKE TIENDA WAS AT THE WATER EDGE. HYSAGE-1 NOTICED THIS BECAUSE IT WAS OPEN THOUGH HOUR WAS LATE.

B. WHEN ARRIVED AT ISLAND WHICH HAD NORMAL FOLIAGE AND VEGETATION, LANDED AT LITTLE VILLAGE WHERE MOST OF HOUSES WERE ADOBE CONSTRUCTION (LOW CLASS HOUSING). HOTEL WAS TWO STORY STRUCTURE WITH VERANDA. WAS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE VILLAGE ALONG BEACH AND ONLY BUILDING THAT TYPE SEEN IN AREA. (COMMENT: APPEARED TO BE LARGE GUEST HOUSE WITH EATING FACILITIES.)

X
4

C. PARTY DEPARTED ISLAND ABOUT DARK. ON LEAVING ISLAND HYSAGE-1 SAID SHE COULD SEE LIGHTS SHORE LINE IN FAR DISTANCE.

D. MAKEUP PARTY TRAVELING BY CAR AS FOLLOWS: MEXICAN OF SPANISH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Mention of "Rogelio" → over

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

19 May 64

ANCESTRY WAS (FNU) MOYA, A MEXICAN JOURNALIST OR NEWSMAN. HE OCCASIONALLY REFERRED TO OWNER OF HOTEL AS "TIO". SECOND MEMBER OF PARTY WAS ROGELIO, AN OFFICIAL OF CUBAN EMBASSY. THIRD MEMBER WAS CLOSE FRIEND BRANKO MILIJANOVIC, WHOM SHE MET WITH BRANKO ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. NAMES NOT USED AND HYSAGE-1 NOT SURE WHETHER HE CZECH OR RUSSIAN BUT DESCRIBED HIM AS THE PERSON BRANKO ALWAYS DEFERS TO. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: APPROXIMATELY 5'11" TO 6', Andreyev STOCKY STRONG BUILD, LIGHT BROWN HAIR, FAIR COMPLEXION, NOTICEABLY LIGHT GRAY EYES, AND EXTREMELY HANDSOME FROM WOMEN'S POINT OF VIEW. FLUENT SPANISH SPEAKER. WIFE, WHOM HYSAGE-1 MET AT COCKTAIL PARTY BRANKO HOME, DESCRIBED AS SHORTER THAN HUSBAND [illegible] AND EXTREMELY UNATTRACTIVE.

D. MEMBERS OF GROUP HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN ISLAND BEFORE JUDGING BY CONVERSATION "TIO" AND FAMILIARITY WITH PLACE.

E. YACHT REPORTEDLY HAD SLEEPING ACCOMMODATIONS MAX EIGHT PERSONS.

2. FOR HQS:

OF INTEREST IS HYSAGE-1 STATEMENT THAT THE EUROPEAN DESCRIBED ABOVE CHAIRED THE MEETING ~~WITH~~ which TOOK PLACE ON ISLAND. THE CUBANS, INCLUDING CONCHITO FERNANDEZ, DEFERRED TO HIM. PRESENT WITH CONCHITO WAS ANOTHER CUBAN REFERRED TO AS "DOCTOR". DISCUSSION WHICH LANTED S ALL DAY CONCERNED PLANNING FOR PANAMANIAN ELECTIONS WHICH PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ON, AND DISCUSSION POSSIBILITY FURTHERING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT PANAMA IN LIGHT EXISTING SITUATION. (COMMENT: OTHER THAN ELECTION PLANNING WHICH INVOLVED ECHEVERS, ZUNIGA, AND VICTOR AVILA, IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN LITTLE MORE THAN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON FUTURE, WITH LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE.)

SECRET

FORM DS-933
12-1-51

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY

REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION

TO: CIA

FROM: VO - Duncan 4/23/68

DO NOT WRITE ABOVE THIS LINE

I. NAME (If married woman, give maiden name): Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez SN

DATE OF BIRTH: May 3, 1942

PLACE OF BIRTH: Havana

ALIASES AND NICKNAMES: previous check 9/15/67

SEX: m

MARITAL STATUS: uk

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

ADDRESS:

OCCUPATION AND NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: Designated First Secretary of the Cuban Permanent Mission to the UN

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA:

#701

CONTROL: THIS REQUEST PLACED WITH THE OFFICE OF SECURITY BY:

DIVISION OR AGENCY: Visa Office

DATE:

NAME OR REQUESTING OFFICER: SCA:VO:B.Duncan

REASON FOR REQUEST, OR TYPE OF PROGRAM: F 31 - 7 Cuba

II. RESULTS OF THIS REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION:

☐ NO RECORD
☐ NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION
☐ SECURITY INFORMATION AT
☐ OTHER (Use reverse side for

SPECIAL

Rec'd 4/24/68

CHECKED BY:

DATE:

III. FOR USE OF OFFICE OF SECURITY:

For information concerning Subject you are referred to CSCI-3/782,001 dated 29 June 1964, subject as above, and CSCI-316/00696-64 dated 25 August 1964, subject: Shipment of Explosives to Mexico, and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

KTJ
26 April 1968

FILE IN 201-338665*

24 APR 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATI. CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COP 27 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	/	5	
2		6	/
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER ____ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR C/CA DO4 C/CI/PS C/ICZ FI2

ACTION NO. 345 CA5 CA/PROP DDP ADDP

S E C R E T 251614Z AUG 70 CITE DO BASE WASHINGTON 2790 9698

(DOBW 2790)

DO BASE, NEW YORK INFO: DIRECTOR

149698

AKULE/DOMOPS/AMROSE/WUSLAB

REF: DO BASE WASHINGTON 2781 (IN 146109)

1. WUSLAB LUNCHED WITH ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ (201-332665) AT BEAUX ARTS HOTEL, NEW YORK CITY, 21 AUGUST 1970.

2. RODRIGUEZ STATED HE INTERESTED OPINIONS NOT DOCUMENTS AND SUGGESTED WUSLAB/1 TALK TO PROMINENT US AND LATIN AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN GOVERNMENT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND FOUNDATIONS TO DETERMINE WHAT IS IN THE WIND RE US POLICY TOWARD CUBA. RODRIGUEZ CONTENDED THAT THERE ARE MANY FACTORS INDICATING INCREASED U.S. PRESSURE ON CUBA. THIS SITUATION FORCES CUBA TO ACCOMODATE OWN REVOLUTION WITHIN RIGID SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND AWAY FROM INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLES OF 26 JULY MOVEMENT. THUS CUBAN SOCIETY IS NOT THE JOYFUL ONE FIDEL PROMISED.

AN	
AB	
~~IN~~	
FROM	
~~BX~~	
DES	NFD
FI	

3. RODRIGUEZ GAVE WUSLAB/1 LARGE HTBASTE INTER OFFICE ENVELOPE CONTAINING BOOK BY RAUL ROA, BROADSIDE BY VICTOR VACCARO, AND COPIES OF GRAMMA AND VERDE OLIVO.

4. RODRIGUEZ EXERTED NO PRESSURE ON WUSLAB/1 AND SEEMED SATISFIED WHEN WUSLAB/1 REMARKED THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY NOT GO NYC AGAIN FOR SOME

200-6-337/3

CS COPY

201-332665

SECRET

PAGE TWO DO BASE WASHINGTON 2790 SECRET

TIME. POUCHING DETAILS THIS MEETING.

5. FILE: 200-6-337/3 AND 201-332665. GP-1.

SECRET

SEP 2 70

14-00000

35

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: JOHN M. BURKE:GHD
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: ~~WH-COG-OPS~~
DATE: 4164/1325 25 November 1970
~~4163~~

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY ____ 25 PER ____ # ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WHS INFO FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 27 NOV 70 20 16z CITE DIRECTOR 080058

TO DO BASE WASHINGTON INFO DO BASE NEW YORK WH/MIAMI

TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE WUSLAB

1. PLEASE ADVISE IF WUSLAB-1'S AMSTAFF CASE OFFICER ARRANGED TO TURN WUSLAB-1 OVER TO OTHER AMSTAFFER. ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE LATEST INFO ON WUSLAB-1'S NEXT ASSIGNMENT WITH HTBASTE.

2. FILE: 201-332665 AND 200-6-337/3.

END OF MESSAGE

C/DS
X
4
WH/C/OPS

MICROFILMED
DEC 29 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AC/WH/COG

JOHN F. MARKHAM
C/DOI/2

D200-6-337/3

RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

27 NOV 1970
201-332665

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, DO Division

FROM
Chief of Base, Washington

SUBJECT
AKULE TYPIC AMORSE WUSLAB WUSHARP DOMOPS
WUSHARP request for assistance

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference : DO BASE WASHINGTON 2989

1. On 14 December 1970, the undersigned visited WUSHARP at the latter's request and had the following discussion. WUSHARP asked whether we could use WUSLAB/1 as a means of contacting Cuban officials for the purpose of establishing lines which could later be exploited by WUSHARP assets. I explained to WUSHARP that WUSLAB/1 had been instructed to adopt a passive role in relationship to his Cuban contacts, and to respond only to contact initiated by the Cubans. WUSHARP stated that they understand our point of view thoroughly.

2. At this meeting I briefed WUSHARP on the telephone call from a DGI representative cited in reference. I told WUSHARP that I would give them a memorandum on this as well as a copy of the PCQ on Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez (201-332665) in which they expressed definite interest.

Joseph G. BENSON

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - C/WH
2 - C/DO

200-6-337/3

201-332665

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNCA - 6085	16 DEC 1970 15 December 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-6-337/3

14-00000

ORIG: JOHN M. BURKE:mli
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7141/1819
DATE: 27 MAY 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY DP PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, C/EA/SA C/DO 4 DDP ADDP [illegible] C/CI C/FI 2.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

20 10 51Z MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO DO BASE NEW YORK WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE

ABSTRACT INDEX

038015

REFS: A. DO BASE NEW YORK-7800 (IN-090897)

B. UNDW-3230, 15 MAY 70

1. WITH ONE EXCEPTION ALL PERTINENT AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ AVAILABLE AT HQS WAS FORWARDED TO ADDRESSEES WITH REF B. EXCEPTION CONCERNS TOP SECRET REPORTS FROM LNERGO ON RODRIGUEZ OPS INVOLVING EMPLOYEE OF SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY IN WASH D.C. AND POSSIBLE OP AGAINST STATE DEPARTMENT THROUGH THIS SOURCE OF HIS. BELIEVE CURRENT LNERGO HQS INTEREST IN RODRIGUEZ IS POSSIBLY DUE TO OUR RECENT PRODDING THEM FOR ANY INFO THEY MAY HAVE DEVELOPED ON HIM THROUGH THEIR INVESTIGATION THIS SOURCE. FYI: HQS IS ALSO CURRENTLY LOOKING AT RODRIGUEZ AS PRIORITY TARGET BECAUSE OF LARGE NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER JKLANCE ASSETS WHO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH HIM (SEE REF B).

2. CONCUR THAT SUBJECT BE MADE PRIORITY CASE FOR AMOTS.

/CONTINUED/

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

Rodriguez Menendez [illegible]

CS COPY

25 May 70

201- 332665

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR:

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 038015

TO

PAGE 2

HOWEVER, SUGGEST THAT BASE MAY WISH TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE COORDINATED FOUR-PRONGED APPROACH TO RODRIGUEZ AS A TARGET. FIRST IS AMOT APPROACH. SECOND, JKLANCE DEFECTORS AND AGENTS WHO KNOW SUBJECT. THIRD, LNERGO ASSETS. FOURTH, LNERGO'S ABILITY TO ENTRAP SUBJECT AND HIS CURRENT ASSETS IN LEGALLY ACTIONABLE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND APPLY CARROT OR STICK ULTIMATUM. CAN BASE ASCERTAIN WHAT, IF ANY, ACCESS AGENTS LNERGO NOW HAS NEXT TO RODRIGUEZ? EXTENT OF LOCAL LNERGO KNOWLEDGE OF RODRIGUEZ OPS IN WASH, D.C.? ALSO, CAN BASE ASCERTAIN IF LNERGO "TARGET STUDY" IS FOR PURPOSE OF DEFECTION, RECRUITMENT IN PLACE, OR DOUBLE AGENT OP?

3. FOR MIAMI: PLEASE PROCESS AMOT STUDY SOONEST, ADVISE WHICH OF JKLANCE ASSETS MENTIONED REF B STUDY ON RODRIGUEZ CAN BE UTILIZED THIS CASE FOR ASSESSMENT OR APPROACH, AND MAKE SUBJECT AND HIS FAMILY PRIORITY REQUIREMENT FOR NEXT AMANVIL DEBRIEFING.

/CONTINUED/

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR c 38015

TO

PAGE 3

4. FILE: 201-332665.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/Comment: *Reference, attached, concerns FBI request for AMOT support in preparing target study, and probably a defection attempt, against a DGI officer stationed at the CMUN.

DO/I/B2 R.J. Baker

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

GORDON JORGENSEN
C/DO

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

PAGE 1 OF 2

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY DCP PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD C/DO 4 DDP ADDP CS/DO C/CI C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 245

AN 2 FI
~~IS~~ SECT
ABSTRACT X INDEX
[illegible] H/C/OP

NYDO

S E C R E T 262038Z MAY 70 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 7800

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

26 MAY 70 IN 0 0 0897

4

RYBAT TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE

1. FOLL FOR WOMACE INFO ONLY.

2. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT JKLANCE PROGRAM TO UNCOVER RELATIVES AND FRIENDS OF DGI OFFICIALS ASSIGNED ABROAD HAS NOT AS YET PROGRESSED TO EXAMINATION OF DGI OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK, LOCAL LNERGO INFORMALLY HAS ASKED IF SURVEY COULD BE MADE ASAP OF ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ (201-332665), CMUN FIRST SECRETARY AND DGI OFFICER. LOCAL LNERGO HAS RECEIVED DIRECTIVE FROM ITS HDQS TO COMPILE DETAILED REPORT ON RODRIGUEZ AND HIS ACTIVITIES AND FORWARD "TARGET STUDY" TO LNERGO HDQS. BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS AMANVIL/1 AND OTHER REPORTING ON RODRIGUEZ, AND BECAUSE HE NOT NOW MARRIED, LNERGO HDQS APPARENTLY FEELS HE SHOULD BE PRIME TARGET FOR APPROACH. LOCAL LNERGO QUITE WILLING INFORMALLY COORDINATE ACTIVITY WITH BASE. THUS, WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER INFO ADDEES CAN PROVIDE AS TO ANY LEADS TO RODRIGUEZ VIA RELATIVES OR FRIENDS WHO MAY BE IN U.S. AT PRESENT.

3. RODRIGUEZ BORN 3 MAY 42 HAVANA. FORMERLY MARRIED TO

Rogelio Rodriguez [illegible]
Lopez - May [illegible]

201-332665

CS COPY

SECRET

PAGE 2 DO BASE NEW YORK 7800 SECRET
ESTHER GAVILAN NOGALES, DPOB NOT KNOWN. SON EDUARDO ABOUT SIX YEARS OLD, RESIDES CUBA CITY NOT KNOWN. PARENTS NAMES NOT KNOWN, BUT FATHER REPORTEDLY LONG TIME MEMBER PSP. RODRIGUEZ PERMANENT CUBAN ADDRESS LISTED SEPTEMBER 67 AS CALLE 30, VEDADO, HAVANA.

4. BASE JUDGES THAT PROMPT PROVISION OF SURVEY DATA INFORMALLY TO LOCAL LNERGO WOULD BOTH ENCOURAGE ACTION AGAINST RODRIGUEZ AND PERSUADE LOCAL LNERGO TO DEEPEN COOPERATION CONCERNING THIS AND OTHER OPS AGAINST LOCAL CUBAN TARGET. THUS REQUEST SOONEST ACTION BY HQS.

5. FILE 201-332665. NO INDEX. GP-1.

SECRET

FBI doc.
21 May 70 (NY)
Re. Cuban Mission to the United Nations
no Bufile given

FBI doc
11 May 70 (NY)
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
no Bufile given

FBI doc.
7 May 70 (NY)
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
no Bufile given

FBI doc.
4 May 70 (Wash)
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Bufile: (NI) 105-130905

SECRET

27 APR 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Mr. D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT : Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, Cuban Intelligence Officer

1. Reference is made to your previous correspondence concerning Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, First Secretary of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) and an officer of the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI). Rodriguez is the CUIS Case Officer for Jennifer Enid Miles, a South African national, now under investigation by the Bureau. Your most recent memorandum on Rodriguez and Miles was dated 26 January 1970.

2. On 30 January 1970, there was a liaison discussion about Miles and Rodriguez at which time your representatives advised that your Bureau planned to interview Miles, on an appropriate pretext, and that there were signs that she might be susceptible to "doubling". We recognize that the Miles Rodriguez case is an internal security responsibility of the Bureau but, to assist us in our efforts to assess Rodriguez as a DGI officer, it would be appreciated if you would provide us with the results of your interview with Miles as well as personality information about him that she may acquire in the future.

3. We would also like to have your comments about considering Rodriguez as a potential penetration of the DGI in Cuba. There is the possibility that Miles might be used to assist in approaching Rodriguez if, for example, she has refused to cooperate as a double agent or later if internal security considerations warrant an approach to Rodriguez.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

Signed: Raymond G. Rocca
James ANGLETON

CIOL-00061-70

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

DDP/WH/COG/OPS/JBurke:jaf

21 April 1970

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI
1 - WH/COG/OPS

FILE: 201-860915

SECRET

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
UFGA-5697	29 Apr 70, Att. 5	201-[illegible]	-237/3		

DOC. SUBJECT

Transmittal of WUSLAB Contact Reports, February-April 1970

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
WUSLAB/1	Meeting on 10 Apr 70; report dated 13 Apr.	

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc: distribution. Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

2. Production: WUSLAB/1 said that Jose Raul Viera Linares had phoned him at his home at about 1100 on 8 April. Viera said that a friend had described to him an acquaintance who had had an eye problem similar to WUSLAB/1 (or words to that effect), and that Viera now realized the seriousness of the case and that WUSLAB/1 would not be able to travel. Viera said that the chances were now remote that he would be returning to New York. A friend of his named "Rogelio" would contact WUSLAB/1. He did not say when or where, but it would be when circumstances permit. WUSLAB/1 asked if Viera might be assigned to another foreign country. Viera did not deign to answer this question.

3. I asked WUSLAB/1 what he considered the possibilities of recruiting Viera were. He thought an important factor would be Viera's liking of comfort and security. He would not be motivated by money, but he did like good living. He also probably did not like living in Havana, and would not like to stay there for a very long period. W/1 thought that if Viera came out to a country such as Spain that contact with him could easily be developed. In the United States Viera was on his guard. Also in the United States Viera did not have high level contacts with the local government, whereas in other countries he would be expected to have such contacts. Some of those contacts might then be also in contact with U.S. officials and you could get a cross-check on Viera. I told WUSLAB/1 that we would finish the PCQ form on Viera the next time we get together.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)*	201-			

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (7-46)

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO	
201-332665	019-005-042
SEX M COB ?	UNDA-04862A01
	14 APR 70
CIT ?	+19-500
OCC ?	P3
MBR OF CUBAN UN MISSION AS OF 10 APR 70	
UFA	R 7004230770

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ____ AT ____ Z

DISSEM BY 23 PER ____

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT DO 4

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, WH 8, E12, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 625

SECRET 102113Z APRIL 73 CITE DO BASE WASHINGTON 2574

DO BASE/NEW YORK INFO DIRECTOR

ISOLOG PERUMEN WUSLAB

REF: DO ~~BASE/NEW~~ YORK 7515 (IN052816)

10 APR 73 060598

1. JOSE PAUL VIERA LINARES PHONED WUSLAB/1 MORNING 6 APRIL. SAID MOST LIKELY WOULD NOT BE RETURNING TO NEW YORK. UNDERSTOOD NATURE WUSLAB/1'S HEALTH WOULD PREVENT HIS TRAVELLING. HIS FRIEND "ROGELIO" WOULD CONTACT WUSLAB/1. GAVE NO DETAILS FUTURE CONTACT.

2. VIERA DID NOT ANSWER WUSLAB/1'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD BE ASSIGNED ANOTHER POST OUTSIDE CUBA.

3. LOCAL LNERGO BELIEVES "ROGELIO" MAY BE ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN PERMANENT MISSION.

4. FILE: 201-328053 AND 200-6-337/3. GP-1.

SECRET

CC to 201-332665

SECRET

FBI doc.
30 Mar. 70 (NY)
Re: Joanna Faith Haas
no Bufile given

DISPATCH | SECRET

TO
Chief, WH/COG

INFO.
Chief of Station, WH/MIAMI;
Chief, DO Division

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
[illegible]/DO.OPS/AMRAVEN -- Information from AMRAVEN/1 on Cuban UN Mission Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI, extract to appropriate 201 files, and per paragraph 7

REFERENCES : A. DIRECTOR 010338
B. DO DASB/NEW YORK 7570
C. DO DASB/NEW YORK 7575

1. Transmitted herewith as an attachment to this dispatch are one copy each for WH/COG and WH/MIAMI of the AMRAVEN/1 debriefing results on CMUN and DGI Center personnel and activities in New York. The information was obtained by [illegible] during a short meeting 22 March 1970 (the information on Teofilo ACOSTA and "[illegible]" was obtained jointly by [illegible] and [illegible]). Other information was forwarded via Reference B. Information on Pedro Luis PINEIRO Kirin (201-[illegible]), CMUN Third Secretary and DGI officer, also was cabled separately via Reference C.

2. Copies of the attached have been passed by FIGALAN to the local LNERGO office. "ELGIN" is the local code name used between the Base and LNERGO to designate AMRAVEN/1. As addressees will note, the attached sheet on PINEIRO makes no mention of the LNERGO [illegible] made to and reported by him; rather than make such information a matter of record within LNERGO FIGALAN merely passed that information to LNERGO orally 23 March.

/continued

Attachments:
As Stated, H/W

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Chief, WH/COG, w/2 cc of attachments, H/W
2 - COS, WH/MIAMI, w/2 cc of attachments, H/W
2 - Chief, DO Division, w/o attachments

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
GROUP 1	UNBA-4041	26 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET RYBAT	19-6-133/3

3. Because we had but limited time with [illegible] on this trip, the attached information is necessarily slim. Items of particular interest concern PINEIRO and the forthcoming cutback in DGI activity, not only here but elsewhere.

4. Re the attached information on Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-[illegible]), CMUN Counsellor and DGI officer, [illegible] told the writer that VIERA's contact within Random House (publishing firm) is one

Jason *EPSTEIN (no further bio data available).

5. Re the attached information on [illegible] RODRIGUEZ [illegible] (201-[illegible]), First Secretary and DGI officer, and his "female friends", [illegible] told the writer that one known romantic involvement is one

(Miss) Joanna Faith *MAAS
DOB: 1947
POB: Believed U.S.A.
CIT: U.S.
OCC: [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ (or intern), General [illegible], Beth Israel Hospital, New York City.

This young lady, who is part or all Jewish, is the daughter of a New York taxi driver. She visited Cuba in 1969. From technical coverage of the CMUN [illegible] is aware that DGI Center Chief Orlando [illegible] Gutierrez (201-[illegible]), First Secretary, knows of RODRIGUEZ' involvement with Miss MAAS (one morning [illegible] phoned the young lady's apartment at 0815 hours to ask if RODRIGUEZ were there). [illegible] believes that RODRIGUEZ' interest in MAAS is romantic only; as opposed to PINEIRO's interest in Mildred MARQUEZ Ortiz, per the attached sheet.

6. Re war-name "AGED" per the attached sheet, FEGLAN believes that AMANVIL/1 may be mistaken in the year "AGED" was here as part of the Cuban Delegation to the UN General Assembly; as related below, there are possibilities for "AGED" in both 1967 and 1968. In 1967 there are the following personalities who could be identical with "AGED":

A. Joaquin Camilo GARCIA Alonso, born 26 August 1937 in Havana;

B. Gonzalo DIAZ Diaz, born 25 November 1945 in Pinar del Rio;

C. Pedro Juan BELTRAN Veloso, born 8 March 1933 in Las Villas;

D. Carlos E. ANTELO Perez, born 15 January 1943 in Pinar del Rio;

E. Gonzalo DEPRES Solo (201-728312), born 10 January 1939 in Havana.

In 1968 there are the following personalities who could be identical with "AGED":

F. Eduardo ARIOZ Agero (201-840126), born 21 March 1930 in Las Villas;

G. Gonzalo GONZALEZ Cuoto, born 15 November 1942 in Havana;

H. Crescencio E. VALENZUELA Paez, born 14 September 1941 in Havana;

I. Alvaro P. [illegible] Fonseca, born 8 December 1943 in Oriente;

J. Reno VALENZUELA Acebal, born 20 July 1938 in Havana;

K. Julian TORRES Rizo, born 1 September 1944 in Havana.

Other members of the UNGA Delegations for 1967 and 1968 we have been able to eliminate because they are either not DGI personnel and/or AMMUG/1 knows them sufficiently to rule out the possibility that they are identical with "AGLO". If the tag-name corresponds to the true name at all, then it would appear that the two most likely candidates for "AGLO" are Eduardo ARAOZ Agero (201-840126) and Carlos [illegible] Perez. The latter was here in 1967; ARAOZ here in 1968. We lean toward ARAOZ.

7. Should addressees be able to shed any light on the true identity of "AGLO" we would be most interested. Even if this is not possible, presumably we will know eventually who he is should his assignment here materialize.

8. The attached sheets should be extracted to the appropriate 201 files. To facilitate this the 201 numbers are listed below:

Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez (201-[illegible]8505)
Pedro Luis PINERO Marin (201-[illegible]876)
Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-[illegible])
Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201-[illegible]302)
Ricardo ALARCON Quesada (201-[illegible]7580)

Howard G. FIGELAN

UN DA - 4841
26 March 70

7. Recruitment Targets. Subjectively, Source considers that the most vulnerable of the CMUN personnel are Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Ambassador ALARCON, and Pedro Amado MORALES Carballo. RODRIGUEZ because he likes the ladies and the material things in life; ALARCON because of his strained relationship with PRENDES; and MORALES because he is basically a good sort and a realistic person. As stated, this is subjective reasoning on Source's part.

Teofilo ACOSTA Rodriguez
201-755744

8. Replacement Personnel. With VIERA and PINERO leaving soon, there is talk in Havana about assigning one Teofilo ACOSTA here as a replacement for one or the other. ACOSTA is a negro in his early 30s and has served in several African posts for the DGI (including Tanzania and Mozambique). ACOSTA has been protected by Manuel PINEIRO Losada, former DGI chief, but is disliked by most MINREX types who know him. Source described ACOSTA as a sly and suspicious person who would not hesitate to report on anyone, including his friends and neighbors. ACOSTA is believed to have been deeply involved in various "wars of liberation" in Africa. ACOSTA was originally under consideration as a replacement for Francisco V. PORTELA, the Prensa Latina chief in New York, but it was finally decided to leave PORTELA here as there were advantages to his being a U.S. citizen.

Source also mentioned that one "AGEO" (a war name; real name not known to Source) was under consideration for assignment here. Source said that "AGEO" was a member of the Cuban Delegation to the 22nd UN General Assembly in 1967 (date possibly not correct). This "AGEO" was in charge of the purge within MINREX in 1967 which resulted in the ouster of some 300 persons regarded as homosexuals, counter-revolutionaries, or incompetents.

UNDA - 4841
26 Mar 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

200-009-052
UNDA-04834A01
24 MAR 70
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
CURRENTLY IN NEW YORK AS OF MAR 70 AS MBR OF CMUN

UFA

R 7004022074

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

RODRIGUEZ

PRIOR TO FILING	TO. ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/
[illegible]
CA 30
[illegible] CT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE
COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C	5 [illegible]			
2. [illegible]				
3.				
4. [illegible]		13 Apr		
5.				
6. [illegible]		13 Apr		
7.				
8. DO/I/c. [illegible]				
9. DO/KT		21 Apr 70		
10. ~~[illegible]~~				
11. ~~[illegible]~~				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
APR 2 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

3

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
200-9-52

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
	24 Mar 70	UNDA 04834

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

08437

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, WH/COG		XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief of Station, WH/MIAMI, Chief, Domestic Operations Division			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Base, New York			MICROFILM

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMROSE/DOMDPS
Transmittal of Cuban Official Presence Listing for New York

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

REF: DIRECTOR 018607

1. During a visit to the Base on 20 March 1970 the Headquarters officer mentioned in paragraph 3 of the reference requested that the Base pouch to Headquarters a listing of all currently-assigned personnel of the Cuban UN Mission. Attached herewith for WH/COG and WH/MIAMI are one copy each of the monthly listing prepared by the local LNERGO Cuban Squad showing each CMUN official and his dependents (the latter may be here or back in Cuba; changes are not recorded in this category).

2. This listing is as of 3 March 1970; it remains valid with the exception of Jorge REYES Vega, Second Secretary and DGI officer, who departed PCS on 7 March.

3. NOTE: The "Pct." number indicates in which police precinct each CMUN official resides.

Howard G. FIGALAN

MICROFILMED
APR 2 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
As stated - Para 1 - h/w.

Distribution:

2 - Chief, WH/COG, w/att. h/w.
2 - Chief, WH/MIAMI, w/att. h/w.
2 - Chief, DO, w/o att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

-1 Att

200 to DC/CI

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA-4834	23 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~19-500~~ 200-9-52

Cuban Mission to the United Nations
6 East 67th Street
New York, New York
March 3, 1970

Currently in New York as of May 1970 as member of CMUN

	Pct.
✓ ALARCON QUESADA, RICARDO (201-347590)	19
Position	Ambassador
Residence	1175 York Ave., Apt. 6D, NYC
Phone	PL 2-0123
Dependents	MARGARITA PEREZ, wife; MARGARITA ALARCON, daughter; BLANCA MAZA PEREZ, mother-in-law
	(R coded)
✓ ALOM GIL, JULIO (201-851731)	17
Position	First Secretary Cuban Mission to the UN
Residence	251 E. 51st St., Apt. 10L
Phone	593-0480
Dependents	MARINELA LARRAMENDI RODES, wife, born 4/10/36; LENA ROSA ALOM LARRAMENDI, daughter, born 11/22/64; LAURA ESTHER ALOM LARRAMENDI, daughter, born 5/11/67
	(R coded)
✓ DE SOUZA, ANTONIO (201-354048)	110
Position	Adviser
Residence	83-10 35th Ave., Apt. 6U, Jackson Heights, NY
Phone	TW 9-9282
Dependents	ALICIA MATEOS DE SOUZA, wife; ANA MARIA, daughter, born 2/7/54; ALICIA ANTONIA, daughter, born 6/23/51
	(R coded)
DRAKE CAPIRO, PABLO (201-815821)	19
Position	Attache
Residence	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone	UN 1-5250
Dependents	CONSUELO HORTA LARRINAGA, wife
	(R coded)
FRANCO GONZALEZ, RUBEN RAFAEL (201-857465)	19
Position	Attache
Residence	370 E. 69 St., Apt. 5K
Phone	---

MICROFILMED
APR 2 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

CS COPY

Att #1 to UNDA-4834

200-9-52

	Pct.
GELABERT MARTINEZ, JUSTO CESAR	17
Position (201-839221)	Attache
Residence	61-15 97th St. Elmhurst, NY, Apt. 15M falsifies apt.
Phone	699-5526
JIMENEZ PADRON, FLORENTINO	19
Position	Attache
Residence (201-850953)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC (Recoded)
Phone	UN 1-5250
Dependents	AGUEDA MARTINEZ GARCIA, wife, born 4/15/37
MORALES CARBALLO, PEDRO A.	17
Position (201-850951)	Counsellor, CMUN
Residence	400 E. 55th St., Apt. 16 (Recoded)
Phone	593-2431
Dependents	MARIA ANGELINA DE LOS REYES, wife, born 2/2/41; MARIANELA MORALES DE LOS REYES, daughter, born 11/10/64; PEDRO CESAR MORALES DE LOS REYES, son, born 7/31/69; ISABEL BERMUDEZ DIEZ, born 4/18/07
PEREIRA GONZALEZ, ORLANDO F.	19
Position	First Secretary
Residence (201-848605)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC (Recoded)
Phone	UN 1-5250
Dependent	MARIA DE LOS ANGELES LOPEZ CANAS, wife, 3/1/47
PEREZ ALFONSO, ROLANDO	19
Position	Attache
Residence (201-836757)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC (Recoded)
Phone	UN 1-5250
Dependent	MARIA DE LAS MARTINEZ LARA, wife

to be replaced
by Rafael CADALSO
Bundomo - 50416
PDC
16 March

SECRET

NY 105-31084

SECRET

	Pct.
FR ✓ PINERO AIRIN, PEDRO LUIS	19
Position (201-824376)	Third Secretary
Residence	401 E. 74th St., Apt. 5K, NYC (R coded)
Phone	861-2468
Dependent	JUANA CRUZ FERNANDEZ, wife
FR ✓ PRENDES GUTIERREZ, ORLANDO	19
Position (201-330002)	First Secretary
Residence	201 E. 66th St., Apt. 7H, NYC (R coded)
Phone	249-0824
Dependent	TERESITA FERNANDEZ ARANGO DE PRENDES, wife
FR ✓ REYES GOICOCHEA, RAUL	19
Position	Attache
Residence (201-859874)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone	UN 1-5250
FR ✓ ~~REYES VEGA~~, JORGE E.	20
Position (201-816437)	Second Secretary (departed US PCS on 7 Mar 70)
Residence	15 W. 72nd St., Apt. I7H, NYC
Phone	787-0544
Dependent	MARIELA REYES, daughter
FR ✓ RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO	110
Position (201-332665)	First Secretary
Residence	Park Plaza Apartments 61-15 97th St., Elmhurst, NY, Apt. 15M
Phone	699-5526
FR ✓ SANTANA FRAIZ, MIGUEL M.	19
Position (201-816439)	Attache
Residence	345 E. 81st St., NYC, Apt. 5J
Phone	UN 1-5862
FR ✓ SANTIAGO HUMET, ROBERTO	19
Position	Attache
Residence (201-859875)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone	UN 1-5250

unique [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

104-10180-10050

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

C19-006-133/03
UNDA-04764
12 FEB 70

CIT CUBA
OCC 1ST SECY
< USA, NY, NY
SERVES AS THE OFFICIAL CMUN/DGI CONTACT W/ JOSE MARIA QUIMPER, A LEFTIST PERU NATL EMPL IN THE DEPT OF POLI AND SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS UN SECRETARIAT. APPEARS HANDLE MUCH OF CMUN BUSINESS W/LOCAL PRENSA LATINA OFFICE

R 7002190005

FILE IN 201-332665

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: [illegible]

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN SD

FROM:

RID/AS D

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

[illegible]

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/[illegible]		12 FEB 1970	12 FEB 1970	[illegible]
2. WH/C/OP		[illegible] 70	[illegible]	[illegible]
3.				
4. ENNIS			File	CB
5. BURKE			B	[illegible]
6. Kathy			17 Feb	RGB
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

copy to Prero File

RYBAT

MICROFILMED
FEB 17 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	X

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

19-6-133/3

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

12 FEB '70

DOCUMENT NUMBER

UFGA 04764

FORM 1-64 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH | SECRET/RYBAT

TO: Chief, WH/COG | XX

INFO.: COS, WH/MIAMI; Chief, DO

FROM: Acting Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT: TYPIC/ZAP-OSE/POLOPS/AMANVIL
Information Provided by AMANVIL/1 on Cuban UN Mission Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Extract to appropriate 201 files
REFERENCE: URDA-4763, 10 February 1970

1. Transmitted herewith as an attachment to this dispatch are one copy each for C/WH/COG and COS/WH/MIAMI of the AMANVIL/1 debriefing results on CMUN and DGI Center personnel in New York. The information on Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez, DGI Center Chief, and Esperanza BALLESTER Fernandez was obtained by BETHOURN during meetings 26 January 1970 and 31 January respectively (some of the information on PRENDES was forwarded via DO BASE/NEW YORK 7403). The remainder of the information was obtained by FIGALAN during a meeting 1 February. Other information obtained by BETHOURN and FIGALAN from AMANVIL/1 on local subjects was forwarded by the referenced dispatch.

2. Copies of the attached have been passed by FIGALAN to the local LNERGO office. "ELGIN" is the local code name used between this Base and LNERGO to designate AMANVIL/1.

3. The attached should be extracted to the appropriate 201 files. To facilitate this the 201 numbers are listed below:

Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201-330002)
Pedro Luis PINERO Kirin (201-824376)
Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz (201-816439)
Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953)
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665)
Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez (201-848505)
Victoria FERNANDEZ Padilla (201-340661)
Esperanza BALLESTER Fernandez (201-812430)

All but FERNANDEZ and BALLESTER are DGI personnel.

MICROFILMED
FEC 17 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment: H/W
Debriefing Results (5)

Howard G. FIGALAN

CS COPY

Distribution:
1ATT (2-WH/COG w/att 2-WH/MIAMI w/att 2-DO w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	URDA-4764	11 February 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET/RYBAT	19-6-133/3

5P

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 31 JANUARY AND 1 FEBRUARY 1970

1. Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez, First Secretary and DGI Center Chief. PRENDES is a highly intelligent and capable DGI officer who has some nine years experience in his trade. He is well-liked and respected by Manuel PINEIRO Losada ("Barba Roja"), former Chief of the DGI, and Ramon OROZA Naveran ("Demetrio"), currently Chief of U.S. operations in DGI Headquarters, particularly by the latter. PRENDES appears to be a fanatical revolutionary. He also is well-liked and respected by the staff of the DGI Center here, and he in turn is quick to single out each for praise--with the notable exception of Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez, DGI officer and First Secretary. PRENDES seldom mentions PEREIRA, and Source concludes that he does not like or have much use for PEREIRA.

2. PRENDES' dislike for both Permanent Representative Ricardo ALARCON Quesada and Mrs. ALARCON is growing daily, and ALARCON's recall has become a fixation with PRENDES. While PRENDES is basically modest, his vanity emerges when discussing his own professional ability and accomplishments. Outwardly, he is anti-American, referring to Americans frequently as "nuestros enemigos". However, he is enjoying his tour in New York and obviously admires certain aspects of U.S. life. He has a large collection of American records, likes American clothes, etc.

3. PRENDES' wife, Teresita FERNANDEZ Arango, is scheduled to return home to Cuba permanently in June 1970. PRENDES plans to do the same in December 1970, after the next UN General Assembly ends. His two year tour will be up in September 1970. Teresita FERNANDEZ is popular with the CMUN personnel.

4. Source stated that PRENDES' father was uneducated (believed to be a fisherman), and his mother is a directress of a school in Matanzas. Source considers PRENDES a much more likeable type than the average Cuban intelligence officer. PRENDES is interested in the CMUN and its job as a whole, unlike his predecessor as Chief of the DGI Center, Chafik Homero SAKER Zenni ("an animal", according to Source).

MICROFILMED
FEB 17 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

1W ATT 1 to UNDA-4764

19-6-133/3

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "[illegible]" ON 1 FEBRUARY 1970

1. Pedro Luis PINERO Kirin, Third Secretary. PINERO is the favorite of DGI Center Chief Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez, First Secretary, because PINERO is hard-working and "audacious". Source believes that PINERO is the DGI Center officer specializing in the handling of Cuban exile agent operations; PINERO "disappears" from the CMUN for 2 to 3 days at a time, and Source speculated that PINERO might be traveling to Miami to contact DGI agents. PINERO also continues to be active at night in lower Manhattan, and Source thought that he might be either making new contacts amongst youth/student circles in Greenwich and East Villages, or seeing existing contacts in those locations; this, of course, is only speculation on Source's part.

2. PINERO is currently in a state of mental depression. Not only has he been working too hard, he also received a "Dear John" letter from Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso, who had been a member of the Cuban UNGA Delegation in Fall 1969. This letter was hand-carried from Cuba to New York City in January 1970 by Esperanza BALLESTER Fernandez, a Cuban delegate to the Ninth Governing Council Session of the UN Development Programme. (PINERO is divorced from his wife in Cuba, and has two children by her; he and ARUCA had been planning marriage). Source thought that PINERO might return to Cuba soon for these reasons, as he has been here already for a little over two years.

3. According to comments made by Ramon OROZA Naveran, Chief of U.S. operations, DGI Headquarters, PINERO and Jose Raul VIERA Linares are considered by OROZA to be the two DGI officers here in the most danger of being declared persona non grata by the U. S. Government.

SOURCE ATTACHED

SECRET

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "[illegible]" ON 3 FEBRUARY 1970

1. Miguel Manuel SANTANA Prais, Attache. SANTANA's chief DGI duty is the purchase of electric and electronic instruments and components, mainly for shipment back to Cuba. SANTANA is an accomplished electrician and technician and is particularly knowledgeable re technical television matters. After Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin, Third Secretary and DGI officer, SANTANA is the favorite of DGI Center Chief Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez. SANTANA has done the electrical and technical work on the CMUN closed circuit television and alarm systems, and PRENDES has praised his work highly in this regard. Source thinks that some other Cuban Embassies abroad may install similar systems, and opined that the materials for same would be procured here by the CMUN and pouched either directly to the particular Embassy or via Havana. SANTANA would handle such procurement.

2. Jose Raul VIERA Linares, Counsellor. Source could offer little new information on VIERA and his intelligence activities. VIERA, not overly intelligent, has intellectual pretensions and likes to give people the impression that he is cultured and very well-read. VIERA has the responsibility within the CMUN (and the DGI Center) for handling U.S. citizens who wish to travel to Cuba; he handled the volunteers of the Venceremos Brigada who went to Cuba to assist in the sugar cane harvest. According to comments made by Ramon OROZA Naveran, Chief of U.S. operations, DGI Headquarters, VIERA and Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin are considered by OROZA to be the two DGI officers here in the most danger of being declared persona non grata by the U.S. Government; VIERA would be expelled mainly because of his involvement with U.S. citizens as indicated above.

3. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, First Secretary. Source could offer little new information on RODRIGUEZ; the latter has always been very reserved with Source and seldom talks with him. Source is aware that RODRIGUEZ serves as the "official" CMUN/DGI contact with Jose Maria QUIMPER, a leftist Peruvian national employed in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, UN Secretariat. RODRIGUEZ also appears to handle much of the CMUN business with the local Prensa Latina office. As far as contacts go, RODRIGUEZ concentrates--at the UN at least--on Latin Americans.

Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez, First Secretary. PEREIRA is not overly liked within the CMUN. He is servile to and afraid of DGI Center Chief Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez. Whereas PRENDES has remarked to Source in favorable terms about all his other Center staff personnel, PRENDES has seldom mentioned PEREIRA at all. Source concludes that PRENDES does not like or have much use for PEREIRA.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 1 FEBRUARY 1970

1. Mrs. Victoria FERNANDEZ Padilla, newly arrived Attache at the CMUN, was the Subject of a squib passed to your office 23 January 1970. Source "ELGIN" provided the following information on FERNANDEZ on 1 February 1970.

2. FERNANDEZ will stay in New York City for probably about a three month period; while here she will be working on documents and files at the CMUN. In Havana, she is employed in the documents section of the International Organizations Directorate of MINREX. She had been scheduled to come here for three months for the same purpose in Fall 1969 during the XXIV UN General Assembly, but Cuban Permanent Representative ALARCON had objected so her travel was postponed. FERNANDEZ is billeted in the apartment (5 M, 220 East 63rd Street) previously occupied by Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez, Attache; GELABERT is staying temporarily with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, First Secretary, in his apartment in Queens, 15 M, 61-15 97th Street, Elmhurst. Neither GELABERT nor RODRIGUEZ is happy over this turn of events. FERNANDEZ is married, but Source does not know anything about her husband.

3. FERNANDEZ is fat and ugly; she does not dress well. She is a mulatto. She is not known for her intelligence quotient. She has a somewhat rigid personality and does not get along well with people, male or female. She is convinced that she is discriminated against because she is part negro. FERNANDEZ considers herself as a revolutionary but does not seem to understand politics and ideologies. She takes herself extremely seriously. Within MINREX she is a "loner"; older than most of her female professional associates, she has nothing in common with them and her overbearing attitude is offensive to them. Source believes that it is almost a foregone conclusion that FERNANDEZ and Permanent Representative ALARCON will have a run-in, based on their respective personalities.

4. FERNANDEZ' brother, Oscar FERNANDEZ Padilla, is Vice-Minister for Labor Justice, Ministry of Labor. He is an "old guard" Communist, and Victoria FERNANDEZ is thus linked in some minds to the out-of-favor old guard herself.

5. In previous years Victoria FERNANDEZ has served as an instructress in the civil defense program. She has enjoyed being in a position of authority over those normally, outside the training program, her superiors in position and ability.

6. She has no known intelligence/security affiliations, but Source believes that she would be happy to collaborate with the DGI or DSE if so requested.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 26 JANUARY 1970

Esperanza BALLESTER Fernandez, Cuban Government Official

1. Esperanza BALLESTER Fernandez, born 12 March 1927 in Havana, attended the Ninth Session of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Governing Council in New York City 19-27 January 1970.

2. At the present time BALLESTER is Chief, Technical Assistance Section, Directorate of International Organizations, Cuban Foreign Ministry. In January 1967 BALLESTER, as an Observer, attended the Third Session of the UNDP Governing Council in New York City; in January 1969 she attended the Seventh Session. She is not known to have any intelligence/security affiliation.

3. On 26 January 1970 Source "ELGIN" commented on BALLESTER as follows.

> While ostensibly an ardent revolutionary, BALLESTER does not really understand revolution and appears to be confused. Among other things, she is disturbed by the fact that her mother and brother left Cuba. The former is in Miami, but BALLESTER is reluctant to have any contact with her at this time because she fears the Cuban Government would misunderstand. Instead, BALLESTER is considering making a request for official Cuban Government authorization to meet her mother outside the U.S. at a later date.
>
> BALLESTER is a hard-working "bureaucrat" who attacks her work conscientiously. Her husband, Rafael MARTEL, is a well-known Cuban radiologist who currently is serving an 18 month tour in North Vietnam with a Cuban technical aid group. BALLESTER and MARTEL are quite wealthy, by Cuban standards, and both are undertaking their current jobs out of loyalty to Fidel.

19-6-133/3

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY: Bz PER ________ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

FILE, VR C/WH/SA C/DO4 C/FI2 C/CI C/CI/RS C/RF5

ACTION NO. 113

S E C R E T 222226Z JAN 72 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 7392

(MILESWORTH ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMLOSE DOMOPS

REF DIRECTOR -662301

23 JAN IN 015755

1. BASE OFFICER FIGALAN HAS DISCUSSED JENNIFER ENID MILES, SUBJ REF, AND HER DGI ROLE WITH LOCAL LNERGO OFFICE. NOTE LNERGO WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE HANDLING CASE. LOCAL LNERGO ONLY ON PERIPHERY, ALTHOUGH OP INVOLVES CUBAN OFFICER ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ. MILES BACK IN WASHINGTON AS OF MID JANUARY 72.

2. BASE WILL CONTINUE MONITOR MILES CASE THROUGH LOCAL LNERGO, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE HDQS CONTINUING FORWARD TO US ALL LNERGO HDQS DISSEMS THIS MATTER.

3. FILE 201-356915 (MILES), 201-332655 (RODRIGUEZ).

S E C R E T

SECRET

FBI doc. (X-ref.)
26 Jan. 70
Re: Rodriguez Lopez, Rogelio

FBI doc.
12 Dec. 69 (Wash.)
Re: Jennifer Enid Miles
Bufile: (LA)-65-73121

FBI doc (X-ref)
9 Dec. 69
Re: Rodriguez-Lopez, Rogelio

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 13 JAN 70

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

Extra Copy

FILE, VR. CI/SO, C/EUR5, C/AF5, C/DO4, C/CI, C/FI,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

13 23 32 z JAN 70

CITE DIRECTOR 002301

OTTAWA MADRID PARIS LONDON MEXICO CITY

INFO WH/MIAMI DO BASE NEW YORK PRETORIA

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE

Irish File

→ Vasques FYI

1. LNERCO HAS REQUESTED ANY INFO THAT COMES TO RVROCK'S ATTENTION RE TRAVEL AND ACTIVITIES OF IDENTITY, KNOWN DGI AGENT. REPORTEDLY PLANNED FOLLOWING TRIP TO EUROPE: 24 DEC 69 WASHINGTON, D.C. TO CANADA. 27 DEC 69 CANADA TO MADRID WHERE SHE HAD EIGHT DAY RESERVATION AT UNNAMED HOTEL. THEN PLANNED FOUR DAYS IN PARIS AND FOUR DAYS IN LONDON PRIOR TO RETURNING TO WASHINGTON.

2. SUBJ TRAVELED TO CUBA FROM MEXICO CITY 22 DEC 67, RETURNING 25 MAR 68. IS PRESENTLY IN CONTACT WITH KNOWN DGI OFFICER STATIONED AT CUBAN UN MISSION, NYC (COPY OF 201 BEING POUCHED NEW YORK, TM #S074683).

3. SAME INFO AND REQUEST GIVEN TO LNERCO REPS AT ACTION ADDRESSEES BY THEIR HQS. PLS DO NOT QUERY LOCAL LIAISON.

4. FILE 201-860915.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

Jennifer MILES

6
4
3
2
1

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

______ PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 002301

PAGE 2

C/WH/COG

C/EUR/BC

E/F Mr. Silsby (draft)

E/IB/S Mr. Sorrels (draft)

C/AF/COPS/CI Mr. Bergin (draft)

C/AF/2/SA Mr. Fuller (draft)

DC/WH/1 Mr. Tsikerdanos (draft)

C/CI/OPS/AF Mr. Caveadine (draft)

C/CI/OPS/WH Mr. Hughes (draft)

DO/I/B2 Mr. Markham (draft)

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG: J. MERTZ:mamd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 13 JAN 70

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	[illegible]	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY d/b PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO: ______

CONF: [illegible] INFO FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T

13 23 32z JAN 70

CITE DIRECTOR 002302

TO OTTAWA MADRID PARIS LONDON MEXICO CITY

INFO WH/MIAMI DO BASE NEW YORK PRETORIA

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE

REF: DIRECTOR 002301

IDEN: JENNIFER ENID MILES.

DGI ALIAS: MARY; CIT: SOUTH AFRICA; DPOB: 6 MAY 44, KIMBERLY, SA.; HT: 5FT 9IN; WT: 130-135 LBS; HAIR: BLOND; EYES: BLUE; PP: "O" 20107 ISSUED 26 JUN 68, OTTAWA; OCC: SECRETARY AT SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, SINCE APR 69. PREVIOUSLY WORKED TORONTO AND LONDON BUT NOT AS EMPLOYEE OF SOUTH AFRICANS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG
C/EUR/BC
E/F Mr. Silsby (draft)
E/IB/S Mr. Sorrels (draft)
C/AF/COPS/CI Mr. Bergin (draft)
C/AF/2/SA Mr. Fuller (draft)
DC/WH/1 Mr. Tsikerdanos (draft)
C/CI/OPS/AF Mr. Caveadine (draft)
C/CI/OPS/WH Mr. Hughes (draft)
DO/I/B2 Mr. Markham (draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE
COMMENTS

FROM:

EO/SD

Bettie

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. ci/Reg		31 OCT 1969	[illegible]	[illegible]
2. c/ci/ops		Dale		
3. Brown				
4. ~~[illegible]~~				P
5. Ennis			[illegible]	S
6. Harvester				
7. Piccolo				P
8. Mabry				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				

File

MICROFILMED
OCT 31 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RYBAT

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT X INDEX X	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)	19-6-133/4
DATE MICROFILMED		DOCUMENT DATE 23 Oct 69	DOCUMENT NUMBER UNDA 04684

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

RYBAT
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

TO
Chief, WH COG

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

INFO.
COS, WH MIAMI; Chief, DO UCOD

FROM
Acting COB, New York

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE - Debriefing of AMCLOCK/1 on Cuban UN Mission and Delegation Personalities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Extract for appropriate 201 files

Refs: a. UNDA-4675, 14 October 1969
b. UNDA-4676, 14 October 1969

1. Attached herewith for C/WH/COG and COS/WH/MIAMI are two copies each of three memoranda concerning results of an 11 October 1969 debriefing of AMCLOCK/1 by Howard G. FIGALAN on CMUN and Delegation personalities. The meeting with AMCLOCK/1 was necessarily brief, and thus the results are not as extensive as those forwarded by the two referenced dispatches (from a 6 October meeting with AMCLOCK/1).

2. A copy of each of the memoranda has been passed by FIGALAN to the local LNERGO Cuban Squad, per our existing informal arrangement. "ELGIN" is the code name for AMCLOCK/1 as used between the Base and LNERGO here.

3. Items should be extracted for the appropriate 201 files.

Howard G. FIGALAN

Attachments:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Chief, WH/COG, w/atts.
2 - COS, WH/MIAMI, w/atts.
2 - Chief, DO, wo/atts.

MICROFILMED
OCT 31 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1 ATT

COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA-4684	23 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-6-133/4

SECRET

31

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 11 OCTOBER 1969

CUBAN-UN MISSION PERSONALITIES

ZR 201-834376

1. Pedro Luis PINERO Elvin, Third Secretary. ELGIN stated that PINERO continues to spend much of his time with Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso of the Cuban UNGA Delegation. ELGIN said that PINERO seems to have the approval of the DGI Center here for his modish dress and his excursions to Greenwich Village, et al. ELGIN assumed that PINERO is being used by the DGI Center to roam around town at night meeting new people in the hopes of developing U.S. contacts. Apparently PINERO's garb at times approaches that of a hippie. ✓

ZR 201-815281

2. Pablo DRAKE Capiro, Attache-designate. DRAKE is scheduled to arrive here in late October to replace Rafael AGUILERA Batista, Attache and DSE code clerk. ELGIN did not recognize DRAKE's name and could furnish no information concerning him. 201-351449 ✓

ZR 201-853407

3. Jose Osvaldo GARCIA Calvo, Attache-designate. GARCIA had been scheduled to come here in July 1969 as an aide to Antonio DE SOUZA, CMUN Advisor. His wife, Nydya Irene ARROYO Martinez, was to have been a secretary to Ambassador Ricardo ALARCON Quesada. ELGIN said that GARCIA and ARROYO will not be coming to New York; their assignment has been cancelled. ARROYO currently is working in the Cuban Foreign Ministry (MINREX), but GARCIA has been sacked from MINREX and is now somewhere in the interior of Cuba. GARCIA fell into official disfavor because a girl friend of his denounced him to the DSE, either because GARCIA would not divorce his wife and marry her, or because she just became disenchanted with him for some reason. Moreover, GARCIA in his MINREX capacity had accompanied the British Ambassador in Cuba on a provincial tour several months ago. During the tour, the Ambassador, apparently favorably impressed by GARCIA, invited him to visit the United Kingdom. GARCIA neglected to report this invitation to the proper Cuban authorities, and when the fact of the invitation leaked out, GARCIA was suspended from MINREX.

4. MISCELLANEOUS. Although he naturally would not be aware of the specifics, ELGIN commented that it appears to him that the DGI Center here is extremely active operationally and seems to have more than enough funds at its disposal to pursue such activities.

MICROFILMED
OCT 31 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

1b ATT. 1 to UNDA-4684 CS COPY 19-6-133/4

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON [illegible] OCTOBER 1969

[illegible] ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, CMUN FIRST SECRETARY AND DGI OFFICER

1. ELGIN was shown the two photographs (as furnished by your office) of the individual believed to be Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, CMUN First Secretary and DGI officer, who was engaged in an intelligence activity in Queens on Saturday night, 4 October 1969. ELGIN identified the better of the two photographs as RODRIGUEZ; his identification was unhesitating. In questioning ELGIN further to be sure that he was positively convinced that the individual in question was RODRIGUEZ, ELGIN stated that RODRIGUEZ had recently had his hair cut and that it was now lying flatter on his head and that he was keeping it "slicked down" with water or oil. There was no doubt at all in ELGIN's mind that the individual was RODRIGUEZ. ELGIN has known RODRIGUEZ for several years and has seen him here this past month fairly frequently.

2. ELGIN could not furnish any information as to where RODRIGUEZ might have been over the week-end of 4/5 October. He did not see him on either of those two days.

3. ELGIN commented that RODRIGUEZ has been spending quite a bit of time lately with Maria de los Angeles FLORES Prida, an Alternate Representative of the Cuban UNGA Delegation. Their companionship is assumed by ELGIN to be more in the social line than in the professional line. RODRIGUEZ is a bachelor; FLORES is a divorcee.

SECRET

[illegible] AMERICA [illegible] SOURCE "[illegible]" [illegible] OCTOBER [illegible]

CUBAN UNGA DELEGATION PERSONALITIES

ZR 201-791533

1. Roberto Miguel FERNANDEZ Vasquez, Advisor. ELGIN stated that he had seen very little of FERNANDEZ in the previous week, and could offer no new information on him or on his activities. FERNANDEZ seems to shun most of the Delegation and Mission personnel apart from his fellow DGI people.

ZR 201-338693

2. Augusto C. VEGA Hernandez, Advisor-designate. Although VEGA has been carried on the provisional Cuban Delegation listing, he has yet to appear here. ELGIN was not familiar with VEGA's name, but he commented that he had heard talk of another Advisor coming here in October; ELGIN thought that possibly this could be VEGA.

3. Maria de los Angeles FLORES Prida, Alternate Representative. FLORES has been spending quite a bit of time with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, CMUN First Secretary and DGI officer. RODRIGUEZ is also an Alternate Representative of the Delegation. Their companionship is assumed by ELGIN to be more in the social line than in the professional line.

19-6-133/4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. — 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM — 8. DATE OF INFO. — 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST — 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN — 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665 019-500
SEX M DOB ? UNDA-04682
21 OCT 69
CIT ?
OCC ?
CMUN FIRST SECY AND DGI OFFICER,
ARRIVED JUN 69

R 6910300759

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

[illegible]

DISPATCH

RYBAT
SECRET

X

TO: Chief, WH/COG

INFO: COS, WH/MIAMI; Chief, DO

FROM: COS, New York

SUBJECT: TYPIC/[illegible]
Cuban Activity Reports, 1 July - 30 September 1969

Action Required: FYI, and abstracting to appropriate 201 files

Reference: UNDA-4583, 10 July 1969

1. Transmitted herewith for Chief, WH/COG, and COS, WH/MIAMI, are one copy each of the monthly Cuban activity reports prepared by the undersigned concerning operational activity against the official Cuban target in New York for the months of July, August, and September 1969.

2. It is suggested that abstracts be placed in the appropriate 201 files.

Howard G. FIGALAN

Attachment:
Reports, as stated above

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Chief, WH/COG, w/atts
2 - Chief, DO, w/o/atts.
2 - COS, WH/MIAMI, w/atts.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

CS COPY

OCT 2 . [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UNDA-4682	DATE 21 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-500

14-00000

SECRET

NYM-6825 2P

5 August 1969

MEMORANDUM

Distribution:
1 - Unit A (DUMMY)
1 - Unit B (DUMMY)
1 - COB/MAR
3 - HGF

TO : Chief of Base

FROM : Howard G. FIGALAN

SUBJECT: ISOLOG/Operations
Western Hemisphere Targets, Group II: Cuba
Monthly Activities Report, July 1969

1. During July 1969 the writer continued in contact with AMBEDEW/3. No Intelligence Information Report disseminations sourced to AMBEDEW/1 were received from Headquarters during July, nor were any operational information squibs received. Results of the photos sent for identification by AMBEDEW/1 via UNDA-4574, 26 June, were not received by the end of July. Although AMBEDEW/1 was "surfaced" on 16 July, the Base was not advised of the vehicle by Headquarters until 23 July, after the Base had queried via DO BASE NEW YORK 6372. Fortunately, AMBEDEW/3 advised the Base of the media of surfacing prior to 23 July. The surfacing had minimal impact locally, as the vehicle chosen for the surfacing does not reach the local observer as would the New York Times, the New York Daily News, or the New York Post. With the turnover of AMBEDEW/1 to WODISH for resettlement, the case, for informational purposes, is closed.

2. DO BASE NEW YORK 6697 concerned the effort to expel Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato (201-331832), CUMY First Secretary and Deputy Chief of the DGI Center; and Lazaro ESPINOSA Bonet (201-816433), Third Secretary and DGI officer; and the intent to deny a reentry visa to Jorge REYES Vega (201-816437), Second Secretary and DGI officer, who is currently in Cuba on leave. Subsequently, BOZA left for Cuba on leave on 27 July; his wife already had returned to Cuba in June. Additionally, the following CUMYers will be placed on "warning" status and liable to expulsion if any further illicit activities occur: Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin (201-824376), Third Secretary and DGI officer; Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz (201-816439), Attache and DGI officer; and Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953), Counsellor and DGI officer.

3. Shortly before his departure on leave, Jorge REYES Vega introduced on 9 June Base asset WUHABIT/1 to REYES' "replacement" for the leave period. This turned out to be Orlando E. PEREIRA Gonzalez (201-848505), newly arrived First Secretary. The threesome lunched, and REYES did most of the talking, concentrating on the Cuban election to the Governing Council of the UN Development Programme. WUHABIT/1 did ascertain that PEREIRA spoke fair English and good Russian, and PEREIRA volunteered that he had spent two years in the Soviet Union (he was a First Secretary in

ES COPY

SECRET

H/W ATT. 1 to UNDA-4682 NYBAT 19-500

the Cuban Embassy in Moscow 1967/1969. In introducing PEREIRA, REYES stressed that WUHABIT/1 should feel free to discuss any subject with him, and in turn told PEREIRA that he should call upon WUHABIT/1 whenever PEREIRA needed advice or help. While RYBAT traces did not reveal any intelligence affiliation for PEREIRA, the Base and local LNERGO strongly suspect that PEREIRA is a DGI officer. His behavior in the future months will undoubtedly confirm or deny this.

4. The most noteworthy new arrival, [illegible] RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665), First Secretary and DGI officer, has been lying dormant since his arrival in early June. He is living, presumably temporarily, in the CMUN. Julio [illegible] Gil (201-351731), another new First Secretary, also has been quiet since his June arrival.

ZR

5. UNDA-4578, 3 July, transmitted a current listing of CMUN personnel to WH/Miami for use in debriefing AMCARD/1 as to any knowledge or acquaintanceship with any of them. The writer and BETHOURN of WH/Miami discussed in New York on 1 July the possible move of AMCARD/1 to the New York area.

6. The month of July appeared to be a quiet one for both the legitimate CMUN personnel and the DGI Center.

19-500

SECRET

RYBAT

[illegible]-6707

28

8 September 1969

MEMORANDUM

Distribution:
1 - Unit A (DUMMY)
1 - Unit B (DUMMY)
1 - COD/MAR
3 - HGF

TO : Chief of Base

FROM : Howard G. FIGALAN

SUBJECT: ISOLCG/Operational
Western Hemisphere Targets, Group II: Cuba
Monthly Activities Report, August 1969

1. AMBEDEW/1 arrived in the area for resettlement on 1 August 1969. Although WODISH is handling the administrative aspects of the resettlement, the writer is staying in periodic contact with AMBEDEW/1 and AMBEDEW/3 for future operational purposes (e.g., debriefing AMBEDEW/1 on new CMUN arrivals, etc.). Results of the last batch of photographs forwarded by UNDA-4574, 26 June, were received via DIRECTOR 25971 in early August.

2. On 20 August the UN Secretary General was briefed by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN on the illicit activities of Lazaro ESPINOSA Bonet (201-816438), CMUN Third Secretary and DGI officer, and Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato (201-331832), First Secretary and Deputy Chief of the DGI Center. The following morning, 21 August, the CMUN was advised by diplomatic note that ESPINOSA should expeditiously depart the U.S. and that BOZA (then in Cuba on leave) would not be allowed a reentry visa. Jorge REYES Vega (201-816437), Second Secretary and DGI officer, also was requested to confine his activities to those related directly to his status as an officer of a mission to the UN. (See DO BASE NEW YORK 6763 for background.) The story surfaced in the press the following day, 22 August.

3. In mid-August LNERGO advised the writer that ANCLOCK/1 would be visiting the U.S. This was the first indication to RYROCK of his possible travel here this year.

4. On 30 August AMDELAY/1 arrived in the area for resettlement.

5. In late August the Base with local LNERGO monitored, for WH/MIAMI, the AMGAIT/1 matter involving Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin (201-824376), CMUN Third Secretary and DGI officer. We were all in agreed opinion that PINERO would not show up for the 28 August meeting as it had been laid on prior to the events cited in paragraph 2 above; we were correct as PINERO did not appear. See DO BASE NEW YORK 6792 for background. It is likely that the local DGI Center will remain more operationally quiet for a time because of the knocks taken by the DGI lately: the expulsion of Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar, the defection of AMBEDEW/1, the expulsion of

SECRET

RYBAT

NW ATT 2 to UNDA-4682

19-500

SECRET

RYBAT

DOZA and ESPINOSA, and the defection of AMDELAY/1 all coming within the past six months.

6. In mid-September the Cuban Delegation to the 24th UN General Assembly will start arriving in sections. The first arrives on 11 September, the second 15 September, and the last on the 18th. Not surprisingly, the name of AMCURVE/1 (201-333971) is not among those coming. We doubt that he will be out for quite some time, if ever. The bulk of the Representatives, Alternate Representatives, and Advisors of the Delegation have been here before for General Assemblies. The distaff side will be well represented by Marta JIMENEZ Martinez, Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso, and Maria de los Angeles FLORES Prida; the first two are well known to us from previous General Assemblies. Ramon OROZA Naveran, an Advisor of the Delegation, is well-known to us as a leading official of DGI Headquarters.

SECRET

RYBAT

19-500

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
TRANSMITTAL OF PHOTOS

201-858915
UNDA-04679
21 OCT 69

UFA

R 6910311045

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/ SD

FROM:

RID/ SD

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE
COMMENTS

Bettie

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.		29 OCT 1969		WA
2. CA/KC/Lopez				
3. Brown				
4. Piccolo				P
5. Ernie				E
6. Merty				
7. Darryl Lucky				
8. Piccolo				P
9.				
10.				
11. ~~Piccolo~~				
12. Maury				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				

one copy removed

MICROFILMED
OCT 28 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RYBAT

File

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX X

DATE MICROFILMED

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 19-6-133/4

DOCUMENT DATE 14 Oct 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER UHDA 04675

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH

RYBAT
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH/COG

INFO.
COS, WH/MIAMI; Chief, DO

FROM
COB, New York

SUBJECT
TYPIC/DOMOPS/AMLOSE
Debriefing of AMCLOCK/1 on Cuban UN Mission and Delegation Personalities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Extract for appropriate 201 files

1. Attached herewith for C/WH/COG and COS/WH/MIAMI are two copies each of two memoranda concerning results of a 6 October 1969 debriefing of AMCLOCK/1 by Howard G. FIGALAN on Cuban UN Mission and UNGA Delegation personalities.

2. A copy of each of the two memoranda has been passed by FIGALAN to the local LNERGO Cuban Squad, per our existing informal agreement. "ELGIN" is the code name for AMCLOCK/1 as used between the Base and LNERGO here.

3. Results of the 6 October meeting concerning Marta JIMENEZ Martinez (201-784065) of the Cuban Delegation have been forwarded to above addressees by separate dispatch.

4. The writer anticipates that further and more detailed debriefing information on personalities of local interest to this Base and LNERGO will be forthcoming in future sessions with AMCLOCK/1.

5. Items should be extracted for the appropriate 201 files.

Howard G. FIGALAN

Distribution:
2-WH/COG, w/both atts.
2-WH/Miami, w/both atts
2-DO, w/o atts.

MICROFILMED
OCT 28 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachments:
As stated above

OCT 14 1969

COPY

2 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA-4675	13 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 19-6-133/4

SECRET

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 6 OCTOBER 1969

CUBAN UN MISSION PERSONALITIES

ZR 201-850951

1. Pedro Amado MORALES Carballo, Counsellor. Source stated that MORALES has no intelligence/security affiliation. He is close to Fidel CASTRO Ruz. He is "very frivolous", not a serious type of person. Although MORALES is an Alternate Representative on the II Committee of the UNGA, he knows little about the issues or the work of the Committee. He has intellectual pretenses, but in actuality is of somewhat limited intellectual capacity. Does not take his work seriously. Source termed him a "tonto". Source is not aware whether MORALES has had any contacts with Cyrus EATON since MORALES' arrival here. ✓

all in USA as of 6 Oct 1969

ZR 201-851731

2. Julio ALOM Gil, First Secretary. Source stated that ALOM has no intelligence/security affiliation. ALOM is very close to Ambassador Ricardo ALARCON Quesada. ✓

ZR 201-843605

3. Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez, First Secretary. Source stated that PEREIRA is a DGI officer. He speaks a "little" Russian learned when he was assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Moscow. PEREIRA is a close associate of Manuel PINEIRO Losada, Chief of the DGI. PEREIRA is the DGI replacement for Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar, former CMUN Counsellor; however, JIMENEZ' diplomatic replacement is Pedro Amado MORALES Carballo. Source does not personally like PEREIRA. Just before PEREIRA was assigned to New York he married Maria de los Angeles LOPEZ Canas. ✓ Until her marriage, LOPEZ served as secretary to the Chief of the Cuban Communist Youth Organization. She now works part-time in the CMUN as a teletype operator.

ZR 201-332665

4. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, First Secretary. RODRIGUEZ is a bachelor, which Source stated is rare among DGI personnel assigned abroad. Source stated that RODRIGUEZ has a frank and open manner, also rare among DGI personnel. ✓

ZR 201-850953

5. Florentino JIMENEZ Padron, Attache. Source stated that JIMENEZ has no intelligence/security affiliation. He is the CMUN chauffeur. Member of the Cuban Communist Party. A "campesino" type. Came to the Foreign Ministry as a chauffeur from the Cuban Armed Forces. JIMENEZ enjoys good personal relations with Foreign Minister Raul ROA, and is under ROA's "protection". ✓ During his assignment at the Cuban Embassy in Prague, JIMENEZ initiated a one-time sexual liaison with a local woman with

OTJL

SECRET

CS COPY

MICROFILMED
OCT 28 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

H/W ATT. 1 to UNDA-4675

19-6-133/4

the approval of the DGI Center. He continued the liaison, however, and the DGI Center complained to the Foreign Ministry; ROA bailed JIMENEZ out.

ZR 201-846371

6. Serafin GARCIA Rodriguez, Attache. GARCIA (who had arrived here in February 1969) has departed permanently from New York for Cuba.

ZR 201-824376

7. Pedro Luis PINERO Zirin, Third Secretary. Source stated that PINERO and Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso, member of the Cuban UNGA Delegation, of late are always together, day and night. Marta JIMENEZ Martinez commented that one time Lohania did not return to her room until 0400 hours in the morning after having been with PINERO. Source assumes that PINERO and ARUCA are having an affair. (In 1967, during the UNGA, ARUCA and Nicolas RODRIGUEZ Astiazarain, then CMUN Counsellor, were romantically involved; ARUCA expected RODRIGUEZ to divorce his wife and marry her -- he didn't). ✓

ZR 201-839221

8. Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez, Attache. Source was told by Jorge REYES Vega, Second Secretary, that GELABERT and his wife, Neida BLANDY Reyes, returned to Cuba at the direction of the CMUN because BLANDY was behaving promiscuously ("como una prostituta"). They plan to divorce. Source doubts that GELABERT will return to New York. Source did not know the person or persons with whom Neida BLANDY was sexually misbehaving. Source said that REYES commented to him that GELABERT appeared to be afraid of BLANDY. ✓

9. MISCELLANEOUS

ZR 201-330002

(A) Source continues to regard Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez, First Secretary and Chief of the local DGI Center, as a very "simpatico" person. He also thinks well of Teresita FERNANDEZ Arango, PRENDES' wife, as a person. PRENDES spends little time outside of the CMUN. As Chief of the DGI Center he concerns himself principally with administration of the Center's personnel and operational activities, leaving conduct of actual operations to his subordinates. ✓

ZR 201-328953

(B) Source thinks that Jose Raul VIERA Linares, Counsellor, may be acting as the deputy to PRENDES. At any rate, after PRENDES, the three ranking DGI personnel are VIERA, Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, and Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez (not necessarily in that order). ✓

SECRET

201-836757

(C) Rolando PEREZ Alfonso, Attache, and Rafael AGUILERA Batista, Attache, continue as the two code clerks.

201-351449

201-816439

(D) Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz, Attache, is very interested in radios. SANTANA is a "disagreeable person", and rarely speaks. Source is not sure whether SANTANA is with the DGI or the DSE.

SECRET

19-6-133/4

14-00000

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 6 OCTOBER 1969

CUBAN UNGA DELEGATION PERSONALITIES

201-357128

1. HOUSING ARRANGEMENTS. Fernando ALVAREZ Tabio, Ambassador, and Enrique CAMEJO Argudin, Ambassador, are rooming together in the Peter Cooper Hotel. Marta JIMENEZ Martinez, Minister, Maria de los Angeles FLORES Prida, First Secretary, and Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso, First Secretary, are rooming together at the Peter Cooper Hotel. Roberto Miguel FERNANDEZ Vasquez, Antonio Bruno FERNANDEZ Pajon, and Victor Manuel GONZALEZ Valdez, all Advisors, have moved from the Peter Cooper and are now staying in the apartment of Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez, #5 M, 220 East 63rd Street. (It is possible that one of the Cuban diplomatic couriers is also staying in the GELABERT apartment as well). 201-79133

201-255771 201-[illegible]

2. DELEGATION ADVISORS. All of the "Advisors" on the Delegation are with the DGI. Ramon OROZA Naveran, Manuel MARTINEZ Galan, and Raul Ceferino ZAYAS Linares have gone to Canada to "inspect" the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa; from there they will return to Cuba via Mexico. They do not plan to return to New York enroute home. Source thinks that the other three Advisors -- FERNANDEZ, FERNANDEZ, and GONZALEZ -- will remain in New York until the end of the UNGA. They are currently taking English lessons for several hours most mornings (place not known to Source). Source considers that these three are all "disagreeable" people -- very reserved and not at all friendly. Source considers Roberto FERNANDEZ Vasquez to be a "sinverguenza".

201-276104

3. MISCELLANEOUS. Carlos OLIVARES Sanchez, formerly Cuban Ambassador to the Soviet Union and formerly a high ranking official of the Foreign Ministry, may attend a later portion of the UNGA. OLIVARES is in Boston to have an eye operation at Massachusetts General Hospital. He may stop off in New York enroute back to Cuba. OLIVARES' influence in Cuba has been waning ever since Fidel CASTRO began replacing the "Old Guard Communists" with "Fidelistas".

SECRET

CS COPY

MICROFILMED
OCT 28 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

H/W ATT. 2 to UNDA-4675

19-6-133/4

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
AKA ROGELIO
INFO AS REPORTED IN DEBRIEFING OF SUBJ OF
201-815358

019-005-034
316 -0312069
02 SEP 69
P41

R 7003300131

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. · 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM · 8. DATE OF INFO. · 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST · 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN · 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ / LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ? 35

CIT ?
OCC ?
ADDITIONAL INFO AND TRACES

201-334253
UFAA-01145A01
31 JUL 69
P2

S 6908060705

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI doc,
30 July '69 (Wash.)
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
no Bufile given

23 JUN 1969

ASSIGNED AGENT: C. JOHNSON 6/19/69
AX File # 105-RC

NAME: LOPEZ, ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ
AKA's

DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH: 5/3/42, Havana, Cuba.
SEX :

CITIZENSHIP:

FOREIGN TRAVEL & DATES:

Ref Jak

6-24-69

IDENTIFICATION #'s

NAI to, CSCI-316/00696-64 dated 25 August 1964, subject: shipment of Exp Commies to Mexico and CSCI-3/782,061 dated 29 July 1964, subject ~~[illegible]~~ as above.

ADDRESSES:

OCCUPATION & EMPLOYMENT & DATES

9-10/67, Technical Aide of the Cuban Government at the 22nd Session of the General Assembly of the UN.

RELATIVES:

24 JUN 1969

14-00000

104-10180-10050

INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, USC Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY MEXICO CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/552,869

SUBJECT NAMES AND PASSPORT NUMBERS OF CUBANS FLYING FROM HABANA TO MEXICO CITY

DATE DISTR. 10 JULY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

all TRAVEL

REFERENCES IN 76244

DATE OF INFO. 6 & 8 JULY 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (9 JULY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 7504

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PERSONS (B) WITH GOOD ACCESS TO TRAVEL INFORMATION.

1. TRAVEL DATA SHOWS THE FOLLOWING CUBANS ARRIVED IN MEXICO CITY FROM HABANA VIA AIR ON THE DATES INDICATED: 6 JULY 1963: ALICIA FERNANDEZ ESTEVES, PP NO 23747; MARTA MARTINEZ GARCIA, PP NO E/63/389; RAFAELA CHACON MARDI, PP NO E/63/388; AGUSTIN YASELLS GONZALEZ, PP NO DIPLOMATIC D/61/509; MARIO OIZ FOLGUEIRA, PP NO DIPLOMATIC D/63/447; IRMA MILAN OLIVERA, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/433; FIDEL ARMONA Mila MILAN, INFANT, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/433; SILVIA B. REYNES MONTES DE OCA, PP NO 32489; MARTHA CABALLER DARDER, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/432; ~~MARTHA CONCEPCION, INFANT,~~ DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/432; RAUL A. MACUER Parra PARRA, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/451; RAUL PEREIRA VAZQUEZ, PP NO E/ RODRIGUEZ, INFANT, PP NO 63/456; ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/454 AND ESTER GAVILAN ROGALES, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/455.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE FBI CINCSO CINCLANT.

His wife

RODRIGUEZ (Lopez) Rogelio

CUBA

The September 2nd issue of the Diario Oficial of the Government of Mexico reveals several changes in the personnel of the Cuban Embassy during the month of August. New arrivals were Raul APARICIO Nogales, Counselor for Cultural Affairs, Rogelio RODRIGUEZ/Lopez, Second Secretary, and Elpidio [illegible] Comesaños, Attaché. The single departure during the month was Armando SARDINAS Garcia, Attaché.

13 Sept. 1963
Mexico A-336

UNCLASSIFIED

RODRIGUEZ Lopez Rogelio

DELEGATE TO MEXICAN NATIONAL ACADEMY OF MEDICINE INTERVIEWED -- Havana, Hoy, 15 May 64

Pedro Baeza, Cuban delegate to the Centenary celebration of the National Academy of Mexico, was interviewed upon his return to Havana. The most important event at the celebration, he told reporters, was his meeting with US scientist Linus Pauling who wishes to visit Cuba.

BOLIVIAN DELEGATE TO LABOR DAY CELEBRATION LAUDS REVOLUTION -- Havana, Hoy, 20 May 64

Paulino Tito Calle, secretary for foreign affairs of the Agrarian Workers Union of Canton Coyana, Arona Province of La Paz Department, Bolivia, praised the Cuban Revolution and branded as false the propaganda against it. He is a member of the Bolivian delegation to the Cuban celebration of Labor Day which included Alejandro Silva and Mario Cortes.

SECOND SECRETARY RETURNS TO MEXICO CITY POST -- Havana, Hoy, 17 May 64

13F

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, second secretary in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, left Havana by plane for Mexico City to resume his post.

AMBASSADOR TO UN DEPARTS FOR NEW YORK -- Havana, Revolucion, 19 May 64

Ambassador to the UN Carlos M. Lechuga, accompanied by his wife Gladys Lauderman and daughter Miriam, left Havana for New York City to resume his post on 18 May.

SINGER TOURS COMMUNIST CHINA CITIES -- Havana, Revolucion, 19 May 64

Cuban singer Miriam Acevedo, who sang in various cities in the Soviet Union, is currently appearing in various cities in Communist China such as Peiping, Nanking, and Shanghai. While in the latter city, she was visited by Cuban students.

DISPATCH | SECRET

X MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of

INFO
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
C TYPIC/DOMOPS/AMBEDEW Rogelio RODRIQUEZ Lopez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Reference your telephone request of 24 June 1969 requesting a photograph of Eugelio RODRIGUEZ which is better than the one appearing in the Cuban Mugbook, it is believed that Subject of your request is Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, whose photograph is included in the Mugbook. There is no photograph of Eugelio RODRIGUEZ.

2. Forwarded herewith for your retention is a photograph of Rogelio *RODRIQUEZ Lopez, recently designated First Secretary, CMUN, who was scheduled to travel to New York via Mexico in early June 1969. Unfortunately, this photograph is little, if any, better than the one in the Cuban Mugbook. It is the only other photograph available at Headquarters.

3. AMBEDEW-1 has been shown and has positively identified the attached photo as Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, a DGI officer in Section III who was known to AMBEDEW-1 as "Rogelio." A-1 last saw Rogelio in Paris on 21 November 1968, at which time Rogelio was enroute to Conakry on what A-1 thought to be an important mission. It appeared that someone in Conakry could not leave until Rogelio arrived. A-1 understood that Rogelio had been in the UN Mission in New York, or in Canada, in 1964-65.

4. The above information may be passed to LNERGO.

Olive S. ECKHOLM

Distribution:
2 - COB, New York, att. h/w
1 - COS, WH/Miami, w/o att.

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
19-6-139/4	UNDW-2947	3 JUL 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-332665 ✓

Distribution:
1 - DO/I/B2
1 - WH/COG/OPS (Betty)
1 - Originator
1 - RID

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
PS
BX
~~DES~~ ~~NFD~~
FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE		TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	R. Pryor	ch	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG		David A. Phillips
DO/I/B2		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DO		Gordon Jorgensen

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION MFG. 11-63

(40)

DISPATCH

Dept. of State
27 June 64
A-1517
Re: Changes in Soviet Bloc Diplomatic
Personnel in Mexico

FBI doc. (X-ref)
4 Jun 69
Re: Rodriguez, Rogelio

FBI doc.
27 May 69 (Wash)
Re: Cuban Mission to the U.N.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: DARYL GEISLER:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 5061 R. 1457
DATE: 24 APRIL 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 6 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR. R/AN DO 4,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 25 14 57Z APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 96045

TO DO BASE NEW YORK INFO: WH/MIAMI

TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE

REF: DO BASE NEW YORK 6232 (IN 37470)

1. FOLLOWING TRACES ON ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ SUBSEQUENT SEPT 67:

A. LNREAD (~~[illegible]~~) DOCUMENT REPORTED HE SON OF LONG TIME MEMBER OF PARTIDO SOCIALISTA POPULAR. MARRIED TO ESTER GAVILAN NOGALES (DBC 2003, 30 NOVEMBER 67).

B. QUTIMID 15 SEPTEMBER 68 SAID RODRIGUEZ ARRIVING MADRID FOLLOWING DAY IN TRANSIT TO GUINEA (~~POSSIBLY SPANISH GUINEA~~) AND THAT HE TRAVELING WITHOUT VISA BECAUSE HAD TO LEAVE HAVANA IN HURRY.

C. AMBEDEW/1 REPORTED THAT RODRIGUEZ WAS DGI OFFICER IN SECTION III (NORTH AMERICA AND SOVIET BLOC). SAW HIM ON 21 NOVEMBER 68. WAS GOING TO CONAKRY ON IMPORTANT MISSION. APPEARED THAT SOMEONE COULD NOT LEAVE CONAKRY UNTIL HE ARRIVED.

D. FOLLOWING TRAVEL AVAILABLE RODRIGUEZ FROM 67 TO PRESENT: 12 JUNE 67 CUBA-MEXICO; MEXICO - CUBA 19 JUNE 67; CUBA- MEXICO 19 SEPT 67 (I); MEXICO - UNNY 18 SEPTEMBER 67 (I); CUBA - BWIN 18 SEPTEMBER

201-332665
25 April 69

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

DS COPY

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE: APR 29 12 46 PM '69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY RID/EDI PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO PAGE TWO

1967; BWIN - UNNY APRIL 68 (I); CUBA - SPAIN 19 SEPTEMBER 68; FRANCE - CSR 4 OCTOBER 68.

END OF MESSAGE

MAY 19 69
JAR

GORDON JORGENSEN
C/DO

C/WH/COG

DO/I/B2 ✓

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY #0/15 PER ______

ACTION
WH8
540

☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO
FILE, VR. RYAN, C/OPS, FI2, DO4

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 221551Z APR 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 3630
WMIM

22 APR 69 IN 41615
C

Bernie

DO BASE NEW YORK INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE

REF: DO BASE NEW YORK 6232 (IN 37479)

1. NO STATION OR AMOT TRACES ROGILIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ SUBSEQUENT TO SEPTEMBER 1967.

2. FILE 201-332665.

S E C R E T

AN FE
~~AB~~ X
~~TI~~
~~FC~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~FI~~
WH/COP

CS COPY

201-332665
22 April 69

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED
BY: AT: Z
DISSEM BY 24 PER #

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.
X-REF TO CS FILE NO.
☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

RING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH-8
INFO FILE, VR, DO-4, RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI-2
ACTION NO. 969

16 Apr 69 IN 37470

B T

S E C R E T 162059Z APR 69 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 6232
NYDO

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE

REF DO BASE NEW YORK 4322

1. CUBAN UN MISSION HAS REQUESTED VISA BE AUTHORIZED MEXICO CITY FOR ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ (201-332665), DESIGNATED FIRST SECRETARY NEW YORK. RODRIGUEZ IS WELL KNOWN DGI OFFICER. AS ADDEES WILL RECALL FROM REF, RODRIGUEZ WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR ASSIGNMENT HERE APRIL 68 BUT NEVER CAME.

2. REQUEST ADDEES UPDATED TRACES (INCLUDING AMOT) SUBSEQUENT JMWAVE 9521 AND UNDW 1832, BOTH DATED SEPTEMBER 67.

3. FILE 201-332665.

S E C R E T

AN
AD X
[illegible]
WH/C/OP

CS COPY

201-332665
16 April 1969

SECRET

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

TO: CIA	FROM:	DATE

FULL NAME (Married woman include maiden name) Rogelio [illegible] Lopez	ALIASES, NICKNAMES	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH May 3, 1942 Havana

HOME ADDRESS previous check 4/23/63	SEX m	CITIZENSHIP Cuban	MARITAL STATUS	SPOUSE'S NAME

OCCUPATION	NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

Will apply Amembassy Mexico for visa as First Secretary of the Cuban Mission to the UN

201

Vd 4/17/69

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE Visa Office	TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM
DATE 4/16/69	
NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER SCA:VO:BKDuncan	[illegible], Rogelio (Lopez)

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NAI
TO CSCI-3/782,061
dtd 29 Jun 64. subj.
as above.

24 Ap. G Forbeville WH/C/OP

201-332665

17 APR 1969

FORM 9-65 DS-939

FBI doc.
28 Oct. 68 (NY).
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Bufile: 105-130905
NY - 105-91642

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [illegible]				Wa
2. [illegible]		1 NOV 1968		
3. [illegible]		4 NOV 1968		
4. SolC		[illegible]	[illegible]	
5. ERRIS		6 NOV 1968		
6. McT		14 NOV 1968		
7. Daryl				
8. Nancy		14 NOV 1968		
9. [illegible]				
10. W. King		14 NOV 1968		K
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
NOV 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	
	INDEX	X

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 200-9-52

DOCUMENT DATE 25 Oct 1968

DOCUMENT NUMBER UNDA 04161

DATE MICROFILMED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
XX ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH/Cuba

INFO.
Chief, DO

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
TYPIC/DOMOPS/AMCLOCK
Transmittal of Information on Official Cuban Community in New York

ACTION REQUIRED : REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: Index, if necessary; extract information to appropriate 201 files

REF: DO BASE/NEW YORK 5174

1. As indicated in the reference, the undersigned met with Subject on 19 October 1968 for the purpose of debriefing him on items of local interest to the Base and LNERGO.

2. Attached herewith is the information obtained at that meeting, broken down on separate sheets by major topics:

A) Cuban UN Mission (CMUN) personnel;

B) Cuban personalities of local interest (but who are not now in New York);

C) Physical lay-out of the CMUN;

D) Miscellaneous information on the official Cuban community;

E) Cuban Delegation to the 23rd UNGA.

MICROFILMED
NOV 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

3. Perhaps the most interesting items are the following:

A) Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201- 330032 ?) appears to be the new chief of the DGI contingent within the CMUN, with Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato (201-331832) probably serving as the deputy; Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-323953) and Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar (201-749244) follow as the third and fourth ranking DGI officers;

1 att

ATTACHMENT:
1-3 copies per para 2 above, att. h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
2-C/DO, w/o att
3-C/WH/C, w/ 3 cc of att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D-19-5-42

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UNDA-4161

DATE
22 October 1968
OCT 25 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
200-9-52
19-500

B) There are apparently now two code clerks in the CMUN;

C) The physical lay-out of the CMUN;

D) The proportion of intelligence/security personnel within the CMUN (this information updates that given in UNDA-4116, 23 September 1968).

4. It is suggested that Headquarters extract appropriate items for the respective 201 files, particularly the intelligence/security personnel. To facilitate this process, the following individuals are mentioned in the attachments (201 numbers shown where known):

Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar (201-749244)
Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953)
Jorge BOLANOS Suarez (201-787157)
Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato (201-331832)
Carlos MORALES Quevedo (201-777568)
Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201- ?) 201-310002
Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin (201-824376)
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665)
Cecilia ANDRE Sardain (201 - ?) 201-8[illegible]
Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz (201-816439)
Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez (201- ?) 201-834021
Rafael AGUILERA Batista (201-351449)
Rolando PEREZ Alfonso (201- ?) 201-836757
Jorge REYES Vega (201-816437)
Nicolas RODRIGUEZ Astiazarain (201-804011)
Marta JIMENEZ Martinez (201-784065)
Alfonso VILLACORTA (201- ?) 201-772477
Jose FERNANDEZ COSSIO Rodriguez (201-766981)
Fernando ALVAREZ Tabio (201-357128)
Jose Antonio RABAZA Vasquez (201-333971)

5. Copies of the attachment were passed to the local LNERGO office by the undersigned. ELGIN is the code name for Source in dealings with local LNERGO.

Howard G. FIGALAN

7P

SECRET

NOV 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 19 OCTOBER 68

CUBAN UNITED NATIONS MISSION (CMUN) PERSONNEL

201-749244

1. Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar, Counsellor. JIMENEZ was promoted to Counsellor in July 1968 because, according to Source's opinion, this rank would give him more status in his overt responsibility for economic and UN Development Programme matters. Source believes that JIMENEZ is now the fourth ranking DGI officer in the CMUN behind PRENDES, BOZA, and VIERA. Source considers JIMENEZ to be the most sophisticated officer in the CMUN. [illegible]

201-328453

2. Jose Raul VIERA Linares, Counsellor. Source believes that VIERA is now the third ranking DGI officer in the CMUN behind PRENDES and BOZA. Source thinks that VIERA will be transferred back to Cuba soon, probably in December 1968.

201-727157

3. Jorge BOLANOS Suarez, Counsellor-designate. Source stated that the Foreign Ministry has cancelled the assignment of BOLANOS. He definitely will not be coming to New York.

201-331832

4. Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato, First Secretary. Source believes (but does not have positive proof) that BOZA is now the Deputy Chief of the DGI contingent in the CMUN, behind PRENDES. BOZA specializes in "Black Power" matters. Source said that BOZA is now occupying the apartment formerly lived in by Carlos MORALES Quevedo, First Secretary, and his family. The wife of BOZA, Adamina VASQUEZ Caparo, currently is working in the CMUN as secretary to Ambassador ALARCON. Source believes that the assignment here of BOZA means greater emphasis is to be placed on "Black Power" matters. Behind

201-777565

5. Carlos MORALES Quevedo, First Secretary. Source stated that MORALES has reservations to leave New York enroute to Cuba 18 December 1968. Since the departure in early October of his family, MORALES has been living in the CMUN.

201-336002

6. Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez, First Secretary. Source is positive that PRENDES is now the Chief of the DGI contingent within the CMUN. Source also stated that in such capacity, PRENDES also would be responsible for DGI activities in Canada.

201-324376

7. Pedro Luis PINERO Firin, Third Secretary. Source believes, based on stories that he had heard in Cuba, that PINERO is a DGI officer.

CS COPY

SECRET

201-332165

8. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, First Secretary-designate. Source does not know RODRIGUEZ or anything about him. RODRIGUEZ was scheduled to come to New York some months ago; it would seem that he is not coming at this point. RODRIGUEZ amply has been documented as a DGI officer through other sources.

201-823421

9. Cecilia ANDRE Sandain, Second Secretary-designate. Source does not know ANDRE, who was scheduled to come at the same time as Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez. Source thought ANDRE might be the wife of Jorge BOLANOS Suarez (paragraph 3 above), as he thought BOLANOS' wife was named Cecilia, whom Source knew to be employed as a staff officer in the Cuban Embassy in London during BOLANOS' assignment there.

201-816439

10. Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz, Attache. Source, who had identified SANTANA as a DGI officer in November 1967, now states that he is not sure whether he is with the DGI or with the DSE. Source thinks that he is probably with the DGI. Source said that the wife of SANTANA will return here late October.

201-839221

11. Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez, Attache. Source stated that GELABERT is with the DSE. He replaced Ramon MARTINEZ Suarez as the "Portero" of the CMUN.

201-351449

12. Rafael AGUILERA Batista, Attache. Source confirmed that AGUILERA replaced Roberto GUERRA Gonzalez as a code clerk.

201-836757

13. Rolando PEREZ Alfonso, Attache. Source stated that there are now two code clerks in the CMUN; by process of elimination, it would appear that PEREZ might well be the second one (Source did not know the name of the other code clerk).

14. CLERICAL EMPLOYEES. In addition to Adamina VASQUEZ Caparo (wife of Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Cato, First Secretary) who works as secretary to Ambassador ALARCON, and Mercedes SALGADO Hernandez (wife of Jorge REYES Vega, Second Secretary) who is the Telex operator, Source believes that two other wives of CMUN officers also work part-time in the CMUN. One of these females is pregnant, and may be married to one of the code clerks. Source thinks that the other might be the wife of Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin, Third Secretary (her name is Juana CRUZ Fernandez), but was not at all sure of this identification.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 19 OCTOBER 68

CUBAN PERSONALITIES OF LOCAL INTEREST, BUT NOT NOW IN NEW YORK

201-869011

1. Nicolas RODRIGUEZ Astiazarain, Former CMUN Counsellor. Source stated that RODRIGUEZ is now the head of the Czech (and possibly the Hungarian) Desk, Directorate of "Socialist Countries", Foreign Ministry. He is now divorced from his wife, Magaly MESTRE Pintado, and reportedly will marry Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso, who was a member of the Cuban Delegation to the 22nd UN General Assembly in the Fall of 1967. RODRIGUEZ was not in any known difficulties or trouble when he returned to Cuba in early March 1968; he did do a short stint of "voluntary" cane-cutting after his return, but this is particularly required of members of the Cuban CP (of which he has been a member for some 4 years).

201-784665

2. Marta JIMENEZ Martinez, Member of Cuban 22nd UNGA Delegation. Source does not believe that JIMENEZ will attend any portion of the 23rd UNGA this year. She is the Deputy Chief of the Directorate of International Organizations of the Foreign Ministry; since the Chief of that Directorate is in New York for the 23rd UNGA, Jose FERNANDEZ COSSIO Rodriguez, Source believes that JIMENEZ could not be absent from Cuba at the same time. Source stated that JIMENEZ is very close to Fidel CASTRO, and at times has by-passed Foreign Minister Raul ROA to go directly to Fidel on certain questions.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 19 OCTOBER 68

PHYSICAL LAY-OUT OF THE CUBAN UN MISSION (CMUN)

1. BASEMENT -- contains a kitchen and storage rooms.

2. GROUND FLOOR -- reception area; archives of unclassified UN (mostly) documents and papers; telex machine room; offices of Justo César GELABERT Martinez, Attache, and Mercedes SALGADO Hernandez (wife of Jorge REYES Vega, Second Secretary). GELABERT, a member of DSE, replaced Ramon MARTINEZ Suarez as "Portero" of the CMUN. SALGADO (reported last year by the same Source as a member of the DSE) is the Telex operator.

3. SECOND FLOOR -- office of Ambassador Ricardo ALARCON Quesada (runs along the front side of the CMUN on East 67th Street); reception salon for visitors; large office occupied by Antonio DE SOUZA Carvajal, Advisor; smaller office occupied by Gustavo Adolfo PLAZA Peterssen, Attache, and Adamina VASQUÉZ Caparo (wife of Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato, First Secretary). VASQUEZ is acting as secretary to Ambassador ALARCON.

4. THIRD FLOOR -- mostly living quarters; large common room; library; Rolando CONDE Figueredo, Attache (who is the chauffeur), lives on this floor; there are also several offices, occupants unknown.

5. FOURTH FLOOR -- entire floor is occupied by DGI personnel. (Last year, the Source reported that the DGI occupied the third floor; what Source actually meant was that the DGI had the third floor per European style of reference, which is the American fourth floor).

6. FIFTH FLOOR -- more living quarters (presumably the residential occupants of the CMUN, other than CONDE, live on this floor).

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 19 OCTOBER 68

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION ON OFFICIAL CUBAN COMMUNITY

201-773477

1. Alfonso VILLACORTA, Prensa Latina. Source stated that VILLACORTA is disgusted with the Cuban regime, but has stayed on with Prensa Latina here because his brother is in prison in Cuba. Source believes that VILLACORTA would defect were his brother ever able to get out of Cuba. VILLACORTA cordially dislikes the CMUN and its personnel. VILLACORTA, who has been reportedly pro-Chinese in the past, has no deep political convictions, according to Source. Jose Antonio RABAZA Vasquez, a member of the Cuban Delegation to the 23rd UN General Assembly this year, has spent quite a bit of time with VILLACORTA in the past month. Source thinks that VILLACORTA may be homosexual.

2. Relations between the CMUN and the local Prensa Latina Office. Source said that relations between the two offices continue to be marked with ill-feeling on both sides. The CMUN personnel look down on the two Prensa Latina employees, and the latter are well aware of this condescending attitude.

3. CMUN Morale. Source claimed that morale is high within the CMUN regarding Cuba's current status in the world. In response to a question as to whether VIERA and JIMENEZ resented the arrival of PRENDES and BOZA, and the consequent "demotion" of the first two within the DGI hierarchy here, Source indicated that he had seen no manifestations of resentment on the part of either VIERA or JIMENEZ. Source believed that this was mainly because both PRENDES and BOZA have long been senior to VIERA and JIMENEZ.

4. Proportion of Intel/Security Personnel within the CMUN. Of the 16 officers of the CMUN, 12 are believed to be affiliated with either the DGI, DSE, or DIER (the affiliation now thought for the code clerks). PRENDES, BOZA, VIERA, JIMENEZ, MORALES, and REYES are known to be DGI officers. PINERO is a presumed DGI officer. SANTANA is either DGI or DSE. ESPINOSA and GELABERT are known DSE. AGUILERA is known to be either DSE or DIER (Investigations Department of the Rebel Army). PEREZ is suspect DSE or DIER. Only four CMUN personnel are without any intelligence or security affiliation: Ambassador ALARCON, DE SOUZA, PLAZA, and CONDE.

SECRET

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 19 OCTOBER 68

CUBAN PERSONALITIES, 23rd UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DELEGATION

201-766981

1. Jose FERNANDEZ COSSIO Rodriguez. Director of International Organizations, Cuban Foreign Ministry. Now gets along well with Foreign Minister Raul ROA, but at one time he led the "anti-ROA Mafia" within the Ministry. Major ambition at this time is to become an Ambassador in one of the more prestigious posts abroad. Interestingly, he is a distant relative of Raul ROA. Has been a member of the Cuban CP for 4/5 years. Source said that FERNANDEZ COSSIO is "making a career of Communism", meaning that he makes the system work for him but is not ideologically oriented. He is a "loner", and his only real friend is the head of Directorate of Socialist Countries of the Cuban Foreign Ministry, who once saved the life of FERNANDEZ COSSIO during BATISTA days. Source terms FERNANDEZ COSSIO a superficial person, not an intellectual type, and interested in living comforteably and having money to spend.

201-357138

2. Fernando ALVAREZ Tabio. Not pro-Communist and not really pro-CASTRO. A political rationalizer who is happy with the regime that allows him to lead his own life. Would not consider defection unless the regime changed its attitude toward him, which is not likely, according to Source.

201-333971

3. Jose Antonio RABAZA Vasquez. RABAZA is, in Source's belief, a homosexual (consistent with other reporting on RABAZA). He works in International Organizations of the Foreign Ministry under Marta JIMENEZ Martinez, Deputy Chief. While in New York, RABAZA has been very friendly with Alfonso VILLACORTA of the local Prensa Latina office. Source believes that VILLACORTA at least has tendencies toward homosexuality himself. RABAZA is very close to Osmani CIENFUEGOS in Cuba, and the latter has protected him in the Foreign Ministry (other reporting has indicated that RABAZA found himself in difficulties with the regime after an assignment in Rome; he spent close to a year in prison). According to Source, CIENFUEGOS spoke up for RABAZA and this is why he still is in the Foreign Ministry. RABAZA does not associate with others in the Delegation or in the CMUN; he spends little time in the UN Delegates Lounge, contrary to others in the Delegation. Source characterized his behavior as "mysterious", and suspects that RABAZA may be practicing his sexual proclivities here. He is well-educated and speaks several languages. He considers himself to be a good poet.

S E C R E T

4. Technical Assistants of the Delegation. Source stated that all of the Technical Assistants of the Delegation are members of the DGI, the external intelligence service. All have now departed New York. During their stay, Source observed that all spent their time with DGI officers assigned to the CMUN. The only Technical Assistants personally known by Source are Ramon SANCHEZ-PARODI Montoto, Alvaro TAMAYO Fonseca, Rene VALENZUELA Acebal, and Eduardo ARAOZ Agero. Source did not know of any specific duties or missions of any of the Technical Assistants. He commented that TAMAYO was a close friend of Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato, First Secretary of the CMUN, who specializes in "Black Power" matters in New York. Source does not know if any more Technical Assistants will come to New York during the 23rd UNGA.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 9 PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH/COG8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR6, WH8

S E C R E T 181700Z OCT 68 CITE LONDON 7780

18 OCT 68 IN 16325

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF A DIRECTOR 42495

B OELA 49969

C OELA 50017

1. RE PARA 3 REF A. POUCHING ADDITIONAL NAMES UNDER REF C.

2. DEFER FILE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

201-009239
UNDA-03263A02
16 OCT 67

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE TRIP TO NEW YORK AS CITED BY SUBJ
OF 201-009397

WAS RYBAT

R 6903032527

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET 3

ORIG: D. RYAN;pfd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 16 OCTOBER 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 7 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-332665

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR6, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 42495

TO MADRID INFO: LONDON 17 1727Z OCT 68

TYPIC

BT.

REF: LONDON 7682 (BEING RELAYED MADRID)* (IN 13417)

1. REQUEST MADRID CABLE NAMES AND TRAVEL DATA ALL CUBAN COURIERS OR EMBASSY INSPECTORS WHO HAVE ARRIVED OR DEPARTED MADRID SINCE MID-SEPTEMBER 68. AUDIO TECHNICIANS KNOWN USE THIS COVER WHEN TRAVELLING ABROAD ON SWEEPING MISSIONS.

2. NOTE THAT ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ ARRIVED MADRID 19 SEPT 68 PER MADRID-6153. RODRIGUEZ IDENTIFIED BY AMCLOCK/1 OCT 67 AS CUBAN EMBASSY INSPECTOR. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY DETAILS AVAILABLE ONWARD TRAVEL BY RODRIGUEZ AFTER ARRIVAL SPAIN. MADRID-6211 INDICATED HE PLANNED ARRIVE MADRID 16 SEPTEMBER IN TRANSIT GUINEA. CAN THIS BE CONFIRMED?

AN
AB
IN
TS
PI

3. LONDON: TO ASSIST IN EFFORT IDENTIFY PERSONS WHO CONDUCTED SWEEP, SUGGEST SMOTH BE QUERIED FOR NAMES ALL CUBAN OFFICIALS WHO HAVE ARRIVED UK SINCE MID-SEPTEMBER 68.

CS COPY

4. FILE 201-332665.

END OF MESSAGE

201-332665
17 Oct 1968

WH/COG/COMMENT: *Reported unknown persons conducted sweep of new Cuban Embassy building London during period 3-9 Oct 68;

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ #

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR

PAGE TWO (date and time filed)

(elite) (reference number) (pica)

(classification)
S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 12415

TO

SMOTH requested info re possible identities of persons who conducted sweep.

C/WH/COG
EUR/CUBA Geo DeWilliams
EUR/BC/UK Ed Wilt (phone)

JOHN L. HART
C/EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 2 PER ______ #

ACTION c/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR, c/[illegible], c/WH, c/FI/D, c/CI, c/CI 2

MADR

S E C R E T 101134Z OCT 68 CITE MADRID 6310

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

10 OCT 68 IN 39811

8

~~NYBAT~~ TYPIC

REF: JMCOBRA 1158 (IN 04422)

B 7

1. QUAXE-1 REPORTED DEPARTURE THELMA ESTHER (KING) HARRISON FOR CUBA ON IBERIA FLIGHT 941, 9 OCTOBER. KING NEITHER MET NOR ACCOMPANIED BY CUBAN OFFICIALS. QUAXE-1 SAID THAT KING NOT IN TRANSIT WHEN BOARDED AIRCRAFT THUS PROBABLY ARRIVED MADRID 7 OR 8 OCTOBER. WE WILL CHECK QUTIMID AND QUDOZE FOR ANY ACTIVITY.

2. FILE 201-332665.

S E C R E T

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: [illegible]

Signed: [illegible]

R.O. #463 - Unit WH/2/Panama

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate

~~EXCD~~	~~FI~~	WH/COG
~~RB~~	~~DUCT~~	
ABSTRACT X		~~INDEX~~

CS COPY

10 Oct 68
201-332665

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

FIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/EUR-4, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI-2, DDP, ADDP, C/OBR

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 022115Z OCT 68 CITE JMCOBRA 1158

PANAMA CITY, MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

2 OCT 68 IN 04422

MADRID

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC

(IN 04307)

REF: MADRID 6211 (NOT SENT PANAMA CITY)

1. LNERGO ADVISED STATION 2 OCTOBER THELMA KING TRANSITED MIAMI 29 SEPTEMBER TO CATCH PANAM FLIGHT 114 FROM NEW YORK TO PARIS. HER TRAVEL INTERESTING IN LIGHT TRAVEL ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ PER REF, AND STATION WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO FROM MADRID.

2. FOR PANAMA: STATION FILES REFLECT ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ A DGI CASE OFFICER, WHO HAS HAD CONTACT WITH LATIN AMERICANS IN THE PAST, AMONG THEM THELMA KING.

3. FILE 201-332665.

S E C R E T

WH/C/OP

B-7

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Desensitize
Signed:
R.O. #463 - Unit WH/2/Panama
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

CS COPY

SECRET

2 Oct 68
201-332665

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER

ACTION
WH/COG-8 ☐ RID COPY

CL…IED MESSAGE TO… & C… IES

SE…RET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR WH-8, EUR-6, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI-2

RC	G AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 021701Z OCT 68 CITE MADRID 0211
MADR

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR

2 Oct 68 IN 04307

TYPIC

REF: JMCOBRA 1122 (IN 02373)

1. QUTIMID 15 SEPTEMBER SAID THAT RODRIGUEZ ARRIVING MADRID FOLLOWING DAY IN TRANSIT TO ~~GUR~~ GUINEA (POSS SPANISH GUINE . REPORT ALSO SAYS THAT RODRIGUEZ TRAVELLING WITHOUT VISA BECAUSE HAD TO LEAVE HAVANA IN HURRY. NAME DOES NOT SHOW ON QUOTA TRAVEL LISTS.

B 7

2. FILE 201-332665.

SECRET

AN pe
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DEC~~ NFD
~~DI~~
WH/C/OP

CS COPY

SECRET

201-332665
2 Oct 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER #

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

D MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR, RF/AN, EUR6, WH8 CI/OPS, FI2 Cuse

AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 301530Z SEP 68 CITE JMCOBRA 1122

30 SEP 68 IN 02373

C

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 6153 (IN 00361)

1. ADVISE ANY INFO ACTIVITIES REF SUBJ AND ONWARD TRAVEL.

2. FILE 201-332665

SECRET

B T.

AN RE
AB x
~~IN~~
~~ES~~
~~RX~~
~~DESTROYED~~
FI
con/ci/op

COPY

SECRET

201-332665
30 Sept 1968

SECRET

TC

WH/RG-8 ☐ RID COPY

WH-8, EUR-6, RE/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI-2

SECRET 261741Z SEP 68 CITE MADRID 6153

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

TYPIC WATCHLIST

26 SEP 68 IN 00361

1. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ PP D-68-320 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HABANA ON IBERIAN FLT. 942 SEPT 19.

2. FILE: 05-120-20.

SECRET

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM: pk

RID/AO

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

pls detach cc/ by file

MICROFILMED
SEP 26 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICERS INITIALS
1. WH/REGC		25 SEP		
2. WH/Mexico		26 SEP 1963		
3. [illegible]	don			
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X	FILE TITLE
		INDEX	X	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 200-9-52

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 23 Sept 1963

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFDA 04116

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Cuba
INFO.
Chief, DO Division, Chief of Station, JMCOBRA
FROM
Chief of Base, New York
SUBJECT
© TYPIC/DOMOPS -- Current Roster of Cuban UN Mission
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

MICROFILMED
SEP 26 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. The following is a current listing (as of 13 September 1968) of the officers assigned PCS to the Cuban Permanent Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) in New York City. Intelligence or security affiliation is also shown where applicable. The listing is in the probable order of real (as opposed to UN listing) precedence. As can be seen, the CMUN continues to upgrade both legitimate diplomatic personnel and intelligence/security personnel both in terms of quantity as well as quality.

A. Ricardo ALARCON Quesada (201-347590), Ambassador and Permanent Representative;

B. Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953), Counsellor, DGI officer;

C. Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar (201-749244), Counsellor, DGI officer;

D. Antonio DE SOUZA Carvajal (201-354048), Advisor (essentially a figure-head without substantive responsibilities or power);

E. Alberto LOZA Hidalgo-Gato (201-331832), First Secretary, DGI officer;

F. Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201- ?), First Secretary, DGI officer (presence not confirmed as of 13 September, but was scheduled to arrive 10 September);

201-330002

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Chief, WH Cuba
2 - Chief, DO Division 2cc [illegible] DO/CI
2 - Chief of Station, JMCOBRA

200-9-52

CS COPY

(CONTINUED)

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D-19-5-42
D-100-5-14

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UNDA-4116

DATE
SEP 23 1968
20 September 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-500

G. Carlos MORALES Quevedo (201-777568), First Secretary, DGI officer;

H. Jorge REYES Vega (201-816437), Second Secretary, DGI officer;

I. Lazaro ESPINOSA Bonet (201-816438), Third Secretary, DSE officer;

J. Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin (201-824376), Third Secretary, presumed DGI officer;

K. Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz (201- ?), Attache, presumed DGI officer; 201-816429

L. Gustavo Adolfo PLAZA Peterssen (201-805658), Attache;

M. Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez (201- ?), Attache, reportedly was with DIER in 1961, no further information available; 201-839221

N. Rafael AGUILERA Batista (201-351449), Attache, code clerk, either DIER or DSE employee;

O. Rolando CONDE Figueredo (201-354057), Attache;

P. Rolando PEREZ Alfonso (201- ?), Attache, (here according to UN records but not confirmed by LNERGO as of 4 September). 201-836757

2. In recent months visas have been requested for the following officers, but they have not arrived as yet, and presumably some of them may not now be coming for one reason or another.

A. Jorge BOLANOS Suarez (201-787157), Counsellor-designate, was due to arrive in late August but presence has not been confirmed;

B. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665), First Secretary-designate, DGI officer, visa requested in April 1968 with no further information available as to whether he will come (presumably he will not);

100201

C. ✓ Cecilia ANDRE Sardain (201- ?), Second Secretary-designate, same ETA status as Rogelio RODRIGUEZ above.

3. VIERA Linares serves as Charge d'Affaires in the absence of Ambassador ALARCON Quesada. Up to this point, neither the Base nor LNERGO have been able to state evidentially as to whether VIERA or JIMENEZ Escobar is the sucessor to Chafik Homero SAKER Zenni (left PCS October 1967) as the DGI Station Chief. We both, however, tend to regard JIMENEZ as carrying the most weight in terms of operational activity and in terms of effectiveness. Now, with the arrival of BOZA Hidalgo-Gato (who reportedly has been the deputy to Ramon OROZA Naveran, head of U.S. operations for the DGI, per our last information), it remains to be seen if BOZA figures higher in the local hierarchy than VIERA or JIMENEZ. With JIMENEZ, VIERA, BOZA, and PRENDES Gutierrez, the local DGI station has more ranking talent than has been the norm. The Cubans do not necessarily slot their intelligence officers in Mission titles equivalent to their true ranks and responsibilities.

4. In terms of vulnerability from the LNHARP standpoint, the intelligence/security personnel at this point appear to offer little in the way of approach potential. Jorge BOLANOS Suarez (if he comes) and Gustavo Adolfo PLAZA Peterssen, on the basis of known information, seem the likeliest targets for us as of now. Both the Base and LNERGO, however, continue to look at all of them in this regard.

5. It will be noted from the above that of the 16 CMUN personnel now here, 8 are identified DGI/DSE, 2 are presumed DGI, and 1 (GELABERT) may be DSE or DIER. The percentage of personnel involved with intelligence/security thus ranges from a minimum of 50% up to 69% of the total CMUN personnel strength.

6. The number of official Cubans in New York will, of course, be swelled by the arrival of the Cuban Delegation to the 23rd UN General Assembly this month. We have requested, via DO BASE/NEW YORK 4844, traces on the 8 of the 12 man delegation on whom we hold no information.

Howard G. FIGALAN

FBI doc. (X-ref)
24 Apr. 68
Re: Rodriguez Lopez, Rogelio

FBI doc.
30 Nov. 67 (NY)
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez
no Bufile given

FBI doc.
6 Oct. 67 (NY)
Re: Cuban Mission to the United Nations
no Bufile given

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-009239 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. WH/C/FI J. McTighe Rm 3D54

FROM 32/21 WH/COG #3

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH, C/DO 2, C/EUR 4, C/SR 5

SECRET

S E C R E T 292115Z CITE JMWAVE 9521 (STEADMAN ACTING)

29 SEP 67 IN 62756

DO BASE/NEW YORK INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLOCK

REF: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3359 (IN 61764)

INDEX / ABSTRACT / WH/C/FI

1. FOLL ARE STATION TRACES JESUS (JIMENEZ) ESCOBAR (201-749244): NAVY CAPTAIN OF "SIERRA MAESTRA"; STUDIED AT MARITIME SCHOOL NEAR HAVANA; FROM COMMIE FAMILY (REVOLUCION NEWSPAPER, 4 JAN 62). GRADUATED MARIEL NAVAL ACADEMY AS NAVIGATOR FOR CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE; CA 1960 DECK OFFICER FOR MAMBISAS; 1961 SENT SOV BLOC TO ASSUME CAPTAINCY OF SHIP "SIERRA MAESTRA"; INCOMPETENT AND THUS UNDER ORDERS OF GERMAN OFFICERS ON FIRST TRIPS "SIERRA MAESTRA"; MARRIED GERMAN GIRL, MONIKA, DURING TRIP TO GERMANY; MID-62 HAD ACCIDENT WITH SHIP AND LOST JOB OF CAPTAIN; COMPLETELY INTEGRATED WITH REGIME (AMOT-54, 13 OCT 63). TRAVELLED MEXICO-HAVANA 12 JULY 65 (CUBANA AIRLINES MANIFEST). COMMERCIAL POLICY SPECIALIST, MINCEX, DELEGATE GATT MEETING URUGUAY JAN 67 (SENSITIVE REPORT, JAN 67 AND MONTEVIDEO-2776, 16 JAN 67). BORN 16 SEPT [illegible]; MAMBISAS REP STATIONED HAVANA AS OF EARLY 67; FORMERLY MAMBISAS REP ROTTERDAM; KNOWN AROUND SHIPPING LINES AS COMMIE

SECRET

201-009239

(DIR-67550, 18 JAN 67).

2. ONLY STATION TRACE JORGE E. (REYES) VEGA (201-816437) IS ASSIGNMENT UN MISSION NEW YORK 15 APR 67 (SENSITIVE REPORT DATED MAY 67).

3. FOLLOWING FYI ARE SUMMARY STATION TRACES SUBJS PARA 2 REF:

A. ALBERTO MANUEL (BOZA) HIDALGO-GATO (201-331632); EMPLOYEE CUBAN CONSULATE WHEN IT LOCATED SAVANNAH, GEORGIA; FORMER CUBAN CONSUL TORONTO, CANADA, DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA CANADA NOV 62 FOR CARRYING UNREGISTERED FIREARMS; SUSPECT CUIS OFFICER.

B. JOAQUIN CAMILO (GARCIA) ALONSO: BORN 16 AUG 37, HAVANA, PSP MEMBER SINCE 1957; BEGAN WORKING FOR G-2 IN MID-59; LATE 59 COMMISSIONED AS AIDE AND SECOND CHIEF OF G-2 ISLE OF PINES; 1960 DESCRIBED AS SECOND LIEUTENANT G-2; LATE 60 OR EARLY 61 WORKED IN DEPT OF REGIONAL POLITICS, MINREX; EARLY 61 REPORTED AS G-2 OFFICER IN HAVANA; CIRCA 62 REPORTED WORKING AS G-2 AGENT IN "DIRECCION DE POLITICA COMERCIAL CON LA AMERICA LATINA" IN MINISTRY INTERNAL COMMERCE, AND IN THIS POSITION IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH MANUEL PINEIRO.

SECRET

PAGE 3 JMWAVE 5521

C. ROGE

C. ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ (201-332655): BORN 3 MAY

42, HAVANA; IDENTIFIED AS DGI OFFICER BY AMMUG/1, AMSEES/1,

AMSKIFF/5, AND AMKNOB/1; STATIONED CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO 1962

APR 65, DURING WHICH TIME HE BELIEVED HAVE ACTED AS DEPUTY

CHIEF DGI MEXICO; ASSIGNED DGI HQS SINCE APR 65; HAS SERVED

AS CASE OFFICER FOR NUMBEROUS CLANDESTINE CUIS OPS IN MEXICO

AND CENTRAL AMERICA; APPEARS TO BE EXTREMELY COMPETENT, WELL

TRAINED AND DEDICATED DGI OFFICER.

4. NO IDENT STATION TRACES GONZALO (DIAZ) DIAZ EXCEPT

FACT HE ATTENDING PRESENT SESSION UNGA.

5. RE PARA 3 REF, ONLY PARODI STATION FILES WHO CONNECTED

WITH CUIS IS RAMON (SANCHEZ-PARODI) MONTOTO (201-777320), ON

WHOM THERE FOLL POSSIBLE TRACES: G-2 AGENT WHO TRAVELLED U.S.

AND MEXICO ON GOC MISSIONS (DBA43319, 31 DEC 62); SELF-

ADMITTED G-2 AGENT HAVANA (00A-3,218,566, 8 SEPT 62); G-2

AGENT WHO ARRIVED U.S. 30 OCT 60 (WH/COG/CE CARD); MEMBER

G-2 SECTION, MINREX, WORKING IN DEPT KNOWN AS "DIVISION DE

ASUNTOS LATINO AMERICANOS" (DBF-82092, 5 JULY 61); G-2 AGENT

SIERRA MORENA, LAS VILLAS (UFK-138, 21 SEPT 62); DSE OFFICER

HAVANA (SUBJS FATHER, MAY 65). POUCHING PHOTO OF 201-777320

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Chief, [illegible]

Chief of Station, [illegible]

FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT Requirements for [illegible] of [illegible] by [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated below

REFERENCES: None

1. Attached please find pertinent Headquarters traces on the following members of the Cuban delegation to the United Nations XXII General Assembly:

a. Fernando ALVAREZ Tabio

b. Marta JIMENEZ Martinez

c. Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso

d. Joaquin Camilo GARCIA Alonso

e. Alberto Manuel BOZA Hidalgo-Gato

f. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

There are no Headquarters traces on Gonzalo DIAZ Diaz, another member of the Cuban delegation. Traces on other members of the delegation were forwarded earlier.

CONTINUED

Attachments:
Hqs. traces (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - C/DCS, New York (w/att h/w)
2 - COS, JMWAVE (w/att h/w)

1 ASX

201-009239

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	UFGW-1832	26 SEP 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	201-009239

Typed: 21 Sept. 67

Distribution:
1 - WH/COG/FI
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - DO/I/CH
1 - WH/REG

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/FI	R.J. Weatherman:flg	5061

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/C/FI	9/22	William Murray
C/WH/C/CICS		Harry T. Mahoney
WH/COG/MO C/WH/COG		Robert Ortman David A. Phillips
DO/I/CH		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DO	26	

2. [illegible] up [illegible] [illegible] (the [illegible]) [illegible], will help [illegible] [illegible] as possible suspects for recruitment or [illegible]. Of particular interest is any information indicating they are working for Cuban intelligence and/or security services.

GEORGE [illegible]

SECRET

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-[illegible])

Rodriguez was stationed in Mexico City as a Third Secretary from 1961 to April 1965. He has been identified by a number of reliable sources as a DGI official, including AMMUG/1 who stated Rodriguez used following alias: Eduardo, Casimiro, Jose Antonio. He was the case officer for [illegible] using the Raul for quite some time prior to his return to Cuba from Mexico. He was one of two Cuban diplomats who were disarmed at the airport in Mexico City by Mexican officials in December 1961.

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hypheoated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

FILE NO. (If any)

DATE Sept. 20, 1967

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) — First Name — Middle Initial
RODRIGUES- Lopez, ~~Rafael~~ Rogelio

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP
Cuba

UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)
6 East 67th St. New York, N.Y.

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL
PAA 206

Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE
Calle 30 #307, Babana, Cuba

BIRTH DATE
5-3-42

BIRTH PLACE
Habana Cuba

NAI
11 OCT 67
KTJ

FILE IN 201-332665 *

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION
9-19-67 Preinspection at Nassau for NYC arrival.

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION
To Attend UN Session for duration of session.

DESTINATION
Cuban Mission to UN NY.C.

201 30005 5 Oct

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.
O.N.I.

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

'M 1-57
'. 6-1-961

FORM DS-939
[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY
REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION

TO: CI/I
FROM: MBSaladino
DATE: 9/15/67

NAME (If married woman include maiden name): Rogelio RODRIQUEZ Lopez
DATE OF BIRTH: 5/3/1942
PLACE OF BIRTH: Havana
ALIASES AND NICKNAMES:
SEX: m
MARITAL STATUS: uk
CITIZENSHIP: Cuban
ADDRESS:
OCCUPATION AND NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: Technical Assistant
ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA: Member, Cuban Delegation to 22nd Session UNGA.

CONTROL: THIS REQUEST PLACED WITH THE OFFICE OF SECURITY BY:
DIVISION OR AGENCY: Visa Office
DATE: 9/15/67
NAME OF REQUESTING OFFICER: SCA:VO:MBSaladino:ms
REASON FOR REQUEST, OR TYPE OF PROGRAM: V 31 7 CUBA (TWENTY SECOND DELEGATION UNGA)

19 Sept 67

II RESULTS OF THIS REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION:

☐ NO RECORD
☐ NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION
☐ SECURITY INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐ OTHER (Use reverse side for reporting)

CHECKED BY:
DATE:

III FOR USE OF OFFICE OF SECURITY:

Refer to CSCI 3/782,061 dtd 29 June 67
CSCI 316/00696-64 dtd 25 Aug 64
and to the FBI

18/9/67

(Date) 18 SEP 1967

Dept. of State
272 (mexico)
13 Sep. 67

CR

ORIG: CLIFTON ROBERSON:mjr
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 7447/9008
DATE: 15 JUNE 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 53 PER #

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☒ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-332665

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE 16 23 46 Z CITE DIRECTOR 11931

AN	FI	
~~[illegible]~~	~~DESK~~	
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

5

TYPIC/WATCHLIST

REF: MEXICO CITY 1764 (IN 88532)

SENSITIVE SOURCE INFO INDICATES ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ, DGI OFFICER WHO ARRIVED MEXI 12 JUNE 67, IS DELEGATE CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL COMMISSIONS OF UNESCO MEETING MEXICO. REQUEST STATION REVIEW SC WASH 65760 RE SUBJECT ACTIVITIES AND/OR POSSIBLE TRAVEL PLANS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: SUBJ ARRIVED MEXICO 12 JUNE 67

C/WH/COG/CICS H. T. MAHONEY (DRAFT)
WH/1/MEXICO

201-332665
16 June 1967

Thomas Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET [illegible]

MEXICAN VISA REQUESTED FOR CUBAN [illegible] DELEGATE

FM HAVANA: HAVANA [illegible]

TO MEXICO CITY: FOREIGN MINISTRY -- 224

THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTRY REQUESTS A VISA ON THE DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT OF [illegible], A DELEGATE TO THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL CONDITIONS OF [illegible], WHICH WILL BE HELD IN MEXICO. PLEASE SEND INSTRUCTIONS BY CABLE.

[illegible] STUART

Clem ~~Kay L. M.~~

~~Dick H.~~

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ-LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

201-257691
HMMA-31788
11 APR 67
P11

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
ALL THROUGH FILE, PER LIENVOY REPORTS, EVI-
DENCE OF REG/FREQUENT CONTACT BETWEEN NOVICKY
AND IATSKV OF SOV. EMB, AS WELL AS WITH
SUBJ OF CUBAN EMBASSY.
POSSIBLE INTEL CONTACT OF CSR 2ND SECY OLDRICH
NOVICKY /201-257691/.

R 6704190723

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 8

ACTION WH/COG 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 130029Z CITE MEXICO CITY MEXI 1746

13 JUN 67 IN 88532

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC WATCHLIST

ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ (201-332665), CUBAN DIP PPT D 66 627 ARRIVED MEXICO FROM HAVANA 12 JUNE ACCORDING TO LIFIRES. NO INFO AVAILABLE ON REASON FOR TRIP OR POSSIBLE TRAVEL FROM MEXICO.

ZZ

S E C R E T

BT

AN 9 FI
~~38~~ ~~RESP~~
ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~

~~ZZ~~ PROCESSED
20/6/67 HC

201-332665
13 June 67

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ ☐ ☐

Action: ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T 251115Z CITE MADRID 9817

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KEYWAY PBRUMEN XHARRON

25 NOV [illegible] 46050

IBERIA FLT 542 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVA 21 NOV W/137 PAX.

CUBAN OFFICIALS WERE: OCTAVIO COTON BUSTAMANTE PP-EF-65-725;

CYUIS 737- 54737- EF-65-3402; ABDO SOTO PRIETO PP-D-64-181;

JOSE GONZALEZ SJOSTROM PP-E-65-1368; GUIDO SANCHEZ ROBERT PP-D-65-[illegible];

MERCEDES LLANES GARCIA PP-[illegible]-65-599; RAMON RAMIREZ SOTO PP-D-65-[illegible];

NESTOR ALVAREZ SALERO PP-E-65-1363; JORGE CADIZ CABRERA PP-E-65-[illegible];

ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ PP-D-65-637.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-332665

201-352665

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

ORIG: E. SCOGGIN:mot
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 25 November 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	CI	5	CA-PA
2		6	RO
3	FI-IC	7	PI
4	140	8	D

DISSEM BY 24 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE · WH-8 EUR-8, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 28 19 42 Z CITE DIRECTOR

(REFERENCE NUMBER) 55146

TO MADRID INFO: JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

FS
BT

TYPIC WATCHLIST

REF: MADRID 9813 (IN 45905)

1. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ IDENTIFIED AS DGI OFFICER BY AMMUG/1, AMSESS/1, AMSKIFF/5 AND AMKNOB/1. HAS USED PSEUDOS ~~[illegible]~~ EDUARDO, CASIMIRO, JOSE ANTONIO AND RAUL.

2. STATIONED CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY 1962 THROUGH APRIL 1965. BEGAN ASSIGNMENT AS THIRD SECRETARY AND PROMOTED TO SECOND SECRETARY 63. NOVEMBER 64 IDEN, AGENT PENETRATION OF THE YOUNG COMMUNISTS OF HONDURAS (JCH), A REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION, SENT MEXICO BY JCH WITH PACKAGE TO TURN OVER TO CUBAN WHO WOULD CONTACT HIM. IDEN CONTACTED BY RODRIGUEZ TO WHOM GAVE PACKAGE. RODRIGUEZ SAID ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR IDEN GO CUBA SAME DAY. SEVERAL HOURS LATER RODRIGUEZ AGAIN ARRIVED IDEN HOTEL, TOLD HIM NOT NECESSARY GO CUBA, GAVE HIM PACKAGE AND FIFTY DOLLARS, INSTRUCTED HIM RETURN HONDURAS OVERLAND. PACKAGES TOO WELL WRAPPED FOR IDEN TO IDENTIFY CONTENTS. RODRIGUEZ ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT SEVERAL HONDURANS WHO ORGANIZING GUERRILLA MOVEMENT FOR JCH.

cont/

RELEASING OFFICER 26-1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

08-30

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

[redacted]

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ________

[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

[redacted] SECRET [redacted] [redacted]

CITE DIRECTOR 55746

TO PAGE TWO

3. AMKNOB/1 IDENTIFIED RODRIGUEZ FROM PHOTO AS CURRENT CUIS CASE OFFICER MEXICO EARLY 65. STATED KNEW RODRIGUEZ AS RAUL.

4. REQUEST ANY INFO ONWARD TRAVEL, DESTINATION, AND ACTIVITIES RODRIGUEZ.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS H Mahoney
WH/COG/FI William J. [illegible]
for WH/COG/MO [illegible]
WH/1/Mexico J [illegible]
E/IB/S [illegible]

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

ORIG: E.SCOGGIN:mot
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 25 November 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1	CI ✓	5	CA-PA
2		6	
3	FI-IC	7	
4	MO	8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ #

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, WH-8, EUR-8, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 29 1942 Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 55147

TO MADRID INFO: JMWAVE, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC WATCHLIST 1313

REFS: A. MADRID (IN 45905)

B. DIRECTOR 55146

IDEN: BAYARDO (PAGOADA) FIGUEROA.

ES

BT

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS ✓

WH/COG/FI

for WH/COG/MO

WH/1/Mexico

E/IB/S

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

26-2
0830

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX ☐ YES ☑ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM

DISSEM BY 53

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR, EUR 8, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI

RID/ FI

ABSTRACT ✗ ~~INDEX~~

SECRET 253951Z CITE MADRID 9813

MADR

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

25 Nov 66 IN 45905

TYPIC WATCHLIST

ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ PP-D-66-637 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVA 21 NOV IBERIA FLT 942.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-332665

25 Nov, 1966

FBI doc. (X-ref)
20 May '66
Re: Rodriguez Lopez, Rogelio

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Kingston

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: TYPIC/KAPOK
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As Indicated

REFERENCE : DIR 98504

It is requested that the attached photograph of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665) be shown to RUABBE and RUADLIB/1 for possible identification in connection with CUIS activities. There is no information at Headquarters which indicates that Subject has been in Jamaica.

Constance M. QUILHOT

Attachment: H/W
Photo

Distribution:
3 - COS/Kingston w/att

Jamaica

CS COPY

GROUP 1
[illegible]

201-332665

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HJKW-353

DATE: 9 MAY 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK DESENSITIZED

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-332665

2 May 66
Distribution:
1 - WH/C/CICS
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - WH/7
1 - RID

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/C/CICS	Ida Galliher	mak	3411

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/C/CICS		Joseph Vidal
WH/7	5 MAY 1966	
FI/D/CSB	6 May	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
A/DCWHD/C	5	John T. Flynn

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

4: ☒ YES ☐ NO

ASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 12

28/21

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

JMWAVE

ACTION

DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH 3, C/CI, C/FI/D 4

DISSEM PER DIO-8

18 Apr 66 [illegible] 99148

S E C R E T 182249Z

KNGS INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0246

TYPIC ZRKNICK

REF KNGS 2531 (IN 97625)

AN KC	~~CI~~	WH/C/ES
~~IS~~	~~DIST~~	
ABSTRACT X		~~INDEX~~

1. NOTE "CELI" POSSIBLY PHONETIC FOR "CHELE" AKA OF ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ (201-332665), DGI OFFICER MEXI UNTIL 1965, WITH INTEL INTEREST AND CONTACTS CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. ALL WAVE INFO ON RODRIGUEZ AVAILABLE HQS.

S E C R E T

CFN 0246 2531 "CELI" "CHELE" AKA ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ (201-332665) DGI 1965 CENTRAL AMERICA HQS

SECRET

BT

Action - I.G.

NNNN

201-332665
18 April 66

CARDE

(5)

Nombre (s)	Edad	Nacionalidad	Pasaporte
[illegible] P10843	4? AÑOS.	[illegible] DIP.	?/67/343
[illegible] P-7365	[illegible]	CUBANO. [illegible]	?/6?/677
[illegible] P8303	[illegible] AÑOS.	[illegible] OFI.	D/6?/317
[illegible] CASO.	48 AÑOS.	CUBANO. DIP.	D/67/[illegible]
Jose [illegible].	5? AÑOS.	CUBANO. DIP.	D/67/330
Jose [illegible]. P9046	73 AÑOS.	CUBANO. [illegible]	?/66/131
[illegible].	40 AÑOS.	CUBANO. DIP.	D/67/312
Alejandro [illegible].		CUBANO	DIP. D/67/312
[illegible]	34 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP. D/67/?28
[illegible]. P1856	38 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	[illegible] D/67/1466
Luis [illegible].	42 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	ESP. D/67/664

Llegada **Aerolinea**

Salida	Aerolinea	Punto de Desembarque
19 DE JUNIO DE 1967	CUBANA. VUELO # 465	LA HABANA CUBA.

Visa Mexicana Expedida en:

[illegible] Emilio [illegible]. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 327 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN [illegible] EL 16 DE JUNIO DE 1967.

[illegible] LOPEZ. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 497 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN [illegible] EL 9 DE JUNIO DE 1967. LLEGO VUELO 464 DEL DIA 12 DE JUNIO.

Fernando [illegible]. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 39? EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN [illegible] EL 24 DE MAYO DE 1967.

[illegible] CASO. VISA [illegible] # 2199 EXPEDIDA POR EL CONSULADO DE [illegible] EL 14 DE JUNIO DE 1967. LLEGO EL 15 DE JUNIO DE 1967. [illegible].

Jose [illegible]. VISA [illegible] # 49? EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN [illegible] EL 9 DE JUNIO DE 1967. LLEGO EL 12 VUELO 464 DE [illegible].

200-9-4/2

P-7365

Jose [illegible]. VISA DIPLOMATICO # 478 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 7 DE JUNIO DE 1967. LLEGO EL 12 DE JUNIO DE 1967 VUELO # 464.

Orlando [illegible]. VISA DIPLOMATICO # 462 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 5 DE JUNIO DE 1967. LLEGO EL 12 DE JUNIO VUELO # 464.

Alejandro [illegible]. VISA DIPLOMATICO # 325 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN [illegible] EL 14 DE JUNIO DE 1967.

Max [illegible]. VISA DIPLOMATICO # 495 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 9 DE JUNIO DE 1967. LLEGO EL 12 DE 1967 VUELO # 464.

Romulo PEREZ ROJAS. VISA OFICIAL # 977 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 27 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1967.

Luis [illegible]. VISA OFICIAL # 150 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 16 DE JUNIO DE 1967.

FROM SPR ON

Valentin Vasilyevich BAKULIN

201-251813

SENT WITH HMMA - 31320

13 FEBRUARY 1967

b. Non-Soviet Contacts :

45). Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (P-7365, 201-332665), Second Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico and identified intelligence officer.

On 25 August 1961 RODRIGUEZ wanted to borrow a film from Subject (3).

P-7365

FBI doc. (X-ref)
26 Dec. 66
Re: Rodriguez, Rogelio

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. E. Scaggins

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 25 M

ACTION

WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR, EUR 8, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CI,

RI/AN	
PS	DEST
ABSTRACT	INDEX

S E C R E T 151800Z CITE MADRID 0036

MADR

15 Dec 66 60399

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC WATCHLIST

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 55146

B. MADRID 9813 (N45905) *

CHECK OF QUOTA RECORDS INDICATE ROGELIO*RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ LEFT MADRID FOR GENEVA 22 NOV.

* LOPEZ ARRIVED MADRID

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

201-332665

15 Dec. 1966

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 22

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM By 15

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 051413Z CITE BERN 8768

5 Dec 65 IN 52856

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID, JMWAVE, GENEVA

TYPIC WATCHLIST

REF DIRECTOR 56955 *

NO BERN INFO ON RODRIGUEZ. PLS ADVISE WHETHER LIAISON MAY BE QUERIED.

AN 2	FI	
~~20~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

S

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

* ROGELIO LOPEZ.

201 - 332665

5 Dec. 1966

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-3326

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM By 15

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

GNVA

INDEX		
ABSTRACT	✓	

S E C R E T 021530Z CITE GENEVA 3457

BERN INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC WATCHLIST

REF MADRID 9882

2 DEC [illegible] 51389

NO INFO AVAILABLE RE RODRIGUEZ ACTIVITIES GENEVA. DEFER TO BERN RE POSSIBLE LIAISON CHECK FOR PARA TWO REF TRAVEL INFO.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

201-332665

2 Dec. 1966

14-00000

~~File in 201~~
67

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM D, SS Cm Eg 2d

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 2, WH-8, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, RI/AN, FI

MADR

S E C R E T 011311Z CITE MADRID 9882

ESG UFG HMM ESB
DIRECTOR, GENEVA INFO JMWAVE, MEXICO CITY, BERN

1P

IN 50682

TYPIC WATCHLIST

AN	LHC/ES
PS	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X

ZZ

REF: DIRECTOR 55146 (NOT SENT GENEVA, BERN) 3

1. LATIN AMERICAN TRAVEL RECORDS SHOW ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ-LOPEZ, 201-332665 DEPARTED MADRID FOR GENEVA ON 22 NOV 66.

2. FOR GENEVA: RODRIGUEZ ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVANA 21 NOV. REF REPORTED RODRIGUEZ IDENTIFIED AS DGI OFFICER BY AMMUG-1, AMSESS-1, AMSKIFF-5 AND AMKNOB-1. HAS USED PSEUDOS EDUARDO, CASIMIRO, JOSE ANTONIO AND RAUL. REF REQUESTED ANY INFO ONWARD TRAVEL, DESTINATION, AND ACTIVITIES RODRIGUEZ.

3. INDEX RODRIGUEZ.

S E C R E T

BT

Rodriguez - Lopez

SECRET

MICROFILMED
JAN 26 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-332665
1 Dec. 1966

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 7 ✓

SECRET

ORIG: E.SCOGGIN:mot
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 30 November 1966

☐ FILE RI
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1	CI	5	RN
2		6	D
3	FI-7C	7	
4	MO	8	

DISSEM BY ✓ PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: VR , FILE EUR 8 CI CI/OPS FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET
(DATE AND TIME FILED) 3 1552 Z
(REFERENCE NUMBER) 56955
CITE DIRECTOR

TO GENEVA INFO: MADRID JMWAVE BERN

BT

TYPIC WATCHLIST

REFS: A) MADRID 9813 (IN 45905) (NOT SENT GENEVA)
B) DIR 55146 (BEING RELAYED GENEVA)
C) DIR 55147 (BEING RELAYED GENEVA)

1. REF A STATED ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ, PP D-66-637, ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVANA 21 NOV. REF B GIVES BIO DATA ON RODRIGUEZ AND REQUESTS INFO ON ONWARD TRAVEL AND ACTIVITIES. SENSITIVE INFO INDICATES RODRIGUEZ GOING GENEVA FROM MADRID.

2. REQUEST STATION PROVIDE ANY INFO POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS
WH/COG/MO
E/AS/A ✓
E/~~IBES~~ CUBA
C/WH/COG/FI

AC/EUR/AS
RELEASING OFFICER

1-7

16

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

FBI doc. (X-ref.)
30 Mar '66
Re: Rodriguez-Lopez, Rogelio

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665
X-REF TO FILE NO. [illegible]
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 8

71 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OPS.

S E C R E T 062350Z

7 DEC 65 IN 08987

DIR INFO MEXI CITE WAVE 7727

TYPIC AMMUG

REFS: A. DIR 61329

B. MEXI 5410 (IN 01718)

1. ON 3 DEC 65 AMMUG/1 REPORTED LUCIO AND RODRIGUEZ NOT IDENTICAL.

2. RE PARA 3 REF B: A/1 HAS NEVER KNOWN RODRIGUEZ TO USE PSEUDO LUCIO.

S E C R E T

QUERIED IF RODRIGUEZ AND LUCIO ARE IDENTICAL

CFN: 7727 61329 5410 3 DEC 65 AMMUG/1 LUCIO RODRIGUEZ NOT IDENTICAL 3 B A/1 PSEUDO

BT

SECRET

Copy

CS COPY FILED IN 201-749651

201-332665

C ☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

ORIG : E. SCOCCIA:sr
UNIT : WH/C/CICS
EXT : 9465
DATE : 27 NOVEMBER 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-332665 ✓

84 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

B 201-769095

9 Nov 65 20 48

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY RI/AN, WH8, CI/OPS SIG CEN

TO WAVE INFO MEXI CITE DIR 61329

29 Nov 65

REF: MEXI 5410* (01718)

ORDER CINCH IDENTIFICATION OF LUCIO, REQUEST WAVE ASK AMMUG/1, WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ AS DGI OFFICER, IF RODRIGUEZ AND LUCIO ARE IDENTICAL.

11

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
DEC 7 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

*AMSPICE/1 has identified RODRIGUEZ as her CUIS CO "Lucio."

B 201-769095

9 Nov 65
201-332665

C/WH/C/CICS for

WH/C/MO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

29-8

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

3 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Owner of Auto Bearing California License HEW 810
(Now Mexican Diplomatic Plates D-136)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 26 July 1965 on the above subject. This office has no objection to your including information contained in our memorandum of 6 April 1965 in a report to the Bureau of International Commerce, The Bureau of Customs, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

2. It is noted that according to a usually reliable source, this automobile is currently registered to Camilo Domenech Gadea, who was Commercial Counselor of the Cuban Embassy until he left for Cuba on 10 February 1965. As of the present date, the automobile is still being used by the Cuban Embassy.

Distribution: Legal Attache

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

FILES: 50-2-4-A
P-7365
P-8955

Date: July 26, 1965 SECRET

To:

From:

Subject: OWNER OF AUTO BEARING CALIFORNIA
LICENSE HEW 810
105-4380

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Reference is made to your memorandum dated April 6, 1965, captioned as above.

It is noted the automobile referred to in your memorandum is now in possession of an employee of the Cuban Embassy, which could be a violation of export laws regarding Cuba. Your approval is therefore requested to include the information in your memorandum in a report to the Bureau of International Commerce, The Bureau of Customs, and Immigration and Naturalization Service.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

P-7365

NAME: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

LOCATION:

RESIDENCE ADDRESS:

TEL #

*OFFICIAL TITLE:

SALARY:

DUTIES: finance officer, pays the employees
Suspected G-2

POLITICAL POSITION:

CONTACTS:

*PLACE OF BIRTH:

*DATE OF BIRTH:

CIVIL STATUS: **Married**

*FAMILY MEMBERS - PP # Wife: Ester GAVILAN Rogales PP D/63/455
Children : Dolores RODRIGUEZ Baes PP D/63/456
Miguel Gustavo Fernandez RODRIGUEZ PP D/63/456

AUTOMOBILE:

HABITS - HOBBIES:

SIGNATURE - HANDWRITING:

*ARRIVAL IN MEXICO - PP # D/63/454, Arrived with wife and 2 children 8 July 1963

SUBSEQUENT TRAVEL: Was previously assigned to Mexico, left late Sept 1962

*PHOTOG



FILM 2
PHOTO 14
5 AUG 1963



FILM 194
PHOTO 2
12 JULY 1963

INTEREST

P - 7365
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez
201-332665

14-00000

Mexico

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, San Jose

INFO
Chief of Station, Mexico

FROM
Chief, WH/Division

SUBJECT
Jorge VEGA Rodriguez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-25993, 29 April 1965

Action : See Para 3.

1. It was reported in Reference that a man identifying himself as "Roberto" from Costa Rica phoned the Cuban Embassy, Mexico City, on 23 April 1965, in an attempt to get in touch with the successor of Regelio Rodriguez Lopez, Cuban intelligence officer. The man further stated that he was the doctor friend of Manuel, presumably Manuel Mora, head of the Costa Rican Communist Party.

879

2. An intercepted letter, dated 2 May 1965, to Judith Ferrato from Dr. Jorge Vega Rodriguez, Apartado 1212, San Jose, refers to his recent quick trip to Mexico. Vega wrote to Judith using her Party pseudo of Juanita Saenz, and at the end of the typewritten letter he wrote by hand "Greetings to Cafula and Engle (?)". Cafula is one of the pseudos used by Costa Rican Communist leader Carlos Fallas Sibaja. Headquarters has been interested in Vega's frequent trips to Mexico and his intimate friendship with Judith, as revealed by their telephone conversations, but no derogatory information on Vega has been developed. However, the fact that he is familiar with the Party pseudos of Judith and Fallas suggests that he may be more involved than he appears to be.

3. It is requested that Station San Jose determine if Dr. Vega was in Mexico on 23 April 1965, the date of the call to the Cuban Embassy. The Station is again asked to try to uncover any indication of subversive activity on the part of Vega. Is he friendly with the Mora brothers?

CHESTER D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
2-San Jose
1 - Mexico

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HRSW-2700

DATE
10 JUN 1965
7 June 1965

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-42557

SECRET

Chief of Station, San Jose XXX

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

PBRUMEN/Unknown Costa Rican in Contact with Cuban Embassy

Action Required: For information, and see paragraph two.

1. According to LIENVOY, on 23 April 1965, an unidentified man called the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City to speak to the Ambassador, who was not in. The man refused to give his name but said he was the person who used to be seen with "the young blond man" from the Embassy. Subject asked the Embassy secretary to tell the Ambassador that he had received a cable from the Embassy asking him to come to Mexico from Costa Rica and that now he was here, but could not stay long. Subject also said that he had seen the Ambassador frequently but had been told not to use names on the telephone; that he had received the cable at the beginning of Holy Week but could not get a plane reservation then; that they had known him in the Embassy by the name of "Roberto"; that since the young blond man had now gone to Cuba, Subject was supposed to make the acquaintance of the person who had taken the young's place; and that the cable had alluded to some business they were going to take care of. Finally, Subject said to tell the Ambassador that he was the doctor friend of Manuel.

2. The Station is unable to identify Subject. However, the blond man is probably Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, Second Secretary and identified Cuban intelligence officer, who left PCS for Cuba on 5 March 1965. The Station would be interested to know the identity of Subject if it can be determined by the San Jose Station.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
- 2 - COS, San Jose
- 1 - C/WHD
- 3 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

HMMA 25998 29 April 1965

SECRET 50-6-75/4

Glenna H. PELLEN egm

chrono
50-6-75/4
P-7365

Lawrence F. BARKER

SECRET

6 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Owner of Auto Bearing California License NEW 810

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 26 March 1965 on the above subject. According to a usually reliable source, the automobile which previously bore California License NEW 810, now has Mexican diplomatic plates D-136 and is owned by the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The date on which the license plates were changed is not known.

2. The description of Rogelio Rodriguez, who purchased the automobile in California, does not fit the descriptionof Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, who was a member of the staff of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City at the time of the purchase; and the identity of the purchaser is unknown.

Distribution: Legal Attache

THIS IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

Distribution:
50-2-4/A
P-7365
P-8955

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

⑦ ⑥

DISTR:

ACTION: ACTION COPY

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRRE T
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 1 '55

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
RRRRRRRRRRR	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS LFX		6161

TO DIR - INFO MEXI CITE DWAVE 0590
NUMBER

KAPOK TYPIC AMKNOB
REF WAVE 9937 (IN 5865)

1. DEBRIEFING AND FLUTTER AMKNOB-1 CONDUCTED DURING PERIOD 23 MAR - 7 APR 65 ESTABLISHED AND REAFFIRMED HIS CURRENT AND PAST BONA FIDES. A-1 FLUTTER CONDUCTED 2 APR INDICATED NO DECEPTION FOLL POINTS:

A. A-1'S CURRENT CIS CONTACTS AND HISTORY HIS PAST RELATIONS THEREWITH.

B. HIS STATEMENT HE NOT INVOLVED WITH OTHER INTEL SERVICES.

C. HIS CLAIM HAS NOT INFORMED CIS RE KUBARK CONTACT.

D. A-1'S ASSERTION HAS TOLD COMPLETE TRUTH TO KUBARK RE HIS CIS RELATIONSHIP.

E. A-1 CLAIM HAS NOT FABRICATED REPORTS TO KUBARK.

2. A-1 ADMITTED UNDER FLUTTER HAVING ENGAGED IN SOME EXAGGERATION IN HIS REPORTING TO WAVE. PROBING THIS TOPIC WAVE ESTABLISHED A-1 HAD SPECULATED ON RELATIVE IMPORTANCE RAUL HIS CIS CO MEXI WHOM HE REPORTED TO WAVE AS CHIEF CIS OFFICER MEXI. A-1 EXPLAINS IMPORTANCE ATTRIBUTED TO HIS CIS CO BASED ON FACT LATTER TREATED RESPECTFULLY BY FELLOW EMPLOYEES. SIMILAR INSTANCE FUZZY REPORTING RESULTED IN A-1 REPORT TO WAVE THAT HE WAS DIRECTED TRAVEL SPAIN BY CIS. IN FACT A-1 WANTED VISIT SPAIN ORDER SPEND CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS WITH FAMILY, SO HE SURFACED POSSIBILITY HIS TRAVEL TO SPAIN TO RAUL. RAUL RESPONDED WOULD LIKE VISIT SPAIN AND MIGHT CONTACT A-1 THERE. DANGERS SUCH INACCURATE REPORTING IMPRESSED UPON A-1 WHO CLAIMS WILL STICK STRAIGHT FACTS IN FUTURE.

3. A-1'S PAST CURRENT VALUE TO CIS CLEARLY NOMINAL VIEW HIS VAGUE REPORTING TO DATE. WAVE PLANS PROMOTE HIS STATUS WITH CIS PRIMARILY BY PROMPTING HIM IN REPORTING TO CIS INFO HE ACQUIRES ON OWN FROM CUBAN EXILES AND FEEDING HIM ITEMS SELECTED BY WAVE FOR PASSING CIS.

4. REVIEW HIS CONTACTS INDICATES A-1 HAS ACCESS MRR, SECOND FRONT, MOST OTHER ANTI-GOC INDIVIDUALS WAVE AND MEXI AREAS. FOR EXAMPLE A-1 LEARNED FROM MANUEL (ARQUES) DIAZ (201-273016) THAT HE

'''ECONT''''

[illegible] 12 Apr

CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

CYS. TO P-7365

FILE No. P-8061

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE:

INFO.

CLASSIFICATION

FILE:

PRECEDENCE			INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	DEFERRED	PRIORITY			
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO INFO CITE

PAGE TWO XXX WAVE 0590 (IN 6161)

NUMBER

INVOLVED UNIDENTIFIED GROUP PLOTTING ASSASSINATE AMTHUG-1. WAVE IN PROCESS CHECKING THIS INFO AND IF APPROPRIATE PLAN FEED IT CIS VIA A-1. THIS MOVE CERTAIN INCREASE CIS INTEREST IN HIM.

5. A-1'S PAST VALUE KUBARK ALSO REDUCED DUE PRIMARILY A-1'S INACCESSIBILITY PRECLUDING CLOSE OPS GUIDANCE WHICH HE REQUIRES MORE THAN AVERAGE AGENT. HE WILLING SPEND 6 MONTHS TRAIL PERIOD MEXI IN EFFORT INCREASE CIS INTEREST EVALUATION OF HIM AT SAME TIME AVAILABLE FOR CLOSER KUBARK DIRECTION EXPLOITATION. IF GRANTED A-1 WILLING HAVE FAMILY JOIN HIM MEXI FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE MEXI. NO MOVE THIS DIRECTION WILL BE MADE UNTIL WAVE ABLE ASSESS ITS PRACTICALITY.

6. WAVE PREPARING A-1 FOR DISPATCH MEXI NEAR FUTURE TO CONTACT CIS. WILL ADVISE ETD.

7. IN CONTINUED ATTEMPTS IDENTIFY A-1'S CIS CO MEXI, WAVE SHOWED A-1 WAVE'S MUG BOOK AND A-1 SUCCEEDED IDENTIFYING PAUL, HIS CURRENT CIS CO MEXI, AS IDENT TO ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ (201-332565). MUG BOOK ALSO SHOWN AMMUG-1 WHO ALSO IDENTIFIED SAME PHOTO AS THAT OF RODRIGUEZ.

8. INDEX RODRIGUEZ.

'''END'''

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

①

Date : March 26, 1965

To :

From :

Subject: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Owner of Auto
Bearing California License HEW 810

Phillips

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further disseminated without appropriate authorization.

It has been reliably reported to this office that captioned vehicle, not otherwise described, was observed on the grounds of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City at 11:30 A.M. on October 29, 1964.

Investigation to date to identify the owner has developed that captioned vehicle is a 1961 Ford Falcon two-door with Vehicle Identification Number 1R11S123981. Investigation in California has disclosed that the captioned vehicle was last sold to one ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ who gave a false address in the Los Angeles area to the seller of the vehicle. At the time of the sale, RODRIGUEZ indicated that he was buying the automobile for someone else in Mexico, and would allegedly go to Mexico in the automobile.

RODRIGUEZ was described at the time of the purchase of the vehicle as a man between 35 and 40 years of age, apparently a Mexican (judging from his Spanish, dress, etc.) and was allegedly staying with relatives in Los Angeles, California.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Group I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

copies to
P-8955
P-7365

P-7365

(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

It is possible that captioned automobile was purchased for a Cuban diplomatic establishment. Any information you may have which would assist in identifying the owner of this automobile would be greatly appreciated.

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

[illegible] 1304

ORIG.: FLB

EXT.: COMMO

CHRON

DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 22 MARCH 65

FILE: P-2768

Cuban chrno

	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
XXXXXX	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO WAVE INFO. DIR CITE MEXI

NUMBER

TYPIC

REF: WAVE 9539 (IN 5639)

POUCHING UNDER TM 723649 PHOTOS OF CUENCA, RODRIGUEZ, AND VEGA.

END OF MESSAGE

copies to "P" files

CUENCA (P-

RODRIGUEZ (P-

and Manuel VEGA (P-

Thanks

[illegible]

L F BARKER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING

W C CURTIS

RELEASING OFFICER

P-7365

14-00000

DISTR:

ACTION: ACTION COPY

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 15 MAR 1965

FILE:

DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
XXXXX ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS MHS	152256Z	5639

TO DIR

INFO MEXI

CITE WAVE 9539

NUMBER

TYPIC

REF A WAVE 9233 (5502)
B DIR 91534 (NOT RCVD)
C MEXI 2752

1. AMCOG-1 WHO ACCOMPANIED PRIO TO MEXI REPORTED FOLL INFO POSSIBLY RELATED REFS. IN HOTEL ROOM ON 11 FEB, PRIO TOLD A-1 THAT ON PREVIOUS AFTERNOON WHILE WALKING DOWN MEXICO CITY STREET, UNIDENTIFIED MAN (PRIO GAVE NO DESCRIPTION) APPROACHED HIM, SHOOK HANDS AND IDENTIFIED SELF AS G-2 OFFICIAL. PRIO SAID THHEY THEN HELD SHORT TALK ON "GENERAL TOPICS".

2. AMCOG-1 UNABLE AMPLIFY STORY. ACCORDING A-1, PRIO DID TAKE NUMBER WALKS WHILE MEXI CITY, BUT USUALLY ACCOMPANIED BY GROUP CUBAN EXILES SO A-1 VIEW WOULD BE UNUSUAL FOR MEMBERS EMBASSY APPROACH PRIO IN STREET.

3. ATTEMPTING ELICIT FURTHER DETALS FROM PRIO THROUGH AMPALM-4.

4. MEXI: PLEASE FORWARD PHOTOS MENTIONED REF C. WILL ATTEMPT HAVE PRIO REVIEW THEM FOR POSS IDENTIFICATION.

END OF MESSAGE

16/0137Z

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

AMCOG-1 PF

CYS. TO

FILE

f- Carlos PRIO Socarras

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

(2)

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/Operations
AMMUG-1 Review of LITAINT-2 Material

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMA-25052, 23 December 1964

1. AMMUG-1 was shown copies of several documents obtained by LITAINT-2, and attached to reference for Headquarters comments. Of those shown to AMMUG-1 on 2 February 1965, only those translated in paragraph 3 were identified by him as pertaining to DGI.

2. AMMUG-1 pointed out the following items of significance in reference to the attached correspondence:

a. The name "ALBERTO" written in pen in the upper right hand corner probably refers to the "ALBERTO" of the LN Section of the DGI.

b. The name in the upper right hand corner indicates the person to whom the reply should be directed.

c. The name "FERRO" written in the upper right hand corner refers to Jose Miguel ROA Fernandez, who was assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

d. The signature "PABLO" indicates it is correspondence from Cuba to Mexico.

3. The documents referred to above have been translated for the record as follows:

"30/ICI: R[illegible] for Eulogio:

In the month of January ________ I am forwarding a cable from M-One requesting films of that country and other Central American countries.

CONTINUED . . .

Distribution:
0 & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-13443	10 March 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-128/3

15 MAR 1965

P-7365

"We suggest you take care of this matter as soon as possible and to report the possibilities of obtaining these films or of sending some person for the purpose of realizing this work, including the cost of the operation.

Revolutionary,

Pablo"

②

"S/N ICL

Comrade Ferro

Several days ago we received a request from comrade Eulogio with reference to your need of a loan to pay some debts, which resulted from recent purchases made by you.

We are aware that your work requires certain commodities, such as a presentable house, capable of making persons, who you receive, feel comfortable in the atmosphere they are in.

Now, you should have analyzed your economic possibilities before incurring those debts. If you had done so you would have realized that these were not within your reach (budget), for which reason you would have turned to us, with the purpose of finding a solution to that problem.

We are instructing comrade Eulogio to make you a reasonable loan with which you can get out of your present debts.

In the future you should consult us and in particular present a plan to comrade Eulogio, on any problem of that nature, with the confidence that it will be solved.

You should make us a report justifying the loan that you will get to pay the debts you have."

John N. CORNISH

3.-131.- 8 marzo 63.

761.- Salida al 154138.- 1250hs._ Jorrín con la esposa del Sr. Herrera Franyuti le dice que el embajador que está enfermo quiere que el Sr. pase a verlo.- HF que en seguida que llegue le avisa.- ---804.-

883.- Entrada a las 1311hs.- HF Ramón Rubidal por Cepeda._ Jorrín que anda por el aeropuerto.--- 889.

890.- Entrada a las [illegible]hs.- Morales por Rogelio.- Jorrín que Rogelio salió a Cuba.--- 903.-

p. 1365

95.- Salida al 260225.- 1436hs._ HD Avilio por Efraín.- HF que acaba de salir.--- 914.-

---

....

P-1365

SECRET

2 March 1965
LX-2460

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: General: AMMUG/1 Debriefing Report #271
Specific: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez/Photographic Surveillance of Cuban Consulate, Mexico City.

1. On 9 February 1965, AMMUG/1 identified a photograph of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Second Secretary at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and a member of the DGI (Directorio General de Inteligencia). He also identified a photograph of RODRIGUEZ' wife whose name he could not recall.

2. These photographs are part of the surveillance on the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City and were taken from the following:

Film No.	Photo	Date
373	10	22 February 1964 (Rogelio RODRIGUEZ)
279	15	26 November 1963 (RODRIGUEZ' wife)

3. Additional information on RODRIGUEZ is contained in the following AMMUG/1 Debriefing Reports:

#153	dated 24 August 1964
#181	" 9 September 1964
#217	" 2 March 1965.

Ret'd to Havana 5 Mar 1965

J. Piccolo
WH/C/RR/OS

AN	FI	
~~DS~~	~~[illegible]~~	
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

Ben Stotts
C/WH/C/RR/OS

SECRET

201-33[illegible]
201-332665

2 March 1965
LX-2460

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: General: AMMUG/1 Debriefing Report #271
Specific: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez/Photographic Surveillance of Cuban Consulate, Mexico City.

1. On 9 February 1965, AMMUG/1 identified a photograph of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Second Secretary at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and a member of the DGI (Directorio General de Inteligencia). He also identified a photograph of RODRIGUEZ' wife whose name he could not recall. Wife is Esther Gavilán Rosales de Rodrigez.

2. These photographs are part of the surveillance on the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City and were taken from the following:

Film No.	Photo	Date
373	10	22 February 1964 (Rogelio RODRIGUEZ)
279	15	26 November 1963 (RODRIGUEZ' wife)

3. Additional information on RODRIGUEZ is contained in the following AMMUG/1 Debriefing Reports:

#153	dated	24 August 1964
#181	"	9 September 1964
#217	"	2 March 1965.

J. Piccolo
WH/C/RR/OS

Ben Stotts
C/WH/C/RR/OS

Distribution:
2-RI (201-332665) 2-AMMUG/Pro, Mary, Bernice, Lois, Chrono

201-332665

CUBA 1964
RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO. DIPLOMAT.
SECRET CIA-P-202222

CUBA 1963
GAVILAN ROSALES DE RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ESTHER. (WIFE OF ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ).
SECRET CIA-P-202221

Film 373 Photo 10

22

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

DPOB:

[illegible] Cuba

Second Secy, Mexico
City Cuban Embassy.
and DGI member
(Direccion General
de Inteligencia)



CUBA 1963
GAVILAN ROSALES DE RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ESTHER. (WIFE OF ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ).
SECRET CIA-P-202221

1 March 1965
WH/C #65-48
LX-1836

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/D Staff

SUBJECT : General: AMMUC/1 Debriefing Report #217
Subject: S/W Communications

In s/w communications, the agent is given a name, separate from his own pseudonym, as an indicator. In the Romeo Operation the use of the name "JULIO" meant that the letter was for "EDUARDO" that is Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, who had that as one of his pseudonyms and used it in August 1962 when he was in the MA Section at DGI (Cuban Intelligence service) Headquarters. The Valladares Operation similarly used "GENARO" to indicate that the letter was for "TEODORO," identity unknown, but a case officer in MA Section in August 1962.

Mary Hutchison
WH/C/RR/OS

Benjamin Stotts
C/WH/C/RR/OS

Distribution:
2-FID
2-AMMUC/1 Production
1-WH/C/ESEC
2-RI (19-5-1 and 201-332665)
1-Lois
1-Mary/Bernice
1-Chrono

CS cy filed 19-5-39

Copy 201-332665

14-00000

(6)

8369

RESUMEN
miércoles 10 febrero 1965 -1-

2152

09:07 SOL ARGUEDAS se reporta a casa del Lic. ALONSO AGUILAR y éste le pregunta cómo le fué en su viaje por Cuba. SOL responde que estupendamente. AGUILAR se alegra y comenta que sería muy bueno charlar ampliamente pues "a nosotros nos interesan mucho tus comentarios" de todo lo que seguramente ha podido seguir mas de cerca. SOL agrega que este ha sido el viaje mas inteligente que ha hecho, inteligente en el sentido de la comprensión, una cosa menos emotiva. AGUILAR así lo cree y manifiesta que ahora ya tiene una base que deberá servirle para la reapreciación de muchas cosas. SOL dice que además tiene pensado regresar muy pronto, y por tal motivo quisiera que AGUILAR y señora fueran el sábado a cenar a su casa. AGUILAR agradece la invitación pero no puede aceptar en vista de que precisamente ese día deberá estar en Ciudad Obregón, pues tiene el compromiso de hacer un recorrido rápido por el Estado de Sonora, pero promete que a su regreso se pondrán de acuerdo y se reunirán.

IP

2365 146

09:24 El Dr. ALVAREZ (la voz del guatemalteco VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ) pregunta a la Embajada de Cuba por ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y al ser informado por JORRIN que no se encuentra deja el recado siguiente: que lo esperaron ayer los esposos que lo habían invitado y que como no pudo ir lo esperan el sábado para merendar, porque ellos van a estar fuera. JORRIN toma nota y pasará el recado.

8955 1825

09:37 JESUS GIL después de ofrecer a la venta cierta cantidad de frijol azufrado a CAMILO DOMENECH de la oficina comercial de la Embajada Cubana, dice que mañana almorzará con TOÑO ROCHA pues es muy amigo de él y que es el Procurador de la República y que va a aclarar esas cosas que han publicado en contra de mismo CAMILO los diarios capitalinos. Este dice que lo tien sin cuidado, pues es la misma prensa que siempre ha criticado a los grandes hombres y verdaderos próceres, con mas razón van a criticar a un pobre hombre como lo es él. JESUS dice que de todas maneras " son unos mierdas, y bien mierdas", pero que los verdaderos amigos están con CAMILO que lo quieren de verdad. CAMILO lo sabe y se lo agradece.

10:15 Una empleada del Lic. FERNANDO FIGUEROA TARANGO Secretario del Presidente de la Gran Comisión del Senado, manifiesta que aquel desea ir a Cuba con su familia en viaje de placer. El Vice-Consul ABREU dice que lo puede hacer. La empleada entonces solicita "un salvo-conducto para FIGUEROA". ABREU indica que no es necesario pues eso solo es cuando hay estado de guerra, pero que si tiene pasaporte oficial puede otorgársele la visa.

6

P-7365

14-00000

200. Salidas al 09.-1410.- Sin contestación. Luego Rogelio Rodríguez pide una conferencia al 33565 de La Habana y posteriormente pregunta a Bertha Pino (empiezan a hablar en el número 309) si ha recibido todas sus cartas y Bertha dice que sí. Rogelio pregunta por qué no le ha contestado y Bertha no responde y pregunta por el ...... y -- Rogelio indica que lo mandó con Mario hace dos semanas, lo mismo que los zapatos. Bertha se dá por enterada. -- Después la Dra.Margot Machado con Rogelio para comunicarle que ya está bien. Rogelio se alegra y pregunta cómo Verenita y Margot comenta que bien y engordando. Nuevamente habla Bertha y pregunta a Rogelio si está haciendo mucho frío y éste dice que nó, que ya levantó. Bertha pregunta cómo están en la embajada y Rogelio comenta que todo mundo bien. Bertha pregunta cuándo regresan a Cuba - Vega y él y Rogelio creé que hasta marzo, a principios; pregunta si va a contestar sus cartas y Batha aclara que el - viernes le contestaron y le mandaron un sobre amarillo con La señora de Sama. Rogelio:que ya lo recibió; pregunta si ya empezó a trabajar y Bertha dice que nó, que hasta el 23 de febrero y el martes irá a Santa Clara. Rogelio:que ayer con Bola de Nieve e Iván, le mandó una carta; pregunta si está de acuerdo con las cartas y Bertha indica que sí; - que le dé recuerdos a todos los compañeros. Rogelio: - que está bien.- 360.-

P. 7365
P. 8591
P. 7921
P. 8604

362. Entrada equivocada.- 366.-

367. Salidas al 09.-1425.-Sin contestación. Luego Rogelio pregunta el importe de la llamada que hizo a Cuba y MF pide que dentro de 20 minutos llame al 188440.- 380.- Posteriormente MF le dá tiempo y precio de la llamada a Cuba.-383.-

383. Salida al 141861.-1906.-J.se comunica a la farmacia y pide medicamentos a nombre de Cepeda.- 396.-

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (3.-L31.- 7 feb.65) -- --

P 7365

Embajada de Cuba: 144237.-
2 feb. 65 .-
M 11. L 36.-
0950 - 1407.

105. Entrada 0950.- HF pregunta si ya llegaron las becas para los estudiantes y MD pide llame al 141326 para que lo informen.- 123.-

123. Entrado 1122.- Novicky de la Embajada de Checoslovaquia con Rogelio para decirle que le urge hablar con él; pregunta si es posible y éste dice que sí y quedan de verse a las 12 en el lugarsito aquel.- 143.-

P. 7365
X

143. Entrado 1205.- El Lécado Cuauhtémoc Pardo al no encontrar a Sinobas, queda de volver a llamar.- 154.-

X

155. Entrada 1212.- Urdanivia pregunta al embajador qué se le ofrece y éste dice que necesitaba lo comunicara con el Ing. Carlo Durant porque hablaron de verse para hablar algo de materia azucarera, ya que parece que hay una bibliografía que Durant estima que es muy moderna y le gustarí preguntarle ciertas cosas. Urdanivia: que Durant es un hombre de mucha confianza y muy competente. Armas está de acuerdo y agrega que Durant, le estuvo hablando de unas publicaciones sobre determinadas técnicas azucareras que se han ido incorporando en algunos países a la industria. Urdanivia: que Durant tiene simpatía por la revolución de Cuba y todo, que es un hombre en quien puede confiar y por lo tanto mañana le dará sus teléfono. Armas acepta. Urdanivia pregunta qué noticias de Nuñez tiene y Armas indica que en éstos no ha sabido nada, sin embargo está esperando carta porque él le escribió mandándole unos libros que le pidió; que en caso de que sepa algo, lo llamará.

To Report

P-8726

P-7365

CUBA

CUBA
Cancillería y residencia: Francisco Márquez 160
(Colonia Condesa)

Excmo. Sr. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas,
Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario
Señora Clara CARBONELL de Hernandez
Presentación de credenciales: 3 de Julio de 1963

Señor Ramón SINOBAS Casado. Consejero
Señora Marta SOLIS de Sinobas
Residencia: Alvaro Obregón 123, Depto. 605,
3er. Piso (Col. Roma) Teléfono: 11-21-79

Señor Raúl APARICIO Nogales, Consejero Cultural,
Señora Raquel ABREU de Aparicio
Residencia: Zamora 199-A (Condesa). Teléfono: 14-57-89

Señor Camilo DOMENECH Gadea, Consejero Comercial
Señora Esther Natalia JIMENEZ Navarro de Domenech
Residencia: Cuernavaca 35-7 (Condesa). Teléfono:

Señor Rogelio RODRIGUEZ López, Segundo Secretario.
Señora Esther GAVILAN de Rodriguez Lopez
Residencia: Baja California 173-3. Teléfono: 14-02-63

Señor José Miguel FERNANDEZ Roa, Tercer Secretario.
Señora Lolita RODRIGUEZ de Fernandez Roa.
Residencia: Juanacatlan 23-401 (Condesa). Teléfono:

Señor Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez, Tercer Secretario
Residencia: Francisco Márquez 160 (Condesa). Teléfono: 14-13-26

Señor Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez, Tercer Secretario.
Residencia: Telefono:

Señor Luis ALBERU Souto, Agregado Cultural
Residencia: Michelet 7, Depto. 301 (Anzurez).

Señor Enrique VILLAVICENCIO Argudin, Agregado Diplomático.
Señora Xenia MENENDEZ de Villavicencio.
Residencia: Francisco Márquez 160 (Col. Condesa). Teléfono: 14-13-26

SO: DIARIO OFICIAL, Organo del Gobierno Constitucional de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2 de Enero de 1965

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

049 JK/JG/ \ PART

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

SECRET

DATE : 16 DECEMBER 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, PP 2, PP/PRO, PP/PYD 2, PP/PMO, 100 4, DO/I, AD/CI, S/C 2

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE
MICROFILMED FEB [illegible] 1963
RI [illegible]
No CS Record Value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated
RF [illegible]

JP

10

ROUTING	
1	4
2 ✓	5
3	6

DEC 17 07 44:53
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 38553

TO DIR INFO [SACU] CITE HAVA 0693 ✓

INTEL

DA 16 DEC

APPR: PARAS 1,4 (2) PARAS 2,3 (3) PARAS 5-6
06, 08

SOURCE: PARA 1 [GEORGE K HARPER, LAS VILLAS PLANTATION] OWNER (F) PARAS 2,3 AMARIA (B) PARA 4 AMBARK-1 (C) PARA 5
06 [HARRY GRAHAM] (F) FROM DR MEMBER (F)

1. ERNESTO GUEVARA HAS MOVED WESTWARD. HIS EXACT LOCATION NOT KNOWN BUT 165 MEN THOUGHT TO BE UNDER HIS COMMAND ARE CAMPED NEAR MANACAS IN WEST LAS VILLAS. GUEVARA IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE BELIEVED TO BE TO CUT OFF CENTRAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC WEST OF SANTA CLARA. FC: AMBARK-2 CONFIRMS THIS REBEL STRATEGY, SAYS MAY BE PLANNING TRY CUT HIGHWAY AT SANTO DOMINGO. SC: HEAVY TRUCKS CANNOT TRAVEL EAST OF SANTA CLARA. BACKROADS CAN BE USED BY AUTOS AND LIGHT TRUCKS.

2. 26TH OF JULY REPLACING CTC LABOR OFFICIALS WITH OWN PEOPLE ON SUGAR CENTRALES WHICH IT CAPTURES. CONRAD BEQUER DIAZ, WITH HQS IN SIERRA MAESTRA, IN CHARGE OF THE PROGRAM.

SECRET

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3/80

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

SECRET

DATE : 16 DECEMBER 1958

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

PAGE 2

ROUTINE

IN 38553
HAVA 0693

TO INFO CITE

3. MANUEL RAY, MRC CHIEF, IS VISITING SIERRA MAESTRA FOR CONFERENCE WITH FIDEL CASTRO DISCUSS CASTRO DESIRE DISSOLVE MRC AND INCORPORATE IT INTO 26TH JULY.

4. SMALL FEU FORCE ACTIVE NEAR COLISEO IN MATANZAS. ARMS SHIPMENT SEIZED IN CAYO HUESO, FLA WEEK 7 DEC WAS PURCHASED BY FEU FOR USE IN HAVA.

5. BATISTA HAS CONTRACTED FOR SERVICES 2 FRENCH ARMY OFFICERS EXPERIENCED IN GUERRILLA WARFARE TO ADVISE CUBAN ARMY.

20-4

SUPDATA: HQS MAY WISH QUERY PARI ON PARA 5.

DISSEM EMB DEF ORALLY.

RELEASED 161830Z

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

1/20

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
TSD/SAB
4200 Admin. Bldg.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. AC/TSD/TA		28 June		
2.				
3. TSD/SRS		28 JUN 1960		
4.				
5. WH/4/FI		Coordinated by phone		
6.				
7. RI/DP	1308 L	28 JUN 1960		
8.				
9. TSD/SRS				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				
18.				

COMMENTS

PRIORITY

RECORD COPY

PRIORITY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NAME BY PHONE	OFFICE
Ralph Seehafer	WH/4/FI

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

NAME	TITLE
COLIN C. REID 03	C/TSD/SAB

RELEASING OFFICER

NAME	TITLE
03 ROBERT K. CRAVEN	AC/TSD/TA

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER 08
201-274049

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HKHW-3523

FORM 610

SECRET

14-00000

PRIORITY

TO : Chief of Station, Havana
INFO

201-(274049) 08

FROM : Chief, KURIOT

DATE 23 JUN 1960

SUBJECT : AQUATIC/Operational 01
SW Supplies for AMIRE-1

RE: "403" — CHECK "X" ONE
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCES

: HAVA - 4989, 17 June 1960

1. The SW supplies 01 and instructions needed to establish two-way SW correspondence with AMIRE-1 are transmitted herewith. We realize that some of the instruction forms and supplies which are being transmitted are duplicates of those sent to the Station in support of other operations. However, in order to facilitate the handling of each operation, the supplies for each are furnished as a complete unit. This will preclude the need for borrowing from one agent's supplies to outfit another.

2. AMIRE 01 will write to the Case Officer, using carbon system #39337. 99 Two unused sheets of carbon #39337 should be issued to the agent for this purpose. He should be told to store them separately to avoid accidental loss of his writing system. His carbon system is developed by means of tablet #30607. A supply of the developer material, in quantities sufficient for training purposes, accompanies this dispatch.

3. According to the WH operational plan, SW messages written by AMIRE-1 01 will be mailed to accommodation addresses in various Latin American countries. In accordance with that, KURIOT will provide the appropriate WH Field Stations 28 with the materials necessary for developing the operational messages.

4. AMIRE-1 01 will develop 99 the SW messages he receives by means of pill 99 #58838. He should be issued twenty pills #58838 for that purpose. It is recommended that the agent be told to hide his developer materials in a safe place. This should not present much of a problem because the pills are so 99 small. We do not generally recommend that pills be camouflaged as medicines. 99 Even in cases where the SW ingredient does have a bona fide medicinal usage, the concentration represented by the SW pill would usually be in excess of the 99 normal dosage, and thus there would be a danger of having an unwitting person use them by accident. 99 If the Case Officer feels that for operational reasons it is desirable to camouflage them as medicines, they should only be kept in a bottle which is clearly marked FOR EXTERNAL USE ONLY. 99

5. According to the operational plan, the Base to agent SW messages will be prepared for the Area Division by KURIOT at Headquarters. The Area Division will pouch the SW messages (as "blank" sheets of stationery) to 99 the appropriate Field Station for application of the cover text and mailing.

6. The AMIRE-1 01 Case Officer 99 should familiarize himself with the accompanying supplies and instructions before any attempt is made to train and issue supplies to the agent. Experience has shown that it is advisable to plan for two or three short (2 hour) agent training sessions scheduled over a period of days, rather than to attempt to cram the training into one long session.

7. Special attention should be given to planning the 24 cover correspondence. It is usually recommended that the agent use false name and return address on his SW messages to the Station, thereby dis-associating himself completely from his SW reports once they are in the mail channel. 24 This requires that the correspondence be fictional, and entails a certain amount of skill on the part of AMIRE-1 01 in fabricating apparently innocent correspondence. 24 We have found that the use of a 24 false postal identity frequently provides the agent with considerable psychological reassurance during the course of the operation.

8. The cover/

HAVA - 3523

FORM 10-57 53b
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
PRIORITY

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.
1 of 3

24/PV

08
(...)

8. The cover correspondence must in no way appear to be different from the bulk of mail ordinarily found in the channel being used. It should contain no information which could be viewed as suspicious in any way. The external aspects of the correspondence must be innocent in all aspects if the SW is to be expected to provide any level of security.

9. We have found that the reliability of any SW system depends nearly entirely on the care with which it is used. Please stress the need for careful writing techniques in your agent training sessions.

10. The following supplies and instructions are transmitted in support of the AMIRE operation:

a. Standard Form #1059-CWT which describes in detail how to write with a carbon sheet.

b. One carbon sheet #2010, labeled DEMONSTRATION CARBON is to be used to demonstrate the principles of carbon writing. The development process for this system can be carried out in the agent's presence.

c. One bottle (100 ml.) of developer #20609 which will develop the demonstration carbon writing.

d. Instruction Form/H-16029 describing the development of the DEMONSTRATION CARBON.

e. Three carbon sheets #39337. The one labeled PRACTICE CARBON is to be used in training and is to be retained by the Station. Two are to be issued to the agent. The agent should not be allowed to witness the development of this system, nor should he be shown the message after development.

f. Instruction Form H-36037 specific instructions for the development of carbon system #39337.

g. Twenty pills #30607, to be used to develop practice and real messages written with carbon #39337.

h. Two practice messages written with AMIRE's ingoing SW system which he should use to practice his development technique.

i. Twenty-five pills #58838 which AMIRE will use to develop the SW messages he receives. Two or three of these pills should be used in training. Twenty of the remaining pills should be issued to the agent.

j. Instruction Form #H-26058, instructions for the use of developer #56838.

k. One copy of the "Station Maintenance of SW Supplies form.

l. Miscellaneous items such as cotton, swab sticks, and blotters; items generally useful for SW processing.

11. You will note that two different kinds of carbon sheets have been submitted with the supplies. One is labeled DEMONSTRATION CARBON. This should be used in the practice session only. It should be used to demonstrate carbon writing techniques to the agent. This system can be developed in the agent's presence. The other carbons submitted (#39337) constitute the agent's operational sending system. One sheet of carbon #39337 has been labeled PRACTICE CARBON. After the agent has mastered the use of the DEMONSTRATION CARBON he should be given an opportunity to write with the PRACTICE CARBON. It is very important that the Case Officer have the chance to critique the agent's SW writing technique with the actual system which the agent will use. However, the agent

should not/

34/PN

99

should not be allowed [to witness the development of his operational [illegible] on system] nor be shown the (message after development.) The (developm[illegible] carbon 99 #39337) should be carried out at the Station. 99 If the Case Officer [illegible] that the training messages written with the operational (PRACTICE CARBON) 99 [illegible] that the agent's technique is poor, he should use (photographs) 4 of the [illegible] messages to point out to the agent those areas where improvement [illegible] needed, or he should just discuss it verbally.

12. The Station should retain the (DEMONSTRATION 99 CARBON) the (PRACTICE 99 CARBON,) and the rest of the supplies. Please bear in mind that [illegible] developed messages and working materials should be treated as classified.

13. Please do not hesitate to request additional help from [illegible] as needed.

for Sherman M. Prasinto
JOANNA H. MANESTR[illegible]

Enclosures: (1 Box & 1 Env)
1. Supplies & Instructions
2. Supplies

22 June 1960

Distribution:
3 - COS, Havana, w/encls a/s

~~1~~ - RI, w/o encls
1 - TSD/SRS, w/o encls
2 - WH/4/FI, w/o encls
1 - TSD/SAB, w/o encls

TSD/SAB (JHManestrick) (2922):gke

03

CS COPY
23 Jun 60
EK - 3523

9/12J

( )08

08
201-(274C49)

12 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

ATTENTION: C/C & TAB

SUBJECT: (Emilio Americo RODRIGUEZ) 04

1. Subject has been recruited by the Habana Station at the rate of $300.00 per month effective 1 June 1960.

2. It is requested that Finance Division deposit the monthly salary of Subject to (Account No. 44-335-104, Whitney National Bank of New Orlenas, P.O. Box 1260, New Orleans 10, Louisiana.) 24 This account is under the name of (Emilio Rodrigues.) 04

3. The first deposit should be made on 30 June 1960 for the month of June and monthly thereafter until further notified.

4. No taxes are to be withheld from Subject's salary.

J. D. Esterline
C/WH/4

WH/4/FI/RSeehafer/dc

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/4/Finance
1 - WH/4/Chrono
→ 1 - WH/4/Subject

12 Jul 60

201-(274C49)
08

5/PN

December 1959

PERSONAL DATA:

NAME: Emilio A. Rodriguez 04 AGE: 32 years. 08
DATE OF BIRTH: January 27, 1928. 09

PRESENT ADDRESS: Edificio FOCSA, Apt. 23-L, Calles 17 & M,
Vedado, Habana, Cuba. 08

NATIONALITY: American. PLACE OF BIRTH: Havana, Cuba. 08

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 438-42-7817 30 SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.: 16-45-28-53

MARITAL STATUS: Married (11-1/2 years) 08 CHILDREN: 3 boys, 1 girl. 08

EDUCATION: Colegio De La Salle, Havana, Cuba 08
Alcee Fortier High School, New Orleans, La. 08
Tulane University, New Orleans, La. 08

DEGREES: Bachelor of Science, Master of Arts.

UNDERGRADUATE WORK: Scientific-Medicine Program, majoring in Psychology and minoring in Biology and Chemistry.

GRADUATE WORK: The Humanities, majoring in Linguistics and Literature. (Lacking 1 more year to complete work on my Ph. D.) 08

HONORARY MENTIONS: Phi Kappa Chapter 08 of Phi Sigma Iota National Honor Society. All graduate work done under scholarships and fellowships provided by 08 Tulane University and the State of Louisiana. 08

CAMPUS ACTIVITIES: Phi Kappa Sigma, Phi Iota Alpha; Pan-American Club, International Club, Flying Club, American Association of Teachers of Spanish and Portuguese. 08

PLACEMENT TESTS: Graduate Record Examination --
Advanced Test Score: 670 (Upper 5% of National Average).
U. S. Civil Service Commission -- 1952
Military Intelligence Research Specialist: Grade GS-7
Intelligence Research Specialist: Grade GS-7
Foreign Affairs Officer: Grade GS-7

LANGUAGES: Conversation: English, Spanish, Portuguese (poor).
Reading: English, Spanish, Portuguese.
Writing: English, Spanish, Portuguese (poor).
Working knowledge of: French, Italian.

CHARACTER REFERENCES:

Mr. David L. White, 512 Walnut St., New Orleans, La. 06, 08
Mr. Perry M. Arthur, 9820 Thanksgiving Drive, Perrine, Fla. 06, 08
Mr. Lee T. Wolf, 420 Park Ave., Swarthmore, Pa. 06, 08
Mr. Clarence Zehnder, Edificio FOCSA, Apt. 28-J, Calle 17 & M, 06, 08
Habana, Cuba.

Miss Dorothy Maness, 2722 Palmer Ave., New Orleans, La. 06, 08
[illegible] 06, 08

23|PJ

December 1959

WORKING EXPERIENCE:

U.S.A. - 1948-1954:

08 08

Gas Refrigerating Co., New Orleans, La. -- Sales Counselor
Cardiovascular Research Laboratory, Tulane School of Medicine, New Orleans, La. -- Research Technician. 08
Middle America Research Institute, Tulane University, New Orleans La. -- Assistant Librarian. 08
Touro Infirmary, New Orleans, La. -- Medical Technician 08
Berlitz School of Languages, New Orleans, La. 08 Professor.
08 Tulane University, Spanish Department, New Orleans, La. -- Teaching Fellow. 10
08

(Most of the above positions were held principally for the purpose of providing additional income while doing Graduate Work at Tulane University)
08

HAVANA, CUBA - 1954-1960. Branch Sales Office for the following:
08

Appleton Electric Co., Chicago, Ill. -- Asst. District Manager.
08 Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co., Hartford, Conn. -- Idem.
08 Century Electric Co., St. Louis, Mo. -- Idem.
06 Hubbard and Company, Chicago, Ill. -- Idem.
06 Hubbard Aluminum Products Co., Pittsburgh, Penn. -- Idem.
06 The Okonite Company, Passaic, N.J. -- Idem.

06

This is a combined Havana District Sales Office handling the individual business of each of the above companies in this territory, and representing their interests in Cuba.

PRESENT POSITION AND DUTIES: 08

Since April 1954 I have been working as Assistant District Manager of the Havana District Sales Office for the above described companies. In this capacity I have been directly responsible for all business operations of these companies throughout the territory of Cuba. It has been my duty to promote the sale in Cuba of all items manufactured by said companies; organizing representation in the main cities; appoint distributors; assist in collection of accounts when necessary; direct the servicing of their products in case of operating difficulties; supervise the handling of all of their export-import shipments; study the market conditions and trends, analyze competitive situations and advise the factories accordingly; cooperate with and advise local distributors in their sales promotion programs and assist with important accounts and contracts; to counsel Management in sales policy and procedures in this territory; and to protect in every way possible the interests in Cuba of the above mentioned American manufacturers.

RESUME:

Due to the economic and political situation prevailing in Cuba, and present restrictions on imported goods, I am considering the advisability of making a change whereby I can improve my present standing and future potentialities in accordance with my educational qualifications and proven experiences. I am only interested in working direct for an American Company, either at home or abroad, with a starting base salary of about $12,000 a year.

6/PJ

01
AM(IRE)-1 08
201 — (274049)

1752

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 18-13

SECRET

ORIG : RALPH SEEHAFER
UNIT : WH/4/FI
EXT : 2065
DATE : 18 MAY 1961

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : CARACAS

FROM : XXXXXXXXBELL

CONF : BELL 15

INFO : DDP, COP, ADCP/A, WH, BELL S/C

MAY 18 2048Z 61

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 9323
9323

TO PRITY CARA INFO CITE DIR BELL 0628
0628

JMZIP

PLS PUT FOLLOWING INTO SW WRITE COVER LETTER AND MAIL TO AM(IRE)-1:
01

"MSG NUMBER FIVE. (HENRY). RECEIVED YOUR SW MSGS THRU FOURTEEN.
06

BE VERY CAREFUL OF (ELVIRA JOVANE DE SAYAS) WE HAVE REPORT SHE VERY PRO-CASTRO. FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOU ALSO BEING SENT BY RADIO. HENRY, CLINTON, HAPPY AND EUGENIO SHOULD LEAVE CUBA AS SOON AS FEASIBLE. USE EVERY MEANS AVAILABLE INCLUDING COMPANY FUNDS FOR LEGAL OR ILLEGAL TRAVEL. MEANTIME DIVORCE YOURSELF FROM OPERATIONS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND CONCENTRATE ON YOUR EXFILTRATION. ADVISE IF OUR HELP NEEDED. IF ROBERTO WILLING BE ALTERNATE WT CHANNEL FOR PETE AND NET PROVIDE HIM WITH RADIO. HE ONLY TO BE USED IN EMERGENCY. USE INK AS PRIMARY CHANNEL. INSTRUCT FELIPE USE SW AND COURIERS FOR NORMAL COMMO AND WT ONLY FOR VERY URGENT MATTERS. WE SENDING POUCH VIA TIGERS WIFE. FOR SECURITY REASONS WE REMOVED ENVELOPE THREE CONTAINING PERSONAL LETTERS AND REPLACED WITH ENVELOPE CONTAINING PESOS FOR FELIPE MANAGE OPERATIONS. TELL FELIPES WIFE SEND FULL DETAILS BANK ACCT TO HENRYS PO BOX MIAMI. WE WILL

99

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

6/pJ

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 9323 BELL 0628

TO INFO CITE DIR

- 2 -

99 06

INTERCEPT AND BEGIN MONTHLY DEPOSITS. TELL PETE BE CAREFUL OF COUNSELLOR YUGOSLAV EMB WHO INTELLIGENCE AGENT. DIMPLE BRIEFED CONTENTS THIS MSG FOR ORAL RELAY TO YOU."

06

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

R.W. Herbert
J. C. KING 02
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

03
(Ele Terrell)
AC/WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Reichhardt
C. A. STANULIS
AC/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

4/RV

AM(IRE)-1
01

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 054 9MAY61
TO : BELL
FROM : CARACUS
ACTION : BELL 15
INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH, BELL S/C

ROUTING

1		4	
2	FI	5	
3		6	

08
9MAY61 0326Z
201 — (27·1049)

PRIORITY

IN 1615

PRITY BELL WAVE CITE CARA 5865

JNZIP

01

1. FOLLOWING FROM AM(IRE) COVER LETTER DATED 29 APRIL: MSG 9 STOP UR W/T 17 APR JUST RCVD STOP (CLINTON, WIFE AND EUGENIO) RELEASED STOP REGISTERING (SWISS) END STOP STAND BY POSSIBLY CLINTON TRANSMITTING STOP COMPLETELY ORGANIZING OPERATIONS AROUND PETE AND PACO STOP PETE WILL HAVE CONTACTS WITH TIGER, PANAMA AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORES WHO VERY ACTIVE COUNTER-REV STOP FURNISH ADDRESS FOR DELIVERIES STOP ALL REPEAT ALL SECURITY MEASURES WILL BE USED STOP BELIEVE IMPOSSIBLE ANY AMERICAN OPERATION STOP PRELIMINARIES ALL DEPARTING UNDERWAY STOP SUGGEST OBTAIN MORE POST OFFICE BOXES STOP HAVE NO NEWS BINIARIS WHOM PLAN SEEK FUNDS STOP SIGNED [HENRY.] 06

06.06.06

99

2. ENVELOPE POSSIBLY OPENED AND RESEALED. NO EVIDENCE OTHER EXAMINATION. COVER LETTER APPARENTLY WRITTEN BY WOMAN.

01

3. FROM RE-EXAMINATION MSG 7 FROM AM(IRE) WOULD APPEAR THAT LAST PART LAST SENTENCE ENDS WITH ("HAPPY AND SELF"). THE NAME (HAPPY) IS PROCEEDED WITH WORD ENDING IN E.

24

06

END OF MESSAGE

9 May '61
201-(274049)
08

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

"/P√

SEE HAFER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

536
DATE : 9 MAR 61
TO : BELL
FROM : WAVE
ACTION : BELL 15
INFO : DOP, COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Jd APIRE 201 -

MAR 9 1929Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 2743

PRITY MEXI INFO BELL CITE WAVE 4342

JMZIP

REF MEXI 7544 (IN 2645)

1. STATEMENTS MADE BY (LUIS ALBERTO DE JESUS CONDON CAJIGAL) TO MEXI ACCURATE. OLIEN HANDLED (BOBBY MADURO) AND (JUAN MENDEZ) WHO IDEN A. (RIVERO) MENTIONED POSS IDEN B; PSUEDO (EMILIO FERNANDEZ) AKA (EUGENIO) IDEN C; (PLINIO PRIETO) IDEN D. ALL KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER.

2. WAVE HAS NO INTEREST SUBJ. HOWEVER, WAVE SUGGESTS IF SUBJ DESIRES TRAVEL WAVE AREA JOIN AMIRON MIL TNG PROGRAM WILL HAVE AMOTS ASSIST HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

9 May '61

201-(274049)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Lechafer

ROUTING

1	JP	4	
2		5	
3		6	

CSS

DATE : 9 MAR 61

TO : BELL

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

MAR 9 0445Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 2645

PRITY BELL INFO PRITY WAVE CITE MEXI 7544

JMZIP SECUR

REF: BELL 1750 (OUT-46140)+

FOLL STATEMENT FROM LUIS ALBERTO DE JESUS CONDOM CAJIGAL:

REJOINED ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND ABOUT MAY60. OFFICES WERE AT EDIFICIO FOCSA APTO 214 SECOND FLOOR WGERE LOCATED CIA. CUBANA DE FIANZA, PRESIDENT BOBY MADURO, IN CHARGE OF JUAN MENDEZ (NOW IN UNDERGROUND HAVA). THERE ASKED JOIN FRD BY SENORES RIVERO AND EL RUBIO WHO CARRIED FRD CREDENTIALS. WAS ACCEPTED AND SENT PLANILLAS OIAMI OF JUAN MENDEZ WAR NAME JORGE PILOTO AND OF SELF, WAR NAME JORGE PINO. GROUP HAD CONTACT WITH AMCITIZEN AMEMBASSY HAVA NAMED EMILIO FERNANDEZ WAR NAME EUGENIO. GROUP ASKED CHECK RECEPTION RADIO SWAN IN PROVINCES PINAR DEL RIO HAVANA AND MATANZAS. GROUL VIEITED BY PINIO PRIETO (LATER EXECUTED 12 OCTOBER 60) AND DELEGATE FABIO FROM MIAMI RE ORGANIZATION FIFTH COLUMN UTILIZING PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE SELECTING HOUSES HAVANA FOR ARMS CACHES AND DROP ZONES. SUBJ TOOK ASYLUM 2 JANUARY 61 MEXI EMBASSY HAVA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * NO TRACES ALIAS JORGE PINO.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

08

201-(274049)

(Rodriguez, Emilio) 04

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING 09-18

ORIG: J. J. MULLANE 694
UNIT: WH/4/SECURITY
EXT: 6785
DATE: 9 MARCH 1961

TO: JMWAVE

FROM: ~~DIRECTOR~~ JMBELL

CONF: BELL 15

INFO: COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED / ROUTING / PRIORITY / OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

WH/4/Security

9 MAR 61 2050Z

OUT 6435

OUT 6435

TO FRITY MOVE INFO CITE BELL 2491

2491

JMZIP SECUR

REF RDJ: 3161 (IN 2661) (NOT SENT MOVE)

06, 08

1. REQUEST KUSODA REP ASAP CONTACT MR. (FR[illegible] TO RODRIGUEZ GONZALES, INSTRUCTOR, BERLITZ SCHOOL, 1209 ST. CHARLES AVE.) AND RELAY MESSAGE FROM SON (EMILIO) 06 "DO NOT RETURN CUBA. EXPLANATION WILL FOLLOW IN LETTER." TELEPHONIC CONTACT SUFFICIENT.

2. FYI SON RECENTLY ARRESTED AND RELEASED. AUTHORITIES SEEKING FATHER.

END OF MESSAGE

This is probably—
the (Emilio Rodriguez) 04
of 201-(274049.)
08

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
CHIEF, WH/4/SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/4/FI R. Seehafer in draft
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOSEPH F. LANGAN
CHIEF, WH/4/SECURITY
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

6 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT: AMIRE-1 01 Arrest on 3 March 1961 08

REFERENCES: (A) RIPM 3046 (IN 2218)

(B) BELL 2340 (OUT 6009)

1. Reference A does not give sufficient detail to make a very realistic appraisal at this time of the damage to our operations from the arrest of AMIRE-1. 24

2. According to AMRYE-1, the head principal agent of our stay-behind nets in Cuba, AMIRE-1 01 was kept fully informed of everything concerning operations and reporting. He also knew of the AMPARCH-1 agent net and how contact can be made with the agents. He was kept fully cognizant of all incoming and outgoing radio messages and reports.

3. Following is a list of the agents known or probably known to AMIRE-1: 01

AMEYE-1
AMPARCH-1
AM[illegible]TOR-1
AM[illegible]-1
AMDIVY-1
AMMICLITE
AMMICLITE-2
AMBOUT-1
AMPALMA-1
AMALBA-1
AMBLAD-1
AM[illegible]ED-1
AMPARLOR-2
AMDCIT-1
AMCONCERT-1
AMTIS-1
AMPEDDARCH-11
AMGLEN-9
AMPALM-4

4. 01 AMIRE-1 was also in contact with counter-revolutionaries such as the following which could have been the cause of his arrest:

Francisco SANTIAGO 06
06 Pepo SOLIS
06 SANTANA (fnu), FM radio operator 06
06 Humberto SORI Marin

SECRET

11/PV

SECRET

01

5. AM[illegible]-1 was also made aware of the persons and places where the staybehind funds are cached or stashed. He was to have provided 01,24 AMOT-34 with a radio set on 4 March 1961. He was also one of the staybehind agents who was originally introduced to the British.
24

03
Robert E. Whedbee
C/WH/4/FI

WH/4/FI/RGSeehafer:mkt

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/WH/4/CI
1 - C/WH/4/FI/D/CU 24
1 - WH/4/F&P (File British Liaison)
1 - WH/4/Chrono
✓ 2 - WH/4/FI

SECRET

5/pv

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO [illegible]A-6710, 24 August 1960

06

(Juan M. Cassnova Rodriguez)
(Apartado 6290) 08
Habana, Cuba

SECRET

CS COPY

2/ru

TO Chief of Station, JMWAVE	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		MICROFILM

SUBJECT TYPIC
Letter From Fletcher M. KNIGHT to Widow of Peter Di GERVENO

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Action Required: For Your Information

Forwarded under separate cover attachment is a copy of a letter from Fletcher M. KNIGHT to the widow of Peter Di GERVENO for your information.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Attachment:
Letter u/s/c

Distribution:
3-COS,JMWAVE w/att u/s/c

201-274049

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGS-10515	DATE 6 MAY 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-274049

1 May 1968

Distribution:
1-RID
1-WH/REG/C
1-WH/COG/OPS
1-Originator

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/OPS	Nancye Grafz	jaf	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/OPS		Arthur T. KARM

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH COG		David A. PHILLIPS

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

15 April 1968

Mrs. Paula R. Rodriguez
9351 S. W. 178th Street
Miami, Florida 33157

Dear Mrs. Rodriguez:

I was deeply moved by your recent letter in which you so eloquently expressed appreciation for help the Agency provided you.

I am most grateful to you for sharing with me your thoughts about your husband's life and his dedication to this Agency. It is very comforting for me to know that we have been a source of strength in your time of sorrow.

If we can be of help as time goes on, please be so kind as to let us know.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms

PERSONAL

RHelms/ecd - 15/4/68

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 4

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR CI/OA, MPS/BEZ DDP, ADDP
WH/COE8

S E C R E T 151839Z CITE CARACAS 8292

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

AKULE CIELBOW

15 Nov 67 # 93760

File DIGERVENO 201

REFS A. HVCW-7746 (NOT SENT JMWAVE)

B. HVCA-14933 (NOT SENT JMWAVE)

1. REQUEST HQS CONSIDER NOT CANCELLING PROJECT CIELBOW. REF B POUCHED 14 NOVEMBER CONTAINS COVER RECOMMENDATIONS AND REQUEST THAT HQS SKEEK A REPLACEMENT FOR DIGERVENO, WHOSE DEATH REPORTED BY BANASIAK ON RETURN FROM JMWAVE.

2. HUNKELER AND COS MET NIGHT 14 NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO DRAFTING OF REF B. HUNKELER BELIEVES IF SPANISH SPEAKING OFFICER WITH BUSINESS EXPERIENCE CAN BE OBTAINED THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN REPLACING DIGERVENO IN PROPOSED COVER MECHANISM. HUNKELER REPORTS GOOD PROGRESS MADE IN OBTAINING OUTLETS FOR HIS LINES OF MERCHANDISE. AT COS REQUEST HE WILL PREPARE REPORT FOR HQS AND STATION ON THIS PROGRESS UPON HIS RETURN JMWAVE.

3. JMWAVE: REQUEST STATION EXPRESS COS SYMPATHY TO WIFE OF DIGERVENO, WHOSE DEATH BOTH PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL LOSS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
KAPOK SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
Cover for Peter J. Di Gerveno

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The cover for Peter J. Di Gerveno was discussed by Robert S. Hunkeler, Chester B. Dagnillo and the undersigned on 7 and 9 November 1967. The purpose of the conversations was to determine the most suitable cover to be used under the broad umbrella offered by Hunkeler's various enterprises.

2. The following conclusions were reached:

a. That Di Gerveno will come to Caracas as the representative for some of Hunkeler's sales lines. Specifically he will be the representative for IDENTITY-1, which is Hunkeler's marketing firm.

b. In addition to representing IDENTITY-1, generally, he will specifically be IDENTITY-1's sales agent for IDENTITY-2; IDENTITY-3; and IDENTITY-4 and possibly for IDENTITY-5.

3. IDENTITY-2 is the manufacturer of a wide variety of industrial epoxy products used in the construction industry and as anti-corrosive coatings required by most petroleum companies in Venezuela. Hunkeler has conducted talks with IDENTITY-6, a large local holding company engaged in a broad variety of business enterprises. IDENTITY-6 is interested in marketing the IDENTITY-2 line. As sales agent for IDENTITY-1, Di Gerveno would also serve as a technical advisor to IDENTITY-6, and would not interfere with IDENTITY-6's marketing activities. Under these circumstances Di Gerveno would enjoy a degree of immediate sponsorship by an important local firm which should assist in the rapid solidification of his status cover.

ATTACHMENT: Under Separate Cover
1. Identity List

DISTRIBUTION:
2-C/WHD w/att u/s/c

201-274049

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCA - 14933

DATE
13 November 1967

CLASSIFICATION
KAPOK SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

4. IDENTITY-3 is a line of liquid fertilizer in which IDENTITY-6 is also interested. However, since the local fertilizer industry enjoys protection in the form of import licensing restrictions, it will take from one to two years of negotiation to determine whether the GOV will permit the importation of this line. Di Gerveno would, in conjunction with IDENTITY-6, represent IDENTITY-1 in the negotiations to obtain such permission. Again, this role would provide a degree of sponsorship by IDENTITY-6 and would enable Di Gerveno to at least meet significant government officials. While his operational objectives do not involve the GOV as a target, he could provide assessment and other operational data useful against this target.

5. IDENTITY-4 produces a line of concrete block manufacturing machinery and accessories. There little doubt that as capital equipment, these can be imported into Venezuela--but the number of prospective buyers is limited. Such a line would not of itself support Di Gerveno's cover, but would be a satisfactory supplement there to which would be useful in explaining the fact that he will not devote his full time to any one activity--and to account for at least that portion of his income which could not be justified on the basis of his work on behalf of IDENTITY-2 and -3.

6. IDENTITY-5 produces wrought iron for the utility industry. IDENTITY-1 is considering accepting representation for IDENTITY-5 on a hemisphere wide basis. If this line is accepted, and Di Gerveno represents it locally, it will also help to enhance his status and to account for what would normally be an unusual work pattern.

7. We do not wish at this point to get into a detailed discussion of financial arrangements. If, as we hope, Di Gerveno does make some sales, commissions will be payable to him. If under existing regulations he could keep at least a proportion of these, we would favor it as an incentive to work at his cover. If not, we have confidence that he is a well enough disciplined professional, to work at it in any event.

8. We would expect that the operational duties we have planned for Di Gerveno will take about 20 hours a week. This would involve meetings with the inside case officer; meetings with the agents; preparation of contact reports, drafts of cables, intel reports and dispatches, plus some time to think about his operations.

9. We would expect Di Gerveno to spend the balance of his work week actually performing cover duties. His pattern cannot be neatly defined as four hours for cover and four hours daily for operations. His daily pattern will vary widely and he must retain flexibility in order to be available when needed for operational duties. Nevertheless, to reiterate, he will have time for cover work and will be expected to do it.

10. Under these circumstances, we desire that he be thoroughly trained in his cover duties and that he have a thorough knowledge of the products he is to sell. If it takes 6 months to train him--we expect the 6 months to be used. As part of the training, and to open the door for his PCS arrival, when he has completed cover training with IDENTITY-1 through 4 (or 5), he and Hunkeler should visit Caracas together. Di Gerveno can be introducted by Hunkeler to his commercial contacts, they can seek office space, and, generally, lay the groundwork for Di Gerveno's PCS arrival shortly after the exploratory trip.

11. Please keep us advised on action taken, and progress on this proposal.

12. Just before the release of this dispatch we have learned of Subject's death. This is a cause for real regret--but we would like to ask Headquarters to retain this cover proposal and to seek a possible substitute for Di Gerveno who will have not only good knowledge of the Spanish language, but sufficient commercial background to fit into the proposed cover.

Stefan K. Labanow

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
KAPOK SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT NO. 1 TO HVCA - 14935

IDENTITY-1	-	NALAD Corporation
IDENTITY-2	-	Eband Epoxies, Inc.
IDENTITY-3	-	NA-CHURS Plant Food, Inc.
IDENTITY-4	-	J W Appley & Son, Inc.
IDENTITY-5	-	A M Byers Co; subsidiary of General Tire and Rubber
IDENTITY-6	-	Boulton Bros

DISTRIBUTION:
2-C/WHD

ORIG: [illegible]Williamson:flg
UNIT: DO/.../CCG
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 27 October 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 | 6
2 | 7
3 | 8
4 | 9
5 | 10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
33 PER [illegible] 3

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/[illegible] ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE [illegible] C/FI 2 C/WH.

C/DO 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

S E C R E T

OCT 31 22 15Z

CITE DIRECTOR 48243

TO DO BASE/NEW YORK INFO: JMWAVE, CARACAS

AKULE AMCLOCK

REFS: A. JMWAVE 9863 (IN 77992)*
B. CARACAS 8124 (IN 78860)**
C. DIRECTOR 44104 (NOT SENT CARACAS)***

KG [illegible]
file
DIGERVENO
soft file

1. REQUEST DIGERVENO TDY HQS ONE DAY DURING WEEK 30 OCT TO DISCUSS FUTURE AMCLOCK OP AND TIMING DIGERVENO PCS CARACAS.

2. TO ASSIST IN FUTURE PLANNING AMCLOCK OPERATION, WOULD APPRECIATE DIGERVENO BEING PREPARED DISCUSS AMCLOCK'S REACTION TO PARAGRAPH TWO REF C DURING HQS TDY.

3. PLEASE ADVISE ETA.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CCG COMMENTS: *Ref A requested a reading on the status of the plans and timing of DIGERVENO'S proposed PCS transfer to Caracas.

**Ref B suggested Hqs and JMWAVE set a date for the release of DIGERVENO from his PBRUMEN duties so he can thereafter spend full time preparing for his Caracas assignment. Ref B also says DIGERVENO'S ETA in Caracas is not critical, and the Caracas Station prefers every effort be made to insure a viable long term cover to trying to meet an arbitrary date for his arrival in Caracas.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO __________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 48243

***Para 2 of Ref C requests DIGERVENO to ask AMCLOCK-1 if he (AMCLOCK-1) could and would be willing to meet and maintain periodic contact with a foreign diplomat in Havana as a means of maintaining communications contact with WOFIRM.

C/WH/COG

WH/COG/MO

C/WH/3/V

DO/I/B2

C/DO/I/B2

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

~~DISSEM~~ 24

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	C
2		6	
3		7	
4	5	8	

ACTION Gu..-6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH/COG-5, D/OP, C/CCS-3, C/CSPS, C/DO-4, C/OPSER, C/CI

S E C R E T 241842Z CITE CARACAS 8124

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE DO BASE NEW YORK

RYBAT AKULE PERS

REF JMWAVE 9868 (IN 77993)

24 OCT 67 IN 78860

KG

Wait

File DIGERVENO 201 file.

1. CARACAS HOPED HAVE DIGERVENO ON DUTY BY ABOUT 1 JAN 68 SINCE THIS WOULD HAVE PROVIDED SUFFICIENT TIME FOR COVER TRAINING AND TIMING WOULD HAVE BEEN GOOD FOR SCHOOL TRANSFERS OF HIS CHILDREN.

2. WHILE WOULD STILL LIKE TO ADHERE TO TIME TABLE ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED, BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT THAT AS MUCH TIME AS NECESSARY BE SPENT ON COVER TRAINING TO INSURE THAT THIS PHASE OF OP IS SUCCESSFUL.

3. SUGGEST HQS AND JMWAVE SET A DATE FOR RELEASE OF DIGERVENO FROM PBRUMEN DUTIES SO THAT HE CAN THEREAFTER SPEND FULL TIME PREPARING FOR CARACAS ASSIGNMENT. REALIZE IMPORTANCE AMCLOCK 1 OP AND IF DIGERVENO PRESENCE CONTINUES BE ESSENTIAL TO THAT OP, SUGGEST PREPARATIONS BE MADE RELEASE DIGERVENO FROM PBRUMEN DUTIES ABOUT 1 JAN; THAT TRAINING BE CONDUCTED WITH DUE DELIBERATION TO INSURE THOROUGHNESS; AND THAT CONSIDERATION BE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 8124 SECRET

GIVEN HAVING DIGERVENO LEAVE FAMILY JMWAVE UNTIL END SCHOOL SEMESTER JUNE 68.

4. IN SUM, DIGERVENO ETA NOT CRITICAL AND STATION PREFERS EVERY EFFORT BE MADE INSURE VIABLE LONG TERM COVER TO TRYING MEET AN ARBITRARY DATE FOR HIS ARRIVAL.

SECRET

SECRET

3 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Staff/Non-Official

SUBJECT : Non-Official Cover Request for
Peter J. DI GERVENO (p)

1. Approval for non-official cover for Peter J. DI GERVENO (p) (former AMIRE-1) is requested. This Career Agent has been employed under the same pseudonym since July 1961. During the period June 1960 through July 1961, he carried the cryptonym AMIRE-1. Central Cover Staff has not been requested to develop non-official cover for this agent before.

A. General Information

2. Peter J. DI GERVENO (p) is a Career Agent in the JMWAVE Station and will go to Caracas, Venezuela, in the same employment capacity. The proposed salary for him will be $13,769 per year (equivalent GS-13/3). Other allowances which DI GERVENO will be entitled to during his assignment will be as follows:

Quarters Allowance	$4,600 p.a.
Post Differential	10%
Equalization Allowance	2,200 p. a.
Education Allowance	
2 children at $900 p.a. each	1,800 p.a.
2 children at $1,000 p.a. each	2,000 p.a.
Transfer Allowance	175
Temporary Lodging Allowance $9.00 per day per adult up to 90 days $4.50 per day per child under 11 years Supplementary Post - Allowance for 5 dependents (other than wife and self) for up to 90 days at $5.00 per day.	

3 Oct 67
201-274-49 ; file

Furniture Monetary Allowance (does not include appliances)		$4,500
Appliances		650
Stove	$125.00	
Refrigerator	$295.00	
Freezer	$230.00	
Costs of Air Travel and shipment of personal effects		5,865.75
Total air fare from Miami to Caracas for six adults and one child	$929.50	
Total per diem for ½ day at $25.00 a piece for six adults and one child	81.25	
Passport charges (pictures, fees, etc) for seven persons	35.00	
Taxis to and from airports	20.00	
Total HHE shipping and storage of 12,000 lbs at $40.00 per CWT - estimate includes excess baggage and air freight	4,800.00	
Reimbursement for Venezuelan Income Tax computed at 6% of reported salary, estimated at $18,369		1,102 p.a.
Reimbursement for operational use DI GERVENO private vehicle.		600 p.a.

3. DI GERVENO and family are considered to be mentally and physically fit for overseas duty.

4. Current and previous cover utilized by Subject are as follows:

(a) Subject was legitimately employed in Havana, Cuba, as the manager of a combined Havana District Sales Office which handled the individual businesses of several US firms during the period 1954 through July 1961. His income during that period of time was approximately $10,000 per year.

(b) Subject has been under non-official cover from July 1961 to the present as a consultant for the Roberts Electronic and Engineering Service. This cover is backstopped from the principal office in New Jersey.

5. Subject is available to assume the proposed cover immediately.

6. It is proposed that Subject arrive in Caracas around the beginning of January 1968.

7. The project cryptonym under which Subject will be carried if CIELBOW.

B. Biographic Information

1. Date and place of birth: 27 January 1928 in Havana, Cuba.

Sex: Male.

Race: Caucasian - mildly dark skin.

Religion: Roman Catholic

Citizenship: US (naturalized)

Previous citizenship: Cuban (by birth)

Marital Status: married.

Children: three sons and one daughter ranging in ages from 10 to 16 years old)

Present residence address: 9361 S.W. 178th Street
Perrine 57, Florida

2. Number and relationship of dependents to accompany Subject on his foreign assignment;

Wife

Four children - ranging in age from 10 to 16

Mother-in-law

All of above dependents live with Subject at the address listed as Subject's present residence.

3. Education: Tulane Univeristy (1945-1948) - Subject obtained a BS in Psychology

Tulane University (1948-1954) - Subject obtained a MA in Humanities and lacks one year to complete PH. D.

4. Subject was a legitimate businessman in Havana, Cuba, from 1954 through July 1961. He was the general manager of a Havana District Sales Office which represented several US firms (Appleton Electric Co., Century Electric, Hubbard Aluminum Products, Okonite Company) in Cuba. In the ensuing period from July 1961 to the present, Subject has been employed by a CIA-created commercial organization (JMOCEAN), during which time it might be presumed that Subject acquired additional commerical expertise. Subject's salary has ranged from $10,000 (in Cuba) to $13,769 (currently).

5. Outside interests which might provide basis for cover development: None.

6. Objective personality evaluation: Subject is very friendly, outgoing, neat in appearance and fully bi-lingual. His fitness reports reflect his congeniality in addition to his conscientious behavior and attitude.

7. Subject is considered to be financially solvent and to be without any unnatural debts or outstanding loans.

8. Previous foreign residence: Subject lived in the US for nine years while attending Tulane University. The remainder of Subject's life has been spent in Havana, Cuba, or Miami, Florida. Subject has had several fairly extensive TDYs to several Latin American countries.

9. Subject is fully bi-lingual (Spanish and English). He has limited capability in Portuguese, Italian and French. He is being assigned to a Spanish speaking country.

C. Security Considerations

1. Subject has been employed by CIA since June 1960. Subject was granted a Type A clearance on 5 September 1961 in addition to the issuance of a CSA on 27 January 1965 (CSA # 214 422) to permit Subject's conversion from Contract Employee to Career Agent Status.

2. Subject is fully witting of CIA interest.

3. Subject's Type A clearance permitted him to work in the JMWAVE Station during much of his tour in Miami. He has been inside Headquarters building on at least four occasions.

4. Subject was the Principal Agent for a Cuban stay-behind operation during the period June 1960 through July 1961. On four occasions, he was held and questioned for short periods of time by Cuban G-2. While there is no evidence that Cuban IS has positively identified Subject as a CIA asset, it can be presumed that Cuban IS is alert to the strong possibility of Subject's CIA connection. Subject's wife is fully witting of Subject's true employment. Subject may have been exposed to other than CIA staff employees by one of the members of his stay-behind net either during the period when he was operationally active in Cuba or subsequently. However, while in Miami, Subject has studiously avioded contact with the Cuban community, thereby obviating further speculation about his present employment. Subject's cover during his tenure in Miami (from July 1961 to the present) appears to have been excellent.

There are no relatives or close friends of Subject or his wife in Venezuela.

5. No connection with any intelligence organization other than CIA.

6. No adverse factors in Subject's personal life.

7. Subject has never used any Agency reference.

8. & 9. After his present proposed tour, Subject will be expected to continue in a similar capacity elsewhere in the WH area. It is expected that Subject's tour in Caracas will be at least four years.

10. Paula Ross RODRIGUEZ - wife. Resides with Subject.

11. Subject has both contract life insurance and contract hospitalization under the auspices of this Agency.

12. No members of Subject's family have current clearances. Subject's wife is the only member of his family that is witting of his true employment.

D. Operational Information

1. Type of Operation.

Subject will be a Principal Agent for established agents, specifically tested penetrations of leftist/extremist groups in Venezuela. In the course of his activities, he will act as a spotter and assessor of new agents, but will not be expected to participate in attributable recruitment attempts.

2. Location.

Caracas, Venezuela.

3. Subject should be able to travel freely throughout Venezuela in addition to being able to occasionally make TDY trips to other Latin American countries and Europe.

4. Special Groups agent should be able to contact.

There are special groups Subject should be able to contact, beyond those he could normally approach, given his background and education.

5. Subject should be able to attribute an income of at least $18,000 per year.

6. Subject should be able to devote at least 30 hours a week to operational duties.

7. Communications channels desired.

No special communications channels will be necessary.

8. Cover Suggestions

Cover arrangements have been initiated with HUNKELER in Miami. HUNKELER has a consultant and sales organization operating in Latin America and is considered by WH Division as being able to provide excellent cover for Subject.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

NONOFFICIAL COVER REQUEST FOR INDIVIDUAL

HEADQUARTERS EDITION

FORM 10-64 2311

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NONOFFICIAL COVER REQUEST
FOR INDIVIDUAL

To insure the most effective application of nonofficial cover, it is essential that cover requirements be brought to the attention of Central Cover Staff in the earliest stages of planning. As soon as it has been determined that an agent is to be placed under nonofficial cover, either in the United States or abroad, a meeting with a representative of Central Cover Staff should be arranged. (When outside recruitment of an agent for a nonofficial cover assignment is contemplated, Central Cover Staff facilities are available to facilitate "clean" recruitments and protect the agent against identification with CIA during the integration period.) Initial discussions will be informal and exploratory and should result in the elimination of unsuitable cover possibilities. Central Cover Staff, Nonofficial Cover Branch telephone extensions are 5144 and 5122.

Following the initial discussion, and based upon it, a cover requirement memorandum signed by or for the operating division chief should be submitted to Central Cover Staff. It is specifically requested that a headquarters case officer other than the agent himself be designated to deal with Central Cover Staff in the development of the desired nonofficial cover, including the preparation of the cover requirement memorandum, in order that this development may proceed on a completely objective basis. This memorandum may be keyed to the paragraphs numbered below to obviate repetition.

No commitments will be made with any cover organization until Central Cover Staff has been advised by memorandum that the proposed cover and the agent's participation in the operation have been concurred in by the field and/or the Chief of Operations, DD/P. Such memoranda are to be signed by or for the division chief. Each agent proposed for a nonofficial cover assignment is subject also to personal interview by a designee of Chief, Central Cover Staff, for assessment as to his suitability for the proposed cover. This interview, when required, will be requested by Central Cover Staff.

At the conclusion of the discussions with the operating divisions and discussions between representatives of Central Cover Staff and the cover organization, two formal documents ordinarily will be prepared:

a. The first, a "Letter of Cover Instructions" addressed to the agent will be prepared by the Central Cover Staff. It will outline exactly the cover story to be employed and will specify what is expected of the agent to maintain a proper relationship to the cover facility. Each item in the instructions will be discussed with the agent and/or his case officer by the Central Cover Staff case officer, after which the agent will be required to acknowledge the receipt of these instructions. The branch chief concerned will also be asked to indicate that nothing in the "Letter of Cover Instructions" conflicts with instructions given the agent by the operating division.

). When the cover facility is a legitimate organization rather than an Agency-controlled mechanism, a "Letter of Understanding" with the cover organization is prepared by Contract Personnel Division. It is the "contract" with the cover organization.

The "Letter of Understanding" and the "Letter of Cover Instructions"
l be submitted to the operating division for comments and concur-
ce before presentation, respectively, to the cover organization and
the agent for signature. Sanitized copies, in duplicate, of both the
tter of Cover Instructions" and the "Letter of Understanding" will
furnished the operating division—one copy of each for headquarters
ntion and one for transmittal to and retention by the field station
its guidance and reference by the agent as required.

NONOFFICIAL COVER REQUEST

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Pseudonym of agent to be covered and any pseudonyms, cryptonyms or aliases used previously. Has Central Cover Staff been requested to develop nonofficial cover for this agent before? If so, under what pseudonym, cryptonym or alias?

2. Current employment status and contemplated Agency status under cover if different from current status, i.e., Staff Employee, Staff Agent, Contract Employee, Contract Agent, Career Agent, etc.; Agency salary range, kinds and amounts of allowances to which agent will be entitled during his assignment under nonofficial cover.

. Is the agent now considered by the Agency's Medical, Psychiatric, Assessment and Evaluations Staffs to be fit for overseas duty?

. Current and or previous nonofficial or official covers employed by the agent, including foreign and domestic, formal or informal cover stories, with a statement as to the extent of backstopping in each case. Unbackstopped, informal cover stories used for domestic disguise of CIA staff employment are specifically requested.

. Date of availability of agent to assume the cover.

. Proposed date of departure for overseas post. It must be recognized that cover necessitating the development of a new facility frequently requires several weeks for the necessary clearances of the proposed cover facility's committing officials. Additional weeks of negotiation, company training, etc., often are necessary.

7. Project cryptonym under which agent will be carried. If there is no approved project in the conventional form, the basic authority should be cited and a statement given that funds are available to support any financial commitments made to the cover organization.

B. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. Date and place of birth, sex, race, religion, current citizenship status, previous citizenship(s), marital status, children, present and last previous residence addresses.
2. Number and relationship of adult dependents to accompany agent on his foreign assignment, together with current residence and a statement as to availability of biographical information on each. Number and relationship of minors who are to accompany.
3. Education (college transcripts may be required where academic cover desired).
4. Business or professional experience including salary ranges in previous positions.
5. Outside interests, hobbies, etc., which might provide basis for cover development.
6. Objective personality evaluation.
7. Agent's personal financial status in general terms, including approximate amount of loans and debts outstanding.
8. Previous foreign residence—generally discussed.
9. Language abilities with particular reference to language(s) indigenous to the area of assignment. If English is not agent's native language, state the degree of proficiency in English.

C. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

1. How long has the agent been employed by CIA? Security approval number, date issued, and purpose for which granted. Any derogatory information developed by investigation.
2. Is agent to know specifically of CIA interest, only of U.S. Government interest, or neither?
3. How frequently has agent entered CIA headquarters installations or field installations substantially identified as CIA?
4. Cite any identification of agent's CIA connection to other than CIA staff personnel. Include relatives, friends, neighbors. Cite any known or suspected foreign intelligence interest in agent at any time and any known incidents or circumstances which may have tended to compromise his cover security. Does the agent or spouse have relatives or close friends in or near the area of assignment? Are they presumed witting or unwitting of his U.S. Government connection?

5. Has agent any past connection with or has his intelligence status been identified to OSS, SSU, CIG, G-2, A-2, CIC, ONI or any foreign intelligence, police or security service? Is any such connection known outside CIA and the service involved?
6. Any other factors, such as family problems, which might have bearing upon the personal security of the agent or his ability to live his cover.
7. Has agent ever given CIA, Miss Violet Pitts, or "2430 E Street" or other potentially compromising reference for credit or other purposes? If so, where and approximately when? Cite any other instances of employment of cover for credit or other purposes not already cited above. Include specifically use of Agency-provided cover units or facilities.
8. After the currently proposed tour, do present plans for this agent contemplate (a) continuation in a nonofficial cover status; (b) transfer to an official cover status; (c) assignment to headquarters or (d) termination? It must be recognized that protection of certain nonofficial cover facilities precludes early assignment to a more compromising cover status after completion of the nonofficial cover tour.
9. If this request is for interim cover, what are foreseeable plans for eventual, more permanent cover?
10. Identity, relationship, degree of knowledgeability, and address of person designated to Chief, Benefits and Counseling Branch, Office of Personnel for contact in the event of an emergency situation involving agent, as prescribed by HR 20-46.
11. Government or Agency-affiliated beneficial plans in which agent participates (WAEPA, GEHA, Federal Employees Group Life Insurance, Association Benefit Plan, etc.) and other personal insurance held, together with identity and location of beneficiaries and whether or not each beneficiary is witting of agent's CIA affiliation.
12. Agent's Selective Service, military or naval reserve status, including current unit attachment.
13. Clearance status of agent, spouse, and other adult dependents who will accompany agent overseas. Are spouse and adult dependents knowledgeable of agent's CIA connection? His Government connection? Has agent been polygraphed?

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

1. *Type of Operation*

The general type of operation involved, i.e., CA, FI, COMMO, Logistics, etc., and the expected duration of assignment. The sensitivity of the operation should be indicated—e.g., observation, spotting and reporting only; case officer for established agents; recruitment of new agents; penetration operation—and a statement should be included as to the identities of any individuals and organizations, in the U.S. or abroad (other than CIA staff personnel, cover facility officials, and those listed under 2(C)(4) above), who are or will be made witting of agent's CIA or U.S. Government affiliation while he is under this nonofficial cover.

2. *Location*

The city in which the agent is to reside should be specifically stated and alternates in order of preference should be given

3. Indicate localities outside of agent's permanent location which agent should be free to visit and state the frequency and duration of such visits. Also it is important to know whether or not the time and intervals of such meetings will be determined by the agent or dictated by influences or circumstances beyond his control.

4. *Special groups agent should be able to contact*

It is sometimes possible to relate a cover to a particular group in the operational area, i.e., social, cultural, political, commercial. If this is considered an important factor in the cover, this aspect of the requirement should be explained in detail.

5. Approximate annual income which agent must be able to attribute to the cover organization. Sound cover, of course, requires overt (cover) explanation for a reasonable approximation of the sum actually to be available to the agent through Agency salary and allowances. However, a professional intelligence agent's qualifications frequently cannot plausibly command an ostensible income from commercial or other lay sources nearly approaching his Agency income. Firm understanding should be had relative to the agent's living within his cover income. Reservation of a portion of his Agency remuneration may be required. A less desirable alternative is the provision of additional cover for income.

6. Estimate of the minimum number of hours per week which the agent must devote to operational duties.

7. *Communications channels desired*

In rare instances it may be possible to set up SW means of communication through the cover facility. If this is desired, the justification and frequency of such communication facilities should be indicated.

8. *Cover Suggestions*

Any specific cover suggestion or preferences expressed either by the agent or the operating division emphasizing the agent's special suitability to the cover suggested and/or the special advantages of the cover vis-a-vis the target.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO
BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
DISSEM BY 28 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TO. 20 COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	C
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	55	10	

ACTION
C/WH 6
☒ RID COPY

INFO.
FILE, VR, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI 3
C/CSPS, C/CI, O/OPSER

SECRET 282200Z CITE CARACAS 7683

28 Aug 67 IN 40593

ACTION

disem later

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

KAPOK

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 29984
B. JMWAVE 8954 (IN 38443)

1. LABANOW MET WITH DIGERVENO AT AIRPORT 24 AUGUST AND DISCUSSED OP. HUNKELER PRESENCE AT AIRPORT TO SEE OFF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES FACILITATED PRELIMINARY THREE SIDED CONVERSATION RE COVER POSSIBILITIES AND TRAINING. HUNKELER AND DIGERVENO WHO ALREADY ACQUAINTED, APPEAR HAVE GOOD RAPPORT.

2. DISCUSSION CENTERED AROUND TRAINING, BUT IT CLEAR THAT HUNKELER FIRM OFFERS WIDE SCOPE COVER OPPORTUNITIES EITHER AS SALES REP, IN MARKET ANALYSIS, OR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SURVEYS. IN CONNECTION WITH LATTER, HUNKELER FIRM PLANS INITIATE STUDY IN COSTA RICA DURING NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS WHICH MAY OFFER OPPORTUNITY FOR ON THE JOB TRAINING FOR DIGERVENO IF LATTER SPECIALTY DECIDED UPON.

3. FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE SUGGEST THAT FOLL ACTION BE TAKEN CONCURRENTLY WITH PREPARATION PROJECT IN ORDER TRY GET DIGERVENO IN PLACE BY 1 JAN 68:

A. HQS REP TRAVEL JMWAVE CONFER WITH HUNKELER AND

28 Aug. 67
201-274049

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
DISSEM BY PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION
☐ RID COPY

INFO.
FILE.

PAGE TWO CARACAS 7683 SECRET

DIGERVENO TO PINPOINT COVER ASSIGNMENT AND PREPARE COVER TRAINING PROGRAM.

B. THAT DIGERVENO BE MADE AVAILABLE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO UNDERTAKE FULL TIME TRAINING FOR COVER ROLE.

C. IF POSSIBLE, DURING TRAINING PERIOD, SUGGEST DIGERVENO TDY CARACAS FOR ABOUT ONE WEEK TO REVIEW SITUATION AND DISCUSS OP WITH STATION.

SECRET

BT

NNNNFIE576

18 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

FROM : Chief, WH/3/Venezuela

SUBJECT : Assignment of Emilio Rodrigues

1. I wish to make it clear that I do not oppose the assignment of Rodrigues per se to Venezuela, but I do have some reservations on what he is going to be doing. COS, Caracas intends to use him as the case officer for the CIHAVOC and CITILT Projects. Since both are basically CE/CI projects I think this is a great mistake. The amount of research in these projects necessarily requires a great amount of files research which Rodrigues in his cover situation will not be able to do. This will entail a greater amount of work for the inside case officer, defeating the purpose for which Rodrigues was originally considered; freeing the inside case officer for developmental work.

2. The introduction of Rodrigues into the CIHAVOC Case will also introduce one more step through which most of the vital information that CIHAVOC-2 produces must pass. For example, his info now goes through CIHAVOC-1 to the case officer. With the addition of Rodrigues one more time consuming step will be added.

3. I am also of the firm opinion that different case officers should be used for these operations since both are penetrations of the same party and at times produce similar info. In addition, both are extremely sensitive and the compromise of one could possibly lead to the compromise of the other.

4. If Rodrigues was assigned to Caracas for the handling of a sensitive case which exposure would be embarrassing to the United States, such as a high level political penetration or a sensitive Soviet/Satellite Case then it would be well justified. However, I feel that his assignment as an outside case officer for these two activities is not since they could be better handled and serviced from the inside.

5. Finally, the cost of placing Rodrigues in the field is not commensurate with his planned utilization. It will cost over $40,000 for the first year and approximately $35,000 per year from then on. See attached approximate schedule prepared by WH/Support. An amount the current budget cannot easily absorb.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
C/WH/3

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 21 PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION
WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO.
FILE. VR, WH/COG 8, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2

S E C R E T 241700Z CITE JMWAVE 8954 (STEADMAN ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS

24 AUG 67 IN 38443

DYVOUR

REF: DIRECTOR 29984

1. DIGERVENO ACCEPTS DEEP COVER ASSIGNMENT CARACAS ON BASIS ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS DISCUSSED DURING HIS RECENT TDY HQS.

2. DIGERVENO WILL MEET LABANOW PER REF.

S E C R E T

BT

CIELBOW

24 Aug '67

201-274049

SECRET

WH/3/

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ #

ACTION c/WH6 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO

ADV. COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY:

INFO. FILE. VR, c/WH/COG 5, c/CCS 3, c/CSPS, DDP, D/SECUR 4

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	3	6	C
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION

S E C R E T 172218Z CITE JMWAVE 8860 17 Aug 67 IN 34037

DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS

KAPOK DYVOUR

1. RE DIGERVENO FORTHCOMING ASSIGNMENT CARACAS UNDER DEEP COMMERCIAL COVER, DIGERVENO SUGGEST FOR HQS AND CARACAS CONSIDERATION THAT HIS WIFE BE EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY FOR BUSINESS. WIFE IS EXPERIENCED COMMERCIAL SECRETARY WITH KNOWLEDGE OF TYPING, SHORTHAND, FILING AND GENERAL OFFICE PROCEDURES. ALSO SPEAKS FLUENT SPANISH. WIFE HAS NEVER WORKED FOR WOFACT OR LNHARP.

2. BELIEVE USE OF DIGERVENO WIFE AS COVER COMPANY SECRETARY RATHER THAN LOCAL EMPLOYEE AS DISCUSSED IN HQS, WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE SECURITY OF OPERATION; AND WOULD OBVIOUSLY FACILITATE DIGERVENO'S WORK IN OFFICE ON SENSITIVE REPORTS.

3. IF ADDRESSEES CONCUR, REQUEST PROPER TYPE CLEARANCE FOR WIFE (IDEN).

4. WHILE ABOVE ENVISAGES USE OF WIFE PRIMARILY IN COVER CAPACITY, CARACAS MAY POSSIBLY SEE SOME ADVANTAGE HAVING HER ALSO FAMILIARIZE HERSELF WITH WOFACT PROCEDURES (REPORTS WRITING, DISPATCH FORMAT ETC) PRIOR DEPARTURE FROM JMWAVE.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 23 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (22)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO

ADV. COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY:

ACTION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION c/WH6 ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE. VR, c/WH/COG 5, c/CCS 3, c/CSPS
DDP, D/SECUR 4

S E C R E T 172218Z CITE JMWAVE 8861

DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS

17 Aug 67 IN 34022

KAPOK DYVOUR

REF: JMWAVE 8860 (IN 34037)

IDEN IS PAULINE JUANITA ROSS RODRIGUEZ, AKA PAULA, DPOB 2 JAN 23 BOGALUSA, LOUISIANA, U.S. CITIZEN.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

DC/WH/3 WJ

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/3

Lets discuss when C/WH/3 returns. We know how we feel about this but the ops. considerations have not been well thought out in my opinion.

Ed

(DATE)

FORM NO. 1 AUG 54 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

SECRET

11 AUG 1967

PAY AND ALLOWANCES - JULIO RODRIGUEZ

GRADE: GS-13(2) SALARY $13,321 p.a.

GROSS PAY EVERY 4 WEEKS:	$1,024.00
DEDUCTIONS:	
Retirement	$66.56
Contr. Life Ins.	12.00
Contract Health	7.96
	$86.52

Income Taxes withheld at JMWAVE

Quarters Allowance:	$4,600 p.a.
Post Differential:	10%
Equalization Allowance	$2200 p.a.
Educational Allowance:	2 children @$900 p.a. each 2 children @$1,00 p.a. each
Transfer Allowance	$175.00
Temporary Lodging Allowance	$9.00 per day per adult up to 90 days $4.50 per day per child under 11
Supplementary Post Allowance	$5.00p.a. for each child, or $20 p.d.
Furniture Monetary Allowance	$4,500 (does not include appliances)
Appliances to be added:	Stove $125.00 Refrigerator $295.00 Freezer $230.00

Under Project TVE, POV $50.00 allowance or full use of QP less personal mileage

Cost of Air travel and shipment of effects $5,865.75 (see below)

$929.50	Total air fare Miami to Caracas @$143.00 (econ jet) for 6 adults and 1 child
$ 81.25	Total per diem for ½ day @$25.00 p.a., 6 adults, 1 child
35.00	Passport charges (pictures, fees, etc.) for 7 persons
20.00	Taxis to airport in Miami & from airport in Caracas
$4,800.00	Based on total shipping and storage allowances of 12,000 lbs. @$40.00 per CWT - estimated to include excess baggage and air freight.
$5,865.75	

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 4-65 2010

7-6

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 16 7

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CICS	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	MOT	8	

FROM

25/M

ACTION

C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR C/WH6, DDP, ADDP,

COPY

S E C R E T 152008Z CITE LA PAZ 2505 15 MAY 67 IN 67462

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

RY

DESENSITIZED

COS WISHES TO COMMEND PETER J. DI GERVENO ON HIS PERFORMANCE DURING RECENT TDY LA PAZ. DI GERVENO WORKED HARD AND SKILLFULLY UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS, COOPERATED FULLY WITH STATION, AND EARNED RESPECT OF GOB OFFICIALS FOR COMPETENCE OF HIMSELF AND THEREFORE WOFACT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

15 May '67

201-274047

14-00000

201-Emilio Rodriguez

AMIRE-1

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM 2d

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	SS	5	
2		6	
3	MO	7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CCS-3, CSPS, OP-2, D/MS-2

S E C R E T 241934Z CITE JMWAVE 6411

DIRECTOR

4 APR 67 Ⅱ 37140

TYPIC PERSONNEL

RE EFFIELD-LABANOW TELECON OF 4 APRIL ALL MEMBERS OF RODRIGUEZ FAMILY EXCEPT MOTHER OF EMILIO HAVE HAD MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS. RESULTS WERE FORWARDED BY UFGT-18624 DATED 2 FEBRUARY. MOTHER SCHEDULED FOR 4 APRIL. RESULTS WILL BE FORWARDED WITHIN THE WEEK.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CI	5	
2		6	
3	FO	7	
4		8	

FROM #1

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT - TIME [illegible] BY [illegible]

INFO

FILE [illegible], C/OA, [illegible], CI/PS, [illegible] 4, [illegible], [illegible], WH 8

S E C R E T 311947Z CITE JMWAVE 6367

31 MAR 67 IN 34474

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LA PAZ

REF: DIRECTOR 88252

file

1. JMWAVE PREPARED SEND TYPIC CASE OFFICER PETER J. DI GERVENO (IDEN) WHO NATIVE SPANISH SPEAKER AND EXPERIENCED IN WORKING WITH SGSWIRL OPERATORS. DI GERVENO HOLDING CONFIRMED RESERVATIONS 1 APRIL UNDER TRUE NAME, CAN ETA LA PAZ 1030 BRANIFF FLIGHT 521. SPACE ON NEXT AVAILABLE FLIGHTS SUNDAY, TUESDAY AND THURSDAY NOT YET CONFIRMED.

2. IF WOFACT OFFICER NOT REQUIRED, CAN SEND EXPERIENCED CUBAN REFUGEE INTERROGATOR. HOWEVER REQUIRED TRAVEL DOCUMENTS WOULD DELAY ETD.

3. PLEASE ADVISE PRIOR 1900 PREFERED TIME ARRIVAL LA PAZ AND WHETHER WOFACT OFFICER REQUIRED.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
FROM 22

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (35)

SECRET

PRECEDENC

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CI	5	
2		6	
3	FO	7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 2040Z BY C

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, SOD 6, CCS 3, CI/OA, CS/PS, CS/DO, SEC/R 4,

SECRET 311947Z CITE JMWAVE 5368

31 Mar 67 34458

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LA PAZ

REF: DIRECTOR 88252
JMWAVE 5367 (IN 34474)

IDEN: EMILIO A. RODRIGUEZ

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

DATE [illegible] 1967

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part I - Request for Action

NAME Peter J. Digerveno STATUS Career Agent
(Pseudonym) (Career Agent, Contract Agent, Contract Employee)

PROPOSED ACTION:
Summary of branch and/or field recommendations; specific operational task performed by individual; views re long and/or short range utility of individual for Branch area and overall Division needs

1. It is recommended that Peter J. Digerveno, a Type A Contract Agent with Career Agent status, be promoted from his present Grade GS-13 step 2 level to the grade (equivalent) of GS-14 step 1.

2. During the period 1 December 1965 through 25 February 1967 Digerveno has served as an operations officer in the FI Branch at the Miami Station. His performance during this period has been outstanding. His primary duty, and the one in which his performance has been exceptionally competent, was as the principal member of the so-called "operational flying squad" of the Station, i.e., he traveled, alone or with another officer, to various areas of the world to approach Cuban target personalities for recruitment purposes; to debrief newly recruited agents or resident agents traveling abroad; to train newly recruited agents or more senior agents; to serve as a consultant and advisor on Cuban affairs for stations or bases which did not possess an officer knowledgeable regarding Cuban operations; to aid such Stations in conducting operations, to confer with and, where desired by the local Station, to advise or assist local liaison services in the conduct of Cuban operations.

3. Only an officer with the highest qualifications makes a fully effective "flying squad" member. He must be fluent in Cuban Spanish; he must have area knowledge in depth concerning Cuba, including the latest internal developments. He must have a personality which enables him to induce officials--on occasion very senior officials-- to collaborate with the U.S. Government while serving inside Cuba despite the serious personal risks involved. He must be able to train agents in all of the complex skills involved in the maintenance of a resident

C/WH/COG
BRANCH

Signature

BOARD ACTION:

23 Mar '67

201-274049

APPROVED BY:

DATE :

SECRET
(when filled in)

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part I - Request for Action
(Continued)

agent in a Communist denied area, including OWVL, secret writing, cryptography, W/T procedures, concealment devices, personal security, intelligence collection and reporting. He must be able to accomplish all of this training against critical time limitations. It has been Digerveno's ability to handle this very complex and difficult job in a consistently effective and secure manner which has won him the praise of the Miami Station management and commendations from several other field stations. He has turned in an exceptionally competent performance in every operation which he has handled. In a Station which considers it has developed a number of very capable and versatile operations officers, Digerveno must be regarded as one of the two or three top officers, regardless of grade.

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part II - Biographic Data

PSEUDONYM*	DOB	CITIZENSHIP	201 NUMBER
Peter J. DIGERVENO	27 Jan 1928	USA	201-274049

MARITAL STATUS
Married

DEPENDENTS (Relationship and DOB)
Pauline - Wife - 30 January 1923
Emilio - Son - 11 September 1951 16
Joseph - Son - March 1953 14
Patti - Daughter - 23 October 1954 12
Paul - Son - 1957 10

EDUCATION

Dates	Name of School	Location	Degree	Major Studies
1945-48	Tulane University	Tulane, La.	BS	Psychology
1948-54	Tulane University	Tulane, La.	MA	Humanities

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES--Indicate Proficiency--R-W-S-U

Language	Reading	Writing	Speaking	Understanding
Spanish	Fluent	Fluent	Fluent	Fluent
Portugese	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor
Italian	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor
French	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor

NON-AGENCY EXPERIENCE--5 years prior to Agency Connection (Include Military Service)

Dates	Name of Employer	Location	Job or Function	Salary/ Grade
1954-1960	Havana District Sales Office (Representative for various U.S. firms)	Havana, Cuba	Manager	$10,000 per annum approximately

AGENCY EXPERIENCE--Staff ☐ Contract Agent ☐ Career Agent ☒ Contract Employee ☐

Dates	*Cover Employer Name	Location	Basic Salary	Ops Tasks
June-60-July-61	Same as above. Bona fide business.	Havana, Cuba	$300 per month	Case Officer Principal Agent, Stay behind offic
July-61-Present	JMOCEAN	Miami, Fla.	$13,321 per annum	FI Ops Offic

*Indicate also nature of business and whether bona fide or Agency mechanism.

S E C R E T
(when filled in)

SECRET
(when filled in)

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part III

Chronological Narrative
Performance Report

PSEUDONYM

Peter J. DIGERVENO

Summary of evaluation of past performance (if applicable) with emphasis and details of current performance for assigned operational tasks

DATES	LOCATION	AGENCY TASK
June 60-July 61	Havana, Cuba	FI, PM, CA, CI, SB
July 61-April 65	Miami, Florida	FI
May 65-Present	Miami, Florida	FI

During the period June 1960-May 1965 DIGERVENO acquired considerable FI operational experience, beginning with approximately 18 months in a hostile, Denied Area atmosphere. He is a most conscientious officer, absorbed by and dedicated to his work. He is resourceful, constructive, capable and requires a minimum of supervision. He has growth potential as an operations officer and can handle FI, CI and CA cases with equal competence. His appearance is more typically Latin American than native United States which enhances his usefulness in Latin American and some European posts. He would be most effective in deep cover commercial assignments where his business experience and fluent Spanish can be used with maximum effectiveness.

During the period May 1965 through December 1966, DIGERVENO has turned in an unusually strong performance. For detailed information concerning his performance see attached current Fitness Report.

In case of "New Hire" include a personality assessment in terms of capability, attitude, and projected suitability; state names of Division personnel who have interview him; give account of his performance in current non-Agency job.

SECRET
(when filled in)

14-00000

1. NAME (Last) [illegible]	(First) [illegible]	(Middle) J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Jan 28	4. GRADE GS-13
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE [illegible]			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible]	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	XX REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			XX ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)			SPECIAL (Specify)	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 2 May 1965 - 31 December 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Develops, recruits, trains, briefs and dispatches denied area resident agents.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles denied area resident agents thru clandestine communications channels (OWVL, SW and W/T).	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Handles agents in Station area engaged in developing leads to denied area target officials and carrying out operational support functions.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Reports by dispatch, cable and internal memorandum.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Coordinates extensively with other elements in the Station and with other Stations concerning his operational responsibilities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-63 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible] made for improvement of work performance. [illegible] for training. Comment on [illegible] current position. Amplify or [illegible] Section B to provide best basis for [illegible] future personnel action. Manner of performance of [illegible] must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer's performance during the reporting period has been distinguished by outstanding devotion to duty and exceptional competence in all phases of denied area operations. As one of three officer's on the Station's "flying squad", Subject has travelled widely and often to meet and handle denied area agents in western countries as far separated as Mexico City and Beirut, spending six of the last twelve months away from the Station; despite the consequent disruption of his family life, he has accepted and carried out every assignment with unfailing enthusiasm and consistently high standards of performance. His perceptive manipulation of people, whether in approaching and recruiting new agents or guiding and controlling established resident sources, has shown positive results in product quality and operational security throughout the reporting period. His ability to prepare an agent for clandestine operations in a denied area, in both tradecraft and psychological terms, is unsurpassed among officers working against thir target; he is imaginative, yet meticulous in paying attention to the multitude of detail needed for successful resident agent operations, and is able to draw extensively on his earlier personal experience as a stay-behind resident to buttress his briefings. Most of his operational contacts have been carried out abroad, without the advantage of continuing personal contact with senior Station officers; despite the often unfamiliar local situation, he has consistently maintained the highest tradecraft standards and won respect of all elements of the host Station

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	**BY EMPLOYEE**	
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT		
DATE 9 February 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Peter J. DI GERVENO (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)	
2.	**BY SUPERVISOR**	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 20	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 9 February 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, FI Branch, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Matthew McCullough (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)
3.	**BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL See Attachment.		
DATE 16 February 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ John P. Dimmer, Jr. (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

SECTION C - NARRATIVE COMMENTS (cont'd)

wherever he has been.

Subject's linguistic ability (bi-lingual Spanish-English) and his logical, orderly approach to his work are particularly effective talents with respect to clandestine communications. Not only is he fully qualified to instruct agents in SW and OWVL (including the use of numerical and literal ciphers), but the clandestine messages he prepares himself are notable for meaty content, unambiguous style and concise format; other officers less fluent in Spanish frequently consult him concerning their own OWVL or SW messages.

Although Subject is a career agent, he has functioned in a staff capacity during most of his tour at this Station. Lacking experience with internal procedures at the beginning, he is today fully familiar with operational administration and support matters, and his files (operational, administrative and production) are among the best and most complete in the Branch. He is by nature a gregarious person but is also self-sufficient to an advanced degree and likes to work on his own; left to his own devices, he may spend undue time on routine detail which could be handled by his secretary or one of the Branch IAs but this characteristic has been most valuable during TDY trips when circumstances have often left him without the possibility of any qualified assistance. In all his work he shows a healthy regard for operational and administrative economy and is cost-conscious in the use of funds and materiel.

Subject's performance merits an exceptionally strong evaluation when rated against the standards expected of staff officers in his grade. He is an outstandingly able agent handler in Cuban operations and as he acquires broader experience, can be expected to compare equally favorably with officers running denied area operations anywhere in the world. In terms of personal character and professional talent, he is a fine officer, dedicated to the work of this organization, and it has been a distinct pleasure to have served with him.

SECTION D - 3 COMMENTS BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Chief of Station has chosen to review this report in order to underline the very high opinion held by the Station concerning the performance of this officer. The excellent educational background, intense devotion to duty, courage, imaginative approach to operations, agent-handling ability, and his tradecraft skills have been noted in other reports and need not be repeated here. However, the reviewer wishes to note that during the reporting period, faced with a number of new operational challanges and a sizeable amount of independent work in areas far removed from the Station location, Subject has turned in an unusually strong performance. In his handling of several important and sensitive agents being mounted into a denied area Subject demonstrated exceptional attention to detail, a fine knowledge of tradecraft, and unusual good judgment in a number of difficult operational situations. Thus, the reviewer fully concurs with the narrative comments and the performance evaluations of the rating officer.

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION	
RYBAT - SECRET		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WHD	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE RCE		MICROFILM

SUBJECT

Renewal of Robert S. HUNKELER Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: As Indicated

1. The present contract with Robert S. HUNKELER expires on 31 March 1967 and the question of renewal is up for immediate treatment and decision. The paragraphs below outline the major factors to be considered in this matter.

2. HUNKELER is a former staff officer who resigned from WOFACT in 1964 to establish a market research and marketing firm. He was recontacted in the spring of 1965 and employed as an independent contracter by the then COS, JMWAVE, who expressed the hope that this relationship might set a standard for use by WOFACT of former staff officers as long term clandestine assets and outlined HUNKELER's duties and responsibilities as follows:

a. To provide cover for WOFACT personnel abroad.

b. Spotter and assessor of Central American consular community in Miami.

c. Spotter and assessor of recruitment targets throughout Latin and Central America as developed through his travels and contacts.

d. Third party recruiter and agent handler, but only in certain carefully controlled circumstances.

3. These original concepts framing HUNKELER's activities have continued as the major guide lines to his employment. Also added was the task of reporting such positive and operational intelligence as he might elicit from his contacts and associates.

Attachments
1 - Operational Review of
    Robert S. HUNKELER h/w
2 - IDENTITIES u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/atts.

FEB 20 '67

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-27019	16 February 1967
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT - SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-374049

4. The following summarizes the progress that was made in these areas during the two year period of HUNKELER's contract status with us.

a. Cover was provided for a Berlin based agent, AMTHRILL/1. Although the agent was terminated by Berlin Station, management of his cover was competently and professionally handled by HUNKELER. HUNKELER has continued to offer his services to WOFACT in this respect and, although he could provide a cover office anywhere in the Latin American sphere, has specifically suggested Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and Venezuela. He is now in the process of opening, on his own initiative, branch offices in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic and again volunteered them for possible use as cover. According to HUNKELER, Station Caracas has shown some interest in taking advantage of the offer. There has been no other use by WOFACT of this HUNKELER potential during the past two years. Such use in the future is an open question depending in part on whether WOFACT has a requirement for cover facilities such as this, and in part on the nature of our relationship with HUNKELER.

b. HUNKELER has met frequently with members of the Central and Latin American consular community in the Miami area. These associations were enhanced by HUNKELER's activity and participation in several international organizations concerned with business and social relations among Latin and North American countries. Some operational information was gathered about these persons, but none of them ever shaped up as a valid intelligence target worthy of further development and recruitment. It is not expected that this target area will be of any more interest in the future than it is now.

c. HUNKELER has a large number of business associates throughout Latin America and in his travels has contacted a number of government officials up to the presidential level. Most of these contacts have been of a business nature. One of them, a Panamanian legislator, is of some interest to the Panama Station. Interest in the others has been minimal. Future prospects remain open, but must be considered as long range.

d. There has been no use made of HUNKELER as a third party recruiter and agent handler during his two year tenure. He has declared himself always ready and willing to take on agent handling tasks, but the Station has found it more advantageous and efficient to use inside personnel for this. It is highly unlikely that station policy will change in this regard.

4. HUNKELER has been on several business trips during this period. On these occasions he was given an intelligence brief and his operational expenses were defrayed by WOFACT. The results, in terms of disseminated reports, have generally been negative.

5. Recently, HUNKELER provided an introduction to some individuals who have a potential for use in the JMUNION program. There was some discussion of continued activity for HUNKELER in this program, but it was the consensus that there was not sufficient promise in his contribution to merit retaining him for this purpose alone. It can be expected, however, that he might, in the future, assist in entree to other persons of JMUNION interest.

6. Station JMWAVE is of the opinion that employment of Robert S. HUNKELER has not had the results that were hoped for when the contractual relationship was first established. Recognition of this was implicit in the renegotiation of his salary scale from $4800 to $3600 per annum in March 1966 at the end of his first year's contract. It is also the opinion of this Station that there is little likelihood of improvement in the near future although it is recognized that a long range potential exists. These statements are made without prejudice to Robert S. HUNKELER, who has at all times taken a responsible, willing and cooperative attitude in his relationships with Station representatives and discussions of tasks and the prospects of future employment. It should be noted that HUNKELER wants very much to retain some form of relationship with the organization, as much for reasons of interest in the intelligence profession as for income he might derive.

Headquarters Action Requested

7. To summarize, it is JMWAVE's view that HUNKELER's only actual potential value to WOFACT is as a support agent to WH Division as a whole, in supplying unofficial cover and possibly in spotting, developing, and recruiting JMUNION assets. His value to operations of JMWAVE Station itself will be non-existent or minimal, since there is little HUNKELER can do for that Station which cannot be accomplished more easily by a staff employee. Therefore, it is requested that Headquarters review this case and comment as soon as possible. The alternatives are:

a. Renewal of contract as it is at present salary of $3600 per annum.

b. Terminate. HUNKELER has advised that he is not prepared to accept a salary under his present level. It is suggested that the following representative memoranda also be read in this connection:

UFGT 18719, Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report
UFGA 26782, Unofficial Cover Opportunity, Caracas
UFGA 26598, JMUNION/Donald James Miller
UFGA 26195, Unofficial Cover Opportunity, Haiti
UFGA 26170, HUNKELER Visit to Haiti

8. The above was outlined to Robert S. HUNKELER on 15 February 1967 by his present Case Officer, Jeremy F. GEDLAND. After an objective and frank discussion, HUNKELER requested that he be permitted an opportunity to prepare a memorandum setting forth his views on the situation and further asked that it be forwarded to Headquarters in conjunction with the present memorandum. The Case Officer agreed that he should be granted the chance to so express himself and to be heard on all levels where his employment was being treated of. HUNKELER's memorandum is attached.

Philip G. ELMARD

S-E-C-R-E-T

Date 19 October 1966

Career Agent Biographic Data

a. Pseudonym of agent **Peter J. DiGerveno** Staff or Division **WH**

b. Date and place of birth: 27 January 1928 - Cuba

c. Marital status: Married

d. Relationship and years of birth of dependents:

Wife - 30 Jan 1923
Son - 11 Sep 1951
Son - Mar 1953
Dau - 23 Oct 1954
Son - 1957

e. Citizenship of agent: USA

(1) If naturalized, when?

(2) If naturalized, where?

f. Non-CIA education to include name and location of college, degrees, dates, and major:

1945-48	Tulane University	Tulane, La	BS	Psychology
1948-54	Tulane University	Tulane, La	MA	Humanities

g. Military service None

(1) Country served and years:

(2) Branch of service and rank:

h. Non-CIA employment: Kinds of business or profession, positions, salaries, locations, and dates:

1954-1960 - Was manager of a combined Havana District Sales Office for various U. S. firms. Income estimated at about $10,000 yearly.

19 Oct 66

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 2)

i. Dates of psychological assessment, professional and language aptitude tests, if applicable:

j. Languages, including English, using the following terms:

Elementary, Intermediate, High, Native

Language	Reading	Writing	Speaking
Spanish	**Fluent**	**Fluent**	**Fluent**
Portuguese	**Poor**	**Poor**	**Poor**
Italian	**Poor**	**Poor**	**Poor**
French	**Poor**	**Poor**	**Poor**

k. Agency training:

Subject Covered	Duration of Course	Years Taken

l. Alias or pseudonym used for psychological assessment, testing or training, if applicable:

m. Security clearance number:

n. Date of last LCFLUTTER:

o. Contract provisions: (Underline One)

(1) Provision for periodic step increases Yes No

(2) Provision for legislative pay increases Yes No

(3) Provision for total offset of cover income Yes No

(4) Provision for civil service retirement Yes No

(5) Any unusual provisions (please specify)

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 3)

p Date of beginning of current tour:

q. Previous CIA employment:

Years	Type of Cover	CIA Duties	Project	City	Salary
15 Jul 1961		Contract Agent (MOC)	JMWAVE		$9600
1 Sep 1962	NOC	Conversion to Contract Employee FI Ops Off	Taskforce W	JMWAVE	$9600
17 Mar 1963	"	FI Ops Off	"	"	$10,400
5 Jan 1964	"	"	"	"	$10,950
5 Jul 1964	"	"	"	"	$11,295
14 Feb 1965	"	Conversion to Career Agent	"	"	$11,315
1 Dec 1965	"	"	"	"	$12,510
3 Jul 1966	"	"	"	"	$12,873

S-E-C-R-E-T

ATTACHMENT TO UFGA 27019

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Operational Review of Robert S. Hunkeler

DATE: 16 February 1967

Background:

1. Shortly after Hunkeler resigned from KUBARK he met with the then Chief of Station on several occasions concerning Hunkelers potential use as a Station asset. It was between the period following his resignation, and before his first contract with the Station, that the COS told Hunkeler that he was in a "cooling off period" during which time Hunkeler should devote his energies towards the settlement of his personal affairs and the development of his own business interests. Hunkeler was also told that his value to the Station and to KUBARK would be increased if he were free from all ties with KUBARK and ODYOKE in order that Hunkeler may be available at a later date for KUBARK assignments. The COS did not, however, make any commitments to Hunkeler.

Developments:

2. During the months which followed Hunkelers resignation he proceeded to attend to his personal affairs in Lakeland, Florida, and established his company, Identity A, in the WAVE area.

SECRET

3. After a number of months had lapsed, Hunkeler was contacted by the Station COS and was recruited under a contract in the amount of $500.00 a month plus operational expenses. Hunkeler expressed a willingness to undertake any assignment and a desire to actively participate in operations. (His initial target was largely limited to the monitoring of the activities and the personalities of the foreign consular corp in the WAVE area and reporting on matters of operational interest as they came to Hunkelers attention.)

4. Shortly after Hunkeler was placed under contract he submitted a paper to the Station which spelled out a number of specific tasks which he could, under the cover of his company if required, undertake for the Station or KUBARK. (~~These assignments are still comptable with his present cover and background.~~) There follows a list of these tasks;

(a) Sale of KURIOT doctored parts and supplies to the government of PBRUMEN through middlemen and in a manner as to not disclose Hunkelers involvement.

(b) Providing non-official cover facilities to persons being assigned overseas and who require a tight, realistic and flexible cover.

(c) Recruitment pitches, courier work, or related assignments anywhere in Latin America.

(d) Monitoring of diplomatic and commercial activities in the WAVE area.

(e) Reporting on targets of operational interest, both in the WAVE area and in those countries where Hunkeler visits.

(f) Spotting and assessment of specific operational targets in the PBPRIME and in Latin America.

Review of Accomplishments:

5. Whereas Hunkeler remained ready and willing to travel anywhere at anytime for any KUBARK assignment, he was advised that his long range value would be jeopardized if he were to take operational assignments involving any degree of risk. Hunkeler was, in his opinion, "kept in a vacuum" as regards his being able to serve field Stations which have not to this date been made aware of his availability to travel except in those cases when his business travel takes to a country and the field Station is advised of his presence in the area.

6. From the outset Hunkeler began to report on developments in the WAVE area and he began to work in organizations which would permit him to penetrate the diplomatic community

and strengthen his operational capabilities in terms of being able to spot and assess Latin American political leaders. Hunkeler got him-self appointed to a policy making position in the Identity B, he was elected to the position of President of Identity C, appointed to the Board of Directors of Identity D, was elected to the position of President of Identity E, and became a delegate to several conferences (Panama, Jamaica and in PBPRIME) of the Identity F.

7. It was largely as a result of Hunkelers Latin American oriented commercial activities and his organizational activities that he was able to provide timely and valuable reports on the Dominican crisis, establish a personal relationship with Identity G and persons close to him, spot and access several Panamanian targets, and report on the activities and recommendations of Identity H, an organization which provides commercial policy to the President of Panama.(See _______________) Hunkeler kept the Station up to date on the personalities and activities of the Consular Corp in the WAVE area, and has furnished assessments and biographic information on 12 members of this group.

8. Other accomplishments include the following;

(a) Operational Reporting: During the last two years Hunkeler has traveled to and submitted operational and/or intel reports about Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Venezuela, Panama and Costa Rica, in addition to reports originating in the WAVE area.

(b) Establishment of Cover Facilities: In 1966 Hunkeler set up and maintained cover facilities for an agent who was initially trained in Hunkelers companies and subsequently assigned to a European post where he remained until a personnel reduction cut caused his termination. The cover aspects of this cover operation, however, were tight and professionally managed by Hunkeler. Other cover facilities developed by Hunkeler in this period included a cover office facility in Haiti, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic.

(c) Other: In late 1966 Hunkeler met with an Officer assigned to the WAVE Station for the purpose of reviewing the operational potentials of the Caribbean. Hunkeler was able to provide the Officer with the names and introductions to persons well known to Hunkeler who are now in the Caribbean or residing in Miami and available to participate in agent, p.a., or informant capacities.

Present Situation:

9. In early February, 1966, Hunkeler met with a Case Officer of the Cracas Station who reviewed Hunkelers existing business activities in Venezuela and who told Hunkeler that the Caracas Station desired to use a Hunkeler company for non-official cover purposes in Venezuela. The success of Hunkelers commercial activities in the Dominican Republic (and the corresponding move by Hunkeler to open an office in Santo Domingo) is a recent development and there has not yet been time to query Station Santo Domingo as to whether or not they have a requirement to use Hunkelers facilities. (Hunkeler is presently phasing out of much organizational work in the WAVE area in order to devote more time to the chore of setting up his operations in Santo Domingo and Venezuela where both of his companies are currently doing business.)

10. There are several aspects of Hunkelers present business activities which have not yet been finalized: He will soon terminate his lease at his present address and has not yet decided where to re-locate his offices; he is still in negotiations with an investment group in Haiti and may undertake a consultant type survey there which would provide access to Haiti of possible interest to that Station.

Future Potentials:

11. When Hunkelers contract was about to expire in February, 1966, he met with a Station Officer and advised that he was fully in accord with a salary cut from $500.00 to $300.00 a month in keeping with budgetary cuts which were evident at that time. Moreover, Hunkeler volunterily ceased requesting reimbursement for operational expenses choosing to use his KUBARK income for entertainment expenses which oftimes have operational value to KUBARK. Although he has expressed his strong desire to continue his KUBARK relationship under a renewal of his present contract for $300.00 a month, he has advised that he does not care to renew his contract for a figure of less than $300.oo a month.

Robert S. Hunkeler

16 February 1967

14-00000

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UFGA-27019

SECRET RYBAT

IDENTITY

A. The NALAD Corporation (North & Latin American Development Corporation), an exporting company now specializing in industrial equipment, light industrial plants, and equipment.

B. Florida Colombia Alliance, founded by the Secretary of the State of Florida, Tom Adams.

C. The Dominican-American Chamber of Commerce

D. The Miami-Dade County Chamber of Commerce

E. The International Affairs Council of the Miami-Dade County Chamber of Commerce, the largest international trade organization in the Southeastern U.S.

F. The Chamber of Commerce of the Americas, comprised of 47 Chambers of Commerces from 17 countries.

G. Haitian Dictator Francois Duvalier

H. CONEP - Consejo Nacional de Empresas Privadas (National Association of Private Industry)

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, C/EUR 4, C/NE 3, CI/CI, CI/OPSER, C/CS 3, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 151220Z CITE FRANKFURT 5899 (QUAINTANCE ACTING)

PRIORITY ROME, BEIRUT INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC

IN 57332

15 JULY 66

REF A FRANKFURT 5627 (IN 51018)

B FRANKFURT 5882 (IN 56612)

C JMWAVE 1994 (IN 56802)

D ROME 0439 (IN 56717)

1P

FI

INDEX

c/WH/C

1. FYI ROME: DIGERVENO IS IDEN A USING IDEN B OPS ALIAS. ASSUME BEIRUT WILL CABLE ETA. SOKENIS IS IDEN C USING IDEN D OPS ALIAS. HE IS PARTICIPATING AGENT TRAINING.

2. AFTER INITIAL DIGERVENO DEBRIEFING OF ROMERO, BARRING UNFORESEEN COMPLICATIONS EITHER LANGOSCH OR SOKENIS COULD FOLLOW UP. DECISION DEPENDS ON CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH DEBRIEFING WILL TAKE PLACE IN ITALY. WILL APPRECIATE ROME COMMENTS PER REFS A AND B, INCLUDING VIEWS ON WHETHER LANGOSCH PARTICIPATION WOULD INHIBIT FUTURE OPS USE IN ITALY.

3. FYI JMWAVE: AMVAN HAS TENTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANOTHER MEET WITH NUNEZ WHICH MAY FACILITATE SOKENIS USE IN ITALY. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

4. SUGGEST ROME CABLE CONTACT DIGERVENO INSTRUCTIONS TO BEIRUT.

S E C R E T

BT [redacted]

*CONCURRES DI GERVENO STOPOVER ITALY TO HANDLE ROMERO SCREENING INTERVIEWS.

201-765392

201-274049

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ✓ TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 3

ACTION

C/WH/C 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE VR, C/EUR 4, C/NE 3, C/CI, C/OPSER, C/CCS 3, C/FI 2

15[illegible]57272

S E C R E T 151220Z CITE FRANKFURT 5900 (QUAINTANCE ACTING)

PRIORITY ROME, BEIRUT INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC

REF FRANKFURT 5899 (IN 57332)

IDEN A: EMILIO RODRIGUEZ

IDEN B: MAJOR ALEXIS DELGADO

IDEN C: JOHN POULTER

IDEN D: CAPT LEWIS EKHOLM

S E C R E T

BT

[illegible] - 1 ([illegible])
21

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C-8, CI, CI/OPS, RI

S E C R E T 092356Z

PRIORITY MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 3809

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMTHRILL

REF A UFGA 21519
B MEXI 4068 (IN 07548) *
C WAVE 3810 (IN 08651)

10 JUL 65 IN 08655

1. AMTHRILL-1 AND DI GERVENO ARRIVING MEXI 10 JULY, ETA 1930.

2. DI GERVENO (IDEN A) TRAVELING UNDER ALIAS LEON BERNADA. PLAN STAY PRADO HOTEL. WILL CALL IDEN B AFTER SETTLED. PLAN VISIT STATION 12 AND 13 JULY.

3. DISPATCH REF A FORWARDED HQS 25 MAY 65, POUCH 2767, ITEM 20. BELIEVE COPY DELIVERED MEXI DURING REUTEMAN/ELMARD RECENT VISIT.

*Concur Di Gerveno visit

S E C R E T

CFN 3809 UFGA 21519 4068 3810 AMTHRILL-1 DI GERVENO 10 ETA 1930 DI GERVENO A ALIAS LEON BERNADA PRADO HOTEL B 12 13 A 25 65 2767 20 REUTEMAN/ELMARD

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES -1

24 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH/C-8

SECRET 092356Z

PRIORITY MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 3810

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMTHRILL

10 JUL 65 IN 08651

REF WAVE 3809 (IN 08655)

IDEN A: EMILIO AMERICO RODRIGUEZ

IDEN B: ALAN WHITE. HOME PHONE 48-14-46.

SECRET

CFN 3810 3809 EMILIO AMERICO RODRIGUEZ ALAN WHITE 48-14-46

BT

SECRET

201

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : STEPHEN ROKA
UNIT : TSD/OA/AB/D & IS
EXT : 2835
DATE : 5 MARCH 1965

☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: TSD 6
INFO : DDP, WH/C 8, CCS 3, OP 2, VR, FILE

5 Mar 65 47z

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 90299

AQUATIC

RE UFGA 19153

DISGUISE TECH BERNARD PREPARED TO TDY WAVE WEEK 15 MARCH. NEED NOT MEET. REQUEST CONCURRENCE AND WHETHER SUBJECTS OF REF AVAILABLE.

End of Message

TSD Comment: Request disguise support for WELDRAKE, HUSEBY, SLOMAN, DIGERVENO and AMTRUNK-21.

WH/SA/MOB Mr. Cini by phone x-6488
TSD/PERS Mr. E. Mac Lure by phone x-3031

5 Mar 65

SIDNEY GOTTLIEB
DC/TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

ROBERT BUSSEY
C/TSD/OA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

F-1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO:

ADVANCE COPY

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/CYPOSE/AMIRE/AMGLEN/AMFOX
WT Operator Candidate Inside Target Area.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Request for Headquarters Review of Files - Para 5.

1. In the fall of 1960 AMIRE-1 (Peter J. DI CERVENO) recruited in Havana a WT operator candidate, whose name he cannot recall at this time. This candidate was spotted and first contacted by AMPANIC-1, who passed the lead over to AMIRE-1. AMPANIC-1 first contacted the candidate on the porch of the old Mercedes Benz Agency at Malecon and Principe Streets, and AMIRE-1 then contacted subject in the latter's apartment in the fourth floor of a building located in the middle of the block on the East side of Menocal Avenue (Infanta) between Valle and San Jose Streets. This building had a store in the first floor, was painted a pinkish beige, and the apartments were very small (one bedroom and bath, living-dining room combination and a small kitchen). Subject was at the time working in a hardware store and living with his wife and a small child. Subject was about 33 years old, 6'6" tall, 120 lbs., wore thick glasses, light complexion, light hair, protruding facial features.

2. Subject had experience as a professional WT operator and worked a clandestine WT set for the Organizacion Autentica (OA) against the Batista regime. AMPANIC-1 was a member of the OA and spotted subject through a leader of the OA for whom Subject worked in the underground.

3. Subject was trained for a week or so by AMGLEN-1 in a safehouse located at 39 San Rafael Street which had been obtained for that purpose by AMFOX-1. AMFOX-1 attended the training sessions as a look-out, but neither AMFOX-1 nor AMGLEN-1 knew the identity and address of the trainee. Training included the clandestine operation of a RS-1, the use of signal plans, the use of pads in coding and decoding, and personal security. Training was conducted in the fall of 1960 after recruitment of Subject and with the approval of CO George D. SCOPGORY, who was AMIRE-1's CO at the time and to whom full reports were turned in on the

(Continued)

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters

DATE TYPED 28 Jan. 63	DATE DISPATCHED 1963
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-7439
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-33-54/3

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

training and the identity of the candidate. Subject was never activated and was kept on stand-by for possible use at a later date. For that purpose bona fides were established by AMIRE-1 and reported to his CO. Subject was not supplied with a WT 01 set and no signal plans nor pads were issued to him.

01

4. AMIRE-1 recalls Subject was very secure in his clandestine contacts and operations. Despite established bona fides, AMIRE-1 had considerable trouble in gaining Subject's confidence and 01 three preliminary contacts were necessary before getting down to business. Subject was last contacted by AMIRE-1 at Subject's apartment described above, in January or February 1961. At this time Subject was still willing and ready to work.

01 5. It is assumed that Headquarters files on the activities of AMIRE-1, AMCLEN-1 or AMFOX-1 will contain copies of the training reports and information reported by AMIRE-1. We would appreciate Headquarters assistance in ascertaining Subject's identity and present whereabouts in order to determine if he could still be used operationally inside the target area. AMPANIC-1 has been terminated by JMWAVE PW Branch because of weakness in his personal security, and it is believed best not to contact him on this matter if possible.

END OF DISPATCH

61MJ

30 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4 03
ATTENTION : George Hlcovas
SUBJECT : Cover for AMIRE/1 01

1. Pursuant to your requirement for status cover 01 for AMIRE/1, 01 the following devised cover has been developed. AMIRE/1 will be employed as of 1 November 1961, by Roberts Electronic and Engineering Service, 24 a devised cover firm engaged in providing consulting services in the field of electronics and electrical instruments. His immediate position will be that of consultant assigned to the Southeastern part of the United States. This cover was selected in view of AMIRE/1's past employment where he represented various electrical suppliers. 01

2. Roberts Electronic and Engineering Service 24 is located at 08 4010 Glengyle Avenue, Baltimore 15, Maryland, telephone ROgers 4-6770. 08 This is a fully backstopped cover device which will list AMIRE/1 as one of its employees thereby furnishing a credit and employment 01 reference for him. His payments will be made to him by bank transfer as in the past.

3. It should be pointed out to AMIRE/1 01 that he will receive 24 a U. S. Treasury form 1099 at the end of each taxable year, showing Roberts as his source of income. Therefore, it is incumbent on AMIRE/1 01 to file an overt tax return listing himself as an independent contractor with Roberts, 24 thereby explaining why taxes were not withheld.

4. You are requested to advise CCG when this cover arrangement is no longer needed, so that proper backstopping can be effected.

JOHN G. SOUTHARD
C/CCG/NC

30 Oct 61

201-274049

08

5|PJ

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S[illegible]

ORIG : (GEORGE [illegible]) 03
UNIT : WH/4/PA-CI
EXT : 5001 1579
DATE : 2 NOVEMBER 1961

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: BELL 10

INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

03

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT64[illegible]

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 21802

JMZIP

REF: WAVE 7378 (IN 18[illegible])*

1. [illegible] 01 BACKSTOPPED BY ([illegible] ELECTRONIC AND 24 ENGINEERING SERVICE) ([illegible] 06 AVE BALT 18 MD) THRU (ROGERS 06 [illegible]-377[illegible]). EMPLOYED 2 NOV 61 AS CONSULTANT ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTS FOR [illegible] AT 9000 DOLLARS YEAR.

2. TAX INFO TO FOLLOW BY [illegible] POUCH.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Requested priority cover status for subject

03

J. C. KING
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

C/CC/[illegible] (by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

G. J. [illegible]
C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

7lbJ

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: UFG-W-642 dated 17 [illegible]

SUBJECT: Cover for Subject

1. Pursuant to your requirement for status cover for Subject, the following devised cover has been developed. Subject will be employed as of 1 November 1961, by (Roberts Electronic 24 and Engineering Service) a devised cover firm engaged in providing consulting services in the field of electronics and electrical instruments. His immediate position will be that of consultant assigned to the Southeastern part of the United States. This cover was selected in view of Subject's past employment where he represented various electrical suppliers.

06 2. (Roberts Electronic and Engineering Service) 24 is located at (4010 Glengyle Avenue, Baltimore 15, Maryland) telephone 06 (ROgers 4-6770.) This is a fully backstopped cover device which will list Subject as one of its employees thereby furnishing a credit and employment reference for him. His payments will be made to him by bank transfer as in the past.

3. It should be pointed out to Subject that he will receive a U.S. Treasury form 1099 at the end of each taxable year, showing 24 (Roberts) as his source of income. Therefore, it is incumbent on Subject to file an overt tax return listing himself as an independent contractor with (Roberts), 24 thereby explaining why taxes were not withheld.

4. You are requested to advise Headquarters when this cover arrangement is no longer needed, so that proper backstopping can be effected.

6/pw

SECRET

(RUIZ Perez, Carlos (Guillermo))

[illegible]

RUIZ, Guillermo

Latest information (7 July 1971) indicates he is with the MINREX office of Scientific-Technologic Affairs in Havana.

(Excerpt from SECRET)

201-735296

SECRET 201-735296

CLOSED

File in next

volume.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Report

Olejarz
~~[illegible]~~
Lunsford

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. CS DB-312/02338-69

COUNTRY Cuba/Spain

DATE DISTR. 8 October 1969

DOI 19 September 1969

SUBJECT Rejection of Air Spain Offer to Sell Three Britannia Aircraft to Cuba

ACQ Spain, Madrid (19 September 1969) FIELD NO.

SOURCE Member of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid who is a reliable reporter and is known to have access to this type of information.

201-735296

1. On 19 September 1969, Guillermo Ruiz Perez, the Cuban Minister to Spain, sent a letter to Air Spain officially rejecting their offer to sell three Britannia aircraft to Cubana Airlines. (Headquarters Comment: In CS-311/07888-69, dated 8 September 1969, an Iberian Airlines employee whose reporting is usually accurate reported that Air Spain had offered, on 1 August 1969, to sell Cubana Airlines three Britannias for US $2,643,000.)

201 file

2. Field Dissem: None.

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

File: Amaury

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
DCS	BIC	TREASURY					

WHC/RR	3	WH/SAO	1	E/IB/R	3
WHC/OPS	2			E/MADR	1
WHC/EW	1	CI/OPS/WH	2	E/R	1
WHC/PP	1				
WHC/MIAMI	1				

MADRID 9618
(IN 49866)
QUOTA/QUDOZE
CSDB-312/02338-69

TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO 1, WH/C 7 (1), EUR 4 (1), WH 1

LIAISON	COORDINATING	RELEASING
Joint/65	E/IB/R P.R.	RH JM cb

[illegible] Division

[illegible]

[illegible] Cuban Personnel in Madrid

1. [illegible] has provided the following [illegible] on Cuban [illegible] personnel assigned to Spain, [illegible] (201-321007); Ricardo [illegible] (201-[illegible]) and [illegible] Guillermo *RUIZ [illegible] (201-[illegible]):

[illegible] (Mercedes)

[illegible] was [illegible] to the post of [illegible] to take charge of the Cuban [illegible] 1957; this [illegible] left Cuba, although [illegible] Foreign Affairs [illegible] at the Cuban [illegible] Cruz arrived in [illegible] Embassy in [illegible] 1959. Although [illegible] of his post [illegible] It was commented that [illegible] and a very good opinion of [illegible] he cooperated with the [illegible]

[illegible] abroad to [illegible] who is about [illegible] years old, [illegible] presumably left in [illegible] continues at his post. [illegible] considerations. [illegible] the impression [illegible] (1959), [illegible]

[illegible]

S E C R E T

14-00000

[illegible] (approximately [illegible]) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] on past two occasions [illegible] Switzerland, and [illegible] City on vacation. [illegible] to have [illegible] with bus driver an [illegible] much power, [illegible] Ministry of [illegible] connection [illegible] and attitudes [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] with a person [illegible] but sincere, and [illegible] to the [illegible] in the [illegible] the joint [illegible] functions of [illegible] to the [illegible]

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division Chief, Europe Division Chief of Station, WH/Miami		NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, Madrid		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	TYPIC/QUDOZE/Unidentified Cuban in Zaragoza		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			

1. Osvaldo GARCIA who arrived in Spain nearly two months ago to supervise the production of two-burner stoves being manufactured by the Spanish firm Talleres Cataluna, S. A. (TACA) (TACA is also manufacturing the 10,000 cane wagons for the Cubans), passed through Madrid on 23 September and told AMAUTO-1 that there was an unidentified Cuban in Zaragoza who is preparing a study on Spanish firms trading with Cuba. AMAUTO-1 immediately suspected that this Cuban was an agent of RVROCK and suggested that GARCIA get to know this person and try to elicit biographic information as well as attempt to get a photograph of him for possible identification.

2. Station has no idea who this Cuban might be.

Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WHD
- 2 - C/EUR
- 2 - COS/WH,Miami

CS COPY

FILE AMAUTO-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA-25535	2 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 25

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT: WH 8 — INFO: FILE, VR RF/AN EUR 6 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2

ACTION NO. 782 CI/OA FI 2

26 SEP 69 IN 53062

S E C R E T 261334Z SEP 69 CITE MADRID 9655 MADR

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 40647

1. AMAUTO-1 RETURNED TO MADRID FROM HOME LEAVE ON 18 SEPTEMBER. WIFE AND FAMILY ARRIVED MADRID 17 SEPTEMBER. QUTIMID REPORTED AMAUTOS PLAN REMAIN MADRID FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER YEAR AND POSSIBLY TWO. WIFE PREGNANT WITH SIXTH CHILD.

2. STATION WILL SUBMIT OUR VIEWS ON AMAUTO-1 AFTER REVIEW YOUR DISPATCH.

3. FILE 201-735296.

S E C R E T

MW
AN JB
43
~~28~~
~~25~~
25
~~DI~~ RID
~~25~~
C/WH/2

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296

26 Sep 69

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DOCUMENT
DATE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
FILE NUMBER: TELEGRAM # 67091

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD:cs
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1819
DATE: 23 SEPTEMBER 1969

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER ______ # ______

☒ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE: VR. RI/AN EUR6 DDP ADDP CSDO F12 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 24 19 05 Z SEP 69 CITE DIRECTOR 40647

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. OSMA-24926

B. MADRID 9234 (IN 19794)

C. MADRID 9263 (IN 22677)

1. HQS STILL INTERESTED AMAUTO-1 AS POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGET. INTERESTED PARTICULARLY HIS PRESENT STATUS. ACCORDING QUTIMID REPORT MARCH 69 (REF A) SUBJECT INTENDED DEPART MADRID PCS AUG 69. REF B REPORTED SUBJECT HAD DEPARTED FOR HAVANA 4 AUG BUT NO HQS INFO HIS DEPARTURE PCS. LATEST INFO (REF C) REPORTED SUBJECT ~~[illegible]~~ ON HOME LEAVE, THEREFORE ASSUME HE WILL RETURN MADRID SOON.

2. ~~[illegible]~~ PREPARING DISPATCH CONCERNING OUR RENEWED INTEREST AMAUTO-1, ASSUMING HE INTENDS RETURN MADRID TO CONTINUE ASSIGMENT. ~~WILL FORWARD BY SEPARATE POUCH.~~ MEANWHILE, WOULD APPRECIATE STATION VIEWS (BY POUCH) ON ~~[illegible]~~ NEW APPROACH TO SUBJECT; ALSO

AN JB
AB X
~~IN~~
~~FB~~
~~BX~~
DESTROYED
FI
C/CI/IC

(CONTINUED)

CS COPY

201-735296

24 Sep 69

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3	09	7	
4		8	

RIG:
NIT:
:T:
ATE: OCT 1 3 17 PM '69

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PER RID/EDI

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: INFO FILE . VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 40617

PAGE TWO

POTENTIAL STATION ASSETS WHICH WE COULD USE AS AVENUE FOR APPROACH AMAUTO-1.

3. WISH TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO STATION AND QUSEQUINS FOR PAST INITIATIVE AND GOOD REPORTING RE AMAUTO CASE.

4. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG

E/IB F. A. Allner

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

NEED TO DO A DISPATCH TO [illegible] DETAILING OUR NEWLY REVIVED INTEREST IN [illegible]TC-1 AS A POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGET.

3 ITEMS OF INTEREST - VULNERABILITIES.

1. HIS DESIRE FOR EXPENSIVE [illegible] AND GOOD LIVING (MONEY)
2. MEDICAL PROBLEM - POSSIBLE [illegible] PERMANENT INJURY THAT COULD CAUSE HIM TO LIMP.
3. HIS DESIRE TO WORK IN INDUSTRY -

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 24

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ACTION UNIT
WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RF/AN EUR 6 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 CI/OA FI 2

ACTION NO.
782

26 SEP 69 IN 53062

S E C R E T 261334Z SEP 69 CITE MADRID 9655

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 40647

1. AMAUTO-1 RETURNED TO MADRID FROM HOME LEAVE ON 18 SEPTEMBER. WIFE AND FAMILY ARRIVED MADRID 17 SEPTEMBER. QUTIMID REPORTED AMAUTOS PLAN REMAIN MADRID FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER YEAR AND POSSIBLY TWO. WIFE PREGNANT WITH SIXTH CHILD.

2. STATION WILL SUBMIT OUR VIEWS ON AMAUTO-1 AFTER REVIEW YOUR DISPATCH.

3. FILE 201-735296.

S E C R E T

SECRET

☐ CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 48 PER ______

ACTION
WH8 ☐ RID COPY

#342

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR6, FI2, IW,

Whaley

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 221635Z SEP 69 CITE MADRID 9618

DIRECTOR

49866

23 Sep 69 IN 49866

TYPIC INTEL QUDOZE

REF: OSM 9665

1. ON 19 SEPTEMBER AMAUTO-1 DICTATED LETTER TO AIR SPAIN INTERVENTORS OFFICIALLY REJECTING AIR SPAIN OFFER TO SELL THREE BRITANNIA AIRCRAFT TO CUBANA.

2. DEFER FILE.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN EUR 6 CI CI/OPS FI 2

ACTION NO. 372

S E C R E T 231446Z SEP 69 CITE MADRID 9624

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

23 SEP 69 IN 50289

TYPIC WATCHLIST

1. LUIS O. RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ PP-D-62-56 AND GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ PP-D-67-590 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HABANA 18 SEPT ON CUBANA FLT 470.

2. FILE: 65-120-20

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
MINCEX VICE MINISTER UNTIL LATE 67. CUBAN EMB IN MADRID CHARGE D'AFFAIRES. REFUSED TO ACCEPT DSE DOMINANCE OF CUBAN EMB IN MADRID.

201-808896
OSMA-25453
15 SEP 69
P2

R 6909181350

FILE IN 201-235296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 10

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT:

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 7 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN EUR 6 FI 2 C/OPS

ACTION NO. 664

SECRET 131239Z AUG 69 CITE MADRID 9263 (ROPARD ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC

22677

13 Aug 69 IN 22677

d/

1. REQUEST TRACES INCLUDING AMOT ON JUAN ANTONIO (CURBELO) LEMUS BORN VULTUS, CUBA 8 MAR 30. SUBJ CURRENTLY ACTING CHARGE CUBAN EMBASSY WHILE GUILLERMO RUIZ ON HOME LEAVE.

2. FILE 201-733544.

SECRET

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ____ 20 MAR 69 Emmy -

CURBELO (201-733544) FORMER 2ND SECRETARY SANTIAGO, CHILE, 1965-1966.

J answered

K2

MADRID [illegible] 84 (IN 19794) 8 MAR 69 REPORTED [illegible] DEPARTED MADRID FOR HAVANA ON 4 MAR 69.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 3

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR EUR6, RI/AN, FI2, CI/IC2, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 103

S E C R E T 182055Z AUG 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 4945 19 AUG 69 IN 25849

DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 9263 (IN 22677)

1. JUAN ANTONIO CURBELO LEMUS (201-733544) ARRIVED SANTIAGO, CHILE, AS SECOND SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY IN AUGUST 63 (HCSA-10169, 20 AUGUST 63, AND SAGO 5834, 24 AUGUST 63). RETURNED TO CUBA FROM CHILE IN AUGUST 64 (MACHINE TRAVEL LISTING). ATTENDED WORLD CONFERENCE ON AGRARIAN REFORM HELD IN ROME IN JUNE/JULY 66; DESCRIBED AS OFFICIAL OF CUBAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCE (OIRA-45082, 23 JUNE 66; ROME 0386, 8 JULY 66, AND OIRA-45261, 27 JULY 66). SEE MACHINE TRAVEL LISTING FOR ADDITIONAL TRAVEL.

2. NO ADDITIONAL AMOT TRACES. DIRECTOR: ABOVE DOCUMENTS WHICH NOT AVAILABLE STATION FILES MAY CONTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO ON SUBJECT.

3. FILE: 201-733544.

SECRET

14-00000

Spain

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO
Chief of Station, Santiago

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, Europe Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
KIAMBROSIA Transmittal of Photographs of Cuban Officials in Madrid

Reference: MADRID 9147

1. As explained in Reference we are forwarding several photographs of Cuban officials currently assigned to Madrid. We would appreciate KIAMBROSIA-3 reviewing the photographs to possibly identify the official who met in Madrid.

Photograph #1 - Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Cuban Minister

Photograph #2 - Aristides DIAZ Baviroca, First Secretary and current Intelligence officer.

Photograph #3 - Orestes BARREDA Perez, First Secretary

Photograph #4 - Jose DIAZ Puga, Attache and suspected intelligence officer. Iden OGI ... [illegible] (23 Jul 69)

2. Photograph number 5 is that of Hector GALLO Portiles, former Cuban intelligence officer in Madrid. Although a long shot we wonder if this GALLO is the same person who met the agent in Havana.

Howard R. ZACODES

Distribution:
- 2 - COS, Santiago w/att.
- 2 - C/WHD wo/att
- 2 - C/EUR wo/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-25360

DATE
4 August 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

C SIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

3

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: _____ AT: _____ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER _____ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO _____

X-REF TO FILE NO. _____

FILE RID ☐ RET TO _____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

WH8

8C5

☐ RID COPY

INFO. FILE, VR, RI/AN EUR6 FI2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 101630Z JUL 69 CITE MADRID 8970 (ROPARD ACT

JUL 69 IN 01275

4

DIRECTOR INFO ROME

TYPIC AMBGEWN AMCAGE HTAOIMID

1. AMCAGE-1 ADVISED AMOUTO-1 6 JULY HE PLANNED GO HAVANA VIA MADRID 7 JULY. DURING BRIEF STOPOVER AT MADRID AIRPORT INTENDED TO MEET PRESIDENT OF ALFA ROMSO COMPANY WHOM WILL ACCOMPANY TO HAVANA. WISHED TO INTRODUCE AMAUTO-1 TO THIS MAN.

2. FILE 201-759701.

S E C R E T

SECRET

File:
AMAUTO-1

14-00000

SPAIN

ORIG: EMMY PRYOR:ak
UNIT: WH/COG OPS
EXT: 7144 R. 1819
DATE: 10 JULY 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

Ennis

CONF: C/WH 8 | INFO | FILE: VR. DDP, ADDP, C/EURS, C/CI, C/FI 2

Pryor

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

11 15 [illegible] JUL 69

CITE DIRECTOR 19791

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE AMBEDEW

REFS: A. OSMA 25059, 21 APRIL 1969
B. DIRECTOR 16159
C. MADRID 8882 (IN 92987)

1. PHOTOS FORWARDED WITH REF A SHOWN TO AMBEDEW-1 WHO IDENTIFIED FOLLOWING, NUMBERED PER REF: NO. 1, RECOGNIZED AS "GALLO," (HECTOR GALLO) FORMER CHIEF OF CENTER, SPAIN. NO. 4. IDENTIFIED AS "ENCARGADO DE NEGOCIOS" IN SPAIN, GUILLERMO (RUIZ). A-1 ADDED THAT RUIZ WAS VERY "DICTATORIAL" IN HIS DEALINGS WITH DGI OFFICERS, AND THAT HE HAD SERIOUS PERSONALITY CONFLICT WITH GALLO. NO. 6, RECOGNIZED AS THE MAN A-1 THINKS REPLACED GALLO AS COC IN SPAIN, WHOSE PSEUDO IS "DOMINGO."

2. ALTHOUGH A-1 THOUGHT PHOTO NO. 2 LOOKED VERY FAMILIAR, HE UNABLE IDENTIFY. DID NOT RECOGNIZE ANY OF REMAINDER PHOTOS.

3. BASED ON FACT PHOTOS SUBMITTED WITH REF A REPRESENT SMALL PERCENTAGE NUMBER CUBAN DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED SPAIN, PLUS FACT DGI KNOWN TO UTILIZE COMMERCIAL OFFICE PERSONNEL, BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE REQUEST FROM LIAISON PHOTOS OF ALL CUBAN DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED SPAIN FOR

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | SECRET | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

/

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 79794

TO PAGE TWO

POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATIONS BY A-1, AS REQUESTED REF B.

4. NO INDEX. FILE 19-6-139/4.

END OF MESSAGE

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

AC/WH/COG

E/IB

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

AMAUTO /1/
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

201-814891
MADR-08368
10 MAY 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ HAS STARTED AFFAIR W/AMAGONIZE/1 /201-298225/ LAST TWO NIGHT. NIGHT 8TH SUPPOSEDLY WORKING LATE BUT TOGETHER

WAS 201-353964

R 6908180632

FILE IN 201-735296

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
WH
ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED
BY: 0 AT: 1300 Z
DISSEM BY 3 PER
ACTION
c/WH8
701
☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (15)

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG
INFO
FILE, VR. dR/SO, c/OPS, dci, c/F2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 101203Z MAY 69 CITE MADRID 8368

10 MAY 69 IN 55419

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMMEDIA QUTIMID AMAGONIZE

REF: DIRECTOR 00167

1. ALL QUTIMID INFO CHECKED THRU EARLY MORNING HOURS 10 MAY. LATE EVE CALL TO HOTEL BY AMAGONIZE-1 REPORTED AMMEDIA-1 NOT YET ARRIVED MADRID. AMAGONIZE-1 INDICATED IN CONVERSATION WITH AMAUTO-1 WIFE THAT HAD CALLED AMMEDIA-1 EMB EITHER 6TH OR 7TH AND THEY REPORTED HE HAD LEFT FOR MADRID. CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN AMAGONIZE-1 AND AMAUTO-1 WIFE SHOW BEWILDERMENT AND CONCERN NON ARRIVAL AMMEDIA-1. CONVERSATION LATE EVE 8 MAY AMAUTO-1 WIFE ASKED "JOKINGLY" IF HE MIGHT NOT HAVE DEFECTED.

2. AMAUTO-1 HAS STARTED AFFAIR WITH AMAGONIZE-1 LAST TWO NIGHTS. NIGHT 8TH SUPPOSEDLY WORKING LATE BUT TOGETHER. AT 0100 HRS 10TH AMAUTO-1 WENT TO APT AMAGONIZE-1 AFTER OFFICIAL FUNTION. BEING UNUSUALLY NICE TO EACH OTHER ON PHONE LAST COUPLE DAYS.

3. AMAGONIZE-1 NOW WORRIED AMMEDIA-1 MIGHT BE SECRETLY MADRID WATCHING HER MOVEMENTS. CLAIMS ON PREVIOUS OCCASION IN MADRID OBSERVED HER MOVEMENTS FOR FOUR DAYS BEFORE CONTACTING HER.

4. UNABLE MAKE OTHER CONFIRMATION ARRIVAL AMMEDIA-1

SECRET

File:
AMAUTO-1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: ______ PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO   BRANCH ☐   DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MADRID 8368 SECRET

WITHOUT DIRECT QUESTION TO QUSEQUINS WHICH BELIEVE NOT ADVISEABLE. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

5. FILE: 201-353964

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

S E C R E T

08 70 50z [illegible] 69

CITE DIRECTOR 00167

PRIORITY MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMBROWN AMMEDIA

REF: MADRID 8337 (IN 53617)

1. WILL SEND AMBEATNIK/1 (IDEN) ON FIRST AVAILABLE FLIGHT UPON CONFIRMATION AMMEDIA/1 [illegible] VISIT MADRID.

2. FILE 201-353964.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG

E/IB Mr. Sorrels

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CC

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

00168

CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMBROWN AMMEDIA

REF: DIRECTOR 00167

1. IDEN IS DR. IGNACIO FITERRE RIVERA, CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO THE HAGUE 1959-61; PROFESSOR MATHEMATICS SMALL COLLEGE JACKSONVILLE, FLA. 1961-PRESENT; FRIEND AND BENEFACTOR CARLOS ALFARAS VARELA AND BERTHA FERNANDEZ SINCE MID-FORTIES WHEN BOTH WORKED FOR HIM IN MINISTER EDUCATION OF GRAU SAN MARTIN REGIME; ALFARAS RECENTLY ASSURED FITERRE THAT THEIR FRIENDSHIP REMAINS AS WARM AS EVER. DESCRIPTION: APPARENT AGE 55; FIVE FEET TEN INCHES, 200 LBS; GREY HAIR, STRAIGHT, FULL; BROWN EYES; NATURALIZED US CITIZEN. WAS ACTIVE IN TRIPLE A, JAILED AND EXILED UNDER BATISTA.

2. 201-353964.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: Pls ref attached cable.

On basis [illegible] for Ro [illegible]

C/WH/COG

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

E/IB Mr. Sorrels

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED WH ☐ SLOTTED

BY D AT 2025 Z

DISSEM BY ✓ PER #

ACTION C/WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

559 C/FI 2

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR, C/EUR 5, C/SB 5, C/RI/SD, ADDP, DDP, C/CI

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 301835Z APR 69 CITE MADRID 9275 (BOPARD ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

30 APR 69 IN 48023

RYBAT TYPIC REDCOAT AMAGONIZE

1. SINCE 24 APRIL QUTIMID HAS REPORTED MORE THAN SEVEN HOURS OF REVEALING CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN AMAGONIZE-1 AND WIFE AMAUTO-1 ON SUDDEN RECALL OF FORMER. CONVERSATIONS TOTALLY INDISCREET AND EXPOSE EXTRAORDINARY AMOUNT INFO ON SUPPOSED REASONS FOR RECALL AND ITS APPARENT CONNECTION WITH AMBEDEW-1 AFFAIR. CANNOT EMPHASIZE ENOUGH THE BITTERNESS VOICED BY AMAGONIZE-1 OVER URGENT RECALL. FONOFF INSISTED SHE TAKE FIRST FLIGHT PBRUMEN WHICH SCHEDULED 5 MAY, ALTHOUGH AMAUTO-1 HAD CABLED FONOFF FOR EXTENSION DEPARTURE DATE TO 13 MAY.

2. FOLLOWING ARE THEIR SUPPOSITIONS REVEALED BY QUTIMID FOR SUDDEN RECALL:

A. AS FREQUENTLY REPORTED AMAGONIZE-1 HAS VOICED DISPLEASURE WITH WORKING CONDITIONS MADRID, AND FONOFF, ACCORDING QUTIMID IS AWARE FRICTION BETWEEN AMAUTO-1 AND AMAGONIZE-1. (AS NOTED BEFORE MOST COMPLAINTS VOICED TO WIFE AMAUTO WHO CERTAINLY KEEPING HER HUSBAND INFORMED.)

SECRET

UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MADRID 8275 S E C R E T

IN ADDITION, AMAGONIZE-1 NEVER HAD GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH AMADRIFT-1, WHO NOW IN PBRUMEN, AND HE PROBABLY HAS TOLD AMSTAFF AND FONOFF ABOUT AMAGONIZE-1 BEHAVIOR.

B. WIFE AMAUTO-1 SUGGESTED THAT RECALL PROBABLY STEMS FROM GENERAL PRECAUTION TO PREVENT FUTURE AMBEDEW-1 TYPE DEFECTIONS. THESE CONVERSATIONS LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT AMBEDEW-1 AFFAIR HAS CAUSED WIDESPREAD AND DEEP CONCERN IN FONOFF. AMAGONIZE-1 COMMENTED SHE SURE FONOFF THINKS THAT VULNERABILITIES WHICH CAUSED AMBEDEW-1 DEFECTION ARE ALSO PRESENT IN HER CASE. NOTE NO MENTION NAME AMBEDEW-1 BUT MANY REFS TO DEFECTION, "SERIOUS HAPPENING PARIS", DESERTION, ETC.

C. AMAGONIZE-1 SUSPECTS FONOFF ALSO CONSIDERS ~~HL~~ HER A RECRUITMENT TARGET BECAUSE OF UNEXPECTED INVITATIONS BY AMAGONIZE-2 AND QUAXE-1 (AND POSSIBLY CONTACT WITH QUCHESS-1). SHE INFORMED AMADISU-1 OF THESE CONTACTS BECAUSE IT WAS HIS BUSINESS TO KNOW. (DURING A BUSINESS CALL TO PBRUMEN EMB RECENTLY QUAXE-1 INVITED AMAGONIZE-1 TO A DRINK SOME DAY. AMAGONIZE-1 OBVIOUSLY BECAME

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: _______ AT: _______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _______

X-REF TO FILE NO. _______

DISSEM BY: _______ PER # _______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 MADRID 8275 SECRET

SUSPICIOUS. QUAXE-1 MADE INVITATION ON OWN INITIATIVE BUT LATER TOLD CASE OFFICER.)

3. AMAUTO-1 AFRAID AMAGONIZE-1 MIGHT DEFECT AND MADE HER SWEAR SHE WOULD NOT. (AMAUTO-1 PROBABLY ALSO EXPRESSING FEARS OF FONOFF.) AMAGONIZE-1 CONSIDERED THIS PREPOSTEROUS BECAUSE OF HER COMPLETE LOYALTY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND FACT SHE INCAPABLE ABANDONING HER DAUGHTERS. (WE SUSPECT FONOFF NOW QUESTIONING OR RE-THINKING BASIS HER LOYALTY AND THEIR TRUST IN HER. AMAGONIZE-1 HAS SAID THAT CHILDREN WOULD PROBABLY BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT HER THUS CONTRADICTING STATEMENT ABOVE.)

4. IN VIEW SERIOUS SITUATION DESCRIBED ABOVE, OBVIOUSLY PRECIPITATED BY AMBEDEW-1 AFFAIR, REQUEST HQS CONSIDER APPROACH TO AMAGONIZE-1 UNDER FJSTEAL FLAG BEFORE HER DEPARTURE 5 MAY. PITCH COULD ACCOMPLISH FOLLOWING:

A. SHE COULD ACCEPT PITCH AND WORK AGAINST PBRUMEN TARGETS. (THIS CONTRARY TO APPROACH AGREED UPON BY STATION AND HQS, BUT AMAGONIZE-1 FREQUENTLY STATED SHE ALONE AND HAS NO FRIENDS. HER BITTERNESS WITH PBRUMEN TACTICS RE HER RECALL MIGHT BE IMPETUS ENOUGH TO QUICKLY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: ______ PER ______ #

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE, VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 4 MADRID 8275 SECRET

ACCEPT FRIENDLY OFFER FROM FJSTEAL NATIONAL SINCE SHE WOULD IDENTIFY WITH HIM HER OWN NATIONAL ORIGINS.

B. IF SHE REFUSES PITCH AND RUNS TO SUPERIORS HERE THIS COULD CONFIRM TO FONOFF HER VULNERABILITIES TO RECRUITMENT AND WOULD PROBABLY RAISE MORE SERIOUS QUESTION OF HOW LONG SHE WAS IN CONTACT WITH FJSTEALER. SHE MAY NOT REVEAL PITCH BECAUSE BY SO DOING SHE WOULD BE CUTTING OWN THROAT AND THIS WOULD MAKE HER SUBJECT TO SEVERE SCRUTINY AND INTERROGATION. ON OTHER HAND IF SHE REVEALS PITCH THIS MIGHT SERVE AMPURPLE OBJECTIVE AND MIGHT ALSO RAISE QUESTION IN PBRUMEN MINDS ON WHETHER AMEEDEW-1 RECRUITED BY FJSTEAL OR BY WOLADY. (NO EVIDENCE PBRUMENS MADRID AWARE WOLADY INVOLVEMENT.)

5. FILE: 201-288225.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY______ AT______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______ #

ACTION C/WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

548

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE VR. C/RI/SD, C/EUR 5, C/FI 2, C/CI

S E C R E T 301251Z APR 69 CITE MADRID 8256

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

30 APR 69 IN 47801

RYBAT TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 8156 (IN 42197)

1. AMAUTO-2 REPORTED 29 APR THAT COULD NOT RETAIN JOB WITH AMAUTO-1 HOUSEHOLD AND SHE TERMINATING EMPLOYMENT 4 MAY AFTER RETURN AMAUTO-1 AND WIFE FROM BARCELONA. CLAIMS SHE SPOKE WITH WIFE AMAUTO-1 NIGHT 29 APR ABOUT KEEPING JOB BUT WIFE ALREADY DECIDED THAT WANTED YOUNGER PERSON AND HAD ALREADY PLACED ADVERTISEMENT IN LOCAL PAPER. AMAUTO-2 NOW WORKING WITH NEW EMPLOYEE WHOSE LAST NAME NOT YET KNOWN, BUT A-2 WILL TRY OBTAIN. A-2 HAS PROVIDED LAYOUT AMAUTO-1'S OFFICE AT HOME AND DINING AREA.

2. A-2 TOO NERVOUS AND TIMID TO MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS AND NO AMOUNT REASSURANCE COULD MITIGATE FEARS.

3. A-2 WILL BE AVAILABLE TO WIFE AMAUTO-1 FOR PART TIME WORK THUS PREFER POAS NOT BE CANCELLED.

4. FILE: 201-848515.

S E C R E T

SECRET

AMAUTO-1

ORIG: LAWRENCE SULC:ch
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144/1819
DATE: 23 April 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 2 PER ____ # ____
☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: c/wh 8 INFO FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 95667

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI 24 18 14Z APR 69

RYBAT TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 8156 (IN 42197)

1. POA REQUESTED FOR AMAUTO-5 (201-848517), A-3's HUSBAND. WILL ADVISE.

2. REQUEST AMPLIFICATION PARA 7 REF. RECRUITMENT OF AMAUTO-2 ACCOMPLISHED BY STATION UNILATERALLY, WHICH WE BELIEVE WAS DESIRABLE MEANS. UNLESS OVERRIDING LOCAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SURFACING PLANS TO QUSEQUIN-37, WOULD ~~PREFER~~ SUGGEST CONTINUED UNILATERAL OPERATION.

3. FILE: 201-848517, 201-848515.

END OF MESSAGE

D/C/WH/COG

E/IB MR. SORRELS

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T
R Y B A T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Europe Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC AMROSE AMBEDEW
Transmittal of Photographs for AMBEDEW-1 Recognition

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 93245

1. Attached are 15 photographs of personalities both Cuban and non-Cuban who reside in the Madrid area. The majority are Cuban officials. We have added appropriate comments alongside the name of those individuals in whom we suspect are Cuban intelligence agents or collaborators. Another list will be forwarded as soon as photographs can be obtained.

Photo #1	Hector GALLO Portieles (known DGI) Name mentioned by AMBEDEW-1
Photo #2	Ricardo DIEZ Gallart - commonly called Gallart Code Clerk Madrid
Photo #3	Orestes BARRERA Perez, First Secretary formerly in Switzerland, Mercedes ARIAS, wife
Photo #4	(right to left) Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Encargado de Negocios; Nilde VECIANA de RUIZ, wife of Encargado; Ricardo ESPINO Martinez, Commercial Counselor
Photo #5	Ricardo ESPINO Martinez, Commercial Counselor
Photo #6	(arrows only) Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa, First Secretary and suspected DGI

(continued)

Attachment: H/W
Photographs

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att
2 - C/EUR wo/att
2 - COS/WH/Miami wo/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA-35059	21 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	65-120-20

Photo #7	Guillermo RUIZ Perez Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa and wife
Photo #8	Jose Andres MARTINEZ Sanchez aka Sorel (nom de plume) suspected collaborator who may be closely integrated into leftist movement in Spain.
Photo #9	(left to right) Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa Unidentified Cuban - we suspect that he is a courier. Unidentified A Cuban entertainer - name unknown
Photo #10	Unidentified Cuban - possibly a courier
Photo #11	Another photo of Jose Andres MARTINEZ Sanchez (in middle) see Photo #8.
Photo #12	Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Encargado de Negocios Alfredo HIDALGO, Dominican national who was studying law in Madrid very close to Hector GALLO and Aristides DIAZ, both DGI
Photo #13	Julio CASTELLO Dumas, Cuban journalist now in Madrid.
Photo #14	Vera BORODOWSKY Jackievich, (in center) Secretary to RUIZ
Photo #15	Nilda VECIANA de RUIZ Vera BORODOWSKY Jackievich Guillermo RUIZ Perez

2. It is suggested that Headquarters show AMBEDEW-1 a number of photographs of QUMOON crewmen preferrably photos of crewmen on the international circuit including those of QUTRUNK-19, QUCRASH-1 and QUZONE-1. We would suggest against showing only those of our assets if photos of other crewmen are not available.

Howard R. SACODER















14-00000









2



RUIZ estrecha la mano a un dominicano llamado HIDELGO.-

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 24 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 32 PER ______ #

ACTION: WH/C 045

☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE C/CI/SD, C/TSD 3, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EUR 5 RDP, ADDP, CSDO

S E C R E T 281739Z MAR 69 CITE MADRID 7944 28 Mar 69 IN 24937

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, FRANKFURT

RYBAT TYPIC TECHS

REF: A. OSMA-24746

B. MADRID 7945 (IN 24849)

1. REQUEST TRACES MARIA JESUSA (MARTIN) VILLAR AND JOSE ANTONIO (FERNANDEZ) CREGO, BOTH SPANISH CITIZENS WHO APPLYING FOR IMMIGRANT VISA FOR UNITED STATES. MARTIN CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS DOMESTIC IN HOME AMAUTO-1. REGRET HAVE NO FURTHER BIO DATA ON COUPLE BUT BOTH OF ADVANCED AGE. SHOULD HAVE SOME BIO ON 31 MAR. INFO BELOW GLEANED FROM QUTIMID.

2. FERNANDEZ RETURNED GALICIA BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTY FIND EMPLOYMENT MADRID. MARTIN ANXIOUS JOIN HIM SOONEST, BUT TRYING SAVE MONEY FOR TRAVEL. QUTIMID 20 MAR REVEALED THAT MARTIN PROCESSING FOR VISA TO STATES BUT IS KEEPING THIS NEWS FROM AMAUTOS. SHE RECEIVES MAIL FROM STATES AT HOME FEMALE FRIEND AND HER PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH FRIENDS RE LETTERS ARE HUSH HUSH. SHE APPEARS PURPOSELY TRYING WITHHOLD INFO FROM AMAUTOS.

3. QUTIMID REPORTS THAT MARTIN WILL BE LEAVING

File:
AMAUTO-1
201

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR,

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE W MADRID 7944 SECRET

AMAUTO HOUSEHOLD IN JUNE ALTHOUGH AMAUTOS UNHAPPY BECAUSE MARTIN APPARENTLY TRUSTED IN SENSE THAT AMAUTOS CONFIDENT CHILDREN IN GOOD HANDS WHEN THEY LEAVE TOWN OR ARE ENTERTAINING OUT. AMAUTOS WANT HER REMAIN WITH THEM UNTIL AFTER THEIR HOME LEAVE JULY-AUGUST, BUT MARTIN WANTS LEAVE BEFORE. (HOME LEAVE PLANS NEW TO STATION. WE REPORTED EARLIER THAT AMAUTO-1 DID NOT WANT RETURN SPAIN.)

4. OPERATIONAL BREAK OCCURRED MORNING 28 MAR WHEN NAME OF FEMALE FRIEND UNCOVERED. REQUEST TRACES AND PRIORITY

RID/ no traces.

CLEARANCE ON TOMAS (HIDALGO) GATO (COMMONLY USE GATO AS LAST

RID [illegible] /

NAME), BORN HAVANA, 22 AUG 1911 AND ON WIFE, ALINA (FREYRE) BORN HAVANA 6 SEPT 1915. BOTH U.S. CITIZENS. FATHER OF TOMAS IS TOMAS GATO BORN KEY WEST, FLORIDA 26 DEC 1885. MOTHER CELIA GOMAS BORN KEY WEST 1893. ALINA NATURALIZED 18 JUNE 1966. HIDALGO IS MANAGER WOOLWORTHS MADRID AND GOOD FRIEND AMERICAN CONSUL. IT WAS FROM CONSUL THAT WE OBTAINED INFO ON MARTIN AND HUSBAND. ALINA CAME TO EMBASSY 24 MAR TO INQUIRE INTO PROCEDURE OBTAINING VISA FOR MARTIN AND HUSBAND. QUTIMID LED US TO CONSUL.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: 2

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY: PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE

PAGE 3 MADRID 7944 S E C R E T

5. WITH APPROVAL AND FAVORABLE TRACES INTEND CONTACT HIDALGO AND WIFE FOR POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION MARTIN FOR USE EXPLAINED IN REF B. HIDALGOS LEAVING MADRID 2 APR FOR APPROX TEN DAY VISIT TO STATES. HIDALGOS VERY GOOD FRIENDS OF FORMER AMERICAN CONSUL MARGARET HUSSMAN WHO NOW IN WASHINGTON. HQS MAY WANT CONTACT HUSSMAN FOR ASSESSMENT. NO STATION TRACES ON ALL ABOVE. PLS INDEX.

6. FRANKFURT: FYI ONLY.

7. FILE DEFER 201.

S E C R E T

ORIG: LARRY SULC/act
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R 1819
DATE: 11 APRIL 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 4 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, C/RI/SO, C/EUR 5, C/CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 19 03Z APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 92231

TO MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: MADRID 7966 (IN 26836)

1. POA GRANTED 11 APRIL AMAUTO-2 PROVIDE INFO ON AMAUTO-1. WILL ADVISE RE POAS AMAUTO-3 AND -4.

2. FILE: 201-848515.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG
EUR/C Wm A K Jones

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 32

ACTION c/WH5

☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE c/PI/SD, c/TSD3, c/CI, c/FI2, c/EUR5, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

044

S E C R E T 281742Z MAR 69 CITE MADRID 7945 28 MAR 69 IN 24849

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, FRANKFURT

RYBAT TYPIC TECHS

MADRID 7944 (IN 24937)

1. AS REPORTED EARLIER TRAFFIC AMAUTO-1 HAS PRIVATE OFFICE IN HOME WHICH HE FREQUENTLY USES ACCORDING QUTIMID/QUDOZE. HAS HAD NUMBER OF MEETINGS WITH RUMANIAN REP. Maria Teresa MARTIN OFFERS EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR COLLECTION INTEL ON AMAUTO-1 GUESTS AND HABITS, BUT MORE IMPORTANT HER ACCESS TO HOUSE MAKES IT POSSIBLE INTRODUCE SUITABLE AUDIO DEVICE IN AMAUTO-1'S PRIVATE OFFICE AS WELL AS DINING ROOM SINCE AMAUTO-1 FREQUENTLY ENTERTAINS HIGH LEVEL PBRUMEN VISITORS, OFFICIALS AND SPANISH BUSINESSMEN.

201-848575

2. FILE DEFER 201.

S E C R E T

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO. Chief, European Div., COS, WH/MIAMI
FROM Chief of Station, Madrid
SUBJECT TYPIC/AMAUTO-1
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

QUTIMID 21 February 1969 reported that AMAUTO-1 will be leaving Spain PCS in August 1969. He revealed this information to AMPOSSUM-1.

Howard R. Sacoder
Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
2 - C/EUR [illegible]
2 - COS, WH/MIAMI [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-24926
DATE
11 March 1969
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
HQS FILE NUMBER
201-735296

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

065-008-007
OSMA-24877
28 FEB 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER IN MADRID

UFA

R 6903120462

FILE IN 201- 735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 25   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT:

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 8 PER

ACTION C/WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/EUR 5, C/TSD 3, C/FI 2, C/CI, C/CCS 2, C/CSPS

904

S E C R E T 031515Z FEB 69 CITE FRANKFURT 1565   3FEB69 IN85183

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

[redacted] TYPIC AMAUTO TECHS

REF: OSMA-24746

1. PER REF, DURING NEXT TECH VISIT TO MADRID KUHARICH WILL DISCUSS PROPOSED REQUIREMENT.

2. KUHARICH WILL TDY MADRID UPON CHOLOMETES RETURN.

3. FILE: 201-735296.

S E C R E T

Ruiz-Perez

L.C.

WH/COG

STAMP

Desensitized

Alva E. King
WH/COG

3 Feb 69

201-735296

files

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: RYBAT/SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: C/EUR Div., C/WOACRE; COB/Frankfurt MKNOVA

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: TYPIC/TECHS/AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 16 January 1969 QUTIMID reported a discussion between Subject and the Chief of the Rumanian Trade delegation in Spain, during which the Rumanian asked when they could meet. Subject invited the Rumanian to his home where, he said, he has set up a small office and was beginning to work more at home than in the office, because of the added comfort. (We wouldn't be surprised if this was suggested by his wife, who is very jealous of her husband.) The meeting was arranged for 1130 hours on 17 January. AMAUTO-1 commented that he is up quite early in the morning, presumably to begin work in his office.

2. The above report is the first we have received on Subject's use of his home as an office. The invitation to the Rumanian, of course, casts suspicion on the nature of the conversation.

3. Since his move to new quarters, AMAUTO-1's home is about 50 yards from two WOFIRM staffers - Martin B. CRYMM and Conrad B. FALAGIARO. (See attached sketch). Edwin B. RATTEREE lives approximately 200 yards from the AMAUTO home. This proximity to AMAUTO-1's home by three staffers brings up the question of the use of an RF device to monitor conversations in AMAUTO's office at home, assuming at this time, that he has a phone in the office, most likely an extension of the home phone. For planning purposes, we would appreciate from MKNOVA a list of requirements for a target study in the use of an RF device. If other means are available for external penetration of his home we would welcome your suggestions and comments. Please advise us also if the RF device is still a controlled item, which cannot be discussed with or released to liaison. Your earliest reply would be appreciated.

4 Jan 69

CS COPY

Howard R. Sacoder
Howard R. SACODER

Att: Sketch of Area-AMAUTO-1's home: Iden sheet usc

Distribution: 2-C/WH w/att; 2-C/EUR w/o att; C/WOACRE w/att; 2-COB/Frankfurt/MKNOVA w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
2att	OSMA-24746	24 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	RYBAT/SECRET	201-735296


CALLE
IDEN D
CALLE
B
IDEN G
Iden. F
IDEN E
A
Approx 200 YDS
CALLE
C

CS COPY

att #1 to HMMA 24746

#01-135296

R Y B A T/S E C R E T

SEPARATE COVER ATT.
OSMA-24746

IDEN A	CALLE JEREZ
IDEN B	CALLE TRIANA
IDEN C	CALLE PIO XII
IDEN D	Ralph Seehafer
IDEN E	Howard Ellis
IDEN F	C.H. Duffin
IDEN G	Guillermo RUIZ Perez

R Y B A T/S E C R E T

w/att #2 to OSMA 24746 201-736396

SECRET
(When Filled In)

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION RYBAT

DISPATCH NUMBER OSMA-24746		DATE 24 Jan 69
ENCLOSURE NUMBER	PAGE NUMBER	PARAGRAPH NUMBER

SECURITY REGULATION(S) VIOLATED
CSI-F 110-2 para 4 d and a

SUBSTANCE OF VIOLATION
Agent (target) compromised by position of contact, date & time of visit.

RID. ANALYST

FORM 6-64 2244 SECRET (36-43)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

Spain - [illegible]

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY: 15 PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

[illegible] ☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE. VR. [illegible]

S E C R E T 031152Z JUL 68 CITE MADRID 5594

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

3 JUL 68 IN 43255

TYPIC

ON EVENING OF 15 JUNE 68 WIFE OF AMAUTO-1 SAID AMAUTO-1 HAS MADE RESERVATIONS FOR THEIR DEPARTURE FOR [illegible] ON 6 AUGUST TO GO ON VACATION. SHE COMMENTED THAT POSSIBLY AMAUTO-1 MIGHT NOT WANT TO RETURN TO MADRID.

S E C R E T

ST

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO
Chief, EUR Div., Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/QUDOZE/MHGUILE Indications of Clandestine Activity planned by PBRUMEN Embassy in Madrid.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: A. MADRID 4776
B. OSMA-23406, 12 Jan 68

1. In the four month period since the forwarding of ref B, the QUDOZE and QUTIMID Operations have continued to provide insights into the program of the PBRUMEN official establishment in Spain, the requirements laid on it and the evolution in the thinking of AMAUTO-1 and his staff as they work toward expanding their contacts and influence in the political, economic and cultural-propaganda fields. These developments will provide the subject matter for subsequent dispatches. However, in addition to such conventional "public relations", the QUDOZE Reports have recently carried evidence of MHGUILE activity. Because such activity automatically means PBRUMEN involvement in Spain's internal affairs, QUOTA has taken an even greater than usual interest in these developments. Translations of the transcripts detailing this information are given below.

2. The earliest and certainly the most striking MHGUILE information was forwarded under ref A describing AMAUTO-1's advice to AMADIEU-1 on the techniques of living a clandestine life, on the use of disguise and on the necessity for good organization for "with bad organization we are lost". Then, a QUDOZE Report of 30 April 68 summarized a discussion on the lack of personnel in the Embassy to make scientific and technical contacts, at which time AMAUTO-1 digressed into describing the cover for a new member of the staff whom he apparently expected to arrive in the near future. ".....what is lacking is a comrade who could take care of the cultural and apparently the technical aspect also. Who could also ascertain who are the Americans, their addresses, in what streets are located their...." He adds that this comrade will have to move about, to make contacts, to be up on everything, and if time remains to do other things. He added that he remembers the President (of PBRUMEN) gave much importance to this as a matter of honor for all the missions abroad. He repeated that the technical aspect (i.e.collecting technical information) required a comrade, a

Distribution:
2 - C/WH Div.
2 - C/EUR Div., 1 - COS/JMWAVE

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-23870

DATE
28 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
65-6-44/3

comrade who learns the details of foreign commerce in order to be able to converse well with people. Apparently this would be a type of overt specialty that they would give to the comrade who in order to hide the true purpose of his mission which would be to collect information for them as AMAUTO-1 is heard to comment that they have to "invent" the work of this comrade in order that he might have a definite specialty. AMAUTO-1 seems to be thinking of a specific person because he comments that he speaks two languages, that he likes economics, and adds that at the end of two months he would be ready.

3. Following the return of AMADRIFT-1 on the 7th of March 68, via PBRUMEN national flight, after home leave in PBRUMEN, the QUDOZE material reported extensive conversations between AMADRIFT-1 and AMAUTO-1 on future plans. Two were of MHGUILE interest:

A. QUDOZE Rport of 13 March 68. AMAUTO-1 says, "this is... with the American movement in Spain and with the monopoly that they have here". He says, "In my judgement our fundamental problem in Spain from the political point of view is to ascertain what there is behind all this, what is there here, we must get ourselves in motion". "That is a very important point for us, to ascertain what are their names, who are those who are here, how they (the Americans) are moving". He adds that, "If we are able to find out, we will be able to stop them completely."

B. QUDOZE Report of 14 Mar 68. AMAUTO-1 says that they have to find out "what are the forces in Spain, with the possibility of our having access (to them)". He comments that Spain, is at a crossroads internally and externally. He says they have to find out what is happening in Spain, whether they give the workers liberty to strike, etc. He again repeats all they have to find out, mentions finding out "who are the monarchists, what forces they represent, to what forces are they united, who are the elements that are being financed by the CIA and by the American Embassy". "Which are those scattered elements that the newspaper of the Movement has accused of being backed by the American Embassy, what financial power do they have?"

4. AMAUTO-1 had apparently set great hope on the 1 May 68 anti-government demonstration by workers and students which, as Headquarters is aware, the police effectively handled. In a 2 May QUDOZE Report, AMAUTO-1 repeatedly commented on what a tremendous failure the demonstration had been; he kept asking AMADRIFT-1 what had happened, why the Spanish people had not responded, why the workers had not, and finally said "The next demonstration we are going to name here a member of the Embassy".

Jane D. ASTRAHAN

SPAN-[illegible]

SECRET

Chief, European Division X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, Madrid

QUDOZE

1. The following conversation came from Subject source:

(At a meeting with Hector GALLO and Aristides DIAZ, the following statement was made by Guillermo RUIZ, Cuban Charge d'affaires:

"You know why I'm saying this....because the CIA is directly intervening in the internal affairs of the country, ARAGON can say it, the DGS Director can say it, as well as our dear friend Don Camilo PONSEVEDRA (phon.), and here they don't permit this or anything because they know very well that......here the Soviet KGB as well as the American CIA can't.....because the Spaniards.....hate it so much. The Americans are trying to asphyxiate this government, first because while FRANCO is in power there is always the great danger of a revolt here. The Americans want to have a government in Spain of the type Italy, France and West Germany have, a stable government, that has a high middle class, and where there is a high standard of living, because when you have the difference between the individual who is eating.....and the individual who is eating a chicken, then you have a dangerous problem, because in Latin America we have.....but here in Europe it's different, that is why I'm telling you this.....they can be intervening in the government.....that is why we must try to find out."

2. Following is the identity of the personnel involved -

a. Hector GALLO Protieles, First Secretary of Cuban Embassy, also believed to be Chief, DSE officer stationed at the Embassy.

b. Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa, Second Secretary/Press Attache, also possibly involved in intel matters.

c. Guillermo Orestes RUIZ Perez, Charge d'Affaires.

Distribution:
2 - C/EUR; 2 - C/WH

OSMA-23813 7 May 1968

SECRET 65-6-44/4

The exact identities of ARAGON and RONSEVEDRA are not known. The DGS refers to Direccion General de Seguridad which is the Spanish Internal Security Service.

Edwin W. RATTEREE

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 47 Spain - C/15

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

BY ______ AT ______ Z

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 0 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH/COG8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. EUR8, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/RA, CI/IC, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2, TSD

S E C R E T 241716Z APR 68 CITE MADRID 4776

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHGUILE

24 APR 68 IN 57392

1. FOLLOWING AS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST IS TRANSLATION OF PORTION OF QUDOZE TAKE OF 4 APRIL 68:

Ruiz — Aristides Diaz

IDEN A HOLDS A CONVERSATION WITH IDEN B. IDEN A GIVES HIM ADVICE AND INSTRUCTIONS RELATED TO THE FACT THAT IN THE FUTURE HE WANTS IDEN B TO BE DISGUISED WHEN HE MEETS PEOPLE. (IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY IF IDEN A ALSO REFERS TO OTHER PEOPLE IN THE EMBASSY AS WELL). ONLY PHRASES CAN BE DISTINCTLY UNDERSTOOD: IDEN A: YOU ARE ALREADY CLANDESTINE, YOU KNOW THAT NOT EVERYTHING IS BAD NEWS. ORGANIZATION AND NO CONTACTS, AN ORGANIZATION IN CHARGE OF LOOKING FOR HOUSES, MEANS ..... THAT IS TO SAY, TO BE ABLE TO CHANGE YOUR FACE QUICKLY. USE ELEVATED SHOES TO APPEAR TALLER, YOU HAVE TO CHANGE EVERYTHING, WHEN YOU START LIVING IN THE COMMUNITY, THEN NOT ONLY MUST YOU LIVE SECRETLY BUT YOU MUST ALSO CHANGE YOUR

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION		1 / 6 2 / 7 3 / 8 4 / 9 5 / 10
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		
BY ______ AT: ______ Z	INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO		
	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______		
	X-REF TO FILE NO. ______		
DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.		
ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE VR.		

PAGE 2 MADRID 4776 SECRET

APARTMENT. WHEN YOU MEET WITH PEOPLE FOR EXAMPLE, YOU PUT ON THE ....AND THEN WHEN THE MEETING IS OVER, YOU CHANGE YOUR APPEARANCE AND GO OUT TO THE STREET. IDEN B: .....THEY WERE ABLE TO GET TRUCKS, MACHINERY, ARMS, PACKAGES OF .... BUT IT SEEMS THAT THE POLICE DETAINED THEM. IDEN A: WITH BAD ORGANIZATION WE ARE LOST. IDEN A LATER COMMENTS THAT HE WAS ONLY ARRESTED ONCE, BUT IT WAS ONLY A JOKE, BUT ASIDE FROM THAT HE SAYS THEY NEVER CAUGHT HIM.

2. IT NOTED THAT QUOTAS VERY EXCITED OVER THIS PORTION OF THE QUDOZE TAPE.

3. PLS INDEX IDEN B.

SECRET

BT

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 4

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ________ AT ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY 9 PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE. VR. EUR 5. WH 8. CI. CI/OPS. CI/RA. CI/OA. CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD 6

S E C R E T 241716Z APR 68 CITE MADRID 4777

24 APR 68 IN 97376

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHGUILE

REF: MADRID 4776 (in 97353)

IDEN A: GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ

IDEN B: ARISTIDES DIAZ ROVIROSA.

Kerby action

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ACTION 5 Dupuy

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

CA CI CI/OS

RS C

INFO FILE, VR, WH/7, CHRS, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, TSD, CA/ ... FI/INT

SECRET 131135Z FEB 63 CITE MADRID 4154

13FEB63 IN 49920

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, FRANKFURT

TYPIC WHAPRON TECHS

1. STATION INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE IN RESTAURANT WHICH AMAUTO-1 HAS IDENTIFIED ON QUDOZE AS HIS FAVORITE RESTAURANT IN MADRID. IDEN RESTAURANT PARTIALLY OWNED BY QUSEELY-1 WHO CASE OFFICER CONVINCED WILL DO ANYTHING ASSIST IN OPERATION. HAVE NOT YET APPROACHED HIM THIS BASIS.

2. STATION INFORMAL CASING RESTAURANT ON 12 FEB FINDS NO VASES OR MOVABLE OBJECTS ON TABLES SUITABLE FOR CONTAINING MICROPHONES. UNDERTABLE INSTALLATION VERY LIKELY UNSUITABLE IN VIEW DIRECTIONAL NOISES FROM OTHER TABLES.

3. STATION INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY PURCHASE SMALL SLENDER VASES TO CONTAIN ARRANGEMENT TWO OR THREE FLOWERS FOR EACH TABLE AND WOULD REQUEST SUITABLE INSTALLATION BY WKTOPAZ IN AT LEAST TWO VASES OF SMALL MIKE/TRANSMITTER, TYPE TO BE DECIDED AFTER DETERMINATION EXACT SIZE VASES.

4. THIS CABLE ONLY FOR PURPOSE ADVISING ADDRESSEE STATIONS FACTS THIS OPERATION WHICH CONSIDERED OF VALUE IN VIEW

~~Rothwell~~

file AMAUTO

E Scapp

PAGE 2 MADRID 4154 S E C R E T

GIDGTE HAS DISCLOSED OCCASIONS IN WHICH AMAUTO-1 HAS CALLED SPANISH CONTACTS TO MEET THEM AT IDEN RESTAURANT FOR BUSINESS CONVERSATIONS.

SECRET

D14YD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, European Division

INFO.: Chief, WH Div., COS, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: KAPOK/QUDOZE
AMAUTO-1 Discussion of Missiles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 10 January 1968, AMAUTO-1, in one of his many daily discussions with his subordinates, reflected on the international position of his country, and among the things he said, we quote the following which may be of possible interest to addressees. Although part of the discussion was not heard because of the emotional inflection of the speaker, we feel that the jist of the discussion is clear and understandable.

> "We are demonstrating to the world that Cuba...is favorably disposed to do whatever...(AMAUTO-1 begins to talk against the United States) that when the Americans have to raise the white flag...because the first plane that appears on radar...(AMAUTO-1 is speaking excitedly and it is very difficult to understand each word but it appears that he is talking about the positions of missiles in Cuba), Havana, Las Villas and Camaguey and that with these missiles, we can cover Miami, New York, and all their bases and all of their "mierda". . .if the Americans say they are going to sud them (missiles? planes?), we will send them; if they (Americans) say they are going to invade us, the first plane that comes to invade...(AMAUTO-1's subordinate remarked that 15 October 62 marked a point in international politics, when the Yankees ordered the Soviets to withdraw their missiles). . .(AMAUTO-1 injected) "they (the Soviets) presented them (the Cubans) with ten bombs".

2. Our reason for reporting this fragmentary information is that AMAUTO-1 might be confirming the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba.

Howard R. SACODER
201-735246

Distribution:
2 - C/EUR
2 - C/WHD
1 - COS/JMWAVE

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OSMA-23513

DATE: 9 February 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

-00000

PH10

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, JMWAVE
FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid
SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/MHAPRON/QUTIMID/QUDOZE
Plans of New Cuban Ambassador in Madrid
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The new Cuban Ambassador to Spain, Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez arrived in Madrid on the Iberia flight of 3 December 1967 accompanied by his wife, Nilda, and three sons. CALZADILLA, RUIZ's predecessor had not been a strong administrator and had let the various components of the Cuban official establishment in Spain run their own affairs. This fact plus the inevitable tendency of a new chief to be a "new broom" and rearrange things according to his own lights, led Station Madrid to expect some changes particularly within the Embassy. However, the QUDOZE and QUTIMID operations have shown RUIZ at least initially to be an aggressive and well organized individual with ideas of his own that clearly reflect his background in commercial affairs and prepared to make changes that promise to go beyond the superficial sweeping of a new broom. Underlying RUIZ's actions and proposals is the clear implication that he came to Madrid with the specific task of upgrading the Cuban mission in Spain both in terms of prestige and effectiveness. Station Madrid will transmit to the addressees the relevant information on this program as it becomes available from the QUDOZE and QUTIMID operations along with information on the official Cuban personalities administering the program.

2. A striking difference between RUIZ and his predecessor was noted in the QUDOZE and QUTIMID reports of that first week. RUIZ has no inhibitions over spending money. One of the Embassy cars, a Peugeot was replaced with a new model and there was discussion of replacing the other two Peugeots with new ones. Nilda, RUIZ's wife, was picked up by the wife of GOVIN who turned $200 over to her to go shopping at the Corte Inglesa, one of Madrid's two best

Continued .....

Distribution:
2 - C/WH Division
2 - C/EUR Division
2 - COS, JMWAVE

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-23,406

DATE
12 January 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
200-120-61

known department stores. RUIZ checked with GALLO, his deputy, on the proper clothes for diplomatic functions in Madrid and an appointment was to be made with a tailor. Nilda declared that the apartment where CALZADILLA and his family had lived economically was inadequate and they decided to look for a chalet, something very spacious and well-priced. They subsequently seriously considered one known to rent for 30,000 pesetas ($500) per month and then turned it down, apparently for reasons other than price. A new telex machine was ordered for the Embassy. The technician stated they could install a teletype that could only receive, not send, messages but this seemed acceptable.

3. On Monday, 4 December 1967, the day after his arrival, RUIZ ordered the Cuban consuls in Barcelona, Sevilla and Vigo to Madrid for a meeting. The order was couched in terms of "wanting to meet" them, but after their arrival on Wednesday, 6 December, all parties settled down to a detailed meeting in which primary attention was given to administrative matters, trade and propaganda. The latter two subjects will be dealt with in separate dispatches. On the administrative side, RUIZ listened sympathetically to complaints about low salaries, old buildings and inadequate operating budgets and concluded by asking for a monthly report on receipts and expenses and a report on the consuls' current needs, their monthly balances and their administrative activities. The printing and telephone bills were the two items of expense that kept recurring throughout the discussions.

4. By the end of the week, RUIZ had prepared a report on the situation he found in the Chancerry and the mission in general for forwarding to Havana and which he first discussed with his subordinates. He started by assuring them that he had "found great co-operation among all the comrades in this mission" and declared that the staff was complete. Apparently, RUIZ intends to make no personnel changes and Hector GALLO Portieles, who had previously been most eager to return PCS to Havana, now has gone to Havana on vacation. He left Madrid on the 20 December 1967 Iberia flight.

5. The Cuban mission has certain financial problems since the present budget dates from previous years and does not cover current expenses. However, the "new economic activities of the consulate" are expected to assist with the problem. Here RUIZ is presumably referring to the pressure brought to bear in November 1967 by Cuban sympathizers in the Spanish Foreign Office working through the Customs and the Immigration Office to force Cuban exiles to register with the Cuban consulate and pay the $22.50 fee for a valid passport. Enough exiles have responded to this pressure to relieve some of the financial problems of the Cuban mission. This source of income will last as long as the Cubans' friends in the Foreign Ministry are able to assist them.

6. The reception of Cuban official travelers at the airport and the handling of Embassy pouches poses a continuing administrative problem for the Embassy. Jose DIAZ Puga, who is in charge of this airport work has to devote himself exclusively to taking care of the couriers and their pouches when any come in, leaving visitors to fend for themselves. This situation has been alleviated by other Embassy staff members jaunting out to the airport at will to meet the incoming planes. Now, RUIZ has declared that the rest of the staff must stay in the Embassy because they have a work plan to fulfill. Thus, he has left himself with an unresolved problem he must face in the very near future.

7. The new Ambassador concluded his report with three recommendations:

a. Rent another building where the Chancillary, the Commercial Office, the Consulate and the Cubana Offices can all be housed instead of being dispersed in separate buildings as they are now;

b. Rent or preferably buy a residence for the Chief of Mission. The one they now have is not adequate;

c. Send another person from Cuba who has the background to take care of scientific work plus continuing the contacts the Mission will have already made. In view of RUIZ's previous statement on the completeness of the staff, such a person would likely be a "non-official" representative of one of Cuba's cultural fronts such as the Casa de las Americas.

8. RUIZ concluded his remarks by saying that in Spain there is a tremendous field for the Cubans, they have no language problem and they can do a great work. Such is the goal RUIZ has proclaimed and that Station Madrid believes he was sent to attain.

Jane D. ASTRAHAN

Informe Nº 729

221-81-87

Página -1
D
4 de septiembre 1968

1. VERA LLAMA A LA CASA MERCEDES.- Para decir que están interesados en comprar un automóvil y pide les visite un vendedor con los modelos. Quedan en pasar mañana por la mañana.

2. LA SRA. DALIA RAMOS (Cubana) LLAMA A RUIZ.- Esta señora conoce a RUIZ porque estuvieron juntos en la escuela, en Cuba cuando GUILLERMO tenía 12 o 13 años. Hace 20 años que no se ven y RUIZ le comenta que cuando lo vea no va a conocerlo porque ha cambiado mucho. DALIA (Dalia) le comenta que ella no cree que haya cambiado mucho porque él (RUIZ) es rubio de ojos verdes y que en cambio ella (DALIA) se tiñe el pelo. DALIA está casada con el hermano de MARIO GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI, MANOLITO. Está en la playa de Gandia, Valencia pasando una temporada y cuando regrese a Madrid visitará a RUIZ, en la oficina. RUIZ le dice que la invitará entonces a comer juntos. El objeto de la llamada de DALIA es presentarle a HERMINIO PEREZ VIDAL, puertorriqueño-español, que quiere hacer contacto con Cuba para exportar ajos. HERMINIO PEREZ VIDAL es primo de MARIO GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI. GUILLERMO lo invita a pasar por la oficina el lunes por la mañana.

3. VERA LLAMA A UN AMIGO DE FLIA que parece cubano.- Le pregunta si tiene visita ahora y él le contesta que acaba de ver a ARISTIDES. VERA le comenta que tiene una cosa que decirle y éste le dice que lo invita a a comer a su casa (de VERA). Ella le dice que lo invita si ~~mismo~~ él (el amigo) cocina.

4. PERSONA QUE NO SE IDENTIFICA LLAMA A ANDRES MARTINEZ.- Para cobrarle una cuenta. ARISTIDES le dice que ya no trabaja con ellos y le da la dirección donde vive. Virgen del Coro 12 o 14.

FIN-

Copy of att to OSMA-24210, 10 Sept '68

201-735296

14-00000

[illegible]

26 septiembre 1962
[illegible]

Conversación entre Gallo y Ruiz relacionada con las [illegible] del círculo del Núcleo del Partido. Gallo alega que es una obligación moral (asistir?) ya que se discuten asuntos internos del Partido. Parece ser que ésto se menciona porque Ruiz no ha asistido a algunas/a reuniones. Ruiz comenta que él tiene otros asuntos importantes además de eso, y más [illegible] relacionado con el [illegible] cuanto le dice a Gallo, "...discúlpame, porque tú estás en permanente [illegible] sión." Gallo sigue insistiendo sobre la obligación moral que tienen con el Partido. Ruiz ya un poco [illegible] le dice que él (Ruiz) es miembro del Partido [illegible] a las reuniones del núcleo en el [illegible] asistía para [illegible] cómo se desarrollaba, pero que no había participación activa. También [illegible] que una persona [illegible] del Partido [illegible] que no han [illegible] suficientes (pruebas de confianza?).

Ruiz pide a V.A. que le consiga el nombre completo del doctor [illegible], y [illegible] lo llama por teléfono a [illegible]. —— Habla con [illegible], le pregunta si [illegible] lo que le envió el [illegible] (no se puede [illegible]) [illegible] en que se verán durante el día.

V.A. avisa a Ruiz que el nombre del doctor es J[illegible]

cy. of att. to OSMA-24303
15 Oct 1968

201-735296

[illegible] N° [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] de [illegible] 1963

1. [illegible] - [illegible] suscribirse a la revista [illegible]. Le dicen que se dirija al Instituto de [illegible] en [illegible] 45.

2. [illegible] - Para decirle que en el [illegible] de las [illegible] de hoy, salió de [illegible] un paquete "que ya tú te imaginas para quien es" y va como carga acompañada por él ([illegible]). Añade que él [illegible] a Madrid a las [illegible] de [illegible], [illegible] de una gente y de aquí sale tránsito para la Habana. [illegible] como [illegible] y [illegible] tienen que estar en el [illegible]. Parece que [illegible] que viaja con [illegible] es [illegible]. (Véase Inf. 822 par. 3).

3. [illegible] - Para decirle que [illegible] la gente viniendo [illegible] esta tarde en el vuelo de Iberia 161.

4. [illegible] - Para solicitar una entrevista con el agregado cultural de la embajada.

5. YUPA LLAMA A ELIDA.- Para que diga a GUILLERMO que ella está dejando sobre el escritorio de él un confidencial que manda [illegible] el de Portugal para la Habana.

6. [illegible] Y MARIA [illegible] - Parece que ambas están disgustadas [illegible] no les [illegible] los [illegible] de [illegible] a que tenían [illegible] parece les han subido el salario en [illegible] [illegible] "son unos hijos de..." [illegible] a [illegible] y ELIDA. MARIA la manda a callar [illegible] "estoy negra y lo que hay es una cochinería." Comenta que "el que ha movido esto es el marido de la otra (parece que refiriéndose a [illegible]). [illegible] de decir cosas terribles." MARIA pregunta a [illegible] que ha dónde han ido (RUIZ y ELIDA) y ésta le dice que deben haber ido a ver un piso por ahí. Comenta que "están todos [illegible] al pagar [illegible] pesetas de [illegible] de [illegible] y [illegible] ha sido el más [illegible] lo [illegible] que era él, estos son 40 veces más [illegible]. [illegible] no les iba a creer." MARIA le dice "[illegible] ya hablaremos." MARIA le dice que RUIZ y ELIDA le preguntaron si ella (ANGELA) sabía de alguien para sustituir a [illegible] y [illegible] le dice que ELIDA ha comentado que ella no quiere recomendación de nadie, ni de JMB (el [illegible]) y que va a poner un anuncio en el periódico. (Nota: [illegible] de RUIZ, pañuelos y corbatas). Parece que [illegible] lleva 20 años trabajando con el personal cubano y MARIA 13 años.

7. UNA [illegible] - Para decir que ella es prima hermana de [illegible] y [illegible] tiene noticias de [illegible] a [illegible]. [illegible] le dice [illegible]

201-775291

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, JMCOBRA

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/QUDOZE/QUTIMID/MHAPRON
Guillermo RUIZ Perez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Charge d'Affaires of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, has occupied that post for nearly a year. During that time, the QUDOZE/QUTIMID material has revealed various facets of his personality, showing him to be a man of volatile temper, an incessant talker and with more breadth of experience and outlook than the other members of the local Cuban mission.

2. In his public relations RUIZ seems to do well. Here in Spain he has been interested in meeting as many people as possible and in widening his circle of acquaintances. No matter what their political views may be, he feels it is worth establishing some kind of relationship with them and will listen attentatively to persons with a good reputation in the intellectual world. He has laid great emphasis on cultural matters in outlining his plans for the Embassy's activities. He has shown a certain intellectual restlessness, a desire to keep abreast of events in the world outside of Cuba and a willingness to accept whatever he deems to be good or useful from that exterior world. Thus, during his early conversations with his staff soon after his arrival, he extolled the virtues of the Yankee system of "briefing" and the fact that executives have privacy for thinking without being bothered by the routine details of the office. RUIZ has been concerned over having Cuba and the Cubans well thought of in Spain. He early said he was pre-occupied by the interpretation he would be able to give to Cuba here, that cultural relations were

continued ....

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR [illegible]
2 - COS, JMCOBRA

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-24,212

DATE
13 September 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
65-6-44/3
65-2-10/9

reduced to a very narrow circle and since Cuba was "in" economically it was now necessary to give attention to the political and cultural fields. He later commented on the fact that Cuba is practically unknown in Spain, that Cuban products are never seen in the local stores and that the view of Cuba of the average Spaniard has come from the exiles. He has continued to discuss the need for advertising Cuban products and considered decorating his office and his home with Cuban items and furniture so he could show a little bit of Cuba to his Spanish and foreign contacts. Another consequence of this desire to put Cuba's best foot forward is a certain harshness in dealing with the shortcomings of his colleagues and fellow Cubans outside the mission, calling attention to any deficiencies in their conduct and ways of dealing with the persons they meet. As recently as in a QUDOZE report of 13 July he was complaining that the Cubans seem to have lost the elegant touch in their public functions.

3. RUIZ's attitude toward money follows logically from his desire that Cuba's prestige increase and he is quite willing to spend money where it will show. The Embassy's 6 January reception was an expensive affair, the Embassy and Commercial officers take their Spanish contacts to the best restaurants, he and his wife pay 30,000 pesetas (approximately $ 430.00) rent per month for a house deemed suitable to his position and buy new clothes without hesitation for the various diplomatic functions. Before he went on home leave on 6 August 1968, he was encouraging his staff to rent better apartments that would more nearly match their status as diplomats and his wife was looking for a different house for them, one with fewer maintenance headaches and with rooms large enough for small receptions of as many as 40 people. All of this is quite in accord with RUIZ's own bourgoise tastes, reflected more than any thing else in his great interest in clothes and in being well dressed. Yet the Cuban mission operates on a slim budget and the salaries are not high. Station Madrid has no information on whether Cuban mission personnel receive a housing allowance but assumes they must as otherwise RUIZ, at least, could never make ends meet. RUIZ earns a gross salary of $681.50 per month and all his living expenses including clothes, food, medical expenses, education for the couple's 5 children and perhaps utilities must come from this sum. RUIZ also expects to be able to invite Cuban officials transiting Madrid and his Spanish and foreign contacts home for lunch or dinner at any time. There is no indication that he receives a representation allowance yet he will allow his wife to charge nothing except the salaries of two maids to the Embassy and she can't economize on food when they are alone because he will go out to a restaurant rather than eat rice and beans. RUIZ is plainly cautious in his dealings with Havana over money, even while wanting to live as well as possible in Madrid. The difference in the couple's manner of living between Havana and Madrid must be striking since RUIZ had a good position in the Ministry of Foreign Commerce prior to becoming Charge d'Affaires and yet his wife told Vera, the Embassy secretary and her closest friend, that she did not have a refrigerator in Cuba and would like to take one back with her if they did not return to Madrid after home leave!

4. As an individual, RUIZ has appeared in QUDOZE/QUTIMID as nervous, capricious, quick tempered. In contrast to his pleasant public appearance and his usually acceptable telephone language, his private conversation is vulgar, low and full of ugly words. He swears continually and flies off into rages. He is a compulsive talker and apparently uses his long conversations and his consultations over some course of action as a means of psychological reinforcement. He has given the impression of being insecure in his position and when faced with an accumulation of problems in the office prior to home leave, was talking of resigning and returning to Cuba. This insecurity may account for his touchiness over the way he is treated by the Spaniards, especially those in government positions. He has been noted describing several of his interviews with Spanish Ministers or people holding important government positions at great length, going into much detail on the length of the meeting, if they shook hands, if the person smiled, if he had anything nice to say about Cuba or the Cubans, etc. As the addressees know, RUIZ came to his post as a transfer from the Ministry of Foreign Commerce. On numerous occasions he has said that his life interest is in commerce and industry and prior to his vacation in Cuba, he was increasingly depressed over his present position and his ability to fill it, which may account for some of this sense of personal uncertainty. He has seemed a hard worker and a man with good ideas on the work of the Embassy and how it should be organized, ideas which he has repeated endlessly, but he has been unable to inspire in his subordinates. In his disputes with GALLO in June he complained about the lack of team spirit in the office.

5. RUIZ's political ideas are centered in the Cuban revolution and the Station considers him as an unquestioned regime supporter. However, his approach is different from that of the younger, less intelligent men who have known nothing else. RUIZ has had a sufficient breadth of education and experience to make a choice, to have reached his own decision that the Castro regime is good for Cuba and that Marxism as interpreted by the Cubans is an adequate intellectual foundation for life. A QUDOZE Report of 13 December 1967 included a discussion with a Spanish employee of the Embassy during which RUIZ explained that the Cuban revolution is different from any other revolution there has ever been in the world, that it has different characteristics and trajectories, that in spite of having a mark of Marxist principles it has many variations which make it different. These variations are unknown even to some of the comrades themselves. In a QUDOZE Report of 23 June, he commented on certain features of the Cuban system as "very difficult to understand unless one is of the left". The QUDOZE Report of 4 July quoted extensively in OSMA-24,112 of 9 August 1968 showed most clearly RUIZ's view of Cuba and the revolution as one entity and to see himself within that structure, a part of it and serving it. Beyond that, his mind runs in business and public relations rather than political channels and he has shown less interest in the policies than in the power relationships of the men within the hierarchy who administer the policies. He has been able to avoid sounding doctrinaire in his discussions and has been able to deal satisfactorily with the wide variety

of people he likes to meet. This last winter the couple was able to find a secular school for their children where they would not be taught religion. Along with the rest of his staff RUIZ has exaggerated ideas about the size and aggressive intentions of the WOFIRM organization in Spain and is always on the lookout for a "provocation" even to the extent of refusing to receive an unknown newspaper man who called for an interview.

6. RUIZ seems to have little time for his wife, Nilda, and their children and, at least in public, his attitude toward his wife has been quite curt. He has mentioned on at least two occasions having "his problems at home" and that all married couples have problems they alone can solve, but he has never discussed them. Nilda, for her part, in her long conversations with Vera has made no comments that would indicate any special problems. She had always worked prior to coming to Spain and at first was quite discontented with a life of idleness, but adjusted herself to her new situation. She appears intelligent, competent, a good mother and probably a good business woman. She is outspoken but also solicitous and affectionate with her husband, always interested in his work and encouraging him in what he does. RUIZ, like most of the members of his staff, has health problems. He has had trouble with his back since 1955 and here in Spain has had colds and an intensification of the pain in his back.

7. Despite health problems, office problems and whatever feelings of inadequacy he may have had, home leave must have done RUIZ good for he returned to Madrid on 30 September 1968 for another year and his wife and children are expected to follow shortly.

Jane D. Astrahan

Jane D. ASTRAHAN

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

JAN 16 3 59 PM '68
RECEIVED
RID/AN

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/AN

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

22 JAN 1968

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REG C		22 JAN 1968		
2.				
3. WH/C/CI				
4. ES				EOS
5. WH/C/FI				
6. C. Komm.				K
7. Rocky		9 MAY 1968		K
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

— make sure that these are [illegible] we can get to them —

Check my [illegible]

RUIZ – Photo #55 Vol. II

BORODOWSKY – Photo #57 Vol. II

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
12 Jan 1968

DOCUMENT NUMBER
OSMA 23400

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division Chief of Station, JMWAVE	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	Chief, European Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, Madrid		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	Operational/TYPIC/MHAPRON Biographic Data and Photos of RUIZ and BORODOWSKY		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Forwarded herewith for the information of the addressees is the biographic data and photos on the new Cuban Ambassador to Spain Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) and his wife and on RUIZ's secretary Vera BORODOWSKY Jackiewich (201-298225). The material was secured through liaison.

Jane D. Astrahan
Jane D. ASTRAHAN

1cc WITH ATT MADE INTO OSMA 23400 - CLASSIFIED (201-298225)

Attachment: As stated above

Distribution:
2 - C/WH Division, w/att H/W
2 - COS, JMWAVE, w/att H/W
2 - C/EUR Division, w/o att

[2cc E/IB/S - w/ATT]

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

1 ATT

CS COPY

201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA-23,400	12 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-120-61

14-00000

NEGATIVES

Ministerio de la Gobernación

DIRECCIÓN GENERAL
DE SEGURIDAD

COMISARIA GENERAL
DE INVESTIGACION SOCIAL

Madrid, 22 de diciembre de 1967

Asunto: ORESTES-GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, ENCARGADO DE NEGOCIOS DE CUBA EN MADRID.-

N/ Ref.ª:

S/ Ref.ª:

DIRECCION GENERAL DE SEGURIDAD
COMISARIA GENERAL DE INVESTIGACION SOCIAL
SECRETARIA TECNICA
22 DIC.1967
REGISTRO DE SALIDA
Núm. 162[illegible]

Ampliando nota núm. 15890 del dia 13 del corriente, sobre la llegada a Madrid del Encragado de Negocios de Cuba en España Orestes-Guillermo RUIZ PEREZ, en sustitución de Francisco CALZADILLA NUÑEZ, a continuación se incluyen datos referentes a dicho individuo y su señora:

La Sra. RUIZ PEREZ, nació en La Habana el dia 26 de diciembre de 1934, y como ya consta, se llama Nilda VECIANA LOPEZ.

En cuanto al Encargado de Negocios, Orestes-Guillermo RUIZ PEREZ, nació también en La Habana el dia 10 de febrero de 1930.

Se sabe que estan efectuando gestiones para encontrar vivienda más adecuada a sus necesidades que la que ahora ocupan que, es la que tuvo siempre en nuestra capital el anterior Encargado Cubano.

Se acompañan fotografias del Representante Diplomatico Aludido y su esposa.

- - - - - -

Imp. de la D. G. de S. — 8.000 9-57

M G 10. Mod. 3 — UNE A 4

ATT 6 OSMW 22700   CS COPY   201-735276

14-00000

Ministerio de la Gobernación

DIRECCION GENERAL
DE SEGURIDAD

COMISARIA GENERAL
DE INVESTIGACION SOCIAL

Madrid, 22 de diciembre de 1967

Asunto: ORESTES-GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, ENCARGAD
DE NEGOCIOS DE CUBA EN MADRID.-

N. Ref.ª:

S. Ref.ª:

DIRECCION GENERAL DE SEGURIDAD
[illegible]
SECRETARIA TECNICA
22 DIC.1967
REGISTRO DE SALIDA
Núm. [illegible]

Ampliando nota núm. 15890 del dia 13 del corriente, sobre la llegada a Madrid del Encargado de Negocios de Cuba en España Orestes-Guillermo RUIZ PEREZ, en sustitución de Francisco CALZADILLA NUÑEZ, a continuación se incluyen datos referentes a dicho individuo y su señora:

La Sra. RUIZ PEREZ, nació en La Habana el dia 26 de diciembre de 1934, y como ya consta, se llama Nilda VECIANA LOPEZ.

En cuanto al Encargado de Negocios, Orestes-Guillermo RUIZ PEREZ, nació también en La Habana el dia 10 de febrero de 1930.

Se sabe que estan efectuando gestiones para encontrar vivienda más adecuada a sus necesidades que la que ahora ocupan que, es la que tuvo siempre en nuestra capital el anterior Encargado Cubano.

Se acompañan fotografias del Representanto Diplomatico Aludido y su esposa.

M G 13. Mod. B -UNE A 4

3P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO: Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, JMCOBRA
FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid
SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/QUDOZE
Conflict Between Guillermo RUIZ Perez and Hector GALLO Portieles
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
AUG 16 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Reference: OSMA-24,050 dated 12 July 1968

Action Required: FYI

1. At the time the referenced dispatch was prepared, the QUDOZE Reports were showing the beginning of a full fledged fight between Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the Charge d'Affaires of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and his first Secretary, Hector GALLO Portieles. As so often happens in human relations, less important issues proved the vehicle for expressing deeper conflicts and problems. In this case, the primary problem can be simply summarized. The members of RUIZ's staff operate independently of their chief and he feels he is neither consulted nor informed by his subordinates on their activities. This is particularly true in relation to GALLO. The specific issues which sparked their quarrels were RUIZ's dispute with Emilio ROMERO, editor of the newspaper Pueblo, and the distribution of Che GUEVARA's Diary.

2. A QUDOZE Report of 2 July 1968 outlined a hot discussion that ensued when RUIZ went into a rage over a phone call GALLO had received from Emilio ROMERO. RUIZ and ROMERO are not on speaking terms whereas GALLO and ROMERO get along well. GALLO said he feared enmity with ROMERO would bring about the publication of articles unfavorable to Cuba whereas RUIZ replied that when the first unfavorable article comes out, he will take it to the Foreign Minister and settle the matter on that level. He believes that he represents Cuba in Spain and that his

continued ....

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, JMCOBRA

CS CO

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO B 201-306051	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA-24,112	DATE 9 August 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 65-6-44/3

subordinates should back him by taking the same positions in public that he takes, a not unreasonable demand on the part of a Chief of Mission. RUIZ bluntly told GALLO that he, GALLO, had committed an error and GALLO just as bluntly disagreed. GALLO's view was that RUIZ had come in in a bad humor and nothing pleased him whereas RUIZ felt GALLO should try putting himself in RUIZ's place, something he claims GALLO is incapable of doing. Finally, this particular argument ended in a form of compromise with GALLO agreeing to call ROMERO the following day and remind him that he "should call the Minister".

3. On 4 July the battle was renewed over the distribution of Che's Diary. At that time the Embassy only had 6 or 7 copies which were being loaned out on an overnight basis. RUIZ said he wanted to send the Diary "to a mountain of people" while GALLO was also offering it freely and without consulting RUIZ about the action or his list of recipients. RUIZ scolded him roundly for this and, ignoring GALLO's attempts at self-justification, told him he had to respect the instructions he received. At one point in his tirade, RUIZ even went so far as to suggest it would be better for one of them to leave and go to work in another country, for example Rumania. Several interesting items emerged from this long quarrel:

A. GALLO has some undefined problem which Station Madrid assumes is related to his personality and his approach to his fellow workers. Ruiz said, "Look, GALLO, here everyone knows the problem you have. It is necessary to be hard, because unfortunately all the comrades that have come here through many years know of the problem..." Ruiz then insisted on the importance of discussing problems among the comrades and said "for example in your case, you have been foolish in not outlining the problem. I was waiting and ESPINO was waiting and PILOTO".

B. RUIZ commented that now he can understand the attitude of CALZADILLA. Before, he had thought CALZADILLA was in error but now he feels the same way. He mentions "an ambivalence" and says he will not react the same way, "that CALZADILLA was wrong in limiting himself to a reduced group of persons whereas I will continue to go forward but with everyone, not just a few."

C. RUIZ takes a broader view of Party membership than his contemporaries. In commenting on the weekly study circle for members of the Party, he set forth his opinion that all the comrades of the local Cuban Mission should participate even though they may not be members because in his eyes it is as if they all really were members.

D. RUIZ repeated a statement he has made on previous occasions - the great interest of his life is foreign commerce. However, in this 4 July QUDOZE Report, he added the interesting detail that he had not wanted to come to Madrid as Charge and, in affect, had been persuaded to come against his will. He believes he is best able to serve in the control of industry and that is where he could perform a tremendous work for his country as every revolutionary ought to be in the place of work where he is able to do the most. "Until now, I have always done and have always gone where the revolution sent me... with my present limitation of criteria, I should not be here". He repeated his conviction that he is wasting his talents and doing nothing for Cuba in the position of Charge in comparison with what he could do elsewhere. "I believe that with which I am best able to serve my country is in the control of industry...I put myself in an industry and I see if things are being done well or if they are being done badly because I have knowledge and because I arrive at my conclusions through the accounting...look, here I am wasting my presence and my resources when I am able to be useful to production in another position."

By the end of this 4 July report, RUIZ had exhausted all his combativeness and appeared very depressed.

4. RUIZ is due for home leave in Havana the first part of August. There have been indications scattered throughout the QUDOZE and QUTIMID Reports of the last month or two that he might not return. The information given in Paragraph 3-D above seems to make this possibility even more likely and is a developement that Station Madrid will watch closely.

5. The arguments ended inconclusively. Neither man could afford to carry the battle to the ultimate conclusion of an open break. GALLO has tried to make some pro-forma gestures acknowledging RUIZ as head of the Mission and RUIZ will soon be going on home leave. However, the former close association noted upon RUIZ's arrival is gone and they are more distant and cool. GALLO at one point in this same 4 July QUDOZE Report mentioned how he had looked forward to working with RUIZ and QUDOZE had shown an initially close working relationship between them with daily discussions of the problems of the Mission and the events of the day. Now, their relationship is cool, correct and business-like. The personalities of the two men have also come into sharper relief. RUIZ with his quick temper, shouted and used harsh, course language and in the end got nowhere; GALLO did not raise his voice, although his language was no improvement over that of his boss, and tried to sound reasonable but never gave in an inch on any of the points over which they quarreled. In the end nothing was resolved except possibly to clear the air of some of the tension between the two men for in a 10 July QUDOZE Report, RUIZ was still complaining about GALLO's friendship with Emilio ROMERO and saying that GALLO only wanted to be out meeting people and not preparing written memos on his work!

Jane D. Astrahan
Jane D. ASTRAHAN



CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 36

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735246

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION
WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO.
FILE, VR, RI/AN, WA 8, EUR 6, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CAS, ADDP

mode

S E C R E T 090852Z AUG 68 CITE MADRID 5702

9 Aug 68 IN 67286

T

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR, LA PAZ

TYPIC

REF: JMCOBRA 0490 (IN 63507)

1. STATION HAS MONITORED ACTIVITIES ORESTES GUILLERMO (RUIZ) PEREZ AND HIS WIFE CLOSELY THROUGH QUDOZE/QUTIMID SINCE COUPLES ARRIVAL MADRID LAST DEC AND CONVINCED REF REPORT BY VECIANA ABSOLUTELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. RUIZ, FAR FROM BEING DISSATISFIED WITH REGIME IS CONVINCED SUPPORTER WHO BELIEVES THAT IN SERVING CUBAN REVOLUTION HE IS SERVING BEST INTERESTS OF CUBA. RUIZ INTERESTED IN OUTSIDE WORLD AND IN MAINTAINING DIALOGUE WITH VARYING TYPES OF PEOPLE BUT DOES THIS FROM INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION WHICH HAS ACCEPTED CASTRO'S INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNISM AS APPLIED TO CUBA. ONLY ELEMENT OF DISSATISFACTION NOTED IS RUIZ FEELING HE IS NOT IN POSITION WHERE CAN BE MOST USEFUL. HE BELIEVES HE IS WASTING HIS TALENTS IN DIPLOMATIC POST AND WOULD LIKE POSITION MORE SUITED TO HIS INTERESTS IN EITHER COMMERCE OR INDUSTRY WHERE CAN

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~DM~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~FI~~

CS COPY

201-735246
9 Aug. 1968

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
AUG 13 3 31 PM '68

BY: AT: Z
RECEIVED
RID/EDI

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MADRID 5702 SECRET

SERVE REVOLUTION BETTER. WIFE APPEARS AS NON-FANATIC BUT ALSO REGIME SUPPORTER AND AS A WOMAN WHO WILL BE RULED BY HUSBAND IN SUCH MATTERS.

2. DETAILED DISPATCH BASED ON MATERIAL ACCUMULATED DURING PAST EIGHT MONTHS FOLLOWS SHORTLY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TOTAL COPIES 27

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT: Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER #

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735296 ✓

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, CI/CA

PIAOC

S E C R E T 031132Z JUL 68 CITE MADRID 5394

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

3 JUL 68 IN 43255

TYPIC

ON QUIMID OF 15 JUNE 68 WIFE OF AMAUTO-1 SAID AMAUTO-1 HAD MADE RESERVATIONS FOR THEIR DEPARTURE FOR PBRUMEN ON 6 AUGUST TO GO ON VACATION. SHE COMMENTED THAT POSSIBLY AMAUTO-1 MIGHT NOT WANT TO RETURN TO MADRID.

S E C R E T

AN	PL	
PS	DEST	wh/ops
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296
3 July 1968

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO B 201-249867
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735296
X-REF TO FILE NO. B 201-818437
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 30

68

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 15

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

201-249867
201-818437
201-735296

MADR

S E C R E T 061054Z CITE MADRID 3302

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

6 DEC 67 IN 05127

TYPIC WATCHLIST

CIT: CUBA 201-735296

ISIDORE MALMIERCA PEOLI PP D-67-921; GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ PP D-67-890; RICARDO ESPINO MARTINEZ PP D-67-627 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVA 3 DEC IBERIA FLT 942.

11P

S E C R E T

AN KL FI

MICROFILMED
DEC 29 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN KB
AB
~~IN~~
~~PG~~
~~RY~~
~~DBS~~ HPD
FI

B. 201-249867
B. 201-818437

201-735296
~~201-735269~~
6 Dec 1967

SECRET

22 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Guillermo Orestes RUIZ Perez (201-735296)
Cuban Charge d'Affaires in Madrid

According to QUDOZE/QUTIMID, Subject is suffering from a spinal ailment resulting from a fall he had about 12 years ago. Since then he has had chronic back-aches which were particularly severe during the time that he was in the U.S., Haiti, and Santo Domingo. His pains have recurred since he arrived in Spain about six months ago. On 3 June he had another severe attack and was treated by the Embassy's Spanish doctor VILLALANDA who prescribed Cortisone. His condition was diagnosed as incurable since it was doubted that the injury to his spine could be corrected by an operation. Subject was further told by his doctor that the condition would worsen to the point where within six to 10 years he would have a defective walk. Subject planned to send the diagnosis and x-rays to ROA in Havana who would pass them to the Cuban specialist MARTINEZ-PAZ for reviewing.

Gloria de Perignat
WH/COG/OPS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEMINATION / PERSON/UNIT — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 — TOTAL COPIES 2 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-735246

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____

DISSEM BY 15 PER ____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION EUR 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, WHCOG 8, CI, CI/OPS, MADRID, FI, FI/INT 2

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 181533Z MAR 68 CITE MADRID 4454 18 [illegible] 72639

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS

KEYWAY PBRUMEN QUTIMID

5 1P

AN [illegible]	FI	
RG	~~DESP~~	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX ✓	

1. ON 12 MAR 68 AN AMERICAN CITIZEN WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS DAVID JACOBUS WENT TO THE PBRUMEN EMBASSY AND REQUESTED SEE AMAUTO-1 (IDEN). AMAUTO-1 REFUSED SEE HIM UNTIL HE HAD IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AND STATED PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT IN WRITING.

2. JACOBUS SAID HE STAYING AT HOTEL CAPITOL, CALLE JOSE ANTONIO 41. ADDED HE HAD SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH U.S. GOVT AND BEING PRESSURED FINANCIALLY TO RETURN TO U.S. WHERE HE WOULD BE ARRESTED. REQUESTED AMAUTO-1 SUGGESTIONS FOR RECEIVING AID.

3. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH OTHER MEMBERS EMB STAFF AMAUTO-1 SAID THERE AN AMERICAN WHO WANTS GO PBRUMEN SAID IF HE WANTS TO GO WHY DOESN'T HE STEAL AIRPLANE OR BOAT.

4. NO OBJECTION PASSING TO LNERGO. PLS PROTECT SENSITIVE SOURCE.

S E C R E T

BT

MICROFILMED
MAY 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

201-735246
18 March 1968

2234

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 2   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735296

X-REF TO FILE NO.

BY ______ AT ______ 2

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO WH/COG/CI BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 52 PER

ACTION WH/COG ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. WH8 EUR8 CI CI/OPS CI/OA CI/RA

TSD6. FI. DDP. ADDP

S E C R E T 061204Z MAR 68 CITE MADRID 4359

6 MAR 68 IN 64742

AN	PI	
PS	DEST	CI/OPS
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

DIRECTOR, FRANKFURT INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC MHAFRON QUCAB TECHS

REF: MADRID 4358 (IN 64743)

IDEN - MAGIN (FERRER) TRAVE, DIRECTOR OF SERVICIO TECNICO COMERCIAL DE CONSTRUCCIONES NAVALES ESPANOLAS. THIS ORG IS SEMI OFFICIAL ASSOCIATION OF 37 SHIP BUILDING FIRMS AND HELPS ARRANGE AND/OR COORDINATE MANY OF CONTRACTS FOR SHIPBUILDING FOR OTHER COUNTRIES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-735296
6 March 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY 26 PER 10

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735296

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO WH/COG/68 BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, SA/DDP, CI/CA

TSD 2, FI, DDP, ADDP

MARC

S E C R E T 061224Z MAR 68 CITE MADRID 4358

64763

DIRECTOR, FRANKFURT INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC MHAPRON QUCAB TECHS

REFS: A. MADRID 4154 (IN 49536)

B. MADRID 4322 (IN 61625)

AMA Y	FI	
~~FO~~	[illegible]	6 MAR 68
ABSTRACT		INDEX

1. INVESTIGATION BY QUSEELY-1 SHOWS AMALTO-1 DOES FREQUENT REF A IDEN RESTAURANT. MOST MEETINGS RECENTLY HAVE BEEN WITH IDEN B AND UNDOUBTEDLY CONCERN NEGOTIATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION TWO SHRIMP BOATS. THIS SUBJECT OF SPECIAL INTEREST BOTH FROM THE MHVIPER POINT OF VIEW AND ALSO FOR POSSIBILITQY THAT THESE BOATS MIGHT BE CONSTRUCTED FOR USE BY PBRUMEN FOR EXPORT OF THE REVOLUTION.

2. REQUEST FRANKFURT EARLY VISIT FOR FREQUENCY SWEEP AND PREPARATION OF PEPPER MILLS REQUIRED FOR INSTALLATION AS DISCUSSED PER MADRID 4322 (IN 61625).

3. QUSEELY-1 PREPARED PROVIDE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE INSIDE RESTAURANT TO PLACE ARTICLE ON TABLE AT APPROPRIATE TIME. BELIEVES PEPPER MILL IS APPROPRIATE ARTICLE TO USE.

4. FOR ADDL BACKGROUND OF SHIPBUILDING NEGOTIATIONS HQS MAY WISH REVIEW MADRID EMBASSY TELEGRAMS 2633, 16 FEB 68; 2230, 17 JAN 68. NATURALLY OUR INTEREST EXTENDS

SECRET

201-735296
6 March 1968

14852

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ..... AT MAY 14 3 11 PM '68 Z

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

MAY 15 4 04 PM '68

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FORWARDED
RID/EDI

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY: RECEIVED

ACTION: RID/EDI ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MADRID 4358 SECRET

BEYOND THIS SUBJECT AS WE HOPE TO COVER MANY CONTACTS OF AMAUTO-1 AT THIS RESTAURANT.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, FE Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, European Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
Operational/BGBERET/QUDOZE/PBRUMEN
C Comments of Cuban Charge d'Affaires in Madrid on Vietnam

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

A: SPAIN, MADRID CIT CUBA

1. According to a QUDOZE Report of 17 February, the 201-735276 Cuban Charge d'Affaires in Madrid, Guillermo RUIZ Perez, was discussing the war in Vietnam with one of his subordinates and commented that a Chinese general is driving the North American command mad. He added that this Chinese says that they failed the first time and can fail the second time but that in the end the victory will be theirs. He also added that Vietnam had been at war with the Chinese for thousands of years, that the Chinese have a demonic power that is their people.

2. The nature of the QUDOZE Report does not permit further amplification of the above information which, even though fragmentary and obscure, is being forwarded for whatever use Headquarters may wish to make of it. Should any clarifying information appear in future QUDOZE reports, it will be forwarded. It is interesting to note that, although Station traces do not show the information, a previous QUDOZE Report quoted RUIZ as saying he had once been in North Vietnam as a member of a trade mission.

Jane D. Astrahan
Jane D. ASTRAHAN

MICROFILMED
MAR 14 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
- 2 - C/FE Division
- 2 - C/WH Division
- 2 - C/EUR Division

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

CS COPY

[redacted]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-23,597

DATE
201-735276
1 March 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
65-6-44/3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
VICE MINISTER OF ECONOMY WAS DIMISSED
RE DEBRIEFING REPORT OF ARIEL PICOT DIAZ
201-777193

201-777193
OSMA-23549
23 FEB 68

UFG

R 6803210106

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/~~AN~~ CR

FROM:

RID/CR

E/REG
4-B-09
X 5998

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

gR

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/C/IB		15 Feb	19 Feb	
2. [illegible]			[illegible]	S
3. WH/COG/			✓	✓
4. WH/COG/OPS			4/21	
5. WH/COG/RR			23 Feb	
6. WH/COG/ops				
7.				
8. RID/AN			58	CB
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16. E/TB/S				
17. WH/C/OPS ~~RID/FI~~				

Should we ask for the original tape on this for more clarification?

Yes

Has been done

27 FEB 1968

The following action is authorized: Received
Signed: S. V[illegible]
R.C.: WH/[illegible]
Date

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296
	INDEX		

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 9 Feb. 68

DOCUMENT NUMBER OSMA 23513

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, European Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Div., COS, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
~~KAPOK~~/QUDOZE
AMAUTO-1 Discussion of Missiles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 10 January 1968, AMAUTO-1, in one of his many daily discussions with his subordinates, reflected on the international position of his country, and among the things he said, we quote the following which may be of possible interest to addressees. Although part of the discussion was not heard because of the emotional inflection of the speaker, we feel that the jist of the discussion is clear and understandable.

> "We are demonstrating to the world that Cuba...is favorably disposed to do whatever...(AMAUTO-1 begins to talk against the United States) that when the Americans have to raise the white flag...because the first plane that appears on radar...(AMAUTO-1 is speaking excitedly and it is very difficult to understand each word but it appears that he is talking about the positions of missiles in Cuba), Havana, Las Villas and Camaguey and that with these missiles, we can cover Miami, New York, and all their bases and all of their "mierda". . .if the Americans say they are going to send them (missiles? planes?), we will send them; if they (Americans) say they are going to invade us, the first plane that comes to invade...(AMAUTO-1's subordinate remarked that 15 October 62 marked a point in international politics, when the Yankees ordered the Soviets to withdraw their missiles). . .(AMAUTO-1 injected) "they (the Soviets) presented them (the Cubans) with ten bombs".

2. Our reason for reporting this fragmentary information is that AMAUTO-1 might be confirming the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba.

Howard R. SACODER
201-735296

Distribution:
2 - C/EUR
2 - C/WHD
1 - COS/JMWAVE

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-23513

DATE
9 February 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 2U-73
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 42

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 5

ACTION

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T 131135Z FEB 63 CITE MADRID 4154

13Feb63 IN 48920

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, FRANKFURT

AB	PT	
DS		
ABST		

TYPIC KHAPRON TECHS

1. STATION INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE IN RESTAURANT WHICH AMAUTO-1 HAS IDENTIFIED ON QUDOZE AS HIS FAVORITE RESTAURANT IN MADRID. IDEN RESTAURANT PARTIALLY OWNED BY QUSEELY-1 WHO CASE OFFICER CONVINCED WILL DO ANYTHING ASSIST IN OPERATION. HAVE NOT YET APPROACHED HIM THIS BASIS.

2. STATION INFORMAL CASING RESTAURANT ON 12 FEB FINDS NO VASES OR MOVABLE OBJECTS ON TABLES SUITABLE FOR CONTAINING MICROPHONES. UNDERTABLE INSTALLATION VERY LIKELY UNSUITABLE IN VIEW DIRECTIONAL NOISES FROM OTHER TABLES.

3. STATION INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY PURCHASE SMALL SLENDER VASES TO CONTAIN ARRANGEMENT TWO OR THREE FLOWERS FOR EACH TABLE AND WOULD REQUEST SUITABLE INSTALLATION BY ARTOPAZ IN AT LEAST TWO VASES OF SMALL MIKE/TRANSMITTER, TYPE TO BE DECIDED AFTER DETERMINATION EXACT SIZE VASES.

4. THIS CABLE ONLY FOR PURPOSE ADVISING ADDRESSEE STATIONS FACTS THIS OPERATION WHICH CONSIDERED OF VALUE IN VIEW

[illegible]
[illegible]

RECEIVED
RID/MIS

FEB 23 9 29 AM '68

PAGE 2 MADRID 4154 S E C R E T

QUDOZE HAS DISCLOSED OCCASIONS IN WHICH AMAUTO-1 HAS CALLED SPANISH CONTACTS TO MEET THEM AT IDEN RESTAURANT FOR BUSINESS CONVERSATIONS.

S E C R E T

FORWARDED
RID/MIS
FEB 23 2 12 PM '68

MAR 28 68
18

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
	2. RI FILE NO.				
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.		9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO ORESTES
201-735296 065-009-007
SEX M DOB ? OSMA-23493A01
02 FEB 68
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
ASSIGNED SPAIN PCS. CUBAN OFFICIAL
REP CHARGE D AFFAIRES. DATE OF ARR
IN SPAIN 03 DEC 67

UFGHMMHFGOSB R 6802160509

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

f 23

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735296
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
49

ACTION
WH/Cog 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH 7, [illegible], CI/OPS

SECRET 251759Z JAN 68 CITE MADRID 3978

ANALYST
PS
ABSTRACT

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC MHGUILE

REF: MADRID 3859 (IN 31987)

ONLY CUBAN MALE WHO TRAVELED US (NEW YORK) 6 JAN WAS ROBERTO CRUZ SEGUNDO. OBTAINED IMMIGRANT VISA 27 DEC 67. NO STATION TRACES.

SECRET

SECRET

MICROFILMED
FEB 14 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1P

201-735296
26 Jan 1968

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
1.	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-133/03
UNDA-03310
30 OCT 67
P5

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
VICE MINISTER FOREIGN COMMERCE. RUIZ WILL BE GOING TO SPAIN AS CHARGE D AFFAIRES

R 6802161385

UFG

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735296
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. R D [illegible]
FROM: 12

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

P[illegible]DENCE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 7 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH/106 TIME BY 6

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, WH 8, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, C/[illegible] FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 171220Z JAN 68 CITE MADRID 3859

17 JAN 68 IN 31987

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHGUILE

1. IN QUDOZE REPORT OF 5 JAN 68 AMAUTO-1 REQUESTED THAT A CABLE BE SENT SAYING THAT THE FOLLOWING DAY A COMPANERO (UNIDENTIFIED) CARRYING AN ENVELOPE WAS LEAVING FOR MIAMI. PREVIOUSLY IN THE CONVERSATION AMAUTO-1 ASKED THE PERSON IF HIS PASSPORT WAS READY. HE REPLIED THAT HE NEEDED ENTRANCE AND EXIT PERMIT, AND RETURN VISA. COMMENTS WERE MADE RE PRICE ROUND TRIP TO MIAMI BEING 600 DOLLARS SO ASSUME THE PERSON RETURNING TO MADRID.

2. MADRID WILL CHECK QUOTA TRAVEL REPORTS THAT DATE AND WITH CONSULATE IN EFFORT IDENTIFY.

S E C R E T

ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~

SECRET

201-735296
17 Jan 1968

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735296

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. R Ditus

28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 01

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/8, CI, CI/OPS

WAVE

S E C R E T 302252Z JAN 68 CITE JMWAVE 1081

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC MHGUILE

REFEREENCES MADRID 3859 (IN 31939)

MADRID 3978 (IN 37739)

AN	FI	
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~	

30 JAN 68 IN 40434

NO STATION OR AMOT TRACES ROBERTO CRUZ SEGUNDO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-735296
30 Jan 1968

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.: /AN

FROM:
RID/FI

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

IN VIEW OF [illegible]
CUBAN [illegible] AND
[illegible] ACTIVITIES
IN [illegible]
NEW FILE CLASSIFICATION
MAY BE WARRANTED.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REG C		30 JAN 1968	30 JAN 1968	ua
2. WH/c/IPP				
3.				
4. WH/C/CI/ST				
5. RD				RD
6. ~~WH/c/FI~~				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
JAN 30 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FILE TITLE:

TRACE REQUEST: ABSTRACT X / INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED:

DOCUMENT DATE: 19 JAN 1968

DOCUMENT NUMBER: OSMA 23415

FORM 7-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

2V

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/MHSPAWN/QUDOZE/QUTIMID
Plans of New Cuban Ambassador in Madrid on Propaganda Matters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. OSMA-23,413 of 19 January 1968
B. OSMA-23,406 of 12 January 1968 200-735-296

MICROFILMED
JAN 30 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. When Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the new Cuban Charge met with the Cuban consuls following his arrival in Spain, the result was a long meeting at which primary attention was given to administrative matters, trade and propaganda. The subject of propaganda will be dealt with in this dispatch.

2. The Castro regime has always attached great importance to propaganda activities of all kinds and when the new Cuban Charge d'Affaires began to re-organize the work of his subordinates, propaganda matters were not overlooked. According to the QUDOZE and QUTIMID operations, the provincial consulates have been receiving four types of propaganda for distribution, two of which were identified. One was the propaganda put out by the organizations created by the Castro regime, for example "The Voice of Vietnam". The other is newspapers. PACHECO, Consul in Sevilla, mentioned Granma, which he claimed many people read, and added that lately he had been receiving Juventude Rebelde.

3. RUIZ's ideas apparently go beyond hand-shaking and the distribution of propaganda. He asked the consuls to make a list of all the institutes and all the scientific centers in their territories including the special positions of these centers and any other relevant information. They are to use these lists to develop a systematic work plan of visiting each one, making friends, trying to obtain scholarships for Cuba, trying to obtain publications and propaganda of every type, free if possible or by subscription

Continued ......

Distribution:
2 - C/WH Division
2 - C/EUR Division
2 - COS, JMWAVE
[2cc4 E/10/S]

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO DC5-8-7	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA-23,415	DATE 200-735-296 19 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-120-58

if necessary. The consuls were told to go with the attitude of "looting".

4. Even while he was laying these responsibilities on his consuls, RUIZ was busy within the Embassy. In discussions with Andres MARTINEZ, a Spanish employee who works on cultural matters and is responsible for publication of the Embassy bulletin, RUIZ mentioned that he is interested in offering Cuban documentaries to Spanish Cine (Movie) Clubs as they now have a large number, "an infinity", of documentaries showing both Cuban technical application and how the people live. RUIZ also asked to see copies of the Embassy bulletin and in the meantime suggested MARTINEZ do a bulletin drawing a parallel between Gibralter and Guantanamo. Finally, according to a QUDOZE report of 11 December 1967, Hector GALLO Portieles had been ordered to prepare a work plan for cultural activity. In this context cultural activity is not limited to art, music and literature but also includes public information media. The Cuban Embassy has already built up a series of press contacts over the past years and the Cuban Revolution seems to draw a ready response in Spanish intellectual circles as evidenced by the Spanish delegates attending the Cultural Congress held in Havana from 4-11 January 1968. An expense-paid trip is always attractive to be sure but the delegates, many of whom were not communists, were also sympathetic to the host. Accordingly, within the limits imposed by the Spanish government, Station Madrid expects an increase in the propaganda and political action activities of the Cuban official establishment.

Jane D. Astrahan
Jane D. ASTRAHAN

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/~~AN~~ C.C

FROM:

RID/CR

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

... action is ... Dissemination

S Vitale

WH/Cog

Note: ... indicate

22 JAN 1968

MICROFILMED
JAN 17 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/Reg/C				Wa
2. WH/C/FI	1		1/15	
3. McSupe				
4. WH/C/CI		22/1		DMR
5. 3T				
6. ES			25 Jan	ES
7.				
8.				
9. ~~WH/Reg~~				
10. WH/C/CI ~~Rocky~~				
11. ~~WH/C/FI~~				
12.				
13. RID/Files				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. ~~RID/FI~~				

#9 - Kapok
material must be retained by Action desk . . . RID/SD Louise x6829

AMAUTO-1
R. Kaiman
has file
no

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
	INDEX	201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
C1 ...	12 Jan 68	USMA 23406

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM 3P

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/MHAPRON/QUTIMID/QUDOZE
Plans of New Cuban Ambassador in Madrid

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
JAN 17 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. The new Cuban Ambassador to Spain, Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez arrived in Madrid on the Iberia flight of 3 December 1967 accompanied by his wife, Nilda, and three sons. CALZADILLA, RUIZ's predecessor had not been a strong administrator and had let the various components of the Cuban official establishment in Spain run their own affairs. This fact plus the inevitable tendency of a new chief to be a "new broom" and rearrange things according to his own lights, led Station Madrid to expect some changes particularly within the Embassy. However, the QUDOZE and QUTIMID operations have shown RUIZ at least initially to be an aggressive and well organized individual with ideas of his own that clearly reflect his background in commercial affairs and prepared to make changes that promise to go beyond the superficial sweeping of a new broom. Underlying RUIZ's actions and proposals is the clear implication that he came to Madrid with the specific task of upgrading the Cuban mission in Spain both in terms of prestige and effectiveness. Station Madrid will transmit to the addressees the relevant information on this program as it becomes available from the QUDOZE and QUTIMID operations along with information on the official Cuban personalities administering the program.

2. A striking difference between RUIZ and his predecessor was noted in the QUDOZE and QUTIMID reports of that first week. RUIZ has no inhibitions over spending money. One of the Embassy cars, a Peugeot was replaced with a new model and there was discussion of replacing the other two Peugeots with new ones. Nilda, RUIZ's wife, was picked up by the wife of GOVIN who turned $200 over to her to go shopping at the Corte Inglesa, one of Madrid's two best

Continued .....

Distribution:
2 - C/WH Division
2 - C/EUR Division
2 - COS, JMWAVE

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D. 200-9-44

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-23,406

DATE
12 January 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
200-120-61

known department stores. RUIZ checked with GALLO, his deputy, on the proper clothes for diplomatic functions in Madrid and an appointment was to be made with a tailor. Nilda declared that the apartment where CALZADILLA and his family had lived economically was inadequate and they decided to look for a chalet, something very spacious and well-priced. They subsequently seriously considered one known to rent for 30,000 pesetas ($500) per month and then turned it down, apparently for reasons other than price. A new telex machine was ordered for the Embassy. The technician stated they could install a teletype that could only receive, not send, messages but this seemed acceptable.

3. On Monday, 4 December 1967, the day after his arrival, RUIZ ordered the Cuban consuls in Barcelona, Sevilla and Vigo to Madrid for a meeting. The order was couched in terms of "wanting to meet" them, but after their arrival on Wednesday, 6 December, all parties settled down to a detailed meeting in which primary attention was given to administrative matters, trade and propaganda. The latter two subjects will be dealt with in separate dispatches. On the administrative side, RUIZ listened sympathetically to complaints about low salaries, old buildings and inadequate operating budgets and concluded by asking for a monthly report on receipts and expenses and a report on the consuls' current needs, their monthly balances and their administrative activities. The printing and telephone bills were the two items of expense that kept recurring throughout the discussions.

4. By the end of the week, RUIZ had prepared a report on the situation he found in the Chancerry and the mission in general for forwarding to Havana and which he first discussed with his subordinates. He started by assuring them that he had "found great co-operation among all the comrades in this mission" and declared that the staff was complete. Apparently, RUIZ intends to make no personnel changes and Hector GALLO Portieles, who had previously been most eager to return PCS to Havana, now has gone to Havana on vacation. He left Madrid on the 20 December 1967 Iberia flight.

5. The Cuban mission has certain financial problems since the present budget dates from previous years and does not cover current expenses. However, the "new economic activities of the consulate" are expected to assist with the problem. Here RUIZ is presumably referring to the pressure brought to bear in November 1967 by Cuban sympathizers in the Spanish Foreign Office working through the Customs and the Immigration Office to force Cuban exiles to register with the Cuban consulate and pay the $22.50 fee for a valid passport. Enough exiles have responded to this pressure to relieve some of the financial problems of the Cuban mission. This source of income will last as long as the Cubans' friends in the Foreign Ministry are able to assist them.

6. The reception of Cuban official travelers at the airport and the handling of Embassy pouches poses a continuing administrative problem for the Embassy. Jose DIAZ Puga, who is in charge of this airport work has to devote himself exclusively to taking care of the couriers and their pouches when any come in, leaving visitors to fend for themselves. This situation has been alleviated by other Embassy staff members jaunting out to the airport at will to meet the incoming planes. Now, RUIZ has declared that the rest of the staff must stay in the Embassy because they have a work plan to fulfill. Thus, he has left himself with an unresolved problem he must face in the very near future.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET KAPOK	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA-23,406

7. The new Ambassador concluded his report with three recommendations:

a. Rent another building where the Chancillary, the Commercial Office, the Consulate and the Cubana Offices can all be housed instead of being dispersed in separate buildings as they are now;

b. Rent or preferably buy a residence for the Chief of Mission. The one they now have is not adequate;

c. Send another person from Cuba who has the background to take care of scientific work plus continuing the contacts the Mission will have already made. In view of RUIZ's previous statement on the completeness of the staff, such a person would likely be a "non-official" representative of one of Cuba's cultural fronts such as the Casa de las Americas.

8. RUIZ concluded his remarks by saying that in Spain there is a tremendous field for the Cubans, they have no language problem and they can do a great work. Such is the goal RUIZ has proclaimed and that Station Madrid believes he was sent to attain.

Jane D. Astrahan
Jane D. ASTRAHAN

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM: EE

RID/HU

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

21 DEC 1967

MICROFILMED
DEC 18 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

27 FEB 1968

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/CEGC		18 DEC 1967	18 DEC 1967	Wa
2. WH/C/CI			19/12	JOH
3. BT				
4. FS			27 Dec	ERS
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 14 Jan 1967

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFGA 29123

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

4-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION	
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, MADRID	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, EUR Division; Chief, WH Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE		MICROFILM

SUBJECT ~~TYPIC AMOT/Operational~~
Cuban Embassy Official (fnu) RUIZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. Madrid 3135
B. Madrid 3204

1. JMWAVE traces reveal that (fnu) RUIZ, successor to Francisco CALZADILLA Nunez, 201-315988, may be identical with Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez, 201-735296. Information pertaining to RUIZ Perez is as follows:

a. In August 1963, RUIZ was appointed Cuban Commercial Counsellor at Mexico City, and was believed to be a G-2 official attempting to infiltrate counterrevolutionary groups based in Mexico. (UFGA-11065, dated 16 September 1963, and UFGA-11445, dated 23 September 1963.)

b. In 1964 an attempt was made to establish communications with RUIZ through Antonio VECIANA, an uncle of RUIZ' wife. VECIANA stated that neither he nor members of his family were in correspondence with RUIZ, and that he was unwilling to act as a "go-between." (UFGA-19006, dated 21 December 1964.)

c. A Headquarters' "WATCHLIST" card, dated 1 June 1965, indicates that RUIZ was believed to be assigned to the General Directorate of Intelligence, Ministry of Interior, in Havana.

2. AMOT traces pertaining to Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez, and an evaluation of his new assignment are attached.

MICROFILMED
DEC 1 [illegible] 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Julian T. PROCARIO

Attachment: H/W
AMOT Report EE-8119

Distribution:
2 - COS/ Madrid w/att
(2) - C/EUR Div. w/att.
3 - WH/COG w/att.
3 cc [illegible] w/att

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

201-735296

DEC 14 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-29123	12 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-315988 201-735296

ATTACHMENT to UFGA-29123

SECRET

FROM: SE/REA

AGENT: I-46

VIA: I-1

4/P

EE-8119

5 Dec. 1967

FP 201-315285

SUBJECT: Francisco CALZADILLA Nunez <replaced by Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez as Charge d'Affaires of Cuba in Spain>
(201-735296)

REF: AR-2294, 30 Nov. 1967

1. Francisco CALZADILLA Nunez has not been an attache at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid but rather the head of the Embassy as with his rank of Minister Plenipotenciary he has always acted ad Charge d' Affaires Ad Int. in Spain.

2. Since the end of 1959, after the incident which took place in the CMQ TV station in Havana between Fidel CASTRO and the then Ambassador of Spain to Cuba, Juan Pablo de LOJENDIO, and the subsequent recall of Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona who, at that time, was Cuban Ambassador to Spain, both countries have kept persons with a rank of less than ambassador as the heads of their respective embassies.

3. If Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez is replacing CALZADILLA Nunez, he will do so as Charge d'Affaires a.i. If we take into consideration the fact that RUIZ Perez, since August 1963, has been holding positions of confidence in the Cuban Government in the fields of economics and commerce, such as Commercial Counselor in Mexico and Vice-Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, first in administration and afterwards in economy, it can be presumed that he has complete knowledge of the commercial policies of the Cuban Government.

4. From the above, it is believed that the designation of RUIZ Perez to be in charge of the Cuban Embassy in Spain means that the Cuban Government is anxious to intensify even more its commercial exchange with Spain and for this reason is sending as its top re-

MICROFILMED
DEC 16 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

Att. i UFGA 29123

201-735296

EE-8119, 5 Dec. 1967

SUBJECT: Francisco CALZADILLA's replacement in Spain (cont.)

presentative in Spain a specialist in international commerce. As such, he can not only fertilize the ground for the above purpose but also take a principal part in the conversations which at this time are always held by commercial delegations of both countries, with a view to commercial trade between the two countries.

5. Following are the file traces we have on RUIZ Perez:

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez: EE-2131, Information about him, I-21, 30 Oct. 1964.

EE-2251, Information about him and file traces, I-31, 17 Nov. 1964.

Commercial Counselor at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico in Nov. 1963. Address: Francisco Marquez No. 160 (Colonia Condesa), Mexico, D.F. (Source: Cuban Diplomatic and Consular Missions Abroad, 25 Feb. 65.

EE-4342, List of Ministers and Vice-Ministers of the Cuban Govt., 26 Oct. 1965, page 1.

Vice-Minister of the MINCEX. One of the head persons present at a meeting held by the workers of the MINCEX on 8 Feb. 1966 to express their solidarity with the statements made by the Prime Minister in reply to the Red Chinese Government. (Source: El Mundo and Granma, 9 Feb. 1966.)

Member of the Cuban Delegation at the second session of the Bulgarian-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration, held on 17 Feb. 1966 in Havana. (Source: El Mundo, 18 Feb. 1966.)

EE-5349, Study on the structure of the Cuban Govt., I-31, 13 June 1966.

Vice-Minister of Political Economy of the MINCEX. Supporter of the regime. Born in 1928 approx. White. About 5'5" tall, weighing about 130 pounds. Blond hair and blue eyes. Married. Lived in Havana Mun. Dist. and Province. (Source: Debriefing of Danilo PIEDRA Humpierre, I-42, 27 Dec. 1966.)

Orestes RUIZ Perez: CC-666, Travel Havana-Mexico.

Travelled Havana-Mexico on 21 May 1964. PP. 63487. (Source: CCA passenger manifest.)

Guillermo Orestes RUIZ Perez: Cuban, 42 years of age. Came to take the place of Enrique VEGA Perez, former attache at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. PP-D-63/487 diplomatic. Arrived in Mexico on 29 Nov. 1963. (Source: Passenger manifests.)

SECRET

HE-8119, 5 Dec. 67

SUBJECT: CALZADILLA's replacement (cont.)

Guillermo RUIZ Perez: Financial Director of Economy of the Ministry of Finance. (Source: Hoy, 12 Dec. 1962.)

Vice-Minister of MINCEX. One of the leading persons present at an event to give prizes to 154 cane cutters of the different enterprises of MINCEX who worked during the Fifth People's Harvest. (Source: Hoy, 1 Aug. 1965.)

HE-4471, Information about Ramon DOMESTEVEZ Dominguez, E-15, 17 Nov. 65.

One of the leading persons who took part in an event held at the National Association of Lawyers of Havana on 23 March 1966. (Source: Granma, and El Mundo, 24 March 1966.)

Guillermo RUIZ: Head of the office of the economic group of Finance Ministry. Communist. G-2. (Source: Jose PAZ Novas, 17 Jan. 1961.)

Militiaman. Active Communist. Head of the Department of Study and Expenses of the Constitution of the Finance Ministry. (Source: AA-365, 10 Aug. 1962.)

Vice-Ministry of MINCEX. Attended the signing of a commercial treaty between Cuba and Bulgaria for the period 1965-1970. (Source: Bohemia, 4 Sept. 1964.)

Attended a dinner given by the MINCEX in honor of its vanguard workers in the city of Havana. (Source: Revolucion, 13 Mar. 1965.)

Vice-Minister in charge of administration of the MINCEX. Member of the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth World Festival. (Source: Radio Progreso, 15 Mar. 1965.)

Attended the graduation exercises of a school of the MINCEX. (Source: Revolucion, 21 Sept. 1965.)

Vice-Ministry of Economy of the MINCEX. Attended a meeting of workers of the ministry. (Source: Granma, 9 Feb. 1966.)

Vice Minister of Foreign Trade. Received officials from Bulgaria when they arrived in Havana by plane. (Source: Granma, 11 Feb. 1966)

Member of the Cuban delegation which took part in the second session of the Bulgarian-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration held in Havana. (Source: Granma, 18 Feb. 1966.)

Member of the Cuban delegation that began conversations today with the Bulgarian Minister in Havana, with a view to the signing of the Protocol of Collaboration between the two countries. (Source: Radio Progreso, 18 Feb. 1966.)

Was present when Lachezar AVRAMOV, minister and member of the secretariat of the CC of the PC of Bulgaria, visited President DORTICOS. (Source: Granma, 20 Feb. 1966.

SUBJECT: CALLADILLA's replacement (cont.)

Arrived today in Santiago de Cuba with the group which included the Minister and Secretary of the CC of the PC of Bulgaria. (Source: Granma, 20 Feb. 1965.)

Present at the affair held at the MINCEX on 27 May 1966 to began a course on combative preparation. (Source: El Mundo, 28 May 1966.)

Presided over the general assembly of the workers of the MINCEX held yesterday afternoon. (Source: Granma, 12 July 1966.)

Received the Minister of MINCEX, Dr. Marcelo FERNANDEZ Font, when the latter returned from the USSR, where he was a member of the Cuban delegation to the celebration of the 49th anniversary of the Russian Revolution. (Source: El Mundo, 18 Nov. 1966.)

Went to the Jose Marti Airport to receive the Bulgarian Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade. (Source: El Mundo, 7 Dec. 1966.)

Vice-Minister of Economy of the MINCEX and president of the Cuban delegation which took part in the signing of the commercial protocol for 1967 between Cuba and Poland. Went to the airport to receive Marian DMOCHOWSKI, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade of Poland. (Source: Granma, 8 Jan 1967.)

He signed the commercial treaty between Cuba and Poland for the Cuban Government. (Source: Radio Progreso, 14 Jan. 1967)

Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade. Signed a commercial treaty for 1967 between Cuba and Poland. (Source: Granma, 14 Jan. 1967.)

At the airport to receive the Cuban delegation headed by Marcelo FERNANDEZ which was returning from Moscow. (Source: Granma, 3 Feb. 67.)

Member of the G-2. Works at the MINCEX. (Source: I-91, 24 Apr. 1967.)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
DISPATCH

FROM: EES
WH/COG/CICS/E.Scoggin

EXTENSION: R-9008

NO. OSMW - 10827

DATE: 12 December 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/WH/COG/CICS	12/12		SOR	~~2~~ ~~Line~~ File 201-735296 NO
2.				
3. WH/COG/MO				
4.				
5. C/WHD	14 Dec 67			
6.				
7. EUR/CUBA	15 Dec		S	
8.				
9. C/E/IB			✓	
10.				
11. RID/D&P				
12. RID/AN			MAS	
13. [illegible]				
14. WH/~~Reg~~ C/CICS				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief of Station, Madrid	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division VIA:C/EUR		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: TYPIC MHGUILE/Operational
Ambassador Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For Your Information

1. The earliest information in the file of Guillermo RUIZ Perez, born 1931, is that he was in exile in Mexico during the BATISTA regime. In April 1962, he was described by a refugee who was a former co-worker as a militiaman and a militant communist who was Chief of the Department of Construction Expenses Studies, Office of Financial Statistics, Ministry of Treasury. RUIZ arrived in Mexico City in August 1963 as Commercial Counsellor. Shortly thereafter, AMTIKI/1, a reliable JMWAVE asset, stated he had received a letter from a friend inCuba who stated that RUIZ was a "G-2" member sent to Mexico to infiltrate counter-revolutionary groups. In January 1964, LITAMIL/9, a reliable Mexico Station asset, reported that RUIZ of the commercial office was emerging as a fanatical Fidelista.

2. In April 1964, the AMOTS contacted several members of the VECIANA family (relatives of Nilda VECIANA Lopez, wife of Guillermo RUIZ) who live in Miami to see if any one of them would be willing to contact RUIZ for purposes of recruitment.

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Madrid
1 - COS, JMWAVE

201-735296

C-O-N-T-I-N-U-E-D

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMW - 10827	19 DEC 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T — GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-735296

12 December 1967

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - C/WH/COG
1 - E/IB/S

ABSTRACT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/CICS	E.Scoggin:mot		R-9008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/COG/CICS	[illegible]	Gordon Rothwell
WH/COG/MO	13/12/67	
C/WH/COG	13 Dec 67	David A. Phillips
C/WHD		William V. Broe
EUR/CUBA		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/E/IB	12/14/67	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | SECRET | OSMW - 10827

The VECIANA family members stated they do not correspond with Nilda, were not willing to contact RUIZ, and did not believe he would cooperate. They stated that RUIZ's father was an old guard communist and his brother (first name not given) was a member of the Department of State Security (DSE, the Cuban internal intelligence agency) in Havana. In May 1964, AMMUG/1 stated that Guillermo RUIZ was one of the DGI officials stationed in Mexico and that he was "case officer for intelligence operations targetted against some nearby area."

3. RUIZ was appointed Vice Minister for Economics of the Ministry of Foreign Trade in August 1964, and it is assumed he held that position until appointed Cuban Ambassador to Spain.

NORREN D. METTENET

HOWARD G. DOBBS

201-735246

RID/AN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735296

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E

TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE [illegible] FI

S E C R E T [illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REF A MADRID 3256 (IN 04620)

B MADRID 3204 [illegible]

ANS | FI | PS | DEST | ABSTRACT ✓ | INDEX

2Dec67IN04629

SUBJECT REF A IS COUSIN OF CUBAN CHARGE-DESIGNATE GUILLERMO (RUIZ) PEREZ WHO EXPECTED ARRIVE MADRID WEEKEND 2-3 DECEMBER. STATION ANXIOUS MAKE DIRECT CONTACT WITH SUBJECT REF TO TAKE ADVANTAGE POTENTIAL ACCESS TO NEW CHARGE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-735296
2 Dec 1967

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

#1

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, RI WH/8 EE/P CI CI/OPS FI CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 210925Z CITE MADRID 3135 [illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 2945 (IN 83682)

1. FRANCISCO CALZADILLA AND FAMILY LEFT SPAIN FOR HABANA IBERIA 941 ON 18 NOV. SOTO ON SAME FLIGHT.

2. QUAXE-1 REPORTS CALZADILLA TO BE REPLACED BY RUIZ (FNU), FORMER VICE MINISTER FOREIGN COMMERCE. POSSIBLY IDEN ORESTES GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, VICE MINISTER OF ADMIN OF MINISTRY FOREIGN COMMERCE.

S E C R E T SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 26/21 PER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

#132

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

FILE, VR, C/FI/D4, C/RI/SD

ACTION CHANGE

MADRID 3303
(STATION & NUMBER)

IN 06970 A
(IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : F/D
(DIVISION)

TO : WH/COG
(DIVISION)

BY : T. ROBERTSON/F/D/X-6974
(NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : B. MURRY/WH/COG/X-5061
(NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

For Chris H.

ref. cable attached.
pls. Transfer to CICS

SECRET

14-00000

Chrono

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
15/FILD

ACTION
C/WH/C [illegible]

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, DDP, C/FI, C/EUR 2, C/~~[illegible]~~ 5, C/WH 2, C/CI/SD
C/FI/INT

6 Dec 65 IN 06970

S E C R E T 061054Z CITE MADRID 3303

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, JMWAVE, MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYLOTE PBRUMEN WATCHLIST

1. IN 4 DECEMBER TELEX GUILLERMO (RUIZ) PEREZ (WATCHLIST 552) ASKED EMBACUBA PARIS TO INFORM JOSE ANTONIO (GARCIA) LARA (WATCHLIST 227) IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) THAT RUIZ IN SPAIN AS CUBAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES. √/

2. INDEX RUIZ AND GARCIA.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-73[illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 47

ACTION WH/SOG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 4, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 050821Z CITE MADRID 3287

5DEC64 IN05962
05962

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 3204 (IN 01996)

1. GUILLERMO (RUIZ) PEREZ, PP D-67-890, NEW CUBAN CHARGE, ARRIVED MADRID 3 DECEMBER WITH WIFE, NILDA (VECIANA) LOPEZ, PP-D-891, AND THREE SONS, GUILLERMO, ALEJANDRO AND JULIO.

2. REQUEST 201 NUMBER AND CRYPT FOR RUIZ.

S E C R E T [illegible]

14-00000

E.C.PAYNE:mot
WH/COG/CICS
R-9008
6 DEC 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 3

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

6 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-735296

COPY

INFO: FILE , VR wh/cog, EUR/C, cs/ops.

wh/cog 8

c/ca 2 Fi-72

S E C R E T

7 13 42 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 57644

MADRID INFO: JMWAVE

TYPIC

REFS: A. MADRID 3204 (IN 01996)*

B. MADRID 3287 (IN 05962)**

C. MADRID 3257 (IN 04629)***

SUBJ REFS A AND B IS AMAUTO/1 (201-735296). TRACES FOLLOW BY DISPATCH. IF STATION AND QUWEB ASSESSMENT CARDOSO FAVORABLE, CONCUR PLAN MAKE DIRECT CONTACT WITH HIM FOR POTENTIAL ACCESS AMAUTO/1.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/Comment: *Ref A requested traces on Subj refs A and B.
**Ref B requested 201 number and crypt for Subj refs A and B.
***Ref C stated station considering contact CARDOSO, a recent Cuban refugee Madrid and cousin of AMAUTO/1, for future access to AMAUTO/1.

ANC CS FI
ABSTRACT X INDEX

AC/WH/COG/CICS
WH/COG/MO
C/WH/COG
EUR/CUBA

C/EUR/SA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-735296
6 Dec 1967

```
                                                   S-E-C-R-E-T

0009 RUIZ, GUILLERMO                                                       019-005-030
     SEX M                                                                 03C-06992
     CIT CUBA                                                              26JAN68
     PRESENTLY VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN COMMERCE RE                        FBI
     ACTIVITIES FOR CUBAN AUTHORITIES                                      P6
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DBC-06992                                     26 FEB 68  03628863

0010 RUIZ, GUILLERMO                                                       201-0729530
     SEX M                                                                 OSMA-30162A01
     CIT CUBA                                                              04JUN76
     VICE MINISTER FOR LIGHT INDUSTRY IN MINCEX. RES
     CUBA. INFO FROM DEBRIEFING NOTES OF SLCAPRICE/1.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO LA/C/OP, 305317 , 9229, 28/04/75
     OSMA-30162                                    27 SEP 76  09438195

0011 PEREZ RIOS, ORESTES                                                   201-0311333*
     SEX M DOB 19JUL16              POB CUBA, LAS VILLAS                   TYPE NAME T
     CIT CUBA                                                              RCD DATE 61
     REF WAVE-00373, 02 JAN 62
     RES ? CORR.CARD WAS RIOS, ORESTES
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                                   31 DEC 65  00678215
```

```
0012 PEREZ, GUILLERMO /CPT/                                               019-005-030
     SEX M DOB C35                      POB CUBA, ORIENTE, HOLGUIN        D8D-06485
     CIT CUBA                           OCC GOVT EMPL                     12FEB71
     < CUBA, ORIENTE, YATERA DSE CHIEF YATERA MOUNTAIN                    FBI
     ZONE                                                                 P5
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     D8D-06485                                   11 MAR 71  03608966

0013 PEREZ, GUILLERMO                                                     200-007-292
     SEX M                                                                HCS-02017
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     HCS-02017                                   18 NOV 72  02787539

0014 PEREZ, GUILLERMO                                                     018-004-109
     SEX M                              POB NICA                          HRS-04536
     CIT NICA                           OCC LABOR                         16APR70
     < NICARAGUA ATTENDED SECOND MEETING OF THE CUSCA IN                  P2
     COSTA RICA, SAN JOSE FORM 19-21 MAR 70, REPRESENTED
     CGT-I AT CONFERENCE
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     HRS-04536                                   30 APR 70  02698572
```

---CONTINUED---

```
0021 PEREZ, GUILLERMO
     PANAMA JULY 48                                                 056-004-001
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52                     SER-44
     056-004-001-44
                                          01 JAN 58  07199467

0022 PEREZ, GUILLERMO
     SEX M                                                          053-004-102
                                    OCC SHOEMAKER                   HNMA-04672A01
     < USSR ENROLLED AT CADRE SCHOOL IN USSR                        08JUN71
                                                                    P2
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                          APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     HNMA-04672
                                          24 FEB 72  02717361

0023 PEREZ, GUILLERMO
     SEX M                                                          019-006-095/04
     CIT CUBA                                                       UFAA-01222A01
     < CUBA ARMY CAPT ASSIGNED TO USE IN GUANTANAMO,                21AUG69
     ORIENTE                                                        P187
     FORMERLY: SER >19-5-3/4,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     UFAA-01222                           27 MAR 70  02154970
```

S-E-C-R-E-T

```
0024 PEREZ, GUILLERMO
     SEX M
                                                    009-004-134
                                                    HOP-00530A01
                                                    08AUG55
     FORMERLY: OO NO DATE, SER NO FSN,              SER-8
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52     SER 8
     HOP-00530
                                    13 JUL 60  05901917

0025 PEREZ, ORESTES
     TREASURER OF THE CUBAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF JUL   100-009-012
     26, CHICAGO, ILL.                                   OFB-04590
                                                         09JUN58
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52          P 5
     OFB-04590
                                    19 AUG 58  06152269

0026 PEREZ, ORESTES
     TREASURER OF THE CUBAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF JULY  100-009-012
     26, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.                              OBF-04590
                                                         09JUN58
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52          P 5
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     OBF-04590
                                    31 DEC 58  06174810
```

---CONTINUED---

```
0032 RUIZ                                                             201-0145265*
     SEX M DOB C17                      POB HOND                      TYPE NAME A
     CIT HOND                           OCC TAILOR                    RCD DATE 57
     REF HHT -02131, 19 MAY 69          OCC CODE CRAF
     RES HONDURAS @ OF AGUILERA, SAMUEL MBR COMMUNIST
     PARTY TRAVELLED TO USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                                 12 JUN 69  00210957


0033 RUIZ                                                             201-0746401*
     SEX M                                                            TYPE NAME A
     REF MANA-04717, 14 FEB 64                                        RCD DATE 64
     RES NICARAGUA @ OF RUIZ SILVA, JOSE CIT NICARAGUA.
     OCC NICARAGUAN SECURITY AGENT. IN CONTACT W/OFFICE OF
     FRANKLIN A. WHEELOCK GARCIA /201-240990/ DOI FEB 64
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                                 31 DEC 65  00210949


0034 RUIZ                                                             201-0064528*
     SEX M DOB 09OCT20                  POB HOND                      TYPE NAME A
     CIT HOND                                                         RCD DATE 54
     REF HHT -02114, 30 APR 69
     RES HONDURAS @ OF DIONISIO, RAMOS-BEJARANO
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                                 17 MAY 69  00210893

                            END OF REPLY - 0034 RECORDS LISTED
```

4-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY		
OSMA-30148	28 May 1976	201-0729530		

DOC. SUBJECT
SLCAPRICE/1 Debriefing Notes

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
SLCAPRICE/1	24 May 1976	

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

RUIZ, Orestes Guillermo Perez

As of 1969 was a DGI officer. Code name is "Adam." Seems to be anti-Soviet and not terribly communistic. Hates PSP. A capable intelligence officer, who is quiet about his ideological differences.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)
RUIZ, Orestes Guillermo Perez

201- 735296

FORM 11-72 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY [illegible]

(7-46)

Lester
① Guillermo RUIZ Perez
② wife: Nilda VECIANA López

10 FEB 1969



14-0000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

200-009-056
OSMA-28783A01
09 AUG 73
P24

CIT ?
OCC ?
DGI.
NAME APPEARED ON CUBAN WATCHLIST INCORPORATING
INTEL AND AUDIO TECHS.

UFA

R 7309140244

Indicate The Subject, Project Or
201 File No. In Which This
Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 735296

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC CHARGE D' AFFAIRES
RES SPAIN, MADR. TRACE REPLY

100-002-082
316 -0159172
09 JUN 72

R 7206161151

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 735296

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-46)

DOC. IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF SECOND COPY			
SX-20079	1 Nov 72	74	6	755/5	

DOC. SUBJECT

AERANK PERSONALITIES

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

SOURCE: AERANK, GRU SIGINT OFFICER

PHOTO/NAME IDENTIFICATIONS

NAME: SHENANAYEV, Albert Mikhaylovich (201-739593)

PHOTO NUMBER: SD24266

DATE SHOWN: 27 Oct 71

REMARKS: Photo/name not familiar

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)*

201- 739593

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

VUCINIC, GAVRILO
201-735655
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
MIN COUNSELOR YUGO EMB ROME.

201-346816
DIRA-55434A01
30 MAY 72

R 7206090699

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 735655			

FORM 8-63 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735256 065-008-007
SEX M DOB ? DEF -20075
16 JUN 71
CIT ? DEFENSE
OCC ? P2
DEPARTEC SPAIN ON 16 SEPT 70

R 7108040954

[illegible]

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 235296

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-68)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 7

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
IDENTIFIED BY SUBJECT OF 201-749651

201-749651
UFAA-02925A01
19 APR 71
P3

R 7105030375

amauto/1

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
A DGI OFFICER

201-276761
UFAA-02626A01
14 JAN 71

OSM

R 7101260931

File — AMPATO/1

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 9-57 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

065-008-007
OSMA-26609
22 OCT 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
FRIEND OF LUIS HERMOSILLA
< SPAIN

Amauto

UFA

R 7011090365

FILE IN 201-

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201-735296

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH | SECRET

TO
Chief of Station WH/Miami
Chief of Station, Madrid

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
AMAUTO/Alexander SAMKO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

Reference: UFAA-2231

Headquarters agrees that the primary objective of contact with AMAUTO-1 by a controlled person for assessment purposes, was well met. We wish to add, moreover, our appreciation for a smooth job with what could have been a difficult "controlled" asset.

MICHAEL V. SLATINSKI

MICROFILMED
AUG 24 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - COS, WH/Miami
3 - COS, Madrid

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 8-201-866054

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFAW-912

DATE: 19 AUG 1970

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-735296
~~x-ref 201-866054~~

(14 Aug 1970)

Distribution:
1 - EUR/IB
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - RID
1 - Originator

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	Richard Wheeler	pfd	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/COG	1 [illegible]	Wesley L. Laybourne

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD AC/EUR/IB	17 Aug 70	William V. Broe Louis F. Rosso

DISPATCH

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

FROM:

RID

WEAVER VIC EH-139
RID/AN GA 80
EXT. 4773 TUBE GT-7

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C - Brown	13 AUG 1970			
2.				
3. Wheeler				dr
4. Brown				
5. Lunsford				cf
6. Paulette				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID FI				

COMMENTS

[illegible]

MICROFILMED
AUG [illegible] 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

You butcher life!

Fyi

3-6: I believe we hold both 201's. If so, pls file & send sales tickets back to RI.

111519

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 10 Aug 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFAA 02231

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	S E C R E T
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO.	Chief of Station, Madrid; Chief, EUR
FROM	Chief of Station, WH/Miami
SUBJECT	C AMAUTO/Follow-up Interview with Alexander SAMKO

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. MADRID 1287, 8 June 1970
B. WH/MIAMI 7776, 4 June 1970

Action: FYI

1. Forwarded herewith is a contact report from PACHANKIS on his follow-up interview of Alexander SAMKO (201-866054), which concerns SAMKO's contact with AMAUTO/1 (201-735296) in Madrid. As can be seen from the report, Madrid Station's defensive briefing of SAMKO apparently took effect and he has been cautious in avoiding the many suspicious characters that have appeared since his trip to Madrid.

2. The question of his writing to AMAUTO/1 was mentioned by SAMKO. He was told that AMAUTO/1 was back in Cuba and we did not know when he would return to Madrid, if ever. WH/Miami believes we should wait until AMAUTO/1 returns to Madrid, or some other post in the Free World, and then have SAMKO write to him.

3. Despite SAMKO's newly self-discovered James Bond talents PACHANKIS enjoyed handling him. It also appears that our primary objective, contact with AMAUTO/1 for a face to face assessment, has been met.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

Attachment:
Contact Report (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att (in dupl.) h/w 2 cc sent C/IG/S, w/att
2 - Chief, EUR, w/att (one copy) h/w
2 - COS, Madrid, w/att (one copy) h/w

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
B - 201-866054	UFAA-2231	AUG 10 1970 5 August 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-735296

SECRET

2P

29 July 1970

AUG [illegible] 1970

Contact Report on Alexander SANKO, on 28 July 1970.

1. On the morning of 28 July, I called Sam to check in with him after being away on TDY for almost 6 weeks. He sounded a bit upset at not being contacted during this period, so I dashed out to his Hollywood home to explain what had happened and set him at ease.

2. It was plain to see that the trip had changed him. He is now a bit presumptuous, cocky, and know it all James Bond. He told me all sorts of wild stories about being tailed in Madrid "by 7 or 8 'Chivatos' (Castro agents," and leading them on long "8 or 9 mile hikes through Madrid." Castro agents were also "watching" him on the day he was in Barcelona and on the short layover his Pan Am plane had in Lisbon on his way home. At no time, however, was he molested by these "agents."

3. The Castro surveillance continued -so Sam says- in Hollywood. "About the second night after I got home," c. 14-15 June, a car parked across the street and a little to the rear of his house "after it got dark." When Sam got into his car and went to the gas station, the car -described as looking like a white Volkswagen, without headlights on- followed Sam's car on his short trip in the neighborhood and back to his home. He could not make out the physical description of the driver of the VW. He has never seen this car again.

4. The only other suspicious individual near his home, was "a tall, thin man," (described as about 5-11 to 6 ft and 170 lbs; black hair; no distinguishing features visible; once wearing slacks and white shirt, another time wearing a suit). This individual showed up across the street from his home "just as the sun had gone down, several evenings during the first week that I got home." (c. 14-18 June) The man just walked past the front back and forth a few times and appeared to have his car around the corner of Sam's house. He could not identify the car or anything else about the man.

5. Again, during the first week after his return Sam received several telephone calls where no one would answer when the phone was picked up, or the person calling would say, "sorry, wrong number." Sam has not experienced any other suspicious incidents after the first week home from Spain. I should note that Sam does not talk of these incidents with fear, but rather in the vein of a paperback detective story.

6. Sam would not admit that he enjoyed himself somewhat in Madrid as a tourist, although he did not deny that he stayed in a luxury hotel, ate as well as drank well, saw the sites and even went to a night club, all on the house. He went so far as to say that if he had "known it was going to be like this, I never would have gone." Yet, in the same breath, he told "William" that he would be back in Spain in September. Of course, Sam would go again if we asked him,

H/W att to UFHA-2231 SECRET CS COPY 201-735296 "but, only to help my country." (With "Patriots" like Sam, how can we lose.)

7. Sam is most anxious to start some correspondence to "William." He says "William" asked him to send him some photos of Cape Kennedy and some smoked shrimp. Sam wants to know if we want to supply him with photos of the Cape that he can send. Sam states he will write anything we wish. I promised to check out the status of the case with my office and Madrid to see what course of action they deem should be initiated.

8. Modesty not being one of his greatest virtues Sam rambled and rambled about the "secrets" he got out of "William" and passed on to the Madrid c/o. I went along with him and complimented him on a job well done; which is true. But, he was not satisfied with my plaudits, he wanted to know "What Washington said?" To which I said, "everyone, Washington, Madrid and Miami thought you did an excellent job and we are most grateful for your cooperation." He liked that very much; you could see it in the smile on his face. He tries to make it sound like it was a great ordeal and sacrifice on his part to go to Spain to see "William," but he cannot hide his anxiety to get on the next plane to Madrid, and the good life there.

9. I pointed out that "William" is now back in Cuba and there is no indication of when he will return. Nevertheless, Sam feels he should write him "because the letter will be sent to Cuba to him." I assured him that I would get a reading on this matter and have an answer for him sometime next week. At that time, I promised to take him and his close friend Masip to lunch. Sam gave me an extensive and expensive expense account of his trip. I will attempt to decipher it at the close of this report.

10. We ended the meeting on very cordial terms. He was not so mad at not being contacted so much as he is dying to get back on the gravy train, and so much time has passed by without word to or from "William." Sam asked for some way in which he can contact us "right away" if "William" notifies him "that he's ready to jump. You know when he jumps he won't have much time." I pointed out that at present "William" is in Cuba and the prospects of him defecting from Cuba right now are very slim indeed. We would, however, take this into consideration after "William" returns to Spain or another foreign post. We will be seeing each other next week to clear up the accounting (we owe him money, he says) and have lunch.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

201-735296

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CARL LUNSFORD/cb
WH/COG/OPS
7144, 1819
8 AUGUST 1970

FILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

C/WH5 INFO FILE, VR. C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SDC, DDP, ADDP, C/EUR5

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 10 20 10 Z AUG 70 CITE DIRECTOR

MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI 058060

RYBAT TYPIC AMMARTINI

REF: DIRECTOR 051625

1. HAS MADRID LEARNED ANYTHING FROM QUTIMID/QUDOZE RE REF (MONEY) CHECK WHICH PERTAINS TO AMMARTINI-1 CASE?

2. HQS CHECKED WITH WOBONE NEW YORK AND WERE ADVISED CHECK REGISTERED TO AMAUTO-1 WITH NO DIFFICULTIES AND POSTED 17 JULY 70. APPEARS STRANGE NOTHING HAS SURFACED CONSIDERING TIME LAPSE UNLESS AMAUTO-1'S MAIL BEING FORWARDED TO HAVANA.

3. FILE: 201-870553 AND 201-788424.

END OF MESSAGE

(WH/COG COMMENT: Informed Madrid that the check for Danilo MENDEZ in the amount of $171.00 was being sent to AMAUTO-1 via New York. Check was balance of $1521.00 which AMMARTINI-1 brought out when he defected.)

AC/WH/COG

JOHN L. HART
C/EUR

C/E/IB/S

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

AMAUTO-1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

WEAVER VAL
RID/AN
EXT. [illegible]

[illegible]-129
GA 50
[illegible] CT-7

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION I ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

COPY DETACHED file

I'm not sure #15 was a good idea, though the P.S. cancels it anyway. For the rest, a very good job!

The seed is planted. Will it flower?

MICROFILMED
AUG 5 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

File.

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C	[illegible]	5 AUG 1970		
2. Wheeler		6 Aug		
3. Lunsford				CL
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 21 Jul 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER OSMA 26417

55024

FORM 1-67 610e USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO
Chief, European Division; COS, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid PCH

SUBJECT
~~TYPIC AMAUTO~~
Details of Meetings between SAMKO and AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

<Details of meeting with Subject of 201-735296 in Madrid in [illegible]>

References: A. MADRID 1261

B. MADRID 1287

(201-866054)

1. Alexander SAMKO arrived in Madrid on 30 May and was met by the undersigned at 1700 hours in his hotel room. SAMKO does not know the true name of the undersigned. He quickly complained of his flight and said never before has he flown on a "cattle plane" and avowed never again to fly Aeronaves de Mexico. PACHANKIS correctly assessed him as a querulous person. The undersigned was mentally prepared for his comments regarding the flight, the bad food served on the plane, and, much later in the week, the hotel room, Madrid in general and, because of the language barrier, his one-plate diet of steak and potatoes. He said his return trip would be through London where he expected to fly the Boeing 747 to New York. SACODER interrupted him and said that we had other plans for him and his only reply was "oh!". Beneath his rough exterior and use of the vernacular, which is indeed spicy, SAMKO is a loveable person who has an infinite number of anecdotes. Although he had no children, he gives the impression of being a good, grandfatherly type who could easily put anyone in a nostalgic mood. After leaving the room we continued the conversation in the hotel bar. SACODER reviewed the cover stories and went through a series of do's and don'ts; i.e., do try to establish a channel between SAMKO and AMAUTO-1; don't hesitate to accept an invitation to visit AMAUTO-1's office, failing all other means to meet with him; do try to invite him out alone to a restaurant for dinner or to a bar for a drink; do accept an invitation to have dinner at his home; don't hint to your sponsorship for this trip. He had no objections to the cover stories, but embellished them to his liking with

MICROFILMED
AUG 5 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
  2 - C/WHD, w/att, USC 2 cc [illegible] C/SR/5, w/att
  2 - C/EUR, wo/att
  2 - COS, WH/Miami, w/att, USC

...continued

1 Att

Attachment: Photographs, USC

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 26417

DATE
21 July 1970

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-735296

appropriate references to his deceased spouse, the fact that "Julio" was always jealous of AMAUTO-1 and his doctor's orders to take a vacation to relieve his mind of the recent death of his wife. After several rehearsals SAMKO would have convinced anyone of the purpose of his visit to Europe. He did an outstanding job throughout the operation.

2. On the evening of 30 May SAMKO and SACODER dined at an out-door restaurant. We spent another three hours rehearsing his cover story, reviewing the objectives and trying to anticipate questions AMAUTO-1 might ask during their meeting together. SAMKO was given the following objectives:

a. The foremost objective was for SAMKO to renew and improve upon his relationship with AMAUTO-1, to the extent that they would be able to reminisce, over a prolonged period, about the relationship that existed before AMAUTO-1's departure from the United States.

b. To exchange addresses and telephone numbers for the purpose of sending occasional greetings to one another.

c. To invite AMAUTO-1 (and his wife, if necessary) to dinner, at his expense.

d. To ascertain AMAUTO-1's future plans.

e. To assess AMAUTO-1's feelings toward the United States and toward his own government.

f. For SAMKO to talk favorably about the United States using himself as an example, (the son of immigrant parents who made good in business); to emphasize the opportunities available to anyone with imagination, ambition and aggressiveness.

g. If the opportunity presented itself, to show sympathy for the apparent failure of the Cuban Government to reach the 10 million ton sugar goal and to ask whether the non-fulfillment of this goal would adversely affect the economic development of Cuba. It was our hope that sometime during the conversation AMAUTO-1 would volunteer to discuss his country's economic situation which might have opened the conversation to further exploitation by SAMKO.

h. Parallel with objective e. above, SAMKO was instructed to ask (provided an appropriate opening appeared in the conversation) AMAUTO-1 for his personal comments on the Vietnam issue and anti-war demonstrations in the United States and abroad. We were trying to draw out AMAUTO-1's personal analysis of the U.S. position vis-a-vis the war in Vietnam and to compare his statements with the Cuban Government position.

3. Although SAMKO was determined to see AMAUTO-1 even if he had to camp outside AMAUTO-1's home, we reminded him that because of AMAUTO-1's position, he might refuse to see SAMKO in his home, but that SAMKO should not hesitate to

accept any reasonable invitation to be with AMAUTO-1. When SAMKO approached AMAUTO-1's home we had a stroke of luck. First, one of AMAUTO-1's children was in the front yard playing, and two, the door to the driveway was open, thus SAMKO was able to enter the front yard. Under separate cover for C/WHD and COS, Miami we are forwarding photographs taken during the initial meeting between SAMKO and AMAUTO-1. The pictures were taken from the home of one of our staffers. We believe they highlight the events leading to the reunion of these two old friends. The following is a description of each photo:

PHOTO A: SAMKO arrives at AMAUTO-1's home at 1150 hours, 31 May 1970. (Although not shown, KENTLAND and SACODER were monitoring AMAUTO-1's home from 0900 hours on 31 May so that, in the event AMAUTO-1 decided to leave before SAMKO's arrival, we could instruct SAMKO by phone to delay his departure.)

B: After trying to enter via the front gate, SAMKO called to one of the children who was playing in the front yard. The child told him to go to the garage entrance. SAMKO walks toward that entrance.

C: The boy apparently called for someone in the house. A maid, not shown in this photo, but who can be seen in photo L, came out and approached SAMKO. In his halting Spanish, SAMKO said he wanted to see "el Senor". The maid said he wasn't in. He explained to the maid that it was "very importante" to see the Senor. By this time another maid appeared, shown in this photo, and she gets into the act. She repeats that el Senor is not in. SAMKO, sensing he wasn't getting anywhere, changed his tactics and asked to see "la senora". The maids went into individual monologues, but SAMKO could not understand what they were saying. Finally, SAMKO produced a note, which he was asked to prepare, and handed it to the maid in this photo. SAMKO repeated that it was "very importante to see el Senor."

D: The maid accepts the note and returns to the house. Three of AMAUTO-1's children observe the activities from the front entrance.

E: AMAUTO-1 exits, with note in hand and looks toward the driveway. SAMKO spots him and calls out, "Bill, don't you remember me, it's SAMKO." Bill replies, "SAMKO, muy bien, come here, come here." Actually, AMAUTO-1 goes toward SAMKO and they embrace. (The driveway slants toward the house and from our observation post we could not see the embrace.)

F: AMAUTO-1 accompanies SAMKO into the house, arm in arm. As they go SAMKO tells AMAUTO-1 that he put on weight and asked where his boy was. AMAUTO-1 replies that he's rich because all these kids are his (pointing to the three boys).

G: Same as F, above.

H: After a brief talk in the house, the AMAUTOs and SAMKO return to the driveway where they snapped some pictures. AMAUTO-1 is impressed with SAMKO's Polaroid and they exchange comments on their cameras.

I: AMAUTO-1 helps move the baby carriage through the gates. This is his newest and sixth child.

J: Same as I, above.

K: Maid takes baby out for a stroll. This is a new maid.

L: A picture of the new maid. (Might prove helpful for future identification in the event we resume our operation against AMAUTO-1's residence.)

M: AMAUTO-1 prepares to open both gates to remove his new Alfa-Romeo.

N: Same. Notice AMAUTO-1's high forehead. He has lost a considerable amount of hair since his arrival in December 1967.

O: AMAUTO-1's wife enters the picture; also, another one of his sons.

P: SAMKO's still taking pictures. He gave the pictures to AMAUTO-1 to avoid casting any suspicions. (SACODER ran out of film here, but AMAUTO-1 removes his Alfa from the garage. The car still carries Italian license plates. The AMAUTOs, SAMKO and the kids get in the car and leave for the amusement park located at the Casa del Campo.)

4. During the conversation in AMAUTO-1's home, SAMKO began his deliberate softening of AMAUTO-1 with such comments as "you know Bill, Julio was jealous of you because I treated you like a brother. I didn't want you to return to Cuba, but I couldn't stop you. We were all in favor of Castro." Bill admitted here that SAMKO was a good friend and enjoyed his job and the pay was good, but added that "I had to go. I was in the States illegally." SAMKO added "you know, Bill, I never was blessed with any children; you were like a son to me, but when I heard you died in the mountains in Cuba, I blamed myself for letting you go." Bill replied that he was wounded on his left side. SAMKO explained that if AMAUTO-1 was in the States illegally, SAMKO could have arranged for him to remain in the States by getting assistance from some police and detective friends in Florida. SAMKO repeated his delight to again see AMAUTO-1 and how happy he was to know he is alive.

5. Moments after entering the house, AMAUTO-1 invited him to have breakfast. SAMKO refused, but settled for a beer. AMAUTO-1 excused himself, went to the phone and called an unidentified party. SAMKO could not understand the conversation, but SAMKO and Station officers suspect that he called his embassy or one of his colleagues, possibly advising him of SAMKO's presence. (It is also possible that AMAUTO-1

called the embassy to advise the duty officer that he (AMAUTO-1) would be leaving for the Amusement Park. There were no QUTIMID reports supporting this theory.) The fact that the telephone call was made soon after SAMKO's arrival leads us to suspect that the call was made to establish a surveillance of SAMKO and AMAUTO-1 at the park. As noted in references SAMKO was specifically briefed on this possibility and was alerted to report any absence of AMAUTO-1 from the room.

6. We were confident that AMAUTO-1 would be the first to ask the cover questions, but instead his wife asked both questions: What are you doing here? and How did you get our address? SAMKO repeated the cover story and at the end of the second - how did you get our address - AMAUTO-1 said that it was quite possible. (AMAUTO-1's wife remained cool and suspicious throughout the initial confrontation, but later reacted warmly toward SAMKO.) As we noted above, SAMKO embellished the story to his satisfaction. He also shed a few tears when he repeated the story of his wife's death and the doctor's recommendation that he take a vacation. He continued his softening approach of AMAUTO-1 by adding: "Bill, when my wife took ill some years ago, she asked me to divest myself of all business interests, but if you were there with me, Bill, you could have handled my affairs and you might have been a millionaire today." SAMKO sensed that AMAUTO-1 and his wife were moved by this comment and were literally drooling with the thought of being millionaires. The wife asked a number of questions regarding SAMKO's wealth, his real estate activity, collection of silver and his success in general. The wife was astounded with the simple explanation of how SAMKO went about building and financing apartment houses. SAMKO made a suggestion that AMAUTO-1 invest in silver because the scarcity of this metal would eventually raise the market value. He explained to AMAUTO-1 that he was collecting all silver coins stamped prior to 1965. The next couple of hours were spent at the amusement park where, on arrival, AMAUTO-1 steered SAMKO to a cafeteria near the main entrance. In short order two men arrived on the scene, friends of AMAUTO-1. They were introduced to SAMKO, but SAMKO could not remember the names. After a few moments a couple arrived and they, too, were introduced to SAMKO. (SAMKO could not identify the persons he met from the photographs in our mug book.) AMAUTO-1's friends took a number of photographs of SAMKO and AMAUTO-1 and after a short while together, they left. The conversation at the park was aimless. They discussed the kids and SAMKO repeated how delighted and proud he was to know that one of AMAUTO-1's children was named Alexander - his namesake. AMAUTO-1 had a wide grin while SAMKO was talking about Alexander. He asked AMAUTO-1 about the oldest boy. AMAUTO-1 replied that the oldest was in Havana studying civil engineering. SAMKO suggested to AMAUTO-1 that he should give his children the best education and have them stay away from politics and political courses but concentrate on the professional fields, engineering, law, medicine, etc. AMAUTO-1 admitted that his intention was to keep his children away from a political career. SAMKO said he would send Alexander some commercial slides of Cape Kennedy and other points of interest in Florida.

7. While still at the park SAMKO said he hoped AMAUTO-1 would get an assignment to the United Nations so that AMAUTO-1 would have an opportunity to visit SAMKO in Florida. AMAUTO-1 was thrilled with this idea and SAMKO's offer. SAMKO said his eyes glowed while AMAUTO-1 pondered this possibility. SAMKO talked about his home and the beach nearby, the climate, his new car, etc. SAMKO's comment on AMAUTO-1's reaction was interesting. He said that beneath AMAUTO-1's communist exterior lies the capitalist. Before leaving the park (AMAUTO-1 had to leave for the airport where he had an appointment to see AMECRU-1), SAMKO said, "Bill, if you ever need me, I'll never let you down. You have a good friend who loves you a lot." SAMKO said he noted some emotional change on Bill's face after this comment.

8. SAMKO was met 48 hours after the contact with AMAUTO-1 in the event AMAUTO-1 decided to put a surveillance on SAMKO. No surveillance was noted when SAMKO was picked up, but on entering the car SAMKO suggested that SACODER keep an eye out for a tail. We drove around town for fifteen minutes. Certain that no one was tailing us, we drove to a Station safehouse which has an underground garage. SAMKO was visibly excited and was enjoying the "cloak and dagger" role, but he was nervous. He was highly impressed with the garage entrance to the safehouse and commended us for being so shrewd and security conscious. He wanted to know whose apartment it was and SACODER said that it was his private "pad". His comment was:"you sure live it up well." As PACHANKIS aptly explained in one of his reports, SAMKO's temper does rise. He was highly excited during the meeting because he was asked to leave the hotel room. Since the reservation was made for four days, he was asked to leave. He pleaded with SACODER to do something to keep him in the hotel room or risk losing the opportunity to lunch with AMAUTO-1 because AMAUTO-1 was to call him at the hotel on Saturday, 6 June. SACODER admitted the error but added that there was a simple solution if he could not convince the hotel management to allow him to stay a few more days. SACODER suggested that he should explain to the manager that 1) his laundry had not yet returned and 2) he was expecting an important phone call on Saturday and that there was no way of getting in touch with the caller. Failing this, SACODER offered another simple solution. Since SAMKO and AMAUTO-1 had not yet exchanged addresses, SAMKO could return to the AMAUTO-1 home and give the maid a note advising AMAUTO-1 that he had to change hotels. (SAMKO admitted that he told AMAUTO-1 about the possibility of having to leave the hotel because his reservation ended soon.) SAMKO did not at first accept this logic, but SACODER explained that he (SACODER) could not plead with the hotel management on SAMKO's behalf. This was poor security. SAMKO accepted this and after a glass of scotch and water admitted that the solution was indeed simple, but he was terribly excited at first.

9. Throughout the debriefing SAMKO revealed the following: He was born in Perth Amboy, New Jersey on 2 November 1907 to Polish parents. At the age of 14-15 he worked as a construction hand on a bridge being built in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania. Later, he worked on the construction of the Anhauser Yeast Factory in Oldbridge, New Jersey. He married in 1930. During the hard years, his wife worked in a factory while he roamed the streets looking for employment. In the early 40's he worked for Dupont reportedly on the atomic bomb project, but specifically with U-235. After the war he applied for work with NBC which he thought would be the National Broadcasting Company, but after he filled out his application and was accepted

for employment, he learned that it was the National Buscuit Company. He was a master mechanic. He's an ingenious person and has invented several items on which he has patents. Although the years before, during and after the war were difficult, he had the foresight to put his meager savings in real estate. He moved to Florida in the early 50's, reportedly purchased two apartment buildings, but sold them after a year for a $15,000 loss and made some investments in land near the Cape Kennedy area. He was about to begin a multi-million dollar building project on the land, but the NASA complex was moved to Houston and he therefore cancelled his plans and sold the property. While he is not considered wealthy SAMKO lives quite comfortably in retirement. He has a Lincoln continental in the garage and a home valued at about $50,000. Another of his complaints was the way we controlled his purse strings while in Madrid. We put him in a hotel used by many travel agencies which SACODER thought was comfortable, but SAMKO would have preferred the Hilton. He complained of the fact that he was dipping into his own money and was not happy with the idea of keeping receipts (aside from the hotel bills and the airline ticket, SAMKO probably did not keep any receipts). He was advanced $280 in Madrid which will be T/A'd to Miami. Miami should pick up his full tab and might consider buying him a case of scotch as a token of our appreciation for his accomplishments on the assignment, but PACHANKIS probably has learned that a couple of pats on SAMKO's back is sufficient to reward him.

10. Contact was again made with SAMKO on the eve of his possible luncheon engagement with AMAUTO-1. We again reviewed the objectives and he was given a defensive briefing as suggested by WH/Miami. He was told that PACHANKIS probably would not visit with him for about two weeks after his return and that he should not attempt to get in touch with PACHANKIS. He understood why this was necessary and agreed with the briefing. If a luncheon could be arranged, SAMKO was asked to concentrate on the following: (in addition to the requirements he was given before his first meet with AMAUTO-1)

A. Try to ascertain AMAUTO-1's future, his ambitions, his next possible assignment.

B. If possible engage him in a conversation regarding the United States to get his reaction toward our problems.

C. Build up your successes and reflect on how AMAUTO-1 might have achieved similar goals had he remained in the United States.

D. Be alert for any opening to inject questions relating to the Cuban economy vis-a-vis the failure of the "ten million", but to avoid criticism for this failure, and show sympathy.

11. SAMKO had no difficulty convincing the hotel management that he had to remain in the hotel until Saturday, 6 June. He spoke directly with the manager and told the manager that he was planning to leave on 7 June for Barcelona and would stay at a sister hotel and asked the manager to make reservations for him. The crisis had passed.

12. On the morning of 6 June AMAUTO-1's wife called SAMKO and, in English, said that her husband would pick him up at 1400 hours in front of the hotel. At the appointed hour, AMAUTO-1's official vehicle pulled up in front of the hotel driven by a chauffeur. AMAUTO-1 greeted SAMKO in front of the hotel and after exchanging a few words, they departed for a nearby restaurant. (SAMKO was too preoccupied to make note of the name of the restaurant. We decided against any surveillance during the AMAUTO-1/SAMKO meeting to avoid alerting AMAUTO-1 and/or his staff that the SAMKO visit to Madrid was pre-planned.)

13. At lunch SAMKO and AMAUTO-1 again reminisced. They discussed the following:

A. In one of his references, AMAUTO-1 said that men like him are needed in Cuba and noted that he would probably die fighting for Cuba which is young and aggressive, but that some day it will be a great country; that he has been fighting all his life to relieve the oppressed and repeated that he will die fighting. (It is interesting to note SAMKO's reaction here to AMAUTO-1's statement. When SAMKO first visited AMAUTO-1 on 31 May, he was certain that under the facade of being a devoted revolutionary AMAUTO-1 was indeed a capitalist at heart, but at this meeting SAMKO modified his comment by adding that it appears AMAUTO-1 is truly a communist, who maintains strong convictions of the righteousness of the revolution. The above comments by AMAUTO-1 produced the peg on which SAMKO could have questioned the veracity of AMAUTO-1's statement on freeing the oppressed, but he was not specifically instructed to maintain a polemic argument on the rights and wrongs of the revolution because we felt this objective was secondary to the re-establishment of a relationship between these two old friends. A future meeting might include the exchange of an objective appraisal of the revolution as seen by SAMKO.)

B. AMAUTO-1 proposed that SAMKO act as an intermediary for the sale of Cuban sea food in the United States. He explained that the Cubans have a large fishing fleet in the Canary Islands. The fish caught is processed in the Canary Islands and can be shipped to the United States as a product of Spain, not of Cuba. AMAUTO-1 added, "SAMKO, you're like a father to me, please think about it (the agency)? AMAUTO-1 explained that SAMKO could earn about $200,000 a year in commission based on sales of $2,000,000. SAMKO said he would think about it, but privately to SACODER he said that he had no intention to disturb his retirement with a fishy business.

C. SAMKO gave AMAUTO-1 a new Kennedy half-dollar which delighted AMAUTO-1.

D. SAMKO told AMAUTO-1 that he expected AMAUTO-1 to be bigger than just an ambassador to Spain. He said, "I want you to get to the United Nations." SAMKO repeated his desire to show AMAUTO-1 his Florida home and spend a few days at the beach with him. AMAUTO-1 again was visibly moved with this idea.

E. SAMKO restated that "Bill, you have a good friend, don't forget it. You are like a son."

F. They exchanged addresses. SAMKO had printed his address, but AMAUTO-1 asked him to write it on another piece of paper. AMAUTO-1 reasoned that he wanted it written to understand it better, but we believe he will use the sample to compare it with letters SAMKO might send in the future. They promised to write to each other. SAMKO was given AMAUTO-1's private address, not that of the embassy.

G. AMAUTO-1 regretted that SAMKO had to leave so soon because he would have enjoyed showing SAMKO the Spanish interior. SAMKO said he might consider returning near the end of 1970, but AMAUTO-1 did not say whether he would be in Spain in late 1970.

H. AMAUTO-1 said he was suspicious when he first saw SAMKO noting that the nature and importance of his position make him act suspicious, but the suspicion soon dissipated - so he said.

14. On saying their last goodbyes at the hotel, both men embraced and again promised to keep in touch through correspondence. At this point the operation was over. SAMKO was met late that evening. He was taken to a new safehouse.

15. Accomplishments: We feel the objectives programmed and rehearsed were successfully fulfilled, perhaps far greater than our own expectations. Unless we are misjudging the shrewdness of AMAUTO-1 through our own naivete, we believe the relationship was sincerely re-established and a channel opened for future use by AMAUTO-1 should he desire to use this channel other than to maintain a friendly correspondence. It was unfortunate that his Barcelona trip interfered possibly to the point of SAMKO having one or two additional meetings with AMAUTO-1 nonetheless, in the six plus hours together, SAMKO admirably fulfilled our requirements and courageously maintained the fiction of his visit to Spain. We believe too, that although AMAUTO-1 appears to be solidly in favor of the Cuban regime, he did not criticize the United States which we feel he might have done had he suspected that SAMKO's visit to Madrid was sponsored by the U.S. Government. AMAUTO-1 has come a long way since his internship as a butcher in the United States and

probably realizes that while he retains a prodigious role in the Cuban Government, he will continue to give his loyalty and devotion to the regime. At the same time, we feel, AMAUTO-1 is an opportunist and might take advantage of the SAMKO channel should the current regime come to an end or ~~his own position jeopardized by the vengeful attitude~~ of his colleagues.

15. We would appreciate PACHANKIS doing the following:

A. Purchase a dozen or so slides of Cape Kennedy and rocket launchings which will be sent to AMAUTO-1's son, Alexander. SAMKO should prepare a letter to AMAUTO-1 as soon as the purchase is made extending his appreciation to AMAUTO-1 for spending his valuable time with SAMKO and repeating his desire to help in any way possible and not to hesitate doing so.

16. We again would like to extend to SAMKO our appreciation for his support and full cooperation. Also, our thanks to Miami and PACHANKIS for their fine support.

Howard R. Sacoder

Howard R. SACODER

P.S. AMAUTO-1 was recalled on 30 June 1970 and his future is uncertain at this time; therefore, we suggest that SAMKO not mail any letters or send any slides to AMAUTO-1 in Madrid.

201-735296

29

201-7552

HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO: OSMA - 26417, 21 JULY 1970

TO: CHIEF, WHD

FROM: COS, MADRID

CS COPY

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

Came in Cuba separately

S/C att to OSMA-26417

SECRET



B



C



D



E.



14-00000



6

H



I



14-00000



M



N



D





P

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
RECALLED TO HAVANA ON 30 JUNE

201-821698
MADR-01639
16 JUL 70
OSM -10090

UFA

R 7007311560

FILE IN 201-235296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1519/7114
DATE: 15 JULY 1970

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION BY 28 PER ___

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ___

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, C/FI/SP, C/CI/OS, C/FI, C/CI2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 16 21 04 Z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 051625

TO MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMMARTINI

REF: MADRID 1509 (IN 114492)

1. ACCORDING OUR CALCULATION, TOTAL VALUE OF THREE CURRENCIES REPORTED MADRID 1529 (IN 101645) IS $1521. CHECK SENT FROM COLOGNE ($1350) LEAVES BALANCE OF $171.

2. CHECK IN AMOUNT $171 DRAWN ON MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY, NEW YORK, MADE PAYABLE TO DANILO MENDEZ FERNANDEZ, BEING SENT FROM NEW YORK ON 16TH. LETTER IS REGISTERED TO GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, CUBAN EMBASSY, MADRID. DE LA NUEZ AT HOTEL BILTMORE NEW YORK NAMED ON ENVELOPE AS SENDER. SINCE RUIZ NOT IN MADRID ASSUME SOMEONE ELSE AUTHORIZED ACCEPT CERTIFIED LETTER.

3. PLS ADVISE IF YOU LEARN LETTER RECEIVED.

4. FILE: 201-870553.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Comment: To enforce story that DE LA NUEZ out of Spain Station suggested remaining sum of $175.00 be sent to MENDEZ Fernandez from New York.

AC/WH/COG

JOHN H. SHERWOOD C/E/FI/CI

E/IB

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

File: AMAUTO-1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

35

WH 8 RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

576

SECRET 161551Z JUL 70 CITE MADRID 1645 16 JUL 70 124103

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 1639 (IN 124057)

1. REFERENCE REPORTED ARRIVAL 15 JULY NARCISO MARTIN MORA DIAZ (210-301123), REPLACING GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296), AND ROBERTO MULET DEL VALLE (201-821693), POSSIBLY REPLACING ORESTES BARREDA PEREZ (201-821007).

2. IN VIEW CLOSE ASSOCIATION BARREDA WITH RUIZ, MUST CONSIDER POSSIBILITY THAT HE WAS DGI STATION CHIEF MADRID INSTEAD OF ARISTIDES DIAZ ROVIROSA (201-791154). MULET ASSIGNMENT, THEREFORE, MERITS PARTICULAR STUDY AS POSSIBLE NEW DGI CHIEF.

3. REQUEST FULL TRACES MORA AND MULET, INCLUDING AMOT.

4. FILE 201-301123, 201-821693. CP-1

SECRET

CS COPY 201-301123

File:
201-735296
16 Jul 70

FORM [illegible] USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 27

10 SECRET (When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

DISSEM BY DDP PER

ACTION

C/WH 8   FILE, VR   C/RI/SD C/EUR5 C/CI C/EI2 C/SB5 DDP ADDP

713

SECRET 241212Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1440

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI   MADR   1P   24 JUN 70 I 10110

RYBAT TYPIC GUDOZE

1. GUDOZE REPORTS 18 JUNE FOLLOWING CUBAN AMBASSADORIAL ITEMS:

AN BN
PS

WH/COP

A. GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296) AND WIFE GOING HAVANA 20 OR 21 JULY FOR GENERAL MINREX MEETING CHIEFS OF MISSION LATTER HALF JULY.

B. PERSON CURRENTLY CHIEF OF SECRETARIAT FOR CARLOS CHAIN SOLER GOING TO WARSAW AS AMBASSADOR.

C. OTHER AMBASSADORS IN MADRID THAT DATE AWAITING 23 JUNE FLIGHT TO HAVANA INCLUDED RAUL VALDES VIVO (201-?) ALFIO ZORRILLA MAZORRA (201-812116), AND CARLOS ALFARAS VARELA (201-814891).

MICROFILMED
AUG 10 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

D. SOME DISCUSSION HELD BETWEEN RUIZ, WIFE AND ABOVE VISITORS CONCERNING WHO WILL BE NEXT AMBASSADOR TO MOROCCO. IN DOUBT WHETHER WILL BE CHAIN SOLDIER SON-IN-LAW OR POSSIBLY SON-IN-LAW AMMARTINI-1 (201-870443). (CANNOT CLARIFY SINCE PARTICIPANTS EQUALLY VAGUE.)

2. FILE 201S AS NOTED. GP-1

SECRET

B-201-812116
B-201-814891
B-201-870443

[illegible]

24 June 70

CS COPY

201-735296

SECRET

OSMA-26416, 16 July 70
QUMO 26

Report No.344 17 June 1970

Ruiz dictates to Nilda:"The Cuban Embassy greets the Minister of Foreign Affairs and has the pleasure to request the corresponding permission to carry a pistol, "Star" 9 m.m.short, No.50.234, which at the present time is being held in the offices of the "Star" factory, in the Plaza de España, for ________________
______________, whose photograph is attached."

File
AMMUTO-
201

Ruiz is talking with a Cuban who is in Madrid on a scholarship.

They are talking of bringing a teacher from Cuba and Ruiz says that this would be very difficult. He says that instruction is given by professors, but education is given by the parents, and what the children will be depends on this education. Ruiz says that his father made him a communist. Of all the children, he was the only one that studied, but it was his father that formed them all. From the time he was a small child his father gave him books of Lenin to read. These books arrived clandestinely to Cuba. He remarks about problems his own children have given him. He refers to an incident where one of the children was invited to a First Communion, and speaks of the freedom he gave the child to make his First Communion also, if he wanted to.

Then Ruiz says that his other son "ALEJANDRO, is inclined to remain in Spain, and he is willing to let him if this is what the boy wants. He says that these things have to come from one's own self, and if they are opposed in these actions it can leave marks on them for the rest of their lives. Ruiz says he gives them the liberty to choose.

Ruiz tells ~~this student with whom he is conversing~~ that Alejandro DE LA NUEZ has gone to the United States, and adds that De La Nuez' wife never came to meetings or reunions that were held at the embassy. She always gave as an excuse that her nerves were bad. Ruiz says that De La Nuez took the money with him.

This comrade(F) left at 12:15. He said goodbye to her very cordially. Apparently around the 29th of the month she is going to Paris.

Later Ruiz entered the office again and put the radio on very loud. He didn't leave the office all morning, but the radio continued to play very loud; so much so that you can hardly tell when anyone goes in or out of the office.

Report 345 18 June 1970

Apparently they have received a document in which all the Chiefs of Mission have been called to Cuba for the third week of July, as some of them can make it coincide with their leave. He tells Curbelo that he intends to send Nilda either before or after he leaves.

FILE:
AMMUTO-1
201

SECRET

Report 351(continued)
royalties from the song throughout the world, which have been calculated at between $750,000 and $1,000,000, and although this amount will have to be divided among many things, something would fall to them.

Ruiz says to work abroad they have to or should send people of the greatest trust, otherwise it is better that they remain in Cuba. If there isn't complete confidence it is a constant struggle with the capitalistic life, money, the stores, the easy life. They mention De la Nuez, and Ruiz says if he's gone he's gone, but the interesting thing would be to know what motivated him; his wife, his son, or money. He says that it has caused a great impression here, and that no one even imagined such a thing. Only two days before he had been in the study circle with all of them.

A girl that is in this meeting with Ruiz says that De la Nuez' daughter is married to Juan Antonio GARCIA, who is Head of Government..., that he has been proposed for ambassador(Ruiz says that they will now have to reconsider this), and what they all three agree on is that De la Nuez was not to blame,

Ruiz mentions the letter from De la Nuez' son in which he says that his father has betrayed them. They also mention an ambassador who has left(for Cuba-?) and took watches as gifts to everyone in the Ministry. Ruiz thinks that some of them will remain here in Spain as they have a great deal going for them there.

Report No.352 26 June 1970

Ruiz' is very displeased. He speaks to Horacio about how badly some of the comrades speak of him when they return to Havana. He asks him if he remembers the name of one of these comrades that spoke badly of him last summer when he was there on vacation. It was someone named COLON and another one that soon left. After what COLON said they wrote him a letter calling his attention to the criticism. Ruiz is very worried about his re-call to Havana. He tells Horacio that he doesn't think it is about his work, and Horacio says they are doing things there that are super-human, that without the necessary means at hand they are resolving difficult problem of various kinds. Ruiz mentions contacts that he has had in Spain with different people, and he never has committed an error, and has always handled everything with great tact and in favor of his government, even when he has had to deal with Falangists.

Ruiz says that he is very sensitive and that things have got to the point that he can't just let them go by, things they are accusing him of in Havana. But, there is no one that has the courage to tell him directly to his face so that he could justify himself, and if they are things that he cannot handle then for them to call him back, and relieve him of the post because "Comandante Guillermo Ruiz cannot resolve them, but the thing is

Report No.352(continued)
that the Minister doesn't want to receive him or listen to him when he goes there. Horacio says that the worst of it is that here in Spain there is always some personality from there that they have to entertain, someone important, and that the attention they need is continual, and sometimes it is necessary to attend to the people here in Spain, which prevents them from attending those who arrive from there, but they don't understand this.

He continues to talk with Horacio and he is indignant. Ruiz says that he has been in the Revolution since he was twenty years old, when he began to think for himself. He says that he belongs to no party, none other, that is, but the Cuban communist party. He says that the situation is becoming so uncomfortable regarding him, and he doesn't like it at all. He says he puts everything he has an all the care possible into doing his job.

Ruiz says that one never knows about these things in Havana, and that it is possible that he won't be returning. In the event that this should happen, he is going to leave Horacio officially in charge, so that he will represent him during his abscence.as Charge'de Affairs, and if he returns he will notify the Spanish government officially. He wants samples or models of the passports to take with him, and then he tells Horacio that if he has not returned by the 18th of July, that he should represent him at the official reception. He gives Horacio instructions as to what to wear, what the official ceremonies are and just what they consist of.

Report No.354 30 June 1970
Ruiz speaks to someone that calls and gives him a message which annoys Ruiz. Someone has called the Provincial Department of Public Health of Santander saying that they (the Cubans) use "boric acid" in the stoves(?) which they export. They give him this message in the name of the Commercial Office of Cuba, they have a Latin-American accent, and say that they would take adequate measures so that no stove would be shipped.

Ruiz says to Horacio that he doesn't have time to take care of this matter, and for him to accompany Franco and go to the General Department of Security and make charges about the telephone call which is interfering with the trade between Cuba and Spain. He says to go right up as far as the General Director if necessary, not explaining the "boric acid" one way or another, but simply as to the malicious call which was made in the name of the Commercial Office of Cuba. This can cause a delay of six or eight days in the departure of a ship while this call is being explained in Public Health.

4-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID
WEAVER
RIP/AN
EXT.

FH-109
GL 50
TUBE GT-7

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

6-7: This is now quite academic, but with the approach by SANKO under his belt, & this lift from Havana in his face, we may get an some action from this broken love affair. Less than this has driven men into us. He surely needs an approach by a staffer.

MICROFILMED
AUG 31 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

PLS X-REF [redacted] TO 201-016156
AND 201-821007

3

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C Sub				5
2. Lunsford				CL
3.				
4. Mann		27 July		lm
5.				
6. White		18 Aug.		dd
7. Brown				
8.				
9. RID/AN/CARC		19 AUG 1970		CW
10.				
11. RID/EDI				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-735276

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
15 Jul 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER
OSMA 26409

FORM 7-61 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

55016

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO.
Chief of Station, WH/Miami
Chief, Europe Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC/QUDOZE
Guillermo RUIZ Perez' Recall to Havana

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AUG 31 1970

References: A. MADRID 1466
B. MADRID 1457

(201-521069)

1. Relative to Subject's recall to Havana, which came via a telephone call on 24 June (probably from MINREX) bidding him and Orestes BARREDA Perez to return, QUDOZE has recorded Subject's reaction to the unexplained call as follows:

recalled to Havana

(201-061636)

A. on 26 June Subject ~~talked at length with~~ Horacio FUENTES Martinez speculating on Havana's possible motives for requesting his return at this time, when in a matter of a few weeks he was scheduled to travel to Cuba for the 26 of July celebrations which he expected to combine with his vacation leave. He was extremely upset and complained bitterly about companeros who have tried to discredit him in Havana. He wondered if Havana was going to put him on the carpet for charges brought against him by these companeros. He recalled one COLON (he was not sure of the name) who last summer made false accusations against him, for which he received a letter of reprimand from Havana.

Subject (201-735296) re letter's recall to Havana

B. Subject also wondered if Havana could have any complaints about his work. He had always maintained good relations with the Spaniards and despite their contrary political idiology, he was careful not to ruffle their feathers while upholding his government's position at all times. He could not

(continued)

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - COS/WH,Miami - [illegible]
2 - C/EUR

DS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
65-6-44/3	OSMA 26409	15 July 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296

imagine that Havana would question him on that score. However, if there were problems that Havana felt he lacked the ability to resolve, he should simply be removed "because Comandante Guillermo Ruiz cannot resolve them." Subject said he had been a revolutionary since the age of 20 when he began to think for himself. He had never belonged to any political party other than the Cuban Communist. The current state of affairs, however, was becoming too disturbing and distasteful to him because conscientiously he knew that he was putting forth his full mental and physical capacity toward the fulfillment of his function.

C. Subject told Fuentes that since he didn't know what was brewing in Havana it was possible that he might not return to Madrid. In any event he would designate Fuentes to substitute for him as charge d'affaires. During the entire conversation no mention was made of Orestes BARREDA Perez and why he was asked to return with RUIZ. The latter seemed to be thoroughly absorbed in his own concern over whatever fate lay in store for him on his return to Cuba.

for Philip C. Kendrot
Helen B. NOTHDURFT

201-735-276

14-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY: 4 PER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ACTION UNIT: WH8 | INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 321

S E C R E T 141535Z JUL 70 CITE MADRID MADR 1621

14 JUL 70 1 22500

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

1. QUSECRET-1 (QUDOZE MONITOR) REPORTS 14 JULY THAT COMPLETE CLEANING UNDERWAY IN CUBAN EMBASSY, ALL STAFF PATICIPATING, IN PREPARATION FOR ARRIVAL 15 JULY OF VIP FROM HAVANA. FURTHERMORE, THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF PERSONAL EFFECTS BELONGING TO FAMILY GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296) WERE PACKED, INCLUDING ALL OF RUIZ'S PERSONAL BOOKS FROM OFFICE. DEFINITE IMPRESSION IS THAT RUIZ WILL NOT RETURN.

2. STATION MONITORING QUDOZE/QUTIMID AND AIRPORT TO DETERMINE FURTHER DETAILS CONCERNING NEW ARRIVAL AND OTHER CHANGES.

3. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN ✓
~~ABSTRACT~~
LH
PS
BX
~~DES~~ NFD
~~FI~~
WH/C/RR

CS COPY
SECRET

14 Jul 70
201-735296

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

201-339505
MADR-01604
13 JUL 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
GOING HAVANA FROM MADRID 14 JULY

R 7008030136

UFA

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: 4 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION NO. 216

FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, DDP, ADDP, FI 2

S E C R E T 131619Z JUL 70 CITE MADRID 1604

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC QUTIMID

13 JUL 70 IN 121769

1. ALBA GRINAN NUNEZ (201-339505), CUBAN AMBASSADOR LONDON, GOING HAVANA FROM MADRID 14 JULY.

2. ALSO ON SAME FLIGHT WIVES AND CHILDREN GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296) AND ORESTES BARREDA PEREZ (201-821007).

3. FILE 201'S MARKED. GP-1

SECRET

pm ou 70-1

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO 201-735296 SEX M DOB ?	C19-009-001 WMIM-08160 07 JUL 70
CIT CUBA OCC ? SLATED TO BE RECALLED TO CUBA	UFA -00562 P2
OSMOFPOIROELHMM	R 7106070271

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 735296			

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
SLATED TO BE RECALLED TO CUBA

019-009-001
WMIM-08160
07 JUL 70
UFA -00562
P2

R 7106091029

OSMOFPOIROELHMM

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201-735296

FORM 0-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO	C19-009-001
201-735296	WHIM-08160
SEX M DOB ?	07 JUL 70
	UFA -00562
CIT CUBA	P2
OCC ?	
SLATED TO BE RECALLED TO CUBA	
	R 7007300682
OSMGFPOIRCELHMM	

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

DIAZ VIGO, ALBERTO	201-815359
201-792504	PARI-09562
SEX M DOB ?	02 JUL 70

CIT ?
OCC ?

R 7007160602

FILE IN 201-792504

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 14 WH/MIAMI 8126 S E C R E T IN 115943, 2 July 70

SLARCS – AMANVIL

MINISTRY. HE WAS LATER NAMED FIRST SECRETARY IN NORTH KOREA AFTER BASILIO RODRIGUEZ, FORMER LABOR MINISTER, WAS SENT THERE AS AMBASSADOR. RUMOR IN MINREX IS THAT MULET WAS RECRUITED BY DGI IN NORTH KOREA. ON HIS RETURN, HE DISAPPEARED, FAILING TO COME TO WORK FOR EITHER THE LABOR MINISTRY OR MINREX. HE SUDDENLY REAPPEARED ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO TO STUDY JAPANESE IN PREPARATION HIS CURRENT ASSIGNMENT. RUMOR IN MINREX CIRCLES IS THAT HE RECEIVED DGI TRAINING DURING PERIOD HE OUT OF CIRCULATION.

L. EXPANSION OF INFLUENCE IN IBERIAN PENINSULA. SUBJ SAID HE KNEW OF NO DGI PLANS IN THIS REGARD. HE SAID THAT HE KNOWS GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ WELL AND CONSIDERS HIM DGI. (WILL DEBRIEF SUBJ ON RUIZ IN NEW YORK.) SUBJ DOES NOT KNOW RAFAEL FERNANDEZ SARDINAS. SUBJ EXPECTS CUBAN RELATIONS WITH SPAIN TO DETERIORATE BECAUSE CUBA VOTED AGAINST IMPORTANT SPANISH RESOLUTION AT RECENT ILO CONFERENCE IN GENEVA. (BETHOURN UNFORTUNATELY DID NOT GET DETAILS RESOLUTION.) CUBAN DELEGATION HAD GOTTEN INSTRUCTIONS FROM RISQUET

// Extract for AMAUTO-1 201

SECRET

File: AMAUTO-1

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD
UNIT: WH COG/OPS
EXT: 7144 R. 1819
DATE: 30 JUNE 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 21 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH-8 INFO FILE, VR, C/EUR-5, C/KE/SD, C/CI, C/FI-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 01 22 30z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 047881

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI PARIS

RYBAT TYPIC QUDOZE

REF: OSMA-26240 (NOT SENT PARIS)

WH/C/OB

1. IN REF QUDOZE REPORT NO 314 OF 5 MAY AMAUTO-1 HAS VERY INTERESTING CONVERSATION WITH UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN WHO APPARENTLY JUST ARRIVED MADRID FROM CUBA AND PLANNING STUDY IN ALCALA, UNIVERSITY OF SANTANDER, AND LATER IN PARIS.

2. ACCORDING CONVERSATION BETWEEN SUBJECTS, UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN IS PCC MEMBER, PLANS MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH CUBAN EMBASSY MADRID AND WILL POSSIBLY SERVE AS INFORMER/SPOTTER AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. AMAUTO-1 ASKED SUBJECT LEAVE MAILING ADDRESS AND PROMISED FUTURE CONTACT BY "PARTY WOMEN'S FEDERATION." UNFORTUNATELY SUBJECT'S ADDRESS NOT MENTIONED. ADDITIONAL CHECK OF HQS QUDOZE/QUTIMID INFO FAILED MENTION ANY SUBJECT POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH THIS WOMAN.

3. VIEW POSSIBILITY DGI PLANNING USE SUBJECT AS COLLABORATOR WHILE SHE IS ABROAD, HQS WOULD APPRECIATE MADRID ASSISTANCE IN ATTEMPT ESTABLISH HER IDENTITY, RESIDENCE, ACTIVITIES, AND ANY ADDITIONAL INFO FOR ASSESSMENT AS POSSIBLE IN-PLACE RECRUITMENT

[illegible] COPY

1 July 70

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-735296

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______ PER______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 047881

TO PAGE TWO

TARGET. NO OBJECTION STATION QUERYING LIAISON.

4. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: QUDOZE info on conversation between AMAUTO-1 and unidentified woman who appears fully integrated with Cuban regime and offers collaborate with DGI while studying abroad.

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/EUR/FI/CI

for AC/WH/COG
EUR/IB

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

FORM 3020 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG 1-70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: 15 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT: WH8 | FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 919

S E C R E T 261620Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1478 (MADR)   26 JUN 111882

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO QUDOZE   cit Cuba

1. IVAN RUIZ VECIANA, SON OF GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296), LEFT FOR HAVANA 24 JUNE WHERE WILL ATTEND SCHOOL.

2. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

201-735296
26 Jun 70

EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

(111) 36

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

3

8

WH 8 [illegible], RI/AN, EUR 6, FI 2, CI, CI/OPS

586

26 JUN 70 IN 111523

S E C R E T 261023Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1466 (MADR)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI (UFA)

TYPIC AMAUTO QUDOZE travel

REF: MADRID 1457 (IN 110636)

1P

cit Cuba 91

T

ZZ

1. ON 25 JUNE CONFIRMED THAT GUILLERMO R U I Z PEREZ AND ORESTES B A R R E D A PEREZ FR-(201-821007) TRAVELING HAVANA 30 JUNE.

2. RUIZ STILL IN DOUBT AS TO PURPOSE OF CONSULTATION BUT EXPRESSED WORRIES TO WIFE THAT SOMEONE IN HAVANA MAY BE UNDERCUTTING HIM.

3. CARLOS A. N E I R A GARCIA FR-(201-811811) WHO ARRIVED Madrid 24 JUNE APPARENTLY WAS UNABLE CLARIFY.

4. FILE 201-735296 GP-1

S E C R E T

AN	W
AB	~~X~~
FI	~~X~~
	2
	3
	FD
FI	

ZZ [illegible]SED

7 JUL 1970

MICROFILMED
JUL 15 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296

26 Jun 70

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2 26

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR R/AN, EUR 6, FI 2, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 768

S E C R E T 250923Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1457 MADR

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

25 JUN 70 I 10636

TYPIC AMAUTO QUDOZE

1. GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296) AND ORESTES BARREDA PEREZ (201-821006) GOING TO HAVANA SOON IN RESPONSE TO 24JUNE PHONE CALL FROM MINREX. RUIZ IN DOUBT WHETHER PURPOSE RELATED TO ADVANCED DATE OF JULY CHIEF OF MISSION MEETING OR SPANISH-CUBAN RELATIONS. SPECULATION MADE THAT IT COULD RELATE TO RECENT REQUEST FOR AMBASSADOR TO FINLAND TO TRAVEL HAVANA. RUIZ PLANS TO DISCUSS WITH CARLOS NEIRA GARCIA (201-811811) UQSN ARRIVAL MADRID EN ROUTE PARIS ON 24 JUNE.

2. FILE 201 AS INDICATED. GP-1

S E C R E T

1P

AN

~~AR~~ X

W

4

MICROFILMED
JUL 7 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

B201-821007

B201-811811

SECRET

25 Jun 70

201-735296

14-00000

FORM 1320 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2 5 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

10 SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

ADVANCE COPY

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: DRP PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

ACTION NO. 713

INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD C/EUR5 C/CA C/EI2 C/SB5 ~~DDP ADDP~~

Lunsford

file

fib AMAUTO-1

cc AMMARTINI

S E C R E T 241212Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1440

24 JUN 110110

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC GUDOZE

1. GUDOZE REPORTS 15 JUNE FOLLOWING CUBAN AMBASSADORIAL ITEMS:

A. GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296) AND WIFE GOING HAVANA 20 OR 21 JULY FOR GENERAL MINREX MEETING CHIEFS OF MISSION LATTER HALF JULY.

B. PERSON CURRENTLY CHIEF OF SECRETARIAT FOR CARLOS CHAIN SOLER GOING TO WARSAW AS AMBASSADOR.

C. OTHER AMBASSADORS IN MADRID THAT DATE AWAITING 23 JUNE FLIGHT TO HAVANA INCLUDED RAUL VALDES VIVO (201-?) ALIPIO ZORRILLA MAZORRA (201-812118), AND CARLOS ALFARAS VARELA (201-814891).

D. SOME DISCUSSION HELD BETWEEN RUIZ, WIFE AND ABOVE VISITORS CONCERNING WHO WILL BE NEXT AMBASSADOR TO MOROCCO. IN DOUBT WHETHER WILL BE CHAIN SOLDIER SON-IN-LAW OR POSSIBLY SON-IN-LAW AMMARTINI-1 (201-870443). (CANNOT CLARIFY SINCE PARTICIPANTS EQUALLY VAGUE.)

2. FILE 201S AS NOTED. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM

M-6803
22 June 1970

SUBJECT: Jules Chopin

At 2200 hrs on the evening of Saturday, 20 June, Jules Chopin entered the Embassy offices as instructed. His face showed the strain of the situation, yet he managed to force a grin. He was taken to a convenient office and for the next 3½ hours was debriefed. While sipping Scotch throughout the evening he managed to control some of his natural fears of the present and future.

In all fairness, he must be commended for answering our questions in a straightforward, sincere manner. While not every question--from the various interested parties--was put to him, the majority were. In some cases, he was given requirements for the next meeting, and in addition, he offered several worthwhile reports.

Apart from the business aspects of the meeting, there were two dominating themes running throughout: His passionate pleas for the personal safety of his family in the US and my stand that after his conduct on 12-13 February 1970, he had to prove his worth and good faith; not to me, but to the powers that be, who were highly distrustful of his intentions.

Specifically, the following matters were discussed:

1. Asked if he knew what the DGI was, Chopin was confused, but understood when I said "DSE" or "G-2". In his circle, the intel people are known as "Seguridad del Estado" or "G-2". He denies that he has ever worked for them wittingly. He doubts that he has ever worked for them unwittingly, because he has never had more than a passing working relation with them. Chopin states that he has never known officially who the intel personnel are, "but after awhile, you can hear and see things that leave no doubt." Asked to identify those persons who he feels are intel and their hierarchy, Chopin stated:

A. In early 1969, Armando LOPEZ, appeared to be Chief of Intel and DIAZ Vigo, the number two man.

B. When Orlando CASTRO defected in c. March 1969, LOPEZ was immediately recalled to Havana and has not been heard from since. DIAZ Vigo assumed head of intel, and Havana sent Emidio VALDES Martinez as a replacement. With VALDES, came his wife Magda (Mercedelos ESPINOSA Vivar) who went to work as DIAZ Vigo's secretary. Chopin considers her to be an intel agent as well.

C. In c. late February or early March 1970, Diaz Vigo was recalled to Havana. He has not been heard from again and there is

Attachment-1

DIAZ

W/ Att*1 To OFPA 92830

S E C R E T

201-815359

talk that he will not return.

D. Magir has taken over the control of the Consular Section and appears to be directing the functions that DIAZ Vigo had. No one has been appointed to take DIAZ Vigo's post.

E. The only other prominent suspect of being a full fledged intel type is Hildo ALVAREZ Valdes, who came to Paris about 2 years ago with the cover position of chauffeur. ALVAREZ' true role was made evident shortly after he arrived in Paris when an unwitting functionary of the Cuban Embassy gave ALVAREZ a routine chauffeur's assignment. Whereupon ALVAREZ turned to the individual and said, "I didn't come here to be a chauffeur." ALVAREZ has never functioned prominently as a chauffeur, "and they had to change his status after a while, because he couldn't fool anyone in that role."

F. Chopin denies that he knows anything of their manner of operations; who their contacts or agents are; and, in a word, the inner workings of the intel apparatus.

G. Chopin acknowledges that many Latin Americans visit the Embassy, "but they go upstairs to the Consulate," and he does not know their identities, nor the exact purpose of their visits. His lone contact with Latin American types are when they enter his section asking for propaganda material. In those cases, Chopin directs them to help themselves from the racks of Cuban publications available.

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid PCL

SUBJECT
RYBAT TYPIC
Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) and Danilo MENDEZ Fernandez (201-788424)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. At Christmas 1969, after turning down other invitations, AMMARTINI-1 and his wife accepted an invitation to dinner at the home of Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) and his wife Nilda. Another couple was present, Danilo MENDEZ Fernandez (201-788424) and his wife Lydia. Ruiz impressed the AMMARTINI couple as intelligent and muy fino. He talked very favorably of the U.S., especially New York City for which he had great admiration. "Americans are very bad", he said, "but they have very good things." "Jose, let's go to New York", he said at one point, causing MENDEZ, a good revolutionary, some discomfort. He never had trouble in the five years he spent in the States, Ruiz said at another point in the conversation.

2. Mendez is a "great apple polisher", according to the AMMARTINI couple, and he was hard put to know what to say when the "Ambassador", his boss (indirectly) spoke so favorably of the U.S. AMMARTINI-1's wife, on the other hand, said that Lydia Mendez was having a somewhat similar problem with Nilda Ruiz. The latter was expecting again at the time and after five boys, Lydia suggested that she (Nilda) probably wished for a girl. "Not at all", said Nilda. "I don't want a daughter of mine to go into agricultural work at fourteen years of age", she exclaimed setting Lydia back. AMMARTINI-1 pointed out that the Ruiz couple has a 14 year-old son in Cuba -- a "hostage" while they are abroad. They might be willing to defect, according to AMMARTINI-1, if it weren't for leaving the boy in Cuba.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami

....continued

CS Copy filed in 201-870553

File in 201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-788424

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 26343

DATE
19 June 1970

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-870443
201-735296

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	RYBAT/SECRET S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA - 26343

3. Incidentally, AMMARTINI-1 said that he was surprised to learn that Ruiz had been Vice-minister of Foreign Trade before coming to Spain. Ruiz himself mentioned it casually one day.

Reginald N. FLOREGA

RYBAT/SECRET

201-735296

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 10 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY 39

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER ____

Action changed to Nicaraguan Desk per Ennis

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CI/OPS, CI, FI 2

ACTION NO. 134

S E C R E T 181136Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1389

HNM HRS UFH (MADR) HM

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA, SAN JOSE, WH/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY

18 Jun 70 106027

TYPIC QUTIMID

1. ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ MAIRENA, NICARAGUAN, CALLED CUBAN EMBASSY ON 25 OR 26 APRIL REQUESTING PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH AMAUTO-1 FOR WHOM HE BROUGHT TWO LETTERS. SAID HAD BEEN DEPORTED FROM COSTA RICA WHERE JAILED FOR "POLITICAL REASONS". WAS REFUSED ASYLUM BY MEXICO AND LEFT SAN JOSE FOR MADRID ON 24 OR 25 APRIL. IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER OF "FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL SANDINISTA" WHO SPENT 14 MONTHS IN CUBA, DEPARTING CUBA ON 9 JANUARY 1969. ATTACHE (AND DGI OFFICER) JOSE DIAZ PUGA WHO ANSWERED PHONE TOLD RODRIGUEZ TO CALL EMBASSY FOLLOWING MORNING FOR INTERVIEW WITH AMAUTO-1.

mo201

cit Nica

requested interview with subject

of 201-735296

trace request

2. NO STATION TRACES. LIAISON BEING QUERIED. PLEASE SEND TRACES.

3. FILE DEFER. GP-1

S E C R E T

WH

X

X ✓

2

WH/C/[illegible]

MICROFILMED
JUL 6 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-735296

~~[illegible]~~

18 Jun 70

CS COPY

SECRET

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/C/OPS/Wammon	2 Aug	
2	Brown (p.16)	"	
3	WH/C/RR		
4	WH/C/PP		
5	WH/C/SW		
6	FOLEY, p.48		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1. COPIES MADE FOR AMAWLO-1 AND AMMARTINI-1 FILE.

2. WE DIDN'T KNOW AMMU10-1 WAS WORRIED ABOUT HIS RECALL. HE APPEARED QUITE UPSET, ~~THIS~~ COULD HAVE BEEN THE RIGHT TIME FOR A DIRECT RECRUITMENT PITCH.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WH/C/OPS/ LUNSFORD	

	UNCLASSIFIED	✓	CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions GPO : 1968 O - 297-542 (40)

2554.

Report No.344 17 June 1970

Ruiz dictates to Nilda:"The Cuban Embassy greets the Minister of Foreign Affairs and has the pleasure to request the corresponding permission to carry a pistol, "Star" 9 m.m.short, No.50.234, which at the present time is being held in the offices of the "Star" factory, in the Plaza de España, for ______________, whose photograph is attached." ______________

Ruiz is talking with a Cuban who is in Madrid on a scholarship.

[illegible] 10
201

They are talking of bringing a teacher from Cuba and Ruiz says that this would be very difficult. He says that instruction is given by professors, but education is given by the parents, and what the children will be depends on this education. Ruiz says that his father made him a communist. Of all the children, he was the only one that studied, but it was his father that formed them all. From the time he was a small child his father gave him books of Lenin to read. These books arrived clandestinely to Cuba. He remarks about problems his own children have given him. He refers to an incident where one of the children was invited to a First Communion, and speaks of the freedom he gave the child to make his First Communion also, if he wanted to.

Then Ruiz says that his other son "ALEJANDRO, is inclined to remain in Spain, and he is willing to let him if this is what the boy wants. He says that these things have to come from one's own self, and if they are opposed in these actions it can leave marks on them for the rest of their lives. Ruiz says he gives them the liberty to choose.

Ruiz tolb this student with whom he is conversing that Alejandro DE LA NUEZ has gone to the United States, and adds that De La Nuez' wife never came to meetings or reunions that were held at the embassy. She always gave as an excuse that her nerves were bad. Ruiz says that De La Nuez took the money with him.

This comrade(F) left at 12:15. He said goodbye to her very cordially. Apparently around the 29th of the month she is going to Paris.

Later Ruiz entered the office again and put the radio on very loud. He didn't leave the office all morning, but the radio continued to play very loud; so much so that you can hardly tell when anyone goes in or out of the office.

Report 345 18 June 1970

Apparently they have received a document in which all the Chiefs of Mission have been called to Cuba for the third week of July, as some of them can make it coincide with their leave. He tells Curbelo that he intends to send Nilda either before or after he leaves.

Report No.345(continued) 18 June 1970

Ruiz and Nilda are alone and are talking about when they can leave Spain. Ruiz wants here to go on Iberia, but Nilda says she doesn't want to go separately. If he goes on Cubana she will go with him. Nilda speaks of the 18th of July fiesta, and says that the Minister has been so nice to him that he shouldn't miss this Spanish holiday. They then discuss leaving for Havana on the 20th or 21st of July.

We had better follow this one closely, because it should by [illegible]-1's son-i. law

Report No.345

18 June 1970

Nilda speaks to Ruiz about someone that spoke to her, that wants to stay in Madrid for a few days, but they don't have any money, (Possibly it is ALFARA) and they have asked her if they can stay at her house. It seems that the people she is talking about are on their way to Cuba, and they say, if they don't have the money to stay in Madrid, then let them go directly to Cuba. Nilda says that CHAIN's son-in-law is going to Morocco as Cuban ambassador. The one that he had as his secretary. When Alfara was in Madrid he said that the son-in-law had neither the personality nor the qualifications for the position. Ruiz says that if they are referring to the head of Chain's office, that he is going to Poland as ambassador, but Nilda insists that it is the husband of Chain's daughter.

Two comrades arrive, a man and a woman. They are going to Holland, where they will spend a week, and they want a visa. They will go to other European countries also, and will be a month and a half altogether. (It seems that it is only the woman that is going to Holland and the other countries). Ruiz asks her if it is her first trip to Europe. She says it is her first trip to Western Europe, but that she has already been in the socialist countries of Europe. Ruiz asks them what Havana thought about De la Nuez. Ruiz says it isn't worth having an argument or quarrel with the "gallego" because of De la Nuez. Ruiz believes that the whole affair was handled by the C.I.A.

Ruiz asks them who has been named ambassador to Morocco, and they confirm the fact that the husband of his daughter (CHAIN-?) has been appointed.

They return to the topic of De la Nuez. Ruiz says the only thing they know is that he has gone, but they don't know where. In any case, most likely they had family or friends among the refugees in Miami.

I should think this could make good CA press play

Ruiz asks the girl if there are new people in the Ministry there (Havana-?), if new ones are coming in. She says that her enterprise has 71 employees, and that 55 of them are outside of the enterprise, that the personnel situation is very bad. Two days ago they started giving language classes in French and German, and they talked with RAUL and he believes it is very necessary, because it is very difficult to find people. In addition to their being of trust, what is difficult is their lack of culture.

Again they discuss De la Nuez' case and his wife. They tell Ruiz not to be too discouraged because it is the first time that anything like this happened to him here. Ruiz tells them about the illness of the woman, and that she never wanted to come to the meetings, but on the other hand went to meetings and gatherings of commercial people and others. He was never suspicious of him. Two days before he had been in the study Center with all of them. Ruiz says that it had been six months since they

Report No.345(continued)
proposed getting a substitute for De La Nuez, but only because of his administrative inefficiency, and for no other reason. If Ruiz had suspected anything he would have put him on a plane and sent him back there.

A person from the Feria in Barcelona comes into the office. He has some business to do with Horacio here in Madrid. They hope that Raul LEON will arrive on Thursday, as they have many things to work out together regarding the Chamber of Commerce in Madrid. He speaks about "Cubaexport" and a problem that they have with the brand name. He says it would be better to postpone the process and continue exporting meanwhile to the Canary Islands, until it is all settled. He has visited the Chamber of Commerce in Barcelona. He has eaten and had supper with some of the people from there. He mentions GUERRERO y Garabon, to whom he and ROVIRA have given an explanation: First, the problem that exists with the Cuban Chamber of Commerce can be resolved by a simple diplomatic gesture, Second, the individual that has an interest in it, it is up to him Third, the problem can be solved by establishing another Chamber of Commerce in Madrid. This however, would involve spending and would not be worth it to them economically.

FOLEY

ROVIRA told him that he wanted to go to California. He wants to be close to Cuba and learn the future development of the Cuban production.

Nilda says that they have received a call from Paris telling them that VALDES VIVO left there and will arrive in Madrid at 2:45 PM. Ruiz asks if they sent the cable to Moscow. Nilda says that they have, but that no one answered the cable. They have received only one cable from Moscow saying that he was coming. Then they sent another cable back asking on what Flight, and on what day, but they have had no answer.

Report No.346
Two people enter Ruiz' office. One of them is called "ZORRILLA"(ph). They are discussing De La Nuez. Zorrilla says he has been very hurt by it all, not only politically, but personally also. He says that he always felt that De La Nuez was a person one could trust, and that he has failed them. Ruiz says that here everyone trusted him.

Report No.346(continued)
They continue to talk about De La Nuez, particularly the visitors. Ruiz says that after this they are going to have to strengthen the cadres, that it is important for everyone. He says he has spoken to [illegible]. MANUEL CASTRESANA (phon), and they have agreed to form new very strict cadres.

The visitors leave and on saying goodbye Ruiz says not to discuss the De La Nuez affair too much so that it won't spread any further. Besides, they are all very impressed by it.

VALDES VIVO CALLS RUIZ on the telephone. Ruiz asks him if he has arrived at the hotel and if he has seen MARISI (phon). (MARISI is staying at the same hotel as Valdes). Ruiz says that Zorrilla has just been there, and he has given him the telephone number of the hotel for him to call. He says they have had no word on the Cubana flight, only that it is to arrive today and will leave tonight. But, Ruiz says if it arrives at 3 o'clock that this will not give them time to inspect it and all to leave, even though they will do it all at night. Both Valdes and Marisi are leaving this evening on Cubana.

Ruiz then speaks with Marisi, and says that he had heard of his appointment as ambassador. Apparently this is the one that is to be in Morocco. They say that this ambassador, in all the capitals that he is going to, is visited by the best doctors. Ruiz tells them that he has a luncheon engagement but that he will keep in touch regarding the flight.

Report No.348
The ambassador that has just arrived from Beirut enter the office. He was at the movies last night and they comment on it. Then two other persons come in, one of them is Zorrilla. They speak of various things; that by diplomatic mail they should only send things of a confidential nature, everything else should go by diplomatic pouch.

MERCEDES enters and says that Comrade Armando VELAZQUEZ, whom Ruiz does not know, is here. He is the father of the Cuban consul in Jamaica. He says he has been here 15 days waiting for something to be resolved. He adds that a Rosa Maria of the Ministry was supposed to resolve this problem, but she hasn't done so. He doesn't want to borrow money here, and BARREDA has already given him 1000 pesetas. He wants them to send a cable to Havana to resolve his situation. Mercedes says that this consul studied in the University with Barreda and that he is a very fine person.

Report No. 348 (continued)

They tell Ruiz that the person that is here is ALARCON; he hasn't seen him, nor has he received any cable about his arrival.

Then the ambassador asks Ruiz if they carry pistols here. Ruiz shows him one with five chambers, with which he can shoot without taking it out of his pocket. He says they won't kidnap him, and that one has to be prepared for there are 10,000 gusanos here.

Ruiz tells the ambassador to consult with ROA and tell him that he has received a cable telling him to be in Havana the second week of July, but that the National Day in Spain is on the 18th. He says that he doesn't want to miss this celebration, because the Minister of Foreign Affairs came to their fiesta, and he would have to explain about the reunion in Havana and all that, and they could think something else. So that he is thinking of staying even if he has to leave the very next day on the 19th.

Report No. 349

Some comrades arrive. It appears to be the Alfaras. Mercedes calls Iberia and confirms reservations for the afternoon flight to Havana, #941, in the names of Carlos Alfara and Berta Fernandez. She asks what time they should be in the airport in order to leave on the six o'clock flight. They tell her they should be there an hour before flight time.

Ruiz begins to dictate the following to Nilda, in a very low voice "To enlarge further on the report dated 7 of the current month regarding my meeting with the Minister of Labor, Sr.LICINIO DE LA FUENTE, in relation to the request of theNational Institute of Fishing and the Ministry of Basic Industries for contracting Spanish technicians, we wish to inform you that today we received a telephone call from the Executive Officer to the Ministry of Labor. He informed us that our request for Spanish technicians is still being considered, but that the Minister of Labor and the Spanish government wishes to communicate officially to my Government, their official displeasure with the position adopted by the Cuban representation in the last meeting of the O.I.T.(I.L.O) regarding a proposition that interferes in the internal affairs of Spain. Unfortunately the Minister of Labor had confirmed that the request of our representative in Geneva contradicted the efforts that were being made at high levels of our countries for the betterment of our relations, and the cooperation, and for the brotherhood that should exist between two peoples of the same blood.

My total lack of knowledge of what took place in the I.L.O. with regard to Spain, and the position taken by our delegation, precludes me from answering with accuracy, limiting myself only to saying that I would pass on the words of the Minister and that an explanation of the problem would be given.

Report No.349(continued)
On the other hand, on this same date I received word from our Consul in Barcelona advising that he has observed a minimum of interest in the industrial circles with which we trade. This would make it appear that a problem exists at a high level between the Government of Cuba and the Government of Spain, which is holding back trade with our country. Specifically, some industrialists have advised our representative that the Ministry of Commerce has spread the word that until certain talks are held between the two governments authorization of permission of import with destination Cuba have been suspended.

We are attempting to confirm this today and learn if there exists some relation with what we have been advised by the Ministry of Labor.

We would appreciate it greatly if you would, as soon as possible, inform us what the position of our Government was in the meeting of the I.L.O. in Geneva. — [illegible] please!

Dear ROA: I beg you to see that this confidential /note/ gets to our President, to the Minister of Basic Industries and to the President of the Fishing Institute.

Ruiz tells Horacio that he should tell MARIÑAS that "we are willing to change our passports, and to give us blank models of both the diplomatic and regular passports in order to study them and compare them with those used by other countries.

Report No. 350

24 June 1970

Ruiz asks PACHECO if they have reserved tickets for him and BARREDA, who have been called from Havana by telephone. The tickets are to be reserved for the two of them only, not for the wives, neither Mercedes nor Nilda.

Ruiz says that NEIRA is to arrive today on his way to Paris, and they will see what he has to say about this(the call from Havana) They don't know if the call from Havana is for the ambassadors meeting which will be held now, or only for the two of them to discuss something related to Spain. Pacheco says that that is maybe why the ambassador of Helsinki asked for reservations yesterday.

JM

FOLEY

Suspicious Cubana crews!

Ruiz continues to talk with the new person that has arrived. He says that he has had to go to the Hotel Conde Duque to visit the crew of Cubana, who have never once come to the embassy, although sometimes some of them are here for a week; they don't attend the study circles, the meetings, nor anything. They havee complained about Ruiz because sometimes they have learned of receptions that have taken place and they haven't been invited. Ruiz says that if at these receptions they invited industrial and commercial people, or even cultural people, they would get nothing done here. When they give a reception it is because of work, to maintain contacts, find things out, and not for any other purpose. They have nothing to do there, and he is not going to invite them to just come and eat and drink When they have to spend some pesetas they do it, but for questions of work. Nevertheless they have the obligation to maintain contacts. Ruiz has sometimes met these people on the street, especially the air-stewardesses, with some "pick-up", and although all the people they are friendly with are very nice people, they should know who these people are.

Ruiz then explains to this new comrade the problem of the location of the embassy. He tells him that they are building a new embassy and all the services will be together. There will also be some community rooms, such as a library, a recreation room, a dining room with a bar, that they will all have a chance to see, but this is going to take probably a year. It will be on Avenida de la Havana. Meanwhile they are putting up with this place because they only pay $50.00 for it, and Havana finds its a gift. If they were paying $500, by now they wouldn't be here; they would have found some other place. They have the place rented since 1936, and even though they have spent more than a thousand (or one hundred thousand) in fixing it, it is still an old house.

With this new arrival he talks about the children, and the problems they have with the schools. They have to find schools where they don't teach religion nor politics.

Report No.350 (continued) 24 June 1970

It seems that they would like to bring a professor from Havana, so that the children could study the same revolutionary methods as there, but Ruiz sees this as a very difficult thing to do. Because, one would not solve the situation of the different grades and ages, and they are not going to send four or five because they are needed there. He sees it as a better possibility to hire Spanish professors among the young capable people, with revolutionary leanings and who are sinpathetic toward Cubans, and have them teach the methods, and from books that are brought from there. In this way they could have many professors or teachers for the various ages, and they could rent and furnish an apartment for this purpose.

Apparently Ruiz has no problems with the school his children attend. The Director of the school is a friend of theirs and visits the embassy. Her husband is a communist. The children that attend the school have the same political leanings as their parents. Neither religion nor politics are taught. Ruiz says that the two older ones eat at the school, but the little ones don't as they need help. Ruiz pays over $100 for 4. The person who is with him has two children and pays $100 for the two.

The children of this new comrade that is talking to Ruiz arrive day after tomorrow. He has a little girl 11 years old and the other one is nine. Ruiz is advising the comrade to send his children to the same school where his children go. The name of the school is "ESPINO" or "EL PINO", in the Calle Serrano. He says he will be glad to speak to the Director. They have sports, and music, and the children can have lunch at the school.

Report No.351 25 June 1970

He is talking with Mercedes, and they enter the office and continue the conversation. They are speaking in confidential voices, because Mercedes normally talks very loud, they are now talking in very low voices. Mercedes is trying to consale him, saying that his work is very difficult and little understood. Ruiz says that they are"throwing him the bait." He is very depressed.

Tomorrow he has an appointment with Quiroga publishing company, who have had a meeting with DAVID PAX(phon) about the rights of the song "Guantanamera.", which was acknowledged in London by an American firm, and it's author as being the Cuban Jose FERNANDEZ Diaz, at a reunion that was held there. In the United States alone there are rights (or royalties) of over $50,000. They are trying to establish definite authorship for this Cuban, so that he will be able to collect some of the

Report 351(continued)
royalties from the song throughout the world, which have been calculated at between $750,000 and $1,000,000, and although this amount will have to be divided among many things, something would fall to them.

Ruiz says to work abroad they have to or should send people of the greatest trust, otherwise it is better that they remain in Cuba. If there isn't complete confidence it is a constant struggle with the capitalistic life, money, the stores, the easy life. They mention De la Nuez, and Ruiz says if he's gone he's gone, but the interesting thing would be to know what motivated him; his wife, his son, or money. He says that it has caused a great impression here, and that no one even imagined such a thing. Only two days before he had been in the study circle with all of them.

A girl that is in this meeting with Ruiz says that De la Nuez' daughter is married to Juan Antonio GARCIA, who is Head of Government..., that he has been proposed for ambassador(Ruiz says that they will now have to reconsider this), and what they all three agree on is that De la Nuez was not to blame.

Ruiz mentions the letter from De la Nuez' son in which he says that his father has betrayed them. They also mention an ambassador who has left(for Cuba-?) and took watches as gifts to everyone in the Ministry. Ruiz thinks that some of them will remain here in Spain as they have a great deal going for them there.

Report No.352 26 June 1970

Ruiz' is very displeased. He speaks to Horacio about how badly some of the comrades speak of him when they return to Havana. He asks him if he remembers the name of one of these comrades that spoke badly of him last summer when he was there on vacation. It was someone named COLON and another one that soon left. After what COLON said they wrote him a letter calling his attention to the criticism. Ruiz is very worried about his re-call to Havana. He tells Horacio that he doesn't think it is about his work, and Horacio says they are doing things there that are super-human, that without the necessary means at hand they are resolving difficult problem of various kinds. Ruiz mentions contacts that he has had in Spain with different people, and he never has committed an error, and has always handled everything with great tact and in favor of his government, even when he has had to deal with Falangists.

Ruiz says that he is very sensitive and that things have got to the point that he can't just let them go by, things they are accusing him of in Havana. But, there is no one that has the courage to tell him directly to his face so that he could justify himself, and if they are things that he cannot handle then for them to call him back, and relieve him of the post because "Comandante Guillermo Ruiz cannot resolve them, but the thing is

Report No.352(continued)
that the Minister doesn't want to receive him or listen to him when he goes there. Horacio says that the worst of it is that here in Spain there is always some personality from there that they have to entertain, someone important, and that the attention they need is continual, and sometimes it is necessary to attend to the people here in Spain, which prevents them from attending those who arrive from there, but they don't understand this.

He continues to talk with Horacio and he is indignant. Ruiz says that he has been in the Revolution since he was twenty years old, when he began to think for himself. He says that he belongs to no party, none other, that is, but the Cuban communist party. He says that the situation is becoming so uncomfortable regarding him, and he doesn't like it at all. He says he puts everything he has and all the care possible into doing his job.

Ruiz says that one never knows about these things in Havana, and that it is possible that he won't be returning. In the event that this should happen, he is going to leave Horacio officially in charge, so that he will represent him during his abscence.as Charge'de Affairs, and if he returns he will notify the Spanish government officially. He wants samples or models of the passports to take with him, and then he tells Horacio that if he has not returned by the 18th of July, that he should represent him at the official reception. He gives Horacio instructions as to what to wear, what the official ceremonies are and just what they consist of.

Report No.354 30 June 1970
Ruiz speaks to someone that calls and gives him a message which annoys Ruiz. Someone has called the Provincial Department of Public Health of Santander saying that they (the Cubans) use "boric acid" in the stoves(?) which they export. They give him this message in the name of the Commercial Office of Cuba, they have a Latin-American accent, and say that they would take adequate measures so that no stove would be shipped.

Ruiz says to Horacio that he doesn't have time to take care of this matter, and for him to accompany Franco and go to the General Department of Security and make charges about the telephone call which is interfering with the trade between Cuba and Spain. He says to go right up as far as the General Director if necessary, not explaining the "boric acid" one way or another, but simply as to the malicious call which was made in the name of the Commercial Office of Cuba. This can cause a delay of six or eight days in the departure of a ship while this call is being explained in Public Health.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES /

SECRET

(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

1

2

5

6

~~Dick Hasseler~~

Lauford

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY AT Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

DISSEM BY 58 PER

ACTION UNIT

C/WHE FILE, VR C/RISD, C/EUR5, C/CI, C/FI, D/COMMO 4,

839

S E C R E T 151731Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1364

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMECRU AMSOUR

15 JUN 70 IN 103797

REF: MADRID 1237 (IN 94220)

1. NAMES AMECRU-1 AND WIFE LISTED ON MANIFEST IBERIA FLIGHT 10 JUNE BUT MARKED "NOT ABOARD". NEXT FLIGHT 17 JUNE.

2. INCIDENTALLY, CUDOZE REPORTED 13 JUNE CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMAUTO-1 AND MANUEL FALCON FROM UNIDENTIFIED SPANISH MINISTRY (PRESUMABLY FOREIGN AFFAIRS) IN WHICH AMAUTO-1 SAID WHEN HE SAW AMECRU-1 IN BARCELONA LATTER HAD MENTIONED HIGH ESTEEM FALCON HOLDS FOR AMAUTO-1. BOTH AGREED TO INVITE AMECRU-1 TO LUNCH MADRID UPON HIS RETURN. NO TRACES FALCON.

3. FILE 201-261863; X-REF 201-325364. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: C 2 PER

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR C/CI/SO, C/EUR 5, C/CI

ACTION NO. 758

SECRET 130955Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1353

13 JUN 70 IN 102856

T

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMMARTINI QUDOZE

REF: MADRID 1312 (IN 100475)

1. ON 12 JUNE GILLERMO RUIZ DICTATED REPORT FO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF AMMARTINI-1. AMONG OTHER THINGS, REPORT SAID FOLLOWING: SUBJ DEMONSTRATED HE INCAPABLE HANDLING JOB; HAD NO KNOWLEDGE FOREIGN TRADE. CESETA OFFICIALS SO INFORMED AND ORESTES RUIZ OF CESETA HAD ADMITTED THESE FACTS. FRANCISCO LEON HAD BEEN CHOSEN REPLACE SUBJ. NO EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL DEVIATION, HOWEVER, EXCEPT ON ONE OCCASION HAD SPENT TOO MUCH ON CLOTHES FOR CELEBRATION OF FIESTA NACIONAL. HIS WIFE DID NOT ATTEND WOMENS FEDERATION MEETINGS AND WAS NOT NORMAL. SUBJ WAS SUPERFICIAL WITH HIS SUPPLIERS. WHAT IS MORE, HE DRANK IN EXCESS. AFTER LEARNING SUBJ'S "TRAICION" ANALYSIS SHOWED HE HAD PLANNED THE ACT IN ADVACE: ITEMS WERE THAT ONE OF HIS CHILDREN LEFT COUNTRY; HIS WIFE HAD REMARKED THAT SHE HAD DONE MUCH FOR REVOLUTION, NOW REVOLUTION OWED HER SOMETHING; AND SUBJ'S DISTANCE (OR STRANGENESS) WITH RESPECT TO HIS NEPHEW, ORLANDO DE LA NUEZ. FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF

FILE: AmPulo-1

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.
X-REF TO CS FILE NO.
BY: AT: Z
☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
DISSEM BY PER #
ACTION UNIT
INFO FILE, VR
ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 1350 SECRET

HIS DISAPPEARANCE WAS 9 JUNE. HAD BEEN CALLS TO COMMERCIAL OFFICE THAT SUBJ WAS VISITING OTHER CITIES ON BUSINESS. SUBJ DID NOT APPEAR AT WORK 8 JUNE. RICARDO ESPINO TALKED TO "PORTERO" AT SUBJ'S HOME BUT LATTER HAD NOT SEEN HIM LEAVE. WHEN FUNCTIONARIES OF COMMERCIAL MISSION AND EMBASSY ENTERED HOUSE, NOTHING THERE. ALSO CESETA MONEY BOX, CONTENTS UNKNOWN, MISSING. HAVE BEGUN PROCESS TO NOTIFY SPANISH AUTHORITIES OF DISAPPEARANCE. RUIZ' WIFE SAID THAT SUBJ'S DAUGHTER ALSO OUTSIDE CUBA REPRESENTING SOMETHING. RUIZ LATER TOLD HORACIO FUENTES THAT SUBJ HAD TAKEN OFFICE FUNDS AND WAS PROBABLY IN MIAMI OR NEW YORK. HE BLAMED SUBJ'S WIFE. (SOURCE: QUDOZE).

2. A-1 AND WIFE NOT AWARE DAUGHTER OUT OF CUBA. CUBAN OFFICIALS PROBABLY MISTAKEN ON THIS ITEM.

3. FILE 201-870443. GP-1

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 45

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 2 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH 8 FILE, VR C/CA, EUR 6, CI, CI/OPS, C/OA, FI 2, DO 4

ACTION NO. 164

S E C R E T 081452Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1287 MADR 8 Jun CCC835

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

3P

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 1261 (IN 09601?)

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF TWO AND ONE HALF HOUR MEETING BETWEEN SAMKO/AMAUTO-1.

A. SAMKO PICKED UP BY AMAUTO-1 IN CHAUFFEUR DRIVEN EMBASSY MERCEDES.

B. WHEN DISCUSSING FUTURE PLANS, AMAUTO-1 SAID WILL RETURN CUBA TO FIGHT FOR JUST CAUSE. THAT HE WILL PROBABLY DIE FIGHTING FOR CUBA WHICH IS YOUNG AGGRESSIVE COUNTRY, BUT NOT PRESS THIS THEME NOR SPEAK ADVERSELY OF UNITED STATES. SAMKO DID NOT CHALLENGE STATEMENT, BUT ADDED THAT HOPES SOMEDAY AMAUTO-1 ASSIGNED TO UNITED NATIONS THUS WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY VISIT SAMKO IN FLORIDA. AMAUTO-1 VISIBLY DELIGHTED WITH POSSIBILITY.

C. THEY EXCHANGED ADDRESSES AND AMAUTO-1 URGED SAMKO WRITE. SAMKO HAD PRINTED OUT HIS NAME, ADDRESS

MICROFILMED
JUN 22 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

NOTED

AN WW
~~AN~~ X
4
WH/COP

6 201-866054

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296
8 Jun 70

FORM 3020 10 69 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MFG-1-70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ # ____

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 1287 SECRET

AND PHONE NUMBER, BUT AMAUTO-1 ASKED HIM TO WRITE IT OUT "UNDERSTAND IT BETTER" BUT SAMKO AND STATION BELIEVE AMAUTO-1 WILL USE SAMPLE TO COMPARE WITH LETTERS SAMKO MIGHT SEND IN FUTURE.

D. AMAUTO-1 REGRETTED THAT SAMKO HAD TO LEAVE SO SOON BECAUSE WOULD HAVE ENJOYED SHOWING SAMKO SPANISH INTERIOR. SAMKO SAID HE MIGHT CONSIDER RETURNING NEAR END OF YEAR, BUT AMAUTO-1 DID NOT SAY WHETHER HE WOULD BE IN SPAIN AT THAT TIME.

E. AMAUTO-1 ADMITTED THAT HE WAS SUSPICIOUS ON SEEING SAMKO FOR FIRST TIME ON 31 MAY BUT CONCERN SOON DISSIPATED. SAID NATURE AND IMPORTANCE HIS POSITION MAKES HIM SUSPICIOUS.

F. REQUESTED SAMKO ACT AS INTERMEDIARY IN U.S. FOR SALE CUBAN FISH PRODUCTS TRANSPORTED FROM CANARY ISLANDS AND MARKED "PRODUCT OF SPAIN". SAID SAMKO STANDS TO EARN $100,000 YEARLY. SAMKO SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER OFFER.

2. SAMKO DEPARTED MADRID 7 JUNE [illegible] BARCELONA WHERE HE WILL GET DIRECT FLIGHT TO NEW YORK. EXPECTS F [illegible]URN

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MADRID 1287 S E C R E T

MIAMI 10JUNE. SAMKO GIVEN DEFENSIVE BRIEFING. WILL EXPECT NO PERSONAL CONTACT FOR AT LEAST ONE WEEK AFTER RETURN.

3. STATION BELIEVES SAMKO CARRIED OUT MISSION IN EXCELLENT MANNER AND FEEL THAT BASIC OBJECTIVES SUCCESSFULLY FULFILLED.

4. FILE 201-735296 AND 201-866254. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-735296

67

WH

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

01 1715 Z

8

PRECEDENCE

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO

WH 7 FILE, VR, R/AN I EUR 6, FI 2, CI CI/OPS, CI/OA

885

S E C R E T 041354Z JUN 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7776 WMIM

PRIORITY MADRID INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. MADRID 1261 (IN 096017)

B. DIRECTOR 039497

4 JUN 70 IN 096798

01

1. ONLY CONCERN WE HAVE IS SECURITY OF SAMKO DURING TRIP BACK TO MIAMI. WOULD APPRECIATE DEFENSIVE BRIEFING BY MADRID OF SAMKO. IT MAY BE THAT HE APPEARS VERY INTERESTING TO CUBANS AS AGENT POTENTIAL IN STATES. OUR COMPLIMENTS ALSO TO SAMKO AND STATION.

2. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

S E C R E T

MICROFILMED
JUN 22 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN CI
AB
2
4
FI
WH/C/CI

B 201-866054

CS COPY

201-735296

04 JUN 70

I 70

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER

WH 8 FILE, VR, DI/AN, EUR 6, FI 2, CI, CI/OPS

863

S E C R E T 041228Z JUNE 70 CITE MADRID MADR 1267 (ROPARD ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 039497

4 JUN 70 IN 086572

1. SACODER PHOTOGRAPHED SAMKO'S ARRIVAL AT AMAUTO-1 HOME AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN FRONT YARD. PHOTOS HIGHLIGHT ACTIVITIES LEADING TO SAMKO'S ENTRY INTO HOUSE.

2. INTEND SHOW MUG BOOK TO SAMKO AT NEXT MEETING. OPINION HERE IS THAT AMAUTO-1 PROBABLY WANTED COVER HIMSELF WITH OWN STAFF AND POSSIBLY TO LAY ON SURVEILLANCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER SAMKO WAS BEING DIRECTED AGAINST HIM.

3. AMAUTO-1 DEPARTURE PLANS MIGHT HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO PERMIT HIM TRAVEL TO BARCELONA FOR OPENING TRADE FAIR 3 JUNE AND ALSO TO BE PRESENT AT FAIR FOR "CUBA DAY" SCHEDULED FOR 10 JUNE. AMAUTO-1 REPORTEDLY TO RETURN MADRID FROM BARCELONA ON EVENING 5 JUNE.

4. FILE 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN
AB
IDX
PS
BX 4
DES NPD

MICROFILMED
JUN 22 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B-201-866054

201-735296

04 Jun 70

CS COPY

SECRET

84

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

C. P.

ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD/cb
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7141, 1819
DATE: 3 JUNE 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH-8 INFO FILE, VR. EUR-6 RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO
CI CI/OPS FI-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 03 22 36z JUN 70 CITE DIRECTOR

039497

PRIORITY MADRID INFO ROUTINE WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 1261 (IN 096017)

MICROFILMED
JUN 23 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN 010
AB X
IN
FS 2
RY 4

1. REF CABLE MOST INTERESTING. OUR COMPLIMENTS TO SAMKO AND STATION FOR JOB WELL DONE.

2. AGREE EVENTS MENTIONED PARA 1 F PUZZLING AND HQS WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FOLLOW-UP STATION CAN OBTAIN THROUGH QUTIMID/QUDOZE. SINCE SAMKO WAS INTRODUCED TO OTHER COMRADES BY AMAUTO-1, LATTER PROBABLY PREPARED CONTACT REPORT. POSSIBLY QUTIMID/QUDOZE MAY INDICATE HIS TRUE FEELINGS TOWARD SAMKO OR REVEAL ANY SUSPICIONS OF SAMKO VISIT.

3. HQS ALSO INTERESTED CLARIFICATION OF PHOTOS WHICH STATION POUCHING. DID SAMKO IDENTIFY SUBJECTS FROM STATION MUGBOOK, OBTAIN NAMES, ETC., OR WAS HE PROVIDED COPIES OF PHOTOS WHICH TAKEN AT CAFETERIA? JUDGING FROM REF, AMAUTOS' HAVE CHANGED ORIGINAL DEPARTURE PLANS WHICH ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 31 MAY. ADVISE.

CS COPY

(CONTINUED...)

3 Jun 70
201-735296

B-201-866054

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: PAGE TWO
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ____ PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

7 0 39497

4. FILE: 201-735296 and 201-866054.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG COMMENT: Reported highlights of Alexander SAMKO operational contact with AMAUTO-1 on 31 May. SAMKO warmly received by AMAUTO but latter's wife appeared suspicious. Later meeting scheduled for 6 June.

RI/E/IB/S Louis Rosso

C/WH/COG W. [illegible]

C/WH/1 [illegible]

JOHN L. HART
C/EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 2 — 17 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

WH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: D AT: 1750 Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 8 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, EI/AN, EUR 6, FI 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

ACTION NO. 772

S E C R E T 031645Z JUNE 70 CITE MADRID (MADR 1261) (GOPARD ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

3 Jun 70 IN 096017

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: WH/MIAMI 7703 (IN 091445)

3P

1. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS SAMKO/MAUTO-1 FOUR-HOUR MEETING 31 MAY.

A. WIFE AMAUTO-1 WAS FIRST TO RAISE COVER QUESTIONS BUT SAMKO DID SUPERB JOB WITH ANSWERS. WIFE WAS COLD AND SUSPICIOUS THROUGHOUT PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS, BUT LATER WARMED UP TO POINT EXCHANGING ABRAZOS ON DEPARTURE.

B. SAMKO BELIEVES RELATIONSHIP FIRMLY RE-ESTABLISHED AND AMAUTO-1 DESIRES EXCHANGE OF ADDRESSES FOR PURPOSE MAINTAIN CONTACT.

C. AMAUTO-1 AND WIFE ACCEPTED DINNER FOR SATURDAY, 6 JUNE.

D. AMAUTO-1 AND WIFE VISIBLY MOVED WHEN SAMKO ASKED DISCUSS HIS BUSINESS SUCCESSES AND THEY ASKED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF HIS BUSINESS.

AN
~~AB~~
IN
PS
BX 4
~~DES~~
RI
4/C/CP

MICROFILMED
JUN 22 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY
SECRET

B-201-866054

03Jun70
201-735296

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

19249

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 1261 SECRET

D. POLITICS AVOIDED PER OUR INSTRUCTIONS.

E. SAMKO TURNED ON CHARM DURING CONVERSATIONS AND FED AMAUTO-1'S EGO WITH COMMENTS ON HOW HE WISHED AMAUTO-1 REMAINED IN MIAMI TO HANDLE HIS AFFAIRS. THAT HE COULD HAVE BEEN MILLIONAIRE TODAY; EXPLAINED THAT WAS NEVER BLESSED WITH CHILDREN BUT AMAUTO-1 WAS LIKE SON. HAD BLAMED HIMSELF FOR ALLOWING AMAUTO-1 RETURN TO CUBA TO GET KILLED BUT WAS PLEASED WHEN HEARD HE WAS WELL. PARTING COMMENT BY SAMKO WAS "IF YOU EVER NEED ME BILL, I'LL NEVER LET YOU DOWN. YOU HAVE A GOOD FRIEND WHO LOVES YOU A LOT."

F. SAMKO AND STATION DISTURBED BY POSSIBLE SURVEILLANCE. MOMENTS AFTER ENTERING AMAUTO-1'S HOUSE AMAUTO-1 MADE PHONE CALL. SAMKO WAS BRIEFED THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. ONE HOUR LATER AT AMUSEMENT PARK AMAUTO-1 STEERED SAMKO TO CAFETERIA WHERE MOMENTS LATER FOUR CUBANS, PRESUMABLY FRINEDS OF AMAUTO-1, WERE INTRODUCED TO SAMKO. CUBANS TOOK NUMBER OF PICTURES. SEEMS INCONSISTENT WITH GOOD SECURITY PRACTICE, BUT EVENT OF SOME CONCERN TO STATION. FORTUNATELY, NO CONTACT WAS

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MADRID 1261 SECRET

PLANNED WITH SAMKO FOR 48 HOURS AFTER HIS MEET WITH AMAUTO-1. NO SURVEILLANCE NOTED WHEN SAMKO CONTACTED BY STATION, EVENING 2 JUNE. SAMKO IN HIGH SPIRITS AND ENJOYS ROLE. RAPPORT GOOD. WILL POUCH PHOTOS AND DETAILS.

2. STATION PLANS BRIEF CONTACT WITH SAMKO BEFORE HIS NEXT MEET WITH AMAUTO-1. HE WILL ATTEMPT DRAW OUT AMAUTO-1'S FUTURE PLANS. IF ADDEES HAVE COMMENTS OR QUESTIONS PLS FORWARD ASAP.

3. FILE 201-735296 AND 201-366054. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

201-735296

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

JUN 5 10

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID, AN.

FROM:

RID/

WEAVER VAL EN-129
RID/AN GA 50
EXT. 4239 TUBE GT-7

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS,

COPY DETACHED MU

2-3: There is backtrak on her. She is of poss ops interest to Madrid. Better put her in a shadow.

MICROFILMED
JUN 15 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C	Brown	15 JUN 1970		
2. Wheeler				DW
3. Lansford				CL
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST — ABSTRACT X — INDEX X

2

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 03 Jun 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER: OSMA 26265

54872

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami: COS, Lisbon

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC QUTIMID
Aida Rosa CORREA Felipe de ECHEVARRIA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MADRID 1230

in contact with Subject & 201-235296

1. QUTIMID periodically has reported contact between Subject and Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the Cuban Minister in Madrid, mostly over the telephone but also indicating that he has seen her personally. It would appear that he has taken unusually strong interest in her, consibring the number of other more demanding tasks he claims to have. Until now, we have not been able to identify either Subject or her relationship with RUIZ.

2. On 28 May QUDOZE (a sensitive joint audio penetration with liaison) reported the following memorandum (presumably to Havana) on Subject as dictated by RUIZ:

> "Sr. RUIZ Ojeda. Some months ago we received a ciphered cable dealing with Aida Rosa CORREA Felipe asking that we contact her to determine her situation. At that time we informed you that said Aida Rosa CORREA, married to Pedro ECHEVARRIA, Portuguese citizen who was in Cuba during 1959-1968, intended to return to our country, abandoning her husband because of his alcoholism.
>
> "Approximately one week ago the brother of Aida Rosa CORREA - Luis CORREA Felipe - passed through Madrid en route to France on a special mission. He spoke with her at the Airport about definitely returning in order to see that her 12-year-old son might be educated in Cuba.

MICROFILMED
JUN 15 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WHD
- 2 - C/EUR
- 2 - COS, WH/Miami
- 2 - COS, Lisbon

....continued

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D-65-2-10/9

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 26265

DATE
3 June 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-235296
665-6-44/3

Today we interviewed Aida Rosa CORREA and her son, who at all times has maintained a positive attitude toward this Embassy concerning her return. We have let her know that given the circumstances of her presence in Spain - not as a 'gusano' but as the wife of a foreign doctor who has worked in our country - we saw no difficulty to prevent her from returning, especially taking into account the fact that she expressed herself as a revolutionary, but that first we had to receive official permission.

"In our opinion, because the situation in which she finds herself in Spain because of marriage to a foreigner, her return can be authorized, based on what has expired."

Philip C. Kentland

Philip C. KENTLAND

201-735296

14-00000

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

WEAVER VAL EX-129
RID/AN GA 50
EXT. 4239 TUBE GT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/c		10 JUN 1970		
2.				
3. Burke			11	JB
4. Ennis		11 June		
5. Wheeler				✓
6. Ray Frazier Irish		30 June 28 OCT 1970		
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

AMOT Study on SPAIN - good results

~~we'll need photos for the rest~~

- please send photos to AMOTS

MI[illegible]ED
JUN [illegible]
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Input - see me if you have any problems

P.S. MADE CHECKS ALL THOSE AND [illegible] IN THE DGI CENTER NETWORK IN SPAIN.

IA COMPUTER PROCESSED

43280

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT X	FILE TITLE
	INDEX	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
	01 Jun 70	UFAA 02047/01

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

UFAA-2047/01

0TA2228

~~MAY 19 1970~~

1 Jun 70

SECRET

Name: Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

DPOB: 10 February 1930, Havana Municipal District, Havana Province

Occupation: Minister, Cuban Charge d' affaires in Spain. From August 1964 until late 1967, he was Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MINCEX). From 1 August 1963 until mid-1964, he was Cuban Commercial Counsellor in Mexico. From 1959 until 1962, he was an official of the Ministry of Treasury, having appeared in 1961 and 1962 as Director of Economy Financing of the Ministry of Treasury. It has also been reported that he was a G-2 member (member of the Department of State Security (DSE)) in 1961 and 1962. It has been reported that he had been working at the Ministry of Treasury since prior to 1959, that is, under the Batista regime. So far, we have not been able to confirm this information.

Date of arrival at post: Exact date unknown. We believe that he has been holding his present position since at least 18 November 1967.

Physical description: White, approximately 5'7" tall, about 180 pounds of weight (it has been reported that he has a stout build), light-colored eyes (blue or green), blond hair (somewhat wavy and combed back), round face. Has no visible identification marks.

Parents:
a. Jose Antonio RUIZ (the matronymic is probably Armas)
b. Nieves PEREZ Entrialgo.

Spouse: Nilda VECIANA Lopez, (R [illegible]) born between 1934 and 1942, place of birth unknown. White, approximately 5'5" tall, 135 pounds of weight, blond or light brown hair, green eyes. She is a schoolteacher. PCC, FMC and CDR member.

Children:
a. Guillermo RUIZ Veciana
b. Ivan RUIZ Veciana
c. Julio G. RUIZ Veciana
d. Alejandro RUIZ Veciana
e. Juan C. RUIZ Veciana

Siblings:
a. Jose Antonio RUIZ Perez
b. Osvaldo RUIZ Perez

SECRET

201-735296

0TA2223

Political affiliations and attitude: It has been reported that Subject is a member of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) and a staunch sympathizer of the Cuban regime. There is information to the effect that in 1958, Subject was in exile in Mexico and was a member of the Triple A Organization led by Dr. Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango. It has also been reported that during the struggle against BATISTA (1957-1958), Subject belonged to action and sabotage groups in Havana and was charged with placing bombs and other devices. Source does not know exactly what activities Subject carried out as a member of action and sabotage groups, but believes that he had to leave for Mexico in 1958 on account of his activities.

Intelligence connections: RUIZ has been reported as a member of the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI). It has been reported that in 1961 and 1962 he was a G-2 (DSE) member at the Ministry of Treasury, where he worked.

Travels: He traveled to Mexico (from mid-1963 until mid-1964, he was Cuban Commercial Counsellor in Mexico). Spain, where he has been since late 1967 as Cuban Charge d' affaires. (It was reported that on 27 July 1968, he arrived in Paris, from Madrid. We do not know the reasons for that trip).

Access: a. Rolando CARDOSO Perez (A18 239 674). Arrived in the U.S. on 10 October 1968 from Madrid, Spain. He knows Subject because he and Subject are cousins (Subject's mother and Rolando's mother are sisters). When Rolando arrived in the U.S., he said he was going to reside at 940 SW 11th Avenue, Miami, Florida, telephone number 377-3877. We have not been able to locate him because we were told at this address that Rolando had left for another state and that his present address was unknown to them). Rolando saw Subject for the last time at the Barajas Airport, Madrid, Spain, on 10 October 1968, when Rolando was going to take the plane which brought him to the U.S. According to Rolando, they greeted each other on that occasion. Rolando said he had seen Subject at this same airport in early or mid-1968 and that they had talked for approximately five minutes. On this opportunity, Subject was at the airport waiting for the arrival of a group of Cuban diplomats.

b. Manuel Domingo German VIGOS Perez (A18 780 716). Arrived in the U.S. on 20 February 1970 by way of the Refugee Airlift. He knows Subject because he and Subject are cousins (Subject's mother and Manuel's mother are sisters). Manuel saw Subject for the last time in 1963, at the home of Subject's mother, where they happened to meet. According to Manuel, he and Subject only said hello to each other. When Manuel arrived

OTA-[illegible]

JUL 19 1970

in the U.S., he reported his address as 4000 NW Fourth Street, Miami, Florida, telephone number 445-7193, home of a lady named Mercedes BORGES Dobarros. Manuel also stated that he would later leave for 433 West 49th Street, New York, N.Y., home of Antonio GOMEZ Lemus. Manuel told I-122 that he and his friend, Jorge BORGES Dobarros, were homosexuals and had been living together since approximately 1963. (Jorge BORGES Dobarros arrived in Miami aboard the same Refugee Airlift flight as Manuel. He is a brother of Mercedes BORGES Dobarros, and he and Manuel went to live in Mercedes' house when they arrived in Miami).

We believe that Manuel cannot be used in an approach to Subject because they have not maintained relations for a long period of years. In addition, Subject might know Manuel' weakness (homosexualism) and might take advantage of this knowledge to blackmail Manuel. Manuel also told I-122 that he had received psychiatric treatment in Havana.

Assessment: Subject's present position; the positions, all of them important, which he has held before; and the fact that he has been reported as a DGI officer, lead us to believe that we do not have many possibilities of success in an attempt to recruit or defect Subject. The fact that Subject's father has been a militant Communist since prior to 1959 and that Subject's wife has been reported as a supporter of the regime should not be forgotten.

Subject's revolutionary background during the struggle against BATISTA seems to indicate that he is in favor of acts of terrorism. This gave him knowledge and experience in matters related to subversive activities and/or intelligence activities which he could use later.

Therefore, we believe that Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez must be a very useful person for the Cuban regime, in Spain. He has experience in negotiating trade agreements and in handling administrative affairs (he has been working in this field for more than ten years). All this knowledge and experience added to his knowledge and experience in subversive and intelligence affairs make him a man who is not often found in the Castro regime.

1. OTA-1858, 16 January 1970, contains information and/or file traces on Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez, his wife, and other members of his family. OTA-1858 also contains or lists all other references or reports in which Subject has been mentioned.

2. We have the following new traces on Subject and his wife:

3

0TA2228
MAY 1[illegible] 1970

a. RUIZ Perez, Orestes Guillermo:

Trip Madrid-Havana, 20 February 1970; Cuban passport PP-D/67/890. Seat No. 24. Source: CCA passenger list.

b. VECIANA Lopez, Nilda:

Trip Madrid-Havana, 30 January 1970; Cuban passport PP-D/67/891. Seat No. 25. Source: IBERIA passenger list.

MAY 19 1970

SECRET

3. We have the following file traces on persons mentioned in this report:

A. RUIZ? Jose Antonio: father

OTA-1858, 16 January 1970, I-33. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Information and file traces on Jose Antonio RUIZ.

B. PEREZ Entrialgo, Nieves: mother

OTA-1858, 16 January 1970, I-33. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Nieves PEREZ Entrialgo is mentioned in this report (no traces).

C. RUIZ Veciana, Guillermo:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. File traces on Guillermo RUIZ Veciana.

D. RUIZ Veciana, Ivan:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. File traces on Ivan RUIZ Veciana.

E. RUIZ Veciana, Julio G.:

RUIZ Veciana, Julio:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. File traces on Julio RUIZ Veciana.

F. RUIZ Veciana, Alejandro:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Traces on Alejandro RUIZ Veciana.

G. RUIZ Veciana, Juan C.:

RUIZ Veciana, Juan:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Traces on Juan RUIZ Veciana.

H. RUIZ Perez, Jose Antonio:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Information and traces on Jose Antonio RUIZ Perez.

I. RUIZ Perez, Osvaldo:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70, I-33. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Information on Osvaldo RUIZ Perez.

5

0TA2228

SECRET
-6-

Brother of Guillermo RUIZ Perez. White, born approximately in 1930. He is working as a farm laborer, waiting for his turn to depart Cuba by way of Spain. Married, opposed to the regime. Resides in the City of Havana. Source: Debriefing of Manuel Domingo German VIGOS Perez, 24 Feb 70, I-122.

J. CARDOSO Perez, Rolando:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70, I-33. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Traces on this person.

K. VIGOS Perez, Manuel Domingo German:

VIGOS Perez, Manuel Domingo:

A18 780 716. DPOB: 5/12/41, Havana, Cuba. U.S. address: 4000 NW Fourth St., Miami, Fla. Address in Cuba: 353 Santos Suarez St., Santos Suarez, Havana. Entered the U.S. at Miami on 2/20/70 (RD-1065). No occupation in Cuba. Single. Source: Immigration card.

VIGOS Perez, Manuel D.:

Trip Varadero-Miami, 20 Feb 70. He is 28 years old. Has no passport. Bricklayer. Source: AIRLIFT passenger list.

L. BORGES Dobarros, Mercedes:

Resides in Miami, Fla. Sister of Jorge BORGES Dobarros (homosexual). (BORGES is a close friend of Source). Source: Debriefing of Manuel Domingo VIGOS Perez, 24 Feb 70, I-122.

GARCIA Dobarros, Mercedes:

Resides at 4000 NW Fourth St., Miami, Fla., where Source, who is a friend of hers, is residing. Source: Debriefing of Manuel Domingo German VIGOS Perez, 24 Feb 70, I-122.

M. GOMEZ Lemus, Antonio:

Head of the Department of Associations of the Havana Provisional Revolutionary Government. Interventor of the Havana Association of Veterans. Handed it over to Liberation Army Lt. Antonio PANUNCIA Garcia. Source: Press, 10/15/60.

Attended the "Condecoration of Drivers" which was held in the Declaration of Havana Hall of the Provisional Government. Source: Press, 11/18/60.

Has a college degree. Greeted the "Cobre Agrarian Star" and her companions when they visited Havana. Source: Press, 1/7/61.

Official of the Havana Provisional Government. Communist

SECRET

OT 12208

MAY 19 1970

and informer. Source: Jose PAZ Novas, 17 Jan 61.

Head of the Department of Associations of the Havana Provisional Revolutionary Government. Met with the President and Secretary of the Union of Revolutionary Civic Associations. Source: "Revolucion" newspaper, 1 Jun 61.

N. BORGES Dobarros, Jorge:

Homosexual and close friend of source. The latter resided in his house when he arrived in the U.S. Born approximately in 1923. Prior to 1963, he worked with Mucbleria Salas Furniture Store as an interior decorator and also as a salesman. Worked with the MICONS (Ministry of Construction), in Havana, as a watchman at construction work sites. Source: Debriefing of Manuel Domingo German VIGOS Perez, 24 Feb 70, I-122;

BORGES Dobarros, Jorge B.:

Trip Varadero-Miami, 20 Feb 70. 46 years old. Cuban passport PP-026677. Employee. Source: AIRLIFT passenger list.

BORGES Dobarros, Jorge Benito:

A18 781 146. DPOB: 4/19/23, Havana, Cuba. U.S. address: 4000 NW Fourth St., Miami, Fla. Address in Cuba: 353 Santos Suarez St., Santos Suarez, Havana. Entered the U.S. at Miami on 2/20/70 (RD-1065). Passport PP-026677, issued on 4/9/69. Single. Source: Immigration card.

201-735296

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 7 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. → ~~[illegible]~~

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. [illegible] 2,6

BY: AT: Z

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

DISSEM BY 38 PER

File N. AUTO

ACTION UNIT C/WH8 INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD, C/EUR5, C/CI, C/FI2, D/COMMO 4

ACTION NO. 590 DDP, ADDP, CS/DO

SECRET 011735Z JUNE 70 CITE MADRID 1237 (ROPARD ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

1 JUN 70 IN 094220

RYBAT TYPIC AMSOUR AMECRU

REF: A. MADRID 1181 (IN 089967)

B. DIRECTOR 037031

1. RESULTS AMECRU-1 MEETING 29 MAY WITH QUPILL-1 AND KENTLAND AS FOLLOWS:

A. EXPENSES. A-1 EXPLAINED THAT FOR HIS TRAVELS, PHONE CALLS AND RESIDENCE BILLS PARIS (FOR CONVENIENT ACCESS TO AMKNAR-1) HAS RECEIVED $2500 FROM ONE FAMILY (AMCALL-1), $1000 FROM ANOTHER (AMPANIC-7) AND $3000 FROM AMSOUR-1 SISTER. NOT PRESSING FOR MORE UNTIL SEES RESULTS CURRENT TRIP, BUT COMMENTED THAT MUCH AS SYMPATHIZES WITH AMSOUR-1 SISTER DIFFICULTIES WITH STOCK MARKET, SUCH DETAILS MINOR COMPARED TO LIFE OF HER BROTHER.

B. CASES TO DISCUSS HAVANA. WILL GIVE PRIORITY TO AMPANIC-7 (201-276080), (HAS LETTER FROM AMPANIC-7 MOTHER TO CELIA SANCHEZ), AMCALL-1 (201-275949) (HAS LETTERS TO FIDEL CASTRO FROM BELGIAN MINISTER RAYMOND

AMAUTO-1

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 1237 SECRET

SCHEYVEN, VATICAN SECSTATE AND VANISTENDAEL), AMSOUR-1, AMHINT-3 (201-287682) AND SUBJECT 201-859862. WILL FIRST CONTACT CELIA SANCHEZ AND THEN WORK WITH MININT OFFICIALS DESIGNATED BY HER OF R FIDEL CASTRO (SHOULD HE GET TO SEE HIM). FOR TIME BEING WILL NOT RAISE CASE OF PERSON APPEARING IDEN WITH AMOBESE (201-334245) FOR WHOM COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION CAMPAIGN HAS NOT YET REACHED REQUIRED $30,000. HAS NOT RECLAIMED AMPANIC-7 RANSOM FROM PARIS EMBASSY IN ORDER KEEP CASE NEGOTIABLE. UPON SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION THESE CASES WILL DISCUSS WITH APPROPRIATE PERSONS POSSIBILITIES FOR PACKAGE EXCHANGE FOR WHICH, HE REALIZES, CANNOT EXPECT ANY PRIOR LNHARP COMMITMENT.

C. HOPES TO VISIT U.S. THIS SUMMER OR FALL AND SEE OLIVER G. GALBOND.

D. AMAUTO-1 (201-735296): LUNCHEON APPOINTMENT SET FOR 30 MAY. INTERESTING TO NOTE HIS CAPSULE ASSESSMENT AMAUTO-1 AS "INTELLIGENT, WELL-ORGANIZED MAN WHO HAS ATTAINED POSITION UNUSUALLY HIGH FOR HIS

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ___

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MADRID 1237 S E C R E T

LIMITED BACKGROUND AND WHO PROBABLY WILL REMAIN WITH REGIME BECAUSE OF MANAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED AND PATRIOTIC MOTIVATION TO IMPROVE COUNTRY THROUGH REVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINE".

2. C/O ASKED IF PROPER MOMENT PRESENTED DURING AMAUTO-1 LUNCH THAT A-1 ATTEMPT TO ELICIT WHETHER AMAUTO-1 WOULD BE IN TOWN 31 MAY. A-1 WOULD USE LOGICAL PRETEXT OF NEED TO KNOW IF AMAUTO-1 AVAILABLE FOR LAST-MINUTE CONSULTATION BEFORE HE BOARDS 31 MAY FLIGHT TO HAVANA. (A-1 PHONED C/O NIGHT 30 MAY TO ADVISE THAT AMAUTO-1 WOULD BE IN MADRID ALL DAY 31 MAY.)

3. WILL PREPARE FOR JKLANCE DETAILED REPORT ON EVENTS AND OBSERVATONS HIS TRIP WHICH WILL GIVE TO C/O AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY AFTER RETURN ON (HE HOPES) 10 JUNE. (ALSO WILL ~~LOAN~~ LEND HIS DOMINICAN PASSPORT FOR STATION TO COPY VARIOUS OFFICIAL CACHETS.)

4. AMECRU-1 APPEARED ELATED OVER PROSPECT OF TRIP AND RELATIONS WITH BOTH QUPILL-1 AND KENTLAND WERE QUITE CORDIAL.

5. QUPILL-1 LATER TOLD C/O THAT AMSOUR-1 SISTER

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 MADRID 1237 SECRET

PHONED NIGHT 28 MAY QUITE UPSET OVER FAILURE TO HEAR FROM HIM. HAD CONSULTED WITH "FRIENDS" WHO SUGGESTED SHE TRAVEL TO SPAIN FOR PERSONAL MEETING WITH QUPILL-1, FOR WHICH ALREADY HAD RESERVATIONS ON FLIGHT 29 MAY. WHEN Q-1 ADVISED HER THAT NO FURTHER NEWS EXPECTED UNTIL AFTER AMECRU-1 RETURN, SHE AGREED TO CANCEL TRAVEL PLANS.

6. QUTIMID CONFIRMS AMECRU-1 LUNCH DATE WITH AMAUTO-1 AND AIRLISTS SHOW HIM AND WIFE ON 31 MAY MANIFESTS.

7. FILE 201061063, 201-325064. X REF 201-276080, 201-275949, 201-287682, 201-859862, 201-735296, 201-334245, 201-836293. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: RUIZ-Perez, Orestes Guillermo
[201-0735296]
Volume 2

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: PCS/LOC

ROOM: 2 D 11

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Third Agency documents

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
18 Sep 78		P. ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

RUIZ Perez, Orestes Guillermo

AMAUTO-1

VOL II

201-735296

14-00000

END OF VOL II - 31 May 1970

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFICATION   TOTAL COPIES   65

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

XREF TO CS FILE NO. ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

DISSEM BY 7

WH8   FILE, VR   C/AN ENC6 FI2 C/CAS C/FD

ACTION NO. C-60

SECRET 271427Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7703 WMIM

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

27M[illegible]081445

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 7651 (IN 083062)

B. DIRECTOR 036576

C. MADRID 1177 (IN 089749)

1P

1. SAMKO HAS CONFIRMED FLIGHT RESERVATIONS FOR MADRID ON 29 MAY. HAS BEEN BRIEFED AND UNDERSTANDS CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

2. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

SECRET

(1)
X
R
4
WH/C/8

MICROFILMED
JUN 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

3-201-866054

CS COPY

201-735296

28 May 70

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 1020 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

23 II 2

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: 4 PER

ACTION UNIT: WH8 FILE, VR RI/AN, EVR6, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI2

ACTION NO. 055

S E C R E T 251224Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1177 MADR

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI ROME

1P

TYPIC AMAUTO IN 089749

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 7651 (IN 080062)

B. DIRECTOR 036576

MICROFILMED
JUN 9 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN SAMKO 29 MAY TRAVEL CONFIRMED. ON ARRIVAL MADRID WILL BE CONTACTED BY SACODER PER MADRID 1166. RESERVATION AT HOTEL FENIX CONFIRMED BUT WONDER IF HE MAY HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY WITH FLIGHT RESERVATIONS IN VIEW RATHER HEAVY PRE-SEASON TOURIST TRAFFIC THIS YEAR.

2. FLOREGA PRESENCE MADRID FOR SAMKO APPROACH COULD BE HELPFUL BUT NOT DEEMED ESSENTIAL. ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD IT APPEAR DESIRABLE TO EXTEND CURRENT DEBRIEFING BEYOND 29 MAY, SUGGEST HE BE ALLOWED REMAIN TO WRAP UP CASE.

3. FILE 201-735296, 201-866054. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN	CC
~~AB~~	
~~IN~~	
PS	MO
BX	4
~~DES~~	NFD
~~FI~~	

B-201-866054

201-735296

CS COPY
SECRET

25 May 70

File: [illegible]

Quaco 26 5 May 1970

Report No. 314

FRANCO enters the office. They mention the incident that happened last night at Barajas airport when the plane arrived from Havana. A woman(Spanish) raised her umbrella and threatened HORACIO, while a gusano kept hitting him. FRANCO says that he hit five or six of the attackers real hard, and that he thinks he really hurt one of them quite badly around the face and head. Everyone was covered with blood.

A woman and a man come into the office and talk about the incident(above) also. Then the girl says that she has come to Spain to take a course in Alcala. It seems that the course is connected with UNESCO. She will later go to the University of Santander and on to Paris to take a course there. She says she is a member of the Party, and wants to know how she is going to maintain her contact here in Spain. RUIZ says that they too are members, but that due to the difficulty of public relations that it is a month and a half since they have had a group meeting. He says that the work that they are doing makes it difficult to carry on the Party life, but that nevertheless it is necessary to have group meetings to discuss the members. She says that she would like to live in Madrid, in a student residence, and commute to Alcala by car, or bus every day. Ruiz says that in this way it would be more economical for her and she would have more contact with the other students. She says that she would like to be in some Spanish-American college to get acquainted with the students there. RUIZ says she could be very useful to them with her student connections, and that without interfering with her studies she can also be helping Cuba. He highly recommends that she get every thing she can, culturally during her stay in Spain. He says that for very much she has read about museums and historical and artistic places it is quite different seeing them.

/ [illegible]

Ruiz asks her to leave her address at the embassy so that the President of the Women's Federation of the Party can take advantage of her being of use to them in one way or another. Ruiz tells her that anything that might happen to her to come to the embassy and let them know about it. He says there is the danger that they will spy on her or follow her and that there is the possibility of enemies getting close to her. He says that everyone makes mistakes and that if she does to let them know at once so that they can prevent the consequence, and give her good advice.

He has been out of the office for a long time. At about 2:30 pm he comes in with BARREDA and another person. Ruiz says that he has to write to the Deputy Secretary(of Foreign Relations-?) about the incident at Barajas airport. He is going to point out the permissiveness of the police. He is going to point out that the officials of the embassy were provoked by the others

EGMA-26245 22 may 1970

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

20

SECRET (When Filled In)

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY dl PER ______

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO FILE, VR R/AN. EUR6 CI/OPS FI2.

ACTION NO. 896

S E C R E T 221222Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1166 MADR

22 MAY IN 088519

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: WH/MAAIMI 7651 (IN 088062)

1P

1. SAMKO HAS RESERVATION AT HOTEL FENIX RPT FENIX PASEO DE LA CASTELLANA 2, BEGINNING 30 MAY. ON ARRIVAL SAMKO SHOULD TAKE TAXI DIRECTLY TO HOTEL WHERE SACODER USING ALIAS JOHN ALCINO WILL CONTACT AT 1700 HOURS, 30 MAY. IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY SAMKO SHOULD CALL ALCINO ON 276-6990. WHILE WAITING FOR SACODER'S VISIT SAMKO SHOULD ARRANGE FOR SEPARATE TOURS OF MADRID, TOLEDO AND EL ESCORIAL/VALLEY OF FALLEN FOR 1, 2 AND 3 JUNE. THIS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT STORY AS WELL AS FOR SAMKO TO HAVE LITERATURE ON HIS PERSON WHEN MAKES CONTACT WITH AMAUTO-1.

2. THANKS FOR FINE SUPPORT.

3. FILE 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

SECRET

MICROFILMED
JUN 9 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN	
AB	X
~~IN~~	
PS	
BX	4
~~DSC~~	~~AFD~~
~~FI~~	
WH/C/OP	

201-866054

CS COPY

201-735296

SECRET

22 May 70

[illegible] TOTAL COPIES 15

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: G[illegible]
UNIT: C/[illegible]/CTS
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 21 May 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

file

CONF: WH-8 | INFO: | FILE, VR. Do-4, RE/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ 25 10 23Z MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR 030857

TO DO BASE LOS ANGELES

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DO BASE LOS ANGELES 2098 (IN 037976)

1. THANK YOU. MOST USEFUL.

2. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG G. Brown

DO/I/B1 J.C. Rendell

William V. Broe
C/WHD

C/DOI

FILE:
[illegible]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET
GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY 6

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY zel PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH-8 INFO FILE, VR KI/AN, EUR-6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI-2

ACTION NO. 870

S E C R E T 212102Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7651 (NEBECKER ACTING)
WMIA

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 7628 (IN 087031)

B. WH/MIAMI 7633 (IN 087093)

C. MADRID 1151 (IN 087675)

21 MAY 70 088062
MICROFILMED
JUN 12 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. SAMKO HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE RESERVATIONS ON AERONAVES DE MEXICO FLIGHT TO MADRID ON 29 MAY.

2. SAMKO THOUROUGHLY UNDERSTANDS FOLLOWING COVER FOR TRIP:

A. WHEN WIFE PASSED AWAY, WAS BROKEN UP AND STILL NOT COMPLETELY RECOVERED. DECIDED TRIP TO EUROPE WOULD HELP FORGET.

B. SAW "JULIUS" LAST YEAR AT SAMKO'S HOLLYWOOD DELICATESSEN. SAMKO, WHO HEARD AMAUTO-1 HAD BEEN KILLED, WAS TOLD BY "JULIUS" OF AMAUTO-1'S CURRENT POSITION IN MADRID. SAMKO, THEREFORE, LOOKING UP AMAUTO-1 FOR OLD TIMES SAKE.

3. IF CONTACT ESTABLISHED, SAMKO INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW THESE LINES WITH AMAUTO-1:

WH/C/OP

B-201-866054

CS COPY
SECRET

21 May 70

201-735296

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION　CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　TOTAL COPIES　ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY: ______ PER ______ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT　FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 7651 SECRET

A. RELIVE OLD DAYS AND TRY TO REKINDLE OLD SPARK. MENTION HOW GOOD THINGS ARE IN STATES AND OPPORTUNITIES EXISTING.

B. IN LOW KEY, SOUND HIM OUT ON FEELINGS TOWARDS STATES, ANTHUG, REGIME, FUTURE, AND FAMILY.

C. SET UP CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR FUTURE, USING SAMKO'S HOME ADDRESS. AT SAME TIME, ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN ADDRESS TO WHICH HE COULD WRITE AMAUTO-1.

4. SAMKO UNDERSTANDS THESE BASIC INSTRUCTIONS AND CONCURS IN THEIR LOGIC. HE STATED WILLINGNESS TO APPLY THEM IN EVENTUAL MEETING WITH AMAUTO-1. ANY MORE COMPLICATED INSTRUCTIONS WOULD TEND TO CONFUSE AND POSSIBLY ALIENATE SAMKO AT THIS TIME. THIS ALSO ALLOWS MADRID ANY OPTIONS IT MAY WANT TO USE WITHOUT CONFUSING SAMKO.

5. SAMKO INDICATED "JULIUS" WAS JULIO DIAZ, BORN CIRCA 1930 IN CUBA. DURING 1950'S WHEN AMAUTO-1 WORKED FOR SAMKO, "JULIUS" ALSO WORKED AND WAS FRIEND OF AMAUTO-1. "JULIUS" RESIDES SOMEWHERE IN WEST PALM BEACH OR FORT LAUDERDALE, IS MARRIED, AND HAS CHILDREN. SAMKO HAS

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 WH/MIAMI 7651 SECRET

NOT SEEN SINCE CHANCE ENCOUNTER ABOUT YEAR AGO.

6. PLS PROVIDE HOTEL AND CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS. SAMKO WILL ACCEPT ANYONE WHO MENTIONS MR. JOSEPH NORRIS.

7. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

SECRET

E SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

ACC. COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

C AT: 1750 Z

BY 12 PER

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

WH 8 FILE, VR RI/AN, DO4, EUR6, FI 2, CI/OPS

3201

S E C R E T 211605Z MAY 70 CITE DO BASE LOS ANGELES 2298 LACD

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

21 08797 264/6CA

REF: DIRECTOR 035471

1. ROFFINOLI CONTACTED SUBJ REF (SUBJ) UNDER SUITABLE PRETEXT EVENING 20 MAY. SUBJ LIVING AT REF ADDRESS WITH ONE JORGE BORGES, A CUBAN REFUGEE.

2. NEITHER SUBJ NOR BORGES UNDERSTAND ENGLISH, SPEAK ONLY FEW ENGLISH PHRASES. SUBJ SOLVED LANGUAGE BARRIER BY ASKING SPANISH-ENGLISH SPEAKING NEIGHBOR TO INTERPRET. WHILE SUBJ CALLING NEIGHBOR, ROOMMATE BORGES MANAGED TELL ROFFINOLI SUBJ SUFFERING FROM SEVERE NERVOUS CONDITION, HAD UNDERGONE ELECTRO SHOCK TREATMENT APPROX YEAR AGO. ROFFINOLI NOTICED SOME NERVOUSNESS ON PART OF SUBJ, BUT THOUGHT PROBABLY DUE INITIAL UNCERTAINTY WHY ROFFINOLI CONTACTING HIM.

3. SUBJ IS WHITE CUBAN APPROX 5'6" TALL, WEIGHS 130-135 LBS. HAS SLENDER BUILD ALTHO SMALL PAUNCH. FACE OVAL SHAPED, COMPLEXION SLIGHTLY BLEMISHED. AQUILINE NOSE. HAS BLACK HAIR, CUT AT AVERAGE LENGTH. (NO SIDEBURNS, ETC.) SUBJ HAS VERY BOYISH APPEARANCE, COULD EASILY PASS AS PERSON 21-22 YEARS OLD ALTHO HE CLAIMS TO BE 29. NO OVERT HOMOSEXUAL TENDENCIES NOTED.

201-935296

21 May 70

CS COPY

SECRET

PAGE 2 DO BASE LOS ANGELES 2098 S E C R E T

4. SUBJ NEVER EMPLOYED SINCE ARRIVING LOS ANGELES ALTHO HAS APPLIED FOR SEVERAL JOBS. ACCORDING TO BORGES, SUBJ DENIED WORK DUE TO HIS NERVOUS CONDITION.

5. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: C AT: 1340 Z

DISSEM BY: dl PER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT
WH8

FILE, VR Eur6 R/AN 62

ACTION NO.
785

S E C R E T 211235Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1151
PRIORITY WH/MIAMI, DIRECTOR
TYPIC AMAUTO

21 May 70 IN 087675

REF: A. DIRECTOR 035742
B. WH/MIAMI 7628 (IN 087021)

1. PLEASED WITH APPEARANCE OF "JULIAS" INTO OPS PICTURE. WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT APPROACH TO AMAUTO-1 USING SAMKO; HOWEVER REF B HIGHLIGHTS AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF SAMKO'S CHARACTER WHICH COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION. BEFORE PROVIDING CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS NEED CLEAR INDICATION THAT SAMKO, ALTHOUGH DOING FAVOR FOR HIS GOVT, WILLING AND ABLE FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. HE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT HIS MISSION TO MADRID IS TO OBTAIN ASSESSMENT OF AMAUTO-1 AND THROUGH RENEWAL OF OLD FRIENDSHIP TO OPEN CHANNEL TO AMAUTO-1 SHOULD THE LATTER EVER NEED A FRIEND IN THE U.S. ALSO THAT HE CANNOT RPT CANNOT EXPRESS OR IMPLY TO AMAUTO-1 THAT VISIT TO MADRID WAS AT THE BEHEST OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OR JKLANCE. WITH THIS ASSURANCE SEE NO REASON NOT TO PROCEED WITH OP. ON OTHER HAND

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296
21 May 70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 1151 SECRET

IF HE NOT WILLING OR ABLE COMPLY WITH THESE GUIDELINES, THEN OPERATION NOT LIKELY ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES AND MIGHT CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT TO ALL CONCERNED.

2. WELCOME ANY WH/MIAMI CHANGES IN SCENARIO; OTHERWISE STATION WILL PROCEED AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED.

3. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: C AT: 1920 Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25 30

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

PRECEDENCE

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4			

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN EUR6 CI CI/OPS CI/OA

ACTION NO. 695 FI2

20 MAY 70 087093

S E C R E T 201545Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7633 (WHIM) (NEBECKER ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF WH/MIAMI 7628 (IN 087021)

1P

1. SAMKO CONTACTED MID-DAY 20 MAY. HE HAS SHOTS, NEW PASSPORT, AND READY TO TRAVEL. PACHANKIS MENTIONED TENTATIVE DATE OF 29 MAY VIA IBERIA.

2. WHEN QUESTIONED ON MUTUAL FRIEND WHO COULD HAVE TOLD HIM OF AMAUTO-1 POSITION IN SPAIN, SAMKO SAID HE TALKED TO "JULIAS" FROM OLD DAYS ABOUT ONE YEAR AGO. "JULIAS" WORKED IN GROCERY STORE WITH AMAUTO-1 AND CURRENTLY RESIDES IN MIAMI/HOLLYWOOD AREA. SAMKO CANNOT FURTHER IDENTIFY. APPEARS WE CAN INVOKE "JULIAS" AS COVER STORY FOR CONTACT, RATHER THAN PURSUE MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ LEAD.

3. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN WH
AR X
~~IN~~
FI 100
RX 4
~~DE FED~~
~~EI~~
WH/C/OP

MICROFILMED
JUN 9 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

b-201-866054

CS COPY

201-735296

20 May 70

SECRET

10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: C AT: 1840 Z

DISSEM BY: 41 PER #

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI2

ACTION NO 690

S E C R E T 201805Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7628 (NEBECKER ACTING) WMIM

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MADRID

20 May 70 C 87021

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. MADRID 1131 (IN 085999)

B. DIRECTOR 035471

C. DIRECTOR 035482

D. DIRECTOR 035499

MICROFILMED
JUN 9 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2P

1. REFS B THRU D APPEAR TO BE CONTRADICTORY. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. IN ANY EVENT, SAMKO HAS ALREADY BEEN BRIEFED ALONG LINES OF DIRECTOR 033355. DO NOT BELIEVE BRIEFING ON COMPLICATED SENARIO WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE, AS SAMKO IS SIMPLE MAN, HAS SOMEWHAT VOLATILE PERSONALITY, AND NOT TRAINED INTEL OPERATIVE. HE IS IN ~~EVVECT~~ EFFECT DOING FAVOR FOR HIS GOVERNMENT AND IS NOT A RECRUITED ASSET WHO HAS BEEN TRAINED TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS. IN ADDITION, HE APPEARS TO BE RATHER NAIVE AS FAR AS INTEL OPS ARE CONCERNED. (AS EXAMPLE, WHEN SAMKO APPLIED FOR PASSPORT, EXPECTED RED CARPET TREATMENT. DESCRIBED PASSPORT OFFICIAL AS "MISERABLE SOB" WHO GAVE EVERYONE HARD TIME.

AN 00
AB ~~X~~
~~IN~~
FS (No)
BX 4
~~DES~~ NFD
~~FI~~
WH/C/CP

B-201-866054

SECRET

CS COPY

20 May 70

201-235296

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

DVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

Y: AT:

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

SSEM BY PER #

TION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

TION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 7628 SECRET

PACHANKIS TOLD HIM FOR SECURIY REASONS PASSPORT PEOPLE NOT ADVISED SAMKO ROLE IN AMAUTO CASE.) ALSO, BELIEVE ANY PREARRANGED PLAN COULD MOST EASILY GO AWRY GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES OF AMAUTO CASE.

3. SUGGEST MIMAI BRIEFING OF SAMKO REMAIN SIMPLE AND UNCOMPLICATED. THIS WILL ALLOW MADRID CASE OFFICER TO PERSONALLY ASSESS SAMKO ANT TAILOR OPERATIONAL DIRECTION TO SAMKO AND OPERATIONAL CLIMATE IN MADRID. IN SUMMARY, GIVEN TIME ELEMENT AND OUR ASSESSMENT SAMKO, WE FEEL CONTACT BETWEEN SAMKO AND AMAUTO-1 AT THIS STAGE SHOULD BE AIMED AT UP-TO-DATE ASSESSMENT OF LATTER AND POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT COMMO CHANNEL TO FREE WORLD.

4. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

SECRET

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	UK
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: GBrown:fll
UNIT: C/WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R-1325
DATE: 20 May 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: ~~[illegible]~~ INFO: FILE, VR, EUR 6, WH/COG 8, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T 20 21 25 z May 70 CITE DIRECTOR 035742

TO WH/MIAMI INFO: MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. MADRID 1131 (IN 035999)
B. DIRECTOR 035471
C. DIRECTOR 035482
D. DIRECTOR 035499
E. WH/MIAMI (IN 037021)

MICROFILMED
JUN 5 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. BELIEVE CONTRADICTION CITED REF E IS ONLY APPARENT. CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER (NOT NUMERICAL ORDER) OF OTHER REFS WAS D, A, B, AND C. THAT IS, REF D, WRITTEN FIRST, TOOK BASIC POSITION THAT VIGO NOT TO BE CONSIDERED FOR APPROACH WHEN WE HAD SAMKO FOR THAT PURPOSE. THIS POSITION OBTAINS. REFS B AND C WERE ONLY IN RESPONSE TO REF A SUGGESTION THAT KNOWLEDGE OF VIGO ON SAMKO'S PART WOULD BUILD UP CREDIBLE SAMKO STORY TO AMAUTO-1. THIS DOES NOT MEAN ANY USE OF VIGO. REFS B AND C WERE SENT PRIORITY AND THUS GOT LOWER NUMBERS THAN REF D.

2. DEFER TO ADDEES ON SCENARIO.

CONTINUED

CS COPY

201-735216

B201-866054

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

20 May 70
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR. RID/EDI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 035742

3. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054.

END OF MESSAGE

19 JUN 1970

A C/E/IB Louis Rosoo

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

James E. Flannery
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

11/

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER;pfd
UNIT: WH COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 19 MAY 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 30 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN EUR6 FI2 c/cs

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 1923 19Z MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR 035499

TO WH/MIAMI, MADRID

AN 0/0

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 7595 (IN 085478)

B. DIRECTOR 033355

1. DUE LACK OF INFO MENTIONED REF A, PLUS SHORT TIME AMAUTO-1 SCHEDULED REMAIN MADRID, DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE VIGO LEAD WORTH PURSUIT. APPRECIATE WORK DONE ANYHOW.

2. HQS BELIEVES SAMKO APPROACH MENTIONED REF B OUR ONLY GOOD POSSIBILITY VIEW TIME LIMITATIONS. WHEN MADRID VIEWS ON SCENARIO RECEIVED, SAMKO AND PACHANKIS CAN ARRANGE TRAVEL.

3. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref A mentioned location of distant cousin of AMAUTO-1, current recruitment target. Ref B urged field to consider sending former employer of AMAUTO-1 to Madrid for "chance confrontation."

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

EUR/IB

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

19 May 70

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/EUR/
RELEASING OFFICER

EUR/Exd

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-735296

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: G.BROWN:cf
UNIT: C/WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1325
DATE: 19 MAY 70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, RID/AN EUR6 FI2 CI/OPS DO4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 1922 05Z MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR 035482

TO PRIORITY MADRID INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 1131 (IN 035999)

1. ASKING LOS ANGELES FOR REF INFO SEPARATELY, EXCEPT BELIEVE NOT ADVISABLE ASK AMAUTO-1 COUSIN ABOUT AMAUTO-1 LOCATION SINCE COUSIN HAS NOT SEEN HIM FOR SEVEN YEARS AND HAS BEEN UNDER PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT.

2. COMPLETELY CONCUR REST OF REF.

3. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

AN/WL
AS X
RID
FI

W J Wild
C/WHD

AC/EUR/IB/S Louis Rosso

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/EUR/FI/CI
EUR/COO

RELEASING OFFICER

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG
201-735296

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

19 May 70
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG: G. [illegible]:cf
UNIT: C/WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1325
DATE: 19 MAY 70

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY [illegible] PER _____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. _____

CONF: WH 5 FILE, VR, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 19 22 23 Z MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO PRIORITY DO BASE LOS ANGELES INFO ROUTINE WH/MIAMI, MADRID 03547

TYPIC AMAUTO

1. PLS DETERMINE ASAP PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND OCCUPATION OF MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ, 935 BEACON AVENUE, APARTMENT 10, LOS ANGELES, APPARENTLY NO TELEPHONE. VIGOS WENT LOS ANGELES FROM MIAMI IN EARLY MARCH.

2. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

AT [illegible]
AR
IB
[illegible]
BX
[illegible] INFO
FI

WH COMMENT: Based on Madrid 1131 (IN 035999) request that access agent of WH/Miami be given much information about Subject as possible for sake of approach to Cuban target in Madrid.

C/WH/F [illegible]
AC/EUR/IB/S [illegible]
C/WHD [illegible]

JOSEPH BULIK
C/DO/I/B1
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-735296
19 May 70

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 41 PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT
WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2

ACTION NO.
542

S E C R E T 191224Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1131 MADR

19 MAY IN 085999

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 033355

1. WE BELIEVE THAT CHANCE ENCOUNTER WITH AMAUTO-1 ALONE TOO DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE SINCE AMAUTO-1 IS FREQUENTLY IN COMPANY SOMEONE FROM HIS STAFF OR HAVING LUNCH WITH SPANISH OFFICIALS OR BUSINESSMEN. MOREOVER, ENCOUNTER UNDER THIS SITUATION, WE FEEL, WOULD NOT PERMIT RELAXED EXCHANGE BETWEEN SAMKO AND AMAUTO-1. WE WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE:

A. ON ARRIVAL SPAIN VIA AERONAVES DE MEXICO FLIGHT 450 LEAVING MIAMI FRIDAY SAMKO WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO HOTEL OF STATION SELECTION. STATION OFFICER WILL ALSO OCCUPY HOTEL IN ALIAS AND INITIAL CONTACT WITH SAMKO WILL BE MADE IN HOTEL. (INCIDENTALLY, BELIEVE NO NEED PACHANKIS ACCOMPANY SAMKO TO MADRID.)

B. EARLY SUNDAY AFTERNOON SAMKO WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO AMAUTO-1'S PRIVATE RESIDENCE. HIS EXCUSE WILL BE THAT HE WOULD HAVE GONE TO EMBASSY BUT WAS CERTAIN THAT

AN
AB X
IN
BZ
DES
FI
WH/C/OP

CS COPY

SECRET

19 May 70
201-735296

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

BY ______ AT ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 1131 SECRET

EMBASSY WOULD BE CLOSED. IN ADDITION, SINCE SAMKO SCHEDULED TOUR OF MADRID AND SUBURBS LEAVING EARLY MONDAY MORNING DECIDED MAKE EFFORT CONTACT AMAUTO-1 AT HOME RATHER THAN POSSIBLY MISS OPPORTUNITY TO SEE HIM. (SAMKO WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO SIGN UP FOR TOUR OF CITY TO LEND AUTHENTICITY TO STORY.) SAMKO WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED REPLY TO INEVITABLE QUESTION FROM AMAUTO-1: HOW DID YOU FIND MY ADDRESS? SAMKO'S REPLY WOULD BE THAT HE OBTAINED ADDRESS FROM IBERIA EMPLOYEE AT AIRPORT WHO SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME TRYING TO LOCATE AMAUTO-1 RESIDENCE. (ADDRESS APPEARS IN DIP LIST AVAILABLE OVERTLY.) SAMKO WOULD FURTHER EXPLAIN, IF NECESSARY, THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW EMPLOYEE GOT ADDRESS, BUT KNOWS SHE MADE NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CALLS. WE CANNOT PREDICT AMAUTO-1'S REACTION TO THIS DIRECT APPROACH. HE MIGHT CLAIM PRESS OF BUSINESS OR OTHER COMMITMENTS THEREBY REFUSING SEE SAMKO IN HOME BUT MIGHT SUGGEST THAT SAMKO VISIT EMBASSY MONDAY MORNING. SAMKO SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SAY THAT IF THIS WOULD NOT EMBARRASS AMAUTO-1 HE WOULD GLADLY CANCEL TOUR AND GO. TO USE STANDARD LINE

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: _______ AT: _______ Z

DISSEM BY _______ PER _______ # _______

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. _______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. _______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO _______ BRANCH _______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MADRID 1131 SECRET

THAT BECAUSE HE IS AMERICAN HE SHOULD NOT VISIT PBRUMEN EMBASSY, WOULD, WE FEEL, QUICKLY AROUSE AMAUTO-1'S SUSPICION. SAMKO'S APPROACH TO AMAUTO-1 RESIDENCE CAN BE MONITORED FROM HOMES OF TWO STAFFERS WHO LIVE WITHIN EYSHOT OF AMAUTO-1'S RESIDENCE.

C. AMAUTO-1'S PROBABLE SECOND QUESTION: HOW DID SAMKO KNOW HE WAS IN MADRID? REQUIRES MORE THOUGHT AND HELP FROM MIAMI. IDEALLY, SAMKO SHOULD BE ABLE SAY THAT A MUTUAL FRIEND OF BOTH AMAUTO-1 AND SAMKO WERE TOGETHER RECENTLY IN MIAMI AND AMAUTO-1'S NAME MENTIONED. SAMKO ASKED WHAT HAPPENED TO AMAUTO-1 AND FRIEND DISCLOSED THAT AMAUTO-1 NOW "AMBASSADOR" TO SPAIN. (SUBJECT WH/MIAMI (IN 085476) 7595 MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE "FRIEND" WHOSE NAME SAMKO MIGHT USE. STATION SUGGESTS THAT CONTACT BE MADE WITH SUBJECT IN LOS ANGELES TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE KNOWS WHERE AMAUTO-1 IS. ALSO OBTAIN PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION, OCCUPATION IN LA AND PRIOR JOB IN MIAMI PLUS OTHER NOTABLE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH COULD BE USED AS FILLER BY SAMKO TO SHOW THAT POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN AMAUTO-1'S COUSIN AND SAMKO.) IN ADDITON, SUGGEST

SECRET

201-235296

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY PER ☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT | INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 MADRID 1131 S E C R E T

PACHANKIS RE-CONTACT SAMKO TO ASCERTAIN NAMES OF PERSONS IN UNITED STATES WHO KNEW AMAUTO-1 AND FROM WHOM SAMKO OSTENSIBLY MIGHT HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION OF AMAUTO-1'S MADRID ASSIGNMENT. WELCOME OTHER SUGGESTIONS AS REPLY TO ABOVE QUESTION.

2. LINE SAMKO WOULD TAKE AFTER FOOT IN DOOR SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY REHEARSED IN MIAMI BEFORE ARRIVAL MADRID BECAUSE OF OI- ELEMENTA MIAMI SHOULD +

CABLE WHAT SPECIFIC

INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN TO SAMKO SO THAT STATION OFFICER COMPLETELY AWARE OF HOW SAMKO IS TO CONDUCT HIMSELF.

3. IN VIEW DESIRE TO INITIATE CONTACT BEFORE AMAUTO-1'S JUNE DEPARTURE SUGGEST CONTACT ABOVE PERSONS ASAP.

4. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

WILL SVC UPON REQUEST

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL
OF
TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** (When Filled In)

Unasgnd

067

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

C/S [illegible] HEVIS
UNIT WH/COG/RR
EXT [illegible]
DATE 1? MAY 1970
CONF. WH [illegible] 6

CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CS/DO,
DO 5, FI 6, FI/D, IW, EUR 5 DCI, D/DCI, DDI, [illegible]

TDCS DB-315/02487-70

DATE DISTRIBUTED 18 MAY 1970

PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
OSM-10026/MADR 1069
(IN 079701)
MADR-1100 (IN 082937)
QUSEQUIN/QUDOZE
Liaison: 65*

DISSEMINATION

[illegible] 2	WH/R	1	E/IB/R	3	PARA 4:		
SEC/OPS 2	WH/CA	1	E/MADR	1	QUKETCH/22		
SEC/E[illegible] 1	WH/FI	1	WH/MEX	1			
SEC/CA 1	WH/SAO	1	E/R	1			
WH/MIAMI #	WH/REG	1					

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE | ARMY | NAVY | AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS (Place X in appropriate space. List electrical addressees.)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTROLLED DISSEM

CABLE SEC
- RECOMMEND EXO ☒ XXX
- BASIC DOCUMENT NOT MADE AVAILABLE DCI ☒ XX
- RELAY CABLE ATTACHED ☒ XX MADRID WH/MIAMI
- SHOW IW ☐

IW
- DISSEM ELECTRICALLY ☐ TO:

(CORRECTION TAPE USED)

OTHER
- EXCLUSIVE FOR USIB ☐
- USIB PERSONAL ATTN ☐
- ZRWAHOO CABLE SENT XXX AS RELAY
- NOT FOR LIAISON ☐

File: [illegible] 10-1

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Robert Hopkins
C/WH/COG/RR

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
E/IB/R

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER
Robert H. Rife
C/WH/R

COPY NO.

FORM 3-69 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (13-20-44-47)

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

IN-079701

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO XXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX

Exo , [illegible]

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

10 18 00z May 70

CITE TDCS DB-315/02487-70

DIST 18 MAY 1970

COUNTRY CUBA/SPAIN

DOI 4-6 MAY 1970

SUBJECT PROTESTS BY CUBAN EMBASSY IN SPAIN OVER ALLEGED ATTACKS ON CUBAN OFFICIALS

ACQ SPAIN, MADRID (EARLY MAY 1970) FIELD NO. OSM 10026

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE; FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS SENSITIVE AND USUALLY RELIABLE.

1. IN EARLY MAY 1970, THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MADRID PREPARED A PROTEST NOTE TO THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY OVER AN INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT THE BARAJAS AIRPORT IN MADRID BETWEEN CUBAN REFUGEES AND CUBAN OFFICIALS, IN WHICH BLOWS WERE EXCHANGED. ACCORDING TO MINISTER GUILLERMO RUIZ, CUBAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, THE EMBASSY WILL CHARGE THAT SIX FUNCTIONARIES AND FOUR DIPLOMATIC COURIERS FROM HAVANA WERE PHYSICALLY ATTACKED ON 4 MAY AT THE AIRPORT BY DISAFFECTED CUBANS, ALL RESIDENTS OF SPAIN. THE NOTE STATED THAT "THIS COWARDLY AND UNJUSTIFIABLE AGGRESSION" ENDANGERED DIPLOMATIC

DOCUMENTS AND COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AN ISOLATED ACT BUT THE CONSEQUENCE OF REPEATED PROVOCATIONS AT BARAJAS. SPANISH AUTHORITIES WERE ASKED TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF THESE INCIDENTS.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO ANOTHER UNTESTED SOURCE WHO WAS AN EYEWITNESS TO THE 4 MAY INCIDENT, THE CROWD INCLUDED 23 MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND A NUMBER OF CUBAN EXPATRIATES MEETING AN IBERIA FLIGHT FROM HAVANA WHICH WAS CARRYING 75 CUBAN OFFICIALS AND 30 CUBAN REFUGEES. MAXIMO TORRES, FORMER MAYOR OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA AND A MAN OF OVER 60 YEARS OF AGE, ADDRESSED ONE OF THE ARRIVING CUBAN OFFICIALS, MISTAKING HIM FOR A REFUGEE. THE OFFICIAL REBUFFED HIM RUDELY AND A GENERAL ARGUMENT ENSUED AND BLOWS WERE EXCHANGED. HORACIO FUENTES MARTINEZ, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY, JUMPED FROM A NEARBY CAR AND PISTOL-WHIPPED ONE OF THE REFUGEES. AFTER THE POLICE ARRIVED, TORRES AND HIS WIFE NEEDED MEDICAL ATTENTION.)

3. ON 6 MAY, ROBERTO FRANCO OLIVA, CUBAN CONSUL IN MADRID, COMPLAINED TO A SPANISH POLICE INSPECTOR CONCERNING THE INCIDENT AT THE AIRPORT AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE SCENE AT THE AIRPORT HAD BEEN PREPARED BY THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) AND 'COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES." THE INSPECTOR REPLIED TO THIS THAT SPANISH AUTHORITIES WERE

INVESTIGATING AND WOULD GIVE CUBAN OFFICIALS THE PROTECTION IN SPAIN WHICH THEY SHOULD HAVE. HE SAID THAT THREE CUBAN REFUGEES HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND WOULD BE DEPORTED TO FRANCE. FOR THEIR PART, THE REFUGEES HAD SAID THAT HORACIO FUENTES HAD PULLED OUT A GUN DURING THE FIGHT, A CHARGE WHICH FRANCO DENIED AT LENGTH.

B. MANY OTHER ATTACKS HAVE BEEN SUFFERED BY CUBAN OFFICIALS AT THE AIRPORT AND DAMAGE DONE TO THEIR PARKED CARS.

C. WHEN CUBAN SEAMEN ARE ARRESTED BY THE SPANISH POLICE IN THE CANARY ISLANDS THEY ARE INTERROGATED SEPARATELY IN THE POLICE STATION BY AN AGENT OF THE CIA WHO IS A CUBAN "GUSANO" (TURNCOAT).

D. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SPANISH REPUBLICANS AND SPANISH COMMUNISTS IN CUBA, THE SPANISH EMBASSY IN HAVANA IS NEVER MOLESTED.

E. FRANCO IS PREPARED TO ADVISE CUBAN PASSENGERS COMING TO SPAIN TO CARRY RAZORS FOR SELF DEFENSE. CUBAN OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO GO TO THE AIRPORT, SHOULD APPLY FOR LICENSES TO CARRY PISTOLS.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE, CUBAN DIPLOMATS MAY APPLY FOR GUN PERMITS TO THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WOULD PROBABLY RECEIVE PERMISSION. NON-DIPLOMATIC CUBANS MUST APPLY TO THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF

INTERNAL SECURITY (DGS) BUT WOULD PROBABLY NOT RECEIVE PERMISSION. TDCSDB-315/01741-70 REPORTED THAT AS OF 8 APRIL ALL CUBAN COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES WERE CARRYING PISTOLS, AND THAT SOURCES OF KNOWN RELIABILITY HAVE NOTED THAT CUBAN DIPLOMATS ABROAD HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO CARRY A SMALL HAND WEAPON.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE.

14-00000

(21)

LS

WH8 FILE, VR Rllb. R/an. a. alops Fz

439

S E C R E T 151826Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7555 (WMIN) (REDECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

IN 085470

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF A DIRECTOR 56893 (4081546)

B WH/MIAMI 7519

1. AMAUTO-1 COUSIN, MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ, DEPARTED MIAMI EARLY MARCH FOR LOS ANGELES. PRESENT ADDRESS IS 935 BEACON AVE., APT 16, LOS ANGELES 90015, NO TELEPHONE. ABOVE FROM RELATIVE OF VIGOS IN MIAMI, MERCEDES (GARCIA) DOBARROS, WHO DOES NOT KNOW AMAUTO-1.

2. AS INDICATED IN REF B, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE SUMMARY ON AMAUTO-1 FROM VIGOS DEBRIEFING, DUE TO LACK OF INFO. ABOVE ADDRESS FORWARDED IN CASE HQS WISHES TO PURSUE.

8

6/6
3 X
~~INFO~~
~~FI~~
64/1/68

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

18 May 70

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

(24)

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

DISSEM BY 30 PER

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN EUR6 FI2 CI/OPS CI CI/IC2

DDP ADDP CSDO

ACTION NO. 298

S E C R E T 151724Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7570 (NEBECKER ACTING)

IN MIAM 15 MAY 70 084149

DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 033355

B. UFAA-1978

1. IN MEETING WITH SAMKO ON 14 MAY, PACHANKIS MENTIONED POSSIBLE TRIP TO MADRID AS TOURIST TO HOLD "CHANCE MEETING WITH AMAUTO/1. SMAKO VERY ENTHUSED, FLATTERED HIS GOVERNMENT NEEDED HIM, AND IN POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND FOR OPERATION. NO FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS MADE (EXPECT WE WOULD PAY EXPENSES ON TRIP) AND HE APPEARS TO BE MOTIVATED TO HELP COUNTRY AND OLD FRIEND. AT OUR REQUEST, SAMKO HAS APPLIED FOR NEW PASSPORT. INCIDENTALLY, HIS WIFE PASSED AWAY ON 6 NOVEMBER 1969.

2. WE ARE NOW IN POSITION TO DISPATCH SAMKO. PLS ADVISE WHEN HE IS NEEDED ON AMAUTO/1 APPROACH.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

OK, let's go. Do you think enough caution, "chance," and "non-political" etc. have already been written into this op?

NOT yet.

[illegible] 10-1

SECRET

FORM 1020 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MFG 1

I

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 24

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRET (When Filled In)

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR R/AN, C/OA, FI 2, EUR6

ACTION NO. 927

SECRET 121902Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7515 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MADRID

12 [illegible]

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 030893

1. MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ OF PARA 3 REF IS COUSIN OF AMAUTO-1. HE WAS GIVEN CI DEBRIEFING BY AMOTIN-122 ON 24 FEBRUARY. VIGOS HAS NOT SEEN AMAUTO-1 SINCE 1963, HAS BEEN RECEIVING PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND IS HOMOSEXUAL. DUE TO LACK OF INFO FROM VIGOS, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE REPORT ON AMAUTO-1.

2. WILL HAVE PACHANKIS INTERVIEW FOR ANY POSSIBLE INFO MISSED BY AMOTS AND ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~EX~~
~~DS~~ MFD
~~SI~~

CS COPY

201-735296
12 May 70

SECRET

DC

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER:mdu
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819/7144
DATE: 11 MAY 1970

TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 35/21 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH/8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 21 06 MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO WH/MIAMI INFO MADRID 033355

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 030893 B. UFAA-1978

1. VIEW REF B, HQS SANGUINE ABOUT POSSIBILITIES OF "CHANCE" APPROACH BY SAMKO TO AMAUTO-1. AS REASONABLY WELL OFF RETIRED PERSON, SAMKO COULD NATURALLY GO TO MADRID AS TOURIST. HQS WONDERS WHETHER THIS WOULD HOLD WATER UNLESS WIFE ACCOMPANIED HIM. REQUEST MIAMI INVESTIGATE THIS POINT.

2. APPROACH BY SAMKO WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT LEAD TO RECRUITMENT, BUT WOULD OFFER PERSONAL READING OF AMAUTO-1 BASED ON WHAT APPEARS TO BE WARM ENTREE PROVIDED BY FONDLY-REMEMBERED PAST ASSOCIATION. IF APPROPRIATE, SAMKO COULD PROVIDE LINK TO "OTHER WORLD" IN CASE AMAUTO-1 EVER NEEDED HELP. LATTER SCHEDULED TRAVEL HAVANA IN JUNE 70 AND RETURN MADRID PRIOR POSTING CUBA. JUDGING FROM AMBEDEW-1 AND AMDELAY-1 CASES, BRIEF RETURN TO CUBA MIGHT PROVE TURNING POINT IN ANY DECISION TO DEFECT. THEREFORE, ANY MEETING WITH SAMKO SHOULD BE PRIOR JUNE DEPARTURE.

AN UU
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BR~~
~~DEST~~ RFD
FI

3. IN EVENT POSSIBLE SAMKO TRAVEL TO MADRID, WE WOULD NEED

201-735296

C O N T I N U E D . . .

CS COPY

12 May 70

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

Mar 20 11 39 AM '70

14 1 39 PM '70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY __________ PER __________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO __________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. REQUIRED. RID/EDI

CONF: | INFO | FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

703335

PAGE TWO

LIST OF PLACES FREQUENTED BY AMAUTO-1 WHERE SAMKO WOULD HAVE CHANCE "BUMP INTO" HIM. IF MADRID HAS OTHER IDEAS, WELCOME ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO.

4. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: Ref A said Hqs willing consider use of SAMKO to approach AMAUTO-1. Ref B gave results of Miami's contacts with SAMKO.

WE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

EUR/IB

COORDINATING OFFICERS

James E Flannery
JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

FORM 1020 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

I

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

MAY 12 6 16 PM '70

Lunsford
f.i. Amsoray

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. COPY

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 28 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO Back to the
drawing board

ACTION UNIT WH8 FILE, VR, R/AN, C/OA, FI2, EUR6

ACTION NO. 927

S E C R E T 121902Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7515 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MADRID

12 [illegible]

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 030893

1. MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ OF PARA 3 REF IS COUSING OF AMAUTO-1. HE WAS GIVEN CI DEBRIEFING BY AMOTIN-122 ON 24 FEBRUARY. VIGOS HAS NOT SEEN AMAUTO-1 SINCE 1963, HAS BEEN RECEIVING PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND IS HOMOSEXUAL. DUE TO LACK OF INFO FROM VIGOS, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE REPORT ON AMAUTO-1.

2. WILL HAVE PACHANKIS INTERVIEW FOR ANY POSSIBLE INFO MISSED BY AMOTS AND ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

FILE:
AMAUTO-1

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (21)

SECRET

COMPLETED BY CABLE SECRETARIAT

MAY 18 3 40 PM '70

ACTION COPY

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

YES ☐ NO ☐

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____________ BRANCH

Lance Ford

file

WH8 FILE, VR EUR 6, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

439

SECRET 191620Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7595 (NEDECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

IN 005470

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF A DIRECTOR 030893

B WH/MIAMI 7515 (4081546)

1. AMAUTO-1 COUSIN, MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ, DEPARTED MIAMI EARLY MARCH FOR LOS ANGELES. PRESENT ADDRESS IS 935 BEACON AVE., APT 10, LOS ~~T~~ ANGELES 90015, NO TELEPHONE. ABOVE FROM RELATIVE OF VIGOS IN MIAMI, MERCEDES (GARCIA) DOBARROS, WHO DOES NOT KNOW AMAUTO-1.

2. AS INDICATED IN REF B, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE SUMMARY ON AMAUTO-1 FROM VIGOS DEBRIEFING, DUE TO LACK OF INFO. ABOVE ADDRESS FORWARDED IN CASE HQS WISHES TO PURSUE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

View lack info, suggest only hold in [illegible]. What you think?

Answ. no interest.

Amauto-1

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

201-814891
MADR-01054
08 MAY 70

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
TRAVELING HAVANA MID-JUNE FOR A MEETING
OF AMBASSADORS

UFAOIR

R 70C5190007

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO
Chief of Station, Madrid

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Study on Guillermo RUIZ Perez.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OSMW-11726

Forwarded herewith is a completed version by AMEDIT-2 of the study on Guillermo RUIZ Perez.

MICHAEL V. SLATINSKI

KENNETH B. TICINETO

Attachment: h/w

Distribution:
3 - COS, Madrid w/att h/w
2 - COS, WH/Miami w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMW-11829

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE
8 MAY 1970

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-735296

(5 May 1970)

Distribution:

1 - EUR/IB
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - RID
1 - Originator

AN	
AB	
IN	
PS	
RY	
DES	NFD
FI	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS Richard Wheeler	pfd	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG	5 May 70	James E. Flannery for

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/EUR/IB		Louis Rosso Glenn A. Rounsevell

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

0

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M COB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
INFO AS REPORTED BY SUBJECT OF 201-866054

201-866054
UFAA-01978
04 MAY 70

R 7005110495

OSM

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FORM 3020 10-69 USE PREV. EDITION

1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

MAY 8 10 46 AM '70

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: ACTION COPY

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 2 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ACTION NO. 587

S E C R E T 081046Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1054

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI ROME

TYPIC AMMEDIA QUDOZE

8 MAY IN 073059

1. FROM QUSEQUIN/QUDOZE 6 MAY:

A. CARLOS ALFARAS, CUBAN AMBASSADOR LEBANON AND SYRIA, TOLD ANTOLIN (PROBABLY ANTOLIN ALFONSO CASTENEDA), CUBAN EMBASSY ROME THAT HE (ALFARAS) AND WIFE SCHEDULED FLY MADRID/ROME 9 MAY IBERIA FLIGHT 358. ANTOLIN SAID THAT SALVADOR VILASECA, AMBASSADOR ITALY, IN CUBA FOR WEEK'S VACATION; EXPECTED RETURN ROME 6 MAY ALITALIA 366.

B. GUILLERMO RUIZ, CHARGE IN MADRID, SAID HE TRAVELING HAVANA MID-JUNE FOR A MEETING OF AMBASSADORS.

2. FILE 201-814891, 201-7352996, 201-759701. GP-1

SECRET

Extract for 201's

FILE:
RM 2a/0-1

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER;pfd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 1 MAY 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 59/21 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WHE INFO FILE, VR. [illegible], EUR 6, CI/OPS, FI 2, CI, CI/IC 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

TO MADRID WH/MIAMI CITE DIRECTOR 030393

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: A. WH/MIAMI 7346 (IN 072939)

B. DIRECTOR 021639

1. REF A REPRESENTS LEAD TO AMAUTO-1 WHICH HQS WILLING PURSUE IF MADRID THINKS WORTH WHILE. ALTHOUGH SAMKO DID NOT INDICATE RELATIONSHIP WAS VERY DEEP, QUTIMID/QUDOZE TRAFFIC SEEMS TO INDICATE AMAUTO-1 LOOKED ON SAMKO WITH GREAT DEAL NOSTALGIA. MUCH DEPENDS ON MADRID'S OTHER PLANS THROUGH SUBJECT REF B (201-866047). REQUEST STATUS YOUR CONTACT WITH HIM AND PLANS.

2. RECENT REVIEW OF AMAUTO-1 TAPES BY AMEDIT-2 SHOW THAT AMAUTO-1 MAINTAINS CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH QUSEQUIN-82. AMEDIT-2 COMMENTS THAT QUSEQUIN-82 KNOWS AMAUTO-1 PERSONALLY AND SEES HIM RATHER OFTEN BUT PRESUMABLY IN LINE OF DUTY. HQS INTERESTED IN NATURE AND EXTENT THIS RELATIONSHIP. VIEW QUSEQUIN-82 COMMENTS REPORTED IN OSMA-23624, ATTACHMENT 1, STATION MIGHT USE THIS RELATIONSHIP TO APPROACH AMAUTO-1.

3. ~~[illegible]~~ WODISH REPORT DATED 27 MAR 70 WAS DEBRIEFING OF MANUEL

201-235246

CS COPY

UU
DES NFD
FI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

24 Mar 70
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE: MAY 7 10 23 AM '70

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

MAY 11 4 26 PM '70

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: RID/EDI
CONF:
INFO FILE, VR.

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

(classification)
SECRET

PAGE TWO
(date and time filed)

(elite) (pica)
(reference number)

TO ┌ CITE DIRECTOR 030193

(VIGOS) PEREZ, 30-YEAR OLD CUBAN WHO ARRIVED MIAMI BY AIR ON 20 FEB 70. VIGOS CLAIMS TO BE UNIDENTIFIED CLOSE RELATIVE OF AMAUTO-1 BUT HAS AMAUTO-1'S HISTORY SOMEWHAT GARBLED. VIGOS ALSO SAYS THAT ONE OSVALDO RUIZ PEREZ, DESCRIBED AS BROTHER OF AMAUTO-1, HAS ASKED TO LEAVE CUBA AND IS NOW IN CANE FIELDS. WH/MIAMI REQUESTED TO CHECK THESE LEADS.

4. FILE 201-735296. END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref A said that SAMKO, Miami butcher who old acquaintance of AMAUTO-1, has been located and willing travel to Madrid if necessary. Ref B is POA grant for one Carlos CARRASCO, whom Madrid plans to use somehow to get to AMAUTO-1.

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

C/WH/COG

AC/EUR/IB

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
CUTIMID QUDOZE
Sonia GOMEZ Aragon, Cuban MINREX Official

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: None, FYI. Please assign 201 number

References:
A. MADRID 0473
B. WH/MIAMI 6576
C. DIRECTOR 011307

1. The following information about Subject's trip to Spain and her activities while here was obtained from QUTIMID and QUDOZE.

2. Subject arrived in Madrid on 10 February 1970. She traveled to Barcelona during the week of 23 February and returned to Madrid 6 March whereupon she then left for Portugal. She returned to Madrid on 17 March and waited for Guillermo RUIZ Perez' return from the Spanish/Cuban Commercial negotiations in Cuba. Sonia departed Madrid for Cuba on 27 March 1970. It appears that she intended to travel to Vienna, Austria next, since several cables were sent to Vienna from Madrid advising Sonia's travel status. During her stay in Spain, Sonia was in frequent contact with one Jose Agustin GOYTISOLO, Spanish writer in Barcelona, telephone 228-4063 (Station traces are OSBA 02385, 17 February 1965; OSBA 02718, 11 August 1967; and OSBA 02795, 1 March 1968). She was not known to have been in contact with any other locals and what little time she had for diversion she spent with the mission officers and their wives.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami

....continued

201-869482

CROSS REFERENCE TO
65-2-1079
65-6-44/4
~~201-735296~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 26218

DATE
13 May 1970

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
~~201-~~
201-735296

3. The purpose of Sonia's trip to Madrid was to discuss the 1970 work plan for the Embassy with the Charge, Guillermo RUIZ Perez. She also talked with the various Embassy officials, most probably to familiarize herself with their duties and to see if they had any problems. She pitched in and helped with the backlogged work of Orestes BARREDA and Horacio FUENTES and also helped with the cultural activities. For instance, she sent two cables to MINREX - one regarding the forwarding of movie posters for a March exhibit and another regarding the forwarding of a Cuban stamp exhibition by end March.

4. In their discussion of the 1970 work plan Sonia told RUIZ that they were going to plan the February, March, and April quarter. She showed him "an agenda for the control of planned and unplanned activities" and the general directives of the plan which included scientific information and political information, with specific directives (requirements) ~~for~~ Spain. RUIZ has to prepare for Havana a monthly report, then a quarterly summary, of the activities accomplished. Based on these reports the activities of the following quarter will be planned.

a. In line with the plan of scientific information, Sonia and RUIZ discussed the pros and cons of a Comite Cientifico-Tecnico which is to be set up in Madrid. RUIZ was of the opinion that the local (Spanish) Communist Party would try to infiltrate it and this would bring problems to the Embassy. Sonia pointed out the successes encountered in Switzerland and Sweden with such a committee even though at first there were problems which were later overcome.

b. Sonia showed RUIZ a commercial project which she planned to take to Portugal and asked him to read it because it was also of interest to the Cuban mission in Spain.

c. Sonia mentioned that the Plan of Information was still to be completed especially in the priority categories of livestock and economy.

d. They turned next to the topic of the budget. Sonia said that the budget for each mission had to be submitted before the end of April (every year) and no additional expenditures could be submitted for approval during the course of the year. Spain, Canada, and France, however, would be treated individually. Their special needs, such as acquisition of more office space, raises in cost of living allowances, etc., would be taken into consideration at any time.

5. During their various discussions RUIZ aired his complaint about the Visa Department in Havana saying that the department was practically worthless and that last year 76 cables regarding visas remained unanswered. Sonia defended the Ministry saying that it had a lot of work to do, but RUIZ replied that they wanted to work only 8 hours a day. They also discussed the scholarship situation. It seems that during an interview between PRIETO (Probably Jose PRIETO Benitez, Director of Foreign Relations of the DAP) and the Minister of Public Works, PRIETO was asked to provide a list of scholarship candidates to be considered and he had none. Sonia mentioned that in Belgium they also lost four scholarships because of this same reason.

6. According to QUTIMID Sonia GOMEZ Aragon is married to one Miguel (LNU) and has a daughter named Iliana. Sonia's mother is still living although appeared to be very ill at the time Sonia left for her trip to Madrid because Sonia cabled at least twice to Havana inquiring about the status of her mother's health. (TYLOTE reported that Sonia's home phone number in Havana is 7-4263.) Perhaps Headquarters can determine the full name of her husband by checking the reverse telephone listings. Sonia is attractive, intelligent, sertious-minded and reserved. The last time she visited Spain she stayed with Vera BORODOWSKI and was on the same type of mission as the present one - to discuss the Madrid Embassy's work plan. She also visited the Barcelona Consulate and the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon.

Helen B. NOTHDURFT

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) file

Since Headquarters has recently prepared an extensive analysis on RUIS for the information of addressees, an additional review has been omitted. However, the attached biographic study should be useful.

30 April 1970

NAME: Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) (NOTE: A comprehensive study/analysis on RUIZ was prepared in February 1970, see OSWW-11726.)

ALIAS: Also uses Guillermo RUIZ Perez

DPOB: 10 February 1930, Havana

PRESENT POSITION: Minister, Charge d'Affaires, Cuban Embassy, Madrid, since December 1967.

WIFE: Nilda VECIANA Lopez (DPOB: 26 December 1934, Havana)

CHILDREN: Five sons, and a sixth child due to be born April/May 1970, Guillermo, the oldest, in school in Cuba. Alejandro, Julio, Juan Carlos and Ivan with their parents in Madrid.

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: White, variously described as 5'5" - 5'7" tall, and 170-190 pounds, stout build; round face, fair complexion, blond slightly wavy hair, light-colored eyes (also reported as blue and green), wears glasses. No visible identifying marks. Well dressed.

PERSONALITY: Perhaps a relative's description of RUIZ sums up his personality - "a man of many moods." He has variously been described as intelligent, mentally alert, competent, hardworking, and respected by his subordinates. Pleasant, easy going, nervous, quick-tempered, brusque but sincere, opinionated, strong-minded idealistic, self-confident. Has basic emotional instability, gives impression of being insecure in his position. At times sarcastic, indifferent, egotistical, cynical, serious, ungrateful and cold, who, paradoxically, appears friendly to some people. Outspoken, compulsive talker, articulate, limited vocabulary, swears a good deal.

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

He can turn on considerable charm, where motivated. In contrast to his pleasant public image and acceptable language, private conversation is vulgar, swears continually and flies into rages.

Likes good living and spends money where it shows. Avid reader, keeps abreast of world events, shows willingness to accept whatever he deems to be good or useful from the outside world. Concerned with the image and prestige of Cuba in Spain. Emotionally committed to an ideal. An AMEDIT study summed RUIZ up as a realist. He speaks English and French. His wife, a teacher, always worked before going to Spain, and there works as a secretary and bookkeeper at the Embassy on an informal basis. Appears intelligent, competent, outspoken but solicitious and affectionate with her husband; interested in, and encourages him in his work. Appears to support the regime, but not a fanatic. RUIZ is the dominant personality of the two.

EDUCATION:

One reference states that he went to work at age 14, which suggests lack of formal education.
In 1960 as an employee of the Ministry of the Treasury, selected to attend a statistics course offered by CEPAL, which lasted two years.

One relative reported he completed elementary education at "Hermanos Maristas" school in Havana; did not know whether he attended high school, but said in early days of the Castro regime attended the University of

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

Havana.

Another relative said his primary and secondary education was received in private institutions, and that he has a degree in "political economics" from the University of Havana.

He is well versed in world affairs and has an understanding of international trade.

PREVIOUS POSITIONS: Vice Minister, MINCEX, 1964-1967.

Commercial Counselor, Cuban Embassy, Mexico City. Although he was accredited to that position in December 1963, travel indicates he was in Mexico from August 1963 to May 1964. Other references indicate he was in that position in September 1963.

Ministry of the Treasury. In April 1962 he was Chief of the Department of Construction Expenses Studies, Office of Financial Statistics of that ministry. He was with the ministry as early as 1960, when he was selected to attend the statistics course.

During the Batista regime he was in exile. Came to the U.S. sometime in the 1950's and apparently remained for some time before he left in February 1957, when, according to some reports, he entered Cuba clandestinely. Also reported to have been in exile in Mexico.

LNYUMA records show he came to U.S. on 8 November 1956 to see his brother, left 17 November for the Dominican Republic where he received five months military training. Returned to the

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

U.S. 5 April 1957, overstayed his time, and on 11 February 1958 was ordered deported; claimed he would be killed if he returned to Cuba and did not show for deportation. Subsequent investigation showed he was in Cuba as of 2 March.

POLITICAL ATTITUDE:

A member of the Cuban Communist Party, admitted on the recommendation of Armando HART Davalos, Secretary of Organization. Although he has been described as a militant Communist, a convinced supporter of the Castro regime and a fanatic Fidelista, there is evidence to dispute this image. An analysis of available information indicates that he is not a convinced Marxist, he cannot accept Party discipline, and that his character is basically incompatible with the system he serves.

His father is reported to be an old-guard Communist and a leader of the barber's union. A brother reported to be a member of DSE in 1946.

He expressed dissatisfaction with his position as a diplomat, feels his talents are wasted and would like a position in commerce or industry, where he considers he could better serve the revolution. Has criticized the bureaucracy and inefficiency in the government in Havana.

He has said that many Cuban diplomats want to stay out of Cuba, but it seemed to him that the Cuban government wanted to keep him (RUIZ) out of the way (i.e., outside Cuba). That LEON had appointed him, supported him, and they are good friends, but that he (RUIZ) does not like to work with a man who one does not get to know, nor to know what he is thinking. He said he felt as if he were in Miami.

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS:

In May 1964 AMMUG-1 reported RUIZ was a DGI case officer in Mexico for operations targetted against "some nearby area," and later identified his photograph as DGI member in Mexico.

In 1961 an emigre said RUIZ, with the Finance Ministry, was a Communist and G-2.

AMTIKI-1 said a letter from a friend in Cuba stated that RUIZ, then in Mexico, was a member of G-2, sent to try to infiltrate counterrevolutionary groups (1963).

In April 1968, RUIZ advised Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa on the use of disguises, the need to "live secretly" and commented on DIAZ' being "already clandestine."

The Cuban Ambassador to Geneva, in 1968, commented on RUIZ' refusal to accept DGI dominance of the Cuban Embassy, Madrid. (AMDELAY-1). In July 1969, AMBEDEW-1 said RUIZ was very dictatorial in his dealings with DGI officers.

CONTACTS:

Not much is known of his contacts in Madrid, other than official. Is in touch with Ahmed LAIDI, Algerian Ambassador; Manuel TELLO Troncoso, Counselor of Chilean Embassy, Madrid; Alexandru PETRESCU, Romanian Minister to Spain and Carlos CARRASCO Munoz de Vera, a lawyer and personal friend.

TRAVELS:

1963:	Aug.	To Mexico
	22 Nov.	Mexico-Cuba
	29 Nov.	Cuba-Mexico
	8 Dec.	Cuba-Mexico
1964:	21 May.	Mexico-Cuba
1967:	13 Dec.	Cuba-Spain
1968:	15 Jan.	Spain-Netherlands

14-00000

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

	16 Jan.	Netherlands-Spain
	27 July	Spain-France
	31 July	France-Spain
	6 Aug.	Spain-Cuba (via Ireland, Canada)
	29 Aug.	Cuba-Spain
	21 Nov.	Spain-Cuba
	10 Dec.	Cuba-Spain
1969:	27 Feb.	France-Spain
	27 Feb.	Spain-Dominican Republic
	11 Mar.	Spain-Switzerland
	4 Aug.	Spain-Cuba
	17 Sept.	Cuba-Spain (via French West Indies, Azores)
	10 Oct.	Spain-Cuba
	29 Oct.	Cuba-Spain
	14 Nov.	Spain-UK
	16 Nov.	UK-Spain
	28-30 Nov.	Two-day trip by auto to San Sebastian and Burgos
	6 Jan 70.	To Italy, returning by auto.

Also claims to have been in North Vietnam as a member of a trade mission (QUDOZE).

ASSESSMENT: It appears that RUIZ might well be responsive to an approach, with consideration given to the manner in which it is undertaken, the timing and the person involved.

SECRET

[illegible]

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

ACCESS:

MISCELLANEOUS:

Although RUIZ' health has been described as generally good, he suffers from a back ailment which resulted from a fall in 1955 and which has been diagnosed as incurable. Also he suffers from a liver ailment for which he takes medicine.

RUIZ is scheduled to return to Cuba in mid-1970, where he expects to be with MININT, rather than MINREX or MINCEX.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE • TOTAL COPIES 7

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 798

S E C R E T 291535Z APR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7346 WMIM 23 APR IN 072939

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF A WH/MIAMI 7304 (IN 070131)

B UFAA-1978

1. SAMKO SHOWN PHOTOS OF AMAUTO-1 AND REMARKED, "WHY, THIS IS WILLIAM." REMEMBERED AMAUTO-1 AS NICE CLEAN-CUT BOY WITH HIGH IDEALS. WHILE THERE WAS PROBABLY FATHER-SON RELATIONSHIP, SAMKO DID NOT RECOGNIZE IT AS SUCH.

2. SAMKO IS WILLING TO TRAVEL TO MADRID TO TALK WITH AMAUTO-1. HE HAS AN EXPIRED PASSPORT. WAS TOLD INTERVIEW WAS EXPLORATORY AND PACHANKIS WOULD RECONTACT IF SAMKO SERVICES WERE NEEDED.

3. POUCHING ABOVE CONTACT REPORT, ALONG WITH REF A CONTACT REPORT, VIA REF B.

4. FILE: 201-866054 AND 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN ✓
AB X
IN
PS
BX
DES NPD
FI
WH/COG

CS COPY

201-735296
29 Apr 70

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO
Chief of Station, Madrid;
Chief, European Division

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
TYPIC AMAUTO
Interview of Alexander SAMKO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Para 2 below

References:
A. DIRECTOR 026320,
B. WH/MIAMI 7304
C. WH/MIAMI 7346

1. Forwarded herewith are two contact reports submitted by Henry S. PACHANKIS on his interviews with Alexander SAMKO (201-866054) concerning Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296). Both contact reports are self-explanatory and were summarized in References B and C.

2. Please advise if WH/Miami should pursue the matter of contact between SAMKO and RUIZ in Madrid. If so, the Station suggests that PACHANKIS accompany SAMKO to Madrid as his handler.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

Attachments:
A. Contact Report, 21 April 1970
B. Contact Report, 28 April 1970

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD w/atts h/w (in dupl)
2 - COS, Madrid w/atts h/w (in dupl)
2 - Chief, EUR w/atts h/w (one copy)

MAY 4 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-735296	UFAA-1978	29 April 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-866054

C/FI/

DC/FI

Kerschey.

21 April 1970

SUBJECT: Interview with Alexander SAMKO.

1. SAMKO was contacted by phone (927-6721) on the morning of 21 April, and he agreed to meet with "Joseph NORRIS, an official of the US government," later the same morning at his home: 1647 Rodman Street, Hollywood, Florida.

2. SAMKO accepted my credentials without any reservations. He is a Caucasian male in his 60s. He is of strong build; "white" gray hair; small clear eyes which require thick glasses to read. His most distinguishing feature is a large tatoo on his right forearm. He has a loud booming voice, with a NY accent and although he does not appear to have much of a formal education, he is articulate and sociable. He appears to be retired now and spends his days playing chess with a business associate. He lives in a clean middle class neighborhood and has a Lincoln Continental (about 3 or 4 years old) in the garage.

3. After speaking with him for over half an hour, SAMKO does not appear to know Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez. SAMKO answered my questions in a straightforward manner and I have no reason to doubt his testimony. Specifically, these are the facts as SAMKO related them:

A. The name Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (it was typewritten on a 3 x 5 card) means nothing to him. His business associate -who has worked with him for many years and especially during the 1950s- does not recall the name.

B. SAMKO acknowledges that from c. mid 1958 till c. the end of 1959, he owned the "Fruit Center" -a grocery, meat market, and fruit store- on 100 SW 17th Avenue, Miami (one block from Flagler Street). He does not recall that anyone in his employ answered to the name of Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez, or any combination of these names. He never had anything but an impersonal employer/employee relationship with his personnel.

C. The last time he had been to Cuba was in c. 1948, "when I went down from New York." He denied several times that he had been to Cuba after Castro took power in 1959.

D. SAMKO had bought the "Fruit Center" from a Mr. FNU WOODS, who also owned the property in the vicinity of 100 SW 17th Avenue. SAMKO dismissed the personnel WOODS had in the store when he bought. He does not know the whereabouts of WOODS at this time, but presumes he still owns the property.

4. Naturally, SAMKO was curious to know why we were after RUIZ. To satisfy his curiosity and perhaps elicit some admission, in the event he was playing games with me, I disclosed these bits of information:

H/W [illegible]

[illegible] 1054

A. RUIZ had been exiled in the US -from Cuba- in the 1950s. (He was in his mid 20s at the time).

B. We had information that RUIZ had worked for SAMKO in his store as a butcher in the 1950s and that they had established a close personal friendship apart from the normal business relationship.

C. When Castro took power in Cuba (c. 1959), RUIZ had returned to Cuba and there are reports that SAMKO had visited RUIZ in Cuba in 1959. And, further, that SAMKO had offered RUIZ a partnership in his store if RUIZ returned to the US.

D. RUIZ was now the Cuban Minister to Spain and the GOUS was interested in talking to his old friends to see what kind of a person RUIZ was. We had reason to believe that SAMKO was an old friend of RUIZ'.

5. SAMKO listened intently. He seemed confused by all these reports. He denied the allegations firmly, but without betraying any sign of nervousness or doubletalk (as when one is telling less than the truth.)

6. SAMKO asked if we had a photo of RUIZ. He said he knew of no other SAMKO in the Miami area, such as a brother, uncle, etc. He did not appear to be bothered or inconvenienced by the allegations, so if he was not telling the truth, he did a wonderful job of it. The only thing he could suggest was to locate Mr WOODS -the owner before him of the "Fruit Center"- to see if he had RUIZ as an employee.

7. In view of SAMKO's statements of denial, there was nothing more to do than to thank him for his cooperation and say good morning.

Henry. S. PACHANKIS.

[illegible]

SUBJECT: Interview with [illegible] SANKO, on the case of Comandante Guillermo RUIZ Perez, DGI Minister to Spain.

1. On the evening of 27 April, SANKO was contacted by phone at his Hollywood home ([illegible]). He was cordial and agreed to receive [illegible] on the morning of 28 April. He said he looked forward to seeing the photos of RUIZ: "Maybe we can get to the bottom of things if I see his picture."

2. Before showing him the pictures on 28 April, I gave him a short preamble on the background of the case. I said that we were perplexed that he did not recognize RUIZ' name since we had it on good authority that RUIZ still reminisced about his days in SANKO's employment and remembered him with fondness. I added that our purpose was to have someone in whom RUIZ had complete confidence talk to him and find out how he feels about his political fate. There was no violence or hanky panky involved; only a straight man to man exchange. (It was my hunch that perhaps SANKO feared we were trying to tie him into something illegal or related with RUIZ' Revolutionary activities while he was in the US and SANKO was playing it cool. This was a possibility since it was strange SANKO did not recognize RUIZ, while everything pointed that there had been a relationship.)

3. My fears were dispelled when SANKO had an opportunity to study the photos carefully: "Why, this is William. He has aged, but I would know him anywhere." There was a friendly, happy smile on his face as he reached back into his memory:

"When I bought the store, he was already working for the previous owner, [illegible]. He worked for me about 7 or 8 months and then he left for Cuba, to fight Batista. There was a tear in his eyes when he said goodbye. I understood that he had been killed. I never heard from him again. You say he is a big shot with Castro. I'm surprised at the turn, since he was such a freedom lover. He had high ideals. In my opinion, he was pro American, although he seemed more pro Cuban. He loved his country and wanted to liberate it and rid it of tyranny. He used to show me the atrocities that Batista committed when they were published in "Bohemia" and it made his blood boil. And, it made my blood boil too. He used to talk to me about taking part in the Revolution and I used to try to talk him out of it. He was happy after he talked it over with me. He would consult his problems with me and after the talk he would say, 'Sanko, I'm glad I talked to you.' I used to [illegible] him off, set him straight and help out in every way I could. I used to contribute food from the store. William would have it picked up. He said it was for the families of those men who were jailed in the US for running guns to Cuba. Although he was just a grocery clerk -he was [illegible] of the grocery department and helped out in the meat department when the butcher had a day off- he was a very clean cut fellow. He had a good appearance and was an all round nice guy. He was a quiet boy, a loner. I never associated with him enough to know of his family. I can't remember that he had any relatives or friends that I know. [illegible] back. Remember I've been [illegible], a long time and I haven't thought about him in all this time. I saw him, a long time ago and I haven't run into these people again. He was an enthusiastic Castro follower then, but I can't understand how he has turned so far left. I didn't realize he still remembers me, and you say he talks of me fondly (his face lit up with pride). He was a good boy, young, in his 20s. All of my employees had respect for me. I backed them up in everyway I could and William did everything I asked of him. No, I can't remember his last name. I only recall 'William.' Will I write to him? I won't write, because he won't answer it. You have to confront him. Sure he will talk to me. We have alot to talk over. He will pay attention to me. You say you want me to go to Spain to see him? At my expense? Oh, well, at your expense. Well, if it is for my country, I would be glad to help out."

4. I pointed out on more than one occasion that this was not a commitment, but an exploratory interview. We were grateful for his cooperation and would certainly consider him in the event my superiors opted to contact RUIZ. SAUNO was born in New Jersey and has a birth certificate. He has an expired passport from his days as a merchant seaman. In the event he is requested to go to Spain to pitch RUIZ, SAUNO understands that he will be paid only for his personal expenses.

5. To sum up, SAUNO has finally disclosed his relationship with RUIZ, but only after viewing RUIZ's photos. He knew RUIZ only as "William." Although from what SAUNO said of their relationship there was a defacto father-son alliance, SAUNO never thought of it as such. Evidently the younger man was more impressed with his mentor, than the mentor with his pupil. SAUNO is available to travel to Spain to meet with RUIZ, "and try to steer him back to the high ideals he had in 1959."

6. Before parting, I thanked SAUNO once again for his cooperation and promised to keep in touch with him in the event his services were required. He too was gracious and said we could call on him anytime we need him. He repeated his offer: "If its for my country, I'll cooperate."

Henry S. [illegible]

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 35/n PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 396

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. /

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

S E C R E T 242136Z APR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7304 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

24 Apr 70 IN 070131

REF: DIRECTOR 026320

1. ALEXANDER SAMKO INTERVIEWED AND CLAIMED HE NEVER HEARD OF OR KNEW AMAUTO-1. LAST TIME HE WAS IN CUBA WAS 1948 AND DENIED HE EVER TRAVELED TO CUBA AFTER CASTRO TAKEOVER IN 1959. EXPERIENCED CAREER AGENT PACKANKIS INTERVIEWED AND HAS NO REASON TO DOUBT SAMKO ANSWERS. AS FOLLOW-UP, PACHANKIS WILL SHOW TWO DIFFERENT PHOTOS OF AMAUTO-1 TO SAMKO FOR IDENTIFICATION. WILL ADVISE. POUCHING SAMKO INTERVIEW.

2. FILE: 201-866054 AND 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN
AB
IN
FS
PX
DHC NFD
FI

CS COPY FILED IN 201-866054

~~CS COPY~~

SECRET

File in:
201-735296

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, EUR; Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC/QUDOZE/AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. In a conversation held in his office on 3 December 1969 AMAUTO-1 said that in 1957 he worked in the United States as a butcher for one Alexander SAMKO, a Polish-Italian. He said that SAMKO visited PBRUMEN after 1 January 1959 and invited AMAUTO-1 to return to the States to continue his job as a butcher. SAMKO is not further identified in the report.

2. If SAMKO could be located it might be interesting to obtain his assessment of AMAUTO-1.

Howard R. Sacoder
Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
~~2~~ - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - WH/Miami - To cut Pouch

2 cc sent to [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA-25745	5 December 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-735296

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
RYBAT/TYPIC/AMAUTO
Meeting with 201-866047 ([illegible])

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 16 April 1970 Stacy B. HARRIOTT had lunch with Subject and Agustin GERVAS who are partners in Taller, S.A. The following is HARRIOTT's report of that meeting:

A. "Subject, and GERVAS have joined with another lawyer, fnu ITURRIAGA, to explore joint venture possibilities in Spain. Subject and Iturriaga are law partners with offices in Madrid. An assessment of Subject based on such a short conversation would not normally be of much assistance but since Subject opened up on his thoughts about Cuba, a general recommendation can be reached.

B. "During the lunch I was able to work the conversation around to the business potential for Spanish and U.S. companies in Latin America. Eventually, we touched on Cuba, and Gervas said that Subject considers himself to be an expert in this area as he visited Cuba last year and had a private three-hour interview with Fidel Castro. Gervas said that Subject received a "snow job" from the "jefe", and this about sets the tone for his feelings for the present Cuban regime. It was not clear how Subject received an invitation to Cuba, but he said that he assisted in obtaining a contract from Cuba for the Pegaso truck company - whether as a representative of this company or in a free-lance capacity

/continued/

CS copy filed in 201-866047.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - WH/Miami

File in 201-735296

FILE: AMAUTO-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA 26195

DATE
29 April 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-866047
~~201-735206~~

was not brought out. It seemed to me that Subject is riding an emotional high for Cuba and Castro. His face lit up and he became relatively excited when telling us how Castro mixes and talks with the "common people," and is from Spanish parents, and has done so much for the country. I asked him what his general impression was of life there and he replied "phenomenal," and I believe he meant it.

C. "Some comments that Subject made would appear to be inspired by Cuban propaganda or a briefing. He said that JKLANCE is in control of U.S. internal security and is forcing a rightest swing in its internal politics. Also, all people going to Cuba from Mexico are photographed by JKLANCE people, while if you go from Spain you don't run this risk.

D. "I asked him if there was good potential for Spanish companies doing business with Cuba. He replied that Cuba is a bridge to Latin America. This seemed a strange answer, and I pointed out that you didn't have to go to Cuba to get to Latin America. He said, "that's true, but other countries will change to the Cuban system and will need technicians to assist them. Then we (Iguess he meant Spanish business men doing business with Cuba) will have excellent possibilities.

E. "Subject said that he knew the Cuban Ambassador to Spain and in fact visited him this morning and received a large box of Havana cigars from him.

F. "Subject is about 30 years old, good looking and makes an excellent first impression. He appears to have a good business background in addition to being a trained lawyer. He seems aggressive, determined and has a good imagination for business ventures.

G. "It would be premature to say that Subject leans toward Communism or has been had by the Cuban I.S. I doubt that he would have talked so freely about his admiration for Cuba if he is working covertly for them. It is quite certain that he is being used by the Cuban Embassy for commercial purposes, and I would estimate that he would make an excellent "front man" for Cuban business ventures.

H. "I would recommend against trying to recruit Subject as a means of getting to the Cuban Ambassador. He would probably turn down the pitch and inform the Cuban Embassy."

2. The above report is an excellent beginning in our assessment of Subject and HARRIOTT must be commended for his adeptness at steering the conversation toward the relevant areas of interest. We think the report stands alone and requires little commentary by the Station; however, we might add here that there is a strong probability that Subject was indeed snowed under by the impact of his alleged three-hour talk with Castro. Given Castro's charisma and persuasive qualities it would not be difficult to "convince" a young lawyer, alien to the Cuban environment, of the progress in Cuba. Not withstanding HARRIOTT's fine report we feel that Subject is still wallowing in the ebullience of this confrontation with Fidel Castro. His short relationship with the Cuban Embassy and one visit to Cuba would hardly make him an authority on Cuba.

3. If you agree we would like to try another attempt to get an assessment of Subject. For days we have been trying to devise a cover story for a Station officer to use in an approach to Subject. We have one and would like your comments, suggestions and ideas. A Station officer, preferably in disguise and using an alias, would approach Subject as a free lance writer for "World News" (a suggestion made by UCAMERA-1 because there are so many stringers for "World News" that it would be virtually impossible to confirm) with the intention that he is writing an article on Spanish lawyers in business with the theme that a degree in law offers greater opportunities for advancement in business and government. (The theme actually is taken from an article in Fortune or Business Week magazine read by the undersigned some years ago). The theme was tested on UCAMERA-1 and he agrees that it is a good one and would work because of the general nature of Spanish businessmen to like to talk about themselves. What is involved however, is a considerable amount of homework, particularly in the collection of names of lawyers in business who have been successful. UCAMERA-1 is preparing a list of such people and we will review them together. The undersigned subsequently will ask for Dun and Bradstreet reports on the firms these lawyers represent as well as review the firms' financial history in our reference aids located in the Embassy's commercial library.

4. The theme opens the door to a number of provoking questions, but it particularly offers a good opportunity to assess the personality of the target. Perhaps the opportunity will again come when Subject discusses his relationship and knowledge of Cuba at which time an interesting exchange might ensue possibly provoking Subject to reveal his true relationship with the Cubans and/or his affection for the Cuban system. No pitch would be made and, if after this assessment, the officer arrives at HARRIOTT's conclusion, the Station would recommend against using Subject as an intermediary to AMAUTO-1.

Advise.

Howard R. SACODER

RYBAT

201-735226

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 35/a PER

ACTION WH 8

ACTION NO. 396

INFO FILE, VR R/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, FI 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

for Amauto-1 201

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3			
4		8	

S E C R E T 242136Z APR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7304 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

REF: DIRECTOR 026320

24 Apr '70 IN 070131

1. ALEXANDER SAMKO INTERVIEWED AND CLAIMED HE NEVER HEARD OF OR KNEW AMAUTO-1. LAST TIME HE WAS IN CUBA WAS 1948 AND DENIED HE EVER TRAVELED TO CUBA AFTER CASTRO TAKEOVER IN 1959. EXPERIENCED CAREER AGENT PACKANKIS INTERVIEWED AND HAS NO REASON TO DOUBT SAMKO ANSWERS. AS FOLLOW-UP, PACHANKIS WILL SHOW TWO DIFFERENT PHOTOS OF AMAUTO-1 TO SAMKO FOR IDENTIFICATION. WILL ADVISE. POUCHING SAMKO INTERVIEW.

2. FILE: 201-866054 AND 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

File: AMAUTO-1

ORIG: RICHARD ENNIS;pfd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1255
DATE: 22 APRIL 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY_______ PER_______ #_______
CONF: [illegible]

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

INFO FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) S E C R E T
(date and time filed) 23 00 01 Z APR 70
(elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 027720

TO WH/MIAMI INFO: OTTAWA

TYPIC AMROSE AMDOCILE

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 020399

1. LNERGO DOCUMENT ON GINES GORRIZ CASTROMAN DATED 1961 AND MISFILED JUST RETRIEVED BY HQS. DOCUMENT CONCERNS GORRIZ'S MILITARY SERVICE RECORD WHICH WE STILL TRYING OBTAIN.

2. LNERGO DOCUMENT LISTS GORRIZ'S NEXT-OF-KIN WHILE IN SERVICE AS HUMBERTO MARRERO, 617 152 STREET, NEW YORK. GORRIZ BROTHER LISTED AS SUMBERTON (SIC) CASTROMAN, SAME ADDRESS. GORRIZ HOME ADDRESS SAME PLUS "CARE OF PEREZ".

3. COULD THE HUBERTO (SIC) LISTED AS GORRIZ'S BROTHER IN WH/MIAMI 6934 (IN 049917) BE HUMBERTO MARRERO? ONE NOT IDENTIFIABLE, NON-DEROGATORY TRACE ~~[illegible]~~ CU MARRERO FROM LNERGO IN 1952.

4. NO HQS TRACES SUMBERTON CASTROMAN. NO CASTROMANS IN NEW YORK TELEPHONE DIRECTORY. NO PEREZ AT ABOVE ADDRESS IN REVERSE DIRECTORY. NO HUMBERTO MARRERO IN DIRECTORY.

5. CAN YOU PIN DOWN MARRERO'S ADDRESS SO WE CAN TRY LOCATE?

AN	ULC
AB	
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~SX~~	
DES	RFD
FI	

201-735216

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY

23 apr 70
COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

APR 23 4 31 PM '70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________
CONF:

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

RECEIVED
RID/EDI

APR 27 11 28 AM '70
FORWARDED
RID/EDI

INFO FILE, VR.

PAGE TWO
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

027720

6. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

APR 29 '70

LR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

EUR/BC/C L Leas
E/BC E. Wing

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

File
OSMA 76-1

QuTomic
Report No. 2533.

14 April 1970.

Mr. JAVIER, from the Casa Conde of Vigo, calls HORACIO to say that they have had in Vigo for two months the ship VIA JAIBA (ph) for repairs and the captain has decided that it is best if the crew takes its month of vacation now and return later to the ship in Vigo. J adds the captain has to return to Cuba on Friday by CUBANA, but he has no visa and authorization must be requested from the General Department of Security. HORACIO takes down the captain's name: Eugenio LEOPOLDO PORTAL y PEÑA, Passport No. 038-534, issued 12 September 1969, Havana.

Nilda RUIZ calls Alicia FRANCO to instruct her that should someone go by claiming to be a relative of hers to say she has no cousins or relatives of any sort. AF tells her that person went by the Consulate the day before claiming to be her cousin and saying he was a Spaniard. NR contends she cannot imagine where he got that notion because she has no cousins, adding that her cousins are Catalonians and not from Gijón. AF says the man who came to the Consulate saying to be her cousin resembles NR, and describes him as having blue eyes, sort of blond, and tall. She then says it is an older married couple. According to NR, all her family comes from Catalonia. AF repeats this is an older married couple and their problems cannot be solved by the Consulate, rather they must be resolved there (in Cuba?),

OSMA-26224

19 May 1970

for as she says, "It is a boy who also claims to be a relative of yours and wants to come here, but that he has a brother in New York." NILDA says, "That is a bunch of lies..." N wants A to take down the name of that person if he should come back to the Consulate, so that she may find out who they are.

FRANCO talks with ALICIA and says that the case of the gusano who killed this wife is being handled by HORACIO.

Report No. 2536. 14 April 1970.

Raul GONZALEZ Romero calls ALDO (ph) to ask if VILLA ROYA is there, for he wants to talk with him. He is. ALDO ask the architect comrade how are things going regarding the lots. GR says everything they have seen has been interesting and it is good experience for they can compare and select. He adds that so far the lot on Paseo de la Habana is the best and this is precisely what he wants to tell José Miguel VILLA ROYA.

GONZALEZ ROMERO (to VILLA ROYA): After having seen what we have seen until now and after having checked everything yesterday afternoon--with this man next door--the possibility of resolving at this time the question of the frontón /pediment/, we think that the best lot we have seen, and the truth is that we should not let any more time go by because we might lose it, is the one one Paseo de la Habana. That is, the first one

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY IW PER GS

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CS/DO, DO 5, FI 0, FI/D, IW, SI/AN.

ACTION NO. 839

CI, SOD 3, WH/COG 4, WH/COG/R 4, EUR 9, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, CS/RF

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. Lunsford

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

TDCSDB 315/01741-7

OSM 9970

SECRET 121553Z APR 72 CITE MADRID 0861

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

10A[illegible]060346

INTEL TYPIC ZRWAHOO TIMID

SUPDATA SOURCE: PARAGRAPH TWO FROM 1 QUAXE-1 AND FROM 2 QUFLUTE-1. NO INDEX.

FILED: 121553Z

(IW COMMENT: OPS DATA (TRUE NAME) DELETED FROM SUPDATA PER CSHB-F-51-1, CHAPTER IV, PARA 29. COPY OF ORIGINAL SUPDATA GIVEN TO WH/COG, EUR/IB, VR, FILE, ADDP, C/FI.)

FILE:
pmm 70-1

SECRET

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 060346

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS

EXO DDI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

CONFIDENTIAL 101918Z CITE TDCS DB 315/01741-70

DIST 10 APRIL 1970

COUNTRY: CUBA

DOI: 3 APRIL 1970

SUBJECT: CUBAN GOVERNMENT POSITION ON KIDNAPPING OF CUBAN DIPLOMATS

ACQ: SPAIN, MADRID (6 APRIL 1970) FIELD NO. OSM 9970

SOURCE: AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS SENSITIVE AND USUALLY RELIABLE.

1. ON 3 APRIL 1970 GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, CUBAN MINISTER TO SPAIN, ADVISED HIS SUBORDINATES OF THE OFFICIAL CUBAN POSITION ON KIDNAPPING. HE SAID THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT HAS SAID THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL CUBA EXCHANGE ANY POLITICAL PRISONER FOR A CUBAN OFFICIAL - THAT "HE WHO KIDNAPS ONE OF US WILL HAVE TO KILL US."

2. (FIELD COMMENT: REPORTS FROM OTHER SOURCES OF KNOWN RELIABILITY HAVE NOTED THAT ALL CUBAN DIPLOMATS TRAVELING OR STATIONED ABROAD HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THEIR GOVERNMENT TO CARRY A SMALL HAND WEAPON. AS OF 8 APRIL 1970 ALL CUBAN

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

7. The Station has now focused on a possible intermediary to an eventual approach to [illegible]. Of all the operations currently active or planned, we believe this operation will be the most demanding on the Station. (See OSMA 26061, 18 March 1970.)

8. We have now pinpointed the home address of the mistress of Subject of 201-[illegible] and it is now a question of watching her movements. A lack of surveillance capability has placed a burden on Station personnel, but it is expected that a pitch will be made before the end of April, preferably by Perry D. WACHAL prior to his departure.

9. A dispatch was prepared and forwarded asking for Headquarters permission to use [illegible]-1 to make a recruitment pitch to Subject of 201-[illegible]. [illegible]-1 and Subject are former classmates and based on his assessment there might be a good chance to gain Subject's cooperation. (See OSMA 26085, 1 April 1970.)

10. Headquarters approval was received to mount operation AMCACTUS. [illegible]-37 will arrange all the details with AMCACTUS-1 and AMCACTUS-2. In an effort to make operation AMCACTUS as broad and flexible as operationally possible, the Station has commented on the use of the AMCACTUS devices in parallel operations. (See OSMA 26105, 8 April 1970.)

11. The PBRUMEN Government has approved the construction of a new official installation in Madrid which is expected to be completed within one year. The Station is actively pursuing this matter with the intention to install various audio devices in the new building. There will be a number of barriers to overcome since the PBRUMENS appear to want the building constructed by their own team of workers. The Station expects to work closely with [illegible] in this operation. (See OSMA 26040, 18 March 1970 and DIRECTOR 621511, 1 April 1970.)

Perry D. WACHAL

AM[illegible] 1
201-

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba/Spain

SUBJECT Cuban Diplomat in Spain, Guillermo Ruiz Perez

REPORT NO. 00-[illegible]/[illegible] CAS

DATE DISTR. 27 MAR 1970

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES [illegible], I-A, I-B (5[illegible])

DATE OF INFO. Feb 70

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Havana/Feb 70 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, A 13 760 716, age 30, who arrived in the US by air on 20 Feb 70. Source was a resident of Havana. He completed 15 years of schooling.

[This report was developed by a Naval representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE

1. Guillermo Ruiz Perez, a close relative, is the Cuban Ambassador to Spain [collateral information dated 19 Jan 65 indicates that a Guillermo Ruiz Perez was the Acting Charge d' Affaires in Spain]. Ruiz has been a Communist since before the days of Castro's regime. I think that he was a member of the old PSP. Just prior to 1959 Ruiz was operating clandestinely in the Dominican Republic trying to create an overthrow of Trujillo's regime. For this Trujillo reportedly wanted him dead, but Ruiz escaped and returned to Cuba. Castro appointed Ruiz Minister of Foreign Relations sometime during 1959. Ruiz filled this post until 1963 or 1964 at which time he was appointed Ambassador to Spain, a post that he still holds.

2. Ruiz is a well-educated individual with a degree in political economics from the University of Havana. All his prior secondary, and primary education was conducted in private institutions. Ruiz is a man of many moods. At times he is sarcastic, indifferent, [illegible], cynical, serious, ungrateful, and cold. Paradoxically, he appears friendly to some people. Regardless, he is a very intelligent and educated person.

3. At present he is living at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, Spain, with his wife and four children. I do not think that he has returned to Cuba since his last trip home in early 1968. He has a brother, Osvaldo Ruiz Perez, who has asked to leave Cuba via Spain and is presently working in the cane fields.

4. Physical description of Guillermo Ruiz: Caucasian, age 40, 5'6", 175 lbs, green eyes, thin blond hair, wears glasses, and is always impeccably

-end-

Personalities

5
4
3
2
1

U Y33

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S Y33

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

CS COPY

The dissemination of this document is limited to [illegible] employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

201

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba, Spain

SUBJECT Cuban Diplomat in Spain, Guillermo Ruiz Perez

REPORT NO. 00-[illegible]/07039-70

CAC

DATE DISTR. 27 MAR 1970

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES C-CSD-69003, I-A, I-B (53[illegible])

DATE OF INFO. Feb 70

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Havana Feb 70 and earlier

1P

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, A 18 780 716, age 30, who arrived in the US by air on 20 Feb 70. Source was a resident of Havana. He completed 15 years of schooling.

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE

[This report was developed by a Naval representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

201- 735296

1. Guillermo Ruiz Perez, a close relative, is the Cuban Ambassador to Spain [collateral information dated 12 Jun 68 indicates that a Guillermo Ruiz Perez was the Acting Chargé d' Affaires in Spain]. Ruiz has been a Communist since before the days of Castro's regime. I think that he was a member of the old PSP. Just prior to 1959 Ruiz was operating clandestinely in the Dominican Republic trying to create an overthrow of Trujillo's regime. For this Trujillo reportedly wanted him dead, but Ruiz escaped and returned to Cuba. Castro appointed Ruiz Minister of Foreign Relations sometime during 1959. Ruiz filled this post until 1963 or 1964 at which time he was appointed Ambassador to Spain, a post that he still holds.

2. Ruiz is a well-educated individual with a degree in political economics from the University of Havana. All his prior secondary, and primary education was conducted in private institutions. Ruiz is a man of many moods. At times he is, sarcastic, indifferent, egotistical, cynical, serious, ungrateful, and cold. Paradoxically, he appears friendly to some people. Regardless, he is a very intelligent and outspoken person.

3. At present he is living at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, Spain, with his wife and four children. I do not think that he has returned to Cuba since his last trip home in early 1968. He has a brother, Osvaldo Ruiz Perez, who has asked to leave Cuba via Spain and is presently working in the cane fields.

Brother of subject # 201-735296

4. Physical description of Guillermo Ruiz: Caucasian, age 40, 5'6", 175 lbs, green eyes, thin blond hair, wears glasses, and is always impeccably dressed.

-end-

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS C[illegible]

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

II

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8 | INFO FILE, VR C/EUR 5, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 462

SD

WH/C/OC

S E C R E T 252057Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6934
WMIM

OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC SMABOVE

25 MAR IN 049917
R

1. PER AGREEMENT DURING SMABOVE VISIT MIAMI, WE HAVE LOCATED SEVERAL RELATIVES OF GINES SILVIO GORRIZ CASTROMAN. IN CONTACTING FRANCISCO GORRIZ CARBALLO ONE OF THE AMOTS RECEIVED A RATHER UNFRIENDLY RECEPTION. WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF SMABOVES COULD DETERMINE WHETHER GINES HAS HAD ANY CONTACT WITH FRANCISCO.

2. ACCORDING TO THE AMOT REPORT GINES HAS A BROTHER IDENTIFIED AS HUBERTO GORRIZ CASTROMAN RESIDING NEW YORK CITY ON OR NEAR 162TH STREET, EXACT ADDRESS UNKNOWM.

3. POUCHING COMPLETE AMOT REPORT FOR OTTAWA AND DIRECTOR.

4. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

25 Mar 70

[illegible]

SECRET

201-735296

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATI OP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDI AL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr White		
2	DU-3		
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

This sort of pitty-patty Belles-Lettres exchange will get no one nowhere. No one is serious about amounts. If he is leaving mid-70 - its futile. Dismal performance.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/CI/FI	

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

TO JOHN SHERWOOD

FROM WHEELER

Would appreciate your comments in turn. Pls return for an on going

Notes

1. Now that AMAUTC-1 is scheduled to go back to Cuba in mid-year, it is a bit late to begin the recruitment of an intermediary. We have information that he intends to go back to MININT rather than MINREX or even MINCEX, which makes the likelihood of his coming out again somewhat slimmer to say the least. I'm afraid that, although we have time only for a reasoned quick approach, this type of approach might lose him to us for good.

2. This causing him to become suspicious is not quite what we had in mind when we wrote ref B. We made, I think, a rather strong case for laying cards on the table with AMAUTC-1, and a slow development by a senior staff officer seemed to emerge from the possibilities. We even suggested how it might be done (through the gymnasium). That might be impossible, but the validity of the approach should deserve a comment.

3. An intermediary would be an access agent, so certainly he should be responsive. I can't consider this point to have any additional bearing on the matter. Of course it will be difficult, and I'm glad they're prepared to work on it.

4. I'd like to have had a chance to review the Dun & Bradstreet file on Carlitos, even tho the PCA has gone forward. CORRECTION: we have it.

5. A joint operation (income ways) is the easy way out. We simply did not get started in time.

6. I disagree, because the question of commitments is somewhat premature, but I'd be willing to push for 750-1,000 a month while working in place, with a bonus when he does come out. For defection outright, which is a poor second, he might even be worth work to resettle him here. LBGA 19006 reported a 1964 attempt to get at Mrs. AMAUTO-1's relatives in Miami, and they might still be there. Perhaps they would sponsor. Everything, but everything depends on initial approaches and debriefings.

7. There are a lot of unanswered questions, posed in the outgoing, and I'd have appreciated a word about them: we have answered this one, we are working in tal manner on that one, etc.

a. The construction work on the new Embassy. There is a separate dispatch on this so all is on wheels.

b. The lonely automobile trips deserves looking into. No comment in the incoming.

etc.

In any case, they're on it, so I want to encourage as much as possible.

Pls tube back (DU-3) when you've had a chance to comment

?

[illegible]

Iler?

[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/R Y B A T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: RYBAT TYPIC
AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. OSMW 11585

B. OSMW 11726

1. There is little we can contribute to the exceptionally fine reports submitted by Headquarters on AMAUTO-1. His character, personality, physical and mental capabilities, and to some extent even his vulnerabilities, are succinctly outlined in your reports. In addition, you have appropriately recognized the Hurculean task we have, to overcome his strong-mindedness and idealistic character.

2. After a series of discussions among the officers involved with PBRUMEN operations at the Station, we have concluded that to execute a logically developed "traditional" recruitment, we are faced with the challenge to recruit a person, an intermediary, in whom AMAUTO-1 has confidence and respect; an individual who is able to plausibly carry on a polemic argument with AMAUTO-1 without either antagonizing him or causing him to become suspicious of the intermediary's true role. Moreover, the intermediary must be intelligent to be able to respond in an appropriate way to our instructions, as well as show a genuine willingness to cooperate. Frankly, we have no such person currently on our list of assets and to find someone with the attributes set forth in Reference A, will be difficult to say the least, but we are prepared to work diligently on this problem.

Attachments:
A. PRQ Part I, USC
B. Identities, USC

[illegible] Date 25 MAR 70

ATT. # 1 SLASHED into OSMA-26061/01; FILED INTO 201-866047.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, w/atts A&B, USC
2 - C/EUR, w/att B, USC
2 - COS, WH/Miami, w/att B, USC

....continued

1 ATT

COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OSMA - 26061

DATE: 18 March 1970

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/R Y B A T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-735296

3. AMAUTO-1 confides in few people. From our reading of QUTIMID and QUDOZE, there are at least three persons who could logically and effectively fill the role as an intermediary. They are Identities A, B, and C. We can categorically eliminate Identity A for obvious reasons, i.e., lack of direct access to him. Because of his relationship to Identity D, we can also tentatively eliminate Identity B. He presents a risk which we are not certain should be taken; however, we would like to add a comment on him in a later paragraph. Identity C would seem to be the most logical choice. He is intelligent, a professional man, well-to-do, young and one with whom AMAUTO-1 frequently talks and whom he often sees. We know little about his political proclivities although he gives the impression of being a moderate analyst of world events and doesn't seem to have a strong affection or aversion for the PBRUMEN Government. We have a good background on him prepared for us by Dun and Bradstreet; however, as you can well imagine, the report concentrates on the economic side of the individual. We have made a number of attempts here in the Embassy to determine whether he has any American contacts, but with negative results. His visa file does not show where he visited in the United States or the purpose, except that it was a business trip. He has an indefinite visa and we are fairly certain that, if necessary, we could use the question of his visa as an entree to him. We are currently reviewing with all Station assets their knowledge of Identity C. In addition, we are also considering assets such as QUCASH-1 and QUSPOT-1, who could, under some legitimate business pretext, contact Identity C. Our objective is to develop a warm entree to Identity C without compromising any of our agents, but we are in need of an assessment of Identity C by either a Station Officer or an asset working under an officer's instructions. We will keep you advised of our progress. We are forwarding PRQ Part I under separate cover. A POA on Identity C was requested separately. There are no derogatory Station traces.

4. Identity B would be an excellent choice if not for his relationship with Identity D. This avenue might be explored with QUSEQUIN-48 if Headquarters is agreeable to a joint operation. QUSEQUIN-48 could probably get the necessary clearances from Identity D directly, or from one of Identity D's aides, to contact Identity B. We will not pursue this until we receive your comments.

5. It is not too early to consider the emoluments we might want to offer to AMAUTO-1 at the time a pitch is made. As always they should be divided into two areas - for defection and for recruitment and work in place.

Howard R. Sacoder
Howard R. SACODER

201-735296

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT A. TO: OSMA - 26061, 18 March 1970

IDENTITIES

Identity A: Romanian Minister to Spain

Identity B: Nicholas FRANCO

Identity C: Carlos CARRASCO Munoz de Vera

Identity D: Generalisimo Francisco FRANCO, Chief of State

CS COPY

S/C ATT. 1 to OSMA-26061

201-735296

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Europe Division;
COS, WH/Miami; COB, FRANTECH

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
RYBAT TYPIC TECHS/Construction of New PBRUMEN Embassy

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OSMA 24774

1. The PBRUMEN government has approved the construction in Madrid of a new office building to be used as an Embassy, Commercial office and residence for the PBRUMEN Minister. The site has been identified and work is expected to begin soon, probably after the return of AMAUTO-1 from PBRUMEN, sometime within the next two weeks. The builders expect to complete the building within eight months.

2. QUSEQUIN-37 is far more confident than we are, about the possibility of getting access to the building during the construction phase to possibly install various audio devices. We believe this operation to be a formidable one and we might be challenged by the presence in Madrid of PBRUMEN security forces overseeing the construction, the presence of PBRUMEN electricians and other professions, complicating the access to the building. We believe AMAUTO-1 has the Romanian experience well in mind and most likely will do everything within his power to overcome the possibility of an audio penetration of his building.

3. We would be grateful for any information addressees might have on the general modus operandi of PBRUMEN security forces in areas where PBRUMEN official installations have been constructed. Have they used PBRUMEN technicians, electricians, construction engineers, etc? Also we would like to know whether the PBRUMENS have installed their own telephone system or have they generally relied on the system of the host country. We would appreciate too, any comments Headquarters or other addressees would like to make on the best course of action for the Station to consider. QUSEQUIN-37 believes he can get a copy of the blueprints after the plan

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS,WH/Miami
2 - COB,FRANTECH

(continued)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA 26040	18 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	Advise File

is submitted for approval to the Spanish Government. He feels confident that he can probably get the Spanish telephone company to cooperate and possibly some of the sub-contractors, if there are any.

4. We have made the assumption above that Headquarters desires the Station to pursue this matter,; if not please advise.

Howard R. SACODER

c. L.

ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD:mdu
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819/7144
DATE: 20 MARCH 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 2d PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH-8 INFO: FILE, VR, KE/AN, EUR-6, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 20 23 29Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO WH/MIAMI INFO MADRID 018916

TYPIC ANAUTO

REF: WH/MIAMI 6841 (IN 044777)

1. NO ADDITIONAL HQS TRACES ON ALEXANDER SAMKO.

2. SAMKO ASSIGNED 201-866054. HIS POA IS BEING PROCESSED, WILL ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-866054, X-REF 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref provided bio data and requested POA for debriefing on Alexander SAMKO, businessman in Miami, Florida. AMAUTO-1, recruitment target in Madrid, Spain, worked for one Alexander SAMKO as an apprentice butcher in 1957.

E/IB/S ____________

File:
Anauto-1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

C L

ARL LUNSFORD:mdu
WH/COG/OPS
R1819/7144
17 MARCH 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 4 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, EUR 6, CI/OA, FI, AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 19 19 15Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI 018318

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 0689 (IN 043650)

1. ONLY HQS TRACE ON CARLOS CARRASCO MUNOZ DE VERA OTHER THAN INFO CONTAINED OSM-9487, MAR 1969, IS TRAVEL FROM SPAIN-CUBA 10 MARCH 69; CUBA-SPAIN 14 MARCH 69.

2. CARRASCO ASSIGNED 201-866047. POA BEING PROCESSED, WILL ADVISE. IF ASSESSMENT FAVORABLE, WILL ASSIGN CRYPTONYM.

3. FILE: 201-866047, X-REF 201-736296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Reference requested traces and priority POA on Carlos CARRASCO Munoz De Vera, businessman and lawyer in Madrid, Spain, and a personal friend of AMAUTO-1.

C/WH/COG

AC/E/IB/S

FILE!
AMAUTO-1

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

35718

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 7

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 33 PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

I

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

FILE, VR RI/AN EUR6 CI/OA

ACTION NO. 708

S E C R E T 172034Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6841 (NEBECKER ACTING)

WMTM

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO-1

17 Mar IN 044777

1. THROUGH LOCAL WOBONE OFFICE STATION HAS LOCATED AN ALEXANDER SAMKO WHO LIVES IN HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA. ACCORDING TO LOCAL RECORDS HE WAS BORN 2 NOVEMBER 1907 IN PERTH AMBOY, NEW JERSEY. WIFE'S NAME IS SELMA SAMKO. HE IS CURRENTLY LISTED AS THE OWNER OF THE BEACH DELICATESSEN AND GROCERY LOCATED AT 302 JOHNSON STREET, HOLLYWOOD.

201-366654

2. THE 1957 MIAMI CITY DIRECTORY LISTED SUBJECT AS MANAGER OF A FIRM KNOWN AS MIR-A-KIL PRODUCTS. 1958-59 DIRECTORY LISTED HIM AS OWNER OF THE FRUIT CENTER AT 100 SW 17TH AVENUE.

3. LOCAL FILES STATED THAT ON 12 MAY 1960 SAMKO MADE AN APPLICATION FOR A LIQUOR LICENSE. HE WAS FINGERPRINTED AND HIS FINGERPRINTS WERE FORWARDED TO LNERGO. LATTER REPORTED NO CRIMINAL RECORD.

4. STATION WILL CONTACT AND DEBRIEF ON RECEIPT OF POA.

5. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

AI 100
~~AP~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~EX~~
~~DEC~~ ~~NPD~~
~~FI~~
LH/C/HP

CS COPY
SECRET

201-735296
17 Mar 70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 2 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 4 TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR, RF/AN, EUR6

ACTION NO. 659

S E C R E T 171406Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6832 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MADRID

17 Mar [illegible] 044405

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. MADRID 0689 (IN 043650)

B. MADRID 0690 (IN 043656)

1. NO STATION TRACES CARLOS CARRASCO MUNOZ DE VERA.

2. FILE CARRASCO 201. X-REF 201-736296. GP-1

S E C R E T

FILE: AMAUTO-1

SECRET

14-00000

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 7

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

II

DISSEM BY 7 PER ______ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH 8 INFO FILE, VR R/AN C1 C/OPS C/CA FI 2

ACTION NO. 560

S E C R E T 161518Z MAR 70 CITE MADRID 0690 16 MAR 043656

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 0689 (IN 043650)

1. IDENTITY: CARLOS (CARRASCO) MUNOZ DE VERA
DPOB: SPAIN, 6 MARCH 1939

2. FILE 201-736296. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

7 **SECRET**
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

II

ACTION UNIT WH 8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CI CI/OPS C/OA FI 2

ACTION NO. 561

SECRET 161517Z MAR 70 CITE MADRID 0639

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI 16 MAR 70 043650

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 015890

1. STATION COMMENTS ON RECRUITMENT AMAUTO-1 TO BE POUCHED 18 MARCH.

2. REQUEST TRACES AND PRIORITY POA ON IDEN WHO IS LAWYER, AND PERSONAL FRIEND AMAUTO-1. PRQ PART I WILL BE ATTACHED TO ABOVE DISPATCH. POA FOR CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT AND IF FAVORABLE, RECRUITMENT AS INTERMEDIARY FOR OP AGAINST AMAUTO-1.

3. FILE 201-73$\overset{5}{6}$296. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1 Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID/FI. 2 Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

[illegible] VAL EX-129
[illegible] CA 50
[illegible] CT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

TO.	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		19 MAR 1970		S
2. Wheeler		23 Mar.		[illegible]
3. Lunsford				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COMMENTS

[illegible] Thl.

2-3: This is probably Lourdes Suárez de Cepeda, ¿no? Doesn't look like any action required.

~~[illegible]~~

61547

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT X INDEX	FILE TITLE
		FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296
DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE 13 Mar 70	DOCUMENT NUMBER OSMA 26025

FORM 1-64 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

1401

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Europe Division;
COS, WH/Miami, COB/DO, New York

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC/QUTIMID/U.S. Company in Touch with Cuban Embassy

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. OSMA 25995
B. DIRECTOR 014234
C. MADRID 0620

1. According to QUTIMID on 26 February, Miss SUAREZ de Cepeda of the Grolier Company called AMAUTO-1 and spoke with his secretary to explain that her company is giving their book to a number of persons in order to obtain their opinions about the product and AMAUTO-1 was one of the persons on Grolier's list. AMAUTO-1's secretary said that he would call when he returned. Later, Miss SUAREZ was told that an appointment was made for 10 March.

2. This would appear to be a routine item which probably would not merit further investigation, unless we can discover someone of higher caliber in the Grolier Company who could approach AMAUTO-1 as a means of cultivating a meaningful friendship with AMAUTO-1.

Philip C. Kentland
Philip C. KENTLAND

2CC T E/IB/5

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami
2 - COB/DO, New York

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA 26025	13 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~05-120-80~~ 201-735296

WH/C/OP

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER;pfd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 13 MARCH 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET

21

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN DDP6 CI/OPS, FI2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 14 16 20Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 017236

TO WH/MIAMI INFO: MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO-1

REF: WH/MIAMI 6753 (IN 040850)

1. FOR STATION'S INFORMATION IN REF INVESTIGATION, LNYUMA FILE ON AMAUTO-1 SHOWS HE USED FOLLOWING ADDRESSES DURING HIS STAY THERE:

A. C/O OSVALDO RUIZ (BROTHER)
826 N E SECOND AVENUE

B. 121 N E FIFTH STREET, APT 19

C. 1440 N W TWENTY FIRST TERRACE

D. 1749-½ N W TWENTY FIRST STREET

2. FOR HIS LNYUMA INVESTIGATION HE RETAINED LAW FIRM OF WALTERS, MOORE, AND COSTANZO, 1008 AINSLEY BUILDING.

3. FILE SHOWS HE FIRST LEFT CUBA 8 NOV 56, WENT TO KEY WEST TO SEE BROTHER, LEFT MIAMI AIRPORT 17 NOV 56 AS TOURIST TO DOM REP WHERE HE RECEIVED FIVE MONTHS MILITARY TRAINING. DECIDED TO LEAVE BECAUSE HE FOUND HE WAS IN WITH GROUP OF CUBAN "GANGSTERS" AND WAS IMPRISONED THERE FOR FIFTEEN DAYS FOR TRYING TO ESCAPE. POLICARPIO

AN
RID

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14 Mar 70

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

201-735296

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY________PER________#

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: INFO FILE VR.

PAGE TWO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 017236

TO

SOLER (AKA JOAQUIN RODRIGUEZ) WAS IN CHARGE OF CUBAN EXILES TRAINING THERE.

4. HE REENTERED U.S. 5 APRIL 57, OVERSTAYED HIS TIME, AND ON 11 FEB 58 WAS ORDERED DEPORTED TO CUBA. HE CLAIMED HE WOULD BE KILLED IF HE RETURNED, THAT U.S. WAS ONLY PLACE WHERE HE FELT FREE, SO HE NEVER SHOWED FOR DEPORTATION. LATER LNYUMA INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT AS OF 2 MAR 58 HE WAS LIVING AT CALLE 86 NUMBER 705, APT 1, MIRAMAR, HAVANA, HAVING LEFT ON "EXPEDITION PLANE" FROM MIAMI.

5. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENTS: Ref reports WH/Miami reviewing leads in Miami area pertaining to targetting of AMAUTO-1.

MAR 19 3 59 PM '70

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

EUR/IB

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

/16 SECRET (When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 35/28 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DO4, EUR6, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 483

SECRET 132110Z MAR 70 CITE DO BASE/NEW YORK 7526

NYDO

Later info revealed she was staying in Madrid. Cable from Madrid No. [illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

TYPIC DOMOPS QUTIMID AMAUTO

13 MAR IN 042774

4

REF DIRECTOR 014234

1. NO BASE OR LOCAL LNERGO TRACES MISS (FNU) LOURDES SUBJ REF. PRETEXT PHONE CALL BY BASE OFFICER TO GROLIER INC. PUBLISHER (ONLY LOCAL FIRM CORRESPONDING TO GROLIER CITED REF) ESTABLISHED THAT NO PERSON THAT NAME EMPLOYED THERE.

2. NOTE THAT PHONE NUMBER MENTIONED REF IS MADRID NUMBER, NOT NEW YORK.

3. UNLESS FURTHER IDENTIFYING INFO FORTHCOMING ON LOURDES BASE PLANS NO ADDITIONAL ACTION THIS MATTER.

4. FILE 201-735296. GP-1.

SECRET

8

AN

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296

13 Mar 70.

15 November 1976

SUBJECT: Typed Notes from Review of I&NS File of
Orestes Guilmero RUIZ Perez

Subject's file was presumably reviewed in the spring of 1970 at the I&NS office at 119 D St., N.E., Room 547

[Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez] made application at Miami on 2 April 1957 c/o Osvaldo RUIZ
826 N.E., 2nd Avenue
Miami, Fla.

Was admitted 5 April 1957 (from 3 Apr primary inspection)

Alias in school: Willie
Address : Quinte 5, #714, Havana
DPOB : Havana, 10 Feb. 1930
Remarks : Cannot go back to Cuba. Havana U. student. If he returns would be killed by Batista Govt.

Left Cuba 8 November 1956, went to Key West to see his brother, above address.

Left from Miami approx. 17 Nov 56 as tourist to Dom. Rep. by CDA airline on tourist card. Stayed with Mrs. Rosa HERNANDEZ, Calle Morffa # 17, C.T. Family friends of 1 yr. from Havana. Stayed two weeks. Went to Feria de la Pax as interpreter and guide, hired by HERNANDEZ family. Worked for tips. Lived at boardinghouse at Calle Barahouce # 115 for 4 months.

Wanted to immigrate because it was only place where he felt free.

Came to U.S. on CDA #400 on 2 Apr 57. Had previously applied in 1947 for study in States from Havana but didn't come. Was married at that time.

Had written letters to newspapers in Havana against Batista Govt.

Full set of finger prints available.
Applied to extend time of temporary stay. Statement dated 10 May 57 (with interpreter)

Address given: 121 N.E. 5th St., Apt 19
Miami
Passport : 49248, Cuban

continued

Was a prisoner in Dom Rep, not in a prison, but in a concentration camp with 11 others for 15 days because he tried to escape, because he was taking military training. Had been asked there by one Jose Antonio ECHEVERRIA who was killed in Cuba in attack on Pres. Palace on 13 57. ECHEVERRIA approached RUIZ at Havana U. When he went to Dom Rep, found a bunch of Cuban gangsters instead of decent people. POLICARPO Soler aka Joaquin RODRIGUEZ, was in charge of group, who was one who arrested him. Had actually 5 months military training Nov 56 to Apr 57.

Was in student demonstrations and passed propaganda vs. Batista regime.

One Dr. VENAGE, Cuban, gave RUIZ a ticket to return to the U.S. from Dom Rep.

N.B. He is opposed to Communist philosophy. His group, the university students, had a fight with Communists. not true admitted leftism comments

On or about 12 July 57 RUIZ wanted to obtain permanent residence visa in U.S.

5 Nov 57 notified he had to leave by 4 Dec 57.

25 Sept 57, living with wife and child at 1440 N.W. 21st Terrace. /Miami/

In Nov 57, at 1749½ N.W. 21st St., Miami and ________ had joined there.

Overstayed his time. 11 Feb 58 ordered deported to Cuba. Represented on or about 14 Feb 58 by the firm Walters, Moore, and Costanzo (1008 Ainsley Bldg.)

Notified 4 times of interrogation but had moved addr. week a/o 25 Jul 58.

Order for detention issued 21 Aug 58.

Order for deportation issued 19 Mar 59.

Investigation showed he returned to Havana to Calle 5#714 on 2 Mar 58 on an "expedition by plane." A/o 6 Apr 59 living at Calle 86 #705, Apt 1, Miramar

Chris Hopkins
Task Force "K"

TAL SLIP | DATE [illegible]

ROOM NO. | BUILDING

REMARKS:

119 D St NE

Rm 547

Ask for Edith Byard

FROM:

ROOM NO. | BUILDING | EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.
☆ GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

①

Made appl at Miami on [illegible] 2 Apr 57

c/o Osvaldo Ruiz
826 NE 2nd Ave
Miami, Fla.

Admitted 5 Apr 57 (from 3 Apr primary inspection)

Alias in school : Willie
Address : Quinta 5, #714, Havana
DPOB : Havana, 10 Feb. 1930
Remarks : Cannot go back to Cuba. Havana U. student. If he returned would be killed by Batista govt.

Left Cuba 8 NOV 56, went to Key West to see his brother, above address.

Left from Miami a/p 17 NOV 56 as tourist to Dom Rep. by CDA airline on Tourist Card. Stayed w/Mrs. ROSA HERNANDEZ, Calle Marta # 17, C.T. Family friends of 1 yr. from Havana. Stayed 2 wks. Went to Feria de la Paz as interpreter & guide, hired by HERNANDEZ family. Worked for tips. Lived at boarding house at Calle Barahona #115 for 4 months.

Wanted to immigrate because it was only place where he felt free

Came to US on CDA #400 on 2 APR 57
Had previously applied in 1947 for study in States from Havana but didn't come. was married at that time
Had written letters to newspapers in Havana against Batista govt.

Full set of fingerprints available
Appl to extend time of temporary stay
Statement dated 10 May 57: (w/interpreter)

Addr given: 121 N E 5th St, Apt 19
Miami
Passport: 49248, Cuban.

Was a prisoner in Dom Rep, not in a prison, but in a concentration camp w/11 others for 15 days because he tried to escape, because he was taking military train. Had been asked there by one José Antonio Echeverria who was killed in Cuba in attack on Pres Palace on 13 Mar 57. Echeverria approached Ⓡ at Havana U. When he went to DR, found a bunch of Cuban gangsters instead of decent people. POLICARPIO SOLER aka JOAQUIN RODRIGUEZ was in charge of group, who was one who arrested him. Had actually 5 mos. military train Nov 56 - Apr 57.

Was in student demonstrations & passed propaganda vs. Batista regime.

③

Chi Dr. Venage, Cuban, gave Ⓡ ticket to return to US from DR.

He is opposed to Communist philosophy. His group, the University students, had a fight w/Communists.

a/o 12 July 57 wanted to obtain permanent residence visa in U.S.

5 Nov 57 notified he had to leave by 4 DEC 57.

25 Sep 57, living w/wife & child at 1440 NW 21st Terrace

In Nov 57, at 1749½ NW 21st St, Miami & M-in-L had joined them

Overstayed his time

11 Feb. 58, ordered deported to Cuba.

Represented a/o 14 Feb 58 by firm Walters, Moore, & Costanzo (1008 AINSLEY BLDG

Notified 4 times of interrogation but had moved addr. unk a/o 25 JUL 58.

Order for detention issued 21 Aug 58

Order for deportation issued 19 MAR 59.

Investigation showed he returned to Havana to Calle 5 # 714 on 2 MAR 58 on an "expedition by plane."

A/o 6 Apr 59 living at Calle 86 # 705, apt 1, Miramar

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 12 PER ______ #

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

I

ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, FI 2, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 160

S E C R E T 111655Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6753 WMIM 11 MAR 70 IN 34085 0

DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO -1

REF: DIRECTOR 015890

1. WH/MIAMI ATTEMPTING TO CHECK OUT REF INFO ON AMAUTO-1 THROUGH SEVERAL ASSETS AND LOCAL WOBONE. WILL ADVISE IF ANYTHING DEVELOPED.

2. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

01

AN UIU
~~AB~~ X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DES~~ FD
~~FI~~
w/d/c/l

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296
11 Mar 70

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER;pfd
UNIT: WH COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 10 MARCH 1970

S/E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN EUR6 FI2 CI CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 10 23 16Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO PRIORITY MADRID, WH/MIAMI 075890

TYPIC AMAUTO-1

REFS: A. OSMW-25989 (NOT SENT WH/MIAMI)

B. OSMW 11726

1. ITEM 12 DATED 28 JAN 70 REPORTED REF A QUOTES AMAUTO-1 AS SAYING THAT HE WILL NOT BE IN MADRID FOR INAUGURATION NEW BUILDING SINCE HIS TOUR IN SPAIN ENDING. ITEM 15 DATED 6 FEB REPORTED REF A, QUOTES AMAUTO-1 AS SAYING HE INTENDS TO LEAVE FOR HAVANA AFTER 18 JULY.

2. VIEW ABOVE, REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS ON REF B ASAP.

3. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENTS: Ref A is normal dispatch take from QUTIMID/QUDOZE audio operation run against AMAUTO-1 in Spain. These items were not signalled by cable.
Ref B is lengthy dispatch from Hqs pointing out vulnerabilities of AMAUTO-1, means of targetting him, and request for comments by WH/MIAMI and Madrid.

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

C/WH/CCG W. Lyl
EUR/IB M. Sorrels

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

201-735296

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

10 Mar 70

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

King

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. CSDB-312/00665-70

DATE DISTR. 6 March 1970

COUNTRY Cuba/Spain

DOI December 1969-30 January 1970

SUBJECT Problems of Cuban Mission in Madrid with Lack of Response from Havana

ACQ Spain, Madrid (2 February 1970) FIELD NO. OSM 9937

SOURCE An official Spanish service from a usually reliable source who was able to read the memorandum reported below.

1. In a memorandum dated 30 January 1970 to Carlos A. Neira Garcia, official of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Cuban charge d'affaires in Madrid Guillermo Ruiz Perez outlined the salient current problems of most concern to his mission:

a. Building construction. Ruiz submitted a proposal to Havana in December 1969 for the construction of a building to house all the mission offices including the embassy, the consulate, the commercial office, the Cubana Airlines office, and possibly the minister's residence. Ruiz had not received a concrete reply to the proposal and he urged Neira to take it up again with the ministry.

b. Radio facility. Responding to a request from the Director of the Cuban National Fishing Institute, Emilio Aragones Navarro, in December 1969, Ruiz applied to the Spanish authorities for permission to install a radio facility in the Canary Islands for communicating with Cuban ships. The permission had been granted by late December yet Havana had failed to follow up the project with plans and instructions.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
DCS	BIC	TREASURY	FBI 4					

FILE: [illegible]

WHC/RR	3	WH/SAO	1	E/IB/R	3		OSM-9937
WHC/OPS	2			E/MADR	1	QUS	EQUIN/QUDOZE
WHC/EW	1	CI/OPS/WH	2	E/R	1		(ZRSAUCE)
WHC/PP	1					CS	DB-312/00665-70
WHC/MIAMI	1					COORDINATING	RH SR CD
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO 2, WH/C 7 (1), EUR 4 (1), WH 1						LIAISON ●	

c. Visa delays. Havana is consistently late in processing visa requests for foreigners traveling to Cuba. Ruiz attributed the delays to the red tape which involves processing the requests through two ministries; The Visa Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Directorate of Immigration in the Ministry of Interior. Ruiz requested authorization for the consulate to send its visa requests directly to the Directorate of Immigration since this is the section that ultimately determines whether a foreigner may or may not enter Cuba.

2. Field Dissem: None.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. MAR 5 3 70

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	C/
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

II

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DO4, EUR 6, FI2, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 709

S E C R E T 051515Z MAR 70 CITE MADRID 0620

DIRECTOR INFO DO BASE NEW YORK

TYPIC QUTIMID AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 014234

5 MAR IN 037245

dl

10

1. LOCAL TRACES MISS LOURDES FORWARDED OSMA-25995, POUCHED 4 MARCH 70.

2. FILE: 65-2-10/9. GP-1

S E C R E T

[illegible]

NO

THIS PERTAINS TO
THE GAL THAT
INTERVIEWED AMAUTO
FOR SOME TYPE [illegible]

SECRET

FILE, [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief, Europe Division; COS, WH/Miami; COB, DO New York

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: TYPIC/QUTIMID/U.S. Company in Touch with Cuban Embassy, Madrid

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. QUTIMID reported a 21 January 1970 conversation held between the wife of the Cuban Charge in Madrid and a Miss "Lourdes" speaking for the Grolier Company in New York. Miss Lourdes said that her company was undertaking some type of publicity and wished to interview the Charge in this regard. When questioned about what kind of work the company does, Miss Lourdes replied that Grolier is an investigation (studies) and consultant firm with central office located in New York City. Lourdes gave her local number as 233-7448. She was advised that the matter would be brought up to the Charge, Guillermo RUIZ, and she would be informed of the results later.

2. Later that day Aristides DIAZ Ruvirosa, the Embassy's press officer and a member of the DGI, called back to say that he would see her the next day in his office at 10:30.

3. According to QUSEQUIN, telephone 233-7448 is registered in the name of Isaac BENDAHAN Sananes at Calle General Moscardo 6, 6th floor, Apt. C, Madrid. There are no Station or liaison traces on BENDAHAN.

4. DO Base New York may be able to identify the Grolier Company in New York and the reason for which their representative was in touch with the Cuban Embassy.

5. Whatever follow-up action is conducted, the sensitivity of the QUTIMID operation should be kept firmly in mind so that our interest does not appear to stem from a technical monitoring of the Cuban installation.

Distribution:
✓2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami
2 - COS, DO/NY

Philip C Kentland
Philip C. KENTLAND

COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OSMA 25995

DATE: 4 March 1970

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 65-2-10/4 ~~65-120-20~~

CSMM-25570
15 FEB 1970

Source
Report No. 259 (Cont'd). 27 Jan 1970

I told her that I personally regretted it, as an individual and as Cuban, but that as a diplomat I could not do her any favor because she had left Cuba voluntarily, in flight, and that I could not render any assistance to her and least of all protect her. If I had then been able to take pictures, I could have sent them to Havana for them to see (This happened when RUIZ had first arrived here.)

RUIZ goes on to say that many people are misled when they arrive in Madrid from Cuba, or have been misled by their relatives. Parents bring their children--RUIZ says there are over 400 Cuban children in one school. One of them left /school/ once and passage had to be provided for him at the airport in CUBANA and allowed him to leave because they did not want to be mixed up in that affair. The child was 14 years old and did not want to stay in Madrid in the parrochial school with the monks. R says that should anything happen to him and his wife wants to stay in Madrid, he wants his children to return to Cuba and remain there until they become of age and make their own choice, but that to take children out of Cuba is a mistake.

FYI
KS[illegible]
[illegible]

FILE: [illegible]

Report No. 261.   29 Jan 1970

NILDA is typing while RUIZ is out of the office. CURBELO comes in and she tells him a cable arrived granting her permission to travel to Havana, but that she will not be going because RUIZ became annoyed. She adds that RUIZ is very selfish.

NILDA and RUIZ discuss her trip. R asks her if she is going; she says 'no' because he does not want her to go. Apparently he tells her to go home that instant and get ready, after she tells him that she has no time to take out her summer clothes, etc. She declines by saying that he has already ruined everything. She goes on to say that she had not asked MELVA or anyone else for her passage, but had written to RUZ (ph) saying that she was very depressed and that she missed her son very much, and they had arranged for her passage. NILDA adds that she is not going on a pleasure trip, but to see her son and see how he is doing, which she finds only natural. She would have stayed with him for two whole days and would have talked to the School Director and found out how the child was doing. She calls R selfish and says if the trip had been for him she would not have doubted it. She wants to know why RUIZ places objections to her trip to Havana. He wants the two of them to go together, and for her to wait until their vacation, not at this time. She contends it is because he does not want to stay by himself, as she knows him well after 16 years of living together.

NILDA says she will have to write to NEIRA regarding her passage and to thank him.

Report No. 262 (Cont'd).

other such things. This amount could be reduced if we bring our Cuban architects, who were here two years ago, and knowledgeable of their mission could discuss with the land owner and the construction firm those things they feel could be omitted and the price could be brought down considerably. We do not need a luxury building, but one that is attractive, simple and functional. Term payments could also be extended. I want to impress upon you that when we entered into negotiations we had a binding agreement.

"The lot is on Avenida La Habana. Fermín GUTIERREZ looked well into this matter. He asked me to send him the project and that he would look at it. The system of payments in Spain allows us to pay $100,000 or $150,000 annually which will not be difficult for us.

"NEIRA, I want you to talk to CHAIN, not bearing pressure on him, but to make him understand that what I want is to leave my successor established, for any construction , lasting over nine months I certainly will not be able to enjoy.

[illegible]

"Another thing I want to bring to your attention is in regard to our Consulate, its activities and relations with the Visa Section. A letter has come from VERA addressed to FRANCO pointing to FRANCO's incorrect wording of a cable to that Section. I agree that it was incorrect, but I

Report No. 263.   31 Jan. 1970

There is another unidentified Cuban in the office. When RUIZ is left alone with her, he says that he feels like an exile, that he has been out for two years and is tired. There are many who want to be out of Cuba, he continues, but it seems to him they want to keep him out of the way. He goes on to say that LEON had appointed him, and supported him, but although they are good friends, he does not like to work with a man whom one never knows what he is thinking, and one never gets to know. R mentions a cable he had sent and says it could have cost his assassination,and that he had purposely done so to see if he were summoned to discuss the matter in Cuba. He would have liked to discuss it there, but they have apparently remained silent. R laments he feels as if he were in Miami.

Report 2314

4 February 1970

MERCEDES READS RUIZ THE FOLLOWING TELEX :

" WE FEEL NILDA SHOULD TRAVEL ON IBERIA NEXT MONDAY BECAUSE THE TRIP IS SHORTER AND SHE HAS THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED. MINREX." Ruiz is at home and remarks he is going out to dinner tonight.

[See Report 262, 30 Jan 70, for memo that Ruiz sent NEIRA at MINREX with Nilda.]

44

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144 R. 18[illegible]
DATE: 2 MARCH 197[illegible]

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 8 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE VR, RI/AN, DO 4, EUR 6, FI 2, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 04 17 59Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 014234

UND
CSM

DO BASE NEW YORK, INFO: MADRID

TYPIC QUTIMID AMAUTO

REF: OSMA-25969 (NOT SENT DO BASE NEW YORK)*

IP

citUS Sex F

1. ACCORDING SENSITIVE SOURCE ONE MISS LOURDES, OF GROLIER COMPANY OF STUDY AND RESEARCH, MAIN OFFICE NEW YORK, CALLED CUBAN EMBASSY MADRID ON 21 JAN REQUESTING AN INTERVIEW WITH CHARGE, GUILLERMO RUIZ. INTERVIEW FOR SOME TYPE PUBLICITY AND GRANTED FOR FOLLOWING DAY.

trace reply

2. RUIZ IS PRIME HQS RECRUITMENT TARGET AND WE THEREFORE INTERESTED ANY OUTSIDE CONTACT WITH SUBJECT THAT OFFERS ASSESSMENT DATA. APPRECIATE ANY INFO DO BASE NEW YORK CAN PROVIDE RE FULL IDENTITY AND BIO ON MISS LOURDES, TEL: 233-74-48. NO OBJECTION BASE QUERYING LOCAL LNERGO, PROTECTING SOURCE OF INFO.

3. INDEX LOURDES. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
MAR 23 1970
DOC. MICRO SER.

RI UV
AB X
IP X
PS
2
FI

WH/COG/COMMENT: *Reference was intercepted telephone call from Miss LOURDES, employee of Grolier Co. in New York to Cuban Embassy, Madrid, requesting an interview with the Charge d'Affairs.

201-735296

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

4 Mar 70

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG:
NIT:
(T:
ATE:

13 44 AH '70

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☑ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO 13 12 38 '70 BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

___________ PER ___________

☑ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ___________

SNF:

R1

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

04 17 59z MAR 70

70142347

NS

C/WH/COG W. Langbrun

EUR/IB W. Sorrels

DO/I/B2 R J Baker

GORDON JORGENSEN
C/DO

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTIO OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS P IBITED.

COPY NO.



RECEPCION POR EL XIV ANIVERSARIO DEL EJERCITO POPULAR NACIONAL DE LA R.D.A.

● **El agregado militar, naval y aéreo de la Embajada de la República Democrática Alemana, capitán de fragata Emil Fehlauer, ofreció anoche una recepción con motivo del 14 aniversario del Ejército Popular Nacional de la RDA, fundado el primero de marzo de 1956.**

A la recepción, celebrada en la sede diplomática alemana, asistieron los miembros del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, comandantes Manuel Piñeiro Loseda, viceministro primero del Ministerio del Interior; Manuel Díaz González, jefe de la sección de Relaciones Exteriores del MINFAR; Roberto T. Viera Estrada; y Orlando Rodríguez Puerta.

Igualmente se encontraban presentes los comandantes Julio Casas, viceministro para los Servicios del MINFAR; Samuel González Rodiles; José Quevedo Pérez; y Emigdio Báez Vivo, de la Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria; así como el primer capitán Harry Villegas Tamayo y otros oficiales de nuestras Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias.

De la celebración del aniversario del Ejército Popular Nacional también participaron los integrantes de la delegación del Ministerio del Interior de la RDA que se encuentra en Cuba encabezada por el viceministro primero, teniente general Herbert Günstein; agregados militares de las embajadas acreditadas en nuestro país; representantes del cuerpo diplomático extranjero y funcionarios del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba.

FILE: [illegible] 70-1

Report No. 2234 (Cont'd)

to see about a package that Melba had lost traveling from Cuba the week before and could not locate because she had lost the ticket.

One Miss LOURDES calls on behalf of the Grolier Company from New York and tells NILDA they are conducting some type of publicity and would like to arrange an interview with Guillermo RUIZ. NILDA asks what type of company it is. She is told it combines study and research. N notes down the following information for RUIZ to call when he gets in: Grolier Company of Study and Research, main office in New York, Miss LOURDES, tel.: 233-74-48. [illegible] calls [illegible] from the [illegible] to reset the interview she [illegible] for 10:30 the next morning.

Checking with fbi.

SANTAMARIA, from the Ministry of Commerce, calls in answer to R's call and to apologize for not having been able to attend the reception. R begins by saying that when Raúl LEON had left for Cuba he had sent a letter of thanks to the Minister (of Commerce) for his kind considerations and at the same time had mentioned that "before your [pl.] trip it would be most beneficial and advisable for both parties if you [pl.] could advance us a list of subjects you are interested in discussing in Havana, for it would at least give us a little time to prepare ourselves." SANTAMARIA says, "Precisely, on Friday at 10:30 I am having a [illegible] (21 January 1970)

[illegible] Mrs. Concepción CAMACHO de MATOS calls RUIZ. NILDA asks if she is the same person who called the other day and said she was the widow of... (MATOS). The woman says 'yes' and NILDA tells her: "Look Miss, you're playing a very dangerous game."

MATOS: I don't know what you mean, miss.

NILDA: Well, because none of the comrades here is going to allow himself to be provoked. So, please do not keep on."

MATOS: Well, I don't know what you are referring to, miss, I am completely astonished.'

NILDA: Well look, don't be astonished, you might end up some other way.

MATOS: I don't know what you are talking about.

NILDA: Well, we do.

NILDA hangs up.

Mrs. MATOS calls the Ambassador's secretary again; it seems there has been a misunderstanding.

NILDA: Look miss, we do not wish to talk to you anymore. We are telling you in a nice way. Please do not call anymore.

MATOS: I am not going to call again... I only want to say I had nothing to do.,. I know nothing at all.

[illegible]

... Only that I have received a message. I received a telephone call... I have just arrived in Madrid, I am not familiar with Madrid, or know anyone.

NILDA: Aren't you the one who called the other day? You made a date.

MATOS: What kind of a date?

NILDA: Didn't you make a date with the Charge d'Affaires?

MATOS: No, no,no. One moment, miss. I received a telephone call and was told to call this gentleman, the Cuban Ambassador. I could also tell you about another ambassador, but that they were trying to get in touch with me.

NILDA: Who are'they'? To whom do you refer when you say that 'they' called you?

MATOS: I was called on behalf of the Ambassador of Chile and the Ambassador of Cuba. I thought it was extremely unusual, miss, because I don't know anyone here.

NILDA: Didn't you call here a few days ago?

MATOS: I called when I was advised to do so.

NILDA: And you made a date with the Ambassador.

MAWOS: I don't know now what exactly did happen. I was asked to talk with him and to get in touch with him, miss.

NILDA: But, who called you, miss?

MATOS: Whoever it was said "I am the Cuban Ambassador," so then it all seems to have been a plot, or something of the sort.

NILDA: Look, if it is a plot I suggest you do not get involved because where we are concerned it is somewhat dangerous.

MATOS: No miss, I am very proper and a serious person.

NILDA: Since you are so serious and proper don't ever let anything happen to you.

MATOS: I live with a daughter and you must realize that I live only for her.

NILDA: Well, look, if you live for her, don't get mixed up in these things for they may cost you dearly.

MATOS: Very well, miss. I am deeply grateful to have been enlightened by you. I can see already that it is simply a plot or an implication by someone.

NILDA: It is a plot and we know it. And we know who is behind it.

MATOS: Yes, miss, I would also like to know, I assure you.

NILDA: Well look, stay away from this mess or you'll pay dearly... good-bye.

MATOS: Fine, miss. I am also very grateful that you have told me. My apologies, huh?

EXTRACT FROM
CSMA 25989
20 FEB 70

CONTINUED

Item 12-continued.

with the Minister who told him that next week they would discuss the matter of costs and that the Minister was in favor of Ruiz' idea. Ruiz asks Villaroya to wait a few days more and in the event that they receive bad news they will have a few drinks together at the Castellano to forget their sorrow. Ruiz says he is very anxious to move out of the place he is in, and aks how long it will take to construct bhe building. Villaroya tells him about 9 or 10 months. Ruiz says that most likely he won't be there to inaugurate the building because his tour is ending in Spain, but that he will come from wherever he is for the inauguration.

28 January 1970

Item.1.- PILOTO CALLS YOLANDA. He asks for the address of the school. She says it is Guadalquivir 16.

Item 3.- AN UNIDENTIFIED COMRADE CALLS THE HOSTAL GENEVA. A Cuban answers. The Comrade asks to speak to Antonio CASADO. The Cuban(F) says he is not there that he is on a trip to New York. The comrade leaves no message.

Item 4.- ARISTIDES RUIZ CALLS UNESCO IN PARIS, tel. 56-65-757. (The connection is poor) Ruiz greets MARTINEZ MOREL(phon- he seems to be Cuban) and tells him that he (Aristides) arrived Saturday and that he is leaving on Sunday (1 February) for Cuba. He asks for MILT(phon) and Martinez says that up to Monday he hadn't arrived.

Aristides asks to speak with extension 4111. They don't answer. He then asks for 4110 and an American, whose name seems to be Frank, answers. They speak lengthily in English about the installation of television in two Cuban schools. They also speak about films and the financing of the projects, mentioning the Swedes and the people of UNICEF.

Item 23.- PILOTO CALLS CUCA (It is 10:30 PM). They speak for a long time although Piloto is a little worried and nervous. He says "--the one on guard today is one of the bad ones and besides this, he is with his wife". He tells Cuca that as the offices are carpeted you can't hear anyone's footsteps--and he is afraid they will hear him. He remarks, "The people here have got me very nervous".

3 February 1970

Item 11.- DR. MACORRA CALLS HORACIO. This doctor has just had an operation and now that he is well again he wants to renew his connections(with Horacio) because he has to go to Cuba to give a course in the Cuban Society for Oncologicos(phon) Studies. Mercedes asks for his full name, which is LUIS DE LA MACORRA, tel. 261-12-83, home telephone 200-93-52.

Later, referring to the same subject Pepe says "the last new people (that have arrived?) are alcoholics ? ? but if you only know, things are better at least with regard to us, peace and charity".

10 February 1970

Item 18.- The second tape begins with part of a conversation between Piloto and Cuca around dinner time. Cuca says that her mother is 55 years old and her father is 57. Her mother she says has had six children. Piloto mentions the difference in age between him and Cuca; he says 12 years is a lot. Piloto says he continues to lose weight.

11 February 1970

Item 3.- CONCHITA CALLS NILDA.- She says that the place where she bought the radio is called BARROSO and it is at Lavapies 45. Nilda talks to Alicia. She says that she had a very nice time (in Havana), but that the weather was very bad; it rained a lot and it was cold. Nilda was with (in Havana) Alicia's children. She says that they got very good marks in their studies and the little one can read and they are very happy. Nilda also spoke with Alicia's mother-in-law. She is suffering from la presion(high or low blood pressure) and she has not been able to get the necessary medicine. Then Nilda speaks of her own son. She says he is very tall and thin and that he is working in tobacco. She says he is in Guane(phon),and as she couldn't make the trip as it was two and a half hours long, they sent the boy to her house and she was with him for a few days. She says the boy is very happy, he is a serious type and causes no problems. Apparently Nilda's mother is ill, according to her remarks. Alicia says it is better that Nilda's boy is in Cuba, because there he will become a man and solve his own problems.

[illegible]

Item 8.- VILLAROYA, OF CONSTRUCCIONES AZAGRA CALLS RUIZ. He asks Ruiz about the project. Ruiz says that the news is good in the sense that it has been accepted in principle, and he believes everything is going along fine. But, they will have to wait. Ruiz thinks they will have a definite answer in about two weeks. He adds that they have great interest in this matter and also he would like to know definitely.

Item 20.- Someone REMARKS that Piloto "is seldom (in the embassy) in the afternoons".

ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 13 FEB 1970 WH/C/OP

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______
CONF: [illegible] 8

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE, VR. EUR 6, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI 10 21 Z 13 FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TYPIC QUDOZE

011307

REF: MADRID 0473 (IN 026722)

1. IN NOV 1967 ONE SONIA GOMEZ (NAT UNK) LISTED AS EMPLOYEE IN ECONOMIC OFFICE OF NATIONAL CENTER FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (CNIC) LOCATED IN HAVANA CITY.

2. TRAVEL TRACES SHOW SONIA GOMEZ ARAGO (SIC), CUBAN CIT, TRAVELLED CUBA-SPIAN 26 NOV 68. LEFT SPAIN FOR CUBA 21 JAN 69, DIP PP 68/676.

3. IF "SONIA" STILL IN MADRID APPRECIATE STATION OBTAIN ADDITIONAL BIO, DETAILS HER ACTIVITIES, CONTACTS, INTENDED LENGTH OF STAY, ANY ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS, ETC.. (NOTE PARA TWO, "SONIA" APPARENTLY STAYED MADRID ABOUT TWO MONTHS ON LAST VISIT).

4. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref reported suspicious activities and requested traces on recent arrival Spain from Havana of unk Subject identified only as "Sonia". Sonia possibly iden with Sonia GOMEZ Aragon (or Arago)

C/WH/COG
EUR/IB
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14 Feb 70

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-735296

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY 24

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

BY: ______ AT: ______ 3

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

III

C.SSEM BY 49 PER ______ # ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR6,

ACTION NO. 421

S E C R E T 170833Z FEB 70 CITE MADRID 0473 MADR

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

17 FEB IN 026722

TYPIC QUDOZE

1. QUDOZE 11 FEBRUARY REPORT COVERS LENGTHY CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMAUTO-1 AND RECENT ARRIVAL FROM HAVANA IDENTIFIED ONLY AS "SONIA" CONCERNING CONFIDENTIAL DETAILS HIS MISSION ACTIVITIES. AIRLIST SHOW SONIA GOMEZ ARAGON ARRIVING 10 FEBRUARY, CARRYING DIP PASSPORT.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE TRACES.

3. FILE 65-6-44/3. GP-1

S E C R E T

1P

RID/INDEX NEG

CUBAN CON NEG

CUIS NEG

TRAVEL ATT

BIO REG ATT

S

AN/ NO

AB X

~~FN~~

PS

BX 4

~~DE~~ MFD

~~FI~~

WH/C

MICROFILMED
MAR 4 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

D 65-6-44/3

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296
14 Feb 70

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

I.DEA. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR EUR6, RI/AN,

ACTION NO. 480

S E C R E T 171446Z FEB 70 CITE LISBON 5440 LISB

17 FEB IN 027047

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO QUTIMID

REF: DIRECTOR 009871

1. NO KNOWLEDGE DR. CAMACHO AT UNIVERSITY COIMBRA HOSPITAL. ALSO NO COIMBRA HOSPITAL IN LISBON. NO LISTING CAMACHO AT ALL IN COIMBRA PHONE DIRECTORY. NO STATION TRACES ON CONCHA OR CONCEPCION CAMACHO.

2. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN
AB X
WH/1/OP

CS COPY

SECRET

17 Feb 70
201-735296

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   ASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES [illegible]   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)   GROUP 1

1 Crawford
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

back to the old drawing board.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: ✓ PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT [illegible]   INFO   FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 341

S E C R E T 161426Z FEB 70 CITE MADRID 0464   16 FEB 70 IN 026187

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMAUTO/QUTIMID

REF: DIRECTOR 009871

1. SEE ALSO TWO CONVERSATIONS IN GUTIMID REPORT 2288, POUCHED 11 FEBRUARY. WOMAN IDENTIFIES SELF AS CONCEPCION CAMACHO VIUDA DE MATOS. GUSEQUIN IDENTIFY TELEPHONE NUMBER AS BELONGING TO CONCEPCION CAMACHO DE CASAR, PLAZA CARBALLO 8, TOWER 7. NOT IN TELEPHONE BOOK OF NOVEMBER 1969. NO TRACES STATION FILES UNDER ANY VARIATIONS NAMES. NO PLAZA CARBALLO ON CITY MAP BUT PROBABLY IN NEW SECTION CITY.

2. BECAUSE OF CONFUSION AND CONTRADICTIONS IN CONVER-SATIONS REPORTED IN 2288 APPEARS POSSIBLE WOMAN MAY HAVE BEEN SEEKING AMOROUS ADVENTURE WHICH MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN BASED ON CHANCE SOCIAL ENCOUNTER OR ON REPUTATION AMAUTO-1 AS "DON JUAN". PROBLEM NATURALLY COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT WHEN SHE TALKING TO AMAUTO-1 SECRETARY SHE WAS IN FACT TALKING TO HIS WIFE. AT NO TIME IN THE CONVERSATIONS IN QUESTION DID SHE BECOME AWARE THIS FACT.

AMAUTO-1

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: ______ PER ______ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 2464 SECRET

3. NOTE ALSO THAT IN QUTIMID 2247 SHE FIRST IDENTIFIED SELF AS WIFE DIRECTOR COIMBRA HOSPITAL BUT IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH AMAUTO-1 SAID HER HUSBAND WAS PILOT.

4. WILL ADVISE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON IDENTITY OF WOMAN RECEIVED FROM SUSEQUINS BUT BELIEVE UNLIKELY ANYTHING HERE WHICH CAN BE EXPLOITED.

5. FILE 201-735236. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT [illegible]

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, [illegible]

ACTION NO. 341

S E C R E T 161426Z FEB 70 CITE MADRID 0464 MADR

15 FEB 70 IN 026187

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMAUTO QUTIMID

REF: DIRECTOR 009871

1. SEE ALSO TWO CONVERSATIONS IN QUTIMID REPORT 2288, POUCHED 11 FEBRUARY. WOMAN IDENTIFIES SELF AS CONCEPCION CAMACHO VIUDA DE MATOS. GUSEQUIN IDENTIFY TELEPHONE NUMBER AS BELONGING TO CONCEPCION CAMACHO DE CASAR, PLAZA CARBALLO 8, TOWER 7. NOT IN TELEPHONE BOOK OF NOVEMBER 1969. NO TRACES STATION FILES UNDER ANY VARIATIONS NAMES. NO PLAZA CARBALLO ON CITY MAP BUT PROBABLY IN NEW SECTION CITY.

AN
AB
IN
PS
SX
DEC HPD
SI

2. BECAUSE OF CONFUSION AND CONTRADICTIONS IN CONVER-SATIONS REPORTED IN 2288 APPEARS POSSIBLE WOMAN MAY HAVE BEEN SEEKING AMOROUS ADVENTURE WHICH MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN BASED ON CHANCE SOCIAL ENCOUNTER OR ON REPUTATION AMAUTO-1 AS "DON JUAN". PROBLEM NATURALLY COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT WHEN SHE TALKING TO AMAUTO-1 SECRETARY SHE WAS IN FACT TALKING TO HIS WIFE. AT NO TIME IN THE CONVERSATIONS IN QUESTION DID SHE BECOME AWARE THIS FACT.

16 Feb 70

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY: PER RID

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 0464 S E C R E T

3. NOTE ALSO THAT IN QUTIMID 2247 SHE FIRST IDENTIFIED SELF AS WIFE DIRECTOR COIMBRA HOSPITAL BUT IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH AMAUTO-1 SAID HER HUSBAND WAS PILOT.

4. WILL ADVISE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON IDENTITY OF WOMAN RECEIVED FROM QUSEQUINS BUT BELIEVE UNLIKELY ANYTHING HERE WHICH CAN BE EXPLOITED.

5. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

Guillermo RUIZ Pérez

DOB : Late January or early February 1930.
POST: Minister Plenipotentiary, accredited since 12 December 1967.
ADDRESS: Juan de Mena #8, Madrid.
TELEPHONES: 259-5956 (home), 221-7028 (office).

DOI : March 1970.

WIFE: Nilda VECIANA. Probably in her early thirties, she is pregnant and was due to have her sixth child in May 1970. However, her physician recommended forced labor (reasons unknown), which was scheduled for 17 April 1970. She has had difficulties with her pregnancy because of recurring fainting spells and overweight, which are being treated by Dr. HERNANDEZ and Dr. MATA (the latter ordered lab tests for Diabetes, the results of which are unknown).

Married for 16 years to Guillermo, Nilda is a pleasant woman who has not been known to quarrel openly with her husband or express political or religious opinions, although in this last respect she has recited the Lord's Prayer in front of Embassy personnel, which suggests that she may have been or is a practicing Catholic.

Mrs. Ruiz is a language teacher by profession (speaks English fluently), and is active in the Embassy as secretary to her husband and bookkeeper, but only on an informal basis.

Of rather weak personality /_Exception, see Attachment II; she was upset at the time_7, which is reflected in the way that she handles her five boys--"little beasts," according to Severina ORTIZ, the maid--, Mrs. Ruiz does not permit them to be punished severely and is always complaining that she does not spend sufficient time with them.

She is known to have lived in New York for five years in the fifties (on 48th St., three blocks from Times Square), a city that she likes very much. She goes shopping alone, and once even to the airport in a taxi (Juan Antonio CURBELO, the embassy security officer, did not like the idea) to wait for her husband's arrival from one of his trips. She seems to get along well with the wives of other Cubans in the staff.

Nilda travelled to Havana on 30 January 1970 to see her son Guillermito, and returned to Madrid on 11 February. Although RUIZ used her to send a lengthy memo to Carlos NEIRA, his superior at MINREX [for text see Attachment III], he was not very happy with her trip— an attitude that Nilda resented very much ("You are very selfish") until her husband changed his mind.

Her parents live in Havana (local telephone, 2-8130). [Cuban Telephone Directory lists that telephone number under Y. LAM, Calle 21 #3421, Marianao.]

CHILDREN :

1.- Guillermito ("Guille"). At 14 he is the oldest and is currently studying in Havana. He is very tall and thin. There were reports that he was unhappy in Cuba, and his father went to Havana on 16 October 1969 to solve a "personal problem" with Guillermito. If true, Guille no longer feels that way because on 26 December he was quoted to be very happy in his new school.

Guille was scheduled to cut cane after 10 January 1970, but was actually assigned to a tobacco farm in Guane early this year.

2.- Alejandro, who is nine years old (DOB: 15 Feb). According to those who know him he is a real "devil" and a good swimmer. He is taking guitar lessons, and goes to Colegio

Estilo and Gimnasio Mascardó, Pilar de Zaragoza #99, Madrid.

3.- Ivan, who is about eight years old.

4.- Juan Carlos.

5.- Juliote.

All five are very spoiled and have caused several maids to leave their jobs. Severina ORTIZ bitterly complains that they show no respect for their parents. This is why she "hates" Mrs. Ruiz. There was another maid, Ana María , who was replaced because she did not look after the children. /_ Ana María is currently employed by the wife of Arístides DIAZ, who is leaving Spain definitively in August 1970._7

BACKGROUND : Guillermo RUIZ, familiarly known as El Guajiro, probably comes from a humble family in Cuba, as he lived in a solar /_ in Cuba, a slum dwelling_7 in Marianao and began to work when he was only 14 years old.

except says he has a degree from U. of Havana?

In the fifties he emigrated to the United States, travelling throughout the East Coast and holding minor jobs. In 1957 he began to work as an apprentice butcher for a Polish-American named Alexander SAMKO, who had a grocery store on Flagler St. in Miami. He did so well in attracting Latin-American customers to the store that he soon began to distribute meat in the area for SAMKO.

He has said that when he left Miami in 1958 he turned over to his brother a house in North Miami, a brand new car, and over a thousand dollars in the bank.

But his "success" could be traced, perhaps, to another acquaintance that he is known to have had.

At the time RUIZ and Major José María MOLEON →201-292060 Carreras, then another Cuban exile, were in contact with an American of Cuban descent known as Joe LOUIS or LUIS, an underworld figure who was competing with the Italians in the bolita racket in Tampa. RUIZ himself has told close associates that LUIS or LOUIS offered them $800 a month, plus car and expenses, to supervise "collections" in Miami.

Furthermore, LOUIS or LUIS even asked them to kill a man named FERNANDEZ, who was involved in the numbers game in Miami, for $5000 each.

In February 1958 RUIZ left Miami with Harry VILLEGAS Tamayo [a Captain in the Cuban Army, he has been seen at parties in foreign embassies in Havana with Major Manuel PIÑEIRO Losada, DGI chief] and three other members of the 26th of July Movement and entered Cuba clandestinely.

At the triumph of the Revolution Alexander SAMKO went to Havana, where he stayed for a week at RUIZ's home, and offered him a partnership in the business, which RUIZ rejected.

In 1960 he was one of 18 out of 5000 who were selected by the Ministry of the Treasury, where he was working, to take the full statistics course outlined by ECLA. The course, which lasted two years, included such subjects as mathematics, finances, democracy...and Marxism-Leninism.

One of his schoolmates at the time was Marta ARCOL, now director of the Art Museum of Havana.

In 1963 he was sent to Mexico, and after returning to Havana was appointed Chief of the Trade School at MINCEX, post that he held for two years.

In 1967 he was sent to Spain to replace Ramón CALZADILLA as charge d'affaires.

EDUCATION : Aside from the statistics course taken in 1960, RUIZ seems to lack, in the eyes of some observers, a solid, formal education. But he makes up for it by being an avid reader (five newspapers a day, plus books). This impression, however, may be wrong, for there are indications that he either studied or wanted to be a CPA.

He understands and speaks English and French (fluency unknown), and has undertaken to teach grammar to the embassy staff.

Sensitive to art, or so he says, he frequently complains of the general lack of culture in Cuba. His vocabulary level is rather low, cussing quite often in the presence of others.

RUIZ is well-versed in world affairs, and does have an understanding of international trade.

He has read some of the works of José Martí, whom he likes to quote. But there is another book that he also refers to repeatedly, Kim PHILBY's, the KGB spy who penetrated MI-6.

He is up-to-date on current intelligence publications.

HEALTH : Blond, baby-faced, and blue-eyed ("Very handsome," according to Anita, the young maid), RUIZ is known to be suffering from an undisclosed liver illness for which he takes a medicine called bilidis. Late in 1969 he was planning to go to Portugal on vacation following the advice of his physician, Dr. Pedro CABAS (telephones, 276-7746, 256-2294), but he did not make the trip. He coughs frequently, is used to cold weather, and was thinking of going to the same gymnasium as his son Alejandro.

He wears eyeglasses to correct astigmatism, and is known to like skin-diving, a sport that he practiced in Cuba.

In general terms, however, he enjoys good health.

EMPLOYMENT : There is no doubt that Guillermo RUIZ exercises the full authority that presumably he should have as Minister Plenipotentiary (relations between Cuba and Spain remain at this level because of Spain's refusal to appoint a full Ambassador after LOJENDIO was expelled from the Island by Fidel CASTRO).

He is involved in and kept informed of all matters that have to do with Cuban-Spanish relations, including trade. He does not permit commercial attachés to bypass him when they submit reports to their respective enterprises in Havana.

In addition, he supervises Cubana Air Lines operations, and no one may travel on Iberia to Havana without his permission (this applies only to Cubans, for tickets must be paid in foreign currency). Evidently he controls the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon, and Rafael FERNANDEZ Sardiñas, the chargé there, travels frequently to Madrid for consultations with RUIZ (" Our relations with Portugal are not very good now").

Cuban officials arriving in Madrid must consult with him before arranging visits to Spanish officials or factories, and only he, Juan Antonio CURBELO Lemes, Arístides DIAZ Rovirosa, and Roberto FRANCO Oliva, are authorized to issue visas for people travelling to Cuba.

He seems to have good working relations with Spanish Government officials because he is always careful to place all the "cards" on the table in his meetings with them.

Nothing is known about unofficial contacts with other diplomats in Madrid except that he is close to and exchanges information with the Algerian Ambassador.

At times he tries to give the impression, and this might be true, that he enjoys the full personal confidence of Osvaldo DORTICOS and Raúl ROA.

He frequently tells other Cuban diplomats stopping in Madrid that he makes 90% of the decisions without consulting Havana because that is "why I am here for."

Above all, he directs constant and bitter criticism against the bureaucracy in Havana because of its incompetence, which, in his opinion, will cause Fidel CASTRO to carry out a major purge after the 1970 sugar harvest comes to an end ("No one in Havana wants or cares to make a decision").

The Peter Principle /" In a hierarchy every employee tends to rise to his level of incompetence"_7, which he has read and is going to send to Fidel CASTRO for reading on the advice of Melba HERNANDEZ, should be taken as an example of what is happening in Cuba. Furthermore, in his view Havana is always trying to interfere with the Embassy in Madrid, resulting in lack of co-ordination and even co-operation. (To Horacio FUENTES Martínez: " More than lack of organization there is chaos in Cuba today.")

He directs almost the same criticism against his staff in Madrid because they lack qualifications for the posts that they hold. " They think that I am a fool," he once told an associate, "but I don't miss anything that they do."

In turn, he has also been the target of criticism from Havana, first from Sonia GOMEZ, who made a critical evaluation of the Embassy, which he decided not to answer ("I took a librium, smoked a cigar, and forgot all about it").

[Sonia GOMEZ, a MINREX inspector close to Vice-Minister Carlos CHAIN, was in Madrid in mid-February 1970 for another review of embassy accomplishments. But this time she seemed friendly with Guillermo RUIZ.]

On another occasion he complained to Arístides DIAZ that he had received one more critical report from Havana because the Embassy "had not achieved much," although they had done things that were not included in the yearly plan.

But perhaps the most serious censure of his activities came in by telex (" Why worry? The Americans and the Spaniards intercept all messages anyway") early in October 1969. Havana questioned the way RUIZ was handling trade negotiations with the Spanish Government. [The trade agreement was extended by mutual consent to 31 December 1972.]

In his reply addressed to Raúl LEON Torras, first vice-minister of MINCEX and senior Cuban official directly responsible for the talks, Guillermo RUIZ defended his right to be "informed" and "consulted" in rather strong language. Therefore, he rejected that his cable number 521 was offensive to Joaquin ALVAREZ, a Cuban trade official who had been the source of the complaint.

In the last paragraph he told Raúl LEON that the indemnification question (payment to Spanish citizens who owned property in Cuba) depended on his reply to Don Pedro SALVADOR, a Spanish Foreign Office official, and not on "bribery" conjectures.

Evidently this last cable upset him so much that he was nervous and particularly security-conscious. Less than a week later, he called Raúl LEON Torras and requested permission to go to Cuba, ostensively to settle a "personal problem with my son."

When he returned to Madrid on 29 October he was a changed man, again fully confident of himself. Nevertheless, he has told close friends that he feels very lonely in Spain and has had the desire to simply board a plane and return to Cuba abandoning the Embassy.

Late in January 1970 he was again depressed, for he felt like an "exile" in Spain after two years of service (" Even though LEON played a part in my appointment I cannot work for a man that I do not understand. Maybe he sent me abroad to get me out of the way. I feel as if I were in Miami.")

He thinks he is "burned" in Spain, and when he returns to the Island he will definitely not go back to MINREX, but to MININT. He has told close friends his term in Spain is up and he will be returning to Cuba probably in the summer. In any event, he does not plan to be in Spain more than nine months. Nilda, his wife, has stressed that they are leaving Madrid permanently in July 1970.

[illegible]

POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS: Although outwardly a "revolutionary", Guillermo RUIZ is a man of moderate political views struggling to justify the actions of his government in face of the political and economic realities of Castro's Cuba.

In this sense his inner feelings perhaps lie closer to the theory of the betrayed revolution, but not for ideological reasons: the incompetence of the Cuban Government has in fact sabotaged the goals of the Revolution.

A member of the Cuban Communist Party, to which he was admitted on the recommendation of Armando HART Dávalos, secretary of Organization, he is definitely not a convinced Marxist, and consequently cannot accept the role of "robot" required by Party discipline and vertical structure (" Revolutionaries should not be coerced by political control forms," he wrote Telesforo DIAZ Portillo, a MINREX official, on 26 December 1969. " Communists are quite meddlesome," he told another colleague soon after, although in this instance he may have been referring to the Spanish CP).

But the most important revelation of his views came to light on 11 December 1969, when he was quoted as telling a visiting DAP official from Havana: " If I disagree with orders, I question them because I am not a robot nor do I have the mentality of one. As a human being I express opinions no matter the risk that I may personally have to take."

Obviously, a man who thinks in this way cannot be a Marxist.

Aside from the constant criticism of Havana because of incompetence, lack of vision, and the unreal world they live in, he is quick to point out other deficiencies in life there, as reflected in his directive to the embassy staff not to celebrate Christmas together because there are "hungry people" in Cuba. But he did invite some of his associates for dinner on Christmas eve, the classical Spanish Nochebuena. He has also said that medicine in general is quite backwards in Cuba.

Probably an atheist, he is known to believe that "religion should not be considered a handicap for people trying to return to Cuba."

On the other hand, he refers to Latin-American diplomats as "bootlickers" because they use the English language in parties, and has remarked that "capitalism is no good".

RUIZ seems to have certain admiration for Francisco FRANCO, who, in his view, is the only reason why Spain has not turned communist. Of course, it is doubtful that he really believes this.

He does not hide his favorable opinions of the American people, who are "frank" and "simple". " They treated me very well," he told Raúl LEON Torras in December 1969.

On international matters he is up-to-date and well-informed. Following are some of his views, which are contradictory at times:

" Cuba is a political power, not a military or economic power.

" The USSR has neutralized U.S. sea power in the Mediterranean.

" Cuba can destroy Guantanamo whenever it chooses to do so, although the base has lost its strategic value to the United States.

" US-China rapproachment should be feared, but also a Japan-China alliance.

" U.S. power is beginning to crumble, but the Soviets are revisionists.

" The Egyptians harm us when they buy sugar from Cuba and then resell it to other countries.

"We have to be on the side of the Soviets for two reasons: first from the military and economic point of view; secondly, because whether right or wrong they are on the same side fighting those who are on the other side.

" Cuba has had and has major discrepancies with the USSR, China, and the U.S., but we are on the side of communism because we are against capitalism.

" Israel and Cuba have the same motivations. That is why they are so successful against the Arabs. They have no choice.

" The Egyptians and the Syrians are not brave. The Israelites, like the Cubans, are brave enough to face the enemy."

PERSONALITY : Guillermo RUIZ is an easy-going rather simple man who no doubt enjoys the prestige and success that he has had in Spain.

He has a strong personality, undoubtedly the predominant pole in his marriage. He seems to get along well with his wife. (" If anything should happen to me and my wife wants to remain in Spain, I want my children to go back to Cuba to study. Then they can decide for themselves what they want to do.")

Certain degree of racism can be detected in his speech, for he always refers to Negroes as niches, a contemptuous Cuban expression.

He almost never discusses women with colleagues, nor is he known to be involved in any extramarital affair.

[Possible exceptions: Vera VORODOWSKI, his secretary now in Cuba. There were rumors that RUIZ was the beneficiary of Vera's affection. There is also a young Spanish girl named JIMENA (lnu), who addresses RUIZ in the familiar tu. She lives in the house of Carmen LABRA or LABRADA.]

He likes to go to the movies (saw Topaz; no comments), and receive people at his home for cocktails.

SECURITY : It is normal for any member of the Cuban Foreign Service to exercise certain discretion in the area of security, but Guillermo RUIZ is particularly sensitive in this respect, which perhaps could be traced to his probable involvement with the DGI in one way or another.

He is quick to warn visiting Cubans of the CIA's efforts (" La Compañía Sociedad Anónima") to compromise them, even before leaving Havana. "Our Embassy," he says, "is the primary target for U.S. operations in Spain."

He keeps control of mail going to and coming from Havana in the diplomatic pouch, and states repeatedly that his office is bugged and telephone tapped (" There are microphones here the size of olives"). In addition, he thinks he is followed openly by Seguridad.

For all these reasons he has asked Havana for funds to build a new embassy, where he plans to have a shielded room free from microphones. (The building, which will cost approximately $600.000, was approved by Havana and a Cuban architect travelled to Madrid in late March 1970 to discuss the project with Sr. VILLARROYA, from Construcciones Azagra, who is handling the real-estate operation. Villarroya's telephone number is 254 4238.)

He is particularly aware of what he calls "traps", and in this sense recalls that once he was asked to dinner by the wife of a VIP, and after accepting the invitation he was told that someone else and a priest would attend too. Even though the lady in question was very upset, he did not go because one of those present could have been a "seditionist" ready to be "arrested" by the police. An inevitable scandal would have followed. He adds that he receives visits in the Embassy because there he admits only those that he wants to see.

An interesting item is the case of Conchita CAMACHO (telephone 201 4989), who called RUIZ at the Embassy claiming to have met him at a party and wanting to see him, alone, at the Hilton for a "chat". /See Attachments I and II./

Perfectly aware of the implications and seemingly in violation of his own rules, he did go to the hotel after ordering Horacio FUENTES to check the telephone number (" The CIA has a new agent"), in spite of the fact that Raúl LEON Torras was arriving in Madrid on that night.

He and Fernando, his driver, waited outside until the woman left the hotel with some men. RUIZ wanted only, so he says, to warn her not to get involved in matters between Cubans because she could "lose her life".

Regarding communications, Guillermo RUIZ has even suggested installing a radio transmitter and speaking in code with Havana. / The Cubans are in fact installing a radio transmitter on Islas Canarias to communicate with their fishing fleet. But RUIZ, in this particular case, has stressed to the Spanish Government that Cuba is willing to permit Spanish citizens to operate the station, thereby avoiding any suspicion that the transmitter will be used for other purposes._7

In spite of his security-consciousness, he himself is the target of certain control by Juan Antonio CURBELO Lemus, the "cultural" first secretary who in reality is the security man at the Embassy (RUIZ has complained that he needs a "real" one in Madrid: " Sergio /DEL VALLE, minister of the Interior_7 told me they were getting someone ready to send as cultural attaché"), for CURBELO instructed the front-desk girl to pass on to him a summary of who sees who and for what, including RUIZ's visitors.

RUIZ likes to recall the time when a Cuban in his staff (name unknown, but presumably he is back in Cuba) spread the rumor that RUIZ and Nilda were not well-liked in Havana, perhaps to undermine his authority. CURBELO reprimanded the man by stressing that "when Havana is doubtful of anybody here in Madrid it uses official channels to let us know."

Nevertheless, he does make mistakes, as evidenced by discussing in his office, with members of his staff, the possibility of advising Havana that a Spanish foreign service officer scheduled for duty there might be open for recruitment. Recalling his constant warnings that his office is bugged by Seguridad, such discussion clearly exposes him to expulsion from Spain.

By the same token, he likes to travel by car to the interior of the country alone (he must have powerful reasons to do so, for he is risking attack by Cuban exiles, a possibility that he surely must not discard given the reception that they gave Armando HART Dávalos, Carlos CHAIN, and Carlos ALFARAS at Barajas Airport on 30 June 1968). Neither his wife nor CURBELO approve of this.

At times he is known to write on paper key phrases or names when discussing confidential matters in his office, or to speak very low. Furthermore, he says he goes to Parque del Retiro when he wants to discuss sensitive matters with anybody.

In short, he is security-conscious, very shrewd, and suspicious of anybody that comes near him.

TRAVEL : Following are the trips that Guillermo RUIZ made from October 1969 to February 1970:

To Havana to settle a "personal problem" on 20 October 1969 by Iberia (first class), returning to Madrid on 29 October.

To London on 14 November 1969 for consultations with Raúl LEON Torras, returning two days later by air (also first class).

To Bilbao, San Sebastian, and Burgos, by car, on 28 November 1969, returning two days later.

To Italy from Barcelona with his wife and two children on 29 December 1969. He went to pick up an Alfa Romeo, which he paid out of his own funds. They returned through Florence, Genoa, San Remo, and Barcelona, arriving in Madrid on 6 January 1970.

To Burgos by car with REGALADO (fnu) and URQUIZA (fnu) on 24 January 1970.

To Havana on 20 February 1970. He was scheduled to participate in trade negotiations with the Spanish delegation that left Madrid on 22 February 1970. RUIZ returned to Madrid on 24 March 1970.

FRIENDS : Not much is known about Guillermo RUIZ's personal acquaintances, except for the following:

Pedro RUIZ.- A good friend who goes to his home rather frequently, Pedro is quite influential according to Guillermo. He is also a friend of MASSO (fnu).

Carlos or Enrique CARRASCO.- He is a partner of Carrasco, Muñoz e Iturriaga, with offices at Avenida Generalísimo #28, 10th floor. RUIZ meets with him often, either for lunch or at his home. They seem to be good personal friends. CARRASCO may have to do with arrangements for the sale of Cuban frozen seafood. Travelled to New York late in October or early November 1969. RUIZ is known to have visited CARRASCO's office.

Rosendo CANTO.- Lives at Goya #54, Madrid. His friendship with RUIZ may be interesting if he is the same Rosendo Canto who was a well-known batistiano (probably his father). If this is the case contacts with RUIZ are politically dangerous for the latter, unless he is using CANTO with the approval of Havana. According to Roberto FRANCO Oliva, the consul, CANTO wanted to go to Cuba, live there for a year, and then join the Cuban Foreign Service ("He is a fool," RUIZ). CANTO's father is ill in Cuba and sends him mail through the Cuban diplomatic pouch. CANTO is involved with the diplomatic representation of Equatorial Guinea.

Armando FERNANDEZ.- "A good friend," says RUIZ. But he has doubts about FERNANDEZ's source of income ("Maybe he gets money directly from Havana without my knowledge"). FERNANDEZ sends a "lot of things" to Cuba. He is an artist, and lives at Bondad #1 (telephone, 255-3281). Armando claims to know Fidel CASTRO and Celia SANCHEZ personally. It may be true, for he received a package at the embassy from the latter in March 1970. However, he asked the Cuban staff to send it to him because he "did not want to be seen taking something out of the embassy." FERNANDEZ's father has cancer.

201-226172
not worth
following up.

JIMENEZ Asenjo, deputy director of the Spanish Dirección General de Seguridad. Knows RUIZ personally, and is in contact with him rather often, but presumably in the line of duty.

SUMMARY : Guillermo RUIZ is a very shrewd, articulate individual who has reached heights that in all probability would have been beyond his capability in normal circumstances.

Nevertheless, from what can be seen his work in Spain has been effective, and he keeps a tight control over his staff. He is a man confident of himself and of the backing [Armando HART Dávalos ?] that he surely must have in order to remain in this sensitive post of the Cuban foreign service.

Precisely because of his privileged status RUIZ is very careful in whatever he does, avoiding mistakes that would endanger his position.

Therefore, he will probably resist any indirect approach, which he will recognize in time to brush it off.

But this does not mean that he is unapproachable, for he is not. There is no question that his personality is incompatible with the system that he serves, although with profound misgivings as to its efficiency. It is then a question of how and when.

The very fact that he has made open remarks suggesting his unhappiness with Havana and his non-Marxist leanings in an office "bugged by the other side," as he points out, could be interpreted as a signal on his part indicating that he is ready to listen.

But he will be suspicious of an indirect or subtle approach, which, in his view, could be a trap to compromise him, including a loyalty test by the DGI.

Consequently, a direct approach has much better chance of success. It would be proof for him that he is walking on firm ground by dealing directly with Americans. Which leads to the question of when . There are two key factors to consider :

a) His recall to Cuba.

b) The 10-million ton sugar harvest, which is scheduled to end on 15 July 1970.

RUIZ has indicated that he is unhappy in his post--perhaps not really meaning what he says--, which he has occupied for over two years.

As he has said that Fidel CASTRO plans a major purge after the 1970 sugar harvest, he himself may be one of the targets. Assuming that his ideological inconsistencies have been noticed, the DGI, in the absence of proof regarding his loyalty and considering whatever support he has in Havana, may request his recall at an appropriate opportunity: during a major reorganization of the Cuban Government.

In any event, RUIZ does not expect to remain in Madrid much longer, and is planning to be back in Havana by the 18th of July.

If Cuba is successful in harvesting 10 million tons of sugar, and they have already reached six, the "victory" that Cuban propagandists will herald from July on may have a psychological impact on RUIZ's thought. He will be less inclined to defect, in place or otherwise, at such time.

Finally, if RUIZ's personality were to be summarized in one word, that word would be realist with a logical mind. Above all, this is what RUIZ is.

Attachment #I.

Report No. 2274.

9 January 1970.

One 'Miss' CONCHITA calls asking for RUIZ. NILDA says she is his secretary and CONCHITA may leave the message with her. C would like to surprise him. NILDA asks for her last name; C does not give it to her because it would then fail to be a surprise, but leaves her telephone number (201-49-69) for R to call her after 8, for she works until that time. On NILDA's insistence C gives her last name as CAMACHO, adding she is the widow of the doctor who was director of the Coimbra Hospital.

RUIZ calls Mrs. CAMACHO at 201-49-69. She begins the conversation by saying they had met at a party which she had attended with her husband at the Dominican Embassy in Madrid. She reminds him that they had talked with the Paraguayan Ambassador and former Dominican Ambassador Rafael COMPRES, and that the party had taken place two years ago. Despite all the details RUIZ insists he does not remember her and asks how he can be of service to her. She tells him "I have just arrived and find myself somewhat isolated, disoriented, and I must find work. I recall you telling me on that ocassion 'If you should ever have any problem and you come to Madrid, look me up.' One other ambassador also offered me his assistance and I have tried to locate both of you." Mrs. C mentions having a daughter, that her husband was a pilot and that she is a Spaniard, adding she is not too old. R replies that in all honesty he does not remember her. She insists on seeing him to have a chat, and R suggests she come to his office at her convenience. She prefers talking with him alone, without his secretary or anyone else present, and suggests a bar at some hotel like the Palace, Ritz or Hilton. He is agreeable to any place she may desire; they agree to meet that night at 9:30 in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel. She will be dressed all in black.

RUIZ calls FERNANDO F is to meet R outside the latter's home about 9 o'clock dressed in coat and tie.

SECRET

Report No. 2248.

HORACIO calls the telephone company requesting the address for telephone number 201-49-89. The information is denied.

RUIZ calls PILOTO to have him meet RAUL LEON in Barajas that night. RUIZ is unable to do so because of a previous engagement.

FERNANDO calls CURBELO to ask for PUGA's phone number. F wants to tell P he cannot meet the professor at P's house that night because he (F) has to take RUIZ somewhere.

SECRET

Attachment #II

Report 2288. 22 January 1970

Mrs. Concepción CAMACHO de MATOS calls RUIZ. NILDA asks if she is the same person who called the other day and said she was the widow of... (MATOS). The woman says 'yes' and NILDA tells her: "Look Miss, you're playing a very dangerous game."

MATOS: I don't know what you mean, miss.

NILDA: Well, because none of the comrades here is going to allow himself to be provoked. So, please do not keep on.

MATOS: Well, I don't know what you are referring to, miss, I am completely astonished.

NILDA: Well look, don't be astonished, you might end up some other way.

MATOS: I don't know what you are talking about.

NILDA: Well, we do.

NILDA hangs up.

Mrs. MATOS calls the Ambassador's secretary again; it seems there has been a misunderstanding.

NILDA: Look miss, we do not wish to talk to you anymore. We are telling you in a nice way. Please do not call anymore.

MATOS: I am not going to call again... I only want to say I had nothing to do... I know nothing at all. ... Only that I have received a message. I received a telephone call... I have just arrived in Madrid, I am not familiar with Madrid, or know anyone.

NILDA: Aren't you the one who called the other day? You made a date.

MATOS: What kind of a date?

NILDA: Didn't you make a date with the Charge d'Affaires?

MATOS: No, no. no. One moment, miss. I received a telephone call and was told to call this gentleman, the Cuban Ambassador. I could also tell you about another ambassador, but that they were trying to get in touch with me.

NILDA: Who are 'they'? To whom do you refer when you say that 'they' called you?

MATOS: I was called on behalf of the Ambassador of Chile and the Ambassador of Cuba. I thought it was extremely unusual, miss, because I don't know anyone here.

NILDA: Didn't you call here a few days ago?

MATOS: I called when I was advised to do so.

NILDA: And you made a date with the Ambassador.

MATOS: I don't know what exactly did happen. I was asked to talk with him and to get in touch with him, miss.

NILDA: But, who called you, miss?

MATOS: Whoever it was said, "I am the Cuban Ambassador," so then it all seems to have been a plot, or something of the sort.

NILDA: Look, if it is a plot I suggest you do not get involved because where we are concerned it is somewhat dangerous.

MATOS: No miss, I am very proper and a serious person.

NILDA: Since you are so serious and proper don't ever let anything happen to you.

MATOS: I live with a daughter and you must realize that I live only for her.

NILDA: Well, look, if you live for her, don't get mixed up in these things for they may cost you dearly.

MATOS: Very well, miss. I am deeply grateful to have been enlightened by you. I can see already that it is simply a plot or an implication by someone.

NILDA: It is a plot and we know it. And we know who is behind it.

MATOS: Yes, miss. I would also like to know, I assure you.

NILDA: Well look, stay away from this mess or you'll pay dearly... good-bye.

MATOS: Fine, miss. I am also very grateful that you have told me. My apologies, huh?

/NILDA was very upset after this call./

Attachment III

Report No. 262. 30 January 1970.

RUIZ records following memorandum on tape:

"Comrade NEIRA.- I take this opportunity that NILDA is going to Havana to bring to your attention some of our problems here in Spain.

"The first pertains to the construction project for a building which I sent to CHAIN with the President of the National Bank when he passed through here in December, and to this day, after five weeks, I have not received an adequate answer. You know that when preliminary negotiations are initiated one enters into certain obligations with the land owners as well as with the construction firm, to whom we must give an answer.

"On my insistence, Comrade ROA gave me... sent a cable informing me that as yet the budget had not been approved and he could not give me the results.

"Present locales do not meet the Spanish minimum requirements for working space. CURBELO brought from Havana proposals for the leasing of a locale for the Commercial Office with a rental fee of $2,000 a month. We discussed this proposal at a meeting of comrades here and it was rejected in the belief that it was more advantageous for us to buy. We also discussed this with Fermín GUTIERREZ, who visited the Commercial Office and to whom we pointed out that in view of the system of payment here in Spain it was better to purchase a building, since this transaction at no time would affect our system in our trade policy with Spain.

"To the point of being persistent we should like to request a building for all services: the Cuban Office, the Commercial Office, the Consulate-Embassy Office, plus living quarters on the top floor for the diplomatic Representative, something with which I am not in complete accord. In summary, a building which would offer maximum security and freedom of movement. The Commercial Office would occupy the first floor, the Embassy, the second floor, and the third floor the living quarters for the Chief of the Mission. This would resolve all our local problems and our representation in Spain.

"This construction firm built for the Rumanian representation in Spain and is now building for the Polish and others. We have been quoted a fixed price of $600,000 which includes a luxury building, with glass windows, air-conditioned, and other luxuries. This amount could be reduced if we bring our Cuban architects, who were here two years ago, and knowledgeable of their mission could discuss with the land owners and the construction firm those things they feel could be omitted and the price could be brought down considerably. We do not need a luxury building, but one that is attractive, simple and functional. Term payments could also be extended. I want to impress upon you that when we entered into negotiations we had a binding agreement.

"The lot is on Avenida La Habana. Fermín GUTIERREZ looked well into this matter. He asked me to send him the project and that he would look at it. The system of payments in Spain allows us to pay $100,000 or $150,000 annually which will not be difficult for us.

"NEIRA, I want you to talk to CHAIN, not bearing pressure on him, but to make him understand that what I want is to leave my successor established, for any construction not lasting over nine months I certainly will not be able to enjoy.

"Another thing I want to bring to your attention is in regard to our Consulate, its activities and relations with the Visa Section. A letter has come from VERA addressed to FRANCO pointing to FRANCO's incorrect wording of a cable to that Section. I agree that it was incorrect, but I find it strange that that Section should pay so much attention to correct forms and analyze the contents so little. The contents of things are not being studied, and it is essential that deep thought be given to the work that is being done. When someone comes to the Consulate with an authorization to travel to Cuba, it is usually three or four days prior to flight departure. Since the Visa Section must defer to the Department of Emigration for its authorization, inasmuch as the latter determines whether or not a foreigner can go into Cuba, the process is not carried out with the urgency that it requires, consequently, there is delay. This creates much inconvenience for us, and even personal problems, for we must consider that often people arrive with the exact amount of money and a week's delay could hurt them so that at times they don't even have enough money for lodging or food.

"At present we have the case of a member of the Chilean Communist Party and OSPAAAL whose passage has been set aside by these organizations to travel from Madrid to Cuba. Four days ago FRANCO sent a cable and still there is no answer. We made the decision to grant this person a visa because the plane leaves tonight, otherwise he will have to delay the trip one more week. If the tickets were reserved for him here there is no doubt he has been given authorization.

"NEIRA, I want you to talk to OJEDA and request that our Consulate be able to contact the Emigration Department directly. FRANCO has been on the job for approximately one year and has never given reason for complaints, but if he has now made a mistake in the editing of a cable it could have been that in the face of mounting problems he is presented with daily he might have exploded.

"Another thing I want to tell you is that last night we had as guests in our home the Chilean Director Hugo BENAVENTE and his wife, the leading lady in his Peruvian company which has brought to the stage "Luz de Europa". If they are not communists in the sense of the word, like the rest of the company, they do sympathize with us. They invited PINEDA to attend the premiere, and he answered with a cable which was shameful to see and read. The wording of that cable gives the impression that PINEDA is being held captive and asks them to please come to his help and send for him. He makes us look ridiculous. Just think that cable has been read by others before they showed it to me. The political position of PINEDA and other Cuban writers should be investigated, as now they are putting up on stage "La Noche de los Asesinos" and they also want another Cuban writer to come. I should like to get your advice in this area as I am totally ignorant of matters related to culture, for we have no cultural attaché here.

"There is also the following problem: The comrades in the fishing /department 7, specifically Comrade ARAGONES, are interested in having a radio communications station to contact ships on the high seas. In this regard I spoke to Mr. ASENJO in the Security Department who said there was no inconvenience on his part if they requested it and took the necessary steps. You know Mr. ASENJO. I saw him a month ago and he had asked me if we had decided not to go ahead with it, as there had not been an answer in that regard after having obtained authorization from the General Administration of Security which was the most difficult step.

"Comrade Joaquín ALVAREZ reports that in reference to the letters left here by LEON for the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Commerce here in Spain, the former is taking an offensive position in foreign relations as you can see, and the Minister of Commerce has been quite busy, for the entry of Spain in the Common Market is almost a fact and conversations are in progress. This is why they have assigned to Mr. SANTAMARIA, General Director of Commercial Policy, the study of subjects which the Spanish side plans to take up in Havana during the negotiations in February. I am in touch with this man and in fact had to call him up today, for he had said that before giving me the agenda of subjects to be discussed there was to be a meeting of Ministries to include Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Information and Tourism, plus others, to determine what was to be discussed in Cuba and decide on other matters.

"Because Mr. SANTAMARIA was not in this morning, he has promised to call me at 6:30 this afternoon, but he will not find me here because I'll be taking NILDA to the airport.

"Tell Joaquín ALVAREZ that regarding the 50-million credit request from Cuba to Spain for 1970, there has been no confirmation inasmuch as we have been unable to talk with the present Secretary of Commerce. We find the figure somewhat high but have no basis for judgment to focus on any area.

"You must have heard already about the success of our reception. Not only because of the number, which was quite high, but because of the quality of the attendants. We had to use two rooms. We had prepared only one but when the Minister arrived it became necessary to open another room. There was representation from the ultra-right to the ultra-left. This has been a great triumph for us considering that in these countries the quality of people attending these events is taken well into account.

"Comrade NEIRA, an embrace for you and for those working with you. I hope when SONIA comes over she brings a project for 1970 that can be fully undertaken by us. We are very bad at making projects. This past year we did many things that had not been planned, while others that were planned remained undone, but with last year's experience we shall strive to plan better.

"Take charge of my wife's return. I have given her permission for one week and no more, for I do not like to act as babysitter--they are four children and although they are my own I do not care for it. Greetings to all my comrades and you do the cutting of the cane for I have been unable to cut. A hug."

DISPATCH

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Madrid; COS, WH/Miami

ATTN: ROGER S. KIRKMAN

FROM

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT

TYPIC Continued Operational Interest in AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Paragraph 5, below.

References : A. OSMW-11585
B. MADRID 9655

1. Headquarters has just completed, with the able help of AMEDIT-2, a thorough review of QUDOZE tapes for the last quarter of 1969. We have added pertinent file material where necessary in order to round out the picture, but the review emerges primarily as an assessment of AMAUTO-1 as a personality and as a recruitment target. We forward this study as an attachment hereto, under separate cover, for your consideration.

2. Headquarters has not lost its keen interest in AMAUTO-1 as a long-range recruitment target, foreseeing the possibility of defecting him in place (at least for the remainder of his posting to Madrid), or defecting him outright (which would admittedly be less desirable). In line with these purposes, we offer the following readings, which may or may not be entirely applicable to AMAUTO-1:

a. AMAUTO-1 is a shrewd, articulate person who has reached heights that probably he might not have reached under normal circumstances. His work in Spain has been effective in general, and he seems to be very confident of himself and of the backing which he thinks he has from PBRUMEN.

/continued/

Attachment:
As Described Para. 1 above (USC)

Distribution:
2 - COS, Madrid W/Att. USC
1 - COS, WH/Miami W/Att. USC

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

OSMW-11726

DATE 12 FEB 1970

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

201-735296

Distribution:

1 - EUR/IB
1 - WH/COG/CHRONO
1 - WH/COG/OPS

FEB 15 8 31 AM '70

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	Richard Wheeler:ak 2/4/70	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/COG	8 FEB 1970	Wesley L. Laybourne
FEB 16	8 32 AM '70	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/EUR		John L. HART

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(40)

DISPATCH

b. Nevertheless, he has received some rather telling criticism of a professional nature, even though it is unknown whether this criticism also touches on his personal life. Perhaps because of this, AMAUTO-1 seems to be very careful in whatever he does, avoiding mistakes that would endanger his position, and avoiding any real or fancied provocation.

c. There seems to be little question that AMAUTO-1 is approachable, although he would probably resist any indirect approach in which "cards are not laid on the table." It appears very likely that his character is basically incompatible with the system he serves (with profound misgivings as to its efficiency).

d. The very fact that he has made open remarks suggesting his unhappiness with PBRUMEN and his non-Marxist leanings in an office he himself points out is "bugged by the other side" could be interpreted as a signal from him, indicating that he is ready to listen. His remarks on the subject might be those of a man who believes he can "jump off" at any time, if necessary. Note that he tends to live with criticism from his home office rather than try to get out from under --- perhaps meaning that he would not accept a PCS assignment home. (The attachment hereto shows him describing a compatriot who wishes to return home as "a fool.") He has said himself that he believes AMTHUG-1 plans a major purge for mid-1970, and he might consider himself as a victim of that purge.

e. A fact which might affect timing is the arrival of a child in May. If he were to persuade his wife (and his government) to have the child in Spain, rather than return home for it, he would have a good excuse for requesting the presence of his oldest child (the only one who is now at home). If his wife returns home for delivery, he would (for a time at least) have three hostages in PBRUMEN instead of one.

f. UFGA-19006 reported a 1964 attempt to get at AMAUTO-1 through his wife's relatives. The consensus at the time was that AMAUTO-1 is probably immune to this type of approach. Headquarters, therefore, still opts for a logically developed, "traditional" recruitment build-up.

3. In line with the above, Headquarters suggests to Madrid certain lines of action which might be followed in an attempt to know more about AMAUTO-1. These actions might seem somewhat easier from our perspective than they actually are in the field, but we propose them for your consideration.

a. The man handling the new construction work (paragraph 16 of the attachment) should be checked out.

b. The established pattern of lonely automobile trips outside the capital (see paragraph 22 of the attachment) might be instructive to follow down. At least, the situation might offer a chance for approach or for subsequent handling.

c. AMAUTO-1's desire to see more people at home, and the indication that he discusses important matters at home becomes doubly interesting with the possibility of a vacant house next door (see paragraph 18 of the attachment). The person who owns the apartment building might offer a fruitful lead.

d. The apparent hostility of the current maid (see paragraph 24 and 27 of the attachment) might offer further exploitation.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
		OSMW-11726

e. AMAUTO/1's desire to affiliate himself with an exercise group (see paragraph 26b of the attachment) might offer a possibility to put an access agent next to him. The circumstance would be relatively normal, not calculated to arouse his suspicions. The use of someone of WOLADY nationality might, in fact, help to allay what is evidently a tendency AMAUTO/1 has of suspecting provocation.

f. Headquarters would greatly appreciate the opportunity of examining AMAUTO/1's X-rays. In this connection, we would like to see an investigation of the physician used on this matter (see paragraphs 31 and 32 of the attachment).

g. We would like to have Madrid's assessment of the diplomat mentioned in paragraph 8 of the attachment.

4. At the same time, we would appreciate it if Miami could follow down any of the leads stemming from AMAUTO/1's time in WOLADY. We are trying to trace his entrance back in the 1950's and as much of his time here as possible, and perhaps Miami Station can develop leads on the persons mentioned in paragraph 24 of the attachment hereto, especially in reference to the brother left with the house. (Note Below.)

Michael V. SLATINSKI

I would appreciate your giving personal attention to this matter, because it is rare that we have such a detailed assessment as we have in this case.

Edward D. SABETAY

201-735296

FORM 8-64 1401 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3.

[illegible]

Under Separate Cover Attachment to: OSMW-11726

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Pérez

DOB: c. 1931

Cuban Minister Plenipotentiary to Spain,
accredited 12 December 1967.

CHRONOLOGY

1. RUIZ probably comes from a humble family in Cuba, because he lived in a solar (semi-slum area) and began to work when he was only fourteen years old. This circumstance suggests that he lacks a formal education. He appears to come from a "revolutionary" family (his father was identified as a Communist and a leader of the barbers' union in UFGA-13595, and a brother was identified as a member of the DSE as of 1964 in UFGA-19006), [illegible] (201-735296)

2. In the fifties RUIZ emigrated to the United States, traveling throughout the east coast and holding minor jobs. In 1957 he began to work as an apprentice butcher for a Polish-American named Alexander SAMKO, who had a grocery store on Flagler Street in Miami. He evidently did so well in attracting Latin American customers that he soon began to distribute meat in the area, working for SAMKO (RUIZ seems to be somewhat proud of this success). He also appears proud of the fact that when he left Miami in February 1958, he left his brother (same brother?) a house in North Miami, a brand new car, and over $1,000 in the bank.

3. Although he did well in the meat business, he traces a large part of his success to another acquaintance in Miami: an American of Cuban descent known as Joe LOUIS (or LUIS). Joe LUIS was an underworld figure who was at that time competing with the Italians in the bolita (numbers) racket in Tampa. RUIZ and MOLEON (fnu), another Cuban exile, were each offered $800 a month by LUIS to supervise bolita collections in Miami. (There is no specific indication that RUIZ took his bolita friend up on this offer). Furthermore, LUIS went so far as to offer RUIZ and MOLEON $5,000 apiece to kill a man named FERNANDEZ (fnu), who was also involved in the bolita racket in Miami.

4. In February 1957 (note the 1958 date, above; perhaps an error on RUIZ' part) RUIZ left Miami along with a man named VILLEGAS (whose first name might be Harry) and three other members of the 26th of July Movement. They entered Cuba clandestinely. When the revolution triumphed in Cuba, Alexander SAMKO went to Havana, where he stayed for a week as RUIZ' house guest. SAMKO offered RUIZ a partnership in the meat business in Miami if he would return. RUIZ rejected the offer, saying that the Revolution needed him.

CS COPY

SECRET

[illegible]

S/C att to CSMW-11726

201-735296

5. RUIZ brags that in 1960 he was one of 18 persons out of 5,000 who were selected by the Ministry of the Treasury, where he was working at the time, to take a statistics course offered by CEPAL. The course, which lasted two years, included such subjects as mathematics, finance, democracy (?), and Marxism-Leninism. One of his schoolmates at the time was Marta ARCOL, now the director of the Museo de Arte in Havana. (It is interesting to note that in UFGA-13595 RUIZ was described as an anti-Communist as of 1960 by a Cuban refugee.

6. UFG-1539 reported RUIZ as Chief of the Department of Construction Expenses Studies of the Ministry of the Treasury in 1962, and he was described as a militant Communist. In 1963 he was in Mexico, and UFGA-11065 mentioned him as G-2, living at Calle Cuenavaca 35, apartment 7. A report from LITAMIL-9 in 1964 characterized RUIZ as a violent CASTRO partisan, and AMMUG-1 in 1964 described RUIZ as a CUIS officer. Presidential Decree 3440 of 4 August 1964 (UFGA-19006) reported RUIZ as being appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Commerce, and QUDOZE has him appointed about that time as chief of the trade school at MINCEX, a post he held for two years. In 1967 he was appointed charge d'affaires in Madrid vice Francisco Ramon CALZADILLA.

ON THE JOB

7. There seems little doubt that RUIZ exercise the full authority that presumably he should have as Minister Plenipotentiary. The relations between Cuba and Spain appear to remain static because of Spain's refusal to appoint a full Ambassador to Cuba after LOJENDIO was expelled from the island by CASTRO in 1959. RUIZ is involved in and is kept informed on all matters related to Cuban-Spanish relations, including trade. He does not seem to permit commercial attaches to bypass him when they submit reports to their respective home offices in Havana. In addition, RUIZ takes a keen and active interest in Cubana operations, and he has said that no one may travel to Havana on Iberia without his permission. He insists that Cuban officials arriving in Madrid consult with him before arranging visits to Spanish officials or factories. He seems to have good working relations with Spanish government officials, because he is always careful to "put all his cards on the table" in meetings with them. (The tenor of his conversation seems to emphasize that he likes things this way in all his relations, personal as well as professional).

8. Little appears concerning RUIZ' unofficial contacts with other diplomats in Madrid, except that he is close to and exchanges information with the Algerian Ambassador. (According to current records, this is Ahmed LAIDI, posted to Madrid on 15 December 1966, living at Calle Tiemblo 3, Ciudad Puerto de Fierro. Latest desk traces show this person as born 20 April 1934 in Oudja, Morocco, and as of 25 October 1966 to have been the Director General of the Foreign Ministry in charge of political, economic, and cultural affairs. He is described as

reserved, intelligent, and probably something of an operator. He was Ben Bella's chief of cabinet before joining the Foreign Office in 1964, and he functions more on special assignment than as part of the chain of command. He was a member of the Algerian UN delegation as of 28 September 1965.)

9. RUIZ tries to give the impression that he enjoys the full confidence of Osvaldo DORTICOS and Raul ROA, thereby being able to exercise the full authority of his position. He frequently tells other Cuban diplomats stopping in Madrid that he makes 90% of the decisions without consulting with Havana, explaining that "this is the reason I am here."

10. Above all, RUIZ directs constant and bitter criticism against Havana, because of what he terms the incompetence there. In his opinion, this generalized incompetence will cause CASTRO to carry out a major purge after the 1970 harvest is in. (He specifically repeats that "no one in Havana wants to make any sort of decision"). One of his favorite books is The Peter Principle, to which he refers constantly, and he uses this book to describe what is going on in Havana. In RUIZ' view, Havana is always trying to interfere with the Embassy in Madrid, a situation which results in a lack of coordination and cooperation. RUIZ directs the same criticism against his staff in Madrid, because his personnel lack qualifications for the jobs they hold. He once told an associate: "They think that I'm a fool, but I don't miss anything they do."

11. In turn, he has also been the target of criticism from Havana, first from Zoila GOMEZ (?), who made a critical evaluation of the Embass. RUIZ' reaction is instructive: "I decided not to answer it. I took a librium, smoked a cigar, and forgot all about it." On another occasion he complained to Aristides DIAZ that he had received another critical report from Havana regarding his program for the Embassy. Havana was complaining that not much had been achieved. RUIZ noted that the Embassy had accomplished much that was not in the plan, and he intended to answer that particular criticism in detail.

12. Perhaps the most serious criticism of his activities came in a coded cable received by the Embassy early in October 1969. Havana questioned the way that RUIZ was handling the commercial treaty negotiations with Spanish authorities. In a communication directed to Raul LEON Torres (201-725624) (Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Commerce) and in rather strong language, RUIZ defended his right to be informed and consulted on the matter, denying that his cable number 521 was offensive to Joaquin ALVAREZ (Director of Trade with Western Europe and North America), who was evidently the source of criticism against RUIZ.

13. Evidently, this last piece of criticism upset RUIZ so much that he was nervous and particularly security-conscious. Less than a week later he called LEON in Havana and requested permission to go to Cuba, ostensibly to settle a personal problem with his son. However, his wife explained to another person in the Embassy that RUIZ' trip was due to his sick mother. His trip was probably due to the exceptionally sharp criticism and RUIZ' desire to clear it up personally.

14. When RUIZ returned to Madrid on 29 October 1969, he was a changed man, again relaxed and fully confident of himself. Nevertheless, he has told close friends that he feels very lonely in Spain and at times has had the desire simply to board a plane away from Spain and abandon the Embassy. He is always careful to say he desires to return to Havana, but he leaves room for the inference that he would rather go somewhere else. He believes that he is "burned" in Spain. He has said that when he returns to the island, he will definitely not return to his Ministry.

SECURITY AND SECURITY-CONSCIOUSNESS

15. RUIZ seems to be particularly sensitive in the area of security-consciousness. This attitude can possibly be traces to an involvement with the DGI in one way or another, but his background and especially his political views (see below) would appear to argue against his affiliation. RUIZ is quick to warn visiting Cubans against the efforts of what he terms "la compania, sociedad anonima" to compromise them, even before they leave Havana, indicating RUIZ' possible belief in the omnipresence and power of the sociedad anonima. He censors mail going to and coming from Havana, and he repeatedly states that his office is bugged, his telephone is tapped, and that he is followed quite openly wherever he goes. He attibutes this surveillance to the Seguridad, and he probably ascribes it to the Spanish. (Note that, despite his "knowledge" that his words go to hostile surveillance, he still dares to express critical opinions openly).

16. This security-consciousness is apparently the big reason he has asked Havana for funds for a new Embassy building, where he plans to have a shielded room free from bugs. He intends to have Havana send electricians for the job and Cuban personnel to act as doormen, etc., with the wives of the latter to be his char force. He seems fanatic on the subject of not having any Spanish personnel in the building. (Note that one Sr. VILLARROYA, of Constructiones Aznar in Madrid, is handling the real estate operation.)

17. RUIZ is particularly aware of what he calls "traps." He once recalled that he had been asked to dinner by the wife of a VIP and, after accepting the invitation, was told that a priest would also attend. He did not attend the dinner, although it considerably upset his hostess, because he was afraid of a scandal arranged by the police. He said that he receives only in the Embassy, because through that door can enter only those whom he wants to see.

18. Nevertheless, RUIZ has several times mentioned that he holds his really important conversations at home, and that he would rather see more people at his home instead of at his office. (In this connection, it is noted that the house next door to his --- Calle Triana 44 --- which used to be a home for the aged) is now empty. The owner of the apartment building where he lives is Ignacio ARTERO, a Spaniard.

19. RUIZ has even suggested installing a radio transmitter and speaking in code with Havana. The Cubans are in fact installing a transmitter on the Canary Islands, but RUIZ, characteristically keeping his actions correct, has stressed to the Spanish that Cuba will not use the transmitter for other than legitimate commercial purposes. RUIZ even offered to allow Spanish citizens to operate the station in order to emphasize his point.

20. Correct as he generally is in his professional behavior, RUIZ made what appears to be a mistake in discussing with members of his staff the possibility of telling Havana that a Spanish foreign service officer scheduled for duty there (Juan TORROBA Gomez, cf. OSMA-25692) might be open for recruitment. If one recalls RUIZ' constant warnings that his office is bugged by Seguridad, the discussion about TORROBA clearly exposes him to action by the Spanish authorities.

21. RUIZ himself is the target of what appears to be control by Juan Antonio CURBELO Lemus (201-733544) who is allegedly the First Secretary in charge of cultural affairs but who seems to be the "security man" in the Embassy. (We note that CURBELO's photograph was shown to AMBEDEW-1, who did not recognize the likeness). RUIZ has complained at least once that he needs a "real" cultural attache. CURBELO has instructed the front-desk girl to pass on to him a summary of who sees whom at the Embassy and for what purpose, including RUIZ' visitors. (Given RUIZ' near-mania for running his own shop, CURBELO must indeed exert an acknowledged security control).

22. Despite security considerations, however, RUIZ appears addicted to taking automobile jaunts by himself to the interior of the country. He must have very powerful reasons to do so, for he is probably exposing himself to attack by Cuban exiles. Given the reception accorded to Carlos ALFARAS, Armando HART, and Carlos CHAIN at the Barajas airport in June 1968, RUIZ might be unnecessarily exposing himself. He has not told anyone of where he goes or what he does, and both his wife and CURBELO strongly disapprove of his custom.

FAMILY

23. RUIZ' wife is Nilda VECIANA, who was reported on in UFGA-19006. She is probably in her early thirties. She is pregnant and due to have her fifth (?) child early in May 1970. She has had difficulties with her pregnancy because of recurring

fainting spells and overweight. These conditions are being treated by Dr. HERNANDEZ (fnu) and Dr. MATA (fnu).

24. Nilda is a pleasant woman who has not been known to quarrel with her husband or express political or religious opinions, although once she recited the Lord's Prayer by heart in front of others. A teacher by profession, she handles the bookkeeping at the Embassy on an informal basis. She appears to have a rather weak character, judging from the way she handles her boys. According to Severina ORTIZ Gomez, the maid, these are little beasts who treat the servants badly, even reviling them with obscenities, while referring to their mother as "la chula." Nilda does not permit the boys to be punished.

25. Nilda goes shopping by herself, and once she even took a taxi by herself to the airport to meet her husband, even though CURBELO did not like the idea at all. She seems to get along well with the wives of other Cubans on the staff.

26. RUIZ' children are:

a. Guillermito. He is the oldest and is now studying in Havana. There were reports that he was unhappy there, and RUIZ asked on 16 October 1969 to go to Havana to settle a personal problem with Guillermito. If there were a problem, it seems to have been solved, because RUIZ on his return quoted Guillermito as being very happy in his new school. (Some time ago, Mrs. Hector GALLO Portieles was constantly needling the other women about not being "revolutionary" enough and took Nilda RUIZ to task for having her children with her instead of at school in Cuba. The RUIZ family had brought four of their children with them, and later the other(s) came to join them, before the older one returned to school. RUIZ once told a visitor that Guillermito had been left with his grandparents during their exile in Miami and had been very resentful of it, so they had been very careful ever since not to repeat that mistake).

b. Alejandro. He is about six years old. According to those who know him, he is the real devil of the lot as well as a good swimmer. He is taking guitar lessons, goes to Colegio Estilo, and swims at Gimnasio Mascardo, Pilar de Zaragoza 99. (Nilda has talked to the Gimnasio people about RUIZ' going there also for swimming or exercise).

c. Ivan.

d. Juan Carlos.

e. One other (?)

27. All four children are very spoiled and have caused several maids to leave their jobs. Severina bitterly complains that the children show no respect for their parents, and that is the reason Severina gives for her hate for Nilda.

EDUCATION AND CULTURE

28. Aside from the two-year statistics course taken in 1960, RUIZ appears to lack a solid, formal education, although he makes up for it by being an avid reader (five newspapers a day plus books). He understands and speaks English and French (fluency unknown) and has undertaken to teach grammar (presumably Spanish) to the Embassy staff.

29. RUIZ appears to be sensitive to art, and he frequently complains about the general lack of culture in Cuba. (This might indicate thatRUIZ considers himself "above" the Revolution). He shows some of the general inconsistencies of the self-educated. For example, his vocabulary level is rather low, and he curses frequently when talking to other male members of the staff. On the other hand, he seems rather well versed in international affairs and has a good understanding of international trade. It is probable that he has read some of the works of José Marti and, although he dictates letters to his secretary, he types some of his own reports to Havana.

HEALTH PROBLEMS

30. RUIZ suffers from what his wife has described as a liver illness (not further specified) for which he takes a medicine called bilidis. (This may refer simply to the medical words for "liver disease". Competent experts here guess that the medicine is used for anything from chronic constipation to gassiness and constant eructation because of inadequate digestion of fatty foods. It is possible that RUIZ suffers from the hard-to-pin-down mal de foie, which can be found in a high-strung, hard-driving person. RUIZ' evident use of librium (see above) might also suggest this condition).

31. Late in 1969 RUIZ was planning to go to Portugal to rest, following the recommendation of his physician Dr. CAVAS (also received as CABAS and CALDAS), and whose telephone number appears to be 276-77-46. There is also a mention of a Dr. PERIU, but his relationship is indistinct. RUIZ coughs frequently, is used to cold weather, and was planning to go for his health to the same Gimnasio as his son, Alejandro.

32. A July 1968 memorandum for the record stated that RUIZ suffers from a spinal ailment resulting from a fall he had about 12 years ago. Since then he has had chronic backaches which were particularly severe during the time that he was in the U.S., Haiti, and Santo Domingo. His pains have recurred since he arrived in Spain. On 3 June 1968 he had a severe attack and was

treated by the Embassy's Spanish doctor VILLALANDA (fnu), who prescribed cortisone. His condition was diagnosed as incurable, since it was doubted that the injury to his spine could be corrected by an operation. RUIZ was further told that the condition would continue to grow worse, and that within six to ten years he would have a defective walk. RUIZ planned to send the diagnosis and X-rays to ROA in Havana, who would pass them to the Cuban specialist MARTINEZ-PAZ for review.

TRAVELS

33. Following are the trips RUIZ is known to have made during the last quarter of 1969:

a. To Bilboa, San Sebastian, and Burgos by car, on 28 November 1969, returning two days later.

b. To Havana, to settle "a personal problem," on 20 October 1969 via Iberia (first class), returning to Madrid on 29 October.

c. To London on 14 November for consultations with Raul LEON Torres, returning two days later by air.

d. To Italy with his family on vacation on 28 December to pick up an Alfa Romero that he bought for the Embassy, returning by car and arriving in Madrid on 6 January 1970.

CONTACTS IN MADRID

34. Little is known about RUIZ' contacts in Madrid. Aside from the Algerian Ambassador (see above), we know about:

a. Pedro RUIZ. A good friend who goes to RUIZ' home frequently. According to RUIZ, Pedro is quite influential and is a friend of MASSO(?).

b. Carlos CARRASCO. Another person who calls RUIZ frequently. In late October or early November 1969 CARRASCO went to New York.

c. Rosendo CANTO (201-749310). CANTO lives at Goya 54, Madrid. His friendship with RUIZ is interesting, given CANTO's background, because their being together could be very dangerous for RUIZ unless he were using CANTO for some reason with the approval of Havana. CANTO wants to go to Havana for a year, live there for a year, and then join the Cuban Foreign Service. Referring to CANTO's desire, RUIZ said on 8 January 1970: "He is a fool."

CHARACTER

35. Superficially, RUIZ seems to be an easy-going and rather simple man who no doubt enjoys the prestige and position he has and the successes he has had professionally in Spain. He appears to have a strong character and probably plays the predominant role in his marriage. He and his wife seem to get along very well

together, and they are not heard to argue. On the other hand, there appear to be very deep inconsistencies in his public and private behavior. Sometimes he speaks like a man at war with himself.

36. A certain degree of racism can be detected in his constant reference to blacks as "niches," a disrespectful Cuban colloquialism roughly comparable with the pejorative word, "nigger."

37. RUIZ almost never discusses women with his colleagues, except for one off moment when he mentioned a girl he knew in the United States before the Revolution. Perhaps RUIZ wisely remembers that Nilda also works at the Embassy and refrains from mentioning women on her account. In any case, he is not known to be involved in any extramarital affair. (Still, one wonders about the custom of absenting himself by automobile into the interior of Spain).

38. His habits seem to be simple: he likes movies; he has read Topaz (but made no comment thereon); and he receives people at his home for cocktails.

POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS

39. Although outwardly a "Revolutionary," RUIZ gives much more the appearance of a man with moderate political views struggling to justify to himself the actions of his government, especially in view of the political and economic realities of his country. It is possible that his feelings might lie closer to the theory of the "betrayed revolution" ---but not for strictly ideological reasons. The incompetence of the Cuban governmental bureaucracy, for example, has sabotaged the revolution.

40. In the first place, RUIZ definitely does not seem to be a Marxist and consequently he cannot accept the role of "robot" (his term) required by Party discipline and vertical structure.

a. On 29 December 1969 he wrote to Telesforo DIAZ Portillo, a MINREX official: "Revolutionaries should not be coerced by forms of political control."

b. On 11 December 1969 he told a visiting Agropecuario official from Havana that: " ... if I disagree with orders, I question them because I am not a robot nor do I have the mentality of one. As a human being I express opinions no matter what the risk that I may have to accept personally."

c. RUIZ seems to have little compunction in talking to what he thinks of as old acquaintances, even though they may be on the opposite side of the political fence from him. He once mentioned how he went out of his way to greet a "gusano" on the street because they had been friends in Havana. The Cuban exile evidently turned away from him, but RUIZ defended his own action in initiating the greeting.

41. Aside from the constant criticism of Havana's incompetence, lack of vision, and lack of realism, he is quick to point out the deficiencies of life in Cuba as reflected in his directive to his Embassy staff not to celebrate Christmas together, because there are hungry people at home. RUIZ has also said that medicine in general is quite backward in Cuba.

42. Although he is probably an atheist (or likes to think of himself as one), he is known to believe that "religion should not be considered a handicap for persons trying to return to Cuba." He does not hide his views of the American people, either, for he describes Americans as "frank" and "simple". "They treated me very well," he told Raul LEON Torres in December 1969. On the other hand, he refers to Latin American diplomats as bootlickers because they use the English language at parties, and he has remarked that "capitalism is no good."

43. He seems to have a certain admiration for General Francisco FRANCO, of whom RUIZ has said: "FRANCO is the only reason that Spain is not Communist." RUIZ also called FRANCO "one of the few most brilliant politicians of all time." These seem like strange words for a man as security-conscious as he.

44. He appears to be well-informed on international matters. Some of his views are contradictory at times, but they characterize him as what might be called an undecided realist:

a. "Cuba is a political power, not a military or economic power."

b. "The USSR has neutralized US sea power in the Mediterranean."

c. "Cuba can destroy Guantanamo whenever it chooses to do so, although the base has lost its strategic value to the United States."

d. "US-China rapprochment should be feared, but also a Japan-China alliance."

e. "US power is beginning to crumble, but the Soviets are revisionists."

f. "The Egyptians harm us when they buy sugar from Cuba and then resell to other countries."

g. "We have to be on the side of the Soviets for two reasons: first from the military and economic point of view; secondly, because, whether right or wrong, they are on the same side fighting those who are on the other side."

h. "Cuba has had and now has major discrepancies with the USSR, China, and the US, but we are on the side of communism because we are against capitalism."

201-735296

14-00000

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER:c.
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7344/1549
DATE: 10 February 1970

SECRET

15

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 15 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 | FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6

(classification)

SECRET

(date and time filed)

13 19 00Z FEB 70

(reference number)

009871

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MADRID LISBON

TYPIC AMAUTO QUTIMID

REF: OSMA-25870 (NOT SENT LISBON)

1. REF CONTAINS QUTIMID REPORT NUMBER 2274 DATED 9 JAN 70 CONCERNING CALL BY ONE CONCHA CAMACHO TO AMAUTO-1, UNDER SOMEWHAT PROVOCATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES. CONCHITA DESCRIBES SELF AS WIDOW OF THE DOCTOR WHO WAS DIRECTOR OF COIMBRA HOSPITAL (PLACE UNKNOWN). SHE LEAVES PHONE NUMBER 201-49-89, WHICH CURBELO TRIES VAINLY TO TRACE THROUGH PHONE COMPANY.

2. REQUEST MADRID TRACE PHONE NUMBER, CONCHITA CAMACHO, AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACT, SINCE AMAUTO-1 AGREED MEET HER. REQUEST LISBON CHECK COIMBRA HOSPITAL IN ATTEMPT IDENTIFY DR. CAMACHO. THERE WERE NO IDENTIFIABLE HQS TRACES ON CONCHA OR CONCEPCION CAMACHO.

3. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENTS: Ref contained phone tap information as above, plus other details hinting at some sort of provocation of AMAUTO-1, Field had not alerted us to this possible operational lead.

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/COG
E/IB/S
E/IB/P

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

13 Feb 70

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-735296

14-00000

ORIG: RICHARD [illegible]
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144 R: 1819
DATE: 9 FEBRUARY 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

1/5 SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30/13 PER 1071 .22

☒ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 ~~[illegible]~~ 5 [illegible]
2 ~~[illegible]~~ 6 [illegible]
3 ~~[illegible]~~ 7
4 [illegible] 8 [illegible]

CONF: C/WH6
FILE, VR. DDP C/E C/CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 10 21 04 2 FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

TYPIC LISAGA 008947

REF: MADRID 0420 (IN 020665)

1. REQUEST STATION TRY GET AN ORIGINAL COPY FOR RETENTION. FAILING THIS, REQUEST PHOTOCOPY. HQS MOST INTERESTED KNOWING WHETHER AMAUTO-1'S ORDER RE BOOK DISTRIBUTION IS HIS OWN IDEA OR STEMS FROM HIS HQS, IF YOU HAVE ANY WAY TO FIND OUT.

2. FILE 201-735296, 201-805447, 50-6-149/3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref reported that AMAUTO-1, Cuban Chargé Madrid, has received from Habana 80 copies of book concerning LISAGA-1 case. QUFLUTE-1 may have possibility of obtaining copy for us. AMAUTO-1 reportedly has ordered no distribution of book outside official Cuban Community.

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/EUR/FI/CI

C/WH/COG
EUR/IB

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division;
~~Chief of Station, Madrid~~

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
TYPIC QUDOZE
AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References:
A. OSMA-25745, 5 December 1969
B. DIRECTOR 004676, 23 January 1970
C. WH/MIAMI 6341, 26 January 1970

WH/Miami has been unable to develop any leads or traces to Alexander SANKO, the individual for whom AMAUTO-1 worked in the States. Local LNERGO was also queried with negative results.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

Dec to E|IB|S

Distribution:
(3) - Chief, WHD
2 - Chief, EUR
2 - COS, Madrid - out pouch.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-1770

DATE
FEB 6 1970
4 February 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-735296

SECRET

Extract from [illegible] Report No. [illegible]80, Item 2, [illegible] February 1970
[illegible], 20 April 1970

Tilla Ruiz [illegible] Tilla [illegible] (Aristides' wife). She asks her how the [illegible], that was [illegible] with the Ruiz, is getting along. Tilla [illegible] says that the [illegible] that [illegible] spoke to her about are [illegible] for her, because she thinks that she and Aristides will [illegible] definitely come back to [illegible].

(THINK WHAT WAS MEANT WAS THAT RUIZ (AMMUTO-1) AND [illegible] BY AUGUST)

SECRET

FILE:
AMMUTO-1

-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 2 Feb 70

TO: Mr Wheeler

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:

D U-3

file in

AMAUTO-1

201.

FROM: AF/1/A

ROOM NO. 6C39 BUILDING EXTENSION 7361

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (C)

LAIDI, Ahmed

Algeria

DOB: Oudja, Morocco dob: 20 April 1934

Named August 1963 advisor on African Affairs in presidency and now is listed as Ben Bella's chief of Cabinet. While he is a relative newcomer to scene here and not known personally to the Embassy, it appears likely that he is close to Ben Bella and therefor a useful contact.

Deptel #658
4/10/63

In accordance with a decree published on 12 November 1963, Ahmed Laidi has been appointed chef du cabinet of Presedent Ben Bella.

Journal Offic
15 Nov 1963
Algiers

Subj is new Director General of Political Affairs, MFA. (Algiers EMBTEL 964, 21 Oct 64
filed:Alg/Cuba

Laidi, (Director General, Foreign Ministry in charge of Political, Economic and Culturel Affairs), member of Sept 65 delegation to UN General Assembly. Described as reserred, in- igent, and probably something of an operator; he was Ben Bella's chief of cabinet before ing foreign office in 1964 and although technically still number three man in fonoff, has ed to function more on special assignment basis than as part of chain of command. His mc. recent [illegible] project has been B ndung 2. Algiers Embtel 660, 28 Sept 65, Alg/UN

Appointed Algerian Ambassador to Spain, October, 1966

A-168, 25 Oct 66
Filed Algeria/Spain

WH/COG 70-38

26 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: SB/C

ATTENTION : Connie Terry

SUBJECT : Cuban Charge d'Affairs Comments on Czechoslovakian Situation

REFERENCE : OSMA-25789, dated 7 January 1970

1. The following comments of the Cuban Minister to Spain, Guillermo RUIZ Perez, reflect Cuban thoughts on the Czechoslovakian situation:

> The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia has been a disaster; however, criticizing the Soviet action would mean taking sides with the Americans. A friend may be criticized in private but publicly be should be defended. (QUDOZE, 19 November.) The Cubans have to side with the Soviets for military and economic reasons and because, whether right or wrong, they belong to the same ideological group. Cuba had and still has enormous discrepancies with the Soviet Union, China, and the United States but weighing the differences Cuba is with Communism and opposed to Capitalism. (QUDOZE, 3 November.)

2. The above information was obtained from a Sensitive Source and should be protected as such.

Glenn O. Brown
C/WH/COG/OPS

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - 201-735296
1 - Czech Country file

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

I

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 852

SECRET 261525Z JAN 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6341 (WMIM)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

26 JAN IN 013247

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 004676

1. UNABLE TO DEVELOP LEADS TO AMAUTO/1'S FRIEND ALEXANDER SAMKO. HAVE REQUESTED CHECK FROM LOCAL LNERGO AND WILL ADVISE.

2. FILE: 201-735296.

SECRET

AB
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DES~~ MFD
~~FI~~
WH/C/CF

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296
26 JAN 70

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144 R. 1819
DATE: 21 JANUARY 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 2d PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH-8 INFO FILE, VR. EUR-6, RI/AN, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 23 00 44z Jan 70 CITE DIRECTOR 004676

TO WH/MIAMI INFO: MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

1. THROUGH QUDOZE AMAUTO-1 HAS AT LEAST TWICE TALKED ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCES IN MIAMI AREA IN 1957 WORKING IN MEAT BUSINESS WITH ONE ALEXANDER SAMKO (OR SAMKOV). HQS TRACES CANNOT IDENTIFY THIS PERSON. REQUEST MIAMI TRY.

2. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

AN V
AB ~~X~~
~~IN~~
~~DS~~
~~PI~~
~~[illegible]~~
FD

CS COPY

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

E/IB M. Sorrels
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. Brown for
JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

23 Jan 70

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-735296

2/WH

IP

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Madrid CSM x
Chief, European Division
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, WH/Miami
OPERATIONAL/AMOT
Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735290)

Reference: DIRECTOR 62752

Forwarded herewith is AMOT report, OTA-1858, containing biodata and comments on Subject, from IDENTITY, who is Subject of 201-826285 and of reference.

Rolando Cardoso Perez, cousin

Albert E. DANZIGER

Attachment:
1. OTA-1858 h/w
2. Identity u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - COS, Madrid w/att 1 h/w, 2 u/s/c
2 - C/EUR w/att 1 h/w, 2 u/s/c
~~3~~ - C/WH w/att 1 h/w, 2 u/s/c

MICROFILMED
FEB 09 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Dated 4 Feb 70

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2 att

UFAA-1690

20 January 1970

201-735290
~~201-826285~~

S E C R E T

CS COPY

S E C R E T

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Date: [illegible]

I. [illegible]

1. Name: Guillermo [illegible] 201-735276 [illegible]

2. DPOB: Born about 19[illegible], [illegible] in Havana, Cuba. 8P

3. Address:

   a. Present: Madrid, Spain (exact address unknown)

   b. Permanent: Marianao, City of Havana (exact address unknown)

4. Other names used: None

5. Present Position: As of 10 October 19[illegible] when Source [illegible] him for the last time, he was holding the position of Commercial Attaché of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, Spain (Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in Spain). Source does not know since what date Subject has been holding this position.

6. Marital Status: Subject is married but Source (W cod'd) does not know the name of Subject's wife (Hilda [illegible] López). She is white, was born about 1934, and is slender and blonde. She is a schoolteacher and resides with Subject in Spain. Her political ideology is not known to Source, but Source believes that she follows Subject's ideology. (Subject's wife, Hilda [illegible] López, is the daughter of Juan or Celestino [illegible] [illegible] (D) and Palma LOPEZ Méndez or Menéndez (D).)

7. Relatives:

   a. Parents: José Antonio [illegible] (mat. unk.) (D), white, born about 1910. He is a barber and owns a barber shop located on Cuba St., City of Havana. He is a former member of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and is now a member of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). He is also the head of a sectional office of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) in Reparto Monterrey, Jacomino section, City of Havana.

   [illegible] (UN). She was born about 1914 in Havana and is white. She is a housewife. She is adapted to the present Cuban regime on account of her husband's and son's political ideology. Resides with her husband in Reparto Monterrey, Jacomino section, City of Havana.

   b. Brothers and Sisters:

      (1) José Antonio [illegible] (D). He was born in Havana about 19[illegible] and is white. He is known to have worked as a truck driver and, during the present Cuban regime, he worked as a Havana-Víbora Route 37 bus driver in Havana. He is a supporter of the regime. Member of the National Revolutionary Militia (MNR) and wears the militia uniform. He is said to be a gunner. Resides in A Reparto Monterrey, Jacomino section, Havana Cuba next to his parents' home.

Dom c 1935 Cuba
Havana

tracer

S E C R E T

MICROFILMED
FEB 09 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

[illegible] / [illegible] LFHA 01690

201-735276

[illegible]
[illegible], Havana
Brother of Subject of
201-735296

[illegible] type of [illegible] some time in [illegible] while work[illegible] Havana [illegible] not know [illegible]

c. Children: Source [illegible] children, but does not know if the children are [illegible] Subject or not. (Subject has five children: Guillermo RUIZ Veciana (?), [illegible] RUIZ Veciana (?), Julio RUIZ Veciana (?), Juan RUIZ Veciana (?) and Ivan RUIZ Veciana (?).)

8. Languages:

a. Native language: Spanish

b. Foreign languages: Source believes Subject knows some English because Subject has resided in the U.S.

9. Physical Description:

a. Race: white

b. Apparent age: about 30

c. Height: about 5'7"

d. Weight: about 190 lbs.

e. Build: stout

f. Hair: blond, slightly wavy, combed back

g. Eyes: light-colored (Source does not remember exact color)

h. Complexion: fair

i. Shape of face: round

j. Clothing: Usually wears coat and tie, by virtue of his position in Spain.

k. General appearance: average

l. Identification marks: none visible

m. Characteristics: no distinguishing characteristics

10. Personality, Character, Habits and Personal Weaknesses:

a. Personality: Intelligent, normal.

b. Character: Pleasant, normal.

c. Habits: Smokes cigarettes.

d. Personal Weaknesses: Has a weakness for women, especially Asiatic women or women of [illegible] type. Likes to dance and drink with some moderation.

SECRET

11. Financial situation:

a. Before 1959: [illegible] did not have Subject to hold any job [illegible] supported by his family. [illegible] Subject has all his needs.

b. After 1959: [illegible] in regard to power and [illegible].

12. Curriculum Vitae [illegible]

a. Education: Subject [illegible] at the "[illegible]" School in [illegible] of Havana. Source does not know if he studied high school. In the early days of the present Cuban regime, Subject was attending Havana University but Source does not know what he was studying.

b. Employment Record: Prior to 1959, Subject was not known to have held any job in Cuba. In 1958, he was in exile in the U.S. but Source does not know if he worked in the U.S. or not. During the present Cuban regime, Subject has made a few trips to Latin America and Europe on G2 missions. (In 1958, while Subject was in exile in the U.S., he returned to Cuba clandestinely as a stowaway.)

13. Travel outside Cuba: In 1958, Subject was in exile in the U.S. (no further details known to Source). During the present Cuban regime, Subject has traveled to Latin America and Europe on G2 missions. As of 20 October 1960, he was in Spain (Source does not know when Subject arrived in Spain).

14. Contacts and Friends:

a. Relatives and friends in the government: According to Source, the members of Subject's family on his father's side are Communists. Some of them were members of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). Source obtained this information from comments which he has heard among relatives. He does not know or remember the names and positions of these members of the family of Subject's father.

b. Friends in Cuba who do not hold positions in the government: Unknown.

c. Relatives and friends outside Cuba: Source (Subject's cousin).

II. [illegible]

A. Political [illegible]:

i. Prior to 1959, Subject was not a member or collaborator of the Communist Party of Cuba. He was known to be connected with the Youth Section of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Autentico).

2. Subject was anti-[illegible] prior to [illegible].

3. Subject helped in the [illegible] regime in what was [illegible] in Havana. He is said to have [illegible] the Batista regime. He [illegible]

4. Subject [illegible] after it was [illegible] Castro was in [illegible]

5. Source does not [illegible] accepted and [illegible] with the Cuban regime, but believes that Subject has accepted it totally and completely.

6. Source does not know if Subject is capable of extensive personal sacrifice for a "cause."

7. Subject has benefited from the present regime. He presently holds a position which he probably would not hold had there been no revolution.

8. Source does not know if Subject is the sort of person who would be capable of doing something against the present Cuban regime if he were opposed to it, although, according to Subject's background and activities during the Batista regime, he is the sort of man who fights.

9. Subject has never been anti-Communist. Subject's father is an old-guard Communist.

10. Source has never heard Subject express any opinion on the United States, but believes that Subject follows the policy of the Cuban regime in this regard, as he is a supporter of the regime.

11. Source has no indication or evidence that Subject could be recruited or defected. However, Source says that any attempt to recruit or defect Subject could be based on his position or benefits for his wife and children. Source says that it should also be considered that Subject has a weakness for women, especially [illegible] women or women of Asiatic type.

12. Subject is outside Cuba but Source does not know if his wife and children are with him and if he would be in a position to defect if he wished to do so.

[illegible]

A. RUIZ Pérez, Guillermo [illegible]

[illegible]-141, 31 July 1967, [illegible]

RUIZ Pérez, Guillermo:

Trip Madrid-Havana, [illegible] passport [illegible]

Trip Madrid-Havana, [illegible]; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/67/890. Source: Iberia passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 10 November 1968; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/67/890. Source: Iberia passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 6 August 1968; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/67/890. Source: Iberia passenger list.

Born on 10 February 1939, Havana. Arrived in Paris from Madrid on 27 July 1968. Source: List of Cubans Traveling, 31 August 1968.

B. VECIANA López, Hilda:

PP-8134, 7 December 1967, X-102.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 6 August 1968; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/67/891. Source: Iberia passenger list.

Trip Mexico-Havana, 9 May 1964; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/635. Source: CCA passenger list.

VECIANA López, Hilda:

Trip Madrid-Havana, 6 August 1968; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/67/891. Source: Iberia passenger list.

Member of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). Daughter of Juan VECIANA and Palma LOPEZ. Married to Guillermo RUIZ. Is in Spain with her husband and her parents. White, born about 1942, about 5'5" tall, 135 lbs., blond hair, light green eyes. Teacher. Member of the Federation of Cuban Women and Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Source: Orlando [illegible], 14 April 1969, X-10.

C. VECIANA, Juan:

White, born in 1907, 5'8" tall, about 200 lbs., graying black hair, gray eyes. Married to Palma LOPEZ. Has a daughter named Hilda VECIANA López, born about 1942. He was born in Cataluña, Spain, and is a naturalized Cuban citizen. He resided on 70th Ave. at the corner of 5th Ave., Miramar, Marianao, Havana, in a house that was given to him by the present Cuban regime. Visited the U.S. prior to 1959. He is a high official of the Ministry of Construction. PCC member. Unconditional supporter of the regime.

[illegible], Juan [illegible]:

He is an uncle by marriage of [illegible] [illegible] Spain since March 1969 with [illegible]. Source: Orlando CASTRO Cardoso, 24 April 19[illegible], I-10.

[illegible] Palmar, Cel[illegible]:

Trip Havana-Madrid, [illegible] January 1969; Cuban passport [illegible]. Source: CCA passenger list.

Note: According to information in our possession we [illegible] that Juan V[illegible] is identical with Celestino [illegible] Palmar.

D. [illegible]:

Married to Juan V[illegible] (mid. unk.). She was born about 1911 and is white, weighs about 115 lbs. and has graying hair and light-colored eyes. She has a daughter named Hilda V[illegible] López, born about 1942. Resides on 70th Ave. at the corner of 5th Ave., Miramar, Marianao, Havana. Has been in Spain with her husband since March 1969. Member of the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC). Aunt of Source's wife. Source: Orlando CASTRO Cardoso, 24 April 1969, I-10.

LOPEZ Menéndez, Palma:

Trip Havana-Mexico, 9 December 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/744. Source: CCA passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 10 June 1969; Cuban passport PP-E/69/472. Source: CCA passenger list.

LOPEZ Méndez, Palma:

Trip Mexico-Havana, 20 December 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/744. [illegible]. Source: CCA passenger list.

E. RUIZ, José Antonio:

RUIZ Ramos, José:

Manager of the Wall Street Barber Shop, located at 560 Aguiar St., Havana. Appointed to this position by Resolution [illegible], 17 April 1963, of the Ministry of Domestic Trade (MINCIN). Source: Official Gazette #116, 25 June 1963, page 6364.

6

F. [illegible]:

On 10 July 1961, [illegible] on a list of [illegible] Technological [illegible] [illegible]

G. [illegible]:

Trip [illegible] passport [illegible]

Trip Mexico-Havana, 30 [illegible] 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/744. [illegible]. Source: CCA passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 8 August 1960; Cuban diplomatic [illegible] port PP-D/57/392. Source: Iberia passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 19 June 1960; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/57/392. Source: CCA passenger list.

H. RUIZ Veciana, [illegible]:

Trip Madrid-Havana, 4 August 1960; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/57/391. Source: Iberia passenger list.

RUIZ Veciana, Alejandro:

Trip Mexico-Havana, 9 May 1964; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/335. Half fare. Source: CCA passenger list.

I. RUIZ Veciana, Julio:

Trip Havana-Mexico, 20 November 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/407. Infant. Source: CCA passenger list.

Trip Mexico-Havana, 9 May 1964; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/335. Half fare. Source: CCA passenger list.

RUIZ Veciana, Julio C.:

Trip Madrid-Havana, 29 June 1960; Cuban passport PP-D/59/472. Child. Source: CCA passenger list.

J. RUIZ Veciana, [illegible]:

Trip Havana-Madrid, 12 February 1960; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/58/50. Source: CCA passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 4 August 1960; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/58/50. Child. Source: Iberia passenger list.

[illegible]

Trip [illegible]; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/20. Source: [illegible] list.

[illegible]

Trip [illegible]
PP-D/63/20. [illegible]

K. [illegible]

Trip [illegible]-Mexico, 8 [illegible] 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport D-[illegible]/63/744. Infant. Source: [illegible] passenger list.

Trip Havana-Mexico, 25 [illegible] 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport [illegible]/63/744. Child. Source: passenger list (does not say what [illegible]).

Trip Madrid-Havana, 6 [illegible] 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/20. Child. Source: Iberia passenger list.

RUIZ, Evin:

Trip Mexico-Havana, 9 May 1964; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/744. Child. Source: passenger list.

201-735296

SEPARA
TO: UFAA-1690

SECRET

SCA TO:
UFAA-1690

2P

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UFAA-1690

FR

1. IDENTITY IS: Rolando CARDOSO Perez (201-822295), cousin of Subject of UFAA-1690. CARDOSO last saw Subject at the Barajas Airport in Madrid when CARDOSO was departing for the U.S. in October 1968. They exchanged greetings only at that time, however, they had previously seen each other at Barajas Airport in mid-1968 when they talked for about five minutes about trivialities. Subject was at the airport to meet arriving Cuban diplomats. CARDOSO is willing to write to Subject and to assist in an approach should it be desired, however, he does not believe that Subject is recruitable. They have a family relationship but are not close because of political differences, however, it would not be unusual for them to exchange greetings. (DIRECTOR 62752 points out CARDOSO's faults).

Cousin of Subject of 201-735296

2. The following is biodata on Rolando CARDOSO Perez:

a. Parolee No.: A18 239 674

b. DPOB: 23 May 1936, Havana, Cuba

c. Address in Cuba: 419 Libertad St. between Juan Delgado and D'Strampes Sts., Santos Suarez, Havana

d. Employment in Cuba: From approximately 1952 until 1958, he worked in his father's bicycle repair shop on Soledad St. between Pocitos and Carlos Tercero Sts., Havana. From the end of 1958 until 1963, he worked in a coffee shop located next to his father's bicycle repair shop in Havana. From 1963 until 1965 he was unemployed, studying English and business administration. From the end of 1965 until the end of 1966, he worked in the Construction Department of the Antonio Guiteras National Electric Enterprise in Havana, earning a salary of $80.00 pesos a month as a common laborer. From the end of 1966 until approximately March 1967, he worked as a farm laborer as a member of the Military Units to Aid Production (UMAP) in Florida, Camaguey Province. From March 1967 until he left Cuba in November 1967, he was unemployed, engaging in making and selling hair nets and other similar items. From November 1967 until 10 October 1968, he was in Spain and did not have any employment during this period.

MICROFILMED
FEB 09 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

e. Date of arrival in the U.S.: He arrived in the U.S. on 10 October 1968. He had departed Cuba on 26 November 1967 on a Chesa Airlines plane, going to Paris, France, and then taking another plane to Spain the following day.

f. Address in U.S.: 540 SW 11th Avenue, Miami, Fla., phone 377-3877

g. Employment in U.S.: From mid-October 1968 until December 1968, he worked at the Delicias fruit preserves

CS COPY

/Continued/

S/C att. to UFAA-01690

201-735296

plant on W. 28th St., Hialeah, Fla. In December 1968, he underwent a hernia operation. In January 1969, he worked three days in the Los Pinos Nuevos Bakery in Miami. Then he was unemployed for two months, recovering from the hernia operation. Since approximately March 1969, he has been working at the Marti Theater on SW 8th Ave. between 4th and 5th Sts., Miami, under the orders of the manager, Manuel ALVAREZ.

h. Spouse: Alina ALVARADO Torres (NT). They have been married since 23 December 1966. She is white and was born on 21 October 1937 in Havana, Cuba. She is an English, French and painting teacher, and also a stenographer. Resides with Source. They have no children.

i. Children: none

j. Parents: Bernardo CARDOSO Rodriguez (NT). White, born about 1902 in La Esperanza, Las Villas Province. Resides at 689 Soledad St., Havana. Retired National Police corporal. Opposed to the present Cuban regime.

Francisca PEREZ Entrialgo (NT). White, born about 1911 in Havana. Housewife. Resides with her husband. Opposed to the regime.

k. Brothers and Sisters:

(1) Rina PEREZ Perez (NT). Arrived in the U.S. in approximately 1961. Claimed Source from the U.S. Resides at 2735 SW 24th Terr., Miami, Fla., phone 446-4555.

(2) Bernardo CARDOSO Rodriguez (NT). Born about 1929 in Havana or in La Esperanza, Las Villas Province. White. Resides in New Jersey.

(3) Jorge CARDOSO Perez (NT). White, born about 1942 in Havana. Lives with his parents. Opposed to the regime. Now unemployed. Formerly worked in a laboratory in Havana. Opposed to the regime.

(4) Pastora CARDOSO Perez (NT). White, born about 1951 in Havana. Lives with her parents.

l. Physical description: White, appears to be about 34 years of age, about 5'8" tall, 140 lbs., average build, fair complexion, light brown hair, brown eyes, ovoid shaped face, no identification marks.

m. Other names used: none

n. Education: He completed two years of business school and took a course in business administration. Knows some English (fair).

CSMA-25832, 14 Jan 1970
QU2026

[illegible]( )

He thinks, now that he knows the past history of the case, that your friend had been used as a tool for "others(people's) interests".

Report No. [illegible] [illegible] December 1969

Ruiz is talking with Curbelo and [illegible] about the new building. Apparently they are waiting for an O.K. from Havana. Ruiz seems concerned about the maintenance of the building, as it has six floors and a basement. Havana will have to send an electrician, who is also a plumber, and that understands something of carpentry. They will need three or four other men to act as doorman, watchman, etc. The wives of these men will be the charwomen of the building. Curbelo says once that Havana approves the building they will have to sit down and talk over what difficulties hiring Spanish personnel might present. Ruiz doesn't want Spanish personnel under any circumstances. He speaks of having two dining rooms, one for the Commercial Office and the other for the Embassy; here meals prepared outside will be served. The dining room will be completely isolated so that no visitor or invited guest will be able to place anything in the ceiling nor in the walls without being seen. They are going to install a closed circuit television so that all entries and exits will be controlled. Ruiz says that a Japanese type television of the kind they are discussing only costs something over $500, and he adds that most likely there is one in the American embassy.

Report No. 242 [illegible] January 1970

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID/AN 13 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

SMITH, LESLIE
RID/AN
EXT. 7670

EP-499
GA50
TUBE GT 7

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/COG		[illegible] 1970		S
2. [illegible]		15 Jan		[illegible]
3. Lunsford				CL
4. GRATZ				DJ
5.				
6. WH/C/RR			31 Jan	RH
7. SR				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Checked with GUR/CO and GRATZ, no particular interest.
3 to 4.
Nancy do you have an interest in these individuals
— 4-3 [illegible]

3, to 6.
May be of some interest in regards to Spanish-Cuban relations

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296
DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE 9 Jan 70	DOCUMENT NUMBER DSMA 25306

FILE TITLE

05009

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: QUDOZE
Joaquin AUVI Casals, Lazaro GARRIDO Sanchez & Antonio MARQUEZ Pedraza

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-735296

1. Of possible interest to addressees is a translation of the following letter dictated by Guillermo RUIZ Perez to his secretary on 26 December 1969. The letter was addressed to a comrade "OCUZA or LANUZA (fon)" in Havana ~~in response~~ in response to a confidential note received by RUIZ from Havana.

> "In relation to your confidential note number 7240 about the Spanish prisoners, Joaquin AUVI Casals, Lazaro GARRIDO Sanchez and Antonio MARQUEZ Pedraza, whose release was requested in a note from the Spanish Embassy in Havana, I would like to tell you the following: Firstly, Senor Joaquin AUVI Casals was of interest to D. Pedro SALVADOR de Vicente; but because of the bad record and activities of this man, it was understood that his departure would be denied. I talked to Pedro SALVADOR about this matter and upon mentioning this man's background he told me that his interest was due to a phone call he had received from a friend of his in Miami. He considers that, given the background in this case, his friend was supposedly an instrument of "other interests". Secondly, regarding the other Spaniards, we have no objection whatsoever to their departing the country. Without anything of further consequence,....."

2. Station files contain no traces on AUVI, GARRIDO or MARQUEZ.

Perry D. Wachal
Perry D. WACHAL

P. [illegible] SALVADOR DE VICENTE, THE [illegible] DELEGATE FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS OF THE SPANISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR RID 4/IBS
2 - COS, WH/Miami

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OSMA - 25806

DATE: 9 January 1970

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-735296

[illegible]

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. CSDB-312/03010-69

DATE DISTR. 17 December 1969

COUNTRY Cuba, Spain

DOI Late September 1969

SUBJECT Cuban-Spanish Commercial Relations

ACQ Spain, Madrid (Early October 1969) FIELD NO. OSM 9815

SOURCE An official Spanish service from a source described as sensitive and usually reliable.

1. On 23 September 1969 the Cuban Minister to Spain, Guillermo Ruiz Perez, called on Pedro Salvador de Vicente, the Special Delegate for Latin American Affairs in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to discuss the forthcoming trade negotiations in Cuba. During the discussion Salvador told Ruiz that the one and only question which concerns the Spanish Government is that of Cuban indemnifications and pensions for Spanish employees, and he asked Ruiz what the latter could say regarding this problem. (Field Comment: The indemnifications refer to property owned by Spanish nationals which was confiscated by the Cuban Government.) Ruiz claimed that he had no instructions on what he could say, adding that the claims were numerous and that the paperwork involved was difficult and required a great deal of time.

2. Salvador told Ruiz that the subject of indemnifications and pensions must be discussed during the forthcoming negotiations, and that the Cuban Government must provide at least an approximate figure of what it is going to pay. He said that the indemnification figure must be based on the value of the expropriated properties, less the amount of any taxes levied on the properties. (Source Comment: Salvador did not say what would happen if the Cuban Government failed to reach some agreement on the question but he implied that negotiations would be delayed until the Spanish Foreign Ministry received the Cuban Government's reply to this question.) (Field Comment: Since the conversation between Salvador and Ruiz was held before the recent change of the Spanish Cabinet and other Government positions, there is no

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM SECRET

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
DCS BIC TREASURY FBI 4								

WHC/RR	3	WH/SAO	1	E/IB/R	3
WH/OPS	2			E/MADR	1
WHC/EW	1			E/R	1
WH/PP	1	CI/OPS WH	2		
WHC MIAMI	1				

TO 3 IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO 1, WH/C 7 (1), EUR 4 (1), WH 1

LIAISON

OSM-9817
QUSEQUIN
(OUDOZE)
CSDB-312/03010-69

COORDINATING

RELEASING RH SR

information on how these changes would affect the question raised by Salvador or the signing of a new trade agreement with Cuba. As of 17 November 1969, Salvador was still Special Delegate for Latin American Affairs.)

3. (Field Comment: Until recently, the indemnifications and pensions problem had not emerged as a serious factor in the negotiations for a new trade agreement. There has been a gradual deterioration of Spanish-Cuban commercial relations since the conclusion in May of preparatory negotiations for a new agreement, but this deterioration ostensibly was the result of a Spanish Government decision to reduce Cuban sugar imports over the next three years. The Cuban Government apparently had not considered such decision in its analysis of Cuban-Spanish commercial relations, and it was quite upset when the decision was revealed during the preparatory negotiations. Some of the problems causing the strain in Spanish-Cuban relations were previously reported in TDCSDB-315/2470-69, TDCSDB-315/02182-69, TDCSDB-315/03509-69, CS-311/08659-69 and CSDB-312/02600-69.)

4. **Field Dissem: State.**

[illegible]
[illegible] 25570

9 January 1970

Report No. 2274

N.T.

One 'Miss' CONCHITA calls asking for RUIZ. NILDA says she is his secretary and CONCHITA may leave the message with her. C and R have not seen each other for two years and C would like to surprise him. NILDA asks for her last name; C does not give it to her because it would then fail to be a surprise, but leaves her telephone number (201-49-89) for R to call her after 8, for she works until that time. On NILDA's insistence C gives her last name as CAMACHO, adding she is the widow of the doctor who was director of the Coimbra Hospital.

RUIZ calls Mrs. CAMACHO at 201-49 89. She begins the conversation by saying they had met at a party which she had attended with her husband at the Dominican Embassy in Madrid. She reminds him that they had talked with the Paraguayan Ambassador and former Dominican Ambassador Rafael COMPRES, and that the party had taken place two years ago. Despite all the details RUIZ insists he does not remember her and asks how he can be of service to her. She tells him "I have just arrived and find myself somewhat isolated, disoriented, and I must find work. I recall you telling me on that ocassion 'If you should ever have any problem and you come to Madrid, look me up.' One other ambassador also offered me his assistance and I have tried to locate both of you." Mrs. C mentions having a daughter, that her husband was a pilot and that she is a Spaniard, adding she is not too old. R replies that in all honesty he does not remember her. She insists on seeing him to have a chat, and R suggests she come to his office at her convenience. She prefers talking with him alone, without his secretary or anyone else present, and suggests a bar at some hotel like the Palace, Ritz or Hilton. He is agreeable to any place she may desire; they agree to meet that night at 9:30 in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel. She will be dressed all in black.

RUIZ calls FERNANDO. F is to meet R outside the latter's home about 9 o'clock dressed in coat and tie.

Report No. 2248.

Cruzito Martinez

HORACIO calls the telephone ~~company~~ requesting the address for telephone number 201-49-89. The information is denied.

HUMBERTO PILOTO FUENTES IN THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE

RUIZ calls PILOTO to have him meet RAUL LEON in Barajas that night. RUIZ is unable to do so because of a previous engagement.

[illegible]

FERNANDO calls CURBELO to ask for PUGA's phone number. F wants to tell P he cannot meet the professor at P's house that night because he (F) has to take RUIZ somewhere.

JUAN ANTONIO CURBELO LEMUS

[illegible] companhia rural — Viseu

[illegible] Romano Fontes [illegible] cap.

[illegible] Gomes Vaz de [illegible]

[illegible] Raul Henrique [illegible]

[illegible] João Eduardo Cruz.

[illegible] Augusto Aguiar, ten.

[illegible] companhia rural — Aveiro

[illegible] Luís Correia, cap.

[illegible] Alves Caetano, ten. [illegible] Fernando Manuel [illegible] Valério da Silva.

[illegible] Telmo da Graça [illegible] Pereira de Vasconcelos, ten.

[illegible] companhia rural — Coimbra

[illegible] Alfredo de Sousa Fa- [illegible] cap.

[illegible] de secção: [illegible] de Oliveira Brito.

[illegible] de Magalhães, ten. [illegible] Manuel de Sousa Almeida.

[illegible] companhia rural — Guarda

[illegible] António Pinto [illegible]

[illegible] de secção: [illegible] dos Santos Antunes.

[illegible] José de Melo Bravo [illegible]

[illegible] do Nascimento, ten.

[illegible] rural — Castelo Branco

[illegible] José Marques da Sil- [illegible]

[illegible] de secção: [illegible] Jorge Vasco de Oliveira [illegible], ten.

[illegible] Borges Alexandre [illegible]

[illegible] Correia da Costa [illegible]

[illegible] Jaime Geraldes dos [illegible]

[illegible] António Resende Sove- [illegible]

Guarnição militar

[illegible] de Serviço de Saúde

[illegible] Bairro de Santana

Telefs. [illegible] e 25010

[illegible] de Mobilização do Regimento de Serviço de Saúde

[illegible] de Artilharia Ligeira, n.º 2

(Santa Clara)

Telef. 22071

Centro de Mobilização de Artilharia 2

Largo de Santa Isabel

[illegible] Grupo de Companhias de Saúde

Rua da Sofia

Telef. 23453

[illegible] de mobilização do serviço de saúde n.º 2

Carreira de tiro

Hospitais Civis

Hospitais da Universidade de Coimbra

Telefs.:
[illegible]
Administração: 2[illegible]06
P. P. C. A. ([illegible] linhas) 22[illegible]

Administração

Provedor: Dr. Mário Manuel Gândara Nogueira.
Provedor adjunto: Dr. Joaquim Pedroso de Lima.
Direcção técnica:
Director dos serviços clínicos: Prof. Dr. Joaquim Antunes de Azevedo.
Director dos serviços clínicos, adjunto: Dr. José Lopes Cavalheiro.
Director dos serviços de urgência: Prof. Dr. Bártolo do Vale Pereira.
Chefe do internato médico: Vago.
Serviços administrativos e gerais:
Chefe da secretaria: Dr. Jorge Manuel de Matos e Silva Fernandes.
Chefe da contabilidade: Dr. Roque Pinto Ferrão.
Chefe dos serviços de manutenção do património: Vago.
Chefe dos serviços económicos: Vago.
Tesoureiro: José Rosa Madeira de Carvalho.
Abastecimentos e armazéns: Dr. Cândido Pacheco de Araújo.
1.ºˢ oficiais:
Aníbal Duarte Apóstolo.
Aníbal Francisco Simões Martinho.
António Simões dos Santos Ferrão.

Directores dos serviços de medicina

1.ª Medicina

(Propedêutica médica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Manuel Joaquim Bruno da Costa.

2.ª Medicina

(Terapêutica médica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Joaquim Antunes de Azevedo.

3.ª Medicina

(Patologia médica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Mário Simões Trincão.

4.ª Medicina

(Clínica médica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Augusto Pais da Silva Vaz Serra.

1.ª Cirurgia

(Propedêutica cirúrgica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Bártolo do Vale Pereira.

2.ª Cirurgia

(Medicina operatória)

Director: Prof. Dr. Luís José Martins Raposo.

3.ª Cirurgia

(Patologia cirúrgica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Fernando Alberto Serra de Oliveira.

4.ª Cirurgia

(Clínica cirúrgica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Bártolo do Vale Pereira.

Serviços de especialidades

Urologia

Director: Dr. Alexandre José Linhares Furtado.

Otorrinolaringologia

Director: Dr. Carlos Alberto dos Santos Miguéis.

Clínica Obstétrica (Clínica do Dr. Daniel de Matos)

Telef. 22031

Director: Prof. Dr. Albertino da Costa Barros.

Oftalmologia

Director: Dr. Leovegildo de Albuquerque

Dermatologia

Director: **Dr. António Vasco Beltrão Polares Baptista.**

Ortopedia

Director: **Prof. Dr. Fernando Alberto Serra de Oliveira.**

Pediatria

Director: **Dr. José dos Santos Bessa.**

Psiquiatria (Manicómio Sena)

Telef. 22093

Director: **Dr. António Henriques de Elias Nunes Vicente.**

Neurologia

Telef. 22093

Director: Dr. António Henriques de Elias Nunes Vicente.

Ginecologia

Director: Prof. Dr. Francisco Manuel Santos Ibérico Nogueira.

Pneumotisiologia

Director: Prof. Dr. José de Gouveia Monteiro.

Clínica de doenças infecciosas

Telef. 22035

Director: Vago.

Quartos particulares

Q 1 e Q 2 — Medicina e cirurgia
Q C O — Obstetrícia
Q P — Psiquiatria

A direcção clínica dos quartos particulares é exercida pelos professores das diversas clínicas hospitalares e chefes de serviço.

Serviços complementares de diagnóstico e terapêutica

Chefes de serviços:
Radiologia: Dr. Álvaro da Costa Martins.
Sangue: Dr. Teodoro Fernandes Mendes.
Electrocardiografia: Dr. António José Chorão de Aguiar.
Análises clínicas: Vago.

Serviços farmacêuticos

Director dos serviços farmacêuticos: Vago.
Chefe dos serviços farmacêuticos: Dr.ª Alda Lopes Ramos.
1.ºˢ químicos farmacêuticos:
Maria Elisa Lopes Serra.
Maria Luísa Alves da Veiga Azevedo.

Sep. Anuário Comercial de [illegible], [illegible]

Enfermagem

Enfermeiros gerais:
Alberto da Silva Mourão.
Deolinda dos Anjos Moreira.
Enfermeiros-chefes:
[illegible] Ventura Cardoso,
Adélio Costa,
[illegible] Paiva,
Domingos Carvalho,
Eugénia da Conceição Paiva.
Francisco Cândido da Silva.
Francisco [illegible] Velho.
José Augusto Guimarães dos Reis.
João Maria Pereira dos Santos.
[illegible] Pereira dos Santos.
Manuel Ferraz de Carvalho.
Maria da Conceição Marques dos Santos.
Maria da Conceição da Silva Mourão.
Maria da Luz
Maria da Piedade Madeira da Fonseca.
Maria Pureza Simões Serra.
Maria Vieira Falcão.
Rosinda Nunes Baptista.
Silvério Carvalho.

Escola de Enfermagem do Dr. Ângelo da Fonseca

(Edifício dos Hospitais da Universidade)

Telef. 22133

Administrador: Dr. Mário Miguel Gandara Norton.
Monitor-chefe: Dulce Augusta Magalhães Pinto.
Chefe da secretaria: Naldi Maria Clara Castelo Branco.

Militar

Hospital regional n.º 2

Avenida Jardim Botânico

Telef. 25491

Inspecção-Geral das Actividades Económicas

(Zona de Fiscalização n.º 6)

Avenida Sá da Bandeira, 91

Telefs. 23147 e 24709

Inspector: Armando Lourenço Coelho dos Santos, cap.
Técnico de 3.ª classe: João Rui Pestana Mendes de Almeida.
Adjunto de zona: João Coutinho Vilar.

Inspecção-Geral dos Produtos Agrícolas e Industriais

3.ª Delegação

Rua Augusta, 31

Telef. 22078

Chefe da delegação: Vago.
Regente agrícola de 1.ª classe: Albano Duarte Silva.
Agente técnico de engenharia de 2.ª classe: Manuel da Costa Valente.
Regentes agrícolas de 3.ª classe:
Félix Dias Ramalho.
Serafim Pina de Almeida.
Chefe fiscal: Carlos Sabino de Carvalho.
Agente fiscal de 1.ª classe: Aníbal Pereira Viegas.

Instituto de Assistência à Família

(Delegação)

Rua Dr. Santos Rocha, 42, telef. 24062

Delegada: Alzira Luísa de Praça Costa.

Instituto de Assistência Nacional aos Tuberculosos

(Delegação da Zona Centro)

Avenida Bissaia Barreto

Telefs. 28163 e 28164

Delegado: Dr. José dos Santos Bessa.

Centro de Diagnóstico e Profilaxia da Zona Centro (S. C. G.)

Avenida Bissaia Barreto

Telefs. 28163 e 28164

Director: Dr. José dos Santos Bessa.
1.º assistente: Dr. João Carlos de Moura Marques.
Serviços clínicos:
Radiologista: Dr. Paulo de Albuquerque e Melo de Moura Relvas.
Dr. Manuel Folhadela C. Oliveira.
Dr. Rogério Tavares Pinto.
Assistente vacinador: Dr.ª Maria de Lurdes Madureira.
Serviços técnicos e auxiliares:
2.º ajudante técnico radiologista: Maria Cândida Laranjeiro A. Lopes.
Encarregada de câmara escura de 1.ª classe: Dulce Ireno de O. Leite.
Serviços de enfermagem:
Enfermeira-chefe: Maria Jorge de Lucena S. de Carvalho.
Brigadas móveis:
Médicos:
1.º assistente: Dr. Abílio de Almeida Henriques.
Dr. Elísio Gomes de Matos.
Dr. José Pedro dos Santos.
Dr. Júlio Cardoso.
Dr.ª Maria Célia Judice Serra Cunha.
Dr.ª Maria de Lurdes Flaiho dos Santos Gomes.

Instituto de Assistência Psiquiátrica

Delegação da Zona Centro

Dispensário de Higiene e Profilaxia Mentais

Av. Sá da Bandeira, 85, telef. 23903

Delegado: Dr. Domingos Vaz Pais
Chefe da secretaria: Dr. Alberto Leão Gomes.

Instituto de Coimbra

Rua da Ilha, 1, telef. 24633

Presidente: Doutor Diogo Pacheco de Amorim.
Vice-presidente: Doutor Guilherme Braga da Cruz.
Secretários:
Doutor Arnaldo Miranda Barbosa.
Dr. Francisco Teixeira de Queirós, *Ponte de Lima.*
Dr. João Manuel Bairrão Oleiro.
Doutor José Bayolo Pacheco de Amorim.
Tesoureiro: Dr. João José Lobato Guimarães.

Instituto de Criminologia

Bairro de Santana, telef. 22[illegible]

(Funciona no edifício da cadeia penitenciária)

Director: Prof. Dr. Eduardo Henriques da Silva Correia.
Chefe da 1.ª secção: Dr. Mário Artur da Silva Maldonado.
Adjunta: Dr.ª Maria Rosa Graça de Lemos Crucho de Almeida.
Chefe da 2.ª secção: Dr. António Herculano Gomes de Matos Beja.
Adjunto: Dr. Fernando Andrade Cordeiro de Figueiredo
Secretário: Alfredo Henriques Anião.

Instituto Industrial

Rua [illegible]

Telef. [illegible]

Director: [illegible], eng.
Professores ordinários:
Joaquim Vieira da Fonseca, eng.
Dr. José Carlos Teixeira [illegible]
Octávio António Vieira [illegible] Prazeres, eng.
Director do laboratório de química: [illegible] Vieira de Abreu [illegible]
Professores provisórios:
Dr. Aires [illegible] de Lima
Amândio João Mesquita Gon[illegible] eng.
Dr. António Henriques.
Dr. António Brandão[illegible] Silva.
Dr. António da Costa R[illegible]
António Felgar, eng.
Dr.ª Emília Amélia dos Santos [illegible]
Dr. Fausto Gonçalves Pereira.
Guedes Pinto, eng.
Dr. José Fernando Alves Q[illegible]
Dr. Manuel da Rosa [illegible]
[illegible], eng.ª
Maria Helena de Almeida, eng.ª
Maria Manuela Miranda [illegible]

Instituto de Medicina Legal

Edifício da Faculdade de Medicina

Telef. 23[illegible]

Director: Prof. Dr. Luís Augusto [illegible] Santos.
Chefes de serviço:
Dr. Aires Pedroso de Lima.
Dr. Flávio de Azevedo Osório [illegible] Gouvêa.
Assistentes:
Dr. António Joaquim [illegible]
Dr. Elias da Silva Tavares Dias [illegible]
Dr. José de Oliveira F[illegible]
Dr.ª Maria Teresa [illegible] Costa Bettencourt de Ávila.
Dr. Miguel Marques da [illegible] rata.

Conselho Médico Legal

Presidente: Prof. Dr. Augusto [illegible] Silva Vaz Serra.
Secretário: Prof. Dr. [illegible] Amorim Robalo Cordeiro.
Vogais:
Prof. Dr. Albertino de Barros
Dr. António Henriques de [illegible] Vicente.
Prof. Dr. António Jorge [illegible] Gouveia.
Prof. Dr. [illegible] do Vale Pereira
Prof. Dr. Eduardo Henriques [illegible] Correia.
Prof. Dr. Fernando Pinto C[illegible]
Prof. Dr. Henrique de Oliveira
Prof. Dr. Luís Augusto [illegible]
Prof. Dr. Renato de Azevedo [illegible] Trincão

Instituto Nacional do Trabalho e Previdência

Delegação

Rua Augusta, 37, telef. [illegible]

Delegado: Dr. Guilhermino [illegible]
Subdelegados:
Dr. Amadeu José de Sousa [illegible]
Dr. Manuel António de A[illegible] Azevedo e Vasconcelos

Tribunal do Trabalho

Rua Augusta, 37, 1.º

Telef. 2[illegible]

Juiz: Dr. Manuel Cordeiro de [illegible] Freitas.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
QUDOZE
Comments of AMAUTO-1 on Current Topics of Interest

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The following comments of AMAUTO-1 reflect Cuban thoughts on the Czechoslovaquian situation, internal Spanish politics, and the effects of recent changes in the Spanish Government on the impending trade negotiations between Spain and Cuba.

a. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia has been a disaster; however, criticizing the Soviet action would mean taking sides with the Americans. A friend may be criticized in private but publicly he should be defended. (QUDOZE, 19 November.) The Cubans have to side with the Soviets for military and economic reasons and because, whether right or wrong, they belong to the same ideological camp. Cuba had and still has enormous discrepancies with the Soviet Union, China, and the United States but weighing the differences Cuba is with Communism as opposed to Capitalism. (QUDOZE, 3 November.)

b. AMAUTO-1 was asked by his government to report on the new Spanish Government which Havana calls "Opus Dei". To a visiting Cuban official he admitted that he was at a loss to understand Spanish politics but attempted to define them. It is not true that the Spanish Government is in the hands of the Opus Dei. There are some men in the government who lean toward the Opus Dei but there are others of a very different leaning because they come from the Falangist ranks. These men (the Falangists) may go along with the Opus Dei line because they allow themselves to be "carried by the tide" but they are not of the Opus Dei. (QUDOZE, 19 November.)

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD [illegible]
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami [illegible]

....continued

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 25789

DATE
7 January 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-735296

c. Concerning the impending trade negotiations with Spain, in addition to the economic problem the Cubans are now faced with another impediment which further delays the negotiations: the recent changes in the Spanish government. It is difficult at this time for the Cubans to approach any Spanish official because of the climate of confusion among them. Most Spanish officials have no idea as to whether they will remain in their posts or will be replaced. Therefore, it is futile for the Cubans to press them for action on the negotiations. The most they can do is wait patiently until the situation is normalized. If the negotiations are not held within the 30-day expiration period of the agreement, it is possible that the present agreement can be extended for two months. This would be advantageous to the Cubans because during the first two months of the year they will be able to acquire all the goods they will need for 1970. (QUDOZE, 19 November).

Philip C [illegible]
for Helen B. NOTHDURFT

201-735296

GuTIMID
CSMA - 25713, 5 Dec 1969

Report No. 2061 — 31 October 1969
1 & 2 November 1969

[illegible] (phon).

They agree to meet at the cafeteria de Huertas (phon).

[illegible]. They send kisses through the phone and talk of their great love for each other.

Report No. 2063 — 3 November 1969

FRANCO CALLS ROSENDO CANTO at his house. He's not in. Franco leaves the message that a letter has arrived from Canto's father and he'd like to give it to him.

FRANCO CALLS ANGOSO. Angoso mentions to Franco a letter signed by Curbelo which has been lost. In the letter Curbelo authorized the ticket of an American named COHEN (to go to Cuba).

Report No. 2066 — 3 November 1969

[illegible] CALLS MIMI. He tells Mimi that Nilda (Ruiz) fainted at the Galerias Preciados, but that now she is at home resting.

RUIZ CALLS DR. HERNANDEZ. The doctor is not there. Ruiz talks to the doctor's wife. He says he is a little afraid, because Nilda has had five previous pregnancies and this is the first time she has had any trouble.

Report No. 2067

FRANCO CALLS DR. ROSENDO CANTO. Franco says that Sr. RUIZ wants

---

Nilda calls Espino on 11 November 1969, according to word she has had from Carmen ESPINO, young Guillermo RUIZ is much more contented in Cuba ~~than~~ than he was (GUTIMID - CSMA-25713, 5 Dec. 1969).

FILE:
AMAWTO-1

ACC
A C.

NEW HOUSE MAID ([illegible]) FOR [illegible]'S

Report No. 2146 28, 29, & 30 November 1969

Item 3. SEVE [illegible]. She says that the new house maid is about 50 years old, her hair is dyed and she is very skinny and bossy. SEVE doubts very much that she is going to be able to dominate "these wild [illegible] Ruiz. She says that because of the children Maria's nerves have gone to pieces. She says that the other day [illegible] hit the six year old, and that the child called Fernando "an obscenity". Another one of the little savages told Seve "go to -----", for no reason at all. Seve says that the mother is as bad as the children in this respect. They refer to Hilda as "the chola" and Seve says that evidently Hilda doesn't care whether the children bother the servants or not. Seve says she can't stand neither Hilda nor the children. She then says that Hilda is expecting her sixth child in February.

Report No. 2149 2 December 1969

Item 3. ARISTIDES speaks with CONTRERAS and says: "We are going to have a meeting with the Deputy-Director of the EFE Agency. I know him. First we were going to have the meeting today, but he called me and said he was taking over as the new Director of the EFE Agency today. He continues saying that the meeting will be tomorrow at 730 in the afternoon. Aristides says, "I explained to him that the PRENSA LATINA correspondent in Ecuador was passing through Madrid, and that we would like to see him and exchange impressions with him, and he is going to see us tomorrow at 7:30PM". Contreras asks Aristides for

S E C R E T

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Europe Division
Chief of Station, Santiago

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
AKULE/DBRUMEN/Manuel TELLO Troncoso

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OSMA 25624

1. On 7 or 8 December 1969, Subject, who is the Counselor of the Chilean Embassy in Madrid, invited the Cuban Charge, Guillermo RUIZ Perez to a luncheon to meet the wife (not identified by name) of Senator Salvador ALLENDE who reportedly was passing through Madrid. She arrived on the evening of 7 or 8 December and was to leave (destination unknown) on 14 December. TELLO said that RUIZ should meet ALLENDE's wife. RUIZ commented that in principal he envisioned no problem in meeting the woman, but that he would confirm the invitation on 9 December. TELLO went on to say that he invited a group of people to the luncheon including Alfonso SASTRE and Fernando RIESTRA.

2. Station traces note that Alfonso SASTRE Salvador was born on 20 February 1926 in Madrid, and is a graduate of the University of Madrid in philosophy and letters. He is a writer, anti-US and pro-Castro who participates in all types of activities of the Communist "intellectual" elements. His wife, Genoveva FOREST Tarrat was arrested in May 1962 for participating in demonstrations, refused to pay the fine and remained incarcerated for 20 days. SASTRE visited Havana on a number of occasions and reportedly was called to the Cuban Embassy in Madrid in July 1968 to interview Haydee SANTAMARIA.

3. There are no traces on RIESTRA.

Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR [illegible]
2 - COS/Santiago [illegible]

2-2-

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA 25754	17 December 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER /Dafer [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, Europe Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

Chief of Station, Madrid

TYPIC/AMAUTO/Cancellation of POA's

Reference: DIRECTOR 56464

1. Please cancel all clearances mentioned in Reference. Since AMAUTO-2's separation from AMAUTO-1's household and her immigration to the United States with her husband, AMAUTO-5, we no longer have an operational interest in her. As you know, AMAUTO-3 was used solely as an intermediary for a warm approach to AMAUTO-2. This was accomplished, and we have had no further contact with her. No Station contact was ever made with AMAUTO-4.

2. After the departure of AMAUTO-2 from AMAUTO-1's household, the Station soon learned of her replacement and this information was passed to the QUSEQUIN's. It was decided that the QUSEQUINs would attempt to recruit the new domestic, but for unknown reasons, contact was never made. We believe that there is a new domestic now working in the AMAUTO-1 household, but we have no details on her.

Howard R. Sacoder
Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - WH/Miami

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA 25710

DATE
5 December 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-845516, [illegible]

201-735246

CS copy filed in 201-845515

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Europe Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC/QUDOZE/Juan TORROBA Gomez, Spanish Minister to Cuba

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

On 10 October 1969, Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Cuban Charge in Madrid dictated a letter to the Cuban Foreign Office setting forth his impressions of Juan TORROBA Gomez. These impressions by RUIZ can be interpreted as the preparation of a target study on TORROBA. The following is a verbatim text and translation:

El analisis que se realiza sobre las activadades desarrolladas por el Senor Juan Torroba y su -----, la falta de interes y comprension de parte de ----- nos da un conocimiento directo sobre las actividades de la Embajada de Espana en esa que nos puede ser muy util en nuestras relaciones. Antes de su llegada hemos tratado de ahondar en la personalidad del Senor Torroba y aparte de confirmar la buena opinion que los espanoles tienen sobre su persona, hemos conocido tambien que es hombre debil de caracter y que en esa medida pueda ser influenciado a pesar de su ----- personalidad (o capacidad). El cargo que desempena de sub-Director de Asuntos Consulares es en realidad un cargo de asesor en materias consulares pero sin mando. Es acortado la tesis de ayudarlo en su trabajo y aun llegar al extremo de que algun funcionario como el intimide con el de forma tal que esa debilidad de caracter y propension a la influencia ajena pueda servirnos a nuestros propositos. Es indudable que un ataque al Senor Torroba en el sentido de hacer deficil su tarea traeria como consecuencia inmediata una mayor influencia de aquellos que sin lugar a dudas estan interesados en que se convierta en -----. Por otra parte no consideramos posible que aun en el caso de que su trabajo no sea el mejor pueda hacerse una substitucion de otro funcionario que -----.

(continued)

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WHD
- 2 - C/EUR
- 2 - COS/WH,Miami

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA 25692

DATE
28 November 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

Para poder resolverte el planteamiento que me haces de manejar por esta embajada la salida de los -----, te ruego me aclares el concepto del porque es ha producido un mal entendido. Todo lo que implique esta mas que alusivo a los problemas de Espana con Cuba a traves de esta embajada por supuesto redundara en nuestro beneficio. Un caso claro es la solicitud de la salida de ----- y su manifestacion de qu quizas -----. Pues la Embajada en Cuba ... (volume of radio increases effecting reception.)

TRANSLATION:

The study being made of the activities of Mr. Juan Torroba and his (word indistinct), the lack of understanding and interest on the part of (word indistinct), give us a direct insight into the activities of the Spanish Embassy there (in Cuba) which could be very useful to us in our relations (with the Spaniards). Before his arrival (in Havana) we tried to probe into the personality of Mr. Torroba and, in addition to confirming the good opinion that Spaniards have of him, we learned that he is weak in character and that from this angle he could be influenced despite his (word indistinct) personality. The position he held as Deputy Director of Consular Affairs (in the Spanish Foreign Ministry) was actually that of advisor on consular matters but he exercised no authority. The idea of helping him in his work is apt and could be carried to the point where some officer like himself (of similar category) could intimidate him in such a way that his weakness of character and susceptibility to outside influence would serve our purposes. There is no doubt that an attack against Sr. Torroba in the way of making his task more difficult would bring as an immediate result a greater influence on the part of those who are interested in having him become a (word indistinct). On the other hand we do not consider it possible even in the event that his work should not prove to be the best, that another officer could be substituted that (word or words indistinct).

In order to resolve the question of handling from this Embassy the departure of the (word indistinct), please clarify the reason why there has been a misinterpretation. Everything to the problems of Spain and Cuba through this Embassy will, of course, redound to our benefit. A clear case is the application for departure of (word indistinct) and his statement that perhaps (word or words indistinct) since the Embassy in Cuba...(volume of radio increase affecting reception.)

Howard R. SACODER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG: CARL LINSFORD:cs
NIT: WH/COG/OPS
XT: 7144/1819
ATE: 21 November 1969

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y: 30 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN EUR6 CI/CA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 21 22 00z NOV 69 CITE DIRECTOR 56464

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. OSMW-11585*
B. DIRECTOR 49352**
C. MADRID 8256 (IN 47801)***

1. HQS INFORMED THAT POA'S ON AMAUTO-2,3,4, AND 5 HAVE EXPIRED AND WILL BE CLOSED IF PRQ PART I AND II NOT FORWARDED BY END NOVEMBER. THESE AGENTS MAY NO LONGER PROVIDE ACCESS TO AMAUTO-1 NECESSARY FOR PROPER TARGETTING, BUT VIEW CONTINUING HIGH INTEREST IN AMAUTO-1 AND POSSIBILITIES MENTIONED REF C, REQUEST SOONEST EXPRESSION STATION INTEREST.

2. FILE: 201-845515, 845516, 845517, 845518, 735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENTS: *Detailed continued interest in AMAUTO-1 as a target, described some vulnerabilities, and requested comments on developing approaches.

**Notified field of expiration of POA covering AMAUTO-2 on 11 October 69 and requested expression of continued interest in him.

***Notified Hqs that AMAUTO-2 was being dismissed from household employment with AMAUTO-1 family (he is Cuban Charge Madrid). Also

(CONTINUED...)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 56464

TO PAGE TWO

said that A-2 was available for part-time work with wife of AMAUTO-1 and suggested therefore that Hqs not cancel POA. (Note: All subsequent AMAUTOs are possible access agents.)

DC/WH/COG W.

E/IB/S

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/EUR/FI/CI

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[illegible]		
2	Dick Wheeler		DW
3			
4	Lunsford		CL
5			
6	for AA AUTO file		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

DU-3

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

[illegible]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Chile/Costa Rica/China

REPORT NO. OO-B(L) 322/06021-64

SUBJECT Manuel Tello, Chilean Diplomat/Anti-US, Pro-Communist Sympathies/Expected Prominence if Allende were Elected/Business Interests/Hector Burr, Chilean Consul in San Francisco

DATE DISTR. 15 September 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

X8 all

DATE OF INFO. Dec 63 - Sep 64

PLACE & DATE ACQ. - -/Dec 63 - Sep 64

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, college student.

Source has been successful in a modest building construction operation, and appears to have access to investment funds. He is a new source. His cooperation is by way of a prominent US police official, long a friend of his family.

1. A [US] friend of mine and I first met Manuel Tello, then Chilean Consul General in San Francisco, late in 1963, probably December, at the San Francisco Press Club. At that time, Tello was accompanied by several attractive young women, one of whom was his daughter, Carmen. Tello proved to be a gracious, polished diplomatic type and we all hit it off well together. As a matter of fact, we hit it off so well that Tello visited my friend's home from time to time, managed to interest him in a number of business ventures to be launched in Chile and later in Costa Rica.

2. Tello was quite active in the San Francisco area. Among his official interests were the sponsoring of a Chilean or pro-Chilean youth group, and an attempt to organize a group of businessmen able to finance commercial ventures in Chile. Integral parts of his plans were the Alliance for Progress funding and the recent California-Chile commercial and cultural programs. Ventures were to include the construction of several hundred thousand dwellings in Chile, a commercial fishing venture, to be based at Iquique, establishment of a fish meal plant also at Iquique, and the acquisition of a huge ranch or finca near Puntarenas in Costa Rica. The latter project, however, seemed more personally Tello's, whereas he was to be but one of several other investors in the others.

3. As months went on, suspicions of Tello's motives began to grow. Normal avarice is easily understood, but in the course of visits to my friend's home Tello began to hazard unmistakably anti-American expressions. We were to learn that he was an attorney and had come from an old and wealthy Chilean family, but was something of a black sheep. He spoke of his mother's apologetic references to him as "her Communist son". Tello claimed intimacy with Salvador Allende and made it clear that "when", not "if", Allende was elected president, Tello was to be extremely influential in the new hierarchy. Incidentally, he also stated

S-E-C-R-E-T

3-NO [illegible] U-NO

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC		

[illegible]

CONTROLLED DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless ... in accordance with paragraph 8 of NSCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government ...

DO NOT TYPE ABOVE LINE

DO NOT TYPE ABOVE LINE

emphatically that if by any remote chance Allende were not to win, there would be a revolution in Chile by November 1964. Tello claimed also that he had visited several times with Raúl Castro, and had met Fidel, all within the past year or so. He insisted that the US would recognize Cuba before the end of 1964. Tello said also that he was on good terms with important people in both the Soviet and Chinese Communist governments, and that both nations were anxious to have him as Chile's ambassador, but that he was not especially anxious to go. Another reference to Communist China was the possibility that Chile might have some small cargo ships built there.

1.160

4. Tello's pro-Communist and anti-American feelings were shared with his daughter, Carmen who claimed to have been a youth group leader in the University of Chile. Another daughter, Patricia, I believe her name is, was said to be even more intensely anti-US. Either she or her husband is connected with a Latin American organization, possibly the OAS or Pan-American Union. Another daughter is married to the director of personnel in the Fertica plant in Costa Rica.

5. At times, it was clear that Tello's avarice transcended his concern for the poor. Once when another American suggested that the building of the houses in Chile would give employment to many more Chileans if they avoided use of pre-fab units and pre-cut timbers, etc, Tello was not interested. He wanted to get in, get as much as possible, and get out as soon as possible. At times he referred to plans to live in Europe after he had made a few financial killings.

6. I have details on only one Chilean proposal, this a fish meal operation known as Cachagua. It was formed within the past year with an authorized capital of E850 thousand [approximately US$537,500], about half of which was paid in. The prime investors were said to be Horst Enrique Hageman, Emilio Lennon Martinez, Gaston Pascal Leon, Cristian Casanova Subercaseaux, and Gonzalvo Subercaseaux Canartu. Its main office is in Santiago; its plant in Iquique. Somewhere behind the scenes was Tello.

7. Somehow, in a manner I do not pretend to understand, Tello really wanted an American "front-man" in order to withdraw earnings in excess of what the law permitted. His planning for an American's participation included marriage to his oldest daughter, Carmen, who was later involved in a shooting incident in San Francisco in June 1964, shortly after the departure of her father to his new post in San José, Costa Rica, where he is now Charge d'Affaires.

8. In Costa Rica, Tello seems to have considerable influence also. One of his schemes there is the acquisition of a huge ranch in the Puntarenas area. The property, now self-supporting, lies between the Pan American highway and the Gulf of Nicoya. He plans to develop it both for commercial and residential purposes with the operation of a gambling sanctuary in the to-be-established resort section.

9. Tello's successor as Chile's consular representative in San Francisco is Hector Burr. He appears to have the same anti-US bias as Tello. At the time of the supposedly self-inflicted gun shot wound of Tello's daughter, Carmen, Burr said, "This is an international incident. My government will demand an apology from the United States." It was our guess by this time that Burr was interested only in creating anti-US ill will in Chile so as to enhance the election possibilities of Allende.

- end -

TELLO Troacoco, Manuel

CHILE
Sept. 14, 1955

The Subsecretary for Diplomatic Affairs of the Colombian Foreign Office, Dr. Ricardo Araya, informed an Embassy officer on Sept. 12 that the La Republica article was accurate only insofar as it reported that Ambassador Vargas had returned to Chile. Dr. Anaya said that as far as he was aware Ambassador Vargas had gone to Santiago to make final arrangements for the visit to Chile of the Colombian War College, scheduled for September 14 to 29. The Chilean Embassy states that the Ambassador returned to Santiago accompanied only by his wife. First Secretary Sr. Manuel Tello Troacoco is Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

D-203, Bogota, Sept. 14, 1955 OUOnly

- Tello Troncoso, Manuel

3F

ROUTINE

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -25651

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS OCI FBIS DCS
[illegible] AID USIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET

02 23 30 APR 69

CITE TDCSDB-315/01333-69

DIST 2 APRIL 1969

COUNTRY CUBA/CHILE/FRANCE/SPAIN

DOI 25 MARCH 1969

SUBJECT PROPOSED TRAVEL OF CHILEAN SENATOR SALVADORE ALLENDE TO CUBA

ACQ SPAIN, MADRID (27 MARCH 1969)

FIELD NO. OSM-9523

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "SENSITIVE AND USUALLY RELIABLE."

3F

1. AS OF 25 MARCH 1969 CHILEAN SENATOR SALVADOR ALLENDE INTENDED TO VISIT CUBA ABOUT 5 APRIL FOR HIGH-LEVEL TALKS. (FIELD COMMENT: HIS CUBAN INTERLOCUTORS AND THE SUBJECT OF THE TALKS WERE NOT KNOWN BUT THE LATTER APPARENTLY CONCERNED IN PART ALLENDE'S POLITICAL FUTURE.)

6F

2. PREPARATIONS FOR ALLENDE'S TRIP WERE MADE BY INTERMEDIARIES IN MADRID, INCLUDING COUNSELOR MANUEL TELLO TRONCOSO OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY AND CUBAN CHARGE GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ. CUBAN COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

2 April 69

RICARDO ESPINO MARTINEZ, WHO EXPECTED TO FLY TO HAVANA ON 26 MARCH, WAS TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS THERE. TO AVOID POSSIBLE UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, ALLENDE'S TRAVEL TO CUBA WAS TO BE CAMOUFLAGED BY AN INVITATION TO PARIS TO SPEAK ON 9 APRIL TO THE "FRIENDS OF UNESCO," WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM TO STOP IN CUBA EN ROUTE TO EUROPE.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (ALSO SENT SANTIAGO AND PARIS). CINCSO CINCLANT

Tello, Manuel

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL IN [illegible] PAGE 2/2 CHILE

FONOFF INFORMS TELLO ASSIGNED COSTA RICA ON TDY PENDING ARRIVAL NEW CHILEAN AMBASSADOR. EXPECTED THAT TELLO WILL THEN RETURN HIS POST SAN FRANCISCO. THEY ASSUME HIS PHYSICAL PRESENCE CALIFORNIA AT THIS TIME IS DUE PERSONAL REASONS.

24 June '65

DUNGAN

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C				S
2. WHale				[illegible]
3. Linsford				eS
4.				
5. Ennis		Rec'd 22 May	22 May	E
6. Whalen				
7. Bert				
8. Daryl				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

2 · x ~ Check w/ Chile desk to see who TELLO is. Maybe this finally is our handle into AMAUTO-1.

Don. Maybe a naive trace, but there is some likes tough nut in himself.

w/ [illegible] AMAUTO [illegible] pg 3 [illegible] TELLO [illegible] #-1

FILE TITLE		
TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	~~X~~
	INDEX	
FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)	201-735296	
DATE MICROFILMED		
DOCUMENT DATE	7 Nov 69	
DOCUMENT NUMBER	OSMA 25624	

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Santiago

INFO.

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;
Chief, Europe Division; COS, WH/Miami

FROM

Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT

O AMULE/QUTIMID/PBRUMEN/Manuel TELLO Troncoso

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

On 29 October QUTIMID reported a conversation between Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the Cuban Minister to Spain, and Manuel TELLO Troncoso, identified in the Diplomatic List as Counsellor of the Chilean Embassy, regarding the postponement until 31 October of a meeting they were to have on 29 October. We have no information on the purpose of the meeting. We note that TELLO arrived in Spain in January 1969.

Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
- 2 - COS, Santiago - To out Pouch
- 2 - C/WHD
- 2 - C/EUR
- 2 - COS/WH, Miami - To out Pouch

CS COPY

2 cc sent to F/JB/S

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA 25624	7 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-735296

HMMT-38170-201

Report No. 1970(continued) 7 October 1969
Item: 12

[illegible] the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, Tel-70-05-50. Guillermo RUIZ wants to talk to Raul LEON. Ruiz says, "We had the meeting, that I told you about, today. There was no time to cancel it as your cable didn't arrive on time. Consequently I had to attend. Because I had no concrete instructions, I was limited to listening to their good wishes and to try to arrive at an understanding between us. The Marquise that conducted the meeting was very pleasant and conciliatory. When they started to talk figures, I avoided the issue. Then I said that this meeting would be nothing more than to make contact between us and that at the moment there was nothing more I could do. We agreed to hold another meeting on 17 October, at which time they would like to hear our ideas. I promised nothing, but that I would confirm the meeting by telephone. He (the Marquise?) said that this would give no time to discuss it.
Leon says "Did they say anything about the OLGA affair?" Ruiz says "No, just ideas on other things, but they in no way mentioned the OLGA affair." Raul says "Just ideas in general". Ruiz says, "Just commercial ideas. They wanted to hear the Cuban ideas". Ruiz wants Leon to send him instructions for the next meeting. He wants to know if anyone is coming from Havana to attend the meeting.

NOTE: INFO OBTAINED FROM LITAMIL FOR PERIOD
6 OCT - 24 OCT 1969.

OSMA-24636
7 NOV 1969

Report No. 1984 8 October 1969

HILDA CALLS A.M. Hilda dictates a telex to AM. It is for "Mario GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI in Geneva." The telex says that Dr. Zoilo MARINELLO and three other comrades are leaving on Swiss Air from Madrid at 4:10PM. (s) Ruiz.

Item # 5

HILDA CALLS DR. [illegible] (Medical doctor), Tel-276-77-46. She makes an appointment for Ruiz for today at 7:30.

Report No. 1985

Item # 5

SR. KIRCHOV (phon) CALLS [illegible] from Germany. They speak about films, and Corrales says that Dr. Marinello is arriving in Madrid today. He will try to see Marinello and tell him that Sr. Kirchov's firm (A[illegible]-?) is interested in seeing him.

Report No. 1986 8 October 1969

Report No. 1987 9 October 1969

Item # 4

COMRADE [illegible] RAMOS OF ICAIC CALLS ESTEVEZ. Ramos says he is interested in talking to a person named Joaquin MARTI , because this person has offered to sell Cuba some films. He adds that the only thing they know about MARTI is that he is connected with [illegible] films. Estevez asks Ramos if Cuba is going to take part in the Iberoamericano film festival in October. Ramos has no word on this yet from Cuba. He is going to talk to ERRADI(phon) about it.

Report No. 1937(continued)

Item # 6

A CALL FROM A [illegible] SHOP FOR HILDA. Hilda answers and says that the RUIZ are leaving this afternoon for 15 days and won't be returning till the beginning of next month.

Report No. 1938 9 October 1969

Item # 3

Dr. PERIN CALLS HILDA RUIZ.

Hilda tells the doctor that yesterday she had to take Guillermo(Ruiz) to the doctor. Dr. Perin asks if he is ill. Hilda says not really but he has liver trouble and she is forcing him to go to the doctor.

Item # 4

[illegible] CALLS RUIZ FROM BRUSSELS.

Note.- While Ruiz is waiting for the call he can be heard saying to Horacio "The doctor says my liver is inflamed and that I must take a rest. So, I am going to Lisbon------".

Report No.1939 9 October 1969

Item # 3

CAPTAIN [illegible] CALLS QUESADA in Paris. Q: "Yesterday the delegate was here and I sent [illegible] to talk to him. He said he was going to London to wait for you and from there he is going to "that country/Spain/, and that within a week he was going to return and work with you here in Paris". Q. "I haven't seen him. I said that I would be in Milan, if he should happen to ask you". "We agreed to meet one night, but I had to go to Grenoble and he didn't come."

Item # 8(continued)

tells him that they are leaving for Madrid on Friday (October 17) on Iberia Flight 161. He wants Damian to reserve rooms in Madrid for himself, DOMENECH, AGUILAR and CANDELA.

Report No. 2008 ————— 15 October 1969

Report No. 2009 16 October 1969

Report No. 2010 16 October 1969

Item # 7

RUIZ IS TALKING WITH LEON IN HAVANA. Ruiz tells Leon that he has sent him a cable today telling him he is forwarding a report. He tells Leon also that he has planned another meeting for October 21, and that today he has received confirmation from those who are going to attend. But, now a personal problem has come up with his eldest son, and he would like to return to Havana. He says that he can see those people tomorrow and ask for another postponement of the meeting. He adds that if he goes to Havana that it will give him a better chance to talk to Leon. At first Leon refuses authorization for Ruis to travel. Leon says he wants to discuss it first(he doesn't say with whom). Then he agrees and tells Ruis that he may return to Havana. Ruiz says he is sorry not to be able to keep the meeting but that he will postpone it for Tuesday the twenty-eighth.

Report No. 2011 16 October 1969

Report No. 2012 16 October 1969

Report No. 2019 20 October 1969

Item # 10

[illegible] CALLS [illegible]. He says that he spoke with the Comrade and that it had no kind of importance whether it was 50 or 60 cycles because "that is definite". It is not coupled with anything to tape nor anything like that; it is not like the other one that was co-ordinated and had to go along with the voice. He says that they will send the thing tomorrow and he will be there when it arrives.

Report No. 2020 19 & 20 October 1969

Report No. 2021 20 October 1969

Report No. 2022 21 October 1969

Item # 1

A CALL [illegible] FROM [illegible] TO ROME. Quesada tells Hilda that model [illegible]1750/Alpha Romeo/costs $2,200.00. She says that they will probably go and pick it up. Then she tells Quesada that Ruiz is in Cuba for a week because his mother is sick.

Item # 4

FRANCO CALLS SR. [illegible]. He says that Minister Domenech and the group are staying at the Hotel Gaya until they leave by Iberia (on the next available flight) for Cuba. He says they came in over the road via Irun.

Report No. 2023 21 October 1969

Report No. 2024 21 October 1969

Report No. 2025 21 October 1969

Item # 3

HILDA CALLS [illegible] (Note: Hilda has called many hotels in Vegetable Biology and Agriculture in [illegible], Spain, between 3 and 29 November. Franco says that Cuba is sending an agronomist engineer named Teodoro LOPEZ Betancourt.

Report No. 2035 24 October 1969

Item # 1

HILDA CALLS ESPINO. She tells Espino that Ruiz' mother is still ill. He wants to know if Ruiz will return on Tuesday in spite of that. Hilda says she doesn't know.

Item # 2

PAYRET CALLS [illegible] FROM STOCKHOLM. Payret tells him that the courier [illegible] will arrive today in Madrid on Flight 771 from Copenhagen and to please meet him at the airport.

FILE: [illegible]

Report No. 2060 31 October 1969
1 & 2 November 1969

Item # 4

RUIZ CALLS TERCEIRO AT IBERPLAN (phon).

They greet one another very cordially, and Ruiz thanks him for sending the list. Terceiro asks how things were in Havana. Ruiz says fine in every sense, and adds "they are in the ten million ton harvest, now more than ever, as we are hitting the 'cyclamates' where it hurts". Terceiro asks " if you people paid for the campaign or not?" Ruiz says no, that luckily it was the American Department of Agriculture. He adds, "We have calculated that it will leave us, free, approximately one million tons of sugar. The price of sugar has reacted very well, and now a Sugar Conference is to be held in Geneva. You know we are going to get out propaganda now that will state "Only Cuban sugar does not cause cancer". Terceiro laughs, and says "some other problem yes, but not cancer." Ruiz says that the campaign has come at a perfect time for them because they have been struggling for years with the [Illegible; artificial sweeteners?], especially in Japan, as they represent approximately one-half million tons. Japan was the country that used it most.

Terceiro says that he has begun to study the famous issue of the Chamber of Commerce. RAMON greets Ruiz and says that he would like to take a book to him and also to talk to him about a personal matter. It is in reference to a recommendation made by Ramon's father for some people in Cuba that are interested in going to Spain. Ramon continues, and says

Item # 4 (continued)

that he is going to Mexico and Venezuela in December and if he can combine it he would like to go to Cuba also. He says, "It will be the moment for IBERPLAN to become familiar with Cuban reality once and for all". Ruiz says he can see him next week.

Item #5

A PERSON (MALE CALLS and asks for "contact". Nilda says she does not understand his language. The man asks that if it is the Cuban Embassy, to please put him in "contact". Nilda says--4252. Ruiz talks to the man and says "Look, don't be a fool nor so idiotic we have grown up; we now have ten years of revolution, and we are not likely to fall into the kind of provocation that you are trying to do. You can tell that to whoever gives you orders or whoever is recording this conversation." The man asks Ruiz who he wants him to tell that to. Ruiz answers "Don't bother me any more. Tell it to the CIA or whoever gives you order, because probably it is the CIA or some other person. The one that gives you orders. Moreover, if you are tapeing this, so am I. I was waiting for your call. You just called a few minutes ago, so don't be an idiot." The man then says, "You think that the CIA gives me orders". Ruiz answers, "Most likely it is the CIA that gives you orders as the only enemy that Cuba has is the CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency,don't be a fool." The man says, "You are very intelligent", and Ruiz answers, "It is not a question of intelligence. It is simply that in ten years we have learned something." The man then says, "Ten years,eh", and Ruiz answers "Ten years of revolution, ten years with guns in our hands." Then the man says, "In this moment do you have a gun in your hand." Ruiz answers, "Yes, we have a gun in our hands. We are always waiting for the CIA; morning, noon, and night, always with guns in our hands." The man: "If you think I am under orders of the CIA you are a little silly." Ruiz answers "Look, I don't want to continue this conversation. You are a fool. I,too, am playing the part of a fool, because the telephone in my embassy is completely intercepted, I imagine. Everyone is listening to us, so you are an idiot, and I am silly to talk to you. Therefore, goodbye sir, and please don't bother me again." Ruiz hangs up.

PEGGY CHECKING
IN QWPXL-1 201
FOR FOLLOW-UP
[illegible] ON THIS
AS PROMISED PARA
2,

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, DDP, ADDP, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, SOD 6, FI 3, FI/D, IW

ACTION NO. 944

S E C R E T 301755Z OCT 69 CITE MADRID 9902 MADE SUSPENSE WH CDO

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY 30 OCT 69 IN 76461

TYPIC QUAXE QUTIMID

1. ON ARRIVAL IN MADRID 28 OCT FROM HAVANA, THE SPANISH CONSUL GENERAL, JOAQUIN (THOMAS) GARCIA, TOLD QUAXE-1 THAT AN UNIDENTIFIED INRA OFFICIAL WAS ASSASSINATED AROUND 20 OCT. DURING SAME WEEK THOMAS' CHAUFFEUR WAS IN VICINITY HOTEL CAPRI WHICH NEAR MININT BUILDING, AND HEARD SHOOTING. ONE OR MORE SHOTS STRUCK CONSUL'S CAR (CONSUL WAS NOT WITH CHAUFFEUR). CHAUFFEUR WAS NOT INJURED. ONE OF "REVOLUTIONARIES" APPROACHED CONSUL'S CAR AND CHAUFFEUR WAS THREATENED BY REVOLUTIONARY WHO WAS CARRYING SUB MACHINE GUN. REV SAID HE HAD JUST KILLED ONE PERSON AND DEMANDED BE DRIVEN OUT OF AREA. CHAUFFEUR DROVE INDIVIDUAL TO OUTSKIRTS OF CITY AND RETURNED TO SPANISH EMBASSY. THOMAS SAID THAT IN RECENT WEEKS SUCH EVENTS HAPPENING WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY.

2. ABOVE IS INTERIM REPORT. THOMAS PROMISED GIVE DETAILS TO QUAXE-1 BEFORE RETURNING HAVANA.

3. THOMAS HAD CONVERSATION WITH AMAUTO-1 ON FLIGHT TO MADRID DURING WHICH AMAUTO-1 REPORTEDLY SAID THAT REASON FOR

File: 201-735296
30 Oct 69

CS COPY
SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

3 06 PM '69

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. [illegible]ARDED

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 9902 SECRET

HIS QUICK VISIT TO CUBA WAS TO DISCUSS COMMERCIAL MATTERS BETWEEN CUBA AND SPAIN WHICH HAVE REACHED CRITICAL STAGE. (STATION PROCESSING LENGTHY CONVERSATION BY AMAUTO-1 RECEIVED ON QUDOZE RELATING TO PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH SPANISH ON COMMERCIAL MATTERS. WILL POUCH INTEL REPORT ASAP.)

4. ACCORDING TO QUTIMID, AMAUTO-1 HAD TO VISIT HAVANA RPIMARILY TO SETTLE LEGAL DIFFICULTY IN WHICH SON INVOLVED. HOWEVER OF APPARENTLY EQUAL IMPORTANCE WAS TO CONSULT WITH JOAQUIN ALVAREZ REMENTOL AND OTHER MINCEX OFFICIALS ON FORTHCOMING SPANISH-CUBAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS CURRENT CUBAN CONTRACTS WITH SPANISH FIRMS. AIR MANIFESTS CONFIRM AMAUTO-1 DEPARTURE FOR HAVANA 20 OCTOBER AND RETURN 28 OCTOBER.

5. FILE 201-735296 AND 65-2-10/9.

SECRET

SECRET

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Madrid

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

TYPIC/QUDOZE/AMAUTO/QUDOZE Transcripts

ACTION REQUIRED: See Below

REFERENCES : A. UFAW-619, 14 October 1969
B. OSMA-25538, 17 October 1969

1. The AMEDITS have just completed the QUDOZE transcripts for the period 19 September - 13 October 1969. This was the second group of transcripts forwarded the AMEDITS for translation, per our trial period as mentioned in reference A, in order to make them more fully useful to different components at Headquarters. The take from the QUDOZE operation appears very interesting. We noted with interest that AMAUTO-1 discusses freely with his subordinates and privileged visitors subjects of a confidential nature, including matters that have to do with intelligence activities. Some of the discussions offer a number of operational leads which we can follow-up, such as the medical information given on 22 September 1969 in the morning hours.

2. The AMEDITS have suggested that as an aid to help them translate accurately and possibly more rapidly, they would appreciate receiving some original tapes in addition to the transcripts on a trial basis. Then when parts of the transcripts are not understandable to the translator he would have readily available reference for replay.

3. With the next transmittal of the next QUDOZE material, we would appreciate receiving both the transcripts prepared by the station and the actual tapes covering the same period of time. The complete package can then be forwarded to the AMEDITS for their use as mentioned above.

TERENCE A. MILENBACH

HENRY K. PURTIN

Distribution:
3 - COS, Madrid

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
X-Ref 201-735296	OSMW- 11629	
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-6-114/2

Distribution:

1 - E/IB/S
1 - WH/COG/OPS
(Chrono)
~~2 - RID~~
1 - Originator

WH/COG/OPS C.Lunsford:cs 7144

COORDINATING

	DATE	
C/WH/COG		James E. Flannery

RELEASING

C/[illegible] Frederick A. Allner, Jr.

53

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/

WEAVER VAL EN-129
RID/AN GA 50
EXT. 4239 TUBE GT-7

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		4 NOV 1969		5
2. Ennis		4/20 NOV		E
3. Wheeler		18 NOV.		
Lunsford				CL
WH/COG/RR				
5. C/COG/RR			5 Dec	RH
6.				
7.				
8. RID/AN/[illegible]				VW
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS.

[illegible] [illegible] ON
☐ [illegible] Records Officer
Stamp and Signature
Required
Route to [illegible] for [illegible]
☐ Classify to
ICS File No. [illegible]
Route to [illegible], AN GA-50
for final processing

COPY OF TRANSLATION SENT WH/RR, WH/SIPP AND SB/C DESK.

PLS CLASSIFY INTO RUIZ 201 FILE.

VW

04808

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 29 OCT 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER OSMA 25605

FORM 1-63 610c USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

1401

14-00000

ATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, EUR; COS, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
0 TYPIC/QUDOZE
Mexican Journalist's Comments on Czechoslovakia

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI Only

Attached is an extract from a transcript of 16 October 1969 concerning a conversation held between a female Mexican journalist from the magazine "Siempre" and the Charge d'Affaires of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, Guillermo Orestes RUIZ Perez (201-735296).

Perry D. WACHAL

Attachment:
As stated, herewith

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City, w/att, h/w
2 - C/WHD, w/att, h/w
2 - C/EUR, wo/att
2 - COS, WH/Miami, w/att, h/w

CS COPY

2cc. sent to E/IB/S w/att
[illegible]

201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 25605

DATE
29 October 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
~~65-6-40/3~~

They had told him that someone was waiting to see him, and now a girl comes in: RUIZ was expecting her. He greets her. She is a correspondent of *Siempre*, the Mexican magazine, and Ruiz has arranged an interview for her with Mrs. [illegible] or TALMES(ph). This girl asks if she told him that she was going to Cuba. No, replies Ruiz, all she did was to send her "background". He asks her if she is carrying her magazine credentials. She always does, she says.

Ruiz tells her what she must talk about at the interview, about politics in Spain and its relations with the United States.- She must have her questions prepared before-hand, and even the possible replies. She must order them carefully as if they were unimportant, but with a socialist sense.

Ruiz explains to this girl that what is of interest is Spain, the superstructure, the railroads, the banks, the national organizations, but not the fundamental things, yet well tied up, all the way to the bone. He says that people here are soccer fans, but later you can ask, "What do you think about a socialist regime in Spain?" The thing is to stop people in the street, one at a time.

You must take into account that Paco is considered one of the most brilliant politicians of all times. He is sagacious, intelligent. If communism had triumphed here it would have been the first communist country in the world, and yet neither communism nor socialism has anything to do here while Franco is in.

The girl came from Czechoslovakia, and she talks about that country and of Poland, where she has not been, but they have told her a lot about it. She depicts life in Czechoslovakia as extremely sad. She had been there in 1963. She comments that what they did last year in Czechoslovakia was to set the country back tremendously, because that was the first time that people had taken an interest in national affairs. Society was so rotten that people rebelled, but the invasion caused such a great shock that people sunk into a state of apathy from which they are not coming out. They are heading for a crisis that not even the Soviets will be able to stand. People have no interest in their work. Machinery is far behind. The scale of wages is disastrous. The only people that make money are the physicians and the nurses, who charge for a visit the equivalent of a worker's monthly salary. Besides there is tremendous corruption. And so the wage scale, the old machinery, and the corruption make life unbearable. It must be taken into account that they crushed 200,000 persons and that 35,000 Party members are in jail under suspicion. Before, people stood in line to join the Party; now they tear up their Party cards in the street. Disillusionment is enormous. Marxism as conceived by Lenin or Marx is no longer applicable: it must be brought up to date and placed in the current scale of technological evolution and world production. No one in Czechoslovakia wants to go to the USSR. Everybody, especially the students, wants to leave for Austria or Germany. The black market is up to date. The definition is very sad.

Fidel's latest speech, published by Prensa Latina, was distributed through the Embassy, but they got hold of the copies and destroyed them. They say that leftist publications praise whatever they want or whatever interests them, and Fidel's speech was of no interest to them, since they did not analyze it thoroughly.

She says that there is a latent revolutionary sentiment throughout Europe. At the Sorbonne there are some powerful centers where they compare the performance of the Chinese and Asiatic outbreaks more than they do the Soviet ones.

This correspondent says that when she gets to Cuba she is going to visit FIDEL, because there is a trend of distrust of Cubans throughout Europe, because they think that they receive information only through one channel.

Upon hearing these somewhat anti-Soviet remarks on the part of the correspondent, Ruiz interrupts her and says they have to be on the side of the Soviets for two reasons: first from the military and economic point of view, and also because right or wrong they are on the same side of the fence and must fight against those on the other side. Cuba has had, and still has, great discrepancies with Russia, China, and the United States. In the face of all these discrepancies we are on the side of communism because we are against capitalism.

Ruiz says that in order to find out if you are a communist you must ask yourself if you agree with distribution of wealth and land, equitable distribution of production, respect for man, nationalization of industry. This is what counts.

At the end this girl says that the only truth is that unfortunately we Cubans cannot live in peace in any socialist country. Men like FIDEL and CHE, in a country of seven million people, going against the whole world all by themselves. You should see the treatment Fidel gets from the intellectual magazines in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

Ruiz calls HILDA and tells her that this woman comrade is going to interview Mrs. TAMAMES or TAMAYO (ph) and asks Hilda what her personal opinion is about [the lady]. She says she has only seen her three or four times, and [asks] in what sense he means. Ruiz says that this woman comrade is from the

Mexican magazine, Siempre. Nilda tells him that this lady is very superficial and fickle. She is from Havana. The correspondent wants to know what opinion [they have] of her husband. They say he is "un poco mosca" [somewhat of a fly].

Then this correspondent wants to know the address of either a Mexican or the Mexican consulate. Ruiz says that if it is to exchange her Madrid-Mexico ticket for a Madrid-Cuba one, go by Fuencarral 45, and AMOSSO, a Spaniard, or PACHECO, a Cuban, will make the change for her. It seems she wants to leave on Monday. She wants them to take care of her Mexican visa because she says that if she goes it will not be timely, after what happened with Humberto CARRILLO. She says that OLIVARES is now in charge. She is going to Cuba now and will go to Mexico in 15 days.

Nilda comes in and gives her the home telephone number of the lady she is going to interview: 226-86-96.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, Mexico City		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division Chief, EUR; COS, WH/Miami		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Madrid		MICROFILM
SUBJECT 0 TYPIC/[illegible] Mexican Journalist's Comments on Czechoslovakia		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI Only

Attached is an extract from a transcript of 16 October 1969 concerning a conversation held between a female Mexican journalist from the magazine "Siempre" and the Charge d'Affaires of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, Guillermo Orestes RUIZ Perez (201-735236).

Perry D. WACHAL

Attachment:
As stated, herewith

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City, w/att, h/w
2 - C/WHD, w/att, h/w
2 - C/EUR, wo/att
2 - COS, WH/Miami, w/att, h/w

CS COPY

Rec. sent to E/IB/S w/att.
LA/A

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OMMA - 25005	DATE 20 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~[illegible]~~

They [illegible] told him that [illegible] [illegible] and now a girl [illegible] in. RUIZ was expecting her. He greets her. She is a correspondent of Siempre, the Mexican magazine, and Ruiz has arranged an interview for her with Mrs. [illegible] or [illegible](ph). This girl asks if she told him that she was going to Cuba. He, replies Ruiz, all she did was to send her "background". He asks her if she is carrying her magazine credentials. She always does, she says.

Ruiz tells her that she must talk about at the interview, about politics in Spain and its relations with the United States. She must have her questions prepared beforehand, and even the possible replies. She must deal with them carefully as if they were unimportant, but with a socialist sense.

Ruiz explains to this girl that what is of interest is Spain, the superstructure, the railroads, the banks, the national organizations, but not the fundamental things, yet well tied up, all the way to the base. He says that people here are soccer fans, but later you can ask, "What do you think about a socialist regime in Spain?" The thing is to stop people in the street, one at a time.

You must take into account that Paco is considered one of the most brilliant politicians of all times. He is sagacious, intelligent. If communism had triumphed here it would have been the first communist country in the world, and yet neither communism nor socialism has anything to do here while Franco is in.

The girl came from Czechoslovakia, and she talks about that country and of Poland, where she has not been, but they have told her a lot about it. She depicts life in Czechoslovakia as extremely sad. She had been there in 1963. She comments that what they did last year in Czechoslovakia was to set the country back tremendously, because this was the first time that people had taken an interest in national affairs. Society was so rotten that people rebelled, but the invasion caused such a great shock that people sunk into a state of apathy from which they are not coming out. They are heading for a crisis that not even the Soviets will be able to stand. People have no interest in their work. Machinery is far behind. The scale of wages is disastrous. The only people that make money are the physicians and the nurses, who charge for a visit the equivalent of a worker's monthly salary. Besides there is tremendous corruption. And so the wage scale, the old machinery, and the corruption make life unbearable. It must be taken into account that they crushed 200,000 persons and that 35,000 Party members are in jail under suspicion. Before, people stood in line to join the Party; now they tear up their Party cards in the street. Disillusionment is enormous. Marxism as conceived by Lenin and Marx is no longer applicable; it must be brought up to date and placed in the current scale of technological evolution and world production. No one in Czechoslovakia wants to go to the USSR. Everybody, especially the students, wants to leave for Austria or Germany. The black market is up to date. The definition is very sad.

Fidel's latest speech, published by _Prensa Latina_, was distributed through the Embassy, but they got hold of the copies and destroyed them. They say that leftist publications praise whatever they want or whatever interests them, and Fidel's speech was of no interest to them, since they did not analyze it thoroughly.

She says that there is a latent revolutionary sentiment throughout Europe. At the Sorbonne there are some powerful centers where they compare the performance of the Chinese and Asiatic outbreaks more than they do the Soviet ones.

This correspondent says that when she gets to Cuba she is going to visit FIDEL, because there is a trend of distrust of Cubans throughout Europe, because they think that they receive information only through one channel.

Upon hearing these somewhat anti-Soviet remarks on the part of the correspondent, Ruiz interrupts her and says they have to be on the side of the Soviets for two reasons: first from the military and economic point of view, and also because right or wrong they are on the same side of the fence and must fight against those on the other side. Cuba has had, and still has, great discrepancies with Russia, China, and the United States. In the face of all these discrepancies we are on the side of communism because we are against capitalism.

Ruiz says that in order to find out if you are a communist you must ask yourself if you agree with distribution of wealth and land, equitable distribution of production, respect for man, nationalization of industry. This is what counts.

At the end this girl says that the only truth is that unfortunately we Cubans cannot live in peace in any socialist country. Men like FIDEL and CHE, in a country of seven million people, going against the whole world all by themselves. You should see the treatment Fidel gets from the intellectual magazines in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

Ruiz calls HILDA and tells her that this woman comrade is going to interview Mrs. TAMAMES or TAMAYO (ph) and asks Hilda what her personal opinion is about [the lady]. She says she has only seen her three or four times, and [asks] in what sense he means. Ruiz says that this woman comrade is from the

Mexican magazine, Siempre. Nilda tells him that this lady is very [illegible]. She is from Havana. The correspondent wants to know what opinion [they have] of her husband. They say he is "un poco mosca" [somewhat of a fly].

Then this correspondent wants to know the address of either a Mexican or the Mexican consulate. Ruiz says that if it is to exchange her Madrid-Mexico ticket for a Madrid-Cuba one, go by Fuencarral 45, and ALONSO, a Spaniard, or PACHECO, a Cuban, will make the change for her. It seems she wants to leave on Monday. She wants them to take care of her Mexican visa because she says that if she goes it will not be timely, after what happened with Humberto CARRILLO. She says that OLIVARES is now in charge. She is going to Cuba now and will go to Mexico in 15 days.

Nilda comes in and gives her the home telephone number of the lady she is going to interview: 226-86-96.

24820

100

[illegible] que lo hacían [illegible] en la [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ingerencia para [illegible] régimen socialista.

[illegible] los ferrocarriles, la Iglesia, [illegible] [illegible] políticos más brillantes de todos los tiempos. [illegible] ni el comunismo ni el socialismo vienen más que hacer [illegible].

Tras Michel viene de Checoslovaquia y habla de aquella nación [illegible] Polonia a la que había visitado [illegible] habla mucho de ella. [illegible] Checoslovaquia [illegible] la vida [illegible]. Ella había estado el año 19[illegible]. [illegible] Checoslovaquia [illegible] la gente no tiene interés por el trabajo, la maquinaria está [illegible] [illegible] Checoslovaquia [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

Good reading on Ruiz

[illegible]

[illegible]

b

d

[illegible]

CS COPY

H/W att to OSMA-25605

201-735296

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Carl Lunsford
WH/COG/OPS

EXTENSION: 7144

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/WH/COG/OPS			5	
2.				
3. C/WH/COG	[illegible]			
4.				
5. C/E/IB	6/10			
6.				
7. ~~C/EUR/IB~~				
8.				
9. RID/D&P				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Madrid

INFO
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
0 TYPIC/AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. MADRID 9655
B. DIRECTOR 40647
C. OSMA 24212
D. OSMA 24112

ACTION : See paragraph 5, below

1. Headquarters maintains its high interest in AMAUTO-1 as a long-range, in-place recruitment target. Much of this interest is kept alive by the excellent operational reporting done by Station Madrid over the past year, of which references C and D hereto are good examples.

2. Subject's position and total personality recommend him to us as a high-potential target. He is strongly intellectual and emotionally committed to an ideal. At the same time, he exhibts certain vulnerabilities which could be exploited. We believe, however, that AMAUTO-1 could be approached only in a classic sense: a rationally developed, long-range recruitment culminating in what would be essentially an intellectual and even ideological pitch. This course of action would take time and assets, but we think he would be eminently worth it.

3. First, his access not only is good now but seems destined to improve. Secondly, if he were our agent, he has the wit and the acuity to know what we want and submit information accurately based on requirements. Lastly, he is a strong personality who could be counted on to move flexibly but effectively within the target milieu.

Distribution:
  2 - COS, Madrid
  1 - COS, WH/Miami

CS C...

(Continued)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMW - 11585

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE
7 OCT 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-735296

2 October 1969

Distribution:

1 - E/IB
1 - WH/COG/OPS
  (Chrono)
1 - WH/COG

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/COG/OPS
OFFICER: C. Lunsford
TYPIST: cs
EXT: 7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG		David A. Phillips
~~E/IB~~		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: C/EUR/IB
DATE: Oct 6, 1969
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: Frederick A. Allner, Jr.

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

4. As a recruitment target, however, AMAUTO-1 seems to present serious difficulties. He is strong-minded, opinionated, idealistic, and apparently committed to the revolution. On the other hand, there are certain things about him which could be converted into recruitment vulnerabilities. First among these is his apparent belief that the regime (read: the Revolution) is not making the best use of his talents. One cannot tell precisely whether this is the cause or result of his apparent basic emotional instability. During public appearances he displays polished manners and a pro-regime attitude; in private he frequently complains to his subordiantes that he did not ask for a diplomatic position, that he would prefer an industrial job, and that he believes his position to be more a handicap than a promotion. Secondly, he obviously desires personal prestige and luxurious living. While these traits do not mean so much in the case of a Cuban as compared to a Soviet or Chinese, hardships and economic mismanagement in Cuba do in fact create a contrast with his basic impulses. Thirdly, his spinal ailment has been diagonsed as incurable. While this may be true, he should realize that further examination by other medical men (while on a training mission in WOLADY, perhaps) could help him considerably. There may even be other vulnerabilities which further target study could expose.

5. We present these thoughts at the same time that we are fully aware of other operational pressures on Madrid's time and assets. Nevertheless, we would appreciate the Station's comments on further development of AMAUTO-1 as an in-place recruitment target. The first need would be the proper access agent, someone with a Jesuit-like intellectual training who can deal with him in the realm of concepts and philosophy as required. In any case, we would like continued target reporting on AMAUTO-1, as your time permits.

Terence A. MILENBACH

Henry K. PURTIN

201-735296

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/~~AN:~~ SD

FROM:

RID/SD

PROPER FILE NO.

Bettie

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/Reg		8 OCT 1969	8 OCT 1969	[illegible]
2. WH/C/ops		8 OCT 1969		S
3. [illegible]				
4. [illegible]		9 Oct		[illegible]
5. [illegible]				[illegible]
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. ~~RID/PI~~				

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION I ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

4-5: This [illegible] indeed [illegible] in jumping to conclusions. However, AMAUTO-1 is still a good target. Pls check the other mentioned leads i.e., to give them results of the check.

TRACING COMPLETE 9/10/69

RYBAT

FILE AMAUTO-1

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 10 '69

DOCUMENT NUMBER USMA 25530

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SEC

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid PCR

SUBJECT
RYBAT/TYPIC/QUTIMID/AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

1. On 23 September 1969 AMAUTO-1 called an unidentified Spanish woman who resided in Cuba for many years before returning to Spain. AMAUTO-1 noted that he visited the Spanish woman's cousin, identified as Esther CORRIPIO, while he vacationed in PBRUMEN and found everyone in good health. The unidentified Spanish woman asked AMAUTO-1 if there was much food available and the following dialogue began:

AMAUTO-1:	Yes, everything is being resolved. But imagine to be free, one must pay a high price and the price must be paid. There is no other way.
WOMAN:	What one wants, one must pay.
AMAUTO-1:	It is very logical, but look, when one is a servant to the rich, the servant usually lives relatively well, but the servant continues as a servant. However, when one no longer wants to be a servant to the rich, one has to begin saving and the only way there is for the poor to save is to reduce (the intake) of essential foods, change the essential and begin to buy machines and to buy a series of things (cuestiones) and one day, we will become rich together. We can say we are rich when we have resolved all the problems, not only material problems, but spiritual, cultural, that is, when everyone can do and believe as he likes.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami

....continued

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 25530

DATE
1 October 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 201-735296

WOMAN:	Oh! I don't do anything but talk of Cuba and I adore the country. I have a brother there who is a nurse and he says he is fine.
AMAUTO-1:	Cuba gets into your blood. When I saw Esther she was a little thin, but was in good health.

2. We think the above is another good example of AMAUTO-1's passion for the good life. While he appears patriotic and openly supports the regime, we continue to believe that he would prefer a return to the relative freedoms enjoyed by his countrymen before the start of the revolution.

Howard R. Sacoder
Howard R. SACODER

14-00000

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. NOV 69.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

BID/
WEAVER VAL EN-129
RID/AN GA 50
EXT. 4239 TUBE GT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Ali

2-3: Check w/ Chile desk to see who TELLO is. Maybe this finally is our handle into AMAUTO-1.
Dan. Maybe a name trace, but [illegible] seems like a tough nut in himself.

Copy for AMAUTO
C.h. Pls put all. info on TELLO in A-1 file here.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		April 24 1969		S
2. Whaler				[illegible]
3. Lindsford				[illegible]
4.				
5. Ennis		Rec'd 22 May	22 May	E
6. Wheeler			5 Jan	[illegible]
7. Best		22 May	25 May	[illegible]
8. Daryl				[illegible]
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 7 Nov 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER OSMA 25624

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

04827

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Santiago

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;
Chief, Europe Division; COS, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
AKULE/QUTIMID/PBRUMEN/Manuel TELLO Troncoso

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

On 29 October QUTIMID reported a conversation between Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the Cuban Minister to Spain, and Manuel TELLO Troncoso, identified in the Diplomatic List as Counsellor of the Chilean Embassy, regarding the postponement until 31 October of a meeting they were to have on 29 October. We have no information on the purpose of the meeting. We note that TELLO arrived in Spain in January 1969.

Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
2 - COS, Santiago - To cct Pouch
~~2~~ - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS/WH, Miami - To cct Pouch

CS COPY

3 cc [illegible] to F/IS/S

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA 25624	7 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

TO COL. ROSS

03

FROM: [ISENSTEAD, DAD]

27, 10

1. HAVE JUST RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM [CAS, LONDON:] "INFO RE MRS. SLOBODA DEPARTURE FOR MOSCOW TO DATE IS ONLY FROM HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCE WHICH MUST NOT BE ENDANGERED. 27,10 [CAS LONDON] WILL CABLE OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE WHEN OTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM LESS SENSITIVE SOURCE WHICH CAN BE USED TO ATTEMPT NEGATE ANY SOVIET PROP PLAY. ESSENTIAL NO ACTION BE TAKEN BY LONDON EMBASSY TO INTERCEDE ON BEHALF TWO SLOBODA CHILDREN WHO AMERICAN CITIZENS UNTIL SUCH INFO AVAILABLE."

2. APPEARS TO ME EMBASSY COULD INTERCEDE ON BEHALF CHILDREN WHO AMERICAN CITIZENS PROVIDED SUCH ACTION NOT BASED ON STATEMENT THAT MRS. SLOBODA INTENTION JOIN HUSBAND IN MOSCOW KNOWN BUT THAT IT APPEARS PROBABLE FROM HER PREVIOUS NONCOOPERATIVE ATTITUDE, AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT MUST SAFEGUARD RIGHTS AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO MINORS.

27,10

3. IN ORDER KEEP [CAS, LONDON] ADVISED RE USAREUR AND DA INTENTIONS WOULD APPRECIATE IF YOU COULD LET ME KNOW PRESENT STATUS.

4/80

National Archives and Records Administration



Kennedy Assassination Collection Full Results

✓

Viewing/Ordering Information

Back to Brief Results | Back to Search | Exit JFK

Hits 1-1 of 1

Not in Box

Hit 1 of 1

AGENCY INFORMATION

```
         AGENCY : CIA
  RECORD NUMBER : 104-10181-10099
 RECORDS SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A
```

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

```
     ORIGINATOR : CIA
           FROM : [No From]
             TO : [No To]
          TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
           DATE : 01/01/0000
          PAGES : 38
  DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
       SUBJECTS : UNIT ID
 CLASSIFICATION :
   RESTRICTIONS : 1B
 CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/21/1998
       COMMENTS : JFK64-17 : F18 : 1998.03.21.10:31:39:436107 : 38 WHITE
                  BANDED PAGES.
```

Audit history for this Record Identification Form

Hits 1-1 of 1

Back to Brief Results | Back to Search | Exit JFK

National Archives and Records Administration
webmaster@nara.gov

G.[illegible]:cf
C/WH/COG/OPS
1325
19 MAY 70

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

S E C R E T 19 22 23Z MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY DO BASE LOS ANGELES INFO ROUTINE WH/MIAMI 035477
MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

1. PLS DETERMINE ASAP PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND OCCUPATION OF MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ, 935 BEACON AVENUE, APARTMENT 10, LOS ANGELES, APPARENTLY NO TELEPHONE. VIGOS WENT LOS ANGELES FROM MIAMI IN EARLY MARCH.

2. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

AZ
AP
ID
BX
RFD
FI

WH COMMENT: Based on Madrid 1131 (IN 085999) request that access agent of WH/Miami be given much information about Subject as possible for sake of approach to Cuban target in Madrid.

AC/EUR/IB/S

C/MID

JOSEPH BULIK
C/DO/I/B1

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

201-735296

CS COPY

19 May 70

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

ON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT: Z

EM BY 41 PER

TION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI2

TION NO. 542

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☒ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRET 191224Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1131 MADR

19MAYIN085999

[illegible]

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 033355

1. WE BELIEVE THAT CHANCE ENCOUNTER WITH AMAUTO-1 ALONE TOO DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE SINCE AMAUTO-1 IS FREQUENTLY IN COMPANY SOMEVONE FROM HIS STAFF OR HAVING LUNCH WITH SPANISH OFFICIALS OR BUSINESSMEN~~T~~. MOREOVER, ENCOUNTER UNDER THIS SITUATION, WE FEEL, WOULD NOT PERMIT RELAXED EXCHANGE BETWEEN SAMKO AND AMAUTO-1. WE WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE:

A. ON ARRIVAL SPAIN VIA AERONAVES DE MEXICO FLIGHT 450 LEAVING MIAMI FRIDAY SAMKO WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO HOTEL OF STATION SELECTION. STATION OFFICER WILL ALSO OCCUPY HOTEL IN ALIAS AND INITIAL CONTACT WITH SAMKO WILL BE MADE IN HOTEL. (INCIDENTALLY, BELIEVE NO NEED PACHANKIS ACCOMPANY SAMKO TO MADRID.)

B. EARLY SUNDAY AFTERNOON SAMKO WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO AMAUTO-1'S PRIVATE RESIDENCE. HIS EXCUSE WILL BE THAT HE WOULD HAVE GONE TO EMBASSY BUT WAS CERTAIN THAT

AN LCC
AB X
IX
VR
BK
DES RFD
PI
WH/C/OPS

CS COPY

SECRET

19 May 70

201-735296

SECRET

PAGE 2 MADRID 1131 S E C R E T

EMBASSY WOULD BE CLOSED. IN ADDITION, SINCE SAMKO SCHEDULED TOUR OF MADRID AND SUBURBS LEAVING EARLY MONDAY MORNING DECIDED MAKE EFFORT CONTACT AMAUTO-1 AT HOME RATHER THAN POSSIBLY MISS OPPORTUNITY TO SEE HIM. (SAMKO WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO SIGN UP FOR TOUR OF CITY TO LEND AUTHENTICITY TO STORY.) SAMKO WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED REPLY TO INEVITABLE QUESTION FROM AMAUTO-1: HOW DID YOU FIND MY ADDRESS? SAMKO'S REPLY WOULD BE THAT HE OBTAINED ADDRESS FROM IBERIA EMPLOYEE AT AIRPORT WHO SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME TRYING TO LOCATE AMAUTO-1 RESIDENCE. (ADDRESS APPEARS IN DIP LIST AVAILABLE OVERTLY.) SAMKO WOULD FURTHER EXPLAIN, IF NECESSARY, THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW EMPLOYEE GOT ADDRESS, BUT KNOWS SHE MADE NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CALLS. WE CANNOT PREDICT AMAUTO-1'S REACTION TO THIS DIRECT APPROACH. HE MIGHT CLAIM PRESS OF BUSINESS OR OTHER COMMITMENTS THEREBY REFUSING SEE SAMKO IN HOME BUT MIGHT SUGGEST THAT SAMKO VISIT EMBASSY MONDAY MORNING. SAMKO SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SAY THAT IF THIS WOULD NOT EMBARRASS AMAUTO-1 HE WOULD GLADLY CANCEL TOUR AND GO. TO USE STANDARD LINE

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY: ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PAGE 3 MADRID 1131 S E C R E T

THAT BECAUSE HE IS AMERICAN HE SHOULD NOT VISIT PBRUMEN EMBASSY, WOULD, WE FEEL, QUICKLY AROUSE AMAUTO-1'S SUSPICION. SAMKO'S APPROACH TO AMAUTO-1 RESIDENCE CAN BE MONITORED FROM HOMES OF TWO STAFFERS WHO LIVE WITHIN EYSHOT OF AMAUTO-1'S RESIDENCE.

C. AMAUTO-1'S PROBABLE SECOND QUESTION: HOW DID SAMKO KNOW HE WAS IN MADRID? REQUIRES MORE THOUGHT AND HELP FROM MIAMI. IDEALLY, SAMKO SHOULD BE ABLE SAY THAT A MUTUAL FRIEND OF BOTH AMAUTO-1 AND SAMKO WERE TOGETHER RECENTLY IN MIAMI AND AMAUTO-1'S NAME MENTIONED. SAMKO ASKED WHAT HAPPENED TO AMAUTO-1 AND FRIEND DISCLOSED THAT AMAUTO-1 NOW "AMBASSADOR" TO SPAIN. (SUBJECT WH/MIAMI (IN 085476) 7595 MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE "FRIEND" WHOSE NAME SAMKO MIGHT USE. STATION SUGGESTS THAT CONTACT BE MADE WITH SUBJECT IN LOS ANGLELES TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE KNOWS WHERE AMAUTO-1 IS. ALSO OBTAIN PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION, OCCUPATION IN LA AND PRIOR JOB IN MIAMI PLUS OTHER NOTABLE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH COULD BE USED AS FILLER BY SAMKO TO SHOW THAT POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN AMAUTO-1'S COUSIN AND SAMKO.) IN ADDITON, SUGGEST

SECRET

201-238296

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

BY ______ AT ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ ☐ FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 MADRID 1131 SECRET

PACHANKIS RE-CONTACT SAMKO TO ASCERTAIN NAMES OF PERSONS IN UNITED STATES WHO KNEW AMAUTO-1 AND FROM WHOM SAMKO OSTENSIBLY MIGHT HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION OF AMAUTO-1'S MADRID ASSIGNMENT. WELCOME OTHER SUGGESTIONS AS REPLY TO ABOVE QUESTION.

2. LINE SAMKO WOULD TAKE AFTER FOOT IN DOOR SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY REHEARSED IN MIAMI BEFORE ARRIVAL MADRID BECAUSE OF OI- ELEMENTA MIAMI SHOULD

CABLE WHAT SPECIFIC

INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN TO SAMKO SO THAT STATION OFFICER COMPLETELY AWARE OF HOW SAMKO IS TO CONDUCT HIMSELF.

3. IN VIEW DESIRE TO INITIATE CONTACT BEFORE AMAUTO-1'S JUNE DEPARTURE SUGGEST CONTACT ABOVE PERSONS ASAP.

4. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

+ Will Svc upon request

TRANSMITTAL
OF
TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** (When Filled In) [illegible]

067

ORIG [illegible]
UNIT WH/COG/RR
EXT [illegible]
DATE 14 MAY 1970

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

CONF [illegible] CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CS/DO,
DO 3, FI 6, FI/D, IW, EUR 5 DCI, [illegible]

TDCS DB-315/02487-70

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DATE DISTRIBUTED 15 MAY 1970

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
OSM-10026/MADR 1069
(IN 079701)
MADR-1100 (IN 082937)
QUSEQUIN/QUDOZE
Liaison: 65*

DISSEMINATION

WHC/RR [illegible]	WH/R 1	E/IB/R 3	PARA 4:	
WHC OPS 3	WH/CA 1	E/MADR 1	QUKETCH/22	
WHC/FI [illegible]	WH/FI 1	WH/MEXI 1		
WHC/CA 1	WH/SAO 1	E/R 1		
WH/MIAMI [illegible]	WH/REG 1			

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS (Place X in appropriate space. List electrical addresses.)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTROLLED DISSEM

CABLE SEC
- RECOMMEND EXO ☒ XXX
- BASIC DOCUMENT NOT MADE AVAILABLE DCI ☒
- RELAY CABLE ATTACHED ☒ MADRID WH/MIAMI
- SHOW IW ☐

IW
- DISSEM ELECTRICALLY ☐ TO: (CORRECTION TAPE USED)

OTHER
- EXCLUSIVE FOR USIB ☐
- USIB PERSONAL ATTN ☐
- ZRWAHOO CABLE SENT XXX AS RELAY
- NOT FOR LIAISON ☐

FILE:
AMAUTO-1

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Robert Hopkins
C/WH/COG/RR

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
E/IB/R

RELEASING OFFICER
Robert H. Rife
C/WH/R

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

COPY NO.

(15-20-44-47)

FORM 5-69 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

IN-079701

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE XXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX

EXO , DOH

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

18 18 00z MAY 70

CITE TDCS DB-315/02487-70

DIST 18 MAY 1970

COUNTRY CUBA/SPAIN

DOI 4-6 MAY 1970

SUBJECT PROTESTS BY CUBAN EMBASSY IN SPAIN OVER ALLEGED ATTACKS ON CUBAN OFFICIALS

ACQ SPAIN, MADRID (EARLY MAY 1970) FIELD NO. OSM 10026

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE; FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS SENSITIVE AND USUALLY RELIABLE.

1. IN EARLY MAY 1970, THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MADRID PREPARED A PROTEST NOTE TO THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY OVER AN INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT THE BARAJAS AIRPORT IN MADRID BETWEEN CUBAN REFUGEES AND CUBAN OFFICIALS, IN WHICH BLOWS WERE EXCHANGED. ACCORDING TO MINISTER GUILLERMO RUIZ, CUBAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, THE EMBASSY WILL CHARGE THAT SIX FUNCTIONARIES AND FOUR DIPLOMATIC COURIERS FROM HAVANA WERE PHYSICALLY ATTACKED ON 4 MAY AT THE AIRPORT BY DISAFFECTED CUBANS, ALL RESIDENTS OF SPAIN. THE NOTE STATED THAT "THIS COWARDLY AND UNJUSTIFIABLE AGGRESSION" ENDANGERED DIPLOMATIC

DOCUMENTS AND COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AN ISOLATED ACT BUT THE CONSEQUENCE OF REPEATED PROVOCATIONS AT BARAJAS. SPANISH AUTHORITIES WERE ASKED TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF THESE INCIDENTS.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO ANOTHER UNTESTED SOURCE WHO WAS AN EYEWITNESS TO THE 4 MAY INCIDENT, THE CROWD INCLUDED 23 MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND A NUMBER OF CUBAN EXPATRIATES MEETING AN IBERIA FLIGHT FROM HAVANA WHICH WAS CARRYING 75 CUBAN OFFICIALS AND 30 CUBAN REFUGEES. MAXIMO TORRES, FORMER MAYOR OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA AND A MAN OF OVER 60 YEARS OF AGE, ADDRESSED ONE OF THE ARRIVING CUBAN OFFICIALS, MISTAKING HIM FOR A REFUGEE. THE OFFICIAL REBUFFED HIM RUDELY AND A GENERAL ARGUMENT ENSUED AND BLOWS WERE EXCHANGED. HORACIO FUENTES MARTINEZ, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY, JUMPED FROM A NEARBY CAR AND PISTOL-WHIPPED ONE OF THE REFUGEES. AFTER THE POLICE ARRIVED, TORRES AND HIS WIFE NEEDED MEDICAL ATTENTION.)

3. ON 6 MAY, ROBERTO FRANCO OLIVA, CUBAN CONSUL IN MADRID, COMPLAINED TO A SPANISH POLICE INSPECTOR CONCERNING THE INCIDENT AT THE AIRPORT AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE SCENE AT THE AIRPORT HAD BEEN PREPARED BY THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) AND "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES." THE INSPECTOR REPLIED TO THIS THAT SPANISH AUTHORITIES WERE

INVESTIGATING AND WOULD GIVE CUBAN OFFICIALS THE PROTECTION IN SPAIN WHICH THEY SHOULD HAVE. HE SAID THAT THREE CUBAN REFUGEES HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND WOULD BE DEPORTED TO FRANCE. FOR THEIR PART, THE REFUGEES HAD SAID THAT HORACIO FUENTES HAD PULLED OUT A GUN DURING THE FIGHT, A CHARGE WHICH FRANCO DENIED AT LENGTH.

B. MANY OTHER ATTACKS HAVE BEEN SUFFERED BY CUBAN OFFICIALS AT THE AIRPORT AND DAMAGE DONE TO THEIR PARKED CARS.

C. WHEN CUBAN SEAMEN ARE ARRESTED BY THE SPANISH POLICE IN THE CANARY ISLANDS THEY ARE INTERROGATED SEPARATELY IN THE POLICE STATION BY AN AGENT OF THE CIA WHO IS A CUBAN "GUSANO" (TURNCOAT).

D. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SPANISH REPUBLICANS AND SPANISH COMMUNISTS IN CUBA, THE SPANISH EMBASSY IN HAVANA IS NEVER MOLESTED.

E. FRANCO IS PREPARED TO ADVISE CUBAN PASSENGERS COMING TO SPAIN TO CARRY RAZORS FOR SELF DEFENSE. CUBAN OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO GO TO THE AIRPORT, SHOULD APPLY FOR LICENSES TO CARRY PISTOLS.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE, CUBAN DIPLOMATS MAY APPLY FOR GUN PERMITS TO THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WOULD PROBABLY RECEIVE PERMISSION. NON-DIPLOMATIC CUBANS MUST APPLY TO THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF

INTERNAL SECURITY (DGS) BUT WOULD PROBABLY NOT RECEIVE PERMISSION. TDCSDB-315/01741-70 REPORTED THAT AS OF 8 APRIL ALL CUBAN COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES WERE CARRYING PISTOLS, AND THAT SOURCES OF KNOWN RELIABILITY HAVE NOTED THAT CUBAN DIPLOMATS ABROAD HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO CARRY A SMALL HAND WEAPON.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE.

(21)

ds

WHD [illegible] [illegible]

439

S E C R E T [illegible] MAY 70 CITE WAVE [illegible] (CHESECKER ACTING) (WMIA)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

IN [illegible] 005470

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF A DIRECTOR [illegible]

B WAVE [illegible] (4081546)

1. AMAUTO-1 [illegible], MANUEL ([illegible]), DEPARTED MIAMI EARLY MARCH FOR LOS ANGELES. PRESENT ADDRESS IS [illegible] AVE., APT 10, LOS ANGELES 90015, NO TELEPHONE. ABOVE FROM RELATIVE OF VIGOS IN MIAMI, [illegible] (GARCIA) [illegible], WHO DOES NOT KNOW AMAUTO-1.

2. AS INDICATED IN REF B, AMOT? DID NOT PREPARE SUMMARY ON AMAUTO-1 FROM VIGOS DEBRIEFING, DUE TO LACK OF INFO. ABOVE ADDRESS FORWARDED IN CASE HQS WISHES TO [illegible].

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

CIA
RB
DC/WH/D
FI
6/4/98

18 May 70

201-735296

CS COPY
SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

(24)

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN EUR6 FI2 CI/OPS CI CI/IC2

ACTION NO. 298

DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 151724Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7570 (NEBECKER ACTING)

WMIM

15 MAY 70 084149

DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 033355

B. UFAA-1978

1. IN MEETING WITH SAMKO ON 14 MAY, PACHANKIS MENTIONED POSSIBLE TRIP TO MADRID AS TOURIST TO HOLD "CHANCE MEETING WITH AMAUTO/1. SMAKO VERY ENTHUSED, FLATTERED HIS GOVERNMENT NEEDED HIM, AND IN POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND FOR OPERATION. NO FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS MADE (EXPECT WE WOULD PAY EXPENSES ON TRIP) AND HE APPEARS TO BE MOTIVATED TO HELP COUNTRY AND OLD FRIEND. AT OUR REQUEST, SAMKO HAS APPLIED FOR NEW PASSPORT. INCIDENTALLY, HIS WIFE PASSED AWAY ON 6 NOVEMBER 1969.

2. WE ARE NOW IN POSITION TO DISPATCH SAMKO. PLS ADVISE WHEN HE IS NEEDED ON AMAUTO/1 APPROACH.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

OK, let's go. Do you think enough caution, "chance," and "non-political" etc. have already been written into this op?

NOT yet.

Amauto-1

SECRET

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

I

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN

SECRET

28

WH8 R/AN, C/OD, FI2, EUR6

927

S E C R E T 121900Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7515 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 030893

1. MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ OF PARA 3 REF IS COUSIN OF AMAUTO-1. HE WAS GIVEN CI DEBRIEFING BY AMOTIN-122 ON 24 FEBRUARY. VIGOS HAS NOT SEEN AMAUTO-1 SINCE 1963, HAS BEEN RECEIVING PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND IS HOMOSEXUAL. DUE TO LACK OF INFO FROM VIGOS, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE REPORT ON AMAUTO-1.

2. WILL HAVE PACHANKIS INTERVIEW FOR ANY POSSIBLE INFO MISSED BY AMOTS AND ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

AB
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~RI~~
~~DES~~ NFD
~~EI~~

CS COPY

201-735296
12 May 70

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER:mdu
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819/7144
DATE: 11 MAY 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 36

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 35/21 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 FILE, VR. R/FW, EUR 6, DDP, ADDP, C/DO, CI, CI/C 2, C/OPS, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 12 21 06 MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO WH/MIAMI INFO MADRID 033355

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 030893 B. UFAA-1978

1. VIEW REF B, HQS SANGUINE ABOUT POSSIBILITIES OF "CHANCE" APPROACH BY SAMKO TO AMAUTO-1. AS REASONABLY WELL OFF RETIRED PERSON, SAMKO COULD NATURALLY GO TO MADRID AS TOURIST. HQS WONDERS WHETHER THIS WOULD HOLD WATER UNLESS WIFE ACCOMPANIED HIM. REQUEST MIAMI INVESTIGATE THIS POINT.

2. APPROACH BY SAMKO WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT LEAD TO RECRUITMENT, BUT WOULD OFFER PERSONAL READING OF AMAUTO-1 BASED ON WHAT APPEARS TO BE WARM ENTREE PROVIDED BY FONDLY-REMEMBERED PAST ASSOCIATION. IF APPROPRIATE, SAMKO COULD PROVIDE LINK TO "OTHER WORLD" IN CASE AMAUTO-1 EVER NEEDED HELP. LATTER SCHEDULED TRAVEL HAVANA IN JUNE 70 AND RETURN MADRID PRIOR POSTING CUBA. JUDGING FROM AMBEDEW-1 AND AMDELAY-1 CASES, BRIEF RETURN TO CUBA MIGHT PROVE TURNING POINT IN ANY DECISION TO DEFECT. THEREFORE, ANY MEETING WITH SAMKO SHOULD BE PRIOR JUNE DEPARTURE.

3. IN EVENT POSSIBLE SAMKO TRAVEL TO MADRID, WE WOULD NEED

AN	UU
AB	X
IN	
PS	
RX	
ED	NFD
FI	

201-735296

C O N T I N U E D . . .

COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

12 May 70
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MAY 20 11 30 AM '70

MAY 14 1 35 PM '70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY_______PER_______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

RECEIVED RID/EDI

CONF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

033353

TO

PAGE TWO

LIST OF PLACES FREQUENTED BY AMAUTO-1 WHERE SAMKO WOULD HAVE CHANCE "BUMP INTO" HIM. IF MADRID HAS OTHER IDEAS, WELCOME ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO.

4. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: Ref A said Hqs willing consider use of SAMKO to approach AMAUTO-1. Ref B gave results of Miami's contacts with SAMKO.

WH

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

EUR/IB

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

James E. Flannery
JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

FORM 3020 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN
1
2
3 ~~[illegible]~~
4 Lunsford
5
6
7
8 file Amauto

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER #

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ MAY 12 ☐ 6 16 PM '70

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ACTION COPY

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO Back to the old BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR R/AN, C/OA, FI2, EUR6 drawing board

ACTION NO. 927

SECRET 121902Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7515 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MADRID

12 MAY [illegible]

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 030893

1. MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ OF PARA 3 REF IS COUSIN OF AMAUTO-1. HE WAS GIVEN CI DEBRIEFING BY AMOTIN-122 ON 24 FEBRUARY. VIGOS HAS NOT SEEN AMAUTO-1 SINCE 1963, HAS BEEN RECEIVING PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND IS HOMOSEXUAL. DUE TO LACK OF INFO FROM VIGOS, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE REPORT ON AMAUTO-1.

2. WILL HAVE PACHANKIS INTERVIEW FOR ANY POSSIBLE INFO MISSED BY AMOTS AND ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

FILE; AMAUTO-1

SECRET

(21)

[redacted]

file

COMPLETED BY
CABLE SECRETARIAT

MAY 18 3 40 PM '70

ACTION COPY

WH8 ☐ FILE, RI ELLU RILAN c. c/ops FI2

439

S E C R E T 18102Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7595 (REBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

IN 005470

REF A DIRECTOR 032693

B WH/MIAMI 7515 (4081546)

1. AMAUTO-1 COUSIN, MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ, DEPARTED MIAMI EARLY MARCH FOR LOS ANGELES. PRESENT ADDRESS IS 335 BEACON AVE., APT 16, LOS ANGELES 90215, NO TELEPHONE. ABOVE FROM RELATIVE OF VIGOS IN MIAMI, MERCEDES (GARCIA) DOBARROS, WHO DOES NOT KNOW AMAUTO-1.

2. AS INDICATED IN REF B, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE SUMMARY ON AMAUTO-1 FROM VIGOS DEBRIEFING, DUE TO LACK OF INFO. ABOVE ADDRESS FORWARDED IN CASE HQS WISHES TO PURSUE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

— Given lack info, suggest only hold in abeyance. What you think?

Answ. no interest.

AMAU10-1

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

201-814891
MADR-01054
08 MAY 70

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
TRAVELING HAVANA MID-JUNE FOR A MEETING
OF AMBASSADORS

UFAOIR

R 70C5190007

FILE IN 201-735296

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation

TO ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN

PROPER FILE NO

FROM:

RID/WEAVER VAL 2B-129
RID/AN GA 50
EXT. 4239 TUBE GT-7

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		24 [illegible]		S
2. Whaler				[illegible]
3. Linsford				eL
4.				
5 Ennis		Rec'd 22 May	22 May	E
6 Wheeler			[illegible]	
7. Best		22 May	23 May	CB
8. Daryl				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Mli

2-3: Check w/ Chile desk & see who TELLO is. Maybe this finally is our handle with AMAUTO-1.

Don. Maybe a name trace, but Manolito seems like a tough nut in himself.

copy for AMAUTO

c.c. pls put att. info on TELLO in 201 file here.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 7 Nov 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER OSMA 25024

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

04827

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Santiago

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;
Chief, Europe Division; COS, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
AKULE/QUTIMID/PBRUMEN/Manuel TELLO Troncoso

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

On 29 October QUTIMID reported a conversation between Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the Cuban Minister to Spain, and Manuel TELLO Troncoso, identified in the Diplomatic List as Counsellor of the Chilean Embassy, regarding the postponement until 31 October of a meeting they were to have on 29 October. We have no information on the purpose of the meeting. We note that TELLO arrived in Spain in January 1969.

Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
- 2 - COS, Santiago — To out Pouch
- ~~2~~ - C/WHD
- 2 - C/EUR
- 2 - COS/WH, Miami — To out Pouch

CS COPY

2 cc sent to F/IB/S

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA 25624

DATE
7 November 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-735296

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Madrid

INFO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Study on Guillermo RUIZ Perez.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OSMW-11726

Forwarded herewith is a completed version by AMEDIT-2 of the study on Guillermo RUIZ Perez.

MICHAEL V. SLATINSKI

KENNETH B. TICINETO

Attachment: h/w

Distribution:
3 - COS, Madrid w/att h/w
2 - COS, WH/Miami w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OSMW-11828

DATE: 8 MAY 1970

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-735296

(5 May 1970)

Distribution:
1 - EUR/IB
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - RID
1 - Originator

AN
AB X
IN
PS
BX
DES NFD
FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS Richard Wheeler	pfd	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG	5 May 70	James E. Flannery

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/EUR/IB		Louis Rosso Glenn A. Rounsevell

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M COB ?

201-866054
UFAA-0[illegible]978
04 MAY 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
INFO AS REPORTED BY SUBJECT OF 201-866054

OSM

R 7005110495

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FORM
EDITION

1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

1	[illegible]	5	
2		6	
3	[illegible]	7	
4	~~[illegible]~~	8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

MAY 8 10 48 AM '70

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ~~[illegible]~~

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: ACTION COPY

DISSEM BY 2 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ACTION NO. 587

SECRET 081046Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1054

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI ROME

TYPIC AMMEDIA QUDOZE

8 MAY IN 078059

1. FROM QUSEQUIN/QUDOZE 6 MAY:

A. CARLOS ALFARAS, CUBAN AMBASSADOR LEBANON AND SYRIA, TOLD ANTOLIN (PROBABLY ANTOLIN ALFONSO CASTENEDA), CUBAN EMBASSY ROME THAT HE (ALFARAS) AND WIFE SCHEDULED FLY MADRID/ROME 9 MAY IBERIA FLIGHT 358. ANTOLIN SAID THAT SALVADOR VILASECA, AMBASSADOR ITALY, IN CUBA FOR WEEK'S VACATION; EXPECTED RETURN ROME 6 MAY ALITALIA 366.

B. GUILLERMO RUIZ, CHARGE IN MADRID, SAID HE TRAVELING HAVANA MID-JUNE FOR A MEETING OF AMBASSADORS.

2. FILE 201-814891, 201-7352996, 201-759701. GP-1

SECRET

Extract for 201's

FILE:
RM 2a10-1

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

SECRET

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER;pfd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 1 MAY 1970

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 54/21 PER ______ #

CONF: [illegible]

INFO: FILE, VR, [illegible]

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 17 [illegible] 70

TO: MADRID ~~[illegible]~~ WH/MIAMI CITE DIRECTOR 030393

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: A. WH/MIAMI 7346 (IN 072939)

B. DIRECTOR 021639

1. REF A REPRESENTS LEAD TO AMAUTO-1 WHICH HQS WILLING PURSUE IF MADRID THINKS WORTH WHILE. ALTHOUGH SAMKO DID NOT INDICATE RELATIONSHIP WAS VERY DEEP, QUTIMID/QUDOZE TRAFFIC SEEMS TO INDICATE AMAUTO-1 LOOKED ON SAMKO WITH GREAT DEAL NOSTALGIA. MUCH DEPENDS ON MADRID'S OTHER PLANS THROUGH SUBJECT REF B (201-866047). REQUEST STATUS YOUR CONTACT WITH HIM AND PLANS.

2. RECENT REVIEW OF AMAUTO-1 TAPES BY AMEDIT-2 SHOW THAT AMAUTO-1 MAINTAINS CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH QUSEQUIN-82. AMEDIT-2 COMMENTS THAT QUSEQUIN-82 KNOWS AMAUTO-1 PERSONALLY AND SEES HIM RATHER OFTEN BUT PRESUMABLY IN LINE OF DUTY. HQS INTERESTED IN NATURE AND EXTENT THIS RELATIONSHIP. VIEW QUSEQUIN-82 COMMENTS REPORTED IN OSMA-23624, ATTACHMENT 1, STATION MIGHT USE THIS RELATIONSHIP TO APPROACH AMAUTO-1.

WODISH
3. ~~[illegible]~~ REPORT DATED 27 MAR 70 WAS DEBRIEFING OF MANUEL

201-235296

CS COPY

☐	
[illegible]	
~~AB~~	
~~LL~~	
~~IS~~	
~~EX~~	
DES	NFD
FI	

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

04 May 70

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE: MAY 7 10 23 AM '70

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

11 4 26 PM '70

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY RID/EDI
CONF:
INFO FILE, VR,

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

(classification)
SECRET

PAGE TWO
(date and time filed)

(elite) (pica)
(reference number)

TO

CITE DIRECTOR 630193

(VIGOS) PEREZ, 30-YEAR OLD CUBAN WHO ARRIVED MIAMI BY AIR ON 20 FEB 70. VIGOS CLAIMS TO BE UNIDENTIFIED CLOSE RELATIVE OF AMAUTO-1 BUT HAS AMAUTO-1'S HISTORY SOMEWHAT GARBLED. VIGOS ALSO SAYS THAT ONE OSVALDO RUIZ PEREZ, DESCRIBED AS BROTHER OF AMAUTO-1, HAS ASKED TO LEAVE CUBA AND IS NOW IN CANE FIELDS. WH/MIAMI REQUESTED TO CHECK THESE LEADS.

4. FILE 201-735296. END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref A said that SAMKO, Miami butcher who old acquaintance of AMAUTO-1, has been located and willing travel to Madrid if necessary. Ref B is POA grant for one Carlos CARRASCO, whom Madrid plans to use somehow to get to AMAUTO-1.

MAY 18 70

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

AC/EUR/IB Louis Rosso

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
QUTIMID QUDOZE
Sonia GOMEZ Aragon, Cuban MINREX Official

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

AR: None, FYI. Please assign 201 number

References: A. MADRID 0473
B. WH/MIAMI 6576
C. DIRECTOR 011307

1. The following information about Subject's trip to Spain and her activities while here was obtained from QUTIMID and QUDOZE.

2. Subject arrived in Madrid on 10 February 1970. She traveled to Barcelona during the week of 23 February and returned to Madrid 6 March whereupon she then left for Portugal. She returned to Madrid on 17 March and waited for Guillermo RUIZ Perez' return from the Spanish/Cuban Commercial negotiations in Cuba. Sonia departed Madrid for Cuba on 27 March 1970. It appears that she intended to travel to Vienna, Austria next, since several cables were sent to Vienna from Madrid advising Sonia's travel status. During her stay in Spain, Sonia was in frequent contact with one Jose Agustin GOYTISOLO, Spanish writer in Barcelona, telephone 228-4063 (Station traces are OSBA 02385, 17 February 1965; OSBA 02718, 11 August 1967; and OSBA 02795, 1 March 1968). She was not known to have been in contact with any other locals and what little time she had for diversion she spent with the mission officers and their wives.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami

....continued

201-869482

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
65-2-1079 65-6-44/4	OSMA - 26218	13 May 1970
~~201-735296~~	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296 ~~201-~~

3. The purpose of Sonia's trip to Madrid was to discuss the 1970 work plan for the Embassy with the Charge, Guillermo RUIZ Perez. She also talked with the various Embassy officials, most probably to familiarize herself with their duties and to see if they had any problems. She pitched in and helped with the backlogged work of Orestes BARREDA and Horacio FUENTES and also helped with the cultural activities. For instance, she sent two cables to MINREX - one regarding the forwarding of movie posters for a March exhibit and another regarding the forwarding of a Cuban stamp exhibition by end March.

4. In their discussion of the 1970 work plan Sonia told RUIZ that they were going to plan the February, March, and April quarter. She showed him "an agenda for the control of planned and unplanned activities" and the general directives of the plan which included scientific information and political information, with specific directives (requirements) for Spain. RUIZ has to prepare for Havana a monthly report, then a quarterly summary, of the activities accomplished. Based on these reports the activities of the following quarter will be planned.

a. In line with the plan of scientific information, Sonia and RUIZ discussed the pros and cons of a Comite Cientifico-Tecnico which is to be set up in Madrid. RUIZ was of the opinion that the local (Spanish) Communist Party would try to infiltrate it and this would bring problems to the Embassy. Sonia pointed out the successes encountered in Switzerland and Sweden with such a committee even though at first there were problems which were later overcome.

b. Sonia showed RUIZ a commercial project which she planned to take to Portugal and asked him to read it because it was also of interest to the Cuban mission in Spain.

c. Sonia mentioned that the Plan of Information was still to be completed especially in the priority categories of livestock and economy.

d. They turned next to the topic of the budget. Sonia said that the budget for each mission had to be submitted before the end of April (every year) and no additional expenditures could be submitted for approval during the course of the year. Spain, Canada, and France, however, would be treated individually. Their special needs, such as acquisition of more office space, raises in cost of living allowances, etc., would be taken into consideration at any time.

5. During their various discussions RUIZ aired his complaint about the Visa Department in Havana saying that the department was practically worthless and that last year 76 cables regarding visas remained unanswered. Sonia defended the Ministry saying that it had a lot of work to do, but RUIZ replied that they wanted to work only 8 hours a day. They also discussed the scholarship situation. It seems that during an interview between PRIETO (Probably Jose PRIETO Benitez, Director of Foreign Relations of the DAP) and the Minister of Public Works, PRIETO was asked to provide a list of scholarship candidates to be considered and he had none. Sonia mentioned that in Belgium they also lost four scholarships because of this same reason.

6. According to QUTIMID Sonia GOMEZ Aragon is married to one Miguel (LNU) and has a daughter named Iliana. Sonia's mother is still living although appeared to be very ill at the time Sonia left for her trip to Madrid because Sonia cabled at least twice to Havana inquiring about the status of her mother's health. (TYLOTE reported that Sonia's home phone number in Havana is 7-4263.) Perhaps Headquarters can determine the full name of her husband by checking the reverse telephone listings. Sonia is attractive, intelligent, sertious-minded and reserved. The last time she visited Spain she stayed with Vera BORODOWSKI and was on the same type of mission as the present one - to discuss the Madrid Embassy's work plan. She also visited the Barcelona Consulate and the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon.

Helen B. NOTHDURFT

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) file

Since Headquarters has recently prepared an extensive analysis on RUIS for the information of addressees, an additional review has been omitted. However, the attached biographic study should be useful.

30 April 1970

NAME:	Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) (NOTE: A comprehensive study/analysis on RUIZ was prepared in February 1970, see OSMW-11726.)
ALIAS:	Also uses Guillermo RUIZ Perez
DPOB:	10 February 1930, Havana
PRESENT POSITION:	Minister, Charge d'Affaires, Cuban Embassy, Madrid, since December 1967.
WIFE:	Nilda VECIANA Lopez (DPOB: 26 December 1934, Havana)
CHILDREN:	Five sons, and a sixth child due to be born April/May 1970, Guillermo, the oldest, in school in Cuba. Alejandro, Julio, Juan Carlos and Ivan with their parents in Madrid.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:	White, variously described as 5'5" - 5'7" tall, and 170-190 pounds, stout build; round face, fair complexion, blond slightly wavy hair, light-colored eyes (also reported as blue and green), wears glasses. No visible identifying marks. Well dressed.
PERSONALITY:	Perhaps a relative's description of RUIZ sums up his personality - "a man of many moods." He has variously been described as intelligent, mentally alert, competent, hardworking, and respected by his subordinates. Pleasant, easy going, nervous, quick-tempered, brusque but sincere, opinionated, strong-minded idealistic, self-confident. Has basic emotional instability, gives impression of being insecure in his position. At times sarcastic, indifferent, egotistical, cynical, serious, ungrateful and cold, who, paradoxically, appears friendly to some people. Outspoken, compulsive talker, articulate, limited vocabulary, swears a good deal.

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

He can turn on considerable charm, where motivated. In contrast to his pleasant public image and acceptable language, private conversation is vulgar, swears continually and flies into rages.

Likes good living and spends money where it shows. Avid reader, keeps abreast of world events, shows willingness to accept whatever he deems to be good or useful from the outside world. Concerned with the image and prestige of Cuba in Spain. Emotionally committed to an ideal. An AMEDIT study summed RUIZ up as a realist. He speaks English and French. His wife, a teacher, always worked before going to Spain, and there works as a secretary and bookkeeper at the Embassy on an informal basis. Appears intelligent, competent, outspoken but solicitious and affectionate with her husband; interested in, and encourages him in his work. Appears to support the regime, but not a fanatic. RUIZ is the dominant personality of the two.

EDUCATION:

One reference states that he went to work at age 14, which suggests lack of formal education.
In 1960 as an employee of the Ministry of the Treasury, selected to attend a statistics course offered by CEPAL, which lasted two years.

One relative reported he completed elementary education at "Hermanos Maristas" school in Havana; did not know whether he attended high school, but said in early days of the Castro regime attended the University of

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

Havana.

Another relative said his primary and secondary education was received in private institutions, and that he has a degree in "political economics" from the University of Havana.

He is well versed in world affairs and has an understanding of international trade.

PREVIOUS POSITIONS:

Vice Minister, MINCEX, 1964-1967.

Commercial Counselor, Cuban Embassy, Mexico City. Although he was accredited to that position in December 1963, travel indicates he was in Mexico from August 1963 to May 1964. Other references indicate he was in that position in September 1963.

Ministry of the Treasury. In April 1962 he was Chief of the Department of Construction Expenses Studies, Office of Financial Statistics of that ministry. He was with the ministry as early as 1960, when he was selected to attend the statistics course.

During the Batista regime he was in exile. Came to the U.S. sometime in the 1950's and apparently remained for some time before he left in February 1957, when, according to some reports, he entered Cuba clandestinely. Also reported to have been in exile in Mexico.

LNYUMA records show he came to U.S. on 8 November 1956 to see his brother, left 17 November for the Dominican Republic where he received five months military training. Returned to the

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

U.S. 5 April 1957, overstayed his time, and on 11 February 1958 was ordered deported; claimed he would be killed if he returned to Cuba and did not show for deportation. Subsequent investigation showed he was in Cuba as of 2 March.

POLITICAL ATTITUDE:

A member of the Cuban Communist Party, admitted on the recommendation of Armando HART Davalos, Secretary of Organization. Although he has been described as a militant Communist, a convinced supporter of the Castro regime and a fanatic Fidelista, there is evidence to dispute this image. An analysis of available information indicates that he is not a convinced Marxist, he cannot accept Party discipline, and that his character is basically incompatible with the system he serves.

His father is reported to be an old-guard Communist and a leader of the barber's union. A brother reported to be a member of DSE in 1946.

He expressed dissatisfaction with his position as a diplomat, feels his talents are wasted and would like a position in commerce or industry, where he considers he could better serve the revolution. Has criticized the bureaucracy and inefficiency in the government in Havana.

He has said that many Cuban diplomats want to stay out of Cuba, but it seemed to him that the Cuban government wanted to keep him (RUIZ) out of the way (i.e., outside Cuba). That LEON had appointed him, supported him, and they are good friends, but that he (RUIZ) does not like to work with a man who one does not get to know, nor to know what he is thinking. He said he felt as if he were in Miami.

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS:

In May 1964 AMMUG-1 reported RUIZ was a DGI case officer in Mexico for operations targetted against "some nearby area," and later identified his photograph as DGI member in Mexico.

In 1961 an emigre said RUIZ, with the Finance Ministry, was a Communist and G-2.

AMTIKI-1 said a letter from a friend in Cuba stated that RUIZ, then in Mexico, was a member of G-2, sent to try to infiltrate counterrevolutionary groups (1963).

In April 1968, RUIZ advised Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa on the use of disguises, the need to "live secretly" and commented on DIAZ' being "already clandestine."

The Cuban Ambassador to Geneva, in 1968, commented on RUIZ' refusal to accept DGI dominance of the Cuban Embassy, Madrid. (AMDELAY-1). In July 1969, AMBEDEW-1 said RUIZ was very dictatorial in his dealings with DGI officers.

CONTACTS:

Not much is known of his contacts in Madrid, other than official. Is in touch with Ahmed LAIDI, Algerian Ambassador; Manuel TELLO Troncoso, Counselor of Chilean Embassy, Madrid; Alexandru PETRESCU, Romanian Minister to Spain and Carlos CARRASCO Munoz de Vera, a lawyer and personal friend.

TRAVELS:

1963:	Aug.	To Mexico
	22 Nov.	Mexico-Cuba
	29 Nov.	Cuba-Mexico
	8 Dec.	Cuba-Mexico
1964:	21 May.	Mexico-Cuba
1967:	13 Dec.	Cuba-Spain
1968:	15 Jan.	Spain-Netherlands

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

	16 Jan.	Netherlands-Spain
	27 July	Spain-France
	31 July	France-Spain
	6 Aug.	Spain-Cuba (via Ireland, Canada)
	29 Aug.	Cuba-Spain
	21 Nov.	Spain-Cuba
	10 Dec.	Cuba-Spain
1969:	27 Feb.	France-Spain
	27 Feb.	Spain-Dominican Republic
	11 Mar.	Spain-Switzerland
	4 Aug.	Spain-Cuba
	17 Sept.	Cuba-Spain (via French West Indies, Azores)
	10 Oct.	Spain-Cuba
	29 Oct.	Cuba-Spain
	14 Nov.	Spain-UK
	16 Nov.	UK-Spain
	28-30 Nov.	Two-day trip by auto to San Sebastian and Burgos

6 Jan 70. To Italy, returning by auto.

Also claims to have been in North Vietnam as a member of a trade mission (QUDOZE).

ASSESSMENT: It appears that RUIZ might well be responsive to an approach, with consideration given to the manner in which it is undertaken, the timing and the person involved.

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

ACCESS:

MISCELLANEOUS:

Although RUIZ' health has been described as generally good, he suffers from a back ailment which resulted from a fall in 1955 and which has been diagnosed as incurable. Also he suffers from a liver ailment for which he takes medicine.

RUIZ is scheduled to return to Cuba in mid-1970, where he expects to be with MININT, rather than MINREX or MINCEX.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 15 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 798

S E C R E T 291535Z APR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7346 (WMIM) 29 APR IN 072939

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF A WH/MIAMI 7304 (IN 070131)

B UFAA-1978

1. SAMKO SHOWN PHOTOS OF AMAUTO-1 AND REMARKED, "WHY, THIS IS WILLIAM." REMEMBERED AMAUTO-1 AS NICE CLEAN-CUT BOY WITH HIGH IDEALS. WHILE THERE WAS PROBABLY FATHER-SON RELATIONSHIP, SAMKO DID NOT RECOGNIZE IT AS SUCH.

2. SAMKO IS WILLING TO TRAVEL TO MADRID TO TALK WITH AMAUTO-1. HE HAS AN EXPIRED PASSPORT. WAS TOLD INTERVIEW WAS EXPLORATORY AND PACHANKIS WOULD RECONTACT IF SAMKO SERVICES WERE NEEDED.

3. POUCHING ABOVE CONTACT REPORT, ALONG WITH REF A CONTACT REPORT, VIA REF B.

4. FILE: 201-866054 AND 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN VW
AB X
IN
PS
BX
DCS NED
FI
WH/C/OP

CS COPY

201-735296
29 Apr 70

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO
Chief of Station, Madrid;
Chief, European Division

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
TYPIC AMAUTO
Interview of Alexander SAMKO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Para 2 below

References:
A. DIRECTOR 026320,
B. WH/MIAMI 7304
C. WH/MIAMI 7346

1. Forwarded herewith are two contact reports submitted by Henry S. PACHANKIS on his interviews with Alexander SAMKO (201-866054) concerning Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296). Both contact reports are self-explanatory and were summarized in References B and C.

2. Please advise if WH/Miami should pursue the matter of contact between SAMKO and RUIZ in Madrid. If so, the Station suggests that PACHANKIS accompany SAMKO to Madrid as his handler.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

Attachments:
A. Contact Report, 21 April 1970
B. Contact Report, 28 April 1970

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD w/atts h/w (in dupl)
2 - COS, Madrid w/atts h/w (in dupl)
2 - Chief, EUR w/atts h/w (one copy)

MAY 4 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-735296

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-1978

DATE
29 April 1970

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-866054

NAME UZLOV, Sergey

201-0 948382

WES- ________ or WASH- ________

1. Original source of information:

   ____ [Geneva] flag (cable no., date): 10

   X [Rome] assessment (cable no.,date): 10

   ✓ INS form (A-no.,date): A21-703-170

   ____ other (document, date):

2. Reason for our interest:

   ___ PI for DCD: ___ OI for SE/USSR:

   ✓ OI for SE/X/FR: OI / for SE ___ OI for (other): OI for SE

3. FBI approval: Copies of assessment cable sent to SE/USSR and SE/CI/I, SE/RI

   316-00~~994-77~~ requested (CIR no., date): CIR-316/~~00994~~ 01234-77, ~~28 Mar 77~~ 7 Apr 77

   ___ received (IN no.,date):

4. Name trace and soft file:

   ✓ name traced (date, results): 31 Mar 77 - No TRACES

   21 Mar 77 soft file opened (date): 21 Mar 77

5. AA

   ___ issued (Bidfield; other):

   ___ answered (date):

   Address: 21 Mar 77
   c/o ~~Anna/Zeldovich~~
   ~~2425 Ring Highway Apt. F-10~~
   ~~Brooklyn, N.Y. 11229~~
   414- Ave N
   Apt 6B
   Brooklyn, N.Y. 11230
   Tel: Wats 485 (212) ~~377-635~~ 339-314

6. Special requirements:

   ✓ ✓ ✓ received from (branch, date): SE/X/FR (6 Apr), SE/CI/X (6 Apr), SE/CI/1, 6 Apr

7. 201 opened: 339-14

8. DCD coordination:

   ___ release requested (date):

   ___ released to DCD (date): w/interest; w/o interest

   ___ contact/coordination w/DCD before interview:

9. FR notification:

   ___ cable to FR base (cable no., date):

10. Contact and Interview:

   ___ contacted by (~~true name~~, alias, date): [FRED M STEVENS] 06

   ___ interviewed by (~~true name~~, alias): [Fred M Stevens] 06

   ___ date and place: NY - 26-28 Apr 1977

S E C R E T

14-00000
104-10181-10117 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

8 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible DRE Animus Towards President Kennedy

1. This memorandum makes record of a recollection which has been brought to mind in recent weeks since my return from Yugoslavia in late November 1966.

2. In Spring 1961, upon returning from Berlin I was assigned to JMWAVE. One of the cases on which I worked from then until shortly before my reassignment to Headquarters in late summer 1963 concerned funding of overseas elements of the DRE (Student Revolutionary Directorate) which had its main office in Miami (the case officer for this group during this period was Mr. Ross CROZIER, since resigned).

3. I believe that it is this group, the DRE, which has been referred to in investigations into the President's assassination as the Cuban Student Directorate, whose New Orleans representative is said to have had contacts with OSWALD.

4. I have assumed that, since the time I was transferred from Miami and scheduled for my next assignment as COB, 27 10 Zagreb, officers better and more recently informed than myself have probably examined in detail all aspects of the DRE involvement with OSWALD, in order to rule out any slight possibility that compromise of the CIA sponsorship of this organization might in any way embarrass the Agency. Recent news reports of investigations centering in New Orleans on the assassination have once again brought to mind the concern I felt in November 1963, by which time, however, I was far removed from current knowledge of the operation.

3/80

[illegible]

5. I do retain a distinct recollection that the DRE leadership, specifically Luis FERNANDEZ Rocha, whom I met several times, did hold sentiments of chagrin and embitterment that President Kennedy had not more forcefully pursued a "liberation" of Cuba. Whether or not this animus, which could be discerned as occasional signs of anger or of contempt or of discouragement, might have been translated into a wish for revenge, may be better known to other officers who dealt with this group after the summer of 1963.

Calvin Thomas 03
Calvin Thomas
SB/O/PT

[illegible]

1/80

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO OELA-37,729
TO Chief, WE INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 19-5
FROM Chief of Station, London		DATE 28 December 1962
SUBJECT KEYWAY/PBRUMEN/SMOTH 01 Cuban Identified and Suspect Intelligence Officers		RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED See para four		
REFERENCE(S)		

01

1. Attached hereto are three copies of a SMOTH prepared list of identified and suspect intelligence officers, compiled from SMOTH records but not including information derived from special Intelligence sources. 01

01

01 2. Copies are being distributed to JAGUAR, SMABLE, ASIO (Australia), and JACONET. 01

01

3. As the list includes a considerable amount of information from KUBARK sources, SMOTH would be grateful if Headquarters would consider giving clearance to distribute copies of this study to friendly Latin American and Western European liaison services. They have further asked whether it would be appropriate to pass a copy of this report to ODENVY. 24

4. London Station would appreciate a brief cabled reply to the request for further distribution of this information.

LAWRENCE L. HOLDY

Attachment: "Cuban Identified and Suspect Intelligence Officers"
3 copies

Distribution:
4-Chief, WE w/atts

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

VEGA Perez →

201-334253
OELA-37,729
28 Dec 62

8/920

VALDES VALDES, Ramon

Born circa 1911.
Suspect I.S.

1961: Officer at G-2 Headquarters, Havana. Signs orders to view prisoners at La Cabana Prison.

Description: circa 5' 7" tall, heavy build, weight: 190 lbs. approx., short neck, scanty grey hair.

VAZQUEZ MONTENEGRO, Ramon

Suspect I.S.

1960: Member of Cuban Security and acted as bodyguard to President DORTICOS.

Reportedly travels on subversive missions in Latin America.

June 1962: Member of G-2 in the Cuban Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

VEGA PEREZ, Manuel

201-334253

Suspect I.O.

Diplomatic Attaché, Cuban Embassy, Mexico since June 1962.

Responsible for new "Committee in Defence of the Cuban Revolution".

Reported by defector to be former instructor at G-2 training school.

VELAZ (VELOZ), Lt. Anibal

Excerpt:
Attm to OELA-37,729
28 Dec 1962

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL 31 05

SX-32554
26 Sept 77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Two MVD Officers in Minsk Who Are Engaged in the Surveillance of Foreigners

SOURCE : (201-0948382). A foreign-language student from Minsk who worked in various jobs throughout the USSR. Born in 1949, he emigrated in 1976. Neither his bona fides nor his reporting reliability has been established.

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1969-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW : 26-28 April 1977

DOC. MICRO. SER.
L 1 2 6 1977
MICROFILMED

1. The two MVD officers described in this report are part of a small (and otherwise unidentified) section of the Minsk City Internal Affairs Directorate (GUVD) on Dobromyshlenskiy pereulok (the subject of a separate report). This section is engaged in the surveillance of foreigners for the apparent purpose of identifying those of their Soviet contacts who may be black marketeers.

2. KOVALEV, Vladimir, whose nickname is "Boni", holds the rank of senior lieutenant. Born in about 1949, he is 174 cm tall, of medium build, and has slightly wavy short blond hair. He is very nearsighted and wears glasses. He dresses modestly and inconspicuously and has the appearance of an "educated and cultured" person.

3. KOVALEV is married to Tamara nee MATVEYEVA, and they have a son, born in about 1972, who attends a special kindergarden for the children of high-ranking and other privileged officials. KOVALEVA, the daughter of a retired KGB lieutenant colonel, is a graduate of an economics institute and works as a senior economist for the State Committee for Standards, earning 170 rubles per month. The KOVALEVs live on Bobruyskaya ulitsa directly opposite a bus station.

4. KOVALEV is a graduate of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages, where he studied Spanish and English in the Department of Translating. After graduation, KOVALEV left Minsk for one year to go into the Army. However, Source found this hard to believe, as he knew that KOVALEV had been turned down for military service in 1966 because of nearsightedness. During the time that KOVALEV was in the Army, his wife told Source that where her husband was serving "they put army boots on once a month, just for show." KOVALEV's military service card (voyennyy bilet) nevertheless indicates both his 1966 rejection and the year that he supposedly spent in the Army.

5. Source believes that KOVALEV's father-in-law was instrumental

RECORD COPY

28 Sept 1977
201-948382

CONFIDENTIAL

in his choice of a career and probably helped KOVALEV through his own connections. (Fnu MATVEYEV, the father-in-law, had once been an important KGB official in the Belorussian SSR.) Source also believes that KOVALEV, while he is an MVD officer, has close ties with the KGB and may have been co-opted by it. He bases this belief on KOVALEV's close and frequent association with Anatoliy AKSENOV, a KGB lieutenant (the subject of a separate report). The Yubileynaya, a hotel where foreigners stay, is apparently one of KOVALEV's assignments, as he is frequently seen there.

6. (Fnu) PINYAZ' is the MVD officer who works with KOVALEV. Born in about 1945, PINYAZ' is of average height and build, has short blond hair, gray eyes, and dresses simply in an apparent effort to be inconspicuous. During a drinking session, PINYAZ' admitted to Source that he "cooperates closely" with the KGB. PINYAZ' is frequently seen at the Hotel Turist.

7. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: Soviet GICS, Soviet travel, IP Main Index, OCR and SE/SAG/OP branch index. These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

A. There are no Headquarters traces on Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV (para 5).

*AKSENOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich
SEX: M
DOB: c1948
POB: USSR, Minsk
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. In charge of KGB unit in Yubileynaya Hotel in Minsk.

B. There are no Headquarters traces on Vladimir KOVALEV (paras 2-5).

*KOVALEV, Vladimir
SEX: M
DOB: ca 49
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: MVD officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. Is assigned to the Yubileynaya Hotel in Minsk.

C. There are no Headquarters traces on PINYAZ', fnu (para 6).

*PINYAZ', fnu
SEX: M
DOB: ca 45
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: MVD officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet Emigre 201-0948382. Is assigned to the Hotel Turist in Minsk.

Victor F. Zimin
SE/SAG/OP

SE/SAG/OP:Natalie Valetich/Anna Peterson:ek

Distribution:
Orig - IP/DMSE (please classify into 201-0948382, index names in para 7)
1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR
1 - SE/RR
1 - SE/CI, attn Joe Flaherty
1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono

201-948382

CONFIDENTIAL

SX-32439
8 September 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Organization, Functions, and Personalities of the MVD in Minsk

SOURCE: (201-0948382), a foreign-language student from Minsk who worked in various jobs throughout the USSR. Born in 1949, he emigrated in 1976. Neither his bona fides nor his reporting reliability has been established.

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1969-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 26-28 April 1977

1. The headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) of the Belorussian SSR is on the corner of prospekt Lenina and ulitsa Uritskogo in Minsk. The Minister is General-leytenant KLIMOVSKIY. He is married and has two daughters, both of whom studied in foreign languages at the Belorussian State University.

2. There is an MVD militia unit, called an internal affairs section (otdel vnutrennikh del, OVD), in each of the six rayons (precincts) of Minsk, as follows:

A. Frunze Rayon OVD, on Obuz'naya ulitsa.

B. Tsentral'nyy Rayon OVD, on the corner of Respublikanskaya ulitsa and Komsomol'skaya ulitsa.

C. Sovet Rayon OVD, on Ploshchad' Ya.Kolasa.

D. Oktyabr' Rayon OVD.

E. Lenin Rayon OVD, at Serebryanka Mikro-rayon.

F. Zavod Rayon OVD, on Partizanskiy prospekt.

3. Each of these rayon OVDs (known as ROVD) consists of the following departments (otdeleniye):

A. Investigations Department (Sledstvennoye otdeleniye), the largest component of the ROVD, conducts investigations of all crimes committed within the boundaries of the rayon. According to Source, the best educated and most highly trained investigators and inspectors of the militia are to be found

RECORD COPY

9 Sept 1977
201-948382

CONFIDENTIAL

in this department. In the Frunze ROVD, Inspectors Aleksandr GLYDOVSKIY and Vladimir MELESHKO were friends of Source, who stated that both men have anti-Soviet leanings. An MVD major, Vladimir KOMAROVICH, investigates the most serious cases.

B. The Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation (OBKhSS) is concerned with protecting socialist property in state establishments such as stores, plants and factories, hotels and restaurants. The following OBKhSS personalities were known to Source: (fnu) MALYSHKO and (fnu) POLYANSKIY in the Frunze ROVD, (fnu) KELLER and (fnu) VYSOTSKIY in the Tsentral'nyy ROVD, and (fnu) SUCHKOV in the Oktyabr' ROVD.

C. Department for Combatting Parasitism (Otdel bor'by s tuneyadstvom). Source thought that the term "parasitism" (tuneyadstvo) had recently been removed from the USSR Criminal Code and replaced by "vagrancy, begging and other parasitic types of existence." But the official procedures remain the same. Soviet citizens not engaged in socially productive labor are first given a warning, which they must sign at the department. If they remain unemployed, their case is turned over to a court, and the offense is punishable by a sentence of up to two years. However, there are ways to get around the law. Source says that if it can be shown that parents or a spouse are providing support or if a person can get seasonal work, he can defend himself before the department. But most citizens are not aware of these loopholes, according to Source. After the Investigations Department, this militia department turns over the greatest number of citizens to the courts. Also, this department and the law that it enforces are frequently used against dissidents.

D. Passport Department. Employees of this department make entires in the internal passports of citizens regarding their place of residence, and this department therefore gets many visitors. The department also enforces passport regulations.

E. The Guards and Protection (Okhrana) Department is responsible for providing militia protection to special establishments, such as radio and television studios and stations. This department also provides escorts for prisoners and guards at trials.

F. Department of Burglar and Intrusion Alarms (Otdel vnevedomstvennoy okhrany OVO). Source did not have any information on this department except that he thought it provides guards and watchmen for various enterprises in addition to its work with alarm systems.

G. Motor Pool (Motodivizion) provides and maintains patrol cars and motorcycles for the militia.

4. The rayon OVDs (ROVDs) fall under the Minsk City Internal Affairs Directorate (Gorodskoye upravleniye vnutrennikh del, GUVD) of the Executive Committee of the Minsk City Soviet. (fnu) PISKAREV, who holds the rank of general-mayor of internal affairs, is chief of the Minsk GUVD. The GUVD, which is on Dobromyshlenskiy pereulok, houses the pretrial detention cell (kamera predvaritel'nogo zaklyucheniya, KPZ and OVIR). Even though the Minsk city OVIR falls under the Belorussian Republic OVIR, there is no republic-level OVIR office in Minsk, although there are some republic-level OVIR officials who sit in the MVD headquarters building on prospekt Lenina.

5. Shortly before Source left Minsk to emigrate, he learned of a very small section in the GUVD, consisting of two or three people engaged in the surveillance of foreigners. Of particular interest to this section are the foreigners' contacts with black marketeers (fartsovshchiki). Although Source previously thought that only the KGB was concerned with black marketeers, he concluded that the MVD is also involved and that the two organizations probably work closely together, both posting their representatives in the hotels where foreigners stay, such as the Turist, the Yubileynaya, and the Minsk. Source knew of two members of this small section, Vladimir KOVALEV and (fnu) PINYAZ' (who are covered in a separate report).

Victor F. Zimin
SE/SAG/OP

SE/SAG/OP:Anna K. Peterson:ch (7 Oct 77)

Distribution:
Orig - IP/DMSE (please classify into 201-0948382)✓
1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR
1 - SE/RR
1 - SE/CI, Attn: Joe Flaherty
1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono

201-948382

14-00000

4P

CONFIDENTIAL

DOC. MICRO. SER.
SEP 15 1977
MICROFILMED

SX-32430

2 September 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Druzhinniki and Operativniki, Voluntary Civilian Militia Patrolmen

SOURCE : (201-0948382), a foreign-language student from Minsk, who worked in numerous jobs throughout the USSR. Born in 1949, he emigrated in 1976. Neither his bona fides nor his reporting reliability has been established.

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1969-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW : 26-28 April 1977

1. The druzhina is a group of civilians who volunteer to assist the militia in maintaining public order. Although the druzhiny originated spontaneously in about 1962, they have since become official appendages of the militia. There is at least one druzhina in each factory, public and commercial enterprise, institute and technical school. Although the druzhina officers are supposedly elected, they actually are appointed by the administration at the factory. A duty roster is posted. Almost everyone except the management has to be on duty at one time or another; no one can refuse. It is very hard to make people, especially the factory workers, roam the streets on druzhina duty after a day's work because they would rather go home.

2. In the institutes the druzhiny operate this way. After lectures all the students of a particular department have to attend a compulsory meeting. The senior druzhinnik of the institute is in charge of the meeting, together with the senior druzhinniki and deputies in the departments. Those students who for some reason did not manage to escape this duty (using a medical excuse, influence with the chief, or other means), are then marched to the nearest druzhina post. There are dozens of such posts in each rayon (precinct) of the militia, usually in the basements of apartment houses. Usually there is an officer of the militia there, with several militiamen of lower ranks.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

2 Sept 1977
201-948382

3. At the druzhina post, each druzhinnik gets a red arm band to wear. Then, they are dispatched to different locations to patrol and uphold public order. What actually happens is that they just walk around the streets for a while, then return the red arm bands and go home. Not all of them, however, just walk around: for any number of reasons (desire to get ahead, anger at the world, or exercise of a little power) some of them grab off the streets either innocent people or obvious drunks, and take them to the post. Source himself was taken in several times to such a post. There a militia officer fills out a report, and does not even try to listen to the detained person's explanation of what happened. If you do not try to prove your innocence, the matter will end just with a fine of five to ten rubles and a report to your place of work, which will cause you to lose any bonus pay at work. If you try to argue, to prove your innocence, then the action is more serious. A patrol car that periodically visits each post, picks you up, and takes you to the rayon MVD. There, the militia holds you all day. In the best case, you have to pay a fine of ten rubles, and in the worst case, you receive fifteen days of confinement with compulsory labor, only if there was nothing criminal in your behavior. If there was, then you get a trial and a jail sentence.

4. If the druzhinniki do not bring anyone in, they are criticized for not doing their job conscientiously. Another reason for pressure on them, in Source's opinion, is that the government needs the money from the fines.

5. Some of the more active druzhinnik are offered jobs in militia after graduation.

6. Source heard about another organization, the operativniki, but he does not know the difference between them and the druzhinniki. It seems that the operativnik are a little higher in rank. They meet in secret, no one announces their meetings, or the names of the members. No one knows or talks about it.

7. In the Institute of Foreign Languages, the chief of the operativnik was Vladimir SHUMRIKOV, born 1939, about 186 cm. tall, sturdily build, an athlete (former shotputter) who has short wavy hair, dark eyes, large features, and a fairly handsome, but somewhat hard face. He graduated from INIYaz in 1973, speaks English and German, likes to drink, always hangs around the foreigners at the sport meets. SHUMRIKOV has been a Party member since 1973. Source saw him several times with Yevgeniy SURGATOV (KGB) in a Minsk bar. SHUMRIKOV also knows KGB senior lieutenant Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV.

8. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: Soviet GICS, Soviet travel, IP Main Index, OCR and SE/SAG/OP branch index. These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

A. There are no Headquarters traces on Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV (para 7).

H
*AKSENOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich
SEX: M
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382.

B. There are no Headquarters traces on Vladimir SHUMRIKOV (para 7).

H
*SHUMRIKOV, Vladimir
SEX: M
DOB: ca 39
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: chief of operativniki
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. Chief of operativniki, Minsk Institute of Foreign Languages.

C. There are no Headquarters traces on Yevgeniy SURGATOV (para 7).

H
*SURGATOV, Yevgeniy
SEX: M
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382.

CONFIDENTIAL

Victor F Zimin

Victor F. Zimin
SE/SAG/OP

SE/SAG/OP:Isabelle H. Domes:rl (7 September 1977)

Distribution:
✓ Orig - IP/AN/SE (please classify into 201-0948382 and
index indicated names in para 8)
1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR
1 - SE/RR
1 - SE/CI/I
1 - SE/CI, Attn. Joe Flaherty
1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono

CONFIDENTIAL

201-948382

SX-31590
17 Jun 77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Selection and Recruitment of KGB Officers, Agents and Informers in the Belorussian SSR

SOURCE : (201-0948382), a foreign-language student from Minsk who worked in numerous jobs throughout the USSR. born in 19[illegible]. he emigrated in 1976. Neither his bona fides nor his reporting reliability has been established.

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1972-1976

DATE OF INTERVIEW : 26-28 April 1977

1. Source obtained most of the information in this report from Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV, a KGB senior lieutenant who was in charge of the KGB unit in the Yubileynaya Hotel in Minsk, and from friends and classmates who are now KGB and militia officers.

2. Source's curiosity about the selection and recruitment of KGB personnel was aroused when AKSENOV told him that he was considering the recruitment of Source as a KGB informant. Source asked AKSENOV who is selected and for what reasons. AKSENOV replied that the KGB usually uses spotters, who recommend people for recruitment. Background is important. A person from a peasant or worker's family is considered a better choice, and he must either be a quiet and colorless type who blends into the circle of people in which he operates, or else a conspicuous loudmouth who asks embarrassing questions. The latter would be more likely suspect of being a member of the opposition rather than a KGB informant. The average informant, according to AKSENOV, is not very bright because KGB officers themselves are not particularly intelligent and are afraid of anyone who is smarter than they. Source says that he was never recruited.

3. Both Source and AKSENOV think that in the remote areas of the USSR there are very few cases of such a recruitment pitch being turned down. Far from the big cities the KGB is an all-powerful instrument, and anyone who refuses just to report on the conversations of his friends in the name of patriotism will end up with dismal career prospects unless he has friends in high places. However, it is unlikely that such a person would be chosen for a KGB recruitment pitch in the first place. Therefore most of the lower levels of the KGB consist of people from simple backgrounds for whom there are no other career prospects and who prefer this kind of service to being in the Army.

4. The KGB officers in the Belorussian SSR are also those who are not bright enough to make a career in some other field, such as science, engineering, or foreign languages, but they differ from the lower-level cadres in that they are the sons of high-ranking

17 June 1977
201-948382

Party and government officials. This is why so many sons of Belorussian dignitaries work for the KGB. Otherwise they would be doomed to jobs which would pay them, at most, 120 rubles per month for the rest of their lives, even if they could survive the competition in a Party job. In the KGB, an officer, who achieves such status by going through a school, can look forward to steady promotions until he reaches the rank of major. And if his sponsor retains his influence, the officer can eventually be promoted to lieutenant colonel or even colonel before retiring. Also, it is a prestigious, interesting, and financially advantageous job which places the KGB officer above the common people to the point where many officers consider themselves to be above the law. Their salaries are often supplemented by discreet cooperation with black marketeers, who pay off either in goods or a percentage of the take. And there are the services of the women who sleep with foreigners, for money ~~or for~~ other considerations, and who report to the KGB. So a person like AKSENOV, responsible for a large tourist hotel like the Yubileynaya, actually presides over a small kingdom.

5. A KGB officer meets each of his agents (filer was the word used by Source) in a safe house (konspirativnaya kvartira). Other officers are not supposed to know who these agents are, and this "conspiracy" is a matter of great pride to them. Source was once caught leaving the hotel room of a Bulgarian girl with whom he had spent the night, but he was released when he gave AKSENOV's name to the junior KGB officer on duty (thereby implying that Source was on assignment for AKSENOV).

6. Source described KGB influence as "overwhelming". For example, a Soviet going abroad on an official assignment cannot refuse to cooperate with the KGB because such refusal would mean that the person wouldn't be able to travel, as the KGB has a say about his final clearance. Source also gave the example of an applicant for an unimportant job with the Minsk Symphony who was originally turned down. But when AKSENOV spoke to the KGB officer responsible for the Symphony, the applicant was not only hired but received the greatest respect from the Symphony Director during the entire period of his employment.

7. The KGB likes to recruit retired military personnel (otstavniki) because they are considered politically reliable and patriotic. Many otstavniki recruited by the KGB are former Osobyy otdel (Special Section, security functions) people, so KGB work is not a novelty for them. Such retirees are frequently used in stationary positions, reporting on or guarding specific areas.

8. Since the KGB relies on spotters for the selection of its agents, the spotters themselves can get into trouble if they recommend the "wrong" person. This means that the spotters are afraid to select clever people, so in the end they select mediocre ones. Selection is determined by the following: If the prospective agent or informer is a kolkhoznik, he is immediately 50% qualified. If he was in the Army, particularly in the Osobyy otdel, this adds another 30%. Other qualifications are based on the person's being "quiet", "average", or "ordinary".

9. The spotter is supposed to turn in a list of potential recruits and write a recommendation for each person. The prospective agent or informer is then called in and an offer to cooperate with the KGB is made. Source never heard anything about money being mentioned, but the KGB does offer help in the advancement of one's career. The initial assignments are very simple: The agent or informer just has to keep his eyes and ears open and to report anything that smacks of anti-government or illegal activity. Who can refuse such a call to patriotic vigilance? And if one does, he might well be classified as an enemy of the state and end up doing the lowliest physical labor rather than enjoying a promising career.

10. AKSENOV also told Source that the KGB usually opens a file on a Soviet citizen who corresponds with anyone abroad. After this, his telephone conversations are monitored and periodically recorded. And finally, KGB agents and informers who come into contact with him will be asked to report on him.

11. Source once asked AKSENOV what the KGB would consider its greatest accomplishment. AKSENOV replied that the discovery of a secret agent (nelegal) would be first on the list, followed by the discovery of an illegal printing press. Without printed matter a revolution cannot take place, according to AKSENOV. Third on the list is the discovery of the illegal possession of a rifled weapon, such as a rifle or pistol. This last item would not be considered particularly important in itself, but a KGB officer can do very well for himself if he plays his cards right. He must time the discovery of the illegal weapon with a public event involving the visit of an important Party or government dignitary. Thus, in the eyes of his superiors, his discovery is tantamount to thwarting an assassination attempt. Any one of the three accomplishments would lead to automatic promotion, a medal, and tenure for life in the KGB.

12. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: Soviet GICS, Soviet travel, IP Main Index, OCR and SE/SAG/OP branch index. These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

There are no Headquarters traces on Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV (para 1).

*AKSENOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich
SEX: M
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB official
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. In charge of KGB unit in Yubileynaya Hotel in Minsk.

Victor F. Zimin
SE/SAG/OP

SE/SAG/OP:Isabelle H. Domes:ek

Distribution:
Orig - IP/AN (please classify into 201-0948382 and index indicated name in para 12)
1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR
1 - SE/RR
1 - SE/CI/I
1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono

201-948382

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SE/BIO, Attn. Craig Schnabel

SUBJECT : Photos for Photo File

1. Attached are photos on four Soviets, provided by a Soviet emigre.

2. KOROBOCHKIN, Leonid Ivanovich. DOB ca 43, probably in Minsk, USSR. OCC truck driver. LOC USSR, Belorussian SSR, Minsk. REF SX-31465, 12 May 77, 201-0948382.

3. MIKHEDO, Anatoliy. DOB 48, Minsk, Belorussian SSR. Graduate of French Department, Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. OCC tourist guide. LOC USSR, Belorussian SSR, Minsk. REF SX-31465, 12 May 77, 201-0948382.

4. TETEKHIN, Sergey. DOB 49, Borisov, USSR. Graduate of French Department, Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. OCC French-Russian translator. LOC USSR, Belorussian SSR, Minsk. REF SX-31465, 12 May 77, 201-0948382.

5. AKSENOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich. DOB 48, Minsk, Belorussian SSR. Graduate of French Department, Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. OCC KGB lieutenant. LOC USSR, Belorussian SSR, Minsk. REF SX-31466, 12 May 77, 201-0948382.

Patty Nelson
SE/SAG/OP

Attachment:
Envelope with photographss

Distribution:
Orig - SE/BIO, w/att.
1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono, w/o att.
✓1 - SE/SAG/OP (UZLOV/201-0948382), w/o att.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SX-31533
23 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Keeping of Large Sums of Money in the Soviet Union

SOURCE : (201-0948382), a foreign-language student from Minsk who worked in numerous jobs throughout the USSR. Born in 1949, he emigrated in 1976. Neither his bona fides nor his reporting reliability has been established.

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1972-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW : 26-28 April 1977

1. Unless you have iron-clad proof that you got the money legally, the balance of your account in any one savings bank (sberkassa) should not exceed a thousand rubles. Each savings bank has a militia representative who reports suspiciously large accounts to the OBKhSS (Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation) of the militia for investigation. Source got this information from a militia lieutenant who was an OBKhSS officer in his rayon.

2. Since savings banks do not have a centralized accounting system, another way of keeping large amounts of money is to have accounts in several banks, as long as none of them exceeds the thousand-ruble limit.

3. One of the best ways of keeping money when traveling, or even at home, is in the form of an akkreditiv (a personalized cashier's check). An akkreditiv can be bought at any bank or savings institution and can be cashed anywhere at any time but only by the person to whom it is made out and only on presentation of an internal passport. Without the passport, the akkreditiv cannot be cashed, thereby making it a safer form of keeping money than currency.

4. If money is to be kept at home, it is somewhat less suspicious to have it in the form of three-percent government loan bonds (trekhprotsentnyy zaem). These are not personalized and can be cashed at any time at a small discount. They also have the advantage of a prize that can be won at one of the periodic drawings based on their numbers.

Victor F. Zimin
SE/SAG/OP

23 May 1977

SE/SAG/OP:Isabelle H. Domes:ek
Distribution:
✓ Orig - IP/AN (pls classify into 201-0948382)
1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR
1 - SE/RR 1-SE/SAG/OP chrono

201-948382

SECRET

SECRET

6P

SX-31225
20 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary Biographic Form on Soviet Emigre Sergey Aleksandrovich UZLOV 25

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 26-28 April 1977

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1949-1976

PART I: BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. NAME: Sergey Aleksandrovich UZLOV.

SE/AGCP

2. BIRTH: 19 November 1949 in Minsk. He was an illegitimate son of a Jewish mother and a Russian father. He was later adopted and raised by his mother's husband, Aleksandr UZLOV, as his own. His natural father is unknown.

3. LANGUAGES: Native Russian, claims to speak Belorussian well, knows German well, as a result of taking it at the Foreign Language Institute, and knows basic English.

4. MARITAL STATUS: He married Irina Aleksandrovna UZLOVA, nee LEPSHEY, on 21 September 1973. She was born in 1952 in Minsk. They have a son, Sergey, born on 4 February 1974 in Minsk. The couple was divorced on 29 August 1975 and the son remained in the USSR with his mother. Irina is the daughter of a military journalist and was graduated from the Spanish Department of Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages (INYAZ). She is now working as a librarian in the Pedagogical Institute i/n Gorkiy in Minsk.

5. PARENTS: His mother is Raisa Pimenovna UZLOVA, nee BYKOVA, born in 1922 in Kiev. She is, at present, living with her son in New York. His father is Aleksandr Sergeyevich UZLOV, born in 1921 in Moscow. He has been retired since 1973. He was a professional driver and auto mechanic, was in the NKVD from 1933 to 1941, and was a commander of the Katyushas rocket battalion during the war. After the war, he worked as a driver for Avtokolonna 2411 in Minsk. He still lives in Minsk.

At age 12? Wrong DOB?
1912?

SECRET

DOC. MICRO. SER.
0 9 1977
MICROFILMED

20 May 1977
201-948582

6. EDUCATION:

1956-66	He attended and graduated from Secondary School No. 24, specializing in German language instruction. The former head of the school was fnu UDAL'TSOVA.
1969-72	He attended Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages (INYAZ), German Department. He did not graduate.
1972-74	He attended the History Department of the Belorussian State University. He did not graduate.

Members of INYAZ who travel abroad are:

A. the former Chief of INYAZ, Lyudmila KRASNOVA, born about 1930, a former girl friend of Kiril T. MAZUROV, a member of the Politburo. She has recently been replaced, but UZLOV does not know by whom. She speaks German and frequently travels abroad.

B. the chief of the German Department, Lyudmila Aleksandrovna SUKHAREVA. She has been there for a long time. She travels abroad, but, presumably, to GDR only.

C. Prorector fnu KHOZYAYEV who speaks English. He has traveled to London.

D. Professor fnu USILOV went to GDR as an exchange teacher.

E. the dean of Teacher Retraining(povysheniya kvalifikatsii), Spartak Ivanovich KARASEV, who also teaches psychology. He went to Germany.

F. Professor fnu TRUNOVA, who teaches English.

7. EMPLOYMENT:

1966-67	He was a movie operator at the theatre "MIR". At that same time, he was a salesman at the State Department Store, Minsk.
1967-68	He had a variety of seasonal jobs: a concrete worker at Settlement Korelyugi (Grodnetskiy rayon), Mosty village, and at Pukhovichi (Minsk rayon).

1972-74	He worked with a sound and public address system at the Belorussian State University.
1974-76	He was a street photographer at the Outside (vyyezdnoye) Bureau of the Minsk Factory for Photographic Work.
1976-departure	He had miscellaneous employment.

8. RESIDENCE IN THE USSR: From before 1966 to his emigration, UZLOV lived at 47 Volgogradskaya ulitsa in Minsk.

9. EMIGRATION: UZLOV emigrated from the USSR on 28 November 1976. He arrived in Rome shortly thereafter, and departed for the United States on 22 March 1977.

10. PRESENT SITUATION: UZLOV currently lives at 414 Avenue N, apartment 6B in Brooklyn, NY 11230. He is unemployed.

11. PERSONAL EVALUATION: UZLOV is a smart, witty, outgoing, aggressive person, accustomed to living by his wits. He is willing to take chances and play roles, but, at the same time, he is not afraid of hard work, as long as it pays well. He is somewhat given to romanticizing, for example, by seeking a job in intelligence and not fully realizing that it is a steady and, often, dull job. He is not persistent, not able to stick to his studies or hold a job; instead, he prefers to work hard for shorter periods to earn money, and then do nothing.

UZLOV seemed to be completely won over by the United States, saying that he is willing to do anything that would be asked of him, such as his voluntarily bringing in photographs of some of the personalities he described, and suggesting that he would try to use the loose code system that he had established with his friends back in Minsk to obtain information for us, if we so require. At the last possible moment, he admitted that he was incarcerated in the USSR for participation in a fight, but was later found innocent by a higher court.

Physically, UZLOV is good-looking, trim, athletic, and is a former boxer, who trys to keep himself in good shape. He likes to dress well and, seemingly, no longer drinks to excess, as he used to do in the Soviet Union.

PART II: OI KNOWLEDGEABILITY

12. KGB: See KGB Personalities in the Minsk Area (SX-31466) and KGB Presence in a Tourist Hotel in Minsk (SX-31527).

13. SOVIETS WHO TRAVEL ABROAD: See Graduates of the Minsk

State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages who Travel Abroad or are Disaffected (SX-31465).

14. SAFEKEEPING OF MONEY: See Safekeeping of Legal and Illegal Money in the Soviet Union (to be published).

PART III: TRACES (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: Soviet GICS, Soviet and/or ZZ travel, IP Main Index, OCR and SE/SAG/OP card file. These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report, with an active interest in any of the subjects, should run full traces of their own.)

15. There are no Headquarters traces on Spartak Ivanovich KARASEV (para 6E).

*KARASEV, Spartak Ivanovich
SEX: M
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: professor
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. Psychology teacher and Dean of Teacher Retraining, Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. Travels abroad.

16. Fnu KHOZYAYEV (para 6C) is probably identical to Mikhail Andreyevich KHOZYAYEV (201-0809235), born on 3 December 1928 in Mogilev. He was a student on a UNESCO fellowship to Leeds, Manchester and Edinburgh Universities in the UK from 30 September 1966 to March 1967. He traveled to the West on a few other occasions. MENTIONED IN DEBRIEFING REPORT BY SOVIET EMIGRE 201-948382

[illegible]

17. Lyudmila KRASOVNA (para 6A) is probably identical to Lyudmila Mikhaylovna KRASOVNA (201-0890689), born on 23 June 1933 in Moscow. She was an interpreter at the Soviet Trade Representation in Amsterdam from 7 September 1971 to before April 1974. She has also traveled to West Germany.

18. Kiril MAZUROV (para 6A) is identical to Kirill Trofimovich MAZUROV (201-0185622), born on 7 or 14 April 1914 in Gomel oblast. Since at least 1957, he has been the First Secretary of the Belorussian Central Committee and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, on the Political Committee. Also in 1957, he became a candidate member of the CPSU Presidium.

He became a full member in 1965. He has been the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers since 1965 and a member of the Politburo since at least 1970. MAZUROV has traveled to the West, including the United States in 1960 as the head of the Belorussian delegation to the 15th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

19. There are no Headquarters traces on Lyudmila Aleksandrovna SUKHAREVA (para 6B).

*SUKHAREVA, Lyudmila Aleksandrovna
SEX: F
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: professor
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. Chief, German Department, Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. Travels abroad.

20. There are no Headquarters traces on fnu TRUNOVA (para 6F).

*TRUNOVA, fnu
SEX: F
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: professor
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. Professor, Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. Travels abroad.

21. Fnu USILOV (para 6D) is probably identical to Boris Konstantinovich USILOV (201-0901995), born on 19 March 1935. He intended to travel to the University of Heidelberg in West Germany to be a language instructor there about March 1972; however, he never arrived.

22. There is no information on Sergey Aleksandrovich UZLOV (Subject) (201-0948382) in addition to that in his 201. There are no Headquarters traces on his former wife Irina Aleksandrovna UZLOVA, nee LEPSHEY (para 4).

Victor F. Zimin
SE/SAG/OP

SE/SAG/OP:Isabelle H. Domes:ch (25 May 77)

Distribution:
Orig - IP/AN (please classify into 201-0948382, index indicated names in Part III, and ZR into 201-0809235, 201-0890689, 201-0185622 & 201-0901995 with the phrase "mentioned in a debriefing report by Soviet emigre 201-0948382.") ✓
1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR
1 - SE/RR
1 - SE/CI/I
1 - SE/SAG/CA
1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono

Sterile Distribution:
1 - FBI (part I only)
1 - DCD/ETF via SE/RR (part I only)
1 - PCS/DEF (part I only)

201-948382

CONFIDENTIAL

23

2

3

SX-31527
12 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: O KGB presence in a tourist hotel in Minsk

SOURCE: (201-0948382) A foreign language student from Minsk, who worked in numerous jobs throughout the USSR. Born in 1949, he emigrated in 1976. Neither his bona fides nor his reporting reliability has been established.

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1972-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 26-28 April 1977

1. Most of this information was obtained from Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV, a senior lieutenant of the KGB, and other friends and classmates of Source who are at present KGB and militia officers. AKSENOV was at that time in charge of the KGB unit in the Yubileynaya Hotel, Minsk.

2. In each tourist hotel in Minsk there is a so-called militia punkt (unit). It is usually in a room on the first floor of the hotel somewhere off the lobby. Supposedly this is a militia unit whose purpose is to protect foreigners, maintain order in the hotel, and prevent black-marketing. Actually, this unit is manned by KGB representatives in militia uniforms who carry militia as well as KGB identification. The militia seems to be the favorite cover for the KGB.

3. In the Yubileynaya Hotel this unit always had four or five persons on duty. During the day it had two privates and a sergeant in uniform and two officers in civilian attire. At night, when on duty, all of them usually wore militia uniforms. Aside from the above-mentioned militia functions, their actual mission was to prevent what they considered to be unnecessary contact of Soviet citizens with foreigners, to observe any suspicious actions by either, and to ensure that only approved persons had access to the hotel. All other Soviet citizens would be stopped, their documents checked, and their business questioned. An officer from such a unit once stopped Source after he had spent the night with a Bulgarian girl in the hotel. Source thinks he was discovered through audio surveillance.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 May 1977
201-948382

This officer showed his militia identification, and asked for and checked Source's documentation by telephone. He released Source without making any report, because Source, by veiled references to AKSENOV, managed to make this officer believe he was AKSENOV's agent. Later Source learned that this officer was AKSENOV's KGB subordinate.

4. The KGB also has an audio surveillance room and possibly several saferooms in the hotel. Once in 1975, after drinking with Source for several hours in a restaurant, AKSENOV invited him to come to the "special place" in the Yubileynaya Hotel. Source thinks that AKSENOV probably telephoned before going to the Yubileynaya. Source was led through a number of corridors to a room in the back of the hotel which AKSENOV unlocked with a key. There was no one in the room, although AKSENOV later told Source that there are supposed to be two people on duty at all times. AKSENOV and Source continued drinking in the room. Source did not pay too much attention to details, but at one point, apparently in order to impress Source with KGB capabilities, AKSENOV showed the Source a tape recorder, which was of foreign or Baltic republic make, and let him listen through the earphones to what was being recorded from a room under surveillance. Source claimed that he could hear all the sounds in the room, that of running water, etc. AKSENOV switched from room to room; audio quality was uniformly good. AKSENOV later explained that this is the audio surveillance room (komnata proslushivaniya) and that the KGB is capable of listening in to any room in the hotel. A log using notations in code (according to Source's best recollection) is kept indicating the time periods of listening in on each room, and the conversations actually recorded. Source was unable to recall whether there was more than one tape recorder in the room or how one recorded segment was distinguished from another on the tapes. He presumed that it was done by voice announcement, but he did not remember seeing a microphone which would be used for this purpose. None of these technical details were explained either then or later by AKSENOV.

5. AKSENOV never mentioned any phone surveillance and Source presumed that this is done in a different location, outside the hotel.

6. In subsequent conversations, AKSENOV told Source that all rooms occupied by foreigners are listened to by a spot check from the time that the occupant enters his room. There is apparently a device which indicates when this occurs. The running of water as an audio hindrance is a useless measure, AKSENOV said, as KGB audio technicians are able to eliminate this as well as many other extraneous noises in order to make the conversations audible.

7. Later Source learned (he does not remember from whom) that telephones are also used as audio listening devices and that they are effective even without the receiver being taken off the hook (i.e., hot mike).

8. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: Soviet GICS, Soviet travel, IP Main Index, OCR and SE/SAG/OP branch index. These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

There are no Headquarters traces on Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV (para 1).

H

*AKSENOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich
SEX: M
DOB: ca 43
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. In charge of KGB unit in Yubileynaya in Minsk.

Victor F. Zimin

Victor F. Zimin
SE/SAG/OP

SE/SAG/OP:Isabelle H. Domes:ch (7 Jun 77)

Distribution:
Orig - IP/AN (please classify into 201-0948382 and index indicated name in para 8).
1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IG, SE/USSR
1 - SE/RR
1 - SE/CI/I
1 - SE/CI (Joe Flaherty)
1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono

201-948382

9p

SECRET

SX-31466

12 May 1977

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 29 1977
MICROFILMED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: KGB Personalities in the Minsk area

SOURCE : (201-0948382) a foreign language student from Minsk who worked in numerous jobs throughout the USSR. Born in 1949, he emigrated in 1976. Neither his bona fides nor his reporting reliability has been established.

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1972-76.

DATE OF INTERVIEW : 26-28 April 1977

The following is in response to a requirement levied by SE/CI/I on 6 April 1977.

1. The KGB building in Minsk is on Leninskiy prospekt. There is another entrance at ulitsa Volodarskogo 2. The building occupies an entire city block and has its own prison within this area.

2. AKSENOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich. Born in 1948 in Minsk. He lives at the House of Scientific Workers, prospekt Lenina, Apt. 12, Minsk. He is 168 cm. tall, has a solid build (he is a former gymnast), blond hair, hazel eyes, and a soft-looking face with prominent red veins. When conversing, he has the habit of looking downward and then suddenly raising his eyes to look up. Source does not consider him to be particularly intelligent but rather as having a "crafty, peasant approach to life."

A. AKSENOV is the son of Aleksandr Nikiforovich AKSENOV, a member of the Central Committee and Second Secretary of the Belorussian CP. This makes the father the second highest ranking Party official in the Belorussian SSR. He has been characterized as a ruthless careerist. The mother is a physician who no longer practices.

RECORD COPY

SECRET

12 May 1977
201-948582

B. AKSENOV's wife is Tat'yana nee KONDRAKOVA, born in 1950 or 1951, in Dzerzhinsk-on-Volga. The father had wanted Anatoliy to marry the daughter of another member of the Belorussian CC, Aleksey Alekseyevich SMIRNOV, and this has caused much conflict between father and son, in addition to that already generated by the son's heavy drinking and his frequently getting into trouble when drunk. AKSENOV is afraid of his father. In order to curry favor with her father-in-law, AKSENOV's wife reports episodes of her husband's drunken behavior to him. The younger AKSENOVs fight frequently and separate from time to time; at the time of the source's departure they were living apart. The wife is materialistic and takes advantage of her husband's position. She deals frequently on the black market.

C. They have a daughter, Galina, born in 1973 in Minsk. AKSENOV has a brother who works for the CC, CPSU in Moscow, and a sister.

D. AKSENOV attended Minsk Middle School 24 together with source, graduating in 1966. He graduated from the French Department of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages in 1972, after which, on his father's insistence, he enrolled in a KGB school (apparently in Minsk), graduating as a lieutenant in 1973.

E. He has since been working as an operations officer (operupolnomochennyy) in the Operations Department (Operativnyy otdel or operotdel) of the KGB in Minsk. His first assignment was at the Yubileynaya Hotel, followed by the Turist Hotel, and at present he is responsible for the Yubileynaya Hotel. He holds the rank of senior lieutenant.

F. After becoming a KGB officer, AKSENOV continued to associate with the source and other classmates, and through him the source met a number of other KGB officers and was able to learn something about certain KGB operations in the Minsk area.

G. Photographs of AKSENOV are available in SE/BIO photo file.

3. BORICH, Yuriy (pnu). Born in about 1950. He is the son of a KGB general (fnu). BORICH is app. 180 cm. tall, thin, has light hair which he parts on the left side. He is

a quiet person. He plays the guitar. He and his wife are both graduates of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. He speaks German and English. BORICH was on assignment in The Netherlands (for the KGB, the Source thinks), had returned to Minsk but was scheduled to return to The Netherlands just before the Source's departure.

4. CHISTYY, Fedor (pnu). Born in about 1949. He is tall (182 cm.), heavy-set, has blond hair and deeply set eyes. The source describes him as clumsy, with a crude-looking face, and as "stupid but crafty". He is a graduate of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages and was an informer while a student there. CHISTYY served in the Army. He is a KGB officer, he works with AKSENOV (see paragraph 1) in the Operations Department. He is a heavy drinker and smoker.

5. GURIY (fnu, pnu) is 173 cm. tall, burly, and has a face, according to Source, which resembles that of a bull-dog. He is a KGB major, works in the Minsk KGB Operations Department, and serves as the overseer (kurator) of the Minsk Motel, which is about 11 miles to the west of the city.

6. LAPSHOV, Vladimir (pnu). Born in about 1946. He is short (166 cm.), heavy-set, looks like a boxer, has short hair, blue eyes, and a birthmark on the left side of his face. He has a penetrating gaze.

A. He was formerly a black marketeer. He is a construction engineer, he has been to Iran but now works in Moscow (he is originally from Minsk). Source suspects that LAPSHOV may be KGB on the basis of an incident when he was stopped by the militia for speeding. He showed some sort of identification which prompted the militiaman to salute him and let him go.

B. He is married to the daughter of cosmonaut Pavel Ivanovich BELYAYEV, who died on 10 January 1970. LAPSHOV likes to dress well and is considered by Source to be a show-off.

7. MOLOCHKO, Viktor Nikolayevich. Born in about 1946, he is the son of the Minister of Trade of the Belorussian SSR, Nikolay Petrovich MOLOCHKO. Viktor MOLOCHKO at present is a lieutenant in the KGB Operations Department (Operotdel). He is short, fat, has dark hair, is married and has children.

8. MOROZ (fnu, pnu), works for the KGB. He has been in Africa on assignment, possibly with military or economic aid, and has published a work on Africa. MOROZ always moves in KGB circles. He is married to the daughter of a lieutenant general (*general leytenant*), who commands an Army. He is short (about 167 cm.) has bulging eyes, a short neck, and looks "like a toad." He owns a new model Volga, a sensation in Minsk, as only a few of these cars per year, are allocated for civilian purchase.

9. NIKULKIN, Yakov Prokop'yevich. Is a lieutenant general (*general leytenant*) in the KGB and head of the Belorussian SSR KGB. He is a friend of Aleksandr Nikiforovich AKSENOV (see paragraph 1).

10. POKHIN, Aleksandr (pnu). Is a retired KGB major, was formerly a deputy chief of the Minsk KGB *Operotdel* and an immediate superior of Anatoliy AKSENOV. POKHIN's daughter, Lyudmila, is a graduate of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages and is a friend of the Source.

11. SECHEYKO, Vladimir (pnu). Born in about 1946. He was the only person who graduated from a KGB school (apparently in Minsk) with the rank of junior lieutenant, because of his bad behavior. He was later expelled from the KGB for excessive drinking and now works at the meteorological station in Minsk. His wife's name is Tamara.

12. SAZANOVICH (fnu, pnu). Is a KGB colonel, Chief of the Special Department (*Osobyy otdel*) of the Belorussian SSR KGB. SAZANOVICH interrogated a black marketeer, a friend of the Source.

13. SURGANOV, Yevgeniy Fedorovich. Born about 1945. Is a KGB officer. He is a graduate of the Physics Department of the Belorussian State University. His father is Fedor Anisimovich SURGANOV, Chairman of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. Yevgeniy SURGANOV is about 190 cm. tall, blond, of medium build, attractive. His left shoulder is noticeably lower than the right. He likes to drink.

14. ZENOVICH (fnu, pnu). He is a a Captain in the Belorussian KGB, was responsible for Philharmonic Orchestra but has been replaced. His wife's name is Svetlana, she was born in 1950. They have a daughter, Anna, born 8 March 1972. At present ZENOVICH is learning to drive a bus. *Interviewer's Comment:* This possibly indicates that ZENOVICH may have been fired from the KGB.

15. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: Soviet GICS, Soviet travel, IP Main Index, OCR and SE/SAG/OP branch index. These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

A. There are no Headquarters traces on Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV (para 2).

H

*AKSENOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich
SEX: M
DOB: 48
POB: USSR, Minsk
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. Operations officer, Operations Department, KGB.

B. There are no Headquarters traces on Yuriy BORICH (para 3).

H

*BORICH, Yuriy
SEX: M
DOB: ca 50
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. Possible KGB officer. Has been to The Netherlands.

C. There are no Headquarters traces on Fedor CHISTYY (para 4).

H

*CHISTYY, Fedor
SEX: M
DOB: ca 49
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382.

D. There are no Headquarters traces on fnu GURIY (para 5).

H

*GURIY, fnu
SEX: M
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB major
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382.

E. Vladimir LAPSHOV (para 6) is possibly identical to Vladimir Grigoryevich LAPSHOV, born on 21 July 1930, an engineer who intended to visit Canada in March 1977.

H

*LAPSHOV, Vladimir
SEX: M
DOB: ca 46
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: engineer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. Engineer. Has been to Iran. Suspect KGB.

F. Viktor Nikolayevich MOLOCHKO (para 7) is possibly identical to one Viktor MOLOCHKO, born 1946, listed as a sailor, who departed Spain in February 1968.

H

*MOLOCHKO, Viktor Nikolayevich
SEX: M
DOB: ca 46
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. Lieutenant in Operations Department of KGB.

G. There are no identifiable Headquarters traces on fnu MOROZ (para 8).

H. There are no Headquarters traces on Yakov Prokopyevich NIKULKIN (para 9).

*NIKULKIN, Yakov Prokopyevich
SEX: M
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382.
Lieutenant general in KGB.

I. There are no Headquarters traces on Aleksandr POKHIN (para 10).

*POKHIN, Aleksandr
SEX: M
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382.
Retired KGB major.

J. There are no Headquarters traces on fnu SAZANOVICH (para 12).

*SAZANOVICH, fnu
SEX: M
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382.
KGB colonel.

K. There are no Headquarters traces on Vladimir SECHEYKO (para 11).

SECRET

H

*SECHEYKO, Vladimir
SEX: M
DOB: ca 46
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: meteorological employee
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382.
Former KGB employee.

L. There are no Headquarters traces on Yevgeniy Fedorovich SURGANOV (para 13).

H

*SURGANOV, Yevgeniy Fedorovich
SEX: M
DOB: ca 45
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382.

M. There are no Headquarters traces on fnu ZENOVICH (para 14).

H

*ZENOVICH, fnu
SEX: M
DOB: ca 40
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382.
KGB captain.

Victor F. Zimin
SE/SAG/OP

SE/SAG/OP:Isabelle H. Domes:rl (17 June 1977)

SECRET

Distribution:
✓Orig - IP/An (please classify into 201-0948382 and index
indicated names in para 15)
1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR
1 - SE/RR
1 - SE/CI/I
1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono

201-948382

CONFIDENTIAL 7P

SX-31465
12 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Graduates of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages who travel abroad or who are disaffected.

SOURCE: (201-0948382), a foreign-language student from Minsk who worked in numerous jobs throughout the USSR. Born in 1949, he emigrated in 1976. Neither his bona fides nor his reporting reliability has been established.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 14 1977
MICROFILMED

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1972-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 26-28 April 1977

The following is in response to a requirement levied by SE/X/AF on 11 April 1977 and SE/CI/X on 12 April 1977.

1. CHADLIYEV, Anatoliy pnu. Born in 1949 or 1950. He is 176 cm. tall, of medium build, has short red hair, full lips, protruding eyes, freckles. He is single. He does not drink or smoke and is very reserved. In 1973, he graduated from the Institute, having studied in the English Department. He spent two years in Burma and since 1975 has been in Guinea as a contract interpreter.

2. DAVIDOVICH, Aleksandr pnu. Born in about 1948 in Minsk, he is 178 cm. tall, thin, has narrow shoulders, light hair, grayish blue eyes, full lips, and a large head. He likes to dress well and is considered by Source to be good-looking. He gesticulates when talking, he drinks and is an ardent card player. He likes women.

A. DAVIDOVICH's father is a colonel in the Personnel Department of the KGB in Minsk. His mother is a physician. During his school days, DAVIDOVICH got into trouble with the militia when he was caught, along with two other students, stealing a private car. But the matter was settled out of court, and DAVIDOVICH's only punishment was a reprimand at a Komsomol meeting.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 May 1977
201-948328

B. DAVIDOVICH left the Institute in 1971 to go to Algiers for two years, before taking his final examinations, but returned after one year to take these exams and to graduate. He speaks French, English and German.

C. In 1972, he married Nataliya (maiden name unknown), who is from Yevpatoria (in the Crimea), and is a graduate of the French Department of the Institute. In 1972, he also entered the Army but was discharged by a commission three months later due to a nervous disorder. To an ordinary person this would mean never being able to go abroad again. But in 1975, Source heard that DAVIDOVICH was in fact leaving the country again, with his wife, going possibly to Guinea or to Ghana. When asked how he managed this despite his record of illness, DAVIDOVICH told Source that his medical problem was curable and that he was now well. Source thinks that DAVIDOVICH is most likely working for the KGB, at least as a co-opted agent.

3. FISHMAN, Yakov Iosifovich. Born in about 1950. He was a neighbor of Source for 15 years. FISHMAN's father, Iosif, and a brother live in New York. Two days before Source's departure FISHMAN asked him to transmit the following information to authorities in the West. In 1973, FISHMAN served as a sergeant (serzhant) in a strategic missile unit 4 kilometers from the poselok (settlement) of Novobelokorovichi, Zhitomir Oblast'. This unit was armed with medium-range strategic rockets targeted against Munich. Twenty-four kilometers from this unit was another battalion with the same type of rockets, targeted against Frankfurt. These units were part of the 82nd Rocket Division of the Vinnitsa "Rocket Army." While assigned to this battalion, FISHMAN traveled to a rocket-connected manufacturing and repair plant at poselok of Kolosov near Minsk, and the poselok of Bataysk in Rostov Oblast'. The pickup points at both of these places were underground. FISHMAN wants to leave the USSR, but when he tried to apply, the officials would not even accept his papers because of his having been in the rocket troops.

4. KOROBOCHKIN, Leonid Ivanovich. Born in about 1943. Graduated from the Institute with Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV (KGB operations officer in Minsk and a friend of the Source). KOROBOCHKIN's father, born in 1902, is now a retired Air Force colonel and has been a Party member since 1921. KOROBOCHKIN was in the Army for one year and worked for the Belorussian Philharmonic Symphony for a year. He cannot find a good job but is trying to become a truck driver with the idea of driving the USSR-West European routes and then defecting. KOROBOCHKIN despises the Soviet government and system. He was one of three people, including Source, involved in a plot to

burn down a Party museum in Minsk, but they decided against this, thinking that it would jeopardize their chances of leaving the USSR. Source can communicate with him by prearranged code. A photo of KOROBOCHKIN is available in SE/BIO photo file.

5. LAZERKA, Vladimir pnu. Born in 1949 in Minsk. Is a graduate of the Spanish Department of the Institute. His wife's name is Tat'yana, she was his classmate at the Institute. His father is an engineer. After graduating, LAZERKA worked as a dispatcher at the Minsk airport and in 1974 went to Cuba with AEROFLOT.

6. MIKHEDO, Anatoliy pnu. Born in 1948 in Minsk of a Belorussian father and a Jewish mother. Graduated from the French Department of the Institute. He is a very good friend of Source, who considers him well-educated and cultured. MIKHEDO served in an (unknown) African country as a contract interpreter in 1973-75 but is now back in Minsk. He is working as a Sputnik tourist guide in Minsk but is very unhappy and dreams of going abroad again on another contract, though his chances are slim. He has become a heavy drinker. Two photographs of MIKHEDO are available in SE/BIO photo file.

7. MUZKOV, Yuriy pnu. Born in about 1936. He is KOROBOCHKIN's (see paragraph 4) half-brother. MUZKOV was a military specialist in the Higher Engineering and Missile Technical School (Vyssheye inzhenerno raketno tekhnicheskoye uchilishche, VIRTU) in the poselok of Uruch'ye near Kalinin. At present he is a lieutenant colonel in one of the Baltic republics, possibly Latvia.

8. MYAGKOV, Valeriy pnu. He is the son of a colonel on the staff of the Belorussian Military District. MYAGKOV and several other students of the Belorussian State University typed and pasted up in prominent places in Minsk about ten paper leaflets proclaiming "Down with Communist tyranny!" The KGB found them out by comparing the characteristics of the typewritten proclamation with the typewriter samples in their files. MYAGKOV got four years in prison, at least two of which he spent in the KGB prison in Minsk at ulitsa Volodarskogo 2.

9. PETROV, Dmitriy pnu. He is the grandson of a retired Army colonel, and was brought up by a widowed mother. PETROV was born in 1949 in Minsk. He graduated from the French Department of the Institute in 1972. He was a contract interpreter in an (unknown) African country and is now in Minsk. He worked as an interpreter in the economic achievement exhibit in Minsk. Source heard rumors that PETROV will be going abroad again quite soon.

10. PETUKHOV, Oleg pnu. Born in 1949. His address is ulitsa Likhanova 111, Apt. 116, Minsk. He is single and has a sister and mother in Minsk. PETUKHOV graduated from the Institute, where he studied German and English. At present he is working in an automobile repair shop.

PETUKHOV was in the Army in the Western Ukraine in a restricted zone where some secret units were stationed. He was one of the three participants in the plot to burn down the Party museum (see paragraph 4). PETUKHOV is trying to leave the USSR but has been unsuccessful thus far. The Source can communicate with him by a code based on associations which they have devised.

11. SHOR, Mstislav pnu. Born in about 1936. He is Jewish. He lives at ulitsa Ol'shevskogo 9, Minsk. SHOR is a former wrestler; he now works in a radiator factory. He has two sons. SHOR has divorced his wife and applied for an exit visa. He has been a neighbor of Source for many years.

12. TETEKHIN, Sergey pnu: Born in 1949 in Borisov. He is 183 cm. tall, of medium build, and wears glasses. His father is a major general (general-mayor, equivalent to a brigadier general in the U.S. Army) who lives in Borisov and is commander of a tank unit in the poselok of Pechi. TETEKHIN graduated from the French Department of the Institute in 1972 and spent two years in Uganda. He has now gone to Africa (country unknown) again. A photograph of TETEKHIN is available in SE/BIO photo file.

13. TSIRLIN, Leonid Abramovich. Born in about 1934, he is married, has a son. His address is ulitsa Volgogradskaya 47, Apt. 2. He is a senior economist at the Belorussian Land Reclamation and Water Resources Trust (Trest melioratsii BSSR), ulitsa Kommunista 6, Minsk. He wants very much to go to Israel but is having difficulties because of alimony from his first marriage. TSIRLIN is an anti-communist who has organized a group of 6-7 Jews who meet to study Hebrew, spread the word on emigrating to Israel, explain how to fill out the necessary forms, etc. TSIRLIN approached Source on the day before his departure for the USA and told him about the above, asking him to contact Israeli military and civilian authorities to obtain Zionist literature and possibly to be assigned intelligence missions. Source was introduced to TSIRLIN by his neighbor, Mstislav SHOR (see paragraph 11). Source delivered TSIRLIN's request to a Mr. GOREV of the Israeli Embassy in Vienna.

14. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: Soviet GICS, Soviet travel, IP Main Index, OCR and SE/SAG/OP branch index. These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

A. There are no Headquarters traces on Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV (para 4).

*AKSENOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich
SEX: M
DOB: ca 43
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
OCC: KGB officer
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948382. KGB operations officer.

B. Anatoliy CHADLIYEV (para 1) (201-0925018) was born in 1949 in Tbilisi. In 1971, he was an interpreter in Burma at the Soviet Technical Aid Mission. From before April 1974 to about October 1975, he was a translator for the Nigerian Steel Development Authority in Kaduna, Nigeria. Mentioned in an interview report by Soviet emigre 201-948382

There are no Headquarters traces on Aleksandr DAVIDOVICH (para 2).

*DAVIDOVICH, Aleksandr
SEX: M
DOB: ca 48
POB: USSR, Minsk
CIT: USSR
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948328. Graduate to Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. Has been to Algiers.

D. There are no Headquarters traces on Nataliya DAVIDOVICH (para 2).

*DAVIDOVICH, Nataliya
SEX: F
POB: USSR
CIT: USSR
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948328. Graduated from Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages.

E. There are no Headquarters traces on Vladimir LAZERKA (para 5).

LAZERKA, Vladimir
SEX: M
DOB: 49
POB: USSR, Minsk
CIT: USSR
OCC: dispatcher
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948328. Works at Minsk airport. Has been to Cuba.

F. There are no Headquarters traces on Anatoliy MIKHEDO (para 6).

MIKHEDO, Anatoliy
SEX: M
DOB: 48
POB: USSR, Minsk
CIT: USSR
OCC: tour guide
LOC: USSR, Minsk

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948328. Tour guide for Sputnik group. Has been to Africa 1973-5.

G. There are no identifiable Headquarters traces on Dmitriy PETROV (para 9).

H. There are no Headquarters traces on Sergey TETEKHIN (para 12).

TETEKHIN, Sergey
SEX: M
DOB: 49
POB: USSR, Borisov
CIT: USSR
LOC: Africa?

Known to Soviet emigre 201-0948328. Was in Uganda for 2 years. Is currently in Africa.

Victor F. Zimin
SE/SAG/OP

SE/SAG/OP:Isabelle H. Domes:ch (3 Jun 77)

Distribution:

Orig - IP/AN (please classify into 201-0948328, index indicated names in para 14, and ZR into 201-0925018 with the phrase "mentioned in an interview report by Soviet emigre 201-0948328.")
1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR
1 - SE/RR
1 - SE/X/AF
1 - SE/CI/X
1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono
1 - SE/CI/I

201-948328

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

31-1

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
220103Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
022946

0 INDEX
DISSEM BY: 44

CONF: SE 8 INFO: FILE IP/OMS, FR 5, OCO 3, PCS/OEIF, IPCS, SIA/1, SIA C14, EPS/EG2, LSN/ID, CCS2

0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: FR/NEW YORK.Y

R

UNINTEL CKTOP FORRES PDSEEKY

1. HQS OFFICER (IDEN) USING ALIAS FRED M. STEVENS PLANS VISIT TO NEW YORK 26-29 APRIL FOR INTERVIEWS WITH SOVIET EMIGRES SERGEY UZLOV AND GEORGE MARKOV.Y

2. FBI HQS COORDINATION EFFECTED. NO BASE CONTACT OR SUPPORT ANTICIPATED.Y

3. FILE: 200-008-096/09. E2 IMPDET.A

ORIG: SE/SAG/OP (ZIMIN); COORD: SE/X/FR ( ); FR/B2 (LEWIS); FR/OPS (MALTON); AUTH: C/SE/SAG (KARPOVICH); REL: C/FR/2 (NICOL).

S

DATE: 21 APRIL 1977
ORIG: VICTOR ZIMIN:EK Z
UNIT: SE/SAG/OP
EXT: 5622

SE/X/FR
FR/B2 E Lewis
FR/OPS C Malter
COORDINATING OFFICERS

S. Karpovich
C/SE/SAG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

C/FR/2
RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 055608

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

31-1

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR / DATE-TIME GROUP / CITE / MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 220103Z DIRECTOR 022947

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 44

CONF: SE 8 INFO: FILE IP/DMS, FRS, OCO 3, PCS/DEF, C/PCS, SIA/1, SIA, C14, EPS/EG2, LSN/10, CCS2

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: FR/NEW YORK.Y

UNINTEL CKTOP FORRES PDSEEKY

R

REF: 022946 |PLS FILL IN|Y

IDENTITY: VICTOR ZIMIN. E2 IMPDET.H

ORIG: SE/SAG/OP {ZIMIN}; COORD: SE/X/FR { }; ~~FR/02 {~~ };

~~FR/OPS 1~~ }; AUTH: C/SE/SAG {KARPOVICH}; REL: C/FR/2 {NICOL}.

DATE: 21 APRIL 77

ORIG: VICTOR ZIMIN:EK

UNIT: SE/SAG/OP

EXT: 2522

SE/X/FR ✓

FR/02 ✓

FR/OPS ✓

C/FR/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S. Karpovich

C/SE/SAG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 055LOA

T4-00000

PR R
mt

Merlyn
Natalie - pls
make copies
for all files.

20 April 1977

On 20 April 1977 the FBI telephonically granted approvals on Boris BRODETSKIY, Boris PALANT, and Sergey UZLOV.

As regards Vitaliy GOLDEN, the FBI has no current address on him. (The undersigned advised the FBI on this date that G. was destined for JFS, Worcester, Mass. The FBI stated they would now query their appropriate office and advise us once an address is obtained. Earlier, they had queried ✓ another office.)

L.G. Karpoff

Recorded on cards
20Apr77 mt

Uzlov file

SECRET

12 Apr 77

MEMORANDUM FOR: SE/SAG/OP

FROM: SE/CI/X/Africa

SUBJECT: Requirements for Sergey UZLOV and Boris PALANT -- Your memo 8 Apr 77

1. I don't have Aleksandr DAVIDOVICH (para 1-A-1) on my presence list for Conakry, but I would be interested in learning more about him, especially if he is in Guinea. Also anything UZLOV may have on Aleksandr CHADLIYEV.

2. Re para 1-B-1, any further details you can obtain on Anatoliy RUSANOV from PALANT would be most helpful. We don't have any record of RUSANOV arriving in Turkey.

Marianne King
SE/CI/X/Africa

R-1902

SECRET

UZLOV

SECRET

11 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/SE/SAG/OP

FROM: Douglas G. Bonner
C/SE/X/AF

SUBJECT: OI Requirements for Interviews of Soviet Emigres

REFERENCE: SAG Memo Dated 8 April 1977

1. Reference alerts us to provide OI requirements for SE/SAG/OP's scheduled debriefing of two Soviet emigres--Sergei UZLOV and Boris PALANT. We are keenly interested in what these two persons have to say about the young people who graduated from the French interpreters' faculty and proceeded to posts in Africa, as several of these names are familiar to us as leads. We are even more interested in background and assessment data on the three military instructors TARASENKO, LIPIN, and VOROBEV, who are currently in Africa and of interest to this branch.

2. In addition to straight bio and assessment data, we would like answers to the following:

A. What were the career and personal objectives/goals of these young persons who accepted assignments in Africa? Were they aware of the climactic/sociological/anthropological differences/difficulties they would encounter in Africa? Did they accept their assignments primarily to save money? Were any of them looking upon their African assignments as a form of "escape" from the Soviet Union? Had any of them ever mentioned suffering

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 060965

UZLOV

SECRET

mistreatment by the KGB or the Party?

B. Did the two sources have the opportunity to talk to any Soviet interpreters who had returned from tours in Africa? If so, what did these persons have to say about the climactic/sociological/anthropological problems they had encountered there, and how they handled them? African assignments are particularly difficult for Soviets who do not adapt easily to conditions in Africa. Because this inability to adapt to African conditions is operationally exploitable, we would like to learn as much about it as possible. We would also be interested in what they said about their duties as interpreters.

DGBonner
Douglas G. Bonner

S E C R E T

8 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SE Division Branch and Group Chiefs

SUBJECT: OI Requirements for Interviews of Soviet Emigres

1. SE/SAG/OP has scheduled two Soviet emigres for interviews in Washington within the next two weeks. We solicit your OI requirements for them, if you think--based on the following biographic sketches--they might have information for your branch.

A. Sergey UZLOV, born 19 Nov 49 in Minsk, Belorussian SSR. From 1969-72 he studied in the German pedagogical faculty of the Minsk Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages, where he became friends with several people who later traveled abroad as Soviet interpreters:

(1) Aleksandr DAVIDOVICH, DPOB 1948, Minsk; 1973 graduate of the French interpreters faculty; served 71-72 in Algiers; left for Guinea in 75 with wife Natasha; father is KGB colonel and high official in personnel department of Belorussian KGB.

(2) Sergey TETEKIN, DPOB 49, Borisov; 1973 graduate of French interpreters faculty; was sent to Uganda; father is major general, division or corps commander in Borisov.

(3) Anatoliy CHADLIYEV, DPOB 49, Minsk; 1973 graduate of French interpreters faculty; served in Burma; left for Guinea in 75.

(4) Anatoliy MIKHEDO, DPOB 48, Minsk; 1973 graduate of French interpreters faculty; served 73-75 in some African country; now working in Minsk as a guide.

(5) Dmitriy PETROV, DPOB 49, Minsk; 1972 graduate of French interpreters faculty; served in some African country and may be sent again soon.

S E C R E T

UZLOV

(6) Vladimir LAZERKA, DPOB 49, Minsk; 1974 graduate of Spanish interpreters faculty; now in Cuba with Aeroflot.

(7) A number of UZLOV's friends entered the KGB in Minsk.

B. Boris PALANT, born 15 Jan 52 in Kharkov, Ukrainian SSR. In 1974 he graduated from the foreign language department of Kharkov State University, where he became friends with the following Soviets who later traveled abroad, probably as KGB officers:

(1) Anatoliy RUSANOV. Had a TDY to Britain, now is PCS in Turkey; speaks medium-level English.

(2) Sergey MASHENKO. Was an exchange student at Oxford or Cambridge; now teaches English in Kharkov and may be preparing for new PCS.

(3) Vladimir TARASENKO, Aleksey LIPIN, and Aleksey VOROBEV--all will be assigned PCS to African countries, are now officer-instructors at Frunze Military Academy training third-world nationals.

(4) Yuriy KOTLYAR. Was exchange student at Oxford, married British citizen Cynthia CARLILE; now is an instructor at Frunze Military Academy. Speaks excellent English.

2. If you have any OI requirements for these interviews, please notify me on R-1404 by 15 April 1977.

Patty Nelson

Patty Nelson
SE/SAG/OP

Distribution:
Orig. - SE/SAG/OP (requirements)
1 - SE/TO
1 - C/SE/SAG
1 - C/SE/SAG/CA
1 - C/SE/RR
1 - C/SE/XO
1 - C/SE/X/AF
1 - C/SE/X/EU
1 - C/SE/X/EA
1 - C/SE/X/NE
1 - C/SE/X/LA
1 - C/SE/X/FR
1 - C/SE/USSR
1 - C/SE/CI
1 - C/SE/CI/X
1 - C/SE/CI/I
1 - SE/SAG/OP (chrono)
✓2 - SE/SAG/OP (soft files)

UZLOV

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

MF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

22-2

CLASSIFICATION
ECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP
[illegible]

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
015544

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 44

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER SOP

0 IP FILES #132

CONF: C/SE5 INFO: FILE C/W/OMS, C/SN/110, C/PCS, C/FR4, C/C/4, 0004, 000/00

0: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION/INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.Y

ATTENTION: CI-1 SECTION Y

IR-316/01254-77 Y

ECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS NVOLVED Y

UZLOV

PALANT

UBJECT: SEEK/SQ: INTERVIEWS WITH SOVIET EMIGRES Y

EFS: CIR-3016/00994/77 - 28 MARCH 1977

CIR-316/00726/77 - 3 MARCH 1977 Y

1. REQUEST PRIORITY APPROVAL TO INTERVIEW FOLLOWING SOVIET MIGRE WHO HAS COME TO OUR ATTENTION VIA PRELIMINARY SCREENING IN UROPE: Y

BORIS ALEKSANDROVICH BRODETSKY

DPOB: 9 SEP 46, KAZAN, USSR

OCC: ENGINEER

INS#: A21-703-838

WIFE: MARINA NEE VAINSHTOK

DPOB: 19 OCT 51, MOSCOW, USSR

OCC : SINGER/MUSICIAN

DATE:
ORIG: 7 April 77
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 2 OF 2

22

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T.

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

015544

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

INS: A21-703-839

SPONSOR: JEWISH FAMILY SERVICE,

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

{SUBJ DEPARTED ROME FOR LOS ANGELES

ON 22 MARCH 1977} Y

2. IF POSSIBLE PLEASE INCLUDE IN YOUR RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE A REPLY TO REFS REQUESTING CONTACT APPROVAL FOR BORIS PALANT AND SERGEY UZLOV. Y

[illegible]

3. SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. Y

4. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B {2}. IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER.H

FILE: 200-8-96/11

ORIG: SE/SAG/OP {M. HOOKS}; COORD: SE/X/FR { PHIPPS}; FR/1 { }; AUTH: C/SE/SAG {KARPOVICH }; REL: C/PCS ~~[illegible]~~/LSN {KATZOSH }.8

DATE: 7 APRIL 77 mh
ORIG: MERLYN HOOKS:RL
UNIT: SE/SAG/OP
EXT: 1404

C/PCS ~~[illegible]~~/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

SE/X/FR
FR/1/WA P. Hughes
COORDINATING OFFICERS

S. Karpovich
C/SE/SAG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

SECRET

6 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SE/SAG/OP

FROM : SE/CI/I

SUBJECT : Requirements for Sergey UZLOV

REFERENCE : ROME 54329, 9 March 1977

Following are SE/CI/I requirements for Sergey UZLOV, who is to be interviewed by SE/SAG/OP in the U.S.:

1. Please ask Subject to provide the location of any KGB installations in Minsk known to him, any places besides the Hotel "Yubileynaya" used by the KGB in Minsk for operational purposes, and any KGB telephone numbers in Minsk of which he may be aware.

2. Ask Subject to pinpoint the location of and describe as fully as possible the KGB audio control room in the Hotel "Yubileynaya" (layout, equipment, etc.). Approximately when did Yevgeniy AKSENOV take him to the room, and for what purpose? Can he recall any comments made by AKSENOV about the room or its equipment, or about AKSENOV's responsibilities in connection with the Hotel "Yubileynaya"?

3. Please debrief Subject fully about his relationship with AKSENOV and obtain full biographic details. Please also ask him to provide a personal description and an assessment of AKSENOV. Does he know any more about AKSENOV's KGB training or his KGB career?

4. Does Subject know if AKSENOV was ever in contact with foreigners? Does Subject have any knowledge, from AKSENOV or otherwise, about KGB/Minsk operations against foreigners?

5. Please obtain from Subject as much biographical information as possible on each of the following whom he named as KGB officers he knew superficially through AKSENOV:

WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 056479

SECRET

Yevgeniy SURGANOV
Vladimir MOLOCHKO(V)
(FNU) BORICH (correct spelling?)
Aleksandr POKHIN
Fedor CHISTYY

6. Did AKSENOV explicitly tell Subject that the above are KGB officers? If not, how does Subject know? Did these officers frequent the Hotel "Yubileynaya" only for social purposes? For operational reasons? Both? Dates/time frame? Can Subject provide any additional information about their intelligence training, specialties, operational activities, past assignments, or current assignments?

7. How did Subject learn that Aleksandr POKHIN is Deputy Chief of the Ops Department of the Belorussian KGB? From POKHIN? From POKHIN's daughter Lyudmila? From AKSENOV? What is the designation for this component in Russian? Does Subject have any idea who is the Chief?

8. Does Subject have any other knowledge of the organization and structure of the KGB in Minsk? Or of other personnel? Please ask him to provide names and biographic data on any additional KGB/Minsk officers he may have met or any he may know of but does not know personally.

9. Please obtain a full account of what Subject knows about Leonid Abramovich TSIRLIN, including additional biographic information, how TSIRLIN happened to approach Subject before Subject's departure, and details regarding the underground Zionist group in Minsk on whose behalf TSIRLIN is allegedly acting. How well does Subject know TSIRLIN? What is his appraisal of TSIRLIN? Does Subject know any of TSIRLIN's associates besides Slava SHOR? If so, please obtain full details.

10. Please ask Subject to provide the full name of his neighbor Slava SHOR and biographic information. Please also ask Subject to describe his relationship with SHOR and SHOR's relationship with TSIRLIN.

11. Please obtain biographic information on Yakov FISHMAN, including the full names of his parents who according to Subject have been in New York since 1974. Where in New York? As emigres? How well does Subject know FISHMAN? For how long? Ask Subject to describe fully the background/circumstances for FISHMAN's request that Subject memorize PI for the benefit of Western intelligence.

12. Can Subject supply any further biographic or career information on Aleksandr DAVIDOVICH's father, who according to Subject is a KGB colonel and the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Personnel Department of the Belorussian KGB? Did Subject learn this from the son? Does Subject know if the son is still in Guinea? By which Ministry was he sent to Guinea? Could he be working for the KGB? Did Subject ever meet the elder DAVIDOVICH? Can Subject describe him? Does Subject have any idea at all what the father's full name is, or of the patronymic of the son whom Subject described as his friend in both grade school and college?

13. Does Subject know or know of any graduates of the Interpreter Faculty of the Minsk Institute of Foreign Languages who became KGB employees? Details?

14. It is not clear from Reference what Subject's entree was to the group of children of Minsk "top society and KGB officers" with whom he claims to have associated. For this reason, details about the background and position of Subject's father may be particularly pertinent. Please ask him to amplify as much as possible.

F. Patricia Young
F. Patricia Young

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - SE/CI/I

14-00000

[illegible]33 7-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

SE5

ACTION

C/OP

[illegible]

EYES ONLY

T 726532 EIA594 PAGE 01 IN 231135

TOR:231644Z MAR 77 ROME 54824

SECRET 231702Z MAR 77 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE ROME 54824

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: SE/SAG/OP

SUBJECT: WNINTEL RYBAT PLAERONAUT PDSEEK

REF: ROME 54823 [IN 231135]

1. FOLLOWING SOVIET EMIGRES ABOARD ICEM PROFLIGHT 2322, TWA 841, 22 MARCH 1977:

BORIS PALANT

DESTINATION: JFS, BUFFALO, N.Y.

SERGEY UZ[illegible]

DESTINATION: [illegible]ANA, N.Y.

2. FILE: 200-028-096/2. E2 IMPDET.

record copy filed

P&E DISSEM

RYBAT

RECORD COPY

SECRET

Peter Kingland –
Hickly —

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 21 PER

TOTAL COPIES 7-11

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

1 OP 4
2 5
3 6

ACTION UNIT C/SE 5

ACTION

INFO RF FILE VR

EYES ONLY

T 553794 EIA479 PAGE 01 IN 210967

TOR:291707Z MAR 77 ROME 54329

Copies passed c SE/RR, SE/CCS/2 and SE/CI/C on 10 March 77

S E C R E T 091455Z MAR 77 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE ROME 54329 (SECTION 1 OF 2 One of Two

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: SE/SAG/OP INFO C/EUR

SUBJECT: WNINTEL RYBAT PLAERONAUT POSEEK

RYBAT
RECORD COPY

OI interest

1. SUBJECT IS SERGEY UZLOV (USLOV). BORN 19 NOVEMBER 1949, MINSK, OF RUSSIAN FATHER AND JEWISH MOTHER, INS NO. A-21-723-170, DEPARTED USSR 26 NOV 1976, DEPARTING ROME SOMETIME IN MARCH 1977. SUBJ ASSESSED BY BESDINS 4 MARCH 77 FOR OI INFO ON SOVIET INTERPRETERS TRAVELLING ABROAD AND KGB OFFICERS IN MINSK.

2. AFTER GRADUATING FROM HIGH SCHOOL IN 1966, SUBJ WORKED AT SEVERAL MANUAL LABOR JOBS AND IN 1969 ENROLLED IN MINSK PEDAGOGICAL INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES WHERE HE STUDIED AT GERMAN TEACHER TRAINING FACULTY. HE DROPPED OUT AFTER THIRD YEAR SINCE HE FELT THAT THERE WAS NO FUTURE FOR HIM AS HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER OF GERMAN AND THAT AS A JEW HE WOULD NOT BE GIVEN FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS. FROM 1972 TO 74 SUBJ EMPLOYED AS RADIO LAB WORKER WITH BELORUSSIAN STATE UNIVERSITY, SIMULTANEOUSLY STUDYING AT HISTORY FACULTY.

S E C R E T

MFG 2-76

E,SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ON UNIT NOTIFIED ______

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ICE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

ION UNIT | INFO | RF FILE VR

TION #

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 663794 EIA479 PAGE 02 IN 210967

TOR:291707Z MAR 77 ROME 54329

HE DROPPED OUT AFTER ONE YEAR AND FROM 1974 TO 76 WORKED AS A PHOTOGRAPHER FOR MINSK PHOTO CENTER.

3. MINSK INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES WAS LOCATED ON ULITSA ZAKHAROVA, NEAR POBEDY SQUARE. IT HAD FOUR TEACHER TRAINING FACULTIES (ENGLISH, GERMAN, FRENCH AND SPANISH) AS WELL AS INTERPRETER FACULTY COMPRISED OF FOUR DEPTS REPRESENTING SAME LANGUAGES. SUBJ CLAIMS THAT ABOUT EIGHTY PER CENT OF STUDENTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF GERMAN AND SPANISH, WERE DRAWN FROM RURAL AREAS OF BELORUSSIA. AMONG THE OTHER STUDENTS WERE SOME CHILDREN OF BELORUSSIAN VIPS.

4. SUBJ KNEW SEVERAL GRADUATES OF INTERPRETER FACULTY OF HIS INSTITUTE WHO WERE PART OF A SMALL GROUP EVENTUALLY CIRCULATING ON FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS. SUBJ STATED THAT THEY TRAVELLED ABROAD UNDER CONTRACTS WITH VARIOUS SOVIET MINISTRIES (THOUGH IN MOST CASES WORKING AS MILITARY TRANSLATORS/ INTERPRETERS). UPON RETURN TO USSR, THEIR CONTRACTS WERE TERMINATED AND THEY HAD TO SEEK OTHER JOBS WHILE AWAITING POSSIBLE NEW ASSIGNMENTS ABROAD. SUBJ WAS NOT INFORMED ON THEIR CP MEMBERSHIP AND BELIEVED THAT MOST OF THE TRANSLATORS KNOWN TO HIM DID NOT BELONG TO THE PARTY.

S E C R E T

PE TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

1 2 3 4 5 6

T 663794 EIA479 PAGE 03 IN 210967

TOR:291707Z MAR 77 ROME 54329

5. SUBJ RECALLS FOLLOWING INTERPRETERS:

A. ALEKSANDR (PATRONYMIC UNKNOWN) DAVIDOVICH, DPOB 1948, MINSK, A JEW, MARRIED TO NATASHA, MAIDEN NAME UNKNOWN, WHO ALSO GRADUATE OF FRENCH FACULTY OF MINSK INSTITUTE THEY RESIDEIN MINSK ON ULITSA LENINA, HOUSE NUMBER UNRECALLED. DAVIDOVICH'S FATHER IS KGB COLONEL AND HIGH OFFICIAL (CHIEF OR DEPUTY) IN PERSONNEL DEPT OF BELORUSSIAN KGB. DAVIDOVICH'S MOTHER IS A MEDICAL DOCTOR. AFTER FOURTH INSTITUTE YEAR, DAVIDOVICH SENT IN 1971 FOR ONE YEAR APPRENTICESHIP TO ALGERIA, THEN RETURNED HOME TO GRADUATE, THEN DRAFTED FOR ONE YEAR INTO ARMED FORCES. AFTER THREE MONTHS IN THE SERVICE, DAVIDOVICH RECEIVED MEDICAL DISCHARGE FOR NERVOUS DISORDER WHICH NORMALLY WOULD MEAN END OF INTERPRETER CAREER. SURPRISINGLY, DAVIDOVICH (POSSIBLY THROUGH HIS FATHER'S CONTACTS) WAS AGAIN GIVEN CONTRACT AND LEFT FOR GUINEA WITH HIS WIFE IN 1975. DAVIDOVICH, WHO SUBJECT'S GRADE SCHOOL AND COLLEGE FRIEND, IS INTELLIGENT AND CULTURED. HE LIKES TO DRINK AND IS A SKIRT-CHASER.

B. SERGEY (PNU) TETEKIN, DPOB 1949, BORISOV,

S E C R E T

14-00000

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____ RUN BY

S E C R E T

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

UNIT NOTIFIED

COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ION UNIT ____ INFO ____ RF FILE VR

TION #

IN 210967

T 553794 EIA479 PAGE 04 ROME 54329

TOR:291707Z MAR 77

RUSSIAN, MARITAL STATUS UNKNOWN, SON OF A
MAJ. GEN. WHO DIVISION OR CORPS COMMANDER IN BORISOV.
AFTER GRADUATION IN 1973, SENT TO UGANDA. TETEKIN DESCRIBED AS
VERY STUPID.

C. ANATOLIY (PNU) C H A D L I Y E V , DPOB 1949,
MINSK, RUSSIAN, SINGLE, GRADUATED 1973 AND SENT TO BURMA.
WORKED AS WATCHMAN UPON RETURN TO MINSK AND CA 1975 CONTRACTED
FOR WORK IN GUINEA. CHADLIYEV DOES NOT DRINK OR SMOKE, IS
NOT INTERESTED IN WOMEN, IS VERY RESERVED AND VERY ORDINARY,
OF MIDDLE-CLASS BACKGROUND.

D. ANATOLIY (PNU) M I K H E D O , DPOB 1948, MINSK,

PAGE 3 ROME 54329 S E C R E T

OF BELORUSSIAN FATHER AND JEWISH MOTHER, MARRIED. VERY CLOSE
FRIEND OF SUBJ, WELL EDUCATED AND VERY CULTURED. AFTER
GRADUATION IN 1973, SPENT TWO YEARS IN AN UNIDENTIFIED AFRICAN
COUNTRY. PRESENTLY WORKING AS GUIDE IN MINSK "SPUTNIK" TOURIST
OFFICE MAKING 92 RUBLES PER MONTH AND DREAMING OF ANOTHER
ASSIGNMENT ABROAD. COMPULSIVE DRINKER.

E. DIMITRIY (DIMA) P E T R O V , DPOB 1949, MINSK,
MARIED. GRANDSON OF RETIRED ARMY COLONEL, BROUGHT UP BY

S E C R E T

PER

TOTAL COPIES

RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

BY AT

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 663794 EIA479 PAGE 05 IN 210967

TOR:0917072 MAR 77 ROME 54329

WIDOWED MOTHER. VERY STUPID. AFTER GRADUATION IN 1972, SENT TO AN UNIDENTIFIED AFRICAN COUNTRY AND UPON RETURN WORKED AT BELORUSSIAN EXHIBIT OF ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS IN MINSK AS GUIDE/INTERPRETER. SUBJ HEARD THAT HE IS SCHEDULED FOR ANOTHER AFRICAN TOUR IN NEAR FUTURE.

(NOTE: ALL ABOVE GRADUATES OF FRENCH DEPT OF INTERPRETER FACULTY OF MINSK INSTITUTE. EXCEPT FOR PETROV, TETEKIN AND CHADLIYEV, ALL EXPRESSED ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENTS IN POLITICAL CONVERSATIONS WHICH, ACCORDING TO SUBJ, WAS A RECENT TREND AMONG HIS ACQUAINTANCES.)

F. VLADIMIR (VADIM) LAZERKA, DPOB 1949, MINSK. MARRIED TO TANYA, A CLASSMATE AT SPANISH FACULTY OF MINSK INSTITUTE. LAZERKA'S FATHER IS AN ENGINEER. AFTERGRADUATING IN 1974, LAZERKA WORKED AS DISPATCHER AT MINSK AIRPORT AND IS PRESENTLY IN CUBA WITH AEROFLOT.

G. (FNU) MAKHUN, DPOB CA 1948, GRADUATE OF SUBJECT'S HIGH SCHOOL AND MINSK LANGUAGE INSTITUTE. SUBJ HAS NOT SEEN MAKHUN SINCE 1966, BUT ACCORDING TO DAVIDOVICH, MAKHUN WORKS CONTINUOUSLY AS MILITARY TRANSLATOR ABROAD.

6. SUBJ WAS VERY CLOSE TO A KGB OFFICER, ANATOLIY

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY O
ISSUING OFFICE IS P

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________

DEFERRED TELEPO

ACTION UNIT	I N F O RF FILE VR	1 4 2 5 3 6
ACTION #		

T 553794 EIA479 PAGE 06-06 IN 210967

TOR:2917272 MAR 77 ROME 54329

AKSENOV, DPOB 1946, MINSK, MARRIED TO TANYA KONDRAKOVA, FRENCH TEACHER AT MINSK POLYTECHNICAL INSTITUTE. THEY RESIDE AT APT 12, PROSPEKT LENINA (HOUSE NUMBER NOT RECALLED), IN SO-CALLED "HOUSE OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS" NEAR TS.U.M.-CENTRAL DEPARTMENT STORE. AKSENOV'S FATHER IS SECOND SECRETARY OF BELORUSSIAN CP (FORMERLY, SECRETARY OF VITEBSK OBLAST) AND RECENTLY ELECTED TO CC OF CPSU. AKSENOV GRADUATED FROM FRENCH DEPT OF INTERPRETER FACULTY OF MINSK INSTITUTE, BUT JOINED KGB AND IS NOW SEN. LT. AND CASE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF HOTEL "YUBILEYNAYA" IN MINSK. HE IS VERY APOLITICAL PERSON AND COMPULSIVE DRINKER.

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 663827 EIA495 PAGE 7/1 7 (7) IN 212996

TOR:091711Z MAR 77 ROME 54329

S E C R E T 091455Z MAR 77 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE ROME 54329 (SECTION 2 OF 2)

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: SE/SAG/OP INFO C/EUR

SUBJECT: WNINTEL RYBAT PLAERONAUT PDSEEK

PAGE 4 ROME 54329 S E C R E T

ON VERGE OF ALSOCHOLISM. AKSENOV IS SUBJECT'S CLOSEST FRIEND SINCE GRADE SCHOOL. "YUBILEYNAYA" WAS SUBJECT'S FAVORITE HANGOUT AND THERE HE WAS INTRODUCED BY AKSENOV TO SEVERAL OTHER KGB OFFICERS LISTED IN FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH. AKSENOV TOOK SUBJ ON ONE OCCASION TO KGB AUDIO CONTROL ROOM (KOMNATA PROSLUSHIVANIYA) IN HOTEL "YUBILEYNAYA".

7. THROUGH AKSENOV, SUBJ KNEW SUPERFICIALLY FOLLOWING KGB OFFICERS IN MINSK: SEN. LT. YEVGENIY SURGANOV, DPOB 1945, MINSK, GRAD OF PHYSICS FACULTY OF MINSK UNIVERSITY, SON OF CHAIRMAN OF SUPREME SOVIET OF BELORUSSIAN SSR; VLADIMIR MOLOCHKOV, SON OF TRADE MINISTER OF BELORUSSIAN SSR; (FNU) BORICH, DPOB 1951, MINSK (FATHER IS A MAJ. GEN.), GRADUATE OF GERMAN FACULTY WHO LEFT FOR HOLLAND IN MARCH 1974; MAJOR ALEKSANDR POKHIN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPS DEPT OF

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

67

IN 212976

T 653807 E1A495 PAGE 22 8 ROME 54329

TOR:091711Z MAR 77

BELORUSSIAN KGS (POKHIN'S DAUGHTER IS LUDMILA, GRADUATE OF
ENGLISH FACULTY OF MINSK INSTITUTE AND SUBJECT'S FRIEND);
FEDOR CHISTYY, DPOB 1950, IN UNIDENTIFIED BELORUSSIAN
VILLAGE, STUDIED WITH SUBJ, THEN CHANGED TO INTERPRETER
FACULTY. WORKED IN GDR AND IN 1975 OR 76 WORKED IN OPS DEPT
OF MINSK KG3.

8. SUBJECT'S GRADE SCHOOL AND COLLEGE FRIEND, 1972
GRAD OF GERMAN PEDAGOGICAL FACULTY, VLADIMIR GASTILO-
VICH, BELORUSSIAN, BORN 1949 IN MINSK (MOTHER IS MEMBER
OF BELORUSSIAN SUPREME COURT), IS PRESENTLY INTERFLUG REP AT
MINSK AIRPORT AND FREQUENTLY TRAVELS TO GDR. DRUNKARD.
ANOTHER FRIEND OF SUBJ, GRAD OF SPANISH FACULTY, MINSK
MILITIA LT. VLADIMIR KOVALEV WORKS NOW WITH "
"FARTSOVSHCHIKI" (BLACK MARKET WITH FOREIGNERS) DEPARTMENT;
HIS FATHER-IN-LAW IS RETIRED HIGH-RANKING KGB OFFICER; SUBJ
AND LAZERKA WERE BEST MEN AT KOVALEV'S WEDDING. SUBJECT'S
FRIEND, NATASHA TARASOVA (MARRIED, BUT RETAINED MAIDEN
NAME), 1971 GRADUATE OF GERMAN FACULTY, PRESENTLY WORKS IN
GDR CONSULATE IN MINSK.

9. PRIOR TO SUBJECT'S DEPARTURE FROM MINSK HE WAS

S E C R E T

TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1 4
2 5
3 6

T 663827 EIA455 PAGE 05 9 IN 210976

TOR:291721Z MAR 77 ROME 54329

APPROACHED BY LEONID (LENYA) ABRAMOVICH TSIRLIN, WHO ASKED HIM TO SPEAK TU ISRAELI OFFICIALS IN THE WEST OR TO (FNU) SHOSTAK, REP OF JEWISH COMMUNITY IN MARYLAND.

PAGE 5 ROME 54329 S E C R E T

TSIRLIN ALLEGEDLY ACTED ON BEHALF OF AN UNDERGROUND ZIONIST GROUP IN MINSK CONSISTING OF 7 TO 8 MEMBERS (NONE KNOWN TO SUBJECT). TSIRLIN REQUESTED CONTACTS WITH THE WEST, DELIVERY OF ZIONIST LITERATURE AND POSSIBLY INTEL MISSIONS. TSIRLIN WORKS AS SENIOR ECONOMIST WITH TRUST "BELMELIORATSIYA" ON ULITSA KOMMUNISTICHESKAYA 6. HE RESIDES AT ULITSA VOLGOGRADSKAYA 47, APT 2, MINSK. SUBJ HAS KNOWN HIM SINCE 1974 AND MET HIM THROUGH SLAVA SHOR, SUBJECT'S NEIGHBOR AT ULITSA OLSHEVSKOGO9, IN MINSK. SUBJ DELIVERED ABOVE MESSAGE TO MR. (FNU) GOREV OF ISRAELI EMBASSY IN VIENNA. (SHOR RECENTLY APPLIED FOR EXIT VISA.)

10. ANOTHER OF SUBJECT'S NEIGHBORS (PHONE 24-13-61), YAKOV FISHMAN, WHOSE PARENTS HAVE BEEN IN NEW YORK SINCE 1974, ESCORTED SUBJ TO BREST AND WANTED HIM TO MEMORIZE FOLLOWING PI FOR THE BENEFIT OF WESTERN INTELLIGENCE: FISHMAN SERVED IN 1973 IN STRATEGIC MISSILE UNIT 4 KM NORTHEAST OF POSELOK

S E C R E T

7-71 MFG 2/78

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 663807 EIA495 PAGE ~~C~~ 10 IN 2129~~6~~ 67

TOR: 2917112 MAR 77 ROME 54329

NOVOBELOKOROVICHI, ZHITOMIR OBLAST. HIS ROCKET BATTALION (DIVISION) WAS ARMED WITH INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES TARGETTED AGAINST MUNICH. ANOTHER IDENTICAL ROCKET BATTALION WAS LOCATED 24 KM FROM FISHMAN'S. BOTH BATTALIONS A PART OF 82ND ROCKET DIVISION OF VINNITSA ROCKET ARMY. WHILE IN SERVICE, FISHMAN TRAVELLED FOR MISSILE PICK-UP TO UNDERGROUND PLANTS IN POSELOK KOLOSOVO NEAR MINSK AND IN BATAYSK, ROSTOV OBLAST.

11. SUBJ VERY AGGRESSIVE AND OUTGOING INDIVIDUAL. HE COULD NOT HOLD STEADY JOB AND WAS NOT PERSISTENT IN COLLEGE STUDIES. IT SEEMS THAT HIS FAVORITE PASTIME WAS HANGING AROUND "YUBILEYNAYA" HOTEL VAR WHICH FREQUENTED BY CHILDREN OF MINSK TOP SOCIETY AND KGB OFFICERS. SUBJ CLAIMED THAT HE COOPERATING WITH AMERICAN AUTHORITIES BECAUSE OF HIS ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENTS AND DESIRE TO INFLICT DAMAGE ON COMMUNIST REGIME IN USSR. HE ALSO EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR EVENTUAL INTELLIGENCE CAREER IN HIS NEW HOMELAND. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, REFRAINED FROM GIVING SUBJ BIDFIELD AA. SUBJ IS HIAS CASE, TRAVELLING WITH MOTHER TO NEW YORK CITY. DURING FIRST FEW WEEKS AFTER ARRIVAL CAN BE REACHED C/O ANNA ZELDOVICH, 2425

S E C R E T

PER | TOTAL COPIES | RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	I N F O	RF FILE VR	DEFERRED TELEPOUCH		
			1	4	
			2	5	
ACTION #			3	6	

T 663807 EIA495 PAGE ~~06-06~~ 11 | 11 IN 210976

TOR:091711Z MAR 77 ROME 54329

RING HIGHWAY, APT F-10, BROOKLYN, N.Y., 11229.

PAGE 6 ROME 54329 S E C R E T

12. FILE: 200-028-296/2. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

14-00000

28 Mar 77

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Intelligence Division
CI-1 Section

FROM: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: SEEK/SQ: Interviews with Soviet Emigres

1. As a follow-up to preliminary CIA screening in Europe, we plan to interview the following Soviet emigres about foreign intelligence information:

a. BOLDYREV, Petr Matveyevich
DPOB: 12 December 1936, Leningrad, USSR
OCC : Philosophy teacher
INS#: A21-658-204
SPONSOR: International Rescue Committee,
New York, New York

b. GOLDIN, Vitaliy Yefimovich
DPOB: 16 February 1940, Severodvinsk, USSR
OCC : Mathematician
INS#: A21-703-897
SPONSOR: Unknown

c. SVETLOV, Feliks Viktorovich
DPOB: 22 July 1932, Moscow, USSR
OCC : Lawyer
INS#: A21-375-520
SPONSOR: HIAS, New York, New York

d. UZLOV (USLOV), Sergey
DPOB: 19 November 1949, Minsk, USSR
OCC : Photographer
INS#: A21-703-170
SPONSOR: HIAS, New York, New York

CLASSIFIED BY 055608. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2). DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED.

S E C R E T

2. Should our interviews produce any information likely to interest the FBI we shall, of course, forward it to you promptly.

3. Please let us have a FBI name check on each of these emigres, and, if you have them, their current addresses.

CIR-316/00994-77

SE/SAG/OP:Merlyn Hooks:ek x1404 17 Mar 77

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - OPS/LSN
1 - SE/X/FR
2 - FR/2
4 - SE/SAG/OP soft files
1 - SE/SAG/OP FBI file
1 - IP/AN/SE (Pls classify into 200-008-096/11)

061 SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: SUR-8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, DDA, AGC/DDC, C/PCS, CA-4, CCS-2, CI-4, COMMO-7, CWO-2, DDO/DO, IP/DMS, LA-8, LSN/IC, LSN/MIL, ODPD-D, OGC-2, OLC, SE-8, SECUR-3, (62/P)

---

78 0421219 PAGE 001
TOT: 152147Z MAR 78 DIRECTOR 188531

S E C R E T
STAFF 152146Z DIRECTOR 188531
TO: [LONDON.] 15-1

WNINTEL [MH]SPLASH [CK]LEG [SG]CHART [RT]WINNER

REF: [LONDON] 92099 0391413

CI ____

To: Veciana 201 as she did not mark this for filing in the 201.

1. FOLLOWING ARE HEADQUARTERS TRACES FYI [LONDON] ONLY ON WILLIAM GAUDET AND ANTONIO VECIANA MENTIONED REF.

2. WILLIAM GEORGE GAUDET

DPOB: 21 SEPTEMBER 1908, ST. JAMES, LOUISIANA, USA

CIT: U.S.

BC

AS OF CA 1953 GAUDET'S ADDRESS WAS GIVEN AS 2176 ESPLANADE AVENUE, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA. HE WAS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF LATIN AMERICA AND PUBLISHED IN THE EARLY 1950'S A MAGAZINE OR BULLETIN "LATIN AMERICAN REPORTS". HE WAS A CONTACT OF DCD FROM 1948 UNTIL NOVEMBER 1961 IN NEW ORLEANS AREA. HE WAS DEBRIEFED ON HIS LATIN AMERICAN TRAVELS 1948-1955 AND WAS A CASUAL CONTACT FROM 1955-1961. GAUDET WAS AMONG INDIVIDUALS LISTED IN A LETTER OF 24 JANUARY 1978 TO CIA FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS. THE COMMITTEE INTENDED CONDUCT INTERVIEWS WITH GAUDET AND INQUIRED IF DCD HAD EVER BEEN IN CONTACT WITH HIM. HQS RESPONDED ON 27 JAN 1978 SAYING WE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH HIM FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, BUT HAD NO CURRENT CONTACT WITH OR RECENT INTEREST IN HIM.

2. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT GAUDET HAS MADE THIS CLAIM BEFORE, THAT OF HAVING BEEN AN "OPERATIVE" AND HAS EXAGGERATED HIS ROLE WITH THE AGENCY. AS AN INTERESTING HISTORICAL ASIDE, AN ARTICLE IN THE WASHINGTON "STAR" (15 JAN 1976) REPORTED GAUDET HAD RECEIVED MEXICAN TOURIST VISA IN NEW ORLEANS, APPARENTLY CIRCA 1963. HIS VISA NUMBER IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THAT OF VISA GRANTED LEE HARVEY OSWALD.

RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce

3. ANTONIO CARLOS V E C I A N A BLANCH (201-0312966)

DPOB: 18 OCTOBER 1928, CUBA

SECRET

Fi: VECIANA 201

7/PN

SECRET

STAFF

78 0421219 PAGE 003
TOT: 152147Z MAR 78 DIRECTOR 188531

03
ORIG: EURBC (WERDEN); COORD: AC/ACS/LSN (KUHN); FOR AGC/DDC;
LA/COG/COCI (SPEED); 03
REL: C/E/BC (STIMSON). 03

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

3/rv

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF. 0 . 0 0 0 0 0

1

SECRET

STAFF

1014502 DIRECTOR 560902

CONF C/WH 8 INFO FILE C/IP/AN, C/AFG, C/SBS, C/OPS, C/CSN/MIL

DISSEM BY: 9/16

16-17

16-11

TO: WH/MIAMI, [CARACAS] INFO [BOGOTA]. Y

~~RYBAT~~ [VUTOGA] [GICOO] Y

REF: DIRECTOR 559962 |*| Y

1. FOLLOWING TRACES ANTONIO CARLOS VECIANA BLANCH PER PARAGRAPH THREE K OF REFERENCE: Y

A. FOUNDER OF ALPHA 66 GROUP (1962-65) AND FORMER MEMBER OF PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN CUBA (1960-61). Y

B. POA GRANTED VECIANA JANUARY 1962 FOR USE WITH REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE (MRP) BUT NO RECORD IN HIS FILE WHETHER HE EVER USED OR CONTACTED. POA CANCELLED NOVEMBER 1962. Y

C. ISR REGISTERED VECIANA TO LNGLUE NOVEMBER 1962 AND RECORD SHOWS HE TERMINATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE JULY 1966. Y

D. EMPLOYED WITH OFFICE OF CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID), LA PAZ, BOLIVIA, CIRCA APRIL 1968 TO JUNE 30, 1972. Y

C/WH/C 01-3

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

201-312966

7 Jan 74

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 237261

SECRET

480

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2 2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

560902

2. FILE: 201-312966. E2, IMPDET.

WH COMMENT: *MENTIONED ANTONIO VECIANA AND STATED THAT HE WAS DENOUNCED AS A CIA AGENT.

JUL 16 74
JB

DATE: 7 JUNE 1974
ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD/JD
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 7208/9061

C/WH/SAO
DC/WH/3
SB/X/W+
SB/SP/X
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

DC/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 237261

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WINSTON, HENRY
201-6887 Vol II of II

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1966 —

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Third Agency Documents

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/11/75	3/17/75	Betsy Wolf	Betsy Wolf
3 May		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf
23 MAY		JOHANNA SMITH	Johanna Smith
7 NOV. 78		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

201-6887

Third Agency Docs Henry Winston 201-6887 Vol II

Third Agency Docs Henry Winston Vol II 201-6887

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

[illegible] 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on [illegible] (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ____________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☑ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed ____________ (name) ____________ (title) ____________ (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ____________ (initials) ____________ (date) 197__

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-026287

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

There is information on an individual who may be identical with the subject of this 201 in OPS/ITG. For details call extension 5020.

KEEP THIS NOTICE FILED ON TOP

OF 201- 006887

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINSTON, HENRY
201-0006887 074-006-783/05
SEX M SX-23696/01
13 AUG 74
P56

MENTIONED IN DEBRIEFINGS OF SOVIET EMIGRES PDSOLE/1 AND PDSOLE/2.

DATE 04 DEC 75 09356242

201-0006887

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

S E C R E T

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINSTON, HENRY
201-0006887 100-006-139/04
SEX M CD-02099
08 MAR 74
CIT USA P2

RES USA. MENTIONED IN ANALYSIS OF "STORY OF AN AMERICAN COMMUNIST BY JOHN GATES.

DATE 22 MAR 74 09083288

201-006887

S E C R E T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

RK ✓

~~TG~~

OBW ✓

RTTUZYUW RUFTRNR 0537 1291248-UUUU--RUTLAAA.

ZNR UUUUU ZYH

R 081211Z MAY 72

FM FBIS VIENNA

TO RUFHVOA/VOA MUNICH

RUTLAAA/FBIS WASHDC

FBVI

BT

UNCLAS LD 380 [illegible]

COPY TO LIAISON

WINSTON GRANTS INTERVIEW TO PRAGUE TELEVISION

AB51811 SEE AB01652 PRAGUE DOMESTIC CZECH 081130 [illegible]

LD82254 PRAGUE CTK ENGLISH 082037

PRAGUE DOMESTIC TELEVISION SERVICE IN CZECH 1830 GMT 7 MAY 72 A

(INTERVIEW GIVEN TO PRAGUE TELEVISION BY HENRY WINSTON, CHAIRMAN

OF THE U.S. COMMUNIST PARTY, AFTER HIS MEETING WITH VASIL BILAK,

MEMBER OF THE PRESIDIUM AND SECRETARY OF THE CPCZ CENTRAL COMMITTEE

ON 6 MAY--RECORDED IN ENGLISH WITH CZECH TRANSLATION SUPERIMPOSED) [illegible] ((QUESTION)) COMRADE CHAIRMAN, WHAT IS THE REACTION

[illegible]

OF THE U.S. PUBLIC AND OF YOUR PARTY TO THE RECENT EVENTS IN VIETNAM?

((ANSWER)) THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IS ONE OF HORROR AT THE GENOCIDAL POLICY BEING CONDUCTED BY THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION IN INDOCHINA. THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES NUTT IS A MOVEMENT OF THE MAJORITY. IT COMPRISES SEVENTYSIX 76 PERCENT OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES. IT UNITES PEOPLE OF VARYING POLITICAL VIEWS; BLACK, WHITE, BROWN, YELLOW, RED, AND IT IS A PROGRAM FOR THEIR UNITY. IT LEADS THEM TO UNITY AROUND THE PROGRAM FOR ENDING THE WAR NOW IN VIETNAM, FOR THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS, AND A PROGRAM WHICH GIVES AND CREATES THE CONDITIONS FOR THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN DESTINY FREE FROM U.S. IMPERIALISM, BOMBS FROM THE AIR OR SHIPS AT SEA. IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT GUS HALL, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES, WHO IS NOW OUR PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE AND (CHARLES TYNER), CHAIRMAN OF THE LEAGUE FOR THE LIBERATION OF YOUNG WORKERS, WHO IS OUR VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE, WENT TO HANOI AND SAW WITH THEIR OWN EYES THE CRIMINALITY OF THE WASHINGTON PIRATES, WHO DROPPED BOMBS FROM THEIR B-52 JET PLANES AND USED ALL KINDS OF GENOCIDAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

OF ELDERLY [illegible] [illegible] CHILDREN, THE SAME [illegible]

[illegible]

THREE THOUSAND 3,[illegible] VILLAGES DESTROYED BY BOMBS DROPPED BY THE PLANES OF U.S. MONOPOLISTS, BY B-57 AND B-52 PLANES. THREE THOUSAND VILLAGES MEANS THREE THOUSAND 3,000 LIDICES. THESE BOMBS ARE BEING DROPPED BY THE U.S. MONOPOLY BOURGEOISIE, WHICH DIRECTS NIXON AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM.

((QUESTION)) WOULD YOU TELL ME IN THIS CONTEXT WHAT IS THE RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE IN THE UNITED STATES?

((ANSWER)) THE PEACE MAJORITY ABOUT THIS -- I SPOKE IN THE UNITED STATES REFLECTS ITSELF IN GREETING THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE PEOPLE IN EUROPE IN GENERAL ON THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AND IT IS HOPING TO CREATE A ZONE WHERE WORLD HUMANITY WILL NOTT AGAIN BE FACED WITH THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. THAT IS WHY YOU FIND SUCH STRONG SUPPORT FOR THIS INITIATIVE TAKING PLACE IN A THOUSAND DIFFERENT FORMS AND DEVELOPING FURTHER. THE AGREEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY HOLDS A PROMINENT POSITION ON WHICH THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE AS SUCH CAN UNITE AGAINST THE REVANCHISTS AND WARMONGERS AND ONCE AND FOR ALL PREVENT A WAR, WHICH COULD ONLY PRODUCE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF LIVES DESTROYED AND BURNED BY THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS.

((QUESTION)) THE CRISIS OF U.S. SOCIETY ALSO INVOLVES THE [illegible] EXAMPLE IS THE [illegible]

DAVIS. IT IS GENERALLY KNOWN THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA, LIKE THE ENTIRE PROGRESSIVE PUBLIC, FULLY SUPPORTS T-IS WELL-KNOWN U.S. COMMUNIST. IN YOUR OPINION WHAT WILL BE THE FURTHER COURSE OF THE TRIAL?

((ANSWER)) FIRST OF ALL I BRING GREETINGS FROM THE U.S. COMMUNIST PARTY, FROM THE COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF ANGELA DAVIS AND FROM ANGELA DAVIS PERSONALLY. MOST CORDIAL GREETINGS AND THANKS TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE WHO SO COURAGEOUSLY AND SELFLESSLY STRUGGLE FOR THE FULL FREEDOM OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS, PERSECUTED BY THE MONOPOLISTS AND RACISTS IN THE UNITED STATES.

((QUESTION)) THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

((ANSWER)) ANGELA DAVIS' CASE IS A REFLECTION OF THE REACTIONARY PROFASCIST POLICY WHICH IS [illegible] IN THE COUNTRY, AND IT IS PART AND PARCEL OF THE CAMPAIGN OF EXTERMINATION AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM, AND IT IS PART AND A STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THE POLICY THROUGH WHICH THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS ALL POSSIBLE SORTS OF MILITARISTS AND REVANCHISTS IN WEST GERMANY AND THE APARTHEID GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. U.S. IMPERIALISM DOES NOTT SUPPORT ANY PROGRESSIVE REGIME ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, BUT IT SUPPORTS ALL REACTIONARY REGIMES EVERYWHERE --THAT IS WHAT IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC POLICY LEADS TO THE STAGED

TRIAL OF ANGELA DAVIS, WHICH REFLECTS THE ATTACK [illegible] FASCIST FORCES ON DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES.

IT BEGAN WITH AN ATTACK ON ALL BLACK PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES. THAT IS WHY THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION IS NOW TAKING STEPS TO PACK THE SUPREME COURT IN SUCH A WAY THAT IS BECOMES A NIXON COURT, WHOSE RULINGS WILL BE TO RIP OUT ALL THE PROGRESSIVE PEACEFUL LEGISLATION OF THE CONGRESS AND EVERY PROGRESSIVE DECISION OF THAT COURT. AND THAT IS WHY EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO PREPARE THE APPROVAL OF NEW LAWS AND REGULATION WHICH ARE AIMED AT CURBING DEMOCRACY AND AT MAKING IT POSSIBLE NOTT ONLY TO WAGE THE WAR BEYOND THE SEA BUT ALSO TO SUPPORT FORCES INSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHICH WOULD CRUSH THE BLACK LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND CRACK THE UNITY OF THE WORKING PEOPLE. [illegible] CO/BROWN/HA

[illegible] MAY

BT

#2417

14-00000

RTTUZYUW RUFTHA[illegible] 1291629-UUUU--[illegible]

ZNR UUUUU ZYH

R [illegible]10157 MAY 72 [illegible]

FM FBIS LONDON

TO FBIS WASHDC

FBLD

BT

UNCLAS VI RUFT

COPY TO LIAISON

CPUSA CHAIRMAN WINSTON ENDS STAY IN CSSR

L081915 PRAGUE CTK INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1914 GMT

8 MAY 72 L

((TEXT)) PRAGUE MAY EIGHT CTK--HENRY WINSTON, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES, LEFT HERE TODAY AFTER A THREE-DAY VISIT.

HE WAS SEEN OFF BY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND MEMBERS OF THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE WORLD MARXIST REVIEW.

Henry WINSTON

14-00000

BEFORE DEPARTURE, [illegible] SAID THAT THE THREE [illegible] SPENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM AGAIN THAT SOCIALISM MEANS IN REAL LIFE. HE SPOKE WITH GREAT ESTEEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S FRIENDSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND SAID THAT THE UNITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, HEADED BY THE USSR, AND THEIR PEACE INITIATIVE ARE GUARANTEES THAT PEACE WILL BE PRESERVED IN THE WORLD.

HE ALSO THANKED THE PEOPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF ANGELA DAVIS, AND SAID THAT HIS IMPRESSIONS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL BE AN INSPIRATION FOR HIS FUTURE WORK.

281612 COSTELLO/VS HF/19322 MAY

BT

#3948

NNNN

BW
JSC

The Czechoslovak guests were cordially seen off on 5 May 1972 at Berlin-Schonefeld Airport by Herbert Malcherek, deputy head of the Agitation Department, and other collaborators of the SED Central Committee, as well as by representatives of the CSSR Embassy in the GDR.

POLITBURO MEMBER AXEN RECEIVES CPUSA LEADER WINSTON

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 5 May 72 p 2 A

[Text] Berlin (ADN)--On Thursday, Hermann Axen, Politburo member and SED Central Committee secretary, received Henry Winston, chairman of the CPUSA, who is currently in the GDR for a friendship visit, in the headquarters of the Central Committee. During the meeting, which was marked by a spirit of friendship and the close fraternal friendship between the two parties, the chairman of the fraternal U.S. party reported on the results of the 20th CPUSA Congress, the party's successes in the struggle for exercising its election rights in the presidential elections in November 1972, on problems of the struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and on the movement for the defense of Angela Davis.

Hermann Axen conveyed the greetings of Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the SED Central Committee, to Gus Hall, secretary general of the CPUSA, and to all U.S. communists, reassuring them of the continued fraternal solidarity of the SED and the GDR working people in their struggle for peace, democracy and social progress, for the defense of civil rights and the liberation of Comrade Angela Davis.

Hermann Axen extensively informed the U.S. workers leader about the implementation of the decisions of the Eighth SED Congress and the GDR's struggle for peace and security in Europe.

The talk once again confirmed the full agreement of the SED and the CPUSA on all basic questions of the struggle of the world communist movement and served the further deepening of the fraternal relations between the two parties.

At a very cordial meeting with representatives of the GDR Committee for Human Rights, Henry Winston, chairman of the CPUSA, movingly outlined the efforts of thousands of U.S. citizens in defense of Angela Davis.

BRIEFS

HONECKER VIEWS SOVIET FILM--The two final parts of the Soviet film epic "Liberation" are having their solemn first night in the GDR at the Kosmos Cinema in Berlin. Guests of honor at this event are First Secretary of the SED Central Committee Erich Honecker and USSR Ambassador Mikhail Yefremov. [Text] [East Berlin Voice of the GDR Domestic Service in German 1700 GMT 8 May 72 L]

GDR-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP EXHIBIT--Berlin--"Linked by Friendship--for the Happiness of our Peoples" is the motto of the exhibition which opened in Berlin on 8 May on the 25th anniversary of the German-Soviet Friendship Society. Guests at the opening ceremony were Klaus Gysi, GDR minister of Culture, M.T. Yefremov, USSR ambassador in the GDR, and a delegation of the Soviet Society for Friendship with the GDR. [East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2027 GMT 8 May 72 L]

Henry Winston

HENRY WINSTON

I. Personal History

A. Birth and Family Background

Henry Winston, a Negro, was born April 11, 1914, at Hattiesburg, Mississippi, to Joseph and Lucille Bingham Winston, both of whom were born in Mississippi. The family moved to Kansas City, Missouri, about 1927. Joseph Winston died there on October 28, 1958. He and his wife had been separated for many years.

Winston had several sisters and a brother, namely, Dora Humphrey, Lillie Belle Black, Roberta Smith, and Otis D. Winston. Another sister, Anna Lee McConico, is dead. Apparently none of Winston's family ever became affiliated with the CPUSA.

B. Marital Status

On May 2, 1941, Henry Winston and Edna Lerner, a white native-born New Yorker, were married in Brooklyn, New York. Edna was born April 23, 1918. Her father was born in Russia, and her mother in Austria. Henry and Edna have two children, Larry Douglas, born February 14, 1947, and Judith Anne, born September 25, 1950, both in New York City.

Who's Who of National Leaders
CPUSA 1969
SBC 57696 10-V-134

(WINSTON, HENRY
70)



HENRY WINSTON

Guy Owens, a Negro, was born March 5, 1934, in New York City, the illegitimate son of [illegible] Owens, although Henry Winston is often referred to as his father. He has been active in communist affairs since the late 1940s. At one time, he suffered a mental breakdown and spent some time in the Soviet Union, where he was hospitalized. He also attended school there. For a time, he lived with his mother and Winston, although he is currently living in Apartment 3-C, 150 [illegible] Street, New York City, and is unemployed.

C. Education

Winston attended Lincoln High School in Kansas City, Missouri, from 1928 to about 1930.

D. Employment

While in Kansas City, he worked at miscellaneous jobs from 1930 to 1932 before going to New York City. Since then, he has given his full time to CPUSA activities.

E. Foreign Travel

In November, 19[illegible], Winston was sent to the Soviet Union by the CPUSA to attend the Lenin School, and remained at this school until May, 19[illegible]. In March, 19[illegible], he revisited the Soviet Union.

Winston, accompanied by his wife, Edna, and their two children, went to the Soviet Union in the Fall of 1961. His wife and children returned to the United States in November, 1961, but Winston remained abroad for two and a half years. During this period, he underwent examination and treatment by Soviet doctors for his virtual blindness. On his return, he stated he had been to East Germany twice and had attended Congresses of the Communist Parties in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, in addition to having traveled extensively in the Soviet Union.

Winston has indicated that he has traveled to many socialist countries throughout the world, including Red China as well as Korea, Indonesia, and other places, where he had discussed the international communist movement and the problems connected therewith.

Winston with his wife, Fern, went to Santiago, Chile, in October, 1965, to attend the 13th Congress of the Chilean Communist Party as a delegate-observer.

In March, 1966, they traveled to the Soviet Union to attend the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They revisited that country in the Fall of 1967, as part of the official delegation of the CPUSA, to attend the 50th

Anniversary of the October Revolution [illegible] November of 1968, they returned to the Soviet Union [illegible] visited East Berlin.

Winston together with Gus Hall headed the CPUSA delegation to the World Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow beginning June 5, 1969.

F. Military Service

Winston was inducted into the United States Army on February 17, 1942, and honorably discharged on October 31, 1945, with the rank of Technician, Fifth Class. During much of his service he acted as a "public relations reporter" and was attached to the London Public Relations Office of the Negro Interest Section.

G. Health

On January 12, 1960, authorities at the United States Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, where Winston was incarcerated, stated that he was ill and appeared to be losing his equilibrium. Later that month, Winston was examined by a neuropsychiatrist from Indianapolis whose findings showed that he had intercranial pressure which could be caused by a brain tumor or a brain hemorrhage resulting from high blood pressure. As a consequence, Winston was operated on February 2, 1960, for a benign tumor in the brain. A marked degree of incoordination of his gait was noted, and he was considered to be legally blind. On June 30, 1961, he was released from prison following commutation of his sentence by President Kennedy.

In August, 1961, there were indications that Winston very likely still had a brain tumor but had refused to undergo another operation because he was given only a fifty-fifty chance for survival. Soviet medical reports in early 1962 allegedly revealed that Winston's condition was much improved, that his vision was six per cent in his right eye and one per cent in his left, and that the tumor in his head had not spread. On March 12, 1963, Soviet doctors, after a complete physical examination, stated that the symptoms indicating a recurrence of Winston's brain tumor had completely disappeared.

In January, 1966, Fern Winston advised that doctors in the Soviet Union told Winston that he must return to that country for hospitalization and treatment twice a year for periods of four to six weeks. This treatment, consisting of injections, exercises, medicine, and diet, is supposed to reduce the blood pressure and enable Winston to see, at least, some contrast between dark and light.

Winston has claimed on numerous occasions that, while he was in prison, the Government doctors made a wrong diagnosis of his ailment and, as a result, he is now blind. On November 7, 1960, while in prison, Winston brought suit against the U.S. Government for one million dollars under the Federal Torts Claims Act alleging that the failure of prison authorities to properly diagnose his condition and to treat him for a brain tumor had resulted in his becoming totally blind. On January 18, 1965, however, Winston's attorney, John Abt, said he was dropping this suit because of the difficulty of extracting the necessary information from prison authorities and because the time required would detract from Winston's public activities.

Winston reportedly suffers from some imbalance of his metabolism which causes him to have attacks of hiccups persisting for several days.

B. Current Address

Winston resides at 354 East 108th Street, New York, New York.

II. Communist Party Affiliations

A. History

Winston joined the YCL in January, 1931, and became a member of the CPUSA in the Summer of 1931. In December, 1932, he left Kansas City, Missouri, as a YCL delegate to the National Hunger March in Washington, D. C., and then proceeded to New York City, where he worked for the "Young Worker," official organ of the YCL.

In 1933, he was Chairman of the Harlem Youth Section of the Unemployed Councils and was later named Chairman of the Youth Section of the Unemployed Council for the New York City metropolitan area. From April through November, 1933, he was Section Organizer of the YCL in Brooklyn.

From November, 1933, to May, 1935, he was in the Soviet Union, where he attended the Lenin School. Upon his return to the United States, he became Organizational Secretary of the YCL in Cleveland and was named to the Ohio District Committee of the YCL. In March, 1936, Winston was named YCL National Organizational Secretary, and in May, 1937, was elected YCL National Administrative Secretary.

Winston was active in the YCL as editor of the "Young Communist Review," official magazine of the YCL, and as Director of the YCL Training School held at Camp Beacon, New York, during 1937 and 1938. He was reelected YCL National Administrative Secretary in May, 1939, and held this office until his induction into the Army in February, 1942.

Winston became a member of the CPUSA National Committee in June, 1940; was elected a member of the Communist Political Association National Committee while serving in the Armed Forces in 1944; and was renamed to the CPUSA National Committee in July, 1945. From October, 1945, to July, 1946, he served as Secretary of the Party's National Negro Commission. He was named a member of the editorial staff of "Political Affairs" in 1946. In July, 1946, he was elected a member of the Party's National Board and appointed CPUSA National Organizational Secretary. He held the latter position until his disappearance into the Party's underground apparatus in July, 1951.

Winston was a fugitive from July 2, 1951, following his failure to appear after being convicted of a violation of the Smith Act, until his surrender to authorities on March 5, 1956.

In August, 1961, Winston was elected to the CPUSA's National Executive Committee and was made CPUSA Vice Chairman.

On his return to the United States in February, 1964, after two and a half years abroad, Winston was elected a member of the Secretariat and the National Executive Board. At the 18th National Convention of the CPUSA in June, 1966, he was elected CPUSA National Chairman.

B. Current Activity

Winston is currently CPUSA National Chairman and a member of the Secretariat, the National Executive Board, and the National Committee.

C. Congressional Testimony

Winston testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 2, 1948, on behalf of the CPUSA in opposition to universal military training and the draft.

D. Indictments and Arrests

Winston was indicted on July 20, 1948, under conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act of 1940. He was tried, convicted, sentenced to five years imprisonment, and fined $10,000 but failed to appear in Federal Court for commitment to prison on July 2, 1951. He remained a fugitive until his surrender on March 5, 1956, as a result of which he received an additional three-year sentence for contempt of court. Winston remained in prison until his sentence was commuted by President Kennedy on June 30, 1961, for reason of health.

On August 3, 1961, the Department of Justice, in view of Winston's physical condition, dismissed the detainer against Winston which had been placed because of his indictment under the Smith Act. Winston's indictment under the Smith Act was dismissed on May 29, 1963.

III. Characterization

A. Physical Appearance

Winston is six feet tall. He is stockily built, weighing around 200 pounds. He has black hair, brown eyes, and a pockmarked face. He dresses neatly, wears a suit and tie, and appears to be well groomed at all times.

B. Habits and Idiosyncrasies

Because of his near-total blindness, Winston has to be led or driven around, except when he is at home or at CPUSA headquarters. His associates read to him, and in this way he is able to keep informed about national and world events and Party affairs.

Winston relishes his position as CPUSA National Chairman and the emoluments accruing from it. He does not lack for personal or material comforts. He can travel anywhere in the world anytime he desires. When he goes to the Soviet Union he is paid homage, catered to, and afforded all the medical attention he wishes.

Winston's wife, Fern, is said to have complained that she has no easy life because she frequently has to act as his nurse, secretary, and chauffeur and gets nothing in return from him except abuse. Gus Hall is reported to have helped patch up their marital difficulties and persuaded them to stay together.

C. Effectiveness as Party Leader

Winston occupies his top post in the CPUSA by virtue of the fact that Hall, when he became General Secretary, needed a prominent Negro Party leader to give him support because of his own lack of following among Party Negroes. Since Winston is now an important figure in the national leadership, Hall and other Negro functionaries are obliged to be attentive to and respectful of him.

Hall is apparently resentful that Winston is essential to his continuing Negro support in the Party and that he must necessarily treat Winston with deference. Hall reportedly would like nothing better than to have Soviet doctors keep Winston in the USSR for an indefinite period of time when he visits that country for a medical check-up, thereby preventing Winston from participating in CPUSA affairs. Hall is said to believe that Winston is mentally ill as a result of his brain tumor.

From Winston's earliest days in the communist movement until his release from prison, he--unlike many other Negro Party leaders--was not known to be arrogant or to press for special recognition or advantage because of his color. But on ascending to the highest level of national leadership, a change came over him. The old, affable Winston became imperious and demanding in inner Party circles and let it be known to all his associates in the National Office that he was an important figure. He made it obvious that he was to be consulted, with his opinion sought, and his approval obtained on all matters. To the office workers in the national headquarters, Winston is a terror; to associates and co-workers, he is arrogant and domineering.

Nevertheless, Winston is considered to be an effective and popular Party leader among the membership, white as well as black. He has an engaging personality and is always smiling or laughing. Because of his pleasant, cooperative demeanor, his rough humor and wisecracking, and his lack of temper, he enjoys an easy relationship with people. He seems to like everyone, and his friendly manner has ingratiated him with the rank and file.

In his rise to the top leadership, Winston was extremely careful to faithfully follow the Soviet and the prevailing CPUSA line at all times and to be in tune with the thinking of his superiors. While forceful and decisive in debate, he rarely displayed any independence or initiative, but hewed to the Party line. He avoided becoming angrily contentious in debate or discussion because he wanted to be on the side of those who counted most in terms of authority and leadership. He worked well with people on committees, but became firm when issues of moment were at stake and he knew the desires of higher officials. He never tangled with a person in higher authority or standing but went along as a "good guy."

Winston stays clear of personal intrigue and maneuvering. In the Party's Negro cadre, which is perpetually divided and rife with unending rivalry and backbiting, he strives to play the role of the middleman or the pacifier.

As a speaker, Winston is of the rough-and-tumble type who is a good agitator. He makes an effort to assume a dignified stance on the platform and seldom resorts to exaggerated oratorical antics.

He gives every indication--in speech and in vocabulary--of having had minimal schooling. His extempore language is choppy, disorganized, colloquial, and full of mispronunciation of even simple words. He has virtually no writing skill and is not known to have authored any type of document during his long career in the Party. Speeches, reports, and articles issued under his name are the work of ghost writers.

Winston, who was reelected National Chairman of the CPUSA at its recent 19th National Convention is, along with Gus Hall, the type of loyal leader the Soviets want in the CPUSA at the present time.

HENRY WINSTON DENOUNCES U.S. POLICY IN INDOCHINA

Moscow TASS International Service in English 1916 GMT 2 Mar 71 L

[Text] New York March 2 TASS--The National Chairman of the U.S. Communist Party Henry Winston sharply denounced Washington's policy of escalating the war in Indochina and stepping up racialism and anti-communism in the United States. Speaking in the past few days at youth meetings over the radio and television in Connecticut he emphasized that if the United States had unilaterally intervened in the war it can and must withdraw from Vietnam in the same way.

This is pure demagogy when the administration talks of cutting military spending and of saving the lives of U.S. servicemen. The communists believe that not a cent should be spent on the aggressive war waged thousands of miles away from the shores of our country.

Henry Winston condemned the campaign of political persecution conducted by the U.S. authorites. I am quite sure, he emphasized, that the forthcoming trial of Angela Davis in California is a political conspiracy. I met Angela Davis a few days ago. After my talk with her I became even more convinced of the political character of this trial. The case of Angela Davis has been framed up by the racialist and anti-communist forces of the State of California.

201-006897

The Washington DAILY NEWS points out that the 'Peace Corps' program, which costs taxpayers 100 million dollars annually, does not work, and recommends that the administration find better ways to use these funds.

Official Washington has in fact acknowledged the failure of the 'Peace Corps' activity. This is evidenced by the White House's decision to merge the Peace Corps with VISTA, so-called corps of teachers.

The activity of such centralized 'volunteer service', in the opinion of the White House, may bring greater returns for the invested dollars.

But the U.S. press casts serious doubt on the effectiveness of the administration's plans, and not without reason.

The fameless ten-year activity of the 'Peace Corps' made many in America convinced that no one, except for ideological saboteurs, needs this 'volunteer' organization.

HENRY WINSTON DESCRIBES U.S. RACIST POLICIES

Moscow TASS International Service in English 0903 GMT 27 Feb 71 L

[Text] New York Feb 27 TASS--Speaking at the law faculty of the Yale University in New Haven on Friday, National Chairman of the Communist Party of the United States Henry Winston has said that Nixon's policy, aimed at expansion of the war in Cambodia, Laos and other areas of Indo-China, is actually the racialist policy of American imperialism.

Henry Winston has emphasized that the policy of the present-day government of the United States becomes increasingly menacing. Henry Winston said this policy leads to intensification of racism and anticommunism as component parts of the programme, aimed at elimination of the resistance to the governments line.

Current reprisals against civil right fighters are only the beginning of a campaign which was launched with the aim of breaking the resistance of the Negro people. This campaign is now spearheaded against Angela Davis, a symbol of struggle against racism and anticommunism. These reprisals, if they are not duly rebuffed, will tomorrow spread to the whole of the American people, blacks and whites. The struggle in defence of Angela Davis and other political prisoners is, therefore, the matter of honour for all Americans, who cherish freedom and peace.

U.S. COMMUNIST PARTY ISSUES STATEMENT ON ANGELA DAVIS

Moscow TASS International Service in English 0810 GMT 28 Feb 71 L

[Text] New York, Feb 28, TASS--The National Womens Commission of the Communist Party of the USA issued the following statement for International Womens Day:

The vicious frameup persecution of Angela Davis by the Nixon-Agnew-Reagan axis is an attack upon the rights of all who struggle for peace, democratic rights and freedom from capitalist exploitation. In addition, Angela Davis shares the plight of all who would escape the yoke of racist oppression.

201-006887

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: 1455

DISSEM BY PER 4

SECRET 3

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ANL-2514

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT: AF 9

FILE, VR, ADDP, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX CI/OPS XXXXXX CS/DO XXXX FI 3 ADDP 10, DI/AN

ACTION NO. 2/2

DDP, EUR 8, SB 8, CA 5, CI/SO 2

S E C R E T 051354Z JUN 70 CITE LAGOS 4071 5 Jun [illegible] 097527

DIRECTOR INFO KADUNA LONDON LCPIPIT

INTEL

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR HQS COMMENT IF THERE PREVIOUS REPORTING ON BUDAPEST MEETING. KRCASH/1. HYU MAY RELAY TO LONDON WITHOUT FIELD COMMENT FOR PASSAGE TO LIAISON IF ALL REFERENCES TO NIGERIA REMOVED, USING BYLINE "AFRICAN MARXIST WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CIRCLES.

INDEX: ULYANOVSKIY FILE: OWARAQRP

FILED: 051354Z

WINSTON, HENRY
201

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT [illegible] FILED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: 1455

DISSEM BY: PER 7

SECRET 3

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ANL-2514

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT: AF 9

FILE VR, ADDP XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX CI/OPS XXXXXXX CS/DO XXXX FI 3 XXXX IW, CI/AN

ACTION NO. 673

DDP, EUR 8, SB 8, CA 5, CI/SO 2

S E C R E T 051354Z JUN 70 CITE LAGOS 4071 5 Jun I. 097527

DIRECTOR INFO KADUNA LONDON LCPIPIT

INTEL

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR HQS COMMENT IF THERE PREVIOUS REPORTING ON BUDAPEST MEETING. KRCASH/1. HYU MAY RELAY TO LONDON WITHOUT FIELD COMMENT FOR PASSAGE TO LIAISON IF ALL REFERENCES TO NIGERIA REMOVED, USING BYLINE "AFRICAN MARXIST WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CIRCLES.

INDEX: ULYANOVSKIY FILE: OWARAQRP

FILED: 051354Z

WINSTON, HENRY
201

SECRET

SECRET CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 5 JUNE 1970
IN 097527
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

The following Intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

Distribution for BACKGROUND USE ONLY to: SDO 2

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COUNTRY: USSR/AFRICA

DOI: LATE APRIL 1970

SUBJECT: PLANS FOR WORLD COMMUNIST MEETING AND FOR MEETING OF AFRICAN COMMUNISTS

ACQ: NIGERIA, LAGOS (4 JUNE 1970) FIELD NO: ANL-2514

SOURCE: A NIGERIAN MARXIST WHO FORMERLY HELD A RESPONSIBLE POSITION IN THE BANNED SOCIALIST WORKERS AND FARMERS PARTY AND IS STILL ACTIVE IN OTHIR PRO-COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS. HIS REPORTING ON COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN NIGERIA IS USUALLY RELIABLE AND ACCURATE. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH BASSEY, FATOGUN AND GOODLUCK AFTER THEIR RETURN FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

1. CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO HOLDING ANOTHER MEETING OF WORLD-WIDE COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES. A PREPARATORY MEETING FOR THIS MAY BE HELD IN BUDAPEST BEFORE

THE END OF 1970. AMONG SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE PREPARATORY MEETING WOULD BE WHETHER OR NOT TO CONVENE A MEETING OF AFRICAN COMMUNIST AND IF SO, WHERE AND WHEN IT SHOULD BE HELD. DURING A MEETING WITH THREE LEADING PRO-COMMUNIST NIGERIANS IN MOSCOW ON 30 APRIL 1970, POSTISLAV A. ULYANOVSKIY, A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (CC-CPSU) URGED THEM TO CONSIDER ATTENDING THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE ALL-AFRICA MEETING (FIELD COMMENT: THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED IN TDCSDB-315/02646-70 ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS MEETING BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF THE CC-CPSU AND NIGERIAN TRADE UNION LEADERS W. O. GOODLUCK AND S. U. BASSEY AND NIGERIAN AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY OFFICIAL DAPO FATOGUN.)

2. THE IDEA OF AN ALL-AFRICA MEETING OF COMMUNISTS WAS INITIATED BY AFRICANS ATTENDING THE MEETINGS OF WORLD COMMUNIST LEADERS IN MOSCOW ON 21 AND 22 APRIL 1970. AMONG THE AFRICAN (SIC) COMMUNISTS ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

(FNU) WINSTON OF THE UNITED STATES AND DELEGATES FROM SOUTH AFRICA, MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA AND GUINEA-BISSAU.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (ALSO SENT KADUNA LONDON)

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM GP-1



DELEGATION TO CUBA, CPUSA: (left to right) Ted Bassett, [illegible] Taylor, Henry Winston, Fern Winston, Ronald Stevenson, Juan Roque.

Blockade of Cuba hits U.S. consumer: Winston

W-201
206887

By TOM FOLEY

NEW YORK, Sept. 5 — American consumers pay more for sugar and steel because the United States does not have normal relations with Cuba, Henry Winston, national chairman of the Communist Party, said today.

Brazil junta gives in

RIO DE JANEIRO, Sept. 5 (UPI) — The Brazilian government bowed today to the demands of a band of "very, very determined" men who kidnapped U.S. Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick and threatened to execute him.

The Foreign Ministry announced it would free 15 political prisoners as demanded. The announcement came barely an hour and 20 minutes before expiration of an ultimatum that presumably would have meant death for the 61-year-old envoy.

The ambassador was seized by a band of four men on a Rio de Janeiro street Thursday and the kidnappers set a deadline of 48 hours for their demands to be met. They repeated the ultimatum this morning but moved up the deadline for acceptance of their demands 2:30 p.m. (1:30 p.m. EDT) today.

The government announcement came at 12:30 p.m. (11:30 a.m. EDT) after it received a handwritten note from the ambassador to his wife saying that he was alive and well but asking the government to accede to what he called "very, very determined" men.

There had been two original demands – release of the unnamed prisoners and full publication of the kidnappers' note, which denounced the government as a "dictatorship." The note was pub- [illegible]

The Government has already

command, the Foreign Ministe and high national authorities.

This way the responsibilit will be completely upon the head of the kidnappers for the safety o Ambassador D. Burke Elbrick, the statement said.

The kidnappers were believe to be members of "MR8," guerrilla group made up mostly c Brazilian university students. Th initials stand for Movimien Revolucionaria and the "8" refer to the date of the death of Ernest Che Guevara, the Cuban revolu tionary killed in Bolivia Oct. 8 1967.

Swiss protest Westmoreland planned visit

GENEVA — General Westmoreland, U.S. Chief of Staff, will make an official four-day visit to Switzerland beginning Sept. 11.

Westmoreland, formerly commander-in-chief of U.S. arme forces in South Vietnam, wil familiarize himself with the state of combat readiness of the Swi armed forces, and will also in spect a number of Swiss militar training centers.

"Voix Ouvriere" (Workers' Voice), organ of the Swiss Part of Labor, reports that the pro gressive public in Switzerland ha protested against Westmoreland visit because he bears responsi

Daily World 6 Sep 69

[illegible] nomic blockade of Cuba not only affects that island but hurts the ordinary American by boosting monopoly prices on a number of items, including the steel and nickel that goes into his car and refrigerator, Winston pointed out. Cuba has 30 percent of the world's nickel deposits, he noted.

Winston gave his views to a press conference at Communist Party headquarters here a few days after his return from Cuba. He led a Communist Party delegation that visited every province in Cuba in August.

See editorial Page 7

The blockade of Cuba affects economic and political relations between U.S. and Latin America, he went on.

U.S. consumers hit

"It's not only a matter of sugar, but also steel, in terms of the U.S. Steel monopoly and trust," he said.

"It's not only sugar prices — Cuba is the world's second largest sugar producer — but even the price of lobsters."

Instead of receiving Cuban lobsters U.S. consumers get lobsters from the racist-fascist and apartheid regime of South Africa," Winston said. "This trade between U.S. and South Africa actually upholds a regime which opposes everything decent in the world."

He emphasized that reversal of the policy of the Nixon Administration towards Cuba is the only effective answer to achieving new relationships towards Latin America as a whole.

Scientific exchange affected

He said he was very happy to receive the [illegible] [illegible] to Cuba by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba.

"There I was able to observe the crimes that U.S. imperialism has inflicted on the country and also the courageous manner in which the Socialist government of Cuba has undertaken to erase the effect of these crimes," he said.

The economic blockade of Cuba not only affects normal trade (sugar, steel, lobsters), but also scientific exchange, for example, Winston pointed out.

Doctors are prevented from going to Cuba, exchanging information, from helping to train technicians and other doctors, and from using textbooks, he added.

Life span rose

"Despite all this, some most inspiring developments in science are taking place in Cuba today," he said. "Despite this lack of scientific exchange, the life span [illegible] Cuba has [illegible] [illegible]. Also in Cuba today there is not a single case of malaria, even though Cuba used to be known as the source of malaria fever. Cuba has combated malaria by using the Salk vaccine variety developed and produced by the Soviet Union.

"Now Cuba's main concern today is the battle for industrialization of the country," Winston said, stressing that the fight to produce 10 million tons of sugar is an important one in Cuba and will help it to meet international commitments and improve the mechanization of agriculture.

"Cuba is showing how a country can develop under socialism," he concluded. "This, in turn, is having a very dramatic effect on the rest of Latin America. This is why normalizing relations with Cuba is a prerequisite for developing normal relations with Latin America."

---

authorized the [illegible] of the declaration and will authorize the transfer to a foreign country of the 15 persons detained whose names will be indicated," the government said in a public statement.

The decision was taken after a meeting of the high military

There's no surtax
on the Daily World.
10c at your news stand.

Black GIs anti-war action reported in South Vietnam

HANOI (LNS) — More than 100 black GIs staged an anti-war protest July 30 in the port base of Qui Nhon, in Kinh Hoa province, according to a report by the Liberation Press Agency of South Vietnam.

The report, as transmitted by Prensa Latina, said that the men marched from one end of the base to the other and also marched on the local airport. They reportedly "shouted slogans demanding peace, the end of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. troops".

At the airport, the black GIs battled with cops who tried to stop the demonstration.

Episcopalians vote $200,000 'reparations'

By RICHARD GREENLEAF

NEW YORK, Sept. 5 — Church leaders in the U.S. are still striving to evade the principles set forth in the Black Manifesto, even though some churches are making payments on the reparations account which the Manifesto holds they owe black Americans.

Such is the situation following this week's action by a convention of the Episcopal Church, which after two days of heated debate in South Bend, Ind., allocated $200,000 to the Black Economic Development Conference, the group which promulgated the Manifesto and has been seeking to collect payments on the $500 million it says the churches owe the Negro people for centuries of oppression.

The resolution adopted by the Episcopalians included a passage rejecting the "ideology" of the Manifesto.

The Rev. George M. Murray, Bishop of Alabama, said in the course of the debate: "I cannot vote for a group whose only record is this manifesto, a violent Marxist document."

But the resolution did recognize the Black Economic Development Conference as a movement for "organizing the self-determination" of the black community.

Evasion charged

The action followed by less than two weeks an address by the Rev. Lucius Walker, Jr., executive director of the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization, in which he charged that many churches and synagogues were seeking to avoid doing anything about the Black Manifesto.

Walker was addressing the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, meeting in Los Angeles. IFCO is the group which financed the meeting in Detroit earlier this year at which the BEDC was founded and the Manifesto formulated.

"After all the churches' rhetoric about love, brotherhood and justice," Walker said, "at many points it is flipping out when the real proposition is put, acting like a young lady who knows what to do to get a young man's attention, then falling back on her virtue when the question's popped."

He suggested that recourse might be had to the UN or an international court of law.

The 1915 Paris Conference, he argued, established the validity of reparations being given to individuals rather than to nations.

One of the most fervent pleas made at the Episcopalians' meeting was that of the Rev. Junius F. Carter, Negro rector of Holy Cross Episcopal Church in Pittsburgh.

"I am sick of you," he cried. "You don't trust me, you don't trust black priests; and you don't trust black people."

[illegible] American Petroleum Com-

en democrats and police ing the neo-Nazi election ngs occurred in Saarbrueck- Flensberg. Recklinghausen many other towns. A Civil nittee of Struggle Against Nazism has been formed. mands have been made by organizations that the NDP anned. The West German e Union of Employes is ag the most recent to do so.

es nationalized

NZIBAR — The government decided to nationalize all pri- t buses. It will establish a owned transport service ch will include former bus ers who will be paid a fixed ry.

---

lean election

NTIAGO — The Communist ty of Chile will run its own didate in next year's presi- tial election. The candidate's ne will be disclosed in Septem-

ge ban on fascists

ERLIN — The Union of Per- s Persecuted Under Nazism again demanded a ban on the fascist National Democratic rty in West Berlin. The West rlin NDP is preparing for a vention scheduled for October Adolf von Thadden, NDP ehrer, will arrive in September oversee activities and to par- ipate in the rally in October.

The West Berlin city adminis- tion has not arrested NDP embers who were involved in desecration of a monument to tims of fascist violence.

apid progress

CARACAS — The Communist rty of Venezuela, which was gal less than a year ago, cel- rated on August 8 its National y with meetings throughout country. The central gather- was in Maracay, where the st conference of Communists s held 32 years ago.

On October 1, the weekly Tri- na will become a daily.

hy wait' til tomorrow
you can find out
today's Daily World

[illegible] TV and condemn the anti-socialist "2,000 Words" manifesto in June, 1968. D[illegible]k failed to do so, and this had a bad influence on the elections then being held for the proposed extraordinary Czechoslovak party congress in September.

[illegible] the party presidium that a date had been set for a meeting of all Warsaw Pact member states in July [illegible] in the Polish capital. Cern[illegible] said that if he had known a date had been fixed, he would never have voted in the presidium that Czechoslovakia should refuse the

[illegible] Some leaders, as is clear [illegible] what I have said, really carried out a two-faced policy. They behaved one way when negotiating officially and another way when they should have defended the collectively worked-out policy."

The "2,000 Words" manifesto

Continued on page 5

'Blockade must be ended,' --U.S. Communists in Cuba

W-201

Special to the Daily World

HAVANA, Aug. 28 — Henry Winston, national chairman of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. who is heading an American Communist delegation visiting here, issued the following statement:

U.S. imperialism, before the revolution, accounted for 75 percent of Cuba's imports and 66 and two thirds percent of all her exports.

How to strangle in infancy the greatest event of our time in this hemisphere was the main concern of the U.S. monopolists. They broke off diplomatic and trade relations.

The mass release of revolutionary energy, the unity and creativity established among the people of Cuba, demonstrated what a free people can accomplish.

They found reliable friends in the Soviet Union, other socialist states, and many other countries.

'Blockade will fail'

Socialism in Cuba continues developing.

The anti-Cuba policy of U.S. imperialism now includes the blockade. This policy, too, will fail.

HENRY WINSTON

Our delegation saw with their own eyes how an entire people is geared to the accomplishment of the main task of realizing within one year 10 million tons of sugar.

Simply put, this means the achievement of 20 billion pounds of sugar in 12 months. That kind of production could give more than 6 pounds of sugar to each of the 3 billion humans on this earth.

The enthusiastic fight for this goal grips the people. What this means in terms of Cuba is helping to lay the foundation for the most rapid development of industry and agriculture, which will be based on the latest scientific techniques, mass building of housing, schools; in short, an advance on every front.

The story of Camaguey shows concretely the boldness in the planning of construction and the mass undertaking in cadre-training to be able to manage this undertaking.

Hails Cuba's racial equality

Just imagine a plan which begins with the daily output of 11,000 liters of milk, to be increased to one million per day. And what then? The creation of a milk-processing plant in which all kinds of dairy products will be developed.

Such is the approach in every field.

Of great beauty is that racist practices ended with imperialism and among the many great lessons of this revolution is the equality established between black, white and mulatto.

The cause of Cuba must become the cause not only of Communists but of all democrats, anti-imperialists and radicals.

The story of Cuba must become known to the millions of our land. The economic blockade must go. This barbarity is the essence of U.S. imperialist policy. The people can and must compel the Nixon administration to put an end to this criminality.

Special to the Daily World

HAVANA, Aug. 28 — A U.S. Communist Party delegation, headed by national chairman Henry Winston has returned here from the interior of the country where it witnessed a tremendous mobilization in the drive to harvest 10 million tons of sugar in a year.

The delegates returned last week from Camaguey, one of the main centers of the sugar industry.

Greeted by Cuban leaders

The 10-million-ton goal is the main economic task set by the Cuban Communist Party and the Revolutionary Government for achievement by the year ending July 26, 1970.

Earlier, after their arrival in Havana on Sunday, Aug. 10, the delegation visited other projects in the Isle of Pines and the provinces of Las Villas and Camaguey.

Receiving the U.S. delegation on their arrival were Commander Ramiro Valdes, 37, member of the Political Bureau of the Cuban C.P.; Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the secretariat of the Central Committee and Commander Jesus Montane,

Continued on page 11

Daily World 29 Aug 69

14-00000

W-201

Daily World 13 Aug 69

Delegation of CP visiting Cuba

NEW YORK, Aug. 12 — An official, six-person delegation of the Communist Party, U.S.A., headed by national chairman Henry Winston, is now in Cuba at the invitation of the Cuban Communist Party. It is first such delegation since 1960.

"We are enthusiastic about the delegation and feel great pride in it and the reinforcement of warm, cordial cooperation between the Cuban Communist Party and ours," James Jackson, chairman of the International Department of the Communist Party, told the Daily World.

He recalled that Cuban President Fidel Castro himself had invited Winston to Cuba to recuperate after the eye operation Winston underwent in prison that resulted in loss of his eyesight. Castro offered to exchange 100 "gusanos" ("worms," a term applied to Cubans who turned against their own country in the service of imperialism) for Winston while in prison.

There have long been warm bonds between the Cuban people and the people of the U.S. Jackson said. The opportunity exists for a change in official relations between the United States and Cuba.

COMMUNIST STATEMENT

The Communist Party issued a statement today over the signature of James Jackson, chairman:

"The Communist Party delegation of American Communists headed by Henry Winston our national chairman, w a s officially elected by the national committee and brings to Cuba the warm, comradely greetings of our party and of the American people, who seek normal diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between our country and the first country of socialism in the Western hemisphere.

"Comradely relations between our party and the Cuban Communists under the leadership of Fidel Castro will be strengthened by this series of discussions which will contribute to a necessary campaign to end the boycott and reverse the present antagonistic policy of the United States toward Cuba.

"This delegation will have an opportunity to see socialism in process in Cuba and will exchange opinions in the two week period. They will report back to our party and to the American people."



HENRY WINSTON

Viet patriots hit 137 targets

Continued from page 2

tempt to outflank the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and get into position along its western border. The Pathet Lao counterattacked and captured the important air base of Muong Soui.

Fifteen miles south of Muong Soui lie the two secret CIA bases of Sam Thong and Long Thien held by the CIA, an estimated 1,150 U.S. Special Forces troops, and several Thai artillery units. Theoretically, the two bases are under the control of the Royal Lao General Vang Pao. Actually, they are controlled from the Special Forces headquarters in Udorn, Thailand.

Long Thien, in the mountains on the western edge of the strategic Plain of Jars, is Special Forces headquarters for Laos, containing the "Green Beret" supply and command center.

General Vang Pao, like the units under Special Forces command, is of Meo nationality.

The charges by Laos Premier Souvanna Phouma that "40,000 North Vietnamese" have invaded Laos in violation of the 1962 agreement on the neutralization of the country, are directly related to the fact that Sam Thong and Long Thien are threatened by Pathet Lao attack. It may be predicted that the closer the Pathet Lao get to the CIA "Green Beret" center, the louder Souvanna Phouma's cries will become.

Souvanna Phouma's charges of violations of Laos "neutrality" come from a man who approved the U.S. bombing of more than 70 percent of his own country over the last several years. The U.S. policy behind this bombing was once stated by an American diplomat in Vientiane: "To make progress in this country, it is necessary to level everything."

Romanian CP congress ends with call for socialist unity

BUCHAREST, Aug. 12 (UPI) — President Nicolae Ceausescu today ended Romania's 10th Communist party congress with a resounding cry for unity among socialist nations and in the world.

"Our unanimity is living proof

party and of socialism," he told the more than 3,000 delegates.

Ceausescu was re-elected to another four years as party secretary-general.

His closing speech brought the hall to its feet chanting "Ceau-

Hallie Donaldson memorial Aug. 24

SEATTLE, Aug. 12 — A memorial for the late Hallie Donaldson, artist, teacher and founder of the Washington Cultural Cooperative, is scheduled for Washington Hall

Get Into the Spi
THE BI
Sunda
Arrow Park,
Buy your picnic ticket NOW
tion NOW ($2.50). Childre
Tickets available at: Daily
Benj. Davis Book Shop, 2529
son Book Shop, 100 E. 16th
WE NEED VOLUNTEER
TO MAKE
WE NEED: Sources of food:
saleable items . . . Cooks,
DO YOU HAVE A CAR? ..
BASHFUL JOIN THE DOER
A Day of . . . SWIMMI
ING, BASEBALL, VOLL
REV. KIRKPATRICK FOLK SC
SOUL FOOD
PUERTO RICAN FOOD
Drink and Eat an

CHICAGO
GUS
General S
THE RECENT WORLD
THE NEW UPSURGE OI
FRIDAY,
AUG. 22, 8 p.m.
First of a
50t
of t
Donation: $1
students: 50c

Support
THE DAILY MA
$125
ENCLOSED FIND:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINSTON, HENRY
201-006447
SEX M DOB ?

050-004-124
MEXI-09202
11 NOV 66
HMM -10836
P2

CIT USA
OCC ?
RE PROPOSED MEETING OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE
COMMUNIST LEADERS IN MEXICO IN NOVEMBER OR
DECEMBER 66.

R 6612200609

HVCBLBHZPUFGHCSHAB-

FILE IN 201-[illegible]597

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINSTON, HENRY
201-006887
SEX M DOB ?

CIT USA
OCC ?
REF PROJECTED CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST
PARTY LEADERS IN MEXICO.

050-004-124
MEXI-09133
04 NOV 66
HMM -10820
P2

UFGHZPHABHCSHLB

R 6612130492

FILE IN 201-006887

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIROGUE
201-233477
VOL. I

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 JULY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
27 JULY 78		ED. LOPEZ	Edwin Juan Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

211 LB/WCJ
TE 14 APR 59

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	DOB	4	13
2	DCB	5	2
3	C	6	3

DIRECTOR

FROM PARIS

ACTION SR 6* (TEMPO TO SR AT 1150, 14 APR)

INFO CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, FI/D 3, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

APR 14 1636Z 59

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 44422

TO DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE PARI 5705

RE FROB 3977 (IN 42861)**

1. FRIGANZA PARI AWAITING HQS DECISION AEASPIC.

2. REQUESTS CONCURRENCE PARA 3** REF. REGRETS NOTE URGENCY BUT IN CIRCUMSTANCES SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT MANAGE WITHOUT EARLY DECISION.

3. WE NEED SAFEHOUSE SUBJ USING AND CONCUR THERE DEFINITE SECURITY AND ARREST RISKS IF HE QUARTERED OTHER THAN IN SAFEHOUSE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR REDWOOD USED.

**IF HQS CONCURRED FRAN WOULD MOVE SUBJ TO PBPRIME VIA FRAN. GAVE DETAILS OF CROSSING FRANCO-GERMAN BORDER.

Answered by cable
dated 3 Apr 14 Apr 59 expedited OP Immediate
MR

15 APR 1959

SR/DOB
14 APR 1959

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

GEHEIM

GEHEIMHALTUNGSVERPFLICHTUNG

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

EINVERSTÄNDNISERKLÄRUNG

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

1. Ich bin mir der Tatsache bewusst, dass mir kraft des zwischen mir und der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten bestehenden Verhältnisses gewisse Information zukommen wird, und dass diese Information selbst oder die aus ihr möglichen Folgerungen der art sein werden, dass ihre rechtswidrige Enthüllung oder unvorsichtige Behandlung die Interessen und möglicherweise die Sicherheit der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika ungünstig berühren könnte.

2. Ich werde stets die überragenden Interessen der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten an Information anerkennen, die ich infolge von mit Sondervertretern der Regierung geführten Gesprächen oder von an mich durch Regierungs-Vertreter gestellten Ersuchen diesem Einverständnis gemäss besitze oder erwerbe.

3. Ich gebe mein feierliches Wort, niemals Information oder Kenntnis der oben angegebenen Art durch Rede, Betragen oder irgendein anderes Mittel bekannt zu machen, zu veröffentlichen oder zu enthüllen, es sei denn, dass ich besondere Ermächtigung dazu erhalt.

4. Ich verpflichte mich niemandem mitzuteilen, dass ich dieses Verhältnis mit der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten eingehe, es sei denn, dass ich besondere Ermächtigung dazu erhalte.

5. Ich verpflichte mich, über keinerlei Personen, mit denen ich im Rahmen dieses Verhältnisses mit der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten gesprochen habe, mit Namensnennung oder anderweitig zu sprechen.

Unterschrift	Unterschrift
....	David [illegible]
Vertreter der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten	
(Datum)..	(Datum) 29 April 1959

GEHEIM

201-233477

GEHEIMHALTUNGSVERPFLICHTUNG

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

EINVERSTÄNDNISERKLÄRUNG

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

1. Ich bin mir der Tatsache bewusst, dass mir kraft des zwischen mir und der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten bestehenden Verhältnisses gewisse Information zukommen wird, und dass diese Information selbst oder die aus ihr möglichen Folgerungen der art sein werden, dass ihre rechtswidrige Enthüllung oder unvorsichtige Behandlung die Interessen und möglicherweise die Sicherheit der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika ungünstig berühren könnte.

2. Ich werde stets die überragenden Interessen der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten an Information anerkennen, die ich infolge von mit Sondervertretern der Regierung geführten Gesprächen oder von an mich durch Regierungs-Vertreter gestellten Ersuchen diesem Einverständnis gemäss besitze oder erwerbe.

3. Ich gebe mein feierliches Wort, niemals Information oder Kenntnis der oben angegebenen Art durch Rede, Betragen oder irgendein anderes Mittel bekannt zu machen, zu veröffentlichen oder zu enthüllen, es sei denn, dass ich besondere Ermächtigung dazu erhalte.

4. Ich verpflichte mich niemandem mitzuteilen, dass ich dieses Verhältnis mit der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten eingehe, es sei denn, dass ich besondere Ermächtigung dazu erhalte.

5. Ich verpflichte mich, über keinerlei Personen, mit denen ich im Rahmen dieses Verhältnisses mit der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten gesprochen habe, mit Namensnennung oder anderweitig zu sprechen.

Unterschrift	**Unterschrift**
....	David ....
Vertreter der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten	
(Datum)..	(Datum) 09 April 1969

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for the submission of certain information and related directed services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In consideration of the submission of such information and related directed services, you will be paid $500.00 per month until the activity is completed, a period to approximate 6 months. Of this amount:

$450.00 per month to be held in escrow pending your departure to and return from such activity.

$ 50.00 per month to be paid directly to you for personal expenses.

2. Bonus. A bonus to be paid contingent upon the comparative success of the mission, the amount of the bonus to be determined at a later date by the Contracting Officer, if the Contractee is chosen to perform the task assigned.

3. Termination. In the event the United States Government terminates this activity or your connection with same, sooner than originally proposed, through no fault of yours, you will receive all monies held in escrow and a satisfactory resettlement will be effected as per prior oral agreement with the United States Government.

However, if for any reason traceable to you, such as making yourself unavailable for proper services or training, you fail to consummate the terms of our understanding, you will not receive monies held in escrow, your salary will be immediately terminated and you will be resettled in a place in accordance with above mentioned prior agreement without further compensation or assistance.

4. Secrecy Clause. You will be required to keep forever secret the contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ATE 485 JM/DLD/
26 MAR 59

TO DIRECTOR

FROM PARIS

ACTION SR 6

INFO CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, OS 2, S/C 2, DPD 4

8575

ROUTING

1	DCB	4	
2	DDB	5	2
3		6	3

MAR 27 0238Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 37247

TO DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE PARI 5504

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE AEASPIC SECUR

1. RE SUBJECT LCFLUTTER, AEASPIC OK FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, MINOR EXAGGERATIONS LIFE HISTORY.

2. SUBJECT INSTRUCTED RETURN AMBERT, PUT AFFAIRS IN ORDER, RETURN PARI 6 APRIL WHEN ROSTEDT INTERVIEW SCHEDULED. HE WILL BE PREPARED DEPART BUT NO REPORT NO COMMITMENT MADE.

(REPEAT)

3. FYI: SUBJECT WITHOUT ANY VALID DOCUMENT. ERGO, TRAVEL SOMEWHAT RISKY AND CAN NOT STAY HOTELS. IF DISAPPEARANCE NOTICED SUBJECT COULD NOT SAFELY STAY CHEZ ANNICK. KEEPING HIM SAFEHOUSE AWKWARD BUT POSSIBLE IF NOT PROLONGED AND ALSO NOT RISKLESS. YOU MAY WISH ALERT HBELECTOR FOR TRIP FRAN IMMEDIATELY AFTER ROSTEDT INTERVIEW.

END OF MESSAGE

27 MAR 1959

requires no action

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : H. PAL
UNIT : SR/DOB
EXT : 8331
DATE : 20 Mar 59

TO : PARIS FRANKFURT

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, OS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	5	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	6	[illegible]

MAR 20 23 21:59
REC'D CABLE SECT.

DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY	INITIALS
ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 84802

TO PARI INFO FRAN FROB CITE DIR 18040

18040

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE PARI 5469 (IN ~~X XXXX~~ 34410)

1. ~~OPERATOR~~ MR. PAUL BELKIN ETA PARIS ~~SAS~~ SABENA FLT 633 LEBOURGET FIELD 1310 MARCH ~~23~~ 22.

2. PLS ARRANGE MEET ASSIST CLEARANCE CUSTOMS OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: REQUESTED HQS SEND OPERATOR FOR LCFLUTTER OF AEASPIC.

20 MAR 1959

WE/3

CBE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

SR/COP
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

311-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 189 ES/JO/JO/ JL
20 MAR 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, OS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	DOB	4	B
2	DOB	5	3
3	C	6	L

MAR 20 1802Z 59

PRIORITY

IN 34410

TO DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE PARI 5409

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE DIR 17554 (OUT 83806)*

1. FRIGANZA CONTACTED AEASPIC IN AMBERT. PURSUADED HIM COME PARIS WITHOUT POLICE PERMISSION. HE ARRIVING EVENING 21 MARCH. CAN REMAIN TWO OR THREE DAYS.

2. HAVE SECURE SITE HOUSE AND TEST AGENT.

3. SEND OPERATOR.

END OF MESSAGE.

CS COMMENT: *CONCERNED LCFLUTTER FOR AEASPIC.

Paul Belkin
Lv. N.Y. Sabena 4:15 p.m
Fl # 546
Arr Brus 12.00
Arr Paris Fl # 633
Le Bourget 13:10

Priority cable dispatched
Thru SR/COP 20 Mar
give ETD Paris for Paul B

SR/DOB
20 MAR 1959
ml

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

578 SE/LSB/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG George Fill
UNIT SR/DOB
EXT 8331
DATE 18 March 1959

TO PARIS FRANKFURT
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, EE 4, WE 4, OS 2, S/C 2
F1, F1/OPS

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED MAR 18 21 36 Z 59
ROUTINE REC'D CABLE SECT.
X PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT83806
OUT 83806

TO PARI INFO FROB FRAN CITE DIR 17554
17554

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

REF FROB 3763 (IN 33235) *
PARI 5377 (IN 32810)

1. HQS DELAYED LCFLUTTER OPERATOR TRAVEL SINCE DO NOT DESIRE LCFLUTTER AEASPIC UNLESS ASSURED CONTROLLED CONDITIONS AVAILABLE

2. SUGGEST FRIGANZA VISIT AEASPIC AND

A. DETERMINE IF HE CAN COME PARI PRIOR 10 APRIL, OR

B. ASSURE HQS SECURE SITE AVAILABLE VICINITY AMBERT.

3. LCFLUTTER OPERATOR AVAILABLE DEPART ON 24 HOUR NOTICE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: * CONCERNED PLANNED LCFLUTTER OF AEASPIC.

SR/2
SR/3
SR/~~E~~COP/FI
IRD By phone C. Phalen
WE/3
EE/G

20 MAR 1959

C/WE
for ERIC W. TIMM
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/SR/DOB Michael Rae
MICHAEL RAE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-235477

SJ/ [illegible]

[illegible] Crookham

[illegible]/CS

[illegible] March 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

FRANKFURT [illegible]

DIRECTOR

SR 6

DDP 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE

	DEFERRED	17 [illegible]
☒	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 53332

FROB

INFO FRAN

CITE DIR 17342

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

REF A. FROB 3658 (IN 29383)
B. FROB 3708 (IN 30930)
C. FROB 3697 (IN 30482)

1. SCHEDULING HBELECTOR CIRCA 20 APRIL FOR ALL SUITABLE CANDIDATES WHO SHOULD BROUGHT FRAN SUFFICIENT TIME DISCUSSION WITH ROSTEDT AND PROCESSING FOR DEPARTURE.

2. ROSTEDT WILL DISCUSS MOVEMENT AND NUMBER NECESSARY ESCORT PERSONNEL UPON ARRIVAL FRAN 3 APRIL.

3. UPON COMPLETION LCFLUTTER OF AEASPIC ROSTEDT DESIRES TALK TO HIM IN PARIS WITH BRIGANZA PRIOR MOVEMENT FROM FRANCE.

4. AEASPIC, AESATCHEL AND AENUTMEG 3 ONLY CANDIDATES DOCUMENTED HQS FOR TRAVEL [illegible]. AWAITING BIO DATA AND ASSESSMENT AENUTMEG 8.

END OF MESSAGE

A. RECOMMENDS FRAN C/OS ACCOMPANY AGENTS IN TRAVEL TO U.S.
B. REQUESTS ROSTEDT ARRIVE FRAN EARLY TO ASSIST ASSESSMENTS.
C. ASKS DATE AENUTMEG 8 SHOULD ARRIVE FRAN FOR ASSESSMENT.

ASS/DPD coordinated by phone

SR/3

SR/DCOP/FI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SR/COP/
RELEASING OFFICER

C/SR/DOB
MICHAEL HAL[illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

201-233477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : [illegible]

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/CPS, EE 4, WE 4, OS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	DoB	4	B
2	DoB	5	3
3		6	2

REC'D [illegible]

IN 33235

TO PRITY DIR INFO FRAN PRITY PARI CITE FRAN [illegible]

RE: PARI 5377 (IN 32510)

1. RE PARA 3: AGREE PRESUMPTION.

2. PLAN RENT CAR, DRIVE TO AEASPIC AND LCFLUTTER III VICINITY AMBERT.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR REDWOOD USED.

**[illegible] AEASPIC WHO FOR ADMIN REASONS UNABLE MEET FRICANZA PARIS 19 MAR OR NEAR FUTURE. ASSUMED ADMIN REASONS WAS PROBATION STATUS TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS.

18 MAR 1959

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Perry C

ROUTING			
1	DOB.	4	B
2	DOB	5	3
3	C	6	2

DATE : 138 WCJ/LBIU/W
17 MAR 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SB 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, OS 2, S/C 2

MAR 17 1725Z 59

PRIORITY

IN 32810

TO DIR FROB INFO FRAN CITE PARI 5377

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE FROB 3734 (IN 31879) *

1. ANNICK PHONED AEASPIC WHO "FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS" UNABLE MEET FRIGANZA PARIS 19 MARCH OR "IN NEAR FUTURE."

2. AEASPIC AVAILABLE CHEZ M.J. DASSAUD, 14 RUE ST JOSEPH, AMBERT (PUY DE DOME), TELEPHONE: 136, BETWEEN 0900-1200 AND 1400-1800 HOURS.

3. ANNICK DID NOT EXPLAIN WHAT MEANT BY "ADMIN. STATUS" BUT PROBABLE THIS PROBATION STATUS TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * REQUESTED PLATIPADIS VISIT ANNICK AND ARRANGEMENTS MEET AEASPIC PARI 19 MARCH.

MAR 15 1959

201.233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	DDB	4	B
2	DOB	5	3
3	[illegible]	6	2

DATE : 14 MAR 59

210/[illegible]

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, OS 2, S/C 2

MAR 14 1622Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 31879

TO (PRIORITY) PARI INFO DIR FRAN CITE FRGB 3734

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

NIGHT ACTION

REF A. DIR 16768 (OUT 81907)*

B. FRGB 3707 (IN 30913)

1. REQUEST PLATIPODIS VISIT ANNICK AT REF B ADDRESS AND MAKE ARRANGEMENTS MEET AEASPIC PARI 19 MAR. ANNICK KNOWS NAME "MIKE". OWING TIME LIMIT BELIEVE THIS ADVISABLE RATHER THAN RISK MISSING AEASPIC BY RELYING ON POST.

2. IF REASONS WHY PLATIPODIS OR ANOTHER CASE OFFICER CANNOT CALL ON ANNICK, REQUEST SEND EXPRESS LETTER ADDRESSED ANNICK TELLING HER M WANTS MEET DAVID AT HER HOUSE 19 MAR. M WILL FETCH DAVID, NOT MEET SET TIME AT AGREED RENDEZVOUS.

3. FRIGANZA WILL TAKE NIGHT TRAIN, ETA PARI AM 19 MAR.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *STATED LCFLUTTER OPERATOR PLANNED TRAVEL PARI 19 MAR. ASKED IF AEASPIC WOULD BE AVAILABLE. SUGGESTED FRIGANZA MEET OPERATOR PARI.

AEaspic 201

SR/DI/S

16 MAR 1959

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

512/0J/BV/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG George Fill
UNIT SR/DOB
EXT 8331
DATE 13 March 1959

ROUTING			
1	DOB	4	
2	DOB	5	
3		6	

TO FRANKFURT PARIS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, OS 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	MAR 13 16 02Z 59
	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
X	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 81907 OUT 81907

TO FROB PARI INFO FRAN CITE DIR 16768

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE NO NIGHT ACTION 16768

REF FROB 3501 (IN 22378)

1. LCFLUTTER OPERATOR PLANS TRAVEL PARI 19 MARCH. CAN AEASPIC BE AVAILABLE.

2. SUGGEST FRIGANZA MEET OPERATOR PARI.

3. REQUEST PARI ARRANGE CONTROLLED SITE FOR INTERROGATION.

END OF MESSAGE

Agree LCFLUTTER AEASPIC prior final decision.

IRD Coord by phone CPhalen
SR/2 ABV for JJ
SR/3
SR/DCOP/FI
WE/3

16 MAR 1959

EE/COP
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

C/SR/DOB George C. Fill
MICHAEL RAE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

[illegible]

SR/DOB/59/ 1163

12 March 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Alien Affairs Staff/SO

ATTENTION : Mr. Pennington

SUBJECT : Illegal Entry of Three Foreign Nationals (REDSOX Agent Candidates) into the United States.

1. This will confirm the information furnished your office by Mr. Perry Crookham of this Base relative to the contemplated entry of subject individuals into the United States on or about 20 April 1959.

2. It is presently anticipated that a member of the SR Division will proceed to Germany in early April to assess subject personnel with a view toward their subsequent travel in his custody on the HBELECTOR flight to the United States to begin training as REDSOX agents.

3. By separate memorandum, the Air Support Section/DPD has been requested to schedule a HBELECTOR flight to depart Germany for the U.S. about 20 April 1959.

4. Subject agent candidates are:

a. Zigrids Bruno PLENSNERS. Latvian presently residing in Sweden. OA has been obtained. CI/OA No. C-71157

b. Yevgeniy Nikolayevich SUKHAREV. Russian presently residing in Germany. OA has been obtained. CI/OA No. C-69189

c. David TZITZICHVILI. Georgian presently residing in France. POA obtained. OA requested. CI/OA No. C-73532

5. The Security Office has been contacted regarding Security Officer escort for the flight.

6. Since the agents will be arriving in the United States illegally, provisions will be made for their supervision by a staff officer on a 24 hour day basis.

7. For any further information, please contact Mr. P. Crookham on extension 8331.

MICHAEL RAF
Chief, SR/DOB

IC/vat
O & 1 - Addressee 1 - Subject File 1 - Chrono H7-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 305 DJM/JO/JO/
12 MAR 59

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	5	2
3	[illegible]	6	

MAR 12 1836Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 30930

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, FI/SOD, EE 4, S/C 2

TO DIR INFO FRAN CITE FROB 3708

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE FROB 3658 (IN 29383)

1. AS WE APPROACH DEADLINE PER DIR 07093 (OUT 59714) CLEAR NEWENS AND FRIGANZA WILL BE HARD PRESSED HANDLE WORK. CERTAIN AMOUNT TRAVEL GET AENUTMEG 3 AND AEASPIN c (IF CHOSEN) UNAVOIDABLE. SUBJECTS VIEN 4005 (IN 22370) Nov. 58 MORESO. PRESSING HARD GET TO AENUTMEG 8 AND SUBJECT FROB 2634 (IN 24137) Nov. 58 - SR/3/F1 WHO MAY BE WILLING AND IS CLEARLY LEADER TYPE.

2. COULD ROSTEDT COME FRAN NOW REMAIN TDY UNTIL CANDIDATES SENT AEACRE TO ASSIST DEBREIFINGS, ASSESSMENT, ETC? ADDITIONAL BENEFITS EXTENDED BRIEFING, ROSTEDT'S INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE AEACRE REQUIREMENTS ETC OUGHT ENHANCE OUR PROSPECTS MEET NEEDS AND FUTURE TASK.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

13 MAR 1959

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. 201-233477

CRYPTO: [illegible]

PRQ I: Yes

PRQ II: Yes

POA: To contact and assess. Dated 15 September 1958. Extended for six months.

OA: 11 March 1959. OK for entry into U.S.

CI/OA Number: C-73532

PHYSICAL: OK

LCFLUTTER: Favorable

PSYCHOLOGICAL: McGovern

SECRET
(When Filled In)

No. C-73532

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB - F111

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of AEASPIC, for the purpose specified in your request dated 9 Mar 1959.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI 10-5 and FR 10-215.

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 11 Mar 1959

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

dea

SECRET

FORM NO. 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JUN 55

(6)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL

DATE: 9 March 1959

PROJECT: AEACRE

TO: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

FROM: (Division) SR/DOB

SUBJECT

TRUE NAME: David TZITZICHVILI

CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM: AEASPIC

TYPE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE: REDSOX Agent

CI/OA FILE NO.: C-73532

SO FILE NO.:

USE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE (Full details - Specify country of assignment)

It is anticipated that the Subject will be brought to the United States in late April to begin training, upon the completion of which he will be dispatched on a black mission into the USSR as a member of a REDSOX team during late 1959.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐ PROVISIONAL APPROVAL	☐ PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☒ OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐ GOVERNMENT NAME CHECK	☐ PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)	☐ OTHER:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐ PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IS ATTACHED IN TWO COPIES	☐ PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☒ PRQ II IS ATTACHED, IF OBTAINABLE	☐ GREEN LIST CHECK HAS BEEN INITIATED

FIELD TRACES

☐ REVEAL NO INFORMATION OF VALUE	☐ WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐ REVEAL INFORMATION AS ATTACHED	☐ NOT INITIATED. NOT EXPECTED TO POSSESS RELEVANT INFO.

SUGGESTED INVESTIGATIVE COVER

☐ GOVERNMENT	☐ ACADEMIC
☐ COMMERCIAL	☐ OTHER:

RI TRACES (*If derogatory attach summary)				DIVISION TRACES (*If derogatory attach summary)			
☐ RECORD	☐ DEROGATORY*	☐ NON-DEROGATORY	☐ NO RECORD	☐ RECORD	☐ DEROGATORY*	☐ NON-DEROGATORY	☐ NO RECORD

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION OR SPECIAL COVERAGE DESIRED

NOTE: In accordance with the request of CI Staff (Mr. Brewer), the attached PRQ Part II is submitted herewith. Inasmuch as it is contemplated that a SR representative will proceed to Frankfurt in the near future to contact Subject relative to the mission, it is requested that the OA be expedited.

SUBJECT	IS	☒	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF CIA INTEREST (Possibly)
		☒	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST
		☒	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF IMPENDING INVESTIGATION (Probably
	HAS	☐	BEEN	☐	NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON A "COVER STORY" (not reflected in file)

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
GEORGE A. FILL	8331	MICHAEL RAS, Chief, SR/DOB

FORM NO. 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 AUG 56

SECRET

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: George Fill
UNIT: SR/DC3
EXT: 8331
DATE: [illegible]

TO: PARIS, FRANKFURT
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, CS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

PRECEDENCE:
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

MAR 2 17 20 '59
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO PARI PROB INFO FRAN CITE DIR [illegible]

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE PROB 3501 (IN 22378)

1. WILL ATTEMPT GET LCFLUTTER OPERATOR PARIS SOONEST IF ASSESSMENT REVIEW REVEALS NECESSARY.

PBZ 2. APPROVE PARI ACTION [illegible] PER PARA 2 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

Note: Report Pari after Hqs approval write Subject double-talk letter explaining delay.

ASPIC

3 MAR 1959

SR/3
WE/3
EE/COP
SR/2
SR/COP
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WE
ERIC W. TIMM
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/DOP
MICHAEL RAE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

S E C R E T

Chief, SR

EE; COS, Germany

Chief of Base, Frankfurt

[illegible]

For your information

EGFA-2[illegible], 20 January 1959

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment A is the medical report by the Chief of Medical Staff, COS based on the laboratory report of the French doctor whom Subject used. Also enclosed as Attachment B is the chest x-ray of Subject whose name has been removed from it.

2. Two photographs of Subject for AEACIE are enclosed under separate cover as Attachment C.

Anthony R. Briganza

Approved: Charles D. Richards

Attachments - As stated above

Distribution:
3 - SR w/Atts A, B h/w; Att C s/c
2 - COS w/Att A
1 - EE 2 w/Att A h/w

CS COPY

Docteur Louis ELBET
Ancien Externe des Hôpitaux
de Marseille

TALLARD (H.-A.)
TÉLÉPHONE :

CONSULTATIONS :
LUNDI - MERCREDI
VENDREDI - SAMEDI
- de 9 à 12 heures -
MARDI - JEUDI
- de 14 à 16 heures -
et sur rendez-vous

Tallard, le 5 Novembre 195
8

Je soussigné Docteur Elbet certifie que Monsieur David TZITZICHVILI, que je viens d'examiner cliniquement et radiologiquement est actuellement en excellente santé, et indemne de toute affection contagieuse ou parasitaire en activité.

Les examens de Laboratoire (Lab. ^{re} JOUVE) donnent :

- urée = 0,gr35
- cholestérol = 1,gr70
- acide urique = 35 mgr/ l. sang total
- BW négatif

En foi de quoi je lui délivre le présent certificat pour valoir ce que de droit.

Dr L Elbet

SECRET

15 January 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FOB

FROM : Chief, COS/Medical

SUBJECT : Laboratory Studies - AEASPIC I

1. The chest x-ray was reviewed and although it is of poor technical quality, there is no evidence of active disease of the lungs.

2. The laboratory procedures which were reported by the French physician are also within normal limits.

Vincent I. Cookeny
VINCENT I. COOKENY

SECRET

201-233477

H T2

5-10-14-17

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED NFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

RII

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

T

C
s/c encl to
EGFA - 15336

NTS (Number each comment to show from whom
Draw a line across column after each comment.)

POUCH MATERIAL
SEPARATE COVER
ENCLOSURE
EXPEDITE

1.
SR/DOB 105 J
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

24 Feb 1959

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible]

[illegible] ENCLOSED

DO NOT [illegible] envelope

DO NOT [illegible] DATE

S[illegible] envelope [illegible] ning to

SECRET

To: Chief, SR

Fm: Chief of Base, Frankfurt

w/o att C to EGFA-20336

SECRET

387 DMCL/KJ
19 FEB 59

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	DoB	4	B
2	DoB	5	2
3	C	6	2

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, OS 2, S/C 2

FEB 19 2301Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 22378

TO DIR INFO FRAN PARI CITE FROB 3501

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE: DIR 13127 (OUT 73385)*

1. DO NOT AGREE IMPUGNATION AEASPIC SINCERITY. HOWEVER AGREE WISDOM LCFLUTTER PARI PRIOR TAKING FINAL DECISION. BELIEVE SOONER, BETTER.

2. MEANWHILE REQUEST PARI AFTER HQS APPROVAL WRITE SUBJECT DOUBLE TALK LETTER EXPLAINING:

A. DELAY UNAVOIDABLE, NOT HIS FAULT, WILL EXPLAIN NEXT MEETING.

B. OWING COMPLICATIONS NOT INVOLVING SUBJECT CANNOT PREDICT DATE NEXT MEETING.

C. WILL NOTIFY IN GOOD TIME BY LETTER.

D. WARM REGARDS.

3. SUGGEST SAME PERSON WHO WROTE LETTER MENTIONED PARA 7 EGFA 24867 DO THIS ONE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *HQS REQUESTED CONSIDER FRENCH-SPEAKING HQS LCFLUTTER OPERATOR TDY PARI:TO INTERVIEW AEASPIC PRIOR TO FINAL DECISION.

S-E-C-R-E-T

FEB 1959

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

SECRET

055 MM/WS

DATE 17 FEB 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT (FROB)

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
2	DDB	5	2
3	C	6	3

ROUTINE

IN 20979

TO DIR INFO PARI FRAN CITE FROB 3477

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

REF: A EGFA 24867 (IN)

B FROB 3376 (IN 16580)

C FROB 3425 (IN 19285)

IN ORDER AVOID ALIENATING AEASPIC BY APPARENT FORGETFULNESS ASSURANCES GIVEN DURING LAST MEETING REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS SOONEST ON WHAT WE SHOULD WRITE HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED HQS ADVISE PARI ON WHAT TO WRITE AEASPIC AS EARLY LETTER REQUIRED.

FEB 20 59

SR | DOB 18 FEB 1959

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

189 KM/BM/aw/Ngo

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 9

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	DOB	4	
2	DOB	5	2
3		6	3

FEB 12 14 55 59

REC'D CABLE SECT.

DATE : 12 FEB 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2, FI, FI/OPS

ROUTINE

IN 19285

TO DIR INFO FRAN PARI CITE FROB 3425

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

REF FROB 3376 (IN 16580)*

PLS REPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT:* FROB STATED NOTICE TO AEASPIC OVERDUE. REQUESTED HQS ADVISE PARI ON WHAT TO WRITE AEASPIC AS EARLY LETTER REQUIRED.

15 FEB 1959

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

• 531/ERB/BV/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: George A. Fill
UNIT: SR/DOB
EXT: 8331
DATE: 10 February

ROUTING			
1	DOB	4	B
2	DOB	5	3
3	C	6	2

TO: FRANKFURT PARIS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO: CI, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, OS 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED FEB 17 17 17Z 59
X ROUTINE REC'D CABLE SECT.
PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT 73385 [illegible]

TO FROB INFO FRAN PARI CITE DIR 13127

13127

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

REF FROB 3376 (IN 16580)

1. ALTHOUGH SUBJ APPEARS QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED MISSION ASSESSMENT REVEALS AEASPIC NOT COMPLETELY SINCERE AND MAY BE HANDLING PROBLEM.

2. TO MOVE SUBJ FRAN PREMATURELY MAY CREATE DISPOSAL OR RESETTLEMENT PROBLEM. HQS WILLING RISK LOSS HIS SERVICES IN ORDER PREVENT UNNECESSARY EMBARRASSMENT.

3. REQUEST CONSIDER FRENCH SPEAKING HQS ~~OR BRLN~~ LCFLUTTER OPERATOR TDY PARI TO INTERVIEW SUBJ PRIOR TO FINAL DECISION. PARI AND FROB COMMENTS REQUESTED.

END OF MESSAGE

Comment: Request advice on what to write AEASPIC.

17 FEB 1959

SR/2
SR/3
SR/COP/
WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

EE/COP
RELEASING OFFICER

C/SR/DOB Michael Rae
MICHAEL RAE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

41-233477

14-00000

191 ERL SW,

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 5 FEB 59

ROUTING			
1	DAB	4	
2	DoB	5	3
3		6	2

TO DIRECTOR

FROM FRANKFURT

ACTION SR 6

INFO EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

FEB 6 1833Z 59
ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

FROB 3376 IN 16580 A

TO INFO CITE

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM EE TO SR BY ALICE ANDERSON, EE, EXT 3303, IN COORDINATION WITH ESTER FOGWELL, SR, EXT 3093.

9 FEB 1959

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

191/ 6 FEB 59/ EE

011 JW/JG/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE :	05 FEBRUARY 1959
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	FRANKFURT
ACTION:	~~EE 6~~ SR
INFO :	SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2
	ADDED: SR 2 (ACTION)

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1	3/2	4	
2	2CB	5	2oB
3		6	2

FEB 6 06 20 '59

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN16580

TO DIR INFO FRAN PARI CITE FROB 3376

REF: EGFA 24867

1. PER PARA 7 REF NOTICE/ TO AEASPIC OVER DUE. REQUEST ADVICE ON WHAT WE SHOULD WRITE HIM AS EARLY LETTER OBLIGATORY.

2. PLS INFO PARI WHICH CAN WRITE LETTER.

END OF MESSAGE

9 FEB 1959

201-233477

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

TO Chief, SR

INFO EE; MS; Paris; COS, Germany

201 (not assigned)

FROM Chief of Base, Frankfurt

SUBJECT REDWOOD/REDSOX/AEACRE
AEASPIC

ACTION REQUIRED For your information. N.B. para 9

REFERENCES
A. DIR 04094, 11 December 1958
B. PARI 4625, 9 January 1959
C. DIR 07455, 9 January 1959

X

1. Identity of DIR 04861, dated 17 December 1958 (hereafter referred to as Identity) and the undersigned arrived in Paris on 7 January. Our plans to meet and assess Subject were discussed with the Paris Station and arrangements were made to put an interpreter at our disposal. We are most grateful to the Paris Station for the help and support we were given.

2. The undersigned took a small suite of rooms at the Hotel Celtic, rue Balzac, Etoile in the name of Major Michael C. Long under which he was travelling. It was here that the interviews with Subject took place. Identity stayed in another hotel.

3. Meetings with Subject: Per the telegram sent from Paris on 19 December (see PROB 2977) Subject appeared at the rendezvous promptly. He had understandably imagined that final arrangements for his departure to Germany would be made and he was a little confused and irked, also understandable from his point of view, to learn that that was not the case. We explained that there were several steps still to be completed and that he would be introduced to a colleague who wanted to talk with him. After this we would discuss the question of his move to Germany. Subject objected that his travels and the time he has given cost money. We reminded Subject that more than once before we had offered to pay him for his travel expenses and in effect pay him a retainer which he had refused. We then paid him Frs. 50,000; he was not overly reluctant about taking the money, whereas earlier he had refused except for a token payment of Frs. 5,000 to cover the cost of the medical examination we asked him to have made.

4. Subject was then introduced to Identity (known as "John") and the interpreter (known as "Paul"). Subject, in keeping with the wishes of Identity, was not told that Identity is a psychologist. After a leisurely and good, but not luxurious, lunch during which the ice was broken, the company repaired to the Hotel Celtic where Identity through the interpreter began his clinical exami[illegible] res and tests. After this four hour introductory affair, Subject was given some homework and dismissed.

5. The second formal meeting on 8 January began at 1200 hours. Subject appeared promptly at the hotel room and produced some of the homework he had been given. He had not finished because he had had no sleep on the night of 6/7 January and, in any case, it was not expected that he would complete the task. This second meeting with Identity was devoted to clinical examination and lasted until about 1800 hours.

6. Subject appeared as requested promptly at 0900 hours on 9 Jan[illegible] for the third session with Identity. He delivered a sizeable bundle of completed homework which was given to the contract agent to translate. Platipodis (known as "Tom") thereupon acted as interpreter for Identity. Subject reported that during the night of 8/9 January the French police concerned with watching foreigners had paid him a visit. It was a routine matter and had been triggered because Subject had registered at a hotel where his carte d'identitie, a special one for foreigners with special markings because he has a criminal record and is restricted to his home department, was noted by the hotelier and the police who make regular check[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION SECRET ☐ CONTINUED

CS COPY

Nothing came of the check and there is no reason to believe that Subject will be troubled further. But the prospect of complications with the French authorities, who are now-a-days frequently in an angry mood anyway, disturbed Subject so that he was not as pliable or as intent on the exercise with Identity as he had been. Also, not knowing what could have been behind the police check and not wishing to take unnecessary risks in the circumstances, we did not dally with the remaining things which needed to be done. Identity was finished with Subject shortly before noon, whereupon we instructed him to check out of his hotel and have his picture taken, the latter because we had not received by post the negatives he claims to have sent. We met Subject at the Gare Montparnasse at 1500 hours to discover that he had not been able to get the negatives owing to the reluctance of the photographers to part with them, or so he claimed. Instead, we got several "Photomat" shots and accompanied Subject to the vicinity of his hotel near the Gare St. Lazard where we waited until we saw Subject depart from the hotel after checking out with his things. Thus we knew that he had departed safely and that he had not got involved in a police follow up.

7. Arrangements with Subject: By the time we left Subject on 9 January we promised him that we would write him within five days to inform him of the approximate date of the next meeting and/or give him a general answer whether he will be transferred to Germany; i.e., whether he has been hired. DIR 07455 had not yet been received by us in Paris. Before leaving Paris on 10 January we received DIR 07455 which requested that no definite commitment be made to Subject and we accordingly left a draft letter with the Paris Station which will be sent to Subject on or about 15 January. In double talk this letter will tell Subject that we (the undersigned) have not received a definite answer, that we shall try to get one for his sake, and that we expect to have one by about 1 February. In the meantime Subject should make no definite plans one way or the other. We trust that it will be possible and convenient to reach a decision concerning Subject by about 1 February. In the course of the Paris meeting we also informed Subject that we (the undersigned) would probably come to fetch him, which tentative assurance was given in order that Subject would not have reason to think that he would lose contact with someone he knows and thereby to help buck up his morale. Subject was also told that he would probably go to PEPRIME if hired. Otherwise, no plans or tentative arrangements were discussed with Subject.

8. Identity's Assessment of Subject: Case officer discussed Subject at length with Identity and we believe it is safe and fair to state that there is complete general agreement concerning Subject. We may disagree on the point of pairing Subject with ASSATCHEL, but so far this would seem to be a minor matter. Identity struck the phrase that Subject "satisfies all selection criteria" used in PARI 4695 and will have concurred in this dispatch. Identity would prefer not to write a precis of his assessment at this time; he would rather submit his full assessment which will cover his views concerning pairings with other possible candidates after his return to Headquarters. There is little we can add and trust that this will suffice for the time being. In general we believe that our assessment submitted as Attachment C to EGFA-24034 is not wide of the mark. We do not, however, wish this to be construed as an indirect report on Identity's assessment of Subject; he will submit his own report. Incidentally, we have enjoyed working with Identity on this case and have learned from his techniques and approach. His trip has so far been most salutary.

9. Comment concerning a decision on Subject: The decision on Subject's candidature for REDSOX ought not be delayed any longer than is necessary. Identity agreed that Subject will keep for a time and that he very much wants the job with us. There are several reasons why we think that it would be unwise to delay the decision to remove Subject from France to Germany where he can be held without undue difficulty. First, he is naturally impatient and will not be happy if he is obliged to wait

for an extended period. While we recognize that Subject's hapiness is not a matter of much immediate concern, we believe that it could be an important factor in his future handling. Second, Subject reports that his business is doing well and that he hopes eventually to acquire a French passport which in effect would remove the restrictions under which he now lives. The acquisition of a passport and financial success would, we believe, considerably change Subject's frame of mind and possibly his willingness for REDSOX. Third, Subject might at any time have a run-in with the French authorities. It might not be his fault but it might make it impractical or impossible to reach him when and if he is wanted. Fourth, Subject points out that he cannot simply disappear from Gap without straightening out his affairs, particularly his business affairs with his business partners. "Cannot" may be an exaggeration, but the fact is that Subject is the sort of person who would leave his friends in the lurch, as he sees it, only under extreme circumstances. He would not be happy about having done so. He would like to have about three weeks warning before his departure and as far as we can judge this is not an unreasonable request. In short, we believe that Subject is an excellent, albeit not ideal, candidate and that it would be wise to insure his availability insofar as we can by bringing him at the earliest possible date to Germany where we shall have better control.

Anthony H. Friganza

Approved: Francis M. Bankshire
Francis M. Bankshire

Distribution:
3 - SR
1 - EE
2 - MB
2 - Paris
2 - COS

14-00000

414 GHS/DLD/SB/ER
13 JAN 59

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

JAN 13 2243Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 47184

TO DIR INFO FRAN PARI CITE FROB 3160

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

REF OFPA 36605

1. DISCUSSED CANDIDACY SUBJECT DURING TDY PARIS. FACT HE APPARENTLY WIDELY BLOWN RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT IF HE USED FOR WHOLLY BLACK MISSION. APPEARS ABLE AND FROM FILE SUITABLE. PARI BELIEVES HE STILL WILLING.

2. IN VIEW IMMEDIATE AND PRESSING NEED CANDIDATES, SUGGEST WE WITH IDEN DIR 04861 (OUT 54659) RUN ASSESSMENT SUBJECT BEFORE FORMER RETURNS HQS. IF YOU CONCUR, WILL ADVISE PARI OUR ETA THERE AS SOON AS WE CAN ARRANGE SCHEDULE.

END OF MESSAGE

1 - JUN 1959

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

528 DMCL/LSB/LSB/

: George Fill

UNIT : SR/DOB 529

EXT : 8331

DATE : 9 January 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	DOB	4	B
2	DOB	5	3
3	2	6	2

JAN 9 10 54:59

REC'D CABLE SECT

	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY	INITIALS A
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 60652 2352

TO : XXXXX FRANKFURT PARIS

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

TO PARI INFO FRAN FROB CITE DIR 07455

07455

REDWOOD REDSOX AEASPIC TSICHINYUL

REF PARI 4625 (IN 45386)

1. PREFER STUDY ASSESSMENTS ALL CANDIDATES PRIOR TO ANY COMMITMENTS INCLUDING TWO UNDER CONSIDERATION SALZ. XX HQS CABLING.

2. SUBJ CAN BE TOLD WE HAVE DEFINITE INTEREST AND WILL NEGOTIATE FURTHER EARLY FEBRUARY.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: * REQUESTED AUTHORITY MAKE DEFINITE ARRANGEMENTS TRANSFER (AEASPIC) FRAN ABOUT 1 FEBRUARY.

C/EE

EE/G

WE/3 ________

SR/2 ________

1959

SR/COP/FI ________

C/WE

[redacted] ________

ERIC W. TIMM

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

C/SR/DOB

MICHAEL RAE

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

277 ES/BJ/

DATE : 8 JAN 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 8 1950Z 59

~~PRIORITY~~

IN 45386

TO DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE PARI 4625

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE AEASPIC

RE DIR 04860 (OUT 54658)*

1. IDEN REF AFTER COMPLETING FULL ALBEIT COMPRESSED ASSESSMENT BELIEVES AEASPIC SATISFIES ALL SELECTION CRITERIA.

2. REQUEST AUTHORITY MAKE DEFINITE ARRANGEMENTS TRANSFER SUBJECT FRAN ABOUT 1 FEBRUARY. ANNENT HANDLING AND BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISE GIVE SUBJECT DEFINITE ANSWER BEFORE HE RETURNS GAP MORNING 10 JANUARY, WHICH DATE HIS PERMIT BE AWAY FROM GAP EXPIRES.

3. PLEASE REPLY PRIORITY.

4. FURTHER: CONSIDER TRANSFER AEACRE AFTER REMOVAL FRAN OUGHT NOT BE PROTRACTED. WILL FOLLOW WITH VIP POUCH FROM FOB.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ASSESSMENT OF AEASPIC, AESATCHEL AND JOSEPH MCGOURN (IDEN).

9 JAN 1959

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

REPORT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION

SUBJECT: AEASPIC

Dates of Examination:
8, 9, 10 January 1959

Subject was met in Paris on the above dates by the case officer and the examiner and was submitted to a preliminary psychological examination via a French interpreter.

Subject was born 12 July 1918 in Georgia which, at this time, was not yet part of the USSR. The Subject classifies his parents as "Nobles" and is of the opinion that their status had a great influence upon his behavior and development particularly in the period which followed the family's flight from Georgia to France in 1921. In other words, the Subject abides by the prejudicial class attitude of Noblesse Oblige and feels an obligation of honorable and generous behavior attributable to his birth rank. He is also of the opinion that this concept of nobility has evolved into a system of dignity and pride in his endeavors. This concept is also extended to include the attitude: "If you pretend to be something, you have to act accordingly."

The family fled Georgia before the Soviet invasion. The Subject feels that he was too young to understand but recalls having revolted against the flight because it was a humilitating defeat rather than a tactical retreat. He operates by the attitude that one must fight, surpass or conquer rather than to submit or accept defeat. He is, according to his own self-concept, a person who can not tolerate being beaten in competition. As a child the Subject felt that he was much stronger than several million men. He presents the analogy that he is like a man who wants to kill an elephant. All he needs provided for him is a high powered rifle and then he would feel equal to the elephant. The Subject admits of physical inferiority feelings by virtue of his size and strength but he denies any feelings of intellectual inferiority and admits that he depends more upon his mental faculties than upon his physical abilities. Apparently the Subject has never been able to accept what he considers the original defeat and flight from Georgia.

SECRET

201-233477

In addition, his father later returned to Georgia because he wanted to die in Georgia. Although the Subject can appreciate his father's point of view he is unable to forgive his father for having admitted his defeat by returning to Georgia to die. Although the Subject does not regard himself as a Georgian and is certainly not regarded as a nationalist, he is a competitive individual and may be motivated for affiliation in order to compensate for having experienced what he regards as defeat at the hands of the Soviets. To substantiate the validity of the presence of this attitude in his personality he offers the example that when he was committed to prison he was not bothered by the prison life but by the fact that he had made a wrong calculation in associating himself with an unreliable partner and consequently was arrested and imprisoned. For him, therefore, the first day in prison was worse than all the others. According to the Subject, the sense of defeat together with the competitive urge to balance the score is the primary factor in his personality and life experience. In addition to these, as was mentioned above, he is highly self-confident and optimistic that he will succeed despite the hazards and odds. It would appear that these attitudes are important as regards his motivation for affiliation, management and utilization of his services.

Because the father had provided himself with certain monies the family was able to live comfortably and even opulently upon its arrival in France. However, the vicissitudes of life brought the family progressively to financial difficulties and later to material degradation. The Subject is of the opinion that this loss of economic status had a marked influence upon his way of thinking thereafter. Whereas the family had previously lived in an artificial, feudalistic way it was not brought into more direct contact with reality and, although this was not necessarily a bad influence, life was tough. The Subject's early loss of economic status is important as regards his selection for affiliation because it also constituted a loss of social status which is more primary in Subject's personality. A review of the Subject's life history reveals that he has always responded to material incentives in his various schemes and ventures. However, in terms of his personality, material success is a short-cut method of attaining social status. Consequently, it may be concluded that his drive for social status is more basic than his need for financial status.

From an early age the Subject was non-disciplined and in the school situation he constantly rebelled against the authority of those teachers whom he felt did not regard him as intelligent or pay him sufficient individual attention. Because he felt his teachers were too distant they were automatically unpleasant and apparently his rebellious behavior was his way of obtaining attention and getting closer to the teachers. He consistently refused to abide by the conformist attitude of his peers and felt compelled to do those things not normally done by others. He engaged in practical jokes and was generally regarded as an activist in the school situation. As a result he was expelled from one shcool after another and accumulated a record of having attended 18 different schools. It is also of interest that he never obtained a degree from the institutions of higher education which he attended.

This early delinquent behavior in the school situation is of interest to us because it reflects the Subject's motivational attitudes which are present to date. As far as he is concerned, his scholastic experience, generally speaking, represents frustration, the seeking of a goal to puruse and his hope that his ideals would crystalize and materialize. The Subject is rather abstract in this interpretation. It would seem that his ideal involves not only material but moral comfort and security. However, he has always regarded society, through his disappointments and mortifying experiences, as wicked and selfish in its majority. Consequently, he expressed his dissatisfaction in the form of aggressive and anti-social behavior typical of the malcontent.

One might ask why this individual reacted to his life experience in this manner. He was apparently a precocious child who experienced disillusionment both in his family and in his society. At first he felt this disillusionment was unique and peculiar to himself, but he soon discovered that his discontent was also shared by others. This reinforced his combative attitude and he reflected this attitude in his non-conforming behavior. It was as if he suddenly had discovered to his great disappointment that there was no Santa Claus.

Another aspect of his system of ideals proceeds from his concept of chivalry which he feels his parents inculcated. This is a sort of Robin Hood concept by which the Subject visualizes himself as a hero who rushes to the rescue of the weak and oppressed. This concept is somewhat afantastic and has misguided his behavior in various situations throughout his life. For example, the school situation, he would typically assume blame for the wrong-doings of others. Later in life he responded to the plight of others for the conscious reason of wanting to help them. The Subject feels that many people need help and that he has always wanted to help others in order to help himself. In other words, he is motivated to help others in order to obtain love and affection. His need for love and affection is probably one of his most basic needs and this need is expressed in all of his interpresonal contacts.

The Subject's mother reacted to his neurotic behavior with over-affectionate solicitousness. Although she wasn't actually able to determine the reasons for his internal distress she was aware that something was taking place within him and finally took him to a psychiatrist because of his behavior problems. However, she didn't feel able to advise him of what she was doing and took him to the psychiatrist on a subterfuge. In addition, because the Subject disagreed with the psychiatrist's conclusions, he did not benefit by this experience. This would indicate that in handling the Subject it would be wise not to approach him covertly or as if he were a problem but to permit him to maintain his posture that he is right and that society is wrong. The mother was a marked conformist who insisted that the Subject should abide by the social order. To be successful, the Subject's handlers should avoid trying to make him conform in his attitudes toward society by well-meaning gestures or contrivances.

The Subject continually deceived and disappointed his mother because each time she started him in a new school he made promises that he would behave but each time he managed to be expelled because of his behavior. The Subject is consciously convinced that his mother acted in his good interest and not for her satisfaction of wanting a perfect child. However, it is the opinion of this examiner, that the mother's over-solicitousness was compensatory for her basic rejection of the Subject. It is not likely that she did things for him but that she did things to and with him for herself. In other words, she wanted the Subject to be perfect so that he could be worthy of her love. This may also have been her attitude toward her husband. The Subject did not behave perfectly, did not merit her love and consequently appears to be continually seeking the love and affection of other persons. However, the Subject cannot accept this opinion as regards his mother and denies that she acted in her own interest. One of his principal defenses is denial - simply assuming the attitude that such and such is not true when he probably believes it is true.

The Subject regards his mother as having been the axle of the family. He also regards her as having been the major influence in his life. He is particularly disappointed in his mother because he feels, although he loved her, she deserted him through suicide. He feels she had sacrificed herself completely for her children and that she killed herself because she no longer knew how to distribute love and care. Concomitantly, the Subject began to lose regard for his father when he realized that his father was not providing his mother with affection. However, the Subject identifies with his father in the respect that both have never achieved anything significant and consequently may have disappointed his mother. The Subject misses his mother's love and feels that his life was broken when she died. He found himself completely alone and all his illusions apparently disappeared. He has tried to obtain affection through others and realizes that his need for affection is a big part of himself. On the other hand "I am a complicated person, however, I am not difficult to understand."

The Subject reflects disappointment in his father as a personal ideal. He regards his father as an independent person who was kind but profoundly selfish. Nevertheless, the father would give the shirt off his back. The father was fond of children, loved the whole family and was happy when he saw others happy. However, the Subject is disappointed in his father in that his father never succeeded. He feels that if his father had succeeded none of the things that happened in his life would have come to pass. He feels that his mother's suicide is a direct consequence of his father's failure to succeed.

When the father returned to Georgia the Subject was driven to dispair over the dissolution of the family. The Subject was the baby of the family and the death of his mother and the departure of his father and sister were a threat to his emotional security. He tried to restrain his father by threatening him that because of a French law requiring foreigners to pay taxes before leaving the country, the father ran the risk of being arrested. When the Subject told his sister this, she became angry and replied that the father was mature enough to act as well as possible. The Subject's attempt to prevent his father from leaving was conflictual for him because, although he didn't want his father to leave, he also did not want to interfere with his father's desire. This experience taught the Subject that when his father made a decision he would carry it through at any cost. As it happened, the result was the disintegration of the family. However, this incident is of interest to the Subject's handlers because he indicates that he will abide by firm authoritative decisions even though he objects to them.

Whereas the Subject was attached to his mother, his sister was identified with his father. The sister followed her father to Georgia out of a spirit of affection and sacrifice because she felt that her father needed her. The Subject regards his sister as a tributary of his father's mistakes. The sister taught languages in school and at the time of Stalin the children would say: "We have done this and that thanks to Stalin!" She would reply: "You are individuals and you have done this or that without Stalin!" As a result she was arrested and sent to a concentration camp but with the change of regimes she obtained her freedom and returned to her job. It would appear that the sister is an individualist like the Subject.

The sister's husband had emigrated to France at a much later date and apparently could not adapt himself and regretted having left Russia. He returned to Russia and the Subject believes that because he had served in the German Army he was sent to a concentration camp in Russia. Subject regards the intellectual level of his brother-in-law as that of his sister. The brother-in-law also had an inferiority complex and this may have been an additional reason why the Subject had rejected him as a brother-in-law.

The Subject's brother, who is an architect in Gap, appears to be an independent person who is conservative and more conforming than the Subject. The Subject does not regard his brother as having distinguished himself in extraordinary fashion. It is of interest that the Subject may be jealous of his brother and states that his brother has been more successful but in his own sphere and in terms of his own standards. It is of interest also that the Subject's philosophy is not to accept the fact that he has been unsuccessful but to try to explain his lack of success by the process of introspection and self-analysis. This emphasis and orientation as regards obtaining a greater knowledge of himself is typically a neurotic and represents his need to love himself and to rationalize his failures. The Subject feels that his brother is jealous of him whereas it is likely that both are jealous of each other. It is also likely that the Subject and his brother were rivals for the mother's affection. For example, the Subject feels both he and his brother loved the same type of women.

The Subject was more expressive of his affection toward his mother whereas his brother was more timid, shy and independent. When the brother saw the Subject getting his mother's attention he tried to replace the Subject. When the brother learned that the Subject was seeing a girl whom he knew too he advised the girl to leave the Subject alone. This sibling rivalry may continue to date. However, the fraternal relationship is likely to be more complex. It may be that the brother regards the Subject as "Peck's Bad Boy" or the balck sheep of the family and is interested in fostering the Subject as regards opportunities for accomplishment or success. For some reason or other this examiner has the feeling that the brother may have been indirectly instrumental in the spotting of the Subject. The Subject tends to steer away from a discussion of his brother and chiefly presents the data that this brother is kind, somewhat vain and that he is fond of his brother. By a comparative analysis of the Subject and his relationship to his brother it is apparent that the Subject has a very strong desire to succeed and to accomplish. He was also influenced by others in this regard. For example, at a certain time in his childhood the Subject lived near some former Georgian resistance who had fought against the Soviets. The Subject regarded these persons as uneducated but admirable and affectionate. He feels that he certainly must have been influenced by their exciting stories of their many exploits. He feels he must also have been impressed by their patriotism. The Subject is a sentimental person and he was exalted and deeply impressed by the warm and enthralling manner in which they expressed themselves. He feels that this particular association may have contributed to his passion which he always puts into the execution of whatever he undertakes.

The Subject claims that he has learned from his personal experiences in life rather than from school or from the experiences of others. He feels that he has educated himself in the school of life and has derived little from formal education or from the experiences of others. For example, he claims that his mother's opinion had importance for him only at the time she rendered her opinions. As far as he was concerned they did not have a lasting influence. This item is important as far as the Subject's reaction to future training is concerned. It is likely that he would be impatient to proceed with the task in actuality rather than to learn about performing a task through the experiences of others.

The Subject feels that throughout his school experience, perhaps only one or two teachers really understood him. He regarded the others as apparently idiotic or worthless. These particular teachers taught him that it was often necessary in life "to swallow a great deal of useless "stuff" so that thereafter, certain essentials could be more easily digested." This is another helpful hint as regards the trainers who may be assigned to the Subject.

Subject feels that, apart from his academic progress at school, he learned that it was necessary to communicate, to express himself, to understand and explain. He feels that these are necessary skills in society and he relies quite heavily upon his verbal intelligence. It is likely that he would relate well with a person who exhibited superior wisdom and expressive ability. It is also likely that he would relate poorly to an inarticulate person of lower intelligence.

The Subject was also influenced in his mental development by "heroes" such as Lindberg, Edison, Hitler, Einstein, et alia. The Subject reasoned that if such people existed, the possibility to act either for good or evil also existed. The Subject never identified with one hero in particular but with heroes in general. As a result he wished to be a hero himself. The Subject also remembers certain outstanding men of history from whom he learned a certain order was necessary for the good of the people. However, it developed that the Subject was disillusioned in these men and his ideals were shaken when he later learned to his dismay that they could commit abject or monstrous acts. Related to these experiences, is the fact that the Subject puts no stock in emblems or signs of rank or reputation. He regards such signs as identifying labels only and is not impressed. The fact that he tends to be a skeptic or a cynic should be important to his handlers.

As a foreigner in France the Subject was liable to mobilization into the French Army at the beginning of World War II. However, he felt the authorities took an awful long time to make a decision in connection with him and because of this he joined the French Foreign Legion and left immediately for North Africa feeling that at last he was becoming a member of a famous unit and at the same time fulfilling his obligations towards the French military service. This is an example of his impulsivity, sentimentalism and need for prestige. However, it was not long before he became dissatisfied and expressed his discontent in opinions that

France was an incoherent mess. He bitterly regretted that he had become acquainted with people who obviously did not know what they wanted. The Subject feels that his experience in the Foreign Legion did not have any great influence on his character except that it mobilized a profound dislike for irresolute persons. This point was dealt with before. However, it is worthwhile to repeat that the Subject is an impatient fellow who desires immediate action as regards his interests. He is impatient with postponement and with what he regards as a lack of resolve on the part of others. Unless he is dealt with promptly he develops critical opinions and complaints. As regards his affiliation, it is important to note that he has no real alternative at this time and is therefore required to accept normal procedures. Although he may regard these procedures as a waste of time he will accept them because he lacks control at this point in his processing.

The Subject married for the principal reason of creating a family and a home. Even though he understands the values of the principles involved, principles which were inculcated by his father, he now feels that it was a ridiculous mistake to marry just for the sake of principles without the necessary sentiments. He rationalizes that, at that time, he was merely abiding by the precepts of his father without thinking of the possible consequences. However, he soon discovered that creating a family did not represent anything at all except "aggravating the incoherence and the division of society". In other words, for the Subject, marriage meant building a wall around himself. He also found that, instead of finding a partner who complemented him, all he obtained from the partnership was a reflection of himself. (In selecting a partner for this Subject it would be wise to consider this aspect.) The Subject feels that so-called spiritual intimacy is a fallacy. He is of the opinion that women are necessary for sexual purposes but he fails to understand why it is necessary to "build a separate world" with them. It would appear, in terms of the Subject's anti-social attitudes, that he had hoped to create his own world through marriage, but found that this was an illusion. He does not assume the responsibilities for this attempt.

The Subject does not regard his marriage as a complete fiasco. He feels that both he and his wife were fairly nice and that they got along fairly well with one another but did not live very comfortably. Furthermore, he did not feel that there was any evolution in the marriage. He admits to his debit that he married because he wanted to experience what it meant to have children. Actually, however, he did not want children as individuals in themselves but he assumed that the marriage would produce a child whom he exactly imagined and which would be a reproduction of himself. However, the first child turned out to be a female and this may have shaken the Subject. The Subject voluntarily submits that he has learned the difference between the male and the female. This would seem to be a peculiar statement but it has a good deal of meaning for him, particularly as regards his relationship with his mother, sister, wife and first child. He regards women as alogical and as being determined by a psycho-feminine education. He developed this attitude originally as a defense against his mother's conforming tendencies and it is probable that he crystalized the attitude when his wife rejected him after ~~he had~~ attacked the bank and was arrested. His wife had a second child while the Subject was in jail and the Subject knows nothing about either of his children.

(This is enough to tip us off that the Subject should not be exposed to females who would be important in his handling.)

During World War II the Subject became involved in black marketeering and in the false documents business and claimed to have created a gang which he led and to have traveled throughout Central Europe. He also claims that the primary purpose of the gang was to repatriate or liberate war prisoners and that technically speaking, the black market business was a worthless branch, the only purpose of which was to solve financial problems. However, he admits, that it is true that the black market business reached such a magnitude that a person that was interested only in making money could have found it a quite satisfying and sufficient activity in itself.

As was mentioned above the primary purpose of the gang, according to the Subject was to liberate prisoners. He was successful in releasing 13 French prisoners from Germany. He claims not to have done this for patriotic motives but for humanitarian reasons. He helped the prisoners because they needed help and because he felt it was the right thing to do. He was paid for this but claims to have given his money to help the prisoners. He helped the French prisoners despite the fact that he had sympathy for the Germans. He claims that his sympathy for the Germans was based on the fact that some Georgians had relatives in Germany and he hoped that the Germans would defeat the Russians. If the prisoners had been Germans he would have done the same thing.

Even though he admired and sympathized with the Germans he claims he would not have harmed France. All this is rather complex. However, it is possible to understand his motivations according to his basic principle, which involves a vague desire to help others who need it. He also expresses pride in doing the outstanding and the difficult. The material reward is not an ultimate end in itself. His emotionalized ideals are not expressed clearly in terms of politics or nationality. This complex of motivations will also be discussed in terms of the Subject's participation in the bank robbery.

Although the Subject was satisfied, on the whole, with the technical efficiency of his gang and although he was pleased with the freedom of movement and his apparent security, he was arrested because of carelessness or a slip, not in the actual functioning of the gang, but rather on the part of one of the men whom the gang was helping. Consequently the Subject was arrested by the Gestapo. Because he was considered by the Germans to be a very important prey he played along and led the Germans to believe that he was more important than they had figured. He hoped that such a tactic and belief on their part would bring him certain advantages. Although he realized that he could have been shot for only half what he had done and that it may have been disadvantageous for him to exaggerate his part he claims to have done so in order to mix the tracks, to confuse the German authorities and to avoid "fingering" certain partners whom he made appear as negligible in the scheme. He played this game as long as he could but his end gradually drew near. However, he is an imaginative fellow and he hit upon the idea of claiming that he had invented a very interesting motor that would run without gas. The Germans, of course, could have profitably used such a machine at this point in the war and consequently took his offer into consideration and postponed his execution. As a result he bought time and shortly thereafter was liberated by the Americans. Through this experience the Subject has learned that it is very important to know the weaknesses of authorities and to play these weaknesses against one another. His emotions correspond to a joy of being the sole master of the situation. He feels that if he were to find himself in this sort of a situation again that he would act in exactly the same way. This behavior is typical of that of a con man. He has the capacity to control a situation in his own interest and to imaginatively talk himself out of rather tight situations. This is an outstanding characteristic of his personality and consequently should be noted by his handlers.

However, it would appear to the examiner that there is more to this story than meets the eye. One would suspect that, since he obtained mild treatment at the hands of the Gestapo, he probably collaborated more than he is willing to admit at this time. It may be that he did not fool the Gestapo at all. It is quite possible that the Gestapo used him to pass on the authenticity of documents of other prisoners or in some other nefarious activity. If this can be established as true by other techniques then we are dealing with a person who places self-preservation above all else.

The Subject also has a history of criminal activity in France after the war. At that time he was married and was the father of one child. He was working at a model-maker's shop and although he was not well off he was earning a decent living. According to the Subject a close young friend solicited his assistance in attacking a bank in order to finance an intended marriage. At first the Subject felt that the other fellow was crazy to dare to attack a bank. He also claims to have had a twinge of conscience and asked himself the question, "Is it right to do harm by robbing a bank?" Furthermore, he never felt that a team of two partners would be able to attack a bank successfully. Apparently the other fellow was a fairly good recruiter. He reminded the Subject of his war activities and he was of the opinion that since the Subject had been able to accomplish certain illegal activities in the past that he would be quite capable of attacking a bank. He also displayed a confidence in the Subject's capability to invent a plan of attack and played on the Subject's love of risk, of his need for friendship. At each point in the developments the Subject tried to withdraw by saying: "If my mother learned of this, she would die." He postponed the job indefinitely. However, in the meantime his mother died and his friend felt that he no longer had an excuse. The Subject compromised by agreeing to knock over a jewelry store. Apparently they knocked over two jewelry stores for the sake of good measure. However, after having spent his money, the friend again returned with a proposition to attack the bank. The Subject told him: "You got your money for your marriage; now leave me alone." However, the friend had not married his intended, was broke, and was interested in financing another marriage. They agreed that this would be the last job. Afterwards, however, the other fellow apparently threw his money around and was arrested and squealed.

The Subject claims that after he casually learned of his friend's arrest he fled to the Spanish border. He had not foreseen or had prepared himself for such a consequence and he implies a conflict as regards leaving France. In any event, he was captured and imprisoned. The question arises in this examiner's mind as to why the Subject either panicked or was awkward in his flight, if he did have a chance to flee. It may have been that he unconsciously wished to be caught and to be punished in order to relieve his guilt. He was ambivalent about attacking the bank. If this is true, then important consideration should be given to the Subject's personality as regards plans for the eventuality of his being captured in the course of the project.

Subject feels that he failed badly when he was arrested both by the Germans and by the French. He feels that these two incidents were a consequence of poor selection of friends and poor planning. If he were to find himself in the same type of situation again he would take all the necessary precautions in order to avoid the same pitfalls. When he was jailed by the French Police he was somewhat depressed by the facts that he had failed in his planning and also that he had greatly disappointed his relatives who looked down upon him as a noisy and rash fellow rather than as a man who was capable of carrying out a crime. This was quite a blow to his ego. However, his ego didn't collapse. There have been times in his life when he felt the entire world seemd to conspire against him and when everything seemed destroyed. He has always felt that there are ways to get out of a mess, principally by exerting his ego. He continues to believe that, unless a man is so weak, both physically and morally, it is always possible for him to get back on his feet or at least to hope that this is possible. Consequently, the Subject continues to believe that there is always a possibility to fight and to conquer. This optimism may be motivational in his present desire to affiliate with us.

In the two projects which involved liberating French prisoners and attacking the bank, Subject claims that he was betrayed by another. However, he felt his betrayal was unimportant and consequently was not angry at these persons. Because he feels that there are certain moral values which he holds dearly, namely friendship, these persons lost his esteem but he was more in contempt of himself for having miscalculated. Although his mistakes have seriously reduced his circumstances of life, regardless of their size and consequences, he does not feel that they have discouraged him about future possibilities. "If there is a future, there is hope!" The Subject feels that he has never completely lost self-control and that he has always been a master of his actions at all times and that these actions could have been changed by his own volition. This attitude reveals his tremendous narcissistic investment in his own powers. As far as this project is concerned, it would be unwise to rely upon the Subject's judgements and it would be more prudent to plan every detail for him and require him to abide by directions. He is an imaginative executor but he is a very poor planner according to the testimony of his record. His actions are often impulsive and unreasoned. Such irrational behavior may take place in the context of a relationship with another person despite the fact that the Subject may actually have no particular responsibility to the other person except a tie of affection. The Subject is unable to explain this peculiar aspect of his personality and he is aware that any explanations which he might offer are not rational or sufficient. Consequently, this examiner concludes, that his impulsivity and tendency to behave irrationally, and to his own disadvantage amounts to an unconscious determinent of his behavior and is not available to a rational analysis. His propulsion by an uncontrollable internal force is an important point of consideration as regards his utilization by this project.

In summary the Subject's chief motivations for illegal activity appear to be the following:

a. The Subject will apparently do anything for a friend or for a person in need.

b. Subject's relish of novelty, excitement, derring-do and action. He is a Jesse James type.

c. Emotional outlet as regards the Subject's desires to invent and to realize a success of an invention. The Subject is an inventor by virtue of his temperament and mentality and indulges himself in problem-solving behavior and apparently obtains a compulsive satisfaction if his ideas work out. In other words he is activated to carry out an action because of his displaced interest in successfully engineering and accomplishing a challenging task.

d. Material reward. As was mentioned before, material reward appears to be a means to social status. In the case of the bank robbery the friend obtained three-fourths of the take and the Subject was content not to spend his money freely in order not to arouse his wife's suspicions.

e. Competition with authority. Apparently the Subject regarded the Paris bank as a symbol of authority and was motivated to compete with what this symbol represented. It may be that he did not actually wish to defeat the authority but that he wanted to obtain the attention of authority as he did in the school situation. He certainly accomplished this. The authorities are still paying attention to him. In fact they treat him as a "headstrong little boy", and are continually interested in what he has on his mind. Their interest, of course, is not therapeutic but one of prevention.

f. Unrealistic optimism together with an exaggeration of his own powers may also motivate theSubject to engage in such activities. Unconsciously he may feel like David who was able to defeat Goliath by virtue of possessing a sling-shot. One can just see him standing on a counter of a bank with drawn pistols and with the clientele being immobilized in a state of fear and surprise. The situation is so fantastic that it is corny. However, it is meaningful for the Subject and may partially explain his interest in writing detective novels. If one would read his novel he would obtain a very good picture of the Subject.

g. The bank robbery may have represented the Subject's expression of his feelings of freedom upon release from his mother through her death. She had always attempted to try to make him conform. His wife is apparently the same type of person as his mother and she proved it by rejecting him when she learned about his anti-social behavior.

h. The Robin Hood concept, which was mentioned before may instigate the Subject to take from those in power and provide for those in need.

There is an indeterminancy in the examiner's mind as to whether the Subject is a leader or a follower. He claims to have been a leader of the gang during World War II but in a careful analysis his relationship with his bank partner it would appear that the other person was the leader. The Subject, in this instance, was more of an "idea man" and executor whereas the other chap was the instigator. There is no question that the Subject regards himself as a leader. However an inspection of the record indicates that he is a poor leader because he is impulsive, rash and tends to fail. Furthermore, he is like the cat in the Walt Disney film who, while chasing the mouse and having his entire attention directed to catching and incorporating the mouse, inadvertantly gets himself run over by a truck. His first reaction to being splattered by the truck is one of disappointment as regards not having arrived at the goal, i.e., catching the mouse. Despite this defeat he is able to pick himself up again, figure things out and continue his pursuits. However, he does not learn by experience and he repeatedly is defeated because he keeps his eye too much upon the goal and not enough upon the hazards involved in reaching the goal. In addition to his lack of attention to necessary details the Subject is also as was stated above, emotionally "stupid", impulsive, rash, immature, inexperienced, misguided and unplanful. Consequently it is no surprise that he has failed repeatedly throughout his life.

In regards to the above, another incident of this man's life is relevant. His left index fingertip and thumb tip are missing. He claims to have lost these in an explosion which occurred in Germany when he was involved in the repatriation deal. According to him, after the bombing of Berlin, he picked up among the ruins an unexploded bomb of British origin and took it home to salvage the explosive which he might have used in various ways. While he was removing the detonator which was probably stuck in its receptacle, it exploded in his hands. The explosion occurred so quickly that there was no immediate pain but those around him became panicky. He remained cold-blooded and gave the order to remove all things which were there because the explosion undoubtedly alerted the police. When the police came they explained that he had played with a fountain pen which had burst. They took cognizance of his decorations and advised him never to pick up objects dropped by the enemy. The Red Cross cared for his wound. The Subject does not regret the fact that he tried to dismantle the bomb because he feels he had definitely learned that one should keep his hands away from certain things. This bomb incident may be indicative of the things which were discussed in the preceeding paragraphs. There may be more to the bomb incident than the Subject offers but this could not be established by the clinical method.

Subject feels that a critic would say of him that the majority of his undertakings have brought results which were considerably less than hoped for. Consequently, he feels that a critic would regard him either an optimist or a joker or else that his views on the possibilities of accomplishing are not very sound.

In his own defense the Subject feels that he has made many mistakes in his life but however big these mistakes were, he does not feel that they have basically influenced his character. He feels that his character basically involves the desire to become a worthwhile individual even at the cost of behaving wrongly. He feels that if the only criteria for judging a man are his achievements, that he may be regarded as a failure. He emphasizes that the value of an achievement does not consist in its spectacular magnitude or in its multiplicity. For example, he feels that it is not necessary to mass-produce a machine or an object in order to fully understand its function. He realizes that, commercially speaking, it is more rational to mass-produce the item but this repetition does not interest him. In his opinion, the creative idea and the prototype have a much greater value and importance than the establishment of a factory which would popularize the prototype. To illustrate this attitude further, the Subject is of the opinion that one single thought from a great figure is more valuable than millions of books which are published annually. This attitude, of course, may be interpreted as the defensive orientation of a romantic idealist who has not achieved in practical affairs. However, there is more to this. In the Subject's value system, it is more important to act intelligently, sensibly and efficiently. For example, if he were asked to open a window he feels that it would be up to him to decide as regards the appropriate method. He likes to carry out an intellectual effort which results in efficiency. Consequently, he may be regarded more as an "idea man" than an implementer. Of additional interest to his future handlers is his desire to independently figure out the way that something should be done. This tendency is likely to appear in his training and preparation. It would be well to keep this in mind. The Subject feels that he has a tremendous vitality which, in the past, has expressed itself through false attempts such as the bank robbery etc.

He feels that he is not being used properly and that there is a power within himself, a creative urge for movement and realization which is highly emotionally charged and which permits him to feel that he is capable of doing much more than he has in the past. However, this energy will have to be rationally harnessed if it is to be productive.

Another aspect in regard to the above is that one of the Subject's chief motives is curiosity. He continually seeks the unknown. However, when he approaches the unknown he experiences emotional insecurity and is ambivalent about proceeding or withdrawing. This may have been a factor which influenced his unsuccessful escape through the Pyrenees. The Subject has a fear about which he doesn't know or understand and is afraid of getting himself into something which he cannot get himself out of. His immediate action is to withdraw without solving the problem. Consequently, it would appear that the Subject needs the direction of superior intelligence in order to help him evaluate the realities of a situation or predicament. He needs firm support, guidance, and direction as regards the consideration of all possible eventualities and alternatives. As was said before, it must be kept in mind that his urge for self-preservation is stronger than his desire to solve problems or to carry through on a venture. On the other hand, the Subject claims that he always tries his hardest to keep his promises. Thus, if he agrees to do something he will attempt to carry it through despite the dangers involved. He may be rash in this regard but feels his rashness is due to the fact that he thinks quickly and is able to rapidly apprehend and synthesize the components and essence of a problem in its various perspectives. In other words, he is alert and quick and gets the point immediately even before you finish your sentence. However, it would be wise not to interpret his intellectual alacrity as a commitment or as an index that he will complete a task. It means merely that he gets your point; it doesn't mean that he will cooperate, especially when the going gets rough.

Another factor of interest to the project is that this person is not likely to change as regards his basic characteristics. He has marked difficulty projecting himself in terms of what he would like to be. It is his opinion that in order to change himself, it would be necessary that he would become an entirely different person. However, he feels that everything is relative and perhaps he should show more strength of character, be little more compromising, more realistic and less sentimental. However, according to him, this would imply that the environment would be such that there was no room for sentiment. In this case, his personality would be definitely out of place. Consequently, the Subject does not think he will be a very different person in the future from what he is now. However, he hopes that his material situation will have improved not necessarily financially, but socially. He also naively hopes that the world will change and that there will be no discrimination and that there will be a general improvement of living conditions for everyone. He is a humanitarian in his outlook but he is not an activistic social reformer, except in the sense that he is an individualistic rebel. Generally he strives to improve his own standard of living and he feels that his own inclination to better things is the disease of all inventors. The Subject also hopes to acquire, if necessary, a nationality by virtue of which he could feel that he actually belongs to a society. However he is ambivalent in this regard. He regards society as being anxious to stamp and label individuals and he would prefer to be an individualist outside of society than to be a member of society if he is required to conform. As was said before, his handlers would be wise not to label, to type or to try in any way to get the Subject to conform to society. He will run rings around them like he did his mother. As regards his future outlook, the Subject is not entirely optimistic. He feels that he will never be able to reach his ideals because his material ideal (social reform), is so distant and so difficult that he would need to lead many lives in order to attain it. It might be unfair to designate him as a pessimist. As was said before, he is more of a skeptic and perhaps a cynic. Consequently, one should be careful as regards inculcating ideological or social motives. One should be content to accept his motives in their present state. Tampering with them would only result in disturbing the Subject and the relationship.

The Subject denies that he has any emotional interest in or emotional attachment to France at this time. Although it was likely that he was sentimentally patriotic before the war it is a fact that he has been branded as a criminal and has been deprived of certain civil rights and privileges. He now perhaps feels rejected and in turn is rejecting France. Nevertheless he strikes the examiner as a Frenchman in terms of the way he thinks, feels and acts. He is certainly not a Russian in his personality. He expresses himself freely, is discursive, voluble, and is able to carry on a conversation intensely and indefinitely on his topics of interest. This is typically French, but, in terms of his personality, it represents an oral characteristic. In other words he is inclined to express himself orally and is motivated to obtain love and affection together with other supplies by oral incorporation. What this means to you is that he is "mouthy" and he will eat you up if you are not careful or if you get too close. Incorporation is the epitomy of control. Consequently, if you allow him to incorporate you he's got control, not you. Be wary and detached in this regard. He has already eaten up the case officer.

The Subject is currently involved in his avocation of inventions and is the owner and exploiter of several patents. He has engaged the financial and technical interests of several others in his inventions. He currently presents the problem of being divided between the invention business and continuing in the preliminary phases with us. He claims that if he were to join us he would have to relinquish everything to his business partners. This is probably true, and it is also probably true that he would relinquish his invention interest but at the same time, he presents this item in the fashion of a con man. It would be wise to ignore this gambit.

Additional description of the personality includes the fact that he reflects a superior intelligence, is capable of abstract conceptualizations and is easily able to deal in symbols. He would have no difficulty as regards the intellectual aspects of training. However, in his training, other things will have to be kept in mind. He is an narcissistic character who feels that because he lacks the love of others he needs to love himself. In other words, he is quite in love with himself and thereby acts accordingly. He also tends to rationalize and to offer socially acceptable reasons for his individualistic behavior and for his past failures. He acts because he thinks he is right and because he will succeed. He is quite egotistical in this regard. He strives chiefly for emotional satisfaction. It would be wise to remember also that he appears to be altruistic but at the same time he is selfish. He will do things for others and for the community but will hope to get something out of it for himself. The altruistic and selfish drives merge and he is motivated by both at the same time. He needs to prove to others that he is capable of success and he is self-confident in his power but is insecure that others may not regard him as adequate. Basically he is an exhibitionist, but is too sophisticated to brag or to display himself in a transparent manner. However, he needs attention and is likely to do things in order to get attention. This is what he has done in the past. He particularly strives not to be regarded as bad or evil. He wants to be regarded as a person who has differences of opinions and conflicts with the social order. It would be fair to say that he is not a true criminal but is more of a neurotic character who expresses his conflicts and difficulties by non-conforming behavior. He is a stubborn fellow who does not like to be defeated and strives to conquer. Despite his tendencies to magical thinking he strives to be rational and realistic, but his strong emotional pressures get in his way. He experiences melancholy and depressive mood swings but maintains a light side and attempts to relieve his dysphoric feelings with lightness and humor. He relies heavily on the technique of humor to relieve tension and to avoid the demobilization of anxiety in interpersonal relationship. His humor may be regarded as a good index of his anxiety.

In light of the above the Subject's motivation for affiliation at this time is rather complex. However, on the surf ace it is positive, spontaneous, voluntary and tense. He is really on the shelf in Gap, is isolated, lonely, controlled in his movements, restricted in his aspirations and unable to realize freedom and to develop himself as an individual. Consequently, the assignment represents a unique opportunity to escape from his present level of existence and it is no wonder that he is pushing for a quick release from Gap. However, if he were released without the sufficient establishment of controls and the application of selection techniques he may prove to be a difficult handling problem in the future. It is recommended that his processing be slowed down to a hault and that security and other operational requirements be satisfied prior to lifting him out of Gap. Once he is taken out of Gap he, like the con man, is on first base, and, no matter how you slice it, he will have established himself in a bargaining position.

The Subject likes Americans for sentimental reasons. Although he realizes that the United States may have selfish political interests he is willing to go along out of admiration for the sincerity of the Americans. He likes the liberty which exists in America and the fact that people are treated like individuals rather than as numbers. General ly his attitude toward the Americans is typically emotional and is understandable in terms of what has been said about his personality.

Although the Subject is a rank individualist and a non-conformist he realizes that he must cope with the community and must sacrifice for the good of the community. In particular, he would not like to harm others. In this regard it is unlikely that the Subject has even committed physical assault nor is it likely that he would in the future. No matter what the other person would represent to the Subject he would still be regarded as a human being whom the Subject would respect and would not harm. The Subject is not necessarily a hostile person. He will act out of exigency but will deliberately avoid being sadistic or wontonly cruel. This is of importance as far as the project is concerned. If the Subject were to find himself in a tight spot which required killing another person it is not likely that he would do so. It is more likely that he would attempt to resolve the situation by verbal machinations.

The Subject prefers to work alone as regards technical research but as regards the execution of an operation, he prefers to be part of an organization. He knows he can rely upon himself when he is alone and that others have been unreliable in the past. However, if it is necessary for him to work with others he will accept it. It must be kept in mind, however, that he would prefer to work alone. The Subject is likely to be loyal to a person whom he regards as superior and in the relationship he may even be critical of himself. In order to express his loyalty he would like to prove his usefulness to the superior but, at the same time, he would feel inadequate in that he would require the protection of a superior. In his initial contacts with a partner, the Subject would attempt to assume leadership on the team but if the partner were superior by virtue of intelligence and/or experience, the Subject would tend to follow. It is likely that he would be a better follower of an adequate leader than a leader of a less adequate person. The reason for this is that he is more of a dependent than an independent person in terms of his interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, he is inclined to act on impulse and sentiment and consequently his judgement is questionable. In terms of ideal pairing, the Subject would work better with a more sober-minded, calculating and mature individual whom he would respect and with whom he would enjoy an informal but authoritative relationship.

Prior to the last session of the preliminary examination on the 10th of January 1959 the Subject was routinely contacted by the French Police who were investigating his reasons for being in Paris at that time. As a result of this contact, the Subject was markedly apprehensive and preoccupied and was not able to freely devote himself to the psychological analysis as theretofore. The Subject's primary motive is, of course, self-preservation and since he is an extremely alert and vigilant individual he is likely to over-react and to become emotionally upset with such a provocation. Because of this it appears that the Subject needs the guiding influence of a more mature experienced person who is in more control of the situation. An additional point of interest is that the Subject is capable of using such an experience as the visit by the police as a device to control. For example, because of the visit by the police, the Subject aborted the psychological analysis. He did the same thing, in another way, on the preceeding contact with the case officer. It is as if the Subject does not want us to get too close and to learn too much about him. The third aspect of this behavior is that the Subject for some reason or other consciously or unconsciously feels he has "arrived" and is acceptable to our service. In other words, he may act according to the opinion that a decision has been made in his favor and consequently he sees no need for enduring a psychological analysis. It is likely that he would have the same attitude toward a security interrogation and as regards training.

As regards the general selection criteria for the project it would appear that the Subject satisfies the requirements of intelligence, resourcefulness, mechanical talent, team ability, infiltration-exfiltration capability, good health, physical stamina, motivation, etc. However, there are other factors which may or may not vitiate the positive features. These factors are pertinent to areas such as security and handling. It is recommended that before the Subject is removed from Gap that he be administered a security examination in a controlled situation. Such an examination should be conducted by a skilled and experienced individual who is fluent in French, who is unbiased and objective and who is not overly rigid as regards his conventional standards. With such an examiner, there is a fifty-fifty chance that the Subject would satisfy security standards. The other problem area which remains is that of handling, and unless this is thought out carefully and appropriate personnel assigned, the hand will be quicker than the eye.

JOSEPH D. MC GOVERN, Ph. D.
Chief, Research and Psychiatric Support Br.
Psychiatric Staff/Medical Staff

201-233477

017 HM/JG/JG/DD

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 10

SECRET

DATE : 17 DEC 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT (FROB)

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	DOB	4	B
2	DOB	5	3
3	C	6	

DEC 18 06 27 '58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 38946

TO DIR INFO PARI FRAN CITE FROB 2977

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE: A. DIR 04860 (OUT 54658)

B. FROB 2978 (IN 39009)

1. FRIGANZA WILL MEET IDEN A REF.

2. REQUEST PARI SEND FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO IDEN REF B FROM PARI SOONEST: "AIMERAI TE VOIR LE SEPTIEME JANVIER POUR AFFAIRES AVEC MAZDA. ANNICK."

END OF MESSAGE

18 DEC 1958

mR

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 10

SECRET

DATE 018 ~~104~~/JG/JG
17 DEC 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT (FROB)

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	DOB	4	B
2	DOB	5	3
3	✓	6	

Dec 18 06 27:50

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 39009

TO DIR INFO FRAN PARI CITE FROB 2978

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE: FROB 2977 (IN - 38946) ✓

REF IDEN M. DAVID DE PANASKHET, LE PRIEUR, ROUTE DE VENNES, GAP.

END OF MESSAGE

18 DEC 1958

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 087 MM/BM
15 DEC 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : C/, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	DDB	4	B
2	DDB	5	3
3	C	6	

DEC 16 1133Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 38184

TO DIR INFO FRAN PARI CITE FROB 2958

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE FROB 2928 (IN IN 36854)

1. MET AEASPIC IN GAP 13 DECEMBER. WITH RENEWALS WILL KEEP PERMIT ALLOWING HIM GO PARIS CURRENT UNTIL 15 JANUARY. COMMO FIXED SO COULD MEET SHORT NOTICE.

2. AEASPIC FINE FETTLE, ANXIOUS GET GOING. IN GUARDED TERMS PROBED FOR REACTION TO REDSOX JOB WITH COMPANION. HE WILLING. REVIEWED HIS ABILITY RUSSIAN. IT RUSTY SINCE HARDLY USED SINCE WW II BUT ADEQUATE AND IN COURSE TRAINING WITH AESATCHEL WOULD IMPROVE.

3. SUITABILITY: HE IS, IF MENTALLY STABLE. ALTHOUGH HE SEEMS BASICALLY NORMAL, FEEL UNQUALIFIED HAZARD OPINION PROBABILITIES BEHAVIOUR UNDER STRESS. WELCOME PSYCHIATRIST.

4. RE PAIRING AESATCHEL: BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HAPPY MATCH, AEASPIC'S SUPERIOR BRAINS NICELY COMPLEMENTING AESATCHEL'S SUPERIOR BRAWN.

5. OWING AWKWARD CONNECTIONS, FRIGANZA RETURNED FROM GAP DIRECTLY FRAN VIA GENEVA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT:* SUGGESTED PSYCHIATRIST VISIT FRAN TO INTERVIEW AEASPIC.

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

1 0 DEC 1958

SECRET

DRAFT
11 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT : David TZITZICHVILI - Red Sox Candidate

1. This is an indirect assessment of the above named individual based on a W-B test administered by a case officer in the field and on a PRQI. Subject apparently is being considered for a two-man mission of relatively short duration. The main questions about him seem to be: Can he learn to do what will be required? What would be his motivation? With what sort of person would he get on best in a two-man team? What special problems can be anticipated and avoided in his handling?

2. A brief telephone report was supplied to the headquarters case officer on 10 December 1958. It was stated that Subject possesses adequate intelligence, unusual social skills, and a propensity for getting what he wants without conscience. He is impulsive and surprisingly irrational in satisfying his personal desires. He will appear at first to have leadership skill and interest -- hence will probably just take over leadership of the team. In the long run, however, most persons who would be team-mates would become disenchanted and either reject him or take over themselves. Because of this man's social versatility, impulsiveness and freedom from conscience, he would be particularly difficult to control. That is, it would be difficult to ascertain that he

SECRET

201-233477

actually did what he claimed to have done. His case officer would have to be especially alert for double-dealing, careful to build in checks and counterbalances, and tough and firm in handling style. Despite the limitations noted it was felt that this man is worth the risks involved.

3. In comparison with agent candidates of the same nationality which we have assessed, Subject's intelligence is above average. No intellectual; he is nevertheless unusually well informed and unusually observant of what is going on around him. He is likely to be quite pedantic, but his thinking is not rigorous. He makes decisions impulsively and on analogy. He is therefore likely to appear more reasonable and better organized than he is in fact, and one is less likely to be prepared for his impulsive acts of bad judgment. To summarize the intellectual factor, he is intelligent, but he looks brighter, better educated and more capable of good judgment than he is in fact. However, these are not intellectual limitations to his usefulness in the type of mission considered.

4. Perhaps this man's strongest skill is his versatility in playing social roles. If he so wants, he can make himself appear acceptable to a wide variety of people. He is accustomed to getting out of tight spots by exercising charm or "personality." At the same time, however, he can be very temperamental when his desires are frustrated

and when he feels he is crossed. He needs a lot of sensual experience and his sensuality and desire for emotional experience is not too well controlled. He especially likes new and novel experiences, which he will go after with little attention to the probable consequences.

5. This man is quite dependent on social activity and social relationships for amusement, support, and incentive. He may at times try to play the role of the independent, self-sufficient, lone-wolf, but he could not sustain such a role for long. He must participate with people in a relatively emotional way. At the same time he is likely to be exceptionally suspicious of all the people he works with. He is not very realistic in his suspiciousness, and he is inclined to exaggerate clues and signs. With reference to the proposed mission, he is likely to express distrust of anyone who is introduced as a partner. Likewise it may be assumed he will try to take over the role of leader even though he has no particular leadership skills. This will present problems, because in our opinion over the long haul he would make a poor leader, for the following reasons: (a) he is not accustomed to playing any role consistently for a long period of time, (b) he is more dependent socially than he likes to admit, (c) his judgement is not consistent; he operates too much on impulse or sentiment and hence when the chips are down he cannot backstop his decisions with reasoned judgement.

6. It is our opinion that this man is unusually unencumbered by conscience. When he wants something, he takes it. When it requires him to cross a friend, he does so without guilt. If he looks ahead at consequences he does so in terms of "getting caught and being punished" rather than losing moral stature. He certainly feels little genuine loyalty to codes, institutions, or causes other than his own. He is more likely to remain loyal to a specific individual whom he respects or fears. The principal implications of these characteristics are: (a) he is not regarded as a promising candidate for polygraph testing -- the record is more likely to be misleading than in most cases (b)he will require a particularly firm straight forward, alert case officer whom Subject either respects or fears. A warm, friendly relationship here would likely result in Subject becoming exceedingly suspicious of his case officer, in efforts to manipulate the case officer, and disruption of relations owing to temperamental outbursts.

7. The best single characterization we can make of his motivation for the assignment is that if his personal desires happen to be congruent with the purposes of the mission, then his motivation is appropriate. His interests might include desire for an exciting clandestine expereince and for social prestige, as well as for money. They certainly do not include any abstract political or ideological motives. The important

thing is that this man is unusually intent on satisfying his own whims and caprices whenever they are set-off, which makes him more inconsistent than one expects and hence more difficult to control.

8. Conclusion: Even more than the normal run of agent candidates, this man is solely out for himself. Coupled with this characteristic is his social skill and his ability to get away with gratifying his own desires irrespective of the feelings or interests of others. This indicates peculiarly difficult control problems, which in our opinion require an unusually competent, alert, strict, even authoritarian case officer. Despite the number of negative characteristics discussed in this report, it is nevertheless our opinion that this man is still worth considering providing he has the minimum requirements of language, access to target, and cover. He has the requisite intelligence and very useful social skills. He can get away with activities which would be disturbing or upsetting to other people, and this would appear to be a major qualification.

ROBERT E. GOODNOW
Branch III
TSS/Chemical Division

402/GHS/HES/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5

DATE : 11 DECEMBER 1958

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 11 23 46:58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT OPERATING BASE

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 36854

TO DIR INFO FRAN PARI CITE FROB 2928

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE: DIR 04094 (OUT 52886)*

1. FRIGANZA WILL TRY SEE AEASPIC GAP 13 DEC CHECK IF SUBJ STILL WILLING, MAKE ELASTIC ARRANGEMENTS HAVE HIM READY FOR MEET WITH PSYCHIATRIST. WILL FLY GENEVA, TAKE TRAIN GAP, RETURN VIA PARIS.

2. SUGGEST PSYCHIATRIST VISIT FRAN TO INTERVIEW SUBJ FROB 2776 (IN 30291) AND SUBJ FROB 2887 (IN 35386) IF WE CAN HAVE LATTER READY.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *HQS ARRANGING FOR PSYCHIATRIST TO MEET WITH AEASPIC AND FRIGANZA IN PARIS SOONEST.

12 DEC 1958

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

703 HM/WS/V

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : George A. Fill
UNIT : SR/DOB
EXT : 8331
DATE : 10 December 1958 73

ROUTING			
1	DOB	4	
2	DOB	5	3
3	a	6	

DEC 10 23 14:58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : FRANKFURT

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE					
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 52886

TO FROB   INFO FRAN   CITE DIR 04094

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

REF FROB 2891 (IN35499) *

1. INITIAL VERBAL RESULTS AEASPIC WB TESTS GENERALLY FAVORABLE. PREFER CONDUCT FURTHER PSYCH INTERVIEW IN PLACE PRIOR TO ANY MOVEMENT.

2. HQS NOW ATTEMPTING ARRANGE FOR PSYCHIATRIST TO MEET WITH SUBJ AND FRIGANZA IN PARIS SOONEST.

3. SUGGEST PUSH WORK COMPLETE ASSESSMENT ALL AVAILABLE CANDIDATES. BUT MOVEMENT TO AEACRE TO BE COMPARTMENTED AND ON HIGHLY SELECTIVE BASIS. (END OF MESSAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *STATED THAT AEASPIC SUITABLE FOR BLACK MISSION BUT NOT SURE THAT HE WOULD BE FIT PARTNER FOR AESATCHEL DUE TO LANGUAGE PROBLEM AND THAT TEMPERMENTS MARKEDLY DIFFERENT.

11 DEC 1958

SR/3

EE/COP   SR/DOP/FI   AC/SR/DOB George A. Fill

COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.
201-235017

14-00000

SHE ✓

DATE : 312/GHS/JJW/ 8 DEC 58

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	3
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, S/C 2

DEC 8 2250Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 35499

TO DIR INFO FRAN CITE FROB 2891

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE: EGFW 7965

1. WE HAVE REASSESSED AESATCHEL FOR REF MISSION AND BELIEVE HE SUITABLE. LENGTHY CROSS QUESTIONING INDICATES HE SINCERELY WILLING AND WILL BE EASILY HANDLED. MAINLY TO DEVELOP MORALE AND REMOVE HIM DISMAL FRAN WINTER ATMOSPHERE BUT ALSO GIVE HIM PHYSICAL TRAINING, PLAN SEND HIM MITTENWALD AREA TO SKI BEGINNING ABOUT 29 DECEMBER. AWARE SOME RISK HE MIGHT INJURE SELF BUT BECAUSE HE GOOD SHAPE AND CAN SKI THINK RISK JUSTIFIED IN ORDER COUNTERACT EFFECT PROTRACTED AND DEMORALIZING WAITING FRAN. WILL KEEP HIM THERE UNTIL JUST BEFORE TRANSFER AEACRE WHERE HE SHOULD ARRIVE TOP FORM.

2. AEASPIC SUITABLE BLACK MISSION BUT NOT SURE HE FIT PARTNER FOR AESATCHEL. LANGUAGE PROBLEM AWKWARD. TEMPERAMENTS MARKEDLY DIFFERENT. HOWEVER WOULD LIKE SECOND INTERVIEW WITH HIM BEFORE COMMITTING OURSELVES HIS SUITABILITY PAIR WITH AESATCHEL.

3. HAVE NOT HEARD FROM AEASPIC SINCE PARIS MEETING WHICH WINSHIP ATTENDED. REQUEST PERMISSION BY 11 DECEMBER HAVE FRIGANZA VISIT HIM IN GAP 13 DECEMBER MAKE ARRANGEMENTS COME FRAN EARLY JANUARY FOR FURTHER ASSESSMENT AND LCFLUTTER.

S-E-C-R-E-T

9 DEC 1958

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE -2-

FROB 2891

IN 35499

TO INFO CITE

WILL CLEAR WITH PARIS EN ROUTE GAP.

4. SUBJECT FROB 2776 (IN 30291)* MAY BE WILLING AND SEEMS OUTSTANDING CANDIDATE FOR BLACK MISSION. WE PRESSING HIS ASSESSMENT WHICH HOPE FINISH BY 12 DECEMBER.

5. SUBJECT FROB 2887 (IN 35386)** ALSO APPEARS GOOD AND WE HURRYING ASSESSMENT BUT CANNOT COMPLETE BEFORE MID JANUARY.

6. BOTH SUBJECT PARA 4 AND 5 PHYSICALLY EXCEPTIONAL, SUFFICIENTLY INTELLIGENT, HAVE INTREPID COMMANDO MENTALITY NEEDED REDSOX. IF BOTH ASSAY WELL AFTER FULL PROCESSING, SUGGEST HDQS CONSIDERS TAKING THEM AEACRE WITH AESATCHEL AND AEASPIC HENCE HAVING ALTERNATES AEASPIC IN EVENT HE FOUND UNSUITABLE AS PARTNER AESATCHEL. WISH UNDERSCORE THIS TENTATIVE PROPOSAL ONLY. IF IT FEASIBLE AND ATTRACTIVE, PLEASE ADVISE SO WE CAN PUSH WORK TO HAVE ALL READY FOR TRANSFER SAME TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED POA TRACES ALEXEJ HALMAK.

**REQUESTED POA TRACES JOHANN SCHMIDT.

S-E-C-R-E-T

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I — BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

———/PRQ/———

Instructions:
1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable".
3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. FULL NAME David (FIRST) ——— (MIDDLE) TZITZICHVILI (LAST)

2. Name in native script See attached

3. Name at birth (if different from 1) Not applicable

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use) Dathouna

5. a. Date of birth 12 July 1918 b. Place of birth Tiflis (Gori)

6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate Stateless

7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6) Georgian

8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant) Avenue Ballonne 1, Gap (Hautes Alpes)

9. Permanent address (if different from 8) Not applicable

10. Present occupation (full title, salary, etc.) Directeur technical (self employed) agent for machine tools Generale Mec-technique (Gap)

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate was granted) Not applicable

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. Explain relationship Givi Zaldastani, Othar Zaldastani (friends)

SECRET

1st COPY

201-255277

13. **Father — Full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth, and subsequent nationalities.**

Simon Tzitsichvili, mining engineer
born Tiflis ca. 1887
Georgian
Returned to Tiflis, USSR 1948-49. Believed still living.

14. **Mother — Same information as 13.**

Marie Tsitsichvili (nee KANTCHELI)
Housewife
born Tiflis ca. 1894
Georgian
Suicide 1948

15. **Wife (or husband) — Full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)**

Renee PARROD
Born Besancon August 1927
married in Paris 1949
lives rue Astride Briand, Place de la Revolution, Besancon
divorced 1953 in Paris

16. **Children — Full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.**

1) daughter Elisabeth 9 yrs. old French Lives with mother
2) son Gabriel 7 yrs. old French Lives with mother

17. **Brothers and sisters — Same information as 16.**

See attached sheet.

17. Artchil: Brother, born 1916 in Borzhomi near Tiflis, architect, served in the French Army from 1940 until 1945, became Lt. in a motorized infantry unit and fought in North Africa, France and Germany; twice married, first wife Nov, nee JORDANIA, divorced, second wife, Jacquline, nee [illegible], born 1935 in Gap; lives in Gap with second wife and two of the three children born of the first marriage.

Helena: Sister, born 1916 in Grosni, married Irakli LORDKIPANIDZE, born 1913, now believed divorced. Helena and her husband returned to the USSR in 1948, subsequent to which both were arrested, exiled to Siberia. She is now believed to be living in Moscow. He volunteered with the German Army in WW II.

———/PRQ/———

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held

Sister is teacher of languages (French, English) in Moscow.

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

1) Carte de Sejour Temporaire (French) marked "S" AC28574
   24 April 1958 - Cap - one year
2) Permis de Conduire (French) 21 March 1957 - Cap - unlimited

20. Religion — Degree practiced membership religious orders.

Orthodox (Georgian) non-believing
Was Christian Scientist 5 years before war.

21. Present and past political affiliations.

None

22. Travel outside country of present residence — Country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited.

Germany (Berlin, Poelits) 1941 (several visits) work   Austria (Vienna)

Poland (Lodz, Posen, Warsaw, Cracow) 1943 work

23. Education — School, location, course, degree, dates.

1) Primary 1923-1930 Paris, Versailles, Montrouge
2) Lycee 1930-1935 Vanves, Paris, Versailles, Chalon s/Marne
3) Arts et Metiers Chalon s/Marne 1935-36-37
4) Ecole Cinematographique Paris 1937-38
5) Ecole Breguet Paris 1938-39 Electrical school
   no degrees or diplomas

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language	French	Speak	well	Read	well	Understand	well (native)
Language	Georgian	Speak	native	Read	fair	Understand	well
Language	German	Speak	well	Read	well	Understand	well
	Spanish		fair		fair		fair
	English		fair		fair		fair

SECRET

———/PPQ/———

Military service — Dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war.

Foreign Legion 1940-41 North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia)
Cavalry 1st Class (distinguished private)
No medals, not POW

26. Present and past membership in organizations (Professional, social, political, etc.)

No organisations

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Photography	Forgery of documents
Electricity	Weapons (small arms)
Mechanics	

28. Financial status — Earnings, bank deposits, securities, property.

100,000 fr. per month   no property   firm   makes about 2 million

29. Employment history — Type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reason for leaving. Include employment by any government.

1) Bicycle repairman age of 6 yrs. during summer 1926 Versailles, France.
2) Made movie projector as child for showing films.
3) Made electrical repairs for others throughout childhood from 11 yrs.
4) Repaired sewing machines.
5) Worked in garage washing cars, aiding mechanic.

SECRET

29. (Continued)

6) Worked as night watchman.
7) Welder.
8) Lathe operator

Only really steady job was contract in Stettin, Berlin 1941. Earned 1.10 mark as electrician for [illegible] plant.

Now works on production of machines for advertising.

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

Wrote a detective novel in 1957 On est mieux sur une chaise

31. List persons living at same address, close associates (individuals or groups), correspondents at home and abroad.

Givi ZALDASTANI: Boston, Mass.
Othar ZALDASTANI: Boston, Mass.
DUPUYT, the family: 30 rue Cabanis, Paris XIV
    Yvonne (the grandmother) born about 1881
    Colette (the mother), nee Dupuyt, KHOMERIKI born about 1915
    and the four daughters, all single.

32. List five character references.

Dr. Andre VINARD: born about 1915, dentist, lives in Gap
Jack PARADIS: born about 1918, optician, lives in Gap
Jean AGIMOND: born about 1908, restauranteur, lives in Gap
The family EYGLENANT: the family of Subject present sister-in-law,
    jewelers, live in Gap

33. Court record — Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

Sentenced at Paris 1953 to 7 yrs. solitary confinement (theoretical).
Arrested in July 1950 for bank robbery. Released December 1955.
Sentence reduced by collective amnesty.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age 40

Apparent age

Height 5'10" (70in.)

Eyes Brown

Face — shape Long oval

Complexion

Sex Male

General appearance

Prominent features

Other identifying features

Posture

Weight 56 kg.

Teeth Artificial

Hair Dark brown, balding

Scars Wounds on index finger, thumb of left hand. Accident with grenade.

Build Tip of fore-finger and thumb of right hand missing.

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments

201-233477

14-00000

TO Chief, SR
INFO EE; WE; Paris; COS, Germany

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201 (not assigned)

FROM
Chief of Base, Frankfurt

DATE 13
NOV 8 1958

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/REDSOX/AEACRE
Subject of EGFA-22041

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
Please give us instructions on what is to be done with this contact henceforth

REFERENCE(S)
DIR 44873, 10 October 1958

*

1. Approval to contact and assess Subject was given in reference which also approved our proposal that Peter K. Winship accompany Newens and the undersigned on this job in order that he would be able to carry to Headquarters his personal impressions of Subject.

2. We arrived in Paris on 13 October where we discussed our plans with John P. Platipodis who informed us that the Paris Station had no objections to our proceeding as we proposed. The undersigned travelled as Maj. Michael C. Long; Newens and Winship travelled in true name.

3. We rented a car in Paris and drove to Gap, arriving before noon on 14 October. The remainder of the day was spent in familiarizing ourselves with the town and locating the house where Subject was reported to live. Because none of us spoke French without a noticeable Anglo-Saxon accent, we did not wish to visit the apartment of Subject's brother and risk meeting the brother or sister-in-law who would easily be able to detect that we were not Frenchmen. Therefore, the undersigned drove to Veynes about 40 km. away where he got an older woman working in a small inn to put through a telephone call for us. The woman had no idea what she was doing and was not suspicious. She spoke with Subject's sister-in-law who said that Subject was no longer sleeping there but was expected to visit the house at about 2100 hours. Consequently, the undersigned returned to Gap where Winship and Newens were on hand to surveil Subject's house. A second call to the house of Subject's brother was put through at about 2130 hours from a different town also about 40 km. from Gap. The man who made the call for us learned that Subject was planning to visit Paris, and that it was not known whether he had left.

4. Not wishing to risk missing Subject altogether, we decided to call at the apartment of Subject's brother on the morning of 15 October after 9:30 when it could be expected that the brother would have left home for his office. The undersigned made the call, spoke with the sister-in-law (who, we subsequently learned, took the undersigned for an Englishman). The conversation lasted perhaps 15 minutes. The sister-in-law gave us Subject's present address where he is not registered and told us where he eats lunch daily. While Newens and Winship counter-surveilled the site, the undersigned waited for Subject outside the restaurant where he takes his meals until Subject approached at about 1245 hours. Subject had already been alerted that a non-native French speaking person was looking for him and recognized the undersigned at once. An introduction was made, Subject was shown the photographs which AEPADDLE had taken and accepted these as proof of the undersigned's authenticity. Subject said he was planning to leave that night for a two day visit to Paris on business. It was suggested that Subject, in order to save fare and so that we should have an extended opportunity to discuss "certain matters" with him, might prefer to drive with us. Subject accepted this suggestion and arrangements were made to pick him up in front of a cafe on the outskirts of Gap where he is temporarily lodged.

5. Subject was met by the undersigned at 2000 hours and told that the undersigned was accompanied by two colleagues. Shortly thereafter

201-233477

FORM 53a 1957

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CS COPY

Newens and Winship were picked up and we departed for Paris. During the trip we had an opportunity to converse with Subject about his early life, family problems, etc. As it turned out the long drive gave us an ideal opportunity to draw out Subject about himself and his present circumstances. We arrived in Paris on 16 October at 0700 hours. Subject was dropped near the house of Identity A. Arrangements were made to meet him at 1600 hours in the vicinity of the Gare Montparnasse. During this session with Subject, PRQ I biographic information was obtained. After the four hour meeting, we took Subject to dinner which gave us further opportunity to talk to him. Between our arrival in Paris and our meeting with Subject at 1600 hours, he had been occupied with business affairs so that he had not slept at all, was tired, and wanted to break up early.

6. We next met Subject on 17 October at 1230 hours. Subject had spent the morning winding up his business affairs. After a quick lunch, we took another room at the California Hotel where we talked with Subject until after 1700 hours. During this meeting Subject was given the Wechsler Bellevue test. We also discussed future contact and instructed him to have a full medical examination done, including a chest x-ray, and sent to us as soon as convenient. Likewise Subject was instructed to write us a detailed autobiography running not less than 200 pages or so from about 1939. Subject paled at the detail we requested but said he would make an effort.

7. Subject still carries a special identity card which means he is restricted to the Department of Hautes Alpes. However, he is able within 48 hours to get a special pass from the police which permits him to visit any city in France up to seven days and if he had demonstrable good reasons for a longer visit, he believes arrangements could be made. Subject believes that for about French francs 50,000 he could acquire a French identity document bearing no restriction. This would take time; the money would be needed for legal counsel and bribes. We discussed with Subject the possibility of visiting Germany for 7 days including travelling time on a false German identity document. Being an old hand at forgery, Subject was enchanted with the idea and quite confident he would be able to pull it off. This was discussed because we thought it might be better and more convenient to bring Subject to Frankfurt for an LCFLUTTER examination and assessment rather than to do this in Paris. Subject cannot get legal permission to go outside of France.

8. Contact Arrangements:

(a) Subject will be notified by letter that we wish to meet him. The letter should be addressed to Identity B. The letter should be written in German and should give (1) time and date of meeting (the site will NOT be mentioned; (2) an English phrase must be included at the end of the letter, e.g. "Good Luck." The signature is immaterial. N.B.: Not less than five days and preferably seven should be allowed from the time the letter is posted until the day Subject is to be met.

(b) Meeting place in Paris is the Cafe Georges VI, rue Faubourge St. Honore, just off the rue Royal, Place de la Concorde.

(c) Alternate times for the meeting are three hours after the original meeting time, and then two hours later, i.e. five hours after the original meeting time.

(d) If Subject is unable to come to Paris, he will:

(1) Write or telegraph Identity A stating he is unable to come. The person meeting Subject will go to this address and inquire about M. David; he should be told M. David was unable to come.

(2) Thereupon a telegram will be sent to Subject in Gap in which a telephone number will be included. Sign the message Michel.

(3) Upon receipt of the telegram, Subject will telephone and ask to speak with Michel Long, whereupon he will receive further instructions.

(4) In the event no message is received at Identity A, a telephone call to Identity C should be put through by a native French speaker who will ask for M. David, pretending he is one of David's friends.

(e) Subject will write to Identity D. He will post his letter in a plain envelope to Identity A who will post the inner addressed envelope from Paris.

9. Re DIR 41763, dated 20 September 1958: Subject is completely willing to repatriate to the Soviet Union at our behest. We believe he is sincere in this contention. He could be moved to Germany using a false document to get him across the border for a few days, but if we were to do this, we would incur the risk that Subject might be picked up or might invent some incident in order to claim that it would be impossible for him to return to France. Subject does not like Gap and very much wants to leave. Although we did not go into the matter deeply, we may assume that there is no possibility that Subject on a REDSOX mission could recruit his relatives because no one in the family seems to know where they live. The sister who repatriated is supposed to be living in Moscow but the last letter from her was received several years ago.

10. As attachments please find the following:

(a) PRQ I sent under separate cover
(b) Newens assessment of Subject sent under ~~separate cover~~ H/W
(c) Friganza's assessment of Subject sent ~~under separate cover~~ H/W
(d) The Wechsler-Bellevue results sent herewith in one copy to AEACRE only
(e) Identity list

11. Peter K. Winship will be able to give AEACRE his view on Subject in person. We have told Subject that he cannot expect an early decision on his employment with us. We told him that within about 30 days we would drop him a letter acknowledging the receipt of the medical report which we asked him to send us and informing him of a tentative date when we might wish to meet him in Paris again. Before undertaking further to assess, LCFLUTTER, and interrogate Subject, we would like a tentative expression of Headquarters interest in the case. It would seem that there is sufficient information on which to make such a decision.

Anthony H. Friganza

Approved: Francis M. Bankshire
Francis M. Bankshire

Attachments - A thru E as stated above

Distribution:
3 - SR w/Att A, B, C, D, E   A & E USC   BCD H/W
2 - EE w-Att A, B, C, E
2 - WE w/Att A, B, C, E
2 - Paris w/Att A, B, C, E
2 - COS w/Att A, B, C, E

FORM 53c 10-57 | USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | ☐ CONTINUED | PAGE NO.

201-237177

SECRET

To: Chief, SR
Fm: Chief of Base, Frankfurt
s/c att A to EGFA-24034

SECRET

General Debriefing and Assessment of Subject

1. Introduction:

The Subject was contacted in Cap by Friganza. General familiarisation with him was undertaken en route to Paris (by car) on the night of 15/16 October 1958. Subsequently he was met in Paris on 16 October (afternoon) and on 17 October. On the last day the Wechsler Bellevue was given also further meeting- and communications' arrangements made.

Because of the time-limitation (he was unable to stay in Paris also he had some business of his own to transact), the debriefing and assessment had to be necessarily held to general terms, the main consideration given to Subject's over-all life-run the main stress put on the assessment for REDSOX suitability.

There were no personal or security problems. From the beginning Subject was willing, most eager, and co-operative. He is also willing to co-operate in the future and would not hesitate to take a long trip in order to meet us again.

2. General Biography:

a. Pre WWII

Subject is a Georgian national. Both his parents were Georgians. He was brought to France by his parents, who fled from the Soviet Union. Until WWII they lived in Paris or surrounding areas. For one or the other reason they moved frequently. This might have been due to the profession of his father, who was a graduate mining-engineer and who probably held an administrative or engineering job in France.

Owing to the above, Subject changed schools accordingly. He said that he never had trouble in his studies because of a good memory and fast retention. Consequently, he was usually bored because of frequent repetitions. Owing to boredom and possibly to some sense of opposition, he became usually a nuisance to the teachers. Subject told us that once he had to be transferred to another school, because he got into a violent argument with a teacher. His mother was quite concerned about his behaviour and took him to a psychiatrist (from Subject's narrative it is not clear what the diagnosis was).

In his free time he liked to perform odd jobs, such as, for example, fixing bicycles or helping out in electrical repair jobs or installation work. He also loved to invent gadgets and odd machines.

Undoubtedly Subject had an inclination towards technical matters. On the other hand, he had a tremendous drive to be financially independent, to make money, and to get ahead in life. It also seems that he did not like to be employed by a person and that he always strived for self-employment.

After graduating from school he attended several engineering colleges. At Breguet he studied electro-engineering. Subsequently he enrolled in the technicum for cinematography. It is a fact that Subject had studied a lot; on the other hand, it appears that he did not graduate from any of these technical institutions.

Approximately in 1940, Subject enlisted in the Foreign Legion. He was accepted in Paris and sent via Lyon-Marseille-Port St. Jean to Sidi-bel-Abbes. February-August 1940 he was stationed in Tunesia (Susa).

. From Subject's narrative it may be assumed that he was not a bad soldier and that he actually liked to serve. He said that he had been suggested for officers' training but that this did not materialize (possibly because France was occupied in the meantime). Subject's highest rank was that of a Pfc (or equivalent thereof). According to him this rank has some prestige in the Legion.

In the same unit with Subject there were about 12 Georgians, a number of Armenians, some Spaniards, and Jews. Subject knew of a so-called Georgian Company which subsequently was encircled by the Germans; however, he did not belong to this company. The occupation of France in April/May 1941 ended his military career. He was demobilized and returned to Paris.

b. During WWII

After the discharge from the Legion Subject felt a great desire to fight for France. He told us that he loved France and that he wanted to do something for his chosen homeland. However, it seems that he never got around to doing anything about this ambition. He said jokingly that members of the resistence were not listed in telephone directories, and therefore he did not know how to make contact with them. On the other hand it appears that he did not try very hard and that his love for independence (personal independence) was greater than his wish to join any collective resistance activity. Thus he decided to act on his own.

He told us that at this time there was some recruitment of labour-forces in France for Germany. He decided to enroll as labourer. He went to a certain office in Paris and was sent in due course to Germany. For a while he worked in a synthetic gasoline plant in Boelitz near Berlin. Subject said that this was the only time that he was actually steadily employed. Because the Georgians were rather esteemed by the Germans, he had certain freedoms. For a while he lived with a married German woman and generally speaking, it appears that he had a couple of other girl-friends on the side. For some reason or other he also worked in a munitions plant. When playing (as he told us) with a small hand grenade, one of his fingers was crippled.

It is obscure how he obtained another job in Germany, but it is probably a fact that he worked as a driver for the NSKK (National Socialist Party Motorized Corps).

It is felt that Subject actually went early into the black marketing racket. He told us that he had traveled extensively and had been in occupied Poland (Lodz for example). He termed these travels as "fun" because he had enough money to spend (ergo black market). It might also be possible that he traveled in conjunction with the forged documents business he had begun.

It is not quite clear what prompted him to start forging passes into and out of Germany. During the interview he claimed that his aim was to help imprisoned French officers to get back to France. Nevertheless, although a plausible reason (it was mentioned that he wanted to help France), it is felt that the ulterior motives might still have been love of excitement and wish to make money. Technically speaking Subject must have been an accomplished forger. He told us that his past studies at the cinematographic technicum had given him valuable techniques to be applied to photo-mechanical forging of documents, stamps, and cachets.

It is felt that he must have had accomplices. Nevertheless he claims that he did not work with the French Resistance although it might be possible and probable that they gave him one or the other order to fill. At a certain point Subject spoke about working through intermediaries and cut-outs. Generally speaking it still might be possible that he actually worked with the French Resistance but does not wish to tell us.

Prior to a trip to Germany (Subject was at the time in Paris on business) he was arrested by the German regular police. He explained to us that he had worked with a girl who acted as intermediary in certain documentation affairs. It appears that the girl was unwittingly involved with German police (It is not quite clear from Subject's story whether she worked for the Germans wittingly or unwittingly) and had passed on information concerning Subject's activities.

Be it as it may, Subject was arrested on the railroad station which had been closed-off by German police especially for this operation. He was apprehended in the presence of the girl. He had a pistol with him which complicated matters slightly.

Because the case was political, he was not held unduly by the criminal investigation branch but passed on to the Gestapo. Subject was brought to Berlin, where he was interrogated for several months at Gestapo HQ. He told us that he had given them the information desired and that he had never been beaten or maltreated. He mentioned that his interrogator or interrogators changed their apparel frequently, sometimes appearing in civilian clothes, at times in navy or army uniforms.

He was questioned about the techniques employed and later was requested to consult on document forgeries; i.e. recognizing forgeries submitted to him among genuine documents. Subject told us that this was almost impossible, because his forgeries were so well made that it was hard to tell the fake from the real stuff. Nevertheless, he endeavoured to oblige and pointed out some documents of doubtful genuineness.

Later he was brought before court (it is not clear whether actually or in absentia) and given a defence lawyer. It is not clear whether he was sentenced to death, however, it might be understood from his inferences.

Subject was moved from jail to jail and from concentration camp to concentration camp. He told us that some of the time he spent in solitary and some of the time in communal cells. Occasionally he was manacled hand and foot. Towards the end of the war he knew that executions were carried out en masse. He resorted to a little ruse de guerre and announced to the Germans that his father and he had invented a motor that could run without gasoline. He also made it known that although he was able to draw one part of this motor, the other essential part was with his father, who in turn had cached it somewhere.

Subject knew that his father could not be contacted because the part of Austria he was in at the time was occupied (liberated territory). However, he was willing to draw the mechanism for his captors. It appears that the whole idea seemed attractive to the Germans and that they demonstrated great interest (this was the period of the Wunderwaffen). Subject thinks that this saved him from impending execution. Shortly afterwards he was liberated by components of the advancing US Army.

c. After WWII until Present

It might be chronologically incorrect, but at this point it should be mentioned that Subject's father decided to be repatriated. As far as Subject knows, his father is still in Soviet Georgia and might hold an engineering job. A fact is that his father had written to him (quite a while ago) and requested books on refrigeration-engineering. Subject's sister did not wish to let the father go alone, so she repatriated with him. She was accompanied by her husband, who also was a Georgian and who had been a member of the German armed forces. His sister's husband immediately upon arrival in the Soviet Union was sent to Siberia. His sister is believed to be working as a language professor.

Owing to the above his mother committed suicide. Subject's older brother, who had been an officer in the French Foreign Legion (decorated a couple of times) and is an engineer, went to Gap, where he got a position as municipal engineer.

Subject began working in Paris. He was employed by the firm of Jaques Garé, which specialized in making models of houses. He stayed with this firm approximately from 1947-1948 and was paid about Fr. frs. 120 an hour. There he met his future wife PARROD, Renée, who originated from Besançon (her parents have a grain business in Besançon and own a house and car.).

Subject was married in 1949. Among Subject's acquaintances was a certain ADAM, Jaques (about six months older than Subject). It appears that ADAM convinced Subject of the necessity to make more money. Because making great quantities of money was quite difficult, they decided to commit robberies. It appears that Subject was not against this idea and did not oppose Adam, who had been a former schoolmate of his and with whom he had lived together in Versailles.

Their first objective was a jeweler's store in the rue du Bac (VIIème). It seems that they broke in without much trouble and got away with Fr. frs. 1,000,000 in jewelry. Adam organized the sale of the loot. They netted Fr. frs. 250,000 each. It should be noted that the police had no clue as to who the culprits had been.

Approximately one year later Adam appeared at Subject's house and blackmailed him (in front of his wife) to commit another robbery. This objective was another jewelry store. However, the proprietor of the shop happened to be there (or actually the robbery had to be committed in daytime). Subject did not wish to get into a fight, so they beat a hasty retreat.

Approximately a year later the chosen objective was a bank. Adam and Subject watched the banking house from a truck which was equipped with a periscope. The truck was so parked as to make it possible to observe the teller's counter and thus to count the incoming money. At one point Adam wanted to begin the hold-up when an old woman brought about Fr. frs. 1,000,000. Subject, however, was against it (he told us that he had thought of his mother). Nevertheless, the hold-up took place. Both friends entered the bank. Subject jumped on the counter with drawn pistol. Miraculously both got away. Some time later Adam was apprehended mainly because he started spending money. Adam confessed. Subject at that time was on his way to Gap together with his wife, and daughter, Elizabeth. He told his wife the story and asked her to flee to Switzerland. Subject himself decided to attempt to cross the Spanish border. He, having been recognized by a shepherd, was apprehended in the mountains. As Subject indicated during the interview, he had not been actually too eager to flee the country.

During the ensuing investigation the two first crimes were confessed by Subject. He was sentenced to solitary imprisonment (a technical term in France which precludes parole).

Subject served his term in various rather notorious prisons of France. It appears that he read quite a lot (if and when it was possible) and also worked at one of his inventions: a machine for making cardboard boxes. This machine was actually built for one of the prison administrations and put into operation at the prison factory.

When he got out of jail, his wife's family communicated to him that they did not wish to see him any more. As a matter of fact he has not seen her since and does not know whether she has remarried. He told us that he would like to see his children but that he will only do so when he has achieved something in life.

At present Subject is living in Gap. He is not allowed to travel without permission from the local police. However, people treat him normally, because, as he likes to put it, "I am the brother of the brother". Subject is partner in a mechanical construction firm at present specialized in making advertising aids (electro-mechanical). If and when necessary, he gets permission to travel.

Some time ago Subject wrote a crime novel which until now is unpublished. It appears that also he tried to get employment with the News Bureau having had an acquaintance who had some contacts there. Subject is not satisfied with his present situation. He has no position in life, and besides, he is unable to move, and that annoys him greatly.

3. Assessment:

Subject appears to be quite a complex personality. Based on so brief an acquaintance it is still hard to tell what is veneer and what is actual make-up. It is evident that part of his present reasoning might have evolved in jail. Nevertheless, jail may be regarded as only a step in Subject's evolution.

When considering the sketchy biography, we see that sometimes in the past he felt allegiance towards France regarding it as his homeland. If this was true in the past, it is not any longer the case. He does not like France and the French, although his recent experience in Jail was his own fault. Moreover, he has forfeited the right to become a citizen and with it the possibility to fashion his career to his own liking. However, this officer does not know whether this is a driving factor in his decision or wish to perform dangerous work. It is felt that Subject was to a certain extent always an adventurer. He was accustomed to "move around" from childhood on. Besides, he was always determined to get ahead in life and to make money. His activity during the war was positively not dictated by ideological motivation only. There was a definite gain to be had in the forgery field. If his actions now appear to be presented as purely ideological ones, this cannot be completely true, because at the same time Subject states that he enjoyed making money and spending it.

There seems also to be in him a like for the clandestine and illegal combined with a satisfaction derived from general disaster as for example war. Subject told us that he had an opportunity to see artillery in action and that he liked to see them fire. He also liked to see flaming houses. Yet, on the other hand, he kept himself out of any active participation in military action and rather concentrated on the task of producing good forgeries and making money.

Politically speaking he hates Russians. He said that the German theory of the Untermensch is true in regard to the Russians. Subject says that he dislikes Communism but that Russians are for him the enemies par excellence. Otherwise he has no national or racial prejudices. He says that he does not practice any religion, however, he added, "Believe in your God; I shall believe in mine".

Subject is an excellent conversationalist and definitely has the ability to get along with most personalities without actually accepting their ideas or ways of thinking. He has read a lot, however, it is felt that his knowledge of scientific matters (he has claimed to have such knowledge) is based on para-scientific literature which he reads indiscriminately.

Subject is an individualist. He is probably rather ruthless in furthering his personal interests. His present ambition is to be somebody in life.

It is this officer's opinion that Subject is rather suitable for REDSOX. He has the traits of a born clandestine operator and a liking for the dangerous and illegal. Physically he is healthy and enduring (proven by his long stay in various rough jails). He learns easily and is assimilating easily. On the other hand, his handling might sometimes present problems, because he may act impulsively and rashly believing that what he does is the right thing to do. It is this officer's feeling that Subject might sometimes not think matters over preferring to make snap decisions and to act accordingly.

4. Recommendations:

It is recommended that Subject be assessed by our psychiatrists in Washington. It is this officer's opinion that any purely psychometrical assessment will not yield the necessary results. Generally speaking, Subject has desirable traits and aptitudes for REDSOX or other intelligence tasks.

Patrick B. Nowens

201-233477

Preliminary Assessment of Subject

1. Brief Biography

Subject is a 40-year-old Georgian emigre living in Gap, Hautes Alpes, France. Together with his parents, brother and sister he moved from the disintegrating Georgian Republic in 1921 to France where he has lived ever since, except for about three years during World War II when he worked voluntarily in Germany as a semi-skilled laborer. He joined the French Foreign Legion in 1940 and was demobilized in 1941, having served for the most part in North Africa. While in Germany he developed a skill at forging documents which he used to help French officers to escape to France. He was arrested, convicted and jailed for about a year and a half. After the war he returned to Paris. In 1946 and 1947 Subject committed two armed robberies. In 1949 he robbed a bank in Paris, subsequent to which he was caught, convicted and sentenced to ten years, which was later reduced to five by the terms of a general amnesty. Since his release in 1955 Subject has lived in Gap where his brother lives and works as a moderately successful architect. Subject was married in 1947, divorced in 1950 while in prison. He has a daughter, born before his arrest, and a son, born while he was in prison.

2. Comments on Contact and Debriefing

Subject was contacted by Anthony H. Friganza in Gap on 15 October 1958, having been assessed and prepared for the contact by AEPADDLE, an old friend of Subject's, in February 1958. Shortly after the first meeting with Friganza, Subject met Patrick B. Newens and Peter K. Winship. In the course of meetings lasting a total of about 22 hours he was debriefed and a preliminary assessment, including a Wechsler-Bellevue psychological test, was made. There was no difficulty in authenticating ourselves with Subject and in the course of our conversations, we got no indication that Subject did not answer the questions put to him in a frank and open manner. If anything, Subject perhaps tried to please for it is clear that Subject would like a job, almost any job, with us because his present situation in Gap is restrictive and holds no promise of a future. But, Subject by nature is not easily debriefed or interrogated because he is glib and seems quite naturally to answer specific questions in a general way. Noteworthy and indicative is the fact that the only birth date Subject knew was his own; he did not know his parents', his wife's or even his brother's. This is not suspicious or unique, but it indicates that it is difficult to pin him down to hard facts. When dealing with unpleasantnesses or touchy matters, Subject is apt to philosophize as he did when he was asked questions about the current relationship of his brother and his new wife. Rather than give opinions on facts about the girl, he noted that marriage is sixty percent love and forty percent comedy, which is very Gallic and probably true, but only in a round-about way at best does it express Subject's personal views on the question under discussion. No attempt to be tough with Subject was made and there was no occasion when we conveniently could have challenged his sincerity or veracity, so we do not know how Subject behaves in such circumstances. We would guess that he would adopt a take-it-or-leave-it attitude. He would not be easily bullied.

3. Education, Languages and Cultural Standing

Subject probably has a better-than-average formal education for a Frenchman who did not and never planned to go on to a university. He has a fair lay knowledge of history but is ill informed on details. Subject is something of a scientific dillutant, interested in the atom, gadgets, electrical and mechanical, and probably the gamut of scientific and pseudo-scientific things and ideas. His knowledge is broad but not deep; in some things it is about as deep as Popular Mechanics, but in others he knows considerably more.

Subject claims to speak Georgian with native fluency. He may speak it well but we venture that it is not the same language currently being spoken in Georgia, this probably being so if only because he has never been to Georgia. There is no indication he uses the language much, if at all. He speaks, reads and writes French with native fluency. Actually, French is his native language; at lease he calculates in French. He speaks and reads German well and is capable of expressing himself quite fully in it. He understands English and can say simple things in it. Subject says he is able to understand and speak Spanish well enough to get along.

Culturally Subject is French. His mannerisms are French, as are his habits. If there is anything particularly Georgian about Subject, it is not noticeable. We would guess that Subject was brought up in not too well-to-do middle class circumstances but under the influence of his parents who had had a much better, possibly even prosperous, past.

4. Character and personality: It is safe to describe Subject as independent and as a man who instinctively prefers to take his chances relying on his own abilities and resources in order to avoid compromising his independence by assuming commitments. He is a long wolf type. We guess that Subject behaves this way partly because he has an exaggerated notion of his competence, and partly because he is impatient with delay and with people who are less quick or able than he. Even though Subject needs people and likes company, he does not want to have his affairs, particularly his business affairs, dependent on others. There are several points which support this: By his own admission (which, incidentally, may be quite misleading because he may have quite incorrect opinion of himself) Subject as a student was obstreperous, impatient, and consistently so. As a voluntary worker in Germany when he seems to have struck out on his own is further evidence. Now, rather than taking a steady job of some kind which suits his abilities, Subject is once again striking out on his own, although his record as a convict mitigates this because he has no choice. One of the reasons why Subject does this is that he has an insatiable desire to strike it rich or at least to achieve success and stature. This desire to attain something may be related to the comparison he must be forced to make between his record and that of his brother: His has been unruly, irregular, troublesome, and he has attained very little; his brother became an officer in the French army (even though he was foreign born) and is now a so-so successful architect. Also, we suspect that we have not yet gotten the full story on Subject's marriage and divorce. Perhaps Subject married unwisely, lost face with his family, and/or was considered a low type mate by his wife's family even before he was arrested.

One of the underlying reasons why Subject is so independent is that he is impatient. In conversation we noticed that he did not wait for questions we wished to put to him to be fully formed. He tends to interrupt in order to supply usually interesting and sometimes even pertinent information. He seems unable to bide his time. We doubt that Subject has any definable moral or other standards. In any given instance he either rationalizes the facts in order to reach a conclusion which appealed to him to begin with, or he simply overlooks the certain significant issue. Still, Subject is not amoral or a criminal type. We believe he knows right and wrong, sometimes considers whether any given act would be right or wrong and/or decent. His trouble is that not having any firm base point leads him into moral contradictions which he can't solve and frequently is unaware of because he doesn't really care. We doubt that Subject's morals concerning drink, women, gambling and the other vices differ greatly at most from the average person of approximately the same background. To repeat, it is not that Subject has no standards -- his are just different and peculiarly his own.

We believe that Subject is sentimental but is ashamed of being so; he makes a joke of it. He wants to be liked by people and realizes that most people find him interesting, entertaining and attractive. We think that Subject unconsciously gives an important place to comradeship. He can influence people and be influenced by them. He is mature about such things but still we think he would stick by a friend in trouble, perhaps to the point of foolishness. Because Subject has the winning personality he does, he has never been obliged to retain friends and/or acquaintances because he knows he will always be able to find new ones. Interestingly enough Subject more than once distinguished between a friend and an acquaintance, and in so many words stated that he has had very few friends as such.

Subject demonstrated that he is able to reason and to do so very well. He saw the solution of logical and algebraic problems he was given remarkably quickly. While attempting to solve these problems, Subject reasoned well enough but showed that his memory is perhaps not as good. Subject knew his own date of birth and hardly any other; of course, he had no interest in the others.

Subject is perceptive and is able to combine his perception with his ability to reason. He made several remarks which indicated that he saw through the behaviour of certain personalities, political questions, etc., which were discussed. Subject is observant but we did not have sufficient time with him to know whether his powers of observation are excellent or simply above average.

Subject has a winning personality and is quite capable in dealing with people. He listens well, talks rapidly and at length without attempting to monopolize the conversation. He is quite willing to climb out on a conversational limb, listen when he hears someone else speak up who is apparently better informed, and asks questions if his interest has been aroused. We would guess that Subject would be particularly well suited to dealing with the public. He nicely combines pseudo-attentiveness and Gallic charm.

We doubt that Subject has much resolve and almost certainly would not stick to a boring, difficult job for very long. We doubt he would simply quit in a huff; he would far prefer to rationalize and, if necessary, to manufacture excuses for release. Connected with this is the possible character weakness in Subject concerning his reliability to fulfill any given set task. We doubt that he would oversleep or get drunk but if he personally did not understand and appreciate the importance of the job, he would be inclined to let it slide or ignore it. An excellent point in Subject's favor is that he could not be brow beaten or easily dominated. For instance, we doubt that even the threat of physical torture would force Subject to tell something he did not wish to say. To preclude any such crisis, Subject would be glib, second guess his interrogators, invent facts or at least rearrange them to suit whatever purpose he might have in mind. Subject could probably be dominated by a man of superior intelligence (at least considerably superior to his) who spoke native French and was sufficiently informed about Subject's background so that he could catch out Subject in any one of his evasions.

Subject is a materialist because he has the idea that material success is necessarily the passport to respectability, social success, happiness and a host of other such abstract imponderables. Not that Subject is too unhappy or emotionally unbalanced at the present time; he enjoys the very carefree life he leads. We think that because Subject has this desire for material gain and hence respectability, the promise of a sizeable financial reward would by itself be sufficient to win his loyalty and wholehearted cooperation. This is not to say that the anti-Communist struggle for good and against evil means nothing to him. It does, of course, and he might undertake dangerous work for the love of adventure, but he would do so with a great deal more verve and conviction if he were sure of the pot of gold at the end of the road.

5. Resourcefulness and Adaptability: We believe Subject is extremely resourceful and would be so in nearly any circumstance. He is glib and he can talk. We doubt he is a slave to preconceptions. Because his moral standards are neither well defined and are elastic, his reasoning and behaviour is not constricted by them. He is a pragmatist through and through. He is also a realist. We thought Subject's appraisal of his own position, possibilities for the future, his past, etc., were disarmingly accurate and candid. However, Subject is 40 years old and we doubt that he could be made to change his ways, at least not for very long. We think he would work hard at learning any new job just so long as he found it interesting, adventurous, and/or materially rewarding. He has turned his hand to a lot of things and is experienced at being obliged to experiment and adapt himself to new situations in order to avoid trouble, discomfort, and work.

6. Willingness and motivation: Concerning a REDSOX mission and/or a repatriation mission under our direction, we think Subject is sincere and correct in claiming he is a willing candidate. We doubt that he would attempt to beg off at the last moment. He is no physical coward. However, Subject is willing for REDSOX because in it he sees a way out of the bind he is now in. He can't leave France because there is nowhere to go. Because he has a criminal record he is unable to build a future for himself in France, and he is unable to travel in order to look for possibilities. He has been exiled to a hick town where he is paroled to his brother who is to some extent responsible for his good behaviour. So basically Subject is willing because it is a way out. There is an element of adventure in his willingness but any adventurous ideas would immediately evaporate if Subject were a French citizen and had a financially successful business. Subject is anti-Communist, etc., we feel quite certain, but he is either too jaded, or too mature, or too cynical to permit such notions to play much of a role. If he were given the idea that KUBARK demands fiery anti-Communist motivation, Subject would do his best to convince us that that is what he is. Subject in so many words said that one of his prime desires was to get out of France, and as a first choice to go to the United States. The promise of American citizenship would weigh in heavily as a factor in Subject's willingness to undertake almost any REDSOX mission regardless of the danger. In a word, Subject's motivation is material.

7. Handling of Subject: The handling of Subject from this point on must be ruthless and calculated. We think that Subject would be neither shocked nor offended by such handling; as a matter of fact he probably expects it. We would recommend against paying Subject more than the absolute minimum he needs to survive until the mission had been completed. If Subject is removed from France, some means must be found to convince Subject that we can dispose of him to an area or a place at least as disadvantageous to Subject as his present one is. In other words, don't give Subject the carrot until he has done the job. Subject would not necessarily need to be trained in French as this is the only language in which he is perfectly fluent. Even though his Georgian is very good, it is not current and he could be used only on a black mission. He appears to be physically rugged and in good condition. Very arduous and exacting training would be salutary.

We do not think that Subject would be an awkward disposal problem if he were transferred to AEACRE for training and his mission were subsequently cancelled. Given some money and a job, he could be resettled in any South American country without difficulty.

8. Recommendation:

(a) We hope there is sufficient information on Subject now recorded on which Headquarters will be able to decide if Subject is of interest for REDSOX or not. If he is, he should be further debriefed and interrogated and given the LCFLUTTER test. The LCFLUTTER test could be given in Paris or Frankfurt.

If it is given in Paris there will be a less favorable climate, some risk will be taken that we might have difficulties with the French, and we might face several operational problems in getting a secure house, etc.

If the test is given in Frankfurt, Subject would necessarily need to travel here on a phoney German Reisenausweis (which we consider he could use properly from the language point of view). The principal risk in bringing Subject to Frankfurt is that Subject might have an accident or he might manufacture some reason not to return. In either case we might have an awkward disposal problem on our hands and we might be embarrassed vis-a-vis the Germans.

We would prefer to bring Subject to Frankfurt because we believe that Subject is bona fide and would be unlikely to double cross us.

(b) We wish to emphasize that this is a preliminary assessment and recommendation. With that caveat we would recommend Subject for a fully black REDSOX mission which requires: (1) able bodiness, (2) superior intelligence (considering the calibre of person who is likely to be willing) and reasoning power, (3) willingness to undertake an extremely hazardous mission, (4) no native Russian fluency, (5) basic technical, mechanical, and pseudo-scientific abilities. We would hesitate at this point to recommend Subject for a repatriation mission even though he is willing because we question whether Subject has the resolve or patience for such a task.

Anthony H. Friganza

S E C R E T

s/c Attachment E to
EGFA-24034

NOV 1 1958

Identity A is Mme. DUPUYT, 30 rue Cabanis, Paris IVeme.

Identity B is David de Panashhet, 1 Avenue de Bellevue, Gap, Hautes-Alpes.

Identity C is CAF #1082

Identity D is Dr. Hendryck S. Vincent
405th Personnel Utilization and Evaluation Unit
APO 757
U. S. Army, Germany

S E C R E T

CS COPY

201-233477

14-00000

625 SE/LSB/LSB/1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : G. Fill
UNIT : SR/DOB
EXT : 8331
DATE : 17 September 1958

625

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	DOB	4	
2	DOB	5	3/DOB
3		6	2/DOB

SEP 19 21 01:58 '58
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

TO : FRANKFURT PARIS

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT74783

TO FROB INFO FRAN PARI CITE DIR 41763

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

REF A. FROB 1947 (IN 35899)*

B. EGFA 22041 (C/S COMMENT: * QUERIED IF HQS DESIRED FOB CONTACT AND ASSESS SUBJ OFPA 39997.)

1. POA GRANTED.

2. IF POSSIBLE, SUGGEST FRIGANZA CONDUCT DEBRIEFING AND INITIAL ASSESSMENT IN PLACE.

3. DEBRIEFING EMPHASIS ON POSSIBILITY RECRUITMENT OF RELATIVES OR INDUCED REPATRIATION.

4. MOVEMENT TO GERMANY FOR FURTHER ASSESSMENT CONTINGENT ON FAVORABLE ASSESSMENT AND HQS EVALUATION OF OPS POTENTIAL.

END OF MESSAGE

WE/3

SR/3

22 SEP 1958

SR/COP/FI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EE/COP

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

C/SR/DOB Michael Rae
MICHAEL RAE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

21-23-77

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM: **AEASPIC**

2. PSEUDONYM:

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Initially contacted by AEPADDLE on spotting trip to France in early 1958.

Subsequently contacted by Frankfurt and Paris case officers.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Frankfurt Case Officer, Anthony H. FRIGANZA, is in touch with agent and presumably could arrange transfer of Subject from France to Germany for further transportation to the U.S.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Anthony H. FRIGANZA (p) Frankfurt c/o. Alias used not indicated.
Patrick B. NEWENS (p) Contract Employee, Frankfurt. Alias used not indicated.
Francis M. BANKSHIRE (p) Psychologist. Alias used "John".
Paris representative Interpreter. Alias used "Paul".

FORM NO. 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-95a WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 NOV 56

SECRET

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Primary motivation appears to be acquisition of employment which would permit his removal from his present restricted surroundings.
Secondary motivation possibly is to acquire citizenship of a country other than France. Other motivations likely include financial reward.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

No control as yet since Subject has not been contracted with nor have specific commitments been made to him.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Not indicated in files.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

N.A.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working).*

U.S. Government. Files indicate Subject may look on contacts as U.S. Intelligence representatives.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

None indicated in file.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Presumably none.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None indicated in files.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

None. Subject is Georgian by birth; however, his family fled to France when he was 3 years old. Therefore, for all practical purposes he might be considered French but due to his past record in France, it is probable he feels no allegiance to France.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION VI — **OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT**

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

N.A.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

N.A.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

N.A.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

It is desired Subject be further assessed and placed in training in the U.S. for possible use as a member of a REDSOX team for a black operation into the USSR.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

N.A.

SECTION VII — **PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY**

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

N.A.

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

N.A.

SECTION VIII — **AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT**

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY. AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject has been contacted by personnel listed in Section 1 (3) whom he probably knows as U.S. representatives, presumably all under pseudonyms.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Claims to be good at documentation forgery.
States he engineered the escape of several French Officers from German imprisonment during WWII.

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

No specific salary or other commitment has as yet been offered Subject but it is felt he should receive approximately $600. per month while in training and debriefing status with no guaranteed bonus but provisions made for possible maximum bonus of $10,000., which could also be used as death benefits.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

No commitments made as yet.

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Field traces thru Paris Station reveal Subject was imprisoned in 1936 for a brief period after which he was released in the custody of his Mother. Imprisoned in 1950 for robbery and presently on parole from prison in custody of his Brother.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

Frankfurt and Paris case officers have worked with Georgian colony in France where Subject is known.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

POA C-73532

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

15 September 1958

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

History of impulsive actions indicate Subject has nerve and daring. Although the Psychologist feels Subject, "is likely to be loyal to a person whom he regards as his superior", his impulsiveness and immaturity would make him a handling problem. It has been reported that he is an exhibitionist and an egotist but his personality includes the fact that he reflects a superior intelligence.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

No reflected in files.

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Files do not indicate excessive habits.

SECRET

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Reads considerably.

Mechanically inclined. Spends considerable time inventing and developing mechanical gadgets.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

French - native. Although of Georgian birth and ancestry, Subject has lived most of his life in France.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

PRQ Part I obtained by case officer in field, directly from Subject.

PRQ Part II extracted from Subject's 201 file.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

May require settlement in U.S. if this is offered Subject as inducement.

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W, WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Not indicated in files. Frankfurt Station has information.

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

N.A.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
9 March 1959	GEORGE A. FILL

SECRET

HAND CARRY

Prepare in duplicate

SECTION A

REQUEST FOR: Pseudonym ______ Alias ______ Crypto or derivative number X
(Check one)

1. Pseudonym Assigned ______

Alias Assigned ______

Cryptonym Assigned [illegible]SPIC-1

2. Project or Agent (give adequate description) (If a project please give description at bottom of page/Section B) Agent is a Georgian living in France who is being processed as a possible REDSOX agent of FOB.

3. Status (Staff Employee; Staff, Contract, or Field Agent; etc) ______

4. DOB Branch/Staff Frank McNulty Case Officer

5. FI (Type of Activity: FI, PP, CE, etc)

6. To be used in cable traffic (yes or no) yes

NOTE: List any pseudonyms or cryptonyms previously assigned none

****

SECTION B

True Name or Project description David TSITSICHVILI

SR/MC ______

Sections A and B are to be separated by SR/MC when completed

SECRET

201-233477

S E C R E T

TO: Edgar C. B. Push

FROM: FI/D

Dear Sir:

The reply on your Green List Request:

Number	Name
3477	TZITZICHVILI, David

was completed and forwarded to CI/CA

11 SEP 1958

S E C R E T

201-233477

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB - Fill

NO: C-73532

SUBJECT: TZITZICHVILI, David

Reference: Your Memorandum dated 8 Sept 1958

Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as requested in referenced memorandum.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by KUDESK grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as an agent as the authority granted in an Operational Approval. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is complete.

An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed. To process the Operational Approval, full information (complete PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six months (6) from this date.

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

DATE: 15 Sept 1958

dea

SECRET

SECRET

THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED:

8 SEP

1. SUBJECT (NAME, IN ROMAN LETT AND IN NORMAL ORDER) 5K 15-3-25
David TZITZICHVILI 73537

RE ONSE TO GREEN LIST REQUEST NO. 081777

#081777 EST 8 Sept. 1958

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. BIRTH DATE
20 December 1919, or 12 July 1918

4. BIRTH PLACE
Tibilsi, Georgia

5. CITIZENSHIP
Stateless

6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Address: 1 bis rue de Bellvue, GAP (Hautes Alpes) France.

7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

REQUEST FROM
NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER
Edgar C.B. Pash
OFFICE DESIGNATOR SR/DOB
ROOM, BUILDING 1052 J
EXTENSION 4705

14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED? X YES ___ NO

15. TYPE OF REQUEST
X FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
___ ADDITIONAL DATA
___ COVER NAME

16. INTEREST IN SUBJECT
___ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
X OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
___ OTHER

17. INFORMATION REQUIRED
CE or communist activity.

8. MILITARY SERVICE

SERVICE ARM, COUNTRY	SPECIALTY	LOCATION	DATES
French Army, private			1939-1941

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Subject worked in Germany from 1943 to 1945.		

SEP 15 4 06 PM '58

10. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Subject was married to Renee PARROT. Now divorced.

12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND ASSOCIATES
Subject lives with brother, Artchil de PAHASKET.

13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC) ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. 201-233457 SEE CSI-10-7

FORM 5-57 501 REPLACES FORM 51-125 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TO: [illegible]

DATE

FROM: FI/D

- A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/STD BIOGRAPHIC FILES.
- B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.
- C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, STD IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.
- D. ☒ FI/STD HAS NO ~~PERTINENT~~ INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF A CONTINUING SEARCH WAS REQUESTED IN SECTION 14, INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.
- E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

16 Apr. 58

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/STD.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/STD THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/STD'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL

DATE: 8 September 1958

PROJECT: AEDEPOT

TO: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

FROM: *(Division)* SR/DOB

SUBJECT

TRUE NAME: David TZITZICHVILI

CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

TYPE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE: REDSOX agent

USE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE *(Full details - Specify country of assignment)*

Subject will be contacted and assessed by Frankfurt Operations Base personnel to determine his capability and suitability as a potential REDSOX agent.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒ PROVISIONAL APPROVAL	☐ PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐ OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐ GOVERNMENT NAME CHECK	☐ PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*	☐ OTHER:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒ PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IS ATTACHED IN TWO COPIES	☒ PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐ PRQ II IS ATTACHED, IF OBTAINABLE	☒ GREEN LIST CHECK HAS BEEN INITIATED

FIELD TRACES

☒ REVEAL NO INFORMATION ~~OF VALUE~~ NON-DEROG	☐ WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐ REVEAL INFORMATION AS ATTACHED	☐ NOT INITIATED. NOT EXPECTED TO POSSESS RELEVANT INFO.

SUGGESTED INVESTIGATIVE COVER

☒ GOVERNMENT	☐ ACADEMIC
☐ COMMERCIAL	☐ OTHER:

RI TRACES *(*If derogatory attach summary)*				DIVISION TRACES *(*If derogatory attach summary)*			
☒ RECORD	☐ DEROGATORY*	☒ NON-DEROGATORY	☐ NO RECORD	☐ RECORD	☐ DEROGATORY*	☐ NON-DEROGATORY	☐ NO RECORD

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION OR SPECIAL COVERAGE DESIRED

Note: Please expedite. POA is needed at FOB by 15 September 1958.

SUBJECT	IS	☐ AWARE	☒ UNAWARE OF CIA INTEREST
	IS	☐ AWARE	☒ UNAWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST
	IS	☐ AWARE	☒ UNAWARE OF IMPENDING INVESTIGATION
	HAS	☐ BEEN	☒ NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON A "COVER STORY"

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
GEORGE A. FILL	8331	MICHAEL RAE

FORM NO. 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 AUG 56

SECRET

(8)

Biographic Data

Name: David TZITZICHVILI (No information shown why Subject's surname differs from that of father's.)

Date of Birth: 20 December 1919 (Some records show birthdate 12 July 1918.)

Place of Birth: Tibilsi, Georgia

Nationality: Georgian

Citizenship: Stateless

Address: Subject lives with brother at 1 bis rue de Bellvue, GAP (Hautes Alpes), France.

Employment: Subject is trying to set up an advertising agency and is also working on some inventions and patents.

Languages: Georgian, French, German, some English

Military service: 1939-1941 private in French Army. (Subject worked in Germany from 1943 to 1945. Aided French officer POW's to escape and was later arrested and sentenced to death for espionage. Liberated by U.S. Army in 1945.)

Relatives:

1) Father - Simon KANTCHELI. Lives in Tbilisi, Georgia.

2) Mother - Marie KANTCHELI. Deceased.

3) Sister - Helene LORTKIPANIDZE. About 42 years old. She and her husband live in Tbilisi.

4) Brother - Artchil. He changed his name to Artchil de PANASKET. About 41 years old. Lives in GAP (Hautes Alpes) France. Is a French citizen. Occupation - architect. (Subject lives with him.)

Marital status: Subject is divorced from his French wife, Renee PARROT. They had 2 children.

201-233477

SECRET

David TZITZICHVILI

#08470

8 Sept. 1958

Edgar C.B. Pash
SR/DOB
1052 J
4705

20 December 1919, or 12 July 1918

Tibilsi, Georgia

X

Stateless

X

Address: 1 bis rue de Bellvue, GAP (Hautes Alpes)
France.

X

CE or communist activity.

1939-1941

French Army, private

Subject worked in Germany from 1943 to 1945.

Subject was married to Renee PARROT. Now divorced.

Subject lives with brother, Artchil de PARASKEF.

SECRET

14-00000

SR/DOB PICTURES FOR
PASSPORT (Sept. 4 1960)

AEASPIC

Pictures of
AEASPIC











SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A [illegible] ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER 73532.

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

620 MH/LSB/LSB/C-1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

A DIB 5
DIB 3
C 2

ORIG : Edgar C.B. Pash
UNIT : SR/DOB
EXT : 4705
DATE : 5 September 1958

TO : FRANKFURT, PARIS

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/CA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

0..70333

TO FROB INFO FRAN, PARI CITE DIR

40056

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE: FROB 1947, OFPA 39997

POA FOR SUBJECT IN PROCESS. WILL ADVISE FURTHER ACTION WHEN RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * (IN 35899) HQS REQUESTED CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT SUBJ OFPA 39997.

WE/3 ______________

SR/3 ______________

SR/COP/FI ______________

EE/COP
FI

C/SR/DOB/
MICHAEL RAE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SEP 1958

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

21/233477

14-00000

262 SE/DJB/DJB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 02 SEPT 1958

SECRET

SA-E

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	5	3
3	[illegible]	6	2

SEP 2 [illegible] 22:58

[illegible]

ROUTINE

IN 35899

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT (FROB)

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

TO DIR **INFO** PARI FRAN **CITE** FROB 1947

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE

RE: OFPA 39997

DOES HDQS DESIRE FOB CONTACT AND ASSESS SUBJECT.

END OF MESSAGE

3 SEP 1958 MR

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
OFPA - 39997

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO Chief, SR

INFO Chief, WE
Chief of Base, Frankfurt (ATTN: Anthony H. FRIGANZA)

FROM Chief of Station, Paris, KUTUBE

DATE

SUBJECT Operational/REDWOOD/REDSOX/AEACRE
REDSOX Candidate in France

RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
Headquarters' Comments on Paragraph 2

REFERENCE(S)
A. EGFA - 22041
B. PARI - 2456
C. DIR - 30031

1. Pursuant to Reference C, the Station requested UNWEAVE traces on the Subject of Reference A. The resulting report has been translated and is attached herewith.

2. The Station concurs with the suggestion that the REDSOX section of FOB undertake the recruitment and processing of the Subject. For reasons that need not be discussed in detail in this dispatch, the undersigned has become extensively known in the Georgian colony in true name, and plans to continue spotting and assessing Georgian candidates for other SR activities in France. The Georgian colony in France is small and the Station already has ample evidence that news of intelligence activity within the colony often becomes common knowledge very quickly. Therefore, it is best to risk an unknown outside asset for something so unequivocally compromising as a REDSOX recruitment.

3. Attached also is one of two copies of Subject's signature which was obtained by AEPADDIE as a means of establishing bona fides (see OFPW - 20982).

4. The Station will be glad to discuss the various problems of this case with FRIGANZA or anyone else designated by FOB. It is requested that Headquarters advise what further action will be required of the Paris Station.

Wallace N. Havedon
WALLACE N. HAVEDON

7 August 1958

Attachments:
A. UNWEAVE report
B. Bona fides

Distribution:
3 - SR, w/att A and B (2 cy A, 1 cy B)
1 - WE, w/att A (1 cy)
2 - Frankfurt, w/att A (2 cy)

207137

201-233477

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

SECRET [illegible] CONTROL

DIRECTION
de la
POLICE JUDICIAIRE

Cabinet du Directeur

N° H 501.595

RECHERCHES

A tous SERVICES

PRÉFECTURE DE POLICE
SURETE NATIONALE
GENDARMERIE NATIONALE



Il y a lieu de rechercher très activement le nommé :

TZITZICHVILI David, dit "DATOUNA", né le 20 décembre [illegible] à Tiflis (Géorgie), sans domicile connu.

Signalement :

1 m 67 à 1 m 70 - corpulence mince - visage allongé - nez long - cheveux chatain foncé - calvitie frontale.

Cet individu est l'auteur présumé du vol à main armée, commis le lundi 26 juin 1950, contre la BANQUE du CREDIT de l'OUEST, Bd Haussmann à Paris.

TZITZICHVILI se déplacerait en province, en compagnie de sa femme née PARROT, en état de grossesse avancée, et de leur fillette âgée de trois ans environ.

Il est susceptible de circuler à bord d'une voiture automobile dont la marque et le numéro sont inconnus.

Doit être considéré comme DANGEREUX - Peut être armé.

En cas de découverte, procéder à arrestation de TZITZICHVILI et de sa femme, et aviser d'urgence Etat-Major des Brigades Territoriales - Direction de la Police Judiciaire - Préfecture de Police - téléphone : ODEon [illegible], et automatiques 1593, 1594 et 1595, ainsi que la 3ème Brigade Territoriale, 9, rue Achille Martinet à Paris (18°) - téléphones : [illegible] 55-2[illegible] ou MONT. 09-77, automatique : 1500.

PARIS, le 6 Juillet 1950.

LE DIRECTEUR DE LA POLICE JUDICIAIRE,
R. DESVAUX

[illegible]

SECRET [illegible] CONTROL

14-00000

ENCLOSURE NO. A TO C[illegible]PA 9997

SECRET
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

TZITZICHVILI, David (Alias DATOUNA)

1. TZITZICHVILI was born on 20 December 1919 at Tiflis in Georgia (USSR) of Simon and Marie KANTCHELI. He is also recorded as being born on 12 July 1918. In 1948 he married Renée PARROT; they had two children and lived at 28 rue Cabanis in Paris. He later divorced her.

2. TZITZICHVILI earned the first part of his baccalauréat, then entered the Foreign Legion at the beginning of World War II.

3. He was identified on 8 July 1950 as a participant in an armed bank robbery committed on 26 June 1949 in Paris. He was hunted throughout France; particularly in the area around Gap where his brother lives; and was finally arrested in Cergère on 11 July 1950, after abandonning an automobile that he had stolen at Sens (Yonne), while attempting to enter Spain illegally by way of the Pyrenees. 55,000 francs were found on his person, he confessed to the crime and told where he had hidden 540,000 francs (the remainder of his share of the hold-up). On 5 January 1953 he was condemned by the Cour d'Assises de la Seine to seven years of hard labor for the premeditated theft of 1,969,000 francs. Taking into consideration the time he served while waiting to be tried and his good behavior, he was released on 19 December 1955.

4. The measure to deport TZITZICHVILI because of arrest, passed on 12 February 1954, was modified on 14 February 1956 to limit him to residence in the Hautes Alpes department, where his brother Achille PANASKIET (formerly TZITZICHVILI) now lives.

5. TZITZICHVILI had planned on immigrating to Peru upon his release from prison, but he was refused an entrance visa to that country. He had an Italian friend in Lima named LANFRANCO RANGONI, who lives at Avenue Taena, Bureau 92 and is an official of the Peruvian Chemical Industry.

6. TZITZICHVILI had a rather stormy youth. He arrived in France in 1921 with his parents. In October 1936 he was condemned to imprisonment until the age of adulthood by the Tribunal pour Enfants de la Seine for theft. However, after a few weeks he was placed in his mother's custody. After that he fought in the War until 12 October 1940 when he was discharged. In 1943 he went to Germany as a voluntary worker and returned to France in June 1945.

7. Upon his arrest in July 1950, he was not only charged with armed robbery, for which he was sentenced, but also for four thefts accompanied by violence and an attempted theft, all committed between 1949 and June 1950.

SECRET
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

CS COPY

201-2[illegible]77

SECRET
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

The attached was circulated by the police before T[illegible]ICHVILI's arrest. His description is given as follows:

1m 67 to 1m 70 tall

Thin build

Long face

Long nose

Dark brown hair

Balding in front

SECRET
noforn/CONTINUED CONTROL

ENCLOSURE NO. B TO UFPA 39997

AUG 8 1953

SECRET

MEMORANDA

MEMORANDA

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION
DATE: 14 Aug 58
ACTION: ☒ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM: RID/201
ROOM NO.: 1040 K
TELEPHONE: 2027

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☒ NON-SENSITIVE
201 NO. 1.: 233477
SOURCE DOCUMENT: OFPA-39997
NAME (Last): TZITZICH'LI. (First): David (Middle): (Title):
SEX 3.: ☒ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT
TYPE NAME 2. (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

REQUESTOR'S COPY TO BE DESTROYED UPON RECEIPT OF MACHINE LISTING

PHOTO 4.: ☒ YES ☐ NO
BIRTH DATE 5.: 20.12.19
COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.: USSR
CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.: Tiflis
OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.: 1. 2. 3.
OCCUPATION/POSITION:
OCC/POS. CODE 9.:

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM:
PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.: FRAN
ACTION DESK 11.: SR/7
2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.:
3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.:
COMMENTS:

201-

PERMANENT CHARGE: ☒ YES ☐ NO
RESTRICTED FILE: ☒ YES ☐ NO
SIGNATURE:

FORM NO. 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 OCT 58

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

14-00000

534 ERB/SW/

ORIG : Francis McNulty
UNIT : SR/DOB 534
EXT : 4705
DATE : 27 June 1958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	5	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	6	[illegible]

JUL 3 16 25 '58
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

TO : PARIS FRANKFURT

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

☐	DEFERRED	☐	PRIORITY	INITIALS
☒	ROUTINE	☐	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT96319
OUT 96319

TO PARI INFO FRAN FROB CITE DIR

30031
30031

~~RRR~~ EGFA 22041

1. REQUEST UNWEAVE TRACES PROVIDED SUBJECTS NAME CAN BE BURIED AMONG OTHERS.

2. POA REQUESTED FOR SUBJECT.

3. PHOTOS OF SUBJECT WILL BE SENT PARI AND FOB.

END OF MESSAGE

RI: Subj is David Tsitsichuili

7 JUL 1958

SR/2

ac SR/~~COP/FI~~

WE/3

7 JUL 1958

C/WE/FI Robert E. Anderson
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

CSR/DOB Michael Rae
MICHAEL RAE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

201-233477

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. EGFW-7178
74-6-39-1

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Base, Frankfurt

DATE JUL 10 1958

FROM Chief, SR

INFO: COS, Germany
COS, Paris

SUBJECT GENERAL REDWOOD/REDSOX/AEACRE
SPECIFIC Photographs of Subject of EGFA-22041

ACTION REQUIRED: Information

1. Attached for your information and possible use in establishing bona fides with Subject are two photographs of him made in March 1958 at a ski resort in eastern France. The photographs are from movies taken by AEPADDLE/1, and the source will be obvious to Subject.

2. AEPADDLE/1 also obtained a specimen of Subject's name written backward on a slip of paper. This was sent to Paris in OFPW-20982, and could also be used to establish bona fides with Subject.

3. A POA has been requested, and the field will be notified when it is received.

4. We should appreciate the Paris station's comments on the relative merits of the proposals made in EGFA-22041 as to ways of approaching Subject.

COPY

David T

MICHAEL RAE

Attachments:
1-2 Photos of Subject

Distribution:
2 Addressee w/atts as stated one cy. ea.
2 COS, Paris w/atts. as stated 1 cy. ea.
2 COS, Germany wo/atts.

1-RI w/o atts.
2-SR/DOB/SA&E
1-SR/DOB Chrono

SR/DOB/SA&E/FMcNulty:nw/4705(30 June 58)
(Releasing officer)
(Coordinating officer)
SR/
(Authenticating officer)

SR/COP/FI

MICHAEL RAE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

13—61224-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

201-233477



201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

261 MM/DJB/[illegible]
DATE : 25 JUNE 1958

ROUTING			
1	DOB	4	[illegible]
2	DO	5	2
3	e	6	DIO

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : PARIS
ACTION: SR 6
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, WE 4, S/C 2

JUN 25 1747Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 46759

TO DIR INFO CITE PARI 2456

REDWOOD AEACRE

RE OFPW 20982

1. ONLY STATION FACILITY CHECK STATUS SUBJECT REF IS UNWEAVE.

2. PLEASE ADVISE IF STATION SHOULD INITIATE REQUEST TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

David TSITSICHVILI

74-1-39-1

26 JUN 1958

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM: RI/AN

DOCUMENT NUMBER: EGFA-22041

DOCUMENT DATE:

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SR/DOB	1C52 J	2 JUN 1959		
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. RI/FI	1400L			

COMMENTS

NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files at the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.

this dispatch has been assigned the wrong 201 number. the Subject of this dispatch is David TSITSICHVILI 201:233477
doc. was never abstracted

FILE TITLE
TZITZICHVILI, DAVID

FILE NUMBER
201 233477

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT X

DATE PROCESSED 13 June 1959

INDEX 0061

FORM NO. 610a
1 OCT. 55

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

VIA: AIR

Dispatch No. EGFA 22041
76 6 59

TO : Chief, SR

Date: JUN 13 1958

FROM : Chief of Base, Frankfurt

INFO: EE, WE, COS, PARIS

SUBJECT: General - Operational/REDWOOD/REDSOX/AEACRE
Specific - REDSOX Candidate in France

Reference: OPFW 20952, dated 23 May 1958 201-207137

Action requested: Please advise if it is desired
that we contact and assess Subject

1. Subject of this dispatch is the person thought to have genuine REDSOX potential mentioned in the first paragraph of reference.

2. Subject was described to us by AEPADDLE before the latter contacted him in France and from the report submitted under reference, it would appear to us that he may be even better than first was thought. We have noted the pros and cons as outlined in reference and would like the opportunity to comment on the latter. It would seem to us that the fact that Subject is on parole ought to make little difference, as far as his candidacy for REDSOX is concerned. Surely a means can be devised to remove him from France so that he will neither be hunted by the French authorities nor become the object of suspicion simply because he has left. He might emigrate to South America, which we probably could help him achieve. He could move to North Africa and disappear from there. If the fact that Subject is on parole is thought to be a handicap because it reflects on his character, we believe that what we wrote about the criminal record of AEOASIS 2 applies equally to this case. The matter of relatives in Georgia being considered as a con is difficult for us to understand, but we assume there must be some special circumstances which make it so. Generally speaking, we should have thought this to be a positive factor. Regarding possible surveillance by the other emigres we submit that such must be assumed in every case, notwithstanding what the Subject in question may think. The presumed surveillance becomes a problem when it is time to remove a candidate for training, which calls for a smooth cover for his disappearance (Cf. EGFA 21407). After all, emigre surveillance can only do so much; it cannot keep close tabs on an individual hourly. About the last point: Unless there are some special reasons not explained in reference why contacting Subject is difficult, we believe that we could do this securely and without attracting attention. The means of authenticating the approach outlined in reference should be ample - assuming that AEPADDLE's arrangements are firm.

3. Unless the Paris Station is in a position to make the contact with Subject, we request permission to do so. If granted, we would visit Gap, contact Subject by means of a photograph which, it would seem, could be supplied by Headquarters. It should be an uncomplicated matter to establish our bona fides. We should then try to arrange for Subject to

CS COPY

SECRET ~~201-207137~~ 201-233477

EGFA 22041
76-6-39

visit Germany (possibly black, if necessary) for full debriefing and assessment. It would seem to us that if we can arrange a visit to Germany, the future problems which would arise concerning his secure removal to AEACRE for training can be worked out. Our contact in Gap with Subject would be coordinated with the Paris Station in detail.

4. If the above suggestion is approved, a reply in the near future is requested so that we shall be able to arrange our schedule accordingly.

AHY
Anthony B. Friganza

APPROVED: Francis M. Bankshire
~~Charles D. Richards~~
Francis M. Bankshire

Distribution:
3 - SR
2 - EE
2 - WE
2 - CCS
2 - PARIS

201-207137 201-233477

SECRET

AIR

OFPW-20932
76-6-39

Chief of Station, Paris

Chief, SR through Chief, WE

INFO: COS, Germany
COS, Frankfurt

REDWOOD REDSOX AEACRE
AEPADDLE Debriefing

ACTION REQUIRED:

Attached for the information of Paris and Frankfurt is a copy of the debriefing of AEPADDLE. The Paris Station has already received some of this information directly from AEPADDLE, but there was probably not enough time for him to pass all of it to Platipodis during their meetings. There are a number of items that the field stations may find of use, but only one person named appears to have any genuine REDSOX potential. This is David TSITSICHVILI (Cf. IV of Attachment No. 2).

Pros

1. No wife or children
2. Not living in large Georgian colony
3. No occupation
4. Daring, initiative

Cons

1. On parole
2. Relatives in Georgia
3. Possible emigre surveillance
4. Difficult to approach without attracting attention

Request Paris comments on feasibility of further efforts—possibility of finding out more about crimes for which Subject and ADAM were sentenced; also about nature of parole and possibility of having it lifted.

MICHAEL RAE

JOHN D. PHILIPSBORN

28 April 1958 SR/DOB/FMcNulty

Attachments: 1. Bona Fides (1 copy)
2. Debriefing (2 copies) UNDER SEPARATE COVER

SECRET

201-233477

Distribution
3 COS, Paris w/1 cc of att # 1 & att # 2
2 COB, Frankfurt w/1 cc of att # 2
2 COS, Germany w/o att
1 RI w/o att
1 WE/3 w/o att
✓2 DOB File w/1 cc att # 2
1 DOB Chrono

SR/2 ____________________

SR/COP/FI ____________________

CWE ____________________ ERIC W. [illegible]
WE/3 ____________________
CSR/DOB ____________________ MICHAEL RAE

14-00000

534 ERB/SW/

201-233477
74-6-37-2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : **Francis McNulty**
UNIT : SR/DOB **534**
EXT : 4705
DATE : 27 June 1958

RE Filing (check one):
this copy as indicated X
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked
Signature: Jane G Green

TO : PARIS FRANKFURT

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 3 16 25 '58
CABLE SECT

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT96319
OUT 96319

TO PARI INFO FRAN FROB CITE DIR 30031

~~RRR~~ EGFA 22041

30031

1. REQUEST UNWEAVE TRACES PROVIDED SUBJECTS NAME CAN BE BURIED AMONG OTHERS.

2. POA REQUESTED FOR SUBJECT.

3. PHOTOS OF SUBJECT WILL BE SENT PARI AND FOB.

END OF MESSAGE

RI: Subj is David Tsitsichuili

RI COPY

7 JUL 1958

SR/2

ac SR/~~COP/FI~~

WE/3

C/WE Robert K. Anderson

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CSR/DOB

MICHAEL RAE

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FORM 2-58 1389

201-233477

[illegible]

AEPADDLE DEBRIEFING 3 and 4 April 1956

I. Previous Ops of British and Georgian Emigres

A. Georgians involved

1. Noe JORDANIA, late President of Georgian Republic in 1920's.

2. Revaz CASACHVILI, ca. 75 yrs. old. Lives with wife at 133 r. l'Abbe Groult, Paris XV, no phone. Gets Social Security and aid from Georgians.

3. Eliase PATARIDZE, ca. 55-60 yrs. old. President of Georgian Association in Paris and of Georgian National Democrats. Lives with wife and children at 35 r. du Gen. Erlanger, AUteuil 6589. Has grocery store at 84 r. Michelange. Three children: one 20 yrs. old and twins (boy and girl) 14.

4. Levan ZURABICHVILI was possibly involved. AEPADDLE surmised this, although L. Z. did not so state. Ca. 51 yrs. old. Married, boy 7, girl 5. Budget director for SIMCA automobile plant. Lives at 2 r. Jacques Mawas, Phone LEcourbe 0212. Graduate of Ecole des Mines. Father of L. Z. was friend of PATARIDZE and CABACHVILI (National Democrats). L. Z. considers self a National Democrat, but felt need for broader organisation to embrace all non-Socialist Georgians. He has established such an organisation, possibly known as the Comite des Georgiens Libres.

(all the above four have lived in Paris since the 1920's)

5. Ena SOUMBATACHVILI (SOUMBATOFF) was the Georgian contact man with the British.

[illegible]-23477

GABACHVILI and PATARIDZE were in touch with the Chief of British Intelligence" in 1950-53. GABACHVILI stated that he felt the British worked closely with the Americans, and that the chief intended to bring him to the US. GABACHVILI and PATARIDZE did not know why the British dropped the work, but GABACHVILI felt that after 1953 the British had turned the Near East over to the US. GABACHVILI has not been in touch with the Americans.

B. Agents used by the British

1. Mamia BERESHVILI

Lives in Leuville near Paris. Age ca. 36-40. Employed as a chemist and earns ca. 60,000 - 80,000 francs per month. Hgt. ca. 5'8", wgt. ca. 175 lbs., dark curly hair, dark round face, presently wears goatee and moustache. ASPADDLE knew BERESHVILI before. All BERESHVILI's family were killed or deported. He is anti-Russian and anti-Communist. He was very close to Noe JORDANIA. He has some writing ability, and had an article published last month in a journal of the anti-Russian group of the Georgians (possibly known as Notre Patrie) which is published by Micha STOUROUA (STURWA). BERESHVILI belongs to this group and writes for newspapers. He went two or three times to Georgia on illegal missions. The last time he was wounded in the lower right leg, and was helped by a companion. He did not service the customary dead drop the last time because of his leg. The method of crossing involved use of uniforms of Turkish army officers, and the assistance of another Georgian and two Turks. At night they changed to civilian clothes and crossed over. BERESHVILI says there are organised Georgian groups willing to fight the Russians.

Since 1953 BERESHVILI has been contacted two or three times by the Americans, but nothing has come of this, and he feels the Americans are not following up properly. He said the latest attempt involved a letter written to him in Russian, giving him a telephone number to call. Before calling it he tried to trace the number through connections of his wife's. He feels that contact with Georgia is important if the emigration organizations are to be representative of the feelings in the homeland.

Beginning in 1945 BERESHVILI was in the French Army for two or three years. This was to avoid being sent back to the USSR. In 1948 he had a grocery store. AEPADDLE feels that BERESHVILI would be willing to go again. AEPADDLE asked BERESHVILI about the conflict of interest between the emigres and the sponsoring country. BERESHVILI said he feels it is possible to satisfy both interests.

Note: Georgian Soviet ballet troupe which visited Paris in January - February 1958 knew of BERESHVILI's missions to Georgia.

2. Fnu DJAPADZE (CHAPADZE)

Now lives in London. Born 1912. Married, has children. Was in close contact with CABACHVILI and PATARIDZE. Went to Georgia in 1951 and 1952. AEPADDLE gathered that DJAPADZE was the partner of BERESHVILI. BERESHVILI said that a clash occurred on the last trip involving politics. He did not mention DJAPADZE, but since they are of different parties, AEPADDLE has connected them. (It is not clear whether this clash occurred on the trip when BERESHVILI was wounded.)

While in London, and later in Paris, AEPADDLE met Irakli MENTETACHVILI, 23 Alexandria Rd., Wimbledon, London SW 19. MENTETACHVILI stated that he has contact in London with the police or intelligence service, and offered to be of service to AEPADDLE. AEPADDLE asked MENTETACHVILI about DJAPADZE. MENTETACHVILI had nothing good to say about him. Considered him a big bluff, who was not properly handled by the British. MENTETACHVILI said the 1953 work was not continued because of the poor quality of DJAPADZE. MENTETACHVILI said that DJAPADZE never actually crossed the border. AEPADDLE discounts some of this, saying that MENTETACHVILI is a very bitter man. CABACHVILI and PATARIDZE said that they have a good, courageous man for entry into Georgia, whom AEPADDLE assumes to be DJAPADZE. They said this man is in London working for British Intelligence.

3. Bagrat TCHADIACHVILI (CHADJASHVILI)

Born 1916 in Georgia. Married to a Russian. Lives at 27 r. Villedieu, Valentigney (Doubs). Taken prisoner in the Crimea by the Germans in 1942 or 1943. After three days he went into an SS group (in the same group were David KVARIANI and the KALATOZI brothers, Shota and Irakli). The assignment of the group was to serve as security police after the Germans should take Georgia. After the war TDJADIAHVILI ended in Valentigney where he works in a small shop. (Note: There is a fairly large Georgian colony in this small town. Most of them work at the Peugeot automobile plant.) He is emotional, gets drunk easily, and beats his wife. In the summer of 1951 and 1952 he went to England for training, but was never sent because he disagreed with the purposes of the mission. The British were interested in military matters, while he was more interested in political conditions. TDJADIACHVILI was working with the same group as BERESHVILI. TDJADIACHVILI is 5'10", 165 lbs., very excitable after a few drinks. Very nationalistic, can't stand Georgian socialists. He did not mention any associates in England. He considered all his assignments to be of a petty nature. AEPADDLE feels that he is interested to work, however he lives in a small town where everyone knows about his previous training.

II Other persons of possible interest

1. Toutouni AKHMEDIANI

Lives at 31 r. Villedieu, Valentigney (Doubs). Stated that quite a few Georgians in Valentigney have worked for or are under the influence of the Soviets. Several are planning to go back. AKHMEDIANI is excitable, over 50, has rheumatism and eye trouble. Feels that action is necessary and has the desire, but knows his limitations. Fought with the Germans against the Soviets.

2. Shota STOUROUA (STURWA)

Lives in Paris area, not married. Anit-Soviet, but AEPADDLE had no chance to find out how far. Age 36 or 37, physically strong, has desire to work. Is elevator repair man, with plenty of opportunity to move around. Platipodis has means of reaching STOUROUA through Irakli KALATOZI, 67 r. Jean Jaures, Vanves (Seine).

3. Sergo (?) KOKREIDZE (GOKH- KHOKH-)

Lives 5 r. Leconte de Lisle (Metro Eglise d'Auteuil) c/o Mrs. Kedia. Does not live there but visits often. Is in close contact with Ilo DJABADARI, artists' agent, 16 r. du Cherche Midi, Pari XVI, Phone Littre 190-. DJABADARI is an agent for ballets and movies. Trying to set up a Georgian ballet together with Sergo KOKREIDZE. Have 12 boys and girls in troupe, want to expand to 30 members and come to US. Expect to tour Spain in near future. Sergo KOKREIDZE is about 5'8", 140 - 150 lbs. Is a dancer, thin body and face. Light hair, part bald. Narrow moustache. 41 years old. Is a W W II escapee with friends in Georgia. AEPADDLE is of the opinion that man not suitable for our specific purposes, but willing to do something. Can write.

4. Alyosha ABACHIDZE

Expressed wish to work. Lives at 6 r. Mont Blanc, Paris XV. Is over 50, 5'10" or 11", 200 lbs. Round face, bald. Emotional, flushes easily. Anti-Socialist. Works as a messenger for the Indian Embassy, earns 30,000 - 35,000 francs per month. Widower, no family. Worked with Germans, apparently as an agent trainer. Strong, fast thinking, has initiative. Not a talker or writer, but an action man. Had some recent lung trouble. Willing to go to Gerogia. Believes best means of contact with Georgia is through Turks of Georgian descent who live near Georgian border and who could aid in crossing. Doesn't believe in frequent crossing.

5. Irakli KALATOZI

Age about 36 - 37. French citizen. Keeps in touch with travellers from Georgia. Thinks in terms of hot war situation. Fears that action now might jeopardize existing Georgian underground organisation. Feels that even top Georgian Communists have more ability and a larger following than the emigre leaders. 5'8", 160 lbs., bald, married, two daughters, moustache, drives taxi. Trained as a chemist. W W II escapee.

6. Revas GOCITIDZE

Has new name (unknown to AEPADDLE). About 38 years old. French citizen. Well-balanced, intelligent. Was medical student in Georgia. Now is chemist. Makes ca. 80,000 francs per month. Wife Nelli nee MDIVANI. Has son and daughter. Lives at 53 Boul. St. Michel, Phone DAnton 7829. W W II escapee. Strong man, 6'1", 180 lbs. Former international volley ball player. Long face, curly hair, no moustache. Never expressed any interest in active work. Loves money. Likes France.

7. Mathe KERESELIDZE

Le Vesinet (near Paris). Phone PRincess 1743. Ca. 45 years old (appears 55). Lives with father, Gogi, and brother, Louloa.

Wife Maia. Daughter Nina, 22 years old, works for 20th Century Fox, and wants to come to the US. She has a business education. She is a French citizen. Mathe was born in Tiflis, left at age 3, and was educated in Germany. He and brother sent to France in early 30's to learn French. The family followed later. In 1941 Mathe volunteered to help the Germans fight the Soviets. In 1942 he was sent on a parachute mission from the Crimea to Georgia. He was caught after hiding with a farmer for three months. His companion was killed and he was wounded in the leg. KERESELIDZE kept his German uniform all the time he was in prison. A military court considered him a POW, but the NKVD sentenced him to 20 years for espionage. He was in several camps. His family attempted to get word of him through the French and German embassies in Moscow. They spent their own funds, and received aid from Artchil TSITSICHVILI. KERESELIDZE was released from pirson in 1957 and arrived in France in September. He refused to return to Tiflis or to take Soviet citizenship. His teeth are poor and he is in need of rest. He plans to go to Germany for medical and financial assistance as a former soldier. He will also attempt to finish the memoirs he has started. He will also attempt to find work through former German comrades, and may ask for German or French citizenship. Still wants to fight Communism, and does not fear reprisals against self or family. Interested in becoming an advisor on Soviet affairs, or in working for Voice of America. Knows Georgian, Russian, German, and French. Has fair knowledge of English.

8. Sergo TSOULADZE

Born in Georgia. Ca. 41 years old. Educated in France. (Picture included in AEPADDLE's movies.) Graduate of Paris Medical School. French Army 1939 - 1940) worked for French underground in WW II in Communist section. Was eager Communist at end of war; member of Party. Asked for permission to return to Georgia after war, but did not actually go until March 1958. Married to French girl, Madeleine, also Communist. Wife attended Moscow Youth Festival 1957. Have son and daughter. TSOULADZE is 5'10", 185 lbs., reddish moustache, heavy face, grey curly hair. Illegally practiced medicine in France. Subject's oldest sister Tamara TALY (TALASHASHVILI) told AEPADDLE's wife that only two days before receiving Soviet visa Subject had stated his intention to remain in France, take French citizenship, and become a legal doctor. Subject has another sister, Ninouka, who is married to Shota KALATOZI. She and her husband are considering repatriating, but since Shota was in the SS, he is afraid of the consequences. Shota and Sergo TSOULADZE devised a code to advise Shota whether he should repatriate or not. Shota is to inform AEPADDLE of any such message. Shota was formerly an engineer, is now a taxi driver. AEPADDLE feels that Sergo TSOULADZE is no longer a firmly convinced Communist. Sergo stated that he plans to do research at the University of Tiflis, and to keep out of politics. He plans to see Helene TSITSICHVILI in Tiflis.

9. Gouram TSOULADZE

Is a cousin of Sergo. He is 5'11", 190 lbs., round face, light hair, heavy moustache. He is an officerworker for Air France. He is 22 or 23 years old. He went to the Moscow Youth Festival in 1957 with a French football team. He stayed in Moscow about two months, using money he made selling watches and pullovers. He plans to go back to the USSR this summer, and is looking for funds to finance his trip and black market activities. Gouram told AEPADDLE if this does not materialize, he will try to go the US instead. AEPADDLE overheard GOURAM tell Sergo he would see him in September. PADDLE considers Gouram to be not too secure or substantial. He is not well educated. He says little. Sergo has been a strong influence in his life. AEPADDLE stated he was non-committal to Platipodis in evaluating Couram. Couram lives with his father Bagrat on Square Leon Cuillot.

10. Kalistrat SALIA (SSALIA)

Born 26 August 1900. Wanted to see AEPADDLE, but there was no opportunity. Address 8 r. Berlioz. Not working, except on Georgian publication. Travels to Germany and Belgium. No visible means of support. Publishes journal in French. AEPADDLE says he has best brains and is most influential individual in Georgian emigration. From 1945 - 1948 he was closely involved with the Soviet Embassy in Paris. He helped distribute Soviet films, and was associated with the repatriation movement.; In 1953 or 1954 Levan ZURABICHVILI was Micha KEDIA in Geneva, shortly before KEDIA died. KEDIA worked for Germans during WW II, and warned ZURABICHVILI that SALIA was a Soviet agent. SALIA has a good literary journal, and AEPADDLE said that he tries to nullify emigre political activities by tying up some of the best minds in purely cultural activities. GABACHVILI and ZURABICHVILI say SALIA is a Soviet agent, but that they don't know what to do about it. AEPADDLE says SALIA is in close contact by mail with Civi KOBAKHIDZE who works for VOA in Washington.

11. Jora ASSATIANI

35 years old. Married to a French girl, has one child. Lives in Leuville (apparently in communal house with BERESHVILI et.al.). Wife is a school teacher. Subject arrived in Paris in 1947, after escaping forced repatriation. Applied for US visa in 1949, but did not come because of lack of friends here. Works at Indian Embassy. Wants to fight communism. Claims his job gives him contact with legal travellers to the Soviet Union, who could be used for taking in letters, newspapers, etc. Subject is well educated, and is close to some of the higher officials in the Indian Embassy, whom he considers Communists. His French is good, and his English fairly good. Subject said he could not go back to the USSR on a mission himself. He is 5'6", 170 lbs., bald, round face, light complexion, quick thinker, well dressed. Well-regarded by all who know him. Feels that the older generation of emigres is too rigid. Considers BERESHVILI a good asset, also Sergo KOKHREIDZE.

III. Miscellaneous

1. The following is given as evidence of Soviet activity among Georgians in France:

a. The following have received telephone calls from Tiflis:

Leo SARDJVELADZE, from his daughter two phone calls on family matters. The daughter married a W W II escapee who came out in 1943 or 1944 and went back in 1946 or 1947.

Shota KALATOZI, from his mother. He also received several letters in which she said that everything is fine in Georgia but that Shota is old enough to make up his own mind about repatriation.

Themo TAKTAKICHVILI, from his mother who said she may visit him in Paris.

b. The following have received packages from Tiflis containing food and home made candy:

Themo TAKTAKICHVILI
Mrs. Ketho TCHENKELI (CHENKELI)
Georgi CHANCHIACHVILI (SHANSHIASHVILI)

c. Nearly everyone received the Georgian language paper of the Mikhailov Committee in Berlin.

2. GABACHVILI, PATARIDZE and ZURABICHVILI all expressed interest in American support for their group. They stated that the support given to their group as a whole by Polish intelligence before W W II largely contributed toward the readiness of large numbers of Caucasians to fight against the USSR during the war. PATARIDZE said he would like to be sent to Turkey to organize contacts with Georgia. Says he can get necessary papers for trip to Turkey, and has man in mind for such mission (apparently DJAPADZE). PATARIDZE says this operation would cost no more than one million French francs.

3. At a convention of National Democrats in Paris, AEPADDLE met A. KIPIANI from London. KIPIANI is a former colonel of the Polish Army and works closely with General ANDERS. KIPIANI suggested working through American intelligence, and will send AEPADDLE a letter for making contact with the Anders group in the US.

4. AEPADDLE carried money (apparently from NY Georgians) to Paris to assist the publication and distribution of an emigre paper.

5. Both the Socialists and National Democrats would like to organise a group for common action. One drawback is that the Socialists apparently want to play down anti-communism (as opposed to Georgian separatism) and also want to have nothing to do with the American Committee in Munich. Noe TSINSADZE, the principal collaborator with the American Committee refused to break the connection or to drop the anti-communist line.

6. There are no really young Georgian-born people in Paris, but there are about 50 or 60 second generation Georgians, who speak French among themselves, but have some interest in Georgian affairs. The visit of the Georgian ballet stimulated this interest, and some of these youngsters are eager to visit Georgia.

7. The Germans are trying to set up an information link with the Caucasus. Concerned with this activity are Micha ALCHIBAYA and fnu MENDE, the German officer in charge who was interested in the Caucasus during WW II. So far nothing concrete has been accomplished. AEPADDLE received this information from PATARIDZE, who has been to Munich in connection with this activity.

David TSITSICHVILI (nickname Dathouna)

Subject is a childhood friend of AEPADDLE. Age - 39 years, height: 5'10", weight: 160 lbs., bald, has moustache. Subject is included in movies taken by AEPADDLE. Subject arrived in France with family from Georgia ca. 1923, and lived in Paris. He was a poor scholar and did not get any kind of diploma from school. He served as a private in the French Army from 1939 to 1940 or 1941 when he was discharged. In 1942 or 1943 he volunteered for work in Germany with the Todt Organization as a truck dirver, but changed to some other kind of work after reaching Germany. While in Germany he assisted French officer POW's to escape, aiding them with false papers, stamps and uniforms. He was able to travel from Berlin to Paris, and AEPADDLE saw him in Paris on one occasion during the war. In 1944 a woman got in touch with him about helping an alleged French officer, and at the railroad station where he was to meet her, he was arrested by the SS (sic). In early 1945 he was sentenced to death for espionage, but managed to drag out his case by implying the existence of a large British-run net of which he was a part. In 1945 he was liberated by the US Army and returned to Paris in the summer of that year. He was unable to find a suitable job, and between 1945 and 1948 he did odd jobs as a draftsman, and tried to market an invention of his own (some kind of engine). He married a French girl about 1946 or 1947, and had two children. In 1948 he began to rob banks, jewellery shops, etc., with a companion, Jean ADAM, a Frenchman who had worked with him during the war assisting French officers. ADAM was caught, and Subject attempted to escape to Spain but was also caught. Because of their war record they were given a "light" sentence -- ten years. Subject was released about one or two years ago, and is required to live in the small town of Gap (Hautes Alpes), under parole to his brother. ADAM has also been released, and is not under restriction as to residence. Subject feels this is unjust discrimination against himself as a non-citizen.

Subject is bored by the quiet life in Gap. His wife and children are not with him, and he has not been able to make contact with them. AEPADDLE said his wife may have divorced him. Subject is now trying to set up an advertising agency, and is also working on inventions and patents. Subject told AEPADDLE that he would like to work for American intelligence, and that he had unsuccessfully tried to reach US Naval Intelligence in 1957 through the American Embassy in Paris. AEPADDLE said that Subject has always been interested in this kind of work, and that he has imagination and initiative, and likes action. AEPADDLE feels that Subject's motivation is that he wants to live down his prison sentence and redeem himself as a man. He wants to acquire citizenship where he can feel he belongs (preferably US citizenship). Money is secondary with him. AEPADDLE says that Subject needs to have strict instructions and guidance in order not to go overboard and exceed the proper limits.

AEPADDLE requested and received from Subject two copies of Subject's name written backward. AEPADDLE explained that this would serve as bona fides for anyone who might want to contact Subject in the future.

Subject knows Georgian (AEPADDLE is not sure that he reads or writes well), French, German and a little English. AEPADDLE described him as sensitive, and wanting respect. Subject has no present contact with his family in the USSR. Subject has written a detective novel, but it has not been published. He has also invented a calendar that shows the day of the week for any given date (a slide rule type gadget).

Subject's family

Father: Simon   Mother: Marie (deceased)
Sister: Helene   Brother: Artchil

Subject is now living with his brother Artchil, who is about 41 years old. The address is 1 bis r. de Bellvue, Gap (Hautes Alpes), Phone 1082. Artchil was recently divorced from the daughter of Noe Jordania (late President of Georgian Republic in early 1920's). His two daughters live with him. His former wife also lives in Gap. They are the only Georgians living there. Artchil was in the French Army until 1943 and is a French citizen. He is a graduate in architecture from the Ecole des Beaux Arts, and is a successful architect in Gap. He is presently in charge of reconstruction of a whole village which had to move because of a new dam. He has changed his name to Artchil de PANASKET (name of a village in Georgia formerly owned by the family). Artchil is financially well-off and is helping other Georgians, including Mathe KERESELIDZE, who has recently returned from Siberia.

In 1943 Subject's father, mother and sister left Paris for Germany, where the daughter worked in an office, and where the father hoped to sell some inventions to the Germans. At that time Helene (who is now about 42 years old) married Irakli LORTKIPANIDZE in Paris. They returned to Paris in 1946 or 1947. The Soviet Embassy was encouraging repatriation, and the father and daughter decided to go back. The mother objected and was supported by her two sons. She finally committed suicide in protest, but they went anyway (father, daughter, her husband and child). The daughter is now teaching French in Tiflis. The father recently had a letter published in the Berlin Georgian newspaper (apprently the Georgian paper of the Mikhailov Committee) urging Georgian emigres to repatriate. AEPADDLE heard that shortly after their return both father and daughter were sent to Siberia for a time.

NOTE: AEPADDLE went to Gap with his wife on his way to Florence. Also there at that time was Levan ZURABICHVILI who happened to be vacationing.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 14 Aug 59	ACTION ☒ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM RID/201	ROOM NO. 1040 K	TELEPHONE 2027

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE ☒ NON-SENSITIVE	201 NO. 1. 233477	SOURCE DOCUMENT OFPA-39997

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): TZITZICHVILI, David

SEX 3. ☒ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2. (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
☒ YES ☐ NO	D 20 M 12 Y 19	USSR	Tiflis	1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.
FRAN	SR/7		

COMMENTS:

201- 233477

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
☒ YES ☐ NO	☒ YES ☐ NO	Minnick

FORM NO. 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 OCT 58

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

PUNCHED

(38)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIROGUE
201-233477
BULKY

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 JULY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
27 JULY 78		ED LOPEZ	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

TERMINATION AGREEMENT

The undersigned hereby acknowledges that a contractual relationship has heretofore existed between him and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as ("the Government"). The Government has fully and completely satisfied all of its obligations to the undersigned.

The undersigned on behalf of himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns hereby releases and forever discharges the Government, its officers, agents and employees from any and all debts, claims, benefits or demands arising out of the above mentioned contractual relationship.

The undersigned fully understands and appreciates the fact that the prior relationship between the parties and all information and knowledge acquired in the course of said relationship (particularly with reference to persons and methods employed by the Government) are the property of said Government and constitute military secrets affecting its security. The undersigned knows and understands that these are protected by German Law under the provisions of Annex A to the Convention on Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Government is highly appreciative of the excellent services heretofore rendered by the undersigned. However, to preserve the security above mentioned, it is further understood and agreed that both parties shall hereafter disavow that the relationship ever existed.

The undersigned further agrees he possesses no right, title or interest in any information or knowledge arising out of said relationship and he further solemnly swears that he will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, conduct or any other means the fact of said relationship nor any such knowledge or information arising therefrom except as authorized in writing by the sane official of the Government as that who witnesses this oath.

Frankfurt/Main, this 2nd day of March 196

Georg F. Sanders (L.S.)

WITNESS:

William [illegible]

File WIROGUE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 30 September 1964

TIME: 1030 - 1400 hours

PLACE: Automobile in the Vicinity of Kuhwaldstr.

ARTHUR A. LIFALL, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

WIROGUE called at approximately 0945 hours on the Stage I Ops phone and asked for Mr. Murmann. C.O. took the call and was advised that the caller was "Dave" and that he desired to speak to a colleague of Mr. Murmann at the earliest possible time. C.O. made arrangements to meet him in front of the safe house at 51 Kuhwaldstr which WIROGUE occupied during his 1 1/2 year association with HARVARD (this is no longer a HARVARD safe house). C.O. did not tell "Dave" his name over the telephone and indicated that he would be able to recognize "Dave". C.O. picked "Dave" up on the corner of Volta and Kuhwaldstr and drove a couple of blocks to a parking place where the conversation took place.

C.O. learned that WIROGUE was no longer employed by the Boehler Company in Munich. He apparently has had a couple of factory jobs since that job and is currently unemployed. According to "Dave" he is without work, without friends, without money and "only contacted Murmann's old office because he is at the end of his rope". Subject stated that he had tried hard to find suitable employment in Germany, but that there was absolutely nothing available which he could do. It was obvious that WIROGUE wished to renew his association with the AIS and that "intelligence work" was the only kind of employment for which he felt himself really qualified. When C.O. indicated to him that the employment possibilities had not changed since WIROGUE was told there was no possibility of future employment with the Agency, Subject said that the purpose of his telephone call was to advise us of his plans to go to Paris and attempt to contact the French Intelligence Service to which he would offer his services. He wished to find out if we would have any objections to his seeking employment from the French or possibly the British since we are apparently unable to utilize him further. C.O. said that obviously WIROGUE would do what he would do and that while we had no control over his actions it would seem a bit surprising that he would delibertely place himself in the hands of the French authorities where he was known to have a criminal record. WIROGUE implied that he would obviously tell all to the French and indicated that he was not concerned about any actions that they would take against him. He appeared sure in an extremely vague and confused way that the French Intelligence Service could use him.

In the course of the lengthy discussions WIROGUE let it be known that he was not very happy about the treatment he had received from the Americans--that he felt he had been dropped, and it appeared obvious to C.O. that if we had no further work for him he was threating to tell his story to the French authorities--a story which he presumably feels we would not like the French to know about. It should be stressed that at no time was the "blackmail threat" bluntly presented. It was merely that he wished to advise us of his plan to leave for Paris this date with this intention in mind and that he wished to determine if we had any "objections".

C.O. reviewed with WIROGUE the considerable efforts which had been made to assist him in establishing a new life here in the FEDREP-- a new life story, legal documentation, the opportunity to look for employment for a period of more than a year while receiving subsistence from us, etc. C.O. told Subject that he obviously had a good mind and was in good health and that--if he was unable to find some type of employment in the thriving West German economy that appealed to him and satisfied him--he would probably be unhappy wherever he goes. C.O. discounted Subject's belief that "intelligence work" was the only thing for which he was suited. C.O. expressed the view that he should get his head out of the clouds and his feet on the ground--that he should find a job, however menial, and throw himself into it. At this point WIROGUE said that at one time he had told Mr. Murmann of his desire to become a driver or chauffer but that Mr. Murmann told him he could find much more suitable employment. With a certain amount of disbelief C.O. pursued this topic with him telling WIROGUE that--if he was really serious in believing that this kind of employment would be satisfying to him, that it was the first sensible thought he had expressed in the course of the discussions and that C.O. would determine whether it would be possible to assist Subject in obtaining a West German driver's license (Subject indicated that he had a Congo drivers' license when he arrived in Frankfurt although it was issued in another name). While Subject pretended to have a genuine interest in obtaining such employment-- and used this to refute C.O.'s accusation that he only wanted to start at the top and considered most kinds of honest employment as being beneath him--C.O. is highly skeptical of Subject's motives. WIROGUE was told to call Mac (this is the only name which C.O. gave to WIROGUE) on the following day (Thursday, 1 October) and C.O. would let him know whether he could help him obtain a West German license. WIROGUE was quick to point out that

#42

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 21 April 1964

TIME: 1130 hours

PLACE: Kaiserstr. and
Taunus Anlage

OKD
ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject who had invited him to meet for lunch. They had a drink together and then went to a Chineese restaurant.

At first C. O. was afraid that Subject was getting ready to ask a favor or present a problem but it turned out that he merely wanted to visit with C.O. whom he considers to be his only friend, at least in Frankfurt. He said that his work with the Munich firm is going very well and is coming along fine. He received his first month's salary and expects to go to Munich on the first part of May for consultations and would then, around 30 May, move to Munich permanently. C. O. told Subject that he would be leaving for the U.S. probably the first week in June and Subject asked if they could have dinner together at least one more time before he left.

Subject said he had signed the contract, details of which he had previously given C.O., but was sorry that he had not brought the contract with him and promised to show it to C.O. the next time they met. Subject thanked C. O. for all the help he had given him to enable him to make a new start and wanted the lunch to be a small token of his appreciation. He also paid C.O. 20 DM which had been loaned him a year and a half earlier and gave C.O. a small French cigarette lighter as a rememberance. C. O. dropped Subject off downtown and suggested they have lunch, perhaps the first or second week in May.

SECRET

[illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 18 March 1964

TIME: 12 o'clock

PLACE: Schultheis Restaurant

OKD
ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject in response to a telephone call in which Subject invited C. O. to lunch to help him celebrate a new stroke of fortune. WIROGUE told C. O. that the director of the firm in Munich (reported in previous contact reports) and his European sales representative had met with Subject and discussed the possibility of his association with the Munich firm. Subject said the following had been agreed on:

> Subject would receive 1500 DM a month salary, free living quarters in Munich, the cost of maintaining his apartment in Frankfurt, expense account, ~~[illegible]~~ percentage of the profits realized from any of Subject's inventions patented by the firm, a work shop in Munich plus absolute personal freedom of movement regarding working hours, etc. etc.

C. O. told him that the above was very hard to believe, that he should have this in writing. Subject said that it was to be drawn-up and sent to him for his signature.

C. O., of course, expressed his delight with Subject's perspicacity and perspicuity and ~~least~~ last but not ~~last~~ least boundless gall. C. O. asked if this would mean he would be moving to the Munich area. Subject said that this was doubtful unless he could find a mechanic in the Munich area who would work as cheaply as Nagely with whom he is now associated. He intends to spend most of his time in Munich, however, and will come to Frankfurt once a month to oversee Nagely's work on the production models of his projects. Subject intends to do the research and development work in Munich with Nagely in Frankfurt making the finished model.

GROUP 1
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

C. O. told Subject that he should not forget he would be required to establish a Zweiter Wohnsitz. Subject said he would look into this as soon as the work shop in Munich was completed and ready for him.

Subject stated that C. O. was his only friend and that he would like to call him again soon and have lunch with him. C. O. told him he would be delighted to meet him whenever he has time. C. O. dropped Subject off downtown after congratulating him once again on his good fortune.

NOTE: C. O. is aware that Subject is basically a lonely man and does enjoy his company. He is also aware that Subject is staying in frequent touch because he feels he is operating in a society to which he really does not belong and associates himself more with things American.

11 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

On 25 February 1964 the undersigned met with Clarence Schmidt and Art Stimpson of OCA Bonn to apprise them of the status of the WIROGUE case. Since Clarence S. was preparing to depart PCS, C.O.'s discussion was primarily with Art S., Clarence's replacement.

C. O. briefed Art on WIROGUE's background prior to recruitment and his activities while associated with KUBARK. C. O. reviewed HARVARD's attempt to prepare Subject for resettlement and said that we are now in a position to quit claim him and close the case and that we wanted to bring OCA up-to-date on the status of Subject's case and to find out if there are any loose ends from Bonn's point of view or HARVARD's which should be tightened up prior to cutting Subject loose.

C. O. explained that since December 12, 1962 when OCA received a query from the BFV regarding Subject, HARVARD had been trying to reach the point where Subject could be on his own. C. O. explained that we had realized that after the original political recognition interview fiasco had brought Subject to the attention of the BFV, that to enable Subject to emigrate from Germany or to stay here without continuing problems in the future would require preparing a complete life history for Subject with a new political recognition interview story. Both the Lebenslauf and a new interview story were prepared and copies of the old story were removed from the various files and replaced by the new. C. O. said that HARVARD had two questions for Bonn ~~and tha~~t (1) at the time of the original BFV interest in Subject had OCA promised Subject WOULD be resettled outside Germany? and (2) would OCA know if the BFV in Cologne had a copy of Subject's political recognition interview story?. Art brought out OCA's file on the case and said to answer the second question first it would appear from the detailed information contained in the BFV query that they

[illegible]

were indeed in possession of a copy of the story. He went on to state that in answer to question (1) OCA's reply to the BFV was that Subject was of operational interest to AIS and would they please suspend their investigation until Subject is no longer of interest at which time OCA would automatically provide the BFV with the details of Subject's case.

C. O. said that John Wilms of the 513th MI Group at Camp King was reasonably certain that the BFV man in Zirndorf had only sent excerpts of the Sanders political recognition interview story to the BFV in Cologne, since so many cases of interest to the BFV are processed each month that only the bare outlines of a particular case would be sent on from Zirndorf. Art and Al W. said that if the original story had not gone to Cologne then a very detailed summary had gone.

We all agreed that unless Subject got into serious trouble in the future no problems would arise. In any event we could only wait and see what might come up.

OCA appreciated being brought up-to-date on the case and provided HARVARD C. O. with copies of the BFV 's original query and OCA's reply. C. O. promised to send OCA a copy of Subject's original and of his latest political recognition interview story and a copy of the Lebenslauf.

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 10 March 1964

TIME: 1500 hours

PLACE: Oderweg & Glauburgstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject as a result of a telephone call requesting C. O.'s assistance. Subject told C. O. that he had gone to the local police revier and had tried to register but that since he had neglected to take along a filled-out Anmeldebestätigung signed by the landlord he had been told to go get the form, fill it out properly and then return. The police had looked at his deregistration slip with the 2 March date indicated and had told him to waste no time since an individual is required to deregister and re-register within a period of 8 days and it was now the 10th of March. Subject said that since his rental contract dates from January 1 and that date is indicated on the registration slip, the police will question why he waited so long to register. C. O. told him that the answer was simple and that he wished Subject would not bother him with such small problems. C. O. told Subject to get an Anmelda form and fill it out and have his landlord sign that he moved into the apartment on 1 March ~~and explain to the landlord that~~ he had been deregistered as of 2 March. Subject said that he had already figured this out but that he wanted an excuse to meet C. O. and talk to him.

He showed C. O. a Munich Konto check for 4,000 DM which he had received for developing a device reported in previous contact reports and went on to say that his business trip to Munich had been reasonably successful. He had discussed the development of several new devices with the director of the Munich firm and was now in the process of working on another device for the firm. He had made arrangements whereby he would receive no payment for the new device but that the firm would use its sales outlets to market another invention of his for him. The firm had also asked Subject if he would be willing to come to Munich to live and work. Subject has agreed if the offer turns out to be worth his while. C. O. congratulated Subject and told him to continue the good work.

SECRET

[illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 3 March 1964

TIME: 1130 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr. 51

11

OKD

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject and gave him his new Reiseausweis expiring in 1966 and pointed out there was a restriction against going into business for himself. He was given his Lohnsteurkarten for '62, '63 and '64 plus his Abmeldebestatigung indicating his deregistration from 145 Hohemarkstr to 51 Kuhwaldstr on 2 March 1964. He was told to go to the local Police Review and register.

Subject was given a copy of his new political recognition interview story and was asked if he had any questions regarding his legend. Subject replied that the story was so long he could not possibly memorize it completely. C. O. told him that the intent was to provide in detail any and all facts which in the future might be of importance to him in the conduct of his affairs.

Subject was asked about his plans for the future. His answer was that the Director of the firm (reported in contact report 17 February 1964) had invited him to come to Munich on 3 March 1964 to discuss, among other things, the possibility of employing Subject in the engineering department. This plus the fact that Subject has signed an agreement with BOHLER & CO. OPTICAL FACTORY, FF/M to act as an engineering consultant might enable him to realize his ambition, i.e. to have a position rather than an ordinary job.

C. O. quitclaimed Subject and wished him luck.

Subject asked that C. O. be sure to let the higher echelon know he appreciates all that has been done for him.

Subject said that although official contact is at an end he hoped that C. O. would not reject an invitation for a friendly get together from time to time. C. O. replied that if business matters permitted he would be glad to meet Subject.

Subject jovially announced that they would probably meet some day in the U.S. C. O. reminded him that any action on his part which would involve the taking of fingerprints could have dire consequence for him. C. O. went on to report what he had told Subject months earlier and that is:

[illegible]

SECRET

Any attempt to immigrate to the U.S., Canada, Australia, etc. would bring him to the attention of INTERPOL.* On the other hand, he could immigrate to South America but it would be imperative that he first learn Russian if he is to pass himself off as a recent refugee from the Soviet Union. C. O. said he could see no reason to prevent Subject from visiting any country or even entering as a technical representative. C. O. told him that he is soundly, if not perfectly, documented and that we can do no better and that he should never forget that his fingerprints are the weakest links.

C. O. said good-by and parted company. Case closed.

NOTE: Normally **HARVARD** would provide a statement on one of our cover unit stationary letterheads covering the period of time Subject was in our custody and indicating that he was more or less professionally associated with the U.S. Army. Chief/HARVARD and C. O. felt that unless Subject requests such a letter it would be adviseable not to expose him to any more of our M.O. We can be sure that if Subject needs such a letter he will contact HARVARD.

* This of course is not true but does enable us to exercise some control.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 28 February 1964

TIME: 1130 hours

162

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr. 51

OKD

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped in to see Subject and paid him DM 800 final subsistence for March. C. O. emphasized that this would be the last time Subject would receive any money and that he must now arrange for a new source of income. Subject laughed and said he had the impression C. O. was anxious to get rid of him and also seemed to have doubts as to his ability to take care of his financial problems. C. O. laughed in turn and said he would indeed be glad to see Subject on his own and added that he had no doubts re: Subject's ability to get money but that he is only hoping Subject would use methods acceptable to society (chuckle).

Since Subject had both English and German versions of his legend, C. O. took the English copy with the explanation that if Subject should submit a Lebenslauf, in connection with a job application, the German version would be more appropriate.

C. O. took Subject to lunch and dropped him off in the city after promising to see him on the 2nd of March.

C.O. picked up Subject's Reiseausweis and told him it would be returned to the authorities and a new one would be issued. This would eliminate the need for a renewal until 1966.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

112

24 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

1. C. O. and Sam Markowtiz met with John Wilms, Special Liaison Advisor to the 513th MI Group at Camp King, to discuss certain problems connected with the WIROGUE case. C. O. told John that we are going to attempt to make a clean ~~brake~~ break with Subject this coming Friday but there were a few loose ends which had to be cleared up before we could take this final step. C. O. said that in reviewing the new political recognition interview story, we had noted that the new story did not incorporate the name change of Subject's father from Simon Sanders to Frank Simon Sanders. C. O. asked if the new copy would have to be changed or replaced. John made a note of what the change of name should really be and told C. O. ~~we~~ he'd have all the new copies changed to read Frank Simon Sanders. John said that this sort of thing happens from time to time; that it is just a simple error and will raise no eyebrows.

2. C. O. then brought up the point that Subject's Reiseausweis will expire in October 1964 and we and Subject were wondering if ~~Subject~~ he would run into any problem when he went to the Polizei Presidum to get a Reiseausweis renewal. John said that there would be no problems that he could see: but to make sure that there is no slip-up, we should pick up Subject's current Reiseausweis and if Sam prepares the necessary Antrag, John will get us a new Reiseausweis within one or two days, dated with a current date. C. O. said he would pick up Subject's Reiseausweis and give it to Sam this week and Sam will prepare the necessary papers for a new Reiseausweis, plus a 1964 Lohnsteurkarte and a deregistration slip. If this works out, our plans to ~~brake~~ break with Subject will be accomplished this coming Friday.

3. C. O. then ~~pointed out~~ brought up the BFV's interest in Subject in late 1962 and mentioned to John we had received a query from Bonn indicating the BFV's interest in Subject, and contained what looked like excerpts from Subject's political recognition

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

interview story. C. O. went on to say that we were wondering if a copy of the story might have gone to the BFV in Bonn, and that Wilms had missed one of the old copies when he recalled all copies recently and replaced them with the new story. John said that Camp Zirndorf processes 50 to 100 cases a month, one half of which are interest in one way or another to the BFV. He said that what had gone to Bonn was very likely an excerpt, that the entire story would not have been sent to Bonn. John went on to say that with the new copy in the file, if this excerpt should come to light in the future, a check would merely indicate that someone had made a mistake and the matter would be dropped. John added that he knows we are concerned about this case, but that he sees no reason why there should be any trouble of any kind. He said that the only problem will be if Subject himself comes to the attention of the authorities because of some shenanigans on his part.

Orme K. Deravat

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 17 February 1964

TIME: 1345 hours

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject in what is now his apartment and which has been completely painted and wallpapered. C. O. gave Subject a copy of his Lebenslauf in German and a copy in English. He was told to read the story thoroughly and then to call C. O. later in the week when he was ready to discuss any points in the story not clear to him or to resolve any questions which he might have. C. O. said he would bring a Soviet realities expert with him who could answer any questions he might have. Subject gave C. O. his copy of the old political recognition interview story plus receipts which indicated he had paid 300 DM "Caution" and a rent receipt for 300 DM for the month of February. He also showed C. O. his rental contract for the 6 month period starting February 1, 1964. Subject gave C. O. a bill for 410 DM, cost of repairing his lower plate. C. O. gave Subject the money and told him to pay the bill and get the receipt stamped paid and return it to C. O. Subject was told that C. O. would pay him for the month of March, deregister him probably the latter part of the week, and give him the deregistration slip. He was also told C. O. would deliver his new political recognition interview story to him probably this week. Subject was not too pleased to hear that he would be deregistered because his Reiseausweis expires in October 1964 and Subject feels that it might not be renewed unless he is under the protection of the U.S. Army. C. O. said he feels there is no reason to worry unless Subject is not working and, thereby proving that he is not an industrious law-abiding citizen. Subject said that he has been trying to sell his inventions and told C. O. the following story:

Subject, in his wanderings about the city, had by accident met the Frankfurt representative of a Munich firm which manufactures a device called the "Starlettograph which is used in the printing industry. Subject told the sales representative how his product could be improved and, as a

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

SECRET

result of their discussions, WIROGUE met the director of the firm. The director became interested in an advertising device which Subject has developed and asked him to prepare a good working model in time for the Hanover Fair in April. The director also asked Subject, if the company supplied him with one of their devices, would he be able to incorporate his ideas for improving the machine in time for the Hanover Fair. Subject claims that he told the director he would modify the machine by the end of March and if the device works properly he would expect payment of 20,000 DM. According to Subject, before the director returned to Munich he promised to send a device to Frankfurt immediately upon arrival. The name and address of the firm is:

Film-Klischee GMBH
München 22
Thierschstrasse 15

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 30 January 1964

162

TIME: 1000 hours

PLACE: AMCONGEN

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. and Subject met at the American Consulate since Subject's apartment (DRC's former safe apartment) is being painted. Subject told C. O. he had been staying at the Balmoral Hotel and would move back into the apartment on Friday evening, 31 January 1964. C. O. and Subject went to the apartment which is indeed being painted and ~~is being~~ repapered.

C. O. paid Subject DM 1,000, DM 800 of which is for subsistence and rent for February and the remaining DM 200 to be applied to the one month's rent in advance required by the landlord.

C. O. told Subject that all copies but one of his original political recognition interview story had been recalled and the German language version of his Lebenslauf was now being used to provide the basis for a new story. C. O. told Subject that as soon as the new story was prepared, copies placed in the various files and the one remaining copy of the old story removed from its file, Subject would be, for all practical purposes, his own boss.

C. O. told him that we have decided to help him get a new start by (1) paying the cost of having his dentures repaired, (2) by paying DM 200 on the DM 300 one month's rent in advance Subject must pay, (3) by providing DM 800 per month for subsistence and housing until he can be legally on his own, (4) by giving him at least one month's notice prior to termination and (5) by making him a present of all the household items now in the apartment including the iron, the vacuum cleaner, and the radio. Subject's rather perfunctory thank you was somewhat less than what C. O. had expected and when C. O. expressed surprise at Subject's lack of enthusiasm, Subject stated that he was most appreciative but was not very demonstrative.

SEC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

F

Subject said he had returned to Doctor Filner who said he could not work on Subject's dentures until approval was granted. Subject asked if we knew Doctor Feilner's estimate had been DM 750. C. O. said we knew and that he should go to the dentist who had given him the DM 400 estimate.

C. O. told Subject to obtain receipts for the one month's rental payment and for the February rental payment. He was also to call C. O. the week of February 2nd to arrange a meeting so that C. O. can pick up the receipts and Subject's copy of his old political recognition interview story.

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

* USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1 NAME OR TITLE Chief, DRC	INITIALS		CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE		COORDINATION
2			FILE
			INFORMATION
3			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE

REMARKS

I am in agreement with DARONNAT's attached suggestion. I feel we will be getting off cheap in paying:

A. For the dental work.

B. Household furnishings per attached list

C. 1-2 months subsistence.

Do you concur?

~~[illegible]~~

Concur

GE

FROM NAME OR TITLE Chief, Resettlement AZ	DATE 27 Jan 64
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	TELEPHONE

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 95 Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.

AGL (1) 10-50-050-07010

27 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, HARVARD
FROM : ORME K. DARONNAT
SUBJECT : WIROGUE

Don, I suggest that we reduce the quantity of some of the items listed on the attached and make WIROGUE a present of the remainder as part of his resettlement.

I have been emphasizing to Subject over the past weeks that President Johnson's economy drive has affected all agencies and departments. Subject, therefore, has been conditioned not to expect money for BKZ or for furniture or a termination sum. Any or all of these would normally be provided in a case of this kind.

I feel that if we pay to have his lower denture repaired, approximate cost DM 400, make Subject a present of the household items listed, and continue to pay him subsistence for a month or two after we notify him he is on his own, we will, I believe, get rid of him as cheaply as possible and without serious complaints.

Orme

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 21 January 1964

TIME: 1200 hours

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

OKD

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject and paid him subsistence for the week ending 31 January 1964. He was told that we have received permission to increase his subsistence from DM 600 to DM 800 per month until his final resettlement. The extra DM 200 is to be applied to his rent. C. O. said that Subject would be paid DM 1000 on 31 January - DM 200 to be applied to one month's rent in advance, and the DM 800 to be rent (DM 200) and subsistence (DM600) for February.

C. O. said we were disappointed that he had decided to stay in his present apartment and take over the DM 300 rent. We had hoped he would be sensible enough to use this opportunity to save a little money. Subject's answer was that he feels that he should be able to afford the rent when he is turned loose and that if he can't afford that much rent he might as well be dead. Subject said he could not understand why C. O. was harping on the subject, that all he was asking for was one month's advance notice prior to being turned loose on his own. C. O. said he was willing to drop the matter as long as Subject did not come crying the blues to us later about needing money. Subject said that if things got really bad he would get a job. C. O. applauded and offered his congratulations but said he assumed this would only be a desperation measure. Subject did not like the joke.

WIROGUE proudly announced that he has made intensive efforts the last few weeks to sell 4 of his inventions. C. O., somewhat exasperated, told him he would never understand how such an obviously clever man could, for so many years, refuse to face up to his responsibilities to himself and society and live in a dream world of get rich quick schemes. Subject put on what is now a familiar act in which he acts terribly hurt because C. O. (his one true friend) does not have faith in him. C. O. told Subject that he is a great actor and added that he (C. O.) would think much more highly of him if he would think

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

about going to work like any normal person and fiddle with his inventions at night. C. O. reminded him that if he had not been able to come up with a successful invention after 1 1/2 years of our patronage he should get his head out of the clouds and join the rest of us. By this time Subject was beginning to sulk so C. O. took him out to lunch. Later while taking a stroll, Subject stated that if the cold weather continued he was going to return to the Congo. C. O. hustled him into Woolworths and bought him some long underwear.

Subject asked if C. O. had been able to get permission to have his lower plate repaired. C. O. told him he was to go to Dr. FEILNER between 1130 - 1230 Wednesday the 23rd of January for an examination. FEILNER would supply us with an estimate. C. O. would then get a decision on whether or not we could help Subject with this problem.

C. O. dropped Subject off downtown.

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 15 January 1964

TIME: 1115 hours

PLACE: Kuwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped by and informed Subject we will not be moving him into any more of our housing, that housing suitable for him is occupied and would not be available for some time. C. O. told Subject that he will give him 800 DM a month instead of the usual 600 DM. He is to take care of housing himself. He was advised to get economy housing and try to save money since the President's economy drive was affecting our budget and C. O. could not promise what kind of help, if any, could be given Subject when he finally leaves our custody. Many months ago C. O. had told Subject that upon his final termination we would see what help could be given him towards apartment rental, dishes, furniture, etc. C. O. felt that it would be a good idea to tell Subject that he should not expect a great deal of help when he leaves us, that he might receive very little, if any.

[illegible] DM 300 [illegible] "[illegible]" [illegible]

[illegible]

C. O. tried to discourage Subject from taking over the Kuwaldstr apartment, but Subject said he is working on an invention for the owner of the apartment and would try to swing some sort of deal. Subject asked if he could expect to receive some help if he had to pay rent in advance when he gets his new quarters. C. O. told him we would pay the first month's rent in advance but would require the receipt from Subject.

Subject said he would call C. O. as soon as he has made arrangements for living quarters for himself.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 10 January 1964

TIME: 1130 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped by to see Subject and pay him two weeks subsistence. Subject asked C. O. what he intended to do regarding housing for him since the maids had told him the apartment would be given up 31 January. C. O. said he was aware that the apartment was to be given up and had hoped to get a month or two extension. C. O. went on to say that he felt that it could not be done and that he would talk to his housing people and would contact Subject early the following week.

C. O. told Subject that his L~~i~~ebenslauf had been completed and was being translated into German. C. O. feels that the final step towards Subject's permanent resettlement can be taken within the next two months.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Draft

7 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WIROGUE
1100 hours

On this date Grady Elms, John Spiegler, Don McLaughlin, Bill Murray and John Wilms (Camp King) met to discuss the WIROGUE case. It was explained to Wilms that we have prepared a Lebenslauf for Subject and we are ready to take the next steps necessary for Subject's resettlement and that we wished to establish if, as Wilms told us some months ago, it would be possible to prepare a new political recognition interview story and replace the old copies with the new story. Wilms said it ~~was~~ would be necessary to recover ~~four~~ seven copies of the old story, ~~Camp King copy, the Criminal Police copy, Nuernberg copy and the copy in the hands of the BFV,~~ but he felt that this could be done. It was decided that months ago when the BND became interested in this case that copies had probably not been made of the story, only extracts to include Subject's name, his birth date, probably the names of his parents and an extract of the reference ~~of~~ to Subject's activities with ~~the~~ a Georgian Resistence Group. It was decided, therefore, that this same information should definitely appear in the new Lebenslauf. This was to be taken care of by having Subject's father's name be Frank Simon Sanders (since Subject's name is Georg Frank Sanders and on the original story Subject's father's name is given as Simon Sanders the new story will indicate that Subject's father's full name is Frank Simon Sanders which will explain Subject's middle name as Frank). [illegible] In the paragraph refering to Subject's detention by the militia it is desired ~~to~~ make some reference to Subject's alleged activities in a resistence group. It is felt that if Subject's new story ever comes to light in the future, what was once reported as Subject's activity in a resistence group will be found ~~taken~~ to have been misread and ~~will only be~~ was only alleged activity in a Georgian resistence group. We all realize that if a [illegible] copy has been made of the old story there is nothing we can do about it anyway.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 13 December 1963

TIME: 1030 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped in and paid Subject two weeks subsistence and after a short chat took him to lunch. C. O. and Subject spent several hours window shopping and just generally buming around. Subject's moral was greatly improved as a result and C. O. feels the time was well spent.

Subject said that he has been worried; that he knows he will be turned loose on his own soon and asked C. O., if possible, to let him have sufficient notice so he can make plans. C. O. told him that he would try to give him at least one month's notice.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 29 November 1963

TIME: 1030 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped by, paid Subject two weeks subsistence and thanked him for his note of sympathy regarding the death of President Kennedy.

Subject was told that his background story is complete and that we hoped we would soon be in a position to take positive steps toward his resettlement. Subject went into a long-winded explanation of why he thought it was wrong for a man to pay all his life for a crime when technically he had paid by serving his prison term. C. O. told him that unfair or not Subject's misdeeds have placed certain restrictions on his activities and nothing could be done to change that. He was reminded that with a new identity he will be in a position to establish himself and be a contributing member of society. Subject's answer was to the effect that he was not too happy to be contributing in Germany.

C. O. knows that the above is Subject's way of letting C. O. know he would like to be clean as a whistle, be able to use his true name and go back to France.

C. O. told him that all things considered he could be a lot worse off and should think about building his future.

Subject then stated that he would repay all the money we had spent on him. C. O. told him that we did not want the money repayed that he would only foul-up our books. He was told that the best way for him to repay the debt would be to work hard and lead a decent life.

C. O. left after promising to have lunch with Subject soon.

SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 15 November 1963

TIME: 1100 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr

-324

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped in to see Subject, paid him two weeks subsistence and provided cigaretts and coffee. He was told that unfortunately we have not finished his legend and it will be a few more weeks until we can try to replace the old story with the new. Subject said that he hoped that he can get started soon because he is getting nervous just hanging around and not being gainfully employed. He reminded C. O. that C. O. had supposedly promised him BKZ and help on new furniture when he finally moved out on his own. C. O. reminded him that C. O. had not promised him anything at all but had said he, the C. O., would find out if any help could be given Subject in this area.

Subject backed down and then stated that his wish had been to go to South America and that C. O. had promised him this would be arranged. C. O. told him that our intention had been to arrange this for Subject but that it is impossible to accomplish and the matter would have to be dropped. Subject was told, as he has been told several times, that if he desires to go to South America he will have to arrange it on his own and after he has built up some work experience here in the F.R.

SECRET

[illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

124

DATE: 1 November 1963

TIME: 1100 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr Apartment

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped in to see Subject, gave him cigaretts and 300 marks subsistence for the next two weeks. He was told that his legend is just about completed, that it is now being proof read and that our next step would be to have it accepted by the German authorities. When this has been accomplished all obstacles to his final resettlement will have been removed.

Subject said that he had been thinking a great deal lately about being turned loose on his own in the near future. He said that he hopes to have his latest invention perfected to the point where he will be receiving a substantial income at the time he leaves us. C. O. told him that it seemed liked he still is trying everything he can to keep from going to work, that he still is placing too much emphazis on "get rich quick" schemes. Subject denied that this was the case but C. O. does not believe him.

C. O. wished him luck in his plans but advised him that when it was time for him to be on his own he would not be given a long transition period. Subject said that up to now he has been working for the work shop owner without receiving pay of any kind but that sooner or later he would be receiving a check and asked what he should do when this happened. C. O. told him that he could see no problem in that if he cannot be paid in cash there is no reason why he couldn't take a check in the name of Sanders and cash it since he is registered at Camp King. Subject said that it might be in a kind of a check that is paid directly to ones bank account. C. O. told him that the answer to that was simple, that he should say that he has no bank account.

C. O. doesn't know what Subject was trying to get at but is sure that he has something in mind. He then asked C. O. to find out what the rent would be on the Kuhwaldstr apartment,

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 4 October 1963

TIME: 1015 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped in and paid Subject two weeks subsistence and found him in high spirits. He has almost completed another invention which appears to be some type of advertising device which projects a pre-determined message on a screen. C. O. told Subject that he was in a hurry but would be glad to come by at a later date to see a demonstration of the device.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 20 September 1963

TIME: 1130 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject and paid him two weeks subsistence. Subject was in extremely good spirits and seemed quite pleased to see C. O. He stated that things are going better and better for him that the mechaniker with whom he is working had given him a new electric razor for having solved a difficult mechanical problem which had plagued the shop for some weeks. Subject said that he has managed to complete two of his inventions and, another device which he had been working on for the mechaniker had been completed and worked so well it had been sent to a display in France. Subject said that he is making more and more contacts among the technical people here in Frankfurt and that his worry now is that he might be offered a good job and won't be able to accept it since he will require a Lohnsteurkarte and a Versicherungskarte. He then asked C.O.'s advice as to what could be done regarding this problem. C. O. said that he is hoping to have an acceptable Labenslauf completed in the near future and as soon as that story is substituted for the old he will receive the necessary documents. At that point he will be free to do anything he wishes as far as work and housing is concerned.

NOTE: C. O. has the necessary tax and insurance cards in his possession but will not give them to Subject until his Lebenslauf and legal position in Germany is satisfactory. If C. O. gives Subject the documents now he would probably go to work and besides earning money would accept our subsistence without notifying C.O. Subject said he wanted C. O. to understand that he was not complaining, that he was indeed most grateful for the ~~training~~ support he has received over the past months, but he is just as eager as we are to be on his own making his way in life. C. O. said he understood and appreciated this fact and hoped that everything would be in order within the next couple of months.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

3 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Stage I

FROM : Chief, Resettlement Branch

SUBJECT : LEGEND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR WIROGUE'S RESETTLEMENT

1. Since May 1962 HARVARD has been attempting to work out a sound resettlement for WIROGUE. Headquarters had authorized HARVARD to assist Subject in his desire to immigrate to South America. As the first step in this program, Subject was interviewed at Camp King and a story adequate to insure West German political recognition was presented to the German interviewer. Certain details of this story aroused the interest of the German government and it was necessary for steps to be taken to kill this unwanted interest. This development would not in itself have been too much of a problem, but in subsequent investigation of the procedure to be followed for immigration to South America, HARVARD learned that applicants are screened very thoroughly, given aptitude tests, etc. etc. This screening is performed by ICEM who is charged by the South American countries with the responsibility for insuring that any immigrant is thoroughly desirable. It became obvious to HARVARD that Subject would require a legend sufficient to withstand detailed interviews and sufficient to qualify him in some profession on the basis of his actual ability - - the existing political recognition story does not provide this.

2. In discussions with Wilms and Wagner of the 513th, it was decided that a detailed life story should be prepared by CABEZONE and on the basis of this story a new political

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

recognition interview should be written which would replace those copies of the old interview now in the various files. A reasonably complete legend previously prepared by Alex Lembersky is attached and with additional information can be used almost as is. Since this life story will be notional, it will have to be written up in sufficient detail and plausible enough to provide Subject with the information needed for the filling out of various future job applications, to stand-up under detailed interviews to which he may in the future be subjected and, if immigration ever takes place, to satisfy those requirements. HARVARD feels that this can only properly be prepared by a native born Russian. HARVARD, therefore, requests Chief, Stage I to assign a Stage I interrogator knowledgeable on the Soviet Union to prepare a life story to include a detailed escape from Georgia to Turkey.

3. We realize that this request could involve considerable work but due to the peculiar problems inherent in the WIROGUE case, it is vital that we prepare Subject for a new life as a completely different person. Only by doing the job properly now will we be able to place ourselves in a position to satisfactorily sever subject's dependence upon KUBARK and reduce to a minimum the need for future contacts.

G. Donald McLaughlin

Attachment:
Legend

cc: Chief, DRC

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 23 August 1963

TIME: 1030

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr

aa2

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in to see Subject and paid him two weeks subsistence. Subject was very excited due to his success in applying for a patent, for a new type soup dish. Case Officer took great pains to praise Subject highly because he is aware that this has been a tremendous psychological boost for WIROGUE who was beginning to doubt his ability.

Subject for a long time has been attempting to get a patent but could not come by the necessary funds, approximately 200 DM. Case Officer asked him how he was able to swing this and was told the following story, some of which Case Officer already knew:

> During the months that Subject has been in HARVARD's hands, he has kept himself busy by inventing various gadgets and devices. Some months ago he made contact with a mechaniker, Alfred Naegele, who has a work shop on 25 Glauburgstr. Subject has had this individual make certain small parts which Subject was not able to make, due to a lack of tools. Over the past months, Subject has won the confidence of Naegele and has been exchanging his labor for permission to use the work shop facilities. Subject has also solved job problems for the work shop owner who has now begun to take on specialized jobs only because he has Subject's talent and ability available to him. Subject continues to help Herr Naegele gratuitously since he feels that in time he will make the contacts which will be of help to him when he is finally on his own. Subject told Case Officer that one of Naegele's contacts had prepared the technical description and application for Subject's soup dish invention without cost to Subject. Subject will pay off the cost by helping Herr Naegele. Subject feels he can use this same procedure to patent other ideas which he has.

[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Case Officer noticed that on the patent application, Subject was listed as an engineer living at Kuhwaldstr 51. When Case Officer questioned him regarding the use of this Kuhwaldstr address Subject said that he felt it was necessary for the following reasons:

1. While riding with Naegele to the Taunus one day and passing Camp King, Herr Naegele had remarked that the Camp was the place where Americans trained commandos and others for work of a secret nature.

2. Since Case Officer had told Subject many months ago that we intended to give up the Kuhwaldstr apartment and he Subject wanted to do everything he could to make arrangements to establish himself on his own he had decided it would be best to use the Kuhwaldstr address because he would be receiving mail and did not want to inconvenience Case Officer by having him be a delivery boy.

3. Subject felt that the use of this address would not break security since he would not use that address for any official reason, e.g., police matters, etc., etc.

Case Officer still reamed Subject out thoroughly and told him that even though our attempts to maintain maximum security were probably 50% successful we should at least try. Case Officer finally realized he was fighting a losing battle and would succeed in antagonizing Subject and if nothing else make more difficulties for himself and told Subject they might as well drop the subject. Subject kept insisting that he would do nothing to jeopardize what Case Officer's organization was trying to do for him and assured Case Officer he thinks out very carefully what the results of any particular course of action might be.

Case Officer told Subject that he is trying to complete his legend and once everything is in order with the German government Subject would be in a position to establish himself. Case Officer told him that it is obvious his hopes for immigration to South America should be shelved for a good long time, that it would appear obvious Subject should establish himself here in Germany building up a work background and then if he so desired, immigrate. This would be without our help.

Case Officer said that his legend should be sufficient to satisfy any further inquiries he might run into. Subject asked what Case Officer's plans were for going to work and finding a place to live and asked what Case Officer's help would consist of. Case Officer told him that he would find his own employment and that since he would not know whether Subject should or would want to commit himself to a long term lease on an apartment, that Case Officer would probably recommend that Subject be given a couple of thousands of marks as a resettlement sum. This could be used by Subject at any time and in any way he sees fit but would eliminate the need for him to return to Case Officer for help towards an apartment, etc. Case Officer said his goal was to legalize Subject's case so that there would be no need for him in the future to come to us for help.

Subject asked just how good the legalization would be, would he be able to go to other countries and if not, then the exercise is a waste of time. Case Officer feels that the reason for Subject's question is that he would probably attempt to immigrate to the U.S. sometime in the future. Also he claimed that he brought up the question only to find out if he could go to other countries on a visitors visa if he makes contact with a firm that would require him to do so in the course of his duties. Case Officer told him that he would investigate these problems in due course but felt that Subject could probably get visitors or tourist permits to all the countries without any difficulty but if he applied for immigration to some country whose investigations require fingerprints and a check of Interpol~~e~~, Subject would then be in trouble up to his ears (HARVARD has ascertained that Subject is not on file with Interpol~~e~~ but has not told Subject this since we may want to use the threat of being listed with Interpol~~e~~ as a future control.)

S-E-C-R-E-T

62

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 9 August 1963

TIME: 1030

PLACE: Kubwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in to see Subject and paid him two weeks subsistance. Subject was not in the best of spirits. He said he has lots of ideas but no one will talk to him unless he has a patent and since patents cost money he is becoming more and more frustrated.

Case Officer suggested that he try to locate individuals who put up capital for development and patent expenses for a percentage of the future earnings. Subject said he has been investigating this possibility but so far has had no success.

Case Officer told him to try to be patient that Case Officer hopes to have his legend finished in the near future and take steps for his complete legalization in West Germany.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROUGE

DATE: 26 July 1963

TIME: 1030

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

1. Case Officer dropped in to see Subject, gave him coffee, cigaretts, etc., and paid him two weeks subsistance. Subject said that he had run into difficulty with his invention and has been busy redesigning certain parts. Some time ago Subject made contact with a man who has a work shop and does specialized developmental work for various factories in the area. Subject has from time-to-time had certain parts made in this work shop. Subject says that he no longer can afford to pay the price this man asks and has made a deal with him whereby he helps the man out in his work shop and receives the time as credit toward any job Subject wants done. Subject told Case Officer that if he needed to contact him at any time and did not find him at home he could be reached at 558925 by calling and asking for Mr. Sanders.

2. Case Officer told Subject that his Legend is coming along pretty well and Case Officer feels that with a little luck we will be able to take definite steps toward his more or less permanent resettlement. Case Officer promised to spend more time with Subject when they meet again two weeks from today.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SEC

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 12 July 1963

TIME: 1130

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr

Orme K. Daronnat
Orme K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in to see Subject; paid him ~~some assistance~~ SUBSISTANCE for the next two weeks and gave him cigaretts, coffee, booze, etc. Subject is still working dilligently on his invention (Electric Dictionary) which is making slow, but as he says, steady progress. He says it could go much faster but he is limited by a lack of money and therefore must be content with doing a little at a time. Case Officer asked him if he had heard from Braun. Subject answered no but was not surprised since the Chief of ~~Resettliment~~ RESEARCH and Development told him it could be several weeks before they contacted him. Case Officer said that he hoped that he could COMPLETE A WORKING MODEL of his invention because very likely no firm would really become interested unless he had a good working instrument to demonstrate. Case Officer told Subject that we had worked out a pretty good legend for him but there were a few necessary details to be added. Subject asked for an estimate as to how long his status quo would remain as is, because he would hate to be thrown out on the street without a chance to prepare for it. Case Officer told him that he had nothing to fear in this respect ~~that [illegible] the~~ until his story was ready and Camp King ~~so~~ took the necessary action Case Officer would then inform Headquarters that his recommendation is to resettle Subject on the local economy with a reasonable amount of BKZ and help toward the purchase of furniture. Subject asked if this entire processing would take six months. Case Officer said it was possible that in any event Subject would be given adequate time to establish himself; i.e. finding a job, etc. Case Officer promised to see him definitely within two weeks.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 28 June 63

TIME: 1145

PLACE: Kuhwaldstrasse

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C.O. dropped into see Subject and paid him subsistence for the next two weeks.

Subject informed C.O. he had gone to the electrical firm BRAUN and had asked to see the Director of Research and Development. Surprisingly enough he was granted an audience with the "Great Man" and was allowed to explain his invention (electric dictionary). The Director was interested and told Subject he would discuss the idea with his engineering panel. If they were interested Subject would be contacted. C.O. said that he should negotiate for a job that resettling him in Germany would appear to be his best bet since he has more going for him here than he would in South America.

C.O. said he was working on his story (legend) and would recommend to Headquarters that Subject resettle in Germany with help toward BKZ and furniture.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 14 June 1963

TIME: 1300

PLACE: Kuhwaldstrasse

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS: C.O. met Subject and took him to lunch. He was told that C. O. was convinced that Subject should forget about emigrating to South America for the present and should concentrate on settling here in Germany. Co. O. pointed out that he spoke German and could probably get a good job here but that if he went to S. A. he had few real prospects and the fact that if he did not speak Russian he would be suspect in the eyes of the russian emigrees there.

C. O. told him that it was his opinion we should prepare a good story to replace the one he has now but to make sure that it would not require that he know a great deal of Russian so that if he should go to S. A. at a later date he would not have to study too long. C. O. said he would still notify Hqs. and see if they are willing to subsidize 6 mos. intensive Russian language training. If not we would concentrate on getting him established here and then at a later date discuss S. A. emigration. C. O. said he would also recommend that Subject be helped toward furniture and BKZ if he remains in Germany.

[redacted] [redacted]

WIROGUE

7 June 1963

1200 hours

Kuhwaldstr.

CO dropped in to see Subject and found him in an exceptionally good mood.

He remarked that he was bgginning to feel like a charity case and asked how long he would be on our hands. CO told him that there were three possibilities:

1. Subject could stay right here in Germany, find himself a job and CO would find out what help Headquarters would provide in the way of help toward an apartment and furniture.
2. Subject would have to study Russian for six months, since it is impossible for anyone to have been raised and worked in the Soviet Union without knowing some Russian. At the end of that time he would try to process him for S.A. (Subject was not told this but it is obvious that if he does not know Russian, once he gets to S.A., the first Russian he comes in contact with will realize he is not a bona fide refugee which would lead to trouble for Subject.)
3. There is a possibility he could be gotten to Chile. (John Wilms has suggested that through his contacts he might be able to get Subject to Chile, since the Chilean Ambassador owes him a favor.)

CO told Subject to think about the three possibilities and make and give CO his thoughts on the problem the next time they meet.

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. Daronnat

28 May 1963

WIROGUE

Alex Lembersky and Bill Murray discussed the legend possibilities for WIROGUE -- It was established that since Subject speaks no Russian it is impossible to build a legend due to the fact that the simplest Arbeiter in the Soviet Union can speak some Russian.

It was decided that:

1. Rogue should be given an intensive course of Russian language instruction;
2. He be sent to Chile through John Wilm's connections, or;
3. He be told that nothing can be done for him and he be resettled on the local economy.

Orme K. Daronnat

WIROGUE

Tuesday 21 May 1963

C.O. explained to John Wagner (Camp King) that Subjects' story, on the basis of which pol. recog. was granted, was so ridiculous that no decent legend could be built around it. A good life story will be an absolute necessity if Subj. is to immigrate through ICEM & South America.

John W. suggested that the story be rewritten to satisfy our purposes. The story would then be prepared at Camp King for Rudy's signature. The old story would then be removed from the KRIPO's and ZIRNDORFS' files and replaced by the new story.

C.O. suggested that the BFV might also have a copy. John said they would get it.

[redacted] WIPOSUF: in the [illegible] in Paris

Cof and AFRF have been informed that if [illegible] is processed through them for immigration [illegible] should be a flap. Both Cof and AFRF [illegible] had any knowledge that this case was [illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: FJ/ 10 May 1963

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat
Orme K. Daronnat , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

CO dropped in to see Subject and found him busy as usual working on his inventions. He was told that we are making slow but sure progress toward his eventyal immigration. Subject said that he had been to the Zentralstelle fur Arbeitsvermittlung and had picked up some information re immfgration to South America. (CO took a look at the material and saw that it tended to verify the info that Jack R. had given us re immigration and work opportunities).

CO will see Subject again on Friday the 17th.

Thurs. 16

C.O. dropped by to tell Subj. he would not see him until 23 May.

Thurs. 23

C.O. took Subj. to Wiesbaden for his morale. After lunch and a walk in the park Subj. was returned to his apt.

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 18 April '63

TIME: 1130

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat, **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO took Subject to lunch and found him to be in a reasonably good mood. CO told him that we were making slow but sure progress in solving the problems regarding his immigration. Subject said he would be patient but hopes that something will happen soon.

Memo for the [redacted] 9 April '63

Bill Murray [redacted] ie him the backgr
information on [redacted] point up the need for CARAVEL's
help. Chris said [redacted] out as much as possible the workings
of INTERPOL beside [redacted] check out the two names against
the Interpol files in [redacted]

9 April '63 - [redacted]

Chris called to [redacted] ard that Interpol Hdqtrs in Paris sends out a wanted list to every country in the world. This list includes the names of 1. Those to be arrested. 2. Those whose address is desired. 3. Those to be checked on periodically by the local authorities. A person appearing on the list stays on indefinitely. The list is follwed by fingerprints and a data card.

1630

Chris called to inform us that CARAVEL had called to inform him that Subject was not listed under the two names we had given him and since he was not in the German Interpol files was not in the Interpol files of any other country with the possible exception of Hdqtrs in Paris. CAREVEL will be going to Paris in the near future and can check the files since he has free access.

16 April 63

Bill M. asked Chris B. to have Dean W. to make sure that CARAVEL checks out WIROGUE'S names with INTERPOL in Paris when he goes there in the next few weeks.

9 May 63

Dean W. called to inform us that WIROGUE is not listed in the main INTERPOL files in Paris.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 9 April 1963

TIME: 1200

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Darconat , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

CO met Subject and found him to be in a blue funk. Subject said that he was somewhat less than pleased with his German documentation that as long as he stayed Germany and was under the protection of the German Government he had nothing to worry about. He feels that as long as the US Forces are here he has no problems but that as soon as we leave Germany will probably take a long look at the number of refugees here and take steps to encourage certain types to depart. Subject said that he could end up in all kinds of trouble. CO told him that in the first place the US Forces would be in Germany for a long time at least during his lifetime. In the second place Subject would be long gone before the Government changed it's attitude toward refugees.

Subject then said he was worried that when he got to S.A. the Columbian Government would probably check with the Soviet Gov't to find out if he was indeed an ex Soviet citizen. This would result in his being put in prison for entering the country under false pretenses. CO said there was no reason for the Columbian Government to check with the Sovs. Subject would arrive a bone fido immigrant fully checked out by the organization responsible ~~for~~ to the Columbian Govt. CO pointed out that the Columbian Govt would be crazy to alert the Sovs that one of their ex citizens was there with the possibility of having him recruited to work for the Sovs. Subject was still dubious but stated that he would go anyway since that is what we wanted. CO pointed out that he had requestd help in going to SA and that we had found it necessary to get him a Reiseausweis to accomplish this. He was told that it is too late now for him to have misgivings that what is done is done and he would have to accept it.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: Airogue

DATE: 29 March 1963

TIME: 1200

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. Daronnat, **Case Officer**

COMMENTS: CO met with Subject and paid him two weeks subsistance. Subject asked about the status of his immigration processing and was told that it was not coming along as well as CO would like but there was nothing to done about it.

Subject is in no hurry to be out on his own seems to be enjoying his stay with us. CO is worried that Subject might be difficult to get rid of when the time comes to make his move.

CO promised to drop by sometime during the following week.

March 13th, 1963

A discussion held in Bad Godesberg on March 12th, 1963, between Mr. H. Neegard, Chief of ICEM Mission in Germany and Mr. J. Riley of AFRF revealed the following procedure taken by ICEM on refugee applicants for migration to South America under the ICEM Special Program:

1. Applicant, if a refugee, must be recognized under UN High Commissioner's Mandate as a bona fide political refugee. (Note: All refugees holding a Reiseausweis automatically fall under the Mandate.)

2. A detailed curriculum vitae of the applicant must be sent by AFRF to Mr. Neegard. ICEM emphasizes that all time be accounted for since "gaps" are not accepted.

3. Applicant must supply documentary proof of profession or skill. In lieu of such documents, a letter of testimony from a current employer describing job skills and qualifications of applicant will be considered.

4. ICEM will arrange to interview the applicant and to give tests to determine applicant's qualifications. ICEM will not accept tests which are made by other sources. The interview and test can be given in FF/M.

5. ICEM conducts its own security clearance on each applicant whether USEP or non-USEP case.

6. If applicant is found acceptable by ICEM, a work contract must be signed by the applicant prior to departure from Germany. ICEM has a placement service which arranges the job placement and obtains the work contract. This is a standard ICEM procedure. ICEM will not sponsor the applicant who does not sign a work contract.

7. The total procedure requires at least three months from the date the applicant's curriculum vitae is received by ICEM, Bad Godesberg.

8. ICEM does not accept payment of passage by applicants nor is there an ICEM loan grant. ICEM charges DM 210.-- for men between 18-51 for transportation including luggage. The charges for women's transportation amount to DM 165.-- (18-51 years old), DM 84.-- for children between 5 and 18 years old. Transportation of children under five is free of charge. The total transportation cost per family will not exceed DM 586.--.

9. ICEM Placement Service in South American countries will meet the migrant on arrival, introduce him to the employer, and ascertain that all is in order. In the event that an applicant leaves this work, ICEM placement service will assist him to find another job. The placement service does not give assistance after the second job is found.

10. Mr. Heegard stressed that each applicant is processed thoroughly to avoid sending an unqualified person to South America.

11. Basic Spanish, according to Mr. Heegard, can be learned by an applicant over a period of three months - at least three hours of instruction per week. This should be done prior to departure from Germany.

12. During the processing the applicant receives a pamphlet explaining the economic, social, political, etc. conditions of the country of his choice.

13. Mr. Heegard said that, in general, promotional opportunities are excellent in certain fields due to the lack of a qualified personnel.

14. The Special Program is the only one under which ICEM operates for foreign refugees desiring to emigrate from Europe to South America.

15. Professions and skills required in South America are: (COLUMBIA)
Electrical machine construction (Elektromaschinenbau): engineer, technician (drafting and operating), draftsman, master, cutting-tool maker (Schneidwerkzeugmacher), matrix maker for plastic material.
Metallurgy: Skilled foundry worker; moulder (metall foundry); rolling-mill worker and technician, casting mould matrix maker (Metallgussform-Schablonenmacher).
Miscellaneous professions: Repair mechanic, photo-engraver, offset-retoucher, technician for plastic material, papermaker.

16. Professions and skills not required in South America:
Lawyers, office worker, specialist for commerce and sale, construction engineer, construction technician and construction worker, carpenter, leather manufacturer, waiter, servant, unskilled laborer.

17. HOUSING - ICEM does not find housing for the migrant but may give advice if needed.

18. ICEM BAD GODESBERG coordinates with ICEM GENEVA on the processing of an applicant.

19. S.A. job openings may be found at the ZENTRALSTELLE FÜR ARBEITSVERMITTLUNG, ESCHERSHEIMERLANDSTR. 1-7 FF/M. (ICEM GENEVA sends the job lists to the above organization).

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 13 March 1963

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme A. Daronnat , Case Officer

COMMENTS: CO dropped in to see Subject and paid him two weeks subsistance. CO told Subject that there were two major hurdles to his immigration to Columbia. 1. ICEM would require that he be thoroughly interviewed and tested to establish just what his technical qualifications are. It would, therefore, be necessary that we be careful to build his work history around work which he not only could have been doing in the Soviet Union, but in which he could pass a practical examination and which the South American country needs and desires. Subject said that if his legend included schooling in electro-mechanical fields with the major portion of his work experience in development and improvement of devices and processes he could in fact pass any practical test and subsequent interview.

2. We must assume that he is listed with INTERPOL since the French would almost automatically inform other European countries of Subject's disappearance from France. Subject agreed that this was a major problem but one that he could not help with.

Subject has resigned himself to being processed as a regular immigrant and has said that he will do whatever we require.

Memo for the record WIROGUE 7 March '63

Blake Cox called to inform Harvard that some of ICEM's cases have a security chedk run on them which would include a check with Interpol. Blake will try to find which type of case is checked and why.

The investigation is handled by the Special Assistant to the Director of ICEM in Geneva.

Blake will also find out the name of the person who conducts the investigation and the office he is in. He will also check to find out if R.M. Gray is still there.

12 March '63

Blake called to inform us that R. M. Gray is now the PIO in Geneva. The special assistabt to the Director is Peter Regis. His assistant is Yarousch ? (retiredArmy Major). Blake said USEP cases are not checked as thoroughly as straight applicants to ICEM but he still cannot find out what decides if a case will be checked with Interpol.

14-00000

Memo for the record   ZIRCONE   1 March '63

This date Don McL. [illegible] and Bill K. discussed with Gus E. and Jack R. of AFRP the content of our conversation with Earl Blake Cox 27 Feb. Gus agreed with Blake's thinking and suggested that instead of writing for immigration information, either he or Jack would go to ICEM and personally discuss the immigration questions with the proper people.

Memo for the record   WIROGUE   27 Feb. '63

On this date Bill M. and Don McL. discussed the Wirogue case with Earl Blake Cox(Chief, RMS, AMCONGEN Munich).

Blake was told that we have a case which we wish to help immigrate to South America. Blake was told that we had hoped to send Subject directly to ICEM(Subject cannot immigrate directly to South America but must have all arrangements handled through I CEM) but that in exploratory talks with Gus Elmendorf'(Chief, AFRP) Gus had been of the opinion that our case would be thoroughly investigated, interviewed, tested, etc.; procedures which we wished to avoid since they might bring to light the fact that our case was not the person he claimed to be.

Blake agreed that Gus was correct in his thinking that if Subject went to ICEM on his own he would be interviewed and trade tested for a special program set up by ICEM to supply SA with certain higher types of skilled specialists, e.g. ~~Foreman~~ foremen, shop managers, etc.

Blake suggested that we make our case USEP eligible through AFRP and then refer him to ICEM. This procedure would probably give Subject more status in ICEM's eyes and eliminate some of the background investigation. Subject would also be referred as a self-payer meaning he would have the funds to pay his own transportation.

Blake asked if Subject would have a job waiting for him and was told that he would have no job but would have a letter attesting to the fact that there was $3,000.00 being held for him insalary and bonuses which he had received while working for the Army. Blake thought this arrangement would be satisfactory.

Blake feels that coming to ICEM as a USEP case through AFRP Subject would probably be accepted without question since he would have been thoroughly checked out by Camp King and AFRP thus eliminating the need for investigatory action by ICEM.

Blake was on his way to Bad Godesberg and said he would try to find out without arousing suspicion whether or not a refugee is fingerprinted and with what authorities the fingerprints are checked. He would also find out if a security investigation is made and how

(over)

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 15 February 1963

TIME: 1130

PLACE: Kuhwald Strasse

Orme K. Doramud, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer worked with Subject discussing the vital statistics which would have to acquired for and memorized by Subject in order to supply the refugee organization with certain factual information necessary for his processing. This information would also be vital if in casual conversation Subject was to keep from drawing suspicion to himself when queried about his homeland, etc.

C/O said that he would be able to acquire the information Subject would need. Subject asked if with his name could it have been possible for his father to have come from one of the Baltic countries. C/O promised to find out and inform him at their next meeting.

28 February

1100

C/O dropped in to see Subject and informed him that he would very likely be processed for South America through a refugee organization. This would mean with a refugee organization behind him and USEP support he would not be subjected to the investigation, interviews, etc he would normally undergo if he went directly to ICEM.

C/O told Subject that arrangements would be made for him to start studying Spanish as soon as practical.

Subject was told that his name was a common one throughout the Baltic region and therefore, he would be able to discuss that part of his legend with confidence.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 12 Feb. ,63

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. Daronnat , Case Officer

COMMENTS: Subject told CO that he had gone to the Columbian Consulate at 10 am Hauptbahnhof and found it to be a one man, or rather, a~~n~~ one woman office. He said he found the representative to be a pleasant but rather incompetent German woman about 50 years of age. He told her that he was a refugee and wished to inquire about immigrating to Columbia. She told him that as an engineer he would have no difficulty being accepted but that he would have to contact the Ministry in Columbia through ICEM which would make all the arrangements. If everything worked out properly she would receive notification to issue a visa.

CO explained that it would be impossible for Subject to go to ICEM on his own. Subject was told that these developments would indicate that Subject should be processed as a regular refugee with a Volunteer Agency ~~case~~ and USEP support.

CO told Subject that he would advise Hdqtrs of the new developments and get permission to use the new approach to his resettlement.

Subject was advised to work on his legend until CO ~~would~~ came ~~go~~ by on Friday.

[redacted] [redacted]

Memo for the record --- WIROGUE

11 Feb. '63 the undersigned asked Chief, CAMANTILLA why a European refugee who applied for immigration to a South American Country would be referred by that Consulate to ICEM.

The answer was that ICEM handles the immigration processing for refugees in Europe going to countries overseas. This saves the individual country the expense entailed in maintaining immigration and welfare offices and staffs. If a refugee goes to ICEM on his own he would probably be referred to a welfare Agency or be processed by ICEM itself. This would mean forms to be filled out in detail and time consuming background checks.

If the Refugee is a Camantilla - USEP case most of the work would have been done by CAMANTILLA and would probably eliminate the need for the refugee to appear at I CEM in Bad Godesburg until the final stages of the processing.

Orme K. Daronnat

GEHEIM!

11 February 1963

OC-5517

An
Das Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz
zu Hdn des Herrn Dr.Meier
Köln

BETRIFFT: Georg SANDERS, geb. 25.7.1919 in Tiflis, UdSSR

BEZUG: Dort. Schreiben vom 14 Dezember 1962 - IV A 4-112-P-50580-2/62

Subject is of continuing operational interest to AIS: Accordingly, it would be appreciated if your investigation were suspended. Should our operational interest be terminated at any time while Subject remains in the German Federal Republic, we will automatically furnish you with the details of this case.

C. W. Schmitz
CCA Liaison Officer

GEHEIM!

Translation of German report from the BFV to the American Embassy, OCA, z.H. Mr. C. W. SCHMITZ in Mehlem.

Concerning Georg SANDERS, ~~gebxx25x~~ born 25 July 1919 in Tiflis/USSR. Present residence in Oberursel/Ts, Hohemarkstr. 145.

Cross reference, none.

As of the 14th July 1962 SANDERS is in the custody of an U.S. organization in Oberursel. It was alleged that he had arrived on the same date as a tourist from East- to West-Berlin and defected there.

On the 28th of August 1962 he filed application for recognition as a foreign refugee.

On 29 August 62 he was interviewed, in the presence of a member of a U.S. organization, by the criminal investigation. During the interview SANDERS made untransparent statements concerning his defection.

Among other SANDERS said that he had been a leading member of a resistance group in the Soviet Union. Moreover he claimed that he evaded arrests by joining a Soviet tourist group with the assistance of friends.

The tourist group went on a guided tour of the Soviet occupied East zone of Germany. The group left Tiflis on the 10th of July 1962 arriving in East Berlin on the 14th of July 1962. Subject claimed that upon arrival to East Berlin he escaped immediately. However, SANDERS refused to make more detailed statements about his escape to West Berlin. Allegedly it was unknown to him how his friends had managed to place him into the tourist group.

We would be grateful if any communications or information concerning SANDERS inclusive a possible interview report would be forwarded to us.

VS-Vertraulich

BUNDESAMT FÜR VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ
Gesch.-Z.: IV A 4 - 112-P-50580- 2 /62

5 Köln 1, den 14 · Dezember 1962
Postfach

VS-Vertr.

X

Durch Kurier

25083

American Embassy, OCA
z.H. Mr. C.W. SCHMITZ
Room III - 407

Mehlem

Betr.: Georg SANDERS, geb. 25.7.1919 in Tiflis/UdSSR,
z.Zt. wohnhaft in Oberursel/Ts.,
Hohemarkstr.145

Bezug: Ohne

SANDERS befindet sich seit dem 14.7.1962 in Obhut einer US-Dienststelle in Oberursel, nachdem er angeblich am gleichen Tage als sowj. Tourist von Ost- nach Westberlin geflüchtet war. Am 28.8.1962 stellte er Antrag auf Anerkennung als ausländischer Flüchtling. Am 29.8.1962 wurde er in Anwesenheit eines Angehörigen einer US-Dienststelle durch die Kriminalpolizei vernommen. Bei der Vernehmung machte SANDERS undurchsichtige Angaben über seine Flucht.

SANDERS führte u.a. an, in der UdSSR einer Widerstandsgruppe als führendes Mitglied angehört zu haben. Einer beabsichtigten Festnahme will er sich dadurch entzogen haben, in dem er sich von Freunden in eine sowj. Touristengruppe einschleusen ließ, mit der er zu einer Besichtigungsfahrt in die SBZ am 10.7.1962 aus Tiflis abgereist und am 14.7.1962 in Ostberlin eingetroffen sei. Er flüchtete angeblich unmittelbar nach seiner Ankunft in Ostberlin.

- 2 -

SANDERS weigerte sich, nähere Angaben über seine Flucht nach Berlin-West zu machen. Angeblich ist ihm auch unbekannt, auf welche Weise ihn seine Freunde in die Reisegruppe einzuschleusen vermochten.

Für eine Mitteilung aller dort über SANDERS vorliegenden Erkenntnisse und die Überlassung einer möglicherweise vorliegenden Befragungsniederschrift wären wir dankbar.

Im Auftrag

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 8 Feb 1963

TIME: 1505

PLACE:

Orme K. [illegible], Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Subject called to say that he had gone to the Columbian Consulate which was closed. He had, ~~[illegible]~~ spoken, however, with someone in the Consulate and had learned that everything regarding emigration could be done in FF/01. Subject will return to the Consulate on the 11th and expects to see C.O. on the 12th.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 8 Feb. 1963

TIME: 1130

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat
Orme K. Daronnat
, Case Officer

COMMENTS: CO dropped by to see Subject and informed him that we had been informed that if Subject was still interested and could swing an immigration visa to South America we had authority to pay his way to SA and provide monetary support up to 125.00 per month until he is able to establish himself. Subject was quite surprised and pleased and wanted to know long he would receive the montjly payment. CO told him that this had been left up to CO's discretion who assuredd Subject~~/h~~ that as long ~~he~~ as he diligently applied himself to finding work and was not too choosy he would continue to receive financial support.

CO and Subject agreed that Columbia seems to be the best choice. CO told Subject to go to the Columbian Consulate, Am Hauptbahnhof 10 and get as much information as possible regarding immigration. He will attempt to find out if his processing can be done herein FF/M or if it will be necessary to go to Hamburg.

Subject was told that after he gets to SA, CO will maintain contact through the mail or someone ~~////~~ in SA will maintain contact with him by letter drop.

Memo to the File WIROGUE

On 5 Feb 63 CO went to Bonn to talk with OCA re the WIROGUE case and the BfV request for information on him.

CO discussed the case with KUBARK Staffer Clarence Schmidt (true name) and explained that it is true that a Georg Sanders processed through Camp King for his political recognition, but that his name, story submitted for his recognition, etc., were complete fabrications concocted by Camp King to ensure that WIROGUE receives his political recognition and Reiseausweis. Moreover since it ~~xx~~ is a fabrication that means that there are no reports of any kind which can be passed to the BfV. Finally it was explained by CO that since Subj is an agent (or rather was) and not a normal defector he of course did not go through Stage 1 and 2 processing at Cabezone and therefore there are no routine reports here that could be passed to the BfV.

Schmidt answered that the reason the BfV made an inquiry is that because subjs statement for his recognition indicated that he defected from the Soviet Union and read like a report of someone who ~~was being~~ debriefed by Cabezone. Moreover the story submitted for his recognition seemed so weak that it immediately drew the attention of the BfV, the German organization responsible for the security of West Germany.

Mr Schmidt then went into a long explanation of the function of OCA and its relationship to the rest of the Intelligence (US) Community and the BfV. He stated that as the sole coordinating body for the entire ~~IX~~ AIS community OCA is the sole office for liaising with the BfV and that any matter of interest of any component of the AIS community must be handled by OCA, whether it be written or oral. It is therefore shown in the present case ~~that~~ that since the BfV requested info on a Georg Sanders it sent the request to OCA with the realization that OCA would coordinate the matter with all the AIS components and moreover the answer passed to BfV would not be a KUBARK one (even though the BfV liaison people know OCA is primarily KUBARK) but a coordinated AIS one. It is for the above reason that OCA is very disturbed by the activity of Mr John Willms of Camp King who throughout the years has repeatedly refused to clear with OCA and handled any business he had with the BfV directly with the BfV and usually with the Chief of the BfV. CO had explained that even before he brought up the BfV inquiry on Sanders with Willms, Willms mentioned that he had already made an appointment tto talk with the Chief of the BfV and thus would take up the matter as a service to us. Schmidt answered that Willms uses these ruses as excuses to go to Bonn and butter up the Chief of the BfV.

In any event Schmidt stated that since he received the inquiry from the BfV he is obligated to answer it and in order to keep the BfV out of the case will inform it that Subj is of continuing operational interest to AIS. He requested that CO send him a cable stating that Subj is of ops interest and that it is contemplated that he will be resettled outside of Germany. This cable was sent to Bonn on 6 Feb 1963.

CO, upon return from Bonn, reported the above with Mr Lyack, Chief, Cabezone, who stated that though there is an agreement between the services and OCA, the Generals in Heidelberg back Mr Willms in his personal relations with the German services and thus this battle which has been going on for years will probably continue for several more years. In any event if the matter of Willms versus OCA comes up again it is strongly urged that Chief, Cabezone be queried as soon as possible.

David R Reinbold
david r reinbold

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: ZIROGUE

DATE: 31 Jan. 1963

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. Daronnat, **Case Officer**

COMMENTS: CO dropped in to see Subject and found him busy with one of his inventions. He was paid subsistance and given cigarettes and coffee. Subject was told that there was no news regarding his immigration. CO promised to drop by on Thursday the 7th.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

29 January 1963

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

On this date George List and the undersigned discussed CO's plans and thinking regarding WIROGUE's immigration to South America. Case Officer explained that since Subject is an exceptional case and not a bona fide refugee, we will not be able to take advantage of the normal immigration channels without taking the chance of being involved in fraud. Case Officer further explained that since WIROGUE's contact with the Consulate of his choice will not in any way be controlled by us, this immigration attempt will be a one shot operation and if it fails, we will not have a second chance because if he is turned down for immigration, any subsequent attempts he makes to immigrate will bring to light the fact that he had previously applied for immigration to another country. It is essential therefore that we plan for every contingency. Case Officer feels, based on HARVARD's experience, that when WIROGUE applies for immigration he will be required to give

(1) the name and address of his present employer and probably the name of his supervisor and telephone number.

(2) what type of work he has been doing;

(3) proof that he will be able to support himself for a minimum of two years at the rate of$125 a month.

(4) proof of his professional qualifications.

(5) birth certificate.

(6) detailed information regarding his employment and residence addresses in the Georgian SSR

(7) details of the war-time military service.

Police good conduct certificate

Case Officer said that early next week he will meet with Wagner and Willms of the 513th and explain the above. If it is possible he will get them to agree to provide the details of (1) above in the event the Consulate should call as part of the routine immigration processing. (2) above will be taken care of in the same manner. Regarding (3), Headquarters has given us authority to expend up to $3,000 and Case Officer will inform ~~apprise~~ 513th of this. They will be asked to provide a letter if required, stating that Subject has been associated with them (whatever cover organization they wish to use) since his defection in July '62 and has roughly $3,000 in salary and bonuses being held for him. Regarding (4) whether or not is is adviseable to provide Subject with proof of his professional qualifications will be discussed with the 513th. (5) above, a birth certificate will probably not be necessary since so many defectors do not have these documents with them. Information on employment and residences will be worked up by the Case Officer from past defector's BARs and with material available to SR 6. (6) above - this information may also be acquired through facilities of SR 6.

After discussions with the 513th, Case Officer will tell WIROGUE that we have been informed by Headquarters that if Subject still desires to immigrate to South America and is successful in immigrating, we have authority to provide financial assistance during the transistion period up to $125 a month. Since Case Officer knows WIROGUE, the next question will be, "How long will I receive this $125 a month?" Case Officer will reply, "Until you become satisfactorily established or we have reason to believe that you are not sincerely trying to establish yourself." Case Officer will tell him, ~~but only if absolutely necessary,~~ that ~~Subject~~ he could count upon a year's support, if it were necessary.

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 16 January 1963

TIME: 1100

PLACE:

Orme K. Daronnat

COMMENTS: ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

Case Officer dropped by to see Subject and paid him subsistence.

Subject's morale is high, but he would like to get some word soon on what is to be done with him. He was told that we had quired headquarters and asked them to advise as soon as possible and that there was nothing more we could do for the present.

SECRET

7B-SANDERS, Geo

Bob:

A trace of EGMA-25083, 16 Jan 63, was NEGATIVE. John sent copies of the dispatch to DRC and CAT.

Attached is a copy of HARVARD's reply which states KUBARK interest.

Potential "missed traced" due to no carding although Subject has been known to KUBARKERS since August 28, 1962.

This result failure to card alias of WIROUGE. Hqs. will now card Sanders as though true name, further compounding folly. Obviously, someone forgot to card alias of WIROUGE & records should be corrected.

J.M.Q.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 10 January 1963

TIME: 1130

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer picked up Subject, took him downtown and had lunch with him. Subject is in good spirits but would still like to receive word one way or the other of what will happen to him in the future. Case Officer told him that we had sent out a cable requesting an answer to our proposals.

SECRET

SECRET

9 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

Case Officer received a letter from Chuck Pettit, addressed to WIROGUE (George Sanders), Hohemarkstr. 145. Case Officer opened the letter and found it to be from a Lt. Zircle of the Transportation Corps. The Lt. mentioned that he and his friend had enjoyed their conversation with Subject at the Bahnhof a short time ago and had found him very interesting. The Lt. said he received a great deal of pleasure from meeting people such as Subject with such interesting backgrounds.

He suggested that he and Subject meet for dinner in the near future.

Case Officer took the letter to Bob Bullock, told him a little bit about Subject's past and suggested that something be done to prevent the Lt. from continuing his friendship with Subject, since Case Officer felt that WIROGUE would probably use the Lt. for whatever he could get out of him. Bullock said he would have CID contact the Lt. and tell him to lay off for his own good. Bullock promised to find out if the Lt. had given Subject his address and to advise him that if he should run into Subject, he should not mention having written a letter.

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 3 January 1963

TIME: 1515

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr. 55

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped by to see Subject and pay him subsistence to 19 January. Subject is in good spirits and does not seem as restless as he usually is. He confided to Case Officer that he is hoping he won't have to do any running around regarding his immigration as long as the weather stays as bad as it is. He seems to be reasonably satisfied with his lot in life and only asked that the Case Officer drop by a little more often if possible because he gets lonely.

S-E-C-R-E-T

#52 Elbe Strasse
Frankfurt a. Main

3 January 1963

Mr. Georg Sanders
145 Hoenmark Str
Oberursel
Frankfurt a. Main

Dear Mr. Sanders:

Just wanted to drop you this line to tell you again how much I enjoyed our conversation the other evening at the Bahnhof. My greatest experiences in Germany are the different people I meet, and it is always very pleasant to talk with someone such as yourself who has such an interesting background.

My friend felt rather silly at his attempted joke. The next time he either will have less to drink or will think more before clowning!

It would be a pleasure to see you again during my tour of duty in Frankfurt. Maybe if you have a free hour or so in the future you would want to have another supper in the Bahnhof!

Sincerely,

William D. Zirkle
William D. Zirkle
2/Lt, TC

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1 NAME OR TITLE: DRC (Murray)
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION:
2
3 WIROGUE [redacted]
4

INITIALS		CIRCULATE
DATE		COORDINATION
		FILE
		INFORMATION
		NECESSARY ACTION
		NOTE AND RETURN
		SEE ME
		SIGNATURE

REMARKS: Bill: We have handled this with Lt. Zirkle with no trouble at all —

Bob Bullock

FROM NAME OR TITLE:
DATE: 7 Jan
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION:
TELEPHONE:

DD FORM 95

Lt. William D. Zirkle
U. S. Army Trans Center
Frankfurt a. Main

ElbeStr #52

Internationale
Frankfurter
Messe
17-21.2.1961

-3.1.63-20
6

Herrn
Georg Sanders

Frankfurt a. Main - Oberursel

HoenmarkStr #145

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 19 December 1962

TIME: 1030

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in to deliver some Christmas cheer to Subject and gave him his Reiseausweis and Anmeldebestatigung. His HARVARD identity document was picked up.

Subject told Case Officer he had the feeling that Headquarters would advise us to turn him loose without any additional help from us and he was worrying because it would be difficult for him to get a job and apartment on very short notice. Case Officer told him that we are aware of this and that if it is recommended that he be resettled on the economy we are not in the habit of throwing people out in the street and that we would do everything we could to help him become integrated.

Subject was paid subsistence for two weeks. Case Officer promised to try to drop by the end of next week.

From time to time Subject tries to find out if Case Officer knows the details concerning Subject's past work for us and the reasons for our insistance that he was blown in the Congo. (A fact which he does not believe and therefore feels that the relationship was discontinued for other reasons.) Case Officer told Subject that he did not know and did not wish to know the details since in our job we are only told what is necessary for us to resettle the people for whom we are responsible.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 28 November 1962

TIME: 1000

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped by to see Subject, who seems to be in good spirits and busy making preparations to make application for a patent on one of his brain-storms.

Subject was told that the details of his case had been submitted to Headquarters, that we were now prepared to move based on Headquarter's advise. Subject was told that we can only wait for the answer from Headquarters.

Subject has requested a German typewriter which will be delivered to him some time this week.

S E C R E T

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 21 November 1962

TIME: 1000

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Dale informed Case Officer that he had taken clothing to Subject and had paid him subsistence as Case Officer had requested. He said that he had promised Subject that one of us would be by around the same time. He informed Subject that he could buy a scarf, a hat and a pair of shoes and we would pick up the tab.

Subject seems to be in good spirits but is eager to be on his way to South America or somewhere.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 16 November 1962

TIME: 1230

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer picked up Subject and took him downtown, bought him lunch and then bought him several items of clothing which he badly needed. Subject was greatly pleased ~~and~~ although he cannot understand why we are doing so much for him. Case Officer explained that he is receiving nothing more than any other case what we are asked to help. Case Officer said that we were told originally by Headquarters to help Subject in any way that we reasonably could and that we with the cooperation of Headquarters are doing just that. Case Officer said that as far as he knows now, Subject will be helped to immigrate to South America and that we hope to send a dispatch to Headquarters explaining Subject's case as it now stands and we hope to receive soonest Headquarter's advice as to the future course of action we will take regarding Subject. Case Officer said that he hopes to be in a position within a week or two to advise Subject as to what we can and hope to do for him.

Case Officer said that in the final analysis if we do not help Subject to immigrate and he is turned loose on the economy, we would not throw him into the street, that he would be given a period of time in which to find a job and an apartment and that it is usually our procedure to help financially, at least the first month's rent and an additional subsistence payment until he receives his first paycheck. Subject was greatly relieved to hear this.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 14 November 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

OHMS K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in to see Subject and pay him weekly subsistence. Subject was extremely nervous and very upset. He said that the apartment is so quite that it is impossible for him to do any work on his inventions. There is no gas stove so that he can solder, no telephone and the only clothes that he has are summer clothes which he was wearing when he came to us from the Congo.

Case Officer told him that we would try to get something out this week and hoped to receive some indication from Headquarters as to our next step. Subject begged Case Officer to come by as often as possible so he would have someone to talk to. Case Officer rpomised to try to return on Friday, 16 November.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 9 November 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1, Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped by to tell Subject that security advised us to move him before 1700 today. Case Officer told him he would be by after 1330 to pick him up.

Case Officer picked up Subject at 1400 and moved him to 51 Kuhwaldstr, top floor. Subject asked if he could unpack and spread out. Case Officer informed him that this apartment would also be given up, but he did not known when. He advised Subject not to spread out too far.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 23 October 1962

TIME:

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1 Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT , **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped by to see Subject and pay him subsistence for the week. He was advised that our legal department would possibly recommend a patent attorney if and when he needed one. He replied that he already had had an attorney recommended to him by a contact he had made during the course of developing his invention. Case Officer asked him for the names of the contacts which he had made and he gave Case Officer the following information.

He said he has made the acquaintance of a salesman representative for several factories specializing in small electrical devices. The mans name is Wilhelm Salzmann, whose address is Frankfurt/Main, am Tiergarten 52, telephone 492251. Subject said that this person had recommended a patent attorney by the name of Wilhelm Reichel, a Dr. Ing. Patentanwalt, Frankfurt/Main, Parkstr. 13, telephone 559165.

Subject told Case Officer that if he is lucky and his invention is successful prior to any definite arrangements we make for his immigration to South America, he will leave our custody and probably stay right here in Frankfurt. He said that he is aware he has commited himself to go to South America and will do so but all that he wishes to do if immediate success of his invention is not forthcoming, is to get a patent on his invention so he can negotiate at a later date from South America.

Case Officer feels that this is about the best we can expect from Subject. Case Officer has discussed this situation regarding the patent with John Morrison of the legal staff, who says that he will at least try to find out if this patent attorney is qualified and successful.

NOTE: Case Officer has learned that the patent laws in Germany are somewhat peculiar in that a patent attorney is a technical qualified man who can obtain patents on subjects in which he has specialized and for which he has received a specialized education but he is not an attorney in the sense that he can deal with any legal questions which arise in the course of patent procedures or litigation in patent matters. Normally, an individual who intends to get a patent will hire an attorney who will contact a patent attorney. Between the two of them they can handle all problems and procedures involving a patent. This also can be worked in reverse.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 16 October 1962

TIME: 1000

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1, Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in and paid Subject one-weeks subsistence.

He is still buzy with his invention and is firmly convinced that he will make a million dollars. Subject seems perfectly content to stay in our custody and has not mentioned his proposed immigration to South America. It is obvious that he wants to finish his invention and try to sell it. If he is unsuccessful, Case Officer feels that he will probably want to immigrate immediately.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 10 October 1962

TIME: 1030

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1, Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in and paid Subject 150 DM subsistence. He was told that we had finally received his Reiseausweis which means that for the first time in many years, he has legal documentation. The way is now clear for him to immigrate to South America.

He was told that Case Officer will send a cable to Headquarters, informing them as to the status of Subject's documentation and propose that steps be taken to begin Subject's processing for South America Case Officer said that he had several ideas as to how this should be done but in the final analysis would have to defer to Headquarters decision.

Subject asked if that meant he would be leaving soon. Case Officer told him it was his opinion that he would still be here in December.

Subject seems extremely content and satisfied ~~at the present, at least~~ with the status quo.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Tele 492-813

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 3 October 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1 Apt 9

ORMS K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

CO dropped by to see Subject and paid him his weekly subsistence. Subject is happily engrossed in his latest invention and no longer seems impatient to leave HARVARD hands. Case Officer told Subject that we had received his Beschluss which indicates that the German authorities will issue him a Reiseausweiss. He was told that next week Case Officer will notify Headquarters that his documentation has been received based on his story that he is a recent refugee. We will further advise them that unless they have objections, we will start his processing for South America possibly with the sponsorship of one of the refugge organizations.

Subject agreed to this approach although Case Officer believes that he is hoping he will succeed in making himself financially independent by selling one of his inventions. If this should happen, Case Officer is sure that Subject will ask for his documentation and leave HARVARD housing and go on his own.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 17 September 1962

TIME: 1600

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1:Apt.9

Orme K. Daronnat, Case Officer
Orme E. Daronnat

COMMENTS:

CO dropped in to see Subject and pay him subsistance. He is very enthusiastic about his inventions and since he is occupied is reasonably happy. CO ~~proposed to~~ promised to drop in later in the week.

21 September 1962

CO dropped in to see Subject to tell him that we were now reasonably certain that he would receive political recognition and his Reiseausweis. He was told that we are making good progress acquiring the information necessary for immigration and that soon he could start his processing. Subject is so wrapped up in his inventions that he seemed hardly to hear what CO was saying. CO sat him down and went over the events leading up to the present; that he had come to us for a job and when that had not been forthcoming had stated that his ambition was to be legalized and get citizenship by immigrating to a SA country. He was reminded that that is what we are striving to do but that we at this point are not sure how the immigration will take place. He was told that Hdqtrs may require that he immigrate on his own with us supplying the plane ticket and nothing more or he may possibly be helped by a refugee organization. CO said he did not know if or what kind of financial assistance would be given him. Subject said that he is grateful and wants to do whatever we desire

(over)

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: ~~1~~ 13 Sept. 1962

TIME: 1030

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1, Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat, **Case Officer**

Orme K. Daronnat

COMMENTS:

CO dropped in to see Subject and found him all hopped up about his latest invention. He prefeerred not to discuss it with CO but says that he is so sure that it is a money maker that he intends to apply for a German patent as soon as he works out all the details. CO told him that he should hold off as long as possible but in any event he should remember that his name is Georg Sanders and that any business he conducts should be done using his Hohemarkstr. address. 145.

CO may be wrong but he feels that Subject is agreeing to immigrate to S.A. only in the hope that we will provide him with a stake of some kind.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 5 September 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1; Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. Daronnat, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

CO dropped by to see Subject and found him working on his latest invention. He has given up working on the device originally proposed by CO since he does not have sufficient tools and because some ~~ttt~~ of the parts ~~are~~ must be ordered from the US. CO encourages him as long as it keeps him busy and helps to pass the time.

Subject has an extremely inventive mind and has explained several of his ideas to CO. They would appear to have commercial value. Unfortunatly Sugject has neither the money to develop them nor is he in a position to get involved with patents or manufacturers at the present time.

He seems reasonably happy with his present status but CO anticipates a hairy situation if upon applying for immigration to a SA country, the processing period takes a long time.

Subject finds that

Memo for the Record

28 August 1962

CO and Al Ph. met with Geo. L to discuss the Wirogue situation and to inform him what was being done or planned re Wirogue's resettlement.

Al reviewed the situation as it now stood and explained that Hdqrtrs proposal that Subject be issued a backstopped Fremdenpass was completely unsatisfactory since it would not stand up under anything but the most casual investigation. It was explained that Camp King had been ~~appraised~~ informed of only the necesaary details of Wirogues problem and had agreed that the approach should be cover story making Rogue a recent defector, an interview and political recognition. Geo. L agreed that this seemed to be the proper step and gave us the go ahead.

CO suggested that we have AFRF make official inquiry at the various SA Embassyesand Consulates for detailed material giving immigration requirements. This is deemed necessary because the information is not normally given out over the phone and Rogue can be trusted to give CO only that information which will serve his purpose. He is not above telling us that an immigrant musthave $ 5000.00 to be considered,etc. It is very important that Rogue have the right answers when he applies and is interviewed for Immigration. Geo. L agreed to CO's suggestions and proposed that CO have AFRF get started on this project soonest.

1400

Wirogue was taken to Camp King where he was 1st briefed on his story and then successfully interviewed. It is possible that Rogue will be completely documented within 2 or 3 weeks.

30 August

CO met with Gus E and Jack R and told them we were in need of detailed SA Immigration requirements.

They agreed to get out an official inquiry to all the consulates and Embassys and attempt to find out the followings

What documents are needed
What professions are indemand
How long is required for immigration processing
Does the immigrant need a certain amount of funds
Is a sponsor necessary or helpfull
What is the residence requirement for citizenship
What are the quota restrictions
Are there SA government agencies or private agencies who will help the Immigrant get started
etc.

Note: Rogue has already told CO that he cannot go to Argentina because he has "friends" there who would gladly turn him in to the authorities or make trouble for him in any way they could. Rogue prefers Vuenesuela if he has a choice.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 15 Aug. 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1, Apt.9

Orme K. Daronnat, **Case Officer**

Orme K. Daronnat

COMMENTS: CO picked up Subject and took him to lunch in the country near ~~Neu~~ Isenburg. Subject has been extremely edgy lately and it was felt by CO that a relaxing meal and 2 or 3 hours conversation might have a salubrious effect.

CO mentioned to Subject that if he were interested we might be able to find a radio or something along that line for him to build. Subject was very enthusiastic suggested that we get started soonest.

Subject was dropped off at his apartment and CO promised to come by as soon as he could find something to occupy Subject's time.

Subject was told that Hdqtrs had suggested Argentine for resettlement because they had no quota restrictions and were in need of technicians. Subject said that Argentine was out of the question since he had acquaintances there who would be happy to stir up any kind of trouble they possible could.

Subject suggests that he go to SA on a tourist visa. According to him it would be much easier after his arrival to apply for immigration since he already would be there. This reason is quite valid and sensible but CO knows that Subject has 2 quite different reasons for making this suggestion. 1. With a tourist visa he has visions of having us finance him from country to country until he finds exactly what pleases him and, 2. He figures that with a tourist visa he can return to Europe without having committed himself irrevocably to immigration statuswith all it's attendant responsibilities for settling ~~[illegible]~~ down, etc.

It is also obvious to CO that we cannot trust Subject to make inquiries himself at the various SA Consulates because he will tell us only those details which he wants us to know and unfortunately we hav eno way of checking since the Consulates will not give out information re immigration over the phone.

When the time comes CO feels that we may be able to get the information we need by working through AFRF.

Subject prefers Venezuela.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Tele 492813

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 8 August 1962

TIME: 1500

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1; Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat, Case Officer

COMMENTS: Harvard CO and Al P. from TSS went to see Subject and informed him that Hdqtrs wishes his resettlement to be accomplished on the basis of documents as legal as possible. He was told that we will start the action necessary to get him a Fremdenpass and we hope a Reiseausweis. We explained that we must work very carefully and thoroughly that when he applies for a visa he must be prepared to give all the right answers since the SA consulates and Embassies do not give out immigration material without discussing the matter with the interested individual.

Subject is a bit sceptical that ~~all~~ everything can be backstopped but is willing to play ball. Al took some preliminary informationfrom Subject and will discuss our problem with Camp King. CK has indicated that they might be able to help us get Subject resettled, particularly in Chile.

Subject is becoming extremely edgy and Harvard CO is hoping that that this case will start moving soon.

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 1 August 1962

TIME:

PLACE:

, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

---

1 August 1962 – Subsistence paid.

CO visited Subj at his apt and found him getting very restless over the delay in his South America processing. He stated he does not want to continue to receive support from us but wants to get someplace where he can start working and be on his own.

Subj stated that he called the German firm which expressed an interest in his going to the Congo and was told to have Geduld. He stated in very clear terms that he is tired of having Geduld and hopes that something will soon happen.

He mentioned again that he does not want to have the name dePaneshkhet. CO told him that when we get the go ahead on a SAmerican country we will discuss the whole document picture and related matters.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 25 July 1962

TIME: 1000

PLACE: [illegible]str 1/9

David [illegible], **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO visited Subj at his apt and paid him DM 100 subsistence for the period 29 July through 4 Aug.

Subj was told that a cable was received from Hqs indicating that the people are definitely thinking about his resettlement in South America and wanted to make sure whether or not he had a preference. That was why, it was explained to Subj, that CO called on 24 July and inquired whether or not he had this preference.

Subj mentioned that he had thought seriously about his name on his phony Austrian passport and concluded that if at all possible he would like to retain the name Rainer. CO mentioned that under no circumstances would it be Rainer and was glad when Subj didnot push the point. Subj mentioned however that when it is certain where he is going he will bring up the matter again.

To the list of documents he has previously claimed he needs (under his new identity) Subj added the International Drivers License.

Subj was most concerned about his future and asked all kind of questions to ascertain that everything will be laid on when he goes to South America. He brought up the matter of the officials in the S. American country sometime or another checking with the Austrians. CO replied that if anything ever comes up, the officials will not check with the Austrians but with the pertinent South American officials who will have been informed by us to make his entry and life in the new country a possibility. Subj seemed to buy this but expressed the fact that something could go wrong.

Before CO left Subj Subj informed him that he will go around to the Venezuelan, Chilean and Colombian Consulates and request tourist information.

WIROGUE, former REDSOX Agent Candidate and AF Division Agent, has been quitclaimed and resettled on the local economy. This dispatch covers the WIROGUE case from May 1962 to March 1964.

Subject arrived in FRANKFURT/MAIN on 22 May 1962 and immediately made telephone contact with CABEZONE. He had been guaranteed a meeting with a Fran KUBARK representative who, he had been told, would explore KUBARK employment possibilities for him. He in the meantime would be attempting to market a telephone answering device which he had invented, and conduct an investigation into the disappearance of 30 million francs which had been misappropriated by members of the Congolese Defense Ministry. KUBARK's reasons for establishing contact were dictated, however, by the need to relieve Subject of his KUBARK supplied false Austrian passport in the name of Reiner, the need to institute or suggest a course of action which would encourage him to establish himself as a contributing member of society and, above all, prevent his return to the Congo.

Subject was met by Stephen R. LACKLEN and Roscoe MOSIEN and put up in a safehouse. He was relieved of his documents under the pretext that they were to be photographed and he would not need them for the time being since he would be given an identity document for use during the period of time he would be in KUBARK custody. LACKLEN explained that as an administrative officer he was interested only in taking care of his immediate needs but soon however he would be introduced to one who's business would be to work with him in an attempt to resolve his problems.

Since it had been decided that Subject was primarily a resettlement problem, Orme K. DARONNAT of HARVARD was introduced to Subject. DARONNAT told Subject that he would be working with him during his stay in Frankfurt while we were awaiting word on whether or not his services were needed by the Government. Subject stated that his greatestwish was to work for the "Company". If this was not to be, he hoped he would be helped to legalize and immigrate to South America. He emphasized his obligation to complete his mission for the C.D.F. and claimed also he had to return to the Congo to conclude his contract even if we decided to employ him. C. O. told him our first order of business was to establish the need for his services and in the meantime he could attempt to market his invention.

HARVARD needed time to establish Headquarters interest in the amount and type of assistance Subject should be given. Also he was still an unknown quantity, restless, and from early cable traffic a potential troublemaker. In view of these considerations we were anxious to make his stay in Frankfurt reasonably pleasant and reduce his desire to return to the Congo; therefore, he was provided with subsistence and confortable quarters.

DARONNAT introduced David E. COULLIARD (MKTOPAZ) explaining to Subject that we would be wise to discuss documentation for him since a long time might elapse before we had the answer to Subject's possible employment with us and if the answer was negative, we should be prepared to take steps to legalize him. COULLIARD explained the merits of a Fremdenpass and a Reiseausweis; i.e., a Fremdenpass could be obtained without much difficulty but control and security would be limited to the time Subject remained registered at the place from which the Fremdenpass was issued. Therefore, the Fremdenpass might well be a short range solution unless Subject could get an immigration visa to desired country of resettlement in a short time. On the other hand the issuance of a Reiseausweis could completely legalize Subject, but would have to be issued on the basis of a false defection story and should not be done unless absolutely necessary. Subject stated that he hated Germans and no matter what happened would not stay in Germany. He suggested that he be helped to immigrate to the U.S., Canada, England, Australia, etc. C. O. told him that with his criminal record of arrest and imprisonment in France immigration to other than S.A. was out of the question and even this was in doubt. He stated if KUBARK employment was not possible he would hope to get legal documentation in the name of de Panaskhet (his brother's name) and take up legal residence somewhere.

By this time (June) HARVARD C.O. had an inkling that Subject was not eager to return to the Congo but surmised that his nuisance value might be such that he could parlay his position into something better. HARVARD C.O. felt that Subject's dislike for the Germans was real but was emphasized by him in order to benefit as much as possible from a prolongation of his new association with KUBARK. He also stated that he was willing to discharge any responsibility to the Congolese by mail, thereby confirming C.O.'s suspicion that he did not in fact want to return to the Congo and was only interested in prolonging his stay in FF/M and benefiting therefrom.

In July 1962 Headquarters advised HARVARD to provide Subject with resettlement assistance including help in immigrating to South America. Consequently, he was told that although we appreciated his past service the economy drive in Washington precluded employing him in any capacity. He was told that we were authorized to help him realize his stated desire to immigrate to S.A. but that we would not be able to "wave a magic wand" and have him settled there with a job and a rosy future. He was told we would help him in whatever areas we could but he would be expected to apply himself to the problem and drop all plans to return to the Congo.

Subject at this point was so discouraged by his inability to sell his invention, the realization that his services were not needed by KUBARK and weeks of inactivity that he willingly agreed to forego returning to the Congo and give up all documentation in the name of Reiner if something could be done to give him hope for the future.

Headquarters had recommended that Subject be resettled on the basis of a backstopped Fremdenpass; however, Clarance W. LEIBROCK (MKTOPAZ) and DARONNAT after much discussion of the relative merits of the types of documentation available, decided that only a Reiseausweis would stand up under the investigation of immigration authorities and in addition, it was felt that there was no guarantee Subject would be going to South America. Therefore, if he were required to stay in Germany for a prolonged period of time, it would be best to provide him with complete FEDREP recognition processing resulting in a Reiseausweis. A subsequent discussion with ODIBEX Camp King reps confirmed this reasoning and, with the concurrence of Acting Chief AD/FI, Subject was briefed by Camp King representatives and then interviewed for political recognition. He received political recognition on the basis of a fabricated story in which he purported to be a Georgian who defected from East Berlin while with a tourist group.

HARVARD felt that progress was now being made but a temporary setback resulted from a query initiated in December 1962 by CAVATA to OCA Liaison Officer Bonn requesting full traces, interrogation reports and all information available on Subject. David R. REINBOLD of HARVARD informed OCA by cable and in a subsequent visit to Bonn that Subject's name, George SANDERS, story submitted for recognition, etc. were complete fabrications to insure that WIROGUE received political recognition and a Reiseausweis. It was explained that WIROGUE was strictly a HARVARD agent resettlement case of no AIS ops interest and not a routine CABEZONE case. OCA stated that the political recognition interview story had naturally drawn the interest and attention of CAVATA.

OCA advised REINBOLD that CAVATA would be kept out of the case by being told Subject was of continuing AIS ops interest and HARVARD could go about its resettlement efforts.

Subject by this time had agreed to immigrate to any South American country with the exception of Argentina, where he claimed he had acquaintances who were not kindly disposed toward him. At first Subject suggested that he go on a tourist visa and apply for immigration status after his arrival. Although this suggestion was quite sensible and valid DARONNAT knew that his reasons were: 1) with a tourist visa, he had visions of having KUBARK finance him from country to country until he found exactly what would please him, and 2) he knew that with a tourist visa he could return to Europe without having committed himself irrevocably to immigration status with all its attendant responsibilities.

Available South American immigration data indicated that a prospective immigrant would have to have personal qualifications sufficient to make him an attractive prospect plus proof of financial solvency sufficient to provide self-support at the rate of $125 per month for two years. Headquarters approved the expenditure of $3,000 for this purpose and discussions with MKTOPAZ and Camp King resolved the necessary documentation problems.

Fully documented and armed with the assurance that there would be financial assistance available during his first months in South America, Subject applied at the local Colombian Consulate for permission to immigrate. HARVARD had hoped that letters of solvency and letters of recommendation would be sufficient to enable Subject to process with a minimum of red tape. This was not to be and Subject was informed he could only immigrate by processing through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).

This problem was discussed with a cleared official from Refugee Migration Section AMCONGEN, Munich, and the Chief of CAMANTILLA. HARVARD was informed that European refugees immigrating to South America are processed through ICEM thereby eliminating the need for individual countries to maintain immigration offices and welfare staffs. Unfortunately, since

ICEM is responsible for the immigration processing, it is determined to pass only high level types and, therefore, conducts stiff security investigations and gives detailed interviews and job testing to all prospective immigrants.

By now it was apparant that if the disappointments and frustrations connected with this case were ever to end a reappraisel must be made to decide whether or not to go ahead and subject WIROGUE to several possibly very searching interviews. There was also the possibility he would be interviewed in Russian (practically non-existant) and Georgian (less than fluent). With these language deficiencies we knew he would be immediately suspect if interviewed by any recent refugee from the Soviet Union. We were hampered by not being able to insure Subject's smooth processing through ICEM, and by the fact that if we did help him to process we would be making USEP, ICEM and CAMANTILLA a party to fraud with the danger of any slip-up causing embarrassment to KUBARK, ODIBEX and to the Federal Republic. We were not sure that the aforementioned risks were worth taking and the problems worth trying to resolve when it was obvious to HARVARD C.O. that if Subject did get to South America and became disenchanted, his first stop would be the local U.S. Consulate or Embassy where he would ask to see the KUBARK representative and once again force KUBARK to become directly involved in his personal problems.

In spite of the hundreds of hours of Case Officer time, the many discussions necessary to pull together adequate information regarding immigration, etc., HARVARD was faced with the realization that to prepare Subject for South American immigration could take many more months. We were faced with the fact that until Subject was provided with a detailed life history containing the information required by prospective employers and/or immigration authorities he was not in a position to be resettled anywhere, let alone South America. We knew a new approach would have to be tried if HARVARD was ever to be in a position to satisfactorily sever Subject's dependence upon KUBARK and reduce to a minimum the need for future contacts. HARVARD C.O. felt that Subject should be told outright that immigration to South America was not practicable under the present circumstances and what would be done would be to provide him with a detailed life history with enough factual information needed for the filling out of any future job applications, to stand up under detailed interviews, and, if immigration ever took place, to satisfy immigration requirements.

DARONNAT told Subject that any South American immigration thoughts should be shelved, that he should work and establish himself in Germany and if he intended to immigrate in the future he would have to do it on his own. It was pointed out that he would have to study and learn Russian, that any professed Soviet refugee arriving in South America without Russian would be immediately suspect by the emigres there.

ODIBEX authorities at Camp King had readily agreed that Subject's original political recognition interview story did not provide the proper framework around which a decent legend could be built. It was agreed that given a detailed legend prepared to HARVARD's satisfaction ODIBEX could prepare a new political recognition interview story and would remove copies of the old story from the various FEDREP files and replace them with the new.

HARVARD's problem was explained to Chief, Stage I, CABEZONE who assigned Gerald H. BESDINS to prepare a life story to include a detailed escape from the Georgian S.S.R. to Turkey.

By ____________________ 1964, an excellent legend had been written, a new political recognition interview story prepared and substituted for the old and to HARVARD's satisfaction for the first time since Subject had arrived in HARVARD's custody, the way was clear for a final resettlement. DARONNAT informed Subject that the time had come to part company, that he was completely legalized and documented and was now in a position to take his place in society. Subject was given his legend in German, complete legal documentation, one month's final subsistence and, since he had taken over a dropped CABEZONE safehouse, was given dishes and various items to set up housekeeping. He was quitclaimed and warned that he should always keep in mind the consequences of any action on his part which would result in having his fingerprints taken. (Subject has often expressed the wish to immigrate to the U.S. or even Canada or Australia and with his new identity could probably do so. He has been told that these countries do thorough security investigations and a check with Interpol would disclose his true identity. HARVARD has established that Interpol has no interest in Subject but we feel his ignorance of that fact provides us with some control over any steps he might take to emigrate from Germany.) Subject has been told however that there is nothing to prevent him from visiting other countries or even entering as a technical representative.

HARVARD as the final step in the WIROGUE case has arranged through [redacted] to be listed in [redacted] for Subject [redacted] so that any attempt to immigrate to any country will bring him to the attention of KUBARK and appropriate action can be taken.

In summary, everything has been done to insure Subject a successful future free from problems resulting from his "black" association with KUBARK. On the other hand, there is no reason for KUBARK to fear any future attempts by WIROGUE to return to the fold under veiled threats to reveal all. With his criminal background he is aware that he can be brought to the attention of French authorities. He also believes that KUBARK's position in the FEDREP is such that we have nothing to fear from any action on his part.

At the time of this writing Subject has a position as research and development engineer with a Munich firm. He allegedly receives DM 1500 per month, has an expense account and is to receive a percentage of all profits realized from the sale of any devices he develops. He expects to move to Munich permanently about the end of May 1964.

BIOGRAPHY OF GEORG FRANK SANDERS

1. IDENTITY:

   A. FULL NAME: Georg Frank SANDERS

   B. NAME AT BIRTH: Georg SANDERS, as featured in my birth certificate and all other Soviet documents. However, upon arrival in the West, I added to my first name the name of my father, Frank. While in the USSR when the patronymic was required, I was referred to as Georg Frankovich SANDERS.

   C. OTHER NAMES USED: I never used any other names but I was called by my mother by a Georgian diminutive 'Zhori', and by my Russian friends 'Zhora' or 'Zhorzh'.

2. BIRTH:

   A. DATE OF BIRTH: 25 July 1919

   B. PLACE OF BIRTH: Tiflis, Georgia, USSR. Tiflis is the old Russian name. The Georgian as well as the present official name is Tbilisi.

   C. NATIONAL ORIGIN: Georgian

3. CITIZENSHIP:

   A. AT BIRTH: Soviet. From 1917 (October Revolution in Russia) until 1921, Georgia was governed, from the downfall of Czarist regime, by Menshevists and partially occupied by Turk, German and British troops. Only in 1921 did the Soviet government in Georgia officially come to power. However, all persons born during this transition period were classified later as Soviet citizens.

   B. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: Stateless

4. RELIGION: Orthodox (pravoslavnyy). Being raised in a godless society, I practiced my religion to a very limited extent in my youth, and, due to existing conditions in USSR stopped going to the Church in my adult life.

5. SOCIAL ORIGIN: Intelligentia (sluzhashchiy); my father was an engineer, and my mother - a white collar worker.

6. **PROFESSION:** Electro-technician, an equivalent of German 'Ingeneur without diploma' (no college graduate)

   A. LAST OCCUPATION: Chief electrician (starshiy elektotekhnik) with MIKHA-TSKHAKAYA RTS.

7. LAST RESIDENCE: Shota Rustaveli Street (ulitsa), #25 (private home of my common-law wife, Nina GANDELI) in MIKHA-TSKHAKAYA, Kutaisi Oblast, Georgian SSR.

8. MARITAL STATUS: Single. From 1946 to the time of my escape I lived in a common-law marriage with Nina GANDELI, nee TAKTASHVILI, born 1920. When I first got to know her, she was married to a post-office employee but her marriage was an unhappy one. Her husband was much older and the marriage had been arranged by her parents, old fashioned farmers from a distant village who were happy to marry their daughter off to a relatively educated and well-to-do man. By the time I was drafted into the service Nina and I were lovers. When I returned from the war, I moved in with her for her husband had been killed in action during World War II and she lived, with her daughter born during this time, in a small home inherited from her husband. Her parents were dead, and she worked as a mail carrier for she had very little education. During the later years of our life together, I discovered that Nina was having affairs with other men. This caused frequent quarrels at home, and made my life unbearable. Finally, the woman became pregnant, and since I was positive that it was not my child, I decided to end our relationship. This was one of the reasons for my defection. I have no children of my own.

9. PARENTS:

   A. FATHER: Frank Simi SANDERS, born circa 1885 in the Baltic area, came to Russia proper circa 1910 and worked as a civil engineer in the Baku, Batumi, and Tbilisi areas. In 1918, he married my mother in Tbilisi. He died in 1924 of an accident at his place of work. I do not remember my father at all, but knew from my mother that he was a very good and kind man, and was well liked.

   B. MOTHER: Maria SANDERS, nee KANTCHELI, born circa 1885 in a small village near the Azerbaydzhanian border in Tbilisi Oblast. She was an only child, and when her parents died of old age, within a few years of each other, she moved to Tbilisi and worked as a clerk in various private enterprises until she married my father. After her husband died, she went back to work. She changed her place of employment several times and the only job I can remember was her last employment as a cashier with the shoe-repair shop (artel) on Sovetskaya Ulitsa in Tbilisi. She died in 1934 of a heart attack.

10. BROTHERS AND SISTERS: None at present. I had a brother Leon born 1923 who died some six months after his birth.

11. OTHER RELATIVES: I knew that my father had relatives in the Baltic area but our family had no contact with them and I did not know any of them. I had no close maternal relatives, and the distant relatives in my mother's home village had no contacts with my family disapproving my mother's marriage to a 'foreigner' of another faith. I never visited the home village of my mother.

12. CLOSE FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATES: I never had any real close friends, but I was somewhat closer to the following persons in town:

(1) Director of RTS, who was transfered in 1959 to Rustavi, Georgian SSR.

(2) Rayon veterinarian who had his office in the rayon veterinary clinic and travelled extensively in the rayon area visiting collective farms.

(3) Club librarian (a girl friend)

13. SPECIAL SKILLS: I like to invent gadgets and built up a relatively good home work shop

14. LANGUAGES: Georgian - native

Russian - from school and contacts with population in Russian speaking area and in the service.

German - from school and residence in Germany

English - from Technicum, home study and association with Americans in Germany.

15. FINANCIAL STATUS: None

16. EDUCATION HISTORY:

1927-1934 - Trudovaya Shkola #107 (10-year school, desyatiletka) located on the corner of Prospekt Mikhaylovskiy and Kirochnaya Ulitsa, in Tbilisi, (Presently PLEKHANOVA and MARDZHANISHVILI Streets, respectively.) Prior to 1927, it was the German Real Gymansium, but although converted into a srednyaya shkola at that time, the instruction was conducted in German, until 1930 when it changed to Georgian. The majority of the students were Georgians. Russian language instruction was given two hours a week and Georgian - one hour a week, until 1930. I completed seven years at this school and then due to the death of my mother, entered a technicum where I would be given board and quarters.

1934-1938 - Tbilisskiy Elektro-Tekhnicum, located on Sovetskaya Ulitsa in Tbilisi, in a two-story building with a yard where the shops and the students' hostel were located. In summer 1934, I submitted an application to this school supplemented with the seven-year school certificate and a photo. In July or August I passed the entrance examinations consisting of Mathematics, Physics, written and oral Georgian and Russian and when I saw my name posted on the school's bulletin board I knew I had been accepted. I paid no tuition and was given a small stipend just enough for a bare living. The hostel accommodations where I shared a room with three other students were free. On the first floor of the technicum building, near the school office, was located a students cafeteria where meals could be bought cheaply. The food was of poor quality. The female students of the school lived in a small annex on the same street, two or three blocks from the technicum.

For four years I studied physics, mathematics, history, English, Georgian language and literature, Russian language and literature, and from 1936 or 1937 - Constitution of the Soviet Union. The general subjects were on a high school level. Specialized subjects given at the technicum were technology of metals, theoretical mechanics, strength of materials, electrical machines, electro-techniques, electrical gears (privody), electrical measuring instruments, drafting. The students were also given military and physical training. Classes ran from September to July of each year; summer recesses I spent usually in near-by kolkhozes in a group organized by the technicum to help out farmers with their crops.

Examinations were held twice a year, prior to New Year and at the end of second semester, and were graded by the following system:

5 - Otlichno (excellent)

4 - Khorosho (good)

3 - Posredstvenno (satisfactory)

2 - Plokho (bad)

1 - Ochen plokho (very bad)

The first three were passing grades.

In the spring of 1938, I took the final examinations, oral and written, and was issued a diploma. It was a one-page certificate and indicated that I had attended the technicum for 4 years. It listed the grades I had received on the various subjects and showed that I was graduated as an electro-mekhanic.

All graduates were assigned to various places of employment where they had to stay not less than two years. This is a form of repayment for the money which the government spent on their education. I was sent to the MIKHA-TSKHAKAYA M.T.S. which in 1958 was converted into an R.T.S.

17. EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:

1938 - 1941 and 1946 - until defection - - Mikha-Tskhakaya M.T.S. (Machine-Tractor Station), later converted into R.T.S. (Repair Technical Station) - Machino-Traktornaya and Remontno-Tekhnicheskaya Stantsiya, respectively. Mikha-Tskhakaya, referred to by the population simply as Tskhakaya, was the rayon center of Tskhakayskiy Rayon being renamed so after the famous Georgian Revolutionary Mikha Tskhakaya (the old name of the town was Akhal-Senaki and Akhal-Senakskiy Rayon, respectively). M. Tskhakaya was one of the organizers of the Georgian Communist Party. The town has now about 10,000 population and is located on the RR line Samtredia-Sukhumi (the main connection between Tbilisi and Moscow) with the junction to Poti, the Black Sea resort. The town is located between two large tributaries of the Rion River: Tsivi and Terakhi Rivers. On the latter, located a few kilometers from Mikha Tskhakaya, is situated a small hydro-power station where I was a part-time employee upon my return from World War II.

At the M.T.S. (which was in 1958 converted into R.T.S. after the machines and equipment were distributed to the local grain and grape producing collective farms with the sole responsibility of repair of these machines left with R.T.S.) I soon became the foreman of a small brigade of electro-mechanics responsible for the maintenance and repair of electrical parts for those agricultural and other machines. My starting salary was 400 or 500 rubles, ~~but it~~ was increasing rapidly and when I was drafted into the army, my salary was almost doubled by that time.

For personal reasons I returned to this town after my discharge from the service, and obtained my old job. I also got a job as electro-technician with the above described power station which supplied power for the town and the rest of the rayon. I was assigned this second job since there was a lack of qualified personnel after the end of the war. I worked in the second shift at the power station from 1947 until 1953 (when the position was filled by a young graduate of Kutaisi technicum) earning 700 rubles in addition to my basic salary with the R.T.S. Prior to my escape, my income was about 120 new rubles before deductions. I also had some additional week-end income from repairing electric household appliances, radios, etc., for the local citizens. The old currency was converted 10 to 1 in 1961.

18. MILITARY HISTORY

A. DRAFT BOARD REGISTRATION: In the summer of 1939 I received a notification from my rayon-voyenkomat (draft board) of my rayon and reported there on a specified date before the draft board, then I was sent in a group of other future conscripts to the rayon polyclinic for a medical check-up. I had lost the first joint of my left thumb and index fingers during an accident at the job, and when the findings of the medical examinations were reported to the draft board, I was rejected for active duty and deferred into the reserve. At that time my pripisnoye svidetelstvo (registration certificate) was exchanged for the military booklet.

B. INDUCTION DATE: On about 26 August 1941, I received a notice instructing me to report to the rayvoyenkomat on 27 August. I reported there and was notified to report for induction on the following day. Then I, with a group of either 80 or 100 conscripts from my rayon, was put on the train and via Tbilisi travelled to Baku, where the group was put in so called Salyanskiye Kazarmy (Salyany Barracks) located on the outskirts of Baku, on the highway to Salyany and the Iranian border.

C. BRANCH OF SERVICE AND SERIAL NUMBER: I served in the anti-aircraft artillery. I had no serial number (which is never issued in the Soviet Army).

D. BASIC TRAINING: I took basic training at Salyany barracks in Baku for a period of two months. One month I took the regular basic training, and the remaining month improved my qualifications as a car driver (I learned how to operate an automobile while working on electric detail on car repair at my M.T.S.). I can not recall the unit number where I went through the basic training. At that time the barracks were full of troops, basically infantry and artillery units which rotated quite frequently.

E. SPECIALIZED COURSES: One month's driver's training as mentioned above.

F. RESERVE STATUS:

Summer 1939	Rejected from the active duty for medical reasons and given reserve status.
Fall 1946	Discharged from the army and after submitting my travel and discharge papers to my Rayvoyenkomat was issued a new military booklet which contained an indication of my reserve status. I was never recalled for military training or duty of any kind after my final discharge from the service.

G. CHRONOLOGY OF MILITARY SERVICE:

In a group of other enlisted men, I was sent by train to the 2nd battery of the 253rd separate anti-aircraft artillery division (OZAD-ogne-zashchitnyy artilleriyskiy divizion). Commanding officer of the battery was Lt. VAKS. Commander of the vzvod upravleniya (administration platoon) of the division was Lt. ENDELADZE. Deputy divizion commander for political affairs was Capt. CHOKHA and politruk of my battery was Senior Lt. SAMARIN. Major Vlado (Vladimir) GURGENIDZE was the commanding officer of OZAD and in February 1943 he was also appointed the commander of the PVO (protivo-vozdushnaya oborona or anti-aircraft defense) in the town of Michurinsk. The headquarters of the division was located in Michurinsk, while the battery itself was stationed near the station TARASOVO near the settlement of Konskoye, 7 km. from Michurinsk and 6 km. from the six marshalling yards located at Kochetovka station. A higher HQ was in Tambov and was at first commanded by Col. CHERNYAVSKIY and later by Col. TSVETKOV, a demoted General.

When I first arrived in Michurinsk, I was assigned as a truck driver with the division's supply platoon (khoz-vzvod or khozyaystvennyy vzvod) commanded by Junior Lt. MAKAROV, but later I made the acquaintance of the above mentioned ENDELADZE, a countryman, and through latter's intervention was assigned as a personal driver to division commander GURGENIDZE, also a Georgian, who was later promoted to Lt. Col. and who kept me with him until I was discharged from the service.

H. PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS: After six months in the service, I was promoted to yefreytor (corporal), and at the end of my first year to Junior Sergeant. In 1944, I was made a sergeant.

I. DECORATIONS: None

J. DATE OF DISCHARGE: I was discharged from active military duty at the end of September 1946. I received my travel orders and per diem funds at my unit in Michurinsk and turned them in at my rayvoyenkomat. In 1955, I was given another medical check-up by orders of the voyenkomat and discharged from the reserve for medical reasons (same as before) and issued a so called belyy bilet (white ticket or permanent deferment from service).

19. RESIDENCES FROM BIRTH:

1919 - 1926	Several addresses in Tbilisi
1926 - 1934	Tbilisi, Kirochnaya Ulitsa #35, an apartment in a two-story house, formerly a private house, later taken over by the State ZHAKT (housing organization) enterprise. After my mother's death, I entered the local electro-technicum and moved to the students' dormitories.
1934 - 1938	Tbilisi, Ulitsa Sovetskaya, # not recalled, student hostel of Tbilisi Electro-Technicum.
1938 - 1941	Mikha Tskhakaya, Ulitsa Tsulukidze, #14. Here I rented a room in a private one-story house of a retired RR switchman, Ilya LORDKIPANIDZE, who had to rent a room in his house to boarders to supplement his pension. Ilya's wife, Keto (Catherine), for an additional charge took care of my laundry and cooked for me. The couple had no children of their own and treated me as their own son.

1941 - 1946	Army Service
1946 - 1962 (until defection)	Mikha Tskhakaya, Ulitsa Shota Rustaveli, #25, the private home of my common-law wife, Nina GANDELI. I was in love with her and had an affair with her before I went to war. During the war, I found out that Nina's husband was killed in action and decided to return to Tskhakaya to be near her. I moved in with Nina and continued to live with her without registering our marriage at the local ZAGS (registrar office for marriage, deaths and births). Although I insisted on legalizing our union, Nina was always opposed, being unhappy in her first marriage, and wanted to feel free to end the relationship at any time. For the last several years Nina, as I found out, was meeting other men during my absence from home. A rift between us developed and grew more and more with the passing of time. Being deprived of Nina's intimacy, I reacted by dating other girls. We were on the verge of separation many times but somehow made up. I tried desperately to resolve our problems since, when I still was very close to Nina, I made anti-regime remarks on several occasions and even planned a joint escape from the USSR. I was afraid to aggravate her too much in order not to push her into possibly reporting me to the militia. However, for some reason Nina did not want to break off with me completely, and one day announced that she was expecting a child and wanted to legalize our marriage. Since, I did not consider myself the father of the child and fearing black-mail by Nina, I decided to speed up my defection which I was planning anyway.

20. TRAVEL:

None except as described previously.

21. HISTORY OF ARRESTS:

In June 1962, I was approached by the rayon militia at my place of work and was taken to the militia offices where I was accused of being a long standing member of a Georgian resistance group and of making anti-government statements. Although I had actually made such remarks on occasions and was therefore guilty of the latter charge, I noticed that the militia did not have sufficient information on this subject and I denied all accusations. I could not figure out who was behind the report. After prolonged interrogation, during which I was extensively questioned on my biography, parents, army service, contacts, etc., I was released with the warning that I was not to leave the area for the time being and that I would be contacted in the near future by the militia. Except for this case, I was never arrested or detained by militia or security organs.

22. MEMBERSHIP IN POLITICAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS:

I never belonged to the Communist Party. I was urged to join the Komsomol in 1937 while at the Tbilisi Elektro-Technicum, and was sponsored there by two of my class-mates, each of whom had more than two years of Komsomol standing. I submitted the application to the local Komsomol yacheyka (cell) and at a general meeting of the cell members my application was discussed and I told my life story and answered questions put to me by the members. After I was accepted, I received my membership card in about two months from the city rayon committee of the Komsomol in Tbilisi after which I had to attend meetings and pay very small dues. I never held any official position with the Komsomol organization. When I left Tbilisi, I had to deregister from the Tbilisi organization and register with the local organization at my new place of residence in Mikha Tskhakaya (usually referred to by the local population simply as 'Tskhakaya'). The same proceedure had to be repeated upon my departure to and discharge from the army (deregistration from the old organization and registration at the new place). Upon my return from the army to Tskhakaya, I never registered with the local organization again.

When I started to work in Tskhakaya, I was automatically enrolled in the prof-soyuz (trade unions) where I was a passive member paying my dues (something like 1% of my salary) to the trade union organizer of MTS (prof-org) and attending the obligatory meetings from time to time. I never took any advantage of trade union members privileges such as the cut-rate accommodations in rest homes (putevka v dom otdykha).

23. CONNECTIONS WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES:

I never had any contacts with intelligence services. I was never approached to serve in any capacity for Soviet security organs.

24. DEFECTION AND ESCAPE:

A. MOTIVATION:

In spite of being born and raised in a Communist country, I, at an early age began to understand that real freedom did not exist for the individual. It was also clear to me that personal advancement did not depend on talent and integrity but on the degree of one's political activity. I analyzed the Communist lies seeing reality so different from the official propoganda. During and after the war, I met people who visited Western countries and was able to benefit from the particles of truth about a different life there from the even sometimes very carefully worded reports of those people. After I purchased a good radio of 'Mir' make in 1956, I started to listen intensively to foreign broadcasts. For a long time I cultivated the idea of eventual escape from the USSR where I had no relatives, no family, no possibilities for advancement and a decent life. My anti-government sentiments which developed as time passed became stronger and stronger, and it became more and more difficult for me to hold myself back and not to express them openly, which I did anyway on several occasions. My involvment with the militia and the unfavorable developments in my personal life accelerated my plans for defection.

B. TECHNIQUES OF ESCAPE:

On 25 June 1962, three days after my experience with the militia, I left my residence at 0700 as I normally would to go to work. I walked out of town toward Samtredia. I wore my regular clothing, had 80 rubles and a small hand bag. I did not want to take the train being afraid of militia surveillance. After I walked two or three kilometers on the highway, I got a ride on a truck from a near-by collective farm which was headed in the same direction. I got off the truck downtown in Samtredia and paid the driver one ruble, then walked toward the railroad station. Here I purchased the ticket for Batumi and boarded the train at 1150 arriving in Batumi at 1415. I found a safe place and slept until dark. I started off on foot from Batumi and followed the sea shore until I reached the old shooting range about 1 1/2 or 2 km to the south. Here I entered the water at about 2200 hours, after destroying my passport (the rest of my documents were left at home) and burying my clothing and bag. I knew from previous study of a map at home that I had to swim some 18 km. to Turkish territory. I swam all night and was not sure if I had reached Turkish soil, but being exhausted, I came ashore at about 0300 or 0400 hours. The point where I stepped out was on the gradient of a steep slope. There I saw the silhouette of a hut and went in. There was an old discarded electric motor in the hut. From the Russian description on the motor, I understood that I was still in Russia. I hid in the underbrush near-by and spent the rest of the night and the following day there. When it was getting dark, I climbed the slope to observe the area. I walked for a while hearing voices in Russian coming from the shore. I saw a dark object on the sea which resembled a submarine. I continued walking near the shore and around 2200 or 2300 hours I entered the water and started to swim 3 km off shore and then parallel to it. When I came into the range of a search light which swept the sea, I submerged. When I came to the surface the search light swept over me but nothing happened and I knew I had not been discovered. I continued to swim until I was completely exhausted, and several hours before dawn went ashore and hid in a cave opposite two big rocks in the sea near the shore. I remained there until morning. The next morning I climbed up the slope where I saw a stone structure resembling a grave. I went in and observed the land around me from a small opening. I saw a large village which I later learned was Kemal-Pasha. I thought at first that a minaret was an observation tower. I also presumed that this was the village of Sarpi, still on Soviet territory. I was very thirsty and climbed down the hill to a near-by stream to drink water. I met an 11 or 12 year old boy whom I addressed in Russian but the boy drew away from me. Being still not sure as to where I was, I walked in the stream for a while to hide my footprints. Then I hid in the underbrush until it grew dark. I came out and went around the village to its opposite end. There I entered the town and knocked on the door of a house situated on a hillside. I called out in Russian. Even though I heard voices and footsteps in the house nobody opened the door. I climbed on the roof of a sort of stable in the courtyard and spent the night there. Early next morning I was awakened by noises in the courtyard. I saw several women and two men. I approached them and tried to make them understand by sign language that I had come from Russia. Meanwhile, some persons carrying sticks and axes came into the courtyard. I again tried to explain that I came from Russia and wanted to remain in Turkey. The men took me to the military authorities in Kemal-Pasha.

When I dived into the sea in Batumi, I was wearing swimming trunks, a belt and a pair of fins. There was a clasp knife in my belt, a sack needle for stinging myself in case of a cramp, my money in a nylon bag, three bars of chocolate, a compass and two Phenamin tablets to increase my energy in a separate nylon bag. Except for the occasional search light in the sea, which I avoided by diving, I did not encounter any other obstacles on my way.

I did not inform anybody about my escape plans and did not receive any help from anybody.

From Kemal-Pasha where I was given some clothing, I was taken by car to Erzerum and from there by train to Istanbul refugee center. I was there about a week and was taken to Germany with the assistance of US authorities on Friday 6 July 1962.

25 DOCUMENTS:

A. PASSPORT:

I received my first three-year passport at #17 militia (passport desk) office of Molotovskiy rayon of Tbilisi, where I resided at that time. The passport was a single sheet of paper with my photo and biographic data on it. In 1939 I exchanged it for a new five-year passport at the Mikha Tskhakaya rayon militia. This passport was of a regular booklet form and along with my photo and bio data, had a stamp of propiska (registration with militia) which stated the date of my arrival in this town and my residence address. When I was drafted to the army, I turned in my passport and military booklet to the rayvoyenkomat, and picked it up upon discharge from the service. At that time I received a new five-year passport from the same militia office with the propiska showing my new address. In 1951, I exchanged my passport for the new one which was valid for 10 years and which was exchanged for another 10-year passport in 1961.

B. MILITARY BOOKLET (Voyennyy Bilet):

See paragraph 18. In the army I had a service booklet (sluzhebnaya knizhka) which I turned in to my rayon voyenkomat upon return from the army.

C. LABOR BOOKLET (Trudovaya Knizhka):

I never possessed one since it was issued by one employer and turned in to the new employer when an individual changed employment. I never changed jobs.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: AIROGUE

DATE: 5 July 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Osterdstr. 1; Apt. 9

Orme K. [illegible], Case Officer

COMMENTS: CO and Mr. Minor went to see Subject in response to a telephone call from him. His Major problem was that he was broke and needed money. CO gave him DM 100.00 to eat on for a week but Subject says that it's impossible to live on that amount.

It is obvious that he is getting edgy and wants some action from Hdqtrs. He was told that if anything is to done for him in S.A. it will require correspondence between our people in S.A. and Headquarters, that this will take time and there is nothing he can do but wait. Subject thanked us for our help and said he is sorry to cause us so much trouble.

12, 19, 26 July - subsistance paid.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

Tile #192813

SUBJECT: [illegible]

DATE: 28 June 1962

TIME:

PLACE: FFM Apt

David R. Reinbold
david r reinbold, **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO visited Subj at his apartment and learned that though the German firm in Dusseldorf is interested in his invention, it nevertheless has not committed itself and desires to study it awhile. Subject indicated to CO that he has no intentions to wait until the Germans make up their minds. He was obviously discouraged by his inability to sell his invention and realization he is no longer needed by [illegible].

As the result of the above he commented that he is now anxious to go to South America or to any country where we can assist him legalizing. He even stated that since he has no funds from the sale of his invention he is not anxious to return to the Congo and say goodbye to his friends. He stated several times previously that the only reason he would return would be to see his friends, that he has no business to take care of, and that he could handle the personal matters through the mail.

CO informed him that he would inform Washington that subject is now ready and anxious to go to S America. Subj then brought up the fact that the Dusseldorf firm which he visited was very interested in taking advantage of his Congo background and send him there as a business representative. At first he would go strictly as a private individual working for a business firm, but that his status would change somewhat once the German Government would sponsor part of the firm's activity in the Congo. He stated that he has no real desire to return to the Congo for a German firm since such a step would in his mind indicate that he no longer is available for us. He would therefore rather go to a place of our choosing and be available any time he was asked to serve by Uncle Sam. He commented however that in the event we delay his leaving Germany unduly (in his estimation) he may be forced to take the offer made by the German firm. He made it clear that he did not mean this as a threat, but a straight resettlement fact since by taking the job in the Congo he would at least have a job, whereas by going to South America he has no job in sight.

Memo to the File [illegible]

On 26 June 62 Subj called and said that he had gone to Dusseldorf on 22 June and is returning there for further discussions on his invention on 27 June. He stated that the people there are interested in his invention and he hoped that xxxxxxxx something could soon be worked out.

He commented further that the person he brought the letter to (letter of introduction mentioned in previous reports) is with a German firm which is interested in the Congo and in contact with Congolese officials.

Subj will call CO upon his return to Frankfurt on 27 June 62.

David R. Reinbold
david r reinbold

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 22 June 1962

TIME: 0930

PLACE: Ostenstr 1/9

david r reinhold, **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO met Subj at his apt and informed him that word was received from Washington that due to President Kennedys economy drive Subjs services were no longer needed. Moreover that we were highly appreciate of his past performances and devotion to us. Subj, who was very calm throught the entire session, took the news very well and stated that he had expected to learn his above fate.

He commented that now that he will no longer be in our employ he is virtually without means to support himself since the only funds he has xx are the amounts given him by Mr Murmann. He said further that unless he sold his invention to someone in Germany he not only would not be able to support himself but could also not pay for his fare to South America. (See below) It was xxxxx therefore agreed that Subj should now make every effort to sell his invention here and to this effect he was given his letter of introduction to the Dr in Düsseldorf where he hoped to go today. If this does not succeed he will attempt to contact a few of the large electrical firms (such as Siemens, Braun, AEG) in the Frankfurt area. CO informed him that we will give him sufficient time for him to discover whether or not He will or can sell his invention in Germany. During this time he was told he could remain in our apt and continue to receive his subsistence from us. Subj answered that since he will not be working for us in the future he is very anxious to make his own way and will make every effort to get his business taken care of as soon as possible.

Subj was told that in the event he is not successful in selling his invention, we would inform our people in Washington that he is without funds and request financial assistance, especially to cover plane fare wherever he is going. He emphasized that if he does sell his invention he intends to pay his own way.

(over)

CO further commented that while Subj returns to the Congo to conclude his business (and on the way stop off in Geneva and Brussels to take care of his matter for the Defence Ministerium) we would upon his return given him a new passport, probably a second Austrian passport, but in the name of [illegible]. We would moreover make xxx every effort to get him into a South American country where he, with a minimum of effort and difficulty could legalize and establish citizenship. Subj stated that he is or would be very thankful for this assistance. He then mentioned that he does not really have any business to take up for the xxxxxx Defence Ministry, that that was just a ruse to get him out of the country. Moreover that in the event he does not sell his invention he has no intention to return to the Congo since he will not have sufficient funds to pay for his retur trip to Germany.

•Subj promised to call CO upon his return from Dusseldorf.

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFFECTOR

SUBJECT: [illegible]

DATE: 19 June 1962

TIME: 1400

PLACE: Ostendstr 1/9

david r reinbold **, Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO visited Subj at his apt and paid him DM 300 subsistence (and meals) for the period 11 June through 30 June 1962.

Subj stated that the firm in Dortmund was not interested in his invention stating that they would have to sell it so cheaply they could not make any money on it.

Subj asked if there was anything new. CO informed him that the ways of Hqs are often strange to understand but that there is evidence that something is being done since a telegram was received inquiring whether or not he had any preference as to where he may prefer to legalize in South America. He stated that he did not care where he lived, the important thing being that he would like to work for us anywhere in the world. He even mentioned Loss where he claimed he could be of some use.

CO informed Subj that for future planning he would like to know that in the event we would assist him in legalizing in S. America, but informed he that he would no longer have a job with us, whether he could get along on his own. He stated that though this would make him unhappy he would naturally have to make the best arrangements possible.

Subj though concerned about his future and indicating that he dislikes sitting around doing nothing nevertheless was not over bearing or demanding.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 14 June 1962

TIME: ~~[illegible]~~ 1100

PLACE: Annex A

Orme K. Daronrat

Orme K. Daronrat, Case Officer

COMMENTS: Subject called to inform CO that he had heard from Dortmund regarding his invention but money had not been mentiondd and he was going there to see if he could get some action.

CO told him that Hdqtrs had informed us that they would try to have an answer to our questions and problems by the end of this week.

He was also informed that CO would be leaving on Saturday on vacation and that Mr. Minor would be working with him until CO returned. He was assured that Minor was aware of all the problems and knows the case thoroughly.

Subject might return on Saturday but if not he will contact Minor next week.

S-E-C-R-E-T

192913

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 5 June 1962

TIME: 1000

PLACE: Ostendstr. [redacted], Apt 9

Orme K. Darommat
ORME K. DAROMMAT, **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

Case Officer and a TSB Representative dropped in to see Subject and informed him that we had notified Headquarters the results of our discussion regarding documentation and had informed them of our and his thinking concerning this problem. He was told that there was nothing else to tell, that now we could only wait to get an answer with their suggestions. He was offered his old Austrian passport and identity papers so he could go to Geneva and Brussels to finish his assignment for the Congolese Defense Ministry. Subject said he was in no hurry to do this and therefore refused the passport, stating that he was hoping to hear from Dortmund regarding his invention within the next two weeks and this assignment he had to do could be done on his way back to Leopoldville. It is obvious that Subject's primary worry or concern is to get a job with us. Subject asked if his identity card could be renewed. Case Officer took the card and had it re-validated until 24 June and returned it to Subject.

Subject was also told that the cook would be taken from him for several weeks and that Case Officer would give him 100 DM to eat on. Subject was quite surprised and pleased.

Subject suggested that we investigate the possibility of his immigrating to Australia, Canada, England, etc. Case Officer said that his chances were nil, that the entrance requirements to these countries were extremely difficult to satisfy and that his best bet is probably South America.

Case Officer promised to return as soon as he had some free time or as soon as he heard something from Headquarters.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 29 May 1962

TIME: 1200

PLACE: 1/9 Ostendstr.

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

David E. [illegible]

Case Officer and [redacted] introduced as Mr. Joseph LORTON, went to see Subject with the express purpose of discussing the various possibilityes that might be available to document Subject as legally as possible.

Subject told CO that he had made contact in Dortmund under the name of de Panaskhet, whith a firm that was interested in his invention. They told him that since he did not have a patent this would pose a problem and offered him 5,000 DM for his idea. Subject told them he would give it to them outright for $10,000. Although they did not refuse his request, they told him they would think it over and discuss it with the boss and would have to make a patent search which would take up to 4 weeks. Subject told them to go ahead but not to try to pull any funny business since there were ways of proving that the idea was his and he could offer it to other firms. Subject will now wait to be contacted by this firm.

Case Officer told Subject that we had not heard anything from Headquarters regarding his re-employment by us. He asked if there was some way of finding out approximately how long it would take. CO told him this was very difficult, but we would see if we could make an educated guess.

Subject asked for a key to the mailbox since he will be receiving mail from his friends in Dortmund and possibly from the firm which he has contacted.

[illegible]

[redacted] then began discussing documentation with Subject along the following lines:

The type of documentation he would receive if any would depend upon the final decision from Headquarters as yet not received. We solicited suggestions from Subject as to solutions to the documentation problem. Apparently his immediate desire is to receive back his Austrian pass, finish his business in Europe and return to the Congo to clean up matters there.

The other or long range alternative would be, he would like to have especially if he is not employed by KUBARK, documentation of a legal nature in the name of David de Panaskhet with which he could surface anywhere in the world and take up legal residence. He himself suggested the possibility of our agency determining some South American country where suitable briberies are possible. He could acquire citizenship in a short period of time, if possible without his personal appearance there and acquire a passport from that country. Obviously this would mean finding some country where bribery would affect quick acqusition of citizenship and passport. He did not express any particular eagerness to accept German documentation unless he could get a Reiseausweis. We discussed the relative merits of a Fremdenpass and a Reiseausweis. We told him that if we could obtain a Fremdenpass with a minimum of change in his true life story, but the acquisition of a Reiseausweis would mean telling a big lie, which he personally took a dim view, but said he would do it if necessary. We said we thought we could get him a Fremdenpass without too much difficulty from controlled authorities but the effect of control and security of this passport would be limited to the time he remained registered at the place from which the Fremdenpass was issued. Therefore, the issuance of a Fremdenpass might well be a short range/ solution only unless he could obtain an immigration visa to the desired country of resettlement without a six-month period. In any event, the decision to obtain a Fremdenpass would rest on the decision made by Headquarters as to the final disposition of his case. In the event a Fremdenpass was to be obtained Subject was requested to sign all necessary forms and submit all necessary information for the completion of these forms, which he did. He was reassured again that no steps will be made to acquire a Fremdenpass without prior consultation with him.

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: **WIROGUE**

DATE: 24 May 1962

TIME: 1100 hours

PLACE: Ostendstrass

OKD

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

LACKLEN introduced DARONNAT as Mr. Murmann and explained that he would now be working with Subject. On the way to lunch DARONNAT explained that he and Subject would be working together to resolve whatever problems Subject might have. During lunch, conversation was limited mostly to Subject's views on the Congo situation and the solutions. He also expounded at great lengths on the ~~matter~~ nature of the Congolese and the Belgians whom he would appear to dislike intensely.

Upon return to the apartment Subject was told that we would like to get him West German documentation with political recognition. He was told that if we are successful he would be documented as legally as possible under the circumstances and would be in a position to begin a new life. Subject was very pleased but a bit skeptical that we could accomplish this. He was asked to think carefully about his desire to use the name David de Panaskhet since, if he was wanted for breaking parole in France, there could be a watch list for that name and it could be assumed that since Panaskhet was his brother's name, Subject might assume that name some day. Subject stated that someone was confused about his status in France, that he was not on parol and had, therefore, not done anything wrong in leaving the country. He said that the worst that could happen if he returned there would be for the authorities to ask him why he had left the town he had been confined to. His answer would be that since they had restricted his movements he had left the country (C. O. doubts that this is true but ~~would~~ did not raise any questions).

Subject was given a DRC identity card, number 596, in the name of David de Panaskhet. Since HARVARD is awaiting Headquarters proposal regarding Subject's resettlement, C. O. suggested that he investigate the possibility of marketing his telephone answering device.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Subject stated that a woman friend of his in Dortmund knew him by his Russian name but if he visited her she would ask no questions which would pose a security or otherwise embarrassing problems for us. The man he proposed to visit in Dusseldorf to whom he had a letter of introduction, would have to be told his name is Reiner. C. O. told him to do what he thought necessary but to be careful since it would appear that his case was complicated enough without complicating it further. C. O. told Subject to call him when he returns from Dortmund and Dusseldorf.

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

DATE: 23 May 1962, 1000 to 1145 hours

SUBJECT: WIROGUE KUBARK OFFICER: Stephen R. LACKLEN

1. As requested by AD/FI, LACKLEN met WIROGUE as scheduled in the CABELONE apartment at 100 hours on 23 May 1962. Roscoe H. MOSIEN accompanied to witness the meeting and assist later if necessary, in reconstruction of needed facts.

2. LACKLEN told WIROGUE that ~~he~~ had been sent a message to Washington with the highlights of the 22 May meeting. He said that this message probably could not be acted upon prior to 23 May due to the time difference between Washington and Frankfurt. He was advised that while we hope for some word today it was more probable we would not get an answer prior to 24 May. WIROGUE said that he understood the time delays in awaiting replies from Washington and expressed his satisfaction with our efforts to assist him.

3. LACKLEN told him the documents which he had loaned us were being photographed and would be returned to him as soon as possible. WIROGUE said he was in no hurry for his documents and for us to keep them as long as we needed them. He said he hated being couped up in this apartment and hoped that we could give him an interim pass which would permit him to go out on the street in Frankfurt. LACKLEN said that he was trying to obtain this pass as soon as possible, the photo WIROGUE gave 22 May was not proper with thw sport shirt and that he would have MOSIEN take more pictures the afternoon of 23 May with coat and tie. for the pass. LACKLEN explained that the delay in issuing the pass was simply getting another operational activity to release one of their cover passes for WIROGUE. LACKLEN assured him that we were moving as rapidly as possible and would make every effort to have a pass for him by 1700 23 May. LACKLEN said if this was not possible he would phone him at 1700 and probably have the pass the following morning, the morning of 24 May. WIROGUE agreed.

4. WIROGUE said that he wanted to travel to Dortmund and Dusseldorf to talk to people there about his telephone answering device. He would like to have a pass to facilitate this trip which would take two or three days. LACKLEN suggested WIROGUE "sit tight" until we had some information from Washington before making this trip. In this exchange of conversation WIROGUE mentioned that he preferred not to use his Austrian passport in Germany. LACKLEN took this entree and asked WIROGUE why didn't he get a real passport as it was obvious WIROGUE felt the Austrian passport was reaching the end of its usefulness. WIROGUE said he wanted more than anything else to legalize himself in any country, even the Congo. He said that he knew US citizenship was impossible because of his criminal record. LACKLEN asked him if he had ever considered German citizeship. (NOTE: In the discussion of a permanent recognition document, LACKLEN deliberately confused the terms economic recognition, citizehsip, political recognition,etc.) WIROGUE was not willing to spend the required five years residency in Germany to attain citizeuship or for that matter in any other country. LACKLEN mentioned that some German documentation might be obtainable, however, he knew

nothing about this. LACKLEN said that certainly with the large numbers of refugees that have come to West Germany in the past 15 years, there must be some means of getting documentation. LACKLEN said if WIROGUE would officially ask him for German recognition that he would forward this request to Washington. LACKLEN made it very clear that we here in Germany could make no commitments, could do nothing on this matter or make another move on this case until we hear from Washington. WIROGUE said he clearly understood this and asked for German documentation in exchange for his Austrian passport, etc.

5. Later in the conversation WIROGUE mentioned he had a moral obligation to carry out his assignment for the Congolese army here in Europe and said he must give them some information by mail withing three weeks. LACKLEN asked WIROGUE how would a German recognition affect his dealings with the Congolese army. WIROGUE said he must return to the Congo for two or three days to conclude his contract with them. He would require his Austrian passport for this.

6. Throughout the conversation WIROGUE used the words,"if "the service" does not have anything for me." It is LACKLEN's opinion that WIROGUE believes it quite possible that KUBARK may not have an assignment for him and that if we can provide him with usable recognition documentation he might be officially cut ~~effectively~~ terminated. The one problem still unclear, however, is how to obtain his agreement not to return to the Congo. The matter that we retain his Austrian passport will prevent him from returning to the Congo, but it will be very desirable to find a plausible reason by which we can make him see he must not return to the Congo.

7. LACKLEN requested and WIROGUE agreed to remain in the apartment until the pass could be obtained. LACKLEN arranged for a maid to come in and cook his meals. French magazines were provided. It is believed he will be content in the apartment through 24 May.

8. Throughout the meeting WIROGUE continually expressed his views on the Congo, documentation procedures and techniques, etc. LACKLEN suggested that he had very useful information that might be of interest to an expert in these fields and asked if he would be agreeable to talking with someone. WIROGUE said he would be very pleased to do so. LACKLEN made this pitch as a contingency by which we might tie up WIROGUE for several days in "important" debriefings and delay his pressing for an immediate solution. We might also describe delays as being caused by Washington bureaucracy, something of which he claims to be very familiar with. During these debriefings it would be possible also to learn the extent fo his knowlegeability of KUBARK operations, personalities, etc. LACKLEN believes WIROGUE has quite an extensive knowledge of KUBARK. He has been handled by many people, in many places and in many ways.

9. Concerning WIROGUE's request that we ask Washington approval to explore the possibility of obtaining German recognition for him, he requested that if documentation could be obtained he would like it in the name of "David De Panaskhot". He said this was his brother's legal name in France. WIROGUE suggested also that the document include that he was also known previously as "David Teitzichvili" which is his real and true name from birth.

10. WIROGUE continued to show a complete satisfaction and contentment with our handling of his case so far. LACKLEN reiterated that we were "rolling along" as rapidly as possible and would make every effort to get an early reply from Washington. To further "substantiate" our desire to give him every assistance, LACKLEN offered to furnish him with the addresses of the Telefunken, Grundig and other electric factories in West Germany where he might sell his invention. WIROGUE said he would appreciate this, but that he also had letters of introduction to several firms in Dortmund and Dusseldorf. At the conclusion of the meeting, LACKLEN summed up the timetable for action as follow:

a. MOSIEN would return at about 1400 today to take needed pass photos and bring him some French reading material. ~~[illegible]~~ WIROGUE agreed to remain in the apartment until such a pass was available. LACKLEN would do his best to get it by 1700 today, but if not, early on 24 May.

b. When a pass was available WIROGUE could work out arrangements to go to ~~[illegible]~~ Dortmund, etc., however, it may be that his debriefing on the Congo, on documentation, etc. was of sufficient importance that he should be debriefed immediately.

c. To make his stay in the apartment as comfortable as possible he should suggest to the maid the types of foods he particularly enjoys.

d. We would continue to press Washington for authority needed to resolve his case.

11. WIROGUE understood the program and was quite satisfied. He is cooperative and LACKLEN believes will continue to be so as long as a logical and plausible program is presented. LACKLEN's next contact with WIROGUE will be by telephone at 1700 hours on 23 May when he will tell him the pass is not ready and arrange for another contact at 1030 hours on 24 May.

Stephen R Lacklen
STEPHEN R. LACKLEN

RYBAT
SECRET

CONTACT REPORT 22 MAY 1962

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE phoned Mr. Schneider (HORDWIN) at FC 553001 at 1420 hours 22 May advising that he was at the Frankfurt Main Bahnhof and wished to meet Mr. Schneider. Mr. Schneider requested WIROGUE call back in ten minutes. HORDWIN advised Acting AD/FI that WIROGUE was in Frankfurt and requested what action was desired. Acting AD/FI advised HORDWIN to arrange pick up, billet subject in CABEZONE blown apartment and await further instructions. HORDWIN advised WIROGUE when he called back that Mr. Miller (LACKLEN) would meet him at 1500 hours at Track 15, Main Bahnhof. At Acting AD/FI's request LACKLEN first reported to his office to review passport photograph of WIROGUE and get further instructions. Acting AD/FI instructed LACKLEN to take him to the apartment and if feasible, obtain the passport and with extreme caution elicit any information regarding WIROGUE's purpose for coming to Frankfurt. DOOS came through the office at this time and was advised that LACKLEN and CABEZONE were carrying out this task.

2. WIROGUE was met as planned. He advised that he had already checked into the Hotel Savoy across the street. LACKLEN believed it most feasible to obtain the passport if he were in a CABEZONE apartment. If he were in the hotel, he may be reluctant to give up the passport, etc. WIROGUE was concerned at first about burdening us by living in our apartment but agreed to do so. Stephen R. LACKLEN using alias Mr. Edward Miller and Roscoe MOSIEN using alias Mr. Dale drove subject in CABEZONE car to #1 Ostend Strasse, apartment 9. This nice one-bedroom apartment with kitchen and bath and a living room is regarded as blown and is scheduled to be dropped in Fiscal 1963. The telephone number there is 492813. Contact instructions given WIROGUE in a FRAN cable were Mr. Schneider's number FC 553001 (ops phone located in HORDWIN's office) and the Annex A Guard Post number Northern 8766 for after hours. Both of these numbers should be changed as soon as feasible.

3. As soon as WIROGUE was settled in the apartment, LACKLEN described himself as an administrative officer who was meeting him seeing that he got settled in the new apartment and attending to any of his immediate needs. LACKLEN made it very clear that he had no authority to give him any committments or resolve his case. LACKLEN said, however, that he would like

SECRET
RYBAT

to take back to his boss some general information on what WIROGUE wanted in Frankfurt. This led WIROGUE to begin a long discussion of his problems in the Congo and his desires for a new assignment with the "Service". LACKLEN was trying to build up sufficient rapport by letting him talk, to find an opening by which he could obtain the passport.

4. WIROGUE advised that he had come from Leopoldville to Brussels and was fortunate enough to catch a connecting flight 22 May to Frankfurt. He explained he was in Frankfurt to talk with some old contacts in hopes they might have a job for him. He asked if Miller (LACKLEN) knew Mike, LACKLEN told him no. He said that he had arranged with the Congolese Minister of Defense to come to Europe to attempt to trace 30,000,000 Francs (sic) - rate 65/1 US Dollar which had been given to the Ministry of Defense officials to purchase airplanes. This money had been deposited in Swiss banks and disappeared. He showed LACKLEN an Order de Mission dated 17 May 1962 signed by the Secretary General of the Congolese Foreign Ministry identifying him for travel for the Congolese Government to as many countries in Europe as necessary. WIROGUE sounded resolved to complete this mission. He claimed, however, that this mission was simply a cover for his Frankfurt contact with the "Service".

5. WIROGUE talked about himself for about an hour and a half. Some of the highlights of this are:

a. About the investigation - a Belgian citizen, who had been in the Congo before independence and who was now a colonel in the Congolese Army and close to General Mobutu had gone to the American embassy to "name-check" WIROGUE. WIROGUE said he was not worried about this investigation (NOTE: LACKLEN was not asking these questions, but simply listening to WIROGUE and attempting to lead up to the request for his passport). WIROGUE felt the only way this Belgian colonel could pin him down was by contacting the Viennese diplomat representative in Leopoldville and through him checking WIROGUE's Austrian passport number. He mentioned that his friends in the Surete and Department of Defense Ministry had asked him for a police certificate from Austria. WIROGUE saw no problem in furnishing this. He could fabricate this with no trouble and was confident it would be accepted because the Congolese officials would have no other such document to compare it with and had a practice of throwing records away.

b. LACKLEN asked WIROGUE what he would like to do, what type of work he was interested in. WIROGUE replied in a 30 minute presentation that he liked outdoor work with military operations like commando work. He liked to work inmilitary uniform or civilian clothes. He hated desk work. LACKLEN asked him if he would like to work in Communist China, Russia, Indochina, or Germany. WIROGUE replied by saying it depended on the job. He wanted a challenge. He said just give me a mission and I'll carry it out. Don't worry about his being arrested, killed or whatever, money was not important. LACKLEN again emphasized that he had no job in mind, but simply was trying to determine what WIROGUE was interested in, what his experience had been, and what he might be qualified to do. LACKLEN said that he would take this information back to his boss, who would have to contact Washington. We here in Frankfurt knew nothing about him and had no file of his experience.

c. LACKLEN asked WIROGUE suppose there is no assignment for you? What would you like to do then? WIROGUE continued discussing his interest in working for the "Service" and indirectly made it clear he was not interested in a normal job and life. LACKLEN asked him what country he was a citizen of. WIROGUE stated that he was stateless. LACKLEN asked him what country he would like to live in if he had his choise, if he could have anything he wanted where would he like to go what would he like to do in a normal life? WIROGUE replied he didn't know, but he hated Germans and [illegible] gave the impression that he was very content with his present status. At no time was it discussed or did WIROGUE mention employment, entry, or citizenship in the U. S. He also stated he could not go back to France due to some trouble which he then described as the bank robbery.

d. LACKLEN asked him if he was actually receiving a salary from the Congolese Government. He said he was making about 15,000 Congolese Francs per month and this was not enough to live decently on. He said his job in addition to this investigation he was conducting on the embezzlement of money that he was in effect the chief of the Congolese Air Force.

e. WIROGUE described his abilities in demolitions, commando work, liquidations, air operations and navigation and a general knowledge of "spy work". He also said that he was an expert on documentation and that he liked to work making phony documentation, water marks, etc. He also mentioned his telephone answering device which he made for $8.00 and wished to go to Dortmund, West Germany to attempt to market it.

f. During the course of the above conversation WIROGUE showed LACKLEN several documents to substantiate his claims of employment by the Congolese Government, etc. LACKLEN decided that the documentation interest of the "Service" in these Congolese documents would be the best entree to obtain his passport. LACKLEN attempted to display a shallow inflated interest in the water marks and stamps on the documents as an Admin Officer who had had a one week operational course and was really trying to get the documents to impress his boss. With each document LACKLEN commented about their simplicity and easy forging possibilities and how much the documents people would love to get ~~ax~~ their hands on this. WIROGUE loaned LACKLEN the following documents:

(1) Passport (Austrian) 090058
(2) Return Sabena Air Ticket 8096473 to Leopoldville
(3) Congo Drivers Permit
(4) Carte d' Indenitite D'Etranger
(5) ½ Pass from MINDEF/Congo re Technician Status (Civilian)
(6) Health Certificate
(7) Laisses Passer # 71-58. Congo Pass from Leopoldville to Brazzaiville
(8) Laissez Passer as Major, Congo Army
(9) UN Pass (access to Royal Hotel, Leopoldville)
(10) Congo Certificate of Vaccination
(11) Order de Mission (17 May 62) by Secretary General Foreign Ministry
(12) Order de Mission to Brazzaville to apprehend a man signed by Joseph MATUBA, 26 March 62

(13) Attestation he is Attache (Technician) Congo Army by M. Kalongo, Sec. Gen. Ministry of Defense 28 December 61

6. LACKLEN asked if he could borrow these documents so they could be photographed as he was sure they were of extreme value. LACKLEN said that inasmuch as these documents were WIROGUE's property if he insisted he would have someone photograph the documents tonight and bring them back as fast as possible, but

it would be preferable to have it done on 23 May during the regular working day. WIROGUE said that he was in no rush for the documents and please go ahead, take our time, but he would like to have them back within 48 hours. He then said what would happen if I went out on the street tonight without documents? LACKLEN said that he could possibly give him a simple identity card as working with the American Army here, but requested that WIROGUE stay in the ~~xx~~ apartment tonight, there was food there and we would bring in anything he wanted, such as magazines, etc. WIROGUE said that he was tired, that he would take a bath and stay in the apartment. LACKLEN said that he would return at approximately 1000 hours 23 May and if WIROGUE had any problems call the emergency number he was given.

7. LACKLEN observed as WIROGUE was going through his wallet, attache case and pockets for various documentation which he thought we would like to photograph, an approximate 9" x 11½" inch photostat black copy which identified as his birth certificate. During the course of the conversation, WIROGUE also said that he had a driver's license your people gave me with my passport and while mentioning his commission as a major in the Congolese army that he was able to obtain this rank by showing his German Army papers (sic). WIROGUE did not indicate whether these papers were given him or he obtained or made them himself. **

8. Incidentally, WIROGUE indicated he would go into Soviet Russia on his own, accomplish any mission we wished to assign him and return. All at his own risk, provided we would "help him". He also indicated exceptional interest in making phony documents, etc.

** LACKLEN did not ask him for these documents since they had apparently been provided by our "Service" and would be inconsistent with ~~xx~~ the story of the "Service's" interest in photographing Congolese documents, stamps, etc. It is believed that at the right moment WIROGUE could be taken elsewhere for lunch or some other excuse, that he would probably leave these documents in his apartment and we could take possession of them. However, when this is done and he misses them, the die is cast.

SUBJECTIVE COMMENTS BY LACKLEN

1. LACKLEN feels his approach as a personnel officer representing his boss, trying to get facts which might be helpful in finding out what could be done to help WIROGUE was effective in establishing a proper rapport with him. LACKLEN repeatedly emphasized that he lacked authority, information, etc to make any committments or be any more than an intermediary to his boss, who himself was an intermediary with Washington. LACKLEN emphasized his "sincere" interest in helping WIROGUE.

2. LACKLEN believes WIROGUE has been very satisfied with his first contact in Frankfurt and will be cooperative until we advise him his passport, etc, will not be returned.

3. WIROGUE impresses LACKLEN as being the man described and possessing the personality and other traits described in the cables. It is believed that he can be a dangerous and difficult individual when "crossed". It is suggested that a clear course of action be established prior to advising WIROGUE his documents are not being returned as it is quite likely WIROGUE has planned or will plan his own course of action.

4. LACKLEN believes that WIROGUE can be delayed for two, three, four, or even more days with the story these documents, the stamps are terrific, "our people" are really excited about them and we would like to keep them longer, we would like to send them to Washington, etc. It may be that WIROGUE could be given an identification card similar to but not identical with xx those provided defectors describing the individual as in Army custody as an interim measure and clearly marked with an expiration date.

5. It may be important to note that prior to meeting WIROGUE LACKLEN had only read FRAN 0404 and made a 30 second perusal of LEOP 3939 and DIR 11783. LACKLEN did really not retain any data from the two incoming messages and certifies that he did not lead WIROGUE in the conversation but simply let him talk with xx the purpose of establishing rapport and obtaining the passport if possible.

6. At approximately 1755 hours LACKLEN returned to the DCOS's office and briefed the DCOS and Acting AD/FI on the meeting. Acting AD/FI sent an Ops immediate cable to LEOP DIR and routine toR FROB. A meeting was scheduled in the AD/FI office at 0830 23 May. Acting AD/FI's request LACKLEN notified Deputy Chief MKTOPAZ to attend the meeting. Axxix Deputy Chief MKTOPAZ came to CABEZONE at 1945 hours 22 May and inspected documents. Acting Chief, CABEZONE was advised.

Stephen R. Lacklen

LEBENSLAUF VON GEORG FRANK SANDERS

1. IDENTITÄT:

   A. VOR- UND NACHNAME: Georg Frank SANDERS

   B. NAME BEI GEBURT: Georg SANDERS, wie ersichtlich aus meinem Geburtsschein und allen anderen sowjetischen Dokumenten. Bei Ankunft in den Westen habe ich jedoch den Namen meines Vaters, Frank, meinem Vornamen beigefügt. In den USSR, als das Führen des Vatersnamens verlangt war, wurde ich Georg Frankovich SANDERS genannt.

   C. ANDERE NAMEN: Ich habe niemals irgendwelche andere Namen benützt, aber meine Mutter hat mich mit der georgischen Abkürzung meines Namens "Zhori" gerufen und meine russischen Freunde haben mich "Zhora" oder "Zhorzh" genannt.

2. GEBURT:

   A. GEBURTSDATUM: 25. Juli 1919

   B. GEBURTSORT: Tiflis, Georgien, USSR. Tiflis ist der alte russische Name. Der georgische Name als auch der gegenwärtige offizielle Name ist Tbilisi.

   C. NATIONALITÄT: Georgier

3. STAATSBÜRGERSCHAFT:

   A. BEI GEBURT: sowjetische. Von 1917 (Oktober Revolution in Russland) bis 1921 war Georgien nach dem Fall des zaristischen Regimes von Menschewiken regiert und teilweise von türkischen, deutschen und britischen Truppen besetzt. Erst 1921 kam in Georgien die sowjetische Regierung offiziell an die Macht. Jedoch wurden alle Personen die während dieser Übergangszeit geboren wurden später als Sowjetbürger anerkannt.

B. GEGENWÄRTIGE STAATSBÜRGERSCHAFT: Staatenlos

4. RELIGION: Orthodox (pawoslawni). Da ich in einer gottlosen Gesellschaftsordnung aufwuchs habe ich meine Religion in meiner Jugend nur sehr begrenzt ausgeübt und habe später als Erwachsener vollkommen aufgehört in eine Kirche zu gehen wegen der bestehenden Bedingungen in den USSR.

5. GESELLSCHAFTLICHER URSPRUNG: Intelligenz (slushaschtschi); Mein Vater war ein Ingenieur und meine Mutter gehörte zur Gruppe der Kopf-Arbeiter.

6. Beruf: Elektro-Techniker, das würde ungefähr in Deutschland einem Ingenieur ohne Diplom, d. h. ohne Universitätsbildung, entsprechen.

A. LETZTE STELLUNG: Chef Elektriker (starschi elektotechnik) bei MICHA- ZCHAKAJA RTS.

7. LETZTER WOHNORT: Sdota Rustaveli Strasse (ulitsa) Nr. 25 (Wohnung meiner Lebensgefährtin Nina GANDELI) in MICHA-ZCHAKAJA, Kutaisi Oblast, Georgien SSR.

8. EHESTAND: Ledig. Seit 1946 bis zu meiner Flucht lebte ich mit Nina GANDELI zusammen, geboren 1920, Mädchenname TAKTASCHWILI. Als ich sie kennenlernte war sie mit einem Postangestellten unglücklich verheiratet. Ihr Mann war viel älter als sie und die Ehe war von ihren Eltern geplant worden. Die Eltern waren altmodische Bauern von einem entlegenen Dorf die froh waren ihre Tochter mit einem verhältnismässig gebildeten und wohlhabenden Mann zu verheiraten. Zu dem Zeitpunkt da ich in die Armee einberufen wurde war Nina meine Geliebte. Als ich aus dem Krieg zurück kam zog ich zu ihr, da ihr Mann im Zweiten

Weltkrieg gefallen war. Sie lebte mit einer Tochter, die währendessen geboren worden war,in einer bescheidenen Wohnung die sie von ihrem Mann geerbt hatte. Ihre Eltern waren tot und sie arbeitete als Briefträgerin da sie nur eine bescheidene Ausbildung genossen hatte. Während der letzten Jahre unseres Zusammenlebens fand ich heraus, dass Nina Beziehungen zu anderen Männern unterhielt. Das war der Anlass zu Streitigkeiten und das Zusammenleben wurde unerträglich. Dann erwartete sie ein Kind und da ich sicher war, dass es nicht mein Kind war, entschloss ich mich unsere Beziehungen zu beenden. Das war mit ein Grund für meine Flucht. Ich habe keine eigenen Kinder.

9. ELTERN:

A. VATER: Frank Simon SANDERS, geboren ungefähr 1885 im Baltikum; er kam ungefähr 1910 ins russische Gebiet. Er arbeitete als Ingenieur in Baku, Batumi und Tbilisi Gebiet. Er starb 1924 an den Folgen eines Arbeitsunfalls. Ich kann mich an meinem Vater nicht mehr erinnern, aber ich lernte von meiner Mutter, dass er ein guter und gütiger Mann war der allgemein beliebt war.

B. MUTTER: Maria SANDERS, Mädchenname KANTSCHELI, geboren ungefähr 1885 in einem kleinen Dorf in der Nähe der aserbaidshanischen Grenze im Tbilisi Oblast. Sie war das einzige Kind;als ihre Eltern im hohen Alter innerhalb weniger Jahre starben zog sie nach Tbilisi und arbeitete in Büros von verschiedenen privaten Unternehmungen, bis sie meinen Vater heiratete. Nachdem ihr Mann starb fing sie wieder an zu arbeiten. Sie wechselte ihre Arbeitsstelle verschiedene Male und die einzige Arbeitsstelle an die ich mich erinnere war die letzte Stelle die sie innehatte als Kassiererin in einem Schuhreparatur-Geschäft (artel) in der Sowetskaja Ulitsa in Tbilisi. Sie starb 1934 an einem Herzschlag.

10. GESCHWISTER: Keine Lebenden. Ich hatte einen Bruder Leon der 1923 geboren wurde und 6 Monate nach der Geburt starb.

11. ANDERE VERWANDTE: Ich weiss, dass mein Vater im Baltikum Verwandte hatte, aber unsere Familie hatte keinen Kontakt mit ihnen und ich kannte niemanden. Ich hatte keine nahen Verwandten mütterlicherseits und die entfernten Verwandten in dem Heimatdorf meiner Mutter unterhielten keinen Kontakt mit meiner Familie da sie die Ehe meiner Mutter mit einem "Ausländer" eines anderen Glaubens ablehnten. Ich habe das Heimatdorf meiner Mutter niemals besucht.

12. NAHE FREUNDE UND BEKANNTE: Ich hatte niemals nahe Freunde aber ich stand den folgenden Personen in der Stadt etwas näher:

(1) Direktor von RTS, der 1959 nach Rustavi in Georgien SSR versetzt wurde.

(2) Rayon Tierarzt, der sein Büro in der tierärztlichen Klinik des Rayons hatte und der viel im Rayon herumreiste um dort die Bauern zu besuchen.

(3) Bibliothekarin des Klubs (eine Freundin)

13. BESONDERE BEFÄHIGUNGEN: Ich liebe es kleine Dinge zu erfinden und mir im eigenen Heim eine gute Werkstatt einzurichten.

14. SPRACHEN: Georgische Sprache - Muttersprache

Russisch - von der Schule und durch Kontakt mit der Bevölkerund in russisch sprechenden Gebieten und als Soldat.

Deutsch - von der Schule und durch Aufenthalt in Deutschland

Englisch - Von der technischen Schule und durch meinen Kontakt mit Amerikanern in Deutschland

15. FINANZIELLE LAGE: keine

16. AUSBILDUNG:

1927-1934 - Trudowaja Schkola Nr. 107 (10- Jahre Schule, desyatiletka) die sich an der Ecke von Prospekt Michailowskiy und Kirochnaja Ulitsa in Tbilisi befand. (Zur Zeit heissen die Strassen PLECHANOVA und MARDSHANISCHWILI). Vor 1927 war es das deutsche Realgymnasium und obwohl es in eine srednjaja schkola umgewandelt worden war wurde der Unterricht bis 1930 in Deutsch abgehalten und erst von diesem Jahr an in der georgischen Sprache. Die Mehrzahl der Schüler waren Georgier. Bis 1930 gab es zwei Stunden in der Woche russischen Sprachunterricht und eine Stunde georgischen Sprachunterricht. Ich war sieben Jahre in dieser Schule aber wegen des Todes meiner Mutter wechselte ich auf die technische Schule über da ich dort wohnen konnte und verpflegt wurde.

1934-1938 - Tbiliskii Elektro-Technicum in der Sowetskaja Ulitsa in Tbilisi, ein zwei-stöckiges Gebäude mit Gärten wo die Werkstätten und Wohnheime untergebracht waren. Im

Sommer 1934 suchte ich um Aufnahme in dieser Schule an und überreichte das Schulzeugnis der sieben absolvierten Jahre und ein Photo. Im Juli oder August bestand ich die Aufnahmeprüfung über Mathematik, Physik und schriftliche und mündliche Prüfungen in georgischer und russischer Sprache. Als mein Name auf der Aushängetafel der Schule aufschien wusste ich, dass ich bestanden hatte. Ich musste kein Schulgeld bezahlen und bekam ein Stipendium welches gerade alles lebensnotwendige deckte. Der Aufenthalt im Schulheim, wo ich ein Zimmer mit drei anderen Studenten teilte, war frei. Im ersten Stock des Technikums, in der Nähe des Schulbüros, war ein Speisesaal wo man billig essen konnte. Das Essen war schlecht. Die weiblichen Studenten lebten in einem Nebengebäude in derselben Strasse, zwei oder drei Häuserblocks vom Technikum.

Vier Jahre studierte ich Physik, Mathematik, Geschichte, Englisch, georgische Sprache und Literatur; von 1936 oder 1937 an die Verfassung der Sowjet Union. Die Gegenstände wurden auf dem Stand einer"Höheren Schule" gelehrt. Dann gab es noch die folgenden spezialen Unterrichtsgegenstände: Technologie der Metalle, Theorie der Mechanik, Materialstärke, Elektro-Maschinen,elektrische Arbeitsverfahren, Elektro-Geräte, elektrische Messinstrumente, Zeichnen. Die Studenten wurden auch militärisch ausgebildet und körperlich ertüchtigt. Der Unterricht dauerte von September bis Juli. Die Sommerferien verbrachte ich gewöhnlich auf einem Kolchos mit einer Gruppe,die vom Technikum organisiert worden war, um den Bauern mit der Ernte zu helfen.

Die Prüfungen fanden zwei mal im Jahre statt, vor dem Jahresende und am Ende eines zweiten Semesters. Noten wurden nach dem folgenden System gegeben:

5 - Otlitschno (sehr gut)
4 - Choroscho (gut)
3 - Posredstwenno (genügend)
2 - Plocho (schlecht)
1 - Otschen plocho (sehr schlecht)

Die ersten drei Noten waren notwendig um versetzt zu werden.

Im Frühling 1938 hatte ich Abschlussprüfungen, mündlich und schriftlich und ich bekam ein Diplom ausgehändigt. Das Zeugnis war eine Seite lang und brachte zum Ausdruck, dass ich das Technikum 4 Jahre lang besucht hatte. Es enthielt die Noten für alle Gegenstände und zeigte, dass ich als electromechanic ausgebildet worden war.

Allen Prüflingen wurden verschiedene Arbeitsplätze zugewiesen an denen sie mindestens zwei Jahre zu verbleiben hatten. Das ist eine Art von Rückzahlung des Geldes, das die Regierung für die Ausbildung ausgegeben hatte. Ich wurde MICHA-ZCHAKAJA M.T.S. zugewiesen; der Name wurde 1958 in R.T.S. abgewandelt.

17. BERUFLICHER WERDEGANG:

1938-1941 und 1946-bis zur Flucht MICHA ZCHAKAJA M.T.S. (Maschinen-Traktoren-Station), später abgewandelt in R.T.S. (Reparatur-Technische-Station) . (Matchino-Traktornaja und bzw. Remontno- Technitscheskaja Stanzija). MICHA-ZCHAKAJA wurde von der Bevölkerung einfach Zchakaja genannt und war Rayon-Zentrum des Zchakajskii Rayon, so genannt nach dem berühmten georgischen Revolutionär MICHA ZCHAKAJA ((der alte Name der Stadt war ACHAL -SENAKI bezw. ACHAL - SENAKSKII Rayon). M. Zchakaja war einer der Organisatoren der georgischen kommunistischen Partei.

Die Stadt hat gegenwärtig ungefähr 10.000 Einwohner und befindet sich an der Eisenbahnstrecke Samtredia-Suchumi (die Hauptstrecke zwischen Tbilisi und Moskau mit Abzweigungen nach Poti, dem Badeort am Schwarzen Meer. Die Stadt liegt zwischen zwei Zuflüssen des Rion Flusses: Tsiwi und Terachi. Am Letzteren liegt ein paar Kilometer von M. ZCHAKAJA entfernt ein kleines Elektrizitätswerk wo ich nach meiner Rückkehr aus dem II. Weltkrieg zeitweilig arbeitete. Bei M.T.S. (welche 1958 in R.T.S. umbenannt wurde nachdem die Einrichtungen und Maschinen den lokalen Getreide-und Trauben- erzeugenden Kolchosen zugeteilt worden waren und als einzige Verantwortung die Reparatur dieser Maschinen mit R.T.S. verblieb). Ich wurde bald Vorarbeiter einer Gruppe von Elektro-Mechanikern, die für die Pflege und die Reparaturen der elektrischen Teile von landwirtschaftlichen und anderen Maschinen verantwortlich waren. Mein Anfangsgehalt war 400 oder 500 Rubel, aber es stieg schnell und als ich in die Armee einberufen wurde war mein Gehalt schon fast doppelt so hoch.

Aus persönlichen Gründen kehrte ich in diese Stadt zurück, nachdem ich aus dem Militärdienst entlassen worden war und ich erhielt meine alte Stellung wieder. Ich bekam dazu noch eine Stelle als Elektro-Techniker mit dem vorher erwähnten Elektrizitätswerk, welches Elektrizität für die Stadt und dem übrigen Rayon erzeugte. Ich erhielt diese Stelle zugewiesen, da nach dem Krieg ein Mangel an qualifizierten Arbeitskräften bestand. Ich arbeitete in der zweiten Schicht im Elektrizitätswerk von 1947-1953 (dann wurde die Stelle von einem jungen Absolventen des Kutaisi Technikums gefüllt). Ich verdiente dort 700 Rubel neben meinem Grundgehalt bei R.T.S. Vor meiner Flucht war mein Einkommen ungefähr 120 neue Rubel Brutto. Ich hatte zusätzliches Einkommen von Wochenend-Arbeiten für die Reparatur von Haushalt gegenständen,Radios usw. durch Einwohner der Stadt. Das Geld war 1961 10 zu 1 abgewertet woden.

18. MILITÄRISCHER WERDEGANG

A. REGISTRIERUNG FÜR MILITÄRDIENST: Im Sommer 1939 wurde ich von meinem rayon-wojenkomat (Rekrutierungsstelle) benachrichtigt, dass ich mich an einem bestimmten Tag dort einzufinden habe; von dort ging es mit einer Gruppe anderer zukünftiger Rekruten zu der rayon polyclinic für die medizinische Untersuchung. Ich habe den linken Daumen und Zeigefinger bis zum ersten Glied durch einen Arbeitsunfall verloren und als dies dem Rekrutierungsstelle mitgeteilt wurde, wurde ich für den aktiven Dienst als ungeeignet erklärt und der Reserve zugewiesen. Zu demselben Zeitpunkt wurde mein pripisnoje swidetelstwo (Registrierungs-Dokument) für ein Soldbuch ausgetauscht.

B. EINZIEHUNGSTAG: Ungefähr am 26 August 1941 wurde ich aufgefordert mich am 27. August beim raywojenkomat zu melden. Ich tat das und wurde aufgefordert mich zum Dienst am folgenden Tag zu melden. Mit einer Gruppe von ungefähr 80 bis 100 Rekruten meines Rayons fuhren mir mit dem Zug von Tbilisi nach Baku, wo die Gruppe in der sogenannten Saljanskije Kasarmi (S. Kaserne) untergebracht wurde, die sich am Stadtrand von Baku, auf der Strasse nach Saljani und zur iranischen Grenze,befand.

C. militärische EINHEIT und ERKENNUNGSNUMMER: Ich diente bei der Luftabwehr Artillerie. Eine Erkennungsnummer hat es bei der sowjetischen Armee nicht gegeben.

D. GRUNDAUSBILDUNG: Meine erste militärische Ausbildung erhielt ich in der Saljani Kaserne in Baku und sie dauerte zwei Monate. Einen Monat reguläre Grundausbildung und im zweiten Monat verbesserte ich meine Qualifikation als Autofahrer (Ich hatte gelernt wie man einen Wagen fährt während ich in der M.T.S. die elektrischen Reparaturen an Autos durchführte. Ich weiss die Nummer der Einheit nicht mehr in der ich meine Grundausbildung erhielt. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt waren die Kasernen überfüllt, meistens Soldaten der Infantrie und Artillerie die immer wieder abgelöst wurden.

E. SPEZIALAUSBILDUNG: Einen Monat Fahrschule wie oben erwähnt.

F. RESERVE ZUGEHÖRIGKEIT :

Sommer 1939: Aus Gesundheitsgründen untauglich für aktiven Dienst und der Reserve zugeteilt.

Herbst 1946: Aus der Armee entlassen-nachdem ich meine Reise und Entlassungspapiere meinem Rajwojenkomat übergeben hatte erhielt ich ein neues Soldbuch welches meine Reserve Zugehörigkeit enthielt.Ich wurde nie mehr einberufen oder zu irgendeiner Übung eingezogen nachdem ich von meinem Militärdienst entlassen worden war.

G. CHRONOLOGISCHE AUFZEICHNUNG MEINES MILITÄRDIENSTES:

Mit einer Gruppe anderer Rekruten wurde ich mit dem Zug zu der 253. Separaten Luftabwehr Artillerie Division, 2. Batterie, gebracht (OSAD- ogne-saschtschitnyi artilleriski division). Der kommandierende Offizier der Batterie war Leutnant WAKS. Kommandant der wswod uprawlenje (Verwaltung, Zugsführer) der Division war Leutnant ENDELADSE. Stellvertretender Divisionskommandant für politische Belange war Hauptmann TSCHOCHA und politruk meiner Batterie war Senior Leutnant SAMARIN. Major Wlado (Wladimir) GURGENIDSE war kommandierender Offizier von OSAD und im Februar 1943 wurde er auch zum Kommandeur von

PWO (protiwo- wosdischnaja oborona) (Luftschutz) für die Stadt Michurinsk ernannt. Das Hauptquartier der Division war in Michurinsk, während die Batterie in der Nähe der Station TARASOWO bei der Siedlung Konskoje, 7 km von Michurinsk und 6 km von den 6 errichteten Gehegen bei Kochetowa (Station) lag. Ein höhes Hauptquartier war in Tambow und wurde erst von Oberst TSCHERNJAWSKI und später von Oberst ZWETKOW, einem degradierten General kommandiert.

Als ich zuerst in Michurinsk eintraf wurde ich erst als Lastwagenfahrer dem Verpflegungszug der Division zugeteilt (choswswod oder chosjajstwennyi wswod), kommandiert von Junior Leutnant MAKAROW. Später wurde ich mit dem oben erwähnten ENDELADSE bekannt, ein Landsmann von mir und wurde durch seinen Einfluss dem Divisions-Kommandeur GURGENIDSE, auch ein Georgier der später zum Oberstleutnant befördert wurde, als persönlicher Fahrer zugeteilt. Er behielt mich in dieser Position bis ich vom Militärdienst entlassen wurde.

H. BEFÖRDERUNGEN UND DEGRADIERUNGEN: Nach 6 Monaten Militärzeit wurde ich zum jefrejtor (Gefreiten) befördert, am Ende des ersten Jahres zum Unterfeldwebel und 1944 wurde ich zum Feldwebel befördert

I. AUSZEICHNUNGEN: keine

J. ENTLASSUNGSTAG: Ich wurde vom aktiven Militärdienst Ende September 1946 entlassen. Ich erhielt meinen Fahrbefehl und Reisegeld von meiner Einheit in Michurinsk, die ich später dem rajwojenkomat übergab. 1955 wurde ich nochmals ärztlich untersucht, auf Befehl vom vojenkomat und offiziell aus meiner Reservestellung entlassen, aus Gesundheitsgründen (so wie zuvor) und erhielt eine sogenannte belji bilet (weisse

Karte)oder dauernde Befreiung vom Militärdienst.

19. WOHNORTE SEIT GEBURT:

1919-1926	verschiedene Adressen in Tbilisi
1926-1934	Tbilisi, Kirotschnaja Ulitsa Nr. 35 eine Wohnung in einem 2-stöckigem Haus, welches früher privates Eigentum war und später SHAKT (Staatliche Häuserverwaltung) unterstand.Nach dem Tode meiner Mutter trat ich in das Elektro-Technikum ein, wo ich im Pensionat war.
1934-1938	Tbilisi, Ulitsa Sowjetskaja (Nummer nicht in Erinnerung), Studentenheim des Tbilisi Elektro-Technikums.
1938-1941	MICHA ZCHAKAJA, Ulitsa Tsulukidse Nr.14. Hier mietete ich ein Zimmer in einem privaten einstöckigem Haus, das einem pensionierten Eisenbahn-Weichensteller, Ilja LORDKIPANIDSE,gehörte, welcher ein Zimmer vermieten musste, um etwas zu seiner Pension dazuzuverdienen. Ilja's Frau Keto(Katherina) kümmerte sich um meine Wäsche und kochte für mich wofür ich extra etwas bezahlte. Das Ehepaar hatte keine Kinder und behandelten mich wie ihren eigenen Sohn.
1941-1946	Militärzeit
1946-1962 (bis zur Flucht)	Micha Zchakaja,Ulitsa Schota Rustaveli Nr. 25, die Privatwohnung meiner Geliebten Nina GANDELI. Ich liebte sie und hatte mit ihr ein Verhältnis bevor ich

in den Krieg ging. Während des Krieges hörte ich, dass Nina's Mann im Krieg gefallen war und ich entschloss mich nach Zchakaja zurückzukehren um in ihrer Nähe zu sein. Ich zog zu Nina und lebte mit ihr zusammen ohne unsere Heirat bei SAGS (Registrierstelle von Geburten, Heiraten und Sterbefälle) zu registrieren. Obwohl ich erst darauf bestand unsere Verbindung zu legalisieren wollte Nina es nicht, da sie in ihrer ersten Ehe unglücklich war; sie wollte frei sein um die Verbindung jeder Zeit lösen zu können.

Während der letzten Jahre fand ich heraus, dass Nina sich während meiner Abwesenheit von zu Hause mit anderen Männern traf. Unstimmigkeiten entstanden, die mehr und mehr wuchsen als die Zeit verging. Nachdem das Verhältnis mit Nina sehr kühl geworden war, fing ich an mich mit anderen Frauen zu treffen. Wir waren oft daran uns endgültig zu trennen, aber wir fanden immer wieder zusammen. Ich versuchte verzweifelt unser Problem zu lösen,denn ich hatte zu einem Zeitpunkt als wir uns noch sehr nahe waren Bemerkungen gegen die Regierung gemacht und ich plante sogar eine gemeinsame Flucht aus den USSR. Ich wollte sie nicht zusehr verärgern um sie nicht womöglich dazu zu bringen, dass sie mich bei der Militia anzeigte. Aber aus irgendwelchen Gründen wollte Nina nicht gänzlich mit mir brechen und eines

Tages teilte sie mir mit, dass sie ein Kind erwarte und dass sie unsere Heirat legalisieren möchte. Da ich mich aber nicht als der Vater des Kindes betrachtete und da ich Erpressung von Ninas Seite fürchtete entschloss ich mich meine Flucht, die ich ohnehin schon geplant hatte, zu beschleunigen.

20. REISEN:

Keine anderen als schon erwähnt.

21. VERHAFTUNGEN:

Im Juni 1962 kam dieMilitia zu mir und bracht mich von meinem Arbeitsplatz zu ihrer Dienststelle wo ich beschuldigt wurde ein langjähriges Mitglied einer georgischen Widerstandsgruppe zu sein und regierungsfeindliche Äusserungen gemacht zu haben. Obwohl ich solche Bemerkungen bei verschiedenen Gelegenheiten gemacht hatte und deshalb schuldig im Sinne des letzteren Teils der Anschuldigung war, konnte ich fühlen, dass die Militia nicht genügend Informationen besass und ich verneinte alle Anschuldigungen. Ich konnte mir nicht denken wer dahinter steckte. Nach langen Verhören, bei denen ich über alle Einzelheiten meines Lebens, Eltern , Militärdienst, Kontakte, u.s.w. befragt wurde, wurde ich mit einer Warnung entlassen das Gebiet nicht zu verlassen und es wurde mir gesagt ich würde wieder von der Militia hören. Mit dieser einzigen Ausnahme bin ich nie verhaftet oder verhört worden, weder bei der Militia oder anderen Sicherheitsbehörden.

22. MITGLIEDSCHAFT IN POLITISCHEN PARTEIEN ODER ORGANISATIONEN:

Ich gehörte niemals der kommunistischen Partei an. Mir wurde nahe gelegt 1937 Komsomol beizutreten während ich am Tbilisi

Elektro-Technikum war. Dabei wurde von zwei Klassenkameraden die Bürgschaft übernommen, jeder von den beider war schon mehr als zwei Jahre Mitglied . Ich reichte mein Gesuch bei der lokalen Komsomol jatschejka (Zelle) ein und bei einer Zusammenkunft der Zellenmitglieder wurde mein Aufnahmegesuch besprochen, ich erzählte meine Lebensgeschichte und beantwortete Fragen. Nachdem ich aufgenommen worden war, erhielt ich meine Mitgliedskarte in ungefähr zwei Monaten vom Stadt-Rayon-Komittee des Tbilisi Komsomol; darauf hin besuchte ich Versammlungen und zahlte kleine Beiträge. Ich hatte niemals eine offizielle Position bei Komsomol. Als ich Tbilisi verliess musste ich mich von der Tbilisi Organisation streichen lassen und mich am neuen Wohnort Micha Zchakaja (bei der Bevölkerung gewöhnlich nur "Zchakaja" genannt), neu eintragen lassen. Dasselbe geschah als ich in die Armee eintrat (Ausstreichen aus der alten Organisation und Einschreiben am neuen Wohnort). Als ich nach der Entlassung von der Armee wieder nach Zchakaja zurückkehrte liess ich mich nicht wieder in die lokale Organisation eintragen.

Als ich in Zchakaja zu arbeiten begann wurde ich automatisch in die (prof.-org) Gewerkschaft eingeschrieben, in der ich ein passives Mitglied war, das seine Beiträge (etwas wie 1% meines Gehaltes) an den Organisator der Gewerkschaft von MTS bezahlte und von Zeit zu Zeit einer Pflichtversammlung beiwohnte.Ich machte nie Gebrauch von den Vorteilen der Mitgliedschaft wie ermässigte Preise in Erholungsstätten (putewka v dom otdicha) .

23. VERBINDUNGEN MIT EINEM SICHERHEITSDIENST:

Ich hatte nie einen Kontakt mit einer Sicherheitsbehörde. Ich wurde auch nie aufgefordert in irgendeiner Art für den sowjetischen Sicherheitsdienst zu arbeiten.

24. FLUCHT

A. GRÜNDE:

Trotzdem ich in einem kommunistischen Land geboren und erzogen worden war begann ich doch schon frühzeitig zu verstehen, dass für die Einzelperson keine Freiheit bestand. Es war mir auch klar, dass persönlicher Aufstieg nicht von dem Talent und der Rechtschaffenheit eines Menschen abhing, sondern von dem Ausmass der politischen Betätigung. Ich sah durch die kommunistischen Lügen, da die Wirklichkeit so verschieden von der offiziellen Propaganda war. Während und nach dem Krieg traf ich Menschen die westliche Länder besucht hatten und ich war in der Lage Bruchstücke der Wahrheit über den Unterschied in den Lebensarten aus diesen Erzählungen abzuleiten, obwohl diese Berichte sehr vorsichtig vorgebracht wurden. Nachdem ich 1956 ein gutes Radio der"Mir" Marke kaufte hörte ich sehr oft ausländischen Stationen zu. Lange Zeit trug ich mich mit der Idee aus den USSR zu fliehen wo ich keine Familie, keine Verwandten und keine Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten hatte. Meine feindliche Einstellung zur Regierung wurde stärker und stärker mit der Zeit und es wurde für mich immer schwieriger mich zu kontrollieren und diesen Gefühlen nicht offen Ausdruck zu verleihen, was ich dann doch einige Male tat. Meine Erfahrung mit der Militia und die Entwicklung meines persönlichen Lebens beschleunigte meine Fluchtpläne.

B. TECHNISCHE EINZELHEITEN DER FLUCHT:

Am 25. Juni 1962, drei Tage nach meinen Erfahrungen mit der Militia, verliess ich meine Wohnung um 7 Uhr früh wie jeden Tag um in die Arbeit zu gehen. Ich verliess die Stadt zu Fuss in Richtung Samtredia. Ich trug meine normale Kleidung, hatte 80 Rubel bei mir und eine Handtasche. Ich wagte nicht den Zug zu nehmen da ich Angst hatte von der Militia überwacht zu werden. Nachdem ich 2-3 km auf der Landstrasse gegangen war, wurde ich von einem Lastwagen eines nahe gelegenen Kolchos mitgenommen, der in der gleichen Richtung fuhr. Ich verliess den Lastwagen in der Stadtmitte von Samtredia, zahlte dem Fahrer einen Rubel und ging zur Eisenbahnstation; hier kaufte ich eine Fahrkarte nach Batumi und nahm den Zug um 11.50der um 14.15 in Batumi ankam. Ich fand einen sicheren Platz und schlief bis zur Dunkelheit. Ich verliess Batumi zu Fuss entlang des Seeufers bis ich 1 1/2 oder 2 km südlich die alte Schiess-Stätte erreichte. Hier ging ich um ungefähr 22 Uhr ins Wasser, nachdem ich meinen Pass zerstört hatte (die anderen Dokumente liess ich zu Hause) und vergrub meine Kleider und Tasche. Ich wusste durch das Studium einer Landkarte, dass ich ungefähr 18 km zu schwimmen hatte um türkisches Gebiet zu erreichen. Ich schwamm die ganze Nacht und ich war nicht sicher ob ich schon türkisches Gebiet erreicht hatte , aber ich war erschöpft und schwamm ungefähr um 3 Uhr oder 4 Uhr früh zum Ufer. An dem Punkt wo ich ankam began das Ufer steil anzusteigen. Ich sah die Silhuette einer Hütte und ging hinein. Da fand ich einen alten elektrischen Motor, russisch beschriftet, woraus ich ersah, dass ich noch in Russland war. Ich versteckte mich in der Nähe im Gebüsch und verbrachte dort die Nacht und den folgenden Tag. Als es dunkel wurde, kletterte ich den Abhang hinauf um das Gelände zu überblicken. Ich ging ein Stück und hörte russische Stimmen die vom Ufer kamen. Ich sah einen dunklen Gegenstand auf dem Wasser, welcher wie ein Unterseebot aussah. Ich ging weiter am Ufer entlang und um ungefähr 22 oder 23 Uhr ging ich ins Wasser und schwamm 3 km hinaus und dann parallel zum Ufer. Als ich in die Reichweite eines Suchlichtes kam, das über dem Wasser spielte, tauchte ich unter. Als ich nach oben kam ging das Suchlicht gerade über mich hinweg, aber nichts geschah und ich wusste, dass ich unendeckt geblieben war. Ich schwamm bis zur Erschöpfung, einige Stunden vor der Morgendämmerung schwamm ich zum Ufer und versteckte mich in einer Höhle zwischen zwei Felsen im Meer in Ufernähe. Da verblieb ich zum Morgen. Am nächsten Morgen kletterte ich den Abhang hinauf, wo ich ein steinernes Gebilde sah, das wie ein Grab aussah. Ich ging hinein und schaute mir die Umgebung durch eine kleine Öffnung an. Ich sah ein kleines Dorf, später lernte ich, dass es Kemal-Pascha war. Erst dachte ich ein Minarett wäre ein Beobachtungsturm. Ich nahm an, es wäre das Dorf Sarpi noch immer auf russischem Boden. Ich war sehr durstig und kletterte den Hügel hinunter zu einem Bach um zu trinken. Ich traf einen 11 oder 12 jährigen Buben den ich russisch ansprach, aber der Bub lief weg. Ich war noch immer nicht sicher wo ich war, ich ging ein Stück im Bach um meine Fussabdrücke zu verbergen. Dann versteckte ich mich im Gebüsch bis zur Dunkelheit. Ich ging dann um das Dorf herum zum anderen Ende. Ich betrat das Dorf und klopfte an die Tür eines Hauses, das am Abhang eines Hügels lag. Ich rief in russischer Sprache. Ich hörte Stimmen und Fusstritte im Haus, aber niemand öffnete. Ich kletterte auf das Dach eines Stalles im Hof und verbrachte dort die Nacht. Früh am nächsten Morgen wurde ich durch Geräusche im Hof geweckt. Ich sah einige Frauen und zwei Männer. Ich näherte mich ihnen und versuchte mich durch Zeichensprache zu verständigen und zu erklären, dass ich aus Russland kam. In der Zwischenzeit waren Menschen mit Stöcken und Äxten auf den Hof gekommen. Ich versuchte wieder zu erklären, dass ich aus Russland käme und in der Türkei verbleiben möchte. Die Männer nahmen mich dann zu den militärischen Behörden in Kemal-Pascha.

Als ich in Batumi ins Wasser ging, hatte ich Schwimmhosen an, einen Gürtel und ein paar Schwimmflossen. Ich hatte ein Klappmesser im Gürtel, einen Sack Nadeln um mich zu stechen im Falle eines Krampfes, mein Geld war in einem Nylonsack, 3 Tafel Schockolade, ein Kompass und zwei Phenamin Tabletten um meine Energie zu heben, in einem anderen Nylonsack. Mit Ausnahme des Suchlichtes auf dem Wasser, das ich durch Tauchen zu umgehen suchte, gab es keine anderen Hindernisse.

Ich hatte niemanden von meinen Fluchtplänen erzählt und niemand hat mir dabei geholfen.

Von Kemal-Pascha, wo ich Kleider bekam, wurde ich mit dem Wagen nach Erserum gebracht und von dort mit dem Zug nach Istanbul ins Flüchtlingslager. Dort war ich eine Woche und wurde dann mit Hilfe von US Behörden am Freitag den 6. Juli 1962 nach Deutschland gebracht.

25. DOKUMENTE:

A. PASS:

Ich erhielt meinen ersten drei Jahre gültigen Pass von der

Militia Dinststelle Nr. 17 (Pass Abteilung) des Molotowski Rayon von Tbilisi, wo ich damals wohnte. Der Pass war ein einzelnes Blatt Papier und meinem Photo und den wichtigsten Daten. 1939 tauschte ich ihn gegen einen 5-Jahres Pass ein, bei der Militia des Micha Zchakaja Rayons ausgestellt. Das war ein Pass in der üblichen Buchform mit Photo und wichtigsten Daten und hatte einen propiska Stempel (Registration mit der Militia), welcher den Tag meiner Ankunft in dieser Stadt und meine Adresse enthielt. Als ich in die Armee eingezogen wurde, gab ich den Pass und das Militärbuch bei den rayonwojenkomat ab und bekam ihn nach meiner Entlassung wieder ausgehändigt. Darauf hin erhielt ich einen neuen 5-Jahres Pass von der gleichen Dienststelle mit propiska, welcher meine neue Adresse anzeigte. 1951 tauschte ich diesen Pass gegen einen neuen 10-Jahres Pass ein und 1961 gegen wiederum einen neuen 10 Jahre gültigen Pass.

B. MILITÄRBUCH: (Wojennii Bilet)

Siehe Para. 18. In der Armee hatte ich ein Soldbuch (slushebnaja knishka), welches ich meinem rayonwojenkomat nach meiner Entlassung aus der Armee übergab.

C. ARBEITSBUCH: (Trudowaja Knishka)

Ich besass keines, da es von dem Arbeitsgeber ausgestellt wird und wenn jemand seinen Arbeitsplatz ändert , dem neuen Arbeitsgeber übergeben wird. Ich aber habe niemals meinen Arbeitsplatz verändert.

TERMINATION AGREEMENT

The undersigned hereby acknowledges that a contractual relationship has heretofore existed between him and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as ("the Government"). The Government has fully and completely satisfied all of its obligations to the undersigned.

The undersigned on behalf of himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns hereby releases and forever discharges the Government, its officers, agents and employees from any and all debts, claims, benefits or demands arising out of the above mentioned contractual relationship.

The undersigned fully understands and appreciates the fact that the prior relationship between the parties and all information and knowledge acquired in the course of said relationship (particularly with reference to persons and methods employed by the Government) are the property of said Government and constitute military secrets affecting its security. The undersigned knows and understands that these are protected by German Law under the provisions of Annex A to the Convention on Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Government is highly appreciative of the excellent services heretofore rendered by the undersigned. However, to preserve the security above mentioned, it is further understood and agreed that both parties shall hereafter disavow that the relationship ever existed.

The undersigned further agrees he possesses no right, title or interest in any information or knowledge arising out of said relationship and he further solemnly swears that he will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, conduct or any other means the fact of said relationship nor any such knowledge or information arising therefrom except as authorised in writing by the same official of the Government as that who witnesses this oath.

Frankfurt/Main, this 3rd day of March 1964

Georg F. Sanders (L.S.)

WITNESS:

William [illegible]

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Chilenische Generalkonsulat
Frankfurt am Main
Wendelsweg 64

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalkonsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Chile interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Chile ansaessig sein muss, um die chilenische Staatsbuergerschaft zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt werden kann?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. O. Elmendorf
Executive Director

CHILE

Translation from German

Letter from Consulado General de Chile

Question 1: see attachment.

Question 2: Chilean citizenship can be obtained after a minimum of five years of residence in Chile.

Question 3: There is no immigration quota.

Question 4: Technical professions are in demand in the first place.

Question 5: It would be better if the immigrant could count upon some financial assistance.

Question 6: See Attachment

1.

C H I L E

Translation from German

Immigration Visa:

a) According to Chilean D.F.L. (Law Nr. 69) an immigration visa will be issued to persons willing to emigrate to Chile together with their families in order to undertake a selfsupporting work of technical nature or in an other special field. The visum gives the right of unlimited residence and execution of profession in Chile.

b) In case of the issue of an immigration visa the work factor is considered above the capital factor.

c) The belongings of the immigrant are, besides a low fee, free of duty, tax, and storage fees.

d) In order to file an application for an immigration visa the special conditions, outlined in Circular Nr. 3 have to be fulfilled. Especially the "Cartilla de Inmigracion" has to be furnished (forms are to be obtained at the Consulate). The "Cartilla de Inmigracion" is to be filed in duplicate and executed in Spanish.

e) Visa fees amount to DM 9.10 per passport.

List of luggage for an immigration visa

1) In case the application for an immigration visa is filed in Germany, the luggage list must be furnished with seven copies. For proper form see Circular Nr. 8.

2.) The luggage list can contain only personal belongings and material necessary for the applicant's profession, which were owned by the applicant before the immigration visa was issued and were produced in the applicant's homecountry. The items must be used. In some exclusive cases they may be new, however purchased before the issue of the visa.

3.) Items necessary for the execution of profession are such which serve the applicant in continuing the profession he has been executing while still in Germany.

4.) Household belongings can be imported, however only to an extent in accordance with the immigrant's situation.

5.) In exclusive cases the immigrant may also import a motor vehicle, truck, jeep, or smaller truck. Trucks and jeeps can be imported duty-free, for a delivery van 100% of the FOB-value are charged. Passenger cars or other vehicles cannot be imported. The immigrant can, however, import a tractor, should this be an item necessary to carry out his profession.

6.) The luggage must not contain items of art or luxury, such as valuable carpets, gobelins, music boxes etc.

General

1.) The Consulate sends out forms for application for an immigration visa only in such cases where exact details are already known and it seems likely that a visa will be issued. Application forms are not sent out solely upon request.

2.) In order to file a visa application we request to submit only those documents marked with a cross in Circular Nr. 3. The remaining documents are to be produced only at the time the visa will be issued. It is recommended to submit the documents necessary for filing an application in person at the Consulate after foregoing written announcement.

3.) In the case of written inquiries we request that a stamped envelop be enclosed with the inquiry.

4.) For apersonal appearance we request a written announcement for a working day, except Saturday, at nine AM.

5.) For the issue of the visa the presence of all persons involved is necessary (excluding children under 15 years of age.)

6.) Though the immigration visa is to be approved by the Chilean Foreign Ministry the Chilean General Consulate has the right to check the immigrant's data.

7.) For all types of visa an international certificate of small-pox vaccination is necessary. Such certificate is good for two years.

8.) Persons under 21 years of age need a permit by the father or the person in charge which must be certified by a notary, if the applicant intends to travel without his parents of the persons in charge of him.

9.) The Consulate does not assist in finding work. It is recommended that potential applicants contact the German language newspaper

CONDOR
Casilla 9469
Santiago de Chile

CONSULADO GENERAL DE CHILE

FRANKFURT AM MAIN
64, WENDELSWEG
☎ 687346

4-9-1962

EM/g

Nº 951

Ei[illegible]
-5. SEP 1962
Erledigt

An
American Friends of Russian Freedom
Incorporated
Frankfurt / Main
P.O. Box Nº 5005

Betr.: Auswanderung nach Chile

Sehr geehrte Herren!

In Beantwortung Ihrer Fragen vom 31. August können wir Ihnen folgende Auskunft geben:

1.- Einzelheiten über die Erteilung eines Einreise- bzw. Einwanderungsvisums bitten wir, unserem Circular 2 zu entnehmen.

2.- Die chilenische Staatsbürgerschaft erwirbt man, wenn man mindestens 5 Jahre ansässig war.

3.- Eine Einwanderungsquote besteht nicht.

4.- Gefragt sind vorwiegend technische Berufe.

5.- Es wäre besser, wenn der Einwanderer von irgendeiner Seite her mit finanzieller Unterstützung rechnen könnte.

6.- Siehe Circular 3.

Wir hoffen, Ihnen mit unserer Auskunft gediente zu haben und stehen weiterhin gern zu Ihrer Verfügung.

Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung

Enrique Melkonian C.
Konsul

CIRCULAR Nr. 2

CONSULADO GENERAL DE CHILE
FRANKFURT/MAIN
WENDELSWEG 64
TEL.: 60 73 46

Frankfurt, den 4/9 1962

Sehr geehrte ~~Herr~~ ~~Frau~~ ~~Frl.~~ American Friends of Russian Freedom

Betrifft: Ihr Schreiben vom 31/8 1962

RICHTLINIEN FÜR DIE ERTEILUNG EINES VISUMS UND DIE EINREISE VON TOURISTEN

Wir erlauben uns, Ihnen nachstehend einige grundsätzliche Erklärungen über die Erteilung von Visa und die Einreise von Touristen in Chile zu geben. Ausländer können in Chile unter verschiedenen Voraussetzungen einreisen:

1) als Tourist
2) mit einem Arbeitsvertragsvisum (VISACION DE RESIDENTE SUJETO A CONTRATO)
3) als Studierender (VISACION DE RESIDENTE ESTUDIANTE)
4) zu einem längeren befristeten Aufenthalt (VISACION DE RESIDENTE TEMPORARIO)
5) als Einwanderer (VISACION DE INMIGRACION)

I. TOURISTEN

a) Auf Grund eines besonderen Abkommens zwischen Deutschland und Chile und eines besonderen chilenischen Gesetzes kann man in Chile zu einem Aufenthalt von höchstens 90 Tagen als Tourist ohne Visum einreisen. (In besonderen Fällen besteht die Möglichkeit, die Aufenthaltsdauer ein einziges Mal um weitere 90 Tage in Chile verlängern zu lassen).

b) Als Tourist kann man in Chile mit folgenden Unterlagen einreisen: Gültiger Pass ohne Visum, oder gültiger Personalausweis, aus dem der vollständige Name, Geburtsort und -datum, Staatsangehörigkeit, Beruf, Wohnort, Ausstellungsdatum und Gültigkeitsdauer hervorgehen, und der Stempel und Unterschrift der ausstellenden Behörde sowie ein Lichtbild des Inhabers enthält.

c) Außerdem ist ein von einem Amtsarzt ausgestellter Internationaler Pockenimpfschein mitzuführen, der 2 Jahre Gültigkeit hat.

d) Bei der Einreise ist die Rückpassage in das Herkunftsland oder die Passage für ein anderes Land vorzulegen, für das der Tourist eine Genehmigung zur Einreise besitzt.

e) Bei der Einreise in Chile erhält der Tourist eine "Tarjeta de Turismo" (Touristenkarte), die in zweifacher Ausfertigung auszufüllen ist.

f) Wer in Chile als Tourist einreist, kann dort keine bezahlte Tätigkeit ausüben. In Ausnahmefällen kann das Innenministerium in Chile eine Genehmigung für die Ausübung einer solchen Tätigkeit für eine Höchstdauer von 5 Tagen erteilen.

g) Personen, die als Touristen in Chile einreisen, können dort keine "VISACION DE RESIDENTE TEMPORARIO" beantragen (siehe Art. IV)

h) Als Touristen werden Personen angesehen, die als Erholungsreisende, wegen sportlicher Interessen, in Ausübung einer geschäftlichen Tätigkeit ohne Entgelt, aus familiären Interessen, etc. nach Chile kommen, ohne die Absicht zu haben, für immer im Land zu bleiben oder dort zu arbeiten.

i) Für eine Touristenreise brauchen keine konsularischen Formalitäten erfüllt zu werden.

j) Inhaber eines "Staatenlosen-Passes" können in Chile unter den gleichen Bedingungen als Touristen einreisen, wenn außerdem folgende Voraussetzungen erfüllt werden:

1) Der Reisepass muß von einer Behörde seines Aufenthaltslandes oder von einer von Chile anerkannten internationalen Stelle ausgestellt sein und alle für die Rückreise erforderlichen Transitvisa oder ein Einreisevisum in ein anderes Land enthalten.

2) Der Passinhaber muß im Besitz einer Genehmigung zur Wiedereinreise in sein gegenwärtiges Aufenthaltsland sein.

II.VISACION DE RESIDENTE SUJETO A CONTRATO(Einreise auf Grund eines Arbeitsvertragsvisums)

a) Dieses Visum wird Personen erteilt, die zur Erfüllung eines Arbeitsvertrages nach Chile fahren.

b) Es wird für eine Dauer von höchstens zwei Jahren erteilt. Das Ende des Vertrages bedeutet jedoch stets das Ende der Gültigkeitsdauer des Visums.

c) Zur Beantragung des Visums ist der Arbeitsvertrag vorzulegen, auf dem mindestens die Unterschrift des Arbeitgebers notariell beglaubigt sein muß. Der Vertrag muß eine Klausel enthalten, daß der Arbeitgeber sich in jedem Fall verpflichtet, die Kosten für die Rückreise des Arbeitnehmers zu übernehmen. Das Konsulat behält sich das Recht vor, eventuell eine Garantie für die Bezahlung dieser Kosten zu verlangen. Außerdem werden die in unserem Circular Nr.3 bezeichneten Unterlagen benötigt.

d) Bei Vertragsende kann von den chilenischen Behörden ein neues Visum oder die "Permanencia Definitiva" (Daueraufenthaltsgenehmigung) erteilt werden.

e) Die Visumgebühren betragen DM 36,2o pro Pass.

III.VISACION DE RESIDENTE ESTUDIANTE (Visum für Studienzwecke)

a) Dieses Visum wird Ausländern erteilt, die nach Chile fahren wollen, um dort an staatlichen oder staatlich anerkannten privaten Lehranstalten oder an Hoch- und Fachschulen zu studieren. Der Inhaber dieses Visums kann damit solange in Chile bleiben, wie er Studierender ist.

b) Es ist ihm nicht gestattet, ohne besondere vorherige Genehmigung des chilenischen Innenministeriums eine bezahlte Tätigkeit im Land auszuüben.

c) Unter besonderen Umständen kann der Inhaber dieses Visums evtl. mit einem Dauervisum in Chile bleiben. Nach einem zweijährigen Aufenthalt in Chile hat er das Recht, die "Permanencia Definitiva" zu beantragen (Daueraufenthaltsgenehmigung).

d) Die Visumgebühren betragen DM 36,2o pro Pass.

IV. VISACIONES DE RESIDENTE TEMPORARIO (Visum für befristeten Aufenthalt)

a) Dieses Visum wird Ausländern erteilt, die sich länger als 9o Tage in Chile aufhalten wollen und zu einem Verwandtenbesuch oder wegen anderer Interessen nach Chile kommen, oder wenn die chilenischen Behörden der Auffassung sind, daß der Aufenthalt in Chile von besonderem Nutzen für das Land ist. Das Visum berechtigt zu einem Aufenthalt von einem Jahr. Es kann innerhalb seiner Gültigkeitsdauer, jedoch nicht nachher verlängert werden. Nach Ablauf eines Jahres muß der Inhaber des Visums, wenn er in Chile bleiben will, die "Permanencia Definitiva" (Daueraufenthaltsgenehmigung) beantragen. Auch wer dieses Visum in Chile erhalten hat, muß die "Permanencia Definitiva" ein Jahr nach der Visumerteilung bzw. nach zwei Jahren seines dortigen Aufenthaltes beantragen.

b) Die ausländische Ehefrau eines Chilenen wird als Inhaberin einer Visacion de RESIDENTE TEMPORARIO betrachtet, wenn sie mit einem chilenischen Pass nach Chile kommt oder im Pass ihres Ehemannes eingetragen ist.

c) Die Visumgebühren betragen DM 36,2o pro Pass.

V. VISACION DE INMIGRACION (Einwanderungsvisum)

a) Nach dem chilenischen D.F.L. Nr.69 (Gesetz Nr.69) wird das Einwanderungsvisum solchen Personen erteilt, die mit ihrer Familie nach Chile auswandern, um dort eine selbständige Tätigkeit technischer Art oder auf einem sonstigen Spezialgebiet auszuüben. Das Visum berechtigt zu einem unbefristeten Aufenthalt und zur Berufsausübung in Chile.

b) Bei der Begutachtung der Vergünstigungen für Einwanderer wird der Faktor Arbeit vor dem Faktor Kapital bewertet.

c) Das Umzugsgut des Einwanderers ist, abgesehen von einer kleinen Gebühr, zoll- und steuerfrei und auch frei von Lagergebühren.

d) Zur Beantragung des Visums sind die besonderen Bedingungen zu erfüllen, die aus unserem Circular Nr.3 hervorgehen. Insbesondere ist die "Cartilla de Inmigración" vorzulegen (die Formulare werden vom Konsulat ausgegeben), die in zweifacher Ausfertigung mit Maschine in spanisch auszufüllen ist.

e) Die Visumgebühren betragen DM 9,1o pro Pass.

Bei der Anfertigung der Gepäckliste für ein Einwanderungsvisum ist folgendes zu beachten:

1) Wenn das Visum bei dem Konsulat beantragt wird, dann ist die Gepäckliste in 7 Exemplaren anzufertigen. Wird das Visum in Chile beantragt, so genügen 5 Exemplare, die bei Visumerteilung vorzulegen sind. Die vorgeschriebene Form geht aus unserem Circular Nr.8 hervor.

2) Die Gepäckliste darf nur Gegenstände zum persönlichen Bedarf und zur Berufsausübung enthalten, die vor Erteilung des Visums Eigentum des Einwanderers waren und aus seinem Herkunftsland stammen. Es muß sich um gebrauchte Gegenstände handeln. In Ausnahmefällen können sie neu sein, doch müssen sie vor der Visumerteilung erworben worden sein.

3) Unter Gegenständen zur Berufsausübung sind nur solche zu verstehen, die der Fortsetzung der Tätigkeit dienen, die der Auswanderer bisher in Deutschland ausgeübt hat.

4) Es können Haushaltsgegenstände mitgenommen werden, jedoch nur in einem der jeweiligen Situation des Einwanderers angemessenen Rahmen.

6) In Ausnahmefällen kann der Einwanderer ein Motorfahrzeug mitnehmen. Es kann ein Lastkraftwagen, Jeep, Tempowagen oder Lieferwagen sein. Lastkraftwagen, Jeep und Tempowagen können zollfrei eingeführt werden, jedoch für einen Lieferwagen sind 100% des FOB-Wertes zu zahlen. Personenwagen oder andere Fahrzeuge kann der Einwanderer nicht mitnehmen. Er kann jedoch auch einen Traktor mitnehmen, wenn dieser für seine Tätigkeit erforderlich ist.

7) Das Umzugsgut darf keine Kunst- oder Luxusgegenstände, wie z.B. echte Teppiche, Gobelins, Musikschränke, etc. enthalten.

ALLGEMEINES

1) Das Konsulat läßt nur in den Fällen den Interessenten Antragsformulare zugehen, wenn genaue Anhaltspunkte bekannt sind und mit der Möglichkeit einer Genehmigung zur Visumerteilung zu rechnen ist. Sie werden jedoch nicht auf Anfragen allgemeiner Art zugesandt.

2) Zur Beantragung eines Visums bitten wir nur die Unterlagen einzureichen, die in unserem Circular Nr. 3 angekreuzt sind. Die übrigen Unterlagen sind erst zur Visumerteilung vorzulegen. Zur Antragstellung empfehlen wir die Unterlagen nach vorheriger schriftlicher Anmeldung persönlich im Konsulat vorzulegen.

3) Bei schriftlichen Anfragen bitten wir in jedem Fall einen Freiumschlag beizufügen.

4) Um persönliche Auskünfte einzuholen, bitten wir um vorherige schriftliche Anmeldung für einen Werktag außer Samstag, 9 Uhr.

5) Zur Visumerteilung ist in jedem Fall die persönliche Anwesenheit der betreffenden Personen (mit Ausnahme von Kindern unter 15 Jahren) erforderlich.

6) Obwohl die Einreisegenehmigung vom chilenischen Außenministerium erteilt wird, behält sich das Chilenische Generalkonsulat das Recht vor, die Richtigkeit der gemachten Angaben zu prüfen.

7) Für alle Visumarten wird ein internationaler Pockenimpfschein benötigt, der von einem Amtsarzt ausgestellt sein muß. Seine Gültigkeitsdauer beträgt 2 Jahre.

8) Minderjährige (unter 21 Jahren) benötigen, wenn sie nicht in Begleitung des Erziehungsberechtigten reisen, eine notariell beglaubigte Einwilligungserklärung des Vaters oder sonstigen Erziehungsberechtigten, die die Reise ins Ausland und den Aufenthalt dort gestattet.

9) Das Konsulat nimmt keine Arbeitsvermittlung für Chile vor. Es empfiehlt Interessenten unverbindlich, sich an folgende deutschsprachige Zeitung zu wenden:

CONDOR
Casilla 9469
Santiago de Chile

IV

Hochachtungsvoll
i. A.
Enrique Melkonian C.
Cónsul

Betr. Einwanderungsvisum

CIRCULAR N°3

CONSULADO GENERAL DE CHILE
Frankfurt/Main
Wendelsweg 64
Tel.: 68 73 46

To
American Friends of
Russian Freedom

Unterlagen für die Erteilung eines Visums

- 1) Reisepass. Die Gültigkeitsdauer darf frühestens 12 Monate nach der Visumerteilung ablaufen.
- 2) Polizeiliches Führungszeugnis der zuständigen Polizeibehörde (nicht mehr als 3 Monate alt).
- ~~3) Allgemeines amtsärztliches Attest (nicht mehr als 3 Monate alt).~~
- 4) Ärztliches Attest des Auswanderungslagers (Hanau, München oder Berlin) - wird nur für Einwanderungsvisum benötigt.
- 5) Internationaler Pockenimpfschein, vom Amtsarzt ausgestellt. (Nicht mehr als 2 Jahre und nicht weniger als 14 Tage alt).
- ~~6) Arbeitsvertrag mit notariell beglaubigter Unterschrift mindestens des Arbeitgebers und einer Klausel, nach welcher dieser sich verpflichtet, die Rückreisekosten des Arbeitnehmers zu tragen.~~
- 7) 4 Passbilder (kein Fotomaton) 5 x 5 cm, auch für jedes Kind.
- ~~8) Gebühren DM 3[illegible],20 pro Pass.~~
- 9) Gebühren DM 9,10 pro Pass.
- 10) Fragebogen in 2-~~1~~-facher Ausfertigung, mit Schreibmaschine ausgefüllt und mit Tinte Unterschrieben.
- 11) Lebenslauf in 2-~~1~~-facher Ausfertigung in spanischer Sprache, mit Maschine geschrieben und mit Datum und Unterschrift versehen.
- 12) Inhaltsaufstellung des unbegleiteten Reisegepäcks - Umzugsguts ~~5~~-7-fach, in spanischer Sprache, mit Maschine angefertigt (s.Circular N°8).
- 13) Dokumente, die Ihren Beruf bestätigen.
- 14) Schriftliche Referenzen.
- 15) Für Minderjährige (unter 21 Jahren) notariell beglaubigte Einwilligungserklärung des Vaters oder Erziehungsberechtigten, dass die Reise nach Chile und der Aufenthalt dort gestattet sind.

N.S. Durchgestrichene Angaben sind nicht zutreffend.

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Konsulat von Peru
Frankfurt am Main
Guiollettstrasse 10

Sehr geehrter Herr Konsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Peru interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Peru ansaessig sein muss, um die peruanische Staatsbuergerschaft zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisums ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im Voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Translation from German

Consulado del Peru

Frankfurt/Main
Guiollettstrasse 10

September 7, 1962

Re.: Immigration to Peru

Gentlemen:

1.) There are no special application forms for an immigration visa. The applicant appears in person at the nearest Consulate of Peru with the following documents:

a) Travel Document and 3 passport photos
b) Birth certificate
c) Proof that the applicant has sufficient means to pay for his transportation, as well as his living expenses for at least two years. As minimum living costs we figure 500 DM per month per person. A work contract can also be supplied as proof of the above.
d) Medical certificate issued by a health officer not more than 6 months before submission to the Consulate.
e) Certificate of small-pox vaccination, issued not longer than 2 years before submission to Consulate
f) Police waiver covering the past 10 years
g) Certificate of good conduct (Leumundszeugnis)

Visa fees amount to DM 180.-- plus possible telegram fees.

2.) The citizenship of Peru can be acquired only if the applicant has resided without interruption for at least four years in Peru and can prove that he has served the country(?). Further 10 sponsors are required.

3.) We do not know about any restrictions under the immigration quota.

4.) We do not know any special professions in demand.

5.) See Paragraph 1 c

6.) See Paragraph 4

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Konsulat von Kolumbien
Frankfurt am Main
Am Hauptbahnhof 10

Sehr geehrter Herr Konsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Kolumbien interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Kolumbien ansaessig sein muss, um die kolumbianische Staatsbuergerschaft zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Frankfurt/M., 7.8.1962

Anbei erhalten Sie eine Broschüre, aus der Sie alles erfahren können, was für Ihre Zwecke interessant ist.

Punkt 1(

Fragebogen kann Ihnen dieses Konsulat leider nicht zusenden, da ohne Anweisung des Aussenministeriums in Bogotá kein Visum ausgestellt werden darf. Anträge müssen in Bogotá vom evtl. Arbeitgeber gestellt werden.

Punkt 2)

Staatsbürgerschaftsfragen können vom Generalkonsulat in Hamburg beantwortet werden.

Punkt 3)

Anschrift: Vorletzte Seite des beigefügten Prospektes

Punkt 4)

siehe Punkt 3)

Punkt 5)

siehe Punkt 3)

Punkt 6)

siehe Punkt 3)

E

- 4. SEP 1962

Erl.

CONSULADO DE COLOMBIA FRANKFURT

Venezuela
has been closed
for immigration
since 1960

[redacted]

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Generalkonsulat von Venezuela
Hamburg 13
Hagedornstrasse 22

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalkonsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Venezuela interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einwanderervisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Venezuela ansaessig sein muss, um die Staatsbuergerschaft Ihres Landes zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einreisequote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt.

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Konsulat der Republik Ecuador
Frankfurt am Main
Taunusanlage 16

Sehr geehrter Herr Konsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Ecuador interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Ecuador ansaessig sein muss, um die Staatsangehoerigkeit Ihres Landes zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Brasilianische Konsulat
Frankfurt am Main
Hochstrasse 53

Sehr geehrter Herr Konsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Brasilien interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Brasilien ansaessig sein muss, um die brasilianische Staatsbuergerschaft zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt werden kann?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. O. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Jack
[illegible]
To B.M.

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Generalkonsulat von Paraguay
Hamburg 13
Jungfrauenthal 24 I

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalkonsul!

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Paraguay interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einwanderervisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Paraguay ansaessig sein muss, um die Staatsbuergerschaft Ihres Landes zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

109542

Translation from German

Consulado General del
Paraguay.

Hamburg, November 26, 1962

American Friends of
Russian Freedom, Inc.
Frankfurt/Main
P.O. Box 5005

Gentlemen:

We acknowledge receipt of your inquiry concerning the immigration program for refugees and are glad to answer the following questions:

1.) For immigration a special immigration permit, issued by Instituto de Reforma Agraria, Asuncion, must be obtained. Only upon receipt of such permit we will issue an immigration visa. Citizens of various countries do not need any immigration visa since July 1962.

2.) Citizenship can be obtained upon an uninterrupted stay in the country for five years.

3.) There are no limitations as to an immigration quota.

4.) Preferred professions: farmers and craftsmen, as well as wealthy persons who wish to invest funds in the country.

5.) Every immigrant must have sufficient funds in order to take care of his integration.

6.) The immigrant must be absolutely healthy and must not be handicapped in any way.

Due to a tremendous work-load we were unable to answer your letter earlier.

Sincerely yours,

Consulat General of Paraguay
Hamburg

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Generalkonsulat von Bolivien
Hamburg 20
Heilwigstrasse 125

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalkonsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Bolivien interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einwanderervisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Bolivien ansaessig sein muss, um die Staatsbuergerschaft Ihres Landes zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einreisequote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Generalkonsulat von Bolivien

Hamburg, 7.Sept. 1962

An
American Friends of Russian Freedom
Incorporated
FRANKFURT / MAIN

Postfach 5005

Ei
1[illegible] SEP 1962
Erl.

Sehr geehrte Herren !

In Beantwortung Ihres Schreibens vom 31.v.M. muessen wir Ihnen leider mitteilen, dass wir Ihnen bei Ihrem Auswanderungsprogramm nicht behilflich sein koennen. Diese Auskuenfte wird Ihnen aber das

Ministerio de Inmigración
La Paz / Bolivien

beantworten koennen. Wir bitten Sie deshalb, sich direkt an das Ministerium zu wenden und zeichnen

hochachtungsvoll
GENERALKONSULAT VON BOLIVIEN
i.A.
(Lenhartz)

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Vice-Konsulat von Uruguay
Frankfurt am Main
Hattersheimer Strasse 2

Sehr geehrter Herr Vice-Konsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Uruguay interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Uruguay ansaessig sein muss, um die Staatsbuergerschaft Ihres Landes zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einreisequote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Translation from German

Consulado del Uruguay
En
Frankfurt

September 21, 1962

Dear Mr. Elmendorf:

1.) See enclosed form (the form was not enclosed)

2.) Permanent residence in the country after legal immigration during three years for married persons, five years for single.

3.) There is no immigration quota. The immigration visa is issued by the Ministry of Interior through the immigration office.

4.) Mainly qualified farmers, craftsmen and technicians.

5.) No. However the immigrant must be able to support himself by his profession or private capital.

6.) A medical examination by the physician of the consulate is required.

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIROGUE
201-233477
VOL. II

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 JULY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

201-233477

SECRET

SR/DOB/60-1911

22 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OS/Alien Affairs Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Pennington

SUBJECT : Extension of Time in ZI for REDSOX Agent AEASPIC, CI/OA No. C-73532.

REFERENCES : a. SR/DOB Memorandum 1463, dated 12 March 1959.
b. SR/DOB Memorandum 1730, dated 14 September 1959.

1. It is requested that an extension of time be arranged through your office to allow REDSOX agent AEASPIC, who entered this country (black) 20 April 1959, to remain in the United States until about 20 April 1961. It is not envisaged that Subject will be required to remain in ZI throughout this entire period; however, such an extension will afford adequate time for implementation of operation AESENTINEL.

2. Close supervision as regards personal and social contacts of AEASPIC will, of course, be continued by an SR/DOB staff officer, until such time as Subject re-enters training when his status will revert to that as outlined in Reference a. (supervision by a staff officer on a 24-hour basis).

3. Subject is available at the convenience of your office should his visits to Immigration and Naturalization Offices be deemed necessary to effect this arrangement.

4. For any further information please contact Fred Kirkpatrick on Ext. 8331.

MICHAEL RAS
Chief, SR/DOB

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - addressee
1 - 201 file
1 - SR/DOB chrono

SECRET

233477

SECRET

9 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Status Report

In November 1959 Cover Branch assisted SR/DOB Case Officer Fred Kirkpatrick in formulating cover under which AESENTINEL agent AEASPIC could live and thus be released from 24-hour custody. AEASPIC was documented under the name David Durvard and was so registered by Alien Affairs Staff. AEASPIC carries a cover letter issued by Alien Affairs to this effect.

SR/DOB Case Officer Fred Kirkpatrick was documented * (see below) under the name Fred K. Komer, a self-employed manufacturers representative, presently engaged, with David Durvard, in adapting certain American automatic coin-operated vending machines to the French market, in particular in the Paris area. Mr. Durvard is serving as Mr. Komer's engineer/technical advisor.

This arrangement has to date worked entirely satisfactorily, and it is hoped will continue to function until about mid June, when aforementioned cover arrangement should be discontinued owing to resumption of operational training. Fur further information, please contact Fred Kirkpatrick on Ext. 8331.

---

* 1. New York driver's license No. 3068221, Aug. 13, 1957 issued in the name of Fred Karl Komer, 290 Concord Dr., River Edge, N. J.

2. Social Security No. 056-04-2165 issued in the name of Fred Karl Komer

3. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, Balt., Md., issued in the name of Fred Karl Komer, 290 Concord Dr., River Edge, N.J.

SECRET

14-00000

15 March 1960

Extension of time granted for AESENTINEL agent AEASPIC whereby subject may remain legally (Immigration/Naturalization cognizant) until 20 October 1960. This information relayed to SR/DOB by Alien Affairs Staff representative Mr. Pennington.

FRED KIRKPATRICK,SR/DOB

201-233477

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HBPA-4142

TO: Chief, SR

INFO: Chief, WHD
Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: (201-233477)

FROM: Chief of Base, Sao Paulo DCH

DATE: 7 March 1960

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/AEACRE
Accommodation Address

RE 43 — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See below

REFERENCE(S): SAOP-1036, 2 October 1959

In connection with paragraph 2 of reference, effective immediately it is requested that letters sent to Timothy K. Rancifer for insertion in the local mail system be sent instead to the following address:

True name of Lucian W. Fabsik
American Consulate General - SP
APO 676, New York, New York

D. C. Higby
David C. Higby

3 March 1960

Distribution:
- 4 - Headquarters
- 2 - Rio de Janeiro
- 2 - files

STL

HBPA-4142

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: S

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

CS COPY

201-233477

Translations of David's letters being done by WE/France Desk

~~Mr. John Roberts, Chief, WE/France~~ Nick Letcou, WE/France
1108 J Bldg.

George Boublik, 1108 J (our contact re translations)

201-233477

Accommodation Address for David ([illegible])

David De Fanaskhet
c/o Jan Pilsudski
Caixa Postal 1174 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo, Brazil

Jerry Mahoney
~~Gerry Mahoney~~ ~~x8195~~ x 5359
Mrs. Murray - 8491
1212 Barton Hall, WH/2B
our contact w/ WH/2B re
David's mail to and from Brazil

pseudo
The ~~true~~ name and APO is:

Mr. Paul Maggio [illegible] (true)
Agency APO 676
New York, New York

New Accomodation Address for David: Eduardo Callo
Caixa Postal 11744 (Lapa)
São Paulo, Brasil

~~Paul A. Maggio~~ Lucian W. Fabsik
American Consulate General, SP
APO 676, c/o Postmaster
New York City, New York

201-233477

[illegible]-4142

Chief, SR

Chief, WH
Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

(201-233477)

Chief of Base, Sao Paulo

7 March 1960

[illegible]/[illegible]
Accommodation Address

See below

[illegible]-1036, 2 October 1959

In connection with paragraph 2 of reference, effective immediately it is requested that letters sent to Timothy E. Mancifer for insertion in the local mail system be sent instead to the following address:

True name of Lucian [illegible]. Fabqik
American Consulate General - SP
APO 676, New York, New York

David C. Rigby

3 March 1960

Distribution:
4 - Headquarters
2 - Rio de Janeiro
2 - files.

STL

201-233477

14-00000

Eduardo CALLO
Caixa postal 11746 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo
BRASIL

2/.233477

SELO

VIA AEREA
PAR AVION

Madame Colette KHOMERIKI
30,rue Cabanis.
PARIS 14o FRANCE

Sao Paulo le 29 fevereiro
1960

Ma Cocotte chérie.

Voici la deuxième lettre que je t'écris.D'ailleurs ce
n'est pas seulement à toi que j'ai envoyé des lettres,mais
aussi à mon frere,au toubib et mon ex-belle soeur,et aussi aux
gens chez qui j'étais avant de vous quitter voici un an passé.
J'avais écrit d'ici dès que j'avais pû le faire,c'est à dire
il y a de cela trois mois environ.Je n'ai jamais reçu aucune
réponse à l'adresse que j'avais donnée ? J'espère que cette-fois
j'aurais plus de chance car il doit y avoir certainement une
raison quelque-part. Comme c'est la mode ces temps-ci,ou bien
l'avion qui portait mes lettres s'est ecrasé quelque-part,ou
bien celui qui rapportait les reponses a fait la même chose,ou
alors ce qui serait plus près de la verité,il n'y a jamais eu
de reponse pour une raison qui m'échappe. Il est possible aussi
comme je suis souvent en deplacement dans le pays ou même en
dehors,que le courrier se soit envolé en fumée,les Jivaros ai-
ment ~~faire~~ du feu de temps à autre.

Je vous racontais un tas de choses interessantes des
pays que j'avais l'occasion de visiter,ayant été un peu partout,
mais comme je n'aime pas repeter les mêmes choses plusieurs fois,
vous ne saurez rien dutout si je n'ai pas de reponse à cette
lettre aussi.

Je suis revenu seulement hier d'une promenade de deux
mois dans le nord du pays. C'est plein de serpents et de Bresilier
Parmis les bresiliennes il y en a de vraiment chouettes et de
moins chouettes aussi.Il faut y gouter pour comprendre.Je parle
évidemment des bresiliennes des grandes villes,parceque quand
on quitte la ville,ça fait plutôt Vesinet ~~ou~~ on aurait tendance
à vouloir se payer une bouteille d'Airwick que d'y mettre le nez.

Il a fait un peu chaud ces temps-ci,c'est l'été pour
cet hemisphère,et quand il pleut c'est de la vapeur qui vous
descend sur le dos,mais avec un bon ventilateur,une douche froide
et des boissons glacées,on arrive à ne pas fondre completement.

Je n'ai rien à faire en ~~France~~,mais tu sais bien ma Cocott
que je pense toujours à vous,où que je me trouve,aussi mon idée
est-elle de faire un saut pour vous voir,même ne serait-ce ~~qu'un~~
instant,dès que cela me sera possible.

Que s'est-il passé chez vous depuis mon depart.Annik a
dû retrouver Titi,madame Bebert Monestier a certainement demena-
gée. Nelly se met-elle toujours les doigts dans le nez? Momée
ronchonne t'elle toujours. Et toi que fais-tu? J'ai oublié le
nom du chien noir..ah oui,Opi le pisseur.

Et bien voilà,maintenant nous allons parler serieusement
Je pense que cette lettre va t'apporter de bonnes nouvelles,mais
je ne le ferais que si je suis certain d'avoir une reponse.Quand
je l'aurai je t'enverrai de l'argent d'abord pour te depanner et
en suite parceque je vous aime,toi et les tiens.Dès que le contact
sera retabli je vous ferai parvenir ou te ferai parvenir tous
les mois de quoi vous aider substantiellement et peut-etre plus.
Ce que je te demande en echange c'est:

1°) d'envoyer aux personnes que j'ai citées plus haut,juste
un petit mot pour donner mon nom et ma nouvelle adresse exacte-
ment comme celle-ci.Ni plus ni moins

2°) de demander à Annick,à Nina et à Nelly de m'ecrire si
elles le veulent bien,cette lettre etant aussi pour chacune d'elles
et elles doivent certainement savoir combien cela me ferait plai-
sir.

Entre temps les jours passeront et je viendrai vous voir,
probablement en novembre ou en decembre,si je ne me casse pas
la gueule en route,les pierres sont un peu pointues sur le che-
min où je suis.Alors je vous embrasserai beaucoup,beaucoup,toi
Momée, Annick, Nina, et ma petite Nelly.

Eduardo CALIC

Caixa postal 11744 (Lapa)

Sao Paulo

Brasil

Dearest,

Here is the second letter that I'm writing you. You know, it's not only to you that I sent letters but also to my brother, to the doctor, and to my former sister-in-law, and also to the people with whom I stayed before leaving you a year ago. I wrote from here as soon as I could, that is, about three months from that time. I never received ~~any~~ reply at the address I gave? I hope that this time I will ~~have more~~ be luckier for there must certainly be some reason somewhere. As frequently happens these days, either the plane which was carrying my letters had an accident somewhere ~~as~~ or the one which was bringing back the answers did the same thing (i.e. had an accident), or, ~~more likely~~ closer to the truth, there never was ~~[illegible]~~ an answer for some reason that escapes me. It is possible also, since I travel ~~around~~ frequently throughout the country and even abroad, that the mail went up in smoke. The Jivaros like to start fires from time to time.

I told you lots of interesting things about the countries that I've had a chance to visit, having been almost everywhere, but, since I don't like to repeat the same things several times, you will find out nothing if I do not get an answer to this letter too.

I just returned yesterday from a two month trip to the north of the country. It's full of snakes and Brazilian women. Among the Brazilian women there are some really cute ones, and less cute also. you have to taste them to understand. Evidently, I'm speaking of the Brazilian women of the large cities, because when one leaves the city its more like Vesinet and one's reaction would be to buy a bottle of Airwick rather than stick his nose there.

It's been rather hot lately. It's summer in this hemisphere, and when it rains the steam goes down your back. But with a good fan, a cold shower, and iced drinks, one manages not to melt completely.

I've nothing to do in France, but you can be sure Honey that I'm always thinking of you wherever I may be. Therefore, my intention is to take a short trip to see you, even if only for a moment, as soon as this is possible.

What's happened among you since my departure. Annik must have found Titi again, Madame Bebert Monestier has surely moved out. Does Nelly still put her fingers in her nose? Does Memée still grumble? And you, what are you doing? I forgot the name of the black dog — oh yes, Opi the pisser.

Well, now we are going to speak seriously and (I) think this letter is going to bring you good news, but I will not do so unless I'm sure of an answer. When I get one, I will ~~first~~ send you some money first to take you over and then because I love you, you and yours. ~~As soon as~~ Once contact is reestablished I will send you (~~singular~~ plural) or rather I will send you (singular) every month enough to help you substantially and perhaps more. What I ask in exchange is:

1) to send to the people I've mentioned above, just a little note giving my name and my new address exactly like this one. Neither more nor less.

2) to ask Annick, Nina, and Nelly to write me, if they will, this letter being also for each of them; and they must surely know how happy this will make me.

In the meantime the days will pass and I will come to see you, probably in November or December unless I kill myself on the way, the rocks are rather sharp on the road I'm taking. Then I kiss you very very much, you, Annick, Nina, and my little Nelly.

(signed: Edward)

US 7¢ US 7¢

Via Air Mail

Mr. Robert P. Haghe
P. O. Box 8028
South West Station
Washington 24, D. C.
U. S. A.

27 Oct 1959

Dear Bob

Received your first letter today. Will take care of the matter. Enclosed find some envelopes which I think are very colorful and might be an addition to your collection.

Paul
Paul

COPY

25 Feb 60

Dear Paul,

Enclosed is one letter from David informing all concerned of his change of post office box to: Eduardo Callo, Cahxa Postal 11744 (Lapa) Sao Paulo, Brasil. It is dated 29 February, so please forwarrd on or just after that date. Thanks very much for your help.

Sincerely,
BCP

(This letter forwarded to Brasil for remailing 25 Feb. 1960 at 1300 hours)

201-233477

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Special Contracting Officer DATE: 11 February 1960

FROM : Mr. David TZITZICHVILI

SUBJECT: Beneficiary, designation of

1. In accordance with the terms of my current affiliation with the United States Government, it is my understanding that in addition to monthly salary, bonus and other benefits, I am entitled to five thousand dollars in ($5,000.) death benefits payable to a designated beneficiary, providing my death occurs during the performance of my mission or as a direct result thereof.

2. I therefore designate the following person as beneficiary to receive the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.):

Colette HOMERIKI
30 Rue Cabanis
Paris 14, France

Relationship: Friend

David Tzitzichvili

201-233477

THE CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY
930 H STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

J. M. McHENRY
MANAGER

TELEPHONE
METROPOLITAN 7-9900

February 10, 1960

Mr. David Durvard
1164 - 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Durvard:

In order to provide adequate telephone service in your vicinity, it has become necessary for us to make certain rearrangements of telephone equipment. These rearrangements will result in some changes of subscribers' telephone numbers.

We sincerely regret that your telephone is among those affected.

The change will take place during April, 1960, and your new telephone number will be FEderal 8-1263 . Before the
ıe of our representatives will call on you and
›er card on your telephone.

request, of course, your telephone number does
Directory. However, to cause you minimum incon-
. refer all of your calls from the old number to
a reasonable period of time. If you should not
ınce, please call our Business Office.

ɔu for your understanding and cooperation.

Dave's new
Office # is
Federal 8-1263

Apt. # is not
Changed

Cordially,

J. M. McHenry

Manager

201-233477

The cover address of the establishment for David's employment:

Fred K. Komer (employer)
290 Concord Drive
River Edge, New Jersey

047 08/WS/W

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE	22 JAN 60
TO	DIRECTOR
FROM	SAO PAULO
ACTION:	SR 6
INFO	CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	DaB	4	
2	Dob	5	
3	C	6	

JAN 23 05 43Z 60

RECD CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 32458

TO DIR INFO RIOD POUCH CITE SAOP 1120

REDWOOD AEACRE

REF HBPW 2021

1. BASE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE UP POST OFFICE BOX 11734 NOT LATER THAN 15 FEB.

2. INSTRUCT AGENT SOONEST TO USE FOLL ADDRESS IN FUTURE: ANY NAME, CAHXA (ALSO RVCD CAXXA) POSTAL 11744 (LAPA) SAO PAULO BRAZIL.

END OF MESSAGE

Fred - Inform David so that he might in turn inform his friends who have the old address.

Dav

25 JAN 1960

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET

18 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/DOB Finance Office

SUBJECT : Request for Operational Advance.

1. Safehouse Branch/CL has requested the remaining four months rent in advance for the living quarters of AESENTINEL agent, AEASPIC. Under the stipulations of the agreement with the agent, this rent is to be paid by AEASPIC. The terms of the lease specify $147.50 a month payable on the 1st. day of the month. The lease began 1 November 1959, and will run until 30 June 1960, a period of eight months. The first four months rent ($590.00 for November thru February) have been paid from money credited to AEASPIC.

2. Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB Case Officer will draw an advance from SR/DOB Finance of $590.00 for the four remaining months rent. This sum will be deducted from AEASPIC's monthly salary (i.e. $147.50 a month for the period March thru June 1960).

FRED KIRKPATRICK

APPROVED:

Chief, SR/DOB

SECRET

SR/DCB/60/_______

14 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Alien Affairs Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Pennington

SUBJECT : Personal Status of SR/DCB Agent, AEASPIC (David DURVARD)

1. Please be advised that SR/DCB Agent, AEASPIC, is being closely supervised by SR/DCB as regards to his personal and social contacts.

2. He is at present residing in a Washington, D.C. apartment under the name David Durvard. This apartment was obtained by Safehouse Branch and fully approved and checked by the Office of Security.

3. Safehouse Branch has also obtained an office some five blocks from his living quarters. This office site has also been approved and checked by the Office of Security. AEASPIC is at present engaged in his office, doing unclassified work to keep him occupied. He is being visited, by an SR/DCB Case Officer, on a regular weekly basis (and/or as the necessity arises).

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DCB

FK/vat

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Subj's. File
1 - Chrono

201 233477

SECRET

SR/DOB/59/1531

8 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Communications

SUBJECT : Evaluation of Code of SR/DOB REDSOX Agent

1. It is requested that the attached encoded message be broken and the code which it represents evaluated.

2. This code represents the attempt of a REDSOX agent to formulate a worthwhile method of cryptography. It is therefore hoped that this code will prove of some interest to the Office of Communications.

3. The following details are furnished concerning the encoded message:

a. The message will be in the English language.

b. The key to the code is contained in the text of the encoded message.

4. It would be appreciated if a cryptographer or other representative of your office could interview subject agent, provided his code indicates he has an aptitude for this work.

5. For further information, please contact Mr. Fred Kirkpatrick on Ext. 8331.

MICHAEL RAB
Chief, SR/DOB

Att. - message

PC/gs
Distrib:
0 & 1 - add. w/1 copy of att.
1 - SR/DOB w/o " " "
1 - SR/DOB chrono

SECRET

[illegible] - 233477

SECRET

Chief, SR/DOB
ATTN: Mr. Edward H. Sanner, Jr.

24 November 1959

Chief, Safehouse Branch/OL

Safehouse No. 297 - Req. # 59-23 - CCD # SH-143 - SSD # 206920

Requisition: Your request for a domestic safehouse (Req. # 59-23) routed to us via the Central Cover Division (CCD # SH-143) has been met by the property and in the manner herein described. Said property to be utilized per requirements set forth in the requisition has been approved by the Office of Security (SSD 206920).

Property: A furnished efficiency apartment located at 940 25th Street, N. W. Apt. # 202, Washington, D. C.

Lessor: John Safer, Management Co.

Lessee: Mr. Powell Browning, Jr., a Security-cleared attorney-at-law with offices located at 3145 N. Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. Office Telephone FE 3-5081. By virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement, exclusive rights of tenancy has been assigned to the Agency. Accordingly, Mr. Browning is the nominal lessee while indirectly the Agency is the actual lessee and responsible for full and strict compliance with the terms of the lease. Questions or problems involving relationships of the lessee cut-out and the lessor, neighbors, police, et al will be handled through the lessee cut-out (Mr. Browning) acting under the control and direction of the Safehouse Branch.

Lease: Original lease is on file in the Safehouse Branch. Terms of the lease are $147.50 per month payable on the 1st day of the month. The lease begins 1 November and runs until 30 June 1960, a period of 8 months.

Cover Story: Mr. Powell Browning, the lessee cut-out, has ostensibly leased the apartment in order to assist a foreign client to obtain housing because of the mans language difficulty and in his inability to comprehend the provisions of a lease. Mr. Browning has therefore signed the lease in the clients behalf.

Case Officer: Mr. Edward H. Sanner, Jr., Ext. 8331.

Financial Arrangements: Rent, utilities, ~~and telephone service~~ will be paid by the lessee cut-out, Mr. Browning. Any unusual or abnormal matters properly belonging or chargeable to the lessee should be taken up with and approved by the Safehouse Branch. [illegible]

Pursuant to the stipulations of R 45-1025, the financial commitments of the lease were approved by the Chief, Real Estate and Construction Division/OL. In compliance with arrangements made between the Comptroller and the Director of Logistics we have advised the former regarding this acquisition.

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CCD/NC
1 - SSD/OS 1 SH File 297

WALTON C. CARROLL

David gave card below to Perry Crockman on 16 December 1959. He had these made up on his own as a means of identification.



DAVID DURVARD

ENGINEER – TECHNICAL ADVISOR

POTOMAC HOUSE
940 25TH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

FEDERAL 7-6387

201-233417

HBPW-2021

TO	Chief of Base, Sao Paulo	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.	201-233477
INFO	Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro		
FROM	Chief, SR	DATE	
SUBJECT	REDWOOD/AEACRE Servicing accommodation address	RE: 43-3 - (CHECK "X" ONE)	☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED	See Paragraph 2 below		

REFERENCE(S)

a. DIR 45223, 21 September 1959

b. HBPA-3747, 12 October 1959

1. As outlined in reference a, the postal address requested is for use by an agent. To date he has written three letters, giving this as his return address.

2. Subject has indicated he does not anticipate voluminous correspondence; however, such answers as he does receive will come through this accommodation address. Therefore, it is requested the address be serviced as often as is conveniently possible and at least once a week.

GEORGE F. LIPSIUS

Distribution: (3 Nov 59)
2 - COB, Sao Paulo
1 - COS, Rio de Janeiro
2 - WH
1 - WH Mailroom
1 - RI
1 - SR/10 Attn: Lois Ogle
✓2 - SR/DOB
1 - Chrono

201-233477

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET

NOV 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : WIROGUE/1 Contract (Formerly ABASPIC)

1. A review of the WIROGUE/1 file showed that subject was under contract for a period beginning 20 September 1959 through 30 June 1960. Since that date until 20 October 1960, subject was under SR/DOB OOA. On 21 October 1960, the African Division picked up the case and is preparing to dispatch him on 20 November 1960.

2. It is requested that the contract be brought up to date and amended to encompass the following points:

A. Effective date: 21 November 1960 through 20 November 1962.

B. Compensation: $500 per month, plus $3000 per annum for housing.

C. Medical: to extent it is necessary to maintain good health.

D. Insurance: $5000 payable to beneficiary.

E. Bonus: for outstanding performance, resettlement in another country.

F. Termination: ending of all benefits and monies.

3. This contract will have to be prepared for signing prior to 18 November 1960.

4. For further information, please contact Mr. Daniel R. Hiesciur, X8284.

(Signed) Glenn D. Fields

Glenn D. Fields
Acting Chief, Africa Division

SECRET

201-233477

SECRET

6 November 1959

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that I, David TZITZICHVILI, fully understand, and agree to abide by, all provisions concerning the change in my personal status and release from 24-hour custody as explained to me this date.

Primary restrictions are as follow:

The use only of David DURVARD identity

Travel restrictions limited to Washington D.C. area

Obtaining or attempting to obtain a driver's permit

Purchase, directly or indirectly, of an automobile

Obtaining or using any charge or credit purchase plan

Room-mates (Not to include visitors)

Any illegal activity

I fully understand that the provisions of my current contract with the United States Government and the provisions of the Secrecy Agreement which I have signed are both still applicable, and will remain so during the period 6 November 1959 to 1 July 1960 or until cancelled by the United States Government.

I further understand that any violation of the instructions which I have received, either verbal or written, will be just cause for the termination of my contract and such further action as may be deemed appropriate by my superiors.

WITNESS:

SECRET

201-233477

SR/DCB

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SR/10	NOV 4 1959	NOV 1959 1	NOV 5 1959	
2.				
3. SR/COP/FI	5 NOV 1959			
4. SR/mc			9 NOV 1959	
5. WH/2			9/11	
6. WH Registry		10 NOV 1959		
7.				
8. RI/DP			10/11	
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				
18.				

RECORD COPY

TZITZICHVILI, DAVID

COORDINATING OFFICERS	
NAME	OFFICE
see above #1	Chief, SR/10
E J McCarthy	SR/COP/FI
[illegible]	WH/2

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER	
NAME	TITLE
Michael Rae MICHAEL RAE	Chief, SR/DCB

RELEASING OFFICER	
NAME	TITLE
R D [illegible]	Chief, WH

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE NUMBER
201-233477

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
10 NOV 1959
3 November 1959

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HBPA-2021

FORM 3-58 610b

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HBPA-2021

TO
Chief of Base, Sao Paulo

INFO
Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-233477

FROM
Chief, SR

DATE

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/AEACRE
Servicing accommodation address

(CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
See Paragraph 2 below

REFERENCE(S)

a. DIR 45223, 21 September 1959

b. HBPA-3747, 12 October 1959

1. As outlined in reference a, the postal address requested is for use by an agent. To date he has written three letters, giving this as his return address.

2. Subject has indicated he does not anticipate voluminous correspondence; however, such answers as he does receive will come through this accommodation address. Therefore, it is requested the address be serviced as often as is conveniently possible and at least once a week.

GEORGE F. LIPSIUS

Distribution:
- 2 - COB, Sao Paulo
- 1 - COS, Rio de Janeiro
- 2 - WH
- 1 - WH Mailroom
- 1 - RI
- 1 - SR/10 Attn: Lois Ogle
- 2 - SR/DCB
- 1 - Chrono

201-233477

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET

SR/DOB/59/ 1785

2 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, OS

ATTENTION : Mr. Pennington

SUBJECT : AEASPIC, CI/OA No. 73532
(Local Address)

The local address of the Subject to be furnished the Immigration and Naturalization Service for use on his documentation in lieu of passport is as follows:

940 25th Street N.W.
Apt. 202
Washington, D.C.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

OHT/vat

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 2 - DOB Security
- 1 - Chrono

201-233477

[illegible]

SECTION A

REQUEST FOR (Check One) Pseudonym ______ Alias ✓ Crypto ______ Derivative Number ______

1. Pseudonym Assigned ______

Alias Assigned DAVID DURVARD

Cryptonym Assigned ______

2. Project or Agent (give adequate description, if a project please give description at bottom of page/Section B) 9 MONTH HOLDING PERIOD FOR AGENT

3. Status (Staff Employee, Staff, Contract, or Field Agent, etc.) ______
CONTRACT AGENT

4. SR/DOB PERRY CROOKHAM, FI
Branch/Staff Case Officer (Type of Activity: FI, PP, CI, etc.)

6. To be used in cable traffic (yes or no) No

NOTE: List any pseudonyms or cryptonyms previously assigned AEASPIC

SECTION B

True Name or Project Description DAVID TZITZICHIVILI

SR/[illegible] ______

Sections A and B are to be separated by SR/RC when completed.

201-233477

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby amends the initial contract accepted by you in April 1959, to include the following provisions for the period 20 September 1959 through 30 June 1960. During the period of time as indicated, you will be required to perform such duties as may be assigned you by your superiors. All such duties, whether of a research nature or otherwise, will be considered to be of a confidential nature. The terms and conditions of your amended contract are as follow:

1. Compensation

In consideration of the satisfactory completion of such duties as may be assigned you, you will be paid $400.00 monthly.

2. Bonus

Due to the nature of the assignments which will be given you to perform, no bonus will be considered.

3. Medical

You will be provided such medical or dental treatment as may be considered necessary to maintain your physical fitness and permit the accomplishment of your assignments. Periods of hospitalization will necessitate the suspension of salary for the duration of said hospitalization.

4. Insurance

You will be insured for the amount of $5,000.00 payable upon death to a beneficiary designated by you, provided your death occurs while in the performance of duty.

5. Termination

If for any reason traceable to you, such as making yourself unavailable for proper performance of duty, you fail to consumate the terms of our understanding by not attempting to perform your assigned duties, your salary will be immediately terminated and you will be resettled in a place to be decided by your superiors, without further compensation or assistance.

6. Secrecy Clause

You will be required to keep forever secret the contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

7. Term of Contract

The foregoing amendment to your initial contract is for the period as specified, after which the terms of your initial contract will again apply.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________

Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

201-233477

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for the submission of certain information and related directed services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In consideration of the submission of such information and related directed services, you will be paid $500.00 per month until the activity is completed, a period to approximate 6 months. Of this amount:

$450.00 per month to be held in escrow pending your departure to and return from such activity.

$ 50.00 per month to be paid directly to you for personal expenses.

2. Bonus. A bonus to be paid contingent upon the comparative success of the mission, the amount of the bonus to be determined at a later date by the Contracting Officer, if the Contractee is chosen to perform the task assigned.

3. Termination. In the event the United States Government terminates this activity or your connection with same, sooner than originally proposed, through no fault of yours, you will receive all monies held in escrow and a satisfactory resettlement will be effected as per prior oral agreement with the United States Government.

However, if for any reason traceable to you, such as making yourself unavailable for proper services or training, you fail to consummate the terms of our understanding, you will not receive monies held in escrow, your salary will be immediately terminated and you will be resettled in a place in accordance with above mentioned prior agreement without further compensation or assistance.

4. Secrecy Clause. You will be required to keep forever secret the contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

201-235477

David's 2 and 3rd
letter. Sent all
the same time

23 October 1959

Dear Paul,

Enclosed are two more of David's letters to be forwarded by you. These are both dated 26 October so please post on or after that date.

Thanks again for this convenience.

Sincerely,

201-233477

Sao Paulo
23 October 1959

Dear Atchico,

I've been thinking for an hour and I still don't know how to begin. I can't say that as a brother I've especially been a blessing to you, and often I've caused you more trouble than I would have liked, directly or indirectly. My leaving Gap was inevitable. On the one hand because of the obligation to remain there until an indefinite date, and above all because of the work I'm now doing which had been in the offing for quite a while. My stay at Ambert had nothing to do with my departure; it was only a business trip.

If I had been able to write you sooner, I would have done so. Now I can, and as there are many things in suspense I would be glad to be able to take them up where I've left them. I never expected you to bear the price of my actions; therefore, I'm counting on you to tell me whom you paid for me, for I presume that most people immediately thought you were responsible for my debts. As soon as you reply, I will immediately send you the money to reimburse you, or, if need be, to pay the interested party.

If you didn't already know, I'm notifying you that Jacqueline is first on my list and there is no reason why she should be deprived of what is hers. I could very well have sent her the money today, but I don't even know if this letter will arrive at the right address. It's more than a year since I left you, and I'm making contact again.

Next on the list ther's you naturally, whom I do not forget. Listen, what I ask is that you wrtie me seriously, for your sake as well as mine. Give me the list of these people in order of urgency.

When I left Ambert, I had left instructions to pay certain people, and I don't know if this has been done. I'm going to write to the Dassauds, in this way, perhaps, I'll know what has happened.

I've been here a very short time and have had a lot to do in the past few months. Unfortunately I can't tell you where, when, or what kind of work. I only ask that yow have faith in me.

How is life at Gap? How are the girls, Elico and Irene? I would be glad to receive a letter from them with a few pictures of all of you, if possible. Many regards to Jacqueline with hopes that she and hers are all well.

201-233477

As far as "hers" are concerned, you know that I still have a picture of my Flack (moreover, it's my only family album) but she must have changed and must be a happy mother of many children, bitch that she was.

I kiss you all and expect a letter from you.

[signed]

P.S. This is my address. Since I'm often away, take care to copy it correctly; your letter will be forwarded.

David de Iquaskhet
c/o Jan Pilsudski
Caixa Postal 11734 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo, BRAZIL

Sao Paulo le 20 octobre 1959

Mon cher vieux Atchico

Voila une heure que je tourne autour du pôt et je ne sais pas encore par quel bout commencer. Je ne peux pas dire que j'ai ete pour toi specialement une benediction de frere, et souvent je t'ai cause des emmerdemenbs plus que j'aurais jamais voulu t'en faire directement ou indirectement. Mon depart de Gap devait se produire inevitablement. D'une part, en raison de la contrainte d'y sejourner jusqu'a une date indeterminee, et surtout en raison du travail que je suis en train de faire qui etait prevu depuis longtemps. Mon sejour a Ambert n'a rien a voir avec mon depart, ca n'etait simplement qu'un deplacement d'affaires.

Si j'avais pu t'ecrire plus tot, je l'aurais fait. Aujourd'hui c'est possible, et comme il reste beaucoup de choses en suspend je serais heureux de pouvoir les reprendre la où je les ai laissees. Je n'ai jamais tenu a ce que tu supportes le prix de mes actes, aussi je compte sur toi pour me dire qui a tu paye pour moi, car je suppose que la majorite des gens ont immediatement pense que tu etais responsable de mes dettes. Des que tu me repondras, je te ferai parvenir immediatement de l'argent pour te rembourser, ou eventuellement payer l'interesse .

Si tu ne le savais pas, je t'avise que Jacqueline est la premiere ~~[illegible]~~ sur ma liste et il n'y a aucune raison pour qu'elle soit privee de ce qui lui appartient.

201-233477

J'aurais tres bien pu lui envoyer son argent aujourd'hui, mais je ne sais même pas si cette lettre arrivera a la bonne adresse. Cela fait plus d'un an que je vous ai quitte, alors je reprends contact.

Ensuite sur la liste il y a toi naturellement que je n'oublie pas. Ecoute moi, ce que je te demande c'est de m'ecrire serieusement pour toi comme pour moi. Tu me donnes la liste de ces gens dans l'ordre d'urgence.

Quand j'ai quitte Ambert, j'avais laissé des instructions pour regler certaines personnes et je ne sais pas si cela a ete fait. Je vais ecrire aux Dassaud, ainsi peut-etre saurais-je ou en sont les choses.

Je suis ici depuis tres peu de temps et j'eu beaucoup a faire tous ces mois-ci, malheureusement je ne peux ni t'expliquer ou quand et quelle sorte de travail. Je te demande simplement de me faire confiance.

Comment va la vie a Gap ? Comment vont les filles, Elico et Irene ? Je serais bien content de recevoir une lettre d'elles avec quelques photos de vous tous si cela est possible. Bien des choses a Jacqueline en esperant qu'elle va bien, ainsi que les siens.

A propos de''siens'', tu sais que j'ai toujours une photo de ma Flack (c'est d'ailleurs tout mon album de famille) mais elle a du changer et doit etre une heureuse maman de beaucoup d'enfants, cochonne comme elle etait.

Je vous embrasse tous bien fort et attends une lettre de vous.

David de Fansaknet
c/o Jan Pilsudski
Caixa Postal 11734(Lapa)
Sao Paulo, BRASIL

P.S. Ceci est mon adresse. Etant tres souvent en deplacement, ayez soin de la recopier tres correctement, On transmettra.

Monsieur A. De PANASKHET
Architecte
I bis,Avenue Bellevue (Lablache)
GAP Hautes Alpes FRANCE

Sao Paulo
20 October 1959

Dear Kathela and Louis,

worn out by a long trip .... signed the PELICAN. Twenty thousand leagues under the sea, as many in the air, and here I am in cha-cha-cha land.

Rio (see Francis Carco) is a magnificent city. Principal industries: pleasure and love. If I were a Brazilian I would have called this city Loveland, (the French name is somewhat more earthy) this is, perhaps, less poetic than Rio de Janeiro but more in the spirit of things. Louis would quickly make a fortune curing the flourishing cases of clap (vulgar French expression) and other little venereal details.

I'll be here for some time. I have a bit of work to finish in this country, on the order of hide and go seek. This is bound to take me a few weeks if not a few months. After that I think I'll be able to pay you a very short visit.

For the time being I am in Sao Paulo which is a city even more magnificent than Rio, and also larger. In the movies you see Burt Lancaster and Brigitte Bardot speak a pure Portuguese. Sometime ago, they spoke German flawlessly?

Here I am burdened with a new language. It is very much like Spanish and I think I'll get used to it rather quickly, but everything is beginning to get mixed up: English, German, Russian, French, Georgian, and Spanish. Long live Esperanto! If someday I go to China, I've had it.

Now you have a vague idea of what I've done up to now, and, besides, I'm not supposed to give my life's history.

I often think it would be good to see each other again to laugh a little and to take some happy trips around Marseilles. How are you and how are the girls? Elice, Irene, and Cathy. I would love to have a line from each of them if their pen isn't too heavy. It's over a year since I've seen them. At the same time I'm writing to Atchico, so that if Atchico were to hear the girls speaking of me at home he will not be embarrassed or surprised. I'm thinking that now they have an American uncle. That's good. However I haven't got a ranch yet, and besides, even if I had the possibility to get one, it wouldn't tempt me.

201-33477

How is Zouquette? And Sophie? I hope that you still see her and if so tell her that I would really be happy to get a few lines from her, if she has no objections. Since I can't write her directly, you would be very kind to pass to her any answer I may write. It's true that I am also a brazilian papa.

And pretty Eliane? Many regards to her. I don't care suggest that she write me. First, it's not polite, and then we would eventually snap at each other again, but I believe that I wouldn't mind being bitten by her. Oh well, I love to suffer. Hello to Dina, naturally.

You write me, I'll write you, and some day I'll return.

(signed)

P.S. Here is my address. Take good care to write it in full. I'm often on the road.

David de Panaskhet
C/O Jan Pilsudski
Caixa Postal 11734 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo
Brazil

Sao Pa[illegible] le 29 Octobre 1959

Chers Nathela et Louis

Fatigué d'un long voyage.....signé le PELICAN Vingt mille lieues sous les mers,autant dans les airs et me voilà au Cha-cha-chaland.

Rio (voir Francis Carco)est une ville magnifique principales industries:Les plaisirs et l'amour. J'aurais été bresilien j'aurais appelé cette ville Icilombaise,c'est peut-etre moins poetique que Rio de Janeiro mais plus dans le ton. Louis ferait rapidement fortune a soigner le foisonnantes chaudes-pisses et autres petits details veneriens.

Je suis ici pour quelques temps.J'ai un petit travail a terminer dans le pays dans le genre de coucou tu m'as vu,tu m'as pas vu,viens que je t'attrape.Cela me prendra certainement quelques semaines si ce n'est pas quelques mois.Apres cà je pense pouvoir vous rendre une petite visite a toute vitesse entre deux coups de feu.

Pour l'instant je me ~~xxxx~~ trouve a Sao Paulo qui une ville encore plus magnifique que Rio,et plus grande aussi. Au cinema on voit Burt Lancaster et Brigitte Bardot parler un portugais sans melange.Il y a quelques temps deja,ils parlaient l'allemand~~imp~~ impecablement?

Me voiçi encombre d'une nouvelle langue. Cela ressemble fortement a l'espagnol et je pense m'adapter assez vite.mais tout commence par s'embrouiller,anglais allemand russe francais georgien espagnol.Vive l'esperanto! Si un jour je vais en Chine je suis foutu.

Maintenant vous avez à peu près une idée de ce que j'ai fait jusqu'ici,et d'ailleurs je ne suis pas sense raconter ma vie.

Je pense souvent que ce serait bien de se revoir pour rire un peu et avoir quelques joyeuses sorties marseillaises.Comment allez-vous et aussi comment vont les filles.Elico,Irene et Catny.J'aimerai bien avoir un mot de chacune d'elles si la plume n'est pas trop lourde.Cela fait plus d'un an que je ne les ai vues.Par le meme courrier j'ecris a Atcnico de sorte que si Atchico entendait les filles parler de moi à la maison il n'y aura pas de gene ou de surprise.Je suis en train de penser que maintenant elles ont un oncle d'Amerique.Ca fait bien.Evidemment je n'ai pas encore de ranch,d'ailleurs meme si j'en avais la possibilite cela ne me tenterait pas.

Comment va Zouquette ? Et Sopnie ? J'espere que tu la vois toujours et dans ce cas dis lui que je serais reellment content de recevoir quelques lignes d'elle si toute fois elle le veut bien.Ne pouvant lui ecrire directement tu serais bien gentille de lui retransmettre mon eventuelle reponse.C'est vrai que je suis aussi papa bresilien.

Et la belle Eliane? Bien des choses a elle.Je n'ose pas lui proposer de m'ecrire.d'abord ce n'est pas poli, et ensuite on arriverait encore a se mordre,mais je crois que j'aimerais assez etre mordu par elle.Que veux-tu,j'aime souffrir moi. Bonjour a Dina,naturellement.

Tu m'ecris.je vous ecris et un jour j'arriverai.

David de Fanasknet
c/o Jan Pilsudski

Caixa Postal 11734(Lapa)
Sao Paulo
BRASIL

P.S Voici mon adresse.Prenez bien soin de l'ecrire en entier.Je suis souvent en deplacement

Monsieur et Madame Dr.Louis ELBET

a TALLARD (Hautes Alpes)

FRANCE

Mrs. Elbet is aves' brother's first wif
(friends)

Mr & Mrs Dr. Louis Elbet
a TALLARD (Hautes Alpes)
France

26 Oct 59

"Tired from a long journey" - signed the Pelican.

and now I am in Cha-Cha land. Rio is a magnificent town principale industries are pleasure and love. If I were a Brazilian I would say here we make love. Maybe this name is less poetic than Rio de Janerio but it is more poetic in the sense. Louis would make much money if he wereto come here in treating veneral disease cases. I will be here for several months and after that I think I will come and see you.

Now I am in San Paolo which is more magnifént that Rio. In the movies you can see Bart Lancaster and Brigitte Bardot talking in fluent Portugese.

I am now learning anew language, Portugese, which seems to be very much like Spanish. Everything now becomes mixed in my head. English, German, Russian, French, Georgian Spanish. If I go to China I will be lost/if I have to learn that language/

I think often of you. How are you and how arethe girls. Elico, Irene and Cathy I would like to have a letter from each one. It has been almost a year since I have seen them. At the same time I am writing to my brother.

How is everyone? My best regards to them.

21-233477

(brother Achille)
Mr. A. De Panashket Architecte
I bis, Avenue Bellevue (Lablache) GAP
My Dear Atchico:

26 Oct 1959

For one hour now I have been trying to start my letter, and don(t know how to start. My departure from GAP was inevitable, because you know what my situasion was there. Had it been possible I would have written to you sooner but it was not possible. Many things have remained as I left them and I don't want you to pay for anything which is my responsibility. I hope you will tell me who you have paid and how much. ~~Axxx~~ As soon as you answer me I will send you money. I could sendyou the money this time but I do not know if my letter will reach you and I will try to keep in touch with you again. When I left Ambert I left instructions for you but I ~~kn~~ don't know if they were carried out. I will write to Dassaud and I will know what has happened so far. I have been here for a few days and ~~was~~ have been very busy ~~xxxx~~ since I left GAP I cannot explain what I am doing but I ask your confidence. How are the girls. I would like tohave some photo's of them.

I kiss everybody

Dave

201-233477

October 13, 1959

Dear Paul,

Am sending David's letter to be forwarded further by you. This letter is dated 19 Oct. '59 so please post on or after that date.

Will send you other letters he may write in the future.

Thanks a lot for the conveniences and will appreciate your sending me any letters he shall receive.

Sincerely,

David's 1st letter to

TRANSLATION

Dear Jo and dear Lise,

I think it's about time I wrote you again. I wonder if, perhaps, these long months of silence haven't caused you to doubt my affection for you all, although before leaving you, you knew already that where I was going, it would be impossible for me to remain in contact with you.

How often have I seen the moment when I no longer had the chance to write you, and nevertheless, today this is possible, and I no longer know what to tell you -- My mind is a blank, but above all it's your turn to tell me what you have done. Where you are, life continues. You come and go; you see people -- and how are the three of you? What are you doing? I'm in such a hurry to hear from you that I want to mail this letter even before finishing it. There are so many things you can tell me because I need to hear you, to read you, and to be with you as before. I'm sure that some day I'll return and we'll have fun like crazy, but this is for later, perhaps in a few months from now?? I am now the most handsome man in Brazil. Evidently not for very long since I arrived only yesterday, but word has gotten around you know. They line up to see me!

In the meantime I was travelling all over, but above all I travelled quite a bit by air, and it can be said that since I left you, I spent half my time flying in the clouds with all kinds of planes, and also sometimes without planes. Sao Paulo is the pearl of Brazil. You meet a lot of Brzailian men and some pretty Brazilian women, but what I'm interested in is to know if you are all really in good health. My (greatest) wish would be to have a very long letter from each of you, including little Michel.

I give all three of you a very affectionate and big kiss.

[signed]

P.S. I want to point out to you that since the mail here leaves quite a bit to be desired and since I travel very often, it's better to write carefully the address I'm giving you. In any case I'll receive your letter.

201- 233477

le 11 Octobre 1959

Tres cher Jo et très chere Lise,

Je pense qu'il est grand temps que je vous donne signe de vie -- Je me demande si parfois ces longs mois de silence ne vous ont pas fait douter de mon affection pour vous tous, bien qu'avant de vous quitter vous saviez dejà, que là ou je me trouverais il me serait impossible de rester en contact avec vous.

Combien de fois j'ai vu venir le moment ou je n'avais plus eu l'occasion de vous ecrire et pourtant voilà qu'aujourd'hui cela m'est possible et je ne sais plus quoi vous dire -- Tout se vide dans mon esprit mais c'est surtout à vous de m'expliquer ce que vous avez fait -- Là où vous êtes, la vie continue. Vous allez, vous venez, vous voyez des gens --- et puis comment allez vous tous les trois? Que faites-vous? - J'ai envie d'expedier cette lettre avant même de l'avoir terminée tellement je suis pressé d'avoir de vos nouvelles - Il y à tant de choses que vous pouvez me raconter parceque j'ai besoin de vous entendre, de vous lire et d'etre avec vous comme par le passé. Je sais bien qu'un jour je reviendrai et nous rigolerons comme des bossus mais enfin ceci est pour plus tard, dans quelques mois peut-etre?? Maintenant je suis le plus beau de Bresil evidement il n'y a pas longtemps puisque je n'y suis arrivé que depuis hier mais ca se sait dejà vous savez. On fait la queue pour me voir!

Entre temps j'etais en voyage un peu partout mais j'ai surtout fait beaucoup d'avion et l'on peut dire que depuis que je vous ai quitte j'ai passe la moitie de mon temps dans les nuages avec toutes sortes d'engins volant, et parfois aussi sans avions -- São Paulo est la perle du Bresil -- On y rencontre un tas de Bresilien et de jolies Bresiliennes mais ce qui m'interesse c'est de savoir si vous etes tous vraiment bien portant. Mon plus desir serait d'avoir une tres longue lettre de chacun de vous -- Mon petit Michel inclus.

Je vous embrasse tous les trois très affectueusement et très fort.

(signed)

P.S. Je tiens a vous signaler que la poste ici laissant quelque peu à desirer et etant moi-même très souvent en deplacement il vaut mieux ecrire avec soin l'adresss que je vous donne. Entous les cas j'aurais votre lettre.

Sao Paulo, Brasil

David co [redacted]
c/o Jan [redacted]
Caixa Postal 11724, (Lapa)
Sao Paulo, Brasil

Le 19 Octobre 1959.

Très chers Jo et très chère Lise

Je pense qu'il est grand temps que je vous donne signe de vie - Je me demande si parfois ces longs mois de silence ne vous ont pas fait douter de mon affection pour vous tous, bien qu'avant de vous quitter vous saviez déjà, que là où je me trouverais il me serait impossible de rester en contact avec vous.

Combien de fois j'ai vu venir le moment où je n'aurais plus eu l'occasion de vous écrire et pourtant voilà qu'aujourd'hui cela m'est possible et je ne sais plus quoi vous dire - Tout se mêle dans mon esprit mais c'est surtout à vous de m'expliquer ce que vous avez fait - Là où vous êtes, la vie continue. Vous allez, vous venez, vous voyez des gens... et puis comment allez vous tous les trois ? Que faites-vous ? - J'ai envie d'expédier cette lettre avant même de l'avoir terminée tellement je suis pressé d'avoir de vos nouvelles - Il y a tant de choses que vous pouvez me raconter parceque j'ai besoin de vous entendre, de vous lire et d'être avec vous comme par le passé - Je sais bien qu'un jour je reviendrai et nous rigolerons comme des bossus mais enfin ceci est pour plus tard, dans quelques mois peut-être ??

201-233477

Monsieur etMadame Joseph DASSAUD
I4,rue Saint-Joseph
Ambert (Puy de Dome)

FRANCE

Maintenant je suis le plus beau [illegible] il n'y a pas longtemps puisque je n'y suis ~~arrivé que~~ depuis hier mais ça se sait déjà vous savez. On fait la queue pour me voir!

Entre temps j'étais en voyage un peu partout mais j'ai surtout fait beaucoup d'avion et l'on peut dire que depuis que je vous ai quitté j'ai passé la moitié de mon temps dans les nuages avec toutes sortes d'engins volants et parfois aussi sans avions. São Paulo est la perle du Brésil. On y rencontre un tas de Brésiliens et de jolies Brésiliennes mais ce qui m'intéresse c'est de savoir si vous êtes tous vraiment bien portants. Mon plus desir serait d'avoir une très longue lettre de chacun de vous. Mon petit Michel inclus.

Je vous embrasse tous les trois très très affectueusement et très fort.

Dath.

P.S. Je tiens à vous signaler que la poste ici laissant quelque peu à désirer et étant moi-même très souvent en déplacement il vaut mieux écrire avec soin l'adresse que je vous donne. En tous les cas j'aurais votre lettre.

[illegible] ARNAUD
rue Saint Joseph
Ambert Puy de Dome

Dear Joe + Loise

I think it's time to give you some indication I'm alive. You mustn't be surprised at my silence because as I told you before, it will not be possible to write to you. ~~Today~~ But today it's possible. ~~Everything is mixed up~~ I am somewhat confused, ~~and~~ so just go ahead and tell me whats new there. How are you? What have you been doing. You must have so much

201 233471

to tell me and I needy to hear from you and be with you as before. I am awaiting anxiously to have news of you. I know one day that I will come back, and we will have a good time again together. That, however, will be certainly not before several months. Now I am in Brazil. I ~~was~~ have been all over the place many times on ~~pla~~ airplanes. Today I am here in São Paolo. It's a very beautiful city. My greatest wish is to have a long letter from each of you.

Dath

P.S. I warn you that mail service here is a little poor, and as I am oft times in transit, please write my address correctly.

SR/DOB/59/2766

13 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

ATTENTION : William J. Cotter

SUBJECT : AEASPIC - #174803

REFERENCE : Memo from Director of Security, dtd. 6 Oct. 59.

1. As suggested in paragraph two of the referenced memorandum Subject, on 9 October 1959, was presented to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for registration and fingerprinting.

2. Three photographs of the Subject are attached. His physical description is as follows:

DOB:	12 July 1918
POB:	Tiflis, Georgia, USSR
Height:	5' 6"
Weight:	136 lbs.
Eyes:	Brown
Hair:	Black (Balding)
Build:	Small, wiry
Scars:	Old broken nose. Tip of thumb and first finger of right hand missing. Scar near right knee.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

OHT/vat

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - DOB Security
1 - Chrono

201-239477

INFO Chief, WHD COS, Rio	227-35-15 field
FROM COB, Sao Paulo	DATE 12 October 1959
SUBJECT Operational/IGDEFOOD/AEACRE Servicing of Accommodation Address	RE "43.3" (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED Instructions, see below	

REFERENCE(S)

a. DIR-47334, 6 October 1959
b. SAOP-1036, 2 October 1959
c. DIR-45223, 21 September 1959

It is requested that Base be provided instructions for servicing of the accommodation address referred to in references a. and b. Until such time as these instructions are received, Base plans to service the accommodation address once a week beginning with the week of 11 October 1959.

Timothy K. BANCIFER

8 October 1959

Distr:
4 - Chief, WHD
2 - COS, Rio
1 - Chief, SR

OV 1959

201-233477

HBPA-3747

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

SECRET

9 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Alien Registration of AEASPIC

1. SR/DOB Case Officer, Fred Kirkpatrick drove AEASPIC to 119 D Street N.E. for a 1000 appointment with Miss BYARD in room 517 of Immigration and Naturalization for purpose of alien registry. Full fingerprints and true biographical information were taken at this time. Certificate of Registry will be forwarded to agent by Immigration people in the name David DURVARD.

Fred Kirkpatrick
FRED KIRKPATRICK

SECRET

201-233477

14-00000

SECRET

6 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Lockpicking Instruction for AEASPIC

Case Officer, Fred Kirkpatrick picked up George F. Muns, TSS/ASD and drove him to safehouse for purpose of instruction of basic fundamentals of lockpicking to AEASPIC. Instruction was from 1100 hours to 1230 hours. After lunch, Muns was driven back to town. Muns was introduced to agent as "George".

F. Kirkpatrick

Orig - Daily Log file
1 - Subj's 201

SECRET

201-233477

SECRET

SR/DOB/59/1751

1 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Division

ATTENTION : Non-official Cover Branch (Jack Lynch)

SUBJECT : Cover Alias

REFERENCE : SR/DOB Memo No. 1748 dtd. 30 September 1959,
Subj: AEASPIC, Request for Cover.

Subject of referenced memorandum is to use the alias of David DURVARD.

GEORGE A. FILL
Acting Chief, SR/DOB

SECRET

SR/DOB/59/1214

30 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Division

ATTENTION : Non-official Cover Branch
(Jack Lynch)

SUBJECT : AEASPIC
(Request for Cover)

1. AEASPIC is a contract agent with an operational approval. As his overseas assignment has been postponed, it is desired to hold him in this country for about nine months. TSS has agreed to utilize his services during the period he is in the U.S. and has requested a covert security approval which is now being processed.

2. Subject will be paid by SR/DOB and handled by a DOB case officer. He will be working in safehouse number 269 recently vacated by TSS.

3. It is requested that a non-official cover be provided Subject to explain his employment in safehouse 269 and that he be provided with a backstopped cover story to permit him to rent an apartment in the downtown area and to live in a normal manner. Subject's proposed alias is forwarded under separate cover.

4. Listed below is background information on Subject. For additional information contact O. H. Todd of this office on extension 4705.

General Information

a. Subject is a contract agent being converted to contract employee for a 9 - 12 month period.

b. Subject has an OA. A CSA has been requested.

c. He has had a satisfactory psychological assessment and a carriage test.

d. No previous non-official cover.

Biographical Information

a. DOB 12 July 1918, TIFLIS, USSR. Subject is male, divorced, currently a French citizen.

201-233477

b. Subject has some college education, makes a good appearance and can pass as a professional man.

c. His take home pay will be $400. a month.

d. Most of his life has been spent in France with war time jobs in Germany.

e. He speaks French, German and Georgian. His English is adequate for making his own way in day to day situations.

Security Considerations

a. Subject knows he works for "U.S. Intelligence". No more.

b. In an emergency involving agent contact, Chief, SR/DOB, SR/DOB/COP or Security Officer/SR/DOB on extension 8331.

c. Subject is in this country "black", having arrived about six months ago. Prior to that he was in France for several years. He is currently being held in an SR safehouse.

PERRY E. CROOKHAM
Acting Chief, SR/DOB

OHT/vat

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - SR/DOB Security
1 - SR/DOB Chrono

[illegible] 23477

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Soviet Russia Division

DATE: 6 October 1959

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT: AEASPIC - #174803

REFERENCE: Memorandum from D/C, SR Division dated 29 September 1959

1. Action has been initiated with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to permit the subject to remain in the United States in a parole status for an additional six months' period. This is the normal length of time for which such paroles are granted. If necessary, at the expiration of six months, assuming the conduct of the subject so warrants, steps will then be taken to further extend his parole.

2. It is requested that this Office be provided with a complete physical description of the subject, along with front view and profile photographs. In addition, in order to satisfy the requirements of the I&NS, it is felt that he should be presented to an appropriate official of the I&NS for registration, which will include the taking of his fingerprints (for submission to the FBI). This registration procedure and other security aspects of his handling during his stay in the United States should be discussed with a representative of this Staff in the immediate future.

3. The request for a security approval for his utilization by TSS is currently being processed in the Security Support Division of this Office.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

William Cotter

William J. Cotter
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

SECRET

[illegible] 133477

577/SE/LS

ORIG: Perry Crockham
UNIT: SR/DOB
EXT: 8331
DATE: 5 October 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING
1 DOB
2 DOS
3
4
5
6

OCT 6 ... 15 55
CID CABLE SEC

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO: SAO PAULO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH 4, S/C 2 (RIOD 3 (POUCHED))

OUT 53109

TO SAOP INFO Riod (by pouch) CITE DIR 47334

47334

REDWOOD AEACRE

REF A. SAOP 1036 (IN 32746)

B. DIR 45223 (OUT 98152)

1. WILL USE ADDRESS PARA 1 REF A.

2. POUCH TOO SLOW. WILL SEND DE PANASKHETS MAIL TO RANCIFER FOR REMAILING.

3. REQUEST INCOMING MAIL AS OUTLINED PARA 3 REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

REF A. Requested accommodation address for use by Agent David De Panaskhet.

REF B. Suggested accommodation address for above Agent.

David's correspondence file.

SR/10 M. Keck

SR/COP/FI

WH/2

5 OCT 1959

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

CSR/DOB
MICHAEL RAE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

206/CI/CIT/CIT/CIT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET 3

DATE: 3 OCT 1959

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: SAO PAULO

ACTION: [illegible]

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, [illegible], S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	6	

ROUTINE

IN 32746

TO DIR INFO RIOD (POUCH) CITE SAOP 1036

REDWOOD AEACRE

REF DIR 45223 (OUT 98152)*

1. BASE HAS ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS CITED SAOP 762 (IN 30009). SEE HEPA 2663 RE THIS BOX.

2. RE PARA 2 REF BASE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHY OUT LETTERS OF DAVID DE PADASKHET NOT POUCHED BASE FOR INSERTION LOCAL POSTAL SYSTEM, UNLESS SERVICE DEEMED SLOW. SUGGEST USE APO ADDRESS RANCIFER RATHER THAN OPEN MAIL TO FWD OUT LETTERS TO SAOP IF USE POUCH UNDESIRABLE.

3. CAN REMAIL INCOMING LETTERS AS SUGGESTED PARA 3 REF IF THIS METHOD DEEMED MORE DESIRABLE THAN POUCH.

4. ADVISE IF HQS INTEND USE ABOVE BOX OTHERWISE, WILL TRY OBTAIN ANOTHER.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR USE BY AGENT DAVID DE PADASKHET.

5 OCT 1959

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-233477
Copy No.

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI ATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ C FIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	SR/DCB	WR	
2	Kent	HJ	
3	[illegible]		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Retain in
Acsapic file

29 SEP 1959

29 [illegible]

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
DCSR	

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

(40)

FORM NO. 237 Replaces Form 30-4 which may be used.
1 APR 55

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1955—O-342531

29 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

ATTENTION: Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT: AEASPIC
174803

REFERENCE: Office of Security Memo dated
18 September 1959

1. Further consideration has been given to the holding of subject agent in the U.S. prior to the activation of his operation in the summer of 1960. Maintaining him in a "hold" status abroad, probably in Germany, was also considered. The nature and sensitivity of the operation with which subject will be connected makes preferable a holding status as close to Headquarters as possible. Employment in a Headquarters element would provide day-to-day supervision and make possible periodic operational contacts to review questions of security, morale, and new operational developments.

2. Therefore, SR Division solicits the support of the Office of Security in making it possible for us to hold the agent in the U.S. during the next year, making the necessary arrangements with the Attorney General.

CHARLES KATEK
Deputy Chief, SR Division

201-253477

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, SR/DIV

DATE: 18 September 1959

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT: AEASPIC
174303

REF : SR/DOB Memorandum dated 14 September 1959

1. The subject is an alien who, at the request of SR/DIV (for the purpose of Redsox training), was paroled into the U. S. into the custody of the CIA in April 1959.

2. According to the referenced memorandum, the subject's training for this purpose has been suspended until about 1 August 1960, when it will be reinstituted. This delay, it is understood, is due to the fact that his proposed mission has been postponed until late 1960.

3. It is observed that SR/DIV proposes that the subject be permitted to remain in the U. S., without being in custody, until his training is reinstituted in late 1960, and, in the interim, his services will be utilized by TSS. It is also noted that the subject has, in the past, been convicted of robberies abroad; has engaged in various nefarious activities and that his knowledge of the English language is limited.

4. Although recognizing that the subject is undoubtedly a likely candidate for the Redsox program, and further, that, psychologically, it might well be preferable for the individual to feel that he is not in an "arrest" category, still, this office is reluctant to place in jeopardy the arrangements made with the Attorney General by CIA, whereby individuals otherwise excludable can be brought into the U. S. for training or for other operational purposes.

5. It is felt, consequently, that further consideration should be given to the necessity for keeping AEASPIC in the U. S. during the period he is waiting for his training to be commenced.

AF-233477

In the event after full consideration, it is still deemed essential that he remain in this country during the interim period, it is suggested that the Director of Security be provided with a detailed memorandum of justification.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

William Cotter
William J. Cotter
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

14-00000

530 GIS/SI/SII/

ORIG: Perry Crookhar
UNIT: SR/DOL
EXT: 8331
DATE: 17 September 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

Perry
DOC
DOC
B
10

TO: SAO PAULO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH 4, S/C 2

Sep 21 [illegible] 59

CUT 00152
45223

SAOP

REDWOOD AEACRE

1. REQUEST LOCAL ACCOMODATION ADDRESS FOR USE BY AGENT DAVID DE PANASKHET.

2. ALSO NEED NAME AND ADDRESS IN ORDER MAIL HIS OUT LETTERS TO SAO PAULO FOR YOUR INSERTION INTO LOCAL POSTAL SYSTEM.

3. INCOMING LETTERS SHOULD BE REMAILED IN SECOND ENVELOPE TO ROBERT P. HACHE PO BOX 3028 S.W. STATION WASHINGTON 25 D C.

END OF MESSAGE

SR/10 M. Burk
SR/COP/FI
WH/2 R D Galvey

22 SEP 1959

MR
D

C/WH

Michael Rae
MICHAEL RAE

SECRET

[illegible] BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE [illegible]

201-233477

SECRET

SR/DOB/59/ 1735

17 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

THROUGH : Special Contracting Officer

FROM : Contract Approving Officer, Michael Rae

SUBJECT : Engagement of Ernest G. HAICRINK (p) as Independent Contractor

REFERENCE : SR/DOB/59/ 1660, dated 24 July 1959 to Finance Division re same subject

1. Project AESENTINEL, under which subject individual has been engaged, was originally approved through the period 31 March 1960. A request for renewal and amendment of the project has been submitted to FI, and it is intended subject individual will be utilised under this project during 1960.

2. The following provisions will apply to subject individual during the interim period, i.e.: 20 September 1959 through 30 June 1960.

3. Term and Project Charge. Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project AESENTINEL. The effective date of the oral contract is 20 April 1959, and has been extended through the period 31 March 1961, subject to termination by the Government upon thirty (30) days actual notice.

4. Security Approval. The initial security clearance obtained for Subject's use, CI/OA No. C-73532, dated 11 March 1959, has been suspended during the interim period. Requests have been made of the Office of Security (SSD and Alien Affairs Staff) for subject's use.

5. Citizenship. Subject is a foreign national.

6. Compensation. Subject will be paid salary in the amount of $400.00 per month, payable in United States currency.

7. Quarters and Subsistence. Basic quarters and subsistence costs will be borne by the Subject. Occasional incidental expenses will be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

8. Operational Expenses. No Operational Expenses are contemplated during the period covered.

9. Other Commitments. The following additional commitments have been made to the Subject:

SECRET

201-233477

a. Medical Benefits. Subject will receive such dental and medical benefits as may be necessary to maintain his physical status for his eventual use on his assigned mission. Costs to be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

b. Insurance. Insurance coverage for death or disability incurred in line of duty, not to exceed $5,000.00. Costs chargeable against Project AESENTINEL.

c. Resettlement. The initial provisions made for resettlement of Subject still apply.

d. Entertainment. Basic entertainment expenses will be borne by Subject. Occasional entertainment expenses will be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

10. Contingent Obligations. Although no such promise has been made the Subject, resettlement in the United States could possibly become necessary as a form of control, should this be deemed necessary from a security viewpoint.

11. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

12. At such time as Subject re-enters training for his proposed mission, about 1 July 1960, all provisions of his initial engagement will again apply.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

Dist:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Contracting Officer

21 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: David's use the name David De Panaskhet

Where: In France, everwhere

When: 1956 to present

With: All friends and relatives

Registered with police as D. Tzitzichivili. In Gap, France when police called him in they referred to him as Mr. De Panaskhet but while they questioned him they referred to him as Mr. Tzitzichivili.

David has no official documents in the name of De Panaskhet, all of his documents are in the name of Tzitzichivili.

David had a chess club membership card in the name De Panaskhet.

David wrote a book "It's Better for me to sit in the chair (electric)" a crime novel. An article concerning this book with a picture of Dave appeared in the newspaper La Provencal - this article had a picture of Dave with the name De Panaskhet, in 1957.

201-233477

Chief, SR/DIV 18 September 1959

Director of Security

AEASPIC
174803

REF : SR/LOB Memorandum dated 14 September 1959

1. The subject is an alien who, at the request of SR/DIV (for the purpose of Redsox training), was paroled into the U. S. into the custody of the CIA in April 1959.

2. According to the referenced memorandum, the subject's training for this purpose has been suspended until about 1 August 1960, when it will be reinstituted. This delay, it is understood, is due to the fact that his proposed mission has been postponed until late 1960.

3. It is observed that SR/DIV proposes that the subject be permitted to remain in the U. S., without being in custody, until his training is reinstituted in late 1960, and, in the interim, his services will be utilized by TSS. It is also noted that the subject has, in the past, been convicted of robberies abroad; has engaged in various nefarious activities and that his knowledge of the English language is limited.

4. Although recognizing that the subject is undoubtedly a likely candidate for the Redsox program, and further, that, psycholcgically, it might well be preferable for the individual to feel that he is not in an "arrest" category, still, this office is reluctant to place in jeopardy the arrangements made with the Attorney General by CIA, whereby individuals otherwise excludable can be brought into the U. S. for training or for other operational purposes.

5. It is felt, consequently, that further consideration should be given to the necessity for keeping AEASPIC in the U. S. during the period he is waiting for his training to be commenced.

201-233477

In the event after full consideration, it is still deemed essential that he remain in this country during the interim period, it is suggested that the Director of Security be provided with a detailed memorandum of justification.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

William J. Cotter
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

SR/DCB/59/ [illegible]

14 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OS/Alien Affairs Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Pennington

SUBJECT : Change of status, case of AEASPIC, CI/OA No. C-73532

1. As outlined in the attachment, it is desired that subject's present 24-hour custodial status be suspended until such time as he re-enters R-TSOX training about 1 August 1960, and authority be granted for him to reside in an apartment in Washington, D.C. under alias, where he will not be under 24-hour supervision. Subject is to be employed by TSS, and will report daily to an established TSS covert site.

2. Although subject will not be under constant direct supervision during this period, he will be reporting week days to a TSS representative, in addition to which he will be contacted on a weekly basis by a member of this Base. Subject's unescorted movement will be limited to Washington, D.C. proper and he has already been informed of various other restrictions which he must abide by, i.e.: no auto, no driver's permit, no permanent room-mate, certain bar and night club limitations, and so forth.

3. Subject is available at the convenience of your office for such visits to Immigration and Naturalization Offices as may be deemed necessary.

4. For further information regarding subject agent, please contact Mr. Perry Crookham on extension 8331.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

Attachment:
cc Memo for Chief, OS/SSD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Subj's 201
1 - Chrono

201-233477

SR/COB/59/ -472-

14 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OS/SSD

ATTENTION : Mr. Richard Hanna

SUBJECT : Request for ZI utilization of agent, AEASPIC

1. Background:
Subject was brought to the United States via UBRAINBOW flight on 20 April 1959 for training, after which he was to have been dispatched on a black mission into the USSR as a member of a REDSOX team during late 1959. CI/OA Division approved (No. C-73532) on 11 March 1959. The proposed mission was recently postponed until late 1960, and it is presently contemplated that subject will re-enter training for the mission about 1 August 1960.

2. Inasmuch as considerable time, effort and expense have been devoted to the recruitment and training of the agent, who appears well qualified for the mission, it is desired to retain him during the interim in a productive capacity. Due to his rather unique background and capabilities, it is believed he could be employed in a useful capacity by TSS.

3. In view of the foregoing, it is presently planned to release subject from the present 24-hour custody, permit him to reside in an apartment in Washington, D.C. under alias, and work on a daily basis for TSS offices in an established (TSS) covert site. The work tentatively planned for him involves cataloging specific information taken from East German documents, and developing and/or improving tools and methods for picking locks. Although TSS might present other related requirements, subject's employment would not involve work which would preclude his eventual use as a REDSOX agent.

4. By separate memoranda, CI/OA Division has been requested to suspend subject's OA until he resumes training, and OS/Alien Affairs Staff has been requested to coordinate with Immigration and Naturalization Office concerning subject's proposed status and documentation.

5. Your approval of paragraph 3 above is requested.

6. For further information on this subject, please contact Mr. Perry Crookham on extension 8331.

Distr: O,1-Add, 1-OS/AAS, 2-Subj's file
1-Chrono

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/COB

201-233477

SR/DCB/59/

11 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Ray McCarnon

SUBJECT : Request for suspension of CI/OA No. C-73532 (AEASPIC)

1. As reported telephonically to your office, it is presently planned to utilize subject agent in the Washington, D.C. area, under alias, from the present time until early summer, 1960. Subject will be working on a daily basis for TSS offices in an established (TSS) covert site. The work tentatively planned for him involves cataloging specific information taken from East German documents, and developing and/or improving tools and methods for picking locks. Although TSS may present other related requirements, subject's employment will not involve work which would preclude his eventual use as a REDSOX agent.

2. By separate memoranda, authority for utilizing subject in this ZI employment has been requested of OS/SSD, and OS/Alien Affairs Staff has been requested to coordinate with Immigration and Naturalization Office concerning subject's proposed status and documentation.

3. It is therefore requested that subject's Operational Approval be suspended, to be reactivated upon request about 1 August 1960, at which time subject will re-enter training for the originally planned REDSOX mission.

4. For further information regarding this subject, please contact Mr. Perry Crookham on extension 8331.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DCB

PC/vat

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Subj. 201 file
1 - Chrono

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Examination of Agent in Safehouse September 3, 1959

FROM:
AC/OD/MS 2714 I Building (3348)

NO.

DATE 9 September 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/SR/DOB Attention: Mr. William Romer				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 476711

SECRET

9 September 1959

MEMORANDUM TO: C/SR/DOB

ATTENTION : Mr. William Romer

SUBJECT : Examination of Agent in Safehouse September 3, 1959

1. History: Subject states he has always been in good health. He is an ex-French foreign legionaire, survivor of German concentration camps and has held many jobs under various conditions. He feels in excellent health and is free from complaints.

2. Physical Examination: Height 5'6", weight 136 pounds, age 41. General: Small, wiry, balding Frenchman with prominant features who appears in excellent health. He is intelligent, cooperative and quite sociable. Blood pressure 110/70, pulse 66, respiration 14, temperature 98.6°. Head and EENT: Evidence of old broken nose with a deviated septum. Neck and nodes: negative. Chest: lungs and heart negative. Abdomen: negative. Genitalia, rectum and prostate: negative. Orthopedic and neurological: negative. Scar near right knee.

3. Impression: Healthy male with life expectancy (under ordinary conditions) to age 68 or 70. No recommendations.

Lee K. Buchanan, MD
LEE K. BUCHANAN, M.D.
Acting Chief, Operations Division,
Medical Staff

201-233477

SECRET

20 August 1959

Mr. Ernest G. Mayerink:

You are hereby notified that your services under an agreement with the Government, effective 20 April 1959, are terminated effective the date of this memorandum for the convenience of said Government.

Effective this date upon the affixing of your signature, you relinquish all further claims against the Government for services furnished during the effective period of such agreement.

Your signature in the space provided below is acknowledgment of the contents thereof.

By Contracting Officer

ACKNOWLEDGED

____

WITNESSED

____

201 235477

Agent # 2. (DAVID)

1918 JULY 12

TIFLIS
GEORGIAN. SSR.

1941 BERLIN, GER AUSTRIA

1943 POLAND (LODZ, POZEN, WARSAW)

201-233477

GEORGIAN ~~GEORGIAN~~ FRENCH

				UNDERSTAND
GEORGIAN	GOOD ~~NATIVE~~	GOOD	GOOD. ~~FAIR~~	GOOD.
FRENCH	NATIVE ~~WELL~~	GOOD	NATIVE ~~WELL~~	NATIVE
GERMAN	WELL		WELL	WELL
SPANISH	FAIR		FAIR	FAIR
ENGLISH	FAIR		FAIR	FAIR.

5'10" WEIGHT 56 KG.

AGE: 40

WOUNDS ON INDEX FINGER + THUMB LEFT HAND (ACCIDENT WITH HAND GRENADE)
TIP OF FORE FINGER + THUMB OF RIGHT HAND MISSING.

14-00000

N.A.

1940 - 1941 CAVALRY DISTINGUISHED PRIVATE

N.A.

NONE

N.A.

N.A.

ELECTRICAL
~~[illegible]~~

ECOLE BREGUET
PARIS

1939

1923

PARIS, FRANCE

[illegible] school [illegible]
attended by the agent

Specialty or Profession	[illegible]	Place of Employment	Dates
AUTO MECHANIC ASS'T		FRANCÉ	
NIGHT WATCHMAN			
WELDER			
LATHE OPERATOR			

[illegible]

N.A.

[illegible]

N.A.

Agent #2. (DAVID)

SECRET

PART TWO (Operational Data)

Biographical

1. Agent's cryptonym AEASPIC.

Russian spelling

familiya otchestvo imya

2. Agent's operational name:

Native Language spelling (if other than Russian)

familiya otchestvo imya

3. Operational names for mother and father:

Russian spellings

(mother)
imya otchestvo

(father)
imya otchestvo

Native Language spellings (if other than Russian)

(mother)
imya otchestvo

(father)
imya otchestvo

Infiltration

4. Approximate date of agent's departure from training area ______. 5. Approximate date of agent infiltration Circa 26 (day) Sept (month) 1959 (year).

6. If infiltration is by air or water how long will the agent stay in hiding before traveling to the target area? 1 hour 30 minutes

SECRET

Mission

7. Describe the itinerary of the agent from time of infiltration to time of exfiltration. (This information is needed in order to avoid using places he will visit in the documents.)

in flight

8. Will the agent seek employment while on the mission? NO

9. Will the agent contact any relatives or friends while on his mission? NO

If so, indicate their places of residence.

Exfiltration

10. Approximate date of exfiltration Sept (month) 59 (year)

11. Indicate method of exfiltration. Walkacross - illegal

12. If method is illegal border crossing, indicate exact location on border. (This information is needed for necessary border cachet or border pass.)

Remarks

13. Indicate any proposals or suggestions on the part of SR for document legend; i.e., place of PASPORT issuance, etc.

14. Has the agent been asked his ideas as to cover? If so list them briefly.

15. Is this to be a singleton operation? NO. If this agent is to be infiltrated with one or more others, will they be traveling together during the operation? YES

16. Attach any photographs (even though taken several years ago) which the agent might have of himself. (This is of the utmost importance in cases where the agent was born before 1930.

20 August 1959

Mr. Ernest G. Maycrink:

You are hereby notified that your services under an agreement with the Government, effective 20 April 1959, are terminated effective the date of this memorandum for the convenience of said Government.

Effective this date upon the affixing of your signature, you relinquish all further claims against the Government for services furnished during the effective period of such agreement.

Your signature in the space provided below is acknowledgment of the contents thereof.

By Contracting Officer

ACKNOWLEDGED

____

WITNESSED

____

201-233477

20 August 1959

TO: Contracting Officer

Effective this date, and in concurrence with the Government representative, I, Ernest O. Maycrink, request that I be paid this date all monies accrued to me and held in escrow for me by the Government under an agreement with said Government for the period 20 April 1959 to 20 August 1959.

Ernest G. Maycrink

ERNEST O. HAYCRINK

(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 33065 A

DATE 6 August 1959

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE)

DAVID TZITZICHVILI
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS:

SECRET

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 33065 B

DATE 6 August 1959

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) Ernest G Maycrink

ERNEST G MAYCRINK
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS:

SECRET 201-233477

SECRET

Biographical Data

David TZITZICHVILI was born 20 December 1919, in Tbilisi, Georgia. He is 5' 7½" and of slight build. Subject has been assessed as of superior intelligence. He identifies himself with city life and although of Georgian birth and ancestry, has lived most of his life in France. Subject served in the French Army as a private (1939-1941). Upon demobilization, he worked in Germany as an electrician (1943-1945). He was liberated by the U.S. Army in 1945. Subject speaks French (native), Georgian, German and some English.

SECRET

201-233477

SA/CS/591 1660

24 July 1959

TO: Chief, Finance Division

VIA: Special Contracting Officer

FROM: Contract Approving Officer, Michael Rae

SUBJECT: Engagement of Ernest G. MAYCRINK (P) as Independent Contractor.

1. Term and Project Charge. The subject individual has been engaged under oral contract, for use under Project AESENTINEL. The effective date of the oral contract is 20 April 1959, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one year subject to termination by the Government upon thirty (30) days actual notice.

2. Security Approval. The appropriate security approval for Subject's use has been obtained. Type Operational Approval, No. C-73532, dated 11 March 1959.

3. Citizenship. The Subject is a foreign national.

4. Compensation. Subject will be paid salary in the amount of $500.00 per month, payable in United States currency. Of this amount, he will actually receive $50.00 per month during training and the duration of the mission. All unpaid monies will accrue to his credit in an escrow account, the payment of which will be dependent upon the proper performance of his duties and be payable upon completion of mission for which engaged. Provisions also made for payment of bonus not to exceed $10,000.00.

5. Quarters and Subsistence. The Subject will be furnished quarters and subsistence. These costs to be borne by SR/DOB Station funds.

6. Operational Expenses.

Operational travel and expenses to be paid as officially authorized.

a. Domestic travel costs will be borne by SR/DOB Station funds. Travel costs to and from the United States, and foreign travel will be charged against Project AESENTINEL.

b. Operational expenses to be borne by Project AESENTINEL. Training expenses to be carried by Station Allotment.

201-233477

14-00000

7. Other Commitments.

The following additional commitments have been made to the Subject:

a. Medical Benefits. Subject will receive such dental and medical benefits as may be necessary to permit him to properly perform his assigned mission. Costs to be borne by SR/DCB Station funds.

b. Insurance. Insurance coverage for death or disability incurred in line of duty, not to exceed $5,000.00. Costs chargeable against Project A[illegible]ENTIGEL.

c. Resettlement. Provisions made for resettlement of Subject in a country other than that in which he was recruited. Costs of resettlement will not exceed $1,000.00, and will be chargeable against Project A[illegible]ENTIGEL.

d. Entertainment. All normal entertainment expenses will be borne by SR/DCB Station funds.

8. Contingent Obligations. The following has not be promised the individual, but may have to be met by the Government:

a. Resettlement in the United States, either as an additional bonus for the Subject or as a form of control should this become necessary from a security viewpoint.

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DCB

FC/vat

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - SR/FF
- 1 - SR/DCB Finance
- 1 - Subject's 201 File
- 1 - Chrono

SECTION A

Prepare in duplicate

REQUEST FOR: Pseudonym x Alias ______ [illegible] or ______
[illegible] Derivative name ______

Pseudonym assigned Ernest G. MAYCRINK

Alias assigned David Tardent

Cryptonym assigned AEASPIC

a. Project or agent (give adequate description; if a project please give description at bottom of page/section.) AESENTINEL Project

b. (Status: Staff Employee; Staff, Contract, or Field Agent, etc.)

Field Agent

SR/DOB Gregg Ross FI
Requesting [illegible] Case Officer (Type of activity FI, PP, [illegible])

d. Is to be used in cable traffic (yes or no) No

e. List any pseudonyms or aliases previously assigned None

SECTION B

True name David TZITZICHVILI (True name not to go out of SR Division)

Project description

DATE

[illegible]

201-233477

[illegible]

2 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB

FROM : Training Staff, SR/DOB
Billy Jack Johnson

SUBJECT : AESENTINEL Training 25 - 30 May 1959
Map and Compass

1. The originator enjoyed the opportunity to instruct agents AESENTINEL 1 and 2 in Map and Compass.

2. Heavy stress was placed on Maps. Compass work had to be brought into the subject but in a very light degree.

3. The agents showed a very keen interest in the subjects and felt that they had really improved their working knowledge in Maps and Compass.

4. In Maps, the following subjects were covered.

a. What are maps and why they are needed.

b. Various types of maps.

c. Terrain and how indicated on maps.

d. Map orientation, Compass inspection, Graphic

e. True North, Mag North and Grid North.

f. Map declination

g. Map direction

h. Sand Table contours

i. Cardboard profiles

j. Map Symbols

k. Ridge lines and Valleys

l. Terrain Movement

201-239477

Salary payment record

27 April	$50.00 drawn from DOB/Finance by George Fill as initial $25.00 payment each to AEASPIC and AENUTMEG/3. Receipts obtained and submitted to Bernie Mohr.
20 May	$200.00, representing partial salary for agents for period 20 April to 19 May drawn from DOB/Finance by Perry Crookham. $50.00 paid AEASPIC, $150.00 paid AENUTMEG/3, of which $100.00 was refunded to DOB/Finance, and a TA sent The Hague with request the $100. be converted to Swedish Kroner and forwarded in AENUTMEG's letter to his parents. Receipts for $50. and $150. obtained from the agents and filed in respective 201 files.
9 July	$200.00, representingpartial salary for agents for period 20 May to 19 June drawn from DOB/Finance by Perry Crookham. $50.00 of above amount for AEASPIC being held in his 201 file. $150. of above was drawn for AENUTMEG 3 - $79.00 of which was converted to 400 Swedish Kroner and posted to AENUTMEG's parents in his letter. The remaining $71.00 being held in NUTMEG's 201 file. Receipts to be obtained at time of payment.
20 August	$100.00, representing partial salary for agents for period 19 July - 20 August drawn from DOB/Finance by Fred Kirkpatrick. $50.00 of above amount for AEASPIC and $50.00 for AENUTMEG/3. Receipts obtained. Following receipted to be obtained for total salary/bonus amounts for both agents, in view of project postponement.

AENUTMEG/3: $42.95 (total refund on allotment to parents)
$1350.00 (total escrow account)
$1000.00 (total bonus)
Plus new set of totaling $600.00 (200. for months of May, June and July as per written.

AFASPIC: $1700.00 (total escrow account)
$1000.00 (total bonus)
NOTE: AFASPIC's partial salary receipts are in order re agreement.

m. Map study for concealed movement.

n. Map locations by:

1. Universal Military Grid

2. Latitude and Longitude

Note: In view that final maps for ops were not known, very little stress was placed on Grids and Lat; Long systems.

5. Compass Subjects:

1. Two Compasses were available. U. S. Army Lensatic and Swiss made reflector direct reading types.

2. Agents selected the Lensatic as their choice.

Not to much emphasis was placed on compasses, but enough to enable the agents to use a map.

Following subjects of compasses were taught:

a. Azimuths

b. Back azimuths

c. Converting from Map to Compass and Compass to Map

d. Map orientation by Compass

e. Compass, nite use.

6. Instructors Observations of Students

David is very intelligent and shows an interest in doing a good job on his assignment. Is cautious, out spoken, and desires to talk over any requirements given to him in writing. He diplomatically assums leadership and discusses aspects of problems with his partner Al. He also was very interested in the subject of Map and Compass and personally thanked me for the interests showed in their questions.

Al is also very intelligent and he, I think, respects Davids age and knowledge and accepts Davids leadership. However, if he does not fully understand Davids comments, he questions David until he is satisfied in his mind that what David is doing is right.

SECRET

These agents work well together and it is my personal feeling that with proper considerations or call it "agent handling", they will accomplish their assigned mission.

I do recommend, once the type of Maps and Compasses are decided upon for ops usage, that the agents be given more work in Maps and Compass. At any rate, they do need practical work now in the use of a Map and Compass.

BILLY JACK JOHNSON

Orig. & 1 - Chief, SR/DOB
c.c. 1 - SR/DOB/COP
1 - Project AESENTINEL C.O.

TO : Chief, SR Division

Date: 18 May 1959

ATTN : George FILL

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT: S.F.#: ~~[illegible]~~ 171803

IRD#: 36915

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Subject of this report is a forty year-old divorced stateless male, resident of France. Subject was born in Russia and has been residing in France since childhood. He has never received his French citizenship.

2. On 13 March 1959 Mr. George FILL, Deputy Chief SR/DOB, requested that Subject be polygraphically examined as soon as he (Subject) could be made available in a safe house in Paris, France. Mr. FILL stated that Subject was being considered for use in a sensitive position and, in view of Subject's complicated life history, it was felt necessary to check out certain portions on the polygraph. The primary interest was to polygraphically determine whether the events in Subject's life history, from approximately 1940 on, had actually occurred; whether Subject was fabricating in order to deliberately deceive the Americans because he was an opposition agent, or whether he was exaggerating in order to make himself appear more suitable.

3. On 23, 24, and 25 March 1959 Subject was interviewed and polygraphically examined in the French language, on the premises of a safe house in Paris, France. Subject was very cooperative throughout the interviews and readily submitted to polygraph examination.

DETAILS OF THE REPORT

1. Subject stated that he was born on 12 July 1918 in Gori near the town of Tiflis in Georgia. Subject has two siblings, a sister, Helen, born on 1 May 1915 and a brother, Achille, born on 17 July 1916. Subject's father was a petroleum engineer and was rather well-to-do, but following the Bolshevik Revolution and the assimilation of the short-lived Republic into the Soviet Union, Subject and his family fled and settled in France in the early 1920's.

2. Subject's early years were spent in Paris where he attended various schools without graduating from any of them. Subject ascribes this to his inability to accept the prescribed dull instruction and the everyday boredom of learning things in which he was not interested. Subject also stated that he was rather wild and undisciplined in those days, and liked to do as he pleased.

201-233477

3. From 1935 to 1936 Subject attended the school of "Arts and Metiers" at Chalons-sur-Marne for approximately one and one-half years. He was expelled from this school because of a childish prank. Subject and several of his friends had gone into a forbidden area in the attic where they were exploring. The head of the school heard a noise and went to investigate. Subject jumped out of a window into the courtyard and was caught by the Director. This was the last of a long series of infractions of the school discipline, and the Director of the school, wanting to make an example of Subject, requested that his (Subject's) parents take Subject out of the school. This was a technical school, leading to a degree in engineering.

4. The next school that Subject attended was Ecole Breguet, which led to a degree in electrical engineering, located on Rue Pasteur in Paris. Subject lasted here for a period of six months, and was expelled because he had made a photograph of a nude woman and was caught showing it around the school.

5. From 1937 to 1938, a period of approximately 14 months, Subject attended the Ecole Cinematographique. The course here lasted for only two years, and Subject almost made it all the way. Subject stated that he was a good student in those courses in which he was interested, but he would never submit to discipline or authority from individuals for whom he had no respect and no liking. This ended Subject's formal education.

6. When Subject was in his teens he got into difficulty with the French Police on several occasions. When he was approximately 15½ years of age, Subject and his mother had gone to a hotel in Paris, and during a routine check of identity papers it was established that Subject's identity card had lapsed, and he was taken to the police precinct in order to explain the circumstances. Subject was accompanied by his mother, who promised to the police that this would be attended to immediately.

7. When Subject was approximately 16 years of age, he stole a dictionary from a book store. He was apprehended by the clerk who called the police, and Subject was taken to the local precinct. A call was made to Subject's mother, and Subject was released in his mother's custody. No restitution was necessary, since the book had been taken back by the clerk.

8. When Subject was 17 years of age, he and a group of his friends had gone to Robinson in order to go horseback riding. They were late in returning the horses and started galloping in the streets of Robinson in order to get back to the riding stable. The local gendarme stopped them and charged them with some infraction having to do with disturbance of the peace. Subject stated that three years later, he returned and paid a 900 franc fine.

9. When Subject was 19 years of age, he spent 12 days in jail in Paris. This was due to an infraction of the French registration ordinances for foreigners, during the days prior to the start of World War II.

The French had instituted a special means of control for the non-French citizens residing in France, and Subject had neglected to get the proper documents. Subject stated that these were the only brushes with the French Police that he had while he was a youth.

10. Regarding his Army career, Subject stated that in 1939 he volunteered for service in the French Foreign Legion. He stated that he had registered, with his class, for Army service but had never received a notice to report, and this was the reason for his volunteering in the Legion. Subject went with his group to Tunisia, where he was assigned to the cavalry.

11. At this time there was an attempt made on the part of the French to form ethnic companies, and the Georgians, under the command of Captain ODICHELIDZE (NR-IRD) (now a retired Major living in LeVesinet near Paris), formed into an infantry company consisting of about 120 men and were stationed near the town of Montpelier, France. Subject attained the rank of Corporal. This company saw no action, and in June 1941 Subject was separated from the Legion, which was then considered as part of the French Army.

12. Subject went through part of his demobilization procedure in Lyons, France, where he was issued 800 francs and given a travel order to proceed home to Paris. When Subject arrived in Paris, he was required to go to the gendarmerie on Boulevard Exelams, which was the demobilization center for the Paris area, where he was issued an additional 200 francs and officially taken off the rolls of the French Army. Subject stated that this was the time of complete disorganization in France, due to the recent defeat by the Germans, and the beginning of the occupation.

13. The French Army official, with whom Subject spoke regarding the possibility of obtaining employment, advised Subject to go to the French Military Intelligence. Subject stated that he obtained the address, which he could not recall at this time, and attempted to get in touch with the proper individual. Subject was unsuccessful and was given the "run around." Failing this, Subject returned home and lived at the family residence at #28 Rue Cabanis (this number has now been changed to #36). Subject attempted to lock for employment, but he was unable to find any type of work.

14. Through some friends, Subject discovered that the Germans were hiring people for employment in Germany. Subject went to the German Arbeits Amt on the Quai d' Orsay and made application for work in Germany. He stated that he was an electrician, and he was told that he would be sent to Poelitz-Stettin to work in a factory, where he would be receiving one mark per hour (which was then equivalent to 20 francs). Subject signed a contract for a period of one year, and he received a travel order to proceed to his destination.

15. Subject stated that within a few days he and a number of other volunteers were loaded aboard a special train and proceeded into Germany.

The proposition looked good to Subject at the beginning, but soon he found that there were numerous bums and thieves who also applied as volunteers. Subject finally arrived and was assigned to work as an electrician in a factory which was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic gasoline. Subject was lodged in a camp together with a group of other voluntary workers.

16. After approximately three months Subject became restless and dissatisfied, and wanted to change employment. He applied, and got permission, for a week end pass to Stettin, which was approximately 20 to 25 kilometers from where Subject was working. In Stettin Subject met a Georgian by the nickname "Chou Chou." (Subject stated that Guivy ZALDASTANI (NR-IRD) told him (Subject) that Chou Chou is presently in the United States). Subject stated that Chou Chou was in a German uniform with some special insignia. Chou Chou invited Subject to visit him (Chou Chou) and several other Georgians, who were being trained by the Germans for special work, apparently as saboteurs, against the Soviets. Subject went to visit Chou-Chou, met approximately 15 Georgians, and an attempt was made to interest Subject in this organization. However, nothing ever came of this.

17. Subject advised that he was getting more dissatisfied working in the factory, and a few weeks following his original visit to Stettin Subject asked for, and got, a pass to go to Berlin, in order to see an imaginary uncle. Subject received an authorization which entitled him to stay away for a period of ten days, which made it until 2 June 1942. The documents that Subject had in his possession at this time were as follows: a pink paper which identified Subject as a Georgian living in a factory lager, and which he obtained approximately ten days after his arrival at the factory; the second document was a work card which was issued to all the workers in the factory and served as an identity card. Subject's intention was to return to France, and he extended the date on the travel paper to 12 June 1942, which gave him sufficient time to accomplish his journey.

18. With this travel document Subject had no difficulty and arrived in Berlin. In Berlin Subject took the train to Aachen, where he met several other individuals who intended to cross the frontier and return to France. Subject made inquiries as to how to proceed into France, and he was told to go and see the Gestapo to obtain authorization to cross the frontier and was told to return to Berlin. Instead, Subject decided to proceed, on foot, toward the Belgian border, and this time Subject did not consult the German authorities.

19. Subject proceeded to the Eupen, Malmedy area and inquired from door to door about someone who could help him across the German frontier. Subject finally found an individual who promised, for the sum of 40 marks, to lead him (Subject) across the German-Belgian frontier, during the night. They crossed the frontier without any difficulty, and Subject proceeded on to Verviers, Belgium, where he took the train to either Liege or Charleroi. Subject made inquiries as to where he could change his German marks into

French francs, and the Belgians, thinking Subject to be an escaped prisoner of war, helped him with instructions on how to proceed, and Subject took the train to the French-Belgian frontier, arriving in the vicinity of Valenciennes. While still on the train, Subject had to go through a control point in the forbidden zone near St. Quentin. At this time he was helped by the conductor of the train and the postal clerk. Subject successfully passed through this difficult point, concealed in a mail sack. At Valenciennes a check of the passengers was made by a German control officer who somehow seemed to overlook Subject's presence, and did not ask Subject any questions. From this point on Subject had no difficulty and arrived in Paris and proceeded to his home.

20. Subject's father inquired why Subject had returned to France, and upon learning that Subject had left his job without authorization, was very upset and talked Subject into returning to Germany. After three or four days at home Subject went to the German Arbeits Amt, made an application for work as an electrician, and requested that he be assigned work in Berlin. Subject stated that he was not asked any questions, apparently no check was made, and he departed for Berlin, by train.

21. Subject was employed in a factory in Berlin which was engaged in making electrodes. Here Subject was employed as a photographer, but his job did not last very long, because Subject did not come to work on time and was not very interested in his job, since it was a very monotonous, repetitious sort of work. An incident occurred in the factory which became a pretext for Subject's transfer to another factory. There was a robbery in Subject's department, involving the theft of some platinum crucibles. While Subject was never accused of it, he was asked questions by the police officials who came to the factory to investigate the theft. The factory manager used this incident as a pretext to have Subject transferred.

22. Subject was assigned to work as an electrician in another factory in Berlin, which was engaged in the manufacture of belts for machine guns mounted in aircraft. Subject stated that the production work was very antiquated, and numerous women were engaged in inspecting belts for the proper size, by using a hand gauge. Subject built a jig which greatly speeded up the inspection work, and the management of the factory decided that Subject was a great German patriot.

23. In Berlin, Subject met a Frenchman by the name of Pascal, who was also employed as a French voluntary worker. Pascal told Subject that he (Pascal) wanted to return to France. Subject was also tired of his job, and they decided to try to get back to Paris. They went to the office of the Arbeits Amt in Berlin and got blank leave passes. Subject filled in the information on a typewriter, then with a burnt match and india ink retraced the outline of the "cachet" from a validated leave pass, and returned to the Arbeits Amt office where he stood in line to have his pass validated. When Subject's turn came, the busy clerk, with a cursory

glance at the pass, put in the official validating Arbeits Amt cachet. With this document, Subject proceeded to the Berlin "Presidium" (Police Headquarters) where, on the basis of this document, Subject was able to obtain a foreigner's passport. Subject advised that he was successful in this endeavor only because the various German departments had very little liaison with each other, and there appeared to be no central card index system whereby individuals could be cross checked. Another reason that Subject advanced as an explanation for his success was that, according to Subject, German clerks were extremely conscious and respectful of any official looking cachet, and could not conceive that anyone would have the effrontery of counterfeiting an official document. Subject explained that the information he had filled in the passport stated that he was allowed to proceed to France in order to visit his parents. Subject described the foreigner's passport as a regular booklet with a grayish color. The same procedure was utilized in order to obtain a passport for Pascal.

24. Sometime during the spring of 1943, Subject and Pascal returned to Paris, and both decided that there was no point in remaining in France under the German occupation, and they made plans to go to Brazil. They took the train and proceeded to the Spanish border, arriving in the town of Hendaye. They crossed into Spain through a mountain trail, and attempted to exchange their French francs into Spanish pesetas. They were unsuccessful, were looked upon very suspiciously, remained for one day and decided to return to France, where the German Grenz Polizei, which Subject believes were members of the Wehrmacht, arrested Subject and Pascal and kept them under guard for a period of approximately four days. During this time, they were mildly interrogated, and a check was made to see whether they were wanted by the German Police. After four days, they were released and taken under guard to the Hendaye Railroad Station, and were told to buy tickets to Paris, which they had indicated as their residence.

25. As soon as the German authorities left, Subject and Pascal exchanged their tickets for another destination, and got out at the town of Pau. There they proceeded, on foot, to Molcon on the border of Vichy France. They crossed over and met two gendarme and told the gendarme that they (Subject and Pascal) wanted to join the Foreign Legion. At the gendarmerie, they were given an official travel order to proceed to Toulouse. Upon arriving there they were told to proceed to Marseilles. In Marseilles, Subject and Pascal made a faux pas. They showed their German passports, and the attitude of the French changed. Pascal indicated to the French authorities that he would volunteer as a worker in Africa, and Subject stated that he would return to Paris. Subject went to Lyons where he had a friend, a far removed cousin by the name of Guiga who was later killed during an air raid. Subject's cousin attempted to help him (Subject) but was unable to do so, and Subject took the train to the Chalons-sur-Soane, the border between occupied and unoccupied France.

26. At the border, the guard misread Subject's name as Fritz WILI. Subject played his role to the hilt, using his knowledge of the German

language, and said that he was a representative of the Armistice Commission. Subject crossed the border, however, on the occupied side Subject was stopped by the German border guard. Subject showed the guard his (Subject's) passport and was told that it was not sufficient, that he needed a travel order. Subject decided to bluff and asked to be taken to the headquarters of the border guards, where he managed to convince the official that he (Subject) was really going back to Berlin in order to resume his work. Subject told this official that he (Subject) had been to visit his brother in Marseilles, and that the French were not cooperative and had refused to issue him a pass to return to Berlin. The official of the border guard which may have possibly, according to Subject, have been the Gestapo, wrote Subject out a pass indicating that Subject was returning to his work in Berlin.

27. This enabled Subject to proceed through the control point, but instead of returning to Berlin Subject proceeded back to Paris. Here Subject remained for several months without doing any kind of work. During this time, while in a bar, Subject was talking to the barmaid, who told Subject about her brother who was a prisoner of war in Germany. Subject told her that it wasn't very difficult to get out, and said that he would try and see whether he could do it himself. Subject asked her for a photograph of her brother, and he had the intention of using it on a passport. However, all this came to nothing because Subject was not properly equipped at this time.

28. It was at this time, in late 1943, that Subject saw how easy it was to go back and forth between Germany and occupied France. Since he had a passport Subject was not stopped between the two countries, and in order to insure free travel he made himself a permanent travel order. This he obtained through Georgian friends, who were working in various German ministries. Subject's knowledge of photography was very helpful.

29. Subject's friends, noticing that he seemed to go back and forth at will, began to charge him with small commissions. He would take coffee and various other foodstuffs, which were scarce in Germany but easily obtained from Spain, through devious channels. Subject would either deliver or sell the products to certain individuals in Germany, and would keep a certain percentage of the money for himself. Subject quickly became aware that he could make more money if he could obtain the items himself. Subject made contacts with various individuals who were engaged in making trips back and forth from Paris to the Spanish border. They would bring back coffee, tea, American dollars, and various other scarce items. Some German soldiers were unwitting members of Subject's blackmarket operations.

30. In order to do this work successfully, Subject had to become acquainted with the various passes and travel orders issued by various German departments. Subject set up a laboratory, complete with photographic enlarging apparatus. He photographed and enlarged visas in order to be able to reproduce the exact outlines and lettering in the visa. Then he would reduce them to the proper size and transfer them on to the proper documents.

Subject got in touch with an engraver in Paris, who engraved the proper plates from which Subject could reproduce, at will, the proper stamp for the proper document. The paper itself was not a critical item, since the various German ministries usually used any available paper. Occasionally there was a watermark, and in that case, Subject reproduced the watermarks by first photographing the document, washing the watermark, which usually consisted of wavy lines, from the negative, then Subject would make another negative and wash off everything but the watermark. Subject went so far as to actually engage in substituting photographs on passports.

31. Subject stated that he would buy passports, which were passports of foreigners working in Germany, and substitute pages where necessary, and the photographs were handled in the following manner. Subject stated that the photographs in these passports were attached by means of metal clasps to the passport page and, therefore, could not be very well removed. Subject would, instead, remove the gelatin from the photograph very carefully by using a very mild diluted acid, such as acetic acid, first putting a little wax on to the clasps so that they would not be eroded by the acid and placing blotter paper under the photograph. This acid solution would dissolve the gelatin emulsion, and Subject would remove it from the photographic paper. Next, he would take the photograph of the new owner of the passport and, by using steam or warm water, he would soften the emulsion and then carefully lifting it off the paper, using tweezers and little sticks of wood, Subject would transpose the emulsion into the photographic paper of the passport. Subject stated that this was an extremely delicate operation, and required long and careful practice on his part.

32. During the above procedure the photograph was slightly distorted, and occasionally the emulsion would absorb too much water and would overflow the bounds of the original photograph. In that case, Subject would trim the edges to fit properly. Subject stated that one corner of the photograph would usually be stamped by the validating office, and if the catchet was in ink, the ink would remain on the paper when Subject lifted off the old emulsion. This ink would show through the new emulsion, and on cursory examination it would be impossible to distinguish whether the ink was over the emulsion or under the emulsion. If the catchet were of the impression type, there would be no problem whatsoever since it would show through the new emulsion very readily.

33. Subject stated that he obtained for himself a Rumanian diplomatic passport which he bought, through a girl friend, from a Rumanian at the Rumanian Embassy in Berlin. Subject bought this passport for 1000 marks, and he used it only while he was traveling in Berlin. In effect, Subject assumed an entirely new identity whenever he stepped into his car since the registration and driver's license were all made out to conform with the name on the passport. Since Subject's car was registered in the name of an employee of a foreign embassy, Subject was entitled, as a diplomat, to a larger gas ration.

34. Subject continued his blackmarket activities until approximately February 1944 when, through an oversight, Subject was arrested by the German Police. Prior to his arrest, Subject lived extremely well and occupied a good apartment in Berlin. Subject's family thought that he occupied a high place in the Ministry, because Subject was in possession of large sums of money, and also appeared to have no difficulty traveling anywhere. Subject stated that he even obtained a pass for his father, who wanted to visit Munich. Subject stated that his father, at the time, devised a system for extracting oil from shale, and Subject, wanting to help his father with his (father's) knowledge, used a stratagem whereby he (Subject) gave 100,000 marks to his mother to invest into his father's firm.

35. Subject stated that he helped ten French workers and four prisoners of war to return to France. This came about as a result of requests that came to Subject from friends and not as an organized plan to help any individuals escape from Germany. The only individual, who was a prisoner of war whose name Subject could remember, was a Frenchman by the name of C. VILLEMAIN (NR-IRD). VILLEMAIN, even though a prisoner of war, worked on a farm during the week and could go into town on Sundays. The others whom Subject helped were deported workers. Subject recalled the names of two of these, Henri JOIGNY (NR-IRD) and Charles ALLAUMES (NR-IRD). Subject stated that he provided each of these men with a passport, a travel order, ration cards, and a small sum of money. Subject also instructed each one on how best to conduct himself in order to avoid being apprehended at the border.

36. Subject also furnished an individual by the name of HEGELSTEIN with a travel order. HEGELSTEIN was a German Jew, who was engaged in blackmarketing operations. HEGELSTEIN had managed to conceal his Jewish background and was in possession of a German passport, but feeling that the Germans were about to arrest him, he prevailed upon Subject to furnish him with a false travel order, which Subject did.

37. Subject advised that he was successful in this work because each German ministry issued its own travel orders, and there was no means of double checking; first, the difficulty was too great to double check the temporary duty travel orders; secondly, the Germans were extremely respectful of official looking documents; thirdly, because of the low mentality of personnel at check points; finally, because the passports were not counterfeit in all cases, and all Subject did was to substitute a new photograph for the original. In return for the favor that Subject extended to these people, some of them reciprocated by helping him with his blackmarket operations.

38. Subject had a plan whereby he wanted to enlarge his blackmarket operations, and had the intention of setting up a two-way radio system to improve his communications. VILLEMAIN, the French prisoner of war whom Subject helped, was an engineer, and Subject had intended to use VILLEMAIN in setting up the post in Paris. However, before Subject could accomplish this he (Subject) was arrested by the German Police.

39. Another person whom Subject met in Berlin was named LUCAS, a Frenchman who was employed in a radio shop in Berlin. LUCAS became an associate of Subject and helped Subject by stealing various spare parts, for the purpose of setting up the radio station. LUCAS was also instrumental in bringing about Subject's downfall. LUCAS had met a young lady in Berlin. She was a Belgian national and said that she had a fiance in Paris whom she had not seen for some time. She asked for help in going to Paris, and Subject was to meet her in the Cafe Trumf in Berlin. Subject eventually met her and told her that he (Subject) would make her some false documents, to enable her to get to Paris. A meeting was arranged for the next day, at which time she was to bring a passport and a photograph and transmit to Subject. She did not show up at the appointed hour and place. Subject waited for a short time and then went to the railroad station, accompanied by his girlfriend, Astree SCHMIDT (MR-IRD), and his partner in blackmarket activities, KATZ. The platform was empty, except for the girl Subject was to meet. Subject addressed her and asked her why she had not kept the appointment, and she replied, "You are going to be arrested." At this moment the German Police converged on the platform where Subject, SCHMIDT, and KATZ were standing, and arrested them.

40. Subject stated that on this day he was leaving on a trip to Paris and had brought along four suitcases containing radio parts, pistols, ammunition, inks, printing equipment, cameras, and various paraphernalia necessary for the manufacture of false documents. The police took Subject back to his hotel and searched the apartment, where they found more equipment and photographed everything. After that, Subject was taken to the police station, where he was separated from his friends. The arrest occurred on either 21 or 22 February 1944 at approximately 1127. Subject recalls the time, because the only day train to Paris left at about that hour.

41. Subject stated that the previous evening he had suffered an accident on his hand. He had found a small phosphorous bomb and was unscrewing the detonator, when it blew up and cut off several of Subject's fingers. At the police station, Subject was treated, medically. Subject was interrogated for a period of approximately eight months. In the beginning, he was interrogated every day, and he admitted to the following crimes: Subject stated that he did engage in making false documents and that he was endangering the security of the German Reich, and was charged by the police with espionage and of conducting intelligence with the enemy. Subject did not specifically admit to these two charges, but kept up the police interest in his case by evasive answers. Subject was condemned to death, but before the sentence could be carried out Subject was liberated by the entry of the American Army, on 12 April 1945.

42. Subject had been an inmate of the German prisons in Tegel, Plotzen See, Hanover, and Wolfenbutten. Subject stated that he believes the plans for his execution were delayed because of a scheme that he devised to interest the authorities in him. Subject stated that he advised the Germans that he was the inventor of a motor which could be run on hydrogen.

Subject stated that he told the Chief Warden in the prison of his (Subject's) invention, and the Warden told Subject to write a letter to a special German service which was in charge of this type of information. Subject believes that it was known as "Service Dienstelle 0000". A representative arrived and interviewed Subject asking Subject to furnish plans for this motor. Subject stated that he had hidden part of the plans, and the investigation went on. Subject always managed to put them off slightly.

43. Subject stated that he made two attempts to escape while in the custody of the German Police. The first time, Subject was under police interrogation in Berlin and during an air raid the prison in which Subject was being held was destroyed, and Subject attempted to escape but was caught. The second time, Subject was at the prison at Plotzen See and made a key out of a piece of wire and opened the door of his cell. However, he was unsuccessful in this escape attempt also.

44. Subject stated that his two friends, Othar and Guivy ZALDASTANI (NR-IRD), who are now in the United States, know about Subject's blackmarket activities and the circumstances leading to his arrest, and also know about his subsequent prison term. Guivy even participated in some of Subject's blackmarket deals, and Othar came to see Subject while he was in the Plotzen See Prison.

45. The reason for Subject's transfer from prison to prison was due to the rapid Soviet advance, and luckily Subject found himself in an area which was overrun by the American Army, in the middle of April 1945. After liberation, Subject and the other prisoners were sent to a camp in the vicinity of Kassel, from which they were to be repatriated to France. However, living conditions were extremely difficult, and Subject and several friends decided to go out on their own. They occupied a deserted villa on the outskirts of Kassel. Subject brought in electric service by utilizing American Army cables and attaching them to the electric wires. One day an American Army truck passed over the wires and tore them. The driver stopped and apologized, and said that he would come back later and fix the wires. In the afternoon, the driver of the truck returned with several companions and they connected the electric wires to the house. The driver then asked Subject whether he (driver) could bring his girlfriend to the house, and Subject agreed. This went on for several days, and finally the driver's girlfriend remained to live at the house. The driver then brought some of his companions, who brought their girlfriends to live at the house. Subject and his friends were supplied with American Army rations, and this convenient arrangement continued for several months until Subject and his friends decided to return to France.

46. Subject made his way to the repatriation center in Paris, which was located in the Hotel Lutetia on the Boulevard Raspail. At this time Subject claimed to have lost all of his documents and went under the name of David DATO. He claimed to be a French citizen who had been a prisoner of war in Germany. However, Subject was unable to carry this off, as he was recognized by one of the Georgians, who worked in the repatriation

center. Subject was interrogated by the French Security Officer, who established Subject's true identity. Subject then stated, to the Security Officer, that he (Subject) had been deported to Germany as a forced laborer. The Security Officer believed Subject, and Subject received the 30,000 franc award which was mandatory for all repatriated forced laborers. This was in early 1946. Subject quickly spent this money, and on the advice of the examining Security Officer, Subject got in touch with the "Service de Renseignements France" on Boulevard Maunory in Paris. Subject tried to contact a Colonel PASSY, who had been known during the War under the Nom de Guerre, Lieutenant Colonel FRANKLIN. Subject did not get to see PASSY but was told to leave his name with the secretary. Finally, Subject was contacted and asked to report on the Georgians in France. Subject refused this assignment, and this was his only contact with an intelligence service.

47. Subject stated that he originally met Jean ADAM when they were both children and again after the War. Subject was working for an architect who had a decorating firm, and after his friendship with ADAM was resumed, ADAM convinced Subject that it was easy to take money by committing robberies. Subject at first refused to participate, but then agreed because of his friendship for ADAM and because of the excitement. The first robbery was committed in early 1949. Subject used a broken revolver, into which he inserted wooden bullets which he had whittled. This robbery was so successful and so interesting that the two partners decided to commit another robbery of the same type. This was also successful, and they attempted a third one. The targets for all of these robberies were jewelry shops. The third robbery was unsuccessful, and Subject wanted to go back to an honest life. Subject was, at this time, happily married, and was afraid that his wife might find out about his activities. However, ADAM threatened that if Subject did not work with him on another robbery, he (ADAM) would tell Subject's wife about the prior robberies. Subject agreed to participate in one more escapade, and in June 1950 they committed a successful robbery on the Bank "Credit de l' Ouest" on the Boulevard Hausmann in Paris. The proceeds of the robbery were split by the two, and very shortly thereafter ADAM was apprehended by the French Police because of his wild spending. Under interrogation, ADAM admitted to the robberies and implicated Subject. Subject was apprehended by the French Police, while he was on the French-Spanish border. He was brought back to Paris for trial, and was sentenced, on 5 January 1953, to seven years at hard labor. He was released on 19 December 1955 for good behavior. This is on record with the French Police and was not discussed at length with Subject.

48. Subject stated that he has not heard from his father and sister since their return to the Soviet Union, except for the following: Approximately two years ago, Subject's brother received a letter addressed to "The sons of Count ________" bearing the address of Subject's brother in Gap, France. This letter was ostensibly from a woman whom neither Subject nor his brother knows and asked for news of them. It had a reply envelope in it, and Subject does not know whether his brother ever

201-233477

answered the letter. Prior to this, in approximately 1949, Subject received a letter from his father which was about 12 pages long, and which asked Subject to send his father technical books on refrigeration. Subject stated that he never replied to this letter. Subject had news of his sister, who used to write occasionally to her friend, Madame Anette BABET (NR-IRD), who lived at #52 Boulevard St. Germain, Paris, France.

49. Subject also received news of his sister from a 2nd or 3rd cousin by the name of Mathieu KERRESSELIDZE (NR-IRD), who is about 52 years of age and lives at #17 or #27 Avenue General DeGaulle, LeVesinet (Seine et Oise), France. Subject stated that Mathieu was a prisoner of war in Siberia and had probably been a member of the Bergman Battalion who had parachuted into the USSR during the early days of the War. Mathieu returned to Paris approximately one and one-half years ago. His name had been in a Georgian newspaper. Mathieu was arrested by the French and charged with collaborating with the Germans. He was interned by the French for a short time and acquitted. At the present time Mathieu is in Germany attempting to find work. His last known address is the one stated above. Subject was not certain of the dates that Mathieu returned to France. Subject saw Mathieu in Paris, and during a conversation Mathieu stated that he had met Subject's sister in Moscow, after his release from the Siberian prisoner of war camp. At that time Mathieu was in Moscow in contact with the French Consulate, which issued him a paper stating that he was a French citizen. Mathieu then got in touch with Subject's brother, who sent Mathieu sufficient funds to return to France.

50. Subject stated that he has two distant cousins in the United States, Guivy and Othar ZALDASTANI. Subject stated that he recently saw Othar, who had come to France on a visit, and Subject asked ~~Othar~~ to tell Guivy that everything is going well. Subject's maternal uncle, Djibo (Gabriel) KANTCHELI (NR-IRD), who is a taxi driver and lives at #37 Rue de la Rochefoucauld, Paris IX, France, is well acquainted with the majority of the Georgians who formerly resided in France but are now spread throughout the world. Subject's father was a member of the Georgian nobility and, as such, had a large circle of friends.

51. Subject stated that he would be very interested in obtaining a permanent job with the Americans, which would give him a sense of accomplishment and would satisfy his yearning for an exciting and unusual life.

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

The following pertinent questions were asked of Subject:

TESTS I & II

1. Is your name David __________? Yes.
2. Were you born in July 1918? Yes.

3. Other than DATO, have you ever used another name in order to hide your true identity?

Subject stated that he also had a passport in the name of a Rumanian, while he was engaged in blackmarket activities in Germany. The question was reworded to read, "Other than DATO and the name of a Rumanian, have you ever used another name in order to hide your true identity?" Subject answered, "No."

5. Is your true name David ____________? Yes.

6. Were you a student at the Ecole des Arts and Metiers? Yes.

7. Were you a student at the Ecole Cinematographique? Yes.

8. Were you a student at the Ecole Breguet in Paris? Yes.

10. Did you tell anyone that the Americans are in contact with you? No.

11. Did you tell Annick the purpose of your visit to Paris? No.

Subject stated that he had told her that he was going to undergo some sort of an examination. She has actually never asked Subject what the purpose of his contacts with the Americans were, but she is aware that the Americans are in contact with Subject for some specific purpose, since she is the go-between.

12. Are the answers that you have given me truthful and exact? Yes.

14. Do you hate the Russians and the Soviets? No.

17. Have you been refused French citizenship? Yes.

Subject charts manifested no emotional disturbance indicative of deception to any questions during tests I and II.

TESTS III & IV

3. Did you enlist in the French Foreign Legion? Yes.

4. Were you ever arrested or detained by any military police? No.

5. Are the events regarding your life history true? Yes.

6. Did you serve in the German Army? No.

7. Did you serve in the S. D: No.

8. Did you serve in any German military or para-military service whatsoever? Yes.

Subject stated that he was employed for a short period of time as a chauffeur in the NSKK and, occasionally, for a period of approximately three months, he served as an interpreter in French and German for the Schutz Polizei.

8a. Other than what you told me, have you served in any German military or para-military service? No.

10. Were you a Gestapo agent? No.

11. Did you participate in blackmarket activities during 1943 and 1944 as you told me? Yes.

12. Were you engaged in any secret work for the German Police? No.

13. Are you deliberately hiding from me any of your activities in Germany? No.

Subject's charts manifested no emotional disturbance indicative of deception to any questions during tests III and IV.

TESTS V, VI, & VII

1. Are you deliberately hiding the truth regarding the letter which you and your brother received from Russia? No.

2. Did your father return to the USSR because he believed in Communism? No.

3. Did you sister return to the USSR because she believed in Communism? No.

4. Did your mother commit suicide because of disappointment in you? No.

5. Are you corresponding with your father and your sister in the USSR? No.

9. Did Mathieu give you news of your sister in the USSR? Yes.

8. Do you think that Mathieu is a Soviet agent? No.

9. Did Mathieu give you secret instructions from Soviet Intelligence? No.

10. Did Mathieu tell you that he met your sister in Moscow? Yes.

11. Did the Georgian Consul use blackmail to force you to work for the Soviets? No.

Subject's charts manifested no emotional disturbance indicative of deception to any questions during tests V, VI, & VII.

TESTS VIII & IX

5. Did you work as an electrician in Poelitz? Yes.

6. Did you obtain a travel order to go from Stettin to Berlin as you explained to me? Yes.

8. Are you deliberately hiding the truth about your trip from Stettin to Berlin to Paris? No.

10. Were you employed as an electrician in the factory in Berlin? Yes.

11. Were you forced to become a Gestapo agent? No.

12. Did you tell me the truth about tracing a cachet with a burnt match? Yes.

13. Did you tell me the truth about getting a passport? Yes.

Subject's charts manifested no emotional disturbance indicative of deception to any questions during tests VIII & IX.

TESTS X & XI

2. Did you charge the forced laborers for the counterfeit documents? No.

3. Did you help VILLEMAIN? Yes.

3a. Did you help ALLEAUMES? Yes.

4. Did you help JOIGNY? Yes.

4a. Did you help ADELSTEIN? Yes.

5. Did you help LUCAS? Yes.

5a. Did you receive anything in return for your help? No.

8. Did you go with Pascal from Berlin to the French border? Yes.

11. Did the Gestapo furnish you with false identity papers? No.

12. Did you tell me the truth about substituting the photographs on the passports? Yes.

13. Did you exaggerate your life history in order to appear more suitable in our eyes? No.

14. Did you fabricate the stories you told me? No.

Subject manifested emotional disturbance indicative of deception to question 5a. He explained this reaction by stating that he had never received any monetary payment, however, it could be considered that he was repaid to some extent, or that he expected to be repaid, through favors in his blackmarket activities.

TESTS XII & XIII

19a. Did you ever use another name to conceal any activities for a foreign intelligence service? No.

22. Have you ever sold or given information to a foreign power? No.

22a. Have you told anyone your connection with the American Government? No.

23. Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party? No.

24. Are you sympathetic toward the Communist regime? No.

25. Have you ever participated in any Communist activity? No.

29. Have you ever been employed by a foreign intelligence service? No.

29a. Are you an agent of the English Intelligence Service? No.

29b. Are you an agent of the French Intelligence Service? No.

29c. Are you an agent of the Soviet Intelligence Service? No.

Subject's charts manifested no emotional disturbance indicative of deception to any questions during tests XII & XIII.

TESTS XIV & XV

1. Did you have a Rumanian passport? Yes.

4. Were you a traitor to the French Nation? No.

6. Did the German Police arrest you as you explained to me? Yes.

8. Did Jean ADAM blackmail you into committing a robbery at the jewelry store? No.

9. Other than what you told me, did you commit any other crimes? No.

Subject's charts manifested no emotional disturbance indicative of deception to any questions during tests XIV & XV.

CONCLUSION

A review of Subject's charts showed no reactions indicative of deception to any of the pertinent questions. Subject admitted, prior to the polygraph test, that he had committed a jewel robbery which is not known to the French Police. He was assured that we were not interested in prosecuting him, and he seemed to be satisfied with that explanation. It is this examiner's opinion that Subject is not a member of the RIS or any other foreign intelligence service.

OS/IRD/PHB:vmo

201-233477

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : William Romer, SR/BOB

DATE: 27 May, 1959

27 May 59

FROM : William R. Caraway, O/Tr/CT/MS

SUBJECT: Personal observation of Dave and Albert

My personal opinion of the two students that received instruction in First Aid from me. The period of acquittance was four and one half days. They were very receptive to the course and were able to ask intelligent questions on the material being presented. When being questioned, both would give a good dissertation in their answering even though there was some language problem. Now to the individuals.

__Dave:__ In my conversations with Dave, he would bring up the subject of hiking and camping, saying that he couldn't see the necessity in this and that he would rather live in a house with all of the conveniences at hand. The idea of physical labor doesn't appeal to him, he would rather use his brain.

When there was a lull in conversation, he would be the one to start it. He enjoys motoring, and the feeling of being free from those around him. Although Dave states that he would like to live alone and do his own cooking, housekeeping and etc., I get the feeling that most of it is just talk and that he would rather have a companion, someone that would sort of more or less take care of him.

At the dining table, he would eat only those foods he reconized and those that he enjoyed. He would ask about the others, but would seldom try them.

__Albert:__ Quiet, very seldom talked about himself. At meal times he ate everything that was placed before him. Liked to insert a little humor into life. Seems to enjoy physical exercise as well as mental. 201-233477

In conclusion I would like to say that [illegible] officers, both displayed a keen interest in learning the material that was presented to them. I would say that the case officer used good judgement in their selection, the makeing a team of these two was in good taste, as the one seems to make up where the other lacks.

William R. Caraway
Training Officer, Operations Division,

Medical Staff

(When Filled In)

NON-ACCOUNTABLE MATERIAL MANIFEST

DATE 11 May 1959

TO: Chief, SR
ATTN: Dexter E. RO[illegible]

FROM: Chief of Base, Frankfurt

A. THE NON-ACCOUNTABLE MATERIAL(S) LISTED BELOW ARE FOR STATION USE AS INDICATED BY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING NUMBERED DESIGNATORS IN COLUMN 3:

1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
2. DISCUSSIONS WITH LIAISON SERVICES
3. PASSAGE TO LIAISON
4. OTHER (Specify) REDSOX/AEACRE
5. OTHER (Specify)
6. OTHER (Specify)

B. THE FORWARDING OF THE ATTACHED MATERIAL CONFORMS TO CURRENT POUCH REGULATIONS.

Anthony B. Friganza
SIGNATURE

ITEM NO. (1)	DESCRIPTION (2)	USE (3)
2000	Cigarettes	
	(Note: For AEASPIC-3)	

FORM 6-57 1236 TEST

SECRET

201-233477 (13-47)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SCO (Mr. Leutscher)

DATE: 8 May 1959

FROM : Operations Division, Medical Staff

SUBJECT: TARDENT, David (a)

Subject has been evaluated by the Medical Staff and found physically qualified for proposed assignment.

E. J. Corrigan
E. J. CORRIGAN
Administrative Officer

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - SR/DOB (Romer)
1 - OD/MS

SECRET

5 May 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Observations during Period 20 April - 2 May of D. Tardent.

1. Physical Description:

Height: 5' 6"
Weight: 120 lbs.
Hair: Black - balk headed
Eyes: Dark Brown
Distinguishing marks: Missing first joints of right thumb and right first finger. Wears moustache (black)

2. Physical Condition:

Subject seems to enjoy walking and running. He remarked that he could trot along three miles in one hour.

3. Eating Habits:

Subject is not too impressed with American way of eating, that is, having all the food put on the table and then each taking a portion of each course and filling up the plate.

Subject feels that more time should be devoted to eating than Joe C. alloted for eating. He was amazed that it only took the latter about 15 minutes to eat. Likewise, Subject likes to eat one course at a time and that each course be brought into the room and placed on the table separately. After the meal he would like fresh fruit, cheese, coffee. He does not care much for sweets, neither does he care for cottage cheese salad, i.e., cottage cheese and canned fruit. This combination irks him. Subject was assured that this was a manner of eating in America and that it was a custom and that the undersigned probably would find some faults with the way the French serve food. Dave enjoys fruit juices.

Dave eats his food in the manner to which he is accustomed. He puts only one course on his plate and only when finished eating it does he help himself to the next course, etc.

At breakfast he is a very light eater. He is content just with coffee, toast and juice.

4. Freetime:

During the undersigned's stay with Subject, most of the freetime was spent watching TV, walking and attending English lessons. Subject stated that he wanted to learn English, so the undersigned accommodated him. A 35 cent Cardinal edition of "English thru Pictures" was purchased for him and was used as the text book. Subject was coming along fairly well in the language. Subject is able to manage satisfactorily in the language only

201-233477

thing which hinders him is his lack of confidence. Time will probably take care of his improvement.

5. General Remarks:

He was amazed that he was in the U.S.A., though he was here he stated that he could not believe that he was here. The relative seclusion during the past two weeks did not reassure him in anyway that he definitely was in the U.S.A. Many of his ideas regarding American seemed to be impressions that he obtained from seeing American films while in France. Thus he has a little difficulty trying to place the America that he has observed now with what preconceived ideas that he already has of America.

While in town on 23 April, his only remark about Washington was that he did not see any exceptionally beautifully girls (Hollywood types). He also stated that the American males, i.e. American Soldier in 1945, was nice strong, healthy type of male.

Enroute from the airport Dave wore his blackout glasses until we reached the district line. While crossing the South Capital Street Bridge Dave sensed that we were brossing the bridge because of the vibrations caused by the car passing over the steel mesh on the bridge, stated that we must be crossing the Potomac river now. Another question was how far was the airport from the house where we were headed. The undersigned agreed that we were crossing the Potomac and that the area we were going to was over fifty miles from the district.

By nature Dave is very curious. To satisfy his curiousity he uses various ruses in order to elicit information regarding his status and future.

Whenever the undersigned went for a walk with Dave, usually before and after meals, the former expected to be asked numerous personal questions. One or twice, Dave mentioned that he did not know why he was here, what kind of job he would have, etc.

Dave was assured that this sounded somewhat irregular, the undersigned felt that he must have been told something womewhere along the line. At this point, Dave would stop asking questions. Later on the undersigned learned that Dave was very talkative with Tom Miller (alias) and told the latter the whole story about what was told to date. It is assumed that Dave was trying to show Tom that he knew everything and thus hope that Tom would fill any little details that Dave would omit. These were two different approaches that Dave used trying to elicit information from the undersigned and Tom Miller.

Dave seems to be quite a perfectionist when it come to things mechanical. While at the Log Cabin, Dave tried on a number of occasions to adjust the TV set. Dave could not understand why the TV set sometimes would not function properly particularly whenever a passing plane would go over it would interfere with the sets operation. This account did not suit him for he had to try and adjust, so as a result more time was expended on adjusting than watching TV. He was quite irked because he felt that the TV was malfunctioning.

Dave likes to watch cowboy and gangster films, and the children programs. He liked the latter because the participants spoke very slowly and he could understand the language.

Periodically, Dave would question the undersigned on schedule for the day and when told what it would be it seemed that he would fail to hear what was told to him and later on would propose the same question. Dave did not like the idea that he had to start English from basic he wanted to have something more advance.

Dave like to test others and it seems that he will continually do so throughout the course.

Dave did not seem to impressed with the idea that he had to be debriefed all over again. His comment was that he told this over and over so many times and that it was not necessary to do over again. At times when he did not want to answer a question he would state that he already told this to George and drop the matter there.

1 May 1959:

Shortly before Dave's departure for another safehouse, Dave remarked that he was not much concerned about the training that he will have to undergo during the next phase but is concerned more about "der Tat." What he was driving at was to try to elicit what information he could regarding the work that he will be required or expected to fulfill once training is over, i.e., the mission. Dave was assured that this naturally would follow only after the completion of the training, then he would be informed by the people concerned that at this time such information could not be given him.

That evening, the undersigned stayed with Dave and Albert at the new safehouse. At supper remarked about the manner in which the food was served that it was not according to French custom. Albert said you eat the way you want, yet at the same time filling up his plate.

After supper, Dave querying Albert about the property, to whom does the land belong etc. All Albert could say that it all belongs to the man who owns the house and left matters drop at that.

Dave was quite witty at the supper meal today. This was the first time that the undersigned seemed to see him in such jovial spirits. Both men seemed to hit it off very well. Dave seems to recognize Alberts brawn.

Dave seemed to like the cooking better at the new location. He stated that this place wasmuch better that the other place. He stressed that the housekeepers here were much better that the others.

5. Miscellaneous:

Subject failed to give any information about a cousin of his who is residing in the U.S.A. Subject told the debriefer that this information was already passed to George.

Cousin: could be a Wachtan Tschishchivili, who resides at the Oakland Apartments, Columbia Pike, Arlington, Va. Wachtan works for VOA, GS-11, radio announcer on the Georgian program. He is a member of some oriental research group which meets at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C.

JOSEPH CHACHO

DEBRIEFING
of
David TZITZICHVILI

Time of debriefing: 28 and 29 April 1959.

Debriefer: Mario K.Giordano.

201-233477

CONTENTS.

Pages:
Brief of David's Activities . . . . II - VI
List of Personal Names . . . . VII- VIII

I. DEBRIEFING (the full report) . . . . 1 - 24

A. General Data 1- 3

B. David's Childhood 4- 7

C. Period of WW II 8-21
In French Foreign Legion (subdiv.: 1 - 3 8
" Poelitz, Stettin, Germany " 5 - 8 8-9
" Flight to Berlin, Achen " 8 - 10 9
" Eupen-Malmedy, to Paris " 11 - 17 9-10
" Berlin, as photographer " 17 -20 10-11
" " ,Stahlschnederstr. " 21 11
" " ,Passport for Foreigners 23 - 25 11-12
To "Brazil" (Paris, Spain) 25 - 27 12
Gought on Spanish-French border 27 - 30 12
" " Free France Zone " 31 -32 12-13
To Free French Legion, Marseilles 32 - 34 13
Back to Paris, troubles in Lion 34 - 37 13
In NSKK, Berlin and Atlantic Wall 39 - 45 13-14
In Police Force in Berlin 44 - 52 14-15
Document forgery (en mass) 48 - 60 15-17
" " (continued) 68 - 76 17-18
Financial background, Blackmarket 61 - 67 17
Contacting the ABWEHR, in Berlin 77 - 78 18-19
The Belgian Girl, security precaut79 - 82 19
" " " , arrest in Berlin 83 - 88 19-20
In prison, interrogation, "invention"89 - 96 20-21
Transfer to Wolfenbüttel, release, 97 - 99 21

D. Explanations to Activities during WW II,1- 7 21-22

E. The Period After WW II. 1 - 22 23-24

II. ANALYSIS.

F. Additional Qestions 26-33

G. Characteristic Traits in His Activity 34-36

H. Reliability of the Story. 36

J. Security Risk. 37-39

K. Suggested Next Steps. 39

L. Personal Impression made on Debriefer. 40

- - - - - - -

CONTENTS.

Pages:
Brief of David's Activities . . . . II - VI
List of Personal Names . . . . VII- VIII

I. DEBRIEFING (the full report) . . . . 1 - 24
A. General Data 1- 3
B. David's Childhood 4- 7
C. Period of WW II 8-21
In French Foreign Legion (subdiv.: 1 - 3 8
" Poelitz, Stettin, Germany " 5 - 8 8-9
" Flight to Berlin, Achen " 8 - 10 9
" Eupen-Malmedy, to Paris " 11 - 17 9-10
" Berlin, as photographer " 17 -20 10-11
" " ,Stahlschnederstr. " 21 11
" " ,Passport for Foreigners 23 - 25 11-12
To "Brazil" (Paris, Spain) 25 - 27 12
Gought on Spanish-French border 27 - 30 12
" " Free France Zone " 31 -32 12-13
To Free French Legion, Marseilles 32 - 34 13
Back to Paris, troubles in Lion 34 - 37 13
In NSKK, Berlin and Atlantic Wall 39 - 45 13-14
In Police Force in Berlin 44 - 52 14-15
Document forgery (en mass) 48 - 60 15-17
" " (continued) 68 - 76 17-18
Financial backgroud, Blackmarket 61 - 67 17
Contacting the ABWEHR, in Berlin 77 - 78 18-19
The Belgian Girl, security precaut79 - 82 19
" " " , arrest in Berlin 83 - 88 19-20
In prison, interrogation, "invention"89 - 96 20-21
Transfer to Wolfenbüttel, release, 97 - 99 21
D. Explanations to Activities during WW II,1- 7 21-22
E. The Period After WW II. 1 - 22 23-24

II. ANALYSIS.

F. Additional Qestions 26-33
G. Characteristic Traits in His Activity 34-36
H. Reliability of the Story. 36
J. Security Risk. 37-39
K. Suggested Next Steps. 39
L. Personal Impression made on Debriefer. 40

- - - - - - - -

David TSITSICHVILI

BRIEF of ACTIVITIES

TIME/ AGE:		PLACE:	ACTIVITIES:
A. 1918		Georgia	Born, and lived 2-3 years.
B. Childhood:			
1921	3	Paris	The family arrived from Georgia to France.
	4-6	"	School: Notre Dame. Change of address.
	7	"	" Lycée Montagne. " "
		"	" Ecole Communale. " "
	8	or Viroflex	" Lycée Hoche. Thrown out.
		"	" Ecole Communale. Taken back to:
		"	" Lycée Hoche. Change of address.
		"	Acquintance with Jean ADAM.
		"	" with old Georgian Resistance men.
	13	Paris- or-Vanves	School: Lycée Michelet, 6 months,thrown out.
	14	"	" Ecole Communale (the first) " "
			" Ecole Communale (the 2-nd) " "
	15	Chalon-s.Marne	" ,trade:Art et Metier,1.5 years, " "
1937		Paris	" Ecole Breguet,electrotech. " "
		"	Stole a dictionary from a library.
three		"	Thrown out of home, lived in a hotel
months		"	worked in railroad station, at night.
			On parole,had to renew documents every 3 mts
1938 Mar,		"	Failed to do this, detained for 13 days.
-May'39		"	Back in father's home, sent to
			School of Photography and Movie. Unfinished.
Dec.'39		"	Volunteered to French Foreign Legion.

BRIEF of ACTIVITIES (Continued)

DATE:	PLACE:	ACTIVITIES:
C. Period of W. II:		
Dec.39	Paris	Volunteered to French Foreign Legion.
1940	Tunis	French Foreign Legion, courses for N.C.O.,unfi-
	Barcares	F.F.L.:Sent to a special Gorgian unit. /nished.
	Paris	Discharged,after the end of German/French war.
1942	Paris	Did not join the German/Georgian special unit.
	"	Volunteered for work in Germany.
3 mnths	Politz	Worked with HIDRYER WERKE.Contract for one year.
		Got acquinted with PASCAL. Both decided to flee.
May'42	Berlin	Contacted some Georgians, said:going to Paris.
	Achen	Falcified his leave/travel document;went to GESTAPO: was ordered to return to Berlin.
	Eupen-Malmedy.	Illegally crossed the border.
	On train/	Had luck and help from French employees:
	to Paris/	twice escaped German controls.
A few days	Paris	Visited the family.Reported again for work in Germany (in an other bureau of German Labor Office), and was sent to a factory in
	Berlin	as photigrapher.
	"	Suspected in theft, his living place searched.
	"	Troubles with German women. Discharged.
	"	Contacted the Labor Office. Was directed to
	"	work in a factory at Stahlschreiber Street
	"	Met PASCAL again.They decided to flee to Brazil. They forged leave certificates, got passports for foreigners, and traveled to Paris.
	Paris	Visited the family. They started for Brazil.
	Spain	Hunger: nobody exchanged their money. They decided to return. 500 m inside France, near
	Bayonne	they were arrested by German Custom Guards, searched, investigated, ordered to return to Paris, escorted to the train. Had luck:managed to get tickets instead to Paris to -
	Pau,	and crossed to the free zone of France. Seen by French gendarmes, he invented the story of wanting to join the Free French Legion.Sent t
	Marseilles,	to the Regimental HQ. Trouble with Pascal's documents. Escaped before being arrested. Pascal went:direction Algiers. David - to Paris.
	Lion	David contacted a relative, to get documents for returning to Paris. Did not get any.
	Border of/ French oc-/ cupied / Zone . /	David passed the French post, showing his German passport. Held by the German post, he requested being brought to "officer", and there he "spoke" himself free, and through to -
A few days.	Paris .	He visited his mother, and reported to German Commandantura, for work with NSKK in Germany.
	Berlin-Rügelheim,	drivers' courses of the NSKK.
	" -Brandenburger Tor,	in a drivers' unit of NSKK.

-IV-

BRIEF OF ACTIVITIES (continued, 2).

TIME:	PLACE:	ACTIVITIES:
C. [illegible] II, continued.		
1943	Berlin French West	N.S.K., continued. David volunteered to — Coast, as driver at the Atlantic Wall construction. They were taken to —
	Paris	and given French-Ford trucks to drive to —
	Saint - Nazaire.	David was detatched to Navy. (N.S.K unit). Later he refused to take an oath, was returned under arrest to N.S.K. puritive camp in —
	BERLIN.	asked and got the permission to contact the Police HQ, for employment in police force.
	"	Employed with the Police. Guard duties.
	"	Broke his elbow at physical training.
	"	In hospital for 45 days, then convalescing.
	"	Falcified convalescence leave papers.
	"	Forged a 3-month "surgical operation" certificate, to be free of checks with his police unit. During this time and already before, David was active in blackmarketing with gold and coffee, and he started document forgery on larger scale. He got acquainted with Irakly LORDKIPANIDZE, the future husband of his sister Helen. He knew already Asterée SCHMIDT-AZI-BADASSI, his confidant in forgeries. Other acquaintances in Berlin: a half-jew KATE, French radio-technicians LUCAS, ALLUMES, VILEMAIN, a.o. He prepared false documents for 14 people, for friends and unknown people. He made trips-
	to Paris	where he contacted engraver ALLOU and ordered forged stamps and seals, also blank forms of official letters. He traveled to
	French-Spanish	border 3 or 4 time, to buy coffee, and brought to, and sold it, in Berlin.
	Berlin	He used a German soldier in the Commandantura in Paris, and his wife in Berlin for signaling purposes (conventional telephone calls indicating safe arrivals).
1944	Berlin	He sent his parents and sister, who had come to Berlin, with false travel documents to Vienna, his parents being unwitting of falsif. He contacted the German Military Intelligence Service "OKW ABW" to get employed with it.
Feb.		He damaged his left hand when a capsule of an unexploded incendiary bomb exploded in his hands, in his room, wounding ALLUMES also. A Belgian girl, for whom he was preparing documents, who should not have known where he lived, came to his living place just when the explosion had happened.
22 Feb.	Berlin	He, Katz, Allumes, Astrée were arrested at Anhalter rr station when meeting the Belgian girl.

BRIEF of ACTIVITIES (Continued,3)

C. WW II, continued:

TIME:	PLACE:	ACTIVITIES:
1944	Berlin	He was held for days, chained to a heater in solitary arrest, nobody caring for his hand. Then he was brought into a hospital. From there he telephoned the Belgian girl, asking some civilian clothes sent to him. The girl promised to bring those. Instead of her came policemen and took him to hospital in
	Berlin-	Teglitz jail. For months he was daily driven to the Police Hq for interrogation. Later he was held in a cellar of the Police Hq. His father came from Vienna and was allowed to see him (somewhere where the evidences of his forgery were displayed). He wrote to "OOOOS" to report an invention of his - to escape being liquidated. He was interviewed by specialsits and asked to work on it. He, Katz and Allumes were transferred to —
1945	Wolfenbüttel	jail, near Hannover, away from the approaching front line. He does not know of Asterée's faith.
April	"	The Americans freed them from the jail. He and Allumes went to —
	Cassel,	where they were officially discharged.

D.E. After WW II.

TIME:	PLACE:	ACTIVITIES:
1945	Paris	David wanted to register in an hotel as a Frenchman DATTO. He was recognized as TZITZICHVILI by a woman who thought him being his brother, Achilles. He was reported to the Sureté Militaire, however was released after he had explained what he had done during the war, against the Germans.
	"	He worked with Jaques CARRE. He married Renée FARROD. (Date not asked)
1946		His parents, sister and brother-in-law returned from Vienna.
1948	"	His old friend Jean ADAM contacted him, asked to participate in roberies. He refused: his mother would have been hurt by this. His mother died. His father, sister and her husband returned to USSR. Jean Adam contacted him again, and they robbed a jevelry store. They tried an other hold-up, but failed. He refused to continue such things: his wife did not like Jean Adam.
1949	"	Jean ADAM came back, threatened to tell all to David's wife if he won't cooperate. He agreed.
1950	"	They cased many places, finally decided and made a hold-up in a banck, successfully.

BRIEF of ACTIVITIES (Continued,4)

TIME:	PLACE:	ACTIVITIES:
E. AFTER WW II (continued)		
1950	Paris	Jean Adam was arrested; confessed and committed David. David was arrested on -
1950	French-Spanish border.	
	Paris	David was sentenced for 7 years imprisonment.
		His wife demanded and got divorced from him.
Nov. 50		She gave birth to their second child.
	Paris	Prison de la Santée - David was held there for 2.5 years. Later he was held in:
	Fresnes Poissy Rion Nimes Avignon.	
		His sentence was reduced by 10% on the occasion of the election of the new President of the Republic, and by three months for good conduct.
		He was released (he did not mentioned when).
		He has not seen his divorced wife since 1950.
		(He did not say anything about his activities after his release from the prison.)

LIST OF PERSON NAMES

IN THE DEBRIEFING RECORD (Page,Chapter,Subdivision.

ADAM Jean 5B6: 6E11: 23E5,7,9,10: 24E11. Also: Jean.
ALLOU, engraver, 16C59,60.
ALLERES, radio engineer, 17C63: 19C91,84: 21C97,99.
Asterée = SCHMIDT-AZI-BADASSI 15C51: 19C84.
ARMFIELD, Jack and brother, 5B6.

BAGRACION, 1A3.
BASSONPIERRE,De, 4B2
"Belgian Girl" 19C79,82: 20C84,87,88.
BORREAU = ELBET,Dr. 3A6.

CARRE Jaques, 23E3.
CASTAGNIET, sisters, 4B2.
CHOUCHOU, 5B8.
CUDONEG, 4B2

DATTO = David TZITZICHVILI, 23E1.
David, = " " , through the report.
De BASSONPIERRE 4B2
De PANASKHET = Achilles TZITZICHVILI,dit De Panaskhet.3A6.
" " Catherine, 3A6.
" " Irene, 3A6.
" " Marie-Helene, 3A6.
De WARREN, Lieutenant, 8C1.
DIREMER,Mr. 4B3.
DISSMANN = KATZ, 17C70.
DRUMOND,Genevieve, 4B3

ELBET Louis,Dr. = BORREAU, 3A6.

GARGARETHELI, 5B8.
Georges, 3A15.
GIVI, 3A15, a cousin of David, in U.S.A.
GOLA, 5B8.
GOELITZ Ramon, 5B7a.
GUEDEVANICHVILI,Archilles, 8C4.

HANAY,=DISSMANN,17C70.
Helen ≠ LORDKIPANIDZE,née TZITZICHVILI,23E2. Through the report.

Irakli = Lordkipanidze, 16C54: 23E2.

Jean = Jean ADAM, 23E9: 24E12,13,16.
Joachim,LNU,4B4.
JOHO or JOHIO, 11C18.
JOIGNY Henry, 18C76.
JORDANIA Atia, 3A13.
" Nathela,3A6, married TZITZICHVILI,later ELBET.
" Redik, 3A12.

KANTCHELI Djibo, 3A10.
" Marie, 2A4,married TZITZICHVILI, David'd mother.
KATZ = DISSMANN, 17C70: 18C73: 19C84: 21C97,99.
KEDIA, FNU, 8B4: 9B8: 22D5,7.
KERESSELIDZE, Leo, Leon, 3A8, 9.
" Mathée, 2A3,5: 3A7,8,9."Mathée"through the report.

LORDKIPANIDZE, Dimitri,2A5.
" Helen, 23E2, née TZITZICHVILI,David's sister.
" Irakli, 2A5: 3B7: 16C53,54; 21D1: 23E2.
" Kodar, 2A5.= TZITZOU.

LONGUIN, Georges, 2A6.
LUCAS, radio engineer, 17C63,64,69: 18C74,75,76: 19C79,80.

Mathée = Keresselidze, through the report.
MINIZINI, 7B16.

NOVIKOFF,driver, 14C39.

PANASKHET, De, 3A6. (See: De Panaskhet.)
PASCAL, LNU, 8C6: 11C22: 12C26,28: 13C33,34.
PARROD,Renée, 23E4,=married TZITZICHVILI,David's wife. (1A2)
PEINE,Frenel, 4B2.

RADEMANN,- 16C56: 20C93.
REGIMBAULT, Père, 4B2.
ROQUES,FNU, 2A6.

Sachico, 5B8.
SANTEX, 4B4
SATARELLI,Mr. 4B4 = TETINARD.
SCHMIDT-AZI-BADASSI, Astrée, 15C51: 19C84. = Astrée.
SERGO 5B8.

TCHOLOKASHVILI, Kakhutza, 5B8.
TELLIER, 7B16.
TETINARD = SATARELLI,4B4
TZITZICHVILI,Achilles,Atchico, 2A6: 23E1.= De PANASKHET.
" David, 1A1. "David" through the report.
" Gabriel, 1A2: 24E19.
" Gulga, 3A11: 13C35.
" Helen, 2A5: 3A7.=married LORDKIPANIDZE.
" Renée, = née PARROD.
" Simon, 1A3, David's father.
" Elizabeth, 1A2.
" dit De PANASKHET 3A6,= Achilles TZITZISCVILI.

VILEMAIN,radio engineer.17C63: 18C74: 19C80.
VILI,Fritz, 13C36. = David.
WARREN,De, 8C1.
WERWERT,- 17C70: 18C73.

I. DEBRIEFING

of

TZITZICHVILI, David.

Time of debriefing: 28 and 29 April 1959.
Place " " : Safehouse.
Language used : German, partly French.

- - - - -

A. General Data:

1. The Subject himself: David TZITZICHVILI, nickname: Dathouna,
Born: 12 July 1918, in GORI, Georgia. /shortended: Dat.
Nationality: Stateless.
Family status: Divorced.
Languages spoken, in sequence of fluency: French, German, Georgian, and some Russian.
Profession: ?
Visible defects: The tips of the thumb, and of the forefinger (less than one joint) of the left hand are missing.

2. Divorced wife: Renée, née PARROD, born on 30 August 1917. Married in Paris, after WW II.
Children: Daughter Elisabeth, born in March 1949;
son Gabriel, born in Nov. 1950, after the divorce.
Divorced in 1950, after David was jailed, on wife's request.

3. Father: Simon TZITZICHVILI, Georgian.
Date of birth: possibly 2nd February, year unknown.
Profession: mining engineer, specialty: petrol refinery.
Studied in Russia, and one year in Freiburg, Germany.

Historical background: Tzitzichvili was the second-largest family in Georgia. One area in Georgia is called after this family. Simon has the title of "Count". He is one of the two pretenders to the Throne of Georgia, the name of the second pretender being BAGRACION.

In 1921 Simon, together with his wife and three children, fled from Georgia via Turkey to France. The family remained for two weeks in Marseilles, and moved then to Paris. They were wealthy then. Simon took a hosiery shop. Later things went worse, and Simon for a while was a taxi driver. Still later he tried with some inventions, but had no material success. In 1942 he went to Berlin, in connection with one of his inventions. Later his wife followed him. David went to

Germany before the father went. David's sister went to Berlin probably in 1941/1942 (no clear statement about this).
In 1944 Simon, his wife and their daughter moved from Berlin to Vienna, Austria. In 1946 they came back to Paris, together with their son-in-law. In 1948, after the mother had died, Simon, together with the daughter and the son-in-law returned to USSR.
From USSR Simon has writtenmone letter in which he had asked for literature concerning "the cold" what made David to think that he is dealing with the problems of refrigeration.
According to the informations received from Mathé KERESSELIDZE Simon lived in 1958 in TIFLIS.

4. Mother: Marie, née KANTCHELI, of Georgian origine.
The date of birth, 2 February, might have been hers or father's year of birth-unknown.
She poisoned herself in Paris, in 1958, in connection with Simon's talks of going back to USSR: she did not like to go, especially because the sons refused to go.

5. Sister: Helen, nickname: Elico, the oldest in the family.
Born: 1 May 1915, in GROZNY.
During WW II she went from Paris to Berlin, where she worked for six month in the East-Ministry (Ost-Ministerium).
In 1942, probably in May, she married in Berlin a Georgian, Irakli LORDKIPANIDZE, who at that time worked with the German Security Service - "Sicherheits Dienst" (SD).
In 1944 she, together with her parents, moved to Vienna, Austria, where the husband joined them later.
They had two children, both sons: Nodar, born in 1945 in Vienna and Dimitry, born at the end of 1947, in Vienna.(?)
Nodar's nickname is TSITSOU.
In 1946 (?) the family returned from Vienna to Paris (together with Helen's parents).
In 1948-49 they returned, together with Simon, back to the USSR (Note: presumed together with their children, although David did not mention the children).
According to the information received from Mathé KERESSELIDZE, in 1958 he has seen Helen in Moscow and she had told him that she is working in Tiflis in quality of a teacher of languages. She had been detained for five years (1952-1957) in a camp or closed town because she had said something on the address of Stalin, in fact nothing bad, but this was misunderstood and falsely reported to the authorities. She was vindicated after Salin's death, and she even was paid the salary retroactively for the time she had been detained.

6. Brother: Achilles, nickname: ATCHICO.
Born: 17 July 1916, in BORZHOMI, Georgia.
Occupation: Architect, selfemployed, associated with two other architects: Georges LONGUIN and fnu ROQUES, all three having their office in GAP, Deptm Hautes Alpes, France, corner of Rue Pasteur and Rue de France. In the firm Achilles uses

a new last name: DE PANASKHET, which he has taken sometimes in 1946 or 47. Panaskhet is the name of the village in Georgia where the family had its origine.

The official full version of Achilles name is now: TZITZICHVILI dit De PANASKHET. For his children the full name is but: De PANASKHET.

During WW II Achilles was an officer in the French Army, in Africa and in Germany.

In 1944 Achilles married Nathela JORDANIA, a daughter of the former President of the Republic of Georgia (1917-1921).

They are divorced now. Of their three daughters two, both born in Paris, are living with the father: Maria-Helene (14) and Irene (12. Catherine (6), born in Gap, is living with the mother, who, since 1959, is remarried. Her second husband is a physician, Dr. Louis ELEET. The last name of this physician was formerly BORREAU. He changed it because of the bad meaning: bourreau = the hangman.

7. Cousin Mathé KERESSELIDZE, who had joined the Germans during WW II and was parachuted to USSR. He was captured there, sentenced to 15 years of hard labor (1943-58) and was then allowed to repatriate to France, where he arrived some six months to one year ago. Now he is in Stuttgart, Germany.

Before returning to France he has occasionally met in Moscow Helene who had told him of herself and of her father (see items 3 & 5). (NOTE: Asked by the debriefer, whether Helene had said to Mathé something about her husband, David mentioned having heard nothing about Irakli. He explained this by the bad relations between Helene and Irakli: the initial big love had faded soon. No questions were asked about the children of the couple.)

8. Cousin Leo or Leon KERESSELIDZE, a brother of Mathé. His nickname is: LOULOU.

9. Father of Leo and Mathé KERESSELIDZE. He was mentioned by David together with Leo. His address, possibly common with Leo: VESINET, Seine on Oise.

10. Uncle Djibo KANTCHELI, brother od David's mother, a taxidriver who taught David's father in taxi business (he knew to drive). Uncle's address: 37 Rue de Larochefoucauld, Paris IX.

11. A far relative Guiga TZITZICHVILI. He tried to help David in Chalon in 1942, but failed. He died later.

12. Redik JORDANIA, a brother of Nathela, Achilles's wife.

13. Atia JORDANIA, a sister " " " "

14. David's father probably had one brother and three sisters.

15. Cousin Givi, in the U.S.A., details known to Georges.

3. David's childhood:

1. David does not remember about the kindergartens he had been in. He has visited 18 differnt schools.

2. The first school, he remembers, was NOTRE DAME, a Catholic boarding school in Boulogne sur Seine, where he remained for two years (4 to 6 years of age). His brother went to the same school. The oldest of the students were up to 18 years, making their bacalaureate.
David remembers the names of: Père REGINBAULT, the assistant director; two teachers, sisters mademoiselles CASTAGNIET; Frehel PEINE - one of the neighbors in the dormitory; De BASSONPIERRE, a pupil of a higher class, was shot during the war as a "collaborateur"; an other pupil: Le CUDONEC. The pupils wore navy-type uniforms with a coat of arms on the sleeve showing the letters "ND" (Notre Dame).
Of the events he remembers that he could not climb a pole because his arms were too short, he could not hold himself tight. Once he saw a blood-stained chair in the school's dining-room: the director had shot at and wounded during the night a thief. Once his hair got twisted or pinched between the bars of the bed; he thought that somebody was under the bet and was pulling him on hair.
The family lived at that time at Rue Poussin, later at ~~Rue~~ Quai de Tokio, which is now called Quai des Etats Unies. He and his brother were taken to the school normally by taxi on Sunday night, and brought home on Saturday after the lessons.

3. In connection with the change of the living place he changed to Lycée Montaigne, Rue Guynemer, when he was 7. He attended the 8th grade, the grades being: 12-the lowest, 1 - the highest.
There he remembers a teacher Mr. DIREMER (pronounced -mère), who had yellow spots on his hands. He is dead now. He had a son. He also remembers a girl in this school, Genevieve DRUMOND, who was sitting immediately before him. He liked the girl very much, but did not dare to show his liking, sauf by pulling her on hair. They went together to this school up to the 7th grade.

4. The next school was "L'Ecole Communale", Rue Littrée, corner Rue Vaugirard. David's brother went to the same school. David remembers a teacher Mr. SATARELLI whose nickname was TETINARD. A pupil SANTEX was good in gym. The father of a Jew had a curiosity shop, the boy's name was Joachim.
At this time David's father had already given up his hosiery shop and was working as a taxi driver of a company-owned car.

5. When David was 8 or 9 years of age, the family moved from Paris to VIROFLAY, some 3 km from Versailles. The move was

made by taxi: father had to make many rounds. They got an one-family house with a garden of about 1000 square meters. David and his brother went to the "Lycée Hoche".

6. In Viroflex David lerned to know a boy, Jean ADAM, 6 months older than he himself. Jean was the single son of the director of the perfume export house O.L.L. David had a fight in woods with Jean after he had got a stone drown by Jean on his head. They were good friends later.

Jean had friends: two brothers AR FIELD, one's first name was Jack, and their nice looking but loose minded sister Maud. When competing in springing from a swing, Jack broke one of his legs. David and Jean seated him on a chair, carried to the porch of his house and run away.

David and Jean grounded a "secret club". They built an Escimo igloo and made fire in it. The igloo took fire and ignited the surrounding field and forrest. The boys fled. The fire-brigade had to battre the fire. David went home. He did not say anything to his father about his part in the brand: he explained his red face by much running when playing. Later the police came . David's fault was detected, his father had to pay the damages, he had not enough money for this.

7. David's father had, by this time, given up taxi driver's job. He was working on different inventions. He was sure he had discovered petrol fields in France, but he was not believed. He inventend a device for authomatic replay of records; he asked for 90% of the intake but was offered 40% only. Father had a movie projector with which David was not alloved to play. Thus, David construed his own projector and showed it to the father. Father was thrilled, and allowed David to use his (father's) projector. David did, and broke it.

7a. In this school David made much nonsences. He thinks that the reason for this was the need to show up: he was small and his name made the French children laugh and mock him. He wanted to show that he was a full guy. He got his third reprimand when he burned carbide in an incstand. He was thrown out when he planted a cracker in a restroom in the garden of the school and a teacher fell into the bassin of the restroom when the cracker exploded. An other pupil, Ramon GOELITZ had seen him planting the cracker and had reported this.

8. In Viroflex , neighboring to the house where David lived, resided ten single Georgians who had made some resistance to the Russians during WW I or after this. David used to visit those men, he was something like a mascot of theirs. They had a dog and an ape. They taught David some small tricks. Six of the men were working as taxi drivers for the subsistence of all the group. One stood at home, cooking for all, and one, Kakhutza TCHOLOKASHVILI, was the boss. David remembers some names or nicknames of them: CHOCHOU, SACHIKO, GARGARETHELI, SERGO (died), COLA.

9. After having been thrown out from the Lycée Hoche, Dawid was sent to a communale school in Viroflex, some three kilometers away from their home. He was given money for the street car, however,he did not take the car: he used the money to buy what he needed for his silly things and acts.

10. At the end of the term David was taken back to the Lycée:his mother, probably, had asked for this, and had given some maney, -one can do everything with money. He remained in this school until they moved back to Paris, to Vanves.

11. David´s contact with Jean Adam continued up to the beginning of the war. David has never abtruded himself to him. He followed many plans of Jean, although he was sure that he could have made better plans. The parents of David and Jean had nothing in common, although they knew one-another. However, it happened that Jean always lived somewhere in the vicinity of David, and when Tzitzichvili-s moved to Paris Vanves, Jean lived near the Parte Françon.

12. In Vanves David was sent to Lycée Michelet. After six months he was thrown out. They were served some vegetables in this college at lunch times. Once a plate with vegetables was caught by a pupil when this was upon to fall down, and the catcher was glad. David,however, took the plate and deliberately threw it to the floor,brook it. The supervisor came and asked how did this happen. David told the truth, and was throwh out of the school.

13. Then David, 13 or 14, was sent to a community school.There he had to take a test to get the "Certificat d´Etuded" He took the first, written part of the test, and after it, during the lunch time he got so fascinated by a bricklayer´s work that he started to help the man, also because he was promised 10 Francs for this. When he later inquired about the time, he learned that he was already late for the oral part of the test. So he did not go for it: he continued to work, to earn the promised pay. However, he was paid nothing,and he was thrown out from the school.

14. The parents sent him for another communal school in the same area. There he had a fight with an other pupil who threatened him with a knife. David forced the knife from him and threw it away. The knife stuck high in the wall of a house. The other boy reported the case making him, David, looking guilty, and he was thrown out of this school as well. He remembers that in this school there was a pupil who had a device in his mouth to adjust his teeths, and the boy used this device to make queer noises.

15. Then David was sent to a professional school,"Art et Métier", in Chalon sur Marne. At this time his parents were living somewhere to the east of Paris. There David remained for 1,5 years and,again, was thrown out because he,instead going to classes went to the attick of the building and practiced there

throwing of a big knife. This ~~was~~ made noise, he was detected and thrown out.

16. In this school he belonged to the "leading" trio of the school, the others being an Italian Minizini, about 14, and a French boy Tellier (13).
Every Thursday and Saturday the school went for walks. Their supervisor probably had a girlfriend whom he visited during those walking periods, leaving the boys on their own. On one such a case the trio decided to for drinks in a tavern. They had all together 13 Francs and some sous. Everybody was bragging with his experiences with women, and it was decided to have women. However, Tellier, the youngest backed out, and so did Minzini. But he, David, to show his manliness, went upstairs with the woman who asked 10 francs. The woman asked him to wash himself before the act. He did. The room was cold, and the water was cold, he nearly "lost" his penis. But, with the help of the woman, ~~thexxxxxxx~~ he managed the act, and felt proud when he returned to the others. However, since then he had a kind of mixed feelings toward the women, shiness, fear and attraction all together, and he did not have any of them for three years since then.

17. His father was agry with him because he again was thrown out of the school. Father told that he is good but for a hog-heard. But, nevertheless, he was sent to an other school, Ecole Breguet, for electrotechnicians, in 1937.
But, there, also, he was thrown out.

18. Thereupon he left the parents' home, lived for three months in an hotel and worked nightly in the railroad station, unloading ~~the~~ oysters. It was a cold job. The father took him back home and sent him to the school of photography and movie at the corner of Rue Littrée and Rue Vaugirard, close to an other school where he had been earlier. There he remained for two half-terms, March- July, and October - May, having not finished the course, because the German-Polish war started.

19. Sometimes between his going to Ecole Breguet and the school of photography he had stolen an English dictionary from a library. This came out, however, he was not put in jail. The only effect was that his normal identity papers of a stateless person were withdrown and replaced by temporary papers which he had to renew every three months. He did not do this, and after 6 months he was taken and held by the police for 13 days before he was given new papers.

C. Period of WW II:

1. In December 1939 David reported in Paris to a depot of the French Foreign Legion for voluntary service in the Legion. 15 days later he was sent to Lion, and from there, after one week stay, to Marseilles. From Marseilles he was shipped to Oran, and further sent to Sidi-Bel/Ables in Algier, then to Tunis, Sous, to the First Cavalry Regiment. There Lieutenant De WARREN sent him to courses for N:C:Os.

2. But soon an order was received to send all legionnaires-Georgians to BARCARES where special units had to be formed of diferent nationalities. At about 110 Georgians, and thousands of legionnaires of other nationalities were sent to Barcares. They remained idle, doing but very little exercising.

3. After the German-French hostilities ended, those foreign legionnaires were returned from Barcares to Paris and discharged, including David. He went back to his parents.

4. He looked for work. A Georgian had recommended him to go to Germany where a Georgian Legion was being formed for the fight against the Soviets. Archilles GUEDEVANICHVILI was said being gathering people for this purpose. David's father told him that a Georgian KEDIA is the man who organizes this in connection with the Germans. David went to this man, had a talk with him, but did not like the idea.

5. Then David reported to the German Labor Office in Paris, volunteering as an electrician for work in Germany. He was sent to POELITZ, near STETTIN, HIDRYER WERKE, with a contract for one year.

6. He remained there for some three months: a mate of his, PASCAL (first name), did not like the work, and both decided to quit, to go " on leave".

7. They had no valid German travel documents. It was impossible to travel with the identity card issued by the factory if there was no leave certificate: travel documents issued by the police. (NOTE: here the story is confused: as the debriefer recollects, David spoke on the first day of the debriefing that he had help from a girlfriend who put into good German the text which he had prepared for the forged certificate of leave, to visit his sick uncle in Berlin. On the second day he revoked this, saying that this must have been a misunderstanding, he had spoken out of the chronological sequence, about a later case when he had help from a girlfriend.)

David went to the police in Stettin, and somehow managed to get the travel documents, valid until 2 June, to visit his sick uncle in Berlin (who did not exist at all).

8. In Stettin David met a KEDIA-man, but again refused to join this organization, and he traveled to Berlin, met there some Georgians, spoke of going to Paris, was asked and took some letters for delivery in Paris and took the train up to Achen.

9. In Achen he asked a Frenchman how to get to France. He was advised that the German GESTAPO is giving necessary permits.

10. Now David falcified his leave permit, changing the validity date from 2 to 12 June, and went to GESTAPO. The falcification was not detected. However, he was not allowed to travel to Paris because his leave and travel document showed but Berlin as his place of destination, and he was ordered to return to Berlin.

11. Instead of returning to Berlin David took the train up to two km from EUPEN, in order to pass the XXXXXXXXXX border in the EUPEN-MALMEDY area clandestinely. He xx asked somebody for advise how to cross the barder, and he was sent to a man who agreed to take him over during the night time.

12. David had but 50 German Marks. He told this to the guide and asked how much he will have to pay him. The man asked 20 Marks. During the night the guide took him to a place, indicated David a direction xxx to follow for crossing the border and to arrive to the railroad station on the other side of the border. This was all he was offered for the 20 DM.

13. David waited until the guide left. Then, fearing that the guide could have directed him into a trap, he took a direction 90 degrees to the right of the advised direction, and followed this direction for about half an hour, and turned then 90 degrees to the left, thus into the old, advised direction. Originally he had had in mind to turn later once more to the left and thus to come back to some spot on the original direction just opposite of the place wherefrom he started his walk. However, when he had reached a road, he noticed a man on bycicle approaching towards him. He hid himself in the culvert, and when the man was quite close, he, David, jumped out, frightenend and stopped the man, then asked whether he is a good Frenchman. Receiving a positive reply, he then asked how to procede to the railroad station. The man showed him the direction to the next farm, and advised to ask for further information there - it would have been too complicated to advise for all the way. David thanked and left for the farm . The man, glad to escape from his charger, offered him some cigarettes.

14. David found nobody in the farm. He, thus, proceeded on his own, and finally reached the railroad station. Before boarding the train, he went to a barber, to shave and to clean his

clothes. He had but 32 German Marks left. He asked the barber how much the railroad ticket Namur-Paris would cost, and asked also to exchange his German money. He got the information and the money exchanged. He had just enough for the ticket with a few remaining for something to eat.

15. David bought the ticket and borded the train. He asked other travelers about the controls. He was told that the German military personnel is performing the control at the Belgian-French border. He thought to leave the train before the border, to cross the border clandestinely and then return to the train, but it was too late, he could not leave the car any more, the control-team, a Lieutenant, a N.C.O. and two man, was there already. The officer marched up to David, looked him into the eyes, then turned his back to David and shouted the N.C.O. to hurry up. David had luck: he had no documents, and nobody asked him for those: the N.C.O. probably thought that the Lieutenant had checked his documents.

16. He felt happy, but the others told him that there will be one more check at the "red zone" (la zone rouge) near SAINT QUENTIN. Thereupon David left the compartment and approached, in the coridor of the car, a railroad employee. He showed the person his ticket, told that he has no documents, and demanded that the employee, as a good Frenchman, help him, another Frenchman, to come to Paris. He was asked to wait. The employee soon returned with the chief of the train. The latter took David to the mail car of the train and ordered the employee in charge of this car to find a place for David to hide. A mail sack was opened and David was instructed to get in. David did, and felt so secure and comfortably that he fell asleep. He remembers having herd some shouting and kicking around, however, he was not hit. He was in Paris when the sack was opened. He felt very ~~ix~~ happy, offered money, but he was told that this was not made for money. He then promised to give the man some drinks, but in the excitement he forgot this. When he later remembered this and returned to the station, he did not find the person any more.

17. Two or three days later David again reported to a German Labor Office in Paris, this time as a photographer. He, of course, did not go to the same office where he had been before, where they could have recognized him.

18. He got the assignment into a factory in Berlin, which produced electrodes wor welding instruments. He had to photograph samples of material used and of electrodes produced, for checking purposes, under different conditions. He also had to make photocopies of different books, and photographs for the identity cards. The factory was somewhere in LICHTENBERG, not quite in Berlin (the next day David said that the factory was in FRIEDENAU). He does not remember the name of the factory, but he heard the director answering telephone calls by saying

JOHO or JOHIO and, thus, he learned that this was the name of the director. He does not remember the adress of the place where he lived.

19. In this factory there was a chemical laboratory with a Dutch laborant. This man showed David some bowls made of platina, which he said using for different mixing work. Later some of these bowls were stolen. He, David, was suspected, and his living place was searched, but - he had not taken those bowels.

20. ~~Later~~ he got in trouble because he had been to movie with a German girl. An other girl, who was jealous, had reported this, and he was fired: a foreigner had no right to go with a German girl. However, this discharge was made to be "honorable", and he could apply for a new job.

21. David went to the Labor Office, showed his discharge papers, and was directed to a factory in the STAHLSCHREIBERSTRASSE, Berlin, Moritsplatz. The factory was producing steel ammunition belts for aircraft maschine guns. The technics used in this factory were primitive. David invented a simple machine for adjustment of the right grip necessary to hold the cartridges in the belt. The director was much pleased.

222 In Berlin David met PASCAL again. They both got the idea that it is enough for them of the life in Germany, and they decided to go to South America, to Brazil.

23. They needed passports, such for foreigners. To get those, they needed certificates of leave from their working places. Thus, David went to a Labor Office, to the prettiest girl, and asked for two leave certificates. The girl was obliging, however said, that the factory must issue the certificates, not the Labor Office. David then explained that he was misunderstood, that he did not ask for the certificates, but for the blank forms, so he could bring those to the factory. He got the forms, filled them in, forged an imprint of the stamp of the factory by copying it over an electric bulb, stole himself during the night into the office of the foreman and made an other imprint with a cachet found there. It was easy for him to enter the office because he was living in the same building with the factory, and when he needed warm water for washing, he had to go to the upper story for opening the valve, and from there it was close to the "studio" or workshop (atelier): there was not much danger of being seen by the night guard as the operation did not take long time.

24. With the leave certificates ready, David returned to the same girl in the Labor Office from whom he had received the forms. The obliging girl stamped the certificates "registered", entered their names into a cardfile, and thus, David and Pas-

cal had officially certified (by the Labor Office) permits of leave to solicit for the Passports for Foreigners.

25. They got the passports, and they traveled to Paris. David saw there his mother, and spoke her of his intention to go to Brazil. This was in 1942.

26. David and Pascal decided to go via Spain and Portugal. David bought a map, and they started. They crossed the border to Spain, and got into trouble then, because nobody wanted to exchange their German money, they could not even buy food. Thus, they decided to return to France.

27. When they were for some 500 meter back in France, they were seen by the German custom guards. They were arrested, separated and put into cells in a cellar. Fortunately, the wall between the two adjacent cells into which they were put, was so thin that they could conversate with each other.

28. David, afraid that Pascal could say something wrong when interrogated separately, advised him to say, when asked, that it was David who bought the map. And it really happened that Pascal was questioned first, and he, duly instructed by David, could give co-ordinated answers.

29. He, David, was brought to a lieutenant who made a thorough search, looked into his watch, and even into his rectum. However, the lieutenant was polite and friendly. David gave some explanation for being in this area - visiting somebody, whereupon the lieutenant said that the pasport authorized David to travel up to Paris only.

30. They were ordered to return to Paris. One NCO was ordered to accompany them to the railroad station and to see that they really will depart for Paris. They went to the station. The NCO ordered tickets for them: Bayonne - Paris. At the same moment the NCO was called by a friend away from the counter. David quickly used the opportunity and asked the clerk at the counter not to give them tickets to Paris, but instead to PAU, a station some 10 km from the border of the free, unoccupied part of France. The clerk objected first, saying that the NCO ordered the tickets to Paris, but David quickly persuaded him "to help other Frenchmen against the Gestapo-man". He got the right tickets. The N.C.O. returned, saw them off, but, of course, he did not know that David got the tickets to Pau, not to Paris.

31. They came to the border. A Frenchman advised them how to get over the border - everybody was ready to help them. They went, but soon got stuck in mud, and David lost one of his shoes. It was dark, he could not retrack it.

32. Then they were stopped by the French gendarmes who thought that they were Germans. David quickly inverted the story of their flight from the occupied zone for joining the Free French Legion. The gendarmes took them to a village where David could buy a pair of shoes, but alas, canvas shoe only, and of too large size. Then they were directed to a company of that Legion, to [illegible]. The chief of this company gave them a horse cart to go to the regimental H.Q. in Marseilles, Camp de Sainte Marthe.

33. There arrived, David advised Pascal to go to the registrar the first, so they both could see whether he, as a Frenchman, will be accepted without showing his German passport. David, being a Georgian, did not want to go the first.
Pascal went. His story was not believed. To prove his being a Frenchman and not a German as suspected, he showed his German passport for foreigners. This made the situation worse, and Pascal was happy to get out without being arrested.

34. Both retreated. David decided to return to Paris. Pascal did not want to return and said that he will go to Algiers, to get a job on the construction of the Algiers - Nigeria railroad. They departed.

35. David, on his way back to Paris, reached Lion. There he went to one of his far relatives, Guiga TZITZICHVILI, and asked whether the latter could help him to get a permit to go to the German-occupied Paris. Guiga thought this being a simple matter, because he had a good friend in the Security (Sureté). However, the relative failed, nearly got in trouble himself, and advised David to dissappear quickly, what the latter did.

36. Somehow David managed to pass the French control by showing his German passport. The guard misunderstood his difficult name, and let him pass as Corporal Fritz VILI.

37. But the German post stopped him, David, and started asking different questions. David demanded to be brought to the chief of guards. He was taken to a N.C.O., whom he, again, asked to be brought to an officer. He was brought to a "Sturmbanführer" (Major in the SS). David explained to this officer something of having visited his brother in Marseilles. The officer nicely helped him to return to Paris.

38. Back in Paris, David went to the parents. The mother mocked him about his quick return from Brazil.

39. Soon David reported to the German Commandantura in Paris, to volunteer as a driver to the N.S.K., the Transportation Corps of the Nazy Party. He was accepted and sent to Berlin, MUGELHEIM LAGER, close to OSTKREUTZ. He knew to drive, he had a driver's license since 1938.
After some three or four months of training they were distri-

buted to different places in Berlin. He came to a unit stationed close to the BRANDENBURGER TOR, vis-a-vis to the French Embassy building, where he had to wait and drive a cab for eight hours the day. He lived in the same house in front of which their cars were stationed. He does not remember any names from the time of this training period. One of his co-drivers in this small unit was NOVIKOF.

40. David remained in this drivers' unit in Berlin until, some three to four months later, volunteers were called to go to France, as lorry-drivers to the West coast where the Atlantic Wall was being constructed. He volunteered, and 15 days later, together with other volunteers, he was sent to Paris.

41. In Paris they were given French-made Fords of five ton loading capacity (C U - charge utile). The convoy of some 50 cars, each with two drivers, started in direction to SAINT NAZAIRE. At the departure, still in Paris, close to Porte d'Orleans, one driver had an accidence: he could not take the curb, drove on the sidewalk, killed and damaged a few people, without damaging the car. David, who interpreted at the spot when the case was cleared, was ordered to take this car over, because the driver who just had the accidence, was not allowed to continue to drive immediately.

42. The convoy was divided into three parts, with David going to the detachment which was detailed to the Navy. This was approximately at the time when the British made a mock landing or a demonstration of a landing.

43. In 1943, still on the French West coast, the NSKK men were ordered to take an oath. David refused, and as the consequence, was sent back to Berlin, guarded by two men, into a NSKK penal or refractory camp.

44. David asked the leader of this camp, an "Obersharführer" (equivalent to a N.C.O.),/ later David changed the grade to "Hauptsturmführer" - equivalent to a Captain/, for permission to contact the Police Headquarters, for volunteering into the police service. The campleader granted him six-hour leave to settle his employment with the police, or to face a tough deal because of his refusal to take the oath.

45. David went to the Police H.Q. at ALEXANDERPLATZ in Berlin, was accepted and given a note that he had registered for the service in the Police. He returned with this note to the NSKK camp, and on the next morning he was released on ground of this note.

46. In the Police David had to ~~take~~ undergo physical examination in a SS and Police hospital. He was found fit physically and was sent into barracks of which he does not remember the address. His grade in the police was "Rott-Wachtmeister - Dolmetscher" - something as the second-lowest grade in the ordinary police,

, the SCHUPO (Schutzpolizei). The "Dolmetscher" simply indicated that he was a foreigner, as the knowledge of languages was the only reason why foreigners could be employed by the police. He had nothing to do with interpreting or translating. They did some exercising and made centry duty at a large petrol store. His hours on duty were, by 24-hour spells: 1300 to 1300, then off up to the next day, 0800 to 0800 and off up to the next day, 1300, and so one for a week. In the next week the same pattern repeated, but the start being at 1000 h.

47. In summer, during an exercise of physical training, a man who had to catch David when he was coming down from a high flight into which he was thrown by two men, the catcher got frightened, backed out, David, as a concequence, fell to the ground, and broke one arm, the elbow, and damaged the other arm. He remained for some 40 days in hospital, the same in which he had the physical examination when entering the police service.

48. When released from the hospital, he was given a convalessence certificate which kept him free of work. He had to go periodically for checks and for renewal of this certificate. After he had been for those checks and renewals for a few times, he started to forge the signature of the physician and "renewed" the certificate himself.

49. During his stay with the police force in Berlin, and also when he was "convalessing", he had a private room hired at KURFURSTENDAMM 26, or "not exactly" 26 - he said not to remember the exact number of the house.

50. Then he got the idea to falcify a document releaving him for a longer period of time from checks with the police unit. This had to be a certificate showing that he had to undergo a "surgical operation" which will take at least three months.

51. He had a girlfriend, Asterée SCHMIDT-AZI-BADASSI, a half-Azerbaijan, who was fluent in German and in French. David asked her to put the medical certificate into good official German. Then he forged the cachets and the signature of the physician, the same who had written the renewals of his disability certificate.

52. He presented this forged certificate to a clerk in the office of his police unit. He was on good terms with the clerks there, he was a "friendly foreigner" who joked and spoke about Paris. This clerk took a short look on the certificate, made corresponding notes in his files, and this was enough for David for the case that somebody would ask about his whereabouts: he did not need to rely any more on the forged document: the clerk had made an official entry into the books, and there was no way to check, neither to doubt this entry.

53. During those three months of "surgical operation" David get in contact with Irakli LORDKIPANIDZE, a boyfriend of his sister Helen who worked with the East-Ministry (Ost-Ministerium). Irakly, who worked with the "SD" (Sicherheitsdienst,-Security Service), and who later married Helen, had just received order to go to Paris.

54. David asked Irakli to give his travel document or order for a short time to him, so he could show those to his supperior and to ask for similar ores. Irakli obliged. David photographed the documents - he had no intention to show those to his boss, he was going to make his own documents.

55. His sister brought him some forms which were used in the Ost-Ministeriom, and he collected others more from different offices.

56. Thus, David prepared for himself a falcified travel document to Paris, signing it with the name of Police President RADEMANN. This name he has used on many documents in later times.

57. Before using this document he checked it, or made a rehersal with his girlfriend. He gave the falcified document to the girl for inspection, and then, soon after this, he pushed his genuine police passport above the false paper, asking the girl about her reaction and findings. She said that she had understood that the first paper was a travel order, but she had not had enough time to read it through, in full. This, David explained, was the trick: one has to give the falcified paper first, and then, without giving the checker enough time for its study, insert an other, genuine doccument which would attire the attention of the checker, detract it from the falcified one.

58. David used this trick with the controls and had a smooth journey to Paris.

59. In Paris David contacted the engraver ALLOU, corner of the streets Rue Filles du Calvaire - and Beaumarechais. He asked Allou to prepare for him a seal of the German SD Headquarters. The man consented after a short hesitation, after David had spoken of Frenchmen's moral duty to help other Frenchmen against the Germans. The same man made for David later many more seals and stamps of different German offices, like the Security Service, the East-Ministry, the Labor Office the Police Headquarters and the travel permission stamp for the passports.

60. By the intermediary of this ALLOU David let also be printed different forged letter- and order-forms of the above mentioned offices, in thousands of copies, sofar those did not have filigeee nets printed in. However, he personally was able

to prepare by hand the filigree net if the document needed it.

61. To the question of the debriefer concerning the expenses of all this immense work, David explained that all this costed him over 100,000 French Francs. Later he changed this sum to 140,00 to 150,000 F.Francs.

62. At first he made money by reselling golden watches of his friends, as well as other objects, receiving good gains.

63. Then he had three friends in Berlin, French radio-engineers who had been brought to compulsory works to Germany but later released. The last names of those Friends were: LUCAS, ALLUMES and VILEMAIN. Lucas and Vilemain wanted to have traveldocuments to Paris. The father of Lucas was a wealthy man in Paris.

64. When David was preparing for his own journey to Paris, he let Lucas write a letter to his father, asking him to give David 200,000 Francs. The father obliged.

65. Besides, and especially after he had his caches ready, he earned plenty of money through his operations on the black-market, buying coffe at the French-Spanish frontier for 50 German Marks the kilogram, and reselling it in Berlin for 900 to 1200 Mark the kg.

66. He personally had made 3 or 4 trips to the Spanish border for coffee, and four other men have done this for him.

67. Those trips were easy, especially the French part of them on which were no special checks. Nor were the trips dangerous because the luggage of military personnel was not searched, and nor was the luggage of police force.

68. When making and using these confeit seals, one had to pay attention to the number of the unit in the seal which to use: those numbers referred to the type of the work and the importance of the offices, f.i. "10" would show that the seal was of an unimportant small office, whereas the right number to use was perhaps three or four.

69. Before letting LUCAS to use the forged papers, David wanted to check the papers on somebody else.

70. David had a half-Jew pal KATZ-DISSMANN. His mother, born HAMAY, Hungarian, had married a Jew Katz, and later, in a second marriage - Dissmann. A son from this first marriage was now using the name of DISSMANN, however, was under the pressure of a certain WERWERT who knew of his Jewish origin. Katz asked David to prepare papers for the Spaniard WERWERT for an official trip to Spain. David agreed, however asked for two old genuine Spanish passports for this purpose.

71. He got the old passports, those could be easily bought on black market, and out of those two passports he made a new one for Werwert.

72. David went into details in describing how he prepared the passport, especially how he exchanged the photograph which was fixed by groumets, andthus, could not be removed and simply replaced. He had to use plenty of skilled washing and master-photography for remouving the old image and replacing it by the new one without damaging the passport, nor the "photograph" itself.

73. Werwert used the passport. He was instructed by Katz to report in Spain to a priest who was in contact with Katz. The signal from the priest came, Werwert had arrived without trouble. At this occasion Katz disclosed to David that Werwert was not a Spaniard, as pretended, but a German.

74. How David prepared the documents for Lucas and Vilemain: to report as specialists to the Labor Office in Paris.

75. David had arranged with Lucas to acknowledge his safe arrival in Paris. The woman, in whose house the Lucas´es lived in Paris, was working in the German Commandantura in Paris. Through her David learned to know the name and the address of the family of a german soldier -,operator of the switchboard of the Comandantura in Paris. The family lived in Berlin. Some coffee was given to the soldier and he was urged to phone his wife in berlin and to tell that he had received some coffee for her. This was the signal announcing safe arrival of Lucas in Paris. David told that this signal was used in some ten cases.

76. David had issued false travel documents to some 14 persons. One of them was a friend of Lucas in Berlin, whose name and home address were: Henry JOIGNY, 5,Rue Jaretti,Paris XV.

77. Somehow David became an idea to join the "ABWEHR" of the German Armed Forces, something more important and exiting than his previous activities. He had no good idea of the real scope and of the structure of the "Abwehr". He went to the house of "AMT ABWEHR, OKW" in the WILHELMSTRASSE. The porter at the entrance asked him to which branch he wanted to go. David told "West" whereupon the porter had said that he should go to"West Einz" (I West), and instructed him into which room to go. There David found an officer wo explained to him that the office had been moved to TANNE,in POTZDAM.

78. David went to P$_o$tzdam. It took him hours until he found TANNE, an area surrounded by barbed wire, heavily guarded, all guards being N.C.Os. He showed his police passport and asked to be brought to the chief of the guards. He was brou-

brought to a Lieutenant who took him to a Colonel. The latter, having heard that David wanted to get employed, this means that he did not belong to the organization, got mad, did not believe that an unauthorized person could have penetrated so far, (into a top secret area), and asked how he learned about the place. David told his story. The colonel checked on phone with the police H.Q. and got the reply that they have such a man. David, then was asked what he could do, his name was registered, and he was told that he will be contacted later.

79. Through a chain of persons, linked to LUCAS, David got a request to prepare documents for a Belgian girl's journey to Paris. He consented.

80. He met the girl, like many other persons, outside of his living place, on different places, and under good security precautions, f.i.: somebody entered the meeting place on his behalf and asked the person who was awaiting him to come out. He, David, was at that time out observing the environs, to see whether somebody would be surveilling his two persons. If there was no surveillance, then he followed his people, approached them in a safe place. He never brought them to his living place. But LUCAS and VILEMAIN had been to his quarters.

81. Before he had finished the documents for the Belgian girl, he and ALLUMES had found after an airraid, an unexploded incendiary bomb. Allumes had explained that such a bomb, having not exploded when coming down, is harmless. They took the bomb to David's living place, and David, cautiousely, tried to take out the capsule. The capsule exploded. The thumb and the forefinger of his left hand were damaged, and Allumes got a splinter into his face. The landlady was mad: the fools are playing with bombs, ruining her hause which was saved in the airraid. She wanted to report them to the police, but David calmed her down, saying that he himself will report the case, he himself is a policeman, a.s.o.

82. At the same time the Belgian girl happened to come and saw David injured. She showed no grief because of the paines caused to David and the loss of his fingertips, - she was angry that she could not have her papers and could, thus, not start her pleasure trip to Paris.

83. It took injured David three days until the documents for the girl were ready, and an appointment was made to meet her in the ANHALTER BAHNHOF wherefrom the trains to Paris were starting after the Potsdamer Bahnhof was demolished. The meeting was fixed for 2200h.

84. David went for the meeting together with ALLUMES, KATZ and ASTEREE. They found the station rather empty, and they thought that they had come too early. But then David noticed the

Belgian girl just at the platform gate. He approached her. She told David that he will be arrested immediately, and indeed, all around there came men with machine pistols ready. All but the Belgian girl were arrested, and hold separately. This was on 22 February 1944.

85. David was held for a few days in a room chained by his right hand (the undamaged hand) to a heater. Nobody spoke a single word with him. He was brought some food like it is being made with a dog.

86. His injured hand was not cared for at all and started to fester. When he lamented about this, he was transferred to a hospital where he was put into a large ward together with many more people.

87. He noticed a telephone in the coridor of the hospital. He asked a coin from a Dutch patient and phoned to the Belgian gerl, asking her to bring him some civilian clothes. He still did not believe that this girl had betried him.

88. The girl promised to come to see him the next day at 1000H. He sure, got a visit the next day at 10, but by guards who took him to the hospital in TEGEL jail. Now it was clear to David that the Belgian girl was in contact with the German police.

89. From the Tegel jail he was daily taken for questioning to the police H.Q.

90. A few months later, when his fingers had nearly healed, he was trensferred into a cellar of the police H.Q.

91. His question~~n~~ing continued for nine months, with the sessions at first daily, then two to three times a week, later once in a week or biweekly. The charges were heavy: grave forgery, damaging the security of the state, demoralization of the foreign laborers, helping the POW to flee, and espionage (some photos of the bomb-damaged Berlin were found in his living place).

92. Sometimes before his arrest, David had organized the move of his parents and sister from Berlin to Vienna, of course with forged traveldocuments, however, the family being not aware of the falcifications.

93. After his arrest the parents came from Vienna to see him. He does not know whether they were brought by the authorities or did they come at their own initiative. The evidences of his crimes were displayed in the same room where he met his father. It was then that the father learned that he, David, had forged the traveldocuments for the move of the family, that there was no police president Rademann whose name the documents showed, that David had invented this name. His

father was very much embarrassed.

94. During the interrogations David was asked many times for whom he did all those things, for which intelligence service: nobody believed that a single person could have achieved so much without any big foreign service behind him.

95. The police inspectors had hinted him that he would not escape the death sentence. To gain time, he wrote a letter to "00008" and reported an invention of his: a motor which worked without gas, - in those days, Germans being very short of gas, such an invention should attire attention.

96. He was contacted and asked for details of his invention. He told something and requested better living conditions and food, so he would be able to work on this invention. He also mentioned that some details of the invention are in Vienna and should be brought from there to Berlin. (At that time Vienna was already occupied by the Russians). Later two specialists were sent to him, to check his information. They found that the idea was acceptable theoretically, and he was urged to continue to work on it.

97. In connection with the approach of the front to Berlin, they, this means David, Katz and Allumes, were transferred to WOLFENBUTTEL jail, near HANNOVER. He does not know what happened to Asterée.

98. In Wolfenbuttel they remained for some three months, until the Americans freed them in April 1945.

99. They went together to KASSEL Discharge Camp, wherefrom he and Allumes went to Paris, whereas Katz went his own way.

D. Additional explanations to the activities during WW II.

1. The photographs which David had made of the documents of Irakli Lordkepanidze were not good enough. So he had to enlarge the photos as much as he could, up to the size of a few square feet. He ameliorated the enlarging by some pencil work. Then he re-photographed the enlarging and produced new, good photos of the documents in the exactly right size of the original documents.

2. All the photographic lab work was done in his hotel room. He used two MINOXes and one CONTAX, and a French type enlarger with the objective of his Contax. The equipment costed him over 100,000 (it was not specified whether French Francs or German Marks).

3. David's father needed money for his inventions. David gave
him 100,000 D. through a third person, his father not knowing
from whom the money kame. This was before David's "journey to
Brazil."

4. David had plenty of money, mostly earned by selling coffee
on black market. Once he has bought in Berlin for ten kg
coffee a car, an Opel.

5. The Georgians in Berlin did not know of his doings and re-
lations in Berlin much, although he mixed with them, nor did
KEDIA know anything and was puzzled by this. When arranging
the wedding party of his sister, in May-June 1942, he asked
Kedia for his car. The request was refused. David, then, hired
4 or 5 cars for a full day (paying with coffee), and it hap-
pened that Kedia saw him coming with his caravan of cars, loa-
ded with vines and other good things which he had bought black
for the feast. Kedia had asked him about the caravan, and Da-
vid had replied that Kedia can now see that David can have as
many cars as he just likes, although Kadia did not give his
when asked.

6. For the move of his parents from Berlin to Vienna David had
reserved an appartment in the train, again using false docu-
ments. To this he said that it is difficult to get reserved
a seat for one person in a train, but it is easier to reserve
a full appartment of a car for one person, or a complete rail-
road car or train for a special reason, because the greater
the request, the higher authorities make the request, the
higher authorities decide the issue, the less effective is the
neness
factual check of the genuity of the request and of the docu-
ments by which the request is made.

7. As to the motives of his not joining the Georgian Legion:
He, David, does not feel being a Georgian, or too much of
a Georgian. He hates the Russians in general, although he
has nothing special against any particular Russian. The Rus-
sian communists he dislikes even more than the ordinary Russian
ans. There was no real reason why he did not join the Kedia
group - he simply disliked the idea. NOTE: this contradicts
with his statements made during the first day of the debrie-
fing, according to which he was ready to fight together with
anybody (even with the devil's grandmother) against the com-
munists.

E. The Period after WW II:

1. After the return from Kassel Discharging Camp David wanted to register in Paris as a Frenchman, using the name of DATTO. However, a woman servant of the hotel thought to have recognized in him his brother Achilles Tzitzichvili. The Sureté Militaire was contacted. David had to give the names of the people whom he had helped during the war against the Germans. Finally, he was released, however not allowed to use the name of DATTO.

2. David's parents and his sister Helen with his husband Irakli (NOTE: their children were not mentioned by David) returned from Vienna to Paris in 1946, helped by Achilles.

3. In Paris David worked with Jaques CARRE, 166 Boulevard Voltaire.

4. He learned to know Renée PARROD, and married her. He has not seen her since 1950. (for details see A 2.).

5. In Paris Jean ADAM contacted David again and asked him to participate in a hold-up. He refused, reasoning that his mother would die if she would learn of this.

6. David's mother died in 1948, and some two months later his father and sister with her husband returned to the USSR.

7. After the death of David's mother Jean Adam contacted David again, and insisted on his participation in the hold-up in a jevelry. David consented.

8. To start with the hold-up, they needed a car. They hired a taxi for a drive to CLAMART, some 10-12 km from Paris. When the car was passing through a forest, David drew his pistol and forced the driver to stop and to abandone his car. The driver was promised that no harm would be done to him if he obliges.

9. They parked the car close to the jevelry shop which they planned to rob. Jean went over the street, and watched the window of the jevelry shop. David entered the shop and asked to show him a ring which was in the window. When the shopkeeper opened the window, this being an agreed signal, Jean entered the shop. David pulled the pistol, and they looted the shop. They fled ~~xx~~ in the car which they later left near the police station, with a 500 Francs bill pinned to the driver's seat - reimbursement for having used the car.

10. One month later they tried an other hold-up, but this did not work. Daviv did not want to continue such things and told this to Jean. David's wife did not like his contact with Jean, although she did not know anything about their common doings.

11. One year later Jean Adam approached David again and blackmailed him into continuing to participate in his roberies: he threatened to tell everything to David's wife if the latter would not cooperate. David went along.

12. Jean had no plans ready, but he needed money. First they planned to rob somebody whom they would have seen receiving plenty of money from some bank. They tried to watch at different banks, but they could not see from the street through the windows up to the counters.

13. To help out, they equipped their car with a concealed periscope, and they could see better. But this too, did not help: David at the periscope had never enough time to describe the person to Jean well enough so he could recognize and attack him, or the person went in a "wrong" direction where he could not be attacked.

14. They had no difficulties with the car, although this was stolen. They parked the car in the courtyard of the police headquarters, together with the cars of the policemen and of some other private persons. Besides, the car was foreseen with a forged registration plate, showing the number of a well honorable person.

15. At last they decided to make an ordinary hold-up in a bank. Everything went smoothly. This was in June 1950.

16. Soon after this Jean attired the attention of the authorities by too lavishly life. He was arrested and confessed, implicating David also.

17. David fled, but was arrested when trying to pass the French-Spanish border.

18. David was sentenced to 7 years in jail.

19. His wife requested and got divorced. She was pregnant at that time, and in Nov.1950 gave birth to their son Gabriel.

20. David was hold successively in the following prisons: Paris, Prison de la Santée for 2.5 years, later at Fresnes, Poissy, Rion, Nimes and Avignon.

21. The sentence was shortened by 10% on the occasion of the election of the new President of the Republic. Three month he got granted for good conduct.

22. David said having never been out for gain: he had made all this for excitement. He did not like roberies because there one had to threaten, or even to use weapons against,innocent people. He has often had boxes full of money, not knowing what to do with it. If now consenting to do things for the Americans, he he would not ask for money,he would take what he will be offered

II. ANALYSIS.

1. The debriefer was instructed to conduct the debriefing in a most friendly way, so that David would not get suspicious about the purpose of this debriefing.

2. David was asked by Charles to tell the debriefer his full story, so that this could be used in planning of the cover-story for his future activities.

3. In complience with those instructions, the debriefer gave David full freedom of telling the story in his own choosen way, without being much interrupted. He was asked but a few explanatory questions, sofar those could be inserted without causing any suspicion, and sofar the debriefer was in the situation to put those intelligently: he himself did not have much advance information on David. In some cases David asked whether an item he was just telling, was important or necessary for the planning of his coverstory, what in most cases was confirmed.

4. However, David did not give the full story in its details. Besides, there are some contradictions between the different parts of his story. Some events, as described by him, seem to be unbelievable.

5. Unfortunately, the debriefer is not in command of shorthand, and he had no support of consealed tape-recording. Thus, short key-notes and the memory of the debriefer were the only sources of information when the debriefing report was later written. Due to this, some details of the story got lost or confused, especially when it appeared that David changed some details during the second session of the debriefing.

6. To clear those points, additional questions should be asked. Some of those questions can still be asked without alarming David's suspicions, whereas others are of a kind which would certainly show David that those are asked for control purposes. This shlould be born in mind when drafting the final list of additional questions, and when deciding the conditions under which those shall be asked.

7. The here given list of additional questions is but a tentative one, drafted on the basis of this one debriefing report only. (See: K,1 and 2.)

The capital letters and the numbers in front of each question refer to the corresponding items in this debriefing record, or, if such items do not exist, indicate the need to cover additional items.

The small letters are for later references to the additional answers or sub-items.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS.

A 1. a. Other visible defects: (the damaged elbow?)
b. Religion?
c. Relatives and friends with whom he correspondes?
d. Any real or claimed connections with political parties?

2. a. Nationality of his divorced wife?
b. Her religion?
c. When married?
d. Addresses on which they lived together?
e. Last address of the family known to David?
f. When was the divorce requested? When granted?
g. When did David see his wife for the last time?
h. When did David see his children for the last time?

3. a. Father's year of birth? Or age?
b. His last address in Paris
c. The date of his departure from Paris to USSR?

4. a. The date of mother's death?
b. Mother's year of birth? Or age when died?

5. a. When did Helen go to Berlin? On which terms?
b. When did she work with the East-Ministry?
c. Where else has she worked in Berlin or Germany?
d. When was she married to Irakli ? (1942 or 1943?)
(In which church and/or registrar's office, and where feted?)
e. Where did the couple live in Berlin?
f. When did Helen return from Vienna to Paris? Together with whom ? (1946, with husband and parents? What about the children?)
g. When was Dimitri born, and where? (in Vienna, end of '47?)
h. Together with whom did she go to USSR?
(Nothing was mentioned about the children.)

- - - - -

16. a. Any information concerning Irakli LORDKIPANIDZE,
b. and his relatives?

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS.

B. 1. David has said that he has been to 18 schools. He listed eleven schools, with two sections in one of them, thus, together 12 schools. Which are the six not mentioned? He should give a full list of schools, in chronological order, together with the addresses of the family at those periods.

18. a. In which hotel did he live when working in the railroad station?
b. Who was his employer?
c. How much he was paid for the work?
d. Which were the hours of his night job?
e. What did he do during the days?

19. a. From which library did he steal the dictionary? (Name and address?)
b. Where did he live at that time?
c. Where did he live six month later when the police arrested him?
d. Where was he detained on this occasion, for how long?
e. Had he to continue to renew the identity papers every three months? For how long this went this way?
f. Was he later issued new, permanent identity documents? (When, by whom, which documents?)

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS.

C. 1. a. When was David sent to the courses of N.C.Os?
b. Who was the officer in charge of these courses? or his immediate supervisor there?

2. a. When they were sent to BARCARES?
b. How long they stood there?

3. a. When he was returned to Paris and discharged?
b. His address after the discharge (with the parents?)

5. a. Which identity documents he used when registering with the Labor Office for work in Germany, POELITZ?
b. Where did he live in POELITZ?
c. What was his job in the factory?
d. How much he was paid? The method of paying:weekly, beweekly, or how?
e. Which identity papers he had when outside the factory?

7. a. How did he get the travel permit from the Police in Stettin? What did he show to the police for this purpose?
b. Did he go together with Paskal to the Police?
c. Did they (or he) have leave permit (s) from the factory
d. Where did he live during his stay in Berlin?

8. a. How many letters he took with him from Berlin to Paris?
b. Who gave him those letters?
c. Where did he hide the letters when en route?
d. Did he deliver the letters in Paris? How?

9. (His story of going in Achen to the GESTAPO to ask for a permit to go to Paris, when having on himself different letters, and when in possession of but a leave / travel permit to Berlin, with a forged date, seems unbelievable - or most imprudent). Therefore, he should be asked to repeat the stepy about his steps in Achen which he made to become a leagal permit for the trip.

11. Which documents David had on himself when crossing the border at Eupen-Malmedy?

17. a. Where did his parents live at that time? Give address.
b. When was this?

18. (David said not to remember where he lived during his stay with the JOHO factory).
a. How long it took him to arrive to his working place, and to get home in the evening?
b. Which means of transportation did he use?
c. When was the search made in his room?

C. 19.d. At what time of the day was the search made?
e. Was he present at the search?

20.a. For how long did he remain with the JOHO factory?
b. What was said in his discharge papers as reason of discharge?

21. a. Which home address did David report in the Labor Office in Berlin when applying for a new job?
b. Did he show his release certificate from the previous working place?

22.a. Where did David meet Pascal in Berlin? When was this?
b. What has Paskal spoken David about his life and adventures during the period of separation?
c. Where did Paskal live in Berlin?

23.a. Which stamp did David coppy on the electric bulb to his forged leave permit? (Give the text of the stamp or seal
b. Which stamp did he imprint on the same permit in the office of the foreman?
c. Why did he call the office of the foreman an "atelier"?
d. Did David forge the leave permit for Pascal also?
24.e. Did David go back to the Labor Office together with Pascal or alone? Or alone with both certificates?

25.a. What was the reason to ask for Passports for Foreigners?
b. Which country of destination was mentioned in their requests for passports? (David has said that the passports were made out for a journey to Paris only. It seems being unbelievable that such passports were issued for a travel to Paris which was occupied by the Germans)
c. For how long a period was the passport valid?
d. On which address did David's family live at that time?
e. Where did he stay in Paris at this occasion?
f. Where stood Pascal?
g. Was there no search for him after he dissappeared from the factory? (His mother could have known of this if he was looked for in Paris.)

26.a. How much money did he have when starting from Paris to Brazil?
b. How much had Pascal?
c. In which currency was this money?
d. Which identity documents did he have for this journey?
e. Were these documents already prepared for their journey to Brazil? How, which entries they had?

27.a. On whom was the map when David and Pascal were caught by the guards after they had returned from Spain?
b. Which guards catght them?

28.a. Why was it necessary to instruct Pascal to say that David had bought the map?
b. What else did he instruct Pascal to say or not to say?
c. How does he know that Pascal was questioned first?
d. What questions was Pascal asked to which you had prepared a coordinated answers?

29. a. Which explaration you gave to the officer for your presence in the border area?.
b. Which explanation gave Pascal?
c. Were you present at the interrogation of Pascal?
d. Which relations between you and Pascal did you report?

30.
a. Why did you ask for tickets to PAU?
b. How much did the tickets to PAU cost?
c. How much did those to Paris cost?
d. Who paid for the tickets? In which currency?
e. Was PAU on the normal direction from Bayonne to Paris?

37. a. What did David tell to the officer about his presence in Lion and wherefrom he was coming?
b. Did he spoke something about his brother? What?
c. What had he said, where was he coming from?

38. a. Where did the family live in Paris when David returned from this trip?.
b. When was this?

39. a. Which identity papers David used when reporting in Paris for the employment with the NSKK?
b. Did he have to show his driver's license?
c. Where and when did he get the driver's license?
d. How many months, which period of the year, he was in the drivers' unit Unter-den-Linden?
e. Who were the people he had to drive, who gave the orders?

40.
a. In which year and month he was sent by the NSKK to Paris?

42. a. Which was the number and/or the name of the unit to which David was detached at the French West Coast?
b. Where was the unit stationed?
c. Who was the commander of the unit? who were other superiors?

43. a. When was the NSKK unit asked to take an oath?
b. How did David refuse to take the oath. (The procedure?)
c. How long, after his refusal, he was retained there before he was returned to Berlin?

44. a. Which identity papers did David have with himself when brought to the NSKK punitive camp?
b. Which identity papers did he have when he went to the Police Headquarters?

C. 45. a. What did the Police asked and got on information about David's previous employment?
b. What did David tell about his relations with the NSKK?
c. Which home addresses he gave: in Paris and in Berlin?
d. Whom did he spoke in the Police HQ, and who issued him the certificate which he brought to the NSKK camp?

46. (49) (David has said that he had a room hired where he stood during his duty-free time.)
a. When and where did you rented the private room for yourself?
b. In what kind of a house this room was?
c. Who was the landlord or the landlady?
d. What was the rent?
e. Had you registered the room with your Police Unit?
f. For how long did you have this room?

48. a. How often he had to show himself in the hospital, for renewal of his convalessence certificate?
b. Was there a stamp used when the certificate was renewed?
c. How many times he had "renewed" the certificate himself?

51. a. When and where (town, occasion) did David get acquinted with Asterée ?
b. Since when did Asterée knew of his falcifications?
c. Since when did she help him in this? How did she help?
d. Where did he get the typewriter ?
(52) e. When was this certificate re "surgical operation" prepared and used?
f. On haw many occasions did David use this certificate?

57. a. Where did he learn this trick with the two documents - presenting the false one first?

59. a. Sketch all the seals and stamps ALLOU has made for you.

60. a. Which documents you have supplied with filigree nets prepared by youself? Where did you learn this?
b. Form-letters of which offices did you let be printed through the intermediary of Allou?

70. a. Was WERWERT the real name of the man for whom you prepared a Spanish passport, or why was this name used?
b. Who was Werwert according to the passport you prepared for him?
c. Did you photograph Werwert to get the necessary photo? where did you do this?
d. Where did you get the necessary "visa" for the pass?

71. a. What was the name of the soldier in the switchboard of the commandantura in Paris?
b. What was his address in Berlin?
c. Describe the family, give names, ages.
d. Describe their living place, or where you met the wife?
e. Were the soldier and his wife witting of their use?

C. 76. a. Give as many names and addresses of people for whom you prepared false documentation as you remember.
b. Have you prepared documents for mass-transportation except those for your parents and sister from Berlin to Vienna?

80. a. Where, how many times, did you meet the Belgian girl?
b. Who of his friends or patrons had wisited his living place

81.
a. Where did he meet ALLUMES on the morning when they brought the unexploded bomb to his, David's, room?

82. a. How does he explain that the Belgian girl came to his living place and found him injured?

83. a. Why had Allumes, Sterée and Katz to come to the railroad station for David's meeting with the Belgian girl?

92. a. When did the parents and the sister of David go from Berlin to Vienna?
b. Which documents David had prepared for this move?

93. a. When and where was the meeting arranged between David and his father?
b. Was there anybody present in the room during this meeting?
c. What kind of a room was this?

96. a. What has he told to the specialists about his invention?
b. What did the specialists find being acceptable theoretically?

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS.

D. 1. a. Where did you develope the negatives and films, and where did you make the copies (the positices) and enlargements?
b. Did the landlord/landlady know of all this?

3. a. Through whom did you give money to your father?
b. How much was this? in which currency?
c. When and where was this?

E. 1. a. In which hotel in Paris did you try to register under a false name, and what, exactly, was this name?
b. Did you have any documents on this name? which?

3. a. Where did you live in Paris before your parents returned from Vienna?
b. The same question - after the parents returned from Vienna

4. a. Where, when, did David learn to know RenéeParrod?
b. Where did Renée live before they married?
c. Whom of Renée's relatives he knows and corresponds with?
d. The addresses of known relatives of Renée.

9. a. What was the name and address of the jevelry shop which they ransaked?

13. a. How was the periscope concealed in the car?
b. Which type and year of make the car was?

15. a. In which bank they made the hold-up?

20. a. Give names of inmates and of supervisors he remembers from the different jails he was hold.
b. What did he learn on "techniques and tactics" of clandestine work in these jails?
c. Who were his most important teachers in those subjects?

------

23. List addresses where you lived after you were released from the prison, until you were contacted.

24. List jobs you have had during this period, giving addresses character of job, salary earned, or income if selfemployed.

G. CHARACTERISTIC TRAITS IN HIS ACTIVITY.

1. Irrational instability.

As a child he gets thrown out of six schools for having done nonsense. (Ref.: B 7,12,13,14,15,17.)

Nor does he finish the last, the photography and movie school, although he is about 21 years of age and should,thus, be able to think for himself. (B 18.)

Instead,he volunteers into the French Foreign Legion,thus, going in war against the Germans. (C 1.)

Later he volunteers for work in Germany, stays on jobs 3 to 4 months then flees the country (twice), and after a few days out of Germany, volunteers again for work there, all without any good, compelling reason.(C 18,22; 39,40.)

The reasons for changing his jobs when in Germany or with the Germans, xxx and the situations in which he changes or contemplates to change his jobs, are unreasonable,if not unbelievable. (C 45, 77.)

2. Lack of motivation.

He thinks that during the school age it was the inferiority complex that made him do nonsense: he wanted to show up despite being small in growth and having a funny name,(B 7a, 16.)

He is not doing anything for material gain,he has done none of his special activities for money, and he won't do this in the future. (E 22).

He has no ideological motivation, neither patriotic,nor enough political feelings: he does not feel being a Georgian, he is not interested in the Georgian Throne, he has partly forgotten the Georgian language, and he wanted to register as a Frenchman. (A 1; E 1.)

Although he"hates the Russians in General", and even more the Soviet-Russians, this hatred was not strong enough to make him join the German-sponsored Georgian anti-Soviet unit.(C 4,8.)

His longing for thrill and excitement, the single remaining motivation, seems to be limited to the more-or-less comfortable, physically easy activities, like forging of documents, and fooling officials with those documents, playing a wise man who acts according to his psychological tricks. (C 24,36,37,57; D 6.)

This love of excitement was not strong enough, just as was not the political motivation, to bring him to more dangerous, and more demanding acts.(C 4, 8; E 2.)

Besides, this longing for excitements has decreased with the age. When during the school age he did not care what his parents felt when he was being thorwn out of all schools, when he caused brands, stole, was arrested by the police (B 6,19), and when in 1939 he was bold enough to volunteer to the Foreign legion, then, in later years, he is not so bold any longer,as mentioned before, and he is held back by the thought of his mother's and his wife's feelings. (E 5, 10.) He even needs the repeated approaches of Jean Adam, and coersion, to get over the restraining influence of his wife.

During the debriefing, although he was left in full freedom to tell his story, to feel, to live it once more, he did not show any excitement; he spoke as if telling the story of an other person, leaving the impression of a man weary of his turbulent past, possibly longing for the family (he mentioned having not seen his wife since 1950).

3. Lack of initiative.

His troubles in the schools seem having started when he got acquainted with Jean ADAM whose plans he followed, although he "was sure that he could have made better plans".(B 11.)

In Germany he had PASCAL who did not like the jobs,spoke of leaving those, whereupon"they"then decided to flee.(C 6,22.)

Later Jean ADAM is back again with his bad ideas and intentions, even blackmailing David into action.(E 5, 11.)

4. Lack of planning.

He often acts under the effect of a momentary thought, without planning, or he changes the plans if there were any.

Sometimes those acts or changes are just ridiculous, and show how bad was the "planning" itself. (C 26, 30,34.)

Thereby he neglects the neccessary security precautions, and takes unneccessary risks. (C 10, 13, 16, 17, 77, 78, 81, 84, 87, E 1.)

Sometimes, when his "plan" does not work, he gets lost and remains inactive, lets things go their own way. (C 15.)

H. RELIABILITY OF THE STORY.

1. His story gets unbelievable because too often:

a/ he has "good luck" which helps him (C 15,16,27,30,78,a.o.),

b/ his opponent is stupidly derelict, which enables David always to come out a winner, to escape the danger of being captured. (C 10,23,23,29,36,37,44,45,52,58,77.)

2. There are statements in his story which are not well believable, f.i.:

- that he and Pascal got leave- or travel-documents from the Police in Stettin without having had any leave certificate from the factory, or that he,having been only for a few months in Germany, knew the language well enough and could prepare forged leave certificates for himself and Pascal. (C 7.)
- that he does not remember where he did live in Berlin when employed as a photographer, when this place was searched.(C 18)
- that "Passports for Foreigners" were issued by the German authorities so easily,without any checks, on so lomited purpose as was theirs: only for a short leave in Paris.(C 25, 29.)
- His tutoring of Pascal concerning the map:this was not necessary at all, because it really was he,David, who bought the map, Pascal could not have stated wrongly. (C 28.)
- that he was allowed to go from the NSKK penal camp to Police H.; that the Police engaged him without any investigation of his past; that the NSKK penal camp released him simply on the basis of a note that he had registered for work with the Police. (C 44-46.)
- that he, at this time, knew the trick with the combination of a false and a true document, (C 57.) and -
  - that the higher an officer, the easier is to fool him (D 6),
  - that one has to use the "lack of link" between different authorities: to present a(forged)document of one authority to an officer of an other authority, who would not find the forging. (This was mentioned in connection with D 6.)
- that the officer in OKW ABW gave him the top-secret location of the installation without having asked for the purpose of his visit. (C 77.)
- that he was so security conscious and did not meet the patrons in his living place, that the "Belgian girl", Allumes and others had not been to this place before. (C 80,81,82.)
- that he had ordered through Allou forged letter-forms of different offices by thousands of copies.(60).

J. SECURITY RISK.

1. Whether the story is right or invented, or "beautified", there are points in it which indicate to some security risks connected with this person:

2. - His father, sister, her husband, and probably their children are in the USSR, whereto they repatriated from France in 1948.(A3)

3. - His father, although a theoretical "pretender to the Throne of Georgia", is in so good relation with, and so well trusted by, the communists government of the USSR and of Soviet Georgia, that he is allowed to live permanently (over 10 years) in Tiflis, Georgia. (A 3.)

4. - His cousin Mathée Keresselidze, who was sent by the Germans as a spy to USSR, was caught there, and sentenced to 15 years in prison or hard labor, was later free to come to Moscow and to repatriate to France. (A 7.)

5. - His sister Helen, after she repatriated, was used by the communists as a teacher of languages in Georgia. Then,convicted for insulting talk about Stalin, and sentenced to 5 years in a detention area, she was later vindicated, received retroactively the salary for those five years, was allowed to come back to Tiflis, was occasionally at the same time in Moscow when Mathée was there, and they,occasionally,met there. (A 5.)

6. - Helen´s husband Irakli Lordkipanidze, a former German SD man, repatriated to USSR together with his wife. (See p.1 above.) However, Mathé shall allegedly having heard nothing about his fathe when he met Helen in Moscow. (A 7.)

7. Such things happen sometimes, but they are far from belonging to everyday´s pattern in Soviet life. The concentration of all those happenings on a very limited circle of David´s relatives could hardly be occasional. This should have special reasons.

8. The question arises: If this concentration is not occasional, then - what is its purpose or reason, and how much is David involved?

9. Concerning David himself:

a/ According to this story he has acted in so many cases imprudently, just relaying on his "good luck" only, and the stupidity of his opponents, that this could have developed into a habit of his.

b/ He has spoken of having been very cautious and security minded when taking people to his living place (that only two friends have been there), and when meeting people. (C 80.)

But

But he, probably, has not thought of how dangerous it was for him to re-register two times in Paris under his right name for re-employment in Germany after he had abandoned there two working places. Nor has he thought how dangerous it was for him to visit his parents on those occasions in Paris, at the addresses on which he might have been wanted, while these addresses, probably, were registered as his home addresses when he applied for work in Germany.

c/ David has shown during the debriefing broad knowledge of different advanced techniques and tactics of clandestine work, which he claims having used. If believing his story, then the question arises: where could he have learned all this knowledge at that early time, before 1944?

d/ The incident of having instructed Pascal through the cellar wall what to say during the interrogation about the map, with no other items mentioned on what more he had instructed Pascal at the same occasion, makes one think that this part of the story is invented. It looks that David had been told of such pre-coordination of testimonies, that he had not quite understood the matter, and - relying on his "intelligence", was telling nonsense. (C 28 and H 2,related item.)

e/ David's acclaimed broad knowledge of different "psychological" tricks on one side, and on the other side his unwittingly demonstrated lack of understanding of many basic principles of clandestine work, leave the impression that David has heard of most of those clever things after he had used his primitive knowledge during WW II, and is simply trying to impress us by telling "clever" stories. This would be in line with his need of showing up. (G 2; B 7a, 16.)

f/ This could be true if he still is a "honest" crook, and the story is right in its main lines.
However, the too tight concentration of events, different information and alleged knowledge in this story, together with the unexcited, unpartial way of telling the exciting story by David, give also reason to think that the story is a "too good" cover-story of a penetration agent.

10. What could happen when David, being taken for a"honest crook", would be used in a clandestine operation?

a/ Due to his general instabilty and the trend to act under the effect of some momentary thought, he might easily deviate of the pre-arranged, secure plan of action, and may fall into difficulties through his irrational steps.

b/ Due to the lack of solid, binding motivation, and the trend to use his own"cleverness", he may "somehow" come to the splendid idea of contacting the "other side" and carry out the assignment in his own, a better, perhaps less straining,easier way. In his eyes this does not need to be unhonest, because the boss knows that he is a crock, a honest, but clever one.

c/ If this analysis is right, then this hypothetical case of "honest" David is mooving along the road of a wise man's work which David likes to go: not too dangerous and straining physically, however, well exciting.

d/ If, however, David is a double agent, then he would not need any of the found traits in his past activity, and his way to the other side is simple, provided that he will not be detected here before.

X. SUGGESTED NEXT STEPS.

To avoid possible errors, the following steps are suggested:

1. A cross-check of all debriefing reports and other information available on David.
2. Drafting a list of additional fact-finding and control questions.
3. Asking these questions under simultaneous application of consealed tape recording, thus providing an opportunity for detailed study of the answers and reactions of David.
4. Secret checks on persons mentioned in David's story, especially on Mathée Keresselidze.
5. Secret checks with the French authorities on the last 10 years of David's whereabouts, activities and contacts, including the time in jails.

L. PERSONAL IMPRESSION MADE BY DAVID ON THE DEBRIEFER.

1. Soon after the second session of the debriefing, on 29 Apr, the debriefer was asked by the assigner whether the debriefer, if he were in the situation of an agent to go together with David on a clandestine operation, replied:

NO, there is no rely on this man.

2. This reply stands at this day of closing of this report:

a/ it is dangerous to go with him, even if warned that he is or might be a double-agent and when, thus, prepared for the resulting special dangers - - he may add many more, unpredictable dangers by his irrational, flash-of-thought actions.

b/ it is still more dangerous to go with him if knowing his weaknesses, however taking him for a "honest" crook. No matter whether he be boss or subordinate, one can not rely on his adherence to the prepared plan and given orders.

c/ It is suicidal (unwittingly, of course) for a person who would be sent with him without being informed of his weaknesses, in full trust of his knowledges, experience, rationality and all other necessary qualities which he does not have.

3. Despite of this rather negative impression, it must be said that David could still prove to be a satisfactory performer, and an acceptable calculated risk on many one-man special operations, this especially in view of the rather general shortage of "excellent" stock of candidates.

201-233477

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LEMBERGER-LISA, EDUARDO MENES
201-300614

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1960-1971

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
March 6	3-6		
3/13/78	3/13/78	Leslie Wizelman	Leslie Wizelman

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

197626

24 June 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Eduardo WHITEHOUSE Insua

1. On 22 June 1971 Mr. Ed Sullivan, WH/Security officer, informed DC/WH/COG that he had been advised by SOD that Mr. WHITEHOUSE was in Miami and had some information which he would like to pass to the Agency. Mr. WHITEHOUSE, a Cuban, was a pilot during the Bay of Pigs Invasion and was under contract with the Agency from November 1964 to April 1965 as a pilot under the WITHRUSH Project in the Congo. He has not worked for the Agency since that time.

2. Mr. Sullivan requested SOD to have Mr. WHITEHOUSE use the Domestic Contact Service channel in Miami for passing his information to us.

3. File: 201-300614.

Chris Hopkins
WH/COG/SA

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES (2)

ORIG: RICHARD HARRINGTON:ljo
UNIT: WH/2/HD&ES
EXT: 7163/1946
DATE: 23 JULY 1969

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY DHB PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, DDP ADDP CS/DO SOD6 a/c/ops a/c/2 FI2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 23287

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY TEGUCIGALPA, SAN SALVADOR

23 JUL 69

IUSTEER

1. MORNING 23 JULY 1969, IUSTEER PHONED HQS CASE OFFICER AND STATED TEDDY WHITEHOUSE (201-300614) AND an UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN ATTEMPTING HIRE CUBAN PILOTS MIAMI AREA TO FLY F-51 AIRCRAFT TO EL SALVADOR. IUSTEER SOURCES, WHO WERE FOUR CUBAN PILOTS WHO REFUSED OFFER, SAID WHITEHOUSE AND ASSOCIATE BEGAN RECRUITMENT EFFORT CIRCA 14 JULY 1969. WHITEHOUSE OFFERING DEPOSIT $20,000 IN PILOTS BANK ACCOUNT PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR EL SALVADOR IF PILOT AGREES FLY PLANE TO ELSALVADOR AND IN COMBAT.

RO
AB X
IN
FG
EX
DES NFD
FI

2. IUSTEER PHONED INFO TO HQS CASE OFFICER WHEN UNABLE CONTACT WH/MIAMI. HQS ATTEMPTING RECONTACT IUSTEER VIA PHONE ORDER OBTAIN FOLLOWUP INFO INCLUDING IDENTITIES ANY PILOTS WHO HAVE ACCEPTED, NAME OF AMERICAN WHO WORKING WITH WHITEHOUSE, IDENTITY OF THEIR EL SALVADOR CONTACT, LOCATION OF PLANES, ETC. IUSTEER DUE DEPART MIAMI BY END OF WEEK AND ~~NOT AVAILABLE~~ LE TO WH/MIAMI AFTER 25 JULY 1969.

MICROFILMED
SEP 10 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONTINUED . . .

CS COPY

201-300614
23 JUL 69

(2)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

(OVER)

MICROFICHE

B201-283488

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 33281

TO

PAGE TWO

3. REQUEST WH/MIAMI ADVISE ANY CONFIRMATION THIS REPORT AND ANY FOLLOWUP DATA FROM IUSTEER IF POSSIBLE OR OTHER SOURCES.

4. FILE: 201-283488 AND 201-300614.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SOD/AB Paul Gottke (in draft)

WH/COG

Robert H. Kiefe
for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

John C. Murray
JOHN C. MURRAY
AC/WH/2

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION NAME CHECK
DATE: 7 APRIL 1967
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: WHITEHOUSE, ROGELIO ENRIQUE

IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION NAME TRACE
DATE: 7 APRIL 1967
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: WHITEHOUSE, EDUARDO ROGELIO

Miami, Fla. August 23 1965

Mr. Gerald Sounders
P.O. Box 831
Miami, Fla.

Dear Jerry:

Wish to thank you for your personal concern and satisfactory solution obtained in the financial settlement of my case.

I consider it a privilege to have worked with you, cooperating in a small way to preserve Democracy in the Republic of Congo.

If I can ever be of service to the United States -beloved country of my ancestors- I would consider it a high honor.

Do let me hear from you and feel sure that I am your devoted friend.

Sincerely,

Eduardo J. Whitehouse

446 N. E. 39th St
Miami, Fla.

MICROFICHE

23 AUG 65

201-300614

14-00000

201-

20 August 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief/KUCURL/HENGEN

FROM : Edward W. LORENTZ

SUBJECT : Eduardo Whitehouse

REFERENCE : Dir-35418

1. Edward W. LORENTZ met with Eduardo Whitehouse on 17 August 1965, relative to finalizing the Whitehouse claim for monies still due from his previous contract. LORENTZ emphasized that he was authorized to pay monies due per contract through 7 April 1965, plus a four day layover in Rome during Whitehouse's return to the U.S. This layover was due a Panam strike of which Whitehouse was inadvertently delayed through no fault of his own.

2. The aforegoing authority is based on ref and calculated as follows:

A. Base Pay for March - USD 800.

B. Base Pay 7/30 for April - USD 186.66 plus USD equivalent of USD 41.00 for actual expenses while 2½ days in Rome.

C. Total USD 1027.66.

3. Whitehouse although feeling that he should be allowed the full amounts due amounting to USD 1950.00 has accepted such adjudication of his claim. LORENTZ feels that possibly he was sufficiently satisfied that he received any funds, that probably in his sense of fair play that the case might be considered closed. For the record, what medical treatment received by Whitehouse amounted to under USD 200. To further complete the record the following attachments are enclosed:

A. Letter from Dr. Elkhoury.

B. Second letter from Whitehouse to Jack Anderson, Leop.

C. Letter from Whitehouse to LORENTZ.

D. Bills of actual charges in Rome.

E. Receipt from Whitehouse for final payment. [illegible]

F. Station memo concerning newspaper inquiry.

7

20 AUG 65

201-300614

4. Less than 24 hours after facing Whitehouse to advise him that his claim of USD 1950 had been reduced to 1027.66, Whitehouse reacted with the newspaper media in an exemplary manner when he could have ~~reacted with~~ a adverse feeling. The Subject despite difficulties encountered in the field with KUBARK advisors appears to be man of honor and certainly under controlled situations is a professional pilot and could be an asset to KUBARK interests.

E. W. Lorentz

Edward W. LORENTZ

POLYCLINIQUE DU
DOCTEUR L. ELKHOURY
Avenue [illegible]
LEOPOLDVILLE - KALINA
Téléphone 3259
Boîte Postale 1778 Léo I

Je soussigné certifie avoir soigné Mr Whitehouse pour des troubles neuro-végétatifs accompagnés d'une forte hypotension.

Comme le traitement n'a pas amélioré son état de santé, je recommande à Mr. Whitehouse de rentrer dans son pays pour un repos d'un mois où il se libérera de nos conditions spéciales

Léo le 1-5-61

201-300614

Miami, Fla. June 10th 1965

Col. Jack Anderson
Chief, Air Operations
Leopoldville
Congo.

Dear Jack:

Please find attached a copy of my letter to you of the April 2[illegible]/1965. The original and also a copy of [illegible] certificate [illegible] my return to Miami for [illegible], were mailed to you c/o [illegible] [illegible], Leo. I [illegible] to [illegible] George [illegible] the [illegible] letter was intercepted [illegible] [illegible]. This [illegible] does not constitutes a U.S. mail violation, otherwise I would have turned the case to the F.B.I. for its investigation.

I respectfully request the opinion of this [illegible] since I am most interested in [illegible] this case.

[illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] due to [illegible]. I will [illegible] your [illegible] in [illegible].

[illegible] you will not [illegible] that I [illegible] this c/o [illegible] at the [illegible] that this time it will reach you without [illegible].

[illegible],

[illegible]

c:
Mr. J. [illegible]

Jerry: Before you [illegible]
[illegible]

POOR QUALITY DOCUMENT

Miami, Fla. August 13 1965

Mr. Jerry Saunders
P.O Box 531
Miami Int. Airport
Miami, Fla.

Dear Mr. Saunders:

Three months have passed by since my return from Leopoldville and as I explained to you in our past meetings, the amounts corresponding to the basic pay of of March, April and up to the 13th of May, -when my contract expired- are still unpaid therefore leaving an outstanding balance of $1950.00 in my favor.

Although I appreciate your concern in this case, I wish to inform you about certain facts concerning my work in the Congo that will explain how every cent of the mentioned amount was earned.

When pilot Fausto Gomez was shot down near Bunia -Dec. 17th 1964- that Air Base became paralized as two of the pilots resigned and the only one remaining was ready to leave. Every one refused to take charge of the Bunia Base because of the proximity of the rebels, dangerous terrain, living conditions below standards, improper food, etc. Under these adverse circumstances I accepted the position of Chief Pilot and left the comfortable quarters of Stanleyville. Arrived to Bunia Dec. 25th 1964 and next day reasumed full air operations against the rebels flying two and three missions per day as squadrom leader with new unexperienced pilots. These pilots did not have shooting, combat manuvering instruction, therefore I instructed them and also in Dead Reckoning, instrument flying, etc. We hit the enemy day by day forcing them to retreat to the very border of Northeast Congo. M. Godefroid Munongo -Minister of the Interior- personally congratulated us for our accomplishements in behalf of the Congo.

When I became ill, due to improper food, parasites, etc,. I was ordered back to Leopoldville for medical treatment. Unable to recover and having lost 25 pounds, Dr. Elkhoury suggested me return to Miami for a more adequate treatment. Photostatic copy of certificate are attached. Left Leopoldville April 3 1965 with the understanding that my contract was not being cancelled. I sincerely believe that my work and dedication throughout the entire campaing in Northeast Congo deserved the full payment of the mentioned contract.

Your consideration to this matter would be appreciated.

Sincerely,

E. J. Whitehouse

cc: Mr. H. R. Telford
Mr. Robert Blake

VIA XX SETTEMBRE 30
TEL. 463036

App. N. [illegible]

Sig. WHITEHOUSE

Data [illegible] 19[illegible]	3	4	5				
Appartamento							
Arrangiamento ½	6200	6200	6200				
Domestici							
Piccola colazione							
Uova - Frutta			200				
Caffetteria		200	100				
Spremute			400				
Colazione							
Pranzo							
RISTORANTE							
Gelati - Pasticc. - Sandwiches							
Vini							
Liquori							
Birra		500	500				
Acqua Minerali							
Bibite							
Bar							
Autobus							
Bagni							
Cani							
Riscaldamento							
Biancheria - Stireria							
Telefono		100	50				
Totale del giorno	6200	7000	7250				
Riporto		6200	13200				
Totale			20450				
Pagamenti							
Totale							
Imposta d'entrata			251				
Bollo di Quietanza			40				
Servizio			3884				
TOTALE GENERALE			[illegible]				

I Sigg. Clienti sono pregati di pagare il conto entro il giorno della presentazione.

ALBERGO REALE - Roma
VIA XX SETTEMBRE, 30

D. BONETTI Prop.

Camera N. 401

Sig. WHITEHOUSE

[illegible]	Telefono interurbano . . .	1500
	I. G. E. . . .	23
	Bollo . . .	17
	TOTALE . .	1540

[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

POOR QUALITY DOCUMENT

[illegible]

201-300614

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ACTION Sc D 2 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/DE, OS 2

S E C R E T 190048Z

19 Aug 65 IN 35137

DIR CITE WAVE 5105

CHAPPIE ITHRUSH SECUR PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 5104 (IN 35139)

IDENTITIES: A. JANICE MIYAYA, AKA JANICE ROMAN, CLAIMS SECRETARY TO IDEN B.

B. ROBERT ROGERS, NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY.

S E C R E T

CFN 5105 5104 A JANICE MIYAYA AKA JANICE ROMAN B B ROBERT ROGERS NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY

BT

SECRET

MICROFICHE

19 AUG 65

201-300614

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. ____

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SCD 6 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C 2, OS 2

SECRET 190048Z

DIR CITE WAVE 5104

CHAFFEE [illegible] SECUR PBRUMEN

LORENZ MIAMI SENDS

1. EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE WAS CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE ON 18 AUG BY IDEN A REPRESENTING IDEN B REQUESTING AN INTERVIEW FOR PURPOSE OBTAINING BACKGROUND INFO ON PBRUMEN PILOTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH PROPOSED TRIP TO CONGO. WHITEHOUSE REFERRED IDEN A TO IOSTEER.

2. IOSTEER RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM IDEN A REQUESTING SAME INFO. IOSTEER ADVISED ALTHOUGH HE WAS ACQUAINTED WITH SOME PBRUMEN PILOTS IN CONGO HE HAD NO OFFICIAL CONNECTION AND COULD ADD NOTHING FURTHER.

(see [illegible])

3. INDICATIONS ARE IDEN B PROBABLY SAME SUBJ WAVE 9805 (RYBAT).

4. [illegible] TO ADVISE POSSIBLE TRIP TO CONGO OF IDEN B AND SOME INDICATION PROBABILITY HIS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW PBRUMEN PILOTS FOR SPECTACULAR PUBLICITY.

SECRET

CFN 5104 LORENZ EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE 18 A B PBRUMEN A IOSTEER A NO OFFICIAL B 9805 B

19 AUG 65 IN 35139

SECRET

MICROFICHE

19 AUG 65

201-300614

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

WA

ORIG : W. WAI[illegible]:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4476
DATE : 12 AUGUST 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300614

34 SECRET

13 AUG 65 17 [illegible]

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6 INFO: VR. FILE ☑ RID COPY WH/C 8, AF 7, CI/OA

SIG CEN

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR 35418

201

W

CHAPP[illegible] WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 4430 (IN 21101)*

RE REF AND TELECON WITH LORENTZ 5 AUG, RECOMMEND [illegible] (W) BE PAID SALARY THROUGH 7 APR 65 (DATE RETURNED MIAMI) AND ALL MEDICAL EXPENSES DUE ILLNESS RELATED CONGO TOUR. HQS DEEMS THIS SETTLEMENT GENEROUS IN VIEW W PERFORMANCE IN CONGO, I.E., GROUNDED SIX WEEKS, RETURNED PRIOR EXPIRATION CONTRACT, PLUS FIELD EVALUATION AS MARGINAL PILOT AND TROUBLESOME MANAGEMENT PROBLEM. REALIZE THIS MAKES W SHORT FIVE WEEKS SALARY; ON OTHER HAND KUBARK SHORT ELEVEN WEEKS HIS CONTRACTED SERVICES AS PILOT.

2. FYI, FROM REVIEW W 201 FILE, BELIEVE W REASONABLE ENOUGH ACCEPT ABOVE SETTLEMENT GRACEFULLY. DESIRE LORENTZ DO UTMOST SETTLE CASE PER ABOVE TERMS. HOWEVER, IF IT APPARENT W UNHAPPY ENOUGH TO CAUSE UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY, LORENTZ AUTHORIZED NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENT UP TO TOTAL REMAINDER SIX MONTHS SALARY.

END OF MESSAGE

(13 AUG 65)

*Req Hqs decision re subj claims for back pay.

201-300614

SOD/AB/OPS/3 W Wainwright
WH/C/MO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

34 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C 8, AF 7, CI/OA

29 JUL 65 IN 21101

S E C R E T 292043Z
WAVE-4430
DIR CITE WAVE 4430

[illegible] WITHRUSH [illegible]

REF: DIR 31462

[illegible] MIAMI SENDS:

[illegible] IF ANY HQS DECISION RELATIVE TO EDUARDO [illegible] WHITEHOUSE REPEAT WHITEHOUSE CLAIM FOR BACK PAY [illegible] [illegible] NAL NEWS SUBSTITUTE [illegible].

S E C R E T

[illegible]

SECRET

29 JUL 65

201-300614

Subj 201 —

12 July 1965

TO: HENGEN

FROM: Edward W. LORENTZ

SUBJECT: Eduardo Julius Whitehouse

1. As we both know the Whitehouse case has been kicked around sufficiently that the finalizing of the case should be effected as soon as possible. My trip with Larry Murphy to Dow Leutcher's office, in my estimation didn't produce any effective decision. Mr. Leutcher's point of view was, if the man was due the money, pay him. If he was not due the money, don't pay him. I will give you the facts as I see them and if you feel that it is prudent to seek the advice of Jack Anderson for his opinion I'm sure it will be most helpful.

((?) 7931 ~ 3 May) March

[illegible]

A. LEOP-7030 dated 30 ~~May~~, indicates receipt of (W) intention to terminate contract effective 13 May. Additionally, stipulates (W) incapacitated six weeks and requests authorization for immediate return and treatment. OK

2. Your 97928 of 1 April, concurs requests of Leop. Additionally, you stipulate to terminate contract the day the Subject departs Leop. OK

3. LEOP-8028 of 2 April, stipulates that Leop. "terminating (W) contract and returning first available". Requires medical attention not available Leop. Malady due conditions advance basis complicated lact of proper medical attention and maltreatment.

B. Para 2 same message, indicated another medical case (Menedez) would remain Leop dispite fact "he can contribute nothing".

Yes, not so! Cable indicates man wants to get paid for 6 months.

4. LEOP-8054 states (W) departed 3 April, via PAA, transferring flight in Rome. (W) presented me with three days Hotel bills in Rome to cover what he considered evacuation flight plus PAA on strike. ?

5. LEOP-8117 dated 7 April, allowed Perez to depart 8 April and recommended approval to pay full salary till 25 April. (Opinion - is this a case of paying a man full salary on one hand while not paying another under the same circumstances)?

[illegible]

6. DIR-99498 of 7 April, requested details of (W) medical case. O/C

"violation"

7. LEOP-7150 dated 28 May, stipulates (W) returned on violation not "Leop request". Instructed contact Heston to execute voluntary termination of contract not executed. (W) departure 3 April not at Leop request. (Opinion - in a contractual relationship it appears

(2) [illegible]

12 JUL 65

201-300614

MICROFIC

Check it in
cable - not
[illegible]

highly unlikely to "request" someone to leave or terminate written agreement. Wouldn't one direct in lieu of request)?

8. WAVE-0832 dated 16 April, gave medical evaluation which was reviewed by WAVE Medical personnel. (Opinion - in debriefing of Subject I was personally convinced this man was sick. Furthermore, (W) advised that he is in possission of medical report by Dr. El Khorury that it was manditory for (W) to be evacuated for adequate medical treatment.

9. WAVE-k457 dated 3 May, indicated (W) still under going continuous medical treatment.

10. On April 19, (W) signed our local Quit Claim Form, but recent conversation with the Subject indicated that he felt that although the Form was signed that the "company would live up to its promises".

11. There is no doubt that (W) was ill and based upon medical opinion, as late as 7 May, in my personal observation that the man was incompatiated from performing a full time job that based upon the fact that no definitive or written agreement was made prior to departure, that the Subject be paid in full for the six months term of his contract. (Opinion - there is know doubt in my mind that this man firmly believes that he is entitled to the salary based strictly upon the fact that he was "evacuated" not terminated.

12. I don't feel the man is unscrupulous enough to blackmail to obtain what he feels is truthfully his, but feel positive that he will speak to anyone of influence to assist in obtaining back salaries that he feels is his. Cite the five reasonably important personnel references that he lists on his Job Application Form. We are not dealing with the common type individual using vealied threats, but someone who is an intelligent individual who at one time exerted enough influence on Jack Anderson to appoint a Chief Pilot and further influence Gen. Lewis Walsh into taking action to hire some of his buddys.

Edward W. Lorentz
EDWARD W. LORENTZ

SECRET

file 201

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 15 June 1965 js

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, OPS/3/AB/SOD

ATTENTION: David Lamoureux

C# 201-300614

The file on WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo Julius is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

15 JUN 65

201-300614

(1)

FORM 12-62 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MICROFICHE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[illegible]

SOD 6

RI FILE, WH/C 8, AF 6, [illegible], PG 2

28 MAY 65 IN 78194

LEOP-9150

SECRET 281822Z

DIR INFO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) CITE LEOP 9150

[illegible] WITTROCK [illegible]

REF: DIR 12727

1. BASIC DETAILS REASON WHITEHOUSE (W) RETURN EXPLAINED LEOP 8[illegible], 8877, 7837. W RETURNED OWN VOLITION NOT LEOP REQUEST. INSTRUCTED CONTACT HESTON EXECUTE VOLUNTARY TERMINATION CONTRACT, NOT EXECUTED. W DEPARTURE 3 APRIL NOT AT LEOP REQUEST. W PREVIOUSLY NOTIFIED STA INTENT TERMINATE CONTRACT END SIX MONTHS.

2. PROVIDING MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS PBPRIME CONFIRMED LOCAL DIAGNOSIS FEEL W ENTITLED MEDICAL EXPENSES. NO COMMITMENTS MADE RE MEDICAL BILLS OR SALARY.

SECRET

MICROFICHE

28 MAY 65

201-300614

(1)

14-00000

#96

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

25 May 1965

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: WHITEHOUSE, EDUARDO J.

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Whitehouse was seen by me 8 April 1965 for a return physical examination. All laboratory and Xray that date was relative the complete physical examination.

The $10.00 charge for treatment included injection, medicine and prostate massage. Ther was no extra Charge for sinus treatment.

Office visits from April 9th through 28th were primarily for his tenseness and apprehension. The only additional charge, relative his sinus condition, was a $20.00 charge for sinus Xrays on April 9, 1965.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Piper, M.D.

William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

MICROFICHE

25 MAY 65

201-300614

25

MESSAGE FORM

3 SECRET

ORIG : F. DALY:jg
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 20 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300614

ROUTING R/

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

21 MAY 65 15 24z

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6

INFO: AF 6, WH/C 8, CI/OA, PG 2, VR, FILE

TO LEOP INFO ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ CITE DIR 12727

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: LEOP 8028 (IN 36890)

PLS ADVISE PRECISE DETAILS RE WHITEHOUSE (W) TERMINATION. REF A INDICATES TERMINATION BEING ~~ACCOMPLISHED~~. HOWEVER W NOW STATES HE RETURNED TO PBPRIME AT LEOP REQUEST (WHILE STILL UNDER CONTRACT) FOR PURPOSE OF CONTRACT-PROVIDED MEDICAL TREATMENT. THEREFORE HE WANTS PAYMENT COVERING PRESENT MEDICAL BILLS AND BACK SALARY.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/5 Tom Baskett (Phone)

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

E. N. KORN-PATTERSON
AF/COPS

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB

25 MAY 65

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MICROFILMED

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-300614

[illegible] 02845 [illegible]

18 May 65

[redacted]

xo 201

Whitehouse required approximately twenty-five hours T-28 flight instruction Leop prior to field deployment. Functioned very marginally as Chief Pilot Bunia and continually requested transfer to multi-engine. Due to apprehension made himself physically and mentally incapable of tactical flight.

It is my opinion that he should not be considered for any future tactical operations and would not be acceptable for recontract in Congo operations.

[redacted]

xo 201

Functioned solely as C-46 co-pilot. Was one of the transport pilots, along with Joe Balboa and Vallicierge, that continually hampered transport operations. Is too old and not physically capable of enduring sustained field operations. Indicated desire to return to Congo, but do not feel he would contribute anything to flight operations. Limited to co-pilot only duties which not desirable this operation.

18 MAY 65

(1)

201-300614

14 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/Air Branch

SUBJECT : WITHRUSH Contract

1. On Wednesday, 12 May 1965, I discussed with Mr. Dow Letcher, OP/CPD, the WITHRUSH contract with which you are familiar and under which Eduardo Whitehouse served in the Congo. This is the standard contract for Cuban and European WITHRUSH pilot employees. Specifically, I was interested in learning from Mr. Letcher if he believed Paragraph 7 D could be applicable to the case of Mr. Whitehouse since Mr. Whitehouse desires assistance in paying medical bills for a physical disability (which may be temporary) which may have been incurred while he was serving with us in the Congo.

2. This memorandum makes record of the fact that, judging from what Mr. Letcher had to say about the WITHRUSH contract, and also in view of Mr. Ben DeFelice's recently expressed concern regarding the benefits aspects of that contract, action should be taken to review and, if necessary, revise the contract at the earliest possible date. This stems from the strong possibility that Cuban pilots who suffer injuries or disabilities while serving with WITHRUSH may wish, as in the case of Whitehouse, to claim benefits after the termination of the contract, for conditions which originated during the term of the contract.

3. On 12 May 1965 I provided Mr. Letcher with a draft form of a proposed WITHRUSH contract pertaining to rotary wing aircraft pilots only and asked that he review it and judge its adequacy.

Frank Daly
SOD/AB/OPS/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - OP/BSD Attn: Mr. Ben DeFelice
1 - OP/CPD Attn: Mr. Des Letcher
1 - SOD/PERS
1 - SOD/AB/OPS/3
1 - SOD/RI
1 - Chrono

(1)

SOD/AB/OPS/3:F.DALY:kas(13 May 1965)

14 MAY 65

201-300614

MICROFICHE

14-00000

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
UNIVERSITY CLINIC
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

7 May 1965

Mr. Roberto Medell

OFFICE PHONE: HI 6-6474
RESIDENCE PHONE: HI 8-5105

Mr. [illegible]house

April 7, 1965 general physical exam.... $ 15.00
Chest Xray $10. C.B.C. $5. sedrate
$5. ur. $2. Rx. injection, sinus
treatment, P. massage, & med-
icine $10.00 .... = 32.00
electrocardiogram & [illegible]........ 15.00
April 8, office, sinus Rx. $5. &
[illegible] $20.00 .... 25.00
April 11th & 12th, sinus treatment
$5.00 2 .... = 10.00
April 13, sinus Rx. & injection 7.00
April 14th, 15th, & 16th, sinus
treatment $5.00 3............... = 15.00
$ 119.00

MICROFICHE

7 MAY 65

201-300614

(1)

A-2y. #42

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

7 May 1965

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: WHITEHOUSE, EDUARDO

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Whitehouse has had sinus trouble off and on for many years. This has been increased recently, probably due to pressure changes in aircraft.

It has been advised that he have a nasal operation for deviated septum. This structural defect is in no way related to his occupation.

Sincerely yours,
William S. Piper, MD
William S. Pipor, M.D.

WSP:bk

7 MAY 65

201-300614

MICROFICHE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET GROUP 1

21/30

FROM	Jm WAVE
ACTION	D/MS 2
INFO	VR. FILE DDP, WH/C 1, SOD 6, AFC, C/OA.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

3 May 65 IN 58071

S E C R E T 032241Z

DIR CITE WAVE 1451

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH MEDIC PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE-0832 (IN 46796)

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. LOCAL CLEARED MEDIC TREATING EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE ADVISES SUBJ NOT RESPONDING TREATMENT ACUTE AND CHRONIC SINUSITIS. LOCAL ENT SPECIALIST RECOMMENDS SUBMUCOUS RESECTION FOR CORRECTION DEVIATED SEPTUM.

2. REQUEST HQS OPINION IF SURGERY CAN BE PERFORMED UNDER TERMS OF CONTRACT AND CITE SUBJ WAS MEDICALLY CLEARED PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR CONGO.

3. FORWARDING MEDIC REPORT VIA POUCH.

S E C R E T

CFN : SUBJS MEDICAL CONDITION.

SECRET

~~CALL BEN DEFELICE~~

FRANK —

I HAVE TALKED TO BEN DEFELICE CONCERNING THIS — WE HAVE THE ACTION NOW. PLZ SEE ME.

LARRY

MICROFICHE

3 MAY 65

201-300614

UAPA-0099

Dispatch No. UAPA-0099

Date: 29 [illegible]

TO : Chief, KUCURL

FROM : Chief, IUPAGAN

SUBJECT : WITHRUSH Crew Training Report

REFERENCE : DIR 85744, paragraph 3(D)

Forwarded herewith is subject report of training and pilot evaluation conducted by Carlisle B. FORNEGAR as requested per reference.

Philip L. MUSHER
Chief, IUPAGAN

Attachment:
a/s h/w
s/c (Idens)

Distribution:
0 & 2-KUCURL
2-IUPAGAN

(5)

COPY

29 APR 65

201-300614

Attachment to Dispatch No. UAPA-0099

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WITHRUSH Crew Training Report

1. The object of the crew training was to test each pilot on his knowledge of the aircraft systems and emergency procedures and to check ride each pilot and give him refresher training as required.

2. The following named pilots received ground and flight training as listed below:

	Ground School and Training	Flight Hours
Iden A	10½	7+20
Iden B	10½	1+30
Iden C	10½	1+30
Iden D	6+00	4+30
Iden E	8+00	4+35
Iden F	10½	5+05
Iden G	26+00	7+20
Iden H	26+00	Obs. 10+40 - Trg. 8+05
Iden I	20+00	6+20

3. Evaluation of each pilot as follows:

a. Iden A - Had flown C-46 about 1200 hours before and was picking it up very nicely. I gave several engine out - single engine landing and go-arounds - no flap landing - emergency gear extension. Short field landings several ILS approaches.

b. Iden C - Was the pilot who cracked up the other C-46, plus he was unwilling to fly at night. I gave him 1½ hours of air time and recommended he be used only as a co-pilot on grounds of poor head work.

c. Iden B - He is an older pilot who would bounce the airplane and then sit there waiting for it to hit again, without adding power to let it down easy. He also wanted to feather the wrong engine after one was cut. Recommended he only be used as a co-pilot.

d. Iden D - He had been flying in and around Iden J for several years, however, in his training he was quite sloppy in his flying. he would not come within 20° of assigned heading turns at the begining.

Also he was very rough with the airplane in pitch control. On ILS approaches he would vary the manifold pressure from 12" to 30" to try and stay on the glide slope. On short field landing and take-off after about six of them he started approaching the procedures I was trying to show him, but I was convinced as soon as I left the area he would return to his own style of flying. I recommended that at the end of his six month contract which was about 30 days away he be terminated.

e. Iden E - This man had previous C-46 experience of about 2000 hours. He showed great interest and did a good job from the beginning. I recommended he be used as PIC in C-46's.

f. Iden F - This man was suppose to have had a good deal of experience, but his flying left very much to be desired. He had just been convalescening from amebic dysentery. He replied when asked, that he felt up to flying but his performance was very poor. He decided he still didn't feel up to flying and returned to the doctor's care.

g. Iden G - Had previous multi-engine experience and co-pilot time in the B-26's. He progressed satisfactory and with 7+20 hours was released to the field to fly in right seat to observe tactics and gain more experience before moving to left seat as PIC.

h. Iden H - Had limited experience, however, he was very interested and applied himself to the task of checking out in the B-26K. He was very helpful in reproducing power limitations and power setting for the CB-16-17 series engine and also reproduced the P&W pamphlet on the CB-16-17 series engines, which I had brought along as a training aid. This was made required reading material for all B-26 drivers. This man rode along as an observer while Iden G was being trained, which aided him when he started flying. I recommended he also be released to the field and ride the right seat to observe tactics and gain more experience before flying missions in the left seat.

i. Iden I - The Chief Pilot of the group is a very capable pilot who applies himself very well. He appears to be interested in improving the professional standards of his pilots. I had several rides with him (6+20) until I felt he would be able to instruct the rest of the pilots in the proper procedures to be used in the B-26K's.

4. The training program was quite curtailed by the restrictions to Iden K. Most of the pilots were required to remain out in the field to meet operational needs. Also only one B-26 was available in Iden K which

was in check till 18 March and then was not available two other days because of maintenance.

5. I recommend that Air Operations Officers be checked out in the equipment they are supervisors for in order to keep on top of their pilots proficiency. The pilots that are sent over should be screened better so as not to require so much training in the field.

Carlisle B. FORNEGAR

Separate Cover Attachment to

Dispatch No. UAPA-0099

Iden A - Fausto Valdes

Iden B - Jose Perez Menendez

Iden C - Francisco Valliciergo

Iden D - Efrain Morantes

Iden E - Castor Cereceda

Iden F - Theodore Whitehouse

Iden G - Rene Travieso

Iden H - Luis Ardois

Iden I - Jack Varela

Iden J - Africa

Iden K - Leopoldville

[illegible] #42

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

28 April 1965

Check RIF No.#

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: WHITEHOUSE, EDUARDO J.
446 N.E. 39th St.
Miami, Fla.

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Whitehouse has been under treatment since 8 April 1965 for acute and chronic Sinusitis which has failed to clear.

He has been seen by Robert Oliver, M.D., ear, eye, nose and throat specialist who has recommended a submucous resection for correction of deviated septum.

I concur with the diagnosis and recommendation of surgery.

Sincerely yours,

William S Piper, M.D.

William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

28 APR 65
MICROFICHE
201-300614

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE 26 April 1965 mml

TO: Chief, OPS/3/AB/SOD

ATTN: David Lamoureux

C NO. 201-300,614

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo Julius

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
XX	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired on 26 April 1965. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

26 APR 65

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MICROFICHE

201-300614

(7)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM	JMWAVE
ACTION	SOD 6
INFO	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

RID: FILE AF, DDP, WH/C 8, D/MS 2, CI/OA

SECRET 162353Z [redacted]

DIR CITE WAVE 0832

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH MEDIC PBRUMEN

17 APR 65 IN 46796

REF DIR 93498 ✓

Whitehouse

DM

LORENTZ SENDS:

1. PX SUBJECT WITHIN NORMAL LIMITS EXCEPTED ELEVATED BP 150/104 CHRONIC ACUTE SINUSITIS, RESIDUAL AMOEBIASIS, ACUTE ANXIETY REACTION. RECEIVING MEDICATIONS THESE CONDITIONS UNDER LOCAL COVERT PHYSICIANS DIRECTION 2-3 TIMES WEEKLY.

2. LOCAL PHYSICIANS RECOMMENDATION SUBJECT HAVE MINIMAL ACTIVITY UNTIL SYMPTOMS ARE RELIEVED AND UNDER CONTROL. NO HOSPITALIZATION EXPECTED.

3. NO SIGNIFICANT FACTS IN DEBRIEFING ALTHOUGH SUBJECT CLAIMED HE RECEIVED "INJECTIONS" IN LEOP UNDER DOCTOR'S CARE THAT EFFECTED HIS NERVOUS SYSTEM. THIS FACT IS NOT INCLUDED IN MIAMI MEDIC REPORT.

4. FORWARDING DETAILED REPORT VIA POUCH.

SECRET ✓ ADVISE ON PHYSICAL EXAM

CFN

SECRET

(17 APR 65)

201-300614

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

☐ RI ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
LEOPOLDVILLE
ACTION
AF 7
INFO
VR. FILE DDP, WH/C 8, SODC

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

N

S E C R E T 141345Z

14 APR 65 IN 44880

DIR CITE LEOP 8248

WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 01131 ✓

REF 100 USD ADMINISTRATIVE PAY AS CHIEF PILOT BUNIA.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CFN

+ REQUESTED REASON (AUTH FOR WHITEHOUSE USD 100 BASE SALARY + INCENTIVES.

(1)

14 APR 65

MICROFICHE

201-300614

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-5474

9 April 1965

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: WHITEHOUSE, Eduardo

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Whitehouse was seen by me yeaterday for a general physical examination. He holds a current F.A.A. Class II medical certificate issued by me 10 Nov. 1964.

Mr. Whitehouse related a history as follows: He has been out of the country for five months and had bloody diarrhea off and on for 2½months. He has had sinus trouble with pain and nasal discharge and increased symptoms with pressure changes. His weight loss has been 20 pounds. His prostate became inflammed and tender.

Results of yesterdays physical exam are as follows: Chest Xray was normal and consistant with one taken at this office 10 November 1964; E.E.N. & T. all normal; Heart - normal size, rhythm, sounds; Abdomen -negative including hernia; Thyroid - normal; Blood Pressure 150/104; pulse rate at rest - 74;

Electrocardiogram was within normal limits; urinaly-s sis - sug. - neg. alb. - neg. micro. - neg.; Sed Rate 3mm/hr.; Hbg. 14 gms. RBC 4,500,000 WBC 7,700 diff. - seg. 62 lymph. 31 stab. 4 mono. 3;

This patient is at present in an acute Anxiety State, has acute and chronic sinusitis, and seems to be recovering from what is probably chronic amoebic dysentary. I found the prostate to be normal. His sinuses were treated with drops and diathermy. I asked that he keep a temperature chart, Durabolin 1cc was given i.m. and three other medicines were

(2)

9 APR 65

201-300614

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

- cont'd - 2

WHITEHOUSE, Edwardo

given to be taken orally for treatment of his sinuses and his anxiety state.

Mr. Whitehouse is to return today for another sinus treatment, Xrays of the sinuses, and he is to bring in a specimen of feces. His treatment should continue approximately two or three times weekly until his sinuses are clear and medication relieves his anxiety state and nervousness.

Thank you for referring this airman.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Piper, MD

William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 26

ORIG : F. DALY:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 6 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2	/	6	
3	/	7	
4		8	

7 Apr 65 18 10z

~~SIG CEN~~

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD-6 INFO: VR, File, DDP, WH/C-2, AF-6, D/MS-2, CCS-3

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

ADVISE FOLL RE WHITEHOUSE:

(1) CONDIT AS DETERMINED BY PHYSICAL EXAM,

(2) AMOUNT HOSPITALIZATION REQUIRED IF ANY,

(3) RESULTS DEBRIEFING IF SIGNIFICANT.

99498

END OF MESSAGE

MS Mr Corrigan (Telecon)

AF/5

WH/C/MO Lee Moughan (Telecon)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

6 APR 65

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MICROFICHE
Copy N.

201-300614

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, AF6, WH/C 8, CCS 3, OP 2, OF 3,

S E C R E T 041600Z

4 Apr 65 IN 37757

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE LEOP 8054

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

WHITEHOUSE DPTD LEOP 032145Z MIA VIA ROME LISBON SCHED DPT LISBON PAA 255, 4 MAR.

S E C R E T

CFN

4 APR 65

~~MICROFICHE~~

201-300614

(1)

14-0000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29

9 SECRET

☐ RI ☑ COPY ☐ [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION SOD

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT AF + SOD

TIME 1400

BY ZC

INFO VR. FILE, AF 6, DDP, WH/C 8, CC 3, D/MS 2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 021410Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE LEOP 8028

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEM

REFS: A. DIR 97928 *

B. LEOP 7937 (IN 33942)

1. PER INSTRUCTIONS REF A, TERMINATING WHITEHOUSE CONTRACT RETURNING P~~E~~RST AVAILABLE. REQUIRES MEDICAL ATTENTION NOT AVAILABLE LEOP. MALADY DUE CONDITIONS ADVANCED BASES COMPLICATED LACK PROPER MEDICAL ATTENTION AND MALTREATMENT. ? mean incorrect medical diagnosis and subsequent treatment ?

2. PARA 2 REF B REQUESTED AUTHORIZATION RETURN SUBJECTS, TERMINATION CONTRACT NOT SPECIFIED. PEREZ RETURN REQUESTED LEOP CONVENIENCE, CAN CONTRIBUTE NOTHING REMAINING LEOP. DESIRES COMPLETE SIX MONTH CONTRACT TERMS.

S E C R E T

CFN

* Instructed Leop to terminate contract the day subj departs Leop.

SECRET

①

2 APR 65

201-300614

MESSAGE FORM

29 SECRET

ORIG : [illegible]DALY:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 1 Apr 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2	✓	6	
3		7	
4	✓	8	

[illegible]

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE . JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SOD 6 INFO AF 6, DDP, WH/C 8, VR, FILE

TO PRIORITY LEOP INFO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) CITE DIR 97928

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

Whitehouse

REF: LEOP 7937 (IN 33942)

DIR-97928

1. CONCUR REQUESTS PARA 2 REF.

2. ~~BOTH CASES~~ IN EACH CASE TERMINATE CONTRACT DAY SUBJ DEPARTS LEOP. SINCE TERMINATION MUTUAL CONSENT, KUBARK PAYS RETURN TICKET COSTS.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/5 T. R[illegible] (phone)

AF/B&F C. Szymanski (phone)

WH/C/MO T. M[illegible] (phone)

SOD/SECUR [illegible]

POOR QUALITY DOCUMENT

1 APR 65

E. N. KORN-PATTERSON
AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

①

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MICROFICHE

201-300614

[illegible]: 42

201

I, EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE herein and hereby acknowledge that the contractor, during the term of the agreement consummated between us, effective NOV 13 1960 and terminated APRIL 3, 1965, has fulfilled all such commitments as outlined and authorized in subject agreement.

Therefore, in recognition of the good faith and good will of the contractor and the accord and agreement between myself and the contractor, with the termination of this agreement, I hereby release and forever discharge the Contracting Officer, all of his agents, employees and representatives, from any and all claims, demands, and liabilities in any form, or by any party, throughout the world, from services performed by me for the Contracting Officer under said agreement with the Contracting Officer.

I hereby promise I will not reveal activities, sponsors, or any other information that came to my attention due to the performance of my duties during the period of the contract, in writing or any other form.

APRIL 19/65
Date

Employee

Date

Witness

APR 65

MICROFICHE

201-300614

①

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

☐ DUMMY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION
SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO
VR. FILE DDP. WH/C 8 S 6 CCS 3 D/M 2
CI/OA

S E C R E T 30/0915Z

30 Mar 65 IN 33942

DIR INFO WAVE CITE LEOP 7937

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

1. NOTIFICATION INTENT TERMINATE CONTRACTS EXPIRATION SIX MONTH OBLIGATION TOMAS AFONT, 30 APRIL; GASTON RODRIGUEZ, 22 APRIL; JOSE MENENDEZ PEREZ, 26 APRIL; TED WHITEHOUSE 13 MAY.

2. WHITEHOUSE INCAPACITATED OVER SIX WEEKS AMOEBIC INFECTION, HIGHLY NERVOUS, NO STAMINA, CONTINUES LOSE WEIGHT. REQUEST AUTHORIZE IMMEDIATE RETURN PBPRIME DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT. PEREZ INCAPACITATED LAME BACK, THREE WEEKS REST PRESCRIBED, NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED RETAINING LEOP. REQUEST PERMISSION RETURN.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

	ACT.	INFO	FILE
1	✓		
2			
3			
4			

1 copy back [illegible]

31 MAR 65
MICROFICHE

201-300614

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 29

34 SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

☒ COPY ☐ [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3	H	7	
4		8	

FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION SOD 6

INFO

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT AF & SOD

TIME 1450

BY [illegible]

VR. FILE AF6, ADP, WH/C8, DIMS 2, CCS 3, CI/OA

SECRET 311505Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE LEOP 7977

31 MAR 65 IN 35132

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: LEOP 7937 (IN 33142)*

IUSTARK REPORTS WHITEHOUSE CONDITION GROWING PROGRESSIVELY WORSE. PLSE ADVISE PARA 2 REF.

SECRET

CFN

* REQUESTED WHITEHOUSE BE RETURNED PBPRIME,

①

31 MAR 65

MICROFILMED

201-300614

TOTAL COPIES 21

☐ COPY ☐

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

32/1 SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Leopoldville

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA 6, AF 4,

SECRET 041736Z LEOP-6156

IN 53304

DIR INFO WAVE CITE LEOP 6156

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 74677

1. PER PARA ONE REF, CURRENT PBRUMEN PROBLEMS PRIMARILY RESULT:

A. LACK OF INTESTINAL FORTUTUDE FOCUSED BY T-28 CRASH

B. LACT OF SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL ALLOW R AND R, AVAILABLE PILOTS CONSTANTLY REQUIRED IN FIELD.

C. LACK S AND R FACILITIES. SINCE CRASH HAS BECOME MAJOR CAUSE APPREHENSION AND DISSATISFACTION.

2. LEADERS ASSIGNED IN FIELD BELIEVED BEST QUALIFIED OF THOSE AVAILABLE:

A. B-26 CASTAR CERICEDA

B. T-28 STAN - TRISTAN GARCIA

C. T-28 EUNIA - TED WHITEHOUSE

TRAVIESO FROM PERFORMANCE TO DATE CONSIDERED WELL QUALIFIED. UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY VIEW FUTURE RESPONSIBLE ASSIGNMENT WHEN ACQUIRES MORE CONGO EXPERIENCE.

3. PER PARA TWO REF PILOTS.

A. T-28 QUALIFIED. TRISTAN GARCIA, TOM AFONT, R. TRAVIESO, L. ARDOIS, M. RAMOS, T. WHITEHOUSE, G. RODRIGUEZ.

MICROFILMED

4 JAN 65

2

POOR QUALITY DOCUMENT

SECRET

201-300619

B. T-28 TRAINING LEG. PERON, MENDEZ, BRINGUIER, TUNON.

C. C-46. VALLICIERDO, MENENDEZ, MORANTES.

D. B-26. ALVEREZ, CERECEDA, VALDEZ, ROJAS, BERNAL, BLAZQUEZ.

SECRET

POOR QUALITY DOCU

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG: DAVID C. LAMOUREUX:ec
UNIT: SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT: 7367
DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ [illegible] 7-122-18/2

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

16 Nov 64 23 49z

SIG CEN

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6

INFO: WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) DDP, WH/SA8, AF 4, VR, FILE

TO: LEOP

INFO: WAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

CITE DIR 64448

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 64156 *

DIR-64448

~~RE~~/REF SUBJECT QUALIFIED T-6 NOT T-28.

END OF MESSAGE

* ALL CUBAN PILOTS GIVEN SINGLE ENGINE TRANSITION AND EVALUATED FOR FLYING ABILITY PRIOR DEPARTURE PBPRIME.

SOD/AB/OPS/3

AF/5

16 NOV 64.

AF/COPS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/AB/SOD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

MICROFICHE

201-300614

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

☑ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

30 SECRET

FROM: JMWAVE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION: SOD6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO: VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA 8, AF4, CCS 3, CI/OPS, OP3, OF 4, OS 2

S E C R E T 162259Z WAVE-4905

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 4905

16 Nov 64 IN 24444

CHAPPIE* WITHRUSH P3RUMEN DTEARN*

LOPENTZ TDY MIAMI SENDS: (IN 22199)

* See HB 90-4004 Re ACTION INDICATORS.

REF A. WAVE 4730 (PARA 2)

B. LEOP 4729 (IN 23790) **

** Revalidate Ticket For Subject.

1. WHITEHOUSE AND MORANTES DEPARTING PAN AM FLIGHT 153 NOV 17. ETA LEOP 1800 NOV 18. PLS MEET.

2. MORANTES UNDER CONTRACT EFFECTIVE 1 OCT 64. THIS INFO FOR LEOP ONLY. PAID SALARY THROUGH END OF NOV. AUTHORIZED 15 KILOS EXCESS BAGGAGE AND WILL CLAIM UPON ARRIVAL.. NO OTHER ADVANCES. TRAVELING UNDER COLUMBIAN PASSPORT B-91770 WITH PBPRIME REENTRY PERMIT.

3. MORANTES BREIFED WOULD RECEIVE LOCAL CONTRACT UPON ARRIVAL. HAVE MAINTAINED STRICT NON ODYOKE APPROACH AND SUBJECT COOPERATIVE. HOWEVER REQUEST HESTON OR REP HAVE FORMALIZED CONTRACT INCLUDING HAZARD DUTY CLAUSE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN ILLUSION AND ALSO RE-BRIEF LOCAL SECURITY

SECRET

SECRET

16 Nov 64

201-300664

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES 32

RI ☐ COPY ☐ CURRY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FROM ☐ ☐ BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

INFO VR, FILE, DDP WH/SA 8, WE 4, AF 4, CI, CI/OPS, CA 2

SECRET 151611Z

IMMEDIATE LEOP INFO DIR BRUS CITE WAVE 4855

CHAPPIE/WITHRUSH/FBRUMEN

15 Nov 64 IN 23669

LORENTZ TDY MIAMI SENDS:

1. EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE WAS PURPOSELY CANCELLED FROM SABENA FLIGHT. WAS ADVISED BY SABENA NEW YORK QUOTE TO CONTACT CONGO CONSULATE BRUS FOR ISSUANCE OF VISA ON MONDAY UNQUOTE. ADDITIONALLY SOMEONE OF AUTHORITY INDEPENDENTLY RESCHEDULED SUBJECT FOR MONDAY DEPARTURE ALTHOUGH TICKED IN MIAMI CONFIRMED BRUS-LEOP SPACE ON SUNDAY.

2. HOLDING WHITEHOUSE NEW YORK PENDING FURTHER CLARIFICATION AND LEOP DIRECTION. CAN REVALIDATE TICKET VIA PAN AM IF ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE EFFECTED LEOP IN TIME FOR DEPARTURE ON 17 NOV.

3. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

RI COPY

15 NOV 64

201-

SECRET

FORM 1-64 1389

MESSAGE FORM 21

24 SECRET

ORIG : Dave Lamoureux
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS-3
EXT : 7367
DATE : 14/11/64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 7-124-18/2

ROUTING ℓI

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

14 Nov 64 17 42z

SIG CEN

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD-6 INFO: DDP, WH/SA-8; AF-4, VR, File

TO LEOP INFO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) CITE DIR 64156

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

DIR-64156

REF: LEOP 4609 (IN 20863) *

AFTER FULL CONSIDERATION OF POINTS RAISED IN REF REGARDING WHITEHOUSE ACCEPTABILITY, HQS DISPATCHED HIM TO CONGO. AGREE THAT CHIEF PILOT SHOULD BE CONSULTED, AND IN PAST WHEN THERE HAS BEEN DEFINITE ANTIPATHY BY PBRUMENS HQS HAS RESPECTED FIELD VIEWS. HQS HOWEVER DOING ALL POSSIBLE TO SUPPLY BEST QUALIFIED ([illegible] FROM DIMINISHING POOL) ~~XX~~ CANDIDATES, AND THE FIELD MUST WORK WITH THOSE THAT ARE AVAILABLE. FYI ALL CUBAN PILOTS ARE GIVEN SINGLE ENGINE TRANSITION AND EVALUATED FOR FLYING ABILITY PRIOR DEPARTURE PBPRIME. TOLD THEY TO FLY AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED BY SAO. WHITEHOUSE QUALIFIED T-28.

END OF MESSAGE

* WHitehouse NoT Desired BY CHief Pilot At This Time.

FYI - This cable ~~was not written by~~ SOD/AB/OPS-3

SOD/AB/OPS-3 ✓

WH/SA/IOS ✓

AF/S

E. N. Kim-Pettit
AF/COPS

Teleco
BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/AB/SOD
14 Nov 64

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

201-308614

14-00000

IN CONSIDERATION of my employment on the terms hereinafter set forth, I, Eduardo J. Whitehouse hereinafter called employee, hereby agree to the following conditions of employment:

1. That the term "employer" as used in this agreement shall be the Government of the Republic of the Congo, or any designated Department or Agency of said Government, or any Company or Agency that the said Government may designate.

2. That the service to be rendered by the employee under this agreement is to be an aircraft pilot, with no specific aircraft assignment.

3. That the term of employment under this agreement shall be for a period of one - 1 - year from November 13, 1964. During the first six month term of this agreement, this agreement may be terminated by the employer at any time by thirty - 30 - days written notice in advance to the employee. During the last six month term of this agreement, this agreement may be terminated by either the employee or the employer by thirty -30- days written notice in advance to the other party.

4. That the employee shall be paid a basic, all inclusive, salary of Eight Hundred -$800.00- Dollars per month during the first six month term of this agreement. During the last six month term of this agreement, the employee shall be paid a basic, all inclusive, salary of Nine Hundred -$900.00- Dollars per month. That the employee shall be paid an additional Ten -$10.00- Dollars per flying hour each month, for all flying hours in excess of seventy flying hours per month.

5. That the employee accepts the responsibility of the payment of all applicable taxes on all income earned by him under the terms of this agreement.

6. That the employee shall be furnished round trip tourist class air transportation costs from Miami, Florida, to destination, and return, and all other expenses directly relating to the travel involved. In the event at the termination of this agreement, the employee accepts employment with an employer other than the Government of the Republic of the Congo, the return transportation cost shall not be paid said employee.

7. That the employee shall be provided with the following benefits during the term of this agreement:

a. A monetary benefit of $10,000 in the event of his death from any cause whatever during the term of this agreement.

POOR QUALITY DOCUMENT

13 NOV 64

201-300614

MICROFILMED

of his death by accidental means while aboard a tested aircraft while operating in a non war risk area and engaged in the performance of services under this agreement PROVIDED death occurs within 90 days of the accident.

c. An additional monetary benefit of $30,000 in the event of his death by accidental means while engaged in the performance of services under this agreement aboard an aircraft being tested as to its airworthiness or when the aircraft is operating in a war risk area, PROVIDED death occurs within 90 days of the accident.

d. That in the event the employee receives an injury or disability while directly engaged in the performance of services under this agreement, he will be entitled to medical, surgical, hospital, transportation and disability benefits in such amount as in the sole discretion of the employer is proper, PROVIDED said benefits shall not exceed a total of $20,000 for the same injury or disability.

8. That the employee agrees to undergo a medical examination within five calendar days after his return.

9. That the employee promise he will not reveal in writing or any other method, the activities, the sponsors, or any other facts that come to his attention by virtue of the performance of services under this agreement.

SIGNED AND SEALED BY me this 13th day of November, 1964.

-Seal-

ACCEPTED at Leopoldville, the Republic of the Congo, this ______ day of ______, 1964.

______________________________ -Seal-

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 42 ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY.

27 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

JMWAVE

ACTION: 556

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT SOD TIME 2245 BY BP

TO: VR. FILE, DCP, WH/SA 8, AF 4, WE 6, OS 2, OF 4
IW 4, DO/H3,

S E C R E T 130052Z

PRIORITY LEOP INFO PRIORITY DIR BRUS CITE WAVE 4730

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH SECUR DTEARN PBRUMEN

LORENTZ TDY MIAMI SENDS:

13 Nov 64 IN 22199

1. LUIS ARDOIS WITHRUSH PILOT SCHEDULED DEPART NEW YORK 12 NOV VIA SABENA 548; ARRIVE BRUS 13 NOV 0950. DEPART BRUS 13 NOV 2005 VIA SABENA 529; ARRIVE LEOP 14 NOV 0555. SUBJECT POSSESSES PBPRIME MULTIPLE ENTRY PERMIT. CONTRACT EFFECTIVE 11 NOV AND ADVANCED ONE MONTH SALARY. NO OTHER ADVANCES. RECEIVED T-6 CHECKOUT.

2. EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE WITHRUSH PILOT SCHEDULED DEPART NEW YORK 14 NOV VIA SABENA 548; ARRIVE BRUS 15 NOV 0950. DEPART BRUS 15 NOV 1105 VIA SABENA 519; ARRIVE LEOP 15 NOV 1905. SUBJ POSSESSES PBPRIME MULTIPLE ENTRY PERMIT. CONTRACT EFFECTIVE 13 NOV AND ADVANCED ONE MONTH SALARY. NO OTHER ADVANCES. RAPIDLY QUALIFIED T-6 AND IRREVOCABLY UNDERSTANDS FUNCTION AS LINE PILOT AND ACFT TYPE ASSIGNMENT FROM CHIEF PILOT.

S E C R E T

ADOUBLE ACTION INDICATOR. See 90-400-1

MICROFICHE

SECRET

13 Nov 64

(1)

201-300614

November 12 , 1964

I certify I have given Mr Eduardo Whitehouse Six Hours and Forty Five (6:45) minutes of dual instruction in North American AT-6D and I found him to be proficient and safe in this aircraft.

He is average in coordination and in my estimate his potential ability to fly tactics is limited.

I reccomed he should be given two more hours in this aircraft.

/Rene Travieso
FAA CFI # 1425396

12 NOV 64

201-300614

MICROFICHE

D

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

10 Nov. 1964

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Florida 33148

Re: WHITEHOUSE, EDUARDO J.

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Whitehouse was examined by me today for routine Federal Aviation Agency Class II physical which he successfully passed and was issued a medical certificate.

At your request a Chest Xray and hemoglobin was done. The Chest Xray was normal and his hemoglobin was 16.2 gms. or 104.8%

Mr. Whitehouse was given the following injections: Typhoid-para-typhoid, Typhus, Small-pox, Cholera and Dipth.-Tet.

Thank you for referring this airman.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Piper, M.D.
William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

1

MICROFILMED

10 NOV 64

201-300614

PERSONAL EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Name of employee in full: Eduardo Whitehouse Insua

Person to be notified in case of emergency:

Name Brizeida Whitehouse
Relationship wife
Address 446 NE 39 St., Miami

Telephone FR4-2396

Designation of Beneficiary:

Name Brizeida Whitehouse
Relationship wife
Address 446 NE 39 St., Miami

Telephone FR4-2396

List all insurance policies:

Date of Policy	Company	Policy No.	Coverage	Beneficiary	Contain War Clause? Yes	No
	none					

Have you completed Last Will & Testament? yes
Date of Will: Nov. 10,1964 Location of original: R. Hedell
Copy on file with:

Name and address of person holding Power of Attorney:

Date Nov. 10,1964

Signature of Employee

MICROFICHE

10 NOV 64

201-300614

SECRET

SOD [illegible]

4 NOV 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff/OS

SUBJECT : Request for Assistance with Cuban Nationals for Project WITHRUSH

1. The Special Operations Division and the African Division are interested in obtaining the services of the following individuals for employment in the Congo under Project WITHRUSH.

Name and Bio Info	Document Required
a. Pedro Enrique MONTERO Resident Alien A-11885661 DOB: 2 April 1931 POB: Buena Vista, Las Villas, Cuba 201-761359	Re-entry Permit
b. Ernesto PEDROSO Villanueva Refugee A-12490636 DOB: 31 March 1922 POB: Havana, Cuba 201-761343	I-512
c. Eduardo Julius WHITEHOUSE Inesa Resident Alien A-11241940 DOB: 14 March 1916 POB: Santiago, Cuba 201-300614	Re-entry Permit

2. All have POA's.

3. It is requested that you make necessary arrangements with the I & N Service to facilitate issuance of the appropriate documentation at their Miami Office.

4 NOV 64

201-300614

SECRET

4. Thank you for your continued cooperation.

Robert W. Gambino
Security Officer
Special Operations Division

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/AB/SOD
1 - SOD/SECUR
1 - 201-761389
1 - 201-761343
1 - 201-300614 ✓
1 - SOD/Ab/OPS-3
1 - SOD/RI

SOD/AB/OPS/3:D.Lamoureux:mt (4 November 1964)

[illegible]-1253

SECRET

2 NOV 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : FBI Traces on 201-761343 and 201-300614

1. The following FBI Reports were reviewed by this office:

A. Anti - Fidel Castro Activities, dated 12/11/61

B. Eduardo Julio Whitehouse Inema, dated 4/5/60

2. No derogatory information was found concerning either individual. This information was given verbally to Mr. J. Borainy in your office, on 26 Oct 64.

Paul W. Gottke
Acting Chief
Special Operations Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 4 - Addressee
1 - C/AB/SOD
1 - 201 - 761343
1 - 201 - 300614 ✓
1 - AB/OPS/3/SOD
1 - RI/SOD

AB/OPS/3/SOD:D.Lamoureux:jjf (30 October 1964)

2 Nov 64
201-300614

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : DAVID C. LAMOUREUX:bgw
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 7367
DATE : 27 October 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300614
201-741343

27

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING Rl

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

28 Oct 64 22 14z

SIG CEN

TO : JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6

INFO: DDP, WH/SA 8, AF 4, R/AN, C/OA, VR, file

TO WAVE (FOR LORENZ) INFO

CITE DIR 60102

CHAFPIE WITHRUSH PERUMEN

REF: WAVE 8357 (IN 82076)*

SUBJ'S 42 AND 44 GRANTED POA'S 26 OCT 64.

END OF MESSAGE

*Bio data on personnel.

SOD/AB/OPS/3

WH/SA/IOS

WH/SA/MOB

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BRUCE CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

RELEASING OFFICER

28 OCT 64

PAUL V. [illegible]
AC/SOD/AB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-300614

SECRET

Executive Registry
64 7111/1

Capt. Eduardo J. Whitehouse
446 N.E. 39th Street
Miami, Florida

Dear Captain Whitehouse:

Thank you for your views and observations contained in your letter of 22 October 1964. Your interest is appreciated.

Contrary to the information on which you base your desire to discuss Cuban matters, be advised that this agency is not rendering help to Cuban organizations. Thus it is believed that a discussion of this topic would not be of benefit to either of us.

Thank you again for your interest.

Harold E. Padgett
Assistant to the Director

DDP/WH/SA/MOB/PROP/JBOtt:ems (28 October 1964)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - ER
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/SA/ESEC
1 - OPS/3/AB/SOD
1 - WH/SA/MOB/PROP

MICROFICHE

1

SECRET

[illegible]

28 OCT 64
201-300614

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
OPS/3/AE/SCD - D. Lamoureux

NUMBER
201 - 300614

SUBJECT
WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo J.

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
2 October 1964 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

For use as a pilot under Project WITHRUSH, as set forth in your request (form 772) dated 2 October 1964.

Please forward PRQ Part II.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	26 October 1964

MICROFICHE

FORM 1-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1

(9)

201-300614

Miami, Fla. Oct. [illegible] 1964

Executive Registry
[illegible]

Mr. John McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

I am one of the Cuban pilots survivor of the Bay of Pigs ill-fated invasion to Cuba. Flew several missions and talked with the four American pilots who died in the morning of April 19th 1961 while flying as volunteers for our cause.

Contrary to the general opinion that the CIA was to blame for that fiasco, I wish to express to you my admiration and gratitude for the excellent instrucstion received wile training in Central America and for those who gave up their lives for the cause of Democracy. A wrong and regretable decision by the Administration turned a positive victory into a shameful defeat for the Cubans and the United States.

I understand that certain Cuban organizations are receiving direct help from your Agency. Regret to inform you that most of them are unworthy of such help and not so long ago, their leaders were Castro's followers.

Would like the opportunity of discussing this matter personally with you for the welfare of both our countries.

Please accept the testimony of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

E. J. Whitehouse

Capt. Eduardo J. Whitehouse

446 N. E. 39th St
Miami Fla.
Tel. FR-4-2396

22 OCT 64
201-300614

E. J. Whitehouse
[illegible] N. E. [illegible]9 St
Miami, Fla.

MIAMI, OCT 2 1964 FLA.

8¢ U.S. AIR MAIL

VIA AIR MAIL

Mr. John McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL URGENT

FBI RESULTS

201 - 300614

Refer to data re EDUARDO JULIO WHITEHOUSE INSUA, sent 4/5/60, report dated 12/30/60?

Per Mr. Bludworth
21 October 1964
crm

100-9-14 (unevaluated) need date

DBF 45887

RID

(21 OCT 64)
201-300614

D

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29 RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUDOY

31 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
Panama City

ACTION
SOD 6

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT SOD TIME 1745 BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 7, AF 4, DDP, WH/SA 3, CI/OPS

SECRET 152100Z

R
PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 4741

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

REF DIR 56647 *

15 Oct 64 IN 93958

RA
1. NO TRACES SUBJ REF. CHECKED ALL LOCAL ODYOKE SERVICE PLUS

S

HYABIDE — PANAMANIAN SECRET POLICE

2. NO INDEX.

SECRET

* RE EDWARD JULIUS WHITEHOUSE INSUA.

201-300614

1)

SECRET

15 OCT 64

201-300614

ORIG : D. Lamouroux: jjf
UNIT : AB/OPS/3/SOD
EXT : 7367
DATE : 13 Oct 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM 25

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

14 OCT 64 17 50 z

SIG CEN

TO : PANAMA CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SOD-6 INFO WH-7, DDP, WH/SA-8, C/CB, VR, FILE

TO PACY INFO CITE DIR 56647

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

1. REQUEST FIELD TRACES ON EDWARDO JULIUS WHITEHOUSE INSUA, CUBAN, DPB: 14 MAR 1918, SANTIAGO, CUBA. EMPLOYED BY PANAVEN AIRLINES, PANAMA, & [redacted] JAN 63 TO JUN 64.

2. LIAISON AUTHORIZED.

3. PLS ADVISE SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

AB/OPS/3/SOD
C/WH/2/P

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/AB/SOD

14 Oct 64

201-308619

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MICROFICHE

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 22

RI ☐ COPY ☐ DIRTY

7 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO RI / DDP WH/CAR CI/OPS VR FILE

S E C R E T 091144Z

9 OCT IN 90082

DIR CITE LEOP 3775

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 54684

NO STATION OR LIAISON TRACES.

S E C R E T

Requested traces on EDUARDO JULIUS WHITEHOUSE INSUA, CUBAN.

copy sent C10A 13 Oct 64

SECRET

1)

9 OCT 64

201-300614

MICROFICHE

SECRET

NON-OFFICIAL COVER CONCURRENCE

DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY CI/OA ONLY

SUBJECT'S NAME	C OR 201 NO.
DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	U.S. RESIDENCE
OVERSEAS RESIDENCE	
EMPLOYER	PROJECT

DIVISION OR STAFF	CASE OFFICER	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

PROPOSED USE 2C42

From CI/OA
To: OPS/3/ATB/SOD

TO BE COMPLETED BY CCS ONLY

CCS/NC CASE OFFICER *(Extension 5144)*	CCS FILE NO.

Central Cover Staff concurs in your proposal to use subject for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon CCS to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise CCS/NC promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated. The pseudonym assigned subject should be provided CCS/NC at the time notification of activation is forwarded. If notification of activation is not received in CCS/NC one year from above date it will be assumed proposed use did not materialize.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject or his employer is in CCS/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCS/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

☐ If check mark appears here the proposed use of subject requires DDP approval under CSI 240-6, para. 5. Please review CSI 240-6 and initiate action as appropriate.

7 OCT 64

①

DISTRIBUTION: 1-CCS 1-CI OR 1-AREA DIVISION

CHIEF, CCS/NC OR DESIGNEE

FORM 2-64 2214

SECRET

MICROFICHE (4-42)

201-300614

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 7 Oct 1964 prc

TO: OPS/3/AB/SOD - D. Lamoureux

C NO.: 201-300614

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward E. Brown

SUBJECT: WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo J.

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

- ☐ PRQ I
- ☐ PRQ II
- ☐ FIELD TRACES
- ☐ RI TRACES
- ☐ OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES
- ☐ RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
- ☐ GREEN LIST
- ☐ REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
- ☐ REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
- ☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
- ☐ REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
- ☐ REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
- ☐ REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
- ☒ OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please furnish PANAMA trace results.

Sent Panama City 13 Oct 64

(1)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

7 Oct 64

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

201-300614

MESSAGE FORM 22 RI ROUTING

ORIG: DAVID S. [illegible]
UNIT: SOD AF/CPS/3
EXT: 7351
DATE: 2 OCTOBER 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300614

28 S-E-C-R-E-T

1		5	
2		6	6/B
3		7	
4		8	

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SOD 6
INFO: AF 4, DDP, WH/SA 8, CI/OPS, VR, FILE

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 54654

CHAPPIE WITHUSH FBRUMEN

1. REQUEST FIELD TRACES ON EDUARDO JULIUS WHITEHOUSE INSUA, CUBAN, DPB: 14 MAR 1918, SANTIAGO, CUBA. EMPLOYED BY AEROVIAS PALMA AIRWAYS IN CONGO FROM JULY 1951 TO SEPT 1961.

2. LIAISON AUTHORIZED.

3. PLS ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

5 OCT 64

SOD/AF/CPS/3

AF/5

MICROFICHE

AF/CCPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/SOD/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-300614

(1)

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 150220

DATE 2 Oct 1964

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE) CS/SI

WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo Julius 201-300614

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
14 March 1918 Santiago, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Public Relations Man
North Shore Villas - 6918 Indian Creek Dr.
Miami Beach, Fla.
1 July 1964-present

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Pilot

[redacted]

TO

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME David C. Lamoureux
OFFICE DESIGNATOR OPS/3/XB/SOD
ROOM, BUILDING 2 D 39
EXTENSION 7367

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Pilot - Cubana Airlines	Havana, Cuba	Sept 4 43-Jan 1 59
Unemployed	Miami, Fla.	Jan 1 59-May 1959
Training camps		1960-1961
Pilot - Aerovias Panama Airways - Leopoldville	Congo	Jun 61-Sept 61
Pilot - Interocean Airways - Leopoldville	Congo	Sept 61-Sept 61
Insurance Salesman (own business)		1961-1963
Operations Manager - Pilot - for Panaven Airlines	Panama	Jan 1 63-Jun 1 64
Public Relations - North Shore Villas - 6918 Indian Creek Dr.	Miami Beach, Fla.	Jul 1 64-present

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED
Took part in invasion to Cuba in 1961 as pilot.

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5'11"	160	Blue	Blond	White	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Brizeida Whitehouse

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Father: Edward L. Whitehouse
Mother: Maria C. Insua

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

OCT 13 2 31 PM '64

(2)

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D.

MICROFILMED

SEE CSI 10-7

(2 OCT 64)

FORM 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET (over)

201-300614

SECRET

TO: David C. Lamoureux

13 Oct 1964
DATE

FROM: FI/D [redacted] 87

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 2 Oct 1964

TO:
☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: David C. Lamoureux
OPS/3/AB/SOD
2 D 39

SUBJECT: *(True name)* WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo Julius

PROJECT: WITHRUSH

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO. 300614

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Congo, Africa

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Pilot

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT: None

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY:

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☒	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 156219

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY WH	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☒	WILL FORWARD Congo
☒	NO DEROGATORY INFO. WAVE	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

MICROFICHE

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
David C. Lamoureux	7367	Bernard J. [illegible], Jr.

2 Oct 64

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-300614 (9)

42

PERSONAL INFORMATION

REF.: A-11 241 940
[illegible]

NAME [illegible] Eduardo Julius
LAST FIRST MIDDLE

PHONE NUMBER UN55070 [illegible]2306
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 261-66-2326
☒ MALE
☐ FEMALE

MARITAL STATUS
☐ SINGLE
☒ MARRIED
☐ ENGAGED
☐ WIDOWED
☐ DIVORCED
☐ SEPARATED

PRESENT ADDRESS 6911 Indian Creek Dr. Miami Beach Fla.
STREET CITY STATE

PERMANENT ADDRESS 446 N. E. 39th St. Miami, Fla.

DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR) 9-14-18
PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY) Santiago, Cuba

WEIGHT 5.11 | COLOR OF HAIR blond | COMPLEXION light | DESCRIBE ANY SPECIAL OR OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OR IDENTIFYING MARKS.
HEIGHT 160 | COLOR OF EYES blue

PASSPORT PARTICULARS: Re-entry permit
ISSUING AUTHORITY U.S. Dept.Justice
PLACE OF ISSUE Miami, Fla.
PASSPORT NO. A-11-241-940
DATE OF ISSUE Dec. 31 1963
KIND OF PASSPORT
VALIDITY PERIOD 1 year

CITIZEN OF U.S.A. YES ☐ NO ☒
NATURALIZED: DATE PLACE
NATIONALITY: Cuba
HAS YOUR PASSPORT EVER BEEN CANCELLED? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS:

EDUCATION	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	DATES ATTENDED	GRADUATE DEGREES	MAJOR SUBJECTS
HIGH SCHOOL	Gulf Coast Military Academy Gulfport, Miss.	1933-37	yes	
COLLEGE	~~Havana, Business College~~	1938-39	yes	
TRADE, BUSINESS OR CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, OTHER WITH DATES				

SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL STUDY OR RESEARCH WORK Aviation

VOCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS LICENSE, CERTIFICATE, ETC.

WHAT FOREIGN LANGUAGES DO YOU SPEAK FLUENTLY? Spanish, Italian, French READ yes WRITE yes

U.S. MILITARY SERVICE (BRANCH) Cuban Airforce FROM: 1943 TO: 1945
TYPE OF DISCHARGE: Honorable
RANK: Col.
PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN NATIONAL GUARD OR RESERVES

ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS (CIVIC, ATHLETIC, FRATERNAL, ETC.)

PREVIOUS ADDRESSES DURING PAST TEN YEARS

DATES FROM	DATES TO	STREET	CITY/STATE	COUNTRY
[illegible]	1959	10 St. [illegible]	Havana	Cuba
1959	1960	Biltmore Terr Hotel	Miami Beach	Fla. USA.
1960	1961	7324 S. W. 17th St.	Miami	Fla.
1961	1962	2051 S. [illegible]	"	"
1962	1963	446 N. E. 39th St.	"	"

SPOUSE (INCLUDE FIANCE AND PRIOR MARRIAGES) - CHILDREN

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]	6911 Indian Creek Dr.	House wife
[illegible] "	[illegible]	same	student
[illegible] "	6- 3-53	same	"

23 SEP 64

(CONTINUED ON OTHER SIDE)

201-304614

14-00000

EMPLOYMENT — In the spaces provided below describe every position which you have held since you first began to work, including any active military service. Start with present position and work back to the first position which you held. Account for any periods of unemployment. USE CONTINUATION SHEET IF NECESSARY.

A. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 7-1-64 TO PRESENT TIME
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Public Relations
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 450.- PER YR. FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: North Shore Villas 6918 Indian Creek Dr. Miami Beach Fla
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: T. [illegible]
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Promote business
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: still employed

B. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 1-1-63 TO: 8-1-64
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Operations Mgr.
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 700.- PER YR. FINAL $ 700.- PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: Panaven Airlines, Panama.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Carlos Maldonado
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Ops. Mgr. and Pilot.
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: had to ~~leave in~~ move to Panama.

C. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 9-4-43 TO: 1-1-59
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Airline Pilot
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 400.- [illegible] PER YR. FINAL $ [illegible] PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: Cubana Airlines - Havana Cuba
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Jose Vilaboy
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Airline Pilot
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: Political

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☒ YES ☐

HAVE YOU NOW OR EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER? GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☒ YES ☐

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY ANY POLICE OR MILITARY AUTHORITY? IF SO NAME THE ARRESTING AUTHORITY GIVE TIME, PLACE AND REASON FOR SUCH ARREST OR DETENTION, AND THE DISPOSITION OR COURT ACTION. NO ☒ YES ☐

JOB APPLIED FOR: Pilot MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SALARY $ [illegible] PER YR.

REFERENCES. LIST FIVE PERSONS, NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY DEFINITE INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY. DO NOT GIVE NAMES OF SUPERVISORS LISTED ABOVE.

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
Col. Fed G. Koch, Jr.	U. S. National Guard Bureau, Washington	U.S. Col.
" Howard Slaten	Pease Airforce Base, New Hampshire	" "
" Timothy Donohue	Otis Airforce Base, Mass.	" "
Ernest. Werner	Fed. Aviation Agency, Miami Int Airport	F.A.A. Director
Mark. Kohly	C.A.S. Office, Miami Int. Airport	C.A.S. Director

FATHER'S NAME: [illegible] DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY): [illegible]
PRESENT ADDRESS: New Smirna Beach, Fla. PRESENT OCCUPATION: [illegible]
NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: [illegible] PRESENT NATIONALITY: American
MOTHER'S FULL NAME: Maria [illegible]. Insua DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY): [illegible]
PRESENT ADDRESS: 6918 Indian Creek Dr. Miami [illegible] PRESENT OCCUPATION:
NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: PRESENT NATIONALITY: [illegible]
IN CASE OF EMERGENCY NOTIFY: Lucia [illegible] (NAME) 47 Antilla Coral Gables (ADDRESS) MI- 6606 (PHONE NO.)

IF THE ABOVE SPACE IS NOT SUFFICIENT USE CONTINUATION SHEET.

I authorize investigation of all statements contained in this application. I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts called for is cause for dismissal.

8-13-1964
DATE SIGNATURE

From June 1961 to Sept. 1961 contracted by A.A. Airlines to fly in the Congo, Africa.

Took part in the ill-fated invasion to Cuba in 1961 as pilot.

WEHRCSH
PERSONNEL CHECK LIST

42

	Last	Metronymic	First
NAME:	WHITEHOUSE	Insua,	Eduardo Julius

JOB: Pilot

201-NUMBER: 300614 requested [illegible] (OPHAND)

C-NUMBER:

POA REQUESTED: 2 Oct 1964

GREEN LIST REQUESTED: 2 Oct 1964

RI TRACES REQUESTED: 30 Sept 1964

RI TRACES RETURNED: ~~NPII~~ ND 1Oct64

DIVISION TRACES REQUESTED: 2Oct64

DIVISION TRACES RETURNED: N.D WH

FIELD TRACES SENT: CONGO INITIATED 2Oct64 Panama City sent 13Oct64

FIELD TRACES RETURNED: WAVE N.D. Panama - N.D. per PACY 4741

MEMO TO CI/OA RE RI TRACES: 772

MEMO TO CI/OA RE DIV TRACES: 772 WH

MEMO TO CI/OA RE FIELD TRACES: 772 WAVE; will forward Congo, forwarded 13Oct64

POA GRANTED: OK per Jack Downing 26Oct64

CONTRACT SIGNED:

K
O
2
+

No Derog. FBI + I&N per WAVE 2532

MICROFICHE

201-300614 OK

SUPPLEMENTARY PERSONAL INFORMATION

FLIGHT CREW

Name and Rank: Eduardo J. Whitehouse (Capt.)

I. General Flying Experience:

A. Military Flying: Instructed by U. S. personnel for the invasion to Cuba in 1961.

B. Airline: Cubana Airlines
Panaven Airlines

C. Far East:

II. Equipment Types and Flying Times	PILOT (IN HOURS)	CO-PILOT (IN HOURS)	OTHER CREW TITLE	OTHER CREW (IN HOURS)
A. C-46	50.-			
B. C-47	[illegible]50.-			
C. DC-4/C-54	5500.-			
D. DC-6				
E. DC-7				
F. Jet Transport (By Type)				
G. Amphibian (By Type)				
H. Flying Boat (By Type)				
I. Helicopter (By Type)				
J. Super Const. 1049-G.	[illegible]0.-			
K. Lockheed 10	[illegible].	1[illegible]0.-		
L.				
M.				
III. TOTAL FLYING TIME	13[illegible].-			
IV. Total Instrument Time — Hood	[illegible].-			
IV. Total Instrument Time — Actual	[illegible]7.-			
V. Total Night Time	[illegible]			
VI. Total Flying Time in Past Six Months				
VII. Type Equipment in Past Six Months				

VIII. Aviation Licenses & Ratings

	Type	Number	Ratings
A.	[illegible] Transport	[illegible]	
B.	[illegible] "	[illegible]	
C.			
D.			
E.			

IX. Selection of an applicant may well be influenced by the type and amount of ground and flight training received. To assist in evaluating your overall qualifications it is important that you endeavor to submit documentary evidence, in a thorough and detailed manner, of all training received during the past three year period. (This information may be submitted in the form of notarized statements, photostats, etc.)

X. Are you willing to be based at any station at the discretion of the Company? Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts requested is cause for dismissal.

DATE

SIGNATURE

201-300614

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIROGUE
201-233477
VOL. IV

INCLUSIVE DATES: ____

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: ____
ROOM: ____

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 JULY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

MICROFILMED
FEB 12 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DC/AF				
2. C/AF				
3.				
4. AF/WEST				WA
5.				
6. ~~[illegible]~~				
7. AF/5				
8.				
9. RI/CRO				
10. RID/AN				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. [illegible]				
15.				
16. RI FI				
17. RID/FI				

RECLASSIFIED
RI/[illegible]
RI/[illegible]
RI/DPS
RI/Files

2-4. I still wonder whether he's more trouble than he's worth. This is a handful for Leop.

Too early [illegible]

7-9. Please desensitize this document from the classification SECRET/[illegible] to SECRET.

E. M. Geiger
R.C. #358
AF/5

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST: ABSTRACT X; INDEX X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-233477

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
16 MAR 1961

DOCUMENT NUMBER
ACLA 00491

FORM 12-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T ~~RYBAT~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: [illegible]

TO: Chief, Africa Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: Unknown

FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville R.B.-3

DATE: 15 March 1961

SUBJECT: Review of WIROGUE Project to Date and WIROGUE's New Position in Congolese Air Force

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Support of WIROGUE as indicated in para 6

REFERENCE(S):
A. DIR-29127, dated 12 March 1961
B. ACLW-132, dated 17 November 1960

MICROFILMED
FEB 12 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. This dispatch is to inform Headquarters of the main developments and problems concerning WIROGUE to date, and to set forth in detail Station thoughts and plans concerning WIROGUE.

2. WIROGUE, in his contacts with Robert B. Guthman, and in the last two weeks with Lester E. Salvach, has always presented a multitude of ideas which include a strong element of violence, mayhem or just plain larceny. In spite of being given a flat no, he has persisted in desiring a gun. When it was mentioned that these were hard to find, and that a pistol or rifle was in addition a dangerous thing for the Congolese to find on a white man, he said that that was all right, a machine gun would do. He even suggested the formation of a special force of whites, with himself as the leader, naturally, to "fight the Congolese in case of trouble." We concur with the description of WIROGUE in para 5, Ref B, except for the means to obtain the best results from him. When left to his own devices to implement an assignment, WIROGUE can all too often create more problems than he answers. His security consciousness is not outstanding from an operational point of view. Control is seemingly best when WIROGUE can talk over his problems at frequent intervals and discuss them with the case officer. The station has found it desirable to meet him with greater frequency than heretofore and to provide understanding (rather than sympathy), interest, encouragement but most of all guidance, and apply a steady checkrein to what are mostly rather wild ideas. Attachment A is a clear example of the type of activity WIROGUE tends to undertake if left on his own and the security risk he represents in such situations.

3. In addition, WIROGUE's attitude and responsibility to KUBARK money leaves much to be desired. Headquarters' comment in Ref A concerning WIROGUE's "propensity for financial mismanagement" is fully realized by this station. To recap WIROGUE's financial misadventures briefly, he spent his money lavishly upon arrival, rented an extra apartment he didn't need, besides several stores for which he was not yet prepared to use, has bought and sold at least three cars and is currently driving a large Chrysler (in spite of being told at the time that it was far too conspicuous). When having depleted the original $400 loaned to him, he requested his $500 housing allowance in one lump sum. He now accepts the fact that he will receive the housing allowance in "little dribbles" (his words) but still feels that he was told he would get it in a lump sum payment. He has little to show from his initial loan for setting up a business, and even if provided with all necessary equipment he could probably not follow through without additional financial backing. The Station feels that no matter how much money he is provided, WIROGUE would manage to get into financial difficulties or at least spend all that he had available.

4. On 4 March 1961, WIROGUE telephoned and wished someone to meet him immediately. He explained, at the meeting, that at dinner the evening before he had met:

INDEX

PIERROT, Paul Arnold /MAJ/
Approximate DOB [illegible]
Major, Chief Congolese Air Force
Ht. 5'10"
Mulatto

2 att of w (2 + 3)
#1 NSM

CS COPY

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-28

15 Mar 61
201-233477

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1 of 3

Speaks excellent English and French.
Lives with wife (name unknown) Western looking and Western habits, darker complexioned than PIERROT.
[illegible] - 233477

(WIROGUE typically referred to PIERROT as "the major" and said that he didn't remember his name. Later, WIROGUE, in spite of being briefed otherwise, continued to fail to obtain names of people with whom he dealt.) WIROGUE was to meet PIERROT the evening of 8 March at 1700 to discuss the possibility and details of his becoming administrative liaison officer under contract to the Congolese Air Force. PIERROT is interested in developing his own cadre of instructors, both for flying and mechanical work, to develop further the embryo group of 150 cadets currently more or less ready for flying training.

5. At meetings held 5 and 6 March WIROGUE supplied the following details concerning his new job: he was to meet the Minister of National Defense ad interim, Fernand KAZADI, on 7 March to sign a contract. He finally did meet KAZADI (whom WIROGUE knows only as M. le Ministre) on 9 March but no contract was yet signed. As of 15 March WIROGUE had not yet signed a contract but this is pending, he tells us, any day. (A copy of this contract will be forwarded to Headquarters when obtained.) The terms of the agreement include, he states, that he will provide through his European contacts at least three pilot instructors and three mechanic instructors within thirty days. (Thirty days from when is an open question.) More instructors will be needed at a later date, the possible total number being set at ten, five for flying and five for mechanical instruction. These instructors will be paid 20,000 Belgian Congo Francs a month plus 10,000 BCF bonus. WIROGUE will receive 25,000 BCF and 10,000 BCF bonus each month, with housing to be supplied in all cases. If the instructors have families, family transport in addition to their own will be provided by the Congolese government. In addition, medical care and a fifteen day vacation each year is to be provided. The work week is to consist of a 5½ day week.

DPD ?

6. WIROGUE has said that he is totally dependent upon KUBARK support to supply the needed instructors. He also feels he must provide documentation to prove he is an ex-captain in the German Army and is quite anxious concerning this point. (Answered by para. 3, Ref A). WIROGUE also feels that the instructors should be other than PBPRIME in order to better back up his cover story, since PBPRIME instructors might point the finger of suspicion in his direction. One or two PBPRIME candidates, however could be included providing a proper cover story were provided. WIROGUE needs names of candidates as quickly as possible, though a dummy list of names "to whom he has written" can be supplied if either PIERROT or KAZADI become too insistent. All candidates must be French speaking. In addition, WIROGUE needs a good 35 mm. camera and feels that this was promised to him, with other equipment, and though his targeting has shifted he still has great use for it. Currently WIROGUE has one of ~~the station Leicas on short loan in order to photograph the N'Dolo Air-~~ port facilities for PIERROT.

7. Recruited instructors should be provided a means of outside contact with the Station separate from WIROGUE, which could be implemented if needed, at a later date. The actual hiring and correspondence relating to their contracts should be sent over to WIROGUE as though he were handling the entire matter himself on behalf of the Congolese government. The address which should be used for all correspondence on an overt basis is included with this dispatch as Attachment B, with the title of Major preceding the name provided in Attachment A of ACLW-192.

8. With a set salary from the Congolese Government, it is WIROGUE's wish to commence repayment of the $4,000 loan made to him for his business. Also, this particular situation could be fairly short-lived in view of United Nation's offer to the Air Force to assist in Congolese Air Force training. It is obvious that PIERROT and the Congolese Government are trying to develop several sources at once to guarantee training for their embryo Air arm, and the final outcome is difficult to determine. The Station is also aware that PIERROT and KAZADI could be using WIROGUE at this juncture to obtain instructors for the air force, but might ease him out

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ACLA-491

of their own accord later on, either deeming him not worth keeping because he is not a professional airman, or because he will have done something to antagonize them. Also, the Station or Headquarters may deem it advisable to ease him out of this job, as Headquarters has suggested in Ref A, after he has provided an entree for putting some instructors on the scene. We believe this situation represents a worthwhile gain, however, if WIROGUE does obtain the contract as presently constituted.

9. Attachment C provides some information concerning Paul Arnold PIERROT and the Congolese Air Force which was provided by the Air Attache, Leopoldville, and which has already been reported through their channels. PIERROT is obviously trying to develop a training program and build up the Congolese Air Force from several sources at once, and if several of these sources provide the desired aid it is debatable if his own program (with WIROGUE) would become very extensive or even be implemented. It is also possible that WIROGUE's role in the training picture could shift at any time. We feel that at this time we can only go along with developments as they occur and try to realize the maximum benefit from the situation. Headquarters will be kept informed of any changes in the situation, and be provided more specific data when available.

10. In all fairness to WIROGUE, it should be pointed out that until recently the station has not had the time to properly target WIROGUE. As he appears to be untrained in KUTUBE and KUCAGE operations, he requires a great deal of case officer time, an item which is in short supply in this station. We believe WIROGUE may develop into a worthwhile asset, if the time and attention he requires can be spent on him, however. The station is taking the appropriate steps in this direction.

Lester H Salvack,
Lester H. SALVACK

16 March 1961

Attachments: 3, h/w

Distribution:
4-Hqs, w/attach

This man is a liability except for one or two "weight" things for which we would have no other candidate. KM

201-233477

FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3 of 3

Attachment B

1P

SECRET

B.P. 2949

Leopoldville,

Republic of the Congo

MICROFILMED
FEB 12 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INDEX

[illegible]

SECRET

ATT 2
ACLA-451

CS COPY

16 Mar.
201-233

1P

Attachment C

SECRET

SUBJECT: Paul Arnold PIERROT - Background Information provided by Air Attache, Leopoldville

1 N'DOLO airport is currently being evacuated by the U.N.O.C. forces and turned over to the Congolese government for use by the Congolese Air Force There are some 150 cadets who have received some training and are considered ready for advanced training, but as of this time, have nowhere to be trained PIERROT has made extensive efforts to obtain aid from many sources to train these cadets The AIRA reports that PIERROT has requested aid from the Belgians, the British, United Nations, and asked the AIRA to request aid from the French for the Congolese Air Force. About 30 cadets are in training in Tunisia at the present time. On 11 March the AIRA recommended aid be extended to the Congolese Air Force, but under the auspices of the United Nations.

2 PIERROT also reported 11 March that he had 6 Moth and 9 Harvard T-6 aircraft being delivered near the end of March, and asked if the United Nations Command would allow them to enter the Congo. He even offered to let the planes remain under U.N. control.

3. PIERROT is a mulatto ahd claims to have a white grandmother in Dallas, Texas He was trained by the Belgians and claims to have flown C-47's and T-33 jet planes, though he has not been on flying status since 1956 due to goiter trouble At this time accurate bio data is not availalbe His assistant is Lt M.J. LEMAN who is reportedly completely devoted to PIERROT. PIERROT is personally ambitious and at one point in the fall of 1960, he approached TFELIDE authorities with a plan to take over the government if they would help him His plan was too transparent and weak for any serious consideration at that time.

MICROFILMED
FEB 12 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INDEX

ATT 3
ACLA-491

SECRET

16 Mar 61
201-233177

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET 08

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 413
17 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (COPY ISSUED TO AF CABLE DESK AT 1355 17 MAY)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43
one copy

MAY 17 1745Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 36726

PRITY DIR FRAN CITE LEOP 3918

IN36726

RB.

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 10710 (OUT 83990)

1. WIROGUE (W) STATED 17 MAY HE LEAVING VIA SABENA 21 MAY.

2. PER PARA 3 REF SHOULD LEOP OR FRAN INFORM W OF DANGER. NEED CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS FRAN SOONEST. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS FAVORS FRAN CONTACT FOR WIROGUE IF FRAN WILLING AND ABLE TO HANDLE.

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : E.N. KORN-PATTERSON/jr.
UNIT : C/AF/5
EXT : 5032
DATE : 16 May 1962

1644

ROUTING			
1	3	4	
2	C/F	5	
3		6	

TO : PRIORITY LEOPOLDVILLE FRANKFURT

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

2

Rel Copy

3 6 z

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 83494

OUT 83494

TO PRITY LEOP INFO FRAN PRITY CITE DIR 10710

10710

R.B

RYBAT WIROGUE AQUATIC

REF: A. LEOP 3885 (IN 34623)

B. LEOP 3462 (IN 47511) (BEING RELAYED FRAN)

1. HQS FAVORS FRAN CONTACT FOR WIROGUE (W) IF FRAN WILLING AND ABLE TO HANDLE. PURPOSE WOULD BE RETRIEVE HIS PRESENT DOCUMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR SUBSTITUTE PAPERS, PREFERABLY SUCH AS WOULD PREVENT HIS RETURN TO CONGO AND AVOID POSSIBILITY FUTURE COMPROMISE TO KUBARK. W SHOULD BE TOLD HIS COMPLETE COOPERATION ESSENTIAL IF CONTACT TO BE CONTINUED AND THAT WE WILLING GIVE HIM LEGAL DOCUMENTATION ON THIS PREMISE. FRAN PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND CONTACT PLAN.

2. FYI RETRIEVAL AUSTRIAN PAPERS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE. PROPOSE HOLD DISCUSSIONS FIRST TO DETERMINE W DESIRES AND OUR ABILITY MEET THEM. DEPENDING ON RESULTS OF TALKS WOULD OFFER W ONE OF FOLLOWING CHOICES DOCUMENTS IN EXCHANGE:

A. WEST GERMAN REFUGEE

B. THIRD COUNTRY PASSPORT (POLISH, CUBAN, DOMINICAN, ETC)

C. HIS ORIGINAL NOW EXPIRED FRENCH DOCUMENTS.

W SHOULD BE TOLD OF ABOVE ONLY BY FRAN CONTACT. BELIEVE MAY BE EASIER RETRIEVE PRESENT PAPERS IF HE REASONABLY CONFIDENT SUBSTITUTE DOCUMENTS BE

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

per CSN 43-43

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO : PRIORITY LEOPOLDVILLE FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE 2

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

[illegible]

TO INFO CITE DIR [illegible]

MORE TENABLE.

3. RECOMMEND W BE TOLD OF DANGER HE FACES IN STAYING IN CONGO VIEW REF A INVESTIGATION AS ADDITIONAL INCENTIVE TO QUIT CONGO FOR GOOD.

4. LEOP AUTHORIZED CONVERT PROCEEDS OF W CAR SALE AT STATION RATE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *VIEW MALIERE INVESTIGATION, BELIEVED URGENT KUBARK PREVENT WIROGUE RETURN FRAN AS SUBJ USING KUBARK FALSE DOCS AND STA ALMOST CERTAIN BE INVOLVED IF ARRESTED.

C/06/AF Cavadine (phone)

TSD (Borninger by phone)

AF/B&F (1)

FE/C Phelps (phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AF/COP

RELEASING OFFICER

E.N. Korn-Patterson
E.N. KORN-PATTERSON
CAF/5

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: ROBERT BOUCHARD 1664
UNIT: AF/5
EXT: 5032
DATE: 17 May 1962

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	5	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

file copy

PRECEDENCE		
DEFERRED	17 May 62 22 25z	
ROUTINE		
PRIORITY		SIG CEN
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		INITIALS

OUT83997

TO PRITY LEOP INFO FRAN CITE DIR 11029

RB

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF: LEOP 3918 (IN 36726)

SUGGEST WIROGUE BE INFORMED BY LEOP OF INVESTIGATION RISK.

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

EE/G (Phelps-phone)
CI/OG/AF (Cavadine-draft)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

E.N. KORN-PATTERSON
CAF/5
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

1589

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : P. Springer
UNIT : AF/COP/FI
EXT : 5571
DATE : 24 May 62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD [illegible] 3, C/SR 4, S/C 2

one copy

OUT86480

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

TO PRITY FRAN LEOP INFO FROB CITE DIR 12520

Bob B

RYBAT WIROGUE TECH CABEZONE

REF. A. FRAN 0502 (IN 39623)
B. FRAN 0545 (IN 40229)
C. LEOP 3955 (IN 39724)

1. REF B APPEARS OFFER PROMISING APPROACH IF CAN BE RECONCILED WITH REF A, PARAS 3 AND 4. DOES WILLINGNESS WIROGUE ACCEPT BACKSTOPPED GERMAN REFUGEE DOCUMENTS MEAN HE NO LONGER OPPOSED REMAINING GERMANY? AGREE PARA 2 REF B PLOYS BUT INCLINED DOUBT SUBJECT WOULD BE DETERRED FROM RETURN TO CONGO BY THREAT OF ARREST, OR THAT SUBJECT WOULD WIND UP CONGO AFFAIRS IN "TWO OR THREE DAYS".

2. IF SUBJECT INSISTS HE MUST RETURN TO CONGO TO CONCLUDE GOC CONTRACT, BELIEVE WE SHOULD ACQUIESCE RELUCTANTLY AND HAND BACK DOCUMENTS FOR THIS PURPOSE ON THEORY IT BETTER TO HAVE FRIENDLY OR NEUTRAL TERMINATED AGENT IN CONGO THAN UNFRIENDLY ONE ELSEWHERE. FOLLOWING POINTS ALSO PERTINENT:

A. NO OTHER KUBARK COMPONENT INTERESTED WIROGUE SERVICES

B. THERE NO FEASIBLE MEANS PREVENTING HIS RETURN TO CONGO IF HE WISHES.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 86480

PAGE 2

TO INFO CITE DIR 12520

C. HIS AUSTRIAN DOCUMENTATION, ALTHOUGH EXPOSABLE AS FRAUDULENT, CANNOT BE TRACED TO KUBARK. (HE TOLD IT "PURCHASED ON BLACK MARKET").

D. PROVISION OF SUBSTITUTE DOCUMENTATION PRIOR TO SUBJECT'S DISENGAGEMENT FROM CONGO WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE SITUATION AND RENEW OUR INVOLVEMENT.

5. IN AGREEING TO SUBJECTS RETURN TO CONGO PER ABOVE PARA, FRAN SHOULD CAUTION HIM NOT TO CONTACT LEOP AND TELL ~~[illegible]~~ HIM (HE MAY) COME BACK FRAN ~~[illegible]~~ FOR NEW DOCUMENTATION AND RESETTLEMENT (AND IF CONGO BUSINESS CAN BE CONCLUDED IN NEAR FUTURE.) SUBJECT SHOULD TAKE NECESSARY STEPS WHILE FRAN SO THAT NEW DOCUMENTATION WILL BE AVAILABLE ON HIS RETURN FROM CONGO.

6. LEOP: IF WIROGUE RETURNS, AVOID CONTACT BUT CONTINUE MONITOR ACTIVITIES AND INVESTIGATION.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *SUGGESTION FOR HANDLING WIROGUE CASE.

CI/OG/AF (J. Cavadine in draft)

SR/OPS

C/AF B. Fields

TSD (J. Borninger in draft)

FE/G

C/EE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/AF/5

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

284

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	5	4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 24 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

MAY 24 15122 62
ACTION CHANGE

PRIORITY

IN 40229A FRAN 0545

TO INFO CITE

~~RYBAT~~ WIROGUE TECHS CABEZONE

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM EE TO AF BY WILLIAM PHELPS EE DIV EXT 7858 IN COORDINATION WITH MR SPRINGER AF DIV EXT 5564.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43
S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

PCC 043KFP029

PP UKFPC

DE UKFPC 10

May

P 241000Z ZEA

PRIORITY

BT

XXXXX ZEA

ZERO FIVE SIX WASH ZERO SIX SIX LEOP

SECRET

PRITY DIR LEOP INFO FROB CITE FRAN 0545

RYBAT WIROGUE TECHS CABEZONE

1. SECOND LACKLEN/WIROGUE MEET 23 MAY AMIABLE. W STATED HIS GREATEST DESIRE IS TO LEGALIZE HIMSELF. WILLING ACCEPT GERMAN DOCS IF BACKSTOPPED. CLAIMS HAS MORAL OBLIGATION CARRY OUT "CONGOLESE ARMY ASSIGNMENT IN EUROPE" AND MUST COME UP WITH ANSWERS RE 30 MILLION FRANCS WITHIN 3 WEEKS AND MAIL RESULTS CONGO. DESIRES RETURN CONGO THEREAFTER FOR 2-3 DAYS CONCLUDE CONTRACT WITH GOC.

2. OUR INTENTIONS HANDLE W AS HARVARD RESETTLEMENT CASE AND ISSUE BACKSTOPPED GERMAN DOCS. AS FIRST PLOY WILL TELL HIM WE HAVE WORD FROM VIENNA THAT OFFICIAL QUERY FROM CONGO HAS RESULTED IN DETERMINATION HIS DOCS PHONEY AND THAT HE WOULD BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN CONGO. SECOND PLOY THAT EVEN ODYOKE ASSISTANCE COULD NOT FORESTALL ARREST SINCE PERIOD HIS WORK FOR US ENDED SEPT 61. WE HAVE NO CHOICE FOR HIS OWN PROTECTION KEEP HIS AUSTRIAN AND CONGOLESE DOCS.

SECRET

CFN: 0545 LCAKLEN/WIROGUE 23 W GERMAN DOCS CONGOLESE EURIPE RE 30 MILLION FRANCS 3 CONGO 2-3 GOC W HARVARD DOCS VIENNA ODYOKE NOT FORESTALL SEPT 61 NO CHOICE

BT

225

NNNN

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	5	4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 23 1640Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 39724

360

DATE : 23 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION: C/AF 3 (COPY ISSUED TO AF AT 1310 23 MAY)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, CDC, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

PRITY ~~FRAN~~ DIR INFO PRITY FROB CITE LEOP 3955

R.B.

RYBAT WIROGUE CABEZONE

REF A FRAN 0495 (IN 39135)

B FRAN 0502 (IN 39623)*

1. FYI: PARA 3 REF A, ROUND TRIP TICKETS PROVIDED BY GOC FOR MEDICAL TRIP. REF B LINE ESSENTIALLY SAME AS TOLD LEOP.

2. WIROGUE PROBLEM SOLVABLE ONLY BY REMOVAL FROM SCENE IN SUCH WAY HE CANNOT RETURN. RESETTLEMENT IF HIS BURN AND BLOW TYPE SERVICES NOT NEEDED ELSEWHERE IS ONLY ANSWER LEOP CAN SUGGEST WHICH HAS CHANCE OF AVOIDING FLAP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADVISE PROPER ACTION IN VIEW SUCCESSFUL ACQUISITION WIROGUE DOCUMENTATION.

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

210

DATE : 23 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/AF 3 (COPY ISSUED TO AF CABLE DESK 0900, 23 MAY)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED per CSH-A3-43

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 23 1247Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 39623

RB

PRITY DIR LEOP INFO FROB CITE FRAN 0502

RYBAT WIROGUE TECHS CABEZONE

REF FRAN 0495 (IN 39135)**

1. WIROGUE STATED HE ARRANGED WITH CONGOLESE DEFMIN COME EUROPE ATTEMPT TRACE 30 MILLION FRANCS WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN DEFMIN OFFICIALS TO PURCHASE AIRPLANES. MONEY ALLEGEDLY DEPOSITED IN SWISS BANKS AND THEN DISAPPEARED. SHOWED ORDER DE MISSION (NOW IN OUR POSSESSION) DATED 17 MAY SIGNED BY SECGEN CONGOLESE FORNMIN. W CLAIMED HE INTENDS COMPLETE ABOVE MISSION BUT REAL REASON HE IN FRAN IS REESTABLISH CONTACT WITH "SERVICE" (OBVIOUSLY KUBARK WAS MEANT).

2. FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS NOW IN OUR POSSESSION BUT, BECAUSE OF CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH, UNABLE OBTAIN AUSTRIAN BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND DRIVER'S LICENSE WHICH GIVEN W BY MKTOPAZ AT TIME HIS PASSPORT RECEIVED:

A. PASSPORT (AUSTRIAN) 090058

B. RETURN SABENA AIR TICKET 8096473 TO LEOP

C. CONGO DRIVER'S PERMIT

D. CARTE D'IDENTITE D'ETRANGER

E. PASS FROM DEFMIN/CONGO RE TECHNICIAN STATUS (CIVILIAN)

DECLASSIFIED

201-233477

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

F. HEALTH CERTIFICATE

G. LAISSEZ PASSER 71-58 (CONGO PASS FROM LEOPOLDVILLE TO BRAZZAVILLE

H. LAISSEZ PASSER AS MAJOR, CONGO ARMY

I. UN PASS (ACCESS TO ROYAL HOTEL, LEOP)

J. CONGO CERTIFICATE OF VACCINATION

K. ORDER DE MISSION (17 MAY 62) BY SECGEN FORNMIN

L. ORDER DE MISSION TO BRAZZAVILLE TO APPREHEND A MAN SIGNED BY JOSEPH MATUBA, 26 MAR 62

M. ATTESTATION HE IS ATTACHE (TECHNICIAN) CONGO ARMY BY M. KABONGO, SECGEN DEFMIN, 28 DEC 61.

3. AS STATED REF RAPPORT NOW EXCELLENT BUT ANTICIPATE SERIOUS TROUBLE WHEN W TOLD WE WILL NOT RETURN DOCS. HE ADAMANT HIS REFUSAL REMAIN GERMANY. SAYS CANNOT RETURN FRANCE BECAUSE OF ARMED ROBBERY CHARGE. WILLING ACCEPT ANY KUBARK ASSIGNMENT ANY PLACE IN WORLD INCLUDING FJSTEAL.

4. WE HAVE CA 48 HOURS COMPLETE ACTION BEFORE W BECOMES SERIOUS HANDLING PROBLEM. FLAP POTENTIAL VERY HIGH AND W KNOWLEDGEABILITY COULD BE EXTREMELY DAMAGING SHOULD HE DECIDE MAKE PUBLIC HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH KUBARK. PLS ADVISE PROPER ACTION IN VIEW SUCCESSFUL ACQUISITION W DOCUMENTATION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR ZIBET USED.

**WIROGUE ARRIVED FRAN 1400 22 JAN.

1761

ORIG: DON HUSCH
UNIT: AF/5
EXT: 5457
DATE: 22 May 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED

per CSN 4843

PRECEDENCE

☐ DEFERRED 22 MAY 62 23 38z
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

SIG CEN

INITIALS

INITIALS

OUT 85674

OUT 85674

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12057

12057

RYBAT WIROGUE AQUATIC

REF: DIR 11783 (OUT 85235)

CONTRARY REF SUBJECT RETURN CONGO NOT RPT NOT IN VIOLATION TERMINATION AGREEMENT. DID NOT DISREGARD PROMISE LAST SENTENCE PARA 2.

END OF MESSAGE

C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

EE/G Wm Phl
TSD (Borninger-phone)
AF/5 Gardiner
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AF/COPS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-253477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : [illegible]/jn
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5457
DATE : 21 MAY 1962

ROUTING			
1	Ct	4	
2	Ct	5	
3	CIL	6	

172

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

1 copy

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

85235

TO FRAN INFO LEOP per CSN 43-43 CITE DIR 11783

RYBAT WIROGUE AQUATIC

REF: FRAN 0404 (IN 37347)

1. BACKGROUND INFO SUBJECT: BORN 20 DECEMBER 1919 TIFLIS, USSR. EMIGRATED WITH PARENTS TO FRANCE 1921. MARRIED PARIS 1948, TWO CHILDREN, DIVORCED 1950. COMMITTED NUMEROUS CRIMES, CONVICTED LAST OF BANK ROBBERY FRANCE JANUARY 1953. RELEASED FROM PRISON DECEMBER 1955 ON PAROLE TO RESIDE ONLY HAUTES ALPES DEPT FRANCE. CONTACTED BY AEPADDLE ON SPOTTING MISSION IN EARLY 1958, INTERVIEWED OCTOBER 1958, AS RESULT SLATED FOR REDSOX PROJECT. GIVEN AEASPIC CRYPT, POA SEPT 1958, BROUGHT BLACK TO PPRIME APRIL 1959. AFTER EXTENSIVE PM TNG, REDSOX MISSION POSTPONED, THEN CANCELLED ON JUNE 1960. GIVEN NEW TNG FOR TRANSFER TO ANOTHER COMPONENT. AUGUST 1960 ARRANGED TO RESETTLE IN MEXICO. PLANS CANCELLED AND TRANSFERRED TO AF DIV OCTOBER 1960. CRYPT CHANGED TO WIROGUE. FLOWN BLACK TO FRAN NOVEMBER 1960, FURNISHED AUSTRIAN PASSPORT, DRIVERS LICENSE, BIRTH CERTIFICATE. SENT ON JET FROM FRAN TO LEOP DECEMBER 1960 FOR NEW OPS ASSIGNMENT. BECAME ADVISOR TO CONGO AF BUT RESULT OF SECURITY AND FINANCIAL TROUBLE WAS ORDERED RETURNED TO PPRIME. RETURNED PPRIME JULY 1961 AND SERVICES TERMINATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1961 AT FRAN. RETURNED CONGO, VIA BRAZZAVILLE IN VIOLATION OF TERMINATION AGREEMENT. AGAIN TOOK UP WITH CAF; FREQUENTED LEOP STATION IN EFFORT REVIVE KUBARK ASSOCIATION. CONDUCT HAS CAME TO ATTENTION VARIOUS AUTHORITIES AND STATION FEELS ACUTE SECURITY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-233477

[illegible]LED
per CSN 43-43

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PAGE TWO

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 85235

TO INFO CITE DIR 11783

PROBLEM EXISTS. CLAIMING BE SENT BY CAF, SCHEDULED TO TRAVEL GERMANY 21 MAY 1962.

2. SUBJECT DESCRIBED AS EXTREMELY HARD TO CONTROL, SOLELY OUT FOR HIMSELF, POSSESSING SOCIAL SKILL AND ABILITY TO GET AWAY WITH GRATIFYING HIS OWN DESIRES IRRESPECTIVE OF OTHERS FEELINGS. REQUIRES AN UNUSUALLY COMPETENT, ALERT, STRICT, EVEN AUTHORITARIAN CASE OFFICER; HAS ABOVE AVERAGE MIND AND HAS, BY HIS RETURN TO CONGO, SHOWN DISREGARD FOR PROMISES MADE.

3. VIEW ABOVE, MAY REFUSE RELINQUISH DOCUMENTS. FRAN SHOULD ATTEMPT TO LEARN DESIRES RESETTLEMENT WITHOUT PROMISING HIM ANYTHING FOR THE MOMENT. MAY SUGGEST POSSIBILITIES MENTIONED DIR 10710 (OUT 83494) AS WORKABLE ALTERNATE DOCUMENTATION BUT INDICATE THAT, ALTHOUGH KUBARK OWES HIM NOTHING, WE RECOGNIZE HE IN PERSONAL DANGER IN CONGO AND MAY BE ABLE ASSIST. ALSO POINT OUT THAT HE HAS BEEN EAGER RETURN EUROPE AND ONCE BACK THERE HE SHOULD REMAIN. KUBARK CANNOT SAVE HIS NECK IF CONGO INVESTIGATION RESULTS DAMN HIM.

4. PLEASE ADVISE PROGRESS. FROB MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND FROM PREVIOUS HANDLING.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/5 Gardiner
TSD (by phono) Breninger (phone)
CI/OPS/AF J. Gardiner
EE/C

C/EE

AF/COP

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 390
22 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3 (AF CABLE DESK NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1450, 22 MAY)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, CDC, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

MAY 22 1851Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 39135

OPIM DIR LEOP INFO FROB CITE FRAN 0495

R.B

RYBAT WIROGUE CABEZONE

REF A FRAN 0404 (IN 37347)

B DIR 11029 (OUT 83947)

C LEOP 3939 (IN 38911)

1. WIROGUE ARRIVED FRAN 1400 22 JAN. MET BY STEPHAN R. LACKLEN WHO POSED AS ADMIN OFFICER INTERESTED IN DETERMINING REASON FOR TRAVEL GERMANY. W SAID HE HERE ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS CONGOLESE GOVT AND HAD DOCUMENTATION TO PROVE IT. W NOW IN BLOWN CABEZONE SAFE HOUSE.

2. LACKLEN ABLE ACQUIRE PASSPORT AND ALL OTHER DOCUMENTATION, EXCEPT BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND AUSTRIAN DRIVER'S LICENSE, UNDER PRETEXT NEED PHOTOGRAPH. RAPPORT EXCELLENT BUT ANTICIPATE SERIOUS PROBLEM WHEN W TOLD WE WILL NOT RETURN DOCS.

3. W INTERESTED REMAIN IN CLANDESTINE WORK BUT STATED UNWILLINGNESS REMAIN GERMANY. ABSOLUTELY NO COMMITMENTS MADE TO W. AIR TICKET (IN OUR POSSESSION) IS ROUND-TRIP LEOP-FRAN-LEOP. INTENDS RETURN LEOP AFTER COMPLETION OF MISSION.

4. DETAILS RE ABOVE INFO FOLLOWS.

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE 2

FRAN 0495 IN 39135

TO INFO CITE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR ZIBET USED.

**HQS SUGGESTED WIROGUE BE INFORMED BY LEOP OF INVESTIGATION RISK.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

200
DATE : 22 MAY 62
TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE
ACTION : C/AF 3(COPY ISSUED TO AF CABLE DESK 0835 22 MAY)
INFO : ADDP, C/PG, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

MAY 22 1235Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 38911

DECLASSIFIED
per CSN 43-43

PRITY DIR FRAN CITE LEOP 3939
RYBAT WIROGUE

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED WIROGUE BE INFORMED BY LEOP OF INVESTIGATION RISK.-

R. B

REF A FRAN 0404 (IN 37347)
B DIR 11029 (Cont 83797)*

1. WIROGUE (W) DEPARTED LEOP 21 MAY. DID NOT HAVE FIRM RESERVATIONS BRUS TO FRAN BUT SAID ETA 23 MAY. W WILL USE ALTERNATE CONTACT PLAN.

2. STATION EXCHANGED 60,000 BCF AT 144.5 STATION EXCHANGE RATE. W INFORMED RE INVESTIGATION PER REF B AND NOT IMPRESSED. ATTITUDE WAS; SO THEY LOOK UNDER THIS NAME, SO WHAT? HOWEVER, LEOP CONCERNED AND BELIEVES IS IMPORTANT FRAN PICKUP W DOCS AND PREVENT HIS RETURN TO CONGO. W TOLD NOTHING MORE EXCEPT CONTACT ARRANGED.

3. LEOP DOUBTS W WILL BE WILLING GIVE UP HIS PRESENT DOCS, AS THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY PREVENT HIS RETURN TO CONGO. HE DOES NOT SEEM APPRECIATE THEY NOT BACKSTOPPED. SUSPECT FRAN MAY HAVE TO OFFER JOB, MONEY OR OTHER BAIT. W HOPEFUL HE WILL MEET OLD CONTACT AND THAT JOB WILL BE AVAILABLE ALTHOUGH LEOP DID BEST DISCOURAGE HIM. W CARRYING TELEPHONE ANSWERING RECORDER INVENTION WITH HIM WHICH HE WISHES TO PEDDLE. STUDY OF THIS MIGHT PROVIDE BAIT.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
CSN 43-43

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : LICH GARDINER
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5038
DATE : 18 May 1962

1642

ROUTING

1		4	CA
2		5	
3		6	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: AF 7

INFO : CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, EE 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE

- DEFERRED 18 May 62 23 25z
- ROUTINE
- PRIORITY
- OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

SIG CEN

INITIALS

OUT 84498

OUT84498

TO LEOP INFO FRAN CITE DIR 11346

11346

RB

WIROGUE AQUATIC

REF: FRAN 0404 (IN 37347)

HQS WILL ANSWER PARA ONE

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REF RYBAT

BPhelan in draft

AF/COPS/FI
RELEASING OFFICER

EE/G
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for Gardiner
E.N. KOCH-PATTERSON
CAF/S
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. 1

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET C8

394

DATE : 18 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/TSD 4 (AF CABLE DESK AND TSD NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1255, 18 MAY)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/AF 3, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING
1
2
3

MAY 18 1653Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

IN 37347

OPIM DIR LEOP CITE FRAN 0404

RYBAT WIROGUE AQUATIC

RE DIR 10716 (OUT 93-194) *

1. FRAN PREPARED MEET AND HOUSE SUBJ REF BUT REQUIRE INTENSIVE BACKGROUND INFO TO HANDLE CASE PROPERLY. AVAILABLE INFO FRAN RESULT MKTOPAZ SUPPORT 1960 GIVES INSUFFICIENT BACKGROUND FOR ASSESSMENT PROBLEMS INVOLVED.

2. SINCE HAVE GOOD PHOTO OF SUBJ, CAN MEET AT AIRPORT. PLEASE ADVISE DATE FLT NO AND ETA. MAN CARRYING LIFE MAGAZINE WILL APPROACH SUBJ AND ASK TO BE OF ASSISTANCE. ADVISE SUBJ TO REPLY HE EXPECTS TO BE MET BY MR SCHNEIDER. IF MEET AT AIRPORT ABORTIVE SUBJ CAN CALL MR SCHNEIDER MON-FRI 0830-1730 ON 553001 OR 5500 8766 AFTER WORKING HOURS AND WEEKEND.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS FAVORS FRAN CONTACT FOR WIROGUE IF FRAN WILLING AND ABLE TO HANDLE.

14

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201-233477

14 May 1962

SECRET

MEMO FOR THE RECORD:

Subj: WIROGUE.

Subject was originally considered for a REDSOX project that was subsequently cancelled. Throughout the file are recommendations that in dealing with the subject any station should assert very definite authority. For example, the recommendation of COS Frankfurt, 13/11/59:

> "The handling of subject from this point on must be ruthless and calculated...We would recommend against paying S more than the absolute minimum he needs to survive until the mission is completed"

On 20 September 1960 Africa Division picked subject up for an assignment in the Congo. In conjunction with this mission, subject was furnished Austrian documentation, which, according to a Dir communication dated 2? November 1960, was to be used in order to travel from West Germany to Leo via Switzerland & Italy, and should be returned when no longer needed.

The Director's communication to Leo again reiterated that subject would take firm orders and should be dealt with in a positive manner. Unfortunately, shortly after arriving in the Congo subject got into financial difficulty, created security problems with his conduct, and then jumped into a new position with the CAF that moved so swiftly as to preclude any effective station direction.

On 30 June 1961 the Director recommended termination of subject since he was becoming too great a security risk. Subject was returned to the U.S., then was sent back to Frankfurt, given $2,000.00 pay and put on his own. There was no indication of any hard feelings on the part of the subject but it is admitted that he "wondered" why he was let go.

On 20 September 1961 subject turned up on his own in the Congo and began to approach station personnel with offers of help, no matter what the station wanted or where they wanted him. On 12 December 1961 the station admitted that subject is a security hazard of sorts and asked for some direction.

The Security Division at headquarters states that the documentation originally furnished subject were retained by him since he had no other citizenship papers. Once these documents run out it will be impossible for him to renew them.

In the light of the generous termination terms, in the repeated statements to subject that KUBARK could not utilize his services, and the possible security hazard, it would seem best to completely sever any relationships with him. Judging from the psychiatric opinion, as well as opinions of personnel who have worked with subject, he fully understands and will not question stern authority.

201-233477

For this reason it is recommended that either one of the two following courses of action may be taken, preferably the first.

1. In very unequivocal language inform subject that his official connection to the U.S. interests in the Congo have been and continue to be nil. That continued contact with these interests could result in his apprehension (if for nothing else for possessing forged documents). Instruct him that he clearly understood that his relationship with this organization could be terminated under the terms of the contract and although we are appreciative of his past efforts, he is now on his own.

2. Bring him back to the U.S. and go forward with the original plan to resettle subject in Mexico. We made preliminary inquiries about this possibility 19 August 1960 before he came with Africa Division and the only thing that stopped the transfer plans was the possibility that he could be used in the Congo.

Solution number one runs the risk of having subject get disgruntled, and then running to the wrong people to tell all he knows. On the other hand, if the man reacts to direction as we are told he does this may be all that he needs to stay clear of the station. It is apparent that at some point in time he has to be given the gate.

Solution number two runs into the financial problem as well as dealing with an individual who is no longer connected with this organization. However, it does meet one of the "requirements" laid down by the COB in Frankfurt back in 1958, ie., "Given some money and a job he could be resettled in any South American country without difficulty". The second solution is inviting, if for no other reason, in terms of getting subject out of a rather difficult area.

3. The 3rd possibility is to bring him directly to a 3rd country + take the documents away from him there — then tell him he is on his own.

[illegible]

Messages dealing with WIROGUE documentation duties:

DIR: 10389-7/2/61: "ref Frankfurt 2539 (In 25104). No action required Frank re: Termination. Meet and assist on arrival only"

LEOP 192: 14/11/60: "Documentation prepared with accompanying cover story to show WIROGUE/1 is an Austrian and who has never had ODYOKE connections, nor ever been in PBPRIME (see attachment A) Note, attach A describes the Austrian passport"

DIR: 06782: 26/10/60:
"Tells Leo what jobs WIROGUE can do.

DIR: 08443: 27/10/60:
Asks for several blank Austrian birth or baptism certificates and fill in exemplars.

See Attached papers.

14-00000

109

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 14 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (AF TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 0805 14 MAY)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING			
1		4	
2	Cop	5	
3		6	

MAY 14 1109Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 34623

PRITY DIR INFO FRAN CITE LEOP 3885

RYBAT WIROGUE

~~bb~~ BdrB

REF LEOP 3462 (NOT SENT FRAN) (IN 47511)*

1. CNA ADVISER LOUIS MALIERE INFORMED GUTHMAN HE CHECKING OUT WIROGUE (W). DOES NOT TRUST HIM. SAID W SUSPECT AS DRIVES EXPENSIVE CAR AND LIVES IN EXPENSIVE HOUSE. MALIERE SAID THUS FAR UNION HAS REPORTED NOTHING ON W. MALIERE ALSO QUERYING STAHL FOR W TRACES.

2. GOC HAS ASKED W FOR POLICE CLEARANCE FROM COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. W TOLD THEM WOULD TAKE TIME AND SPOKE OF FORGING OWN. W HAS TOLD GOC MINISTRY DEFENSE HE NEEDS TO GO EUROPE FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES AND GOC IS PAYING W ROUND TRIP. WIROOT IS ASKING W TO CHECK BANK ACCOUNTS IN BELGIUM AND SWITZERLAND FOR GOC OFFICIALS BOHULU AND BHUNDE WHO SUSPECTED OF GRAFT IN RECENT GOC AIRCRAFT PURCHASES. WIROOT IS GIVING W MISSION ORDER AND W STATES HE INTENDS CONTACT POLICE IN BOTH COUNTRIES FOR THIS PURPOSE.

3. W ASKED IF ANY WORD FOR HIM AND REQUESTED A CONTACT IN FRAN. SALVACK TOLD W CONTACT WOULD BE REQUESTED BUT COULD PROMISE NOTHING, CONTACT MIGHT BE REFUSED. W STATED IF NOTHING FOR HIM IN EUROPE WOULD RETURN CONGO. SAID HE READY TO LEAVE WEEK 14 MAY.

DESENSITIZED

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

LEOP 3885 IN 34623

LEOP VIEWS IN REF STILL VALID, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW PARA ONE ABOVE. W POSITION LEOP VERY WEAK. (HE BELIEVES HIS POSITION STRONG THOUGH ADMITS DOES LITTLE WORK.) VIEW MALIERE INVESTIGATION, BELIEVE URGENT KUBARK DO SOMETHING PREVENT W RETURN AS HE USING KUBARK FALSE DOCUMENTATION AND WE ALMOST CERTAIN BE INVOLVED IF HE ARRESTED.

4. STATION WILLING TO LAY ABOVE INVESTIGATION ON LINE TO W, EXPLAIN RISK HIS RETURN. CAR STILL ONLY ASSET OF VALUE W OWNS AND BEFORE TELLING W OF HIS DANGER NEED HQS ANSWER RE EXCHANGE FOR CAR IF HE SELLS IT AS REQUESTED PER REF. REQUEST PRITY HQS COMMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *GAVE LEOP ASSESSMENT OF WIROGUE.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ACLA - 844 Bod
TO: Chief, AF INFO: COS, Brussels COS, Munich		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. ACLA-844 2 apr 62
FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville		DATE 2 April 1962
SUBJECT: Major Peter DE GROEVE		RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE) X MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		
REFERENCE(S)		

1. The recent purchase of three DC-3's and a DC-4 by the Congolese government is having continuing repercussions. This deal has been reported in detail through both TPELIDE and ODUNIT channels including the accusations of substantial graft which accompanied it. The most recent developments, however, have not yet, to the Station's knowledge, been reported by either of the above channels.

2. STAHL reported to HESTON in a meeting 28 February that WIROGUE is back with the Congolese Air Force. STAHL described him as an Austrian with a Belgian passport, formerly with the German commandos, who knows nothing about aviation. STAHL continued to say

> 20 Major Peter *DE GROEVE (Advisor to Congolese Air Force ca. February 61 - March 62. Belgian. Involved in purchase three DC-3 planes from Iran Airways at price $125,000 per aircraft. Competent authorities stated comparable aircraft could be purchased $50,000 to $60,000 and predicted trouble from purchases.)

left the Congo with 14,000 pounds which, supposedly, was his share of some $180,000 reputedly made on the above airplane purchases. According to STAHL, DE GROEVE bribed someone at the Sureté who then let him cross safely to Brazzaville.

3. On 30 March WIROGUE informed SALVACK that the GOC had put him in charge of investigating the above airplane purchases. His first real task is to arrest DE GROEVE and bring him back to the Congo. Congo (Brazza), however, refuses to cooperate and told WIROGUE when he queried them that DE GROEVE had requested political refuge. Besides, WIROGUE felt, the Brazza side of the river would be very hesitant to return a white man to the tender mercies of the Congolese in Leopoldville. DEGROEVE is supposedly in Pointe Noire waiting for a French ship to take him to Marseille, a voyage of some 20 days. WIROGUE is currently toying with various ideas for possibly kidnapping DE GROEVE in Pointe Noire.

4. Both WIROGUE and STAHL said DE GROEVE is wanted for rape in Belgium. WIROGUE said he had also stolen some money there, though STAHL's version was that DE GROEVE had debts amounting to 400,000 Belgian Francs. In either case, it is doubtful that DE GROEVE will return to Belgium.

Lester H. SALVACK

2 April 1962

Distribution:
Original and 1 - Chief, AF
1 - COS, Brussels
1 - COS, Munich

201-253477

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible] OB

290

TE : 23 MAR 62

: DIRECTOR

OM : LEOPOLDVILLE   I - 1 copy

TION : C/AF 3

FO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	5	4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 23 1433Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 47511

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-48

DIR CITE LEOP 3462

RYBAT WIROGUE

L.G.

1. WIROGUE CONTACTS STATION AT PERIODIC INTERVALS. 19 MARCH W APPEARED DISCOURAGED AND A LITTLE DESPERATE. HE STILL WORKS FOR CONGOLESE AIR FORCE, MAKING 15,000 BCF PER MONTH. SAYS HE NEEDS MORE JUST TO LIVE. FEELS KUBARK USED HIM UNFAIRLY. W WANTS TRAVEL GERMANY AND ITALY TO TRY MAKE BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING HIS INVENTIONS. ALSO WOULD SEARCH FOR ANOTHER JOB. SAID HE STILL OWNS CAR FOR WHICH HE THINKS HE CAN GET ABOUT 260,000 BCF TO COVER COST TRIP.

2. STATION CONCERNED BY W PRESENCE LEOP AND POSSIBILITY HE COULD, IF FINANCIAL SITUATION BECOMES SUFFICIENTLY DESPERATE, WORK FOR ANOTHER SERVICE. DOUBT HE WOULD COOPERATE WITH BLOC SERVICES BUT CANNOT BE CERTAIN. ALSO THERE IS POSSIBILITY HE MIGHT WORK FOR SMOTH, UNION, WIROOT, ETC. LEOP DOES NOT BELIEVE HE HAS YET TURNED TO OTHER SERVICES. APPEARS HOPE KUBARK WILL AGAIN TAKE HIM ON. (IN DISCUSSING DESIRE GO GERMANY SAID HE WOULD LIKE MEET WITH KUBARKER TO DETERMINE IF ANY JOB AVAILABLE FOR HIM. SALVACK FINESSED DIRECT REPLY THIS POINT BUT SAID LEOP NOT ABLE DO ANY MORE FOR HIM THAN ADVISE HQS OF HIS DESIRE.)

[illegible]

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3. IF CONVERTING W MONEY WOULD GET HIM OUT OF LEOP PERMANENTLY STATION WOULD RECOMMEND MONEY REALIZED FROM CAR SALE BE CONVERTED AT CURRENT STATION RATE OF 125 BCF TO ONE DOLLAR. THIS WOULD GIVE W ABOUT 2,000 DOLLARS WHILE CONVERSION AT OPEN MARKET RATE WOULD GIVE HIM ONLY ABOUT 1400 DOLLARS. HOWEVER W STATED HE LIKES CONGO AND IF THINGS DID NOT GO WELL FOR HIM IN EUROPE HE WOULD PROBABLY RETURN LEOP. THUS COURTESY CONVERSION FOR W WOULD PROVIDE NO GUARANTEE HE WOULD NOT RETURN LATER. AS LONG AS W CARRYING FALSE KUBARK

DOCUMENTATION HE WILL CONTINUE BE PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH KUBARK NO LONGER HAS OBLIGATION TO W, FACT HE IN CONGO ON KUBARK FALSE PAPERS CONTINUES MAKE HIM OUR BABY. (SHOULD CONGOLESE BECOME SUSPICIOUS AND TRACE HIM OR SHOULD ANOTHER SERVICE CHECK WITH AUSTRIAN OFFICIALS AND DETERMINE HE TRAVELLING ON FALSE PAPERS, THIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO HIS ARREST. IN SUCH A CASE HE MIGHT REVEAL SOURCE OF DOCUMANTATION.)

4. BASIS LOCAL EXPERIENCE WITH W CANNOT RECOMMEND HIM FOR ANOTHER KUBARK ASSIGNMENT DESPITE FACT HE CLAIMS WANTS BE OF SERVICE ODYOKE, HOWEVER, OUR DILEMMA IS FACT HIS PRESENCE CONTINUES BE POTENTIAL SECURITY HAZARD. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY HQS ADVICE RE POSSIBLE SOLUTION. ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION WOULD BE CONVERT MONEY AT STATION RATE AND HAVE KUBARK GERMANY PICK UP HIS DOCUMENTATION WHILE HE IN GERMANY. THIS WOULD PREVENT HIM FROM RETURNING CONGO AS WOULD NO LONGER HAVE DOCUMENTATION IN NAME UNDER WHICH HE NOW LIVING IN CONGO. HOWEVER, THIS COULD ANGER W AND CAUSE HIM REVEAL EVERYTHING HE KNOWS.

5. REQUEST HQS VIEWS.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

.G : R. Bouchard
NIT : AF/W/1
T : 4559
ATE : 20 Dec 61 1593

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

20 DEC 61 [illegible] 1422Z

: LEOPOLDVILLE

OM: DIRECTOR

NF: C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT82669

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 31302

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF: LEOP 2690 (IN 40416)*

1. APPRECIATE THAT WIROGUE PRESENTS SECURITY PROBLEM AS WELL AS CONSTANT IRRITANT TO LEOP BUT FEEL HE WILL BE NO LESS A HAZARD IN ANOTHER AREA. ALSO DO NOT WISH ESTABLISH PATTERN GIVING HIM ONE WAY TICKET OUT EVERY TIME HE GETS IN JAM, PARTICULARLY SINCE THIS HIS OWN DOING.

2. SUBJECT GIVEN GENEROUS TERMINATION PAY CONSIDERING THAT WE ALSO WROTE OFF 4000 DOLLARS HE OWED US. HE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT WE CEASING RELATIONSHIP.

3. AS LAST RESORT SUGGEST IF HE SHOULD POSE REAL THREAT WIROGUE BE REMINDED OUR KNOWLEDGE HIS BACKGROUND AND ABILITY DISCLOSE TO OTHER SERVICES. ALSO THAT HIS PRESENT DOCUMENTATION AT MERCY OUR DISCRETION. THIS OF COURSE ONLY INTENDED AS CONTROL FACTOR. DO NOT PROPOSE ACTUALLY CARRY OUT.

4. DO NOT WISH INJECT HIM IN REDSOX OPS OR ANY OTHER SEGMENT KUBARK.

[illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED HQS IDEAS OR SUGGESTIONS RE WIROGUE.

AF/W/1

AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

per CSN 43-43

201-233477

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: R. Bouchard
UNIT: AF/W/1
EXT: 4559
DATE: 20 Dec 61 1593

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

20 DEC 61 23 42z

RE Filing (check one):
~~No CS Record Value. Destroy.~~ ☒
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature: R. Bouchard

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT82669

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 31302

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF: LEOP 2690 (IN 40416)*

WIROGUE as security problem Leop

RI COPY

ROUTING INITIAL
RI/AN
RI/FI
RI/FI

DEC 20 3 38 PM '61
RID/SIG
RECEIVED

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

201-233477

FORM 1389a

BRP

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 245
19 DEC 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DEC 19 1432Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 40416

DIR CITE LEOP 2690

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE (W) REPORTED 16 DEC BUHULL BOHULU SAID DE GROEVE NOW IN TEHERAN BECAUSE PLANES THERE, NOT EUROPE. BUHULU AFRAID PURCHASE PLANES BECAUSE THEY NOT THOROUGHLY CHECKED, SENT DEGROEVE CABLE ORDERING HIM RETURN CONGO OR BE FIRED.

2. W SAYS HIS ENTIRE POSITION WITH GOC SHOT. HE DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH MONEY ON WHICH TO LIVE. IS LOOKING FOR JOB. ASKED IF ANYTHING ANYWHERE FOR HIM WITH KUBARK. W SAID HE NOW FEELS HIS RETURN TO CONGO MISTAKE. (STATION COULD NOT AGREE MORE). HE ONLY WANTED TO DO SOMETHING.

3. W HAS BEEN IN SPORADIC CONTACT AND HAS APPARENTLY GIVEN STATION ALL INFO HE COULD. WE FEEL W IS SECURITY HAZARD HERE AND WE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PAGE 2

LEOP 2690 IN 40416

MAY EVENTUALLY BE FORCED PAY HIS WAY GET HIM OUT OF CONGO WITHOUT MAJOR FLAP. H~~EA~~AVE NOT PASSE~~E~~D HIM ANY MONEY BUT EVEN SO IT IMPOSSIBLE DUCK RESPONSIBILITY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS. BEST ANSWER IF HE TO BE USED BY KUBARK HE BE USED IN REDSOX OPS BUT LEOP QUESTIONS WHETHER HE SUFFICIENTLY STABLE FOR ANY OPS WORK. ADVISE HQS IDEAS OR SUGGESTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

NO. 201-233477

SECRET

DATE : 258
9 DEC 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION: IW 2

INFO : COP, CA 2, CA/PMG, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/INT 2, FI/D, WE 4, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
☐

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 9 1823Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 35694

TDCS -3/495,601

DIR INFO BRUS PARI LOND LANT ELIZ (POUCH) CITE LEOP 2613

INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE WIROGUE. MAIN SOURCE FOR PARA 2 IS SIMON BOHULU, CHEF DE CABINET FOR GOC DEFENSE MINISTRY.

FILED: 080900Z REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

ACL-623 CONGO REPUBLIC

SUBJECT: CRITICISM AND DISSATISFACTION WITH CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (CNA) GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU

DOI: NOV-DEC 61. PADA: CONGO REPUBLIC, LEOPOLDVILLE, 7 DEC 61

SOURCE: EUROPEAN (F) WITH CLOSE CONTACTS WITH CNA OFFICERS.

APPR. 3

COPY

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS
ON PAGE 2, LINE 7, THE PHRASE "AND KILLED [illegible] ORIGINALLY READ "WHICH RESULTED IN 44 KILLED."
SOURCE GRADE CHANGED FROM F TO C.

ROUTING INITIAL

AF/REG	4	AF/LEOP	1	WE/3/R	1
AF/W	2	AF/ELIZ	1		
AF/E	1	AF/BRAZ	1		
AF/W/RE	4				
AF/E/RE	5				

TDCS PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:
John R. Edwards
JOHN R. EDWARDS

DATE DISTRIBUTED: DEC 9 2153Z 61

BASED ON: ACL 623 WIROGUE

LIAISON:

RI/FI

SECRET

FORM 1389 4-56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-233477

Copy No. (35)

201-233477

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

Branch copy filed as indicated ☐

RB Indexing (check one): Marked ☐ None required ☐

COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/495,601

SUBJECT CRITICISM AND DISSATISFACTION CONCERNING CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (CNA) GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU

DATE DISTR. 9 DECEMBER 1961

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 35694

DATE OF INFO. NOVEMBER-EARLY DECEMBER 1961

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (7 DECEMBER 1961)

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 623

APPRAISAL 3

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE WEST EUROPEAN ADVISOR (C) TO HIGH-LEVEL CONGOLESE MILITARY OFFICERS.

1. MANY OFFICERS IN CNA (CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY)/HEADQUARTERS ARE DISSATISFIED WITH GENERAL MOBUTU. THEY COMPLAIN THAT HE FAILS TO MAKE DECISIONS OR TAKE ACTION AND THAT SECRETS AND PLANS MADE BY CNA HEADQUARTERS SEEM TO BE KNOWN IMMEDIATELY BY OTHERS. (SOURCE COMMENT: PLANS MADE TO LAUNCH MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST KATANGA APPEAR TO BE KNOWN BY KATANGA FORCES ALMOST AS QUICKLY AS PLANS ARE MADE.)

(FIELD COMMENT: SECURITY IS UNKNOWN WITHIN THE CNA. THUS, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT "SECRET" INFORMATION GETS OUT.)

2. (SOURCE COMMENT: NO SPECIFIC PLAN IS KNOWN BUT FROM VARIOUS BITS OF CONVERSATION IT APPEARS SOME CNA OFFICERS WANT TO REMOVE MOBUTU AND REPLACE HIM WITH ANOTHER OFFICER. ONE NAME

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY AS A POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT IS MAJOR LEONARD MULAMBA.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: MULAMBA WAS DEPUTY CHIEF OF CABINET TO JOSEPH BUNGHE, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE IN THE ADOULA GOVERNMENT OF AUGUST 61. HE WAS ARRESTED BY PRO-MOBUTU FORCES IN LULUABOURG IN FEBRUARY 1961. THE CNA FIRED ON LUMUMBISTS DEMONSTRATING FOR HIS LIBERATION AND KILLED 44.

MULAMBA, A KNOWN GIZENGA SYMPATHIZER, WAS FREED AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED ~~NATIONS COMMAND.~~

4. FIELD DISEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

.451

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FILE NO. 201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 7 DEC 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION: IW 2

INFO : COP, ~~DRD~~ 4, CA 2, CA/PMG, CA/PROP, FI/INT 6, FI/D, AF 19, IOD, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked [illegible] required ☑

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 7 1943Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 34510

TDCS-3/495,332

PRITY DIR INFO BRUS PARI LOND ELIZ LANT CITE LEOP 2590

INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE WIROGUE FROM SIMON BOHULU WHO JUST RETURNED FROM EUROPE WHERE HE WAS ON PLANE PURCHASING MISSION FOR CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT. FOR LIAISON.

FILED: 071600Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

ACL-622

CONGO REPUBLIC

SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT PURCHASES FOR KATANGA AND CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (CNA)

DOI: 46 DEC 61 PADA: CONGO REPUBLIC, LEOPOLDVILLE, 7 DEC 61

COPY

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.
TRUDY PELISSIER, AF, CONSULTED AT 1605 HOURS, 7 DECEMBER 1961.
SOURCE GRADE CHANGED FROM F TO E.

AF/RES	4	AF/LEOP	1	WE/G/R	1
AF/W	2	AF/ELIZ	1	WE/P	4
AF/E	1	AF/BRAZ	1	WE/R	1
AF/W/RE	4			WE/E/R	2
AF/E/RE	5				

ROUTING | INITIAL

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
x PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:
JOHN R. EDWARDS

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
DEC 7 2117Z 61

BASED ON: ACL 622 WIROGUE

LIAISON: *

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-233477

FORM 6-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. (35)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

PAGE 2

IN 34510 LEOP 2590

TDCS

SOURCE: EUROPEAN (F) WITH CLOSE CONTACTS IN CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT (GOC) FROM CNA OFFICER (F). APPR 6.

RI COPY

IW COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORM 4-54 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. (35)

14-00000

FILE NO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

RI Indexing (check one): Marked ☐ None required ☐

Signature:

REPORT NO.: TDCS -3/495,332

SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT PURCHASES BY THE KATANGA GOVERNMENT

DATE DISTR.: 7 DECEMBER 1961

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO.: 6 DECEMBER 1961

REFERENCES: IN 34510

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (7 DECEMBER 1961)

APPRAISAL: 6

FIELD REPORT NO.: ACL 622

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: WEST EUROPEAN ADIVSOR (C) TO HIGH LEVEL CONGOLESE MILITARY OFFICERS; FROM A CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY OFFICIAL (F).

1. THE KATANGA GOVT IS PURCHASING TEN HARVARD AIRCRAFT THROUGH COGEA NOUVELLE S.A., 225 RUE ROYAL, BRUSSELS. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS IS A NEW PURCHASE AND THESE PLANES HAVE NOT BEEN DELIVERED.) (FIELD COMMENT: NO OTHER DETAILS KNOWN.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT

RI COPY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (35)

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1389
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 5 DECEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1360
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

14-00000

FILE NO. 201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : WELLES
UNIT : AF W
EXT : 3829
DATE : 1 DEC 61

1633

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

5 DEC 61 [illegible]

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: COP, C/CI, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

76672

TO INFO per CSH 43-43 CITE DIR 22033

LEOP

RYBAT/WIROGUE

REF: [illegible] PARA 5 [illegible]

Agree ref WIROGUE handling. Do not consider trip advisable. Appropriate authorities here now aware W/ not likely speak with much authority and purpose and hence would treat with considerable reserve.

RI COPY

ROUTING · INITIAL
RI/AN
RI/[illegible]
~~RI/[illegible]~~
RI/FI

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

201-233477

FORM 4-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(35)

SECRET

307
E : 2 DEC 61

: DIRECTOR

M : LEOPOLDVILLE

ION : C/AF 3

O : COP, C/DPO 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/BELL 5, C/WH 2, CABLE SEC,
S/C 2

DEC 2 2232 61

ROUTINE

IN 31778

DIR CITE LEOP 2541 per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

Answered Welles, 4 Dec

Negative Turn

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF ACLA 667

1. ODACID IN RESPONSE TO ROUTINE TPELIDE REPORTING REQUESTED PER ODACID TEL 895 AVAILABLE INFO RE WIROGUE (W) PLANE-PURCHASING MISSION TO PBPRIME. ODUNIT REP WROTE REPLY TO ODACID 2 DEC WHICH MERELY ANSWERED ODACID QUERY. HE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO HIS HQS HE BELIEVES W TRIP OK AND WOULD BE INTERESTING FOR ODUNIT TO DEBRIEF W. ODUNIT REP ALSO TOLD W PEPRIME MIGHT PERMIT SALE AIRCRAFT, EVEN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, IF JOINT GOC/UN CONTROL OF SUCH AIRCRAFT WORKED OUT. W INTERPRETED THIS TO MEAN PBPRIME WOULD SELL AIRCRAFT WITH NO "IFS". [illegible]

2. W HAS RECEIVED CONFLICTING ORDERS FROM GOC TO GO PEPRIME

201-133477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

AND TO CANCEL TRIP. SAID IF VISA ISSUED HE READY GO PBPRIME TO SHOW HE CAN DO SOMETHING. WHEN ASKED WHAT HE WOULD DO HE SAID THAT UP TO KUBARK. (STATION BELIEVES WIZARD/4 MIGHT WELL DISCHARGE W IF LATTER MAKES TRIP WITHOUT DIRECT APPROVAL.) W TOLD ODUNIT REP HE IN INFLUENTIAL POSITION WITH WIZARD/4 BUT ADMITTED TO SALVACK THAT HIS POSITION VERY WEAK. SAID HE NEEDED HELP.

3. W FEELS STATION BLOCKING HIS TRAVEL PBPRIME BUT STATES AT SAME TIME HE NEEDS KUBARK BACKING. MONEY MADE AVAILABLE FOR PURCHASE OF AIRCRAFT BY GOC HAS BEEN DRAWN BY BUHULU WHO CONGOLESE REP SENT BY GOC TO PURCHASE PLANES IN EUROPE. W NOW ADMITS NO FUNDS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE HE COULD USE BUT SAYS HE COULD EXPLORE AVAILABILITY PLANES. W ASKED IF HE HAD OBJECTIONS TO GOC BUYING FIGHTER PLANES FROM CUBA. HE SAID GOC HAD TO BUY THEM SOMEWHERE AND HE HEARD PLANES AVAILABLE THERE. SALVACK TOLD W THIS DEFINITELY BAD IDEA.

4. W OBVIOUSLY NOT IN GOC INNER CIRCLE BUT IS DESPERATELY TRYING TAKE SOME ACTION TO BUILD HIS OWN POSITION WITH GOC. STATION DOUBTS IF W WOULD EVER BE GOOD CHANNEL FOR KUBARK TO USE FOR THIS TYPE ACTION AND HIS AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE FOR PLANES VERY DOUBTFUL

AND CONFUSED, EVEN TO HIM. WIZARD/4 RECENTLY MENTIONED W TO

OUTHMAN, INDICATING DISPLEASURE WITH 'S FREE WHEELING TACTICS. AS RESULT HAVE NOT PASSED W ANY FUNDS AUTHORIZED DIR 25730.*

5. REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE RE ADVISABILITY W TRIP. ALSO REQUEST INFO WHETHER ODACID AND ODUNIT HQS ACTUALLY FAVOR TRIP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *(OUT 72570) RE HQS AUTHORIZATION REGARDING FUNDS WIROGUE)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: ACLA-667

TO: Chief, AF

INFO: Chief, EE

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville

DATE: 29 November 1961

SUBJECT: 6 ZIBET/WIROGUE

RE: "43.3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE(S):

A. DIR 25730

B. ACLA 630 dated 19 October 1961

1. On 29 November 1961 WIROGUE told the undersigned that he felt his position vis-a-vis the Congolese Government was rapidly weakening. First, WIROGUE had endorsed sending one of the advisors with the Congolese Air Force to Europe to purchase planes and later found WIZARD/4 was at least cognizant of a second GOC representative sent to Europe on the same mission. WIROGUE made vague references to some 2,000,000 Congolese Francs of the 40,000,000 available for airplane purchases "going into someone's pocket." WIROGUE was incensed at the move of the GOC in sending a parallel mission to Europe and not informing him of it. He saw WIZARD/2 and asked about this other mission. WIZARD/2 apparently informed WIZARD/4 about WIROGUE's visit and since then, for a period of the last five days, WIZARD/4 has refused to see or talk to WIROGUE.

2. The GOC has also apparently proposed sending WIROGUE on an intelligence gathering mission to Katanga. WIROGUE asked if KUBARK were interested in this undertaking. We advised him strongly against this move and added we had no interest whatsoever in the project.

3. WIROGUE has also met the ODOATH representative and showed him the model submarine which was the subject of ACLA-630. The ODOATH representative evinced interest in this model and through the ODUNIT representative, whom WIROGUE has seen on several occasions and discussed the problem of purchasing planes for the GOC, the ODOATH representative was aware that WIROGUE has an Ordre de Mission signed by WIZARD/2 to travel to PBPRIME. He said for WIROGUE to inform him when he was ready to depart and he would arrange for WIROGUE to contact appropriate ODOATH people in PBPRIME to discuss the model.

4. WIROGUE approached GUTHMAN on November 24 and SALVACK on November 29 with a request whether he might be of use to KUBARK either in Africa or elsewhere in the world, and that he would like to be taken back into the fold. He is obviously concerned about his position in the GOC at this time and feels with the diplomatic relations being established between Belgium and the GOC that his position will become increasingly weaker. To reemphasize past assessments of WIROGUE, he is far too disorganized an individual to be an effective FI agent but would probably be useful where action is required but detailed accurate reporting is not. The station agrees with an early statement made concerning WIROGUE that he has a peculiar turn of mind which lends itself remarkably to nefarious and extra-legal activities but would add that these activities should be of an action type.

Lester H Salvack
Lester H. SALVACK

29 November 1961

Distribution:
Hqs - 4

CS COPY

201-233477

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1284
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 22 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

DEPT OF AIR FORCE INCOMING STAFF MESSAGE
NUMBER C-215
FROM: USAIRA LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 22 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF AIR FORCE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

ATE :	254 20 NOV 61	SECRET
O :	DIRECTOR	
ROM :	LEOPOLDVILLE	
CTION	IW 2	
NFO :	COP, DPD 4, CA 2, CA/PMG, CA/~~[illegible]~~, FI/INT 6, FI/D, IOD 4, WE 4, [illegible] DD/I (A), DD/I(L), AD/CI, S/C 2	

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
~~Branch copy filed as indicated~~ ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

7 201-233477

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 20 1642Z 61
21 1000

ROUTINE

IN 25011

TDCS 3/493,627

DIR INFO LANT ELIZ LOND BRUS PARI CITE LEOP 2463

INTEL

SUPDATA SOURCE WIROGUE. FOR LIAISON

FILED: 201030Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

ACL-605

CONGO REPUBLIC/KATANGA

SUBJECT: LOCATION OF KATANGA AIR FORCE (KAF) PLANES

DOI: 17 NOV 61 PADA CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE, 1[illegible] NOV 61

SOURCE: EUROPEAN (F) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT (GOC). APPR 3.

RI COPY

W COMMENT: NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

GERTRUDE PELISSIER, AF DIVISION, CONSULTED AT 1545 HRS, 20 NOVEMBER.

ROUTING INITIAL

AF/REG	4	AF/LEOP	1		
AF/W	2	AF/ELIZ	1		
AF/E	1	AF/BRAZ	1		
AF/W/RE	4				
AF/E/RE	5	WE/6/R	1		

TDCS PRECEDENCE
XX ROUTINE
PRIORITY

ELEASING IWO:
Rudolph Zamula
RUDOLPH ZAMULA

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
NOV 20 2101Z 61

BASED ON:
ACL 605
WIROGUE
LIAISON:

SECRET

201-233477

FORM 4-56 1389 Use Previous Editions REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. (35)

14-00000

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one): ☐
None required ☐
Signature:

OUNTRY REPUBLIC OF CONGO

REPORT NO. TDCS 3/493,627

UBJECT LOCATION OF KATANGA AIR FORCE (KAF) PLANES

DATE DISTR. 20 NOVEMBER 1961

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

ATE OF NFO. 17 NOVEMBER 1961

REFERENCES IN 25011

LACE & ATE ACQ. REPUBLIC OF CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (18 NOVEMBER 1961)

PPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 605

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

OURCE EUROPEAN BUSINESSMAN (C) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT (GOC).

1. THE KAF FOUGA JET IS CURRENTLY BASED AT KOLWEZI. HOWEVER THE MAJORITY OF KAF PLANES ARE NOW BASED AT KISENGE, LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 70 KM EAST OF DILOLO. (SOURCE COMMENT: GOC OBTAINS INFORMATION OF KAF FROM DEBRIEFING TRAVELLERS, SENDING OUT GROUND PATROLS, ETC. THE GOC DOES NOT HAVE LIAISON INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH UNOC.) (FIELD COMMENT: IN ADDITION TO THE FOUGA THE BULK OF KAF AIRCRAFT PROBABLY CONSISTS OF 5 DORNIER 28'S, 2 OR 3 DOVES AND POSSIBLY ONE C-47.) IF THE GOC ACQUIRES PLANES AS IT IS SEEKING TO DO, ONE OF THE FIRST TASKS ASSIGNED WILL BE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OVER THE KATANGA TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION OF AIR FIELDS, NUMBER OF PLANES ON THE FIELDS AND TO GATHER GENERAL MILITARY INFORMATION. (FIELD COMMENT: OTHER SOURCES

COPY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 6-58 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (35)

FORWARDED
RID/[illegible]IS

RECEIVED
NOV 29 1 08 PM '61

DEC 1 12 33 PM '61

CLOSE TO THE GOC STATE ANY PLANES PROCURED BY GOC WOULD BE USED FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND TO ATTACK AIR FIELDS IN KATANGA.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT

END OF MESSAGE

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-42

ROUTING
29 NOV 1961

1	4
2	5
3	6

593

DATE : 17 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (C/AF TEMPO COPY [illegible])

INFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C[illegible]

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☒ None required ☐
Signature: E. Bouchard

NOV 18 01452 61

PRIORITY

IN 24145

MICROFILMED
MAY 2 1962
DOC. MICRO. SER.

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2443

RYBAT WIROGUE

✓ SIMON *FR BOHULU (201-311570), Cabinet Chief Defense Ministry (Leopoldville), has gone to Europe to buy planes for GOC

RI COPY

INDEX

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI	Epl
R[illegible]	
[illegible]	
RI/FI	

17 Nov 61

201-233477

FORM 6-58 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (35)

14-00000

H-1-W/ 2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
[illegible] POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

INFO

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT
Operational - WIROGUE Documents

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: ACLA-630, dated 19 October 1961

1. The two attached "laissez-passers" are being forwarded (USC) to the Station, per conversation with GUTHMAN, for return to Subject of the reference.

2. Concerning the submarine discussed in paragraphs 3 through 5 of the reference, we are in full agreement that Subject be put in direct contact with ODOATH. We have no desire to perpetuate KUBARK contact with Subject.

WBB
Walter B. BERWOLD

f/ WBB
Paul E. LEIGHTON

Attachments: USC Via TRUE NAME POUCH
2 documents as stated above

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Leopoldville w/a ~~h/w~~ usc

201-233477

DATE TYPED	16 Nov 61
DATE DISPATCHED	2[illegible] NOV 1961
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	ACLN- 326
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	201-233477

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

ROUTING	AF/W/1 INITIAL
[illegible]	gbl
[illegible]	
AF/W/1	
~~[illegible]~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
AF/W/1	Robert Bouchard	mye	3829

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AF/W/1	Nov 18	E. O. Welles
C/AF/W		Lester C. Houck

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/AF		Bronson Tweedy

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

ORIG : WELLES
UNIT : AF W
EXT : 3829
DATE : Nov 22 61

1659

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

23 NOV 61 422

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

OUT 72570

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/DFD 4, C/CA, C/CI, S/C 2

TO LEOP (PRITT)
INFO
CITE DIR 25780

RYBAT WIROGUE

CS COMMENT: *REQUEST AUTHORIZATION PROVIDE WIROGUE WITH REPRESENTATIONAL FUNDS ON MONTH TO MONTH BASIS.

REFS: LEOP 2443 (IN 24145) ; LEOP 2467 (IN 25284)*

1. PER PARA 5 SECOND REF:

A. YES BUT PREFER REIMBURSEMENT FOR EXPENSES AS INCURRED RATHER THAN SET FIGURE.

B. SWANSON NO LONGER EUROPE AND DO NOT WISH ENCOURAGE CONTACT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

C. COMPLEX MATTER. ALL SALES REQUIRE ODYOKE APPROVAL WHICH NOT FORTHCOMING UNLESS END USE CLEARLY FOR LEGITIMATE PURPOSES. GOC AIR FORCE UTILIZATION WOULD NOT QUALIFY.

D. TELL WIROGUE HQS AT PRESENT NOT [illegible] [illegible] AND SEEKING ASSETS FOR INSERTION AND WHICH [illegible] [illegible] IF WE [illegible] WISH KEEP UNKNOWN FROM WIROGUE IF POSSIBLE.

~~D. NEGATIVE.~~

2. OUR POSITION VIS A VIS PARAS 1 B-D ABOVE COULD OF COURSE CHANGE OVERNIGHT AND IF SITUATION BRINGS ABOUT CHANGE GROUND RULES WE CAPABLE STRENUOUS EFFORTS ASSIST GOC.

3. CAN ONLY ADVISE WIROGUE PURSUE EUROPEAN LEADS PER PARA 4 FIRST REF.

135 4. ~~[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] OF ODYOKE POSTURE TOWARDS CONGO.~~

B Tweedy
BRONSON TWEEDY
RELEASING OFFICER

C AF W 3 W
DFD (Yates) (Buck)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

L. C. Hucky
C AF W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 541
20 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (AF COPY SLOTTED AT 2110 20 NOV 61)

INFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/SR 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

NOV 21 0036Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 25284

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2467

RYBAT VIROGUE

REF LEOP 2443 (IN 24145)

1. VIROGUE (W) CONTACTED GUTHMAN 18 AND 20 NOV. AT FIRST MEETING CLAIMED HE NOW CLOSE ADVISOR TO WIZARD 4 BUT SAID TO MAINTAIN POSITION HE NEEDS KUBARK HELP. REQUESTED LEOP BRING HIS NAME INTO CONVERSATION WITH WIZARD 4 AND/OR OTHER WIZARDS AND REFER TO HIM AS OUTSTANDING GERMAN COMMANDO TYPE DURING WORLD WAR II. HE ALSO ASKED THAT KUBARK PROVIDE HIM WITH SMALL AMOUNT OF FUNDS WITH WHICH TO MEET REPRESENTATIONAL COSTS HIS JOB AND PROVIDE SMALL GIFTS FOR VARIOUS MEMBERS MILITARY WITH WHOM HE IN CONTACT. W POINTED OUT HE HAS ACHIEVED POSITION WHICH KUBARK HOPED HE WOULD ACHIEVE PRIOR TO TERMINATION. COMMENTED HE PREPARED DO ANYTHING POSSIBLE HELP ODYOKE BUT NEEDS AID PER ABOVE

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET 43-43

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

REQUEST AND GUIDANCE.

2. AT 20 NOV MEETING W SAID HE HAD JUST COME FROM WIZARD 2'S OFFICE. ALLEGED WIZARDS 2 AND 4 WISH SEND HIM PBPRIME WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS TO PURCHASE MILITARY AIRCRAFT. WHEN QUESTIONED ON THIS SUBJECT HE STATED WIZARD 2 TOLD HIM OF SOVIET OFFER OF PLANES AND INDICATED HE WISHED OBTAIN PLANES ELSEWHERE TO AVOID BEING FORCED BY PUBLIC OPINION TO ACCEPT SOVIET AID OFFER (SEE LEOP 2452) (IN 14575) W CLAIMS WIZARD 2 ADMITTED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO CONTINUE REFUSING SOVIET OFFER FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME IF HE UNABLE OBTAIN PLANES IN WEST. W EMPHASIZED NEED FOR HIM TO OBTAIN PLANES AND PILOTS SOONEST IF ODYOKE WISHES AVOID HAVING VOID FILLED BY BLOC OR OTHER ANTI ODYOKE FORCES. HE AGAIN URGED KUBARK PUT HIM IN CONTACT SOONEST WITH SWANSON OF ARAB DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. INDICATED HE WOULD TRY AND SEE SWANSON WHILE ON WAY TO OR FROM PBPRIME.

3. ALTHOUGH W PROBABLY HOPES KUBARK WILL HELP HIM SOLIDIFY HIS POSITION BY FINDING PLANES FOR HIM TO BUY ON BEHALF GOC, HE GAVE IMPRESSION HE BELIEVES ODYOKE HAS ONLY VERY SHORT TIME (MEASURED IN DAYS NOT WEEKS OR MONTHS) TO MAKE DECISION TO AID GOC. AS USUAL W'S VIEWS WERE

NOT CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT OR ENTIRELY LOGICAL IN EXPOSITION. HOWEVER HIS FEELING OF URGENCY COINCIDES WITH VIEWS GUTHMAN HAS FORMED SINCE RETURN FROM MOST RECENT TDY. STATION PREPARING SEPARATE CABLE ON SUBJECT OF URGENT NEED FOR REVIEW ODYOKE POLICY TOWARD CONGO.

4. WHEN STATION RECOMMENDED W'S RECALL, IT WAS DONE IN BELIEF HE RISKED ARREST. LEOP ALSO ASSUMED HE WOULD NOT RETURN TO CONGO. UNFORTUNATELY LATTER ASSUMPTION DID NOT PROVE CORRECT AND ALTHOUGH WE NO LONGER OFFICIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS WELFARE IT MUST BE ASSUMED HE WILL TURN TO KUBARK FOR AID SHOULD HE FIND HIMSELF IN TROUBLE WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES. ALTHOUGH WE NO LONGER HAVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIM, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT REFUSE ASSIST HIM SHOULD HE NEED HELP, PARTICULARLY IF ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR HIM TO DENOUNCE STATION PERSONNEL. THUS, VIEW FACT HE HAS RETURNED TO CONGO AND IS IN POSITION WHEREBY HE MIGHT INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATION, LEOP RECOMMENDS WE BE AUTHORIZED PROVIDE HIM WITH FUNDS (NOT TO EXCEED 5,000 BCF PER MONTH) FOR USE REPRESENTATIONAL PURPOSES. ALSO, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT EXPECT HIM TO PRODUCE GREAT AMOUNTS POSITIVE

INTELLIGENCE VIEW PAST PERFORMANCE, BELIEVE WE MIGHT AS WELL GIVE HIM SOME GUIDANCE AS CANNOT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AVOID CONTACT WITH

5. REQUEST FOLLOWING:

A. AUTHORIZATION PROVIDE W WITH REPRESENTATIONAL FUNDS AS SUGGESTED ABOVE ON MONTH TO MONTH BASIS.

B. HQS INSTRUCTIONS RE W CONTACT WITH SWANSON PER REF.

C. INDICATION AS TO WHETHER ODYOKE WILLING PERMIT PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IN PBPRIME SELL PLANES TO GOC. (IN THIS RESPECT WISH NOTE THAT IF PLANES NOT OBTAINABLE IN PBPRIME GOC WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY TURN TO OTHER SOURCES.)

D. INDICATION WHETHER HQS INTERESTED IN PROVIDING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALST TO SERVE AS PILOTS OR OTHER PERSONNEL FOR CONGO AIR FORCE.

6. WISH STRESS W NOW ACTING AS AGENT GOC AND IS NOT A CONTROLLED KUBARK AGENT. HOWEVER, HE SEEKING GUIDANCE AND IF AID PROVIDED BELIEVE HE WOULD ATTEMPT FOLLOW DIRECTIONS UNLESS SUCH GUIDANCE ENDANGERED HIS POSITION WITH GOC.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *WIROGUE CONTACTED SALVACK 15 NOV AND REQUESTED HE BE PUT IN CONTACT WITH ROLAND C SWANSON OF ARAB DEVELOPMENT CORP.

DEPT OF STATE OUTGOING TELEGRAM NUMBER 874
TO: AMEMBASSY LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 21 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

DEPT OF STATE OUTGOING TELEGRAM NUMBER 881
TO: AMEMBASSY LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 25 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

DEPT OF STATE OUTGOING TELEGRAM NUMBER 895
TO: AMEMBASSY LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

323

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 16 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : AF 7 (AF COPY SLOTTED 1215 16 NOV)

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/PS, FI, EE 4, OT, S/C 2

8

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 16 1543Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 23258

PRITY MUNI DIR INFO FRAN CITE LEOP 2441

UPHILL ZIBET

1. STAHL ARRIVED LEOP 12 NOV LANDING DORNIER 27 AT NDOLO AIRPORT. HE IMMEDIATELY ARRESTED AND HELD BY GENDARMERIE, AND CAR TRAINEES. WIROGUE SAID HE THERE AND ARRANGED STAHL RELEASE. THREE ADDITIONAL DORNIERS IN GERMANY TO BE GIFT TO GOC. ALL ABOVE INFO FROM WIROGUE.

2. HESTON, STAHL'S REGULAR CONTUMT, IS CURRENTLY ON VACATION UNTIL MID-DEC. STATION DOES NOT WISH TO DROP CONTACT THAT LONG DURING CRITICAL PERIOD CONGO. REQUEST MUNI ARRANGE NEW CONTACT WITH STAHL. WISH COME OR PHONE HESTON APARTMENT BETWEEN 1130 AND 1200 HOURS 22 NOV. ALTERNATE SAME TIME 9 NOV. ASK FOR MR PEEL. PLEASE ADVISE IF ABOVE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS ACCEPTABLE. (FYI SALVACK WILL MAKE CONTACT WITHOUT REVEALING TRUE NAME OR FUNCTION.)

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

211-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FIGHT ONE FIVE WASH

Relay to Lond. AF Temps

TDCS-3/492,774

S E C R E T

IN20108

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2437

RYBAT WIROGUE

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

REF LEOP 2365 (IN 18883)

WIROGUE REPORTED 9 NOV WIZARD 4 WISHES PURCHASE 2 BRISTOL MARAUDERS AND 2 DC-4 TRANSPORTS. ACTING AIRA LOANED WIROGUE BOOK ON AIRCRAFT WHICH GOC STUDIED TO SELECT PLANES WANTED. WIROGUE SAID GOC SENDING TWO MEN TO ENGLAND ARRANGE PURCHASE WHICH MUST BE MADE IN TWO WEEKS. WIROGUE TO BEGIN WEARING CNA UNIFORM, BEING SENT LULUABOURG TO "STUDY SITUATION."

S E C R E T

CFN 2437 2365 WIROGUE 9 NOV WIZARD 4 2 BRISTOL MARAUDERS 2 DC-4 AIRA WIROGUE GOC WIROGUE GOC ENGLAND CNA LULUABOURG

ST

121

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201-233477

14-00000

325

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 9 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (AF COPY SLOTTED 1240 9 NOV)

INFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/FI/SPOG, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

NOV 9 1719Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 20108

CITE

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2437

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF LEOP 2383 (IN 18893) *

WIROGUE REPORTED 9 NOV WIZARD 4 WISHES PURCHASE 2 BRISTOL MARAUDERS AND 2 DC-4 TRANSPORTS. ACTING AIRA LOANED WIROGUE BOOK ON AIRCRAFT WHICH GOC STUDIED TO SELECT PLANES WANTED. WIROGUE SAID GOC SENDING TWO MEN TO ENGLAND ARRANGE PURCHASE WHICH MUST BE MADE IN TWO WEEKS. WIROGUE TO BEGIN WEARING CNA UNIFORM, BEING SENT LULUABOURG TO "STUDY SITUATION."

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *WIROGUE SAID GOC WISHES PURCHASE 10 TO 12 LIGHT FIGHTER PLANES, HIRE MERCENARY PILOTS AND MECHANICS.

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

201-233477

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1157
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ATE : 446
7 NOV 61

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

CTION : C/AF 3 (AF COPY SLOTTED AT 1550-7 NOV)

NFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/IW 2, C/FI/SPOG, S/C 2 (SUSPENSE DD/I)

NOV 7 2011Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 18883

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2388 (BETTELHEIM [illegible])

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE (W) CAME TPELIDE LATE AFTERNOON 7 NOV. SINCE AIRA, ASST AIR GONE, CALLED SALVACK. SAID GOC WISHES PURCHASE 10 TO 12 LIGHT FIGHTER PLANES, HIRE MERCENARY PILOTS AND MECHANICS. ONE PROSPECTIVE PILOT ALREADY INTERVIEWED. (W FORGOT NAME NATURALLY). ASKED GUIDANCE WHAT TYPE PLANE GOC SHOULD BUY. WIZARD 4 WANTS ANSWER MORN 8 NOV. SALVACK ONLY ANSWERED HE NOT AIR OFFICER AND W SHOULD TALK WITH ACTING AIRA, STOGNER. W SAID GOC HAS 100 MILLION BCF TO SPEND ON PLANES PILOTS MECHANICS.

2. WICLAM REPORTED GOC GENERAL STAFF IMPRESSED EFFICIENCY KATANGA ARMY AND DISCUSSING HIRING MERCENARIES THEMSELVES.

3. DEFER HQS FOR DISSEMINATION OF ABOVE. INFORMING GPOTHER IN CASE HE WISHES PASS UN.

END OF MESSAGE

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

P 071711Z ZEA

5T

XXXXX ZEA

SEVEN NINE FOUR WASH

C/AF temp

LD

S E C R E T

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2388 (BETTELHEIM AEZINO)

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE (W) CAME TPELIDE LATE AFTERNOON 7 NOV. SINCE AIRA, ASST AIR GONE, CALLED SALVACK. SAID GOC WISHES PURCHASE 10 TO 12 LIGHT FIGHTER PLANES, HIRE MERCENARY PILOTS AND MECHANICS. ONE PROSPECTIVE PILOT ALREADY INTERVIEWED. (W FORGOT NAME NATURALLY). ASKED GUIDANCE WHAT TYPE PLANE GOC SHOULD BUY. WIZARD 4 WANTS ANSWER MORN 8 NOV. SALVACK ONLY ANSWERED HE NOT AIR OFFICER AND W SHOULD TALK WITH ACTING AIRA, STOGNER. W SAID GOC HAS 100 MILLION BCF TO SPEND ON PLANES, PILOTS, MECHANICS.

2. WICLAM REPORTED GOC GENERAL STAFF IMPRESSED EFFICIENCY KATANGA ARMY AND DISCUSSING HIRING MERCENARIES THEMSELVES.

3. DEFER HQS FOR DISSEMINATION OF ABOVE. INFORMING GPOTHER IN CASE HE WISHES PASS UN.

S E C R E T

201-233477

14. November 61

[redacted]

14 November 61 [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

Laissez Passer # D 8755 issued to Reiner, Georges

Laisses Passer # 58/1961 Oddiciel Passage Du Pool issued to Reinert.

above being sent to Leop this date for return to WIROGUE

Original signed
by Dan Niescuir
201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : E. O. Wallec[illegible]
UNIT : AF/W/1
EXT : 3829
DATE : 10 Oct 61 1709

ROUTING
1 C/AF
2 [illegible]
3 [illegible]
4
5
6

10 Oct 61 [illegible] z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT56572

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE FRANKFURT MUNICH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/EE 3, S/C 2

Per CSN 43-43

TO PRITY LEOP INFO ROUTINE FRAN MUNI CITE DIR 17004

RYBAT WIROGUE UPHILL

REF LEOP 2218 (IN 42712)*

NO DOUBT LEOP ADOPTING CORRECT POSITION AND MUST NOT GIVE WIROGUE ~~[illegible]~~ ANY ENCOURAGEMENT OR WAILING WALL FOR ANY ANTI-STAHL [illegible] ACTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

*RYBAT

EE/G 1WO

AF/W/1

C/AF/[illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Per CSN 43-43

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/A

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

21 NOV 1961

PUNCHED

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. C/AF/W		30 OCT 1961		
2.				
3. [illegible]	[illegible]		3d Oct	
4.				
5. Bouchard				B
6. Niescum				
7.				
8. Pat				
9.				
10.				
11. RI/AN				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Can't Rogue simply go to ODOATH - all this idea is perpetuating the KUBARK/Rogue connection

What about the Docs in Para 2?

DISPOSITION

201-233477

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-233477

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

ACLA 00630

FORM 12-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: ACLA-630

TO: Chief, AF

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville

DATE: 19 October 1961

SUBJECT: [illegible]/WIROGUE
- Request for Documents

RE: "43-3" (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Hqs guidance re model (para 5)

REFERENCE(S):

1. On 2 October 1961 WIROGUE telephoned Lester H. SALVACK and said that he had something important to discuss with him. WIROGUE requested SALVACK to come to his house in Binza, a suburb of Leopoldville.

2. WIROGUE had two requests. The first was to ask "Dan" to forward the two laissez-paissezs which WIROGUE states he turned over to Dan and never got back. WIROGUE was quite emphatic that he needs these documents. SALVACK suggested that WIROGUE write a note stating exactly what he wanted and give it to him to forward. WIROGUE did and the note is forwarded as a separate cover attachment to this dispatch.

3. WIROGUE then showed SALVACK a model of a one man submarine on which he had been working in conjunction with a Belgian engineer (Identity #1) who is also a Congolese Air Force advisor. He claimed that this submarine would be capable of speeds up to 100 kilometers an hour on short runs, and would have a cruising distance of 500 kilometers. The model, being built to 1/7 scale, is approximately half completed, and, of course, has never been tested. WIROGUE said he had discussed this model and his plans fully when in Headquarters, and had made a full report concerning all details. SALVACK said that (1) he was not an engineer and (2) was in no position to make any promise or commitment. All that he could do was to report that the model was in the process of construction and to further report that WIROGUE wanted to make sure that the West got it instead of the Communist bloc.

4. WIROGUE expressed full willingness to show the model, and have his companion explain it fully, to anyone SALVACK wished to bring to WIROGUE's house. SALVACK made no commitment other than to report the conversation. (It should be noted that WIROGUE had never mentioned this item before to Station personnel, and told Salvack that neither he nor his companion had said anything to anyone in The Congo concerning it up to this point.)

5. If Headquarters is willing, the station suggests that the ODOATH attache be put into contact with WIROGUE concerning this item. He could conduct any necessary tests or experiments. Because of WIROGUE's past, however, and the nature of his documentation, the Station requests Headquarters guidance and approval prior to taking any action.

CS COPY

201-233477

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [illegible]-630

6. On returning to The Congo WIROGUE crossed the Congo river from Brazzaville successfully in spite of the ferries being closed to all but diplomatic travel, but it involved a prolonged argument for more than an hour with the immigration authorities at the ferry landing. WIROGUE has never fully admitted what he did to successfully enter The Congo, though knowing the situation, he probably indulged in some small bribery. Since he had merely disappeared for a short while after mentioning that he might need medical attention, his Congolese Air Force job was still open. (There are many GOC advisory positions vacant, and for someone to obtain such a position with any sort of qualifications is not too difficult. When a position is vacated it is seldom refilled, certainly not quickly.) He has reiterated strongly at each of the three meetings SALVACK has had with him that he is willing to help PBPRIME any way possible.

Lester H Salvack.
Lester H. SALVACK

19 October 1961
Attachments: 1. WIROGUE letter, USC
2. Identity, USC

Distribution:

Hqs - 4, w/a USC

201-233477

FORM 5-60 1401 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATT TO: ACLA-630

Att #2

IDENTITY: Peter de GROEVE



SECRET

ACLA-630

Separate Cover Attachments #1 and #2

h/w.

Chief, AF

201-233477

VIA AIR MAIL

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Cindy

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

DATE : 380
9 OCT 61

TO : DIRECTOR L-1[illegible] Crichl.

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (AF COPY SLOTTED AT 1545-9 OCT)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/IW 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2, (SUSPENSE DD/I)

OCT 9 1928Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 42712

PRITY DIR INFO FRAN MUNI CITE LEOP 2218

RYBAT WIROGUE UPHILL

1. WIROGUE CONTACTED SALVACK 7 OCT. SAID CONGOLESE AIR FORCE (CAF) CHIEF PIERROT NOW PERMANENTLY OUSTED. ALSO SAID MALIERE TOLD HIM CNA PLANS PUT EUROPEAN IN CHARGE CAF AND CONSIDERING THREE PERSONS FOR POSITION: COL STAHL, WIROGUE AND CAPTAIN PETER DE GROEVE, WHO ALSO CAF ADVISER.

Card

2. WIROGUE ASKED PBPRIME REACION AND INTEREST IN STAHL. SALVACK SAID STAHL WES GERMAN AND PBPRIME WILLING SEE STAHL IN POSITION. SALVACK DENIED ANY ODYOKE CONTACT WITH STAHL OHER THAN THROUGH AIRA. WIROGUE SAID HE WILLING SUPPORT STAHL AS LONG AS STAHL DID NOT TRY UNDERMINE HIS POSITION. ADDED HE THOUGHT HE COULD GET STAHL THROWN OUT OF CONGO IF ODYOKE SO WISHED. SALVACK TOLD WIROGUE ODYOKE DOES NOT DESIRE THIS AND SAID SUCH

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

STEP MIGHT REBOUND AGAINS

3. WIROGUE MET GUTHMAN ON STREET OUTSIDE TPELIDE 7 OCT. LEAVING COMPANION (WHOM GUTHMAN BELIEVES TO HAVE BEEN DE GROEVE) WIROGUE TOOK GUTHMAN ASIDE AND STRESSED THAT ODYOKE WOULD HAVE BETTER CONTROL OF CAF THROUGH HIM THAN THROUGH STAHL. GUTHMAN SIDESTEPPED ISSUE STRESSING ODYOKE HAD NO INTEREST UNDERCUTTING WEST GERMANS OR STAHL. WIROGUE AGAIN SAID HE IN GOOD POSITION AID ODYOKE AND WILLING DO SO IF REQUESTED.

4. WIROGUE VISITED AIRA 9 OCT TO DISCUSS SAME SUBJECT. AIRA DENIED ANY ODYOKE CONNECTION WITH STAHL BUT POINTED OUT STAHL WEST GERMAN AND PRO-WEST. THEREFORE IN ODYOKE INTEREST TO HAVE STAHL NAMED CHIEF CAF IF GOC FAVORABLE HIS NOMINATION.

5. WIROGUE SEEMS FEAR STAHL AND CONSIDERS STAHL THREAT TO HIS POSITION. (STAHL WOULD BE IN GOOD POSITION CHECK WIROGUE'S COVER STORY AND EXPOSE HIM AS IMPOSTER.) LEOP AND AIRA HAVE IMPRESSION WIROGUE WANTS TO OUST STAHL IF POSSIBLE AND WANTS PBPRIME BACKING FOR ACTION.

6. REQUEST ANY HQS GUIDANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

19 OCT 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Daniel Niesciur, Room 2009, I Building

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : TZITZICHVILI, David
#174 803

1. In response to your recent request, the Subject was escorted from Washington, D. C., to Frankfurt, Germany, as described in the attached report. A receipt for money passed to the Subject in Germany is enclosed. It is also understood that Mr. Daniel NIESCIUR received written acknowlegement from the Subject for the receipt of this money at the time of his departure from Washington, D. C.

2. No further action will be taken in this matter unless requested by you.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

for Victor R. White

Attachment:
Report Dated 13 September 1961
with attached receipt

SECRET

201-233477

SECRET
WHEN WITH REPORTS

124 803

OFFICE OF SECURITY

Support Division

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

This data is the property of the Office of Security and should be returned when it has served its purpose. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Headquarters Staff Officers directly concerned. This material shall not be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the prior approval of the Office of Security.

CONSISTING OF
One REPORTS

SECRET

#174 803

13 September 1961

GENERAL

On 7 September 1961, the SUBJECT, David TZITZICHVILI, and Case Officer Dan N. were met by the reporting agent at the Union Station in Washington, D. C. at 0900 hours. At this time the case officer explained to the SUBJECT that the reporting agent would have in his possession documents for SUBJECT and two thousand dollars in cash which was to be given to SUBJECT after their arrival in Frankfurt, Germany. At this time the SUBJECT executed a signed receipt for the money and documents and this receipt was kept by the case officer.

The SUBJECT and reporting agent departed Union Station, Washington, D. C. via Pennsylvania Railroad Train #174, the Colonial, and arrived at Trenton, New Jersey, at 1300 hours, 7 September 1961. The SUBJECT and reporting agent then proceeded via taxi-cab, Trenton, New Jersey, to McGuire Air Force Base, Wrightstown, New Jersey.

The SUBJECT and reporting agent departed McGuire Air Force Base via Military Air Transport Service BKA 31 at 2000 hours and arrived in Frankfurt, Germany, at 0830 hours at the Rhein-Main Airport on 8 September 1961.

After arrival at Rhein-Main Airport SUBJECT and the reporting agent proceeded via taxi-cab to downtown Frankfurt. At this time the money and documents were given to SUBJECT. He executed a signed receipt for this material which is attached to this report as Exhibit #1. After SUBJECT received the documents and money he departed the company of the reporting agent at the train station in Frankfurt, Germany.

During the course of the trip to Germany SUBJECT stated that he would possibly remain in Germany for a few weeks and that he was also contemplating moving to Switzerland or returning to the Congo. SUBJECT seemed well satisfied with the termination agreement and at no time displayed any dissatisfaction concerning his treatment during the past several months.

The reporting agent departed Frankfurt, Germany via Pan American Airlines Flight #73 at 1400 hours, 11 September 1961, and arrived at Washington, D. C. at 1930 hours, 11 September 1961.

This flight covered a distance of approximately eight thousand miles and the flight time was approximately seventeen hours.

Attachment: Exhibit #1

201-233477

EXHIBIT. #1

8 Sept 1961

Received from Joe
B———— one envelope
containing documents &
one envelope containing
$2000.00.

David Stegner

Ernest G. Mayerhofer

14-00000

1672

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : LESTER C. HOUCK
UNIT : C/AF/W
EXT : 3939
DATE : 22 Sept 1961

ROUTING
4
5
6

22 SEP 61 312

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE BRAZZAVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

WIROGUE

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT99815

TO LEOP (PRITY) INFO BRAZ (PRITY) CITE DIR 13499

RYBAT/WIROGUE

REF: LEOP 2988 (IN 33643)*

1. ATTITUDE AT TERMINATION ENTIRELY FRIENDLY AND APPEARED HONESTLY PUZZLED AS TO WHY DROPPED. BELIEVE JUST WANDERING ABOUT LOOKING FOR AN INTEL JOB. NO INFO ON WHO PAYING NOW AND HE HAS ENOUGH FUNDS RETURN ON OWN. OTHER DETAILS NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE.

Wot

2. GENERAL GUIDANCE IS THAT SINCE HE WILL BE NOTHING BUT MISCHIEF IN AREA, YOU SHOULD SUGGEST HE LEAVE. THERE ARE TO BE NO FURTHUR FUNDS INVOLVED. GRIN AND LOOK AWAY IF HE STAYS IN VICINITY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE ZAPPLEY MEETING WITH WIROGUE 22 SEPT AND QUESTIONS RAISED.

AF/W/12

AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

DESENSITIZED
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

517
ATE : 22 SEP 61
O : DIRECTOR
ROM : LEOPOLDVILLE
CTION : C/AF 3 (C/AF TEMPO SLOTTED AT 1550-22 SEP)
FO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

Chrono
cc:
cc:
cc:

2 - 1 copy

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

SEP 22 1914Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 33643

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2088

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

IMMEDIATE ACTION

1. ZAPPLEY WHEN AT BEACH HOTEL BRAZ AFTERNOON 22 SEPT SAW WIROGUE GET OUT OF TAXI. WIROGUE GREETED ZAPPLEY SAYING HE "GEORGE." THEY TALKED BRIEFLY OF HOW TO CROSS RIVER WITH FERRIES CLOSED. WIROGUE ASKED IF BEST TO RETURN PARIS OR ENTER CONGO FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. WIROGUE SAID HE STILL HAD PERMIT ENTER AND LEAVE CONGO FROM MINISTRY DEFENSE.

2. THIS RAISES MANY QUESTION. WHAT WAS WIROGUE ATTITUDE ON TERMINATION? ANY INFO WHO PAYING WAY NOW? WHAT NAME AND PASSPORT HE USING? (IF HE PLANS USE OLD PERMIT FROM MIN DEFENSE THEN HE STILL USING SAME NAME AS WHEN HERE BEFORE.) DOES HE STILL HAVE FALSE PASSPORT ISSUED BY KUBARK. WHEN DID HE LEAVE PBPRIME AND WHAT WAS DESTINATION. POSSIBLE HE ON PAYROLL OTHER COUNTRY OR POSSIBLE HE WANTS BACK ON KUBARK PAYROLL. REQUEST HQS VIEWS AND GUIDANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : EStover 565
UNIT : AF/1
EXT : 8284
DATE : 21 September 1961

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO : CABLE SECRETARIAT
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : AF 7
INFO : EE 4, S/C 2

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

IN 32112 A GNVA 2486

TO INFO CITE DIR

PLS RELAY GNVA 2486 (IN 32112)* TO LEOPOLDVILLE. SLUG [illegible].

END OF MESSAGE

*RE GEORG RELGER.

AF/1/2

AF/A/1

EE/9

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

[illegible]
C/AF/[illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 310
20 SEP 61

REF

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GENEVA

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE 4, SR 6, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	006	4	B
2	[illegible]	5	3
3	[illegible]	6	

SEP 20 1421Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 32112

TO DIR INFO BERN CITE GNVA 2486

ZIBET INK

ON RETURNING GNVA FROM BRUS VIA FRAN, FRIGANZA MET EX-REDSOX CANDIDATE AEASPIC AT AIRPORT. HAD VERY SHORT CHAT. HE SAID HE "DROPPED IN FRAN", DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HE DID WRONG, CARRYING DOCS IN NAME GEORG REINER, CAN BE REACHED THRU SAVOY HOTEL, FRAN. PLANS DEPART FRAN 21 SEPT FOR CONGO AS HAS NOTHING ELSE TO DO. WAS MAJOR, WILL BE AGAIN. ASSURED FRIGANZA ALWAYS WILLING HELP KUBARK. SENT BEST REGARDS "PAT".

END OF MESSAGE

[Dan Narain advising disposition the date of Dan's arrival]

JCB 21 SEP 1961

Paul —— for your file.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

201-235477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 310
20 SEP 61

RFL

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GENEVA

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE/4, SR 6, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. - Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

[illegible]

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 20 1421Z 61

25 SEP 1961

ROUTINE

IN 32112

TO DIR INFO BERN CITE GNVA 2486

not necessary to
index 201 material

ZIBET INK

ON RETURNING GNVA FROM BRUS VIA FRAN, FRIGANZA MET EX-REDSOX CANDIDATE AEASPIC AT AIRPORT. HAD VERY SHORT CHAT. HE SAID HE "DROPPED IN FRAN", DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HE DID WRONG, CARRYING DOCS IN NAME GEORG REINER, CAN BE REACHED THRU SAVOY HOTEL, FRAN. PLANS DEPART FRAN 21 SEPT FOR CONGO AS HAS NOTHING ELSE TO DO. WAS MAJOR, WILL BE AGAIN. ASSURED FRIGANZA ALWAYS WILLING HELP KUBARK. SENT BEST REGARDS "PAT".

END OF MESSAGE

David *TZITZIVILLI, stateless DOB 12 July 1918 - POB Gori, Georgia, USSR
alias Georg Franz *REINER DOB 25 July 1921 POB Salzburg, Austria.

Georg Franz *REINER - alias of David *TZITZIVILLI.

AEASPIC changed to WIROGUE

Amended

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	JW
RI/TY	
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

201-235477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

415

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 8 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

L-1copy

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : D/OS 2

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/AF 3, S/C 2

SEP 8 1700Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 25782

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

DIR CITE FRAN 3578

RYBAT WIRCUGE SECUR TECHS

REF: DIR 10107 (out 93573) x

1. WIROUGE/1 AND ESCORT ARRIVED FRAN 8 SEPTEMBER 0830 LOCAL. SUBJECT TERMINATED SATISFACTORILY.

2. MR. JOSEPH BRANNIGAN ETD FRAN 11 SEPTEMBER PAA 73 1400 LOCAL. ETA NEW YORK 1715 LOCAL.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* .ITINERARY WIROGNE/1 AND ESCORT MR JOSEPH BRANNIGAN.

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: Mary M. Holder
UNIT: OS/OSD/SB-SD/1
EXT: 4253
DATE: SEPT. 1961

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO: FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

L-1 copy

CONF: D/OS 2

INFO: COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/AF 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED

6 SEP 61 18 13z

93573

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

TO PRITY FRAN INFO CITE DIR 10107

RYBAT WIROGUE SECUR TECHS

WIROGUE/1 AND ESCORT, MR. JOSEPH BRANNIGAN, DEPART MAGUIRE AFB 7 SEPT 1600 HRS LOCAL MATS EKA-31, AMD: WRI-FRF - 2 PT - 7769--RA-9. ETA NOT AVAILABLE. REQUEST FRAN MEET AND ASSIST. WIROGUE/1 WILL BE TERMINATED IMMED AFTER ARRIVAL FRAN. KURIOT ISSUED WIROGUE/1 ORIGINAL AUSTRIAN SERIES A PASSPORT WITH ALTERED SERIAL NUMBER IN NAME GEORG REINER. THIS DOCUMENT FOR DISPOSAL USE. DETAILS POUCHED. BRANNIGAN REQUESTS RETURN RESERVATIONS MATS JET 48 HOURS AFTER ARRIVAL FRAN.

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS

AF/N/2

TSD/IB By phone w/Kallander 9/5 - Mr

EE/ADMIN

EE/6 CSK

GEORGE WEIS
C/EE/OPS

DESENSITIZED

f/ James P. O'CONNELL
C/OSD/OS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

414

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 7 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : D/OS 2 (OS CABLE DESK NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1140 7 SEPT 61)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/AF 3, S/C 2

SEP 7 1526Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 25104

TO DIR INFO CITE FRAN 3530

RYBAT WIROGUE SECUR TECHS

RE DIR 70707 (OUT 93573)**

NO STATION RECORD WIROGUE/1. PLS FURNISH TERMINATION DETAIL OPIM.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED FRAN MEET WIROGUE/1 AND EXCORT.WIROGUE/1 WAS TO BE TERMINATED UPON ARRIVAL.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG Marx M. Holder
UNIT OS/OSD/SD/1
EXT x-4263 1613
DATE 7 September 1961

TO : FRANKFURT
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: D/OS 2
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/AF 3, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

7 SEP 61 21 16z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT94114

TO CPIM - FRAN INFO CITE DIR 10389

RYBAT/WIROGUE/SECUR/TECHS

REF: FRAN 3530 (IN 25104)*

NO ACTION REQUIRED FRAN RE: TERMINATION. MEET AND ASSIST ON ARRIVAL ONLY.

END OF MESSAGE

* Requested termination details Wirogue/1.

Mary M. Holler
FOR Ted Shackley
George Weisz by phone
C/EE/CPS
RELEASING OFFICER

OS/AAS telcord. Murphy
AF/W/2 telcord. Dan
TSD/IB telcord. K. Clarke Walt Richardson by phone
COORDINATING OFFICERS

James P. O'Connell
C/OSD
by phone
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

414

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 7 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

1

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : D/OS 2 (OS CABLE DESK NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1140 7 SEPT 61)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/AF 3, S/C 2

SEP 7 1526Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 25104

SANITIZED

TO DIR INFO per CSN 43-43 CITE FRAN 3530

RYBAT WIROGUE SECUR TECHS

RE DIR 70707 (OUT 93573)**

NO STATION RECORD WIROGUE/1. PLS FURNISH TERMINATION DETAIL OPIM.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED FRAN MEET WIROGUE/1 AND EXCORT.WIROGUE/1 WAS TO BE TERMINATED UPON ARRIVAL.

SANITIZED
per CSN 43-43

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

176

DATE : 28 AUG 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

AUG 28 1501Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 19538

thermo Copy to Dev d.

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1898

per CSH 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

WIROGUE/1 KNEW VERY LITTLE RE STATION ACTIVITIES. HE AWARE GUTHMAN AND SALVACK TRUE NAMES AND ADDRESSEES. KNEW BETTELHEIM ONLY BY FIRST NAME. AWARE GUTHMAN IN CONTACT WITH WIZARD/4. WAS USED PASS MONEY TO WIBOTTLE IN HOSPITAL. STATION USING APARTMENT W/1 RENTED AS SAFE APARTMENT AND HAS POST OFFICE BOX UNDER W/1 NAME.

END OF MESSAGE

per CSH 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

22 AUG 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Daniel Niesciur, Room 2009, I Building

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : TZITZICHVILI, David
#174 803

1. In response to your request dated 6 July 1961, a safe-house facility was located and made available to you for an indefinite period beginning 12 July 1961.

2. No further action will be taken in this matter unless requested by you.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

SECRET

201-233477

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: ABCLT-247

TO: Chief, Finance Division

INFO: Chief, AF

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.:

FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville

DATE: 27 JULY 1961

SUBJECT: Finance/WIROGUE
Transfer of Accountability-Ernest C. Maycrink

RE "438" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Credit Advance Account

REFERENCE(S):

LEOP-1538	DIR-49325
LEOP-1568	LEOP-1599
DIR-48429	DIR-00712

1. On 7 July 1961 WIROGUE was advanced the sum of U. S. $100.00 for living expenses in Brazzaville while awaiting onward transportation to PBPRIME. (DIR-48429 requested WIROGUE return to PBPRIME). This is his only outstanding advance with Leopoldville Station. Receipt attached hereto.

2. DIR-49325 authorized Station to withhold money received from sale of personal car against outstanding advances. However, before his departure WIROGUE accounted for 11,580 BCF over what he owed the Station. The sum of 42,500 BCF from the sale of his automobile plus 11,580 BCF converted at 50/$1.00 (LEOP-1599 and DIR-49325) gave WIROGUE a credit of $1,081.60. In January 1961 WIROGUE was ordered to Thysville by the Station and was authorized $0.10 per mile for use of his personal car, therefore, 312.5 miles times $0.10 equals $31.[illegible] leaving WIROGUE a credit of U. S. $1,112.85. (See attachment).

3. WIROGUE was paid his June salary of $500 on 26 June and also his housing for July ($250.00). (Station was notified on 1 July, DIR-48429 that WIROGUE was to return to PBPRIME). However, July rental was used in the final settlement of the lease for the usual damages claimed by local landlords and in lieu of 30 days termination notice. Receipt forwarded under Voucher: 1153.

4. Accountability in the amount of U. S. $100.00 is herewith transferred to Headquarters plus a credit of $1,112.85. As WIROGUE was specifically told he would have to account for the above $100.00 for living/traveling expenses Station did not subtract that amount from his credit.

18 July 1961

Angela R. Derricote

Attachments:
1. Receipt for $100, h/w
2. Thysville certification by Guthman, h/w
3. Coquilhatville estimate, h/w
4. Breakdown of advances and accountings, h/w

Distribution:
Hqs - 4, w/a a/s

201-233477

302

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 17 JULY 1961 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BRAZZAVILLE

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

JUL 17 18 38z61

REC'D CABLE SECT.
ROUTINE

IN 39898

TO DIR INFO POUCH LEOP CITE BRAZ 137

REF: DIR 00712 (OUT ~~76077~~)

WIROGUE

BRAZ MADE WIROGUE/1 ADVANCES OF 130,000 CFA FRANCS AND $100 ON 10 JULY 1961. POUCHING RECEIPTS FOR T/A HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* ADVISE ADVANCES MADE BY LEOP AND BRAZ WIROGUE/1 EXCLUDING $4000, HQS LOAN.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Dan Niescier
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818
DATE : 12 July 1961

1668

ROUTING
1 4/10
2
3 Chu
4
5
6

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE BRAZZAVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, S/C 2

[illegible]
per CSN 43-43

12 JUL 61 22 03z

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT7[illegible]22

TO LEOP BRAZ INFO CITE DIR 00264

WIROGUE RYBAT

WIROGUE/1 ARRIVED 11 JULY.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible]
per CSN 43-43

AF/W/2

AF/W/1

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK
C/AF/W

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

236 236 1.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE 10 JULY 1961

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BRAZZAVILLE

ACTION: AF 7 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1235 10 JUL)
(AF DIV NOTIFIED 1235 10 JUL)

INFO : FG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, OS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	W	4	FE
2		5	W
3	C	6	

JUL 10 15

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

36589

TO DIR INFO CITE BRAZ 135

WIROGUE

1. IF FOR ANY REASON WIROGUE/1 NOT MET AT IDLEWILD AND HE GETS THRU IMMIGRATION SUCCESSFULLY ALONE, HE WILL GO TAFT HOTEL. IF NOT ABLE GET ROOM WILL LEAVE MESSAGE AT DESK FOR "MR WATSON."

2. IF THIS FAILS MAY POSSIBLY BE TRACED THRU NEW YORK FRIEND MARGARET LAGRUTTA. TELEPHONE TE6-0949.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

236 236 1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 10 JULY 1961

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BRAZZAVILLE

ACTION: AF 7 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1235 10 JUL)
(AF DIV NOTIFIED 1235 10 JUL)

INFO : PG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, OS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 10 16

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

36589

TO DIR INFO CITE BRAZ 135

WIROGUE

1. IF FOR ANY REASON WIROGUE/1 NOT MET AT IDLEWILD AND HE GETS THRU IMMIGRATION SUCCESSFULLY ALONE, HE WILL GO TAFT HOTEL. IF NOT ABLE GET ROOM WILL LEAVE MESSAGE AT DESK FOR "MR WATSON."

2. IF THIS FAILS MAY POSSIBLY BE TRACED THRU NEW YORK FRIEND MARGARET LAGRUTTA. TELEPHONE TE6-0949.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 1

PRITY LEOP DIR CITE VIEN 9254

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF LEOP 1533 (IN 29021) C/AF

1. VIEN UNABLE PROVIDE CABLE REQUESTED REF FROM ANY REAL SCHOOL. BELIEVE EFFORT TO SEND CABLE FROM NOTIONAL SCHOOL WOULD BE QUICKLY DISCOVERED AND INVESTIGATED BY LOCAL POSTAL AUTHORITIES. COULD PROVIDE LETTER ON UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA STATIONERY BUT NOT FROM AN ENGINEERING FACULTY. MIGHT BE ABLE PROVIDE LETTER ON VIEN TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE WHICH HAS ENGINEERING FACULTY. IF TIME PERMITS SUGGEST KURIOT MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE FORGED ENGINEERING DIPLOMA FROM AN AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OR PROPERLY CERTIFIED PHOTOSTAT OF SUCH.

2. IF VIEN TO ASSIST, NEED BACKGROUND INFO WIROGUE. IF HE IDEN REF? WHAT PASSPORT HAS HE? HAS HE LIVED IN AUSTRIA?

3. FOR DIR: A PHOTOSTAT OF AN AUSTRIAN ENGINEERING DIPLOMA IN METALLURGY FROM THE MONTANISCHE HOCHSCHULE LEOBEN IS IN ATTACHMENTS TO EAVA 25324.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE: 296
08 JULY 61 296

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: BRAZZAVILLE

ACTION: C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY ISSUED MR. DUNBAR, AF AT 1605 8 JUL)
(MR. DUNBAR NOTIFIED AT 1525 8 JUL)

INFO: *COP, C/CI, C/WE 2, D/OS 2, S/C 2

1-1 copy

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JUL 8 19 17Z 61

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 36146

TO: OPIM DIR INFO: LEOP POUCH CITE: BRAZ 133

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF: DIR 48429 (OUT 71923)

1. WIROGUE/1 TO PARIS 10 JULY ON AIR FRANCE 410. FROM PARIS TO NEW YORK 11 JULY ON AIR FRANCE 011. ARRIVES IDLEWILD 2120 LOCAL TIME 11 JULY.

2. HAS NON IMMIGRANT MULTIPLE ENTRY VISA TYPE B-1 ISSUED BRAZZAVILLE WITH AGREEMENT GPILIAD.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

I.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

297
DATE : 8 JUL 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY ISSUED MR. DUNBAR AT 1605 8 JUL)
(MR. DUNBAR AF, NOTIFIED AT 1525 8 JUL)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/WE 2, S/C 2

L - 1 copy

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 8 1800Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 36124

per CSH 43-43

TO (PRIORITY) DIR INFO ROME BRAZ (POUCH) CITE LEOP 1629

RYBAT WIROGUE

WIROGUE/1 WENT TO BRAZ AFTERNOON 7 JULY. BRAZ HOLDING 72 HOURS AND WILL MAKE ALL TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS AND WILL ADVISE HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

per CSH 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

520
DATE : 5 JUL 61

TO : DIRECTOR

2° - 1 copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1845, 5 JUL)
(MR NIESCIUR, AF DIV NOTIFIED AT 1830, 5 JUL)

INFO : COP, C/CI, S/C 2

JUL 5 2200Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 34523

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1599

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF DIR 17181*

1. STATION PLANS EXCHANGE CONGO FRANCS REALIZED BY WIROGUE/1 IN SALE OF CAR AT RATE 50 CONGO FRANCS TO DOLLAR. HE STILL HAS OUTSTANDING LOAN $4000 MADE BY HQS. ALSO ORIGINAL HQS TRAVEL ADVANCE OF $1010 WHICH NEVER TA'D TO LEOP.

2. ADVISE SOONEST IF HQS WISHES ANY W/1 CAR MONEY WITHHELD AGAINST ADVANCES.

3. STATION WILL ADVANCE W/1 COST OF TOURIST TICKET PLUS $100 EXPENSES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CABLE PRE-DATES CS FILES. COPY MAY BE SEEN IN SIGNAL CENTER ARCHIVES.

DESENSITIZED
[illegible] 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

521

DATE : 5 JUL 61

2 - copy

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1845, 5 JUL)
(MR NIESCIUR, AF DIV NOTIFIED AT 1830, 5 JUL)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

JUL 5 2200Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 34522

PRITY DIR INFO PRITY ROME CITE LEOP 1597

RYBAT WIROGUE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF DIR 48429 (OUT 71923)

1. CAN ARRANGE VISA WIROGUE/1 IN BRAZZA. MOST DIRECT FLIGHT PBPRIME PANAM FROM LEOP. LEOP RECOGNIZES NEED FOR MOST DIRECT TRAVEL W/1 BUT TO MAINTAIN SECURITY (PREVENT ANY FUTURE CHECK BY WILDCAT REVEALING W/1 TRAVEL PBPRIME) AND STILL PROVIDE 72 HOUR PRIOR NOTICE SUGGEST FOLLOWING:

A. W/1 DEPART 7 JULY FROM BRAZZA TO ROME VIA KLM.

B. W/1 BE CONTACTED ROME BY KUBARKER. WHEN WIROGUE RESERVATIONS ROME TO PBPRIME FIRM FORM NOTIFY HQS GIVING REQUIRED 72 HOUR LEAD TIME.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 34522 LEOP 1597

2. LEOP WILL ADVANCE TRAVEL MONEY AND W/1 TO BUY OWN TICKET. ADVISE.

3. ROME: IF HQS APPROVES WILL NEED CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS GAVE SUGGESTIONS AND GUIDANCE TO DECREASE RISK OF WIROGUE/1 ARREST AND POSSIBLE COMPROMISE KUBARK.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

175
7 JUL 61

ROUTING
1 [illegible] 4
2 5
3 [illegible] 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 5 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 0740 7 JUL '61.
AF NOTIFIED AT 0740 7 JUL '61.)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/WE 2, S/C 2

JUL 7 1045Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 35434

OPIM DIR ROME CITE LEOP 1615

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A. LEOP 1599 (NOT SENT ROME) (IN 34523)

B. LEOP 1597 (IN 34522)

NEED REPLY REFS SOONEST. WIROGUE/1 BEING HELD BRAZZA PENDING ANSWERS.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE	461 : 6 JUL 61
TO	: DIRECTOR
FROM	: ROME
ACTION	: C/AF 3*
INFO	: COP, C/CI, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 6 2058Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 35125

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

PRITY LEOP INFO DIR CITE ROME 4534 (SHERIDAN ACTING)

RYBAT ARGANDER AJAJA

REF LEOP 1597 (IN 34522)**

IF SUITABLE WIROGUE/1 COME EMBASSY HE CAN ASK AT RECEPTION FOR MR. HERBERT HOOKER. OTHERWISE HAVE HIM TELEPHONE HOOKER AT ROME 675915 GIVING NAME AS JOHN THOMAS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR ZIBET USED.

**IF HQS APPROVES, REQUESTED CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

2

ORIG : Daniel Niesciur:eaf
UNIT : AF/W/2 1648
EXT : 4818
DATE : 30 June 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

30 Jun 61 22

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

L - 1 copy

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, D/OS 2, S/C 2

Chrono

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-43

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT71923

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO BRAZ CITE DIR 48429

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF: A. LEOP 1568 (IN 31066)
B. LEOP 1533 (IN 29021)

1. REGRET DELAY. AGREE RISK OF WIROGUE/1 ARREST AND POSSIBLE COMPROMISE TOO GREAT. TO PRECLUDE ANY REVELATION KUBARK INVOLVEMENT REQUEST W/1 RETURN PBPRIME. SUGGEST FOLLOWING GUIDANCE:

A. HAVE W/1 OBTAIN PBPRIME VISA IN EITHER LEOP OR BRAZ. EITHER STATION SHOULD FACILITATE VISA ISSUANCE. HAVE HIM TAKE MOST DIRECT FLIGHT TO PBPRIME. DEPARTURE FROM BRAZ PREFERRED. NEED 72 HR PRIOR NOTICE TO LAY ON WITH IMMIGRATION AND KUSODA.

B. IF ABOVE NOT FEASIBLE W/1 WILL HAVE TO GO GERMANY THERE BE CONTACTED AND BROUGHT PBPRIME UNDER KUSODA ESCORT VIA MATS. THIS APPROACH COMPLICATED AND REQUIRES UPWARDS OF WEEK TO TEN DAYS TO ARRANGE.

C. EITHER PLAN WILL REQUIRE FULL DETAILS RE ROUTE, FLTS, PORTS OF ENTRY, ETA'S ETC.

(CONTINUED)

DESENSITIZED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Dan Niesciur:eaf
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818
DATE : 30 June 1961

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 71923

TO INFO CITE DIR 48429

2. IN ANY EVENT IT ADVISABLE W/1 MOVE BRAZ FOR WEEK OR SO UNTIL ALL ARRANGEMENTS MADE.

3. FOR BRAZ: ARRANGE CONTACT AND TURN OVER WITH LEOP AND ASSIST IN ANY MANNER POSSIBLE. FYI W/1 REQUIRES FIRM HAND AND STRICT CONTROL.

4. ADVISE YOUR IDEAS HOW BEST TO PHASE OUT HIS CURRENT JOB AND LIQUIDATE HOLDINGS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE BACKSTOPPING WIROGUE SINCE WILDCAT IS MAKING DETAILED CHECK ON HIM.

AF/W/1 W
AF/W/2

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK
C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

1775

ORIG: D. [illegible]ESCIUR
UNIT: [illegible]/W/2
EXT: 4318
DATE: 15 June 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: COP, C/CI, S/C 2

16 Jun 61 23 32z

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT 67366
67366

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 45917
45917

RYBAT WIROGUE

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

REF: LEOP 1487 (IN 24937)*

1. WIROGUE/1 SALARY AND HOUSING $750 PER MONTH. PRORATED MONTHLY OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES NOT TO EXCEED $150. TOTAL $900.

2. POUCHING INCREASE $3750 CAR THRU 30 JUNE 61.

END OF MESSAGE

*DESK COMMENT: Referenced cable is RYBAT

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/B&F
AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible] R. C. [illegible]
C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1 [illegible]
2 [illegible]
3 [illegible]
4
5
6

DATE : 14 JUN 61 302

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3,

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

copy

JUN 14 1607Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 24937

DIR CITE LEOP 1487

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A ACLW 206, ATT B: 23 DEC 60

B DIR 17181 (out 54652)**

C DIR 18035 (out 56360)*

1. FROM REFS STATION ASSUMES WIROGUE TO BE PAID SALARY $500 MONTHLY PLUS QUARTERS ALLOWANCE $250, PLUS OPERATIONAL EXPENSES.

2. OAR DATED 14 JANUARY 61 ALLOTS ONLY $2,000 THROUGH 30 JUNE 61.
$3750

3. REQUEST HQS SPECIFY LIMIT MONTLY EXPENDITURE AND ADVISE STATION OF ALLOTMENT AUTHORIZATION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CABLE PREDATES CS FILES. COPY MAY BE SEEN IN SIGNAL CENTER ARCHIVES.

**DIR 17181 (OUT 54652) DISCUSSED WIROGUE CONTRACT, PAY $500 MONTH, $250 MONTH QUARTERS, AND $4000 OPS LOAN. PLACED WIROGUE ON PROBATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

456

DATE : 31 MAY 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 31 21542 61

ROUTINE

IN 18147

DIR CITE LEOP 1395

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

ON 28 MAY WILDCAT/5 REQUESTED NAME CHECK FOR WIROGUE ON BEHALF WIROOT. APPARENT CAUSE WAS APPLICATION BY WIROGUE FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE CARD THOUGH STATION NOT AWARE HE APPLYING UNTIL NAME CHECK REQUESTED. WIROOT/2 SUPICIOUS MAJOR PIERROT WHO HAS BEEN IN OPPOSITION WIFLAT/3. THUS WIROOT SUSPICIOUS WIROGUE VIEW HIS CONTACTS WITH PIERROT. STATION REPLYING NO TRACES. DEPENDING ON DEPTH, CHECK COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTY FOR WIROGUE.

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

WIROGUE File

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET RYBAT

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCHUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818
DATE : 2 MAY 1961

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

3 MAY 61 19 51 z

TO : FROB, LEOPOLDVILLE INFO: FRAN

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

OUT52348

CITE DIR 38033

38033

TO FROB, LEOP INFO FRAN

RYBAT WIROGUE ZIBET

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

REF: A. LEOP 1200 (IN 38501)
B. FROB 9126 (IN 37367)

1. REGRET DELAY. FLUID SITUATION CONGO MAY PRECLUDE INJECTION KUBARK ASSETS IN CONGOLESE AIR FORCE. GOC STALLING ON CAJEEP/2 CONTRACT SINCE NO ONE WANTS ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY.

2. KUBARK INTEREST HAVING C/2 SUPPLY INSTRUCTORS TWO FOLD (A) PREVENT BELGIANS FILLING JOBS AND (B) INTEL PENETRATION, IF POSSIBLE. STILL HOPING ACCOMPLISH BUT PROSPECTS DIM.

3. IN EVENT CONTRACT IS SIGNED SUGGEST FROB CONSIDER FOLLOWING CRITERIA:

A. ALL SIX INSTRUCTORS C/2 AGREED FURNISH TO BE NON-BELGIAN FRENCH SPEAKERS.

B. ATTEMPT RECRUIT FROM THIS GROUP ONE OR TWO WHO LOOK GOOD OPERATIONALLY AS KUTUBE ASSETS. IF RECRUITED AUTHORIZE UP TO 800 DM PER MONTH AGENT SALARY WHILE IN CONGO. THIS IN ADDITION TO NORMAL SALARY INSTRUCTORS TO RECEIVE UNDER CONTRACT FROM CAF.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET RYBAT

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET RYBAT

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818
DATE : 2 MAY 1961

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

3 [illegible] 19 51z

TO : FROB, LEOPOLDVILLE INFO: FRAN

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED

R ROUTINE

OUT52348

TO INFO CITE DIR 38033

38033

C. C/2 INVOLVEMENT BE KEPT AT MINIMUM.

D. ~~[illegible]~~ CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE TO BE FURNISHED BY LECP.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/S COMMENT: *RE CAJEEP/2 CONTRACT BEING DRAFTED BUT NOT SIGNED.

B Tweedy
BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF

GORDON STEWART C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

D/EE/G/Ops HWN
COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET RYBAT

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

General Information on WIROGUE/1:

A. Portinent Biographical Information:

Pseudonym - Ernest G. MAYCRINK

Place of birth - Gori, Georgia, USSR

Date of birth - 12 July 1918

Sex - Male

Race - Caucasian

Religion - none

Marital status - Divorced (wife and 2 children - one son and one daughter)

Citizenship - Stateless

Education:

1922-24	Paris, Notre Dame, uncomp., change of family address
1925	Paris, Lycee Montagne, uncomp., change of family address
1925	Paris, Ecole Commule, uncomp., change of family address
1926	Viroflex, Lycee Hoche, uncomp., expelled for pranks
1926	Paris, Ecole Commule, uncomp., change of address
1931	Paris-Vanves, Ecole Michelet, 6 mo comp, expelled for insubordination
1933-35	Chalon S. Marne Art et Metier, Technical Engineering School, attended one and one half years and expelled
1936-37	Paris, Ecole Brequet, Electro-Engineering, attended one year earned first half of Baccaularaute in electro technology then expelled
1938-39	Paris, School of Photography and Movies, trained as cine camera operator technician, left after one and three fourths of a two year course due to outbreak of WW II in November 1939

Military History:

Dec 1939 - Paris, volunteered for French Foreign Legion
Jan 1940 - Tunis, North Africa, 1st Cav. Reg. 1st Squadron, 4th Platoon
Feb 1940 - Sent to N.C.O. training course in Legion, pulled out to be reassigned to all-Georgian unit

SECRET

Mar-Aug 1940 - Barcares, assigned in Georgian unit
Aug 1940 - Paris, discharged at end of Franco/German hostilities

Employment History:

1942 - Paris, volunteered for work in Germany
Poelitz, worked for HIDRYER WERKE for one year as installation electrician
Paris, self-employed at photo shop. Portrait photography
Berlin, photographer of metals for a factory which produces electrodes for welding instruments
Berlin, assembly line worker in Berlin factory producing steel ammunition belts. Received commendation from factory director for labor saving device he manufacture of device for automatic adjustment of cartridge cases
Meugelheim, driver mechanics course for the NSKK (Nazi Party Motorized Corp.) Drove trucks during construction of Atlantic wall by Germans.
1943 - Berlin, employed with SCHUPOLIZEI as translator French-German language
1946-47 - Paris, employed by Architects Carre Associated as electrical installation planner and constructor of proto-type model builder
1951-52 - Paris (in prison), devised and sold on the French market a pocket automatic transit indicator. Received cash settlement for this while in prison
1953 - Rion (in prison), devised and gave to prison administrator, invention for making cardboard boxes. Device was built and used by prison administrator
Dec 1955 to Apr 1956 - Gap, employed by M.D. as X-ray machine maintenance technician and operator
1956-57 - Gap, invented, patented and sold a calendar device to the French commercial market
1958 - Ambert, invented and patented a commercial advertising device, photo-mechanical in nature. Models built and sold to French advertising concerns
1959-60 - U.S., devised and passed drawings for two pieces of equipment for use in Project AESENTINEL
July 1960 - U.S., presently working on a low-cost telephone answering device

Occupational Specialities:

Mechanical electrical engineering
Cine or portrait photography
Research and innovation of labor/cost saving devices

Languages and Dialects:

French - native
German - very good
Georgian - fluent spoken; reading and writing good
English - speaking and writing fair; reading fluent
Spanish - speaking and writing poor; reading good
Russian - poor

Special Skills:

Experience in document forgery
1942 - Achen-Berlin, altered own documents
1942 - Berlin-Paris, filled in German travel blank forms. Altered old German authorization stamp for travel forms. Made other authentications stamps for other people interested in travel across German held territory
1943-44 - Berlin, fabricated stamps and cachets for travel documents. Used photo techniques for changing and/or aging pictures in documents. Also reassembled old false passports to form new ones, as well as counterfeited German financial vouchers.

B. Operational Information:

1. Circumstances of Recruitment -

The agent was first contacted in October 1958 as a result of a lead from AEPADDLE. He was recruited in April 1959 by the Frankfurt Station, for a REDSOX operation. There had been some difficulty in the initial recruitment, since it could not be resolved as to whether or not he could work amicably with another agent in the proposed operation. After psychological assessments and LCFLUTTER examination, it was decided to recruit subject. He was assigned the crypto AEASPIC. In April 1959 subject was brought to the DOB, via a HBRAINBOW flight. Subject was trained in the AESENTINEL project for a black mission into the USSR as a member of a REDSOX team. This project was postponed for a year. In the interim he was assigned to TSD, where he was employed at a covert site, involving the cataloguing of specific information from East German Documents, and developing and/or improving tools and methods for picking locks. On 17 June 1960, it was decided that Project AESENTINEL would not be carried out. On receipt of this information SR/DOB endeavored to place subject elsewhere, where his training would be beneficial. The African Division expressed interest and had agreed to utilize him as a result of assessments. During the period from the 21st of October until dispatch, subject will be carried on COA funds.

SECRET

2. Security Flaps -

A. During the latter part of WW II subject was arrested by the German police for forgery. He was not unduly held by the criminal investigation branch of the police but passed on to the Gestapo. Subject was brought to Berlin where he was interrogated for several months at Gestapo Headquarters. Later he was tried and sentenced to death. For some unknown reason he was moved from jail to jail, concentration camp to concentration camp! While in prison he resorted to a "ruse de guerre" and told the Germans his father had invented a motor that could run without gasoline. He offered to draw the designs of the motor and was able to stall long enough to be liberated by components of the advancing U.S. Army.

B. In 1946-47 subject and an accomplice committed two robberies of jewelry stores.

C. In 1949 subject robbed a bank of 1,000,000 Fr. fr. His accomplice was apprehended and shortly thereafter confessed, implicating subject. Subject was apprehended while attempting to cross the Franco-Spanish border. He was sentenced to ten years in prison of which he served only five, receiving parole for good behavior. Upon release in 1955, he was exiled on parole to Gap, France where he worked as an architect.

D. To our knowledge there is no indication that subject is known to be associated with KUBARK.

SECRET

14-00000

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 376
11 MAY 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : AF 7

INFO : CCG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐

MAY 11 1615Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 49373

DIR INFO ELIZ PARI CITE LEOP 1304

C/S COMMENT: *POA GRANTED IDEN, RECRUITMENT AS CONTRACT AGENT POSSIBLE AND REQUEST HE BE CONSIDERED FOR UNOFFICIAL COVER ASSIGNMENT.

REF DIR 38541 (IN 53269) *

1. IN PRESENT POLITICAL FLUX STATION FEELS AIR KATANGA

POSITION FOR SUBJ REF WOULD BE TENUOUS AND POSSIBLY SHORT-LIVED.

THERE ARE TWO POSITIONS LEOP WHERE IDEN WOULD BE HIGHLY USEFUL.

2. WICLAM PILOT DUE DEPART LEOP ~~END OF~~ JUNE. NEED REPLACE-

MENT. STATION REVISING WICLAM PROJECT SO REGULAR CHARTER BUSINESS

ESTABLISHED. HOWEVER THIS ONLY ~~PART~~ TIME. SECOND POSSIBILITY PER

WIROGUE SUGGESTION. WIROGUE UNCERTAIN RE SALARY BUT STATES CAN ARRANGE

SUBJ BE INTRODUCED PROPER PEOPLE. AS AIR FORCE LACKS PILOTS STATION

BELIEVES SUBJ COULD EASILY MAKE SELF INDISPENSIBLE, ACHIEVING POSITION

WHERESDE ABLE PROVIDE INTEL ON MILITARY, SPOT, AND GATHER GENERAL INTEL

FLYING AROUND CONGO. WOULD PREFER USE SUBJ LATTER POSITION WITH POSSIBLE

HELP ON WICLAM PLANE, PROVIDING HQS HAS NO OBJECTION CROSSING OPS.

END OF MESSAGE

COPY

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2303
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 9 MAY 1961
CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMPER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

481

DATE : 24 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR 2 - 1 copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

APR 24 2047Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 41144

DIR CITE LEOP 1226

REF A DIR 36207 (out 98503)*

B LEOP 1200 (IN 38501)

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE REPORTS HE CURRENTLY ACTING AS ONLY INSTRUCTOR CAF CADETS. IN SPITE OF DUBIOUS QUALIFICATION WIROGUE TEACHING THEORY NAVIGATION, READING MANUALS ON SIDE TO STAY AHEAD. PIERROT STILL CHIEF CAF BUT REFUSES TAKE ANY RESPONSIBILITY OR ACTION. ENTIRE CAF PROGRAM SLOWLY DISINTEGRATING.

2. WIROGUE BELIEVES SHOULD PERSON CAPBALE TEACH FLYING APPEAR LEOP AND ASK FOR POSITION INSTRUCTOR CAF HE WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY HIRED OBVIOUSLY KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER CAF CAPBABLE OF PAYING SALARY AND LIABLE TO BE SLOW MAKING PAYMENT . THIS IS STILL OPENING

SECRET

FOR ASSET.

3. UNOC CONTACTS WITH GOC ON REORGANIZATION CNA AND SUPPORT FOR TRAINING LIMITED SO FAR TO EXCHANGE NOTES. NO DECISIONS YET TAKEN. UNOC POLICY PER LEOP 1141 IS SUPPORT ANY ACTION CAF ABLE TAKE ON ITS OWN. SUGGEST TRIAL OF SINGLE RECRUITED ASSET APPEARING IN LEOP AND BEING PUT IN TOUCH WITH CAF BY WIROGUE. NO ASSETS CAPABLE THIS ACTION CURRENTLY ON SCENE. PER REF A DOUBT IF UN WOULD HIRE BUT WOULD GIVE BLESSING TO CAF HIRING.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET RYBAT

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4813 1655
DATE : 27 APRIL 1961

ROUTING
1 2 3 4 5 6

27 APR 61 21 56 z

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI, S/C 2

1 copy

OUT 50644 OUT50644

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 37204

37204

SANITIZED per CSN 43-43

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF: LEOP 1226 (IN 41144)*

1. PROCRASTINATION GOC SIGN CAJEEP/2 CONTRACT AND INABILITY PIERROT ASSUME RESPONSIBLE CONTROL CAF AND ITS PROGRAM REDUCES PROSPECT INJECTING KUBARK ASSETS INTO TRAINING SCHOOL.

2. WILL ATTEMPT LOCATE SUITABLE ASSET REQUESTED PARA 3 REF ALTHO BELIEVE SITUATION TOO DUBIOUS TO ENSURE THIS MUCH OF A LONG-RANGE INTEL PENETRATION. ORIGINAL CONCEPT WAS TO PREEMPT BELGIUM PARTICIPATION IN CAF AND INTEL MISSION SECONDARY. THIS APPARENTLY NO LONGER CASE.

3. AS YOU AWARE NECESSARY TAKE A SECOND LOOK AT ANY WIROGUE PROPOSAL.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/S COMMENT: *WIROGUE BELIEVES SHOULD PERSON CAPABLE TEACH FLYING APPEAR LEOP AND ASK FOR POSITION INSTRUCTOR CAF HE WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY HIRED, OBVIOUSLY KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER CAF CAPABLE OF PAYING SALARY AND LIABLE TO BE SLOW MAKING PAYMENT.

SANITIZED per CSN 43-43

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET RYBAT

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

625

DATE : 19 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : COP, CA2, CA/EAG, CA/PMG, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, IW 2, FI, FI/INT 2, FI/D, WE 4, DD/1, AD/CI, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 19 2230Z 61 7 W

ROUTINE

IN 38653

TDCS

TO INFO CITE

DIR INFO BRUS LANT PARI CITE LEOP 1203

INTEL

SUPDATA PA

1 (ALSO RECEIVED 6) WIROGUE DURING STAFF MEETING, PARA 2, WIROGUE

FILED 191340Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

ACL-444

LEOPOLDVILLE, CONGO REPUBLIC

SUBJECT BELGIAN SIPORT OF CONGOLESE AIR FORCE

DOI 18 APR 61. PADA LEOPOLDVILLE REPUBLIC OF CONGO 18 APR 61

SOURCE EUROPEAN ADVISER (F) TO CONGOLESE MILITARY. APPR 2.

IWOG COMMENT:

THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS NOT BEEN DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

REPORT NO. TDCS

COUNTRY

DATE DISTR.

SUBJECT

PRECEDENCE

REFERENCES IN 38653

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

FIELD REPORT NO.

APPRAISAL

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. DURING A CONGOLESE MILITARY STAFF MEETING INCLUDING CAPTAIN BABIA, AIDE TO GENERAL MOBUTU, AND MAJOR PAUL ARNOLD PIERROT, CHIEF OF THE CONGOLESE AIR FORCE (CAF), THE QUESTION WAS RAISED WHO IS PAYING FOR LARGE SHIPMENT OF CAF SUPPLIES. BABIA CONFIRMED THAT LT. COL MARLIERE, BELGIAN ADVISOR TO MOBUTU AND FORMER SENIOR FORCE PUBLIQUE OFFICER, PAID FOR THE SUPPLIES ON BEHALF OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT. (SOURCE COMMENT: BELGIANS ARE BEGINNING SUPPLY EVERYTHING TO CAF WITHOUT COST.) (FIELD COMMENT: QUANTITY, TYPE AND PRICE OF MATERIAL NOT KNOWN TO SOURCE. ANOTHER CONTACT (F) STATED BELGIANS NOW BRINGING IN EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO HELP TRAIN CAF.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

To: [illegible] ...erdorfer

From: [illegible]

Subject: Trip to Congo

Dear Stan,

Just a brief rundown on the Congo business. I arrived on the Monday following Easter and of course it was a holiday so did not and was not contacted undtil the following day (Tuesday). By that night I had an agreement ready and in the hands on the Congolese Air Force on Wednesday. On Thursday we met with the minister of the cabinet and he indicated all was in order and that the papers would be signed the following day (Friday). On Friday nothing happened so we started out Saturday, again nothing happened so there was nothing to do but wait until Monday. By this time I had talked with Sabena and got a free ticket on them from Leopoldville to Brussels so that I'd have more flexibility. On Monday there was still no action and again gave them the benefit of the doubt by remaining until Tuesday when I could have gotten a 707 flight on Monday night direct to Brussels. On Tuesday I left Leopoldville in the afternoon, proceeded to Brazzaville and ~~had~~ waited 10 hours for the delayed KLM flight (DC-7), finally leaving at 3 AM and arriving in Frankfurt at 1900 that night

As I told you, Major Reiner is an Austrian who acts as an adviser to the Congolese Air Force. Major Pierrott, commander of the air force is young and ambitious. At the present time there is nothing but a shell and instructors are badly needed. There are, according to Pierrott, 8 AT-6's and 7 Tiger Moths on order which will give them a total strength of 9 of each aircraft. They expect to put a total of 120 cadets into training. I talked along the lines of a package deal on training but this didn't sink in. They just want to get started and go in to detail later. As you can well imagine, the government structure in the Congo is very shaky and it will be a long time before the U. N. forces leave and things settle in a normal manner. For example, there could be a change in the govt., including Pierrott, any day and this could be followed by any number of changes in the weeks following. Any contract we sign could be thrown out by a new government. In addition there is also a good possibility of renewed violence which might throw everything in a turmoil.

Without going in to detail, following are the more important points of the agreement:

1. Air Force retain us for purpose of hiring personnel for purpose of training mechanic and pilot personnel.
2. Air Force pays transportation of personnel from point of hire to Leopoldville and return plus any travel done in the Congo.
3. Air Force pays (to the bank in Ely) $1,000.00 for my expenses such payment to made within 20 days after signing agreement.
4. Initially, 3 mechanic and 3 pilot instructors will be hired and Air Force will accept persons of German, Swiss, French or English nationality
5. Pay of personnel will be responsibility of Air Force and mechanics will receive $770.00 or $650.00 plus room. Pilots will receive $870.00 ~~hr~~ plus flying pay which is figured at $50.00 for each 25 hours flown (they anticipate pilots will fly 25 hours per month) or $750 plus room plus flying pay. In addition, all personnel will be furnished their noon meal except on weekends when they are not working.
6. Personnel will be able to transfer one half of their pay to country of residence---this figures out at $385.00 and $455.00 re-

We received 10% over actual cost of purchases made on behalf of Air Force except aircraft on which we are paid 2% over cost.

8. Air Force will pay us a fee of 10% each month on total salaries of employees. It was agreed that individual salaries would be averaged at $650.00 each. This payment to be made on the first of each month by transfer to the Ely bank.

9. We obtain insurance in amount of Sterling 3500 for each employee and Air Force pay the actual cost .

10.

As you can see, it is a simple agreement and one which will not make us rich. They indicated they would want one film strip machine and available training films for mechanics and pilots.

It appears that there will be a great deal of contract flying for the UN in the Congo for some time to come. As I told you, Interocean and TWA are doing the most with Interocean having six DC-4s flying 1500 hours per month and TWA doing nearly 300 with two aircraft. TWA will pull their aircraft out in the next ten days for the Haj and it would seem that your man in New York might be able to work something out whereby we could replace them and remain in the Congo.

Living accomodation are good in Leopoldville. Villas rent from $100.00 on up with a nice place for about $175.00. This would be a three or four bedroom place with all the facilities. If we had crews there, they could live together as I'm sure none of them would want to take families. Food is expensive but no more so than in Tripoli. Car gasoline sells at a little over 40 cents a gallon which isn't bad. Nothing is being imported in to the country so things could get real serious in the next 4 to 6 months. American cigaretts are not available and Belgian brands are not plentiful. There is a money black market for hard currency and you can get anywhere from 65 to 90 Congo francs for a dollar whereas the legal rate of exhange is 50 to a dollar. The Time correspondent was caught changing money and the Embassy had quite a time getting the thing straightened out.

Under ordinary circumstances (except for contracting with the UN), I wouldn't think of signing a contract with the Congolese govt. at this time. However, with things as they stand this is a good way to get our foot in the door and could open up other fields in West Africa. Perhaps Carma would like to make a trip out there now as our representative!!!!

Wish the situation in Jordan were better---I'll give you as much done as possible after my arrival. I've heard nothing more from the Congo so will probably be leaving on Monday for Cairo.

Best regards,

18 April 61

WIROGUE UPDATE

MEMO FOR THE RECORD:

1. CARTER YATES CALLED THIS DAY AND PASSED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RE THE CONTRACT WHICH CAJEEP/2 PRESENTED TO THE CONGOLESE:

a. Would furnish six French speaking instructors immediately. Three more at a later date.

b. Would furnish one electronic training device which flashes still pictures onto a screen and describes the action in the local language.

c. In return the Congolese would reimburse CAJEEP/2 $1000.00 for his trip to Leopoldville and 10% of the salaries of the instructors for handling the administration of the project.

d. Also 2% commission on any aircraft which CAJEEP/2 would be asked to purchase.

2. CARTER INSTRUCTED THE COVER COMPANY NOT TO ALLOW CAJEEP/2 TO MAKE ANY AIRCRAFT PURCHASES WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL. THE COVER COMPANY ACEDEDTO THE REQUEST.

3. INFORMATION AS TO SALARIES OR OTHER ARRANGEMENTS ARE UNKNOWN.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 487
19 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

L-1 copy

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH 43-43

APR 19 1838Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 38501

DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE LEOP 1200

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A DIR 34146 (out 94186)

B FROB 9126 (IN 37367)

1. CAJEEP/2 HIGHLY COOPERATIVE WHEN LEOP. CONTRACT DRAFTED BUT NEVER SIGNED DUE FLUID POLITICAL SITUATION.

2. KAZADI GOC MIN DEFENSE RECALLED BY KALONJI TO SUD KASAI JUST WHEN CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. ADOULA IN ADDITION TO MIN INTERIOR TOOK OVER POST DEFENSE. AIR FORCE (CAF) DIRECTLY UNDER DEFENSE BUT 11 APR PIERROT, CHIEF CAF, LEFT LEOP FOR WEEK. RETURNED 17 APR WITH STATUS OF CAF IN GOC STRUCTURE VERY UNCERTAIN. STRONG POSSIBILITY IT MAY BE PUT UNDER COMMAND MOBUTU AND ARMY.

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

585

DATE : 17 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

L-1 copy

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

APR 17 2141Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 37367

DIR LEOP ~~INFO~~ FRAN CITE FROB (GROVEN ACTING) 9126

RYBAT WIROUGE ZIBET

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED NEGOTIATIONS WITH CAJEEP/2 FOR CONTRACT TO SUPPLY NON-PBPRIME PILOTS AND MECHANICS FOR CONGOLESE AIRFORCE SCHOOL IN CONGO

REF: A. LEOP 1169 (IN 34729)

B. DIR 34146 (OUT 94186)*

1. CAJEEP-2 PHONED AT WIESBADEN HOME BY FOB STAFFER ASMR. RIEDER ON 14 APRIL. HE AGREED INFORM US WHEN CONTRACT SIGNED AND ON FUTURE TRAVEL.

2. ON 17 APRIL CAJEEP-2 PHONED TO CONFIRM HE LEAVING FOR MIDDLE EAST. HAD HEARD NOTHING ABOUT CONTRACT BUT PRESUMES WILL BE SIGNED BEFORE HIS RETURN TO WIESBADEN CIRCA 1 MAY.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE MORE DETAILS ON REF B REQUEST FOR RECRUITMENT OF SELECTED CONGO JOB APPLICANTS. ADVISE LANGUAGE CAPABILITY DESIRED OR SPECIFIC CRITERIA FOR PROPOSED RECRUITMENT ATTEMPTS WITH GUIDANCE ON SALARY COMMITMENTS AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

3. AT THIS POINT DIRECTION GOC, AND MIN DEFENSE GOING HIGHLY CONFUSED. NO SINGLE AUTHORITY WILLING TO TAKE ACTION AND HAND OF BELGIANS OBVIOUS BEHIND CURRENT PROCRASTINATION.

4. IF POSSIBLE IMPLEMENT CONTRACT WILL INFORM IMMEDIATELY. IN PRESENT SHUFFLE WIROGUE STILL CAF ADVISER BUT POSITION MUCH WEAKER THAN WHEN KAZADI MIN DEFENSE. DEPENDING ON DEGREE OF INTERFERENCE BY BELGIANS WIROGUE COULD EASILY LOSE POSITION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED CAJEEP/2 NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 287
12 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

L-1 copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 12 1519Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 34729

DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE LEOP 1169

RYBAT WIROGUE

[illegible] per CSN 43-43

REF DIR 34136*

1. CAJEEP/2 DEPARTED LEOP 12 APR. WILL REMAIN WIESBADEN UNTIL 17 APR. HE THEN HAS BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST. INFORMED WOULD BE CONTACTED IF CONTRACT SIGNED.

2. KALONJI RECALLED ACTING MIN DEFENSE KAZADI WHO LEFT FOR SUD KASAI 11 APR. ADOULA WHO ALREADY MIN INTERIOR NOW ALSO DEFENSE. SAID DISCUSSED CONTRACT WITH ILEO WHICH THEY FAVOR BUT HAVE NOT SIGNED. AT LEAST PART OF REASON IS FEAR ANY CONGOLESE MINISTER COMMIT HIMSELF TO POSITIVE ACTION. IF CONTRACT SIGNED BY 16 APR CABLE NOTIFICATION TO CAJEEP/2 WILL SET IN MOTION IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTRACT.

3. FOR HQS: DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE. POSSIBLY DIR 34146 (OUT 94186) INTENDED.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 614
11 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

par CSH 43-43

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 11 2038Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 34307

DIR LEOP INFO FRAN CITE FROB (CROWEN ACTING) 9095

RYBAT WIROGUE ZIBET CAECLIPSE

REF: DIR 34146 (OUT 94186)*

FOB ABLE HANDLE PARA 2 REF. CAJEEP-2 CAN CALL MR. RIEDER, FRANKFURT CIVILIAN 558433 DURING WORK HOURS AND IDENTIFY SELF AS TRUE NAME. REQUEST CAJEEP-2 ADDRESS OR TELEPHONE NUMBER GERMANY IF PREFER CONTACT INITIATED BY FOB.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED FROB TO CONTACT CAJEEP/2 UPON RETURN WIES MID APRIL TO OBTAIN NAMES AND BIO DATA ON CANDIDATES FOR CONGO JOBS.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

656

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCIUR
UNIT : ~~4818~~ AF/W/2
EXT : 4818
DATE : 10 APRIL 1961

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

10 APR 61 22 22z

TO : FROB, LEOPOLDVILLE INFO: FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

—1 copy

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 94186
PRIORITY

per CSN 43-43

TO (PRITY) FROB, LEOP INFO FRAN CITE DIR 34146

JIROGUE RYBAT ZIBET

1. CAJEEP/2 (IDEN) PRESENTLY LEOP NEGOTIATING CONTRACT TO SUPPLY NON-PBPRIME PILOTS AND MECHANICS FOR CONGOLESE AIRFORCE SCHOOL IN CONGO. LEOP STATION POSING AS INTERESTED TPELIDE OFFICIALS IN CONTACT C/2 WHO NOT FORMALLY AWARE BUT PROBABLY SUSPECTS KUBARK INVOLVEMENT, ~~BUT PROBABLY SUSPECTS AND CAN BE MADE AWARE OUR~~ NO OBJECTION MAKING C-2 WITTING KUBARK INTEREST. ~~INTEREST.~~

HWN

2. REQUEST FROB CONTACT C/2 UPON RETURN WIESBADEN MID APRIL TO OBTAIN NAMES AND BIO DATA ON CANDIDATES FOR CONGO JOBS WITH OBJECT IN SOME CASES OF THEIR RECRUITMENT AS KUBARK AGENTS. IF LEAD TIME SUFFICIENT WOULD PREFER RECRUITMENTS BE MADE BY FROB PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FOR LEOP. EXTENT OF C/2 INVOLVEMENT SHOULD BE KEPT MINIMUM.

3. FOR LEOP: INFORM C/2 CONTACT WILL BE MADE WIESBADEN. C/2 GRANTED OA 12 FEB '60 FOR SUCH CONTACTS.

END OF MESSAGE.

HWN CHIEF/EE/G

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818 1657
DATE : 10 APRIL 1961

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : FROB, LEOPOLDVILLE INFO: FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

10 APR 61 22 22z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

OUT 94187 94187

TO (PRITY) FROB, LEOP INFO FRAN CITE DIR 34147

WIROGUE RYBAT ZIBET 34147

REF: DIR 34146 (OUT 94188)

IDEN ROLLAND C. SWANSON.

END OF MESSAGE.

CHIEF/EE/

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible]

039

DATE : 9 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR L-1477

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 1100, 9 APR 61)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 9 1338Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 33155

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1155

per CSH 43-43

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF LEOP 1128 (IN 30853)*

1. KANDOLO MINISTER TO SIGN CONTRACT. DETAILS SETTLED BUT TYPICAL CONGOLESE PROCRASTINATION. SWANSON DELAYED DEPARTURE TWICE BECAUSE CONTRACT NOT YET SIGNED BUT IS SETTING 11 APR AS FIRM DEPARTURE WHETHER CONTRACT SIGNED OR NOT. GCC INFORMED.

2. HAVE NOT MENTIONED SUGGESTION PARA 3 REF TO SWANSON. WAITING APPROVAL.

3. WIROGUE REPORTED 9 APR STAHL EXPECTED ANY DAY. IF POSSIBLE WILL ARRANGE THEY NOT MEET.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *SUGGESTED CONTACT BE ESTABLISHED FOR SWANSON WIESBADEN.

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

293 RLG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 7 APR 6:

TO : DIRECTOR

2-1 copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 0835, 7 APR 61)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH 43-43

APR 7 1301Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 32207

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1141 BETTELHEIM ACTING

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF LEOP 1140 (IN 31740)

Huh?

PIERROT ?

SWANSON DISCUSSED CONTRACT WITH UNOC ACTING CHIEF AIR COL. PIEROTTI. (

PIEROTTI STATED UNOC POLICY TO GIVE FULL SUPPORT PIERROT AND CAF AND AS LONG AS NO BELGIANS OR PBPRIMER INVOLVED AS ADVISORS UNOC IN FULL ACCORD. SWANSON MEETING AMBASSADOR TO CLEAR AIR COMPLETELY.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *STATED STATION INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT SWANSON REP OF EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY OF PBPRIME PARENT COMPANY NOW IN LEOP NEGOIATING CONTRACT WITH CAF.

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 467 JO
6 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED C/AF 1430, 6 APR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

L-1 copy

APR 6 1921Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 31740

CITE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1140 (BETTELHEIM ACTING)

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF LEOP 1128 (IN 30853)*

1. STATION INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT SWANSON REP OF EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY OF PBPRIME PARENT COMPANY NOW IN LEOP NEGOIATING CONTRACT WITH CAF. THIS PRESENTED AS DEAL STRICTLY BETWEEN GOC AND COMPANY WITH NO MENTION KUBARK INTEREST. AMBASSADOR CONCERNED BECAUSE MAY BE AGAINST 21 FEB RESOLUTION UN. AMBASSADOR STATES CAN NOT APPROVE OR BACK SWANSON IF HE DOES NOT OBTAIN UNOC APPROVAL OF CONTRACT.

2. AMBASSADOR TOLD OUR INTEREST ONLY AROUSED LAST COUPLE DAYS WHEN SWANSON APPEARED. WE INTERESTED IN WHO INSTRUCTORS ARE AND KIND OF DEAL MADE WITH CAF.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

3. STATION INSTRUCTING SWANSON CLEAR WITH UNOC BEFORE PROCEEDING. THOUGH SWANSON PBPRIME NO OTHER PBPRIME CONNECTION SHOWS. SITUATION SUCH UNOC DECISION THIS TIME UNCERTAIN AND ENTIRE OP MAY BE SHORT CIRCUITED.

4. AMBASSADOR FEELS STRONGLY THIS MATTER TO POINT HE STATED MIGHT HAVE TO REMAND SWANSON PASSPORT IF DEAL MADE WITHOUT UNOC APPROVAL . VIEW ABOVE, SUGGEST HQS NOT DISCUSS WITH STATE PENDING OUTCOME SWANSON-UNOC TALK.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *SUGGESTED CONTACT BE ESTABLISHED FOR SWANSON WIESBADEN WHICH WOULD EXPEDITE OBTAINING NAMES AND BIO DATA OF CANDIDATES. COULD ALSO PROVIDE ACCESS TO CANDIDATES FOR POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 295 JO
5 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED C/AF, 1000, 5 APR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

L-copy

APR 5 1314Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 30853

[illegible] per CSN 43-43

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1128 (BETTELHEIM ACTING)

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF A. DIR 33071 Out 91606*

B. DIR 32895 Out 91094

1. WILCO. WIROGUE NOT GOING EUROPE USING ALIBI SWANSON VISIT HERE PRECLUDES NEED. RE PARA 4 REF A WIROGUE REPORTS COL STAHL CANCELLED TRIP LEOP LAST MOMENT FOR UNKNOWN REASON.

2. CONTACT WITH SWANSON DELAYED UNTIL REF A RECEIVED. LONG INITIAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN WIROGUE AND SWANSON HELD 4 APR WITH SALVACK AS TPELIDE REP. DISCUSSION CENTERED ON STRAIGHT BUSINESS DEAL CONCERNING INSTRUCTORS NEEDED, PAYMENTS, CONTRACTS, LIFE INSURANCE, AVAILABILITY, WORKING CONDITIONS, ETC. BIGGEST STUMBLING BLOCKS NOW ARE METHOD SIGNING CONTRACTS AND COST PLUS CLAIM ON SWANSON'S PART. SWANSON WILLING NEGOTIATE AND MAKE DEAL BUT DOES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

LEOP 1128 IN 30853

NOT WISH APPEAR TOO EASY. WIROGUE DISCUSSING POINTS WITH PIERROT 5 APR AND WILL MEET SWANSON FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AFTERNOON 5 APR.

3. SWANSON STATES HAS TWO PEOPLE READY IMMEDIATELY AND REMAINDER SOON. OBVIOUS FROM STATEMENTS AND SITUATION HE AWARE AT LEAST PBPRIME INTEREST BUT STATION CONCURS HE APPEARS DISCREET. SUGGEST CONTACT BE ESTABLISHED FOR SWANSON WIESBADEN WHICH WOULD EXPEDITE OBTAINING NAMES AND BIO DATA OF CANDIDATES. COULD ALSO PROVIDE ACCESS TO CANDIDATES FOR POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT. SWANSON ETD 6 APR.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *SINCE UPHILL INVOLVED, CONFUSED AS TO WHY PIERROT ASKING W/1 CONTACT COL STAHL.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCIUR 1616
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4018
DATE : 4 APRIL 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET RYBAT

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE L
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : *COP, S/C 2

4 APR 61 21 54 z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

~~91968~~

PRIORITY

OUT 91968

per CSN 43-43

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 33214

33214

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF: A. LEOP 1120 (IN 29880)
B. DIR 32696 (OUT 90734)
C. DIR 33071 (OUT 91606)

INSTRUCTIONS REFS B AND C STILL STAND.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT YQNECTAR CABLES.

per CSN 43-43

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET RYBAT

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/WEST
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

498
DATE : 3 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1940 3 APR)
(MR. NIESCIUR, AF, NOTIFIED AT 1935 3 APR)

INFO : *COP, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

APR 4 0025Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 29880

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1120 (BETTELHEIM ACTING)

per CSN 43-43

WIROGUE RYBAT

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT YQNECTAR CABLES.

REF A. LEOP 1112 (CIN29376)

B. DIR 32696 (Out 90734)**

**SWANSON UNWITTING KUBARK RELATIONSHIP THIS CASE BUT HAS FULL SECURITY CLEARANCE AND HAS BEEN CONTACT KUBARK GERMANY IN PAST.

1. WIROGUE RECEIVED CABLE FROM SWANSON LATE 2 APR GIVING ETA 3 APR. CABLE STATES SWANSON STAYING BRAZ SINCE NO VISA LEOP. WIROUGE REQUESTS STATION REP BE PRESENT AT MEETINGS BUT STATION NEEDS KNOW DEGREE SWANSON WITTING AND COVER FOR STATION REP BE PRESENT. IF SWANSON UNWITTING THIS COULD BLOW OP. PLAN WIROGUE CONTACT SWANSON 4 APR BRAZ.

2. FULLY RECOGNIZE DANGERS WIROGUE COVER IN GERMANY BUT WITH UPHILL REPS APPEARING IN LEOP WIROGUE AND COVER WILL BE PUT TO TEST ANYWAY. WISH EMPHASIZE WIROGUE DIRECTED GO EUROPE BY CAF AND STATION FEELS IT NECESSARY WIROGUE OBEY FOR PROPER DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS.

SECRET (END OF MESSAGE)

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Dan Niesciur:nye
UNIT : AF/W/2 1661
EXT : 4618
DATE : 3 April 1961

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

1 copy

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

3 Apr 61 23 32z

PRIORITY
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

[illegible]

TO PRITY LEOP INFO CITE DIR 33071

33071

WIROGUE RYBAT

par CSN 43-43

REF: A. LEOP 1112 (IN 29376)
B. MUNI 5132 (IN 28066)
C. LEOP 1069 (IN 25118) PARA 3

1. OUR FIRST INTEREST CNA AIRFORCE IS TO SEE THAT IT FILLED BY NON-BELGIANS. ALL THINGS BEING POSSIBLE WE WOULD ALSO LIKE AN INTELL PENETRATION AND STILL HOPE FOR THIS BUT IN VIEW PRIORITY WILL NOT INTERFERE DIRECT GERMAN CONTRIBUTION.

2. SINCE SWANSON UNWITTING (ALTHO PROBABLY SUSPECTS KUBARK INTEREST) YOU WILL HAVE TO ENSURE VIA XX WIROGUE/1 THAT YOU REPRESENTED IN DISCUSSIONS. ASSUME ROLE OF TPELIDE OFFICER ASSIGNED TO THIS TYPE DEVELOPMENTS ADEQUATE EXPLANATION TO SWANSON WHO REPORTEDLY DISCREET. HIS COMPANY CONFIRMED THAT A CABLE IN FRENCH HAD BEEN SENT W/1 ON 28 MARCH AND SWANSON PRESENTLY IN LEOP.

3. W/1 NOT ORIGINALLY CAST FOR ROLE TYPE HE HAS ASSUMED. WE DEFINITELY NOT WILLING PERMIT HIM FREE WHEEL IN EUROPE MAKING CONTACTS A/O CONTRACTS AT WILL. INDEED UNLESS A CLOSE AND HARD HAND IS KEPT ON HIM HE MAY LIKELY END UP MORE OF A LIABILITY THAN AN ASSET. WE AWARE HE HARD HEADED AND SMART AND REALIZE CO WILL HAVE TO BE ON HIS TOES AND EQUALLY HARDHEADED BUT HE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET OUT OF HAND AND OUR READING IS THAT HE WILL RESPECT THIS

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Dan Niesciur:rye
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818
DATE : 3 April 1961

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PAGE TWO

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 91606
DIR 33071

TO
INFO
CITE DIR

TREATMENT.

4. SINCE UPHILL INVOLVED WE CONFUSED AS TO WHY PIERROT ASKING W/1 CONTACT COL STAHL, COL STEIN AND UNIDENTIFIED GENERAL (PRESUMABLY UTILITY) IN MUNICH TO DISCUSS ARMS FOR CAF SINCE PER REF B COL STAHL NOW IN CONGO SUPPOSEDLY DISCUSSING SAME TOPIC UNLESS W/1 UNAWARE THIS FACT AND TRYING TO PLAY OWN ANGLE. ALSO IT IS NOTED THAT PER REF C PIERROT TOLD W/1 "THEY IN CONTACT COLONEL GERMANY WHO COULD CHECK INSTRUCTORS". THIS MAY WELL BE UPHILL AND IF SO NAMES SWANSON IS PLANNING TO SUGGEST ARE BONA XXX FIDE INSTRUCTORS WITHOUT INFERENCE UPHILL AND WITHOUT KUBARK AFFILIATION.

5. IN OUR VIEW W/1 INVOLVEMENT WITH UPHILL PORTENDS DIFFICULTIES FOR HIM EVEN DISASTER IN OUR USE OF HIM SINCE AS YOU KNOW W/1 DOCUMENTATION FALSE AND THIS AND HIS ALLEDGED MILITARY SERVICE IN GERMAN ARMY CAN EASILY BE CHECKED BY UPHILL.

6. DETERMINATION POSSIBLE EXIT WIROGUE THIS CASE TO BE MADE AFTER WE INFORMED RESULTS SWANSON/WIROGUE CONVERSATIONS. REPEAT THESE MUST BE MONITORED AND CONTROLLED.

END OF MESSAGE

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK
C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

072
DATE : 2 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ~~LEOPOLDVILLE~~

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, S/C 2

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

APR 3 0830Z 61
SERVICE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 29376 A LEOP 1112

TO INFO CITE

CS COMMENT:

CORRECT PARA 1 TO READ:

"1. IN ANSWER REF A PARA 2 WE PREFER WIROGUE REMAIN LEOP BUT HE WORKING FOR CAF AND ORDERED EUROPE. NOW GIVEN SECOND TASK TO CONTACT GERMAN OFFICERS COL (FNU) STAHL (L) (SEE MUNI 5132 (IN 28066)), COL (FNU) STEIN, AND UNIDENTIFIED GERMAN GENERAL MUNICH. HE TO DISCUSS ARMS FOR CAF INCLUDING TYPES AND QUANTITY AVAILABLE, PRICE, METHOD AND TIME OF DELIVERY, THOUGH HE NOT TO ACTUALLY MAKE DEAL. TO PREVENT LEAVING THIS MATTER UPHILL, DOES HQS WISH PROVIDE NAMES OTHER ARMS DEALERS. MAY BE DIFFICULT KEEP WIROGUE LEOP IF KAZADI AND PIERROT DETERMINED HE GO GERMANY."

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

628

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE : 2 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1530 2 APR
DR. HOUCK, AF NOTIFIED AT 1610, MR NIESCIUR, AF,
NOTIFIED 1615 2 APRIL)

INFO : ~~COP~~, S/C 2

APR 2 1933Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 29376

OPIM DIR CITE LEOP 1112

REF A. DIR 32895 (OUT 91094) ##

B. DIR 32696 (OUT 90734)

1. IN ANSWER REF A PARA 2 WE PREFER WIROGUE REMAIN LEOP BUT HE WORKING FOR CAF AND ORDERED EUROPE NOW GIVEN SECOND TASK ~~FOR (PORTION GARBLED WILL FORWARD)~~ TO CONTACT GERMAN OFFICERS COL (FNU) STAHL (L) (SEE MUNI 5132), (IN 28066) COL (FNU) STEIN AND UNIDENTIFIED GERMAN GEN~~A~~ERAL MUNICH. HE ~~(PORTION GARBLED WILL FORWARD)~~ TO DISCUSS ARMS FOR CAF INCLUDING TYPES AND QUANTITY AVAILABLE ~~(PORTION GRABLED WILL FORWARD)~~ PRICE, METHOD AND TIME OF DELIVERY (THOUGH HE NOT TO ACTUALLY MAKE DEAL, TO PREVENT ~~(PORTION GARBLED WILL FORWARD)~~) LEAVING THIS MATTER UPHILL, DOES HQS WISH PROVIDE NAMES OTHER ARMS DEALERS.

MAY BE DIFFICULT KEEP WIROGUE LEOP IF KAZADI AND PIERROT DETERMINED HE GO GERMANY

~~NR~~2. REQUEST CLARIFICATION REF B. IF SWANSON NOT WITTING KUBARK RELATIONSHI.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

THIS CASE WHAT HAS HE BEEN TOLD AND WHAT IS STORY FOR ORIGINAL CONNECTION PER PREVIOUS TRAFFIC, ONE LEVER USED BY WIROGUE TO BECOME PIERROT ADVISER WAS STORY HE HAD CONTACTS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTORS. IF SWANSON ESTABLISHES DIRECT CONTACT PIERROT THIS COULD EASILY UNDERCUT WIROGUE INFLUENCE.

3. WISH URGE IF POSSIBLE RECRUIT AT LEAST ONE EACH MECHANIC AND FLYING INSTRUCTOR PRIOR TO ARRIVAL LEOP. FULLY APPRECIATE TIME FACTOR AND DESIRE PREEMPT ANY EFFORT ON PART PIERROT TO PROCURE INSTRUCTORS BY OTHER CHANNELS. IF WIROGUE AND SWANSON SETTLE ON NAMES THERE IS

~~IS~~ POSSIBLE TIME FOR HQS TO CHECK OUT PROSPECTIVE INSTRUCTORS AND MAKE RECRUITMENT PITCH. ALTHOUGH CONGOLESE HAVE BIG IDEAS AND HOPE NEED MORE INSTRUCTORS, THIS MAY NOT BE CASE. IF WE RUSH IN ALL ? NONKUBARK ASSETS WE MAY FIND OURSELVES WITH EXPENSIVE OP OVER WHICH WE HAVE LITTLE CONTROL AND WHICH MIGHT PRODUCE LITTLE FOR KUBARK.

4. IF FEASIBLE SUGGEST HQS DELAY SWANSON TRIP AND HAVE HIM CABLE WIROGUE IMMEDIATELY TO MEET HIM IN EUROPE. ALSO, PLEASE ADVISE

SOONEST WHAT COVER STORY USED WITH SWANSON RE WIROGUE AND COVER HQS SUGGESTS SALVACK OR GUTHMAN USE IF PRESENT WIROGUE/SWANSON MEETINGS. IF SWANSON COMES LEOP IMPOSSIBLE TO ATTEND ALL MEETINGS WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING WIROGUE COVER.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT YQNECTAR CABLES.

**DID NOT WANT WIROGUE WANDERING IN EUROPE.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Dr. L.C.Houck
UNIT : C/AF/W
EXT : 3939 1530
DATE : 1 April 1961

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

1 APR 61 17 41z

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

1 - copy

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 91094

91094

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 32895

32895

RYBAT WIROGUE

per CSN 43-43

REFS A LEOP 1102 (IN 28638)
B DIR 32696 (OUT 90734)

1. ASSUME REFS CROSSED. AS YOU NOTE SWANSON ENROUTE LEOP.

2. IN ANY EVENT WE DEFINITELY DO NOT WANT WIROGUE WANDERING IN EUROPE.

3. FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE WISH ALL MEETINGS TO BE IN AREA AND CONTROLLED BY KUBARK STAFF PERSONNEL.

END OF MESSAGE

References RYBAT

per CSN 43-43

B Tweedy
BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

LESTER C. HOUCK
C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

4

14-00000

6 492
DATE : 31 MAR 61

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

L-1 copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF 1610-31 MAR)
(AF CABLE DESK NOTIFIED AT 1605-31 MAR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

MAR 31 2053Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 28638

PRITY DIR INFO BERN FRAN CITE LEOP 1162

RYBAT WIROGUE

[illegible] per CSN 43-43

REF DIR 31932 (NOT SENT BERN FRAN) (out 87945)

1. AT MEETING 31 MARCH WIROGUE REPORTED PIERROT AND KAZADI HAVE ORDERED HIS TRAVEL GERMANY TO MAKE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIRING AND TRANSPORTATION RONGOLESE AIR FORCE (CAF) INSTRUCTORS. HE SHOULD DEPART WEEK 3-7 APRIL VIA UAT AND CURRENTLY INTENDS TRAVEL GENEVA THEN GERMANY. LOCATION IN GERMANY DEPENDS ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH SWANSON FROM WHOM HE HAS NOT YET HEARD AND WITH WHOM ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE MADE BEFORE DEPARTURE. SWANSON CABLE NEEDED SOONEST.

2. WIROGUE TO ALSO MEET CAF CONTACT IN GERMANY WHOSE NAME AND LOCATION STILL NOT KNOWN. WIROGUE BEING PRESSURED TO OBTAIN THIS INFO.

3. STATION BELIEVES WIROGUES ACTIVITIES EUROPE SHOULD BE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLOSELY GUIDED. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL KUBARK CONTACTS BE ARRANGED GENEVA AND GERMANY. CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS NEEDED. EXACT ITINERARY WILL BE PROVIDED WHEN KNOWN.

4. FOR HQS: PIERROT HIGHLY CONCERNED OVER POOR CAF SECURITY AND WIROGUE CURRENTLY IN FULL CHARGE ARRANGE AND TIGHTEN CAF SECURITY. HAS REQUESTED FULL GUIDANCE FROM STATION. STATION FEELS SECURITY SYSTEM AND SUGGESTIONS SHOULD BE BASED ON WW ROMAN TWO GERMAN ARMY PATTERN IN KEEPING WIROGUE COVER. REQUEST DISPATCH ANDY BACKGROUND MATERIAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED WIROGUE DEVELOPMENTS.

14-00000

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818 1604
DATE : 31 MARCH 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE 2 copy

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : *COP, S/C 2

31 MAR 61 20 43z

DEFERRED SIG CEN

ROUTINE

OUT 9 734

PRIORITY

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO per CSN 43-43

OUT 90734

CITE DIR 32696

32696

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF: A. LEOP 1086 (IN 26480)
B. LEOP 1087 (IN 27093)**
C. LEOP 0957 (IN 15023)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT YQUECTAR CABLES.
**ASSUMED THERE KUBARK RELATIONSHIP WITH SWANSON OR COMPANY AND AT LEAST SOME OF GERMAN INSTRUCTIONS RECRUITED OR RECRUITABLE.

1. KUBARK IN CONTACT WITH PARENT COMPANY OF WHICH SWANSON FOREIGN REP STATIONED WIESBADEN AND ARAB DEVELOPMENT CORP ITS SUBSIDIARY. K SWANSON UNWITTING KUBARK RELATIONSHIP THIS CASE BUT HAS FULL SECURITY CLEARANCE AND HAS BEEN CONTACT KUBARK GERMANY IN PAST.

2. SWANSON INFORMED HOME OFFICE HE PLANNING VISIT LEOP O/A 1 APR TO DISCUSS PERSONNEL, TRAINING SCHOOL REQUIREMENTS AND CONTRACTS. WILL CABLE ETA TO WIROGUE/1.

3. SWANSON WILL HAVE LIST OF BONA FIDE GERMAN INSTRUCTORS WHICH IF ACCEPTABLE TO PIERROT WILL GO CONGO SOONEST. NONE OF THIS GROUP WILL BE RECRUITED KUBARK AGENTS SINCE TIME TOO SHORT. BUT AS NEED INCREASES FOR MORE INSTRUCTORS OR FOR REPLACEMENT OF FIRST GROUP KUBARK CAN THEN INJECT RECRUITED AGENTS THRU SWANSON'S PLACEMENT SERVICE. THIS PHASE OF EXERCISE DESIGNED TO ~~XXXXXX~~ PREEMPT ANY EFFORT ON PART OF PIERROT TO PROCURE INSTRUCTORS UNILATERALLY.

4. TO PRECLUDE FURTHER W/1 DEALS STRONGLY URGE GUTHMAN BE PRESENT IN ANY DISCUSSIONS W/1 HAS WITH SWANSON OR CONDUCT DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT W/1.

END OF MESSAGE.

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ACLA-515

TO: Chief, KURIOT
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: Unknown
VIA: Chief, AF
FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville
DATE: 28 April 1961
SUBJECT: AQUATIC/Operational/WIROGUE
Transmittal Receipt for Documents
ACTION: For Your Information
No indexing required
REF: ACLA-258, dated 30 March 1961

Transmitted herewith is one copy of the signed receipt for authentication materials as requested in reference.

Lester H. SALVACK

28 April 1961

Attachment: as stated above, h/w

Distribution:
4-Hqs, w/attach

201-233477

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

14-00000

RYBA

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief of Station, LEOPOLDVILLE

INFO.

FROM Chief, KURIOT

per CSN 43-43

SUBJECT AQUATIC/OPERATIONAL/WIROGUE
Transmittal of Documents for WIROGUE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
DIR-29127

1. Transmitted herewith are two WW II German documents (attachment A) issued to subject which will substantiate his background legend as a former Wehrmacht Captain. Attachment B gives particular information of entries on the documents which you may use for briefing subject.

2. It is requested that these documents be returned to this office when no longer needed operationally. Please sign and return one copy of the enclosed receipt for authentication materials.

WALLACE F. JACCOMY

Enclosure: (1 envl.) UNDER SEPARATE COVER
A. documents with receipt
B. information

Distribution:
3 - COS, Leopoldville, w/encl. UNDER SEPARATE COVER

201-233477

DATE TYPED
30 MARCH 1961

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
ACLW-258

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
REF: AQUATIC

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
TSD/IB/FS#4	JOSEPH BORNIGER	rc	3391

1 - TSD/SRS. wo/encl.
2 - AF/W/1, w/encl. A
1 - IB files
1 - IB/FS#4

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AF/W/1		Coordinated by phone w/Dan Niesciur

DESENSITIZED

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
ASSTC/TSD AUTH	per CSN 43-43	CHARLES J. RYAN

RYBAT

RYBAT

SECRET

DOCUMENTATION FOR GEORG REINER

per CSN 43-43

MILITARY CERTIFICATE

1. Military Certificate issued by the 8th Grenadier Training Brigade. (Infantry) The designation O.U. on the right hand top corner means "Ortsunterkunft", it is the place of issue-which during war time did not specify a town or area due to security consideration. It merely means the place where the unit was physically stationed at the time the document was issued. The certificate states that Capt. Georg Reiner, born 25. July 1921 in Salzburg has lost his regular military pay book on 2.2.1944 on account of enemy action. A new book has not yet been issued.

SOLDBUCH ERSATZ

2. The Soldbuch Ersatz (Pay book substitute). (a) Front Section (Soldbuch-Ersatz) indicates that document was issued to Capt. Georg Reiner, born on 25. July 1921 in Salzburg, his dog tag number is 214739, his nearest of kin, his father Franz Reiner, lives in Salzburg, Siebenbürgerstr. 2. (b) The Section (Orden und Ehrenzeichen) indicates that he received a medal for having been wounded on 9.12.42. (c) The Section (Beurlaubungen über fünf Tage) shows that he was granted a leave for over five days. It was a convalescent leave which entitled him to free transportation. The lower portion of the same section indicates that he received some shots for dysentery (Ruhr) and was vaccinated. The other side of the document shows the following from right to left.

   a. Clothing record.
   b. Issuance of rationed shaving cream and soap.
   c. Name of military unit to which he belongs.

3. It is requested that subject sign document on space provided. (Soldbuch Ersatz name over Eigenhändige Unterschrift.) DO NOT use ball point pen. Have subject practice "his name" several times before affixing to document.

RYBAT

per CSN 43-43

SECRET

14-00000

DIRECTOR

MUNICH

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

Chrono
cc:
cc:
cc:

MAR 30 23[illegible]

ROUTINE

IN 28066

LEOP INFO DIR FRAN CITE MUNI 5132

per CSN 43-43

KAPOK ZIBET ZRAMBER UPHILL

REF LEOP 1094 (IN 27411).

1. FYI, UPHILL'S MIL ADVISOR TO CONGO DEPARTING FOR TWO WEEK TRIP LEOPOLDVILLE 30 MARCH. HE WILL HAVE DISCUSSIONS NESTOR VATU[illegible] AND MOBUTU, REVIEW CONGO MIL SITUATION, AND ACCEPT FOR CONSIDERATION HIS HQS ANY REQUESTS FOR AID. HE EXPECTED RETURN MID APRIL FOR [illegible] THREE WEEKS FURTHER DISCUSSIONS UPHILL PRIOR RETURNING LEOPOLDVILLE OFFICIALLY START HIS ASSIGNMENT. HE WILL BE DOCUMENTED IN CONGO AS LT. COL. STAHL. HIS TRUE NAME IS MEISTER AND HE PROBABLY IDEN WOLF MEISTER, BORN 12 MAY 1923 IN BONN, ACTIVE FOR UPHILL [illegible] (201-[illegible]) LEAST 55. (DIR: SEE MUNI 3234 AND RELATED TRAFFIC.) NOTE SHOULD BE NO KUBARK EFFORT CONTACT STAHL THIS TRIP.

2. HAVE ALSO LEARNED UPHILL INTEL ADVISOR NOW BEING TRAINED

SECRET

per CSN 43-43

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

[illegible] ASSIGNMENT CONGO, PROBABLY WILL DEPART EARLY MAY. HE IS KURT [illegible], ALIAS BOCHOLT, BORN 27 MARCH 1911 IN BERLIN/NEUKOELLN, FORMER [illegible]MINALKOMMISSAR AND SECURITY MAN FOR CHANCELLOR ADENAUER. ([illegible] SEE EGMA 51362.)

2. FOR DIR: COMMENTS PARA 4 DIR 38615 FOLLOW IN EGMA 54242.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HEARTILY CONCURRED ADVISABILITY ESTABLISHING CONTACT [illegible] PERSONNEL IN CONGO. BELIEVED LOCAL EXCHANGE INFO USEFUL FOR [illegible]BARK AND UPHILL.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 332
29 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 0935 29 MAR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

x-copy

ROUTING

MAR 29 1408Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 27093

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1087

IN27093

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF: DIR 31932 (out 88945) *

1. ASSUME THERE IS KUBARK RELATIONSHIP WITH SWANSON OR COMPANY AND AT LEAST SOME OF GERMAN INSTRUCTORS RECRUITED OR RECRUITABLE. PREFER RECRUITMENT INSTRUCTORS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL CONGO.

2. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN MR. ROLAND C. SWANSON AND WIROGUE/1 RE THE CONTRACTING OF PILOTS AND MECHANICS.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: D. [illegible]
UNIT: AF/W/2 1589
EXT: 3939
DATE: 28 MARCH 1961

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 30 MAR 61 19 37 z
ROUTINE
P PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

SIG CEN
INITIALS

88945
88945

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 31932

31932

REF: A. LEOP 1011 (IN 20574)
B. LEOP 1069 (IN 25118)

per CSN 43-43

WIROGUE RYBAT

1. MR. ROLAND C. SWANSON, EUROPEAN REP OF ARAB DEVELOPMENT CORP WHICH SPECIALIZES IN CONTRACTING PILOTS AND MECHANICS WILL SEND WIROGUE/1 CABLE WITH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. INSTRUCTORS WILL BE GERMAN ON SIX MONTH CONTRACT.

2. PLS ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/S COMMENT: *KAZADI AND CROWD PUSHING FOR IMMEDIATE RESULTS AND TEND TO BLAME WIROGUE THAT PROGRAM HAS NOT STARTED.

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

43-43

[illegible], C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1 [illegible]	4
2 [illegible]	5
3 [illegible]	6

438

DATE : 28 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR L-1 copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 1420 28 MAR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

MAR 28 1900Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 26480

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1086

RYBAT

WIROGUE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

REF LEOP 1069 (25118)

1. WIROGUE INFORMED BY PEIRROT 27 MARCH CAF SCHOOL WILL DEFINITELY BEGIN 3 APRIL. AT SAME TIME ASKED IF HE COULD LEAVE IMMEDIATELY FOR EUROPE TO GET INSTRUCTORS AND AGAIN QUERIED FOR NAMES OF PEOPLE TO WHOM HE HAD WRITTEN. HAS STILL NOT OBTAINED NAME OF GERMAN COL WHO IS CONGOLESE CONTACT BUT CAF WILLING TO BYPASS.

2. WIROGUE WORRIED BECAUSE THUS FAR HE HAS BEEN ALL TALK AND NO RESULTS. PRESSURES ON WIROGUE FROM WIFLAT/3, KAZADI AND PIERROT GREATER ALL THE TIME. GOC CLAIMED CAN GET INSTRUCTORS HERE WITHOUT PASSPORTS. IF SOME NAMES SUPPLIED CAN STALL BUT WITHOUT ANY NAMES SITUATION FOR WIROGUE BECOMING VERY DIFFICULT. WIROGUE BELIEVES

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

IF PROJECT DOESN'T RECEIVE SUPPORT IMMEDIATELY HE WILL HAVE TO LEAVE AREA. STATION DOUBTS PROBLEM QUITE THIS SERIOUS.

3. ADVISE ACTION TACAN SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

364

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 25 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF 1711 25 MAR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

Y-1 copy
JA

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MAR 25 2050Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 25118

PRITY DIR CITE LECP 1059

IN25118

[illegible] per CSH 43-43

RYBAT

WIROGUE

REF: A. DIR 31327 (OUT 87351)**

B. ACLA-491

1. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ARE LEARNED BY WIROGUE FROM CONGOLESE ON ALMOST DAILY BASIS. REF B CONTAINED ALL INFO THEN AVAILABLE. AND SHOULD BE IN HQS. IN TYPICAL CONGOLESE MANNER KAZADI AND CROWD ARE PUKSHING FOR IMMEDIATE RESULTS AND TEND BLAME WIROGUE THAT ENTIRE PROGRAM DID NOT START DAY AFTER THEY HAD IDEA. THEY TOLD HIM THEY WILL BEGIN 1 APR.

2. IN ADDITION TO ADVANTAGE OF KUBARK ASSETS BEING INSERTED INTO ARMED FORCES PER LECP 1011* THE REQUEST FOR WIROGUE TO DEVELOP CAF INTEL ARM HAS POSSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING CONGOLESE INTEL NET WHICH

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

WOULD BE RESPONSIVE KUBARK DIRECTION THROUGH WIROGUE. THIS ENTIRE OP DEPENDS ON DEGREE OF TRUST CONGOLESE HAVE IN WIROGUE. STATION FEELS THIS PROJECT IS EMMINENTLY WORTH PRIORITY SUPPORT AND WILL COLLAPSE IF NOT PROVIDED. WIROGUE REPORTED 25 MARCH HIS FINAL CONTRACT COULD NOT BE SIGNED UNTIL DOCUMENTATION RECEIVED.

3. TO GAIN TIME SUGGEST HQS ARRANGE SEND CABLE IN FRENCH TO IDEN FROM POSSIBLE CANDIDATE WHO HAS AVIATION CONTACTS. IF POSSIBLE SHOULD BE BACKSTOPPED SINCE KAZADI AND PIERROT INFORMED WIROGUE THEY IN CONTACT COLONEL IN GERMANY WHO COULD CHECK INSTRUCTORS. WIROGUE HAS BEEN TOLD TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO. IDEALLY ONE INSTRUCTOR AVAILABLE NEAR 1 APR WOULD SATISFY MOST CURRENT PRESSURES IF ASSURANCES OF REST FORTHCOMING SOON COULD BE GIVEN PIERROT AND KAZADI.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* IN 20574

**PRESENTLY INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY TO RECRUIT NON-PBPRIME INSTRUCTORS.

400

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 25 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF DIV 1820 25 MAR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 25 1754Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 25054

TO

INFO

CITE LEOP 1070

per CSN 43-43

PRITY DIR

RYBAT

WIROGUE

RE LEOP 1069 (IN 25118)

IDEN: MAJOR G.F. REINER, B.P. 2949, LEOPOLDVILLE.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T per CSN 43-43

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

416
DATE : 23 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR   2 - 1 copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 1320 23 MAR)

INFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

MAR 23 1807Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 23793

TO (PRIORITY) DIR   INFO   CITE LEOP 1052

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A LEOP 1011 (IN 20574)

B ACLA 491

1. WIROGUE SHOWED STATION DRAFT DOCUMENTS FROM MINISTRY NATIONAL DEFENSE OUTLINING NEW CONGO AIR FORCE (CAF). DRAFTS LISTED FOUR MECHANICS INSTRUCTORS IN FIELDS MOTORS, RADIO ELECTRICITY AND INSTRUMENTS EXPECTED BY END OF MARCH. ALSO SHOWED WIROGUE AS CONTACT BETWEEN CAF COMMANDING OFFICER AND EUROPEAN PERSONNEL, TO STUDY ADMIN MODIFICATIONS FOR EFFICIENCY, AND BEGIN SERVICE FOR OPS CONTROL AND SECURITY SERVICE.

2. WIROGUE BEING PRESSURED BY PIERROT AND KAZADI FOR RESULTS HIS EFFORTS RECRUIT INSTRUCTORS. ALSO ASKED FOR DOCUMENTATION. WIROGUE REQUESTED WE PROVIDE AT LEAST A CABLE ANSWER IN FRENCH FROM POINT

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.   Copy No.

IN GERMANY IN RESPONSE TO HIS HYPOTHETICAL LETTER THAT SOMEONE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING OFFER.

3. GOOD POSSIBILITY WIROGUE POSITION WILL BE JEOPARDIZED BY HIS NOT PRODUCING INSTRUCTORS. REALIZE TIME ELEMENT SHORT BUT CONGOLESE ANXIOUS DEVELOP CAF RAPIDLY. ADVISE SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *WIRGUE NOW HAS ATTESTATION AS ADVISOR WITH RANK OF MAJOR TO CONGOLESE AIR FORCE SIGNED BY KAZADI.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: D. [illegible]
UNIT: AF/WEST/2
EXT: 4818 1772
DATE: 23 MARCH 1961

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	23 MAR 61 23 13z
X	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	SIGNED INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 87351

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 31327

WIROGUE [illegible]

31327

REF: LEOP 1011 (IN 20574)

per CSN 43-43

1. PRESENTLY INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY TO RECRUIT NON-PBPRIME INSTRUCTORS. DO NOT BELIEVE FIRM COMMITMENT CAN BE GIVEN UNTIL COMPLETE RUN DOWN POUCHED BY YOU RECEIVED AND REVIEWED.

2. IN INTERIM HAVE WIROGUE DELAY PIERROT.

END OF MESSAGE.

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

399

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 17 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 1345 17 MAR 61)

INFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

Lucy

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MAR 17 1834Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 20574

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1011

per CSCI 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 29127 Out 82330

1. COMPLETE RUNDOWN POUCHED 17 MAR. WIROGUE NOW HAS ATTESTATION AS ADVISOR WITH RANK OF MAJOR TO CONGOLESE AIR FORCE SIGNED BY KAZADI. CONTRACT NOT YET SIGNED.

2. WIROGUE ASKED BY PIERROT IF HE WOULD GO EUROPE TO HIRE INSTRUCTORS. WIROGUE WILLING BUT NEEDS INSTRUCTORS SET UP FOR HIM. WHEN ASKED TIME ELEMENT WIROGUE SAID BY END OF MONTH.

3. PIERROT ALSO ASKED WIROGUE TO CREATE CONGOLESE AIR INTEL ARM

4. STATION BELIEVES USE KUBARK RECRUITED INSTRUCTORS WOULD PROVIDE EXCELLENT MEANS INSERTING ASSETS INTO ARMED FORCES AND DEVELOPING AIR FORCE INTO HIGHLY TRAINED AND DISCIPLINED UNIT WHICH COULD BE USED

SECRET per CSCI 43-43

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

TO SUPPORT POLITICAL FORCES FRIENDLY ODYOKE. THE SO CALLED AIR INFANTRY UNIT OF ABOUT 242 MEN WHICH TO BE FORMED WOULD PROVIDE STRONG FORCE BY LOCAL STANDARDS AND COULD PROVIDE BALANCE OF POWER. ALSO, INSTRUCTORS WOULD BE IN POSITION GATHER INTEL TRROUGHOUT CONGO, PARTICULARLY IF WIROGUE SETS UP AIR INTEL UNIT.

5. URGE HQS GIVE CAREFUL COSSIDERATION THIS OPS POSSIBILITY. REALIZE WIROGUE NOT BEST ASSET FOR THIS WORK BUT IF MR. HECKATHORNE NOT USED ELIZ, BELIEVE THIS WOULD OFFER EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY INSERT HIM AS SCHOOL CHIEF. PLS ADVISE HQS VIEWS SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RYBAT SECRET

ORIG: C. A. ILLCIUR
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT:
DATE: 10 MARCH 1961

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: COP, C/DPD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

1 Copy

ROUTING			
1	AF/W	4	
2	Staff	5	
3	Chron	6	

	DEFERRED	10 MAR 61 23 11z
R	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	SIG CEN
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 82330
OUT 82330

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 29127
29127

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF: LEOP 0957 (IN 15023)*

C/S COMMENT: *OFFERED WIROGUE JOB ADMINISTRATOR F PILOT AND MECHANIC INSTRUCTORS WITH RANK OF MAJOR IN CONGOLESE ARMY.

1. REF RECD AFTER WIROGUE WAS TO SIGN CONTRACT. ASSUME HE NOW HAS JOB. WHAT IS HIS SALARY? IF LARGE REDUCES CONTROL ELEMENT. ALTHOUGH DO NOT DOUBT WIROGUE CAN HANDLE JOB AND ACKNOWLEDGE NEED FOR ENTREE OF INSTRUCTORS HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS RE PERMITTING WIROGUE ASSUME POSITION WHICH WOULD ENTAIL HANDLING OR MANIPULATING LARGE SUMS OF MONEY WITH APPARENTLY SLIGHT PROVISIONS TO RESTRAIN HIS ACTIVITIES. AS YOU AWARE THIS VIEW SUPPORTED BY WIROGUE'S PROPENSITY FOR FINANCIAL SCHEMING BENT OR AT LEAST RASHNESS. FOR THIS REASON IT MIGHT BE WISE TO PHASE WIROGUE OUT OF this JOB AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. IN INTERIM WE BELIEVE THERE IS GAIN INVOLVED FOR US AND THINK CIVILIAN PILOT INSTRUCTORS AND MECHANICS CAN BE RECRUITED BY US IN THIRTY DAYS IF NEEDED. KUBARK PREPARED BEAR DIFFERENTIAL IN SALARY BETWEEN WHAT CONGOLESE WILLING TO PAY AND PEPRIME STANDARDS.

3. KURIOT PREPARING DOCUMENTATION BACKSTOPPING WIROGUE'S STORY. WILL POUCH SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE.

DPD (Para. 2)   TSD (Para. 3)
C.Y...ton by phone   C. Calendar by phone
COORDINATING OFFICERS

GLENN FIELDS, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

RYBAT SECRET

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

350
DATE : 9 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : AF 7

INFO : COP, DPD 4, CA 2, CA/EAG, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2, IW 2, FI/D, WE 4, DD/I, AD/CI, S/C 2

ROUTING

MAR 9 1648Z 61

7-W

ROUTINE

IN 16135

BRUS INFO DIR CITE LEOP 0967

WIROGUE

ZIBET

AIRA LEOP KNOWS PAUL ARNOLD PIERROT, HEAD CONGOLESE AIR FORCE, ATTEMPTED PURCHASE 6 AUSTERS, 12 BRISTOLS, 6 SPITFIRES AND 8 T-6 PLANES IN BELGIUM IN DEC. DOES NOT KNOW IF DEAL CONSUMMATED OR WHAT ACTUALLY PURCHASED. NEED ALL POSSIBLE INFO CONCERNING CONGOLESE PURCHASE OF AIRCRAFT. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 07 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : AF 7

INFO : DPD 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, S/C 2

MAR 7 1946Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 15023

DIR CITE LEOP 0957

WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE IN CONTACT PAUL ARNOLD PIERROT WHO DESIGNATED HEAD CONGOLESE AIR FORCE. PIERROT OFFERED WIROGUE JOB ADMINISTRATOR FOR PILOT AND MECHANIC INSTRUCTORS WITH RANK OF MAJOR IN CONGOLESE ARMY. WIROGUE TO SEE DEFENSE MINISTER 7 MAR TO SIGN CONTRACT.

2. WIROGUE TO PROVIDE NAMES AND ATTEMPT HIRE THREE PILOT INSTRUCTORS AND THREE MECHANICS WITHIN 30 DAYS WITH TRANSPORTATION, HOUSES AND SALARY OF 30,000 BCF PER MONTH PAID BY CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT. MORE INSTRUCTORS NEEDED LATER.

3. IF WIROGUE ACCEPTED NECESSARY KUBARK SUGGEST INSTRUCTOR PERSONNEL WITH WIROGUE AS CHANNEL FOR HIRING. WIROGUE STATES HE NEEDS DOCUMENTARY PROOF TO SUPPORT STORY HE EX-CAPTAIN GERMAN ARMY.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE 2

IN 15023 LEOP 0957

4. STATION HAS RESERVATIONS WIROGUE ABILITY FILL JOB BUT BELIEVE HE CAN PROVIDE INITIAL ENTREE FOR INSTRUCTORS. FORESEE NO EXCEPTIONAL RISK EITHER KUBARK OR ODYOKE AND RECOMMEND HQS APPROVAL. IF DISAPPROVE POSSIBLE TO STOP ACTION IN NEXT DAY OR SO. IF APPROVE PLS PROVIDE WIROGUE DOCUMENTATION SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

W. Reiner Georg F.

ITINERARY OF Reiner, Georg Franz FROM ____________ TO ____________

PASSPORT

COUNTRY	TYPE	ISSUED	SERIES & NUMBER
Austria	Ordinary	26.8.55	B 546226

DATE	PAGE	DESCRIPTION	COUNTRY	PLACE	REMARKS
21.Dec.55	5	Exit cachet Vienna Schwechat AP	Austria	Schwechat	
21.Dec.55	5	Entry cachet France	~~Austria~~	Orly	
29.Dec.55	5	Exit cachet	France	Orly	
29.Dec.55	5	Entry cachet	Belg.	Melsbroek	
19.Feb.56	5	Exit cabhet	Belg.	" "	
19.Feb.56	6	Entry cachet	Austria	Schwechat	
24.Jun.59	7	Entry Cachet	France	Orly	Exit chachet Schechat not normally entered AF Flight 733 Wenesday Lv. 06:50 Vienna, Arv. Orly 12:25
14.Jul.59	7	Exit cachet	France	Orly	AF Flight 732 Tuesday Lv. 17:35 Arv. Vienna 20:55
14. Jul.59	7	Entry cahet	Austria	Schwechat	
11.March 60	9	Residence permit for West Berlin valid for three month	W.Berlin		Such permits are given for various dates.
10.Jun 60	11	Residence permit for West Berlin valid for six month	W.Berlin		NOTE: Normally border entry/exit cachets are not entered in Austrian Passports for travel between West Germany and West Berlin.
26.8.60	13	Passport revalidation	Austria	Vienna	

GENERAL INFORMATION TO BE NOTED

Subject was issued the following documents:

1. Austrian (Ordinary) Passport Nr. 546.226 in Vienna at the main Passport Office located in Wien I, Postgasse 9, which is near the main Post Office and also near Schwedenplatz. As noted in the passport entries, document was issued in 1955 and was valid until 1960, when it was again renewed for another five years. The lack of exit and entry cachets of very frequent travel to Germany and Berlin is explained by the fact that generally since late 1955 Austrians entering Germany no longer were stamped in or out. For this reason, Subject can claim that he made many trips to Germany and back each time remaining as long as three months without special permits. (Austrians need a residence permit only when they remain more than three months at one time.) As noted above, that passport was first issued by the main Passport office, however, the renewal was obtained at a sub station, Wien IV, Taubstummengasse 11. This can be explained by the fact that at that time subject lived in that part of Vienna after he returned from Berlin.

2. Austrian Drivers Permit:

This document was obtained in Vienna in 1956 and is valid for an indefinite time. Section B, which is not crossed out indicates that he is authorized to drive ordinary private cars not in excess of 3500 kg. (No trucks etc.) Reverse left hand portion shows fee stamp of 6 schilling has been paid. Normally this section also indicates authority on which permit was issued, but since this is his first permit no such entry is made.

3. International Certificate of Vaccination:

When subject contemplated travel outside Europe, he felt it best to obtain a vaccination certificate normally required in many countries. He could have obtained the blank document from a travel agency who directed him to go and have proper entries made for smallpox and yellow fever. At the suggestion of the travel agency he went to see Dr. Ladislaus Tomsich, General Practitioner, Wien III, Marokkanergasse 133. This Doctor, had the necessary vaccines for smallpox and yellow fever and he took both vaccines on 12 November 1959. Smallpox vaccinations are generally valid for three years. The yellow fever shots are good for 6 years.

4. Baptismal Certificate:

This document was issued in Salzburg, the place where subject was born.

During the war years subject lost all his papers and so in 1954 he returned to Salzburg to obtain a copy of his baptismal certificate. Entries indicate that certificate was issued to Subject showing his fathers name as Reiner, Franz, catholic, Geologist having lived at time of subjects birth in Salzburg, Siebenbürgerstr. 2, that his father was born on 24. 4. 1899 in Vienna and that he was married in Vienna on 23. 6. 1920.

Entries for his mother indicate her name as Maria Anna, nee Nielitz, catholic, born on 20 August 1900 in Vienna.

The name of subjects God-Parent was Walter Klenner, who also was a catholic and his profession was Engineer from Slazburg. The priest who performed the baptism was Erich Igertz, Chaplain. The document was dated 23 August 1954 in Salzburg-Mülleg.

201-233477

5. Letter indicated acceptance for employment in West Berlin.

For business reasons in accordance with cover legend, subject has been in and out of Germany ever since 1955. By 1958 subject became interested in seeking employment in Berlin. He was in contact with the construction firm of Arthur Döll and Son and after he wrote to them on 24. 7. 58 he received a reply that this firm was willing to give him a job as an engineer. Since he indicated in his letter to the firm that he was about to come to Berlin anyway, the firm of Döll suggested to him that he should stop at their office and sign a formal work contract.

Signatures to be applied by Subject:

1. Passport: Page three below picture on space provided. Regular pen and dark ink. No ball point pen.

2. Drivers Permit: Between entries 4 and 5 next to picture and turning document to write name from entry 5 to 4.

3. International Certificate of Vaccination: This document should be signed in ink on inside cover page in space provided.

No signature required for the other two documents.

EXPLANATION OF THE PASSPORT ENTRIES

Inside front cover: Contains cachet indicating that Subject paid 20 Schilling to obtain passport.

PAGE 1: This page contains Passport Serial "B" Nr. 546226. The Dues Stamp of 6 Schilling also indicates payment despite the fact that the opposite page shows 20 Schilling. This is the normal procedure. The ink written number is the accession number of the passport office and the last two numbers indicate that the document was issued in 1955. Further entries indicate name and profession and nationality of bearer to be Austrian.

PAGE 2: Entries on this page indicate the following: Occupation as Engineer, that he was born in Salzburg on 25 July 1921, his present place of residence is Vienna. It is further indicated that the shape of his face is oval, his eyes brown and hair color brown. Special identifications marks indicate the tips on his thumb and index finger are missing.

PAGE 3: This page shows the picture of bearer including the dry seal for authentication over the picture. Below is the space for subject to affix his signature. The bottom of the page shows a wet authenticating seal and the signature of the person who issued the document.

PAGE 4: This page indicates that the passport is valid for all countries of the world, that it is valid until 25 August 1960 and was issued in Vienna on 26 August 1955. The last entry indicates that passport was renewed until 24 August 1965 for such entry please see page 13.

PAGES 5, 6, & 7: These pages show various entry and exit cachets of simulated travel undertaken by subject. (For further explanations see attached sheet for travel.)

PAGE 9: This entry is a residence permit for West Berlin and valid for three months. (Austrians normally don't need a permit for any stay in Germany unless they stay more than three months.) This permit was obtained in West Berlin from Div. II Berlin Police. The fee paid was one DM. It was invalidated when a new residence permit was obtained.

PAGE 11: This page indicates a second residence permit for Berlin which was placed in the passport when the permit on page 9 expired. It was validated for six months at this time, and again the fee was one DM. Valid from 10 June until 11 December 1960.

PAGE 13: This page indicates that the Passport was revalidated in Vienna at the Police Station at Vienna-Wieden. This Police Station is located at Taubstummengasse 11, Wien IV, and is located west of the Schwarzenberger Park. Entry shows 6 Schilling fiscal stamp, but a payment of 10 Schilling had to be made for revalidation. Document is valid until 24 August 1965.

201-233477

14-00000

Virginia MacIntyre
940 25th Street, N.W. } Potomac House
Washington 7, D.C.
FEDERAL 3-6338

Address of WIROGUE/1's local girl friend.

201-233477

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1889
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 11 MARCH 1961
CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

14-00000

10 mars 1961

ATTESTATION.-

Je soussigné KAZADI Fernand, Ministre de la Défense Nationale, engage à titre de Conseiller Technique d'Etat Major de la Force Aérienne, Monsieur REINERT. Il est adjoint à ce titre à Monsieur PIERROT.

Fait à Léopoldville, le 10-3-61

ADI

201-233477

AF/W

WIROGUE
file

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, C&L Branch, Finance Division

SUBJECT: WIROGUE Loan

REFERENCE: Your memorandum to Chief, Africa Division, same subject, dated 6 March 1961.

1. As requested in reference, and in accordance with the terms of the fiscal annex to project WIROGUS, there is attached herewith an acknowledgement of the $4,000 received by the agent concerned.

2. Accordingly, it is requested that this amount, currently charged to the project's advance account as a result of Bern T/A 217, be cleared and set up in a memorandum account.

THEODORE M. FRANSEN
Chief, Africa Division Support

10 March 1961

SECRET

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 07 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE 2

ACTION : AF 7

INFO : DDP 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	FI
2	W	5	
3	C	6	

MAR 7 1962Z 61 7.W

ROUTINE

IN 15023

DIR CITE LEOP 4957

WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE IN CONTACT PAUL ARNOLD PIERROT WHO DESIGNATED HEAD CONGOLESE AIR FORCE. PIERROT OFFERED WIROGUE JOB ADMINISTRATOR FOR PILOT AND MECHANIC INSTRUCTORS WITH RANK OF MAJOR IN CONGOLESE ARMY. WIROGUE TO SEE DEFENSE MINISTER 7 MAR TO SIGN CONTRACT.

2. WIROGUE TO PROVIDE NAMES AND ATTEMPT HIRE THREE PILOT INSTRUCTORS AND THREE MECHANICS WITHIN 30 DAYS WITH TRANSPORTATION, HOUSES AND SALARY OF 30,000 BCF PER MONTH PAID BY CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT. MORE INSTRUCTORS NEEDED LATER.

3. IF WIROGUE ACCEPTED NECESSARY KUBARK SUGGEST INSTRUCTOR PERSONNEL WITH WIROGUE AS CHANNEL FOR HIRING. WIROGUE STATES HE NEEDS DOCUMENTARY PROOF TO SUPPORT STORY HE EX-CAPTAIN GERMAN ARMY.

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PAGE 2

IN 15023 LEOP 0957

4. STATION HAS RESERVATIONS WIROGUE ABILITY FILL JOB BUT BELIEVE HE CAN PROVIDE INITIAL ENTREE FOR INSTRUCTORS. FORESEE NO EXCEPTIONAL RISK EITHER KUBARK OR CLYCKE AND RECOMMEND HQS APPROVAL. IF DISAPPROVE POSSIBLE TO STOP ACTION IN NEXT DAY OR SO. IF APPROVE PLS PROVIDE WIROGUE DOCUMENTATION SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

656

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET RYBAT

ORIG: LESTER C. HOUCK
UNIT: C/AF/WEST
EXT: 3939
DATE: 26 JANUARY 1961

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: COP, C/CI, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED 26 JAN 61 20 27z
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

SIG CEN
INITIALS

OUT67004
67004

WIR

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 22428
22428

REF: LEOP 0692 (IN 35283)

per CS 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. AGREE UNDESIRABLE CROSS OPS. HOWEVER, MIGHT BE ADVISABLE HAVE WIROGUE TAKE FLYING LESSONS CONTINGENCY BASIS. IF THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT EXCITING UNDUE ATTENTION, THIS AUTHORIZED. HAS HE PLAUSIBLY ESTABLISHED HIMSELF?

2. WHO IS MOREN?

3. EXPLORING OTHER POSSIBILITIES.

END OF MESSAGE.

DECLASSIFIED
per CS 43-43

201-233497

G. Fields
GLENN D. FIELDS, AC/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/WEST
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET RYBAT

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

247

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 28 JAN 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, S/C 2

WIROGUE

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 28 2201Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 37414

TO DIR INFO CITE LEOP 0713

RYBAT WIROGUE

RE ~~DIR~~ 22428 (OUT 67004)*

SEE DIR 12756 (OUT 95037), LEOP 114 (IN 26424) AND LEOP 0344 (IN 44477).

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *WHO IS MOREN?

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

Houck

491

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1 [illegible]	4
2 [illegible]	5
3 [illegible]	6

DATE : 24 JAN 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, S/C 2

WIROGUE

JAN 24 2123Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 35283

DIR CITE LEOP 0692

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. REQUEST AUTHORITY HAVE WIROGUE TAKE FLYING LESSONS LOCALLY. TOTAL COST APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND FRANCS.

2. VIEW PROBABLE USE STATION PLANE (WHICH NOW HELD NICLAM NAME) FOR CLANDESTINE MISSIONS, BELIEVE ADVISABLE HAVE CLEARED KUBARKER PREPARED FLY PLANE. MOREN WILLING FLY AT THOUSAND FRANCS PER HOUR BUT NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE AS HAS PERMANENT JOB. THUS STATION HAS CONTACTED BUT HAS NOT ATTEMPTED RECRUIT. REALIZE WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE TIME FOR WIROGUE OBTAIN ADEQUATE TRAINING AND OBVIOUS DISADVANTAGE CROSSING WIROGUE-NICLAM OPS. THUS IF TRAINED AND CLEARED PILOT AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE, LEOP HAPPY USE IN PLACE WIROGUE. PLEASE ADVISE.

DESENSITIZED

201-233477

END OF MESSAGE

43-43

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : D. HIESCIUR 598
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 8254
DATE : 9 January 1961

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: COP, C/C S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	CEN
2		5	
3		6	

9 JAN 61 21 47 z

PRECEDENCE
	DEFERRED	
	ROUTINE	
X	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT61228

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 19918

WIROGUE RYBAT 19918

1. ADVISE WIROGUE/1 BERN ACCT BALANCE NOW 13 SWISS FRANCS. FUTURE CHECKS WILL NOT BE HONORED.

2. REQUEST YOU DETERMINE IF FUNDS EXPENDED FOR COVER BUSINESS. IF NOT WHAT WAS PURPOSE.

END OF MESSAGE

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/W/1 RB
COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK
CAF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

Attachment A

NAME: David TZITZICHVILI

PLACE OF BIRTH: Gori near Tiflis, Georgia, USSR (DOB 12 July 1918

NATIONALITY: Georgian

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: Stateless

RELIGION: None

MARITAL STATUS: Divorced. (Subject's ex-wife, one son and one daughter are living at the present time in France. Subject has not seen them since 1950.)

PRESENT ADDRESS: Living under the name David HARVARD, 225 25th St., N.W. Apt. 202, Washington, D.C. "The Potomac House"

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: 42 year old, male, Caucasian, 5'6" tall, slight of build (130 lbs. average weight), long face, long nose, dark brown hair, balding top and front, swarthy complexion, agile and in perfect health.

EDUCATION:	1922-4	Paris	Notre Dame	uncompleted, change of family address
	1925	Paris	Lycee Montagne	uncompleted, change of family address
	1925	Paris	Ecole Communale	uncompleted, change of family address
	1926	Viroflex	Lycee Hoche	uncompleted, expelled for pranks
	1926	Paris	Ecole Communale	taken back, uncompleted change of family address
	1931	Paris-Vanves	Ecole Michelet	6 months completed, expelled for insubord.
	1933-5	Chalon-S. Marne	Art et Metier	Technical Engineering School. Attended 1½ years, then expelled.
	1936-7	Paris	Ecole Breguet	Electro-engineering School. Attended 1 year,

SECRET

201-233477

SECRET

earned first half of baccalareate in electrotechnology, then expelled.

1938-9 Paris School of Photography and Movie — Trained as cine camera operator technician. Left after 1-3/4 of 2 yr course due to outbreak of WWII in Nov. of 1939.

Occupational Specialty: Mechanical Electrical Engineering
Cine or Portrait Photography
Research and innovator of commercial labor/money saving devices,
Electro mechanical or photographical in nature.

See paragraphs 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14 of Employment History for examples.

Military Service: Dec. 1939, Paris, volunteered for French Foreign Legion.
Jan. 1940, Tunisia North Africa, in 1st Cav. Reg., 1st Squadron, 4th platoon.
Feb. 1940 - sent to N.C.O. training course in Legion. Pulled out to be reassigned to all-Georgian unit.
Mar.- Aug. 1940, Barcares. Assigned in Georgian unit.
Aug. 1940 - Paris. Discharged after the end of Franco/German hostilities as Private First Class.

Languages and Dialects: Speaks, reads and writes -- French -- native
Georgian -- fluent spoken, read & write good
German -- good
English -- reads fluently, writes fair, speaks fair
Spanish -- reads good; speaks & writes poor
Russian -- poor

Employment History:
1. 1942 Paris Volunteered for work in Germany.
2. Poelitz, Germany Worked for HIDRYER WERKE on contract for one year as installation electrician.
3. 1942 Paris Self-employed at photo shop. Portrait photography.
1942 Berlin Photographer of metals for a factory which produced electrodes for welding instruments
4. 1942 Berlin Assembly line worker in Berlin factory producing steel ammunition belts. Received commendation from factory director for labor saving device re manufact. of device for automat.adjustment of cartridge cases.
5. 1942 Berlin Mügelheim Drivers mechanics course for the NSKK (Nazi Party Motorized Corps). Drove truck during construction of Atlantic wall by Germans.

SECRET

6.	1943	Berlin	Employed with SCHUPOLIZEI as translator French-German language.
7.	1946-7	Paris	Employed by Architects Carre Associated as electrical installation planner and constructor of prototype model builder. Earned roughly 4 dollars an hour American scale plus commission work extra.
8.	1951-2	In prison, Paris	Devised and sold on the French market a pocket automatic transit indicator. Received cash settlement for this while in prison.
9.	1953	In prison in Riom	Devised and gave to prison administrator invention for making cardboard boxes. Device was built and used by prison administrator.
10.	Dec.1955-Apr.1956	Gap	Employed by M.D. as X-ray machine maintenance technician and operator.
11.	1956-7	Gap	Invented, patented and sold a calendar device to the French commercial market.
12.	1958	Ambert	Invented and patented a commercial advertising device, photo-mechanical in nature. Models built and sold to French advertising concerns.
13.	1959-60 Sept-May	U.S.	Devised and passed drawings for 2 pieces of equipment to be used for Project AESENTINEL.
14.	1960, July	U.S.	At present Subject is devising a low-cost telephone answering device.

Experience in Forged Documents:

May 1942	Achen,- Berlin	Falsified his own travel documents by use of pen to change effective dates.
1942	Berlin - Paris	Filled in German travel blank forms. Altered old German authorization stamp for travel forms. Then made other falsified stamps for other people interested in travel across German-held territory.
1943-4	Berlin	Constructed and used various falsified travel documents stamps copied from old travel documents for various people to travel throughout Germany. Used certain photo techniques for changing and/or ageing pictures in documents. At same time Subject also reassembled falsified old passports to form new ones as well as counterfeited German financial vouchers.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ...BT-2160

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO: Chief, Finance Division

INFO: Atten: Peter G. Scelopp

FROM: Chief of Station, Bern

DATE: 23 December 1960

SUBJECT: RYBAT SGFLAG
African Division Operation

RE 43 3... (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

43-43

1. This is intended as an interim report on the financial aspects, to the extent that we know them as factual, on the African Division operation, the identity of which is made clear by the enclosed thermofax copies. We hesitate to write directly to AD because of the sensitive nature of the activity and ask that Scelopp pass the information to the interested persons. Previous cable traffic has informed Headquarters as to the general conduct of the financial activity to date; this is concerned with the details.

$4,000.00 deposited with B&F, Bern		Swfs 17,213.95
Letter of Credit obtained for Reiner	Swfs 12,000.00	
Commission & expenses	45.50	
Reiner's check No. 3403 cashed in Bern	265.00	
" " " 3404 " " "	130.15	
" " " 3405 " " "	100.00	
" " " 3406 " " "	100.00	
" " " 3407 " " "	160.00	12,800.65
		4,413.30
Check no. 3401 left with Graham to ensure withdrawal of funds in B&F Check No. 3402 has not yet cleared, nor has check no. 3408; perhaps were not negotiated		
Letter of Credit returned by Hofhuis to B&F, subsequently cancelled. Reiner had drawn against L/C in Leopoldville to the amount of Swfs 400.00. L/C cancelled in the amount of - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		11,600.00
		16,013.30
Check No. 3409 written by Reiner, given to Hofhuis and returned by letter to B&F with instructions to "hold pending instructions"	Swfs 12,000.00	
Check No. 3410 (same situation as above)	3,000.00	15,000.00
Balance now in B&F (Reiner) acct		1,013.00 **

** As yet, no expenses for B&F telephone call to Leopoldville and/or any other related expenses charged. Balance in a/c will be affected accordingly.

2. A copy, each, of two letters dated 13 and 14 December 1960 written by Hofhuis are enclosed for information of interested persons. Will Scelopp please pass.

DESENSITIZED
per [illegible] 43-43

GRAHAM

Enclosures:
As stated

Distribution:
3-FD(Scelopp) w/encls.

EGBT-2160

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T
RYBAT

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Base, Sao Paulo

INFO.
Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT
Operational/ZIBET/WIROGUE

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES
See Below
HBPA-4890, dated 12 October 1960

DBF OCR 43-43

1. This is to advice you that subject of reference has been transferred to the African Divisiem and been assigned the cryptogram WIGROGUE/1. The latter is presently in Leopoldville and all correspondance received through your accommodation address is to be pouched to COS, Leopoldville.

2. WIROGUE/1 was instructed to send only unregistered letters and to instruct his correspondents to do the same.

CHARLES R. ROISTADE

PAUL E. LEIGHTON

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COB, Sao Paulo
1 - COS, Rio de Janeiro
1 - COS, Leopoldville

DATE TYPED
22 Dec 1960

DATE DISPATCHED
DEC 22 1960

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HBFW-2312

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-233477

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

1 - RI
1 - WH/2B
1 - AF/W

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
AF/W/2	D. Niesciur	say	8294

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
A/CAF/W		Edward Welles
C/AF		Bronson Tweedy
WH/2B		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH		

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610s WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

513

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : D. Niesciur
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 8284
DATE : 22 December 1960

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : ~~C/AF 3~~

INFO : COP, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 23 DEC 60 15 59z
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT 56360
OUT 56360

INFO
per [illegible] 43-43

TO LEOP

CITE DIR 18035
18035

RYBAT WIROGUE

REFS DIR 17181 (OUT 54652)
LEOP 0512 (IN 20986)

VIEW PREVIOUS FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AUTHORIZE MONTHLY PAYMENTS ONLY.

END OF MESSAGE

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Edw Welles
for C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

513

ORIG: D. Niesciur
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT: 8284
DATE: 22 December 1960

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: COP, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED 23 DEC 60 15 59 z
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY — INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

OUT 56360

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 18035

OUT 56360

18035

RYBAT WIROGUE

REFS DIR 17181 (OUT 54652)
LEOP 0512 (IN 20986)

VIEW PREVIOUS FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AUTHORIZE MONTHLY PAYMENTS ONLY.

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED
AF/W/1 43-43

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Edw Welles
for C/AF/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.
20-233477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

JC(u)

2

3 [illegible]

165

DATE : 22 DEC 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

DEC 22 -33Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 20986

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 0512

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 17181 (out 54652)*

1. PER LEOP 0473, (IN 18739) WIROGUE/1 STATES TOLD HE TO REQUEST THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS QUARTERS ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM ON ARRIVAL. DOES (REF MEAN STATION TO ~~PORTION GARBLED, WILL FWD~~) PAY ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM OR MONTHLY. ADVISE. WIROGUE/1 ARGUES HE NEEDS LUMP SUM PAYMENT TO PURCHASE NEEDED HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS, AS WELL AS PAY RENT.

2. ACLS 149 NOT YET RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED WIROGUE/1 CONTRACT.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2			
3			

DATE : 423
22 DEC 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILEE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/PG, C/CI, S/C 2

DEC 23 2129Z 60
SERVICE

PRIORITY

IN 20986 A LEOP 0512

TO INFO CITE

RYBAT WIROGUE

C/S COMMENT: COMPLETE PARAGRAPH 1 LINE 3 TO READ:

"...DOES REF MEAN STATION TO PAY ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM OR MONTHLY..."

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

RYBAT ①

To Chief of Station, Leopoldville
From Chief, AF
Subject Operational WIROGUE-1
Action See below
Ref

Not sent

1. WIROGUE/1 had been dispatched in accordance to the plan outlined in reference A. It is assumed that contact had been made. As is often the case, a number of questions have undoubtably arisen in R mind or have be raised by ~~[illegible]~~ WIROGUE/1. In anticipation we will attempt to answer the more obvious ones.

2. At the onset we are forwarding under separate cover the FPO for WIROGUE/1. This will furnish a fair outline of subjects previous background and KUBARK affiliation.

3. With respect to the subject of salary and allowances, he is to receive $500.00 per month payment by the Station. Date of payment should be on the first of each month. A flat sum of $3000.00 per annum is to be given to subject for housing and allowances. This sum can be a flat payment of $3000.00, or may be broken down into quarterly payments, and is not accountable.

4. In the course of your relationships with

~~[illegible]~~

WIROGUE/1, the subject of which will undoubtedly arise. He wants to purchase one for his job. It was suggested to him that under the present circumstances in the Congo it would not be wise to consider such a purchase ~~[illegible]~~ until he has ascertained for himself the situation and then only after carefull discussions with you. I'm sure he will discuss the matter with you in the near future. Note that no provision had been made in the project for a vehicle.

5. WIROGUE/1 had an affaire de coeur while in Washington, D.C. Although he might not discuss it openly with you, he did indicate that he would like to continue contact with ~~the~~ girl. While in Germany he asked if it were possible to arrange for a letter drop in Germany under an alias he employed while in DEPRING, to which she could write, the letter drop service in the letter pouched to Leopoldville for delivery. In the return mail he would write a letter, postdate it, give to you for transmittal to FROB for putting into the normal mail channel. If you wish to institute such a channel a request to FROB would be in order. Incidentally the lady in question had been checked out by KUSODA and nothing derogatory was reported.

This would create the impression that subject is in Germany.

6. An arrangement similar to the one described above is in existance whereby WIROGUE/1 writes through the

5927

Station in Rio . This channel was set up by SR and allows WIROGUE/1 contact with relatives in France. He says he used an alias ostensibly because he had jumped bail and settled in Brazil hence avoiding detection by the police.

7. Prior to WIROGUE/1's departure for Leopoldville he received, in addition to a letter of credit for $3000.00, a travel advance of $1010.00 plus 62.00 D.M. Signed receipts for these amounts were received and are being retained at headquarters. A travel order covering his stay in Europe and travel to Leopoldville has been cut.

8. WIROGUE/1's instructions were to make contact and place himself under your management. He was cautioned not to partake in any operational activity without your approval. Further a great deal of time was spent explaining the necessity of living his cover and maintaining operational security.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIROGUE
201-233477
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 JULY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

WIROGUE O
[redacted]
201-23347

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 12 Dec 1964

RID/201 C/A
Initials

The following documents have been removed from this dossier and forwarded as indicated to further processing:

Sent to RID/MIS	Sent to RID/AN
ACLW - 192 - 17 Nov 60	now in Vol III
HBPW - 2372 28 Dec 60	in Vol. IV
ACLW - 266 23 Dec 60	in Vol V
EGCA - 18888 12 Dec 62	in Vol. V

This list is to be destroyed after documents are returned to RID/Files

S-E-C-R-E-T

Mr. Ernest C. Maycrink

Dear Mr. Maycrink:

Effective 31 October 1960, all contracts, oral or written, by and between you and the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, are hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and service, you will receive from the Government, payable in such an approved manner as you may direct in writing, the following:

   (a) Basic compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $6000 per annum.

   (b) Additional compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum for cost-of-living expenses (including quarters), effective upon your arrival at and applicable only to your contemplated permanent post of assignment overseas. Quarters will not be furnished you nor will you accept quarters provided by a cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement.

RM

2. Taxes. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under ~~this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. You herein authorize this organization~~ to withhold taxes on said income if it determines such requirements so necessitate.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses to and from your permanent post of duty overseas and for authorized operational travel. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence during such travel and, when authorized, while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved and financially limited by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

53477

6. Negotiated Benefits. (a) (1). If, in the performance of activities under this agreement, you incur an injury or illness which is not the result of your gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intemperate act, the Government will provide medical, surgical, hospital, transportation and disability bene- fits in such amounts and under such conditions as the Government in its sole discretion deems proper provided, however, that such benefits shall not exceed a total of $5000 for the same injury or illness.

(2) If you die in the performance of activities hereunder and your death is not the result of your gross negligence, willful misconduct or intemperate act, the Government will pay the sum of $5000 to your beneficiary(ies) less any amount paid to you under sub-paragraph (1) above if such injury or illness resulted in your death, provided that said beneficiary(ies) is acceptable to the Government at the time such payment is to be made. An acceptable beneficiary hereunder is an individual to whom payment by the U.S. Government can be made without conflicting with its avowed principles and ideals.

(b) Outstanding performance by you under this agreement and your fulfillment of obligations hereunder in an efficient manner will result in the Government undertaking your resettlement in an area mutually agreeable to both parties, to the extent deemed appropriate by the United States Government.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by this organization to evidence this relationship.

8. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

9. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangement, monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner. It is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment by the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

10. Cover. (a) It is anticipated that you will undertake a cover venture in the course of your performance under this agreement. Such venture must be approved by the appropriate Government representative overseeing your activities prior to its initiation. Any and all documents which you may execute in the course of said cover venture are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

(b) To provide capital for your approved cover venture the Government will loan you $4000 to be secured by a non-interest bearing promissory note, payable on demand. Said loan will be deposited to an account in a foreign bank and a $3000 letter of credit will be issued you against that deposit. The additional $1000 will be released from said account, after approval by the Government representative overseeing your activities.

(c) You will submit to the Government quarterly income and expense statements on the cover venture and copies of all tax returns filed in connection therewith. Your cover accounts shall be kept separate and distinct from the bank account into which your personal compensation payments are made.

(d) You herein agree that monies loaned you by the Government shall be repaid from the profits of the cover venture, in amounts and at periodic intervals to be established by the Government representative overseeing your activities. After said loan has been completely repaid and all other obligations, such as local taxes, etc., have been made, you may retain any further profit derived from said cover venture. However, it is clearly understood and agreed that your primary obligation under this agreement is the performance of Governmental activities.

11. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed through instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the undersigned Contracting Officer executing this agreement. It is agreed that any revelation whatsoever of the above information will constitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement.

12. Instructions. During the term of this agreement, and in your official cover capacity you herein agree to act in conformance with instructions, oral or written given you by authorized representatives of this organization.

13. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on this organization.

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 November 1960, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

(a) By sixty (60) days' actual notice to you from the Government, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination or expiration of this agreement will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Ernst G. Maycrink
Ernest G. Maycrink

WITNESS: Charles R. Roistale

APPROVED: ______________________

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: EI/AN

SG [illegible] A TD 10 OCT 1960

NO. EGFA 32252

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				
3. SR/DOB	26 OCT 1960			
4. Dan Ascior [illegible] Div. 2110 I Bldg.		26/oct/60		For Dave's file F.Y.I. re [illegible] doc. Maybe you can use some of this info for Dave's docs. K.
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				AEA 1/1
15.				201-233477 [illegible]

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 476731

SECRET

REDWOOD/REDSOX/AEACRE

S/C

ENCL A TO EGFA 32052

TO Chief SR

FROM Chief of Base, Frankfurt

SECRET

Attachment to EGFA

REDSOX Spotting and Assessment
Report

Date 6 April 1959

Subject: AEASPIC
DOB:

Address:

Cover for Contact: Friganza as Maj. Michael Long
Rostedt as George Fowler

Notes on Contact:

Rostedt and Friganza took the night train to Paris, arriving morning 6 April, and discussed the AEASPIC case with the Paris station. Rostedt briefed COS/Paris and others on current REDSOX. Rostedt and Friganza departed to meet Subject at about 1130 hrs., taking extreme precautions against surveillance.

Subject did not appear at the rendezvous at 12 hours. We waited until 1230 hours when Friganza decided to visit Annick to determine if Subject had been delayed. En route to Annick Friganza changed his mind and returned to the rendezvous (Georges V) where he saw Rostedt with Subject. Subject had apparently gone to the Georges VI rendezvous (which is understandable considering the hurried circumstances of the previous parting when the rendezvous was discussed), had waited perhaps 1/2 hr. and then decided he had better check the Georges V. On arrival at the Georges V Rostedt immediately recognized him, approached the taxi which Subject had left and re-entered, looked hard at Subject who caught the significance of Rostedt's extraordinary attentions, ordered the taxi around the corner, paid him his due fare, and re-joined Rostedt. It was at this moment that Friganza returned on intuition.

The trio then went to lunch, taking a circuitous route by foot and taxi. Over lunch from about 13-15 hours Rostedt had an opportunity to acquaint himself with Subject and to put to Subject several questions concerning willingness and the job.

After lunch Friganza and Rostedt decided that under the circumstances it would be advisable to keep Subject in Paris rather than risk his arrest travelling between Paris and Ambert or returning to Gap to have his carte d'identite revalidated. Accordingly while Rostedt spent the next 1½ hrs. or so with Subject, Friganza returned to the Paris Station where he asked for the use of 15 rue Weber safehouse. Paris Station had committed the safehouse for the night of 6 and 7 April as well as the morning of 8 April but beginning late afternoon 8 April the house was assigned for the use of AEASPIC. Arrangements were made to have Platipodis who knows Subject to be at the safehouse at 1630 hours (alternate 2330 hrs.) on 8 April. Subject was instructed to go to the safehouse, ring 3 longs, 2 short, whereupon he would be admitted by Platipodis. He was likewise given the name John Sandor and told that in the event of unavoidable inquiry he should claim that he had been lent the apartment by Tom Brown, a friend of John Sandor. He was instructed not to answer the phone and not immediately to answer the door. If after persistent ringing he felt obliged to answer the door, he should pretend he had drunk too much wine, was sleeping heavily, and should come to the door appearing groggy. Subject was further instructed to stay in the safehouse during daylight hours and to venture out at night only if necessary to buy food, eat, etc. He was told that Friganza would return for him sometime between 15 and 16 April.

Between 6 and 8 April Subject will stay with Annick. During the day he will avoid the house, going to movies, etc., appearing only at night to sleep.

Subject was paid Francs 49,874 (exactly $100).

Anthony H. Friganza
Case Officer

SECRET

2 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Station, Germany
Attn: Deputy for Operations

FROM : Chief of Base, Frankfurt

SUBJECT : Application for Issuance of Bundesrepublik Personalausweis for Operational Use

1. Personal Details on the Person to whom Issued:

(a) Last name: Ludeau
(b) First name: Martin
(c) Birthdate: 18 September 1919; Trier
(d) Citizenship at birth: German
(e) Height: 174 cm.
(f) Color of eyes: Brown
(g) Glasses: No
(h) Build: Mittel
(i) Weight: 56 kg.
(j) City of residence: Anything convenient
(k) Place of Issuance of BdPA: Anything convenient.

2. Reason for Request: This document may be needed to bring AEASPIC from France to Germany. It would be used only after discussion with Dexter E. Rostedt from AEACRE and with the approval of Chief of Base, Frankfurt and Chief of Station, Paris to move Subject in this fashion. I have checked to determine whether Subject can move without considerable danger in this fashion and if it is customary; he can and it is.

3. Subject will need no other documents, being that this will be a one time use to cross at Strasbourg. This document is being requested in the event that it is needed for the 6 April meeting in Paris with Subject. Per cables from Headquarters Rostedt is empowered to decide whether Subject should be brought to Germany and if so, it would save one extra trip to Paris if this document were carried by the undersigned to the 6 April meeting so that he could be brought directly to Germany.

4. Photographs have already been given to the MKTOPAZ officer.

Anthony H. Friganza

Approved: /s/ R H Alison
Deputy for Operations, COS

SECRET

Attachment to EGFA______

REDSOX Spotting and Assessment
Report

Date 25 March 1959

Subject: AEASPIC
DOB:

Address:

Cover for Contact:

Notes on Contact:

The undersigned arrived in Paris on the morning of the 25th of March and went to the safehouse where the LCFLUTTER operater had spent the night and was shortly to meet Subject at the Cafe Les Sport near the Port Maillot. Subject passed by as we were having coffee and according to instructions waited elsewhere. We left while the operator collected Subject and took him to the house, enabling us to return at about 11 hours.

Subject was dismissed for lunch at about 1145, whereupon the operator and the undersigned returned to the Embassy office where after a quick lunch the questions for the examination were written. The operator met Subject, returned to the house, and began the examination at about 1430, it having been agreed we would appear at the safehouse promptly at 1630. We did this to find that the operator had not concluded the examination but there was sufficient time to continue which he did. The examination was completed about 1845 hours, whereupon we were informed by the operator that in his opinion Subject was not attempting to deceive on any important points, even though some of the more prosaic aspects of his biography continue to defy logical acceptance.

We then discussed future meeting arrangements with Subject: Subject will appear in front of the Cafe Georges V on the Champs Elysees at 1214 and 16 hours on 6 April. He will wait for five minutes in front of the cafe but will not enter. If we are not there he will return for the alternate. In any event alternate contact will be made through Annick. Subject was instructed to clear up his affairs in Ambert and be prepared to depart for Germany; however, it was also explained to Subject that we were not authorized to make a final commitment to Subject and that much as we regretted this, this would be left until 6 April. Subject was paid Francs 15,500 for which no receipt was obtained since we were in a hurry to catch a plane for the Hague. If Subject has any difficulties he will write Annick. He will not return to Gap. He expects to stay with Josef Dassaud in Ambert until the night of 5 April when he will travel to Paris by train. It was further agreed that on or about 4 or 5 April Subject will have sent a letter to Annickfor "Mike" in which he will conform his arrival and in double talk inform us if he has had any trouble.

We discussed with Platipodis of the Paris station the need to send "Maurice" to Annick on 4 or 5 April to see if Subject had written.

Anthony H. Friganza
Case Officer

SECRET

Attachment to EGFA

REDSOX Spotting and Assessment Report

Date

Subject: AEASPIC
DOB:

Address:

Cover for Contact:

Notes on Contact:

20 March 1959: Upon the receipt of DIR the undersigned borrowed a car from the Paris station on 19 March and drove that night to Moulins, arriving about 9 o'clock. From the principal hotel in this town a call was made to Subject who was informed that we would arrive at Ambert at about 12 o'clock, and we agreed to meet at the railroad station at 1200 hours. We proceeded to Vichey where we changed clothes and bathed and arrived at Ambert about 1220 -- Subject was waiting. He returned the car lent by Dassaud, one of his business partners, to the residence cum work shop at 14 rue St. Josef. We waited outside for Subject who came out, got into the car and we drove to a restaurant which we left immediately as it was too crowded and returned on foot to 14 rue St. Josef house where our conversation was held. Incidentally, Subject showed the undersigned around the work shop and demonstrated how the machine and the for it are made. One cannot help but marvel at Subject's ingenuity and ability as a tinkerer and pseudo-sort of engineer. He said they are producing about 300 a month, sell a few more than this at 48,000 francs a piece (nearly $100). However, Subject gets no income other than pocket money, free room and board where he now lives, and will not receive any until the capital outlay of his other two partners has been amortized. Taking the bull by the horns we explained to Subject the delay: A telegram had been sent to "certain colleagues" in Paris who were supposed to write a letter to be forwarded to Subject. The man to whom the telegram was sent was on leave and upon return he was not notified of the telegram we sent; consequently, Subject was not informed as he should have been. We are terribly sorry and hope that Subject would appreciate such a minor matter. In any event we reminded Subject that he had not been promised a letter on or about 1 February but rather told that he could expect to hear from us then. Subject agreed this was so.

Subject was far less interested in explanation than a decision. He rhetorically asked whether he was acceptable, adding he was obliged to assume he was not, and commenting that although there are "many two legged people in America also" he thought he was probably a unique persom from the point of view of language ability, experience as an operator in dangerous situations, etc. We replied thus: One man (the psychologist) has already come all the way from the States just to see Subject and another was on his way. From this Subject could fairly conclude the importance "Headquarters" attaches to Subject's candidature and that far from being a dead issue, Subject's prospects were good, although all depended on him.

We then turned to the matter of Subject coming to Paris. Subject explained that Paul ( ) had been sent by the Paris station to Annick and had not done very well. He had failed to convince Annick that he was sent by Mike (Friganza) and apparently although we did not go into the details of this, he did not get the message straight. In any case Subject immediately said that he could come to Paris anytime although he would be obliged to travel illegally. This because he had permitted his identity document to expire as of 14 February 1959. However, Subject felt he could make the journey by train without being caught because the police are not checking most trains. He did not want to travel by car because he had heard there are occasional road blocks (this may be true for the undersigned ran into one on the drive from Paris to Ambert). Subject also said he could stay as long as need by but it was absolutely essential that he not be obliged to stay at a hotel -- he could either stay with Annick or at a place put at his disposal by us.

Case Officer

Attachment to EGFA ________

REDSOX Spotting and Assessment Report

Date ________

Subject:
DOB:

Address:

Cover for Contact:

Notes on Contact:

Knowing that the LCFLUTTER operator could get to Paris in two days we asked Subject to take the train on the morning of 21 February. He agreed to do this. He said it would be necessary for him (if he is accepted) to return to Ambert once more; it will not be necessary for him to return to Gap. After discussing this and paying Subject Francs 10,000, we drove by the railroad station where Subject hecked on train schedules and we parted. In regard to the lapse of the validity Subject's documents Subject said: After the 7-10 January meeting in Paris he had driven back to Ambert; he did not return to Gap; he has been living illegally in Ambert since his return from Paris on 11 January. He has failed to extend his document because he calculated he would leave France before the document expired. Subject surmises that if he were obliged to return to Gap he might be able to talk his way out of trouble but he might be given two weeks in jail as a sharp reminder of the necessity to validate documents promptly.

March
21 ~~XXXXXXXX~~1959: Subject was met by the undersigned at the Gare Austerlitz at 2040 hours. Henry C. Ladue of the Paris station counter-surveilled the meeting and our progress from the station by foot and then by metro to the Severes Babylon station. Ladou is certain that our meeting was not surveilled. After going our own way from Ladou, we took a taxi to the Opera, switched taxis and then went to the safehouse in the rue Weber 14. After Subject washed and shaved we drove in the car provided by the station to Les Halles where we had dinner at the Pied de Cochon. We returned to the apartment at about 20 hours, talked for another hour or so while ving a drink, and then retired. During this conversation Subject was encouraged d prompted to develop thoughts on a variety of matters which we hoped would tend give us better grounds on which to assess him. Nothing of particular operational or biographic significance was discussed.

22 March 1959: After breakfast Subject was asked to wait until we returned. We went with Ladou to the airport to meet the LCFLUTTER operator. After the operator arrived we decided on a program and returned to the apartment and suggested that Subject spend the afternoon on his own and agreed on a 2230 rendezvous not far from Port Maillot and the safehouse where Subject was met. We walked to the safehouse and retired at about midnight.

23 March 1959: We arose at 8, left the apartment by about 8:40, walked to a cafe where we breakfasted, and then per arrangement passed the corner of Port Maillot and rue Malakoff at which time the LCFLUTTER operator observed us and followed us to the apartment. We showed Subject upstairs and left the apartment where we met the operator and took him upstairs and introduced him as Mr. Brown. After a very brief introduction with no explanation, we absented ourselves from the room while the operator reviewed Subject's biography in preparation for the LCFLUTTER examination. At about 1245 hours Subject left the apartment on his own, it having been agreed to meet him on the Avenue Grand Amee in front of the Tout Bien cafe. The FLUTTER operator returned to the Paris station office with us where it was agreed that the undersigned would go to Germany and return to Paris on 24 or 25 March. The operator met Subject at the rendezvous and took him to the apartment. After making arrangements for tickets, etc., we returned to the apartment where we interrupted Subject and the operator. During this brief meeting Subject was paid a further 39,000 Francs, making a total of Francs 49,000 or $100. He was instructed to spend the night of 23 and 24 March chez Annick and we would return to see him again on 25 March.

Anthony H. Friganza
Case Officer

S E C R E T

No security flaps although the potential is there for a beautiful one: Our false identity documents together with Subject's lack of any legal documentation is raw material sufficient for this.

Dr Hendryck S. Vincent
Im Trutz Frankfurt 13/I
Frankfurt (Main)
West (Deutschland)



Abs. John Winters
136 Champs Elysees
Paris (8°)

Liber Mike

Was ist nun zu hause? Ich habe seit lange zeit schon keine nachricht bekommen seit die letzte brief. 5.1.5.

Ich möchte gerne wissen ob ich bald was kriegen werde oder wie lange muss ich noch erwarten um ich sicher zu sein. Eine datum, z.b. spiel, 15 tage vor oder nach, wenn mehr pünktlichkeit ist nicht möglich.

Schreiben sie an Annick (unter 2 Umschlage) sie macht das weiter, weil ich bin nicht mehr in meiner alter adresse (für wenigstens noch 15 tage).

Eine telegram wurde noch besser.

Freundschaftlich.

P.S. Meine adresse ist bei Annick wenn sie verlangen.

Subject: [redacted] DAVID

Dates of interview: 8, 9, 10 Jan 1959

1. Subject was met in Paris by the case officer and examiner and submitted to an intensive preliminary psychological examination. He was examined via a French interpreter. The interpreter has been requested to submit his own assessment to the undersigned.

2. Subject is 40 years of age. He was born on the 12th of July, 1918, in Georgia, USSR. At that time Georgia was a free country and not part of the USSR.

3. Subject regards his parents as "nobles" and he feels that their status had a great influence on his behaviour in the period which followed the family's immigration into France in 1921.

4. Subject feels he acquired a certain prejudicial class attitude and abided by the principle of noblesse oblige. In other words he feels that if you pretend to be something, you have to act accordingly. His concept of nobility has evolved into a concept of dignity and pride in his work.

5. The family left Georgia when the Subject was three. They fled before the Soviet invasion. Subject feels that his real existence began at this point. Because the father had provided himself with certain monies, the family was able to live comfortably and even opulently. However, the vicissitudes of life brought the family progressively to material degradation and financial difficulties which greatly influenced Subject's way of thinking thereafter. Whereas the family had previously lived in an artificial feudalistic way, life became tough. Subject feels that the family was brought into more direct contact with reality and that this was not necessarily a bad influence.

6. Subject actually did not want to leave Georgia. He felt it was a flight rather than a tactical retreat. Apparently he has never been able to accept this humiliating defeat and it may be that part of his current motivation for affiliation involves his perception of an opportunity to take countermeasures against the Soviets. He is a person who cannot tolerate being beaten in competition.

7. Subject was a non-disciplined child and was in constant rebellion against his teachers whom he felt did not discriminate intelligent children or pay him sufficient individual attention. Apparently his rebellious behaviour was his way of getting attention. He felt his teachers were too distant and automatically unpleasant. He engaged in practical jokes and was an activist in the school situation. As a result he was kicked out of one school after another and has a history of attending 18 different schools. The least that can be said of this strange behaviour is that he was undisciplined and has always refused to abide by the conformist attitude of his peers. On the contrary he has always felt compelled to do those things not normally done by others. The 18 schools, generally speaking, represent frustration, the seeking of an aim to pursue, and the hope that his ideal would crystallize and materialize. Subject is rather abstract in this respect. Generally, it would seem that his ideal is first of all material and perhaps also moral comfort and security. However, he has always regarded his society, through his disappointments and mortifying experiences, as ~~a~~ wicked and selfish in its majority. Since he felt society was selfish and mean, he expressed his dissatisfaction in the form of aggressive and destructive behaviour. Apparently Subject was a precocious child and he experienced disillusionment in his family and in society. It is as if he suddenly discovered to his great disappointment that there was no Santa Claus.

8. At first Subject felt his disillusionment was unique and peculiar to his particular life experience, but he soon discovered that his discontent was characteristic of others. He experienced this fighting attitude within himself and he reflected it in his non-conforming behaviour.

9. His mother reacted to his behaviour with over-affectionate solicitousness. She wasn't actually able to determine the reasons for his internal distress, but she was aware something was taking place within him. The mother was apparently a marked conformist who insisted that Subject abide by the social order. She took him to a psychiatrist because of his behaviour problems and because she did not advise him of what she was doing and got him to a psychiatrist on a subterfuge, and because Subject did not agree with the psychiatrist's conclusions, he did not benefit by this experience. This indicates to us that in handling Subject it

would be wise not to approach him as if he were the problem, but to permit him to maintain his posture that he is right and society is wrong. In other words we must avoid doing what his mother did to him.

10. Subject has always indulged in a sort of introspection and self-analysis, the purpose of which was to determine how to realize his aspirations. Another aspect of his system of ideals proceeds from the life concept of chivalry which he feels his parents inculcated. This involves the defense and the protection of the oppressed and the weak. It is sort of a Robin Hood concept which he attributes to himself. This chivalrous ideal is active to date. He feels that many people need help and he has always wanted to help others in order to help himself. In other words he is motivated to helping others in order to obtain love and affection. This need for love and affection is probably the most primary of his motives.

11. In respect to the flight of the family from Georgia, Subject feels he was too young to understand it. However, he feels he revolted against it. His idea is that one must fight, surpass and conquer. As a young boy he felt he was much stronger than several million men. This is extremely important as regards utilization of his services. First of all he is self-motivated to succeed out of a spirit of revenge, and secondly he is self-confidant and optimistic that he will succeed despite the hazards of the undertaking. He is like a man who wants to kill an elephant -- all he wants from us is a high-powered rifle -- then he feels he would be equal to the elephant.

12. Subject also seems to reflect disappointment in his father as a personal ideal. He regards his father as a very independent person, kind but profoundly selfish, but who would nevertheless give you the shirt off his back. His father was fond of the children, loved the whole family and was happy when he saw others happy. However, Subject is convinced that if his father had succeeded, none of the things that happened in his life would have come to pass. He feels that his mother's suicide is a direct consequence of his father's failure to succeed.

13. When his father and sister returned to Georgia, Subject was driven to despair by the breaking-up of the family. The death of his mother and the departure of his father and sister was quite a threat to his security.

He tried to hold his father back and even threatened him that because of a French law according to which a foreigner must pay his taxes before he leaves the country, the father ran the risk of being arrested. When he told this to his sister, she became angry with him and replied that the father was mature enough to act as well as possible. Subject's attempt to prevent his father from leaving was conflictual for him because it represented an interference with his father's desire and project. This experience taught him that when his father had taken a decision, he would carry it through at any cost. As it happened, the result was the disintegration of the family. If Subject found himself in the same situation today, he would act in exactly the same way.

14. The father apparently returned to Georgia because he wanted to die in Georgia. Subject feels that his father was doing something important to realize his objectiv~~ity~~e or to achieve his purpose. However, he feels his father accepted defeat by returning to Georgia to die. The mother did not go with the father and apparently was at her wits end after the father left. Subject regards his mother as the axle of the family and when he lost her through suicide, he feels she deserted him.

15. Subject's sister followed her father to Georgia out of a spirit of affection and sacrifice. She felt that her father needed her and Subject feels she was a tributary of his mistakes. The sister has a Ph.D. in languages and taught courses in school. At the time of Stalin the children would say "we have done this and that thanks to Stalin" and she would reply "you are individuals and you have done this or that without Stalin." As a result she was arrested and sent to a concentration camp. With the change of regimes she obtained her freedom and got her job back.

16. The sister's husband returned to Russia also and Subject believes that because he had served in the German army he may have been sent to a concentration camp. He feels the intellectual level of the brother-in-law is lower than that of the sister. The brother-in-law apparently has an inferiority complex. He emigrated to France at a much later date and apparently could not adapt himself and regretted having left Russia.

17. Subject's brother, [illegible] (?), is an architect in Gap. The brother is an independent person who is conservative and probably

conforming. He has not distinguished himself in any extraordinary fashion and Subject unconsciously compares himself with his brother. It is likely that he and his brother were rivals for the mother's affection and, whereas Subject feels that his brother is jealous of him, it is likely that Subject is jealous of the brother's accomplishments. He feels that whenever he succeeds his brother is jealous. Subject is also identified with his brother in a complex and interesting way. For example, he feels that both he and his brother love the same type of women. He is not able to say much about his brother except that he is kind, somewhat vain, and that he is fond of his brother. However, it is likely that his brother may have been indirectly instrumental in Subject's recruitment. It may also be that his brother regards Subject as "Peck's bad boy" or the black sheep of the family and is interested in surpassing excelling him as regards accomplishment or success.

18. Subject was the baby of the family and still is. Whereas he was born in 1918, his brother was born in 1916 and his sister in 1915. Subject was more expressive of affection, particularly for his mother, whereas his brother was more timid, shy, and independent. When the brother saw Subject getting the mother's attention, he tried to replace Subject. This sibling rivalry may continue to date, for example, the brother learned that Subject was seeing a girl whom he knew. The brother advised the girl to leave Subject alone.

19. Subject denies he is jealous of his brother. He admits his brother has been successful but in his own sphere. Subject's new found philosophy is not to accept the fact that he has been unsuccessful, but to try to explain why he has not. In other words he seems to be motivated to obtain greater knowledge of himself.

20. Subject does not consider himself as a Georgian; this is of no importance to him. He regards the flight from Georgia as a defeat and as a loss of the motherland which he has never accepted. He feels he was a Georgian as a child but the most important aspect is that he feels he was defeated by the necessity of the family's flight from Georgia. He offers as an analogy the fact that he was committed to prison; this was a defeat for him. In other words he was not bothered by the prison life but by the fact that he made a wrong calculation in taking on a bad associate and con-

sequently being arrested and imprisoned. Therefore defeat appears to be the first factor in his life experience.

21. At a certain time in his childhood Subject lived near some former Georgian resistants who were fighting against the Soviets. Subject regarded these persons as uneducated but nevertheless ____________ and affectionate. He feels he certainly must have been influenced by the exciting stories which they told him about their fights and many exploits. He feels he must also have been impressed by their patriotism. He feels they expressed themselves in a warm and enthralling manner which exalted and deeply impressed him. He feels this particular association may account for his passion which he always puts in the execution of whatever he undertakes. One of the principal determinants of this man's behaviour is apparently the very strong desire to succeed and accomplish.

22. Subject feels that throughout his school experience perhaps only one or two professors understood him. These particular professors ~~thought~~ [illegible] that it was often necessary in life to "swallow" a great deal of useless "stuff" so that thereafter certain essential problems could be more easily digested. Subject feels that these professors were superior and that he understood them, whereas he regarded the others as apparently idiotic or worthless.

23. Subject was influenced by heroes whom he heard about such as Lindbergh, Edison, Hitler, Einstein, and several others. He realized that if such people existed, it meant that the possibility to act either for good or for evil also existed. He did not identify with any one hero in particular but always wished that he could have been one of them. He did not actually want to be one of them, but wanted to resemble heroes in general. Subject always ~~remains~~-- remembers certain great men mentioned in history. He feels that these great men gave him the concept that a certain order was necessary for the level of the people. However, it appears he was disillusioned in these men and his ideals were shaken because he later learned to his dismay that they could commit abject or monstrous acts. Subject feels he has made many mistakes in life but however big these mistakes may be, he does not feel they have reflected his basic character. He feels that his character was basically based by the desire to become a worthwhile individual, even at the cost of behaving wrongly. He feels that if the only criterion for judging a man ~~is~~ are his

achievements, then he is a failure.

24. Subject feels that apart from the academic progress at school, he learned that it was necessary to communicate, to express himself, to understand and to explain. He feels that these are necessary for one to be a member of society.

25. Subject feels his mother was a major influence in his life. He is disappointed in his mother because he feels he loved her but she deserted him through suicide. He feels she sacrificed herself completely for the children and that she killed herself because she no longer knew how to distribute love and care. Subject began to lose regard for his father from the time he realized that his father was not giving his mother affection. However, he identifies with his father in the respect that both never achieved anything significant and that they both may have disappointed the mother. Subject misses his mother's love and he feels his life was broken up when she died. He found himself completely alone and all his illusions disappeared. He tried to find affection through others. He feels the need for affection is a big part of himself but on the other hand "I am a complicated person."

26. Subject claims he has learned the difference between a man and a woman. This is likely to have a good deal of meaning to him, particularly as regards his relationship with his mother. He regards women as allogical and to be determined by a psycho-feminine education. This is enough to tip us off that he should not be exposed to handling by females.

27. Subject claims he has learned from his personal experience in life rather than from the experience of others. In other words he has educated himself in the school of life and has derived little from the actual formal school situation. For example, he claims his mother's opinions had importance only at the time she was rendering her opinions; thereafter they were not influential as far as he was concerned. This may be important as regards training. It is likely that he would prefer to proceed with the task in actuality rather than to learn about performing the task through the experiences or training of others.

28. Subject joined the French Foreign Legion at the beginning of the war. As a foreigner and as an [illegible] he was subject to

mobilization into the French army, but he felt the authorities took an awful long time to make a decision in connection with him. Because of this, he joined the Foreign Legion and left immediately for North Africa feeling that thus he was becoming a member of a famous unit and at the same time fulfilling his obligations toward the French military service. In the beginning he was satisfied but later he was of the opinion that France was an incoherent mess, and he bitterly regretted that he had become acquainted with people who obviously did not know what they wanted. This experience did not have a great influence on his character except that it expressed a profound dislike for irresolute persons. This indicates that Subject is an impatient fellow who desires immediate action as regards his interest. He is impatient with postponement and unless he is dealt with promptly, he may satisfy his interests elsewhere. However, in the current instance he has no alternative and he is forced to go along with normal procedures which he may regard as a waste of time, but will accept.

29. Subject feels that he married because he regarded marriage as necessary to build a family and to make a home. He feels his marriage was a mistake because, even though he understands the value of the principles involved, principles which were inculcated by his father, it is ridiculous to marry just for the sake of principles without the necessary sentiments. He feels that at the time he was merely abiding by precepts of his father without thinking of the possible consequences. However he soon discovered, in fact, a family did not represent anything at all , and that creating the family was aggravating the incoherence and the division of society. In view point getting married meant building a wall around himself. It also meant that instead of finding a partner who complemented him, all that he obtained from the partnership was a ________________ reflection of himself. He feels that the so-called spiritual intimacy is a fallacy. He claims that, sexually speaking, women are necessary but he fails to say why it is necessary to build a separate world with it.

30. As was explained above, the reasons for his marriage are connected with his family education. He does not regard his marriage as a complete fiasco. He regards his wife as very nice. He thinks he was nice, too.

They got along fairly well with one another but did not live very comfortably. He did not feel there was any evolution in the marriage and he admits to his debit that he married his wife because he wanted to experience what it meant to have children. Actually, however, he did not want children. However, he assumed that the marriage would produce a child whom he had exactly imagined. In other words he wanted an exact reproduction of himself. He obtained a daughter who was beautiful, always laughing, but because of his separation after his arrest, he has ignored what has happened with the child. His wife also had a second child by Subject who was born while he was in jail and Subject knows nothing at all about the second child. Subject met his wife in a model makers shop and believes she liked him immediately. However, if he were to do it again, he would not marry.

31. During the war when Subject was in Germany, he got involved in a false documents business and created a gang which he led. The purpose of the group was to repatriate or liberate war prisoners. The black market was a worthless branch, technically speaking, of the organization. Its only purpose was to solve financial problems. However, it is true that the black market reached such a magnitude that a person who was interested only in making money would have found it quite satisfying and sufficient in itself. As a whole, the technical efficiency of his gang satisfied him. They had freedom of motion and security. Subject was arrested because of a carelessness or a slip, not in the actual functioning of the gang, but rather on the part of one of the men whom they were helping.

32. Through this experience Subject learned that it was very interesting to know the weaknesses of authorities and to play these weaknesses or forces against one another. His emotions corresponded to a joy of being the sole master of his actions and moves. He feels that if he were to find himself in this sort of situation again, he would act in exactly the same way.

33. When Subject was arrested by the Gestapo, he was considered by the Germans to be a very important prey. He played the game and led the Germans to believe that he was an important prey in the hope that such belief would give him certain advantages. Although he realized he could be shot for only one-half of what he had done and that it was

disadvantageous for him to exaggerate in order to mix the treks and confuse the German authorities, this gave him a chance not to mention certain partners whom he made it appear as negligible. He continued this game until he saw that the end was near. For example, there was a great need of gas in Germany and he figured he could gain time by telling the Germans he had invented a very interesting motor which they could profitably use. The Germans took his offer into consideration and postponed his execution. Shortly thereafter he was liberated by the Americans.

34. This vignette indicates that Subject has the developed capacity of a con man and that he is capable of imaginatively talking himself out of rather tight situations. This, of course, is an outstanding qualification as regards the requirements of the project.

35. Subject attacked a bank in 1950. At the time he was married and was the father of one child. He was working in a model makers shop and although he was not well off, he was earning a decent living. However, because of his love for risk and out of friendship for another fellow, he agreed to participate in the bank attack. Apparently the other fellow trusted Subject because he knew of Subject's war activities and he figured that because Subject had been able to accomplish certain illegal activities that he was quite capable of attacking a bank. The attack was carefully planned. Because there were only two on the team they were compelled in view of the smallness of his staff to give extra attention to their plan.

36. According to Subject he was close to this young friend who solicited his financial assistance. At first, Subject felt that the other fellow was crazy to dare to attack a bank. He also had the normal twinge of conscience and asked himself the question "is it right to do harm by robbing a bank?" Subject never felt that the two alone would be able to attack the bank successfully. Consequently, they determined to knock over a jewelry shop first. At each point in the developments Subject wanted to withdraw from the whole deal by saying "if my mother learned of this, she would die." They postponed the job indefinitely. However, his mother died in the meantime and his friend again approached him and told him that now that his mother was dead, there was no longer such a danger. Subsequently they knocked over the jewelry store.

37. Subject's chief motivation for such an activity appears to be the following: (a) Friendship. Apparently Subject will do anything for a friend. (b) Action. Apparently Subject relishes novelty and excitement and daring-do. Apparently he is a Jesse James type. (c) Emotional outlet for success of planning. Apparently Subject indulges himself in problem-solving and obtains a compulsive satisfaction if his plans succeed. In other words, he is motivated to carry out such an action because of his displaced interest in successfully engineering and accomplishing a job. (d) Money. Subject apparently is not motivated for material reward. In the case of the robbery his friend got 3/4 of the take and Subject got 1/4. Subject was content not to spend his money freely because his wife might become suspicious.

38. However, the friend returned after having spent his money. Previously Subject had told him "you got your money for the marriage; now leave me alone." However, the friend had not married and was now desirous of robbing a bank in order to finance another intended marriage. Subject agreed that this would be the last job. They cased the joint very carefully and then committed the act. The other fellow apparently threw his money around, was arrested, and squealed. The police came to Subject's place, found a ___________, and he was arrested, in his flight to the Spanish border. Subject was fleeing to the Pyrenees because he had learned that his bank deal partner had been arrested and had talked, and that the police were after him. Subject voluntarily admits that he lost control over himself and that he had failed to plan in case he failed and had to flee. He had not foreseen or prepared himself fur such a consequence. If he were to find himself again in the same situation, he would prepare an escape even if it were only necessary for the satisfactory planning of the project.

39. However, the question which arises in this examiner's mind is why Subject panicked in his flight. It could have been that he unconsciously wanted to get caught and to be punished in order to relieve his guilt. If this is so, then important consideration should be given to this aspect of Subject's personality as regards planning the project.

40. When he was jailed by the French police he was somewhat depressed by the fact that he had greatly disappointed his close relatives and because he was looked upon as a noisy and rash fellow rather than as a man capable of carrying out a crime.

41. Subject feels he failed badly when he was arrested by the Germans and also when he was arrested by the French. He feels these two failures are consequences of the poor manner in which he chose his friends. He feels it is now up to him to take all the necessary precautions in order to avoid the same pitfalls in the future.

42. There have been times in this man's life when he felt that the entire world seemed to conspire against him and when everything seemed to collapse before him. Yet he has always felt there were ways to get out of a mess principally by virtue of working. He continues to believe that unless a man is so weak both physically and morally, it is always possible for him to get back on his feet or at least to hope that this is possible. Consequently, even when he was broke, Subject always believed there was a possibility to fight and conquer. It is likely he will always have hope and optimism.

43. As regards his philosophy on the two projects which involved liberating French prisoners and the bank attack, he was betrayed by another. Actually, however, he could not have become angry at these persons because he felt his betrayal was unimportant. However, these persons lost his esteem because he feels there are certain moral values which he holds dearly, namely friendship. This would indicate that he is more in contempt of himself for having miscalculated than angry with the other person for having betrayed him. However, Subject does not feel that any of his mistakes, regardless of their size and consequence, have serious consequences as regards his near or distant future. There is no question that his mistakes have seriously reduced his circumstances of life, but he is optimistic and it is likely he regards this assignment as a golden opportunity which not only permits him a chance of success, but does not censure him for his past deeds. Consequently, he feels that to be discouraged about the future is nonsense for if there is a future, there is hope.

44. Although Subject has seen many things in his life and has had many opportunities to become angry, he feels he has never completely lost self control. He feels he has always been the master of his actions at all times and that these actions could have been changed by his own volition.

45. If Subject has ever been ashamed of himself, it must have been when his behaviour was wrongly interpreted by persons whom he loved or who loved him.

46. Subject tends to become embarrassed and confused when certain persons who ask or accept something from him display too much gratitude. In other words, too large a dose of affection will unseat Subject despite the fact that he continually solicits affection.

47. Subject has continually deceived and disappointed his mother because every time she started him in a new school, she made him promise he would behave nicely, but each time he was thrown out of school. He is convinced she wanted this for his good and not for the satisfaction of having a perfect child. However, it is likely that the mother's over-solicitousness was actually compensatory for her basic rejection of Subject. Therefore, she wanted him to be perfect so that she could love him. Consequently, it is unlikely that she did things for him, but she did things with him for herself. In other words, she wanted him to be perfect so that he could be worthy of her love. He was not perfect, probably did not obtain her love, and consequently is continually seeking the love of other persons. However, he cannot accept this fact as regards his mother and denies she did not act in his interest. One of his chief defenses is denial, that is, simply assuming the attitude that such and such was not true when he probably believes it was true.

48. Subject's actions are often impulsive and unreasoned. Such irrational behaviour usually takes place with another person despite the fact that there may be no particular tie or affection between him and the other person. Subject is unable to explain why this is so and intellectually realizes that any explanations which he might offer are not sufficient to explain such behaviour and his emotional state. In other words, this man's impulsiveness and tendence to behave irrationally and to his own disadvantage and in his own disinterest amounts to a compulsion which is sufficient to determine his behaviour but which is unconscious and not

available to rational analysis, or even awareness. In this respect he is propelled by an uncontrollable force. This is an important point of consideration as regards his utilization in this project.

49. Subject's left index finger and thumb are missing. He lost these in an explosion. This occurred in Germany when he was involved in the repatriation deal. After the bombing of Berlin he picked up among the ruins an unexploded bomb of British origin and took it home to salvage the explosive which he might use in various ways. While he was removing the detonator which was probably stuck in its receptacle, the detonator exploded in his fingers. Subject does not regret the fact that he tried to dismantle the bomb because he feels he has learned that one should keep his hands away from certain things. The explosion occurred so quickly that there was no immediate pain but the people around him became panicky. He remained cold blooded and gave the order to remove all things which were there because the explosion undoubtedly alerted the police. The police came and he explained that he had played with a fountain pen which had burst. The policemen strongly advised him never again to pick up objects dropped by the enemy. They took cognizance of his declarations and went away. The Red Cross took care of his wounds.

50. Subject does not think he will be very different in the future from what he is now. However, he feels his material situation will have improved. He does not mean financially but socially. He naively hopes that the workd will change and there will be no discrimination. He also hopes to acquire, if necessary, a nationality in which case he will feel he actually belongs to society. However, he feels that society is anxious to stamp and label individuals and it may be that he would prefer to be an individualist who is outside of society than to be a member of society who is required to conform. Since this person lives in the present, it is very difficult for him to imagine what his future will be.

51. Despite the fact that this man is motivated by rather vivid ideals, he still strikes the examiner as a practical realist who thinks and acts in a matter of fact manner. He has experienced a good deal of life and he is quite sophisticated.

52. Subject feels that a friend would regard him as unstable, affectionate, and a day dreamer.

53. Subject feels that a critic would say of him that the majority of his commercial undertakings have brought results which are considerably lower than hoped for. Consequently, he feels he is either an optimist or a joker, or else his views on the possibilities of accomplishing things are not very healthy.

54. In his defense he emphasizes that in his opinion the value of an achievement does not consist of its spectacular magnitude or in its multiplicity. For example, he feels it s not necessary to say "good morning" 100 times in order to understand the meaning and purpose of "good morning." Also he does not feel it is necessary to mass produce a machine in order to fully understand its function. However, he realizes that, commercially speaking, it is more rational to mass produce the machine but the repitition does not interest him. In his opinion the creative idea and the prototype have a much greater value and importance than the setting up of the factory which will popularize the prototype. To illustrate his feeling further he is of the opinion that one single thought from a great thinker appears to him to be much more valuable than the millions of books which are published yearly.

55. In describing himself Subject reveals that he always tries his hardest to keep his promises. He also feels that he sometimes appears to talk somewhat rashly but he feels this is due to the fact that he thinks fast and he is able to see quickly the components and the essence of a problem in its various prospectives. He is able to rapidly synthesize. In other words he learns extremely fast and he gets the point immediately. He is so quick that he will understand what you are trying to say before you finish the sentence.

56. Subject is unable to see himself in terms of what he would like to be. In order for him to display himself, it would be necessary that he would be another person altogether. However, he feels that, everything relative, perhaps he should show more strength of character, be a little more compromising, more realistic, and less sentimental. However, this would imply that he would then find himself in an environment in which there was no room for sentiment -- in which case his personality would

out of place.

57. It is Subject's experience that his friends love him for what he is. He likes his friends as they are, probably because they are as they are. The idea of attempting to change a friend is unthinkable for him. He loves them for their bad points as well as their good points.

58. Subject is an optimist but also a pessimist. He feels he will never be able to reach his ideals because his material ideal (social reform) is so distant that he would need to lead many __________ in order to attain it. It might be unfair to call this man a pessimist; it is more likely he is a realist and perhaps a cynic.

59. This man denies that he has any interest or emotional attachment to France at this time. However, it is likely he was patriotic at the time of the war. Since he has been branded a criminal and has been deprived of certain rights and privileges, he now perhaps feels rejected and in turn is rejecting France as his fatherland. Nevertheless, he strikes the examiner as a true Frenchman -- he thinks and feels like a Frenchman and is certainly not a Russian in his personality. It is likely that he identifies the French authorities with the police. He cannot tolerate rejecting attitudes. He is like an outsider who is looking in. It may be he has the "sour grapes" attitude by which he feels that since he cannot have what he wants, it is not too good anyway.

60. Subject is not a planner. Despite his interest in invention and the fact that he has pulled off a number of capers, he is more of an instigator, a leader, and an executor. In order for him to be successful in future projects, it is necessary that someone else plan and then tell him exactly what to do.

61. Subject is currently involved in the invention business which he started alone. He is the owner and exploiter of several patents and certain persons are financially and technically interested in his inventions. He is faced with a problem at this time. He is involved in the initial and preliminary phases with us and consequently is put on the fence as regards his invention business. Furthermore, if he were to join us, he would relinquish everything to his business partners.

62. This person will open himself up readily to an open personality. He will be secretive with an inhibited or secretive personality. Consequently, the best person to work with this individual is a direct, expressive and visible personality.

63. This person's social drives seem to involve: (a) General improvement of living conditions for everybody; in other words he is a humanitarian. He is not necessarily an activistic social reformer. (b) Improvement of his own standard of living. He has an inclination to better things and he feels this is the disease of all inventors.

64. Subject expresses himself freely, is discursive, voluble, and is able to carry on a conversation indefinitely. This is typically French but, in particular, it represents an oral characteristic. In other words, he is all mouth. He both expresses himself orally and he is driven by desire to obtain oral supplies by incorporation. What this means is that he will eat you up.

65. Subject reflects superior intelligence, is capable of abstract conceptualization, and is able to deal in symbols.

66. Subject is a narcissistic character who feels that because others don't love him, he needs to love himself. In other words, he is quite in love with himself and acts accordingly.

67. Subject tends to rationalize and to offer socially acceptable reasons for his individualistic behavior.

68. Subject strives chiefly for emotional satisfaction.

69. Subject is ~~an~~ altruistic but at the same time he is selfish. He will do things for the community with the hope of getting something out of it for himself. Both of these drives merge in a unitary fashion. He is motivated by both at the same time.

70. Subject denies nationalistic motives for his actions and prefers to regard them as being primarily humanitarian. Subject is action-oriented and loves to take risk and gets a kick out of excitement and adventure.

71. Subject acts because he thinks he is right.

72. Subject acts because he thinks he will succeed and because he regards what he undertakes as important. He is egotistical in this regard.

73. Subject needs to prove to others that he is successful. He is self confident in his prowess but is insecure that others may not regard him as adequate as he feels he is.

74. It is interesting to note that Subject participated in the release of the 13 French prisoners not out of patriotic motives, but to satisfy his taste for action. If they were German prisoners, he would have done the same thing. Actually, Subject admired the German army, had sympathy for Germans, but did not wish the French to be harmed. This is quite paradoxical but understandable in terms of the Subject's personality. His emotionalized ideals are not defined in terms of politics or nationalities, but are determined by a vague desire to help others who need it. This combination can mislead him and get him into difficulty; for example, his accomplice in the bank robbery.

75. Subject is a rank individualist. He is a non-conformist. However, he realizes he must cope with the community, must sacrifice for the ____________ of the community, and must not harm others. In this regard it is unlikely that Subject has ever committed physical assault, nor is it likely that he would in the future. No matter what the other person is or represents to Subject, he is still a human being whom Subject respects.

76. Although Subject is basically an exhibitionist, he is not inclined to bragging or to exhibit himself in a transparent or patent fashion. He is too sophisticated. However, he needs attention and is likely to do things in order to get attention. This is what he did in 18 schools.

77. As was previously mentioned, Subject helped French prisoners get back to France during the war. He thought it was the right thing to do but did not do it just for France. He was paid for it but he gave his money to help the prisoners. In terms of his hierarchy of motives, it is likely that this person acts according to what he considers to be right. He also expresses self pride in doing the outstanding, the difficult,

and for which he is not necessarily being paid. He acts out of principle, with no special reason. He helped the French prisoners despite the fact that he had sympathy for the Germans. However, his sympathy for the Germans was based on the fact that some Georgians had relatives in Germany and he preferred that the Germans would defeat the Russians.

78. Another reason he helped the French prisoners was that he felt that they were suffering and because they were suffering, he wanted to relieve them by helping them return to their country. Thus he was bent on nurturance. He always stands ready to help someone who is in need.

79. Subject's motivation for afilliation is positive, spontaneous, voluntary, and intense. He likes the Americans but finds it a bit difficult to analyze this sentiment. He feels the Americans have made certain political mistakes but they reflected a fundamental and basic sincerity which he likes. He understands the United States has political interest but he is willing to go along out of admiration for the sincerity of the Americans. He is not looking for special compensation. Generally, he is quite willing to do what is asked without rational reasons. In other words, his motivation is typically emotional and is understandable in terms of his character organization. He feels that a person is capable of doing anything for love of nothing. He is inclined to put things on a personal basis. He doesn't belong to any community. He feels his early years in Georgia have had no effect on his way of thinking or on his way of perceiving life. He likes the liberty which exists in America and the fact that people are treated as individuals rather than as numbers.

80. Subject's motives are genuine and are compatible with his outlook on life. They are not necessarily original or sophisticated but they are personal and therefore bona fide. Furthermore, Subject is really on the shelf in Gap. He is controlled in his movements and is restricted in his aspirations and consequently is unable to realize his freedom and to develop himself as an individual. Consequently, the assignment represents a unique opportunity for him to rise above his present restricted level of existence.

81. Subject is a very sensitive person and he attaches great importance to events of life.

82. Another important characteristic is his curiosity and his interest for experimentation.

83. Another interesting proclivity is Subject's tendency to assume blame for the mistakes of others even when he is not necessarily guilty. As a child he was gifted but undisciplined and an unsuitable student who couldn't concentrate and adapt to the school situation. As a result he was always in trouble but, more interestingly, he was always glad to assume responsibility for the anti-social actions of others. Whether he did this for masochistic reasons or because he wanted to obtain the approval of others for whom he sacrificed is difficult to determine. What is true, however, is that he will submit himself for punishment even though he has not done wrong. He may do this out of friendship in order to have others feel greatful to him. He has the attitude he should be punished for doing wrong, but should not be degraded for doing right. Subject has always realized that he has needed help as regards his emotional problems. He likes to be helped materially, not as and itself (?) but because material help involves the implication of moral help. For example, a dentist in Gap offer~~r~~ed to help Subject in his inventions without asking for advantages. This means a lot to Subject. He attaches small importance to money and he derives a tremendous satisfaction out of helping others or being helped.

84. Subject reflects a tremendous vitality that has, in the past, expressed itself through false attempts such as the bank robbery, etc. He feels he is not being used as he should and that there is a power within himself, a creative urge of movement, a power of realization. It is highly emotionally charged and he feels he is capable of doing much more than he has in the past. Although he feels he is a complicated person, he does not feel he is difficult to understand.

85. Subject likes to act intelligently and sensibly. He strives for efficiency. For example, ~~haxtaxx~~ if a person were to ask him to open a window, he feels it is up to him to decide as regards the proper method. The efficiency plus the results are his rewards. Consequently, he likes practical work which involves an intellectual effort.

86. Subject has a highly developed verbal intelligence and he is able to amplify and elaborate on his ideas.

87. Prior to the last session on the 10th of January Subject was routinely contacted by the French police who were investigating his activities in Paris at this time. As a result of this contact, he was markedly apprehensive and pre-occupied with the seriousness of this visit by the police and was not able to freely devote himself to psychological analysis as heretofore. The important point here is that Subject is an extremely alert and vigilant person. His primary motive is, of course, self-preservation and he is likely to over-react and to become emotionally upset with provocation. He needs the guiding influence of a more mature and experienced person who is in control of the situation.

88. Another important aspect of his relationship with us appears to be the fact that he consciously or unconsciously feels he has "arrived" and is acceptable to us. In other words he feels that perhaps a decision has been made which is in his favor. This reflects his own desire to be accepted together with his estimation of the situation.

89. This individual, despite his past exploits, is not necessarily a hostile person. In other words he will not do harm nor will he hurt others who are weaker than himself. He will act out of exigency but he will deliberately avoid being sadistic or wantonly cruel.

90. For some reason Subject exhibits a marked degree of loneliness and isolation at this time. He seems to be seeking companionship.

91. Subject prefers to work alone as regards technical research, but as regards the execution of an operation he prefers to be with someone or part of an organization. He knows he can rely upon himself when he is alone and that others had been unreliable in his past. However, if it is necessary for him to work with two or more individuals, he will accept it.

92. Subject admits of physical inferiority feelings by virtue of his size and strength but he denies he has feelings of intellectual inferiority. He depends more upon his mental faculties than upon his physical. "I have no fear of an elephant if I have a gun."

93. Subject is a stubborn fellow who does not like to be defeated and he strives to conquer.

94. Subject always looks for causes. He is no magical thinker but tends to be rational and realistic despite his strong emotional re-activity which can be almost explosive at times.

95. Subject particularly strives not to be regarded as bad or evil. In fact, he is not a criminal type but is a neurotic character who has expressed his conflicts and difficulties in non-conforming behaviour. At the same time he is not anti-social. He is a person who has differences of opinion and conflicts with the social order.

96. Subject does not regard himself as an expert or ____________. He realizes his short comings and he hopes his ___________ will be complemented by training.

97. Subject relies quite heavily upon humor for relief of tension and as a defense against the development of anxiety and inter-personal relationshfps.

98. An important aspect of this man's personality and history would appear to be his so-called accident proneness. He is like the cat in the Disney film who, while chasing the mouse and having his entire attention directed to the catching and incorporation of the mouse, inadvertantly gets himself run over by a truck. His first reaction to being splattered by the truck is one of disappointment as regards not arriving at the goal; i.e., catching the mouse. He thereupon acts upon feelings of revenge on the mouse for having caused his unfortunate accident. In addition, this example signifies that Subject is likely to keep his eye too much upon the goal and insufficiently upon the hazards involved in reaching the goal. It may be argued that Subject's philospphy in his past operations are related in some manner to his lack of attention to such details. His history is that of the unlucky cat who manages to get himself run over successfully.

99. This person can be quite discomposed by the surprise of unexpected occurrences.

100. Despite defeat Subject is able to pick himself up, figure things out, start all over in a more systematic way, and continue in his pursuit of his goal. Consequently, he does learn by experience. His mistakes are

chiefly due to the fact that he is or has been "stupid" or impulsive -- stupid, impulsive, immature and inexperienced.

101. Subject is capable of experiencing melancholy or depressive mood swings. However, he maintains a gay facade and he attempts to relieve his depressive feelings with lightness. Underneath the gay appearance, however, is seriousness. One of the chief motives is his curiousity. He seeks the unknown but when he approaches the unknown, he experiences a certain feeling which he recognizes as a threat to his emotional security and he is ambivalent about proceeding or withdrawing. He has an internal fear of something which he doesn't know or understand. Because of this it may be necessary to provide him with firm support, guidance, and consideration of all the possible eventualities. He has a fear of getting himself into something which he cannot get out of and his immediate reaction is to turn around and go away without having solved the problem. Consequently, he needs a person of greater intelligence who is able to help him to evaluate the realities of his situation or predicament. It must be kept in mind that his self-preservation is stronger than his desire to solve problems.

102. Subject is likely to be loyal to a superior and may even be critical of himself in relation to the superior. In other words, he would like to be as useful as possible in order to express his loyalty, but may feel inadequate in that he requires the protection of his superior.

103. This person puts no stock in emblems or signs of rank or reputation. He regards such signs as identifying labels only and is not impressed or motivated for glory symbols. If he were to accomplish an outstanding feat, he would not want a medal -- all he would want was a remark from an important figure to the effect "well done, thank you." He feels it is sufficient only for him to know he has done well.

104. Subject will attempt to assume leadership on the team but it may be that if his partner is superior, he would be a better follower than he would be a leader of a less adequate person. He is more of a dependent than independent person in terms of his inter-personal relationships; furthermore, he acts on sentiment and impulse and consequently his judgment is questionable. This would indicate that he would work better with a more sober-minded, calculating individual. He is likely

to work best with a person whom he respects and with whom he enjoys a friendly but authoritative relationship.

105. There is no reason why this person cannot be handled by an experienced, mature case officer.

106. In view of the supposed length of the mission, it is likely that a short term operation would be more compatible with Subject's assets and liabilities than a long term affair.

107. As regards the requirements of the project, it is understood that the more desirable qualifications would reflect intelligence, resourcefulness, mechanical talent, small man team ability, infiltration-exfiltration capability, good health, physical stamina, and motivation. Subject satisfies all these criteria. The other factors which he exhibits do not necessarily vitiate his positive features.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

235

DATE : 17 DEC 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (MR HOUCK AF DIV NOTIFIED 1515 17 DEC)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

per CSN 43-43

DEC 17 1856Z 60

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 18739

OPIM DIR CITE LEOP 0478

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A. DIR 16116 (OUT 52272)

B. BERN 6595 (IN 15973)

C. BERN 6537 (IN 49492)*

1. WIROGUE EOD 2 DEC. HESTON MADE INITIAL CONTACT AND GUTHMAN NOW HANDLING. WIROGUE GIVEN FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. BUILD COVER DURING INITIAL PERIOD. THIS RESPECT, WIROGUE SAID PLANNED SET UP SHOP WITH AUTOMATIC CAMERA TO TAKE IDENTIFICATION PICTURES. SAID WOULD INSTALL POLAROID CAMERA SO CLIENT COULD PUSH BUTTON AND TAKE OWN PICTURE. GUTHMAN AGREED THIS WORTH EXPLORING, AS WOULD APPEAR PROVIDE INEXPENSIVE COVER.

B. WIROGUE TOLD TRY SPOT PERSONS FOR SURVEILLANCE TEAM, INTEL ASSETS (WITH EMPHASIS ON ORIENTALE PROVINCE) AND PM ASSETS. HE TOLD SUBMIT NAMES ANY LIKELY CANDIDATES TO STATION FOR TRACES PRIOR MAKING APPROACH.

2. QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QJWIN SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS. STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER "EXECUTION SQUAD". WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED, WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS. UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORKING FOR PBPRIME SERVICE.

3. QJWIN INTRODUCED WIROGUE TO HOFHUIS. WIROGUE CASHED IN LETTER CREDIT WITH HOFHUIS TO GET GOOD EXCHANGE RATE. QJWIN REPORTS WIROGUE HAS PURCHASED THREE AUTOMOBILES SINCE ARRIVAL LEOP: CHRYSLER FOR 85000 FRANCS, CITROEN FOR 25000 FRANCS AND TRIUMPH FOR 110000 FRANCS. WIROGUE TOLD QJWIN HE SOLD CITROEN FOR 15000 FRANCS BUT IT STILL PARKED NEAR HIS HOTEL.

4. AT 13 DEC MEETING WIROGUE SAID HE PURCHASED CHRYSLER FOR 75000 FRANCS. MADE NO MENTION PURCHASE OTHER CARS. ALSO SAID HAD RENTED TWO STORES, ONE IN LEOP EUROPEAN CITY FOR 14000 FRANCS PER MONTH AND ONE IN NATIVE CITY FOR 6000 FRANCS PER MONTH. ALSO HAS SIGNED CONTRACT FOR APARTMENT FOR 8000 FRANCS PER MONTH. ASKED GUTHMAN FOR THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS RENTAL ALLOWANCE WHICH HE CLAIMS HQS CASE OFFICER TOLD HIM HE WOULD RECEIVE IN LUMP SUM. GUTHMAN REFUSED, SAYING WOULD HAVE OBTAIN HQS APPROVAL PAY RENTAL ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM.

5. IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM. THEN GUTHMAN TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS. GUTHMAN WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION KUBARK.

6. LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING AND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEADACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT

ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST SOLUTION. ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE PUT HIM IN STAN ONCE MENUCHIN RETURNS TO TRY OBTAIN IMMEDIATE INTEL THAT AREA.

7. REQUEST HQS INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR 1300Z, 19 DEC RE GIVING WIROGUE YEARS RENTAL ALLOWANCE. LATTER CLAIMS NEEDS THESE FUNDS VIEW CAR PURCHASE IN ORDER SET UP COVER MECHANISM. IF WIROGUE TO REMAIN, BELIEVE MUST GIVE HIM AT LEAST ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS, AS BELIEVE HE SHORT FUNDS. ALSO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS RE WIROGUE PAY. LATTER SAYS HIS CONTRACT CALLS FOR FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS SALARY PER MONTH. SAID HE NOT PAID FOR NOVEMBER. STATION GAVE HIM ONE PAYMENT FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS. HOWEVER WISH HQS CONFIRMATION THIS CORRECT AND AUTHORITY PAY HIM IN DOLLARS PER HIS REQUEST. (WANTS DOLLARS AS BLACK MARKET EXCHANGE RATE WHICH USED BY MOST PERSONS HERE TWENTY TO FORTY PERCENT BETTER THAN OFFICIAL RATE).

8. NOT ABLE PICK UP LETTER CREDIT PER REF A. WIROGUE SAID HAD GIVEN IT TO KOFHUI FOR RETURN TO BANK AFTER MARKING IT CANCELLED.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* WIROGUE 1 ETA LEOP 2 DEC. HAS LETTER OF CREDIT FOR 12,000 SWISS FRANCS.

Declassified
per CSN 43-43

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

D. NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 8284
DATE : 19 December 1960 536

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

19 DEC 60 20 21 z

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
PRIORITY

OUT54652

[illegible] OUT 54652

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 17181
17181

RYBAT WIROGUE

RE: LEOP 0478 (IN 18739)*

PER ACLS 149

1. WIROGUE/1 CONTRACT CALLS FOR:

A. FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH BEGINNING ONE NOV. TO BE PAID IN FIELD. YOUR DISCRETION TO PAY IN DOLLARS. HE NOT PAID FOR NOV PRIOR TO DISPATCH. OBTAIN RECEIPTS AND CHARGE PROJECT.

B. THREE THOUSAND DOLLAR QUARTERS ALLOWANCE PER ANNUM, NON ACCOUNTABLE.

C. FOUR THOUSAND DOLLAR OPS LOAN TO SET UP COVER BUSINESS TO BE REPAID FROM PROFITS. ALSO MUST ACCOUNT FOR ONE THOUSAND TEN DOLLAR TRAVEL ADVANCE RECEIVED.

2. INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO MAKE CONTACT AND FOLLOW GUTHMAN'S INSTRUCTIONS IMPLICITLY. ALSO REPORT ACCURATELY ALL CONTACTS OR POTENTIAL AGENTS AND NOT MAKE ANY APPROACHES OR COMMITMENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL.

3. SHARE GUTHMAN'S CONCERN AND RECOMMEND TELL WIROGUE HE ON PROBATION AND MUST TOE THE MARK OR ELSE RECALL AND TERMINATION. POINT OUT IF NECESSARY HE LIVING UNDER FALSE DOCUMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible]

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

PAGE TWO CONTINUED

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

[illegible] OUT54652

OUT 54652

TO   INFO   FI CSN 43-43   CITE DIR 17181

17181

*DESK COMMENT: Reference HYBAT

B Tweedy
BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/W/1 W
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Edward Welles
EDWARD G. WELLES
A/CAF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

$4,000.00 18 November 1960

PROMISSORY NOTE

On the first day of December 1965 I promise to pay to bearer Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00). Value received.

Georg F. Reiner

George Franz Reiner

201-233477

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	ROLL	NUMBER	PAY PERIOD DATE	ALLOTMENT	STA. NO.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] - 17-1	[illegible]5017	811

EARNINGS	DESCRIPTION
[illegible]	[illegible]
500.00	[illegible] SAL

DEDUCTIONS	DESCRIPTION

PAYMENTS and/or REFUND DUE	DESCRIPTION
500.00	[illegible] AT [illegible]
500.00	[illegible] AT [illegible]
500.00	[illegible] AT ST

REFUNDS DUE FROM EMPLOYEE

LEGEND of ACTION CODES

1. Promotions
2. Periodic Step Increase
3. Field Allotment
4. Salary Differential
5. Leave Without Pay
6. Hospital, Insurance, Credit Union
7. Overpayment
8. Tax Deduction Change
9. Allowances
10.

* ASTERISK Denotes other than Normal Salary

ACTION DATA

EFFECTIVE DATE DAY	MO	Y	CO. DE	EFFECTIVE DATE DAY	MO.	Y	CO. DE	P/P	ADDL. COMP. P/P	C/T	R/D	HOL.

1500.00		1500.00			TOTALS
			NET PAY	PD. at HDQTS.	

FORM 11-58 1315 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-233477

(30)

14-00000

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT WI/ROGUE	☐ CA ☒ FI/CI		☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDY ☒ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA	
X	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION AF	
	AMENDMENT		
	RENEWAL	BRANCH AF/[illegible]	
	TERMINATION	DESK AF/Republic of Congo	
	EXTENSION		
	OTHER	CASE OFFICER Daniel [illegible]	EXTENSION 82[illegible]

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY [illegible]/P	TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED	FY	AMOUNT
	$ 17,250	1961	$13,250
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 November 1960 TO 31 October 1961		1962	$ 4,000
	FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL	1132-2621-5017	

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE DDP/PG	DATE 22 Nov 60

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1	~~SSA-DDP/S~~	1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1	CASE OFFICER	[illegible]	DDP/PG

FORM 5-60 849 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-233477

(5)

Trained in use

INCENDIARY KIT

1. Time fuse (50 ft roll)	Ft.	50
2. M1 time pencil Red	Ea	5
White	Ea	5
3. Crimper	Ea	1
4. Tape (30 ft roll)	Ea	2
5. Knife	Ea	1
6. Demo carrying bag	Ea	1
7. Fuzee matches	Pkg	10
8. Twine	Ball	1
9. PTI Red	Ea	6
White	Ea	6
Green	Ea	6
10. AN-M14	Ea	4
11. M2 Thickener (5lb can)	Ea	2
12. Firestarter (5/can)	Ea	4

201-233477

WIROGUE/1
Trained in ~~these~~ use of these items.

DEMO KIT

1. C-3	Blk	16
2. Time Fuse	Ft	100
3. Cap J-1	Ea	50
4. Primacord (100 ft coil)	Ft	200
5. M2 Fuse lighter	Ea	10
6. M1 Time pencil Red	Ea	6
White	Ea	4
7. Tape (30 ft roll)	Ea	6
8. Knife	Ea	2
9. Crimpers	Ea	2
10. Bag, carrying, demo	Ea	3
11. Fuzee matches	Pkg	10
12. M1 pull firing device	Ea	5
13. M1A1 pressure firing device	Ea	5
14. M1 firing device	Ea	5

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE : 13 DEC 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION : C/FD 2

INFO : C/AF, S/C 2*

1 of 3

DEC 13 1146Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 16252

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

BERN CITE BERN 6997

[illegible] [illegible]

REF DIR 10116 (OUT 52272) **

1. INTEGRITY/1 PHONING HOFHUIS ABOUT 1500 HOURS 13 DECEMBER TO SAY WILL PAY CHECK.

2. WE PROPOSE LEAVE BALANCE HEINER ACCOUNT WITH INTEGRITY INTACT. WHEN CHECK CLEARS AND LETTER CREDIT RECEIVED AND CANCELLED WILL REDUCE ACCOUNT BY 12,000 SWISS FRANCS.

3. HAVE ASSURED INTEGRITY/1 WILL HONOR LETTER CREDIT EVENT NEGOTIATED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION SAME AS REFERENCED CABLE.

**INTEGRITY 1 SHOULD ADVISE HOFHUIS THAT CHECK IS GOOD.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

M. J. A. HOFHUIS
B.P. 1691
Leopoldville
Republique du Congo

Leopoldville, 13 Decembre 1960

Bank und Finanz Institut
Neuengasse 1
Berne
Suisse

Messieurs,

Sous ce pli je vous prie de vouloir trouver un chèque N° 3.409, tiré sur votre Banque par Monsieur Georg F.Reiner et d'un import de S.frs 12.000.- (douse mille francs suisses). Ce chèque a été fait à mon nom.

Je vous envoie également la Lettre de crédit N° 101, datée le 29 Novembre 1960, émise au nom de Mr;Reiner pour un montant de douse mille francs suisses. La valeur de la dite lettre est actuellement Sfrs 11.600. Cette lettre a été annulée par une lettre de Mr.Reiner dont je vous prie de vouloir trouver l'original ci-jointe.

Je me réfère egalement à la conversation téléphonique de hier, par laquelle je vous ai demandé s'il y avait provision suffisante pour couvrir le chèque N° 3.409. N'ayant pas reçu votre communication téléphonique au jourd'hui, je suppose que l'affaire est en règle. Toutefois je vous remercie pour votre intervention.

Entretemps je vous demande de tenir à ma disposition le montant de douse mille francs suisses. Dès réception de votre confirmation à ce sujet, je vous ferai parvenir les instructions ultérieures.

En vous remerciant à l'avance pour votre prompte attention, je vous prie d'agréer, Messieurs, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

M.Hofhuis

14-00000

H. J. A. HOFHUIS

Leopoldville, 14 Decembre 1960

Bank und Finanz Institut A.G.
Neuengasse 17
Berne
Suisse

Messieurs,

Suite à ma lettre du 13 courant, je vous envoie sous ce pli également un chèque N° 3.410, tiré sur votre Banque par Mr. F.G.Rainer et pour un montant de Sfrs. 3.000.-

Voulez vous avoir l'obligeance de garder egalement le montant de ce chèque à ma disposition. Au cas, ou il y aurait une manque de provision, je vous demande de me retourner le chèque n° 3.410.

Au plaisir de lire votre confirmation à ce sujet, je vous prie d'agréer, Messieurs, mes salutations distinguées.

H.Hofhuis

C/o L.E.Solé & C°
B.P. 7697
Leopoldville
Rep. du Congo

SOCIÉTÉ DE BANQUE SUISSE

SWISS BANK CORPORATION · SCHWEIZERISCHER BANKVEREIN · SOCIETA DI BANCA SVIZZERA

(VOIR À PAGE 4 LA LISTE DE NOS SIÈGES ET SUCCURSALES ET LEURS ADRESSES TÉLÉGRAPHIQUES)

LETTRE DE CRÉDIT No. A [redacted]

[illegible] 31 mai 1961 [illegible]

B E R N E -- 29 novembre 1960.

A nos correspondants figurant sur la page No. 3.

Messieurs,

[illegible] le porteur de la présente

Monsieur Georg Franz REINER

[illegible] 1r [illegible]

fr.s. 12,000.-- [illegible] DOUZE MILLE FRANCS SUISSES

//

[illegible] tre [illegible] les sommes qu'il [illegible] ra XXXX [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] tre [illegible]

Société de Banque Suisse

201-233477

[illegible]

SOCIÉTÉ DE BANQUE SUISSE

SWISS BANK CORPORATION · SCHWEIZERISCHER BANKVEREIN · SOCIETÀ DI BANCA SVIZZERA

[illegible]

LETTRE DE CRÉDIT N° [redacted]

valable jusqu'au **11 Mai 1961** inclus

B E R N E, le **29 novembre 1960.**

A nos correspondants figurant sur la page No. 3.

Messieurs,

[illegible]

Monsieur Georg Franz REINER

1° accréditons auprès de vous pour une somme totale de

frs.s. 12,000.-- **DOUZE MILLE FRANCS SUISSES**

//

[illegible] tro [illegible]

[illegible] il [illegible] ra xxxx

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] tro [illegible]

[illegible]

Société de Banque Suisse

201-233477

WIROGUE Cover Story

DOB: 1921 25 July
POB: Austria,

1. Father took to France 1921.
2. Place of Residence Versaille,
3. Lyceum in Versaille 1926 - 1938
4. Data on father
   Franz Reiner
   Geological engineer
   Occupied by petroleum & coal concern
   in the valley de la Mur (South Austria)
   and Zterdorf (for petroleum)
   He studied in Bergschule in Freiberg
   Germany near Dresden.
5. Anschluss 11 Mars 1938
6. Returned to Austria Dec 1938
7. Joined Hitler Youth 1939
8. 1939 October joined Germany army
9. Stuttgart preliminary training
10. April 1940 assigned to training school
    for Wehrmacht in Headquarters Berlin
    Assignment teach french,
11. 1944 - Sargent
12. 1944 - Western front - during Battle of Bulge

201-233477

You were wounded and taken prisoner
by Air Forces. (82nd Airborne Div)

13. You were once in Prison camps France
until March 1946.

14. Apr 1946, Clermont-Ferrant, France
employed in

15. Return Austria 1948. Father still living
Mother Dead.

16. 1948 - 1953 ARTS et METIERS (Chalons/Marne)

17. 1953 - 1955 Paris Rue de Vaugirard.

18. 1955 - Return Wien

TSD/TRAINING EVALUATION

NAME WIROGUE

DIVISION AF/V/1

SUBJECT Tutorial Secret Writing

DATES TRAINED 2-4 November 1960

1. During the three-day period WIROGUE received some six hours training in the operational usage of Secret Writing, covering the specifics of his own components of the two SW systems assigned for his operation. The instruction was given in an AF safehouse and was presented entirely in English.

2. In consonance with his own requirements the agent was given a briefing in the principles and practices of SW as a clandestine means of communication in covert operations,--plans at this writing envisage the use of SW only for emergency commo. It was repeatedly emphasized that the success of an SW letter depends 50% upon the unobtrusive "normalcy" of the open text and 50% upon the preparation of the SW text itself.

3. Terminal Evaluation --

a. WIROGUE demonstrated that he could adequately prepare letters bearing a carbon-type secret ink which would meet operational requirements. He is a very meticulous worker and possesses a high degree of manual dexterity--ambidextrously, yet!

b. He quite adequately mastered the development procedures for his assigned receiving system.

4. The agent's training specifically covered the following:

a. Writing techniques with a carbon-type ink

b. Scorch development of SW

c. Standard defense measures for carbon-ink writing

d. Use of glancing light in defensive and offensive examination for SW

e. Relative placements of the SW and overt texts on the lettersheet

f. Discussion of cover letters and indicators.

201-233477

5. The operational supplies passed to the Instructor by SAB were issued to WIROGUE at the completion of the training.

CI/CE Reflections:

1. WIROGUE in the opening phases of the instruction indicated (from a sense of modesty, I presume) that he was completely unfamiliar with SW. During training sessions the caliber of his questions, observations and even of some of the steps in SW technique which he independently suggested for use all definitely indicated to the writer that he was quite familiar and/or somewhat experienced in SW practices.

WILLIAM C. LITTLE, Instructor
TSD/TRNG/Technical School

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief of Station, Leopoldville

INFO.

FROM Chief, Africa

SUBJECT General - Administrative
Specific - Contract - Ernest G. MAYCRINK

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Enclosed for your information and retention is a copy of Ernest G. MAYCRINK's contract.

PAULA T. HENNEGAR

DUDLEY G. FOSHEE
8 December 1960

Attachment:
Contract - MAYCRINK

Distribution:
2 - Leopoldville

201- 233477

DATE TYPED 8 Dec 1960	DATE DISPATCHED 10 DEC 1960
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER ACLS-149	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Mr. Ernest G. Maverick

Dear Mr. Maverick: 31 October ~~[illegible]~~

Effective 31 October ~~[illegible]~~ 1960, all contracts, oral or written, by and between you and the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, are hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and services, you will receive from the Government, payable in such an approved manner as you may direct in writing, the following:

(a) Basic compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $6000 per annum.

(b) Additional compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum for cost-of-living expenses (including quarters), effective upon your arrival at and applicable only to your contemplated permanent post of assignment overseas. Quarters will not be furnished you nor will you accept quarters provided by a cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement.

2. Taxes. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. You herein authorize this organization to withhold taxes on said income if it determines such requirements so necessitate.

3. Travel. ?

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved and financially limited by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

201-233477

5. Repayment. It is recognised that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Negotiated Benefits. (a) (1) If, in the performance of activities under this agreement, you incur an injury or illness which is not the result of your gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intemperate act, the Government will provide medical, surgical, hospital, transportation and disability benefits in such amounts and under such conditions as the Government in its sole discretion deems proper; provided, however, that such benefits shall not exceed a total of $5000 for the same injury or illness.

(2) If you die in the performance of activities hereunder and your death is not the result of your gross negligence, willful misconduct or intemperate act, the Government will pay the sum of $5000 to your beneficiary(ies) less any amount paid to you under sub-paragraph (1) above if such injury or illness resulted in your death, provided that said beneficiary(ies) is acceptable to the Government at the time such payment is to be made. An acceptable beneficiary hereunder is an individual to whom payment by the U.S. Government can be made without conflicting with its avowed principles and ideals.

(b) Outstanding performance by you under this agreement and your fulfillment of obligations hereunder in an efficient manner will result in the Government undertaking your resettlement in an area mutually agreeable to both parties, to the extent deemed appropriate by the United States Government.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognise and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by this organization to evidence this relationship.

8. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

9. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangement, monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner. It is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment by the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

10. Cover. (a) It is anticipated that you will undertake a cover venture in the course of your performance under this agreement. Such venture must be approved by the appropriate Government representative overseeing your activities prior to its initiation. Any and all documents which you may execute in the course of said cover venture are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

(b) To provide capital for your approved cover venture the Government will loan you $4000 to be secured by a non-interest bearing promissory note, payable on demand. Said loan will be deposited to an account in a foreign bank and a $3000 letter of credit will be issued you against that deposit. The additional $1000 will be released from said account, after approval by the Government representative overseeing your activities.

(c) You will submit to the Government quarterly income and expense statements on the cover venture and copies of all tax returns filed in connection therewith. Your cover accounts shall be kept separate and distinct from the bank account into which your personal compensation payments are made.

(d) You herein agree that monies loaned you by the Government shall be repaid from the profits of the cover venture, in amounts and at periodic intervals to be established by the Government representative overseeing your activities. After said loan has been completely repaid and all other obligations, such as local taxes, etc., have been made, you may retain any further profit derived from said cover venture. However, it is clearly understood and agreed that your primary obligation under this agreement is the performance of Governmental activities.

11. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed through instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the undersigned Contracting Officer executing this agreement. It is agreed that any revelation whatsoever of the above information will constitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by

you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement.

12. Instructions. During the term of this agreement, and in your official business capacity you herein agree to act in conformance with instructions, oral or written given you by authorized representatives of this organization.

13. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on this organization.

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 November 1960, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

(a) By ______ actual notice to you from the Government, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Ernest G. Mayerink

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 12 DEC 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION : C/FD 2 (MR GRAHAM, FD, NOTIFIED 1812 12 DEC 60)

INFO : C/AF, S/C 2

DEC 12 2246Z 60

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 15973

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

OPIM DIR LEOP CITE BERN 659

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 13116 (NOT SENT LEOP) (out 95707)
BERN 6537 (IN 49497)

1. BY CHANCE DURING VISIT GRAHAM WITH INTEGRITY 1 LATTER'S OFFICE 1530 HOURS MONDAY 12 DEC INTEGRITY 1 RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM LEOPOLDVILLE FROM A FNU HOFHUIS.

2. HOFHUIS TOLD INTEGRITY 1 HE HAD HIS POSSESSION CHECK SIGNED BY GEORG F; REINER FOR SWISS FRANCS 12,000. ALSO HAS LETTER CREDIT PAYABLE REINER AND SAID REINER GAVE TO HIM FOR SECURITY UNTIL CHECK PAID. HOFHUIS ASKED INTEGRITY 1 IF HE WOULD PAY CHECK. WHILE HOLDING HOFHUIS OTHER END PHONE INTEGRITY 1 ASKED GRAHAM FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

3. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES GRAHAM TOLD INTEGRITY 1 TO STALL HOFHUIS BY TELLING HOFHUIS WOULD PHONE HIM AT LEOP 2839 (WHICH NUMBER SUPPLIED BY HOFHUIS) AND SAY IF WOULD PAY CHECK. HOFHUIS SAID WOULD WAIT EXACTLY 24 HOURS FOR INTEGRITY PHONE CALL.

4. HOFHUIS WOULD NOT TELL INTEGRITY WHY HE HAD REINER'S

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET per CSH 43-43

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CHECK AND LETTER CREDIT. HOFHUIS SAID REINER STAYING HOTEL ASTRID.

5. REQUEST IMMED ADVICE ON WHETHER OR NOT INTEGRITY 1 SHOULD TELL HOFHUIS HE WILL PAY CHECK BEARING MIND LETTER OF CREDIT IS IRREVOCABLE AND INTEGRITY 1 OBLIGED PAY FACE AMOUNT EVEN IF CHECK HONORED.

6. OBVIOUSLY REINER NOT AWARE HE CANNOT WRITE CHECK AGAINST LETTER OF CREDIT. SHOULD LEOP REACH REINER AND LEARN WHAT REINER TRYING TO DO? WHY DOES NOT REINER NEGOTIATE LETTER CREDIT LOCAL BANK? WE FEAR SERIOUS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS JEOPARDIZING OUR SOURCE IF CHECKS WRITTEN REINER FLOAT AROUND LEOPOLDVILLE OR NEGOTIATED BY HOFHUIS BY MEANS ILLEGAL PRESENT CONGO GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT SGFLAG CABLES.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: MR GRAHAM
UNIT:
EXT: 559
DATE:

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: BERN LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: *C/FD 2

INFO: C/AF, S/C 2

1 copy

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 30 DEC 60 01 35z
ROUTINE
PRIORITY INITIALS
☒ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT52272
OUT 52272

TO OPIM: BERN LEOP INFO [redacted] CITE DIR 16116
16116

RYBAT WJ ROGUE

par CSH 43-43

RE BERN 6537 (IN 15973) **

1. INTEGRITY 1 SHOULD ADVISE HOFHUIS CHECK IS GOOD. CASH CHECK AND RETURN LETTER CREDIT TO REINER.

2. FOR LEOP. CONTACT REINER, PICK UP LETTER CREDIT AND POUCH BERN FOR DISPOSITION.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION SAME AS REFERENCED CABLE.

**. [illegible] REFERENCE. POSSIBLY BERN 6595 (IN 15973).

H R Graham

MR GRAHAM, FD
BY DIRECTION
MR HOUCK, AF

[redacted]

par CSH 43-43

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

587

.TE : 29 NOV 60

: DIRECTOR

OM : BERN

TION : C/EE 3

FO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED

Dec CSN 43-43

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 29 2233Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 49492

LEOP INFO DIR CITE BERN 6537

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE 1 ETA LEOP 2 DEC. WILL CONTACT. HAS LETTER OF CREDIT FOR 12,020 SWISS FRANCS.

2. ROISTADE ETA HQS 1 DEC.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET RYBAT

IB MEMO NO. 5238
29 November 1960

[illegible]
per CSH 43-43

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa West/2

ATTENTION : Mr. Daniel Niesciur

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Austrian Documentation for WIROGUE

1. This is to confirm the handcarrying of the following Austrian Documentation by Mr. Daniel Niesciur on 18 November 1960:

   a. Austrian Passport No. 546226
   b. Austrian Driver's License
   c. International Certificate of Vaccination
   d. Baptism Certificate
   e. Business Letter from Arthur Döll and Son, Berlin
   f. Pocket Litter - Brouchers, Austria, West Berlin
   g. General Information on Documentation Cover Story
   h. Itinerary as reflected in Passport
   i. Explanation of Passport Entries
   j. Instruction for Signing Documentation

2. The documentation (above items, a,b,c,) is to be aged after WIROGUE has signed them. It is our understanding that WIROGUE will use subject documentation to travel from West Germany to Leopoldville, Congo, via Switzerland and Italy.

3. It is requested that the subject documentation be returned to TSD/IB when no longer needed for operational purposes.

for CHARLES YECH, JR.
CHIEF, TSD/IB

Distribution:
Original and 1 - Addressee

[illegible]
[illegible] 43-43

201-233477

SECRET RYBAT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

778

ORIG: LESTER C. HOUCK
UNIT: C/AF/WEST
EXT: 3939
DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1960

TO: FRANKFURT, FROB
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 7
INFO: COP, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

24 NOV 60 00 08z

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY — INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

OUT95876
95876

[illegible] Per CSN 43-43

TO FRAN, FROB INFO CITE DIR 13266
13266

WIROGUE RYBAT

PLS ADVISE CHARLES ROISTADE THAT BERN DISCOVERS CANNOT ISSUE LETTER OF CREDIT CONGO FRANCS. MIGHT CONSIDER GERMAN DM's BUT TAKE UP WITH BERN STATION.

END OF MESSAGE.

~~CHIEF~~, EE/OPS/W
RELEASING OFFICER

C/AF/7
DC/EE/G
COORDINATING OFFICERS

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-233477

P.O. Box 54
Canal Street Station
New York 13, N.Y.

SECRET

22 November 1960

TO : Chief, Africa Division
ATTEN. : Daniel R. Niesciur AF/W/2 2110 I Building
FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)
SUBJECT : LETTER ADDRESS
229496

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 9 November 1960 requesting the establishment of a post office box in New York City in the name of Clifford N. MIRKINSON

2. This will confirm advice furnished your office on 18 November 1960 that the requested address has been established as follows:

Clifford N. MIRKINSON
Post Office Box 54
Canal Street Station
New York 13, New York

3. This address will be maintained for an indefinite period and will be serviced twice weekly. Daniel R. Niesciur extension 8284 will be notified upon receipt of mail.

4. Non-registered, first class and air mail, bearing the above address as a return address, may be mailed by you at any convenient letter box in the area where this facility is established. Registered mail and parcel post should be forwarded to this office for secure mailing. Any mail having special security significance should be coordinated with this office prior to mailing. Mail bearing the above address as a return address should not be handled by the Central Mail Room.

5. It is requested that you advise this office when the above address is no longer of use to you. Any inquiries concerning this facility should be directed to the SB/3 Desk of this office, Room ~~IXXX~~ 1409 I Building, Extension 3933.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White
Victor R. White

SECRET

201-233477

RECEIPT FOR AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS

TO: TSD/IB

DATE 18 November 1960

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS TRANSMITTED WITH MEMO NO. ____________ DATED ________________ AND PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ____

Affidavit of Identity in Lieu of Passport No. 05721 issued to David SLEZNER

____
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

WI/ROGUE

NOTE: Authentication Materials must be returned to TSD/IB as soon as the intended operational use has been fulfilled; unused documents, whether filled in or blank, must be returned to TSD/IB when no longer needed.

TSD/IB should be notified if any of the Authentication Materials are destroyed, lost, or for any other reason can no longer be returned.

201-233477

SECRET

17 NOV 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

ATTENTION : Monetary Branch

SUBJECT : Opening Bank Account for Georg Franz REINER

1. It is hereby requested that an account be opened and a sum of four thousand dollars be deposited in a bank in Switzerland under the name of Georg Franz REINER. Subsequently a letter of credit in the amount of 150,000 Belgian Congo Francs ($3,000.00) is to be provided REINER, in Switzerland.

2. To facilitate the transaction and expedite this request, Messrs. Daniel R. Niesciur and Georg Franz Reiner will be in Bern on 28 November. Mr. Niesciur will contact the station and will act as an intermediary between the Bern Station and REINER who is a contract agent.

3. Your assistance in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Bronson Tweedy
Chief, AF Division

SECRET

201-233477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: LESTER C. HOUCK
UNIT: C/AF/WEST
EXT: 3939
DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1960

TO: FRANKFURT, FROB
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 7
INFO: COP, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 2 3 4 5 6

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 24 Nov 60 00 08 z
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

DESENSITIZED
par CSN 43-43

OUT95876

TO FRAN, FROB INFO CITE DIR 13266

13266

WIROGUE RYBAT

PLS ADVISE CHARLES ROISTADE THAT BERN DISCOVERS CANNOT ISSUE LETTER OF CREDIT CONGO FRANCS. MIGHT CONSIDER GERMAN DM's BUT TAKE UP WITH BERN STATION.

END OF MESSAGE.

DESENSITIZED
par CSN 43-43

~~CHIEF~~, EE/OPS/W
RELEASING OFFICER

C/AF/W
DC/EE/G
COORDINATING OFFICERS

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

349

DATE : 22 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : *COP, C/EE 3, S/C 2, D/OS 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 22 1955Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 46297

DIR CITE FRAN 7456

FJDUST WIROGUE

REF DIR 12432 (OUT 94095)

MR PAUL R FENNIG ETD FRAN 1630 LOCAL 23 NOVEMBER VIA MATS FLIGHT 424. ETA ANDREWS 0900 LOCAL 24 NOVEMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION SAME AS REFERENCED CABLE.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 216
18 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR L-1077

FROM : FRANKFURT D. [illegible]

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

NOV 18 1726Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 44534

PRITY DIR INFO FRAN LEOP CITE FROB 8223

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

~~RYBAT~~ ZIBET WIROGUE CATARSI

REF DIR 11912 *Out 93109*

1. SAFE HOUSE AVAILABLE. CALL MILITARY 3324 AND ASK FOR ED OR DAVE. IDENTIFY SELF BY TRUE FIRST NAME. IF AFTER 1730 CALL ED FRANKFURT CIVILIAN 521513 OR DAVE 523466.

2. DESIRE PRIOR MEET WITH ROISTADE FOR BRIEFING ON CASE BEFORE ASSIGNING SAFE HOUSE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ROISTADE WOULD REQUIRE SAFE HOUSE FOR FIVE DAYS TO QUARTER AND BRIEF WIROGUE PRIOR TO LATTERS DISPATCH.

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

670

ORIG: D. HIRSCHUR
UNIT: AF/W/1
EXT: 3966
DATE: 16 November 1960

670

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	AW	4	
2		5	
3	Cmar	6	

TO: 7BLKFULT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3 *

INFO: COP, C/EE 3, D/OS 2, S/C 2

per CSN 43-43

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	NOV 18 23 24 '60	
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.	
	PRIORITY		INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		INITIALS

94095
OUT94095

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12432

12432

WIROGUE FJDUST KYBAT
RE: DIR 08782 (OUT 86554) **

WIROGUE AND KUSODA ESCORT MR. PAUL R. ~~FENNESS~~ FENNIG DEPARTING ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE AT 1500 HRS 21 NOV VIA MATS AIRCRAFT NUMBER 423. ETA FRAN 22 NOV AT 1540 HRS LOCAL TIME. PLS MEET.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *CONFIRMATION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR FJDUST NOT USED.
**STATED WIROGUE WAS BEING GROOMED FOR DEEP COVER ASSIGNMENT LEOP LATE NOVEMBER.

C/EE/OPS
RELEASING OFFICER

oKB
EE/G
CAF/W
AF/W/1
per CSN 43-43
COORDINATING OFFICERS

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Daniel Niesciur, AF/W/2

NO. ACLW-192

DATE 22 NOV 15 Nov. 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/AF/WEST	15 NOV 1960	16 NOV 1960		DYBAED DESENSITIZED per CSH 43-43 S. Jick
2.				
3. Chief, Africa Division				
4.				
5. AF/RI	18 NOV 1960			
6.				
7. RID/CRO	21 NOV [illegible]			
8.				
9. RID/DP	2/1			
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
MARKED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT
Operational
WIROGUE/1

ACTION REQUIRED, REFERENCES

A. DIR 08782 (OUT 86554)
B. LEOP 0225 (IN 36750)

1. The plans and development of the WIROGUE project have reached a point whereby a summation of the progress made and the plans for the future is in order. At this writing it is anticipated that WIROGUE/1 will be on the Leopoldville scene on the first of December.

2. WIROGUE/1 had originally been recruited in Europe for a REDSOX operation. He was flown to PBPRIME "black" and underwent an extensive training program. This included survival, small arms and other similar type PM training. After a year of such training the project failed to materialize, as a result subject was preparing for resettlement in South America. The AF/Division took interest in WIROGUE/1 and after an assessment decided that with his peculiar background, talents and general makeup he could effectively be utilized along the lines cited in reference A. On 21 October 1960 the case was transferred officially to the Africa Division.

3. Since that date to the present, every effort has been made to psychologically orient WIROGUE/1 for this assignment and to prepare him operationally for its fulfillment. To insure the security of the operation, prevent any identification with ODYOKE and/or KUBARK, and to preclude any unexpected uncovery of WIROGUE/1's past which would associate him with his pre-KUBARK life, a number of basic steps were taken. These were:

a. WIROGUE/1 underwent plastic surgery, which changed the shape of his nose.

b. A toupee had been made for his constant use. This and the plastic surgery have altered him sufficiently to obviate any recognition.

Distribution:
2-Leopoldville

201-233477

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
14 Nov, 1960

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
ACIW-192

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-233477

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. AGLW-192

[illegible] 43-43

c. Documentation prepared with accompanying cover story to show that WIROGUE/1 is an Austrian and who has never had ODYOKE connections, nor ever been in PBPRIME. (See separate cover attachment A).

4. It is planned at this time to take WIROGUE/1 "black" to Germany. There he will be met by the undersigned, given his Austrian documentation, contact instructions and letter of credit, stripped of any PBPRIME clothing or personal effects, and dispatched. He is to proceed to Leopoldville on his own and upon arrival make contact. The cover assignment for subject is temporarily left open, although he has been told to look into the prospects of opening a photo or general repair shop. He has actually done photographic work but the decision on this we will leave to your on-the-spot judgment. The letter of credit for three thousand dollars is to be used to finance this venture. There will also be a reserve of one thousand dollars in a Swiss account should expenses necessitate a greater outlay. This money will constitute an non-interest bearing, operational loan which must be repaid by WIROGUE/1 from profits over a period of years. All other profits after the loan is paid off will be WIROGUE/1's.

5. A word about the manner of man with whom we are dealing. He is a small, energetic individual, who has displayed shrewdness, cunning, ingenuity and inventiveness. He has a peculiar turn of mind which lends itself remarkably to nefarious and extra-legal activities. Excitement and intrigue are important factors in his life, he relishes it and as a result may be a little delicate to handle. WIROGUE/1 likes order and clear cut chains of command. He admires the Prussian approach and as a result will take orders even if he may disagree. It is important to him to have the trust and confidence of his case officer. If in his own mind he feels assured of this and is confident of the professional KUBARK-type competence of the CO, he will reciprocate in kind. He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions. One last thought which may be useful. Best results will probably be gotten if, when given an assignment, he be permitted to accomplish it in his own way. The latter is connected with his idea of trust and confidence. ?

CHARLES H. ROISTADT

PAUL E. LEIGHTON

Attachment A (under separate cover)

[illegible] 43-43

FORM 10-57 53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT A TO ACLW-192

per CSH 43-43

1. An Austrian passport, birth certificate and drivers license have been prepared for issuance containing following biographic data:

Name: George Frans REINER
POB: Salsburg, Austria
DOB: 25 July 1921
Fathers name: Frans REINER
Mothers name: Marianna nee KIKLITZ
Occupation: Engineer
Marital status: single
Height: 1 meter 70 centemeters
Weight: 58 Kilo's
Eyes: Brown
Hair: Brown

Distinguishing marks: tips of forefinger and thumb right hand missing. Identical fingers left hand scarred.

2. Documents will reflect travel only in Europe, with no indication of PBPRIME tenure.

SECRET per CSH 43-43

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: WIROGUE

TYPE OF ACTION
XX FI/CI
CA

	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Africa
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Leopoldville
	RENEWAL FY 196	BRANCH: AF/W/2 — DESK:
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Daniel Niesciur
X	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 2103 — BUILDING: I — EXTENSION: 3829

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
C/AF/W	Lester C. Houck	3 Oct.				
C/AF/P&E	Charles Garity Charles Garity	3 Oct				
C/AF/SS	Theodore M. Fransen T. M. Fransen	10/4/61				
AF/COE/FI	Paul Springer	10/10/61				
C/AF	Bronson Tweedy	10-10-61				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

DDP/PG	Thomas E. [illegible]	11 Oct 61				

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
	30 Sept 61	$ —	196	$
			196	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE

FORM 6-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(5)

SECRET

Termination

1. Project: WIROGUE

2. Objectives:

A. To provide a long term, deep cover asset in the Republic of Congo and adjacent areas.

B. To establish a principal agent in the Republic of Congo, in order to build a covert net in support of operational activities.

C. To provide an asset for utility support for KUBARK personnel under official cover.

3. Reason for termination:

Subject's poor performance and lack of operational security coupled with his possible arrest by the Congolese authorities necessitated the removal from the area of WIROGUE/1. Once this was accomplished there was little or no possibility to continue the project.

4. Effectiveness of project:

WIROGUE/1 did manage to establish himself in a position of potential value and therein implement the objectives of the project. However the local situation curtailed his effectiveness and his lack of appreciation of the need for operational security ended his usefulness.

5. Date of Termination:

7 September 1961.

6. Status of Commitments:

No commitments were made to WIROGUE/1 and quit claim was procured.

7. Plans for disposition funds, etc:

WIROGUE/1 was paid a flat sum of $2000.00 which constituted his termination bonus, was given his documentation and transported to Germany where contact was broken. He had been given a letter drop with SR/DCB for future contact. It was agreed that he would keep CIA apprised via the [redacted] drop.

8. Risks: *

The only outstanding risk which WIROGUE/1 may present to CIA would be the identification of current members of the Leopoldville Station to a hostile service. The possibility of this occuring is remote since there is still a hope on W/1 part to work for CIA in the future, however, it does exist. There

SECRET

are no other risks in our judgment.

9. Cost:

$2000.00	termination bonus
250.00	Transportation to Germany
2900.00	write-off unpaid balance of ops loan
$5150.00	Total

10. NA

11. NA

* It is now learned subject has returned to Leopoldville. Although subject stated that he would not cause any trouble, his presence in Leopoldville may cause complications.

DD/P 26117

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : Project WIROGUE (Approval)

AF - Leopoldville

1. The attached project, originating in AF Division, is presented for approval for the period 1 November 1960 through 31 October 1961. The purpose of the project is to establish a long-term deep-cover asset in the Republic of Congo in the form of a foreign national contract agent who will open a small business in Leopoldville.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $17,250 from the DD/P-AF Division budget: $13,250 in fiscal year 1961 and $4,000 in fiscal year 1962, subject to the availability of funds. The funds requested included $9,000 salary and allowances; $1,250 travel expenses; $5,000 operational loan; and $2,000 operational expenses.

3. The attached project outline sets forth the background and concept of the project and is accompanied by a fiscal annex. The agent, WIROGUE/1, is a stateless person who was recruited and trained for a REDSOX operation involving a black mission to the USSR under Project AESENTINEL. That project was postponed for a year and in June 1960 was abandoned. In the interim WIROGUE/1 has been working with TSD at a covert site in cataloging information from East German documents and developing or improving methods for picking locks. WIROGUE/1 was born in Georgia, USSR, in 1913. He spent the period from 1922 until World War II in Paris, France. He served in the French Foreign Legion, volunteered in 1942 for work in Germany and spent considerable time in German prisons and concentration camps as a result of being arrested for forgery. He has a prison record for burglary in France subsequent to World War II. He has had schooling and experience in mechanical engineering, as a camera technician and in commercial photography.

SECRET

He also has invented various labor saving and photomechanical devices. He has had practical experience in the forgery and fabrication of documents. WIROGUE/1 was brought to the U.S. "black" for training in connection with the AESENTINEL operation. It is contemplated that he will be flown "black" to West Germany where he will be surfaced as an Austrian citizen with a legend of having worked in various concerns in West Germany subsequent to World War II. ~~He~~ will proceed to Leopoldville where, with a $4,000 operational loan, he will open a small photo or repair shop which it is expected will give him a degree of freedom of movement and provide for covert contact. It is estimated that there is a need for technicians in the Republic of Congo at the present time. The project has been coordinated with the Chief of Station, Leopoldville.

4. Appropriate Special Staff components concur in recommending renewal. Both CI and FI Staff express certain reservations in view of the background and adventurous nature of the agent, and emphasize the necessity of exercising firm operational and personal control over him at all times.

5. I recommend approval of Project WIROGUE as presented, and endorse the observations of the Staffs noted in paragraph 4 above.

S. M. HINES
Chief, DDP/PG

Approved: Richard Helms
COP-DD/P

18 NOV 1960
Date

Attachment:
Project Outline WIROGUE
Fiscal Annex

Staff Coordination:
For FI Staff
For CI Staff -s/C. Tenney

SECRET

SECRET

PROJECT ACTION COVER SHEET

CRYPTONYM:	WIROGUE/1	**HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:**
OPERATING DIVISION:	AF/W/1	Daniel Niesciur
FIELD STATION:	Leopoldville Republic of Congo	**ROOM NO** 2110 I
TARGET AREA:	Republic of Congo	**EXTENSION** 8284
		DATE 16 November 1960

1. Authority is requested to obligate $17,250.00 from the DDP/AF Division Budget: $13,250.00 FY 61 and $4,000.00 FY 62. The funds to cover the amount requested FY 61 will be absorbed within the Division current budget allocation. Period of project is from 1 November 1960 to 31 October 1962.

2. An OA, C-73532 was granted on 11 March 1959, and amended 3 October 1960.

3. Form 689 is attached.

COORDINATION:

C.W. Tenney DC/CI/Ops (see note in routing sheet)
16 Nov 60

Chief, AF/West

Chief, AF Support

John Anderton
Chief, AF/FI

Glenn Fields
Chief, AF Division

11-16-60
Date

SECRET

[redacted] [redacted]

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM - WIROGUE/1

1. Area of Operations and Purpose

Republic of Congo (former Belgium Congo) - engage in operational support activity.

2. Objectives

A. To provide a long term, deep cover asset in the Republic of Congo and adjacent areas.

B. To establish a principle agent in the Republic of Congo, in order to build a covert net in support of operational activities.

C. To provide an asset for utility support for KUBARK personnel under official cover.

These objectives are in line with the RMD.

3. Personnel

A. Pertinent Biographical Information:

Pseudonym - [redacted]

201-0233477

Place of birth - Gori, Georgia, USSR

Date of birth - 12 July 1918

Sex - Male

Race - Caucasian

Religion - none

Marital status - Divorced (wife and 2 children - one son and one daughter)

Citizenship - Stateless

Education:

1922-24	Paris, Notre Dame, uncomp., change of family address
1925	Paris, Lycee Montagne, uncomp., change of family address
1925	Paris, Ecole Commule, uncomp., change of family address
1926	Viroflex, Lycee Hoche, uncomp., expelled for pranks
1926	Paris, Ecole Commule, uncomp., change of address
1931	Paris-Vanves, Ecole Michelet, 6 mo comp, expelled for insubordination

1933-35 Chalon S. Marne Art et Metier, Technical Engineering School, attended one and one half years and expelled
1936-37 Paris, Ecole Breguet, Electro-Engineering, attended one year earned first half of Baccaularaute in electro technology then expelled
1938-39 Paris, School of Photography and Movies, trained as cine camera operator technician, left after one and three fourths of a two year course due to outbreak of WW II in November 1939

Military History:

Dec 1939 - Paris, volunteered for French Foreign Legion
Jan 1940 - Tunis, North Africa, 1st Cav. Reg. 1st Squadron, 4th Platoon
Feb 1940 - Sent to N.C.O. training course in Legion, pulled out to be reassigned to all-Georgian unit
Mar-Aug 1940 - Barcares, assigned in Georgian unit
Aug 1940 - Paris, discharged at end of Franco/German hostilities

Employment History:

1942 - Paris, volunteered for work in Germany
Poelitz, worked for HIDRYER WERKE for one year as installation electrician
Paris, self-employed at photo shop. Portrait photography
Berlin, photographer of metals for a factory which produces electrodes for welding instruments
Berlin, assembly line worker in Berlin factory producing steel ammunition belts. Received commendation from factory director for labor saving device he manufacture of device for automatic adjustment of cartridge cases
Muegelheim, driver mechanics course for the NSKK (Nazi Party Motorized Corp.) Drove trucks during construction of Atlantic wall by Germans.
1943 - Berlin, employed with SCHUPOLIZEI as translator French-German language
1946-47 - Paris, employed by Architects Carre Associated as electrical installation planner and constructor of proto-type model builder
1951-52 - Paris (in prison), devised and sold on the French market a pocket automatic transit indicator. Received cash settlement for this while in prison
1953 - Rion (in prison), devised and gave to prison administrator, invention for making cardboard boxes. Device was built and used by prison administrator
Dec 1955 to Apr 1956 - Gap, employed by M.D. as X-ray machine maintenance technician and operator
1956-57 - Gap, invented, patented and sold a calendar device to the French commercial market

1958 - Ambert, invented and patented a commercial advertising device, photo-mechanical in nature. Models built and sold to French advertising concerns
1959-60 - U.S., devised and passed drawings for two pieces of equipment for use in Project AESENTINEL
July 1960 - U.S., presently working on a low-cost telephone answering device

Occupational Specialities:

Mechanical electrical engineering
Cine or portrait photography
Research and innovation of labor/cost saving devices

Languages and Dialects:

French - native
German - very good
Georgian - fluent spoken; reading and writing good
English - speaking and writing fair; reading fluent
Spanish - speaking and writing poor; reading good
Russian-poor

Special Skills:

Experience in document forgery
1942-Achen-Berlin, altered own documents
1942-Berlin-Paris, filled in German travel blank forms. Altered old German authorization stamp for travel forms. Made other authentications stamps for other people interested in travel across German held territory
1943-44-Berlin, fabricated stamps and cachets for travel documents. Used photo techniques for changing and/or aging pictures in documents. Also reassembled old false passports to form new ones, as well as counterfeited German financial vouchers.

B. Operational Information:

1. Circumstances of Recruitment -

The agent was first contacted in October 1958 as a result of a lead from AEPADDLE. He was recruited in April 1959 by the Frankfurt Station, for a REDSOX operation. There had been some difficulty in the initial recruitment, since it could not be resolved as to whether or not he could work amicably with another agent in the proposed operation. After psychological assessments and LCFLUTTER examination, it was decided to recruit subject. He was assigned the crypto AEASPIC. In April 1959 subject was brought to the DCB, via a HBRAINBOW flight. Subject was trained in the AESENTINAL project for a black mission into the USSR as a

[redacted] [redacted]

member of a REDSOX team. This project was postponed for a year. In the interim he was assigned to TSD, where he was employed at a covert site, involving the cataloguing of specific information from East German Documents, and developing and/or improving tools and methods for picking locks. On 17 June 1960, it was decided that Project AESENTINEL would not be carried out. On receipt of this information SR/DOB endeavored to place subject elsewhere, where his training would be beneficial. The African Division expressed interest and had agreed to utilize him as a result of assessments. During the period from the 21st of October until dispatch, subject will be carried on OCA funds.

2. Security Flaps -

A. During the latter part of WW II subject was arrested by the German police for forgery. He was not unduly held by the criminal investigation branch of the police but passed on to the Gestapo. Subject was brought to Berlin where he was interrogated for several months at Gestapo Headquarters. Later he was tried and sentenced to death. For some unknown reason he was moved from jail to jail, concentration camp to concentration camp. While in prison he resorted to a "ruse de guerre" and told the Germans his father had invented a motor that could run without gasoline. He offered to draw the designs of the motor and was able to stall long enough to be liberated by components of the advancing U.S. Army.

B. In 1946-47 subject and an accomplice committed two robberies of jewelry stores.

C. In 1949 subject robbed a bank of 1,000,000 Fr. fr. His accomplice was apprehended and shortly thereafter confessed, implicating subject. Subject was apprehended while attempting to cross the Franco-Spanish border. He was sentenced to ten years in prison of which he served only five, receiving parole for good behavior. Upon release in 1955, he was exiled on parole to Gap, France where he worked as an architect.

D. To our knowledge thereis no indication that subject is known to be associated with KUBARK.

3. Agent's knowledge of sensitive matters - has met the following KUBARKERS:

Anthony H. FRIGANZA (P)
Patrick B. NEWENS (P)
Peter K. WINSHIP (P)
Dexter E. ROSTEDT (P)
Fred KIRKPATRICK (T)
George F. MUNS (T)
Michael RAE (T)
Charles R. ROLSTADE (P) Mr. Dan
Paul E. LEIGHTON (P) Dr. Johns

Subject does not know that he is working for KUBARK. He knows that he is connected with some intelligence organization, e.g., ODIBEX. He does not know anything about KUBARK organization nor its modus operandi.

4. Security of meeting sites, communications, etc:

These will have to be worked out in the field by subject's case officer. In general it is proposed to have him be surfaced in Germany as an Austrian and from there, making his own way to Leopoldville. There he is to establish a small repair or photo shop. This would provide a natural reason for his CO or anyone to visit him under the guise of cvert business. Longer meetings would be held clandestinely as determined by his CO. All communication channels will have to be worked out in the field. However until contact is established, a secure emergency channel with Headquarters is being established. This channel is to be used only in the event subject finds himself stranded or for dire emergency.

5. Security:

The agent is very security conscious and will follow any direction in the interest of secuirty

6. Control:

On this point here are several aspects for consideration. He is under contract to us and although he is not too interested in money, he does enjoy its benefits and realizes that it will continue so long as he does a good job. The more important built in control is the fact that he will be under false documents, and being stateless, he is completely dependent on KUBARK to perpetuate his quasi legal existence and to eventually legalize his status. Added to this is the control which stems from the prospect of resettlement in another country. This would give him status as a citizen. Realizing these points, subject is more than willing to play ball with us.

7. Prior contacts with any security service:

As stated in 3B (2) above, the only brush subject has had in the past was with Gestapo and French police. These were prior to his recruitment by KUBARK and were not as a result of I.S. activity.

8. Training of agent:

He had received training in covert black border operations. In addition, he is being trained in small arms and demolition.

9. Cover effectiveness and the operation of the cover facility:

Subject will open a small photo or repair shop, which will give him a degree of latitude in movement and a cover for covert contact. Subject has undergone plastic surgery in order to change his appearance, also a toupe was made to further assist in the changing of his outward appearance. This action was designed to preclude any possibility of recognition by former French associates, particularly since he is to pass as an Austrian. The cover facility, as stated, will offer access to all classes of people, it will provide a natural means for contact, and will permit subject to make trips under the guise of business travel.

WIROGUE/1 will be required to set himself up in business. The dearth of qualified technicians will help facilitate his opening an establishment. WIROGUE/1 will need capital to set himself up, buy needed supplies and have working funds. For the purpose of providing him with funds to establish and open this cover business, we will advance him $4000.00 as an operational loan, to be secured with a non-interest bearing promisary note. An additional $1000.00 will be held in reserve, should he need more money. Ostensibly it will represent his own savings, and will be deposited in a Swiss bank. Provision will be made to pay this money back from his profits. After the loan is paid off, WIROGUE is to keep the profits he may make.

He will initially transfer $1000.00 to a bank in Leopoldville. We are certain that he will not abscond with the funds, since his documentation will be false and his pay and allowances total $8500 per annum, he would therefore stand to lose a great deal more than he would gain.

Being a contract agent, there is ample control if he shows signs of spending too much time in the pursuit of profits from his cover business.

His salary and allowances will be paid in part to a personal account in Switzerland (separate from his business account). This money will ostensibly also represent his savings. The remainder will be paid directly at the station.

C. Security Estimate:

WIROGUE had been recruited in France and exfiltrated black from West Germany to SR/DOB. He has had no known I.S. connections in the past. He will be surfaced in West Germany and will proceed to Leopoldville. He will be documented as an Austrian.

4. Background

The need for various technicians to stabilize the chaotic conditions in Leopoldville coupled with an urgent need for controlled assets in that city gave rise to this project. WIROGUE's particular talents, experience, ability and training open up a wide varietyof possibilities.

5. Evaluation

There will be a need for WIROGUE to establish and live his cover. This is anticipated to take several months. Hence he will become operational in early 1961. However, it is reasonable to expect that the station will undoubtedly place him in covert role much sooner. Nonetheless, we do not anticipate any FI take prior to mid 1961.

6. Coordination

Coordination at Headquarters is being effected with FI Staff, Finance Division and SSA/DDS.

7. References

A. DIR 08782 (OUT 86554) RYBAT
B. DIR 08783 (OUT 86555) RYBAT
C. DIR 08443 (OUT 85967)

8. Timetable:

His covert training will be completed by 15 November 1960. He will be briefed on his cover story, documents, contact instructions, etc., 15-18 November 1960. On/about 18-20 November he will be flown black to West Germany. There he will spend 5 to 7 days to familiarize himself with Germany, receive his final briefing and obtain a visa, then depart for Leopoldville arriving o/a 1 December in Leopoldville. Once there he will require 1-2 months to look over the business possibilities and establish himself.

9. Approval Period and Cost

A. Approval is requested for one years starting 1 November 1960.

B. Following is breakdown of the costs:

1. Salary at $500.00 per month	$6000.00
2. Per diem during travel	250.00
3. Travel to Leopoldville	1000.00
4. Operational loan	5000.00
5. Operational expenses	2000.00
6. Allowances (flat sum)	3000.00
Total	$17250.00

10. Emergency Situation

In all present and anticipated conditions with the exception of a hot war, the agent will have clandestine means of communication with his CO in the ODACID installation and with Headquarters. For contingencies an emergency SW system has been given to agent for direct communication with Headquarters.

C1

SECRET

FISCAL ANNEX

Project WIROGUE-LOAN

Purpose: The objective of this project is to provide a long term, deep cover asset, a contract agent, WIROGUE/1, in the Republic of Congo and adjacent areas in order to build a covert net in support of operational activities and to provide an asset for utility support for KUBARK personnel under official cover. For cover purposes, WIROGUE/1 will establish his own business, a small photo or repair shop, which will give him a degree of latitude in movement and a cover for covert contact.

To assist WIROGUE/1 in establishing his business KUBARK will loan him up to $5,000 on his personal notes, non-interest bearing and due on demand. The initial loan will be in the amount of $4,000. An additional $1,000 loan will be made when, in the opinion of the Chief, Africa Division, it is required and necessary for the business to continue and operate.

Funding: Up to $5,000 in U.S. currency or the equivalent in foreign currencies may be advanced to WIROGUE/1 as loans. The loaned funds will be passed to WIROGUE/1 in a manner agreeable to Chief, Africa Division and Chief, Finance Division. All funds loaned to WIROGUE/1 will be secured by U.S. dollar, non-interest bearing notes payable to bearer on demand. Such notes will be prepared by or approved by the Office of General Counsel. It is anticipated that an initial $4000 will be deposited in a Swiss bank, ostensibly representing his own savings, by KUBARK, Monetary Branch.

Accounting and Write-off: WIROGUE/1 will be required to sign receipts for all funds loaned to him. Finance Division is authorized to accept these receipts as a charge to expense and to set up the loans payable in a memorandum account without a due date. The notes signed by WIROGUE/1 shall be transmitted to Finance Division for safekeeping. Repayment of the loan shall be made from business profits. WIROGUE/1 will be required to submit quarterly income and expense statements on his cover business and also copies of all tax returns filed in connection with his cover business. A copy of all income and expense statements and tax returns will be forwarded to Finance Division. It shall be the responsibility of the Chief, Africa Division to determine when profits warrant payments on the leans and to effect such repayments.

For purposes of control and collection, WIROGUE/1 will be required to sign blank checks on his Swiss and African business bank accounts.

Glenn Fields
Chief, Africa Division

Concur:
11/16/60
Chief, Finance Division

Approved: 17 NOV 1960
Frank P. Bishop SSA/DDS

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: D. HIESCTUR
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT: 3966
DATE: 15 November 1960

637

637

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: FROB
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

CSN 43-13

PRECEDENCE		
☐	DEFERRED	16 23 1
X	ROUTINE	CABLE
☐	PRIORITY	INITIALS
☐	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 93109

OUT 93109

TO FROB INFO FRAN LEOP CITE DIR 11912

11912

ZIBET WIROGUE RYBAT

REF: DIR 08782 (OUT 86554)*

1. CHARLES R. ROISTADE (IDEN) ETA FRAN 21 NOV. WILL REQUIRE SAFE HOUSE FOR FIVE DAYS TO QUARTER AND BRIEF WIROGUE PRIOR TO LATTERS DISPATCH. PLS ASSIST.

2. 1200 DOLLAR ADVANCE AUTHORIZED ROISTADE. T/A HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

*DESK COMMENT: Ref RYBAT.

EE/G
CAF/W
AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/EE/OPS
RELEASING OFFICER

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

CSN 43-43

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: D. NIESCIUR
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT: 3966
DATE: 15 November 1960

633
638

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
X ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY — INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

NOV 15 23 72 '60
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : FROB
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: FRAN, LEOP, COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

OUT93110
OUT 93110

TO FROB INFO FRAN LEOP CITE DIR 11913
11913

REF: DIR 11912 (OUT 93109)

IDEN: DANIEL NIESCIUR

END OF MESSAGE

Signal Center: Pls. ref attached cable

C/EE/OPS
RELEASING OFFICER

EE/C
CAF/W
AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-233477

SECRET

9 NOV 196

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Support Division

ATTENTION : Mr. John Lavery

SUBJECT : Obtaining Post Office Box

1. It is hereby requested that a Post Office Box be opened in the New York City area under the name of Clifford N. MIRCIPSON. The number and location of the box will be required prior to 18 November 1960. Servicing of the letter box will be required twice a week since its only function will be to serve as an emergency communication channel.

2. Any action pertaining to the letter box, and any letters received, should be refered to Mr. Daniel R. Niesciur, AF/W/2, X8234.

Glenn D. Fields
Acting Chief, Africa Division

SECRET

201-233477

14-00000

SECRET

DATE : 2 NOV

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

Rogue

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 2 1715Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 36750

DIR CITE LEOP 0225

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 08782 (OUT 86554)*

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

1. WIROGUE ONE APPEARS BE JUST WHAT DOCTOR ORDERED. UNLESS HE CAN GET VISA RAPIDLY EUROPE, SUGGEST HE COME CONGO WITHOUT VISA. CAN GET FORTY-EIGHT HOUR VISA LEOP ON ARRIVAL PENDING RECEIPT LONGER VISA. BELIEVE LETTER OF CREDIT FROM EUROPEAN BANK IN AMOUNT ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND BCF WOULD PROVIDE PROOF HE WOULD NOT BECOME CHARGE OF STATE. ALSO SHOULD HAVE ROUND TRIP TICKET.

2. CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS: HE TO CALL GUTHMAN AT HOME (3315) OR TPELIDE ASAP AFTER ARRIVAL INTRODUCING SELF AS GUSTAVE. GUTHMAN WILL SUGGEST MEETING FOR DRINK. ACTUAL TIME OF MEETING TO BE TWO HOURS PRIOR TO TIME SET ON PHONE. MEETING PLACE WILL BE IN FRONT MAIN POST OFFICE. WIROGUE ONE SHOULD HAVE BOOK IN LEFT HAND AND UNLIGHTED CIGAR IN MOUTH. GUTHMAN WILL ASK IN FRENCH IF TELEPHONE OFFICE OPEN, ADDING HE HOPES PLACE CALL TO CHICAGO. WIROGUE ONE REPLY TO BE HE NOT CERTAIN RE PHONES AS HE THERE TO CABLE VIEN ANNOUNCING HIS ARRIVAL CONGO.

3. COVERS SUGGESTED REF APPEAR OKAY.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *STATED THAT WIROGUE, CONTRACT AGENT BEING GROOMED FOR DEEP COVER ASSIGNMENT LEOP IN LATE NOV, BEING DOCUMENTED AS AUSTRIAN TO DEPART PBPRIME BLACK FOR SURFACING IN WEST GERMANY

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE:

TO: Mr Nuscieur

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Your copy.

FROM: CIAAS

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

SECRET

COVERT AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENT - INCOME AND FEDERAL TAX DATA

TYPE OF PRINT: ☐ ORIGINAL ☐ CORRECTION

1. PSEUDONYM [illegible]

2. Nº 2614

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS (Check as appropriate)

☐ HEADQUARTERS ☒ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☐ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY

TOTAL AMOUNT (Per annum)	AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX	EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED (Allowances; etc.).	PAYMENTS TO BEGIN (Date)
$ [illegible]	$ [illegible]		[illegible]

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY

☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☒ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID

INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD: ☒ NONE ☐ THIS COUNTRY $ ☐ FOREIGN $

IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD: ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

NAME OF COUNTRY [illegible]

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)

☒ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

COVER FACILITY (Cryptonym) N/A

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)

☑ COVERT (If covert only, omit rest of this item.) ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX (Check one)

☐ HAS BEEN FILED ☐ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☒ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY.

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 (Or equivalent) ATTACHED

13. MARITAL STATUS (Complete as appropriate)

☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED

DATE OF MARRIAGE

DATE OF DEATH

DATE OF DECREE

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE

RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE (Country)

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE (Omit self and spouse) N/A

RELATIONSHIP (No names)	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE

15. REMARKS SUBJECT, FOR INTENTS AND PURPOSES, IS A FIELD AGENT, COVERED BY PROJECT WIROGUE

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

The employer's names and methods for reporting compensation shown in Items 8, and/or 9, above are approved.

DATE [illegible]

SIGNATURE AND TITLE

17. FORM PREPARED BY ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☒ OFFICIAL

PART I CERTIFIED CORRECT

DATE [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL

PART II CERTIFIED CORRECT (Explain when not signed)

DATE

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL (Pseudonym) N/A

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(30)

Conditions

① Wants $3000.00 ← Three thousand to include this months salary.
② Austrian documents
③ Ticket - Europe
④ Must have money prior to departure
⑤ Wants $200.00 now and one week here in U.S. before departure.

Claims that he would have earned $22500.00

Congo -	$15000.00
US	7500
	$22500

3000.00

Two months salary	1000.00
Bonus	1000.00
What is owed him	1000.00
	3000.00

14-00000

695 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: D. HIESCTUR
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT: 3966
DATE: 27 October 1960

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

Chrono
cc:
cc:
cc:

ROUTING	
1 AF/W	4
2	5
3 Chrono	

PRECEDENCE

- DEFERRED
- X ROUTINE
- PRIORITY — INITIALS
- OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

OCT 28 2049Z 60
REC'D CABLE SECT.

OUT 86554
OUT 86554

(Sent to Desk [illegible] informed [illegible])

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 08782

08782

[illegible] per CSN 43-43

WIROGUE RYBAT

1. WIROGUE (IDEN) CONTRACT AGENT BEING GROOMED FOR DEEP COVER ASSIGNMENT LEOP IN LATE NOV. ENVISION USE AS UTILITY AGENT SUCH AS, (1) ORGANIZING AND CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE TEAM (2) INTERCEPTION OF POUCHES (3) BLOWING UP BRIDGES AND/OR (4) EXECUTING OTHER ASSIGNMENTS REQUIRING POSITIVE ACTION. HIS UTILIZATION NOT TO BE RESTRICTED TO LEOP INDEED MAY BE SUBJECT CALL OTHER AFRICAN STATIONS ALTHOUGH EXPECT HIM TO BE RESIDENT LEOP.

2. HE IS INVENTOR, PHOTOGRAPHER, ARCHITECT, FORGER AND FORMER BANK ROBBER WHO HAS SERVED TERM IN PRISON. VERY INGENIOUS OBSERVANT, SHREWD GLIB AND RELISHES INTRIGUE AND DARING DO. THE LATTER PLAYS IMPORTANT PART IN HIS CHARACTER. HE LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER. FOR CERTAIN TASKS THIS MAN UNUSUALLY QUALIFIED AND SEEMS TO BE DISCREET. ASSESSMENT OVER TWO YEARS IS THAT HE IS RELIABLE AND "HONEST". DELICATE TO HANDLE FOR MUST HAVE TRUST IN HANDLER AND HIS PROFESSIONAL CE COMPETENCE AND WILL RECIPROCATE IN KIND. VIEW THIS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WISH ONLY GUTHMAN HANDLE ~~CERTAINLY~~ at least IN INITIAL STAGES.

3. BEING DOCUMENTED AS AUSTRIAN TO DEPART PBPRIME BLACK FOR SURFACING IN

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER S-E-C-R-E-T AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

-2-

PRECEDENCE		
☐	DEFERRED	
☐	ROUTINE	
☐	PRIORITY	INITIALS
☐	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 86554
DIR 08782

TO INFO CITE DIR

WEST GERMANY. FROM THERE TO PROCEED ON OWN. PLANS TO OPEN PHOTO OR GENERAL REPAIR SHOP FOR COVER PURPOSES.

4. HE IS FORTY ONE. SPEAKS FLUENT FRENCH AND GERMAN. FAIR ENGLISH. TRAINED IN SMALL ARMS DEMO AND OTHER PHASES OF PM ACTIVITY.

5. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS, AND CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

6. ALL TRAFFIC TO BE TYBAT.

END OF MESSAGE

G Fields
GLENN D. FIELDS
AC/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK
CAF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

4

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

69

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: D. HIESCTUR
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT: 3966
DATE: 27 October 1960

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE

	DEFERRED	OCT 28 2049Z 60 REC'D CABLE SECT.
X	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 86555
OUT 86555

TO: LEOP
INFO:
CITE DIR 08783
08783

~~RYBAT~~

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

REF: DIR 08782 (OUT 86554)

IDEN: DAVID TZITZICHVILI
DOB: 12 JULY 1918
POB: TIFLIS, GOERGIA, USSR
CIT: STATELESS

END OF MESSAGE

Signal Center: Pls. ref attached cable.

G. Fields
GLENN D. FIELDS
RELEASING OFFICER

DECLASSIFIED
AF/W/1 per CSN 43-43
COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

JOSEPH BORTIGER:rc
TSD/IB/FS/4
3391
27 OCTOBER 1960 579

FRANKFURT

DIRECTOR

TSD 4

FI 2, EE 4, AF 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	CAFEL
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ DEFERRED
- ☒ ROUTINE
- ☐ PRIORITY — INITIALS
- ☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

27 Oct 1960 [illegible]

OUT65967

FRAN INFO BRLN CITE DIR ~~08443~~ OUT 65967 08443

AQUATIC WIROGUE

1. CAN YOU PROVIDE FOLLOWING: SEVERAL BLANK AUSTRIAN BIRTH OR BAPTISM CERTIFICATES AND FILL IN EXEMPLARS? VIENNA PREFERRED. SEVERAL DM 1 FISCAL STAMPS "POLIZEIPRAESIDIUM BERLIN" FOR BERLIN ISSUED "AUFENTHALTSERLAUBNIS"?

2. NEED AT KURIOT 14 NOVEMBER LATEST.

-End of Message-

C/Africa West by phone w/Dan Kiesciur B
C/EE by phone w/Mr. Thomas Lucid CWK

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C V S Roosevelt
C. V. S. ROOSEVELT
C/TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

Charles J. Ryan
CHARLES J. RYAN
ASSTC/TSD/AUTH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 2

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]

FIELD DOCUMENT ROUTING AND ACTION RECORD

INSTRUCTIONS: Routing designations, either individuals or units, are to be placed in the "TO" column. Comments are to be numbered to correspond to the number in the "TO" column. Each comment is to be underlined with a line drawn across the "COMMENTS" column. Each recipient of the attached document is to place his initials in the proper space following the corresponding numbered routing. The date the document is forwarded to the next routing is to be placed in the proper column. The last routing on this sheet shall be the unit in which the basic document is to be filed. If the holding unit is other than the central files, the central file shall be the next to the last routing to insure proper control clearances. THIS DOCUMENT ROUTING AND ACTION RECORD IS TO REMAIN ATTACHED TO THE BASIC RECORD DOCUMENT AS A PERMANENT RECORD.

FROM: SR/DOB/P.Crookham:cc
1062 J X-8331

DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER: SR/DOB/60-2079

DOCUMENT DATE: 26 Oct. 60

ACTION SUSPENSE DATE:

TO	LOCATION	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER INITIALS
1. Chief, AF Div Attn: Dan Nesciur			
2. AF/West			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			

COMMENTS

DOCUMENT PROCESSING DATA

INDEXED		
ABSTRACTED		
FILE NUMBER		

FORM NO. 1 DEC 55 861 [✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED (40)

SECRET

SR/DOB/60- 2079

26 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division

ATTENTION : Dan Nesciur

SUBJECT : CIA personalities known by alias to REDSOX agent, David Durvard (a).

1. The following personalities, listed in true name and alias, are known by AESENTINEL REDSOX agent David Durvard in the alias listed.

2. Subject is unaware of the CIA affiliation of these personalities. The period of time over which Subject was connected with these individuals was from May 1959 through October 1960.

3.

True Name	Division/Staff	Alias
Perry Crookham	SR	Pat Cook
Fred Kirkpatrick	SR	Fred Komer
Edward L. Ross, Jr.	SR	Clint
William R. Romer	SR	Little Bill
Myron Toloczko	SR	Marty Adams
B. J. Johnson	SR	B.J.
Ray Hanchulak	SR	Ray
Col. Edw. Podworny	SR	Col. Ed
Gordon Mothes	SR	Tom
Mortimer Love	SR	Mike or Max
George Fill	SR	Mister George
Joe Chacho	SR	Joe
I. H. McCormick	SR	Hal
C. McCrory	SR	Mack
Joseph Betza	SR	Joe Bowman
Roy Petersen	SR (~~contract~~)	Big Roy
Geoffrey Cratch	SR (contract)	Geof
Janie Cratch	SR (contract)	Janie
Henry Wynne	SR (contract)	Henry
Kathleen Wynne	SR (contract)	Kathleen
Logan Phillips	SR (contract)	Logan
Allie Logan	SR (contract)	Allie
O. H. Todd	O. Security	Hank
Casmiro Barquin	DPD	Chick
Major Aderholdt	DPD	Heinie
Per Stoen	OTR	Thor
Paul Belkin	OS/IRD	Paul
Joseph Bukowsky	Med. Staff	Joe
Dale Haynes	O. Commo	Dale
Alvin Naumann	TSD	Al
Morgan Schrader	WH	Morgan
Dr. J. Houck	AF Div.	Dr. John
Glenn Fields	AF Div.	Mr. Glenn

201-233477

SECRET

4. For any further information please contact Perry Crookham on Extension 8331.

Michael Rae

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

OURCARD, DAVID

IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE

NUMBER

CARRY THIS COPY WITH YOU. IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO RECEIVE THE INJECTIONS ON THE DATES DUE.

VACCINE	DOSE	DATE DUE	DATE GIVEN
SMALLPOX REACTION	Immune reac 22Sep60		22Sept60
TYPHOID	1st		3Oct60
	2nd		
	3rd		
TETANUS	1st		
	2nd		
	STIM	25Sept60	25Sept60
TYPHUS	1st		3Oct60
	2nd		
	STIM		
CHOLERA	1st		
	2nd		
PLAGUE	1st		
	2nd		
DIPHTHERIA	1st		
	2nd		
	3rd		
	4th		
SALK		25Sept60	25Sept60
OTHER VACCINES			
YELLOW FEVER LOT NUMBER	3Oct 60		
SCHICK	R Bullock		

FORM NO. 616 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 MAR 56 (+1)

45ic (c)

IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE

NUMBER DAVE

CARRY THIS COPY WITH YOU. IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO RECEIVE THE INJECTIONS ON THE DATES DUE.

VACCINE	DOSE	DATE DUE	DATE GIVEN
SMALLPOX REACTION			30 JULY 59
TYPHOID	1st	30 JULY	30 JULY 59
	2nd	19 AUGUST	19 AUG. 59
	3rd	23 AUG ~~23 AUGUST~~	3 SEPT. 59
TETANUS	1st	30 JULY	30 JULY 59
	2nd	19 AUGUST	19 AUG 59
	STIM		
TYPHUS	1st	6 AUGUST	6 AUG 59
	2nd	19 AUGUST	19 AUG. 59
	STIM		
CHOLERA	1st	—	—
	2nd	—	—
PLAGUE	1st	—	—
	2nd	—	—
DIPHTHERIA	1st	—	—
	2nd	—	—
	3rd	—	—
	4th	—	—
SALK	1st	6 AUGUST	6 AUG. 59
OTHER VACCINES	2nd	27 AUGUST	3 SEPT. 59
YELLOW FEVER LOT NUMBER			
SCHICK			

FORM NO. 616 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 MAR 56 (+1)

SECRET

No. C-73532

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, AF/W/1 - Edward O. Welles

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of AEASPIC

, for the purpose specified in your request

dated 3 Oct 1960 .

In view of Subject's complicated personal background, he should be controlled and supervised as closely as possible under the circumstances in order to avoid embarrassment to the Agency.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 8 Nov 1960

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

dea

SECRET

FORM 7-58 124 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

201-233477

SECRET

SR/DOB/60-2075

19 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/2B

ATTENTION: Mrs. Murray

SUBJECT: Transfer of Agent Accommodation Mailing Address responsibility from SR/DOB to Africa Division

REFERENCE:
A. DIR 45223 (OUT 98152)
B. SAOP 1036 (IN 32746)
C. SAOP 702 (IN 3009)

1. Subject to your concurrence, responsibility for the accommodation mailing address for SR/DOB agent AEASPIC (David de Panaskhet), which was arranged for by your office, will be transferred to the Africa Division which is now utilizing this agent.

2. The agent accommodation mailing address in Brazil is as follows:

Eduardo Callo
Caha Postal 11744 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo, Brazil

3. The Africa Division case officer responsible for this agent is Dan Nesciur, 2110 I Building, extension 8284.

4. This office extends its appreciation for the expeditions manner in which you have arranged for and maintained this accommodation address.

5. For any further information regarding this please contact Dan Nesciur, extension 8284 or Perry Crookham, extension 8331.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

201-233477

4-00000

SECRET

WIROGUE
File

19 OCT 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Security

ATTENTION : Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT : WIROGUE (formerly AEASPIC) CI/OA No. #73532

1. It has been called to our attention that the parole for subject is to expire on 20 October 1960. The African Division has taken over the case and plans to have subject out of the country by 20 November 1960. Hence a 30 day extension of the parole is requested.

2. WIROGUE is presently quartered at:

Dominion Towers
1201 South Court House Road
Arlington, Virginia
Apartment 109

3. For any further information, please contact Daniel R. Niesciur, X8284.

Bronson Tweedy
Chief, Africa Division

AF/W/1:DRN:say:17 Oct 1960

Distribution:
- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - AF/RI
- 1 - AF/W/1

SECRET

201-233477

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SCO (Mr. Leutscher)

DATE: 19 Oct 60

FROM : Operations Division, Medical Staff

SUBJECT: ASPIC (C)

Subject has been evaluated by the Medical Staff and found physically qualified for the proposed assignment.

Donald W. Farley
Administrative Officer

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - SR/DOB (Kirkpatrick)
1 - OD/MS

SECRET

201-233477

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI TION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Lester Houck		SEP 25 1960
2	AF Division/West		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
J. Kirkpatrick - SR/DOB	

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Replaces Form 30-4
1 APR 55 which may be used.
(40)
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1955 — O-342531

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE 19 Oct 60

TO: Jan Nescur
~~SR/DOB (Kirkpatrick)~~

ROOM NO.	BUILDING
2110 ~~1062~~	I Bldg. ~~J~~

REMARKS:

WIROGUE

Jan,
You'll want this for Jane's 201 file

FROM:
AO/OD/MS

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
	2714 I	3347

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.
GPO : 1957 -O-439445

SECRET

SR/DOB/60-2055

29 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, OS

ATTENTION: Mr. Pennington

SUBJECT: Transfer and Quartering arrangements for AEASPIC

1. This is to confirm a discussion between Mr. Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB and your office regarding transfer and quartering arrangements for AEASPIC, David Durvard (a), and the interest expressed by Dr. Lester Houck of Africa Division re acquiring AEASPIC as a long term asset for that division.

2. In compliance with a request made of this office by Africa Division, it is understood your office has agreed to the temporary quartering of AEASPIC in a furnished safe apartment located at apartment 307, 5741 Colorado Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. This office, with your concurrence, has agreed to lend the use of this apartment for a period of about two weeks, effective 28 September 1960. At present AEASPIC is visited once a week and/or as the need arises. AEASPIC has his own salary for food and public transportation. The same cover arrangements exists under this arrangement as existed when Subject lived at 925 25th Street, N.W., in his own apartment. The cover arrangement is that David Durvard (a) is a technical associate of Fred K. Komer (a) (i.e. an SR/DOB case officer) self-employed, manufacturers commissioned representative.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

201-233477

SECRET

28 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Physical exam/Immunization for David Durvard (a)

At 1000 hours 28 September David Durvard (a) in the company of an SR/DOB case officer attended a full physical exam at the offices of a cleared, witting doctor, Dr. Robert G. Bullock, 2221 North Buchanan Street, Arlington, Virginia. Dr. Bullock indicated to this case officer his preliminary opinion that Subject was in perfect health. Medical records to this effect will be forthcoming. Mr. Durvard (a) also received the first in a series of immunization shots preparatory to a projected assignment in the West African theater. Mr. Durvard, with his case officer will return to Dr. Bullock's office on 4 October at 10:00 a.m. for a second series of immunization shots. Medical records other than those reflected in Mr. Durvard's (a) 201 file will be kept in the Medical File Room (Central Building) under his crypto. A copy will also be kept in AO/OD/MS under pseudo.

FRED KIRKPATRICK

SECRET

201-235477

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/ [illegible]

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.				
2.				
3. SR/DOB	20 OCT 1960			
4.				
5. AF Div Don Nescior	2110 I	27 OCT 1960		
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

rcc: CWH

3 & 4: PLS NOTE, 201 FILE NOW RESP. OF AF DIV.

HBPA-0[illegible]

201-2[illegible]

[illegible] OCT 60

ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS

[illegible] TO ER[illegible]

AF/West [illegible]

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201. 233 [illegible]77

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

12 oct 1960

DOCUMENT NUMBER

HBPA 04890

FORM 12-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

SECRET

HBPA-4890

TO: Chief, SR ✓

INFO: Chief, WHD
Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

FROM: Chief of Base, Sao Paulo

SUBJECT: Operational/REDWOOD/AEACRE
Accommodation Address

ACTION REQUIRED: As requested in para. 1

REFERENCE: HBPW-2021

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-233477

FIELD FILE NO: 10-6-5.4

12 October 1960

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

1. In accordance with instructions contained in reference, the Base has been servicing the accommodation address at least once a week through the services of ALLOMETER-2 who rented this post office box under an alias. On 7 October 1960 the Base forwarded a letter which ALLOMETER-2 had picked up the day before. This letter was registered, and ALLOMETER-2 was obliged (for the second time) to make a personal appearance before the responsible persons and to sign (in alias) an acknowledgment of receipt. If it is at all possible to send these letters unregistered the Base would much prefer that this system be adopted. ALLOMETER-2, over a period of years, has rented many different post office boxes under different names, and the Base considers it a definite security hazard if he is forced to identify himself in the manner required by the registration of these letters.

2. Headquarters attention is called to the fact that the letter which the Base forwarded on 7 October 1960 was postmarked in Europe on 12 August 1960. Even in the light of the notoriously slow Brazilian postal system, the Base cannot explain such a long delay in transit for air mail. Such a delay has been typical of almost every letter the Base has received in the past six months. The Base has no reason to disbelieve ALLOMETER-2 in his repeated assertions that he services the box at least once a week.

Lucian W. Fabsik
Lucian W. FABSIK

10 October 1960

Distribution:
- 5 - Headquarters
- 2 - Rio
- 2 - Files

EDM

HBPA-4890

201-233477

FORM 10-57 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

CS copy

2

201 - not assigned

Chief of Base, Frankfurt — 1[illegible] October 1960

[illegible]

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

For your information

1. The [illegible] Soviet branch files on AE[illegible]PIC 1 were destroyed this date; material not previously forwarded to Headquarters is transmitted under separate cover attachment to this dispatch.

2. A list of the official correspondence destroyed with the file is given below:

[illegible] 7178, 10 July 1958
[illegible], 8 August 1958
[illegible] 1547, Sep 1958
DIR [illegible]055, September 1958
DIR [illegible]765, September 1958
DIR [illegible]875, October 1958
EGMA 2[illegible]034, 13 November 1958
DIR 04094, December 1958
FROB 2928, December 1958
FROB 2958, December 1958
FROB 2978, December 1958
FROB 2977, December 1958
FROB 3089, January 1959
FROB 3090, January 1959
PARI [illegible]625, January 1959
DIR [illegible]455, January 1959
EGMA [illegible]837, 20 January 1959
FROB [illegible]376, February 1959
FROB [illegible]425, February 1959
FROB 3477, February 1959
DIR 13127, February 1959
FROB 3501, February 1959
EGMA 25336, 24 February 1959
DIR 14843, March 1959
FROB 3707, March 1959
DIR 16768, March 1959
FROB 3734, March 1959
PARI 5377, March 1959
FROB 3763, March 1959
DIR 17342, March 1959
DIR 17554, March 1959
PARI 5409, March 1959
DIR 18040, March 1959
PARI 5504, March 1959
FROB 3977, April 1959
FROB 4001, April 1959
DIR 21727, April 1959
PARI 5705, April 1959

[illegible] K. CARRES

APPROVED: Gerald D. Pedley

ATTACHMENT [illegible]:
Attachment [illegible] - AE[illegible]PIC 1 papers

CS COPY

201-233477

14-00000

201- [illegible]

SECRET

TO : Chief, SR

ATTENTION: SR/DOB

SUBJECT : AEASPIC

As a result of conversations between representatives of this Division and SR/DOB, transfer of AEASPIC to Africa West's jurisdiction is agreed on following his present period of training.

Africa Division will assume full responsibility for his handling. To that end, we are obtaining quarters, have had discussions with Alien Affairs Staff, and have taken steps to regularize AEASPIC clearance status for his intended assignment.

As the exact date of transfer is not yet determined, it is requested that Mr. Kirkpatrick maintain contact with Mr. Wells on extension 3829 to handle final transfer arrangements.

SR's cooperation on such matters as shots, training, quartering and a new physical examination are appreciated.

Bronson Tweedy
Chief, Africa Division

SECRET

201-235477

201-

SECRET

TO : Chief, CI/OA Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Ray McConnon

SUBJECT : Future Utilization of AEASPIC

1. Subject is currently in the process of being transferred from the jurisdiction of SR to AF, in all probability for a field assignment in the Congo.

2. Accordingly, it is requested that your records be altered to reflect this change and also, that the necessary steps are taken to amend his OA (C-73532) to permit use by this Division.

3. For further information regarding subject, please contact Edward O. Welles, Africa West, on extension 3829, who will temporarily be handling this case.

Bronson Tweedy
Chief, Africa Division

SECRET

201-253477

1. Occupational Specialty: Mechanical Electrical Engineering

Cine or Portrait Photography

Research and innovator of commercial labor/money saving devices

Electro mechanical or photographical in nature.

See paragraphs 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14 of Employment History for examples.

2. Military Service: Dec. 1939, Paris, volunteered for French Foreign Legion.

Jan. 1940, Tunisia North Africa, in 1st Cav. Reg., 1st Squadron, 4th platoon.

Feb. 1940 - sent to N.C.O. training course in Legion. Pulled out to be reassigned to all-Georgian unit.

Mar. - Aug. 1940, Barcares. Assigned in Georgian unit

Aug. 1940 - Paris. Discharged after the end of Franco/German hostilities as Private First Class.

3. Employment History:

1. 1942 - Paris - Volunteered for work in Germany.

2. Poelitz, Germany, Worked for HIDRYER WERKE on contract for one year as installation electrician.

3. 1942 - Berlin Photographer of metals for a factory which produced electrodes for welding instruments

1942 - Paris Self-employed at photo shop. Portrait photography.

4. 1942 Berlin Assembly line worker in Berlin factory producing steel ammunition belts. Received commendation from factory

director for labor saving device re manufact. of device for automat. adjustment of cartridge cases.

5. 1942 Berlin " Mugelheim — Drivers mechanics course for the NSKK (Nazi Party Motorized Corps). Drove trucks during construction of Atlantic wal. by Germans.

6. 1943 Berlin Employed with SCHUPOLIZEI as translator French-German language.

7. 1946-47 Paris Employed by Architects Carre Associated as electrical installation planner and constructor of prototype model builder. Earned roughly $4 an hour American scale plus commission work extra.

8. 1951-52 In prison, Paris — Devised and sold on French market a pocket automatic transit indicator. Received cash settlement for this while in prison.

9. 1953 In prison in Rion — Devised and gave to prison administrator invention for making cardboard boxes. Device was built and used by prison administrator.

10. Dec. 1955-Apr. 1956 Gap — Employed by M.D. as X-ray machine maintenance technician and operator.

11. 1956-57 Gap — Invented, patented and sold a calendar device to the French commercial market.

12. 1958 Ambert — Invented and patented a commercial advertising device, photo-mechanical in nature. Models built and sold to French advertising concerns.

13. 1959-60 U.S. Sept-May — Devised and passed drawings for 2 pieces of equipment to be used for Project AESENTINEL.

14. 1960, July U.S. At present Subject is devising a low cost telephone answering device.

4. Experience in Forged Documents:

May 1942 Achen, - Berlin	Falsified his own travel documents by use of pen to change effective dates.
1942 Berlin - Paris	Filled in German travel blank forms. Altered old German authorization stamp for travel forms. Then made other falsified stamps for other people interested in travel across German-held territory.
1943-44 Berlin	Constructed and used various falsified travel documents stamps copied from old travel documents for various people to travel throughout Germany. Used certain photo techniques for changing and/or ageing pictures in documents. At same time Subject also reassembled falsified old passports to form new ones as well as counterfeited German financial vouchers.



Physical Description

Subject is described as 42 year old male Caucasian, 5'6" tall, of slight build (136 lbs. average weight), long face, long nose, dark brown hair, balding in front, swarthy complexion. Subject is extremely agil and in perfect health. He is an ex-French foreign legionnaire and survivor of German concentration camps.

Evaluation

Subject's case officer agrees with Agency Assessment that he possesses the traits of a born clandestine operator and would be an apt candidate for any black mission which requires:

1. able-bodiedness
2. ability to assimilate easily (al owing for his physical features)

3. innate sense of locational direction
4. superior intelligence and reasoning power
5. ability to comprehend and apply instruction rapidly
6. willingness to undertake an extremely hazardous mission
7. basic technical and mechanical applied or theoretical abilities
8. ability to improvise and "know how" disturbingly American in character.

Motivation

Subject's motivation is based on personal loyalties rather than monetary gain. Subject has little regard for the value of his money, and must be strongly urged to set aside a part of his earnings. Subject has a strong distaste for the Communist regime and has observed the effects of it at first hand. Subject indeed goes a step farther, subscribing to the "Untermensch" theory re the Russian people. ?

Language Capabilities

Subject speaks, reads, writes:

French - native
Georgian - fluent
German - good to fluent
English - reads fluently, writes, fair, speaks fair
Spanish - reads fair, speaks poor, understands fair

Subject has exhibited good subordination to his case officer, intelligent security precautions re his personal habits, and the ability to quietly fit into an American urban existance. For any further information please call Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB, X-4705.

13 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact Report

1. On 8 September 1960 the undersigned accompanied by SR/DCB case officers Perry Crookham and Fred Kirkpatrick met with David Tzitzichvili (201-233477) in a SR/DCB safe house. The purpose of this meeting was to assess David for possible use by JMARC. The subject was aware he was being interviewed as the same procedure had been used previously by a representative of the African Division.

2. The subject has led an exciting and diverse life. The SR Division brought him to the United States (black) to train for a mission which has subsequently been cancelled. At the present time the SR Division is making arrangements for the resettlement of the subject in Latin America, probably in Mexico. However, due to the training this agency has given the subject SR feels he should be utilized by the DD/P if possible.

3. Observing David for some two hours and listening to his story the undersigned feels there may be some use of him by JMARC. David is a smooth talker who has obviously told his story many times to the satisfaction of his listeners. He elaborates on the exciting and bizarre parts of his life and tends to gloss over those sections he feels that are common to everyone.

4. The subject has been in the United States for some time. This time has been spent in training for a specific mission which never came to pass. Recently he has been engaged in "make work" programs to pass the time. This could well explain his apparent impatience and desire to do something. In his own words he wishes to prove that he is capable of accomplishing a task assigned to him. He asks for a chance to surveil someone, to take clandestine pictures, even to assassinate someone. He very nearly begged to be given a pitch during this meeting.

5. The subject is a stateless person. He is in the United States black and could be completely unattributable if necessary. He desires citizenship and a chance to settle down in one spot. He prefers U.S. citizenship but is not adament on this. However the basic motivation appears to be love of excitement. The subject gives a very good appearance of the classical adventurer. He relates his past exploits in wartime Europe as motivated by the thrill of duping the existing authority.

file in
201-233477

6. It is the undersigned's opinion this individual could be used as a singleton agent in [illegible]. Mr. Bill Romer and Mr. Gordon Mothes of WH/4/PM have at one time been case officers of this individual for SR/[illegible]. WH/4/PM has the 201 folder at the present time.

MORGAN SHRADER
WH/4/PM

19 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mexican Resettlement Arrangements for AESENTINEL agent AEASPIC

1. At 1400 hours, 19 August, SR/DOB case officer, Fred Kirkpatrick and Jerry Pochron from Defection Coordinators Office of CIA met with Clay Calendar and Jim Myers of TSD/IB re documentations arrangements and travel routing for possible resettlement of AESENTINEL agent AEASPIC. The following arrangements were proposed by Mr. Calendar and Mr. Myers for SR/DOB's consideration. TSD/IB suggested that Subject be sent by black flight from here to West Germany, and there surfaced with an altered Greek passport which TSD/IB now has available. A suitable cover story would of course be incorporated re the possession of a Greek passport by Subject, while Subject has no Greek language capability. Since this passport is a valid one, (and was, in fact, purchased by TSD/IB) and is therefore backstopped in name, Subject could apply at the Mexican Embassy in West Germany for a Mexican tourist visa by presenting this passport. Once in Mexico, Subject could request emigration action upon declaration of intent to become a Mexican citizen and upon submitting proof of sponsorship by an employer in Mexico City.

2. Upon your concurrence, Mr. Pochron will arrange for Mr. Kirkpatrick to meet with Mr. Coolidge, the CIA contact used for introducing agency designees into Mexican private industry. Mr. Pochron has already talked with Mr. Coolidge on two occasions and has passed him Subject's file. From their talks, Mr. Pochron has assured me that this arrangement is entirely feasible, Gillete Company of Mexico City being cited as one possibility.

3. AEASPIC would then openly proceed to purchase plane tickets in West Germany for Mexico City and upon arrival there, would be waiting for him. The time table for this entire operation was estimated at about five weeks. Of course we did not discuss Subject's monetary maintenance for the interim period of travel, nor until Subject could begin earning his own living.

201-239477

4. Mr. Pochron expressed his concern and the concern of Mr. Pennington of Alien Affairs Staff about the knowledgibility of Subject re pass Agency tie-in and Agency assets. It will of course be our job to assure Security that Subject is not knowledgable and will entail a minimum of risk to transport and to resettle in Mexico. In view of this concern, all arrangements offered for DOB's consideration by TSD/IB were tailored to afford step by step denial or participation by the U. S. Government. In effect, all items procured by Subject for resettlement could just as easily be obtained on the European black market as well as from this Government. Subject will in effect be briefed and taken by German Station asset to obtain his documents ostensibly on the black market. Monies due Subject would be withheld pending destination arrival. The letter head and supporting sponsorship documents to be used by him for ultimate employment in Mexico would be prepared in such a manner as to be either legitimate or forged. In addition it was suggested that Subject be closely handled and advised by someone known to him to ensure the security aspect both to Subject and to this agency.

5. The meeting was closed by TSD/IB's request to be informed whether these arrangements in theory meet with the approval of SR/DOB, and Office of Security. Mr. Kirkpatrick was assured that Documentation aspects by TSD/IB could be accomplished within one week upon authorization by SR/DOB. With your permission Fred Kirkpatrick will proceed to affirm Mexican employment arrangements for AEASPIC.

FRED KIRKPATRICK

Concur on these [illegible] arrangements that we proceed. And agree we tie-in later. Suggest flight possible. For [illegible] also - suggest we briefly [illegible] The record [illegible] prepare a memo (no details) to Frankfurt on this plan so that they will be clued in that this agent is a resettlement case who might again be valuable in the future. Also should he get Mexican citizenship travel documents I believe the African Div (Fisher ~~[illegible]~~ Houck) would be interested in arranging a job in Congo or other areas for him to [illegible]

Mike

SECRET

SR/DOB/0-2011
25 July 60

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, CDC

ATTENTION : Jerry Pochron (1306 [illegible] x4654 [illegible]?

SUBJECT : Biographical Information Necessary for Possible Resettlement of SR/DOB Redsox Agent David TZITZICHVILI (T).

1. On 21 July 1960, SR/DOB Case Officer Fred Kirkpatrick talked with Jerry Pochron of your office re enlisting your assistance in the possible resettlement of SR/DOB Redsox contract agent David TZITZICHVILI (T) in the region of South or Central America. At the request and as per outline of Mr. Pochron, this office has prepared the following biographic information. See Attachment A.

2. Subject is living in the general Washington D.C. area under the supervision of an SR/DOB Case Officer and is readily available for any further debriefing your office deems necessary.

3. Subject remains on a quasi legally backstopped arrangement of Alien Affairs Staff until 20 October 1960.

4. For any further information please contact Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB, on extension 4705 or 8331.

PERRY E. CROCHMAN
Acting Chief, SR/DOB

SECRET

201-233477

24 June 1960

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Biographic Information/Case Officer Evaluation of
David TZITZICHVILI, alias David DURVARD

Biographic Information

David TZITZICHVILI was born 20 December 1919 in Tbilisi, Georgia, where he lived with his parents until 1921. Subject at that time moved to France with his parents. Subject grew up in France and therefore speaks native French (Parisian). Subject does not have French citizenship, however, and must be classed as stateless. Subject earned the first part of his baccalaureat at Breguet (electro-engineering), then entered the Foreign Legion at the beginning of WWII. Subject fought in N. Africa until French capitulation in 1940, at which time he was discharged to return home to Paris. In 1943 he went to Germany as a voluntary worker. He worked there primarily as an industrial electrician. While in Germany he assisted French officer P.O.W.'s to escape, aiding them with cleverly falsified papers, stamps, cachets and even uniforms. It is interesting to note that while subject attended school at Breuguet, he also attended the Technicum for Cinematography. It was from these past studies at the Technicum that subject was able to develop techniques to apply to photo-mechanical forging of documents, stamps, and cachets. Subject was betrayed to Germans, arrested, and sentenced to death for espionage. Subject was able to drag this case out by implying the existence of a large British run net of which he was a part. In 1945 he was liberated by the U.S. Army and returned to Paris. Subject lived there in relative quiet until he, together with a war-time friend, robbed a Paris bank of a sizeable amount of money. Subject and accomplice were apprehended by the Surete on 11 July 1950, sentenced to prison, but released some five years later for good behavior and on the basis of their war record.

It is interesting to note that while in prison, subject invented a machine for making cardboard boxes. This machine was actually built for one of the prison administrations and put into operation at the prison factory. Upon discharge from prison in December of 1955, subject lived, worked and was paroled to his brother in Gap, France. It was while there that subject was contacted by this agency and subsequently brought to this country for use as one of two agents for Project AESENTINEL.

Subject is presently residing in his Wash. D.C. apartment and is readily available for any interviews.

Subject is engaged in his safe office in several technical gimmicks which could be of value to this Agency. Two of his ideas have been passed forward to TSD for development/exploitation. TSD has expressed interest in another of his ideas, the plans for which have just been completed.

Alien Affairs Staff of Immigration/Naturalization has extended subjects' backstopped residence status until 20 October, 1960.

Physical Description

Subject is described as 41 year old male Caucasian, 5'6" tall, of slight build (136 lbs. average weight), long face, long nose, dark brown hair, balding in front, swarthy complexion. Subject is extremely agile and in perfect health. He is an ex-French foreign legionnaire and survivor of German concentration camps.

Evaluation

Subject's case officer agrees with Assesment that he possesses the traits of a born clandestine operator and would be an apt candidate for any black mission which requires:

SECRET

1. able-bodiedness
2. ability to assimilate easily (allowing for his physical features)
3. innate sense of locational direction
4. superior intelligence and reasoning power
5. ability to comprehend and apply instruction rapidly
6. willingness to undertake an extremely hazardous mission
7. basic technical and mechanical applied or theoretical abilities
8. ability to improvise and "know how" disturbingly American in character.

Motivation

[illegible]

Subject's is ~~ideological more than monetary~~. ~~That is to say~~, Subject has little regard for the value of his money, and must be strongly urged to set aside a part of his earnings. Subject has a strong distaste for the Communist regime and has observed the effects of it at first hand. Subject indeed goes a step farther, subscribing to the "Untermensch" theory re the Russian people.

Language Capabilities

Subject speaks, reads, writes:

French - native
Geogian - fluent
German - good to fluent
English - reads fluently, writes fair, speaks fair
[illegible]

Subject has exhibited good subordination to his Case Officer, intelligent security precautions re his personal habits, and the ability to quietly fit into an American urban existence. For any further information please call Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB, X-4705.

SECRET

A-4

5 July, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT : Upper Dentures for AEASPIC

On 1 July, 1960 AEASPIC was fitted with a full set of upper dentures by Dr. H.F. Bogan, an Agency cleared dentist, located at 17th and "K" St. in downtown Washington D.C. Cost of $150.00 was borne by SR/DCE and satisfied the agent contract clause stipulating that Subject be maintained in physical capacity sufficient to undertake Project AESENTINEL. Dental appointments and consultations were initiated before the postponement of Project AESENTINEL on 17 June 1960.



NAME David Durvard (a.) / 17 June 1960
ADDRESS
PHONE NO.
REFERRED BY

DATE	NO.	OPERATION	HRS.	DR.	CR.
		Part upper [illegible]			
		replacing [illegible]			
		upper [illegible]			
		Porcelain [illegible] each.			
		Dr. Bogan 17th & K St.			

FORM 2022 THE S. S. WHITE DENTAL MFG. CO. NO. 7 RECORD CARD

201-233472

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Soviet Russia Division
ATTN : SR/DOB

DATE: 20 July 1960

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT: AEASPIC, CI/OA No. C-73532

1. In your memorandum of 14 September 1959, No. 1730, you requested suspension of the subject's twenty-four hour custody until he resumed training about 1 August 1960. Your memorandum of 5 July 1960, No. 1996, indicates he will be placed in a safe-house for training about the last of July 1960, and that he will continue his present unescorted status on occasional weekends.

2. This Office has no objection to that procedure.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

CH Pennington
C. H. Pennington
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

SECRET

12 Aug 60.

Copy furnished WH Division (Gordon Sicotte) for review by Colonel Frank Eagan for further WH use.

14-00000

[illegible]

SR/PB/63

[illegible] June 1960

27 June 60

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of [illegible]

ATTENTION : Chief [illegible]

SUBJECT : W/T Training for [illegible] contract agent [illegible]

1. It is requested that [illegible] assessment and subsequent W/T training be instituted [illegible] for SR/[illegible] contract agent [illegible]. [illegible] training [illegible] necessary in order to round out Subject's [illegible] training for operational [illegible] by interested SR/[illegible] components.

2. Subject to your concurrence, it is anticipated that [illegible] W/T training will be given Subject [illegible] located in the [illegible] town D.C. area, and [illegible] beginning 1 August 1960. Training [illegible] until Subject is a qualified operational W/T [illegible].

3. Transportation [illegible] instructor to and from the training sites will [illegible].

4. For any further [illegible], please contact [illegible] SR/[illegible], Extension 5331.

[illegible]
[illegible] Chief, SR/[illegible]

[illegible]/[illegible]

Distrib.: O & 1 - addressee
2 - SR/[illegible]
1 - SR/[illegible] [illegible]

201-233477

14-00000

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TTT-M-60-476

DATE: 1 AUG 1960

TO : Chief, Soviet Russia Division/DDP
ATTN : Chief, SR/DOB

FROM : Chief, Telecommunications, Training and Techniques Staff/OC

SUBJECT: W/T Training - Agent AEASPIC

REF : SR/DOB 60-1990, 29 June 1960

1. This will confirm recent discussions held between Mr. Fred Kirkpatrick of your Office and Mr. Lee Jungen of my Staff relative to the proposed W/T training of AEASPIC. As was explained by Mr. Jungen, W/T training of an agent on a full or part-time basis, is contingent upon the approval of a specific project with supporting communications annex. While we have on occasion participated in "holding" training of agents without benefit of a definite requirement, current operational commitments now make this impossible.

2. Should a definite requirement for the operational utilization of AEASPIC develop we will arrange for the W/T aptitude assessment and training. Prior to our initiating such action, it is requested that a representative of your Office discuss operational details with an appropriate Foreign Division within the Office of Communications. This will enable us to tailor subsequent training in terms of specific equipment and procedures as required by the project. In this respect, further information can be obtained by contacting Mr. Lawrence Eisler on extension 8137.

Robert A. Bloom
ROBERT A. BLOOM

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee

201-235477

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

FIELD DOCUMENT ROUTING AND ACTION RECORD

INSTRUCTIONS: Routing designations, either individuals or units, are to be placed in the "TO" column. Comments are to be numbered to correspond to the number in the "TO" column. Each comment is to be underlined with a line drawn across the "COMMENTS" column. Each recipient of the attached document is to place his initials in the proper space following the corresponding numbered routing. The date the document is forwarded to the next routing is to be placed in the proper column. The last routing on this sheet shall be the unit in which the basic document is to be filed. If the holding unit is other than the central files, the central file shall be the next to the last routing to insure proper control clearances. THIS DOCUMENT ROUTING AND ACTION RECORD IS TO REMAIN ATTACHED TO THE BASIC RECORD DOCUMENT AS A PERMANENT RECORD.

FROM: SR/DOB

DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER:

DOCUMENT DATE:

ACTION SUSPENSE DATE:

TO	LOCATION	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER INITIALS
1. Lou Seckles Ed McMahon	1102 I	29 Jun	
2.			
3. SR/DOB	1062 J		
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			

COMMENTS

NO INTEREST

DOCUMENT PROCESSING DATA

INDEXED

ABSTRACTED

FILE NUMBER

FORM NO. 861
1 DEC 55

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED (40)

24 June 1960

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Biographic Information/Case Officer Evaluation of
David TZITZICHVILI, alias David DURVARD

Biographic Information

David TZITZICHVILI was born 20 December 1919 in Tbilisi, Georgia, where he lived with his parents until 1921. Subject at that time moved to France with his parents. Subject grew up in France and therefore speaks native French (Parisian). Subject does not have French citizenship, however, and must be classed as stateless. Subject earned the first part of his baccalaureat at Breguet (electro-engineering), then entered the Foreign Legion at the beginning of WWII. Subject fought in N. Africa until French capitulation in 1940, at which time he was discharged to return home to Paris. In 1943 he went to Germany as a voluntary worker. He worked there primarily as an industrial electrician. While in Germany he assisted French officer P.O.W.'s to escape, aiding them with cleverly falsified papers, stamps, cachets and even uniforms. It is interesting to note that while subject attended school at Breuguet, he also attended the Technicum for Cinematography. It was from these past studies at the Technicum that subject was able to develop techniques to apply to photo-mechanical forging of documents, stamps, and cachets. Subject was betrayed to Germans, arrested, and sentenced to death for espionage. Subject was able to drag this case out by implying the existence of a large British run net of which he was a part. In 1945 he was liberated by the U.S. Army and returned to Paris. Subject lived there in relative quiet until he, together with a war-time friend, robbed a Paris bank of a sizeable amount of money. Subject and accomplice were apprehended by the Sureté on 11 July 1950, sentenced to prison, but released some five years later for good behavior and on the basis of their war record.

201-233477

It is interesting to note that while in prison, subject invented a machine for making cardboard boxes. This machine was actually built for one of the prison administrations and put into operation at the prison factory. Upon discharge from prison in December of 1955, subject lived, worked and was paroled to his brother in Gap, France. It was while there that subject was contacted by this agency and subsequently brought to this country for use as one of two agents for Project AESENTINEL.

Subject is presently residing in his Wash. D.C. apartment and is readily available for any interviews.

Subject is engaged in his safe office in several technical gimmicks which could be of value to this Agency. Two of his ideas have been passed forward to TSD for development/exploitation. TSD has expressed interest in another of his ideas, the plans for which have just been completed.

Alien Affairs Staff of Immigration/Naturalization has extended subjects' backstopped residence status until 20 October, 1960.

Physical Description

Subject is described as 41 year old male Caucasian, 5'6" tall, of slight build (136 lbs. average weight), long face, long nose, Dark Brown hair, balding in front, swarthy complexion. Subject is extremely/agile and in perfect health. He is an ex-French foreign legionnaire and survivor of German concentration camps.

Evaluation

Subject's case officer agrees with Assessment that he possesses the traits of a born clandestine operator and would be an apt candidate for any black mission which requires:

1. able-bodiedness
2. ability to assimilate easily (allowing for his physical features)
3. innate sense of locational direction
4. superiorintelligence and reasoning power
5. ability to comprehend and apply instruction rapidly
6. willingness to undertake an extremely hazardous mission
7. basic technical and mechanical applied or theoretical abilities
8. ability to improvise and "know how" disturbingly American in character.

Motivation

Subject's MOTIVATION is ideological more than monetary. That is to say, subject has little regard for the value of his money, and must be strongly urged to set aside a part of his earnings. Subject has a strong distaste for the Communist regime and has observed the effects of it at first hand. Subject indeed goes a step farther, subscribing to the "Untermensch" theory re the Russian people.

Language Capabilities

Subject speaks, reads, writes:

French - native
Geogian - fluent
German - good to fluent
English - reads fluently, writes fair, speaks fair

Subject has exhibited good subordination to his Case Officer, intelligent security precautions re his personal habits, and the ability to quietly fit into an American urban existence. For any further information please call Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB, X-4705.

SECRET

Translater for French Letters

Nick Letsou

1104 "J" Bldg.

French Desk, W.E. X 3857

Check for S/W in letters

Mr. Callander

TSS Photo X 8315

Accommodation Address for David

Mrs. Murray, WH 2 B, X 8495

Accommodation Address for David:

Letters to France;

Eduardo Calle
CANA POSTAL 11744 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo Brasil

Letters to Hq. for David;

Robert P. Hague
P.O. Box 8028
South West Station
Wash. 24, D.C.
U.S.A.

201-233477

INSTRUCTIONS

MEMORIZE THE FOLLOW[illegible] AND DESTROY THIS PAPER:

NAME: David Durvard

OCCUPATION: Consultant Electronic Engineer

You are staying in Apartment #109, ground floor at Dominion Towers, at 1201 South Court House Road, Arlington, Virginia. You were given the use of this apartment by Mr. Powol Browning, who lives at 3145 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.. Mr Brownings telephone number is Federal 3-5081. Should any one question you tell them to contact Mr. Browning who is a business associate of yours.

SECRET

201-233477

30 juin Cabanis

Cher "Eduardo". Je suis si anxieuse que même en attendant la possibilité de mettre un timbre sur cette enveloppe je me mets à écrire comme au bon vieux temps ! Savoir où se baladent nos lettres du 7, 9 et 11 mars ! Auraient-elles été jamais ? Si elles traversent les océans vont elles jusqu'à choir dans votre boîte - qui le sait, c'est énervant de ne pas être sûre ! Ici la vie s'aggrave chaque jour et bientôt nous serons obligés comme les chiens et chats de dénicher notre nourriture dans les poubelles ! ce n'est pas drôle ... Colette ne trouve pas de travail ... Annick doit attendre la bonne marche des couturiers ... Zité [illegible] des petits [illegible] et ne peut travailler en ce moment. Nelly a débuté comme vendeuse débutante, avant-hier. Qu'est-ce que ça donnera .. et quel salaire aura-t-elle ! Moi .. je ne compte pas seulement pour mes 81 ans qui m'accablent. Le pain de chaque jour commence à avoir le goût du rare et on ne voit pas d'issue - Victor en principe doit partir à la montagne après demain pour 6 mois pour l'attaque tout sur le dos sans disposer même de croûte : et cela jusqu'en septembre ! il ne s'en fait pas lui !

Jeudi 24 .. Il pleut le temps est terriblement sombre
assorti à nos idées .. pour comble j'ai perdu 10 fr
dans la cuisine ce matin et cela me gêne vraiment
le cafard de plus en plus s'implante et la misère
la plus complète s'acharne sur nous - Nelly n'a pas
travaillé tout un plein [illegible] .. Colette broie du
noir car elle ne peut trouver de travail et cependant
c'est plus qu'urgent .. je m'arrête n'ayant plus rien
à dire. Loulou est venu me faisant lire son père
va très mal et on ne sait au juste ce qu'il a .. je
crois que Loulou craint un cancer au poumon !
Odile est venue nous dire au revoir car elle part
en vacances de Pâques la veinarde !

2 Avril un long arrêt dans ma lettre pour résumer
les catastrophes qui nous tombent sur le dos ! sans
que nous puissions y parer .. Armelle est sans salaire
Colette est sans travail. Nelly en qui se tenait notre
dernier espoir est de nouveau sans travail .. la
personne qui l'avait demandée comme Résidence
a jugé bon de lui donner 5000 fr par quinzaine
mais pas de quoi à payer les [illegible] enveloppes pour
les courses qu'elle lui fait faire .. ainsi elle
cherche autre chose et nous restons le bec dans
l'eau .. avec en plus un commandement
d'arrêt-saisie pour les contributions que
Victor n'a pas payées .. après avoir juré que
c'était payé depuis novembre .. et voilà
chaque jour une nouvelle surprise aussi agréable
Lundi on nous coupe l'eau, le gaz et l'électricité
je me demande ce qui nous restera .. les deux

Une - Jeune plume et encore pas finie ! En
ce moment la vie est littéralement dure pour
tout le monde qu'on ne peut rien obtenir ..
tout le monde vous a écrit. Mon cher D, mais
que seront devenues nos lettres ! envolées dans
les nuages ! Ce que sera le sort de celle-ci ?
Stéphane a encore une fille . Sophie . Ce que
Mathilde doit jubiler ! . Colette a écrit pour
donner votre adresse .. Mme [illegible] vous
demande de vos nouvelles, elle a déménagé
a acheté un charmant appartement au 19 de
l'avenue [illegible] .. et elle l'installe, naturellement
de [illegible] l'amoncellement de choses !
elle est de plus en plus [illegible] .. Pierrette a
grossi .. Eugène roule sur l'or, il est à
Megève où il cherche à acheter une villa
et un appartement à Paris .. il revient du
Tchad où il a [illegible] trouvé une mine
d'or !. Il en a de la chance ! Je ne l'ai
pas encore vu. Sur ce je m'arrête .. on
sonne .. encore des réclamations .. Ce que
je puis en avoir marre, marre, marre.
Je vous embrasse, mon cher D pour moi,
pour toute la famille bien affectueusement
Mémé

du Preito 30 rue Pabanis XIV
Paris France

1744

PARIS 101
-2 4 60
LA GLACIERE (13e)
16h

REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
★160
POSTES
020

Senor Eduardo Cotto
Caixa postal 11744 Lapa
Sao Paulo
Brazil

T

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

9 mars 60 — 30 rue Cabanis Paris XIV

Cher Dat, voilà j'ai voulu attendre la [illegible] pour ne pas me précipiter, j'ai tardé de nombreuses pages pour vous remettre dans le bain et finalement j'arriverai bonne dernière.. de même une lettre arrivée car j'étais tout 25 fr de timbres me [illegible] sur l'enveloppe de Tiaré.. mais ça te sera facile.. pour trouver moyen d'être au bout du monde alors une lettre réclamée par retour et tout ce qu'elle réclamait [illegible] ..alors me voici (ou est-ce bien [illegible] à la poste)) l'une à 85 l'autre mais oui plus 55.. enfin la huitième a une autre poste a fini par arriver à 105 fr voilà maintenant. Je crois que Colette qui a [illegible] les doigts en votre honneur a à lui seul tout dit.. [illegible] l'ère passée dans laquelle nous nous agitions avec des rhumes carabinés on gîte dans la maison sans fin ou se balade avec des bouillottes dans la main ou sur le dos. Renault est parti se prélasser dans différentes maisons pour du boulot... Gaby est allé courir des lots de [illegible] pour [illegible] [illegible] pour [illegible].. Toute Irène est hors de la militaire.. c'est la [illegible] de la [illegible] elle est hors d'atteinte des agitements de l'ère. Je ne peux que la féliciter.. Je vieillis.. je vieillis mon pauvre Dat 80 ans! ça n'est pas drôle vous savez! Enfin j'attends avec impatience tous les détails de votre existence.. on a fait tant et tant de suppositions.. on a vécu dans l'attente perpétuelle de nouvelles et enfin elles arrivent. [illegible]! au diable avez-vous pensé à nous? où les [illegible] fini Michèle et Nelly de faire montre de leur savoir en espagnol. Le pays est-il beau, que les gens sont-ils sympathiques? Ici l'atmosphère de la maison est celle d'une écurie où il y a des ânes sans foin .. on ne se bat pas mais on braie à toute force .. Si c'est dans vos moyens au mois de Juin [illegible] 15 jours de vacances à Colette .. pour l'amour du Ciel faites, ~~car~~ son caractère change, il s'aigrit .. elle critique tout .. ne trouve rien de bien et vraiment nous sommes [illegible] il est vrai qu'elle a tant d'occasions d'être [illegible] embêtements, emmerdes ... etc etc —

ce n'est plus la joyeuse atmosphère habituelle [illegible] de venir au mois pour les problématiques fiançailles de Nelly .. en Octobre dit-on mais je crois bien que cela n'arrivera jamais [illegible] n'est pas dans notre ambiance il lui manque le doigté, le flair [illegible] .. c'est le [illegible] en plein.

J'ose espérer que cette lettre arrivera avant l'autre. J'en profite pour vous embrasser pour tous ces mois passés et avec toute mon affection.

Meme

14-0000



③

1961
GENERAL LECLERC

Señor Eduardo Callo
Caixa postal (11766 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo
Brazil

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

9 mars-80   40 rue Cabanis Paris XIV

Cher Dali, voilà j'ai voulu aider la [illegible] je me suis précipitée [illegible] de [illegible] tout remettre dans le bain et finalement j'arrive bonne dernière. Le même une lettre arrivée est j'étais tout 25 fr de timbres [illegible] sur l'enveloppe de Noël. Mais la te sera faite ... pour toutes moyen d'être au bout du monde alors une lettre l'échouera par bateau et tout est qu'elle s'adressera [illegible] .. alors une réussie (car est la bien renseignée à la poste)) l'un dit 85 f. l'autre mais [illegible] plus 55 f. enfin une troisième a une autre poste a [illegible] aussi à 10 f [illegible] maintenant. Je crois que Colette qui a chatouillé les doigts en votre honneur a à peu près tout dit. Seulement l'ivi soirée dans laquelle nous nous agitions avec des [illegible] carabinées ou fête dans la maison sans fin ou se balade avec des bouteilles dans la main ou sous les bras. [illegible] est parti se présenter dans différentes maisons pour du boulot ... Gaby est allé courir des lots de [illegible] pour rentrer 99 [illegible] pour [illegible] .. Jane est hors de la malaise .. [illegible] de la famille .. elle est hors d'atteinte des agissements de [illegible] que [illegible] .. Je [illegible] .. je [illegible] [illegible] 80 ans ! ce n'est pas [illegible] Vous savez [illegible] j'attends avec impatience tous les détails de votre existence .. on a fait tant et tant de suppositions .. on a vécu dans l'attente perpétuelle de nouvelles et

SECRET

SR/DOB/60-2055

29 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, OS

ATTENTION: Mr. Pennington

SUBJECT: Transfer and Quartering arrangements for AEASPIC

1. This is to confirm a discussion between Mr. Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB and your office regarding transfer and quartering arrangements for AEASPIC, David Durvard (a), and the interest expressed by Dr. Lester Houck of Africa Division re acquiring AEASPIC as a long term asset for that division.

2. In compliance with a request made of this office by Africa Division, it is understood your office has agreed to the temporary quartering of AEASPIC in a furnished safe apartment located at apartment 307, 5741 Colorado Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. This office, with your concurrence, has agreed to lend the use of this apartment for a period of about two weeks, effective 28 September 1960. At present AEASPIC is visited once a week and/or as the need arises. AEASPIC has his own salary for food and public transportation. The same cover arrangements exists under this arrangement as existed when Subject lived at 925 25th Street, N.W., in his own apartment. The cover arrangement is that David Durvard (a) is a technical associate of Fred K. Komer (a) (i.e. an SR/DOB case officer) self-employed, manufacturers commissioned representative.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

SECRET

-00000

RET

CS-1236 (Coolidge)
22 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible resettlement of SR/DOB Redsox Agent

REFERENCE: SR/DOB/60-2011, 25 July 1960

1. As a result of referenced memorandum and in line with conversations held between the undersigned and various members of SR/DOB, the undersigned met with Mr. Gross, president of the Gillette Razor Blade Company in the Company's offices in Boston on 15 September 1960. It was explained to Mr. Gross that the Agency had a resettlement problem and that they wished to invite the cooperation of the Company in the resettlement in Mexico City of an asset for whom we wished to find employment.

2. Mr. Gross, after posing several questions, agreed in principle that the company would be willing to supply such agent with employment in their Mexico City factory. However, he wished to discuss it with the General Counsel and also to look into the laws of Mexico dealing with the period of employment and what provisions there were for disassociating themselves with such man should he prove completely unsatisfactory. It was then explained to Mr. Gross that the Agency would like to be able to supply the agent with a reasonable facimile of a Gillette letterhead together with a message which would offer him employment upon his arrival in Mexico City. Again Mr. Gross approved of it in principle, but requested that a copy of the letter be shown him prior to its dispatch.

3. Upon return to headquarters, the undersigned talked with Mr. Fred Kirkpatrick of SR/DOB and explained to him what was needed to satisfy the requests of Mr. Gross. Mr. Kirkpatrick explained that within the last 48 hours a different division had evidenced interest in the agent and were picking him up for their use so that there would be no further need of the offer of employment from Gillette.

4. The undersigned will see Mr. Gross on 21 September 1960 to explain the situation and thank him for his offer of cooperation.

FRANCIS L. COOLIDGE

201-233477

FLC/mg
cc: Chief, SR/DOB

ET

SECRET

20 September 1960

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

At 1130 hrs., 19 September 1960, Mr. Lester Houck and Mr. Edward Welles, both of Africa Division, were accompanied to SR/DOB covert site to discuss full transfer of the remaining AESENTINEL agent, AEASPIC, to Africa Division.

Present for SR/DOB were Mike Rae, C/SR/DOB; Perry Crookham, Dep. C/SR/DOB (AESENTINEL Project Case Officer); and Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB Case Officer.

Mr. Houck and Mr. Welles expressed an avid interest in picking up AEASPIC on contract for operational assignment in Africa Division. This office agreed to expedite insofar as possible the handing over of AEASPIC and, at the request of Africa Division, to assist in certain pre-training.

SR/DOB has agreed to arrange for AEASPIC certain clandestine training and processing (demolition, small arms, medical/immunization) in consonance with Subject's projected assignment.

This action will obviate any Mexican resettlement procedures for AEASPIC.

Fred Kirkpatrick

SECRET

201-235477

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

Administrative Officer
Operations Division, Medical Staff
2714 I Building, Ext. 3597

Appointment made under the name of: David Durvard (A)

Examining Physician: Dr. Robert G. Bullock
2221 North Buchanan Street
Arlington, Va.

Day and Date: Wednesday, 28 Sep

Hour: 10 A. M.

X 1. Subject submits a completed Form 89 (in Alias) to examining physician at the time of appointment. Signature is required on Form 89.

X 2. For both Subject and/or Dependents:
With the exception of Item numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 25, 26, and 35, all Items on Form 89 are to be completed. When applicable, details of previous illnesses or surgical procedures are to be supplied.

3. When physical examinations for Dependents are required, completed Forms 89 on each Dependent (in ______) are submitted to examining physician at the time of appointment. Signatures are required. Parents may sign for children.

4. When physical examination for Dependents are not required, completed Forms 89 on each Dependent are submitted to AO/OD/MS. Signatures are required.

5. Immunizations must be current to meet Agency Medical Standards. Previous immunization records on both Subject and/or his Dependents are submitted to AO/OD/MS. Only authenticated records are acceptable. This office will determine immunization requirements for the area of assignment.

X 6. AO/OD/MS provides examining physician with immunization requirements for Subject and/or his dependents. When immunizations have been completed, the examining physician will give new immunization cards to Subject. (Cards with Covert doctor's signatures do not provide traveler with an authenticated record. These should never leave the United States.) The new immunization cards are returned to AO/OD/MS. This office will arrange for properly documented immunization cards.

X 7. Following a covert physical examination, Subject and/or his Dependents' medical records will be kept in Medical File Room (Central Bldg.) under his ~~Pseudo~~ Crypto. A copy of Subject and/or his Dependents' immunization records will be kept in AO/OD/MS, under Pseudo. All reference to Subject or Dependents should be made by his ~~Pseudo~~. Crypto.

Lee Highway, turn right one block beyond Glebe Road. "Medical Center" sign. Parking area provided.

201-233477

20 September 1960

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

At 1430 hrs., 19 September 1960, Mr. Lester Houck and Mr. Edward Welles, both of Africa Division, were accompanied to SR/DOB covert site to discuss full transfer of the remaining AESENTINEL agent, AEASPIC, to Africa Division.

Present for SR/DOB were Mike Rae, C/SR/DOB; Perry Crookham, Dep. C/SR/DOB (AESENTINEL Project Case Officer); and Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB Case Officer.

Mr. Houck and Mr. Welles expressed an avid interest in picking up AEASPIC on contract for operational assignment in Africa Division. This office agreed to expedite insofar as possible the handing over of AEASPIC and, at the request of Africa Division, to assist in certain pre-training.

SR/DOB has agreed to arrange for AEASPIC certain clandestine training and processing (demolition, small arms, medical/immunization) in consonance with Subject's projected assignment.

This action will obviate any Mexican resettlement procedures for AEASPIC.

Fred Kirkpatrick

201-233477

30 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mexican Resettlement Arrangements for AESENTINEL Agent AEASPIC

1. At 1330 hours, 26 August SR/DOB case officer Fred Kirkpatrick met with Clay Calendar and Jim Meyers of TSD/IB and Frank Coolidge of Office of Security Contacts. At this time a name, for AEASPIC was agreed on and then passed on to Mr. Coolidge so that he in turn could ascertain the job possibilities for AEASPIC's possible Mexican Resettlement. The name agreed on for AEASPIC was Dimitrius I. Difonas, a Greek name to fit his Greek passport. TSD/IB is ready to draft and arrange all necessary Greek documentation for AEASPIC as soon as a job offer through Mr. Coolidge's Office can be firmed up, which should come about in early September. SR/DOB is to furnish TSD/IB passport type photos with negatives. This has already been arranged for with Hal McCormick of this office.

2. SR/DOB case officer, Fred Kirkpatrick with Clay Calendar of TSD/IB is presently engaged in writing a cover story/biography to fit the new identity of AEASPIC. AEASPIC is as yet unaware of any resettlement arrangements. It is hoped AEASPIC can be utilized by some component of the DD/P, however if not, then these resettlement will go through as per plan.

FRED KIRKPATRICK

201-233477

SECRET

26 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Personnel for Contingency Force

1. There is presently in the Washington area an individual who appears to be suitable for the JMARC Contingency Force. The undersigned was, at one time, Case Officer of subject and believes that he is readily adaptable to the program. Subject is a Contract Agent of SR/DOB who was trained for a specific black mission into Russia during 1959. His nationality is Russian, however, he is now stateless and prior to being recruited had been living in France. Subject's background appears to qualify him as he has served in the Red Army, the French Foreign Legion and in addition has received various training including para-military, while under Agency sponsorship. Subject is unwitting and has good non-U. S. attributility.

2. SR would like to see Subject utilised in some capacity as he represents a large investment in time, training and money. SR now has nothing for subject as his intended mission was scrapped prior to dispatch because of the then forthcoming visit of KRUCHEV to the U. S. Also, subject's resident permit will expire in October at which time, unless he is continued on contract status, he will be re-settled in South America.

3. Attached you will find Bl and Case Officer evaluation of subject.

G Mothes

Gordon Mothes
WH/4/PM

Attachment

201-233477

SECRET

24 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Biographic Information/Case Officer Evaluation of
David TZITZICHVILI, alias David DURVARD

Biographic Information

David TZITZICHVILI was born 19 July 1918 in Tbilisi, Georgia, where he lived with his parents until 1921. Subject at that time moved to France with his parents. Subject grew up in France and therefore speaks native French (Parisian). Subject does not have French citizenship, however, and must be classed as stateless. Subject earned the first part of his baccalureat at Breguet (electro-engineering), then entered the Foreign Legion at the beginning of World War II. Subject fought in N. Africa until French capitulation in 1940, at which time he was discharged to return home to Paris. In 1943 he went to Germany as a voluntary worker. He worked there primarily as an industrial electrician. While in Germany he assisted French officer P.O.W.'s to escape, aiding them with cleverly falsified papers, stamps, cachets and even uniforms. It is interesting to note that while Subject attended school at Breuguet, he also attended the Technicum for Cinematography. It was from these past studies at the Technicum that Subject was able to develop techniques to apply to photo-mechanical forging of documents, stamps, and cachets. Subject was betrayed to Germans, arrested, and sentenced to death for espionage. Subject was able to drag his case out by implying the existence of a large British run net of which he was a part. In 1945 he was liberated by the U. S. Army and returned to Paris. Subject lived there in relative quiet until he, together with a wartime friend, robbed a Paris bank of a sizeable amount of money. Subject and accomplice were apprehended by the Surete on 11 July 1950, sentenced to prison, but released some five years later for good behavior and on the basis of their war record. It is interesting to note that while in prison, Subject invented a machine for making cardboard boxes. This machine was actually built for one of the prison administrations and put into operation at the prison factory. Upon discharge from prison in December of 1955, Subject lived, worked and was paroled to his brother in Gap, France. It was while there that Subject was contacted by this agency and subsequently brought to this country for use as one of two agents for Project AESENTINEL.

Subject is presently residing in his Washington, D.C. apartment and is readily available for any interviews.

Subject is engaged in his safe office in several technical gimmicks which could be of value to this Agency. Two of his ideas have been passed forward to TSD for development/exploitation. TSD has expressed interest in another of his ideas, the plans for which have just been completed.

Alien Affairs Staff of Immigration/Naturalization has extended Subject's backstopped residence status until 20 October 1960.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ernest G. Mayerink

DATE: 20 May 1959

FROM : Special Contracting Officer

SUBJECT: Record of monthly salary paid subject employee

Date	Cash paid	Deposited to Escrow account	Balance Due	Initial
20 May 1959	$50.00	$450.00	$450.00	E. M.
20 June 1959	$50.00	$450.00	$900.00	E. M.
20 July 1959	$50.00	$450.00	$1,350.00	E. M.
20 Aug 1959	$50.00	$450.00	$1800.00	E. M.
20 Aug 1959	~~[illegible]~~	$1000.00	$2800.00	E. M.
MONTHLY	SALARY	DISPOSITION ACCORDING	TO CONTRACT	
21 Aug 1959		-50.00	2750.00	E. M.
27 Aug. 59		-100.00	2650.00	E. M.
2 Sept. 59		100.00	2550.00	E. M.
11 Sept. 59		-200.00	2350.00	E. M.
23 Sept. 59	+500.00		2850.00	E. M.
23 Sept. 59		-100	2750.00	E. M.
1 Oct. 59		-100	2650.00	E. M.
9 Oct. 59		-50	2600.00	E. M.
19 Oct 59		100.00	2500.00	E. M.
26 Oct 59		100.00	2400.00	E. M.
19 Oct 59	400.00		2800.00	E. M.
29 Oct 59		200.00 [illegible]	2600.00	E. M.

14-00000

DATE	WITHDRAWAL		BALANCE	INITIAL
1 Nov 59	$200.00		$2400.00	C. T.
3 Nov 59	1800.00		600.00	E. M.
13 Nov 59	$590.00	To Finance Officer: 4 Months Rental November - February	10. -	E. M.
			0 -	E. M.
24 Nov 59	$400.00	($400.00) Cut to Cash, Nov Salary	$410.00 ~~10~~ -	E. M.
7 Dec 59	$410.00	Cash	0	E. M.
21 Dec 59		($400.00) Cash Salary, Nov.-Dec.	400.00	E. M.
20 Jan 60		($400.00) Cash Salary, Dec.-Jan.	0	E. M.
20 Feb 60		(4.00 [illegible]) Cash Salary, Jan-Feb.	$[illegible]0.00	E. M.
1 Mar. 60		Remainder Cash Salary Jan-Feb	$75.00	E. M.
10 Mar. 60		Remainder Cash Salary Jan-Feb.	$75.00	E. M.
20 Mar 60		Cash Salary Feb-Mar	400.00	E. M.
20 April 60		Cash Salary Mar-April	400.00	E. M.
27 Apr 60		Cash drawn	75.00	
20 May 60		Cash Salary April-May	400.00	E. M.
20 June 60		Cash Salary May-June	400.00	E. M.
20 July 60		Cash Salary June-July	400.00	E. M.
20 Aug 60		Cash Salary July-Aug	400.00	E. M.

14-0000

Chief, SR Division
Mr. O.H. [illegible], Room 1062 J Building
Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

McINTYRE, Virginia
#216857

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 6 May 1960, requesting National Agency Checks on the above Subject.

2. Attached hereto is our report of investigation of 1 June 1960. Records at ACSI and NS were negative and FBI has no investigation conducted. You may also note that credit bureau reports reflect the last name for the Subject to be McINTYRE.

3. This memorandum is not to be considered as a clearance or an approval for Subject's use in any capacity. No dissemination of this information should be made outside of Headquarters without prior coordination with the Office of Security.

4. This matter is now considered closed unless an additional request is received from you.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Fred H. Hall

Attachment
Invest Rpt dtd 1 June 60

21-23477

FILE NO. 216567   1 June 1960

216567   1 June 60

SYNOPSIS

Credit At Washington, D. C. favorable. Police at Washington, D. C. negative. Subject's Social Security Number is 577-16-4297. No additional biographical information was obtained.

REPORT

201-233477

#218557

1 June 1960

CREDIT:
(In Washington, D. C.)

On 16 May 1960, the Subject's name was searched through the files of Stone's Mercantile Agency, Incorporated, 1119 H Street, Northwest, by Special Agent Albert J. M., and revealed a credit report dated 22 January 1960, which reflects the following:

Name: Mrs. Virginia O. Mc____

Age: About 45 - 50

Marital Status: Separated (no details)

Residence: 2500 K Street, Northwest (Potomac House Apartments)
since 1958

Former Residences: 3210 Wisconsin Avenue, Northwest
2500 K Street, Northwest

Previous Employments: From about 15 February 1955 to about 31 January 1957 employed by Gelman Construction Company, Investment Building, as a resident manager at $150.00 per month, plus apartment.

On 17 May 1960, the files of the Credit Bureau, Incorporated, 222 6th Street, Northeast, were searched in the name of the Subject and reflected the following information on one William E. ____ and spouse, as one Virginia Mc____:

The date of the most recent credit report was 10 June 1948, which reflected Subject's age as 37, her address as 901 16th Street, Northwest, with one year renting from a Mrs. [illegible]. Subject's spouse's employment was listed as Diamond Cab Company as a driver for two months, at about $40.00 per week. Subject's spouse was previously employed with the Austin Tobacco Company in South Carolina. Subject's employment was listed as being at Apartment House "1600" at 1600 16th Street, as a switchboard operator since April 1947 at $100.00 per month. Subject has three satisfactory accounts, with a high credit of $38.00, and was said to be originally from South Carolina.

This file contained no additional information in regard to the Subject.

#215867

POLICE: (CRIMINAL AND SUBVERSIVE RECORDS)
(At Washington, D. C.)

On 27 May 1960, the files of the Metropolitan Police Department, Central Repository, were searched in the name of the Subject with negative results.

GENERAL:
(At Washington, D. C.)

On 20 May 1960, attempts to develop biographical information on Subject proved negative at the District of Columbia Drivers License and Violation Bureau, and the Columbia Glass and Mirror Company, 3232 M Street, Northwest, a former place of employment of the Subject.

On 20 May 1960, information obtained at the Galmon Company, Investment Building, 15th and K Street, Northwest, reflected that Subject worked for the company during 1956 and 1957, and left to work for F. B. Shaperio Real Estate Agency. Her social security number, 577-16-4297, was learned through this source.

[illegible]/ary

SECRET

SR/DOB/60 1996

5 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OS/Alien Affairs Staff

ATTENTION: Mr. Pennington

SUBJECT: Change of Living Quarters, Case of AEASPIC, CI/OA No. C-73532

1. Background:

Subject was brought to the United States via HBRAINBOW flight on 20 April 1959 for training preparatory to dispatch on a black mission into the USSR as a member of a REDSOX team. CI/OA Division approved (No. C-73532) on 11 March 1959. This mission has been postponed as of 17 June 1960.

2. In view of the effort and expense devoted to the recruitment and training of AEASPIC, SR Division has deemed it worthwhile to give Subject certain limited additional training prior to operational utilization by another component of the DD/P. To facilitate this end it is requested that subject, towards the end of July, 1960, be permitted to be moved to an SR/DOB safehouse on the outskirts of Washington, D. C. Subject will remain there until final disposition of his case. Although Subject has conducted himself in an exemplary manner re his personal habits and sense of security, final disposition of Subject can be better accomplished in a more controlled installation.

3. It is anticipated that final resolvement of the case of AEASPIC, i.e. operational utilization by another component of the DD/P or resettlement, will be accomplished by 20 October 1960, the date approved by OS/Alien Affairs Staff whereby AEASPIC can legally remain backstopped in the United States.

4. It is further requested that AEASPIC be permitted to continue to spend occasional week-end free time unescorted within the limits of the greater Washington, D. C. area.

5. Subject will continue to be advised and guided by an SR/DOB Case Officer re Subject's personal life and habits.

201-233477

6. Subject will be authorized no access to transportation other than public and/or occassional rides afforded him by his Case Officer in an SR/DOB vehicle.

7. Subject's safe office will be terminated and vacated at the same time as his apartment.

8. For any further information please contact Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB on extension 3331.

PERRY E. CROOKHAM
Acting Chief, SR/DOB

SECRET

SR/DOB/60- 1990

29 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Communications

ATTENTION : Chief OC/TTT

SUBJECT : W/T Training for SR/DOB contract agent AEASPIC

1. It is requested that W/T aptitude assessment and subsequent W/T training be instituted at your earliest convenience for SR/DOB contract agent AEASPIC. This training is deemed necessary in order to round out Subject's clandestine training for operational utilization by interested DD/P components.

2. Subject to your concurrence, it is anticipated that W/T training will be given Subject at a safe office located in the downtown D.C. area, and then continued at an SR/DOB safehouse beginning 1 August 1960. Training is to be maintained until Subject is a qualified operational W/T communicator.

3. Transportation for the communications instructor to and from the training sites will be provided by SR/DOB.

4. For any further information, please contact Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB, Extension 8331.

PERRY E. CROOKHAM
Acting Chief, SR/DOB

PC/gc

Distrib.: O & 1 - addressee
✓2 - SR/DOB
1 - SR/DOB chrono

SECRET

201-233477

SECRET

23 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discontinuance of Project AESENTINEL for 1960

1. On 17 June 1960, SR/DOB was informed telephonically by Quent JOHNSON, COP/SR (Acting Chief SR/Div.) that Project AESENTINEL would not be carried out this year (1960).

2. The feasibility/practicability of carrying out this project at a later date would of course depend on the line of United States policy vis-a-vis countering the Soviet threat.

3. After due consideration, SR/DOB has taken steps to terminate one of the two AESENTINEL agents, [illegible]/3. As regards the other agent, [illegible], it is felt that he could be of definite service to this Agency in some similar capacity. This office is presently engaged in finding a job for [illegible].

FRED KIRKPATRICK

SECRET

201-233477

7 May 1960
30 Rue Cabanis
Paris XIV

Hurrah! At last, at last everything happens... even a letter from Fat! How we have waited for this one because it's the only one we have received. We heard here and there... Ajibo has a letter. Fat is in South America ... Fat wrote Atchiko... and then, nothing for us! We thought this was dirty, you know Fat. In spite of everything, we did not think for one moment that you could have forgotten us! How is that for confidence! Well, you're alive but so far away... This morning we all enjoyed your short letter...but it should be a very long one to make us pardon you for one year's silence. Do you understand? One whole year without knowing anything; imagining the worst and with each ——— our thoughts came to naught in search of Fat, the lifelong friend! You certainly have some nerve to speak of Mimi who grumbles. All that has changed now. I no longer grumble; I keep still. It's Colette who gripes and criticizes endlessly, and makes you three times more irritable. It goes without saying that she has excuses - but so have we. For years she has not had any vacation and is crushed by worries, is unemployed, and doesn't have a cent. Not only is it not funny, it's also disgusting. We hoped until the last minute for your presence at Nina's wedding, which was strictly Russian... the facade at least, but also the reverse side! 230 people, an excellent buffet, champagne, (cruchon?) etc.... Georgian dances and an atmosphere so wonderful that the solemn 2nd lieut. Monestier lost his feet and danced (dragged on by Stanko) the Georgian Dance! There are pictures to prove it which are in the hands of Nina and Bernard. These two are living the perfect love, with a capital A. Bernard is charming in every way. The Monestiers have given generously but we should do the same. Victor who had promised 90,000 gave 50,000. Aunick must have loaned her father 80,000 on Esti's pay and Bernard loaned 50,000 to your father-in-law. With Nina gone we have lived on Aunick's salary with debts more debts. (vaste?) having stated that didn't have a cent until Esti, angry after 18 months without leave sent, for his wife. Aunick departed for Algeria by plane asking her father to pay back the money loaned without leaving us anything to live on. Vic didn't have any money, but the day after Aunick left, he went on vacation to the Balearic Islands with Laridge and a certain Barbara! Nelly, no possibility of vacation or anything. We don't even speak about it. I had to borrow from everywhere to live until Aunick returned. 1½ months afterwards without lodging and not able to find (illegible) They came to live here in one room, and they both working, but Esti has to take time off very often for examination, plans, etc... therefore Aunick gives us 20,000 per month. Colette made a few dresses. Nelly took her beauticians course and soon got her diploma. She looked for a job which she could not find. She was too young (she's 18 years old.) This is just to show you our joy of living. and the change in character of Colette who (illegible) for nothing and makes life expensive for us. On top of everything I had an operation last year. Since January, Victor has spent two weeks in the hospital and he's going for five months to the mountains. Leaving us to pay the rent. the gas, the electricity, the water, and if that isn't enough, the taxes. (which he forgot). This is our debt-ridden life. Whole days without heat, without light even without bread; and when will this end? If Colette only found work, and Nelly too, but nothing — nothing. I'm looking for those religious houses where we can ask for mittance, but great catastrophes like Fréjus and Agadir take up all the possibilities. This gives you an idea of my weakness, and I'm 60 years old. I can no longer work as I used to and, as for my friends, except for (illigible) who payed for Nelly's studies Bribri who is faithful but no longer has much money... that's all. The worst thing is the lack of heat. This gives you a few details on the joyous life that all give of us are leading here. As for Nina, she's out of all this.

201-233477

She has an easy life and rather fashionable life. Her husband is at her feet, it is wonderful for her. Aunick also has a wonderful husband, but with us there is financial trouble. (Illegible) on life Cabinis style! Hopy (illegible) like his father... he bites people whom he doesn't like. He's the darling of Colette Then there is the Cat Poussy who chases the mice which infest the kitchen. Now that you're up-to-date, describe your life to us quickly. How long have you been there, and why has it taken so long to write? Can you come easily? But November or December is quite distant. Don't you think that I'll leave for the other world without seeing you. They're talking about the engagement of Nelly with Ramez for October. This time there is no reason why you should miss it. You knowing now that we've found you again it's out of the question for us to leave you in peace.

You know if you can help us out don't holdback for these past two months have been the most terrible in our life. If in June you can give Colette the possibility of at least a two-week vacation. You will be doing a pious deed. It will do her good morally and physically. If you come back that will buck her up. She needs it badly.

She was 45 years old yesterday. Her sons-in-law Maguy and Loulou, both same, the faithful ones. With this I have bothered you enough, for this time but I wanted to put you in the swim again after a year.

???

I kiss you have all the months without any news. Don't start that over again.

The whole family is going to write you. Even lazy Colette but what wouldn't we do for you.

MIMI

7 Mars [illegible]

Paris XIV

Frick!.. enfin enfin tout arrive.. même une lettre de Dat! ce que nous l'avons attendue celle-là car c'est la seule que nous ayons reçue et d'attendre dure parce que là... Ifibo a eu une lettre Dat est en Amérique du Sud... Dat a écrit à Adiko... et puis rien pour nous! on l'a trouvait incroyable. Vous tous Dat! malgré tout on n'a pas perdu une seule minute que vous voudriez nous voir oubliés! ce que c'est que la confiance tout de même.. enfin vous êtes vivant mais si loin.. ce matin on a dégusté tous en chœur le petit bout de lettre.. mais il en faudra une autre longue pour nous faire oublier un silence d'une année.. vous vous rendez compte? une année sans rien savoir.. en supposant le pire et à chaque moment notre pensée allant dans le vide à la recherche de Dat l'ami de toujours! Vous avez un certain toupet de parler de Pierre qui grogne.. c'est changé maintenant il ne grogne plus, je me tais.. c'est Colette qui rouspète, critique sans cesse à tout mettre les nerfs 3 fois plus en pelote.. évidemment elle a des excuses.. mais nous aussi.. Depuis dix années elle n'a pas eu de vacances est écrasée par les [illegible], n'a pas de travail et pas une miette d'argent ce n'est certes pas drôle mais écrasant. On a espéré jusqu'à la dernière minute votre venue au mariage de Nina qui était formidablement réussi.. la famille au moins mais l'inverse! 230 personnes, buffet excellent champagne Cruchon etc danses [illegible] et une ambiance si formidable que le [illegible] Monetti a perdu pieds et a dansé (entraîné par Stanko) la danse [illegible].. il y a des photos à l'appui que détiennent Nina et Bernard. Une [illegible] en fut le parfait [illegible]

avec un grand A .. Bernard est charmant en tous
points .. Les Monestier ont largement payé mais nous on a
dû en faire autant .. Victor qui avait [illegible] 90.000
en a donné 60 .. Arnault a dû prêter à sa fille 80 000 frs
sur la [illegible] de [illegible] et Bernard a prêté 50.000 à son beau père.
[illegible] [illegible] .. nous avons bien vu [illegible] d'Arnault avec
dettes et [illegible] .. Victor a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] tous
quand [illegible] [illegible] après 18 mois [illegible] [illegible] a [illegible]
sa femme .. Arnault est parti en Algérie par avion
[illegible] à sa [illegible] l'argent [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 99 [illegible]
[illegible] .. [illegible] n'avait pas d'argent .. on le [illegible] [illegible]
départ d'Arnault .. il partait en vacances aux Baléares ~~avec~~ [illegible]
[illegible] et une certaine Barbara X .. Nelly [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] .. mais on n'en parle pas. J'ai [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] et [illegible] pour [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
d'Arnault .. mais [illegible] .. sans logement et [illegible] [illegible]
cherchent une [illegible] d'[illegible] .. ils se sont installés ici dans la
chambre et travaillent tous deux .. mais Colette doit [illegible]
très souvent pour ses examens [illegible] [illegible] .. alors Arnault
nous donne 2000 par mois .. Colette a fait quelques [illegible] Nelly
les études d'esthéticienne et aussitôt ses diplômes [illegible] [illegible]
à la recherche d'une situation qu'elle n'a pas trouvé .. on
la trouve trop jeune (elle a 18 ans) alors en [illegible] ..
Ceci uniquement pour t'indiquer .. notre joie de [illegible] ...
et le changement de caractère de Colette, qui [illegible], [illegible]
[illegible] pour un rien et nous rend souvent la vie dure ..
Tu vois combien j'ai dû être [illegible] l'année dernière ..
Depuis Janvier Victor a passé 2 mois à l'hôpital et il va
partir 6 mois à la montagne .. nous [illegible] à
payer [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] et par dessus le marché
les impôts (qu'il a eu .. !) . Voilà notre vie des [illegible]
partout .. des [illegible] sans [illegible], sans lumière [illegible] [illegible]
et quand cela finira-t-il ?.. si Colette trouvait [illegible]
et Nelly .. mais [illegible] .. [illegible] les [illegible] [illegible]
on demandait notre [illegible] .. mais les grandes [illegible] [illegible]
catastrophes comme [illegible] et [illegible] .

II

les possibilités .. alors fais-toi une idée du tableau et j'ai 80 ans je ne puis plus agir comme avant et les amis !! à part Jamblé qui a payé les études de Nelly .. Bébé qui est fidèle .. mais n'a plus beaucoup d'argent maintenant .. c'est tout. Le pire je crois c'est le manque de feu .. Ceci te donne quelques détails sur la pauvre vie que nous menons tous les cinq. Mimi est, elle, hors d'affaire vu famille assez mondaine mais à ses pieds c'est épatant pour elle .. Annick mais épatante aussi mais avec nos grands soucis financiers. — Popo sur la Vie Cabanis. Hoppy, lui, est propre pas comme son père .. il mord les gens qui ne lui plaisent pas .. c'est le chouchou de Colette .. puis il y a le chat Souffy qui chasse les souris qui infestent la cuisine. Maintenant que tu es au courant raconte vite vite ta vie .. depuis quand es-tu là bas ? pourquoi as-tu mis si longtemps à donner signe de Vie ? Peux-tu venir facilement ? mais Novembre ou Décembre c'est loin cela .. Ne t'avise pas de me laisser partir pour l'autre monde avant de te voir ! On parle des fiançailles de Nelly avec Bainaz pour Octobre .. Cette fois pas question que tu manques tu sais ! maintenant qu'on t'a retrouvé pas question de te laisser en paix !

Tu sais si tu peux nous dépanner ne te gêne pas car ces mois passés ont été les plus terribles de notre existence et ce n'est pas pour dire ! Si tu peux en juin donner la possibilité à Colette d'aller au moins 15 jours en vacances, tu serais une tendre fée, cela lui fera du bien au moral et au physique .. et si tu viens cela la remettra d'aplomb. elle en a un rude besoin !

Lili a eu 65 ans hier .. ses gendres, Snapy et Loulou sont tous venus – les fidèles

Sur ce je t'ai assez embêté pour une fois, mais j'ai voulu te remettre dans le vieux bain après 1 an !

Je t'embrasse pour tous les mois passés sans nouvelles .. ne recommence pas surtout.

Toute la famille va t'écrire même la paresseuse Colette .. mais que ne ferait on pas pour toi !.

Toute ma vieille affection

Meine

exp: [illegible] du Puits 30 rue Cabanis
Paris France

10,37

ERAL LECLE

Señor Eduardo Callo
Caixa postal 11.744 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo
Brasil

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION


S. PAULO · BRASIL
2GT
11 MAR
1960



Recommandé

PARIS XIV
AV. GENERAL LECLERC (14e)
7 V [illegible] 13

REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
165
POSTES
PR 003

Señor Eduardo Callo
Caixa postal 11.746
São Paulo
Brazil
América do Sul

R
PARIS XIV
AV. LECLERC
No 471

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

de Pinto 30 rue [illegible] Saint France.

DR. LAPA
24-5-60
SP
BRASIL



30 rue Cassini
Paris XIV

Cher Dat (Eduardo)

Je me demande si le Brésil existe... si les Indiens l'ont repris .. si la poste est inventée là-bas? s'il existe des facteurs ... des timbres et des habitants?.. peut-être ils sont logés dans la lune? 7 lettres envoyées!. pas une réponse! Vous pouvez jurer que l'on ne vous écrit pas!!... Je risque une dernière fois avec recommandation sinon qu'espérer? Colette a écrit 2 fois.. Annick 2 fois, moi de part!. Nelly 2 fois Nina 1 fois!! avec des noms différents c'est tout de même extraordinaire.. car j'espère bien que vous êtes vivant! Inutile de vous parler de notre vie et situation ... c'est tout à fait impensable et inacceptable au grand bon— ! Sur ce je termine .. aurais-je le même sort de silence ?

On vous embrasse tous deux avec toute notre vieille affection

Mimi

Je voudrais moi être
[illegible] le cas où elle-
vous aidera .. Pour
vous annoncer la
mort d'un [illegible] ami
[illegible] qui .. Achille
était là et nous a dit
vous avoir écrit aussi
et n'avoir jamais eu
de réponse.
Le [illegible] qui est
mort aussi .. [illegible]
J'ai oublié de dire également
[illegible] .. [illegible]
[illegible] .. tous les [illegible]
[illegible] ..
Si cette lettre n'arrive
pas .. c'est à recommencer.
[illegible] vous amicalement
[illegible] [illegible]

30 rue Cabanis
Paris 14

Dear Dat (Eduardo)

I am asking me if Brasil is realy existing, if the planes have find him...if the mail is invented there... are they in the moon? We have send 7 letters. No answer. You may cry that are not wreiting to you...It is the last one. Colette had written twice, Annick twice, I have four time, Nelly twice, Nina once, with different name. That is extraordinary...because I hope you are still alive. It is no necessary to talk about our life...That is all.. I open again my letter to telling you your oncle Keresselidz is dead. Atchiko was here and said he had written also and had never received an answer.

Mme Kwinitadze is dead and also Mr Galoblichvili, one of this day that will be my turn...will I see you again before.?

If that letter didnot arrive, I give up.

We are kissing you all of us.

Grandma.

201-233477

Paris, March 7, 1960

Very dear Eduardo,

We were beginning to wonder if you were still on this planet or if you had ~~integrated~~ emigrated to the moon!

Since the note that you sent me a few days after your departure, we haven't had any news from you. I never received your first letter and I was even very angry for ~~Lulu~~ Loulou had told me that Ach had received news of you and that you were in South America. As for Nathela I really don't know if she received your letter but I am going to write her a note. As for the others I don't know their address. Be so kind as to give it to me so that I can carry out your orders!!! Time passes with incredible swiftness and unfortunately life is so monotonous! Apart from Nina's marriage, which was a great success and during which we had a very good time, there's nothing very interesting. Nina and Bernard found an apartment very near the house at Bd. Auguste Blanqui almost at the corner of the rue de la Santé, the building which is behind the little gas station at the end of a long alley-way. Catch on! As for Titi and Aunick they are still at home but would like to find a place of their own.

You're exaggerating when you say Hopy the "pisser" which is completely wrong. You should instead say Hopy the "biter" for he bites ~~quickly~~ easily unfortunately! Yesterday evening the whole family was gathered including ~~Lulu~~ Loulou and Maguy to celebrate (word missing) three days alas! 45 summers! The atmosphere was very friendly, and just this morning, a letter from you bright and early. It's an extraordinary piece of luck that it's still in one piece as it was pouring out when I shouted a letter from you. You can be sure of getting news from the whole family and I thank you for loving us so sincerely! My august former husband has just

201-233477

caught double pneumonia again, he'll be laid up at least until September which has plunged us all into (free translation) our ears in debt -- a matter of money naturally! Therefore, I'd like to tell you that your letter makes me very happy. You should certainly be framed with the most beautiful frame that exists in this whole wide world for there ~~is~~ are surely no two like you has far as we are concerned naturally. May heaven take it into consideration toward the remission of all your sins, amen! Ouf!!!

I stopped this letter yesterday evening when Odile came to visit me to wish me a happy anniversary with a bouquet of flowers. She stayed for dinner as well as Maguy and all three of us went to the movies to see an old film which was very funny "You Can't Take it With You" in which James Stewart was still young.

What else is there to tell you, you know our life...nothing has changed. So, I impatiently await another letter from you telling us what you are doing with many details. It would be really nice if you could be here for the end of the year. In the meantime I kiss you affectionately.

Coco

201-233744

Paris le 7 Mars 1960

Très cher "Eduardo"

Nous commencions à nous demander si tu étais toujours sur cette planète ou bien si tu avais émigré dans la lune !

Depuis le petit mot que tu m'as envoyé quelques jours après ton départ nous n'avons aucune nouvelles de toi. Je n'ai jamais reçu ta dernière lettre et j'étais même assez inquiet car Loulou m'avait dit qu'Ach avait reçu de tes nouvelles et que tu étais en Amérique du Sud. Quant à Nathalie j'ignore totalement si elle a reçu ta lettre mais je vais lui écrire un petit mot. Pour les autres j'ignore leur adresse. Sois gentil de me la donner pour que je puisse exécuter tes ordres !!! Déjà 10 mois que tu es parti, le temps passe à une vitesse incroyable et pourtant la vie est d'un monotone !

201-233477

A part le mariage de Nina qui a été très réussi et où nous nous sommes beaucoup amusés rien de bien intéressant.
Nina et Bernard ont trouvé un appartement tout près de la maison Bd Auguste Blanqui presque au coin de la rue de la Santé l'immeuble qui est derrière le petit poste d'essence, au fond d'une grande cour. Tu vois! quant à Tito et Annick ils sont toujours à la maison mais voudraient bien trouver un gîte à eux.

Tu exagères de dire Hoppy le "pisseur" ce qui est tout à fait faux tu devrais plutôt dire Hoppy le "mordeur" car il mord facilement malheureusement.

Justement hier soir toute la famille était au grand complet plus Loulou et Maguy pour fêter ... trois fois hélas! mes 45 printemps! l'ambiance était très chaleureuse et juste ce matin à la première heure une lettre de toi c'est une chance extraordinaire qu'elle soit encore i/

entièrement car c'était une avalanche quand
j'ai reçu une lettre de toi
Tu peux être certain d'avoir des nouvelles
de toute la famille et je te remercie
de nous aimer si sincèrement !

Mon auguste ex-mari a repiqué une
double pneumonie il en a eu au moins
[illegible] [illegible] en Septembre ce qui nous
a plongé tous dans le caca
jusqu'au cou question fric
bien entendu ! aussi j'aime autant
te dire que ta lettre nous plonge
dans le délice - tu es certainement
à encadrer... avec le plus beau cadre
qui puisse exister dans ce vaste
monde car il n'y a sûrement pas
deux types comme toi .. à notre égard
bien entendu ... que le ciel t'en
tienne compte pour la rémission de
tous tes péchés . ainsi soit-il ! ouf!!

J'ai arrêté cette lettre hier soir au moment
de la visite d'Odile qui venait me
souhaiter mon anniversaire avec un

bouquet de fleurs. Elle est restée dîner ainsi que Maguy et nous avons été toutes les trois bien sagement au cinéma voir un vieux film très marrant "Vous ne l'emporterez pas avec vous" où l'on voit un James Stewart tout jeune.

Que te dire d'autre tu connais notre vie... rien n'a changé aussi j'attends avec impatience une autre lettre de toi nous racontant ce que tu fais avec force détails.

Ce serait drôlement chouette si tu pouvais être là pour la fin de l'année en attendant je t'embrasse bien affectueusement

Coco



Exp C. Homsenki 30 Rue Cabanis Paris XIV

PARIS 101
16H15
9-3
1960
R. DE LA GLACIERE (13e)

PARIS 101
-9 3 60
R. DE LA GLACIERE (13e)
10H

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
*105
POSTES
SP 020

Monsieur Eduardo Callo
Caixa postal 11744 (Lapa)
SAO PAULO

BRASIL

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

14-00000



7
MAR
1960

Paris, 24 March

Hi Kid,

I hope that unlike myself you received my letter. Since the mailing of the last letter a sensational event occurred in the family. A fourth daughter for Atch, Sophie, born on March 13th. As you asked me, I sent them your address and my congratulations.

Yesterday Loulou came by for a few minutes in the afternoon to give us some very bad news. His father's condition is very bad. We are afraid it is a tumor of the lung. Unfortunately, when one says tumor, one often means cancer! I hope to God that I am mistaken. Little (eligible) the cousin of Ramaz had a fine boy named Christophe; and that's the latest news!

The children should write you every day, but if you want to chew them out, here is Nina's address: Mme. Monestier, 159 Bd. Auguste Blanqui, Paris 13.

Nelly has been working since last Monday in a very stylish and terribly expensive little shop. The job of sales clerk seems to agree with her. It is a store for expensive lingerie at the corner of rue Miromesnil and St. Honore.

I am writing you all curled up in the corner of the kitchen for we are out of heat and today, after a few days of radiant sunshine it is raining in torrents!

What crimes must I have committed in a previous life to lead such an ugly life!

Write us quickly and tell us what you are doing. We know nothing, since your last letter never arrived! I am waiting impatiently for some news from you. In the meantime, I kiss you affectionately.

Coco

Paris le 24 Mars

Cher Vieux

J'espère que contrairement à moi-même, tu as bien reçu ma lettre. Depuis le départ de cette dernière il est arrivé un événement sensas dans ta famille une 2ème fille à Abel Sophie née le 17 Mars. Comme tu me l'avais demandé je leur ai envoyé ton adresse... et mes félicitations.

Hier Loulou a passé quelques instants dans l'après midi pour nous annoncer une bien triste nouvelle, ton père va très mal il doit avoir les résultats des radios aujourd'hui on a peur d'une tumeur au poumon et malheureusement qui dit tumeur, dit bien souvent cancer! Fasse le ciel que je me trompe!!!

La petite Manana, cousine de Ramaz. a eu un beau garçon dénommé "Christophe"

et voilà les dernières nouvelles !
Les enfants doivent t'écrire tous les jours mais si tu veux les eng.... voici l'adresse de Nia : Mme Monestier
159 Bd Auguste Blanqui
Paris XIII.

Nelly travaille depuis lundi dernier dans un petit magasin très chic et horriblement chère. Le métier de vendeuse a l'air de lui convenir. C'est un magasin de lingerie de luxe au coin de la rue Miromesnil et St Honoré.

Je t'écris recroquevillée dans un coin de la cuisine car nous sommes sans feu et aujourd'hui, après quelques jours d'un soleil radieux, il tombe un vrai déluge !

Quels crimes ai-je bien pu commettre dans une vie antérieure pour mener une vie aussi moche !

Écris nous vite et raconte nous ce que tu fais, nous ne savons rien puisque ta première lettre n'est jamais arrivée !

J'attends de tes nouvelles avec impatience et en attendant je t'embrasse affectueusement

C. Homcinki 30 Rue Cabanis Paris XIV

PARIS XIV - AV. GENERAL LECLERC
25 III 60 17

* 105
POSTES

⑥

Monsieur Eduardo Callo
Caixa postal 1174 (Lapa)
SAO PAULO
BRAZIL

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

Paris, March 25, 1960

Dear "Eduardo,"

Everybody was very happy to hear from you again. You know that Mimi and Mama have already written you as well as, undoubtedly, Nina and Nelly. Therefore, I'm the very last to write you but that doesn't mean that I don't think of you.

It's almost a year ~~since~~ you left. Time passes rather quickly in spite of everything. Everybody must have already told you the most important news. So much the worse if I talk nonsense.

Last August 15 I went to meet Titi in Algeria. We returned together early in October. A whole year passed without our seeing each other, but with letters every day, and we found each other as if we had parted the day before, or almost. It was funny to see Titi exercising his functions as a second lieutenant with a section under his orders. What a pleasure to find myself with him there. Now when Bebert and company speak of military service I can join them. The life of an offieer's wife is not so bad. One is spoiled! The first month we were at the sea shore. Since I love the heat this was just the thing for me! Titi left every morning at 5 o'clock to join his section 25 km from the place where I was staying and returned only at 4 o'clock in the afternoon; — the weeks passed quickly except for the beach — and still we could not go very far because of the guerrillas! In short, apart from going out to lunch, I stayed, so to speak, shuttered up in my room waiting for the return of my lord and master. I tried to go swimming alone, but the city and the beach were full of soldiers and I gave up quickly. You cannot imagine, I think, what it's like to eat alone as a woman in a restaurant dining room full of soldiers. I did not dare to raise my eyes from my plate and, to feel looked at while eating, makes you become clumsy. Hardly

201-233477

any women except some middle-aged ones who gave me side ways glances. There was plenty of youth but then too they looked at me like a China doll. That's enough for my "military service".

Titi went back to the school of fine arts, he's coming along fine. Unless someone offers him a wonderful position he will continue at the school. It will be very long! He also works for an architectural firm. Finally you know the procedure having almost been in it yourself, we are looking for an apartment. We would like to have a home of our own. Certain people don't understand why we want to leave la rue Cabanis since there's enough room there. First of all there isn't that much! We have to queue up for the bath room; if Titi wants to walk around in his shorts he can't do it (it's not that he is accustomed to doing this sort of thing) and the people can hear everything that's going on in the room. And then again it's very understandable that we want to have a place of our own which we will furnish as we like and where we will live as we like. To spend a full day in bed or to eat at one o'clock in the morning, etc.--and then, too, there is also a little friction between Mama and me. I'd like to shake her up. If you can do it by letter don't hesitate. She's getting bitter how can she do otherwise. She does nothing or next to nothing and she's letting herself go. She could be so cute if she did what's necessary to get thin, and despite her 45 summers she's still well-built. What she needs is a man to take care of her, to take her out and pull her out of her comatose or almost comatose state. I shake her up often but as for me I am abrupt and sometimes I say what should not be said. I'd like to find her a part-time job, something pleasant which would cause her to get out, take a walk, see people, etc. Evidently the house is less gay than previously and, nevertheless, we are still here. What will it be like when only Nelly will remain who is hardly ever here because she goes out with Ramas. And then there's another thing; people criticize Mama because they see her with nothing to do -- I allow myself to criticize, but I refuse to hear others do it.

The B~~i~~ebert Monestier's ~~Monastaire~~ are almost next door to us, exactly in the building across the street from the metro Glaciere. They found an apartment; but, hold on to yourself 1,600,000 francs deposit. It's crazy. It's their grandfather ~~great friend~~ who loaned them the money which they are paying back at the rate of 10,000 francs per month. They have received many gifts and are completely furnished. We see them frequently. Nelly went to a beaut~~icien~~y school which lasted three months. She liked it very much, but after getting ~~going~~ out, she didn't find a job. Through one of my friends I found her a job as a beginning sales clerk while waiting, but perhaps at the end she'll like being a sales clerk better. She's been working since Monday. Nina is still in the same job. She's waiting impatiently for Bernard to make enough money so she won't have to work.

Mimi is still the same fortunately. As for me, I've changed professions. I am a model. Don't laugh. Evidently I am beginning in this career, but I hope it will work out. One can earn a lot of money and it's a tiring business but pleasant and feminine and a lot more interesting than a ~~the~~ job as secretary where you rest your behind on a chair all day. I began at the beginning of November and I worked until the month of March. I've been unemployed since then, but I'm doing a lot of looking around to find something. The mannequin "cabines" are formed only toward the end of May. I must make some photo tryouts next week. Photography brings in much more. If only it works out I'd like it very much.

What more can I write you! We see Louis and N~~e~~athela quite often. N~~e~~athela has changed jobs and is now earning 150,000 francs a month. Not bad! Hurry up and write us and tell us about the things you're seeing. Do you like Brazil?

My dear Eduado I am going to leave you. Write quickly if you can. I give you a big kiss and hope to do it for good one of these days.

Amick

201 233477

Paris le 25 Mars 1960

Mon vieux "Eduardo"

Tout le monde a été bien content de recevoir de tes nouvelles. Je sais que Mémé et Maman t'ont déjà écrit ainsi sans doute que Nina et Nelly. Je suis donc le dernier à t'écrire mais cela ne veut pas dire que je ne pense pas à toi.

Presque un an déjà que tu es parti. Le temps passe malgré tout assez vite. Tout le monde a dû déjà te raconter le principal. Toujours si je radote.

Le 15 Août dernier je suis parti rejoindre T.T. en Algérie, nous sommes rentrés ensemble les premiers jours d'octobre. Un an entier sans nous voir mais avec des lettres chaque jour, et nous nous sommes retrouvés comme si nous nous étions quittés la veille ou presque. Cela faisait drôle de voir Titi dans l'exercice de ses fonctions de sous-lieutenant avec une section sous ses

41-233477

adieu. quel plaisir de me retrouver avec lui là-bas. Maintenant, lorsque ces messieurs Bobert et Cie parlent service militaire je peux me joindre à eux. La vie de femme d'officier n'est pas si désagréable. On est chouchoutée! Le premier mois nous étions au bord de la mer. Moi qui aime la chaleur j'étais servie! J.J. partait tous les matins à 5h rejoindre sa section à 25 Km de l'endroit où j'étais et ne rentrait qu'à 4h de l'après midi. Les ressources sont vite épuisées à part la plage et encore on ne pouvait guère s'éloigner, à cause fellagha. En résumé, à part sortir au déjeuner je restais pour ainsi dire cloîtrée dans ma chambre attendant le retour de mon Seigneur et Maître. J'ai bien essayé d'aller me baigner seule mais la ville la plage était inondée de soldats j'ai vite renoncé.

2

tu ne peux, je crois, t'imaginer ce que c'est que de manger, seule femme, dans une salle de restaurant, au milieu de militaires. Je n'osais lever les yeux de mon assiette et se sentir regardée pendant que l'on mange te fait devenir maladroite. Presque pas de femmes à part des bonnes femmes d'un certain âge qui me regardaient de travers. Il y avait bien de la jeunesse mais là aussi on me regardait en chien de faïence. Assez parlé de "mon service militaire"

T.t. s'est remis à l'Ecole des Beaux Arts. Cela marche. A moins qu'on lui propose une situation mirobolante, il continue l'Ecole. Ce sera long ! Il travaille également chez des Architectes. Enfin tu connais le [illegible] ayant été aussi presque déclassé. Nous recherchons

3/

un appartement. Nous aimerions être chez nous. Certaines personnes ne comprennent pas que nous voulions quitter la rue Cabanis puisqu'il y a de la place. D'abord, il n'y en a pas tant que cela! il faut faire la queue pour la salle de bains, si T.T. a envie de se balader en petite tenue il ne le peut pas (ce n'est pas qu'il soit coutumier du fait) et puis l'on entend tout ce qui se passe dans les chambres. Et puis enfin, c'est bien compréhensible que nous ayons envie d'un endroit à nous, que nous arrangerons selon notre goût et où nous vivrons selon notre goût: Passer une journée entière au lit ou dîner à 1h du matin etc...

Et puis il y a quelques frictions entre Maman et moi. J'ai envie de la recevoir, si tu peux le faire par lettre ne te gêne pas. Elle s'aigrit. le moyen de faire autrement elle ne fait rien ou presque, et se laisse aller. Elle serait si chouette si elle faisait ce qu'il faut pour maigrir car malgré ses 45 printemps, elle est encore très bien. Ce qui lui faudrait c'est un homme qui s'occupe d'elle, la sorte et la tire de son état comateux ou presque. Je la secoue souvent mais moi je suis brusque et je dis parfois ce qu'il ne faut pas dire. Je voudrais lui trouver un travail à mi-temps, quelque chose d'agréable qui l'oblige à sortir à se pomponner, à voir des gens etc... La maison est évidemment moins gaie qu'avant et nous sommes pourtant encore là ! que sera-ce lorsqu'il n'y aura plus que Nelly qui n'est presque jamais là, sortant avec Ramaz. Et puis il y a aussi une chose, les gens critiquent Maman, à la voir rester sans rien faire - Je me permets moi de critiquer, mais je refuse d'entendre les autres le faire.

Les Bibert Monastier sont presque à côté de nous, exactement dans l'immeuble en face du métro Glacière. Ils ont trouvé un appartement mais avec, tiens-toi bien, 1 million six cent mille francs de reprise. C'est fou. C'est le grand-père qui a prêté l'argent qu'ils remboursent à raison de 10.000 francs par mois. Ils ont reçu beaucoup de cadeaux et sont meublés et montés en vaisselle. Nous les voyons souvent. Nelly a fait une école d'esthéticienne qui a dans 3 mois. Cela lui plaisait beaucoup. Mais en sortant, elle n'a trouvé aucune place. Par une de mes amies, je lui ai trouvé une place de vendeuse débutante en attendant. Mais peut-être finalement, être vendeuse, lui plaira mieux. Elle travaille depuis lundi. Nina est toujours dans la même boîte. Elle attend avec impatience que Bernard gagne assez pour ne plus travailler.

Mémé est toujours la même, heureusement!

quant à moi, j'ai changé de métier. Je suis mannequin, ne rigole pas. Je débute évidemment dans la carrière mais j'espère que cela marchera, on peut gagner beaucoup d'argent et c'est un métier fatigant mais agréable et féminin. Et bien plus

maintenant que le métier de secrétaire
où l'on reste le derrière sur une
chaise toute une journée.
J'ai commencé au début du mois
de Novembre et j'ai travaillé jusqu'au
début du mois de Mars. Je suis
en chomage depuis, mais je fais
des tas de démarches pour retrouver
quelque chose. Les cabines de mannequins
ne se forment que fin Mai. Je
dois faire des essais de photos la
semaine prochaine. La photo rapporte
encore plus. Pourvu que cela marche.
Cela me plait beaucoup!

Que te raconter encore! Nous voyons
assez souvent Louis et Nathela.
Nathela a changé de boite et
gagne maintenant 150.000 - par mois.
ce n'est pas mal!

8-

Dépêche-toi d'écrire et de nous raconter ce que tu vois! Le Brésil te plaît-il ?

Mon vieux "Eduardo" je vais te laisser, écris vite si tu le peux.

Je t'embrasse très très fort et souhaite de faire loin de bon un de ces jours.

Annick.

PARIS XIV - 114
AV. DU GENERAL LECLERC
25 III 60 15H

FRANÇAISE
★ 215
POSTES
FR 306

⑨

Monsieur Eduardo CALLO
Caixa postal 11744 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo
BRASIL

PAR AVION
AIR MAIL


MARQUE DÉPOSÉE
ELITE
GOMMAGE
TROPICAL
MADE IN FRANCE
OPALO

PARIS 25 March 1960

My old " Eduardo"

Everybody was very happy for receving news from you. I know that Grand-ma and Mother have already written and also Nina and Nelly.~~HHH~~ Therefore I am the last one,but that don't mean I am not thinking to you.

It is Nearly one year you are gone but nevertheless the time pass very fast. Everyone must have already told you the principal, does no matter if I wander.

Past 15 august,I join TITI(husband) in Algeria,and went back together in the early days from October.One ~~fai~~whole year without seen each other but one letter every single day and we met again like we never were separat or almost.That funny to see TITI in him s/lieutenant fonctions,comanding a section. Such plaisur to see him again.Now when those gentlemen are speaking military duty I may join them.

Officer's wife life is not so desagreable after all.We are pampered.The first month we were on the beach.I like warm wather and had more as I was asking for. TITI was living at 5am every morning to joining him section 25 km (16 miles) from where I was and return only at 4 p.m.The resources were fast drained off.The beach,and even we could not go very far because the fellaghas! In short ,going to eat for lunch that was all,Iwas almost inclosed in my room waiting the return of my Lord and Master. I have try,all right,to going swim alone,but the town,the beach was flooded with solders.I had given up very fast.

I don't think you can imagined a woman alone in a restaurant room eating surrounded with solders.The felling from every eyes watching you make the people clumsy.There were very few women which were looking to me not very friendly. Enough speaking from my "military duty".

TITI has been return at Ecole des Beaux-Arts. If no one will proposing him a very good job he will he is determin to follow the school.That will be long. Some time he is working for some architects.We are looking for an apartement,we will like to be in our own.Few peoples do not undersand why are wishing to live this place.Mother and me have sometime few words and we are not always agree.I wish to shake her a little,and if you could do that,with a letter do not be afraid.She will be so nice if she only would try to be thiner.I think she need a man who can take a care of her,remove her from that comatose spirit. I did shake her several time but I am to abrupt and I am saying what I must not .I would like to find a job for her,which will oblige her to go out side and see peoples.

The house is less merry today than before,but what will be when Nelly will take off.She already goes almost every days with Ramaz. And something else too,peoples are criticizing Mother because she is not doing anything.I may criticize but I forbid to the others to criticize my mother.

The Monestiers are living not far from here,exactly in the building who face the subway Glaciere.They have found an apartemer but with 1 million six hundred thousand francs for the key.Crazy is not? The grand father loan the money and they repay him with 10 000 frs a month.They have ~~xxxixx~~ receive many present for the mariage and they have furniture and everything they need. ~~WAXXXXXX~~ We see them very often.

Nelly follow an esthetiq's school but she has not found job yet in that line,so she work as salesmaid since monday.Nina is still working in the same company. She is waiting that Bernard earn more money to quit the job.

Meme is always in the same shape,fortunatly. I am mannequin now. Don't laugh at me.I hope this job will go very good.Fatiguing job but agreable and feminin.Certainly much more intersting ~~xxx thanxxxxxxixixa~~ than secretary.Have your behind one whole day is not very funny. I must make some photo test next week.It is ~~pxxx~~ possible to earn more money with that and I like it very much.

What can I say more.We have seen Nathela and Louis.Nathela now earn 150 000 frs a month.That is not so bad.

Rush us a letter and tell us what are you doing? How like you Brasil.

My old"Edouardo"I will live you now and write us if you can

I kiss you very very strongly and hope I will be able to kiss you for good some of this days.

ANNICK

41-233477

Very dear "Eduardo"

We wre starting to asking us if you were still on this planet or on the moon.

Since your little word sended right after your departur we were without news. I had never receive ~~myar~~ your first letter and was a little mad after you because Loulou told me that Athico had news from you and you were in South-America. I ignore completly if Nathela has receive your letter but I willwright to her. I ignore also where live the others people and I will be glade if you can give them adress. Already 10 month since you are gone. The time past with an incredible speed. Beside Nina's marige, which was ~~x~~ very well, nothing interesting.

Nina and Bernard have found an apartement very close from our house, Boulevard Auguste Blanqui, corner rue de la Sante, the building which is standing behind the gas-station. You see ?

TITI and Annick are still with us but wish to find some place to go.

Yesterday evening the whole family was together plus Loulou and Magy to celebret my 45 springs and just this morning a letter from you. It was lucky your letter was still in one piece when I screamed 'a letter from you'

You can be sure to receive news from the whole family and we thank you for your love for us.

My august husband had catched again a double-pneumonia and that will keep him until september, therefore that plonge us in dificulties to the neck....and you may imagine with which happyness I have read your letter. You are certainly the only one to be like that in our world. God bless you and ~~xa~~ must take account for the remission of your offences...Alleluia !

I have stop this letter yesterday evening. Odile and Magy were here, we had diner together and went to the movie. James Steward was starring.

What say next, you know our life, nothing is change. I am waiting impatiently another letter of you to tell us what are you doing. That will be so nice if you could be here for the end of the year .Until then I kiss you lovingly.

COCO

Paris 24 March

Dear Old

I hope you have receive my letter .Since then a sensational event happend .Born march 14 th, a 4th daugter for Atchico, name Sophie. As you ask me ,I have send to him your adress ...and my congratulations.

Yesterday Loulou stop by us few ~~minutes~~ moment to tell us that him father is going very bad and that can be lung cancer. We are hoping it is not.

Little Manana, Ramaz cousin, give birth to a beautifull baby ,boy, is name is Christophe. Those are the latest news.

This is Nina'S adress ;

Madame Monestier
159 Bd.Auguste Blanqui. Paris 13

Nelly is working as salesmaid since Monday in a linin-cloth shop very expensive one corner rue Miromesnil and St.Honore.

I am ~~xxxi~~ writing in the kitchen because the heating is off and today after few suny days it is cold and rainy.

What crime have I done to live such life.

Speed us a letter and tell us what are you doing. Your first letter had never arrived.

I am wating impatiently news from you and until then
I kiss you lovingly.

COCO

Three letters from the Grand-mother

General meaning; I am geting old,the life is difficult,what are you doing,Nina's mariage was a success.
Morality: Send money soon as possible.

Meme Grand-ma.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

235
DATE : 17 DEC 60

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE
ACTION : C/AF 3 (MR HOUCK AF DIV NOTIFIED 1515 17 DEC)
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 17 1856Z 60

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 18739

OPIM DIR CITE LEOP ~~0478~~

RYBAT WIROGUE

File QJWIN

Baron does not wor

REF A. DIR 16116 (Out 52272)
B. BERN 6595 (IN 15973)
C. BERN 6537 (IN 49492) *

1. WIROGUE EOD 2 DEC. HESTON MADE INITIAL CONTACT AND GUTHMAN NOW HANDLING. WIROGUE GIVEN FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. BUILD COVER DURING INITIAL PERIOD. THIS RESPECT, WIROGUE SAID PLANNED SET UP SHOP WITH AUTOMATIC CAMERA TO TAKE IDENTIFICATION PICTURES. SAID WOULD INSTALL POLAROID CAMERA SO CLIENT COULD PUSH BUTTON AND TAKE OWN PICTURE. GUTHMAN AGREED THIS WORTH EXPLORING, AS WOULD APPEAR PROVIDE INEXPENSIVE COVER.

B. WIROGUE TOLD TRY SPOT PERSONS FOR SURVEILLANCE TEAM, INTEL ASSETS (WITH EMPHASIS ON ORIENTALE PROVINCE) AND PM ASSETS. HE TOLD SUBMIT NAMES ANY LIKELY CANDIDATES TO STATION FOR TRACES PRIOR MAKING APPROACH.

2. QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QJWIN SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS. STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN

SECRET

REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER "EXECUTION SQUAD". WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED, WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS. UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORKING FOR PBPRIME SERVICE.

3. QJWIN INTRODUCED WIROGUE TO HOFHUIS. WIROGUE CASHED IN LETTER CREDIT WITH HOFHUIS TO GET GOOD EXCHANGE RATE. QJWIN REPORTS WIROGUE HAS PURCHASED THREE AUTOMOBILES SINCE ARRIVAL LEOP: CHRYSLER FOR 85000 FRANCS, CITROEN FOR 25000 FRANCS AND TRIUMPH FOR 110000 FRANCS. WIROGUE TOLD QJWIN HE SOLD CITROEN FOR 15000 FRANCS BUT IT STILL PARKED NEAR HIS HOTEL.

4. AT 13 DEC MEETING WIROGUE SAID HE PURCHASED CHRYSLER FOR 75000 FRANCS. MADE NO MENTION PURCHASE OTHER CARS. ALSO SAID HAD RENTED TWO STORES, ONE IN LEOP EUROPEAN CITY FOR 14000 FRANCS PER MONTH AND ONE IN NATIVE CITY FOR 6000 FRANCS PER MONTH. ALSO HAS SIGNED CONTRACT FOR APARTMENT FOR 8000 FRANCS PER MONTH. ASKED GUTHMAN FOR THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS RENTAL ALLOWANCE WHICH HE CLAIMS HQS CASE OFFICER TOLD HIM HE WOULD RECEIVE IN LUMP SUM. GUTHMAN REFUSED, SAYING WOULD HAVE OBTAIN HQS APPROVAL PAY RENTAL ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM.

5. IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM. THEN GUTHMAN TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS. GUTHMAN WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION KUBARK.

6. LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING AND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEADACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT

ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST SOLUTION. ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE PUT HIM IN STAN ONCE MENUCHIN RETURNS TO TRY OBTAIN IMMEDIATE INTEL THAT AREA.

7. REQUEST HQS INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR 1300Z, 19 DEC RE GIVING WIROGUE YEARS RENTAL ALLOWANCE. LATTER CLAIMS NEEDS THESE FUNDS VIEW CAR PURCHASE IN ORDER SET UP COVER MECHANISM. IF WIROGUE TO REMAIN, BELIEVE MUST GIVE HIM AT LEAST ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS, AS BELIEVE HE SHORT FUNDS. ALSO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS RE WIROGUE PAY. LATTER SAYS HIS CONTRACT CALLS FOR FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS SALARY PER MONTH. SAID HE NOT PAID FOR NOVEMBER. STATION GAVE HIM ONE PAYMENT FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS. HOWEVER WISH HQS CONFIRMATION THIS CORRECT AND AUTHORITY PAY HIM IN DOLLARS PER HIS REQUEST. (WANTS DOLLARS AS BLACK MARKET EXCHANGE RATE WHICH USED BY MOST PERSONS HERE TWENTY TO FORTY PERCENT BETTER THAN OFFICIAL RATE).

8. NOT ABLE PICK UP LETTER CREDIT PER REF A. WIROGUE SAID HAD GIVEN IT TO HOFHUI FOR RETURN TO BANK AFTER MARKING IT CANCELLED.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* WIROGUE 1 ETA LEOP 2 DEC. HAS LETTER OF CREDIT FOR 12,000 SWISS FRANCS.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

REQUEST NO:

REQUEST DATE:

FROM:
RID/Files
G C 52

EXTENSION

NO. RS

DATE 29 April 69

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. RID/ARD/RCU			WJ
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. RID/Files G C 52			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

BULKY

unprocessed field material

CALL RID FILES, EXT. 6867
FOR ATTACHMENTS. RECORDS
CENTER JOB NO. 69-492
BOX NO. 2

FILE IN 201-233477

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED
(OP-24)

14-00000

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

1P

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING
TO: Chief of Station, Germany		
INFO: PCB EE BCB	EGO, EGF, EGJ	
FROM: Chief of Base, Bonn		
SUBJECT: [illegible] CAYATA [illegible] Soviet Refugee Georg SANDERS		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: COS, BCB Traces

1. The following report, and a request for full traces, has been received from the BfV:

"Since 14 July 1962,

201

Georg SANDERS ex-USSR BfV Trace request
DPOB: 25 July 1919 in Tiflis, USSR
Present Address: Oberursel/Taunus, Hohemark [illegible]

has been in the protection of a US Service in Oberursel, after allegedly breaking away from a Soviet tourist group and fleeing from East to West Berlin. On August 28, 1962, SANDERS made application for recognition as a foreign i.e. non-German, refugee. The following day, in the presence of a member of the U.S. Service, Subject was examined by the Criminal Police. In the hearing, he made ambiguous statements concerning his flight.

Subj claims [illegible] in USSR resistance group. [illegible] tourist group and [illegible]

[illegible] SANDERS alleged that he was a leading member of a resistance group in the Soviet Union. He claims he avoided certain arrest through the assistance of friends who arranged for him to join a Soviet tourist group which left Tiflis on 10 July 1962 for a sightseeing tour in [illegible] arrived in East Berlin on 14 July 1962 and SANDERS allegedly [illegible] after his arrival. Subj applied 28 Aug. 62 for recognition as [illegible]

"SANDERS declined to offer more specific information concerning his flight to West Berlin. Allegedly, the manner in which his friends were able to arrange for his trip is also unknown to him.

"We would appreciate all information on SANDERS available to you, as well as copies of any interrogation reports which have been issued since his arrival at Oberursel.

2. There are no local traces. Copies of the BfV report are being sent to the ID USAREUR representative, CCA, since it would appear that [illegible] the 513th INTC.

Judith G. Frisall

Judith G. Fr[illegible]ell

Dist:
2 COS-G
2 PCB
1 EE
2 BCB

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED 16 Jan 63	DATE DISPATCHED
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGNA-25063	
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER [illegible] 5 12/7 201: X SANDERS	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

CS COPY

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

HQ COPY

DISPATCH

66-266/26 Box 5 Folder 9-23

5.8.79

GESP

S E C R E T

CO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

ZIZISCHWILLI, /FUERST/
201-0233477
SEX M DOB 02 MAY 19
POB USSR, TIFLIS

201-0233477
MUNI-05728
06 APR 66

< W GERMANY, KOELN.
AKA SANDERS, GEORG FRANK
BND SECURITY TRACE REQUEST
SUBJ IN CONTACT W/BND STAFFER

WAS ZIZISCHWILLI, FUERST
DATE 12 JUN 75 CORR CARD

04823438

WIROGUE/1

201-0233477

S/C 29/7

S E C R E T

E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO 201-233477
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MUNICH

ACTION
EE 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2, RI/AN

EUR 6/CE

~~INDEXED [illegible]~~
MATCHED

S E C R E T 061243Z
EGN L-GO
BONN INFO DIR CITE MUNI 5728

6 APR 66 IN 91195

11 (45)

CATIDE UJVAULT

1. CATIDE REQUESTS SECURITY TRACES ON FUERST ZIZISCHWILLI, AKA GEORG FRANK F SANDERS, BORN 2 MAY 19 IN TIFLIS, USSR, RESIDING KOELN, WHO IN CONTACT WITH CATIDE STAFFER. FROM STATEMENTS MADE BY SUBJ CATIDE BELIEVES HE KUBARK EMPLOYED. PLS ADVISE.

201-233477

2. NO MUNI TRACES SUBJ.

3. INDEX ZIZISCHWILLI.

S E C R E T

CFN: 5728 FUERST ZIZISCHWILLI AKA GEORG FRANK SANDERS 2 MAY 19 TIFLIS USSR KOELN KUBARK PLS NO MUNI

MICROFILMED
MAY 1 4 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

201-233477

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT CATIDE / UJVAULT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO. 32u - 5 - 25 / 7
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. FRAN-3145 (IN-72897)
	4. DATE 8 Apr 66
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED
10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Ref: Muni 5728 (IN-91195)

Subject ref was Hazard Agent Disposal Case WIROGUE. He dropped without prejudice on 8 June 1964

201-233477

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
CATIDE CABEZONE WIROGUE ?	2. RI FILE NO. 32W 5 25 7
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. BONN-2534 (IN 92176)
	4. DATE 7 April 66
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-233477

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

REF: MUNI-5728 (IN 91195)

1. RE REF WIROGUE FORMER CABEZONE DISPOSAL CASE. CAVATA PREVIOUSLY INFORMED OUR INTEREST IN SUBJECT HOWEVER BACKGROUND NEVER PASSED TO GERMANS.

2. DEFER FRAN RESPONSE TO CATIDE. RECOMMENT WE ADMIT FORMER INTEREST IN SUBJECT BUT ADVISE CATIDE WE HAVE NO CURRENT INTEREST IN HIM AND RECOMMENT THEY KEEP HIM AT ARMS LENGTH.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT: CATIDE UJVAULT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 32W 5 25 7

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. MUNI-5728 (IN-91195)

4. DATE 6 April 66

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-233477

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

1. CATIDE REQUESTS SECURITY TRACES ON FUERST ZIZISCHWILLI, AKA GEORG FRANK SANDERS, BORN 2 MAY 19 IN TIFLIS, USSR, RESIDING KOELN, WHO IN CONTACT WITH CATIDE STAFFER. FROM STATEMENTS MADE BY SUBJ CATIDE BELIEVES HE KUBARK EMPLOYED. PLS ADVISE.

2. NO MUNI TRACES SUBJ.

3. INDEX ZIZISCHWILLI.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-233477
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible] Bullett

.SIFIED MESSAGE D TOTAL COPIES

3 **SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM BONN EE/6

ACTION EE6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

REPRODUCTION

INFO FILE VR, DF7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT 2, C[illegible]

ECRET 101632Z

FRAN INFO DIR GMNY CITE BONN 2067 10 MAR 66 72218

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

CAVATA REPORTS WIROGUE LOST HIS JOB 25 JAN 66 EITHER FOR LOAFING OR CARELESSNESS. HE AND HIS EMPLOYER AGREED ON THE SEPARATION. HIS PRESENT EMPLOYMENT IS UNKNOWN TO CAVATA.

SECRET

CFN 2067 CAVATA WIROGUE 25 66 CAVATA

BT

SECRET

201-233477
10 Mar 66

S E C R E T

Chief, KURIOT/AB ZX

Chief of Station, Germany Chief, EE C/AF

Chief, COB/Frankfurt

AQUATIC/WIROGUE/Transmittal of Original Documents - WIROGUE-1

REFERENCE: A. DIR 10710, 16 May 1962
B. LEOP 5462, 17 May 1962
C. DIR 11763, 22 May 1962
D. DIR 12530, 24 May 1962

Forwarded herewith are the original documents of WIROGUE-1 which were taken from him in May 1962 as indicated in references. They include the Series [illegible] Austrian passport which was completed by KURIOT for WIROGUE's operational use. These documents were recently turned over to the undersigned by AB/Legal Section who had retained them while procuring a backstopped Reiseausweis for Subject. We forward them to you for your interest and retention. Only a copy of the Austrian Reisepass has been retained in our files.

Jacob D. DABARO

APPROVED: ____________________
Maurice H. THEDARD

Attachment:
One Envelope

Distribution:
2-C/KURIOT/AB, w/att
2-COS/Germany, w/o att
1-Chief, EE, w/o att
1-Chief, AF, w/o att

EGTA-18973 5 January 1964

S E C R E T

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T
RYBAT

PROCESSING

PRO. POSED	ACTION	ACTION PURSUED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Base, Sao Paulo

INFO
Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT
Operational/ZIBET/WIROGUE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
See Below
HBPA-4890, dated 12 October 1960

DBF CSH 43-43

1. This is to advise you that subject of reference has been transferred to the African Division and been assigned the cryptograph WIGROGUE/1. The latter is presently in Leopoldville and all correspondence received through your accommodation address is to be pouched to COS, Leopoldville.

2. WIROGUE/1 was instructed to send only unregistered letters and to instruct his correspondents to do the same.

CHARLES R. ROISTADE

PAUL E. LEIGHTON

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COB, Sao Paulo
1 - COS, Rio de Janeiro
1 - COS, Leopoldville

CROSS REFERENCE TO
RS COPY

DATE TYPED
22 Dec 1960

DATE DISPATCHED
DEC 28 1960

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HBPW-~~2312~~ 2312

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-233477
201-233477

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

~~DBF CSH 43-43~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
AF/W/2	D. Niesciur say	8284

1 - RI
1 - WH/2B
1 - AF/W

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/	C
RID/AN	
RID/	
RID/FS	
RID/FI	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
A/CAF/W	Dec 21/60	Edward Welles Edward Welles
C/AF	Dec 21/60	Bronson Tweedy Edward Welles
WH/2B	23 Dec 60	

DEC 18 15 02 14 '64

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH	12/27/60	R. W. Herbert

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T
RYBAT

PROCESSING

ACTION		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief of Station, Leopoldville

INFO

FROM

Chief, Africa Division

por CSN 43-43

SUBJECT

Operational/WIROGUE/1

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

See Below
A. ACLW-192, dated 14 November 1960
B. LEOP,0478, dated 17 December 1960
C. DIR-17181, dated 19 December 1960

1. A dispatch had been prepared outlining the various administrative and operational details pertinent to the WIROGUE project. Receipt of reference B negated its value and we prepared this one in its stead. Suffice it to say that all steps outlined in reference A were accomplished and he was dispatched with the specific instructions outlined in paragraph 2 of reference C.

2. During WIROGUE/1's association with the undersigned, the subject of a vehicle was raised by him. He stated he needed one to accomplish his mission. It was suggested to him that under the present circumstances in the Congo it would not be wise to consider such a purchase until he has discussed it fully with you and received your concurrence. If he did purchase a vehicle after receiving your approval, then he would have to do it from his own funds and not use funds made available to him to establish his cover business. Obviously he has violated the suggestions.

3. While WIROGUE/1 was in the employment of REDWOOD, there was a communication channel set up between him and his family. This was an arrangement with a letter drop in Sao Paulo. He would write a letter, post date it, and give it opened to the Case Officer who would pouch it to the COB, Sao Paulo for mailing. Letters to WIROGUE/1 would come to a post office box in Sao Paulo where it would be serviced by ALLOMETER-2 and pouched to the Case Officer. We leave it to your discretion, as to whether or not you wish to continue this type of arrangement. Nonetheless, under separate cover, attachment A is a letter for WIROGUE/1 which was received through this channel.

4. I am sure that WIROGUE/1 will undoubtedly want you to set up a similar arrangement through Germany for him so that he may communicate with a female acquaintance of his in PBPRIME. We are not adverse to the idea of his having such a channel, but only on the condition you are able to censure

DATE TYPED
21 Dec 1960

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
ACLW-206

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-233477
201-233477

CLASSIFICATION
por CSN 43-43
S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	INITIA
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
AF/W/2	D. Niesciur	say	8284

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
A/CAF/W	Dec 22/60	Edward O. Welles
DEC 19 15 02 PM '60		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/AF	12-23-60	B. Tweedy Bronson Tweedy

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ACLW-206

the letters. Again we leave it to your discretion.

5. Separate Cover attachment B contains a sterile copy of the FPO.

CHARLES R. ROISTADE

PAUL E. LEIGHTON

Attachment:
   A - Letter for WIROGUE/1 USC.
   B - Project Outline for WIROGUE USC-

Distribution:
   Orig. & 2 - Leopoldville
   [redacted]
   1 - AF/W/1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PROCESSING	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Leopoldville

DCT CSN 43-43

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT: Operational
WIROGUE/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

A. DIR 08782 (OUT 86554)
B. LEOP 0225 (IN 36750)

1. The plans and development of the WIROGUE project have reached a point whereby a summation of the progress made and the plans for the future is in order. At this writing it is anticipated that WIROGUE/1 will be on the Leopoldville scene on the first of December.

2. WIROGUE/1 had originally been recruited in Europe for a REDSOX operation. He was flown to PBPRIME "black" and underwent an extensive training program. This included survival, small arms and other similar type PM training. After a year of such training the project failed to materialize, as a result subject was preparing for resettlement in South America. The AF/Division took interest in WIROGUE/1 and after an assessment decided that with his peculiar background, talents and general makeup he could effectively be utilized along the lines cited in reference A. On 21 October 1960 the case was transferred officially to the Africa Division.

3. Since that date to the present, every effort has been made to psychologically orient WIROGUE/1 for this assignment and to prepare him operationally for its fulfillment. To insure the security of the operation, prevent any identification with ODYOKE and/or KUBARK, and to preclude any unexpected uncovery of WIROGUE/1's past which would associate him with his pre-KUBARK life, a number of basic steps were taken. Those were:

a. WIROGUE/1 underwent plastic surgery, which changed the shape of his nose.

b. A toupee had been made for his constant use. This and the plastic surgery have altered him sufficiently to obviate any recognition.

Distribution:
2-Leopoldville

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/201	C/H
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
RID/FC	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

Distribution:
1 - AF/West/2
1 - C/AF/West

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
14 Nov. 1960	NOV 1960

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: ACLW-192

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-233477
201-233477

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
AF/West/2	Daniel Niesciur	hm	8284

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/AF/W		Lester C. Houck

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/AF	11-16-60	Bronson Tweedy

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED

DCT CSN 43-43

DISPATCH

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ACLW-192

c. Documentation prepared with accompanying cover story to show that WIROGUE/1 is an Austrian and who has never had ODYOKE connections, nor ever been in PBPRIME. (See separate cover attachment A).

4. It is planned at this time to take WIROGUE/1 "black" to Germany. There he will be met by the undersigned, given his Austrian documentation, contact instructions and letter of credit, stripped of any PBPRIME clothing or personal effects, and dispatched. He is to proceed to Leopoldville on his own and upon arrival make contact. The cover assignment for subject is temporarily left open, although he has been told to look into the prospects of opening a photo or general repair shop. He has actually done photographic work but the decision on this we will leave to your on-the-spot judgment. The letter of credit for three thousand dollars is to be used to finance this venture. There will also be a reserve of one thousand dollars in a Swiss account should expenses necessitate a greater outlay. This money will constitute an non-interest bearing, operational loan which must be repaid by WIROGUE/1 from profits over a period of years. All other profits after the loan is paid off will be WIROGUE/1's.

5. A word about the manner of man with whom we are dealing. He is a small, energetic individual, who has displayed shrewdness, cunning, ingenuity and inventiveness. He has a peculiar turn of mind which lends itself remarkably to nefarious and extra-legal activities. Excitement and intrigue are important factors in his life, he relishes it and as a result may be a little delicate to handle. WIROGUE/1 likes order and clear cut chains of command. He admires the Prussian approach and as a result will take orders even if he may disagree. It is important to him to have the trust and confidence of his case officer. If in his own mind he feels assured of this and is confident of the professional KUTUBE-type competence of the CO, he will reciprocate in kind. He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalise all actions. One last thought which may be useful. Best results will probably be gotten if, when given an assignment, he be permitted to accomplish it in his own way. The latter is connected with his idea of trust and confidence.

CRR

CHARLES R. ROISTADE

LER

PAUL E. LEIGHTON

Attachment A (under separate cover)

FORM 10-57 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT A TO ACLW-292

1. An Austrian passport, birth certificate and drivers license have been prepared for issuance containing following biographic data:

Name: George Frans REINER
POB: Salsburg, Austria
DOB: 25 July 1921
Fathers name: Frans REINER
Mothers name: Marianna nee NIKLITZ
Occupation: Engineer
Marital status: single
Height: 1 meter 70 centemeters
Weight: 58 kilo's
Eyes: Brown
Hair: Brown

Distinguishing marks: tips of forefinger and thumb right hand missing. Identical fingers left hand scarred.

2. Documents will reflect travel only in Europe, with no indication of PBPRIME tenure.

CS

DESENSITIZED

201 - 233477

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
EGOA-18888

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
32W-120-o12/01

DATE
12 December 1962

TO
Chief, AF VIA Chief, EE

INFO
Chief, WH

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM
Chief of Station, Germany

SUBJECT
RYBAT WIROGUE
Final Resettlement of WIROGUE

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

1. WIROGUE has received political recognition from the West German government and is fully documented in the name of Georg Frank Sanders. This was accomplished with the cooperation of ODIBEX on the basis of the fabricated story stating that Subject is a Georgian who defected from East Berlin on 14 July 1962 while with a tourist group. It was necessary to acquire political recognition for Subject because this was the only sure means to backstop him if and when he applies for immigration to South America. A Fremdenpass would not withstand the investigation required by immigration authorities.

2. All the South American Consulates in West Germany were contacted with the assistance of CAMANTILLA in an attempt to collect information which would enable HARVARD to select the most likely country to which Subject could immigrate based on his personal preference, opportunities for emigrants, immigration requirements, etc. Columbia, Chile or Peru offer the best possibility.

3. The next step will be for Subject to apply to the appropriate Consulate and begin his processing. Prior to having Subject take this step HARVARD will require Headquarters guidance and thinking regarding the following:

a. Subject as a prospective emigrant will have to furnish proof of employment or proof of financial solvency. Subject's West German documentation indicates that he is an engineer. This does not mean that he is a diplomaed engineer but rather a master mechanic. This is borne out by the details of his falsified life history and in fact by Subject's actual skills in electrical and mechanical fields. HARVARD feels that Subject can satisfy any South American Consulate that he is experienced enough in electrical and mechanical fields to be of value to the economy of the South American country of his choice. Once Subject is admitted to South America, HARVARD has no doubt that he can find employment if he desires it. The ideal solution, however, would be for Subject to have a firm offer of employment prior to his immigration. If KUBARK can arrange this, HARVARD feels that Subject's immigration could be practically assured. Subject could seek employment through the German language newspaper in Santiago, Chile but HARVARD feels that no South American firm would take the chance of hiring him sight unseen unless he were a highly qualified specialist.

b. If proof of employment cannot be provided, proof of solvency is the next requirement. Only one of the South American countries has stated what it considers to be the minimum proof of solvency. The prospective emigrant must show that he has the funds to subsist for two years at the rate of $125.00 per month. HARVARD feels that to deposit $3,000 to Subject's account would be a grave mistake. HARVARD has no doubt that Subject is capable of taking the money and departing for parts unknown unless there were sufficient inducements awaiting him in South America. HARVARD could probably arrange for a letter attesting to the fact that Subject has $3,000 being held for him. Subject could have been working for ODIBEX as a consultant since his defection. The $3,000 would be bonuses and salary.

201-334777

53b
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CS COPY
CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

HQ COPY

per CSN 43-43

HQ COPY

c. HARVARD has not considered processing Subject for immigration through a bona fide refugee organization in order not to involve Subject with the United States Escapee Program and to keep from making a refugee organization a party to fraud with the possibility of embarrassing complications if the immigration does not come off properly. Working through a refugee organization would mean additional paper work and additional problems which for the present would indicate that this immigration avenue should not be considered except as a last resort.

d. When filling out his application forms Subject will have to provide employment and residence addresses consistent with the dates when he was supposedly living and working in the Georgian S.S.R. His wartime military service will have to be covered also. HARVARD feels that this information can be acquired through the facilities of SR/6 when needed.

4. HARVARD is of the opinion that Subject has committed himself to going to South America partly because he will do anything which will prolong his association with KUBARK and partly because he is hoping to realize some personal or financial profit from the exercise. HARVARD has followed the theme that Headquarters deisre is to help Subject and that it can best be done by completely legalizing him. Political recognition is the first step but we desire further that he be helped to immigrate and after 5 years acquire citizenship. Subject has asked HARVARD if he would receive financial help during the transition period in South America. He was told that we could only guarantee his plane fare, that Headquarters would decide how much and what kind of additional help he would receive if any.

5. Subject rejects the idea of staying in Germany except as a last resort. It is possible that because of his irritation with his inactivity Subject may simply request his German documentation and leave HARVARD's custody.

6. Subject has been in HARVARD's hands since 22 May 1962 and has been costing us 100 to 150 DM per week, plus many hours of case officer time. Request earliest Headquarters advice per para 3 above.

Carl T. Updill
CARL T. UPDILL

APPROVED: HYN
HENRY Y. NEMETH

Distribution:
2 - C/AF
2 - C/EE
2 - C/WH

DEC 19 15 02

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

FILE No. 201-233477

ORIG : D. NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 8284
DATE : 19 December 1960 536

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature: P. Wilmot

OUT54652

19 DEC 60 20 21z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY
~~OPIM~~ OUT 54652

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 17181
17181

RYBAT WIROGUE

RE: LEOP 0478 (IN 18739)*

RI COPY

ABSTRACT		INDEX		ROUTING	INITIALS
DATE	19 Dec 60			RID/AN	MB

FORM 1389a
(35)

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

: D. NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 8284
DATE : 19 December 1960 536

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

19 DEC 60 20 21z

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

OUT54652

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY
~~OPIM~~ OUT 54652

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 17181
17181

RYBAT WIROGUE

RE: LEOP 0478 (IN 18739)*
PER ACLS 149

1. WIROGUE/1 CONTRACT CALLS FOR:

A. FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH BEGINNING ONE NOV. TO BE PAID IN FIELD. YOUR DISCRETION TO PAY IN DOLLARS. HE NOT PAID FOR NOV PRIOR TO DISPATCH. OBTAIN RECEIPTS AND CHARGE PROJECT.

B. THREE THOUSAND DOLLAR QUARTERS ALLOWANCE PER ANNUM, NON ACCOUNTABLE.

C. FOUR THOUSAND DOLLAR OPS LOAN TO SET UP COVER BUSINESS TO BE REPAID FROM PROFITS. ALSO MUST ACCOUNT FOR ONE THOUSAND TEN DOLLAR TRAVEL ADVANCE RECEIVED.

2. INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO MAKE CONTACT AND FOLLOW GUTHMAN'S INSTRUCTIONS IMPLICITLY. ALSO REPORT ACCURATELY ALL CONTACTS OR POTENTIAL AGENTS AND NOT MAKE ANY APPROACHES OR COMMITMENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL.

3. SHARE GUTHMAN'S CONCERN AND RECOMMEND TELL WIROGUE HE ON PROBATION AND MUST TOE THE MARK OR ELSE RECALL AND TERMINATION. POINT OUT IF NECESSARY HE LIVING UNDER FALSE DOCUMENTS.

ABSTRACT | INDEX

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

per CSN 43-43

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

13 [illegible] 21z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE TWO CONTINUED

INFO :

[illegible] OUT 54652

OUT 54652

per CSN 43-43

TO INFO CITE DIR 17181

17181

*DESK COMMENT: Reference RYBAT

Bronson Tweedy
BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF.
RELEASING OFFICER

File [illegible]
AF/W/1 W
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Edward Welles
EDWARD O. WELLES
A/CAF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

165

DATE : 22 DEC 60

FILE : 201-233933

DATE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature: B. C. Wright

DEC 22

PRIORITY

IN 20986

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2512

RYBAT WIROGUE

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	13
RID/MIS	
RID/PS	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

RI COPY

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 22 Dec 1960	

FORM 4-58 1389a

(35)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

165

DATE : 22 DEC 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 AF/W
2
3 [illegible]

DEC 22 1433Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 20986

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 0512

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 17181 (out 54652)* (IN 18739)

1. PER LEOP 0478, WIROGUE/1 STATES TOLD HE TO REQUEST THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS QUARTERS ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM ON ARRIVAL. DOES (PORTION GARBLED, WILL FWD) PAY ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM OR MONTHLY. ADVISE. WIROGUE/1 ARGUES HE NEEDS LUMP SUM PAYMENT TO PURCHASE NEEDED HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS, AS WELL AS PAY RENT.

2. ACLS 149 NOT YET RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED WIROGUE/1 CONTRACT.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-233477

Copy No.

14-00000

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

153
DATE : 1 MAY 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value: Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature: B. Albright

MAY 1 1427Z 61

ROUTING

IN 41329

TO DIR LEOP INFO FRAN CITE [illegible]

RYBAT WIROGUE ZIBET

RE: FRAN 9126 (IN 37367)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	HB
RID/MIS	
~~RID/PS~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

RI COPY

ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX
DATE 1 MAY 1961	

FORM 1-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

201-233477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

153

DATE : 1 MAY 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	C/10	4	
2	Staff	5	
3	Chron	6	

MAY 1 1427Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 44329

DECENTRALIZED per CSN 43-43

TO DIR LEOP INFO FRAN CITE FROB 9191

RYBAT WIROUGE ZIBET

RE FROB 9126 (IN 37367)*

PLEASE REPLY PARA 3 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *WOULD APPRECIATE MORE DETAILS ON REQUEST FOR RECRUITMENT OF SELECT CONGO JOB APPLICANTS.

DECENTRALIZED per CSN 43-43

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

297

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 23 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one): No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
File this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RS Indexing (check one): Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 23 1543Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 34165

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

DIR CITE LEOP 2098

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A DIR 07961 (Out 89123)*

B LEOP 2088 (IN 33443)**

RI COPY

ROUTING	INIT
RID/AN	13
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

ABSTRACT ☐ INDEX ✓

23 Sept 1961

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

297

DATE : 23 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

2-1479

Corono
cc:
cc:
cc:

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 23 1543Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 34165

DIR CITE LEOP 2098

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A DIR 07901 (Out 89123)*

B LEOP 2088 (IN 33443)**

1. SALVACK MET WIROGUE (W) WHEN HE CROSSED RIVER ON SPECIAL FERRY FROM BRAZ EVENING 22 SEPT. WIROGUE FREINDLY THOUGH CONSIDERS MANY PBPRIME ACTIONS SENSELESS. W CARRYING KUBARK PROVIDED FALSE DOCUMENTATION AND ON PRODUCING OLD MINISTRY DEFENSE PASS WAS LET INTO CONGO AFTER LONG ARGUMENT WITH GOC IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS.

2. REGRET HQS DID NOT PICK UP WIROGUE'S FALSE PASSPORT. MAIN REASON FOR HIS RECALL WAS FEAR WILDCAT 5 WOULD TRACE HIM AND DISCOVER NO SUCH PERSON EXISTED. ONLY CHANGE NOW IS THAT KUBARK NO LONGER HAS OBLIGATION TO HIM.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

3. W STATES HE TOLD HQS CONTACTS HE RETURNING CONGO SO SHOULD BE NO

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SURPRISE. HAS SOME LETTERS HE WISHES SALVACK FORWARD TO HIS HQS CONTACT "DAN". SAID HE WAS GOING TO CALL EITHER GUTHMAN OR SALVACK IMMEDIATELY TO LET THEM KNOW HE IN LEOP. SWORE HE WOULD NEVER DO ANYTHING AGAINST PBPRIME AND IF HE COULD BE OF ANY HELP ANY TIME WAS WILLING. REALIZED FULLY HE ON HIS OWN IN CONGO AND KUBARK UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO HIM. SAYS HE INTENDS REMAIN CONGO AND MAKE LIVING HERE.

4. W WILL PHONE SALVACK IN FEW DAYS.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* STATED WIROGUE BEING TERMINATED AND REQUIRED TO LEAVE PBPRIME.

**RE ZAPPLEEY MEETING WITH WIROGUE BRAZ.

14-00000

FILE NO. 201-233477 ✓

ORIG.: H. ROBERTS
UNIT: AF/5
EXT: 5457
DATE: 3 AUGUST 1962

1653
1653

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

VO

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

3 AUG 62 21 34z

TO: FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

RE Filing (check one).
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Index: [illegible]
Marked [illegible] None required ☐

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF.: C/AF 3

INFO.: ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/WH 5, S/C 2

per CSN 43-43

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT62136

TO FRAN INFO LEOP ([redacted])

CITE DIR 27679

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

REF: A. FRAN 1894 (IN 33838)

B. DIR 15840 (OUT 91968)

ROUTING
RID/AN -HS

ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX
DATE 3 Aug 1962

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201-233477

201-233477

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

201-233497

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : D. HIESCTUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 3966
DATE : 15 November 1960

637
637

TO : FROB
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

file RID

S. Allright

per CSN 43-43

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	16 23 1	
X	ROUTINE	CABLE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT 93109
OUT 93109

TO FROB INFO FRAN LEOP CITE DIR 11912
11912

ZIBET WIROGUE HYBAT

ROUTING	INITIAL
[illegible]	1-13
[illegible]	
[illegible]	
~~[illegible]~~	

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 16 Nov 1960	

per CSN 43-43

CS COPY

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : Jo Albright
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5032
DATE : 13 November 64

☐ INDEX 21
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 233477

2

ROUTING R1	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

19 Nov 64 22 06z

SIG CEN

TO : BRUSSELS FRANKFURT GERMANY BONN

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: AF 7 INFO CDC, FI, FI/D4, CI, CI/OPS, EE 4, WE 6, VR FILE

J. Albright

RI COPY

TO BRUS INFO FRAN GRMY BONN CITE DIR

55345

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

REF FRAN 0130 (IN 82 22140)*

IF BRUS APPROACHED BY NIGALES, No Point Denying ~~[illegible]~~ WIROGUE (W/1) KUBARK CONNECTION. REVIEW OF W/1 KUBARK CAREER INDICATES COULD DO LITTLE IF ANY DAMAGE IF HE REVEALED ACTIVITIES. SUBJ TERMINATED 1962 AND KUBARK HAS NO FURTHER INTEREST. FOR BRUS: RELAYING DIR 57448.

END OF MESSAGE

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	KAC
RID/MIS	
RID/RA	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

201-233477	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX
DATE 19 Nov 64	

* Fran defers Dir for guidance should Subj reveal true background.

C/CI/OPS/WE

WE/2 John Stein (in draft)

C/WE/2

EE/C

CAF/5

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas J. Thiele
C/WE

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AF/COP

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1-64 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. (35)

RI COPY

10. 201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

670

ORIG: D. HIESCIUR
UNIT: AF/W/1
EXT: 3966
DATE: 16 November 1960

(S?0)

TO: FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3 *

INFO: COP, C/EE 3, D/OS 2, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	NOV 19 23 24 '60
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT94095
94095

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12432
12432

WIROGUE PJDUST RYBAT
RE: DIR 08782 (OUT 86554) **

RI COPY

ROUTING	
[illegible]	#13
[illegible]	
[illegible]	
[illegible]	

ABSTRACT | INDEX
18 Nov 1960

FORM 4-55 1389a

(35)

201-233477

670

ORIG : W. HIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/1
EXT : 3966
DATE : 16 November 1960

620

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3 *

INFO : COP. C/EE 3, D/OS 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	NOV 18 23 24 '60	
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT 94095
94095

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12432
12432

WIROGUE FJDUST RYBAT
RE: DIR 08782 (OUT 86554) **

WIROGUE AND KUSODA ESCORT MR. PAUL R. ~~FEENIES~~ FENNIG DEPARTING ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE AT 1500 HRS 21 NOV VIA MATS AIRCRAFT NUMBER 423. ETA FRAN 22 NOV AT 1540 HRS LOCAL TIME. PLS MEET.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *CONFIRMATION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR FJDUST NOT USED.
**STATED WIROGUE WAS BEING GROOMED FOR DEEP COVER ASSIGNMENT LEOP LATE NOVEMBER.

OS/SB
EE/G
CAF/W
AF/W/1

C/EE/OPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

201-233477 ✓

ORIG: D. NIESICUR
UNIT: AF/W/2 633
EXT: 3966
DATE: 15 November 1960 638

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: FROB

file RID

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF. C/AF 3

B. Albright

INFO: ~~FRAN~~ COP, ~~LEOP~~ C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	NOV 16 23 22'60 REC'D CABLE SECT.
X	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT93110
OUT 93110

TO FROB INFO FRAN LEOP CITE DIR 11913
11913

REF: DIR 11912 (OUT OUT93109)

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	113
RID/...	
RE...	

ABSTRACT	✓	INDEX	
DATE	16 Nov 1960		

CS COPY

201-233477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 32 RI 45 COPY ☐ DIRECT

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

34 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	5	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM FRANKFURT

ACTION EE 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, WE 6, CI/OPS, CAC, FI/D 4, FI, CI, AF 4, TSD 6

27 Nov 64 IN 31538

30

S E C R E T 271658Z

BRUS INFO DIR GMNY BONN CITE FRAN 3463

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

REF: A. DIR 65345

B. FRAN 3129 (IN 22167)

1. WISH POINT OUT SINCE NEITHER CATIDE NOR CAVATA AWARE SUBJ REFS' TRUE BACKGROUND OR PAST KUBARK CONNECTIONS, REVELATION THIS TO THEM BY NIGALES COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING AND POSSIBLY HARM MKTOPAZ ODIBEX CHANNEL FOR OBTAINING POLITICAL RECOGNITIONS FROM FEDREP.

2. IN VIEW ABOVE REQUEST BRUS, IN EVENT APPROACHED, ADVISE FRAN PRIOR ANSWERING NIGALES SO THAT COORDINATED REPLY MAY BE FORMULATED.

S E C R E T

233477

SECRET

201-233477

14-00000

2

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☑ COPY ☐ REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM [illegible] (AK)

ACTION FRANKFURT

INFO CE 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

VR. FILE WE 6, CI, CI/OPS, CD 6, FI, FI/D 4, AF 4,

(1) added [illegible] action) in

SECRET 121709Z

DIR INFO BRUS GMNY BONN CITE FRAN 0129

201-33477

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

REF A

43 - $84 57448 (NOT SENT BRUS)

13 Nov 64 IN 22167

B FRAN 0130

1. FRAN ADVISED BY ODIBEX THAT LOCAL POLICE AUTHORITIES RECEIVED ROUTINE INTERPOL QUERY RE WIROGUE (BRUS: SEE REF B FOR IDEN) WHO ARRESTED 6 NOV AND CURRENTLY IN BRUS JAIL ON CHARGE ATTEMPTED ROBBERY. ROUTINE REPLY SENT BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONFIRMING THAT REFERENCED TRAVEL DOCUMENT WAS ASSIGNED TO PERSON BY NAME OF WIROGUE AND THAT THEY HAD NO INFO RE ANY PRIOR POLICE RECORD.

2. WHILE NO FURTHER QUERY ANTICIPATED, ODIBEX IN POSITION, SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE IN FUTURE RE SUBJ'S AIS CONNECTION OR TRUE BACKGROUND, HAVE LOCAL AUTHORITIES DENY ANY KNOWLEDGE OF BACKGROUND OTHER THAN THAT WHICH HE PROVIDED FOR POLITICAL RECOGNITION PURPOSES. ONLY ADMITTED AIS CONNECTION WOULD BE ROUTINE CURSORY PROCESSING THROUGH CAMP KING.

SECRET

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC 2330 12 NOV 64

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

13 Nov 64

078 2/10 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : AF 7

INFO : EE 4 UR FILE

ACTION CHANGE

FRAN 0129 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 22678 (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : EE (DIVISION)

TO : AF (DIVISION)

BY : J. BARTLET 7576 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH: J. ALBRIGHT 5307 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13

17 Nov 64 07 9 2410

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : AF 7

INFO : ~~EE 4~~ VR FILE

ACTION CHANGE

FRAN 0180 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 22140A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : EE (DIVISION)

TO : AF (DIVISION)

BY : J. BARTLET 7576 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH: J. ALBRIGHT 5267 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

27 SECRET

☑ COPY ☐ ...

REPRODUCTION PR

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

R/C

C79 1) ... A/C

FROM FRANKFURT

ACTION FE 6

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

1	5	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

VR. FILE CLC, WE 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D4, AF 4

adde AF 7 (ACTION) VR

SECRET 121709Z

BRUS INFO DIR CMNY BONN CITE FRAN 0130

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

RE FRAN 0129 (IN 22167)

13 Nov 64 IN 22140

1. SUBJ REF (IDEN) IS FORMER REDSOX AGENT CANDIDATE AND AFRICAN DIV AGENT WHO RESETTLED BY HARVARD JUNE 64. PRIOR KUBARK RECRUITMENT HE SERVED PRISON TERM IN FRANCE FOR BANK ROBBERY. DURING TWO YEAR RESETTLEMENT PERIOD IN FRAN SUBJ GIVEN NEW NAME AND NEW LIFE STORY. ON BASIS THIS NAME AND FABRICATED STORY, SUBJ GRANTED RECOGNITION BY FEDREP. IN EARLY OCT SUBJ RECONTACTED HARVARD AND MADE BLACKMAIN ATTEMPT IN ORDER GET BACK ON PAYROLL.

2. IT POSSIBLE SUBJ MAY REVEAL TRUE BACKGROUND TO BELGIAN AUTHORITIES. SHOULD BRUS BE APPROACHED THIS MATTER, FRAN DEFERS DIR FOR GUIDANCE.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID. ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

27 SECRET

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM FRANKFURT
ACTION ~~EE~~ AF 7
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT
TIME
BY
INFO VR. FILE CDC, WE 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D4, ~~AF 4~~ EE 4

SECRET 121709Z

BRUS INFO DIR GMNY BONN CITE FRAN 0130

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

13 Nov 64 IN 22140

RE FRAN 0129 IN 22767

1. SUBJ REF (IDEN) IS FORMER REDSOX AGENT CANDIDATE AND AFRICAN DIV AGENT WHO RESETTLED BY HARVARD JUNE 64. PRIOR KUBARK RECRUITMENT HE SERVED PRISON TERM IN FRANCE FOR BANK ROBBERY. DURING TWO YEAR RESETTLEMENT PERIOD IN FRAN SUBJ GIVEN NEW NAME AND NEW LIFE STORY. ON BASIS THIS NAME AND FABRICATED STORY, SUBJ GRANTED RECOGNITION BY FEDREP. IN EARLY OCT SUBJ RECONTACTED HARVARD AND MADE BLACKMAIN ATTEMPT IN ORDER GET BACK ON PAYROLL.

2. IT POSSIBLE SUBJ MAY REVEAL TRUE BACKGROUND TO BELGIAN AUTHORITIES. SHOULD BRUS BE APPROACHED THIS MATTER, FRAN DEFERS DIR FOR GUIDANCE.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
RID/PS	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ C/AR

DESTROY ☐ SIG

FRANKFURT

ACTION AF

INFO VR. FILE WE 6, CI, CI/OPS, CA 6, FI, FI/INT, FE 4, CA/PEG

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

RI ☑ COPY ☐ D

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ROUTING

RID/AN

RID/

~~RID/20~~

RID/2129

RID/FI

~~DESTROY~~

S E C R E T 121709Z

DIR INFO BRUS CMNY BONN CITE FRAN 0129

CABEZONE HARVARD WIRO73

43[illegible] S84 57448 (NOT SENT BRUS)

B FRAN 0130

FRAN 0129

13 Nov 64 IN 22167

1. FRAN ADVISED BY ODIBEX THAT LOCAL POLICE AUTHORITIES RECEIVED ROUTINE INTERPOL QUERY RE WIROGUE (BRUS: SEE REF B FOR IDEN) WHO ARRESTED 6 NOV AND CURRENTLY IN BRUS JAIL ON CHARGE ATTEMPTED ROBBERY. ROUTINE REPLY SENT BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONFIRMING THAT REFERENCED TRAVEL DOCUMENT WAS ASSIGNED TO PERSON BY NAME OF WIROGUE AND THAT THEY HAD NO INFO RE ANY PRIOR POLICE RECORD.

2. WHILE NO FURTHER QUERY ANTICIPATED, ODIBEX IN POSITION, SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE IN FUTURE RE SUBJ'S AIS CONNECTION OR TRUE BACKGROUND, HAVE LOCAL AUTHORITIES DENY ANY KNOWLEDGE OF BACKGROUND OTHER THAN THAT WHICH HE PROVIDED FOR POLITICAL RECOGNITION PURPOSES. ONLY ADMITTED AIS CONNECTION WOULD BE ROUTINE CURSORY PROCESSING THROUGH CAMP KING.

S E C R E T

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC 2230 12 NOV 64

SECRET

201-293477

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO.

FROM
Chief, AF Division

SUBJECT
Summary of Information on Subject of 201-233477

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI
FYI

References: A. PARI 6754, 6 October 1964

B. Dir 57448, 16 October 1964

1. Iden was born in 1918, in Georgia, USSR. He emigrated to France with his family when he was three years old. He was a clever, precocious child during his lycee education in France and was frequently dismissed by school directors who did not appreciate his temperamental performance. He also attended several engineering colleges but apparently never graduated. In 1939, he volunteered for the French Foreign Legion and was sent to Tunisia. The occupation of France in 1941 ended his military career. He was demobilized and returned to Paris.

2. Subject claimed that he wanted to fight for France, but he did not wish to join a collective resistance organization. He decided to act on his own so he joined a labor force being recruited in Paris to go to Germanay. For awhile he worked in a synthetic gasoline plant in Boelitz near Berlin. Later he was employed as a driver for the NSKK. During this time, he began his career in black marketing and document forging. He claimed that he forged passes into and out of Germany and did it to help imprisoned French officers to get back to France. It is felt that the ulterior motives might still have been love of excitement and wish to make money. He also claimed that he did not work for the French Resistance, although it was possible and probably that they gave him orders to fill. He did mention working through intermediaries and cut-outs, so its possible that he did actually work with the Resistance but did not want to tell us. Eventually Subject was arrested by the German regular police for his activities, and later brought to Berlin where he was interrogated for several months at Gestapo Headquarters. He ended up by spending time in jails and concentration camps. He was finally liberated by the U.S. Army.

3. After the thrill and excitement of the war years was passed, Subject could not settle down to a routine existence. So he joined up with an acquaintance who he says convinced him of the necessity to make more money. They decided to commit robberies. One was successful. Unfortunately for Subject, the other was not. His friend was apprehended and confessed. Subject spent the next five years in various rather notorious prisons in France.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFPW-38334	4 NOV 1964
29 October 1964	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-233477 201-233477

ROUTING

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
/3		

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

He was then paroled to his brother and was living near Marseilles. He attempted to go into business using some of the inventions that he had conceived during his confinement in prison. His personality and intense drive and self-confidence quickly gained him a business partner with capital to invest in a cinematographic color reproduction system that was patented and earned decent profits for the two of them. Subject was still on parole and tied to his elder brother's "self-righteous indulgence," however. It was shortly after this that Subject was approached by a member of KUBARK who was following up on Subject as an ops lead furnished by a cousin in PSPRIME. Subject was favorably assessed and removed black from France because of travel restrictions imposed by his parole status.

4. The rest of Subject's career has been generally summarized in DIR 57443. We are also attaching a copy of EGOA-21573 for information on Subject's most recent activities.

5. Subject has been described as being very ingenious, observant, shrewd, glib, and one who relishes intrigue and daring. The latter play a very important part in his character. He learns quickly and carries out any assignment without regard for danger. His drawbacks, as enumerated by his case officers, are that he is headstrong, impulsive and constantly needs new interests, has an ego that feeds on recognition and triumphs, a low frustration point at unpredictable times, would probably "fall in love" with his CO which would make agent turn over difficult, and that he would be difficult to dispose of if he became disenchanted, i.e. Subject is a handling problem.

A. H. S.

Alice H. SHAMASKO

Kenneth N. PECHINGPAUGH

Attachments:
1 cy EGOA-21573, h/w u/s/c #1
Identity - u/s/c #2

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS/Pari w/atts h/w & u/s/c

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26 RI ☒ COPY ☐ DISPATCH

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM PARIS

ACTION EE 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED TO: UNIT TIME BY

INFO F, F1/D 4, CDC, WE 6, AF 4, VR, CI, CI/OPS, FILE

J.B. transfer to AF

S E C R E T 061741Z

DIR INFO FRAN GMNY BONN CITE PARI 6754

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

REF FRAN 9367 (IN 84943)

STATION HAS NO RECORD EGOA-21573 OR WIROGUE CRYPTO 6 OCT 64 IN 88108

PLS ADVISE IDEN AND APPROPRIATE BACKGROUND. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

[illegible] FYI

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG : Jo Albright
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5032
DATE : 13 October 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☑ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-233477

MESSAGE FORM 34
28 SECRET

RI ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	18 Oct	8	15z

SIG CEN

TO FRANKFURT PARIS GERMANY BONN

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: AF 7

INFO EE 4, WE 6, SR 7, CI, CI/IPS, FI, FI/D 4, CDC, VR, FILE

TO ~~[illegible]~~ FRAN INFO ROUTINE PARI GERY BONN CITE DIR 57448

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

REF FRAN 9367 (IN 84943)*

*WIROGUE TRYING STICK KUBARK FOR MORE MONEY.

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS BASED ON REMARKS MADE BY WIROGUE'S PAST CO'S. CONCENSUS ~~OF OPINION~~ IS THAT SUBJ COULD DO VERY LITTLE DAMAGE, IF ANY AT ALL, IF JOINED OTHER SERVICE.

2. DURING PERIOD WHEN SUBJ UNDER SR DIV CONTROL, CO HAD PERSONAL, DAILY EXTENDED CONTACT WITH HIM. CO BELIEVES SUBJ HAS INNATE DESIRE WORK FOR INTEL SERVICE AS IT CONSONANT WITH PAST LIFE FULL OF DARING, ADVENTUROUS ACTS. IDEA OF "LEGALIZED SPYING" APPEALS TO SUBJ AS IT PUTS HIM IN IMPORTANT, UNIQUE, PROFESSIONAL CATEGORY. CO BELIEVED HE GENUINELY SINCERE IN WANTING TO DO SOMETHING FOR KUBARK AS HE ENJOYED ROLE AS LOWER ECHELON ACTION AGENT. WHILE IT ENTIRELY POSSIBLE SUBJ THREATENING WORK FOR OTHER SERVICE AS BARGAINING TACTIC FOR ADDITIONAL KUBARK FUNDS, CO RECALLS THAT MONEY NEVER HAS BEEN PRIMARY END FOR SUBJ AS HE ALWAYS FELT ENOUGH MONEY WOULD COME FROM SOMEPLACE TO SUSTAIN HIM FROM ONE VENTURE TO ANOTHER. DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT SUBJ EXPECTS TO BE ACCEPTED BY FRENCH IS. HE KNOWS VERY WELL HE WOULD BE INCARCERATED FOR VIOLATING PAROLE. HIS PRIDE AND PROBABILITY OF CENSURE AND RIDICULE FROM FAMILY AND FRIENDS IN FRANCE WOULD DISSUADE HIM IN END. PROBABLY DOES NOT WANT MORE MONEY, BUT RATHER NEW DOCUMENTS AND IDENTITY IN SOME THIRD COUNTRY SO THAT HE CAN RETURN

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

CONF:

INFO

TO

INFO:

CITE DIR 57448

AND WIN ACCLAIM AND RECOGNITION FROM FAMILY AND FRIENDS. HAS ALWAYS HAD GREAT DESIRE TO "SURPRISE" EVERYONE BACK HOME WITH NEW DOCUMENTS, NEW IDENTITY, PLASTIC SURGERY, ETC.

3. DURING SR DIV PHASE OF SUBJ CAREER, HE IN WASHINGTON D.C. AREA UNDERGOING TRAINING FOR S AESENTINEL PROJECT. KNEW ALL HIS HANDLERS BY ALIASES. DURING TRAINING CONDUCTED IN SAFEHOUSE IN VIRGINIA, KNEW OPERATING PRINCIPLES AND HANDLED SCALE MOCK-UP OF ELINT GEAR TO BE USED AESENTINEL. HAD TRAINING IN BASIC AND ADVANCED FIELDCRAFT, INCLUDING SMALL ARMS, BASIC TRADECRAFT TECHNIQUES AND ERAT PRACTICES, ~~SOVIET~~ RUSSIAN LANGUAGE, SOVIET INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES, M.O. OF KGB BORDER TROOPS, AESENTINEL OPS PLAN, AIR INFILTRATION-EXFILTRATION TECHNIQUES INCLUDING AIRCRAFT FAVORED FOR THIS. SUBJ ABSORBED SOVIET REALITIES, BORDER TROOPS M.O. AND BASIC TRADECRAFT QUICKLY AND WITH GREAT APPLIED EE FLEXIBILITY.

4. DURING LEOPOLDVILLE EAH PHASE, SUBJ KNEW VERY LITTLE RE STATION ACTIVITIES. KNEW COS AND TWO CASE OFFICERS TRUE NAMES. AWARE OF COS CONTACT WITH GENERAL MOBUTU BECAUSE HE WORKING WITH CONGO AIR FORCE. SPENT MOST TIME THERE TRYING DEVELOP CONTACTS. ~~[illegible]~~ OTHER OPS HE MIGHT HAVE DISCERNED WOULD BE OUTDATED BY NOW DUE TO RAPIDLY CHANGING EVENTS IN CONGO.

END OF MESSAGE

EE/C
WE/3
C/WH
CAF/5
DC/SR
C/

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/COP
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic grading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

9 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Albright, AF/S

SUBJECT : 1. Informal Character Assessment of WIROGUE During the Period July 59-Nov 1960
2. Suggested Considerations for WIROGUE Resettlement Phase
3. Damage Report Contribution

1. The following observations and comments are intended to represent an informal personality assessment and factors in consideration of resettlement for AESPIC, now WIROGUE. It is based on a period of training and handling prior to anticipated dispatch--early July 59 through late November 1960. These thoughts are based on personal daily extended contact as trainer/agent handler with Subject as a member of prospective cross-border team for implementation of REDSOX Operation AESENTINEL. One member was re-assessed operationally unsuitable, which left a team of 2 agents, both of which Undersigned continued to handle. It is hoped that this assessment may be of some benefit to the AF Desk Officer, who requested it the day of this writing. It is intended that Subject's demonstrated suitability for AESENTINEL, an infiltration-exfiltration operation into difficult terrain in the Soviet Union, will serve as a mechanism rather than an end in illustrating Subject's general abilities and limitations for the task at hand. An attempt has been made to present this material in subject categories considered operationally meaningful. Quoted passages in Part I are Subjects own or the closest approximation memory permits.

2. It is my considered opinion that the Subject as of this writing has the highest personal and professional regard for Undersigned. I do also consider that, although thoughtful handling and self assuredness were prerequisite agent control factors during this case, Subject did not cause an uncomfortable amount of special handling problems. The senior Project Officer was Mr. Perry Crookham, C/DOD/DOB during the training and holding prior-to-dispatch phase of the operation.

3. Subject Background and Chronological Association Factors Deemed Operationally Significant

A. Subject is an approximately 49 year old eithnic Georgian fluent in Georgian, French, German and English. Subject emigrated to France with the remains of his family during the pre-Lycée stage of his life. His father, a TBILISI University academician and intellectual of some note , elected to stay in Soviet Georgia, during which period Soviet dominance in the West Caucasus was fairly well solidified. Subject considers that his fathers decision was made of his own free will but which nevertheless disappointed Subject greatly, as he greatly admired him, despite the fact that Subject's fathers decision was responsible for the suicide of his mother, whom Subject greatly loved. Undersigned believes that Subject's anguish in memories of his parents was genuine. Subject was a clever though precocious child during his Lycée education, and frequently was dismissed by school directors who did not appreciate his temperamental though erratically brilliant performance. Subject, during this stage of development, probably tried as hard as ever in his life to conform to the rules of society, which during that stage of French national education practices, would probably seem quite strict by American middle school practices. Subject greatly desired academic/professional recognition in imitation of his father. These feelings were especially frustrating because of his quick mind and seeming natural ability for mechanical and electrical theory and principals. I do not believe he ever has learned to consider conventions of living anything more than a tiresome game to be played when there is no alternative. Subject's quick mind, and early appreciation, recognition and adaptance of guile did much to ensure the necessary understanding of French culture for moderate success in that country. Subject who is an unusual looking man even by French standards, has no trouble in identifying with the under-privileged elements of French society. Subject is temporally bald, hooked nose, short, slender, bandy legged, wiry, and of dark complexion but possessed of a dry, caustic wit eager to laugh and contribute in the Caucasian spirit of comarderie to those whom he considers worthy of friendship. Subject, however, makes real friends cautiously, and has conciously established for himself personality assessment criteria that would do justice to many successful senior FI or CE C/O - agent handlers.

B. World War II offered Subject the welcomed opportunity to show his ability and ingenuity by engaging in black market affairs in luxury items and travel documents in German-occupied France. Subject would wistfully recount stories of his escapades during that period, which, after really getting to know Subject, seemed to be entirely possible. Subject admired the Germans as "worthy opponents", particularly their efficiency and ability to act decisively whether the problem be tactical or strategic. An extended period of German encarceration (until war's end) did nothing to alter his opinion. Wars end left Subject bored and unfulfilled. The excitement and thrill of "the game" were gone and Subject's unsettled, numb confusion was for quite another reason than most of Europes milling thousands of displaced and shattered families. Therefore, it was not long before Subject and a close friend from his black market days decided on a daring daylight bank robbery in one of the suburban centers of France. Subject contends he planned the robbery from start to finish, and needed only someone to help. Subject and his accomplice carefully cased a bank, stole a heavy truck and during the height of the business day backed the truck full speed in reverse through the large street level plate glass window. Subject said he hopped out of the truck with an automatic weapon, while "the people were frozen solid", gathered up the money and was away quickly. Subject said the scheme failed because his accomplice went to the cache-site to get some of the money to spend before it was safe to do so. His accomplice was apprehended and in time broke down and implicated Subject. Subject said he was not bitter at his betrayer, but rather professed a genuine admiration for French interrogation techniques. Subject served a difficult confinement of 5 years, and was paroled to an older brother in Marseilles, as I recall.

C. Subject said that he began at that point to appreciate the futility of violent actions, while opposing the authority of society. He therefore attempted to go into business using some of the inventions that he had conceived during his confinement in prison. His winning personality and intense drive and self-confidence quickly gained him a business partner with capital to invest in a cinematographic color reproduction system that was pattened and earned decent profits for the venture. Subject was still on parole and tied to his older brother "self-righteous indulgence", however. It was shortly after this that Subject was approached by a member of the AIS who was following up on Subject as an ops lead furnished by a cousin in the US who was a moderately successful lawyer, and who had been long since recruited as an agent spotter for eithnic Georgians. Subject was favorably assessed and removed back from France, because of travel restrictions imposed under his parole status. I believe that this opportunity rekindled his old feelings of exhilaration and grateful enthusiasm for the opportunity to perform his deeds of doing for an authority, sanctioned by a national state, in this case the AIS.

D. Here at last, he considered, was a secure source of backing and support for his natural outlets. Subject always considered the Agency as ~~an~~ ~~Equal~~ business partner, ally, and protector. He was therefore a grateful, sincere "tool" who thoroughly enjoyed his role as lower echelon action agent. Subject now probably feels like an equal partner.

E. He was a willing pupil, physically active -- since the job called for physical endurance -- and looked on self-denial and fatigue recognition as a point of honor. Undersigned was never a poor athlete, however, was bested on numerous occasions at whatever the field probem. Subject absorbed Soviet Realities, Border Troops M.O. and basic tradecraft quickly and with great applied flexibility.

F. It was during this period that Subject began to confide regularly and in depth to Undersigned. Subject would often tell Undersigned, "Fred, you must believe me, I want to do something." "I will do anything you tell me to do, only tell me." "You (meaning the Agency) want me to kill somebody. - Okay! I do it anyway you say." I believe Subject was genuinely sincere, and that this was neither an attempt to impress his C/O or a trust/assurance maneuver.

G. When an indefinite hold was placed on AESENTINEL by higher Agency authority, one team member was re-oriented and placed on conservation in a cover job. Undersigned ultimately conducted this agent back to his Scandinavian home where resettlement was achieved with a minimum of arrangements, however, Subject was transferred to AF Division for projected operational use in central Africa. This, if memory serves, was accomplished in late 1960.

4. Personal Qualities and Motivation Factors of Possible Operational Exploitability

A. Natural intelligence, resourcefully inventive

B. Mechanical ability, to include photography and gadgetry

C. A certain acumen and shrewdness

D. Concious guile and a "clandestine mind"

E. Physical stamina, and vitality to include extremely good eyesight

F. Probably capacity to withstand hostile interrogation and/or physical stress-privation

G. A sincere exponent of "the end justifies the means"

H. Atheism

I. A winning personality when need be

J. Present and potential language ability

K. Lack of racial prejudice

L. Fierce loyalty to his C/O once respect and friendship are established.

M. Possible self-destruction rather than blow the job in denied area op.

N. Good independent action agent on short term ops.

O. Anti-Communist

P. Moderate drinker

Q. Keen observer and excellent memory for faces and names

R. Self-confidence to a fantastic degree

5. Personal Qualities Considered Operationally Disadvantageous

A. Natually intelligent but headstrong

B. Physiognomy easily remembered

C. A blind spot in intuitive friendships, to possible include trusted female paramour

D. Impulsiveness, and nervous energy that needs constant new interests outlets. An opportunist

E. **Lack of** moral convictions and basic values many of which are divorced from reality.

F. Ego that feeds on recognition and triumphs. (probable inferiority complex)

G. Poor assessment of the value of money ("easy come, easy go")

H. Possible inclination to alter ops plan to conform to Subjects appreciation of the situation, in field situation.

I. Probably prove to "fall in love" with his C/O, which might make agent turn over difficult. This probably would be more basis for successful relationship.

J. Probably poor P/A--probably has little objective confidence in subordinates

K. Low frustration point at unpredictable times or occasions.

L. Difficult to dispose of if he ever becomes disenchanted

6. WIROGUE Resettlement Considerations

A. AF/5 representative has requested comment from Undersigned on WIROGUE's apparent reluctance at resettlement attempts in Frankfurt a/M which are underweigh at the present time, I believe. It is undersigned's understanding that Subject has threated to work for the French Service if resettlement negotiations do not proceed to Subject's liking. Speculation has been that this is probably a bargaining tactic to gouge an appreciable amount of additional dollars in his resettlement claim. Undersigned considers this a quite valid assumption, and entirely attributable to Subject. Subject probably views this threat as particularly critical in view of the seeming political/economic conflict with the French, and appreciates by now one of the differences between the AIS and the IS of a fascist and/or totalitarian state.

B. However, Undersigned would like to suggest the following interpretation for whatever value may be in it. I suggest that money, per se, is not the primary end that Subject is striving for now, just as it never seemed to be his primary concern throughout his life. I believe that Subject genuinely enjoys clandestine operations, at least, his conception of clandestine operations. Subject probably would prefer to work for the AIS or possibly the W. German Service because he has a genuine fondness for the people and many aspects of the culture of both countries. The idea of legalized, or at least internationally tolerated, "Spying" offers the opportunity to legitimize, and thereby rationalize, Subject's [illegible] that he is protecting his equity in an important, unique, "professional" category.

C. Subject, during the period of Undersigned's exposure, always considered that if he had money-fine, if not, then enough would come his way from someplace to sustain him from one venture to the next. Subject felt that the acquisition of money would be a by-product of his opportunist schemes and technical inventions in pursuance of his main goal-personal recognition for personal achievements and triumphs.

D. I believe Subject does not expect to be accepted in his offer of employment with the French Service, but rather to let our minds jump to the next logical step-the full meaning of the result of such an attempt on his part. Subject knows very well that he has violated his parole and would be encarcerated on his return. I believe his pride and the probability of censure and ridicule of family and friends in France would disuade him in the final analysis.

E. Subject is a most excellent chess player. I have never won from him, nor have I ever seen him lose a game. I consider that Subject has thought this line of action out thoroughly. It is apparent that he is willing to gamble his quit claim settlement on something that I believe he has specifically in mind--possibly the offer of new documents and identity in some third country. He has always had a great desire to "surprise" everyone back home (i.e. Paris): with new documents, a new identity, plastic surgery, etc. I do not believe that what he wants is necessarily more dollars, but rather for the AIS to once again help him (as co-partner) to achieve his aim of acclaim, success and recognition, possibly this time to family and friends in France.

F. I do not believe that Subject could ever be physically intimidated. He lost half his front teeth to German interrogators and the other half to French prison guards. Additionally, he does possess a defiant spirit that sometimes comes through as sheer obstinacy to friends.

G. If it is considerd worthwhile, I believe an attempt should be made to locate a C/O locally who has handled him in the past. A C/O for whom Subject has respect as a higher echelon and whom he considers understands him. I suggest that this C/O interview Subject in an uncontrolled environment to determine what it is that Subject really wants. To best of my recollection, Subject thought highly of Monty Love (T), the C/O that helped pitch him and who brought him out Black from France. Monty was to go to one of the German Stations or bases the last time I saw him in late 1959.

8. Damage Report Contribution

A. The following constitutes Undersigned's contribution to a damage report that may well be needed in view of Subject's posture in the matter at hand. It covers only that time sequence during which Undersigned actively handled Subject.

B. This span constitutes:

early July 59 - late Nov 1960

C. At that time Undersigned was a junior C/O on the AESENTINEL Project which was to be prepared and launched from the ZI by SR/DOB, a covert site ops base formerly in the District of Columbia.

D. In early July of 59, Undersigned as "Fred" and George Fill (SR Staffer) as "Mr. George" met Subject and his teammate "Al" who arrived at Natl. Airport, D.C. with their agent handler and trainers. The group had returned from several weeks of survival training in Alaska, and consisted of:

Subject	"Little David" (A)
Gregg Ross (T)	Mr. Gregg (A)
"Al" (agent team mate)	"Big Al" (A)
Bill Rohmer (T)	Bill (A)

E. We drove immediately to a Safehouse in the Virginia countryside and conducted training, holding and orientations from that site until the operation was placed on indefinite conservation and ultimately cancelled because of the Powers U-2 incident.

F. Safehouse keepers were an elderly married couple - "Geof and Janie." There were approximately 6 DOB QP vehicles exposed to Subject.

G. During this holding period another C/O and several agent handlers were there on regular occasions:

Perry Crookham (T)	"Mr. Pat" (A)
Myron Toloczko (T)	"Ski" (A)

Ray Hanchulak (T)	"Ray" (A)
Gordon Mothes (T)	"Gordon" (A)
Joseph Betza (T)	"Joe" (A)
Col. Podwornyy (T)	"Pod"

H. Subject knew the operating principles and handled the scale mock-up of the ELINT gear to be used on AESENTINEL. Subject was exposed to training in:

(1) Basic and Advanced Fieldcraft, to include small arms.

(2) Basic tradecraft techniques and practices

(3) Soviet Russian language training

(4) Soviet interrogation techniques

(5) M.O. of KGB Border troops

(6) AESENTINEL Ops. plan

(7) Air infiltration-exfiltration techniques, to include aircraft favored for this.

9. For further information or clarification please call Fred Kirkpatrick, extension 6587.

Fred Kirkpatrick

Fred Kirkpatrick
SR/O/PT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

RI ☐ COPY ☐

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2	5	6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM PARIS

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WE 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FI, FI/D 4, CDC, WH 6, AF 4, VR, CI, CI/OPS, FE 8

S E C R E T 061741Z

50

DIR INFO FRAN GMNY BONN CITE PARI 6754

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

REF FRAN 9367 (IN 84943)

CRYPTO

STATION HAS NO RECORD EGOAr21573 OR WIROGUE CRYPTO IN 88100

PLS ADVISE IDEN AND APPROPRIATE BACKGROUND. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3 RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		
FRANKFURT		1	5
ACTION		2	6
EE6		3	7
		4 13	0

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED TO: UNIT EE TIME 1180 BY [illegible]

INFO EDC, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D 4, WE 6, CI/OA, VR, FI/INT

A.I. (AF 7) ACTION, VR

SECRET 011438Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PARI GMNY BONN CITE FRAN 9367 10 Oct [illegible] IN 64943

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

RE EGOA 21573

1. WIROGUE CONTACTED HARVARD TO ADVISE HE CURRENTLY WITHOUT JOB, MONEY, FRIENDS AND HOPE FOR FUTURE. SAYS HE HAS TRIED HARD FIND AND RETAIN SUITABLE EMPOLYMENT BUT UNFITTED FOR ANYTHING OTHER THAN INTEL WORK. SINCE PBPRIME UNABLE PROVIDE HIM FURTHER ASSIGNMENT IN THIS FIELD HE PLANS PROCEED PARI AND OFFER SERVICES TO FIS. STATED PURPOSE HIS CONTACT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE ANY OBJECTIONS HIS SEEKING SUCH EMPLOYMENT.

2. HARVARD CO CONFIRMED THAT THERE NO POSSIBILITY OF RENEWING HIS AIS ASSOCIATION. WIROGUE ALSO TOLD THAT, WHILE WE UNABLE PREVENT HIM FROM TAKING PROPOSED ACTION, DOING SO WOULD BE AT OWN RISK SINCE FRENCH AUTHORITIES WOULD PROBABLY NOT ONLY DISBELIEVE HIS STORY OF PAST AIS CONNECTIONS, BUT WOULD TAKE ACTION AGAINST HIM FOR PAST CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. SUBJ OUTWARDLY APPEARED TO DISCOUNT THESE WARNINGS.

DD/P

SECRET

14-00000

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID-AN.

11 28 AM '64

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES.
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

advance copy AF/5/C 11 JUN

1 cc EE/G w/o ATT
1 cc WH/REG w/o ATT
1 cc SR/C/AF w/o ATT
1 cc DDP/CDC w/o ATT

Send the file away

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. AF/5/C	7C18	1/6/64		✓
2. Dam				SHS
3.				
4.				
5. Darby				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

TRACE REQUEST	3	ABSTRACT INDEX	X
DATE MICROFILMED			

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-233477

DOCUMENT DATE
4 JUN 1964

DOCUMENT NUMBER
EGOA 21573

12 3 52 PM '64

MICROFILMED
JUN 16 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

24

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM JUL 10 1964	

TO
Chief, AF

INFO.
Chief, EE; WH; SR; KUPLUM

FROM Chief, Coordination & Support Base, Frankfurt

SUBJECT WIROGUE
Final Resettlement of WIROGUE 201-233477

ACTION REQUIRED : REFERENCES

1. WIROGUE, former REDSOX agent candidate and African Division agent has been quitclaimed and resettled on the local economy. This dispatch summarizes the WIROGUE case from May 1962 to March 1964.

2. Subject arrived in Frankfurt/Main from the Congo on 22 May 1962. KUBARK's reasons for establishing contact were dictated by the need to relieve Subject of his KUBARK-supplied false Austrian passport, the need to institute or suggest a course of action which would encourage him to establish himself as a contributing member of society and, above all, prevent his return to the Congo.

3. Subject appeared to be primarily a resettlement problem, therefore, Orme K. DARONNAT was assigned the Case Officer responsibility.

4. Since adequate documentation was a primary consideration for successful resettlement, Subject was briefed on the relative merits of the types of FEDREP documentation available. Although Headquarters had recommended a backstopped Fremdenpass, subsequent discussions between DARONNAT and MKTOPAZ FRAN representatives indicated a Reiseausweis to be the proper document for permanent resettlement. With the cooperation of ODIBEX Camp King representatives, Subject was interviewed and granted political recognition on the basis of a fabricated story in which he claimed to be a Georgian who defected from East Berlin while with a tourist group.

5. The WIROGUE case suffered a temporary setback when in December 1962 the BUNDESVERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ (BFV), the West German organization responsible for the internal security of the FEDREP became interested in Subject and requested all available information. HARVARD briefed OCA Bonn that Subject was strictly a HARVARD agent resettlement case whose name, recognition interview story, etc were complete fabrications to insure his receiving political recognition and a Reiseausweis. OCA advised the BFV that Subject was of continuing AIS interest and HARVARD resumed its resettlement efforts.

201-233477

(Continued)

DATE TYPED 4 June 64	DATE DISPATCHED
CROSS REFERENCE TO D 32W-120-12/1	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGOA-21573
CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 32W-120-012/01

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

3 Ezla

6. By summer 1963 detailed South American immigration data had been acquired. This disclosed that Subject's language deficiencies, background, knowledge of the Soviet Union, and work history were insufficient to guarantee his smooth processing through the INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION (ICEM). Our investigation also pointed up the fact that until Subject was provided with a detailed life history containing the information required by prospective employers and/or immigration authorities, he was not in a position to be resettled anywhere, let alone South America. As a result, HARVARD's plans to process Subject for immigration had to be cancelled, at least temporarily.

7. A CABEZONE Stage I C.O. was given the task of preparing a life story containing the factual information needed for the filling out of job applications, to stand up under detailed interviews and, if South American immigration ever took place, to satisfy immigration requirements. This legend was given to ODIBEX Camp King representatives who prepared a new political recognition interview story, arranged for the removal of copies of the old story from the various FEDREP files and replaced them with the new.

8. For the first time since Subject had arrived in HARVARD's custody the way was clear for a final resettlement. Subject's Reiseausweis was renewed and he was quitclaimed and advised to work and establish himself in Germany. He was told that nothing more could be done for him and that immigration to South America at anytime in the future would be without KUBARK assistance.

9. HARVARD has done everything to insure Subject a successful future free from problems resulting from his "black" association with KUBARK. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that KUBARK will not have to become involved with any of Subject's future problems. It is also unlikely he will attempt to coerce KUBARK with threats to reveal all. With his criminal background he is aware that he can be brought to the attention of the French authorities. He also believes that KUBARK's position in the FEDREP is such that we have nothing to fear from any action on his part.

10. At the time of this writing Subject has a position as research and development engineer with a Munich firm. He allegedly receives DM 1500 per month, has an expense account and is to receive a percentage of all profits realized from the sale of any devices he develops. He expects to move to Munich permanently about the end of May or June 1964.

11. HARVARD has arranged with CSB Data Processing Branch to publish a noforn drop notice under Subject's documented name so that any attempt to immigrate to any country will bring him to the attention of KUBARK and appropriate action can be taken.

12. It is suggested that Headquarters arrange to apprise HARVARD of any inquiries regarding Subject under his documented name or any of the names listed in Attachment C.

ORME K. DARONNAT

APPROVED:
FREDERICK K. UMNODE

16 JUN

Attachments:
A. Recognition Interview Story (USC)
B. Termination Agreement (USC)
C. Iden List (USC)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - AF, w/atts (USC)
1 - EE, w/o atts
1 - WH, w/o atts
1 - SR, w/o atts
1 - KUPLUM, w/o atts

201-233[illegible]77

14-00000

[illegible] Kommissariat
– Bad Homburg v.d.H. –

s.Zt. Oberursel/Ts., den 23.8.1962

MICROFILMED
JUN 16 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT A TO
DISPATCH NO. EGOA-21573
DATED 4 JUNE 1964

In Begleitung eines Dolmetschers erscheint der angebliche ausländische Flüchtling

Georg Frank **S a n d e r s**,
geb. am 25. Juli 1919 in Tiflis/Georgien/UdSSR.,
wohnhaft in Oberursel/Ts., Hohemarkstr. 145,
Beruf: Elektroingenieur,
Staatsangeh.: ungeklärt, fr. UdSSR,
Eltern: Simon S. und Maria geb. Kantscheli,
beide verstorben,

und erklärt wie folgt:

" Ich weiß, weshalb ich heute hier befragt werden soll. Mein Dolmetscher hat mir auch gesagt, daß ich die Wahrheit angeben soll, da sonst die Gefahr besteht, daß meine Anerkennung als ausländischer Flüchtling gefährdet ist.

Ich wurde als ältestes Kind meiner Eltern geboren. Ich hatte noch einen Bruder, der aber kurz nach der Geburt verstorben ist.

Mein Vater war von Beruf Ingenieur, ist aber bereits im Jahre 1924 verstorben. Ich selbst kann mich an meinen Vater nicht mehr erinnern. Meine Mutter ist im Jahre 1934 an einem Herzschlag verstorben. Sie war zuletzt Kassiererin in einem Schuhreparatur-Geschäft in Tiflis.

Meine Schulzeit begann im Jahre 1927, wo ich an meinem Geburtsort bis 1934 die dortige Deutsche Schule besuchte. Es war eine Schule, in der nach deutschen Gesichtspunkten unterrichtet wurde. Wir bedienten uns zu damaliger Zeit der deutschen Sprache und hatten nur wenige Stunden, wo wir in der georgischen Sprache unterrichtet wurden.

Im Jahre 1934 kam ich, nachdem ich durch eine Prüfung die Befähigung nachweisen mußte, zum Elektro-Technikum in Tiflis, dem auch ein Internat angeschlossen war. Die finanziellen Mittel für diese Schule brauchte ich nicht aufbringen; sondern hatte ein Stipendium.

An dieser Lehranstalt studierte ich vier Jahre Physik, Mathemati Geschichte, Englisch und Literatur.

CS COPY

Encl 1 EGOA 21573

201-233477

Neben der eigentlichen Fachausbildung erhielten wir auch eine vormilitärische Ausbildung, in der Körperschule mit eingeschlossen war. Während der Sommerferien waren die Studenten meist auf einer Kolchose beschäftigt, um so an der Bergung der Ernte mitzuhelfen.
Im Frühjahr 1938 hatte ich meine Abschlußprüfung. Ich bestand diese und erhielt mein Diplom.

Schon von der Lehranstalt wurden uns Arbeitsplätze zugewiesen. Wir mußten uns zu diesem Zweck auf zwei Jahre verpflichten. Ich würde sagen, daß damit eine gewisse Rückzahlung der uns gewährten Gelder zum Zwecke des Studiums geleistet werden sollte. Ich selbst kam zur Maschinen-Traktoren-Station, die später in Reparatur-Technische-Station umbenannt wurde. Mein Arbeitsplatz befand sich in Zschakaja.

Am 28. August 1941 wurde ich zur russischen Armee eingezogen. Ich kam nach Baku. Es handelte sich um eine Flakeinheit, die in der Saljanskiji Kaserne untergebracht war. Nach meiner zweimonatigen Grundausbildung wurde ich als Kraftfahrer ausgebildet.
Zum Schluß meiner Dienstzeit war ich Fahrer des Divisionskommandeurs, Oberstleutnant GURGENIDSE.
Im Jahre 1944 wurde ich zum Feldwebel befördert. Mit diesem Dienstgrad habe ich auch 1946 die Armee verlassen. Es war im September. Ich kehrte wieder an meinen früheren Arbeitsplatz zurück, den ich bis zu meiner Flucht innehatte.

Nun zu meinen Fluchtgründen:

Trotzdem ich in einem kommunistischen Land geboren und erzogen worden war, begann ich doch schon frühzeitig zu verstehen, daß für die Einzelperson keine persönliche Freiheit bestand.
Es war mir auch klar, daß persönlicher Aufstieg nicht von dem Talent und der Rechtschaffenheit eines Menschen abhing, sondern von dem Ausmaß der politischen Betätigung. Ich erkannte die kommunistischen Lügen, da die Wirklichkeit so verschieden von der offiziellen Propaganda war. Während und nach dem Kriege traf ich Menschen, die westliche Länder besucht hatten und ich war in der Lage, Bruchstücke der Wahrheit über den Unterschied in den Lebensarten aus diesen Erzählungen abzuleiten, obwohl alle diese Berichte sehr vorsichtig vorgebracht wurden.

Ich hörte schließlich auch noch westliche Sender, um mich zu orientieren. Meine feindliche Einstellung zum Kommunismus wurde immer stärker und es wurde für mich immer schwieriger, mich mit meinen Redensarten zu kontrollieren und diesen Gefühlen nicht offen Ausdruck zu verleihen.

Im Juni 1962 kam schließlich der Sicherheitsdienst zu mir an meinen Arbeitsplatz. In der anschließenden Vernehmung wurde ich beschuldigt, ein langjähriges Mitglied einer georgischen Widerstandsgruppe zu sein und regierungsfeindliche Außerungen getan zu haben. Obwohl ich solche Außerungen bei verschiedenen Gelegenheiten gemacht hatte und deshalb schuldig im Sinne des letzteren Teils der Anschuldigungen war, konnte ich fühlen, daß der Sicherheitsdienst nicht genügend Informationen besaß. Ich verneinte deshalb alle Anschuldigungen.

Nach langem Verhör wurde ich in meine Wohnung entlassen und erhielt die Auflage, meinen Wohnsitz nicht zu verlassen. Außerdem wurde mir erklärt, daß ich später vom Sicherheitsdienst noch hören würde. Alle diese Umstände ließen in mir den Gedanken der Flucht kommen. Ich lebte fortan immer in der Angst, vom Sicherheitsdienst verhaftet zu werden. Nach reiflicher Überlegung setzte ich am 25.6.62, also drei Tage nach dem Verhör, meine Fluchtabsichten in die Tat um.

Wie an jedem Tag, so verließ ich auch zu gewohnter Zeit, gegen o7.oo Uhr, meine Wohnung. Anstatt aber zum Arbeitsplatz zu gehen, verließ ich die Stadt in Richtung Samtredia. Den Zug getraute ich mir nicht zu benutzen, weil ich der Meinung war, daß dieser überwacht wird. Nach etwa 2 oder 3 Kilometer wurde ich auf der Landstrasse von einem Lastwagen aufgenommen, der mich nach Samtredia brachte. Dort bestieg ich dann schließlich den Zug nach Baku, der gegen 14.oo Uhr ankam. Ich versteckte mich in der Folgezeit bis zur Dunkelheit. Ich ging am See entlang. Nach etwa 2 Kilometer Fußmarsch vernichtete ich meinen Paß (Personalausweis) und vergrub meine Kleidung. Ich mußte nämlich von diesem Ort versuchen, schwimmend türkisches Gebiet zu erreichen. Es mag unglaublich klingen, aber ich schwamm bis gegen o4.oo Uhr früh. An Land gekommen, wußte ich nicht, wo ich mich befand. In einer Hütte fand ich aber Gegenstände, aus denen ich annehmen mußte, mich noch innerhalb des sowjetischen Teritoriums zu befinden.

-4-

Ich versteckte mich wieder und wartete bis zum Abend. Ich ging schließlich wieder ins Wasser und schwamm nun der Küste entlang. Ich mühte mich wieder die ganze Nacht ab, ohne daß ich genau wußte, wo ich mich befand. Im Morgengrauen ging ich wieder an Land. Ich hielt mich zunächst in einer Höhle versteckt. Im Laufe der nachfolgenden Stunden tre traf ich einen Knaben von etwa 11 oder 12 Jahren. Von ihm erfuhr ich, daß ich mich auf türkischem Gebiet, in der Nähe von Kemal-Pascha befand. Da ich immer noch nicht Sicherheit hatte, versteckte ich mich weiterhin zwei Tage. Der Not gehorchend, näherte ich mich schließlich der Ortschaft Kemal-Pascha. Mit meinen russischen Sprachkenntnissen konnte ich mich den herbeigekommenen Personen nicht verständlich machen. Man bedrohte mich mit Stöcken und Äxten, bis ich sie schließlich überzeugen konnte, daß ich aus dem russ. Gebiet käme und um Hilfe bitte. Männer der Ortschaft übergaben mich schließlich den militärischen Behörden in Kemal-Pascha.

Bei meiner Flucht war ich lediglich mit einer Badehose bekleidet. An den Füßen hatte ich Schwimmflossen. Weiter trug ich ein Klappmesser bei mir, mit dem ich mich im Notfalle verteidigen wollte. -
Durch türkische Behörden kam ich nach Erserum und von dort nach Istanbul, in das Flüchtlingslager. Am 6.7.62 übernahmen mich US-Behörden, die mich noch am gleichen Tage nach Deutschland brachten.
Das ist die Wahrheit. Ich bitte, mich als ausl. Flüchtling anzuerkennen, weil ich aus politischen Gründen und aus Angst vor Verfolgung meine Heimat verlassen habe.
Ich bin bisher noch nicht bestraft.
Wegen meiner Zukunftsabsichten befragt, erkläre ich, daß ich auszuwandern gedenke. Es ist aber auch nicht ausgeschlossen, daß ich mich in Europa niederlasse.
Das ist alles, was ich von mir aus und auf Befragen sagen kann.
Die in russischer Sprache geführte Verhandlung habe ich verstanden und bestätige die Richtigkeit durch meine Unterschrift.

G. Sanders
Geschlossen: v. g. u.

Rögner
(Rögner) KOM

201-233477

MICROFILMED
JUN 16 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1P

TERMINATION AGREEMENT

The undersigned hereby acknowledges that a contractual relationship has heretofore existed between him and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as ("the Government"). The Government has fully and completely satisfied all of its obligations to the undersigned.

The undersigned on behalf of himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns hereby releases and forever discharges the Government, its officers, agents and employees from any and all debts, claims, benefits or demands arising out of the above mentioned contractual relationship.

The undersigned fully understands and appreciates the fact that the prior relationship between the parties and all information and knowledge acquired in the course of said relationship (particularly with reference to persons and methods employed by the Government) are the property of said Government and constitute military secrets affecting its security. The undersigned knows and understands that these are protected by German Law under the provisions of Annex A to the Convention on Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Government is highly appreciative of the excellent services heretofore rendered by the undersigned. However, to preserve the security above mentioned, it is further understood and agreed that both parties shall hereafter disavow that the relationship ever existed.

The undersigned further agrees he possesses no right, title or interest in any information or knowledge arising out of said relationship and he further solemnly swears that he will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, conduct or any other means the fact of said relationship nor any such knowledge or information arising therefrom except as authorised in writing by the same official of the Government as that who witnesses this oath.

Frankfurt/Main, this 3rd day of March 1964

George F Sanders (L.S.)

WITNESS:

William [illegible]

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT B TO
DISPATCH NO. EGOA-21573
DATED 4 JUNE 1964

CS COPY

Encl 2 EGOA 21573

201-233477

1P

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT C TO
DISPATCH NO. EGOA-21573
DATED 4 JUNE 1964

IDEN LIST

DAVID de PANASKHET

GEORG REINER

DAVID TZITZICHVILI

MICROFILMED
JUN 16 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Encl 3 EGOA 21573

201-23[illegible]

file WIROGUE

EXCERPT FROM EGOA 21181 -- HARVARD RESETTLEMENT SUMMARY FOR JANUARY 1964:

WIROGUE

Subject's new legend has been translated into German and given to the ODIBEX Camp King representatives who will use it as the basis for a new political recognition interview story. As soon as the new story is completed copies will be placed in the various files to replace copies of the old story. At this point, Subject's documentation will be completely in order and actual resettlement should be accomplished in a few days.

201-233477

SECRET

HARVARD

SUMMARY OF RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITY

1 - 30 September 1963

I. DEFECTOR CASES:

A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-109	Subject moved out of HARVARD housing during the month after having located appropriate employment with CAMANTILLA'S assistance. The results of Subject's T.B. tests were obtained on 24 September and are negative. He will continue in his current job and concentrate on further English study until December when he will again be considered for immigration to the U.S. under P.L. 86-648.
DS-129	Through the assistance of MKTOPAZ and ODIBEX, Subject received his Fremdenpass and was interviewed for FEDREP political recognition. Shortly after being turned over to CAMANTILLA, who is assisting him in his efforts to obtain local employment, the need for additional interrogation arose. While his job hunt was, therefore, slightly delayed, it should recommence shortly. Due to the sensitive nature of Subject's documentation problem (having been previously granted refugee recognition by another country), HARVARD will continue to maintain contact with him until the Reiseausweis is issued.
IDEN-271*	Subject immigrated to the U.S. 19 September 1963 without HARVARD assistance or CAMANTILLA sponsorhip.

B. Received During Reporting Period:

DS-130	Profession: Electro-technician; designer of high voltage power circuits Rec'd by HARVARD: 20 September 1963 From: CABEZONE Nationality: Czechoslovakian Age: 27 No of Dependents: 0 Resettlement Officer: Orme K. DARONNAT

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and declassification

SECRET

201-233477

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-130 (Cont)	HARVARD Resettlement Aims: Subject's processing for immigration to the U.S. under Public Law 414 has already been completed. He is scheduled to depart 28 October 1963 via an ICEM flight for New York where CAMANTILLA will meet and assist. Until this departure date he will occupy HARVARD housing and continue his study of English.
DS-133	Profession: Mechanical Engineer Rec'd by HARVARD: 30 September 1963 From: CABEZONE Nationality: Polish Age: 30 No. of Dependents: 0 Resettlement Officer: Arthur A. LIFALL HARVARD Resettlement Aims: Immigration to Canada (see EGOA 20576, dated 24 September 1963).

C. Former Defector Resettlement Cases (or Cases Still in Stage II) Requiring HARVARD Action During the Reporting Period:

DS-924	Camp King informed HARVARD that Subject had applied for a Reiseausweis renewal in order to visit the FEDREP. Headquarters' answer to HARVARD's query re adviseability of issuing renewal will be passed to the appropriate authorities, thru Camp King, when received.
DS-125	While immigration to the U.S. under P.L. 86-648 was initiated for Subject and his family (see EGOA-20570, 18 September 63), HARVARD now feels his best chances for U.S. entry, in view of his long C.P. membership, is under P. L. 414 first preference (see FRAN 2170). Preliminary discussions have been held with AMCONGEN and an advisory opinion will be obtained.
DS-127	Application for U.S. immigration under P. L. 86-648 has been formally turned down by the local I&NS office. CABEZONE is currently awaiting Headquarters reaction to EGOA-20573, 19 September which recommends P. L. 110 handling.

* Resettled during the reporting period. Subject will not appear on next month's or subsequent HARVARD reports unless and until some new unforeseen aspect of the case arises requiring additional HARVARD action. In this event the case will be listed and the new action described under Category IC.

II. AGENT CASES:

Case Name	Action Taken
A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:	
CAHAVOC - 1	Subject continues to be of interest to FOB and will occupy HARVARD housing until he is successful in his attempts to find an apartment on the economy.
WIROGUE	Background material for Subject's new legend has been acquired with the assistance of Stage I. HARVARD hopes to begin the final stages of Subject's resettlement in the near future.
IDEN-264*	Subject immigrated to the U.S. 5 September 1963 on PAA FLT #73.
IDEN-272	The initial stages of FEDREP political recognition have been completed. Subject's position has been legalized to the extent that he is now looking for employment on the economy.
IDEN-274	With the assistance of CAMANTILLA Subject commenced his photographic training in Hamburg on 10 September. Upon completion of his schooling (in early 1964) he will be given the monetary grant awarded by Headquarters as compensation for his eight-year imprisonment.
B. Received During Reporting Period:	
NONE	
C. Former Agent Resettlement Cases Requiring HARVARD Action During Reporting Period:	
AEBLANKET-2	HARVARD C. O. ORME K. DARONNAT and former HARVARD C. O. DAVID R. REINBOLD visited Subject at her request. She asked for help for a girlfriend who had become involved in possible foreign intelligence activities in the local area. Arrangements were made for REINBOLD to introduce an FOB/CE C.O. to Subject.
AEPOLE-25	Additional correspondence has been exchanged with Subject in connection with his attempting to establish with FEDREP authorities that he contributes to the support of his children living in the USSR.

DIHESITANT	At the request of FOB/SAT, HARVARD has been in contact with AMCONGEN FRAN to establish most expeditious way for Subject to be processed for immigration to the U.S. Immigration is complicated by the fact that Subject and wife are residing in another country and for security reasons must not be processed at the U.S. Consulate located in that country.
TULANCE-1	HARVARD continues to maintain contact with Subject through our local post box and is cabling Headquarters and other appropriate KUBARK elements the gist of each letter received.
IDEN-238,241, 242	HARVARD maintains periodic contact with this family and continues to pay the widow of IDEN 238 a monthly subsistence payment of DM 150.
IDEN-239 & 240	HARVARD arranged for a meeting between the local representative of CAMANTILLA and an FOB/SAT C. O. to discuss the possibility for continued financial assistance to Subjects through U.S.E.P.
IDEN 263	The New York office of CAMANTILLA has brought to HARVARD's attention the recurring difficulties which it has had with Subject. This problem was discussed with FOB/SAT and a summary of the situation forwarded to Headquarters in FROB 5827.

* Resettled during the reporting period. Subject will not appear on next month's or subsequent HARVARD reports unless and until some new unforeseen aspect of the case arises requiring additional HARVARD action. In this event the case will be listed and the new action described under Category IIC.

EXCERPT FROM EGOA 20791 (HARVARD Resettlement Summary)

October 63

WIROGUE

Subject's new legend has been prepared and will be used to provide the details for a new FEDREP political recognition interview. The next step will be to arrange to have the new interview story substituted for the old thus paving the way for Subject's permanent resettlement.

201-133477

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
EGOT-20212

TO
Chief, EE

INFO
Chief of Base, Bonn

FROM
Chief, Coordination & Support Base/Frankfurt

DATE
9 September 1963

SUBJECT
CABEZONE/HARVARD
Backstopping of Resettlement & Disposal Cases

ACTION REQUIRED
FYI

(CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCES:
A. FRAN 6399
B. BONN 4139
C. EGOS 11325
D. EGOT 18868

1. References represent an initial misunderstanding of the problem of WIROGUE which is now being clarified.

2. The problem of backstopping of resettlement and disposal cases has been carefully reviewed by elements of CSB concerned including CABEZONE, MKTOPAZ and CATHINK. In this connection there is attached a copy of a memorandum dated 27 August 1963 from Chief/MKTOPAZ which outlines the current situation. As will be noted MKTOPAZ has and will expand its capability for procurement of operational documents independent of the 513th ICG. It is believed that the present procedures for backstopping of resettlement and disposal cases should be continued. In theory an independent capability is desirable but not really practical at this time. Creation of an independent capability for backstopping resettlement cases would require duplication of the procedures and practices now followed by Mr. Willms of the 513th ICG. In addition, we would not have the advantage of hiding our cases from the Germans among other Army disposal cases. Furthermore, USAREUR has requested notification prior to contact with any German officials of any sensitive cases which we may desire to handle without military assistance--see USAREUR letters dated 7 August 1961 and 23 March 1962, attached. With considerable effort it would be possible to backstop some of our resettlement and disposal cases directly with German officials. It would be quiet difficult, however, to prevent the Army from learning of such action which is contrary to the USAREUR request.

3. It is possible that the FEDREP will enact new legislation on the control of non-German refugees. Likewise, new FEDREP emergency laws may affect this type of case. We will keep this situation under review and in the event the circumstances change will initiate appropriate action.

NORRIS D. WALLACH

Attachments: (H/W)
1. Memo dtd 27 Aug '63
2. USAREUR Ltr dtd 7 Aug '61
3. USAREUR Ltr dtd 23 Mar '62

Distribution:
2 - C/EE w/atts
1 - COB/Bonn w/o atts

201-233477

Follow #1 to Richmond

Turn RIGHT off #1 on #161 approximately 2 miles before you reach Richmond City limits.

Follow #161 over 5¢ toll bridge to #360.

Turn right on #360 to #153.

Turn left on #153 to #460.

Turn RIGHT on #460 to Blackstone.

Turn LEFT on road to main gate - Camp Pickett

At Main Gate - call Bldg. No. 2813. Operator will place call. Escort will meet you at main gate.

Bldg. 2813 - Ext. 4120

ask for:
SKI
RAY
ROY

David [illegible]

201-233477

Leopoldville October 3

Dear Dan

As you can see I am back to Leo and in the same time to my job in the Air Force. I have crossed the river from Brazzaville to Leo without any trouble though that was and still is closed to anyone without a diplomatic passport.

So far so well but I have to ask you to send me back, soon as possible my two Laisser Passer I have show you when I was at Alban Towers Hotel. Those laisser-passer are very important for my own security and my travelling and it will be almost impossible to find two other new identification cards like that. The situation is a little tense and troubled. The white peoples are nervous because the feelling of insecurity between Gizenga's growing influence and the today's Government failure to find the right solution for the present conflict disorganisation of this country and his ruin for the Welfare of the Society. When I cam back to my office everybody was happy to see me again and the secretary of the Defense minister told me "What happen to you Mr Reiner, we are glad to have you here now, we need you very much (?!!). I hope your health is good now.

Meanwhile I have seen Norman and I have let him know what I was doing now. I suppose he will make his report to you. If you want take contact with me you can always write to [illegible] or if you would like in an other way for some reason you can write to

Monsieur Georg Rainer
B.P. 2949
Leopoldville/Congo.

This is my mail-box. I'll be glad to do any thing in my possibility.

Give my best regard to Pat and please give him my adress also to Max wich I have seen in Frankfurt/Main just two days befor my departure at the Airport.

I hope you are in good health.

George.



ATTACHMENT #1

201-231077

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

INDEX-CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
NO INDEX-CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-233477
CROSS REFERENCE TO FILE NO.
FILE RID__DESTROY__RET. TO BRANCH
SIGNATURE

1
2
3
4
5
6

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, ~~AF 4~~, SR 6, S/C 2
EE4

S E C R E T 191510Z

FRAN INFO DIR FROB CITE BONN 4350

HARVARD LCIMPROVE WIROGUE

19 MAR 1963 IN39733

REF FRAN 7407, (NOT TO FROB) (IN 68799) *

SUGGEST MOST DISCREET WAY OBTAIN INFO REQUIRED IS QUERY TO CARAVEL.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *STATED FOR RESETTLEMENT PURPOSES IT IMPORTANT HARVARD KNOW WHETHER WIROGUE LISTED INTERPOL.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
RID/PS	
RID/FI	
AF/7	
DESTROY ✓	

201-233477

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

R I COPY

201-233477

INDEX-CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 233477
NO INDEX-CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
CROSS REFERENCE TO FILE NO.
FILE RID__DESTROY__~~RET. TO BRANCH~~ X
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1	3	4
2		5
3		6

ACTION: ~~FE 6~~ AF/7

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, ~~AF 4~~, SR 6, S/C 2
FE 4

RI COPY

S E C R E T 181611Z

BONN INFO DIR CITE FRAN 7407

HARVARD LCIMPROVE WIROGUE

18 MAR 1963 IN88799

REF FRAN 6489 (IN 62960)*

1. FOR RESETTLEMENT PURPOSES IT IMPORTANT HARVARD KNOW WHETHER WIROGUE LISTED INTERPOL. CAN BONN DISCREETLY MAKE THIS DETERMINATION?

2. NO FRAN TRACES UNDER NAMES DAVID TZITZICHVILI OR DAVID DE PANASKHET DPOB 20 DEC 1919 TIFLIS, USSR.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED CAVATA BE ADVISED WIRAGE WILL PROBABLY BE RESETTLED OUTSIDE GERMANY.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	M
RID/MIS	H
~~RID/APS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
AF/7	
~~DESTROY~~	

201-233477

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

ATE : 6 FEB 63

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : FRANKFURT

CTION: EE 6

NFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, AF 4, SR 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	5	4	ci/cip
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 6 15112 63

ROUTINE

John

BONN INFO DIR BRLN CITE FRAN 6489

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS WIROGUE
REF BONN 4139 (IN 60901) *

IN62960

1. ORDER KEEP CAVATA OUT OF WIROGUE CASE THEY MAY BE INFORMED WIROGUE IS OF CONTINUING OPS INTEREST TO AIS. HOWEVER AS HARVARD EXPLAINED DURING OCA VISIT BONN 5 FEB WIROGUE WAS AND IS STRICTLY RESETTLEMENT CASE OF NO AIS OPS INTEREST.

2. SUGGEST CAVATA ALSO BE ADVISED WIROGUE WILL PROBABLY BE RESETTLED OUTSIDE GERMANY.

West German Internal Security Service

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * REQUESTED INFORM CAVATA THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS.

201-233477

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

4-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 2 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, AF 4, SR 6, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 5
2
3 6
4
5
6

FEB 2 1419Z 63

ROUTINE

John

PRITY FRAN INFO DIR BRLN CITE BONN 4139

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS *IROGUE

file

IN 60901

REF FRAN 6399 (cn 60224)

1. SINCE THIS IS APPARENTLY A KUBARK CASE AND ORIGINAL QUERY CAME FROM CAVATA TO KUBARK ELEMENT OCA, FAIL UNDERSTAND NEED FOR TRANSMITTING REPLY TO CAVATA VIA 513TH REP. ALSO DO NOT FEEL IT NECESSARY CONTACT CAVATA CHIEF IN RESPONSE ROUTINE WORKING LEVEL CAVATA QUERY. THIS MAY BE ATTEMPT ON WILLMS PART TO FIND EXCUSE VISIT CAVATA CHIEF.

2. IF THIS ROUTINE CABEZONE CASE FEEL STAGE I DEBRIEFING AND ASSESSMENT WHICH NORMALLY PASSED CAVATA WILL SATISFY LATTER'S NEEDS. ON OTHER HAND IF KUBARK HAS CONTINUING OPERATIONAL INTEREST AS PARAGRAPH 2 IMPLIES WE CAN INFORM CAVATA ACCORDINGLY THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS.

3. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *FRAN ASKED BONN ADVISE IF DESIRES WILLMS CHECK IN WITH BONN PRIOR VISIT CAVATA.

201-233477

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	5	4	Caflope
2		5	
3	C	6	

DATE : 1 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, AF 4, S/C 2

6

FEB 1 1420Z 63

ROUTINE

John

PRITY BONN INFO DIR BRLN CITE FRAN 6399

Soft file

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS WIROGUE

IN 60224

REF EGNA 25083

1. SUBJ REF IS HARVARD AGENT DISPOSAL CASE WIROGUE REGISTERED CAMP KING WHERE HE PROCESSED 28 AUG 62 FOR POLITICAL RECOGNITION IN ORDER LEGALIZE HIM FOR RESETTLEMENT.

2. CASE DISCUSSED WITH MR. JOHN WILLMS WHO WILL VISIT BONN 5 FEB AND WILL TAKE MATTER UP DIRECTLY WITH CHIEF, CAVATA TELLING HIM THIS AIS CASE AND ASK HIM NOT PURSUE.

3. PLS ADVISE PRIORITY IF YOU DESIRE WILLMS CHECK IN WITH YOU PRIOR HIS VISIT CAVATA.

END OF MESSAGE

201-233477

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FILE NO. 201-235477

SECRET

DATE : 1 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature: Kelly

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 1 1420Z 63

ROUTINE

PRITY BONN INFO DIR BRLN CITE FRAN 6399

[illegible] 201-

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS WIROGUE

IN 60224

REF EGNA 25083

1. SUBJ REF IS HARVARD AGENT DISPOSAL CASE WIROGUE REGISTERED CAMP KING WHERE HE PROCESSED 28 AUG 62 FOR POLITICAL RECOGNITION IN ORDER LEGALIZE HIM FOR RESETTLEMENT.

2. CASE DISCUSSED WITH MR. JOHN WILLMS WHO WILL VISIT BONN 5 FEB AND WILL TAKE MATTER UP DIRECTLY WITH CHIEF, CAVATA TELLING HIM THIS AIS CASE AND ASK HIM NOT PURSUE.

3. PLS ADVISE PRIORITY IF YOU DESIRE WILLMS CHECK IN WITH YOU PRIOR HIS VISIT CAVATA.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
[illegible]	W
[illegible]	H.
~~DESTROY~~	

201-233477

FORM 1389a

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. (35)

FILE NO. 201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : John Kelly
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : 18 January 1963

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, CDC, C/EE 3, C/SR 4, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value, Destroy ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature: J Kelly

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

22 [illegible] 31 09

DEFERRED
XX ROUTINE

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12271

~~RYBAT~~ HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE 12271

See AF/5 soft file.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

RI COPY

	INITIAL
RID/AN	[illegible]
RID/MIS	
~~RID/RS~~	
RID/FI ~~RID/[illegible]~~	
~~DESTROY~~	

18 [illegible]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201-233477

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FORM 1389a (35)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : John Kelly
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : [illegible] January 1963

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

22 JAN 63 01 09z

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, CDC, C/EE 3, C/SR 4, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

~~SIG CEN~~

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12271

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

12271

REF EGOA 18888

NOT TO EXCEED $3,000.

JK

1. HQS RECOMMENDS IMPLEMENTATION PARA 3 B REF. CONCUR ODIBEX LETTER ATTESTING TO SOLVENCY AND MONTHLY PAYMENTS RATHER THAN LUMP SUM.

AFRICA AND 2. HAVE CAPABILITY PROVIDE IN GENERAL TERMS INFO REQUESTED PARA 3 D REF IF LEGEND AND SPECIFIC DATES SUPPLIED.

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

DC/EE/G/B
AF/B&F
AF/5
SR/6/Support
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/COPS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-233477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

ATE : 10 JAN 63 JM

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : FRANKFURT C/AF-3

CTION : ~~C/EE 3~~ AF/5

NFO : ADDP, C/CI, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

C/EE-3

[illegible]
No CS Index Value Dest.
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
None required ☒
Signature: [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH 43-43

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JAN 10 1423Z 63

ROUTINE

IN 47630

TO DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 5867

~~RYBAT~~ HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

See AF/5 Soft file

RI COPY

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH 43-43

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	ah
RID/MIS	
~~RID/[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 071
10 JAN 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/AF 3

INFO : C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING	
1 6	4
2	5
3	6

JAN 10 1821Z 63

ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

IN 47630 A FRAN 5867

TO INFO CITE

John

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM EE TO AF BY A. STEEL, EE, EXT. 6023 IN COORDINATION WITH SANDRA STEEL, AF, EXT. 5032.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201-233477

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

4-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1 5	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 10 JAN 63 JM

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

JAN 10 1423Z 63

ROUTINE

IN 47630

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

TO DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 5867

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

PLS REPLY EGOA-18888.

END OF MESSAGE

John ?

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

S-E-C-R-E-T

HARVARD

MONTHLY RESETTLEMENT SUMMARY

1 - 31 January 1963

AGENTS AND IDENTITIES	CASE OFFICER	STATUS
CAHAVOC-1	DARONNAT	Subject's papers for employment with the Bundeswehr-sprachdienst are still being processed. In the meantime Subject continues to occupy HARVARD housing.
CANDARE-3	REINBOLD	Subject's housing problem remains unchanged. There is no indication when the problem will be solved.
DMMARGIN-3	REINBOLD	Subject's political recognition and Reiseausweis are expected early in February. At that time the case will be closed.
* WIROGUE	DARONNAT	HARVARD will begin making arrangements for Subject's South American immigration processing.
IDENTITY-264	DARONNAT	HARVARD expects Subject's visa to be issued in March.
IDENTITY-266	REINBOLD	Subject will remain in HARVARD housing until his father, CANDARE-3, locates housing of his own.
DS-997	DARONNAT	Profession: Electrical engineer Rec'd by HARVARD: 15 January 1963 From: CABEZONE Age: 34 Nationality: Czech Resettlement Aims: United States Immigration Evac. Code: B Subject will be processed for immigration to the United States under PL-414.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

201-233477

IFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING			
		4	
		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GENEVA

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, RI/AN DUMMY, [illegible] 3, C/FE 6, RF 2

per CSN 43-43

S E C R E T 091615Z

FRAN INFO DIR BERN CITE GNVA 5574 (MIDDAUGH ACTING) 19 AUG 63 IN 96722

INK WIROGUE ~~RYBAT~~

Wirogue Soft

REF EGOA 19702

1. REGRET DELAY RESPONDING REF. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER YOU STILL INTERESTED CONVERSATION WITH INSTRUMENT 17. LATTER SLATED LEAVE GNVA NEAR FUTURE FOR PCS ICEM HONGKONG.

2. INDEX 201-116033.

S E C R E T

201-233477

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

WIROGUE

Soft file

SECRET

HARVARD

SUMMARY OF RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITY

1 - 31 July 1963

I. DEFECTOR CASES:

A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-102	Subject's processing for immigration to the U.S. under PL-110 is continuing and it is expected that he will depart in the near future.
DS-105*	Subject immigrated to CANADA 8 July 1963 on ICEM ship MS ARCADIA. Case closed.
DS-108	Subject continues to study English while his processing for immigration to the U.S. under the Parolee Act is completed. He will give up his job in Ruesselsheim early next month and return to Frankfurt.
DS-109	Subject's processing for immigration to the U.S. under the Parolee Act has been deferred until December 1963. Due to a change in the right lung, discovered while comparing recent and earlier x-rays, the U.S.P.H.S. has requested the deferment until sputum tests and future x-rays indicate the condition stabilized or eliminated.
DS-129	Arrangements are being made through ODIBEX for Subject to receive FEDREP political recognition. CAMANTILLA will then assist in finding a job and housing on the local economy. In the meantime Subject is taking German language lessons.
IDEN-271	Subject's life story has been prepared with appropriate changes regarding his defection in Ireland. The story will be presented to FEDREP authorities for political recognition and Subject will be found work and housing on the local economy.

B. Received During Reporting Period:

NONE

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

201-233477

SECRET

C. Former Defector Resettlement Cases (or Cases Still in Stage II) Requiring HARVARD Action During the Reporting Period:

DS-964	HARVARD has learned through CAMANTILLA that Subject and wife have returned to the U.S. where both have found employment and are now apartment hunting.
DS-984	At Subject's request HARVARD made arrangements to obtain a duplicate of the deregistration form covering Subject's move from Frankfurt to Neuss in July 1962.
DS-999	Subject and family are being assisted in obtaining West German citizenship.
DS-127	Subject's Communist Party membership was discussed informally but at some length with the local ODURGE chief. Since the latter believed that Subject's membership would, according to the strict interpretation of the law, be ruled voluntary, processing for immigration to the U.S. under Public Law 110 has been requested.

* Resettled during the reporting period. Subject will not appear on next month's or subsequent HARVARD reports unless and until some new unforeseen aspect of the case arises requiring additional HARVARD action. In this event the case will be listed and the new action described under Category I C.

II. AGENT CASES:

A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:

Case Name	Action Taken
CAHAVOC-1	Subject has begun to look for an apartment on the local economy. In the meantime he will continue to occupy HARVARD housing.
WIROGUE	Subject's legend is being rewritten and when finished will provide the basis for a more plausible political recognition story. HARVARD hopes that with the substitution of the new story for the old, positive steps can be taken for Subject's resettlement.
IDEN-264	The morale problem created by the slow moving quota under which Subject is registered for U.S. immigration has required HARVARD to register her for immigration under the Parolee Act. It is expected that Subject will receive her visa in August or September but the Parolee Act will be used in the event the quota continues to remain unchanged.

IDEN-272	HARVARD has been informed that Subject, under no condition, should be allowed to return to Austria. ODIBEX is exploring additional possibilities for Subject to stay and work in the FEDREP without restrictions.
IDEN-274	Subject has been enrolled in a 3 month photography school located in Hamburg. It commences in early September and is designed to prepare students for taking the examination for the masters certificate in photography, a must for someone working in this field in the FEDREP. In the interim, Subject is studying photography on his own, utilizing borrowed MKTOPAZ equipment.

B. Received During Reporting Period:

NONE

C. Former Agent Resettlement Cases Requiring HARVARD Action During Reporting Period:

TULANCE-1	HARVARD continues to maintain contact with Subject through our local post box and is cabling Headquarters and other appropriate KUBARK elements the gist of each letter received.
IDEN-238, 242, and 244	HARVARD maintains periodic contact with this family and continues to pay the widow of IDEN-238 a monthly subsistance payment of DM 150. The family has been on vacation during the last three weeks.
IDEN-247	Subject contacted HARVARD for the second time in recent weeks. She was visited and the new information passed on to BOB as before (See EGOA-20258, 22 July 1963).
IDEN-267	At Subject's request HARVARD arranged to obtain a duplicate of the deregistration form covering Subject's move from Frankfurt to Neuss in August 1962.

7 Wingren

HARVARD

SUMMARY OF RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITY

1 - 31 May 1963

I. DRC CASES:

Case Name	Action Taken
A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:	
DS-102	A firm offer of employment with ODIBEX is anticipated. Subject will then be processed for immigration to the U.S. under PL-110.
DS-108	Subject has a room and temporary employment in Rüsselsheim. He continues to study English while awaiting immigration to the U.S. under the Parolee Act. He was interviewed on 24 May by an Immigration and Naturalization Service Officer and will presumably receive a visa upon completion of the INS checks.
DS-109	Subject has a room and temporary employment in Rüsselsheim. He continues to study English while awaiting immigration to the U.S. under the Parolee Act. He was interviewed on 24 May by an Immigration and Naturalization Service Officer and will presumably receive a visa upon completion of the INS checks.
B. Received During Reporting Period:	
DS-120	Profession: Aircraft Mechanic and Pilot Rec'd by HARVARD: 31 May 1963 From: CABEZONE Nationality: Bulgarian Age: 23

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

SECRET

201-233477

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-120 (cont)	No. of Deps: 0 Resettlement Officer: Arthur A. LEFALL HARVARD Resettlement Aims: German Economy While Subject aspires to be a U.S. military jet pilot, this is -- from many angles -- unrealistic. It is believed that Subject may, in time, be able to obtain an aircraft mechanic's job in West Germany and possibly a commercial pilot's license. This will probably have to be preceded by work as an automobile mechanic while learning the German language.
IDEN-271*	Profession: Mathematician Rec'd by HARVARD: 7 May 1963 From: CABEZONE Nationality: Czech Age: 40 No. of Deps: 0 Resettlement Officer: Orme K. DARONNAT HARVARD Resettlement Aims: German Economy Subject will be processed for political recognition and appropriate FEDREP documentation. He has been made USEP eligible and through CAMANTILLA will be helped to find work and housing on the local economy.

C. Former Cases (or Cases Still in DRC Stage II) Requiring HARVARD Action During the Reporting Period.

DS-782	HARVARD, at the request of FOB, contacted AMCONGEN Frankfurt to determine the status of Subject's visa application. It was learned that the case can not be written up until necessary checks are completed. It would appear that the case will not be submitted to Washington for at least three weeks.

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-999	Subject and family were forwarded application forms for filling out and return in connection with their obtaining West German citizenship. Subject's new address was pouched BOB in response to the latter's request.
DS-105	Subject visited the Canadian Consulate in Cologne on 30 May to initiate arrangements for his immigration. HARVARD had briefed him on this trip beforehand in accordance with the information contained in OTTA 0710. He was treated extremely well and all went very smoothly. It appears that he will be able to immigrate shortly after completion of his Stage II debriefing.
IDEN-265	At the request of Subject, HARVARD returned several of his original documents providing proof of schooling.
IDEN-273*	While Subject's limited handling by CABEZONE is being completed, HARVARD has initiated the procurement of the necessary West German documentation to allow him to remain and work in West Germany. He will be turned over to CAMANTILLA who will assist him in obtaining employment.

II AGENT CASES:

A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:

Case Name	Action Taken
CAHAVOC-1	Subject began work on 15 May at DM 714 monthly. He will not receive permanent assignment and housing allowance until the end of his probationary period. It is possible, therefore, that he will remain in HARVARD housing until that time.

Case Name	Action Taken
WIROGUE	HARVARD with the assistance of Stage I is attempting to work up a suitable legend for use in immigration to South America consistent with Subject's political recognition interview.
IDEN-264	Subject has found work on the local economy at DM 500 monthly. She will continue to stay in HARVARD housing until her visa is issued and immigration can take place.

B. Received During Reporting Period:

IDEN-272*	Profession: Tool Designer Rec'd by HARVARD: 21 May 1963 From: Vienna Station Nationality: Hungarian Age: 27 No. of Deps: 0 Resettlement Officer: Orme K. DARONNAT HARVARD Resettlement Aims: German Economy Subject will be processed for Aufenthaltserlaubnis and registered. He will be picked up as a refugee case by CAMANTILLA and helped to find work and housing on the local economy.

C. Former Agent Resettlement Cases Requiring HARVARD Action During The Reporting Period:

AEPOLE-25	HARVARD continues to assist Subject in his efforts to establish, for West German income tax purposes, that he has helped contribute to the support of his ex-wife living in the USSR.
DIO-14	A request was received from the State of Maryland asking for information on Subject, who immigrated to the U.S. under PL-110 in January 1956. Since all of Subject's records were transferred with him, the inquiry was referred to Headquarters in EGOA-19903, 28 May 1963.

Case Name	Action Taken
DMMARGIN-3	In response to a query from BOB, HARVARD provided clarification on the purpose and handling of Subject's Einweisungverfuegung.
TULANCE-1	HARVARD continues to maintain contact with Subject through our local post box and is cabling Headquarters and other appropriate KUBARK elements the gist of each letter received.
IDENTITY-238, 241 and 242	HARVARD maintains periodic contact with this family and continues to pay the widow of Identity-238 a monthly subsistence payment of DM 150.
IDENTITY-270	Additional West German documentation (Abmeldebestaetigung, Versicherungskarte and Lohnsteurkarte) were obtained during the month and forwarded to BOB. Subject is currently being processed for West German recognition.

* See Separate Cover Attachment for true name.

III. MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITY:

A. Effective 10 May 1963, Arthur A. LIFALL, Chief, HARVARD, became the Station Case Officer for Project CAMANTILLA (See EGOA-19737).

B. A request for a provisional and full covert security approval on the local ODURGE officer who does the actual interviewing of HARVARD's candidates for immigration has been initiated. CSA has already been obtained on the local ODURGE chief. The additional clearance should allow us to develop an even better working relationship with these officers than has existed heretofore. When received, it is planned to brief both individuals in greater detail on CABEZONE/HARVARD operations.

SECRET

Under Separate Cover Attachment to EGOT-19339, dated 3 June 1963

IDENTITY 271	JANOS, Ludvik (FRAN-8548, 2 May 1963)
IDENTITY 272	SOS, Zsigmund (FROB-4732, 30 April 1963)
IDENTITY 273	RADISAVLJEVIC, Radisav (FRAN-9305, 31 May 1963)

SECRET

DISPATCH

EGGA 19702 EGGA-19702

TO: COS, Geneva

INFO: Chief, EE; Chief, AF; Chief, WH

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-
323-120-012/01

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

DATE: 24 April 1963 24 Apr 63

SUBJECT: WIROGUE/Resettlement

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See Para 10

REFERENCES: DIR 24971, dated 15 March 1963

1. In May 1962 HARVARD took over the task of resettling WIROGUE, a former AELSOX agent candidate and later African Division agent. Per WIROGUE's request and with Headquarters concurrence, HARVARD agreed to help subject in immigrating to South America.

2. Subject was relieved of his documents (Austrian passport in alias and not backstopped) and the first steps were taken to prepare for eventual immigration. It was decided that subject would require documentation which would stand up under the investigation of immigration authorities. Therefore, he was given a new name and with the help of [illegible] and ODIBEX received a Reiseausweis and political recognition from the West German Government. The latter was granted on the basis of a fabricated story in which subject purports to be a defector from the Georgian SSR who escaped while with a tourist group in East Berlin.

3. With documentation in order, subject was sent to the local Columbian Consulate to apply for permission to immigrate, as HARVARD had hopes that subject would be able to process on his own with a minimum of red tape by bypassing refugee organization channels and by having letters of recommendation and letters of solvency. This was not the case, and the Columbian Consulate informed subject he could immigrate only by processing through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.

4. Due to the nature of this case and certain inherent problems, e.g., subject has a criminal record in France and was a long-time resident there, speaks less than fluent Georgian, speaks no Russian even though his story for political recognition indicates he was a lieutenant in the Soviet Army, has no real profession although he is self-taught in the electro-mechanical field and is confident he can pass a job test as master mechanic, etc, it was imperative that the specific details of ICEM processing be learned in order to find out and be prepared for the problems which would certainly arise if he immigrates through ICEM.

5. HARVARD discussed the basic outline of the problem with the Chief, Refugee Migration Section, American Consulate General, Munich and Chief, CAMANTILLA, and established that subject's processing through ICEM would include a security investigation and detailed interviews and job testing, since ICEM is determined that only "high level" types will immigrate through them to South America. HARVARD proposes to continue with the immigration plans and, although Chief RMS and Chief, CAMANTILLA have been most helpful and have been able to learn ICEM procedures taken on refugee migration applicants, they have been forced to refrain from appearing too inquisitive.

201-233477

HARVARD felt that INSTRUMENT 17 as former special assistant to the director of ICEM might be able to help with advice regarding the type of investigation which will be run on subject and possibly be in a position to stop the investigation, especially if it included a check with INTERPOL.

7. HARVARD has been able to establish that subject is not on record with INTERPOL except possibly in France and hopes to have this checked out through CARAVEL within the next month.

8. HARVARD had also hoped that INSTRUMENT 17 might have details of the ICEM mechanism which would be desirable to know for a case of this type, especially since a slip-up might cause embarrassment for KUBARK, ODYOKE and the Federal Republic. With these inside details we would be in a better position to prepare subject for his interview, or, if necessary, to drop the immigration plans. We feel it extremely important to know how many interviews subject will undergo, how searching these interviews will be, the probability that subject will be interviewed in Russian or in Georgian (subject speaks German and fairly good English), what preparations can be made to insure that the processing runs as smoothly as possible, how intensive is the job testing, etc.

9. HARVARD had felt that Charles T. HORDWIN's personal friendship with INSTRUMENT 17 might result in much more additional information regarding the above than would be the case with a meeting between Orme K. DARONNAY and INSTRUMENT 17 alone. Hence CARKZONA cable 7283 to Geneva.

10. It appears HORDWIN's presence is no longer required and therefore it is requested that, if INSTRUMENT 17 is in a position to supply the kind of "inside ICEM" information HARVARD needs, an appointment be made with INSTRUMENT 17 for Orme K. DARONNAY to discuss this problem with him, unless Geneva feels it is in a position to do so on HARVARD's behalf.

ORME K. DARONNAY

APPROVED.

ARNOLD J. LYACK

Distribution:
2 - COS, Geneva
2 - Chief, EE
~~2~~ - Chief, AF
2 - Chief, WH

RYBAT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 034 19 MAR 63 7/10

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : EE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 20 1654Z 63

ACTION CHANGE

D.S.

ROUTINE

IN 89733A BONN 4350

TO INFO CITE

file Wirogue [illegible]

HARVARD LCIMPROVE WIROGUE

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM EE TO AF BY BILL BRENDLE EE IN COORDINATION WITH JOHN KELLY AF EXT 5457.

201. 233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 18 MAR 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : EE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

MAR 20 1654Z 63
ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

IN 88799 FRAN 7407

TO INFO CITE

file Wirogue soft file

HARVARD LCIMPROVE WIROGUE

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM EE TO AF BY BILL BRENDLE EE IN COORDINATION WITH JOHN KELLY AF EXT 5457

201-233477

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

21

SECRET

1	3	4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, AF 4, SR 6, S/C 2

John

S E C R E T 131611Z

BONN INFO DIR CITE FRAN 7407 file dual file

HARVARD LCIMPROVE WIROGUE

18 MAR 1963 IN88799

REF FRAN 6489 (IN 62960)*

1. FOR RESETTLEMENT PURPOSES IT IMPORTANT HARVARD KNOW WHETHER WIROGUE LISTED INTERPOL. CAN BONN DISCREETLY MAKE THIS DETERMINATION?

2. NO FRAN TRACES UNDER NAMES DAVID TZITZICHVILI OR DAVID DE PANASKHET DPOB 20 DEC 1919 TIFLIS, USSR.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED CAVATA BE ADVISED WIRAGE WILL PROBABLY BE RESETTLED OUTSIDE GERMANY.

201-233477

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET 0

~~E~~ 020/22 MAR 63 8/10

ATE : 1 FEB 63

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : FRANKFURT

CTION: EE 6

NFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, AF 4, S/C 2

ADDED: AF 3 (ACTION)

ROUTING

1	5	4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 1 1420Z 63 5

ROUTINE

PRITY BONN INFO DIR BRLN CITE FRAN 6399

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS VIROGUE

~~IN 60224~~

[illegible] file

REF EGNA 25283

1. SUBJ REF IS HARVARD AGENT DISPOSAL CASE VIROGUE REGISTERED CAMP KING WHERE HE PROCESSED 28 AUG 62 FOR POLITICAL RECOGNITION IN ORDER LEGALIZE HIM FOR RESETTLEMENT.

2. CASE DISCUSSED WITH MR. JOHN WILLMS WHO WILL VISIT BONN 5 FEB AND WILL TAKE MATTER UP DIRECTLY WITH CHIEF, CAVATA TELLING HIM THIS AIS CASE AND ASK HIM NOT PURSUE.

3. PLS ADVISE PRIORITY IF YOU DESIRE WILLMS CHECK IN WITH YOU PRIOR HIS VISIT CAVATA.

END OF MESSAGE

201-233477

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 2 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, AF 4, SR 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 2 1419Z 63

ROUTINE

PRITY FRAN INFO DIR BRLN CITE BONN 4139

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS *IROGUE

IN 50901

File
Desk

REF FRAN 6399 (CA 60224)

1. SINCE THIS IS APPARENTLY A KUBARK CASE AND ORIGINAL QUERY CAME FROM CAVATA TO KUBARK ELEMENT OCA, FAIL UNDERSTAND NEED FOR TRANSMITTING REPLY TO CAVATA VIA 513TH REP. ALSO DO NOT FEEL IT NECESSARY CONTACT CAVATA CHIEF IN RESPONSE ROUTINE WORKING LEVEL CAVATA QUERY. THIS MAY BE ATTEMPT ON WILLMS PART TO FIND EXCUSE VISIT CAVATA CHIEF.

2. IF THIS ROUTINE CABEZONE CASE FEEL STAGE I DEBRIEFING AND ASSESSMENT WHICH NORMALLY PASSED CAVATA WILL SATISFY LATTER'S NEEDS. ON OTHER HAND IF KUBARK HAS CONTINUING OPERATIONAL INTEREST AS PARAGRAPH 2 IMPLIES WE CAN INFORM CAVATA ACCORDINGLY THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS.

3. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *FRAN ASKED BONN ADVISE IF DESIRES WILLMS CHECK IN WITH BONN PRIOR VISIT CAVATA.

201-233477

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

S-E-C-R-E-T

HARVARD

MONTHLY RESETTLEMENT SUMMARY

1 - 31 December 1962

AGENTS AND IDENTITIES	CASE OFFICER	STATUS
CAHAVOC-1	DARONNAT	Subject's papers for employment with the Bundeswehrsprachdienst are still being processed. In the meantime Subject continues to occupy HARVARD housing.
CANDARE-3	REINBOLD	Subject is still trying to line up his own housing in the Frankfurt area. In the meantime he, his wife and son are living in a HARVARD apartment.
DYMARGIN-3	REINBOLD	Profession: Barber Rec'd by HARVARD: 27 December 1962 From: BOB Age: 42 Nationality: Yugoslav Resettlement Aims: Local economy Evac. Code: B Subject was processed for his West German documentation and recognition as a bona fide political refugee. He received his Fremdenpass on 27 December 1962 and will get his recognition and Reiseausweis sometime in January 1963. At that time the case will be closed.
WIROGUE	DARONNAT	HARVARD is awaiting Headquarter's advice regarding the implementation of Subject's S.A. immigration.
IDENTITY-264	DARONNAT	AMCONGEN Frankfurt has advised HARVARD that Subject's visa should be issued in late February or early March.
IDENTITY-266	REINBOLD	Subject, the son of CANDARE-3 is helping his parents find housing in the Frankfurt area. He is still gainfully employed.

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-233477

IDENTITY-268	REINBOLD	Subject's refugee processing has been delayed due to the fact he is under 21 years of age and thus necessitates special consideration and treatment. It is expected, however, that he will have his Notaufnahmeverfahren sometime in January 1963.
DS-987	REINBOLD	It is still hoped that Subject's parole processing will be completed in time to enable him and his wife to make the 31 January 1963 ICEM charter flight.
DS-990	REINBOLD	Subject seems to be getting along well on his job as a technical assistant with a construction company. Through CAMANTILLA he is studying German and plans are being made to enroll him in a special school which will enable him to receive his diploma as a geodetic engineer. In the meantime, Headquarters will be queried Re ops interest in Subject to determine whether he should remain on present job or consider employment with RFE or VOA.

SUPPORT CASES

TULANCE-1	DARONNAT	HARVARD continues to maintain contact with Subject through our local postbox. Headquarters and other appropriate KUBARK elements are being kept advised of Subject's status Re: political asylum, etc.
IDENTITY-238, 241, 242	REINBOLD	Steps are being taken to work out the method of payment to the family for the DM 42,000 approved by Headquarters for housing.

DS-856	DARONNAT	Subject is seen from time to time for purposes of identifying pictures of people of Ops interest.
DS-997	DARONNAT	Subject's processing for immigration to the United States under PL-414 is continuing.
DS-998	DARONNAT	Subject's processing for immigration to the United States under PL-414 is continuing. His papers will not be submitted to AMCONGEN until he is re-interviewed by KUBARK staff psychiatrist in January 1963.

RESETTLEMENTS AND DISPOSALS

TULANCE-1	DARONNAT	Subject has been documented and moved to Switzerland where he has requested political asylum. Subject will be handled as a support case until he receives asylum or is permanently resettled.
IDENTITY-269	REINBOLD	Subject's federal refugee processing was completed on 18 December 1962 when he received his Notaufnahmeverfahren. No difficulty is expected with his C Schein processing. Case considered closed.

S-E-C-R-E-T

HARVARD

MONTHLY RESETTLEMENT SUMMARY

1 - 31 October 1962

AGENTS AND IDENTITIES	CASE OFFICER	STATUS
CAHAVOC-1	DARONNAT	Subject has registered with the police and is busily engaged in seeking employment.
CANDARE-3	REINBOLD	Subject flew to Berlin on 18 October to close out his personal matters and arrange for his move to Frankfurt.
TULANCE-1	DARONNAT	In view of OLDMOOR's inability to expend time on TULANCE's resettlement, HARVARD will go ahead, after receiving permission and guidance from Headquarters, with plans to attempt to resettle Subject per DIR 33746.
WIROGUE	DARONNAT	Subject will continue to receive subsistence and housing while the details of his S.A. immigration are worked out.
IDENTITY 264	DARONNAT	Subject has submitted new x-rays to the Public Health Service and must await final decision from Paris. In the meantime, Subject is convalescing from a recent appendicitis operation.
IDENTITY 266	REINBOLD	Subject flew to Berlin with his father, CANDARE 3. He continues to be gainfully employed.
IDENTITY 268	REINBOLD	Profession: Mechanic Rec'd by HARVARD: 31 October 1962 From: BOB Age: 19 Nationality: German HARVARD Resettlement Aims: Local economy Evac. Code: B Subject was assisted in filling out his application form for his Giessen processing and advised on how to procede re obtaining his West German personal documentation and employment. Once his Giessen processing is completed the case will be closed.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

201-233477

DS-989	REINBOLD	Profession: Machine construction engineer Rec'd by HARVARD: 4 October 1962 From: CAPEZONE Age: 34 Nationality: Polish Religion: Roman Catholic HARVARD Resettlement Aims: United States See Resettlements and Disposals.
DS-990	REINBOLD	On 1 November 1962 Subject will be turned over to CAMANTILLA which has made him USEP eligible and arranged to have him study German full time for one month. Prior to the end of November 1962, it is hoped that Subject will be employed by TPFEELING which has expressed an interest in him, or employed on the local economy with a German engineering firm.

SUPPORT CASES

IDENTITY 238, 241, 242	REINBOLD	An all out effort is being made to solve the family's housing problem discussed by HOFSOOS, REINBOLD and the BEVISIONs on 4 October 1962. Steps will also be taken to assist IDENTITY 241 in finding suitable employment.
DS-856	DARONNAT	Subject is seen from time to time for purposes of identifying people of Ops interest.
DS-987	REINBOLD	Word was recently received from Headquarters indicating that Subject and his family's immigration under PL 86-648 can soon be initiated.
DS-992	REINBOLD	It has been decided that due to a previous agreement, KUBARK, under no circumstances, will intervene on behalf of Subject in his immigration.
DS-997	DARONNAT	Although Subject is still in Stage II, processing for immigration to the United States under PL 414 has begun.
DS-998	DARONNAT	Although Subject is still in Stage II, processing for immigration to the United States under PL 414 has begun.

RESETTLEMENTS AND DISPOSALS

DS-974	DARONNAT	Subject and family immigrated to the United States on 2 October 1962 under PL 414. Case closed.
DS-982	DARONNAT	Subject obtained housing and employment on the local economy. Case closed.
DS-989	REINBOLD	Subject immigrated under PL 86-648 on 30 October 1962 via ICEM Flight MISAB 121193. PAIRC, as sponsor, will handle his resettlement. Case closed.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: N. Roberts
UNIT: AF/5
EXT: 5032
DATE: 13 August 1962 1729

ROUTING
1 5
2 CEP
3 Chew
4
5
6

TO: FRANKFURT INFO: LEOPOLDVILLE (BY POUCH)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ~~C/AF 3~~

f. 1 copy

INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, [illegible] H 5, S/C 2

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 65370

TO FRAN INFO LEOP ~~(BY POUCH)~~

CITE DIR 29622

29622

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

REF: DIR 27679

WISH DRAW WIROGUE ATTENTION TO REPORT ARGENTINA ACCEPTING IMMIGRANTS WITHOUT QUOTA RESTRICTIONS. SEEKING FARM AND SKILLED WORKERS, REFUSING WHITE COLLAR. GOOD LIVING CAN BE MADE IN PROVINCES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *OUT 62136, RE RESETTLING WIROGUE.

201-233477

C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AF/5
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-233477

ORIG : N. Roberts
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5032
DATE : 13 August 1962

1729

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 15z

TO : FRANKFURT INFO: LEOPOLDVILLE (BY POUCH)

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/WH 5, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one)
☐
RE file this copy as indicated. ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one)
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature:

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

~~OUT 65370~~

TO FRAN INFO LEOP ~~(BY POUCH)~~

CITE DIR 29622

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

REF: DIR 27679

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/[illegible]US	
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/[illegible]	
~~[illegible]~~	

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG. N. ROBERTS
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5457
DATE : 3 AUGUST 1962

1653 1652

VO

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

3 AUG 62 21 34z

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/~~TSD 2~~, C/EE 3, [redacted] S/C 2

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT62136

TO FRAN INFO LEOP ([redacted]) CITE DIR 27679

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

RB
NR.

REF: A. FRAN 1854 (IN 33838)

B. DIR 15840 (OUT 91968)

1. PER REF B, KURIOT STRONGLY URGES BACKSTOPPED FREMDENPASS BEST LONG RUN VEHICLE RESETTLE AND LEGALIZE WIROGUE (W). WITH FREMDENPASS W COULD EVENTUALLY BECOME CITIZEN OF SELECTED COUNTRY. HQS FEELS W SHOULD OBTAIN OWN RESIDENCE VISA USING FREMDENPASS OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION. SUGGEST COLOMBIA OR BRAZIL BEST AREAS BUT QUESTION HINGES ON WHERE W CAN GET SELF ACCEPTED. KUBARK ABILITY AID LEGALIZATION LIMITED AND BEST HAVE LEGALIZATION BEGIN NOW BACKSTOPPED TO WITHSTAND LATER CHECKS FROM COUNTRY OF CHOICE.

2. CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTRIES MENTIONED REF A PLUS BRAZIL REQUIRE FOUR TO FIVE YEARS CONTINUOUS RESIDENCY. TO ENTER AND REMAIN RESIDENCE VISA REQUIRED WHICH MUST BE RENEWED PERIODICALLY. ALL COUNTRIES QUERIED SAID NEED APPLICATION AT CONSULATE, EXPLANATION OF FINANCIAL MEANS, MANNER INTENDED TO MAKE LIVING, AND POLICE CERTIFICATE FROM COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.

3. HQS SUGGESTS COUNTRIES OF W INTEREST MIGHT BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO AGRICULTURAL AMBITIONS RATHER THAN BUSINESS OR INDUSTRIAL PURSUITS. W ONCE MENTIONED HE INTERESTED OPENING CHICKEN FARM IN CONGO. SINCE W MUST SHOW PLAN FOR EARNING LIVING SUGGEST SIMILAR LINE WITH SAMERICAN COUNTRY APPROACHED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

5-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PAGE TWO

3 [illegible] 21 34z

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 62136

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 27679

FOR RESIDENCE VISA FOR MOST SYMPATHETIC HEARING.

4. SHOULD BE STRESSED FROM BEGINNING THAT ONLY KUBARK CONTACT AFTER W SUCCESSFULLY RESETTLED WILL BE LETTER DROP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED SUBJ RE PREFERENCE S AMERICAN COUNTRY AND STATED THAT WILL GO ANYWHERE.

C/EE

[illegible]

AF/COP/

WH/FI/CPS

EE/G

E.N. KORN-PATTERSON
CAF/5

TSD COORDINATED IN DRAFT BY Jos. BURNIGER

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DUMMY CABLE FORM

DATE

[✓ OUT] IN 62136

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

[✓ DIR] STA 27679

TO FRAN

INFO LEOP

DISTRIBUTION

1.

2.

3.

4.

ACTION

5.

6.

CLASSIFICATION: S TS KAPOK [✓ RYBAT] LAURICLE

REF

SUBJECT

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

SECRET

FORM NO. 586a REPLACES FORM 59-163A
1 APR 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(44)

tg
~~NRH~~
FILE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WIROGUE RESETTLEMENT SAMERICA

DATE: 31 July 1962

FROM: Norm Roberts

I contacted Mrs. Geery, WH/FI Ops, x 5289, Rm 3D4404, for initial discussion concerning resettlement of WIROGUE in some South American country. She in turn brought Mr. Paul Paxton, D/C WH/FI/Ops, into the discussion. They agreed that AF was approaching the correct channel but were not inclined to thank us for our gift.

AF 33838 suggested WIROGUE preferred Venezuela, Chile or Columbia for resettlement. WH stated Chile is out, principally because for a foreigner to establish a legitimate business in face of government regulations is very difficult if not impossible. The same applies but to a lesser extent with Venezuela which is also a more troubled area. Mrs. Geery and Mr. Paxton both expressed the fear that WIROGUE might only add to Venezuela's troubles.

The next step in this problem is to talk to Mr. Marlowe Duffin, D/C Br/I (Columbia and Venezuela) in WH and obtain his reaction. Mrs. Geery wishes to be included in this talk. Brazil was mentioned as the most likely resettlement area but the areas mentioned would be explored first. In any case, the concurrence of the COS involved would have to be obtained. x 5613 Rm 3D0001

We all concurred that the less contact, no matter how indirect, had with WIROGUE the better for all concerned. Mr. Paxton suggested any payments made to WIROGUE might be done from Germany through an international bank thus alleviating the station of even this responsibility. It would also be one less clue to WIROGUE that our representatives might be in the area.

201-233477

SECRET

Mr. E. [illegible] FYI

SECRET

2. Meeting 1400, Norm Roberts, Mrs. Geery and Harlowe Duffin.

Mr. Duffin's viewpoint was that he could not prevent AF sending WIROGUE to any of the countries, but did feel some other division besides WH should assume the responsibility in case of a flap. He pointed out that WH stations were small enough so it would not be difficult for a fairly clever individual to identify the COS and probably the case officers in a station. In this case, and should WIROGUE attempt to apply pressure through such knowledge, Mr. Duffin wished someone besides a WH field officer to "take WIROGUE by the scruff of the neck and tell him to move on."

I insisted, however, that no matter how heavy the pressure became all any field officer could do was to make a denial, plausible or otherwise. Mrs. Geery suggested that perhaps SR, since they had originally recruited WIROGUE, should assume such responsibility. (She is hardly realistic but anything is possible.)

A second suggestion made by Mr. Duffin is worth further consideration. He stated that WH has had continual difficulty in establishing contract agents in business throughout SA. However, these countries tended to be much more receptive to people planning agricultural pursuits and he felt resettlement and possibility for livlihood would be much greater should WIROGUE approach the country or countries of his choice with some agricultural proposition. I remember WIROGUE mentioned that he had investigated the possibility of chicken farming in the Congo. Such an approach in SA might (a) make him more acceptable as an immigrant to that country and (b) provide a long term basis to make him self-supporting.

I did promise to keep Mr. Duffin and Mrs. Geery informed of any further actions taken concerning WIROGUE which would affect their area. It was also at least strongly implied that either Columbia or Brazil might be the best areas, though the final choice essentially rests on what country WIROGUE can enter.

SECRET

465

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 24 JUL 62 DJM

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/AF 3 *

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/EE 3, S/C 2**

1 copy

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 24 1840Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 33838

DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 1854.

RE DIR 24958 (out 57642)***

R.B.
ans by N.R
8/3/62

SUBJECT REQUERIED RE PREFERENCE SAMERICAN COUNTRY AND STATED THAT THOUGH WILL GO ANYWHERE WE ABLE FACILITATE LEGALIZATION INCLUDING CITIZENSHIP HE PREFERS VENEZUELA CHILE OR COLOMBIA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR ZIBET USED.

**DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

***FOR WIROGUE RESETTLEMENT.

WIROGUE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: ROBERT BOUCHARD
UNIT: AF/5
EXT: 5032 1563
DATE: 19 July 1962

ROUTING
1 5
2 Copy
3 Clasd
4
5
6

23 JUL 62 19 39z

TO: FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, S/C 2, C/EE 3 / copy

per CSN 43-43

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT57642
~~OUT 57642~~

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 24964 24964

~~RYBAT~~ HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

REF: A. FRAN 1467 (IN 23745)
B. LEOP 4255 (IN 24232)

1. ATTEMPTING DETERMINE SAMERICAN COUNTRY MOST SUITABLE FOR SUBJECT RELOCATION BUT DIFFICULT WITHOUT HAVING SOME IDEA WIROGUE PREFERENCE.

2. AGREE IN PRINCIPLE PAY TRAVEL COST TO RESETTLEMENT AREA. PREFER NOT GIVE LUMP SUM FOR INTERIM EXPENSES PER PARA 3C REF A AND CONCUR PARA 2 REF B. ANY CASE FINAL DECISION DEPENDS ON AREA SELECTED. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/EE / C
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/5 lgardner
~~EE/C/OPS~~
TBB (Boerniger-phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Paige, Jr.
AF/COPS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

per CSN 43-43

201-233477

Copy No. 1

FILE NO 201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : ROBERT BOUCHARD
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 6032 1563
DATE : 19 July 1962

1-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

23 JUL 62 19 39z

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, S/C 2, C/EE 3

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐

RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑

Signature:

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT [illegible]42
~~OUT 57642~~

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 24964

24964

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

REF: A. FRAN 1467 (IN 23745)

B. LEOP 4258 (IN 24232)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/[illegible]	
RID/[illegible]	
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

DESENSITIZED
per CSH 43-43

201 233477

FORM 4-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

297

DATE : 6 JUL 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION: C/FE 2 *

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-43

ROUTING	
1 S	4
2	5
3	6

JUL 6 1501Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 24232

R.B.

D.M.

DIR INFO FRAN CITE LEOP ~~4255~~

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

REF FRAN 1467 (IN 23745) **

1. URGE WIROGUE DOCUMENTATION BE PICKED UP AND HELD AND THAT STEPS BE TAKEN PREVENT HIM RETURNING CONGO PER PARA 2 REF.

2. VIEW PAST EXPERIENCE SUGGEST WIROGUE NOT BE GIVEN LUMP SUM BUT THAT FUNDS BE USED AS CARROT AND DOLED OUT ONCE HE REACHES RESETTLEMENT AREA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR NYXIS USED.

**WIROGUE STATED GERMAN FIRM WHICH KNOWS HIM AS REINER IS INTERESTED IN SENDING HIM TO CONGO AS BUSINESS REP.

DESENSITIZED

201-233477

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

485

DATE : 5 JUL 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

S

CAP

JUL 5 2036Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 23745

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

one copy

R.B.

DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 1467

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

1. SUBJ WITHOUT FUNDS AND DISCOURAGED BY INABILITY SELL INVENTION AND REALIZATION NO LONGER NEEDED BY ODYOKE. IS THUS READY AND ANXIOUS LEAVE GERM SOONEST AND GO ANYWHERE WE ABLE ASSIST HIM. EVEN WILLING FOREGO RETURN TO CONGO AND GIVE UP ALL DOCUMENTATION IN NAME REINER.

2. SUBJ STATED GERM FIRM WHICH KNOWS HIM AS REINER IS INTERESTED IN SENDING HIM CONGO AS BUSINESS REP. THOUGH RATHER GO WHERE WE DECIDE HE INDICATED ANY UNDUE DELAY OUR PART MAY FORCE HIM TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER GERM OFFER.

3. DESIRE HQS ADVICE RE:

A. FRAN 1188. (IN 15516) ?

B. PERMISSION PAY SUBJ'S TRAVEL COSTS TO RESETTLEMENT AREA. I think we or Harvard will have to bear

C. WHETHER HE SHOULD RECEIVE LUMP SUM OF MONEY TO HOLD HIM OVER UNTIL SELF SUFFICIENT OR WHETHER HE WILL GET HOUSING, EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL HELP IN RESETTLEMENT AREA. depending, but probably depending upon attitude of people where he goes, I would say probably not [illegible] two way contact, [illegible] letter drops [illegible] to announce whereabouts

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3-6-25

1858

BOB:

Action for this cable (FRAN 1467) assumed by this branch. Mr. Phelps on German desk said the only restriction on action at the moment is how much money we, AF/5, are willing to put out.

Next, called Mr. Kallander, TSD, ext 3391. I agreed to contact him again if and when we got down to facts as to just what documentation papers we would require. However, he pointed out that it would first be necessary for us to clear such action, ie., putting this character into a country, with the area desk involved. Furthermore, he indicated that this may not be too easy a task given WIROGUE's background, etc. Once we get clearance from an area desk, he says we should sit down with the area desk, TSD, and AF/5 to determine the best documentation and method of resettlement. OK? Jol Boeninger x-3137
Clay Callender x-3391

201-233477

520

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 22 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/AF 3

INFO : C/TSD 2, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING			
1	5	4	
2	Caps	5	
3	Chron	6	

JUN 29 1646Z 62
ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

FRAN 1188 IN 15816 A

TO INFO CITE

~~RYBAT~~ WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

Gardner RB

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM TSD TO AF BY KALLANDER, TSD, EXT 3391 IN COORDINATION WITH MR. KORN-PATTERSON, AF, EXT 5571.

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. 1

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

232
DATE : 22 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/TSD 2

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/AF 3, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1 S	4
2	5
3	6

JUN 22 1158Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 15816

DIR INFO [illegible] CITE FRAN 1158

RYBAT WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

~~R.B.~~
D. M.

REF A. DIR 17426 (OUT 94704)

B. DIR 15540 (OUT 91968)

C. FRAN 0805 (IN 46445)

1. RE REF A: HARVARD HAS INFO ON SOUTH AMERICAN CIT REQUIREMENTS DATED AUG 59. SUBJ HAS NO PREFERENCE S/AMERICAN COUNTRY BUT DESIRES GO ONLY WHERE WE ABLE FACILITATE LEGALIZATION INCLUDING CITIZENSHIP.

2. ISSUANCE SERIES A AUSTRIAN PASSPORT, WITH WHICH SUBJ SHOULD BE ABLE OBTAIN OWN TOURIST VISA, WOULD ALLOW ENTRY INTO GIVEN SAMERICAN COUNTRY BUT SOME KUBARK CONTROL OBVIOUSLY NECESSARY TO PREVENT BACKCHECKING IF SUBJ INTENDS REMAIN. PLEASE ADVISE KUBARK CAPABILITIES PREVENT SAMERICAN OFFICIALS CHECKING AUTHENTICITY SUBJ BACKGROUND EITHER IN GERMANY WITH AUSTRIA CONSULATE OR DIRECTLY WITH AUSTRIAN GOVT.

3. WE AWARE SOME S/AMERICAN COUNTRIES ISSUE PASSPORTS FOR NON CITIZENS. COULD KUBARK INTERCEDE TO OBTAIN SUCH NON CIT PASSPORT AFTER SUBJ HAS ENTERED GIVEN COUNTRY.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE 2

IN 15616 FRAN 1188

TO INFO CITE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR AQUATIC USED.

**IF HARVARD DOES NOT HAVE INFO RE SOUTH AMERICA CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS KURIOT WILL PROVIDE IF FRAN REPORTS COUNTRIES OF INTEREST.

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : Clayton V. Kallander:mlv
UNIT : TSD/IB/FS-4
EXT : 3391 1502
DATE : 15 June 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

15 JUN 62 13 37z

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/TSD 2

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/AF 3, C/EE 3, S/C 2 one copy

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 94704 OUT 94704

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 17406 17406

RYBAT WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

Don M.

REF DIR 15840 (OUT 91968)

IF HARVARD DOES NOT HAVE INFO RE SOUTH AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS KURIOT WILL PROVIDE IF FRAN REPORTS COUNTRIES OF INTEREST.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD COMMENT: Will reply re South American citizenship requirements by Telex.

C/EE/G/OPS Bill Phelps, by phone CVK
C/AF/OPS Paul Springer, by phone CVK

SIDNEY GOTTLIEB
A CHIEF, TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CHARLES J. RYAN
ASSTC/TSD/AUTH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : 1732 William W. Phelps
UNIT : EE/G/Ops
EXT : 7858
DATE : 8 June 1962

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/EE 3
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT91968

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 15840

~~RYBAT~~ WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

REF FRAN 0805 (IN 46446)

1. CONCUR PARA 2.

2. RE NEW AUSTRIAN DOC, WILLING AGREE IF THIS BEST ~~XXX~~ SOLUTION, BUT REQUEST EXAMINE QUESTION WHETHER BACK-STOPPED FREMDENPASS WOULD NOT SERVE AS VEHICLE FOR EMIGRATION FROM FEDREP WHILE AVOIDING PROBLEMS PARA 1 REF. WILL REPLY RE SOUTH AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS BY TELEX ~~WEEK~~ WEEK OF 11 JUNE.

AF is resp. for this

END OF MESSAGE

✓ AF/OPS (Mr. Springer phone)
✓ TSD (Mr. Boerniger phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

EE/CCPS
RELEASING OFFICER

Wm Phelps
EE/G/Ops
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

33277

14-00000

1732

ORIG : William W. Phelps
UNIT : EE/G/Ops
EXT : 7858
DATE : 8 June 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	S	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

Z

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OCT 9 1968

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 15840

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

a

RYBAT WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

hold for WIROGUE

REF FRAN 0805 (IN 46446)

1. CONCUR PARA 2.

2. RE NEW AUSTRIAN DOC, WILLING AGREE IF THIS BEST SOLUTION, BUT REQUEST EXAMINE QUESTION WHETHER BACKSTOPPED FREMDENPASS WOULD NOT SERVE AS VEHICLE FOR EMIGRATION FROM FEDREP WHILE AVOIDING PROBLEMS PARA 1 REF. WILL REPLY RE SOUTH AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS BY TELEX WEEK OF 11 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/OPS (Mr. Springer phone)
TSD (Mr. Boerniger phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

EE/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

Wm Phelps
EE/G/Ops
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

566

DATE : 5 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

Cue Springer Fri-AM (5571)
Borringer TSD

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUN 5 2046Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 46446 ✓

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-13

DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 0805

RYBAT WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

ANS. by WP
8 Jun 62

1. SUBJECT NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT W GERMAN DOCUMENTATION UNLESS POLITICAL RECOGNITION FOLLOWS. BELIEVE FABRICATION LIFE HISTORY IN ORDER OBTAIN RECOGNITION TOO RISKY IN THIS CASE SINCE SLIGHTEST FLAP COULD PLACE KUBARK IN EMBARRASSING POSITION VIS A VIS FEDREP AUTHORITIES AND ODIBEX LIAISON.

2. INTEND RETURN AUSTRIAN PASSPORT AND IDENTITY PAPERS AS TEMPORARY MEASURE PERMIT SUBJECT CARRY OUT ASSIGNED TASKS FOR CONGOLESE DEFMIN AND RETURN CONGO IN ORDER FORMALLY ABROGATE CONTRACT WITH GOC. WILL INFORM SUBJECT NO KUBARK EMPLOYMENT AVAILABLE BUT WE WILLING REDOCUMENT HIM WITH AUSTRIAN OR OTHER PASSPORT IN NAME DAVID DE PANASKHET, WHICH HE CONSIDERS HIS TRUE NAME. HE WILL KNOW NEW DOCUMENTATION WILL BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING HIS RETURN FRAN.

3. SUBJECT HAS STATED DESIRE RESETTLE IN SOUTH AMERICA. UNDERSTAND PASSPORT WOULD PROBABLY BE BACKCHECKED WITH COUNTRY OF ISSUE SHOULD SUBJECT DECIDE REQUEST PERMANENT RESIDENCY OR CITIZENSHIP IN SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

GUIDANCE RE CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS IN VARIOUS SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND ADVISABILITY OF ISSUING NEW AUSTRIAN PASSPORT.

4. REQUEST REPLY PRIOR COB 11 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

566

DATE : 5 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUN 5 2046Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 46446

DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 0805

RYBAT WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

R.B.

1. SUBJECT NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT W GERMAN DOCUMENTATION UNLESS POLITICAL RECOGNITION FOLLOWS. BELIEVE FABRICATION LIFE HISTORY IN ORDER OBTAIN RECOGNITION TOO RISKY IN THIS CASE SINCE SLIGHTEST FLAP COULD PLACE KUBARK IN EMBARRASSING POSITION VIS A VIS FEDREP AUTHORITIES AND ODIBEX LIAISON.

2. INTEND RETURN AUSTRIAN PASSPORT AND IDENTITY PAPERS AS TEMPORARY MEASURE PERMIT SUBJECT CARRY OUT ASSIGNED TASKS FOR CONGOLESE DEFMIN AND RETURN CONGO IN ORDER FORMALLY ABROGATE CONTRACT WITH GOC. WILL INFORM SUBJECT NO KUBARK EMPLOYMENT AVAILABLE BUT WE WILLING REDOCUMENT HIM WITH AUSTRIAN OR OTHER PASSPORT IN NAME DAVID DE PANASKHET, WHICH HE CONSIDERS HIS TRUE NAME. HE WILL KNOW NEW DOCUMENTATION WILL BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING HIS RETURN FRAN.

3. SUBJECT HAS STATED DESIRE RESETTLE IN SOUTH AMERICA. UNDERSTAND PASSPORT WOULD PROBABLY BE BACKCHECKED WITH COUNTRY OF ISSUE SHOULD SUBJECT DECIDE REQUEST PERMANENT RESIDENCY OR CITIZENSHIP IN SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-239477

FRAN 0805

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

566 SECRET IN 46446 PAGE 2

GUIDANCE RE CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS IN VARIOUS SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND ADVISABILITY OF ISSUING NEW AUSTRIAN PASSPORT.

4. REQUEST REPLY PRIOR COB 11 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WERBELL, Mitchell Livingstone III
(Vol. II)
201-259910

INCLUSIVE DATES: JAN 1967 - THRU DEC 1973

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: OTHER AGENCY REPORTS (FBI, ETC.)

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/3/78	3/3/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

201-259910

VOLUME II: January 1967 - September 1973

CLOSED

SEE VOLUME III: January 1974 -

2.67

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET / RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, WH/Miami JNN

SUBJECT: D [illegible]/Possible Illegal Arms Shipments to the Caribbean

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

REFERENCE: UFPA-1338, 13 September 1973

3P

1. Station passed referenced information to Customs on 13 September 1973. Initial checks by the Station with the FBI, DEA, and Customs revealed no information on the individuals mentioned in reference (Donald Henry, John Brooks and Bobo Brown). Customs was in agreement with the Station's suggestion that a Customs telephone number should be passed to Henry and the case should be put into Customs hands.

2. Henry called Customs on 13 September 1973. A meeting was arranged for that afternoon. Before the meeting took place, however, a Customs officer recognized the name of Brooks as possibly being one of his contacts. Henry was thus met by two Customs officers. On returning from their meeting, the Customs officers notified the Station, and a meeting was arranged to see them on 14 September 1973. Customs provided the following information on Donald Henry.

a. Donald Henry is about 52 years old. He is from Michigan. He lived and went to school in Canada. He moved to Florida about fifteen years ago. He has resided in the Keys for about seven years.

b. Henry was described by Customs as a braggart. They felt, however, that his offer of assistance was genuine. Customs stated that Henry always had a quick answer for any question asked of him, but when the questions got down to specifics his answers were vague.

c. Contrary to initial information, Henry does not have a boat or an airplane. Customs noted, though, that Henry probably has easy access to one. Neither does Henry have an FAA license for flying multi-engine aircraft, although he told Customs he was capable of flying them. Henry has known John Brooks (an alias used by one John Wilbur)

/Continued/

E2,IMPD

Dist: 3 - C/[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO D- 1[illegible]-5[illegible]1	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFPA-1349	DATE typed 22 September 1973
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET / RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER [illegible]6-11-11/3

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

for about a year. (John Wilbur is described in further detail below.) Henry said he met Wilbur through their association with the Atlantis Dive Center, Inc., Miami, Florida, where Wilbur is employed and where Henry has had a working relationship for some time. The Atlantis Dive Center is owned by one [illegible]aley Ricard (no Station traces). Ricard, Customs reported, is an unsavory character involved in smuggling activities and would not hesitate to shoot anyone who gets in his way.

d. Henry told Customs that when he bumped into Wilbur at the Atlantis Dive Center recently, they started talking about various ways they could make money. Wilbur told Henry that he (Henry) could smuggle arms for him over to Abaco, and they started discussing that possibility. During the conversation, Henry asked Wilbur who he would be working for. Wilbur mentioned the name of Bobo Brown. He told Henry that Brown, an ex-Special Forces U.S. Army Major, had set up a branch of Defense Systems, Inc., on Abaco for Mitchell L. Werbell, III. Wilbur also intimated that EMERALD was aware of the operation and condoned it. Customs noted that Henry did not pick up the name Bobo or Brown until after they had mentioned a Special Forces major, at which point Henry professed to remember his name.

e. Henry also told Customs, when asked why he had called EMERALD, that he had telephoned the FBI first and was told by them that his information was not in their jurisdiction and was given the phone number for EMERALD. Later, Henry changed his story to the effect that he said he looked in the Miami telephone directory to get the FBI's number and called EMERALD ([illegible]) instead because the latter's number was under the FBI's. (Comment. Not true, both numbers are listed under U.S. Government but on separate pages.)

3. As for John Brooks, Customs reported that this name is an alias used by one John Wilbur, who is about 35 years old. Originally from Massachusetts, Wilbur has been in Florida for several years. He has been in touch with Customs for approximately three years. He was initially brought to Customs' attention over a narcotics case. ~~At the time,~~ Wilbur was working/informing for the FBI, infiltrating both right and left wing youth organizations. He was also dating an airline stewardess who was involved in narcotics smuggling from South America. When Wilbur found out about this illegal activity, he told the FBI who, in turn, put him in touch with Customs.

4. Customs described Wilbur as an ultra-right winger and a soldier-of-fortune who is impressive looking and a smooth talker. Customs said Wilbur is also a fabricator. As an example, they mentioned that Wilbur would read an article in a magazine and shortly thereafter would try to pass it off as his information. He would also contact Customs and tell them every rumor he heard in the hopes that one of the stories would be true so that he could collect a reward. Customs said that although Wilbur is a fabricator and rumor collector, he is dangerous and would do anything for money.

5. Customs noted that Wilbur enjoys playing the role of a man with important contacts and likes to flash money around. They also noted that about four months ago he began living with a rich divorcee. She is in the real-estate business and inherited property in the Keys (Duck Key Hotel) from her family. Customs stated that she receives about [illegible]2,0[illegible] a month

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

alimony and supposedly has about $400,000 in the bank. She has set Wilbur up in an apartment and furnishes him with spending money. Customs also said that Wilbur seems to be sort of paranoid in that he constantly mentions BKHERALD, not naming BKHERALD as such but referring to it as "the company," "the driving force behind democracy," and so forth.

6. According to Customs, Wilbur began working for Underwater Sports of America, Miami, Florida, as a salesman in the early 1960's. At the time, reported Customs, Underwater Sports was engaged in contractual work for BKHERALD concerning training during preparations for the Bay of Pigs. The last contact Customs had with Wilbur was about three weeks ago. They plan to see him again in the next few days and will attempt to get his side of the story.

7. Customs stated that in spite of the inconsistencies in Henry's story they felt he was making a legitimate offer to assist and thus advised him to proceed along the following lines:

a. Re-contact Wilbur and tell him that he was prepared to fly arms to Abaco, but he would have to see the "front money" first. Customs commented that if Wilbur produces the money, they would have a case; if not, the whole episode could probably be chalked up to Wilbur's delusions.

b. After re-contacting Wilbur and if Wilbur comes up with the money, Henry should attempt to convince him of the necessity of a dry run. If a dry run is not possible, then he is to go ahead with the operation. Arrests would be made by Customs in the States after the arms have been placed in the aircraft and after the personnel involved have boarded the plane.

8. Customs has promised to keep the Station apprised of the case, especially as it pertains to the Bahamas and other areas in the Caribbean.

Alvin C. Thornbrue
Alvin C. THORNBRUE

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

200-11-1/8

[illegible] serves as a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Follow-up contacts [illegible] information; however, [illegible]

James [illegible]

B 201-259910

~~B 201-259910~~

B - 201-776952

B - 201-823964

B - 201-769473

RECORD COPY FILED IN 200-11-11/8

RECORD COPY

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201-259910

2 65

17 September 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Arms Shipment to Abaco Island, Bahamas

1. On 27 August 1973, Alvin C. THORNBRUE discussed [illegible] LNHARP a case involving the possible violation of the [illegible] Act, more specifically, the transportation of weapons to Abaco Island in the Bahamas.

[illegible]59970

2. LNHARP is aware of Mitchell [illegible] [illegible] in connection with the dissidents on Abaco [illegible] he has been in touch with one Al Sakolsky, a Miami [illegible] reported organized crime connections. They are aware of [illegible] regarding the shipping of weapons to Abaco, which [illegible] have been having. They are also aware of [illegible]'s contact with [illegible] (201-[illegible]) and [illegible] William [illegible] who may have been involved in weapons dealings. [illegible] both [illegible] in some [illegible] with [illegible] weapons to Abaco Island, and apparently both refused to assist [illegible].

3. [illegible], on the other hand, has a [illegible] Prime Minister PINDLING. Apparently [illegible] in the Bahamas which had burned down, and he blamed PINDLING for the blaze because [illegible] had backed the opposition party. [illegible] has a boat named the "Gerry Scott III", which could transport a large shipment of weapons. The boat had been in dry-dock for approximately three months, until approximately [illegible] August, when it went to sea. LNHARP lost track of it for a couple of days, then sighted it and lost it again. Since approximately [illegible] August, the "Gerry Scott III" has not been sighted again.

4. In line with the possibility of a transfer of weapons to the "Gerry Scott III" taking place at sea, LNHARP has been looking for a boat which would be capable of handling the transfer at sea. One such vessel was located, the "[illegible]" [illegible]. The "[illegible]" is a [illegible] vessel that [illegible] a [illegible] U.S. Navy Patrol [illegible] capable of hitting speeds of [illegible]. It was bought in [illegible] by the [illegible], who [illegible] is making $2,000 monthly payments on it. LNHARP noted that it [illegible] to be much too expensive a boat to be used for fishing purposes as claimed.

RECORD COPY

SECRET/RYBAT

201-[illegible]

[illegible] "Gerry Scott III" [illegible] Around [illegible] August, the ship's [illegible] took the traps on board the "Swordfish." [illegible] the ship immediately turned around and returned [illegible] On [illegible] August, the crew loaded another [illegible] lobster traps aboard [illegible]. However, they did not sail until [illegible] August, when they sailed up the Miami River where they are now docked.

[illegible] has the following information concerning MC GILL and [illegible]:

a) [illegible] MC GILL, [illegible] PRESIDENT OF PIONEER PICTURES, INC

[illegible] ASSOCIATE OF HEWITT MC GILL

[illegible] ASSOCIATE OF [illegible] MC GILL

[illegible] ASSOCIATE OF [illegible]

[illegible]

MARRIED TO [illegible] BAILIE

HUSBAND OF [illegible] SISTER TO HEWITT MC GILL

SECRET/RYBAT

2.65

[illegible] [illegible] who [illegible] of [illegible] ([illegible]). [illegible] spent [illegible] in the Miami area during the fall of 1967, in an attempt to dig up information pertaining to [illegible] operations for a book he was supposedly writing. Among some of [illegible]'s contacts were [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] who was also noted as a friend of [illegible]'s. [illegible] during [illegible]'s stay in Miami (13 September 1967), and [illegible] (see para 7) was noted as being in contact with [illegible].

8. [illegible], in a conversation of 30 August, stated that when the "[illegible]" sailed from its berth on the Miami River, they were going to stop and search it. If nothing was found, they would release it and probably notify the appropriate Canadian authorities, advising them to put the vessel(s) on "lookout."

9. [illegible] days later, [illegible] was contacted regarding the status of the "[illegible]". According to [illegible], the "[illegible]" had [illegible], was stopped and searched, and as nothing was found, it was allowed to continue on its way. [illegible] noted that the appropriate Canadian officials had been contacted.

SECRET/RYBAT

2.65

200-11-11/8

FBI document dated
12 Sept 1973 from Miami
Re: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas
Neutrality Matter - Bahamas

Bureau File: MM 105-21382

FBI document dated
27 July '73 from Miami.
Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas
Neutrality Matter - Bahamas
Bureau File - MM 105-21382

FBI document dated 30 July '73
from Tampa, Fla.
Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger

14-00000

FBI document dated
3 July 73 from New York

Re: Mitchell Livingston Wer Bell III
Edwin Marzer
Internal Security - Bahamas

FBI document dated
25 June 73 from New York

Subject: Mitchell Livingston Wer Bell III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas

FBI cable dated 2 July 1973

DIRECTOR 62-108665 (date 6-29-73)

from Miami 105-5082

Re: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas
Neutrality Matters - Bahamas

FBI cable
2 July 1973
(6/28/73)
TO- Acting Director (62-108665)
FROM- Atlanta (105-5082)
re: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger
IS - Bahamas
Neutrality Matters - Bahamas

FBI 62-108665

16 June 1973

Re: Edwin Marger;
Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Internal Security - Bahamas

itch WerBel : Gunsmith to the 'Right' Side

oger Williams

ing is excerpted by per. Atlanta magazine.

'HE DRIVEWAY that hrough the country estate enage boys. They were handsome in the tradi- fashion, and they looked e quiet, leafy setting But camouflage suit and car- stol in each hand; the M 3 "grease gun" tucked r and a silencer equipped der the other.

n propelling himself vig- wheelchair, came their fa- Livingston WerBell III itary, ex-soldier of for- anti-communist and one s leading developers of ms and accessories.

d Geoff chatted lightly pons they were carrying temporarily immobilized heel, punctured the con- brief bursts of informa- sniper rifle, one of his roducts. "This weapon 0 VC in six months," he Those VC took only 13 ll. Twenty-seven cents t Uncle Sam. That's the effectiveness the Army's

er, young Mitch and round after round from n'o the bullet-shattered tomobile that serves as rget on the WerBell fir- n Mitch began firing a ard Army .45. The gun and the noise echoed s and treetops. He then anre, smoothly rectan- an Ingram Model 11, "flash and muzzle sup- man firing it. The muz- d, and the only sound click, followed by the et and the pop as it hit

s eerie, almost chilling. young Mitch put the matic and whipped off ls in one second. Geoff he kind of demonstra- rease gun, a standard hine gun and the snip- erBell calls the XM 21 equipped with a sup-

ck to the house, Wer- why the suppressor, a silencer, is so effec- essory. "It hides the l reduces the firing etal on metal. You bolt noise without an and it's not worth it. e bolt noise anyway tion so for all prac-

no weapons given to him by friendly forces in Vietnam, he said, and they were shipped to the States for display in military museums.

Not surprisingly, WerBell has often been called an operative of the Central Intelligence Agency, a charge that angers him only when it is leveled too vehemently. It is not that he has anything against the CIA. He just doesn't, he says, happen to be one of its boys. His paramilitary work, which consists of advising and sometimes directly assisting foreign governments, is done in the employ of what he calls "an independent group of well-intentioned, patriotic Americans." The Birch Society? The Minutemen? A bunch of far-right Texas millionaires? WerBell won't say, other than to insist that it is not the CIA.

It hardly matters, for according to WerBell, it is all in the service not only of freedom and anticommunism but of the U.S. government; he does not supply or advise or fight for regimes not bearing the State Department seal of approval. A heavy percentage of his merchandise goes directly to the U.S. government, which distributes it to its own forces that need silent or exotic weapons. The balance is sold to friendly governments, either directly or through the good offices of the "independent group." He says he does not sell to individuals, not even if they're certified anticommunists.

WerBell takes pains to point out that he is no ordinary arms broker. That is, he is not one of those shadowy figures who sell weapons to both sides at exorbitant prices or who take possession of contraband shipments on the high seas. "We've always adhered to a basic policy: There is only one friend of the United States in a given area, and we deal only with that friend."

What does WerBell peddle? A range of firearms from machine guns to desk-sized cannons, from the meanest-looking weapons to innocent looking swagger sticks that fire a bullet or even a small rocket; an array of techniques — "systems," he calls them — that will help an American soldier or a foreign army hold off insurgent forces, and occasionally, his personal services.

These services present WerBell at his most shadowy. Serving as a combatant in the armed forces of a foreign nation is against U.S. law, and WerBell is understandably reluctant to admit having done so. He describes himself in such terms as "paramilitary" and "adviser," but acquaintances suspect he has been in the thick of the fighting a number of times. He may even have zapped an insurgent or two.

Corporate Setup

THE HEADQUARTERS for his

In Operational Negation of Insurgency and Countersubversion, tied in with Environmental Industries, and began in earnest to develop a line of military hardware. Sons Mitch IV and Geoff became integral parts of the firm. Mitch IV was already a bona fide counterinsurgent. As a 15-year-old, he had spent considerable time with Dad in the Dominican Republic, specializing in underwater probing for safe landing sites. Geoff, two years younger, barely missed out on a Cuban foray; his father took him to Miami a few years ago, but the plans fell through.

One day I sat in WerBell's office as Geoff displayed a number of Military Armament's most unusual weapons. He brought out "the Stinger," a cigar-shaped tube three inches long, weighing 2½ ounces, that fires a .22-caliber cartridge. Nothing visible suggests a gun, and the bullet, on its way out, dislodges a thin plug that disguises the hole at the end of the tiny barrel. WerBell commends the Stinger to secret agents who get caught with the goods and must take "the last resort," that is, shoot themselves.

In the same exotic category is the swagger stick, bound in leather, with silver studs. By pushing between two studs, one can fire a .22 or, with a special model, a small rocket. The bodyguard of Dominican strongman Gen. Antonio Imbert used the rocket model to blast would-be assassins a few years ago. Then there is a small, brass-fitted cannon. It makes a handsome knick-knack for a soldier-politician's desk. It fires, with one simple finger movement, a bullet that will quiet an unruly visitor. More traditionally military is WerBell's "special long-range knocker-outer," a redesigned Remington 9-millimeter rifle that "will plug 'em in the eye at 200 meters."

The bulk of WerBell's business is in sound suppressors and Ingram Model submachine guns. Suppressors can be used on large as well as small weapons, and in fact have been used effectively on the wicked-looking Vulcan machine guns mounted on American helicopters in Vietnam. The Australian Army Journal ran a story calling the Sionics suppressor "superior to anything previously used . . . (with it) it is now possible for the sniper to fire from relatively short ranges, especially when using subsonic projectiles."

WerBell is so enthusiastic about the Ingram Model submachine guns (there are two models, taking different sized cartridges) that he predicts they will eventually make "obsolete every individual weapon in the world." The U.S. Army, he says, is now looking carefully at the Ingram models with an eye toward making them standard equip-

weapons for the U.S. Army and other counterinsur-

WerBell recovered from a leg injury.

.I.L. sounds com-
er-of-fact when he
ns, and death, and
is been in the mill-
iness for years, and
rd or produced—or
g watermelon sound
Latin America and
in the U.S. armed
ramilitary "adviser."
e warrior, an armed
against "ungodly

alone in this occupa-
tiees it in a unique
diers of fortune are
they live from one
next, brawling and
through a tough and
rding life.

ntrast, is a business-
s in military adven-
nd as far as it suits
idn't titillate him, he
of it. His business is
s, not using them in
lizes in the weapons
of counterinsur-
be roughly defined
uppression of coups
ind the like.

Bell operates, this
established regimes,
dictatorships, against
his political posture
t trouble WerBell, it
have no objection to
erves the interests of
says. Particularly if
se interests is from
nism has no place in
misphere—or in any
totally opposed to it,
l of ideological germs
rangs."

In. WerBell's name
as. The first issue of
king magazine, Scan-
exhaustive story on
l in an abortive inva-
1966, and WerBell was
major, if uncertain,
tion. (WerBell was ar-
ted after the fiasco,
st him were dropped,
arrested were brought
a friend for an ex-
ell replied jauntily,
k for the company.
f you I'll never hear
bout it." So far he
ins.)

r. WerBell hit the
e Atlanta Constitution
t of captured enemy
from Vietnam was de-
Air Force Base, Flor-
columnist conjectured
his friends meant to
weapons to right-wing
s in the U.S. WerBell
at. They were souve-

dedicated to killing people. Environmental Industries, WerBell says, is bankrolled by some of the East's most prominent investment houses; he is its director of international operations. He is also president of a subsidiary called Military Armaments Co., Inc., and because he is in Powder Springs, Military Armaments is there, too. (Behind Environmental Industries, WerBell says, is "a third shadow of which E.I. is a subsidiary"—another tantalizing hint of the CIA.)

Military Armaments may well be a unique American enterprise. Nobody else, WerBell says, is in the business of designing special purpose weapons on such a scale. A good deal of its designing and manufacturing is done under federal license. Silencers, for example, are outlawed by the National Firearms Act, along with sawed-off shotguns, submachine guns and other vestiges of Prohibition era gangland wars.

To manufacture his suppressors, WerBell must pay a special tax of $500 a year, collected by the Treasury Department. The T-men also check periodically to see that his awesome collection of firearms—over 200 individual pieces—is properly registered. Apparently the market for suppressors is not very large because, according to WerBell, his firm is the only one authorized to manufacture them.

WerBell will not discuss the sales or profits of Military Armaments except to say that, after two years of extensive research and development (resulting in "a tax loss of a half million dollars"), the company is now doing very well. It has about 12 employees, including four machinists who work under the direction of Gordon Ingram, who has charge of the design operation and whose name is on the Model 11 submachine gun that young Mitch demonstrated on the firing range.

'Cottage Industry'

INGRAM WORKS in a well-equipped machine shop-lab attached to the main house on the estate, which WerBell likes to call "the farm." WerBell's office is next door to the shop. Its walls are so loaded with weapons that it is a wonder they do not collapse. There are knives and spear guns and pistols and rifles and machine guns, dozens and dozens of them, some purchased, some won in combat, some presented by the appreciative recipients of WerBell's counterinsurgency techniques.

WerBell, who has a sense of humor, calls his enterprise a "cottage industry" and likens himself to "a country doctor . . . I can fall out of the living area upstairs right down to the office." Upstairs is the domain of his German-born wife Hildegard, a pleasant, gray-haired woman who has borne WerBell six children and put up with his rather unusual way of life. (When he left for the Far East in 1968, he said he'd be gone for a year or more, and he was.)

A Military Profile

MITCHELL WERBELL is a short, wiry man of 52, quick with a quip and quite sensible until he begins talking about communism or other social issues. He has the face and bearing of a Prussian officer, an image he cultivated by wearing a mustache and occasionally a monocle. He often dresses in military clothing of indeterminate origin, and he embellishes the image by talking in slightly clipped sentences peppered with military phrases. There is nothing phony in this. WerBell has a strong attachment to weapons and to warfare, and he has been around them so long that the ideas and styles they foster are an ingrained part of his personality.

He comes by both his militarism and his anticommunism honestly. His father was an officer in the Russian Imperial army, even though he was born in the United States. "It was a tricky situation," says Mitch. "He was a citizen of both the U.S. and Russia. In those days you could do that."

The elder WerBell fought against the Bolsheviks, but before the collapse of the czarist regime he wisely secured an appointment as liaison officer between the Russian and American forces—stationed in the U.S. He lived in this country for the rest of his life, putting his early medical training to use in cancer research.

A legacy from father is Mitch's barely disguised aristocratic sympathies. He has been quoted as saying, "Communism is a substitution of a peasant dictatorship over the aristocracy—I prefer the aristocracy." He is without question an elitist. Not surprisingly, his elite is composed of superpatriots and military men.

Mitchell WerBell was born in Pennsylvania, shortly after his Russian-American father and his Scottish-born mother arrived in the U.S. at the end of World War I. His parents traveled a good deal, here and abroad, and Mitch traveled with them, picking up his education as he went. He got a degree in journalism from the University of Pennsylvania. In World War II, he joined the OSS, and served with a unit behind Japanese lines in China, rising to the rank of captain and acquiring a taste for guerrilla-type warfare he would never lose.

WerBell moved to Atlanta shortly after the war and went to work in advertising in a department store. Soon he was head of the department, and soon after that he went on his own.

In the mid-'50s, WerBell pulled out of his agency and then formed his own public relations firm. "I'd already been drifting into international PR," WerBell says, "using my family background. I had tremendous contacts in Europe, and I moved into the Far East, too." How much of this moving in was military, WerBell won't say, but his business took on more and more of what he calls a "geopolitical" flavor.

Before long, he was dabbling in Latin American dictatorships. "Before Fidel took over in Cuba, we were working closely with Batista." He adds with a grin, "Our function was to keep Batista in power, although the U.S. government was looking favorably on Fidel at that point."

From all this, even WerBell doesn't know exactly how, came a passionate concern about communism. "I decided to devote whatever time I could to anticommunist activities," he says. "At first it was sort of a hobby, but then it became my main drive in life. What I'm doing now"—here he gestures at the arsenal on his office walls—"affords me a damned good living. But the living is not why I do it."

The Heart of It

IN 1948, WHILE anticommunism was still a hobby, albeit a paying hobby, WerBell purchased the Dobbs estate. He installed rudimentary design facilities and began experimenting with weapons of counterinsurgency, weapons he believed had the best chance of preventing Communist takeovers in the small, underdeveloped nations of Asia and Latin America. "I realized that in counterinsurgency, the primary problem was a lack of depth in weaponry. People say, 'Win the hearts of the enemy, and you'll win the fight.' That's a lot of bull. The best way to get their hearts, if they're the enemy, is to shoot 'em and cut the hearts out."

While he experimented with weapons—quietly, to avoid problems with the federals—WerBell proceeded with his personal brand of geopolitics. He made himself available to anticommunist regimes that wanted help in fighting off one band of insurgents or another. In the process, he became friendly with a number of Latin America's political strongmen. They were delighted to discover a Nore-Americano who felt as they did about the need for stable, anticommunist regimes, especially their regimes, and who had both the savvy and the guts to help preserve them.

His first major paramilitary operation was in the Dominican Republic during the 1965 revolt. He was, of course, on the side of the government, which was fending off allegedly Communist insurgents; the United States was on its side, too. WerBell wound up in the midst of the fighting. He was the second Dominican government man to reach the Ozama River, scene of the major battle.

Ellsworth Bunker, then U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, became highly exercised over WerBell's activities and his hawkish views on the conflict (WerBell opposed a cessation of hostilities and establishment of a coalition government). Bunker considered trying to toss WerBell out of the country, but nothing came of it. WerBell's "independent group"—CIA, Texas millionaires or whatever—saw to that.

WerBell was already active in the anti-Castro movement, and he brought to it a sense of dash and discipline that the ragtag, bickering bunch of Cuban exiles had seldom seen. Perhaps his major anti-Castro exploit was a speedboat foray into Camarioca, on Cuba's southern coast. The mission was to drop a swimmer, apparently a spy, offshore, and to pick up the family of an exile leader. The boat, flying the Confederate flag on the radio antenna, foundered in high seas, and the raiding party was captured. The Cubans, the story goes, did not know what to make of the brash WerBell, and he and his pals wound up stealing a Castro boat and spiriting some 16 anti-Castroites out of the country before they themselves returned to the United States.

Vietnam Superhawk

IN THE LATE '60s, WerBell turned his attention to Southeast Asia. He is, of course, a superhawk on Vietnam, and would be happy if the U.S. were also fighting communism in all its neighboring countries. He was in Thailand, "working closely with the supreme command," for months, promoting the sales of his weapons and systems. "I showed them things like surveillance equipment and night vision equipment, stuff that lets you surprise the hell out of the bastards." Did he do any fighting himself? WerBell chuckles. "I ain't supposed to be shooting the stuff, just demonstrating how to shoot it."

Three years ago, WerBell's weapons business became promising enough for him to go into it full time. He organized a firm called Sionics (for Studies

Armaments makes the case, too), complete with suppressor and six magazines.

Business Is Business

DOES WERBELL feel a twinge of conscience about providing the world with such deadly and efficient weapons? No. "I see no reason to be concerned," he says. "We're supplying a certain product that is unfortunately a part of the civilized world. As long as people exist, there's going to be an arms business. I don't see much difference between our supplying arms to combatants and a surgical supply house supplying gauze to bind up the wounds inflicted."

There is his anticommunist argument, too. WerBell is fighting the Communist menace; it is a fight that must be won and weapons are needed to win it.

Contrary to cynical opinion, Powder Springs was not named in honor of WerBell and his enterprise. WerBell, in fact, stays as aloof from the local community as possible. His house is so well-stocked, it is practically self-sufficient save for occasional trips to the grocery and liquor stores. There has been, from time to time, anti-WerBell feeling in Powder Springs. WerBell declares, "The hell with it. Who cares? I tell 'em I'm prepared to purchase their property if they don't like the area."

He does not suffer from loneliness, however. There is a steady stream of visitors and customers, foreigners as well as Americans. A few weeks ago WerBell's son-in-law, an Air Force lieutenant colonel, flew in from Ohio, mainly to see what was new around the shop; he hadn't been by in several months, he said, "and things change awfully quickly around here." The day I was there, the colonel and WerBell swapped ideas on ridding the State Department of no-win policy makers and on bringing the enemy to its knees, or its grave, in Vietnam.

WerBell recalls with relish one particular visitor. He came from the State Department a few years back, and according to WerBell, he said, "The functions of the foreign policies of the United States are the business of the State Department in Washington, not of Mitchell WerBell in Powder Springs, Georgia." WerBell's reply? "You can't print it. It was all in Anglo-Saxon words." But that was the old, swashbuckling WerBell. The new, low-profile WerBell says with a grin, "My present policy is that I agree with that theory completely. Period."

If actions to the contrary speak too loudly, they, like WerBell's weapons, can always be suppressed by the man himself. Meanwhile, Mitch and his "independent group" march on.

©1970, Atlanta Magazine

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO TM #409860

TO: C/WHD

FROM: COS, WH/MIAMI

SECRET

14-00000

Garden of Eve!

Eve Arden Offers A Toast – To Life! To Life! at Polynesian Gardens

You'll like our people, you'll like our thatched huts and waterfall and you'll love our Million-Dollar Recreation Building.

- LANAI GARDEN APARTMENTS
- SPA TYPE HEALTH CLUB
- BLUE LAGOON POOL
- THEATRE BALL ROOM
- LUAU AND BARBECUE AREA
- ROOF TOP GOLF
- BILLIARD ROOM
- CARD ROOM
- TENNIS COURTS
- BOWLING ALLEYS

Polynesian Gardens, in beautiful suburban Plantation . . . and Plantation is to Florida what Scarsdale is to New York, and Lincolnwood is to Chicago.



Broward Boulevard to 69th Avenue. Turn North to Model Apartments. Open Daily until 6 P.M.

Within minutes of 14 outstanding Golf Courses and walking distance to the beautiful Plantation Golf Course, close to fishing and boating.

LUXURIOUS ONE AND TWO BEDROOM APARTMENTS
PRICED FROM $23,900 to $36,900 TERMS TO SUIT

POLYNESIAN GARDENS CONDOMINIUM APARTMENTS

Plantation, Florida
Just west of Ft. Lauderdale
Phone: (305) 791-4400, In Miami Call 947-5776

TROPIC®
THE MIAMI HERALD SUNDAY MAGAZINE

July 1, 1973 Vol. 7 No. 25

THE COVER: Arms dealer Mitchell Livingston WerBell III lives in an 007 world of guns and intrigues. Among the guns is his briefcase with a built-in machine gun that fires whenever the right button is pushed. Among the intrigues is his present preoccupation with what happens to Abaco when the Bahamas goes independent this month. For the full story, turn to Page 18. Photograph by John Pineda.

FEATURES

8 **When Kids Are Allergic To Their Parents**
The treatment they call "parentectomy"

12 **The Real Exorcist**
Father Nicola vs. The Devil

18 **Powder Keg At Powder Springs**
Mitchell WerBell's call to arms

26 **Meatloaf Man Meets Peking Duck**
Creating your own Chinatown

DEPARTMENTS

4 **Humor**

7 **People, Etc.**

29 **Crossword Puzzle**

JOHN PARKYN
Editor

JOHN DORSCHNER
Assistant Editor

ALLEN PIERLEONI
Articles Editor

JOHN E. DAVIDSON
Art Director

RICHARD D. SMITH
Rotogravure Manager

Advertising Office telephone 350 2818
Represented nationally by Knight Advertising Sales, Inc., and
Metropolitan Sunday Newspapers, Inc.

Contents of Tropic copyright 1973 by The Miami Herald Publishing Co., a division of Knight Newspapers, Inc. Tropic is a trademark registered in the U.S. Patent Office by The Miami Herald Publishing Co. Published every Sunday at 1 Herald Plaza, Miami, Fla. 33101. While every care is taken, no responsibility is accepted for the damage or loss of manuscripts or photos submitted.

Photographs by John Pineda







Facing page.
Mitch WerBell III in the upstairs gun room of his Georgia home. Behind him, left to right, are son-in-law Paul Routhier, a retired Air Force colonel and president of WerBell's Defense Systems International, Bennett Bintliff, Defense Systems' chairman of the board; and son Mitchell. Top left, moving clockwise: A uniformed WerBell employe practices firing a weapon on the Georgia estate-armory; a belt buckle that doubles as a knife, à la agent 007. Mitch WerBell IV points out Abaco on a map of the Bahamas

POWDER KEG AT POWDER SPRINGS

The flamboyant son of a Cossack Colonel, Mitchell WerBell III has been involved in several Caribbean adventures and misadventures. Now, as the Bahamas nears independence, the wealthy arms-dealer has his sights set on Abaco . . .

By William R. Amlong

"Do I look like a guy who has to se
himself as a soldier of fortune?"

Mitchell Livingston WerBell III is t
son of a cavalry colonel in the Russia
Imperial Army. He has stayed, more
less, in the family business: bedevilin
Bolsheviks. And now he sees himself n
as some ragtag gunrunner, but as a ver
substantial figure in the shaping of worl
affairs through free-enterprise ge
politics.

His disclaimer about not looking like
soldier of fortune, however, doesn't qu
make his point; for that is indeed wh
Mitch WerBell looks like — or at lea
what a montage of James Cagney, Al
Guinness and Walter Mitty would lo
like. There's the walrus moustache a
the khaki bush jacket with the should
patch of the First Airborne Division
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
monocle and a swagger stick are ke
handy. The overall impression is that t
man just stepped out of the Briti
officers' mess in old Burma.

But he is not in Burma, nor in Vi

Three uniformed ex-military men, all under the employ of WerBell, line up for target practice at the Powder Springs compound


IT'S SANDAL SEASON AT NANKIN'S

Revelations® presents
Exclusive Red Carpet Foam Cushioned insoles.

COUPE
In White, Bone, Black or Red Soft Leather . . .
$16.

CANTARE
In White, Beige, Navy, Black or Red Soft Leather . . .
$14.

ALL SHOES AVAILABLE IN SIZES
4to12 S,N,M,W&WW (AAAtoEEE)

For Mail Order add $1 for Postage & Handling Plus 4% Sales Tax

SINCE 1921 nankin's QUALITY SHOES

643 Lincoln Road Mall
163rd St. Shop. Ctr. Theatre Mall
Dadeland Shopping Center

Midway Mall
Hollywood Mall
Downtown Hollywood

POWDER KEG

Continued

nam, nor even in one of the sugarcane fields of South Florida, where counter-revolutionaries are wont to drill and target-practice for yet another assault on Castro's Cuba. Rather, he is sitting in the upstairs gun room of his home in Powder Springs, Ga., a 66-acre estate-armory situated amidst the rolling red-clay hills and pine forests 25 miles northwest of downtown Atlanta. It is a place where the pastoral air is occasionally shattered by the flashing of a red light that goes on whenever the electronic gate is opened, by the staccato barking of machine guns from the test firing range or by the pulsating roar of a combat helicopter hovering low overhead on a test flight.

It is from this base of operations that, it appears, Mitch WerBell has been meddling again, this time in the affairs of the about-to-become sovereign state of the Bahamas.

His activities — although no one is completely sure just what they entail — have prompted Bahamas Prime Minister Lynden Pindling to denounce WerBell and attorney Edwin Marger, an associate, on the floor of the Bahamian Parliament. Pindling called them "international fortune hunters" with "designs on the territorial sovereignty of the Bahamas."

Werbell's involvement in the Bahamas — as an advisor to a faction that wants the island of Abaco either to remain a Crown Colony or to become a separate nation when the rest of the Bahamas becomes fully independent on July 10 — has also prompted some concern by the U.S. State Department's Caribbean Affairs Desk.

It is not a completely unfamiliar experience to WerBell to have elements of the United States government at least concerned — if not outright displeased — with some of his free-lance foreign-policy maneuvers. He relishes recalling how a visitor flew down to Georgia once to give him the message: "The functions of the foreign policies of the United States are the business of the State Department in Washington, not of Mitchell WerBell in Powder Springs, Ga." In another incident, a congressional subcommittee questioned him about his role in an aborted attempt to launch an invasion of Haiti from South Florida.

The subcommittee, the investigations arm of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, was concerned with the role played in the invasion preparations by CBS News. The network was attempting to film a documentary on the military coup being planned by an alliance of Haitian and Cuban exiles. The Haitians wanted to topple Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier; the Cubans wanted to establish an anti-Castro base in Haiti. CBS was steered into the project by Andrew St. George, a free-lance journalist-adventurer who also introduced Producer Jay McMullen to WerBell in the process.

The network, after spending upwards of $170,000 on the proposed documentary, *Project Nassau*, decided to scrap it. "As it is," a CBS News vice president wrote in a Dec. 13, 1966, memo, "we see simply the non-adventures of a rag-tag crew next to whom Duvalier himself looks good, a gang openly flouting U.S. law, in the end to no purpose."

The answers to "why" WerBell got involved are, in the language of the subcommittee report, "at variance" with each other:

Answer No. 1: ". . . I felt then and I feel now, and I will always feel that any effort or any activity that any American can give to a group that is attempting to kill the boil and cancer of communism in the Western Hemisphere deserves every effort. This was my fundamental reason for going into it. This was why I agreed to assist them and why I did everything I could to assist them up to the point where I felt the whole program was ridiculous."

Answer No. 2: "I took this whole project as a rather entertaining comedy. I'm afraid I approached it in this connection and I continued to do so. I felt that this was a very amateurish attempt at something which I didn't know really what was going on, and it was an interlude of entertainment as far as I'm concerned."

The role he played is also unclear. From the point that CBS entered the situation in May of 1966, WerBell appeared at various times to be a network consultant, a CIA operative, a CIA operative impostor, a leader of the invasion, a U.S. government spy on the invasion, a gunrunner and a wired-for-sound observer in an attempt to shake down the Haitian consul in Miami for $200,000 to call off the invasion.

Suffice it to say that the entire episode was typified by the fact that the 68-foot sloop *Poor Richard*, a boat WerBell had leased for the expedition, was repossessed while WerBell and others had it docked at the Ocean Reef motel in Key Largo. "The boat never had anything on it ex-

cept a few good, long drinking sessions," WerBell told congressmen.

Nevertheless, the U.S. government raided the training area for the would-be invaders, seized their arms and arrested them in January, 1967, about two months after WerBell had gone home. Seven persons were indicted for conspiring to violate U.S. neutrality laws — including WerBell. Charges against WerBell, however, were dropped on orders of then-Attorney General Ramsey Clark.

WerBell now declines to discuss the mechanics of how the charges against him were dropped, except to say that he was "in constant contact with the government" during his participation in the invasion attempt and that he "did nothing wrong." In 1970, however, WerBell told an Atlanta magazine writer, "When you work for the company, they take care of you."

"The company" is generally used as a euphemism for the Central Intelligence Agency — an arm of government WerBell says now he has never had anything to do with, except to sell it some guns. The company he was talking about, he says, was CBS. Over the years, however, WerBell has spoken often of his association with the Company. Producer McMullen quoted WerBell to the congressmen as saying he had "previous experience" with "the company." "And when I asked him what company he meant, he said the CIA," McMullen said.

"Everybody always gets that impression about any goddam thing we do," WerBell says. It is a conclusion that is neither difficult nor illogical. It may not, however, be accurate.

But what, then, was Mitch WerBell, wearing camouflage fatigues and a shoulder-holstered rocket pistol, doing in the lead tank — which is where he claims he was — in the Dominican Republic that summer of 1965 as government forces double-timed it to the Ozama River? The tanks were attempting to capture as much territory as possible before a noon cease-fire took effect; instead, they were beaten back by ill-armed rebels at the bridge.

Or what was he doing in Vietnam in 1968, with what WerBell claims was "the simulated rank of major-general" supplied by the U.S. Air Force as he demonstrated his firm's revolutionary silenced submachine gun to a South Vietnamese general?

To questions such as these, WerBell's standard reply is, "I guess I'm just lucky." More than just luck, however, WerBell's propensity for being in the crucial place at the crucial time seems to stem from a combination of machismo, the profit motive, a knack for developing some truly radical weaponry and a plug-in to the Old Boy Network.

The Old Boy Network — "And don't you ever kid yourself that there isn't such a thing," says WerBell — is the cloak-and-dagger types' answer to the union hiring hall. It is a loosely structured help wanted-situation wanted grapevine. "I became friends with a bunch of guys who are now four- and five-star generals," recalls WerBell of his days as an OSS captain behind Japanese lines in World War II.

Memorabilia of the OSS days and subsequent adventures hang in WerBell's home and in his psyche. The walls of both his upstairs den and downstairs "war room" are decorated with dozens of hunting (upstairs) and military (downstairs) weapons. Six unsheathed swords are mounted on the door of the liquor cabinet. Two glass display cases in the den, each locked, contain handguns ranging from standard .45 automatics to single-shot assassination pistols. Daggers, bayonets and throwing knives fill the in-between spaces as bric-a-brac. Photographs of short, slant-eyed generals hang on walls and stand on tables. Between two wild boar heads above the den entrance is a framed certificate from the Vietnamese Airborne.

The biggest war souvenir, though, isn't on WerBell's wall. It is in his head — the way a man of 55 acts after more than 20 years of being in and on the fringes of violent conflicts. Some of it, obviously, is affectation. Some of it is genuine. And some of it just seems strange to an outsider

STEP INTO THE AGE OF
AQUARIUS
FINE OFFICE FURNITURE FOR
THE ENLIGHTENED EXECUTIVE

Rugged and handsome with polished aluminum legs to reflect the executive lock! Aquarius...the most in design and utility. Laminated plastic wood-grain finishes give years of maintenance free service and enhance any office setting. Your choice of available laminated finishes!

U-SHAPED
EXECUTIVE DESK
- 2 file drawers letter/legal
- 2 box drawers
- 34"x78" main section
- 18"x76" return
- 18"x78" sliding door credenza

DOUBLE
PEDESTAL DESK
- 30"x60"
- 3 box drawers
- 1 file drawer letter

SECRETARIAL
DESK
- 1 box and 1 file drawer
- stationery pedestal with doors
- 30"x60" main section
- 18"x42" typing height retur
- wrap around modesty panel

LOWEST PRICES IN SOUTH FLORIDA!
COME IN OR CALL—SEE FOR YOURSELF!
WE SHIP ANYWHERE
Call for Free Full Color Catalogues. Decorator Service Available.

decora steel city

EASY LEASE PLANS AVAILABLE—conserve your working capital for profits in other areas.

MIAMI • 7331 N.W. 27th AVE.
696-0271

6448 S. DIXIE HIGHWAY
S. MIAMI 666-5641

MIAMI • 8750 N.E. 4th CT.
757-6271

[illegible] W. OAKLAND PARK BLVD.
FT. LAUD. 566-7316

Charge Accounts Welcome. Se Habla Espanol.



Gleaming colorful glass butterflies. Ideal for sliding doors, windows and shower doors. Outline represents actual size. Green, yellow, blue and amber. Apply using any clear epoxy. Add 50¢ for handling.

WRITE
P.O. Box 2413
Boca Raton, Fla. 33432

ADVERTISEMENT

Helps Shrink Swelling Of Hemorrhoidal Tissues Caused By Inflammation And Infection

Also Gives Prompt, Temporary Relief in Many Cases from Pain and Burning Itch in Such Tissues.

There's an exclusive formulation which actually helps shrink the painful swelling of hemorrhoidal tissues caused by infection. In many cases the first applications give prompt, temporary relief from itching and pain in hemorrhoidal tissues.

The sufferer first notices relief from such painful discomfort. Then this medication helps to gently reduce swelling of hemorrhoidal tissues. Tests conducted by doctors on hundreds of patients in New York City, Washington, D.C., and at a Midwest Medical Center showed this to be true in many cases.

The medication used by doctors in these tests was *Preparation H®* —the same exclusive formula you can buy at any drug counter without a prescription. Preparation H also lubricates the affected area to protect the inflamed, irritated surface and so helps make bowel movements more comfortable.

There is no other formula like Preparation H. In ointment or suppository form.

UNBEATABLE
GOLF PACKAGE
7 DAYS • 6 NIGHTS
$159.80

SUN 'N LAKE
Holiday Inn
LAKE PLACID, FLORIDA
JOHN L. SULLIVAN, INNKEEPER

GOLF & TENNIS CAMP
FOR TEENS — CO-ED
July - August, 1973 • Send for brochure
Golf • Tennis • Horseback riding • Swimming • Fishing • Fine Holiday Inn accommodations • Excellent food • Professional instructors • In beautiful Sun 'n Lake Estates
FOR RESERVATIONS • GOLF OR CAMP
CALL 1-813/465-3133
COLLECT MIAMI 1-305/458-1841



Aloe MAGIC
combined with
VITAMIN E
by Sandra Lee

Lotions Creams
Moisturizers
Does wonders for your aging skin.
Milson
At Your Favorite Store

ANSWER TO TODAY'S PUZZLE



Thus the sincere man does not do or say that which he would be ashamed of were it brought to light. His uprightness of spirit enables him to walk upright and confident among his fellowmen. His presence is a strong protection, and his words are direct and powerful because they are true. Whatever may be his work, it prospers. - James Allen

it seems that everyone associated with WerBell takes gun in hand for target practice at one time or another. Bennett Bintliff, chairman of the board of Defense Systems International, plays marksman with a handgun

POWDER KEG

Continued

to the world of a fellow like Mitch WerBell.

But there it is: the bush jacket and the monacle. The belt buckle that conceals a "survival knife." The electronic gate and the two guard dogs, a German shepherd named Fritz and a Doberman called Mal (for Evil). The electronic sweep by the two phones to detect transmitting or bugging devices. The Scotch whisky, poured neat — no water, no ice.

WerBell drifted into his present line of work during the mid-1950s after a brief but flourishing post-war career in advertising; he joined and rose to the head of the advertising department of Rich's, a major Atlanta department store. He then founded his own ad firm. His first step was to get involved in international public relations and anti-communism: one of his clients, he says, was the Batista government. From there, he eased into the arms and intrigue business.

WerBell's talent for designing weapons recalls that of Q., the fictional British Secret Service armorer for Ian Fleming's super-spy, James Bond. At his Powder Springs retreat, WerBell has designed a submachine gun disguised as a briefcase, an effective noise-and-flash suppressor for automatic weapons, a cigar that fires a single bullet and a swagger stick that is actually a mini-rocket launcher.

WerBell's sorties into strife-torn areas appear at times to be merely the business trips of a traveling salesman whose line happens to be machine guns. At other times, however — such as during the Dominican revolt and in Thailand — his purpose seems to be less clear.

His gullet warmed by a few gulps of neat whisky, WerBell will recount some of these past adventures, albeit reluctantly and in vague terms because of the new, sober image he is attempting to project. But as the camouflage outfit hangs next to the dark suit in WerBell's closet, the flamboyance of the old gunrunning and tank-riding Mitch WerBell every now and then surfaces in the behavior of the conservative geopolitical advisor, Mitchell L. WerBell III.

While in London recently, as Parliament prepared for the final vote endorsing Bahamian independence, WerBell let it be known to a reporter for the *London Daily Mirror* (circulation five million) that he was: 1) four-square for the cause of the Council for a Free Abaco, and 2) recruiting British mercenaries "for a project I have in mind." Abaco? "Who said it was Abaco?" said WerBell. The fruit of the interview was a front-page story headlined: "Mutiny in Paradise . . . The Island That Wants to Stay British . . . A Call Goes Out for Mercenaries."

Such were the initial tactics in the Battle of Abaco, a cause that, for awhile in the British press, seemed second in anticipated ferocity only to the Catholics-vs.-Protestants strife in Northern Ireland. Joining WerBell as a comrade-in-press release was Lt.-Col. Colin (Mad Mitch) Mitchell, a right-wing House of Commons member and a hero of the Battle of Aden during his days with the Argyle & Sutherland Highlanders. Mitchell, who was muttering to the British press about secret missions to Abaco and the such, recently visited WerBell in Powder Springs, WerBell said.

While there are some people who admire flamboyance such as WerBell's, there are others who don't. Among those others are WerBell's former business associates, a group of New York investment bankers who bought WerBell and Bennett B. Bintliff, an associate, out of the Military Armament Corp. (MAC) that the pair had founded. "He's been headline press all over England, and we're just a quiet little manufacturing company," said Rosser Scott Reeves III, chairman of the board of MAC's parent company, Quantum Corp. "He's a loudmouth. Basically, when you're dealing with a country, the country would like to see responsible executives who are discreet, who will transact business — not tell war stories."

Reeves, however, says he doesn't dislike WerBell — he just doesn't want to be associated with him in the arms business. "I like him a great deal. He's amusing and he's a character. But letting him run Colt or letting him run MAC is like turning loose a high-school hot-rodder to run General Motors."

WerBell and his associates in Powder Springs have now reincorporated under the name of Defense Systems International Inc. and have hired away several of MAC's former weapons specialists. They are not overly fond of Reeves and his people either. "Tunnel vision" is one phrase they use to describe MAC's preoccupation with gun sales.

Defense Systems International, they say, does not suffer from such tunnel vision. They are deeply involved in geopolitics — whatever geopolitics are. And from the list of activities that WerBell and his partners tick off, geopolitics seems to be about anything they want it to be: arms sales, military advice, investment banking, economic development, security work, public relations, international lawyering.

The people who hire the firm, WerBell says, "are interested in an organization that's capable of doing the political, geopolitical, clandestine and economic operations that we're capable of. We operate

WILLIAM R. AMLONG is a Herald staff writer.

"in 22 different countries. If somebody said to us tomorrow, 'We need a complete government, from a minister of health to a minister of welfare to the guy who presses the buttons to make the elevator go,' we could do it."

Just how much demand there is for prepackaged governments — or how much capability Defense Systems International has for providing them — is uncertain. What the firm would appear to have an obvious capacity for, however, is warfare. Its president and chief administrator is WerBell's son-in-law, Paul Routhier, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant-colonel who also doubles as the company's air-war expert. On the staff are various other ex-military types, ranging from a Marine sergeant to several retired colonels. Among its activities, says Routhier, is the sale to smaller, U.S.-approved nations of armament packages, including not only hardware but also training.

What Defense Systems International does not do, its principals insist, is to make wars or shoot people themselves. If they did, they say, they could go to jail for violating U.S. neutrality laws. Nor does it sell the guns to shoot people with, unless the U.S. State Department approves, they say. And the State Department isn't about to approve the sale of any arms by WerBell to the Abaconian secessionists. No matter, says WerBell. "We have no intention of arming Abaco in any shape or fashion. Anyway, they have more arms down there than we have here."

So why, then, is there a photograph lying about of the Hon. W. E. Errington (Eric) Watkins, a member of the Bahamian Parliament from Abaco, clenching a cigar between his teeth and test-firing one of WerBell's silenced submachine guns? The answer may well be far from sinister: as a tourist drinks beer when he visits Busch Gardens, a visitor to WerBell's house does not normally leave without firing off a clip or two through the machine gun. It is an instrument of which WerBell is duly proud: a rapid-fire automatic weapon that, when equipped with the silencer, makes about as much noise as an electric typewriter.

The novelty of WerBell's weaponry aside, however, there remain the questions of how WerBell got involved with the Free Abaco faction, what he is doing for it and how he is getting paid.

The leadership of the Council for a Free Abaco appears to be composed of two men, Watkins and Charles (Chuck) Hall. Watkins, the chairman, is a retired Bahamas policeman and former Nassau resident. He was elected to the House of Assembly from Abaco on the Free National Movement ticket last September. He says he has known WerBell for some 20 years. Hall, a Nassau TV- and radio-store owner, is a direct descendant of the white Tories who settled Abaco immediately after the American Revolution rather than be separated from the British Crown. He says he was referred to WerBell through persons he met while organizing a demonstration against allowing Air Cuba to service the Nassau airport. "The people I met there, basically right-wing, were able to put me on to WerBell." Hall is secretary of the council.

With a budget that they will describe no more specifically than to say it is less than $50,000 and made up entirely of small contributions from Bahamians, the group is paying WerBell and Marger an undisclosed fee through Zeta, a dummy corporation founded solely for the Abaco venture. Why it was necessary to establish such a company is unclear. Of its name, WerBell says, "I think it's Greek for war."

But just what the Zeta Co. or Operation Zeta — it's referred to as both — is doing for the Abaconian secessionists is somewhat uncertain. So far, there has been some lobbying of Parliament in London by Marger, a lawyer with U.S. lobbying experience and a background in international law, but about as un-British a fellow as there is. There have been some saber-rattling press releases to the British newspapers. There have been conversations with Mad Mitch. And there has even been note of the plight of the Abaconian secessionists on the editorial page of the *Atlanta Journal*: three sympathetic columns written by John Crown, a retired Marine



BANK LOANS TO ADD A BEDROOM & BATH

BankAmericard for Sheets and Towels!

Enjoy low bank rates on home improvement, addition or remodeling financing . . . and charge the new furnishings you need with BankAmericard. Arrange for either one of them here and you're one-up on the other. That's why we call it "2-for-1" banking: Whatever service you may need, with a BankAmericard issued by us, you already have us in your pocket!

Enjoy '2-for-1' banking at Miami's BANKAMERICARD banks

COMMERCIAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY
9301 N W 7th Ave., Miami — 759-8511
MERCHANTS BANK OF MIAMI
950 S W 57th Ave., Miami — 667-5661
COMMERCIAL BANK OF KENDALL
8601 S. Dixie Hwy., Miami — 665-7494

Subsidiaries of FLORIDA COMMERCIAL BANKS, INC. A Registered Bank Holding Comp

POWDER KEG

Continued

officer and acquaintance of WerBell's who was introduced to Watkins. There is also some talk about approaching the Organization of American States and the United Nations. And about a referendum on Abaco July 9 — the day before Bahamian independence — on whether to unilaterally declare Abaco a free nation. "We are putting to bear all our activity and friends to tell the world, 'Here's a country that doesn't want to go this way,' " says WerBell.

The accuracy of that assessment of feeling on Abaco can be questioned. Many of the Abaconians who originally opposed separation from the Crown abandoned the movement as fruitless in December, when the British government decreed that the Bahamas — all of the Bahamas — would become independent. Nor was there ever complete opposition throughout Abaco to the Pindling government and independence: of the two Parliament members elected by the island's 6,500 residents, the one other than Watkins is a Pindling supporter and a backer of independence. The impetus for the Free Abaco movement, both Pindling and Minister of External Affairs Paul Adderly have charged, comes from outside the Bahamas. "I still think that what they are basically involved in is the stealing of land," Adderly said in a recent interview. And indeed, the majority of the people on Abaco know very little of WerBell and Marger outside of what they read in the British press.

WerBell says his motivations are strictly anti-communist. A far right-winger — he described himself to a newsman as "to the right of Attila the Hun" — WerBell sees the Bahamas as islands ripe for communism. "Every goddam single symptom that was present in Cuba exists in the Bahamas today," he says.

WerBell's opinion of the Pindling government and of the Bahamas' political climate is one which many observers of the Bahamas do not share. Although the overwhelming majority of the islanders are black and have become very assertive concerning racial equality during the past decade or so, the Bahamas have been deeply influenced by English tradition. The Anglican and Baptist Churches, both conservative institutions, are heavily represented. And the U.S. government is ardently courting Pindling as a friend.

But WerBell, son and heir of a Cossack colonel, sees the rise of Bolshevism where others see the peaceful emergence of a new democratic nation. And the question is whether or not to take him seriously as he sits in Powder Springs with his bush jacket and walrus moustache, talking of hiring mercenaries and of naming a company after what he thinks is the Greek letter meaning war.

The State Department, meanwhile, is keeping a close watch. "You can't write a man off as a clown," said one source, "if he has a warehouse full of arms. We take him seriously enough to want to know what he's up to." T

Colonel Mitchell Livingston WerBell, Jr.
Son of Cossack

Right: Luxurious 100% Silk Crepe de Chine Shirts and Pants done in outrageous textures and magnificent moods.

Shirts $75

with matching pants $90

European Clothing
1850 N.E. 164th St. No. M. Beach
Monday thru Friday 10 A.M. - 9 P.M.
Saturday 10 A.M. - 6 P.M.
Sunday by appointment 947-9047

Be Ready For The Fun of Outdoor Cooking With Gas ...in Minutes

Warm Morning broilmaster

Packaged Portable Gas Grill

Assembled and Ready for Use

Includes These Deluxe Features:
- Deluxe Cast Aluminum Grill
- Portable Cart
- Porcelain Enameled Cast Iron Cooking Racks
- Heat Indicator
- Potato Rack
- Two Redwood Shelves
- 20 lb. L.P. Cylinder and Regulator . . . Just have it filled and you're ready to cook!

Compare our Prices!

CG COUNTY GAS CO.
MIAMI: 1234 N.W. 79th STREET / 693-3921



DON'T LET SUMMER'S HEAT GET YOU DOWN.

If your present Central air conditioning system needs replacing make sure the Carrier ROUND ONE GOES IN

BEST THAT MONEY CAN BUY
Carrier
38G-R

1 Day 24 Hour Changeout Service

CARRIER can replace any Central system

- Carrier's Round One thinks for itself with a doorful of the most advanced solid state controls ever built into a unit. The ultimate in protection against "Brown-Outs" and power failures. For further information, phone us.

SERVING MIAMI FOR 27 YEARS
AIRKO
RESIDENTIAL INC.
7400 N.E. 4th COURT — 754-3433

$1 ONE DOLLAR OFF $1
Easy Carry Handle ON Push Pull Top
16 Oz. SUPER SIZE
SUPERTAN

A balanced blend of Aloe, Cocoa Butter and Lanolin for the whole family.

$1 Off regular low price at your favorite store. Including
- MEDCO DRUGS
- NEISNERS
- TARASCH DRUGS
- SURF DRUGS
- NEWPORT SUNDRIES
- TRUCO DRUGS

$2.25

TO STOREKEEPER: DOLLAR VALUE!
You are authorized to act as our agent in redeeming this coupon. We will reimburse you for the face value of this coupon plus 5c handling, provided you and the customer have complied with the terms of this offer. Proof of purchase of sufficient stock to cover coupons for redemption must be furnished upon request. All must be signed with address of consumer. We will not honor redemption through an outside agency. The customer must pay sales tax. Cash redemption 1/20c. Redemption on other than product specified is fraud.
Send coupons to: Sundown Prod. P.O. Box 1051 North Miami Beach, Fla. 33160
Limit 1 Coupon Per Family Coupon Good Thru 7-30-73
Mr. or Ms. Consumer sign here:
NAME..
ADDRESS....................................
$1 ONE DOLLAR OFF $1



State Dept Cable LONDON 5390
dated 9 MAY '73
Subject: Alleged Anti-Bahamian
Independence Activities in
London

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Port Louis

INFO

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT
Headquarter's Traces on the Military Armament Corporation.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
AR: As Stated in Paragraph Three
Reference: Port Louis 12011, 17 May 1973.

1. There are no Headquarter's traces on Dr. George A. Winkler, but there are traces on the Military Armament Corporation and its Board Chairman, Mr. Mitchell Livingston WerBell III (201-259910). In 1967 WerBell organized a firm called SIONICS, Incorporated (Studies in Operational Negation of Insurgency and Counter Subversion), specializing in producing silencers. In 1970, WerBell merged with Quantum Ordnance Bankers and the new firm was named the Military Armament Corporation with WerBell as Chairman of the Board.

2. WerBell was born on 8 March 1918 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He served in the OSS and was of interest to BKHERALD in 1959 when it was discovered that he was involved with anti-Castro plotters in the Dominican Republic. He was granted a POA in August 1959 but this was cancelled in October 1959 when his information proved to be of little value and it was suspected that he was using BKHERALD funds to promote personal interests. He has subsequently attempted to pass himself as LNBUZZ connected and as a BKHERALD employee. Mr. WerBell's lengthy 201 file shows a long history of his appearing in areas and situations where he can make a fast buck. He is characterized as unscrupulous, a "wheeler dealer", and a promotor of grandiose schemes. WOTACK advises that the arms WerBell offers for sale are of good quality, but that the selling price is considered excessive.

3. In that Mr. WerBell is a WODUAL citizen, the above information should not be passed to CGPAT/1. However, the Station could inform CGPAT/1 that the Military Armament Corporation has an unsavory reputation and, although it may have permission from NVIDEA to export arms, it has no LNBUZZ connections and that any dealings with the corporation should be approached with extreme caution.

Luther S. PENAGELIA

Distribution:
Orig & 1-COS, Port Louis

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	AQPW 240	29 May 73 4 JUN 1973
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-259910

Distribution:
1-AF/5
1-AF/5 Chron

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
AF/5/E	G. Hopman	amg	1023

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OPS	30.5.73	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/AF/S	31 May 73	Robert E. MacDonald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 8/72
(40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, WH/Miami	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	MICROFILM

SUBJECT
VWVAPOR/Mitchell Livingston Werbell III

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

Forwarded under separate cover is a report from LNERGO dated 12 September 1973 on Subject.

Louise B. PERLBINDER

Attachment: U/S/C

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, WH/Miami, w/att., u/s/c

E2 IMPDET CL BY: 019722

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFPW-784	Typed: 12 October 1973
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-0259910

1 - 201-0259910
1 - WH/7/Car Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/7/Car	Esther Lucero	ar	4133/1249

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/7	12 X 73	E. James McTighe

FORM 1-67 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 8-72

DISPATCH

2-52

A ← ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX. TYPE THE WORD "ALIGN" TO REGISTER HERE → ALIGN

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	CO	ACP	TOD	TPE	WRD
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
030001Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
403810

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE [illegible], FI, AIR 6, CI/SO.

DISSEM BY: 38

PER ___ #_______

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO ________
X IP FILES

TO: WH/MIAMI.

0 VWVAPOR

(#53419)

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY STATE 80538 DATED 27 APRIL 1973 (POUCHING COPY):

A. BRITISH EMBOFF WASHINGTON GAVE NOTE TO DEPARTMENT ON BEHALF OF BAHAMAS GOVT (GOBI) ON 27 APRIL 1973 RE NEW REPORTS IN UNITED KINGDOM CONCERNING TWO PEOPLE INVOLVED ANTI-BAHAMAS INDEPENDENCE ACTIVITIES. REPORTS IDENTIFY TWO PEOPLE AS U.S. CITIZENS. THEY ARE EDWIN MARGER, FORTY-FOUR YEAR OLD ATTORNEY, WHO CLAIMS REPRESENT "COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO," AND MITCHEL BELL, (SIC) FIFTY-FIVE YEAR OLD ARMS DEALER. GOBI HAS UNCONFIRMED INFO THAT MARGER IS FLORIDA ATTORNEY AND BELL PRESIDENT OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL INC, POWDER SPRING, GEORGIA. "COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO" UNKNOWN TO GOBI.

B. NEWS REPORTS SAY BOTH MEN ARRIVED UK CLAIMING REPRESENT ABACO CITIZENS WHO WANT REMAIN BRITISH, AND INTERESTED HIRING BRITISH MERCENARIES THO NEITHER MAN SAID MERCENABRIES INTENDED FOR ABACO.

AN E/C
EA
IN
PS
EA
DC
FI
WH/DCAD

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

2.51

02 MAY 73
201-259910

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: ______

14-00000

A ← ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX. TYPE THE WORD "ALIGN" TO REGISTER HERE → ALIGN

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

	AGE	CO.	ACP	TOD	TPE	WRD
CMF	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 3

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP:

CITE: DIRECTOR 403810

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER ___ #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO

0 IP FILES

C. GOBI REPORTED THIS INFO SINCE ACTIVITIES, IF TRUE, MIGHT CONSTITUTE CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AGAINST GOBI.

D. GOBI REQUESTS U.S. GOVT INQUIRE INTO CONDUCT THESE TWO MEN RE REPORTED ACTIVITIES AGAINST GOBI, TAKING ACTION AS NECESSARY.

E. STATE COMMENT LABELLED FYI: ARMS DEALER IS MITCHEL WERBELL OF POWDER SPRING, GEORGIA, WHO KNOWN TO DEPARTMENT AS ADVENTURER WHO INVOLVED IN SIMILAR ACTIVITIES IN OTHER CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES. END FYI.

2. FOLLOWING SUMMARY NASSAU 546 DATED 27 APRIL 1973 (POUCHING COPY):

A. MIN EXT AFF ADDERLEY GAVE INFO COPY STATE 80538 TO EMBOFF IN NASSAU WITH COMMENT THAT GOBI NOT ASKING UK AUTHORITIES TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS.

B. ADDERLEY SAID ABACO LEADER LEONARD THOMPSON AND MR. STRATTON, ONE OF MAIN FINANCIAL BACKERS OF ABACO MOVEMENT, ASSURED PM RECENTLY THEY NOT SUPPORTING SECESSION THROUGH VIOLENCE. (EMBOFF COMMENT: THIS IN LINE WITH INFO RECEIVED THAT MODERATE ELEMENTS ON ABACO DISASSOCIATING FROM EXTREMISTS AROUND ERRINGTON WATKINS)

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 3 OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

403810

PER #

C. NASSAU "GUARDIAN" 27 APRIL 1973 HAS CABINET OFFICE PRESS RELEASE WITH NOTE TEXT, AND REPORTS THAT ABACO ERRINGTON WATKINS AND FRIEND, CHARLES "CHUCK" HALL, IN LONDON SEEKING SUPPORT FOR "COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO."

D. SAME ISSUE HAS WATKINS'S DENIAL HE IN LONDON FOR MERCENARIES OR THAT HE WOULD RESORT TO OR CONDONE VIOLENCE. HE SAID HE LOBBYING HAVE BAHAMAS INDEPENDENCE BILL AMENDED TO EXCLUDE INDEPENDENCE FOR ABACO AND SAID WILL DO EVERYTHING LEGALLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY TO ACHIEVE WISHES AND DESIRES OF PEOPLE. WATKINS SAID GOBI CHARGES WERE EFFORT TO DISCREDIT HIM.

E. DEPARTMENT COMMENT: PROMPT RELEASE OF NOTE TO LOCAL PRESS AND RADIO SUGGESTS IT EXERCISE FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSUMPTION.

3. POUCHING SUMMARY EXTENSIVE FILE ON WERBELL (201-259910).

4. FILE 201-259910. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 2 MAY 1973
ORIG: EASTON C. WARNER: KMS
UNIT: WH/7/CAR
EXT: 7493/1956

AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

2,51 William
C/WH/7
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019722

FBI cable dated 7 May '73

Subject: Edwin Marger:

Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

IS - GREAT BRITAIN

FBI document dated 13 June '73.
from Atlanta, Ga.
Subject: Edwin Marger;
Mitchell Livingston
Werbell, III

FBI document dated
16 Mar 73
(re- mitchell Werbell)

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 25 1972
MICROFILMED

SECRET

302449

DTG: | STAFF | DIRECTOR

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 21/26 PER 21 # 6
CONF C/WH/6 INFO FILE [illegible]
[illegible]

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 056672
[illegible]

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT PLMHSGYSS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 20752 (IN 654371)

B. MEXICO CITY 20754 (IN 654378)

1. MITCHELL L. WERBELL, III (201-259910) IS DIRECTOR OF QUANTON CORP WHICH PARENT COMPANY OF MILITARY ARMAMENT CORP AND DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL. HQS HAS LENGTHY 201 ON WERBELL WHO HAS LONG HISTORY POPPING UP IN AREAS AND SITUATIONS WHERE CAN MAKE FEW FAST BUCKS. HE CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, WHEELER DEALER AND PROMOTOR OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MID 1959 WHEN BECAME INVOLVED WITH ANTI-CASTRO PLOTTERS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OFFERED PROVIDE SKTRUST WITH INFO ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN CARIBBEAN. HE GRANTED POA IN AUGUST 1959 BUT THIS CANCELLED OCTOBER 1959 WHEN HIS INFO PROVED BE OF LITTLE VALUE AND IT SUSPECTED THAT HE USING SKTRUST FUNDS TO PROMOTE PERSONAL INTERESTS. HE BORN 8 MAR 1918, PHILADELPHIA.

2. SKTRUST HAS SPENT LAST TEN YEARS DISCLAIMING WERBELL WHO HAS REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED PROMOTE SELF AS REP OF [illegible] AND SKTRUST. IT PROBABLE THAT WERBELL USING CAMARGO AND TORRES AS FRONT MEN FOR

ORIG		UNIT		DATE	
AUTH		UNIT		SIGNATURE	
RELEASE		UNIT		SIGNATURE	

OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT	OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT
	B201-272522		CS COPY	17 AUG 1972	
	B201-299213				

2.48

201-259910

ORIGINATING MESSAGE

SECRET

DIG:

MSG STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR

302449

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

CONF INFO RF, VR, FILE

TOTAL COPIES

HIS OPERATIONS BECAUSE WERBELL SO BADLY BURNED WITH [illegible]. ALL ABOVE MAY BE PASSED BHDD WITH CAVEAT THAT IT NOT BE PASSED FOREIGN NATIONALS BECAUSE WERBELL LNLUTE CITIZEN.

3. TRACES ON BAUMGART PENDING. WILL FORWARD WHEN RECEIVED.

4. FILE: 201-259910; 201-298213; 201-292522. E2 IMPDET UN-SR

SISH.H

ORIG [illegible]

AUTH [illegible]

RELEASE [illegible]

UNIT [illegible]

UNIT [illegible]

UNIT [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

SIGNATURE [illegible]

SIGNATURE [illegible]

OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT	OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			

OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

FBI document dated
18 April '72
(re: Mitchell L. Werbell, III -
Assoc. w/ Haitian exiles)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
John K. Greaney Assistant General Counsel	7521	DATE 8 November 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. General Counsel			LRH
2.			
3. DD/P 3C34 Hqs.		8 Nov 71	
4.			
5. DD/SEC 4E60 Hqs.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1-3. I have reviewed the attached transcript and find nothing classified. I feel, however, it would be advisable for Ermal Geiss to sign the reply since WerBell's counsel has sent me written interrogatories in this proceedings.

Lawrence R. Houston

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

CONCURRENCE:

Deputy Director for Plans

2.45

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Dept of the Army
Memo for: Deputy Asst Secty of Defense
From: Security Policy + Review Branch
Subj: Wer Bell, Mitchell Livingston III OSDNO. 69
59
dated 6 Oct 71

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 71-1618
11 NOV 1971

Mr. George MacClain
Director, Information
Security Division
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. MacClain:

Subject: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III
OSD No. 69-59

In accordance with your request of 13 October 1971, the Central Intelligence Agency has reviewed the Official Report of Proceedings in the subject case. The Official Report of Proceedings does not contain any information pertaining to the CIA which should be classified.

It should be noted, however, that the lack of classification does not mean the CIA subscribes to or validates the testimony contained in the Official Report of Proceedings and this review should not be interpreted as an endorsement by this Agency of the statements contained therein.

Returned herewith is the Official Report of Proceedings.

Sincerely,

ERMAL P. GEISS

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

Enclosures
- Memo fr Examiner, ISCRD, 9/22/71
- ISCRD memo, 9/23/71
- ISD memo, 9/27/71
- Army response, 10/6/71
- Vol 1, OSD No. 69-59
- Vol 2, OSD No. 69-59

2.46

201-259910

Office of the Ass't Secretary of Defense
Memo dated 13 Oct 71
Subj: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III - OSD No. 69-59

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division

Memo dated 22 Sep 71

Subj: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No. 6959

Office of Ass't. Secretary of Defense
Memo dated 23 Sep 71
Subj: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No. 69-59

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense
Memo dated 27 Sep 71
Subj: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No. 69-59

(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

VANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

File Werbell

FILE, VR. C/PLAN, DDP, ADDP, C/FE/VNO 4, C/FE/LOC 2
C/FE 4
TION NO.
124 C/FI 2, C/CI, C/SAVA, D/SECUR 4, C/SOD 3 (13)

S E C R E T 121148Z NOV 71 CITE BANGKOK 24725 (SEGERQUIST ACTING)

DIRECTOR PHNOM PENH VIENTIANE SAIGON

RYBAT SECUR

REF: DIRECTOR 88114 KNOTAL)

12 Nov IN 467962

1. MR. MITCHELL A. WERBELL, MILITARY ARMAMENT CORPORATION (FORMERLY AN ELEMENT OF WERBELL'S GEORGIA BASED FIRM OF SIONICS WHICH REPORTEDLY WENT BANKRUPT), IS BACK IN BANGKOK ATTEMPTING TO SELL HIS WARES (MACHINE PISTOLS AND SNIPER RIFLES). THE REF MESSAGE CITES THE FACT THAT HQS HAS A LENGTHY 201 ON SUBJECT (201-259910) AND THAT HE IS CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, A WHEELER-DEALER AND A PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE HAS ON OCCASION ALLUDED EITHER TO BEING AN LNLUTE REP OR HAVING LNLUTE BACKING.

2. SUBJECT MET WITH SEVERAL LNCUFF OFFICERS ON 5 NOV 71 AND RELATED THAT HE WAS ATTEMTING AGAIN TO INTEREST THE THAI GOVERNMENT IN PURCHASING HIS PRODUCTS. SUBJECT CLAIMS TO BE PERSONAL FRIEND OF AIR CHIEF MARSHAL DAWEE AND THAT HIS SAMPLE WEAPONS WERE CONSIGNED TO DAWEE IN ORDER TO BRING THEM INTO THAILAND. 3. SUBJECT ADVISED LNCUFF THAT GEN. KRIANGSAK HAD ORDERED

[illegible] added OGC per DDP [illegible] 13 Nov 71

SECRET

2.43

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT Z

SEM. BY PER #

TION UNIT FILE, VR

TION NO.

PAGE TWO BANGKOK 24725 SECRET

ONE HUNDRED MACHINE PISTOLS AND TWENTY SNIPER RIFLES. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAD MET WITH H.S.H. ADMIRAL DISKUL, CHIEF AIDE DE CAMP TO H.M. THE KING AND CLAIMS HE WILL SELL HIS MACHINE PISTOL TO THE ROYAL PALACE GUARDS. FURTHER CLAIMS HE WILL HAVE AUDIENCE THIS WEEK WITH H.M. THE KING.

4. FOLLOWING HIS CURRENT THAILAND VISIT, ON 16 NOV 71 SUBJECT AND MR. JASON M. STONE (201-096998) PLAN TRAVEL PHNOM PENH. PLAN TO CONTACT MR. LADD AT PHNOM PENH. . ACCORDING LNCUFF SUBJECT PLANS CONTACT CAMBODIAN MIL. AUTHORITIES FOR POSSIBLE WEAPONS SALES. SUBJECT HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED ITEMS FOR GEN. POKSAMAN IN BANGKOK.

5. MR. JASON M. STONE IS HEAD OF BANGKOK BASED FIRM OF ASSOCIATED CONSULTANTS COMPANY LTD. HE IS CHINESE, WHO WORKED WITH WERBELL IN SEA DURING WWII. SUBJECT NOW REPRESENTS BELGIAN ARMS FIRMS AND IS REP FOR PILATUS PORTER AIRCRAFT.

6. FOLLOWING PHNOM PENH VISIT WERBELL PLANS TRAVEL TO LAOS IN A PILATUS PORTER, PROBABLY WITH STONE.

7. DUE RESTRICTION ON PASSING DEROG ON U.S. CITIZEN, BELIEVE BEST APPROACH TO FOLLOW IS CAREFUL ADVICE TO LOCAL

SECRET

2.43

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

2	6
3	7
4	8

ANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT:

EM BY: PER #

ION UNIT | INFO FILE, VR

ION NO.

AGE THREE BANGKOK 24725 S E C R E T

IAISON THAT SUBJECT HAS NO OFFICIAL LNLUTE RELATION

ND CAUTION SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN ANY BUSINESS DEAL. GP-1

ECRET

* C/S APPARENTLY WRONG REF.

SECRET

2.43

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 71-1570

REGISTERED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

28 October 1971

Mr. David H. Henretta, Jr.
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division
Suite 602, Lynn Building
1111 North 19th Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Henretta:

I am returning herewith the Interrogatories sent with your letter of October 26, 1971 and which I have executed before a Notary Public as requested.

Since the xerox copy of Mr. Joseph Liebling's letter did not contain some of the formalities that were in the original, I have noted this in my answer to Interrogatory III.

I trust this takes care of what you need.

Very truly yours,

s/ Lawrence R. Houston

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

Encl. - Interrogatories

2.22

INTERROGATORIES

Section 1001, Title 18, United States Code. Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any Department or Agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.

I.

Please state your name, address and professional position and indicate how long you have served in this position.

ANSWER:
Lawrence R. Houston, Esquire
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
General Counsel
Twenty-four years

II.

In your official capacity as General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, did you receive a letter dated February 16, 1971 from Joseph J. Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense?

ANSWER: Yes

III.

Attached to these interrogatories is a three page document marked "Gov. Ex 14". Are pages 2 and 3 a xerox copy of the letter referred to in Question II?

ANSWER: Yes. The xerox copy does not have handwritten salutation, signature or printed letterhead; however, the text of the original and the xerox copy have been compared and found to be identical.

IV.

If the Answer to III. is in the affirmative did you subsequently respond to this letter?

ANSWER: Yes

V.

If affirmative, is page one of the attachment, "Gov. Ex 14", a xerox copy of your responding letter to Mr. Liebling?

ANSWER: Yes

7.42

VI.

If affirmative, is the information in the letter dated 23 February 1971 (in answer to the questions posed in the letter dated 16 February 1971) true and correct to your best knowledge and belief?

ANSWER: Yes

The foregoing answers to the Interrogatories made by me are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lawrence R. Houston
Lawrence R. Houston

Subscribed and Sworn to before me
a person authorized by law to
administer oaths, this [illegible]
day of October 1971.

[illegible]
Notary Public
Fairfax County Va

My Commission Expires May 12, 1973

2.42

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division

Letter dated 26 Oct 71

Re: WerBell, Mitchell L. III, Docket No. 228

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III (MIN-056-71)

FROM: Deputy Director, DCS 912 Key Bldg.	EXTENSION 2265	NO. OGC 71-6387 DATE 15 March 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. John K. Greaney, OGC 7D01 HQ				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.			2·40	

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

MIM-056-71

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : John McConnell
John Greany (OGC)
Chief, Miami Field Office

10 March 1971

Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. On 9 Mar 71 we received a long distance call, presumably from Powder Springs, Georgia, from subject, who is an old and unsavory contact of this office dating from 1959. Werbell has been involved in a variety of scrapes, the latest of which concerned an abortive invasion of Haiti which John Greany was very much concerned about a year or so ago.

2. Werbell stated that the Department of Defense had just revoked his security clearance on grounds of Werbell's "frivolous behavior" in the Haitian caper. Werbell stated that he intended to "fight it to the Supreme Court", as he had always kept us and other elements of the US Government informed concerning developments in the Haitian matter.

3. Werbell asked if there was anything that we could do for him in the way of interceding for him with the DOD, and we informed him bluntly and in no uncertain terms that he was strictly on his own, and we could do nothing for him. He then asked if it would be worthwhile to subpoena Bart Gonzales. We informed him that it was up to his attorney to make such recommendations.

4. Werbell seemed to get the message, and then offered to keep us advised regarding an alleged forthcoming attempt on Haiti which is being sponsored by Rolando Masferrer, even though Masferrer is currently incarcerated in a federal prison. We told Werbell that if he wished to pass any information along we would accept it but under no circumstances should he attempt to elicit any information on our behalf. He agreed that he would operate on this basis and said he might be in touch with us again.

5. In view of Werbell's record we felt that this latest contact should be a matter of record and that OGC should be informed of developments.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG/css

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

Gun Shipment Figures Played Dramatic Roles

By Bruce Galphin

Washington Post Staff Writer

ATLANTA, Dec. 2—The two top officials of an Atlanta firm under investigation for receiving guns shipped from Vietnam through Eglin Air Force Base in Florida are no strangers to controversy or dramatic situations.

One was actively involved in plans to set up an anti-Castro base in Haiti, and both were in the Dominican Republic during the 1965 American intervention to put down a revolution.

Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, vice president of Sionics, an Atlanta weapons research and manufacturing firm, was indicted 2½ years ago on charges of violating a federal law forbidding preparation of a military expedition against a friendly nation from American territory.

The indictment against WerBell and six others was made after customs agents raided an island camp near Marathon, Fla., where they seized a small arsenal of weapons and found 75 battle-clad exiles and Americans.

Not on Island

WerBell himself was not on the island at the time of the raid.

Only four weeks after WerBell was accused, the U.S. attorney in Miami announced the charge was being dismissed "on the authority of the attorney general" (Ramsey Clark). The federal attorney, William A. Meadows Jr., said he could not make any further comment on why the charge was being dropped.

WerBell commented wryly that he was unhappy because "I've lost my one claim to notoriety."

At the time of the indictment, WerBell was quoted by the Atlanta Constitution as admitting an "extremely combatant role" in the anti-Castro base plans.

The federal indictment had alleged a conspiracy to ship guns and munitions from Atlanta and New York to Miami.

But WerBell told a reporter at the time of the indictment that he had withdrawn his support from the Haitian base plan when it appeared to be headed toward direct military action.

"If I'm called upon again to fight Communists in the western hemisphere, I'll do it," he said. "Anything I've done has served the best interest of the United States."

"I've been involved in anti-communist activities a long time," he said. "I've helped the Dominican government fight the Communists."

Aided Newsman

In the Dominican action two years before, WerBell was credited with pulling a wounded American newsman out of a bullet-riddled car in Santo Domingo. The newsman, Miami Herald photographer Doug Kennedy, had been accidentally wounded by U.S. Marine gunfire.

Fred N. Brown, president of Sionics, also was in the Dominican capital at the time as an official for an American development corporation.

At one point during the fighting, he said a few days afterward, he and some 200 other Americans were "lined up against a wall" by armed revolutionaries at a Santo Domingo hotel.

He said the rebels were looking for Cuban nationalists, and that he managed to slip inside the hotel, where American embassy officials negotiated safe conduct. He was evacuated by helicopter to a U.S. warship.

"The Communist movement has actually defeated itself" by forcing the United States "to adopt such a firm policy," he commented at the time.

Both the Dominican fighting and the Marathon raid occurred before WerBell and Brown founded Sionics.

An Air Force officer at Eglin is under investigation for his role in three shipments of small arms from Vietnam. WerBell denied reports that the weapons were intended for right-wing anti-Negro groups and said he himself, while in Vietnam had had the captured weapons sent to Atlanta via Eglin for laboratory research.

M

1969

2.31

201-259910

Viet Arms Shipment to Fla. Aired

By Bruce Galphin
Washington Post Staff Writer

ATLANTA, Dec. 1 — An Atlanta weapons manufacturer said today that he and not an Air Force officer was responsible for three now-controversial shipments of small arms from Vietnam to Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

And, said the businessman, Mitchell L. Werbell III, "We were trying to do a favor for everybody.

"It's a shame they have taken a nice officer like (Lt. Col.) Paul Marriott and made a scapegoat of him. Marriott didn't even know about it."

Marriott, chief assistant of the Eglin Armament Laboratory, is under investigation for his role in the gun shipments. The Air Force has not yet released a report on findings of its investigation.

Werbell is vice president of Sionics, an Atlanta weapons research and manufacturing company.

He said he spent time in Vietnam supervising the testing of flash and sound suppressors manufactured by his firm. While he was there, he said, various South Vietnamese organizations and military officials gave him guns.

Werbell said he was interested in testing the Sionics suppressors on captured Russian-designed AK-47 machine guns, and that he sent a crate back to the states via Eglin. They were officially registered, were delivered to Atlanta and are now "in various stages of disassembly in our laboratory," he stated.

Washington Post - 2 December 1969

2.3b

201-259910

Memo from OGC
23 Feb 71
OGC. 71-0248
Request concerning
affiliation of
WerBell + C.I.A.
(answered "NO")

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Hon. Joseph J. Liebling

Joe: You may already know it, but if you do not, WerBell's lawyer, Edwin Marger, has taken this line before. He was counsel for a British pilot, Hawke, who was tried in Buffalo in 1966 for flying B-26s to Portugal without export licenses. Marger developed the theory that these flights had CIA approval and support. This was totally untrue as we testified at the trial, but Marger seemed convinced that he had a case. He seems to be easily convinced by his clients.

Let me know if you want anything more.

s/Larry
23 February 1971
(DATE)
2.25

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

14-00000

OGC 71-0248

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 February 1971

The Honorable Joseph J. Liebling
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Security Policy)
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. Liebling:

Re: WerBell, Mitchell L., III

In response to your letter of 16 February 1971 concerning Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III's alleged affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency, we have investigated the matter thoroughly, and based on all the information available, the answer is "No" for each of your questions numbered 1 through 6.

You should be advised that Mr. WerBell voluntarily contacted a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency's Domestic Contact Service in Coral Gables, Florida, and at Mr. WerBell's initiation furnished voluntary information for the period 16 December 1965 - 19 November 1966 with eleven contacts. It should be noted that the function of the Domestic Contact Service is to receive information which individuals feel is of interest to the United States Government. The office is overtly listed in the telephone book under the Central Intelligence Agency and, therefore, is readily available for contact.

If Mr. WerBell suggests an affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency, he is hereby authorized to divulge the details of his alleged affiliation in the hearing so that he may not use ostensible security as a means of avoiding answering questions.

Sincerely,

Lawrence R. Houston

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

25

201-259910

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense
Letter dated 16 Feb 71
Re: Werbell application for an industrial security clearance.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
REGISTRATION REQUEST

FROM: FI/DCG/INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER 2 E 03	EXTENSION 5045	NO. ISRM 36075 DATE ~~22 MAR 1972~~ 22 MAR 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/201 Section GA 20		22 MAR		
2.				
3. IP/[redacted] FDI GB 34				5 - 3: PLEASE RUSH ABSTRACTING
4.				
5. FI/ISR 2 E 03				201-259910
6.				ABSTRACT X INDEX DATE ~~21 MAR 1972~~ 22 MAR 1972
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				233

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

No Record in FR/Index. 23 March 1972

25-9910

201- [illegible]

UTILIZATION

RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCS

TO: SECURITY

TO: DD

TO: CCS

ISRM NO.

201 NO.

SIGNATURE Loretta Neighly

DIVISION FR/21

DATE 23 March 1972

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(20-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

I S R LOG

ADDRESSEE REMARKS

NATIONAL FILE NO.

DATE

NEW

RE-REGISTRATION

UTILIZATION

RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCS

TO: SECURITY DC No Record 3/24

TO: DD

TO: CCS

ISRM NO.

201 NO.

SIGNATURE

DIVISION

DATE

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

2.33

(20-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

I S R LOG

ADDRESSEE REMARKS

No Objection to Registration. DCS reserves the right to contact subject in accordance with its responsibilities under NSCID 2, DCID 2/5 and 2/3; but will waive this right by mutual agreement if his intended use so requires.

NATIONAL FILE NO.

DATE

NEW

RE-REGISTRATION

UTILIZATION

RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCS

TO: SECURITY

TO: DD

TO: CCS

ISRM NO.

201 NO.

SIGNATURE

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
Operational Support Staff, 900 Key
[illegible]

DIVISION

DATE 22 Mar 72

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

2.33

(20-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

I S R LOG

ADDRESSEE REMARKS

no CCS objection
23 Mar 72
Jo [illegible]
for Chief/CCS/CCB

NATIONAL FILE NO.

DATE

NEW

RE-REGISTRATION

UTILIZATION

RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCS

TO: SECURITY

TO: DD

TO: CCS

ISRM NO.

201 NO.

SIGNATURE

DIVISION

DATE

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

2.33

(20-38)

DW-7

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CHECK ONE

CS COPY

ee Aldes
T/ISR
-03 Ext. 5345

REQUEST FOR ☒ REGISTRATION ☐ DE-REGISTRATION

DEADLINE: 1400 HRS., 24 MARCH 1972

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISRM NO. 36,075
DATE 22 MARCH 1972
201 NO. 259910

~~XX~~ NEW | RE-REGISTRATION | X UTILIZATION | RE-CHECK

US

NAME (Last, First, Middle)
W E R B E L L, Mitchell Livingston, III

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS
WER-BELL

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
CA 1918	Pennsylvania	USA

RESIDENCE
Highway 360, Powder Springs, Cobb County, Georgia

PRESENT EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION
Defense Systems, Inc., Powder Springs, Georgia	President

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA
Past Emp: Rich's Dept. Store, Atlanta
Former OSS Officer in CBI Theater, WW II

TRACE RESULTS

RID/INDEX REMARKS
N/ 3-23-72 SRS

RID/CE REMARKS

RESULTS

TO:	DATE	NATIONAL FILE NO.
S & DR	24 March 72	238852 Army

1. The ISR has no record of a current operational interest in Subject. This is not a registration.

NOTE: This request for registration in the ISR was changed to a utilization check at the request of Mrs. Goodall, USAFAC, 24 March 1972.

EVB

23 MAR 1972

DROP DATE | REASON DROPPED

CS COPY 233
SIGNATURE

SECRET

IW CW

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 007A22

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	
WH 11	FILE, VR, ADDO, DDO/DO, IP/AN, IW, FI 5, DDO, SA 4,	1 4
ACTION # 498	CI, CI/PS, CI/OPS, SOD 3.	2 5 3 6

T 330389 PAGE 01 IN 953234

TOR:201526Z JUN 73 WHIM 18806

SECRET 201451Z JUN 73 INTEL

TDFIR-314/05249-73
UFP-921

CITE WH/MIAMI 18806

TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL VWVAPOR

SUPDATA - VWAGALLEY/VWKNOB-1 IN MEETING IN NASSAU 15 JUNE 73. VWKNOB-1 AND VWKNOB-2 INDEPENDENTLY SAID REAL TROUBLE MAKERS RE ABACO WERE U.S. MUNITIONS DEALERS ASSOCIATED WITH MITCHELL WARBELL IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA. CLASSIFIED BY TURNER D. SAUNORAS. INDEX WATKINS. FILE: 189-9-1. UFP-921.

FILED 201451Z

SECRET

2.5.6 201-259910 201 Werbell

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN: 953234

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
STATE/INR NMCC/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA [illegible] SDO ONE CRS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR -314/05249-73

DIST 20 JUNE 1973

COUNTRY BAHAMA ISLANDS

DOI 15 JUNE 1973

SUBJECT ANTICIPATION THAT ABACO SECESSIONISTS WILL NOT RESORT TO VIOLENCE

ACQ 16 JUNE 1973

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL BAHAMIAN SERVICE.

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAHAMAS DOES NOT ANTICIPATE ANY VIOLENCE AND/OR ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE ABACO SECESSIONISTS DURING THE INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS. TROUBLE IS NOT EXPECTED FROM THE COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO AND ERRINGTON WATKINS, LEADING SPOKESMAN FOR THE ABACO SECESSIONISTS AND FORMER FREE NATIONAL MOVEMENT (FNM) MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. TROUBLE MAY, HOWEVER, OCCUR AFTER INDEPENDENCE.

2. WATKINS IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN ERRATIC PERSONALITY WHO COULD TAKE EXTREME ACTION IF ABACO WERE IGNORED BY THE GOVERNMENT AFTER INDEPENDENCE OR NOT GIVEN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

SECRET

256

IN 953234

TDFIR-314 05249-73

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

IN THE MEANTIME, WATKINS VALUES HIS POLITICAL CAREER AND WISHES TO REGAIN HIS PARLIAMENTARY SEAT. HE, THEREFORE, IS NOT LIKELY TO ATTEMPT ANY VIOLENT ACTION. (FIELD COMMENT: THE BAHAMAS PRESS REPORTED ON 13 JUNE 1973 THAT WATKINS HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM THE FNM. ON 15 JUNE THE BAHAMAS PRESS REPORTED THAT WATKINS HAD DECLARED HIMSELF AN INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATIVE IN PARLIAMENT AND THAT THE COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO WOULD BE CONVERTED INTO A POLITICAL PARTY.)

3. (BAHAMIAN SERVICE COMMENT: IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT WATKINS' NEW POLITICAL PARTY WILL BECOME A SIGNIFICANT FORCE IN THE BAHAMAS. A FEW OTHER FNM MEMBERS, INCLUDING POSSIBLY SIR ROLAND SYMONETTE, CLEOPHAS ADDERLEY AND MICHAEL LIGHTBOURN, MAY JOIN THE NEW PARTY, ESPECIALLY IF THEY ARE ALSO EXPELLED FROM THE FNM. IN THE FUTURE, A THREE PARTY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE THE PROGRESSIVE LIBERAL PARTY, THE OPPOSITION FNM AND THE NEW WATKINS PARTY MAY EMERGE IN THE BAHAMAS.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1), (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. SECRET

Trace Request from AF OSI
Case # 04D74(24C)3232
Dated 8 May 70

FBI document dated 5 May 70
from Atlanta, Ga.
Subject: Mitchell Livingston
werbell, III
Sionics Lab
Route I, Powder Springs,
Georgia

FBI document
dated 13 Mar '70
Bureau file: (NI) 62-108665
Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell,
III – Neutrality Matters

26 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Washington Evening Star Article entitled "The Story of CBS and the Plot to Invade Haiti" which appeared in the 26 February 1970 Edition

1. Subject article reported that a CBS cameraman, James WILSON, had contacted CIA agents in Houston while on a space shot assignment in 1966, and that the CIA had informed the FBI, who called on WILSON and referred him to U.S. Customs.

2. WH Division has ascertained that on 30 June 1966, a James WILSON called the CIA Duty Officer of the Domestic Contact Service (DCS) office in Houston, Texas, and subsequently related a story about a proposed plot being staged in the U.S. to invade Haiti and overthrow the Duvalier Government, and that CBS had convinced the parties involved that they should allow CBS to photograph and televise a Special Program on the preparations. WILSON requested and received assurances from the DCS officer that he would not be identified as the source of this information.

3. On 6 July 1966, WH Division sent a blind memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of State which forwarded a resume of WILSON's story to the DCS, without identifying the source. The memorandum stated that the source's motive for disclosing this information was to alert the U.S. Government to a potentially embarrassing situation if it were involved in an insecure operation. The JMWAVE Station also passed a resume of this information to the U.S. Customs Bureau in Miami.

4. Except in connection with this report, there is no record of any operational involvement by the Agency with WILSON.

201-259916

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, SOD/GB

SUBJECT : Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject, dated 30 January 1970

1. WH/7 conveyed the substance of your first memorandum on this subject to the FBI, which has now advised us that the Office of Special Investigations, USAF, and the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the Internal Revenue Service, Treasury Department, have both had recent investigative interest in WERBELL's activities.

2. Under these circumstances, WH/7 suggests that LTC Cochrane be advised to inform an appropriate USAF security office of Mr. WERBELL's statements. This should insure that any follow-up inquiry concerning those statements would be properly coordinated with such other investigations as may be in process.

David L. Smock
C/WH/7

[illegible]

201-257910

SOD 70-138

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/7

SUBJECT: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

REFERENCE: Memorandum for C/WH/7, Same Subject, dated 15 January 1970

1. On 28 January 1970, Mr. Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, Vice President of SIONICS, Inc., told LTC Barney Cochrane, USAF, that he had not been contacted by any interested representative of the U.S. Government concerning the information pertaining to Haitian plotting passed previously. Mr. WerBell said that his reference to the plan being initiated in Canada is a blind and that the plotting is based in Haiti. He also stated that he has been approached to provide the equivalent of five million dollars worth of arms to the group and that the plotting has French backing.

2. The above information was received from LTC Cochrane by LTC Charles Williamson, USMC, and is provided to WH/7 for disposition and action. This information, to the best of our knowledge, has not been acted upon by SACSA; however, Mr. WerBell is concerned that no action is being taken or apparent interest shown.

Casimiro Barquin
Chief, Ground Branch
Special Operations Division

2 26

20 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III

REFERENCE : Memo from C/SOD/GB to C/WH/7 dtd 15 Jan 1970
Subject: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

1. Andrew Bacuzzi, SOD/GB, advised 19 January 1969, after my phone call to Mr. Barquin pointing out the third Agency aspect of the Werbell report, that Col. Williamson has checked with his friend Col. Cochrane, and that the latter stated he had taken no other action with this info and intended to take none. Col. Cochrane apparently regards the info as being none of his own official business and was telling his friend (Williamson) about it as a private citizen.

2. Suggest we just use Williamson as the source.

James P. Mullen
C/WH/7/HT

Distribution:
1 - 201-259910
1 - 100-9-16
1 - WH/7/HT Chrono

2.25

201-259910

SOD 70-057

15 JAN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/7

SUBJECT: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

1. The Vice President of SIONICS Inc., Mr. Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, contacted LTC Barney Cochrane, USAF, assigned to SACSA, in early January 1970 and said that he learned of the existence of plans for a special clandestine operation based perhaps in Canada against President Duvalier's regime within the next four months. Mr. WerBell said that he believes this effort has a good chance of success since it is well financed and directed. Mr. WerBell conveyed to LTC Cochrane that he is willing to reveal all that he knows concerning the organization and its plan to interested U.S. authorities.

2. The above information was obtained from LTC Cochrane by LTC Charles Williamson, USMC, assigned to SOD/GB. SOD and the Office of Security have an extensive file on Mr. WerBell who has a long history of worldwide involvement in borderline and sometimes illegal international gun deals. It is felt by LTC Cochrane that Mr. WerBell's story is plausible and warrants further investigation. Mr. WerBell's motive for revealing this type of information at present could be an effort to relieve pressure on his firm and himself for gun deals that did not conform to U.S. export control regulations and are being investigated and warrants pending.

3. To the best of our knowledge, no action has been taken on this information by SACSA.

Casimiro Barquin
Chief, Ground Branch
Special Operations Division

2.34

Cable from FBI dated 22 Jan 70

Subj: Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, Internal Security - Haiti

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

SECRET

ORIG: R. LEHMAN:gt
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 1349-5595
DATE: 19 JAN 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: [illegible] PER [illegible]

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-259916

DISSEM: [illegible]
INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, [illegible]

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

(classification) **SECRET**
(date and time filed)
(elite) (reference number) (pica)
CITE DIRECTOR 003879

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 20 19 50 Z JAN 70

FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI
MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO THIS AGENCY'S CSCI 316/02323-69 DATED 27 JUNE 1969; SUBJECT: WERBELL, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON III, A COPY OF WHICH WAS SENT TO YOUR BUREAU.

2. IN EARLY JANUARY 1970, A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING SUBJECT. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, WERBELL HAS STATED THAT HE KNOWS OF PLANS FOR A SPECIAL CLANDESTINE OPERATION AGAINST PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S REGIME IN HAITI SCHEDULED TO OCCUR WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS. WERBELL SAID THE OPERATION, WHICH MIGHT BE BASED IN CANADA, IS WELL FINANCED AND DIRECTED AND, IN HIS ESTIMATION, HAS A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. SOURCE SAID WERBELL EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO REVEAL ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO INTERESTED U.S. AUTHORITIES CONCERNING THE PLANS AND THE ORGANIZATION BEHIND THE CLANDESTINE OPERATION.

Continued. . .

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

2, 22

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IG:
NIT:
XT:
ATE:

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 003879

SOURCE COMMENTED THAT WERBELL'S MOTIVE FOR REVEALING THIS INFORMATION TO U.S. AUTHORITIES AT THIS TIME MAY BE THE HOPE OF RELIEVING PRESSURE ON HIS FIRM AND HIMSELF FOR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS BELIEVED TO BE PRESENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF U.S. EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS.

3. THE FILES OF THIS AGENCY REFLECT THAT WERBELL IS VICE PRESIDENT OF SIONICS, INC., OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA, AND THAT HE HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS BY YOUR BUREAU IN CONNECTION WITH HIS NUMEROUS BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA. THIS AGENCY WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION WHICH YOUR BUREAU CAN OBTAIN CONCERNING THE ALLEGED OPERATION REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: Memo for C/WH/7 from C/SOD/GB
Subject: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti
Dated : 15 January 1970

C/CI/LIAISON

C/WH/R ______

SOD/GB ______

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

222

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-259916

14-00000

SECRET

27 JUN 1969

1

TO: Chief, Counterintelligence Division
Directorate of Special Investigations
The Inspector General, USAF

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: 0 WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III

1. Reference is made to your request dated 28 May 1969 concerning Subject, born 8 March 1918 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The files of this office contain the following information.

2. According to a summary report dated 19 March 1969, compiled from numerous documents, Subject was of interest to this Agency in 1959 when it was discovered that he was involved with anti-CASTRO plotters in the Dominican Republic. Further investigation disclosed Subject to be unscrupulous--a wheeler-dealer and promoter of grandiose schemes, with a history of materializing in areas and situations where he can make a quick profit. The report also revealed that Subject, in his foreign dealings, had misrepresented himself as an employee of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. In March 1969 Subject was in Thailand conducting or attempting to conduct business with the Royal Thai Government.

CSCI-316/02323-69

Encl. 1 name check

CC: Department of State

CC: Defense Intelligence Agency

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation

RID/CE: JKS/MB/nkc
BASED ON: DIR-88114, 19 March 1969 (to Bangkok)
FILE IN: 201-259910*

201-259910

SECRET

Trace Request from AF, Counterintelligence Division,
Directorate of Special Investigations

File No 04D 74 (24c) 3232 dated 28 May 69

S E C R E T - TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - FTBA-33,068
DATE - 30 JUNE 1969
FILM - NONE
INDEX - NONE
FILE - NONE
TO - CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION
INFO - NONE
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, BANGKOK
SUBJECT - SIONICS INC. PROPOSAL TO RTG FOR SNIPER TRAINING PROGRAM
ACTION - NONE
REF - FTBW-16321

1. STATION HAD SEEN PUBLICATION CITED PARA ONE OF REF.

2. WERBELL FIRST CAME TO ATTENTION OF STATION IN LATE MARCH 1969, WHEN HE WAS IN CONTACT WITH BPP IN BANGKOK. AFTER RECEIVING DIR 38114 IN RESPONSE TO OUR TRACE REQUEST, WE SUGGESTED TO BPP THAT THEY WOULD DO WELL TO AVOID HIM. WE HEARD NOTHING OF HIM FOR THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. HOWEVER, IN LATE APRIL AND EARLY MAY HE WAS BACK IN THE SPOTLIGHT AND, WE DISCOVERED, IN TOUCH WITH A VARIETY OF RTG AND U.S. MILITARY ELEMENTS. WE PROMPTLY PASSED THE GIST OF HIS REPUTATION TO KEY PERSONALITIES IN THE MISSION INCLUDING AMBASSADOR, DEFENSE ATTACHE, ARPA, SA/CI, U.S. ARMY CIC, OSI AND J-2 MACTHAI. WE PARTICULARLY STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT SPONSORED IN ANY WAY BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HIS NAME HAS COME UP CONSISTENTLY FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND WE HAVE PULLED VERY FEW PUNCHES IN DESCRIBING HIM, EITHER TO AMERICANS OR THAIS. IN FACT, WE WROTE A MEMORANDUM EXPRESSING OUR RESERVATIONS, PASSED IT TO J-2 MACTHAI, AND SUGGESTED HE BRIEF THE J-2 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ACCORDINGLY. WE ALSO SENT A BURN NOTICE MESSAGE, BANGKOK 3055, TO ALL FE STATIONS.

3. AFTER DYNAMIC BEGINNING, WERBELL IS NOW SUFFERING EXPECTED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

~~DEFERRED~~

CS COPY

201-259910

SETBACKS. THE EMBASSY HAS REFUSED TO ENDORSE HIM AND HIS PRODUCTS. MACTHAI HAS AGREED TO FURNISH TO RTG SOME OF THE ITEMS HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO PEDDLE, AND RTG HAS COOLED CONSIDERABLY RE SIONICS PARTICIPATION IN ANY ASPECT OF COUNTER INSURGENCY EFFORT. WERBELL'S RUNNING MATE, M/GEN WATSON, HAS ALREADY LEFT THAILAND. WERBELL IS SUPPOSED TO LEAVE SHORTLY. WE WILL MISS HIM.

I'll bet!

EDGAR N. DANAGE

DISTRIBUTION VIA TELEPOUCH

2 - CHIEF, FE DIVISION

State Dept. Telegram
BANGKOK 8458 dated 25 June '69
Subject: Export License for
Ingram Submachine Gun

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO.- FTB -16301

FILE NO.- 201-259910

DATE - 23 JUNE 1968

INDEX - NONE

FILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, BANGKOK

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION

SUBJECT- SIONICS, INC. PROPOSAL TO RTG FOR SNIPER TRAINING PROGRAM

ACTION - NONE

REFS - A. DIRECTOR 07114

B. DIRECTOR 55824

C. BANGKOK 3055 /IN 66602/

1. POUCHING PRIORITY UNDER TM 403749 COPY OF SIONICS PROPOSAL ''NEUTRALIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST TERRORIST THREAT IN THAILAND'' OBTAINED LOCALLY FROM LNREAD WHICH STATION MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE SEEN.

2. PROPOSAL ESSENTIALLY HAS CIVILIAN FIRM INSERTING ITSELF INTO MILITARY ADVISORY ROLE WITH OBVIOUS PURPOSE OF PEDDLING ITS HARDWARE AT SUBSTANTIAL PROFIT YET COVERING ITSELF WITH SEMI-OFFICIAL AURA. IF THAIS FALL FOR APPROACH OF THIS SORT, THEY WILL EVENTUALLY REALIZE THEY HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THIS COULD HAVE FAIRLY SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS ON THAI-US RELATIONS. WE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED SINCE PER REF C WERBELL HAS PENCHANT FOR REPRESENTING HIMSELF AS RETIRED COLONEL AND AS LOCAL CHIEF OF WOFIRM. FYI, WE UNDERSTAND SOME HARDWARE ITEMS IN PROPOSAL ARE QUITE GOOD BUT NOTE THAT SUCH ITEMS COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH REGULAR MAP CHANNELS AT LOWER COST.

FL/TBLT

CS COPY

201-259910

2-7

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH FTBW-16301 PAGE TWO

3. REALIZE THAT STATION IS NOT IN POSITION TO EXERT VETO OVER SIONICS PROPOSAL BUT FEEL IT INCUMBENT UPON WOFIRM TO APPRISE SA/CI, MACTHAI, AMBASSADOR AND ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES ON WERBELL'S BACKGROUND AND OUR VERY STRONG RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THIS PROPOSAL TO CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY ''TO THE DEFEAT OF COMMUNIST TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION IN THAILAND'' AS ADVERTISED, AND EVEN STRONGER RESERVATIONS RE ANY OFFICIAL INVEOLVEMENT WITH WERBELL.

4. FURTHER CHECK OF 201 FILE INDICATES SUBJECT REFS ENTERED MILITARY SERVICE IN APRIL 1943, WAS COMMISSIONED 2ND LIEUTENANT IN SIGNAL CORPS JUNE 1944 AND ASSIGNED TO CHINA-BURMA THEATER. SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO OSS FROM APRIL UNTIL DECEMBER 1945 WHEN HE RETURNED TO WOLADY AND WAS DISCHARGED AS 1ST LIEUTENANT. IN ADDITION TO FOUR CAMPAIGN MEDALS, SUBJECT WAS AWARDED SOLDIERS MEDAL FOR PERSONAL HEROISM EXHIBITED IN SAVING THE LIFE OF CHINESE SOLDIER WHO FELL INTO ELECTRICAL TRANSFORMER. RECORD INDICATES NO FURTHER MILITARY SERVICE.

JOHN K. [illegible]

ATTACHMENT, U/S/C

AS STATED ABOVE

DISTRIBUTION: [illegible] /VIA TELEPOUCH/

2 - COS, BANGKOK

Headquarters:
  1 - FE/TBL/T
  1 - RI/SD
  1 - CI/OPS/FE
  1 - SOD/GB/MS

FE/TBL/T/RGWeidner/SOD/GB/MS/
CTWilliamson:dsr/1742

FE/TBL

X

CI/OPS/FE W.Johnson (In Draft)

Robert D. Kennedy

ACFE/TBL Robert D. Kennedy

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH FTBW-16301 PAGE TWO END

Robert D. Kennedy

CFE William E. Nelson

2.17

23 June 1969

CS COPY

201-259910

Dept of State Telegram
STATE 101507 dated 20 JUNE '69
Subject: Export License for
Ingram Submachine Gun

State Dept. Telegram

BANGKOK 8235 dated 20 June '69

(re: import license)

State Dept. Telegram
STATE 087398 dated 29 May 69
Subject: Starlight Scopes and
Silencers

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6 22

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

RYBAT

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 7 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/FE 4 860 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/CI/SP, C/CI, C/FE/VN 04, C/FE/SC 04, C/SOD 3, C/FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

S E C R E T 261218Z MAY 69 CITE BANGKOK 3055

26 MAY 69 IN 66602

SAIGON INFO: DIRECTOR, VIENTIANE, SINGAPORE, MANILA, RANGOON, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, DJAKARTA, TOKYO, SEOUL, KUALA LUMPUR

REF: DIRECTOR 88114 (SENT BANGKOK ONLY)

ANALYST FE/ESEC
ABSTRACT X

1. WE HAVE BEEN PLAGUED FOR SOME WEEKS NOW BY MR. MITCHELL L. WERBELL III, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF R AND D OF SIONICS, ATLANTA, GEORGIA. WERBELL DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS A COUNTERINSURGENCY EXPERT, HAS A VARIETY OF WEAPONS TO DISPLAY, CLAIMS TO BE A RETIRED COLONEL, AND LAST WEEK INTRODUCED HIMSELF AT A LOCAL NIGHTCLUB AS CHIEF OF WOFIRM IN THAILAND.

2. WERBELL HAS A HISTORY OF SHOWING UP IN TROUBLE SPOTS WHERE HE CAN MAKE A FAST BUCK. HE IMPLIES THAT HE IS U.S. GOVT CONNECTED AND PRESENTS A DEMONSTRATION OF A VARIETY OF EXOTIC WEAPONS THAT NEVER FAILS TO IMPRESS. REF DESCRIBES HIM AS AN UNSCRUPULOUS OPPORTUNIST WITH A REPUTATION FOR LIVING BEYOND HIS MEANS.

CS COPY

26 May 69

SECRET

201-259910

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 BANGKOK 3055 SECRET

AUG 11 69

CW

3. WERBELL IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, BORN 1919, SERVED IN OSS, HAS SHAVEN HEAD AND HANDLEBAR MUSTACHE. REF ADVISES THAT FULL DETAILS OF HIS BACKGROUND SHOULD NOT BE PASSED TO LIAISON SINCE HE IS U.S. CITIZEN. HOWEVER, STATES THAT LIAISON CAN BE INFORMED, SHOULD HE APPEAR IN YOUR AREA, THAT HE HAS AN UNSAVORY REPUTATION, HAS NO U.S. GOVT CONNECTIONS, AND ANY DEALINGS WITH HIM SHOULD BE APPROACHED WITH EXTREME CAUTION.

4. FOR SAIGON: WE UNDERSTAND THAT WERBELL RECENTLY VISITED SAIGON AND DID HIS THING WITH GEN. ABRAMS, WHO WAS SUITABLY IMPRESSED, AND WERBELL IS NOW SETTING UP A SNIPER TRAINING PROGRAM.

JUN 18 69

5. FILE: 201-259910

SECRET

SIONICS

PEACHTREE STREET N.E., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30309 (404) 873 3072

26 May 1969

Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya
Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Supreme Command, RTAF
Bangkok, Thailand

Dear Air Chief Marshal Dawee:

Sionics, Inc. is pleased to submit this proposal in response to the urgent requirement to neutralize the communist terrorist threat in the border areas of Thailand. This requirement was first brought to our attention during the recent trip to threatened border areas of Thailand made by yourself, Air Vice Marshal Manob, and Major General Prasart, accompanied by our field representative to Thailand, Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III.

This urgent requirement was of course further discussed with you during your recent visit to Washington to attend the funeral of General Eisenhower.

In consequence we have prepared a pilot program with the objective of neutralizing the Communist terrorist threat in Thailand. We have entitled the program "Neutralization of the Communist Terrorist Threat in Thailand" with short title NCTTT. In scope the NCTTT encompasses five major phases and spans a twelve month program. Basically we offer a proven program based, in part, on the outstandingly successful U. S. 9th Division Sniper Program in the Delta of Vietnam. Finally, and most importantly, this program is also based on Special Operations programs executed by members of the Sionics organization during wartime, counterinsurgency and guerrilla operations executed in South Asia, Europe, South America, Dominican Republic, and Vietnam.

We have selected a team of highly qualified experts whose combined capabilities represent all the disciplines required to the planning and execution of this program.

2, 2

In view of the above, Sionics, Inc. assures you that the full resources of the Corporation will be provided for the successful performance of this work. We look forward to the opportunity of serving the Royal Thai Government in order to contribute to the defeat of Communist terrorism and subversion in Thailand.

With Warm Personal Regard and Respect.

Sincerely,

Sionics, Inc.

Fred N. Brown

Fred N. Brown
President

2,12

A PROPOSAL

FOR THE

NEUTRALIZATION OF THE

COMMUNIST/TERRORIST THREAT

IN THAILAND

VOLUME I: OPERATIONAL PROPOSAL

6 May, 1969

Presented to: Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya
Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Supreme Command, [illegible]
Bangkok, Thailand

Prepared by: [illegible]IONICS, INC.
Atlanta, Georgia

PROPRIETARY NOTICE

The data furnished herein--

shall not be disclosed outside the Royal Thai Government or the United States Government or be duplicated, used or disclosed in whole or in part for any purpose other than to evaluate this proposal, provided that if a contract is awarded to this offeror as a result of or in connection with the submission of such data, these Governments shall have the right to duplicate, use, or disclose this data to the extent provided in the contract. This restriction does not limit these Governments' right to use information contained in such data if it is obtained from another source.

SIONICS, INC.
Atlanta, Georgia

2.12

Page

[illegible] 1

II. [illegible] 3

III. [illegible] DISCUSSION 3

IV. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 6

A. Objective 6

B. Program Title 6

C. Scope 6

D. [illegible] 6

E. Organization and Management 10

V. [illegible] 12

A. General Concept 12

B. Operations Phasing 13

1. Phase I: Planning, Preparation and Installation of Training Center 13

2. Phase II: Organization and Training 16

3. Phase III: Deployment and Insertion of Hunter/Killer Teams; Initiation of Operations 18

4. Phase IV: Evaluation 2[illegible]

5. Phase V: Expansion of Operations 25

VI. [illegible] 29

2.12

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

AND FIGURES

FIGURE 1. Operational Schedule [illegible]

FIGURE 2. Organization and Management [illegible]

FIGURE 3. [illegible] Prov. 50 H/S Pltn.

FIGURE 4. Equipment

FIGURE 5. [illegible]

FIGURE 6. [illegible] Prov. [illegible] /S Company

2.12

[illegible] INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This proposal is presented by SIONICS, Inc. in response to urgent requirements to neutralize the Communist terrorist threat in Thailand as voiced by responsible members of the Royal Government of Thailand.

We have examined the problem in detail and have concluded that the unique capabilities of SIONICS, Inc. can provide one answer to stopping Communist terrorism in Thailand. We have either worked on, are working on, or will soon become involved in projects of this type, which will insure immediate working knowledge of the essential elements for problem solution.

We have established firm liaison with the Royal Thai Government and U. S. Government organizations in Thailand to include Supreme Command Headquarters, [illegible] U. S. Embassy, USOM, ARPA, JUSMAG, MACTHAI, MACV. Additionally, SIONICS has established wide and successful relationships with U. S. Government and industrial organizations concerned with the problem.

In consequence, it is considered that SIONICS, Inc. would be fully capable of executing the program proposed and of expanding it to help solve the final problem of arresting Communist subversion in Thailand. It is our opinion that the methodology format, and related matters are well described in this proposal. Our task will be to field a team of professional and highly qualified military technicians, backed by appropriate support and resources, that will be fully capable of executing this plan to the complete satisfaction of the Royal Thai Government. To

2,12

this end we have personnel immediately available that represent a solid blend of counter-insurgency operational experience and technical knowhow.

In view of the nature of the problem, this proposal is basically an outline plan indicating how the operation will be accomplished. This volume presents our operational proposal, along with a proposed management plan, a summary of corporate experience, and the resumes of the military and technical personnel SIONICS, Inc. proposes to assign to the effort. The Cost Proposal is submitted separately as VOLUME II.

212

I. PROBLEM

To provide a plan which will contribute to the neutralization of the Communist terrorist threat in Thailand.

II. PROBLEM DISCUSSION

A. Fundamental Requirements for Problem Solution

[illegible], Inc. consider that the basic success of this plan will depend in large measure of fielding a team of knowledgeable individuals who:

1. Know Thailand and the considerable Communist threat to its border areas,

2. Know the principal personalities in the Royal Thai Government (RTG) concerned with neutralizing the Communist threat,

3. Know the principal U. S. Government officials in Thailand, South Vietnam, and Washington, D. C. concerned with assisting the RTG in neutralizing this threat,

4. Fully understand the threat of Communist terrorism and subversion and possess the knowledge and skill to counteract this threat,

5. Know and be able to apply firsthand the tactics, techniques, organizational and training procedures, and weapons and equipment techniques/employment to defeat this threat, and

6. Possess long experience and proven skills in defeating an insurgent threat.

2.12

B. Systematic Introduction of Military Judgement

By definition the neutralization or defeat of Communist terrorism consists of the specialized application of counter-insurgency operations by the employment of intelligence; psychological operations; hunter-killer operations to include jungle, mountain, air, riverine, border, and village security operations; communications; logistics; specialized training and equipment, and other techniques. SIONICS, Inc. considers that the techniques designed by our Corporation to neutralize Communist terrorism in the border areas of Thailand is based on sound past experience in this field and would lead to the development of a wide-spread organization and system within the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF), the Border Patrol Police (BPP), and the Thai National Police (TNP) to counteract this threat throughout the country.

Establishment of a system and organization to neutralize the Communist threat cannot be accomplished without reliance on sound and informed military judgement based on proven techniques. SIONICS, Inc. has pioneered in the development of these techniques which permit the systematic development and use in analysis and execution of military and technical judgement.

The techniques and equipment developed for this purpose are designed and operate for the "usual or normal" case in which they will be used under combat conditions. The capability that accrues from the employment of these techniques and equipment in unusual or peculiar situations should be considered a bonus effect rather than an expected mode of operation.

2.12

6. Critical Factors Related to Solving the Problem

Operational planning for successful counter-insurgency operations requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy, weather, terrain, [illegible] operations and capabilities, and intimate knowledge of the population within the operational area. Additionally, one of the critical factors in counter-insurgency operations is the psychological operations effort that must be geared with any operation of this type. The key to success of these operations is to identify, infiltrate, block, ambush, harrass, and otherwise neutralize the enemy. The basic concept of operations is to strike him when he is most vulnerable, in his rear areas, when he is moving to his objective, or just before he commences his attack. In order to operate in this environment special operational detachments, or hunter-killer teams, will be needed. The individuals that man these teams as well as those who command and direct them, will have to be specially trained, equipped, organized, and, above all, psychologically prepared for these operations.

As a final note this operation to be successful must be fully supported by the Royal Thai Government, the Chief U.S. Mission to Thailand, Chief JUSMAG, and COMUSMAC THAI/MACV.

2.12

III. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

A. Objective

To arrest or neutralize Communist terrorism in the border areas of Thailand.

B. Program Title

Neutralization of Communist Terrorist Threat in Thailand (NCTTT).

C. Scope

The scope of this program encompasses a twelve month, five phase operation as follows:

Phase I - Planning, preparation, and installation of Training Center.

Phase II - Selection of personnel, organization of first RTG Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon (SO H/K Pltn.), and Training Program.

Phase III - Insertion of Platoon into Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility, initiation of Hunter/Killer operations, organization, training and insertion of two additional SO H/K Platoons.

Phase IV - Evaluation of operations to include amending operational concepts, organization, planning, logistics and administration.

Phase V - Expansion of operations with three SO H/K Platoons. Continuance of operations to include deep penetration missions. Preparation for further expansion of NCTTT as required.

D. Schedule

See Figure 1.

2.12

SIONICS, Inc. will have immediately available a team of selected military and technical experts to work on the project. These personnel, led by Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III, SIONICS Field Representative in Thailand and Vietnam, will be backed by appropriate civilian technical personnel who would provide expertise as required in the general fields of sniper and special operations training and the maintenance of the operational equipment and weapons. The Corporation would assign these people to projects in accordance with their individual capabilities.

Program Schedule -- See Figure 1 (NCTTT Program Schedule, Twelve Months).

During the first week after initiation of the program, Mr. WerBell, as program manager, will meet with selected Supreme Command and Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) personnel for the initial establishment of NCTCT planning and organization of the joint MRDC/SIONICS Operations Planning Group (JSOPG). At this time he will receive an indoctrination orientation and guidance from appropriate Supreme Command and MRDC personnel. Coordination, communications channels and liaison requirements will be established. In this regard, it is anticipated that a period of from two to three weeks will be required for this initial planning and the establishment of basic and detailed joint operational plans.

During the next two weeks period, joint activity will consist of the selection of appropriate Sniper Training Team personnel from RTA units and Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon personnel from appropriate RTAF, BPP and TNP

2.12

units in Thailand. In this regard, the Sniper Team should be drawn if at all possible from the ten previously trained sniper personnel presently on duty with the Black Panther Division in Vietnam. These personnel were trained in the U. S. 9th Division Sniper Training Program in the Vietnam Delta. During this Phase personnel will be organized into the SO H/K Platoon structure.

During the period 6th through the 12th week, Platoon personnel would be undergoing the sniper training program consisting of basic firing positions and integrated acts of shooting. Additionally, during this period, JSOPG would establish standing operating procedures and effect the liaison with appropriate RTAF, BPP and TNP units in the joint Tactical Area of Operations Responsibility (TAOR) selected for the pilot program for the First Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon. Thus, at the end of the third program month, the first teams would be selected, organized, trained and ready for insertion into the TAOR.

During the next phase, the operational phase, the three Hunter/Killer teams of the First Provisional SO H/K Platoon would be inserted into the TAOR and established with appropriate Thai military and para-military border control units. At this time SIONICS advisory and technical personnel would be working closely with appropriate JSOPG opposite numbers in order to insure proper employment of the teams. It is important to note here, however, that at no time would SIONICS team personnel be expected to actually direct or enter into operational activities of the Special Operations Hunter/Killer

2.12

teams. On the contrary, they would be enjoined and prohibited from entering into any form of combat activity whatsoever.

During the operational phase, (4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th months) SO personnel would follow closely SO H/K Team activities and conduct with their Thai counterparts continuous evaluation of team activities. During the entire Operational Phase continuing evaluation of the NCTTF Program would be carried on. At some time between the 5th and 6th months a mutual decision would be made with MRDC officials for recommendations to be made to the RTAF Supreme Command for the expansion of team activity and the inclusion of the two additional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoons into a Special Operations Hunter/Killer Company for further operations and protection for additional villages. These operations would be continued to include deep penetration operations as appropriate and permissible providing the RTG obtains permission for across the border operations "in hot pursuit" of Communist terrorists. During the entire insertion and operational phase, it is to be underscored that psychological operations will be conducted at all times in conjunction with Special Operations Hunter/Killer Team activity. The final three months of the 12 month NCTTF program schedule would be devoted to further expansion as necessary of Special Operations Hunter/Killer team activity and/or organization of further Special Operations Hunter/Killer Companies for employment throughout the border areas of Thailand.

2.12

I. Organization and Management (See Figure 2)

Because of the importance which SIONICS, Inc. attaches to the proposed program, we will keep close top management cognizance of this project. The responsible officer (Mr. WerBell) is a Director and Vice President of SIONICS and will report directly to the President of the Corporation. In this manner, we can assure you that to the extent necessary, the full resources of the Corporation can be made available to guarantee a fully satisfactory program.

In managing this project we proposed to guarantee continually and consistency throughout the entire period of this effort. The key to this, of course, rests with the personnel assigned. Frequent changes in personnel will be avoided, and if changes are required, because of new skills being required, replacement personnel will be phased in with adequate overlap wherever possible. A full resume on Mr. WerBell may be found in Part VI of this proposal. It is to be noted that he has had considerable experience in the counter-insurgency field, having served in South Vietnam and the Far East for SIONICS since September of 1968. He has had long experience in weapons and clandestine operations dating back to World War II at which time he was a parachute unit Commander of a Special operations group in OSS units operating in the Far East. Since that time he has been continuously interested in development of exotic weaponry and is the holder of several patents in this field. Since 1958, he has devoted practically all of his time in anti-communist activities throughout Central and South America

2.12

has advised a number of Central American governments on counter insurgency activities and development of weapons techniques for this purpose.

The Program Manager would be assisted by a staff of extremely competent experts chosen from his wide cognizance and knowledge of counter-insurgency experts throughout the free world. He would be assisted when necessary by Major General Harold E. Watson, Director of BIONICS and in charge of technical planning. His knowledge and background in corporate planning, world-wide government, and corporate contracts is considered invaluable to the BIONICS group.

2.12

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General Concept

The purpose of this program will be to strike the Communist insurgents where they are most vulnerable and to mesh the operations of selected Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams into present Royal Thai Government ongoing Counterinsurgency Programs based on the proven and historic causes of victory over the Communists:

Aggressive anti-guerrilla tactics.

Removal of sections of the population thus depriving insurgents of contact with the people.

Removal of the support of the population.

In attacking Communist terrorist vulnerability, the Special Operations Hunter/Killer program will be designed to operate against the enemy and concentrate on the following categories of insurgent vulnerability:

1. Insurgent base area system which, although fragmented, is a coherent complex of combat, combat support, and combat service support facilities and activities which embrace populated as well as remote areas. In this, Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams will, in the final phases of the operation, be directed to attack or operate on the perimeters of insurgent base area systems.

2. Insurgent combat units in avoiding prolonged combat may use escape routes that will subject them ideally to ambush by Hunter/Killer Teams. In this, the classic principals of "the hammer and anvil operation" will be employed. Helicopter

2.12

[illegible] Ultimate development of Special Operations Hunter/Killer [illegible] will aid in effective and swift team ingression and withdrawal at the [illegible] moment.

3. Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams will operate within the border areas and village complexes in order to operate directly within the population against and within which Communist terrorists operate.

4. Operational Phasing

1. Phase I - Planning, Preparation, and Installation of Training Center.

Initiation of planning by SIGHICS Program Manager with Hq. Supreme Command and Hq. Military Research and Development (MRDC) selected personnel. Establishment of a Joint MRDC/SIGHICS Special Operations Planning Group (JSOPG) to develop detailed plans for the organization, training and operational employment of an RTG Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon. In this, the JSOPG may be expanded to include selected personnel from JUSMAG, USOM, and ARPA as required.

b. Training Center and Program

(1) Establishment of the Training Center

An RTG Sniper School and Special Operations Training Center will be established at a location to be designated. As a basis for school personnel, a team of one officer and ten NCO's will be selected. In order to save the five to six weeks required to train this team it will be necessary to draw this team from the ten members of the RTA Black Panther Division who

2.12

graduated from the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School in Vietnam. [illegible] member of the team must be an experienced gunsmith familiar with M-14 accurizing techniques. Additional [illegible] offices and [illegible] personnel will be required to staff the Center with instructors in special operations, artillery fire adjustment, navigation, map reading and deception operations. A certain number of Training Center command administrative personnel will also be required.

(2) Training Facility

A sniper training facility will be constructed to accommodate 30 students. The facility should include a 40 point firing range and adjacent classrooms. The range should be built with target facilities at 150, 300, 600, and 900 meters. A moving target should be built on the 300 meter butt in addition to the fixed targets at that position.

c. Equipment

(1) The sniper teams of the S[illegible] Pltn. will be equipped with National Match Grade M-14 rifles obtained by urgent [illegible] request to JUSMAG. These rifles are glass bedded into impregnated stocks which are impervious to water. The rifles are carefully tuned to provide a high degree of accuracy.

(2) The accurized M-14 rifles will be equipped with a 3-9 variable power adjustable ranging telescope sight (ART). The telescope is mounted in conjunction with a ballistic cam. The sight reticle includes a pair of stadia lines. By varying the power of the telescope until the stadia lines define a 30 inch area on the target, the ballistic cam

2.12

[illegible] the sight to the proper elevation for that distance. Errors due to range estimation are virtually eliminated with this system. As an alternate the M-14 accurized rifle could be equipped with the M84 telescope. These sights are a fixed 2.2 power telescope with a post reticle. Using the M84 the sniper must accurately estimate the gun target range and either hold over the target or adjust the elevating mechanism on the sight to the estimated range.

(3) For night operations at least one half of the sniper rifles will be equipped with the VARO Starlight Scope. VARO Starlight Scopes will be mounted on the M-14 rifles at the sniper school and zeroed during training. The sniper retains his own scope/rifle/suppressor combination during subsequent operations. This procedure assures retention of zero even though the sight is dismounted during daylight operations and remounted for night operations.

(4) The ammunition used in sniper training and combat must be 7.62mm U. S. National Match Grade.

(5) All M-14 sniper rifles will be filled with the SIONICS-MAW-2 noise suppressor. (See Inclosure 1 for complete description). As noted above, each student will retain his own rifle/scope/suppressor combination during subsequent operations.

(6) Additional to the basic sniper rifle/scope/suppressor combination, the SO H/K Pltn. will be equipped with alternate noise suppressed weapons on as required by the

2.12

[illegible] ammunition, demolition, and individual equipment will also be provided as required.

2. Phase II - Organization and Training

a. Selection of Personnel

The JSOPC will, during the 4th and 5th week select a total of 80 highly qualified and motivated personnel. Students accepted into the sniper program will be selected from volunteers. Those who are selected must have 20/20 vision, have qualified as an expert rifleman and be well motivated soldiers. Experience in competitive marksmanship is preferred but is not mandatory.

b. Organization

See Figure 3.

The first RTG Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon will be organized into a Platoon Headquarters and three Hunter/Killer teams as shown. Double Slotting will be authorized during Phase II to provide for an estimated 30% attrition rate. This figure is based on the average attrition rate at the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School in Vietnam. Thus, total training strength will be 2 officers, 12 NCO's, and 66 Junior NCO's or enlisted men for a total of 80 officers and men. Operational strength will be as shown on Figure 3.

c. Training Program

Prior to selection and organization of selected student candidates for the RTG Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon (SO H/K Pltn.) a training program will be prepared and rehearsed with the following as basic precepts:

2.12

(i) The training will be of six weeks duration and includes basic firing positions, and the integrated act of [illegible], trigger squeeze, breath control, sight alignment, and sight picture. Students will be taught the techniques of estimating lead and engaging moving targets. Instruction will be provided on the methods for estimating wind over extreme ranges so that a firer can off set his point of aim to place the bullet on target. Following this, students will learn the methods of zeroing M-14 accurized rifles equipped with the adjustable ranging telescopic sight (ART), the VARO Starlight Scope or the fixed power M84 telescopic sight, and the SIONICS-MAW-2 suppressor. Night firing will be included in the course and each student will learn to engage targets with his starlight scope at ranges of 150, 300, and 600 meters.

(ii) In addition to marksmanship training, students will be schooled in adjustment of artillery fire, day/night land navigation, map reading, and deception operations (See Table [illegible]). Each of these subjects is important to the sniper. He frequently must select his position from a situation map and then travel to that location at night. It is essential that he select the optimum position, know his position in relationship to friendly units and be able to navigate to his preselected position. The ability to accurately adjust artillery fire is important to a sniper. He frequently must adjust illuminating rounds skillfully so that illumination is placed on target in such a manner as to illuminate the target and not compromise

2.12

the sniper's position or that of an adjacent friendly unit.

(iii) Qualification firing will be conducted during the last week of the course. Silhouette targets will be engaged at 150,300,600 and 900 meters with eight targets being engaged by each man during two qualifying courses. Ten points will be awarded for a first round hit and five points for a second round hit. A maximum score is 160 points. A minimum qualifying score is 130.

(iv) Experience gained from the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School shows that approximately 50% of the students successfully complete the course. Thus, at least double the number of final candidates required should be selected to attend the school.

d. Equipment

See Figure 4.

3. Phase III - Development and Insertion of Hunter/Killer Teams, Initiation of Operations

a. Insertion (See Figure 5.)

During this phase the First PTG Provisional SO H/K Pltn. will be inserted into a Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility (TAOR) under operational control of a Royal Thai Army or Border Patrol Police unit. The Platoon will operate under operational control of the RTA or BPP Commander who will be advised in the employment of the Special Operational Team and the three Hunter/Killer Teams by selected members of the JSOPG.

212

B. Initiation of Operations:

Initially and until fire teams are established, [illegible] will be ordered to carry out the following type missions:

(1) Ambush patrols:

Snipers from H/K Teams will be attached to [illegible] or [illegible] units and deployed with ambush patrols. This technique has been the most successful method of employment. Two techniques will be used extensively:

(a) Snipers accompany a platoon ambush. When employed with a platoon ambush, the snipers will remain close to the platoon command post. When an element of the platoon observes enemy activity, the snipers are alerted to that location. They then engage selectively at night with the starlight scope and MAW-A2 suppressors or with the ART scope and MAW-A2 suppressor during daylight. If there is but one Viet Cong in the area, he is taken under fire by a sniper. In this way the ambush position and location of automatic weapons are not compromised due to the quiet operation of the rifle. When a group of communists approach the killing zone, the snipers engage the leaders and radio operators while the platoon fires into the general kill zone. Another technique will be used in an ambush is that of having the snipers fire tracers to mark the flanks of an enemy force which has approached the position in an area other than the specified kill zone. Snipers are also used to engage the enemy who probe the ambush site in order to attempt to draw fire

2.12

prematurely. This avoids the disclosure of automatic weapons positions and detonation of Claymore mines or other anti-disturbance/warning devices.

(b) Snipers with Security Element in Ambush. The second method of employment will be that of placing snipers and a five to eight man security element in a carefully selected sniper/ambush position. The general area will be selected by the NTA or BRP commander after considering enemy activity in the area and the advice of the sniper team. The team will then be moved to a NTA or BRP forward position where it is joined by the security element equipped with M-16's, an M79, and an AN/PRC-25 radio. The sniper/ambush position will be occupied just prior to dark and selected to provide maximum range of fires and location within a reasonable distance from a friendly unit. The snipers maintain continuous surveillance of the area. Eye fatigue at night is minimized by having the snipers alternate use of the starlight scope throughout the night. The M79 is an especially useful weapon at the sniper/ambush position. As an example, the enemy frequently have been observed in a tree line or vegetated area in which a shot was not possible due to low light level. Using tracer fire and by directing M79 fire into the area, the security element forced the enemy to move and expose themselves to subsequent sniper fire.

(ii) Stay-Behinds

H/K Teams trained for long range operations will be extremely effective in engaging enemy ambushers who follow

2.12

[illegible] unit as it moves from one location to another. In this case a sniper team with a 5-8 man security element is selected to provide long range observation of the route over which the unit will travel and pick off the enemy as they follow in ambush. Snipers with their telescope sights and MAW-2 suppressors will be able to engage the enemy at ranges out to 900 meters. At extreme ranges, the enemy will usually not be cautious about his cover and concealment. Thus, he presents an excellent target for the H/K team.

(iii) Off-Set

(a) A VARO Xenon search light will be used to illuminate covertly an area with pink light. The starlight scope is sensitive to a portion of the infrared band that is pink and near the visible light portion of the spectrum. By using a pink filter on a Xenon search light an area can be illuminated with invisible light that registers in the starlight scope. This phenomena will be used in two types of sniper activity; village or perimeter security and ambush operations. Employment of the rifle/scope/suppressor combination will frequently result in the enemy receiving many casualties before he has been taken under fire.

(b) Ambushes will be conducted by placing a searchlight equipped 1/4 ton vehicle 1200 to 1500 meters from a road intersection. Snipers equipped with starlight scopes and MAW-2 suppressors will be placed 300 meters from the intersection and maintain radio contact with the searchlight operator. The sniper

2.12

will control the covert illumination of the intersection and surrounding area. When the communists appear in the kill zone they will be engaged by the sniper team. Thus, by off-setting the sniper team from the searchlight and placing the searchlight and 1/4 ton vehicle in a position remote from the ambush site, the enemy in the kill zone will not be alerted by the noise of the running vehicle engine.

(c) The VARO pink light/sniper combination will be employed in base camp security operations. The searchlight, mounted on a 1/4 ton vehicle responds to radio equipped sniper teams in positions either on the perimeter or on ambush positions outside the perimeter. The background noise of a village or fixed base camp usually conceals the noise of the engine and activity of the searchlight crew. In forward base camps the searchlight remains in the center of the base camp and, by swinging its beam through 360 degrees, covertly illuminates avenues of approach into the position. With this method it is again essential that the sniper teams maintain radio contact with the searchlight crew. The pink light is particularly useful during the dark of the moon period.

(iv) Counter Sniper

H/K Teams are effective in countering enemy sniper activity. Each team, equipped with its telescopic sight and M49 Spotting Scope, will search the area of suspected sniper activity. The optical equipment permits a detailed search of distant areas. A recent example, in Vietnam, is

2.12

14-00000

[illegible] of a unit, after having been fired on by a Viet Cong sniper from [illegible], deployed its sniper team. The team searched the tree line with its optical equipment and the Viet Cong sniper was discovered in a tree at 720 meters distance. While one team member judged the wind using the M49 spotting scope, the other man fired one round, killing the Viet Cong sniper.

(v) Night Hunter Operations

Night Hunter Operations will be conducted to mark targets. A sniper team of 2 men placed in a lead helicopter observe the ground with the starlight scopes mounted on their rifles. When the enemy is sighted, the snipers engage with tracers. Helicopter gun ships, following at a higher altitude then engage the targets. Artillery HE and illumination are adjusted on target as necessary.

(vi) Special Operations

The Special Operation Team, sniper-trained, will be employed under Platoon Commander control for coup-de-main, sabotage/demolition, and sniper activities against the enemy as dictated by the situation and requirements of the RF/PF unit counter-terrorist plan.

[illegible] Subsequent Operations

As experience is gained with combined Sniper team and host unit [illegible] or [illegible] operations, the Special Operations and Hunter/Killer Teams will gradually expand operations to fulfill their basic roles -- that of independently operating teams moving silently to interdict, ambush and destroy the enemy

2.12

[illegible] he moves close to his chosen targets. Local [illegible] or other indigenous tribesmen will be recruited as trackers and [illegible] [illegible] teams operating much the same as did the Malayan jungle trackers with British hunter/killer teams in Malaya from 1955 to [illegible]

c. Psychological Operations

Hunter/Killer operations in conjunction with RTA and BPP units, or with PTC Mobile Training Units must include provision for comprehensive psychological operations. There is no method better designed to strike terror into the heart of the communist terrorist than to see his comrades-in-arms killed, as if by magic, by a silent bullet fired from some "unknown" and distant source. Thus, the inherent long-range flexibility and effectiveness of the rifle/scope/suppressor/sniper combination must be exploited to its fullest. Terror campaigns, 'silver bullet' propaganda, leaflet drops, airborne loudspeaker "talking bird" operations, and other classic psychological operations techniques must all drum home the theme that the communist terrorist is no longer safe in his sanctuary areas nor does he enjoy the classic guerrilla initiative as he once was taught to believe. Aggressive hunter/killer operations combined with astute and massive psychological operations will be employed to destroy communist terrorists will to fight and, most importantly, to discourage local indigenous tribesmen from joining communist ranks.

2.12

4. Phase IV - Evaluation

The NCTTT Program will be subject to close and continuing evaluation by a MRDC Test and Evaluation Team organized and fielded by the JSOPG. Comprehensive records and test data will be gathered and analyzed in order to amend operational concepts and organizations as well as administrative, logistical, and training techniques as required. The Test and Evaluation Team should adhere to accepted principles of field experimentation as appropriate; e.g., the evaluation should be an elaboration of common sense and convenient ordering of evaluation matters so that the Hunter/Killer Teams encounter minimum interruptions.

Upon completion of the Evaluation Phase the T&E Unit will make appropriate recommendations to MRDC for continuation and expansion of the NCTTT Program beyond the 12 month planned period.

5. Phase V - Expansion of Operations

See Figure 1.

As indicated on Figure 1, preparation for the Expansion of Operations Phase commences in the tenth week of the NCTTT with the organization of the Second RTG Provisional SO H/K Platoon. The six-week training program for the Second Platoon starts the 13th week upon graduation of the First Platoon. The second Platoon deploys in the 18th week and conducts Phase III operations as described in Paragraph D above.

Commencing with the 14th week, the Third Provisional RTG SO H/K Pltn. is organized commencing training the 18th week, and Phase III operations the 24th week.

2.12

At the end of Phase III there will thus be three [illegible] Platoons totalling, three Special Operations and 9 Sniper [illegible] Teams operating against the communist terrorist in the field.

At the end of Phase III (end of 6 months) and following recommendations of the MRDC T&E Team, the Supreme Command will have two options.

(a) Organize the three platoons into a Provisional S[illegible] Company (See Figure 6) and continue further operations, or

(b) Reassign Special Operation Teams to RTA, BPP, and [illegible] units as required and continue further operations.

During the final three months of the NCTTT Program, operations will be progressively expanded to provide for protection of additional villages. Operations will be continued deep into enemy controlled areas utilizing helicopter or parachute insertion techniques. HALO parachute insertion techniques will be employed in areas where the enemy is especially vigilant. Operations should be carried out whenever possible to ambush, attack, harrass, and pursue the enemy as far as 10 to 20 miles inside the borders of LAOS, providing RLG permission is obtained. In order to accomplish this, safe areas should be established within friendly [illegible] or other indigenous tribal villages for team rest, recuperation, and eventual extraction by helicopter or [illegible] aircraft. Wherever possible, similar operations should be conducted across the BURMESE border.

2.12

6. Future Operations

At the end of Phase V the NCTTT should have proved itself as one of the most effective counter-insurgency programs available to the RTG. As an example, in 6 months operations the 72 snipers of the U. S. 9th Division attained over 600 confirmed kills, the majority of which were made at night with the M-14 rifle/Starlight Scope/SIONICS-MAW-A2 suppressor combination. In effecting this admirable record, 1.37 cartridges were expended per kill. At the current cost of 28¢ for one National Match cartridge, this averages to 38¢ per kill. This is obviously an oversimplification, but it highlights an extremely successful and economical method of countering communist terrorism along the borders of Thailand.

As a final note, this type of operation is as yet in its nascent stages. Complete operational techniques that will result from execution of the 12 month NCTTT will undoubtedly disclose additional and more effective techniques of killing or neutralizing communist terrorists in Thailand and will contribute immeasurably to bringing stability and RTG control into its border areas.

2.12



FIGURE 1 - OPERATIONAL SCHEDULE
NCTTT


NCTTT MANAGEMENT
SCAF
ACM DAWEE
DIR. EDUCATION & ENGINEERING
VAT MANOB
RDC
PRASART
LIAISON AS RQD WITH:
RT ARMY
RT AIR FORCE
RT NAVY
BPP
TNP
etc.
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS PLANNING GROUP
SIONICS
Mr. M. Werbell
(To be Desig.)
SCAF
(To be Desig.)
(To be Desig.)
OTHERS
As Req:
JUSMAG
USOM
ARPA
etc.
LIAISON AS RQD WITH:
MACTHAI
etc.
TRAINING CENTER
Sniper School
Sp. Opns. Instrs.
PLANNING & OPNS GROUP
1st RTG.
HUNTER/KILLER
TEST AND EVALUATION GROUP

FIGURE 2 - ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT NCTTT

RTG PROVISIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS
HUNTER/KILLER PLATOON


SP OPNS
HUNTER KILLER
PLTN HQ:
1 Lt. Pltn Ldr
1 NCO - Pltn Sgt.
1 NCO - Gunsmith
1 Jr. NCO/EM-RTO
SP OPNS
TEAM
1 NCO - TM CH
9 Jr. NCO - EM-
Sniper/DEMOL
HUNTER-KILLER
TEAM
1 NCO - TM CH
9 Jr. NCO/EM - SNIPERS

[illegible]
1 O
[illegible]
33 Jr. NCO/EM

[illegible] Total

FIGURE 3 - RTG PROV. SO H/K PLTN.

2.18

RTG-PROVISIONAL - SPECIAL OPERATIONS
HUNTER/KILLER PLATOON

LIST OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

1. PLATOON HEADQUARTERS (1 Set)

   a. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT

   2 M-14 Accurized Rifles
   2 ART Sniper Scopes (M-84 Scope, Alternate)
   2 Sionics MAW-A2 Suppressors
   2 VARO Starlight Scopes
   2 M-16 w/MAW-A1 Sup.
   1 PRC-25 or Eqiv. Radio Trans./Recvr.

   b. PLATOON WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT POOL (1 Set)

   8 M-16 x/MAW-A1 Sup.
   8 M-10 Ingram SMG w/Sionics Sup.
   8 Pistol (To be desig.) w/Sionics Sup.
   5 Cases B-40 Mini-Hand Grenades
   10 Cases HALFA 35mm Phosphorus Grenades
   1000 Rounds .38, .45 or 9mm Flare Bullets
   Demolition and Incendiary Equipment and Supplies as required

   c. SO H/K OR H/K TEAM EQUIPMENT (4 Sets)

   9 M-14 Accurized Rifles
   9 ART Sniper Scopes (M-84 Scope, Alt.)
   9 Sionics MAW-A2 Suppressors
   9 VARO Starlight Scopes
   1 PRT-4 Radio Transmitter
   9 PRT-9 Helmet Radio Receivers
   Demolition and Incendiary Supplies and Equipment as required

FIGURE 4 - EQUIPMENT

2.12

NCTIT
TACTICAL AREA OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(TAOR)
TYPICAL H/K TEAM AREA DEPLOYMENT


LAOS
MEKONG RIVER
THAILAND
RTA or BPP Unit H/K ATCHD
AREA NORTH
RTA or BPP •• Unit H/K ATCHD
RTA or BPP Unit ATCHD
HQ H/K
••
HQ H/K
AREA WEST
AREA EAST
RTA or BPP •• Unit H/K ATCHD

FIGURE [illegible] - TAOR

RTG PROVISIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS HUNTER KILLER COMPANY


II
SP OPNS
HUNTER KILLER
••
CO HQ
1 Capt. Co. Cmdr.
1 Lt. XO
1 1st Sgt.
1 Jr. NCO/EM-RTO
•••
SPEC OPNS
HUNTER KILLER

STRENGTH

5	O
19	NCO
100	Jr. NCO/EM
124	Total

FIGURE 6 -RTG PROV. SO H/K COMPANY

PART I: Planning, Preparation, and Training Phases

TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED: ____ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase I: Planning, Preparation
and Installation of Training
Center, through
Phase II: Organization and Training

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

Salaries (direct charges at actual rate): — Totals

Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level:

______ man-mos. @ $________ av. per man-mo. $__________

Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level:

______ man mos. @ $________ av. per man-mo. $__________

Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technician level;

______ man-mos. @ $________ av. per man-mo. $__________

Total billable salaries: $__________

Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at ________% $__________

Overtime premium pay — Estimated at ________% $__________

Office and Secretarial: $__________

Purchased expendable materials and services: $__________

Travel: $__________

Long-distance communication charges: $__________

TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS $__________

FIXED FEE (7%) $__________

TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee $__________

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability of arms and equipment through Thai or U.S. Government official channels.

2.12

PART II: Operational and Evaluation Phase

TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED: _____ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase III: Deployment, Insertion and initiation of Operations, through
Phase IV: Evaluation of Program

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

	Totals
Salaries (direct charges at actual rates):	
Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level: _____ man-mos. @ $_____ av. per man-mo.	$_____
Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level: _____ man-mos. @ $_____ av. per man-mo.	$_____
Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technician level: _____ man-mos. @ $_____ av. per man-mo.	$_____
Total billable salaries:	$_____
Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at _____%	$_____
Overtime premium pay Estimated at _____%	$_____
Office and Secretarial:	$_____
Purchased expendable materials and services:	$_____
Travel:	$_____
Long-distance communication charges:	$_____
~~TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS~~	$_____
FIXED FEE (7%)	$_____
TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee	$_____

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability of arms and equipment through Thai or U.S. Government official channels.

2.12

TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED: _____ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase V: Expansion of Operations

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

Salaries (direct charges at actual rates): Totals

Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level:
______ man-mos. @ $________ av. per man-mo. $__________

Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level:
______ man-mos. @ $________ av. per man-mo. $__________

Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technical level:
______ man-mos. @ $________ av. per man-mo. $__________

Total billable salaries: $__________

Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at ______% $__________

Overtime premium pay Estimated at ______% $__________

Office and Secretarial: $__________

Purchased expendable materials and services: $__________

Travel: $__________

Long-distance communication charges: $__________

TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS $__________

FIXED FEE (7%) $__________

TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee $__________

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability of arms and equipment through Thai or U.S. Government official channels.

2.12

ORIG: RGWEIDNER:dml
UNIT: FE/TBL/T
EXT: 1421
DATE: 3 MAY 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: FE 4 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN FI2 CI CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

03 15 15z May 69

CITE DIRECTOR 93804

TO BANGKOK

PBRAMPART

REF DIRECTOR 88114

1. WE NOTE LNSHOE QUERY DATED 2 MAY TO ITS HQS ASKING FOR TRACES ON MITCHELL L. WERBELL. WISH TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION REF WHICH REPLIED TO RECENT STATION REQUEST FOR TRACES ON WERBELL. SUGGEST YOU MAY WISH PASS GIST OF REF ON FYI BASIS TO LOCAL LNSHOE REPS.

2. ~~KEXX~~ FILE: 201-259910.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD William Johnson CI/OPS/FE (Telecord)

William W. Wells
ACFE

CS COPY

Clifton R. Strathern
CFE/TBL

201-259910
3 May 69

2.11

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

Dept. of Defense
(National Military Command Center
Message Center)
98952
2 May 69 (6 May 69)
Subject: Request for Information

Action: DIA-20

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: R.G. Weidner/dsr
UNIT: FE/TBL/T
EXT: 1421
DATE: 27 March 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 43/53 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-259910

CONF: C/FE 4 INFO: FILE, VR. C/RI/SD, C/FI 2, C/CI, SOD 3

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Destruction
Signed: Edward Early
R.O. #276 - Unit FE/TBLT
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

(classification) SECRET (date and time filed) 20 22 Z 28 MAR 69 (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 88114

TO BANGKOK

~~[illegible]~~

ABSTRACT	X	FE/TBLT

REF: BANGKOK 0411 (IN 16820)

1. HQS HAS LENGTHY 201 FILE ON SUBJECT REF WHO HAS LONG HISTORY OF POPPING UP IN AREAS AND SITUATIONS WHERE HE CAN MAKE A FEW FAST BUCKS. HE IS CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, A WHEELER AND DEALER, AND A PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE HAS A REPUTATION FOR LIVING BEYOND HIS MEANS AND IS HIGH PRESSURE ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION MAN. HE WAS OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MID 1959 WHEN HE BECAME INVOLVED WITH ANTI-CASTRO PLOTTERS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OFFERED TO FURNISH WOFIRM WITH INFORMATION ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN THE CARRIBEAN. HE WAS GRANTED A POA IN AUGUST 1959 BUT THIS WAS CANCELLED IN OCTOBER 1959 WHEN HIS INFORMATION PROVED TO BE OF LITTLE VALUE AND IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT HE WAS USING WOFIRM FUNDS TO PROMOTE PERSONAL INTERESTS. HE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY ATTEMPTED TO PASS HIMSELF OFF AS REPRESENTATIVE OF LNHARP AND WOFIRM. HE WAS BORN 1918 IN PHILADELPHIA AND DID

CS COPY /CONTINUED/

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

28 Mar 69
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO. 201-259910

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

RIG:
NIT:
XT:
ATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

ONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 98114

SERVE WITH OSS DURING WORLD WAR II. HE HAD OWN ADVERTISING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS BUSINESS IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA WHICH WENT BANKRUPT IN 1959. TRACES ON HIS CURRENT FIRM NEGATIVE.

2. ABOVE CANNOT BE PASSED TO THAIS SINCE SUBJECT REF IS WOLADY CITIZEN, HOWEVER YOU MAY WISH TO INFORM APPROPRIATE LIAISON CONTACTS THAT SUBJECT IS REPUTED TO HAVE UNSAVORY REPUTATION, HAS NO CONNECTIONS WITH LNHARP DESPITE ANY INTIMATIONS HE MAY MAKE TO CONTRARY, AND THAT THAIS WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO OBSERVE EXTREME CAUTION RE ANY DEALINGS WITH HIM.

3. FILE: 201-259910

END OF MESSAGE

CI/OPS/FE Robert E. [illegible]

Clifton R. Strathern
William E. Nelson
for C/CFE

CW

01 SEP 1970

Clifton R. Strathern
Clifton R. Strathern
CFE/TBL

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PE. IN/UNIT NOTIFIED

[CLA]SSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

[RO]UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	TJC	6	
2		7	
3	KJ	8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______ #

ACTION FE4 ☐ RID COPY

566

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR. 2/3N, SUB 6

S E C R E T 181107Z MAR 69 CITE BANGKOK 2411   18 MAR 69 IN 16820

DIRECTOR

REQUEST HQS TRACES ON MITCHELL L. WERBELL III AND HIS FIRM SIONICS, 1655 PEACH TREE ST., N.E., ATLANTA, GEORGIA. WERBELL IS HERE OFFERING TO SELL THE LATEST FIREARMS TO RTG. HE HAS PRESENTED SOME OF THESE WEAPONS TO THE KING.

S E C R E T

18 MAR 1969

Chief ______ S. ______

D/C ______ ______

1. ______ ______

2. ______ ______

3. ______ ______

4. ______ [illegible] Chrono ______

[illegible]

WITHIN 24 HOURS

Traces req

SECRET

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ U[illegible] ONLY ☐ CONFI[illegible]N[illegible]AL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Ralph [illegible]. Jusell
Employee Activity Branch
3 E 49, Hdqtrs.

EXTENSION: 7720

NO.

DATE: 26 March 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/Security 3 D 3113			
2.			
3.			
4. WH/COG			
5. attn: Nancy Gratz			
6.			
7. RI/AN	13 AUG 19[illegible]		Z
8. RI/EOI			
9. RI/FS RI/FILES			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

For your information.

NR on Baker in OS files.

5-7 please index

5-9 please file 201-259910

AN	2
AB	✗
IN	✗
FS	✓
RE	2
DESTROYED	
FI	

201-259910

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

1P

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, OP/RD

DATE: 4 March 1968

4MAR68
XAAZ 28107

FROM : L. L. Curran

SUBJECT: BAKER, Bruce Arman

On 7 February, this gentleman telephoned my office. His address is:

Mr. Bruce Arman BAKER
11379 President Drive, N. E.
Blaine Village, Minnesota

Δ U.S.A CIT: U.S.A

Mr. Baker stated that he has been in contact with a Mr. MITCHELL WERBELL, III of Powder Springs, Georgia. 201-259910

Mr. Baker says that Mr. Werbell is in the business of manufacturing weapons and delivering them by air throughout the world. Mr. Baker understands that Mr. Werbell does this for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Baker says that Mr. Werbell is a supposedly reputable man. Baker understands, from Werbell, that Baker will have to get a CIA security clearance to fly for Werbell.

Mr. Baker has served in the military. He has had some paramilitary training. He belongs in a "jump club" and now participates in "freefall", etc. He has a Morse Code proficiency and a Radio License Second Class. He has Spanish language proficiency and would be willing to collect for us.

This man persists on pursuing me re this CIA/Werbell relationship. I tell him I don't know a thing about it. It seems he has a smuggling record when he was 17 and he's afraid this may keep him from getting this Werbell "CIA" clearance.

L.

L. L. Curran

MICROFILMED
AUG 30 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

LLC:sb

Baker requests no contact on his wife re this deal. She is not witting. L

201-259910

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

When war breaks out anywhere in the world, former OSS man Mitch WerBell is eager and able to supply weapons to either side—or both. And he's only one of several high-flying operators in a dark and growing trade

the deadliest salesman

Newsfront

BY ANDREW ST. GEORGE

It is entirely possible, as claimed, that none of America's high-ranking officials received any advance warning of the outbreak of hostilities which ended in Israel's "blintzkrieg" victory over her Arab neighbors. But at least *one* American authority on modern warfare did. He is a ruddy, moustached, ramrod-backed, onetime OSS operative named Mitchell Livingston WerBell III. Two days before the Middle East fighting began last June, he left his Georgia country manor an hour before daybreak, drove the 25 miles to Atlanta airport in 19 minutes and boarded a jet for New York hand carrying a large, square valise which had been custom-made for him in Germany.

In Manhattan, WerBell checked in at the City Squire Inn, went to a double room still carrying the valise, and set it between his legs while he made several phone calls to numbers he looked up in a slim leather notebook. Precisely at noon, he reentered the elevator and pushed the "lobby" button with the unhurried cool of someone absolutely certain that a chauffeur-driven limousine is waiting downstairs—which he was; which *it* was.

A couple of hours later, after crossing Manhattan and boarding a private yacht

WerBell relaxes, above, at plush Puerto Rico hotel between arms deals. Note holster gun on j.b. opp. page.

2.5



Mitch WerBell and two aides look over route on map prior to a night delivery of weapons somewhere in the Caribbean.



For another Caribbean mission, small boat is towed close so that arms can be transferred for speedy run to the shore.

on the East River, WerBell finally opened his valise and displayed its contents: a half-dozen missile guns, both hand and shoulder weapons, which fire a small, self-guided rocket instead of the conventional bullet. WerBell had designed and built some of them himself.

Around him, crowding the yacht's stateroom, solid-looking, somber men watched intently as WerBell demonstrated the new firearms' awesome potential. Later that evening, recalling the demonstration over a drink back in the city, WerBell would describe his nautical hosts only by saying, "They were . . . let's just call them very important friends of Israel. They'd been warned that within days the Mideast would be at war. They were there to make sure that one way or another Israel got a crack at the very best weaponry there is. Not just for the campaign ahead, but for the standoff which is bound to keep the Middle East under tension for years."

Clandestine meetings like this are part of Mitch WerBell's stock in trade. He is a firearms broker of the new breed known as M.M.'s—munitions manipulators. In a world of legalized wars—from Yemen to

2.5



Arms brokers are a curious blend of past and present. Here WerBell, dashing as a Prussian noble, tests MBA rocket pistol.

WerBell, who likes to design arms as well as sell them, examines some of his collection in the "weapons room" of his Georgia home.

Angola to Bolivia—M.M.'s are the new V.I.P.'s of international politics. It is their business to know even before diplomats do where tensions are brewing that bring potential customers. Their most satisfying status symbol is the discovery that somewhere on the globe their merchandise is shooting away, back and forth, on *both* sides of the same conflict.

Heading south from Miami, one's first look at the Bahamas schooners and converted subchasers plowing the blue water with cargoes of arms from such dealers, recalls nothing so much as the rum-running boom of Prohibition years. But a diligent student soon discovers that alcohol and armaments have little in common; the munitions business is a vast, worldwide trade influencing the destiny of governments, nations, political parties—and the men who command them.

Take the recent assassination attempt against Santo Domingo's military strong man, Gen. Antonio Imbert. Driving homeward on Henriquez Ureña Street, General Imbert suddenly saw seven silver stars spurt across the windshield of his Cadillac. Even before [*Continued on page 73*]

"[illegible]"

2.5

shapes, not an unusual pattern to find in various parts of the world today.

On the mound prairies, ice formed in the cracks. As the ice built up, more soil was shoveled up into the polygons of earth and the cracks themselves widened. Finally the earth blocks froze too. When a big thaw set in, the ice in the cracks thawed faster than the earth blocks and flowed away, leaving big polygons of earth standing on the prairies.

What happened next is what happens to a melting ice cube. Its outside edges melt away first so that the cube dwindles into a sphere. The polygons of earth went through the same process. The corners of the earth blocks thawed faster than the sides. Then, while the cores were still frozen, the whole area was submerged for a short time by an ice-choked flood river. The rush of water swept away the thawed material and when the water subsided, what was left were dome-shaped Mima mounds.

In areas where the running water had covered them for only a short time, the mounds were big. Where the water flowed longer, more thawing took place and the mounds were small.

A very satisfying theory. But as usual, other scientists have picked flaws in it. For one thing, they question if the area had the sort of climate which Ritchie describes. They say it was not much colder during the mound-forming period than it is today. And they doubt if the prairies were swept by a flood of water deep enough to cover all the mounds. It would have had to be over 100 feet deep.

Some of the critics are gopher-theory men. The pocket-gopher theory has been around for 25 years, gaining supporters steadily. It particularly excites biologists, because if Mima mounds really turn out to have been made by gophers, they would be the most extraordinary structures (if not the biggest) ever made by any mammal except man.

The gopher possibility first occurred to Walter W. Dalquist back in 1941 when he was making a survey of the mammals of southern Washington. He later developed the theory with Victor Sheffer, a biologist with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

As they point out, wherever there are Mima mounds, there are also gophers, with the exception of Mima Prairie where the finest mounds of all are found. And at one time there were gophers on Mima Prairie, too. Evidence proves it.

The gopher they are talking about is a small brown animal, looks rather like a rat, and is called a "pocket" gopher because it has a fur-lined pocket in its cheek for carrying around food and nest material.

This is the way the biologists explain the gopher theory. As the Vashon ice sheet retreated and vegetation grew up in its wake, pocket gophers began moving in from the south, probably only advancing a hundred feet or so in a gopher generation. Finally at the southern end of Puget Sound, they ran into a new young evergreen forest which had sprung up ahead of them.

Gophers will not live in the shade of a forest so instead of pushing on farther, they dug in on the prairies. As a protection against predators they dug deep.

Each Mima mound represents what at one time was the "territory" of an ancient gopher family. When they built their foraging tunnels, they kept on dragging a little more soil back toward the home site than they took away from it. After thousands of years, those infinitesimal amounts of soil would have built up into a Mima mound. The mysterious mound roots which extend into the gravel below the mounds are abandoned gopher tunnels which have filled up with black silt.

"But not all Mima mounds have mound roots," opponents of the theory point out. They carp at other details, too. As one geologist wrote, "After diligent search, more than 50 stones, ranging in size from two to 20 inches in diameter have been found inside the mounds, well above their base." And how could any gopher shove a stone the size of a football up to the top of his nest?

What the next theory will be is anybody's guess, but the ultimate touch of confusion has already been added. There are those who say the Mima mounds are growing. Nor is this a new idea. Over 30 years ago, farmers in the area started talking about it. "Sure they're growing. When I was a kid they were level with the top of the chicken coop. Now they're several inches taller."

The growing theory cannot be passed off with a hearty chuckle either. Some keen observers have been taking the idea seriously—Doctor Sheffer, for one—although nobody can prove scientifically whether they are growing, shrinking or staying the same. In fact, only one thing is sure about the whole Mima hassle. If something is not done soon, there will not be many Mima mounds left to puzzle over. Acres of them have been leveled for farming. Still others have been dug up for gravel pits and cut through for highways and railroads. Not that the conservation-minded State of Washington would ever let them disappear entirely. A good thing, too. Because if those mystery mounds really are growing, we are going to have more puzzles to grapple with—like what on earth is making them grow bigger? And where, by all that is sane, are they going to end? —Jean Muir

---

THE DEADLIEST SALESMEN

[*Continued from page 43*]

he heard the stutter of silencer-equipped submachine guns, he knew that a long-anticipated event was taking place—an attempt was being made to kill him.

To duck the assassins' bullets, the general dropped sideways. His arm snaked behind the front seat of the limousine where his own submachine gun hung in a rack. But Imbert's life was saved by a different and wholly unexpected sort of weapon.

In the escort jeep, the general's chief bodyguard, Maj. Marino Garcia, flicked a spring-loaded switch on the brown leather swagger stick under his arm. The stick—suddenly converted into a miniature missile launcher—spat forth a high speed .50 caliber rocket projectile. With a chilling "*SWOOSH*" the small missile from the most powerful handgun now in existence blew apart the windshield of the attackers' Oldsmobile. The car turned and fled.

Outside the island confines of the Dominican Republic (where it set off yet another national crisis), nobody heard the news of the ambush with greater interest than WerBell. He was delighted by General Imbert's escape. He has warm personal relations with a number of Latin strong men, and the portly Dominican warlord has been an especially close friend. And it was WerBell who had invented and delivered the shooting stick that apparently saved the situation. Moreover, WerBell discovered, from a detailed description of the assassins' guns, that the ambush weapons, too, came from a lot he had passed on to the Dominican armed forces some years earlier.

In relation to the total worldwide munitions trade the equipment supplied by the private dealers is a drop in the sea—the world turnover in munitions is estimated at 350 billion dollars a year. Still, munitions manipulators like WerBell account for the fastest-growing portion of this vast business.

"The impact of private arms shipments into the underdeveloped world has been sensational," wrote military specialist Jack Raymond of *The New York Times* last year. "So fragile are the instruments of government, so slender, sometimes, their base of popular support, so vulnerable are they . . . that the timely arrival of some mysterious arms merchant can mean survival of one regime or the fall of another. . . ."

One week last March, 210 Americans were killed in Viet Nam. During the same week in Latin America, where undeclared guerrilla warfare rages in half-a-dozen countries, the death toll was near 300.

These guerrilla conflicts are no longer waged with fowling pieces and cane blades. "The guerrillas are as well armed as the government troops," the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency revealed recently. "Often, the guerrillas' weapons are more modern. And they fire thousands of rounds in each encounter."

The regular armies, in turn, are growing anxious to reestablish their traditional overwhelming superiority in firepower. Hard pressed, they are turning to controversial ordnance—napalm, harsh nauseous gases, special infantry rockets built to smash entire houses—which must often be bought in the black market.

Down briefly from its World War II peaks, the munitions business began to rise again in the late 1940's. For a while, however, large well-organized corporations controlled most of it. A firm called Interarmco, for example, had become a worldwide octopus by 1958. Independent operators found that it was often possible to cooperate with Interarmco, but seldom to compete with it. Then in the late spring of 1958, the U.S. State De-

2.5

"This is okay, but when are you going to teach me to chase wimmen?"

partment did an odd, little-publicized thing: it suddenly revoked licenses to export munitions to the Cuban government of President Batista.

General Batista had long been one of Washington's favorite clients, but Cuba was racked by internal disorders. The State Department had decided as a political gesture to curtail the flow of arms to him. By 1958 the official U.S. line on selling firearms had become completely confused. An old friend would be suddenly denied a paid-up munitions shipment, an ostensible outcast in, say, the Middle East, would be suddenly invited to bid on some coveted hardware.

The great corporations were hamstrung by the State Department's vacillations. Independent ordnance salesmen moved into the vacuum. Less troubled by red tape and day-to-day policy changes, they were prepared to make deals and deliver goods swiftly. A new prototype of global gun merchant emerged—the successful munitions manipulator. He came wearing custom-made English tropicals and a platinum-banded watch. He talked in the vernacular of the British officers' mess, adopted by the whole international firearms fraternity.

M.M.'s cover a broad spectrum. They range from the officially licensed, eminently respectable WerBell to a mysterious, Hungarian-born munitions salesman, whose lifelong skill in using false documents is believed to have inspired the Continental underworld term *Hunderpasler*, i.e. man of a hundred passports.

With some exceptions, successful M.M.'s seem to share an upper-class or military background. They often arrive at the munitions business through years of devotion to firearms as gun collectors or tinkerers. Mitch WerBell was still a gun hobbyist, who planted and shipped tropical fruits for a living when he developed—in his home workshop—what is today considered the finest muzzle silencer on the international market.

Sure political instinct and diplomatic skill are essential in the successful manipulation of munitions.

Andrew McNaughton, scion of Canada's most distinguished military dynasty and a former RAF squadron leader turned arms dealer, explained: "The fellows who got somewhere in this business all started out with a common insight. The big corporations had grown used to dealing with governments, but the independents, who were a lot smaller and quicker on their feet, recognized that it was easier to deal with government *departments*.

"Someone, say, had a nice order for machine guns . . . from, perhaps, a group of Kurdish freedom fighters who carry their hundred-dollar bills rolled as thick as a telephone book. Then he had a nice offer from, say, an arms firm in Hamburg to fill the order: MG-34 machine guns, almost as good as new—*better* than some—a spare breech thrown in for $220 each, belted ammo with it, tracer-spaced, $25 per thousand rounds—everything very nice. Except that to move the shipment out of West Germany and around the world, you needed a quiet little okay from Washington. Why? Because that's the way modern bloc politics works, I suppose. Anyhow, you went to Washington, clear-eyed and trusting, and the State Department said, 'No.'

"Now the big corporation might try a little wire-pulling. If it got another 'No,' it might quit for a while. But the independents had discovered that if you got a 'No' from the State Department, you could often go to the CIA, or the DIA, the military intelligence establishment, and get a 'Yes'—provided you were small enough and savvy enough to do it quietly and kick no furniture on the way. Of course, it is a bit trickier this way, turning the trick. You have to charge more. But then you often make a bit more, too."

This seems to be a point on which most M.M.'s agree. Charles Mevs, a philosophical Haitian ("Indicted, but never convicted, my friend!") put it this way: "Everyone knows that small countries are changeable. They have many subsequent governments. A lot of the big corporations had learned to live with that. But the small independents appreciated something else—that big powers tend to have many *simultaneous* governments."

Mevs grinned a huge, white, triumphant grin. "It's the same East and West. Think not? Russia? England? France? No difference, my friend. Remember last year the Moroccan government went to the French Foreign Office trying to extradite one of their exiles, Ben Barka? Yes? And the French Foreign Office said, '*Non, non,* our traditions of political asylum . . . the sacred freedom of choice . . . and *patati*, and *patata*.' So the Moroccans went to the invisible government, to French Intelligence. And they made a little deal. And French Intelligence just said, 'How d'you want this Ben Barka delivered, bagged or crated?' Eh? No difference, my friend."

It is a fact, shared by governmental insiders around the world, that great-power politics have seen a resurgence of old-fashioned Machiavellianism. Take the curious case of John Richard Hawke, 29, a bearded Britisher from Cornwall who, after eight years in the RAF, has turned up as an M.M. doing ferry flying by appointment—bomber planes and bombsights a speciality.

One day early last year, Eugenie Anderson a U.S. representative in the United Nations spoke in the General Assembly. She seemed to be promising that this man Hawke would go to prison for a long, long time. It appeared a curious UN undertaking—Hawke had not yet been convicted of anything. He still hasn't been. But the background of the matter illuminates the workings of modern munitions dealings.

Portugal, a NATO member in need of some ground-support planes for its forces in Angola and Mozambique, had approached Washington with a request to buy 29 B-26 Invader bombers. At the State Department's suggestion, the request was turned down; the U.S., in the United Nations, had promised not to purvey supplies for "colonial warfare." But there were other agencies in Washington more favorably disposed to Portugal, perhaps because they were troubled by the Angolan guerrillas, perhaps for other reasons. At any rate, the situation was ready-made for experienced M.M.'s. The total deal involved over three million dollars.

There now appeared a disting- French aristocrat, wearing the *Lé* *Honneur*; a hard-boiled Australian craft broker operating from [illegible] some mechanics [illegible] a risk [illegible]

2.5

("Sparrow"); some special radio rigs for tactical communications, and a pilot: John Hawke. In short order Hawke was flying over the Atlantic in the first of the seven bombers he was to deliver to Portugal in less than three months. Ostensibly headed for Bordeaux, France, he flew instead to a Portuguese air base where he was met by the Comte de Beaumont, representing a Swiss munitions firm.

Hawke was paid $5,000 for each flight. Although expenses ate up two-thirds of the fee, the deal seemed satisfactory. "Those planes had bomb racks, armor plating, ready gunports—there could be no question in anyone's mind what they were for," he told a visitor recently in Miami. Nevertheless, a question of sorts arose in *some* minds. One day Hawke was arrested and charged with violating the U.S. Munitions Act by exporting bombers without written State Department approval.

At the trial, the prosecution maintained that the United States government had neither known about, nor countenanced Hawke's flights. The pilot had a lone defender: Edwin Marger, a Miami lawyer-pilot, who has been developing munitions law into a specialty. Marger proved that U.S. intelligence did have tacit knowledge of the plane exports to Portugal.

Ferrying his third B-26, Hawke had flown into a pea-soup fog over Washington and blundered across a prohibited zone over the White House. The Federal Aviation Agency radioed up an urgent order to land. When Hawke put the B-26 down at Washington National Airport, he was inspected and questioned. By using the code word "Sparrow," Hawke got clearance to continue his flight. After Hawke's arrest, there seemed to be no proof that the incident ever occurred. The original FAA report of the incident had mysteriously vanished. But Marger finally managed to come up with a copy of the report. Together with the Customs declaration for the same plane, it proved the lawyer's point sufficiently to bring an acquittal.

"The jury realized some official hanky-panky must have been involved," Marger explained, "and they felt Hawke should not be made the goat."

Marger, however, appreciates the American dilemma: "Keep in mind," he says, "what a variety of roles a great power must play. In the UN it must play the benign anticolonialist. At an international conference, the principled pacifist. In the legislature, the protector of its domestic armaments industry, whose congressional friends resent restrictions on exports. In a secret emergency meeting with some battle-weary Latin president, it must be the powerful antiguerrilla leader. In its own National Security Council, it must be the champion of worldwide strategic interests. And so forth—there's no way to reconcile all this in public. That's where the M.M.'s come in, and very usefully, too."

Such geopolitical factors do not concern most munitions peddlers. Dominick de Fekete von Altbach und Nagyrecsath, an arms dealer who in name and background seems straight out of a Graustarkian novel. A former cavalry subaltern of the Royal Hungarian Horse Artillery, he worked his way up in the firearms business because it satisfied his two lifelong interests: guns and money.

After World War II, De Fekete, a shrewd, handsome cosmopolite who spoke five languages, rose to quick eminence in the European contraband business. In the early fifties, he moved his headquarters to South America and turned to the munitions business. He concentrated on foolproof methods of delivering contraband by sea.

De Fekete's clientele was divided equally between rebels and governments—frequently in the same country.

"With rebels you have an easier sale," he once told a friend. "They want whatever you can get for them. But with governments you have an easier delivery."

Such an expert trader along the "Mosquito Coast" as Andrew McNaughton confirms that doing business with arms-hungry banana regimes demands a rather large variety of special skills. "The first time I went to Cuba—before Castro—with a very nice list of secondhand military merchandise," McNaughton recalled, "I thought it would be a simple sales deal. But it wasn't.

"I was offering first-rate stuff at bargain prices," McNaughton explained. "Belgian ceramic-jacketed hand grenades by the hundred at $1.75 each; surplus Garands with spare clips at $41; English Staghound armored cars under $11,000. It was precisely what the Cubans needed and the generals with whom I had daily meetings could barely conceal their interest.

"Then, one evening there was a knock on my hotel room door. It was the Cuban C-in-C's secretary, Pancho. He told me my wares were satisfactory, but why hadn't I given the general a price list? 'What do you mean?' I said. 'We've been talking prices for five days.' Pancho just grinned. 'You know, McNaughton,' he said, 'you're an imbecile, but you're a pilot and I like pilots—I'm a pilot myself. Let me show you what a price list is.'"

In the tropical weapons trade, McNaughton learned a "price list" is the most important sales gimmick. For each item, three different prices must be listed. One is the current market price of the item in question, brand-new, retail: for an M-1 rifle this might be $100. The second price shows the amount for which the weapon had been purchased: in the case of an M-1 rifle, offered as surplus by a government which had bought it in 1946 and warehoused it ever since, the original price may have been a lot lower, say $80. The third figure is the real sales price which the salesman is asking for his surplus item—in the case of the same rifle, this real sales price might be $50.

"To close the deal, you must conclude by making up two bills of sale, said McNaughton. "One lists the current, brand-new market price—this goes to the general's auditors. The second bill of sale

"First, let me congratulate everyone for the fine turnout. . . ."

2.5

If it's the surplus price, the real price you're getting—this goes into the general's pocket. Into the general's pocket also goes the difference between the two prices—in the case of the hypothetical M-1, $50 on each rifle."

The staple of the private arms trade is the assortment of weapons known as Old Reliables. These are hardy perennial items of ordnance which sell steadily everywhere from the Congo to Cochabamba. There is, for example, the 20mm. automatic cannon, priced anywhere from $100 to $650. Delivery price will depend on condition, availability, accessibility of ammunition and shipment difficulties (open or clandestine?).

Other longtime favorites are the Browning Automatic Rifle (from $95 to $350); the big-bang M-1 Garand rifle ($10 to $155); the Enfield No. 4, popular because of its low price (around $25); the Madsen .30 cal. machine gun ($200 to $550); the infantryman's Big Daddy: the .50 cal. Browning machine gun ($100 to $1,000), and the 57mm. recoilless rifle, which will convert a launch into a warship at close range and in the jungle can make a guerrilla platoon's firepower equal regimental artillery (from $1,400 to $3,600). Mobile perennials are the B-26 bomber, the Staghound armored car and the T-28 jet trainer.

But it is the modern, hard-to-get weapons, kept in short supply by political considerations, which are in greatest demand. The U.S. developed M-79 grenade launcher, which looks and handles like a stout, single-barrel shotgun but fires a 40mm. grenade shell or bazooka rocket with riflelike accuracy, commands up to $1,700, ammo extra. There is great interest in the science-fiction MBA rocket guns which fire small, self-guided ballistic missiles at twice the velocity of the blockbuster magnum cartridges—and without explosion or recoil. The experimental *Flechette* spraying light bombs, which explode with a cloudburst of thousands of tiny barbs, are coveted by militarists and "freedom fighters" alike, as are the fantastic new image-intensifying and heat-seeking superscopes, which let the rifleman see and shoot as well at midnight as at noon.

This curious mixture of old and new weapons is reflected in the personality of the successful M.M.'s. For all their "space-age" interest in munitions technology, their personal outlook tends to be curiously old-fashioned. Perhaps because of an inner identification with adventurous types of a by-gone past, they tend to affect charming, eccentric, turn-of-the-century manners. This is true even of such old-style pistol-packing characters as Rolando Masferrer, who is often called the Caribbean's most feared gang lord. An astonishingly literate, brilliant, erratic Cuban who was raised in the United States and graduated at the head of his law school class, Masferrer has been fascinated by violence since his first taste of it at 19, in the Spanish Civil War. He left half his left foot in Spain, but came out of the hospital an officer of the International Brigade and for years afterward lived the life of an international Communist Party enforcer.

After World War II, Masferrer swung to the right and became a newspaper tycoon, senator, cattle magnate and overlord of the Caribbean's biggest gang of gunmen. Now living in the United States, he is a colorful demonstration of the mysterious ways of munitions manipulation. While officially restricted to residence in the State of New York, he managed to equip, in Miami, a 300-man Haiti invasion army with everything from infantry boots to a B-25 bomber. Now under indictment for this stunt, Masferrer is awaiting trial in the Miami Federal court.

The last time the U.S. government tried to convict him on similar charges, he got the case thrown out of court—much like Hawke—by pointing out that "I wasn't doing anything the government was not doing, too."

Other hazards in the trade can be more worrying. Since the Korean War, at least 20—and possibly twice as many—M.M.'s have been murdered. The "Red Hand," a notorious French right-wing organization, is believed to have killed seven private arms dealers in five countries simply to keep down the flow of arms to Algerian rebels during the last years of French colonial warfare. One of them, a Swiss ammunition-seller named Maurice Leopold, was killed with a poisoned arrow.

Masferrer usually carries under his arm a paper bag containing reading material, some Ramon Allones cigars, and a fully loaded National Match Colt .45 automatic pistol. His two bodyguards carry the same model of pistol in empty cigar boxes which they place beside their napkins when dining in a restaurant.

Right now Africa, where live bullets have been known to replace coins as the preferred tender, is the most fertile private firearms market. Latin America comes next, with a huge turnover in hardware of every kind. Comparative volume is hard to establish, because the same firearms travel back and forth repeatedly, from country to country, continent to continent, wherever supply and demand may take them.

The trajectory of such firearms from factory to firing line can be fantastically far-flung. The following history has been put together of a 20mm. cannon sold to Haitian rebels last year. The cannon was made in Finland during World War II and used on the Soviet front. In the late forties, it was sold in a lot to an Interarmco agent in exchange for some carloads of Sten guns. Shipped to Italy, it was taken over by Dominick de Fekete in one of his first weapons ventures and sold to the Israeli Haganah. In 1950 it returned to De Fekete in the mixed lot of surplus Israeli hardware consigned to Costa Rica. In 1955, it made a second transatlantic trip back to the Mediterranean, where agents of the Algerian FLN were waiting for it in Tunis. In 1960 it went overseas again, to Panama, and thence north to the United States, in a shipload officially described as "Deactivated War Souvenirs." It was then sold to Cuban rebels for delivery by air-drop to the Sierra Escambray mountains, but something went wrong with the delivery and the cannon ended up firing instead in Santo Domingo. In 1965 it was brought back to Miami in a mysterious converted subchaser known as the *Texana*. Later the same year, it was acquired by Rolando Masferrer. In mid-1966 Masferrer sold it, in a mixed boatload of light weapons, to a group of rebels preparing to invade Haiti under the leadership of a Catholic priest.

In a quarter of a century, the cannon has seen action in a half dozen wars—big and small—and brought sizeable profits to each M.M. who has bought and sold it. And how do these arms dealers feel about their business?

Mitch WerBell summed up the attitude of the fraternity when he told a visitor recently:

"Please don't call me a 'merchant of death.' All it is really, is that I've been fond of guns all my life. Guns don't kill people, people kill people, and always have, long before anyone invented the crossbow."—Andrew St. George



"Hello, Harry? Fine. I'd like to apologize for saying I couldn't marry you if you were the last man on earth. . ."

FBI document dated
11 May 67
re: Wer Bell, Mitchell —
Haiti

FBI document dated
2 May 1967 from New York
re: Ralph Lauro Serrano

FBI document dated
12 June 1967 from New York
re: Chet Gray

FBI document dated
11 JAN '67
re: Wer Bell, Mitchell Livingston III

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

itchell Livingston WERBEL III
201-259910

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WERBELL, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON, III
(VOL. II)
201-259910

INCLUSIVE DATES: JAN. 1964 THRU FEB. 77

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: OTHER AGENCY REPORTS (FBI, ETC.)

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/3/78	3/3/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

Vol. II

201-259910

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INFORMATION REQUEST

SUBJECT OR OTHER INDIVIDUAL INDEXED IN THIS DOSSIER IS INVOLVED IN A REQUEST UNDER

(CHECK ONE)

☒ PRIVACY ACT
☐ FOIA
☐ OGC/OLC
☐ OTHER (Specify nature of request under remarks)

SUBJECT OF REQUEST: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III	**FILE NO.** 201-259910

DOCUMENT SYMBOL, NO. & DATE (If request is on other than subject of 201)

REQUEST NO.: P76-28	**DATE COMPLETED** APRIL 1977	**DATE APPEALED** (If applicable)

REMARKS

DO NOT FILE ABOVE THIS FORM

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM FROM THIS FILE

(20)

FORM 10-76 3955

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: 005911

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

C/LA/SB
DC/LA/SB
C/

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1

SECRET

22-4

DATE-TIME GROUP 022001Z
CITE CIA
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 960121

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/IP/AMS, C/LSN/10, C/PCS, C/PCS/ITC 2, ACC/000, C/OMS 2, C/CI, D003, 000/00

0 0 0 0
DISSEM BY: 44
PER SOP
132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R K MCHARGUE/GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE 888DIVISION. Y

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS Y

CIR-316/00302-77 Y

SUBJECT: BOMBING OF FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES: NAME TRACE, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III Y

REF: FBI CABLE REQUEST DATED 14 JANUARY 1977 Y

1. THE FILES OF THIS AGENCY CONTAIN CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION ON MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III, BORN 8 MARCH 1918 IN PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA. THE MAJORITY OF THE INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED BY YOUR BUREAU. THIS AGENCY PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED THE FBI WITH INFORMATION ON WERBELL UNDER CSCI-3/773317 OF 24 OCTOBER 1962, SUBJECT WERBELL, MITCHELL L., AND CSCI-316/02323-69 OF 27 JUNE 1969, SUBJECT WERBELL, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON III. IN ADDITION, THIS AGENCY FURNISHED YOUR 80239BUREAU WITH MEMORANDA CONCERNING SUBJECT MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III DATED 27 JUNE 1974, 81 AUGUST 1974, 9 AUGUST 81974, AND

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

C/CA/SOG

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 2

[redacted]SECRET

CIA
980121

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

12 AUGUST 1974. Y

2. WERBELL HAS NEVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THIS [redacted]AGENCY NOR DOES [redacted] THE AGENCY HAVE ANY OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN HIM. WERBELL WAS A COMMISSIONED OFFICER WITH THE OSS DURING WORLD WAR II AND SERVED IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATRE. IN AUGUST OF 1959, THIS AGENCY [redacted] CONSIDERED USING WERBELL AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA, PARTICULARLY CUBA, BUT TERMINATED ITS CONSIDERATION OF HIS POSSIBLE USE IN OCTOBER 1959[redacted] WHEN IT WAS DETERMINED THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS OF LITTLE VALUE AND IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT HE WOULD USE THE PROPOSED CONNECTION WITH THE AGENCY TO PROMOTE HIS PERSONAL INTERESTS. Y

3. DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1962 REPORTING ON WERBELL REVEALED THAT HE VISITED SEVERAL CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND APPEARED TO BE CONTACTING OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING RECOGNITION OF (A) [redacted]"DE FACTO" CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE CALLED THE "UNITED ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF CUBA." IN DISCUSSIONS WITH NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, WERBELL CLAIMED THE PROPOSED CUBAN EXILE GOVERNMENT

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 3

SECRET

CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE

980121

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

HAD THE SUPPORT OF NINETY SEPARATE CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATIONS AND 186,000 CUBAN EXILES. HE ALLEGEDLY OFFERED A NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL [redacted] $100,000 TO OBTAIN THAT GOVERNMENT'S RECOGNITION ■ OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. Y

5. IN DECEMBER 1965, WERBELL SPOKE TO A MIAMI CONTACT OF THIS AGENCY AND TOLD HIM THAT HE AND SIX CUBAN EXILES IN THE UNITED STATES HAD ORGANIZED A GROUP, INCLUDING APPROXIMATELY TWENTY CUBANS INSIDE CUBA, TO PERFORM A COMMANDO OPERATION IN CUBA IN EARLY JANUARY 1966. THEIR PRIMARY MISSION WAS THE ASSASSINATION OF CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO, WITH THE SECONDARY MISSION BEING THAT OF BLOWING UP THE POWER GENERATORS THAT SUPPLY THE ELECTRICITY TO HAVANA. WERBELL, AT THE TIME, STATED THAT HE WAS TRYING TO GET THE "GREEN LIGHT" FROM THE CIA TO PROCEED WITH THE MISSION, AND INFERRED THAT THE MISSION WOULD BE ABORTED IF SEUCH APPROVAL WAS NOT OBTAINED. {NOTE: THIS AGENCY WAS NOT IN CONTACT WITH WERBELL■■■ IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER in this endeavor.] Y

6. IN EARLY 1969 WERBELL WAS IN THAILAND REPRESENTING HIMSELF AS VICE PRESIDENT OF SIONICS, INC. OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA. HE ■DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS A COUNTERINSURGENCY EXPERT, CLAIMED TO BE A RETIRED ■■■■■■

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 01[illegible]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 4 OF PAGES 4

SECRET

CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE, 980121

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

COLONEL, AND INTRODUCED HIMSELF AT A LOCAL NIGHTCLUB AS THE CHIEF OF CIA IN THAILAND. (NOTE: WERBELL WAS NEITHER THE CIA CHIEF OF STATION IN THAILAND NOR AFFILIATED WITH CIA IN ANY WAY.) WERBELL ATTEMPTED TO SELL EXOTIC WEAPONS TO THE THAIS AND TO TRAIN THEM IN COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE. Y

7. WERBELL ALLEGEDLY OPERATES THROUGH A NUMBER OF FRONT BUSINESSES, ONE OF WHICH IS CALLED THE CENTRAL INFORMATION AGENCY (CIA). IN SOME OF HIS DEALINGS WERBELL BROADLY HINTS THAT HE HAS CONNECTIONS WITH THIS AGENCY. Y

8. THIS AGENCY HAS INFORMATION FROM THE FBI CONCERNING ~~PERTAINING TO~~ SOME OF THE TYPES OF WEAPONRY THAT ~~PERSON~~ WERBELL PURPORTS TO SELL. ~~THIS INFORMATION WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO YOUR BUREAU IF REQUESTED.~~ THE [illegible] INFORMATION THE AGENCY HAS ARE PRESS CLIPPINGS [illegible] ARE FORWARDING TO YOU. Y

~~9. IF ANY FURTHER INFORMATION IS FOUND IN OUR FILES ON THIS SUBJECT IT WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOUR BUREAU.~~ Y

9 ~~10~~. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

DATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1977
ORIG: BILL WAGNER:MM
UNIT: C/LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

C/LA/SB

C/LA/COG/OPS- WM. DEVINE
(IN DRAFT)

SOG/G/MSS- ~~D. BLOOMFIELD (IN DRAFT)~~ R. YOUNG

AGC/[illegible]

C/PCS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

CONFIDENTIAL

OGC 77-0704

1 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

ATTENTION : Associate Deputy Director for Operations

FROM : Walter T. Lloyd
Associate General Counsel

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. As you are aware, on the instruction of United States District Judge Peter Fay (Miami, Florida Division), incident to the Drug Enforcement Administration's prosecution of Subject for conspiracy to import and distribute multi-ton loads of marijuana, the undersigned made a detailed review of the files of this Agency concerning Subject in August 1976. This examination was to ascertain any data that ran to Werbell's guilt or innocence of the offense charged and any other data reflecting the nature of the relationship between Werbell and the U.S. Government. This latter requirement was grounded on the Court's view that Werbell's voluntary reporting to the Agency and any government condonation of his activities might be exculpatory in the eyes of the jury.

2. In response, we reviewed the files, identified Agency contacts with Subject and prepared two affidavits: one regarding non-employment by Mr. B. DeFelice and the second regarding Werbell's relationship to the Agency by the undersigned. Copies are attached. During the trial the first affidavit was shown to counsel for Werbell by DEA counsel, Mr. Sam Sheres, at which point defendant's counsel stipulated that Werbell was never a formal employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. Sheres subsequently returned the affidavits to the undersigned at the conclusion of the trial.

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 059605

3. Regarding the relationship of Werbell to the Agency, as approved by the Deputy Director, the undersigned appeared before Judge Fay in his chambers on 31 August and under oath answered questions of the Court concerning Werbell. A copy of the transcript of that proceeding is attached. You will note that Judge Fay requested that all pertinent government records be made available to the Court for its inspection. Accordingly, copies of Agency files were reproduced, culled for "Brady-type" documents, excised to protect sources and methods under the "SWP case criteria" and reviewed and approved by Assistant DD/O on the evening of 1 September. These processed documents were then handcarried to Miami by the undersigned on 2 September.

4. The undersigned advised Judge Fay at 0830 hours on 2 September that I had in my possession copies of all of the Agency files on Werbell, had culled them as to possible "Brady" documents and was prepared to review them with the Judge at his convenience. He was on the bench with a tight schedule and asked that the possible Brady documents first be reviewed by Karen Atkinson, the principal counsel for the prosecution. The undersigned subsequently briefed Atkinson on the nature of data in the possible Brady documents. This resulted in a significant reduction in the number of possibles. The undersigned gave Atkinson copies of the four unclassified OGC documents related to the DOD revocation of Werbell's security clearance in 1971. In addition, Office of Security documents edited and approved for release to Werbell under his Freedom of Information and Privacy Act request (Tabs A and B of OS response), consisting of media publications and security investigative data, were also provided Atkinson. Due to counsel for Werbell raising an issue on Werbell's use of a boat named "Venus" belonging to CIA, a declassified copy of the OS short investigative report outlining data concerning Werbell's use of the Venus to transport arms was also provided Atkinson. The related OS Headquarters assignment document was not provided. Related DDO documents on the ownership of Venus by the "JURE" Cuban group were mentioned to Atkinson but not made available.

5. While the above documents were provided the Department of Justice with the understanding they could be passed to Counsel for Werbell due to subsequent events noted below, it is not certain that this occurred. Specifically, the undersigned declined to release additional "Brady" documents without consultation and instructions

from the Court. The requested meeting was put off by Judge Fay and defendants subsequently rested their case. The DOJ had little else to add and the case went to the jury about noon on 3 September. All the remaining copies of Agency documents were returned to Headquarters by the undersigned the evening of 3 September. On 4 September the jury returned a verdict of "not guilty." As a result, the bulk of "Brady-type" Agency documents on Werbell was not provided to counsel for Werbell and Judge Fay reviewed no Agency documents. It should be noted all copies of documents taken to Miami were excised in accord with the "SWP case criteria" and on return to Headquarters, these were destroyed by the undersigned.

6. As a related matter, on 16 November Mr. Arthur Egbert of the Internal Security Division of the DEA contacted the undersigned seeking background information on Werbell. The undersigned suggested Egbert first review the files of the FBI on Werbell as most of the data we have is contained in FBI reports. Should FBI data be insufficient for his needs I suggested he seek access to our files in DDO and Office of Security via the normal DEA Department of Justice liaison channels.

Walter T. Lloyd

Walter T. Lloyd

Attachments:
(1) Affidavit - DeFelice
(2) Affidavit - Lloyd
(3) Transcript of Hearing of USDC for Southern District of Florida, August 31, 1976.

cc: Jerry Brown, SAG/OS, w/o atts
Ed Montgomery, LD/SRCH/DDO, w/o atts

OGC 76-0844

24 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOG
Chief, DCD
Chief, LA Division

11-1003

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston Werbel III

1. I was advised by the Justice Department on 23 February that Werbel has been indicted and the trial is scheduled to begin on 29 March in Miami, Florida. The charges relate to importing and distributing quantities of marijuana. With Werbel's propensity to raise his past affiliations with the Agency, we can anticipate problems during this trial. An additional problem is presented because Werbel is defended by Edwin Marger who was the defense attorney for John Hawk in the B-26 case in Buffalo, New York in 1966. It was Edwin Marger who subpoenaed the CIA General Counsel as a defense witness.

2. The Justice Department has received information that a person either currently or formerly affiliated with the CIA has been participating in Werbel's meetings with his attorney. It would be appreciated if all addressees could review their holdings on Werbel and determine if there is any validity to any recent contacts with him. I would urge that instructions be sent to Miami that no, repeat no, contact with Werbel take place between now and the beginning of the trial.

3. It would be helpful if each addressee could prepare a summary of the various contacts Werbel has had with CIA in the past. Please check to see if you have any information on a Colonel Bayard who was killed in Atlanta, Georgia during the summer of 1975. Bayard, reportedly an associate of Werbel's, had previous contacts with the Agency. It would be appreciated if your responses could be received by close of business 2 March.

John K Greaney
John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

3.44

OUTGOING MESSAGE 6-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

DATE-TIME GROUP 2702002

CITE WASHINGTON

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 814069

CONF: 1 P/OPS INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

IP [illegible]	☒	[illegible] PROGRAM	
		ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP [illegible]		[illegible] FOR INDEXING	
IP [illegible]		CASE NO. (2-3)	
		[illegible] ACT. CODE	
		[illegible] (11)	
		[illegible] (2)	
IP [illegible]		[illegible] FILES	

TO: LA/MIAMI.Y

FROM: LA/CAR Y

SUBJECT: MITCHELL LIVINGSTONE WERBEL III Y

REF: UFPA-1860, 9 JUNE 1975 Y

1. MITCHELL LIVINGSTONE WERBEL III, WHO IS ONE OF THE PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE DEA REPORT QUOTED IN THE REFERENCE, HAS BEEN INDICTED ON CHARGES RELATING TO THE IMPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA. Y

2. WHILE WE HBAVE SO FAR UNCOVBERED NO BKHERALD CONNECTION WITH WERBEL, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT A PERSON EITHER CURRENTLY OR FORMERLY AFFILIATED WITH BKHERALD HAS BEEN PARTICIPATING IN WERBEL'S MEETINGS WITH HIS ATTORNEY. Y

3. FURTHERMORE, SINCE WERBEL HAS IMPLIED (APPARENTLY FREQUENTLY) IN THEPAST THAT HE HAS HAD BKHERALD CONNECTION OR SUPPORT IN HIS QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES, LARGELY INVOLVING ARMS AND AMMUNITION, THERE IS A [illegible] POSSIBILITY THAT HE MIGHT ATTEMPT IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER TO IMPLICATE BKHERALD IN HIS CURRENT PROBLEM. WE THEREFORE REQUEST THAT YOU COMPLETELY AVOID WERBEL OR ANYONE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

3,43

27 Feb 76

RECORD COPY

201-257910

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0129138

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE WASHINGTON

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

814069

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

CLAIMING TO REPRESENT HIM SHOULD HE ATTEMPT SOME CONTACT WITH THE STATION. (DCD/MIAMI WILL RECEIVE SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS.) Y

4. THE COS HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE FOREGOING AND CONCURS. Y

5. FILE: 201-259910. E2,IMPDET.H

DATE: 26 FEB 76

ORIG: L. BURNETT/JP

UNIT: LA/CARI

EXT: 1497

AC/LA/CAR

DC/LA/CAR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 012913

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY 0-3-2

ACE COI ACP TOO TPE HAD DCI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

LH/CASE 1

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
120003Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
780309

CONF: EUR8 INFO: FILE (PLAN, FR5, CS/IO, CI4, PS/EG2, C/OPS

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: FR/NEW YORK INFO NICOSIA.Y

KEYWAY FORRES

REFS: A. FR/NEW YORK 33363 |IN 758465| {BEING RELAYED TO NICOSIA}

B. DIRECTOR 769406 NF 9281

C. DIRECTOR 670514 0 (NOT NEEDED NICOSIA)Y

1. PRIOR TO RECEIPT REF A, HQS ADVISED BY SECRET SERVICE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN REF B CASE CONCERNING EMMANUEL KASSELAKIS AND STAVROS SYKOPETRITIS AND THAT KASSELAKIS STORY NOW CONSIDERED TO BE BOGUS. SECRET SERVICE FURTHER ADVISED THAT KASSELAKIS PROVIDED OTHER INFORMATION WHICH ALSO CONSIDERED SUSPECT CONCERNING ARMS TRANSACTIONS AND THAT THIS INFORMATION PASSED TO NEW YORK BASE. SECRET SERVICE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED THAT REF A INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM KASSELAKIS.Y

2. UNABLE TO IDENTIFY GEORGE STRATOS.Y

3. FOR FR/NEW YORK: WEEBLER UNDOUBTEDLY IS MITCHELL L. WERBELL {201-259910} OF REF C.Y

4. SAMUEL SCRIVENER JR., WASHINGTON ATTORNEY, EMPLOYED BY BKHERALD IN EARLY 1950'S AS CONSULTANT.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

THIS FILE COPY FOR
201-259910
DO NOT DESTROY

3,42

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 060957

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACK	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	NRO	DCI
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

OMF

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF:

INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY:

480389

5. UNABLE TO IDENTIFY DOMINICAN COMPANY.

6. FILE: 201-889547; 201-257910; X REF 201-060338. E2 IMPDET.

amw

DATE: 10 DECEMBER 1975
ORIG: DAVIS/WARD/AMW
UNIT: E/GC
EXT: 1441

OPS/LSN/ID(IN SUBSTANCE)

FR/2 ________

E/EXO(IN SUBSTANCE)

3,-12

C/FR/2
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/E/GC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

7-71 MFC. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 29 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 28-2 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

21

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______ S E C R E T

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT EUR 8

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR IPLAN, FRS, PS/EG2, CI4, LSN/LO, C/OPS, SS/SOG4

T 504725 EIA377 PAGE 01 IN 758465

TOR:0216352 DEC 75 NYFR 33363

S E C R E T 0217592 DEC 75 STAFF

CITE FR/NEW YORK 33363

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-359910
DO NOT DESTROY

TO: DIRECTOR.

KEYWAY FORRES

1. LOCAL SECRET SERVICE REPORTS FOLLOWING FROM INFORMANT OF ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY. ONE GEORGE STRATOS, LOCAL GREEK-AMERICAN ORCHESTRA LEADER, VISITED CYPRIOTE AMBASSADOR DIMITRIOU IN WASHINGTON CA. 28 NOV TO SOLICIT HIS WILLINGNESS PURCHASE 25 THOUSAND M-16 RIFLES AT $215 EACH , TRANSACTION TO BE CONSUMATED OUTSIDE U.S. DIMITRIOU DECLINED ON GROUNDS PRICE BUT REQUESTED STRATOS SUBMIT PROPOSAL FOR MANUFACUTRE AND SALE OF "HIGH-POWERED MARK I AND II HAND GUNS". WEAPONS WOULD BE MANUFACTURED BY DOMINICAN COMPANY, TELEPHONE NUMBER 532-1019 RPT 532-1019. STRATOS AGREED WORK UP DETAILS.

2. ADDITIONAL DETAILS PROVIDED BY INFORMANT: ONE OF NINE PARTNERS OF STRATOS IS ONE MITCH WEEBLER, WHO STRATOS CLAIMS IS FORMER BKHERALD. STRATOS WASHINGTON ATTORNEY IS SAM SCHREIVNER (PHON), TELEPHONE (202) 296-2950. STRATOS CLAIMED M-16'S AND 462 M-60 MACHINE GUNS HE ALSO WISHES SELL REPRESENT U.S. ARMS LOST INDOCHINA.

3. SECRET SERVICE OFFICER (WHO OF GREEK BACKGROUND) REPORTS STRATOS WAS CLOSE TO PAPADOPOULOS GOVERNMENT AND NOTES THAT LARGE

S E C R E T

3,41

14-00000

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF, FILE VR,

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 504725 E1A377 PAGE 02-02 IN 756465

TOR:021835Z DEC 75 NYFR 33363

AMOUNTS OF U.S. ARMS WERE DISCOVERED MISSING FROM GREEK ARMORIES WHEN NEW GOVERNMENT TOOK INVENTORY IN 1974.

4. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET

3.41

SECRET

The Owner of Guns Seized In 1974 Will Sell Them

MARIETTA, Ga., Sept. 4 (AP)—Mitchell L. WerBell 3d of Marietta has agreed to quit the arms trade, which in the past has frequently involved him in international intrigue.

In a deal worked out yesterday before a Federal judge, Mr. WerBell agreed that he would stop manufacturing and selling guns if the Government allowed him to sell $325,000 worth of arms seized by Federal agents last December.

The guns, called "the largest collection of private guns in the world" by Mr. WerBell and Federal attorneys, include 2,000 machine guns and silencers.

Mr. WerBell said his company, Defense Systems International, Inc., would continue "to do what we have always done—serve this country."

He said he and his sons have plans to sell radios, electronic equipment and military supplies not covered by the agreement.

NY TIMES 5-9-75

3,40

FBI
[illegible] [illegible] CABLE
DATED 25 JUNE 1975
SUBJECT: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON
WERBELL III WILLIAM MARTIN
BELL NEUTRALITY MATTERS -
GRENADA

FBI document dated 8 July 1975
from Atlanta, Ga.

3 Newspaper Articles Appearing in
The Atlanta Constitution forwarded.

14-0000

S E C R E T

TELEPOUCH

[illegible] EIA497 PAGE 01 N 34586

TOR:091404Z JUN 75 UFPA-1860

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO: UFPA-1860

FILE NO : 200-11-11/17; 196-9-1

DATE : 6 JUNE 1975

TO : CHIEF, LATIN AMERICA DIVISION

FROM : ACTING CHIEF OF STATION, LA/MIAMI

SUBJECT : DEA/MIAMI REPORT ON POSSIBLE PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA

1. STATION HAS RECEIVED A REPORT FROM DEA/MIAMI ON A POSSIBLE PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA. STATION CONSIDERS THE REPORT SUSPECT BUT HAS SUGGESTED TO DEA THAT SINCE FBI AND STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE AN INTEREST IN SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN THE REPORT THAT A COPY OF IT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM. STATION ALSO PASSED TO DEA A LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR THEIR USE WHICH MIGHT ASSIST THEM IN OBTAINING FURTHER DETAILS ON THE PLOT AND HAS OFFERED TO PROVIDE THEM WITH PERTINENT INFORMATION THAT MIGHT COME TO OUR ATTENTION THROUGH STATION SOURCES. CORRECT NAME OF THE PROMINENT CITIZEN OF GRENADA MENTIONED IN PARA 3 OF THE REPORT IS KEN MILNE.

S E C R E T

3.37

CS copy to LA/NARC 10 Jun 75

196-9-1

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE REPORT, DEA MIAMI SEC-5-75-3-253, OF 4 JUNE, SENT TO DEA HQS AND FIELD STATION BALTIMORE AND ATLANTA; DEA HQS REQUESTED PASS TO CARACAS REGION: "SUBJECT: MITCHELL L. WERBELL III., ET AL FILE NO. G1-75-0105:

"IN THE COURSE OF DEVELOPING A MARIHUANA SMUGGLING CONSPIRACY INVESTIGATION, MITCHELL L. WERBELL, III., ET AL, G1-75-0105, THE MIAMI REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT HAS UNCOVERED INFORMATION CONCERNING A PLAN TO OVERTHROW THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA.

"THE PLAN, AS OUTLINED BELOW, IS A COMPOSITE OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM ONE WILLIAM BELL, A DEFENDANT IN THE SUBJECT INVESTIGATION, VIA HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH UNDERCOVER AGENTS AND A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL.

"THE PLAN CALLS FOR THE LANDING OF 36 ARMED MEN ON GRENADA DURING THE LATE EVENING HOURS OF A SATURDAY IN MID OR LATE JULY 1975. THE REVOLUTIONARIES WILL APPEAR TO BE SCOTTISH MERCENARIES, BUT IN FACT WILL BE AMERICANS. THE LANDING TIME WILL COINCIDE WITH THE NORMAL SHUT DOWN TIME OF THE ISLAND'S RADIO STATION. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF THE LANDING GROUP

WILL BE THE RADIO/COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, AIR AND SEA PORTS. BELL WILL HEAD AN ASSASSINATION SQUAD WHICH WILL BE DIRECTED TO KILL 21 POLITICAL AND GIVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES. THE PLAN ANTICIPATES HAVING FULL CONTROL OF THE ISLAND BY THE TIME THE ISLAND'S RADIO STATION WOULD NORMALLY GO BACK ON THE AIR ON SUNDAY MORNING. THE COST OF THIS OPERATION IS REPORTED TO BE 3 MILLION DOLLARS. ONE KEN MILL OR MILLS (PHONETIC), A PROMINENT CITIZEN OF GRENADA IS REPORTED TO HAVE CONTRIBUTED ONE HALF MILLION DOLLARS TO THIS OPERATION, AND WILL BE PUT UP AS THE HEAD OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT IF THE TAKEOVER IS SUCCESSFUL. BELL STATES THAT HE WILL BE ASSUMING CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE AGENCIES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. BELL IS BELIEVED TO BE MANUFACTURING WEAPONS AND PARTS FOR WEAPONS, WITHOUT SERIAL NUMBERS, FOR THE OPERATION AT DEFENSE WEAPONS INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING AND RESEARCH INC., P.O. BOX 771 DEERFIELD BEACH, FLORIDA, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRM'S MANAGEMENT. WERBELL'S ROLE IN THE OPERATION IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.

"WERBELL, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON III, WHITE MALE, U.S. CITIZEN, A FORMER WWII OSS OFFICER, BORN 3/8/18 AT PHILADELPHIA, PA., 5FT 6 1/2 INCHES TALL, 155 LBS., BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, RUDDY COMPLEXTION, GRADUATE OF FORK UNION MILITARY ACADEMY, RICHMOND, RA., AND THE CHARLES PRICE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM (EXTENSION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA), AND RESIDENT AT POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA. WERBELL DOES NOT HAVE AN FBI CRIMINAL RECORD, ALTHOUGH A 7/1/73 MIAMI HERALD TROPIC MAGAZINE ARTICLE REPORTED THAT HE AND SEVEN OTHER PERSONS HAD BEEN INDICTED FOR CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE U.S. NEUTRALITY LAWS, BUT THAT THE CHARGES WERE DROPPED ON THE ORDERS OF THEN ATTORNEY GENERAL RAMSEY CLARK. HIS INDICTMENT WAS REPORTEDLY THE RESULT OF HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH A HAITIAN REVOLUTIONARY GROUP DURING 1966. A 1974 ESQUIRE MAGAZINE ARTICLE DESCRIBES WERBELL'S INVOLVEMENT IN A COVERT POLITICAL MOVEMENT TO GAIN INDEPENDENCE FOR THE ISLAND OF ABACO IN THE BAHAMAS. WERBELL IS ALLEGED TO BE A REGISTERED DEALER AND/OR MANUFACTURER OF WEAPONS.

"BELL, WILLIAM MARTIN, WHITE MALE, BORN 6/27/28, 6FT 2 INCHES TALL, 230 LBS., GRAY HAIR, NORTH CAROLINA DRIVERS'S LICENSE NUMBER 2198096; RESIDING AT 4412 WATERBURY ROAD.

3.37

SECRET

TELEPOUCH

T 276121 EIA497 PAGE 25 N 34560

TOR:291404Z JUN 75 UFPA41860

RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA; BELIEVED TO BE AN EX-MARINE CORPS PILOT AND OWNER OF THE MARINE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, US ROUTE 1 - NORTH, RALEIGH, N.C.; BELL HAS BEEN ARRESTED BY THE RALEIGH PD ON THE FOLLOWING CHARGES: CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON AND DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE - 1973; AND ISSUING A WORTHLESS CHECK - 1967. BELL DOES NOT HAVE AN FBI CRIMINAL RECORD.

" IN APRIL 1975, IN ALLEGED FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY, WERBELL CONTACTED AN MIAMI R/O COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL AND REQUESTED THE C/I'S ASSISTANCE IN SMUGGLING MULTI-TON QUANTITIES OF COLOMBIAN MARIHUANA INTO THE U.S. MIAMI R/O U/C AGENTS, ACTING AS PILOT/SMUGGLERS AND COLOMBIAN SOURCE OF SUPPLY, HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH WERBELL AND BELL CONCERNING THE FINANCING, AIR SMUGGLING AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARIHUANA. OTHER INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE CONSPIRACY TO DATE ARE WALLY GILLIS, BELIEVED TO BE SUBJECT OF NADDIS RECORD NUMBER 121267, AND A RICK STEVENS AND A WILLIAM JORDAN, WHITE MALES, 20'S; NO ADDITIONAL ID DATA AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

"CONSPIRACY INVESTIGATION IS CONTINUING. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATIVE TO NEUTRALITY VIOLATIONS WILL BE FORWARDED

SECRET

3.17

TELEPOUCH

T 276101 EIA497 PAGE 06-06 H 34585
TOR:0914042 JUN 75 UFPA-1860

UPON RECEIPT, ONE U/C AGENT (PILOT) HAS BEEN APPROACHED BY BELL TO TAKE PART IN THE GRENADA OPERATION.

"S.R.F. MIAMI BRIEFED VERBALLY CONCERNING GRENADA INFORMATION THIS DATE. A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION WILL BE FURNISHED TO U.S. CUSTOMS, ATF, AND S.R.F. AT MIAMI. JOHN A. LUND JR., REGIONAL DIRECTOR".

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - C/LAD VIA TELEPOUCH E2, IMPDET.

3.37

14-00000

SECRET

24 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Alleged Activities of Walter Mackem

1. During the week of March 9, I lunched with Mr. Wesley Dyckman. Dyckman is a former Agency staffer currently employed by the Drug Enforcement Agency. During the course of our luncheon conversation, the name of Walter Mackem came up. Dyckman told me that Mackem, a JOT classmate of ours, had been fired by the Agency. According to Dyckman, Mackem is now employed in the Washington area as a private investigator. In addition, according to Dyckman, Mackem is involved with a paramilitary activity funded by some unnamed British source. The activity, which Dyckman referred to as "the new land project" seeks to establish a tax shelter on one of the out-islands of the Caribbean by forcefully taking over the island and establishing a government there. Mackem is supposedly involved in paramilitary training of forces who would participate in this paramilitary adventure again. According to Dyckman, the paramilitary training supposedly takes place in Georgia not far from Atlanta.

2. This is the extent of my conversation with Dyckman on the above subject and I have no further information or details concerning this.

Joseph P. Hayes
Joseph P. Hayes
SE/PCH

Orig - OS/SAG
1 - SE/SEC
1 - LA/SO
1 - Hayes

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 017709

3.36

SECRET

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

32-9

OMF	0	0	0	U	0	0	0	PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 191757Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 670514

R
R

CONF: NE 10 INFO: FILE II/RM FRS, DCD2 LSN/ID C/OPS LAIO

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CAHI/SLCY Nickels

DISSEM BY: 030

TO: FR/NEW YORK. Y

AJAJA FORRES Y

REF: FR/NEW YORK 30417 (IN 511214) Y

1. NO ADDITIONAL HQS TRACES ON EDGAR LEMMENS AND CO. OTHER THAN CONFIRMATION THAT IT LICENSED DEALER OF ARMS LOCATED IN/~~[illegible]~~ TIRLEMONT,-BELGIUM AND THAT IT IMPORTED FROM NEW YORK TO BELGIUM A SILENT SUB-MACHINE GUN WHICH LATER SHOWED UP IN SPAIN CONNECTED WITH BASQUE ASSASSINATION. Y

2. MICHELL L. WERBELL, III (201-259910) IS PARTNER OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL INC. OF POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, A LICENSED ARMS DEALER. HE BORN 8 MAR 1918, PHILADELPHIA. HQS HAS LENGHTY 201 ON WERBELL WHO HAS LONG HISTORY POPPING UP IN AREAS AND SITUATIONS WHERE CAN MAKE FEW FAST BUCKS. HE CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, WHEELER-DEALER AND PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MID-1959 WHEN BECAME INVOLVED WITH ANTI-CASTRO PLOTTERS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OFFERED PROVIDE BKHERALD WITH INFO ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN CARIBBEAN. HE GRANTED POA IN AUGUST 1959 BUT THIS CANCELLED OCTOBER 1959 WHEN HIS INFO PROVED BE OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

3.35

Nickels 201

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPS	MRO	DCI
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

670514

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

LITTLE VALUE AND IT SUSPECTED THAT HE USING BKHERALDS FUNDS TO PROMOTE PERSONAL INTERESTS. EVER SINCE, BKHERALD HAS BEEN DISCLAIMING WERBELL ~~WHO HAS~~ REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED PROMOTE SELF AS REP OF LNBUZZ AND BKHERALD. SINCE MUCH OF BKHERALD INFO ON WERBELL ORIGINATES LNERGO, WE SUGGEST LNERGO REP/NEW YORK PERFORM TRACE THROUGH HIS OFFICIAL CHANNEL. (ABOVE INFO MAY NOT BE PASSED FOREIGN NATIONALS BECAUSE WERBELL WODUAL CITIZEN.) Y

3. ONLY TRACE ON MITCHELL WERBELL IV IS THAT HE ALSO INVOLVED IN/FATHER'S ARMS BUSINESS TRADE. HE HAS HAD NO CONNECTION WITH BKHERALD. Y

4. FILE: 201-918287, E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 17 MARCH 1975
ORIG: WENDY RAHMAN
UNIT: NE/ARN/I
EXT: /R 1386

LA/~~COPS~~ FE
NE/SO..
CNE/ARN/I..
CNE/ARN.
FR/ 2..

C/FR/2
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

H Ferguson
SA/DCNE/AO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 025268

14-00000

7-71 MPG 3-74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 15 PER TOTAL COPIES 232 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT NE10 ACTION #	INFO	FILE VR, IP/AN, FR5, LSN/ID, C/OPS, C1/OP2

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 831008 EIA365 PAGE 01 IN 511214

TOR:041600Z MAR 75 NYFR 30417

S E C R E T 041335Z MAR 75 STAFF

CITE FR/NEW YORK 30417

TO: DIRECTOR.

AJAJA FORRES

REF A. UNDW-6325

B. FR/NEW YORK 30022 (IN 473676)

1. SUBJ REFS, ALA-AL-DIN AL-TAYYAR OF THE IRAQI MUN, IS STILL OF CURRENT INTEREST TO FBI WHICH HAS HIM UNDER PERIODIC OBSERVATION. TAYYAR HAS BEEN IN BAGHDAD ON HOLIDAY FOR PAST SEVERAL WEEKS AND FBI HOPES MAKE OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO HIM SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN NEW YORK IN NEXT WEEK OR SO. DURING 25 FEB MEETING WITH FBI COUNTERPARTS, TERPOS AGAIN REITERATED BKHERALD INTEREST IN TAYYAR SAYING HE DEFINITELY WOULD LIKE CONTACT TAYYAR IF FOR SOME REASON FBI DECIDED NOT TO. FBI CONTACTS SAID MATTER WOULD BE RESOLVED ONE WAY OF ANOTHER IN NEXT FEW WEEKS AND THEY WOULD ATTEMPT ASSIST TERPOS IN THE CONTACT IF FBI GAVE TAYYAR UP.

2. FBI ALSO INFORMALLY ASKED FOR TRACES OF FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS/COMPANIES WHICH REF B CONTACT OF TAYYAR (WILLIAM APIKIAN) HAS CONTACTED RE PURCHASING ARMS:

A. MITCHELL WEBELL, III AND IV

SECRET

3.34

7-71 MFG. 3/74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

1	4
2	5
3	6

ACTION #

T 831008 EIA365 PAGE 02-02 IN 511214

TOR:0416002 MAR 75 NYFR 30417

DEFENSE SYSTEMS

POWDER SPRINGS GEORGIA.

LNERGO SOURCE SAID WERBELL (EITHER OR SON) FORMERLY WORKED FOR BKHERALD. ALSO MADE OFF THE CUFF REMARK THAT "DEFENSE SYSTEMS CO" SOUNDED LIKE BKHERALD FRONT ORGANIZATION.

B. EDGAR LEMMENS AND CO.

BELGIUM

FBI HAS INFO FROM BELGIUM SECURITY THAT LEMMENS AND CO. IN THE PAST HAS PROVIDED ARMS FOR THE IRA AND THE BASQUE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.

3. FILE: 201-0918287. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

The Amazing New-Country Caper

by Andrew St. George

Capitalist revolution, the ultimate solution

For the first time in history, the successful managers of America's economy—its entrepreneurs, financiers, merchandisers, investors—are talking rebellion. A kind of rebellion, anyway. There is no call to subvert the Republic, only to abandon it. In increasing numbers, America's most affluent and active elites are threatening to withdraw their funds, their assets, ultimately even themselves and their families from the centers of the U.S. economy, which many of them seem to consider done for. Nicholas von Hoffman, the acerbic and preternaturally foresighted columnist of *The Washington Post*, found that in some of mid-America's best executive clubs, "There is talk of buying gold coins and keeping them in the office safe, of owning a piece of land to retreat to when the trouble starts." The hero of the year's most durable best seller, *You Can Profit From a Monetary Crisis*, by Harry Browne, is "Peter Panic," the quintessential American small investor. He is in flight from his own national economy. Transferring every penny he owns from U.S. investments into Swiss banks and South African gold stocks, Peter Panic practically doubles his worth from 1970 to '73; then he is ready to take the most important step—to find himself a secluded rural retreat to weather the nation's coming troubles.

But retreat *where*? That's the basic problem none of these doomsayers grapples with. A seventy-five-thousand-dollar-a-year man who pulls up lock, stock and bond investments to move to a secluded farmhouse may find there a measure of protection from random violence—or he may find, if real trouble starts, that in his isolation he's utterly defenseless.

Unless, of course, he has planned ahead—as far ahead and as carefully as the originators of what one can only call, for the moment, the Abaco Plan (it remains to be seen by events, of course, whether the Abaco planners were as wise and prescient as they were farsighted and careful). The originators of the Abaco idea were the first to implement the urge to abandon America with a concrete design, including a destination, provision for personal and financial safety, monetary reward and even a Utopian social program. Though the men behind Abaco are nearly the opposite of the commune-seekers of the late Sixties and early Seventies, their objectives are much the same. They seek a way out and a return to fundamental values, but their most fundamental value is the proposition that each of them should be many times a millionaire, untroubled by inflation.

By the time you read this, the men of Abaco may have accomplished the first stages of their program (in which case you will have read about them in the newspapers)—or they may have failed and be in the process of regrouping. But I'd like you to meet them as I did, at a lunch in Washington, D.C., last May.

"Cry 'Havoc!' and let slip the dogs of War"?

No, sir! Not here in Duke Zeibert's place you don't; this well-bred Washington restaurant admits no animals. Not even if they're wearing eighty-dollar Church's shoes. Not even if they happen to be the familiar old two-legged war hounds who were made immortal in the Shakespearean line, and who are being made fashionable again this year by the success of Frederick Forsyth's latest book, *The Dogs of War*.

Here we are in 1974, murky, angst-ridden, confusing old '74, and with Forsyth's novel a best seller, hailed as "soon to be a major movie," deferentially praised for its "reportorial realism," more and more people are talking about "the dogs of war" as if they knew what the phrase meant: an international conspiracy of financiers and killer commandos who wage mercenary mini-wars in the quest for maxi-payoffs. What nonsense! A drink at Duke Zeibert's polished bar will give us a better view of reality than Fred Forsyth's collected works.

Take Mister Mitchell Livingston WerBell here, a ruddy, jovial, moustached chap, sipping his preprandial Tanqueray martini extra dry. It's obvious that if there were anything doggy or bellicose about WerBell, he wouldn't be lunching where he is—at the head of the old Duke's prize front corner table.

Or take the tall, well-tailored man sitting next to WerBell. It is plain at a glance that he looks and—having just been overheard asking, "May I have the pickles, please?"—sounds like a patrician

7,33

London clubman. And that's just what he is: Robert Hamilton, Baron of Belhaven and Stenton, a distinguished member of the House of Lords.

In fact, a good look at the legendary Mitch WerBell—millionaire firearms tycoon, designer of the world's best muzzle silencer, adventurer, friend of dictators and C.I.A. agents, manipulator of the luck of small nations—and at the seven men who are his luncheon guests today reminds us that, in real life, the strategy of private wars demands, first of all, *finesse*.

In Forsyth's telling, "the dogs of war" get together only to make hard-boiled conversation about "knocking off an entire republic" with the aid of World War II machine pistols laboriously concealed in oil drums. WerBell's world is different. A top executive of Defense Services International, Military Armaments Corporation and Sionics Inc., he designs and manufactures his own weaponry, which are recognized all over the world as the most sophisticated small arms obtainable. Having acquired a taste for irregular warfare as an O.S.S. commando leader behind Japanese lines in World War II, WerBell is rumored to have taken a hand in a long string of mini-wars since then, from the South China Sea to the Caribbean and the Mediterranean. But WerBell frowns on crass badinage, especially with food. At Zeibert's the table talk is mostly about gastronomy today, in part because the dill sours and soft-shell crabs are truly remarkable, in part because the host at the neighboring table is Clifton Daniel, the silver-haired Washington bureau chief of The New York *Times*.

But by the time coffee and Courvoisier arrive, Daniel and his party depart. WerBell lights a finely veined Montecruz double corona. "I talked to the island today," he says, and suddenly the table is all attention.

The island"—that's what this lunch is all about. The island is Abaco; not yet an independent republic, nor a center of commerce and finance, but by no means a negligible coral hump, either. In fact, Abaco is the second-largest landmass in the Bahamas—Great Abaco and Little Abaco, surrounded by a sprinkling of small reefs and cays, over seven hundred square miles of fertile tropical paradise. Mitch WerBell and his guests have come to Washington to discuss a project straight out of a Forsyth script: the take-over of Abaco—an action that will allow these men to get themselves and their money profitably out of the U.S.

To be sure, any resemblance to popular fiction stops short with the basic idea. Commando politics is dead. It will no longer do to break open a case of bootleg hand grenades and storm the palace. In fact, Abaco *has* no palace. What it does have is six to seven thousand native inhabitants who lead lives ranging from quiet stagnation to mute poverty.

To be conquered, Abaco must be attacked—that fundamental aspect of territorial expansion has not changed in four thousand years—but in an age of psychological warfare, motivational research, subliminal propaganda and behavior modification, the tactics must be different. WerBell's first assault on Abaco has been psychological. With great skill and ruthless persuasiveness, the citizens of Abaco are convinced, step by step, that they must become an independent nation; that becoming an independent nation is the greatest, most rewarding thing in the whole wide world; that it is *they*, the citizenry of Abaco, who must urgently need and demand and fight for status as a self-governing commonwealth.

"I talked to the island for almost an hour this morning," WerBell repeats gently, now that everyone around the table is watching him with close attention. "They finally got the slips. They've already distributed half of them. They'll make a one-spot run this weekend and see how they score. They think it'll be sixty to sixty-five percent."

No translation is needed. As the Watergate tapes have demonstrated, men who share a secret scenario come to share a secret language, as if by osmosis. WerBell's remarks reveal that he has had a long-distance conversation this morning with one of his chief operatives on Abaco, using a clear phone line—i.e., a connection involving untapped phone numbers. (If the conversation had not involved a key agent on Abaco, and if the phone had been suspect, the conversation would have been brief.)

The agent on the island—most likely C. R. "Chuck" Hall, who has served as WerBell's principal operative on Abaco during most of the Summer of 1974—reported that the special courier who occasionally arrives from Miami aboard a small amphibian seaplane, bringing consignments which the Nassau authorities are not supposed to see, had delivered a shipment of blank survey forms. These polling slips, devised by a prestigious U.S. opinion-research firm, are to monitor sentiment on Abaco in favor of independence—not just once, but week by week, as WerBell's psywar campaign unfolds.

Furthermore, WerBell learned this morning that a test sampling focused on a single Abaco settlement, perhaps Marsh Harbour or Fox Town, had been scheduled by his agents on Abaco for the coming weekend. The organizers expected to poll between sixty and sixty-five percent in favor of independence—an impressive score, reflecting the fact that the covert political campaign of WerBell and Co. is in its sixth month.

Are these people *serious*? They are indeed—not merely serious but experienced, powerful and farsighted. Three of WerBell's luncheon guests are former C.I.A. career officers, all three recently retired from its clandestine services branch, where they acquired invaluable experience in the manipulation, dismantling and rearranging of governments. John Muldoon, who is WerBell's principal agent in Washington, has served as a PolAd—a political adviser—in Vietnam and Africa. Walter Mäcken has seen similar duty in a number of Southeast Asian countries, and Ted Roussos, a tanned, greying man, has been a senior C.I.A. clandestine services official in the Mediterranean—Italy, the Balkans, above all Greece—for almost twenty years before he retired last year to join, ostensibly, the management of the Astor, Washington's best Greek restaurant, long owned by his family.

These men are not war hounds or gunslingers. Their ethos and telos thrust not toward violence but toward *control*. They are technetronic conflict managers—planners, organizers, and only occasionally the manipulators of violent action. Muldoon is a tall, pink, deep-chested Irishman faithfully cast in the mold from which most of the chief inspectors of large American police departments seem to spring. Mäckem looks like an Ivy League graduate instructor, blond, button-down, horn-rimmed, alert, with a Hong Kong Racquet Club tie to match his navy blazer. The pipe-smoking Roussos, in his flawlessly cut English tropicals, demonstrates what the French mean when they say

3.31

distingué—the aging Charles Boyer plunked in a spy scenario, looking not so much the part of James Bond as his enigmatic superior, M. All three follow WerBell's briefing with small nods and half smiles of approval.

WerBell talks on, his eyes on the pearl-grey ash of his cigar, his growly voice low. There's work to be done—lots of it. The day known as U.D.I.—that is, the date when Abaco breaks away from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence—is tentatively set for New Year's Day of 1975. The operations required to seize control of the island have been disguised as the "uprising" of an "autonomous, locally organized independence movement" with such amazing skill that none of the world's major press has spotted what is going on. A number of seemingly local organizations and deceptively "ad hoc" groups have sprung up to handle those activities that cannot be kept from public view—propaganda, organization, and so forth. There are: the Abaco Independence Movement (known as A.I.M.); the Abaco Development Council; Friends of Abaco; the "Prosperity '74" Economic Conference on Abaco.

Every one of these cover organizations has been clandestinely created, financed and managed from WerBell's headquarters in Powder Springs, a suburb of Atlanta. To coordinate their activities—propaganda, recruitment, proselytization, the importation of distinguished guest speakers from the U.S. who preach the independence gospel buttressed by a variety of economic and political promises—a carefully camouflaged "forward headquarters" has been set up in Miami. A large, deceptively suburban house at 1666 S.W. Twelfth Street hides a high-powered SSB radio station, a "dispatch center" for handling cargo traffic with Abaco via a small seaplane, and a halfway house for promising independence militants who are discreetly flown to Miami. On arrival, the independence activists are either enrolled in political indoctrination courses held in Miami, or, having been provided with plane tickets under various cover names, they are flown farther north to a training base near Atlanta, where they receive paramilitary training under the command of a former U.S. infantry officer, Col. Robert Bayard.

Col. Bayard, a tall, leathery man in the Gary Cooper mold, with grey eyes and a shock of reddish brown hair, is the officer in charge of "special personnel." Young, muscular, unattached Abaconian independence enthusiasts, whose commitment to the cause of U.D.I. is especially strong, are given seven weeks of supersecret instruction in the use of small arms, demolition devices and other commando skills at the proving grounds of Mitch WerBell's arms company. Proving grounds? Well, WerBell makes plenty of gadgets that bear testing. His companies produce a deadly sniper rifle, "accurized," automated, utterly silent, with the built-in capability of plugging a beer can at a thousand yards—"We guarantee *this* much," says WerBell—and a special sighting device which enables the rifleman to fix his target day or night. With Gordan Ingram, WerBell has designed and produces the incredible Ingram, a miniaturized submachine gun no larger than the familiar .45 service automatic, eight hundred rounds per minute, the whole shooting match about as noisy as a very fast Ping-Pong match—"pac . . . pac . . . pacpacpac"—the barrel is a patented WerBell silencer. There is plenty of "sophisticated equipment" to test. But among visitors who have been invited there more than once, the place—electronic security fencing, the dog patrols, the imperious warning signs, the helipad for combat choppers, the airstrip for the company Learjet—among people who call Mitch by his first name, the place is known as "the farm."

Training special personnel is a rigorous regime, and Col. Bayard keeps himself in shape; at Zeibert's he takes grilled liver and a single beer, and lunches in silence, seldom intervening in the discussion, occasionally glancing at his wrist chronometer—he must be back at the farm by nightfall, and as a mere colonel, he must "fly commercial"—no Learjets pre-warmed on the ready strip.

Setting out the final phases of the Abaco take-over campaign, Wer-

Abaco's head honcho: millionaire, ideologue and philosopher Michael C. Oliver.



ABACO NATIONAL LAND TRUST

LAND ENTITLEMENT CERTIFICATE

SPECIMEN ONLY

Ah, yes, the seven thousand native inhabitants; after the revolution, every Abaconian will get a certificate like this one, worth one acre of homestead land absolutely free.

3 33

Bell sounds as smoothly and playfully Machiavellian as the senior account executive of a medium-sized ad agency plotting a tricky but not really *make-or-break* media blitz. The support of the locals is essential: "To get it, we're gonna change their self-image." It's easy; just listen. We're gonna use only the *truth:* Abaconians think of themselves . . . well, as people of *modest* means. In reality, they're beggars hunkered on a mountain of gold. And this is by no means another hollow hype. No effective psywar concept is.

Stretching across the central and southern reaches of Abaco there are 300,000—*three hundred thousand*—acres of undeveloped prime land, potentially, and by no means unrealistically, worth hundreds of millions of dollars. This is virgin soil. Under British colonial rule these were crown lands, reserved for the sovereign, and now, under the newly self-governing Bahamas Commonwealth, administered by the Pindling government in Nassau, they're still government land, strictly no trespassing for private citizens.

Just suppose, the scenario goes, that on January 1, 1975, good old torpid hung over "sorry-general-the-switchboard-is-closed" New Year's Day, Great Abaco and Little Abaco and all the lesser cays, reefs and coralback adjacent thereto, declare themselves an independent republic. This vast virgin acreage would be—*up for grabs.* Every native-born Abaconian could line up for his divvy.

"Will he get it?" asks Ted Roussos at the restaurant.

"Ohoho, you bet your boots," says WerBell. "Here, see if I can find this stuff. . . ." He flips through his attaché case, custom-made by Peal's of London, pulls out some gold-rimmed, elaborately printed bonds. "Here. . . the Abaco National Land Trust Beneficiary Share Certificate. And here's the other gizmo, the Land Entitlement Certificate. This says every native Abaconian adult gets his one-acre homesite free and clear after independence. And on the beneficiary share, he'll get some of the major lease revenues. Here's the tender, lays it all on the line. You bet they'll get a share. Provided, the tender says right here, '*Provided that the political situation in Abaco is just and fair.*' "

"Just and fair," says Roussos softly. "Of course, just and fair. If the National Land Whatnot gives each native a one-acre homesite, it will give them all, man, woman and children all together, one perce of their own land. Who will decide what's *just and fair?*"

"Ah . . . probably I will."

There he is . . . the low voice, the bony figure in the forty-nine-dollar Robert Hall drip-dry suit, the jacket bulge between chest and armpit contouring not the familiar shoulder holster but a Hewlett-Packard minicalculator: Mike Oliver *likes* sitting at the far end of the table with a notebook beside the butter plate. He has lunched here prudently and salubriously on nothing but cold fish and iced tea and with a health-conscious frown for the vapor of two-dollar cigars, staring intently at every speaker in turn, now staring at Ted Roussos over the remains of his cold jellied salmon with the deep-eyed concentration of a man whose daimon senses a challenge. "You have a good point, a small point but a good point. 'Just' and 'fair' are only words until somebody decides what they are supposed to mean. On Abaco, I will decide. That's the *big* point, isn't it?"

Right you are, Mike. Chesty Mitch WerBell and Big Jack Muldoon and Smart Walt Mackem and Courtly Lord Belhaven in their bespoke three-hundred-dollar suits and club ties and hand-rubbed Peal's cases, and Bob Bayard in his craggy silence, and all the other N.C.P. staff (New-Country Project is what *that* stands for) and special personnel drawing contract pay on or about Abaco are ultimately only meant to enforce what Mike Oliver considers just and fair and desirable. Ted Roussos knows it, too; he resigns from the project the day after the luncheon meeting. But no one else does. Why should they? Mike Oliver is here, after all, not just as the founder and constitutional creator of a perfectly serious American new-country movement, but in representation of a powerful syndicate of financial backers. It is, above all, Oliver who is making independence an imminent reality for the citizens of Abaco, most of whom have never heard his name.

But among the driven, troubled, questing financiers of America, Oliver is more than a name. To many business leaders he's a miracle worker, a minor prophet on the crumbling walls of the city, a far-sighted sentry registering the approach of the forces of darkness. For a specter is haunting America—a new apparition of four space-age horsemen: Inflation, Unemployment, Depression and Chaos. And providentially, at this critical juncture in mid-1974, Michael C. Oliver, in association with Mitchell WerBell, offers the driven rich an alternative: not just some backcountry hidey-hole, but citizenship and residence in an entirely new country; a newborn commonwealth wholly dedicated to the protection of private wealth and the survival—indeed, the *revival*—of the classic free-enterprise system.

Long before the Dow hit the five hundreds, and coffee went up to fifty cents a cup, long before old people began eating dog food and farmers dumping their calves into ditches, Mike Oliver foresaw that the free-enterprise economy was doomed in America. It sounded strange at first, coming from Mike Oliver, this single-minded belief in devaluation, decline and fall, for in the mid-Sixties the dollar was still the fixed star of the economic firmament, the U.S. economy was booming, and Oliver himself seemed the very embodiment of the American dream of success: a European immigrant to the U.S. at eighteen, he had made his first million by thirty (real-estate development, construction) and 1965 saw him living on a charming wooded estate in Nevada with a pretty wife named Betty and three lively children. Approaching fifty, Oliver was the president of several medium-sized corporations, a settled, influential community leader and the employer of a ravishingly beautiful secretary named Vicky Jo Todd, who was crowned Miss Nevada in 1970. Yet for almost ten years, where other businessmen and economists saw only progress and prosperity, Oliver divined a long-range trend toward depression and disaster.

Worldwide travel and an intense reading of economics helped convince him by 1965 that, as he told a visitor years later, "They're going to screw up the money." He felt certain that debauchery of the dollar would lead to political crisis, inflation, and ultimately to some sort of dictatorship.

"Once I saw that the dollar was kaput, that whatever the government did would only make matters worse, I dumped my stocks and bonds and switched to a strong position in gold coins. Everyone laughed, except my friends; my friends said I'd gone crazy. Well, as you know, it turned out that I'd made some pretty sharp bets in the money market, and instead of calling to suggest where I could get some psychotherapy, my friends called to *(Continued on page 151)*

3.33

(Continued from page 67) ask where I was getting my investment tips. And, while I began making some real money by '69-'70, it wasn't because I had good financial advice. Just the opposite was true: all the investment advisers and trust officers and analysts and forecasters and market consultants were betting the other way, they couldn't read the handwriting even when their noses were against the wall, and so—I beat the market. Let me tell you, not many people do. And the way it happened, it wasn't any tips or charts or portfolio managers; what really happened was that by 1965 I'd become a student—a *disciple*, really—of Professor Ludwig von Mises."

Professor von Mises, the longest-lived (ninety-two), most prolific (nineteen books) and least self-effacing economist of the Austrian School founded by Bohm-Bawerk, died in 1973 in New York City (where he'd been teaching since 1940) just as, after a half century of obscurity and neglect, his teachings began to enjoy a renaissance here, much the way Karl Marx came into vogue in Eastern Europe at about the time the siege guns of the Red Army became audible in the distance.

Had more people listened to Von Mises in time, there would be more gold millionaires like Oliver today, and although not many did, the professor's tiny coterie of admirers often compared him in epochal stature to Karl Marx—a Marx of ultraconservative capitalistic convictions, of course.

Von Mises was a polymath and his teachings are complex, but some of the principal doctrines are not difficult to grasp. Von Mises believed that human freedom and laissez-faire capitalism were one and the same thing. He had passionate, sacramental faith in the market, not as a mere institution—the sort of vulgar "computer" seen by Keynesians which the government can tinker with whenever it needs to—but as a metaphysical process which regulates all human affairs. Much as one cannot hope to fix a fine watch with a bung starter, Von Mises was convinced that government could not intervene in economic affairs, in the providential workings of the market, without causing damage. "Interventionism" was a self-defeating, vicious circle: the first governmental intrusion into business necessitated a second to stem the ravages of the first, then a third one to undo the worst consequences of the second; then a fourth intervention to alleviate the trauma of the third . . . Von Mises despised "interventionists," the whole brainless, sniveling lefty lot of economists, bankers, policy planners, sociologists, who advocated governmental participation in *anything* with an economic aspect; he even opposed free public education above the grade-school level. And Von Mises was evangelical in his belief that unless mankind learned to value, adopt and defend laissez faire capitalism as its paramount social system, it was headed for chaos and slavery.

One beautiful smoking experience.

If you've never had one, have an A&C Grenadier.

Long, slender, mild-tasting A&C Grenadiers—in light or dark wrappers—are a unique blend of fine imported and domestic tobaccos that give you real flavor, satisfying taste. It's one beautiful smoking experience.

Antonio Y Cleopatra.

3 33

Chaos and tyranny—that is what Mike Oliver foresaw as early as [illegible], the inevitable result of America's "interventionist" and "collectivist" fiscal debauchery. That he made millions of dollars in gold profits along the way did not really reassure Oliver, it merely confirmed his premonitions. Of course, the profits helped: to people who tend to think in terms of money—that is, most of us—they seemed to prove that Oliver had something.

To tell the world what he had, Oliver wrote a book in 1968: *A New Constitution for a New Country.* Printed privately, never noticed in a book review, written in pedestrian declaratory style, the book has thus far sold 19,400 copies through the mail—proving that there does exist that contradictory thing, a genuine underground best seller.

The subtitle on the cover reads: "Has the Time Come To Abandon the United States?" Oliver's answer is a firm "Yes." The book tells why, and how. "The United States can no longer be saved from severe crisis. . . . Though not yet under complete tyranny, prevalence of totalitarian ideas and increased use of suppressive measures prove that the end of freedom is in sight [in America]. . . . [Only] those who arrange for a timely departure will escape the coming horror."

The book is not a tract; it's a plan of action. If Ludwig von Mises is indeed the Karl Marx of monetary libertarianism, and Harry Browne, the best-selling author who invented Peter Panic, perhaps its Bakunin, its prolific pan-destructionist, then Mike Oliver is its Fidel Castro—the ultimate militant who redefines the doctrine in terms of total action. Browne's book, advocating that self-sufficient people withdraw to "retreat homes" for safety, has snowballed into an all-season best seller; but it's Mike Oliver who is about to show them how to do it.

"The person with self-respect has a right to preserve his life and freedom," Oliver's book reassures the reader. "But he has no duty to stay in a country whose government policies will destroy him."

The country Oliver is describing isn't Nazi Germany; history is a cruel joker—this time around, it's the United States. "Means for effective action to save freedom in the United States in the foreseeable future no longer exist. Thus, the freedom-loving person has no choice: leave, or be destroyed."

Fortunately, "a surprising number of nearly uninhabited, yet quite suitable places for establishing a new country still exist. . . . The exact location of the new country cannot be revealed at this time. Yet, one has but to look at the western hemisphere to find that places for establishing a new, *fair-sized* country still exist."

And now, that "fair-sized country" has been found. Its conquest is within Mike Oliver's reach. How things have changed in the few years since 1968! A powerful consortium of frightened new-country seekers, wealthy and influential men who would have laughed at Mike Oliver's strictures a short while ago, are supporting his campaign with money and anything else that might be required. Whatever you need, Mike; just say the word, Mike. And the most important acquisition of Oliver's well-endowed New-Country Project has been the meeting and the alliance with Mitch WerBell and *his* semi-business, paramilitary organization. Now it's the Oliver-WerBell organization, at least so far as Abaco is concerned. Special personnel are interviewed, recruited, briefed: Walter Mackem, the scholarly young ex-C.I.A. officer leaves for the Bahamas on his first assignment, Big John Muldoon rents a suite in the Lafayette Building in midtown Washington, Ralph McMullen is dispatched to Miami, along with a pale, quiet former British intelligence officer known only as Grant who is a communications specialist hired to run wireless traffic with the WerBell-Oliver organization's agent network on Abaco . . . *coded* wireless traffic, five-digit groups and all that jazz, the way a proper intelligence station does it. The skeptical Ted Roussos is soon replaced with another U.S. ex-intelligence officer who is not merely enthusiastic, this lean young hard-charger named Charles Boyle, he is, best of all *black*; off he goes to work among the silent, sun-wrinkled fishermen and lobster trappers of Abaco.

And yet who but Mike Oliver is destined to comprehend it, to encompass it, to direct it all? Who but Oliver understands that the campaign for Abaco is not another banana-republic land grab, that this is an ideological, yes, a *moral* movement? Who makes sure that the ideas of free enterprise and unfettered market capitalism find *some* expression in every leaflet, pamphlet or newsletter that the Oliver-WerBell organization produces for distribution on Abaco? AIM DEMANDS CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WHICH WILL ELIMINATE THE POWER OF GOVERNMENT TO ARBITRARILY LIMIT PERSONAL RIGHTS! AIM DEMANDS AN IMMEDIATE END TO GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES. AIM DEMANDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 'LAND TRUST!'

Do the silent, bare-legged men and women of Abaco really demand all this? Why ask? Mike Oliver has it all thought out for them. *Auteur* of a remote-controlled independence scenario, he means to be a *bon patron*—not just the remote manipulator, but in time the efficient and productive manager of the affairs of Abaco. One question remains to be settled here at lunch.

"We are sure that our special personnel will seize and hold control on Abaco when U.D.I. comes," Oliver says, turning directly to Lord Belhaven. "What I'm still worried about is the attitude of the British government. The Pindling regime in Nassau will urge military intervention by the British when they realize that their constabulary is no match for our men. We want to be sure that intervention does not take place. Do you think you can do it?"

Lord Belhaven is an urbane, unflappable veteran of over ten years in the House of Lords. He is an enormous improvement over the first British lobbyist Oliver attempted to retain to represent the interests of the Abaco campaign in London—a Scotsman named Colin Mitchell with a reputation for being mean-tempered and overbearing, a late lieutenant colonel of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who was serving a term in Parliament as a Conservative.

Colin "Mad Mitch" Mitchell was a shock. Brought over to WerBell's Atlanta estate on the usual all-expenses-paid trip to meet some of Abaco's sponsors, Mitchell turned out to be abrasive and relentlessly acquisitive. To help Abaco along, he wanted a large fee . . . a very large fee. His visit was not a success.

Lord Belhaven is different. Keeping an eye on Oliver, calmly but as carefully as the American is watching *him*, he decides not to explain the complexities of influencing Her Majesty's Government. "Oh, absolutely," he tells Oliver with an encouraging smile. "Not to worry. I don't think London really cares what happens in the Bahamas, you know—too many bloody miseries at home. I've already tabled a question on Abaco for next week in the House, and we'll keep up the pressure, I'll promise you that. By the time U.D.I. is due . . . no, I don't think we should worry too much about serious trouble from London."

"Well, U.D.I. is all set: New Year's Day," says Oliver. His face is suddenly different; the intense stare turns into a warm, almost affectionate grin. "Until then, good luck, everybody, and back to work. There's lots to be done."

The men rise in silent agreement. The *Tischgespräch* is over: within twenty-four hours the Oliver-WerBell organization is back in high gear. The path to U.D.I. is lined with a thousand tasks; connections to be coupled, mingled parameters separated, contingencies re-planned, "operational capabilities" to be "actuated."

Robert Anthony Carmichael Hamilton, thirteenth Baron of Belhaven and Stenton, jets back to London overnight, pensively sipping Isle of Islay Scotch in a front-cabin V.I.P. seat. A fortnight or so is spent planning and tabling motions, and on June 10, at half past two of the clock, with the House of Lords reassembled after the Whitsun recess, the Lord Chancellor on the Woolsack, the Bishop of Portsmouth having read the proper prayers, Lord Belhaven rises to address the peers of the realm in a voice of singular gravity:

"My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper. The Question was as follows: To ask Her Majesty's Government what representations they intend to make to the Government of the Bahamas urging them to cease their harassment of the people of Abaco."

Lord Goronwy-Roberts, parliamentary undersecretary of state, stands to respond for the government: "My Lords, the Abaco Islands are an integral part of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, which became an independent sovereign

State on July 10, 1973. It would therefore be appropriate for Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to seek to intervene in the internal affairs of the Bahamas."

Lord Belhaven and Stenton: "My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that reply and appreciate what he says. . . ." And although the people of Abaco have not, on the recent record, demonstrably suffered harassment, and Lord Belhaven knows it, there is a subliminal sense in which it's all quite true. To lure the government into proclaiming and reiterating the principle of nonintervention in the newly independent Bahamas is one of the subtler goals of Lord Belhaven's strategy.

Lord Goronwy-Roberts is densely, gratifyingly energetic about it all: "My Lords, this is the case of an independent country. . . . My Lords, independence is independence." If that dictum hardens into dogma, if only by sheer force of repetition, the Oliver-WerBell organization will have a free hand on Abaco: Washington, for its part, is not likely even to consider intervention. In the meanwhile, Lord Belhaven has once again, as on a number of previous occasions, impressed upon the House of Lords that the plucky, oppressed little Abaco *suffers*.

In Powder Springs, Georgia, where Col. Bayard is sweating five special personnel trainees from Abaco down at the machine-gun range behind the fishpond of Mitch WerBell's farm, it is nine o'clock in the morning. Dusty, strained, popeyed from the jabbing of rapid-fire recoils, the colonel and his boys, whose diurnal "duty tour" begins at six a.m., take a break. In boxy little electric carts of the sort used by golfers, they roll silently across the close-cropped lawn of the WerBell estate, up to the manor house where they draw "midmorning rations"—country ham sandwiches, pecan biscuits, cold milk in fourteen-ounce glasses. Then it's down to the rifle range for three hours of marksmanship instruction with a remarkable training device devised by WerBell himself: a standard 7.62 N.A.T.O. military rifle converted to fire .22 long-rifle cartridges. It's a low-cost, low-noise, practically recoil-free way to teach a man how to hit a Dr Pepper can at seventy-five yards with a military firearm, and it works: the men who make it through this drill are thereafter known, in the special WerBellian nomenclature compounded from the lingo of World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the intelligence establishment's invisible war, as "sniper qualified." They are, too.

Six hundred miles or so southward as the courier plane flies, the Oliver-WerBell organization's Miami headquarters is humming with activity. Vicky Jo Todd, the long-legged, melting-diamond-eyed Miss Nevada of 1970—who, having married one of Mike Oliver's young vice-presidents, is now known nonprofessionally as Mrs. Ralph McMullen—is busy preparing a "packet pickup" for the pilot who makes the biweekly liaison-plane run to Abaco. Into the carefully masking-taped cargo cartons go letters to agents on Abaco; spare parts for a shortwave set on the blink; books (Ayn Rand: *For the New Intellectual*); packages of bumper stickers and windshield stickers for panel trucks apostrophizing the Pindling government's incompetence and corruption, written by Oliver's executive assistant Dave Scholl; and bunches of other goodies best shipped directly and informally since they would only annoy the Bahamas government if spotted passing through the regular customs channels.

Two weeks have passed since that table d'hôte at Duke Zeibert's, and Mike Oliver, having flown more than twenty thousand miles, is back in Washington at the Gramercy Inn (single room, $28.50) talking on the phone to Mitch WerBell, who is also back in Washington but at the grand luxe Madison Hotel (Monroe Suite, $95 daily). Oliver is expecting an important visitor—important because, however well devised and executed the Abaco plan may be, it cannot succeed without investors and colonists—new citizens for an all-new country. This afternoon there is to be a "participant briefing" for just such a prospect. He is Frank Bond of Baltimore, owner of Holiday Spas, a far-flung physical-culture chain. Bond, a spectacularly successful young tycoon known to hold strong libertarian views, has expressed his interest in buying a share of the Abaco project, and I am able to sit in on the briefing while Oliver explains his dreams for the future of Abaco.

Frank Bond arrives late, after eleven at night, accompanied by a short, greying lawyer and an air of coiled impatience. Bond is young, unexpectedly young for a self-made millionaire, slim, dark, dressed in a black suit which looks rich but somehow too *nouveau*. He has already had at least one long talk with Oliver, but the attorney, as he puts it, "knows from nothing" about Abaco. It's just as well, for assembled to greet the two potential participants there are Col. Bayard, Mitch WerBell and of course Oliver—a synergized trio wound up to deliver a socko briefing.

The lawyer begins with the usual question about Abaco as a potential tax shelter, and Oliver fields it with practiced ease.

"Keep in mind what we are building on Abaco is not a tax-shelter nation," he says. "It's a tax-free nation. Have you read any of our planning papers? Have you seen my book? The constitution? No? Well, *maybe* Frank told you"—the lawyer shakes his head dubiously. "Anyhow, basically what we are structuring on Abaco is this . . . maybe I better read it to you from the constitution . . . '*Preamble: We, the people of Abaco*' . . . and so on . . . here '. . . *that the only true and proper function of government is to protect its citizens from force and fraud, and that this government is limited to that function only.*' And here on the next page: '*Government is limited to protection against force and fraud, and may not impose any social or economic structure upon any persons or entities within its jurisdiction . . .*' because, you see, we say here further down that government [illegible] . . *hired by participants to protect* [illegible] *personal rights against external and internal force and fraud.*'"

"What you mean to say . . ." says the lawyer.

"Well, for instance, you see what we mean if you go to page thirty-eight," Oliver overrides him. "Here Article Twenty-seven says—this is *Fiscal Matters*—that '*No government agency, branch or level shall pass any law, regulation or other restriction with the effect of establishing a legal tender or otherwise requiring the acceptance of any form of money, currency, coin or other medium of exchange; except as provided by voluntary contracts or by mutual consent voluntarily arrived at between persons or entities.*' And here, down at paragraph four: '*The financing of government activities shall be accomplished by voluntary payment of premiums by persons wishing to participate in the services of government. . . .*' Do you follow what this means? First off: the government of the independent Republic of Abaco will have no power to issue money. This is *very* important, more important than . . . Frank knows how important this is. Private financial houses will issue all our money and they'll guarantee it. There will be no Federal Deposit Insurance on Abaco, no government loan guarantees or banking regulations. Nothing like the Federal Reserve. No central bank, as you can see—no central bank, no involvement with the International Monetary Fund."

"The money will be backed in gold," says the lawyer questioningly.

"The money will be *in* gold, at least some of it," says Oliver. "Some of us who were the first participants have drawn up the charter for a bank, and we will issue the 'rand,' the basic unit containing .23 troy ounces of gold—a handy medium-sized coin worth about fifty dollars at present rates. Named after Ayn Rand, you understand, not after the South African rand. There'll be quarters and perhaps quintals, the quintal worth just about ten dollars. Then of course we'll have to have paper money, backed either in gold or other stable assets. All fully gold-convertible—you want your wages in gold, you just pay the issuer a visit."

"And if an issuer defaults . . ." says the lawyer softly.

"They won't default," says Oliver. "The assets will have to be there, covering the value of the issue, and if there's any funny business, it's long jail terms for everybody and his accountant—that would be first-degree fraud. But of course self-regulation will probably suggest that issuers carry bankruptcy insurance for triple safety—*privately* written insurance, mind you."

"And public services—I'm thinking of the police, the judges, garbage collection, you know what I mean—those will be financed by whom?" asks the lawyer.

"They'll be financed by voluntary premiums," says Oliver. "Voluntary in the sense that you go shopping voluntarily—nobody rattles handcuffs at you to make you buy groceries, but you buy some just the same, week after week.

3.33

Those who pay the yearly premiums will be known as 'participants' and they'll be entitled to the service the government provides; those who don't, won't be. Whatever services private business can provide competitively will be left to private enterprise."

"Like the police?" the lawyer smiles. "There's a cute deal—if you don't pay your premiums, they can't arrest you for overtime parking."

"Well, no. Not really," says Oliver. "They can't arrest you for overtime parking *anyhow*, because this government won't have the right to tell you how long you should stop your car at the curb—why should it? But if you're guilty of force or fraud, you'll be arrested whether you are a paid-up participant or not. What a nonparticipant won't have will be the right to conduct civil litigation, to set up a surrogate trust, to collect damages on a tort, and so forth."

"What sort of a government will it be, anyhow?" asks Bond. "I mean as an organization. How will it be run?"

"Well, in some ways it'll run just like the government here," says Oliver. "Just like the U.S. Government. The constitution calls for a bicameral legislature. An assembly elected on a proportional basis and a senate. And there, you see, the similarity stops. Abaco will have no foreign service like the State Department, only trade representatives in countries where business demands it. It will have no public school system. Beyond the fourth grade, there'll be only private schools, privately maintained."

"No school system," says the lawyer. "Why not?"

"Because what is called the school system in the United States is really an indoctrination system," says Oliver. "It's a system for bureaucrats to brainwash young people in favor of collectivism and statism."

"And socialism," says Bond approvingly.

"Yes. In the high schools and colleges, in favor of outright socialism," says Oliver. "This is not to say Abaco won't have an educational system of its own kind, but every school will have to be financed privately, by the families of the students or private benefactors. It will mean, here and there, some hardship, some long-term borrowing, maybe —and *that* will be made feasible at very low interest, I expect—but collectively it will mean the survival of freedom in its one essential provenance—in the minds of the next generation. Because, you see," Oliver holds his bony finger before his face to silence all interruptions, "Abaco is not going to be another banana republic. That's not the point; I wouldn't spend an hour's time just to make some money that way. The point is that the Republic of Abaco will be, first of all, a moral experiment, a place where we'll try to keep individual freedom alive even if it doesn't survive in America."

"But won't you need an army?" says Bond doubtfully.

"Oh, sure, Abaco will have its armed forces," says Oliver. "We will call them peace-keeping forces, because that is what they will be. Abaco will never make war on another land. All voluntary, of course. Here soldiers start out all wrong. They are made to swear a mortal oath and stand to attention for the national anthem. Abaco won't have a national anthem, because the government of Abaco will have no suprapersonal, para-legal, special powers. It will function only as the hired servant of the participants who pay for it. The Abaco peace-keeping volunteers won't be made to salute any metaphysical emblems, or take theistic pledges the government has no right to invoke; they will sign a two-year or five-year or any-year contract, as the conditions may demand, just like any hired craftsmen. I suspect it will be a damn good little force."

"Well," says the lawyer, who has been glancing at his watch with rude frequency. "Well, Frank, if you think. . . ."

"Yes," says Bond, rising too, "we gotta go. Call you in the morning, Mike, and we'll talk."

"One more question," says the lawyer. "You got the natives, five, ten thousand natives. . . ."

"Seven thousand," says Mitch WerBell, "maybe eight or nine at the most, if some who are working in the hotels in Nassau return after independence."

"Right, say eight thousand natives," says the lawyer. "How can you be sure they'll buy all this—vote for your constitution and all that? After all, the place *belongs* to the natives."

"Well, we're training quite a few natives with leadership potential," says WerBell. "Political indoctrination, and so on. They'll organize a following, maybe half the population, that'll go along with us, vote the way they're supposed to. And Bob here, Colonel Bayard, he's also training some natives with good potential, except he's training *his* boys how to shoot at a moving target without missing. And we figure the natives who won't buy what we tell 'em—they'll listen to Bob Bayard's boys."

"Fine, call you tomorrow, nice to've metcha, bye. . . ." And Frank Bond and his counsel are gone. Mike Oliver is depressed. "God almighty, I talk too much. . . . What do you think, Mitch?" For an instant, he is as drained as an actor after the performance. "Shoot, Mike, you were *great*. . . ." WerBell is gung-ho as ever, but Oliver is already peeling off his shirt. "I'm going to bed. G'night everybody."

But at breakfast it's a different story. "Frank called before eight this morning—he's really turned on," says Oliver. "He's putting up ten thousand cash as a sort of foothold on Abaco, he said, and next week we'll talk serious money. He *loves* the project."

"As long as it looks like a good deal," WerBell growls in a hung over voice.

"That's what his lawyer said," Mike says happily. "And I told them, me, as long as you care for freedom, because *that's* the big point. And you know what Frank said? He said, 'Mike, you are *absolutely* right.'" ⊞

THE WINNING OF CHER

(Continued from page 85) Records; Cher was with Sonny. They were already separated but Geffen didn't know this; he promptly fell in love. In September of 1973, the only date in his life that he remembers with any accuracy, Geffen, Bob Dylan and Robbie Robertson of The Band went to see Neil Young's show at Geffen's club, the Roxy. A friend told him Cher was alone and wanted to join them. "Cher said, 'Let's get together for dinner,' and we were never apart since," says Geffen with a small preen in his voice. After the taping of the last Sonny and Cher show, David and Cher surfaced together at the Grammy Awards. That produced the famous butterfly-emergent picture of Cher, bare midriffed, in white with a butterfly over one ear and another in her cleavage, and a shaved-for-the-occasion Geffen, in his sharpie tux, on her arm. It was Cher who talked him into the Corniche Rolls with the wire wheels. Cher who threw out all his shirts and dressed him. And now because of Cher and their mutual psychiatrist, Dr. Martin Grotjahn, he can go into this boutique on the Strip and have the two $345 suede jackets fitted and ask if they have a third so he will have *one in every possible color.*

While Cher brought him to this California ostentation and flat-out American exuberance, Ahmet Ertegun influenced Geffen in another way. Ahmet was so composed in his power, so relaxed at handling the totally wrecked rock stars who'd come crashing off planes, fall into his arms, rip the shirt off his dignified back and expect to be taken home for dinner. Even now with Ahmet, at a time when they still expect to be cochairmen of the Atlantic/Asylum board, Geffen gets that Brooklyn-boy look on his face as though he is going to ask, "Is this an ashtray?" before dumping his cigarette. His whole New York world of the high-up Pierre suite and the chauffeured car that is waiting, motor running, for Mr. Geffen when he emerges from Ahmet's town house at two a.m. is blown, and he is back to the time when he had gone to Ahmet in 1968. It was the second or third time they'd met, and Geffen, then managing Laura Nyro and supporting them both, was broke and trying to sell Ahmet an artist. Ahmet asked what it would take to keep Geffen going for a year. Geffen said fifty thousand dollars, naming the figure he had been making when he ran the Ashley Famous music department, the figure that represented wealth to him when he was a busboy in the Catskills and being rich meant having a Cadillac and living on Ocean Parkway. "If you earned fifty thousand dollars a year, that was the most any man could possibly ask for, and that was my goal." Ertegun took out his checkbook and wrote Geffen a personal check. He never allowed Geffen to pay it back. That was style. "He bought me for life," Geffen says. "Every artist I ever came up with after that I gave to Ahmet. I signed Crosby

3 33

25 January 1975

SUBJECT: Press Reports of Ex-CIA Employees Involvement with Persons under Congressional Investigation

1. Press reports of Sentator Lowell P. Weicker's investigation of CIA's involvement with other government agencies surfaced the contact of Lucien Conein of DEA, a former employee, with an electronic manufacturer named Michael Morrisey. The same reports have also tied Morrisey with a Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III, who, according to our files, has claimed United States Government and CIA connections in the past. According to DEA, WerBell recently invoked the Fifth Amendment when appearing before Senator Jackson's Subcommittee investigating DEA on whether or not he supplied arms to Robert Vesco. Also, while not mentioned in the press, at least one retired CIA staffer and possibly two others may have been involved with Conein and Morrisey. The ex-staffer is John P. Muldoon, a friend of Conein's, who currently is a private security specialist who has dealt with Morrisey in the purchase of audio sweeping devices for his business. Muldoon was retained by WerBell during first half of 1974. The other two, Walter J. Mackem, an acquaintance of Conein's, and a Theodore J. Roussos, both of whom were in contact with WerBell for possible employment in a scheme to promote the secession of the Bahamian Island of Abaco, an enterprise publicized in February 1975 issue of Esquire by Andrew St. George.

2. We have no information in our files on the B. R. Fox Company or the Fox Company principals mentioned in the press accounts. We were, however, told by DEA that Mr. Sandy Smith, Time magazine reporter, was working on a story to the effect that the late Bernard Spindel, former owner of the Fox Company, was previously involved in "wire tapping for the Teamsters Union and providing explosive devices for organized crime." Although Mr. Smith did not allege that either CIA or DEA were associated with the Fox Company or Spindel, our DEA source said that Mr. Smith had no intention of dropping the story and we can expect further press coverage.

3. In conclusion, there has been no CIA involvement with the B. R. Fox Company or with Michael Morrisey. Moreover, Mr. WerBell's claims of CIA affiliation or support over the years are simply not true.

3.32

25 January 1975

SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston WerBell III (201-259910)

1. Mitchell Livingston WerBell, who appeared in recent press reports has for over a period of ten years been claiming to be a representative of the United States Government and of CIA. The facts do not support this contention.

2. CIA first learned of WerBell in July of 1959 when he contacted General Cabel indicating knowledge of Cuban and Dominican affairs. Mr. Thomas J. Flores of LA Division was put in contact with WerBell and considered using him as an FI asset. A POA was granted on 7 July 1959 for this purpose. By October 1959 it was apparent that he did not have the access to information as hoped and he apparently looked upon his association with CIA as a means of furthering his various business schemes. All contact was then severed.

3. From that time until the present Mr. WerBell has cropped up in a number of nefarious activities whereby he inferred he had CIA connections or support. He was reported to have been involved in arms sales to Nicaragua and Guatemala, in efforts to gain recognition by certain South American countries of the Cuban Government in Exile, and in an abortive scheme to invade the Republic of Haiti in 1966. He also turned up in Thailand where he contacted the COS purporting to be a counter-insurgency expert. In 1971 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense queried the Agency re Mr. WerBell, asking if WerBell had a contractual agreement or association with the Agency, as Werbell was awaiting a hearing before a Department of Defense Examiner related to his participation in the aboritve Haiti invasion. The Office of the General Counsel placed the matter in perspective. Subsequently, he contacted the Agency to request intercession on his behalf to have his security clearance reinstated which DoD revoked because of his Haitian caper. He was told this could not be done. In 1971 he again appeared in Thailand attempting to sell arms. In 1973 he was under investigation by U.S. Treasury Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and by the United States Customs Service for activities relating to possible mercenary activities in Abaco Island, Bahamas. In this connection WerBell contacted three ex-CIA employees, John P. Muldoon, Walter J. Mackem and Theodore Roussos in a scheme to involve them in the activities of an organization called the Friends of Abaco (FOA) which is advocating the secession of the island from the Commonwealth of Bahamas.

3.32

All three inviduals reported their involvement with the WerBell group and had sought guidance from the Agency. In May and June they were advised to break all ties with WerBell. On 27 June 1974 the FBI was formally apprised of WerBell's overtures for their collaboration in the effort to bring Abaco's secession. In September 1974 WerBell reportedly went to Greece to sell arms to the Greek Government. Most recently WerBell reportedly appeared before Senator Jackson's Sub-Committee investigating DEA and had taken the Fifth Amendment on the question of whether or not he had supplied arms to Robert Vesco.

14-00000

STATE DEPT. CABLE NASSAU 179
DATED 30 JAN '75
Subject: LOCAL REACTION TO ESQUIRE MAGAZINE ARTICLE ON ABACO

FBI cable dated 24 JAN '75

subject: Aladdin M. AL-TAYYAR
Internal Security - IRAQ

DEA Was Offered Explosive Devices

By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

An Alexandria "electronics" firm attempted to sell an official of the Drug Enforcement Administration "assassination devices" designed to carry explosives in such unlikely places as a telephone handset, a cigarette pack or a flashlight.

The official, Lucien Conein, had gone to the firm last spring to inspect electronic surveillance equipment that DEA wanted to purchase, according to an agency spokesman, Robert H. Feldkamp. Conein and a second DEA official, Cyril Frank, also observed a demonstration of the explosive equipment but did not buy any of it, according to Feldkamp.

A catalogue of equipment apparently sold by the company, B. R. Fox, describes several devices designed to carry explosives triggered by time, movement, mechanical pressures, light, or audio mechanisms.

The catalogue states, "The devices have been designed and manufactured for sale to authorized agencies of the United States government, specifically intended for application outside of this country . . . The information contained herein is classified by the manufacturer for U.S. government use only. The handling and storage of this material should be done so mindful of its sensitive nature."

Feldkamp said that Conein and Frank observed a demonstration of "several" devices although Feldkamp said he did not know which devices they saw. Conein, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, is acting chief of special operations and field support for the DEA's office of intelligence. Feldkamp said that Conein's office is the operational arm of the intelligence division and devises ways to penetrate illegal drug operations.

Conein was not available for comment. Feldkamp said that Frank "said emphatically that the demonstration was not requested."

Conein's reaction to the demonstration, Feldkamp said, was, "'Very interesting. However, that's not why I'm here.'" Asked why the demonstration was made by the salesman, whom Feldkamp said he could not identify, Feldkamp replied, "Like any good salesman, the guy was trying to make a sale. He was told DEA has not, will not, does not purchase that type of equipment."

The DEA did buy "a hundred bucks worth" of electronics surveillance equipment, which Feldkamp said is "frequently used (by the DEA) under court order."

Asked why Conein watched the demonstration, Feldkamp said, "You'd probably do the same thing out of curiosity or whatever."

Conein, a longtime employee of the CIA, left the agency in 1968 and joined the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, DEA's predecessor, as a consultant in June, 1972, according to Feldkamp. According to testimony during the Senate Watergate committee hearings, Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. attempted to use Conein as part of an effort to discredit Daniel Ellsberg publicly.

According to Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.), who released information about the incident, Conein speculated that the Fox firm may have thought that Conein was still at the CIA.

Conein apparently did not report the demonstration of the equipment to anyone at the DEA. Weicker said he told DEA Administrator John R. Bartels about the matter on Monday and Bartels "was as shocked and aghast as most people would be." Weicker commented, "Things have come to a pretty sorry pass when people start peddling this stuff to law enforcement agencies and nobody thinks it strange. Bugging equipment can be used legally. There's no way this equipment can be used legally."

Feldkamp said "it wouldn't be within the purview of DEA as a narcotics agency" to review the legality of the explosive equipment.

A cover memo dated June 10, 1974, written on B.R. Fox stationery by a person Weicker identified as Mike Morrissey to Mitchell WerBell III, a Georgia armaments dealer, states that equipment in an accompanying catalogue of explosive equipment "was demonstrated to Lou in this office about three weeks ago . . . I bring this to your attention in case you have not yet seen the material. It is a listing of equipment that is available and planned for Lou up here."

WerBell, who said he made and sold silent automatic weapons to foreign countries with the approval of the federal government, said he had never seen Morrissey's memo because a former employee had intercepted it before WerBell could see it.

WerBell said that he had talked yesterday to both Morrissey and Conein. Conein, WerBell said, told him the equipment had never actually been made. "Lou's not in the assassination business and neither am I," WerBell said.

Morrissey could not be reached for comment.

Barbara Fox Spindel, whose home address is listed as the address for B.R. Fox Laboratories, said in a telephone interview last night that she had served as president of the company, founded by her late husband, but that she had disassociated herself from it last March because she and Morrissey could not get along. She said Morrissey withheld information from her about the firm's business.

Mrs. Spindel said that B. R. Fox is no longer functioning, that she knew nothing about the explosive devices and that she had never seen the catalogue [illegible] them. [illegible] Mrs. Spindel [illegible] "We never had any surveillance devices. That's [illegible]"

Mrs. Spindel said she has received several calls [illegible] "I don't even know what you people are talking about. That's the worst part of all this," she said.



LANDSLIDE IN CANADA—This is all the remains of a street in Asbestos, a mining

Cuba Seeking Trade For 'CIA Agent'

United Press International

Cuba is willing to release an alleged CIA agent in exchange for a woman who has been in an American jail for 20 years after taking part in a shooting spree by Puerto Rican nationalists in Congress, officials said yesterday.

So far, the officials said, there is no indication as to how the administration will respond to the offer by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Castro's offer was interpreted as a deliberate effort to ingratiate himself with Puerto Rican nationalists who are opposed to continued U.S. possession of the island.

The woman, Lolita Lebron, 55, was one of four Puerto Rican nationalists who fired pistols at random from a [illegible] in the House in [illegible].

[illegible] was convicted of espionage and was given a [illegible] prison sentence.

3.21

Washington Post
23 January 1975.

IA Agent Contacted on Alexandria Firm's Assassination Equipment

masson
Staff Writer

ug official
er Central
ency opera-
d of Water-gate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. has been mentioned in connection with an attempt by an Alexandria firm to sell assassination equipment to the U.S. government.

Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr., R-Conn., disclosed today that Lucian Conein, director of special projects for the Drug Enforcement Administration, viewed the equipment manufactured by the now-defunct Alexandria electronics firm. But Conein denies he ever even considered buying any of the equipment.

Weicker released a catalogue of the devices which included such things as exploding cigarette packages and electronic booby traps for telephone receivers. The equipment was manufactured by the B. R. Fox Laboratories, which Weicker said went out of business three weeks ago.

THE SENATOR, a former member of the special Senate Watergate committee, charged that the existence of the catalogue and Conein's involvement in the incident raise serious new questions about the operations of federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

He also questioned a statement by Conein that the DEA planned to purchase only electronic eavesdropping devices from Fox.

"I told the senator that," Conein said. "Yeah, I saw this (assassination) stuff. So what? I've seen a lot of that kind of thing in my day."

Conein was a long-time CIA operative before moving to the DEA with the assistance of Egil Krogh, former head of the White House plumbers for whom Hunt worked.

In July 1971, Conein had a three-way telephone conversation with Hunt and Charles W. Colson, former White House aide who pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice charges in the trial of David Wilsberg. A transcript of the conversation is contained in evidence amassed during the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry.

The conversation centered on activities in Saigon prior to the coup that ousted former South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Conein was a high-ranking CIA operative in Saigon at the time of the 1963 coup.

HUNT LATER used some of the information obtained from Conein as background for fabricating State Department cables that implicated the late President John F. Kennedy in Diem's assassination. Hunt was working for the Nixon White House at the time.

The catalogue released by Weicker included a memorandum to Mitchel Werbell III identified by Weicker as a Georgia arms manufacturer and apparent soldier of fortune. The memo was written by Michael Morrissey, co-owner of the Fox Laboratories, according to Weicker.

In the memo, Morrissey states that the catalogue "was put together only after we started working together with Lou Conein." He later states that "some of this equipment was demonstrated to Lou in this (Alexandria) office about three weeks ago." The memo was dated June 10, 1974.

The memo said the catalogue contained a "listing of equipment that is available and planned for Lou up here (Washington)."

WEICKER SAID the memorandum itself raised doubts about Conein's statement that he had not considered purchasing any of the assassination devices. And he said it stirred questions about whether Conein still was working with the CIA despite his retirement from that agency in 1971.

The catalogue lists its "astro" equipment this way:

"The devices have been designed and manufactured for sale to authorized agencies of the United States government, specifically intended for application outside of this country.

"The items offered are either concealed into everyday-type objects or packaged simply as 'black box' pieces of equipment with no labels or identification on the outside other than the necessary actuator switches and sensors. Upon request, this equipment can be delivered in a 'sterile' condition for foreign use," the brochure continues.

"ALL EQUIPMENT in our 'astro' category is manufactured to the highest standards in terms of reliability, dependability, lifetime, and performance under most weather variations," the catalogue states.

It then states: "The information contained herein is classified by the manufacturer for U.S. government use only."

SLOPPY REPORTER!

SHOULD BE DANIEL ELLSBERG

THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 1975

U.S. Aide Was Briefed on Assassination Techniques

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 22—A top official of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration said today that he had been briefed on what have been described as electronic assassination techniques by a private manufacturer of wiretapping and bugging equipment.

The official, Lieut. Col. Lucien Conein, acting director of the special operations and field support section of D.E.A.'s international intelligence division, said that he received the briefing in May, 1974, from representatives of the now defunct B. R. Fox Company.

Colonel Conein said he had not asked for the briefing and had no interest in the equipment.

Several law enforcement officials and Senate investigators said that this was the first time they had seen evidence that a domestic Federal agency would even look at asssssination equipment.

Served in Saigon

According to the Pentagon papers on United States involvement in the Indochina war, Colonel Conein was a senior operative of the Central Intelligence Agency in Saigon in 1963 and served as liaison between the United States Government and forces that deposed President Ngo Dinh Diem'

Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Republican of Connecticut, who has een conducting an investigation of C.I.A. involvement with other overnment agencies, said that be has a copy of the catalogue of nstruments described to Colonel Conein.

When questioned by a reporter, Mr. Weicker described the devices as "used for assassination, pure and simple."

"There is no place in this country for this sort of thing," he added.

Mr. Weicker said that he had brought the catalogue to the attention of John Bartels, administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and that he had interviewed Colonel Conein and the colonel's deputy, Searl Frank. He said that the officials had assured him that the agency had not purchased any of the devices.

Senator Asks Question

The Senator said that he had been told that the agency's men had done nothing to encourage the manufacturer to think that he might make a sale to their agency.

"My question was, why in the hell didn't they do something to discourage him," Mr. Weicker said.

One of two men who briefed Morrissey and an unidentified New York man on behalf of the Fox Company, which had offices in Alexandria, Va., and New York City. Mr. Morrissey said that he had presented details on the company's electronic surveillance equipment and what the catalogue calls "astro equipment."

Senator Weicker has obtained a memo that he said was from the files of the B. R. Fox Company, written to an official of a Georgia arms manufacturer, that says:

"Enclosed is a catalog which was put together only after we started working together with Lou Conein. I wrote out this line of 'astro' equipment with you and Lou in mind, and because of the nature of the devices, it is not being given to anyone else . . . Some of this equipment was demonstrated to Lou in this office about 3 weeks ago."

Memo Is Signed 'Mike'

The memo was dated June 10, 1974, and was signed 'Mike."

It is part of the evidence that has caused Mr. Weicker to question whether the relationship between Colonel Conein and the assassination equipment manufacturer was a casual one.

When asked by a reporter about the memorandum, Colonel Conein said that he was shown it during an interview with Senator Weicker.

"I told him I had no idea the context in which it was written, and hat I had not known Mr. Morrissey [before the sales demonstration]. I said if I was him [Senator Weicker], I would turn the memorandum over to the F.B.I. and let them investigate. I told him I would be glad to take a polygraph on the matter."

Colonel Conein said that he had listened to a detailed presentation on the booby-trap, assassination devices, but he did not "discourage" the manufacturer because he presumed that as a licensed electronics company it had the authority to produce the explosive devices.

Colonel Conein told Senator Weicker, as he had a reporter, that despite the presentation of the assassination gear, he had selected B. R. Fox out of several companies to provide bugging equipment. To make this purchase, Colonel Conein ignored the presentations of several better-known concerns.

Mr. Bartels, the agency administrator, said that he was conducting an internal inquiry into the transaction.

Mr. Morrissey identified a copy of the catalogue obtained by The New York Times as a photostat of one that he typed in the spring of 1974. The informal catalogue said that the

metal rectangular modules. One screw at each end secures top on unit. Top is removed to pack inside with explosive."

Mr. Morrissey said that he had prepared three copies of the catalogue, and that two copies were in the hands of Federal officials. He declined to identify the two officials or the Government agency they were connected with.

Mr. Morrissey also declined to identify the person who had introduced him to Colonel Conein. The colonel said that he could recall how he had learned of the Fox concern but that its name might have come from an acquaintance in Washington.

Mr. Morrissey, who said that he had a degree as an electronics engineer, said that he designed the equipment in early 1974 as an outgrowth of his work in the field of wiretaps and room bugs.

Mr. Morrissey, who also described himself as a lawyer, said that ibmebeedtmmhevmf said that he believed the equipment he designed, which he said was an electronic triggering device, was legal as long as it was not armed with an explosive. He said that it had nonlethal applications to trigger burglar alarms and other "anti-intrusion" equipment.

He said that he would consider selling such devices only to the Federal Government. He added, however, that he does sell electronic surveillance equipment to local police.

Mr. Morrissey said that the Fox Company was dissolved in November, 1974, as a result of maangement differences. He saidw that he had shared management and control of the company with Mrs. Barbara Spindel. The name Fox was Mrs. Spindel's maiden name, Mr. Morrisey said. He said that he continued to sell electronic surveillance equipment as an individual.

Mrs. Spindel confirmed that the company was no longer in existence and said that she was unaware Mr. Morrissey had circulated a catalogue for such devices. Her husband, the late Bernard Spindel, who formed the B. R. Fox Company, was often quoted as a wiretap expert.

Several law enforcement officials and electronic experts who were interviewed indicated that the devices as described in the catalogue appeared usable only for assassinations or for the booby-trapping of premises.

One veteran industrial security expert said that he saw no domestic market for the devices with private companies. "Even on military installations or high security Government agencies, these types of booby-traps would be inappropriate, you'd never know who you might injure," this source said.

Colonel Concin said that he became a consultant to the Bureal of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in 1972 and became a full-time official of D.E.A. in December, 1973. His nace came up in Watergate committee testimony wher it was disclosed that one of the Watergate burglars, E. Howard Hunt Jr., had met with Colonel Conein. Mr. Hunt at the time was gathering information to prepare bogus cables that implicated President Kennedy in President iDem's assassination in 1963.

[illegible] audio equipment and going over the devices described by Senator Weicker in detail.

Colonel Conein, asked about the briefing, said that he had not solicited the briefing on assassination aspects of Fox's equipment, and "I wouldn't touch that stuff with a 10-foot pole."

He continued: "That stuff is only good in a war, and who's got a war? It was very sophisticated stuff. They had a telephone that could be triggered by remote control. If the wrong person picked up the phone, you'd blow him up."

Colonel Conein said that he had found the material "fascinating" but that he had said nothing to encourage the idea that the agency would purchase such equipment. He said that he had purchased about $500 worth of audio equipment from the B. R. Fox Company, which he said could be used for bugging.

The equipment he bought, he said, cannot be used in the United States without a court order but is for use in D.E.A.'s foreign operations. He said, however, that the gear had not been used, and "I still have it in my safe."

The briefing for Colonel Conein was conducted by Mr.

[illegible] experiment. The following are excerpts on each item available:

¶"Telephone handset insert. Miniature activator with time delay . . . use inside telephone handset. Automatic charge fired at—SEC following lifting of instrument handpiece.

¶"Cigarette pack — antidisturbance explosive. Electronics and explosive module packed inside cigarette pack. When the pack is lifted or moved in any manner, the explosive is set off."

¶"Modified flashlight . . . antidisturbance unit. Standard Everyready 2D cell flashlight has antidisturbance electronics concealed inside where batteries have been removed. Remainder of the battery space is packed with explosive."

¶"Remote-controlled, light-activated sensor. Unit delivers a predetermined charge across its output terminals, when activated from a remote location according to its pre-set code. Use with explosive for firing upon the occurrence of certain conditions relating to light intensity."

¶"Booby-trapped, M-16 explosive clip. Use: A mechanically activated electronic charge circuit is built into a common military item. Upon removal of the single round in the magazine, either by firing or by hand removal, the explosive concealed in the magazine is detonated."

¶"Fragmentation ball — antidisturbance unit. Unit is similar in its operation as the anti-disturbance flashlight, BRF model FD-2. The exception is in the type of explosive charge . . ."

¶"Explosive black box modules. . . . Flat black finish on

14-00000

THE NEW YORK TIMES
THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 1975

U.S. Aide Was Briefed on Assassination Techniques

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 22—A top official of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration said today that he had been briefed on what have been described as electronic assassination techniques by a private manufacturer of wiretapping and bugging equipment.

The official, Lieut. Col. Lucien Conein, acting director of the special operations and field support section of D.E.A.'s international intelligence division, said that he received the briefing in May, 1974, from representatives of the now defunct B. R. Fox Company.

Colonel Conein said he had not asked for the briefing and had no interest in the equipment.

Several law enforcement officials and Senate investigators said that this was the first time they had seen evidence that a domestic Federal agency would even look at assassination equipment.

Served in Saigon

According to the Pentagon papers on United States involvement in the Indochina war, Colonel Concein was a senior operative of the Central Intelligence Agency in Saigon in 1963 and served as liaison between the United States Government and forces that deposed President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Republican of Connecticut, who has een conducting an investigation of C.I.A. involvement with other overnment agencies, said that he has a copy of the catalogue of instruments described to Colonel Concein.

When questioned by a reporter, Mr. Weicker described the devices as "used for assassination, pure and simple."

"There is no place in this country for this sort of thing," he added.

Mr. Weicker said that he had brought the catalogue to the attention of John Bartels, administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and that he had interviewed Colonel Concein and the colonel's deputy, Searl Frank. He said that the officials had assured him that the agency had not purchased any of the devices.

Senator Asks Question

The Senator said that he had been told that the agency's men had done nothing to encourage the manufacturer to think that he might make a sale to their agency.

"My question was, why in the hell didn't they do something to discourage him," Mr. Weicker said.

One of two men who briefed Col. Concein, Michael Morrissey, told a reporter that he had met with him for three hours, showing him audio equipment and going over the devices described by Senator Weicker in detail.

Colonel Conein, asked about the briefing, said that he had not solicited the briefing on assassination aspects of Fox's equipment, and "I wouldn't touch that stuff with a 10-foot pole."

He continued: "That stuff is only good in a war, and who's got a war? It was very sophisticated stuff. They had a telephone that could be triggered by remote control. If the wrong person picked up the phone, you'd blow him up."

Colonel Concein said that he had found the material "fascinating" but that he had said nothing to encourage the idea that the agency would purchase such equipment. He said that he had purchased about $500 worth of audio equipment from the B. R. Fox Company, which he said could be used for bugging.

The equipment he bought, he said, cannot be used in the United States without a court order but is for use in D.E.A.'s foreign operations. He said, however, that the gear had not been used, and "I still have it in my safe."

The briefing for Colonel Conein was conducted by Mr. Morrissey and an unidentified New York man on behalf of the Fox Company, which had offices in Alexandria, Va., and New York City. Mr. Morrissey said that he had presented details on the company's electronic surveillance equipment and what the catalogue calls "astro equipment."

Senator Welcker has obtained a memo that he said was from the files of the B. R. Fox Company, written to an official of a Georgia arms manufacturer, that says:

"Enclosed is a catalog which was put together only after we started working together with Lou Conein. I wrote out this line of 'astro' equipment with you and Lou in mind, and because of the nature of the devices, it is not being given to anyone else . . . Some of this equipment was demonstrated to Lou in this office about 3 weeks ago."

Memo Is Signed 'Mike'

The memo was dated June 10, 1974, and was signed "Mike."

It is part of the evidence that has caused Mr. Weicker to question whether the relationship between Colonel Conein and the assassination equipment manufacturer was a casual one.

When asked by a reporter about the memorandum, Colonel Conein said that he was shown it during an interview with Senator Weicker.

"I told him I had no idea the context in which it was written, and hat I had not known Mr. Morrissey [before the sales demonstration]. I said if I was him [Senator Weicker], I would turn the memorandum over to the F.B.I. and let them investigate. I told him I would be glad to take a polygraph on the matter."

Colonel Conein said that he had listened to a detailed presentation on the booby-trap, assassination devices, but he did not "discourage" the manufacturer because he presumed that as a licensed electronics company it had the authority to produce the explosive devices.

Colonel Conein told Senator Weicker, as he had a reporter, that despite the presentation of the assassination gear, he had selected B. R. Fox out of several companies to provide bugging equipment. To make this purchase, Colonel Conein ignored the presentations of several better-known concerns.

Mr. Bartels, the agency administrator, said that he was conducting an internal inquiry into the transaction.

Mr. Morrissey identified a copy of the catalogue obtained by The New York Times as a photostat of one that he typed in the spring of 1974. The informal catalogue said that the material could not be delivered for two weeks after order and was for sale only to the United States Government. The following are excerpts on each item available:

¶"Telephone handset insert. Miniature activator with time delay . . . use inside telephone handset. Automatic charge fired at—SEC following lifting of instrument handpiece.

¶"Cigarette pack — antidisturbance explosive. Electronics and explosive module packed inside cigarette pack. When the pack is lifted or moved in any manner, the explosive is set off."

¶"Modified flashlight". . . antidisturbance unit. Standard Everyready 2D cell flashlight has antidisturbance electronics concealed inside where batteries have been removed. Remainder of the battery space is packed with explosive."

¶"Remote-controlled, light-activated sensor, Unit delivers a predetermined charge across its output terminals, when activated from a remote location according to its pre-set code. Use with explosive for firing upon the occurrence of certain conditions relating to light intensity."

¶"Booby-trapped, M-16 explosive clip. Use: A mechanically activated electronic charge circuit is built into a common military item. Upon removal of the single round in the magazine, either by firing or by hand removal, the explosive concealed in the magazine is detonated."

¶"Fragmentation ball — antidisturbance unit. Unit is similar in its operation as the anti-disturbance flashlight, BRF model FD-2. The exception is in the type of explosive charge . . ."

¶"Explosive black box modules. . . . Flat black finish on

3.26

FBI cable dated 16 JAN '75
Subject: Aladdin N. AL-TAYYAR
INTERNAL SECURITY - IRAQ

FBI document dated 31
DEC 1966, Bureau File
2-156, Re: Rolando Arcadio
Masferrer Rojas, Internal
Security - Haiti - Cuba;
Neutrality Matters
(From Miami)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/LA/CAR	17	SP
2	DC/LA/CAR	17 OCT 1974	
3	[redacted]		
4	C/LA/CA (info)	17 OCT	
5	DC/LA (info)		
6	C/LA/CAR CAR	6 NOV 1974	

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Mike Absher is an old friend of Ted Roussos and originally introduced Roussos to Jim McTighe and Al Ramos in June. Absher is considering picking up ROUSSOS on contract for the EUR/Greek Desk.

Ruth

File: Wirkellis 201

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
3,22	

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

30 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Theodore Roussos on 31 August 1974

1. During subject meeting Mr. Roussos told me that Mr. Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III called him from Atlanta on 29 August and again on 30 August. Werbell told Roussos that he was leaving for Athens on Saturday, 31 August in order to try to sell arms to the Greek government. Werbell wanted Roussos to be his advisor in this venture and to go to Athens. Werbell indicated that the total deal could reach $5,000,000. Roussos told Werbell that he would check with his "friends" (the Agency) before giving Werbell an answer. Werbell asked Roussos to see if his "friends" were in favor of such arms deals or not. Roussos had generally explained this call to me on the telephone on 29 August. My reaction on the telephone was negative to Roussos' participation in such a deal, and he had conveyed this negative reply to Werbell by telephone before Roussos and I met personally on 31 August.

2. During our personal meeting, Roussos explained that Werbell intended to pursue arms sales legally and via the required U.S. Government channels. He said that Werbell does have the capabilities to design and produce weapons because of his access to arms factories. I told Roussos that Werbell's business activities were his own concern. I strongly advised against his getting involved in this deal. I explained to him the problems which the U.S. Government was having in Greece and the current wave of anti-Americanism and press attacks against the CIA. If Roussos as a former CIA officer well known in Greece became involved in such a venture, a flap of substantial proportions was likely complete with widespread press play. Roussos understood and agreed not to get involved.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 035682

He said Werbell would probably call him from Athens that weekend and he would give Werbell a final negative reply. Werbell planned to meet with Greek Defense Minister Averoff. Roussos said that if the U.S. wanted to stop this deal that we should contact Averoff directly. From what Werbell said, Roussos believes the arms requested by the Greeks would be for guerrillas and not main force units.

Kenneth M. Absher

K. Michael Absher
AC/E/GC

Distribution:
- 1 - Werbell 201
- 1 - Roussos Personnel File

SECRET

9 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell III

1. Mitchell Livingston Werbell III, who served briefly with the OSS in WWII, has been engaged for the past several years in arms dealings and swash-buckling promotional activities which have brought him to the attention of various government agencies. He has always remained within the law by a fine edge. His latest scheme involves a Movement for the Independence of Abaco, an island to the East of the Bahamas. For this he has obtained apparently substantial financial support from wealthy Americans and from a British Lord.

2. Werbell operates through a number of front businesses in Washington, D.C. and in Marietta, Georgia, where he owns one outfit named Central Information Agency (CIA). In all his dealings, Werbell broadly hints that he has current connections with the Agency. We have just learned that Werbell may be in possession of a one-line note from you, stemming from a chance meeting with you at an OSS alumni dinner, reading something like "good to see you again."

3. Three retired Agency employees are currently employed by Werbell in various capacities. This past spring these employees sought contact with the Agency basically to report their concern over the legality of Werbell's activities. We quickly established that the matter was outside our charter and asked these retirees to report directly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We also furnished the Bureau with all the pertinent information in our files. It is to be noted that somewhere in Werbell's scheme of things there appears the ubiquitous Andrew St. George, who plans to write a story on Abaco for True magazine.

/s/ David A. Phillips

file: 201-259910

David A. Phillips
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: DDCI

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010116

SECRET

Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell III

DDO/C/WH/7/A.Spera:cab/1497 (9 Aug 74)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - Exec. Registry
2 - DDO
1 - ADDO
1 - CI/OPS
1 - OPS/LSN
1 - C/OS/SSD/SB
2 - C/WHD
1 - WH/Security
1 - C/WH/7
1 - WH/7/CAR Chrono
1 - 201-259910
1 - 189-9-1
1 - WH/7 (Friends of Abaco)

SECRET

3.21

FBI document from Atlanta, Ga
dated 9 Aug. 1974
(no FBI file)

Subject: Mitchell- Livingston Werbell
III

SECRET

14 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from John MULDOON

1. Approximately 1655 hours, 13 August 1974, a call was received on C/WH/7's extension, 351-4221 by the Secretary, Miss Annamarie Ruppert. She answered the extension by number and the male voice asked to speak to Mr. McTighe. The secretary asked who was calling and the caller replied "John MULDOON." The secretary then replied that she was sorry but Mr. McTighe couldn't be reached. In response to MULDOON's query, "Why not?" and before the secretary could reply, MULDOON became obstinate and asked who he was speaking to. Miss Ruppert replied "his secretary" and then added that Mr. McTighe was away. When MULDOON asked where he was, the secretary replied that she was not at liberty to discuss that. Then MULDOON asked to speak to McTighe's deputy and was told that there was no one around whom MULDOON could speak to. (C/WH/7 was on leave and AC/WH/7 was in the PMC meeting.) MULDOON apparently didn't believe this reply but then asked when McTighe was expected to return. The secretary replied "within a few weeks" (McTighe is on TDY) and then asked if she could take a message to give to McTighe upon his return. MULDOON became belligerent at this point, apparently thinking he was getting the 'run around' and replied, "just tell him to talk to Jack Anderson" and hung up.

2. AC/WHD was briefed on the above telephone call at 1740 hours, 13 August. He decided no action should be taken on 13 August, but would like to meet with C/WH/7, Al Spera, on 14 August.

3. At 0950 hours, the following met with AC/WHD: Mr. Natzke, Mr. Wedemeyer, Mr. Spera and Miss Lehman. In view of C/WHD's previous decision that no further Agency contact should be made with MULDOON, RUSSOS, or MACKEM it was decided that no one would return MULDOON's call. However, AC/WHD would brief ADDO, Mr. Blee, on the above threat, and WH/7 would ask OPS/LIAISON to telephonically pass to the FBI the fact that MULDOON again contacted the Agency and threatened to go to "Jack Anderson." A copy of this memorandum is being sent to OPS/LIAISON for this purpose.

3.19

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010116

Subject: Telephone Call from John MULDOON

4. At AC/WHD's request, WH/Security rechecked the files on the three former Agency employees to determine whether they were Staff Employees. All three were former Staff Employees. MULDOON retired on medical disability; RUSSOS retired and then was rehired on a contract basis in February 1971 and contract terminated in September 1973; and MACKEM was "separated as excess" in October 1973. This information was passed to AC/WHD to brief ADDO.

Ruth Lehman

Ruth Lehman
Acting Chief, WH/7

DDO/WH/7/R.Lehman:cab/1956

Distribution:
Orig - WH/7 (FOA File)
1 - WH/Security
1 - WH/7/CAR
1 - 189-9-1
1 - OPS/LIAISON

3.19

14-00000

[illegible]

DD/O 74-4099

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Intelligence Division

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III

1. Reference is made to TDFIRDB-315/07634-74, dated 10 August 1974, which reported on the growing concern of the Bahamian Government about renewed secessionist activity in Abaco. In addition to the information in reference, the official Bahamian service, which was the source of the above report, also provided a representative of this Agency on 7 August 1974 the following text of a memorandum it prepared for the Secretary of the Bahamian Cabinet:

> "Please be advised that on 3 August 1974, information has been received from our overseas contacts that Chester ZOCHOWSKI, alias Chester GARY, has recently been in touch with Mitchell L. WERBELL, and has reported that WERBELL is still planning unspecified revolutionary activity in Abaco. It is also reported that he has the support of some former U.S. Government employees and that he is trying to recruit a former Special Services officer to promote revolutionary activity in Abaco (the name of Robert ARMSTRONG has been put forward as a possibility). There is also a suggestion that Robert VESCO might be financing some of the activity."

2. The "overseas contact" described above was identified by the Bahamian Service as the British MI-5 representative in Washington, D.C. The Bahamian Service did not identify the "U.S. Government employees" referred to above.

3/18

CLASSIFIED BY 010116. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

[illegible]

3. The files of this Agency reflect that Robert ARMSTRONG and Chester ZOCHOWSKI are known to your Bureau and their involvement in this matter has been reported in previous correspondence to this Agency. Although the Bahamian Service reported ZOCHOWSKI's alias as "Chester GARY," it is believed that this refers to "Chester GRAY."

4. The above information is being furnished to your Bureau for whatever action and further dissemination you deem appropriate. The information, however, may not be discussed with any foreign nationals, including the British and the Bahamians.

FOR THE ~~DEPUTY~~ DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

/s/ David H. Blee

David H. Blee

CIRA-0444-74

3.18

DDO/WH/7/CAR/A. Ramos & E.Rhoad:cab/7493/1956 (12 August 1974)

Distribution:
  Orig. & 1 - FBI
  2 - OPS/LSN
  1 - CIOPS/WH
  1 - 201-259910
  1 - C/OS/SSD/OSB
  1 - C/WHD
  1 - WH/Security
  1 - WH/7/CAR Chrono
  1 - 189-9-1
  1 - E/BC
  1 - ADDO
  1 - DDO
  1 - DDO/Registry
  1 - WH/7/FOA File

BASED ON: WH/Miami 22274 (In 330060) dated 9 August 1974
OBJ: KIB

3.18

FBI document from San Diego
dated 7 August, 1974
(no FBI file)
Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell,
III

SECRET/SENSITIVE

[illegible] 74-4068

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

9 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Intelligence Division

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 6 August 1974; Subject: "Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III, Internal Security - Abaco; Neutrality Matters - Abaco;" your reference (CI-3) 62-108665.

2. Authorization is granted for your Bureau to disseminate the attachment to Reference (your Bureau's memorandum dated 22 July 1974 at Atlanta, Georgia, concerning Subject) to the Department of State, the Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. We would, however, appreciate your limiting the description of source AT T-1 as being simply another government agency.

3. This Agency is most appreciative of your Bureau's handling of this sensitive matter and particularly the opportunity afforded this Agency to coordinate prior to further dissemination of this material.

4. We will be most interested in receiving any additional information concerning this matter which may come to your Bureau's attention.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

David H. Blee

CIRA-0439-74

3.17

CLASSIFIED BY 010116. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DDO/WH/7/CAR/Ruth Lehman:ar:7493/1956 (9 August 1974)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - FBI
2 - OPS/LSN
1 - CIOPS/WH
1 - 201-259910
1 - C/OS/SSD/OSB
1 - C/WHD
1 - WH/Security
1 - WH/7/CAR Chrono
1 - 189-9-1
1 - C/DCD
1 - ADDO
1 - DDO
1 - DDO/Registry
1 - FOA File

BASED ON: FBI Memorandum dated 6 August 1974
Subject: "Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III, Internal Security - Abaco; Neutrality Matters - Abaco;" your reference (CI-3) 62-108665

SECRET/SENSITIVE 3.17

FBI document dated 6 Aug, 1974
from Washington D.C.
Bureau file – (CI-3) 62-108665

Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Internal Security - Abaco
Neutrality Matters - Abaco

CONFIDENTIAL

DX-00043

30 July 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: (C) Mitchell Livingston Werbell and His Employment of Former CIA Employees

REFERENCE: CIRA-0371-74; Subject: Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III.

1. On 29 July 1974, William McDonnell, FBI liaison officer, delivered the attached FBI memorandum to OPS/LSN. In delivering this memorandum, McDonnell stated that whereas the last sentence of paragraph 3 reads "by individuals described as former United States Government employees," Gray actually said that Werbell had indicated that he was being assisted by former CIA employees. The FBI chose to use the term "former United States Government employees" in the attached memorandum in order to 'make the memorandum less sensational.'

2. This memorandum should be read in conjunction with CIRA-0371-74, subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell III, dated 27 June 1974.

3. The FBI requests authorization to forward a copy of CIRA-0371-74 to the Department of Justice. As this memorandum was forwarded to the Bureau for its information only, your views on its passage to the Department of Justice are solicited. The FBI plans to ask the Department of Justice if the Department wishes the Bureau to investigate Mitchell Warbell for ~~possible~~ violation of the Neutrality Act.

Signed: Francis G. Coleman

F. I. G. Coleman
C/OPS/LSN

RECORD COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054698

30 July 74
30 July 74
201-259410

DDO/OPS/LSN/FIGColeman/ck (30 July 74)

Distribution:
O&1 - Addressee
1 - Chief, OS/SSD
1 - WH/Security
1 - WH/7/CAR
1 - IP/AN - 201-259910
1 - OPS/LSN
1 - OPS Reading Board

SECRET/SENSITIVE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

6 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Intelligence Division

SUBJECT : MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III

REFERENCE : A. Conversation between Mr. William McDonnell, FBI Liaison Officer and Mr. F.I.G. Coleman of this Agency on 29 July 1974.

B. FBI New York Report dated 19 July, Subject as above.

1. Authorization is granted for your Bureau to pass a copy of CIRA-0371-74 dated 27 June 1974, Subject as above, to the Department of Justice for its use. We wish to make it clear that the former Agency employees mentioned in paragraph 2 of that report: John Patrick MULDOON and Theodore John ROUSSOS, provided their information voluntarily with the intent of seeking the advice of this Agency on the legality of the proposed venture of the Friends of Abaco (FOA). Both men were advised to avoid contact with the FOA and to report their contacts to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. This Agency has not initiated any further contact with the individuals named above or with Walter Joseph MACKEM, the third former employee approached by the FOA. MACKEM, however, did himself contact this Agency in an attempt to get an official policy on the activities of the FOA. He was

CLASSIFIED BY 010116. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

3.14

SECRET/SENSITIVE

201-259910

informed that the case comes under FBI jurisdiction, that this Agency has no official involvement, and that all information we had on the matter had been made available to your Bureau. He was advised at that time to report his contacts and any information he had to your Bureau.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

/s/ David A. Phillips

David A. Phillips

CIRA-0432-74

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DDO/WH/7/CAR/Albert Ramos:cm:7493/1956 (5 August 74)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - FBI
1 - OPS/LSN
1 - CIOPS/WH
①- 201-259910
1 - C/OS/SSD/OSB
1 - C/WHD
1 - WH/Security
1 - WH/7/CAR Chrono
1 - 189-9-1

BASED ON: C/OPS/LSN Memo to C/WHD dated 30 July 1974
Subject: Mitchell Livingston WERBELL and his Employment of Former Agency Employees

SECRET/SENSITIVE 3.14

[illegible] SECRET

INDEXING REQUESTED
XX NO INDEXING
APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. For your background information, attached under separate cover is one copy each of the following documents concerning Subject:

a. CIRA-0371-74 dated 27 June 1974 — ?

b. LNERGO New York memo dated 19 July 1974

2. In forwarding the 19 July New York memo mentioned above, LNERGO reported that in the last sentence of paragraph 3, GRAY actually said that WERBELL had indicated he was being assisted by former BKHERALD employees. LNERGO chose to substitute LNSUZZ in order to 'make the memo less sensational.'

3. A copy of CIRA-0371-74 is being passed to the Department of Justice.

Wilma R. VAN SCOY

Attachments:
As stated above, u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - COS, WH/Miami (w/atts, u/s/c)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010116

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFPS-419

DATE: 5 August 1974

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-259910

Internal Distribution:
1 - WH/REG w/o att
1 - 201-259910 w/1-b above
1 - WH/7/CAR chrono w/o att
1 - 189-9-1 w/1-b above
1 - WH/7/CAR/Friends of Abaco File w/o att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
DDO/WH/7/CAR	Ruth Lehman	cgm	7493 1954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/7	5 AUG 1974	Alfonso Spera

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

3.13

DISPATCH

FBI document dated 19 July 1974
from New York
Subject: Mitchell Livingston
Werbell, III
Internal Security - Abaco
Neutrality Matter - Abaco

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUG 1974

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Intelligence Division

FROM: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Traces Requested by Mr. Wayne Frankenfield

1. This memorandum is in response to trace requests made by Mr. Wayne Frankenfield of the General Investigative Division on 29 July 1974.

2. The files of this office reveal no pertinent identifiable information on:

Advance Security Corporation of Atlanta, Georgia
Howard GIBSON of Georgia
Security Defense System of Marietta, Georgia

3. Nothing is known of the Central Investigative Agency, except as reported by the FBI.

201-0259910

4. The files of this office contain considerable information on Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III, born 8 March 1918 in Philadelphia, Pa. The majority of this information was received from the FBI. This office previously furnished the Bureau information on Werbell under CSCI-3/773317 of 24 October 1962, subject WERBELL, Mitchell L.; and CSCI-316/02323-69 of 27 June 1969, subject WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III.

5. Werbell has never been employed by this Agency nor does the Agency have any operational interest in him. As a 2nd Lieutenant in the Signal Corps in the China-Burma theater in WW II, Werbell was assigned to OSS from April to December 1945. In August 1959, this office considered using Werbell as a source of information on revolutionary activities in the Caribbean area,

3.12

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054698

RECORD COPY

01 Aug 74

201-259910

particularly Cuba, but terminated its consideration of his possible use in October 1959. From December 1965 to November 1966, Werbell contacted this Agency's Domestic Collection Division in Coral Gables, Florida to voluntarily offer information.

6. Werbell has been assessed as an unscrupulous wheeler-dealer, a promotor of grandiose schemes, a man who lives beyond his means, and a high pressure advertising and promotion man. He has repeatedly misrepresented himself as both an employee of the U.S. government and the CIA. As an arms dealer, he has been involved with numerous Latin American governments and exile groups since the late 1950's and is now involved in Bahaman affairs. In 1969, he was in Thailand, attempting to sell the government arms and a program to neutralize the communist threat in that country.

7. Werbell operated a public relations firm in Atlanta which went into bankruptcy in 1959. He subsequently became Vice President and Director of Research and Development of SIONICS, Inc. of Atlanta, Georgia and later became a partner in Defense Systems International of Powder Springs, Georgia.

8. For further information on Werbell, you are referred to the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

201-0900354

9. The indices of this office reflect a Stephen Van CLEAVE, President of Intelligence Services, Ltd., Suite 11-B, 130 West Wieucea Rd., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia; telephone AC 404-255-7493. The document concerning Van Cleave is charged out, and we are seeking to locate it.

/no-201\

10. John Patrick MULDOON is, as stated in our CIRA-0371-74 of 27 June 1974, subject Mitchell Livingston Werbell III, a former Agency employee. For further information on Muldoon, you are referred to this Agency's Office of Security.

CIR-316/01815-74

C/OPS/LSN/FIGColeman/ck (1 August 1974)

Distribution:
- O&1 - Addressee
- 2 - OPS/LSN
- 1 - IP/AN

3.12

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate General Counsel, OGC

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WER BELL III

REFERENCE : Your memorandum of 24 February 1976,
Subject as above

1. Per reference request, we are forwarding information in our files concerning contacts that have taken place between this Agency and WER BELL.

2. The following is a summary of all DDO contact directly with WER BELL which took place in 1959:

a. A 6 July 1959 Memorandum to C/WH Division signed by Thomas J. Flores stated that General Cabell called Flores to report that WER BELL had called him. WER BELL discussed with General Cabell a trip WER BELL had taken to the Dominican Republic and offered to come to Washington at his own expense to discuss the trip. No commitments were made to WER BELL by General Cabell.

b. A 7 July 1959 Memorandum of Conversation signed by T. J. Flores stated that WER BELL was met in Washington, D.C., by Flores who discussed with WER BELL information concerning the Dominican Republic, Fidel Castro, Fulgencio Batista and General Pedraza.

c. A 8 July 1959 Memorandum of Conversation signed by T. J. Flores stated that on 8 July 1959 Flores called WER BELL to set up an appointment. During the meeting, WER BELL was told that the United States would not support any revolutionary activities by General Pedraza. He was also told that the U.S. will observe its international obligations concerning Cuba and Pedraza, and that

3.45

[illegible]

the U.S. would not overlook any violations by Pedraza or his followers of the neutrality laws. Flores said that the Agency had some interest in the possibility of his (WER BELL's) working for us as an intelligence gatherer under terms to be negotiated after we obtained a security clearance on him. Flores pointed out that the Agency was not attempting to limit his actions in connection with the Dominican Republic, nor was it assuming any responsibility for those matters he carried out in his own behalf. Flores dictated a Secrecy Agreement to him and had him sign it.

d. A 9 July 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by T. J. Flores reported that Subject called him on 9 July 1959 from New York. WER BELL gave Flores further information on Loos, fnu, the representative of a Colonel Frei, fnu, of the Swiss army who had 1,000 men available for duty as soldiers.

e. A 20 July 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by T. J. Flores reported that WER BELL called Flores from Miami on 20 July to ask about the Agency picking up the tab for his forthcoming trip to the Dominican Republic. They discussed his clearance which had not come through.

f. A 3 August 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by Martha R. Tharpe reported that on 24 July 1959 WER BELL called for Mr. Thomas J. Flores. Since Flores was on leave, Tharpe took the call. WER BELL gave Tharpe further information concerning Pedraza and Batista. Tharpe called WER BELL back that evening to tell him that if he obtained further information to report it to Mr. Justin Gleichauf, OO Contacts Representative in Miami, until Mr. Flores returned to Washington.

g. A 5 August 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by T. J. Flores stated that WER BELL phoned him on 5 August 1959 to ask if there was any news on his clearance. WER BELL said he wanted to go to the Dominican Republic soon, and would like CIA to pick up his expenses. He was told there was no

3.45

news. Flores and WER BELL discussed the Dominican Republic and Cuba. On 3 August Flores phoned WER BELL and told him that his clearance had not been granted and that he should not predicate his activities on the expectation of the clearance at any given time. WER BELL said that the Pedraza group was air lifting and dropping material into Cuba.

h. A 9 September 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by T. J. Flores reported that WER BELL called Flores on 9 September 1959 to provide information on Cuba. He was told by Flores that his clearance had not yet been processed.

i. According to a 23 September 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by T. J. Flores, WER BELL called Flores on 9 September 1959 to ask if his clearance had come through since he wanted the Agency to finance his trip to the Dominican Republic. He was told it had not. WER BELL told Flores about some people who had been discussing the counterfeiting of U. S. dollars and Cuban pesos for use in connection with Cuban revolutionary activities. He was told by Flores to contact the FBI. On 13 September WER BELL had phoned Flores at home to say that the FBI had referred him to the Secret Service on the counterfeiting aspect, and that no one seemed particularly interested in the gun running. The Secret Service asked him to go to Miami at his own expense to obtain further information on the matter and WER BELL asked Flores' advice. Flores said that he could not influence him one way or the other since he was not in a position to direct his activities, but felt he might be better off to take no action. He was told that Flores would be in touch with him as soon as he had any further information concerning our possible use of him.

j. A 13 October 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by Thomas J. Flores states that WER BELL phoned him on 25 September 1959 to report on Cuba. On 2 October 1959, Flores talked with WER BELL by phone and terminated the relationship.

3. The following undated memorandums are also contained in WER BELL's file:

3.45

a. A Memorandum for the Record signed by T. Flores reports that WER BELL called Flores on 13 August 1959 to discuss Cuban activities in Miami. This memorandum also records that WER BELL phoned Flores again on 26 August 1959 at which time activities in the Dominican Republic and Cuban activities in Miami were discussed. WER BELL also asked about the status of his clearance, and was told it had not yet come through.

b. A letter signed "W" addressed to "Tom" gave "W's" location and some information concerning Batista and Castro. (This letter is probably in the 1959 time frame.)

c. A Memorandum of Conversation signed by T. Flores reports that WER BELL called Flores and gave his location. The status of WER BELL's clearance was discussed and Flores told him it had not yet come through. WER BELL gave Flores some information concerning Batista. (This memorandum probably is in the 1959 time frame.)

d. An unsigned report, apparently from WER BELL, gave a summary of his contacts and activities during a trip to the Dominican Republic. (This report is probably in the 1959 time frame.)

4. A 17 December 1963 dispatch from Station Santo Domingo reported that Station NOC Officer Joseph Luna recently met WER BELL in Santo Domingo. No further details of the meeting were reported.

5. According to the CS file on WER BELL, three former Agency employees were contacted in 1974 by WER BELL and other representatives of a group called "Friends of Abaco (FOA), a group allegedly advocating the secession of the island of Abaco from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. The three former employees contacted are:

a. John Patrick Muldoon, retired from CIA on 20 March 1972.

b. Theodore John Roussos, retired from CIA on 31 July 1970. He was rehired on a contract in February 1971. His contract was terminated in September 1973.

c. Walter Joseph Mackem, separated from CIA on 31 October 1973.

6. Mr. Muldoon contacted Agency employee E. James McTighe on 22 May 1974. Mr. Muldoon told Mr. McTighe that he was nominal Vice President of a Washington-based firm called "Security Consultants International." He presented Mr. McTighe with a report containing the essential data he possessed concerning WER BELL and other members of FOA whom he had met on 17 and 20 May 1974 in Washington, D.C. According to Mr. Muldoon, WER BELL had hopes of establishing gaming casinos, hotel and other tourist facilities in Abaco catering to the U. S. tourist crowd. As a consequence of some run-in with Prime Minister Pindling of the Bahamas, however, WER BELL is apparently *persona non grata* in the Bahamas; hence his ambitions appeared to be contingent on Abacan independence. Mr. Muldoon reported that at least on two occasions WER BELL made a concerted effort to involve persons formerly affiliated with the Agency in the activities of the FOA in support of its independence. On several occasions, WER BELL introduced Mr. Muldoon and Mr. Roussos as active Agency officials, implying that either the Agency or the United States Government supported the aims of the FOA. WER BELL also proposed to Messrs. Muldoon and Roussos in separate conversations that they conduct a study, involving a visit to Abaco, to determine the feasibility of Abaco's independence in political and economic terms. The study was to include interviews with citizens of Abaco prior to an alleged "plebiscite" on independence to take place in Abaco on 28 June 1974. In default of the collaboration of either Muldoon or Roussos, WER BELL hired Mr. Walter Joseph Mackem, a former Agency friend of both Muldoon and Roussos. According to WER BELL's file, Mackem later in 1974 contacted the Agency in an attempt to get an official policy on the activities of the FOA. Mackem was informed that the case comes under FBI jurisdiction, that this Agency has no official involvement, and that all information we had on the matter had been made available to the FBI. He was advised at that time to report his contacts and any information he had to the FBI.

7. On 24 March 1975, Mr. Joseph P. Hayes, assigned to SE/PCH, reported that during the week of 9 March 1975, he talked with Mr. Wesley Dyckman. Mr. Dyckman is a former Agency employee employed by the Drug Enforcement Agency. According to Dyckman, former Agency employee Walter Mackem was employed in the Washington area as a private investigator. He is also involved with a paramilitary activity funded by some unnamed British source. The activity, which Dyckman referred to as

3.45

"the new land project" sought to establish a tax shelter on one of the out-islands of the Caribbean by forcefully taking over the island and establishing a government there. Mackem is supposedly involved in the paramilitary training of forces who would participate in this adventure. According to Dyckman, the paramilitary training supposedly was to take place in Georgia, where WER BELL is based.

8. On 31 August 1974, Mr. Roussos met with Mr. K. Michael Absher, who at that time was AC/E/GC, and told him that WER BELL was leaving for Athens on 31 August to sell arms to the Greek Government. WER BELL wanted Roussos to be his advisor in this venture and to go to Athens. Roussos told WER BELL that he would check with CIA before giving him an answer. WER BELL asked Roussos to see if the Agency was in favor of such an arms deal or not. Mr. Absher strongly advised against Roussos' getting involved in this deal. Roussos told Mr. Absher that he understood and agreed not to get involved. Roussos said that WER BELL would probably call him from Athens and he would give WER BELL a final negative reply.

9. On 22 July 1974, the FBI reported that WER BELL may be in possession of a one-line note from former CIA Director William Colby stemming from a chance meeting with the Director at an OSS alumni dinner, reading something like "Good to see you again." This note was apparently used by WER BELL to suggest that he and Mr. Colby were good friends. This information was passed on to Mr. Colby on 9 August 1974.

10. According to reporting from several Stations, WER BELL and Arthur L. Smith (a cohort of WER BELL's) were in several Central American countries during August and early September 1962. Their principal activity appeared to be contacting officials of the governments of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador for the purpose of obtaining recognition of a *de facto* Cuban Government in exile called the "United Organization for the Liberation of Cuba." In discussions with Nicaraguan Government representatives, WER BELL claimed the proposed Cuban Government in exile had the support of 90 separate Cuban exile organizations and 186,000 Cuban exiles. WER BELL offered a representative of the Nicaraguan Government $100,000 to obtain that government's recognition of the Cuban Government in exile. The group claimed to have its headquarters at 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, in Washington, D.C. While in Guatemala, Smith claimed that the group had a man in the Department of State in Washington, D.C., whom they pay $6,000 per year "to keep them advised."

3.4T

11. In December 1965 WER BELL contacted a Miami DCD asset and told him that he and six Cuban exiles in the U. S. had organized a group, including approximately 20 Cubans inside Cuba, to perform a commando operation in Cuba during early January 1966. Their primary mission was the assassination of Fidel Castro, with the secondary mission of blowing up the generators that supply electricity to Havana, Cuba. WER BELL, at the time, stated that he was trying to get a "green light" from CIA to proceed with the mission, and inferred that the mission would be called off if such approval was not obtained.

12. On 7 February 1966 the Miami office of the FBI reported that WER BELL had been in contact with various news agencies concerning an alleged plan to assassinate Fidel Castro, and reportedly also had discussed the plan with Mr. Richard Phillips, Public Affairs Officer, Department of State, Washington, D.C. WER BELL claimed to have a group of some 500 men infiltrated into Cuba and said that they were ready for action to overthrow the regime immediately following the assassination of Castro. According to the FBI, WER BELL gave the impression that he is acquainted with many high government officials, both in the U. S. and other countries, and implied that his assassination plan had been approved by CIA.

13. According to a memorandum in WER BELL's file, on 7 February 1968, one Bruce Arman Baker telephoned an employee of this Agency and said he had been in contact with WER BELL. Mr. Baker said that WER BELL was in the weapons manufacturing business and delivered them by air throughout the world. Mr. Baker said that he understood that WER BELL does this for CIA. Mr. Baker said that he understood from WER BELL that he would have to get a CIA security clearance to fly for WER BELL. Baker said that he was afraid that his past smuggling record might keep him from getting a CIA clearance.

14. WER BELL came to the attention of the Bangkok Station in early 1969 when he went to Thailand representing himself as Vice President of Sionics, Atlanta, Georgia. He described himself as a counterinsurgency expert, had a variety of weapons to display, claimed to be a retired colonel, and introduced himself at a local nightclub as Chief of CIA in Thailand. WER BELL attempted to sell arms to the Thais and also to a variety of U. S. military elements. Station Bangkok passed the gist of his reputation to key personalities in the U. S. mission and the Thai Government stressing that he was not sponsored in any way by the U. S. Government.

3.45

15. WER BELL was also the subject of two memorandums signed by Lawrence R. Houston. Mr. Houston, answering a request from Joseph J. Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, on 23 February 1971, denied WER BELL's alleged affiliation with the CIA. On 28 October 1971, Mr. Houston wrote Mr. David H. Henretta, Jr., of the Industrial Security Clearance Review Division, to return notarized Interrogatories previously sent by Mr. Henretta.

16. We have no information on Colonel Bayard except news articles reporting his death which were forwarded by the FBI.

17. Per your request, we have sent instructions to the LA/Miami Station that there should be no contact with WER BELL.

Nestor D. Sanchez
Acting Chief
Latin America Division

DDO/LA/CAR/Cari/D. Geisler:rb Ext. 1956 (3 March 76)

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee
1 - DDO
1 - ADDO
1 - DDO/Reg
2 - C/LA
1 - C/LA/CAR
1 - LA/CAR/Cari chrono
1 - 201-259910

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012913

3.45

FBI document dated 24 July 1974 from Las Vegas
Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

SECRET/SENSITIVE

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

27 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Intelligence Division

SUBJECT : MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III

1. Reference is made to your Bureau's File No. MM 105-21382, Subject as above, and your Bureau's reporting on Subject's involvement with the "Abaco Independence Movement" (AIM) in the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.

2. For your information only, three former employees of this Agency were contacted in June 1974 by representatives of a group called "Friends of Abaco," a group allegedly advocating the secession of the island of Abaco from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. Contact was initiated by Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III, an international arms dealer, and a naturalized Lithuanian named Michael OLIVER, both of whom attempted to involve the former Agency employees in the Abaco Independence Movement (AIM), of which your Bureau is familiar. The three former employees contacted are:

a. John Patrick MULDOON ✓
DPOB: 25 August 1957, Washington, D. C.
Retired from this Agency on 20 March 1972
Address at time of retirement:
4305 Kentbury Drive
Bethesda, Maryland

CLASSIFIED BY 010116. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

3,9

201-259910

SECRET/SENSITIVE

b. Theodore John ROUSSOS
DPOB: 14 July 1919, Washington, D. C.
Retired: 31 July 1970
Address at time of retirement:
2918 Hardy Avenue
Wheaton, Maryland
Note: ROUSSOS was rehired on a contract basis in February 1971. His contract was terminated September 1973.

c. Walter Joseph MACKEM
DPOB: 13 December 1937, Omaha, Nebraska
Separated: 31 October 1973
Address at time of separation:
2609 N. Potomac
Arlington, Virginia

3. Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III, the principal owner of the arms manufacturing firm Defense Systems International and an international arms dealer, has been encouraging a group of Bahamian citizens on the island of Abaco who seek to secede from the Bahamian Commonwealth. In this affair WERBELL has been collaborating with a group based in Miami called the "Friends of Abaco." Active in the Friends of Abaco is Michael OLIVER, a wealthy land developer residing at 2089 El Rancho Drive, Carson City, Nevada. OLIVER, a naturalized U. S. citizen, was born Moses OLITSKI on 11 December 1928 in Lithuania.

4. In encouraging persons in Abaco to seek independence of Nassau, OLIVER's apparent motive is to establish a prototype government based on principles of free enterprise expounded in a paperback book which he has authored called "A New Constitution for a New Country" (Fine Arts Press, Reno, Nev. - 1968). WERBELL, on the other hand, has privately expressed a desire to establish a tourist mecca on Abaco to include hotels, recreation facilities and gambling casinos. Officials of Holiday International, a Baltimore firm specialized in recreation and health spas, have been briefed by WERBELL and OLIVER recently on the Abaco movement. Robert A. C. HAMILTON, 13th Lord of Belhaven and Stenton and a member of the

3.9

Friends of Abaco, on 10 June 1974 sponsored a resolution in behalf of the Abaco Independence Movement on the floor of the British House of Lords, following conversations with WERBELL in Washington in late May.

5. Despite the seeming innocence of the enterprise, however, we have observed that WERBELL, in particular, has made a concerted effort to involve persons formerly affiliated with this Agency in the activities of the Friends of Abaco in support of Abaco's independence. On several occasions, involving at least two former officers of this organization, MULDOON and ROUSSOS cited above, WERBELL has introduced them as presumably active Agency officials in such a fashion as to imply, according to the persons involved, that either this Agency or the United States Government supports the aims of the Friends of Abaco.

6. Most recently, WERBELL has proposed to both retired officers in separate conversations that they conduct a study, involving a visit to Abaco, to determine the feasibility of Abaco's independence in political and economic terms. The study would include interviews with citizens on Abaco prior to an alleged "plebiscite" on independence to take place in Abaco on 28 June 1974. To be included in the investigation is research on the probable reaction in the United Nations Organization to a petition from political groups in Abaco for support on independence, notably any parallels to be found in precedents such as the Biafra secession from Nigeria.

7. Andrew ST. GEORGE, a nationally known free-lance writer, has become active in WERBELL's organization and claims to be preparing an article on WERBELL and the Abaco movement for publication in True Magazine. ST. GEORGE has participated in the several meetings that WERBELL, OLIVER and their associates have had with the two retired Agency officers, Mr. John MULDOON and Mr. Ted ROUSSOS.

3.9

8. In default of the collaboration of either MULDOON or ROUSSOS, WERBELL and OLIVER have hired Walter Joseph MACKEM, a former Agency friend of both MULDOON and ROUSSOS.

9. John MULDOON is currently employed as the Washington representative of the firm Security Consultants International, a subsidiary of the Atlanta (Ga.) detective agency, Central Investigative Agency. ROUSSOS is not employed.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

/s/ David A. Phillips

David A. Phillips

CIRA-0371-74

3.9

14-00000

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DDO/WH/7/E. James McTighe:ar/4221/1497/ (26 June 1974)

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - FBI
1 - OPS/LSN
1 - CIOPS/WH
1 - 201-259910
1 - C/OS/SSD/OSB
1 - C/WHD
1 - WH/Security
3 - O/PERSONNEL for MULDOON, ROUSSOS, and MACKEM's personnel files
1 - WH/7/CAR Chrono
1 - 189-9-1

BASED ON: Memoranda for the Record dated:

22 May 1974
21 June 1974
22 June 1974
26 June 1974

SECRET/SENSITIVE 3.9

24 Aug 74

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Agency Retiree's Involvement with
Abaco Independence Group

1. Through the intermediary of Robert Brown, DC/EA, and retired staffer Jack "Red" Stent, I was put in touch on 22 May 1974 with John MULDOON, another retired staffer who is now nominal vice-president of a Washington-based firm called "Security Consultants International." Muldoon made the contact with me apparently on the advice of Bob Brown and Red Stent whose counsel he sought in an effort to protect himself from the possible implications of his involvement with a group promoting the independence of the Bahamian Commonwealth island of Abaco. We met at 1100 hours at "Tony's" on L street and 18th N.W. in downtown Washington. Red Stent was there to introduce me to Muldoon but he did not participate in the discussion.

2. Muldoon presented me with a typewritten report containing the essential data he possessed concerning a group of individuals with whom he had met on Friday, 17 May 1974 in Washington. Attending the meeting with Muldoon on that occasion were Mitchell WERBELL III (aka "Mitch Three"), Lord and Lady BELLHAVEN (alleged British peers), Mike OLIVER (a wealthy electronics tycoon of European, possibly French, origin who currently resides in Carson City, Nevada), Howard HANDELMAN (Washington correspondent of "U.S. News and World Report"), Renee (lnu) (the evening's object of Werbell's seemingly voracious affections) and an employe of the Library of Congress whom Muldoon chose not to identify to me. At a subsequent meeting on Monday, 20 May 1974, Muldoon had lunch with WERBELL and free lance writer Andrew St. GEORGE who is also involved with WERBELL in the Abaco independence enterprise. The Werbell group is known as the "Friends of Abaco" (already documented as such in our files).

E2 IMPDET CL BY 043547

3. A knowledge of the background of the principals is essential to a comprehension of the affair as recounted by Muldoon:

a. Island of Abaco - From available file information we know that Abaco is a small island at the north end of the Bahamas archipelago a short distance off the Florida coast, which was populated in 1785 by British Loyalists and their Black slaves fleeing the United States following independence. The island remains about 50% white. Openly apprehensive in anticipation of the Bahamas' independence from Great Britain, the residents of Abaco, both white and black, have found themselves - since independence - the object of apparent antagonism and administrative neglect on the part of the Pindling government, which has fueled talk of secession from Nassau rule. This talk has been institutionalized in an indigenous organization headed by a white, Charles "Chuck" HALL, and called the Abaco Independence Movement (AIM). HALL is a resident of Marsh Grove, the country cross roads which poses as the metropolitan capital of Abaco; he frequently visits Miami where he meets with Werbell.

b. Mitchell WERBELL III - A Philadelphian, WERBELL was a member of OSS in the Far East during World War II where, according to Muldoon, he came to know the Director and Lou Conein. Werbell currently a resident of Atlanta, now is president of an international arms peddling firm called Defense Systems International (DSI). In addition to industrial security systems, according to MULDOON, DSI sells automatic weapons (including a miniature machine pistol with a silencer) and bomb-booby-trapped items of various sorts (e.g., a tennis ball with a fuse which is automatically activated when you stop playing) and other James Bondian accessories. Werbell hopes to establish gaming casinos, hotels and other tourist facilities in Abaco catering to the U.S. tourist crowd available for easy ferrying from nearby Miami. As a consequence of some run-in with Prime Minister Michael Pindling, however, Werbell is apparently permanently persona non grata in the Bahamas; hence his ambitions appear to be contingent on Abacan independence.

c. Mike OLIVER - The financial angel of the "Friends of Abaco," Oliver's origins and auspices are somewhat obscure to Muldoon. OLIVER claims to have spent time in a Nazi concentration camp during World War II; he speaks excellent French; he has a pet political theory which he has published. He is seeking some political entity where he can put his theory into practice to illustrate to the U.S. government that it is worth practicing in this country. In contrast to his colleague Mitch Three Werbell, however, he seems adamantly opposed to establishing a gambling empire.

d. Lord and Lady BELLHAVEN - A member of the British House of Lords, BELLHAVEN plans to make a speech there, following his return to London on 22 May 1974, castigating the British government for allowing Abaco to be abused by Nassau. BELLHAVEN appears to be identical with Robert Anthony Carmichael HAMILTON, born 27 Feb 27, the 13th Lord of BELHAVEN and STENTON. His wife is the former Elizabeth Ann MOSELEY, daughter of the late Colonel Arthur Henry MOSELEY (whose claim to fame remains to be probated). This information comes from several tomes on the English peerage which were researched for me by Sally Ann Brown of E/BC.

e. Howard HANDELMAN - The U.S. News and World Report correspondent also has contacts with the Agency, a fact which concerns Muldoon.

f. Central Investigation Agency - An Atlanta detective Agency established a few years ago by Howard COSGROVE, a former Georgia police officer specialized in narcotics operations who was apparently fired from the force for reasons unknown to Muldoon. COSGROVE retains a 26% interest in the CIA (sic); Mitchell WERBELL IV ("Mitch Four") holds another 26% and a remaining 6% interest is held by the nominal president of "CIA," a retired Army colonel named Byer or Briar. The "CIA" has in turn established Security Consultants International, as a Washington-based wholly owned subsidiary. SCI's specialities are anti-audio sweeps and electronic surveillance using devices developed by one David MORISSEY, an electronics engineer who collaborates with MULDOON & "CIA."

4. The incident which alarmed Muldoon occurred during the Friday gathering of the individuals mentioned in paragraph two. Muldoon was palmed off by Werbell at this gathering as an "official of the CIA (Central

Intelligence Agency, in this instance)" who was there to attest to the fact that neither the CIA nor the U.S. Government is opposed to Abacan independence. His interlocutors, despite Muldoon's protests that he was retired from CIA and in no way represented U.S. government interests respecting Abaco, seemed anxious - he felt - to accept his presence there as evidence of U.S. government endorsement of the Abacan independence movement.

5. Muldoon took some pains to gain reassurance that he would not be pinpointed by Werbell as the source of this information if any action were taken on it. I assured him that, apart from the particular incident on 17 May 1974, the general outlines of WERBELL and his activities and aspirations for Abaco have already been reported by two or three other sources. Since there is nothing the Agency can plausibly do at this juncture about WERBELL's apparent effort to con his supporters into thinking that the CIA was backing the Abaco independence venture, I told Muldoon I planned merely to make his side of this story a matter of record and let it go at that.

6. To cap off the story, Red Stent invited us to lunch at the Class Reunion on Eye Street and 18th. When Muldoon and I arrived to meet Stent we found him ensconced at a corner table with three other people. Red rushed over to inform us that he would be introducing me as a colleague of his from AEROJET. He then presented me to WERBELL, Werbell's date Patricia BOTOND and Cecil BROWNLOW of "Aviation Weekly." WERBELL, looking for all the world like Jerry Colonna, was intent on the task of seducing Miss BOTOND, who happened to be promoting a convention for the Atlantic Union organization, a political enterprise which is an offshoot of the World Federalists Movement. Miss BOTOND, as it turned out was reared in Shanghai, China, at the same time as Stent. Red had attended school with her brother - the German School in Shanghai. Miss BOTOND had been expelled from the German school in the late 1930s for having had anti-Nazi doodles in her copybook. Brownlow had helped Red obtain aerial photos of the ChiCom consulate compound in Geneva in the early 1960s when Red was stationed in Paris. When Werbell had wearied of the reminisences of Stent and Botond and had managed to hustle his prey off to a private table, Stent revealed to BROWNLOW that I was not AEROJET but CIA. Fortunately my name was mumbled at the introduction so that no one could have repeated it. No one in fact seemed interested.

7. Following lunch Muldoon left with a colleague for a meeting at the Justice Department to determine whether in sweeping Embassy buildings in Washington he must register as an agent of a foreign government (whichever it might be). Brownlow went about his business. Stent paid for the lunch. I returned to what Stent whimsically refers to as the "Funny Farm." My only regret is that George Orwell could not have joined us for that lunch.

E. James McTighe
DC/WH/7

DDO/WH/7/E.James McTighe:sdf (24 May 74)
Distribution:
- Orig - DC/EA
- 1 - 189-9-1
- ① - 201-259910
- 1 - C/WH/7
- 1 - DC/WHD

458 126
1
7 July 1965

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NAME:	BOTOND, Istvan
BIRTH:	17 Aug 1921, Hungary
CITIZENSHIP:	USA, Naturalized, May 12, 1962
ADDRESSL	2152 Wyoming Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.
MARITAL STATUS:	BOTOND, Patricia, Nee: POTTER
CHILDREN:	BOTOND, Krisztina; b. c1960 BOTOND, Andrew; b. c1962 Step-Children: Lila; b. c1948 Christopher; b. c1947
EMPLOYMENT:	Architect/Urban Designer. The Perkins & Will Partnership, Washington, D.C.
EDUCATION:	1955: Palatine Joseph Polytechnic University, Budapest, Hungary 1961: Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass
TRAVEL:	Extensive
PAPERS:	F.I.C.A.: 074-32-6419
DATA DATED:	Not Dated

3.7

ISTVAN BOTOND, A.I.A.
Architect/Urban Designer
2152 Wyoming Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20008 (202) DUpont 7-7525

Age:	43 Born: August 17, 1921, Hungary
Citizenship:	U.S.A. (Naturalized, May 12, 1962)
Marital status:	Married Wife: Patricia Potter Botond (U.S.A.) Children: Krisztina, 3 1/2 years Andrew, 2 years (Lila, 16 years, and Christopher, 15 years, from wife's previous marriage are not fully dependent)
F.I.C.A.	074-32-6419

• • • •

Education:	Dipl. Architect Palatine Joseph Polytechnic University, Faculty of Architecture and Engineering, Budapest, Hungary, 1955 Master of Architecture in Urban Design Harvard University, Graduate School of Design, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1961 Registered Architect New York State # 8181 District of Columbia # A-1576 NCARB Certificate # 4936
Professional Affiliation:	Corporate Member, American Institute of Architects, Washington Metropolitan Chapter
Awards:	1954, Fourth Prize for replanning of a bombed city square and neighborhood in Debrecen, Hungary (co-designer) 1961, Scholarship at Centro Internazionale di Studi di Architettura "Andrea Palladio," Italy
Languages:	English, Hungarian, German, French (acquaintance)
Travel:	The Bahamas '58; Europe '59, '62, '65; Canada '61, '62; U.S. Virgin Islands '63, '65; Bermuda '63
Interests:	Music, photography; sports: skiing, tennis

3.6

Publications: Magyar Epitömüvészet ("Hungarian Architecture") -- monthly

Jan. '56: Airport and Buildings (Diploma thesis)
July '58: Furniture Factory in Debrecen, Hungary

Harvard University Library

Factors that Shape the City: Case Study -- Budapest

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

June 1963 - Present

The Perkins & Will Partnership, Architects
Washington, D.C.

Head of Design Department

Responsible and involved in every design job as guide and critic. In addition to administrative duties (Personnel, Budget, Schedules, etc.), active designer of two major projects:

a) University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
Teaching Hospital and Ambulant Patient Facilities
First stage ready for bid
Est: $ 7,500,000

b) Duke University, Durham, N.C.
Research Laboratory Building for Medical Sciences
Working drawings under preparation
Est: $ 5,400,000

Other Department works:

Duke University, Durham, N.C.
Main Entrance
Bid: $ 3,700,000

Duke University, Durham, N.C.
Clinical Research II Buildings
Est: $ 1,800,000

George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
Long Range Plan

Doctors" Office Building, Washington, D.C.
Est: $ 2,600,000

Virgin Islands Medical Centers: St. Thomas, St. Croix
Est: $ 14,000,000 each

3.6

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

December 1956-June 1963
(Absent ten months for Post-Graduate Studies)

I.M. Pei & Associates, Architects & Planners
New York, New York

Architect Designer/Planner

Hotel Denver Hilton: design work and detailing of precast exterior and store fronts

M.I.T. Earth Science Building: preliminary design and planning work

Union Station area project, Toronto, Canada: site analysis and feasibility studies

"Financial Plaza," Downtown Toronto, Canada: preliminary studies for a banks and office buildings project

Weybosset Hill, Urban Renewal Project, Providence, R.I.: Urban Designer in the Planning Team

Newhouse Communication Center, School of Journalism, Syracuse University, New York: consultant on precast exterior system

Town Center Plaza, Southwest Washington, D.C.: site study for extension of a newly constructed Housing-Shopping project.

• • • •

Prior to December 1956

Various architectural positions in Hungary (part-time during University years.)

Final year: (August 1955-November 1956) Head of Architectural Department in the Regional Planning Bureau for Northeast Hungary. Duties similar to present position.

3.6

General Investment Corporation
Throughout the Pacific
SUITE 400 / 1451 SOUTH KING STREET / HONOLULU, HAWAII 96814 / PHONE 949-4733 / Cable Address: GENINVCO

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
Rm. 508 ,677 Ala Moana
Honolulu, Hawaii 96814

Att'n: Neil Leitner

Neil,

We have a financial statement on Oliver-Roza Corp., dated 10/23/69 by Chalk & Joerg, CPA's, 717 North Curry St., P.O. Box 1060, Carson City, Nevada, 89071.

An appraisal of an "Oliver Subdivision" by Noble T. Murray, Real Estate Appraiser & Consultant, 2345 Camas Rd., Carson City Nevada.

Michael Oliver, an Electronic's Engineer, of 2089 El Rancho Drive, Carson City, Nevada, is President of at least two corporations, author of "A New Constitution For A New Country"; had a committment from Whitehall Securities Corp., 138 Main St. OceanPort, New Jersey, to his Vanguard Corp. to underwrite the sales of 500,000 shares of common stock at $10.00 per share; deal fell thru because British or Dutch governments failed to come thru with tax relief.

Sincerely,

Leo

Leo F. Jonick

See Mr Stemmerman
if I can't find.

LFJ/mba

3.5

65 52 04-712-3096 OR 48 MAR 14 1969 N
VANGUARD CORP LAND DEVELOPMENT 1968 N Q

2089 EL RANCHO DR
CARSON CITY NEV 89701
TEL 702 882-2483

SUMMARY

PAYMENTS	UNDETERMINED
EMPLOYS	3
RECORD	CLEAR

MICHAEL OLIVER, PRES
MORRIS C. DAVIS, V PRES
BETTY S. (MRS. M.) OLIVER, SEC-TREAS
DIRECTORS: THE officers and L. A. Whitmore, Joseph A. Foss Jr, Dr. R. B. Williams, Dr. R. Meiers, Arthur L. Bonike, and Robert Johnson.

PAYMENTS Suppliers for this operation were not located during current investigation. Oliver's personal payment record is satisfactory.

HISTORY On Mar 19 1969, M. Oliver, president, was unavailable for an interview. One outside source submitted the following statement from Michael Oliver, personally, dated Apr 25 1968:

Cash	$ 8,200	Accts Pay	$ 150
Accts Rec	1,300	Owing Autos	3,200
Coin Collection & Stocks	6,000		
Current	15,500	Current	3,359
R E	327,000	Mtgs	27,047
Autos	5,900	NET WORTH	318,003
Total	348,400	Total	348,400

Unsigned.

-----0-----

Real estate includes interest in Oliver-Roos Corp of $289,000; Carson City residence, $23,000; house at San Diego, Calif, $15,000. Statement was obtained from outside sources.

On Mar 18 1969, Oliver was unavailable for an interview.

Details on this business were not available in outside quarters. One outside source reported that operations are currently in the formative stages.

HISTORY Incorporated in Nevada Nov 1 1968; authorized capital, $500,000. MICHAEL OLIVER, born 1920, married. 1965 to starting this concern, engaged in land development, as an officer in Oliver-Boza Corporation. Prior to that, was associated with the Philco Corp. in Palo Alto, Calif. Prior to that, employed by Volt Tech Corp., at San Diego. The directors are residents of the State of CVlifornia; antecedent informationis not currently available.

OPERATION Operates in the land development field. Full scope of operations not learned. ~~There are no~~ employees, 3 ~~apart from the officers~~. including officers LOCATION: Headquarters are maintained at Oliver's residence, owned by Mr. & Mrs. M. Oliver
3-19 (200c 6)

3.4

THIS REPORT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATEVER.

[illegible]

SIC D-U-N-S ©DUN & BRADSTREET, INC. STARTED RATING

65 52

OLIVER ROSA CORP

CD 48 APR 28 1971
LAND DEVELOPMENT

1965

NQ

2089 EL RANCHO DR
CARSON CITY NEV 89701
TEL 702 882-2483

MICHAEL OLIVER, PRES
FRANK ROSA, JR, V PRES
BETTY S (MRS M) OLIVER, SEC-TREAS
DIRECTORS: The Officers and Robert R Johnson

SUMMARY

PAYMENTS	UNDETERMINED
EMPLOYS	4
RECORD	INCOMPLETE

PAYMENTS Suppliers for this operation were not located during current investigation. Oliver's personal payments record is satisfactory.

FINANCE On April 28, 1971 officers were absent.

Reporter estimates are:

Real estate $ 290,000

REAL ESTATE	TITLE	VALUE
Residence of Olivers	Oliver/Wife	$23,000
House, San Diego	Oliver/Wife	15,000

Further current financial estimates are unavailable. Concerning a personal statement of Michael Oliver, dated April 1968, total assets were listed at $348,400 and net worth at $318,003. Net worth of Oliver centered heavily in real estate.

Operations of the concern appear to be profitable. Full extent of operations unknown. Fire insurance details not learned. Business is well established and affairs appear to be kept in order.

BANKING Bank facility not learned.

HISTORY Incorporated Nevada on Nov 5 1965, authorized capital $200,000 with 20,000 shares at $10 per share.

M OLIVER born 1920, married. Was associated with the Philco Corp in Palo Alto, Calif. Prior to that, employed by Volt Tech. Corp at San Diego. Is presently also the president of a Vanguard Corp.

B OLIVER born 1925, married. Is bookkeeper of concern.

Antecedents of Rosa Jr and Johnson lacking.

RELATED CONCERN: Vanguard Corp. same address, established 1968, operates also in land development. Extent of inter-company relations unlearned.

OPERATION Operates in the land development field. Business non-seasonal. Employs 4 including directors. LOCATION: Headquarters are maintained at Oliver's residence, owned by Mr and Mrs M Oliver.

4-28 (88c 3)

3,4

THIS REPORT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATEVER.

OUTGOING MESSAGE 20-3

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 222323Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 516809

CONF: EA/CO4 INFO: FILE IP/AN EA4 EA/VNO4 LSN/ID LSN/ML C/OPS C1/OP2

DISSEM BY: 47

PER ___ #___

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO ________
0 IP FILES

IP File

TO: HONG KONG, INFO BANGKOK, SAIGON.

TAPPER/CO STRYLIC

REFS: A. HONG KONG 30865 (IN 163687)

B. SAIGON 74819 (IN 164169)

C. SAIGON 74809 (IN 163286)

D. BANGKOK 55098 (IN 165474)

E. SAIGON 74890 (IN 166221)

1. HQS FILES CONTAIN FOLLOWING ON BENNETT B. BINTLIFF (201-885931), SUBJECT OF REF A REQUEST:

A. EARLY APR 1971, DEPARTMENT OF ARMY VIA INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER EXPRESSED OPS INTEREST IN BINTLIFF AS A "SOURCE ASSET" INVOLVED IN ARMY OPERATION 1201-02, ACTIVATED 25 MAR 1966, WHICH WAS THE CONUS FIELD STATION, A SUBORDINATE ELEMENT OF U.S. ARMY FIELD ACTIVITIES COMMAND. HOWEVER, ARMY DROPPED ITS INTEREST IN BINTLIFF WITHOUT PREJUDICE 13 OCT 1972. DPOB LISTED AS 17 FEB 1928, AUSTIN, TEXAS. BINTLIFF ALSO LISTED AS PRESIDENT, QUANTUM CORP., 444 MADISON, NEW YORK, AND VICE PRESIDENT, MILITARY ARMAMENT CORP., L'ENFANT PLAZA N., WASHINGTON, D.C.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

3.3

File in 201-259910

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 59271

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 . PAGE 2 OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

[illegible] 516809 [illegible]

CONF: INFO: FILE DISSEM BY:

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX PER ___ #

0 RETURN TO

0 IP FILES

B. BINTLIFF, AT ONE TIME, WAS AN OFFICIAL OF SIONICS CORP., 1655 PEACH TREE STREET, N.E., ATLANTA, GEORGIA, WHICH LISTS MITCHELL 201-259910 L. WERBELL III AS VICE PRESIDENT. (WERBELL, ON WHOM HQS HAS LENGTHY 201 FILE, IS CHARACTERIZED AS AMERICAN ADVENTURER, UNSCRUPULOUS WHEELER DEALER, AND PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. WERBELL WAS INVOLVED IN GUNRUNNING AND MERCENARY VENTURES IN CUBA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAILAND AND FALSELY IMPLYING BKHERALD CONNECTIONS.) BINTLIFF AND WERBELL WERE INVOLVED IN FUNDING MERCENARY EXPEDITION ON ABACO ISLAND, BAHAMAS. (WERBELL 201 FILE)

C. FBI REPORT MM105-21382, 17 JULY 1973, INDICATES BINTLIFF NOW OWNER OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, WHOSE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR IS PAUL J. ROUTHIER, A RETIRED U.S. AIR FORCE LT. COL. AND WERBELL'S SON-IN-LAW.

2. RE BBRW FIRM MENTIONED IN REF C, CHECK OF ATLANTA TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SHOWS LISTING FOR BINTLIFF, BAYARD, ROUTHIER, WERBELL AND CO., ATLANTA, GEORGIA, WHICH LISTS SAME ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER AS DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL (DSI). DSI ALSO HAS ADDRESS LISTING AT 4321 MACLAND-DALLAS, POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, WHICH IS RESIDENCE

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

CL BY:

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 3 OF PAGES 3

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 0

0 RETURN TO

0

516 809

DISSEM BY:

PER #

201-254910 file
15R [illegible]
ac all. [illegible] - 22 Mar 73.

CLAIMED BY BINTLIFF AND WERBELL.

3. WHAT LITTLE INFO HQS HAS RE BINTLIFF IS INCONCLUSIVE; HOWEVER, IF JUDGMENTS CAN BE MADE BY COMPANY HE KEEPS, DEALINGS WITH HIM SHOULD BE APPROACHED WITH CAUTION. WHILE ABOVE BACKGROUND INFO ON BINTLIFF AND WERBELL CANNOT BE PASSED TO LIAISON BECUASE OF THEIR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, STATION CAN PASS STRYLIC PARA 2E TELEPHONE DIRECTORY INFO AND INDICATE THAT BINTLIFF HAS UNSAVORY CONNECTIONS AND MAY FALSELY CLAIM U.S. GOVT AFFILIATIONS.

4. FILE: 201-685931. E2, IMPDET.H

[illegible]

EA/TBL/T: ROBERT SAVAGE/DRAFT/

EA/VNO/SVN: BRUCE RUBEN/DRAFT/

LSN/ISR: EVERETT BARNES/DRAFT/

DATE: 21 FEB. 74
ORIG: JOSEPH MARRA/RVW
UNIT: CH/HTH
EXT: 6770/1968

ROBERT D. BROWN, JR.
AC/EA
RELEASING OFFICER

3,3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JAMES H. KELLY, JR.
DCEA/CH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 59271

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Sensitive

FROM: DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Support Branch/Operational Support Section
Room 900, Key Building - ext. 2268
Mr. Evan Ames

EXTENSION:

NO. Case 61168

DATE 22 January 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/7/C 3 B 0001 Hqs.			
2.			
3. DC/WH/7			
4. C/WH/7		4	SR
5. Lehman ~~[illegible]~~, B.T.			
6. Easton			
7. Ettinger (Pouch copy to [illegible])			
8. [illegible] - File: 189-9-1 w/worksheet			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.		3.2	

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached report was sent in by DCD/Miami. A copy has been passed to WH Station in Miami.

(MIM-00-E-324/00268-74)

2 to 3 & 4:

this type of info should be passed to the FBI as far as I can ascertain, DCD doesn't do it. — Do you think WH/S should pass it? The [illegible] has traces of [illegible] on all the subjects in this report. both

No. But ensure, if need be with OPS/LIAS help, that DCD does appropriate dissem or whatever they do. SP

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

December 9, 1973

Interim Report - Period of
12/3/73 - 12/9/73

RE: Current Bahamian Situation

At Miami, Florida

Results of the Inquiry:

The following people were contacted by the writer:

Jay Mallin (December 3, 1973.) Mallin states that to the best of his knowledge there are only two groups known to be active in the Abaco Movement--the group that WerBel (Mitchell Livingston WerBel III) is associated with and a group being headed up by a Bob Brown.

Brown is currently in Washington and is about to return to his home which is in Boulder, Colorado. Mallin indicated that if anything were about to occur Brown would certainly be in the Miami area.

Brown is a white American and an ex-Special Forces type. He has formed a group of ex-Special Forces Specialists that in Mallin's opinion "could really raise Hell." Brown, according to Mallin, has been working for Chuck Hall. However, Hall is also aligned with WerBel.

Mallin states t[illegible] all of the planning sessions [illegible]r Brown's group have been held in the living room of Mallin's Coral Gables home.

Brown's group is all white but he has been in contact with some of the local Blacks in Abaco. The Blacks have had no formal training nor do they possess the proper weapons for any sizable operation. In order to obtain weapons and training the Blacks have made friendly overtures to Brown's group.

Mallin stated that some of the local Blacks could move on their own but he believes that it would be highly unlikely.

Mallin speculated that U.S. Mafia money may be being spent in the Bahamas in order to finance the overthrow of Pindling's government to stop the seizure of the casinos. He did not have any evidence to substantiate the theory.

In answer to a direct question from the writer Mallin further commented that Paul Bethal is totally out of the Abaco situation. Bethal's only role, according to Mallin, was the one meeting he arranged for WerBel, Hall, a Michael Lightbourne (Phonetic) and George Wackenhut. Bethal, Mallin further stated, trys to give people the impression that he has very high level connections including members of the National Security Council and that he prepares papers and other briefings for the Council. Mallin states that this is not true, that Bethal in fact has no such contacts.

Mallin went on to say that WerBel would not get involved with anything that would jeopardize his U.S. government contracts especially the sale of his silencer to the Army. In addition, according to Mallin, WerBel is a CIA informant and would advise the Agency of his activities. On December 9, 1973, Mallin was recontacted by the writer. Chuck Hall travels to Miami a great deal and contacts Mallin when he does. Mallin said his last contact with Hall was about two months ago. Hall's supporters are mainly white although there are a couple of [illegible]. Hall is publishing a mimeographed newsletter under the name of the Abaco Independent Movement.

Mallin indicated that, "the whites cannot do anything in Abaco without everyone knowing about it."

There has been a series of thefts of weapons in the Bahamas and Mallin believes that Black militants could possibly be involved. Mallin further believes that there may in fact be a Black militant group operating in the Abaco area.

Mallin stated that, "WerBel's bringing in of Colin Mitchell was just a lot of noise." He went on to say Mitchell did not accomplish anything.

David W. Wike, Associate Security Director, University of Miami. Wike has not heard of any unusual activity in the Bahamas. In answer to a direct question from the writer Wike stated that the only member of the University community known to be travelling to the Bahamas frequently is a student who is a suspected narcotics dealer. Also, no prominent Bahamian personalities or members of their families are known to be attending the University.

John L. Curtin, Dade County Public Safety Department. Curtin states that, "the trouble has been building for the last six to eight months." He believes a direct assault would have to be made on Nassau itself in order to accomplish the desired objective of stopping the seizure of the casinos. Curtin further stated that the Mafia has been "buying guns like crazy." On December 5, 1973, Curtin was recontacted due to the fact that he had dinner with a prominent Bahamian businessman who is known to be in the lumber business. This businessman is white but is well liked by the Blacks in the Bahamas. His identity is unknown to the writer.

This businessman stated that there is definitely increased activity but that no specific date for any overt action has been mentioned.

This businessman believes that Mafia money is an important factor and that Blacks will be hired to do the actual fighting if there is any fighting. He views the casino issue as the crucial one. He believes Blacks who are opportunistic will seize upon the casino issue to obtain weapons and money from the Mafia and attempt to seize power.

Dr. David Cartano, Sociology Instructor, University of Miami. Cartano was contacted due to his being a past member of the Institute for the Study of Change. When he first became associated with the Institute he was introduced by Mallin as being a Bahamian specialist.

Cartano could not contribute anything pertinent to this inquiry. He has not renewed his contacts in the Islands in over one year's time. He does have two Bahamian students in one of his classes but neither of them has mentioned anything of any significance. He doubts their value as sources.

Gordon O. Rothwell, Chief of Security, Sheraton Four Ambassadors Hotel. Rothwell could not contribute anything pertinent to this inquiry. In addition no prominent Bahamians are presently or have been recently in the hotel.

W. Bruce Wrightson, Chief of Security, Sheraton Royal Biscayne Hotel. No prominent Bahamians are presently or have been recently in the hotel.

A confidential local law enforcement source indicated that an attorney in West Palm Beach is selling automatic weapons. He is free lancing and has a small warehouse with two separate alarm systems installed on the warehouse.

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Chief, Miami Field Office
ATTN : Mr. Bruce Mainwaring

OSS-44-74
8 January 1974

Chief, Domestic Collection Division (Support Branch/OSS)

Mitchell L. WerBell, III

1. We have reviewed subject's 201 file for additional information. Subject was of interest to this Agency in 1959 and was granted a POA in August of that year. This was cancelled in October 1959 when his information proved to be of little value and because it was suspected he was using Agency funds to promote his personal interests. He has subsequently attempted to pass himself off as an Agency employee. He is characterized by the file as unscrupulous, a "wheeler-dealer" and a promoter of grandiose schemes. The subject has been under investigation in 1973 by both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the United States Customs Service for activities relating to possible mercenary activities in Abaco Island, Bahamas.

2. If the subject should contact your office again, we suggest you accept whatever information he has to offer but make no further commitments concerning Agency contact. Subject is well known to the appropriate Desk and is of extremely doubtful character.

3. We trust this memorandum will provide you with useful information concerning this subject. Thank you for bringing his name to our attention.

JACKSON R. HORTON

EPRyan for DDAsss/b
cc: Services Br. (Control)
IP Files

FILE: 201-25819

2.1

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 010630

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

201-257710

DCD memo to
Miami field
office.

Dated Jan 74

WICKES, A.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WICKES, ALASTAIR
201- 801702

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10-30 19SEPT 78		WENDY COLLINS	Wendy S Collins

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY

DOC. SOURCE

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No.; etc. - if applicable)

WICKS, ALISTAIR
201-801702
SEX M DOB ?

200-006-485/03
PARI-33753
13 NOV 72

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUPRENUK NOTED SPELLING SUBJ NAME IN REPORT GIVEN AS WEEKS FRENCH PHONETIC RENDERING OF WICKS

R 7301180251

Indicate The Subject, Project Or
201 File No. In Which This
Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 801702

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

WEEKS, ALISTAR
201-8017C2
SEX M DOB ?

CIT RHODESIA ?
OCC MERCENARY
LOCATED ON IBIZA ISLAND IN THE BELEARIC
ISLANDS ASSOCIATED W/COL. PETERS AND MIKE
HOARE

200-011-010/05
DBD -19954
30 JUL 71
FBI

R 7109230296

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)*	201- 801702			

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(7-46)

1-801702

(James)
WICKS, Alastair /Major/

DOB: 17 November 1917

POB: England

Citizenship: Rhodesian

Jul 66 Address: 38 Montague Square
London W 1

Mar 67 Address: 199 Bickenhall
Mansions
London W 1
(listed under Janis Morris)

Mercenary in Katanga gendarme, 1961

Former RAS (Rhodesian Air Services)official

Recruiter of South Rhodesian mercenaries for Tshombe forces - 1964

2nd in Command to Mike HOARE in 5 CDO
Left Leopoldville Dec 1965 at termination of mercenary contract for Johannesburg.

One of mercenaries involved in July '66 plot to overthrow MOBUTU (although still in the pay of MOBUTU)

Also, tried to involve Michael HOARE in the plot. He offered HOARE 20,000 L for 6 month contract and rank of full Colonel.

Recruiting Officer in South Africa for Tshombe's forces..'66

Unwitting SMOTH contact - 1966

Went to London in October 1966

Unscrupulous and undependable

201-801702

WICKS, Alastair

PRET 2818
(IN 31010)
30 Sep 1963

Early Aug Subject came from Salisbury with msgs for PUREN from Pierre LAUREYS and Jack Malloch (of Rhodesian Air Services). LAUREYS was arranging for Malloch to fly out arms and ammo to Royalists in Yemen. Malloch was to get contract to fly arms from Europe to Yemen also. PUREN was to proceed w/plane via Salisbury to Yemen as official observer for South African Defense HQS.

AHS 1016
CS DB 312/641-64
18 Sep 1964

Alastair WICKS, former RAS official, returned to Salisbury to begin the recruitment of Southern Rhodesians for service as mercenaries with TSCHOMBE's forces in the Congo. In newspaper ad calling for recruits, interested parties were requested to call Salisbury 55715, which is the numbdr listed for WICKS in S. Rhodesian telephone directory.

KINSHASA 0864
(IN 17389)
9 Mar 1967

HOARE stated he going London about 12 March to check on Yemen deal. HOARE had previously received letter from Alastair WICKS in London offering him job with good pay and conditions. He believes this job concerns Yemen.

AZPA 2201
16 Mar 67

Attached a letter from WICKS to HOARE, indicating WICKS unable to develop proposition further. HOARE estimates that the WICKS proposition relates to recruitment of mercenaries for service in Yemen. His only basis for this is development reported in AZPA 2200.

201-801762

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Africa Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, PRETORIA

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/SECAROB -- Letter re Mercenary Affairs

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: AZPT - 2258, 4 March 1970

1. Forwarded herewith is the substance of the latest letter received by SECAROB/1 from subject of 201 - 801702 re mercenary affairs and Zanzibar.

2. During ref trip, PHILBROOK will discuss this letter with SECAROB/1 for further clarification and forward the results to Headquarters.

Kenneth H. PHILBROOK

Attachment h/w
letter

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - C/AF w/att

CS COPY FILED IN 201-346585

201-801702

CROSS REFERENCE TO ~~201 - 801702~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER AZPA - 3050	DATE 5 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~201 - 346685~~

H/W ATT TO AZPA - 30 . 5 March 70

We are still held up in one business and I have had to call in my own supplies to give an estimate as the previous one, who was virtually unknown to me, did not seem to understand the importance of security in the industrial field today. This in fact should suit us better as I am sure I can do a better deal for us with our own man.

I have had to put off my departure for one week as a result of this as it was important to keep my fingers on the pulse at this moment. I have a meeting with the partners tomorrow when I hope to get things moving and a firm proposal sent to bankers.

I mentioned to the partners that you had some novel ideas to solve the delivery problem and in view of the possible extra cost, they have asked me to get an outline from you as to what your ideas are, both from the point of view of additional expense which, if adopted, would need to be included in the budget and also to give some added encouragement since this particular problem comes up again and again and so far I have refused to be drawn on the subject though you know my first ideas. I think a letter to the Club Nautico will reach me safely though it would obviously be inadvisable to mention the Spice Islands.

I hear there is much afoot in your part of the world and both Brazzaville and the Sudan have been mentioned, also another operation. I hope you will not return to that sort of thing -- at least until we have fully explored the possibilities of the new company.

(dated 25 February 1970)

CS COPY FILED IN 201-346655

201-801702

CS COPY

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 58 20

SECRET

INFO: NANCY BLAKE
UNIT: AF/4/N
EXT: 6963
DATE: 9 February 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER
AF7
☐ RID COPY

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

☐ INDEX ☐ PERFECT ☒ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-851762 B-201-051875

FILE VR EUR 8, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS

AN | EL |
TS | | AF/4/N
ABSTRACT X | INDEX |

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 74281

LAGOS INFO: LONDON

KRHOLLY

FN WICKES 201

3P

REFS: A. LAGOS 9510 (IN 38143)
B. LONDON 3161 (IN 39172)

1. FOLLOWING HQS TRACES ON ALASTAIR WICKS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JAMES ALASTAER EDMOND WICKS. WAS MERCENARY IN KATANGA GENDARME, 1961. IN JULY 1964, RETURNED TO CONGO AS SECOND IN COMMAND TO MICHAEL HOARE'S WHITE MERCENARY GROUP. WAS LOCAL MERCENARY RECRUITED FOR TSHOMBE IN SALISBURY. MAJOR IN HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT OF 5TH COMMANDO IN CONGO FEBRUARY 1965. RESIGNED FROM 5TH COMMANDO IN DECEMBER 1965, WENT TO JOHANNESBURG ACTING AS MERCENARY RECRUITING OFFICER IN SOUTH AFRICA. WAS ONE OF THE MERCENARIES INVOLVED IN JULY 1966 PLOT TO OVERTHROW MOBUTU BY FORMER CONGOLESE PRIME MINISTER MOISE TSHOMBE INVOLVING THE 5TH COMMANDO MERCENARIES. IN JULY 1967 WICKS REPRESENTED JACK MALLOCH'S AIR TRANS AFRICA IN LONDON. FUNCTION IN LONDON DESCRIBED AS LIAISON WITH AUTAIR OF LONDON AND TO ARRANGE MERCENARY FLIGHT TO CONGO. HOWEVER, THESE OPS HAVE VIRTUALLY CEASED. AUGUST 1967 WICKS INVOLVED IN MERCENARY PLANS TO OVERTHROW CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT. WAS IN LISBON,

MICROFILMED
FEB 27 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

B-201-051875

201-851762

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ RID COPY

FEB 26 3 20 PM '68

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 74281

NEGOTIATING WITH PORTUGUESE ABOUT SENDING ASSISTANCE TO DISSIDENT MERCENARY MAJOR JEAN SCHRAMME.

2. NAVICAR JOHN MALLOCH PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JACK MALLOCH, FORMER PILOT IN KATANGA AIR FORCE. IS NOW HEAD OF AIR TRANS AFRICA IN RHODESIA. COMPANY HAS BEEN IN FINANCIAL TROUBLE SINCE 1966. IN ORDER TO KEEP IN BUSINESS, IT APPEARS MALLOCH HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO ACCEPT CONTRACTS WHICH ARE OBVIOUSLY ILLEGAL. IN AUGUST 1967 HE OPERATED TWO CONSTELLATIONS AND A DC-4, LAST MENTIONED USED ON FREIGHT SERVICES FROM LUANDA, ANGOLA, AND LISBON, AND ON OPERATIONS FROM SAO TOME TO [redacted] BIAFRA. IN LATE AUGUST, MALLOCH FLEW 39 BELGIAN AND FRENCH MERCENARIES INTO PUNIA VIA LUANDA IN A DC-6. HAD AT HIS DISPOSAL FOR THE AIRLIFT ONE DC-7, TWO DC-4'S, AND ONE DC-3. WAS WORKING WITH ALASTAIR WICK~~E~~S IN THE MERCENARY PLANS TO OVERTHROW THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT. JOHN PETERS ATTEMPTED TO TIE HIS EFFORT WITH THAT OF WICK~~E~~S AND MALLOCH, AND THEY [redacted] TENTATIVELY AGREED TO A PLAN TO FLY REINFORCEMENTS TO SCHRAMME TO SERCRAF PLANTATION AT UVIRA. NO INFORMATION ON EITHER WICK~~E~~S OR MALLOCH IN FILE AFTER AUGUST 1967, ALTHOUGH WELL KNOWN THEY CONTINUE ASSOCIATION WITH BIAFRAN AIRLIFT.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

CITE DIRECTOR 74281

TO

PAGE THREE

3. NO HEADQUARTERS TRACES ON ANY OTHER INDIVIDUALS CITED REF A. ABOVE CAN BE PASSED KRHOLLY/4.

4. FOR LONDON: HEADQUARTERS HAS NO INFORMATION WALLERSTEINER; PLEASE FORWARD LAGOS YOUR TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/5

AF/COPS

E/BC/UK

C/AF/4

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER ______

ACTION AF7 ☒ RID COPY

SIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 2L

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-801702

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO AF/4/N BRANCH ☒ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, EUR8

ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

LAGS

SECRET 131043Z FEB 68 CITE LAGOS 9590

13 FEB 68 IN 50136

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

KRHOLLY

REF: A. LAGOS 9510 (IN 32143)
B. LONDON 3161 (IN 39172)
C. LAGOS 9550 (IN 44363)
D. DIRECTOR 74125

AN	K
PS	AF/4/N
ABSTRACT	X

APPRECIATE REF. HOWEVER, STATION'S ORIGINAL QUERY (REF A) NOT ANSWERED. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-801702
13 FEB 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WICKS, ALISTAIR
201-801702 007-009-011
SEX M DOB ? LOND-01001
20 AUG 67
CIT ? UEG -00291
OCC ? P1
FORMER MERCENARY MAJOR WHO IS STILL IN LISBON, NEGOTIATING WITH PORTUGUESE ABOUT SENDING ASSISTANCE TO DISSIDENT MERCENARY MAJOR JEAN SCHRAMME.

ACLUPLOBRAHSAZP R 6708293294

FILE IN 201-801702

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WICKS, ALISTAIR
201-801702
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

007-009-011
BRUS-09865
13 AUG 67
OBB -07301
P5

RE SUMMARY OF TWO PLANS FOR OVERTHROW OF CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT.

OELACL

R 6708254987

FILE IN 201-801702

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WICKS
201-801702
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE MERCENARY PLANS TO OVERTHROW CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT

201-346685
8RUS-09868
13 AUG 67
P1

OELACL

R 6708255679

FILE IN 201-801702

16. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

AF/345/RE 7 — ~~MARY~~ GORMLEY
31 Thanks

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

5 2
6
7 JK
8

FROM 20
ACTION AF 7

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR EURP CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, DDP, ADDP, SODC,

S E C R E T 283930Z CITE SALISBURY 2573 28 JUL 67 IN 21140

DIRECTOR INFO BRUSSELS, KINSHASA, PRETORIA, LONDON

REF: DIRECTOR 23009

ACCORDING BRICK/1, WHO OBTAINED INFO FROM CAPT. O'DONOVAN, OPS MANAGER OF CENTRAL AFRICAN AIRWAYS, WICKS. WICKS REPRESENTS AIR TRANS AFRICA IN LONDON, WAS THERE ON 12 JULY, AND NO INDICATION HE SUBSEQUENTLY LEFT LONDON. FUNCTION IN LONDON DESCRIBED AS LIAISON WITH AUTAIR OF LONDON AND TO ARRANGE MERCENARY FLIGHT TO CONGO. HOWEVER, THESE OPERATIONS HAVE "VIRTUALLY CEASED" AND AIR TRANS AFRICA NOW APPEARS TO RELY SOLELY ON AIRLIFTING PETROL FROM FRANCISTOWN, BOTSWAN TO LIVINGSTON, ZAMBIA USING COMPANY'S TWO FRANCISTOWN-REGISTERED DC-4'S.

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: R. Rideout:cjs
UNIT: AF/5
EXT: 5032
DATE: 26 July 1967

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 28 PER ______ # ______

CONF: AF 7

☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-[illegible]
XREF 201-[illegible]

INFO: FILE, VR, C/FAN, EUR 8, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

26 22 21 Z
CITE DIRECTOR 23009

TO SALISBURY INFO BRUSSELS KINSHASA PRETORIA LONDON

REF: PRETORIA 5ICS 5318 (IN 16565)

1. BRUSSELS 9749 (NOT SENT SALISBURY) REPORTS JOHN R. LATZ CAME BRUSSELS NINE MONTHS AGO AND CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS SALES INSPECTOR BY ETS FOURCROY SA, 119 RUE STEYLS, BRUSSELS, A WHOLESALE LIQUOR DISTRIBUTOR.

2. WIGEAR LAST SAW LATZ CIRCA 10 JUNE. SAYS LATZ LEFT KINSHASA CIRCA AUGUST 66 (LNGOLD TRAFFIC AT TIME CONFIRMS THIS) PASSED THROUGH BRUSSELS ON WAY VISIT FAMILY LONDON; THEN VISITED BROTHER COTE D'AZUR FRANCE. LATZ SETTLED BRUSSELS FALL 66 WITH FOURCROY AND HAS NOT TRAVELED AFRICA SINCE.

3. WIGEAR NOTED LATZ MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH ALASTAIR WICKES, WHO WIGEAR BELIEVES STILL EMPLOYED BY RHODESIAN AIRLINES AND TRAVELS SALISBURY-LONDON. DOES SALISBURY HAVE ANY INFO WICKES' ACTIVITIES?

END OF MESSAGE

AF/2

E/BNL/B

E/BC/UK

AF/COPS

AF/5

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISSEM BY ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

— 10/33

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

[illegible]

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION

AF 7 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

FILE VR, EUR 8, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, [illegible] FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/O 4

S E C R E T 081812 Z CITE KINSHASA 0864

9 MAR 67 IN 17389

DIRECTOR INFO PRETORIA, LONDON

SECAROB

1. ON 3 MARCH 1967 SECAROB/1 HAD MEETING WITH HASLANGER AND REPORTED FOLLOWING ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH WISTATIC/1.

A. SECAROB/1 TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO GET WISTATIC/1 TO FOCUS ON WHAT GDRC WAS GOING TO GIVE HIM FOR PHASING OUT THE 5 COMMANDO AND FOR RECRUITING NEW MEN IN ENGLAND. BASED ON WISTATIC/1'S ATTITUDE THAT SECAROB/1 WAS SOMETHING OF A CAD FOR BRINGING UP MONEY MATTERS, SECAROB/1 TOLD WISTATIC/1 HE HAD NO INTENTION OF PHASING OUT 5 COMMANDO UNLESS THIS FOLLOWED UP WITH RECRUITMENT OF 400 MEN FROM ENGLAND WITH EVENTUAL EXPANSION THIS FORCE TO 800 MEN, MOST OF WHOM WOULD BE ARTISANS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN; AND FINALLY SECAROB/1 TO BE ALLOWED TO DEVELOP TOURISM IN THE EASTERN CONGO. AS A RESULT OF THIS CONVERSATION SECAROB/1 STATED THAT HE NOW HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT BEING AX MAN FOR THE 5 COMMANDO BECAUSE HE HAS NO ASSURANCE THAT THE GDRC WILL PERMIT HIM TO CARRY OUT THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS PROGRAM.

SECRET

[illegible] KINSHASA 8364 S E C R ~~[illegible]~~ ET B. TO SECAROB/1'S SUGGESTION @ WISTATIC/1 THAT MOBUTU CUT IN LNHARP ON THE PHASE-OUT OF THE 5 COMMANDO DUE TO THE WITHRUSH POSITION IN ALBERTVILLE, WISTATIC/1 REPLIED "WE HOPE YOU ARE NOT AGAINST THE BELGIANS ~~[illegible]~~, ARE YOU? WE DON'T LIKE THEM" (ASSUME WISTATIC'S "WE" REFERS TO HIMSELF AND DELPERDANGE.)

C. SECAROB/1 ADVISED WISTATIC/1 THAT PETERS COULD BE A DIFFICULT MAN TO HANDLE IF DISBANDMENT OF 5 COMMANDO NOT PROPERLY HANDLED. WISTATIC/1 SAID HE SAW NO DIFFICULTIES HERE. (SECAROB/1 LATER STATED HE DID NOT FEAR PETERS BECAUSE THE LATTER STILL HAD A SERGEANT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HIS COMMANDING OFFICER, SECAROB/1. HASLANGER CAUTIONED SECAROB/1 AGAINST TAKING PETERS TOO LIGHTLY.)

D. WISTATIC/1 COMPLAINED TO SECAROB/1 ABOUT SECAROB/1 NOT HAVING GIVEN HIM A LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION BACK IN SEPTEMBER 1966. WISTATIC/1 SAID HE HAD INTENDED USE LETTER ALONG WITH OTHERS TO PREVENT HIS REMOVAL AND THAT OF GENERAL DELPERDANGE FROM THE CONGO BY THE BELGIAN ARMY. SECAROB/1 CONCLUDED HIS DISCUSSION OF WISTATIC/1 WITH THE COMMENT THAT WISTATIC/1 KNOWS THE CONGO AS FEW MEN DO AND THAT HE IS A SENSITIVE MAN WITHOUT COURAGE.

SECRET

2. CONCERNING THE OAU MEETING IN SEPTEMBER, SECAROB/1 EMPHASIZED THAT MOBUTU TOLD HIM THAT IT HIS INTENTION TO GET PERMANENT HEADQUARTERS OF OAU TRANSFERRED TO THE CONGO. FURTHER THE GDRC WISHES TO BE A STRONG MILITARY POWER IN CENTRAL AFRICA. WITH THIS COMBINATION MOBUTU HOPES THAT THE GDRC WILL BE THE LEADING POWER IN CENTRAL AFRICA AND POSSIBLY IN ALL OF AFRICA.

3. WHILE CONFIRMING HIS WILLINGNESS TO DISBAND THE 5 COMMANDO IF LNHARP WANTS HIM TO DO SO, SECAROB/1 EMOTIONALLY TOLD HASLANGER THAT HE HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR LNHARP AND WOTACT; HE WAS OUR MAN AND WOULD BE EVER LOYAL TO LNHARP WHICH HE BELIEVES MUST EXERCISE MORE INFLUENCE IN AFRICA; LNHARP HAS ALWAYS BEEN FAIR TO HIM; AND THAT WITHOUT WOFACT THE 5 COMMANDO COULD NEVER HAVE DONE ITS JOB. PRIOR TO LEAVING HASLANGER'S HOME SECAROB/1 LEARNED THAT HASLANGER MIGHT BE LEAVING THE CONGO AROUND AUGUST 1967. SECAROB/1 STATED THAT IF GUTHMAN AND HASLANGER WERE TO LEAVE THE CONGO HE WOULD BE RELUCTANT TAKE ON HIS NEW JOB SINCE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS MEAN A GREAT DEAL TO HIM AND WERE IMPORTANT IN IMPLEMENTING HIS NEW PROGRAM. SECRET

4. FINALLY SECAROB/1 STATED THAT HE GOING LONDON ABOUT 12 MARCH TO CHECK ON THE YEMEN DEAL. HE SUGGESTED LNHARP MIGHT WANT HIM TO GO TO YEMEN AND THAT HE WOULD DO SO IF LNHARP DESIRED IT. HE NOT ENCOURAGED BUT TOLD TO REPORT FULL INFO THIS SUBJECT. (SECAROB/1 HAD PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM ALASTAIRE WICKES IN LONDON. LETTER STATED THAT JOB AVAILABLE WITH GOOD PAY AND CONDITIONS. SECAROB/1 BELIEVES JOB CONCERNS YEMEN. HE KNOWS THAT (FNU) STERLING, OF LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP FAME, HAS LARGE GROUP OF MERCENARISS IN YEMEN.)

5. INSTRUCTED SECAROB/1 TO CHECK WITH PRETORIA ON HIS RETURN SOUTH AFRICA 4 MARCH.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

4-00000

66 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

BY ___ PER ___ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM DIRECTOR

AF 7

INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY [illegible]

E/INT 2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

[redacted]

SECRET 20 23 20 Z [redacted] CITE DIRECTOR 61200

TO LONDON PRETORIA KINSHASA

WIQUIT

REFERENCE A. KINSHASA 9412 (IN 55542)

B. SALISBURY 2305 (IN 59641)

1. HQS NOTES THAT NAME ALASTAIR WICKS HAS NOT APPEARED IN RECENT SECAROB/1 REPORTING OF WIQUIT/1 PLOTTING. DURING SUMMER PLOTTING WICKS ALLEGEDLY ONE OF PRINCIPALS INVOLVED. REFERENCE B, HOWEVER, SUGGESTS THAT WICKS CONTINUES BE INVOLVED IN WIQUIT PLOTTING. WOULD APPRECIATE PRETORIA STATION DEBRIEF SECAROB/1 AT NEXT REGULAR MEETING ON WICKS PRESENT WHEREABOUTS AND ACTIVITIES.

2. HQS HAS ALSO NOTED THE ABSENC[illegible] ANY SMOTH REPORTING TO WOFACT ON THE MACHINATIONS OF WIQUIT/1 GROUP. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR LONDON STATION TAKE THIS UP WITH SMOTH AND SOLICIT THEIR ASSISTANCE IN MONITORING ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS OF PETERS, WICKS, AND POSSIBLY JOHN TERRENCE PEET, SUBJECT

continued....

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: E. Myrick
UNIT: AF/3
EXT:
DATE:

☐ INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF: VR . FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 61200

TO

DIRECTOR 36997 AND 38456.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE KINSHASA STATION POUCH DETAILED DEBRIEFING REPORT PEET TRIP AND HIS CONTACTS WITH WIQUIT/1 GROUP. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE PRETORIA STATION POUCH DETAILED REPORT OF SECAROB/1 RECENT TRIP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/AF

CAF/5

AF/2

John G. Roberts
C/EUR/COPS

E/BC/UK John G. Roberts

AF/COPS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WICKS, ALISTAIR
201-801702
SEX M DOB ?

201-346685
UELA-46585
18 NOV 66
P1

CIT ?
OCC ?

SECARUB/1 SAW SUBJ SEVERAL TIMES DURING HIS LONDON VISIT NOW OFF PAYROLL AND LIVING AT 199 BICKENHALL ST, LONDON, W. 1 TEL HUN 1729. SECAROB/1 DOES NOT HAVE HIGH REGARD FOR SUBJ MILITARY CAPABILITY.

ACLAZP

R 6707191852

FILE IN 201-801702

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

TO Chief of Station, Kinshasa	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO Chief of Station, Pretoria	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief Africa Division	MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Handwriting Analysis - Alastair WICKS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: AZPA - 2084, 9 August 1966

Action Required: For Your Information

The letter forwarded via reference was submitted to WOACRE for handwriting analysis. The results are forwarded herewith for your information.

Jerry O. MEDLISH

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COS, Kinshasa (w/att.)
1 - COS, Pretoria (w/att.)

COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OCT 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER ACLW - 1733	DATE 21 October 1966 201-801702
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-801702

2 AF/5
1 AF/2
1 TSD/BAB

ANY/FI
~~RI [illegible]~~
ABSTRACT X INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
AF/5	E. Myrick	cjs	5032

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
TSD/BAB	26 Oct	John [illegible]
AF/2	28 Oct 66	[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AF/5	28 Oct	[illegible]

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

HF 5 C

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-801702 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 31
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑
DESTROY ☐ SIG. AF/5

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[redacted]
DISSEM BY 2

ACTION
AF 7

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, EUR 8, C/OPS, C/CI 2, C/BA, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6

RN K	~~FI~~	AF/5
~~PS~~	~~DESK~~	
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~	

19 Oct 66 20824

S E C R E T 190837Z CITE PRETORIA 5118

KINSHASA INFO DIRECTOR

SECAROB

REF: PRETORIA 5111 (~17697)

RE REF WICKS TOLD SECAROB/1 HE RETURNING LONDON IN THREE DAYS. ALSO REPEATED RUMOR HEARD IN SALISBURY THAT UNIDENTIFIED AMERICANS RECRUITING MERCENARIES IN SALISBURY FOR PURPOSES OF COUP TO REPLACE MOBUTU WITH BOBOZO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-801702
19 Oct 66

SECRET

12 October 1966

TSD/BAB MEMO #226-66

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, AF/5

ATTENTION : Mr. Earl R. Myrick

SUBJECT : Handwriting Analysis - Alastair Wicks

REFERENCE : AF/5 memo dated 29 Aug. 1966

1. Attached herewith is the handwriting assessment report on subject as requested by reference. The report was prepared by Mrs. Thea Hall of this office. Any comments or criticism would be appreciated.

2. The data supplied is insufficient for further psychological assessment. If contact reports and personal observations of subject's manner and behavior become available, we could produce a more precise assessment oriented to subject's performance in intelligence activities.

William C. Goswood

William C. GOSWOOD (P)
Chief, TSD/BAB

Attachments:
Report &
h.w. sample

SECRET

SECRET

Handwriting Assessment Report

Alastair Wicks AF

The writer seems to be a very clever individual of a high intellectual level who handles his affairs in a independent manner. Endowed with a good intelligence, he is well educated and cultured. He has not only absorbed but, also, assimilated the material he has read and studied and utilizes it in a purposeful fashion. His thinking is clear, logical and versatile. His intellectual faculties are well trained and differentiated, and, to a large extent, they support his practical talents and interests constructively. He discards superfluous matters, and, whenever possible, he deals with only the vital points in a problem or a situation. He possesses impressive mental agility with well developed analyzing and synthesizing faculties. He is quite intuitive and senses instinctively the implications of happenings around him.

He is an alert and astute observer of small details which he relates correctly to their larger aspects. Being quite resourceful, he combines imagination with sober matter-of-factness. He follows prescribed rules and regulations when absolutely necessary and, whenever possible, exercises his mental independence. He forms his own opinion and judgment and keeps his own counsel in making decisions. He may accept somebody else's suggestions that he considers suitable for his purposes but he is not actually influenced by others. At times, he may deliberately make somebody feel as if he is seeking his advice and following it, but, in reality, he does what he considers best. He is very critical and evaluates by high standards. He can be very outspoken in his criticism or he can cautiously withhold it depending on his appraisal of the circumstances. His interests cover small items of information to large size projects and operations. While he notices everything that is going on, he can concentrate on his work. When required, he can switch quickly from one task to another. His memory functions well and he can reproduce facts easily.

SECRET

The writer has administrative ability on a supervisory level. Within a military setup, he could take orders as well as issue them, although he prefers the latter. He can be systematic and methodical in his approach. He can work out a blueprint of an intricate undertaking and supervise its proper execution. He will quickly and easily adapt to fluctuations in a situation and change his tactics accordingly.

He is skillful in manipulating numbers, and he can think in large terms and transactions. Apparently, he is quite interested in money, and he seems to know how to get the best possible advantage out of a financial transaction.

He possesses great facility in expressing himself orally and in writing. He can make his points palatable and can be quite convincing in his arguments. Also, he can formulate his ideas and purposes in different ways, depending on with whom he is dealing. He should have talent for learning foreign languages. He is a gifted person who will exploit his talents in line with the demands that are put before him. He also seems to have physical training and skills. He has a natural feeling for form, sound and color. He probably has developed artistic appreciation and may have an artistic hobby, possibly music.

Emotionally, the writer is complex but fairly well balanced. Innately impressionable and sensitive, he has hardened himself in the course of his life in order to be less vulnerable. He has his feelings and impulses under fairly good control and avoids being carried away by them. In his private life, though, he may tend to be somewhat excitable and irritable. He is self-centered and most interested in his personal advantage. This is a trait that he tries to cover up by being smooth and pleasing in his dealings with people. He possesses natural psychological understanding and can be very diplomatic. He manages to appear outgoing and social while basically he is quite reserved and detached. He seems to avoid emotional involvements in order to preserve his objectivity.

SEC

His appearance is poised and sophisticated, and he knows how to handle himself under different conditions. Being an independent and sophisticated individual, he has developed his own philosophy and code of ethics by which he lives. He does not seem to have any qualms about doing things that would not be conventionally acceptable. He is very broad-minded about himself and others, and he detests pettyness, even in wrongdoing. The purpose justifies the means for him as long as the transaction takes place on a large scale. He is most skillful in practicing various types of deception and he is quite adroit in manipulating people and situations. He is very active and could have "his fingers in a number of pies." He is emotionally somewhat strained, but he has sifficient stamina to support his general functioning.

The writer is apparently an unusually talented person who could function in different types of positions. He could be a military officer, a business executive, a politician, an intelligence agent or he could be a diplomat. He would not be suitable for any kind of routine work, but he is well qualified for mentally challenging assignments--the more challenging the better. He is a diligent worker who is somewhat vain in showing off his competence. He likes to demonstrate how successfully he can carry out a complicated and delicate job. When he is willing to accept an assignment, one can expect a high quality of work performance, but anybody who would expect loyalty from him would probably be disappointed.

TSH/sf
October 3, 1966

No [illegible] tion
of [illegible]
dissemi[illegible] coordi-
nation with [illegible].

SEC

SECRET

29 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Technical Services Division
Behavioral Activities Branch

SUBJECT : Request for Psychological Assessment

1. Attached is a photographic copy of a letter which is being submitted to your office for analysis of the handwriting and possible psychological assessment of the writer. Unfortunately, the original of this letter is not available. Hopefully the quality of the attached copy will be adequate for your purposes.

2. If any further information is required, please contact Earle R. Myrick, Africa/5, Room 7c18, extension 5032.

Michael S. Thompson
Acting Chief, Africa/5

[illegible]

SECRET

6 AZPA - 2084

35 Montagu Square
London W.1.
3 July 66

Dear Willie.

I know you will have been wondering what is going on, but up to now I have not been able to say much. Briefly the story is as follows. After our talk, which confirmed my own feelings, I returned to Salisbury where in effect I said no dice with J.P. They accepted this and I suggested you for the job. I pointed out to them that quite apart from the known disparity in ability, the fact that your loyalty was known to be 100% must be worth everything in a business of this nature and that in terms of £.s.d. you were obviously worth twice as much as J.P. They said they would consider the matter. I was then told that it had been decided to get rid of J.P. one way or another and that they would like to bring you in. I told them I was very pleased but that any negotiation must be done with you direct. Finally, at a last meeting it was decided to do much more ground work — what I had been demanding from the start — and that there would be a standstill for about 2 weeks. I thereupon informed them that I would return home here as (a) I wanted to see the family and (b) I thought it was better than hanging about. I have now had a message to say there will be a delay of 2 to 3 months but that it is still definitely on. In the meantime I am to remain on full salary -- to which I have no objection!

Please write to me in general terms as to whether you continue to be interested and whether you approve of the line taken re yourself. It is of course possible that you may have been contacted direct in which case I would be interested to know

Please accept my thanks to you and Phyllis for a most enjoyable stay — I do hope we didn't really keep Virginia awake so late.

Nan sends her love to you both and hopes to see you again one of these days.

Yrs, [illegible]

P.S. What news the book? Can I hammer your publishers for you?'

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1) TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 7

ACTION AF 7 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT AF TIME 1825Z

INFO FILE VR CS/DO EUR 8 CI C/OPS CI/IC 2 FI FI/INT 2 C/OA

11 AUG 65 IN 74712

WICKS

LOND 5105

S E C R E T 111555Z CITE LONDON 5133

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, KINSHASA, PRETORIA INFO [redacted] LUMBUMBASHI, BUKAVU, BRUSSELS

[redacted]

AF/5C

INDEX

ABSTRACT X

ZIBET WIQUIT SECAROB SMOTH

REF DIRECTOR 26813

1. AT 11 AUGUST MEETING, SMOTH CONFIRMED THEY HAD HAD INDIRECT CONTACT WITH WICKS IN PAST, BUT THAT HE WAS UNWITTING SOURCE. CONTACT MAN PRESENTLY UNAVAILABLE, BUT THEY PLAN PUT HIM BACK IN TOUCH WITH WICKS ABOUT 17 AUGUST, IN HOPE HE CAN ELICIT INFORMATION AS TO WICKS' FUTURE PLANS, ETC.

2. MEANWHILE SMOTH HAVE ASKED SPECIAL BRANCH (DIRECTLY, NOT THROUGH JAGUAR) TO COVER WICKS, BUT TO DATE THEY HAVE NOT LOCATED HIM. WE URGED THEM TO FOLLOW UP RETURN ADDRESS ON LETTER, OFFERING MAKE AVAILABLE FLAT NEXT DOOR OCCUPIED BY FEMALE STATION PERSONNEL AS OP IF DESIRED. ONE PROBLEM IS PRESUMPTION WICKS TRAVELLED ON U.K. PASSPORT, IN WHICH CASE IMMIGRATION WILL HAVE NO RECORD HIS ENTRY OR INTENDED ADDRESS. HAVE ADDRESSEES ANY CLUE AS TO DOCUMENTATION ON WHICH WICKS TRAVELLING?

201-801702
11 Aug 1966

3. WITHOUT INDICATING ANY KNOWLEDGE FUTURE PLANNING REFLECTED REF, WE SPECULATED ALOUD AT POSSIBILITY SECAROB/1

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 LONDON 5128 SECRET

MIGHT VISIT U.K. NEAR FUTURE, SINCE HE CONTINUED BE IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH WICKS AND WAS "KNOWN INTERESTED FIND PUBLISHER FOR BOOK." BELIEVE WE WILL HAVE NO DIFFICULTY OBTAINING SMOTH SUPPORT FOR WOFACT CONTACT WITH SECAROB/1 SHOULD HE VISIT, BUT SMOTH WILL WANT TO KNOW AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE OF HIS TRAVEL PLANS. THIS ALSO APPLIES TO PETERS, SHOULD WE LEARN HE TO VISIT U.K. AGAIN. BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOW KEEP SMOTH FULLY AND PROMPTLY INFORMED ON ALL BRITISH PLAYERS IN THIS GAME, NOT ONLY FOR USUAL REASONS BUT TO ENSURE THEY PUT OUT MAXIMUM EFFORT ON COVERING THEM.

4. WILL ADVISE SEPARATELY RE EMERGENCY CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECAROB/1.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

√(81)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-801702
X-REF TO FILE NO. B201-346685
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 39

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

[redacted]

DISSEM BY 2

ACTION
AF 7

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT AF

TIME 1625Z

BY

INFO
FILE VR, CS/DO, DDP, ADDP, EUR 8, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, FI/SPG, CA 2, CA/PROP

PRET

11 Aug 66 IN 74584

S E C R E T 111342Z CITE PRETORIA 4955

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY KINSHASA, LONDON, ROUTINE LUBUMBASHI

BUKAVU BRUSSELS

WIQUIT SECAROB

REF: A. PRETORIA 4953 (IN 74361)

B. DIRECTOR 26818*

WILL COMPLY REF B WHICH RECEIVED AFTER REF A SENT.

S E C R E T

* RE LETTERS FROM WICKS AND WICKS MENTIONED CULP STILL ON AND ASKS SECAROB/1 SUPPORT.

AF/S/C

~~INDEX~~

SECRET

1P

MICROFILMED
AUG 19 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

WICKS

201-801702
11 Aug 66

B201-346685

(35)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-801701

X-REF TO FILE NO. 301-346685

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM: DISSEM BY #4

ACTION: AF 7 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT: AF TIME: 1906 BY: G

INFO: FILE VR, CS/DO, EUR8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2, CI/IC2

LOND 5089

S E C R E T 101758Z CITE LONDON 5089 10 AUG 66 73951

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, KINSHASA INFO PRETORIA, LUMBUMBASHI, BUKAVU, BRUSSELS

1P

2/1 [redacted] AP/5C

AUTH [redacted] [redacted]

ACT X

ZIBET WIQUIT SECAROB

REF A. DIRECTOR 26716

B. LONDON 5082 (CEL-45,310) (IN 73893)

C. KINSHASA 7090 (IN 72211)

MICROFILMED
SEP 2 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. HAVE DISCUSSED WICKS PRESENCE LONDON WITH SMOTH AND REQUESTED THEM ATTEMPT COVER HIS ACTIVITIES HERE ON BASIS COMMENTS REF C. PLEASE NOTE PER REF B SMOTH HAVE BELATEDLY CONFIRMED HIS INVOLVEMENT FROM SOURCE IN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT QUARTER.

2. SMESPY HAS ACKNOWLEDGED UNOFFICIALLY THAT ~~M~~ SMOTH HAS HAD CONTACT WITH WICKS IN PAST AND IS NOW DEBATING WHETHER APPROACH HIM ON FRIENDLY BASIS STEMMING FROM PREVIOUS CONTACT OR ASK JAGUAR ATTEMPT COVER HIM FROM DISTANCE. MEETING 11 AUGUST 1130 HOURS TO DISCUSS FURTHER AND TRY HELP THEM DECIDE. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER TIDBITS PASSABLE AT THAT TIME.

S E C R E T

ET

B- 301-346685

201- 801701
10 August 1966

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 28 PER 90-19

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE QA TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION PF7 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO

TIME 2040Z

BY B

INFO: FILE VE, CS/DO SUSPENSE, AF, CDO, EUR 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, IW, DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CS/SGO, FI/SPG

6 AUG [illegible] 71600

S E C R E T 061915Z CITE PRETORIA 4941

34685

IMMEDIATE KINSHASA PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LUBUMBASHI,
BUKAVU, BRUSSELS, LONDON, CAPE TOWN

WIQUIT SECAROB

1. SECAROB/1 HAS RECEIVED LETTER FROM WICKS DATED 31 JULY RETURN ADDRESS 35 MONTAGUE SQUARE LONDON W1 SAYING WICKS HAS RECEIVED WORD THAT WICKS REMAINS ON FULL SALARY AND COUP DELAYED FOR TWO OR THREE MONTHS. SECAROB/1 SHOULD REPLY IN GENERAL TERMS IF HE STILL INTERESTED.

2. SECAROB/1 NOTES HE WAS INTERESTED LISTENER TO WICKS ON 11 JULY. DID NOT TAKE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE.

Bur files press conf.

3. SECAROB/1 REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON CONTENT HIS REPLY TO WICKS. MEANWHILE IS MAILING WICKS LETTER TO PRETORIA.

4. ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT, POSSIBLY PERTINENT TO SECAROB/1 UPCOMING DEALINGS WITH WICKS, SECAROB/1 ON 5 AUGUST RECEIVED FROM WIZARD/4 AIR TICKET TO LONDON, PROMISED WHEN SECAROB/1 LEFT CONGO, AND WOULD LIKE USE IT. THIS SUGGESTS SECAROB/1 MEETING LONDON WITH WICKS.

5. SECAROB/1 BOOK TURNED DOWN. RETURNED FROM PUBLISHER 5 AUGUST.

6. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-50170
X-REF TO FILE NO. D 7-9-11
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ✓ TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 7

ACTION C/AF 4 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR C/EUR 4 C/CI C/CA 2 C/FI 2 C/SOD 3 C/FI/INT 2 ADDP DDP

26 JUL 65 IN 63928

S E C R E T 261255Z CITE SALISBURY 1934

DIRECTOR INFO PRETORIA LUANDA BRUSSELS LONDON LUBUMBASHI BUKAVU

RYBAT VIQUIT

REF DIRECTOR 22250 *

ERICW/1 LEARNED 25 JULY ALISTAIR WICKS LEFT LAST WEEK FOR TWO WEEK VISIT LONDON. MISSION UNKNOWN.

S E C R E T

BT

*REQUESTED INFORMATION ON MATTERS OUTSIDE CONGO, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN RHODESIA

WASH S/C NOTE: HQS SIGCEN NOT AUTHORIZED
AUTOMATICALLY RELAY THIS
MSG TO * LUANDA
FORWARD FORM 12 IF RELAY
REQUIRED.

SECRET

WICKS

AN FI
PS DESK
ABSTRACT X INDEX

SECRET

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Alastair WICKS

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

4. CITIZENSHIP
?Rhodesian, South African, British

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Mercenary in the Congo

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST
NAME CHECK № 173910

DATE 31/7/64

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME B.A. Metcalf
OFFICE DESIGNATOR AF/5
ROOM, BUILDING 7C-18
EXTENSION 5032

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☐ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☒ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Mercenary	Congo	Aug 64-present

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION	(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
Any

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

28 July 66
DATE

TO: B. Metcalf

cy

FROM: FI/D

A. XXXX SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES. Reviewed by you 27 Jul 66.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SUBJECT		BADGE NO.	D.	MO.	YR.	TYPE	CODE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
MOSS	536	HX185	24	01	78			DFF-67223
			REQUEST DATE			CONTROL		

REQUESTER IDENTIFICATION CARD

Enclosed are the APERTURE CARD(S) for document(s) you requested.

OFFICE	ROOM	TUBE	PHONE
IP/EIS	GA10	DW7	9245

REQUESTER	SUBJECT	TYPE REQUEST
FOLTZ LINDA	MOSS	362

S-E-C-R-E-T (WHEN FILLED IN)
CL. BY: 007622

Form 2000a 6-63

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 35

ACTION C/AF 4 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☒ ☐

UNIT AF TIME 1632 BY C

INFO FILE, VR, DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CS, CS/DO, C/AF 4, C/CA 3, C/CI/SCC, C/CI, C/CI/PS, C/FI 2, C/FI/SPG, C/CA 2, [illegible]

S E C R E T 150713Z CITE PRETORIA 4882

R-26

IMMEDIATE KINSHASA INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, BRUSSELS, LUBUMBASHI, BUKAVU

~~15 [illegible] 7345~~

RYBAT WIGUIT

REF: DIRECTOR 19340 *

15 JUL 66 IN 57044

1. WICKS PHONED HOARE 14 JULY FROM SALISBURY WITH PROPOSITION HOARE TO RECEIVE 20,000 POUNDS FOR SIX MONTH CONTRACT, ETC. TASK WOULD BE COORDINATION OF MILITARY EFFORT IN KATANGA AGAINST REACTION BY ANC. RANK FULL COLONEL. HOARE STALLED AWAITING ARRIVAL MICHELL WITH REF GUIDANCE.

2. WICKS CLAIMED HE ATTEMPTING POSTPONE COUP UNTIL 27 JULY TO PERMIT RECRUITMENT ADDITIONAL MERCENARIES SO AS ELIMINATE NECESSITY RELIANCE ON PETERS. WICKS REGISTERED KENTUCKY HOTEL SALISBURY. PETERS REGISTERED PARK LANE HOTEL. PETERS PARTICIPATING IN SALISBURY DELIBERATIONS ON AD HOC BASIS.

3. HOARE ACCEPTED REF GUIDANCE EVENING 14 JULY. STATED THIS CONFIRMED HIS UNDERSTANDING COYNE 1 POSITION AND HE WILL NOT ACCEPT WICKS PROPOSITION. POINTED OUT PERSONAL LOYALTY TO PUGH 2 PARAMOUNT DESPITE GLITTERING OFFER. HOWEVER HIS FINANCIAL POSITION HAS DETERIORATED RAPIDLY AND HE NOW IN NEED SOME ASSISTANCE. HOARE

SECRET

SECRET

REQUESTS IF POSSIBLE SOME COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF ABOVE OFFER. HE AVAILABLE FOR ANY TASKS TO COUNTER COUP.

4. HOARE STATED IF COUP TO PROCEED 17 JULY, WICKS AND PETERS WILL RETURN JOHANNESBURG 15 JULY AND DEPART JAN SMUTS AIRPORT 16 JULY WITH FORTY THREE EX-5 COMMANDO TYPES RECRUITED JOHANNESBURG SINCE 4 JULY. PLANE WILL PROCEED TO STAGING AREA AT HENRIQUE [illegible] CARVALLO.

5. HOARE SUGGESTED KINSHASA INFORM MOBUTU OF PLOT. IN ORDER TO HAVE INSIDE MAN NEAR MOBUTU, KINSHASA COULD SUGGEST MOBUTU SEND HOARE REQUEST VISIT HIM AT ONCE OR HE COULD GO TO MOBUTU ON OWN INITIATIVE. HOARE WOULD ASK MOBUTU DISBAND 5 COMMANDO AT ONCE IN VIEW THEIR DISLOYALTY, PETERS' RACKETS, PAYMENTS TO FICTITIOUS MEN, MURDER OF VAN OPPENS AND BURCHETT, STEALING OF PT BOAT, ETC. THIS DISBANDMENT VITAL TO MOBUTU SECURITY AND AS SAFEGUARD AGAINST REPEAT PLOT. WOULD RECOMMEND REPLACE 5 COMMANDO AND POSSIBLY 6 COMMANDO WITH NEW GENDARMERIE FORCE RECRUITED IN U.K. HOARE COULD DO THIS AND ATTEND TO INITIAL TRAINING, ETC. MOBUTU WOULD INGRATIATE HIMSELF WITH OAU BY DISMISSING [illegible] [illegible] MERCENARIES. [illegible] FORCE WOULD SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO MOBUTU. SIMILAR MARINE UNIT COULD BE RECRUITED.

6. HOARE ADDED THE MALUBA WILL REVOLT IN RETALIATION FOR KIMBA EXECUTION IF TSHOMBE SUCCEEDS. ALSO, BELIEVES UMHK FUNDS DEPOSITED

SECRET

SALISBURY OR JOHANNESBURG.

7. MORNING 15 JULY HOARE PHONED MICHELL TO ADVISE HE TALKED TO WICKS IN SALISBURY PREVIOUS NIGHT. TURNED DOWN WICKS PROPOSITION BUT DID NOT ELABORATE. WICKS SAID PETERS HAS PULLED OUT AND IS IN LONDON. PLANNING FOR COUP CONTINUES TO PROCEED SALISBURY. TARGET DATE NOW 21 JULY. NO INDICATION ANY PLANS FOR MOVEMENT RECRUITS FROM JOHANNESBURG AS YET.

8. NO FURTHER INFO ON ROLE MALUMBA, IDENS OTHER MAJOR CONGOLESE FIGURES INVOLVED, OR DEGREE INVOLVEMENT SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN PLOT. PARTICIPATION SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA GOVERNMENTS BEING HANDLED BY SECURITY SERVICES AS INDICATED. PROOF OF OFFICIAL PARTICIPATION LACKING. URGE UTMOST PROTECTION HOARE AS SOURCE SINCE HIS POSITION AS U.K. CITIZEN IN SOUTH AFRICA MOST TENUOUS.

9. PRETORIA HANDLING DISSEM IN INTEL FORMAT.

SECRET

BT

CS COMMENT: *Requests Station to express to Hoare deep appreciation for information on coup planning and forwards a number of reasons for ODYOKE (I) policy remaining in support of a unified and stable Congo for passage to Hoare.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WICKS, ALASTAIR
201-801702
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
FORMER MAJOR IN FIFTH COMMANDO WHO
RESIGNED FROM FIFTH COMMANDO IN DEC 65.
RE ALLEGED PLANS FOR COUP D'ETAT BY FORMER
CONGOLESE PRIME MINISTER MOISE TSHOMBE
INVOLVING FIFTH COMMANDO MERCENARIES.

201-275439
KNSH-06462
13 JUL 66
ACA -00145
P2

ACEACBAZPAHSGBBCEL

R 6609221054

FILE IN 201-801702

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
9-57

SECRET

(7-46)

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Rhodesia/South Africa/Congo (K)/Zambia

REPORT NO. CS -311/03210-66

SUBJECT Additional Congo Mercenary Flights

DATE DISTR. 4 March 1966

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 2 February 1966

PLACE Rhodesia, Salisbury

DATE ACQ. (5 February 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. AHS-1314

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) Reserve officer who obtains information from reserve officer briefings and from officials of air services. His previous reporting on mercenaries recruited and sent to the Congo has proved reliable. He is pro-U.S. He obtained this information from Captain Jack MALLOCH, head of Air Trans-Africa.

As of 2 February a total of eight mercenary flights had been completed to the Congo since the first of this year, with personnel drawn largely from Johannesburg who have been joined by small groups of Rhodesians from Salisbury. Major Alistair WICKS, former deputy commander of No. 5 Commando, is now acting as mercenary recruiting officer in South Africa. Each of the eight flights carried out by Air Trans-Africa transported 70 mercenaries. One additional flight of approximately the same number is still to be undertaken.-

1. Source Comment: Air Trans-Africa has sent one DC-4 aircraft to Zambia where it has been registered and is now engaged in the oil lift.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR

CINCMEAFSA # (Also sent London, Lusaka, Pretoria, Cape Town, Leopoldville)

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

23/4 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM PRETORIA

ACTION AF 7 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2 ... WE ... AF/2/SA

WASH S/C NOTE: HQS SIGCEN NOT AUTHORIZED AUTOMATICALLY RELAY THIS MSG TO SLBY FORWARD FORM 12 IF RELAY REQUIRED

SECRET 281345Z 28 FEB 66 IN 64278

DIR INFO LEOP SLBY CITE PRET 4684 (STRAUB ACTING)

1. ASSISTANT ARMA LEOPOLDVILLE VISITED OFFICE 23 FEB PURSUANT TO ACSI REQUEST FOR BI ON MICHAEL HOARE AND ALLISTER WICKS. REQUESTED REFERENCE NUMBERS ANY BI WE HAD SENT IN SO HE COULD PASS THEM TO ACSI. TOLD HIM WE HAD NO SUCH BI, BUT RECALLED THAT PRESS HAD CARRIED CONSIDERABLE INFO ON HOARE BACKGROUND WHICH MIGHT BE AVAILABLE AT KUBARK HEADQUARTERS. AS FOR WICKS, WE UNDERSTOOD HE RHODESIAN, BUT HAD NO INFO OTHER THAN FACT HE INVOLVED IN AIR LIFT OF MERCENARIES.

2. VISITOR SAID HE PROCEEDING DURBAN AND MIGHT CONTACT HOARE WHILE THERE.

SECRET

CFN 4684 ARMA LEOPOLDVILLE 23 FEB ACSI BI MICHAEL HOARE ALLISTER WICKS BI ACSI NO SUCH BI INFO HOARE KUBARK RHODESIAN NO INFO DURBAN

28 Feb 66

201-346685

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ACTION
AF 1

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE

22 DEC 6[illegible] 19903

201-346285

S E C R E T 221210Z

DIR INFO LEOP CITE PRET 4577

IN 19903

1. SAW SECAROB/1 AND 2 ON DEC 17 AND 18. SECAROB/1 (S) ADVISED IS PURCHASING HOME IN PIETERMARITZBURG AND NEEDS MONEY COMING TO HIM. STATED ONLY MONEY HE HAD RECEIVED WAS $150 IN LEOP TO PURCHASE TICKET FOR WIFE. IS THIS CORRECT. IF NOT WHEN DID HE GET OTHER $55. HE RECALLED THAT EMPLOYMENT WITH KUBARK BEGAN 1 JANUARY 1965. HE APPARENTLY IS BASING THIS ON PRET 5749 IN WHICH HE POINTED OUT HAD INTENDED QUIT ON 31 DEC, HAD BEEN REQUESTED BY KUBARK LEOP TO RETURN WHICH HE AGREED TO DO. ACTUAL AGREEMENT ON TERMS OF PAY WAS 10 JANUARY 1965. UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY PLAN TO PAY HIM $9,563 LESS $150 AS TOTAL SETTLEMENT OF ALL CLAIMS.

2. S AGREED FOR [illegible] TO REVIEW ANY PUBLICATION BY HIM. WE DISCUSSED HIS BOOK WHICH MUST BE SUBMITTED TO PUBLISHERS BY 31 MARCH. IT WILL NOT INVOLVE CONGO POLITICS AND HE WILL NOT HAVE "ONE MEAN THING TO SAY ABOUT ANYONE". WE WILL DO PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF OUTLINE AND PROGRESS OF BOOK IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS TO BE SURE THAT HE DOES NOT GET INTO FINAL STAGES WITH SOMETHING OBJECTIONABLE REQUIRING TOTAL RE-WRITE. WE WILL DO FINAL REVIEW PRIOR SUBMISSION MANUSCRIPT.

SECRET

3. HIS PERSONAL PLANS OTHER THAN URITING BOOK ARE TO SAIL TO LOURENCO MARQUES FOR UEEK THEN LATER TO MAURITIUS, AND AFTER STORM SEASON IS OVER IN 1966 TO SAIL ACROSS ATLANTIC TO UEST INDIES AND FLORIDA.

4. UE UARNED HIM THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES UAS HE TO GET INVOLVED IN RHODESIAN AFFAIRS AND THIS INCLUDED ANY RECRUITMENTS, TRAINING OR ANYTHING ELSE. HE AGREED. UITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF ANY POSSIBLE FUTURE USE BY US, UE ASKED HIM IF HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED AT ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE IN TRAINING MEN FOR GUERRILLA TYPE ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT HE MIGHT. UHILE THIS DISCUSSION UAS TOO VAGUE TO PLAN ON, UE THINK HE UOULD DO NEARLY ANYTHING UE ASKED HIM TO.

5. THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING RE MOBUTU'S REFUSAL TO TELL HIM GOODBY. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT ASK TO SEE MOBUTU. UICKES UANTED TO SEE MOBUTU AND AFTER CONSIDERABLE URGING S UENT TO POUIS AND ASKED IF MOBUTU UOULD SEE UICKES. POUIS ANSUERED NO SINCE MOBUTU UAS VERY BUSY. POUIS TOLD S THAT HE COULD SEE MOBUTU IF HE HAD ANYTHING NEU TO TAKE UP. S REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOTHING. HE ADVISED THAT BOTH HE AND MOBUTU REGARDED THEIR LUNCHEON AFTER MOBUTU HAD TAKEN OVER AS GOODBY. UICKES UAS VERY MAD AND TOOK A BUNDLE OF PAPERS FOR MOBUTU TO SIGN IN ORDER GET TO SEE HIM. UICKES UAS REFUSED ADMITTANCE. SECAROB UAS COMPLETELY RELAXED ON SUBJECT. COULD HE POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT UICKES IN LEOP 2868, IF NOT HE CERTAINLY HAS RECONSIDERED HIS VIEWPOINT.

6. S IS NOT INTERESTD IN RETURNING TO CONGO AT THIS TIME. UE DID NOT SUGGEST THAT HE DO SO, BUT AT SAME TIME HE DOES NOT EXCLUDE

POSSIBILITY IF NEEDED. HE STATED THAT HE DELIBERATELY MADE HIS DEPARTURE APPEAR TO BE ABSOLUTELY FINAL IN ORDER TO NOT UNDERCUT PETERS IN HIS NEW COMMAND. HE SAID THAT IF THERE WAS ANY IDEA THAT HE WOULD RETURN, PETERS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE MERCENARIES. HIS WHOLE DISCUSSION INDICATED THAT HE INVISIONS THAT HE MAY RETURN. S ADVISED THAT HE HAD INSURED PAY FOR THE MERCENARIES THROUGH 31 DEC BUT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THINGS WOULD GO AFTER THAT.

7. SECARC3 WAS HIGH IN HIS PRAISE OF HIS CASE OFFICER WHOM HE REGARDED AS VERY HELPFUL AND REGRETTED NOT BEING ABLE TO BID FAREWELL TO COS LEOP.

8. AS AN ASIDE, S CAUTIONED THAT WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE LEOP'S VIEW THAT MOBUTU WAS FRIENDLY TO KUBARK IS WRONG. HE STATED THAT HE HAD HEARD MOBUTU TALK TOO OFTEN FOR THERE TO BE ANY DOUBT THAT HE DOES NOT LIKE KUBARK. S HAS NO IDEA WHAT THE BASIS OF THIS DISLIKE IS AND THINKS THAT IT IS PROBABLY A COUNTER-REACTION TO THE GREAT SERVICES THAT KUBARK HAS RENDERED TO THE CONGO. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS A PECULIARITY OF MOBUTU'S CHARACTER.

9. S DOES NOT AT ALL EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY TSHOMBE BECOMING ONE OF MOBUTU'S MINISTERS. HE SAID THAT MOBUTU HAS BEEN ACCEPTING SOME ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FROM TSHOMBE. AS TO KASAVUBU, S FEELS THAT HE ALSO MIGHT AT A LATER DATE BECOME A MINISTER UNDER MOBUTU EVEN THOUGH HE APPEARS TO BE FINISHED AT THIS TIME. HE BELIEVES THAT A COMBINATION OF MOBUTU, TSHOMBE AND KASAVUBU WOULD BE GOOD FOR THE CONGO.

10. S'S SON HAS COMPLETELY RECOVERED, HOWEVER, S HAS HAD A SEVERE ATTACK OF MALARIA.

SECRET

USDAO Document: not listed
DATE: 11 December 1965
SUBJECT: WICKS, Alister
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FILE CLASSIFICATION: Not listed

SUBJECT: Not listed

THIRD AGENCY

STATE DOCUMENT A 180
DATE: 18 Nov 65 FROM: AMCONGEN JOHANNESBURG
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
FILE NO: NOT LISTED

SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICAN MERCENARIES IN THE CONGO

THIRD AGENCY

29 SEP 65 (When Filled In)

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ● PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

37

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) · 1 14425-135 TDCS 314/13362-65

DATE OF INFO. 27 SEPTEMBER 1965 DISTR. 28 SEPTEMBER 1965

SUBJECT

SITREP AS OF 0600 HOURS LOCAL TIME

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, ALBERTVILLE (27 SEPTEMBER 1965) REF IN 61285

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: ARREST OF TWO SOMALIS IN ALBERTVILLE. FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 3936

THIS IS AN ALBERTVILLE SITUATION REPORT PREPARED AT 0600 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 28 SEPTEMBER 1965 BY CAS.

1. ON 27 SEPT 1965 A COLUMN OF THE FIFTH COMMANDOS (5 CDO) REACHED LULIMBA AND WAS PREPARING TO MOVE TOWARDS LUBONDJA ON 26 SEPT. THIS COLUMN LED BY MAJOR ALISTAIR WICKES HAD 3 OF ITS MEN WOUNDED DURING THE MOVEMENT FROM BENDERA TO LULIMBA (SOURCE: PILOT DEBRIEFING. CONGOLESE AIRFORCE AIRCRAFT HAVE HAD THE ONLY CONTACT WITH THE FIFTH CDO SINCE 26 SEPT).

2. ON 27 SEPT, CONGOLESE AIRFORCE PILOTS OBSERVED A 5 CDO [illegible], WHICH LANDED [illegible] OF BARAKA, ENTERING BARAKA. THIS SAME

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE [✓ OCR] ORR OO EXO

14-00000

SECRET IN [illegible] TDCS 314/[illegible] PAGE

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY (ATTACHE [illegible]) CINCMEAFSA (ALSO SENT ELISABETHVILLE LONDON BRUSSELS BUKAVU BUJUMBURA DAR ES SALAAM KIGALI).

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

UNIT WAS LATER SEEN LEAVING BARAKA APPARENTLY WITH THE INTENT OF UNLOADING BARGES WHICH WERE ARRIVING NORTH OF BARAKA. (SOURCE: PILOT DEBRIEFINGS).

3. ON 27 SEPT A FATAC C-47 AIRCRAFT ARRIVED IN ALBERTVILLE TO SUPPORT THE ANC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE CONGOLESE REBELS NORTH OF ALBERTVILLE. THIS AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED TO RESUPPLY ISOLATED UNITS AND TO DROP SURRENDER LEAFLETS. FOUR, 7 TON TRUCKS, HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO OPS SUD TO CARRY SUPPLIES FROM ELIZABETHVILLE TO ALBERTVILLE (SOURCE: LT COL HARDIENNE PRINCIPAL ADVISOR TO OPS SUD).

4. ON 25 SEPT 1965 THE TOWN OF LUSANGI FELL INTO REBEL HANDS. NO DEFINITE INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE AS TO THE SIZE OF THE ATTACKING FORCE OR THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE DEFENDING ANC TROOPS. (SOURCE: HARDIENNE).

5. ON 27 SEPT 1965 TWO SOMALI CITIZENS WERE ARRESTED AT THE HOTEL DULAC, IN ALBERTVILLE. THIS HOTEL SERVES AS THE PRINCIPAL BILLET FOR THE EUROPEAN ADVISORS TO THE ANC IN ALBERTVILLE. THE SOMALIS PAPERS WERE FOUND TO BE IN ORDER AND THEY WILL PROBABLY BE RELEASED ON 28 SEPT.

6. ON 27 SEPT 1965, THE OPS SUD ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS PLANS TO MOVE TO BENDERA AT THIS SAME TIME THE NINTH COMMANDO BATTALIONN IS TO MOVE FROM LULIMBA TO MAKUNGU AND KATSHOKA. TWO DAYS LATER THE FIFTH INF BN IS TO COMMENCE ITS ADVANCE FROM BENDERA TO MAKUNGU, KATSHOKA, YUNGU AND KABIMBA. (SOURCE: HARDIENNE).

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

3 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED AF CI

FROM A. BERTVILLE

ACTION --- ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME 1640 | BY D

INFO FILE, VR. 5006

S E C R E T 271551Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO LEOP ELIZ CITE ALBV 0252 14 Jan 65 IN 41050

SECAROB

REF ALBV 0267 (IN 40726)

1. MAJOR WIKES FIVE CDO XO RETURNED FROM LEOP AND REPORTED TO SECAROB-1 AND TROOPS AT FULL MUSTER FOLLOWING:

A. GENERAL MOBUTU EAGER SEE FIVE CDO PROBLEMS SOLVED.

B. NEW FIVE CDO PAY SYSTEM HAS BEEN EFFECTED WHERE PAY REMITTED FROM LEOP DIRECTLY TO A JOBURG BANK THUS COMPLETELY BYPASSING BRUSSELS. THIS SYSTEM SAID WIKES WOULD PERMIT VERIFICATION OF PAY TRANSFER WITHIN FEW DAYS.

2. SECAROB-1 THEN COMMENTED TO TROOPS HE WAS COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH RESOLUTION OF PAY PROBLEMS AND IT WAS TIME TO GET ON WITH THE WAR. ALL HIS TROOPS HAVE APPARENTLY ACCEPTED NEW DEAL. MORALE APPEARS GOOD.

3. SECAROB-1 THEN CONFIRMED HIS SATISFACTION PRIVATELY TO MAZUTIS.

S E C R E T

CFN 0260 0252 MAJOR WIKES CDO XO LEOP SECAROB-1 (?)&-634-) .97757

[illegible] (IN 40726 PAT 3) 2803 3:-497-1 SECAROB-1 MAZUTIS

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

2 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM ALBERTVILLE

ACTION AF ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT AF TIME 1028

INFO FILE VR C/O A SOD 6 FI FI/INT

S E C R E T 271140Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO LEOP ELIZ CITE ALBV 0260

SECAROB 27 Aug 65 IN 40746

REF DIR 38395

1. REF MESSAGE PASSED TO SECAROB-1 (E1) BY MAZUTIS AT 1100Z, 27 AUGUST. S1 AGREEABLE WAIT AND TAKE NO FINAL ACTION UNTIL GUTHMAN RETURNS.

2. MAJOR VICKES DUE ALBV 1400Z, 27 AUGUST WITH REPORT HIS LEOP MISSION CONCERNING PAY QOSOLVE (AS RCVD). S1 INTENDS REPORT THIS WORD TO TROOPS IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. WILL ADVISE IMMEDIATE S1 AND TROOP REACTION.

S E C R E T

CFN 0260 38395 SECAROB-1 S1 MAZUTIS 1100Z 27 S1 NO FINAL GUTHMAN MAJOR VICKES ALBV 1400Z 27 LEOP QOSOLVE AS RCVD S1 S1

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 43

43 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION
AF 7 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT AF TIME 1245

INFO
FILE VR, SUSPENSE AF, CSDO, ADDP, WE 8, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, FI/SPG, IW

S E C R E T 261350Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY ALBV CITE LEOP 0776 (LAMPRIGHT ACTING)

SECAR08

40041
26 Aug 65 IN 40041

1. COL WILLIAMS INFORMED STATION THAT ON MORNING 26 AUGUST LOGIEST AND MAJOR WICKES HELD MEETING WITH MOBUTU RE 5TH COMDO PAY PROBLEM. AFTER ARRANGING FOR LOAN FROM DIRECTOR NATIONAL BANK NDELE, MOBUTU CALLED IN PAY MASTER AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS PAY SOME, UNSPECIFIED, PORTION OF OUTSTANDING PAY IMMEDIATELY. WICKES THEN WENT TO BANK TO INSURE THAT TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO JOHANESBURG WAS MADE. WILLIAMS FELT THIS ONLY STOP GAP MEASURE AND PROBLEM LIKELY COME UP AGAIN IN A FEW WEEKS.

2. WILLIAMS ALSO SAID THAT 80 MERCS KILLED SO FAR IN CONGO AND GOVT OBLIGATED PAY FAMILIES ONE MILLION BELGIAN FRANCS FOR EACH DEATH. ALTHOUGH CONGOLESE BUDGETED FOR DEATHS THEY DID NOT BELIEVE DEATH RATE WOULD BE SO HIGH.

3. WILLIAMS INFORMED HIS REP ALBV 26 AUG TO NOTIFY HOARE. WICKES HAS PROBABLY NOTIFIED HOARE DIRECTLY.

4. PLS PASS ABOVE TO GUTHMAN.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

IN 40041 PAGE 2

CFN 2776 COL WILLIAMS 26 LOGIEST MAJOR WICKES MOBUTU RE 5TH COMDO
NDELE MOBUTU VICKES JOHANESBURG WILLIAMS A WILLIAMS 80 MERCS
ONE MILLION BELGIAN FRANCS CONGOLESE NTR BELIEVE WILLIAMS ALBV
26 AUG HOARE WICKES HOARE PLS GUTHMAN
BT

SECRET

14-00000

27 AU 65 [illegible]

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) TDCS 314/11658-65

DATE OF INFO. 25 AUGUST 1965 DIST. 26 AUGUST 1965

SUBJECT

REVERSAL OF HOARE'S DECISION NOT TO RESIGN HIS COMMAND AND LEAVE THE CONGO

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, ALBERTVILLE (25 AUGUST 1965) REF TDCS-314/1[illegible]-65 IN 39572

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER FROM LT. COL. MICHAEL HOARE.

1. ON 25 AUGUST 1965 LT. COL. MICHAEL HOARE, CO OF THE MERCENARY FIFTH COMMANDO, STATED THAT HE HAS NOW DECIDED THAT IF PAY PROBLEMS ARE NOT SETTLED TO HIS SATISFACTION BY 27 AUGUST, HE WILL GO TO LEOPOLDVILLE ON 29 AUGUST AND TENDER HIS RESIGNATION DIRECTLY TO PREMIER TSHOMBE. SHOULD TSHOMBE NOT INSTITUTE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO AMELIORATE THE FIFTH COMMANDO PAY PROBLEMS, HOARE SAID THAT HE WILL LEAVE THE CONGO ON 2 SEPTEMBER. HOARE SAID THAT HIS PRIDE NECESSITATES CARRYING THROUGH THE THREATS HE HAS MADE TO RESIGN.

2. HOARE ALSO STATED THAT HE HAS INFORMATION THAT HIS SECOND IN COMMAND, MAJOR ALISTAIR WICKS, HAS LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO STEP INTO THE BREACH SHOULD HOARE MOVE OUT OF THE PICTURE. FURTHER, HOARE STATED THAT ON 25 AUGUST, 19 MEN MUTINIED OVER THE QUESTION OF ONE OFFICER BEING SACKED. HOARE HAS PLACED THESE MEN UNDER ARREST AND IS SHIPPING THEM TO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

DIA/NMCC S/OCI 2

CINCMEAFSA

STANLEYVILLE AND OUT OF THE CONGO. (FIELD COMMENT: THE FOREGOING APPEARS TO BE PARTIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HOARE'S SUDDEN REVERSAL OF HIS POSITION REGARDING RESIGNATION.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY (ATTACHE CONGSH) CINCMEAFSA (ALSO SENT LEOPOLDVILLE, ELIZABETHVILLE, BUKAVU, LONDON, BRUSSELS)

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) 14309-168 TDCS -314/11599-65

DATE OF INFO. 21 AUGUST 1965 DISTR. 23 AUGUST 1965

SUBJECT

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING FIFTH COMMANDO PAY PROBLEMS

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, ALBERTVILLE (21 AUGUST 1965) REF IN 37310

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL A COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER FROM LT. COLONEL MICHAEL HOARE. FIELD REPORT NO. ACA 29

1. ON 21 AUGUST 1965, LT COL MICHAEL HOARE, CO OF THE FIFTH COMMANDO, STATED HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM MAJOR GENERAL MOBUTU TO THE EFFECT THAT MOBUTU PLANNED TO COME TO ALBERTVILLE 24 AUGUST TO DISCUSS FIFTH COMMANDO PAY PROBLEMS. HOARE NOTED HOWEVER THAT MOBUTU FREQUENTLY DID NOT KEEP HIS PROMISES AND THEREFORE HOARE WAS SENDING HIS DEPUTY, MAJOR ALISTAR WICKS, TO LEOPOLDVILLE. WICKS ON 23 AUGUST WILL PRESENT MOBUTU WITH PAY AUTHORIZATION FORMS FOR MOBUTU'S SIGNATURE. HOARE SAID IF MOBUTU OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS HAD NOT SIGNED THE PAY AUTHORIZATIONS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
D/OCI 2 CIA/NMCC

AND ARRANGED FOR TRANSFER OF MONIES BY 27 AUGUST, THEN HE WOULD HAVE TO INFORM HIS MEN THAT HE HAD NO IDEA WHEN THE PROBLEM WOULD BE RESOLVED.

2. HOARE FURTHER STATED THAT HE COULD NOT CONTINUE TO GIVE HIS MEN PROMISES AND HAD TOLD THEM HE WOULD HAVE A DEFINITE ANSWER ABOUT THEIR PAY BY 28 AUGUST AT THE LATEST. HOARE COMMENTED THAT HE EXPECTS A LOSS OF APPROXIMATELY 150 MEN IF THE PAY AUTHORIZATIONS ARE NOT SIGNED, AND HE CANNOT HONESTLY TELL THE MEN THAT MONEY WILL SOON BE DEPOSITED TO THEIR SOUTH AFRICAN ACCOUNTS.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY (ATTACHE COMISH) CINCMEAFSA. ALSO SENT LONDON BRUSSELS ELIZABETHVILLE BUKAVU.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

UNIT AF | TIME 2110 | BY DD

INFO FILE

20 AUG 65 IN 36553

#153

CORRECTED COPY

S E C R E T [illegible]

[illegible] ELIZ CITE ALBV [illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible] ON HIS RETURN ALBV 19 AUGUST REPORTED THAT [illegible] HAD STATED THAT IF SI DEMANDS RE PAYMENT OF [illegible] WERE NOT MET IN NEXT SEVEN DAYS AND HE DECIDED TO LEAVE [illegible], THAT [illegible] WOULD "PULL OUT COMPLETELY ALSO".

[illegible] THIS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE BUT SI DEFINITELY UNDER [illegible] THAT SHOULD HIS DEMAND NOT BE MET THEN THE US WOULD [illegible] TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM. IN ADDITION [illegible], SI TOLD [illegible] AND NOTED IT WAS TOP SECRET.

[illegible]: IF THE PAYMENT OF THE FIFTH COMMANDO MERCENARIES [illegible] PROBLEM AND COULD RESULT IN DIS- [illegible] IT, COULD NOT COVERT FUNDING BE CONSIDERED [illegible] SYSTEM IS DEVISED BY THE

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM [illegible] LLC

ACTION [illegible]

☒ RID COPY

☐ ☐ ☒

[illegible] 1548 9

FILE [illegible]

Corrected Copy To Follow

S E C R E T 191300Z

PRIORITY [illegible] DIR INFO ELIZ CITE ALBV 0240

RYBAT [illegible]

B-1

[illegible] ON [illegible]

~~[illegible]~~ 19 AUGUST REPORTED THAT

COMISH COL WILLIAMS HAD STATED THAT IF SI DEMANDS FOR PAYMENT OF SALARIES WERE NOT MET IN NEXT SEVEN DAYS AND HE DECIDED TO LEAVE THE CONGO, THAT "THE AMERICANS WOULD PULL OUT COMPLETELY ALSO".

ALBV FINDS THIS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE BUT SI DEFINITELY UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT SHOULD HIS DEMAND NOT BE MET THEN THE USINZBEU

USE THREAT OF WITHDRAWAL TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM.

~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]

TO WITHDRAW [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ AND NOTED IT WAS TOP SECRET.

[illegible] IF THE PAYMENT OF THE FIFTH COMMANDO MERCENARIES [illegible] A CONTINUING PROBLEM AND COULD RESULT IN DIS[illegible]

[illegible] WITHDRAWAL [illegible] UNIT, COULD NOT COVERT FUNDING BE CONSIDERED

AT LEAST ~~[illegible]~~ UNTIL A WORKABLE PAYMENT SYSTEM IS DEVISED BY THE CONGOLESE. REALIZE POLITICAL PITFALLS INVOLVED BUT IDOVE TOTALLY INTERESTED IN KEEPING THE FIFTH COMMAND IN CONGO, SOONER OR LATER THIS POSSIBILITY MIGHT HAVE TO BE FACED.

S E C R E T

20 AUG 65 IN 36558

14-00000

IU 36558 Pg 2.

CFN 0240 SECARD3/1 SI ALEV 1
3:9:8 0 :9) 2908"-. 1 RE NOT MET

CONGO AMERICAN SI NOT BE US KEIGHLORD SI MAJOR WICKS A NOT COVERT

A CONGOLE = CONGO

BT

1000 2 JUL 65 SECRET

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

14-51-187 2

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)/SOUTH AFRICA

TDCS -314/09208-65

DATE OF INFO. JUNE 1965

DISTR. 1 JULY 1965

SUBJECT

DEVELOPING CONFLICT REGARDING UTILIZATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FIFTH COMMANDO

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, ALBERTVILLE (29 JUNE 1965)

REF IN 03075

FIELD REPORT NO. ACA 2

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER FROM MAJOR ALISTAR WICKES, ACTING COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE FIFTH COMMANDO.

1. ON 29 JUNE 1965 MAJOR ALISTAR WICKES, TEMPORARY CO OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FIFTH COMMANDO (5CDO), CITED BITTERLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SIXTH COMMANDO PERSONNEL FROM ALBERTVILLE AND ADJACENT AREAS AT THE TIME OF THE ARRIVAL OF ADVANCE PERSONNEL OF THE (5CDO) IN EARLY JUNE 1965. HE STATED THIS DEVELOPMENT WAS MAKING IT NECESSARY FOR HIM TO RESPOND TO LOCAL CONGOLESE ARMY (ANC) REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT IN THE ALBERTVILLE AREA. THIS WAS CONTRARY TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM LT. COLONEL MICHAEL HOARE, (5CDO) CO WHO NOW IN SOUTH AFRICA PREPARING TO RETURN TO THE CONGO WITH APPROXIMATELY 200 NEW RECRUITS.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
AD/CI 2 CIA/NMCC

2. WICKES PLACED THE BLAME FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE (5CDO) ON BELGIUM INFLUENCE AND MACHINATIONS AND NOTED THAT HOARE WOULD BE EXTREMELY DISPLEASED WITH DEVELOPMENTS. THE AGREEMENT FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THE (5CDO) TO ALBERTVILLE HAD NOT BEEN PLANNED TO INCLUDE SUPPORT TO ANC GARRISONS IN THE AREA BUT ONLY FOR TRAINING OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AND THE IMMEDIATE SUBSEQUENT MILITARY THRUST INTO FIZI BARAKA AREA.

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY COMISH (ATTACHES), CINCMEAFSA.

(ALSO SENT LEOPOLDVILLE, ELISABETHVILLE)

END OF MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT
NUMBER 2821007965
DATE: 2 JUNE 1965
SUBJECT: WICKS, Allistair
CLASSIFIEATION: CONFIDENTIAL
FILE NO: NOT LISTED

SUBJECT: PROBLEMS AFFECTING 5th Bde Operations,
Northern Congo

THIRD AGENCY

WICKS, Alistair

AFRICA W

26 April 1965

OLENGA STATEMENT ON ARMY PROGRESS

Cairo MENA in Arabic 1920 GMT 25 April 1965--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpts) Cairo--Passing through Khartoum (en route to Cairo--ed.), General Olenga issued a statement saying that the forces of the Congolese revolutionary army are in control of the front adjacent to the Sudanese borders and that the liberation army is moving freely in the area that falls under the control of the revolutionaries.

In his statement, Olenga said that the forces of the liberation army are in control of the left bank of Stanleyville and that the Simbas will occupy the eastern bank of Stanleyville at the appropriate time.

The statement says that the liberation army forces have foiled Tshombe's attempts to carry out elections in the main Congolese towns and adds that the two aims of the liberation army are to get rid of imperialist domination in the country and to impose the authority of the people before September 1965. The statement also affirms that the morale of Tshombe's forces and that of the mercenaries has fallen.

General Olenga and Mr. Kanza will hold contacts with officials in Cairo to explain to them the recent developments in the Congo.

REBELS SAY EMISSARIES SENT TO TALK WITH TSHOMBE

London REUTERS in English 1224 GMT 25 April 1965--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Cairo--Four Congolese insurgent emissaries have been sent to Leopoldville for talks with Prime Minister Moise Tshombe on a peaceful settlement of the Congo problem, an insurgent source said here today. The source said the emissaries had been dispatched by the president of the "Congo National Liberation Committee," Bocheley-Davidson, who is now in Cairo.

The source said that because of divisions in the insurgent ranks, the Sudanese Government had informed them it could no longer allow the transport of arms or equipment through its territory to their forces. The source also said the UAR Government had told the insurgent leadership it was ceasing arms shipments and cutting off financial help because there was no evidence of a united insurgent government.

CIA FBIS 27 Middle East,
Africa & West Europe [illegible]
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SALISBURY SOURCE CONFIRMS HOARE'S RESIGNATION

Paris AFP in French 2230 GMT 23 April 1965--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Salisbury, 23 April--Major Mike Hoare, commander of the number five unit of South African mercenaries serving the Leopoldville Government, has turned in his resignation, an unimpeachable source of Salisbury has confirmed. Major Hoare, nicknamed "mad" [illegible], will undoubtedly leave the Congo together with his adjutant, Major Alistair [illegible] of Rhodesia, and perhaps most of the 300 men in his unit. Their last six-month contract expires 1 May, anyway.

FORM 3010

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 13

2 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Pretoria

ACTION AF 7

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

VR. FILE C CI/OPS CI/OA FI

S E C R E T 031341Z

PRIORITY LEOP INFO DIR CITE PRET 4123 3 MAY 65 IN 57771

REF: LEOP 6591 (IN 57003)

1. SECAROB/2 (S/2) AND BABY LEFT FOR DURBAN AFTERNOON 3 MAY. STAYING AT MOTEL EVENING 3 MAY AND ARRIVING DURBAN 4 MAY. WICKS HAS BEEN CALLING S/2'S MOTHER BUT NO ONE INCLUDING HER MOTHER KNEW WHERE SHE WAS. SHE WELCOMED REF AND WILL CALL WICKS FROM DURBAN.

2 FYI: ADVISE S/1 THAT S/2 IS DELIGHTED HE STAYING ON. SHE REALLY FEELS THAT FOR HIS OWN HAPPINESS HE MUST SEE JOB THROUGH.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 13

3 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION AF 7

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI,

SECRET 011700Z

PRIORITY PRET INFO DIR CITE LEOP 8591

1 MAY 65 IN 57003

SECAROB

REF: A. PRET 4117 (IN 56425)

B. LEOP 8589 * NIY

SECAROB/1 (S) WAS INFORMED THAT WIFE AND BABY STAYING WITH PUBH. S MOST APPRECIATIVE. ASKED THAT WIFE BE TOLD HE DUE TO RETURN PROBABLY AROUND BEGINNING JUNE FOR ONE MONTH LEAVE. ALISTAIR WICKS WILL FILL IN S WIFE ON S CURRENT SITUATION. PER REF B, WICKS LEFT ON LEAVE 30 APRIL, TO CONTACT S WIFE IN DURBAN. S EXPECTS WICKS WILL LEARN SHE IN PRET AND WILL CONTACT HER WITHIN NEXT SEVERAL DAYS.

file

SECRET

*CFN NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC AS OF 1520, 1 MAY 65.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
REPORT NUMBER 2821004865
DATE 26 Feb 65
SUBJECT: WICKS, ALISTAIR
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: 5th Commando Personnel

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY GROUP

020525 **Intelligence Information Cable**

136?? -66

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)

TDCS -314/01525-65

DATE OF INFO. THIRD WEEK OF JANUARY 1965

DIST. 9 FEBRUARY 1965

SUBJECT

MERCENARY ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (4 FEBRUARY 1965)

REF IN 73954

FIELD REPORT NO. OEL 40,338

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL KNOWN, EXPERIENCED IN REPORTING AND RELIABLE, FROM ALISTAIR WICKS."

1. MAJOR MIKE HOARE, COMMANDER OF 5 COMMANDO, CONGOLESE GOVT MERCENARY FORCE, TOGETHER WITH HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND ALISTAIR WICKS, RETURNED TO STANLEYVILLE AREA OF CONGO TO RESUME OPERATIONS DURING THE THIRD WEEK OF JANUARY. THEIR RETURN FOLLOWED FURTHER DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRESIDENT TSHOMBE DURING WHICH TSHOMBE ACCEPTED RECOMMENDATIONS PUT TO HIM IN STRONG TERMS BY HOARE AND ASSURED HOARE OF HIS CONFIDENCE IN HIM.

2. THE MERCENARY FORCE LEADERS WERE CONFIDENT THEY COULD NOW DEAL WITH THE NORTHERN CONGO SITUATION PROVIDED THE 300 ADDITIONAL MERCENARIES, WHOSE ENGAGEMENT TSHOMBE HAS ACCEPTED, ARE BROUGHT INTO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

AD/CI 2 CIA/NMCC

ACTION AND PROVIDED THE FORCE IS EQUIPPED WITH A MINIMAL NUMBER OF HARD-SKINNED VEHICLES. THESE ARE REGARDED BY THE FORCE COMMANDERS AS INDISPENSABLE IN THE FACE OF IMPROVED ARMAMENT WHICH HAS BEEN SUPPLIED THE REBEL FORCES AND WHICH HAS ALREADY INFLICTED UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES ON MERCENARIES USING CONVENTIONAL TRANSPORT.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE CINCMEAFSA (ALSO SENT LEOPOLDVILLE PRETORIA BRUSSELS KHARTOUM ELISABETHVILLE CAPE TOWN).

(END OF MESSAGE)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
REPORT NUMBER: 1821001665
DATE: 28 Jan 65
SUBJECT: WICKS, ALISTAIR
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
FILE NO. NOT LISTED

SUBJECT: Visit to Kamina Base on 25 & 27 January 1965

SECRET C

Hoare

TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

No. 0602163

TO
Chief, Africa Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	USE
	French language version of report pouched under TM 0602162	

DATE 24/1/65

SIGNATURE
Teresa J. BELGREDAN

SECRET

C.D.L.

Date : dimanche 24 janvier 1965

A la suite de l'invitation de Lotz, j'ai donc rencontré le colonel Hoare, en présence de John Lotz et du major WICKS (ou W[illegible]), dans la chambre du colonel au Memling.

WICKS

Hoare m'a expliqué qu'il souffrait d'un manque de liaison avec Tshombe lorsqu'il (Hoare) se trouvait en opérations et que bien souvent il était obligé de revenir à Léo pour traiter directement avec Tshombe. Je lui ai suggéré de laisser en permanence un officier à Léo, parlant français, officier bien sûr qui aurait toute sa confiance.
Hoare m'a répondu qu'il n'avait pas d'officier à lui répondant à ces exigences; mais qu'à son retour de congé il avait appris que l'on avait désigné un officier belge, le capitaine V[illegible], pour servir d'agent de liaison entre Tshombe et lui. Il m'a demandé mon avis sur cet officier que Lotz et moi connaissions très bien.

(V[illegible] est le mari de l'ancienne secrétaire de Tshombe, Monique V[illegible]; durant la sécession katangaise, il travaillait au Ministère de l'Information à E'ville où il se distingua par sa totale incompétence. Revenu à Léo en août 64, il a attendu en vain que Tshombe lui trouve une fonction. En désespoir de cause, il s'est engagé à l'A.N.C. où il a reçu le grade de capitaine - je suppose qu'il est lieutenant de réserve à l'armée belge).

Je n'ai pu que répondre que je considérais ce choix comme peu judicieux.

Hoare m'a alors demandé si au cas où il aurait des problèmes importants à traiter avec Tshombe et qu'il ne pourrait revenir lui-même à Léo, si j'acceptais qu'il m'envoie un de ses officiers pour traiter avec moi et que j'en réfère ensuite à Tshombe. J'ai évidemment accepté.

Hoare m'a encore confirmé l'arrivée des 325 mercenaires.

SECRET

22 [illegible] 64940

[illegible] 22Z

[illegible] INFO PRIORITY DIR CITE [illegible]

(IN [illegible])

[illegible] TAPE CANNOT REACH [illegible] IN TIME FOR TALKS WITH [illegible]/1 [illegible] FOLLOWING IS FILL-IN ON REF BASED ON TAPE REF AND FOLLOW- [illegible] TOTAL INFO FROM TAPE WHICH WILL NOT BE FORWARDED.

[illegible] PARA 2 REF, THREE [illegible] ARE CARLOS HUYGHE, PETER [illegible] MICHEL [illegible]. ALL PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED BY [illegible], [illegible] FIRST TIME HUYGHE [illegible] WITH SELEVER. IN BALANCE OF [illegible] CONFUSED IN THAT TWO GERMANS INVOLVED. WE PROBABLY MISSED [illegible] TWO WHILE CHECKING MACHINE ANSWERING TELE- [illegible]. "[illegible]", [illegible] AGENT IN CONGO WITH COLD [illegible]", IN [illegible] GERMANY. [illegible] SELEVERS INFORMED PRI- [illegible] ACTIVITIES. [illegible] OFFICIAL AND GIS REP [illegible] IS FRIEDRICH WILHELM [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] TO S/1 BY HUYGHE. [illegible] MEN FOR [illegible] AND TWO [illegible]. HAS THUS FAR [illegible]. LATTER WILL [illegible] UNIT. [illegible] TO [illegible]/1. SECOND IS TO [illegible] BASE AT [illegible]. THIRD IS PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

SECRET

[illegible], [illegible] WILL PRODUCE [illegible] NEWSLETTER FOR MERCENARIES AND [illegible]. THIS OFFICE WILL BE RUN BY JOHN LATZ. FOURTH PRIORITY ITEM WILL BE SETTING UP OF LIAISON OFFICE IN JOHANNESBURG, WHICH IS REASON FOR S/1 RETURN TO SOUTH AFRICA IN TEN DAYS. IT [illegible] EXPECTED BRIDGE WILL OCCUPY THIS SLOT. WE NOT CLEAR WHETHER [illegible] THESE RECRUITS AND USE EXISTING MEN HE HAS ENOUGH TO SET UP ADMIN STAFF.

4. AMERICAN MISSIONARY PARA 6 REF IS MRS. KLEINSCHMIDT, WHO [illegible] YEARS CONGO AND STATIONED ADI, LEAVING VIA ARU AND JUBA [illegible]. SHE SAYS THAT CONTRARY TO GENERAL BELIEF, ARMS LANDED [illegible] FORMER AIRFIELD ARE NOT TRANSSHIPPED TO ARUA. INSTEAD [illegible] BY CAR, BICYCLE AND FOOT DIRECT TO ADI OVER ROAD NOT SHOWN [illegible]. SHE SUSPECTS THAT CHIEFS RESIDENCE IN ADI USED AS AMMO DUMP. (ACCORDING S/1 KLEINSCHMIDT IS ALL-ROUND EXPERT ON NORTHEAST [illegible]. WE HAVE ADDRESS AND CAN DEBRIEF FURTHER IF DESIRED. SHE RETURNING STATES MARCH 65).

5. S/1 APPROACHED BY MAJOR CHARLES KEARNEY, EX SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE, (SAAF) ON 23 JAN. KEARNEY, WHO PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ON [illegible], OFFERED TO TAKE OVER "21 SQUADRON" AND TO OBTAIN [illegible] STAFF AND EQUIPMENT FOR IT "UNOFFICIALLY" FROM SAAF. [illegible] STAFF WOULD BE GIVEN LEAVE TO ENABLE THEM TO JOIN MERCENARIES. IT NOT CLEAR WHETHER KEARNEY HAD AUTHORITY MAKE THIS OFFER. [illegible] NO COMMITMENT TO KEARNEY, AS THIS WOULD BE MOBUTU DECISION. [illegible] POINTED OUT SA INVOLVEMENT WAS POLITICAL DYNAMITE, AND [illegible] S/1 DISCUSS FURTHER WITH HQ. S/1 AGREED.

SECRET

USARMA Document # 88945
DATE: December 1964
SUBJECT: WICKS, Alister
CLASSIFICATION: Confidential
FILE N.: Not Listed From: Leopoldville

SUBJECT: Not listed

USARMA Document 06615
DATE: 23 January 1965
SUBJECT: WICKS, Alister
CLASSIFICATION: Confidential
FILE #: Not listed FROM: Leopoldville

SUBJECT: Not listed

THIRD AGENCY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
REPORT NO. 2821017164
DATE: 30 May 64
SUBJECT: WICKS, ALISTAIR
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
FILE NO. NOTLISTED

SUBJECT: 21st Support Squadon

THIRD AGENCY

ACTION	REPRODUCTION COPY	TO: UNIT	TIME	BY
[illegible]	☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ [illegible]			

INFO VR, FILE, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, [illegible] 6, CI/OA, WE 6, CI/PS, SUSPENSE 2

S E C R E T 191715Z 19 Oct '64 ??

PRIORITY LEOP INFO ELIZ DIR CITE PRET 3602 IN 95557

REF: LEOP 4037 IN 95176

1. BY LETTER TO MRS. PUGH DATED 8 OCTOBER SECAROB/2 ADVISED SHE IN EXCELLENT CONDITION. SHE WAS CONFINED TO BED WEEK PREVIOUS LETTER DUE TO USUAL "HEART BUSINESS" BUT OTHERWISE EVERYTHING IS GOING EXCELLENTLY. DOCTOR CONFIRMS THIS AND ADVISES THAT BABY SHOULD ARRIVE ABOUT 17 NOVEMBER. LETTER NOT CLEAR ON FOLL POINT BUT APPARENTLY DOCTOR HAS REQUESTED SECAROB/1'S BLOOD GROUP. PLS ADVISE IF POSSIBLE.

2. SECAROB/2 RECEIVED CALL FROM JOHANNESBURG 6 OCT FROM DES BARNES, WHO SAYS HE IS IN CHARGE JOHANNESBURG OFFICE AND THAT PATRICK O'MALLEY HAS BEEN RELIEVED. BARNES WAS SENDING DONALD GRANT TO SEE SECAROB/2 ON 7 OCT BUT HE DID NOT ARRIVE. ASK SECAROB/1 FOR BACKGROUND ON BARNES AND GRANT.

3. FOLL INTELL IN SECAROB/2'S LETTER WHICH LEOP CAN USE OR KILL. DIFFICULT TO SOURCE HERE PLUS FACT MAY BE OUTDATED BY MORE RECENT

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE SECRET IN ________ PAC

INFO. "AS OF 25 SEPTEMBER PAY WAS BIG PROBLEM OF MERCENARIES, INCLUDING SECAROB/1 HIMSELF. FOUR MERCENARY COMMANDO UNITS ARE THE FIELD. THEY ARE LOCATED AT BUKAVU, LISALA, GEMENA, INGENDE. THERE ARE THREE LEFT AND ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE FOR ONE HUNDRED MORE MEN. THESE MEN WILL ARRIVE SOON AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEM ARE BEING MADE BY SECAROB/1 PERSONALLY, SINCE ALISTAIR WICKS AND PATRICK O'MALLEY HAVE MADE SUCH A MESS OF PREVIOUS RECRUITING. THE MERCENARIES ARE GENERALLY IN GOOD SPIRITS AND SECAROB/1 ESTIMATES THAT THE REBELS WILL BE SUBDUED IN ABOUT SIX WEEKS IF HE IS ALLOWED TO USE HIS JUDGEMENT IN FIGHTING. SECAROB/1 BELIEVES THAT THE BELGIANS ARE NOT ANXIOUS FOR THE WAR TO BE OVER TOO SOON AS THEY ARE BUILDING UP ANOTHER SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN THE CONGO WITH DOZENS OF OFFICERS AND MEN RUNNING HEADQUARTERS AND LOGISTICAL TEAMS."

SECRET

SECRET

4-00000

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)

TDCS [illegible]-64

DATE OF INFO. 5 SEPTEMBER 1964

DIST. 8 SEPTEMBER 1964

SUBJECT
1. CONTINUING ARRIVAL OF MERCENARIES AT KAMINA BASE.
2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MERCENARIES AT THE BASE.
3. FRICTION BETWEEN HOARE AND VANDEWALLE ([illegible])

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (7 SEPTEMBER 1964)

IN 69548

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL-2001

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (F), FROM AN EX-MERCENARY [illegible] (C), FROM HOARE.
APPRAISAL: 2 (THAT HOARE MADE THESE STATEMENTS AND THAT THEY ACCURATELY REFLECT HIS OPINIONS);
3 (THAT THEY ACCURATELY REFLECT THE FACTS).

(Possibility of Mobutu-led coup against M. Tshombe)
(Much dissatisfaction w/ Mobutu in Army)

1. ON 5 SEPTEMBER 64, MERCENARY COMMANDER MAJOR MICHAEL HOARE SAID PRIVATELY THAT WHILE STILL IN ALBERTVILLE EARLIER THAT WEEK HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU TO CANCEL ALL IN-COMING DRAFTS OF MERCENARIES. HOARE IMMEDIATELY SENT TELEGRAMS TO PATRICK O'MALLEY IN JOHANNESBURG AND ALASTAIR WICKS IN SALISBURY TO STOP RECRUITING. ON 3 SEPTEMBER, HOARE FLEW FROM ALBERTVILLE TO KAMINA BASE, WHERE ON 4 SEPTEMBER HE MET WICKS, WHO ARRIVED ABOARD A DC-3 WITH 32 MEN JUST AS HOARE WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE FOR LEOPOLDVILLE. WICKS EXPLAINED THAT HOARE'S INSTRUCTIONS HAD ARRIVED TOO LATE;

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID [illegible] OCI ONE OCR ORR DO
AS/CI 2

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THAT THE MEN HAD ALREADY SIGNED CONTRACTS; AND THAT BY 7 SEPTEMBER THERE WOULD BE A TOTAL OF 700 MERCENARIES AT KAMINA: 440 ALREADY THERE, 260 TO ARRIVE. (FIELD COMMENT: A MERCENARY ROLL CALL FROM KAMINA BASE DATED 30 AUGUST SHOWED A TOTAL STRENGTH THEN OF 216.)

2. HOARE DESCRIBED THE GENERAL LEVEL OF THE MERCENARIES AT KAMINA AS "EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD". SOME 20, HE SAID, HAVE BEEN WEEDED OUT AND SENT BACK FOR VARIOUS PHYSICAL DEFICIENCIES. THE REST ARE YOUNG, ADVENTUROUS AND EAGER. THERE IS ONE PLATOON OF 25 PARATROOPS, "EXCELLENT SOLDIERS." HOARE FOUND THE QUARTERS ASSIGNED HIS MEN UNSATISFACTORY AND TOOK OVER THE LARGEST AND BEST BUILDINGS ON THE BASE: THREE BUILDINGS BUILT AROUND A QUADRANGLE AND, HE SAID, EASILY DEFENDED IF NEED BE. HOARE ADMITTED THAT THE EQUIPPING AND ARMING OF THE MERCENARIES [illegible] GOING VERY SLOWLY. HE HAD MANAGED, HOWEVER, TO GET EACH MAN A RIFLE AND AMMUNITION; MOST EQUIPMENT COMES FROM BELGIUM.

3. DURING THE MORNING OF 5 SEPTEMBER, HOARE SAID, HE SAW COLONEL FREDERIC VANDERWALLE, MILITARY ADVISER TO CONGO PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE. VANDERWALLE, WHO ACCORDING TO HOARE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO BE PLEASANT, GREETED HIM WITH, "WHY DON'T YOU OBEY INSTRUCTIONS; I SAID, NO MORE MEN. HOARE SAID THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE FELT THE MATTER SHOULD BE TAKEN UP DIRECTLY WITH MOBUTU. HOARE, VANDERWALLE AND BELGIAN AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL (FNU) BOUZIN THEN MET WITH

MOBUTU. WHEN MOBUTU ASKED THE SAME QUESTION, HOARE REPLIED, "YOU ASKED FOR 1,000 MEN. I HAVE GOT THEM, AND I CAN'T STOP NOW. WHAT DO YOU WANT ME TO DO?" MOBUTU REPLIED, "WE CANNOT EQUIP OR ADMINISTER 1,000 MEN AT ONE TIME. YOU MUST REDUCE YOUR UNIT TO 250 MEN AT ONCE."

4. AFTER RELATING THE ABOVE, HOARE COMMENTED THAT HE BELIEVED THE DECISION TO REDUCE THE MERCENARY FORCE IS MOBUTU'S AND VANDERWALLE'S. HE THINKS THAT MOBUTU FEARS THAT THE 1,000 MEN AT KAMINA BASE WOULD BE LOYAL TO TSHOMBE PERSONALLY "IN THE EVENT OF AN UPHEAVAL." ASKED WHAT HE MEANT BY "AN UPHEAVAL", HOARE SAID THERE WAS "EVERY POSSIBILITY" OF A "COUP DE FORCE" AGAINST TSHOMBE, ENGINEERED BY MOBUTU WITH THE SUPPORT OF CHIEF OF STATE JOSEPH KASAVUBU. AT THE SAME TIME, DISSATISFACTION WITH MOBUTU IS COMING TO A HEAD WITHIN THE ANC, AND THERE IS "SOME POSSIBILITY" OF AN OFFICERS' UPRISING AGAINST HIM.

5. HOARE CONCLUDED BY COMMENTING THAT THE ANC/COMMAND SEEMS TO HAVE "NO HEART" IN WHAT IT IS TRYING TO DO. FORCES ARE TOO THINLY SPREAD, AND LEADERSHIP IS INADEQUATE. VANDERWALLE IS "NO TACTICIAN, BUT BASICALLY WEAK, UNSURE OF HIMSELF, TECHNICALLY INADEQUATE AND TOO EASILY INFLUENCED, PARTICULARLY BY A CERTAIN (FNU) WATTIER, THE HEAD OF A SMALL GROUP OF BELGIAN MERCENARIES." (SOURCE (EX-KATANGA MERCENARY) COMMENT: HOARE AND VANDERWALLE ARE OBVIOUSLY

AT LOGGERHEADS AND DISAGREE ON PRACTICALLY EVERYTHING.)

[illegible] FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA (ALSO SENT [illegible]
LONDON, PARIS, BRUSSELS, PRETORIA, ELISABETHVILLE, SALISBURY)

(END OF MESSAGE)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

IN 67708

S E C R E T 042353Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY LEOP CITE PRET 3498

REF: DIR 46470

1. ASSUME YOU DO NOT WANT RECAPITULATION ALL REFERENCES ON THIS SUBJECT. GENERALLY PUREN AND MERCENARIES WHO WERE RECRUITING HERE PRIOR TO THEIR RETURN TO CONGO HAD NO MONEY BUT WERE ALWAYS EXPECTING BIG TRANSFER FROM TSHOMBE. EVIDENCE THIS IN SECAROB DIARY REFERRED TO PRET 3476 IS STATEMENT REGARDING TSHOMBE'S 18 JULY CABLE TO PUREN "CASH SOON TSHOMBE OWES HIM ABOUT SIX THOUSAND POUNDS". AT ANOTHER POINT IN DIARY AFTER TSHOMBE HAD TOLD SECAROB PROCEED WITH BUILDING UP MERCENARIES, SECAROB NOTED "TOLD HIM WE MUST HAVE THE CONTRACT BY NOON FRIDAY SO THAT MY MEN COULD RETURN TO SALISBURY AND JOHANNESBURG TO BRING UP THE SMALL ARMY. RATES OF PAY MUST BE FINALIZED, NO TICKET NO LAUNDRY". AT ANOTHER POINT "MEANWHILE HAVE HAD FIFTEEN THOUSAND POUNDS TRANUFERRED TO JOHANNESBURG TO PAY FOR AIR CRAFT REPAIRS, TRAVEL TICKETS, MEN'S PAY ADVANCES, ETC." AT ANOTHER POINT HE NOTED THAT HE WAS SENDING O'MALLEY TO JOHANNESBURG AND NICKS TO SALISBURY BUT "THEY WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR MY OKAY" I.E. SIGNING OF CONTRACT. SEE PRET 3476 RE SENDING JULIA (PUREN) JOHANNESBURG WITH THE MONEY. IN VIEW ABOVE PLUS PREVIOUS DISSEMS WOULD CLEARLY INDICATE THAT TSHOMBE IS PAYING MERCENARIES.

SECRET

2. [illegible] OUS CABLE THAT MERCENARY RECRUITING HAS SEEN CEASED IN SOUTH AFRICA. THIS MEANS THAT THOSE WHO WILL BE SIGNED UP [illegible] WILL BE FROM APPLICANTS PRIOR 2 SEPT. IT DOES NOT [illegible] MERCENARIES WILL GO FROM SA BUT SHOULD RESULT [illegible] IZING [illegible] THE PUBLICITY ORIGINATING IN SA. WOULD SUMMARY NEWS STORY PRIME MINISTER'S SAYING RECRUITMENT GETTING OUT OF HAND AND WOULD BE STOPPED UNLESS ETC. PLUS INDICATION RECRUITS BEING TAKEN FROM IMMIGRANTS BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE TO TSHOMBE OR IS THIS AVAILABLE.

SECRET

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE CABLE NO. 171
DATE: 31 Aug 64
SUBJECT: WICKS, ALISTAIR
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
FILE NO.: CONTROL 26155

SUBJECT: SR MARCENARIES

THIRD AGENCY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE CABLE NO. 26128
DATE: 28 August 1964
SUBJECT: WICKS, ALISTAIR
CLASSIFICATION: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
FILE NO.: CONTROL: 24529

SUBJECT: NOT LISTED

THIRD AGENCY

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO Chief, AF		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO Chief of Station, Leopoldville Chief of Base, Elizabethville			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Pretoria			MICROFILM
			MARKED FOR INDEXING

SUBJECT
O SECAROB Diary

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are photostatic copies of first two installments of SECAROB's Diary which was furnished by Mrs. SECAROB.

2. Most of this is of value only as background since it had already been reported. We will cable the intelligence in future installments if it has not already been reported.

Henry V. Pugh
HENRY V. PUGH

ATTACHMENT:
Photostatic copies of diary

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 2 - Chief, AF
1 - COS, Leopoldville
1 - COS, Elizabethville

1 Attach

CS COPY

201-346685

Date Typed: 25 August 1964

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	AZPA-1685	[illegible]
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-346685

D I A R Y

A resume of the first [illegible]days.

With 40 men to Jan Smuts airport prepared to leave for Leo at 7.30 pm on the evening of Fri 24th July. Owing to a last minute hitch - no clearance of security for Rhodesian Air Services DC 4 the carriers - we did not take off. Following morning clearance came from Salisbury but a call from Leo (Puren) told us to stand by until further orders as Tshombe was on tour and no decision had been taken.

I left for Leo on the evening of Sat 25th July. Met at the airport by Puren and Vicks. No visa trouble when we showed the telegram - the one Tshombe sent Puren on 18th July (arrived 20th-) saying come at once avec tout personnel tous arrieres [illegible] regles. The last part must have done Purens heart good as Tshombe owes him about £5000 he says.

Booked in at the Hotel Memling, Leo and met Dave Sutherland, Errol Kingman, Jimmy Hodges, Peter Mackintosh, all of them are pilots. I am regarded as a pilot. The press were soon on to us and we made a pact with them ; no mention of our presence and we give them the news when it breaks.

A whole week passed when Tshombe was still on tour in Kivu and Stan and then returned only to go to Kiavit for a day. Despite utter frustration we were completely ignored by the Palace and no message reached us. Meanwhile we tried every scheme to reach Tshombe mostly via the kitchen door, but without luck. Dave Sutherland sensing a frost returned to Joburg on 28th.

Met a friend of a friend of mine on Monday 27th .
Another week passed during which we met dozens of dignitaries none of any great importance. Katshiona, close to Tshombe, has his ear as a result of past ,loyalties in Madrid and now expecting the Ministry of Information presently held by Premier Ministre. Typical of many such who are here to collect. Herbert Fauntleroy Julian, see Time Mag. 7 Aug. here to collect 24,000 dollars from Tshombe left after 21 days without seeing him. General [illegible] now out in the cold down to Colonel protesting loudly that he always faced the front, not like others by telephone. Has [illegible] scar on his face caused by Jeep accident. A spent force. Ex Katanga Minister Kibwe also Kitenge now small beer. Met Minister [illegible] from Katanga tells me no currency left in the till in Eville. Waited 1 6 days to see T and left without seeing him. Tshombe overworked and understaffed. Country being run by three men - Tshombe Mobutu and Munongo in that order. Decisions made clearly at the top but lack implementation for lack of staff.

Met Munongo. Not quite the firebrand he was in Katanga 61 but still a powerful and ruthless man quite capable of forming a secret police on the Russian pattern. Somehow feel he is doing this already.

Invasion at Mushie near [illegible] by 200 soldiers of ex Colonel Pacassa a terrorist ex Kindu responsible for the murder of the Italian airmen

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

Atch #1
HZPA 1685

[illegible]

201-346683

Leo calm but Army [illegible] dealt with the matter quickly, capturing documentary proof in [illegible] that these rebels are Chinese assisted and based in Brazza. Puzzled but Tshombe made capital of it and gave out to the world that he warned neighbouring countries of meddling in Congo's affairs.

Situation on all fronts deteriorated rapidly. Feel terrible frustration because not working [illegible] off now and after weeks of inactivity know that Tshombe will still want a rapid result. He needs a major success seen desperately. Stanleyville falls and Paulis threatened. Rebel advances in Katanga as far as Kabongo NE of Kamina Base and west as far as Luluabourg. In Katanga Jeunesse march on Manono and sack the town including Geomines mess and all the factories and mines. Albertville threatened. In the East Baudouinville retaken by ANC and an advance begun on Kapona.

Morale in the ANC at its lowest ebb. Recently ANC motored into battle in the Kivu area "in reverse" gear, literally. Another time Mobutu personally took command and was left high and dry when his men deserted him, and saved only by a timely Captain shouting "forward men if only to save your general". Despite this Mobutu still not disenchanted with his army.

Journalist of a German paper visited Albertville and told me he had seen Soumialot. Town occupied by large number (1000 possibly?) Jeunesse and even boys of 12 and 14 were armed. S. tired and looking beaten. No contact with his "friends". European hostages numbering about 200 (I think this exaggerated) free to roam around town but not to leave. S. has threatened that if white mercenaries are used against him he will chop the lot. A bas Belgiques. Clever move and the fact that there are over 700 Belgian civilians in the Congo has forced the Belgians to forbid the use of their troops. Harriman Spaak pact apparently states that no Americans and no Belgians to be used, but western world plainly anxious for the mess to be cleared up. Military situation not desperate despite what it may look like on a map. Essential realise the average villager is a peaceful man wanting only a quiet life. Whoever bears arms will force him to side with them and provide food and even men. When the tide turns the same thing applies. The hard core rebels have to be rooted out and destroyed. The retaking of towns will look spectacularly like success but the manner in which ANC performs its occupation duties will be the acid test. At the moment they are a miserable failure. Munongo told me he had resuscitated Kongolo with 8 tons food and 35m francs. Three days later after a battalion of ANC had been moved in by Mobutu (opposing Munongo's suggestion of Katangaise) the village was deserted again, no money and no food, ANC had run riot killing and looting and raping. Some fun. Here lies the root cause of the trouble in rehabilitation.

Gerry and Julian (Gerry's wife) had tea with Munongo on Sunday 9th. I was invited but feel Gerry outmanoeuvred me for some reason.

[redacted] [redacted]

However gave me detailed account of the [illegible]. [illegible] understand why Tshombe has not called us yet, suggests pressure of other business. Says he will [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] this week and let the world press know that SA [illegible] and [illegible] are the Congos real friends. Says he can prove Algerian, Ethiopian and Ghanaian troops are in the [illegible] fighting. I wonder. Certainly the rebels are well armed [illegible] because they are using the arms left by ANC when they ran away. Fantastic story that there was a move afoot to quarter the Congo into four separate sovereign states and that he and [illegible] would welcome it. Bitter about broadcast made by Gen head of Int Red Cross in which he asked the nations of the world to [illegible] Soumialiot and to recognize his government.

Just as I was beginning to lose heart Tshombe made his decision. Sent for me 0930 TUESDAY [illegible] Aug. Bring the men at once, see Gen Mobutu. Saw Mobutu. Anticipated some resistance to the idea but fears totally unfounded. [illegible], charming, efficient, powerful. Back to Tshombe to finalize details of contracts, rates of pay etc. Appointment for [illegible]. Red carpet all the way. Car at our disposal, laisser passer, everything.

Next day - nothing. Spent the entire day in the hotel waiting to be called. Whole damn thing is positively medieval.

Next day, Thursday sense of urgency restored to Mobutu and Tshombe and red carpet laid out again. Saw Tshombe twice and drank beer with him in the evening whilst he discussed his escape from Kipushi in 1962! Very convivial but too tired to finalize our contracts. Tomorrow at 10. Meanwhile Mobutu getting anxious and has done what he can. Alerted General Bobozo who is waiting for me in Kamina. I am to fly there tomorrow DC 3. Assures me all materiel, transport, planes etc are there. Complet autonomie d'action Major pour vous. I got him to say it three times to make sure I had not misheard him. No Belgians, mon general. D'accord. Thank God for that. Force Aerienne to be under my command 15 pilots, chef des pilotes Puren. Jerry took it very well but I do not intend to play a heavy role there. Got my task from Tshombe personally - give me back the Congo, Manono Kabalo Nyunzu Albertville Uvira and [illegible] - waving a fat hand and laughing. T looks fit despite sleeping very little. Eyes shining a smile for everybody. A diplomat in the world [illegible]. Told him we must have the contract by noon Friday so that my men could retrun to Salisbury and Joburg to bring up the small army. Rates of pay must be finalised, no ticket no laundry. He laughed Get as many white troops as I want he said. I told him we would begin with 200.

Friday: today. Waited all morning for Tshombe and Mobutu! Finally

DIARY

15th August 64.

Hedges and MacKintosh arrived at lunch time from Luluabourg. Their first mission has been a miserable failure so far. Two Harvards took off yesterday at 1340 to blast the rebels at a point outside L where they are threatening to overwhelm an important ANC training establishment where we understand the ANC have run away and left valuable equipment. When approaching L this morning Kingman came down with the wind and piled up the Harvard on the dirt at the side of the run way breaking one wing, a wheel and jerking off two of the guns in their nacelles. Gerry then sent Hedges and Mac back by Air Congo and stayed behind with Kingman to complete the mission today in theother Harvard

Summoned to the Palace at 1300 hrs. Mobutu arrived at 1335 and we gave him the pro forma contract we had prepared for the enlistment. Ushered in to the presence 1930 hrs. Present Munungo, Tshombe, Mobutu, Lindaka (Security Minister), Julia and myself. Tshombe mad as hell with Julia. Why does it take five visits to get the smallest thing fixed etc. Julia answered him back.

Finally put a straight question to me - was I satisfied with the Katanga contract of 1961, yes or no. I said Yes but owing to the Cost of living expected higher rates. Tshombe pointed to the Index clause and said that took care of the devaluation of money. I insisted on a written contract which they drafted and signed there and then. Have orig. Next Mobutu very agitated wanted to know why was I not in Kamina where Gen Bobozo was waiting for me and why were the SA men not there as promised today? Explained. Then a bombshell from Tshombe. How long would it take to bring one thousand men? 1000. I said a month. Get them aussi vite que possible. Outlined tactical position. Must crush the rebels, now, now, now smashing fist on table. Mobutu then drew map on table and showed me the position. Took piece of paper and wrote down my orders. First - Manono, Kongolo, Albertville, Uvira. Next Bukavu. Next Stan. Gave me 6 Group Mobile units, 200 in each unit, ANC, asked me to keep one of my platoons with each group. Can it be done he asked. Replied yes, if you give me the materiel and force aerienne. Agreed to everything. Stayed and had supper with Tshombe. Told him how Churchill had called Wingate and told him to conquer Burma - you are my man of destiny said Churchill. Now you command me to give you the Congo, I am your man of destiny. He was visibly moved and shook me warmly by the hand followed by the others. Tshombe said you will succeed. I have great confidence in you, I [illegible]. I was deeply moved myself that fate should have chosen an insignificant man such as me to be their instrument to reshape the Congo and perhaps leave a mark on Africa for many a decade; possibly even keep it free of communism and all it

6

General told me to wait at the hotel as they were busy with the agenda for Soapy Williams who arrived early this morning. Will see me this evening at [illegible] hrs. Meanwhile have had £1500 transferred to Johannesburg to pay for aircraft repairs, travel tickets, mens pay advance, etc and arranged for Julia [illegible] to go to Jo'burg with [illegible] (who arrived here 7 days ago at my request) and Wicks to go to Salisbury. Priority must now be given to getting the men quickly to Kamina Base.

Gerry beside himself with excitement today. Tshombe has given him a special mission. Nobody else will do it. Two Harvards to strafe a position near Luluabourg. Details when they get to a field near there. Saw them off at lunch time. Hedges and Mackintosh in one, Puren and [illegible] in the other still wearing civilian clothes, no helmets, no parachutes and what look like pretty rough kites. Puren has plenty of guts but little judgement. I hope he gets through OK. Task will take three days.

2200 hrs.

Soapy Williams has taken up his time since 1500 hrs and we have been waiting ever since. Have the money but the contracts have not been signed. In the (interim) am sending O'Malley to Jo'burg 0900 Al Italia with Wicks on to Salisbury. They will have to wait for my OK. If all goes well tomorrow I will fly to Jo'burg via [illegible] (what an age we live in) & business can begin on Tuesday. Latest Wednesday. I am expecting first lift of 50 men within 7 days. Received £100 each (8 of us) in [illegible] being advance pay.

Attach #1
HZPA 1685

201-341685

Left the palace after longest interview yet - 2 hrs.
Flying Kamina first light in army plane. Issued instructions for the recruitment 1000 men immediate.
Sending J[illegible] via Joburg tomorrow via Brazza with the money.
Everything now depends on speed recruitment.
Wrote Buys for assistance on security side. If this can be eased even slightly recruitment will be easier.
Coming Joburg myself in army plane in about 8 days time. Must find 15 signallers capable of working W/T net over 60 miles otherwise I am done. May try army. May try Americans but must have them absolute no. 1 priority. Prefer latter chaps if it can be done sub rosa. Will contact friend I know for opinion.

Attach #1
HZPA 1685

RI COPY

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

201-3466[illegible]

WICKES, ALASTAIR
201-801702
SEX M DOB 17 NOV 17
SRHC
CIT RHODESIA
OCC MERCENARY
REF KNSH-06803, 25 JUL 66
TYPE NAME T
OCC CODE ?
OI CODE ?

< REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
AKA WICKS, ALAISTAIR.
AKA WYCKS, ALAISTAIR.
AKA WICKS, JAMES ALISTAIR /MAJ/.
ONE OF THE MERCENARYS INVOLV IN PLOT
JUL 66 TO OVERTHROW MOBUTU.

XRef

138038
CC7CC7CC0ACLAC8ACE- 6607281822

WICKS, ALASTAIRS
201-346685
SEX M DOB ? PRET-04882
15 JUL 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
< RHODESIA, SALISBURY
ONE OF PLOTTERS IN JULY 1966 PLANNED
COUP TO OUST MOBUTU. REGISTERED AT
KENTUCKY HOTEL, SALISBURY. SEE FILE
7-9-11, FOR ADDL INFO.

138540
AELC2BACE4C8 6608121628

WICKS, /MAJ/
007-009-011
SEX M DOB ? DEF -02128
26 FEB 65
CIT ? DEFENSE
OCC ? P2
MBR HQS DETACHMENTS.
SUBJ ON PERSONNEL ROSTER FOR THE 5TH COMMANDOS AS OF 17 FEB 65. MOST PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN NEWLY RECRUITED IN SO AFRICA AND SO RHODESIA, ALTHOUGH BY NATIONALITY THEY COME FROM MANY DIFFERENT COUNTIRES IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH.

Hard copy requested

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

133536
6504231579

14-00000

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION: IW (COPY ISSUED TO IW AT: 1940, 12 AUG BP)

INFO: DCI, DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, DDOS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, AF 17, WE 6, VR.

TDCS-314/01482-64

AUG 12 2324Z 64 IN 49806

S E C R E T 122000Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO IMMEDIATE PRET ELIZ PRIORITY BRUS SLBY STRI

ROUTINE PARI ELTE LEOP 2411 (BLANDA[1] ACTING)

INTEL WITHUNDER SECAROB

SUPDATA: PHLEGAR[2] FROM SECAROB[3]. DEFER PRET ON PASSAGE TO SMOTH[4].

NO INDEX. FILED: 122000Z. REPORT CLASS: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

ACL-2788. CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)/SOUTH AFRICA/SOUTHERN RHODESIA

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FROM TSHOMBE AND MOBUTU FOR CONCENTRATION OF 15 MERCENARY PILOTS AND 200 MERCENARY GROUND TROOPS AT KAMINA; PRESUMED PLAN OF CAMPAIGN; PREPARATIONS.

DOI: 11 AUGUST 64

PADA: CONGO REPUBLIC, LEOPOLDVILLE 12 AUGUST 64

APPR: 2 (THAT HOARE MADE THESE STATEMENTS AND THAT THEY ACCURATELY

IW COMMENT:

CSDO: PLS PASS TO SIG CENTER FOR ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION.

Passed to T/C 2155 12 Aug - BP

AF/REG	4
AF/5	2
AF/345/RE	5
AF/2	1
AF/2/RE	5

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

x PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

W. Steeter Bass

W. STEELER BASS

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
13 AUGUST 1964
0148Z

BASED ON: ACL 2788
WITHUNDER; NP/SECAROB

LIAISON:

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO:

FROM:

ACTION:

INFO:

PAGE 2

IN 43806

TDCS

REFLECT THE FACTS AS HE KNOWS THEM)

SOURCE: WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B); FROM EX-KATANGA MERCENARY (C), FROM HOARE.

S/C NOTE: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO SLBY HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH. SIG. CEN. A RELAY REQUEST ON FROM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

IW COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

TDCS -314/01482-64

DATE OF INFO. 11 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 13 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

INSTRUCTIONS OF TSHOMBE AND MOBUTU FOR CONCENTRATION OF MERCENARIES AT KAMINA; PRESUMED PLAN OF CAMPAIGN; PREPARATIONS

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (12 AUGUST 1964)

REF

IN 49806

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) FROM A FORMER KATANGA MERCENARY (C) FROM HOARE.

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 2788

APPRAISAL: 2 (THAT HOARE MADE THESE STATEMENTS AND THAT THEY ACCURATELY REFLECT THE FACTS AS HE KNOWS THEM)

1. ON 11 AUGUST 64, EUROPEAN MERCENARY COMMANDER MICHAEL HOARE SAID PRIVATELY THAT AT 0915 HOURS THAT SAME MORNING, PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE HAD SENT A CAR TO PICK UP HIM AND MERCENARY AIR COMMANDER JEREMIAH PUREN AND WIFE, FOR AN 0930 APPOINTMENT. THEY WAITED UNTIL 1000 HOURS AND THEN SAW TSHOMBE FOR "EXACTLY FOUR MINUTES". THIS WAS HOARE'S FIRST INTERVIEW WITH HIM SINCE ARRIVING IN THE CONGO ON 25 JULY. THE GIST OF WHAT TSHOMBE SAID WAS, "HOW SOON CAN YOU BRING YOUR MEN IN? THIS IS VERY URGENT, AND WE WANT YOU IMMEDIATELY." (FIELD COMMENT: THE MENTION OF "YOUR MEN" IS OBVIOUSLY A REFERENCE TO OTHER EUROPEAN MERCENARIES STANDING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO

AD/CI 2

WH SIT ROOM	DIRNSA(PROD WO)	STATE (OCI)
CNO(OP922Y)	DFI/ACSI	NIC
DIA CIIC	JCS	AFSSO

BY TO COME TO THE CONGO.) TSHOMBE THEN WROTE A PASS IN HIS OWN HAND AND SENT HOARE AND THE PURENS IN A STAFF CAR TO SEE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU. HOARE COMMENTED, "WE RECEIVED RED CARPET TREATMENT ALL THE WAY."

2. THEY SPENT HALF AN HOUR WITH MOBUTU, DURING WHICH PERIOD TSHOMBE TELEPHONED, TO MAKE SURE THEY WERE THERE AND TO TELL THEM TO REPORT BACK TO HIM AFTER THEIR TALK WITH MOBUTU. HOARE SAID THAT THROUGHOUT THE MEETING MOBUTU WAS "CHARMING AND MOST COOPERATIVE, AGREEING TO EVERYTHING." HE APPEARED "MORE ENTRENCHED THAN EVER" AND "IN FULL CONTROL (SIC) OF THE SITUATION."

3. MOBUTU SAID THAT HOARE, THE MERCENARY PILOTS AND 200 ADDITONAL MERCENARIES ARE TO BE FLOWN TO KAMINA. MOBUTU THEN TOLD PUREN HE COULD HAVE 15 PILOTS. PUREN IMMEDIATELY PRODUCED A LIST OF SEVEN PILOTS WHO HAD BEEN WITH HIM IN KATANGA IN 1961 AND ARE NOW WAITING IN LONDON AND BRUSSELS. TO HOARE'S SURPRISE, MOBUTU QUICKLY STARTED PUTTING THROUGH LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE CALLS " AND IN TWO HOURS THE JOB WAS DONE." THESE SEVEN, PLUS THE THREE NOW IN LEOPOLDVILLE (JAMES HEDGES, ERROL KINGMAN AND PETER MACKINTOSH), PLUS PUREN, LEAVE FOUR STILL NEEDED. PUREN IS SENDING TO JOHANNESBURG FOR THEM. HOARE COMMENTED THAT AT THE MOMENT THERE ARE SIX T-6'S AVAILABLE IN LEOPOLDVILLE. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS APPEARS TO BE A MISTAKE. FOUR ARMED T-6'S ARRIVED IN LEOPOLDVILLE FROM LUANDA ON 8 AUGUST,

BUT THEIR CONDITION IS UNCERTAIN SINCE PRIOR TO THIS FLIGHT THEY HAD NOT BEEN FLOWN FOR AT LEAST A YEAR. EIGHT MORE ARE EXPECTED FROM LUANDA. THERE ARE ALSO SIX T-6'S SUPPLIED BY THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE TO THE CONGOLESE AIR FORCE. THESE LATTER ARE NOT ARMED; THE FIRST ONE SHOULD BE ASSEMBLED AND READY TO FLY DURING THE WEEK BEGINNING 9 AUGUST.)

4. MOBUTU OFFERED HOARE THE RANK OF MAJOR, WHICH HE ACCEPTED WITH THE PROVISO THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO BELGIAN OF SUPERIOR RANK IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. AS AGREED WITH MOBUTU, THE COMMAND LINE WILL RUN FROM TSHOMBE TO MOBUTU TO MAJOR-GENERAL LOUIS BOBOZO TO HOARE; AND THE WHOLE FORCE WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO THE ANC. HOARE SAID HE HAS CHRISTENED THE OPERATIONAL UNIT "FIVE COMMANDO-ANC." BOBOZO, HE ADDED, IS NOW WAITING FOR HIM AT KAMINA; AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT HE AND ALASTAIR WICKS, HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND, WILL BE FLOWN THERE ON THE NIGHT OF 12 AUGUST. HOARE SAID HE IS PREPARING A LIST OF THE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT HE WILL NEED AND CLAIMED THAT MOBUTU AGREED, "WITHOUT ACTUALLY SAYING SO," THAT THE LIST COULD BE AMENDED AFTER HOARE HAD PERSONALLY CHECKED OUT THE SITUATION.

5. HOARE SAID THAT THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES AS HE SEES THEM ARE TO BE MANONO, KONGOLO AND ALBERTVILLE. HE PLANS TO SEND PATRICK O'MALLEY, WHO ARRIVED IN LEOPOLDVILLE ON 8 AUGUST OSTENSIBLY AS A JOURNALIST BUT ACTUALLY ON HOARE'S INSTRUCTIONS, BACK TO JOHANNESBURG ON 12 AUGUST "TO GET ON WITH RECRUITING, SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT

ON A SATISFACTORY CONTRACT." (FIELD COMMENT: SEE ACL-2764 (
) FROM THE SAME SOURCE FOR AN EARLIER REFERENCE BY HOARE TO O'MALL AS HIS "CONTACT MAN" WITH THE MERCENARIES ON CALL IN JOHANNESBURG.) HOARE WANTS THE FIRST PLANELOAD OF MEN FROM SOUTH AFRICA TO ARRIV AT KAMINA BY 17 AUGUST AND THE BALANCE WITHIN 10 DAYS. HE PLANS TO SEND WICKS TO SALISBURY ON 16 AUGUST TO RAISE 30 MEN THERE.

6. RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACT, HOARE SAID THAT THE ONE USED IN 1961 IS NOT ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY AS A MODEL FOR A NEW ONE AND WILL HAVE TO BE AMENDED IN "CERTAIN RESPECTS". ONE NEW CLAUSE THAT HOARE INTENDS TO HAVE INCLUDED IS THAT HE MUST BE ABLE TO TERMINATE THE CONTRACT "ON HIS OWN JUDGEMENT." HE ADDED THAT HE FORESEES NO DIFFICULTY WITH MOBUTU ON THIS SCORE.

7. AFTER THE INITIAL HALF-HOUR MEETING WITH MOBUTU ON THE MORNING OF 11 AUGUST, HOARE AND THE PURENS RETURNED TO SEE HIM AT 1530 HOURS THE SAME DAY. MOBUTU WAS JUST THEN LEAVING TO SEE TSHOMBE, AND THE GROUP FOLLOWED. THEY WERE KEPT WAITING UNTIL 1900 HOURS WHILE MOBUTU AND TSHOMBE CONFERRED IN PRIVATE. WHEN THEY WERE FINALLY RECEIVED, THEY PRESENTED MOBUTU WITH AN ESTIMATE OF EXPENSES TO BE INCURRED WHICH HE READ OVER AND APPROVED.

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

(END OF MESSAGE)

31

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

TDCS DB-315/00489-64

DATE OF INFO. 17-20 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 21 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

1. EXPECTED ARRIVAL OF 40-60 MERCENARIES AND THE PROJECTED ORGANIZATION OF THE MERCENARY STRIKING FORCE
2. PLAN FOR ATTACK ON ALBERTVILLE AND SUBSEQUENT OBJECTIVES
3. COOPERATION FROM BELGIAN MILITARY ADVISORS TO ANC

PLACE & DATE ACQ. REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (20 AUGUST 1964)

REF IN 57075

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 2822

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B); FROM EX-KATANGA MERCENARY (C), FROM HOARE. APPRAISAL: 2 (THAT HOARE'S STATEMENTS ACCURATELY REFLECT HIS VIEWS AND THE FACTS AS HE KNOWS THEM).

1. ON 20 AUGUST '64, MERCENARY COMMANDER MICHAEL HOARE SAID PRIVATELY THAT MRS JEREMIAH PUREN, WIFE OF THE MECENARY AIR FORCE COMMANDER, HAD ARRIVED IN JOHANNESBURG FROM LEOPOLDVILLE ON 17 AUGUST WITH THE CONGOLESE GOVT FUNDS NEEDED TO PROCEED WITH MERCENARY RECRUITING. ALTHOUGH HOARE HAS HAD NO NEWS OF HER MOVEMENTS SINCE THEN, HE CONFIDENTLY EXPECTS THE FIRST DRAFT OF MERCENARIES, BETWEEN 40 AND 60 OF THEM, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND ALASTAIR WICKS, TO ARRIVE AT KAMINA BASE FROM JOHANNESBURG ABOARD A RHODESIAN AIR SERVICES FLIGHT ON 21 AUGUST. SOME OF THEM WILL HAVE BEEN RECRUITED IN JOHANNESBURG, SOME IN SALISBURY. BILLETS, EQUIPMENT AND

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

(6

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC OCI ONE OCR EXO

SUPPLIES ARE READY FOR THEM. HOARE HIMSELF PLANS TO FLY TO KAMINA EARLY ON 21 AUGUST. ON ARRIVAL THERE, HIS FIRST TASK WILL BE TO SET UP A HEADQUARTERS CAPABLE OF HANDLING AN INFLUX OF UP TO 100 MEN AT A TIME.

2. HOARE THEN SAID THAT HIS PRESENT PLAN IS TO FORM FIVE COMMANDOS OF 100 MERCENARIES EACH (COMMANDOS "A" THROUGH "E"). EACH IS TO HAVE AN ARMORED SPEARHEAD IN THE FORM OF A "FERRET" OR OTHER LIGHT ARMORED CAR; AND ALL COMMANDOS WILL HAVE TO OPERATE UNDER HOARE'S CONTROL, SINCE HE HAS NO ONE ELSE CAPABLE OF ASSUMING SUBORDINATE COMMAND AT THIS TIME.

3. HOARE SAID HIS FIRST OBJECTIVE IS ALBERTVILLE, WHICH HE PLANS TO TAKE FROM THE LAKE. HE HAS CHRISTENED THE ATTACK "OPERATION WATCHCHAIN" AND HAS DISCUSSED IT IN DETAIL WITH CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU AND WITH COLONEL GUY LOGIEST, RANKING BELGIAN MILITARY ADVISER TO THE ANC. MOBUTU, ON 19 AUGUST, CONCURRED FULLY IN THE PLAN AND SAID ALL NEEDED SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT WOULD BE AVAILABLE AT ONCE. HOARE THEN ASKED HIM FOR RECONNAISSANCE PLANES, FOR USE IN THE ALBERTVILLE AREA, WHICH BELGIAN OFFICERS HAD REFUSED HIM DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO KAMINA. MOBUTU GAVE HIS AGREEMENT TO THEIR USE. ON 20 AUGUST, LOGIEST "ENTIRELY APPROVED" OPERATION "WATHCHAIN". HE THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS WITH HOARE THE CRITICAL SITUATION OF THE BELGIANS IN ALBERTVILLE, WHERE SOME 30 ARE IN PRISON AND SOME 150 OTHERS AT LIBERTY

IN THE TOWN. REFERRING TO THIS CONVERSATION, HOARE SAID IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE WHOLE TOWN BE TAKEN AT ONCE AND NOT PIECEMEAL, SINCE OTHERWISE THE REBELS WILL HAVE TIME TO KILL THE EUROPEANS. HE THEN REVEALED, IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, H-HOUR FOR THE ATTACK ON ALBERTVILLE AS 0300 HOURS 30 AUGUST. "NO ONE HAS THIS INFORMATION, NOT EVEN MOBUTU." THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES WILL BE THE AIRPORT, THE HOTEL DU LAC AND THE WHARF. (FIELD COMMENT: SEE ACL-2755 ((TDCS-314/01366-64) FOR A GARBLED VERSION OF HOARE'S INITIAL PLANNING FOR THIS OPERATION.)

4. AFTER ALBERTVILLE, HOARE'S TENTATIVE OBJECTIVES ARE FIZI AND UVIRA, "ALL IN LINE WITH THE GENERAL OPERATIONAL PLAN SUBMITTED TO AND APPROVED BY MOBUTU." AFTER UVIRA, "THE REAL WAR" STARTS, THE OBJECTIVES BEING BUKAVU AND STANLEYVILLE. HOARE SAID THAT WHEN HE SAW MOBUTU ON 19 AUGUST, HE HAD ASKED HIM "WHAT SHALL I DO WITH (GASTON EMILE) SOUMIALOT, (PIERRE) MULELE AND OTHER REBEL LEADERS IF CAPTURED. SHALL I SHOOT THEM OR TAKE THEM PRISONER?" MOBUTU'S ANSWER WAS, "I DON'T WANT TO HEAR ABOUT THESE THINGS," WHICH HOARE SAID HE INTERPRETS AS TACIT AUTHORITY TO KILL THEM.

5. HOARE THEN SPOKE ENTHUSIASTICALLY ABOUT HIS RECENT CONTACTS WITH BELGIAN MILITARY ADVISERS TO THE ANC. ON 19 AUGUST, BELGIAN AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL (FNU) BOUZIN, WHOM HOARE DESCRIBED AS AN "UNPOPULAR LITTLE MAN, IDLE AND IRRITABLE ALTHOUGH PROBABLY QUITE CAPABLE," SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE HOARE "EVERY ASSISTANCE."

THAT SAME DAY, BELGIAN ARMY COLONEL F P MARLIERE, WAS "EXTREMELY COOPERATIVE," ALLOWING HIM TO EXAMINE AVAILALBE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. HOARE WAS ASTOUNDED TO DISCOVER 20 NEW AMERICAN-BUILT ASSAULT BOATS AND 15 NEW 25-HP ENGINES, WHICH HE WILL USE IN THE ASSAULT ON ALBERTVILLE. HOARE LISTED HIS REQUIREMENTS AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SUPPLIES TO BE TRANSPORTED TO NDJILI AIRPORT FOR AIRSHIPMENT TO KAMINA BASE BY C-130. (FIELD COMMENT: THE BOATS AND ENGINES WERE EN ROUTE TO KAMINA BY AIR ON 21 AUGUST.)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

INFO : C/CPS, F/I 2, IW, VR

S E C R E T 2169322

ELIZ INFO DIR LEOP CITE [illegible] 3565

REF: ELIZ 3660 (IN 54040)

NO TRACES LATZ. SECARDS HAS HIGH REGARD FOR VICKS AND PERSONALLY PICKED VICKS FOR HIS DEPUTY.

21 [illegible] IN 56965

S E C R E T

* RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO LEOP HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIG CEN. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ELIZABETHVILLE

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : [illegible]

S E C R E T 151130Z

DIR INFO LEOP PRET SLBY LOND CITE ELIZ [illegible]

SECAROB

REF: ACE 2394

[illegible] IN 54240

1. SECAROB (S) SAID HE HAS ENGAGED JOHN LATZ AS LOCAL INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN S AND ALISTAIR WICKS IN ORDER KEEP HIM S; ABREAST OF MERCENARY PICTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTHERN RHODESIA. CHANNEL WILL BE FROM WICKS TO LATZ TO BELGIAN MAJOR COCHAUX (ADVISOR TO ANC G-4) TO BELGIAN CONGEN TO S IN KAMINA. (OBVIOUSLY SUCH CHANNEL WILL KEEP LOTS OTHER PEOPLE IN PICTURE AS WELL.) FYI BELGIAN CONGEN HAS DIRECT RADIO COMMO WITH KAMINA BASE. S SAID HE PICKED LATZ BECAUSE HE OLD FRIEND OF WICKS.

2. LATZ IS LONG TIME RESIDENT ASSOCIATED PRESS CORRESPONDENT AND HAS BUSINESS INVESTMENTS EVILLE. BRITISH SUBJECT. HAVE NO DEROG INFO.

3. REQUEST ADDEES TRACES LATZ, ESPECIALLY INDICATIONS ANY INTEL CONNECTION NOTABLY SMOTH. SAME FOR WICKS.

4. ELIZ VIEW REPORTS LIKE REF SHOULD NOT BE PASSED SMOTH (OR DRUS LIAISON).

S E C R E T

S/C NOTE:

• Relay of this cable to [illegible] has been [illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

LEOPOLDVILLE

ACOP, ADD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS,
CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, WE 6, AF 17, VR.

TDCS-314/01684-64

SECRET 161113Z AUG 16 1719Z 64 IN 52051

PRITY INFO PRET ELIZ BRUS STRI PART LOND CITE LEOP 2475 (BLANDA ACTING)

INTEL WITHUNDER SECAROB

SUPDATA: PHLECAR FROM SECAROB. DEFER PRET ON PASSAGE TO SMOTH.

NO INDEX. FILED: 161113Z. REPORT CLASS: SECRET NO FOREIGIN DISSEM

ACL-2605 CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)

SUBJECT: RECONNAISSANCE MISSION FOR MERCENARY PILOTS

DOI: 14 AUGUST 64

PADA: CONGO REPUBLIC, LEOPOLDVILLE 15 AUGUST 64

APPR: 2

SOURCE: WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B), FROM EX-KATANGA MERCENARY (C).

SIG NOTE: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO ELIZ HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH. SIG. CEN.
PRIORITY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

* COMMENT.

TDCS
PRECEDENCE

XX ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
16 AUGUST 2232Z 64

BASED ON: ACL-2605
WITHUNDER/(SP-SECAROB

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CONGO REPUBLIC

TDCS-314/01684-64

DATE OF INFO. 15 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 16 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

RECONNAISSANCE MISSION FOR MERCENARY PILOTS

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (15 AUGUST 1964)

REF IN 52651

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL-2805

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) FROM AN EX-KATANGA MERCENARY (C). APPRAISAL: 2

1. AT 0900 HOURS ON 14 AUGUST 64, MERCENARY AIR FORCE COMMANDER JEREMIAH PUREN, MRS. PUREN AND THE MERCENARY PILOTS, JAMES HEDGES, ERROL KINGMAN AND PETER MACKINTOSH, ATTENDED A BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION GIVEN AT CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) HEADQUARTERS BY BELGIAN COLONEL (FNU) BOUZIN. FROM WHAT THE PILOTS SAID AFTERWARDS, THE PURPOSE OF THE BRIEFING WAS TO PREPARE THEM FOR A MISSION TO WHICH CONGO PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE. THEIR REMARKS INDICATED THAT IT WAS A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE VICINITY OF LULUABOURG, WHERE THERE IS AN ANC TRAINING SCHOOL THAT MUST BE HELD AGAINST THE REBELS. BOUZIN REPORTEDLY TOLD THE PILOTS THAT LULUABOURG

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

SR/1 AF/CI 2

IS STILL IN ANC HANDS, ALTHOUGH SURROUNDED BY REBEL FORCES.

2. AFTER THE BRIEFING, THE PILOTS INQUIRED AS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FLYING EQUIPMENT: HELMETS, PARACHUTES, MAPS, ETC. BOUZIN REPLIED, "THE AMERICANS HAVE IT. WE WILL TRY TO GET IT FROM THEM." THOSE AT THE BRIEFING REPORTED THAT BOUZIN HAD TRIED TO DISCOURAGE THEM AND CONDUCTED HIS BRIEFING IN THE MOST SKETCHY FASHION. PUREN AND THE OTHER PILOTS THEN WENT TO NDOLO AIR FIELD TO PREPARE FOR THE MISSION. MRS. PUREN RETURNED TO THE MEMLING HOTEL.

3. AT 1300 HOURS, PUREN AND KINGMAN TOOK OFF IN ONE OF THE T-6'S, HEDGES AND MACKINTOSH IN ANOTHER. BOTH PLANES WERE COMPLETELY STRIPPED DOWN: NO HELMETS, NO PARACHUTES, NO RADIOS, NO ARMS, NO MAPS; BUT PUREN INSISTED ON GOING. BEFORE THE PLANES TOOK OFF, MRS. PUREN GAVE EACH OF THE FOUR MEN $280 WHICH SHE HAD RECEIVED FROM ANC COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU THAT SAME MORNING. SHE KEPT THE SAME AMOUNT FOR HERSELF AND DISTRIBUTED THE SAME AMOUNT ALSO TO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING: MERCENARY COMMANDER MICHAEL HOARE, HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND ALASTAIR WICKS, AND PATRICK O'MALLEY.

4. THE TWO PLANES WERE SUPPOSED TO HAVE RETURNED LATE ON 14 AUGUST, BUT AT 0100 HOURS 15 AUGUST, HOARE DISCLOSED PRIVATELY THAT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING AND EXPRESSED CONCERN AS TO WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED TO THE FOUR MEN.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

(END OF MESSAGE)

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE

FROM: Name

OFFICE

ROOM

PHONE

TUBE ADDRESS

1. TYPE ACTION ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

2. FILE RESTRICTED ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) 01

5. 201 NO. E2

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
H2			
H2			
H2			
H2			
H2			
H2			

7. SEX F1 ☐ M ☐ F

8. DATE OF BIRTH F2

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH G1

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH G1

11. CITIZENSHIP H1

12. OCCUPATION (clear text) J1

OCC. CODE J2

13. SRL K1

14. OI CODE W1

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER X1

25

DATE X1

16. RESIDENCE

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE B1

19. ACTION DESK CODE D1

20. SECONDARY DESK CODE

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES

22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO.

FORM 9-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38-51)

BUT THEIR CONDITION IS UNCERTAIN SINCE PRIOR TO THIS FLIGHT THEY HAD NOT BEEN FLOWN FOR AT LEAST A YEAR. EIGHT MORE ARE EXPECTED FROM LUANDA. THERE ARE ALSO SIX T-6'S SUPPLIED BY THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE TO THE CONGOLESE AIR FORCE. THESE LATTER ARE NOT ARMED; THE FIRST ONE SHOULD BE ASSEMBLED AND READY TO FLY DURING THE WEEK BEGINNING 9 AUGUST.

4. MOBUTU OFFERED HOARE THE RANK OF MAJOR, WHICH HE ACCEPTED WITH THE PROVISO THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO BELGIAN OF SUPERIOR RANK IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. AS AGREED WITH MOBUTU, THE COMMAND LINE WILL RUN FROM TSHOMBE TO MOBUTU TO MAJOR-GENERAL LOUIS BOBOZO TO HOARE; AND THE WHOLE FORCE WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO THE ANC. HOARE SAID HE HAS CHRISTENED THE OPERATIONAL UNIT "FIVE COMMANDO-ANC." BOBOZO, HE ADDED, IS NOW WAITING FOR HIM AT KAMINA; AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT HE AND ALASTAIR WICKS, HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND, WILL BE FLOWN THERE ON THE NIGHT OF [illegible] AUGUST. HOARE SAID HE IS PREPARING A LIST OF THE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT HE WILL NEED AND CLAIMED THAT MOBUTU AGREED, "WITHOUT ACTUALLY SAYING SO," THAT THE LIST COULD BE AMENDED AFTER HOARE HAD PERSONALLY CHECKED OUT THE SITUATION.

5. HOARE SAID THAT THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES AS HE SEES THEM ARE TO BE MANONO, KONGOLO AND ALBERTVILLE. HE PLANS TO SEND PATRICK O'MALLEY, WHO ARRIVED IN LEOPOLDVILLE ON 5 AUGUST OSTENSIBLY AS JOURNALIST BUT ACTUALLY ON HOARE'S INSTRUCTIONS, BACK TO JOHANN[illegible] ON 12 AUGUST [illegible] RECRUITING, SUBJECT TO [illegible]

14-00000

[redacted] #83

SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ● PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)/TANGANYIKA/ SOUTHERN RHODESIA

TDCS-314/01366-64

DATE OF INFO. 3-5 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 6 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

(12) TSHOMBE'S DECISION TO USE THE MERCENARIES/HOARE'S (military assessment) PLAN FOR SEIZING ALBERTVILLE/ ACTIVITIES OF WICKS AND DEMARD (other mercenaries) (Committee of Natl Liberation plans to massacre Europeans if mercenaries are used)

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (5 AUGUST 1964)

REF IN 44755

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B); FROM EX-KATANGAN MERCENARY (C); FROM PUREN AND HOARE, AS INDICATED. APPRAISAL: 3.

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 2755

1. ON 5 AUGUST 64, JEREMIAH PUREN, ONE OF THE WHITE MERCENARIES NOW IN LEOPOLDVILLE, SAID PRIVATELY THAT MARCO KALIBIONA, CHEF DE CABINET TO PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE AND HIS LIAISON OFFICER WITH THE MERCENARIES, HAD SEEN HIM AND JAMES HEDGES AT 1900 HOURS. KALOBIONA TOLD THEM THAT TSHOMBE, INTERIOR MINISTER GODEFROID MUNONGO, AND CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER IN CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU HAD MET THAT SAME DAY AND DECIDED THAT THE EUROPEAN MERCENARIES WOULD BE USED, AND THAT PUREN WOULD BE IN CHARGE OF THE AIRFORCE. (INFORMANT COMMENT: KALIBIONA IS VERY CLOSE TO TSHOMBE AND HAS ACCESS TO HIM AT ALL TIMES.)

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

OCI, AD/CI 2

IMMEDIATE TO: STATE (RCI)

2. ON 5 AUGUST, MICHAEL HOARE, MERCENARY COMMANDER, SAID PRIVATELY THAT KALIBIONA HAD TOLD HIM ON 3 AUGUST THAT MOBUTU INTENDED TO USE THE WHITE MERCENARIES IN THE DEFENSE OF STANLEYVILLE. (FIELD COMMENT: STANLEYVILLE FELL TO THE REBELS ON 5 AUGUST.) IN RELATING THIS, HOARE COMMENTED THAT THEIR EMPLOYMENT IN THIS FASHION WOULD HAVE BEEN "FATAL" AND THAY THEY WOULD ALL HAVE BEEN SLAUGHTERED.

3. ON THE SAME OCCASION, HOARE PRIVATELY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE CURRENT "HESITATION" OVER USING THE MERCENARIES MIGHT END WITH THEIR ALL BEING ASKED TO LEAVE. HOARE CLAIMED THAT THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THE DELAY IS BELGIAN PRESSURE. THE REASON FOR THE PRESSURE IS THE THREAT BY INSURGENT LEADER GASTON EMILE SOUMIALOT, COMMANDER IN THE EASTERN CONGO, TO KILL THE 100 EUROPEANS NOW HELD IN ALBERTVILLE IF THE MERCENARIES GO INTO ACTION. HOARE COMMENTED THAT "IF THE SITUATION WARRANTS," HE INTENDS TO ASK MOBUTU TO APPOINT HIM TO HIS STAFF IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. HE WILL THEN SUBMIT A PLAN FOR THE RECAPTURE OF ALBERTVILLE. HE WILL ASK MOBUTU FOR 100 MEN AND AUTHORITY TO USE APPROXIMATELY 10 EUROPEANS. (INFORMANT COMMENT: PRESUMABLY THE NUCLEUS OF THIS GROUP WOULD BE THE MERCENARIES ALREADY IN LEOPOLDVILLE.)

4. THE PLAN WOULD INVOLVE THE USE OF THE LAKE TANGANYIKA STEAMER, "BARON DHANIS". HOARE WOULD USE IT AS A TROOPSHIP; HE CLAIMS IT CAN CARRY 500 MEN FOR A SHORT HAUL. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE THE SHIP APPROACH ALBERTVILLE FROM THE NORTH, VIA UVIRA AND KIGOMA,

AND POSSIBLY CONTINUE ON TO MOBA, WHICH IS ON THE LAKE, NEAR BAUDOUINVILLE. (FIELD COMMENT: THE PLAN, AS RECEIVED AND OBVIOUSLY INCOMPLETE, IS CONFUSING. UVIRA IS IN REBEL HANDS. KIGOMA IS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LAKE IN TANGANYIKA. PERHAPS, HOARE MEANT THAT THE FORCE ABOARD THE "BARON DHANIS" WOULD ATTACK UVIRA BEFORE PROCEEDING TO ALBERTVILLE.)

5. HOARE'S SECOND-IN-COMMAND, ALASTAIR WICKS, WHO LEFT LEOPOLDVILLE ON 1 AUGUST FOR JOHANNESBURG IS NOW IN SALISBURY. FROM THERE HE HAS TELEPHONED THAT RHODESIAN AIR SERVICES (RAS) IS NOW "SQUARED AWAY". (INFORMANT COMMENT: THIS MUST BE A REFERENCE TO EARLIER PLANS TO USE THE RAS TO SUPPORT THE MERCENARY ACTIVITIVE IN THE CONGO.)

6. THE FORMER KATANGA MERCENARY, "BOB" DENARD IS NOT IN YEMEN AS REPORTED. HE IS ACTUALLY IN PARIS, RECRUITING MEN THERE FOR SERVICE IN YEMEN.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

(END OF MESSAGE)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FROM C/AF 3 (AF NOTIFIED AND COPY TUBED AT 1430, 31 JUL 64 LMG)

TO ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR

S E C R E T 271112Z

31 JUL 64 IN 40108

PRIORITY PRET INFO PRIORITY DIR CITE DURB 0293

RYBAT/SECAROB

REF DURB 0289 , N34860

1. SECAROBS WIFE DELIVERED AIRLETTER POSTED JOBURG 24 JULY. STATES SECAROB ACTUALLY LEFT JOBURG EVENING 25 JULY, CARRYING LETTER. OMALLEY STILL IN JOBURG, TALKED TO HER ON PHONE 26 JULY.

2. SUMMARY LETTER FOLLOWS: LEAVE THIS EVENING RHODESIA. AIR SERVICE CHARTER DC-4, CAPTAIN MULLOCK. WHOLE AUTHORIZATION FOR MOVEMENT RESTS ON ONE TELEGRAM FROM TSHOMBE WHICH COLONEL BUY'S(SECURITY) HELD WAS AMBIGUOUS. TOUCH AND GO UNTIL 1400 HOURS WHEN BUYS FINALLY GAVE GO AHEAD.

3. PUREN-ROT HIS SOUL-HAD PROMISED CONTACT SECURITY THIS MORNING, INSTEAD LEFT LAST NIGHT WITH WICKS, HEDGES, AND A FEW PILOTS INCLUDING MACKINTOSH. PUREN VERY UNPOPULAR WITH SECURIITY AT MOMENT, OUR SELVES ALSO.

4. ABOUT 45 MEN, ALL OTHER RANKS, FLY WITH ME TONIGHT. EXPECT SECOND FLIGHT WILL BE IN 7-10 DAYS TIME. MEANWHILE BUGY DENYING WHOLE THING TO THE PRESS WHO HAVE THE STORY, PROBABLY FROM ONE OF THE MEN IN PUB. INEVITABLE.

SECRET [illegible]

[illegible] QUITE [illegible]

[illegible] EXCELLENT ORGANIZATION WORK.

[illegible] MEN LOOK A MUCH BETTER BUNCH THAN LAST TIME. INCLUDES

FEW GERMANS, SHOULD MAKE GOOD SOLDIERS. TOO MANY ITALIANS,

LL LET YOU KNOW HOW THEY SETTLE DOWN. GORDON AND OMALLY OBEYED

DIRECTIVES THANK GOD, PUT EMPHASIS ON YOUNG AND ACTIVE MEN,

VENTEROUS SPIRITS, MILITARY EXPERIENCE SECOND. WILL SOO

EM THAT. MY FIRST ORDER WAS OFF ALL BEARDS, INC OWN.

SECRET

SECRET

WICKS, James Alistair RHODESIA W

James Alistair Wicks, was probably born 17 November 1917 in England. (Note: this date is not confirmed.)

Was a mercenary in the Katanga gendarme, 1961.

In July 1964, he returned to the Congo as a member of Michel Hoare's white mercenary group -- was second in command to Hoare.

So: DDP files, 2 November 1965, Confidential.

WICKS, Alistair

SOUTH AFRICA

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY [illegible]

DATE OF INFO. [illegible] JULY 1964

SUBJECT [illegible]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [illegible]

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL [illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible]

SECRET

46

14-00000

197 NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CONGO REPUBLIC / SOUTH AFRICA TDCS-314/01683-64

DATE OF INFO. 14 AUGUST 1964 DISTR. 16 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

FAILURE OF TSHOMBE TO SIGN MERCENARY CONTRACT; FAILURE OF MRS. PUREN TO LEAVE FOR JOHANNESBURG AS PLANNED; DISPATCH OF WICKS AND O'MALLEY.

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (15 AUGUST 1964) REF IN 52536

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: FIELD REPORT NO. ACL-2503

WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) FROM EX-KATANGA MERCENARY (C) FROM HOARE. APPRAISAL: HOARE PROBABLY MADE THESE STATEMENTS AND THEY PROBABLY ACCURATELY REFLECT THE FACTS AS HE KNOWS THEM.

1. ON 15 AUGUST 64, MERCENARY COMMANDER MICHAEL HOARE SAID PRIVATELY THAT, DESPITE THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE ON 13 AUGUST, THE LATTER DID NOT CONVOKE HIM, HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND ALASTAIR WICKS, MERCENARY AIR FORCE COMMANDER JEREMIAH PUREN AND MRS. PUREN ON 14 AUGUST TO COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON PAY AND ALLOWANCES AND SIGN A CONTRACT FOR THE 250-ODD EUROPEAN MERCENARIES TSHOMBE WISHES BROUGHT TO THE CONGO. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR THE EVENTS OF 13 AUGUST, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH TSHOMBE GAVE SUCH AN ASSURANCE, SEE ACL-2799.)(TDCS-314/01799-64)

2. NEVERTHELESS, AT 1200 HOURS, MRS. PUREN WENT TO THE OFFICE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM GROUP 1

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
OO/1 AD/CI 2 EXO

OF CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU TO DISCUSS THE FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SITUATION OF THE MERCENARIES ALREADY IN LEOPOLDVILLE AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS TO RECRUIT THE OTHERS STILL NEEDED. AT 1730 HOURS, SHE SUDDENLY PRODUCED FROM HER HANDBAG A CHECK FOR THE EQUIVALENT IN BELGIAN FRANCS OF APPROXIMATELY 9,000 POUNDS STERLING, DRAWN ON A BELGIAN BANK, WHICH SHE SAID SHE HAD RECEIVED THAT MORNING FROM MOBUTU BUT WHICH SHE HAD WAITED UNTIL THAT MOMENT TO MENTION. AT FIRST, HOARE SAID, IT SEEMED IMPROBABLE THAT THE CHECK COULD BE CASHED. HOWEVER, THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF MOBUTU, MRS. PUREN FINALLY MADE CONTACT WITH A "HIGH-LEVEL SURETE OFFICIAL" WHO CASHED THE CHECK IN U.S. DOLLARS, IN FIFTY-DOLLAR AND ONE HUNDRED-DOLLAR BILLS. (FIELD COMMENT: A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, A HIGH-RANKING NATIONAL SURETE OFFICIAL, REPORTS THAT THE CHECK IN QUESTION WAS FOR 1,122,000 BELGIAN FRANCS, PAYABLE BY THE BANQUE NATIONALE DE BELGIQUE TO MISS J.F. RENOUPREZ. RENOUPREZ IS MRS. PUREN'S MAIDEN NAME.)

5. HOARE THEN SAID THAT, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF HER HUSBAND'S ABSENCE ON A SPECIAL MISSION, SHE DID NOT FLY TO JOHANNESBURG WITH THE MONEY ON THE 14 AUGUST ALITALIA FLIGHT AS SHE HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR DETAILS ON THE MISSION, SEE ACL-2025 (TDCS-314/01684-64).) SHE IS NOW KEEPING THE MONEY IN A SATCHEL IN HER LEOPOLDVILLE HOTEL ROOM. AT 2300 HOURS ON 14 AUGUST, HOARE DECIDED THAT, IN SPITE OF TSHOMBE'S FAILURE TO SIGN THE MERCENARY CONTRACT, WICKS AND [illegible] WOULD

THEMSELVES GO ON THE FLIGHT AS SCHEDULED. THEY LEFT, AND MRS. PUREN WILL "PRESUMABLY" FOLLOW ON 19 AUGUST, THE NEXT AVAILABLE FLIGHT. HOARE EXPLAINED THAT THE CONTRACT IS ALL DRAWN UP, LACKING ONLY THE FINAL PAY RATE AND TSHOMBE'S SIGNATURE. (SOURCE COMMENT: HOARE HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID THAT HE IS ASKING FOR A BASE PAY OF 140 POUNDS STERLING PER MONTH FOR THE ENLISTED MEN, WITH ALLOWANCES THAT COULD BRING THE TOTAL UP TO 225 POUNDS STERLING.)

4. ON HOARE'S INSTRUCTIONS, O'MALLEY WILL PROCEED AT ONCE FROM JOHANNESBURG TO SALISBURY AND STAND BY THERE FOR FURTHER WORD BEFORE STARTING RECRUITING. WICKS HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO START RECRUITING IMMEDIATELY IN JOHANNESBURG.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

END OF MESSAGE

#183

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

3

COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO / SOUTH AFRICA / RHODESIA

TDCS -314/01739-64

DATE OF INFO. 13 AUGUST 1964

DATE DISTR. 14 AUGUST 1964

P.M

SUBJECT FURTHER MERCENARY NEGOTIATIONS WITH MOBUTU AND TSHOMBE; PLANS TO PROCEED WITH RECRUITING; HOARE'S VIEW OF THE SITUATION

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (14 AUGUST 1964)

REF IN 51452

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 2799

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) FROM A FORMER KATANGA MERCENARY (C) FROM HOARE.

APPRAISAL: 2 (THAT HOARE MADE THESE STATEMENTS AND THAT THEY ACCURATELY REFLECT HIS OPINIONS AND THE FACTS AS HE KNOWS THEM)

1 LATE ON 13 AUGUST 64, MERCENARY COMMANDER MICHAEL HOARE SAID PRIVATELY THAT AT 1030 HOURS THAT SAME DAY, HE AND ALASTAIR WICKS, HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND, MERCENARY AIR FORCE COMMANDER JEREMIAH PUREN AND MRS PUREN MET WITH CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU. THE PRINCIPAL DECISION REACHED WAS THAT HOARE'S MERCENARY FORCE, WHEN FORMED, WOULD BE "AUTONOMOUS". (FIELD COMMENT: PRESUMABLY THIS MEANS IT WOULD NOT BE BRIGADED WITH OTHER ANC UNITS.) THE OTHER DECISION REACHED WAS THAT MRS PUREN WOULD GO TO JOHANNESBURG SOON TO ADMINISTER THE [illegible] POUNDS STERLING TO BE DEPOSITED IN A BANK ACCOUNT THERE FOR THE MERCENARIES.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible] OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

WH SIT ROOM [illegible] STATE
[illegible]

(FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REFERENCE TO THIS FUND, SEE ACL-2788 (TDCS-314/01482-64).

2. AT 1230 HOURS, HOARE, WICKS AND THE PURENS SAW PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE. THE MEETING LASTED "EXACTLY TEN MINUTES." TSHOMBE ASKED PUREN IF HE WOULD ACCEPT THE MISSION OUTLINED BY MOBUTU ON 11 AUGUST. PUREN "EAGERLY" DID SO. HOARE COMMENTED THAT THIS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN THE SOLE REASON FOR TSHOMBE'S HAVING WISHED TO SEE THEM. TSHOMBE, HE SAID, APPEARED "WILDLY EXCITED." (FIELD COMMENT: FOR DETAILS OF THE MISSION, SEE BELOW AND ACL-2788 (TDCS-314/01482-64).)

3. AT 1500 HOURS, THEY AGAIN SAW MOBUTU, WHO TOLD THEM THAT A SECOND APPOINTMENT HAD BEEN MADE FOR THEM WITH TSHOMBE FOR 1700 HOURS, TO SETTLE THE LAST DETAILS AND SIGN THE CONTRACT. HOWEVER, AT 1700 HOURS THEY WERE TOLD TO RETURN TWO HOURS LATER. THEY RETURNED AT 1900 HOURS, FOUND MOBUTU WAITING AND, AT 1920 HOURS, WERE ALL ADMITTED TO TSHOMBE'S PRESENCE. TSHOMBE GAVE THEM INSTRUCTIONS TO "RETAKE THE CONGO": MORE SPECIFICALLY, MANONO, KONGOLO, ALBERTVILLE, UVIRA, STANLEYVILLE, IN THAT ORDER. HE PROMISED ALL SUPPORT, WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS OF ANY KIND, WHICH, HOARE LATER COMMENTED, WAS "RATHER DISTURBING AND A BIT TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING." HOARE ALSO NOTED THAT NEITHER TSHOMBE NOR MOBUTU SEEMED PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AS TO HOW THE JOB WAS DONE PROVIDED IT WAS DONE.

WHEN THE QUESTION OF THE CONTRACT CAME UP, TSHOMBE APPEARED UNWILLING TO COPE WITH IT THEN AND MADE ANOTHER APPOINTMENT FOR THEM, FOR 1000 HOURS ON 14 AUGUST. TSHOMBE SEEMED TO HOARE "FIT BUT EXTREMELY TIRED."

4. HOARE SAID THAT WICKS, PATRICK O'MALLEY AND MRS PUREN WILL GO TO JOHANNESBURG ABOARD THE 14 AUGUST ALITALIA FLIGHT. HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS NOW LESS URGENT FOR WICKS TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO KAMINA, AS PLANNED, BUT THAT RECRUITING CONTINUES TO HAVE A HIGH PRIORITY. IN JOHANNESBURG ON 15 AUGUST, WICKS WILL ALERT THE MEN WAITING THERE AND SHOULD BE ABLE, HOARE ESTIMATED, ARRANGE TO HAVE 50 OF THE 200 READY TO FLY TO KAMINA BY 18 AUGUST AND 30 MORE BY 21 AUGUST. LATER ON 15 AUGUST, WICKS WILL FLY ON TO SALISBURY, WHERE HE IS TO RECRUIT AS MANY MEN AS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LESS THAN 30. HOARE SAID HE HAS CLEARANCE FROM THE SOUTHERN RHODESIA SECURITY SERVICE FOR THIS ACTIVITY. HE ADDED THAT THE "FIRST 120 ARE VITAL," THAT HE WOULD TAKE AT LEAST ANOTHER 80 BUT COULD USE "AS MANY AS WICKS CAN RAISE."

5. MRS PUREN WILL RETURN TO LEOPOLDVILLE ON 17 AUGUST. THE PURENS AND THE MERCENARY PILOTS WILL PROBABLY REMAIN HERE UNTIL [illegible] AUGUST. IF PRESENT PLANS GO THROUGH, HOARE EXPECTS TO GO TO KAMINA ALONE [illegible] ABOARD A [illegible] THE MORNING OF [illegible] AUGUST.

6. AFTER RELATING THE FOREGOING, HOARE, WHO APPEARED RELAXED AND ENTHUSIASTIC, SAID HE IS "ABSOLUTELY DELIGHTED" AT THE WAY THE [illegible] IS SHAPING UP AND DESCRIBED IT AS "THE FINEST JOB [illegible]

HOPE FOR." AMONG THE VARIOUS ADVANAGES ARE THE FACT THAT "NO BELGIANS" ARE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE ANC COMMAND AND THAT HE WILL HAVE A "HOT LINE" DIRECT TO MOBUTU. HE NOTED THAT ADEQUATE WIRELESS SETS ARE ESSENTIAL, AND THAT THESE MAY NOT BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT "THE DIFFICULTY WOULD NOT BE IN TAKING TOWNS BUT IN HOLDING THEM ONCE TAKEN." HENCE THE NECESSITY FOR TRAINING GARRISON TROOPS TO TAKE OVER WHEN THE MERCENARY FORCE MOVES ON. HE HAS ALREADY SUGGESTED TO MOBUTU THAT HE COME PERSONALLY TO KAMINA TO CONDUCT AN INSPECTION TWO WEEKS AFTER HIS OWN ARRIVAL THERE. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD "A VERY HIGH OPINION" OF MOBUTU'S CAPABILITIES.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

File No. 5.3, Pg. 1573 (Millard)
Date 24 July 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/Car/PP
ATTENTION: T. Cobb
SUBJECT: Michell Livingston WERBELL - C-78785

Central Cover Division concurs in your proposal to use the above individual for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon Central Cover Division to maintain an accurate register of current 24 nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise Central Cover Division/Nonofficial Cover promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated. 24

JOHN G. SOUTHARD
Chief, CCD/NC

cc: CI/OA

SECRET 137

2(Rs

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM TO: WH/C/OPS

SUBJECT : Call from Mr. Dick Philips (State) Regarding the Arrest of AMLEO-3

1. Mr. Dick Philips said that he received a call from Mitchell L. WER-BELL about the arrest of AMLEO-3. The following information is contained in CIA files regarding Mr. WER-BELL:

"Subject was born March 1918, in Philadelphia. He served in the OSS during World War II and later opened a public relations and advertising firm in Atlanta. During the past three years he has entered various import/export ventures in Latin America and Florida. He was in the Dominican Republic during the past summer. He is well-known to this Agency and is categorized as unscrupulous and a promoter with grandiose schemes. Although he has offered to work for us, he has never been used. He claims close friendship with many Latin American political and military figures."

2. The three Cubans that WER-BELL reported arrested are Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez (AMLEO-3), Gilberto Fondora and Miguel Ramos. These men were crew members of the JURE mother vessel VENUS. From JMWAVE reports it appears that AMLEO-3 was attempting to exfiltrate his family, using the VENUS, when he was caught by Cuban security forces on 3 September 1965.

03

Bryan Mills
C/WH/C/MO/PM

SECRET

Background Use Only TO CIA
Do Not Reproduce

W 03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : WAINWRIGHT/dl
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14/OCT/63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 2-7-7-5-6

ROUTING
1
2 14 Oct 63 18z
3
4
5

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO : ROME
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SAS 8
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, RF, VR

TO PRTY ROME (NO NIACP) INFO

CITE DIR 75462

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: DIR 71153 (25/SEPT/63) *

AMWHIP DUE ROME WEEK OF 13 OCT AND WILL CONTACT STATION PER OLD CONTACT PLAN.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS COMMENT:* ROME SHOULD NOT EXPECT AMWHIP PRIOR WEEK OF 13 OCTOBER.

ROUTING INITIALS
RID/AN
RID/MIS
~~RID/~~
RID/FI

03

WE/4 ~~Stephen J Murphy~~
WE/5 ~~E Ellingsworth~~ 03

R Hanna
~~THOMAS THIELE~~
C/WE/
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

E A Marelius
EDWARD A. MARELIUS
C/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-7

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

RI COPY

RI COPY

201-277556

FORM 1389a

3/BR

AMWHIP/1

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : STEPHEN I. MERGER/mva
UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 21 AUGUST 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

21 AUG 63 21 28z

515 CSN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO : ROME
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WE 6
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 2, FI, EE 4, SAS 8, RF 2

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 62932

KEYWAY PBRUMEN

REF ROME 9965 (IN 01475)*

1. RECENT TALKS WITH AMWHIP 1 IN NEW YORK RE TRAVEL PLANS INDICATE PLANS BUSINESS TRIPS EUROPE THREE FOUR TIMES ANNUALLY SPENDING CIRCA TWO WEEKS EACH TRIP IN ITALY. ROUTINE BUSINESS MATTERS CAN BE EXPECTED OCCUPY CONSIDERABLE PORTION HIS TIME IN ITALY. WHILE AMWHIP 1 CONSIDERED ASTUTE ASSET WITH GOOD POSSIBILITIES ACCESS PBRUMEN TARGETS ITALY, HQS DOUBTFUL HE CAN MEET STA NEEDS FOR ASSET WHO IS READILY AVAILABLE FOLLOW UP LEADS, DEVELOP CLOSE RAPPORT TARGET PERSONALITIES IN RESIDENCE OR IN TRANSIT, MAKE PITCHES WHEN CHANCE ARISES. NECESSARILY LONG INTERVALS BETWEEN HIS STAYS ITALY WILL BREAK RHYTHM OF OP DEVELOPMENT AND MAKE HIM UNAVAILABLE TO ASSESS RECRUIT WHEN LEAD MATURES IN MATTER OF WEEKS.

✓ 2. ALSO SINCE HQS USES AMWHIP 1 OTHER AREA OPERATIONS, IT NECESSARY GUARD AGAINST CONTAMINATING HIS CLEAN REPUTATION WITH PBRUMEN REGIME THROUGH COMMENDABLE BUT OVERLY ZEALOUS EFFORTS HIS PART TO DO MOST FOR STA IN TIME AVAILABLE. FYI, WHILE CONSIDERED SHREWD SOPHISTICATED, HE HAS TOUCH OF COMMON PBRUMEN WEAKNESS OF BELIEVING HAND WILL NEVER BE CAUGHT IN COOKIE JAR AND CAN ALWAYS EXTRICATE SELF WITH PLAUSIBLE DENIAL.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☒ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 65932

3. CONCUR STA DECISION FUNARISCA.

4. PRIOR FINAL DECISION BELL, WISH SUGGEST ANOTHER POSSIBILITY, I.E., RECRUITMENT IDEN C OF DIR 44488, 4 JUNE 63. IDEN C HAS POA, IS VOUCHED FOR BY AMWHIP 1, AND EXPECTS TRAVEL ROME AT LEAST ONE WEEK PER MONTH TO ATTEND TO AMWHIP STORE. NEGATIVE FACTORS ARE HE IS UNKNOWN QUANTITY TO KUBARK REGARDING OP POTENTIAL, SUITABILITY FOR AND INTEREST IN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES. ON POSITIVE SIDE, AMWHIP 1 SAYS HE MOTIVATED HELP ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITY, AND HE PROBABLY PERSONA GRATA PBRUMEN TYPES ON SAME BASIS AS AMWHIP SINCE, UNLIKE BELL, DID NOT DEFECT PUBLICALLY AND NOT BEEN OVERTLY ACTIVE ANTI-REGIME MOVEMENTS. FURTHER, HIS PROXIMITY ROME AND FREQUENT VISITS WOULD GIVE STA CHANCE TRY HIM OUT BEFORE COMMITMENTS AND, IF STA FINDS HAS APTITUDE AND IS WELCOME PBRUMENS ITALY, HE COULD BE CALLED DOWN ON SPUR OF MOMENT FOR SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS IN ADDITION TO REGULAR VISITS.

5. MAIN PROBLEMS WITH BELL APPEAR TO BE (A) LACK PROOF HIS ACCEPTABILITY TO PBRUMENS (B) COVER TO BE USED HIS PERMANENCE ROME. IDEN C SEEMS OFFER POTENTIAL MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN AMWHIP 1 AND BELL. COVER IS ALREADY ESTABLISHED. PROXIMITY IS ADEQUATE FOR REGULAR DEVELOPMENT TARGETS. ACCEPTABILITY TO PBRUMENS AND APTITUDE FOR WORK CAN BE TESTED WITHOUT MAKING DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS, AS WOULD BE CASE WITH BELL.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE THREE

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 62932

6. IF STA WISHES CHECK IDEN C OUT, RECOMMEND FOLLOW UP SOONEST SINCE MAY STILL WISH FALL BACK ON BELL. SUGGEST STA OFFICER SHOULD TRAVEL SUISSE VISIT IDEN C OUTLINE PROPOSALS. NOTE HOWEVER HQS DOES NOT WISH AMWHIP 1 NAME BE USED. REALIZE THIS MAKES APPROACH BIT MORE DIFFICULT BUT BELIEVE IDEN C WELL AWARE ODYOKE INTEREST OBTAIN HELP ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES PBRUMEN OPS AND WILL ACCEPT STORY HIS NAME AROSE DURING CHECK BY ODYOKE OF PBRUMEN EXILES RESIDENT NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND VISITING ITALY PERIODICALLY. THOUGH KUBARK SUISSE HAS NO CONTACT IDEN C, PLS CABLE BERN GNVA INFO DIR PLANNING IF STA DECIDES VISIT IDEN C AND COORDINATE ON ARRIVAL SINCE THEY MAY WISH USE LOCALLY IN ADDITION TO OR IN LIEU OF ITAL USE.

7. FYI: IF IDEN C UNSUITABLE AND WISH PROCEED WITH BELL, BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SEND HIM ROME TDY PRIOR FINAL COMMITMENT TO ASCERTAIN CAPABILITIES AND ACCEPTABILITY PBRUMENS THERE. WHILE FINAL COVER FOR RESIDENCE WOULD BE RESPONSIBILITY STA AND DEVIGIL WOULD ATTEMPT ARRANGE COVER FOR TDY THROUGH KUVEST. KUVEST INDICATES SUCH COVER POSSIBLE THOUGH HAVE NOT TALKED CONCRETE TERMS PENDING DECISION IDEN C AND DEFINITE NEED FOR BELL.

END OF MESSAGE

*Rome prefers defer decision on BELL to get better reading AMWHIP/1 possibilities.

C/WH/INT

RELEASING OFFICER

SAS/MOB - Mr. Wainwright (coord in draft)
WH/5 - Mr. Sherman

AC/WH/4

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

4/1/62

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

AMWHIP

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : W. WAINWRIGHT:tw WW 03
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 18 JUNE 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : ROME

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, S/C

19 JUN 63 15 57z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 48198

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: DIR 44488 (IN 55801)

1. REQUEST SMITHAM ASK AMWHIP FOR DATE HE SENT LETTER TO "THOMPSON'S FRIEND" IN PBRUMEN. ALSO REMIND HIM TO SAVE COPY OF LETTER FOR THOMPSON. IF AMWHIP AGREEABLE, OFFER SEND COPY TO THOMPSON VIA "SECURE CHANNELS". WW

2. FYI, LETTER IS ACTIVATION EFFORT TO RELUCTANT DRAGON AGENT NOW PBRUMEN, WHO MET PARIS BY THOMPSON AND WALLACE A. GROWERY LAST SUMMER. AGENT IS GOOD FRIEND AMWHIP WHO WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN ARRANGING CONTACT.

END OF MESSAGE

WE/4/S. Munger 03

WE/S

Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS THIELE
C/WE/INT

WILLIAM TYNG
AC/SAS/EOB

RELEASING OFFICER 18-11 COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

2/BR

03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : STEPHEN I. MUNGER
UNIT : WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 13 JUNE 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12 62
ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

14 JUN 63 15 52z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO : ROME
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WE 6
INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CCS 2, SAS 8, S/C

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 47139

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF ROME 9337 (IN 55801)*

1. NO TRACES KARIN ESPINOSA. 06

2. MANY TRACES HER HUSBAND MIGUEL ANGEL ESPINOSA BRAVO, 06 BORN 29 SEPT 1902 HAVANA, FORMER CUBAN AMB NORWAY. DIPL CAREER BEGAN 1931 WHEN ASSIGNED ROME AS THIRD SECTY. LATER SERVED MADRID BRUS BERLIN MEXI. TOLD ODACID OFFICER IN JAN 60 COULD NO LONGER SUPPORT CASTRO GOVT BUT DID NOT INTEND RESIGN FOR ECONOMIC REASONS. ARRIVED BUENOS AIRES MAY 61 AS CUBAN EXILE AND BECAME MEMBER ANTI-CASTRO GROUP THERE. OTHER INFO AVAILABLE IF DESIRED BY ROME STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

*SMITHAM met AMWHIP/1 Rome. Latter offered use of new business as cover and said had hired Karin ESPINOSA. 06

Thomas P. Thiele
C/WE/INT

SAS/MOB - Mr. Armstrong (coord in draft)
WR/8 - Mr. Sherman 03

C/WE/4 03

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

8/8R

FILE NO. 201-267956

03 hy

ORIG : STEPHEN I. MUNGER/AVE
UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 3 JUNE 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
3 ✓ SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☒
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267956
X-REF TO FILE NO.
SIGNATURE Stephen Munger
03

4 JUN 63 13 26z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO : ROME
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WE 6
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 2, FI, SAS 8, S/C

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 44488

KEYWAY PERUMEN AMWHIP

1. AMWHIP/1 (IDEN A), LONG TIME KUBARK ASSET FOR PERUMEN OPS, WILL VISIT ROME 5 TO 15 JUNE TO OPEN JEWELRY STORE IN IDEN B. HAS OFFERED BE OF SERVICE TO STA IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE INCLUDING FURNISHING COVER IN NEW STORE. THOUGH LEFT PERUMEN EARLY 1961, REMAINS PERSONA GRATA TO REGIME SINCE GAVE AID TO CURRENT REGIME DURING PRE-REVOLUTION DAYS AND TOOK NO OVERT OPPOSITION STAND. IS CONSIDERED BY CURRENT REGIME AS A POLITICAL BUSINESSMAN AND CAN ENTER OFFICIAL INSTALLATIONS MEET WITH PERUMEN DIPLOMATS. FOR EXAMPLE, PLANS RENEW PERUMEN PASSPORT AT EMBASSY, PARIS, ON CURRENT TRIP.

2. IN PARTNERSHIP WITH IDEN C WILL OPEN JEWELRY STORE ROME. SAYS IDEN C FULLY TRUSTWORTHY ANTI-REGIME AND COULD BE MADE WITTING OF ARRANGEMENTS MADE ROME IF SO DESIRED. IDEN C WAS WITTING SOURCE OF PBPRIME ODUNIT ATTACHE IN PERUMEN PRIOR 1961.

3. AMWHIP/1 IS PARTNER IN NEW YORK OF IDEN D WHICH IS CLOSELY TIED TO IDEN E OF MILAN. COULD ALSO OFFER COVER IN IDEN E BUT BELIEVES THIS LESS SECURE SINCE HE HAS MORE DIRECT CONTROL OVER ROME JEWELRY STORE.

201-267956

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	SS
RID/MIS	/ /
~~RID/FILE~~	
RID/ 6 JUN 1963	

CS COPY

12 1 19 64 83

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2/pl

14-00000

FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

12-62

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☐
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
SIGNATURE

PAGE TWO

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO   INFO   CITE DIR [illegible]

4. RECOMMEND STA ESTABLISH CONTACT SOONEST DISCUSS VARIOUS OPS PROBLEMS POSSIBILITIES, INCL COVER FOR PERUMEN OPS SUPPORT ASSET AS PLANNED. IF COVER FOR SUBJ DIR 38810 STILL UNRESOLVED, STA SHOULD RAISE PROBLEM WITH AMWHIP/1, REALIZING THOUGH THAT LATTER MAY BE RELUCTANT OFFER COVER IN OWN FIRM TO PERSON WHO BROKE CLAMOROUSLY WITH REGIME. STA MAY ALSO WISH ASK AMWHIP/1 VISIT OFFICIAL PERUMEN INSTALLATIONS ROME FOR MEETINGS ASSESSMENTS TARGET PERSONALITIES. STA SHOULD FEEL FREE DISCUSS ALL OTHER PERUMEN PROBLEMS DESIRED. IN ALL ABOVE, STA MUST ABIDE BY AMWHIP/1 JUDGEMENT. NOTE LATTER IS NOT PRINCIPAL AGENT TYPE OR RECRUITER. HAS BEEN HIGHLY VALUABLE AS WITTING INFORMANT, SPOTTER, OPS SUPPORT TYPE.

5. AMWHIP/1 WILL STAY WITH IDEN F. CAN BE REACHED THERE OR PREFERABLY THROUGH IDEN B MANAGEMENT. IN MILAN CAN BE REACHED THROUGH IDEN E. OFFICER MAKING CONTACT SHOULD IDENTIFY SELF AS FRIEND OF BILL THOMPSON AND REFER TO THOMPSON'S TALK WITH AMWHIP/1 OF 31 MAY IN NEW YORK. SHOULD USE ENGLISH IN INITIAL PHONE CONTACT. AMWHIP/1's ENGLISH AND ITALIAN ARE FAIR BUT RECOMMEND SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS BE HELD IN AMWHIP NATIVE LANGUAGE.

CS CO..

END OF MESSAGE

03
SAS/EOB Mr. (Wainwright) (in draft)
WE/5

C/WE/IN Thomas F. Thiele
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

03
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

2/PV

FILE NO. 201-267956

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

03

ORIG : [illegible] I. [illegible]/AVH
UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 3 JUNE 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☒
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267956
X-REF TO FILE NO.
SIGNATURE
03

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

4 JUN 63 13 26z

DEFERRED SIG CEN
XX ROUTINE

TO : ROME
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WE 6
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, SAS 8, S/C

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 44489

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: DIR 44488

IDENTITIES OF REF:

IDEN A - CARLOS TEPEDINO GONZALES, BORN 11 OCT 1924 CUBA NOW RESIDENT NEW YORK CITY

IDEN B - CAVALIERI HILTON HOTEL

IDEN C - JUAN VENTURA VALNER, BORN 10 APR 1914 COSTA RICA, NATURALIZED CUBAN NOW RESIDENT GENEVA, SUISSE ✓

IDEN D - TISHMAN AND LIPP INC., JEWELRY MANUFACTURERS

IDEN E - CARLETTO INC., JEWELRY MANUFACTURERS 201-267956

IDEN F - DR. A. ROMANO, VIA CICCERONE 44, ROME

END OF MESSAGE

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	SS
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
RID/FI	
5 JUN 1963	
DESTROY	

03
SAS/XCB Mr. Wainwright (in draft)
WE/5
C/WE/4
03

Thomas F. Thiele
WE/IIT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4/pv

25 03

ORIG : NAT SCOTT/mak
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 5 NOVEMBER 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

MESSAGE FORM
S E C R E T

2 RI ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : PARIS 15-4

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/SA 8 INFO DDP, WE 6, DO 4, DO/H 3, VR, FILE

5 Nov 64 21 07z

SIG CEN

TO PARI 15-4 INFO MADR 15-2 CITE DIR

62066

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP MHVIPER

REF: PARI 7350 (IN 17041) *
20-4

1. BY ALL MEANS TRY TO GET STUDY AND FORWARD TO HQS.

2. IF UNABLE OBTAIN OPENLY, ADVISE HQS MEANS TO BE USED BEFORE UNDERTAKING CLANDESTINE APPROACH.

END OF MESSAGE

* Two volume study on Cuban Transport System.

MOB	INT	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
EC	RETS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	BF	HH
		SEC	WE

Armstrong
WH/SA/EOB

03 WE/5

03 F. Pierre (by phono)
WE/3

FMWH 15-1

Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT

Armstrong
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

RELEASING OFFICER 5-5 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

7/PN

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[Bill Wainwright] 03		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6	[Bryant] 03		

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

06
RE attached on AMWHIP-1 and [Siegelman]

Please get word to A-1 that if X.he sees 06 [S] to get as much info from him on his current situation in Brazil, who he knows in Cuban community and Cubans he knows in Cuba. Naturally, without exposing his (A-1's) connections with us.

03
WH/5 will handle contact with [Charlie Davis] and subsequent contact, if any, with [Siegel.] 06

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO	DATE
Roc B.	

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O-587282

6|PV

SECRET

Chief, WHD X

Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

PERUMEN
Subject of 201-728615

06

[Daniel Siegel or Siegelman.]

AR: Paragraph 2.

Refs: A. HBRW-5816
B. HBRA-11177

1. Subject applied for, and was granted on 29 April 1964, a 15-day tourist visa to the United States. He told the consular officer that he planned to leave on about 10 May for France, where he planned to stay for a month or more before going to the United States. He plans to contact the following friends there:

Mr. and Mrs. Henri Masliah
110-33 72nd Ave.
Forest Hills 75
New York

Mr. and Mrs. John Duys
1 East 66th St.
New York 21, New York

Mr. and Mrs. H. Gilbert Smith
Dockboard
2 Canal St.
New Orleans, La.

and in Cuba

2. If Subject also contacts AMWHIP-1, it is requested that the latter debrief him on his PERUMEN contacts here and, if he appears to be operationally useful, that a contact be set up in Rio de Janeiro, as requested in Reference B.

Distribution:
4- WHD
2- Files

Harry V. WITHERBY

jcd
30 April 1964

HBRA-12952

MAY 1 1964

UPV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

. 03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

24 S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: (RPLIFRE)
UNIT: WE/3
EXT: 5798
DATE: 20 APR 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MOB INT SS SB
FE AF
RPTS CI CA
SI WH
SEC

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO: PARIS ROME FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WE 2

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, DC/WH/SA 5, VR

~~(DELD)~~

TO / PARI INFO ROME FRAN CITE DIR 17976

DESENSITIZED KEYWAY PERUMEN

REF: PARI 3887 (IN 72764)*
24

1. RISK TO (LIAISON) EQUITY BY UNRETRIEVABLE EQUIPMENT PROPOSED REF OP CONSIDERED OVERRIDING FACTOR. LIMITED LIFE BATTERY INSTALLATION PLUS SECURITY AND (LIAISON) HISTORY (UNSOX ALSO FACTORS WHICH MILITATE ~~[illegible]~~ AGAINST QUICKIE OP WITH NUMEROUS RISKS. ADDITIONALLY, (UNION) ALMOST CERTAINLY RETAINS CONTACT (UNSOX 8 AND VIEW LATTER'S POSITION HE WANTS AVOID ALL TROUBLE WITH (HBFAIRY, HIS APARTMENT NOT CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE FOR LP.

24 02 01 02 02 02

2. SUGGEST STATION CONSIDER INDUCTIVE TAP ON PRESENT (UNSOX WIRES LEADING TO SECURE LP AS ALTERNATE POSSIBILITY.

3. AMWHIP ONE WILL RETURN PARIS APPROXIMATELY 15 MAY FROM ROME ~~[illegible]~~ POSSIBILITY THEREFORE EXISTS MOUNT SIMILAR OP AFTER ADEQUATE PLANNING ACCOMPLISHED AND WITH NON-ATTRIBUTABLE EQUIPMENT.

4. FOR ROME: DO YOU HAVE EQUIPMENT SIMILAR TO SRT 24 AND BATTERIES TO OPERATE OF ITALIAN MANUFACTURE? IF YES PLEASE DESCRIBE EQUIPMENT AND BATTERY SIZES TO PARI.

~~C/WE, BPF~~
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

6/p/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

30 APR 61 15 58z

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO PARI INFO ROME FRAN CITE DIR 17976

RYBAT

5. ALSO SUGGEST STATION CONSIDER USING NON-ATTRIBUTABLE BATTERIES MADE FRAN IF ROME CANNOT PROVIDE.

*Proposal to mount audio targetted against 02 UNSNAFU/19.

03
TSD/AOB E. BRENNAN (PHONE)
WE/4 03
WE/SPO R. WALSH (PHONE)
WH/SA/EOB W. TYNG (PHONE)
CI/TC J. MERTZ (PHONE)
03 FI/OPS R. CRAVEN (PHONE)
03 WE/5 R. LOETS (PHONE)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas F. Thiele
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

03
C/WE/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

6/pJ

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

WW 03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : W. WAINWRIGHT/dl
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 22/APRIL/64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

23 Apr 64 16 55z

TO : ROME
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH/SA 8
INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, F, WE 4, S/C, EE 4, VR

MOB	INT	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
	RETS	LOG	CA
	SI	FF	HH
		SEC	NS

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 16358

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP/1

AMWHIP/1 ARRIVING EUROPE 26 APRIL FOR THREE WEEK'S BUSINESS TRIP, INCLUDING KUBARK ERRANDS PARIS, GENEVA. WILL ARRIVE ROME CIRCA 5 MAY AND CONTACT STATION VIA USUAL CHANNEL TO ASCERTAIN ANY SERVICES ROME MAY WISH.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SA/EOB 03
WE/4 Stephen I. 03
WE/5/C R C Locke 03

Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

22-15

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

4/pn

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Mr. Wainwright:sw:
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 17 April 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

17 APR 64 18 08z

TO. : GENEVA BERN MADRID ROME PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 3, VR

MOB INT SS S3

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO GNVA INFO BERN MADR ROME PARI CITE DIR 15094

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AMWHIP-1 PROCEED GNVA.

RYBAT PERUMEN AMWHIP

REF: GNVA 6486 (IN 62186) (not sent ROME PARI)*

1. RE PARA 2 REF, AMWHIP/1 (IDEN) UNABLE LEAVE NEW YORK PRIOR 24-25 APRIL. HAS MINIMUM THREE DAY PRTY KUBARK BUSINESS PARIS. WILL TRY EXPEDITE BUT DOUBT AMWHIP/1 AVAILABLE GNVA BEFORE 30 APRIL. WOULD HOPE THEREFORE ROME CAN ASK AMWHIP/2 BE AVAILABLE FOR ASSISTANCE, PRIOR A/1 ARRIVAL.

2. FOR PARIS. WILL COMMENT SUBSEQUENT TRAFFIC RE ARRIVAL AND USE AMWHIP/1 FOR PARIS BUSINESS RE CARRILLO AND ROBRENO. 06

END OF MESSAGE 03

WH/SA/EOB ____
WE/5/C R C Loeb 03
WE/3 ____ 03
WE/4 ____ 03
EE/SA/S ____
WH/SA/SO/NS ____

~~BRONSON TWEEDY~~
D C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

12-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

6|PV

[illegible] WH/SA #64-750

13 October 1964

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : AMMUG/1 Operation 06
Meeting with Colonel PORRES, Saturday,
10 October 1964

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 13 October 1964 06
concerning briefing of Colonel Peralta

06 1. Following the meeting described in the reference, Colonel Porres requested a separate meeting which was held on Saturday, 10 October 1964. Andy Rogers of the Guatemalan 03, 16-2 Station was present at the meeting.

2. During the meeting 24 the matters covered on the previous day with the Chief of State were reviewed and the specific action to be taken was indicated with agreement on the following points:

24

A. Special treatment should be given to the "Caso Asiatico" and the "Caso Hombres Ranas" which involved 06 Yon SOSA, Luis Augusto TURCIOS Lima, 06 06 Manuel JOSUE Ortega Paz, and one (fnu) (lnu) whom we will be able to identify if shown a photograph. Every effort should be made to identify the last-named person and then to recruit all four of them. Meanwhile, all information available concerning them should be collected and furnished to the Station for forwarding 16-2 to Headquarters. The object in each of these cases should be to achieve contacts with them for the purpose of effecting recruitments. If required, we will have a Cuban who knows the individuals and whom they believe to be a Cuban Intelligence officer go to 16-2 Guatemala for the purpose of contacting them under controlled conditions which will permit us to monitor the conversation during the time that he poses as still active in Cuban Intelligence. Following this, the recruitment attempt would be made in each case possibly by one of our officers if the circumstances at the time indicate that this procedure would be most likely to be a success.

B. Without waiting for the outcome of effort to recruit the four individuals described above, the Guatemalan government should bend every effort to locate all those individuals (possibly as many as 200) who have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, and to arrest them. Maximum publicity should be given to the arrests once they have been questioned. Hopefully declarations will be made by some of them which will assist in effective propaganda use of their arrest and their involvement in subversion on behalf of the Castro government. They should be interviewed separately and, if possible, some with greater potential should be doubled so that they may serve to keep us informed of plans for subversion in the future. 24

11

C. The Guatemalans should keep us advised at every stage of the progress made in the cases so that we may lend assistance when appropriate.

06

3. Colonel Porres said that he understood the importance of the case and would do his utmost to follow through in line with the action proposed above. He said that although he does not have a large organization, it is secure and is capable of collecting information and of arranging for the arrests and interrogation.

06 06

06 4. Colonel Porres discussed three other cases (the ALFARO case, 06 the case of Luiz Ramirez, 06 and the case of Nestor JORDI Chambonyer. Rogers said that full details concerning the 06 ALFARO case had been sent to Headquarters. 24 This is the same case 24 which according to the Chief of State involved 24 a Mexican courier acting on behalf of the Cuban intelligence service. 06 Colonel Porres said that this individual is still in jail in Guatemala. 11 The 06 Jordi and 06 Ramirez cases are being made the subjects of separate memoranda.

Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI

16/PV

[illegible] 64-[illegible]

13 October 1964

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: AMMUG-1 Operation 24
[Briefing in Guatemala of Chief of State Peralta]

1. The briefing was held in a small luxurious government conference room on the afternoon of Friday 9 October 1964, lasting about 2 1/2 hours. [Chief of State Colonel Peralta] 08,06 [Minister of Government Colonel Serrano] 08,06 08,06 [and Intelligence Chief Colonel Porres] attended for the [Guatemalans.] 11 [Paul Loeb and Andy Rogers of our Station] were present. 03, 03, 16-2

27, 03

2. At the request of the [CoS, Paul Loeb,] I prefaced the operational briefing with a brief description of how the U.S. Intelligence community operates, of the role of CIA, of the need for compartmentation and security, and specifically of how the foregoing considerations make it imperative for the [Guatemalans] 11 to adopt security precautions which will ensure that the information we provide and the [joint operations] 24 we undertake [are compartmented within the Guatemalan government] 24 (and, in fact, discussed by the [Guatemalan government] exclusively with our representatives in the field). 24

3. Following the introductory remarks outlined above, I briefed the group on the DGI structure, the DGI operational techniques, and specifically on DGI aims and 24 operations in [Guatemala.] The [president] lent close attention throughout the briefing and examined the exhibits closely, including the DGI intelligence requirements [for Guatemala 24 and the Salvadoran "Caso Zapote" file.]

4. After the foregoing exposition, I explained 24 our aims in exploiting the information with regard to the [recruitment] aspect, [the CA play,] 24 and the [control of [subversion.] 24 In this connection I asked for [close cooperation 24 and coordination of activities, promising that we shall do our utmost and making reference to our [travel lists 24 and watch list.]

19/PV

24

5. With reference to the ZAPOTE case, because of the developments and plans in El Salvador, I explained 24 briefly the status of the DALTON case and the possibility 24 of his being transferred to Guatemala. (This was in line with the discussion 24 in El Salvador which included our Chief 27 of Station, the President and the President's intelligence 08.06 advisor, Colonel MEDRANO.) I asked that the Guatemalan 24 government take no action unless requested by President 24 RIVERA or Colonel MEDRANO and said that, if DALTON 24 is transferred, one of our people probably would talk to 24 DALTON in Guatemala.)

24

6. The Chief of State Peralta made a rather impassioned speech in which he covered the following points:

a. His own long experience in the OAS, in Cuba and in Central America;

b. His early warnings about Castro--which were disregarded;

24

c. The extent to which Guatemala has lived up to its obligations in the OAS; to which it has 24 cooperated in efforts against Castro; and to 24 which it has looked toward U.S. leadership;

d. The failure of the U.S. to take aggressive action against Cuba and the need for taking a hard line, including the use of force in support of military activity by the free Cubans and the other American countries;

e. His appreciation that the Soviets will not be willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba;

f. Condemnation of Mexico for her dealings with Cuba, for failure to abide by her obligations in the OAS, and for permitting the Castroites to operate out of Mexico against other American countries;

g. The need for action against Mexico;

16/17

11

h. The effectiveness of his own actions against guerrillas in Guatemala and his determination to "meet violence with violence;"

i. Recognition of the importance of the information covered in the briefing and of its exploitation;

24

j. Reference to the case of the Mexican courier working for Cuban intelligence and now detained in Guatemala (the ALBRALO case). 24

k. Acceptance of security restrictions and his decision to hold the information to those present.

06

7. In replying to the remarks of Colonel Peralta I said that we appreciate the cooperation of Guatemala in the OAS and that we shall be most interested in the exploitation of the possibilities in the present case. I added that the matter of using force against Cuba is a policy matter on which I was not competent to comment but that the decisions made by the United States Government are based on careful study of detailed information including information on Soviet intentions and capabilities. 24

06

8. At the conclusion of the meeting, Peralta asked for a copy of the EEI requirements (which he already had gone over closely) and took the copy with him to study further.

Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI

SECRET

6/PV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3 RI ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1	5
		2	6
		3	7
		4	8
ACTION	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

S E C R E T 302217Z

DIR CITE SALV 5312

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMMUG

30SEP64 IN 84511

REFS A. SALV 5303 (IN83009) ✗

B. DIR 53322

1. LANGOSCH AND AMMUG 1, ONCE EACH ALONE AND ONCE TOGETHER SAW JUNAVE 1 MORNING 30 SEPTEMBER. JUNAVE 1 TOOK SAME POSITION AS PARA 2 REF A. DENIED KNOWING AMMUG DESPITE CASE OFFICER RELATIONSHIP, REFUSED DISCUSS ANYTHING ABOUT CUBAN INTEL, AND BEGGED FOR RELEASE AND EXILE TO START LIFE ANEW.

02 02

2. OBTAINING TRUTH FROM JUNAVE 1 WILL BE TIME CONSUMING. HE FULLY AWARE PROOFS AGAINST HIM BUT PROBABLY HOPES POLITICAL PRESSURE WILL FORCE RELEASE AND PROBABLY FEARS ADMISSION OF HIS COMPLICITY WILL NOT HELP HIM. SALV GOVT MUST CONVINCE HIM HE WRONG ON BOTH COUNTS. HE OF DUBIOUS VALUE INSOFAR AS CONTRIBUTING NEW INFO ABOUT PAST ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN INTEL OR PCES BUT OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AS AGENT IF HE CAN BE TARGETTED AGAINST CUBAN INTEL OR PCES. IF RELEASED WOULD BE DEFINITE OBSTACLE TO FURTHER OPS AGAINST AMMUG TARGETS. IF HE SHOULD BE DOUBLED, HIS IMPRISONMENT WOULD COVER RECRUITMENT AND WOULD TEND TO ENHANCE HIS VALUE. PROBABLY WOULD BE MOST USEFUL OUTSIDE SALV INCLUDING MEXI AND CUBA.

02

SECRET

318R

14-00000

3. AS MATTERS STAND MOST IMPORTANT TO PROTECT KUBARK EQUITY IN 02 JUWAVE 2 WHO OF GREAT PROMISE. THIS OP COULD BE AFFECTED ADVERSELY BY SPREAD OF NEWS ABOUT AMMUG EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF KUBARK TO EFFECT RECRUITMENTS. BECAUSE OF VALUE OF 02 JUWAVE 2, PREFER FOR PRESENT NOT TO PROCEED AGAINST OTHERS WHO RECEIVED INTEL TRAINING. AFTER 02 JUWAVE 2 IS PRODUCING AND AFTER PRUDENT INTERVAL KUBARK CAN PROCEED WITH RECRUITMENT EFFORTS 24 AGAINST OTHERS EITHER UNILATERALLY OR WITH LIAISON DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS.

4. PROCEEDING WITH ARREST OF GUERRILLEROS TRAINED IN CUBA PROBABLY WOULD BE BENEFICIAL AS LONG AS NOT ATTRIBUTED TO AMMUG. IN ADDITION TO BENEFITS OF CA PLAY, SOME OF THOSE DETAINED MIGHT BE DOUBLED AND TARGETTED AGAINST GUERRILLA GROUPS OR PC[illegible].

5. APPRECIATE REF B TO WHICH WILL REPLY AFTER DISCUSSING FURTHER PROSPECTS AND GOVT INTENTIONS WITH JUHILL 1 AND POSSIBLY PRESIDENT. 01,08

SECRET

01
* JUHILL-1 AGREED WITH [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
HOLD WHEN [illegible] [illegible] JUWAVE-2.
02

7/18R

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☒ ☐

[illegible]

[illegible] FILE

SECRET 232137Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE SALV 5301

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMMUG

REFS A. SALV 5296 (IN 82314)

B. DIR 32859 *

IN-82908

23 SEPT 64

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFS COS AND LANGOSCH MET [JUHILL 1] 01 MORNING 23 SEPTEMBER IN COS OFFICE TO BRIEF HIM ON [JU]07 WAVE 2 RECRUITMENT, IMPORTANCE AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. [JUHILL 1] 01 WAS MUCH IMPRESSED AND AGREED EMPHATICALLY ONLY HE AND [PRESIDENT] 06 WOULD KNOW [illegible] RECRUITMENT AND THEY WOULD MAKE NO RECORD OF IT. DURING [illegible] LANGOSCH POINTED OUT [JU]07 WAVE 2 IS MOST IMPORTANT LOCAL TARGET BECAUSE HE HAS KNOWLEDGE OF AND ACCESS TO COMMIE PARTIES SALV AND OTHER CENTR[illegible] COUNTRIES, IS POPULAR [UNIVERSITY AND STUDENT LEADER,] 08 [illegible] [[illegible]UAR MILITARY] 29 COMMITTEE, TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO COMMIE [illegible] SUCH AS AT MOSCOW, PRAGUE, MEXI, CARA AND BRITISH GUIANA, [illegible] HAS SOV CONTACTS, [WAS TRAINED AND RECRUITED BY DGI,] 08 AND ALTHOUGH STILL ONLY [27] 08 YEARS OLD HAS BEEN [PCES] 29 MEMBER SINCE [56] 09 S[illegible] POTENTIAL IN PARTY; BUT THAT ANY INDISCRETION COULD [illegible] IN LOSS OF [JU]02 WAVE 2 AND ALL HE COULD PRODUCE FOR YEARS TO COME.

2. LANGOSCH SAID ONE OF HIS AGENTS WHO ALREADY HAS LEFT SALV

SECRET

1218R

ARRANGED CONTACT WITH JUWAVE 2. JUHILL 1 ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION, MADE NO DEMANDS, OFFERED ALL HIS FACILITIES AND UTMOST COOPERATION TO KUBARK. COS AND LANGOSCH BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN NO SECURITY PROBLEM TO DATE.

3. DO NOT PLAN HIT ANY OTHER TARGETS SALV AT THIS TIME, EXCEPT JUWAVE 1, AS JUWAVE 2 OP TOO IMPORTANT TO RISK DRAWING ATTENTION TO KUBARK PRESENCE OR RECRUITMENT EFFORTS. PLAN TO CONTINUE JUWAVE 1 INTERROGATION AND RECRUITMENT EFFORT. HIS SILENCE AND COLLABORATION IMPORTANT IN THEMSELVES BUT ALSO FOR FOREGOING REASON. JUHILL 1 AGREES HANDLE EXACTLY AS KUBARK WISHES.

4. HAVE NOT SPECIFIED AMOUNT OF REMUNERATION TO JUWAVE 2 EXCEPT THAT IT WILL INCLUDE PAYING COST OF FURTHER STUDIES OF BROTHER IN WHATEVER COUNTRY KUBARK CONSIDERS BEST FROM VIEWPOINT OF ADEQUATE SCHOOL OR INSTITUTE AS WELL AS FROM SECURITY STANDPOINT. AFTER GRADUATION MED SCHOOL, BROTHER HAS SPECIALIZED IN CANCER RESEARCH ESPECIALLY BREAST CANCER. NOW COMPLETING WORK AT IDEM AND EXPECTED RETURN SALV OCTOBER. HAVE TOLD JUWAVE 2 BROTHER MUST HAVE SCHOOL AND OTHER RECORDS TO ESTABLISH COMPETENCE IN APPLYING FOR ADMISSION. [illegible] ASAP SUGGEST SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS OR RESEARCH INSTITUTES [illegible] BROTHER SHOULD APPLY AND WHERE PREFERABLY KUBARK SECURELY CAN FACILITATE RAPID ACCEPTANCE, TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTED MEANS PAYING [illegible]. BROTHER SPEAKS ONLY SPANISH BUT HAS READING KNOWLEDGE [illegible] FRENCH. HAVE TOLD JUWAVE 2 BROTHER MUST BELIEVE [illegible] PAID BY JUWAVE 2 AND ACCEPTANCE AT INSTITUTE OR GRANTING OF SCHOLARSHIP ARE STRICTLY ON OWN MERITS.

SECRET

* [illegible] (?)

SECRET

12/BR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Hold

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : TEGUCIGALPA
ACTION : WH 7
INFO : DDP, WH/SA 3, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, VR

5 SEP 64 IN 68373

S E C R E T 042223Z

DIR CITE TEGU 5633

DYBOUR PBRUMEN AMHUG

REF: TEGU 5625 (IN 66562)

FOLLOWING FROM LANGOSCH

1. PBSWING CHIEF AND LANGOSCH HAD PRIVATE MEET MORNING
08, 06
4 SEPT WITH [CHIEF OF STATE COL. OSWALDO LOPEZ] LANGOSCH BRIEFED
06
ON DGI OPS AND ORGANIZATION, INCLUDING INFO ON [MARIO SOSA N. 'ARRO']
06 06 06
[MAGLIO MORENO ESPINAL] [LUIS BANEGAS] AND [ANTONIO FERNANDEZ IZA 'TIRLE']
07
WHO USES HONDURAN DOCS IN NAME [MIGUEL MANCIA MADRID] ALSO
24
FURNISHED RECENT [TRAVEL LISTS] AND COPY OF DGI [REQUIREMENTS ON
24
HOND.] 06

2. [LOPEZ] EXHIBITED KEAN INTEREST, REVIEWED ALL NAMES, SAID
06
HE KNEW SOME PERSONALLY INCLUDING [SOSA], PROMISED PROVIDE ALL
11
POSSIBLE INFO ON ALL [HONDURANS] THROUGH PBSWING CHIEF AND EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS LEND FULL COOPERATION. SAID GOVT HAS ABOUT 25 COMMIES UNDER ARREST AND HAS HAD TO RELEASE OTHERS FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE BUT

SECRET

11/6R

CAPABLE OF MAKING ARRESTS OF PEOPLE LIKE SOSA IF THEY ENTER COUNTRY AND 24 WILLING MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO ODYOKE. HOWEVER, 06 LOPEZ DECRIED LACK OF SECURITY AND COMPETENCE 24 IN HIS GOVT STATING:

A. HE MUST KEEP MATERIAL FURNISHED IN PERSONAL POSSESSION OR OWN HOME BECAUSE OFFICE IS NOT SECURE.

B. MOST PEOPLE IN GOVT INCLUDING THOSE IN INTEL AND POLICE ARE NOT SECURE EITHER BECAUSE SUSCEPTIBLE TO BRIBES OR NOT ABLE SAFEGUARD ANY CONFIDENCES.

C. NOBODY IN GOVT IS TRAINED TO COPE WITH DGI OPS.

D. GENERALLY GOVT PERSONNEL FAR LESS ASTUTE THAN 06 SOSA AND OTHER COMMIES.

3. 06 LOPEZ MENTIONED FELIX OYUELA, CHIEF ARMY INVESTIGATOR, AS ONLY TRUSTED AND REASONABLY COMPETENT PERSON BUT ADDED OYUELA TOO BURDENED WITH OTHER DUTIES. THEREFORE, SEEK SUITABLE CANDIDATE WHOM 06 LOPEZ WILL PROPOSE TO PBSWING CHIEF SO SUCH PERSON COULD BE TRAINED AND DEVOTE TIME TO SUBVERSIVE AND ESPIONAGE MATTERS.

SECRET

* CONCERNED LANGUAGE QUESTIONS ON [illegible] AND [illegible]

7/BR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

G

OPS

19 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/SA/EI

VIA : Chief, WH/PO/A

SUBJECT : AMMUG/1 Operation
Target Analysis and Non-surfacable Leads

1. Reference is made to your memorandum date 16 June 1964 requesting Target Analysis Summary Reports on leads to be exploited and lists of those leads which the Branch desires not to be surfaced to the Intelligence community.

2. Attached are separate lists for each appropriate Central American and Caribbean country detailing nationals of each country whose names have been mentioned or otherwise cropped up during the debriefing of AMMUG/1. WH/2 considers, at this time, that it is not feasible nor desirable to surface any of these leads to the intelligence community, pending a final determination as to the feasibility of pursuing some of these leads for operational exploitation. Those leads which are determined to be of no operational potential will be released to your office on a continuing basis for surfacing to appropriate agencies.

3. Attached also are seven completed Target Analysis Summary Reports on:

a) Francisco Javier MELLA Pena

b) Jaime DURAN Hernando

c) Socrates Isaias PEGUERO Sehuroer

d) Jean Norbert MONTERO

e) Mauricio de la SELVA Venegas

f) Roque DALTON Garcia

g) Noel GUERRZRO Santiago

These individuals represent immediate targets on whom we have already undertaken action. We anticipate that certain selected other individuals from the lists cited in paragraph one above will become targets, and accordingly, are in the process of examining and investigating these. As these individuals are culled through, Target Analysis Summary Reports shall be prepared and forwarded to your office.

26

[John M. Whitten]
C/WH/2

Attachments:
Target Analysis Summary Reports
AMMUG/1 Leads Not to be Disseminated

Distribution:
0 & 1 - C/WH/SA/CI (w/atts)
1 - WH/PO/A (w/atts)
3 - WH/2 (w/atts)

1/pv

Dominican Republic Leads Not to be Disseminated **AMMUG/1 Operation**

Francisco Javier MELLA Pena

Jaime DURAN Hernando

Socrates Isaias PEGUERO Sehuroer

Elpidio RUIZ (this is an alias of "TIBURON" - true name still not known)

David Onelio ESPAILLAT Campos

Francisco Eleuterio RAMOS Peguero

Francisco Elizardo RAMOS Peguero

Teresa Inocencia ESPAILLAT Hernandez

Jose Bienvenido GUERRA Nouel

Hector Augusto CABRAL Ortega

Leopoldo Ariosto GRULLON Ruiz

Jose CASSA Logrono

Silvano LORA Vicente

Ilander Zanoni SELIG Delmonte

Ana Mercedes ESPINAL de Castro

Baldemiro CASTRO Garcia

Marcelino GRULLON Jimenez

Benito ALEJO German

Jorge BOTELLO Fernandez

Rafael Francisco TAVERAS Rosario

Hugo TOYOS Vargas

Cayetano Armando RODRIGUEZ Del Prado

Antonio Emilio Jose DIA Conde

Simon BOLIVAR

Arturo Rafael ESPAILLAT Rodriguez

Carmen E. HERNANDEZ de Fazas

Ernesto LOPEZ Molina

Maximo LOPEZ Molina

KEY- AMMUG 1 [illegible] - X

El Salvador Leads Not to be Disseminated — **AMMUG/1 Operation**

✓ Roberto BARCIANO Marin GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
✓ Raul Fernando ESCOBAR Melendez GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X
✓ Carlos Alberto FLORES Hernandez GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X
~~Juan Ramon LOZANO Rosales~~ ALIAS OF ROBERTO BENCIANO MARIN
✓ Carlos MARTINEZ Ortiz DEAD - GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
✓ Ricardo Augusto MARTINEZ Vanegas GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
✓ Ivan Danilo RODRIGUEZ Leon GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X
✓ Lisandro RAMIREZ Solis GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X
✓ Pedro RODRIGUEZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
✓ Ciro Arturo RUIZ Torres GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ([redacted] 02 CRIN IN CONTACT WITH)
✓ Victor Manual SANCHEZ Bonilla GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
~~Rafael CONTRERAS Molina~~ PSEUDO OF VICTOR SANCHEZ BONILLA
✓ Arturo ALFARO Fuentes GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
✓ Raul Antonio VARGAS GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
✓ Andres Antonio VELASQUEZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
Roque DALTON Garcia
TA ✓ Manuel Antonio CALERO GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING & GUN RUNNING & EXFILTRATION
TA Jose Alberto CARRILLO Calderon KNOWN TO AMMUG 1 & [redacted] 02 CRIN-1 (AGENT)
✓ Jose Salvador Rosales GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
TA Ricardo CASTRO Rivas AGENT ? [redacted] 02 CRIN-1 IN CONTACT WITH CASTRO
✓ Francisco DURAN Cardano GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X
✓ Freddy Guerra GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
✓ Armando LOPEZ Mantiel GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
✓ Jose Antonio GARCIA Rivera GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X

3/30

SECRET

✓ Pedro SANTACRUZ Castro GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X

✓ Ruben MARTI. Guardado GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

? Raul Concepcion Morales NO RECORD IN AMMUG-1 INDEX WH/SA/CI

✓ Jose MANCIA Martinez GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

INDIVIDUAL NAMED RICARDO MARTINEZ REC'D TRAINING IN CUBA

~~Ricardo MARTINEZ~~ NAME USED BY ALEJAND. GOMEZ MONTANO

✓ Jesus Antonio PAZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

✓ Rita RAMIREZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

~~Pedro AREVALO Melgar~~ ALIAS OF JESUS ANTONIO PAZ

TA 06 [Jorge Federico BAIRES] AGENT ? AMMUG-1 KNOWS - [LI]02 GRIV-1 IN CONTACT WITH SUBJ.

✓ Ana Leticia BAJLAZA (BARRAGA?) Quiroa GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X

? Raul Castellanos MENTIONED IN WH/[illegible] WAS SUPPOSED TO MEET AMMUG-1 IN MEXICO

TA 06 [Tomas GUERRA Rivas] 201 [247812] 08 AGENT 06 [GOMEZ MONTANO] KNOWN TO AMMUG 1 + [LI]02 CRIV-1

TA (201 [751265] 08 06 [Alejandro MONTANO Gomez] OR [GOMEZ MONTANO]

06 [Rafael ACEVEDO Blanco] ACCO ADDRESS IN ZAPOTE CASE

06 [Jose Manlio ARGUETA Canas] 201 [262567] 08

SECRET

11/RV

SECRET

Guatemala Leads Not to be Disseminated AMMUG/1 Operation

Antonio JONH Marcos

✓ Julio CARRERA Sierra G/W

✓ Francisco CRUZ Figueroa G/W

✓ Victor Manuel CUELLAR Carranza G/W

- Bernardo DIAZ Mendez G/W only

✓ Rolando HERRERA Hernandez G/W

✓ Marco Antonio LEONI Aguilar G/W AMMUG-1 KNOWS

✓ Edgar Roberto LOBO Dubon GW AMMUG 1 KNOWS

✓ Jose Aquiles L. MORALES G/W AMMUG-1 KNOWS

Manuel Josue ORTEGA Paz

✓ Angel PALENCIA Sanchez G/W only

Ricardo Arturo GUZMAN (pseudo: Alberto SANTOS Melgar)

Jacobo ARBENZ Guzman

Mario BARRIENTOS

Manuel GALICH

Carmen ROMEROSO Soa

Fernando SOSA Pol

Marco Antonio YON Sosa

Luis Augusto TURCIOS Lima

Francisco AMADO Granados

Alicia MOYA de Amado

Jose Manuel FORTUNY

Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ Garbin

Isabel POHL Romero de Sosa

Jose ROSALES

Nelida TURCIOS

SECRET

SECRET

Haiti Leads Not to be Disseminated **AMMUG/1 Operation**

Jorge Norbert MONTERO

Rene DEPESTRE

(Unknown) "PITIN"

SECRET

Honduras Leads Not to be Disseminated AMMUG/1 Operation

Maglio MORENO Espinal

Mario SOSA Navarro

Luis Randolfo BANEGAS

SECRET

Nicaragua Leads Not to be Disseminated AMMUG/1 Operation

Noel GUERRERO Santiago

Professor TORRES (probably Edelberto TORRES Espinoza)

Silvio MAYORGA (or MALLORCA)

Ernesto MARTINEZ

German PALACHI Baca

Efrain SANCHEZ

Carlos A. TINOCO Montiel

Marvin CASTRO

Felix MONTERREY Dobil

Elicio Dtharinto GONZALEZ Moreno

Alejandro ALEGRIA Bermudez

Juan Jose GARCIA Lorio

Eli ALTAMIRANO

Bayardo ALTAMIRANO Lopez

Ivan BACA

Alejandro BERMUDEZ

Anibal LORIO Garcia

Enrique MARENCO

Orlando QUANT Quintana

Rolando QUANT

Monterrey REYES

Rodolfo ROMERO Gomez

Efrain SANCHEZ Sancho

SECRET

Panama Leads Not to be Disseminated **AMMUG/1 Operation**

Thelma KING

Jorge TURNER

(Unknown) "Luis Sonrisa Case" - 2 male guitarists

SECRET

Dominican Republic

Target Analysis Summary Report **AMMUG/1 Operation**

SUBJECT: Francisco Javier MELLA Pena aka Francisco Xavier MELLA Dona
aka "Pichi"

I. Significance of Target

a) Cuban Intelligence Service Connection

MELLA has been identified as a Singleton Cuban Intelligence Service Agent in the Dominican Republic, trained as a frogman, and also in S/W and ciphers. His exact mission on behalf of the CIS is not known.

b) Communist Party Affiliation

Subject is a member of the Castroist revolutionary Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio (APCJ - 14th of June Political Group). The APCJ is not a Communist Party *per se*; however, its present, dominant leaders are Marxist-Communist in their political direction. The APCJ is presumed penetrated by actual Communists, and is known to receive moral and material support from Cuba.

c) Information Which Could be Obtained

1. His exact mission on behalf of the Cuban Intelligence Service. What information is he required to furnish to the Service? The reason for this information.
2. What persons will he use to acquire this information? Will they all be unwitting?
3. What is his exact role as a frogman? (for arms caches, demolition etc..)
4. Information on his accomodation address in France. Additional information on his accomodation address in Jamaica.
5. Information on the relationship between Cuba and the APCJ and plans for the Dominican Republic.
6. Information on other Cuban IS agents known to him.
7. Doubling (see III for more details).

II. Current Location

Hermanos Miralles No. 5, Madrid, Spain (since February 1964, when he went there from Cuba. In Madrid, he was joined by his Dominican girl-friend, Xiomara SALADIN Decillo, whom he married there. Neither has yet returned to the Dominican Republic.) His last known address in the Dominican Republic is Avenida Independencia No. 55, Santo Domingo.

III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection)

None known. The only information on MELLA was acquired in April 1963 when he transited Mexico enroute to Cuba. At that time MELLA became quite upset when "salio a Cuba" (left for Cuba) was stamped in his passport. Accordingly, with this being the only past information on Subject, we would be starting from "scratch".

IV. Family and Relatives

a) Wife: Xiomara SALADIN Decillo, Dominican citizen (no information)

Father: Luis MELLA, Dominican citizen (no information)

Mother: Noemi (nee unknown) de MELLA, Dominican citizen (no information)

(The Santo Domingo Station is presently conducting an investigation of his relatives)

b) None known to be in the United States.

V. Biographic

Date of Birth: 25 February 1937
Place of Birth: Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
Citizenship: Dominican Republic
Languages: Native Spanish (only language capability known to us at this time)
Physical Description: 5' 10" tall
1[illegible]0 pounds
black hair (cut short - but not crew-cut)
dark brown eyes
swarthy complexion
Photograph: Is available at the Desk
Other pertinent Data: MELLA would be described as "pretty". He has no mustache and does not shave.

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

02

a) [illegible]TH/19 - Lives in same apartment building area as Subject. Has furnished some information on Subject and his girl-friend, which he obtained through normal contacts.

06

b) Jaime DURAN Hernando - Operational Lead only (see separate target sheet). He is close to MELLA and also could lead us to a still unifentified CIS agent "TIBURON" who used DURAN as an unwitting courier for the delivery of microfilm to Cuba.

02

c) [illegible]OSS/1 - Although not a leader of the APCJ, he has good access to the APCJ's extremist "circle". He has been used with extremely good results for information on other Cuban targets of interest.

VII. Evaluation:

a) As was stated above, MELLA is completely new to us. However, the Station is currently conducting an investigation of MELLA in an effort to determine his vulnerability for recruitment/defection.

b) With the present ruling Dominican Triumvirate, Subject could be arrested if he came to security notice, not only in his position with the CIS but also if he became involved in any subversive Communist activities. In the event he is arrested he undoubtedly would be deported.

3/PJ

Dominican Republic

Target Analysis Summary Report — **AMMUG/1 Operation**

SUBJECT: Jaime DURAN Hernando aka Jaime DURAN Hernandez aka "Jimmy"

I. Significance of Target

a) Connection with Cuban Intelligence Service

Subject is not a Cuban Intelligence Service agent, but did receive guerrilla training in Cuba.

b) Communist Party Affiliation

DURAN is Secretary-General of the pro-Castro Agrupacion Politica de Catorce Junio (APCJ - 14th of June Movement) in the Dominican Republic, and is a member of that faction of the APCJ favoring the training of its members to direct the future of a socialist government.

c) Subject is a close friend of Francisco Javier MELLA Pena, an identified Cuban Intelligence Service Agent in the Dominican Republic. Subject was also used as an "unwitting" courier by a still unidentified Cuban IS agent "TIBURON" in the Dominican Republic. Subject unwittingly carried to Cuba for "TIBURON" in September 1963, a match-book containing microfilm.

d) Utility - Penetration of the 14 June & plans & intentions of the Cubans vs D.R.

II. Current Location

Believed to be in Cuba. Has been there since September 1963.
Last known Dominican Republic address: Espaillat #20, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection)

None known. (Also see VII - Evaluation)

IV. Family and Relatives

a) Wife - Gloria ACEVEDO de Duran, Dominican citizen (no information)
No other relatives known.

b) No known relatives in the U.S.A.

V. Biographic Data

Date of Birth: 17 June 1933
Place of Birth: Jarabacoa, Dominican Republic
Citizenship: Dominican Republic
Language ability: Native Spanish (only ability known to us at this time)
Physical description: (requesting from the Station)
Photograph: Is available at the Desk

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

OZ
EMDOTH/19 - Lives in the same residential section as DURAN. Has furnished some information on Subject, which he obtains through normal contacts.

OZ
EMBROSS/1 - Has provided numerous reports on DURAN's activities within the APCJ.

OZ
EMDUNG/1 - Has provided brief information on Subject's activities within the APCJ and his travel to Cuba.

VII. Evaluation

In that we presume that DURAN is a hard-core Communist and at present have scant information for a target assessment, immediate prospects for recruitment are virtually nill. Requirements can be levied on OZ EMBROSS/1 since he is a controlled source; information could be elicited from EMDOTH/19 and possibly from EMDUNG/1. As developed, leads from foregoing could be followed up on, but, as indicated above, we will be starting at the bottom of the ladder on DURAN as an operational target.

Cuba - Dominican Republic

Target Analysis Summary Report — **AMCOJ/1 Operation**

SUBJECT: Socrates Isaias PEGUERO Schuorer alias Nelson BARET Disla aka "Pupo"

I. Significance of Target

In that Subject lives in Cuba he could be extremely valuable to WH/SA and WH/2/Dominican Republic.

a) Connection with Cuban Intelligence Service

PEGUERO is the APCJ (Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio - 14th of June Political Group) representative in Cuba acting as focal point between the APCJ and the Cuban Intelligence Service (DGI).

b) Communist Party Affiliation

APCJ representative in Cuba. Subject has been reported as a member of the pro-Castro faction of the APCJ since 1961 when he was exiled in Curacao.

c) Information Which Subject Could Furnish

1. Subject could furnish information on the relationship between the Cuban Intelligence Service and the APCJ.
2. Information on the APCJ as a party, plans, members etc.
3. Information on Cuban Intelligence Service personnel known to him.
4. Possible operations of the Cuban Intelligence Service against the Dominican Republic.
5. Possible information on matters of interest to WH/SA within Cuba.
6. Doubling as a penetration of the Cuban Intelligence Service and the APCJ.
7. Information on Dominicans being trained in Cuba, not only in guerrilla training, but as agents.

II. Current Location

Lives in Habana, Cuba (address unknown). In Cuba he goes by the name of Nelson BARET.

III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection)

None known. No information on his activities since 1961 is known.

IV. Family and Relatives

a) Wife - Gisela SENCION de Peguero, daughter of former Dominican Consul in Curacao.

b) Children - one daughter (name and age unknown), and one son (name unknown) born in Habana, Cuba in December 1963.

c) Father - Isaias PEGUERO Perez (deceased)

d) Mother - Tulia (nee unknown) de PEGUERO (no additional information)

e) Brother - Nelson Ramon PEGUERO Sehuorer (deceased)

f) Sisters - Sobeya O. PEGUERO Schourer and Maria A. PEGUERO Sehuorer (no additional information)

g) No relatives known to be in the United States.

V. Biographic Data

Date of Birth: 14 January 1929
Place of Birth: San Pedro de Macoris, Dominican Republic
(NOTE: when travelling uses Dominican passport issued 28 July 1963 in the name of Nelson BARET Disla, date and place of birth: 23 January 1939, Dominican Republic; occupation: student)
Citizenship: Dominican Republic ? possibly changed to Cuban.
Language ability: Native Spanish; others not known.
Physical Description: 5'7" tal
150 pounds
brown-skinned
black eyes
wears eyeglasses
wears moustache

Photograph is available of his and also the real Nelson BARET Disla

Other pertinent data: Laboratory Technician

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

We have several sources reporting on activities of the APCJ, its members etc. within the Dominican Republic. 02 [illegible]ROSS/1 and/or 02 [illegible]TH/1? could be used to elicit information on PEDUERO through their normal contacts. 02 [illegible]ROSS/1 is being used at this time to report on other Cuban targets.

VII. Evaluation

While there is no information on hand to indicate Subject is approachable, the fact that he is in Cuba, known to AM-UG/1 - whom might approach him - and has been identified to us he becomes of operational interest. Obviously our objective is to continue our interest and collect what information we might, awaiting the day for his exit from Cuba. At that time more definitive action might be considered. His importance as a source of information on inside Cuba and that country's intention and capabilities on the Dominican Republic cannot be discounted and merit our continued alertness to his activities and whereabouts.

3/AJ

Target Analysis Summary Report **AMMUG/1 Operation**

SUBJECT: Roque DALTON Garcia

I. Significance of Target

DALTON is a recruited agent of the Cuban DGI. He has been trained in guerrilla warfare, s/w, radio transmission, and radio reception. AMMUG/1 claims that Subject is a member of the Central Committee of the PCES. AMMUG/1 characterized Subject as having excellent contacts within the DGI in Cuba. Subject is in contact with Mauricio de la Selva Venegas, the Salvadoran intermediary, in Mexico City. In view of the above, Subject could be expected to furnish considerable information on both the PCES in El Salvador and his activities for the DGI.

II. Current Location

Subject was deported from El Salvador to Mexico in late January 1964. On 16 June 1964 Subject was spotted by the Salvadoran National Police in San Salvador, and is now under surveillance. Exact address will be obtained by the San Salvadoran Station.

III. Vulnerabilities

AMMUG/1 lists Subject as his leading candidate for recruitment by us. His reasoning on this is that Subject is not highly motivated, has a weakness for women and the easy life, and a generally weak nature. AMMUG/1 says that Subject is very intelligent, but never showed a real desire to learn during his Cuban training. Subject was given 600 dollars to purchase a radio receiver upon his return from Cuba, but he apparently spent the money on himself.

IV. Family and Relatives

Father (deceased) was U.S. citizen. One of Subject's three brothers fought for the U.S. in Okinawa. A sister, Margarita, is Mexican citizen who now is in Cubaas a student.

V. Biographic Data

DOB: 14 May 1935
POB: San Salvador, El Salvador
Nationality: Salvadoran
Language Ability: Native Spanish; others not known
Physical Description: Height 1.68 meters; long thin face; black eyes; two gold teech; thinlipped; black hair parted on left side.
Photo Available: Yes

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

Subject is known 24 personally by AMMUG-1 16-26 and by 02 JUGRIN-1, recently recruited agent of San Salvador Station. Subject is presently under surveillance by the National Police in San Salvador (Station has unilateral penetration of 24 the police who might be used as a lead into Subject).

VII. Evaluation

From AMMUG-1's assessment of Subject, based on personal knowledge and observation, it would appear that Subject would not be a too difficult target to hit. However, some of his personal characteristics which have made him a handling problem for the DGI would presumably make him a handling problem for us. His failure to perform for the DGI since October 1963 might mitigate against our use of him which would include, presumably, resumption of his s/w channel. Nonetheless, AMMUG-1's claim that Subject is a member of the Central Committee of the PCES (news to us) makes him an operational target for that reason alone.

4/PV

Haiti

Target Analysis Summary Report AMHUG/1 Operation

SUBJECT: Jean Norbert MONTERO

I. Significance of Target

a) Connection with Cuban Intelligence Service

At this time Subject is not an agent of the Cuban Intelligence Service. He is currently in Cuba seeking assistance from the DGI for the training of Haitians in guerrilla warfare activities for an eventual thrust against Haiti to oust President Francois DUVALIER.

b) Communist Party Affiliation

Secretary-General of the Haitian Liberation Front, a newly formed party, with the ultimate aim of merging the two communist parties of Haiti. [Sensitive information available at the Desk indicates that this party is Moscow influenced.]

c) Information which Subject Could Furnish

1. Subject could provide valuable information on the Haitian Liberation Front, i.e., its members, plans, status with the USSR/Cuba etc.
2. Information on the USSR/Cuba position with respect to Haiti.
3. Information on USSR/Cuba influence and penetrations of Haitian exile circles.
4. Information on Cuban's relationship with President Francois DUVALIER.
5. Information on Haitians now in Cuba and/or the USSR.

II. Current Location

As of April 1964 he was living at the Hotel Calina in Habana, Cuba. His permanent residence is believed to be in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic where he has been in exile.

III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection)

None known. He is strongly anti-DUVALIER. In that many Haitian exile circles are somewhat down on the United States as a result of the unsuccessful September 1963 invasion of Haiti, it is possible that Subject merely turned to the "left" for assistance in overthrowing DUVALIER. It is however quite feasible that he would cooperate with the United States if he felt we were taking an anti-DUVALIER stand.

IV. Family and Relatives

None known.

V. Biographic Data

Date of Birth: Unknown
Place of Birth: Haiti (?)
Citizenship: Haitian
Language ability: Native French or Creole; very little Spanish
Physical description: [illegible] feet tall
1[illegible]0 pounds
wears moustache
Negro
Photograph is not available
Other pertinent data: None

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

a) 02 [illegible]LACH/1 - Haitian exile leader in the Dominican Republic who housed the MONTERO exile group in 1963. 24

b) 02 [illegible]LUSH/1 - Haitian exile in the Dominican Republic who stayed with MONTERO in the Dominican Republic in 1963. 024

c) 02 [illegible]LENS/1 - Asset in Haiti 024 who is only in a position to make discreet inquiries regarding MONTERO.

d) 02 [illegible]LION/1 - Asset in Haiti 24 who is only in a position to make discreet inquiries regarding MONTERO.

VII. Evaluation

a) Until information has been gleaned from the assets cited in VI above regarding MONTERO's vulnerability to recruitment little can be done. However, as was pointed out in III above, it is highly probable that subject merely turned to Cuba for assistance in overthrowing President DUVALIER of Haiti.

6/17

b) Subject is not subject to arrest when he returns to the Dominican Republic, unless of course, his activities with the Cubans become known. In any event he definitely would not return to Haiti, as he would immediately be imprisoned and most probably tortured and killed.

Target Analysis Summary Report **AMMUG/1 Operation**

SUBJECT: Noel GUERRERO Santiago (201-81510)

I. Significance of Target

GUERRERO is presently in Mexico and is "intermediary" between Cuban IS and the FLN in Nicaragua. His Cuban Intel pseudo is Andres Madariaga. AMMUG-1 saw him in Mexico in March 1964 regarding funds which the DGI had provided the FLN. According to AMMUG-1 GUERRERO is involved in "Hijos de la Tempestad" which also involves three or four other DGI agents. AMMUG-1 also reported that GUERRERO is in trouble with the FLN which claims he spent money improperly. The FLN has no confidence in him and considers him cowardly and lacking in fighting spirit. By other sources he has been described as one of the main Communists in Central America. He was in Cuba in 1959 to get Cuban aid from the revolutionary movement against Nicaragua. He was formerly a member of the Communist Party in Mexico. He was a cell leader in Corinto and advisor to the Stevador's Union.

II. Current Location

He is presently in Mexico. He was a political exile in Honduras in 1959. He has travelled extensively throughout Central America and may have been clandestinely in Nicaragua in July 1963.

III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection)

AMMUG-1: GUERRERO is in trouble with the FLN which claims he spent money improperly. The FLN has no confidence in him, and considers him cowardly and lacking in fighting spirit. Among AMMUG-1 documents is a critique of the abortive incursion in Nicaragua in July 1963 by Silvio Mayorga and Orlando Quant Quintana which blames GUERRERO for its failure. GUERRERO's own account admits certain mistakes and tries to justify others. However, it must be borne in mind that GUERRERO is a long time

Communist, anti-Somoza revolutionary.

IV. Family and Relatives

Wife: Ofelia Chacon
Brother: Dr. Eloy GUERRERO Santiago, suspected Communist, says Noel is Communist. Eloy is anti-Somoza, has spent time in jail.
Father: Jose F. GUERRERO Castillo, resident of Leon (DOI: 1955)

V. Personalia

DOB: 12 April 1914
POB: Leon, Nicaragua
Nationality: Nicaraguan
Languages: Spanish and English
Religion: Professes none
Education: 2 courses first year law
Photo: Available in Biographic Register
Physical description: 5'3', grey hair, dark brown eyes, complexion trigueno claro (light brunette).'

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

AMMUG-1 knows him personally, was in contact with him in Mexico in March 1964.

VII. Evaluation

In 1942 or 1947 (reported both ways) GUERRERO was expelled from the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) according to another member of the PCM (LIMOAN) who was a recruitment candidate (but dropped), and who said that GUERRERO might then be amenable to recruitment. Apparently no attempt was made to recruit him. He has been recorded throughout the years since as an active Communist revolutionary and was exiled from Nicaragua for revolutionary activities in 1959. Also in 1959 he went to Cuba and was active there in preparing for the revolutionary movement in all Latin America. He apparently was working for Cuban IS at the time of the abortive revolutionary attempt against Nicaragua in 1963, as a document provided by AMMUG-1 written by Madariaga (GUERRERO's pseudo) attempts to point out reasons for its failure. Another document written by Silvio Mayorga and Orlando Quant blames "Andres" (GUERRERO) for its failure. GUERRERO, however, must still be in the good graces of the Cuban IS, if he is an agent in the "Hijos de la Tempestad" and serves as "intermediary" to the FLN, or remnants which may be reorganizing. It seems highly unlikely that GUERRERO would be receptive to either recruitment or defection. AMMUG-1 knows him personally and met with him in Mexico in March 1964. It would appear that AMMUC-1 could furnish more information about his contact with GUERRERO which would be helpful in an assessment of GUERRERO.

There is a report that GUERRERO was in Nicaragua clandestinely in 1962. He would undoubtedly be arrested should he return there and his presence discovered by the Nicaraguans.

NOTE: This is not a complete target analysis and should not be used as such.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.
Chief of Station, Bogota 16-11

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/PBRUMEN/Operational
Photograph of "Comandante William"

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AS STATED

REFERENCE: UFGA-27105

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

It is requested that the photograph of "Comandante William" be shown to the AMBINGO's for possible identification. Subject claimed to have received two years' pilot training at San Antonio de los Banos Air Base, reportedly sometime in 1965 and 1966, and may have worked as a Cubana pilot. While he was in Cuba he used the name Ernesto Castro Moro. Please notify Bogota Station 16-11 of the results.

Constance M. QUILHOT

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - COS/JMWAVE
1 - COS/Bogota
16-11

201-749651

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW-6448	DATE 23 MAR 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-749651

15 March 1967

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - WH/3/C
1 - Originator

AN	FI	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/CICS	I. GALLIHER 03	mjr	7447

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/CICS		Harry T. Mahoney
WH/COG/MO		03
C/WH/COG		
ADC/WH/3/	17 Mar 67	03

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		03

7/920

CIT [illegible] Rip

AMMUG/1 T(1)

☐ YES ☐ NO
INDEX TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 4 TOTAL COPIES 44

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CTCS	5	S
2		6	D
3	MO	7	2
4	FI	8	

DISSEM BY 2

ACTION C/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH/DOS 5, C/FE 8, C/FI/R 4, C/SAS, C/AF 4, C/CI, C/CA 2, C/FI 2, C/FI/DOS, C/FI/INT 2, C/SOD 3

16-10

S E C R E T 081542Z CITE SANTO DOMINGO 2554 8 JUL 67 IN 73441

DIRECTOR, INFO JMWAVE, CARACAS 16-17

16-10

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 2561 (NOT SENT JMWAVE) (IN 73380)*

~~KAPOK~~ DYVOUR PBRUMEN

DESENSITIZED

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. OTHER TOPICS MENTIONED IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN CUBANS AND MR-1J4 REPS, AND NOT INCLUDED IN REFERENCE DUE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT, WERE:

A. 06 PICHI MELLA CASE. CUBANS TOLD DOMINICANS TO REVIEW ALL THE "COMPANEROS" WHO WERE IN CUBA WITH 06 PICHI AND TO BE CAREFUL WITH AND "VIGILAR" 06 MELLA. THEY ADD THAT 06 MELLA MUST MOVE AND AVOID MEETING WITH THE "TIPO" ANYMORE. NEXT SENTENCE SAYS, "IMPORTANTE: AJUSTICIAMIENTO DE VICTOR". VICTOR ALSO REFERRED TO AS AGENT OF CIA AND TRAITOR.

B. DOMINICANS ALSO DISCUSS "GRUPO FRANCES" WITH CUBANS. CUBANS SAY THAT THEY BELIEVE GROUP IS COLLABORATING WITH FRENCH AND YANKEES (CIA) BECAUSE OF THE EASE WITH WHICH THEY GET THINGS DONE. CUBANS ADD THAT THESE PEOPLE (GRUPO FRANCES) GOT IN TOUCH WITH MR-1J4 THROUGH LUIS GENAO AND FIDELIO DESPRADEL.

C. CUBANS SAY THEY ARE INVESTIGATING CONTACT THAT GENAO (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) MADE A FEW MONTHS AGO IN NEW YORK

1

7/90

SECRET

PAGE 2 SANGO DOMINGO 2564 S E C R E T

WITH MEMBERS MR-1J4 (WIDOW MINAYA). CUBANS ARE VERY WORRIED ABOUT PROBLEM OF GENAO AND WHO TO SUBSTITUTE FOR HIM IN MR-1J4. NO INDICATION THAT THIS GENAO IDENTIFIABLE WITH LUIS GENAO ESPAILLAT.

2. FOR DIRECTOR: SUGGEST YOU MAY WISH RELAY REFERENCE TO JMWAVE.

3. FOR JMWAVE: REFERENCE WAS LISTING AND DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENTS CONFISCATED FROM [DOMINICAN COMMUNIST COURIER FERNANDO 24 DE LA ROSA BY VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS]

S E C R E T

BT

* SUMMARY OF ESSENTIAL TYPES AND CATEGORIES OF INFO AVAILABLE TO STATION FROM [FERNANDO DE LA ROSA] CASE AND FROM CONFISCATED PAPERS. 06

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MESSAGE FORM [redacted] [redacted]
TOTAL COPIES: 20
XX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG : JOHN A. CASTORO/Elh&rid
UNIT : DC/WH/COG/CICS ☐ INDEX
EXT : 2640 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 7 DECEMBER 66 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-749651

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 53 PER ________ # ________

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, SECUR 4, CCS 3, C/IOA, C/IOPS

(CLASSIFICATION) S E C R E T (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] [redacted] (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

8 19 22 Z CITE DIRECTOR 58190

TO JMWAVE

AMMUG/1
201

TYPIC AMMUG

REF: JMWAVE 4480 (IN 54041)

29

1. RE PARA ONE REF, (INTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION) MAIN OFFICE LOCATED IN BALTIMORE. REF PROVIDES ALL INFO NECESSARY FOR WOGAME ANSWER CREDIT QUERIES.

2. RE PURCHASE OF HOME, HQS RECOMMENDS AMMUG/1 DEFER DECISION UNTIL QUESTION HIS WOFACT FUTURE DEFINITELY SETTLED. FYI: LANGOSCH HAS REQUESTED AMMUG/1 SERVICES (IN FRANKFURT) BUT QUESTION NOT YET DETERMINED. DISPATCH FOLLOWING. 24

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS
WH/COG/FI 03
WH/C/MO 03

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES 03
C/WH/COG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 8-2 **S E C R E T**

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

7 Dec 66 201-749651

GPW

104-10183-10335 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-749651
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ 03
DESTROY ☐ SIG. (E. Scoggins)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, SEC/EA 4, CCS 3, C/OA, C/OPS 201

AN	FI
RS	DEST
ABSTRACT X	INDEX

S E C R E T 062311Z CITE WAVE JMWAVE 4480 ES

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMMUG

REFERENCE DIRECTOR 57011

6 DEC 66 IN 54041

1. JMWAVE RECORDS SHOW FROM ARRIVAL JMWAVE LATE 64 THROUGH DECEMBER 65 AMMUG/1 USED AS STATUS COVER 29 (INTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION) WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY HEADQUARTERS. JOB TITLE WAS RESEARCHER WITH SALARY $600 PER MONTH. 29 AMMUG/1 CLAIMS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE (BALTIMORE COMPANY) AND SEARCH JMWAVE FILES FAILS PRODUCE ANY INFO THAT AMMUG/1 CONNECTED WITH ANY SUCH, COMPANY. REQUEST HQS CLARIFY.

2. AS IN CASE NUMBEROUS OTHER PBRUMEN AGENTS, JMWAVE REVISED AMMUG/1 COVER 1 JAN 66 TO MEET TAX REQUIREMENTS AND TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE STATUS COVER. STATION NEGLECTED INFORM WOGAME RE THIS CHANGE. 29 (SCHEAFFER) EMPLOYMENT THUS BEGAN 1 JAN 66. THERE WAS NO INTERIM EMPLOYMENT.

CS COPY

3. SEVERAL OTHER CREDIT CHECKS SINCE AMMUG/1 EMPLOYED BY 29 (SCHEAFFER) HAVE WORKED SMOOTHLY. AMMUG/1 ATTEMPTING PURCHASE HOUSE LOCALLY WHICH APPEARS BE REASON FOR PRESENT

SECRET

201-749651
6 Dec. 1966

5IN

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 4480 SECRET

CHECKS. APPRECIATE EARLY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT INQUIRIES TO EXPEDITE CLOSING PURCHASE.

SECRET

BT

NNNN

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Jack Flynn	3/23	JF.
2	Hal Swenson		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☑	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FYI

I've been asked to brief the [illegible] heads [illegible] your [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible].

([illegible] like to participate)

not participate - would like to talk to you on this. J

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. — Hal | DATE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O—587282

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Chief, Covert Training/OS/TR

SUBJECT : Covert Training for member of CIWOOD organization 01

REFERENCE : Proposed Training Curriculum for CIWOOD Trainees From CC/OS/TR 01

1. 01 It is requested that covert training be given to the CIWOOD trainees listed below for the period of 8 March - 30 April 1965. This will be the second group of CIWOOD 01 trainees under this program which was initiated by the 11 Venezuelan Desk of Branch Three of WH Division through 03 Mr. Rawleigh Taylor, Chief, Covert Training, in September 1964. The first group has been given an 8 weeks covert course ending on 26 February 1965. The trainees will be in Washington under the notional cover of "participating in military training courses" or possibly a "purchasing mission" for their Government. As such, they will not be formal liaison visitors and will not be expected to enter Headquarters buildings, except for one day training in the R & S Building, or to meet Agency officials.

2. Project 01 CIWOOD is a 16-17 Caracas Station 24 liaison activity which has as its objectives the establishment 24 of a liaison relationship with the Venezuelan Armed Forces Intelligence Service, (SIFA) 24 to permit CIA to improve the efficiency and capabilities of SIFA and provide CIA access to its intelligence take, and to eventually recruit a member of SIFA. 24 Jacob B. HURSCHWOOD, a Staff Agent under non-official cover in Caracas 16-17 is providing advice and guidance to SIFA and is obtaining intelligence information in return. 24 It is believed that covert training can help improve the efficiency and

14/20

24

internal security of SIFA which will enable this organization to more effectively combat the extremist guerrilla and terrorist activity fomented by the Communist Party of Venezuela with aid and encouragement from Cuba. Venezuela is getting maximum attention from Castro in his effort to bring about communist take-over in Latin America. Besides the inherent value of the training itself, the granting of the training will help IMMSCHOOL improve his daily operational association with SIFA and enhance his opportunity of making a successful recruitment in the future. 24 Orientation in Counter Insurgency is also being included to give SIFA officials 24 a greater awareness of the problem and thus to lay the ground work for future work in this field.

03

3. The responsible desk operations officer for this course will be Mr. William E. Cavan, who will be known to the trainees as "Bill Cabal", the same identity he used with the first group. An Agency serviced telephone number, 638-3120 has been arranged and will be given to the trainees as a number where "Bill Cabal" can be reached in an emergency. 03 This number is serviced 24 hours a day and Mr. Cavan is immediately notified to call the persons who asked for him at that number. Mr. Cavan 03 is located in room 3B2613 of Headquarters Building, extension 4521.

4. The following is pertinent biographic data on the trainees:

a. Lt. Colonel Mario FAJARDO Lobato 06

DPOB: La Guaira, Venezuela, 25 September 1923 08

Marital Status: Married 9 April 1949. Has three small children.

10

Formal Education: High School, Caracas (dates unknown). A graduate of the 08 Venezuelan Military Academy in 1950. Attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1956 and studied English at American University. In 1961 09 he attended the Argentine Army 08 School of War for approximately 12 months.

Language Ability: Spanish and some English. (English listed as "fair")

Present Status: Chief of Administration of SIFA 08

Area Knowledge: Has visited the USA and Argentina

Previous Intelligence Training: None indicated, but has probably had some intelligence training either in the 11 08 Venezuelan Army or his Argentine course.

Other: HURSCHWOOD considers 06 Fajardo as a potential 24 recruit on return to Venezuela and suggests he be given special attention. 11

b. Major Luis Alfonso OCHOA 06

08

DPOB: 9 September 1928, Las Dantas, State of Bolivar, Venezuela

Marital Status: Married 1952, has 5 small children

Formal Education: 10 High School, Caracas, 1946-1950. Entered the Venezuelan military 08 service in 1948 and has taken intermediate and advanced courses in the Venezuelan Infantry School. 08 He has commanded rifle platoons and infantry companies and has been an instructor in the Infantry School of the Venezuelan Army. 08

Language Ability: Only native Spanish

Present Status: 08 SIFA Official; exact title not indicated.

Previous Intelligence Training: not indicated

c. Lt. Colonel Raul JIMENEZ Gainza 06 08

DPOB: 16 December 1932, San Felipe, State of Yaracuy, Venezuela

Martial Status: 06 Married - wife is Matilda Abreu de Jimenez

16/20

Formal Education: Not listed, but probably a graduate of the Venezuelan Military Academy. 08

Language Ability: Not indicated

Present Status: Deputy Director of SIFA 08

Previous Intelligence Training: Not indicated

Area Knowledge: Not indicated.

Other: 06 Jimenez has recently been named Deputy Director of SIFA and should be given deference as the leader of the group. 08

d. Lt. Colonel Solis Antonio MARTINEZ 06

DPOB: 3 August 1926, San Luis, State of Falcon, Venezuela 08

Martial Status: Married, three children

Formal Education: High School, 10 Caracas 1940-1944; 08 Venezuela Military Academy 1944-1947 (graduate). Also completed specialized courses in Infantry Tactics and Tank Warfare, 08 as well as the course of study given by the Superior War College of the Venezuelan Ministry of War. 08 He has served in a variety of capacities within the Venezuelan Army 08 since 1947, commanding everything from platoons through battalions as well as instructor of artillery. 08 He has seen action against the guerrillas in the State of Falcon. 08 He served in 08 Colombia dates unknown, as a member of the Venezuelan mission to "Operation America". 08

Language Ability: Native Spanish, reads but does not speak or write English. His competence in understanding English is given as "fair".

15/20

Area Knowledge: Subject's only travel outside of Venezuela was to Colombia.
11 11

Previous Intelligence
Training: None indicated but probably has had some intelligence training during his military career. 08

Other: He is Chief of Investigations of the SIFA, and will probably return to this position. It is possible that he is aware of Station's police liaison with Venezuelan political police (DIGEPOL), without knowing the details of the relationship.
08 29 24 24

06 5. POA's for training have been granted for Fajardo and Martinez and are pending for OCHOA and Jimenez. It is assumed that the trainees are aware of the Agency affiliation of HURSCHWOOD and that the training will be conducted by CIA. The Director of SIFA is aware of HURSCHWOOD's CIA association and was also received by the DCI on 21 July 1964 during a visit to the U.S.
06 06 06 24

6. Training Requirements: The training should be held in a safehouse, conducted in Spanish and on a full time basis. The suggested dates are from 8 March through 30 April 1965, which have been approved by Chief, Covert Training, OS/TR. The trainees will use notional military training cover during the training period, and it is not anticipated they will enter Headquarters building. They will be taken into the R & S Building for a one-day indoctrination in Seals and Flaps and Audio Surveillance. Requests for this entrance will be covered in a separate paragraph. A one-day orientation course in Counter Insurgency is also discussed in a subsequent paragraph as well as an extensive two-week course in Flaps and Seals for Major Ochoa at a TSD Safe House.
06 16-17

7. Requirements for OTR/OS/Covert Training: Station Caracas has submitted the following recommendations as areas which should be covered in the training of these officers: OTR/OS/Covert Training may modify and/or adapt the list as necessary.

a. The Organization of Clandestine Activities

b. Security

c. Observation and Description (Casing)

d. Surveillance

e. Agent Acquisition
  1. Spotting
  2. Assessment
  3. Recruitment
  4. Training
  5. Management
  6. Termination

f. Clandestine Communications

g. Counter Intelligence

h. Interrogation

i. Reporting

j. Intelligence Research and Analysis

8. It is requested 106 that Ground Branch of SOD make the services of Colonel Valeriano available for a one-day orientation in the latest techniques used in the field of counterinsurgency. The trainees are well aware of the general problems and history of fighting guerrillas and are actively engaged in operations at the present. It is suggested that the instructions stress use of intelligence in combatting guerrilla groups and means of procuring it to include the creation of intelligence nets among peasants in the afflicted areas. It is also believed that any current information on modifications in the tactics of Mao Tse-tung would also be of value as would be examples of the use of psychological warfare programs against the guerrillas and the intellectual leaders of the communist party, considered as the moving force behind the guerrilla movement in Venezuela. It is proposed that Mr. Cavan, 03 who would use the alias of "Bill Cabal", 06 take the trainees to the office of Valeriano 06 and that Valeriano be introduced as a consultant of CIA who is very knowledgeable of counterinsurgency problems. 06 Valeriano, as a member of the International Police Services Academy, has talked to other Latin American officials on this problem as part of his overt duties. It is believed his talks will make SIFA 29 more aware of the threats of insurgency movements and also lay the ground work for possible future association with SIFA or the Venezuelan Government in the counterinsurgency

29 06

field. Through Mr. 03 Ellis, Chief of the Ground Branch of SOD, and Mr. Wall, of the same branch, one-half day orientation course was given to the first trainees who suggested that a full day would be sufficient due to the level of the above trainees and the experience they have in this field.

9. 03 Arrangements have been made with Mr. Luria and Mr. Fritz Hekol of TSD/Training to provide Major Luis 06 Alfonso Ochoa with a Flaps and Seals course for the period of 19-30 April at a TSD Safe House. It is believed the Flaps and Seals course will benefit CIA because it will offer HURSCHWOOD the opportunity to maintain closer contact with Ochoa who will be responsible for this type activity in SIFA. SIFA proposes to make a concerted effort in the letter intercept field to keep better informed of the extreme leftist efforts to overthrow the 11 Venezuelan government, and it is felt that HURSCHWOOD can keep abreast of the operation. Because of SIFA's 29 responsibilities, it is believed that the more efficient effort that SIFA can make in this field will result to the benefit of CIA. Major Ochoa would take the first six weeks of the covert training course then devote the last two weeks to the Flaps and Seals course.

10. It is also requested that TSD/Training provide a one-day course in Audio Surveillance and Flaps and Seals for the other three trainees at the R & S Building. This should be a very general briefing with the least possible emphasis on complicated, expensive equipment that might be later requested by the trainees. It is believed this general introduction will give the SIFA 29 trainees some idea as to approaches and problems involved in these fields as well as the pitfalls that should be avoided. This one-day course was given to the first three trainees who appeared impressed with the concepts exposed to them. This subject has also been discussed with Mr. Luria and a firm date has been selected for the training. The OTR instructor will accompany the trainees and act as translator.

It is requested that CI/OA obtain permission for the visitors to enter the R & S building for this training which is scheduled for the 19th of April.

DESMOND FITZGERALD
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Concurrances:

DC/CI

DDP Training and Qualification Review

03
WH/3/[V/WECAVAN]1p (24 Feb. 65)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/TRO
1 - CI/Staff
1 - FI/OPS
2 - TSD/TRNG
1 - SOD/Ground
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/Plans
2 - WH/3(V)08

SECRET

[illegible]

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Exhibits

1 Cuban pp in name of Fernando MONTERO Lopez
issued to [Fernando MONTERREY Dubon] 06
Nicaraguan, trained in guerrilla
warfare in Cuba 1963

2 Cuban pp in name Carlos PEREZ Ramirez
issued to [Jose Antonio GARCIA Rivera] 06
aka [Carlos MIRILLOS Ramirez] 06
Salvadorean, trained in guerrilla warfare
in Cuba 1963

3 Cuban pp in name of Sergio PERNIA Ortiz
issued to [Pedro SANTACRUZ Castro] 06
aka [Rigoberto LOPEZ Perez] 06
Salvadorean, trained in guerrilla warfare
in Cuba 1963

4 Cuban pp in name of Juan GONZALEZ Perez
issued to [Francisco DURAN Carcamo] 06 Guatemalan,
trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba 1963

5 Cuban pp in name of [illegible] Luna
issued to [[illegible] Guatemalan] 06
trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba 1963

6 Report on [illegible] 06 15 Mar 65

8/90

Exhibits

7. DCI Case file "ZAPOTE" containing
   a) Data on 3 agents
      1. [Rogue DALTON Lavoie] 06
      2. [Alejandro [illegible] Gomez] 06
      3. [Jose Alberto CALDERON Carrillo] 06
   b) SW instructions
      1. Legal let. signature for agent + Case Officer
      2. Accommodation address + description of recipient
   c) CO means
      1. SW + 2-way radio
      2. Reactivation of c[illegible] [illegible]
      3. Travel doc.
      4. Advance of funds
   d) Contact plan for [MONTANO] 06
      1. Place of meeting - primary
      2. Signal - telegram with key phrase
      3. Recognition signals
      4. Alternate meeting site
      5. Signal - telegram with key phrase
      6. Recognition signals
   e) Concealment device account for [DALTON] 06
   f) Itinerary for [DALTON] 06
   g) Concealment [illegible] for [MONTANO] 06
   h) Itinerary for [MONTANO] 06
   i) " " [CALDERON] 06

SECRET

j) Clandestine comm. means from Hq to Mexico (3)
  ① Plain text
  ② Substitution

k) Clandestine comm. means from Mexico to Hq

l) 3 envelopes used for SW message, message forwarding it from Mexico (letter draft), requests for lab exam, lab reports

m) Clandestine message Hq to Mexi meeting alone

n) Case officer complaint to head of service

o) Clandestine message from Hq to Mexi

8. Translation of ZAPOTE case file contents in inner envelope

9. Chart of DGI organization

10. English drafts

11. Orig CS dissemination

OPERATIONAL MATERIAL dated 8 February 1966 - 31 December 1970

ALIAS DOCUMENTATION AND TRAVEL

(21)

FORM 10-75 2731 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 006487

OLV 14 June 76

FORM 3040 3-70 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 13

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT TSD

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, WH 8, DDP

ACTION NO. 538

S E C R E T 312214Z DEC 70 CITE DIRTECH 0697

OITC

31 Dec 70 235964

U

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMMUG AQUATIC

REF: DIRTECH 0696 (IN 236095)

IDENTITY MR LESTER L RHODES
6716 EDSAL ROAD
SPRINGFIELD, VIRGINIA 22151 GP-1

S E C R ET.

END OF MESSAGE

ORIG: DONALD KATER ACOP/TSD

LEASING OFFICER KONALD KATER TSD/COP

FI

CS COPY

31 Dec 70

201-549651

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY: ______ AT: ______
DISSEM BY 33 PER ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
(When Filled In)
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

TOTAL COPIES 15

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT TSD

FILE. VR. RI/AN. L4 8, DDP

ACTION NO. 539

S E C R E T 312214Z DEC 70 CITE DIRTECH 3696

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMMUG AQUATIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 9915

SEND PHOTOS TO IDENTITY. GP-1.

S E C R E T

2 JAN [illegible] 236095

SECRET

31 Dec 70

31 December 1970
WH/COG - 70-447

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Ruffner

SUBJECT : Amendment of OA for AMMUG/1

It is requested that the Operational Approval for AMMUG/1 (201-749651) be amended to permit his operational use outside the United States.

Bernice Turbeville
WH/COG/OPS

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - WH/COG/CHRONO
1 - Originator

31 Dec 70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______ #

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

59

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO

X-REF TO CS FILE NO

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

Turbeville

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 888

31 DEC 70 IN 235662

S E C R E T 311239Z DEC 70 CITE MADRID 2755

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR THE HAGUE LONDON

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 2743 (IN 234495)

1. LIAISON TRAVEL LIST DATED 21 DECEMBER SHOWS ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART AND EUGENIO GONZALEZ ALVAREZ LEFT FOR CASABLANCA ON THAT DATE. LIAISON LISTS NOT ALWAYS ACCURATE.

2. FILE 201-865545M GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

31 Dec 70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______ # ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

Bernice

ACTION UNIT
WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION NO.
881

S E C R E T 311131Z DEC 70 CITE THE HAGUE 8901

WHMIAMI INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID, LONDON

592
31 DEC 70 IN 235592

TYPIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 09883 (IN 234350)

1. DEPENDING ON NATURE AND DEGREE WH/MIAMI INTEREST SUBJECT REF, WOULD RECOMMEND WATCHLISTING WITH DUTCH LIAISON WHICH MIGHT PRODUCE TIMELY INFORMATION ON SUBJECT'S ARRIVAL, RESIDENCE WHILE IN THE NETHERLANDS AND ONWARD ITINERARY. OTHERWISE, STATION WILL AT BEST BE ABLE TO PROVIDE AFTER THE FACT TRAVEL DATA. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER WATCHLISTING DESIRED.

2. WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WATCHLISTING WILL SIGNAL JKLANCE INTEREST, ALTHOUGH WE ESTIMATE LITTLE IF ANY LIAISON CONCERN. ALSO THAT STATION MUST, IN GENERAL, LIMIT OVERALL VOLUME WATCHLISTING REQUIREMENTS.

3. FOR DIRECTOR. RECOMMEND HQS BE ALERT TO TRACES SUBJECT REF IN MATERIAL FORWARDED UNDER ONHA-37367 AND RELATED.

4. FILE: 201-865545. GP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

31 Dec. 70

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 25/1 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

1	Coq	5	OPS
2		6	
3		7	RP
4	~~[illegible]~~	8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. Turkeville

X REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 38 PER ______ # ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI, CI/OPS, EI

ACTION NO. 942

S E C R E T 311721Z DEC 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 9914

31 Dec IN 235845

THE HAGUE INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID, LONDON

TYPIC

REF: THE HAGUE 6991 (IN 235592)

1. AFTER WEIGHING REF CONSIDERATIONS AND OUR NEED TO NAIL DOWN SUBJECT'S LOCATION, REQUEST THE HAGUE WATCHLIST SUBJECT OF REF WITH DUTCH LIAISON.

2. FILE: 201-865545. GP-1

S E C R E T

31 Dec 70

14-00000

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 21-1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO 201

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER #

ACTION UNIT 648

FILE, VR 201 on, EUR 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO. 722

Hold for further [illegible] from [illegible]

S E C R E T 291714Z DEC 70 CITE MADRID 2743

29 Dec 70 IN 234495

LONDON, WH/MIAMI INFO THE HAGUE, PARIS, DIRECTOR

TYPIC QUTIMID

REF: WH/MIAMI 09383 (IN 234350)

1. RE PARA 1 REF, ON 21 DECEMBER ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART CALLED DIONISIO ARRANZ TREMOLS, CUBAN COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR IN LONDON, AND TOLD HIM HE LEAVING THAT DATE FOR LONDON. LLOMPART, WHO TRAVELLING WITH EUGENIO GONZALEZ ALVEREZ, WAS TO BE MET BY ARRANZ AT AIRPORT.

2. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, BLANQUITA (PROBABLY BLANCA CALVET, ADMINISTRATOR CUBAN COMMERCIAL OFFICE LONDON) CALLED RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART AND SAID SHE LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS VISIT. RODRIGUEZ ASKED BLANCA NOT GIVE UP APARTMENT IN LONDON WHICH THEY SCHEDULED GIVE UP 1 JANUARY SO THAT HE MIGHT USE IT.

3. BOTH ARRANZ AND BLANQUITA ASKED RODRIGUEZ ABOUT HIS BROTHER'S EYESIGHT TO WHICH RODRIGUEZ REPLIED HE GETTING ALONG QUITE WELL.

4. FILE 201-8655547. GP-1

S E C R E T

29 Dec 70

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

DEC 29 2 05 PM '70

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO. 715

S E C R E T 29142Z DEC 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 09883 IN 234350

PRIORITY LONDON, THE HAGUE, PARIS INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 2727 (NOT SENT PARIS) (L 233739)

1. REQUEST THAT JAGUAR: A.) CONFIRM LONDON ARRIVAL OF ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART. B.) IF POSSIBLE, PROVIDE PRESENT LOCATION AND/OR ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS.

2. FOR THE HAGUE: REQUEST YOU FORWARD ANY INFO THAT BECOMES AVAILABLE ON RODRIGUEZ TRAVEL YOUR AREA.

3. FOR PARIS: REF REPORTED THAT RODRIGUEZ DEPARTED MADRID FOR LONDON ON 21 DECEMBER AND INDICATED THAT HE PLANNING A 40-DAY EUROPEAN TRIP INCLUDING A POSSIBLE VISIT THE HAGUE. NO SPECIFICS AVAILABLE. REQUEST THAT YOU FORWARD ANY INFO THAT BECOMES AVAILABLE ON RODRIGUEZ TRAVEL YOUR AREA.

4. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

29 Dec 70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

WH

1555 20 D 12 07

FILE, VR [illegible]

013

[illegible]

S E C R E T 201527Z DEC 70 CITE MADRID 2727

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, THE HAGUE, LONDON

TYPIC

REFS: A. MADRID 2715 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE AND LONDON) (IN 231249)

B. DIRECTOR 397508 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE AND LONDON)

C. WH/MIAMI 9865 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE AND LONDON) (IN 232901)

1. ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART SCHEDULED DEPART MADRID FOR LONDON 21 DECEMBER 1970. QUTIMID REVEALS HE PLANNING 45-DAY EUROPEAN TRIP AND MENTIONED POSSIBLE VISIT THE HAGUE (DATES NOT SPECIFIED).

2. FILE 201-865545. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

28 Dec 70

EDITIONS

11

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIO CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPI 3-1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
		8	

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY Q AT: 1530 Z

DISSEM BY: 8 PER

PRIORITY

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION NO. 539

S E C R E T 241437Z DEC 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 9865

PRIORITY MADRID INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

24 DEC 70 232901

TYPIC

REF MADRID 2715 (- 23249)

1. PLS PROVIDE ANY INFO AVAILABLE ON PRESENT LOCATION AND/OR ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS OF ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART.

2. FILE: 201-865547. GP1.

SECRET

24 Dec 70

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 54 ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT WH8 FILE, VR RI/AN DO4 CDC CI/IC2 CAS CA/PROP CA/REG DDP ADDP CSDO FI2

ACTION NO. 742

S E C R E T 161847Z SEP 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 8936 (KOPAY D1)

DO BASE NEW YORK INFO DIRECTOR

18 SEP 70 166076

TYPIC AMROSE DOMOPS

REFERENCE: DO BASE NEW YORK 8155 (V160121)

1. STATION WENT THROUGH FILES OF AMMUG-1 AND AMDAUB-1 AND HAD OUTSIDE OFFICERS CONTACT THEM TO DETERMINE FEASIBILITY OF REF PROPOSAL.

2. AMMUG-1 AND STATION FEEL THAT ANY PUBLICITY GIVEN HIM AT THIS TIME WOULD ONLY BE DETRIMENTAL. HE IS HAPPILY SETTLED AND DOES NOT WANT HIS PAST BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF HIS NEIGHBORS OR PERSONS HE WORKS WITH.

3. AMDAUB-1 ON THE OTHER HAND IS SETTLED BUT CURRENTLY HAS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS DUE TO INACTIVITY CONSTRUCTION BUSINESS, FAMILY PROBLEMS, ETC., ALL OF WHICH ARE NOT CONDUCIVE FOR ANY INTERVIEW.

4. IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING WE FEEL THAT THE TIME IS NOT PROPITIOUS FOR ANY ARTICLES

AN
AB
IN
IS
BX
DES NFD
FI

files

[illegible] 201-802332

File: 201-749651
1 Sept. 1970

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 8936 SECRET

TO BE PUBLISHED AT LEAST ON THESE TWO DEFECTORS.

5. FILE: 201-354406. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

201-749651

14-00000

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - UFAW-378

FILE NO - 201-749651

DATE - 22 MAY 1970

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

INFO - NO

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJECT - CITIZENSHIP OF AMMUG-1

ACTION - SEE BELOW

REFS - UFAX-14 DATED 13 JAN 70
UFAW-771 DATED 3 FEB 70
UFAA-1844 DATED 6 MAR 70

WH
AB
FI

1. BILL NO. HR 17740 WAS INTRODUCED TO CONGRESS ON 20 MAY 1970 REQUESTING WAIVING THE TEN-YEAR PROVISION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION ACT IN THE CASE OF AMMUG-1.

2. THE BILL WILL PROBABLY NOT PASS THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS, BUT ITS INTRODUCTION WILL INITIATE THE NECESSARY PAPER WORK MAKING CHANCES FOR PASSAGE OF THE BILL GOOD FOR THE NEXT SESSION.

Joyce K. Jawgiel
JOYCE K. JAWGIEL

DISTRIBUTION
3 - COS, WH/MIAMI

COORDINATE:

C/WH/COG/OP

WH/COG/OP/Geisler:kgb 22May70
Distribution:
1 - 749651
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - Originator

CS COPY

C/WH/COG

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH UFAW-878 PAGE ONE

22 May 70
201-749651

DISPATCH S-E-C-R-E-T

MARKED FOR INDEXING	
NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Below

Reference: UFAW-878

Attached is a copy of Bill No. HR 17740 which may be passed to Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera.

Joyce K. JAWGIEL

Distribution
3 - COS, WH/Miami w/att herewith

CS CO

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAW-883	DATE 3 JUN 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-749651

28 May 1970

Distribution
1 - 201-749651
1 - WH/COG Chrono
1 - Originator

AN
AB X
EX
FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OP/Daryl Geisler		kgb	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/OP	25/5	Glenn Brown

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG	28/5	James Flannery

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11 69 (40)

DISPATCH

3 Jun 70

91st CONGRESS
2d SESSION

H. R. 17740

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 20, 1970

Mr. RODINO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

For the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, who was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence on July 2, 1964, shall be held and considered not to be within the classes of persons whose naturalization is prohibited by the provisions of section 313 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

III

CS COPY

H/watt to UFAW-853

201-749651

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - UFAW-373
FILE NO - 201-749651
DATE - 22 MAY 1970
INDEX - NO
FILM - NO
TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI
INFO - NO
FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
SUBJECT - D CITIZENSHIP OF AMMUG-1
ACTION - SEE BELOW
REFS - UFAX-14 DATED 13 JAN 70
UFAW-771 DATED 3 FEB 70
UFAA-1344 DATED 6 MAR 70

1. BILL NO. HR 17740 WAS INTRODUCED TO CONGRESS ON 20 MAY 1970 REQUESTING WAIVING THE TEN-YEAR PROVISION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION ACT IN THE CASE OF AMMUG-1.

2. THE BILL WILL PROBABLY NOT PASS THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS, BUT ITS INTRODUCTION WILL INITIATE THE NECESSARY PAPER WORK MAKING CHANCES FOR PASSAGE OF THE BILL GOOD FOR THE NEXT SESSION.

JOYCE K. JAWGIEL

DISTRIBUTION
3 - COS, WH/MIAMI

COORDINATE:

FI

WH/COG/OP/Geisler:kgb 22May70
Distribution:
1 - 749651
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - Originator

C/WH/COG/OP

C/WH/COG

SECRET TELEPOUCH UFAW-373 PAGE ONE

201-749651
22 May 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

AMMUG /1/
201-749651
SEX M DOB ?

201-824335
UFAA-01982
04 MAY 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
IDENTIFIED COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR IN CSR

R 7005080080

FILE IN 201-749651

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~S~~ E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
Status of AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Para 2, below

References:
A. UFAX-14
B. UFAW-771
C. UFAW-730

1. Forwarded herewith is the most recent contact report from Hensry S. PACHANKIS concerning AMMUG-1.

2. As indicated, PACHANKIS broke the bad news contained in Reference B on AMMUG-1's citizenship. AMMUG-1 apparently took the news as well as could be expected. Nevertheless, the Station would appreciate periodic notice on the status of AMMUG-1's case so we may keep him informed on any progress.

3. In regard to Reference C, PACHANKIS probed in the area of wife problems and never really resolved the situation. PACHANKIS seemed to think, however, that the wife is still living with AMMUG-1.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD w/att h/w

MAR 6 1970

[illegible] COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-1844	DATE 2 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-749651

[illegible] February 1978

SUBJECT: Contact Report [illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible] on the status of his application for citizenship. [illegible] Company representatives consulted his case with Department of Justice. Unfortunately, the latter have ruled that under present Naturalization laws, A-1 is not eligible for citizenship until [illegible] years [illegible], due to his previous [illegible] with the [illegible]. [illegible], the Company is attempting to have a US Congressman introduce a private bill to obtain a waiver of the clause in the law that prohibits his immediate citizenship. I pointed out that this is a lengthy process, not to mention uncertain, but that every effort is being exercised to render a happy ending. I asked him to be patient and trust us. I also made it known that if he had occasion to leave the country on business, we would gladly help in obtaining his [illegible] reentry permit. To further soften the blow, I assured him that this clause in the law does not affect his present status as a legal resident.

3. A-1 was naturally a bit set back by the decision, but did not express any anger. Instead, he said he understood and was hopeful we could resolve the problem. (I hope so too.)

4. A-1 was at home with [illegible]. The house was in order and very clean. I asked about his wife [illegible] and tried to draw him out [illegible], but he did not go beyond this and I thought it would look too conspicuous to [illegible]. On the three previous occasions that I visited A-1 in the early morning (10:30 hrs) his mother in law is usually there and offers me coffee. She was not there today, but this is not in itself significant since she could have been out shopping.

5. A-1 was shown the pictures of Ismail [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible]. A-1 does not recognize the pictures or the names.

HARRY G. ZACHARAKIS

H/W att 1 UFFA 1874

CS COPY

201-749651

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
Information from AMMUG-1 on Hector and Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References: UFAA-1774

1. On 26 February when Henry S. PACHANKIS met with AMMUG-1 (201-749651) on his citizenship problem, information on the following two brothers was obtained:

Hector RODRIGUEZ Llompart
(201-276598)
Cuban Ambassador to East Germany

Roberto *RODRIGUEZ Llompart
CIT: Cuba
DOB: 22 October 1932
POB: Regla, Havana, Cuba
OCC: Government

2. This information was as follows:

a. AMMUG-1 was asked if he had anything new to report. He brought up a most interesting case, one which could prove to be a valuable lead.

b. AMMUG-1 has known the RODRIGUEZ family since his childhood in Regla (a small town across the bay from Havana). The father had been a bolita banker during the Batista era.

c. AMMUG-1 was very friendly with RODRIGUEZ' two sons:

Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart
DPOB: c. 1934 in Regla, Havana, Cuba

Hector RODRIGUEZ Llompart

CS copy filed in 201-865547

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

MAR 6 197

201-749651

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-749651	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-1845	DATE 3 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-276598

d. During the middle and late 1950s, Roberto had been a salesman for the Burroughs flour company and had stayed clear of the political picture in Cuba.

e. During the same period, Hector had been a student in the University of Havana, under Raul ROA, and had taken part in some revolutionary activities. He had been arrested and beaten by the Batista police for his anti-government actions and his father had sent him into exile in the US.

f. When Castro came into power, the father was a potential "war criminal" for his illicit dealings. AMMUG-1, who was in the police force in the initial stages of the revolution, states that he deleted an incriminating page from the father's dossier (showing he paid off the police to run his bolita operation) and thus saved him from prosecution.

g. AMMUG-1 continued to be close to the family, especially with Roberto, "whom I saw every day and ran around with." Roberto never entertained the revolution. As late as 1962-63, "We used to talk quite openly and frankly. He was always against the revolution and the communists. He worked in the Ministry of Industry because his brother got him the job, but he had only one idea in his head: to get out of Cuba and come to the US. He was even plotting to get out by boat. He had a US visa for many years and had visited here many times."

h. When AMMUG-1 defected, he lost contact with Roberto. But, about two weeks ago a neighbor from Regla came to Miami on the Freedom Flights. (COMMENT: This undoubtedly refers to Cuban refugee Segundo CASCUDO Gonzalez. Reference forwarded the AMOT debriefing of CASCUDO on Roberto.) When AMMUG-1 asked about Roberto, the neighbor said that he understood that Roberto, "was assigned in a foreign Embassy." The refugee could not say what country Roberto was in.

i. This news prompts AMMUG-1 to comment: "This would be a most interesting person to talk to. I don't think that he has changed his original way of thinking. I believe he took the job to get out of Cuba, and because of the influence of his brother Hector. I know he will talk to me and there is no telling what this man is capable of doing if someone approached him."

j. Roberto is (or was) married to:

Zulema (lnu)
DPOB: c. 1934 in Cuba

They had two children and the wife was even more anti-Castro than Roberto.

k. Hector, the other brother, was a rabid revolutionary when AMMUG-1 last saw him in c. 63-64. He had joined the Castro bandwagon at the outset due to his revolutionary activities during the Batista era and his closeness to Raul ROA. In c. 1960-61-62, Hector was closely aligned with "Che" GUEVARA and served in his entourages, even on foreign junkets. "He was very close to Che and traveled abroad a lot. He and I were good friends--he used to bring me gifts when he returned from trips--but you couldn't even insinuate any opposition to the revolution, he was so fierce for it. I hear that he is the Ambassador to Germany; I guess through his friendship with Raul ROA. I doubt if he has changed, but I can talk to him in complete confidence--perhaps not like I could Roberto--but I could know how he thinks".

3. Since Roberto appears to be an excellent recruitment target, we will have him watchlisted with a view toward having AMMUG-1 make an approach to him at the first opportunity. Although Hector appears far less vulnerable, we will consider an approach to him should he be transferred to a Free World country.

4. Please open a 201 file on Roberto.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

14-00000

10 **SECRET**
(When Filled In)
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

DISSEM BY: JL

ACTION UNIT: WH8

INFO: FILE, VR Rilan. Eng. ci clops fi2.

ACTION NO. 549

I

S E C R E T 032035Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6665 3 MAR 70 IN 0 0 0 7 7 0

M

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID, PARIS

TYPIC UNCOSMIC

REF: A. PARIS 4569 (IN 01578)

B. DIRECTOR 059504 (NOT SENT PARIS) (IN 01367)

C. WH/MIAMI 6046 (NOT SENT PARIS)

D. UFAA-1845 (NOT SENT PARIS, MADRID)

1. WH/MIAMI HAS GOOD ASSESSMENT FROM AMMUG-1 (201-749651, DGI DEFECTOR IN 1964) ON ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART, SUBJECT OF REFS. AMMUG-1 HAD CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ROBERTO, WITH WHOM HE GREW UP IN REGLA, HAVANA. IN 1962 AND-63, THEY TALKED QUITE FRANKLY AND OPENLY. ROBERTO ALWAYS TALKED AGAINST THE REVOLUTION AND COMMUNISTS. HE HAD ONE PRINCIPAL IDEA--TO LEAVE CUBA AND GO TO STATES, EVEN BY BOAT. AMMUG-1 DOES NOT BELIEVE HE COULD HAVE CHANGED AND ONLY HOLDS CURRENT GOC POSITION because ~~BOUSE~~ OF BROTHER, HECTOR (201-276598), WHO IS AMBASSADOR IN EAST GERMANY. AMMUG-1 IS SURE ROBERTO WILL TALK WITH HIM.

2. AMMUG-1 SAID HECTOR WAS RABID REVOLUTIONARY

CS copy filed
in 201-276598

~~CS COPY~~

SECRET

[illegible] RODRIGUEZ Lalera [illegible]

201-749651

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ION UNIT NOTIFIED

ANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT: Z

EM BY PER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 6565 SECRET

AND CLOSE TO RAUL ROA. ALSO HAD BEEN CLOSE FOLLOWER OF CHE GUEVARRA. AMMUG-1 COULD ALSO TALK TO HECTOR IN COMPLETE CONFIDENCE, BUT NOT WITH SAME CONFIDENCE AS WITH ROBERTO.

3. DIRECTOR: POUCHING REF D, WHICH IS DEBRIEFING OF AMMUG-1 ON ROBERTO AND HECTOR.

4. MADRID: PLS PUT BOTH BROTHERS ON WATCHLIST. ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN PUTTING AMMUG-1 IN CONTACT WITH ROBERTO WHEN HE TRAVELES TO EUROPE AGAIN.

5. PARIS: PLS QUERY UNCOSMIC-1 FOR ANY FURTHER DETAILS HE CAN RECALL ABOUT TALKS WITH ROBERTO (REF A).

6 FILE 201-276598 AND 201-749651. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

201-749651

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Chief, WHD

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 9 FEB [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DDP	[illegible] FEB 1970	13 Feb 70	
2.			
3. Legislative Counsel	~~[illegible]~~		
4. EX/Ex Dir	17 Feb	17 Feb	
5. EA/DDCI DDCI			
6. ER			ER
7. C/WH			
8.			
9. C/WH/COG	19 FEB 1970		
10. DC/WH/COG	19 FEB 1970		
11. C/WH/C/OPS			
12. Daryl			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

- Note, Miami now.

FORM .62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

D?/? 0-0523

Executive Registry
[illegible]

WH/COG 70-46

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph three for the approval of the DDCI.

2. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera is a former Cuban national who defected to the United States in Nova Scotia, Canada on 21 April 1964. At that time he was an intelligence officer in the General Directorate of Intelligence, the Cuban external intelligence agency. He was brought to the United States under the provision of Section 7 of Public Law 110 (CIA Act of 1949). He has never been a member of the Communist Party, but due to his service in the Cuban external intelligence organization he is not eligible to petition for naturalization until ten years after the date of his defection, or 1974.

3. Mr. RODRIGUEZ desires to become a naturalized U.S. citizen at the earliest possible time and has requested assistance from this Agency. We request that a private bill be submitted to Congress waiving the ten-year provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act in his case, enabling him to become a U.S. citizen after five years of residence. It is recommended that you authorize the Legislative Counsel to seek a private bill for RODRIGUEZ' relief.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SUBJECT: Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera

4. Biographic Data and a Detailed Justification and Assessment on this case are attached.

f J Horton
William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachments: (A) Biographic Data
(B) Detailed Justification and Assessment

Concur ______________________________ [illegible]
Legislative Counsel — Date

Concur ______________________________ 13 Feb 70.
Deputy Director for Plans — Date

The recommendation in paragraph 3 is APPROVED:

R. E. Cushman, Jr. 17 Feb 70
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence — Date

SECRET

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera

1. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera was born on 6 February 1937 in the City of Havana, Cuba, the son of Carlos RODRIGUEZ Ferrer and Josefa LAHERA Marrero. RODRIGUEZ' wife, Luisa Nelia RODRIGUEZ y Timoneda, born 24 August 1934 in Regla, Havana, and her two children by a former marriage, Vicente Maximiliano HERNANDEZ Rodriguez, age 19, and Francisca Luciana HERNANDEZ Rodriguez, age 17, legally entered the United States on 11 May 1965 and reside with Subject in Miami. Her parents, Pablo RODRIGUEZ Escobar and Sara TIMONEDA Valdes now reside in the United States.

2. RODRIGUEZ attended Escuela Publica #46, first to sixth grade; Primaria Superior #19, seventh and eighth grade; Artes y Oficios (Construction Civil) one year; and Instituto de Habana for two years.

3. Subject was a member of the Cuban Rebel Army from 1957 to 1961, during which time he advanced from the rank of Private to Lieutenant. He was imprisoned at Castello Principe, Cuba, from 14 July 1957 to 11 February 1958 for participation in sabotage and propaganda activities on behalf of the 26th of July Movement. He then joined Fidel CASTRO's forces in the Sierra Maestra and remained there until the end of 1958 when he returned to Havana upon the fall of the BATISTA Government. He was a precinct lieutenant of the Cuban National Police from November 1959 to December 1961, at which time he resigned from the Army under which he had held his position in the National Police. He was out of work until April 1962 at which time he was employed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade where he remained until he became a staff member of the General Directorate of Intelligence in August 1963. He was a member of this organization until his defection in Ottawa, Canada, on 21 April 1964, when he left his plane which was enroute from Cuba to Prague.

SECRET

4. Soon after RODRIGUEZ joined the General Directorate of Intelligence, he found he could no longer submit to having his thoughts and actions circumscribed by controls which deprived him of liberty and self respect nor continue to support the Cuban Government or be a part of its intelligence activities; he therefore planned to defect as soon as the opportunity arose. After deciding to leave Cuba permanently, he began a systematic collection of documents at the General Directorate of Intelligence Headquarters. He brought these documents with him to the United States as proof of Fidel CASTRO's subversive activities in Latin America.

5. Subject is 5 feet 2 inches tall, weighs approximately 130 pounds, has a medium build and erect posture. He has a long face, medium complexion, black hair and brown eyes.

DETAILED JUSTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT

1. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera has cooperated with this Agency since his defection on 21 April 1964 at which time he turned over to CIA documents from the General Directorate of Intelligence he had collected during the preceeding several months. In addition, he has provided voluminous, accurate and valuable information on the organization of the Cuban intelligence services, their operations, staff members and agents. These documents and information have given us the potential and opportunity to take effective measures to safeguard United States Government interests. Subject has been of great value in the past, and will continue to be in the future, in the CIA recruitment/defection program. His wide acquaintance among and knowledge concerning high level Cuban diplomats and Cuban intelligence personnel provides the Agency with the necessary background in planning operations against them and makes Subject ideal for use in carrying out the operations. His talents and contacts can be used not only in furthering the defector program, but in other types of political action and psychological warfare operations.

2. As a result of technical interrogations of RODRIGUEZ on 11 May 1964 and again on 15 July 1966, his bona fides have been established not only for intelligence exploitation purposes but also for the purpose of resettlement in the United States. There is no reason to believe that RODRIGUEZ is under the control of any hostile intelligence service.

3. The medical and psychiatric examinations have shown that RODRIGUEZ has no serious medical or psychiatric problems.

4. Mr. RODRIGUEZ has adjusted well to American life. He has been trained as a dental technician and has recently applied for employment with an airline company. It is believed that he would be a solid, responsible citizen.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Citizenship of AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFAX-14

1. On 27 January, Alien Affairs Staff advised that under Section 313 of Immigration and Naturalization Act, AMMUG-1 cannot become an American citizen until after 10 years from April 1964. While normal Cuban exile must wait five years, Communist party members must wait 10 years. AMMUG-1's position as "intelligence officer" is considered a "meaningful extension" of CP membership.

2. In view of AMMUG-1's distinguished service to RVROCK, WH Division will submit a memorandum through appropriate channels requesting authorization to submit a bill to Congress to reduce AMMUG-1's waiting period from ten to five years. At this writing, we do not know how long this processing will take but will keep you advised.

3. Paragraph 2 above is our intention and we naturally cannot guarantee approval at this time. If a special bill is passed by Congress, AMMUG-1 will go through routine application for Naturalization with RVROCK guidance.

James M. HAMMERSFAHR

Distribution:
3 - WH/Miami

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAW-771

DATE
3 FEB 1970
28 January 1970

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-749651

1 - WH/~~COG/OPS~~

AM
AB
~~IN~~
~~FB~~
~~SA~~
FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/OPS	R. Ennis	mamd	5061

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/OPS		Glenn O. Brown

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG		James E. Flannery

E

SECRET TELEPOUCH

UFAX-14

DISP NO - [redacted]

FILE NO - 201-749651

~~DATE~~ - 13 JANUARY 1973

INDEXING - NO

MICROFILM - NO

TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

SUBJECT - REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE ON CITIZENSHIP
- FOR AMMUG/1

ACTION - PARA 6, BELOW

REFERENCE - NONE

1. AMMUG/1 HAS A STRONG INTEREST AND NEED TO BECOME A NATURALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN. HE HAS MADE APPLICATION TO AVIANCA AIRLINE, WHICH IF ACCEPTED, WILL REQUIRE HIM TO TRAVEL TO COLOMBIA. HE HAS BEEN ASSURED THAT PVROCK WILL ATTEMPT ASSIST HIM IN OBTAINING HIS PAPERS.

2. AMMUG/1 HAS NOT FILED AN APPLICATION FOR NATURALIZATION LOCALLY BECAUSE HE IS AWARE THAT HE WILL BE REQUIRED TO ANSWER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS ENTRY INTO THE COUNTRY, ADDRESSES IN THE STATES, EMPLOYMENT REFERENCES, POLITICAL BACKGROUND, AND OTHER QUESTIONS IN DELICATE OPERATIONAL AREAS. HE REALIZES THAT HE CANNOT ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS WITHOUT PVROCK TUTORING. WH/MIAMI HAS BROACHED THIS SUBJECT, IN A GENERAL WAY, WITH LOCAL IMMIGRATION AND WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, WE WOULD HAVE TO HANDLE ON THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.

3. A REVIEW OF AMMUG/1'S HISTORY WILL

UFAX-14

uFAX-14

SHOW THAT HE WAS BROUGHT INTO STATES BLACK FROM CANADA IN APRIL 1964. HE WAS DEBRIEFED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS BY HQS AND THEN SETTLED IN MIAMI. HE WAS NOT PUT ON A COVER PAYROLL UNTIL 1965 AND THEN TERMINATED ABOUT YEAR LATER, AT WHICH TIME HE BEGAN OVERT JOB. THUS, WOULD FACE EMBARRASSING PROBLEM OF ANSWERING DETAILED IMMIGRATION QUESTIONS ON ENTRY AND EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND, NOT TO MENTION PREVIOUS AMSTAFF EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO DEFECTION.

4. AMMUG/1 HAS BEEN ASSURED THAT SHOULD HE HAVE THE OCCASION TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE STATES IN THE NEAR FUTURE, WH/MIAMI IS IN A POSITION TO FACILITATE THE ISSUANCE OF A REENTRY PERMIT IN A SHORT TIME. OUR LIAISON CONTACT IN LOCAL IMMIGRATION HAS ASSURED US ON THIS POINT.

~~1.~~ 5. PLS NOTE THAT HENRY S. PACHANKIS IS IN PERIODIC CONTACT WITH AMMUG/1 AND IS CURRENTLY DEBRIEFING HIM ON THE CUIS NAMES PROVIDED BY AMBEDEW/1. A DISPATCH ON THESE DEBRIEFINGS IS UNDER PREPARATION.

6. IN THE MEANTIME, WE REQUEST THAT HEADQUARTERS INITIATE ACTION WITH IMMIGRATION TOWARD GRANTING AMMUG/1 HIS NATURALIZATION PAPERS. PLS FORWARD ANY QUESTIONS THAT AMMUG/1 CAN PROVIDE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IF IT WOULD PROVE TO BE MORE EXPEDITIOUS, WH/MIAMI HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO SPONSORING A TRIP TO

uFAX-14

UFAX-14

WASHINGTON BY AMMUG/1 TO HELP RESOLVE ANY OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED ON THE ABOVE. ALSO, A PROMPT REPLY TO ANY ACTION HEADQUARTERS CAN TAKE ON AMMUG/1'S CASE IS REQUESTED. THE AGENT IS MOST ANXIOUS TO LEARN OF ANY PROGRESS THAT IS MADE TOWARD HIS CITIZENSHIP.

MELVIN D. KERSCHEN

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

3 - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

UFAX-14

3T

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

On 30 December 1969, AMNIP-1 reported that AMMUG-1's wife called him on the day before Christmas and informed him that her father had been hospitalized with a heart attack and that AMMUG-1 had left her. AMNIP-1 called AMMUG-1's place of employment in Miami on the day after Christmas and was informed AMMUG-1 was not working that day. AMNIP-1 left a message for AMMUG-1 to call him but as of 30 December had not heard from AMMUG-1. AMNIP-1 commented that he thought AMMUG-1's wife was a little unbalanced mentally and although her parents are now in the United States and she has no real ties left in Cuba, that she is interested in returning to Cuba.

Howard A. TRECKLER

Distribution:
2 - COS, WH/Miami

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFAW-730

DATE: 6 JAN 1970

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-749651

2 January 1970

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - WH/COG/OPS

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	J. Piccolo	mli	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DC/WH/COG/OPS		Lawrence B. Sulc

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG		James E

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

806

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR, RI/AN,

WH/MIAMI

S E C R E T 312113Z JAN 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 2582 31 JAN 69 IN 84063

m

DIRECTOR

REF DIRECTOR 69780

1. CONTACT WITH AMMUG-1 WAS REESTABLISHED 31 JANUARY BY PACHANKIS FOR WH/MIAMI WHICH HAD NEVER PICKED UP CONTACT FROM JMWAVE. PACHANKIS HAS MEETING WITH AMMUG-1 SCHEDULED FOR NIGHT 3 FEBRUARY TO SERVICE REF REQUEST.

2. FILE 201-287019 X REF 201-749651.

S E C R E T

19-6-10/3
31 Jan 69

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 7 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-749651

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR. WH/COG-8, CI/OA, Secur-4

S E C R E T 292111Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2567

29 MAY 68 IN 21190

DIRECTOR

AKULE PBRUMEN

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 02905

CORRECTED ALIEN REGISTRATION CARD DELIVERED AMMUG/1 20 MAY. PREVIOUSLY ISSUED CARD BEING POUCHED UFGA-30127, 28 MAY.

S E C R E T

BT

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT	✓	

201-749651
29 May 1968

SECRET

C/WHD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AKULE/PBRUMEN
Alien Registration Cards: AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

REFERENCE: UFGS-10530, 9 May 1968

Referenced Alien Registration Card (corrected) was given AMMUG-1 on 21 May 1968. Forwarded under separate cover is the card formerly issued him.

Julian T. Procario
Julian T. PROCARIO

Attachment: U/S/C [illegible]
As stated

Distribution:
③ - C/WHD w/att usc
2 - WH/COG w/o att

MAY 28 1968

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-30127	DATE 22 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-749651 201-749651

SECRET

MATERIALS REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 201-749651
Vol. II

INCLUSIVE DATES: 31 Dec 70 - 13 Apr 74
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LA/DDO
ROOM: 3C 3…

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2 JULY 78		CHUCK BERK	Charles Berk
27 JULY 78		CHUCK BERK	Charles Berk
14 AUG 1978		CORNWELL	Cornwell
6 NOV 78		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf

MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

E

Volume II
Jan. 71 -

14-00000

OPERATIONAL MATERIAL dated 2 January 1971 - 10 April 1972

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

FBI, 6 April 1978

I&NS, 19 April 1971

/27/ SECRET FR?: STAFF

CONF: LA-8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CI-4, DDO/DO, EA-8,
EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS-2, LSN/ID, ODPD-D, PCS/LSN, (34/P)

---

78 0552087 PAGE 001
TOT: 130012Z APR 78 DIRECTOR 204604

S E C R E T
STAFF 130010Z DIRECTOR 204604
TO: IMMEDIATE LA/MIAMI INFO PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL REAM

REF: LA/MIAMI 28157 0527676

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH NVCANOPY THEY HAVE ADVISED THAT
THEY ARE INTERESTED IN A PRELIMINARY INTERVIEW WITH SLANK-1 (S-1)
AND DEPENDING ON ITS OUTCOME WILL MAKE A DETERMINATION IF THEY
DESIRE S-1'S CONTINUED CONTACT WITH SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA (SA).
PACHANKIS SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO S-1 THAT RTACTION OBVIOUSLY
HAS NO OBJECTION TO HIS COOPERATION WITH NVCANOPY. PACHANKIS
ALSO SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO S-1 THAT RTACTION HAS NO INTEREST
IN HIS (S-1'S) CONTINUED RELATIONSHIP WITH SA.

2. A REVIEW OF THE FILES OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM
PACHANKIS CURRENTLY IN ACTIVE CONTACT INDICATES THAT NVCANOPY
APPROVAL WAS SOUGHT AND GRANTED IN EACH CASE, WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF DEFECTORS SUCH AS SLANK-1 WHO HAD BEEN HANDLED
AS A DEFECTOR ALTHOUGH ACCORDING TO THE FILE HE NEVER OFFICIALLY
GRANTED THIS STATUS UNDER PL 110. HQS DOES NOT COORDINATE
EACH INDIVIDUAL MEETING NOR IDENTIFY OFFICER HANDLING CASE
TO NVCANOPY.

3. FILE: 201-299243; 201-749651. E2, IMPDET.>
LA COMMENT: REF QUERIED HQS REGARDING FBI OR CIA INTEREST IN
S-1 PLAYING ROLE OF CONFIDANT TO ALDEREGUIA.
ORIG: LA/CO (SMITH/SPEED X1819/1325); COORD: AC/LA/CO/EA
(HARRINGTON), AC/LA/PHNCR (PORN), PCS/LSN ( ),
C/LA/CARI (BURNETT), C/LA/CAR (GREIG); AUTH: DC/LA/CO (LATRASH).
REL: C/LAD (WARREN); CL BY: 012034.<

749651

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

14-00000

50/22/ DISSEM PER SO[illegible]132 SECRET CRP NON-AGENCY

CONF: C/LA-8 INFO: FILE, RF, C/CI-2, C/IP/DMS, C/LSN/ID, C/PCS, ODPD-D. (15/P)

78 0530497 PAGE 001
TOT: 080750Z APR 78 ~~CIA 202417~~

S E C R E T
080750Z CIA 202417
TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

ATTENTION: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
SECRET/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
CIR-316/ 01514-78
SUBJECT: TOMCAT; ESP-CUBA-PANAMA; RA-CUBA-PANAMA
REFS: A. FBI TELETYPE DATED 052028Z APRIL 1978, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

B. CIR-316/00260-75, DATED 18 FEBRUARY 1975, CAPTIONED "SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA, ALSO KNOWN AS "EL GALLEGO" INTERNAL SECRUITY-CUBA.

1. WITH REGARD TO CLARIFICATION OF SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA'S ASSOCIATION WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PARTICULARLY WITH CIA, REFERENCE B ADVISED THAT HE WAS OF INTEREST TO THIS AGENCY IN 1960 WHEN WE WERE INDIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ASSISTING IN HIS EXFILTRATION FROM CUBA. HOWEVER, HE TOOK ASYLUM IN THE URUGUAYAN EMBASSY IN HAVANA ON 3 JULY 1960 AND DEPARTED THE SAME DAY FOR CURACAO. AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN MIAMI IN FEBRUARY 1961, THIS AGENCY WAS BRIEFLY IN CONTACT WITH HIM BUT OUR INTEREST WAS DROPPED PARTLY BECAUSE HIS UNCLE, ONE OF THE LEADING FOUNDERS OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, WAS THEN CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO YUGOSLAVIA AND ALDEREGUIA'S TRUE LOYALTIES WERE UNKNOWN. THIS AGENCY HAS HAD NO INTEREST IN OR CONTACT WITH ALDEREGUIA SINCE THAT TIME.

2. VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAHERA DPOB 6 FEBRUARY 1937, HAVANA, CUBA WAS A FORMER DGI STAFF OFFICER WHO DEFECTED ON 21 APRIL 1964 IN HALIFAX NOVA SCOTIA. HE WAS DEBRIEFED AND HANDLED THROUGH NORMAL DEFECTOR CHANNELS AND WAS THE SOURCE OF NUMEROUS CSCI'S CONCERNING THE DGI IN 1964 AND 65. HE WAS USED OPERATIONALLY IN RECRUITMENT ATTEMPTS AGAINST DGI OFFICERS DURING 1964-1967. HE WAS TERMINATED IN JULY 1967, AND WAS CONSIDERED, BUT NEVER USED, FOR ANOTHER RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT IN 1971. SINCE 1971 RODRIGUEZ HAS NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY CIA OPERATION IN MIAMI OR ELSEWHERE. JOSEPH NORRIS IS THE ALIAS OF A CIA REPRESENTATIVE WHO PERIODICALLY DEBRIEFS RODRIGUEZ ON PERSONALITIES AND METHODS OF THE DGI. THERE IS NO OTHER CIA INVOLVEMENT WITH RODRIGUEZ.

316/01514-78

3. THIS AGENCY WILL QUERY ITS REPRESENTATIVE IN MIAMI TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THIS MATTER.

SECRET

8 Apr 78

201-749651

SECRET

NON-AGENCY

78 0530497 APR 19 8 47 AM '78 PAGE 002
TOT: 080750Z APR 78 CIA 202417

RECEIVED

4. CLASSIFIED BY 012034. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.>
ORIG LA/CD/CI SPEED X1325; COORD LA/CARI BURRET;
LA/PHNC/P PORN; ADC/LA/CD KEENAN AUTH C/LAD
WARREN; REL AC/PCS/LSN KUNH CL BY 012034.

A P MAY 3 '78

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

55/25/ SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

ADV NOTIFIED AND ISSUED LA 2214Z PRECEDENCE STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (837) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CI-4, EPS/EG-2,
IP/DYS, LSN/ID, ODPD-D, SIA, SIA/IC, (25/W)

---

76 0527670 PAGE 001 IN 0527670
TOR: 072209Z APR 78 LMIM 28158

SECRET 072142Z APR 78 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 28158

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY.

NIACT DIRECTOR

WNINTEL REAM

REF: LA/MIAMI 28157 0527676

IDEN A: WILLIAM WALTON
FBI SPECIAL AGENT

IDEN B: JACK COGSWELL, A WEST PALM BEACH
RESIDENT WHO SA SAYS WAS A RETIRED U.S. NAVAL
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. E2, IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

7 Apr 78

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

201-749651

55/89/ SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , ,

ADV NOTIFIED AND ISSUED LA 2216Z PRECEDENCE STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (836) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, C/SIA, C/SIA/IC, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, LSN/ID, ODPD-D, (25/W)

78 0527676 PAGE 001 IN 0527676
TOR: 072206Z APR 78 LMIM 28157

S E C R E T 072142Z APR 78 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 28157

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY.

NIACT DIRECTOR

WNINTEL REAM

REF: DIRECTOR 201936

1. DURING THE YEARS THAT PACHANKIS HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SLANK-1 (S-1), FORMERLY AMMUG-1, FROM 1965 TO 1978, PACHANKIS HAS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE THAT S-1 WAS EVER IN CONTACT WITH NVCANOPY. SINCE 1969 IT HAS BEEN PACHANKIS' UNDERSTANDING THAT NVCANOPY HAS BEEN INFORMED EVERY TIME PACHANKIS HAS MADE AN OPERATIONAL CALL ON A U.S. PERSON IN THE MIAMI AREA. PACHANKIS HAS NEVER BEEN EXPOSED/INTRODUCED TO NVCANOPY IN MIAMI. PACHANKIS HAS BEEN INTRODUCED TO NVCANOPY REPS IN NEW YORK CITY WHILE ON TDY TO FR/NEW YORK (CIRCA 1974). PACHANKIS HAS ALSO MET AN NVCANOPY AGENT IN NEWARK, NEWJERSEY UNDER THE ALIAS OF JOE NORRIS.

2. PACHANKIS HAS BEEN HANDLING S-1 SINCE EARLY 1970. SEVERAL TIMES OPERATIONS ALMOST CAME OFF BUT HQS DECIDED AT THE LAST MINUTE TO PRESERVE S-1'S SECURITY. IN THE PAST FEW YEARS THERE HAS NOT BEEN MUCH CONTACT WITH S-1 EXCEPT FOR A CHRISTMAS CALL OR A ROUTINE COG REQUIREMENT.

3. SLANK-1 CALLED PACHANKIS ON 6 APRIL AND REQUESTED MEETING TO REPORT FOLL:

A. SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA (SA) HAS BEEN S-1 FRIEND SINCE 1955 IN CUBA. THEY CONSPIRED AGAINST THE BATISTA REGIME WHILE IN THE RANKS OF THE 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT.

B. S-1 HAD NOT SEEN SA IN ALMOST FOUR YEARS WHEN THEY COINCIDENTALLY MET ON A MIAMI STREET IN 1965 (LESS THAN YEAR AFTER S-1'S DEFECTION FROM DGI). FROM 1965 UNTIL FEB/MARCH 1978, THEY HAD INFREQUENT THOUGH CORDIAL ENCOUNTERS IN MIAMI.

C. AFTER SA'S RECENT ARREST IN MIAMI BY NVCANOPY ON ESPIONAGE CHARGES, SA HAS BEEN A CONSTANT VISITOR TO S-1'S HOME. SA HAS OSTENSIBLY BEEN SEEKING "TEA AND SYMPATHY" FROM S-1.

RECORD COPY SECRET

7 Apr 78

201-749651

CLAIMING HE HAS BEEN FRAMED BY NVCANOPY. WHILE S-1 DOES NOT BELIEVE SA, S-1'S "CI MIND" AND CURIOSITY HAVE COMPELLED HIM TO CONTINUE CONTACT WITH SA. IN RECENT WEEKS SA HAS INTRODUCED S-1 TO IDENS A AND B.

4. S-1 WANTS TWO POINTS MADE CLEAR TO RTACTION AND NVCANOPY. ONE, S-1 HAS NEVER BEEN INVOLVED IN SA'S APPARENT ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES. TWO, S-1 VOLUNTEERS TO SERVE AS SA'S CONFIDANT IF NVCANOPY AND/OR RTACTION CONSIDER S-1 CAN DO GOOD IN SUCH A ROLE. PLEASE ADVISE.

5. STATION HAS NO FILES ON S-1 AND THEREFORE CANNOT COMMENT ON NVCANOPY KNOWLEDGE OF RTACTION'S PAST RELATIONSHIP WITH S-1. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT NVCANOPY HAS BEEN INFORMED OF PACHANKIS' ACTIVITIES IN ALIAS JOE NORRIS FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AT THE HQS LEVEL.

6. FILE: 201-(SLANK-1). E2, IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

Calvin - SPOB (Spec Payroll) x 2135 called re SLANK/1 (201-749651) formerly encrypted AMMUG/1 - He has old (16 Oct 75) MOC which not touched since AUG/76 and wants to know status of case ie - is SLANK/1 being paid - is he terminated - etc.

Since this was case handled by Pachanki's we will check the file and let Calvin know - have ordered the file in Melissa Walsh name.

RH
13 Apr 77

ANK/1 true name is Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lahera

Informed "Calvin" on 15 April 77 that SLANK/1 is still on active contact, not receiving any salary, but could be paid if & when used in an operation. No problems here. SPOB will keep his contract in an active folder.
RH 15 Apr 77

30 JUL 1976

NOTE: WE WILL NOT ASK FOR A DEVISED FACILITY FOR SLANK/1 UNTIL IT IS DETERMINED HE WILL BE USED AGAIN.

LA/COG/EA

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

0

SUBJECT: Engagement of SLANK-1 (201-749651)

1. Term and Project Charge: Subject has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project SLEEPER. The effective date of the oral contract is 16 Oct 1975.

2. Security Approval: An OA for the operational use of Subject outside the U.S. was granted on 6 Jan 1971.

3. Citizenship: Subject is a United States Citizen.

4. Compensation: Subject is reimbursed for travel expenses and is given a salary replacement for any time he is required to be absent form work at the request of the Agency. The salary reimbursement will not exceed $40 a day. He may be awarded cash bonuses for services rendered. He may also be given gifts from time to time, the individual value of which will not exceed $50.

5. Taxes: Subject is obligated to pay U.S. taxes and should be issued a Devised Facility Form 1099 at the end of each tax year.

6. Quarters and/or Subsistence:
    a. Subject is not furnished quarters or subsistence.
    b. No commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increased cost of living and quarters expenses.

7. Operational Expenses: Subject will be reimbursed for operational expenses such as entertainment of operational contacts, phone calls, cover expenses, etc., upon submission of proper accounting for such expenses.

LX-4200

16 Jul 76

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL BY: 025231

RECORD COPY

201-749651

8. Contingent Obligations: Although no commitment to this effect has been made to Subject, should the security of Subject or his family become threatened because of activities undertaken by him at the request of this Agency, this Agency would have an obligation to reimburse Subject for expenses required to reduce that threat, including expenses needed to relocate Subject and his family and, if necessary, to supplement his income while he is establishing a new residence and employment.

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to Subject.

SIGNED:________________

Case Officer

REVIEWED:________________

APPROVED:________________

Field Contracting Officer

Attachment:
Non-Staff Personnel Data Sheet

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - LA/Personnel w/att
1 - Vital Documents w/att
1 - LA/COG/Chrono
1 - 201-749651
1 - LA/B&F

SECRET

NON-STAFF PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

DATE
16 July 76

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. SUBMIT FOR:
A. CONTRACT EMPLOYEES *(TYPE A, B AND CAREER)*
B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT OR MOC *(US CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS ONLY)*
2. THIS FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR OPERATIONAL OR FIELD AGENTS
3. COPIES OF THE FORM WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ORIGINATING COMPONENT *(NUMBER OF COPIES AT ITS DISCRETION)* AND BY CSPS/AGENT BRANCH *(1 COPY ONLY)*

NAME *(LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)* RODRIGUEZ LaHera, Vladimir			SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 2 Jun 1937
MARITAL STATUS M	NO. DEPENDENTS 3	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH (wife) 6 Feb 1937 24 Aug 1934	NATIONALITY U.S.	LAST MEDICAL EXAM
DATE OF LATEST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL Amended OA 7 Jan 1971		JOB TITLE		COMPONENT
CONTRACT CATEGORY B	EFFECTIVE DATE 16 Oct 75	EXPIRATION DATE Indefinite	SALARY	GRADE EQUIVALENT	PROJECT OR FAN O

BENEFITS	YES	NO
SOCIAL SECURITY		
FECA DEATH AND DISABILITY		X
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE		X
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT		X
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERCIAL CIA ANNUITY		X
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		X
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		X
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS		X
OTHER *(EXPLAIN)* If forced to move for security reasons, CIA would help with expenses.	X	X

NON-CIA EDUCATION

Escuela Publica #46	1st-6th Grade
Primaria Superior #19	7th-8th Grade
Artes y Oficios (Construcion Civil)	1 Year
Instituto de Habana	2 years toward bachelor degree

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

DATES FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
Aug 63-Apr 64	Ministry of Foreign Relations	Havana, Cuba	Intel Off	
May 65-Dec 66	Scheaffer Advertising Co	Miami, Fla	Market Re-searcher	$600 mo.
Dec 66-CA Dec 74	Marriot Corp	Miami, Fla.		
Dec 74-Present	Metro Transit Authority	Miami, Fla.	Bus Driver	$13,000 yr.

CIA TRAINING

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY *(BEGINNING WITH EOD)*

DATES FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR. CAT.	LOCATION	PROJECT	SALARY	GRADE EQUIV.
Apr 64-Nov 67	Agent	B	Washington, D.C. & Miami	AMMUG	$600 mo.	
Jan 69-Present	Informant	B	Miami, Fla.	SLEEPER	WAE	

SECRET

SECURITY

FACTORS AFFECTING SUBJECT (PUBLIC DISCLOSURE - PRESS, RADIO, TV); KNOWN OR SUSPECTED IDENTIFICATION TO OTHER THAN CIA STAFF PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE SECURITY SERVICES.

Cuban Intelligence Service

COVER

A. PRESENT COVER IS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NON-OFFICIAL

DIVISION EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY:

At present, subject is not involved in any activities that require him to use a cover. If and when he travels abroad, he will use business or personal cover appropriate to the mission involved.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE:

ADAPTABILITY (SUBJECT AND FAMILY) TOWARDS DUAL LIFE

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NON-OFFICIAL (GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

No known limiting factors

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

Headquarters plans to use Subject to contact and approach Cubans of operational interest to LA/COG.

Pls Pouch to HQS

SECRET

28 April 1976

201-749651

1. For the Record: SLANK-1 (S-1) has purchased ~~a home~~ at:

2931 SW 19th Terrace
Miami, Florida

tel: (305) 443-3027.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

IP/EDR		[illegible] PROGRAM
	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
[illegible]		[illegible] FOR FILMING
IP/[illegible]		[illegible] NO. (2, 3)
		[illegible] CODE
		CODE IDEN (11)
		NED (3)
~~[illegible]~~		FOR FILING
LA/C/OP		

LX-4130

SECRET

RECORD COPY

28 Apr 76
201-749651

PLS CABLE HQS; INFO CARACAS

SECRET

C06/LA

27 March 1976

1. At 27 March meeting, PACHANKIS discussed latest CARACAS Station requirements with SLANK-1 (S-1).

2. S-1 not seen SLPAT-1 (F-1) since c. 1964, thus unable provide updated assessment. S-1 does not know F-1's wife.

3. S-1 considers highly improbable F-1 would accept private meeting via phone. F-1 could be suspicious of S-1's motives and might round up own welcoming committee for confrontation.

4. S-1 confidant a direct street meeting -one on one- would offer best opportunity to communicate Agency offer to F-1.

5. S-1's second choice would be home approach, were it known F-1 was alone or only with wife.

plan.
Who can adapt to any Station name/

6. S-1 is disciplined, discreet, devoted, plucky professional.
States will go anywhere, anytime to cooperate. Prepared take up to
5 days sick leave without pay to participate approach to F-1.
Could leave Miami on Saturday, returning latest Sunday following
week. S-1 is Amcit and has US passport. S-1 needs c. 1 weeks
prior notice to prepare for CARACAS TDY.

7. S-1 reviewed names of Cubans on latest Diplomatic List. Only positive was: Norberto HERNANDEZ Curbelo (the Ambassador) who former DGI colleague of S-1.

cabled

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

fil SLANK-1 201

SECRET

3 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: SLANK-1

In reviewing SLANK-1's file for possible leads to targets of interest the following names were selected:

1. Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart (201-865547)
2. Ricardo ESPINO Martinez (201-818437)
3. Federico CRESPO Moreira (201-894397)
   (in Peru since January 1973)
4. Rafael MIRABAL Fernandez (KDACOUSTIC-1) (201-812117)
   (Mexico - February 1967)
5. Manuel CARDONELL Duque (201-279604)
   (Capt. Pol. worked with M-1)
6. Armando "Ulises" ESTRADA Fernandez (201-809440)
7. Ramon Cesar CUENCA Mintoto (201-328945)
   (PCS Caracas - October 75 (DGI))
8. Roque DALTON Garcia (201-215097)
   (DSE - now in Havana)

Individual files of subject now being reviewed. If one or several of these subjects appears recruitable, a plan will be written up explaining "plan of action."

Wilfred O. CLOWER

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 025231

SECRET

3 Feb 76

18 November 1975

SUBJECT: Change of Address and Phone of SLANK-1 (S-1)

1. S-1 has informed me via a letter to my PO Box that he has moved once again and has a new phone. Please record:

610 SW 19th Road
Miami
telephone (305) 858-3043.

HSP

18 Nov 75

file SLANK-1 201
201-[illegible]51

Ref: DIR 759487

29 October 1975

SUBJECT: Contact Report on SLANK-1 (S-1)

1. S-1 was met on the evening of 28 October, at his Miami apartment, to inform him of the following:

   A. His old DGI chum, Ramon Cesar CUENCA Montoto, appeared to be settling down for an extended stay in Caracas.
   B. Consequently, our people had decided to study him in depth and decide at a later date what action, if any, could or should be taken against him. i.e. to pitch or not to pitch.
   C. Our office had asked me to thank him for his offer to assist in any operation and would keep him in mind in any future plans. S-1 was grateful to hear these words and reiterated his willingness/availability to help out in this or any other Operation.

2. I thought this to be the most diplomatic and effective way to treat this issue. I wanted to give him an answer yet not say we didn't think him the most likely candidate. S-1 has always been PRESENT when we needed volunteers. He longs to get back in the "business" and there is no doubt he can do the job. They don't come any "gutsier." We never know when we'll need him and it's good to know he is there.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

For Slank-1
201-749651

29 OCT 75

PRIORITY - PLEASE

R/ ~~DIR~~ 754594
CARACAS 28265

16 October 1975

SUBJECT: Contact Report on SLANK-1. (S-1)

1. S-1 was visited on the evening of 15 October, at his new address (5501 NW 7th St, apt 106E) same phone (443-5463) to discuss recent HQS requirements.

2. S-1 was excited to learn his old boss: Ramon Cesar CUENCA Montoto is in Caracas. "I just knew he had to be there because the Cuban Ambassador (Norberto HERNANDEZ Curbelo) was my boss in the DGI (c. 1963-64) and 'Cesar' was above us both." (In other words, in c. 1963-64, CUENCA was superior in rank to both S-1 and HERNANDEZ -the present Cuban Ambassador to Venezuela.) (CUENCA was know as Cesar to his coworkers/friends).

3. S-1 is seriouulsly ready, willing and able to partake in any Agency Operation against CUENCA and/or HERNANDEZ. S-1 is an AMCIT and has a valid US passport. His only consideration is obtaining the proper permission from his employers. This is a matter which the Agency MUST solicit for him. As previously reported, S-1 workes for:

Metro Transit Authority (bus driver)
3300 NW 32 Avenue, Miami.

The persons to be contacted at MTA, to grant S-1 the necessary leave are:

Mr. FNU CROSS and
Mr. M. C. BUTLER

4. The ball is in our court. You cannot ask for a more dedicated/motivated/educated (re the DGI) than S-1. S-1 will be ready to travel the minute Agency obtains necessary permission from MTA.

5. Re: "FERNANDEZ" -the Yemen based Cuban military instructor- S-1 reports NEGATIVE. (SLARSTICK-1 had previously reported NEGATIVE)

6. Whatever decision HQS takes, would appreciate being informed so we can notify S-1. He is most dedicated/valuable assest and we owe him this courtesy. In past, he has been alerted and we have failed to notify him of abortions, and left him hanging in mid air.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

For filing in
201-749651
16 Oct 75

[illegible]

S-1 [illegible]

S-1's daughter was 5 years old yesterday and I took the [illegible] a small gift, [illegible]

S-1 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] of himself."

[illegible]

For the record: S-1 [illegible] 413-[illegible]. S-1 has my [illegible] in the event he wants to contact me.

Henry S. [illegible]

201-749651 (IP)

~~F [illegible]~~

SLANK-1

201-749651

28 February 1975

SUBJECT: Contact Report on SLANK-1. (S-1)

1. S-1 was contacted on the evening of 27 February, at his Miami home (2761 SW 24th Terrace, tel: 443-0155) re his availability to approach his old friend, Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart.

2. As on all previous occasions when we have asked for S-1's collaboration, S-1's answer was AFFIRMATIVE. The only condition is that we obtain his employer's permission to be absent from his present job. He is not entitled to vacation until c. August 1975.

3. S-1 is presently employed as a bus driver for the:

Metro Transit Authority
3300 NW 32nd Avenue
Miami.
Tel: 633-9736.

The persons who must grant the permission are, in this order of rank:

H. I. CROSS

B. L. WALLACE

M. C. BUTLER

4. S-1 has a valid US passport. And, he can be available to travel the moment his superiors grant him the leave without pay we request.

5. I have again thanked him for his sincere/loyal cooperation. I have promised to keep him abreast of developments.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 3/74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 3 PER
TOTAL COPIES 18-1
RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT CA10

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR ~~IDN~~ CI/CP2 DO2

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 022297 EIA861 PAGE 01 IN 509121

TOR:281857Z FEB 75 LMIM 23060

S E C R E T 281830Z FEB 75 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 23060 (ENNIS ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

REAM

REF: DIRECTOR 661166

1. SLANK-1 CONTACTED BY PACHANKIS 27 FEB 75.

2. AS IN THE PAST, S-1 INDICATED HE IS WILLING TO MAKE AN APPROACH TO SUBJECT PER REF. S-1 IS NOW EMPLOYED WITH THE LOCAL METRO TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND IS NOT DUE A VACATION UNTIL AFTER MID-1975; THEREFORE ANY ABSENCE FROM WORK MUST BE REQUESTED BY BKHERALD AND APPROVED BY ANY ONE OF HIS SUPERIORS (H.I. CROSS, B.L. WALLACE; M.C. BUTLER -- IN ORDER OF DESCENDING AUTHORITY).

3. S-1 HAS VALID U.S. PASSPORT AND CAN TRAVEL WHEN NEEDED.

4. FILE: 201-0749651. E2, IMPDET.

LA/C/FI

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

28 FEB 75
201-749651

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRC	OCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		1

13-1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP
262113Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
661166

CONF: LA 10 INFO: FILE 1/pIAN,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 38.
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: LA/MIAMI.Y

REAM Y

1. HQS CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF USING VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAHERA/{201-749651} IN APPROACH TO HIS OLD FRIEND ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART {201-865547}.Y

2. REQUEST PACHANKIS DETERMINE PRESENT WHEREABOUTS OF RODRIGUEZ LAHERA AND WHETHER OR NOT HE WILLING AND AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN APPROACH.Y

3. FILE: 201-749651, 201-865547. E2, IMPDET.H

LA/C/LA

B-201-865547

DATE: 26 FEBRUARY 1975
ORIG: MARY MUSGRAVE:CB
UNIT: LA/COG/OPS
EXT: 9229

26 FEB 75
201-749651

RECORD COPY

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/CARI
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

14-00000

JOAN

21 December 1974

SUBJECT: Contact Report on SLANK-1. (S-1)

1. S-1 was met on the afternoon of 21 December, for abrief social call, to pay our respects and present him with a bottle of Scotch for the Christmas season.

2. S-1 was grateful not only for the gift but to see we had not forgotten him. His home life seems to have settled down after some rocky periods earlier in the year and he has a new, more secure position as bus driver for the Metro Transit Authority here in Miami. As previously reported, he has also taken the Postal Service exams and would accepted a letter carrier's job if it is offered to him.

3. As always, S-1 is ready to assist us in any way that he can. If Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart should ever come out again, S-1 can be counted on to make an approach. All that we would have to do is to contact his employers and obtain the necessary permission.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

[illegible]: SLANK-1 201-

+ 0749651

Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart
201
21 Dec 74

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER ONLY

ACE COI ALP TOO TPE MRO OCI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP
232254Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
613425

CONF: C/LAS8 INFO: FILE C/PLAN, C/EUR6, C/CI/OP2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 28
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY MADRID.Y

RYBAT REAM SLASH Y

REF: MADRID 24401 |IN 395143| Y

1. APPRECIATE MADRID'S OFFER ATTEMPT APPROACH SLASH-1. HOWEVER, WISH STAND-DOWN FOR MOMENT ON OP, SINCE WE SEE NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS USING ONLY NAME OF SLANK-1. Y

2. SLANK-1 DISAPPEARED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. HENRY S. PACHANKIS, WHO IN CONTACT WITH SLANK-1, PRESENTLY N.Y. WHERE INVOLVED OTHER OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, AND UNABLE RETURN MIAMI TRY TRACK DOWN SLANK-1. WE HOPE DO SO WHEN PACHANKIS RETURNS MIAMI, AND WILL THEN THINK IN TERMS OF SLASH-1'S NEXT TRIP OUT.Y

3. FILE: 201-365547. E2 IMPDET.d

LA COMMENT: REF OFFERED CO MADRID TO APPROACH SLASH-1 USING NAME SLANK-1 {CHILDHOOD FRIEND OF SLASH-1} AS BONA FIDES.

SLANK-1
201-749651

DATE: 23 OCT 74
ORIG: JOAN SILVERLIEB:MMF
UNIT: LA/COG/OPS
EXT: 9229

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/COG
C/E/IB/S
EUCH
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:
23 OCT 74

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER

TOTAL COPIES 29-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED LA BY A AT 1745 Z

ACTION UNIT 9LA 8

RF FILE VR 9IPLAN, 9EUR 8, 9CI/OP2, 9OSG/IC, 9OSG, 4OPS/INT 2, 9PS/EG 3

ACTION #

T 513726 EIA516 PAGE 01 IN 395143

TOR:231726Z OCT 74 MADR 24401

S E C R E T 231651Z OCT 74 STAFF

CITE MADRID 24401

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

[redacted] REAM SLASH

REFS: A. MADRID 24341 (IN 390775)

B. DIRECTOR 611511

1. QUTIMID OF 21 OCTOBER REPORTS THAT SLASH-1 WILL BE IN MADRID FOR TEN OR FIFTEEN DAYS. CUBAN EMBASSY IS REQUESTING 20 DAY VISA FOR HIM. SLASH-1 IS IN MADRID NEGOTIATING WITH THREE SPANISH FIRMS FOR COMPLETE EQUIPMENT OF PLANTS FOR CUBAN MINISTRY OF MINES. NO INDICATION YET OF WHERE SLASH-1 STAYING BUT EXPECT ASCERTAIN THROUGH QUTIMID.

2. ASSUME FROM REF B THAT SLANK-1 NO LONGER AVAILABLE FOR APPROACH TO SLASH-1. IF HQS DESIRES, MADRID STATION WILL ATTEMPT APPROACH SLASH-1 USING NAME OF SLANK-1 AS BONA FIDES.

3. FILE: 201-0365547. E2 IMPDET.

71-919651

SLANK-1 201

S E C R E T

23 Oct 74

B. SLALOM-1 -- He is close to Nestor RAMIREZ, a CUBAPESCA Representative who is currently in Tokyo. SLALOM-1 states RAMIREZ is approachable because RAMIREZ is definitely not a Communist, and he thinks very much like him (SLALOM-1).

C. SLANK-1 -- He mentioned to PACHANKIS that he had been close to Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart, a Cuban Mining Official who often travels to Mexico and Canada.

D. Gustavo MAS -- Brother-in-law of the current Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. MAS has advised PACHANKIS that he is willing to help us only to the extent of determining the feelings of his sister and the Ambassador at any given time, but no more. He will not accept any remuneration from us and will foot his own bill to visit his sister.

E. SLCOOL-1 and SLACE-1 -- In describing the former, PACHANKIS referred to him as from another generation, i.e., of the ROA class, who could possibly be used with any older Cuban officials that might still be around. He cautioned however, that SLCOOL-1 had undergone a delicate cancer operation two years ago which might impede his usefulness. As concern SLACE-1, PACHANKIS suggested that we were probably better off forgetting him. He described SLACE-1 as very problematical and then went on to add such adjectives as avaricious, sly, secretive, and a person inclined not to follow-through on any task given him.

6. PACHANKIS believes that much can be done with the above defectors against the targets mentioned and, himself, is anxious to get involved in another recruitment operation as soon as possible.

Frank C. Esquivel
WH/COG/FI

SLANK-1

201-749651

memo [illegible]
27 July 74
[illegible] Pachankis - 201

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER

TOTAL COPIES 21 RUN BY 2X

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED WH BY D AT 1850 Z

STAFF

1 /0

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR IP/AN EUR8 OSG CI/OPS/ OPS/INT PS/EG4 OS/LEC

T 147600 E1A780 PAGE 01-01 IN 265330

TOR:291938Z MAY 74 WMIM 21838

S E C R E T 291828Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 21838

TO: PRIORITY OTTAWA INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

REAM FHABOVE

REF: OTTAWA 23304 (IN 264930)

1. REGRET TO ADVISE THAT SLANK-1 WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR OPS TRAVEL UNTIL 9 JUNE 1974. HIS EMPLOYER INDICATED WILLINGNESS FREE SLANK-1 FOR TRAVEL FOR USG UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES; HOWEVER, TWO OF SLANK-1 FELLOW WORKERS CURRENTLY ON JURY DUTY AND EMPLOYER REGRETFULLY UNABLE LIBERATE SLANK-1 FROM WORK COMMITMENT UNTIL 9 JUNE.

2. FILE: 201-332726, ~~201-865547~~, 201-0314229. 201-749651

E2 IMPDET

IP

JUN 28 1974

4

8

WH/4/E1

B201-865547

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

201-749651
29 May 74

29 May 74

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY _____ PER _____ TOTAL COPIES 2 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____ S E C R E T 25

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED WH BY 2005

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

WH8

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR IP/AN CI/OPS EUR8

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 038889 E1A064 PAGE 01-01 IN 226286

PRECEDENCE TOR:171957Z APR 74 WHIM 21548

S E C R E T 171953Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 21548 (BEARDSLEY ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MADRID.

AKULE REAM

REF: DIRECTOR 538829

1. PACHANKIS IN TOUCH WITH SLANK-1 WHO WILLING TO TRAVEL. SLANK-1'S NEW EMPLOYER WOULD HAVE TO BE CONTACTED BY STATION SECURITY OFFICER TO OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR LWOP. OBTAINING INFO ON NEW EMPLOYER TO START CLEARANCE PROCEDURE.

2. FILE: 201-2865447, E-2, IMPDET.

Ko

[illegible]		[illegible]
	X	ABSTRACT
		[illegible]
[illegible]	/	[illegible] FOR FILING
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

201-749651

17 APR 74

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO.

FROM: Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Study of Cuban Defectors

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFAA-4701, 11 January 1973

Forwarded under separate cover is a copy of a personality assessment report prepared by Lawrence B. SELJACK (P) concerning AMMUG-1.

Linda N. QUASHNOCK

Attachment:
Assessment report U/S/C

Distribution:
3 - COS, WH/Miami w/att U/S/C

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 008385

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFAW-1709

DATE: 30 MAY 1973
23 May 1973

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-749651

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
DDO/WH/COG/FI:MBingham: rf			1819

Distribution:
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
① - 201-749651
1 - Originator

AN
AB
IN
PS
PX
~~DES NFD~~
FI

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG		Lawrence Sternfield

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - UFAS-2195
FILE NO - 201-749651
DATE - 29 AUGUST 1972
INDEX - NO
FILM - NO
TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI
INFO - NONE
FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
SUBJECT - AKULE/TYPIC/AMMUG-1
ACTION - SEE BELOW
REFS - UFAT-3304, 21 AUGUST 1972

1. AMMUG-1 WILL BE ADVISED REGARDING INTERVIEW BUT THE PROCESSING MAY TAKE 3-6 MONTHS DEPENDING ON WORKLOAD MIAMI INS.

2. E2, IMPDET.

WANDA F. BREMSON

DISTRIBUTION -

3 - COS, WH/MIAMI /BY TAPE/

Distribution:

1 - WH/COG/CHRONO
1 - WH/COG/OS
1 - Originator
1 - 201-749651

Originated by: Vivian Barry
Vivian Barry,
WH/COG/OS X4163

Released by:
C/WH/COG

2 654555

SECRET

SECRET Ammug-1

WH/COG/242-72
28 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security/Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT : Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lahera

It is requested that Subject be processed for naturalization. I&NS forms, completed and signed by Subject, are attached.

Vivian Barry
WH/COG/OS

2 [illegible]

SECRET

ORIG: WILLIAM STURBITTS:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OS
EXT: 4163 R. 1325
DATE: 17 AUGUST 1972

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 60 PER

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

17AUG72 20 362

CITE DIRECTOR

302184

TO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMMUG

REF: DIRECTOR 301165

1. COPY AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL, (PRIVATE LAW 92-92, 30 JUNE 72) TM NO. 538651 IN 28 AUG 72 POUCH.

2. FILE: 201-749651. E2, IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

201-749651
17 August 1972

CS COPY

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO. 17 Aug 72

ORIGINATING MESSAGE

15AUG72 23 30z

SECRET

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

DTG: | MHI | SITE: DIRECTOR | MFN 301165

301165

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 33 PER

CONF WH8 INFO RF VR FILE IP/AN SECUR4 OLC CCSZ C/SO

CLASSIFIED BY:
E2, IMPDET, WH-SISM

TOTAL COPIES

WH/MIAMI.

TYPIC AMMUG

REF: WH/MIAMI 15472 [IN 683346]

1. AMMUG-1 SHOULD COMPLETE INS PAPERS AND STATION FORWARD COMPLETED PAPERS TO HQS, ATTN: OTIS C. VIGEANT. TYPIC UNIT WILL PREPARE MEMO AND FORWARD PAPERS TO ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFF FOR INS HQS PROCESSING.

2. EXPECT RECEIVE COPY OF AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. WILL POUCH TO STATION WHEN RECEIVED.

3. FILE 201-749651. E2 IMPDET WH-SISM.

B

AN	JAK
AB	X
HR	
FS	
FK	
DESENSITIZED	
FI	

CS COPY

201-749651
15 August 72

ORIG: [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	DATE: [illegible]
AUTH: [illegible]	UNIT: [illegible]	[illegible]	SIGNATURE
RELEASE: [illegible]	UNIT: [illegible]	[illegible]	SIGNATURE

OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT	OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT
[illegible]	[illegible]				
[illegible]	[illegible]				

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

15 Aug 72

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 2 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______

CS Hopkins

ACTION UNIT WH 8 — FILE VR — PLAN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SECUR 4, OLC

ACTION NO. 763

S E C R E T 141555Z AUG 72 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 15470

DIRECTOR.

6 S 3 3 4 6

4

AKULE TYPIC AMMUG

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 291693

B. UFAT 3301

1. MR. JAMES TILLMAN OF LOCAL INS CONTACTED STATION AND INFORMED US THAT AMMUG-1 HAD CONTACTED HIM FOR ASSISTANCE IN INITIATING NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS (WE HAD PREVIOUSLY ALTERED TILLMAN OF POSSIBLE AMMUG-1 CONTACT FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE).

2. TILLMAN STATED HE NOT AUTHORIZED ASSIST AS PRIVATE CITIZENSHIP BILL HANDLED BY HIS CENTRAL OFFICE WHICH MUST ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO LOCAL OFFICE FOR ACTION. TILLMAN INFORMED US THAT HE GAVE AMMUG-1 VARIOUS FORMS TO COMPLETE AND RETURN TO STATION. COMPLETED FORMS SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO BKTRUST HQS ATTENTION ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFF WHICH SHOULD REVIEW AND THEN FORWARD ON TO INS CENTRAL HQS. INS HQS WILL THEN ADVISE LOCAL OFFICE WHAT ACTION TO TAKE, AFTER WHICH AMMUG-1 WILL BE GRANTED CITIZENSHIP.

AN
AB
IN
FS
BK
DI
~~FI~~

3. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST WHETHER ABOVE PROCEDURE CORRECT

CS COPY

SECRET

14 Aug 72
201-749651

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: AUG 28 9 24 AM '72

DISSEM BY PER # RECEIVED IP/EDI

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 15470 SECRET

AND WHAT ELSE MUST BE DONE SO WE CAN ADVISE AMMUG-1 WHAT TO DO WHEN HE, AND HE WILL VERY SHORTLY, CONTACTS US.

4. ALSO REQUEST DATE WHEN WE CAN EXPECT RECEIVE COPY OF AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL.

5. FILE: 201-749651. E2 IMPDET WN-SISM.

SECRET

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO UFAT 3301

DATE 20 JULY 1972

FILE 201-749651

TO CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

SBUJECT TYPIC/AMMUG - AMMUG/1 REENTRY PERMIT

REF DIRECTOR 289809

FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER IS AMMUG/1'S REENTRY PERMIT FOR DELIVFYP TO I&NS.

STANLFY F. SPECKLER

ATTACHMFNT: USC (VIA POUCH 2460(7)6 1972)

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

3 C/WHD: W/ATT USC

EX-2 APDIR, WH-SISM.

SECRET

SECRET

T/N/P

USC ATTACHMENT TO UFAA-3301 (TELEPOUCH)

TO: C/WHD

FROM: COS, WH/MIAMI

SECRET

14-00000

CHRIS HOPKINS:cb
WH/COG/OS
4163
19 July 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
33 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, DDO, OLC, CCS 2, SCUR 4, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 19 JUL 72 23 42z CITE DIRECTOR 291693

WH/MIAMI

REF: WH/MIAMI 15074 (IN 649499)

1. PRESIDENT SIGNED AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL (P.L. 92-92) 30 JUNE. A-1 MAY NOW INITIATE NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS.

2. FILE: 201-749651. EX-2, APDIR, WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE

Chris file (Alice)

OLC Pat Carpentier (telecord)
C/WH/SEC
WH/SS
WH/FI

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

CAMILLE BATHE
DC/WH/COG

19 July 72
201-749651

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: CHRIS HOPKINS:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OS
EXT: 4163 R. 1325
DATE: 14 JULY 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 6

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 48 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, I P/AN, SECUR 4,

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 14 JUL 72 20 28z

(elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 289809

WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMMUG

1. WOBONE HAS REQUESTED AMMUG-1 REENTRY PERMIT FOR DELIVERY I&NS. PLS POUCH SOONEST.

2. FILE: 201-749651. Ex-2, AP DIR, WH-SISM;

END OF MESSAGE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY § 5B(2) (unless impossible, insert date or event)
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE, DCI

AN
AN X
IN
PS
SE
[illegible]
[✓ FI]

14 July 72
201-749651

OS/AAS John Rooney (telecoord)
WH/SEC
WH/SS ✓

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

Al —

John [illegible], CS/AAS, called. He wants AMMUG 1's reentry permit returned to him for delivery to INS. Al [illegible] was supposed to do this, but apparently did not.

Bernice

p.s. AMMUG is Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lahera, request would be made to Miami.

Bernie — Will you please handle this for me? Am

201-749651

Cable sent to WH/Miami 14 July 72

14 July 72

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 55 PER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO

FILE, VR, 1, [illegible] DIC CI/OPS SEC/RS

ACTION NO. 632

SECRET 301456Z JUN 72 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 15075 UIMEN

649500

DIRECTOR.

AXLE TYPIC AMMUG

REF: WH/MIAMI 15074 (IN 649499) Iden to

IDEN: VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAHERA GP-1

SECRET

AB
AB
I
F
E
E
FI

[illegible] COPY

SECRET

30 Jun 72

201-749651

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION → CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18-1 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

7

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 29/30 PER ____ #

ACTION UNIT
WH8

FILE VR PLAN, OLC, CI/OPS, SECURY

ACTION NO.
565

S E C R E T 301456Z JUN 72 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 15074 identy

649499

DIRECTOR.

AKULE TYPIC AMMUG

REF: DIRECTOR 283581

1. AMMUG-1 PLANS NO LEGAL NAME CHANGE. WILL FILE NATURALIZATION PETITION AS IDEN.

2. FILE: 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

Iden in WMIM 15075

AN
AB X
I
F
E
D
FI

CS COPY

30 Jun 72

201 749651

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG: CHRIS HOPKINS:dh
NIT: WH/COG/OS
T: 4163/1325
TE: 26 JUNE 1972

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y 28 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

ONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. OLC secur cp

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number) (elite)

SECRET 27 Jun 72 21 41z CITE DIRECTOR

WH/MIAMI 283581

TYPIC AMMUG

1. SENATE PASSED AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL. PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE EXPECTED WITHIN 6 TO 10 DAYS. PLS ADVISE IF A-1 PLANS LEGAL NAME CHANGE AT TIME HE FILES PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION.

2. FILE: 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

/COG/COMMENT: The Office of Legislative Counsel wants to know if A-1, a DGI officer who defected to the U.S. in 1964, plans to change his name when he files petition for naturalization in near future.

OLC Mr. Carpentier (Telecoord)

WH/SS

J F McManus
WH/F1

201-749651
27 June 1972

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

[illegible]NG OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: 35 PER

ACTION UNIT: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, IP/AN, SECUR4

ACTION NO: 166

S E C R E T 271532Z JUN 72 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 15039

DIRECTOR.

AKULE TYPIC AMMUG

REF: DRIECTOR 250368

1. REQUEST STATUS AMMUG/1 CITIZENSHIP BILL WHICH PER REF BEING CONSIDERED BY SENATE.

2. FILE: 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

27 JUN IN 646464

RD

AI
AB
IP
PC
FI

S COPY

SECRET

201-749651
27 June 1972

A letter, with attached memorandum, dated October 6, 1971, to the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives from the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with reference to the case, reads as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Washington, D.C., October 6, 1971.

A–13721684.

Hon. EMANUEL CELLER,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your request for a report relative to the bill (H.R. 2076) for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez La-Hera, there is attached a memorandum of information concerning the beneficiary.

The bill is apparently intended to permit the beneficiary to become naturalized as a citizen of the United States notwithstanding his ineligibility to citizenship by reason of his membership or affiliation with an organization as proscribed in section 313 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. He has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since April 29, 1964.

Sincerely,

RAYMOND F. FARRELL,
Commissioner.

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FROM IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FILES RE H.R. 2076

The beneficiary, Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, a native and citizen of Cuba, was born on February 6, 1937. His parents and two brothers are natives, citizens and residents of Cuba. He married Marion Cuca-Calla, a native and citizen of Cuba, on August 13, 1959, in Havana, Cuba. This marriage was terminated by divorce in October 1959. There was no issue of this union. On December 17, 1963, the beneficiary married Luisa Rodriguez-Timoneda, a native and citizen of Cuba, in Havana, Cuba. She was born on August 24, 1934, in Havana, Cuba, and is a lawful permanent resident of the United States. One child, Luisa, was born of this marriage on May 25, 1970, in Miami, Fla., and is a citizen of the United States. Mrs. Rodriguez' marriage to Vicente del Rosario Hernandez-Garcia on September 3, 1949, in Havana, Cuba, was terminated by divorce October 14, 1963. Two children were born of this marriage in Havana, Cuba, Vincente Maximiliano, on August 21, 1950, and Francisca Luciana, on January 7, 1952. The boy died in Miami, Fla., in 1968 and the girl became a naturalized citizen of the United States on September 2, 1971. Mrs. Rodriguez and her two daughters reside with the beneficiary in Miami, Fla.

The beneficiary obtained the equivalent of 8 years of elementary education and 2 years of vocational school in his native country. Since December 1966, he has been employed as a supervisor of food handlers for a local aircraft catering service at a weekly salary of $140. Prior to his present employment, he was a market research salesman for a local advertising company. His wife is employed as a machine operator for a local dress manufacturer at a weekly salary of $85. Their combined assets consisting of two automobiles, real and personal property and possessions, total $33,500. The real property bears a mortgage of $17,500.

The beneficiary arrived in the United States from Canada on April 29, 1964, at Thousand Islands Bridge, N.Y., and was paroled into the United States for an indefinite period under the parole provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On November 7, 1966, his status was changed to that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and the date of his admission recorded as of April 29, 1964.

On his alien registration form the beneficiary listed employment with the General Directorate of Intelligence of the Cuban Government from August 16, 1963, until April 21, 1964, just prior to his defection. He also showed military service in the Cuban Rebel Army from February 4, 1959, until December 20, 1961.

The beneficiary desires to become a citizen of the United States because of his long period of residence and to enhance his opportunity for advancement in his vocation.

Private bill H.R. 17740, 91st Congress, introduced in the beneficiary's behalf was not enacted.

The committee, after consideration of all the facts in the case, is of the opinion that the bill (H.R. 2076) should be enacted.

○

Chris Hopkins
3038

P. L. Carpentier OLC

Calendar No. 841

92D CONGRESS } SENATE { REPORT
2d Session } { No. 92-880

VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LaHERA

JUNE 19, 1972.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 2076]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill (H.R. 2076) for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of the bill is to enable Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera to file a petition for naturalization, notwithstanding the fact that he was formerly a member of a proscribed organization.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The beneficiary of the bill is a 35-year-old native and citizen of Cuba, whose status was adjusted to that of a lawful resident alien on November 7, 1966, retroactive to April 29, 1964, the date on which he was paroled into the United States from Canada. He resides in Miami, Fla., with his wife, a lawful resident alien, and two daughters. The beneficiary was employed in Cuba with the General Directorate of Intelligence, and served in the Cuban Rebel Army. Without enactment of the bill, the beneficiary would be unable to petition for naturalization until 1974.

14-00000

A letter, with attached memorandum, dated October 6, 1971, to the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives from the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with reference to the case, reads as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Washington, D.C., October 6, 1971.

A-13721684.

Hon. EMANUEL CELLER,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your request for a report relative to the bill (H.R. 2076) for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, there is attached a memorandum of information concerning the beneficiary.

The bill is apparently intended to permit the beneficiary to become naturalized as a citizen of the United States notwithstanding his ineligibility to citizenship by reason of his membership or affiliation with an organization as proscribed in section 313 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. He has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since April 29, 1964.

Sincerely,

RAYMOND F. FARRELL,
Commissioner.

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FROM IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FILES RE H.R. 2076

The beneficiary, Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, a native and citizen of Cuba, was born on February 6, 1937. His parents and two brothers are natives, citizens and residents of Cuba. He married Marion Cuca-Calla, a native and citizen of Cuba, on August 13, 1959, in Havana, Cuba. This marriage was terminated by divorce in October 1959. There was no issue of this union. On December 17, 1963, the beneficiary married Luisa Rodriguez-Timoneda, a native and citizen of Cuba, in Havana, Cuba. She was born on August 24, 1934, in Havana, Cuba, and is a lawful permanent resident of the United States. One child, Luisa, was born of this marriage on May 25, 1970, in Miami, Fla., and is a citizen of the United States. Mrs. Rodriguez' marriage to Vicente del Rosario Hernandez-Garcia on September 3, 1949, in Havana, Cuba, was terminated by divorce October 14, 1963. Two children were born of this marriage in Havana, Cuba, Vincente Maximiliano, on August 21, 1950, and Francisca Luciana, on January 7, 1952. The boy died in Miami, Fla., in 1968 and the girl became a naturalized citizen of the United States on September 2, 1971. Mrs. Rodriguez and her two daughters reside with the beneficiary in Miami, Fla.

The beneficiary obtained the equivalent of 8 years of elementary education and 2 years of vocational school in his

native country. Since December 1966, he has been employed as a supervisor of food handlers for a local aircraft catering service at a weekly salary of $140. Prior to his present employment, he was a market research salesman for a local advertising company. His wife is employed as a machine operator for a local dress manufacturer at a weekly salary of $85. Their combined assets consisting of two automobiles, real and personal property and possessions, total $33,500. The real property bears a mortgage of $17,500.

The beneficiary arrived in the United States from Canada on April 29, 1964, at Thousand Islands Bridge, N.Y., and was paroled into the United States for an indefinite period under the parole provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On November 7, 1966, his status was changed to that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and the date of his admission recorded as of April 29, 1964.

On his alien registration form the beneficiary listed employment with the General Directorate of Intelligence of the Cuban Government from August 16, 1963, until April 21, 1964, just prior to his defection. He also showed military service in the Cuban Rebel Army from February 4, 1959, until December 20, 1961.

The beneficiary desires to become a citizen of the United States because of his long period of residence and to enhance his opportunity for advancement in his vocation.

Private bill H.R. 17740, 91st Congress, introduced in the beneficiary's behalf was not enacted.

The committee, after consideration of all the facts in the case, is the opinion that the bill (H.R. 2076) should be enacted.

○

5 APR 1972

DETAILED JUSTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT

1. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera has cooperated with this Agency since his defection on 21 April 1964 at which time he turned over to CIA documents from the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) he had collected during the preceeding several months. In addition, he has provided voluminous, accurate and valuable information on the organization of the Cuban intelligence services, their operations, staff members and agents. These documents and information have given us the potential and opportunity to take effective measures to safeguard United States Government interests. Subject has been of great value in the past, and will continue to be in the future, in the CIA recruitment/ defection program. His wide acquaintance among and knowledge concerning high level Cuban diplomats and Cuban intelligence personnel provides the Agency with the necessary background in planning operations against them and makes Subject ideal for use in carrying out the operations. His talents and contacts have been used not only in furthering the defector program, but in other types of political action, psychological warfare and recruitment operations.

2. As a result of technical interrogations of RODRIGUEZ on 11 May 1964 and again on 15 July 1966, and objective operational testing since, his bona fides have been established not only for intelligence exploitation purposes but also for the purpose of resettlement in the United States. There is no reason to believe that RODRIGUEZ is under the control of any hostile intelligence service.

3. The psychiatric and periodic medical examinations have shown that RODRIGUEZ has no serious medical or psychiatric problems.

4. Mr. RODRIGUEZ has adjusted well to American life. He has been trained as a dental technician and for the past two years has been working for the Marriott Corporation, specifically

201-749651

as manager of the airlines' catering division in Miami. He is pleased with this new occupation. There is every reason to expect that he would be a responsible and loyal citizen.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION

DISPATCH NUMBER: UFAA - 4021

DATE: 7 April 72

ENCLOSURE NUMBER:

PAGE NUMBER: 1

PARAGRAPH NUMBER: 2

SECURITY REGULATION(S) VIOLATED: FR 10-315, 1 July 53 Para 2 b (1) (a)

SUBSTANCE OF VIOLATION

Ref: UFAA 4018
UFAA 4019
UFAA 4020

Use of crypt + True identity in same pouch. Specifically this is the use of "Cuban defectors" in dispatch and sending the dispatch in pouch which has other dispatches of same format and basic subject, but using the crypt for Cuba.

RID. ANALYST

FORM 6-64 2244

SECRET

(36-43)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Paris OFP

INFO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division; Chief, European Division

1P

FROM: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT: e PBRUMEN/Photographs of Cuban Diplomats in Paris

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OFPW 46605, 2 March 1972

1. The photographs of Petra Concepcion *Barragan Garcia (201-854152), Carlos Esteban *Ramos Frias (201-877551), Maria Victoria *Caignet Urena (201-826455), Pedro *Lara Zamora (201-888367) and wife and Marco *Campanioni Tamayo (201-886144) and his wife were reviewed with [redacted] defector [redacted] on 6 April 1972 with negative results.

2. The photographs will be reviewed with other Cuban defectors who are the responsibility of WH/Miami and we will advise you of any positive results.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Distribution:
3 - COS, Paris - OP
3 - Chief, WHD
2 - Chief, EURD See to E/F/H

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 13 1972
MICROFILMED

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFAA-4021

DATE: Typed: 7 April 1972

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-749651

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING MICROFILM
TO Chief of Station, Ottawa		
INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;Chief,EUR		
FROM Chief of Station, WH/Miami		
SUBJECT [illegible]/SMABOVE-Felix M. MILIAN Pantoja (201-883219)		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OCOA-16803, 14 March 1972

1. The photographs of Felix M. Milian Pantoja (Subject) and his wife, Luisa M. Gonzalez Sabio, were reviewed with AMMUG-1 on 6 April 1972. While GONZALEZ was familiar to AMMUG-1 he could not provide any information on her. He did not, however, recognize Subject.

2. We will review the photographs of Subject and his wife with the other defectors who are the responsibility of WH/Miami and advise you of any positive results.

3. Station is most appreciative of the high quality photographs that we have recently been receiving from SMACT via SMABOVE.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Distribution:
3 - COS, Ottawa
3 - Chief, WHD
2 - Chief, EUR

CS COPY [illegible] IN 883219

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 744651

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-74966[illegible]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-4018	DATE Typed: 7 April 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-883219

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Paris
INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;
Chief, European Division

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
[illegible]/[illegible]-Rolando MENESES de la Hoya (201-771827)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OFPA 97498, 23 February 1972

Copies of the original photographs of Rolando Meneses de la Hoya and his wife, Sara Manresa Gonzalez, which were forwarded to us by Headquarters, were reviewed with AMSTAFF defector AMMUG-1 on 6 April 1972 with negative results. The photographs will be reviewed with other Cuban defectors who are the responsibility of WH/Miami and we will advise you of any positive results.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Distribution:
- 3 - COS, Paris
- 3 - COS, WHD
- 2 - Chief, EURD

CS COPY FILED IN 201-771827

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 749651

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-749651

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-4019

DATE
TYPED: 7 April 1972

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-771827

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 7

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: ALBERT J. AMORI:GHD
UNIT: WH/COG/FI
EXT: 1617/5010
DATE: 31 MARCH 1972

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 25 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, DP/A 11,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 1Mar72 [illegible] 372 CITE DIRECTOR 250368

TO WH/MIAMI

AMMUG

1. HOUSE PASSED AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL. BILL NOW IN SENATE. MAY TAKE ANOTHER MONTH BEFORE DECISION REACHED.

2. FILE: 201-749651. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

1 Apr 72
201-749651

JAMES E. FLANNERY
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCERPT FROM JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 24 February 1972

3. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Mr. Garner J. Cline, Counsel, Subcommittee No. 1, House Judiciary Committee, who told me that there would be no problem with the Democratic objector relating to H. R. 2076, a bill for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera. Mr. Donald Benn, Associate Counsel of the Judiciary Committee, has not touched base as yet with the Republican objector but will do so before the private calendar is called on 7 March.

~~Mr. Cline told me also that the Davis bill, H. R. 5176, was formally tabled by the full Committee in its meeting of 22 February. The tabling was without discussion on the basis of an adverse recommendation by the Subcommittee. See Memo for Record dated 11 February 1972 on A. Trevor Gallaher.~~

Ammug-1

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCERPT FROM JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

3. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Mr. Drury Blair, Senate Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee staff, who told me that due to the primaries in the Chairman's home state he did not believe that any further meetings of the Subcommittee will be held until mid June. H. R. 2076, a bill for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, is on the agenda for the next Subcommittee meeting. Miss Chris Hopkins, WH Division, has been advised.

LaHera -
Re Rodriguez

Pat Carpenter
Legislative Counsel

X 9207

Bill for waiver of 10 yrs. waiting period for US citizenship has passed the House & is in the Senate.

IG: BERNICE TURBEVILLE:ak
IT: WH/COG/FI
T: 7265 · R. 9229
TE: 16 FEB 72

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 172372Z FEB 72 CITE DIRECTOR 233810

WH/MIAMI INFO: MADRID

TYPIC AMETROPIA

REF: WH/MIAMI 13554 (IN 538589)

1. AGREE WITH REF CRITERIA FOR FURTHER PURSUIT AMETROPIA/1 CASE.

2. FILE: 201-865547 AND 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Miami suggests we not position AMMUG/1 for possible contact with AMETROPIA/1 until he is PCS or TDY long enough to permit an orderly approach.

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
749651 — pack.

JAMES E. FLANNERY
AC/WHD

E/IB

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

CS COPY FILED IN 201-865547

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

17 Feb 72

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23-1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR, P/AN, EUR6, FI, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2

ACTION NO. 173

S E C R E T 152120Z FEB 72 CITE WH/MIAMI 13854

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

15 FEB IN 538389

AKULE TYPIC AMETROPIA

REF MADRID 15657 (IN 532605)

1. APPRECIATE REF INFO ON ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART. BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT YOUR PRIORITY TARGETS RIGHTFULLY TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THIS RATHER ELUSIVE ONE AND SUGGEST THAT WE STAND DOWN ON ANY EFFORT TO POSITION AMMUG-1 FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT. THIS, UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT RODRIGUEZ IS PCS OR IN A TDY STATUS LONG ENOUGH TO PERMIT AN ORDERLY APPROACH.

2. FYI: AMGAME-1 WHO KNOWS RODRIGUEZ, ASSESSES HIM AS BEING A WORTHWHILE TARGET AND POSSIBLY RECRUITABLE.

3. FILE: 201-865547, 201-816552, 201-749651. GP1.

S E C R E T

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 749651

CS COPY FILED IN 201-865547

CS C

SECRET

15 Feb 72

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, WH/Miami

TYPIC/Fernando Otero Espino (201-824860)

Reference: HMMA 41468, 18 December 1971

1. While AMGAME-1 immediately recognized the photograph of Subject which was forwarded in Reference, AMSAED-1, AMBAND-1 and [illegible]-1 did not. We will review the photograph with [illegible]-1 and advise any positive results.

2. Forwarded herewith is a debriefing report from AMGAME-1 on Subject. If after reviewing this report, Mexico City has any additional requirements for AMGAME-1, we will be glad to service them.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Attachment:
Report, herewith

Distribution:
1 - COS, Mexico City w/att, herewith
3 - Chief, WHD without att

CS COPY FILED IN 201-824860

749651

201-831373, 201-802332,
201-749651, 201-816852

UFAA-3771

Typed: 21 January 1972

201-824860
21 Jan 72

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIC CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25-1 ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 48 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR, PIAN, EURG, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI,

ACTION NO 257

SECRET 172143Z JAN 72 CITE WH/MIAMI 13595 17 JAN IN 515283

OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC SMABOVE

REF A OCUA 16526

B UFAA 3597

1. PRIOR TO FEBRUARY CONFERENCE WE INTEND TO REVIEW ALL PHOTOGRAPHS OF PBRUMENS STATIONED CANADA WITH THOSE AMSTAFF/AMQUAKE DEFECTORS WHO ARE RESPONSIBILITY OF WH/MIAMI. PLEASE FORWARD ANY AVAILABLE COPIES OF I.D. PHOTOS FOR INDIVIDUALS LISTED REF B.

2. FYI: VALUE OF SUCH A REVIEW IS UNDERLINED BY AMMUG-1'S RECENT RECOGNITION OF JORGE DE LA VEGA VIGNON (201-815356) VIA SUCH A PHOTO. UNFORTUNATELY, AMMUG-1 WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY VEGA AS BEING INTEL.

3. FILE: 201-815356, 201-749651, 19-2-16. GP1.

SECRET

CS COPY FILED IN 19-2-6

2

DOCUMENT NUMBER [illegible]
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 749651

SECRET

17 Jan 72

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, WH/Miami

PBRUMEN/Fernando Otero Espino (201-824869)

Reference: HMMA 41406

AMBUD-1 did not recognize the photograph of Fernando Otero Espino which was forwarded by Reference. The photograph will be shown to AMDAUB-1, AMADELED-1, AMGAME-1 and AMCARD-1 at the first opportunity.

Eustace D. KLOCK

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City
2 - Chief, WHD

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 749651

CS COPY 201-824860

201-749651

UFAA-3735

Typed: 10 January 1972

~~201-824869~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, WH/Miami

PBRUMEN/Enrique Gomez Carliz (201-777321)

REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: A. HMMA-41339, 13 December 1971
B. HMMA-40515, 7 June 1971

1. AMMUG-1 failed to identify the picture of Enrique *Gomez Carliz which was forwarded in Reference A. We will of course, review the photograph with the other AMSTAFF/AMQUAKE defectors who are the responsibility of the WH/Miami Station and advise you of the results.

2. According to paragraph 3 of Reference A, Subject is to be found at the extreme right of the photograph. While it is entirely possible that we are mistaken, the individual at the extreme right of the photograph bears little resemblance to the [illegible]-1 photograph of Subject which was forwarded to us via Reference B.

3. We would appreciate if if you would review the photographs which were forwarded via References A and B and reconfirm that they are indeed of Subject. We are forwarding as attachments to this dispatch, copies of the photographs which we received to facilitate this task.

Eustace D. [illegible]

Attachments: Photographs, h/w

Distribution:
3-COS/Mexico City, w/atts h/w c|F
3-C/WHD w/atts h/w

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 749651

CS COPY 201-777321

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-749651	UFAA-2734	TYPED: 10 January 1972
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
		201-777321





DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, WH/Miami

PDRUMEN/Nelson Quesada Rivero (201-836379)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HMMA-41292, 16 November 1971
B. HMMA-41414, 16 December 1971
C. HMMA-41353, 13 December 1971

1. The delay in responding to Reference A's request that a picture of Subject be reviewed with the appropriate assets was due to the fact that prior to the receipt of the Reference B photographs, we lacked a good picture of Subject. We felt that the picture of Subject, #143 in Volume II of the Cuban Mugbooks, was something less than satisfactory for the purposes of positive identification.

2. Immediately upon the receipt of the Reference B photographs, the undersigned reviewed with AMMUG-1 the one of Nelson *Quesada Rivero with negative results. AMGAME-1, however, did recognize the name of Quesada and identified him as being AMSTAFF. Needless to say, we will show AMGAME-1 the photograph of Subject at the earliest opportunity to determine how well he knows him and if warranted, will debrief him in detail on Subject.

3. The Reference B photograph of Subject will be reviewed with the other AMSTAFF/AMQUAKE assets residing in the JMCOBRA area and we will promptly inform you of the results.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Distribution:
3-COS/Mexico City -c/r
3-C/WHD

CS COPY 201-836379

2 749651

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-749651
201-816552

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-3732

DATE
TYPED: 7 January 1972

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-836379

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______ # ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES - 2

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2	30	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH 8 | INFO FILE, VR, P/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, DDP, ADDP (10)

ACTION NO. 259

S E C R E T 291300Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 15141 23Nov IN 479487

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMETROPIA/AMUG

REF/ MADRID 15135 (IN 478415)

[illegible] AD. SER.
FEB [illegible] 1972
MICROFILMED

2P

1. AFTER QUTIMID CONVERSATIONS INDIATED AMETROPIA-1 DUE ARRIVE EACH DAY 23-25 NOVEMBER, SUBJECT FINALLY APPEARED 26 NOVEMBER. QUSEQUIN AT AIRPORT DID NOT NOTE ARRIVAL AND STATION COGNIZANT ONLY THROUGH QUTIMID MONITORING AFTERNOON 27 NOVEMBER. AFTER NEGATIVE QUSEQUIN-37 CHECK OF HOTELS NORMALLY FREQUENTED BY CUBANS, PHONE CALL TO HOTEL CONDE DUQUE (WHERE CUBANA AIRCREWS STAY) RECEIVED ANSWER THAT TARGET HAD CHECKED IN 26 AND LEFT 27 NOVEMBER. (AIRLISTS LATER SHOW TARGET WENT TO HAVANA ON 28 NOVEMBER AND LIAISON AFTER-ACTION CHECK CONDE DUQUE REVEALS OTHER CUBAN DIP WITH SAME PATRONYM HAD REGISTERED AND DEPARTED ON DATES SPECIFIED).

2. AMMUG-1 LEAVING FOR NEW YORK BY IBERIA 951 ON 29 NOVEMBER AND ETA MIAMI 1900 HOURS ON EASTERN 027. ADVANCED $100 (T/A MIAMI) TO COVER PURCHASE NEW TICKET SINCE FULL VALUE RETURN TRIP GOOD ONLY FOR PERIOD LONGER THAN 17 DAYS.

AN
AR
~~IM~~
TS
BX 4
~~[illegible]~~
FI

3. TARGET'S EVASIVENESS MAY REFLECT TIGHTENED MEASURES

B201-865547

CS COPY
SECRET

201-749651
29 Nov 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

JAN 25 8 28 PM '72

BY: AT: Z

FORWARDED

DISSEM. BY PER # IP/EDIT/EDT

ACTION UNIT | INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 15141 SECRET

FOR AMWHEN DEFECTION. HE DID NOT STAY AT USUAL HOTEL.
QUSEQUIN TRAVEL CONTROL PROCEDURES OBVIOUSLY DEFICIENT.
AMMUG-1 GAVE PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE AND
APPEARS MORE EAGER THAN EVERY TO ATTEMPT PITCH.

4. FILE: 201-865547; 201-749651. GP-1.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2	23	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH & EUR

BY D AT 1830 Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER #

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR, TPAK, LVRG, CI/OPS, SECUR 4

ACTION NO. 087

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JAN 27 1972
MICROFILMED

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 261713Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 15135

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI 26 Nov IN 478415

TYPIC AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: DIRECTOR 205025

1. AMMUG-1 MET WITHOUT HITCH MORNING 25 NOVEMBER. STILL NO SIGNS OF AMETROPIA-1. QUTIMID TRAFFIC 25 NOVEMBER SHOWED CONVERSATION BETWEEN JOSE MARTIZEZ OF COMPANIA EUROPA DE MANUTENCION CONTINUA AND CACHON IN COMMERCIAL OFFICE WHERE LATTER ADVISES THAT A/1 DEFINITELY DUE THAT DAY (BUT NO OTHER CALLS INDICATING HE ACTUALLY ARRIVED). LIAISON WILLING TO COOPERATE ONLY SO FAR AS PROVIDE TWICE-DAILY CHECK HOTEL AROSA ROSTER AND ALERT FROM AIRPORT IF A/1 SPOTTED ARRIVING, BOTH CHANNELLED THROUGH QUSEQUIN/37, BUT NOT WILLING TO APPROACH MARTINEZ (WHO DOES NOT APPEAR TO KNOW MORE THAN WHAT IS TOLD BY COMMERCIAL OFFICE ANYWAY). QUFLUTE-1 HAD ONLY FALSE ALARM TO REPORT BUT NO OTHER INDICATIONS.

2. STATION KEEPING CLOSE TOUCH WITH AMMUG-1 AND TRYING TO DETERMINE A-1 PRESENCE SOONEST.

2P

AH
AB
IN
CHR
BX
DS
FI

B201-865547

CS COPY

SECRET

201-749651
26 Nov 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

4 52 AM '72

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 15135 SECRET

3. FILE: 201-749651; 201-865547. GP1

SECRET

FEB 8 '72

PB

SECRET

ιBLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

:SON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

VANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

C AT: 1930 Z

SEM. BY DS PER ___ # ___

:TION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR EUR6. ~~CI/CAN~~. CI, CI/OPS FI (9)

SECUR 4

:TION NO. 265

S E C R E T 231908Z NOV 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 13192 WH/MIAMI

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR 23Nov IN 476216

TYPIC AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: MADRID 15114 (IN 476162)

1. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AMMUG-1 FOLLOWS: HT: 64", WT: 140, HAIR: BLACK, AGE 34, FACE: THIN AND SLIGHTLY MARKED.

2. FILE: 201-865547, 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

FI

CS COPY

23 Nov 71

201-749651

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6-1 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

☐ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

clwn 4 clcur

BY ________ AT 1545 Z

DISSEM BY 1 PER ________ #

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR IP/AN SO/P FI SECUR 4 CI/OPS FI

ACTION NO. 351 | EUR 6 * 10

S E C R E T 191502Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 15090

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

IN 473565

TYPIC AMETROPIA QUTIMID

REF: A. WH/MIAMI 13096 (IN 470042)

B. MADRID 15035 (IN 469567)

1. ACCORDING TO QUTIMID CONVERSATION BETWEEN TWO CUBAN OFFICIALS, AMETROPIA-1 LEFT LONDON FOR MONTREAL EARLY MORNING 19 NOVEMBER, WILL RETU. TO LONDON 21 NOVEMBER AND PLANS TO ARRIVE MADRID 23 NOVEMBER. ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS STILL INDEFINITE BUT MADE INQUIRIES ABOUT 26 NOVEMBER CUBANA FLIGHT TO HAVANA. (NO HOTEL RESERVATIONS YET MADE BUT WILL ADVISE ASAP WHEN INFORMATION ABAILABLE.)

2. DEFER TO ADDEE JUDGEMENT WHETHER AMMUG-1 TRIP SHOULD BE MADE ON BASIS THIS INFORMATION. IF AFFIRMATIVE, STATION WILL ASSIST ANY WAY POSSIBLE.

3. FILE 201-865547, 201-749651. GP-1.

S E C R E T

* RELAYED TO [illegible]
PER DIR 203159

CS COPY 201-865549

201-749651
19 NOV 71

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM. BY 28 PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23-1

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

		5	
2	26	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT
WH8

INFO FILE, VR IP/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS, SECUR 4 (7)

ACTION NO.
284

SECRET 151712Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 15035 MADR

15 Nov IN 469867

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMETROPIA QUTIMID

REF: MADRID 15010 (IN 467099)

1. PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SPANISH BUSINESSMAN AND AMETROPIA-1 IN LONDON INDICATES A-1 DEFINITELY WILL SEE SPANIARD IN MADRID BUT AFTER WEEK ENDING 20 NOVEMBER. SINCE CONVERSATION DID NOT MENTION ANY DEADLINES WE HAVE NO TIME FRAME WHITHIN WHICH AMMUG-1 MIGHT BEST TRAVEL TO MADRID.

2. FILE 201-749651. GP-1.

SECRET 201-865547

AN
AB
~~IN~~
PS HR
BX
~~DBS NTD~~
FI

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JAN 27 1972
MICROFILMED

B201-865547

CS COPY

SECRET

201-749651
15 Nov 71

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: ALBERT J. AMORI:ghd
UNIT: WH/COG/FI
EXT: 7141/1819
DATE: 11 NOVEMBER 1971

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
4/31 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF. WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 12NOV71 [illegible] 35z CITE DIRECTOR 200657

WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMMUG

REF WH/MIAMI 13055 (IN 466569)*

1. HOUSE SUB COMMITTEE FAVORABLY APPROVED BILL FOR AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP. BILL NOW GOES TO FULL COMMITTEE AND LATER TO HOUSE FOR FINAL ACTION.

2. FILE 201-749651. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB
IN
PS
SX
DRS NED
FI

WH/COG Comment: REF REQUESTED OUTCOME OF BILL TO GRANT AMMUG-1 U.S. CITIZENSHIP.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

12 NOV 71

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-749651

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CL IFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR, IP/AN, CI/OPS, SECUR 4

ACTION NO. 252

S E C R E T 101851Z NOV 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 13055

WMIM

IN 466569

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMMUG

1. WOULD APPRECIATE OUTCOME OF HQS DISCUSSIONS RE AMMUG-1 BEING GRANTED U.S. CITIZENSHIP. IF THERE HAVE BEEN ANY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS STATION WOULD LIKE TO PASS THEM ON TO AMMUG-1.

2. FILE: 201-749651. GPI.

S E C R E T

AN
AB
DN
RS
RK

ST

CS COPY

SECRET

10 NOV 71
201-749651

L.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED

CSDO EUR

BY T AT 0910 Z

DISSEM BY 43/51 PER #

ACTION UNIT WH-8

ACTION NO. 166

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2C-1

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1	34	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DOC. MICRO. SER.
DEC 1 7 1971
MICROFILMED

PRECEDENCE

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN EUR6 SECUR4 DDP CS/DO CI/OPS FI

SECRET 050842Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID MADR 14969 5 Nov IN 462511

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMETROPIA

REF DIRECTOR 197498

1. AS OF COB 4 NOVEMBER NO INDICATION FROM STATION SOURCES CONCERNING AMETROPIA-1 RETURN NOR DID HOTEL AROSA (HIS USUAL RESIDENCE) CLAIM TO HAVE RESERVATION IN HIS NAME.

2. FILE: 201-749651, 201-865547. GP-1

SECRET

*RELAYED TO AIRTECH PER DIR 198194.

GR 4

B-201-865547

SECRET

5 NOV 71
201-749651

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24-1

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ____ AT ____ Z

BY 46 PER =

ACTION UNIT WH 8 FILE VR, I/IW, EUR 6, SECUR 4, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 91

SECRET 031535Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 14955
MADR

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO LONDON, DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMTROPIA

3 Nov IN 460684
B

REF: WH/MIAMI 13330 (IN 460121)

1. APPRECIATE OFFER BUT STATION CAN HANDLE AMMUG-1.

2. FILE: 201-865547; 201-749651. CPI

SECRET

AS

AMMUG-1

CS COPY FILED IN 201-865547

File In
201-749651
~~201-~~

[redacted]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

FROM:

RID

PAGE BRIAN
IP/AN
EXT. 4239

GI-879
GA50
TUBE GT7

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		27 OCT 1971		
2. DC/WH/C		[illegible]	20	
3. C/WH/C/FE			29	
4. Marshall			1 Nov	R
5. Albright			1 Nov 71	KEO
6. Judy F.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Didn't go to MADRID

— could you please do traces on CRESPO, Thanks Ken

We can open 201

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 27 19[illegible]
MICROFILMED

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST: ABSTRACT X INDEX X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-749651

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 12 OCT. 71

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFAA 03472

68765

FORM 610a

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT: TYPIC Cuban Officials in Madrid

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFAW-1246

1. AMMUG-1 did not recognize the photograph of Manuel Ignacio Quesada Santinach (201-327266), which is contained in Volume I of the Cuban Mugbook.

2. AMMUG-1 recognized two names from the listing of Cuban officials in Spain, which was forwarded by OSMA-27086 of 24 May 1971. They were Ricardo Espino Martinez (201-818437) and Federico Crespo Moreira. AMMUG-1 commented that he had known Espino quite well and that he was in periodic contact with him from April 1961 to May of 1963. AMMUG-1 added that Espino used to be the director of an import house in Cuba, but was unable to recall the name of this firm. AMMUG-1 stated that he had known a Federico Crespo Moreira from his days in the Cuban police. According to AMMUG-1 Crespo worked underneath him from 1959 to January 1961 when both men were transferred to the Army. AMMUG-1 commented that Crespo was given the rank of sergeant. AMMUG-1 last saw Crespo around early 1962. AMMUG-1 added that Crespo was a Caucasian, would be about 32 years of age and that the last time he saw him, Crespo had blondish hair, was about 5'9" tall and weighed about 170 pounds. Station files list Crespo's DOB as being 9 August 1940 which dovetails with AMMUG-1's information.

3. AMCARD-1 information on the subject(s) if any, will be forwarded in the immediate future.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 27 1971
MICROFILMED

Eustace D. Kloock
Eustace D. KLOOCK

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-327266 201-818437	UFAA-3472	OCT 12 1971 Typed: 6 October 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-[illegible]49651

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______ #

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 1 1971
MICROFILMED

ACTION UNIT
WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, FI, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO.
556

S E C R E T 271313Z JUL 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 12082

WMIM

387716

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF: MEXICO CITY 17236 (IN 387237)

1. DUE TO DOCUMENT PROCEDURAL COMPLICATIONS, AMMUG-1 DID NOT DEPART FOR MEXICO CITY AS PLANNED. IN LIGHT OF INFO CONTAINED REF, AMMUG-1 HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED REMAIN IN MIAMI.

2. IN ADDITION TO DEBRIEFING OF AMSLOUCH-6 AND AMSLOUCH-7, REQUEST THAT KLOOCK TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY FOR IN DEEPTH FAMILIARIZATION WITH PBRUMEN PERSONALITIES, ACTIVITIES AND MODUE OPERANDI IN MEXICO CITY.

3. FILE: 201-872345 AND 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN	
AS	X
IN	
	YR
	4
FI	

CS COPY

B 201-872345

SECRET

27 Jul 71
201-749651

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 38 PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3-1

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT: WHB

INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN, C/OPS, FI, SECUR 4,

ACTION NO. 475

S E C R E T 262019Z JUL 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 17230

26/7/71

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 12022 (IN 383676)

W/Miami 201-749651

26 JUL IN 387183

1. EUSTACE D. KLOOCK ARRIVED PER REF.

2. FILE: 201-749651; 201-812117 AND 201-872345. GP-1

S E C R E T

BOSCH FERNANDEZ, AURORA

MIRABAL-FERNANDEZ, RAFAEL

(VON DER) PAHLEN, PETER

RAMIREZ LOPEZ, VINCENTE

RODRIGUEZ LAMEAR, VLADIMIR

IP/ICI X
IP/CRY
IP/MB
IP/CRO

RR

26 JUL 71

~~201-749657~~

201-749651

CS COPY
SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — ...SSIFIED MESSAGE • TOTAL COPIES 1-37 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) — GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

6

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 8 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR, RNAN, SECUR 4, FI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO.: 073

S E C R E T 221324Z JUL 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 12035 (WMIAMI) 22 JUL 71 IN 384361

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF A DIRECTOR 162399 (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY)

B WH/MIAMI 12022 (IN 383676)

1. PER PERMISSION GRANTED REF A, EUSTACE D. KLOOCK WILL TRAVEL MEXICO CITY PER REF B.

2. FILE: 201-749651, 201-812117 AND 201-872345. GP1.

S E C R E T

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 1 1971
MICROFILMED

AN w
AB
IH
PS YR
4
FI

CS COPY

B 201-812117
B 201-872345

22 Jul 71
201-749651

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18-1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	6
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: Lawrence Sternfield:bj.
UNIT: C/WH/COG
EXT: 1945
DATE: 21 JULY 1971

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 23 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: W/H 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CSDO, FI, CI/OPS, SECUR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 21 JUL 71 19 36Z CITE DIRECTOR 182399

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI 6

TYPIC AMROSE AMSLOUCH

REF: WH/MIAMI 12022 (IN 383676)

1. RE PARA 1 OF REF PERMISSION GRANTED.

2. FILE: 201-749651; 201-812117; 201-872345.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 10 1971
MICROFILMED

END OF MESSAGE

4

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

LSternfield
LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG
21 July 71

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

B 201-812117
B 201-872345
201-749651

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 03 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) — GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY D AT 1720 Z

DISSEM. BY 4 PER #

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 1 1971
MICROFILMED

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT WH8 — INFO — FILE, VR RI/AN, SECUR 4, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO. 953

S E C R E T 211628Z JUL 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 12022 (SADELLY ACTING)

21 JUL IN 383676

WMIM

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC AMROSE AMSLOUCH

REF WH/MIAMI 11983 (IN 380663)

1. FOR DIRECTOR: REQUEST PERMISSION FOR EUSTACE D. KLOOCK TO TRAVEL IN HIS REGISTERED ALIAS TO MEXICO CITY ON AMMUG-1/AMSLOUCH-6 OPS. TRAVEL INFO AS FOLLOWS: DEPART MIAMI AT 1730 HOURS 25 JULY VIA PAA FLIGHT 552 WHICH SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE MEXICO CITY AT 2105 HOURS.

2. AMMUG-1 WILL UTILIZE SAME PAA FLIGHT ON 26 JULY WHICH SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE AT 1935 HOURS.

3. FOR MEXICO CITY: REQUEST THAT IF POSSIBLE, YOU MAKE RESERVATIONS PER ABOVE SCHEDULE FOR KLOOCK IN HIS REGISTERED ALIAS AT EITHER HOTEL BRISTOL OR MONTEJO AND RESERVATIONS FOR AMMUG-1 IN HIS TRUE NAME AT THE HOTEL MAJESTIC. KLOOCK WILL CONTACT STATION MONDAY MORNING. APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT.

4. FILE: 201-749651; 201-812117 AND 201-872345. GP1.

S E C R E T

CS COPY

B-201-872345
B 201-812117

SECRET

21 Jul 71
201-749651

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 28 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT: WH8

INFO: FILE, VR, ~~ClfA~~, SECUR4, C/OPS, FI

ACTION NO: 622

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 162042Z JUL 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 11983

WMIM

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

16 Jul 71 IN 380663

TYPIC AMROSE

REF MEXICO CITY 17155 (IN 379734)

1. ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, SUGGEST WE SET 26 JULY AS TARGET DATE FOR AMMUG-1'S TRAVEL TO MEXICO CITY AND THAT HE TRAVEL IN TRUE NAME VIA FAIRLY DIRECT ROUTE. NO MATTER WHAT TRANSPIRES WITH AMSLOUCH-6, KLOOCK WILL BE IN MEXICO CITY 26 JULY TO DIRECT AMMUG-1, IN CONCERT WITH MEXICO CITY.

2. FILE: 201-749651, 201-812117. GP1.

S E C R E T

1P

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 4 1971
MICROFILMED

AN
AB
IP

CS COPY

B 201-812117

16 Jul 71

SECRET

201-749651

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11-4 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY: 6 PER #

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 10 1971
MICROFILMED

ACTION UNIT: WH8

INFO: FILE VR RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, SECURY FI, CI, CI/OPS,

ACTION NO. 991

S E C R E T 101740Z JUL 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 17120 MEXI

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

10 JUL IN 376059

TYPIC AMROSE

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 17033 (IN 368344)

B. DIRECTOR 155185

C. WH/MIAMI 11878 (IN 374346)

D. DIRECTOR 158728

1. REF C ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS SHOW AMMUG-1 TRIP HERE CANNOT BE GIMMICKED. HE'LL BE MARKED FROM FIRST MOMENT FOR WHAT HE IS. APPARENTLY, THIS IS OF NO PARTICULAR CONCERN TO WH/MAMI OR AMMUG-1 HIMSELF. THIS BEING CASE, DO NOT SEE WHAT WE HAVE TO LOSE BY GOING AHEAD. THERE NOTHING THAT SENSITIVE OTHERWISE IN PROCESS, INCLUDING KDTUCK-18 CASE, WHICH SHOULD BE AFFECTED BY AN AMMUG-1 APPROACH TO KDACOUSTIC-1 IN NEAR FUTURE.

2. LETS'S ELABORATE JUST A BIT FURTHER ON OUR QUERY OF PARA 2G, REF A, AND WH/MIAMI COMMENT OF PARA 2G, REF C. IF AMMUG-1 CAN MANEUVER TO SEE KDACOUSTIC-1 UNDER PRIVATE, RELAXED CIRCUMSTANCES (ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT), WE CERTAINLY HOPE HE'LL GO BEYOND MERELY OFFERING HIMSELF AS CHANNEL FOR DEFECTION. (KDACOUSTIC-1 KNOWN STATION OFFICERS PERSONALLY AND HOW TO REACH THEM.) WE'D

AN	ill
AB	
[illegible]	
[illegible]	
[illegible]	4
[illegible]	
FI	

CS COPY

SECRET

B 201-812117

10 Jul 71

201-749651

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM. BY: ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 17120 S E C R E T

LIKE AMMUG-1, AS AN OLD, KNOWLEDGEABLE COLLEAGUE, TO ENGAGE KDACOUSTIC-1 IN MEANINGFUL IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS, COMPARE NOTES ON MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCES, ELICIT RE PERSONAL LIFE, GIVE US A BETTER INSIGHT ON AN UNCOMMUNICATIVE TARGET AND, THUS, A BETTER ASSESSMENT. THIS WOULD BE WORTH THE TRIP, EVEN IF AMMUG-1 OTHERWISE REJECTED.

3. ASSUME AMMUG-1 READY TO GO WITHIN THIS OF NEXT MONTH. COULD AMMUG-1 VISIT BE COMBINED WITH ONE OF HOBBERLIN'S VISITS RE KDTUCK-18 (PARTICULARLY IF AMMUG-1 LOOLS LIKE HE MIGHT BE HANDLING PROBLEM)?

4. FILES: 201-749651; 201-802117. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

4.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 17 1

SECRET

	ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG: L. Laser
NIT: DC/WH/1
XT: 7375/9354
ATE: 9 July 1971

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

Y 35 ________ PER ________ # ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: [illegible] INFO FILE, VR, [illegible] CI/OPS, CI, FI, SECURITY

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 9 JUL 71 21 00 2 CITE DIRECTOR 158728

WH/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC AMROSE

REF: WH/MIAMI-11378 (IN 374346)

1. GIVEN STATION WH/MIAMI AND MEXICO CITY ENTHUSIASM FOR REF OP, HQS CONCURS IN PROPOSAL TO LAY NECESSARY GROUNDWORK FOR AMMUG-1 AND KDACOUSTIC-1 MEETING. GARDALPHE WILL DISCUSS WITH STATION ON ARRIVAL.

2. FILE: 201-749651; 201-862117.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 10 1971
MICROFILMED

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref recommended GARDALPHE delayed for AMMUG-1 trip to Mexico to contact KDACOUSTIC-1.

4

9 Jul 71

B 201-862117

201-749651

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

John C. Murray
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19-2 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY 38

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM. BY: 8 PER #

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, FI, CI, CI/OPS, SECUR 4

ACTION NO. 727

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 10 1971
MICROFILMED

S E C R E T 081503Z JUL 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 11878 (W MIAMI) 8 JUL IN 374346

4

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC AMROSE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 155185

B. MEXICO CITY 17033 (IN 328344)

1. WHILE WE UNWILLING GO TO THE MAT TO PLACE AMMUG-1 IN CONTACT WITH KDACOUSTIC-1, THIS IS A CASE WHERE WE HAVE A GOOD ACCESS AGENT AND BELIEVE WE WOULD BE REMISS IF WE LET THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RECRUIT/DEFECT AN AMSTAFF OFFICER PASS US BY. WHILE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS IS PROBABLY QUITE SLIM, WE FEEL POTENTIAL REWARD WELL WORTH THE MINIMAL EFFORT INVOLVED.

2. FOR MEXICO CITY: FOLLOWING INFO GEARED TO QUESTIONS RAISED PARA TWO REF B:

SUPERVISOR, MARRIOTT IN FLIGHT SERVICES

B. YES

C. NO

D. MARCH 1964 MEXICO CITY AS CO-WORKERS IN AMSTAFF SECTION

E. YES

AN	110
AB	X
IP	
PAGE	2
BY	4
[illegible]	
FI	

CS COPY

8 Jul 71

SECRET

B 201-812117

201-749651

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 11878

F. NO, BUT THEN IT IS NOT OUR OBJECTIVE THAT AMMUG-1 OFFER KDACOUSTIC-1 A JOB.

G. BELIEVE WE CAN SAFELY ASSUME THAT IF AMMUG-1 DOES APPROACH KDACOUSTIC-1 THAT THE LATTER WILL ASSUME THAT AMMUG-1 HAS BEEN SENT BY LNFORT/JKLANCE. THIS BEING SO, BELIEVE AMMUG-1'S PRIMARY GOAL IS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH KDACOUSTIC-1 AND ASSURE HIM THAT IF HE EVER DECIDED TO DEFECT FROM PBRUMEN, THAT AMMUG-1 CAN SERVE AS HIS CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO LNFORT. THIS OF COURSE SAME RATIONALE BEING USED IN THE AMBEATNIK-1/AMMEDIA-1 RELATIONSHIP

H. AMMUG-1'S PRIMARY REASON FOR GOING TO MEXICO WILL BE TO CONTACT KDACOUSTIC-1.

AUG 18 71

CY

I. NO

3. IN VIEW OF MEXICO CITY'S BELIEF THAT KDACOUSTIC-1 WILL RETURN PCS PBRUMEN THIS SUMMER, RECOMMEND WE PRESS FORWARD AND WITH THE NECESSARY GROUNDWORK TO EFFECT MEETING BETWEEN AMMUG-1 AND KDACOUSTIC-1.

4. FILE: 201-749651 AND 201-842117. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: L. Laser:nlh
UNIT: DC/WH/1
EXT: 7375/9354
DATE: 23 June 1971

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 11/21 PER ______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: [illegible] INFO FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T   26 JUN 71 23 37z   CITE DIRECTOR 155185

TO WH/MIAMI INFO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC AMROSE

REF: WH/MIAMI 11787 (IN 366332)

1. PAST EXPERIENCE WITH APPROACHES UTILIZING CUBAN DEFECTORS DOES NOT LEAD US TO BE SANGUINE REGARDING PROPOSED OP AGAINST KDACOUSTIC-1, ESPECIALLY USING "ACCIDENTAL ENCOUNTER" PLOY. WHILE RISK IN SUCH AN ATTEMPTED APPROACH IS MINIMAL, WE WOULD FAVOR DELAYING OP IN HOPES OF DEVELOPING MORE UP-TO-DATE INFO ON THE TARGET'S VULNERABILITIES AND POSSIBLE SUSCEPTIBILITY TO RECRUITMENT/DEFECTION.

2. FOR MEXICO CITY: HAS KDTUCK-4 OR OTHER STATION ACCESS AGENTS DEVELOPED ANY SIGNIFICANT INFO ON KDACOUSTIC-1 RECENTLY?

3. FILE: 201-812117, 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

pls file — 201-749651

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

28 Jun 71

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

FROM:

WEAVER WID
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

GF-437
GA50
TUBE GT7

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		13 JUL 1971	14 July	R
2.				
3. DEVINE				
4. GEISLER				
5. AMORI (?)		19 July		Q.
6. DC/CCO		19		
7. Marshall		19 July		R
8. Devine		20/7		
9. Amori		20 July		Q.
10. B.T.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COMMENTS

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUL 13 1971
MICROFILMED

3-6: Since [illegible] is an active asset, someone should be assigned as his ([illegible]) Hqs CO. There seems to be some confusion about who in CCO should take action on such a case. ~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~

6 to 7, 8, 9: In view of the domestic aspects of this, I think the C/O should be [illegible].

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-749651

DATE MICROFILMED:

DOCUMENT DATE: 28 Jun 71

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFAA 03131

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION [illegible]

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT TYPIC/Future Use of AMMUG-1

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUL 13 1971
MICROFILMED

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. During JKLANCE's most recent attempt to contact AMETROPIA-1 via AMMUG-1, it became readily apparent that the cover story AMMUG-1 utilized with his immediate superior was unsatisfactory from two points: First, it did not permit us the operational flexibility so necessary in an approach of this sort and secondly, if AMMUG-1 had not returned when he did, his job security would have been jeopardized.

2. To correct the above deficiency, WH/Miami has arranged the following with the Miami Field Office (MFO): In the future, if we again utilize AMMUG-1 to approach a PBRUMEN official, we will ask that the MFO arrange to have one of their representatives from their Headquarters component contact the appropriate senior official of AMMUG-1's company. This senior official will in turn notify AMMUG-1's immediate superior that AMMUG-1 is to be permitted to travel on matters of importance to the Department of Defense.

3. Transmitted under separate cover is a copy of a memorandum we received from the MFO concerning the above arrangements.

Eustace D. Kloock
Eustace D. KLOOCK

Attachment:
Memo, u/s/c via True Name Pouch

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att u/s/c

12 Jul 71 CS RF

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-865547	UFAA-3131	JUN 28 [illegible] 21 JUNE 1971
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	[illegible]	201-749651

3 June 1971

18

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM : MFO

ATTENTION : Security Officer

SUBJECT : Ralph NOSEDA

1. Reference your memorandum OS 189-71.

2. Pursuant to your request this office contacted a senior official of the Marriott Corporation in Washington, D.C., who approved the travel to Europe of a Miami based Marriott employee who is affiliated with WH.

3. The Marriott official, Mr. James McALLISTER, contacted his Miami representative, Mr. Ralph NOSEDA, and advised NOSEDA that your asset was free to travel to Spain on short notice.

4. NOSEDA was advised by McALLISTER that this was a matter of interest to the Department of Defense. NOSEDA, to the best of our knowledge, has not been approached by anyone else in Miami or Washington on this matter since the initial call from McALLISTER in March.

REUBEN O. HARVELL

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUL 13 1971
MICROFILMED

CS COPY

S/catt 1 to UFAA-3131

201-749651

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY [illegible] CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15-1

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET

(When Filled In)

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ISSUED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY 35

ACTION UNIT

CI/8 FILE, VR, [illegible] WH, FI, CI, [illegible]

ACTION #

622

S E C R E T 2[illegible]428Z JUN 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 11787

26 Jun 71 IN 366332

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC AMROSE

REF: CS-311/04132-71

1. DURING HIS RECENT TDY TO MEXICO CITY ON THE KDTUCK-16 OPERATION, WOODROW G. HOBBERLIN DISCUSSED WITH TERENCE D. SISTONE OUR PROPOSAL TO USE AMMUG-1 TO APPROACH KDACOUSTIC-1. AMMUG-1, WHOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH KDACOUSTIC-1 DATES BACK TO 1954, ASSESSES KDACOUSTIC-1 AS ONLY FEIGNING LOYALTY TO THE PBRUMEN REGIME AS HE IS BASICALLY AN OPPORTUNIST.

2. WHEN PROVIDED WITH GIST OF INFO CONTAINED REF AND ASKED TO CATEGORIZE KDACOUSTIC-1, AMMUG-1 COMMENTED THAT KDACOUSTIC-1 WOULD HAVE TO BE GROUPED WITH THOSE WHO HAD COME UNDER FIRE FOR BEING SOMETHING LESS THAN RABID REVOLUTIONARIES. WHILE AMMUG-1'S APPROACH TO KDACOUSTIC-1 WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO ASSUME THE FORM OF AN "ACCIDENTAL ENCOUNTER" WE ARE WILLING TO ENTERTAIN ANY IDEAS ADDRESSEES MAY HAVE TO DEVISE A LESS CONTRIVED APPROACH TO KDACOUSTIC-1.

3. REQUEST ADDRESSEE COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE PROPOSAL.

4. FILE: 201-812117, 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

CS COPY FILED IN 201-812117

SECRET

DUPLICATE COPY FOR CROSS FILING IN 201- 749651

26 Jun 71

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Review of Cuban Mugbooks Volumes II and III with AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a copy of Eustace D. KLOOCK's contact report on his latest meeting with AMMUG-1. It is requested that all the individuals mentioned in this report be indexed.

Eustace D. Kloock
Eustace D. KLOOCK

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 7 1971
MICROFILMED

Attachment: Contact Report

Distribution:
3-C/WHD, w/att, h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAA-3054	21 MAY 1971
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
		201-749651

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 7 1971
MICROFILMED

CONTACT REPORT

AGENT AMMUG-1 **PLACE:** AMMUG-1's home

CASE OFFICER: Eustace D. KLOOCK **DATE:** 1630-1700, 19 May 1971

FUNDS PASSED: None

[illegible] by Subject of 201-749651

1. At the time and place indicated above, I reviewed with AMMUG-1 Volumes II and III of the Cuban Mugbook, with the following results:

Volume II

Armando U. FR *Estrada Fernandez (201-809440) Photo #39

AMMUG-1 correctly identified the pseudo of Estrada as being "ULISES". AMMUG-1 added that he had last spoken with Estrada in February of 1964.

German Miguel *Ramos No 201 Cit Cuba Photo #42

AMMUG-1's only comment was that he wasn't sure if Ramos was his correct name.

Roque FR *Dalton Garcia (201-215097) Photo #118

AMMUG-1 commented that he had spoken with Dalton in September of 1964

Manuel FR *Carbonell Duque (201-739084) Photo #159

AMMUG-1 commented that he knew Carbonell from circa 1960, when Carbonell was a captain in the police.

Volume III

AMMUG-1 did not recognize any of the photographs contained in Volume III of the Cuban Mugbook.

2. AMMUG-1 was also shown the photograph of Luis FR *Martinez Menocal (201-769095) which was forwarded in UFAW-1118 of 7 May 1971. While AMMUG-1 thought the face familiar, he was unable to identity the photograph.

3. In addition to the above, AMMUG-1 was also shown the photographs of the following individuals with negative results: Jorge FR *Solis Garcia (201-838320) and Sergio FR *Tolon Valdes (201-754447).

CS COPY

SECRET

Eustace D. KLOOCK

a/a att to UFAA 3054

201-749651

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION		PROCESSING ACTION
		XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, WH/Miami			MICROFILM

SUBJECT

TYPIC/Review of Cuban Mugbooks Volumes II and III with AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a copy of Eustace D. KLOOCK's contact report on his latest meeting with AMMUG-1. It is requested that all the individuals mentioned in this report be indexed.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Attachment: Contact Report

Distribution:
3-C/WHD, w/att, h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAA-3054	21 MAY 1971
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
		201-749651

14-0000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION **SECRET**

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
TYPIC
Visit of U.S. Immigration Official to AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI only.

1. During the undersigned's most recent meeting with AMMUG-1, the agent stated that a Mr. Rex M. Griffin, an investigator of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had visited him on 13 April 1971. According to AMMUG-1, the purpose of Griffin's visit was to inquire into AMMUG-1's present welfare and to determine his relationship to Mr. Rodino. (COMMENT: Mr. Rodino is the sponsor of H.R. #2076 which will expedite AMMUG-1's application for U.S. citizenship by waiving the standard waiting period.) When asked about his relationship with Mr. Rodino, AMMUG-1 simply explained that Mr. Rodino was a friend of his from Washington.

2. Griffin explained that the reason that he wanted to talk to AMMUG-1 personally, was the fact that nearly all of the information surrounding AMMUG-1 was held in INS's office in Washington. He added that the information that was held by the Miami office was closely held and access to the files was severely restricted. During his visit, Griffin asked AMMUG-1 if he noticed any unusual interest in his comings and goings, to which AMMUG-1 replied negatively.

3. In view of above, believe it reasonable to assume that Griffin suspects that JKLANCE is somehow involved with AMMUG-1. This position is concurred in by Station Officer who maintains liaison with the Miami office of the INS.

4. AMMUG-1 characterized Mr. Griffin's visit as being very pleasant and commented that he was "muy amable". In sum, there does not appear to be any need for intervention on AMMUG-1's behalf or on that of the Station. If the need does arise, we will promptly inform Headquarters.

Eustace D. Kloock
Eustace D. KLOOCK

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - C/WHD

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA - 2951	DATE Typed: 19 April 1971
	CLASSIFICATION **SECRET**	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 749651

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
XXXX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT: TYPIC/DGI-DSE Officials Known to AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a contact report prepared by Eustace D. KLOOCK on his most recent meeting with AMMUG-1. During this meeting, Volume I of the Cuban Mugbook was reviewed with AMMUG-1. The individuals AMMUG-1 was able to identify are listed in paragraph 2 of the attached contact report. It is requested that all the names be indexed.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
3-C/WHD, w/att, h/w

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D 19-5-30	UFAA-2925	13 April 1971
D 19-5-42	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~201-[illegible]~~ 201-949651

14-00000

SECRET

HP

MICROFILMED
MAY 3 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9 April 1971

CONTACT REPORT **CASE OFFICER:** Eustace D. KLOOCK(K)

AGENT: AMMUG-1 **PLACE:** AMMUG-1's home

DATE/TIME: 6 April 1971, 1530-1800

Identified by subject (201-749651)

1. On 6 April 1971 I reviewed with AMMUG-1, Volume I of the Cuban mugbooks. He identified the individuals listed in para 2 below. Un less otherwise noted, the following general comments apply to all: That he knew them quite well and the last time he saw them was 1963-1964, usually in Mexico.

2. Arsenio FR FRANCO Villanueva (201-346425). According to AMMUG-1, FRANCO is G-2, and is one of the individuals he approached (at our behest) during the Pan American games which were held in Puerto Rico in 1966. He commented that FRANCO dismissed AMMUG-1's initial approach out of hand stating that he was a Marxist-Leninist. According to AMMUG-1, while a follow up was supposed to be made in Caguas, Puerto Rico, the staff officer who was accompanying AMMUG-1 decided against it.

Jorge E. FR GARCIA-BANGO Dirube (201-736492). AMMUG-1 commented that GARCIA-BANGO was the other individual that he tried to approach during the Pan American games. Like FRANCO above, while a follow up was planned for Caguas, Puerto Rico, the staff officer accompanying AMMUG-1 decided against it.

L X 710201 Cit Cuba

Eclio LOBAINA Lobaina. AMMUG-1 commented that he did not know LOBAINA very well. He added that he used to be AMMUG-1's instructor in firearms at the Police Academy.

1

SECRET

CS COPY

H/w att 1 to UFAA-2925

201-749651

to 201

Rolando PASTOR Rodriguez - possibly identifiable with Armando PASTOR Rodriguez (201-300074). AMMUG-1 last saw PASTOR about 1962 when he was attached to the Administrative Department of the Police Department.

Ramon Cesar CUENCA Montato (201-328945). AMMUG-1 identified CUANCA as being DGI.

Rafael PAEZ Perez - possibly identifiable with Rodolfo PAEZ (201-334244).

Fernando RAVELO Renedo (201-765244). AMMUG-1 correctly identified "RAVELO" pseudo as being "FERMIN"

Manuel VEGA Perez (201-334253). According to AMMUG-1, in 1963, VEGA was the DGI desk officer for Nicaragua.

Joseph Parker MORRAY (201-345987)

Ramon SINOBAS Casado (201-334249). AMMUG-1 said that he knew SINOBAS fairly well.

Carlos Sixto CHAIN Soler (201-349576)

Juan Guido LICEA Figueredo (201-876266). AMMUG-1 identified LICEA as being a diplomatic courier commenting that he only knows him casually as they used to take the same plane from Cuba to Mexico

Augustin YASSELLS Gonzalez (201-345986). AMMUG-1 identified YASSELLS as a diplomatic courier commenting that he only knows him casually as they used to take the same plane from Cuba to Mexico.

Mario OIZ Falgueria (201-737654).

Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953). AMMUG-1 said that his DGI pseudo was "Gomez", and that he was stationed in Bolivia from 1962-1963.

Felipe LLAUDI Hernandez (201-742052). AMMUG-1 commented that LLAUDI's DGI pseudo was "ROBANE".

Oswaldo RELOBA Penechet (201-737138).

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665). AMMUG-1 commented that he knew RODRIGUEZ quite well and when RODRIGUEZ was in Mexico he used to handle HYSAGE-1.

Julian FR NOVAS Fernandez (201-747936)

No 201

Guillermo ARASTAGUIA Fundora. AMMUG-1 commented that ARASTAGUIA was a TSD technician and that his DGI pseudo was "RENE".

[illegible] ✓

[illegible] ✓

Pedro FR FARINAS Diaz (201-728234). AMMUG-1 commented that FARINAS' DGI pseudo was "OTONIEL".

Elpidio FR INTERIAN Comezanes (201-745393). AMMUG-1 correctly identified INTERIAN as being a DGI code clerk. CO Comment: INTERIAN is presently stationed in Santiago, Chile.

Jose FR LAIN Martin Gonzalez (201-750250). AMMUG-1 commented that he knew LAIN quite well and that in 1963, LAIN used to be stationed in the Cuban Consulate in Merida.

Jose Benigno FR MEDINA Plasencia (201-756652). AMMUG-1 identified MEDINA as being a TSD technician and an expert photographer.

No 201

[illegible] ✓

Andres Nicolas AROMA Ramos. AMMUG-1 commented that his DGI pseudo was "ERNESTO".

Orestes Guillermo FR RUIZ Perez (201-735296). According to AMMUG-1, RUIZ was in Mexico in 1964 where he was in contact with Noel GUERRERO, a member of the Nicaraguan FSLN.

Jose Miguel FR FERNANDEZ Roa (201-730852)

Guillermo FR SALGADO Alvarez (201-331825). AMMUG-1 correctly identified him as a diplomatic courier.

Angel FR TATO Ramirez (201-351544)

Teudys FR TRUTIE-Matilla (201-733681). AMMUG-1 identified him as a TSD technician.

Angel PIFERRER No 201

Santiago PEREZ num refs

Orlando FR PRENDEZ Gutierrez (201-330002)

(201-758151)

Luis Norberto FR HERNANDEZ Curbelo. AMMUG-1 commented that HERNANDEZ had been a friend since 1950. He added that HERNANDEZ, along with Saul FR GONZALEZ (201-756664) were the ones who recruited him for the DGI.

Rogelio FR MONTENEGRO Guasp ((201-747803))

Chaf~~els~~ IK Homero FR SAKER Zenni ((201-335014))

AMMUG-1 commented that the name listed for the picture, Manuel RODRIGUEZ Gonzalez, was incorrect. His real name is Gines Silvio FR GORRIZ Castroman (201-761475). [illegible]
(CO Comment: RODRIGUEZ is an alias used by GORRIZ.)

Jose L. FR POSADAS Torres (201-334245)

Manuel Eugenio FR VEGA Perez ((201-334253))

201-749651

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Cuban Mugbook

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFAA-2768, 1 March 1971

1. Your request to show the Cuban Mugbooks, Volumes I and II, to AMCARD-1 and AMMUG-1 is approved.

2. Per Reference, paragraph 2, Headquarters will forward such photographs of Cuban officials to WH/Miami.

3. We are planning a slight change in the new Cuban Mugbook (Volume III). This Mugbook will be distributed earlier (i.e., after 100 photos have been collected rather than after 500 as was the case with Volume II) and in looseleaf binders. As new sections of the Volume III are compiled, probably in groups of 100 photos, they will be sent to the Stations concerned to be added to Volume III. Incidentally, as a result of your comment on the most recent Mugbook, we are sending an alphabetical listing for Volume II to the Stations which received this Mugbook.

Thornton V. CARUANA

Distribution:
3 - COS, WH/Miami

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-831373

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAW-1070

DATE
19 MAR 1971

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-749651

(16 March 1971)
Distribution:
1 - WH/COG/CHRONO
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - Originator
1 - RID/D&P

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	W. J. Devine	pae	5061

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/COG		

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

DISPATCH

DISSEM BY ... AT ... Z

ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐

TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SEEN BY 24 PER

W1-8 15-1

FILE, VR KE/BN, EUR-6, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/IC-2

S E C R E T 012129Z MAR 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 10595 (SADELLY ACTING)

PRIORITY MADRID, LONDON INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC ANETROPIA

REF A MADRID 3167 (IN 270331)

B MADRID 3181 (NOT SENT LONDON) (IN 276371)

C MADRID 2716 (NOT SENT LONDON) (IN 231253)

IN 276573

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 749651

1. APPRECIATE REFS. WH/MIAMI STILL KEENLY INTERESTED IN POSITIONING AMMUG-1 FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT WITH ANETROPIA-1.

2. LONDON: REF B REPORTED THAT QUTIMID REPORT OF 26 FEBRUARY INDICATES THAT ANETROPIA-1 EXPECTS TO COME TO MADRID "WITHIN FEW DAYS" AND THAT HE WAS STAYING IN LONDON AT ~~...~~ home OF EUGENIO H G O N Z A L E Z. WH/MIAMI BELIEVES THAT GONZALEZ IS POSSIBLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH EUGENIO G O N Z A L E Z ALVAREZ. STATION HAS FOLLOWING TRACES ON GONZALEZ WHICH MAY BE PASSED TO JAGUAR:

A. GONZALEZ'S NAME WAS INCLUDED IN A LIST IDENTIFYING COMMUNISTS/INFORMERS WHO WERE EMPLOYEES AT THE U.S. ROYAL TIRE CO. IN HAVANA (AMFAST-13

201-865547

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

1 Mar 71

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED — DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

MAR 2 10 26 AM '71

FORWARDED

RID/AN

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 10595 S E C R E T

REPORT OF 28 NOV 1965) AND

B. DPOB: CIRCA 1915, CAMAGUEY. EARLY MEMBER OF THE MILITIA AND A SUPPORTER OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION. (UFGA 3725, 5 APRIL 1962) STATION HAS FOLLOWING TRACES ON A EUGENIO GONZALEZ WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH EUGNIO GONZALEZ ALVAREZ: (A) CHIEF SUBSECTION 1-2/SPECIAL STEESL/OF CUBAMETALS (UFG 5352, 15 JUNE 1964); (B) AKA "LA MOSCA" HEAD OF PAYMENT, SUB-SECTION OF THE GENERAL CONTROL SECTION OF THE CONSOLIDATED PETROLEUM ENTERPRISE (ECP) OF THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES (MININD) (AA-4434, 12 JAN 1967) AND (C) ASSISTANT MANAGER OF CUBAMETALS, HAVANA (SF/1/212/R215-67). PER REF C, GONZALEZ ARRIVED MADRID FROM CUBA ON 16 DEC 1970 IN COMPANY WITH AMETROPIA-1. HE UTILIZED PP EF 67128.

3. REQUEST YOU CHECK WITH JAGUAR TO TRY AND DETERMINE GONZALEZ'S LONDON RESIDENCE AND/OR AMETROPIA-1'S TRAVEL ~~[illegible]~~ PLANS.

4. FILE: 201-865[illegible]47 AND 201-[illegible]49651 [illegible]

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-749651

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station WH/Miami

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Cuban Mugbook

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
MAR 8 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Request permission to show AMCARD-1 and AMMUG-1 Cuban mugbooks, Volume I and II.

2. We have noted that on a number of occasions in the past, photographs of Cuban officials which have been obtained by our various Stations abroad, are generally sent only to Headquarters. We request that when Headquarters does receive such photographs that WH/Miami be provided with a copy. It should be borne in mind that barring over-riding security considerations, it is our intention to show such photographs to AMCARD-1 and AMMUG-1 for possible identification.

Eustace D. Klooch
Eustace D. KLOOCK

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-831373

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-2768

DATE
MAR 1 1971
Typed: 26 February 1971

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS. FILE NUMBER
201-749651

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 18/04/73

X-REF. SHEET

X-REF.	SYM NUMBER	DOC. DATE	CLASSIFICATION
201-0749651	WMIM-17543	26 FEB 73	201-086554

26 Feb 71

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT (S) IS CROSS REFERENCED
TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.

201-749651

S-E-C-R-E-T

BERNICE TURBEVILLE:ak
WH/COG/OPS
7144 R. 1819
1 FEBRUARY 1971

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 34-1

S E C R E T

R. [illegible]ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 3 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

c/WH8 INFO FILE. VR. c/RI/AN c/EURS c/CI c/FI2 D/SECURY

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 02 22 22z FEB 71 CITE DIRECTOR 107366

MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

~~RYBAT~~ AMMUG AMETROPIA

REF: MADRID 2964 (IN 256286)

1. CONCUR. PLS SUPPLY TRAVEL DETAILS 48 HOURS IN ADVANCE AS REQUIRED BY LNYUMA.

2. FILE: 201-865547 AND 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
MAR 5 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-865547

201-749651
2 Feb 71

JOHN SHERWOOD
EUR/COPS

AC/WH/COG
EUR/IB
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

2 Feb 71

EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR C/RI/AN C/EUR 5 DO C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 092

S E C R E T 021731Z FEB 71 CITE MADRID 2971

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

[illegible] AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: A. LONDON 7630 (IN 256355)

B. WH/MIAMI 0234 (IN 256343)

1. AMMUG-1 SCHEDULED LEAVE MADRID FOR NEW YORK ON 3 FEBRUARY VIA IBERIA FLT 951. ONWARD FLIGHT NEW YORK TO MIAMI 3 FEBRUARY VIA EASTERN AIRLINES FLT 25.

2. STATION PROVIDED AMMUG-1 WITH 150 U.S. DOLLARS ON 2 FEBRUARY WHICH HE WILL ACCOUNT FOR IN MIAMI.

3. FILE 201-865~~647~~ 547, 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

2 FEB 71 257392

MICROFILMED
MAR 5 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2 FEB 1971

CS COPY

201-865547

201-749651
2 Feb 71

SECRET

10-69 EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION [illegible]ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20-1 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY C AT 1735 Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER

FEB 1 2 44 PM '71

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

FILE, VR C/RI/AN, C/EUR 5, D/SECUR 4, C/CI

ACTION NO. 890

S E C R E T 011752Z FEB 71 CITE MADRID 2964

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, LONDON, STOCKHOLM

1 FEB [illegible] 256264

RYBAT AMMUG AMETROPIA

REF: WH/MIAMI 0228 (IN 256017)

1. IN VIEW COMPLETE ABSENCE INDICATIONS AT STATION OF AMETROPIA-1 TRAVEL, UNLESS OTHER STATIONS CAN PROVIDE CONCRETE TARGET ETA MADRID WITHIN NEXT 24 HOURS BELIEVE AMMUG-1 SHOULD RETRUN HOME 3 FEBRUARY.

2. FILE 201-865547; 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

1 Feb 71

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 25 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN B

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY A AT 1955 Z

DISSEM BY 9 PER Ref Rubin

[illegible]

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR C/RI/AN, C/EUR 5, D/SECOR 4, C/CI

ACTION NO. 903T

S E C R E T 019130Z FEB 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 0234 (SADELLY ACTING)

PRIORITY MADRID INFO PRIORITY LONDON, DIRECTOR, STOCKHOLM 1 FEB 71 256343

PBRUMEN AMMUG AMETROPIA

REF: MADRID 2964 (IN 256264)

1. CONCUR PLAN OUTLINED REF.

2. FILE: 201-865547: 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

1 Feb 71

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 1   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN 3

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

ACTION UNIT WH 8   INFO FILE, VR, C/RI/AN, C/EUR 5, D/SECUR 4, C/CI

ACTION NO. 75

FEB 1 2 06 PM '71

S E C R E T 011413Z FEB 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 0228 (SADELLY ACTING)

PRIORITY MADRID INFO DIRECTOR, LONDON, STOCKHOLM   1 FEB 71 256017

RYBAT AMMUG AMETROPIA

1. AMMUG-1'S WIFE SAID 31 JANUARY THAT AMMUG-1'S EMPLOYERS CALLED HER ON 27 JANUARY TO INQUIRE WHEN AMMUG-1 WOULD RETURN TO WORK. AS AMMUG-1 HAD TOLD HIS EMPLOYERS THAT HE HAD TO VISIT A SICK RELATIVE IN NEW YORK, SHE REPLIED THAT THE RELATIVE'S CONDITION WAS STILL GRAVE AND THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW JUST WHEN AMMUG-1 WOULD RETURN TO WORK.

2. FOR MADRID: WE ARE RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW AMMUG-1 AT THIS POINT. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT WANT TO JEOPARDIZE AMMUG-1'S JOB SECURITY WHICH COULD IN TURN ADVERSELY AFFECT HIS ROLE FUTURE OPS. WE BELIEVE, THEREFORE, WE SHOULD SET A CUTOFF DATE ON AMMUG-1'S PRESENT TDY IF AMETROPIA-1 REMAINS UNLOCATED. APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS THIS MATTER.

3. FILE: 201-865547; 201-749651. GP1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

1 Feb 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2 -1

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT ~~924~~ c/WH8

INFO FILE, VR c/RI/AN c/EUR5 c/CI c/FI2

ACTION NO. 924

SECRET 011700Z FEB 71 CITE LONDON 7830

MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI STOCKHOLM DIRECTOR

1 FEB 71 256358

C

RYBAT AMMUG AMETROPIA

REF: WH/MIAMI 0228 (IN 256017)

1. AS POSSIBLE INPUT TO HELP ANSWER REF, JAGUAR CONTINUE TO REPORT AS OF 1600 HOURS LOCAL, THEY HAVE NO INFO TO SHOW AMETROPIA/1 HAS LEFT U.K.

2. FILE: 201-865547; 201-749651.

GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

1 Feb 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z
DISSEM BY: 8 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES
SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 [illegible]
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY
3
4
5
6
7
8

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8
INFO FILE. VR. C/RI/AN, C/EURS, C/FI 2, C/CI
ACTION NO. 5 (C)

S E C R E T 281502Z JAN 17 CITE LONDON 7711

PRIORITY MADRID INFO STOCKHOLM WH/MIAMI DIRECTOR

RYBAT AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF MADRID 2915 (IN 251591)

28 JAN 71 253864

4

1. OVER LAST SEVERAL DAYS ON ZASIS AMMUG/1 ARRIVAL MADRID, STATION HAS PUT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON JAGUYR TO PROVIDE MORE TIMELY INFO ON ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE OF WATCHLISTED CUBANS AND HAVE CITED AMETROPIA/1 AS A CASE OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO JKLANCE.

2. AS OF 1500 HOURS LOCAL, JAGUAR MAINTAINED THERE NO RECORD AMETROPIA/1 HAS LEFT U.K. JAGUAR HAS ALERTED BAIRN TRANSCRIBERS AND HAS PROMISED TO REPORT TO STATION ASAP ANY INFO ON FUTURE PLANS FOR PRESENT WHEREABOUTS ~~AMMUG/1.~~ AMETROPIA

3. AS MADRID KNOWS, BEA ON STRIKE AND IT POSSIBLE ~~AMMUG/1~~ AMETROPIA ONWARD TRAVEL DELAYED.

4. FILE 201-865547. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

28 Jan 71

EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER #

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR C/CBN, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, D/SECUR 4

ACTION NO. 441

S E C R E T 271528Z JAN 71 CITE STOCKHOLM 1369

27 JAN 71 253082

PRIORITY MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI DIRECTOR LONDON

RYBAT AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: MADRID 2915 (IN 251591)

1. TELEPHONE CALL MADE TO COMMERCIAL OFFICE. SUBJECT WAS ASKED FOR IN FULL NAME BUT RESPONSE WAS "RODRIGUEZ" NO HERE. NO OTHER DETAILS WERE OBTAINABLE.

2. NOTE CUBAN COMMERCIAL CONSEILLER NAME ALDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS.

3. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1

SECRET

27 Jan 71

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 24-1

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS SEEN

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

X

C/WH 8 FILE, VR C/RI 4N, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2
300 D/SECUR 4

S E C R E T 260951Z JAN 71 CITE MADRID 2915

PRIORITY LONDON, STOCKHOLM INFO WH/MIAMI, DIRECTOR

RYBAT AMETROPIA AMMUG

26 JAN 71 251891

REF: A. WH/MIAMI 2114 (IN 248101)

B. MADRID 2317 (IN 242980)

1. WOULD APPRECIATE ATTEMPT BY ACTION ADDEES CONFIRM OR DENY PRESENCE AMETROPIA-1 LONDON OR STOCKHOLM THROUGH PRETEXT PHONE CALL(S) COMMERCIAL OFFICE. AMMUG-1 NOW MADRID AND STATION HAS NO INFO AVAILABLE AS OF MORNING 26 JANUARY RE WHEREABOUTS AMETROPIA-1. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. FILE 201-365547. GP-1

S E C R E T

26 Jan 71

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 20-1 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)

5 UP

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

JAN 23 7 23 AM '71

Marshall

Turbelli

DISSEM BY 41 PER

ACTION UNIT C/WH5

ACTION NO. 112

FILE, VR C/RI/AN, C/EUR5, C/CI, C/FI2

S E C R E T 231035Z JAN 71 CITE MADRID 2898

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

23 JAN 71 IN 250488

RYBAT AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: MADRID 2881 (IN 248307)

1. AMMUG-1 MADE CONTACT WITH STATION MORNING 23 JANUARY PER REF.

2. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

23 Jan 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 7-1 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ________

ACTION UNIT WH 8 | INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 028

SECRET 221603Z JAN 71 CITE STOCKHOLM 1375

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY MADRID, ROUTINE DIRECTOR, LONDON.

22 JAN 71 246998

REF: WH/MIAMI 0037 (246530)

1. RE REF REQUEST LIAISON REPORTS AS OF 22 JANUARY 71 THEY HAVE NO RECORD OF ANYONE BY NAME OF SUBJ REF ENTERING SWEDEN. HOWEVER, NOTE IT POSSIBLE FOR PERSON TO ENTER SWEDEN WITHOUT IT BEING RECORDED BY AUTHORITIES PARTICULARLY IF HE COMES SWEDEN VIA OTHER SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRY IN WHICH CASE CONTROLS ON ENTERING SWEDEN ARE LIMITED OR NON EXISTENT.

2. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

22 Jan 71

10-63 EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

WH 07

☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY d AT 1815 Z

DISSEM BY 25 PER

ACTION UNIT c/WH 8

ACTION NO. 861

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3	CAP	7	
4		8	

JAN 21 1 36 PM '71

ACTION COPY

TURBEVILLE

INFO: FILE, VR c/CI/AN, c/EURS, c/CI, c/FI 2, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 211300Z JAN 71 CITE MADRID 2885

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

21 JAN 71 249203

RYBAT TYPIC AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: ~~WH/MIAMI 0137~~ (-249149)

1. AMMUG-1 HAS RESERVATION AT HOTEL PLAZA, LOCATED PARQUE ESPANA 2.

2. FILE 201-865547, 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

21 Jan 71

14-00000

FORM 3020
10-69

USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

MFG 8.7

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES (22) 3

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: at: 1721 Z

DISSEM BY: PER

JAN 21 1 02 PM '71

ACTION COPY

ACTION UNIT
C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR c/Ri/AN, c/EUR 5, c/CI/CI/ 2, DDP, ADDP

TURBEVILLE

ACTION NO.
555

S E C R E T 211643Z JAN 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 0138

21 JAN 71 249150

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT P3RUMEN AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: WH/MIAMI 0137 (IN 249149)

IDENTITY: HECTOR RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART

CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO EAST GERMANY GP-1

S E C R E T

21 Jan 71

4-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG: BERNICE TURBEVILLE:pfd
NIT: WH/COG/OPS
XT: R1819
ATE: 21 JAN 1971

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y 3E PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: C/WH8 INFO FILE, VR. C/RI/AN, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, DDP, ADDP, CS/RO, D/SECUR 4,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 21 JAN 71 23 15z CITE DIRECTOR 04225

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI, MADRID

RYBAT PBRUMEN AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: WH/MIAMI 0137 (IN 249149)

1. AGREE WITH REF OPS PLANNING.

2. FILE 201-865547 AND 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

EUR/IB W. Donnels

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

5
4
3
2
1

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/EUR/COPS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

21 Jan 71

FORM 3020 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MFG 8

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION　CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　TOTAL COPIES 22 -3　ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

SECRET (When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

JAN 21 1 07 PM '71

WH

BY: AT 1721 Z

DISSEM BY: PER

ACTION COPY

ACTION UNIT: c/WH8　INFO FILE, VR c/RI/AN c/CI/SS c/CI c/FI2 DDP, ADDP

ACTION NO. 556　TURBEVILLE

S E C R E T 211643Z JAN 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 0137

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN AMETROPIA AMMUG

21 Jan 71 249149

REF A MADRID 2551 (IN 248307)

B DIRECTOR 103557

1. WHILE THE OPERATIONAL CLIMATE/SITUATION WILL WEIGH HEAVILY IN YOUR FINAL DECISION AS JUST HOW AMMUG-1 WILL APPROACH AMETROPIA-1, WE FORWARD THE FOLLOWING POINTS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION: (A) AMMUG-1'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMETROPIA-1 AS A FRIEND/CONFIDANT DATES BACK TO THEIR CHILDHOOD. WHILE AMMUG-1 ALSO KNEW AMETROPIA-1'S BROTHER, IDENTITY, HE WAS CLOSER TO AMETROPIA-1: (B) THIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP STILL EXISTED WHEN AMMUG-1 LAST SAW AMETROPIA-1 IN 1963; (C) AMMUG-1 STILL FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT AMETROPIA-1 WILL TALK TO HIM IF THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF; (D) AMMUG-1 DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT AMETROPIA-1 IS A LOYAL SUPPORTER OF THE AMTHUG-1 REGIME; (E) ACCORDING TO AMMUG-1, THE ONLY THING AMETROPIA-1 WANTED IN LIFE WAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO COME TO WOCORK; (F) THAT TO HAVE AMMUG-1 PHONE

21 Jan 71

FORM 3020 10-66 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG 8-?

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 0137 SECRET

AMETROPIA-1, WHERE AMETROPIA-1 WOULD HAVE THE CHANCE ~~D~~ TO REFUSE CONTACT, IS PROBABLY THE LEAST DESIRABLE APPROACH. AMMUG-1'S ASSESSMENT OF COURSE IS BASED ON OBSERVATIONS NOW EIGHT YEARS OLD.

2. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AMETROPIA-1 SHOULD BE BURDENED WITH ANH CLANDESTINE COMMO AT THIS POINT. REFER TO MADRID TO SUPPLY AN ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS OR OPS PHONE NUMBER AS APPROPRIATE IF OP DEVELOPS SUCCESSFULLY. WE EXPECT THAT IF AMETROPIA-1 ACCEPTS THE PITCH, HE WILL ASK JUST WHAT HE WILL GET IN RETURN AND PROBABLY HIS CHANCES FOR RESETTLEMENT IN WOCORK. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY COMMITMENT RESETTLEMENT IN WOCORK CAN OR SHOULD BE MADE AT THIS TIME. RATHER THAT HE BE TOLD THAT POSSIBILITY FOR RESETTLEMENT IN WOCORK WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THE EXTENT OF HIS COOPERATION WITH JKLANCE. IF THE QUESTION OF MONETARY RECOMPENSE IS RAISED AMMUG-1 SHOULD INDICATE SALARY (WE ARE THINKING IN THE RANGE (300 TO $500) WILL BE PUT IN AN ESCROW ACCOUNT.

3. WH/MIAMI WILL INFORM AMMUG-1 THAT THE GUIDANCE

SECRET

FORM 3020 10-69 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG 8-70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 WH/MIAMI 0137 SECRET

FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE PROVIDED BY STATION MADRID.

FOR MADRID: AMMUG-1 WILL DEPART MIAMI ON EASTERN FLIGHT 20, 1400 LOCAL ON 22 JANUARY FOR NEW YORK. HE WILL DEPART NEW YORK AT 1900 LOCAL ON IBERIA FLIGHT 952 SAME DAY AND WILL ARRIVE MADRID 0730, 23 JANUARY. DOES STATION MADRID HAVE OPS PREFERENCE FOR AMMUG-1 HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS IN MADRID?

4. FORWARDING SEPARATELY REQUIREMENTS FOR USE WITH AMETROPIA-1.

5. FILE: 201-855547; 201-749651. GP1.

SECRET

FORM 1320 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES 27

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1600

WH 8

FILE, VR [illegible] EUR6 [illegible]

710

S E C R E T 201522Z JAN 71 CITE MADRID [illegible]

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR [illegible] LONDON STOCKHOLM

PARIS

20 JAN [illegible] 087

TYPIC AMETROPIA

REF: WH/MIAMI [illegible]114 (IN [illegible])

1. RE REF, HAVE AM[illegible]-1 CALL [illegible] 473-5400 EXT [illegible] AND ASK FOR "SERGIO" ON WORK DAYS BETWEEN [illegible] AND 15[illegible]-1530 AND WEEKENDS BETWEEN [illegible]-1300 HOURS.

2. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1

S E C R E T

B.T

201-865542

file: 20 Jan 71
201-749651

SECRET

No. 201-749651

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/COG/OPS - B. Turbeville

Operational Approval is hereby ~~xxxxxxx~~ amended in the case of AMMUG/1

________________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows: .

Subject's OA is amended herewith to authorize his operational use outside the United States as set forth in his PRQ Part II dated 13 February 1965, per your memorandum request of 31 December 1970.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/S/ John E. Howard

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 6 January 1971 lc

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 1-67 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(9)

6 Jan 71

RIG: B. TURKEVILLE:mll
NIT: WH/COG/OPS
XT: 7141/1819
ATE: 5 JANUARY 1971

MESSAGE CAT
TOTAL COPIES: 1-1

S E C R E T

SC ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

Y 28 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

ONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. C/WH/COG/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

6 JAN 71 00 20z

CITE DIRECTOR 099417

TO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR-097508

1. AMMUG-1 OA GRANTED EFFECTIVE 5 JAN FOR OPS USE OUTSIDE U.S. AS SET FORTH IN PRQ DATED 1965.

2. SUBJECT REF ASSIGNED AMETROPIA-1.

3. FILE: 201-865547, 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
JAN 20 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WESLEY L. LAYDOURNE
AC/WH/COG

6-Jan 71

B 201-749651

201-865547

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2 -2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 38 PER #

JAN 5 12 53 PM '71

R
~~ALBRIGHT~~
TURBEVILLE

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

INFO FILE. VR. C/RI/AN, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2,

ACTION NO. 187

S E C R E T 052216Z JAN 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 9956 5 JAN IN 237892

PRIORITY LONDON, THE HAGUE INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID

RYBAT TYPIC
REF A LONDON 7124 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE, MADRID) (IN 237738)
B THE HAGUE 8910 (IN 237605)

1. FOR LONDON: OUR INTEREST IN ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART IS BASICALLY OUR ASSESSMENT THAT HE IS RECRUITABLE. THIS ASSESSMENT PROVIDED US BY ONE OF RODRIGUEZ'S CLOSEST FRIENDS WHO IS PRESENTLY RESIDING UNITED STATES. BRIEFLY STATED THIS ASSESSMENT INDICATES THAT RODRIGUEZ HAS TALKED AGAINST THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND COMMUNISTS. ACCORDING TO ASSESSOR, RODRIGUEZ HAD ONLY ONE PRINCIPAL IDEA AND THAT WAS TO LEAVE CUBA AND GO TO THE STATES.

2. WE DO NOT THEREFORE, HAVE ANY DEROG INFO PER SE. HERE FOLLOWS A BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY ON RODRIGUEZ: DPOB: 22 OCT 1932, REGLA, CUBA. IN OCTOBER 1968 RODRIGUEZ APPOINTED DIRECTOR OF MINING INDUSTRY SUPPLY UNIT, UNDER MINISTRY OF MINES, FUEL AND METALLURGY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT SUBJECT OWES HIS POSITION TO HIS BROTHER, HECTOR, WHO IS PRESENTLY CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO EAST GERMANY. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: HT: 64 INCHES, WT: 110 LBS, HAIR: STRAIGHT BLACK.

SECRET

5 Jan 71

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 9956 SECRET

3. FOR THE HAGUE: DPOB AAS PER PARA TWO. IN JUNE 1970, RODRIGUEZ WAS REPORTED AS HOLDING CUBAN DIPLOMATIC PPT D/67/587, ISSUED HAVANA 6 SEPT 1967.

4. FILE: 201-865547. GP1.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY dl PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION 118

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL CO

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1	ops	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

JAN 5 4 22 PM '71

INFO FILE, VR Eur6, RiAN, c/ops 6

SECRET 051722Z JAN 71 CITE LONDON 7124

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

5 JAN 71 237738

TYPIC

REF WH MIAMI 09883 (L 234350)

1. IN ORDER MAKE STRONGER CASE WITH JAGUAR FOR COVERAGE OF RODRIGUEZ, WOULD APPRECIATE SHORT SUMMARY DEROG INFO FOR PASSING JAGUAR SINCE LONDON HAS NO TRACES.

2. FILE 201-865545. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

5 Jan 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIC
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIE 23 - 1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN B

39 **SECRET** (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

JAN 5 2 04 PM '71

~~Marshall~~ R
~~Albright~~
TURBEVILLE

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR EUR6. RI/AN CI CI/OPS. CI/IC2. FI

ACTION NO. 101

S E C R E T 051550Z JAN 71 CITE THE HAGUE 8910

5 JAN 71 237005

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID, LONDON

TYPIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 9914 (L235845)

1. STATION HAS REQUESTED LIAISON WATCHLISTING SUBJECT REF AND RELATED ON WHOM WE HAVE ONLY FULL NAME. TO INCREASE CHANCES EFFECTIVE LIAISON ACTION, WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIPT DPOB AND, IF AVAILABLE, PASSPORT TYPE AND NUMBER.

2. FILE: 201-865545. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

5 Jan 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17-1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 53 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT TSD

INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, WH 8, DDP

ACTION NO. 539

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

111

S E C R E T 312214Z DEC 70 CITE DIRTECH 0696 DITC

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMMUG AQUATIC

2 JAN 71 236095

REF: WH/MIAMI 9915 NR

SEND PHOTOS TO IDENTITY. GP-1.

S E C R E T

CS COPY

SECRET

2 Jan 71
201-749651

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

406

DATE : 26 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 10

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	RI/PROP	4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 26 2021Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 35514

FT 490 IN 35514

DIR INFO RIMN CITE WAVE 3143
JMZIP KUCAGE AMICE
REF DIR 05764 PARA 2 (OUT 85241)+
1. WAVE PLANS START ACROSS BOARD TRAINING AMICE INFILS NEAR
FUTURE AS FOLLOWS: 04
A. (DANILO POZO CASTRO), PDOB SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS, HAVA
06
PROV (23 NOV 1928) FATHER: (JESUS) MOTHER: (ISABEL). NO WAVE
06
TRACES. LOCAL ODENVY TRACE UNDERWAY.
04
B. (EUSTIQUIANO GARCIA LEZCANO) PDOB MARTI, PROV MATANZAS.
(3 DEC 1914.) FATHER: (JOSE MARIA) MOTHER: (ANGELA) NO WAVE
06 06
TRACES. LOCAL ODENVY TRACE UNDERWAY.
C. MIGUEL A. DIAZ ISALGUE, PDOB MATANZAS, PROV MATANZAS.
14 FEB 1937. FATHER: MIGUEL ANGEL. MOTHER: DOLORES. WAVE
REFS: UFGA 1783. NO DEROG INFO. SUBJ INFIL AND EXFIL CUBA
WITH EXPERIENCE CLANDESTINE OPS PRIOR 17 APR 61. IMPRISONED AND
RELEASED. FORMERLY MEMBER [illegible], CURR CLAIMS NO POL AFFIL.
LOCAL ODENVY TRACE UNDERWAY.
08 08
04
D. (OSCAR OLIVA CANTU) PM TRAINEE (6456) (201-297742)
WAVE 4433).
08
04
E. (JUAN ESPINOSA GONZALEZ) PM TRAINEE (7157) POA REQUESTED

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

13/PW

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 35514 WAVE 8143

C/V (585) rr

WAVE 5218. SHIPPED JMMOVE 1 APR 61. (201-3[illegible]). 08

04 08

F. FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ ELEJALDE, TRAV 537. (201-291775)

2. REQUEST POAS SUBJECTS A, B AND C AND ASSIGNMENT CABLED UPON COMPLETION TRAINING. 04

3. REQUEST POA JESUS RIERA FERRO, POB HAVA 10 MAY 1933. FATHER: JESUS 06 MOTHER: FLORA 06 NO WAVE TRACES. LOCAL OBEAVY TRACE UNDERWAY. SUBJECT IS CANDIDATE FOR W/T TRAINING AS A [illegible] RADOP. PRQ PART ONE FOLL IN DISP.

ON OUTGOING BE SURE TO INCLUDE RIMM AS INFO AND NOTE TO RIMM AUTHORIZING TNG.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS: *HQS AWAITING WAVE PLAN INITIATE CAMPAIGN PREVENT EXECUTION AMHING/1.

**CABLES PRE-DATE CS FILES. COPIES MAY BE SEEN IN S/C ARCHIVES.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

5/pw

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

29

COMMUNITY OF NATIONS FUND
SUITE 2004, 347 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
MURRAY HILL 6-5121

February 20,1963

See DIR 23180 22 Mar 63

Mr. Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue
1343 N E Miami Court
Apartment 17
Miami 32, Florida

Dear Mr. Diaz:

This will confirm our previous discussions with you wherein we agreed to employ you at the rate of $[illegible]0.00 per month to commence March 1st. As was explained to you at our last meeting we are engaged in a study to determine the effect of large scale migration on given communities and the dislocations that result therefrom.

We feel that the Miami area is unique in that the dislocations caused by the influx of so many of your fellow countrymen furnishes an excellent opportunity to conduct this study.

It is anticipated that you will spend a large portion of your time in our New York offices, however; it will also require a substantial amount of travel on your part.

If you are still in agreement with this proposal please advise me as soon as possible. I would like to begin this study on March 1st.

Very truly yours,

06

Roger Joyce

2/PV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MESSAGE FORM
SECRET

ORIG : A. D. Rohlfing/bh
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW
EXT : 4550
DATE : 2 June 65

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1	EW	5	FI-TC
2		6	CA
3	mo	7	
4		8	

TO : PARIS BRUSSELS MADRID JMWAVE
15-4 15-5 15-2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C P

INFO: FILE WE 6 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 CI/ICA
FI FI/INT 2

15-4

TO PARI INFO: BRUS MADR WAVE CITE DIR
15-5 15-2

TYPIC KEYWAY MHVIPER
20-4

REFS: A. PARI 1448 (IN 80372)
B. PARI 0299 (IN 38992)
20-4

15850

1. PRESUME CANDIDATE MENTIONED REF A NOT FOR PURPOSES TRAVEL TO HAVANA AS PER REF B BUT RATHER FOR CONTACT WITH PACETTE ONLY. AMWHIP-1 UNABLE COME UP WITH CANDIDATE IN TIME FOR HAVANA TRIP MENTIONED REF B.

2. HQS WILL DEFER INVOLVING AMWHIP-1 WITH PACETTE PENDING OUTCOME STATION ATTEMPTS AT CONTACT.
15-4

END OF MESSAGE

AMWHIP-1 f.t.c.

03

03
WE/3 Silsby (phone)
WE/2 03 Malzahn (phone)
WE/5 Rati (phone)
WH/C/MO Cini (phone)
WH/C/FI 03 Webster (phone)
WH/C/CA

C/WE

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER 2-17 COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14/PV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

AMWHIP/1
file

2 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMBUNNY-1 (201-775391) and AMWHIP-1 (201-267966)

DATE: 25 May 1965, 1900-2030 hours

PLACE: Office of AMWHIP-1, 31 W. 47th St., New York, N.Y.

PRESENT: AMBUNNY-1, AMWHIP-1, and DAMICONE using alias of Al MARIN

1. I had introduced AMBUNNY-1 and AMWHIP-1 to each other 24 May but the office was crowded, so there was very little opportunity to discuss operational matters. We met again on the above date, after business hours, and we were able to meet in private. Although AMWHIP told me that he was delighted with AMBUNNY-1 herself, as he said the "Cubans like that kind of girl -- not too fancy", he thought that
08 her background -- particularly her previously working for the U.S. Ambassador in Bolivia, would make the operation very risky. He said that if it were discovered that AMBUNNY-1 was a penetration of the UNSNAFU-19 office (by the Cubans), his connection with ODYOKE would then be revealed, with the result that all his "connections" with UNSNAFU-19, and "Habana" would be lost. AMWHIP-1 opined that he thought it likely that the Cubans would check her out in Bolivia.

2. AMWHIP suggested the possibility of using a cutout to introduce AMBUNNY-1 to the UNSNAFU-19 installation. He said he would explain in detail at a later time, what he meant, obviously not wanting to reveal any more than necessary to AMBUNNY-1.

3. Also, AMWHIP-1 stated that he was unable to travel to Paris before mid-June, as he had some relatives coming to visit him from Italy. After checking with DI UBALDO, I subsequently informed AMWHIP-1 and AMBUNNY-1 that the
15-4 Paris operation was off. Both expressed relief. I told AMBUNNY-1 that she could most likely still be utilized in
12-2 Rabat, and that we would discuss the possibilities at a later date.

Norris W. Damicone

7/PN

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

Harvey

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact Report. Meeting with AMWHIP-1

DATE : 21 May 1965, 1300-1430 hours

PLACE : National Airport

PRESENT: Subject and DiUbaldo as Breitheim

1. On 20 May I phoned Subject and requested that he travel to Washington to discuss the background of his discussions with 02 UNSNAFU-19 from which stemmed the suggestion that A-1 supply a French-English-Spanish speaking secretary 02 to U-19's mission in Paris. The meeting was quite short for as it turned out, the 02 discussion between Subject and U-19 on the topic of secretaries, which had taken place in March 1965, ~~and~~ had been little more than a casual sort of thing devoid of any specifics whatever and, in particular, devoid of any commitment by either party to proffer or to accept a profferred body. Nevertheless, Subject felt quite certain that slots would still be open 02 in U-19's mission and that a recommendation from him would suffice to effect favorable action by U-19. 02

2. I sketched AMBUNNY's qualifications stressing the fact that she had gone to school in the U. S., had worked here, and had done a hitch as a social secretary for the American Ambassador in La Paz. 08 Subject drew the obvious conclusions that it might be difficult to dummy up AMBUNNY's labenslauf adequately to prevent her from being "discovered" by the Cubans. At any rate, since she was our only candidate, Subject agreed to meet with her in New York so that together they could thresh out the pragmatics of the problem. The meeting was set for 22 May. Al Marin (alias) would participate in this meeting.

Amwhip/1
file

3. For the record, I should like to note that in the two and a half years since I had last seen Subject he had aged over 15 years. When I last saw him he was a round-faced, dark-haired, boyish person and has now been transformed into a very grey, very puffy, 50 year old man though I understand his chronological age is something short of 40. These observations ~~had~~ have nothing to do with anything except they might indicate that Subject is living under a great strain. I derived the impression, which coincides with that I obtained the first time I met with Subject, that he is constitutionally oblique in his approach to matters. He is a very difficult person to corner. I am firmly convinced that to date in this operation, if it may be called that, we have never come close to placing Subject in the corner and that it is high time we do so. I do not imply that he is a man of ill will, rather that instinctively he is a man who slides off problems until such time as he feels he has sufficient evidence or is in the right posture to solve them. I should think it would be our task to exploit these natural capacities while at the same time attempting to assure that Subject is not sliding away from us.

Sidney P. Di Ubaldo

3 July 1962

Skip
Pls file
fully

TO: WKH

FM: AMS

RE: ZRRIFLE

1. Per our discussion of 2 July 1962, I expect that we shall proceed to transfer QJWIN to Baden-Baden per the proposal in OLLA-1463 dated 2 February 1962. LUXE/0489 dated 19 June 1962 stated that COS would have the full details of the capital outlay required by 23 June; however, the information has not been received as of 3 July. The last cable to the Station, DIR 18391 told COS to contact you directly on his arrival on 16 July.

2. With regard to candidates spotted by QJWIN, the two whom he spotted in Italy a year and a quarter ago can probably be used if needed, if we can accept the assessments of them by the Trieste Base contract agent, Magonetti. Magonetti's assessment is contained in OIRA 27542 dated 10 May 1961. The names of the two French candidates are contained in OLLA 1426 dated 15 December 1961. No action has been taken on these names regarding tracing or anything else. My handwritten notes attached to that dispatch contain fuller descriptions of the two people than appear in the dispatch.

03

3. The other spotting effort that can be made is through Hank Manfredi (TN) in Rome. Hank was well briefed on the qualifications desired and the security precautions to be observed in the spotting activity. COS Rome has a copy of the qualifications and restrictions in his safe; however, if Manfredi is told to proceed with his contact in Florence, I suggest that he be re-briefed in detail.

03

4. Frankly, all the rest of the paper in the file is crud except for the pay receipts, which are assembled in one envelope. I have already given you the ZRRIFLE authorization paper signed by Helms and Skip has been given the QJWIN contract, including the extension to 1 March 1963.

5. The details which have yet to be worked out are

a. The precise method of contact with QJWIN

b. The system of drawing funds for payments to him

c. An emergency contact for him (this should probably be COS LUXE).

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2/BR

6. Despite COS LUXE's viewpoint, I happen to know that QJWIN can do more spotting in Corsican circles whenever we want him to.

AMS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME CHECK, DOCUMENT SERVICE, AND PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

RID CONTROL NO. (Filled in by RID)	DATE (Submitted by requester) FEB 20 9 42 AM '61 20 Feb 1961

FROM: (Requesters name) ① T McHale D3	BRANCH FI/D/Ops	ROOM 2512 [illegible]	EXTENSION 3661

TO	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS	CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
RID/INDEX	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	Pls call when Ready [illegible] ~~attached~~
REQUESTER [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	②	
RID/FILES					
REQUESTER				③	
RID/DRS					
RID/201					
RID/ANALYSIS					
RID/MIS					
RID/INDEX					

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME BESTA e	GIVEN NAMES Lemberto
SPELLING VARIATIONS	
AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, sex, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.) Owns Export-Import firm LABE (or LABEX) in Milan
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 8 May 1918	
CITIZENSHIP Italian	RESIDENCE 23 Via Teodosio, Milan, Italy

RID/INDEX TO REQUESTER	COMMENTS
NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce
CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	

BE SURE ALL SUBJECT INFORMATION IS CORRECT

① Type or print all entries.

② On receipt of index card reproductions: draw a green diagonal line across items you don't want RID to obtain for you.

③ Edit (use green) the Copyflo listing to reflect: (a) Cards to be destroyed (green D). Examples: referenced document has been destroyed; less informative than a retained card leading to the same information; referenced information not significant. (b) Corrections and additions, including ∞ when card reflects all facts in document. (c) OK all cards that are correct as typed.

Could this trace be consolidated into an existing or new 201 file? ☐ yes ☐ no. (If yes, complete the following - no other form required.)

1/BR

201 PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION

201 -	(201 number will be supplied by RID. If new 201 number has been obtained by desk, note it in this space.)		
OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS			
CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED ☐ YES ☐ NO	FILE TO BE KEPT ☐ RID ☐ DESK	ACCESS RESTRICTED ☐ NO ☐ YES →	RESTRICTION (If any)

ALWAYS RETURN THIS FORM WITH COPYFLO OF CARD REPRODUCTIONS. IF YOU HAVE REQUESTED A 201 PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION, ALSO RETURN PERTINENT DOCUMENTS.

14-00000

BESTA, FNU
DOB ?

CIT ?

ALLEGED ITALIAN AGENT IN MILAN

043-006-004
OIR -13754

TS 107273
PIO
SER. 7889

Can't locate in RI

[illegible]

ordered

Trying to locate in RI

BESTA, Lamberto

43-5-1-4334
CI 4-374
4 Apr 55
Att.

we14.

BESTA, Lamberto

NTIA 136
(IN 29925)
24 Mar 54

[illegible]

14-00000

BESTA, Lamberto

[illegible]
(CIRA-[illegible] A)

Files are attached with pertinent items clipped....

Lamberto BESTA

April 1955 : Resident of Milan at Via Teodosio 23, collaborated for brief period with DEMIGOD Demigod regarding clandestine traffic in strategic materials. Lives by trafficking in cigarettes and other things - not excluding dope. Also maintains contact with head of 29 French intelligence in Italy in political field. Person of doubtful honesty, braggart and capable of carrying out any kindof activity for money. (Source Demigod)

15-22

March 1954: 11 Ital service (Min of Int) offered to turn over to Milan station full control of PIC operation in which BESTA was involved. Hqs warned "hands off" because of BESTA's extremely bad reputation - he has been implicated in all sorts of contraband traffic as well as reputation of completely unanchored intelligence operator.

Nov 1953: He was an attempted double agent operation b/ 11 Ital service into Yugo I.S.

Have NOT as yet read State Despatches
Referred to in Hunn list "check

41BR

3 July 1962

Skip
pl file
fully

TO: WKH

FM: AMS

RE: ZRRIFLE

1. Per our discussion of 2 July 1962, I expect that we shall proceed to transfer QJWIN to Baden-Baden per the proposal in OLLA-1463 dated 2 February 1962. LUXE/0489 dated 19 June 1962 stated that COS would have the full details of the capital outlay required by 23 June; however, the information has not been received as of 3 July. The last cable to the Station, DIR 18391 told COS to contact you directly on his arrival on 16 July.

2. With regard to candidates spotted by QJWIN, the two whom he spotted in Italy a year and a quarter ago can probably be used if needed, if we can accept the assessments of them by the Trieste Base contract agent, Magonetti. Magonetti's assessment is contained in OIRA 27542 dated 10 May 1961. The names of the two French candidates are contained in OLLA 1426 dated 15 December 1961. No action has been taken on these names regarding tracing or anything else. My handwritten notes attached to that dispatch contain fuller descriptions of the two people than appear in the dispatch.

04 04

3. The other spotting effort that can be made is through Hank Manfredi (TN) in Rome. Hank was well briefed on the qualifications desired and the security precautions to be observed in the spotting activity. COS Rome has a copy of the qualifications and restrictions in his safe; however, if Manfredi is told to proceed with his contact in Florence, I suggest that he be re-briefed in detail.

04

4. Frankly, all the rest of the paper in the file is crud except for the pay receipts, which are assembled in one envelope. I have already given you the ZRRIFLE authorization paper signed by Helms and Skip has been given the QJWIN contract, including the extension to 1 March 1963.

5. The details which have yet to be worked out are

a. The precise method of contact with QJWIN

b. The system of drawing funds for payments to him

c. An emergency contact for him (this should probably be COS LUXE).

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

3/BR

6. Despite COS LUXE's viewpoint, I happen to know that QJWIN can do more spotting in Corsican circles whenever we want him to.

AMS

The candidate: no name used; circa 43-45, 1.75-1.78, strongly built, broad shoulders, circa 85 kilos, slightly oval full face, blond hair combed straight back thinning in corners, thinning on top, rosa complexion, no eye color noticed, worker's hands, nose thin and curved outward a little, thin lips; chin full but not fat, makes impression of a handwerker; has been in prison Sante twice (burglary) - name does not begin with A,B,C,D - otherwise would have gone to Fresne prison; not known whether convicted; has own car; free to travel; 5 years POW in Germany; M. impression: good nerves; composed; can open usual safe; would work with someone previously unknown to him; M. would use him; willing to use gun; did not ask money; Hugo wants his cut. Lives 250-300 km from Paris; legal occupation unknown. Contact thru Hugo; can cut Hugo out with money. This candidate ready any time. Has no passport, but can get one. Can also get passport under phoney name. M. Likes this one as candidate

Saw G and G's candidate 28 Aprilwith lokal in Paris; G contacted this candidate directly; candidate Henri ; description: circa 45 - 48, 1.75 - 1.78; dark brown hair; full, deep on forehead; shiny and combed back; half part on right; brown complexion; not quite square face; brown eyes; heavy eyebrows dark brown w/verbindung between eyebrows; bridge of nose depressed, nose somewhat small; normal ears; mouth schrag when he speaks; small scars on left cheek and small scar running from middle of nose on left side; brown hair on hands, no (rings); well dressed; hands well kept; fingertips (squared): smokes (French +) Ami cigarettes; not a drinker; lives Paris; frequents Bar Le Corsaire, 110 Ave de Suffren; can be found there every day from 4:30 PM; specialist in safes - own tools; also holdups; in Sante prison; belonged after war to Lyon St. Etienne underworld; gave some facts of this which M knows to be true; wanted to know if should be armed for job - ready to go to the end; has a colleague with whom wants to work; not behind iron curtain and not in France; would be expensive; has expired passport, but no sweat in renewing it; M impression - would follow orders; better action man than Hugo's candidate, but not sure whether has safecracking experience to extent Hugo's man has; Has car - Dauphine, beige (?) #2461HS75 (Paris #); not married. M can contact him at tel SUF 46-90-- this is the bar. M told him two weeks to three months (also told Hugo's man the same but Gaillord's candidate wants to know in few weeks whether still hope. Could bring both candidates together into a team.

2 MAY:

1) Santelli could not locate his cousin. [illegible] Marseille after telling Hugo + [illegible] their contacts - lived in Hotel Du Globe, Marseille.

2) Santelli met Pakzovi Jean, married: ca 42-43, works on RR in Marseille - known in [illegible] no children (?), solid person, can keep his tongue, has done holdups, never caught, not exaggerator, good connections in Corsican underworld in Marseille; ht 1.70-1.72, medium build, top of head bald, hair on sides is brown, oval face, brownish complexion (dark not black), brown eyes, moderate cigarette smoker, French + Corsican, POW 40-45, working for RR a few years, lives 7 or 8 Rue St. Therese; is close friend of Santelli;
→ is now looking for candidates; [illegible] purpose in meeting him again. S. + P. looked for a Felix Carboni (?), professional burglar, Corsican, lives in Marseille, has a brother who was arrested by police in a holdup. P. still looking for Felix.

P. understands completely what is sought.

3) Hugo: spends a few hours every day in Transport Alto (? Tobal) – Mme Juliette Jaquillard, 155 Rue de Charonne, Paris XI Tel. ROQ 06-45; met Hugo 29 Apr (called him from Marseille to see if candidate available) re candidate; dinner with Hugo & the candidate 1/2 - 3/4 hour: ~~no~~

M. Angers Hugo II [illegible]

The candidate: no name used; ca. 43-45, 1.75-1.78, strongly built, broad shoulders, ca 85 kilos, slightly oval full face, blond hair combed straight back thinning in corners, thinning on top, rosa complexion; orange color noticed, workers' hands, nose thin & curved outward a little, thin lips; chin full but not fat, ~~[illegible]~~ makes impression of a hardworker; ~~spent~~ has been in prison Santé twice: name does not begin with A, B, C, D – otherwise would have gone to Fresnes prison; not known whether

burglary

convicted; has own car, [illegible] travel; 5 years POW in Germany; M. impressions good nerves, composed, can open [illegible] safe; would work w/ someone previously unknown to him; M. would use him; willing to use gun; did not ask money; Hugo wants his cut. Lives 250-300 km from Paris; legal occupation unknown. Contact thru Hugo; can cut Hugo out ~~of~~ w/money, This candidate ready any time. Has no passport, but can get one. Can also get ~~a~~ passport under phony name. M. likes this one as candidate.]

4) Saw G. + G's candidate 28 Apr in a hotel in Paris; G contacted this candidate directly; candidate's Henri him; description ca 45-48, 1.75-1.78; dark brown hair full, deep on forehead, shiny, combed back, half part on right; brown complexion; not quite square face; brown eyes; thin eyebrows dark brown w/ Verbindung between eyebrows;

from
Lyon

M. with
him
ca
2 hours

bridge of nose depressed, nose somewhat small; normal ears; ~~small~~ mouth schräg when he speaks; small scars on ~~on~~ left cheek + small scar running from middle of nose on left side; brown hair on hands, no rings, well dressed; hands well kept; finger-tips [illegible]; smokes [illegible] cigarettes; not a drinker; lives Paris; frequents Bar Le Corsaire, 110 Rue de Suffren; can be found there every day from 4:30 PM; ~~[illegible]~~ specialist in safes - own tools; also holdups; in Santé prison; belonged after war to Lyon-St-Etienne underworld; gave some facts of this which M knows to be true; wanted to know if should be armed for job — ready to go to the end; has a colleague whose whom wants to to work; not behind iron curtain + not in France; would be expensive; ~~not~~ has expired passport, but no question renewing it; M. impression: would follow orders; better action man than Hugo's candidate but not sure whether has safecracking experience to extent Hugo's man has. Has car: Dauphine, beige (?), # 2461HS 75 (Paris #); not married. M. can contact him at tel: SUF 46-90 — this is the bar. M. told him 2 wks to 3 mos (also told Hugo's man the same) but Halliard's candidate wants to know in few weeks whether still hope. Could bring both candidates together into a team ( ]

promising man

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba
REPORT NO. CSCI-316/00704-64
SUBJECT (fnu) RELOVA
DATE DISTR. 1 September 1964
NO. PAGES 2
REFERENCES

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE OF INFO. 1964
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. August 1964
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments:

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

(fnu) RELOVA, pseudonym "Wilberto," is an officer of the Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence - DGI) in Cuba. He resides at Calle 15 number 2419, Reparto Juan Manuel Marquez, Palya de Santa Fe, Mariano, Habana. 1,2,3,4,5,6

Headquarters Comments

1. An airline passenger manifest revealed that one Osvaldo RELOVA Penichet, probably identical with the above Subject, left Mexico for Habana on 8 July 1963 and was the holder of Cuban passport number D/63/415.

2. An [official Jamaican source] 24 in a report dated 16 October 1963, stated that Osvaldo RELOVA, the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, arrived in Kingston on 14 October 1963. He was in Kingston for one week and lived at the Cuban Consulate office. RELOVA was reportedly making an inspection trip. RELOVA was born on 13 August 1930, in Habana. His home address was given as 15H 2419 Santa Fe, Habana. He carried Cuban passport number D/63/415, issued in Habana on 17 June 1963.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXXX	CCR	FBI 2
	REP	CINCLANT	CINCSO #	I&NS				

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA/EOB	1	WE/5/R	1	CI/LIA	1	IE/[CANADA]	1			LX-1650
WH/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A	3	IE/[BRITISH]	1	1		NO PROJECT (AMMUG/1
WH/SA/R	1					L/WASH/[BR]	1	1		CSCI-316/00704-64
WH/SA/CI	4			RID/AN	1					
WH/WAVE	1									COORDINATING
TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1								LIAISON *		WH/SA/K:LD:swk CI/R&A

201-737138

4PV

/

3. In a report dated 19 October 1963, source unknown, it was stated that one Osvaldo RELOVA Penichet was appointed administrator of "Envases del Cerro, S.A." firm, located on Calzada del Cerro Avenue, Habana.

4. A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 23 October 1963, revealed that Osvaldo RELOVA, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, left Kingston for Toronto on 21 October 1963, on TCA flight number 885.

24

5. An official Canadian source, in a report dated 26 November 1963, said that Osvaldo RELOVA Penicitet, born on 13 August 1930, was not the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada as previous reports stated. Rather, RELOVA, who was a frequent visitor to Canada, traveled as an "Embassy Inspector." He carried Cuban Diplomatic passport D/63/415 with Mexican visa number OF-7090; he had no Canadian visa. The address on his passport was given as 15/3 number 2419, Santa Fe Banch (sic), Habana. RELOVA entered Canada on 16 August 1963, destined to visit Jesus YANES Rodriguez, Cuban Commerical Attache in Montreal. He departed Canada for Mexico on 25 August 1963, in the company of Alberta MENDUCA.

6. A former Cuban Intelligence officer who has been living in the United States since 1963 and whose reporting over the past nine months has proven reliable, gave the following information on 21 July 1964, on Osvaldo RELOBA Penechet (presumably identical with RELOVA):

> In early 1961, RELOBA was an administrator of a section of the Consolidated Hardware Stores and annexes. In late 1961 he went to see source to get help with an investigation on a Mr. BARRAL, Administrator of the Consolidated (sic). RELOBA was requesting source's aid in the belief that source was still working for G-2; source did not tell him otherwise. RELOBA is a new Communist who wants to be more than MARX and is trying to instruct everyone around him. Source said that RELOBA was born about 1934, is 164 pounds, five feet nine inches in height, has a medium thin build, a long face, and a long thin neck. He has dark eyes, black hair, is partially bald, and has a small, thin mustache.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

1/pd

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CSCI-316/00699-64

SUBJECT Julian NOVAS Fernandez

DATE DISTR. 27 August 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE OF INFO. 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Source was shown a photograph of Julian NOVAS Fernandez and source identified him as a Cuban Intelligence Officer. Source saw NOVAS at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964 and assumed he was a functionary there. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,

Headquarters Comments

1. Although source saw Julian NOVAS Fernandez at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964, the records of this Agency reveal that source was probably in error in assuming that NOVAS was assigned to that Embassy and it is more likely that he was just passing through. The following traces by this Agency is the basis for this conclusion.

24

2. An official Jamaican source, in a report dated 24 March 1964, stated that Julian NOVAS Fernandez arrived in Kingston, Jamaica, on 18 March 1964, to take up his duties at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston as Commercial Attache. Source said that NOVAS has the appearance of an American and speaks excellent English. Since his arrival he has been especially occupied with girls. It should be noted that

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	~~XXX~~	OCR	FBI 2	
REP CINCLANT	CINCSO #	I&NS							

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

[illegible]/SA/EOB	[illegible]	WE/[illegible]/P	1	CI/LIA	1	IE/CANADA	1			EX-1645
[illegible]/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A	3	IE/BRITISH	1	V		CSCI-316/00599-64
[illegible]/SA/R	1					L/WASH/ED	1	U		NO PROJECT(AMMUG/1)
[illegible]/SA/CI	4			RID/AN	1					
[illegible]/[illegible]AVE	1									COORDINATING
TOTAL 16 MAR 1965 [illegible]/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4 , RID 1								LIAISON *		RELEASING MMK:LD:swk CI/R&A

FORM NO.

201-747936

4/pd

His wife did not accompany him and source speculated that her arrival may be delayed in view of NOVAS' present inclination for feminine diversion.

3. In a report dated March 1964, this same source said that Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the Cuban Commercial Attache at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston, Jamaica, was born on 2 September 1938, in Habana, Cuba. He carried diplomatic passport D/64/90 which was issued in Habana on 20 February 1964. His home address was given as Carman No. 18, Vibora. He arrived in Kingston from Mexico on 18 March 1964, on Mexicana Flight Number 305.

4. This same source, in a report dated 28 April 1964, stated that the wife of Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the recently arrived Cuban Commercial Attache, arrived in Kingston on 22 April 1964, via Mexico. Her name is Amarilis Marta VALDES Hijuelos and she was born on 19 May 1937, in Jiguani, Oriente, Cuba. VALDES has been indisposed since her arrival in Kingston; this is probably due to her advanced pregnancy. Her home address in Cuba is Avenida 31, Number 3622, Habana. She carried diplomatic passport D/64/239, issued in Habana on 9 April 1964.

5. This same source, in a report dated 9 May 1964, noted that the salary and allowances of the new Cuban Commercial Attache, Julian NOVAS Fernandez, suggests that he is the new Cuban Intelligence Service chief in Jamaica, succeeding Gerardo SANCHEZ Robert.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible] the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT Jose FERNANDEZ

REPORT NO. CSCI 316/00693-64

DATE DISTR. 21 August 1964

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE OF INFO. 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Source identified a photograph of Comandante Jose FERNANDEZ and said that his nickname is "El Gallego." FERNANDEZ is the chief of all army training schools from cadets up. He is not connected with Cuban Intelligence.1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8

Headquarters Comments

1. In a report dated 11 May 1960, from an untested source, it was reported that one Jose FERNANDEZ, possibly identical with the above Subject, was a Cuban Ambassador on an arms buying missions in Rome.

2. In June 1962 a Cuban national, untested, whose father was an old army friend of Jose FERNANDEZ, aka "El Gallego," reported the following information:

> FERNANDEZ is Chief of Artillary Schools in Habana Province; he frequently gives lectures on artillery weapons at a School for Members of the Western Army (La Escuela para los Miembres de Ejerçito Occidente).

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	~~XXX~~	OCR	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT	CINCSO #	I&NS						

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA/EOB	1	WE/5/R	1	CI/LIA	1	IE/CANADA	1		LX-1639
WH/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A	2	IE/BRITISH	1		ND PROJECT(AMMUG/1)
WH/SA/R	1					L/WASH/BR	1		CSCI-316/00693-64
WH/SA CI	4			RID/AN	1				
WH/WAVE	1								COORDINATING / RELEASING
TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1								LIAISON #	WMK:LD:wk CI/R&A

201-333216

16 MAR 1965

3/PV

He was a captain in the army during BATISTA's time and was in prison for his party in the 4 April Movement until his release by CASTRO. FERNANDEZ was not known to be a Communist and, at the time of this report (1962), was not considered to be one He attended artillery schools in the United States (dates and places unknown) and speaks English well. He is well educated and well trained for the position he holds. He is often referred to as "El Gallego Fernandez." FERNANDEZ allegedly was chief of the operation against the invaders of Playa Giron in April 1961. He was described as having been born about 1921, being six feet one inch tall, 185 pounds, having light grayish eyes, light brown hair, a fair complexion, white even teeth, and an oval face. He speaks with a Castillian accent.

3. A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 17 July 1962, stated that Major Jose Ramon FERNANDEZ was the Chief of the Seccion Preparacion y Organizacion Combativa (Section for the Preparation and Organization of Warfare - SPOC), the Cuban Army's key man for defense against invasion, and the military brains of the country. He had access to all secret information. FERNANDEZ received his instructions exclusively from Fidel and Raul CASTRO with whom he is in personal contact. He received his military education in the United States. He is intelligent and reportedly not a Communist.

4. A Cuban national, untested, reported in September 1962, that the facilities of the Military Academy at Camp Managua were being utilized as a training center for officers, officer-candidates and non-commissioned officers. Major Jose FERNANDEZ, aka "El Gallego," has an office on the ground floor of the first building as you enter the camp. FERNANDEZ and a General Enrique LISTER prepared all the training schedules, pamphlets, and training aides, as well as joint exercises in which air ground (armor and infantry) have participated.

5. In a 14 November 1962 report, an untested source said that Comandante (fnu) FERNANDEZ is the only Cuban official who is completely within the confidence of the Soviets with respect to the military fortifications of the Habana area.

24

6. [An official Spanish Service] in a report dated 18 May 1963, stated that an unidentified "usually reliable source" said that Major Jose Ramon FERNANDEZ, known as "El Gallego," is the one who made the preparation for CASTRO's trip to the Soviet Union in February 1963. FERNANDEZ arrived in Habana from Moscow two days before CASTRO's surprise departure.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

4/PV

7: A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 7 August 1963, stated that she did not think FERNANDEZ was a Communist as he has always had Catholic tendencies but that he is a correct soldier and puts the military above everything. He is divorced and his ex-wife is living in Miami with their two daughters, Francis, born in 1951, and Alicia, born in 1955.

06

8. A source who is a high ranking Cuban military officer who has good contacts among Cuban officials (he has not submitted many reports, but they appear to have been accurate) reported in September 1963 that Major Jose Ramon FERNANDEZ Alvarez, Chief of Training, General Staff of the Cuban Rebel Army, is anti-Communist and a military type in the strictest sense of the word. He sticks to his military duties and scrupulously avoids politics; he keeps himself completely isolated from all political elements. He is proud of his present status and thankful to CASTRO for it; for fear of losing it he appears unwilling to undertake any kind of activity against the CASTRO regime. CASTRO is undoubtedly knowledgeable of FERNANDEZ' attitude and has sufficient confidence in him to retain him in his present position. CASTRO also is aware that he has few officers with the military discipline, know-how, and experience possessed by FERNANDEZ.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

1/PV

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CS CI 316/00643-64

SUBJECT Guillermo ARASTAGUIA

DATE DISTR. 11 August 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES CSCI-3/779,803
CS-311/00115-64

DATE OF INFO. 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. Guillermo ARASTAGUIA, pseudonym "Rene," is the chief of the Department of Technical Operational Support (MI) in the Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence - DGI). He was formerly the secretary of Ramiro VALDES in the Departamento de Seguridad del Estado (Department of State Security - DSE), but ARASTAGUIA was a follower of Anibal ESCALANTE and because of a problem concerning ESCALANTE and because ARASTAGUIA was believed to be a homosexual, VALDES transferred him to the DGI. ARASTAGUIA went to the Youth Festival in Helsinki as a representative of the DGI and has traveled to Moscow three times.

2. ARASTAGUIA was born in 1934, is about five feet seven inches in height, has blond hair and green eyes. He is fat, has a chin that juts out, lips that are somewhat sunken, and has a rather high pitched voice and seems effeminate.[1,2,3]

Headquarters Comments

24

1. A report dated 6 October 1960, from an [official Ecuadorean] source, provided a list of Cuban Communists. One Guillermo ARRASTIA, aka "Rene," possibly identical with Guillermo ARASTAGUIA, was included and described as a first lieutenant,

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2	
	REP CINCLANT	CINCSO =	I&NS						

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

WH/SA/COB [illegible] WE/5/R 1	CI/LIA 1 IF CANADA			LX-1681
WH/SA/MOB 1 WE/MADR 2	CI/R&A 3 IF BRITISH			NO PROJECT(AMMUG/
WH/SA/P 1	[illegible] MSH BR			CSCI-316/00643-64
WH/SA/CI 1	RID/AN 1			
WH/[illegible]				

SA 7,(1), WE 1 (2), CI4, RID 1

LIAISON

[illegible] SWK

executive. in G-2. ARRASTIA was reported to have the confidence of Raul CASTRO and Ramiro VALDES; and he was VALDES' righthand man in G-2.

2. An official roster listing the military staff personnel comprising the Intelligence Department, G-2, of the Cuban Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR) was received by a representative of this Agency from an untested source in a report dated 1 March 1961. Included on this list was one First Lieutenant Guillermo ARRASTIA Fundora, possibly identical with Guillermo ARRASTAGUIA.

3. In a report dated 28 October 1962, a list of identified and suspected Cuban intelligence officers was included, the list was received from an official liaison service.24 One First Lieutenant Guillermo ARRATIA (or ARRASTIA) Fundora was included on the list and described as an identified intelligence officer on the G-2 Headquarters staff.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-6-102/4
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. SC

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 9 TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
DISSEM BY 2

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 261700Z CITE GUAT[redacted] 6081
21-2

26 May 66 25182

DIRECTOR

IS AMUG-1 DEBRIEFING (SPANISH VERSION) FORWARDED HGGW-3947 CLEARED FOR PASSAGE TO LIAISON? IF SO, PLAN GIVE PRESENT COPY TO COL ARRIAGA. PLS ADVISE. IF AFFIRMATIVE, PLS SEND ADDITIONAL COPY FOR STATION RETENTION.

22 24 06 16-2

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

AN 14 | PI
ABSTRACT X

NNNN

19-6-102/4
25 May 1966

6/PV

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT **SECRET**

Memorandum

Amnug/1 Support File

TO : Chief, WH Division
ATTN : Barney Hildago

DATE: 21 August 1964

FROM : Chief, Safehouse Branch

SUBJECT: Safehouse #405

REQUISITION: Your requisition for a domestic safehouse (Req. 64-9) routed to us through the Central Cover Staff (CCS 263) has been met by the following property in the manner herein described.

PROPERTY: A two bedroom furnished apartment, (Apt. G-32) 24 located in the 24 Summit Hills Apartments, located at 16th Street 24 and East-West Highway, 24 Silver Spring, Md. 10

LESSOR: Summit Hills Apartments 24 East-West Highway, Silver Spring, Md. 10

LESSEE: Mr. Roger McK. Shea 06 a security cleared attorney with offices located at 2041 Wilson Blvd. 08 Arlington, Virginia. Office Telephone JA 4-5510. 08

LEASE: The lease is on file in the Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics. The terms are for a six month period from 1 July 1964 through 31 December 1964.

COVER STORY: Mr. Shea 06 has leased the apartment for his client Mr. V. Rodriguez who is in the Washington Metropolitan area and is associated with the Inter-University Committee for Political and Social Action. 29

CASE OFFICER: As stipulated by you, Mr. Barney Hidalgo has been designated as the responsible case officer. Any future change in case officer must be reported promptly to the Safehouse Branch.

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS: All obligations 06 for rent, utilities, and other related expenses, will be paid by Mr. Shea, the lessee cutout. Bills received at the Safehouse Branch should be passed to the Safehouse Branch upon receipt.

Edward U. Denison
EDWARD U. DENISON 03

Orig. - Addressee
1 - OL/RECD/SHB Official file

OL/RECD/SHB/JPRyan/bj/3683
03

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

29

SUMMIT HILL PROPERTIES, INC
16th Street & East-West Highway.
Silver Spring, Md.

AMMUG Support File
B

REMINDER

August 17, 1964

06

Dear Mr. Roger Shea 8500 16th St., #G-32

According to our records, your rent due August 1, 1964 - $210.00 has not been received by this office. This, no doubt, is an oversight on your part and we will appreciate your check by return mail to cover same.

In this connection, you are advised that all rents are due and payable in Full by not later than ten (10) days after same becomes due, and your cooperation will be appreciated.

Thanking you, we remain,

29

SUMMIT HILL PROPERTIES, INC.
Silver Spring, Maryland

Frank

Managing Agents

21 aug 64
Not Paid
as of 21 Aug
03 John Ryan promised
will pay in CASH
TODAY
B

4/PN

SECRET

RECEIPT FOR AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS

Case 4983

TO: TSD/IB DATE ____________

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS TRANSMITTED WITH MEMO NO. A3 7002 DATED 12 Aug 64 AND PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH WH/SA/Memo 64-620 3 Aug 64

07
Ernesto Jesus GARCIA Guzman

31
Ecuadorean PP # 19406
11 Ecuadorean Vacc Cert. #4314 31
31 I&NS Form I-94 (showing arrival in U.S. 28 July 1964.)

Nota: We are also returning subject's Cuban Documents as follows:

1. Cuban Dipl. PP No. D/64/139
2. Cuban Ord PP 22560
3. Cuban Int. Vacc.Cert. 296598
4. Negative of subject

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

NOTE: Authentication Materials must be returned to TSD/IB as soon as the intended operational use has been fulfilled; unused documents, whether filled in or blank, must be returned to TSD/IB when no longer needed.

TSD/IB should be notified if any of the Authentication Materials are destroyed, lost, or for any other reason can no longer be returned.

D-061 SECRET

5/PV

AMMUG/1 1 July 1964

Memo for the Record:

On 1 July 1964 AMMUG was transferred from safehouse #2 to the new apartment located at 8500 16th Street, Silver Springs, Maryland. On arrival at the apartment, about 1430, the quarters were not ready and the furniture had not been put in place. The apartment was ready at 2000 the same day. AMMUG's apartment does not have a phone nor was it furnished with kitchen utensils. Sheets, a radio, and kitchen utensils were purchased by AMMUG.

24

Miss Petrowski has made arrangements for the installation of a telephone.

Daniel Flores

i/pd

22 June

VIVIAN:-

Following situation re Laddie:

1- He wants balance of his May pay NOW.

03 06

2- John Ryan and Roger Shea are waiting for word from you

29

in order to call the people at Summit Hill Apartments and give them 3 day notice before Laddie can move in.

29

Summit Hill Apts also would like to know (when notice is given) what type beds to furnish apt with (double or single-Lad does not care which.)

4/PN

16 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: SAFEHOUSE FOR AMMUG-1

1. The undersigned called Mr. 03 John Ryan of the Safehouse Procurement Section on 15 June 1964 to arrange for the Safehouse for AMMUG-1 at 24 Summit Hill Apartments, 8484 16th Street, Silver Spring, Maryland.

2. Mr. 03 Ryan called on the morning of 16 June 1964 to say that a deposit had been placed on Apartment 24 G-32 at 24, 10 8500 16th Street, Summit Hill Apartments, Silver Spring, Maryland.

3. Security has been notified and the apartment is now being checked. If everything goes well Mr. 06 Roger SHEA, Attorney in Arlington, Virginia will sign the lease beginning 01 July 1964. The lease will be for Vladimir Rodriguez Lahera.

Vivian A. Petrowski

6/PV

30 June 1964

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: IN &S CARD

Called Mr. Knott in the Alien Affairs Staff for AMMUG-1's INS card. He will check with them to see if things are moving. As far as he knows they are trying to get MUG's file which might still be at the border.

appt'ment set for 10AM 2 July for fingerprint

24

SUBJECT: SAFE APARTMENT AT (SUMMIT HILL)

AMMUG-1 to move in on the 1st of July. Called there today to check if everything is ready. Will pick up lease from lawyer today and hand carry there tomorrow. Lou DeSanti and Daniel Flores taking MUG out ther tomorrow. BUYING linens for the apartment out of ops expenses.

O.K. MUG moving in.
will take lease & check
for remaining July rent
($160.00) with him.

SECRET

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

26 JUN 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Leonard Libby, WH/SA/CI

THRU : Mr. Walter Richardson o>
Room GH 44

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : COVERT SITE 24
Apartment G 32
Summit Hills Apartments
8500 16th Street
Silver Spring, Maryland
#353 598

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 19 May 1964 to the Chief, Safehouse Procurement Branch, Office of Logistics. This memorandum requested the procurement of a safehouse to be occupied by a Latin American. The safehouse was to be located in the Bethesda, Maryland area.

2. This will confirm verbal security approval provided the Safehouse Procurement Branch by this office for the use of the Subject Covert Site. Forwarded herewith is a report dated 18 June 1964 of the security survey conducted on the Subject premises. Your attention is directed to Section VI on Page 2 of this report which lists possible security hazards. This is brought to your attention so that you will be able to take appropriate action to prevent any compromise of activities at the Subject Covert Site.

3. For your information a search of Office of Security Indices in the names of the individuals listed in the attached report has failed to reveal any additional noteworthy or derogatory information identifiable with them.

4. Under no circumstances may classified material be stored in the Subject Covert Site. In addition, the Subject Covert Site may not be loaned to or utilized by another component of the Agency without the prior concurrence of the Central Cover Staff, the Safehouse Procurement Branch, Office of Logistics and this office.

2/pv

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

5. It is requested that the attached report be returned to this office in a sealed envelope marked, "To Be Opened By Addressee Only" when your office has no further need for it.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

Attachment:
Report dated 18 June 1964

cc: Central Cover Staff
Safehouse Procurement Branch

14-00000

SECRET

OFFICE OF SECURITY

Support Division

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

[illegible]

CONSISTING OF
REPORTS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

FILE NO. [illegible]83 583 DATE 1[illegible] June 1964

SYNOPSIS

I.

The SUBJECT SITE is located in the east wing on the ground floor of an apartment building known as [illegible]00 16th Street 24 The building is located 24 in a large apartment development known as Summit Hills Apartments and is located a short distance off of 16th Street, 24 a main 24 Washington thoroughfare, and East-West highway, Route [illegible] 24 Transportation and personal service facilities are readily available. Telephone service is on an individual subscriber basis. Fire and police protection are adequate. Only possible security hazard noted for SUBJECT SITE is the proximity of SUBJECT SITE's windows to possible penetration from automobiles parked in an adjacent parking lot and people located at ground level on the outside of the SUBJECT SITE. Biographical data on the occupants of apartments in proximity to SUBJECT SITE are contained in the body of the report.

5/PN

FORM NO. 1125

REPORT NO.

CSF 598

II. DESCRIPTION OF AREA

The SUBJECT SITE building is located in a modern, middle-class apartment development known as 24 (Summit Hills Apartments,) which is located along a main thoroughfare of Washington, D.C., (16th Street)24 and Route24 (410, East-West highway.) The SUBJECT SITE building is located in Montgomery County, Maryland. To the south of the SUBJECT SITE building is another apartment building known as [illegible] 24(16th Street) [redacted], (Summit Hills Apartments,) 24 which is located approximately fifty yards south of the SUBJECT SITE building. Between [illegible] (16th Street) 24 [redacted], and SUBJECT SITE building is located a large parking lot. Access to this parking lot, which is parallel to the east wing of the SUBJECT SITE BUILDING, can be gained from either (East-West highway)24 Route (410)24 by proceeding in a westerly direction or from (16th Street)24 a divided highway, which allows entrance to the parking lot for southbound vehicles only. To the west and north of SUBJECT SITE building are additional apartment buildings and parking areas. To the east of SUBJECT SITE building 24 is (16th Street) [redacted]. SUBJECT SITE building is laid out in the form of a cross with wings extending north, south, east, and west. SUBJECT SITE is located in the extreme southeast corner of the east wing of SUBJECT SITE building. D.C. Transit bus service is available along (East-West)24 highway and at the parking lot located in close proximity to SUBJECT SITE is a bus stop for D.C. Transit. This parking lot is located directly north of the east wing of SUBJECT SITE building. Taxi cab service is also available. Complete personal services are located approximately ½ mile away in Silver Spring, Maryland, 24 which can be reached by traveling east on Route (410). A bulk of parking area for automobiles surrounds the SUBJECT SITE building.

III. DESCRIPTION OF SITE

No interior inspection of the SUBJECT SITE was conducted. SUBJECT SITE may be entered through the main lobby entrance and from an outside entrance located midway on the south side of the east wing of the SUBJECT SITE building.

12/TV

383 598

SUBJECT SITE is located on the ground level of the SUBJECT SITE building. Two elevators are located at the rear of the lobby and a stairway to all floors of SUBJECT SITE building is located at the extreme east end of the east wing.

IV COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

Telephone service is provided by Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company on an individual subscriber basis.

V. FIRE AND POLICE PROTECTION

Police protection is afforded by the Montgomery County Police Department which has a substation located on Georgia Avenue in Silver Spring, Maryland. Fire protection is afforded by the Silver Spring Fire Department.

VI. POSSIBLE SECURITY HAZARDS

SUBJECT SITE is located on the ground floor of SUBJECT SITE building (below ground level) and, thus, SUBJECT SITE's windows are at ground level. Visual and technical penetration may be possible from the land area surrounding SUBJECT SITE building and from the parking lot located approximately fifteen yards to the south of SUBJECT SITE building and SUBJECT SITE. No other security hazards were noted and the closest building to SUBJECT SITE building is approximately fifty yards away.

VII. OUTLINE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit A - diagram depicting SUBJECT SITE building and area surrounding it.
Exhibit B - diagram of ground level floor of SUBJECT SITE building.

VIII. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Apartment G 10. 06

This apartment is occupied by one Michael R. SCHRIER, 06 born 1922 in Maryland and married to Joan. SCHRIER has been employed for [illegible] years as an investigator by Paul M. SACHS, [illegible]520 Connecticut Avenue, NW, 08 who is further

3/17/

383 598

described by credit sources as an attorney specializing in investment counseling. 08 Additional information indicates that SCHRIER 06 previously 08 resided at 08 18 Perry Place and was previously employed by The WIGWAM, General 08 wig shop. No detrimental credit information, police information, or House Committee on Un-American Activities records were reflected in the name of SCHRIER or his wife. 06

Apartment 118 (located directly over SUBJECT SITE) 06

06 This apartment is the residence of Esther JOLLES, white female born 22 December 1892 in Russia, and her daughter, Mildred JOLLES, 06 white female for whom two dates of birth are listed: 17 May 1924 09 and 2 March 1917, 09 born New York. 06 Esther JOLLES is the widow of Joseph I. JOLLES, 06 whom Montgomery County Health Department records reflected died of natural causes on 22 June 1960. Mr. 06 JOLLES was formerly the president of the Maryland Belt Parkway 08 Development Inc., Silver Spring, Maryland, and the North 08 Portal Construction Company. A previous address of 4505 08 15th Street, NW, is reflected for Joseph I. JOLLES, 06 Mildred JOLLES 06 and Esther JOLLES. 06

06 Immigration and Naturalization records reflected that Esther JOLLES received a certificate of citizenship through derivative means on 09 16 March 1961. Esther JOLLES 06 is not a naturalized citizen but received her certificate of citizenship through her father. 08 Her Immigration and Naturalization file, derivative number A-402705, alien number 1245777 08 is located in Baltimore, Maryland. Esther JOLLES 06 is employed as a homemaker. Credit sources reflect a credit rating ranging from poor to satisfactory in the name of Joseph I. 06 and Esther JOLLES. 06

06 Mildred JOLLES, 06 daughter of Esther JOLLES, is employed as an analyst by the Quartermaster Corps, Department of the Army, Pentagon. An additional address of 08 Second and D Streets SW, is also reflected for Mildred 06 JOLLES' employment. Mildred JOLLES 06 came to Washington from New York on 31 August 194[illegible], is single, and has no dependents. Credit sources reflect poor to satisfactory credit rating 06 in the name of Mildred JOLLES. 06 No record for either Mildred JOLLES or Esther JOLLES was reflected at appropriate police agencies 06 and the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

ESC lez

SECRET

35/PV

SECRET

RECEIPT FOR AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS

DB CASE NO. 4763

TO: TSD/DB

DATE

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS TRANSMITTED WITH MEMO NO. AB#6891 DATED 27 May 1964 AND PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH Refs: A,B,C,D,E,F, & G of AB MEMO #6891, 27 May 1964

Jaime Sanchez Papo (Alias)

31
1 - (Mexican Drivers License) No. 436747
1 - 1961 (Mexican Voters Cert) No. 6215
31

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

NOTE: Authentication Materials must be returned to TSD/DB as soon as the intended operational use has been fulfilled; unused documents, whether filled in or blank, must be returned to TSD/DB when no longer needed.

TSD/DB should be notified if any of the Authentication Materials are destroyed, lost, or for any other reason can no longer be returned.

D-061

SECRET

2/R

28 MAY 1964

SECRET

Libby

20 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: REJECTION OF AN APARTMENT FOR AMMUG-1

24

1. The apartment at (Hunting Towers , Apt #731 West, Mount Vernon Avenue) (Blvd.), Alexandria, Virginia was rejected because it has been exposed to the following KUBARK staffers and agent assets:

a. Mr. Dolf Luim with AMDIXIE-1 a Cuban who is the (Manager for Vanedadis Magazine) and lives in (Bogata, Columbia.) 08 10

b. Mr. (Mike Kline) with AMTOUT a principal agent in New York. 03

c. (Horace Speed) with AMCASH who is in New York. 03

d. Lou De Santi with AMNIP-1 and Dr. Winston.

2. Due to the foregoing we find it necessary to request that another apartment be secured for AMMUG-1.

for Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI

Distribution:
1 - WH SA/Logistics
1 - AMMUG-1 File
1 = WH SA/CI Chrono

20 MAY 1964

5/PN

[illegible]
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

19-6-102/2

14 May 1964

Memorandum for the Record: Safehouse for AMMUG-1

03

1. Per verbal agreement with Mr. Ray Scoefield this date, it was decided to use the following safehouse presently available for immediate use.

24

HUNTING TOWERS
MT. VERNON BLVD.
APT. #731-WEST
ALEXANDRIA

Rescinded
C/WH/SA/CI
thinks address
is too well
known.
L

2. This apartment was viewed by C/WH/SA/CI yesterday and considered adequate for AMMUG-1. Undersigned and Mr. Scoefield will inventory household equipment on 19 May 1964 (tentatively) and move A-1 into the abovementioned quarters a day or two thereafter, depending upon when WHD Staffers are finished debriefing A-1. Mr. Scoefield advised that he will inform Mr. John Ryan, Safehouse Branch, X3683, that it will no longer be necessary for the Branch to inquire re prospective apartments for A-1 in the N.W. section of Washington, per WH/SA 64-376 dated 6 May 1964

03

03

L
Libby
WH/SA/CI

100 201-749651/ Support

14 MAY 1964

5/PN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

12-62

ORIG : L.LIBBY:pap
UNIT : WH/SA/CI
EXT : 4431
DATE : 11 MAY 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

7 1130
SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH/SA 8
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 6, WH 7, VR

11 MAY 64 22 05z

☐ DEFERRED SIG CEN
☐ ROUTINE

TO PRITY ~~XXXXXXXX~~ MEXI INFO CITE DIR 20506
ACQUATIC PBRUMEN AMMUG
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

REF: MEXI 9336 (IN 78050)*

IN 81839

31 1. KURIOT PREPARING TWO DOCUMENTS FOR REF CASE. FOR DRIVER'S LICENSE REQUIRE FULL FACE NEGATIVE, NAME AND SIGNATURE SPECIMEN IN ALIAS, DOB OF ASSET TO BE USED IN RECOVERY OF MAIL. FOR VOTER REGISTRATION ASSUME "EMPLEADO" WILL SUFFICE FOR OCCUPATION. 31

29

2. PLS FORWARD AIR MAIL ASAP TO TRAVELERS ADVISORY SERVICE, P.O. BOX 8064, S.W. STATION, WASHINGTON, 24, D.C.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REF RYBAT.

C/WH/SA/CI

WH/3/Mexi - Dick Scott (by phone) 03

TSD/AD/ M.Walker, (by phone)

WH/SA/EOB 03

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

11-20

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

11 May 64

5/m

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

MOB	INT-OUTING		SB
1	IOS	4 5 PERS	AB
2			
3 ~~EOB~~	RPTS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	BF	HH
		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 5 (WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1425-7 MAY 64)

INFO : DOP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/WH 5, VR

7 MAY 64 IN 78050

S E C R E T 071753Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 9336

RYBAT TYPIC AMMUG

REF DIR 19477

1. SEE NO DIFFICULTY REF PLAN. MEXI OFFICER CAN CARRY LETTER AND INSTRUCTIONS TO MNTY. (OR BRIEF TDY MNTY OFFICER IN MEXI).

2. BELIEVE BEST HQS PREPARE MEXI IDENTITY DOCUMENTS 31 AS STATION HAS FORWARDED ALL EXEMPLARS. MOREOVER STATION LACKS FACILITIES FOR REPRODUCTION AVAILABLE HQS. VOTER'S REGISTRATION 31 AND DRIVER'S LICENSE 31 SHOWING ANY MEXICO CITY ADDRESS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AND SUFFICIENT FOR RECOVERY MAIL FROM GENERAL DELIVERY.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *AMMUG-1 ANXIOUS WRITE WIFE IN CUBA AND TELL HER HE OK.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

3/R

Temp copy in C/S file

AMMUG-1 file

7 May 64

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 40

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 35/74

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR WH/COG 8, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, SDG, CS/SGO, ADDP, DDP, SECURY

16-24

S E C R E T 021952Z CITE [MONTEVIDEO] 5282 3 Nov 67 IN 85636

16-23 16-20

DIRECTOR INFO [SANTIAGO] JMWAVE [RIO DE JANEIRO]

16-23

REFERENCE: [SANTIAGO] 5331 (IN 83968)

1. IF REFERENCE REQUEST CARRIED OUT WISH CONSIDER HAVING AMMUG-1 ALSO VISIT [MONTEVIDEO] 16-24 FOR SIMILAR PRESENTATION. IF PLAN FEASIBLE, REQUEST EVALUATION AMMUG-1'S POTENTIAL IMPACT, BOTH AS PERSON AND TIMELINESS HIS INFORMATION, FOR PRESENTATION BEFORE [MINISTER 06 OF INTERIOR] AND [CHIEF 06 OF AVALANCHE.]

2. BELIEVE SUCH BRIEFING IN NEAR FUTURE MIGHT ASSIST US IN CONTINUING EFFORTS CONVINCE [GOU] 08 NEED YM SUPPORT NEWLY CREATED [DIRECTORATE 06 OF INTELLIGENCE], UNIT FIRST OF ITS KIND AND FIVE [AVALANCHE] 08 OFFICERS SOON TO RETURN FROM WOFIRM TRAINING AND BEGIN OPERATIONS.

S E C R E T

SECRE

10/80

Field Distribution:
(1 copy each)

COS/Asuncion
COS/Belo Horizonte
COS/Bogota
COS/Brasilia
COS/Buenos Aires
COS/Caracas
COB/Cordoba
COS/Georgetown
COS/Guayaquil
COS/Guatemala City
COS/Kingston
COS/La Paz
COS/Lima
COS/Managua

99

COS/Mexico City
COB/Monterrey
COS/Montevideo
COS/Panama City
COS/Paramaribo
COB/Porto Alegre
COS/Port au Spain
COS/Port au Prince
COB/Quito
COB, Recife
COS/Rio de Janeiro
COS/San Jose
COS/San Salvador
COS/Santiago
COS/Santo Domingo
COB/Sao Paulo
COS/Tegucigalpa

99

COS/JMWAVE
REP/LANT
COS/Algiers
COS/Casablanca
COS/Rabat
COS/Tunis
COS/Dar Es Salaam
COS/Pretoria
COS/Yaounde
COS/Bamako
COS/Conakry
COS/Dakar
COS/Accra
COS/Lagos
COS/Kinshasa
COS/Bujumbura
COS/Addis Ababa
COS/Khartoum
COS/Seoul
COS/Bangkok
COS/Saigon

99

COS/Djakarta
COS/Vientiene
COS/Tokyo
COS/Hong Kong
COB/Jerusalem
COS/Amman
COS/Beirut
COS/Cairo
COS/Karachi
COS/New Delhi'
COS/Colombo
COS/Nicosia
COS/Ankara

99

COS/Athens
[illegible]ran
[illegible]
[illegible]
COB/Berlin
COS/Berne
COB/Geneva
COS/Vienna
COS/Copenhagen
COS/Stockholm
COS/Helsinki
COS/Oslo
COS/Paris
COS/Ottawa
COS/London
COS/Rome
COS/The Hague
COS/Brussels
COS/Lisbon
COS/Madrid
COB/Barcelona
COB/New York

99

[illegible] FILE

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 4 TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 24

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/IC-2, FI/INT-2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 191645Z CITE SAN SALVADOR 6756

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR 19 Apr 67 IN 48874

REFS: A. SAN SALVADOR 6727 (IN 32525)

B. SAN SALVADOR 6711 (IN 20433)

1. SUBJECT REF A NOT YET LOCATED BY NATIONAL GUARD BUT STATION WOULD LIKE AMMUG-1 TO STAND BY IF POSSIBLE FOR THIS AND OTHER OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES INVOLVING DGI TRAINED SALVADORANS KNOWN TO AMMUG-1.

2. AT OUR REQUEST JUSLOOP-1 HAS ORDERED ARREST OF JOSE REMBERTO CARRILLO CALDERON (201-758959). STATION PASSED CARRILLO'S ADDRESS IN AHUACHAPAN. PLAN IS TO HAVE CARRILLO BROUGHT TO ISOLATED NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS IN SAN SALVADOR WHERE HE WILL BE INTERROGATED AND RECRUITMENT ATTEMPTED FOR JOINT OPERATION AGAINST PCES.

3. ALEJANDRO GOMEZ MONTANO (201-751265) IS SUBJECT OF REF B RECRUITMENT INDUCEMENT LETTER. WAS ARRESTED BY POLICE ON 29 MARCH 1967 FOR NOT POSSESSING LEGAL IDENTIFICATION CARD. UNILATERAL AGENT JUMUD-13 CANNOT PROMISE THAT GOMEZ CAN BE DETAINED ANY LONGER SINCE LEGAL HEARING ~~YNG~~ HAS BEEN HELD AND HE IS TO BE RELEASED AS SOON AS RELATIVES

Maria

SECRET

20/RS

16-26

PAGE 2 SAN SALVADOR 6756 SECRET

61

POST NOMINAL BOND. IMMINENT RELEASE EXPECTED. JUMUD-13 SAID HE THOUGHT HE COULD ARREST 04 GOMEZ AGAIN 15 DAYS AFTER RELEASE AND HOLD HIM IN JAIL OVER WEEKEND TO ALLOW 16-26 STATION TO MAKE RECRUITMENT PITCH. 61 JUMUD-13, HOWEVER, NOT VERY DEFINITE IN HIS OFFER AND SINCE HE HAS NOT BEEN THE MOST EFFECTIVE AGENT IN THE PAST, 16-26 STATION PREFERS COMPLETELY UNILATERAL PITCH. AS SOON AS 04 GOMEZ IS RELEASED AND RELOCATED, WE WILL REQUEST AMMUG-1 PRESENCE 16-26 SAN SALVADOR TO MAKE UNILATERAL PITCH. IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO FALL BACK ON JOINT RECRUITMENT PITCH IN JAIL, AMMUG-1'S SERVICES WILL STILL BE NEEDED.

SECRET

BT

NNNN

8/Rs

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-6-102/4
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. SC

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 9 TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
DISSEM BY 2

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/CI/OPS, C/CA/2, C/CA/PEG, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 251700Z CITE GUAT[redacted] 6231 21-2

DIRECTOR

25 May 66 25182

IS AMUG-1 DEBRIEFING (SPANISH VERSION) FORWARDED HGGW-3947 22 CLEARED FOR PASSAGE TO LIAISON? 24 IF SO, PLAN GIVE PRESENT COPY TO COL ARRIAGA. 06 PLS ADVISE. IF AFFIRMATIVE, PLS SEND ADDITIONAL COPY FOR STATION. 76-2 RETENTION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

AN	FI

ABSTRACT X

NNNN

19-6-102/4
25 May 1966

5/20

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-311/01258-65
SUBJECT	Policy Guidance Directives for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in Haiti	DATE DISTR.	4 February 1965
		NO. PAGES	6
		REFERENCES	CS-311/00115-64 CS-311/00345-64
DATE OF INFO.	1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	June 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directives for Cuban intelligence representatives in Haiti, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia -- DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN).

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: HAITI

Priority:

1. Plans of aggression against Cuba.
2. Progressive political forces.
3. Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.
4. Movement for solidarity with Cuba.
5. Strategic information.
6. The Communist Party of Haiti. (Party of Popular Accord.)

Important:

7. Relations with the United States.
8. Internal politics of the country.
9. Social situation.
10. Internal situation of the Armed Forces.
11. The Church.
12. Functions, characteristics, and information on members of the foreign service and the accredited diplomatic corps in the country.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REPCINCLANT	I&NS							
(Note. Field distribution indicated by "#".)								

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

For Distribution See Attached Page

LX-2307
NP (AMMUG-1)
CS-311/01258-65

CI/LS 13 (for AF/OSI, ACSI, ONI, SY, FBI, DIA - 2 each)
TOTALS IE 3, CI 21, RID/AN 1, WH SA 46(5), SR 4, FI 3
nd 23(33), AF 8(8), EE 8(10), FE 12(8), NE 7(19)

LIAISON

COORDINATING RELEASING

R RW
Feb

Hdqrs Dissem

WH/COPS	1	
WH/PO/A	1	
WH/PO/B	1	
WH/1	1	
WH/2	13	
WH/3	1	
WH/3/V	1	
WH/4	1	
WH/5	1	
WH/6	1	
WH/R	1	
WH/SA/EOB	5	
WH/SA/MOB	5	
WH/SA/R	4	
WH/SA/Int	1	
WH/SA/CI	30	
WH/SA/SO/NS	1	
CI/Staff	5	
CI/Liaison	1	
CI/R&A	3	
RID/AN	1	99
AF/1	1	
AF/2	1	
AF/3	1	
AF/4	1	
AF/R	3	
AF/CI	1	
EE/K	1	
EE/SA	1	
EE/BR	1	
EE/YA	1	
EE/H	1	
EE/P	1	
EE/C	1	
EE/IIS	1	
FE/PMI/I	1	
FE/JKO/JO	1	
FE/JKO/K	1	
FE/VNC/VN	1	
FE/R	4	
FE/CI	4	
NE/AA/L&S	1	
NE/AA/AP	1	
NE/AA/E	1	
NE/AA/I	1	
NE/5/P	1	99
NE/6/C&I	1	
NE/Intel	1	
SR/CI	1	
SR/CI/K	1	
SR/RR	1	
SR/O/WH	1	

WE/1	1
WE/2	1
WE/3	1
WE/4	1
WE/5	1
WE/BC	1
WE/R	1

Field Dissem

WH/MEXI	1
WH/MNTY	1
WH/MRID	1
WH/SDOM	1
WH/PIBO	1
WH/POSN	1
WH/KNGS	1
WH/PRIN	1
WH/GORG	1
WH/MANA	1
WH/SJOS	1
WH/SALV	1
WH/TEGU	1
WH/GUAT	1
WH/LAPA	1
WH/BOGO	1
WH/QUIT	1
WH/GAYA	1
WH/LIMA	1
WH/CARA	1
WH/BUEN	1
WH/COBA	1
WH/MONT	1
WH/ASUN	1
WH/SAGO	1
WH/RIOD	1
WH/CURI	1
WH/BRIL	1
WH/SAOP	1
WH/BHIA	1
WH/BEHO	1
WH/LGRE	1
WH/RECI	1
WH/SA/WAVE	5
AF/ALGI	1
AF/ORNA	1
AF/RABA	1
AF/CASB	1
AF/ACCR	1
AF/CNRY	1
AF/BAKO	1
AF/DARE	1
EE/VIEN	1
EE/SBUR	1
EE/CYRU	1
EE/ATHE	1
EE/SLON	1
EE/BERN	1

EE/GNVA	1	
EE/ZURI	1	
EE/HAMB	1	
EE/KAVA	1	
FE/DJAK	1	
FE/MEDN	1	
FE/SURA	1	
FE/TOKY	1	
FE/OKIE	1	
FE/SEOU	1	
FE/SAIG	1	
FE/KOBE	1	
NE/COLO	1	
NE/NEWD	1	
NE/BOMB	1	
NE/CALC	1	
NE/MDRS	1	
NE/KUWA	1	
NE/KAHI	1	99
NE/DACC	1	
NE/LAHO	1	
NE/RAWL	1	
NE/BAGH	1	
NE/BEIR	1	
NE/DAMA	1	
NE/ALEP	1	
NE/JIDD	1	
NE/DAHA	1	
NE/TAIZ	1	
NE/CAIR	1	
NE/ALEX	1	
WE/BRUS	1	
WE/COPE	1	
WE/HELS	1	
WE/OTTA	1	
WE/ROME	1	
WE/MILA	1	
WE/HAGU	1	
WE/OSLO	1	
WE/LISB	1	
WE/MADR	1	
WE/BARC	1	
WE/STOC	1	
WE/LOND	1	
WE/PARI	1	

Liaison Dissem

IE/Canada (RCMP)	11	1
IE/British	11	1
L/WASH/BR	11	1

6/PV

13. The press.
14. Operative data.

Necessary:

15. Condition of the national economy.
16. Governmental structure and functions of its organs.

Essential:

1. PLANS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA:

   a. Military pacts.

   b. Operations within the OAS (Organization of American States) and the JID (Junta Inter-Americana de Defensa - Inter-American Defense Board).

   c. Possibilities of a break with Cuba by the countries which have diplomatic relations with her.

   d. Possibilities of isolation through the application of Inter-American Treaties such as the Treaty of Rio and the Punta del Este agreements.

2. PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL FORCES:

   a. The Party of Popular Accord (PEP), strength, organization, leaders. Information on the same. Programs, ties with foreign leftist political parties. Propaganda methods. Attitude toward the Cuban Revolution.

   b. Other political organizations. Leaders, information on the same. Forces, propaganda methods, programs. Ties.

   c. Contact and knowledge, reaction to political and economic changes in Cuba.

3. ATTITUDE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARD THE CUBAN REVOLUTION:

   a. Toward the Second Declaration of Havana.

   b. With regard to Cuban-Soviet relations in questions affecting Cuba and world peace.

   c. With regard to accusations that Cuba is a base of Communist aggression against the Latin American countries.

4. MOVEMENT FOR SOLIDARITY WITH CUBA:

   a. Find out whether the Solidarity Movement has been organized, in what form it functions, who its directors are, etc.

   b. Find out the possibilities for demonstrations of active solidarity that the progressive organizations can offer.

5. STRATEGIC INFORMATION:

   a. Because of its nearness to our coasts and favorable position for carrying out any kind of action against Cuba, the search must be undertaken for information concerning the possibility that imperialism is using this island as a base of operations against our country.

b. Because of the lack of information to guide the search for concrete data and information, the established principle must be followed of working along the departmental lines, common to all sections of the Department.

c. Notwithstanding what has been previously mentioned, we deem it advantageous to point out several important questions on which work must be begun immediately.

BASES OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS:

a. Localization of camps or bases of operations of counter-revolutionary launches. Characteristics of the same. Ships encountered in this. Nationality of the individuals forming the crew of the ships, armaments of the same, plans and objectives of their attacks, and date when they will be carried out.

b. Counterrevolutionary organizations which will participate in these activities, elements which will be in charge of the same, names, and functions.

c. Utilization of Dominican elements (Trujillo followers) in this work.

ARMED FORCES OF HAITI:

a. Organizations of the Armed Forces, units and troops, armaments, transport, and bases, commanding officers of the same. Budgetary allotments.

b. Military agreements of a secret nature signed by Haiti with the United States for the Latin American countries. Terms of the same. Established agreements.

c. Utilization of the territory of Haiti for carrying out Latin American army manoeuvres. Dates of the same and armies which are participating. Troops.

d. Military concentrations of any type which are carried out on Haitian territory. Armies, units, and troops. Date.

6. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF HAITI. (PARTY OF POPULAR ACCORD):

a. Attitude toward the Second Declaration of Havana.

b. Attitude concerning Cuban-Soviet relations.

c. Attitude toward the lines followed by Cuba in the national and international political systems.

d. Attitude with regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement:

In the case of China and the USSR.

In the case of Albania and the USSR.

With regard to Yugoslavia-China-USSR-Albania.

With regard to peace.

With regard to peaceful coexistence.

e. Internal situation in the Party of Popular Accord:

Forces.

Activities.

Disagreements.

Leaders (information on the same).

f. Relations with leftist forces:

Disagreements.

Possibilities of uniting all of the leftist forces.

g. Methods of combat officially adopted by the party.

h. Work of the party in the cities and the countryside, tending toward the creation of revolutionary awareness in the people.

i. Relations of the party with the bourgeois parties.

j. Solidarity work with the Cuban Revolution.

k. Publicity media which the Party organizes.

l. Repression endured by the party at the hands of the Duvalier dictatorship. Status of the party with regard to legal and illegal operations.

m. Relations of the party with the Dominican Popular Socialist Party and the Communist Parties of other Latin American countries.

Important:

7. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES:

a. Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps.

b. Relations with North American credit organizations.

c. North American military assistance, role of the American military mission.

d. The North American Embassy. Information on the Ambassador and Embassy personnel.

e. Activities of the North American Intelligence corps.

8. INTERNAL POLICY OF THE COUNTRY:

a. Existing bourgeois political parties: composition, forces, propaganda methods, leaders, information on the same. Programs.

b. Relations of the bourgeois political parties with the "Yankee" Embassy, the monopolies, and the churches.

c. Political organizations, information on the same, origin, ties. Orientation.

d. Need of collaborators for information.

e. Where the political parties obtain funds.

9. SOCIAL SITUATION:

a. Conflicts of economic origin manifested as racial demands. Leaders, information on the same.

b. Economic and political predominance of racial groups. Relations of these groups with the "Yankee" Embassy. Leaders, information on the same.

c. Worker, student, and peasant organizations. Structure, strength, and orientation. Leaders, information on the same.

10. INTERNAL SITUATION OF THE ARMED FORCES:

a. The armed forces. Structure. Social composition, organizations, equipment. Troops. Barracks or encampments.

b. Coupist (coup d'état) groups within the Armed Forces. Information on Colonel Ornei, his ties, etc.

c. Military relations of Haiti with other Latin American countries.

d. Ideological training of the Armed Forces. Material and reasoning used.

e. Information on soldiers who are in the International Organizations of the JID and U.N. and on the military attachés in the Latin American countries.

f. Restrictive bodies; organization and activities.

11. THE CHURCH:

a. Eclesiastical Hierarchy.

b. Situation between the native and foreign clergy.

c. Participation of the Church in the internal political life of the country. Governmental opposition.

d. Influence of the Church among the popular sectors; workers, peasants, students.

e. Campaigns of the Church against Cuba, arguments.

f. Relation of the Church with the plans of the United States.

g. Influence of the Church on education in the country.

12. FUNCTIONS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INFORMATION ON MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN THE COUNTRY:

a. U.N.

b. OAS and JID.

c. Officials in and from the Latin American countries.

d. Information on the internal political life of the country, obtained in diplomatic circles.

13. THE PRESS:

a. Information on journalists and the existing dissemination organs. The possibilities of using the journalists both in the country and abroad, for our work.

14. OPERATIVE INFORMATION:

a. Possibilities of illegally penetrating into the country and taking advantage of the proximity of the eastern coasts of Cuba.

Necessary:

15. CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY:

a. North American investments and their influence on the country.

b. Belgian investments and their influence on the country.

c. Other foreign capital and its influence on the country.

d. Level of unemployment.

e. Exports and imports, levels and characteristics.

f. Characteristics of domestic capital. Economic areas of major investment, its relationships with foreign capital.

g. Haiti's position with regard to Central American economic integration.

16. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANS:

a. Relations between the Presidency and the Ministries.

b. Information on personages closest to and most influential with Duvalier.

c. The Congress. The most outstanding figures. Relations with the Government, the "Yankee" Embassy, and the monopolistic enterprises.

d. The Judiciary persons holding high positions. Important laws. Restrictive laws. Relationships between the Judiciary and other authorities.

e. Information on officials having authority over areas of the country.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-311/00466-65
SUBJECT	Policy Guidance Directives for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in the Dominican Republic	DATE DISTR.	11 January 1965
		NO. PAGES	8
		REFERENCES	CS-311/00115-64 CS-311/00345-64
DATE OF INFO.	1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	June 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directive for Cuban intelligence representatives in the Dominican Republic, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia--DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN). It may be noted that this directive was prepared during the régime of Juan Bosch Gaviño.

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO (sic)

Priority

1. Collective action.
2. Status of leftist forces.
3. Dominican Republic Armed Forces.
4. Dominican Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano).
5. Training camps and operations bases.
6. Counterrevolutionary organizations.
7. Repressive corps and CIA Santo Domingo.
8. Status of political parties or groups.
9. Solidarity with Cuba movement.
10. Relations with United States.
11. Church.
12. Armed forces internal situation.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XN	OCR	FBI 2
REPCINCLANT I&NS								

(Note. Field distribution indicated by "#")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

For Distribution See Attached Page

LX-2158
NP (AMMUG-1)
CS-311/00466-65

CI/LS 12 (for AF/OSI, ACSI, ONI, SY, FBI, DIA - 2 each)

TOTALS IE 3, CI 21, RID/AN 1, WH SA 46(5), SR 4, FI 3, WH 23(33), AF 8(8), EE 8(10), FE 12(8), NE 7(19)

LIAISON #

COORDINATING REL/ISING

RWT
:eb

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Hdqrs Dissem

WH/COPS	1
WH/PO/A	1
WH/PO/B	1
WH/1	1
WH/2	13
WH/3	1
WH/3/V	1
WH/4	1
WH/5	1
WH/6	1
WH/R	1
WH/SA/EOB	5
WH/SA/MOB	5
WH/SA/R	4
WH/SA/Int	1
WH/SA/CI	30
WH/SA/SO/NS	1
CI/Staff	5
CI/Liaison	1
CI/R&A	3
RID/AN	1
AF/1	1
AF/2	1
AF/3	1
AF/4	1
AF/R	3
AF/CI	1
EE/K	1
EE/SA	1
EE/BR	1
EE/YA	1
EE/H	1
EE/P	1
EE/C	1
EE/IIS	1
FE/PMI/I	1
FE/JKO/JO	1
FE/JKO/K	1
FE/VNC/VN	1
FE/R	4
FE/CI	4
NE/AA/L&S	1
NE/AA/AP	1
NE/AA/E	1
NE/AA/I	1
NE/5/P	1
NE/6/C&I	1
NE/Intel	1
SR/CI	1
SR/CI/K	1
SR/RR	1
SR/O/WH	1

WE/1	1
WE/2	1
WE/3	1
WE/4	1
WE/5	1
WE/BC	1
WE/R	1

Field Dissem

WH/MEXI	1
WH/MNTY	1
WH/MRID	1
WH/SDOM	1
WH/PIBO	1
WH/POSN	1
WH/KNGS	1
WH/PRIN	1
WH/GORG	1
WH/MANA	1
WH/SJOS	1
WH/SALV	1
WH/TEGU	1
WH/GUAT	1
WH/LAPA	1
WH/BOGO	1
WH/QUIT	1
WH/GAYA	1
WH/LIMA	1
WH/CARA	1
WH/BUEN	1
WH/COBA	1
WH/MONT	1
WH/ASUN	1
WH/SAGO	1
WH/RIOD	1
WH/CURI	1
WH/BRIL	1
WH/SAOP	1
WH/BHIA	1
WH/BEHO	1
WH/LGRE	1
WH/RECI	1

99

WH/SA/WAVE	5
AF/ALGI	1
AF/ORNA	1
AF/RABA	1
AF/CASB	1
AF/ACCR	1
AF/CNRY	1
AF/BAKO	1
AF/DARE	1
EE/VIEN	1
EE/SBUR	1
EE/CYRU	1
EE/ATHE	1
EE/SLON	1
EE/BERN	1

99

EE/GNVA	1
EE/ZURI	1
EE/HAMB	1
EE/KAVA	1
FE/DJAK	1
FE/MEDN	1
FE/SURA	1
FE/TOKY	1
FE/OKIE	1
FE/SEOU	1
FE/SAIG	1
FE/KOBE	1
NE/COLO	1
NE/NEWD	1
NE/BOMB	1
~~NE/CALC~~	1
NE/MDRS	1
NE/KUWA	1
NE/KAHI	1
NE/DACC	1
NE/LAHO	1
NE/RAWL	1
NE/BAGH	1
NE/BEIR	1
NE/DAMA	1
NE/ALEP	1
NE/JIDD	1
NE/DAHA	1
NE/TAIZ	1
NE/CAIR	1
NE/ALEX	1
WE/BRUS	1
WE/COPE	1
WE/HELS	1
WE/OTTA	1
WE/ROME	1
WE/MILA	1
WE/HAGU	1
WE/OSLO	1
WE/LISB	1
WE/MADR	1
WE/BARC	1
WE/STOC	1
WE/LOND	1
WE/PARI	1

99

Liaison Dissem

IE/Canada (RCMP) 11	1
IE/British 11	1
I./WASH/BR 11	1

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

6/PV

Important

13. Functions, characteristics, and personal data on members of the foreign service, and of the accredited diplomatic corps.
14. The press.

Necessary

15. Status of the national economy.
16. Structure of the government and functions of its organs.

INFORMATION GUIDELINES AND OBJECTIVES
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO

Priority

1. Collective Action.

   a) Political and military agreements adopted by regional organs against Cuba in which the Bosch government participates. Meetings in which the government's participation in the adoption thereof may be agreed on. Dominican government proposals on the Cuban case, and collective aggression.

   b) Participation of the government in troops in the aggression, units which would participate in the aggression, their chiefs and strength.

   c) Joint military maneuvers which may be held in Dominican territory by Latin American armies. Participating armies and units thereof.

   d) Military concentrations of Latin and Yankee armies, objectives thereof; presence therein of Cuban mercenaries, their conditions, U.S. Sol. (sic; soldiers?) such as mercenaries of the Plaza Giron type, etc.

   e) Plans of provocations devised by the Dominican government in order to show Cuban Government intervention in the country's internal affairs.

   f) Measures on travel to or from Cuba.

   g) Possibilities for break in relations by countries that may have relations with Cuba.

2. Status of Leftist Forces

   a) Progressive forces: organization, leaders, strength, position, and argumentation in the revolutionary struggle.

   b) Possibility for armed struggle.

   c) Contradictions and degree of unity among the leftist forces.

   d) Publications--circulation.

   e) Repression against leftist forces.

f) Contact with leftist forces in order to know their viewpoints regularly, at all times, and when we may need it, especially on political and economic changes which may take place in Cuba.

g) Student, peasant, and labor movements. Organization, strength, leaders, relations with the leftist forces, degree of unity.

h) U.S. and Church penetration in the mass organizations (labor, peasant, student).

i) Possibilities of spontaneous manifestations of struggle.

j) Possibilities of guerrilla movement: groups, organizations, leaders, weapons, popular support, relations with the leftist forces.

k) Struggle in the city: groups, leaders, form of work, role of the labor and student movement, relations with the leftist forces, and with groups operating in the countryside.

l) Relations of exiles with the insurrectional movement.

3. Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic

a) Organization of the Dominican Armed Forces, units, and strength of the various corps. Bases, barracks, weapons, and transport of the Armed Forces. Locations.

b) Budgetary allocations of the Armed Forces; allocations to each branch (Navy, Air Force, and Army).

c) Existing bilateral agreements with the United States of a secret nature.

d) Secret or public military pacts entered into by Santo Domingo with countries in the Caribbean area, agreements by them concerning special arrangements.

e) Yankee military missions. Names, ranks, and functions of their members, their duties.

f) Armed Forces units with anti-guerrilla training, their strength, time spent in anti-guerrilla training, instructors giving it, weapons, and transportation in the possession of the units. Leaders of the units.

g) Other battalions or special units (parachutists, Rangers), units and strength, their leaders, transport, and weapons.

h) Changes in armament; quantity and characteristics of the new weapons acquired.

i) Participation by Dominican units in Central American or Caribbean military maneuvers, units participating, strength, their leaders.

4. The Dominican Communist Party (Dominican Popular Socialist Party, PSPD)

   a) Attitude toward the Second Havana Declaration.

   b) Attitude toward Cuban-Soviet relations.

   c) Attitude toward Cuba's political activities of a national or international nature.

   d) Position in regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement.

   e) In the case of China and the USSR.

   f) In the case of Albania and the USSR.

   g) As regards Yugoslavia, China, the USSR, and Albania.

   h) As regards Peace.

   i) Regarding peaceful coexistence.

   j) Internal status of the Party.

   k) Forces.

   l) Leaders (information concerning them).

   m) Disagreements.

   n) Relations with other leftist forces, disagreements, possibilities for unification.

   ñ) Methods of fighting officially adopted by the Party.

   o) Attitude of the Party toward the elections.

   p) Relations with the bourgeois parties and the government.

   q) Work for solidarity with Cuba.

   r) Publicity media.

   s) The establishment of permanent and temporary contact with the PSPD.

   t) Relations of the PSPD with other Latin-American Marxist parties.

5. Training Camps and Operational Bases

   a) Location of training camps for Cuban mercenaries, number of mercenaries in them. Type and duration of training, organizations participating in it. Plans and missions of the elements being trained. Leaders of the camps. Place where the Cuban mercenaries go, recruitment locations. Participation by national elements in the training of mercenaries of foreign nationality.

b) Presence of counterrevolutionary elements in the Dominican armed forces; names, assignments, and functions.

c) Location of counterrevolutionary operational bases on Dominican soil; type of bases. Water craft or aircraft present on them. Counterrevolutionary organization which appears at the head of them. Elements participating. Type of water craft and their characteristics. Their weapons, objectives, and plans of attack; dates when they are to be carried out.

6. Counterrevolutionary Organizations

a) Cuban counterrevolutionary organizations which are functioning in Santo Domingo; their leaders. Their contact with government personnel, especially with people in the new régime who are responsible for establishing such contact.

b) Contact by the Bosch government with the magazine Bohemia in Exile of Miguel Angel Quevedo; financial support given it by him, and through whom.

c) Contact with Carlos Prío and elements linked with the PRC; assistance to them. Contact with the counterrevolutionary organizations; contact with the political parties; elements through which it is effected.

d) Methods of communication by the elements in Santo Domingo with the counterrevolutionary centers in Miami; through whom the communications are established, and what means are used for this purpose.

e) Obtaining documents which prove that the Dominican government gives economic assistance to the counterrevolutionary elements.

f) Counterrevolutionaries who are now working in the Dominican state apparatus or in Yankee aid institutions; disagreements between them and the Dominican workers.

g) Connections between the counterrevolutionary organizations and the Trujillo régime. Documents proving these connections.

7. Repressive Bodies and CIA, Santo Domingo

a) Repressive bodies which function in Santo Domingo. Their functions. Activities carried on by them. Their leaders and principal officers. Working methods. Plans and objectives.

b) Intelligence organizations functioning in Santo Domingo. Leaders. Elements abroad. Their duties and functions. Activities carried on. Plans and objectives of Dominican Intelligence, principally against Cuba. Trujillist elements still functioning inside this body; duties and functions.

c) Cooperation between the Dominican repressive bodies and those of the Latin American countries, especially those of Central America.

d) Meetings held with them, dates, and personnel participating in the meetings; locations. Points discussed, agreements arrived at against Cuba, and the Movement of National Liberation. Plans and objectives of the national security forces with regard to the Movement of National Liberation, means and resources mobilized, agents infiltrated into the political movements, repressive methods prescribed.

e) Contacts with Interpol. Cooperation with it. Restrictive measures regarding trips to Cuba. Agents.

f) Foreign advisers of the repressive forces and intelligence bodies; names, ranks, and positions; their functions; cases in which they have participated.

g) Leading functionaries of the CIA in the country: its office. Plans and objectives it pursues in Santo Domingo.

h) Nationals who are working for the CIA; names, ranks, and positions. Their methods and plans. Purpose of their work.

8. Status of the Parties or Political Groups

a) Their present status in regard to composition, strength, penetration, factions, leaders, programs, etc.

b) Participation in the government.

c) Relations of the political parties with the Embassy, the monopolies, the Church, and the Armed Forces.

d) Organizations of a fascist type: relations with the government, the Yankee Embassy, the Church; leaders, members, structure, anti-Communist campaign, arguments, attacks upon Cuba.

e) Provenience of the funds of the political parties.

f) Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.

g) Toward the Second Havana Declaration.

h) In regard to Cuban-Soviet relations, in questions which affect Cuba and world peace.

i) Concerning rightist and extreme rightist groups.

j) Reactions to the economic and political changes taking place in Cuba.

9. Movement for Solidarity with Cuba

a) Possibility of active demonstrations in favor of Cuba: groups, leaders, strength, organization, participants, relations with the forces of the left and other progressive forces.

b) Repression directed at the movement for solidarity with Cuba.

c) Propaganda campaigns for and against. Periodicals; themes.

10. Relations with the United States

a) Alliance for Progress.

b) The American Embassy. Information on the activities of the Ambassador and the personnel of the Embassy. Relations with the reactionary organizations. Relations with the Church. Government functionaries in close contact with the Embassy.

11. The Church

a) Ecclesiastical hierarchy. Information concerning it.

b) Attitude and disagreements between the national clergy and foreign countries.

c) Participation by the Church in the internal politics of the country.

d) Secular organizations of the Church (such as young people, Catholic labor, Catholic knights).

e) Penetration of the Church into the educational system of the country on various levels.

12. Internal Status of the Armed Forces

a) Information on the military chiefs and the activities they carry on. Groups they observe. Trends and disagreements.

Important

13. Functioning; Characteristics and Information on Members of the Foreign Service of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Country

a) United Nations, Organization of American States, the JID /Inter-American Defense Board/.

b) Latin American functionaries in this country. To work with the diplomatic circles accredited to the country.

14. The Press

a) Information on journalists and dissemination organs. Possibility of making use of them. Journalists in the country and abroad.

Required

15. Status of the National Economy

a) United States investments (new and old).

b) Participation by the national oligarchy in the economy. Industry, commerce, agriculture.

c) Utilization and location of Trujillo's property.

d) Trend of the level of unemployment.

e) Relations of the country in regard to Central American economic integration.

f) Possibility of a new economic policy of the United States monopolies in the country.

g) Need for obtaining collaborators who will inform us periodically on economic questions.

16. Structure of the Government and Functioning of its Apparatus

a) Character of the government, program, international policy.

b) Relations between the Presidency and the ministries.

c) Functioning of the Congress. Most prominent figures. Relations with the Yankee Embassy. Representation of the bourgeois parties and the social classes.

d) The judiciary: personages occupying high positions; important laws. Repressive laws. Relations of the judiciary with the other authorities.

e) Information on personalities connected with Juan Bosch.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CSCI-316/01228-64

SUBJECT Fernando FUENTES Coba

DATE DISTR. 2 October 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE OF INFO. 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. October 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Fernando FUENTES Coba was a lieutenant in the Cuban Police Force and worked in the Confidential Department under Commander Efigenio ALMEJEIRAS, Chief of Police. Although source cannot verify it, he heard that FUENTES was discharged from the police force because of problems relating to drugs. The last source heard of FUENTES, he was working in a printing establishment in Halifax, Canada. Source described FUENTES as being about five feet eight inches tall and 160 pounds.1,2,3,4,5,6,7

Headquarters Comments

1. Included with a report dated 27 November 1959, was a complete list of the personnel employed by the Departamento Tecnico de Investigaciones (Technical Department of Investigations - DTI) as of 6 November 1959. Included on the list was one Sargeant Fernando FUENTES Cobas who worked in Bureau "A," the section responsible for foreign intelligence operations for the Policia Nacional Revolucionaria (National Revolutionary Police - PNR).

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT CINCSO # I&NS								

(Note field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA/EOB	1	WE/5/R	1	CI/LIA	1	E/CANADA	1		LX-1693 LX-1591
WH/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A	3	LE/BRITISH	1	ll	NO PROJECT(AMMUG/1)
WH/SA/R	1	5-2				L/WASH/BR	1	ll	CSCI-316/01228-64
WH/SA/CI	4			RID/AN	1				
WH/WAVE	1								COORDINATING
TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2). CI 4, RID 1								LIAISON	WMK:[illegible]:swk CI/[illegible]

201-265067

4/PN

2. An untested source gave a representative of this Agency a copy of a list of regulations issued on 15 May 1960 by the National Revolutionary Police, which came under the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, for the discipline of members of the Servicio Secreto Revolucionario (Cuban Revolutionary Secret Service - SSR). This document was signed by Fernando FUENTE Coba, Chief of the Confidential Section of the General Command of the National Revolutionary Police.

3. In a report dated 19 May 1962, an untested source, who was a guide and interpreter for the ICAP, a Cuban government agency which handled the needs of foreign visitors to Cuba, said that First Lieutenant Fernando COBAS was chief of the DTI until sometime in 1960 when he started working for the Tourist Police, a part of the PNR. In January or February 1961, COBAS transferred to the Transit Police.

4. In a report dated 20 September 1962, an untested source reported that Fernando FUENTES Covas was with the Policia Transita (Transit Police) in the DTI.

5. Another office of this Agency, in a report dated 26 December 1962, reported that Fernando FUENTES Coba, a Cuban national, had been convicted in 1957 of violation of the United States immigration laws. FUENTES was engaged in forging birth certificates to assist Cuban nationals to enter the United States as Puerto Ricans. FUENTES moved to Miami, where he became an ardent Castrista. In July 1959, he served as a provocateur in luring an American flyer, Rafael del PINO, to Cuba, ostensibly to smuggle someone out of Cuba. Because of his success in luring del PINO back to Cuba, where he was badly wanted by the Castro regime, FUENTES received an important position in the Confidential Bureau of the Cuban G-2, and for a time served as chief of the Bureau.

6. On 29 January 1963, a source whose reliability cannot be determined, reported that he had seen Fernando FUENTES Coba, described as a Castro agent, debark from the SS Shirley Lykes on 25 January 1963, at Port Everglades. 24

7. An [official BRITISH liaison service] reported on 25 February 1963, that Fernando FUENTES Coba was born on 21 June 1928, in Habana, Cuba. FUENTES was a former permanent resident of the United States from 1946 to 1949, and served in the United States Army. At the time of this report FUENTES was described as a photographer with the Tourist Commission in Habana. Source, in a report dated October 1963, reported that FUENTES was settled in Halifax, Canada, and had obtained temporary employment.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CSCI-316/00704-64
SUBJECT	(fnu) RELOVA	DATE DISTR.	1 September 1964
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	1964		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Washington, D. C. August 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments:

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

(fnu) RELOVA, pseudonym "Wilberto," is an officer of the Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence - DGI) in Cuba. He resides at Calle 15 number 2419, Reparto Juan Manuel Marquez, Palya de Santa Fe, Mariano, Habana. 1,2,3,4,5,6

Headquarters Comments

1. An airline passenger manifest revealed that one Osvaldo RELOVA Peuichet, probably identical with the above Subject, left Mexico for Habana on 8 July 1963 and was the holder of Cuban passport number D/63/415.

2. An official Jamaican source, in a report dated 16 October 1963, stated that Osvaldo RELOVA, the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, arrived in Kingston on 14 October 1963. He was in Kingston for one week and lived at the Cuban Consulate office. RELOVA was reportedly making an inspection trip. RELOVA was born on 13 August 1930, in Habana. His home address was given as 15H 2419 Santa Fe, Habana. He carried Cuban passport number D/63/415, issued in Habana on 17 June 1963.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
	REP	CINCLANT	CINCSO ≠	I&NS				

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "≠".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA EOB 1	WE 5 R 1	CI LIA 1	IE CANADA 1	~~LA-1650~~
WH SA MOB 1	WE MADR 2	CI R&A 3	IE BRITISH 1	NO PROJECT (AMMUG/1
WH SA R 1			1 WASH BR 1	CSCI-316/00704-64
WH SA CI 4		RID/AN 1		
WH WAVE 1				COORDINATING

4/BR

3. In a report dated 19 October 1963, source unknown, it was stated that one Osvaldo RELOVA Penichet was appointed administrator of "Envases del Cerro, S.A." firm, located on Calzada del Cerro Avenue, Habana.

4. A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 23 October 1963, revealed that Osvaldo RELOVA, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, left Kingston for Toronto on 21 October 1963, on TCA flight number 885.

5. An official Canadian source, in a report dated 26 November 1963, said that Osvaldo RELOVA Penicitet, born on 13 August 1930, was not the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada as previous reports stated. Rather, RELOVA, who was a frequent visitor to Canada, traveled as an "Embassy Inspector." He carried Cuban Diplomatic passport D/63/415 with Mexican visa number OF-7090; he had no Canadian visa. The address on his passport was given as 15/3 number 2419, Santa Fe Banch (sic), Habana. RELOVA entered Canada on 16 August 1963, destined to visit Jesus YANES Rodriguez, Cuban Commerical Attache in Montreal. He departed Canada for Mexico on 25 August 1963, in the company of Alberta MENDUCA.

6. A former Cuban Intelligence officer who has been living in the United States since 1963 and whose reporting over the past nine months has proven reliable, gave the following information on 21 July 1964, on Osvaldo RELOBA Penechet (presumably identical with RELOVA):

> In early 1961, RELOBA was an administrator of a section of the Consolidated Hardware Stores and annexes. In late 1961 he went to see source to get help with an investigation on a Mr. BARRAL, Administrator of the Consolidated (sic). RELOBA was requesting source's aid in the belief that source was still working for G-2; source did not tell him otherwise. RELOBA is a new Communist who wants to be more than MARX and is trying to instruct everyone around him. Source said that RELOBA was born about 1934, is 164 pounds, five feet nine inches in height, has a medium thin build, a long face, and a long thin neck. He has dark eyes, black hair, is partially bald, and has a small, thin mustache.

11BR

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT Julian NOVAS Fernandez

REPORT NO. CSCI-316/00699-64

DATE DISTR. 27 August 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE OF INFO. 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Source was shown a photograph of Julian NOVAS Fernandez and source identified him as a Cuban Intelligence Officer. Source saw NOVAS at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964 and assumed he was a functionary there. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,

Headquarters Comments

1. Although source saw Julian NOVAS Fernandez at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964, the records of this Agency reveal that source was probably in error in assuming that NOVAS was assigned to that Embassy and it is more likely that he was just passing through. The following traces by this Agency is the basis for this conclusion.

2. An official Jamaican source, in a report dated 24 March 1964, stated that Julian NOVAS Fernandez arrived in Kingston, Jamaica, on 18 March 1964, to take up his duties at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston as Commercial Attache. Source said that NOVAS has the appearance of an American and speaks excellent English. Since his arrival he has been especially occupied with girls. It should be noted that

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT CINCSO # I&NS								

Note: Field distribution indicated by "#")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH SA/FOB	1	WE/S/R	1	CI LIA	1	IIR CANADA	1		LX-1645
WH SA/MOB	1	WE MADR	2	CI R&A	3	IE/BRITISH	1		CSCI-316/00699-64
WH SA/R	1					L/WASH/BR	1		NO PROJECT(AMMUG/1)
WH SA/CI	1			RID AN	1				COORDINATING
WH WAVE	1								RELEASING WMK:LD:swk

TOTALS
WH/SA 7 (1) WE 1 (2) CI 4 RID 1

LIAISON #

4/BR

his wife did not accompany him and source speculated that her arrival may be delayed in view of NOVAS' present inclination for feminine diversion.

3. In a report dated March 1964, this same source said that Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the Cuban Commercial Attache at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston, Jamaica, was born on 2 September 1938, in Habana, Cuba. He carried diplomatic passport D/64/90 which was issued in Habana on 20 February 1964. His home address was given as Carman No. 18, Vibora. He arrived in Kingston from Mexico on 18 March 1964, on Mexicana Flight Number 305.

4. This same source, in a report dated 28 April 1964, stated that the wife of Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the recently arrived Cuban Commercial Attache, arrived in Kingston on 22 April 1964, via Mexico. Her name is Amarilis Marta VALDES Hijuelos and she was born on 19 May 1937, in Jiquani, Oriente, Cuba. VALDES has been indisposed since her arrival in Kingston; this is probably due to her advanced pregnancy. Her home address in Cuba is Avenida 31, Number 3622, Habana. She carried diplomatic passport D/64/239, issued in Habana on 9 April 1964.

5. This same source, in a report dated 9 May 1964, noted that the salary and allowances of the new Cuban Commercial Attache, Julian NOVAS Fernandez, suggests that he is the new Cuban Intelligence Service chief in Jamaica, succeeding Gerardo SANCHEZ Robert.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-311/01258-65
SUBJECT	Policy Guidance Directives for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in Haiti	DATE DISTR.	4 February 1965
		NO. PAGES	6
		REFERENCES	CS-311/00115-64 CS-311/00345-64
DATE OF INFO.	1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	June 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directive for Cuban intelligence representatives in Haiti, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia -- DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN).

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: HAITI

Priority:

1. Plans of aggression against Cuba.
2. Progressive political forces.
3. Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.
4. Movement for solidarity with Cuba.
5. Strategic information.
6. The Communist Party of Haiti. (Party of Popular Accord.)

Important:

7. Relations with the United States.
8. Internal politics of the country.
9. Social situation.
10. Internal situation of the Armed Forces.
11. The Church.
12. Functions, characteristics, and information on members of the foreign service and the accredited diplomatic corps in the country.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REPCINCLANT	I&NS							

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

For Distribution See Attached Page

LX-2307
NP (AMMUG-1)
CS-311/01258-65

CI/LS 12 (for AF/OSI, ACSI, ONI, SY, FBI, DIA - 2 each)
TOTALS IE 3, CI 21, RID/AN 1, WH/SA 46(5), SR 4, FI 3,
WH 23(33), AF 8(8), EF 8(10), FE 12(8), NE 7(19)
LIAISON
COORDINATING
RELEASING
RWT
eb

Hdqrs Dissem

WH/COPS	1	
WH/PO/A	1	
WH/PO/B	1	
WH/1	1	
WH/2	13	
WH/3	1	
WH/3/V	1	
WH/4	1	
WH/5	1	
WH/6	1	
WH/R	1	
WH/SA/EOB	5	
WH/SA/MOB	5	
WH/SA/R	4	
WH/SA/Int	1	
WH/SA/CI	30	
WH/SA/SO/NS	1	
CI/Staff	5	
CI/Liaison	1	
CI/R&A	3	
RID/AN	1	
AF/1	1	
AF/2	1	
AF/3	1	
AF/4	1	
AF/R	3	
AF/CI	1	
EE/K	1	
EE/SA	1	
EE/BR	1	
EE/YA	1	
EE/H	1	
EE/P	1	
EE/C	1	
EE/IIS	1	
FE/PMI/I	1	
FE/JKO/JO	1	
FE/JKO/K	1	
FE/VNC/VN	1	
FE/R	4	
FE/CI	4	
NE/AA/L&S	1	
NE/AA/AP	1	
NE/AA/E	1	
NE/AA/I	1	
NE/5/P	1	
NE/6/C&I	1	
NE/Intel	1	
SR/CI	1	
SR/CI/K	1	
SR/RR	1	
SR/O/WH	1	

WE/1	1	
WE/2	1	
WE/3	1	
WE/4	1	
WE/5	1	
WE/BC	1	
WE/R	1	

Field Dissem

WH/MEXI	1	
WH/MNTY	1	
WH/MRID	1	
WH/SDOM	1	
WH/PIBO	1	
WH/POSN	1	
WH/KNGS	1	
WH/PRIN	1	
WH/GORG	1	
WH/MANA	1	
WH/SJOS	1	
WH/SALV	1	
WH/TEGU	1	
WH/GUAT	1	
WH/LAPA	1	
WH/BOGO	1	99
WH/QUIT	1	
WH/GAYA	1	
WH/LIMA	1	
WH/CARA	1	
WH/BUEN	1	
WH/COBA	1	
WH/MONT	1	
WH/ASUN	1	
WH/SAGO	1	
WH/RIOD	1	
WH/CURI	1	
WH/BRIL	1	
WH/SAOP	1	
WH/BHIA	1	
WH/BEHO	1	
WH/LGRE	1	
WH/RECI	1	
WH/SA/WAVE	5	
AF/ALGI	1	
AF/ORNA	1	
AF/RABA	1	
AF/CASB	1	99
AF/ACCR	1	
AF/CNRY	1	
AF/BAKO	1	
AF/DARE	1	
EE/VIEN	1	
EE/SBUR	1	
EE/CYRU	1	99
EE/ATHE	1	
EE/SLON	1	
EE/BERN	1	

EE/GNVA	1	
EE/ZURI	1	99
EE/HAMB	1	
EE/KAVA	1	
FE/DJAK	1	
FE/MEDN	1	
FE/SURA	1	99
FE/TOKY	1	
FE/OKIE	1	
FE/SEOU	1	
FE/SAIG	1	
FE/KOBE	1	99
NE/COLO	1	
NE/NEWD	1	
NE/BOMB	1	
NE/CALC	1	
NE/MDRS	1	
NE/KUWA	1	
NE/KAHI	1	
NE/DACC	1	
NE/LAHO	1	
NE/RAWL	1	99
NE/BAGH	1	
NE/BEIR	1	
NE/DAMA	1	
NE/ALEP	1	
NE/JIDD	1	
NE/DAHA	1	
NE/TAIZ	1	
NE/CAIR	1	
NE/ALEX	1	
WE/BRUS	1	
WE/COPE	1	
WE/HELS	1	
WE/OTTA	1	
WE/ROME	1	
WE/MILA	1	
WE/HAGU	1	99
WE/OSLO	1	
WE/LISB	1	
WE/MADR	1	
WE/BARC	1	
WE/STOC	1	
WE/LOND	1	
WE/PARI	1	

Liaison Dissem

IE/Canada (RCMP)	1	11
IE/British	1	11
L/WASH/BR	1	11

11/BR

13. The press.
14. Operative data.

Necessary:

15. Condition of the national economy.
16. Governmental structure and functions of its organs.

Essential:

1. PLANS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA:

   a. Military pacts.

   b. Operations within the OAS (Organization of American States) and the JID (Junta Inter-Americana de Defensa - Inter-American Defense Board).

   c. Possibilities of a break with Cuba by the countries which have diplomatic relations with her.

   d. Possibilities of isolation through the application of Inter-American Treaties such as the Treaty of Rio and the Punta del Este agreements.

2. PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL FORCES:

   a. The Party of Popular Accord (PEP), strength, organization, leaders. Information on the same. Programs, ties with foreign leftist political parties. Propaganda methods. Attitude toward the Cuban Revolution.

   b. Other political organizations. Leaders, information on the same. Forces, propaganda methods, programs. Ties.

   c. Contact and knowledge, reaction to political and economic changes in Cuba.

3. ATTITUDE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARD THE CUBAN REVOLUTION:

   a. Toward the Second Declaration of Havana.

   b. With regard to Cuban-Soviet relations in questions affecting Cuba and world peace.

   c. With regard to accusations that Cuba is a base of Communist aggression against the Latin American countries.

4. MOVEMENT FOR SOLIDARITY WITH CUBA:

   a. Find out whether the Solidarity Movement has been organized, in what form it functions, who its directors are, etc.

   b. Find out the possibilities for demonstrations of active solidarity that the progressive organizations can offer.

5. STRATEGIC INFORMATION:

   a. Because of its nearness to our coasts and favorable position for carrying out any kind of action against Cuba, the search must be undertaken for information concerning the possibility that imperialism is using this island as a base of operations against our country.

b. Because of the lack of information to guide the search for concrete data and information, the established principle must be followed of working along the departmental lines, common to all sections of the Department.

c. Notwithstanding what has been previously mentioned, we deem it advantageous to point out several important questions on which work must be begun immediately.

BASES OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS:

a. Localization of camps or bases of operations of counterrevolutionary launches. Characteristics of the same. Ships encountered in this. Nationality of the individuals forming the crew of the ships, armaments of the same, plans and objectives of their attacks, and date when they will be carried out.

b. Counterrevolutionary organizations which will participate in these activities, elements which will be in charge of the same, names, and functions.

c. Utilization of Dominican elements (Trujillo followers) in this work.

ARMED FORCES OF HAITI:

a. Organizations of the Armed Forces, units and troops, armaments, transport, and bases, commanding officers of the same. Budgetary allotments.

b. Military agreements of a secret nature signed by Haiti with the United States for the Latin American countries. Terms of the same. Established agreements.

c. Utilization of the territory of Haiti for carrying out Latin American army manoeuvres. Dates of the same and armies which are participating. Troops.

d. Military concentrations of any type which are carried out on Haitian territory. Armies, units, and troops. Date.

6. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF HAITI. (PARTY OF POPULAR ACCORD):

a. Attitude toward the Second Declaration of Havana.

b. Attitude concerning Cuban-Soviet relations.

c. Attitude toward the lines followed by Cuba in the national and international political systems.

d. Attitude with regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement:

In the case of China and the USSR.

In the case of Albania and the USSR.

With regard to Yugoslavia-China-USSR-Albania.

With regard to peace.

With regard to peaceful coexistence.

e. Internal situation in the Party of Popular Accord:

Forces.

Activities.

Disagreements.

Leaders (information on the same).

f. Relations with leftist forces:

Disagreements.

Possibilities of uniting all of the leftist forces.

g. Methods of combat officially adopted by the party.

h. Work of the party in the cities and the countryside, tending toward the creation of revolutionary awareness in the people.

i. Relations of the party with the bourgeois parties.

j. Solidarity work with the Cuban Revolution.

k. Publicity media which the Party organizes.

l. Repression endured by the party at the hands of the Duvalier dictatorship. Status of the party with regard to legal and illegal operations.

m. Relations of the party with the Dominican Popular Socialist Party and the Communist Parties of other Latin American countries.

Important:

7. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES:

a. Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps.

b. Relations with North American credit organizations.

c. North American military assistance, role of the American military mission.

d. The North American Embassy. Information on the Ambassador and Embassy personnel.

e. Activities of the North American Intelligence corps.

8. INTERNAL POLICY OF THE COUNTRY:

a. Existing bourgeois political parties: composition, forces, propaganda methods, leaders, information on the same. Programs.

b. Relations of the bourgeois political parties with the "Yankee" Embassy, the monopolies, and the churches.

c. Political organizations, information on the same, origin, ties. Orientation.

d. Need of collaborators for information.

e. Where the political parties obtain funds.

9. SOCIAL SITUATION:

a. Conflicts of economic origin manifested as racial demands. Leaders, information on the same.

b. Economic and political predominance of racial groups. Relations of these groups with the "Yankee" Embassy. Leaders, information on the same.

c. Worker, student, and peasant organizations. Structure, strength, and orientation. Leaders, information on the same.

10. INTERNAL SITUATION OF THE ARMED FORCES:

a. The armed forces. Structure. Social composition, organizations, equipment. Troops. Barracks or encampments.

b. Coupist (coup d'état) groups within the Armed Forces. Information on Colonel Ornei, his ties, etc.

c. Military relations of Haiti with other Latin American countries.

d. Ideological training of the Armed Forces. Material and reasoning used.

e. Information on soldiers who are in the International Organizations of the JID and U.N.; and on the military attachés in the Latin American countries.

f. Restrictive bodies; organization and activities.

11. THE CHURCH:

a. Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.

b. Situation between the native and foreign clergy.

c. Participation of the Church in the internal political life of the country. Governmental opposition.

d. Influence of the Church among the popular sectors; workers, peasants, students.

e. Campaigns of the Church against Cuba, arguments.

f. Relation of the Church with the plans of the United States.

g. Influence of the Church on education in the country.

12. FUNCTIONS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INFORMATION ON MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN THE COUNTRY:

    a. U.N.

    b. OAS and JID.

    c. Officials in and from the Latin American countries..

    d. Information on the internal political life of the country, obtained in diplomatic circles.

13. THE PRESS:

    a. Information on journalists and the existing dissemination organs. The possibilities of using the journalists both in the country and abroad, for our work.

14. OPERATIVE INFORMATION:

    a. Possibilities of illegally penetrating into the country and taking advantage of the proximity of the eastern coasts of Cuba.

Necessary:

15. CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY:

    a. North American investments and their influence on the country.

    b. Belgian investments and their influence on the country.

    c. Other foreign capital and its influence on the country.

    d. Level of unemployment.

    e. Exports and imports, levels and characteristics.

    f. Characteristics of domestic capital. Economic areas of major investment, its relationships with foreign capital.

    g. Haiti's position with regard to Central American economic integration.

16. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANS:

    a. Relations between the Presidency and the Ministries.

    b. Information on personages closest to and most influential with Duvalier.

    c. The Congress. The most outstanding figures. Relations with the Government, the "Yankee" Embassy, and the monopolistic enterprises.

    d. The Judiciary persons holding high positions. Important laws. Restrictive laws. Relationships between the Judiciary and other authorities.

    e. Information on officials having authority over areas of the country.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CS-311/00466-65

SUBJECT Policy Guidance Directives for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in the Dominican Republic

DATE DISTR. 11 January 1965

NO. PAGES 8

REFERENCES CS-311/00115-64
CS-311/00

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE OF INFO. 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. June 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directive for Cuban intelligence representatives in the Dominican Republic, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia--DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN). It may be noted that this directive was prepared during the régime of Juan Bosch Gaviño.

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO (sic)

Priority

1. Collective action.
2. Status of leftist forces.
3. Dominican Republic Armed Forces.
4. Dominican Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano).
5. Training camps and operations bases.
6. Counterrevolutionary organizations.
7. Repressive corps and CIA Santo Domingo.
8. Status of political parties or groups.
9. Solidarity with Cuba movement.
10. Relations with United States.
11. Church.
12. Armed forces internal situation.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XX	OCR	FBI 2
REPCINCLANT I&NS								
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)								

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

For Distribution See Attached Page

LX-2158
NP (AMMUG-1)
CS-311/00466-65

CI/LS 12 (for AF OSI, ACSI, ONI, SY, FBI, DIA - 2 each)

COORDINATING

RELEASING

TOTALS IE 3, CI 21, RID/AN 1, WH/SA 46(5), SR 4, FI 3,
WH 23(33), AF 8(8), EE 8(10), FE 12(8), NE 7(19)

LIAISON #

RWT
:eh

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CS-311/00466-65

Hdqrs Dissem

WH/COPS	1	
WH/PO/A	1	
WH/PO/B	1	
WH/1	1	
WH/2	13	
WH/3	1	
WH/3/V	1	
WH/4	1	
WH/5	1	
WH/6	1	
WH/R	1	
WH/SA/EOB	5	
WH/SA/MOB	5	
WH/SA/R	4	
WH/SA/Int	1	
WH/SA/CI	30	
WH/SA/SO/NS	1	
CI/Staff	5	
CI/Liaison	1	
CI/R&A	3	
RID/AN	1	
AF/1	1	
AF/2	1	
AF/3	1	
AF/4	1	
AF/R	3	
AF/CI	1	
EE/K	1	
EE/SA	1	
EE/BR	1	
EE/YA	1	
EE/H	1	
EE/P	1	
EE/C	1	
EE/IIS	1	
FE/PMI/I	1	
FE/JKO/JO	1	
FE/JKO/K	1	
FE/VNC/VN	1	
FE/R	4	
FE/CI	4	
NE/AA/L&S	1	
NE/AA/AP	1	
NE/AA/E	1	
NE/AA/I	1	
NE/5/P	1	
NE/6/C&I	1	
NE/Intel	1	
SR/CI	1	
SR/CI/K	1	
SR/RR	1	
SR/O/WH	1	

WE/1	1	
WE/2	1	
WE/3	1	
WE/4	1	
WE/5	1	
WE/BC	1	
WE/R	1	

Field Dissem

WH/MEXI	1	
WH/MNTY	1	
WH/MRID	1	
WH/SDOM	1	
WH/PIBO	1	
WH/POSN	1	
WH/KNGS	1	
WH/PRIN	1	
WH/GORG	1	
WH/MANA	1	
WH/SJOS	1	
WH/SALV	1	
WH/TEGU	1	
WH/GUAT	1	99
WH/LAPA	1	
WH/BOGO	1	
WH/QUIT	1	
WH/GAYA	1	
WH/LIMA	1	
WH/CARA	1	
WH/BUEN	1	
WH/COBA	1	
WH/MONT	1	
WH/ASUN	1	
WH/SAGO	1	
WH/RIOD	1	
WH/CURI	1	
WH/BRIL	1	
WH/SAOP	1	
WH/BHIA	1	
WH/BEHO	1	
WH/LGRE	1	
WH/RECI	1	
WH/SA/WAVE	5	
AF/ALGI	1	
AF/ORNA	1	
AF/RABA	1	
AF/CASB	1	99
AF/ACCR	1	
AF/CNRY	1	
AF/BAKO	1	
AF/DARE	1	
EE/VIEN	1	
EE/SBUR	1	
EE/CYRU	1	99
EE/ATHE	1	
EE/SLON	1	
EE/BERN	1	

EE/GNVA	1	
EE/ZURI	1	99
EE/HAMB	1	
EE/KAVA	1	
FE/DJAK	1	
FE/MEDN	1	
FE/SURA	1	99
FE/TOKY	1	
FE/OKIE	1	
FE/SEOU	1	
FE/SAIG	1	
99 FE/KOBE	1	
NE/COLO	1	
NE/NEWD	1	
NE/BOMB	1	
NE/CALC	1	
NE/MDRS	1	
NE/KUWA	1	
NE/KAHI	1	
NE/DACC	1	99
NE/LAHO	1	
NE/RAWL	1	
NE/BAGH	1	
NE/BEIR	1	
NE/DAMA	1	
NE/ALEP	1	
NE/JIDD	1	
NE/DAHA	1	
NE/TAIZ	1	
NE/CAIR	1	
NE/ALEX	1	
WE/BRUS	1	
WE/COPE	1	
WE/HELS	1	
WE/OTTA	1	
WE/ROME	1	
WE/MILA	1	
WE/HAGU	1	
WE/OSLO	1	
WE/LISB	1	99
WE/MADR	1	
WE/BARC	1	
WE/STOC	1	
WE/LOND	1	
WE/PARI	1	

Liaison Dissem

IE/Canada (RCMP)	1	11
IE/British	1	11
L/WASH/BR	1	11

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

111BR

Important

13. Functions, characteristics, and personal data on members of the foreign service, and of the accredited diplomatic corps.
14. The press.

Necessary

15. Status of the national economy.
16. Structure of the government and functions of its organs.

INFORMATION GUIDELINES AND OBJECTIVES
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO

Priority

1. Collective Action

   a) Political and military agreements adopted by regional organs against Cuba in which the Bosch government participates. Meetings in which the government's participation in the adoption thereof may be agreed on. Dominican government proposals on the Cuban case, and collective aggression.

   b) Participation of the government in troops in the aggression, units which would participate in the aggression, their chiefs and strength.

   c) Joint military maneuvers which may be held in Dominican territory by Latin American armies. Participating armies and units thereof.

   d) Military concentrations of Latin and Yankee armies, objectives thereof; presence therein of Cuban mercenaries, their conditions, U.S. Sol. (sic; soldiers?) such as mercenaries of the Plaza Giron type, etc.

   e) Plans of provocations devised by the Dominican government in order to show Cuban Government intervention in the country's internal affairs.

   f) Measures on travel to or from Cuba.

   g) Possibilities for break in relations by countries that may have relations with Cuba.

2. Status of Leftist Forces

   a) Progressive forces: organization, leaders, strength, position, and argumentation in the revolutionary struggle.

   b) Possibility for armed struggle.

   c) Contradictions and degree of unity among the leftist forces.

   d) Publications--circulation.

   e) Repression against leftist forces.

f) Contact with leftist forces in order to know their viewpoints regularly, at all times, and when we may need it, especially on political and economic changes which may take place in Cuba.

g) Student, peasant, and labor movements. Organization, strength, leaders, relations with the leftist forces, degree of unity.

h) U.S. and Church penetration in the mass organizations (labor, peasant, student).

i) Possibilities of spontaneous manifestations of struggle.

j) Possibilities of guerrilla movement; groups, organizations, leaders, weapons, popular support, relations with the leftist forces.

k) Struggle in the city: groups, leaders, form of work, role of the labor and student movement, relations with the leftist forces, and with groups operating in the countryside.

l) Relations of exiles with the insurrectional movement.

3. Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic

a) Organization of the Dominican Armed Forces, units, and strength of the various corps. Bases, barracks, weapons, and transport of the Armed Forces. Locations.

b) Budgetary allocations of the Armed Forces; allocations to each branch (Navy, Air Force, and Army).

c) Existing bilateral agreements with the United States of a secret nature.

d) Secret or public military pacts entered into by Santo Domingo with countries in the Caribbean area, agreements by them concerning special arrangements.

e) Yankee military missions. Names, ranks, and functions of their members, their duties.

f) Armed Forces units with anti-guerrilla training, their strength, time spent in anti-guerrilla training, instructors giving it, weapons, and transportation in the possession of the units. Leaders of the units.

g) Other battalions or special units (parachutists, Rangers), units and strength, their leaders, transport, and weapons.

h) Changes in armament; quantity and characteristics of the new weapons acquired.

i) Participation by Dominican units in Central American or Caribbean military maneuvers, units participating, strength, their leaders.

4. The Dominican Communist Party (Dominican Popular Socialist Party, PSPD)

   a) Attitude toward the Second Havana Declaration.

   b) Attitude toward Cuban-Soviet relations.

   c) Attitude toward Cuba's political activities of a national or international nature.

   d) Position in regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement.

   e) In the case of China and the USSR.

   f) In the case of Albania and the USSR.

   g) As regards Yugoslavia, China, the USSR, and Albania.

   h) As regards Peace.

   i) Regarding peaceful coexistence.

   j) Internal status of the Party.

   k) Forces.

   l) Leaders (information concerning them).

   m) Disagreements.

   n) Relations with other leftist forces, disagreements, possibilities for unification.

   ñ) Methods of fighting officially adopted by the Party.

   o) Attitude of the Party toward the elections.

   p) Relations with the bourgeois parties and the government.

   q) Work for solidarity with Cuba.

   r) Publicity media.

   s) The establishment of permanent and temporary contact with the PSPD.

   t) Relations of the PSPD with other Latin-American Marxist parties.

5. Training Camps and Operational Bases

   a) Location of training camps for Cuban mercenaries, number of mercenaries in them. Type and duration of training, organizations participating in it. Plans and missions of the elements being trained. Leaders of the camps. Place where the Cuban mercenaries go, recruitment locations. Participation by national elements in the training of mercenaries of foreign nationality.

b) Presence of counterrevolutionary elements in the Dominican armed forces: names, assignments, and functions.

c) Location of counterrevolutionary operational bases on Dominican soil: type of bases. Water craft or aircraft present on them. Counterrevolutionary organization which appears at the head of them. Elements participating. Type of water craft and their characteristics. Their weapons, objectives, and plans of attack; dates when they are to be carried out.

6. Counterrevolutionary Organizations

a) Cuban counterrevolutionary organizations which are functioning in Santo Domingo; their leaders. Their contact with government personnel, especially with people in the new régime who are responsible for establishing such contact.

b) Contact by the Bosch government with the magazine Bohemia in Exile of Miguel Angel Quevedo; financial support given it by him, and through whom.

c) Contact with Carlos Prío and elements linked with the PRC; assistance to them. Contact with the counterrevolutionary organizations; contact with the political parties; elements through which it is effected.

d) Methods of communication by the elements in Santo Domingo with the counterrevolutionary centers in Miami; through whom the communications are established, and what means are used for this purpose.

e) Obtaining documents which prove that the Dominican government gives economic assistance to the counterrevolutionary elements.

f) Counterrevolutionaries who are now working in the Dominican state apparatus or in Yankee aid institutions; disagreements between them and the Dominican workers.

g) Connections between the counterrevolutionary organizations and the Trujillo régime. Documents proving these connections.

7. Repressive Bodies and CIA, Santo Domingo

a) Repressive bodies which function in Santo Domingo. Their functions. Activities carried on by them. Their leaders and principal officers. Working methods. Plans and objectives.

b) Intelligence organizations functioning in Santo Domingo. Leaders. Elements abroad. Their duties and functions. Activities carried on. Plans and objectives of Dominican Intelligence, principally against Cuba. Trujillist elements still functioning inside this body; duties and functions.

c) Cooperation between the Dominican repressive bodies and those of the Latin American countries, especially those of Central America.

d) Meetings held with them, dates, and personnel participating in the meetings; locations. Points discussed, agreements arrived at against Cuba, and the Movement of National Liberation. Plans and objectives of the national security forces with regard to the Movement of National Liberation, means and resources mobilized, agents infiltrated into the political movements, repressive methods prescribed.

e) Contacts with Interpol. Cooperation with it. Restrictive measures regarding trips to Cuba. Agents.

f) Foreign advisers of the repressive forces and intelligence bodies; names, ranks, and positions; their functions; cases in which they have participated.

g) Leading functionaries of the CIA in the country; its office. Plans and objectives it pursues in Santo Domingo.

h) Nationals who are working for the CIA; names, ranks, and positions. Their methods and plans. Purpose of their work.

8. Status of the Parties or Political Groups

a) Their present status in regard to composition, strength, penetration, factions, leaders, programs, etc.

b) Participation in the government.

c) Relations of the political parties with the Embassy, the monopolies, the Church, and the Armed Forces.

d) Organizations of a fascist type; relations with the government, the Yankee Embassy, the Church; leaders, members, structure, anti-Communist campaign, arguments, attacks upon Cuba.

e) Provenience of the funds of the political parties.

f) Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.

g) Toward the Second Havana Declaration.

h) In regard to Cuban-Soviet relations, in questions which affect Cuba and world peace.

i) Concerning rightist and extreme rightist groups.

j) Reactions to the economic and political changes taking place in Cuba.

9. Movement for Solidarity with Cuba

a) Possibility of active demonstrations in favor of Cuba: groups, leaders, strength, organization, participants, relations with the forces of the left and other progressive forces.

b) Repression directed at the movement for solidarity with Cuba.

c) Propaganda campaigns for and against. Periodicals; themes.

10. Relations with the United States

a) Alliance for Progress.

b) The American Embassy. Information on the activities of the Ambassador and the personnel of the Embassy. Relations with the reactionary organizations. Relations with the Church. Government functionaries in close contact with the Embassy.

11. The Church

a) Ecclesiastical hierarchy. Information concerning it.

b) Attitude and disagreements between the national clergy and foreign countries.

c) Participation by the Church in the internal politics of the country.

d) Secular organizations of the Church (such as young people, Catholic labor, Catholic knights).

e) Penetration of the Church into the educational system of the country on various levels.

12. Internal Status of the Armed Forces

a) Information on the military chiefs and the activities they carry on. Groups they observe. Trends and disagreements.

Important

13. Functioning; Characteristics and Information on Members of the Foreign Service of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Country

a) United Nations, Organization of American States, the JID /Inter-American Defense Board/.

b) Latin American functionaries in this country. To work with the diplomatic circles accredited to the country.

14. The Press

a) Information on journalists and dissemination organs. Possibility of making use of them. Journalists in the country and abroad.

Required

15. Status of the National Economy

a) United States investments (new and old).

b) Participation by the national oligarchy in the economy. Industry, commerce, agriculture.

c) Utilization and location of Trujillo's property.

d) Trend of the level of unemployment.

e) Relations of the country in regard to Central American economic integration.

f) Possibility of a new economic policy of the United States monopolies in the country.

g) Need for obtaining collaborators who will inform us periodically on economic questions.

16. Structure of the Government and Functioning of its Apparatus

a) Character of the government, program, international policy.

b) Relations between the Presidency and the ministries.

c) Functioning of the Congress. Most prominent figures. Relations with the Yankee Embassy. Representation of the bourgeois parties and the social classes.

d) The judiciary: personages occupying high positions; important laws. Repressive laws. Relations of the judiciary with the other authorities.

e) Information on personalities connected with Juan Bosch.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

11\ (1 (5-

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HQ DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH 15-3
Chief of Station, [Madrid]
Chief of Base, [Barcelona]; Chief, WE 15-27

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT [redacted]/Operational
AMMUG/1 Identification of Manuel ESTEVEZ Perez

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

Reference: [OSBW] 1022
23

1. As requested in paragraph 2 of reference AMMUG/1 was queried for any information he might have on Manuel ESTEVEZ Perez. AMMUG/1 was unable to identify the name.

15-27

2. [Barcelona]: If a photograph of the Subject is available, it is suggested that a copy be sent to WAVE to show AMMUG/1 for possible identification.

[redacted]

Distribution:
2 - WH/C 15-2
2 - COS/[MADR]
2 - COB/[Barcelona] 15-27
2 - C/WE

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
16 Aug 65	

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-22811

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION

6/BR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28/24

27 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

16-26

FROM [SAN SALVADOR]

ACTION WH8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

VR. FILE DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, SOD 6

SECRET 201440Z 21-26

DIR INFO MEXI WAVE CITE [SALV] 5513

WH DIV CUBA

[redacted] ANNUS

20 JAN 65 IN 63642

~~WDS~~	~~INT~~	SS	SB
	ICS	PERS	AR
~~/B~~		LOG	CA
○			

REF A) [HSSW] 2195 22 (NOT SENT MEXI, WAVE)

B) DIR-7501

C) DIR-74952

D) [SALV] 5469 21-26 (IN 52564)

1. AMBASSADOR DECLINING FOLLOW UP APPROACH TO [PRESIDENT RIVERA] 06 PENDING RECEIPT OF MEXI GOVT REACTION TO Cuban defector [redacted] SURFACING. HE UNDERSTANDABLY WARY OF GETTING [RIVERA] 06 TOO ENTHUSED OVER PROPOSAL WHEN ADAMANT MEXICAN REJECTION OF SURFACING MIGHT TORPEDO OP. 21-26

2. WHILE [SALV] FEELS [illegible] PAPER RECEIVED REF A WILL MAKE INTERESTING PRESENTATION, WE NOT CLEAR ON WHO SLATED TO PRESENT IT. ASSUME [illegible] PRESENTED BY Dept State [redacted] AT REQUEST [GOES] AND [illegible] Cuban defection [redacted], WITH LATTER THEN BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO [illegible] FURTHER DEBRIEFING. 16-26

3. [illegible] defector [redacted] [illegible] [STATION] FEELS IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE SURFACE NAMES OF [illegible] TRAINEES FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

SECRET

91BR

14-00000

SECRET

IN63642
Page 2

A. 11 GOES WOULD HAVE TO ARREST ALL PERSONS MENTIONED OR IT WOULD APPEAR THAT 11 GOES DOES NOT BELIEVE Defector [redacted] INFO. ALTHO 06 RIVERA INDICATED THAT HE WILLING TO MAKE THE ARRESTS, STATION 16-26 INCLINED TO DOUBT THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW THROUGH DUE FEAR OF STIRRING UP 11 SALVADORAN LEFTISTS, AND LACK OF JURIDICAL GROUNDS FOR PROSECUTION.

B. ALTHO Defector [redacted] HAD KNOWLEDGE THAT AT LEAST 75 SALVADORANS RECEIVED G/W TRAINING BETWEEN APRIL 1963 AND APRIL 1964, HE WAS ABLE TO FURNISH ONLY 35 NAMES. OF THESE, LESS THAN HALF ARE KNOWN TO BE TRUE NAMES. WE THUS FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO MENTION ANY OF THE G/W NAMES, STAND ON THE 75 FIGURE, AND IMPLY THAT Defector [redacted] HAS MADE NAMES OF ALL 75 AVAILABLE TO 11 GOES WHO PRESUMABLY AWAITING PROPITIOUS TIME TO ROUND THEM UP.

C. G/W TRAINEES HAVE BEEN INACTIVE SINCE RETURN FROM CUBA AND ONLY RECENTLY STEPS BEING TAKEN BY FUAR MILITARY COMMISSION TO REACTIVATE THEM. SINCE Asset [redacted] IN KEY POSITION TO REPORT ON THIS BUILDUP, THERE IS GOOD CHANCE OF PASSING GOES 11 INFO AT LATER DATE WHICH WOULD PERMIT THEM TO CATCH WHOLE GROUP RED HANDED WITH EVIDENCE ON WHICH THEY COULD BE PROSECUTED. Defector [redacted] INFO COULD BE USED AT THAT TIME TO BOLSTER GOES CASE. 11

SECRET

8168

SECRET

IN 626

16-26

4. RE DGI INTEL AGENTS SALVADOR, STATION COMMENTS Defector [redacted] MENTION IN TESTIMONY (PAGE 55 OF DRAFT PAPER) THAT CUBANS HAVE RECRUITED SALVADORANS AS INTEL AGENTS AND SURFACE Target [redacted] CASE (Dalton [redacted]) DOSSIER AS EXAMPLE, WITHOUT MENTIONING Target [redacted] OR Target [redacted] CASES. THIS WOULD AVOID SURFACING OF Assets [redacted], WHO WOULD PROBABLY TURN INTO HOSTILE AGENT VIS-A-VIS 16-26 STATION IF HIS NAME MENTIONED. SURFACING OF Target [redacted] CASE SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY ARREST OF Dalton [redacted] Target [redacted], AND Target [redacted] BY GOES. 11

5. RE PAGE 55 OF DRAFT OAS PAPER, WE RECOMMEND DELETION OF DGI ESTIMATE THAT GOES 11 PLANNING AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA. 16-26 TO STATION KNOWLEDGE IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR PROP PURPOSES OF PAPER. 16-26

6. IF FOREGOING RECOMMENDATIONS APPROVED BY HQS, STATION ENVISAGES FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY SUBJECT TO GOES 11 APPROVAL:

A. GOES 11 KICKS OFF OPERATION BY ARRESTING PRINCIPALS IN Target [redacted] CASE, WITH TERSE ANNOUNCEMENT TO PRESS THAT GOES 11 HAS EVIDENCE OF EXTENSIVE CUBAN PLOT WHICH IT TAKING TO OAS.

B. IN OAS GOES REVEALS THAT [illegible] HAS GIVEN THE DETAILS OF CUBAN SUBVERSIVE EFFORT IN EL SALVADOR AND

SECRET

[illegible]BR

IN 63642
Page 4

PETITIONS Dept State [redacted] TO MAKE Defector [redacted] AVAILABLE TO TESTIFY.

C. IN RESPONSE, Dept State [redacted] DISTRIBUTES REVISED DRAFT OF REF A PAPER FOR STUDY BY CAS MEMBERS.

D. Defector [redacted] THEN IS MADE AVAILABLE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.

7. REQUEST COMMENTS.

SECRET

CFN

14-00000

104-10187-10003

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

130

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KDBADGER Vol III
Support

INCLUSIVE DATES: 25 Jan 1962 - 13 Nov 1964

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LA/DDO

ROOM: 3C34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
26-6-75	6/26	D HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
6/27		D HARDWAY	D Hardway
		HARDWAY	Hardway
~~[illegible]~~		~~D Hardway~~	~~Hardway~~
11/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

older

KDBADGER 50-6-75/2

SUPPORT

LIENVOY SUPPORT 50-6-75/2
JANUARY 1962 - DECEMBER 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO IP/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM 3-68 2593

MESSAGE FORM 15

ORIG : C. Bustos-Viduela
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 13 NOVEMBER 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-91/2

28 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1			
2			
3		7	
4		8	

13 Nov 64 PRIORITY
13 Nov 64 23 54z
SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, CI/IPS, OS 2, VR, FILE

TO PRIORITY MEXI INFO. CITE DIR 64013

LITEMPO

REF: MEXI 1538 (IN 20864)*

Bustos

1. ONLY POSSIBLY IDENTICAL TRACES MRS SHAPIRO ARE IN HMM 191 AND HMMA 2525. ODIBEX REPORTS 1948 WHICH CANNOT BE LOCATED(BELIEVED ONLY REPORT TRAVEL BETWEEN MEXI AND US) REPORTS ON ROSA ACKERMAN DE SHAPIRO BORN BOZALIA RUSSIA ON 8 MARCH 1909 (MEXI GOVT SHOULD HAVE FILE ON HER).

2. ONLY PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE TRACE LIPPMAN WAS KUTWIN CENSORSHIP REPORT 1942 WHICH LISTS HIM AS CONNECTED REAL ESTATE AND CONTRACTING FIRMS NEWARK NEW JERSEY. HE WAS CONNECTED WITH INDUSTRIAS DE DEFENSA IN HABANA CUBA WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS UNDERTAKING PROMOTIONAL SCHEMES INVOLVING SHIPBUILDING, DOCK FACILITIES, AND DEFENSE WORK.

3. KUSODA IS MAKING LOCAL CHECK. AFTER OBTAINING HUSBAND'S FIRST NAME AND SOME XXXXXX BACKGROUND WILL CHECK VOLUMINOUS FNU SHAPIRO TRACES RI AND CARDS ON HUSBAND. UNLESS ADVISED CONTRARY DO NOT PLAN AT THIS TIME CHECK ODENVY, ODURGE OR ODIBEX. IF THESE AGENCIES WOULD HAVE INFO WE WOULD HAVE TO REQUEST SPECIFIC PERMISSION PASS TO MEXI OFFICIALS.

UL

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG : C. Bustos-Videla
UNIT : WH/1 ☐ INDEX
EXT : 4506 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 13 NOVEMBER 1964 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM
~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

142

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 64013

WH COMMENT: *LITEMPO-2 requested info on SHAPIRO and LIPPMAN who reside New Jersey and who are suspected espionage agents.

RICHARD HELMS
DDP

C/WH/1

JOHN HORTON
C/WH/POA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

22

MESSAGE FORM

~~S E C R E T~~

ORIG : C. Bustos
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 31 AUGUST 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	55
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

1 SEP 64 15 29z

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: TSD 6, CCS 3, OP 2, VR

TO MEXI

INFO:

CITE DIR 48308

REF: DIR 44882

RUTSAY ETA 8 SEPT EAL FLIGHT 305. NO NEED MEET, REQUEST RESERVATIONS. WILL PHONE AREHART DIRECTLY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Ref gave AREHART instructions for Hqs contact re his travel to U.S.

[illegible] Support 2

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~S E C R E T~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG: A. Spera
UNIT: [illegible]/1
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 14 AUGUST 1964

MESSAGE FORM

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

27 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING
1 ①
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

17 z

~~DEFERRED~~

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: TSD 6, C/IC 2, VR Bustos

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 42430

LIENVOY/TECHS

REF: HMMT-4748

NEWTON T. RUTSAY AVAILABLE FOR TDY 10 TO 28 SEPT. ETA FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Pers/Benthall (by phone)

C/TSD/AOB/Yech (by phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

10 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Chief, TSD/AOB

SUBJECT : Request for TDY Replacement for Arnold F. AREHART.

1. WH Division requests your cooperation in providing a TDY replacement for Arnold F. AREHART as Case Officer and technician for the LIENVOY tap center in Mexico City. AREHART has requested three weeks home leave, from 10 to 28 September, to drive his older son to the States to enroll him in his freshman year of college. AREHART has kept his leave plans to a minimum so that his TDY replacement will need to be on loan from Headquarters for as short a time as possible.

2. The Division had offered to provide an operations officer as a TDY replacement but Mexico City Station has requested that a technician be sent instead since the burden of AREHART's job is the maintenance of equipment along with the protection of CIA's interests inside the LP. WH Division suggests that your release of Mr. Charles Deck for this assignment would be ideal if he is available, as no overlap would be required since he is already knowledgeable of this operation. The Station was also very pleased with the work done by Mr. Deck on his last TDY to Mexico.

3. Because of the critical role the LIENVOY Project plays in the Station's whole operational picture, and because of the importance the smooth-functioning of the LP is to our liaison with top-level Mexican officials, your assistance is requested. If Mr. Deck is not available, any other suitable candidate would be acceptable. Please inform Mr. Bustos, WH/1/Mexico, X-4506, -4507 of your decision, as we would like to be able to inform Mexico as soon as possible as to whether a TDY replacement will be available.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/DF/CBustos:ktc (10 August 1964)

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Addressee
        1 - WH/Registry
        1 - WH/1/Mexico
        1 - WH/1/Mexico (LIENVOY/Support)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
TDY Replacement for Arnold F. ARENART (pe)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMW-12750 dated 17 July 1964

1. Arnold F. ARENART (pe) would like to depart from Mexico on 10 September 1964 for home leave and return about 28 September 1964. He does not wish longer leave since it will be necessary to take his younger son out of school. His older son will be entering college in the United States which is the reason ARENART requested leave at this time.

2. A technician would be preferable to an operations officer as a temporary replacement for ARENART as the burden of the job will be maintenance of equipment and protection of KUBARK interests inside the LP. Since ARENART will be away three weeks, it is requested that Headquarters consider sending a technician. The technician will be better able to do the job if he has Spanish; this, however, is not essential as certain LIENVOY/[illegible] speak English.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-4743

DATE
28 July 1964

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Replacement for Arnold F. AREHART during Home Leave

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA 23522

1. Referenced dispatch which reflected the Station's appreciation of Newton T. RUTSAY's high level of performance during his recent TDY in Mexico and requested his return TDY was brought to the attention of the appropriate KURIOT officials.

2. Unfortunately, RUTSAY will not be available to replace AREHART during the latter's home leave period in the fall of 1964, and KURIOT has no one else they can release for a prolonged period this fall. Since the leave probably will only be about two months, Headquarters wonders whether a technician is absolutely required. Does the Station believe that an operations officer, with some Spanish and who could merely take over the administrative work and make the Station contacts, could fill in during this period?

3. We are not sanguine that a replacement can be made available particularly since the man will of necessity need to be "exposable" to liaison, but will try our best to find one. In the meantime, please forward the exact dates it is desired the hoped for man should be in Mexico to allow for adequate overlap.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-75/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
CS COPY HMMW-12741

DATE
17 JUL 1964

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/2

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/1
OFFICER: C. Bustos-Videla: KTF
EXT: 4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
TSD/AOB		McBee in draft

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WHD
DATE:
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: Desmond FitzGerald

1 - CS
1 - Chrono

	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/1	

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIENVOY SUPPORT

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Arnold F. AREHART asked that his TDY replacement inquire at Headquarters regarding the status of his request for equipment which the Station forwarded to Headquarters as Requisition No. 359-19-64. Headquarters has shipped to Corpus Christi the items he requested in connection with the Revere (shipped 20 April), and the Heath and Allied items were shipped on 7 May. The Ampex and B-10 items have not yet been received at Headquarters from the supplier. Headquarters will pouch all items from these that weight and size will permit, the remainder will have to be shipped to Corpus Christi. In view of the equipment listed in LGIS 6020, 18 May 1964, which is also awaiting pickup at Corpus Christi, perhaps there will be a flight soon.

2. It is requested that the above information be passed to AREHART.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-75/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-12611	27 MAY 1964 21 May 1964
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-75/2

ROUTING INITIAL
Distribution:
1-RI
1-Chrono
1-WH Log
RID/[illegible]
RID/MIS
~~RID/IS~~
~~RID/FI~~
WH/3/M
~~DESENSITIZED~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:chk	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/LOG		P. Pike (draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

~~SECRET~~

26 May

26 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD/AOB

SUBJECT : LIENVOY TDY Report

1. TDY support of the LIENVOY operation in Mexico City was provided by this office during the period 23 April to 15 May 1964. The Staff Agent, ARNOLD F. AREHART who manages this operation underwent surgery for a hernia on the 24th of April. The undersigned assumed the responsibilities and performed the duties associated with the LIENVOY operation during AREHART's convalescence. He was incapacitated for duty from 23 April until 12 May. His operation was successful and recovery was normal. AREHART returned to work on 12 May in a weakened condition and three days of overlap was allowed to provide assistance with the more strenuous and tiresome chores.

2. The LIENVOY installation was found to be in excellent condition. The operating personnel were well disciplined and their procedures were well organized. The daily work was being accomplished in a business like and efficient manner. AREHART has done a commendable job in establishing and maintaining this highly productive operation,

3. The equipment in this installation has been in use fifteen hours a day for over four years. As the result of good maintenance practices it is in good shape and functioning well. The minor difficulties encountered during the shake down period have been overcome and equipment maintenance and repair pose no significant problem There was no loss of coverage on any line during the three week TDY.

4. The following observations and recommendations are included herein to improve KURIOT services to the Field and to aquaint responsible officers with technical discrepancies.

A. Pertinent technical information is not being communicated to AREHART.

~~SECRET~~

B. The drying up of the ball point pens in the B-10, Dial Recorder has been a constant nuisance since the beginning of this operation. The pressure sensitive tape was the obvious answer to this problem, but the first ten rolls of pressure tape were received after nearly four years of struggling with the defective pens. It is recommended that pressure sensitive tape be supplied to this operation for future use.

C. The ten rolls of pressure sensitive tape received during this TDY were wound backwards on their spindles.

D. The tires on the idler wheel of the B-10 are drying and cracking and fail to obtain adequate traction on the flywheel. This causes tape feed problems. It is recommended that three dozen new idler wheels be pouched to AREHART immediately. Several of the defective idler wheels are available in this office for inspection.

Charles O. Deck
TSD/AOB

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - TSD/AOB/OSS/WH
1 - WH/3/M 3B0003/Charlotte Bustos
1 - TSD/LOG
1 - TSD/AOB/TRO
Charles O. Deck/3330/jlm

Zette Requisition 554-19-64
30 January 1964

B/10 Parts:

12 each SR-1 Bias Supply silicon retifiers, General Electric # 1N 1695

26 Tubes ~~6XXX5X~~ 6X5

12 each K-2 Feed Solenoids

24 Small Springs for Drive Motor Special.

19 MAY 1964 - Vendor supposed to deliver items to Ligot Commission [illegible] as required, 2 weeks to test and pack.

AMPEX PARTS:

12 Each R-137 Centralab -BA-011-12[illegible]

2 each Alignments Tapes--Part # 6[illegible] 3 [illegible]

19 MAY 1964 - Proc. trying to obtain delivery date from vendor. Scheduled call for 29 May, but not firm.

4 each J-201-s Plugs
4 each P-101-P Plug
4 each P-102-S Plug
4 each J-202-P Plugs

6 each C-203 Motor Capacitors, Electrolytic 2,5[illegible], 220 V.
6 each R-202 Resistors, 20k ohms

REVERE PARTS

36 Spare pressure pads TR-2601. shipped 22 as required
6 each Instant Stop arms (new type) " " "
12 each Tape counter drive belts A-3[illegible]-11101 " " "
12 each Take up belts TR-7809 " " "

TEST EQUIPMENT:

Heathkit Catlog . Fall and Winter 1962-1963 " "

Heathkit Transistor tester	Kit I[illegible]-30	"	"	"
Capacitor Checker	Kit IT-11	"	"	"
Visual-Aural Signal Tracer	Kit T-4	"	"	"
Oscilloscope	Kit 10-10	"	"	"
Scope Demodulator prob kit	Kit 337C	"	"	"
Low Capacity scope Prob	Kit [illegible]-1	"	"	"
Harmonic Distortion Meter	Kit [illegible]-1	"	"	"
Resistance subsitution Box	Kit [illegible]-1		"	"
Condenser Subsitution Box	Kit [illegible]-1	"	"	"

Allied Catalog # 220--1963

Page 197
3 each TS-AJ Tape Splicers Cat # 80R-195 shipped 7 May
2 each TS-45 TapeSplicers Cat # 80R-197 " "
6 each Splicing Tape Cat 80R-203 T-373 3/8 inch " "
6each Splicing Tape Cat 80R-155 ST-500--1/2 inch " "
Page 323 " " "
Resist-O-Chest 2M-788 mfd type number 43

Page 394. " " "
Cable Splacing cord 49T-246 1/2 lb.

22 Jan-64

[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

2

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 151924Z

DIR INFO CARA CITE MEXI 7782

REF EMBTEL 1583 DATED 14 JAN 64

15 Jan 64 IN 99238

1. NOTE CHARGE BOONSTRA REPORT OF VICENTE SANCHEZ GAVITO (MEXICAN AMBASSADOR TO OAS) CONVERSATION IN WHICH SANCHEZ GAVITO SAID "VENEZUELAN PROBLEM IS CRITICAL FOR GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO. ALTHOUGH FONOFF HAS NOTT SEEN ANY OF THE EVIDENCE ON ORIGIN ARMS CACHE, SAID FONOFF HAS RECEIVED RELIABLE INFORMATION TO THE EFFECT EVIDENCE OF CASTRO ORIGIN IS CONVINCING."

2. BELIEVE "RELIABLE EVIDENCE" LIKELY THAT GIVEN TO LITENSOR BY SAMUEL K. CASTELON IN DECEMBER BRIEFING.

SECRET

file
[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET
FOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TIME REC'D CABLE SECT 1700

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION-S/S TELEGRAM OR LIMIT DISTRIBUTION MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION: DEPTEL 1071 to Mexico City

ROUTED TO

- DCI
- D/DCI
- AD/CI
- DDI
- AD/NE
- DDP
- ADDP
- C/SAS
- C WH
- CS/RF

ATTENTION ALL RECIPIENTS: THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS FURNISHED TO THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, ONE COPY OF THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT. REPRODUCTION IS PROHIBITED. THE CABLE SECRETARIAT HAS ROUTED THIS DOCUMENT AS SHOWN TO THOSE WHO HAVE A NEED TO KNOW. EACH INDIVIDUAL WHO SEES THIS MESSAGE SHOULD SIGN AND INDICATE THE DATE OF HANDLING. THIS COVER SHEET MUST BE KEPT ATTACHED TO THE DOCUMENT UNTIL THE DOCUMENT IS DESTROYED. THE COVER SHEET MUST BE RETAINED BY THE RECIPIENT FOR 30 DAYS AFTERWHICH IT MAY BE DESTROYED WITHOUT ANY RECORD OF DESTRUCTION.

SIGNATURE OF PERSON SEEING TELEGRAM	DATE
JC King	18 Dec 63
R. W. Hilbert	18 Dec
B. Reichhardt BR	

file [illegible]

RETAIN COVER SHEET FOR 30 DAYS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

EXP FORM BY
CABLE SEC, O/DCI, 17 APR 63

0 3 7 6

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

33

Origin
SS

Info

ACTION: AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY IMMEDIATE 1071
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO IMMEDIATE 829
AMEMBASSY CARACAS 577 IMMEDIATE

DEC 17 12 29 PM '63

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

CARACAS PASS WARD ALLEN

035

FYI. 1. In connection Venezuelan complaint to OAS, discussions in Standing Group of NSC have identified two alternatives for cooperative system surveillance and interception of vessels and aircraft engaged in transporting arms for subversive purposes to Latin America (especially Caribbean area) directly or indirectly from Cuba. Difference between alternatives centers on need for OAS authorization for use of force in international waters.

2. Alternative A would require OAS authorization use of force in connection with visit-and-search in international waters against selected Cuban vessels and selected vessels OAS countries. It would be a cooperative system of surveillance and interception involving visit-and-search in international waters on a selective basis, with force to be used if necessary. Visit-and-search and, if resistance met, force would be applied by naval units of US or of cooperating OAS countries against selected vessels suspected of transporting arms from Cuba, directly or indirectly.

Drafted by: ARA/CCA:JHCrimmins:cr/ars 12/12/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S:Mr. McKesson

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Bundy

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

FORM 8-63 DS-322

~~SECRET~~

3. Alternative B would not require OAS authorizatio use force inasmuch as visit-and-search would take place only within territorial waters. It would be a cooperative system of surveillance and interception involving visit-and-search only within the territorial waters of an OAS country, with force to be applied, if necessary, by that country's forces or by forces of another OAS country acting under a bilateral agreement. Control of suspect vessels destined for non-OAS country or territory (e. g. British Guiana) would depend on cooperation that country.

4. In both alternatives interception or seizure of suspect aircraft would be carried out only in territory of OAS country of destination by forces of that country or of another OAS country acting under a bilateral agreement.

5. Comparison of alternatives:

(a) Alternative A would be much harder to sell to OAS countries than Alternative B because authorization for use of force required.

(b) Alternative A would be somewhat more effectiv both in fact and as deterrent than Alternative B, although both can be circumvented.

(c) Alternative A would constitute harassment of Castro whereas Alternative B is purely defensive.

(d) Alternative A would incur substantially greater risks of escalation than Alternative B.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(e) Alternative A would be more expensive in terms of US units required than Alternative B.

6. Kind and number of additional measures which we would seek in OAS would vary with choice between alternatives. For example, our tentative thinking is that minimum OAS package acceptable to US under Alternative A would be: authorization use force; condemnation Castro regime; and reaffirmation and invigoration anti-subversive measures. Under Alternative B, minimum package now estimated to be: defensive system with search and seizure within national territory; condemnation; reaffirmation anti-subversive measures; and obligatory break in air and surface communications between OAS countries and Cuba.

7. We consider attitude Mexico and Brazil critical. OAS vote authorizing use force in which one or other did not join would be politically undesirable. END FYI.

8. Action requested

Chief of Mission should take first opportunity of conversation with FonMin on other matters to explore discreetly and informally indicating he acting personally and without instructions the probable receptivity of GOM (GOB) to an OAS resolution authorizing use force. Ambassador should proceed on assumption report OAS investigation committee

strongly

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

strongly confirms Venezuelan charges and will be basis propaganda campaign to alert OAS governments and public opinion.

Report soonest.

GP-3

END

BALI.

~~SECRET~~

14-00000

PPPP -

1515

M E X I C O

12 December 1963

TELLO SCORES OAS POLICIES, CUBA EXCLUSION

Havana in English to Europe 2020 GMT 11 December 1963--E

(Text) Mexico City--Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Tello criticized the Organization of American States, saying that it is in a state of crisis. Tello also criticized the exclusion of Cuba from that organization. In the interview with the Mexican daily NOVEDADES, Foreign Minister Tello said that Cuba's exclusion from the OAS is not in conformity with the OAS charter. He said that the charter does not contemplate the exclusion of any member state.

Referring to the present international situation of the OAS, Tello emphasized that an organization which does not base itself on friendship, cooperation, and tolerance is likely to face a crisis. The Mexican foreign minister stated that in the present state of the OAS, the elements or bases for the organization to strengthen democracy do not exist. He pointed out that contrary to agreements adopted at Chapultepec and Bogota, almost all the present Latin American representatives to the OAS are also their countries' ambassadors in Washington.

JAUREGUI INTERCEDES FOR BOLIVIA HOSTAGES

Lima AFP in Spanish 2337 GMT 11 December 1963--P OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpts) Mexico City--Arturo Jauregui, secretary general of the Regional Inter-American Workers Organization (Organizacion Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores--ORIT), sent a personal request to Bolivian Vice President Juan Lechin on behalf of the foreigners held at Catavi as hostages.

The cable says: "I appeal to your labor union principles in the name of the 28 million ORIT member workers in favor of the hostages. These persons are well known as democrats working in favor of the spirit of humanity and social economic progress. The Bolivian revolution," the message adds, "demands that its prestige and vindication be held high."

- 0 -

DIPLOMAT'S RETURN--Swiss Ambassador to Mexico Fernand Bernoulli returned to Mexico after several months' absence. (Mexico City Radiodifusora Comerciales Spanish 2030 GMT 10 December 1963--P)

PUEBLA BUDGET--The Puebla municipal budget for 1964 shows an increase of 5 million pesos over that of the current year. (Mexico City Radiodifusora Comerciales Spanish 2030 GMT 10 December 1963--P)

RRRR 1

P A N A M A

12 December 1963

PLAN OF TERRORISM IS UNFOLDING

David La Voz del Baru in Spanish 2100 GMT 11 December 1963--P

(Station commentary)

(Text) It appears as if a preconceived plan of terrorism, not known before in Panama, has been unleashed since members of our armed forces were at Fort Gulick. The barbarous death of labor leader Aguilar, beaten and kicked in Puerto Armuelles; the beating of Indian Labor Leader Palacios Salinas; the denunciation through a newspaper of a labor leader who was hanged and beaten in Colon; another case in Boquete; and many other known cases constitute pathetic proof of the plan.

If the objective of the wave of persecution is to attack the ideas of men with bullets, sticks, imprisonment, and other similar measures, it is a stupid move, because ideas are fought with ideas. If some of the humble class try to protest in defense of their rights, they are called communists. The privileged classes have used frequently this pretext against the working classes. If we analyze the situation we will see how the privileged classes have maintained their own monopolistic organization.

The oligarchic groups have greatly increased. Yesterday they could be represented in the two or three existing parties which were directed and governed by them; today, they have seen the need to increase the number of political parties, as much as 20 in a small country, in order to control the public administration. Each party is formed by a privileged family whose only wish is to continue its life of leisure and luxury. This kind of life calls for plenty of money, so in order to obtain the money they need they increase each day the taxation of the poor, who must pay and thus sink deeper into poverty, disease, and ignorance.

If the people do not have work, they cannot earn money; and if they do not have money they cannot pay taxes. If the people try to organize in self-defense, they are accused of being communists, and they are fought with sticks. If the cause of all the evils of democracy is communism, the solution is obvious. We all know who invented communism, and who is living according to it and upholding it. The way to fight communism is to open sources of work to build schools, hospitals, and better roads.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

: DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (TEMPO FOR WH SLOTTED AT 2050-16 DEC 63)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR

S E C R E T 172113Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7410

16 Dec 63 IN 81818

RYBAT

ATTN GALBOND

REF MEXI 7400 (IN 81653)

NO NIGHT ACTION

1. PEAK AND COS MET WITH LITENSOR ALONE AND WITHOUT SINGLE INTERRUPTION FOR ONE HOUR.

2. MEETING AT LITENSOR HOME.

3. LITENSOR INTENSELY INTERESTED, PEAK DID EXCELLENT PRESENTATION OF ENTIRE STORY.

4. LITENSOR SAID HE HAD HAVE "VERY LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF STORY FROM VENEZUELANS" PRIOR TO THIS BRIEFING. HE WAS CONVINCED REPEAT CONVINCED THAT CASTRO GUILTY AND SAID AT END "CUBAN COMMUNISTS WILL NOT STOP WITH THIS DEFEAT".

4. LITENSOR BEING GIVEN COPIES OF PAPERS AND PHOTOGRAPHS BROUGHT BY PEAK; HE INDICATED WISHED TO USE THESE.

6. NO MENTION OF ANY BRIEFING OF TELLO BY ANY OF THREE.

7. BOTH PEAK AND COS BELIEVE BRIEFING A SUCCESS.

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

CLA FIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

: DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (WH CD NOTIFIED AND COPY TUBE[illegible] 1615-16 DEC 63)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR

S E C R E T 162007Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7400

RYBAT

REF: MEXI 7391 (IN 80849)*

16 Dec 63 IN 81653

ATTENTION: GALBOND

1. LITENSOR RETURNED MEXI LATE MORNING 16 DEC.

2. COS AND PEAKE HAVE APPOINTMENT WITH LITENSOR 1645 HRS MEXICAN TIME ON 16 DEC "FOR AS LONG AS YOU WISH".

3. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CS COMMENT: *BELIEVED EARLIEST DATE FOR LITENSOR BRIEFING WOULD BE 17 DECEMBER.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

KR

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI/OPS, CI/OA, VR

cw

SECRET 151956Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7399

1. WISH CALL HQ ATTENTION TO FACT THAT FOLLOWING STATION ACTIVITIES SUSPENDED FOR TRADITIONAL CHRISTMAS VACATIONS DURING PERIODS INDICATED:

A. LIEMVOY 22-29 DEC

B. LIMUD 14 DEC-1 JAN

C. LIKAYAK/2 22-29 DEC

D. LIEMBRACE ON STANDBY

E. LITEMPO ACTIVE, BUT AT "SLOW PACE".

16 Dec 63 IN 81702

2. ADDITIONALLY MOST GOVT SERVICES DRASTICALLY CURTAILED DURING HOLIDAYS INCLUDING ISSUANCE TRANSIT VISAS. THUS STATION WILL FOR ROUGHLY TWO WEEKS BE VIRTUALLY UNABLE CALL ON MANY USUAL SUPPORT POINTS EXCEPT IN EVENT EXTREME EMERGENCY.

SECRET

Liemvoy [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : B. Reichhardt:rg
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 12 Dec 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

30 S E ~~C R E T/~~RYBAT

Destroy

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

13 DEC 63 [illegible] 18z

TO : Mexico City

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, VR

DEFERRED [illegible]

X ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 88863

RYBAT REF MEXI 7353

1. IN ADDITION TO REFERENCE REPORT, FBIS REPORT OF 11 DECEMBER SAYS TELLO, IN INTERVIEW WITH NOVEDADES, CRITICIZED OAS CLAIMING IT IN STATE OF CRISIS AND THAT CUBA'S EXCLUSION FROM OAS IS VIOLATION ITS CHARTER. THESE REPORTS SUGGEST TELLO DELIBERATELY ATTEMPTING PRE-ESTABLISH MEXICAN POLICY WITH REGARD CENSURE ACTION AGAINST CUBA. IN VIEW IMPORTANCE MEXICAN POSITION THIS RESPECT, THESE REPORTS MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN HERE AND IT FELT NECESSARY TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION COUNTER TELLO TACTICS IN WAY THAT WILL RESULT IN MEXICAN SUPPORT FOR STRONGER OAS ACTION.

2. HEADQUARTERS HAS CONVINCING INTELLIGENCE FROM VENEZUELAN SOURCES AS WELL AS OUR OWN WHICH SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT ARMS DISCOVERED IN VENEZUELA ARE DISTINCTLY CUBAN. A NUMBER OF WEAPONS CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS ESPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR CUBAN ARMY. ARMS DISCOVERED IN GENERAL WERE OF A TYPE AND IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO SUPPORT PLAN FOR TAKE-OVER OF CAPITAL CITY OF CARACAS. THEIR APPEARANCE IN VENEZUELA TIES IN SPECIFICALLY WITH KNOWN FALN PLANS WITH REGARD TO LOCATION AND TIMING. THE LATTER SUPPORTED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM CAPTURED FALN MEMBERS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E ~~C R E T/~~RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

G :
T :
:
E :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

16

:
M: DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

NF:
O :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

INFO

CITE DIR 88863

NOT YET SURFACED BY VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT. ABOVE INFORMATION PRESENTLY UNDER PREPARATION FOR VISUAL PRESENTATION WILL BE SENT NEXT BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS.

3. HEADQUARTERS' REQUESTS THIS INFORMATION BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF LITENSOR IN MANNER CONVINCE HIM BEYOND DOUBT OF CUBAN ROLE IN VENEZUELAN TERRORISTS ACTIVITIES. TO MAXIMIZE EFFECT IT FELT THAT THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO VENEZUELAN SOURCES TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.

4. ADVISE IF YOU SEE COMPLICATIONS THIS APPROACH AND DO NOT HESITATE SUGGEST OTHER ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN TO REVERSE TELLO STAND.

5. DRAFT OF THIS MESSAGE WAS SHOWN TO AMB. MANN.

END OF MESSAGE

*IN 78[illegible]07 - According to Manuel Tello, the Mexican position on the censure of Cuba by the OAS is "set."

WH/CA H. PEAK (IN DRAFT)

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (MR REICHHARDT WH/3 NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 2100-13 DEC 63)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/SCO 4, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, VR, C/CI

S E C R E T 140035Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7808

14 DEC 63 IN 80445

RYBAT

REF DIR 88863 *

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED INFO RE CUBAN ARMS DISCOVERED IN VENEZUELA BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF LITENSOR.

1. COS CAN OF COURSE DELIVER REF INFORMATION DIRECTLY TO LITENSOR. SUGGEST HOWEVER THAT SUCH CLANDESITNE PASSAGE DOES NOT PLACE GOM IN POSITION WHERE POSITIVE COOPERATION OTHER OAS NATIONS, STIMULATED.

2. CERTAINLY GOV REALIZES MEXICAN POSTURE THIS MATTER EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. WOULD NOT GOV THEN BE WILLING SEND MEMBER BETANCOURT'S STAFF TO MEXI FOR PERSONAL MEETING LITENSOR TO PRESENT NEW DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, PERHAPS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE INTERNATION SURFACING? SAME VENEZUELAN REP COULD HOLD PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER LITENSOR MEETING. THIS WOULD INSURE FULL PRESS COVERAGE, WITH EDITORIAL FOLLOW-UP BY STATION ASSETS. PERHAPS GOM WOULD FEEL FORCED TAKE MORE POSITIVE STAND BECAUSE OF FEAR LOCAL PUBLIC OPINION REACTION.

3. SHOULD GOV REP HAVE DIFFICULTY OBTAINING INTERVIEW LITENSOR COS MIGHT BE ABLE EXPEDITE.

4. IN ANY EVENT COS CAN DO SHOULD PARA TWO ACTION BE UNFEASIBLE.

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 13 Dec 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET ~~RYBAT~~

Destroy

3 4 5 6

13DEC63 23 10z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
IMMEDIAT

TO : Mexico City
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 89143

REF: DIR 88863

RYBAT

1. IT HAS NOW BEEN DECIDED TO SEND MR. HERSCHEL PEAK WITH THE VISUAL PRESENTATION AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION AND WOULD LIKE HIM TO DO THE ACTUAL BRIEFING IN SPANISH.

2. WHEN COULD A MEETING BE SET UP FOR CURTIS AND PEAK TO SEE LITENSOR? PEAK XXXXXXXX AVAILABLE TO LEAVE SUNDAY EASTERN AIRLINES FLIGHT 305 TO ARRIVE MEXI 10:05. ADVISE BY NOON 14 DEC RE MEETING SCHEDULE.

3. AMB MANN THINKS A BRIEFING OF FORMIN TELLO WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL. AMB EXPECTS RETURN MEXI ON SEVENTEEN DEC. HIS PRESENCE MIGHT FACILITATE TELLO BRIEFING.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible]

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET ~~RYBAT~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

mo ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5 (MR. REICHHARDT, WH, NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1620, 14 DEC 63)BP

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR

14 Dec 63 IN 80849

S E C R E T 141917Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 7391

REF A MEXI 7389 (IN 80468)

B DIR 89143 *

RYBAT

1. BELIEVE EARLIEST DATE FOR LITENSOR BRIEFING WILL BE TUESDAY, 17 DECEMBER.

2. HE OUT OF MEXICO CITY UNTIL LATE NIGHT 15 DECEMBER, REPORTEDLY HAS FULL SCHEDULE ON 16 DECEMBER.

3. WILL REPORT IMMEDIATELY WHEN ABLE CONTACT LITENSOR PERSONALLY.

4. SUGGEST PEAKE ARRIVE ANY CONVENIENT TIME ON 16 DECEMBER, WILL MEET HAVE RESERVATIONS.

5. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *HAVE DECIDED TO HAVE MR. HERSCHEL TO DO THE DEBRIEFING.

K

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (MR REICHHARDT WH/3 NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 2120-13 DEC 63)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, VR

SECRET 140138Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 7389

14 Dec 63 IN 80468

RYBAT

REF A DIR 89143

B MEXI 7385 (IN 80445)

1. FOREIGN MINISTER TELLO HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF ARMS CACHE IS "A FRAME UP". MEXI STATION BELIEVES APPEARANCE OF PEAK OR OTHER UNKNOWN KUBARKER MIGHT ONLY INCREASE THIS DISBELIEF.

2. REF B APPARENTLY CROSSED REF A. STATION REQUESTS HQS GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION PROPOSAL THAT BETANCOURT SEND PRE-BRIEFED REPRESENTATIVE. ONLY IN THIS MANNER CAN FULL PUBLIC EXPLOITATION BE ACHIEVED BY STATION, REGARDLESS OF REACTION OF LITENSOR AND INDIVIDUAL MEXICANS.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/SR 4, D/OP, RF 2

Extra copy

S E C R E T 311932Z

31 JUL 63 IN 90739

DIR CITE MEXI 5570

RYBAT

REF: A. MEXI 3466 (SEE PARA 3) (IN 69474)

B. MEXI 1338 (SEE PARA 2)

C. HMMS 3009

1. FEINGLASS CANNOT REPEAT NOT DO SPANISH FROM TAPES.

2. THIS HAS PUT STATION ON SPOT SINCE HAD INTENDED USE FEINGLASS DO RUSSIAN AND SPANISH ON SOVIET EMBASSY TAPES AND HAD UNDERSTOOD AS RESULT SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS REPEATEDLY LEVIED BY STATION THAT HE HAD SPANISH.

3. FEINGLASS HAS SENT WRITTEN MEMO TO COS STATING HE WILL BE UNABLE DO SPANISH UNTIL AFTER REPEAT AFTER SOMETHING LIKE ONE YEAR OF ADDITIONAL STUDY.

4. COS HAD INSISTED REPEATEDLY THAT SAFARANO REPLACEMENT BE ABLE DO SPANISH WELL ENOUGH TO GIVE TO LITENSOR. FEINGLASS WAS SENT BY HQS TO STATION WITH STATION UNDERSTANDING THIS TRUE.

5. COS ATTEMPTING FIND ADDITIONAL WORK TO GIVE FEINGLASS BUT ALL WORK EXCEPT RUSSIAN TRANSLATION WILL BE CLERICAL AND HE HIGH PRICED CLERK. SEE REF B FOR TIME RUSSIAN TRANSLATIONS TAKE.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

6. FEINGLASS IS CONSCIENTIOUS AND IT COS OPINION HE NOT TO BLAME FOR STATION MISUNDERSTNDING HIS LINGUISTIC CAPABILITIES.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *CABLE PRE-DATES CS FILES. COPY MAY BE SEEN IN CIA CABLE REFERENCE FILE.

50-6-75/2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

1 ~~SECRET~~

ORIG : W.H. CARLEY:jp
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 24 July 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-75/2

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

24 Jul 63 16 38z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI/IC 2, RI/AN, SAS 8, RF

DEFERRED SIG CEN
R ROUTINE

RI COPY

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 56443

56443

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXI 5412 (IN 81732)*

SUGGEST CURTIS RAISE QUESTION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTIONS OF LIENVOY PBRUMEN TAKE WITH DAINOLD WHILE LATTER MEXI. IN VIEW FACT THAT URQUHART (WHO ALSO NOW IN MEXI) IS PRINCIPAL END USER SUCH TAKE, DYVOUR FEELS THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SORT OUT WHAT VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTIONS NECESSARY FOR SAS PURPOSES AND WHAT ARE MEXI STATION CAPABILITIES HANDLE TRANSCRIPTION LOAD.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *Ref stated that SAS wanted verbatim transcriptions of LIENVOY PBRUMEN take and LIENVOY present staff could not handle.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
R	
RI/FI	
WH/3/Mex	
DESTROY	

SAS/SO/AR

WH/COPS

33

J.C. KING
CWHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J.M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

RI COPY

FORM 4-63 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

50-6-75/2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CCS 2, OP 2, RF 2

S E C R E T 221903Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5458

REF DIR 55521

22 Jul 63 IN 84648

1. AREHART WILLING REMAIN MEXI LONG AS NEED EXISTS. DID NOT REQUEST EXTENSION OR ANOTHER TOUR FOR TWO REASONS:

A. HE DISAPPOINTED THAT HQS DID NOT CONSIDER HIM FOR PROMOTION WHICH STATION FEELS HE CERTAINLY DESERVES AFTER THREE YEARS COMMENDABLE SERVICE IN VERY DIFFICULT OUTSIDE SENSITIVE JOB.

B. HE WARY HIS COVER STATUS SHOULD NEXT PRESIDENT NOT BE CONFIDANT LISLEGANT AND IT NECESSARY DISMANTLE LIENVOY.

2. MEXI AGAIN REQUESTS AREHART BE PROMOTED. PLS ADVISE. WILL SUBMIT NEW PRQ WHEN FUTURE LIENVOY KNOWN AND SIX MONTHS PRIOR AREHART DESIRE REASSIGNMENT.

3. ANSWERING OTHER QUESTIONS REF IN SEPARATE CABLE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: REQUESTED STA DISCUSS POSSIBLE ONE YEAR EXTENSION WITH AREHART.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S E C R E T~~

ORIG : C. [illegible]:dc
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 18 July 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. Destroy

19 Jul 63 20 47z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO : RI/AN, OP 3, RF

DEFERRED SIG CEN

R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 55521

REF: HMMT 3803*

1. REQUEST STATION DISCUSS POSSIBLE ONE YEAR EXTENSION WITH AREHART. KUDOVE CAREER SERVICE ~~[illegible]~~ HAS APPROVED. IF THIS NOT ACCEPTABLE REQUEST HE EXTEND TIL DECEMBER WHEN LIENVOY AND LICAPER FUTURES WILL BE DETERMINED PER MEXI 5412. (IN 81732) AT PRESENT NO HANDY PROSPECT FOR REPLACEMENT AREHART. IF LICAPER CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED, HORSFALL CAN REPLACE AREHART. CABLE DECISION AREHART.

2. IN VIEW STATION STAND ON LICAPER CITED MEXI 5412 SHOULD HDQS WITHHOLD REQUISITION FOR NEW LIENVOY EQUIPMENT UNTIL NOTIFIED BY STATION?

3. WILL CABLE LATER RE HORSFALL ETA.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *PRQ on AREHART.

CS/PP/S/A PANEL Mr. Moss (in draft)

C/WH/PERS

WH/COPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. King
J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

~~S E C R E T~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. M. Whitten
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

: DIRECTOR
OM : MEXICO CITY
TION: WH 8
FO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, CCS 2, SAS 8, RF 2

S E C R E T 172217Z

IN51732

DIR CITE MEXI 5412

17 JUL [illegible]

REF DIR 52792

1. MUCH IMPRESSED WITH HORSFALL. TRANSCRIPTION TESTS VERY SATISFACTORY. BELIEVE LINGUISTIC CAPABILITY AND EXPERIENCE BUEN AND BANG QUALIFY HIM EXCEPTIONALLY WILL FOR LICAPER SUPERVISOR OR LIENVOY IF IT CONTINUES. APPEARS CAPABLE ADAPTING MEXICAN PECULIARITIES AND NOT AVERSE BEING CUT OFF FROM OFFICIAL COLONY.

2. MAIN QUESTION ONE OF TIMING. KNOW HE EAGER RETURN HERE AND GET SETTLED. HOWEVER FEEL UNDESIRABLE EXPOSE HIM LIENVOY PERSONNEL IF HE TO WORK ULTIMATELY IN LICAPER. DO NOT WISH LOSE HIM HOWEVER AND CAN GUARANTEE KEEP HIM BUSY DOING PBBAND TRANSLATIONS FOR LITENSOR AND LIENVOY PBRUMEN TAPES WHICH WOULD REMOVE FROM LIENVOY FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE ARE TOLD SAS WANTS THESE VERBATIM WHICH LIENVOY PRESENT STAFF CAN NOT HANDLE.

3. STATION REQUESTS THEREFORE RETURN HORSFALL HERE SOON AS FEASIBLE IN TOURIST STATUS. WOULD LIVE IN FURNISHED QUARTERS UNTIL NEW PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE NAMED (EARLY OCTOBER AT LATEST) AND FATE OF LIENVOY AND LICAPER KNOWN. AT THAT TIME CANDIDATE CONCERNED WOULD ARRANGE COVER AND HORSFALL STATUS WOULD CHANGE FROM TOURIST AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS COULD BE BROUGHT IN. PLEASE .

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

AUTHORIZE HORSFALL BUY COMPACT QP VEHICLE HERE AT 41,000 PESO CEILING. WHEN PERTINENT HQ SHOULD ARRANGE HAVE HIS PIANO SHIPPED HERE TO SOMEONE STILL ELIGIBLE RECEIVE IT.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ORVILLE R. HORSFALL WILL ARRIVE MEXI 1243 HOURS WEDNESDAY 10 JULY.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
KAPOK SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LIENVOY Tapes for Training

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: HMMT-3694

Returned under separate cover are the 15 tapes which were furnished Headquarters for training purposes.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
15 LIENVOY Tapes u/s/c

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City w/atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS-2960

DATE
18 June 1963

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico/Bustos:dd			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	19 JUN 1963	J. C. King

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

21 SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA, S/C 2

IN36488 11 MAY 1963

SECRET 102344Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4544

RYBAT

ATTN: KNIGHT AND GALBOND

FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR MANN TO ASST SECY MARTIN:

(MESSAGE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO CSSCP 210-313 CABLES. DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT. ORGANIZATION.

SECR

DATE: 10 MAY 63
FROM: MEXICO CITY
TO : DIRECTOR

RECD: MAY 11 0156Z 63
ROUTINE
IN 36488

FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR MANN TO ASST SECY MARTIN:

"LOPEZ MATEOS, WHO IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN OPINION, HAS ASKED WIN SCOTT FOR COLLECTION OF U.S. VIEWS ON HIS RECENT LATIN AMERICAN DENUCLEARIZATION PROPOSAL . RECENTLY SCOTT FURNISHED LOPEZ MATEOS EUROPEAN NEWS CLIPPINGS ON HIS TOUR, PARTICULARLY WEST BERLIN WALL INCIDENT. WHICH SEEMED TO DISTRUB LOPEZ MATEOS BECAUSE HE WAS PRAISED BY EAST GERMAN PRESS BUT CRITICIZED BY WESTERN PAPERS. ON NEW REQUEST SCOTT TOLD LOPEZ MATEOS THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE FURNISH ONLY U.S. NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE AND REACTION ON DENUCLEARIZATION AS HE, SCOTT, DOES NOT DEAL AT OFFICIAL LEVEL ON SUCH POLICY MATTERS.

"BECAUSE OF (A) LOPEZ MATEOS' SENSITIVITY TO OPINION ABROAD; (B) FACT THERE HAS BEEN NO REACTION FROM US OTHER THAN DEPT PRESS RELEASE AND YOUR CONVERSATION WITH CARRILLO FLORES (DEPT CIRCULAR TELEGRAM 1878); AND (C) FACT THAT SOVIET, CUBAN AND POLISH AMBASSADORS HERE HAVE PUBLICLY COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON PROPOSED DENUCLEARIZATION, I SUGGEST WE CONSIDER FOLLOWING:

"PREPARE A CAREFUL STATEMENT IN WASHINGTON, ALONG LINES YOUR REMARKS TO CARRILLO FLORES, COMMENTING AS FAVORABLY AS POSSIBLE ON LOPEZ MATEOS'S DENUCLEARIZATION PROPOSAL WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF

SECRET

OUR OWN POLICY POSITION WHICH I'M SURE HAS BEEN CAREFULLY WORKED OUT. THIS STATEMENT COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO SOME SPECIFIC U.S. OFFICIAL OR TO UNIDENTIFIED HIGH OFFICIAL. IF APPROVED, SUGGEST BE SENT DIRECTLY TO SCOTT VIA CAS FOR CAS FOR DELIVERY TO LOPEZ MATEOS."

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

12-62

ORIG : C. BUSTOS 3
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO ☐ INDEX
EXT : 5940 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 25 APRIL 1963 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : PG 2, CI/OA, CCS 2, S/C

26 APR 63 20 41z

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 35426

REF: MEXI 4238 (IN 21625) *

1. WHEN HMMT 3380 RECEIVED AT END JAN FOR BUDGET REASONS HQS DID NOT IMMEDIATELY SUBMIT LIENVOY PROJ AMENDMENT NEEDED TO PURCHASE NEW EQUIP. ESTIMATED COST FOR EQUIP WAS ROUGHLY $20,000. HQS ORIGINALLY UNDERSTOOD OLD EQUIP WOULD BE USED IN PROPOSED LITEMPO TAP CENTER AND CE UNIT.

2. WHEN HQS RECEIVED HMMA 20890 IN MID MARCH SAYING LITEMPO WOULD USE MEXICAN EQUIP AND STATION WAS SUBMITTING PROJ OUTLINE, HQS CONTINUED HOLD LIENVOY REQUEST TO REVIEW ENTIRE LITEMPO/LIENVOY TAP CENTER PROBLEM. HQS STILL AWAITING LITEMPO TAP PROJ.

3. IN VIEW LARGE COST HQS WONDERS WHETHER SECURITY STILL CALLS FOR REPLACEMENT EQUIP. HQS HAS RECEIVED NO WORD ON PROPOSED LIENVOY MOVE SINCE AUGUST 1962.

4. SO THAT HQS CAN AGAIN REVIEW REQUEST FOR LIENVOY EQUIP PLS SUBMIT SOONEST PROJ ON LITEMPO TAP UNIT AND MORE DETAILS OF PROPOSED LIENVOY MOVE. CANNOT JUSTIFY REPLACING EQUIP IF SITE NOT TO BE CHANGED, AND PREFER WAIT UNTIL FISCAL 64.

Lienvoy
Support

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : C.
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1262
ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

page 2

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR [illegible]

5. RELATED PROBLEM IS COVER FOR TARASOFF. PLS NOTIFY HQS YOUR DECISION AND DESIRED ETA DATE. SEE MEXI 3466.**

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: When can Station expect LIENVOY equipment?

C/S COMMENT: *(IN 69474)

R.W. Herbert
J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COPS W Hood
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

c.c. LIENVOY support

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : M. JUDKINS:dd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT. : 5940
DATE : 22 APRIL 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

25 APR 63 18 58z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/RA, FI, TSD 5, S/C

DEFERRED SIG CEN
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 35066

REF: MEXI 4201 (IN 19807)*

1. HQS APPROVES LOAN OF ONE STERILE SPARE B-10 DIAL PULSE RECORDER TO DURKIN.

2. HQS URGES CLOSE SUPPORT TREASURY/NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS. MEXI MAY PROVIDE DURKIN WITH OCCASIONAL LIFEAT COVERAGE PROVIDED NO LIFEAT TAKE GIVEN TO MEXICANS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *William J. Durkin, Treasury rep assigned to Mexico investigating narcotics traffic, approached Station re dial recorder for phone tap on Mexican target.

TSD BRUCE LA ROSE (BY PHONE)
CI/OPS FRANK HUGHES F.M. Hughes
~~WH/COPS~~
CI/R&A/TC

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 4 [illegible]

ACTION: [illegible]

INFO [illegible] 4, S/C 2

IN21625

S E C R E T 192345Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4238

20 APR 1963

REF HMMT-3380, 21 JAN 63

STATION WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHEN IT CAN EXPECT TO RECEIVE EQUIPMENT REQUESTED IN REF.

S E C R E T

LIENVOY

Thru

559-53/54-63

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

!

034 ③

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ATE : 6 APR 63 24

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : BONN

CTION: C/WH 8

IFO : ADCP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

APR 6 1921Z 63
SERVICE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

BONN 4460 IN 12661 A

INFO CITE

RYBAT

C/S COMMENT:

COMPLETE ADDRESS LINE TO READ:

"OPIM BRLN INFO OPIM DIR MEXI FRAN PARI CITE BONN 4460"

K

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

30 SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5*

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 061700Z

OPIM MEXI BONN INFO DIR FRAN CITE BRLN 2433

IN12861

6 APR 1963

RYBAT

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.
**NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 1730 6 APR.

REF BONN 4463 (NOT TO MEXI OR DIR) **

1. REF INDICATES ROMERO ADVISED BY TELEPHONE FROM MEXI THAT HE WOULD BE CONTACTED BRLN UPON ARRIVAL. WISH ADVISE ALL ADDEES THAT PRESIDENT MATEOS AND PARTY TOTALLING SEVENTY REPEAT SEVENTY VISITING BRLN SUNDAY 7 APRIL FOR TOTAL OF ONLY SIX HOURS, ARRIVING VIA CHARTER PANAM AIRCRAFT CIRCA 1000 HOURS LOCAL, WHERE WILL BE MET BY MAYOR OF BRLN ALBERTZ AND OTHER CITY OFFICIALS, WILL TOUR CITY, SEE WALL, VISIT MEXICO PLATZ, ATTEND LUNCH HOSTED BY SIEMENS FACTORY. PARTY DEPARTS 1600 HOURS LOCAL. AT NO TIME ARE ANY AMERICANS INCLUDED IN PARTY. SEE NO OPPORTUNITY AND LESS REASON ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH ROMERO ESPECIALLY IN ABSENCE ANY MESSAGES FOR PRESIDENT MATEOS. NOTE PARTY IN BONN PAST THREE DAYS WHERE IT EVIDENTLY QUITE POSSIBLE APPROACH ROMERO IF SUCH NECESSARY. CANNOT IN ANY CASE MAKE APPROACH CLANDESTINELY SINCE WELCOMING PARTY AND BERLIN CITY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WILL BE PRESENT THROUGHOUT VISIT.

2. BONN: VIEW ABOVE REQUEST YOU ADVISE ROMERO ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISIT BRLN PRECLUDE SECURE CONTACT WHICH IN ANY CASE SEEMS UNNECESSARY VIEW SHORTNESS VISIT. UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ADVISED TO CONTRARY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT ATTEMPT APPROACH ROMERO.

SECRET

K

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

30 SECRET

ACTION: C/WH 5*

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2**

SECRET 060800Z

DIR INFO MEXI BONN CITE HAGU 3620

6 APR 1963

IN 12890

REF DIR 25991 ***

1. STATION ATTEMPTS OFFER SERVICES TO PRESIDENT FRUSTRATED BY

A. LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES WITH ROMERO. SPANISH SPEAKER CALLED HOTEL TWICE 3 APR WITH COMPLETE LACK OF RESPONSE ON PART PERSON WHO SAID HE WAS ROMERO.

B. ATTEMPTED CONTACT COL GRAMOS LATER 3 APR AND WAS TOLD BY ANOTHER ENGLISH SPEAKING COLONEL CARDUNAS THAT GRAMOS WAS IN MEXICO CITY.

C. UPON CALLING ROMERO AGAIN 4 APR WAS TOLD HE WAS NOT REGISTERED THERE.

2. REGRET FAILURE MAKE CONTACT BUT PRESUME THAT IF PRESIDENT HAD NEEDED STATION SERVICES HE WOULD HAVE HAD AIDE CALL NUMBER ALREADY PROVIDED IN HAGU 3494. (IN 90740)

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

***RE MEXICAN PRESIDENT MAKING TRIP TO GERMANY, FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS IN MARCH AND APRIL. DESIRES TO SEND MESSAGES THRU KUBARK CHANNELS HQS AUTHORI
CONTACT BETWEEN LOPEZ SECRETARY RUMERO AND ADDRESSEE STA.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

3 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5* (WH COPY SLOTTED 1630 6 APR 63 BP)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 062006Z

OPIM BRLN MEXI INFO OPIM HAGU PRITY DIR CITE FRAN 7941

RYBAT 8 APR 1963 IN12901

REF BRLN 2433 (IN 12561) **

BONN 4463 ***

IN VIEW REFS, AS ROMERO HAS REQUESTED HE WILL BE FURNISHED TELEPHONE NUMBER IN BERLIN FOR EMERGENCY USE, ON 7 APRIL THUS ELIMINATING NECESSITY FOR PERSONAL CONTACT BY BOB. ROMERO WILL BE GIVEN BOB OFFICE NUMBER BY WYKOFF FOR THIS PURPOSE, AND CAN GIVE HIS NAME STATING HAS MESSAGE TO LEAVE.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**RE MEXICAN PRESIDENT OFFICIAL VISIT TO ADDRESSEE COUNTRIES.

***NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 1715 6 APR 63.

K

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 4 43

SECRET

ACTION: C/WH 6 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT: 0415 6 APRIL 63)JA

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

S E C R E T 052729Z

OPIM MEXI BRLN INFO OPIM BONN PRITY DIR PARI HAGU CITE FRAN 7936

RYBAT

6 APR 1963

IN 12640

REF MEXI 4231 (IN 99541)
DIR 25991

1. CONTACT MADE AT BONN EVENING 5 APR WITH ROMERO WHO WITH PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS AT THE TIME. PRESIDENT MATEOS TOOK WYKOFF ASIDE AND APOLOGIZED FOR MIXUP AT PARIS STATING HIS PEOPLE WERE AT FAULT AND WERE JUST BEING VERY CAREFUL. PRESIDENT STATED HE HAD NO MESSAGES FOR RELAY TODAY BUT WOULD LIKE TO ASK A FAVOR. SAID ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT KNOWN PUBLICLY THAT HE AND HIS PARTY ARE GOING TO BERLIN, AND IN FACT HAVE DENIED IT, THEY ARE PLANNING TO DO SO ON AFTERNOON 6 APRIL AND WOULD LIKE THE SAME SERVICE THERE AS HAVE BEEN EXTENDED TO HIM BY WYKOFF AND WITTENBERGER. WAS ADVISED IT WOULD BE ARRANGED. MATEOS SAID ALL THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN MAKING CONTACT IN BERLIN WOULD BE FOR THE PERSON CONTACTING ROMERO TO SAY HE WAS A FRIEND OF WIN SCOTT. MATEOS AND ROMERO STATED THEY PLANNING TO STAY IN BERLIN AT HOTEL KEMPINSKI, INDICATING WOULD BE THERE A DAY OR SO AND MAY BE RETURNING DIRECTLY TO MEXICO CITY FROM BERLIN.

2. BERLIN: BACKGROUND TRAFFIC BEING RELAYED OPIM. PRESIDENT ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS OF MEXICO MAKING OFFICIAL VISIT FRANCE, GERMANY

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

AND HOLLAND MARCH AND APRIL. COS MEXI IS IN CLANDESTINE CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ODACID. LOPEZ REQUESTED NAMES OF FRIENDS OF COS MEXI IN PARI, BONN, HAGUE WHO COULD CONTACT HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY HUMBERTO ROMERO (PEREZ) AT EACH PLACE DURING VISIT. LOPEZ WILL WANT TO SEND AND RECEIVE MESSAGE THROUGH KUBARK COMMO CHANNELS TO AND FROM HIGH MEXICAN OFFICIALS AND ALSO KUBARK MEXI. HE DOES NOT TRUST HIS OWN FOREIGN SERVICE COMMO. HQS AUTHORIZED CONTACT BETWEEN LOPEZ SECRETARY ROMERO AND KUBARK STATIONS TO PICK UP AND DELIVER MESSAGES. ROMERO SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH AND STATION OFFICER MUST USE ALIAS. INITIAL CONTACT TO ROMERO CAN BE MADE USING WIN SCOTTS NAME AS DESCRIBED. PARI HAS USED NAME WITTENBERGER IN CONTACTING ROMERO AND THE NAME JOHN WYKOFF WAS USED IN BONN. FURTHER DETAILS FOLLOW.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1 ...

2

3

4

5

6

ACTION: C/WH 8 (COPY TO WH (ACTION) AND EE (INFO) 0600 6 APRIL 63)JA

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

S E C R E T 061030Z

OPIM BRLN INFO OPIM DIR MEXI FRAN CITE BONN 4460

RYBAT

6 APR 1963

IN 12661

REF FRAN 7936 (IN 12641)

1. LOPEZ AND PARTY NOW DEPARTING BONN FOR BRLN 0740 HOURS 7 APR.

2. LAPOLLA AS WYKOFF TALKED AT BONN TO ROMERO NOT LOPEZ. LAPOLLA APOLOGIZED TO ROMERO FOR MIXUP AT PARIS RATHER THAN LOPEZ APOLOGIZING TO LAPOLLA.

3. FOR BRLN: DUE TO ROMERO PRESS OF BUSINESS PHONE CALLS MAY NOT ESTABLISH CONTACT. MAY BE NECESSARY TO CAMP IN HOTEL LOBBY AND CONTACT ROMERO ENTERING OR LEAVING AS WAS DONE AT BONN.

4. FOR FRAN: LAPOLLA AND THOMPFORD WILL REMAIN BONN UNTIL LOPEZ DEPARTURE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5 *

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 021552Z

** OPIM MEXI INFO DIR BONN HAGU PARI CITE FRAN 7814

RYBAT

REF PARI 7113 (in 97152) 2 APR 1963 IN99428

RE PARA THREE REF SHOULD WE CONTACT GRAMOS OR ROMERO.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**SUGGESTED MEH IDENTIFY GRAMOS SINCE HE VERY DEFINITE THAT HE AV COURANT ON CONTACT AND THAT ROMERO NOT.

Lienig/Siggan

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

	[illegible]	4	
[illegible]	[illegible]	5	
[illegible]	[illegible]	6	

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

S E C R E T 021745Z

OPIM FRAN INFO ROUTINE DIR BONN MASU CITE MEXI 4031 (OUSLER ACTING)

RYBAT

REF: FRAN 7154 (IN 82003)*

2 APR 1963

IN99541

APPRECIATE ATTEMPT CONTACT ROMERO. IF THIS DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE THEN CONTACT GRAMOS.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

1	c/wf 3	4	
2		5	
3		6	

SECRET

ACTION: C/WH 5 (WE AND WH COPIES SLOTTED AT 1400 29 MAR OJ)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

S E C R E T 291638Z IN 97152

PRITY MEXI INFO PRITY DIR BONN FRAN ROUTINE HAGU CITE PARI 7113

RYBAT 29 MAR 1963 IN97152

REF PARI 7092 (IN 96410)*

1. REGRET HAVING TO REPORT THAT SOLUTION OF MYSTERY OF TWO WITTENBERGERS IS CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF LEFT AND RIGHT HANDS OPERATING IDEPENDENTLY: I.E., UNCOORDINATED EFFORT BY TWO STATION OFFICERS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT. CONFUSION ON PART OF MEXICANS CERTAINLY UNDERSTANDABLE.

2. NIGHT 28 MARCH TELEPHONE CONTACT WAS MADE WITH LT COL GRAMOS WHO IMMEDIATELY STATED HE PERSON PARI SUPPOSED BE TALKING TO AND ROMERO NOT AWARE WHAT GOING ON. GRAMOS STATED WOULD RETURN CALL TO CASE OFFICER DURING NIGHT. DID NOT DO SO. TELEPHONE CONTACT EARLY MORNING 29 MARCH PRODUCED RESPONSE FROM GRAMOS TO EFFECT HE HAD NO NEED OUR SERVICES.

3. SUGGEST MEXI IDENTIFY GRAMOS SINCE HE VERY DEFINITE THAT HE AU COURANT ON CONTACT AND THAT ROMERO NOT.

4. FOR BONN, FRAN, HAGU: HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT KUBARK CONTACT SPEAK SPANISH.

5. HOPE WILLARD C. CURTIS IN DUE COURSE WILL APOLOGIZE TO ROMERO IN OUR BEHALF FOR MIX-UP.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**RE ALLEGED WITTENBERGER AND "OTHER WITTENBERGER".

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ACTION: C/WH 5(WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1500, 28 MAR 0J)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 281839Z

OPIM MEXI INFO OPIM DIR PRITY FRAN BONN ROUTINE HAGU CITE PARI 7092

RYBAT

95070

IN96410

REF A. PARI 7042 (NOT SENT BONN HAGU)

B. MEXI 3947 (IN 95547)

1. FURTHER REPEATED EFFORTS CONTACT ROMERO HAVE BEEN TOTALLY FRUSTRATED BY AIDE TO ROMERO, LT. RODRIGUEZ, WHO REFUSES PERMIT "WITTENBERGER" TALK TO ROMERO, EVEN WHEN HE AVAILABLE, WHICH IS RARE BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS OFFICIAL CEREMONIES. WHEN WETHERILL CALLED MORNING 28 MARCH, RODRIGUEZ SAID ROMERO HAD JUST TALKED TO WITTENBERGER AND MADE APPOINTMENT WITH HIM FOR FIVE O'CLOCK SAME AFTERNOON. WHEN WETHRILL SAID THIS IMPOSSIBLE, R INSISTED HAD BEEN PRESENT DURING CONVERSATION.

2. WETHERILL CALLED AT 1800 HRS, ASKED IF ALLEGED WITTENBERGER HAD APPEARED ON SCHEDULE. RODRIGUEZ COUNTERED BY ASKING NAME WETHERILL'S SECRETARY. GAVE HIM FIRST NAME. R SAID WOULD CALL BACK, AND HAS NOT DONE SO. BELIEVE THIS IS END OF THE LINE. ONLY ALTERNATIVE AT THIS POINT IS TO ABANDON COMPLETELY SECURITY WHICH ALREADY BADLY LACERATED.

3. ONLY EXPLANATION WE CAN OFFER FOR STORY OF "OTHER WITTENBERGER" IS THAT RODRIGUEZ AND ROMERO DECIDED WETHERILL/WITTENBERGER WAS CRACKPOT, AND APPROPRIATE GIVE HIM SOME OF OWN MEDICINE.

A

4. IN LIGHT THIS EXPERIENCE SUGGEST RECONSIDERIYNDWYAULIPFBMTHER STATIONS TRYING CONTACT ROMERO. HOPE MEXI WILL EVENTUALLY LEARN TRUE STORY "OTHER WITTENBERGER", SINCE NOT IMPOSSIBLE FRENCH (WHO UNDOUBTEDLY

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE ISPROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1
2
3

ACTION:

INFO :

IN 96410 PARI 7092

MONITORING PALAIS D'ORSAY PHONE) HAVE BEEN PLAYING GAMES, ALTHO THIS HARDLY MAKES SENSE.

5. WE THOUGHT MEXICANS WERE SUPPOSED TO BE SO FRIENDLY.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED WYKOFF AND STRATFORD CALL ROMERO SAY FRIENDS OF WINSTON SCOTT'S IN MEXI AND ASK IF CAN BE OF SERVICE TO PRESIDENT AND SAY WELL CALL AGAIN.

S/C NOTE: PORTION GARBLED-BEING SVCD.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

DATE : 092
28 MAR 63 21

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 29 0130Z 63
SERVICE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 96410 A PARI 7092

TO INFO CITE

RYBAT

C/S COMMENT: COMPLETE PARA 4, LINES 1 AND 2 TO READ:

"4. IN LIGHT THIS EXPERIENCE SUGGEST RECONSIDER DESIREABILITY OTHER STATIONS TRYING CONTACT ROMERO. HOPE MEXI WILL EVENTUALLY LEARN TRUE..."

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3

20-37

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADOP, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 281902Z

OPIM FRAN INFO DIR BONN PARI HAGU CITE MEXI 3967

RYBAT

28 MAR 1963 IN96402

REF FRAN 7672 (IN 95990)*

YES.

SECRET

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED IS DATA PARA ONE REF 5 APR.

Lenny Dugan

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

12/4 SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, D/OC 2, S/C 2

SECRET 231052Z

OPIM MEXI INFO DIR BONN PARI HAGU CITE FRAN 7672

IN95990

28 MAR 1963

RYBAT

REF MEXI 3947 (95547)*

IS DATA PARA ONE REF 5 APRIL?

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *RE DATE LOPEZ MATEOS SCHEDULED ARRIVE IN BONN.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1	[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5 (C/WH COPY SLOTTED AT 0655 27 MAR 63 JA)

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, D/OC 2, S/C 2

SECRET 271104Z

27 MAR 1963

OPIM DIR INFO OPIM MEXI ROUTINE FRAN CITE PARI 7042

RYBAT

REF DIR 25991 *

IN95070

1. HAVING DETERMINED THAT ROMERO STAYING WITH LOPEZ MATEOS AT OFFICIAL GUEST RESIDENCE, PALAIS D'ORSAY, WETHERILL TRIED CONTACT HIM BY PHONE EVENING 26 MARCH. TALKED TO UNIDENTIFIED MEMBER ENTOURAGE WHO SAID ROMERO NOT THERE BUT RETURNING SHORTLY. WETHERILL GAVE NAME WITTENBERGER, FRIEND OF SENOR BLANCO, TIO, ETC. CALLED BACK LATER, GOT SAME MAN WHO SAID HAD GIVEN WITTENBERGER NAME TO ROMERO, WHO DID NOT RECOGNIZE IT, OR KNOW WHO SENOR BLANCO WAS. WOULD NOT PUT ROMERO ON PHONE WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION OF WHAT BUSINESS WITTENBERGER HAD WITH ROMERO. IN VIEW INCREASINGLY AWKWARD SECURITY SITUATION, WETHERILL BROKE OFF CONVERSATION.

2. SUBSEQUENTLY DELIVERED PERSONAL NOTE TO PALAIS D'ORSAY FOR ROMERO SUING SAME RECOGNITION NAMES AND GIVING TWO PHONE NUMBERS FOR CONTACT, ONE EMBASSY, ONE HOME. HAVE HEARD NOTHING.

3. MEXI: PLS GIVE US SOME FURTHER IDENTIFICATION MATERIAL WE CAN USE ON PHONE WITH ANY ONE WHO ANSWERS PHONE IN PRESIDENTIAL SUITE. WAS ROMERO ACTUALLY GIVEN NAME WITTENBERGER?

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *LOPEZ REQUESTED NAMES OF FRIENDS OD COS MEXI IN ADDRESSEE CITIES WHO COULD CONTACT HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY HUMBERTO ROMERO AT EACH PLACE DURING VISIT. WILL USE KUBARK COMMO CHANNELS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

23 SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, D/OC 2, S/C 2

SECRET 271949Z

PRITY FRAN INFO DIR PARI BONN HAGU CITE MEXI 3947 IN95547

RYBAT

27 MAR 1963

REF FRAN 7605 (NOT SENT HAGU) (IN 94458)

1. PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS SCHEDULED ARRIVE IN BONN AT 1200 HOURS (BONN TIME) GO TO INFORMAL LUNCH AT 1300 HOURS.

2. HE AND PARTY STAYING AT KOENIGSHOF.

3. REAL NAME OF CONTACT IN MEXICO IS WINSTON SCOTT. ROMERO KNOWS PERSONALLY AND IS AWARE PRESIDENT IS CONTACT AND FRIEND.

4. PRESIDENT'S MAIN CONCERN IS FOR MESSAGES FROM MEXICO IF REPEAT IF ANY SENSITIVE MATTERS LOCALS (ONE OF WHOM ACTING CHIEF OF MEXICAN GOVERNMENT) WHO CONTACTS OF SCOTT WISH SEND TO HIM BY KUBARK CHANNELS.

5. PRESIDENT GIVEN NAMES OF FRIENDS OF SCOTT (PER DIR-25991) IN PARIS, BONN, HAGUE, BUT, FROM PARIS, IT OBVIOUS HE HAS NOT BRIEFED ROMERO.

6. SUGGEST, THEREFORE, WYKOFF AND STRATFORD CALL ROMERO SAY FRIENDS OF WINSTON SCOTT'S IN MEXICO AND ASK IF CAN BE OF SERVICE TO PRESIDENT AND SAY WILL CALL AGAIN.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ANY WORD IF ARRIVAL DATE NOW ANTICIPATED OF LOPEZ MATEOS IN BONN AND NAME IF HOTEL HE PLANNING TO STAY THERE.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 271634Z

OPIM PARI INFO DIR CITE MEXI 3944

REF: PARI 7042 (IN 95070)

IN95416

27 MAR 1963

1. REAL NAME IS WINSTON SCOTT. ROMERO KNOWS PERSONALLY AND IS AWARE PRESIDENT IS CONTACT AND FRIEND.

2. PRESIDENT HAS BEEN ADVISED OF CHANNELS AND NAMES OF CONTACTS IN PARIS, BONN, HAGUE. HE OBVIOUSLY HAS NOT BRIEFED ROMERO.

3. SUGGEST BONN, HAGUE MERELY LEAVE NAME AND SAY WILL CALL AGAIN TO SEE IF MESSAGE.

4. PRESIDENT'S MAIN CONCERN WILL BE FOR MESSAGES FROM MEXICO IF REPEAT IF ANY SENSITIVE MATTERS LOCALS (ONE OF THEM ACTING CHIEF OF MEXICAN GOVT) WHO CONTACTS OF SCOTT WISH SEND TO HIM BY KUBARK SECURE CHANNEL.

5. LITEMPO/2, LIELEGANT AND LIERGO ALL AWARE OF CHANNELS TO PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE AND WILL USE IF HAVE SUCH MESSAGES.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

**REQUESTED FURTHER IDENTIFICATION MATERIAL COULD USE ON PHONE WITH ANYONE WHO ANSWERS PHONE IN PRESIDENTIAL SUITE.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO ADDP, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, D/OC 2, S/C 2

SECRET 261348Z

PARI INFO BONN DIR MEXI CITE FRAN 7605 26 MAR 1963 IN94458

RYBAT OOLONG

REF DIR 25991 *

DO YOU HAVE ANY RECENT WORD OF ARRIVAL DATE NOW ANTICIPATED OF LOPEZ MATEOS IN BONN, AND NAME OF HOTEL WHERE HE PLANNING TO STAY THERE. WE HAVE DATE OF 5 APRIL AND WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM THIS IF POSSIBLE.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.
**CONCERNED EUROPEAN TRIP OF LOPEX MATEOS.

Lienvoy/Support

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SECRET

ACTION: C/WH 5*

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/WE 2, S/C 2

S E C R E T 201455Z

MEXI DIR CITE HAGU 3494

RYBAT

21 MAR 1963

IN90740

REF DIR 25991

CONFIRMING RECEIPT REF INSTRUCTIONS HAGUE PHONE NUMBER IS 11 32 10.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**REQUESTED STERILE PHONE NUMBER FOR CONTACT FOR ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEAOS.

Lienvoy / [illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : D. C. [illegible]
UNIT : OC ED
EXT : 6077
DATE : 20 MARCH 1963

ROUTING
C/WH/3
4
5

20 MAR 63 22 03z

TO : BONN, PARIS, HAGUE, MEXICO CITY INFO: LONDON, FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: D/OC 2

INFO : DCP, ADDP, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, C/WH 2, S/C

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
[✓ PRIORITY]

TO BONN, PARI, HAGU, MEXI INFO LOND, FRAN CITE DIR 26254

RYBAT OOLONG

REF DIR 25991 (NOT SENT LOND, FRAN)

1. RYBAT REF ALERTS ADDEES TO OFFICIAL VISIT THEIR COUNTRIES BY ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS, PRESIDENT OF MEXICO, MARCH AND APRIL. ALSO AUTHORIZES AND SETS UP ARRANGEMENTS FOR LOPEZ SEND/RECEIVE MESSAGES THRU KUBARK CHANNELS TO AND FROM HIGH MEXICAN OFFICIALS AND KUBARK MEXI.

2. FOR CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ALL CONCERNED ON COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES, FOLLOWING IS ESTABLISHED.

A. ALL TRAFFIC FROM FIELD (LOPEZ LOCATION) WILL BE ADDRESSED MEXI INFO DIR; OPIM; RYBAT; WITH PILOT "FROM LOPEZ."

B. ALL TRAFFIC TO FIELD (LOPEZ LOCATION) WILL BE ADDRESSED TO STATION INFO DIR; OPIM; RYBAT; WITH PILOT "FOR LOPEZ."

C. COMMUNICATORS WILL ZFF ALL TRANSMISSION.

IF CIPHER TEXT SHOULD BE RECEIVED FOR TRANSMISSION, ~~A ABOVE~~ ABOVE STILL APPLY.

3. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD KUCLUB PERSONNEL BE USED PICK UP OR DELIVERY TRAFFIC.

6

OC-AD OC-S/C OC-ED EE WE WH
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DD/P
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

D/OC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : C. BUSTOS:dd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 19 MARCH 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12 62

ROUTING			
1	C/WH/3	4	
2		5	
3		6	

19 MAR 63 23 12z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO : BONN PARIS HAGUE MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, D/OC 2, S/C

TO [redacted] BONN PARI HAGU INFO OPIM MEXI CITE DIR 25991

RYBAT
FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION
REF: MEXI 3810 (IN 87887)*

1. ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS, MEXICAN PRESIDENT, MAKING OFFICIAL VISIT ADDRESSEE COUNTRIES MARCH AND APRIL. COS MEXI IS IN CLANDESTINE CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ODACID. LOPEZ REQUESTED NAMES OF FRIENDS OF COS MEXI [redacted] IN ADDRESSEE CITIES WHO COULD CONTACT HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY HUMBERTO ROMERO (PEREZ) AT EACH PLACE DURING VISIT.

2. LOPEZ WILL WANT TO SEND AND RECEIVE MESSAGES THROUGH KUBARK COMMO CHANNELS TO AND FROM HIGH MEXICAN OFFICIALS AND ALSO KUBARK MEXI. HE DOES NOT TRUST HIS OWN FOREIGN SERVICE COMMO.

3. HQ AUTHORIZES CONTACT BETWEEN LOPEZ SECRETARY ROMERO AND ADDRESSEE STATIONS TO PICK UP AND DELIVER MESSAGES. ROMERO SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH AND STATION OFFICER MUST USE ALIAS AND GIVE ROMERO STERILE PHONE NUMBER OR OFFICE PHONE NOT READILY TRACKABLE TO KUBARK. IDENTIFY SELF AS "FRIEND OF SENOR BLANCO," OR "FRIEND OF TIO", NAMES WHICH LOPEZ USES TO REFER TO COS MEXI. INITIAL CONTACT TO ROMERO CAN BE MADE BY PHONE OR IN PERSON AFTER HE ARRIVES AND SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS SHOULD BE HELD UNDER CONDITIONS AS SECURE AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, TO AVOID IDENTIFYING

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~ORIG~~ :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE 2

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 25991

25991

KUBARK PERSONNEL TO MEXICANS.

A

4. STATIONS SHOULD USE THESE ALIESES:

HAGU	BILL STRATFORD
PARI	JOE WITTENBERGER
BONN	JOHN WYKOFF

5. ALTHOUGH ROMERO IS KNOWN TO HAVE HAD FREQUENT AND FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH SUCH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FIGURES AS LOMBARDO TOLEDANO AND WITH MEXICAN COMMUNISTS, MEXI CONSIDERS HIM NOT A BAD SECURITY RISK AND HAS PASSED INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL THROUGH HIM FOR SOME TIME.

V

6. FOR MEXI: PLS PASS ABOZE ALIASES TO ROMERO, ~~CABLE~~ LOPEZ ITINERARY TO ALL ADDRESSEES AND IF POSSIBLE WHERE TELEPHONE CONTACT CAN BE MADE TO ROMERO. PLS TELL HIM KUBARK NOT ~~EN~~ABLE PROVIDE ANY COMMO FACILITY AT BELGRADE AND WARSAW.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Pres Adolfo Lopez Mateos req names of friends of COS in Paris, Belgrade, Warsaw, Bonn and the Hague who would contact ~~him HIS~~ his private secretary Humberto Romero (Perez) at each of these places during visit.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

12-62

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PAGE 3

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO
INFO
CITE DIR 25991

COORDINATIONS

WH/3
WE/2
EE/G
C/WH/3
CWE
DC/EE
WH/COPS

RICHARD HELMS
DDP

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

56

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S SECRET	1	[illegible]	4	
	2		5	
	3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1315 /16 MAR/LMG)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 161600Z

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 3810

RYBAT LIENVOY

16 MAR 1963 IN87887

REF DIR 25228*

1. PRESIDENT ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS REQUESTED ON 16 MARCH NAMES OF FRIENDS OF COS IN PARIS, BELGRADE, WARSAW, BONN AND THE HAGUE WHO COULD CONTACT HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY HUMBERTO ROMERO (PEREZ) AT EACH OF THESE PLACES DURING VISIT.

2. PRESIDENT WANTS THIS CHANNEL SO THAT LIERGO[1], LITEMPO/2[2], LIELEGANT[3] AND CURTIS[4] CAN SEND HIM "SECURELY" ANY MESSAGE THEY CONSIDER OF INTEREST. (NOTE: PRESIDENT REITERATED THAT HE DOES NOT TRUST HIS OWN FOREIGN SERVICE CHANNEL AND SAID IS AFRAID OF HIS COMMUNICATION LINKS FOR VERY SENSITIVE INFORMATION.)

3. REALIZE THIS DIFFICULT REQUEST MAKE OF HQS BUT WOULD APPRECIATE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN VIEW OF PRESENT AND FUTURE RELATIONSHIP.

4. PERSONS CONTACTING ROMERO COULD USE "FRIEND OF TIO" OR "FRIEND OF SENOR BLANCO" SINCE PRESIDENT FREQUENTLY REFERS TO CURTIS[4] AS "TIO" AND AS "SENOR BLANCO" OF " BLANCO DIPLOMACIA."

5. APPRECIATE EARLY REPLY.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: * Headquarters forwarded briefing material for LITENSOR(5) European trip which the Mexico City station may select, edit and translate the material it considers most appropriate.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

c/wh/3	4	
mef	5	
	6	

ACTION: C/WH 5(COPY ISSUED TO WH AT 1415, 15 MAR LMG)

INFO : ADDP, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

S E C R E T 151710Z

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 3789

RYBAT BEDOX 15 MAR 1963 IN87153

REF A. DIR 24811

B. HMMW-11374

1. STATION RECD S/C ATTCH TO REF B 13 MAR 63 IN POUCH NUMBER 7854. NO STATION RECORD RECEIPT OF COVERING DISPATCH.

2. PLEASE SUMMARIZE CONTENT OF REF B AND CABLE SOONEST TO STATION.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ORIG : N JUDKINS:dd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 15 MARCH 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

15 MAR 63 22 54z

DEFERRED SIG CEN

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, S/C

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 25228

RYBAT ~~[illegible]~~ LITENSOR

REFS: A. HMMW-11374*

B. MEXI 3789 (IN 87153)**

1. REF A POUCHED BY ERROR 14 MAR. SUMMARY AS FOLL:

A. MATERIALS PREPARED BY KUMONK AND KUWOLF. TO EXPEDITE POUCHING HQS DEFERS FURTHER EDITING TO MEXI. MEXI MAY SELECT, EDIT AND TRANSLATE MATERIAL IT CONSIDERS MOST APPROPRIATE.

B. ATT A IS LIST OF REFS TO PERTINENT ARTICLES IN SPECIFIC ISSUES CURRENT INTEL WEEKLY SUMMARIES.

C. ATT B CONTAINS KUWOLF PREPARED MATERIALS NOT SENT MEXI EXCEPT CUBA ITEM. THESE MAY BE USED TO PROMOTE ODYOKE POSITION ON COMMON MARKET, BERLIN PROBLEM, CUBA, ETC.

D. ATT C COMPILED BY KUMONK. INCLUDES BIO SKETCHES ON OFFICIALS EACH COUNTRY WITH WHOM LITENSOR WILL PROBABLY MEET DURING TRIP. MEXI MAY NOT PASS BIO INFO THROUGH WHICH LINE IS DRAWN.

LIENVOY

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COPS

WH COMMENT: *Forwarded LITENSOR BRIEFING MATERIALS
**Requested cable summary of Ref A

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : C. BUSTOS:dd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 14 MARCH 1963

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C

15 MAR 63 23 42z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 24990

RYBAT LITENSOR

REF: MEXI 3575 (IN 75331)*

IN ADDITION BRIEFINGS REQUESTED BY SUBJECT, SUGGEST COS GIVE SUBJECT GENERAL CI DEFENSIVE BRIEFING INCLUDING USE TECH DEVICES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *LITENSOR has asked for briefing papers on trip.

CI/OG/WI F. HUGHES (IN DRAFT)
WH/COPS W

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG : N. JUDKINS:dd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5510
DATE : 13 MARCH 1963

SECRET

ROUTING

452

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/SR 4, S/C

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PRIORITY

FANT/

TO 1 MEXI INFO CITE DIR 24811

RYBAT BEDOX

REFS: A. HMMW-11374

B. MEXI 3743

1. LITENSOR BRIEFING PAPERS POUCHED REF A 8 MAR. ETA 11 MAR.

2. FOIL SUMMARIZES BACKGROUND AND POLICY RE RAPACKI PLAN:

A. THE POLISH PROPOSAL FOR CENTRAL EUROPEAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE INTRODUCED AT 2 OCT 57 SESSION OF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER, ADAM RAPACKI. ACTING AS SPOKESMAN FOR POLISH GOVERNMENT HE FORMULATED PROPOSAL: SHOULD EAST AND WEST GERMANY AGREE TO BAN ON PRODUCTION AND STORAGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORIES, POLAND WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY INTRODUCE IDENTICAL BAN ON HER TERRITORY. RAPACKI DID NOT MENTION CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BUT HEAD OF CZECHOSLOVAK UN DELEGATION, SPEAKING AFTER RAPACKI, SUPPORTED PROPOSAL, DECLARING HIS COUNTRY WOULD JOIN AGREEMENT, EXTENDING BAN OVER HER ~~[illegible]~~ TERRITORY TOO. EAST GERMANS SUBSEQUENTLY WARMLY ENDORSED THE PROPOSAL.

B. RAPACKI'S PROPOSAL OBVIOUSLY CLEARED AND COORDINATED WITH SOVIET LEADERS PRIOR TO INTRODUCTION. MOSCOW PROMPTLY REPORTED THE PROPOSAL APPROVINGLY AND SOVIET PRESS STRESSED AGREEMENT WOULD BE WELCOMED BY PEOPLES

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

CONF:

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 24811 24811

OF EUROPE, WOULD FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON DISARMAMENT AND CESSATION NUCLEAR TESTS, AND WOULD "HELP IMPROVE RELATIONS AND BRING CLOSER TOGETHER" THE TWO GERMAN STATES.

C. THE PROPOSAL WAS FORMALIZED IN 9 DEC 57 POLISH GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM, PRESENTED BY RAPACKI TO US, BRITISH, AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS IN WARSAW. SOVIET PREMIER BULGANIN PROMPTLY ENDORSED PROPOSAL IN SERIES OF LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

D. IN 1958 RAPACKI MODIFIED HIS PLAN, ALLEGEDLY TO MAKE IT MORE PALATABLE TO WESTERN POWERS. NEW VERSION PUBLISHED NOV 58 , CALLED FOR TWO-STAGE PROGRAM IN WHICH: (1) CURRENT NUCLEAR STOCKPILES AND BASES WOULD BE FROZEN AND PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BANNED IN POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EAST AND WEST GERMANY, AND (2) EXISTING NUCLEAR STOCKPILES AND WEAPONS WOULD BE ELIMINATED AS PART OF GENERAL DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT FOR THE FOUR-NATION AREA. REVISED VERSION ALSO CALLED FOR "AIR AND GROUND CONTROL" WITH NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN CONTROL SYSTEM.

E. POLISH LEADERS HAVE SINCE 1957 PRESSED FOR FORMAL AGREEMENT ON RAPACKI PLAN. SHORTLY AFTER OPENING OF GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE POLISH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
PAGE 3
CONF:
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 24811

DELEGATION SUBMITTED MEMO URGING CREATION NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. MEMO BASICALLY FOLLOWS LINES OF FORMER PROPOSALS RAPACKI PLAN. SOVIET DELEGATION IS CURRENTLY URGING GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE TAKE UP QUESTION NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN VARIOUS AREAS OF WORLD.

F. SINCE RAPACKI PLAN INTRODUCED HAS HAD STRONG SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW. SOVIETS HAVE EVEN URGED EXTENDING ZONE TO INCLUDE BALTIC AND BALKAN COUNTRIES. SOVIET LEADERS UNDOUBTEDLY VIEW PROPOSAL AS MEANS ELIMINATING GERMAN POWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND REMOVING US MILITARY POWER AND INFLUENCE FROM [illegible] GERMANY -- ONE OF MOSCOW'S MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.

G. US STRONGLY OPPOSES RAPACKI PLAN, VIEWING IT AS BLOC DEVICE TO NEUTRALIZE GERMANY, DEEPEN AND EVEN PERPETUATE DIVISION OF GERMANY, AND TO SECURE DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSAL WOULD ALSO BE MILITARILY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO WEST. US MILITARY POWER IN EUROPE WOULD BE DIMINISHED WITHOUT A CONCURRENT DECREASE OF SOVIET STRENGTH. IT WOULD WEAKEN NATO.

H. WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT ALSO VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED TO RAPACKI PLAN, AND ALL SUCH "DISENGAGEMENT" PLANS IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR SAME REASONS. BONN ALSO CONSIDERS SUCH PROPOSALS AS SINISTER AND SUBTLY INTIMIDATORY TO WEST GERMANS, WHO DO NOT CHOOSE BE DEALT WITH AS IF THEY WERE OBJECTS, AND

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

SECRET
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : N. JUDKINS
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PAGE 4

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 24811 [illegible]

WHO DETECT IN SUCH SCHEMES A CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR THEIR EVENTUAL COMMUNIZATION.

I. PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF RAPACKI PLAN BY MEXICAN PRESIDENT WOULD MARK FIRST SUCH SPECIFIC APPROVAL BY GOVERNMENT LEADER OUTSIDE SOVIET BLOC HIS ENDORSEMENT WOULD BE WIDELY PROPAGANDIZED BY POLES AND SOVIETS AND COULD SET PRECEDENT FOR THEM TO SECURE SUCH APPROVAL BY OTHER NONBLOC LEADERS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED INCLUDE POINTS THAT COULD BE MADE BY COS TO DISSUADE LITENSOR FROM POSSIBLE PUBLIC BACKING OF RAPACKI PLAN DURING HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP POLAND.

EE/P ____________

C/EE/P ____________

WH/COPS ____________

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

i.e. ~~[illegible]~~
/ LIENVOY support.

Prepared by Tom [illegible] in CCI for LITENSOR briefing - See Cable 14 Mar 63

13 March 1963

The Rapacki Plan

1. The Polish proposal for a Central European nuclear-free zone was introduced at the 2 October 1957 session of the UN General Assembly by the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki. Acting as spokesman for the Polish Government, he formulated the proposal: should both East and West Germany agree to a ban on the production and storage of nuclear weapons on their territories, Poland would simultaneously introduce an identical ban on her territory. Rapacki did not mention Czechoslovakia, but the head of the Czechoslovak UN delegation, speaking after Rapacki, supported his proposal, declaring that his country would join the agreement, extending the ban over her territory, too. The East Germans subsequently warmly endorsed the proposal.

2. Rapacki's proposal had obviously been cleared and coordinated with Soviet leaders prior to its introduction. Moscow promptly reported the proposal approvingly and the Soviet press stressed that such an agreement would be welcomed by the peoples of Europe, would facilitate agreement on disarmament and cessation of nuclear tests, and would "help improve relations and bring closer together" the two German states.

3. The proposal was formalized in a 9 December 1957 Polish government memorandum, which was presented by Rapacki to the US, British, and French ambassadors in Warsaw. The then Soviet Premier, Bulganin, promptly endorsed the proposal in a series of letters to heads of governments throughout the world.

4. In 1958 Rapacki modified his plan, allegedly to make it more palatable to the Western powers. The new version of the plan, published in November 1958, called for a two-stage program, in which: (1) current nuclear stockpiles and bases would be frozen and production of nuclear weapons would be banned in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, and (2) existing nuclear stockpiles and weapons would be

SECRET

eliminated as a part of a general disarmament agreement for the four-nation area. The revised version of the plan also called for "air and ground control" with NATO and Warsaw Pact countries participating in the control system.

5. Polish leaders have since 1957 pressed for a formal agreement on the Rapacki plan. Shortly after the opening of the Geneva disarmament conference in March 1962, the Polish delegation submitted a memorandum urging creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. The memorandum basically follows the lines of the former proposals of the Rapacki plan. The Soviet delegation is currently urging that the Geneva disarmament conference take up the question of nuclear-free zones in various areas of the world.

6. Since the Rapacki plan was introduced, it has had strong support from Moscow. The Soviets have even urged extending the zone to include Baltic and Balkan countries. Soviet leaders undoubtedly view the proposal as a means of eliminating German power in Central Europe--one of Moscow's major foreign policy objectives.

7. The US strongly opposes the Rapacki plan, viewing it as a Bloc device to neutralize Germany, to deepen and even perpetuate the division of Germany, and to secure de facto recognition of East Germany. Implementation of the proposal would also be militarily disadvantageous to the West. US military power in Europe would be diminished without a concurrent decrease of Soviet strength. It would weaken NATO.

8. The West German government is also vigorously opposed to the Rapacki plan and all such "disengagement" plans in Central Europe for the same reasons. Bonn also considers such proposals as sinister and subtly intimidatory to the West Germans, who do not choose to be dealt with as if they were inert objects, and who detect in such schemes a creation of conditions for their eventual communization.

9. Public endorsement of the Rapacki plan by the Mexican president would mark the first such specific approval by a government leader outside the Soviet Bloc. His endorsement would be widely propagandized by the Poles and the Soviets and could set a precedent for them to secure such approval by other nonbloc leaders.

3 221 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE [illegible]

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1815 12 MAR 63 BP)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

S E C R E T 122215Z

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 3743

RYBAT BEDOX

13 MAR 1963 IN84727

REF MEXI 3575 (W75331)

1. SUGGEST INCLUDE IN MATERIAL REQUESTED REF POINTS THAT CAN BE MADE BY COS TO DISSUADE LITENSOR FROM POSSIBLE PUBLIC BACKING OF RAPACKI PLAN DURING HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP POLAND. PARTICULARLY WISH PRESS THIS POINT SINCE LITENSOR, WHO ANXIOUS BE RECIPIENT NOBEL PEACE PRIZE, MIGHT OTHERWISE BE TEMPTED REACT FAVORABLY TO SUCH A PROPOSAL. NOTE POLISH SEJM JUST MADE PUBLIC DECLARATION IN FAVOR MEXICOS AIMS FOR DISARMAMENT.

2. IF ABOVE MATERIAL CANNOT BE POUCHED IN TIME MEET 15 MARCH DEADLINE PLS CABLE HIGHLIGHTS AND POUCH REST.

3. LITENSOR ON 11 MARCH EXPRESSED AGAIN HIS INTEREST IN BRIEFINGS. REQUEST ETA MATERIALS REQUESTED REF.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *LITENSOR HAS ASKED VIA LIELEGANT FOR BRIEFING PAPERS KUBARK CAN GIVE ON FRANCE, YUGOSLAVIA AND POLAND.

1374

K

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACTION TAKEN
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : KUWOLF/LITENSOR Briefing Materials

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACT: As required.

REF: MEXI 3575
DIR 21965

1. Headquarters is sending herewith materials which KUMONK and KUWOLF staffs have prepared for a briefing of LITENSOR on countries he will soon visit. In order to expedite the pouching of these materials we are not taking time to edit them into a finished product at Headquarters. We are providing more materials and references than will be necessary for this briefing. The Station may select, edit and translate the information it considers most appropriate.

2. Attachment A. This is a list of references to pertinent articles in specific issues of the "Current Intelligence Weekly Summaries."

3. Attachment B. With the exception of the item on Cuba, these KUWOLF-prepared materials were not sent to Station Mexico City. They may be used to promote the ODYOKE position on the Common Market, the Berlin problem, Cuba etc.

4. Attachment C. KUMONK compiled these materials. They include a current description of the situation in each country involved and biographic sketches on many of the officials with whom LITENSOR will probably meet during his trip. The biographic information has been taken from KUBARK and ODACID files. The Station should not pass any biographic information through which a line has been drawn on these attachments.

END OF DISPATCH

Removed from Project KDBIOCCK
CS Classification: 50-6-75/2
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 4

Attachments:
A. List of References, H/W
B. KUWOLF-Prepared Material, H/W
C. KUMONK compiled material, H/W

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, MEXICO CITY, W/ATTS. A,B,C.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 7 Mar. 63
DATE DISPATCHED: 8 MAR 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11374

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-75/2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mex	Judkins	ds	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CA/PROP	7 Mar 63	R. Ratliff by phone
OCI/SIDO	7 Mar 63	T. Loller by phone
FI/INT/IB	7 Mar 63	C. Harris by phone
WH/CA/PROP	7 Mar 63	R. Chamberlain

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/D		J. C. King

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, WOMOLD

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIENVOY/Forwarding of Trainee Evaluation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

1. Forwarded as a split transmission are copies of the Evaluation of Trainees prepared by Lee R. MYLECHRAINE for passage to LIRAMA and LITEMPO-8.

2. The attached document was translated into Spanish in the LIENVOY LP by LIENVOY-5 on 11 February 1969 for passage.

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/2
JOB # 73-175/2
Box: 19 Fold: 5

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment (Via Split Transmission):
Evaluation of Trainees Report
1 - Left Side, h/w
2 - Right Side, u.s.c.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, w/atts
2 - C/WOMOLD, w/atts

DATE 27 FEB 69

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-36437

DATE
12 February 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
[redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/2

[illegible] 1969

EVALUATION OF TRAINEES

1. Identification of Course: Basic Tradecraft [illegible] Activities
2. Date of Course : 13 January - 7 February 1969
3. Location of Training : Calle Tabasco #225, Colonia Roma, Postal Zone 7, MEXICO, D.F.
4. Names of Trainees :

    1. Felipe TREJO Gonzalez, Lt. Col., Mexican Army, Age 46.
    2. Leonardo LOPEZ y Lopez, Age 23.
    3. Mariano [illegible] Molina, Captain, Mexican Army, Age 39.
    4. Felix LOZANO Rangel, DFS, Age [illegible].
    5. Javier MANCERA Fuentes, DFS, Age [illegible].
    6. Esteban GUZMAN Salgado, DFS, Age
    7. Ladislao SALINAS Alor, Captain, Mexican A Age 31.
    8. Jorge MARGAIN Ortiz, Captain, Mexican Army, Age 29.
    9. Rogelio Rafael GARZA Hernandez, [illegible] Mexican Army, Age 26.

5. Evaluation of Trainees:

1. The three DFS trainees, LOZANO, MA[illegible] GUZMAN, because of their previous training [illegible] experience in security activities of the DFS, more read[illegible] stood the training materials and lectures pre[illegible], and they were better able to incorporate the [illegible] learned into the field exercises conducted by [illegible] Again, because of their previous experience [illegible]

H/W ATT. #1 + S/C ATT #2 to HMMA-36437

50-6-75/2

they out performed the other trainees in surveillance, counter-surveillance, debriefing, interrogation and in all other aspects of tradecraft that were covered. These three worked harmoniously with the remainder of the group and made every effort to pass along to them as the occasion arose the good practices learned from their own experiences in security work. All three are considered to be intelligent, alert, imaginative, industrious, and dedicated, and it is the writer's opinion that it would be a pleasure to work with them. All three undoubtedly have a good basic understanding of the typical mission of a national security service, and they know how a security service should go about its work and activities.

2. TREJO - Subject is a career Mexican Army officer and has had no previous experience in intelligence or security work. Throughout the course he was punctual, demonstrated a keen interest in the work, and took an active part in all classroom discussions and street exercises. It did appear, however, that in his discussions with his fellow class members he was usually quite opinionated and argumentative which might possibly indicate some inability on his part to get along well with his fellow workers in the unit. Based on his participation in the class as well as his written work, it is believed that he has a fairly good understanding now of the typical mission of a security service, and the tradecraft principles involved in security service work.

3. LOPEZ y LOPEZ - the only civilian in the group, excluding the DFS trainees, is the youngest of the trainees and appears to have the least formal education. Although he did not participate in the classroom discussions as energetically as did most of the others, he did ask questions from time to time and generally did a good job in all exercises carried out by the group. He appears to lack some of the drive and imagination necessary to become an effective operator and handler of agents. He appears somewhat reserved in his relations and conversations with others in the group, but the writer never noted any friction between him and others. It is suggested that he might be [illegible] used as the "office keeper" and/or person in charge of the files. Somewhat surprisingly, he did a fairly good job on the reporting exercises. His written work is neat and well organized.

.../

4. CHANTRES - Subject is an intelligent, alert, imaginative and conscientious man, and it is believed that he will make a valuable contribution to the work of the unit. He participated actively in the classroom discussions and field exercises and made a real contribution to both. On exercises where he was in charge, he got along well with those working with him, and his planning and execution of the exercises indicated clearly that he is able to apply the lessons learned to the practical work. CHANTRES, it is believed will develop a real interest in security work and would, after some experience, become an effective operator. It is believed, also, that he would be able to supervise others in such a way as to cause them to work together effectively and as a team. His written exercises were well prepared, indicating that he not only learned from the classroom reading and discussion but that he also spent considerable time on them.

5. SALINAS - Subject seems to possess an average aptitude for security work. Like the others, he was always punctual, took an active part in the field exercises, but was somewhat less aggressive in the classroom discussions. He prepared his written exercises in an acceptable manner. Assuming that he should develop a real interest in security work, it is believed that he would make a worthwhile contribution to the work of the unit. He got along well with the others, including the occasions when he was in charge of exercises.

6. MARGAIN - Like SALINAS, Subject is capable and intelligent, and he gets along well with his fellow co-workers. His usefulness to the organization, it is believed will depend on the interest he develops in security work after the unit begins operations. As in the case of CHANTRES, MARGAIN in discussions and in field exercises seemed to give more consideration to the security factors involved in particular actions than did the others. Many of his questions in the classroom were related to security factors involved in recruiting and handling of agents, operation and conduct of surveillance activities, and the possibility of compromises that might result in embarrassment to the sponsor. It is believed that he would give careful consideration to any proposed operational activity from a security point of view before execution of the tasks involved. His written exercises were well prepared, indicating that he gave them considerable time and attention.

.../

7. GARZA - Subject, the youngest of the Army group, is a very intelligent, alert and conscientious young man. He possesses considerable drive, initiative and imagination, and on numerous occasions came up with ideas on proposed exercises. His written exercises were well prepared, and he did a good job on the field problems. Given his youth he might be prone to take unnecessary risks, but it is believed that with some experience and time he will make an excellent officer. Like all the others, he accepts criticism readily and on all occasions when observed by the writer he got along well with his fellow workers.

G. COMMENTS

1. The above comments, it should be noted, are based on a rather short observation period; they should be considered accordingly. The size of the group, somewhat larger than usual for one instructor, necessitated that the instructor spend less time with each trainee than usual. The writer appreciated the opportunity to work with the group and enjoyed it tremendously. He considers them a fine group of men and feels that with time and experience they will make a valuable contribution to the work they will be charged with.

2. In accordance with the expressed wishes of their supervisor, the following suggestions and recommendations are being made. Assuming that no additional men will be added to the unit for the time being, it is suggested that TELLO might be made deputy chief of the unit, and [illegible] chief of operations. Assuming that additional men are to be added later, it is suggested that the remaining three excluding LOPEZ y LOPEZ, might be made section chiefs. GARZA seems to have a more than normal interest in surveillance, and thus might be given that responsibility. SALINAS might best fit as section chief of the group charged with operations against Communist and extremist groups, while MARCAIN might best fit as section chief in charge of exile activities. These comments are based almost exclusively on their apparent interests, based on questions asked and comments made during the classroom discussions and the writer does not mean to suggest that they should be limited to the above proposed assignments.

3. Finally, the writer wishes to thank those responsible for excellent cooperation and support provided during the training course. The cooperation and support provided facilitated the orderly conduct of the course considerably.

.../

4. A copy of all the training materials was left with LOPEZ y LOPEZ for the unit. It is strongly suggested that an effort be made within the next three or four weeks to review the materials in a more or less formal classroom situation. Furthermore, it is suggested that until such time as the unit begins operations, the unit plan and carry out surveillance and other exercises designed to improve their capability.

14-00000

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, WOMOLD

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIENVOY/Completion of Training Report (Training Cryptonym-DAVALILLO)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : DIRECTOR-65355, 12 January 1969

1. As indicated in Reference and other communications, a training request was made by the Station and approved by Headquarters, to train a group under the LIENVOY Project to follow up on leads produced by the joint LIENVOY operation and presumably other Mexican Government unilateral sources. Lee R. MYLECHRAINE, WOMOLD instructor who was assigned to the Mexico City Station until 8 July 1968, was selected as the instructor. MYLECHRAINE arrived in Mexico City on 9 January 1969; the training began on 13 January and ended on 10 February 1969. The training was conducted at a training site, Calle Tabasco #228, Colonia Roma, Postal Zone 7, Mexico City, provided by LIENVOY-2 and LIELEGANT; the building in which the training site apartment is located is owned by LIELEGANT, and the latter and LIENVOY-2 have their offices there. The unit, upon completion of the training, will use the apartment in which the training was conducted for their offices.

Continued.....

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/2
JOB # 73-173/74
Box: 29 Fold: 5

Attachment:
[illegible]

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, via split transmission, w/att
2 - C/WOMOLD, via split transmission, w/att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-36431

DATE
12 February 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/2

2. The LIENVOYs had originally requested that five (5) of their men be trained. However, upon arrival in Mexico City and just prior to the scheduled beginning of the training they requested that they be permitted to add one man and that two men be included in the class from the Direccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS). In the latter case, they submitted three names but said that only two of the three would be expected to attend the class. As it turned out all three of the latter group turned up, thus bringing the class to nine (9) students, five (5) Army officers, one civilian from the LIENVOY group, and the three DFS men. Following is a list of the trainees:

(1) Felix LOZANO Rangel, DFS, age 35.
(2) Javier MANCERA Fuentes, DFS, age 33.
(3) Esteban GUZMAN Salgado, DFS, age 33.
(4) Leonardo LOPEZ y LOPEZ, age 23.
(5) Felipe TREJO Gonzalez, Lt. Col., Mexican Army, age 46.
(6) Mariano CHANTRES Molina, Captain, Mexican Army, age 39.
(7) Ladislao SALINAS Alor, Captain, Mexican Army, age 31.
(8) Jorge MARGAIN Ortiz, Captain, Mexican Army, age 29.
(9) Rogelio Rafael GARZA Hernandez, Lieutenant, Mexican Army, age 26.

3. The training objective of the program was to familiarize the trainees with the basic tradecraft principles and techniques involved in the conduct of clandestine activities, with primary emphasis on the work and activities of security services. Although largely tutorial in nature, numerous exercises were conducted in Mexico City, including two live problems which will be explained later in this dispatch, to further familiarize the trainees with the techniques involved in surveillance, counter-surveillance, personal meetings, deaddrops, interrogation, and investigation. The course included discussion and reading material on opposition to clandestine activities, organization and functions of a security service, personal, physical and organization security; cover, concealment and compartmentation, as well as the basic operational skills of observation, description, casing, surveillance, and elicitation and interviewing. Considerable time was spent on reporting and clandestine communications, as well as on agent acquisition and agent handling.

4. With the agreement of LITEMPO-12 (who said verbally that he had consulted with LITEMPO-4) and LIENVOY-2, the three DFS trainees detained Hector SENTIES Rodriguez, who is known to have had clandestine contact with the Soviets, for interrogation. He was detained on the street near his home on the early morning of 4 February 1969 and interrogated throughout the day at a motel, the Palo Alto, located at Km 14 on the Mexico City-Toluca highway. The other six (6) trainees were able to overhear the entire interrogation but did not actually take part for security reasons. They did not see SENTIES, nor did the latter see them. In line with the discussions and reading material, this live interrogation was of great value to them. Also, on 3 February 1969 LIENVOY-2 passed along to MYLECHRAINE a good lead concerning Carlos PEREZ Aguirre, a young Mexican who also has contact with the Soviets and Cubans. Unfortunately, only one-half day could be spent on investigating

this lead, but even this was of value to the trainees. One trainee was required to make a pretext telephone call, another team of two made a neighborhood check, and the remainder were divided into teams to check with Transito, the Ministry of Defense, the Social Security Institute and the Metropolitan Police. Except for the last team, all picked up some information of value, and the information and its significance in terms of the projected investigation of PEREZ was discussed with them.

5. The performance of the class as a whole was remarkably good. The three DFS men, because of their previous training and experience, were able to absorb and understand the lectures and reading material much more quickly than the others. None of the others had any previous training or experience in intelligence or security work. However, they were keenly interested, actively participated in classroom discussions and field exercises, and all prepared their written work in an acceptable manner. The instructor reviewed all written work with them, as well as plans for meetings, etc., and this proved most helpful. Somewhat unusual for Latins, all students were punctual; there were some very small and unimportant delays, but for the most part these were due to the exceedingly difficult traffic situation in Mexico City or to other reasons apparently beyond their control. No student was absent from classes during the entire training period, and no student was late for more than 45 minutes or an hour.

6. In summary, the instructor and the Station feel that the training objective was accomplished, and that the trainees, although not yet experienced operators, have a sufficient enough understanding of the basic tradecraft principles and techniques to permit them to begin operations. They are all intelligent and alert men, and except for LOPEZ y LOPEZ all have an Army background. CHANTRES is quite imaginative and resourceful, but also quite cautious and concerned about the possibility of flaps and compromises. He gets along well with all his fellow workers, and undoubtedly has real leadership qualities. TREJO is somewhat talkative, opinionated and argumentative, and may have trouble supervising others, but he, too, demonstrated considerable imagination and resourcefulness. GARZA, the youngest of the Army group, appeared to be the most pro-American, is very imaginative, and possesses considerable drive and energy. On one occasion he had the instructor out to lunch at his home, where he lives with his wife (they have no children). He commented on numerous occasions about his many (almost annual) shopping trips to San Antonio, where his wife has a number of close relatives. GARZA, it is believed, would probably be the most susceptible to development and possible recruitment of the group.

7. Except for the remarks in paragraph 6 above, no individual assessment will be forwarded herewith. The instructor has prepared a memorandum on each man, including the DFS group, setting forth his observations and opinions, as well as any information he was able to obtain on the trainees.

8. MYLECHRAINE used the name "Sr. Tomas" with the trainees; so far as is known they did not learn his true name, nor were they aware where he was living in Mexico City. Likewise, they are not aware that he has served previously in Mexico. There were no incidents involving security during the training period, and no other incidents or events that should be reported.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY DKR PER ______

ACTION c/ WH5 ☐ RID COPY

465

ASSIGNED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

24 **SECRET** (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐

CLASSIFY TO

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

INFO. FILE, VR. c/RI/SD c/TSD3 c/CI c/FI2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

MEXI

S E C R E T 262208Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0378 (LANGDON ACTING)

DIRECTOR

26 MAY 69 IN 65913

[illegible] WOACRE LIENVOY LIRAMA

REF : HMMA 36873, 8 APRIL 1969

1. ON 25 MAY GENERAL LUIS (GUTIERREZ) OROPEZA, JEFE DEL ESTADO MAYOR PRESIDENCIAL, AGAIN REQUESTED THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE TO REPLENSIH TRAINING MATERIALS PROVIDED PER LOGISTICS 9780. ORIGINAL REQUEST REPORTED IN PARA 2 (B) OF REFERENCE.

2. GUTIERREZ OROPEZA INDICATED THAT REPLACEMENTS COULD BE BROUGHT INTO MEXICO CITY WITH SAME ASSURANCES AS WHEN ORIGINAL SHIPMENTS ARRIVED.

3. PLS ADVISE.

4. FILE: 50-6-75/2.

S E C R E T

Removed from Project KABADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/2
JOB # 73-125/74
Box: 19 Fold: 2

Nancy file

CS COPY

SECRET

26 May 69
50-6-75/2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

8-62

ORIG : JUDKINS:ds
UNIT : WH/3/MEX
EXT : 5940
DATE : 1 MARCH 1963

24

24

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

4 MAR 63 23 11z

TO : MEXICO
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C

~~SIG CEN~~
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 21965

21965

T
RYBAT

REF MEXI 3575 *

HQS PREPARING AND WILL POUCH LITENSOR BRIEFING PAPERS IN ENGLISH. PAPERS WILL INCLUDE SOME REFS TO PERTINENT DATA ALREADY AVAILABLE AT STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *(IN 75331 (LITENSOR HAS ASKED FOR ANY BRIEFING PAPERS KUBARK CAN GIVE ON VARIOUS COUNTRIES NAMED.

C/WH/3 ______

WH/COPS ______

J. C. King
C/WH/D
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Forrest Shivers
Ac/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

75331

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

DATE : 27 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 27 0411Z 63

ROUTINE

DIR CITE MEXI 3575

IN75331

RYBAT

REF A DIR 35657

B MEXI 1919 Cx 20593

1. LITENSOR HAS ASKED VIA LIELEGANT FOR ANY BRIEFING PAPERS KUBARK CAN GIVE ON FRANCE, YUGOSLAVIA, POLAND, WEST GERMANY, HOLLAND AND ENGLAND.

2. CURTIS WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING HEADQUARTERS CAN MAKE AVAILABLE AND BELIEVE HQS MAY WISH ATTEMPT INFLUENCE LITENSOR ON CERTAIN POINTS IN SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES.

3. WILL NEED REPLY SOON AND, IF HQS WISHES PREPARE PAPERS, APPRECIATE RECEIPT BY 20 MARCH.

[illegible]

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LITENSOR Request for Information on Ammunition for ZAPATA Movement.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

HMMW-11256

Forwarded herewith is a bureau report containing additional information on the reported shipment of ammunition from Brownsville, Texas to Mexico.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
DBA-31071, 7 Jan. 63

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City, W/Att

1 - RI W/Att
1 - Chrono W/Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
23 Jan. 63

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-11266

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-332-249
50-6-75-2

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mex/J.R. Reeves:ds			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/D		J. C. King

FORM 5-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 8 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/MS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 8 1908Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 32097

DIR CITE MEXI 2787 IN32097

REF DIR 03898*

RYBAT LIENVOY

1. COS HAD TWO HOURS ALONE WITH LITENSOR AND LITEMPO/2 ON 5 NOV AT WHICH TIME LITENSOR VIGOROUS AS EVER. HE THIN; BUT HE SAID THIS ON DOCTOR'S ORDERS TO LOSE WEIGHT. COS HAS NOTICED LITENSOR MUCH THINNER AND HAS AGED RAPIDLY IN FOUR YEARS IN PRESENT POST; BUT NO EVIDENCE HIS SLOWING DOWN.

2. ON 8 DEC COS TALKED WITH LIELEGANT WHO SAW AND TALKED WITH LITENSOR AT A WEDDING ON NIGHT OF 6 DEC. LIELEGANT SAYS LITENSOR IN EXCELLENT HEALTH.

3. STATION WILL REPORT ANY INDICATIONS ILL HEALTH.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DESIRED COS COMMENT ON REPORT THAT LITENSOR IN ILL HEALTH/

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 308
3 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (COPY ISSUED TO WH AT 1320 3 DEC LMG)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 3 1753Z 62

PRIORITY

IN28460

PRITY DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2733

RYBAT/LIENVOY

1. LITENSOR VIA LIELEGANT ASKED COS FOR A REPORT ON ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATES OF JUAN JOSE AREVALO IN MEXICO.

2. REQUEST HQS ADVISE WHAT REPLY COS SHOULD GIVE; ALSO, REQUEST PERMISSION ADVISE AMB MANN OF REQUEST AND REPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
& DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

Reeves

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : J.R. Reeves:jz 318
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 30Nov62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

30 [illegible] 45z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO CPIM MEXI   INFO   CITE DIR 02182

REF DIR 01719*

1. ODENVY ADVISED HQS 30 NOV FOLL:

A. NO IDENTIFYING DATA RE ORTIZ.

B. LAWYER REPRESENTING DIAZ INFANTE IS NORMAN LUCHS.

C. ODENVY REPORTS REFLECT THAT DIAZ INFANTE IS MENTALLY UNBALANCED CON MAN. THEY TAKING NO FURTHER ACTION REF REPORT.

2. HQS ALSO MADE INFORMAL INQUIRY OF ODACID MUNITIONS CONTROL AND ODBOON. NEITHER HAVE ANY INFO ON SUCH LARGE SHIPMENT OF AMMO FROM BROWNSVILLE TO MEXICO. BOTH EXPRESSED CONCERN THIS REPORT AND REQUESTED ANY ADDITIONAL INFO OBTAINED BY KUBARK.

3. VIEW ABOVE INFO, HQS PLANNING NO FURTHER ACTION.

4. IF STATION DESIRES FURTHER INVESTIGATION, HQS NEEDS ANY ADDITIONAL INFO AVAILABLE RE LETTER AND ORIGINAL REPORT. ALSO IS ORTIZ KNOWN TO MEXI GOVT OR LITENSOR OR IS HE UNKNOWN INFORMANT.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : **Reeves:jz**
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE TWO

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO

INFO

CITE DIR [illegible]

WH CMT * **Hqs requesting ODENVY investigate report of large shipment ammo from Brownsville to Diaz Infante followers.**

C/S COMMENT: RE REQUEST FOR TRACES ON J. ORITZ.

WH/COPS

CI/LIA - J. Roman (by phone)

T. Flynn (by phone

CI/OG/WH/F. Hughes (draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG : J. R. Reeves :j:
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 6284
DATE : 28 Nov 62

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

1767

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

29 Nov 62 00 31z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO OPIM MEXI INFO CITE DIR 01719

REF MEXI 2688 (IN 25823)*

NO HQ TRACES SUBJ REF. REQUESTING ODENVY INVESTIGATE REPORT AND PASS RESULTS TO KUBARK HQ.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE LTR FROM J. ORITZ RE AMMO BOUND FOR DIAZ INFANTE FORCES TO STAGE ANTOTHE REVOLUTION
WH CMT: * Attached

CI/STAFF- Mr. Hunt (draft)
WH/COPS

W Hood
J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Holman
NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

363

DATE : 28 NOV 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1225 28 NOV 62)/OJ

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 28 1720Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 25823

OPIM DIR CITE MEXI 2688 IN25823

1. MORNING 28 NOV LIELEGANT GAVE CURTIS COPY LETTER ADDRESSED LITENSOR WITH PERSONAL REQUEST FROM LATTER FOR URGENT AND IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION.

2. LETTER POSTMARKED 24 NOV 1962 FROM J ORTIZ 285 LOS ROBLES AVENUE, PASADENA, CALIFORNIA, QUOTE CHECK INTO REPORT OF AMMUNITION FROM BROWNSVILLE, TEXAS, PORT FILLING 22 RAILROAD CARS (960 TONS) BOUND FOR DIAZ INFANTE FORCES TO STAGE ANOTHER REVOLUTION. A LAWYER REPRESENTING HIM IS NORMAN FUCH. THIS MEETING WAS IN OFFICES MILLIKIN AND MONTGOMERY IN PASADENA (CALIF) UNQUOTE.

3. VIEW THIS PERSONAL REQUEST BY LITENSOR REQUEST HQS IMMEDIATE TRACES, INVESTIGATION AND REPLY OPIM. NO STATION TRACES SUBJECTS BUT EXTENSIVE FILE ODENVY REPORTS MARCO ANTONIO DIAZ INFANTE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

, 064

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 30 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, D/OL 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

OCT 30 0642Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 48632

DIR CITE MEXI 2372

RYBAT/LIENVOY

(ALSO RCVD 207)

1. REQUEST TWO REVERE 224 TAPE RECORDERS WITH "Y" TYPE CORDS AND TWO NEW-TYPE IMPULSE RECORDERS MODEL B-10 WITH CONNECTIONS IN REAR BE SENT MEXICO SOONEST.

2. NEED EQUIPMENT TO DETERMINE MODIFICATIONS NECESSARY FOR NEW LIENVOY INSTALLATION.

3. WILL ORDER REMAINING EQUIPMENT WHEN NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS ARE DETERMINED AND WHAT ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IS NEEDED.

END OF MESSAGE

50-6-75

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : A.C. DELANEZ
UNIT : OCI
EXT : 7454 1605
DATE : 25 SEPTEMBER 1962

ROUTING
1 [illegible] 4
2 [illegible] 5
3 6

25 SEP 62 21 22z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: AD/CI 2
INFO : ADDP, C/CA, C/WH 2, DD/I, S/C 2

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 38585

RYBAT PBBAND

REF: DIR 37635 (OUT 79205)

FOR PASSING TO LITENSOR

1. SOVIET PROPAGANDA CONTINUES TO CHARGE THE US WITH "AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS" TOWARDS CUBA AND CARRIES DETAILS IN SOVIET NEWSPAPERS CONCERNING ALLEGED PROVOCATIVE FLIGHTS BY US PLANES OVER SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS ENROUTE TO CUBA. WHILE MOSCOW CONTINUES TO MANIFEST GENUINE CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE US ACTION TO INTERDICT SOVIET SHIPMENTS TO CUBA, SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN HIS 21 SEPTEMBER UN ADDRESS NOTED WITH SATISFACTION PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S STATEMENT THAT MILITARY INTERVENTION COULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED AT THE PRESENT TIME. MOSCOW IS EVIDENTLY TRYING TO BUILD A CASE TO SUPPORT ITS CHARGES IN THE UN THAT THE US IS GUILTY OF "PROVOCATIVE ACTIVITIES" THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

2. RECENT SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUGGEST THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS STILL NOT COMMITTED TO A FIRM COURSE OF ACTION ON BERLIN AND CONTINUES TO PROBE AND ASSESS WESTERN REACTION TO SOVIET MOVES. ON THE OTHER HAND, MOSCOW SEEMS INTENT ON CONVINCING THE ALLIED POWERS THAT IT HAS NOT RETREATED FROM A COMMITMENT TO A UNILATERAL SETTLEMENT IF NEGOTIA-

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 80565 DIR 38385

TO INFO CITE DIR

TIONS LATER IN THE YEAR FAIL TO PRODUCE RESULTS.

3. BUILDUP OF CHICOM FORCES IN TAIWAN STRAITS SPRING AND SUMMER 1962 LEFT PEIPING IN STRONGER MILITARY POSITION THERE BUT POSTURE REMAINS PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE. CHINATS, THOUGH STILL ~~X~~ TALKING ABOUT RETURN TO MAINLAND, ARE UNLIKELY TO LAUNCH ANY OPERATIONS LARGER THAN SMALL-SCALE INTELLIGENCE PROBES IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. BOTH SIDES ADHERE TO BASIC POLICY POSITION THAT "TWO CHINAS" SOLUTION~~S~~/ IS ~~XX~~ OUT OF THE QUESTION, AND THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOLUTION IS DESTRUCTION, ABSORPTION RIVAL REGIME.

4. INDIA-CHINA: RECENT CLASHES ON ASSAM-TIBET FRONTIER HAVE REFOCUSED ATTENTION ON EASTERN END OF HIMALAYAN BORDER~~XX~~ AND HEIGHTENED SINO-INDIAN TENSION; SKIRMISHING LIKELY TO CONTINUE BOTH IN LADAKH AND NORTHEAST, BUT ONSET OF WINTER CONDITIONS IN MID-OCTOBER AND APPARENT RELUCTANCE OF BOTH SIDES TO EXTEND FIGHTING MAKES OUTBREAK OF LARGE-SCALE HOSTILITIES UNLIKELY.

5. INDIA-PAKISTAN: DESPITE PERIODIC TENSIONS OVER BORDER INCIDENTS~~X~~ AND LACK OF PROGRESS ON KASHMIR DISPUTE, RELATIONS ARE RELATIVELY STABLE AND ~~THE~~ THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF MILITARY ACTION.

6. JAPAN: NO CHANGE IN JAPANESE SECURITY SITUATION. VISIT OF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

-3-

OUT 80565 DIR 38385

TO INFO CITE DIR

KENZO MATSUMURA, RULING PARTY ELDER, TO PEIPING HAS ENCOURAGED OPTIMISM OVER PROSPECT FOR INCREASED TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA DESPITE CHICOM INSISTENCE ON LINKING POLITICS AND ECONOMICS.

7. PHILIPPINES: PRESIDENT MACAPAGAL'S ~~X~~ PROMISED DOMESTIC ~~ACTIONXX~~ PROGRAM HAS MADE LITTLE REAL PROGRESS AS YET, BUT HE HAS MAINTAINED THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE BY EMPHASIZING HIS ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN.

8. INDONESIA: EARLY CABINET CHANGES ARE EXPECTED, BUT INDONESIAN POLICY WILL NOT BE AFFECTED. THE GOVERNMENT IS PREPARING TO TAKE OVER CONTROL OF NEW GUINEA FROM THE UN NEXT MAY, AND OTHERWISE IS PRECCCUPIED WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

END OF MESSAGE

NOTE TO CABLE SECRETARIAT: PLEASE FURNISH COPY TO OCI

WH/3/Mex [illegible]

for 1. Chief, WH/3

2. WH/COPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for CHIEF, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

W. O. WEBB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : John M. Whitten:js
UNIT : CWH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 20 Sep 62

1528

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

21 SEP 62 15 46z

~~SIG CEN~~
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT79205

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : CI/OPS, FI/INT 2, S/C 2

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 37635

REF MEXI 1979 (IN 25427)*

DIR 35657 (OUT 75740)** OF 12 SEP WAS SENT IN ANSWER TO YOUR REQUEST FOR SPECIAL BRIEFING FOR LITENSOR. ALL OF IT MAY BE PASSED TO HIM. WILL BRING IT UP TO DATE ON 26 OR 27 SEP AS YOU REQUEST.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Requested additional cable report of whatever COS can pass to LITENSOR to arrive Mexi 26 or 27 Sep.
**PBBAND - Moscow statement re Cuba, situation in Japan and Indonesia, etc.

for J. C. KING
C/WHD

for NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

WH/COPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2	mexi	5	
3		6	

DATE : 060
19 SEP. 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO . ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

SEP 20 0446Z62

ROUTINE

IN 25427

DIR CITE MEXI 1979 (OUSLER ACTING)

IMMEDIATE ACTION

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1919 (IN 20593)

1. PARA FOUR REF* PLS CABLE REPORT SOONEST.

2. REQUEST ADDITIONAL CABLED REPORT TO ARRIVE MEXI 26 OR 27 SEPT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *MEXI REQUESTED CABLED SITUATION REPORT OF WHATEVER COS CAN PASS PERSONALLY TO LITENSOR.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIG : A.C. DELANEY
UNIT : OCI
EXT : 7454 1601
DATE : 12 SEPTEMBER 1962

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

12 SEP 62 21 59z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : AD/CI
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, C/NE 3, C/FE 6, C/SR 4, C/WH 5, C/TFW 5, DD/1, S/C 2

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT75740

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 35657

R RYBAT PBBAND

REF MEXI 1919 (IN 20593)

1. MOSCOW'S STATEMENT OF 11 SEPTEMBER ON CUBA APPEARS DESIGNED TO ADVANCE VARIETY OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES, FOREMOST AMONG THEM BEING TO DETER US FROM ACTIVE INTERVENTION IN CUBA. ALTHOUGH STATEMENT AGAIN USED VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE TO AVOID CLEAR-CUT COMMITMENT TO DEFEND CUBA IN ALL CONTINGENCIES, IT HAS FURTHER ENGAGED SOVIET PRESTIGE IN ENSURING SURVIVAL OF CASTRO REGIME. AS BEFORE, HOWEVER, USSR IS ATTEMPTING TO CREATE IMPRESSION CUBA IS UNDER PROTECTION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR AND MISSILE POWER.

STATEMENT WAS ALSO CALCULATED TO ENABLE MOSCOW TO CLAIM FULL CREDIT FOR HAVING PROTECTED CUBA IF NO US-SUPPORTED INVASION OR INTERFERENCE WITH SOVIET SHIPPING MATERIALIZES. IN ADDITION TO THIS DETERRENT EFFECT, MOSCOW APPARENTLY IS ATTEMPTING TO CHECK GROWING CONCERN IN US AND LATIN AMERICA OVER SOVIET INTENTIONS IN CUBA. IT STRESSED DEFENSIVE NATURE OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT BEING FURNISHED CUBANS ~~XH~~ AND IMPLICITLY DENIED ANY SOVIET INTENTION TO ESTABLISH MILITARY ~~BXEXS~~ BASES IN CUBA.

STATEMENT, MOREOVER, CONVEYED INDIRECT ASSURANCE THAT USSR WILL

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

59

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT75140

-2-

TO INFO CITE DIR 35757

NOT CONFRONT US WITH SIMULTANEOUS CHALLENGES IN BOTH CUBAN AND BERLIN. IT SUGGESTS THAT LEADERS INTEND TO POSTPONE FURTHER SERIOUS BERLIN TALKS UNTIL LATE THIS XX YEAR OR EARLY NEXT YEAR, TO GIVE THEMSELVES TIME TO XXX ASSESS IMPACT ON WESTERN POSIT OF PROPAGANDA ATTACKS ON US "AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS" IN UN AND OF MANEUVERS TO INVOLVE UN IN BERLIN SETTLEMENT.

2. CHICOM MILITARY BUILDUP IN STRAITS IS REGARDED AS PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE AND CHINATS ARE SHOWING RELUCTANCE TO UNDERTAKE PROVOCATIONS THAT MIGHT LEAD TO HOSTILITIES, RECENT U-2 INCIDENT NOTWITHSTANDING.

3. ALTHOUGH SINO-INDIAN BORDER REMAINS TENSE WITH RECURRENCE OF SMALL-SCALE SKIRMISHES, CHANCE OF ANY LARGE-SCALE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IS REMOTE; SKIRMISHING LIKELY TO CONTINUE UNTIL ONSET OF WINTER, 5-6 WEEKS HENCE.

4. IN JAPAN, SITUATION IS QUIET; LEFTISTS APPARENTLY CONSIDER PRESENT INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES LACK POTENTIAL FOR CREATING PUBLIC DISTURBANCES.

5. INDONESIAN SITUATION HAS RETURNED TO NORMAL FOLLOWING AGREEMENT WITH NETHERLANDS FOR SETTLEMENT OF WEST NEW GUINEA ISSUE UNDER UN AUSPICES.

END OF MESSAGE

W O Webb
W. O. WEBB
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

087

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 11 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : DJAKARTA

ACTION: FE 8 (FE TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 0345, 11 SEP)

INFO : ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW 2, WH 7, DD/I, AD/CI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 11 0639Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 19949

PRITY DIR INFO PRITY MEXI CITE DJAK 8352

REF A DIR 34266 Out 73366*

B DJAK 8837 In 18892

C/S COMMENT: *FOR BACKGROUND BRIEFING FRIENDLY SERVICE ONLY REQUESTED STATION CABLE SITREP INFO MEXI 10 SEPT.

1. IN ABSENCE REPLY REF B DJAK APPRAISING SITUATION IN WAKE WEST IRIAN SETTLEMENT AND ASIAN GAMES AS FOLLOWS.

2. INDON OFFICIALDOM INDULGING IN STATE OF EUPHORIA AFTER FINAL REALIZATION TWO LONG SOUGHT OBJECTIVES OF WEST IRIAN AND ASIAN GAMES. OUTCOME OF WHICH EMINENTLY PLEASING TO THEM. SUKARNO IN EXCELLENT SPIRITS AND OBVIOUSLY RIDING HIGH IN FULL CONVICTION HIS PERSONAL AND AUTHORITARIAN POLICIES OF MOBILIZING POPULACE TO CONFORM TO OBJECTIVES OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY ARE BEING JUSTIFIED. ONLY PERSISTENT CLOUD ON HIS HORIZON IS DEBILITATED ECONOMY, WHICH HE NOW MARSHALING STATE APPARATUS TO RECTIFY. ACTUAL PROCEDURES SUKARNO WILL ADOPT TO ATTEMPT RESOLVE SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS STILL UNCLEAR. HE WELL AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT BY ALLEVIATING ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND INJECTING SOME VIGOR INTO ECONOMY HE WILL BE ABLE CIRCUMSCRIBE WHATEVER LATENT OPPOSITION THERE MAY STILL BE TO HIS REGIME.

3. WESTERN INITIATIVES IN REACHING WEST IRIAN SETTLEMENT SATISFYING INDON CLAIMS HAS HAD IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF REDRESSING PRE-SETTLEMENT

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

IMBALANCE OF INDONS PRO-BLOC ORIENTATION. WHETHER THIS NEW BALANCE WILL BE TIPPED IN FAVOR WEST PROBLEMATIC AND DEPENDS ON FURTHER WESTERN INITIATIVES AND CHARACTER OF BLOC COUNTER OFFENSIVE. TWO INDON SCHOOLS THOUGHT PRZVAIL. ONE CONSISTING MIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRACY APPARENTLY SEE OUTCOME WEST IRIAN ISSUE AS PROPELLING INDONESIA CLOSER TO WEST. OTHER, WHICH REPORTEDLY INCLUDES ELEMENTS PALACE GUARD AND SUCH PGOGESSIONAL STATE PHILOSOPHERS AS RUSLAN ABDULGANI, SEEMS TO BELIEVE SOME OVERTURES TO BLOC NECZSSARY IN ORDER BLUNT ANY IMPRESSIB THAT QHST IRIAN SETTLEMENT WILL COMPROMISE INBON VERSION NEUTRALISM TO ADVANTAGESWEST.

4. INTERNALLY, VAST AND DISCIPLINED PKI (INDONESIA COMMUNIST PARTY), ORGANIZATION SOMEWHAT QUIESCENT AND SEEMINGLY STILL AWAITING GUIDELINES FGOM MOSCOW OR PEKING ON TWISTS THEIR SUBVERSION SHOULD TAKE IN WAKE WEST IRIAN SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, PKI OBSERVED ADDING TO MOMENTUM FORM DEMOBILIZING ARMY AND LESSENING ARMY INFLUENCE, WHICH MAIN OBSTACLE PKI AMBITIONS, IN INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS. INDON MILITARY COUNTERING THIS MOMENTUM BY SEEKING GUIDE LIMITED DEMOBILIZATION IN MANNER CALCULATED PRESERVE THEIR STATUS UNDER GUIDED DEMOCRACY AS ONE OF FOUR MAIN FUNCTIONAL GROUPS CONTROLLING INDONESIA'S XORTUNES.

5. SUKARNO GIVING NO IMPRESSION HE INTENDS LIBERALIZE HIS AUTHORITARIAN REGIME. ON VOUTRARY HIS RETOOLING OF "LIBERAL" ELEMENTS FROM GOVT BUREAUCRACY BEING INTENSIFIED AND NEW IMPETUS BEING GIVEN TO NATIONAL FRONT AS SUKARNO'S CATCHALL AND MAIN POLITICAL INSTRUMENT FOR CONTROLLING AND GUIDING ENERGIES OF EMASCULATED POLITICAL PARTIES (PKI EXCEPTED) AND FUNCTIONAL GROUPS TO CONSOLIDATE PRECEPTS GUIDED DEMOCRACY.

(END OF MESSAGE)

14-00000

110

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET 110

DATE : 8 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : DJAKARTA

ACTION: FE 8

INFO : FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 8 0649Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 18892

DIR CITE DJAK 8837

REF DIR 34266 (cont 73306)*

DJAK UNCLEAR WHAT TYPE SITREP WANTED. IN VIEW PRESSURE OTHER WORK WE WONDER WHETHER HQS COULD NOT DO A BETTER TAILORED AND MORE COMPLETE JOB.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUEST STA CABLE SITREP INFO MEXI 10 DEPT.

Forget [illegible]!

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

028

DATE : 7 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 2 (C/WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 2315, 7 SEP)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 8 0245Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 18811

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 1888

RYBAT

REF DIR 33992 Out 72932 *

1. LITENSOR NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL AFTER 17 SEPT. HE TRAVELLING OUTSIDE MEXICO CITY.

2. COS WITH AMB MANN AND MATERIALS SENT (WHICH NOW IN SPANISH) WILL HAVE MEETING WITH LITENSOR (PRIVATELY) PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE.

3. APPRECIATE HQS HELP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *MR HENRY HECKSHER AVAILABLE DURING PERIOD 10-17 SEP FOR BRIEFING OF LITENSOR.

No action needed.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : HENRY D. HECKSHER
UNIT : CFE/PIA
EXT : 5426
DATE : 5 SEPTEMBER 1962

17

1771

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

5 SEP 62 23 55 z

TO : DJAKARTA
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: FE 8
INFO: FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 73306

TO DJAK INFO CITE DIR 34266

FOR BACKGROUND BRIEFING FRIENDLY SERVICE ONLY REQUEST STATION CABLE SITREP INFO MEXI 10 SEPTEMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

LIENVOY
Support

Orrin Magill
DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, FE DIVISION
RELEASING OFFICER

WH (Telecoord w/
Mr. V. Gresham)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HENRY D. HECKSHER
CHIEF, FE/PIA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

15

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG.: Vernot Gresham:js
UNIT: WH/COPS
EXT.: 7743
DATE: 5 September 1962

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

5 SEP 15 05z

~~SIG CEN~~

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

72932

OUT 72932

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/FE 6, S/C 2

TO PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 33992

33992

RYBAT

DIR 31814 (OUT 69116)*

1. MR. HENRY HECKSHER AVAILABLE DURING PERIOD 10-17 SEP FOR BRIEFING OF LITENSOR.

2. ADVISE DATE MOST CONVENIENT TO LITENSOR AND COS.

3. AS COS AWARE MR HECKSHER HAS EXCELLENT AREA KNOWLEDGE OF INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN. HE WILL REQUIRE INTERPRETER ASSISTANCE FROM COS.

4. FYI MR. HECKSHER DEPARTING WITHIN FEW DAYS ON TRIP TO CERTAIN CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES IN CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER PROJECT. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY AS SOON AS FEASIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT *Stated Hq would notify Station when selection of expert in area knowledge firmed up.

Liaison Support

Vernon R. Gresham
for RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

CFE/FIA ✓ Hecksher (in draft)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

N Holman
NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : J. R. Reeves:js
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 23 August 1962

.77

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

24 AUG 62 00 10z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FE 6, S/C 2

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

OUT69116

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 31814

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1773 (IN 10046)*

1. BRIEFING PAPERS POUCHED AS ATTACHMENT TO ~~HMMW~~ 10862 DATED 20 AUG.

2. DUE AREA KNOWLEDGE AND LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT, SELECTION OF EXPERT STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. WILL NOTIFY STATION WHEN ~~selection~~ SELECTION FIRMED UP.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *LITENSOR now tentatively plans depart on Far East Trip 26 Sep.

LIENVOY

WH/COPS RKD

for RAYFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :	062 23 AUG 62
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	MEXICO CITY
ACTION:	C/WH 5
INFO :	ADDP, C/CI, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 23 0322 62

ROUTINE

IN 10046

DIR CITE MEXI 1775

REF DIR 26750 (cont' [illegible])

RYBAT

1. LITENSOR NOW TENTATIVELY PLANS DEPART FOR PHILIPPINES (STOPOVER), INDONESIA, JAPAN, INDIA ON 25 SEPTEMBER.

2. APPRECIATE IF HQS COULD POUCH BRIEFING PAPERS ON INDONESIA, JAPAN AND INDIA; STATION WILL TRANSLATE.

3. WILL CABLE WHEN DEFINITE PLANS AVAILABLE.

4. RE PARA 2 REF COS CAN INTERPRET AT MEETINGS IF EXPERT COMES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS PREPARED OFFER BRIEFING PAPERS PER AND CONCURRED EXPERT COMING MEXI.

LIENVOY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

WH/Mexi

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSED	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : Briefing Papers for LITENSOR

ACTION REQUIRED : See Para 2 below

REFERENCES : MEXI 1469, 21 July 1962

1. Forwarded herewith are the briefing papers on the Communist Movement in Japan, India and Indonesia as requested in reference.

2. These studies were prepared by KUDESK and are forwarded for translation by the Station. Also, it is requested that the Station review the studies and sanitize them for passage to LITENSOR as appropriate.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
Briefing papers:
1 ea: Japan, India, Indonesia

Distribution:
0&1 - COS Mexico City, w/attachments

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DATE TYPED: 20 Aug 62

DATE DISPATCHED: 23 AUG 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-10862

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-209529

_ASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ RYBAT

ORIG : LEE G. NORRIS:jp
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 17 August 1962

1590
20

5-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

17 AUG 62 21 03z

DEFERRED ~~SIG CEN~~
ROUTINE

OUT 66927
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO MEXI (OPIM) INFO CITE DIR 30[illegible]

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1693 (IN 46148)*

1. WOLLENSACK EQUIPMENT NOT SUITABLE AND NO OTHER NEW EQUIPMENT TYPES AVAILABLE. RECOMMEND TRIP BE POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER CONSIDERATION POSSIBLE.

2. IF TRIP CAN NOT BE DELAYED, WE WILL ATTEMPT ENTERTAIN AND DIVERT LIENVOY 2 WITH ARSHART'S HELP. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH CMT: Requested Hqs show LIENVOY-2 Wollensack equipment for New L.P.

Lienvoy
Suspense

TSD/ACB John Castro (in draft)

WH/COPS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET RYBAT~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

342

DATE : 16 AUG 62 DMCL

TO : DIRECTOR.

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1525 16 AUG 62)

INFO : *ADDP, C/CI, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 16 1922Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 46497

TO (PRIORITY) DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1711

REF DIR 29996 (OUT 66087)**

SEE MEXI 1693. (IN 46148)

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

**RE INFO THAT AREHART AND LIENVOY 2 COMING WASH 17 AND 22 AUG.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S E C R E T RYBAT~~

5-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ORIG : J. WHITTEN
UNIT : DC/WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 15 August 1962

15 Aug 65 22 22z
OUT66087

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, S/C 2

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 66087
PRIORITY

TO PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 29996

RYBAT LIENVOY

UNDERSTAND FROM MULFORD THAT ARRHART AND LIENVOY 2 COMING WASH 17 AND 22 AUG TO DISCUSS NEW LIGHT EQUIPMENT FOR PROJECT. HAS THIS BEEN DELAYED OR CANCELLED IN VIEW OF MEXI 16917* ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *(IN 45535) LI TEMPO-2 HAS ASKED COS SET UP TELEPHONE TAP OPERATION.

/s/
J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~S E C R E T RYBAT~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

647

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 29 MAR 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SR 6, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 30 0447Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 11121

DIR CITE MEXI 0415

REDCAP

REF DIR 00232 Out 65709

INFO PARA ONE REF PASSED LIELEGANT, AND ALSO TO AMB.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONTAINED INFO SEMEN TARASCVICH BAZAROV.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

7 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Personnel

SUBJECT : Request for Outside Translator

1. It is requested that you contact the appropriate Career Boards to try to locate candidates to fill the job now being held by George Misko in Mexico City, but under deep cover. He must have the following qualifications:

   a. Languages: Russian (fluent), Czech (fluent), Spanish (would be expected to bring proficiency of Spanish up to good). Also provide names of candidates having only Russian and Spanish.

   b. Job: translating telephone tap tapes

   c. Age: any age acceptable

   d. Sex: male or female but male preferable

   e. Grade: grades 9 through 12 should be considered

   f. Security: Would be sent to Mexico City to work in a basehouse with Mexican liaison personnel and one KUBARK Staff Agent. Must be willing to expose himself as KUBARK to Mexican Government.

   g. Cover: Would be provided by Mexico, could bring family and limited household effects. Will have no contacts with Embassy or have any Embassy privileges.

   h. Type of Employee: Career Agent or Contract Agent preferred. If not available, Staff Agent or Contract Employee Type B would be suitable.

2. Any questions on this request should be directed to Charlotte Bustos-Vidala, WH/3/Mexico, X2555.

3. It is the intention of this desk to slot this new employee into a LIENVOY slot and vacate the Station/Embassy slot for another FI Case Officer.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - LIENVOY/Support
1 - Outgoing memo chrono

~~SECRET~~

PROJECT: LIENVOY (2135-5701-5170) Mexico

Staff Agent: AREHART, Arnold F.

			FY 1962	FY 1963
Approved:	1 July 1961 - 31 January 1962	$40,340		
(Pending)	1 February 62 - 31 Jan 1963	25,482	$65,822	$39,758

		FY 1962	FY 1963
SUPPORT EXPENSES:	Salary	5,000	
	10% S.A. Premium	500	
	Equalization	250	
	Retirement	326	
	Housing	2,100	
	Education	400	
	AREHART auto upkeep & travel	4,900	
	AREHART home leave travel		2,000
	Salary and cover travel for AREHART and family	8,330	11,670
	Total Support Expenses	21,806	13,670
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES:		44,016	26,088
	TOTAL	$65,822	$39,758

~~SECRET~~

( ) (WH/3/mexico

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Material for Passage to Liaison
101 Questions to a Guerilla Fighter

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Attached are two copies of General Alberto Bayo's book (in Spanish) for use in briefing or training agents or members of security forces with which we have liaison. This book is a "do-it-yourself" guide to paramilitary and sabotage techniques. It demonstrates Cuban support for such activities and the need for training in counter-measures by friendly security forces.

2. Headquarters has recommended that all WH Stations have one or more of these books, especially those where official or unofficial liaison exists with a security force.

3. If Station Mexico is interested in this book, a limited number of copies can be obtained. Prior to releasing any of these copies, Headquarters must know the individual and service receiving the book thereby allowing its clearance release.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 Mexico City, w/att

DATE TYPED
25 Jan 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
26 JAN 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-2218

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

25 January 1962

SUBJECT: Request for LIENVOY Project Renewal

1. In accordance with the new policy of charging all costs in connection with Staff Agents to Station Support and not to a project, there is an adjustment required in the budget figures quoted in the attached memorandum requesting project renewal.

2. The LIENVOY Project should be approved for a total of $43,240; $17,152 for fiscal year 1962 and $26,088 for fiscal year 1963. Funds totaling $8,380 in fiscal year 1962 and $13,570 in fiscal year 1963 will be transferred to Mexico City Support to fund Arnold F. AREHART, Staff Agent.

Distribution:
1 - LIENVOY/Support
1 - LIENVOY/Dev & Plan

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KDFACTOR Photographic Surveillance Operation
Folder 11, 50-6-74/3 Operations

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1958 thru 1973 (terminated)

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: Archives (Job no. 78-970)

ROOM: ______

DELETIONS, IF ANY: ______

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
[illegible]	[illegible] 73	Dan Hardway	Dan Hardway
28 June		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
21 [illegible]		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
25 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	Hardway
10/31	[illegible]	Hardway	Hardway
15 NOV. 78		DAN HARDWAY	Hardway
12/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
12-2[illegible]		JENZMAN	Jenzman
[illegible]		Beik	Beik

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

KDFACTOR
/3 OPERATIONS

FOLDER

RETIRED FILE
DESENSITIZED
per CSI-78-17

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 78-855 BOX 36

4230[illegible]

30227

File No 50-6-74/3

Other Agency Documents
(2 Enclosed)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

(Headquarters component) WH/1	**SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION**
TO : IP/AN	
TO : (Station/Base) Mexico City	FROM: (Division) WHD

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3-ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8-USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10-ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE	2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER		
	COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT	050	006	074/3

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION				5. DISPOSITION			
☐	OPEN FILE	☒	CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)	☒	RETAIN	☐	DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)
☐	AMEND FILE TITLE	☐	REOPEN				

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)	8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
HMM	050

9. FILES ACTION

☒	HOLD IN CS FILES	☐	RESTRICTED	☒	UNRESTRICTED	☐	PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER	☐	CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT	12. COORDINATION	13. RID APPROVAL
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. #630	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)	REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE	CODE (FILE) NUMBER		
23 July 1973	50	06	74/3

FORM 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
-63

SECRET

38 1—CS COPY

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

DVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

CTION UNIT WH8

CTION # 923

INFO RF. FILE. VR. CI/AN, DDO, SBS, FI ADDO, CI, CI/OPS, CI/TC

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 180863 PAGE 01-01 IN 895416

TOR:192050Z APR 73 MEXI 23439

S E C R E T 191915Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 23439

TO: DIRECTOR INFO DIRTECH, PANTECH.

REDLEG KDALCOVE TECHS

REF: MEXICO CITY 22902 (IN 550655) 50-6-74/3

factor

1. KDALCOVE PHOTO EXPERIMENTS NOW CONCLUDED. TEST PHOTOS AND INSTALLATION DETAILS ARE BEING FORWARDED BY DISPATCH ALONG WITH REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO INSTALL CLOSED CIRCUIT TV TO MINIMIZE OPERATOR FATIGUE AND MAXIMIZE OP EFFICIENCY. ALTHOUGH STILL TROUBLED AT TIMES BY TRAFFIC AIR POLLUTION, OVERALL PRODUCT IS GOOD QUALITY AND FULFILLS OUR REQUIREMENTS.

2. PER DISCUSSIONS WITH TDY MKSPICE TECHS. TV SYSTEM ENSTALLATION APPEARS FEASIBLE. ALSO GOOD POSSIBILITY THEY MAY HAVE NEEDED EQUIPEMENT WHICH COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE ON EXTENDED LOAN BASIS. IF APPROVED, MKSPICE PHOTO TECH WOULD BE REQUESTED ASSIST IN INSTALLATION.

3. FILE: 50-6-74/2. E2, IMPDET.

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
~~ES~~
~~SX~~
~~DES~~ STD
~~FI~~
CI/WH/1

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

50-6-74/3
19APR73

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATI... CLASSIFIED MESSAGE • TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 99 PER

ACTION UNIT C/WH8 INFO FILE, VR, [illegible], DDO, ADDO, C/CI, [illegible], C/FI-2, C/SB5

ACTION NO. 792

S E C R E T 060033Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 22902 (ROSTEDT ACTING) MEXI

TO: DIRECTOR INFO DIRTECH, PANTECH.

RYBAT REDLEG KDALCOVE TECHS

REF: MEXICO CITY 22495 (C 820452)

850655

D4

AS
AB
SI
PG
EZ
~~DES NPD~~
~~FI~~
WH/1

1. KDALCOVE PHOTO BASEHOUSE OPERATIONAL 1 MAR 1973. KDALCOVE-1 AND -2 GIVEN ON SITE TRAINING AND BRIEFING 28 FEB BY OLIVER J. MANKUNAS AND STATION TECH CHARLES F. HIPPEN. KDALCOVE-1 TOOK FIRST OPERATIONAL FILMS FOLLOWING DAY AND PRODUCT WAS RETRIEVED USING KDALCOVE-2 AS CUTOUT. ALTHO EARLY MORNING PHOTOS WERE EXCELLENT QUALITY, HEAVY BUILDUP OF TRAFFIC AIR POLLUTION BY MID-MORNING SERIOUSLY AFFECTED PHOTO DEFINITION. BEFORE DAYBREAK 5 MAR, MANKUNAS AND HIPPEN AGAIN RETURNED TO PHOTO SITE TO TEST VARIOUS FILTERS AND SPEED SETTINGS IN EFFORT TO ALLEVIATE PROBLEM. TEST PHOTOS TAKEN WITH DARK ORANGE HAZE FILTER SHOWED IMPROVEMENT AND PRODUCED USABLE PRODUCT. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE EXPERIMENTING TO OBTAIN OPTIMUM RESULTS. TEST PHOTOS AND INSTALLATION DETAILS WILL BE FORWARDED BY POUCH.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

6 MAR 1973

CS COPY

SECRET

50-6-74/3

ORIG: R. SWIDER:lf
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 9354
DATE: 5 February 1973

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 13 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

DOC. MICRO. SER.
FEB 15 1973
MICROFILMED

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 367346

TO MEXICO CITY 07 FEB 73 17 12Z

RYBAT TYLOTE REDLEG KDALCOVE

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 22495 (IN 820452)

B. DIRECTOR 362309

1. APPRECIATE REF (A) DETAILS. CONCUR IN YOUR PLAN.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3; 50-6-58/3. E2, IMPDET. WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE.

WH COMMENTS: Ref A requested Mexico City provide details desirability one safesite over another. Ref B complied with Ref A request.

DIV/D CIB Anita Potocki - in draft

AN
AB
IP
ID
EX
DESENSITIZED
[illegible]

Factor

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
50-6-58/3

RAYMOND J. SWIDER
AC/WH/1
50-6-74/3

7 FEB 1973

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

E2 IMPDET CL BY: [illegible]
AFDIR WH - SISM

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ______ #

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 1 9 1973
MICROFILMED

ACTION UNIT: c/DIVA 4

FILE, VR c/PLAN DDP ADDP CS/DO c/SB 5 c/WH 8 c/a c/FI 2

ACTION NO. 578

S E C R E T 310036Z JAN 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 22495 MEXI

820452

M

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT TYLOTE REDLEG KDALCOVE

REF A. DIRECTOR 362309

B. MEXICO CITY 22429 (IN 815792)

AN
AB
IN
PS
DY
DES: NFD
FI
WH/1

1. IN RESPONSE REF A QUESTION, AVAILABILITY IS MAIN FEATURE, BUT EASE IN ADMINISTRATION AND SECURITY ARE ALSO FACTORS INFLUENCING OUR PROPOSAL TO COMBINE PHOTO OPERATION WITH KDVAULT TECHNICAL OPERATION. APARTMENT UNDER EARLIER CONSIDERATION WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL PROBABLY SOMETIME IN MAY, AND WE DO NOT NOW HAVE ANY SUITABLE CANDIDATES TO TAKE POSSESSION WHEN IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. COMBINING BOTH OPERATIONS WILL REDUCE NUMBER ASSETS INVOLVED, COSTS, AGENT MEETINGS AND PROJECT ADMIN. SECURITY WILL BE ENHANCED BECAUSE TWO ACTIVE SITES IN SUCH CLOSE PROXIMITY CKPOLAR INSTALLATION WOULD DOUBLE COVER PROBLEMS AND DOUBLE NUMBER OF CLANDESTINE MEETINGS TO RETRIVE PRODUCT.

B

2. IN SUM, BOTH APARTMENTS IN QUESTION HAVE ESSENTIALLY SAME DESIRABILITY FEATURES FOR KDVAULT OPERATION. HOWEVER,

CS COPY

SECRET

050-6-58/3

31 JAN 1973

50-6-74/3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #____

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 22495 S E C R E T

BELIEVE ACQUIRING BOTH APARTMENTS FOR SUPPORT ACTIVITIES NOT JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF MANPOWER DRAIN AT TIME WE NEED EMPHASIS ON RECRUITING MORE AND BETTER ACCESS AGENTS AGAINST PRIORITY TARGETS.

3. FILE: 50-6-74/3; 50-6-58/3. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED WH

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

C/WH/5B

BY: D AT: 1635 Z

DISSEM BY 12 PER

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION NO 668

FILE, VR c/IRAN c/SB5 c/CI

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PRECEDENCE

SECRET 151500Z JAN 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 22308 (ROSTEDT ACTING) MEXI

807463

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

RYBAT REDLEG KDFACTOR

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 358750

B. MEXICO CITY 22307 (IN 806421)

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 10 1973
MICROFILMED

1. APPRECIATE YOUR RAPID RESPONSE PER REF A. SUBJ REFS HAS OTHER COMMITMENTS WHICH PRECLUDE HIS OCCUPANCY THIS APARTMENT. HE WILLING SIGN LEASE, BUT IN VIEW HIS POTENTIAL FOR OTHER OPS WE ARE RELUCTANT HAVE HIM DO THIS. THUS, WE HAVE INSTRUCTED KDADAGE-42, IN ALIAS, TO TRY AND TIE UP APARTMENT LONG ENOUGH TO ENABLE US FIND SUITABLE CANDIDATE TO LIVE IN APARTMENT AND PERFORM DESIRED OPERATIONAL TASKS. THIS MAY BE FEASIBLE SINCE PRESENT APARTMENT TENANTS DID NOT FOLLOW THRU ON ORIGINAL PLANS TO VACATE 14 JAN. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS. VIEW ABOVE, YOU DO NOT NEED TO AMEND POA AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3; 201-906628. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

D 201-906628

CS COPY
SECRET

50-6-74/3
15 ~~16~~ JAN 1973

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 21 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

CSDO

BY: 6 AT: 0215 Z

DISSEM BY 25 PER

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT: C/WH8

INFO: FILE. VR/ C/IPLAN, C/CI, C/FI2, C/SB5, CSPD

ACTION NO. 565

RP

S E C R E T 130139Z JAN 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY MEXI 22307 (ROSTEDI ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT REDLEG KDFACTOR

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 328305

B. MEXICO CITY 21273 (IN 727027)

C. MEXICO CITY 21713 (IN 761220)

806421

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 10 1973
MICROFILMED

AN
AB
~~IN~~
PS
CX
~~DES/NPD~~
~~PI~~
WH/1

1. REQUEST YOU AMEND POA ON SUBJECT REF A AND GRANT POA ON HIS WIFE TO PERMIT THIS COUPLE TO OCCUPY AND USE APARTMENT CITED BELOW FOR OBSERVATION AND PHOTO POINT AGAINST CKPOLAR MISSION. SUBJECT REF A NO LONGER NEEDED FOR USE OUTLINED REF B SINCE ANOTHER MORE SUITABLE CANDIDATE AVAILABLE. NEED FOR URGENT APPROVAL EXPLAINED BELOW.

2. APARTMENT IS ON THIRD FLOOR OF MENTIONED REF C BUILDING WITH EXCELLENT VIEW CKPOLAR MAIN GATE. TEST PHOTOS TAKEN AND INDICATE SITE SUITABLE FOR USE. THIS SITE WILL REPLACE FORMER KDABSINTHE PHOTO BASEHOUSE. KDADAGE-42 BRIBED RENTAL SECRETARY TO HOLD APARTMENT FOR HIM UNTIL 15 JANUARY. SAID HE HAD OUT OF TOWN FRIENDS INTERESTED THIS LOCATION. WE DOUBT HE CAN PERSUADE SECRETARY TO KEEP APARTMENT OFF RENTAL MARKET BEYOND 15 JANUARY.

3. MARRIED COUPLE ORIGINALLY VETTED BY US AND HELD IN RESERVE

D201-906628

CS COPY

SECRET

13 JAN 1973

50-6-74/3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION UNIT INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 22307 SECRET

FOR THIS PHOTO OPERATION (SUBJECTS OF REF C) WERE, AS YOU KNOW, DIVERTED LAST WEEK TO OCCUPY LP FOR MPCHEEK AUDIO OPERATION.

4. WE HAVE NOT YET ASKED SUBJECT REF A AND WIFE IF THEY ABLE AND WILLING RUN PHOTOPOINT FOR US, BUT OLIVER J. MANKUNAS WHO KNOWS THEIR PERSONAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION BELIEVES THEY WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY.

5. REQUEST APPROVAL PROCEED BY PRIORITY CABLE. NEED APPROVAL PRIOR COB 13 JAN. SUGGEST ASSIGN NEW CRYPT TO THIS OPERATION. WILL FORWARD COMPLETE PRQ I AND II ASAP.

6. FILE: 50-6-74/3 201-906628 E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

IP/EOI FORWARDED MAR 21 1 44 PM '73

IP/EOI RECEIVED MAR 13 2 53 PM '73

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
KDFACTOR Operational Report, 1 March 1972 through 31 July 1972

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

REFERENCE : HMMA-41,734, 10 March 1972 (Previous Report)

INTRODUCTION

1. The KDFACTOR Project has been terminated because of developments reported in other channels. This will be the last of the operational reports forwarded to Headquarters and primarily a wrap-up of developments to date.

OPERATIONS

2. The KDFACTOR Project supported two visual and photographic surveillance points (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE) directed against the MHHARSH installation. Operations from the KDLITERAL surveillance point were suspended on 4 July 1972, the equipment removed on 7 July, and the operator, KDFACTOR-2, terminated the same date. Operations from the KDABSINTHE surveillance point were suspended on 28 July, the equipment removed on 29 July, and termination of KDFACTOR-5 and his family accomplished the same date.

ADMINISTRATION

3. Oliver J. MANKUNAS continued to have responsibility for inside administrative chores and agent handling throughout the period. Processing of the photo product was accomplished inside the Station.

PERSONNEL

4. The project included five salaried assets. KDFACTOR-2 operated the KDLITERAL basehouse. KDFACTOR-5 operated the KDABSINTHE basehouse with the assistance of his wife KDFACTOR-6 and his two sons KDFACTOR-8 and -9. Both KDFACTOR-2 and -5 have served BKTRUST in their photo specialty since 1957.

CONTINUED . . .

CS COPY

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - C/WHD
1 - C/SBD

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

FILE

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-42,197

DATE
1 August 1972

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3 Factor

5. KDFACTOR-2 will continue to reside in the KDLITERAL building, as part of his termination agreement, until probably sometime in December when he will move to new quarters of his own. The KDLITERAL building (MEXI-03, Unit 15) is part of the KDVAULT complex of buildings which will be disposed of as reported in other channels. If this occurs before December, KDFACTOR-2 will move at the time of disposal.

6. KDFACTOR-5 and his family will vacate the KDABSINTHE apartment o/a 31 August. KDABSINTHE is located in a building owned by KDABBEY who plans to dispose of his equity in the property in the near future.

PRODUCTION

7. KDLITERAL: Before being closed down, KDLITERAL, through KDFACTOR-2, was the source of within-the-compound photographic coverage of PCS and TDY MHHARSHers. He provided an average of three rolls of film a week and provided weekly written reports based on his visual observation of the target area.

8. KDABSINTHE: Operated by KDFACTOR-5, KDABSINTHE produced an average of six rolls of film a week and was our principal source for information on visitors to the MHHARSH installation, especially "WOCORK-type" persons and political exiles. This segment of KDFACTOR was also our main source of information on MHHARSH license plates and automobiles.

9. In addition, KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE both provided detailed "attendance sheets" on all MHHARSH personnel. With the loss of this combined coverage, it will be difficult to identity personnel assigned to the MHHARSH installation or to monitor their daily movements in and out of the compound. The two surveillance points also provided periodic photo studies of the MHHARSH installation itself with emphasis on coverage of the construction changes and modification or additions made to the communications antenna system.

SECURITY

10. We were gratified to receive the very favorable Headquarters KDFACTOR security review which was forwarded as HMMW-19,061, 28 June 1972. There is no need for further comment.

PROBLEMS

11. Only the developments reported in other channels.

FINANCES

12. KDFACTOR Project termination costs have been charged to FY 1972 with the exception of rent payments and utility costs which are being charged to FY 1973. The breakdown of agent termination costs is as follows:

KDFACTOR-2	$102,000
KDFACTOR-5	29,575
KDFACTOR-6	35,380
KDFACTOR-8	8,112
KDFACTOR-9	19,592
TOTAL	$194,659 pesos ($15,572.72 USD)

PLANS

13. Not applicable.

EVALUATION/OBITUARY

14. We believe the KDFACTOR Project represented a professional

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-42,197

collection effort being run securely and successfully against a sensitive target with a minimal expenditure of funds and case officer time.

Oliver J. Mankunas

Oliver J. MANKUNAS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 25

PER #

ACTION UNIT WH 8

FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO. 978

S E C R E T 102318Z APR 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19452

MEXI

DIRECTOR

KDFACTOR

10 Apr 72 IN 582033

REF: DIRECTOR 252261

1. BRUCE H. FERNALD MET MONTHLY WITH RAYMOND H. GERENDE FROM JULY 1970 TO MAY 1971 TO PAY TEN INSTALLMENTS OF TERMINATION BONUS. LAST MEET WAS 4 MAY 1971. ALL IMPORTANT INFO ON PROBLEMS OF GERENDE AND WIFE (FORMERLY LIEMPTY-19) WAS REPORTED BY CABLE DURING THIS PERIOD, EXCEPT FOR NEWS THAT GERENDE VISITED HOLLAND DURING CHRISTMAS 1970 WHEN HAD AMICABLE VISIT WITH WIFE AND CHILDREN.

2. GERENDE IS OWNER OF HOUSE RENTED AUGUST 1970 BY STATION STAFFER JESSE R. GARDALPHE. HE STILL TEACHING ENGLISH TO EMPLOYEES OF TWO LOCAL FIRMS AND APPEARS FINANCIALLY PRESSED SINCE CLASS SCHEDULE REDUCED RECENTLY FROM SIX TO TWO HOURS PER DAY. STILL DRINKS, BUT APPARENTLY IN MODERATION. HAS INDICATED HE MIGHT VISIT WIFE IN HOLLAND THIS SUMMER. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO INDICATE GERENDE HAS VIOLATED HIS SECRECY AGREEMENT OR PROBED INTO LNLUTE STATUS OF GARDALPHE.

SECRET

10 April 72
50-6-74/3

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION　CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　TOTAL COPIES　ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

APR 19 10 53 AM '72

BY: ______ AT: ______

FORWARDED

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

APR 13 11 27 AM '72

RECEIVED
TP/EDI

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 19452 S E C R E T

3. FILE: 50-6-74/3. GP-1.

SECRET

APR 21 72

RC

SECRET

14-00000

Julie Paulas

ORIG: Julie Paulas
UNIT: WH 1/FI/CI
EXT: 4167
DATE: 6 APRIL 1972

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 29/31 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/3

CONF: C/WH 5 INFO: FILE, VR, C/Ops, C/OA, , PIDN

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 252261

TO MEXICO CITY

KDFACTOR

REF: A. HMMW-18, 773, 23 DECEMBER 71
B. HMMA-41734, 10 MARCH 72

1. IN ORDER COMPLETE REF A KDFACTOR SECURITY REVIEW RE KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF TERMINATED AGENTS AND FAMILIES, STATION REQUESTED FURNISH BRIEF SUMMARY OF RAYMOND H. GERENDE'S ACTIVITIES FROM TERMINATION IN JUNE 1970 TO PRESENT. ABOVE INFO NEEDED PRIOR TO COB 11 APRIL, IN ORDER PROVIDE NEEDED DETAIL TO REF B.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Reference A requested an updated security review of KDFACTOR Operations and knowledgeability of terminated agents and families. Reference B is Station answer to Reference A. Reference B lacks detail regarding GERENDE, who handled KDFACTOR up to late 1970, present activities.

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

LAWRENCE C. LASER
AC/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

50-6-74/3
7 April 72

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM
Acting
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
KDFACTOR Operational Report, 1 September 1971 through 29 February 1972

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

REFERENCES : A. HMMA-41,028, 17 September 1971 (Previous Report)
B. HMMW-18,773, 23 December 1971

OPERATIONS

1. The KDFACTOR Project continued throughout the past six months to support two visual and photographic surveillance points (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE) directed against the MHHARSH installation.

ADMINISTRATION

2. Oliver J. MANKUNAS continued to have responsibility for inside administrative chores and agent handling throughout the period. Bruce H. FERNALD, who previously handled the assets, is the alternate case officer and would be available to take over agent meeting responsibilities in the absence of MANKUNAS. Processing of the photo product is accomplished inside the Station. Agent meetings have now been cut to a minimum, and the processing of the product and delivery to the consumer has been speeded up.

PERSONNEL

3. The project includes five salaried assets. KDFACTOR-2 operates the KDLITERAL basehouse and has been employed in this capacity since 1957. KDFACTOR-5 operates the KDABSINTHE basehouse with the assistance of his wife KDFACTOR-6 and his two sons, KDFACTOR-8 and -9. KDFACTOR-5 has also served BKTRUST in this capacity since 1957.

PRODUCTION

4. KDLITERAL: During this reporting period, KDLITERAL, through KDFACTOR-2, continued to be the source of within-the-compound photographic coverage of PCS and TDY MHHARSHers. He produced 55 rolls of

CONTINUED . . .

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - C/WHD
1 - C/SBD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-41,734

DATE
10 March 1972

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 50-6-74/3

film and provided weekly written reports based on his daily visual observation of the target area.

5. KDABSINTHE: Operated by KDFACTOR-5, KDABSINTHE produced 100 rolls of film and continued to be the principal source for information on visitors to the MHHARSH installation, with special attention given to visits of "WOCORK-type" persons and political exiles. This segment of KDFACTOR also continued to be the main source of information on MHHARSH license plates and automobiles.

6. KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE both continue to provide detailed "attendance sheets" on all MHHARSH personnel. Without this combined coverage, it would be difficult to identify personnel assigned to the MHHARSH installation or to monitor their daily movements and activities. In addition, the two surveillance points provide periodic photo studies of the MHHARSH installation itself with emphasis on coverage of any construction changes and any modification or additions made to the communications antenna system. Both sites are also available to service special support requests as required. During the period, KDLITERAL performed a number of special photo surveys and a three-week frequency sweep requested by WOACRE.

SECURITY REVIEW

7. There were no known problems of security relating to the project. In response to Reference B request, we have reviewed all phases of the operation and believe that project security is sound. The project assets have all been with us for many years and have established themselves as respectable long-time residents of the area. All five assets, four in one family and one in another, are extremely security conscious and have all been SGSWIRLed. The assets derive a substantial portion of their livelihood from their ~~BKTRUST~~ employment and would thus lose a great deal if security factors ever necessitated a termination of their work for us. As an additional safeguard, the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE operations are compartmented from each other, and there has never been any indication that either segment of KDFACTOR knows of the other's existence.

8. The only termination of a project asset in recent years was KDFACTOR-1, who formerly processed the photo product from both surveillance points. KDFACTOR-1 was terminated amicably in March 1971. We still maintain periodic contact with him; and his brother, KDADAGE-14, continues to be one of our more valued MHHARSH access agents. KDFACTOR-1 is a reputable physician with a wide circle of friends, and on a number of recent occasions he has been very helpful when we have taxed his expertise in his field or requested background information on people in the medical profession. Although KDFACTOR-1 processed the photo product, he was not knowledgeable of the exact surveillance point locations. Delivery and pickup of the finished product was always accomplished by an outside case officer.

9. Contact is maintained with only two of the five assets. KDFACTOR-2 and -5, both of whom are responsible for the operation of their respective basehouses. Both KDFACTOR-2 and -5 are met weekly to obtain the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE product for timely processing and analysis by the Station. Meetings with KDFACTOR-2 are car pick-ups at periodically changed locations in the suburbs. Meetings with KDFACTOR-5 consist of car meetings early in the morning along his route of travel to his overt job. These meetings last only long enough to pick up the product, provide new supplies, and pay salaries, rents, utility bills, etc. Emergency contact plans are on file at the Station and have been forwarded to Headquarters on both KDFACTOR-2 and -5. KDFACTOR-6, -8, and -9 are members of KDFACTOR-5's immediate family and could be contacted through him using his emergency plan.

10. We have taken action recently to guard against the contingency that one of the present sites might be blown, and alternate

means might be required to continue the KDFACTOR coverage. In February 1972 an apartment became available in the same building complex which houses the KDABSINTHE installation. Through the cooperation of KDABBEY-1, we were able quietly to rent the apartment and install elements of the KDCALVERT team as residents. This location affords as good, if not better, vantage point for continuing photo coverage in the event the present KDABSINTHE location becomes untenable. We are also exploring alternate locations for KDLITERAL to solve the problem we face with this element of KDFACTOR coverage (see below).

PROBLEMS

11. The only known problem connected with the project is a product of mother nature which is threatening the effectiveness of KDLITERAL coverage. Approximately two years ago MHHARSH personnel planted eight small trees along the edge of the terrace leading to the garden. These trees have flourished and now have grown to the point where KDFACTOR-2, the KDLITERAL operator, estimates he only has a year more of effective operational capability. We are studying ways of solving this problem and will forward a separate dispatch to Headquarters on the topic in the near future.

FINANCES

12. There have been no changes in anticipated project expenses shown below for FY 1972 and FY 1973.

SALARIES	FY 1972 (USD)	FY 1973 (USD)
KDFACTOR-2	5,280	5,808
KDFACTOR-5	1,728	1,901
KDFACTOR-6	2,112	2,323
KDFACTOR-8	768	845
KDFACTOR-9	1,968	2,165
	11,856	13,042
BASEHOUSE RENT		
MEXI-03, UNIT 15	400	400
MEXI-132	3,550	3,840
	3,950	4,240
MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES		
Basehouse utilities	750	800
Property maintenance & replacement	500	500
Christmas bonuses	988	1,087
	2,238	2,387
TOTAL EXPENSES	18,044	*19,669

PLANS

13. No changes in the project are contemplated.

EVALUATION

14. The support provided by the KDFACTOR Project to the Station REDTOP Program is indispensable. We believe the project represents a professional collection effort being run securely and successfully against a sensitive target with a minimal expenditure of funds and case officer time.

---

*Reflects anticipated salary raises and higher rent on MEXI-132 based on projected cost of living increase over two-year period.

OLIVER J. MANKUNAS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
KDFACTOR Operational Report, 1 March through 31 August 1971

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

REFERENCE : HMMA-40,227, 8 March 1971 (Previous Ops Report)

OPERATIONS

1. The KDFACTOR Project continued throughout the past six months to support two visual and photographic surveillance points (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE) directed against the MHHARSH installation.

ADMINISTRATION

2. Howard T. BAGAUS handled the administration of the project until early April 1971 when project responsibility reverted from the Ops Support Section back to the REDTOP Section. At that time Timothy H. ARCHBOLD assumed the inside administrative chores, and agent meetings were turned over to the outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD who had previously handled the assets. When ARCHBOLD departed PCS on 7 June 1971, Oliver J. MANKUNAS assumed his responsibilities. MANKUNAS also took over agent meetings when FERNALD left on home leave on 25 June and will continue to handle the project assets in the future.

3. Processing of the photo product is now accomplished inside the Station by Phemia B. CHAUVEAU. KDFACTOR-1, who formerly did all the processing in an outside safehouse/darkroom, was terminated amicably in early March 1971, and at that time the responsibility was turned over to CHAUVEAU. The new arrangement has proven to be more than satisfactory. Agent meetings have now been cut to a minimum, and the processing of the product and delivery to the consumer has been speeded up considerably.

PERSONNEL

4. The project includes five salaried assets. KDFACTOR-2 operates the KDLITERAL base house and has been employed in this capacity since 1957. KDFACTOR-5 operates the KDABSINTHE base house

CONTINUED . . .

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - C/WHD
1 - C/SBD - 1 info copy to [illegible]

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-41,028

DATE
17 September 1971

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 50-6-74/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-41,028

with the assistance of his wife, KDFACTOR-6, and his two sons, KDFACTOR-8 and -9. KDFACTOR-5 has also served JKLANCE in this capacity since 1957.

PRODUCTION

5. KDLITERAL: During this reporting period, KDLITERAL, through KDFACTOR-2, continued to be the source of within-the-compound photographic coverage of PCS and TDY MHHARSHers. He produced 76 rolls of film and provided weekly written reports based on his daily visual observation of the target area.

6. KDABSINTHE: Operated by KDFACTOR-5, KDABSINTHE produced 167 rolls of film and continued to be the principal source for information on visitors to the MHHARSH installation, with special attention given to visits of "WOCORK-type" persons and political exiles. This segment of KDFACTOR also continued to be the main source of information on MHHARSH license plates and automobiles.

7. KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE both continue to provide detailed "attendance sheets" on all MHHARSH personnel. Without this combined coverage, it would be difficult to identify personnel assigned to the MHHARSH installation or to monitor their daily movements and activities.

SECURITY

8. There were no known problems of security relating to the project. The termination of KDFACTOR-1 should pose no security problem: Contact was broken amicably, and it is highly probable that he would be more than willing to help out again if his services are needed. Of the remaining assets, all five have been SGSWIRLED in the past. They derive a substantial portion of their livelihood from their JKLANCE employment and would thus lose a great deal if security factors ever necessitated a termination of their work for us. As an additional safeguard, the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE operations are compartmented from each other, and there has never been any indication that either segment of KDFACTOR knows of the other's existence.

9. Contact is maintained with only two of the five assets, KDFACTOR-2 and -5, both of whom are responsible for the operation of their respective base houses. Both KDFACTOR-2 and -5 are met weekly to obtain the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE product for timely processing and analysis by the Station. Meetings with KDFACTOR-2 are car pickups at periodically changed locations in the suburbs. Meetings with KDFACTOR-5 consist of car meetings early in the morning along his route of travel to his overt job. These meetings last only long enough to pick up the product, provide new supplies, and pay salaries, rents, utility bills, etc. Emergency Contact Plans are on file at the Station and have been forwarded to Headquarters on both KDFACTOR-2 and -5. KDFACTOR-6, -8, and -9 are members of KDFACTOR-5's immediate family and could be contacted through him using his emergency plan.

PROBLEMS

10. There were no known problems connected with the project during the reporting period.

FINANCES

11. The termination of KDFACTOR-1 and the subsequent elimination of outside photo processing costs accounts for the drop in anticipated project expenses shown below for FY 1972 and FY 1973.

SALARIES	FY 1972 (USD)	FY 1973 (USD)
KDFACTOR-2	5,280	5,808
KDFACTOR-5	1,728	1,901

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-41,028

SALARIES (con't)	FY-1972 (USD)	FY-1973 (USD)
KDFACTOR-6	2,112	2,323
KDFACTOR-8	768	845
KDFACTOR-9	1,968	2,165
	11,856	13,042
BASE-HOUSE RENT		
MEXI-03, UNIT #15	400	400
MEXI-132	3,550	3,840
	3,950	4,240
MISC. EXPENSES		
BASE-HOUSE UTILITIES	750	800
PROPERTY MAINTENANCE & REPLACEMENT	500	500
CHRISTMAS BONUSES	988	1,087
	2,238	2,387
TOTAL EXPENSES	18,044	19,669*

PLANS

12. No changes in the project are contemplated.

EVALUATION

13. The support provided by the KDFACTOR Project to the Station REDTOP Program is indispensable. We believe the project represents a professional collection effort being run securely and successfully against a sensitive target with a minimal expenditure of funds and case officer time.

*Reflects anticipated salary raises and higher rent on MEXI-132 based on projected cost of living increase over two year period.

Oliver J. Mankunas

Oliver J. MANKUNAS

50-6-74/3

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

file ops folder

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

ADMIN./FINANCE KDFACTOR/KDVAULT--FY 71 Safehouse Expenses

Reference: HMMT-11016, dated 16 July 1971

1. Headquarters has analyzed the KDFACTOR and KDVAULT project charges to Sub-Object Class 2353, as requested in reference. These projects have received credit for the rent refunds recorded on the vouchers mentioned in paragraph 5 of reference.

2. Attached, for the Station's information, is a breakdown of the expenses charged to these projects under S.O.C. 2353. These totals equal the total expense reported on the 30 June 1971 OSR. The Station will note that all expenses incurred in the operation and maintenance of the safehouses are included under this Sub-Object Class.

3. The Station's method of handling the MEXI-03 rent accounting is completely satisfactory to Headquarters.

Patrick W. MAYSTON

Distribution:
3-Chief of Station, Mexico City

Attachments:
As Stated Above

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-7316

DATE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATING

OFFICE
WH/B&F - C. Higgins - kh - 24 August 1971

EXT. 7763

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL | DATE | OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1 | 21-8-71 | L. Lacen for

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
- WH/B&F
- WH/REG
- WH/1

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM
SUBJECT KDFACTOR/KDVAULT- Expense Credit for KDABBEY Refunds of MEXI-03 Rents		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		

1. Upon reviewing Station's Obligation Status Reports from Headquarters, it has been noted that there apparently have been no credits entered for KDABBEY's net rent refunds on MEXI-03

2. MEXI-03 is owned by JKLANCE, with KDABBEY as the ostensible owner. Each month the Station gives the occupant of Units #11, 13, 15 and 17 of MEXI-03 their rent for the month in advance, which they then pay to KDABBEY's agent. Originally this agent was KDVAULT/2, who was witting of the rental arrangement and neither received nor paid rent on Unit #11, which he occupied. Since his termination in April 71, Unit #11 has been occupied by KDVAULT/9, who is not witting of the arrangement. The current occupancy and rent structure for MEXI-03 is:

UNIT #	OCCUPANT	MONTHLY RENTAL	PROJECT CHARGED
11	KDVAULT/9	1,700.00MN	KDVAULT
13	KDVAULT/3	1,650.00MN	KDVAULT
15	KDFACTOR/2	1,430.00MN	KDFACTOR
17	KDVAULT/5	1,540.00MN	KDVAULT

3. At the end of each quarter, KDABBEY submits to the Station an accounting recording the rents received on the four units of MEXI-03, and the expenses incurred for property taxes, rent receipt stamp taxes, municipal water charges, maintenance and repairs, and similar items during the quarter. The difference between the rents paid to and the expenses incurred by KDABBEY as ostensible owner of MEXI-03, is refunded to the Station by KDABBEY with the quarterly accounting.

.....continued

Distribution: Orig & 2 - Chief, WH Division

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT 11016	16 July 1971
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER

7

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT 11016

4. When monthly rents are paid to KDVAULT/3, 5 and 9 and KDFACTOR/2, they are expensed to the appropriate project and entered in a KDABBEY Memorandum Account. When KDABBEY's refund is received, it is recorded as a credit to expense pro-rated between KDVAULT and KDFACTOR, and the Memo Account is cleared.

5. The vouchers recording expense credits from KDABBEY rent refunds for FY 1971 (with one more refund to be made) are: Vou. 10634, 23 Oct 70 (July-Sept); Vou. 11023, 13 Jan 71 (Oct-Dec); and Vou. 11575, 19 May 71 (Jan-Apr).

6. It is requested that recording of these vouchers at Headquarters be reviewed, since Station's analysis of the Obligation Status Reports figures as of 31 May 1971 indicate that no such expense credit has been recorded for KDVAULT or KDFACTOR in S.O.C. 7352 or any other S.O.C. for Vou. 10634 and Vou. 11023, both of which should have shown up by the 31 May OSR.

7. If there is some particular reason why the KDABBEY refund of MEXI-03 rents has not been credited to expense, or if Headquarters wishes the Station to handle the MEXI-03 rent accounting in another manner, please advise.

Norris A. DESSIMOZ

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

S/C SPLIT

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID

LUNGER TED
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

GN-993
GA30
TUBE GT7

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/1		29 MAR 1971	29 MAR 1971	
2. DC		29 MAR 1971		
3. C/WH			29/3	
4. Wheeler				
5. Kravcov			7 APR 1971	K
6. WH/B+F				
7.				
8.				
9. WH/CONTRACTS	21 April	21 April	WSK
10.				
11.				
12. WH/1/[illegible]	24			
13.				
14. File				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COMMENTS

Copy Detached

note termination of KDFACTOR-1. Gives us $4,000 we can use someplace else.

We can use it [illegible]

4-5: How soon will this $ be available? Any extra terminat. expenses?

5-6: note termination + resulting savings.

5-9: FYI.

9-12 Thanks for the opportunity to review this as though security will be improved ~~and~~ as well as savings in time.

MICROFILMED
MAR 29 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
	INDEX	50-6-74/3

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 8 MAR 71

DOCUMENT NUMBER: HMMA 40227

87637

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MICROFILMED
MAR 29 1971
[illegible]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

3P

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
KDFACTOR/
Operational Report for the Period 1 October 1970 - 28 February 1971

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-39679, 28 October 1970 (Previous Operational Report)

GENERAL

1. The KDFACTOR Project continued throughout the period to support two visual and photographic surveillance points (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTH) directed against the MHHARSH installation and to support the related photo processing of the product.

2. The Station is presently taking steps to terminate KDFACTOR-1 the photo processor and move this phase of the operation into the Station.

3. Primary responsibility for the operational and administrative handling of Project KDFACTOR was transferred on 1 December 1970 to the Operational Support Section, and handling of the KDFACTOR personnel was turned over to Howard T. BAGAUS on 2 December 1970.

MEETING ARRANGEMENTS

4. KDFACTOR-5: This agent is met by BAGAUS at 0800 each Tuesday morning at one of four different sites near the Anillo Periferico in Polanco, some three miles from the Station. The modus operandi used with this agent is basically the same as previously used by Bruce H. FERNALD. All meetings are held in the case officer car, and after the meetings, KDFACTOR-5 resumes his trip to work.

Continued....

Attachments: (Split Transmission)
1. Right Side - H/W
2. Left Side - USC
3. IDENTITY - USC

S/C [illegible]
Dated 25 MAR [illegible]

Distribution:
- 2 - Chief, WHD, w/att
- 2 - Chief, SBD, w/att

[illegible]

1 ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-40227

DATE
8 March 1971

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3

5. KDFACTOR-2: He is met at 1630 every Tuesday by BAGAUS, in several new widely spaced sites. Modus operandi is basically the same as that described in the previous operational report for FERNALD, and after the meeting, KDFACTOR-2 proceeds to his cover job.

6. KDFACTOR-1: After meeting with KDFACTOR-2, BAGAUS drives via round-a-bout route to a location several blocks away from the KDFACTOR-1 medical office, where he leaves his car and walks to the office (taking counter-surveillance precautions on the way). BAGAUS, as FERNALD previously, uses the notional cover of either a pharmaceutical salesman for "Laboratorios del Norte" or that of a patient while waiting in the outer office. The waiting period normally depends upon whether KDFACTOR-1 is in at the time, or whether he is in the middle of an operation at the hospital. (Waiting periods vary from immediate admittance to the KDFACTOR-1 office to several hours). The average period is about twenty minutes. A decision was reached in the Station to terminate this asset and to transfer this phase of the operation to the Station itself, in the interest of speed, security, and cost. This termination is planned for early March 1971, at which time, the processing will be done in the Station.

SECURITY

7. There have been no known security problems during this reporting period.

PRODUCTION

8. KDLITERAL: During this reporting period, KDLITERAL through KDFACTOR-2 has again been the principal source of within-the-compound photographic coverage of PCS and TDY MHHARSHERs producing 129 rolls of film. During the period covered, a great change of PCS personnel at the MHHARSH installation took place, and KDLITERAL played a leading role in assisting the Station in identifying the new members of the installation, through not only photographic coverage, but through detailed visual reporting also. In addition to reporting on the activities of the different individuals in the target installation, KDLITERAL has also reported on significant construction changes in the compound such a recent change in the antenna configurations on the roof of the main building. During this period, KDLITERAL has been specifically targetted against AEJEFE, on whom which a special report has been submitted.

9. KDABSINTH: Operating through KDFACTOR-5, KDABSINTH produced 158 rolls of film. It provided the Station with information on visitors to the MHHARSH installation, giving special attention to visits of "WOCORK-type" persons. KDABSINTH continues to fulfill requirements from the various sections of the Station who have requested fixed surveillance of political exiles, etc., to determine if these individuals are in contact with the MHHARSH installation. This segment of KDFACTOR continues to be the main source of information on MHHARSH license plates and automobiles.

10. Both KDLITERAL and KDABSINTH continued to provide detailed "attendance sheets" on all MHHARSH personnel. In addition, they provided reports on the activities and associates of IDENTITY who was on TDY in Mexico from 15 October through 4 November 1970. During this period both units were also involved in surveilling the movements of an AEKICK technician, (201-838166) who periodically makes trips to other Latin American countries on short notice.

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

PLANS AND CHANGES

11. With the exception of the termination of KDFACTOR-1 (paras. 2 and 6) there are no further changes contemplated in this operation during the next reporting period. It is expected that the termination of KDFACTOR-1 will represent about $4,000 US in yearly savings for the operation, and that the previous two week photo

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-40227

processing backlog will be narrowed to a week at the longest.

Howard T. BAGAUS

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

50-6-74/3

11P

SECRET

USC ATT. #3 TO HMMA-40227, 8 MARCH 1971

IDENTITY - Viktor Nikitovich KRESOV, 201
AEKICK Office of the Executive
Action Department

MICROFILMED
MAR 29 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

SECRET

S/C ATT 1 to HMMA-40227

50-6-74/3

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN

NOV 4 12 PM '70
RECEIVED
RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

FROM:

RID.

RYAN, DONALD
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

ER-899
GA-50
TUBE GT-Z

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/1		12 Nov 1970		DRH
2. DC		13 NOV 1970		L
3. C/WH/1				C
4. Wheeler		18 NOV 1970		DW
5. Kravcov				K
6.				
7. SB/X/WH			8/12	DD
8.				
9. WH/1 Kravcov			8 DEC 1970	K
10.				
11. CI/OPS/WH			10 Dec 70	[illegible]
12.				
13. WH/1 Mexico				A
14. ~~WH/KCR~~	15 Dec	15 Dec	15 Dec	J
15.				
16.				
17. RID, FI				

COMMENTS

Copy Detached

How do you all feel about para. 12? (semi-annual program requirements)

5-7: Concur.

3-2 & 4. Semi-annual reporting OK with me. Pls check SB and see if they agree. R

4-5: Since you are the one to follow this, I'll leave the question of semi-annual reporting to you. On a project such as this, perhaps the rules might be bent just a bit. Pls check regs to see if quarterly reports are demanded (I think they may be). In any case, your answer should tell them o.k., but there should be sufficient other reporting to enable us to follow the project adequately. You should also check SB to see how they feel. — Concur - DD

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
50-6-74/3

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT ✓

INDEX

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
28 Oct 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HMMA 39679

124979

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION:
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, SB Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Project/Operational Report, 1 July - 30 September 1970

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HMMA-39188, 10 July 1970

B. HMMW-17950, 10 June 1970

OPERATIONS

1. The LIEMPTY Project continued throughout the period to support two visual and photographic surveillance points directed against the MHHARSH installation and to support the related photo processing of the product.

a. LICALLA is the designation of that portion of the Project that covers surveillance of the rear and garden area of the MHHARSH installation. It operates from one of the units (MEXI-03) of the LIMESA, Station-owned properties, and it includes only one agent: LIEMPTY-9.

b. LILYRIC is the designation of that portion of the Project covering surveillance of the front entrance of the MHHARSH installation. It includes LIEMPTY-13 as the key member of the basehouse team, supported by his wife, LIEMPTY-14, who is the main photographer, observer and log-keeper, and their two sons, LIEMPTY-26 and -27 who assist in photography, maintenance of arrival and departure logs on target personalities, and preparation

Continued......

Attachments: (Split Transmission)
1. Right-hand Side - h/w
2. Left-hand Side - USC
3. Middle - USC

[illegible]

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WHD, w/atts a/s
2 - Chief, SBD, w/atts a/s

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-39679	DATE 28 October 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

of the typewritten reports submitted to the Station. The basehouse (MEXI-132) is located near the front of the MHHARSH installation and it is owned by LIMOUSINE. (Contrary to Reference B Project Renewal, LIMOUSINE is the actual, not "ostensible", owner of this property. Please see HMMA-33814, 8 January 1968, for full details of the various property transfers, destruction and re-construction of buildings and re-locations of operations connected with the Project, past and present.).

c. Photo processing is accomplished by LIEMPTY-4 except in special cases when prints are required quickly and are processed within the Station. LIEMPTY-4 has a darkroom located in the rear of his medical office and he handles the work after normal office hours with patients.

2. Outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD handles the three key agents of the Project (LIEMPTY-9, -13, and -4). He meets with each once a week for passing requirements, paying agent and sub-agent salaries, rents and other expenses, providing supplies, and retrieving the product. Inside case officer Timothy M. ARCHBOLD handles the internal administration of the Project and is the Station contact with FERNALD.

MEETING ARRANGEMENTS

3. LIEMPTY-13: He is met by FERNALD in the early hours of Tuesday mornings at about 0730 in Polanco, an area far from the basehouse. LIEMPTY-13 parks his car and walks through a central park on Calle Horacio where he is intercepted within a ten-block distance by FERNALD, driving his car. During a drive together, instructions and product are passed between them and, once a month, LIEMPTY-13 is paid his salary and the salaries for LIEMPTY-14, -26 and -27. After drop-off LIEMPTY-13 returns to his car and proceeds to his full-time job, thus avoiding any direct route back to the basehouse operation.

4. LIEMPTY-9: After completing his surveillance workday from 0800 to 1500 hours, he completes his written reports and drives to meet FERNALD at around 1630 hours, also on Tuesdays. The location of car meetings varies but remains within a quiet, fairly secluded section. After leaving FERNALD, LIEMPTY-9 proceeds to his cover job at a brother's automobile dealership for the remainder of his day, again avoiding any direct route from FERNALD back to the basehouse.

5. LIEMPTY-4: After receiving the unprocessed take from LIEMPTY-9 and -13, FERNALD prepares instructions, as suggested by log entries that accompany the take, and goes to LIEMPTY-4's medical office waiting room in the late afternoon. For these meetings, FERNALD appears to be a pharmaceutical salesman or a patient and gets to see LIEMPTY-4 only after all other visitors have departed. At each meeting, FERNALD delivers films from both LICALLA and LILYRIC for processing and retrieves the processed take that he had left the week before. While this arrangement means that some of the product (those photos taken soon after meeting with LIEMPTY-9 and -13) are almost two weeks old when received at the Station, we have not found this to be unacceptable. When speed is of the essence in special circumstances, the Station WOACRE technician can handle the processing.

SECURITY

6. With the exception of the potential problems connected with the Raymond H. GERENDE/LIEMPTY-19 divorce, of which Headquarters is aware, there are no known problems of security connected with this Project.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-39679

ASSIGNMENTS/PRODUCTION

7. During the period of this report, LIEMPTY-4 processed approximately 142 rolls of 36-exposure film. Roughly one-third comes from LICALLA and the remainder from LILYRIC which commands the better view and more trafficked approach. In addition to this routine workload, LIEMPTY-4 was called upon frequently for additional prints and enlargement of special targets of interest.

8. LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA), in addition to his picture-taking (perched for seven hours daily atop a ladder arrangement to see above the heightened garden wall), regularly provides a detailed "attendance sheet" and a monthly summary of MHHARSH personnel activities. The photos are an indispensible tool in the day-to-day REDTOP operations program, providing photo identifications of PCS and TDY MHHARSHers and assisting to determine probable RIS affiliation based on observed associations within the compound. The detailed "attendance sheet" helps in keeping track of MHHARSHers present, their patterns and changes in pattern of activities. This information is often the principal tool in PBRAMPART activities, assisting in identifying the probable MHHARSH contacts of double agents despatched to the MHHARSH installation.

9. Following are some sample requirements which were levied on LIEMPTY-9 during the reporting period:

a. weekly reports of work being done at the installation by YERSHOV and PANOV (DIRECTOR 025386), TDY construction workers since May 1970.

b. special reports on the activities of AEMERGER who was under the microscope prior to home leave departure in July 1970.

c. reports on the activities and associations of Mikhail Vasilyevich UMNOV (201-819913), TDY AMTORG representative from New York who is of JKLANCE and LNERGO interest.

d. watch for the arrival of Viktor Nikitovich KRESOV, AEKICK officer of Executive Action Department.

e. confirm arrival and provide details of activities and associations of Subject of 201-866272 (Moble ANGUS), LNERGO/LNREAD double agent.

f. special report on AETURNKEY throughout the period. (LIEMPTY-9 is given a target for concentrated coverage and reporting over a two or three month period at a time.)

10. LILYRIC was provided with the same requirements as LICALLA (paragraph 9 a-e, above). LILYRIC is the main source of license plate and automobile information both on MHHARSHers and on visitors to the installation, and has a standing requirement to report by phone the arrivals of all obviously WOCORK citizens. One such individual, who now visits regularly, has been tentatively identified as the language instructor of the MHHARSH Ambassador's son and a potential lead which we will investigate.

CHANGES

11. Effective 1 July 1970, all of the agents of the Project received salary increases (HMMA-39548, 10 October 1970) for a net increase of $2,184.00 U/S/D per year.

12. Unless Headquarters believes that quarterly reports of operations are essential for an understanding of the functioning

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-39639

of the Project, the Station proposes to report semi-annually hereafter, on 31 October and 30 April, including sufficient financial and other data in April to assist in preparing project renewals. The value of the Project for both REDTOP and other Station operations has been well documented over a long period of time. There have been no recent additions or changes in either personnel or basehouse properties and none is contemplated. Any significant events which might affect the Project's operation, such as the GERENDE divorce, will, of course, be reported separately.

13. The basic operation of the Project remains the same with only spot requirements in support of specific objectives changing from time to time.

Timothy M. Archbold
Timothy M. ARCHBOLD

HMMA-39188

LEFT SIDE H/W

RIGHT SIDE U/S/C

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division	XXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, SB Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT

LIEMPTY Project Operational Report, 26 March - 30 June 1970

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HMMA-38700, 25 March 1970
B. HMMW-17950, 12 June 1970

1. With the termination of Raymond H. GERENDE, effected on 26 June 1970 and described in HMMA-39129, 29 June 1970, the LIEMPTY Project now consists of the operations of the LICALLA and LILYRIC photo base houses and the photo processing of LIEMPTY-4. Outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD handles all agents, normally on a once per week basis, and passes the take to his Station contact. Operational funds are passed to FERNALD by his Station contact, and FERNALD pays all agent salaries, rents, and other expenses. The elimination of GERENDE has resulted in some loss of efficiency, since base house personnel cannot regularly be met as frequently as in the past. This can mean a delay of up to two weeks in receipt by the Station of photos. However, LILYRIC and LICALLA personnel have standing requirements to report by telephone visits of Americans, and they are also alerted in advance whenever possible to forthcoming TDYs of MHHARSH visitors, so that arrangements can be made for special meetings and speedy processing of photos. Normally, all photos are developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4. When speed is of the essence, however, negatives are sent into the Station for processing by the WOACRE technician. Thus, while GERENDE's loss is a serious one in certain respects (he was, on the local scene, talented, knowledgeable, and experienced), LIEMPTY production has not suffered greatly.

Attachment:
1. Left side h/w
2. Right Side u/s/c

received by KIDIAN on 23 July 70

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION

CS COPY

Distribution:
② 1 - C/WH w/left side h/w and right side u/s/c
1 - C/SB w/left side h/w and right side u/s/c

Copy sent to SB/X/WH

LIEMPTY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-39188	DATE 10 July 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓5- 74/3

2. As far as the security problem is concerned, the generous termination settlement awarded to GERENDE has probably removed whatever small temptation there may have been on his part to be indiscreet about his former association. Although GERENDE has certain character weaknesses which emerged as a lack of dedication and a feeling that he could get by with as little work as possible, the Station believes that he is basically not an irresponsible person, and that he realizes not only that he has an obligation to respect security, but that he also realizes that he has been treated fairly and with great patience. He has offered his services for the future, and he was told that we appreciated the offer and did not want to lose complete touch with him, but for now he should devote himself to getting a good job.

3. As for GERENDE's wife, LIEMPTY-19, she also appeared to be grateful for the termination bonus which she had been granted (and which she was told had not been carved out of what was due GERENDE). On the other hand, she has less reason to be loyal to JKLANCE, and her mental stability is somewhat open to question. Therefore, she poses a greater threat to LIEMPTY security than does GERENDE. At the same time, she knows much less about Station operations and personnel than does GERENDE. Furthermore, it is not likely that she would (a la Mrs. LIROCKET-1) go directly to the MHHARSHers with her information. What she might do is reveal to her lawyer that GERENDE had worked for LNPURE and therefore had income to which she might feel that she is entitled. Since GERENDE is no longer employed and therefore no longer has regular income (except for monthly payments of the termination bonus, which she has agreed in writing not to claim), this threat has also been lessened. Theoretically, however, she could expose LIEMPTY and LIFEAT techniques (since she has been a LIFEAT transcriber), but she could not, as far as we know, expose any currently employed agents, with the exception of LIEMPTY-4, who is married to GERENDE's sister. (None of the above assessment of the possible security threat posed by LIEMPTY-19 is changed by her 8 July visit to JKLANCE Headquarters.)

4. There have been no changes in the functioning or activities of the LICALLA base house. In addition to the routine photos, "attendance reports," and special concentration on the activities of various individuals (most recently AETURNKEY), LIEMPTY-9 responded to a number of spot requests. For instance, it was LICALLA coverage which was instrumental in helping to identify the AEGRIP officer who came to Mexico City to meet an LNREAD agent (see MEXICO CITY 2820, 30 March 1970) and to establish that the TDYer spent most of his time in the company of other AEGRIP officers. Also, when the AEKICK inspectors finally arrived early in April, LIEMPTY-9 was able to establish that their principal "escort officer" appeared to be AETURNKEY. LIEMPTY-9 was also alerted to watch for the arrival of the subject of DIRECTOR 042120, 12 June 1970 (and has not, as of this writing, seen any sign of him). Perhaps the most useful contribution during the reporting period was the updating of a sketch of the back of the MHHARSH Embassy, identifying the persons he most often sees at each window. Used in conjunction with the AEMIDRIFF debriefing (and her knowledge of the inside), this helped us come up with as accurate a view as we have ever had of the location of various offices and officers within the MHHARSH Embassy.

5. There have also been no changes in the functions or activities of the LILYRIC base house personnel. Photos and logs of daily comings and goings were routinely furnished. The logs once again proved their value by indicating that the subject of MEXICO CITY 3389, 8 June 1970, was probably lying when he said that he had meetings with AETURNKEY at certain times on certain dates.

50-6-74/3

The logs showed that AETURNKEY might have made the first meeting, but would certainly have been late for it. For the alleged second meeting, however, the log showed that AETURNKEY was in the MHHARSH Embassy for the entire period of the meeting (subject of MEXICO CITY 3389 later amended his story to say that AETURNKEY had not made the second meeting). LILYRIC personnel were quick to spot the subject of MEXICO CITY 3542, 25 June 1970, making visits to the MHHARSH Embassy, and reported these visits by phone even before the Station had learned, from LIENVOY, of this person's telephone call. Several other visitors of apparent WOLADY nationality were also routinely reported to local LNERGO, along with a request for license plate resolution if a WOLADY license plate is spotted. Late in June, LILYRIC was alerted to report the possible visit of a person who had made a phone call to 201-087316, offering the latter some "interesting information." LILYRIC spotted and photographed a person who may be identical with the caller, and attempts are now under way to resolve this.

6. LIEMPTY-4 continues to handle all photo developing and printing (except when certain prints are needed quickly), and in spite of his leg injury, from which he is now recovered, he did not miss any deadlines. The fact that GERENDE has been terminated is not expected to affect his relationship with the Station, even though he is married to one of GERENDE's sisters. FERNALD has established good rapport with him, and he has stated that GERENDE's problems are not his and will have no effect on his association.

7. The above recital of LILYRIC and LICALLA activities would seem to indicate a heavy CI emphasis. Actually, this is not the case. While CI is an important by-product, not only for ourselves but also in support of walk-in operations run by other agencies, the day-in day-out bread and butter photo and fixed surveillance information is of great importance to our positive operations. The data base which has been built up and maintained by LIEMPTY facilities, along with the services of LIENVOY, LIFEAT, and LIEMBRACE, give the Station an impressive support apparatus which is vital to our program.

8. With respect to the approved project renewal forwarded with Reference B, we have the following comments:

a. Through an oversight, we neglected to report in Reference A that LILYRIC base house rent was raised as of 1 January 1970 to an annual rate of $3,360.00 (USD).

b. LICALLA base house rent was raised, effective 1 July 1970, to an annual rate of $1,373.00 (USD). (Reference B shows that this figure has already been requested for FY 1971.)

c. As indicated in Reference A, salary increases for all remaining LIEMPTY personnel will probably be recommended in the near future.

d. The GERENDE dark room rent (MEXI 137) is now being paid to LIEMPTY-4. Pending the completion of GERENDE's new house the lab work was being done temporarily in LIEMPTY-4's office. With the suspension, and now the termination of GERENDE, it became necessary to make this a permanent arrangement, and the Station felt it only fair to pay LIEMPTY-4 this fee ($80.00 USD per month), not only for the use of his space but also for increased water and electric bills (particularly the latter) resulting from his having to develop, print, and dry the photos. GERENDE was paid through December 1969, and in June 1970 LIEMPTY-4 was paid retroactively for the period 1 January to 30 June 1970. It is planned to continue the monthly payments, so this item should be restored in the next project renewal request.

e. Regarding vehicles, MV 2947 (not MV 2823) was sold in FY 1970. MV 2823 is the LIENTRAP vehicle, and is still in use. It is, however, used in the LIEMBRACE Project and the maintenance expenses ought to be charged to LIEMBRACE, just as are the salaries of LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, who operate the LIENTRAP vehicle.

9. The changes noted above do not involve large amounts of money, and are also to some extent offsetting. Therefore, it is not likely that these changes will require additional funds for FY 1971 over the amount approved.

10. As requested in Reference B, following are emergency commo plans as worked out by FERNALD:

a. LIEMPTY-4: Spanish should be used when talking to his secretary; Spanish should also be used, preferably, when talking to LIEMPTY-4. In view of his profession and the uncertainty of his working schedule, the person making the contact should go unannounced to his medical office at Carlos B. Zetina 73 between 1700 and 1830 hours. In the waiting room there is a secretary and the caller should tell her that he was referred by "Sr. Victor de los Laboratorios del Norte" and wants to see the doctor. When admitted, the officer should tell LIEMPTY-4 that he is certain the doctor remembers Sr. Victor. LIEMPTY-4 will answer affirmatively. For positive identification, the officer will show the last salary receipt signed by LIEMPTY-4. LIEMPTY-4 needs no positive identification, because his diplomas with pictures are exposed in visible places in the waiting room.

b. LICALLA (LIEMPTY-9): Spanish only should be used. After 1630 hours but before 1800 hours, phone to his place of cover business (phones: 6-56-15-44 through 48) and ask for LIEMPTY-9. Caller should identify himself as a friend of Victor and state his own interest in having some property insured through him. Add that the caller would like to discuss the matter with him over a cup of coffee. Arrange date and time (about 1700 hours) of meeting. Prearranged place: Woolworth Store at Reforma, near the Reforma Hotel, in the hardware and tools department. LIEMPTY-9 will have a briefcase (or attache case) and a rolled up newspaper in the same hand.

PASSWORD: Officer: Please, where can I get a tape measure calibrated in inches? I need it for my Club.

LIEMPTY-9: You should have no problem in finding one.

For positive identification the officer will show last salary receipt signed by LIEMPTY-9. LIEMPTY-9 will pull out of his briefcase a Monterrey Insurance Co. application form with his name written in the upper right corner. The first and third Tuesday of each month LIEMPTY-9 will be walking in front of SEPS-Paris Restaurant, on the Insurgentes side, from 1620 to 1630 hours, with his briefcase as stated above. Password and identification are as stated above.

c. LILYRIC (LIEMPTY-13): Spanish only should be used. Phone his place of work (5-20-60-20, ext 367), his secretary usually answers, and ask LIEMPTY-13 if he received the present his friend Victor sent him, because Victor has not heard from him for some time. LIEMPTY-13 will answer negatively re the present. The caller will request a meeting with LIEMPTY-13 because he wants to be able to tell Victor how his friend the Ingeniero was. Arrange date and time of meeting. Place is prearranged: in the Koala Restaurant-Cafeteria at the corner of Ejercito Nacional and Moliere (Gigante Super Market parking lot). LIEMPTY-13 will be sitting (or standing) in

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-39188

the waiting area holding a medium sized manila envelope in one hand and two addressed but unsealed airmail envelopes in the other.

PASSWORD: Officer: Can I catch a bus for Santa Monica here?

LIEMPTY-13: I am not very sure, but I will ask somebody.

For positive identification, the officer will show last salary receipt signed by LIEMPTY-13. LIEMPTY-13 will show a folded box of Colgate tooth paste. On the second and fourth Thursday of each month, LIEMPTY-13 will be walking in front of the above-mentioned Koala Restaurant-Cafeteria, on the Ejercito side, from 1330 to 1340 hours. As a recognition signal he will hold the three envelopes as described above, except that if it is ~~raining,~~ he will have all envelopes in one hand but arranged so that the two airmail envelopes will be easily visible. Password and identification are as stated above.

Vincent P. Rizzuto

Vincent P. RIZZUTO

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

50-6-74/3

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT: SB 8

INFO: FILE, VR WH 8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2,

ACTION NO.: 549

S E C R E T 162216Z APR 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2984

DIRECTOR

16 APR 70 IN 064392

REDTOP AETARGET AEKICK

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 025386

B. MEXICO CITY 2962 (IN 063471)

1. ACCORDING TO LILYRIC AND LICALLA, LOCALLY HIRED PAINTERS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED AT MHHARSH INSTALLATION SINCE MONDAY 13 APRIL, PAINTING MAIN BUILDING. THERE HAS BEEN NO DELIVERY OF MATERIALS SUCH AS DESCIBED PARA 4 REF A.

2. FILE 201-854249. GP-1

S E C R E T

File: [illegible]/ops

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

	PROCESSING ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Progress Report 1 November 1969 - 25 March 1970

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-38119, 18 November 1969 P R I O R I T Y

SUMMARY

1. The LIEMPTY Project has thus far survived the absence from duty of its principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE, as well as the threat to the security of the Project represented by GERENDE's marital problems. Bruce H. FERNALD has been handling all Project personnel since early December 1969, when GERENDE was deactivated and placed on half-pay. No problems have resulted from this, other than a delay in the receipt of photos (FERNALD is unable to meet LIEMPTY personnel as frequently as GERENDE was). The security threat will remain as long as GERENDE's estranged wife has it within her power to expose GERENDE's RVROCK connection and the type of work he was engaged in. She has continually promised not to do this, and thus far she has kept her word.

2. The LIEMPTY product continues to be a valuable one for the Station. It continues to play an important CI role (particularly for LNERGO and LNREAD) but its greatest value, as far as the Station is concerned, is in the positive field. Two recent examples underline this: The early (and thus far only) debriefing of AEMIDRIFF was accomplished almost exclusively by showing her photos of all MHHARSH Embassy personnel and getting from her a character sketch on each individual. These photos were all obtained by LILYRIC and LICALLA. Secondly, LIEMPTY observations (as opposed to

Attachment:
Reports u/s/c

Distbituion:
(2) - C/WH w/att u/s/c
1 - C/SB w/att u/s/c

LIEMPTY/605

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-38700	25 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

photos) played an important role in our total coverage of AESEASICK during the recent operational activity undertaken against AESEASICK. In short, LIEMPTY remains a highly effective and highly useful support asset, whose product is obtained in order to be used operationally, not simply collected for the files.

GERENDE

3. The GERENDE problem is unquestionably a serious one. We are forwarding under separate cover copies of several memoranda prepared by GERENDE. One outlines the history of his marital problems, another describes the current legal situation, and a third outlines proposals for a settlement. There is no hope of reconciliation. The Station's position with GERENDE from the start has been that he must agree to an amicable settlement with his wife in order to insure that she would not feel forced to take steps which would jeopardize the security of Station operations. For this reason, the Station insisted from the beginning that any financial settlement with his wife would have to take into account the fact that he was receiving a certain salary from RVROCK, and that he could not fairly keep this salary out of the settlement on the grounds that his wife could make no legal claim to that salary. GERENDE's wife was made aware of our position on this, and she was grateful, even though she realized that this arrangement was strictly informal. The Station felt that GERENDE could not be allowed to use his RVROCK salary as a weapon in the dispute with his wife, because if he did, she could hardly be expected to refrain from exposing his connections. Indeed, events have shown that GERENDE's wife is a vindictive woman, and if it had not been clear to her that she, as well as GERENDE, would lose money if he loses his job, she might have blown the whistle long ago. GERENDE, for his part, would have preferred to keep his RVROCK salary entirely out of the picture. Eventually, however, he agreed that the Station position was fair, and he said he would conform.

4. The attached memoranda from GERENDE are, in the Station's opinion, basically fair accounts. In the beginning, the Station was inclined to give GERENDE's wife (LIEMPTY-19) the benefit of the doubt, largely because her description of GERENDE's character weaknesses came as no surprise (particularly his tendency to procrastinate, even when his marriage was at stake). Early in the conflict, LIEMPTY-19 contacted RIZZUTO and asked point blank what she could tell her lawyer about GERENDE's salary. She was told she could not mention the RVROCK portion under any circumstances, and that if she told anyone that GERENDE had any connection with LNPURE, the connection would be denied and GERENDE would be terminated. She appeared to accept this gracefully, even though it meant she would have to scale her support demands down to the level of GERENDE's overt income (GERENDE's monthly salary from RVROCK was over 7,000 pesos; he earned an additional 4 to 5,000 pesos teaching English, and he has since rented their house, for which he is receiving slightly less than 7,000 pesos monthly). Subsequently, LIEMPTY-19 was told that the Station would see to it that as long as GERENDE continued to receive an RVROCK salary, he would give her the same proportion of this salary that the courts determined should be paid from his overt income. This, of course, was strictly an informal arrangement, one which would stop the minute GERENDE stopped receiving a salary. Later, as LIEMPTY-19's position hardened and her vindictiveness began to rule her actions, LIEMPTY-19 was reminded by the Station that the longer it took for an amicable solution to be reached, the greater was the chance that GERENDE would lose his job. If she persisted in having him arrested (which she succeeded in doing twice), his job would be jeopardized. While she continued to repeat sweetly that she had no intention of causing his termination, and had never breathed a word to a soul about his RVROCK affiliation, her attitude was in fact jeopardizing his job and if he lost his job, she and the children, as well as GERENDE, would lose income. Her attitude is

doubly disappointing in view of the fact that as she became more and more unreasonable, GERENDE was moving in the other direction.

5. The outcome can still not be predicted. As can be seen from GERENDE's memos, the two sides are still far apart on a number of points, including specifically money. LIEMPTY-19 insists on 10,000 pesos per month. GERENDE is willing to pay 5,000. GERENDE is currently on half-pay, which means that his total (all source) monthly income is around 14,000 pesos. From this, he would not only have to pay the amount which is finally agreed upon, he must also continue payments of 2500 pesos per month to LIEMPTY-19's father (paying off a loan obtained to build their house). The complicating factor is the uncertainly of GERENDE's future with RVROCK. The Station has maintained for some time that it is impossible to continue to pay GERENDE his full salary solely torun the LICALLA and LILYRIC basehouses. Now that FERNALD has absorbed this duty with only small inconvenience and some loss of timeliness, it makes even less sense to put GERENDE to work only to do this. GERENDE has long been aware of the Station's thinking in this regard, and prior to the current personal crisis he had been told that he would have to work harder at a greater variety of tasks in order to retain his position. As Headquarters is aware, he had been given additional tasks, and, as reported in reference, he had begun to respond very well. There has never been any question of GERENDE's ability. As we have previously stated, he is personable, intelligent, bilingual and binational, and has had good training and experience in certain fields. On the other hand, there has long been doubt about his seriousness of purpose, his initiative, and his ambition. The "reversal of roles" which he describes in one of the attached memos, which took place when he was confined to his home as an LP keeper, did more than cause domestic problems -- it apparently deprived him of the discipline of a daily job. His well-deserved reputation for being lazy was earned years ago.

6. The question which must be answered is whether or not to terminate GERENDE. He can be useful to the Station, but the Station has learned to get along without him. What are the security hazards involved? The general range of his knowledge is described in paragraph 5 of reference. If all of this were blown, the loss to the Station, particularly in terms of support operations against the MHHARSH target, would be considerable. The Station does not believe that GERENDE would deliberately expose any of this, but it is impossible to predict what LIEMPTY-19 might do, particularly since she would feel that she had nothing to lose, having already lost a possible source of income through the termination. GERENDE's termination bonus would probably be in the neighborhood of ten thousand dollars. Presumably LIEMPTY-19 is aware of the fact that he would get such a bonus, although the Station has never discussed this with her and the possible division of such a bonus between the two of them has never been mentioned.

LICALLA

7. The LICALLA basehouse continues to function without changes, except for the fact that Bruce H. FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-9 since 9 December 1969. Brief meetings with LIEMPTY-9 are held once a week at pre-arranged times and places (well away from the MHHARSH area). Occasionally special meetings are called, by phone, by FERNALD, if special coverage is desired (as in the AESEASICK case, for example). There have been no problems, operational or personal, involving the basehouse or LIEMPTY-9 during the reporting period. LIEMPTY-9 provided 1,728 photographs during the reporting period, and in addition to his regular reporting on observed activities of MHHARSH personnel, he provided special coverage as requested. This "special coverage" consists of his observations of a selected individual -- who does he spend his time with, how is he behaving, when was he present (or absent), etc. LIEMPTY-9 spends over 40

hours a week just watching (and photographing) MHHARSH personnel, and over the years he has gottento know them, and their habits, very well. He can spot unusual or atypical behavior, and when he is asked to put a certain individual under close scrutiny, his comments can be very useful. Newcomers, no matter what their cover, will frequently gravitate to their IS colleagues in the "safety" of the MHHARSH back yard, thereby enabling us to make tentative AEKICK or AEGRIP identifications. TDYers can often be linked up with their internal escort officers. In the case of specific targets, LICALLA special coverage can sometimes give clues to personal relationships which can be exploited. During the reporting period we had special coverage on AESEASICK (to determine any changes in pattern following the AEMIDRIFF defection and following the operation against him -- and in both cases LICALLA did report some change in pattern); 201-305870 (for much the same reason, although here the evidence was not as clear); AEPOLYP (to gather information on his patterns and his associations); AETAKEOFF (for the same reason); and 201-838166 (to find out if he did, in fact work in the "restricted area" and who his associates were, a requirement which was quickly satisfied). Also, LICALLA has been asked to report on the arrival and activities of TDYers such as the AEKICK security inspectors (he is not, of course, told that "security inspectors" are expected -- he is told of the expected arrival of visitors, and he can spot a visitor or newcomer immediately), the possible arrival of 201-314616 and, currently, to attempt to identify, at least by association, the person who went out to meet an LNREAD agent (subject of MEXICO CITY 2741, 17 March 1970). The value of LICALLA to the REDTOP program in Mexico City can scarcely be overstated.

LILYRIC

8. There have been no changes during the reporting period of the operation of the LILYRIC basehouse activity, except that Bruce H. FERNALD took over the handling of the LILYRIC personnel from GERENDE in early December. FERNALD normally meets only LIEMPTY-13, at pre-arranged sites and times (also well away from the MHHARSH area), once a week for pick-up of the films and reports. He occasionally meets LIEMPTY-14 (LIEMPTY-13's wife) when LIEMPTY-13 may be out of town. The LILYRIC coverage is a family enterprise with the work equally divided among LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27, who split up the hours of duty so that there is uninterrupted coverage Mondays through Fridays from 0800 to 1800 hours, and 0800 to 1500 hours Saturdays. (Extra-hour or week-end coverage may be requested as necessary, and the LILYRIC personnel responded to the Station request for such extra coverage during the AEMIDRIFF and AESEASICK cases.) The family has continued to provide reports during the reporting period on all activity centered on the front entrance of the MHHARSH Embassy. Such coverage included, as in the past, daily logs on the comings and goings of MHHARSH officials, up-to-date recording of MHHARSH license numbers, special activities and visitors (particularly Americans, of whom five were spotted and reported on during the reporting period), and some 3,500 photographs. As an example of the value of LILYRIC coverage, within one week of the change of license plates at the MHHARSH Embassy (a biannual change affecting all of Mexico, with new numbers bearing no relation to the old), LILYRIC had provided a complete list of the new numbers (along with the cars to which the plates are assigned). Among other things, this enabled the Station to identify AESEASICK's companions during his last few days in Mexico. Without LILYRIC, identification of the new license plates would have taken months and would have handicapped our operations. LILYRIC has also provided special coverage of the visit of a Latin American CP representative, and is currently watching for the two AEKICK security technicians, 201-314616, and the man who went to meet the LNREAD agent. Also, LILYRIC has reported on visits of Mexican students and the identity of the MHHARSH representatives who deal with them or hand out literature to them. In short, LILYRIC's services, even though the

MHHARSHers undoubtedly assume we have a LILYRIC-like facility, and act accordingly, are another vital element of the REDTOP program.

LIEMPTY-4

9. LIEMPTY-4 has continued to develop and to print all of the LICALLA and LILYRIC photographs. He has been met regularly by Bruce H. FERNALD (taking over for GERENDE) since 26 November 1969. The first few meetings at that time (late November and early December) were arranged by FERNALD by telephone to LIEMPTY-4 and primarily concerned LIEMPTY-4's reports on GERENDE's family problems and related security arrangements. Since mid-December, LIEMPTY-4 resumed a regular schedule (usually weekly) of meetings at pre-arranged sites and times. LIEMPTY-4 has been given a special extension in the Station to which he may call as "Dr. Carlos" to leave a message for "Victor" (FERNALD). FERNALD can change meeting plans by directly calling LIEMPTY-4. The only personal problem directly involving LIEMPTY-4 was surgery on his knee which required his wearing a full cast on his leg for over six weeks. During this period when LIEMPTY-4 has been unable to drive, FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-4, for the exchange of LICALLA/LILYRIC films and prints, at LIEMPTY-4's office, under a suitable pretext and with appropriate security precautions. LIEMPTY-4's services are invaluable since the Station could not, on a continuing basis, process the LIEMPTY material in its own photo lab.

SECURITY

10. Other than the security problems inherent in GERENDE's personal problems, there have been no security problems during the reporting period.

FUTURE PLANS

11. As for GERENDE, the Station has reached the conclusion that he must be terminated. This is not an easy decision to make, nor will it be easy to confront GERENDE with this decision. He has, after all, devoted 15 years of his life to RVROCK. However, as noted above, in spite of his talents the Station has been able to get along without his services. Furthermore, the constant security risk posed by his wife is, frankly, an unacceptable risk. To try to mollify her by promising her a portion of his salary is probably unworkable in realistic terms, particularly since her attitude has progressively hardened. The Station, therefore, intends to terminate GERENDE prior to the end of FY 1970. GERENDE's contract calls for a termination bonus of one month's salary per full year. This would come to $8,750 (USD). For various reasons, including the need to preserve the security of the operation by ensuring that the termination is amicable, it will probably be necessary, as stated in paragraph 6, to give GERENDE about $10,000 (USD). Furthermore, it will be necessary to inform LIEMPTY-19 of the termination, and, to keep her from revealing what she knows, she will undoubtedly have to be given some money herself. The Station does not believe that it would be equitable or sound from a security point of view to use the money which GERENDE himself has earned for this purpose. Therefore, while the figure will remain negotiable, the Station believes that the sum of $2,500 (USD) would be a reasonable amount. Total obligations for FY 1970 in the LIEMPTY Project are currently estimated at slightly less than $33,000 (USD). The Project has been approved in the amount of $38,970 (USD) leaving unobligated approximately $6,000 (USD). It is therefore requested that the LIEMPTY Project be amended for FY 1970 to provide an additional $8,000 (USD) to be used in the GERENDE termination. Funds will be available at the Station.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-38700

12. Regarding the project renewal for FY 1971, as far as LICALLA, LILYRIC, and LIEMPTY-4 are concerned, no changes in procedure are planned. The product is useful, it is as timely as present circumstances permit, and the personnel involved are doing their jobs well. The only change foreseen is an increase in salary for some, if not all, of these agents. The most recent salary increases took effect in May 1968. LIEMPTY-4 has not had an increase since January 1967, and LIEMPTY-13 since January 1964. Increase in cost of living alone would be sufficient justification to raise salaries, but in the case of these agents their consistently excellent work deserves to be rewarded. These salary increases will probably range between 10 and 20 percent.

13. As for other project expenses, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 will no longer be funded under LIEMPTY, but have been transferred to LIEMBRACE effective 1 July 1970. Real estate expenses should remain fairly constant, with perhaps a slight allowance for inflation. The rent on GERENDE's dark room (MEXI 137) will no longer be paid with his termination. MV-2823 will be sold or otherwise disposed of and should not be included in the project for FY 1971. Equipment and operational expenses should remain constant.

Vincent P. Rizzuto
for/John A. PROBERT

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 6

50-6-74/3

SECRET

16 March 1970

TO : Case Officer and Chief of Station

FROM : GERENDE

SUBJECT: GERENDE Background and Status Report of Present Marital Conflict

1. While this is not intended to be a full exposition of my personal and private life over recent years, I would like to make known some of the factors that have, from my point of view, led up to the present situation.

2. I realize that the interests of the organization and the interest of the individuals who may have opportunity to come in contact with my case dictate as little personal involvement as possible in the lives of agents. Indeed, the requirements of security, compartmentation and efficiency prescribe the modus operandi and, to a great extent the modus vivendi, of agency personnel not only in the sense of earning a living but also in manner of living. Ideally, the less said about an agent's private life, the better, but, as the years go by, changes may occur which go unreported or unnoticed and which may bring about unexpected events and repercussions. When a person has been working for the Station, as I have, for fifteen years with little or no personnel handling problems, no security flaps, no obvious problems on the job, and something comes up like the abrupt separation of my wife (LIEMPTY-19) and me with the personal and potential security risks it has entailed, I feel that some explanation is necessary. Should it be in order, I would like this explanation to reach not only my present case officer and Chief of Station but also the former Chief and officers with whom I have had the privilege to work over the years.

3. I would like to give thanks, in advance, for the patience and understanding that have been shown me thus far. Whatever the final outcome, I know that people have been bending over backward to be helpful and patient in hopes of an early solution to the conflict.

4. Back in September 1959, shortly after our wedding in late 1958, my wife and baby girl, were moved, by the agency, into a

Sec Att 1 To HMMA-38700

SECRET

50-6-74/3

spacious, carpeted, furnished apartment near the DIZTAG Embassy, which served intermittently as a listening post-basehouse for the agency. At the time, LIEMPTY-19 was working as the manager of the bookstore at the University of the Americas and, at the same time, studying for a B.A. in philosophy. Those were happy times. We received a two-month leave, went to Europe, the Rome Olympics and visited LIEMPTY-19's family in Holland. Back in Mexico, when the base was in operation I stayed home a lot (one of the requirements), minded the dial and tape recorders and the baby -- an unfortunate reversal of marital roles. After exactly five years the basehouse was closed down and we lost rent, LIEMPTY-19's salary and my mother's salary which she had been receiving as part-time basehouse keeper. My mother and youngest sister gave considerable help in taking care of the baby while LIEMPTY-19 worked and when we went to Europe and left the baby with them. This was during the first three years at the base until we had our second child, Christopher.

5. We moved to a small apartment in Lomas and, to supplement the loss of salary and rent allowance, the Station began paying 1,000 pesos a month for the use of a dark room I had built on the roof of the building. We had our third child, Madeleine, unplanned, two months after settling in the two-bedroom apartment. The apartment need not have been so small but we had chosen it for its location and style and because it was to be a temporary stop until we could find something better. We missed going to the Olympics in Tokyo which we had planned to do (1964) and instead began negotiating to buy a home building site at Rio Escondido but when the deal fell through, we decided to go on leave to Europe again, this time with the two older children, leaving the baby with my sister. We visited with LIEMPTY-19's parents in Holland (they had moved back to Holland after having lived in Washington, D.C., since 1943) and the two children stayed with them while LIEMPTY-19 and I made side trips. Traveling is LIEMPTY-19's greatest love in life. Upon our return to Mexico (I came back two weeks earlier), LIEMPTY-19 was so depressed at leaving Europe and being back in Mexico she was emotionally and physically inaccessible for about six weeks. She had not fully adjusted to living in Mexico or to settling down and becoming a housewife. Our cramped quarters, way of living, lack of money, my job, my irregular hours and habits, my Friday night poker games, the three children, all these got her down.

6. In the fall of 1965 after our return from Europe I began teaching English to beginners in the adult education program at the American School in the evenings. This started as a two-hour a week moonlighting experiment but by early 1966, through student contacts made at the school, I had branched out to teaching at the offices of Carnation Milk Co., Singer Sewing Machine, and Richardson-Merrell Drug Co. for a total of about twenty hours per week. LIEMPTY-19, meantime, was working part-time at the Hamilton School in Lomas where the two older children were attending. The family finances improved and I was able to convince LIEMPTY-19 that

the best thing to do was to invest in land and build a house big enough for our growing family which by now had a fourth child on the way. With three friends as partners, I entered on a land-buying deal which turned out to be complicated as we bought the land in the form of company stock. The company was liquidated and the assets were distributed, as land, to the four partners. I paid for our share with the proceeds from the sale of a small lot I had been paying for since 1955. LIEMPTY-19 was at first reluctant to tie us down with a house but when we finally got the papers and land deed straightened out, she threw herself wholeheartedly into the project and the building which began in August 1967. While LIEMPTY-19 supervised the construction, I worked during September and October almost full-time for the Olympic Organizing Committee and the group from Czechoslovakia which came to train in the pre-Olympics. My father-in-law deposited money in Mexico to help us with the major part of the financing of the house. We used $286,500 pesos of his money and about $60,000 that LIEMPTY-19 and I had saved and got the house finished enough to move in in March 1968. We were very short on furniture and shortly after moving in bought three bedroom sets, an automatic washer and even a piano. Naturally, cash was scarce, dirt was plentiful. The yard was a pile of rubble, the carpentry work had just begun, there were no closets, the house was unpainted. Thereafter, we did things on the house as the money came in: continued with carpentry, finished the driveway, put in grass, built a fence and front gate.

7. Six months after moving in came time for the Olympics and I worked, unofficially this time, with the water polo team from Australia. LIEMPTY-19 worked for the month with the Dutch and Belgian radio and TV group. LIEMPTY-19 was, once again, caught up in the atmosphere of being among Europeans and doing something exciting and out of the routine of home and children. She fell in love with the Australians as well, and for several months all she could talk of was that we should move to Australia. I gave it some thought but decided that we had neither the money to invest nor the youth and technical training to make it as pioneers "down under" and, on the other hand, family, friends, a house, and job seniority here in Mexico.

8. Toward the end of 1968, LIEMPTY-19 decided it was time for me to move out of the master bedroom as she could no longer face that aspect of our married life. For several months we tried this but it did not work out for me. One night in March 1969 after we returned home from a party, she asked me to help her undress and when she, once again, refused to have anything to do with me, I got rough with her, prompting a decision on her part, which she had already been pondering, to visit her parents in Holland as soon as possible. Her father provided the plane fare and she left in April for the United States to visit her brother and sister and Holland, for what she said would be a five week trip. She stayed away ten weeks. The four children remained with me, the maid, and

my mother who came to help three days a week. Upon her return, LIEMPTY-19 bore an air of resignation rather than of enthusiasm and, again, as on her previous return from Europe, was physically down and mentally unhappy. When asked about her thoughts on Australia she said that if she had wanted to live in Australia, she should have married an Australian. The separation had not improved our intimate relationship.

9. In August I was to take five weeks' leave and go with the children to Astro-World in Houston and visit my mother's family in South Carolina. When I suggested postponing making monthly payments on her father's loan until December when the Christmas Bonus would cover the back debt, in order to make the trip, she was adamant. saying that if I did not have the cash for going, I should not take leave. I borrowed from my life insurance policy and left with the three youngest children. Adriana had a touch of hepatitis and joined us three weeks later. After spending the month in South Carolina, we returned to Mexico to find that LIEMPTY-19 had very much enjoyed her solitude. We had already talked about divorce before her trip to Holland in the spring. I had told her that I would not consider parting with the children and she said she would consider leaving them to me if I would settle the debt to her father as well as give her a substantial share of what she considered was her part of the house. The title of the house was in my name and had been since the buying of the land. LIEMPTY-19 said I could mortgage or sell the house but that the money was what she was mainly interested in. I told her that the sale of the house was not financially wise in its unfinished state and that the house and land are very likely to appreciate sharply over the next three or four years considering the housing developments going on in the area. Added to this was the sentimental attachment to the house and area. A mortgage, on the other hand, for the amount of her father's loan plus what she was asking, was something I could not afford considering the more than 12 percent cost of such a mortgage in Mexico.

10. At the same time, during September 1969, that we were going through the above-mentioned discussions, LIEMPTY-19 was taking a course at Japan Airlines to become a tour guide and group leader for trips to the Orient as early as November 1969 and, certainly, to Expo '70 in Osaka during the spring and summer of 1970. She received a diploma to that effect. I told her that if she wanted out of the marriage and wanted to be free to travel it was all right by me but that the children would stay with me and I would continue to repay her father at the agreed rate ($2500 per month and 5 percent per year). She then sought legal advice from an old friend, Dutch lawyer Guillermo Floris Margadant who, in turn, steered her to a young woman lawyer, Dra. Berta Martinez, who must have advised LIEMPTY-19 that under the local legal system the only way to try for a sizable cash settlement and considerable support was to hang on to the children because LIEMPTY-19 made a radical "about-face" in her attitude concerning them and she now said that she could not

"abandon" the children. I refused to visit her lawyer with her saying I was not interested in getting divorced, whereas she said that her mind was made up and that we would have to split up.

11. Things came to a head on the night of 12 November when I got home around 9 PM and she suggested we have a drink and talk things over. I mixed some martinis and she began laying down the terms under which she thought we should get divorced, i.e. I should move out of the house, mortgage to pay back her father's money, grant her custody of the children and support of 2,000 pesos per month per child ($8,000). I said I would not get divorced under those conditions and we discussed and argued in the kitchen for about three hours, killing a bottle of gin in the process. We went upstairs and when I tried to make up to her she tried to rouse the children, unsuccessfully, and then tried to leave the house which I would not let her do. She got hysterical, phoned a neighbor, Uta de la Hoz, then she went into the front yard and awakened the next door neighbors, Walter Hurley and his wife, and asked to go to their house. A few minutes later, Uta and her husband Guillermo came and LIEMPTY-19 went with them to their home two blocks away. About a half-hour later I walked up to Uta's to ask LIEMPTY-19 to come home but was told that she was busy phoning her lawyer and would not return.

12. The following morning I took the children to school as usual and my sister Marcia (LIEMPTY-4's wife) picked them up and took them to her house where I joined them for lunch. LIEMPTY-19 came by in the late afternoon while my sister was out, picked up the children saying she was taking them home, failed to do so, then disappeared and was not to be found.

13. It was the subsequent action taken by LIEMPTY-19 in dropping her lawyers and taking on the services of Bernabe Jurado, the most notorious penal attorney in Mexico, that led to the potential security hazards that ensued.

50-6-74/3

[illegible]

9 March 1970

TO : **Case Officer**

FROM : **GERENDE**

SUBJECT: **GERENDE Status Report**

The present situation of the marital conflict between GERENDE and his wife (LIEMPTY-19) is as follows:

1. GERENDE is living at his mother's apartment at 99 Carlos B. Zetina Street, Apartment 9. He has rented a three-bedroom apartment at Tornel 3 corner with Pedro Antonio de los Santos where he has stored the household effects and furniture removed from his former address at Ladera 39, Lomas de Bezares.

2. The house at Ladera 39 is rented to an executive of Chrysler Corporation International, Dr. Leon MARKIEWICZ, his wife, and fifteen-year old daughter, all of Argentine nationality. The monthly rent is 6,700 pesos M/N and the contract is for two years, beginning 1 February 1970.

3. LIEMPTY-19 and the four children are apparently still living at the residence of the Netherlands' Ambassador, Baron Schelto Van Heemstra at Peña 360, Jardines del Pedregal. It seems fairly certain they are at that address from things that the two older children, Adriana and Chris, have said to GERENDE on the last two occasions he has seen them. They have been there since 5 December 1969. LIEMPTY-19 has denied that she has a fixed address and says that she is staying with "friends."

4. LIEMPTY-19 is continuing to use the services of Bernabe Juardo as her lawyer and, through him, is pressing for even more advantageous terms in the divorce than she had asked in November. Please see the attached copy and translation of the latest proposal made by Juardo on 4 March 1970.

5. The charges and accusations made by LIEMPTY-19 against GERENDE are still not completely resolved and are as follows:

   a. Insults, threats and attempted homicide -- this charge rests at the 5º Juzgado Penal, 2ª Corte Penal located at

[illegible]

50-6-74/3

Lecumberri. The judge is CRUZ Mellado. These charges have not been pressed since they were originally made on 13 November 1969 by LIEMPTY-19. The ruling on these charges, should the case come to trial, must be made by three judges of the 2ª Corte Penal composed of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Juzgados Penales. The judge of the 6° Juzgado is Lic. QUIRAZCO, an alumnus of GERENDE's lawyer, Jorge Mario MAGALLON. Together they have, on two occasions, been to speak to Judge CRUZ Mellado who agreed not to issue an arrest warrant and who has, finally, called for a hearing on 16 March (subsequently postponed) at 10:00. MAGALLON has given GERENDE assurances that the charges are likely to be dismissed.

b. Fraud -- this charge was made by LIEMPTY-19 and her lawyer on 11 December 1969, the day after GERENDE left the Villa Obregon jail after having spent a week there for disobeying a court order. (The court order had consisted of an unfounded request to have GERENDE expelled from his house and to have LIEMPTY-19 reinstated there with her father, as the temporary custodian of the children. GERENDE refused them admission under those terms, hence disobeying the Villa Obregon judge's order, so the judge's secretary arbitrarily ordered, on the spot, a 10-day detention. Subsequently, the judge, LUCAS del ARENAL, was forced to lift the detention after seven days and dismiss himself from the case and divorce proceedings as incompetent. The judge has had to face charges of collusion from and with the lawyers of both parties, i.e. Magallon and Jurado. The charge of fraud rests at Mesa 31ª of the Procuraduria del Distrito Federal. The Public Ministry Agent in charge of that table is Jorge GUTIERREZ Cruz. LIEMPTY-19 claims that the money lent to her and GERENDE for building the house at Ladera #39 was actually loaned to buy the house and that GERENDE, knowing they were married under the separate property marriage clause had wrongfully placed the property in his name only, thereby committing fraud. Actually, the land was bought by GERENDE before Christmas 1965 in a complicated transaction involving three other partners: Robert Bancroft WHITEHOUSE, John (Dick) RENNA, and James Walter HURLEY, and each of the partners placed the property in their respective names with the complete knowledge of their spouses. Later the land was subdivided and after nineteen months the deeds were issued. LIEMPTY-19 supervised and prodded the notary who made the transaction and she was perfectly aware that the property was in GERENDE's name. In August 1967 when construction of the house began, LIEMPTY-19's father's money was used which he had deposited in Mexico for the purpose. Since January 1969, according to the terms of the loan agreement, GERENDE has been paying it off and has receipts from LIEMPTY-19 to show for it.

GERENDE has presented both the land deed ("escritura") pre-dating the construction of the house and the receipts showing up to date payment of the loan at the "Mesa 31ª." No further action has been taken by LIEMPTY-19 or her lawyer on this matter but the charge has not finally been settled and is still pending. The charge is, of course, unfounded and is awaiting the proper "lubrication" in order to be filed away.

c. Neglect -- this charge was made by LIEMPTY-19 in December 1969 at the 7° Juzgado Mixto de Paz claiming that GERENDE had abandoned LIEMPTY-19 and the children to their fate and that they were utterly destitute. GERENDE was not notified of this charge and on 9 February after attending a hearing at the Villa Obregon Juzgado (see below), once out on the sidewalk, Judicial police agents detained GERENDE, took him to the Procuraduria and from there to Lecumberri. This process involved being finger-printed and mugged. The following day GERENDE was out on a 2,000 pesos bond and three days later, 13 February, the justice of the peace (a woman) formally set GERENDE free for lack of evidence. GERENDE and Magallon went back on 5 March to pick up the bond money and see if Jurado had appealed but he had not and, apparently, that matter is closed.

6. On 14 November 1969, one day after LIEMPTY-19 disappeared from home taking the children with her, GERENDE brought charges against her for minor lesions and showed medical proof thereof. The hearing of 9 February after which GERENDE was detained, was called by Villa Obregon judge Bonfilio SEGURA. GERENDE reiterated the charge, LIEMPTY-19 denied it, the judge ruled against her, ordered her to prison but since the injuries were minor, it does not require privation of liberty and she must only go and sign-in once a week.

7. LIEMPTY-19 is at present teaching school at the Edron Academy on Caleri Street in San Angel Inn. The two older children are going to school there. During the latter part of November, all December and half of January, the children did not attend any school. On three occasions GERENDE has been to the school at 13:30 to try to speak to LIEMPTY-19 and see the children. LIEMPTY-19 has objected to this and the meetings have been short and fruitless except for GERENDE learning that they are still staying at the Dutch Ambassador's. GERENDE's last visit there was on 3 March (Tuesday).

8. After the Villa Obregon judge dismissed himself from the divorce proceedings, according to standard procedure, the case went to Coyoacan and Xochimilco respectively where the judges, in turn, excused themselves from the case and it has finally come to reside at the 1st Juzgado Civil in the D.F. The judge is Olda CORREA (woman) and has the reputation of being tough and pretty straight. Since LIEMPTY-19 has not given an address where divorce suit papers can be served her, the suit has not yet been initiated on GERENDE's part. LIEMPTY-19, on the other hand, has not had

GERENDE served with papers though his current address is known, apparently because she is still seeking a voluntary divorce along the lines and terms which are stated in the accompanying set of proposals. GERENDE cannot begin to accept these proposals in their present form as they are patently unfair and hardly a point to beginning bargaining from.

50-6-94/3

8 March 1970

The following proposals were made to GERENDE on 4 March 1970 (Monday) by LIEMPTY-19's lawyer, Bernabe Jurado, through a mutual friend, Licenciado Carlos Heyn, to wit:

TERMS under which the problem of [LIEMPTY-19] and [Raymond H. GERENDE] could be solved.

1. The right (patria potestad) to the minors would be kept by both the mother and father.

2. The guardianship and custody of the four children is entrusted to the mother. The father may visit the children once a week between 10:00 and 19:00 hours; he may take them out once a month and will return them to the mother's address before 19:00.

3. The father is obliged to pay the mother the sum of 10,000 pesos MN, in advance, per month beginning with the month of November 1969, since which time he has not given the mother or children any money at all.

4. This agreement will be raised to the level of a formal public writ the day it is signed by both parties.

5. Both spouses agree to divorce voluntarily under the terms of this agreement.

6. Upon termination of the divorce procedure, by mutual consent, both parties will desist from the civil and penal actions that either might have initiated against the other.

7. Both spouses are obliged to attend punctually the meetings that the legal procedure establishes as well as grant the guarantees demanded by the Public Ministry and acting Judge for the approval of this agreement and granting of the divorce.

8. In order that the father may visit his children and take them out, the mother is obliged to give notice of every change of address.

9. With the exception of the one day a week that the father may visit the children and the one day a month when he may take

S/C ATT 3 TO HMMA 38,706

50-6-74/3

them out, the father contracts the obligation of absolutely abstaining from calling on the mother's address, so that she may carry on her life freely without neglecting her children.

10. While the voluntary divorce is being processed, the mother and children will live at ______________________ and, as above stated, to satisfy their needs, the father will make the first monthly payment of $10,000.

11. Neither the father nor the mother may take the children out of Mexican territory without the authorization of the other.

12. Since GERENDE owes the parents of LIEMPTY-19 the sum of $286,500 plus agreed-on interest, minus whatever payments he has been able to make, the said GERENDE is obliged to mortgage the house at 39 Ladera, Lomas de Bezares in this city, precisely during the course of the divorce procedure by mutual consent as established in the antecedent clauses and before the divorce is granted so that LIEMPTY-19's parents are reimbursed on their loan or on the outstanding unpaid balance.

13. The expenses of making this agreement a formal writ as well as the fees of B. Juardo will be paid by GERENDE but these will be fixed in an equitable manner by Carlos Heyn to whose decision both will submit.

14. In case of failure to comply with any of the clauses of this agreement at any time or for just one time, either by GERENDE or LIEMPTY-19, both agree to expressly establish the following sanctions and terms:

15. If GERENDE is the one who violates any clause just one time, he will forfeit the house at Ladera 39 to the mother and children, LIEMPTY-19, Adriana Juliette, Christopher Ramon, Maria Madeleine, and Laurence Fernando, and said property will belong to the above mentioned persons.

16. If LIEMPTY-19 is the one who violates the terms of this agreement for just one itme, she will lose the custody of children in favor of the father or whatever person he designates for the guardianship and custody of the minors.

17. Since LIEMPTY-19 has to establish an appropriate place to live, in the company of her four children, both parties agree that the household effects will be turned over by GERENDE, to LIEMPTY-19 for that purpose, as well as the automobile she has been using throughout the marriage.

Mexico, D.F., 4 March 1970

NOTE: GERENDE's lawyer advised him not to make a counter proposal. His comments on the above terms are as follows (keyed to above):

1. OK

2. Visitation rights everyday at any time; he may take them out overnight once per week.

3. Will pay 5000 pesos per month, to begin with date of settlement (i.e. not retroactive)

4. OK

5. OK, assuming that agreement is reached on terms

6. OK

7. OK

8. OK

9. Revise to agree with GERENDE's version of paragraph 2

10. OK, except payment is to be 5000 pesos.

11. OK

12. No. GERENDE prefers to continue paying off under the terms of the loan agreement with LIEMPTY-19's father. Later, if a mortgage can be obtained at an acceptable interest, GERENDE might consider this.

13. No. GERENDE and LIEMPTY-19 will each pay their own lawyers.

14. See below

15. Not acceptable

16. Not acceptable (in context of paragraphs 14, 15, and 16)

17. She may receive household effects, but not the car.

55-6-24/5

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

17

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: REDLEG LIEMPTY/LNEASE Double Agent Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. Director 016547
B. MEXICO CITY 2741

1. Per Reference A, LNEASE case Bruce DAKAR (LNEASE Case No. 127-41) was passed to LNERGO who plans to use DAKAR within WOLADY. No additional details are available.

2. Headquarters appreciates Station's support on the case of Frank CAMDEN and the LIENTRAP details forwarded in Reference B. We will keep the Station apprised of any additional developments in CAMDEN's case.

Milton C. SANTRELLA

MICROFILMED
APR 3 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
B 201-862965	HMMW-17789	24 MAR 1970 19 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
B 201-814176	S E C R E T	50-6-74/3

1 - RI
1 - Chrono
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - SB/CI/3
1 - CI/OPS

AN	US
	X
BX	4
~~DBS~~	~~NPD~~
FI	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	LMOsborne	lmr	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SB/X/WH	23-3-70	D. Davis
C/CI/OPS/WH		
C/SB/CI/OPS	23 March 70	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	19 Mar 70	John C. Murray

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

MFG 11-69

DISPATCH

TARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1(

OTIFIED

ICE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY dl PER ______ # ____

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

I

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN. SR8

ACTION NO. 986

S E C R E T 192359Z MAR 70 CITE MEXICO CITY (MEXI 2766)

DIRECTOR

20 Mar 70 046440 M

LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 018246

1. POUCHING LIEMPTY REPORT 26 MARCH. REGRET DELAY WHICH DUE PRESS OTHER ACTIVITIES REDTOP FIELD.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN	OB
AB	X
~~IN~~	
~~S~~	
~~BT~~	
~~DES~~	~~NPD~~
~~PI~~	
WH/1	

CS COPY

SECRET

EMPTY

50-6-74/3

20 Mar 70

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

ORIG: Bob Hazen
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 18 March 1970

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ✓ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 19 00 47Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 018246

TO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: DIR 014964*

1. PLEASE ADVISE DATE YOU POUCHING LIEMPTY REPORT.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref requests latest LIEMPTY Progress Report.

LIEMPTY

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: Bob Hazen
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 18 March 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8
INFO
FILE, VR. RI/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 19 00 47Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 018246

TO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: DIR 014964*

1. PLEASE ADVISE DATE YOU POUCHING LIEMPTY REPORT.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref request latest LIEMPTY Progress Report.

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ORIG: Bob Hazen
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 18 March 1970

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ✓ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8
INFO
FILE, VR, RI/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

19 00 47Z MAR 70

CITE DIRECTOR 018246

TO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: DIR 014964*

1. PLEASE ADVISE DATE YOU POUCHING LIEMPTY REPORT.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref request latest LIEMPTY Progress Report.

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

S E C R E T

ORIG: Rob Hazen
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 19 March 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 19 00 47Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 018246

TO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: DIR 014964*

1. PLEASE ADVISE DATE YOU POUCHING LIEMPTY REPORT.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref request latest LIEMPTY Progress Report.

WH
X

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1
19 March 70

CS COPY

50-6-74/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

6 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: SB/RMO

VIA : SB/X/WH

SUBJECT : Evaluation of Product Supplied to SB/Division Through LIEMPTY and LIENVOY Operations

1. It is requested that an evaluation of the product supplied by the LIEMPTY photographic surveillance operation targeted against the Soviet Embassy, and the LIENVOY joint telephone tap operations targeted against the Soviet, Polish, and Czech Embassies be submitted to this office. These evaluations will be presented with the current Projects LIEMPTY and LIENVOY renewals; they are also desired for use in operational discussions with Mexico City Station.

2. As a guide, whenever possible, these evaluations should relate through the use of overall statistics and/or specific instances in which the product has been deemed useful by the SB/Division.

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - SB/RMO
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - WH/1/Chrono
1 - LIEMPTY Project✓
1 - LIENVOY Project

ORIG: W. R. Hazen
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 6 March 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. CI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

SECRET 06 19 10Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 014961

TO MEXICO CITY

LIFEAT LIEMPTY

REF: A. HMMA-37892
B. HMMA-38119

1. PLEASE SUBMIT LIFEAT AND LIEMPTY PROGRESS REPORTS SOONEST.

2. FILE: 50-6-32/3, 50-6-74/3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref A reports LIFEAT progress 1 June through 31 August 1969. Ref B reports LIEMPTY progress 1 January through 31 October 1969.

LIEMPTY

6 JOHN R. HORTON
4 ACTING CHIEF, WHD
3
2
1

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HMMA-38274	23 December 1969	50	120	2	

DOC. SUBJECT

SEMI-ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT FOR SB OPERATIONAL PROGRAM 1 JUN TO 30 NOV

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

1a. LIEMPTY: No change.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.	50	6	74	3
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) LIEMPTY OPERATIONS	201-			

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(7-46)

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, WH Division		XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, SB Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

Processing action: MARKED FOR INDEXING

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 January - 31 October 1969

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

SUMMARY

1. There has been no change in the operating procedures of the two LIEMPTY base houses, LICALLA and LILYRIC, or in the use made of the product. Raymond H. GERENDE continues as Project principal agent, and renewed attempts have been made to broaden his activities, to include additional agent handling and the following up of ops leads. After a slow start, some progress has been made, but GERENDE is now involved in divorce proceedings with his wife. This situation is steadily worsening and represents a potential security risk to LIEMPTY and other Station operations.

GERENDE

2. As Headquarters is aware, the Station has for some time tried to get additional mileage out of GERENDE. The Station has long recognized GERENDE's not inconsiderable talents: He is personable, fluent in two languages (to the point where he can pass either as a Mexican or an American with no trouble), he has considerable experience in support activities, he has knowledge of the local scene which would be hard to duplicate, and he is completely at the Station's disposal. He has also worked for RVROCK for close to 15 years, in effect making a career of RVROCK, and the Station believes that this long period of service imposes on RVROCK an obligation to see that he is fairly treated and provided with benefits which would not otherwise be due an agent with less longevity. On the other hand, GERENDE has picked up some bad habits--he is not punctual, his written reports leave much to be desired, and worst of all, he lacks drive and ambition.

Distribution:
② - C/WH
1 - C/SB copy to SB/X/CH

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-38119	18 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

3. After several largely abortive attempts to get GERENDE to follow up operational leads (and after noting, at the same time, a fine job he did in recruiting LIRICE-13), the Station decided to present GERENDE with what amounted to an ultimatum: Following a six-week leave at the home of relatives in the US, he was told that in recognition of his past services he was being given a salary increase to $7,000 US per annum (which may not seem like much until it is realized that GERENDE pays no taxes on this, and has the use of a QP car, to boot). He was also told that he would be given a number of leads to follow up (in some cases persons to whom he had natural access; in other cases leads which he would follow up under cover and in alias), as well as agents to handle (in alias). It would be up to him to take advantage of this opportunity to perform up to his level of ability; if he did so, Headquarters would be willing to work out an annuity program which would relieve his worries about eventual retirement. If he did not put out, he could expect to be terminated by the end of FY 1970. GERENDE expressed his gratitude and his willingness to put his shoulder to the wheel, and, in fact, he has done so. In October 1969 he took over the handling of LIANVIL-1 from Oliver G. SCANTLING, and the Station has started to give him leads to follow up. His performance has improved in every way--his punctuality has improved, his written reports are continually improving, and he has made the effort to devise approaches to the various leads and to start to follow up on them.

4. The Station was therefore highly encouraged, until 24 October, when GERENDE reported that his wife wanted a divorce. The problem is basically one of incompatibility of personalities, exacerbated by the fact that GERENDE's operational activities resulted in his being home more often than a man who works a normal office day. GERENDE's wife had taken a long vacation alone earlier in the year, visiting her parents, and the leave taken by GERENDE, referred to above, followed his wife's return and did not include her. Both times GERENDE had the four children. Thus the news of the divorce request did not come as a real surprise. The problem, however, is that both parties want custody of the children, and the dispute becomes daily more bitter and more violent. The station has taken the position that security of GERENDE's operations must be preserved at all costs, hoping, of course, that the divorce can be avoided. At this writing, the outcome cannot be guessed. If the bitter fight results in the surfacing of GERENDE's RVROCK employment, LILYRIC and LICALLA are faced with at least some threat of exposure. The MHHARSHers are quite aware that a LILYRIC-like facility exists; whether they suspect LICALLA is a moot question. LICALLA is in many ways more useful, and the MHHARSHers could put it out of business very easily by making their wall higher. Little could, or probably would, be done to prevent LILYRIC from functioning.

5. Other than LIANVIL-1 and the LIEMPTY assets directly handled by GERENDE (LILYRIC and LICALLA personnel and LIEMPTY-4) other Station assets whose security might be affected by GERENDE's current problems include LIENTRAP, LIRICE-13, and the PCM OP. GERENDE is also aware of the fact that some sort of operation, presumably technical, is or has been conducted from the LIMESA complex; he is aware of the existance and knows some of the members of the LIEMBRACE team (LIEMBRACE-1, -2, and -4, among the currently active), and he knows of the existance of LIENVOY and LIFEAT. His wife is LIFEAT-19 and has been a substitute transcriber as late as late 1968, and his mother was LIFEUD-19 (a former LIFEAT basehouse keeper, inactive since June 1964). GERENDE also knows SCANTLING, David M. WILSTED, and Raymond L. BARCENAS, as well as current Station officers Vincent P. RIZZUTO and Bruce H. FERNALD (the latter in alias). He has also met Andrew E. PELLEMENT, who used an alias. In his 15 years, GERENDE has worked in almost every phase of the Station's support activities, and even though in recent years he has been pretty much restricted to LIEMPTY, his knowledge of activities and assets which are still current is considerable. It is too early to judge the outcome of GERENDE's problems, but the Station is making every effort to see that security of operations is not affected by whatever decision is reached.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-38119

LICALLA

6. The LICALLA base house has continued to function as in the past. LIEMPTY-9 continues to be a conscientious recorder of events. In addition to providing about 3,500 photos during the reporting period, as well as comments on events and relationships which are noted by him, he had provided special coverage as requested on various targets of interest, such as AETAKEOFF. During GERENDE's absence on leave, LIEMPTY-9 was handled by SCANTLING.

LILYRIC

7. LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27 have continued to provide full-time coverage of the MHHARSH Embassy front entrance, providing daily logs of the comings and goings of all officers, and about 9,000 photos during the reporting period. The LILYRIC base house reported on the visits of Americans ten different times, and provided special coverage in connection with AEBURBLE, SCLEASE-2, and one other LNERGO walk-in case. LILYRIC personnel were also handled by SCANTLING during GERENDE's absence.

LIEMPTY-4

8. As in the past, LIEMPTY-4 has done the developing and printing of all LICALLA and LILYRIC photos, and most of the LIENTRAP production. LIEMPTY-4 was handled by FERNALD during GERENDE's absence.

COMMENTS

9. LIEMPTY coverage of the MHHARSH installation continues to be a useful tool in the Station's operations against the MHHARSH target. One IA in the Station spends several hours per week processing the take, keeping mug book and files up to date, checking the information in the logs against other reports when required (to determine whether or not an agent or contact entered the MHHARSH installation as claimed; or whether an AEGRIP or AEKICK officer was out of the installation at a particular time, etc.) and analyzing the LICALLA production for insight into personal relationships. Useful by-products include continual up-dating of MHHARSH license plates and observation of demonstrations outside of the Embassy and renovations within the grounds. Furthermore, in GERENDE the Station has been attempting to develop an outside asset with considerable flexibility, who has been used to make recruitments and assessments as well as handle agents. GERENDE's personal problems are placing his own career in jeopardy and posea potential security hazard to LIEMPTY and other Station operations. This is a problem which will be dealt with and resolved in the next reporting period and prior to the next Project renewal request.

for/John A. PROBERT

50-6-74/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
δ LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 July through 31 December 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-35080, 22 July 1968

SUMMARY

1. There have been no basic changes in the operation of the project during the reporting period. Raymond H. GERENDE continues as principal agent, handling the personnel of the two base houses, LILYRIC and LICALLA, and performing other additional tasks. On 27 December 1968, consistent with our effort to get as much of the support activity as possible handled by outside officers, direct agent-handling responsibility for GERENDE and the LIEMPTY project was turned over to Bruce H. FERNALD. Vincent P. RIZZUTO remains as alternate and as FERNALD's inside contact.

GERENDE

2. Until the introduction of FERNALD, there was no change in the meeting arrangements with GERENDE. Meetings were held on an average of three times per week until October, when LIEMPTY-19 (GERENDE's wife) was relieved of the responsibility of transcribing the Spanish-language portions of LIENVOY coverage of the BEDOX installation. Thereafter meetings averaged twice per week, the main business being the transfer of LIEMPTY base house material and discussion of base house business.

Distribution:
② - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2cc SB/X/WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-36272

DATE
22 January 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓50-6-74/3

3. GERENDE's agent handling responsibilities within the LIEMPTY project remain as previously reported. He had also handled ERFAIN-3 until the latter's termination in August 1968. He developed a good relationship with ERFAIN-3, and he showed that he is quite capable, with proper case officer guidance, of providing useful service to the Station in the handling of agents beyond the support type to which he had been limited in the past. The Station intends to try to expand this role, with due regard for security and for GERENDE's limited experience. Furthermore, the Station still has every intention of using GERENDE selectively in cultivation and development of operational leads, as outlined in reference. No such leads were found for GERENDE during the reporting period (among other reasons, we have no intention of giving GERENDE a lead simply for the sake of giving him something to do), but as soon as a suitable lead is uncovered, it will be passed to GERENDE.

4. GERENDE was particularly useful during the Olympic period. While he did ~~not get a~~ job with the Olympic Committee as he had hoped, his wife was employed as a translator by the European television networks who had come to cover the games. This, plus other personal contacts, gave GERENDE a certain amount of access to Olympic facilities. Both GERENDE and his wife helped considerably in the distribution of AEEGGHEAD material, and GERENDE performed a number of miscellaneous tasks assisting the Station in various Olympic responsibilities.

5. GERENDE has also been used in support of JMROD operations, such as making mail pick-ups and delivering material and making phone calls to AMBASSCON. Following the Warsaw Pact Powers' invasion of Czechoslovakia, GERENDE was asked to cover a demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy, and he wrote a good report which was used in Embassy briefings. Recently, GERENDE has enrolled at the University of the Americas to work for an M.A. in contemporary Mexican history. The Station will explore the possibility of his getting access to persons or information of interest on the University campus.

LICALLA

6. LIEMPTY-9's work (in the LICALLA base house) was inhibited in July due to the construction of a maid's room near his working quarters. During the reporting period, however, he took a total of 2,217 operational photos. His regular reporting and commentary continued as in the past. LIEMPTY-9 is a steady and dependable performer, and his unique vantage point remains the source of the most interesting and revealing photos as well as often very informative reporting.

LILYRIC

7. LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27 have been able to keep the LILYRIC base house manned on a regular basis from 0800 to 1800 hours weekdays and 0800 to 1500 hours on Saturdays, with other hours coverable upon request. This has proven to be a far better arrangement than depending on LIMITED for some of this coverage. In addition to the 6,763 operational photos taken during the reporting period and the daily fixed surveillance reports, LILYRIC reporting is of considerable help in compiling current vehicle and license plates lists, PCS arrivals and departures, unusual activities such as demonstrations or protests, unusual or lengthy absences of personnel, etc., all of which have obvious CI importance. It was LILYRIC photos which made it possible for LNERGO to identify the Subject of 201-841520, who had been in clandestine contact with AEGRIP officers. LILYRIC also reported on a half dozen other American (or American appearing) visitors, some of whom it was possible to identify through tracing license plates.

Claude – [illegible]

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-30272

LIMITED

8. As reported in Ref, LIEMPTY-6 has been terminated and the LIMITED base house closed. All equipment has been turned in, and it can truthfully be said that due to the continuing quality performance of LICALLA and LILYRIC, LIMITED has not been missed at all.

PHOTO LAB

9. LIEMPTY-4 continues to process all photos made by the base houses. In addition, 101 enlargements were made during the reporting period, and 210 prints for LIENTRAP. The quality of LIEMPTY-4's work is good, and he rarely misses his routine deadlines.

Vincent P. Rizzuto
for/Willard C. CURTIS

October 22, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: RHGerendo
Date/Place of Meet: Oct 22 at the CH at 0945 hrs.

1. Prearranged routine meet and G was late. In fact G requested that our meets be scheduled for 0940 hrs, because the traffic conditions in the area he must past coming to meets are bad and are still getting worse. He has no way of starting the trip to the meet before 0900-0905 hrs because he has an English class from 0800 - 0900 hrs.

Next Meet: Oct 24 at the Delicatessen at 0940 hrs.

2. G gave me his LILYRIC and the LICALLA contact reports with corresponding attachments. He also brought some prints.

3. G handed in an accounting for his RF.

4. Separately he handed in a contact report on his meet with Jose GONZALEZ. Returned with the report is instruction material which FELLEMENT prepared for G. We discussed briefly the instruction which was selfexplanatory.

5. I was obliged to put some pressure on concerning the WUITENAU report which he did not bring as he promised. In fact he has done some work on W, but did not get all the info he believed he could get.

6. I spoke to him again about VARGAS case (just as I did 2-3 weeks ago) and this time G was rather convinced that he would not be able to work his way to V smoothly and he advocated a direct (cold) approach. I told him to put on paper what he did thus far concerning VARGAS and what were his suggestions. Will the trick work, I do not know.

6. I told him to ascertain with Base Houses whether the personnel had plans for Xmas leave including himself and ~~submitted~~ submit it for approval. I requested a list of presents including booze and cost . At the end I gave him the news that there will be no turkeys this year.

RHFernald

Ack B. Hayn w/the

EMPTY
LI ~~CACTA~~
OPS

21 October, 1969 (Tuesday)

To. : CO
From : Gerende
Subject : LICALLA Contact Report

time : 1630
place : Hotel

Operational : L-9 reports two new couples at club.

Production : two rolls: C-2432, 33; KOL report; notes.

21 October, 1969 (Tuesday)

To : CO
From : Gerende
Subject : LILYRIC Contact Report

time
place : 0745
LAKE

Operational : L-13 had nothing special to report.

Production : fiver rolls: Y-3205, 06, 07 ,08 09; logs for 14-20 October

[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, [illegible] Division
[illegible]

INFO. Chief, [illegible]

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT [illegible]
[illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCES : A. [illegible]
B. [illegible]

1. [illegible] 1963. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

DATE TYPED | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER | DATE

[illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION | HQS FILE NUMBER

(file) 50-6-74/3

616 BD/BD/BD/BM

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 12 DECEMBER 1958 616

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 12 22 36z'58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 2
INFO : COP, C/FI, C/FI/D, C/TSS 2, D/OC 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☒ PRIORITY — INITIALS Ros for RND
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

OUT53675

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 04467

[redacted]/LIMESA/LIMUST

REF MEXI 2940 (IN 36921)*

1. TRAVEL LIMUST 2 AND 3 TO ARIZONA AUTHORIZED UNDER LIMESA. SUGGEST THEY REMAIN ARIZ FOR HOLIDAYS UNTIL FURTHER NOTIFICATION BY EDLAND. COVER STORY: RETURNING HOME FOR HOLIDAYS, POSSIBLY TO BE CALLED TO COVER HQS FOR CONSULTATION AND TRAINING.

2. LIEMPTY PROJ MUST BE AMENDED INCLUDE LIMUST 2 AND 3 AND AUTHORIZE TRAINING TRIP. HQS WILL PREPARE AMENDMENT PROJ, CONTRACTS, AND CLEARANCES. NEED SOONEST DETAILS LOCAL COVER TO BE USED LIMUST/2.

3. HQS MUST GET STAFF APPROVAL INCLUDE LIMUST 2 INTO LIEMPTY BEFORE CAN AUTHORIZE TRAVEL TO HQS AND TRAINING. WILL ADVISE.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: Gloria Vaines
R.O. #030 - Unit WH/4/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *MEXI SEARCHING FOR SUITABLE COUPLE FOR RECRUITMENT TO USE IN LIMUST.

COORDINATION:
CCD/NC/Biladeau (BY PHONE)
FI/OPS/PROJECTS/REDFORD (BY PHONE)

Liempty/Dev. Plans

R.N. Dahlgren
R.E. GOMEZ, AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

~~R.N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III~~
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

50-6-74/3

SECRET
[redacted]

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is
authorized: [illegible]
18 November 1958
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. [illegible]
Note: [illegible]
[illegible] coordinate
if appropriate.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Division D

SUBJECT : Limesa/Limust

1. Some attention should be devoted, if it has not already been, to the dangers involved in this operation and particularly to what countermeasures the target may institute, or may already have instituted.

2. One current danger certainly exists, to wit, the existence of project Licalla base, which is in the group of buildings comprising the Limesa complex. One of the agents at Licalla base is known to one of the Lipstick agents arrested in the summer of 1958, and it is, hence, possible that both the host government and the target knows of Licalla. It is suggested that perhaps Licalla should be terminated. The reason has been advanced that this should not be done since the agent would be suspicious and in any event Licalla might serve as a red herring for Limesa. It is believed that the Licalla agent could be gotten out of this operation without arousing his suspicion. The Station could mount an obvious tail on him; when he reported it, he could be told he had probably been made and that, hence, the operation should no longer continue. The agent has been a good one and could be used elsewhere on some other work. Licalla house is going to be repaired soon. This might be a good opportunity to stop work there and let some innocent party rent it. That would be a better red herring.

3. Concerning the manner in which Limesa houses were acquired by the Station, it should be kept in mind that the purchase mechanism was identical with that used in Limited. The watchman at Limited knew an American owned it and told this to what to him must have seemed a casual visitor to the premises when it was under repairs. We should, therefore, assume the targets know an American owns it and that it is blown. Therefore, we should also assume that if the targets have conducted any sort of an investigation of Limesa houses, they may well have discovered that the same ultimate owner is involved. So far as is known, the bank which fronts for the purchases has not been checked to see if any inquiries have been made. We must agree the targets have the capability to find out who the front owner is--the bank-- and from there could possibly establish the identity of the owner, Limousine. Limousine and his firms have also been used as cover for other Station agents and operations apart from Limesa and Limited.

SECRET
[redacted]

56-6-44/3

4. It should not be forgotten that a person tried both to rent and buy Limesa properties earlier in the year after we owned them. So far as we know, a check on this person was not productive of suspicious data, but the question arises as to how thorough the investigation was. Possibly the name the man gave when making inquiries was false, meaning that in effect the right person has never been investigated at all. Knowing that the targets have in the past shown some interest in the Limesa buildings, it is not beyond the realm of reason that this man was sent by them. The story he gave for wishing to rent the house--because it was handy and close to a certain school--is identical with the story used by the Station to cover rental of Licalla almost next door.

5. Even granting that the true ownership of Limesa has not been discovered by the targets, they have various recourses through which to establish the identity and activity of the occupants thereof. The following possibilities suggest themselves:

a. Enter into litigation with Limesa owner over exact boundaries or other pretext, demanding property be surveyed. On court order, Limesa could be inspected thoroughly.

b. Undermine target side of Limesa walls, leading to possible condemnation of property by local government or necessity various repairs, etc.

c. Sabotage of electricity (causing fire) or water or sewage, necessitating entry into Limesa of outside persons, who could be infiltered by target agents.

d. Ramming by vehicle, with similar results, police, firemen, etc.

e. Complaint to medical authorities on filth, refuse, etc., leading to inspection by health authorities.

f. Various other approaches might be discussed.

6. One general recommendation can be made: sensitive material should be used and kept in a crypt, and a good one, rather than in the relatively insecure special room now planned as the operational room.

7. Beyond this, every effort should be made to see to it that the operators have good cover. The idea of clothing them in local clothing is excellent and shows right thinking in that direction.

[redacted] J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
PROCESSING ACTION	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING MICROFILM
TO	Chief, WH
INFO.	Chief, SB
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City W
SUBJECT	C LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 November 1967 through 30 June 1968
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : HMMA-33459, 8 November 1967

Summary

1. During the reporting period, the project's principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE, was assigned additional tasks, aimed at broadening his usefulness to the Station. These tasks included spotting and assessment as well as the handling of a recruited agent, ERFAIN-3.* GERENDE did well, and it is believed that a new dimension has been opened for him, and by the same token, the Station has, in effect, gained a new asset. The LIEMPTY base houses continued to produce at their usual rate and with their usual effective support to Station REDTOP operations. The LIMITED Base House and its operator, LIEMPTY-6, were terminated on 31 May 1968. Termination was decided upon partly to save money and partly because advancing age had measurably decreased the reliability and effectiveness of LIEMPTY-6's work. LIEMPTY-26 was rehired, which permitted the LILYRIC Base House to give us the same total hours of coverage as LILYRIC and LIMITED had together in the past.

.........continued

Distribution:
~~2~~ - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2 cc SB/O/WH

* ← This was because [illegible] ERFAIN/3 is being [illegible] !

CS COPY

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-35080	22 July 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-74/3

GERENDE

2. During the reporting period, the case officer has been meeting GERENDE an average of three times per week. Meetings are usually pre-arranged, at various sites and times. Meetings average 20 to 30 minutes. GERENDE turns over to the case officer negatives, prints, logs, and other reports which he has picked up from the base houses since the previous meeting, along with brief contact reports on his meetings with base house representatives. Reports on other operational activities are also turned in and discussed, and GERENDE is given instructions, notes for the base houses, and negatives for any enlargements which may be desired by the Station. Also, LIENVOY tapes and transcripts are exchanged at each meeting. (The departure of LIACUTE-1 at the end of April 1968 left the Station without a BEDOX transcriber. As a temporary solution, pending the return of LIACUTE-1 or the recruitment of another BEDOX transcriber, GERENDE's wife, LIEMPTY-19, has been hired at the rate of 31.50 pesos per hour to transcribe the Spanish language portions of the tapes. She does the work in her home, and GERENDE transports the tapes.)

3. GERENDE has the direct agent-handling responsibility for the following LIEMPTY agents: LIEMPTY-4 (photo-processor; met twice per week); LIEMPTY-6 (LIMITED; met once per week until termination); LIEMPTYs 13, 14, 26, and 27 (LILYRIC; LIEMPTY-13 normally met twice per week -- in his absence LIEMPTY-27 makes meetings); and LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA; met twice per week). He is responsible for directing their work, paying them, and handling all of the administrative problems which may develop. To judge from the results, GERENDE has excellent rapport with these agents and is able to get a consistently high performance rate from them -- particularly LICALLA and LILYRIC personnel.

4. As noted in reference, GERENDE was employed by the Mexican MHRAVEL committee, which we found a useful side benefit. His MHRAVEL activity during the reporting period has been minimal, but we expect it to start picking up again. GERENDE has conducted a few discreet inquiries and investigations for us within the MHRAVEL complex, and we have instructed him to try to get an assignment which will keep him as close to the FJSTEAL delegation as possible.

5. Reference also pointed out that GERENDE had performed nicely in the cultivation and development of an operational lead, and that the Station planned to give GERENDE more of the same. Furthermore, GERENDE's standing assignments (LIEMPTY base houses, MHRAVEL activity, and occasional support of JMROD requirements) were not challenging enough or occupying enough of GERENDE's time. GERENDE is rather firmly committed to WOFIRM by virtue of the fact that he has worked for WOFIRM for over 15 years and has no other outside employment of any consequence. By the same token, he was, through no fault of his own, doing less work for WOFIRM than at any time in his career. GERENDE's operational exposure through the years dictated more and more restrictions on his activity, for sound security reasons. The solution to GERENDE's problem (lack of a promising future) and the Station's (not getting its money's worth) seemed to be to give GERENDE additional tasks which he could handle under suitable cover and with due regard to security precautions. Since most of GERENDE's support activities had been against the FJSTEAL target, particular care would have to be taken in committing him further in this direction. It was decided, therefore, that his principal retooling would be in a non-FJSTEAL field.

CS COPY

6. In line with the above reasoning, GERENDE was introduced to Andrew R. DOSCHER on 17 February 1968. The idea was that GERENDE would be trained to assist DOSCHER in some of his operations against Central American targets. GERENDE's principal duty thus far has been to take over the handling of ERFAIN-3, under DOSCHER's close supervision and guidance. GERENDE has performed quite creditably in this task. He seems interested in the work and has learned quickly. On the other hand, an apparently ingrained habit of procrastination has resulted in dilatory reporting. If GERENDE can overcome this (and both case officers are working hard to teach GERENDE the importance of prompt and complete reporting) there seems to be every reason to believe GERENDE will develop into a competent agent handler.

7. GERENDE was also given the task of locating and developing (in alias) a girl who, per LIENVOY, was being cultivated by AERODENT. Although GERENDE had to be continually reminded of the assignment, he did an excellent job of meeting the girl and gaining her confidence. It is quite likely that he could have recruited the girl as an access agent against AERODENT, but as this point was reached another operation against AERODENT was launched and it was not felt that attempting to recruit the girl would serve any useful purpose, for the time being at least (among other things, there was no indication that she had had any contact with AERODENT for some months). The only flaw in GERENDE's performance was the time it took him to get around to doing the job. It should be mentioned, however, that at the same time GERENDE had a number of pressing personal matters to attend to, including overseeing the completion of his new house, which he finally moved into on 10 March 1968, even though construction is still not entirely completed.

8. Among other assignments completed by GERENDE in the reporting period were the renting of an apartment for use as a listening post; and initiating a relationship with a Russian translator working for the MHRAVEL committee.

LICALLA

9. The star of the LIEMPTY show, as far as quality of performance is concerned, continues to be LIEMPTY-9. His favorable location and his perceptiveness continue to result in revealing photos and equally revealing commentary. In addition to the 2,908 operational photos taken during the reporting period, he has provided daily, weekly, and monthly summaries and notes, semi-monthly attendance reports (of FJSTEAL personnel spotted by him), various special reports, and special intensive coverage of the following: 201-120123; 201-107668; 201-271102; and 201-305870. As of 1 May 1968 LIEMPTY-9's salary was raised from 4,000 pesos to 4,500 pesos per month. LIEMPTY-9 was also given permission to have a maid's room constructed on the roof of his apartment. The original maid's room is LIEMPTY-9's photo point. The maid, who has been with the family for 11 years (since she was 10) either sleeps in the hall, where she is in the way, or in the bedroom of LIEMPTY-9's nine-year old son, which LIEMPTY-9 feels is beginning to be not a proper arrangement. The room will be built at a point on the roof away from the FJSTEAL installation (so as to arouse as little suspicion as possible), and the fact that the maid will be seen going in and out of the room regularly should quiet any suspicions which may arise. Construction work put LICALLA out of action starting 24 June, but it is expected that the work will be finished by 20 July.

LILYRIC

10. LILYRIC's performance continues to be prolific -- 8,568 operational photos in the reporting period. Again, it

should be pointed out that this blanket coverage is useful insurance that all activity is caught. Combined with the daily fixed surveillance reports on all members of the FJSTEAL installation, the Station can safely say that its coverage of FJSTEAL installation ingress and egress is complete during working hours (and any extra hours which the Station wishes covered). Since 1 May LILYRIC has been on duty 57 hours per week: 0800-1800 weekdays and 0800-1500 Saturdays. Commensurate with their new schedule (and the return of LIEMPTY-26 to the active roster), the total monthly LILYRIC salary has gone from 4,900 pesos per month to 6,000 pesos per month (LIEMPTYs 13, 14, 26, and 27, are of course, father, mother, and two sons). The fixed surveillance reports are used on a daily basis, since the Station constantly has operational interest in knowing whether a particular FJSTEALER was "in" or "out" at a particular time, and if out, who he went with, what time he left, etc. In addition, LILYRIC has standing instructions to notify GERENDE (and GERENDE the Station) immediately when American-appearing visitors come to the FJSTEAL installation. Eight such visits were noted in the reporting period, along with a number of other visitors who, for one reason or another, attracted the special attention of LILYRIC.

LIMITED

11. LIEMPTY-6 slowed down noticeably in the reporting period. He was ill several times, his surveillance reports were occasionally inaccurate, and his photographic work was poor. With the assurance that LILYRIC would be able to take up the slack (and give us better coverage for less money) the decision was made to terminate the LIMITED base house. While we are thereby denied some of the flexibility which we have had in the past, it is likely that LIEMPTY-6 would slowly have faded out of the picture anyway. While he was in there, he produced 911 operational photos, as well as daily fixed surveillance reports. Following his termination (a report of which is being forwarded separately) LIEMPTY-6 took a trip to Europe and has now started working full-time in the insurance business for his son-in-law, where he has gained a new lease on life. In other words, the termination couldn't have been more amicable. LIEMPTY-6 vacated the LIMITED apartment (he said he could not afford to keep paying the rent) and it is no longer available to the Station.

PHOTO LAB

12. LIEMPTY-4 has continued to process all LIEMPTY photo work. In addition to developing and making contact prints of all photos mentioned above, he made 778 enlargements of various shots. The photo lab is still in his office, pending the completion of GERENDE's house.

Vincent P. [illegible]
for/Willard C. CURTIS

231

LI[illegible]-11 has started working with the LI[illegible] team when he is not occupied with [illegible] activities and has adapted very well. Also his morale is better because of his increased activity.

HMMA 35038
16 July 68

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO: Chief/WHD

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Operational/LIEMPTY-11

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: As Indicated

1. The placing of LIEMPTY-10 and -11 and the LIENTRAP vehicle under the operational responsibility of LIEMBRACE-1 has been beneficial to both of these capabilities. As has been previously reported, several surveillance assignments could not have been successfully accomplished without the dispatching assist of LIENTRAP.

2. In regard to this combination of assets there have been two weaknesses:

a. The LIENTRAP operators [illegible] familiarity with the LIEMBRACE radio usage and surveillance tactics.

b. Full use of LIEMPTY-11, (LIEMPTY-10 services 26 P.O. boxes on a thrice a week basis. This plus the regular LIENTRAP activity keeps him sufficiently occupied).

continued......

Distribution:
③ - Chief/WHD

201-1[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 50-6-72/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 2[illegible]

DATE: 8 May 1963

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-1[illegible]

3. In order to overcome the above mentioned weaknesses, The Station proposes that LIEMPTY-11 be used part-time with the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. He also will continue his LIENTRAP activities. This activity will enable the Station to make greater use of LIEMPTY-11's time and also give complete familiarity with radio usage and surveillance tactics. LIEMBRACE-1, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 all are in agreement with this proposal.

4. LIEMPTY-11 has an Operational Approval granted on 14 September 1955 for use on the LIPSTICK team. The Station assumes that this OA will allow his use on the LIEMBRACE team. If this is not the case, the Station requests that his OA be amended to allow for such usage.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief, SB

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Progress Report 1 August through 31 October 1967

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : HMMA-32721, 7 August 1967

1. On [illegible] July 1967, Raymond H. GERENDE, principal agent for the LIEMPTY project, was introduced to his new case officer, Vincent P. RIZZUTO. The major reason for the change in case officers was to bring the LIEMPTY project into the section which it is largely designed to support, the REDTOP section. In the three-month period covered by this progress report, GERENDE was met by the case officer 32 times. Meetings were normally prearranged, with times and sites varied (with the introduction of the new case officer, most of the former regular meeting sites were dropped and new ones substituted). Meetings were occasionally arranged via telephone, in which case a prearranged code was used. Due to GERENDE's MHRAVEL activity (see below) it was not always possible to stick to a fixed meeting schedule.

2. GERENDE met with LIEMPTYs-4, 9, and 13 on a twice-a-week basis, and LIEMPTY-6 once per week during this period. These meetings were prearranged. As explained below, GERENDE no longer meets LIEMPTY 10.

......continued

Distribution:
~~1~~ 2 - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2cc To SB/c/wt

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-33459

DATE
8 November 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3

3. There were no known security incidents affecting the LIEMPTY Project or its assets during the period of this report.

LICALLA

what is done with them?

4. LIEMPTY-9, the operator of the LICALLA base house, provided 1,289 operational photographs during this period. In addition, he provided fixed surveillance reports, sighting reports, and special notes and comments. LIEMPTY-9 has proven himself to be a reliable and perceptive reporter of the events he observes. For this reason, he has been asked to provide special coverage on various individuals of interest, or on particular days when coverage is desired. The Station has found the LICALLA reports to be consistently useful in determining the presence, activities, and personal associations of target personnel. In part this is due to the location of the LICALLA base house, but it is also due to the interest, effort, and judgement of LIEMPTY-9 himself. [illegible]

LILYRIC

Where to?

5. The LILYRIC base house has been a prolific provider of operational photos, 4,014 having been submitted in the period under review. While there is occasionally superfluous coverage of visiting sports and cultural delegations (and LILYRIC personnel have been instructed to be more selective in this respect) the blanket coverage afforded by this base house guarantees that nothing will be missed during normal working hours. The fixed surveillance reports are voluminous, highly accurate, and quite valuable. On three separate occasions during the reporting period LILYRIC alerted the Station to the presence of American visitors at the target installation.

LIMITED

6. The efficiency of the LIMITED base house has suffered a slow decline. LIEMPTY-6 has been out of action for short periods because of illness and a physical examination. The physical, however, showed that he is in good health and we look for an improvement in his performance in the next reporting period. His surveillance reports are not entirely reliable due to a tendency to assume that the normal occupant of a certain car is, in fact, in that car. His photos, however, continue to be useful. 314 were provided in the period under review.

and these?

LIENTRAP

7. As noted in HMMA-33279, 13 October 1967, the LIENTRAP photo vehicle, operated by LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, is now in direct contact with LIEMBRACE-1, leader of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. This arrangement, which began in mid-August 1967, has proved to be a very happy one operationally. In addition to permitting more flexible use of LIENTRAP for Station requirements across the board, it has left GERENDE more time to devote to other duties (see below).

PHOTO LAB

8. LIEMPTY-4 has continued to process the photos taken by the base houses, and in addition made 269 enlargements in the period under review. During this period, the photo lab was moved to LIEMPTY-4's office because of renovations going on in GERENDE's house. LIEMPTY-4 processes the photos after working hours, and keeps the equipment and photos locked away during the day. As LIEMPTY-4's office is in his home, the equipment and photos are not left unguarded over night.

GERENDE

9. As reported in reference, GERENDE had been developing

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-33459

a possible access agent to LIRING. This eventually culminated in an attempted recruitment of the prospect by GERENDE. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, GERENDE exhibited considerable resourcefulness and operational skill in developing the target to a point where the recruitment attempt was possible. We plan to use GERENDE in similar roles in the future as opportunities arise, and for this reason we plan to document him with a set of false Mexican documentation as well as a set of false American documentation. GERENDE is collecting exemplars and getting the background information needed, and once the necessary data are assembled, Headquarters (WOACRE) support will be requested.

10. GERENDE has continued to provide support for the JMROD operation as needed.

11. In September and October 1967 GERENDE was employed by the Mexican MHRAVEL committee. He was able to get assigned as aide to the DIZTAG delegation. In this capacity he was able to supplement very nicely the information and support being provided by Jeremy S. HODAPP. This foot-in-the-door came in very handy, and is expected to be even more valuable in 1968, if GERENDE can get the position again. While the job was rather time-consuming we believe that it was well worth it.

12. In connection with his duties with MHRAVEL, as well as in connection with the fact that his WOFIRM activities are nearly 100% against the FJSTEAL target, GERENDE was given a very general briefing on the Station's REDTOP program. It is our hope that, in having a better idea of what the Station is trying to do in this field, GERENDE will be able to make an even greater contribution to that program than he has in the past.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

50-6-74/3

[illegible]

[illegible] – [illegible]

[illegible] → [illegible] in Bank

[illegible]

[illegible] local investment

4½ + 5½

366 Dec 70

110 [illegible]

6000 [illegible] pay.

[illegible] – [illegible]

nominal income only.

KAYAK – 2
[illegible] [illegible]

H[illegible]T 10876 16 Ap 81

HMMS 7235 2 July 71.

Serious Civil Problem.. [illegible] age forget it.
Can be done.
– [illegible] Can be done

Retirement income means only that
which we deposit for him!
[illegible] Payroll Deduction HOS.

[illegible] [illegible] available
Can Budget Stand [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] what he [illegible]?

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief/WHD	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Progress Report for the Period 1 May through 31 July 1967

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference : HMMA-32068, 23 May 1967 (Previous Progress Report)

1. From 1 May through 31 July 1967, 26 operational meetings were held with Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY Project. With the exception of one unscheduled meeting, meetings during this period were prearranged and meeting times and sites were varied. The unscheduled meeting was arranged via telephone using a prearranged open code. During the absence of GERENDE, two operational meetings were held with Oliver G. SCANTLING, alternate Principal Agent for LIEMPTY, and four with LIEMPTY-4, photo lab operator. All of these meetings were prearranged.

2. GERENDE met with LIEMPTY-4, -9, -10 and -13 on a twice a week basis and with LIEMPTY-6 on a once a week basis during this period. GERENDE's meetings with these assets were all prearranged. SCANTLING met with LIEMPTY-9 and -13 on two occasions and with LIEMPTY-6 once during the absence of GERENDE.

continued...

Distribution:

3 - Chief/WHD

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201's noted — blue pencil copies made on file	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 32721	DATE 7 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

3. All assets involved in the LIEMPTY Project performed in a satisfactory manner during this period. Effective 1 July 1967 LIEMPTY-4 and LIEMPTY-11 were given slight salary increases, because of their increased activity.

4. There were no known security incidents affecting the LIEMPTY Project or the assets involved during the three months under review.

LICALLA

5. This basehouse, the operator of which is LIEMPTY-9, provided 1277 frames of operational photographs covering the patio and garden area of FJSTEAL. LIEMPTY-9 also prepared fixed-surveillance reports, sighting reports and special notes and comments.

LILYRIC

6. The LILYRIC basehouse, which is staffed by LIEMPTY-13, -14 and -27, produced 2854 frames of operational photograph during the period. The LILYRIC basehouse operators continued to prepare fixed-surveillance reports on each member of FJSTEAL and turned these in on a weekly basis. LIEMPTY-27 resumed his duties on 1 July as scheduled and this basehouse has now reverted to its normal hours of coverage. (See reference relative to the absence of LIEMPTY-27.)

LIMITED

7. The LIMITED Basehouse, operated by LIEMPTY-6, produced 279 frames of operational photographs plus weekly fixed surveillance reports on each of the members of FJSTEAL. The LIMITED basehouse was closed from 17 through 22 July because of the illness of LIEMPTY-6. During this period LIEMPTY-6 did very little radio-alerting for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team because of the variation of the surveillance team's activities.

LIENTRAP

8. The LIENTRAP mobile photo vehicle had a decrease in activity during this period because of the dismantling of the old LIENTRAP vehicle and the modification and installation of equipment in the new vehicle. The old LIENTRAP vehicle was used to cover photographically all of the residences of opposition elements in Mexico City. As in the past LIENTRAP provided photographic coverage of addresses of the local Communist parties, residences of members of other Hemisphere parties and several PERUMEN targets. A total of 332 frames of operational photographs were provided by LIENTRAP.

PHOTO LAB

9. LIEMPTY-4, the operator of the LIEMPTY photo lab, processed all of the operational photographs mentioned above as well as providing from 2 to 6 enlargements of 299 frames of photographs of special interest taken by the basehouses. LIEMPTY-4 does the photo processing on Tuesday and Thursday nights.

10. Raymond H. GERENDE started the development of a possible access agent to LIRING and also continued to provide support for the JMROD operation. These task being aside from his regular LIEMPTY duties. GERENDE was on vacation from 25 May through 4 June 1967.

11. There will be one administrative change during the coming period when Vincent P. RIZZUTO will assume the Case Officer responsibilities for GERENDE/LIEMPTY. No problems are envisioned in this change over. No other significant changes are planned.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief/WHD		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Project LIEMPTY/Progress Report for the period 1 February through 30 April 1967

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information

References : HMMA-31354, 13 February 1967 (Previous Progress Report)
HMMA-31636, 20 March 1967 (JMROD/LIEMPTY)

1. During the period 1 February through 30 April 1967, 30 operational meetings were held with Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY support project. These meetings were all prearranged and meeting times and sites were varied to avoid establishing a pattern. No emergency or unscheduled meetings were held with GERENDE during this period.

2. GERENDE met with LIEMPTY-4, -6, -9, -10, -11 and -13--basehouse, photo lab and photo truck operators--twice a week during this period. Meetings with these assets were prearranged and were held at varying times and in different sections of the city.

3. All assets involved in the LIEMPTY Project performed in a satisfactory manner during the period under review.

continued...

Distribution:

(3)- Chief/WHD

CS COPY

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 32068	23 May 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

4. There were no known security incidents during the period covered in this report. As a precautionary measure, the LIEMPTY basehousekeepers were instructed to maintain increased vigilance in their respective areas and buildings and to be prepared to evacuate any incriminating equipment and papers on a moment's notice. This was done because of the renewed interest in the assassination of President Kennedy which in turn brought forth comments in the press about photographs taken of Oswald during his visit to Mexico. On three occasions during this period, LIEMBRACE-3 surveilled the operational meetings between GERENDE and LIEMPTY-6. This was done in order to try to ascertain if any FJSTEAL personnel were taking measures to verify the activities of LIEMPTY-6. LIEMBRACE-3 reported that all of the meetings he covered appeared to be clean of hostile surveillance. (NOTE: Headquarters is aware of the interest FJSTEAL has taken in LIEMPTY-6. LIEMBRACE-3 does not know the exact location of LIMITED/LIEMPTY-6, although he is aware of the existence of this asset because of the radio alert system used by the surveillance team when working the FJSTEAL target. In order to avoid LIEMBRACE-3 surveilling LIEMPTY-6 to the exact address, LIEMBRACE-3 was instructed to surveill GERENDE when he departed the meeting site and to report to GERENDE after LIEMBRACE-3 was convinced that there was no hostile surveillance and after they had departed the meeting area.)

LICALLA

5. During this period LIEMPTY-9, operator of the LICALLA basehouse, provided 1112 frames of operational photographs covering the patio and garden area of FJSTEAL. All photographs provided by LIEMPTY-9 were accompanied by fixed-surveillance reports, sighting reports and special notes. LIEMPTY-9 is a perceptive individual and his special notes and comments are considered to be of great value by the interested section in the Station. LICALLA coverage was suspended during the period 19 through 25 March while LIEMPTY-9 was taking a well-deserved vacation. The cover of the LICALLA basehouse appears to remain good, with no undue attention devoted to it by FJSTEAL personnel.

LILYRIC

6. This basehouse, which is staffed by LIEMPTY-13, -14 and -27, produced 2553 frames of operational photographs during the review period. LIEMPTY-13 is employed full-time and most of the coverage is provided by LIEMPTY-14, and -27, although during this period, LIEMPTY-14 carried the largest share of the workload. In March the hours in which LIEMPTY-27, a medical student, attended school were changed from the afternoon to the morning. This schedule change will remain in effect until the end of June 1967. LIEMPTY-14 does not have the mental composure to remain on the job for the hours needed to provide full-time coverage and her homekeeping duties often interfered with her working hours. In order to alleviate this problem, the working hours of LIEMPTY-6/LIMITED were increased and those of LILYRIC/LIEMPTY-14 decreased. No serious loss of coverage resulted from this temporary change in working hours. The salary of LIEMPTY-27 was cut in half for the period of time in which he will not be providing continual assistance to the Project.

7. LILYRIC remains as the main source of information on WOLADY and other foreign visitors to FJSTEAL.

LIMITED

8. LIEMPTY-6, the operator of the LIMITED basehouse, provided 684 frames of operational photographs during the three month period. LIEMPTY-6 also spent a great deal of time alerting for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team during this period because of the AEQUALITY-1 operation. LIEMPTY-6 was on vacation from 8 through 23 April and coverage from this basehouse was suspended during this period. As mentioned above, LIEMPTY-6 now is working longer hours in order to relieve LIEMPTY-14. LIEMPTY-6 does not know why his hours were increased.

9. On one occasion during this period LIEMPTY-6, while alerting the LIEMBRACE team on an FJSTEAL target, noted that a WOLADY subject had entered FJSTEAL on foot. He alerted the team and they were able to surveill the subject and identify him through records at the hotel where he was staying.

CS COPY

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA - 32068

LIENTRAP

10. The LIENTRAP photo surveillance truck was targetted against a purported forged document processing center, members and addresses of the local Communist parties and their front groups, members of other Hemisphere parties, BEDOX personnel in Mexico City and the DIZTAG Commercial Office. In covering these targets, 948 frames of operational photographs were produced. LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, LIENTRAP operators, serviced, on a thrice weekly basis, over 20 postal boxes which are used as accomodation addresses by the Mexico City Station, other field stations and Headquarters.

11. LIEMPTY-4 who operates the LIEMPTY photo processing lab, processed all of the above mentioned operational photographs as well as providing from 2 to 6 enlargements of 227 frames of photographs of special interest.

12. Raymond H. GERENDE continued to provide support for the JMROD operation as well as carrying out his duties as the Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY Project.

13. GERENDE is planning to take a 14 day vacation starting in late May. During his absence Oliver G. SCANTLING will replace GERENDE as the Principal Agent and contact for LIEMPTY-6, -9, -10, -11 and -13. The Station Case Officer will be in contact with LIEMPTY-4. SCANTLING knows all of the assets whom he will handle and has worked with them in the past, but has not met LIEMPTY-4.

14. As approved by Headquarters, the present LIENTRAP vehicle will be replaced by a new Ford "Econoline" truck in the near future. Before the old LIENTRAP vehicle is sold, it will be used to cover residences of the PJSTEAL/NYXIS opposition who are living in Mexico City.

15. No significant operational or administrative changes, other than those mentioned in this dispatch, are planned for Project LIEMPTY for the coming period.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	☒ NO CONTINUED	PAGE NO.
	SECRET		

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Project LIEMPTY
Progress Report for the period 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

References : A. HMMA-30687, 28 November 1966 (Previous Progress Report)
B. HMMA-30956, 28 December 1966 (SGSWIRL of LIEMPTY-10)
C. HMMW-15157, 18 January 1967 (Project Renewal Approval)
D. HMMA-31164, 24 January 1967 (LIEMPTY Security)

GENERAL

1. Project LIEMPTY is a support project which provides information of CI/CE interest on the FJSTEAL installation, FJSTEAL personnel, visitors to FJSTEAL, both indigenous and foreign, and photographic coverage of various targets deemed of interest by the several operational sections within the Station. The Project has eight active agents plus Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent; two vehicles, GERENDE's QPV and the LIENTRAP photo truck; a photographic processing laboratory; and, three basehouses, LILYRIC, LIMITED and LICALLA. LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, operators of the photo surveillance truck, also acquire and service P. O. boxes used operationally by the Station, Headquarters and other Stations.

2. On 9 December 1966 Luke B. MARSCHALEK (p) assumed Case Officer responsibilities for the LIEMPTY Project. MARSCHALEK was introduced to GERENDE in true name and GERENDE is the only member of the LIEMPTY complex whom MARSCHALEK has met. There were no problems during the change of Case Officers and none are envisioned in the future.

continued...

Distribution:

3 - Chief, WHD

CS COPY

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-31354	13 February 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	**HQS FILE NUMBER**
	S E C R E T	50-6-74/3

CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS

3. During the period under review, 30 meetings were held with GERENDE by the Project Case Officer. Meeting sites and times were varied to avoid establishing a pattern and most meetings were scheduled at the previous meeting. Several unscheduled meetings were held during this period and were arranged by the Case Officer telephoning GERENDE to establish the meeting time and site. Times and sites are coded when discussed by telephone and are arranged in such a way as to appear to be a normal conversation. Telephone calls to GERENDE are made from pay booths located away from the LNPURE installation.

4. GERENDE held twice weekly, clandestine meetings with LIEMPTY-4, -6, -9, -10, -11 and -13. These regular meetings are all prearranged and are held at various sites and at various times of the day so that meetings correspond with the regular habits and movements of the basehousekeepers and LIENTRAP operators.

5. All assets involved in the LIEMPTY project performed in a most satisfactory manner during the period under review. LIFEUD-4 has been extremely efficient in developing and printing negatives provided by the other assets.

PRODUCTION AND ACTIVITIES

6. LICALLA. During this period LIEMPTY -9, operator of the LICALLA basehouse, provided 1,239 frames of operational photographs covering the patio and garden of the FJSTEAL installation, the area where many of the officers, family members and visitors congregate. This coverage is especially valuable because the officers are usually at their leisure and often gather into functional groupings. LIEMPTY-9 is very observant and his comments and notes are considered of great value to the Station. All photos provided by LIEMPTY-9 are accompanied by a fixed-surveillance report.

7. LILYRIC. This basehouse is staffed by LIEMPTY-13, -14, and -27 with LIEMPTY-14 and -27 providing most of the coverage because of the full-time outside employment of LIEMPTY-13. During this period the LILYRIC basehouse provided 2,716 frames of operational photographs covering the only vehicle and pedestrian entrance into the target installation. All photographs were accompanied by fixed-surveillance reports on individual members of the staff of the target installation. The operators are often able to provide the license plate numbers of vehicles used by visitors to the target installation, which in many cases help to identify the visitor.

8. LIMITED. The operator of the LIMITED basehouse is LIEMPTY-6. The LIMITED basehouse also provides coverage of the only vehicle and pedestrian entrance to the FJSTEAL installation, but from a different angle, and the comments made relative to coverage in the section on LILYRIC also pertain to LIMITED. The LIMITED basehouse provided 557 frames of operational photographs during this period. LIMITED also serves as the radio alert for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, although the practice of using a radio alert is being decreased. On two occasions during this period LIEMPTY-6 was alerting for the team in a deception exercise, since the team was not working the FJSTEAL target. This was done on instructions from the Station and LIEMPTY-6 was not told that these were deception exercises.

9. LIENTRAP. During this period as in the last reporting period, the LIENTRAP mobile surveillance unit was targetted mainly against the local Communist parties as well as members of other Hemisphere parties who are living or are in exile in Mexico. The LIENTRAP operators are LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 and during this period they produced 564 frames of operational photographs. LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 also service over 20 postal boxes which are used as accomodation addresses by the Mexico City Station, Headquarters and other field stations.

10. Raymond H. GERENDE. Aside from his regular duties as the Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY Project, GERENDE also provided valuable assistance in the furtherance of objectives involved in the JMROD operation. In this regard, Thomas G. URQUHART, Headquarters officer, held approximately seven operational meetings with GERENDE during this reporting period.

SECURITY

11. LIEMPTY-10 and -11 were afforded a SGSWIRL interview on 8 December 1966. There were no outstanding problems indicated in the results of the interview of LIEMPTY-11. The results of LIEMPTY -10's interview were discussed in Reference B.

12. A general security review of the LIEMPTY Project was forwarded in Reference D.

13. There were no known security problems or incidents during this period which may have jeopardized the operation or the assets involved in the Project. KJSTEAL interest in LIEMPTY-o/LIMITED was discussed in Reference D and apparently is a continuing matter.

PLANS

14. During the coming period no significant operational or administrative changes are planned, since the Project is producing in a timely and satisfactory manner.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Security of LILYRIC, LIMITED and LICALLA

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

1. In December 1966 Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY Project, was asked to prepare a security resume, including his opinions, on the security of the LILYRIC, LIMITED and LICALLA Basehouses vis-a-vis Soviet knowledge of their existence. The following paragraphs contain a slightly edited version of GERENDE's report, which was received on 28 December 1966. Station comments follow GERENDE's and are so noted.

LILYRIC

2. In its present new location LILYRIC is the newest of the photo bases under my control. According to LIEMPTY-13, there has been no indication of interest of any sort by the Soviets in the family's move to the new apartment nor was there in the past any show of interest or peculiar behavior on their (Soviet's) part with regard to the old base and the possibility that they might be under photo surveillance.

3. The cover for the work carried on by this base is good since the wife, LIEMPTY-14, who does most of the work has no trouble in justifying her presence at home all of the time. The son, LIEMPTY-27 is a medical student and attends his classes regularly and can justify his hours as study hours. (He continues to be an excellent student and was exempted from examinations at the end of this, his second year in medical school. Actually, he studies most of the night). LIEMPTY-13 requires no cover as he has a full-time job as production manager for a large concern and he usually makes his meetings with GERENDE on his way to or from work.

continued...

Distribution:
3 - Chief/WHD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-31164

DATE
24 January 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/3

4. The set-up in the old as well as the new base is the following: The equipment - camera, scope and tripod - is mounted in one bedroom behind venetian blinds with one slat removed. This room is locked to keep servants or any chance intruder from entering. The operators do not spend all their time behind the camera, but go to the adjoining bedroom where a table and typewriter are set up and where the daily logs are transcribed, knitting done, or some other activity that does not require full concentration is carried out. The curtains and blinds in this room are kept partially or fully open to allow good visibility and provide a normal appearance. Most of the daily movement of the Soviet personnel is followed from this room and when it is necessary to take pictures of visitors, unknown persons or newly arrived Soviets, the operators go to the other room and use the pre-set equipment.

5. GERENDE's Comment. It seems to me that any careful observation by the Soviets would have revealed the tell-tale position of the venetian blinds in both the old and the new bases. I have no doubt that the Soviets realize they are under photo surveillance. The move by the family from the old to the new building must surely have been noted by the Soviets. Possibly the Soviets think the family is working with the local authorities due to LIEMPTY-13's former association with the Mexican Army.

6. Station Comments. The Station agrees with GERENDE that careful observation by the Soviets would have revealed the missing slat in the venetian blinds and also the fact that these blinds are seldom open. The Station also agrees that the Soviets realize that they are under photo surveillance. This was pointed out recently when a Soviet shielded an LNERGO walk-in when they passed the front gate of the Embassy and made a sign to the walk-in indicating that they could be seen by someone watching with a telescope from the buildings across the street. Also, as Headquarters is aware, there have been numerous comments by residents of Mexico City to the effect that anyone entering the Soviet Embassy is photographed; however, seldom has it been rumored that the "Americans" are doing it, which might indicate most people believe the Mexican Government is doing any such photographing and thereby reaffirming GERENDE's statement that the Soviets possibly believe the Mexican Government runs the base.

7. Given the assumption that the LILYRIC base is blown, the Station at this point does not plan to terminate or revamp the LILYRIC installation. Any operational change by the operators would be spotted by the Soviets and if the Base were closed the Soviets would start looking for a new installation. The LILYRIC Base is performing a useful function and it is believed that it will continue to do so. The Soviets have had opportunities to complain to the Mexican Government about being monitored photographically and have not seen fit to do so and it is believed that they probably will not do so unless there is a radical change in Soviet and/or Mexican policy. The Station has instructed GERENDE to take every precaution during his meetings with LIEMPTY-13 to assure that LIEMPTY-13 does not lead the Soviets to him and thereby jeopardizing other operations, especially LICALLA.

LIMITED

8. The operator of the LIMITED Base, LIEMPTY-6, is, to my knowledge, the oldest hand in the photo surveillance of the Soviet target and possibly the most likely to be "burned". His residence for years at the former Base (now the site of the new LILYRIC building) and his move to the present base could not have gone unnoticed by the Soviets. His cover is that of an insurance salesman, but he actually does not work at the cover and is at a disadvantage in trying to explain his source of income. At times, in years past, he had to afford full-time coverage from the base, which allowed him no time to engage in credible cover activities.

9. GERENDE Comments. I do not believe that LIEMPTY-6/LIMITED is a security risk; however, his present means of working from an open door leading to his balcony probably can be spotted by the Soviets. LIEMPTY-6 is extremely cautious about checking himself for surveillance when making meetings.

56-6-74/5

~~56-6-74/5~~

14-00000

10. Station Comments. The same Station comments made in reference to LILYRIC also apply to LIMITED. Also, the use of LIMITED as the radio alert base for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team has weakened the security of this base. In regard to LIMITED, LICOWL-1 has reported that the Soviets are very interested in LIEMPTY-6/LIMITED and that so many Soviets have talked to him (LICOWL-1) about LIEMPTY-6 that he is convinced that the Soviets have a "fear" and an "obsession" about LIEMPTY-6. LICOWL-1 reported on 3 January 1967 that the Subject of 201-744341 and the Subject of 201-756168 asked him on 19 December 1966 for full details known to him about LIEMPTY-6 and Subject of 201-756168 went so far as to say that he believes that LIEMPTY-6 is "watching the Soviets".

LICALLA

11. When the Soviets raised the height of the wall in their backyard about two years ago, they could have blocked completely the view of this base's working window by making the wall a few inches higher. Since they did not do this, it would seem to indicate that they are not aware that their activities are being monitored from this point. On the other hand, in recent months LIEMPTY-9, the operator, has reported that activities in the back yard have been curtailed more and more. For example, the women no longer congregate there daily, the school children enter their classes by a route not visible to LIEMPTY-9 and the trees and shrubs have not been trimmed in years, making LIEMPTY-9's view poor in most directions. LIEMPTY-9 says that he has never noticed any undue interest in his house or his activities by the Soviets. Access to the operating room can be seen from the window which LIEMPTY-9 believes to be the commo room in the target installation.

12. The cover for this base is that of a normal residence. LIEMPTY-9's cover work is that of a car and insurance salesman in a local automobile agency in the afternoon only. LIEMPTY-9 does work in his cover. LIEMPTY-9's cover for the use of the operating room is that he does accounting work for client firms. The door is kept locked at all times and LIEMPTY-9 never allows the servant to enter, even for cleaning purposes. The equipment is kept locked in a trunk within the room when not in use and all logs and photos are kept in a safe located in LIEMPTY-9's bedroom closet.

13. GERENDE Comment. I believe the Soviets are aware of the photo surveillance being carried out by this base due to the position of the window and the curtains during the hours when LIEMPTY-9 is operating.

14. Station Comment. The Station does not believe that this photo base is known to the Soviets. This belief is based on the fact that the LICALLA coverage is excellent and there has been no indication that the Soviets act for the benefit of observers while they are in the backyard. It is interesting to note that the Soviets made no effort to "protect" the LNERGO walk-in mentioned in paragraph 6 above during a visit to the backyard and LICALLA did obtain photographs of the walk-in. The school children no longer pass through the backyard because the location of the school was recently changed and the children now go by another route. The Station has instructed GERENDE to take every precaution in order to protect the security of the LICALLA base.

15. As a general comment pertaining to the security of the bases involved in Project LIEMPTY, it should be noted that the Soviets are aware of the fact that LIMOUSINE is the owner/builder of the new LILYRIC building. LIMOUSINE is also the owner of the LIMESA complex, through a holding company.

16. The Station realizes that most of the details reported in this dispatch are known to Headquarters; however, the Station wanted to make the opinions of the Principal Agent and the Station a matter of record in a consolidated form.

For/Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WHD		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT LIEMPTY/Progress Report
1 August through 31 October 1966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

References : A. HMMA-29775, dated 15 August 1966

B. MEXICO CITY-8526, dated 12 September 1966

C. HMMA-30203, dated 3 October 1966

D. MEXICO CITY-8807, dated 10 October 1966

E. HMMA-30403, dated 26 October 1966

1. SUMMARY OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND REPORTING

A. The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY Progress Report, covering the period 1 May through 31 July 1966, was forwarded to Headquarters as Reference A. Noteworthy interim Project activities were reported in References B. through D. while Mexico City Station's Request for the Renewal of Project LIEMPTY was forwarded with Reference E.

B. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors. This activity was in consonance with various sections of the RMD as approved for Station Mexico City. The above cited program was accomplished through the daily photographic and fixed surveillance coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses. In addition, the LIEMPTY Project provided effective support to other Station and Headquarters (i.e. AMROD and AMLETTER) activities through the exploitation of the LIENTRAP mobile/photographic unit and the LIEMPTY principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE.

continued...

Distribution:
3-Chief/WHD

LIEMPTY

CS COPY

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-30687	28 November 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 30687

2. AGENT COMMUNICATIONS, CONTACT AND PERFORMANCE

During the period under review, Raymond H. GERENDS was seen 2[illegible] times in regular operational meetings by the LIEMPTY Project case officer. No basic changes other than the regular preplanned variations in meeting sites and times were made in the Project communication channels. The up-dated and revised emergency communication system for contact with GERENDS (see HMMA-28333, dated 21 February 1966) remains in effect. All regular contact with the active LIEMPTY agents (LIEMPTYs -4, -6, -9, -10, -11, -13, -14, and -26) was maintained via Raymond H. GERENDS. GERENDS met each of the above cited agents, with the exception of LIEMPTYs -14, and -26, two times each week in clandestine meetings. The operational performance of all active LIEMPTY agents, including GERENDS was most satisfactory. The performance of LIEMPTY-4 in assisting the local WOACRE section with its photographic processing was outstanding.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

A. SUMMARY - Throughout the reporting period, the LIEMPTY Project continued to provide the vast majority of the operational photographs and surveillance reports used by the Station in its planning and operations against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. The LIEMPTY coverage has proved to be a particularly reliable tool for: following the daily comings and goings of the LIMERICK personnel; providing leads to and confirming the identifications of new LIMERICK staffers and also visitors to the LIMERICK installation; providing leads to the relative rank and the specific intelligence service affiliation of various LIMERICK officers; keeping the Station abreast of construction and physical changes in the LIMERICK physical plant; and providing a reliable check on various Station and LNERGO access agents. During the quarter under review, Project LIEMPTY basehouses provided 5,003 frames of operational photographs (169 rolls) as well as 1,290 pages of fixed surveillance reports covering the movements of the LIMERICK staffers.

B. LIENTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIENTRAP mobile unit was again targetted heavily against leaders and meeting sites of the local Communist parties as well as other targets of opportunity, particularly Haitian, Guatemalan and Honduran Communist exile leaders now resident in Mexico. LIENTRAP provided up-dated and/or new identification photographs which are of value to both the JMTIGER and the Station recruitment/penetration program. This apparat provided a total of 237 operational photographs, while the personnel attached to this LIENTRAP unit regularly serviced 23 postal accommodation addresses used by Mexico City Station, Headquarters and other field Stations.

C. LIMITED - During this quarter, the LIMITED basehouse provided 724 frames of operational film as well as daily physical surveillance reports covering the arrival and departure of all LIMERICK personnel and visitors at the front gate of that installation during the evening and week-end hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehousekeeper, working from his excellent visual vantage point, dispatched the LIEMBRACE surveillance team via radio on several LIEMBRACE surveillance operations.

D. LILYRIC - During this reporting period, the LILYRIC basehouse provided 2,859 frames of operational photographs covering the same area and targets noted in the LIMITED section above, but during the morning and afternoon hours. In October the LILYRIC personnel (LIEMPTYs -13, -14, -26 and -27) successfully completed the move into the new LIMOUSINE building. While some photographic coverage was lost during the move, LILYRIC coverage at present is back to normal (see also paragraph 4 of Reference A.).

E. LICALLA - Throughout this period, the LICALLA basehouse provided both physical observation and photographic coverage of the garden and patio of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers, their families and visitors congregate. In providing this coverage LICALLA produced 1,183 individual photographs (of which 80 were color prints used in the Station's "mug book") as well as regular daily reports on the salient activities in this area.

CS COPY

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA- 30637

F. LIEMPTY-4 - With the exception of the color prints, all of the above cited operational film provided by the basehouses and the LIENTRAP unit was developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4 at the LIEMPTY photographic laboratory. In order to alleviate some of the pressure caused by recent adjustments in the Station's WOACRE section, LIEMPTY-4 also processed approximately 200 photographic enlargements which normally would not fall within the scope of this project.

G. Raymond H. GERENDE - Throughout the reporting period, GERENDS served as the full time principal agent for Project LIEMPTY, operating as the cut-out to the above cited basehouses and bearing the first echelon agent handling responsibility for all active personnel. In addition, GERENDE via hard leg work and his translating ability, made numerous and essential contributions to the AMROD deception operation.

4. SECURITY AND PLANS

A. There have been no known incidents during the reporting period which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY or the personnel therein. Station plans to afford LIEMPTYs-10 and -11 SGSWIRL examinations during the ensuing period. All other active LIEMPTY agents have been SGSWIRLed during the past year.

B. No significant operational or administrative changes are planned for the ensuing period since this Project is producing in a satisfactory and regular manner.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ NO CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
yes — MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

17

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Acting Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Identification of Florida License Plate 1-105538

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information
References: A. MEXI-8361, 24 August 1966
B. DIR-31174, 27 August 1966
C. MEXI 8394, 26 August 1966

MICROFILMED
SEP 19 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Contained herein is supplemental information to Reference B.

2. Florida lincese plates 1-105538 were registered to Lewis *WOLSHIN for use on a 1964 Ford.

DOB: 1908 [illegible] USA

3. JMWAVE investigation revealed that WOLSHIN was born in 1908 and is presently residing at 1684 9th Avenue, Hialeah, Florida with his wife Olga A. *WOLSHIN. Their telephone number is 887-7907. He has been employed as a Pool Manager or Assistant Park Manager by Dade County since 1953. He had a satisfactory credit rating. Police checks in Miami indicated the following arrest record:

a. In 1934 he was arrested in New York City for felonious assault. The charge was later reduced to simple assault.

b. In 1941 he was arrested in Savanah, Georgia for investigation of auto larceny. He was released to New York.

c. 1941 arrested in New York City for violation of probation.

d. 1947 arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada for peddling without a license.

e. 1951 arrested in New York City for petty larceny.

4. Neither RI nor WOBONE indices contained information on WOLSHIN or his wife.

5. Permission is granted to pass the above information to LNERGO. We are also making it available to their Headquarters.

Laura J. UTSTINE

LIEMPTY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City
1 - COS, JMWAVE

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-14857	DATE 12 SEP 1966 1 September 1966
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

RI
Chrono
WH/Security
SR/O/WH
WH/C/FI

2EG 8 10 33 AM '66

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/~~Verance~~		nr	3654

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/Security		Mr. Hannah
SR/O/WH	2 Sept 66	F. Wallace M. Honderson
WH/C/FI	8 Sept	

2EG 1 5 03 PM '66

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1		J. Fisher

ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX ✓

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

29 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1

ATTENTION : Jane Zerance

SUBJECT : Identification of License Tag 1-105538

1. Identification of the above captioned license tag was made by JMWAVE security. They have furnished the following information.

2. The license tag is registered to Lewis Wolshin, born 1908; is residing at 684 SE 9th Avenue, Hialeah, Florida. The tag was issued on a 1964 Ford. Wolshin's wife is Olga A. Wolshin; he has been employed as Pool Manager or Assistant Park Manager by Dade County, Florida, since 1953. A credit check was conducted in Wolshin's name, and a October 1964 report indicated biographic data as listed above. He had been known to the credit bureau since 1951, had satisfactory credit, and no derogatory information was available. Police checks in Miami, Florida, indicated the following arrest record:

1934	New York City	Felonious assault charge reduced to simple assault
1941	Savannah, Ga.	Investigation of auto larceny, released to New York
1941	New York City	Violation of probation
1947	Las Vegas, Nev.	Peddling without license
1951	New York City	Petty Larceny

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

file LIEMPTY
50-6-74/3 C

Wolshin's telephone number at Hialeah, Florida, is 887-7907. The Office of Security Indices has no record of Wolshin or his wife Olga.

Richard J. Hannah

Richard J. Hannah
WH/Security

14-00000

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

13 SEP 1966

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Visitors to the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City

1. A usually reliable source reported that an American looking couple visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from 1200 to 1230 hours on 23 August 1966. They were driving a Falcon bus bearing Florida tags 1-105538 (white numerals on blue.)

2. Investigation revealed that the plates were registered to Lewis WOLSHIN for use on a 1964 Ford.

3. WOLSHIN was born in 1903 and is presently residing at 684 9th Avenue, Hialeah, Florida with his wife Olga A. WOLSHIN. Their telephone number is 887-7907. He has been employed as Pool Manager or Assistant Park Manager by Dade County since 1953. He had a satisfactory credit rating. Police checks in Miami indicated the following arrest record:

1934	New York City	Felonious assault charge reduced to simple assault.
1941	Savannah, Georgia	Investigation of auto larceny, released to New York
1941	New York City	Violation of probation
1947	Las Vegas, Nevada	Peddling without license
1951	New York City	Petty larceny.

~~PS~~ ~~DEST~~ LVH/1
ABSTRACT X

4. This Office has no information on the above-mentioned individuals.

5. The information contained herein has been passed to your representative in Mexico City and may not receive further dissemination by your Bureau without prior approval of this Office.

CSCI-316/04400-66 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CS COPY

Lowry/3

50-6-74/3

CSCI-316/04400-66

1 September 1966

BASIC: MEXI-8361, 24 Aug 66
DIR-31174, 27 Aug 66
MEXI-8394, 26 Aug 66

PROJ : LIENVOY/LILYRIC

LIAISON: --

FILE: 50-6-74/3)

(Distribution & coord., next page)

CSCI-316/04400-66

Distribution:
O & 1 - FBI
cc - RI (50-6-74/3)
cc - CI/LIA
cc - WH/1/MEXICO
cc - WH/1/Chrono
cc - WH/FI
cc - WH/Sec
cc - SR/O/WH
cc - WH/C/FI

Coordinated with:
WH/Sec________________
SR/O/WH________________
WH/C/FI________________

WH/1/Jane Zerance/nr/1 September 1966

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 3

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SB8

ACTION

26 AUG 66 IN 84385

S E C R E T 262305Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8394

DIRECTOR

WOMUSE

REF MEXICO CITY 8361 (IN 82664) *

REF CAR WAS FALCON BUS, NOT VOLKSWAGEN.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

* RE AMERICAN LOOKING COUPLE WHO VISITED SOVIET EMBASSY 23 AUG.

d B

LIEMPTY OPS

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ORIG: J. Zeance/kaw
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 26 August 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
XX NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 15 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE . WH/C 8, C/OPS

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 27 1440Z CITE DIRECTOR 31174

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

REF: MEXICO CITY 8361 (IN 82664) NOT SENT JMWAVE

1. FLORIDA TAG 1-105538 REGISTERED LOUIS WOLSHIN DOB 1908 OF 684 S. E. NINTH AVE., HIALEAH. WIFE OLGA A. EMPLOYED AS POOL MGR OR ASST PARK MGR BY DADE COUNTY SINCE 1953. SATISFACTORY CREDIT. POLICE RECORD 1934 TO 1951, FIVE ARRESTS INCLUDING LARCENY, ASSAULT, VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND PEDDLING WITHOUT LICENSE. NO HDQS TRACES. PERMISSION GRANTED PASS LNERGO.

2. JMWAVE: SOLUTION TO LICENSE PLATE OF AMERICAN LOOKING COUPLE VISITING SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO CITY 23 AUGUST.

END OF MESSAGE

LIEMPTY OPS

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

WH/SEC - Mr. Hannah,
(by phone)
WH/C/CICS

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

4-65

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 3

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, SB 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 242020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8361

24 AUG 66 E2864

DIRECTOR

WOMUSE

1. LILYRIC REPORTS AMERICAN LOOKING COUPLE VISITED SOVIET EMBASSY 23 AUG FROM 1200 TO 1230 HOURS. WERE DRIVING CAR, BELIEVED VOLKSWAGEN BUS, WITH WHITE ON BLUE FLORIDA TAGS 1-105538.

2. WILL ADVISE LOCAL LNERGO.

3. PLEASE CABLE SOLUTION TO LICENSE PLATE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

WOLSHIN

Cy of cable sent Jerry Mullane - 25 Aug 66

LIEMPTY OPS

3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief/WHD

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/Progress Report
1 May through 31 July 1966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

References : A. HMMA-28938, dated 13 May 1966

B. MEXICO CITY 7533, dated 6 June 1966

C. DIRECTOR 12138, dated 14 June 1966

D. DIRECTOR 19940, dated 14 July 1966

1. SUMMARY OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES, REPORTING and ACTIVITIES.

The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY Progress Report, covering the period 1 February through 30 April 1966, was forwarded to Headquarters as reference A. Salient interim project activities and levied requirements were contained in references B. through D. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors, as well as various targets of opportunity. This activity was in consonance with and represented partial fulfillment of various sections of the RMD as approved for Station Mexico City. The above cited program was achieved through the daily photographic and fixed surveillance coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses, as well as the LIENTRAP mobil photo unit. In addition the LIEMPTY Project provided essential support to various other Headquarters (i.e. AMROD and AECUTLET) activities and other Station operations through the regular exploitation of the LIEMPTY principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE.

continued...

Distribution:

3 - Chief/WHD

CS COPY

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-29775	15 August 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-74/3

2. AGENT COMMUNICATION, CONTACT AND PERFORMANCE.

During the period under review, GERENDE was seen 25 times in regular operational meetings by the LIEMPTY Project case officer. No basic departures, other than the regular pre-planned changes in meeting sites and time, were made in the regular and alternate communication channels. The up-dated and revised emergency communication system for contact with GERENDE as forwarded to Headquarters in HMMA-28333, dated 21 February 1966 remains in effect. During the period under review, the emergency contact arrangements pertinent to LIEMPTYs -4, -6, -9, -13 and -14 were reviewed by GERENDE and the respective agents. The operational performance of all active LIEMPTY agents was highly satisfactory. As per usual, GERENDE turned in the solid operational performance which the Station has come to expect from this long-time contract agent.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS.

A. Summary - Throughout the reporting period, the LIEMPTY Project continued to provide the vast majority of the operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used by the Station in its operational planning against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. The LIEMPTY coverage has proved to be a particularly reliable tool for: following the daily movements of LIMERICK personnel; providing leads to and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; providing leads to the relative rank and the specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers; keeping the Station abreast of construction changes in the LIMERICK physical plant; and providing a reliable check on various Station and LNERGO access agents. During the quarter under review, Project LIEMPTY basehouses provided a record 5,722 frames of operational photographs (184 reels) as well as approximately 1,200 pages of fixed surveillance reports covering the movements of the LIMERICK staffers.

B. LIENTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIENTRAP mobile unit was targetted against leaders and meeting sites of the local Communist parties as well as other targets of opportunity, particularly exile Communist leaders now resident in Mexico. LIENTRAP provided up-dated identification photographs of Communist officers which are of value to both the JMTIGER program and the Station's recruitment/penetration program. This apparat provided 282 operational photographs, while the personnel attached to the LIENTRAP unit also regularly serviced 21 postal accommodation addresses used by Mexico City Station, Headquarters and other Field Stations. In July, the LIENTRAP unit was repainted and completely overhauled.

C. LIMITED - During this quarter, the LIMITED basehouse provided 1,215 frames (47 reels) of operational film as well as daily physical surveillance reports covering the arrival and departure of all LIMERICK personnel, at the front gate of that installation during the evening and weekend hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper, served as the radio dispatcher for numerous LIEMBRACE surveillance operations.

D. LILYRIC - During this period, the LILYRIC basehouse provided a record 3,301 frames (99 reels) of operational photographs covering the same area and targets as noted in the LIMITED section above, but during the morning and afternoon hours. As noted in paragraph 5 of reference A., Station completed the rearrangement of the LIMITED-LILYRIC working hours, based on the recent recruitment and clearance of LIEMPTYs -26 and -27. The LILYRIC basehouse now provides photographic and physical surveillance coverage from 0800 hours through 1700 hours, while LIMITED provides coverage from 1700 hours to 1930 hours on weekdays. LIMITED also provides morning coverage on Saturdays and Sundays.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-29775

E. LICALLA - Throughout this period, the LICALLA basehouse provided coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers, their families and visitors congregate. In providing this coverage, LICALLA produced 1,206 individual photographs as well as regular daily reports on the salient activities in this area.

F. MISCELLANEOUS - All of the above cited operational film provided by the basehouses and the LIENTRAP unit was developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4 at the LIEMPTY Photo Lab. During this period, LIEMPTY-19 provided translations of numerous articles and documents in support of other Station activities not directly related to Project LIEMPTY.

G. Raymond H. GERENDE - Throughout the reporting period, GERENDE served as the full-time LIEMPTY P/A, operating as the cut-out to the above-cited basehouses and bearing the agent handling responsibility for the related personnel, as well as handling the operators of the LIENTRAP unit (LIEMPTYs -10 and 11), LIEMPTY-4 and LIEMPTY-19. GERENDE's overall operational assignment involved at least 12 clandestine meetings per week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY case officer. It should be noted that GERENDE also made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD deception operation.

4. SECURITY AND PLANS.

A. There had been no known incidents during the reporting period which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY or the personnel attached thereto.

B. In order to alleviate a portion of the pressure caused by the recent major adjustment in the Station's WOACRE section, the LIEMPTY photographic base, during the ensuing period, will process various Station photographic requirements which normally do not fall within the realm of this Project.

C. It is anticipated that the LILYRIC personnel (LIEMPTYs -13, -14, -26 and -27) will move into the new LIMOUSINE building during the forthcoming period. Little, if any, coverage will be lost during this move. Other than noted above, no significant operational or administrative changes are planned for the ensuing period.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

14-00000

ATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
S-E-C-R-E-T	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief/KUSIOT

SUBJECT AQUATIC/AMROD

Examination of Envelopes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-29002, 20 May 1966

Examination of the five envelopes sent as attachments with reference shows possible evidence of tampering on one envelope, while the other four show no evidence of tampering. For your convenience we are attaching a xerox copy of the envelope which showed evidence of tampering.

Neil A. Cocayne

Neil A. COCAYNE

Attachment: (1 envl)
1. Xerox copy of envelope

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City, w/att.

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-14695 CS COPY	30 JUN 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	50-6-74/3

1 - RI, w/o
1 - TSD/Registry, w/o
1 - WH/1, w/o
1 - WH/C/CA/PA, w/o
1 - TSD/CCG/OPS

ANY/FI
FS
DESK
ABSTRACT
INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT.
TSD/CCG/OPS	CDBrammer	mah	27 June 1966	x2922

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/1	24 Jun 66	W. Fredrick (by phone), x3654
WH/C/CA/PA	21 June 66	Pat Johnson (in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/TSD/CCG	27 JUN 1966	John S. Foster

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Project LIEMPTY/Progress Report
1 February through 30 April 1966

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

References:
A. HMMA-28322, dated 17 February 1966
B. DIR-81875, dated 20 February 1966
C. MEXI-6479, dated 7 March 1966
D. MEXI-6611, dated 22 March 1966
E. MEXI-6668, dated 28 March 1966
F. MEXI-6794, dated 6 April 1966

Action Required: For Your Information.

1. SUMMARY OF PROJECT REPORTING AND ACTIVITY

The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY Progress Report, covering the period 1 November 1965 through 31 January 1966 was forwarded to Headquarters as reference A. Salient interim operational and security activities and developments were included in references B. through F. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors, as well as various targets of opportunity. This activity was in consonance with, and represented partial fulfillment of various sections of the RMD as approved for Mexico City Station. The above-cited progress was achieved through the daily photographic and fixed surveillance coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses as well as the LIENTRAP mobile photographic unit. In addition, the LIEMPTY project provided essential support to various other Headquarters (particularly the AMROD operation) and Station activities

continued...

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

IS COPY

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28938	13 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-74/3

through the exploitation of the LIEMPTY Principal Agent, Raymond H. GERENDE.

2. AGENT COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTACT

During the period under review, GERENDE was seen 33 times in regular operational meetings by the undersigned, and on 2 occasions by the local KURIOT representative, Hugh T. FRANCOTTE. The meetings between FRANCOTTE and GERENDE were attended by the LIEMPTY Project Case Officer and dealt with the installation of a new PAKO print dryer in the LIEMPTY photo laboratory. In addition, GERENDE met four times, for extended periods, with LCFLUTTER examiner Daniel R. HOSKIER when he served as the interpreter for the LCFLUTTER examinations afforded LIEMPTYs, -6,-9,-14,-13, -26, and -27. No basic departures, other than the regular preplanned changes in meeting sites and times, were made in the regular and alternate communications channels to GERENDE. It should be noted that an up-dated and revised emergency communication system for contact with GERENDE was forwarded to Headquarters as HMMA-28333, dated 21 February 1966. This plan includes both verbal and physical bona fides and supersedes previous arrangements.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS, ACHIEVEMENTS

a) SUMMARY - Throughout the reporting period, Project LIEMPTY continued to provide the vast majority of the operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. The LIEMPTY coverage has proved to be a most reliable tool for: following the daily movements of LIMERICK personnel; providing leads to, and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; verifying or providing leads to the relative rank and specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers; keeping the Station abreast of construction changes in the LIMERICK physical plant; providing a check on reports of Station and ODENVY access agents. During the three month period under review, Project LIEMPTY's basehouses provided 3,967 frames of operational photographs (146 rolls) as well as 650 pages of fixed surveillance reports covering this target.

b) LIENTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIENTRAP mobile unit was targetted against leaders and meeting-sites of the local Communist parties as well as other targets of opportunity, specifically the leaders of the strike group at the National University. LIENTRAP provided up-to-date photographs of numerous Communist officials, which are of value to both the JMTIGER program and the Station's recruitment/penetration program. This unit provided 330 operational photographs, while the personnel attached to this unit also regularly serviced 21 postal accommodation addresses used by Mexico City Station, Headquarters, and other field Stations.

c) LIMITED - During this period, the LIMITED basehouse provided 1,147 frames (45 rolls) of operational film and daily observation reports covering the arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel and visitors at the front gate of that installation during the afternoon and rush-hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper, served as the radio dispatcher for several LIEMBRACE surveillance operations.

d) LILYRIC - During this period, the LILYRIC basehouse provided 1,660 frames (56 rolls) of operational photographs, covering the same area and targets noted in the LIMITED section, but during the morning and early afternoon hours. In addition, the LILYRIC personnel prepared a detailed report on the daily comings and goings of each LIMERICK staffer and contributed the majority of this Project's physical surveillance reports.

e) LICALLA - Throughout this period, the LICALLA basehouse provided photographic coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers, their families and visitors congregate. In providing this coverage, LICALLA produced 1160 individual photographs as well as regular, daily reports on the salient activities in this area.

f) LIEMPTY-4 - All the above cited operational film (160 rolls, 4,297 frames) provided by the basehouses and the LIENTRAP unit was developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4 at the LIEMPTY photo lab. As noted in paragraph 2 above, a new semi-automatic PAKO print dryer was recently installed in the photo laboratory. With the installation of this dryer, the Station's modernization of the LIEMPTY photo laboratory has been completed. (See paragraph 5 of HMMA-27653, dated 17 November for the details of this program).

g. Raymond H. GERENDE - During the reporting period, GERENDE served as the full-time LIEMPTY P/A, operating as the cutout to the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and bearing the agent handling responsibility for the related personnel as well as handling the operators of the LIENTRAP mobile unit, LIEMPTY-4, and LIEMPTY-19, a Station asset (translator) carried under Project LIFEAT. Gerende's overall assignment involved at least twelve clandestine agent meetings each week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY Project case officer. It should be noted that GERENDE also made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD deception operation.

4. SECURITY

There have been no known incidents which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY. During the period under review, LIEMPTYs -6, -9, -13, -14, -26, and -27 were afforded LCFLUTTER examinations, all with satisfactory results.

5. CHANGES AND PLANNING

As noted in paragraph 5 of reference A, Station is in the process of increasing the hours of both the photographic and physical surveillance coverage provided by the LILYRIC operations during the week-days. At present, the LILYRIC personnel are providing coverage from early morning to late afternoon, while LIMITED is providing week-end coverage. After the LILYRICs have moved into the new LIMCUSINE building, it is anticipated that they will be able to provide complete dawn to dusk coverage, the Station's ultimate goal.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

to be a memorandum from the [illegible] Office of Naval Construction to the Mexican Secretary of the Navy concerning the departure from Mexico City of the Chief of Naval Construction for the port of Mazatlan on official orders. The Station is attempting to determine just how the Soviets obtained this memorandum.

During April 1965, the American Embassy Protection and Welfare officer advised the Station that he had received a call from the States from a Mr. James Green, Sr. concerning his son, James C. Green, Jr. and a friend of his son's, Grant W. Crayne. He said that according to Mr. Green, his son and Crayne had called Mr. Green and told him that they were going to the Soviet Union. The two men later visited the U. S. Embassy and were interviewed by a Station officer. The following day on 12 April, Subject reported that two Americans (who fitted the descriptions of Green and Crayne) had visited the Soviet Embassy that same day. This fact was subsequently confirmed by LIMITED. LIEMBRACE surveillance was placed on the two men and this eventually led to their arrest and deportation from Mexico.

Also during the reporting period, Subject reported an incident which the Station felt could be used to discredit the Soviet Embassy in the eyes of the local population. The story, which is factual, was placed in the newspaper La Prensa by LILISP-E during July 1965. An English language translation of the article follows :

La Prensa, 19 July 1965 (Editorial page)

"The Men 'Made in Moscow'"

. . "The men made in Moscow lack sensibilities, are forbidden, because of their Marxist beliefs, to aid the suffering or to help those in need. On 3 July of this year, in front of the Russian Embassy, a Mexican was hurt by a large lamp which had been placed above the gate to the Embassy and which fell on him due to the strong wind. The wounded man, bleeding profusely, begged the Russian guards who were but a few feet away from a telephone to call the Red Cross. The guard answered that the Embassy was not responsible for the force of the wind and that the man should move on his way and not bother him. At this point, some local workers and students began to gather about the wounded man and several of them asked that the Russian guard telephone the Red Cross. The Soviet guard again refused this request and also refused the students permission to use the guard-house phone themselves. Meanwhile, the bleeding man had lost consciousness and the students demonstrated their feelings toward this monstrous lack of charity by shouting (names) at the Russians. The Russian answered (in Spanish) that the accident was of no interest to the Embassy and besides no one there spoke Spanish. A good Communist has no reason to show pity in the face of misfortune. Deformers that they are, lacking sensibilities, they cannot find the goodness to pity anyone. . . ."

8. Concerning the possible security questions raised by the Station in HMMA-27692 of 12 November 1965, the Station would like to comment that no new doubts concerning LICOOL-1 have arisen since this dispatch was written. We plan to give LICOOL-1 a LCFLUTTER test during March 1966.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Project LIEMPTY Progress Report
1 November 1965 through 31 January 1966

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HMMA-27653, dated 17 November 1965

B. MEXI-5390, dated 23 November 1965

C. MEXI-5401, dated 24 November 1965

D. MEXI-5421, dated 26 November 1965

E. MEXI-5452, dated 30 November 1965

1. SUMMARY OF PROJECT ACTIVITY AND REPORTING

The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY Progress Report covering the period 1 August through 31 October 1965 was forwarded to Headquarters as reference A. Salient interim activities and developments were included in references B. through E. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors, as well as various targets of opportunity. This was achieved through the daily photographic and fixed surveillance coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and the LIENTRAP mobile unit. In addition, the LIEMPTY project provided essential support to various other Headquarters (particularly the AMROD operation) and Station activities through the exploitation of the LIEMPTY Principal Agent, Raymond H. GERENDE.

continued...

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WH Division

Liempty
50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28322	17 February 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

2. AGENT CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS

During the reporting period, GERENDE was seen 34 times in regular operational meetings by the undersigned and on 5 occasions by the Headquarters' AMROD operations officer, Thomas G. URQUHART. All meetings were regularly rotated among eight selected sites. No basic departures were made from the standard meeting modus operandi; however, new contact arrangements, for meetings under emergency conditions, are being worked out with GERENDE.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS, ACHIEVEMENTS

a) SUMMARY - Throughout the reporting period, Project LIEMPTY continued to provide the vast majority of the operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations targetted against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. This activity is in direct support of, and in consonance with, the current RMD as approved for the Station. The LIEMPTY coverage has proved to be a most reliable tool for: following the daily movements of LIMERICK personnel; providing leads to, and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; verifying the relative rank and specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers; keeping the Station abreast of construction changes of the LIMERICK physical plant; and verifying reports of Station access agents. During the period under review, the LIEMPTY basehouses produced 4,212 photographs (149 rolls) as well as 640 pages of fixed surveillance reports covering this target.

b) LIENTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIENTRAP mobile unit was targetted against leaders and meeting-sites of the local communist parties as well as other targets of opportunity. Specifically, LIENTRAP provided up-to-date photographs of numerous communist officials, which are of value to both the JMTIGER program and the Station's penetration/recruitment program. The LIENTRAP unit and personnel also regularly serviced 21 postal accommodation addresses used by Mexico City Station, Headquarters, and other field Stations. The LIENTRAP unit provided a total of 404 operational photographs.

c) LIMITED - During the reporting period, the LIMITED basehouse provided 1,412 frames (54 rolls) of operational film and daily observation reports covering the arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel and visitors at the front gate of the installation during the afternoon and early evening hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper, served as the radio dispatcher on several LIEMBRACE surveillance operations. The value and need of the LIMITED fixed-radio dispatching base has been explained in detail in previous LIEMPTY Progress Reports.

d) LILYRIC - During this period, the LILYRIC basehouse produced 1,542 frames (54 rolls) of operational photographs, covering the same area and targets noted in the LIMITED section, but during the morning and early afternoon hours. In addition, LILYRIC prepared a weekly report on the comings and goings of each LIMERICK staffer and contributed the majority of this project's physical surveillance reports.

e) LICALLA - Throughout this period, the LICALLA basehouse provided photographic coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers, their families, and visitors congregate. In covering this area, LICALLA produced 1,258 individual photographs as well as regular reports on the activities of various officials of special interest to the Station.

f) LIEMPTY-4 - All the above noted operational film (155 rolls, 4,616 frames) provided by the basehouses and the LIENTRAP unit was developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4 at the LIEMPTY photo processing base. As noted in reference A., much of the LIEMPTY photographic lab equipment was scheduled to be replaced during this period. With the advice of the local KODAK representative, both the LIEMPTY lab's film washing system and strip printer were replaced. In addition, a new semi-automatic drum-type print dryer was ordered by the Station for installation in this base during February 1966.

g) Raymond H. GERENDE - During the reporting period, GERENDE served as the full-time LIEMPTY P/A, operating as the cutout to the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and bearing the agent handling responsibility for the operators of the LIEMTRAP mobile unit as well as LIEMPTY-4 and LIEMPTY-19, a Station asset (translator) carried under Project LIFEAT. This overall assignment involved at least twelve clandestine agent meetings per week (in addition the 34 meetings held with the Project Case Officer). GERENDE also made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD operation. It should be noted that GERENDE's alertness in spotting the PBRUMEN surveillance of one of the AMROD accommodation addresses, undoubtedly saved this sensitive deception operation from exposure by the opposition.

4. SECURITY AND PROBLEMS

Other than the attempted PBRUMEN surveillance of the AMROD accommodation address noted above (which was neutralized by GERENDE's alertness), there have been no known incidents which adversely affected the security of the LIEMPTY project or the related agent personnel. While several minor administrative problems arose, all such matters were resolved locally.

5. CHANGES AND PLANNING

a) One major operational change is planned for the ensuing period. Upon completion of the new LIMOUSINE structure (see HMMA-25352, dated 10 February 1965), the Station will move the present LILYRIC basehouse personnel (LIEMPTYs 13, 14, 26 and 27) into that edifice rather than the LIMITED (LIEMPTYs 6 and 7) personnel as originally planned. Ancillary modifications are: 1) To increase the hours of both the photographic and physical surveillance coverage provided by the LILYRIC operators (dawn to dusk) during the week days and 2) have LIMITED provide photographic and physical surveillance coverage on week-ends only, while remaining on daily stand-by for radio-dispatching assignments. These changes were dictated by the following considerations:

1) The new LIMOUSINE building will offer a much better vantage point for both photographic and physical surveillance than does the present complex which houses the LILYRIC and LIMITED bases. Therefore, the Station feels that the personnel occupying this new base should be those possessing the highest technical skills and also those able to provide the most thorough and complete coverage. Since the LIMITED base now has only one trained operator while the LILYRIC basehouse has three, the LILYRIC group is indicated.

2) Because it appears that the coverage of the LIMERICK installation will be a long-range and continuing requirement, the Station desires to staff the new base with personnel of long-range potential. Since LIEMPTY-6 is now almost 60 years old, it is obvious that he does not possess this potential; however, the LILYRIC agent complex happily combines experienced personnel with youthful agents.

3) Finally, the social and financial status of the LILYRIC personnel is much more compatible and consistent with the environment of the new building than is that of the LIMITED family.

While it is anticipated that these modifications and changes will initially cause various administrative and operational problems, it is believed that all such adjustments can be handled locally.

b) The requisite copies of the PRQ Part II pertinent to LIEMPTY-26 were forwarded to Headquarters with HMMA-27593, dated 3 November 1965 along with a request for a full Operational Approval for Subject for use as a cut-out to the LILYRIC basehouse. LIEMPTY-27 was granted a Provisional Operational Approval on 26 January 1966 for use as a part-time basehouse keeper/operator at the LILYRIC installation.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-28322

c) Other than noted above, there have been no major administrative, operational, or personnel changes during the reporting period.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 4

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG : C.Busbts-Videla
NIT : WH/1
XT : 4506
ATE : 18 Nov 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

2 SECRET

20 Nov 65 16 11 z

O : MEXICO CITY

ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY COMMO 7 CS 3 CI CI/OPS ~~SIG CEN~~

FI

O MEXI INFO CARA CITE DIR 59668

REF CARA 3029 (IN 94102)*

HQS APPROVES MR. MOREHOUSE STOPPING BY MEXI FOR DISCUSSIONS ON USES OF SURVEILLANCE PANEL TRUCKS. WILL ARRIVE MEXI SOMETIME LATTER HALF WEEK 22 NOVEMBER. WILL PHONE CABOT AT HOME OR OFFICE ON ARRIVAL. NO NEED MEET NNR NOR MAKE RESERVATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

*Cara requested permission Morehouse visit Mexi on brief TDY for latest methods and problems encountered in use surveillance panel truck.

Lempert / ops

OC/SPS/CNT/D.Millhorn (draft)
WH/3/Venezuela

William V. Broe
Chief, WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, [illegible]

SUBJECT Project [illegible] Progress [illegible]
1 August [illegible] 31 October [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

References: A. [illegible], 10 August [illegible]
B. [illegible], 12 August [illegible]
C. [illegible], 26 August [illegible]
D. [illegible], 1 September [illegible]
E. [illegible], 1 October [illegible]
F. [illegible], 6 October [illegible]
G. [illegible], 26 October [illegible]

1. [illegible]

The [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] visitors, [illegible] (particularly [illegible]) [illegible] of the [illegible] Principal [illegible].

2. [illegible]

a) In [illegible], the [illegible] returned to [illegible] (See reference [illegible]). [illegible] operational, administrative responsibilities [illegible].

b) [illegible] return, [illegible] After [illegible] return, [illegible] regular operational meetings and [illegible] G. [illegible] Headquarters [illegible] officers. [illegible] routine [illegible] operation.

Continued...,

Distribution:
[illegible] - C/WHD

ES COPY

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[illegible]	17 November 19[illegible]
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	[illegible]	50-[illegible]

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-[illegible]

7. [illegible]

Throughout the reporting period, Project LIEMPTY continued to provide the majority of the operational photographs and surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. This activity is in direct support of, and in consonance with, the present RAD as approved for Mexico City Station. The LIEMPTY coverage has proved to be a most reliable tool for: following the daily movements of the LIMERICK personnel; providing leads to, and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; and verifying the relative rank and position as well as the specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers. During the period under review, the LIEMPTY basehouses produced 146 rolls (5,665 individual frames and photographs) of operational pictures as well as approximately 675 pages of fixed surveillance reports dealing with this target. In addition, the LIENTRAP mobile photo unit provided 441 photographs of other targets of interest to the Station. Specific examples of the contributions made by each component of Project LIEMPTY to the fulfillment of the RAD follow:

a) LIENTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIENTRAP mobile unit was targeted against leaders and safe-sites of the local communist parties and visiting or exile communists. Specifically, the LIENTRAP unit verified the location of a PCM safehouse, provided up-to-date photographs of numerous individuals of interest to the Station Case Officer directing the communist party recruitment program, and, in addition, regularly serviced nineteen postal accommodation addresses used by the Station and Headquarters.

b) LIMITED - During the reporting period, LIMITED provided 1,3[illegible] frames (66 rolls) of operational film and daily surveillance reports covering the arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel and visitors at the front gate of the LIMERICK installation during the afternoon and evening hours. In addition, LIMITED-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper, served as the fixed-radio dispatcher on four [illegible] surveillance operations. The crucial need for the LIMITED fixed-radio dispatching base has been amply explained in previous LIEMPTY Project Reports.

c) LILYRIC - During the reporting period, the LILYRIC basehouse produced 1,766 frames (50 rolls) of operational film, covering the same targets noted above in the LIMITED section, but during the morning and early afternoon hours. In addition, LILYRIC prepared a weekly report on the comings and goings of each LIMERICK staffer and contributed the large majority of this project's physical surveillance reports. In addition, LILYRIC provided special reports on: all commercial deliveries made to the LIMERICK installation; the number, description, and apparent assignment of each official LIMERICK vehicle; and reports on construction activity within the installation.

d) LICALLA - During this period, the LICALLA basehouse provided photographic coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers, their families, and visitors congregate. In this effort, LICALLA produced [illegible] individual photographs as well as regular reports on the activities of various LIMERICK officers of special interest to Station Mexico City. In addition, LICALLA is at present preparing a special series of photographs in response to a KUTUBE/D request.

e) LIEMPTY-4 - Throughout this period, all operational film (166 rolls, 4,0[illegible] frames) provided by the three fixed basehouses as well as the LIENTRAP mobile unit was developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4. Given the condition of the processing equipment, which is now being replaced, LIEMPTY-4's finished product was extremely satisfactory.

f) Raymond H. GERENDE - During the reporting period, with the two-week exception noted in paragraph 2, GERENDE served as the full-time cutout to the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and had the agent handling responsibility for the operators of the LIENTRAP mobile unit as well as LIEMPTY-4. This assignment involved at least twelve clandestine agent meetings per week as well as the corollary administrative/financial responsibility. GERENDE also made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive [illegible] operation.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [illegible]

4. SECURITY AND PROBLEMS.

There have been no known incidents during the period under review, which adversely affected the security of the LIEMPTY project or the related agent personnel. While various minor administrative questions arose, the Station was able to resolve all such matters locally.

5. PLANS AND CHANGES.

a) In response to the Station's request, DIR-50873, dated 16 October 1965 granted a POA to LIEMPTY-26 for use as a cutout to the LILYRIC basehouse. LIEMPTY-26 was met by GARENDE and was used operationally during the absence of the regular LILYRIC cutout, LIEMPTY-13. The PRQ Part II and full OA request pertinent to LIEMPTY-26 will be submitted prior to 15 November 1965.

b) As in the past period, Station plans to continue to emphasize the quality of the LIEMPTY photographic product. To this end, much of the photographic lab equipment is being replaced and discussions are being held with the local KURIOT representative, Hugh T. FRANCOTTE, concerning the replacement of the basehouse cameras.

c) Other than noted above, there have been no major administrative, operational, or personnel changes during the reporting period.

for
R L EASBY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

JI SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
DC/WH/C ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, ADDP, C/WH6, C/CI,

SECRET 230047Z 1965

DIR CITE MEXI 5135 23 OCT IN 78370

[redacted] TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY

REF DIR 51315

REF LTR MAILED AS REQUESTED 22 OCT.

SECRET *INSTRUCTED MEXI TO MAIL LETTER

CFN 5135 51315 REF LTR MAILED AS REQUESTED 22 OCT

BT

SECRET

RE

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: De-Report
Signed: Dlenie Parnes
R.O. #330 - Unit WH/4/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

~~File~~ File
LIEMPTY
50-6-74
ops

23 OCT 65
50-6-74/3

X

14-00000

C. Anderson

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : Charles W. Anderson:new
UNIT : C/WH/C/CA/PA ☐ INDEX
EXT : 4197 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 2 September 65 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-20481

3 S E C R E T

2 SEP 65 20 06 z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/C 5 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, ADDP, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

~~SIG CEN~~

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
authorized:

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 40022

Signed:
R.O. #C30 - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

[redacted] TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY

REF MEXI 4616 (IN 43897)

1. AGREE SUSPENDING PO BOX SERVICING FOR TIME BEING BUT DESIRE VISUAL CHECK OF NONOALCO BOX 10 OR 11 SEPTEMBER. 1965

2. PLEASE HOLD ALL LETTERS FROM THAT BOX TILL URQUHART ARRIVAL.

3. DESIRE COMMENTS ON COUNTERSURVEILLANCE AT TIME LIEMPTY-10 SERVICED NONOALCO 25 AUGUST.

4. ASSUMING L-10 POSSIBLY IDENTIFIED AT THAT TIME AND NOW UNDER SURVEILLANCE DESIRE HE MAKE DAILY VISITS GOBERNACION AND PROCURADURIA DEL DF BEGINNING SOONEST. HE TO TRY GIVE IMPRESSION HE LOOKING TO MEET SOMEONE OR WAITING FOR APPOINTMENTS.

5. WISH STAFFER, PEUVION IF POSSIBLE, VISIT NONOALCO PO BOX SECTION TO SEE IF LETTERS SIMILAR TO THOSE RETRIEVED 25 AUGUST ARE VISIBLE IN ANY OTHER BOXES.

6. WHAT WAS DATE STAMPED ON THE 25 AUGUST LETTER THAT WAS NOT MARKED "LIBRE DE POPTE?"

Liempty/5?

7. HISTORY OF LOST TEST LETTERS PLUS INCIDENT REPORTED IN REF INDICATES NONOALCO BOX UNSUITABLE FOR AMROD OP. REQUEST LIEMPTY

RELEASING OFFICER 2-9 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

25 Sep 65
50-6-74/3

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT : ☐ INDEX
EXT : ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 40022

ASSET GET ASAP NEW BOX IN A PO NOT SO FAR ASSOCIATED WITH AMROD, USING FALSE NAME AND ADDRESS. WOULD PREFER BOX AT MAIN PO IF POSSIBLE. AGENT MAY HAVE TO MAKE GIFT TO HEAD OF PO STATION OR SUBSTATION IF BOXES IN SHORT SUPPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

J Flores for
William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

DC/WH/C/CA
WH/1. (Mrs. Bustos in draft)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J Flores for
John T. Flynn
ADC/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Project LIEMPTY/Progress Report 1 May through 31 July 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HMMA-26027, 5 May 1965
B. HMMA-26243, 4 June 1965
C. MEXI-4167, 16 July 1965
D. MEXI-4248, 26 July 1965

1. REPORTING AND BACKGROUND.

The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY progress report covering the period 1 February through 30 April 1965 was forwarded as reference A. Significant interim developments and activities were included in references B through D. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors, as well as various targets of opportunity, through the daily photographic and fixed surveillance coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA photographic basehouses and the frequent use of the LIENTRAP mobile photo unit. In addition, this project provided other essential operational support to various Station and Headquarters activities through the utilization of the services of long-time contract agent Raymond H. GERENDE.

2. AGENT CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS.

a) On 22 May 1965, the Principal Agent for Project LIEMPTY, Raymond H. GERENDE, departed Mexico for a two month period of well-deserved vacation. As per pre-planned arrangements, GERENDE's operational, administrative, and agent-handling tasks were turned over as follows:

To Oliver G. SCANTLING (P): Agent handling and funding of the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and the LIENTRAP mobile unit;

To the LIEMPTY Case Officer - agent handling and funding of the LIEMPTY photo-lab/dark room; and the local AMROD responsibility.

SCANTLING was chosen for this turn-over and the accompanying workload since he had previously handled all but one of the agents involved and because he was familiar with the objectives and overall modus operandi of the LIEMPTY project. The above noted operational assignments will again be levied on GERENDE upon his return to Mexico in early August 1965.

Continued...

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26[illegible]	12 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

b) Prior to [illegible]'s departure, he was seen by the undersigned [illegible] times in regular, operational meetings. After that date, Oliver G. [illegible] was seen on twenty-five occasions and [illegible] (the photo-lab/basehouse keeper) nineteen times by the undersigned in connection with the operational agent meeting requirements of this project. SCANTLING in turn met with each basehouse keeper and with the LIMTRAP operator twice weekly. All meeting times and sites were rotated regularly during the period under review, and no basic departures (other than noted above) were made from the standard modus operandi of the LIEMPTY project.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS, ACHIEVEMENTS.

Throughout the reporting period, Project LIEMPTY continued to provide the majority of the operational photographs and surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. This coverage has proved to be a most reliable and viable tool for: following the daily movements of the LIMERICK personnel; providing and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; and verifying the relative rank and position as well as the specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers. During the period under review, Project LIEMPTY produced 160 rolls (3,833 frames) of operational photographs as well as approximately 700 pages of fixed, physical surveillance reports dealing with this target. In addition, LIEMPTY produced 203 operational photographs of other targets of interest to Station Mexico City. Specific examples of the contributions made by each component of Project LIEMPTY to the fulfillment of the relevant portions of the Station's Related Missions Directive, follow:

a) LIMTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIMTRAP mobile photo unit was targeted against leaders and installations of the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM), visiting communist leaders, and other targets of special operational interest. Specifically, the LIMTRAP unit verified the current addresses and provided up-to-date photographs of two prominent Nicaraguan communists exiled in Mexico; photographic coverage of an Embassy of interest to KUTUBE/D for use in operational planning; and provided photos of the individuals and an installation linked with the local Spanish Republic Royalists. LIMTRAP produced a total of 203 operational photographs and regularly serviced seventeen postal accommodation addresses used by the Station and Headquarters.

b) LIMITED - During the period covered by this report, LIMITED produced fifty-seven rolls (1,[illegible] frames) of operational photographs and regular surveillance reports covering the daily arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel and their visitors at the front gate of the installation in question, during the afternoon and evening hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper served as the fixed radio-dispatcher for three LIEMBRACE surveillance operations targeted against LIMERICK IS officers as well as serving as the spotter and dispatcher for five LIEMBRACE surveillances directed against PBPRIME nationals who visited the LIMERICK installation (see MEXI-4247, MEXI-4248, and MEXI-4250, all dated 26 July, for details).

c) LILYRIC - During the reporting period, the LILYRIC base produced sixty-three rolls (1,652 frames) of operational film, for the same purposes as noted above in the LIMITED section, during the morning and early afternoon hours. In addition, LILYRIC prepared a weekly report on the comings and goings of each LIMERICK staffer and contributed the large majority of the project's physical surveillance reports. Finally, LILYRIC provided special reports on all commercial deliveries made to the LIMERICK installation.

d) LICALLA - During this period, the LICALLA base provided photographic coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers and their families congregate. In this effort, LICALLA produced forty rolls (1,110 frames) of operational photographs which were most useful to the Station in determining or confirming the intelligence service affiliation of various LIMERICK staffers. On [illegible] May [illegible], Harvey C. [illegible] and Joseph K. [illegible] made movie and audio tests from the LICALLA base in support of local and Headquarters operational planning (see reference B. for details).

4. SECURITY AND PROBLEMS.

There have been no known incidents during the reporting period which have

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-2[illegible]

adversely affected the security of the LIEMPTY project or the related agent personnel. While various minor administrative and personnel problems arose, the Station was able to resolve all such problems locally.

5. PLANS AND CHANGES.

a) Station Mexico City plans to have Raymond H. GERENDE reassume the agent-handling and administrative responsibilities that he previously had, upon his return to Mexico in early August 1965. As previously noted in reference A, SCANTLING has been removed from the aegis of Project LIEMPTY and integrated into the LIRAZOR project.

b) Other than noted above, no major administrative or operational changes are planned for the ensuing period.

for Cornelius L. Pennison
Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Project LIEMPTY/Progress Report 1 February - 30 April 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. HMMA-25352, 10 February 1965
B. HMMA-25536, 11 March 1965
C. MEXI-3138, 19 April 1965
D. MEXI-2892, 24 March 1965
E. MEXI-2727, 8 March 1965

1. REPORTING AND BACKGROUND.

The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY Progress Report covering the period 1 November 1964 through 31 January 1965 was forwarded to Headquarters as reference A. Significant interim developments and achievements of LIEMPTY were included in references C. through E. The Project Outline for LIRAZOR, which when approved, will provide for the maintenance of long-term contract agent Oliver G. SCANTLING who is now carried under Project LIEMPTY, was submitted for Headquarters approval with reference B. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors, as well as various targets of opportunity, through the daily photographic coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA photographic basehouses and the frequent use of the LIEMTRAP mobile photographic unit. In addition, this project provided other essential operational support to various Station and Headquarters activities through the utilization of the services of long-time contract agents Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING.

2. AGENT CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION CHANNELS.

During the reporting period, the primary LIEMPTY principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE was seen forty-two (42) times in operational meetings by the undersigned, while principal agent Oliver G. SCANTLING was seen twelve (12) times. Other than frequent and intentional variations in meeting times and sites, no changes were made in the Project's communication systems. All operational contact with the action/sub-agents of the LIEMPTY Project was maintained through Raymond H. GERENDE.

continued...

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26027	5 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS.

Throughout the reporting period, Project LIEMPTY continued to produce the majority of the operational photographs used in Station Mexico City's KUDESK operations against the LIMERICK target. This coverage has proved to be a reliable and viable tool for: following the daily movements of the LIMERICK personnel; providing and confirming identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; and verifying the relative rank and positions as well as the intelligence service connections of various LIMERICK officers. Specific examples of the contributions of each LIEMPTY Project component to the fulfillment of the Related Mission Directive, as approved for Mexico City Station, follow:

a) LIENTRAP - Throughout the reporting period, the LIENTRAP mobile photographic unit was targeted extensively against the leaders and installations of the Partido Comunista Mexicano, the Partido Popular Socialista, and other exile or visiting communist leaders. In mid-April 1965, the LIENTRAP unit provided an up-to-date photograph of ESLIME-1 which was passed to a visiting KUBARK staffer for his use in the recruitment attempt of ESLIME-1. Not only did this photograph serve as a means of identifying the target for the recruiter, but also served as bona fides for the recruiter during the successful recruitment of this communist/exile guerrilla. (See reference C. for details.) Overall, the LIENTRAP unit produced 49 rolls of 35 mm film which will be or have been used in support of planned recruitment attempts, and in providing identifications, locations or contacts of various targets of interest.

b) LICALLA - During the period under review, the LICALLA installation provided photographic coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, where many of the personnel congregate. In this effort, LIEMPTY-9, the LICALLA basehouse keeper provided 52 rolls of 35mm still photographs which were most useful to the Station in determining or confirming the intelligence service affiliation of various LIMERICK staffers by their constant association and conversations with other known intelligence officers. In addition, LICALLA provided special physical surveillance reports on all deliveries made to the LIMERICK installation, the presence of suspect audio technicians, and the changes in the patterns of activity of various LIMERICK personnel. On 23 March, Dudley R. GHASTER, KURIOT specialist, entered LICALLA for an on-site survey in support of a sensitive technical operation being planned by the Station and Headquarters. (See reference A, paragraph 3, e. and reference D. for details.)

c) LIMITED - During the reporting period, LIMITED provided 57 rolls of operational film and daily surveillance reports covering the arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel and visitors at the front gate of the LIMERICK installation during the afternoon and evening hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper, served as the fixed radio dispatch base for five LIEMBRACE surveillance operations covering known or suspect LIMERICK intelligence officers or their contacts. Because of the protective security provided to the LIMERICK installation by local "Services" it would be impossible to provide LIEMBRACE surveillance of LIMERICK staffers without the LIMITED radio dispatching. LIMITED (as well as LILYRIC) also provided confirmation of the visit of subject of reference E (a PBPRIMER in contact with a LIMERICK intelligence officer) to the LIMERICK installation. (See reference E. for details.)

d) LILYRIC - During the period covered by the report, LILYRIC produced 73 rolls of operational film covering the comings and goings of LIMERICK personnel and visitors to that installation during the morning and early afternoon hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-14, the LILYRIC basehouse keeper, provided approximatel 500 pages of physical surveillance reports, covering the movements of LIMERICK personnel.

e. Oliver G. SCANTLING - SCANTLING was married in mid-February and honeymooned until late March; consequently, SCANTLING was "out of action" for approximatel one-half of the reporting period. During the remainder of this period, however, SCANTLING continued as the alternate contact of LICASA-1, the principal agent in the LICASA LAURICLE operation, as well continuing to handle the PBRUMEN access agent he had recruited in January 1965 (see referenc A, paragraph 3). In addition, at Headquarters' request, SCANTLING re-cased the United Arab Republic Embassy in support of a sensitive operation now in the planning stage.

f) Raymond H. GERENDE - Throughout this period, GERENDE continued as the Station's full-time cutout to the LIMITED, LICALLA, and LILYRIC basehouses as well as maintaining the cutout/agent handling responsibility for the LIENTRAP mobile photo unit and the LIEMPTY photographic-processing basehouse. GERENDE again made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD operation as well as servicing numerous postal accommodation addresses.

4. SECURITY.

There have been no known incidents during the reporting period which have adversely effected the security of the LIEMPTY project. Various refinements have been made in the cover story to be used (if necessary) to explain the relationship between the case officer and GERENDE. (See also paragraph 2 re: meeting times and sites.)

5. PLANS AND CHANGES.

a) As noted in reference A. it had become obvious that many of the operational assignments levied on Oliver G. SCANTLING were falling outside the proper scope of Project LIEMPTY; consequently a new Project was prepared to cover the Station's relationship with SCANTLING. This Project Outline (Project LIRAZOR) was submitted for Headquarters' approval with reference B. and SCANTLING will be removed from the aegis of Project LIEMPTY upon receipt of Headquarters' approval of LIRAZOR.

b) GERENDE plans to take a well-deserved vacation from late May through July 1965. Station intends to have SCANTLING handle the photographic basehouses and the LIENTRAP unit (since SCANTLING is already witting of all but one of those LIEMPTY agents) while the LIEMPTY Case Officer will handle LIEMPTY-4 and the photographic basehouse.

c) Other than noted above, there are no major administrative or operational changes planned for the ensuing period.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

24/30 SECRET

LIEMPTY cy

RID ☐ COPY ☒

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION C/WH 2

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE, *Addp, C/FI, C/FI/D, C/TSD-2, D/OC-2

SECRET 091920Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2732 EASBY ACTING

9 MAR 65 - IN-1934

LIMESA LIMOUSINE

REF HMMA 25310

1. LIMOUSINE REPORTS CONSTRUCTION WILL BEGIN ANY DAY ON NEW LIMITED HOUSE. AWAITING LAST OF GOM PERMITS. LIFEUD-6 HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO LIMOUSINE BOOKKEEPER ABOUT POSSIBILITY RENT ONE OF NEW APARTMENTS.

2. IN TRYING TRANSFER FIDEO COMISO FROM NOW DEFUNCT BANCO DE LA PROPRIEDAD DE LA INDUSTRIA TEXTIL TO ANOTHER BANK, LIMOUSINE DISCOVERED BANKS NOW NOT ACCEPTING THIS TYPE FIDEO COMISO. HENCE HE OBLIGED TO TAKE DIRECT TITLE TO PROPERTY. TITLE TRANSFER CHARGES BASED ON PERCENTAGE OF PROPERTY ✓BALUE AND HE MUST PAY ALMOST 22,000 PESOS TO HACIENDA. OWING REAL ESTATE COMMITMENTS AND CASH OUTLAY ON LIMITED BUILDING, HIS CASH POSITION SHORT. ASKS IF CAN DELAY INITIAL PAYMENT OR 45,000 PESOS 90 DAYS.

3. RECOMMEND HQ APPROVAL.

SECRET

CFN

*Dissem Applicable To RYBAT ^Dhoud Limesa Limust

file Limousine-201
make c/o for LIMITED
LIEMPTY/100

SECRET

C. Bustos
WH/1
4006, 4507
15 Jan 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

MESSAGE FORM 19
21 SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8

INFO: OGC2, CL4, DDS, BPA, VR, FILE

~~IMMEDIATE~~
PRIORITY

TO MEXI (PRIORITY) INFO CITE DIR 77743

REF: MEXI 2159 (IN 58393)*

1. APPROVAL GRANTED SELL TO LIMOUSINE LIMITED PROPERTY UNDER XXXX TERMS OUTLINED PARA ONE REF.

2. PROCEED AS FOLLOWS:

A. LIMOUSINE TO DRAW UP LEASE WITH APARTMENT OCCUPANT FOR THREE YEARS WITH RENTAL AT 2,300 PESOS PER MONTH, WITH FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PROVISOS:

(1) OPTION TO RENEW FOR SUCH ADDITIONAL PERIODS YOU SEE FIT WITH RENTAL ESTABLISHED BASED ON NEGOTIATIONS CONSISTENT WITH RENTALS PAID BY OCCUPANTS OTHER APARTMENTS.

(2) PROVISO BINDING LIMOUSINE'S SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS.

B. DRAW UP SEPARATE CONTRACT WITH LIMOUSINE OUTLINING AGREEMENT PARA ONE REF AND FORWARD SIGNED COPY HDQS. AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR CREDIT RENTAL OFFSET TO KUBARK BY LIMOUSINE PLUS RETURN TO KUBARK OF ANY MONTHLY RENTAL PAYMENTS MADE BY APARTMENT OCCUPANT TO LIMOUSINE FOR PERIOD FREE RENTAL IF SUCH IN FACT MADE. ALSO DETERMINE WHAT WILL HAPPEN RENTAL OFFSET AGREEMENT SHOULD LIMOUSINE RETIRE, DIE OR PROPERTY LEAVE HIS CONTROL

END OF MESSAGE

(See page 2)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

~~IMMEDIATE~~
PRIORITY

TO : MEXICO CITY

PAGE # 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

TO INFO CITE DIR 77743

*WH Comment: LIMOUSINE AGREES PAY $12,000 FOR LIMITED, 60% IN CASH, REMAINDER WITHIN THREE YEARS. NEED REPLY BEFORE COB 15 JANUARY.

WH/LOG J. Jwisniewski
OL/RECD/~~Ed Dennison~~
OL/Warfield
OGC/Connell (phone) sec OGC 65-0119
WH/PO/A

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

5
4
3
2
1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET

OCC 65-0119

14 JAN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Logistics

ATTENTION: Mr. Edward Denison

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY, LIMOUSINE

REFERENCE: Mexi 2159

1. In conversation with the Headquarters officer concerned with LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE affairs, this Office was apprised of the fact that the proposed transaction, outlined in reference cable, would be executed without recourse to advice on the legal aspects of the sale under Mexican law and with no intention to make LIMOUSINE's commitment to this Agency legally binding. It is further intended that LIMOUSINE's "promissory notes" be unsecured.

2. Should the proposed transaction be carried out in this manner, this Agency would be unable to enforce LIMOUSINE's promise to pay his debt, and would have no legally cognizable instrument to present to an executor of his estate should he die before meeting his obligations to us. In addition, our right to continued possession of the apartment would be tenuous at best.

3. Thus it is planned to convey real estate appraised at $14,448 in exchange for $7,200 and a collection of unenforceable, unsecured promises. It is hard to believe that in this case, operational security precludes closer protection of Agency assets.

/s/ Peter J. Connell

PETER J. CONNELL
Office of General Counsel

cc: C/WH/1
Operations Officer

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

GROUP 1

☑ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO
VR. FILE, OL 4, O[illegible] 2, BPA

SECRET 121921

12 JAN 65 IN 58393

DIR CITE MEXI 21[illegible]

LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE

REF DIR 74928

1. LIMOUSINE AGREED FOLLOWING TERMS:

A. TOTØAL PURCHASE PRICE OF 1[illegible],000 DOLLARS PAYABLE IN PESOS. SIXTY PERCENT IN CASH.

B. 50,000 PESOS CASH ON BEGINNING CONSTRUCTION (ABOUT 15 FEB).

C. BALANCE CASH PAYMENT ON COMPLETION CONSTRUCTION (AROUND 1 JULY).

D. BALANCE OF 50,000 PESO DEBT REPAYABLE WITHIN 3 YEARS FROM COMPLETION CONSTRUCTION.

E. AS PARTIAL INTEREST ON PAYMENT ABOVE AMOUNT, RENT OF 2300 PESOS MONTHLY TO BE WITHHELD FIRST THREE YEARS. RENTAL RATE NOT TO CHANGE DURING THIS TIME AND THEREAFTER AT RATE NO DIFFERENNT FROM OTHER APARTMENTS SAME BUILDING FOR PERIOD 10 YRS OR UNTIL KUBARK TERMINATES ARRANGEMENT.

2. LIMOUSINE PREFERS CLEAN TRANSACTION UP SOON AS POSSIBLE AND HOPES PAY OFF [illegible] AMOUNT WITHIN FIRST YR.

3. LENGHT TERM KUBARK OPTION ON PROPERTY NOT SPECIFICALLY AGREED WITH LIMOUSINE, BUT NO REASON BELIEVE HE WOULD

SECRET

Liempty/Ops

SECRET

14 58393

NOT AGREE TO ANY TERM WE STIPULATE. ONLY JOKER MAY BE LENGTH TIME HE REMAINS ACTIVIE IN FIRM AS HE NOW 65.

4. REQUEST HQ COMMENTS BY 15 JAN AS WOULD LIKE BE ABLE START DEMOLITION BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR U.S. 17 JAN.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 17

SECRET

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4507
DATE : 31 December 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1	/	5	FI
2		6	CA
3	SS	7	8
4		8	dg

4 Jan 65 01z
ROUTING

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-8

INFO OGC-2, OL-4, BPA, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO. CITE DIR 74920

Barcos

LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE

REF: MEXI 2025 (IN 40408) *

1. NINE TO TWELVE THOUSAND DOLLARS CONSIDERED REASONABLE NEGOTIATION LIMITS WHICH INCLUDES DISCOUNT.

2. REEMPHASIZE PREFERENCE LUMP SUM PAYMENT AND ENSURE OCCUPANCY RETENTION RIGHTS.

3. IF LUMP SUM PAYMENT NOT POSSIBLE CLOSING SALES PRICE SHOULD BE NEAREST TO UPPER LIMIT WITH BULK/(MINIMUM 60%) AS DOWN PAYMENT AND REMAINDER THROUGH WITHHOLDING MONTHLY PAYMENTS OF AGREED LIMITED RENT AS MEANS PARTIAL ENFORCED PAYMENT.

4. ADVISE BEFORE CLOSING. PESOS ACCEPTABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

* STA Needs Clear Indication HQS Limitation For Negotiation.

WH/LCG J. Juleniewski
OL/RECD Bill Cabanis/John Stephens
OL
OGC
WH/FOA

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

RI ☐ COPY ☐

2 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MEXICO CITY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	55	5	
2		6	1
3		7	
4		8	R

ACTION WH 7

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP 4, BPA

S E C R E T 232247Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2629

Log

LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE

23 Dec 61 IN 48408

REF DIR 72229

1. WHILE CANNOT PREDICT HOW LIMOUSINE WILL REACT TO REF, STATION NEEDS CLEAR INDICATION HQ LIMITS FOR NEGOTIATION. WOULD PREFER HAVE THIS PRIOR DISCUSSION REF WITH HIM. HE AND STATION UNDERSTAND MUST CLEAR FINAL AGREEMENT WITH HQ PRIOR PROCEEDING, BUT WISH AVOID HAVING TO BOUNCE SERIES OF PROPOSALS OFF HQ.

2. REQUEST HQ PROVIDE STATION WITH SOME LIMITS ON "LOWER SALE PRICE" WILLING ACCEPT ALSO ON WHAT IS CONSIDERED REASONABLE DISCOUNT RATE. HQ CAN BE SURE STATION WILL GET BEST DEAL POSSIBLE. PRESUME BY "OFFSET AGAINST MONTHLY RENTAL AGREEMENT" HQ MEANS WITHHOLDING AGREED LIMITED RENT AS MEANS PARTIAL ENFORCED PAYMENT.

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 17
SECRET

ORIG : C. Bustos-Videla:jah
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4507
DATE : 18 Dec 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

18DEC64 23 40z
PRIORITY
SIG CEN

TO Mexico City
FROM DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8 INFO OL 4, BPA, OGC 2, File, VR

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 72229

REF: MEXI 1898 (IN 41069)

LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE

1. HQS APPROVES/SALE LIMITED PROPERTY TO LIMOUSINE NEGOTIATION ~~[illegible] NECESSITY AND ACCOMODATION TO KUBARK OVERRIDING KUBARK FINANCIAL INTERESTS [illegible]~~ ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. KUBARK INTERESTS BE PROTECTED TO UTMOST WITH LIMOUSINE ASSURANCES KUBARK WILL CONTINUE HAVE OCCUPANCY RETENTION RIGHTS. ASSURANCE MAY REQUIRE SEPARATE LONG TERM RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENT WITH KUBARK RESERVING RIGHT CANCEL ANYTIME. HQS REALIZES FIXED RENTAL PRICE NOT FEASIBLE UNDER LONG TERM LEASE AND THEREFORE LEASE COULD PROVIDE FOR INITIAL FIXED RENTAL WITH A SLIDING SCALE ADJUSTMENT THEREAFTER.

B. SINCE PROMISSORY NOTE FOR 180,600 PESOS WOULD BE UNSECURED WITH FINAL PAYMENT NOT DUE UNTIL JAN 1972, HQS PREFERS TOTAL PAYMENT FOR LIMITED AT OUTSET RATHER THAN WAIT 6½ YEARS.

C. REALIZING LIMOUSINE'S POSSIBLE FINANCIAL STRAIN MAKE SUCH LARGE PAYMENT INITIALLY, HQS WILLING ACCEPT LOWER SALE PRICE AT REASONABLE DISCOUNT RATE. IF LIMOUSINE UNABLE LIQUIDATE WITH ONE

CONTINUED ——————————

LIEMPTY 4/8P

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :
FROM DIRECTOR
CONF: INFO

PAGE TWO

PRIORITY

TO INFO: CITE DIR 72229

LUMP SUM PAYMENT AT ENHANCED REDUCED PRICE, WILL ACCEPT COMBINATION PAYMENT AT REDUCED RATE WITH GREATER PORTION PAYABLE AT SETTLEMENT AND REMAINDER AS OFFSET AGAINST MONTHLY RENTAL AGREEMENT.

2. HQS FEELS ABOVE PROVISOS IMPORTANT AVOID SUBSEQUENT IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE TOTAL LOSS EVENT LIMITED SUBSEQUENTLY PASSES FROM LIMOUSINE'3 OR HIS ESTATE'S CONTROL.

3. ADVISE TERMS FOR FINAL APPROVAL Prior CONCLUDING AGREEMENT. wyk

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Log/McMahon (draft)
OL/RECD/John Stephens (draft)
OL/RECD/Dennison (phone)

R.W. Herbert

5
4 DESMOND FITZGERALD
3 CHIEF WHD
2
1

W. J. KAUFMAN
CHIEF WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

065

DATE : 24 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (C/WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 0300, 25 OCT) WCJ

INFO : DD/P, ADDP, DDP/SIT 3, C/SOD 3, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D, C/FI/INT, C/IW 2, C/SR 4, C/TFW 5, DD/I, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

OCT 25 0432Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 45628

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 2292

[redacted] LIEMPTY-3

REF A DIR 43984 out 89913

B DIR 43877 out 89777

1962

23 OCT SUBJ MET SOV COMMERCIAL OFFICE EMPLOYEE VALERIY ALEKSANDROVICH ANDRIANOV AND ELICITED FOLL RE CURRENT CUBA SITUATION: ANDRIANOV SAID HAD READ PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S DECLARATION BUT DID NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE WAR. ELABORATELY DENIED THAT CUBA HAS SOV MISSILES, SAID PHOTOS OF SAME FABRICATED AND FOR PROVOCATIVE PURPOSES. SAID KHRUSHCHEV WOULD ANSWER PROVOCATION, HOWEVER NOT WITH MISSILES BUT WITH WORDS, JUST WORDS, NOBODY WANTS WAR. ANDRIANOV CONCLUDED WITH MARXIST LINE THAT SOVS DIDN'T NEED WAR, THAT COURSE OF HISTORY HAS SEEN DOWNFALL OF FEUDALISM, THAT DOWNFALL CAPITALISM INEVITABLE AND SOCIALISM WILL SECCEED.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: ____

Signed: ____

R.O. #I - Unit ____

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

END OF MESSAGE

50-6-74/3

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

50-6-74/3

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

FILE: LIEMPTY/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : MELVIN BECK
UNIT : SR/10/LA
EXT : 2733
DATE : 24 January 1962

1611

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

26 JAN 62 21 08z

TO : MEXICO

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT94732

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 37936

REDWOOD REDSKIN

REF: MEXI 9880 (IN 13260)*

1. HQS WILL AUTHORIZE FUNDING SALAZAR PER PARA 2 REF, PROVIDED PROOF CAMPOS TRIP PATON WELDING INSTITUTE PAID FOR BY SOVS AND SALAZAR ACTUALLY INVITED PARTICIPATE, AND FUNDING SALAZAR CAN BE PLAUSIBLY ACCOUNTED FOR EYES OF CAMPOS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATES.

2. DUE ATTITUDE CAMPOS, AND CERTAINTY HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO USSR KNOWN TO KGB, BELIEVE ADVISABLE FURTHER ASSESS HIS SECURITY. SAME VEIN, AVOID NECESSITY INDIRECT CONTRIBUTION CAMPOS EXPENSES.

3. PLS FORWARD DETAILS SALAZAR RECRUITMENT. REFER HMMW 10395 ADDITIONAL DETAILS HQS GUIDANCE OP, INCLUDING WITHHOLDING REQUIREMENTS WELDING INSTITUTE PENDING CLARIFICATION RECRUITMENT. EXTENDING POA'S SALAZAR AND CAMPOS.

END OF MESSAGE.

Hmma-18236

SR COMMENT: * Request hqs decision whether station proceed with op, assuming necessity to entirely fund SALAZAR expenses.

LIEMPTY/3

SR/COP

WH/3/Mexico
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CWH
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

ACSR/10
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, SR via Chief, WH

Operational/[illegible]
Francisco CAMPOS Herrera and Guillermo SALAZAR Polanco

Action Required: See Para 3
REF: HMMA [illegible]

1. The prospective [illegible] trip of above Subjects was discussed with Gerald F. [illegible] at Headquarters in light of the current [illegible] policy which is in the process of being formulated. We are still very much interested in Subjects' trip and agree with [illegible] that SALAZAR appears to be the principal target, rather than CAMPOS. However, we wish to note that the underwriting of the trip for SALAZAR is contingent on the fact that he and CAMPOS will spend a period of time at the Institute in a capacity other than that of a sightseeing tourist. If at all possible, it would be useful to determine the exact nature of the invitation made by the Soviets to CAMPOS in late 1960 and the manner in which the inclusion of SALAZAR was broached to the Soviets. It is noted that the letters forwarded as attachment to HMMA-15709 do not indicate that an invitation has been extended.

2. There are requirements of intelligence interest on the Electro-welding Institute named Paton in Kiev which Subjects, because of their qualifications and technical knowledge, may well be able to fulfill. The Institute is the major center for welding research in the USSR. It has been identified in overt Soviet literature as having solved problems of mechanical arc welding with a flux of austenitic steel which is resistant to great heat, acidity, and rust. This was reportedly in connection with the development of contemporary rocket engineering. The Paton Institute undoubtedly is engaged in solving problems related to welding in guided missile technology.

CONTINUED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

3 - Mexico City

1[illegible] Jan 1962

25 JAN 1962

HMMW - 10[illegible]

201-239372
201-274162

S E C R E T

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SR/10/LA Arlene Waldron kf 2733

3 - WH/3
1 - WH/MR
2 - SR/10
1 - RI/DSP

AC/SR/10

WH/3

3. The below are preliminary specific requirements on the Paton Institute which will be supplemental at a later date if the operation materializes. They may assist the case officer in assessing Subjects' potential to fulfill requirements of this nature.

a. Obtain information concerning new welding apparatus for, as well as new applications of, the following welding and cutting technology:

(1) Electron beam-welding or cutting
(2) Friction welding
(3) Ultrasonic welding for fine wire and thin strips - exotic metals
(4) Explosive welding
(5) Plasma arc - as used in cutting, coating and welding operations
(6) Vacuum chambers associated with welding

b. What types of automatic welding equipment, using an inert gas such as argon, has the Paton Institute developed? Give any details concerning these equipments such as model designation, characteristics, when and by whom designed and where the equipment was sent.

c. Is the Paton Institute working on the solution of problems related to the welding of special alloys, particularly aluminum, titanium, and stainless steel? Which laboratories of the Institute are working on these problems? Who are the engineers and designers working on these problems? (Two alloys known to be used in the Soviet missile program are AMG-[illegible] aluminum alloy and EI-[illegible] stainless steel).

d. Can the source elicit any information from Soviets at the Institute as to problems related to welding technology in the missile and space programs which was solved by them?

e. Identify other facilities (plants and Institutes) with which the Paton Institute is associated, and in what manner. Identify personnel of the Welding Institute who are on detached duty at other facilities. Identify location of their detached duty, the facility, purpose, and dates of such duty. (Note: For example two engineers from the Paton Institute received awards in October 1960 for participation in the equipping of the newly constructed Metallurgical Plant named Lenin in Kuybyshev, a plant possibly involved in ICBM production). Source should try to determine what work these two personalities performed to merit receiving awards and also work performed by other engineers on detached duty to plants as indicated above.

4. In reply to Paragraph [illegible] of reference, both of the books which were forwarded to Headquarters for evaluation are already available to appropriate [illegible] offices.

5. Requests for extension of POA's on Francisco CAMPOS Herrera (POA expired [illegible] January 196[illegible]) and Guillermo SALINAS [illegible] (POA expired 3 January 196[illegible]) have been initiated. The POA on Pedro Jose CAMPOS Herrera has been cancelled. Please advise if the station wishes the POA which expired [illegible] December 1961, for Howard Carl [illegible] to be extended.

6. In accord with a forthcoming more stringent legal travel policy, it is advised that the station attempt to provide essential information represented by PRQ I and II before the extended POA's expire. In the same vein, attention is directed toward the security status of Francisco CAMPOS Herrera, who has exhibited an attitude [illegible] in his dealings with the Soviets that is open to suspicion. We must assume that the KGB is aware of the correspondence between CAMPOS and Institute.

WILLIAM A. [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMW-8573

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-58/5

DATE
1960

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
- LIMESA/LIMUST/LICALLA

ACTION REQUIRED
- None

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)
HMMA-14477

Transmitted herewith are the six best rolls of LICALLA film.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

9 March 1960

Attachments:
6 rolls of film
1 log (nine pages)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mexico RYBAT Chrono
~~1~~ - Subject

WH/3/Mexico/O.R. BYNAM:jmh

WR
RMS
10/CRD

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: De-Rybat
Signed: Gloria Palma
R.O. (CS) - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

Removed from Project KDFACTOR
CS Classification: 50-6-74/3
JOB # 73-855/64
Box: 35 Fold: 3

DESENSITIZED

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

RECORD COPY

RECORD COPY

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-14793 [redacted]-1762
TO: Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-74/1
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 8 April 1960
SUBJECT - LIEMPTY Project Renewal Comments		(CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING X NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED - None, for Headquarters information only.		

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-8515, 25 February 1960

1. It would appear from paragraphs 2a and 2b of reference that KUDESK and KUTUBE Ops have not been completely informed of the background of the LIEMPTY Project and its agent-requirements. At the time HMMA-14093 (Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY) was written, it was assumed that the Mexico Desk and KUTUBE/D could answer any additional questions, based on reports and dispatches not normally available to the senior staffs, which might be raised during the renewal process.

2. In answer to paragraph 2a, Oliver G. SCANTLING first contacted Inez PARADA de Moreno in early 1957 to fulfill a KUTUBE/D requirement. He visited her as an architect interested in viewing the LIMERICK installation from the building where she lives. He was socially acquainted with her brother, a Catholic Priest, and knew the family to be unquestionably anti-Communist. However, it would be imprudent on the Station's and SCANTLING's part to assume that PARADA does not at least suspect that some anti-LIMERICK intelligence service is involved. PARADA suggested during SCANTLING's initial visit that he could return at any time for further observations. This was reported by SCANTLING on 21 March 1957 and it does not seem appropriate to query him again on the pretext for his recent visits.

3. While HMMA-14093 correctly referred to LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA as "photographic basehouses," the Station would like to emphasize that photographic coverage is only one of their functions (please see HMMA-12095, 4 February 1959). LIMITED is used as a radio dispatch base for automobile surveillance teams in addition to physical surveillance of persons entering the front gate. Their photography is negligible compared to their other duties. The LILYRIC base performs the best photography of persons visiting the front gate, perhaps because the vantage point for taking the pictures is from the second floor and above the street traffic which partially blocks LIMITED photographs. LILYRIC also does individual reports on LIMERICK personnel entering and leaving the main gate. LICALLA is used almost exclusively to identify LIMERICK officials and to support KUTUBE/D requirements in connection with the LIMESA/LIMUST Project. As an indication of the effectiveness of LICALLA photographic coverage, the Mexico Station has all the LIMERICK officials identified. Before this base was activated more than two-thirds of the LIMERICK officials were unidentified. In order to support other operations, it is considered essential that the Station identify all LIMERICK officials. In this respect, LICALLA has provided most of the necessary information. The retention of this base is also considered vital to the security of the LIMUST portion of the LIMESA Project.

4. The Station does not agree that the color photography and moving pictures are a luxury. Color slides were made for identification purposes and have proved useful, particularly in identifying facial features and skin coloring. The motion pictures were made at Headquarters suggestion (Please see HMMW-7687, 29 May 1959 and HMMW-8438, 26 January 1960).

5. In conclusion, the Station would like to point out that the "photographic basehouses" represent an integral and significant part of the Station's counterespionage effort against the LIMERICK installation. These bases do not produce Foreign Intelligence and should not be considered in such a light.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

6 April 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET, [redacted]
KUBARK ONLY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-14045
[redacted]1257

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-74/3

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

DATE
6 November 1959

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/LIENTRAP/LIEMPTY-10 Security Incident - Liaison with ODENVY

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
See paragraph 6 below.

REFERENCE(S)
HMMA-13951 (KAPOK-1705) 16 October 1959

30 NOV 59

1. On 13 October 1959 it was learned from source that the local ODENVY chief got a priority cable from his Headquarters asking why data concerning the Mexican apprehension of the (KUBARK) truck and photographer had not been reported to the U. S. Ambassador locally. The statement was made that "such matters as this should be immediately reported to the Ambassador."

2. This cable resulted from the report the ODENVY office sent in on the incident from the knowledge they had - as reported in reference.

3. The local ODENVY chief replied to his Headquarters that he did not agree that matters concerning KUBARK operations should be reported by ODENVY to the Ambassador.

4. Source stated that the cable was obviously a result of the KUBARK/ODENVY headquarters "ill feeling" which presently exists and which source believes is primarily (and principally) attributable to the article in TRUE magazine of September 1959.

5. Source is LIMEW.

6. It is requested that under no circumstances should the information contained herein be disseminated in any form whatsoever outside KUBARK.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

WCCurtis/vps
30 October 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. #[illegible] - Unit [illegible]
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

50-6-74/3

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET, [redacted]
KUBARK ONLY

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-13951
[redacted]-1705

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-74/3
50-6-74/8-a

JCK

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

RECORD OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: a. Lagort
Signed:
R.O.
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 30 October 1959

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/LIENTRAP/LIEMPTY-10 Security Incident

RE: "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Headquarters information only.

REFERENCE(S):

1. At 1110 hrs., 20 September 1959, while on an operational assignment, LIEMPTY-10 and the LIENTRAP vehicle were temporarily detained by the Servicio Secreto de Mexico (Mexican Secret Service). LIEMPTY-10 was held under unofficial custody for approximately 26 hours before his release was obtained. Ther follows below an account of the more important details pertaining to this incident.

2. LIEMPTY-10 was instructed on 17 September to case the area surrounding the Theatre Iris, located at Donceles 36, preliminary to undertaking a photographic surveillance of all persons entering and leaving the theatre between the hours of 0930 and 1200 hrs., 20 September. In this instance, the Station's target was a pro-Cuban rally sponsored by the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos (CEM). The Station had received information that many of the leading Mexican and Central American Communists would attend this rally and that this was an opportune time to establish which ones did attend and to collect their photographs. The Station did not know that the Mexican Secret Service would also be covering this meeting for the purpose of preventing a Communist-inspired demonstration.

3. The Station was advised at 1730 hrs., 20 September, by Raymond H. GERENDE (ps), the Principal Agent who handles LIEMPTY-10, that L-10 was being held by the Secret Service. Immediately following this notification, Allen W. WARE (ps) was requested to contact Philip K. TESSAROLO (ps) and request him to implement procedures through a criminal lawyer to effect the release of L-10. TESSAROLO was contacted and briefed at 2200 hours and immediately began attempts to locate a reliable criminal lawyer. However, as sometimes happens in an emergency situation, his two most appropriate contacts were out of town. It was not until the following morning at 0700 hrs. that TESSAROLO located another reliable lawyer who agreed to handle the case.

4. Since GERENDE was known to L-10 and since the Station could not be sure how much L-10 might be forced to tell the Secret Service, GERENDE was given the following instructions:

A. To disconnect immediately the LIFEAT/LIVERY lines in the base where he and his wife were living and to move all equipment to another safe location. It was believed appropriate to take this precaution even though L-10 did not know the location of the LIVERY base, the telephone number of the base, or even that GERENDE was living at a place other than his mother's residence in another part of the city.

B. To collect and deposit with his Case Officer any compromising papers presently in his possession.

C. To make a security inspection of the outside photographic lab at his mother's house.

D. To phone L-10's wife and inform her that procedures were underway to obtain L-10's release and for her not to become upset and talkative.

E. To suspend all operational contacts until L-10 was released and the extent of compromise was determined.

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

5. During the evening of 20 September the Station LIFEAT Case Officer was advised that GERENDE had been directed to disconnect the LIVERY lines and to transfer all LIFEAT equipment to a safe location. To further insure the security of LIVERY, all LIVERY lines were pulled externally during the early morning of 21 September.

6. At approximately 1000 hrs., 21 September, LIMEW informed the Chief of Station that a contact of his (LIMEW's) had just informed him that L-10 (true name) and the LIENTRAP vehicle were being held by the Secret Service. LIMEW stated that if L-10 was one of KUBARK's agents he would attempt to have his contact in the Secret Service obtain his immediate release. LIMEW was told that L-10 was, in fact, a KUBARK agent and that the Station would very much appreciate his efforts to effect his release. A short while later LIMEW again contacted the Chief of Station and informed him that it would be necessary for documented ODACID official personally to contact a Commandante fnu LIMON of the Secret Service and that L-10 would then be released. According to LIMEW, L-10 had told the Secret Service that he was carrying out his operational photographic assignment on a contract basis for ODACID; therefore, an ODACID official would have to establish L-10's bona fides.

7. As the Station learned later, the Secret Service agents were roughing up some of the individuals attending the rally; consequently, they were endeavoring to make sure that no photographs were taken which could be used against them by the Communists. L-10 and L-11, the LIENTRAP driver who left the scene before he was detained, were just preparing to leave the area after taking five rolls of film when a Secret Service agent demanded a search of the vehicle on the suspicion that it contained Communist propaganda. L-10, his camera with telephoto lens and the film were then discovered in the rear of LIENTRAP. It was at this time that L-10 was accused orally by the police officers of being a Soviet agent and later of being a local Communist agent. After being taken to Secret Service Headquarters, L-10 told LIMON, in private, about his association with ODACID and emphasized that he certainly was not a Communist agent. LIMEW's source (possibly Commandante LIMON), believing that there may be some truth in L-10's statement, contacted LIMEW. Based in part on assumption and in part on fact, this is the Station's opinion as to how ODENVY became involved in the case.

8. The Station, realizing that LIEMPTY-10 had not committed an illegal act by taking photographs, decided that WARE should personally visit LIMON and request L-10's release. WARE contacted LIMON and the sub-jefe of the Secret Service, Raul MENDIOLEA Cerecero, about 1230 hrs., 21 September, identified himself as an ODACID official and told them that L-10 did from time to time perform photographic assignments for ODACID, particularly in the field of local Communist activities. WARE also told LIMON and MENDIOLEA that L-10 was never permitted to do any task which was illegal under Mexican law and that if he had done so it was certainly not under the auspices of ODACID, but on his own volition. They implied that L-10 had not done anything illegal and that all they wanted to be sure about was that L-10 was not a Communist agent. L-10 was immediately released and the LIENTRAP vehicle returned to him with all equipment intact, including the five rolls of undeveloped film.

9. While WARE was on his way to see LIMON at the Secret Service Headquarters, the Chief of Station was advised by the ODACID Security Office that L-10 was being detained by the Secret Service. The Security Office was told that WARE was presently investigating the matter and should be at the Secret Service Headquarters at that time. By coincidence, WARE was talking to MENDIOLEA when the ODACID Security Office phoned to inform him that WARE was taking care of the matter. It was learned later that MENDIOLEA is a brother-in-law of the local investigator employed full time by the ODACID Security Office. This was how ODACID became involved in the incident. To the best of the Station's knowledge, the ODACID Security Officer has said nothing more about the incident and, at the time, did not attach any particular significance to it or seem especially concerned about

14-00000

L-10's statement that he did some photographic work for ODACID. There was no newspaper or other publicity pertaining to L-10 or LIENTRAP.

10. During his visit to Secret Service Headquarters WARE discovered that L-10 had not been booked or formally charged with an illegal act and that neither LIMON nor MENDIOLEA could recall L-10's name. L-10 was not placed in jail during the 26 hours he was at Secret Service Headquarters but, rather, was permitted to remain in the Secret Service agents' duty room. No bribes were necessary to obtain his release; however, per LIMEW's request, $500.00 pesos were given to LIMEW to give to his source. LIMEW said that in addition to notifying him about L-10's detention, the source was also responsible for all equipment and film being returned intact to L-10.

11. TESSAROLO was advised, as soon as LIMEW became involved in the case, that the criminal lawyer should not pursue the matter any further. Two bottles of scotch whiskey were given to the lawyer through TESSAROLO for the few tasks he had already performed.

12. After his release, L-10 reported that he was not interrogated and that he did not reveal any data about other operations he has worked on nor did he give the names of anybody connected with operational activities. Based on the developments in the case, the Station has no reason to doubt the veracity of L-10's statement. L-10 was reprimanded for his use of statements to the Secret Service about being employed by ODACID. He was told that the revelation of such employment was to be made only by the Station and that henceforth he is never to use such a cover story. L-10 was also reprimanded for his lack of judgment in remaining in an area where there was a strong concentration of police; it is believed safe to assume that L-10 will never make this same mistake again.

13. In retrospect, it is interesting to note that L-10's use of the ODACID employment story is possibly responsible for his not being interrogated and thus compromising other operations and individuals. This case has pointed out to the Station the desireability of having casual contacts in the Secret Service and other local police-type organizations so that the Station, rather than ODACID and ODENVY, is the first to learn of incidents of this type. Considering the multifarious activities handled by the Station, it must be assumed that the police will occasionally apprehend an agent and that the Station must be geared to handle such emergencies.

14. The Station is allowing a one month's cooling off period for the LIENTRAP vehicle and LIEMPTY-10. The vehicle will then be painted another standard color and re-registered in the State of Mexico. After these security precautions are observed, the Station sees no reason why carefully selected photographic surveillance operations should not continue with L-10 as a wiser and more prudent LIENTRAP operator.

Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
15 October 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-12095
[redacted]-1543

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-74/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

JAN

DATE: 4 February 1959

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Progress Report - July thru Dec 1958

RE (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Headquarters information and files only.

REFERENCE(S)

R.C. - Date

SYNOPSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS

1. During the period covered by this report, a new Case Officer, Quinton N. OUSLER, assumed operational direction of several LIPSTICK assets (Oliver G. SCANTLING, Raymond H. GERENDE, LIMITED, LICALLA, LIENTRAP and several support agents), the LIJERSEY surveillance team and the LILYRIC Base. The Station has continued to use SCANTLING, primarily, to follow up LIMESA leads obtained from LIFEAT and the photographic bases; however, no positive returns have been realized from his prodigious efforts except the collection of a considerable amount of operational information. GERENDE performed his principal agent responsibilities for the photographic bases, LIENTRAP, LIJERSEY and until 10 December 1958 handled the LIFEAT/BGMORNING and LIFEAT/Cuban Exile operations. The LIJERSEY surveillance team has been used sparingly for pretext investigations and routine static surveillances; however, a principal agent, Simon D. CLACKETT, is currently being trained in Headquarters to assume the full-time direction, control, training and development of the LIJERSEY team. The new project, LIEMPTY, combining all the assets discussed in this report was submitted to Headquarters on 8 October 1958 with requested project year approval period from 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959. An operational security review of Raymond H. GERENDE's activities was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMMA-11368, 22 October 1958.

ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS - OLIVER G. SCANTLING SEGMENT

2. Agent Information - Oliver G. SCANTLING has continued to perform his assigned tasks in an outstanding manner. SCANTLING's poise, common sense, education, ideology and native ability for the pursuit of clandestine activities make him one of the most valuable support assets available to the Mexico City Station. The fact that SCANTLING has full time overt occupation as Chief Engineer and Production Manager for a local manufacturing company adds to his long-range potential as a KUBARK agent. On two occasions during the past six months SCANTLING has indicated to his Case Officer that he would like to resign from his overt position and devote full time to his KUBARK operational duties; however, the Case Officer has discouraged him from doing this on the basis that he has more long-range potential when his cover occupation is legitimate. Of course, SCANTLING would be more valuable if he could work full time for the Station, but not sufficiently so to warrant his resignation from his overt job (his monthly salary in his overt job is in excess of $800.00 U. S.). The only significant limitation that SCANTLING has evidenced to his present Case Officer is his occasional delay in preparing written reports of investigations and other matters requiring reports for the files. However, this limitation gradually is being overcome and it is expected that SCANTLING's reports will continue to be factual, comprehensive and soon will be promptly submitted.

CS COPY

3. Security Developments - SCANTLING is constantly under a considerable amount of exposure and pressure when following up LIMESA leads obtained from LIFEAT and the photographic bases. Since time is always of the essence when using such perishable leads, SCANTLING frequently is directed to make approaches to individuals performing services for the LIMERICK target after routine, and sometimes only cursory, investigation. Therefore, the possibility always exists of his entanglement in an undesirable security incident. This necessarily

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]K

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMA-12095
[redacted]1543

TO

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO

FROM

DATE

SUBJECT

RE 433 -- (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

is a calculated risk which both SCANTLING and the Station must take if penetration of the primary target is achieved, whether technically or by a recruitment in place. It is to SCANTLING's credit that he has not yet become involved in an incident which the Station feels has compromised him and/or alerted the target of KUBARK's many operational efforts against them. The closest SCANTLING has come to being compromised and to being identified as a PBPRIME agent stems directly from the LIPSTICK surveillance team flap of June 1958. The office used by the surveillance team was rented by SCANTLING in his true name at the time that he was leader of the team. Not the slightest indication, however, has been uncovered which points to SCANTLING as a target of investigation by a local police service. SCANTLING and the Station have been alert and will continue to watch closely for any sign of local police and other opposition interest in his activities.

4. Operational Success and Effectiveness - Briefly discussed below are some of the many operational activities in which SCANTLING participated during the period covered by this report:

D- ZR

A. Juan *CASTRO (201-[illegible]) - SCANTLING continued seeing CASTRO through September 1958 following the last faint glimmers of mounting the original LIMESA/MKLIGHTING operation through CASTRO. As late as September 1958 possibilities still existed, or appeared to exist, that CASTRO would complete his work in the primary LIMERICK office and that it might be possible to install MKLIGHTING. While CASTRO, through SCANTLING, was the principal source of this information, portions were also confirmed by LIFEAT. During July, August and September 1958, SCANTLING had approximately eignt meetings with CASTRO. In late September 1958 LIFEAT indicated that the LIMERICK target was using personnel under the supervision of one of their regular local employees, Antonio *ZEPEDA (201-239821), to complete some of the work CASTRO was supposed to finish and that other contractors were doing jobs around the target area which CASTRO would normally have been expected to do had he still been in the employ of the target. Also, LIMITED and LIFEAT confirmed that the LIMERICK target had lost interest in CASTRO - he was not seen visiting the target installation nor did the target people attempt to get in touch with him. In view of this, SCANTLING was instructed to cease all contact with CASTRO as of 1 November 1958.

B. Pablo *MON Rosas (201-237525) - During the period covered by this report SCANTLING had two interviews with MON Rosas. SCANTLING's most recent report was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMMA-11143, 1 October 1958. Unquestionably the Station has identified Mon Rosas as the technician who services LIMERICK safes and locks. SCANTLING will continue his development of MON Rosas (please see HMMA-11711, 10 December 1958).

C. Octavio *VIDALES (201-237754) - SCANTLING's activities in connection with this LIMESA/MKLIGHTING operation were summarized in HMMA-11397, 29 October 1958, and previous correspondence.

D. HERRERIA GABELICH - This is the firm that made the steel vault door for the LIMERICK installation. SCANTLING made two visits to this firm's workshop and succeeded in obtaining enough information to make an

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/[redacted]K

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-12095
[redacted]1543

TO

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM

DATE

SUBJECT

RE "43 3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

accurate drawing of the type door installed at LIMERICK. This drawing was forwarded to Headquarters via HMMA-11926, 21 January 1959.

E. Casing Report on West German Embassy - During June, July and August 1958, SCANTLING prepared a detailed casing report on the new West German Embassy. SCANTLING's engineering ability enables him to prepare accurate drawings and sketches from a minimum of data. Also, his personality and gregarious manner permit him to visit the inside of such establishments, with an appropriate cover story, and retain minute details which later he commits to paper and emerges with a comprehensive floor plan and important construction data.

F. LIMERICK Construction - SCANTLING's long association with this target from the casing standpoint provides the Station with an unparalleled source of information about LIMERICK construction activities, modifications and reasons for same. All of the LIMERICK casing reports on file in Headquarters are the product of SCANTLING's unusual ability and knowledge. Consultations with Station Officers about LIMERICK construction have been of benefit to the Station during this reporting period and they will continue to be of worthwhile importance.

G. Routine Investigations and Surveillances - Although the Station has several assets capable of performing investigations and surveillances, SCANTLING is still used in situations requiring the utmost in discretion and clandestinity. His activities in this connection are too numerous to list here; suffice it to state that he has contributed materially to the Station's collection of operational information through his investigative efforts. SCANTLING's interview of Paul Frederick Kirschhoff (201-43645) of LCMAYFOWL interest is an example of SCANTLING's use on investigations (see HMMA-11749, 17 December 1958).

H. ESGEM-15 - SCANTLING served as the cutout with ESGEM-15 during the latter's December 1958 trip to Mexico City. In this connection SCANTLING is a support asset which is trustworthy and dependable. SCANTLING never displays undue curiosity in operations such as the ESGEM-15 one; he accepts the minimum amount of information given and performs his duties in a professional and sincere manner.

I. LIEMPTY/3 - SCANTLING handles the administrative matters connected with L/3. Doris M. KILLGO provides operational direction to L/3. During this reporting period, the Station had hopes of SCANTLING taking over the operational supervision of L/3's activities. However, after a four-month trial period with both SCANTLING and KILLGO meeting with L/3, it was decided that it would be desirable for KILLGO to continue handling L/3. L/3's unusual personality and intellect indicated that he could best be directed by a PBPRIME citizen. Therefore, SCANTLING no longer attends KILLGO's and L/3's operational meetings, although he does continue to handle L/3's administrative problems.

J. Raymond H. GERENDE's Duties - During GERENDE's absence from

FORM 10-57 53

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-12095
[redacted]-1543

TO

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM

DATE

SUBJECT

RE "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

Mexico City in December 1958 and January 1959, it was considered appropriate for SCANTLING to handle LIMITED, LICALLA and LIENTRAP. Although this procedure defeats some compartmentation principles, it was the only manner in which the Station could maintain efficiency with the three operations listed above. SCANTLING has known the agents involved with LIMITED, LICALLA and LIENTRAP for several years. In fact, he was at one time the agent in charge of these three operations.

5. Operational Methods Evolved During the Period - The VIDALES operation (see paragraph 4 (C) above) indicated to the Station the necessity for thorough briefings and discussions with the agent making an approach to a target. This can hardly be described as a new operational method, but it does serve to illustrate the minimum efforts that should be followed. The forthcoming LINIMENT IV operation wherein SCANTLING must recruit the landlord of the target's building is offering SCANTLING and the Station the opportunity to prepare thoroughly for SCANTLING's recruitment pitch. The excellent documentation prepared by KURIOT and the story being created by SCANTLING and the Station should increase the batting average on SCANTLING's cold approaches. (See HMMA-11366, 22 October 1958, and HMMW-7038, 21 November 1958, for additional details on this Subject).

In a general sense, one other conclusion can be made about any Station's support apparatus - where technical and photographic operations are possible, the utility of the information obtained is enhanced considerably by accurate, comprehensive and timely casing reports. SCANTLING, as previously mentioned, is an excellent asset for this type of support.

6. Administration - SCANTLING's contract expires on 15 February 1959. As of that date SCANTLING will have received an annual salary of $3,600.00 U. S. for two years. The Station plans to raise his annual compensation to $4,000.00 U.S. No other significant administrative problems exist.

7. Outlook for Future Development - Station plans call for the continued utilization of SCANTLING in the same manner as he is presently being used. The Station will keep SCANTLING as an independent asset and, it is hoped, resist the temptation to make him a principal agent in charge of numerous sub-agents. It is believed that SCANTLING is the type of support asset that can be worthwhile to the Station for many years to come and that every effort should be made to protect his security and value to KUBARK.

ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS - RAYMOND H. GERENDE SEGMENT

8. Agent Information - Aside from the agent information given in HMMA-11368, 22 October 1958, the only significant development was GERENDE's December 1958 marriage to a U. S. educated girl of Dutch citizenship. The $500.00 U. S. for the purchase of two plane tickets as a wedding gift to GERENDE was designed to impress GERENDE with the fact that KUBARK thinks highly of him as an individual and that KUBARK has a great interest in his intelligence career. GERENDE is at the age and stage in life where he is beginning to wonder just what the future holds for him. In the near future, the Station will propose a salary raise for GERENDE

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-12095 [redacted]-1543
TO INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM		DATE
SUBJECT		RE "43 3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

and request a new contract that provides for some type of retirement benefits - perhaps similar to the Civil Service Retirement program for KUBARK employees.

9. Security Developments - Again, the information on this subject was covered adequately in HMMA-11368. GERENDE was relieved of his LIFEAT/BGMORNING and LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles duties on 10 December 1958. This, of course, was in line with recommendations contained in HMMA-11368 and represents a definite security improvement. GERENDE was told that LIFEAT/BGMORNING was being terminated because it had not been productive of enough significant information and that LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles was being terminated because the occupants of the target apartment had moved (Note: This was true where the Cubans are concerned.) Additional security improvements will be made when Simon D. CLACKETT returns to Mexico and relieves GERENDE of responsibility for the LIJERSEY surveillance team.

10. Operational Success and Effectiveness - Briefly reviewed below are the separate operational activities which GERENDE managed during the period covered by this report:

A. LIMITED - This base functioned smoothly, securely and efficiently during the period July through December 1958. The base operator, LIEMPTY/6, demonstrated his usual competence and devotion to duty. In addition to the primary objective of taking photographs of individuals of interest, L/6 also prepared detailed daily logs on the arrivals and departures of all target personnel, weekly reports of workers activities at the LIMERICK installation, performed three one-man surveillances of Mexicans working at LIMERICK in an effort to identify them by name and home address, and provided SCANTLING with information on LIMERICK construction. During this six-month period, LIEMPTY/6 took approximately 800 photographs from the LIMITED base.

B. LILYRIC - This base is operated by LIEMPTYs/13 and 14, with LIEMPTY/12 serving as a cutout between the base and GERENDE. LIEMPTY/14 does most of the photography and reporting for the base since LIEMPTY/13 has a regular job and is not on the premises during regular daytime working hours. L/14 devotes approximately six hours (0800-1400) each day to photography and the remaining time is spent preparing reports. The Base personnel compile individual logs on each target personality indicating their arrivals and departures from the LIMERICK installation (Note: These reports are filed in the appropriate Station 201 file and are available to Station officers in analyzing a target personality's pattern of daily activity). LILYRIC also prepared a weekly report on workers activities at the Club and reports the license plate numbers of all vehicles discharging or picking up individuals at LIMERICK. (Note: These license plate numbers are then checked out through LIVESTOCK/2 for the owners names and addresses - in case of immediate or later operational interest.) During GERENDE's recent absence from Mexico City, OUSLER met directly with LIEMPTY/12. During this period approximately 2,000 photographs were taken from the LILYRIC base.

C. LICALLA - While LILYRIC and LIMITED are excellent bases for photographing individuals entering and leaving the LIMERICK installation, the LICALLA base is the Station's best source of photographs of LIMERICK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-12095
[redacted]-1543

TO

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM

DATE

SUBJECT

RE "433" – (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

employees. LICALLA is so situated that photographs can be made of target personnel in the garden area of LIMERICK. LIEMPTY/9 is the base operator for LICALLA and in the Station's opinion performs his job in an outstanding manner. As reported in HMMA-11368, LIEMPTY/9 is the brother of former LIPSTICK/47 (the first LIPSTICK surveillance team member arrested in June 1958). No repercussions, or indications of any impending ones, have resulted in this family relationship. This, certainly, is the major security problem faced by L/9 during this reporting period. L/9 and his family soon will have to vacate the LICALLA base for the period of time required to remodel it. The Station is quite sure that L/9 does not know that his covert employer owns the LICALLA base and the three adjoining houses and every effort is being made to preserve this secret from L/9. (See HMMA-12032, 28 January 1959, for a more detailed explanation.) Of course, during the remodeling of LICALLA there will not be any LICALLA reporting or photographs. In addition to taking approximately 2,500 photographs during this six-month period, the LICALLA base also prepared weekly reports on LIMERICK garden activities. These reports indicate which LIMERICK employees are seen together each day, which vehicles different employees are accustomed to using, construction activities and other matters which appear of significance to L/9.

D. LIENTRAP - LIENTRAP continues to be a worthwhile Station asset. Approximately 1,400 clandestine photographs have been made of numerous targets during this reporting period and LIENTRAP type activities will undoubtedly remain one of the Station's best investigative assets. As explained in the Field Project Outline, forwarded to Headquarters on 8 October 1958, the Station is of the opinion that the LIENTRAP vehicle should be replaced as soon as possible. Nearly four months have elapsed without receiving Headquarters authority to replace the vehicle. The security situation is even more acute now than at the time of the request. LIEMPTYs 10 and 11 do an excellent job on LIENTRAP operations.

DH
13232

E. LIJERSEY - This operation can be characterized as somewhat dormant for the July - December 1958 period. Because of GERENDE's other important activities, he did not have the time to train and work with the surveillance team. Also, the Station considered that it would be stretching security just a bit too far to have GERENDE engaged in surveillance at the same time that he was handling the photographic base houses and performing monitoring chores for LIFEAT/BGMORNING and LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles. The expected arrival of Simon D. CLACKETT in April and his relieving GERENDE of LIJERSEY will enable the Station to train, within a year, an efficient mobile surveillance team. At present, LIEMPTYs/15, 16 and 17 compose the LIJERSEY team.

F. LIFEAT - Until 10 December 1958 GERENDE served as monitor in the base house containing LIFEAT/BGMORNING and LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles. In addition to living in the base house, GERENDE also transcribed the majority of the BGMORNING and Cuban Exile tapes. He performed these jobs satisfactorily even though his efficiency was handicapped by numerous other duties. Relieving GERENDE of his LIFEAT duties enables him to devote more time to his other operations with a corresponding increase in the security of all his activities.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-12095 [redacted]-1543
TO INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM		DATE
SUBJECT		RE 43 3 — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)		

G. LIEMPTYs/4 and 5 - LIEMPTY/4 does a truly professional job of developing and printing the base house photographs. No significant developments occurred in relation to L/4 except that OUSLER met directly with him during the December 1958 period that GERENDE was away from Mexico City. LIEMPTY/5, L/4's wife, continued doing routine translations in a very competent manner.

11. Administration - Other than the fact that LIJERSEY and the above-mentioned portions of the LIPSTICK projects were combined into this new project, LIEMPTY, there is nothing of significance to report to Headquarters.

12. Outlook for Future Development - Although not meaning to be repetitive by discussing again those recommendations made above, a summary of the Station's outlook on the future of the LIEMPTY GERENDE Segment is believed to be appropriate. With the arrival of CLACKETT in April, GERENDE will be free to devote full time to photographic base house operations. GERENDE can do a lot to professionalize these operations by preparing written communications procedures, by thoroughly debriefing base house operators on their methods of operation, by preparing detailed security reviews on each base and by supervising the trial of new photographic techniques. GERENDE will continue to be used on occasional sensitive investigations to rent operational hotel rooms and to perform other services for the Station which will not impair the security of his primary responsibilities. It is planned that CLACKETT will put some life into the LIJERSEY surveillance team and that the Station will soon have another first rate investigative group to support other Station operations.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
31 January 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

4 FEB 1959
50-6-74/3

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 7

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/WH

SUBJECT: Case Officer Assignments in Mexico

1. KSR Staff has told Rio Station to remove their liaison case officer from handling their Number One clandestine operation.

2. Why should we not do this in the case of Mexico where Estancona is handling LIVESTOCK-2 (Station's most overt and dangerous agent) and LIFEAT (unilateral telephone tap)?

3. Incidentally, telephone taps in Mexico are limping along with about half the target coverage of a year ago.

Charles W. Anderson
CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

1 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Mexico

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY

On this mammoth project, I have only two ideas:

a. Should LICALLA be terminated? It is a possible threat to LIMESA.

b. Gerende should be taken off all LIFEAT work.

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

What's new on Sancho's replacement?

29 Oct 1958

TO: WH/Personnel

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Request for Staff Agent to fill ~~/~~ PAP-8100 Slot in Mexico City

1. It is requested that WH/Personnel locate a Staff Agent to fill the PAP-8100 IO (FI), GS-12 slot in Mexico City which was recently vacated by Wilfred O. CLOWER (p).

2. ~~This~~ This Agent ~~should~~ [illegible] be bilingual in Spanish and should have operational experience, especially in physical surveillance techniques. [illegible] He will be expected to spot, develop, recruit, and direct surveillance assets. ~~and~~ He will ~~also~~ be given full responsibility for organizing an effective physical surveillance team.

3. It is requested that a suitable candidate be located as soon as possible so that the Contract Agent now performing the functions can be relieved of this responsibility and can devote his time to ~~his~~ other tasks.

23 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: CWH

SUBJECT : Development of Physical Surveillance Assets in Mexico

REFERENCE : WH/FI Memorandum of 14 October 1958

1. The subject of the recruitment of a physical surveillance team in the United States for use in Mexico as well as other areas within WH has long been a topic of discussion at Headquarters. While it is palpably ridiculous to consider the use of a surveillance team recruited and trained in the United States and based in Mexico, operationally in other areas in Latin America, there is some merit, at least in theory, to the proposal in 2a of reference. Although one of the basic factors in the make-up of any surveillance team is that its members must be indigenous to the area of operation, it would be possible to recruit such a team as suggested in 2a and use this team in Mexico. However, I believe this would be time-consuming and very expensive for the following reasons:

a. Machine runs have already been made to spot candidates within the Agency of the Mexican/American type for the LIMESA/LIMUST project, with negative results.

b. In order to make it attractive to young men of the caliber desired, we would have to offer some kind of a career with a starting salary of somewhere between the GS 7 and GS 9 level, plus travel and allowances. Without attempting to even estimate this cost one can see that the figures for a team of fifteen would run into six digits.

c. It would take a minimum of three months for a recruiter to move into the southwest area and spot, contact, develop and recruit a team of fifteen.

d. Once a team of suitable candidates was recruited and cleared, it would then take a minimum of another three months to train these candidates in basic trade craft and surveillance techniques.

e. Upon completion of the training period, the candidates would have to be moved individually into the area of operation to become familiar with this area, the language, people, and atmosphere in general, etc. This would take another three months minimum.

f. After completion of the area familiarization period, the team would have to be assembled and put through various surveillance exercises as a unit to check them out prior to actual operations

g. There would be other problems confronting such a team from a security standpoint, such as cover credentials, which would always pose a threat to the operation.

2. To sum up, it would appear that the proposal in 2a of reference is not feasible because of the time and expense involved plus the always latent security hazard.

3. I agree with paragraph 2 b of reference. Not only should the personnel of the surveillance team be recruited at the station, but as outlined in paragraph 3 it should be relatively easy to find suitable candidates. For example it is proposed under the new LIEMPTY project (this consists of the remainder of the non-blown LIPSTICKs and the LIJERSEYs) to recruit a physical surveillance team. Two of the station's outstanding indigenous agents, Scantling and Gerende, are under this project and both are capable of spotting, developing, and recruiting agents.

4. I agree with paragraph 3b, c, and d, and believe that Headquarters should make every effort to find an experienced and competent case officer to fill Clower's slot as the outside surveillance case officer.

John B. Brady
WH/III/Mexico

14 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: CWH

SUBJECT: Development of Physical Surveillance Assets in Mexico

1. On 8 October 1958 a meeting of representatives of SR Division and CI Staff was held, attended by the undersigned, to discuss means for building up physical surveillance assets in Mexico. The SR and CI representatives pointed out that their current and projected work on BGMORNING and their cases requires a considerable strengthening of physical surveillance assets, and it was the consensus that these assets would be used far into the future on Soviet targets. It was further agreed that since the LIPSTICK operation has encountered difficulties this year, new assets should be sought.

2. Various approaches to the problem were discussed, the most viable of which were as follows:

a. Recruiting of teams or basic elements for teams in the Mexican colonies of the southwestern U. S.

b. Dispatch of a new case officer to Mexico with the sole and specific duty of developing and running the new teams.

c. A combination of a and b.

3. Initially, it is believed the dispatch of a new case officer to Mexico would be the most successful and give the best immediate results, for the following reasons:

a. Headquarters and Station records contain the names of numerous cleared contacts or contacts who could be cleared and through whom introductions could be made to persons suitable for surveillance work. Hitherto these have not been fully exploited owing to the heavy workload on Station personnel and the unimpaired functioning till recently of the LIPSTICK group. Some of these contacts were felt out as recruiters and spotters in years past but the matter was never pushed since the need was not so great as now.

b. A new case officer is needed because the present Station staff is still too busy to devote the amount of time needed to build carefully and train thoroughly the new assets.

c. The new assets will require the full time direction and coordination of a case officer who has no other responsibilities. In this connection, it would be advisable to try to select, train and utilize at least twelve new agents as soon as possible.

d. In brief, a replacement of the former physical surveillance leader is indicated, but a more mature and competent case officer is needed.

4. Plan a, recruitment in the U. S., should not be dismissed from consideration. It would take longer than the other plan but might be beneficial in enabling the new agents to be trained in the U. S. They would then have to spend time getting into Mexico and familiarize themselves with operations and operational climate there. This plan, however, presents a problem as to who is to do the recruiting and training in the U. S. SR Division has offered to be of whatever assistance they can, but there is no indication they could do any better at this than WHD.

5. It may be of interest to you to know that the SR representatives said the best work done anywhere in the world on the BGMORNING case, which has wide international ramifications, was done by LIKAYAK-2 in Mexico.

Charles W. Anderson
CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 cc - CWH
2 cc - WH/FI

4. EQUIPMENT: 1 QP auto
Photographic Equipment

5. PROJECT ACTIONS: First approved in 1958, the FY 1971 Renewal Request was submitted in April 1970.

6. COST:

FY	APPROVALS
1966	$45,300
1967	41,500
1968	45,000
1969	43,500
1970	49,468 (Estimated Obligation)
1971	23,635 (Request)

SUMMARY OF CURRENT PROJECT COSTS: FY 1970

Salaries and Bonuses	$40,580.00
Real Estate, Utilities and Rent	6,188.00
Car Maintenance	1,200.00
Property Maintenance and Replacement	500.00
Supplies	1,000.00
TOTAL	$49,468.00

SECRET
(When Filled In)

UNINDEXED DOCUMENT

NOTE: [illegible] cards for this document cannot be made until it is returned to RI

FROM: Dusty Rhodes X-8569	DOCUMENT NO. HMMA-11263
	DOCUMENT DATE 8 Oct 58

INSTRUCTIONS: Desk assistance is required to index the attached document for the reason(s) checked below. Please take the required action, checking the appropriate block(s) under desk comments below, and return to RI/AN within three (3) working days from date of receipt. You may retain one carbon for a working copy pending return of the processed document. If exceptional circumstances make it impossible to meet the deadline, call the analyst whose name appears above to arrange an alternate due date.

REQUIREMENTS

☐ ORIGINATOR REQUESTS REVIEW FOR INDEXING BY HEADQUARTERS DESK

☐ REQUIRES TRANSLATION OR TRANSLITERATION

REQUIRES

☐ 201 ☐ PROJECT ☐ CASE FILE BE OPENED

☐ REQUIRES 201 NUMBER OF CRYPTONYM

OTHER (Specify)

SUSPENSE DATE 14 Oct 58

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. WH/7/MEX					Copy Detached HMMA-11257
2. attn. C. Zehrung					Please indicate RI file # for this dispatch & return to RI/AN. If HMMA-11257 has not been classified, please return it also to RI/AN for processing.
3.					
4. RI/AN					30-6-74
5. ~~RI/AN~~					

WH/7/Refiled

DESK COMMENTS File [illegible]

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING NEEDED

☐ FILE OPENED AS NUMBER

☐ TRANSLATED OR TRANSLITERATED

☐ 201 NUMBER OF CRYPTONYM IS

OTHER (Specify)

DATE

SIGNATURE OF DESK OFFICER

SECRET

FORM 1-58 1356

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMM-A-11263

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6- /1

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

DATE: 8 October 1958

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Operational/Assignment of Cryptonym

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE(S): HMM-A-11257

LIEMPTY

Cryptonym number 476 has been assigned to the project outline forwarded as an attachment to the referenced dispatch.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

QNO/cps

7 October 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Hqs
- 2 - Files

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: WH/III	TELEPHONE	NO. HMM-A-3993
		DATE 16 Jan 57

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
1. Condon		24 Jan	24	mpc		cc det. for LIPSTICK/LICALLA.
2. Brandon		25 Jan	25	[illegible]		KAPOK
3. Brady		25 Jan	25	JB		#3+7 require answers. Cable approval request in P-7 and 7/2
4. Shaw		24 Jan		RBS		BY HAND
5. FLYNN		[illegible]	[illegible]	JD		
MARELIUS		[illegible]		Cumbelius		Copy det.
6. STD/Harter	1501 L	2/8/56	2/8/56	[illegible]	9059	
7. CI/OPS Wright	1604 L		read.	Emp		
8. SR/CE Silver	2052 J		5/6/57	[illegible]		
9.						~~Chiefs~~ Files ~~[illegible]~~
10.						
11.						
12.						
13.						
14. ~~WH/Records~~	1026 B.H.		22 [illegible] 1957	[illegible]		
15. WH/III BRADY						50-6-74/3

FORM NO. 610 1 APR 55 REPLACES FORM 51-10 WHICH MAY BE USED. SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 15—61155-6 (40)

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-3992 JK
KAPOK-492

SECRET

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: DATE 16 January 1956

Signed: Glenn Palmer

R.O. #030 - Unit 44/1/R

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

TO Chief, WHD

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC LIPSTICK/LICALLA

REF: a. MEXI 360; b. DIR 38861

1. On 16 December 1955 the daily check of property which this Station may desire to use for operational purposes(LICOOL run) showed that a house adjacent to the LIMERICK target installation was vacant. LIPSTICK-19 was contacted immediately to investigate the property. He reported that it was a one-story house(duplex) in very poor condition which was being repaired by the owner for rental. He further reported that from the maid's room on the roof a clear view of the entire LIMERICK compound was possible and, if he had understood the LIMERICK language, he would have been able to understand several conversations which were going on between LIMERICK officers in the game area of the compound. LIPSTICK-19 also reported that from the roof of this house it was a distance of only approximately fifty feet to the LIMERICK building across flat roofs with no obstructing partitions except for a small wall and several strands of barbed wire, all totalling about four or five feet high between the last roof and the LIMERICK building.

2. Based upon this favorable report, reference A was sent immediately to Headquarters requesting authorization to rent the house. Two days later reference B was received granting approval to rent the house. Consequently, LIPSTICK-21(the only cleared married man available to the Station, with the exception of LIBERTY, who would fit into the area) was approached and requested to rent the house. This posed a considerable problem to LIPSTICK-21, since the house has only two bedrooms and he already had two children, and at that very time his wife was in the hospital giving birth to a third child. Further, he had a very comfortable house (a duplex which he shared with his brother-in-law at a pre-devaluation rent) which he would never be able to again acquire after this operation was terminated. He did, however, agree to take the house and it was

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

56-6-74/3

[redacted]

HMMA-3992
KAPOK-492
16 January 1956
Page 2

apparent to all concerned that his decision was based upon loyalty to this Station and dedication to the fight against Communism. It is hoped that this unselfish and devoted act of LIPSTICK-21's will be made a matter of permanent record.

3. The reason for LIPSTICK-21 to move from very comfortable quarters at less rent into cramped quarters at a higher rental needed some explanation for his friends and relatives. There is a very fine private school approximately one block from this house which LIPSTICK-21 had often mentioned as the best in the city for his children, and consequently he told everyone that the reason for moving was to be as close as possible to this school so that his children could attend. It should be noted in this respect that, in reality, LIPSTICK-21 had been sending his children to one of the best public schools in Mexico City at no cost. Under the present circumstances, he will have to pay tuition at the private school because it is the only decent school in the area and it provides excellent cover for his residence in the area. It is requested that Headquarters authorize this Station to assist LIPSTICK-21 in the payment of his children's tuition for the above stated reasons. Approximate cost of the tuition would be $20.00 U.S. per child per month, or a total for LIPSTICK-21 of $40.00 US per month. Authorization is requested to assist LIPSTICK-21 by payment of $30.00 U.S. per month.

4. The house is one of a series of one-story houses that extend from the LIMERICK building to a four-story apartment building on the far corner. The fronts of the houses are all directly on the sidewalk with the doors opening onto a one-step stoop. The backs of the houses and the walls of the back patios all abut the compound of the LIMERICK installation. The rear windows of the house face a patio which ends in a brick wall. This brick wall is not as high as the roof of the house, ending about four feet below the level of the roof. There are stairs which ascend from this patio to the roof where the maid's quarters are situated. About halfway up these stairs one can turn and obtain an unrestricted view of the LIMERICK compound. However, the maid's room offers the best operational possibilities since it provides concealment for the observer and his equipment, plus a more advantageous view. LIPSTICK-21 told his maid that she would have to sleep out at a local pension since he needed her room for his radio experiments. This is a plausible story since LIPSTICK-21 is known to be an enthusiastic radio amateur.

5. The maid's room has a door that faces across the roofs in the direction of the LIMERICK installation and one window which faces across the house roof toward the street. A view of the LIMERICK compound is obtained by an observer who is back in the room looking through the partly opened door. Some better method of observation will be worked out which will eliminate the security hazard of a door partially opened at all times of operation.

[redacted]

6. At present we plan to allow LIPSTICK-21 considerable time to get settled securely into his new quarters before starting any operational efforts. After this waiting period is over and we feel that we can securely commence operations, we plan on using the base for the following efforts:

a. A supplementary photographic base. In this connection the request for additional Exactas and spotting scopes previously made should be expedited. It is anticipated that much operational information will be developed by this photographic work showing the various associations between the people when they are at play in the compound which can never be determined from the LIPSTICK-LIMITED coverage. Visitors who seldom leave the compound do engage in social activity within the compound and can be photographed for possible identification by the AEDIPPERS. Items which are loaded into the automobiles for transportation to unknown points may be identified through this coverage. Further, should LIPSTICK/LIMITED be terminated for any reason, we would be able to continue some coverage from this base.

b. Observation by LIPSTICK-21 of the buildings and the activities in the compound will furnish valuable information on the daily living habits of the residents and their guests.

c. The LIPSTICK/LIDOMINO base, presently being occupied by LINCHPIN, is about 75 yards away from the LIMERICK target while LIPSTICK/LICALLA is only about fifty feet. This base may assist the Headquarters technicians, who periodically use the LIPSTICK/LIDOMINO base, for reasons of proximity and the use of their equipment from a different direction. The exact use of the LIPSTICK/LICALLA base in this respect must be determined by the Headquarters technicians who are familiar with the equipment used.

d. Conversations in the LIMERICK compound are audible to someone who is listening from the maid's room. Naturally street noises and extraneous sounds interfere considerably with this eavesdropping so that the employment of some parabolic microphone and recorder must be used for optimum results.

e. Should future operations provide the opportunity to install a transmitter microphone (resonant cavity) in some item carried into the LIMERICK target, LIPSTICK/LICALLA would serve as an excellent base since it has direct line of sight to the back of the LIMERICK target.

f. Preliminary investigation reveals that the possibility does exist that physical access may be obtained to the LIMERICK target from LIPSTICK/LICALIA. This investigation will be intensified and a full report, together with available photographs, will be sent to Headquarters for study by **FEARSON** and NILES as to the feasibility of this type of operation.

7. As stated in paragraphs two and three above, LIPSTICK-21 has undergone considerable personal sacrifice to accommodate this Station in this operation. It has always been the practice to pay a base house operator a starting salary of approximately $120.00 U.S. per month, since the work of operating a base house is almost full-time. LIPSTICK-21 now earns $64.00 U.S. for work of approximately four hours per day. It is therefore requested that this Station be authorized by cable to increase the salary of LIPSTICK-21 to $120.00 U.S. per month.

Matthew S. Dingley
Matthew S. DINGLEY

Distribution:

3 - Wash
2 - Files

MSD/gfb

50-6-74/3

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component) WH	**SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION**
TO :	
TO : (Station/Base)	FROM: (Division)

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12

ITEM 3-ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS

ITEM 6-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8-USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES

ITEM 10-ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES. SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE	2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT	50	6	74/03

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION				5. DISPOSITION		
	OPEN FILE		CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)		RETAIN		DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)
XX	AMEND FILE TITLE		REOPEN			

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

FORMERLY LIEMPTY

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)	8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
HMM	50

9. FILES ACTION

	HOLD IN CS FILES		RESTRICTED		UNRESTRICTED		PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER		CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT	12. COORDINATION	13. RID APPROVAL
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)	REQUEST APPROVED BY Louis W. Armstrong RID/AN

EFFECTIVE DATE	CODE (FILE) NUMBER		
	050	006	074/03

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG. 2-64

SECRET

38

1-CS COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CASE FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 21 October 1958

FROM: (Requester Name) Charlotte Fehrung

COMPONENT	BUILDING	ROOM NO.	TELEPHONE
WH	Barton	2120	2758

1. CASE TITLE

LIEMPTY/ Operations

2. COUNTRY AND NUMBER: 50 (Mexico)

3. CATEGORY AND NUMBER: 6 Operational

4. ACTION REQUESTED

☒	OPEN FILE AS INDICATED.	
☐	AMEND FILE AS INDICATED.	
☐	CLOSE FILE	
☒	RESTRICT FILE TO (DESK).	WH/III/Mexico
☒	PERMANENT CHARGEOUT TO (DESK).	WH/III/Mexico
☐	PREPARE FILE FOLDERS AND SEND TO REQUESTER.	

5. COMMENTS: (Include brief description of file or project)

Photo and physical surveillance coverage and support for station.

RECORD COPY

6. FOR RI USE ONLY

1. PROJECT STATUS ☐

2. FIELD STATION(S)

3. HDQRS. COMPONENT(S)

7. ENDORSEMENT

THIS REQUEST SATISFIES RECORDS REQUIREMENTS.

C. Z. Liccary
RI ANALYSIS

EFFECTIVE DATE

29 Oct Dec 1958

8. APPROVAL

REQUEST APPROVED

[illegible]
FOR CHIEF, RI

RI CASE TITLE NUMBER

			NS
50	6	745	

FORM NO. 812 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 DEC 56

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

Os-Videla:jah
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/3

October 1964

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☒ FILE RID

Mexico
DIRECTOR
CONF. WH 8 INFO SE 7, PG 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA, VR, FILE

23 OCT 64 20 39z
ROUTING

SIG CEN

MEXI INFO CITE DIR 58997

LIEMPTY

REF: MEXI 1307 (IN 96996)*

1. HDQS AGREES IN PRINCIPLE THAT LIMITED BLDG SHOULD BE RAZED RATHER THAN REPAIRED. YOUR PARA THREE PROPOSAL OF COMMERCIAL INCOME NETTING VENTURE WOULD IMMEDIATELY MAKE THIS ASPECT OF LIEMPTY A PROPRIETARY WITH ATTENDANT SPECIAL ADMIN HANDLING. UNLESS THERE ARE OVERRIDING SECURITY AND OPS CONSIDERATIONS WE PREFER NOT DO THIS. HOWEVER IF FINAL DECISION IS TO BUILD STORE AND TWO APARTMENTS, HDQS SUGGESTS LIMITED BE MADE SEPARATE (FROM LIEMPTY) PROPRIETARY SUPPORT PROJ IN ORDER REDUCE CONFUSION OF TWO TYPES ACCOUNTING UNDER ONE PROJ.

2. HDQS STRONGLY BELIEVES PREFERABLE SOLUTION WOULD BE MERELY REBUILD HOUSE ON SAME LAND FOR OCCUPANCY BASEHOUSE KEEPERS. THIS WILL NOT INVOLVE PROPRIETARY. ALSO WOULD BE MORE SECURE FROM STANDPOINT SOV COUNTERMEASURES.

3. ALTERNATE SOLUTION IS SELL LIMITED PROPERTY TO LIMOUSINE AT FAIR MARKET VALUE DETERMINED BY INDEPENDENT APPRAISAL WITH UNDERSTANDING HE BUILD AN APARTMENT ON SECOND FLOOR WHICH HE WILL LET US ON LONG TERM LEASE.

EXEX CONTINUED..........

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1-64 1389a REP[illegible]ION BY OTHE[illegible] T[illegible]N[illegible]CE IS PROHIBI[illegible] [illegible]No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG. C. Bustos-Vidola:jah
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : NOV 13 7 21 PM '58

FROM: DIRECTOR

Page 2

CONF: INFO

TO INFO CITE DIR 58997

4. BLUEPRINTS FOR ANY BUILDING TO BE CONSTRUCTED WITH KUBARK FUNDS MUST RECEIVE HDQS APPROVAL. THIS APPROVAL AND PROJ AMENDMENT MUST BE OBTAINED ~~PRIOR~~ TO ANY COMMITMENT FUNDS. ESTIMATED TIME FOR TOTAL APPROVAL AFTER RECEIPT PLANS IS HOPEFULLY TWO MONTHS. THE HOUSE SHOULD NOT BE RAZED UNTIL APPROVAL GRANTED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *LIMITED photo basehouse which we purchased 1958 is deteriorating and Station suggests raze building and rebuild with store on 1st floor and two apts upstairs at cost of $86.000.

WH/EF Carter (draft)
SR/C/WH (draft) L Shyer
CI/OPS (draft) Overjorde
DDP/PG (draft) Hernandez
WH/FI/Horton (draft)
C/WH/SS/Brooks (draft)
WH/Log/McMahon (draft)

WH/COPS Reed

W Wood
RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

W. S. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFID TIAL ☒ SECRE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

KDFACTOR Project Amendment and Termination

FROM:

H.E. Mulloy

Henry E. Mulloy, WH/1/FI

EXTENSION: 1973/ 4167

NO.

DATE: 26 April 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/1	26	26		FY 72 FUNDS AVAILABLE
2. WH/B&F	26 Apr.	27 Apr		
3. WH/LOG		27 Apr 73	K	
4. WH/SS		5-1-73		
5. WH/Plans/Erna	1 May		EW	
6. ~~C/WH/RR~~				
7. ~~C/WH/TRS~~				
8. C/WH/FI	1 [illegible] 1973		✓	
9. C/WH/Plans	15 May 74			
10. A C/WHD	5/14/73			
11.				
12. MPS/BG/FI	29 MAY 1973			BY HAND
13. WH/1/FI				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT **KDFACTOR**

☐ CA
☒ FI/CI

ACTION		COMPONENT
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION OR STAFF WH
X	AMENDMENT No. 2, FY 72	BRANCH WH/1
	RENEWAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ BIENNIAL	
X	TERMINATION	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Henry E. Mulloy EXTENSION: 4167
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY	DATE APPROVED	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
ADDO	25 May 1973	$ 7,246	19 72	$ 36,090
			19	$

PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1971 TO 30 June 1972

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL 2135-1009

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

Amendment No. 2 to Project KDFACTOR approved in the amount of $7,246, increasing the project's authorization from $28,844 to a revised total of $36,090 for FY 72; termination of Project KDFACTOR approved effective 30 June 1972.

SIGNATURE
MPS/BG

DATE 29 MAY 1973

DISTRIBUTION

1	PPS		1	DIV. OR STAFF OF OFFICER	1	CASE OFFICER	1	MPS/BG

FORM 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

2 2 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Operations

THROUGH: MPS/BG

SUBJECT: Amendment and Termination of Project KDFACTOR

1. Project KDFACTOR supported a visual and photographic surveillance operation in Mexico City targetted against the Soviet Embassy. Assets included five agents and two basehouse surveillance sites. Termination of this project, effective 30 June 1972, was the result of a security review which revealed that the VWBLANKET principal knew the basic details of the KDFACTOR operations.

2. Agent termination was accomplished without any immediate difficulties; however, continued security will depend on the terminated agents' silence. In the event there is a compromise, the risk of damage to the Station's relations with the Mexican Government should be minimized because of the compatible nature of KDFACTOR's operations.

3. The ADDO approved Amendment No. 1 to the project in the amount of $9,844 for FY 1972 to provide for the agent terminations, but an overrun of $7,246 occurred as the result of miscalculation of termination costs. This project action requests this additional sum of $7,246 to cover these expenses.

4. The FI Staff recommends approval of this amendment/termination request.

L. A. Campbell
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment:
Project

Reviewing officer:
FI/OPS - Stephen Roll

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM
KDFACTOR

TYPE OF ACTION	X FI/C	CA	
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division	
X	AMENDMENT NO. 2	FIELD STATION Mexico City	
	RENEWAL FY 19	BRANCH One	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Henry E. Mulloy H.E. Mulloy	DATE 26 Apr 73
X	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3E05 · BUILDING Hqs · TEL. EXT.	RED 1973 · BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray for	26 Apr	26 Apr		
C/WH/B&F	John T. Boeck	26 Apr 73	27 Apr		
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright		5-1-73		✓
C/WH/FI	Robert D. Wiecha		14 May 73		
C/WH/Plans	John H. Wilson				
A C/WHD	James E. Flannery for James E. Flannery	5-14-73			✓

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
FI Staff			22 May 73	x	
CI Staff	/s/ Frank W. Hughes		22 May 73		X
C/CCS/PRG	/s/ Gale W. Allen		21 May 73		X
C/MPS/BG	Paul A.	24 May 73	24 May 73		

ALL FUTURE
ACTIONS ON
THIS PROJECT
[illegible]
APPROVAL OF
DDO or ADDO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 71	30 June 72	$ 7,246	19 72	$36,090

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
ADDO	William E. Nelson	25 May 1973

FORM 5-69 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director
For Operations

SUBJECT : Project KDFACTOR - Amendment
and Termination Request.

1. The KDFACTOR Project (until 1970 encrypted as the LIEMPTY Project) was initially approved in 1958 to provide financial and material support for visual and photographic surveillance operations targetted against the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. In June 1972 the project supported five agents and two basehouse surveillance sites.

2. The KDFACTOR Project was approved by the ADDO in the amount of $19,000 for FY - 72 and $20,000 for FY - 73. Per DIRECTOR 285255, dated 30 June 1972, the ADDO approved Amendment NO. 1 to the KDFACTOR Project in the amount of $9,844 for FY - 72 to provide for costs of agent terminations.

3. The decision to terminate all agents and facilities under the KDFACTOR Project was based on a security review of the project activities which indicated that the VWBLANKET principal knew the basic details of the KDFACTOR operations, including the target, the location of the surveillance sites, and probably the true names and former cryptonyms of the agents covered by the project.

4. The cost of terminating the agents under the KDFACTOR Project amounted to $15,573; the cost of closing down the two basehouses under the project was $1,412. The total amount charged to the KDFACTOR Project in FY 72 was $36,090 which is $7,246 over the approved authorization of $28,844. The overage was incurred in terminating the agents and facilities associated with the KDFACTOR Project. Although Amendment No. 1 to the project was approved in the amount of $9,844 to cover the cost of terminating the agents in the

26 Apr 73

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 03542

project, the actual payments made by Mexico City Station per the terms of each Memorandum of Oral Commitment (MOC) and in accordance with Mexican law and custom exceeded the estimate for termination costs made by Headquarters at the time the Amendment was requested. Termination payments made to each agent are as follows:

KDFACTOR-2	(Recruited 1956)	$8,160
KDFACTOR-5	(Recruited 1956)	2,366
KDFACTOR-6	(Recruited 1956)	2,830
KDFACTOR-8	(Recruited 1965)	649
KDFACTOR-9	(Recruited 1966)	1,568

The long tenure of three of the terminated agents, the relatively high monthly salary of KDFACTOR-2 ($440) plus the computation of the termination payments in accordance with Mexican law and custom were the primary reasons that the final agent termination costs amounted to $15,573.

5. All agent terminations were accomplished in an amicable manner. No visible security risks were apparent at the time of the terminations although any one, or all, of the terminated agents may at some future date decide to divulge to an interested party the details of the KDFACTOR Project operations. KDFACTOR-2, KDFACTOR-5, and KDFACTOR-6 have worked in photo surveillance operations for the Station since 1956 and, therefore, obviously have considerable knowledge of targets, former safesites, personnel, and modus operandi of the Station. However, since the KDFACTOR Project was not concerned with incompatible operations or targets, we believe the risks of damage to Station relations with the Mexican Government in the event of exposure of the KDFACTOR Project operations by a terminated agent are within acceptable limits.

6. It is requested that the KDFACTOR Project be amended to provide the sum of $7,246 for FY - 72 to cover the costs of terminating five agents and two basehouse surveillance sites under this project.

7. It is also requested that the termination of the KDFACTOR Project be approved effective 30 June 1972.

James E Flannery

James E. Flannery
AC/WHD

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Proj

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM	KDFACTOR	
TYPE OF ACTION	X FI/C	CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division
X	AMENDMENT NO. 2	FIELD STATION Mexico City
	RENEWAL FY 19	BRANCH One / DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Henry E. Mulloy / DATE 26 Apr 73
X	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3E05 / BUILDING Hqs / TEL. EXT. / RED 1973 BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray				
C/WH/B&F	John T. Boeck				
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright				
C/WH/FI	Robert D. Wiecha				
C/WH/Plans	John H. Wilson				
C/WHD	Theodore G. Shackley				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 71	30 June 72	7,246	19 72	$ 56,090

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
ADDO		

FORM 5-69 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director
For Operations

SUBJECT : Project KDFACTOR - Amendment and
Termination Request.

1. The KDFACTOR Project (until 1970 encrypted as the LIEMPTY Project) was initially approved in 1958 to provide financial and materiel support for visual and photographic surveillance operations targetted against the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. In June 1972 the project supported five agents and two basehouse surveillance sites.

2. The KDFACTOR Project was approved by the ADDO in the amount of $19,000 for FY-72 and $20,000 for FY-73. Per DIRECTOR 285255, dated 30 June 1972, the ADDO approved Amendment No. 1 to the KDFACTOR Project in the amount of $9,844 for FY-72 to provide for costs of agent terminations.

3. The decision to terminate all agents and facilities under the KDFACTOR Project was based on a security review of the project activities which indicated that the WBLANKET principal knew the basic details of the KDFACTOR operations, including the target, the location of the surveillance sites, and probably the true names and former cryptonyms of the agents covered by the project.

4. The costs of terminating all the agents in the KDFACTOR Project amounted to $15,573.00 which was considerably more than had been initially estimated when Amendment No. 1 for FY-72 was requested and approved. The total amount charged to the KDFACTOR Project in FY-72 was $36,090 which is $7,246 over the project's authorization of $28,844. The overage was incurred in terminating agents and facilities associated with the KDFACTOR Project; the effective date of all terminations was 30 June 1972.

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 055272

5. All agent terminations were accomplished in an amicable manner. No visible security risks were apparent at the time of the ~~terminations~~ although any one, or all of the terminationed agents may at some future date decide to divulge to an interested party the details of the KDFACTOR Project operations. KDFACTOR-2 and KDFACTOR-5 have worked in photo surveillance operations for the Station since 1957 and, therefore, obviously have considerable knowledge of targets, former safesites, personnel, and modus operandi of the Station. However, since the KDFACTOR Project was not concerned with incompatible operations or targets, we believe the risks of damage to Station relations with the Mexican Government in the event of exposure of the KDFACTOR Project operations by a terminated agent are within acceptable limits.

6. It is requested that the KDFACTOR Project be amended to provide the sum of $7,246 for FY-72 to cover the costs of terminating five agents and two basehouse surveillance sites covered by this project.

7. It is also requested that the termination of the KDFACTOR Project be approved effective 30 June 1972.

Theodore G. Shackley
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

KDFACTOR - Mexico City, Mexico -- Photographic Surveillance Team Support -- FY 1972, Cost $19,000 and FY 1973, Cost $20,000

Fiscal Year	Approved	Obligated
1971	$23,635	$27,586

Changes:

1. The processing of photographs obtained through this project now is performed inside the Station. KDFACTOR-1, who formerly processed the take in an outside safehouse, was terminated amicably in early March 1971. Security and efficiency have been increased by this change. KDFACTOR-1 was terminated in 1970, but the termination payments were made during FY 1971 causing an increase in that years obligations.

2. Howard T. BAGAUS handled the administration of this project to early April 1971 when project responsibility reverted from the Operations Support Section to the REDTOP Section. At that time Timothy H. ARCHBOLD assumed the inside administrative supervision, and agent meetings were turned over to the outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD. When ARCHBOLD departed PCS on 7 June 1971, Oliver J. MANKUNAS assumed responsibility for this project, including agent meetings.

Accomplishments:

1. This project has provided continuous daily photographic and visual coverage of personnel and vehicles entering or leaving the Soviet Embassy. A total of 530 rolls of film were produced during the reporting period. U.S. citizens, visitors, and TDY personnel are given special attention. Identifications of license plates and automobile descriptions as well as drivers and their companions are identified under this project. Additionally, attendance sheets are maintained to establish who is at the Embassy on any given day and hour.

These photographs and reports have contributed operational support to the Station's Soviet operations which is not attainable elsewhere. For example, whenever the Soviets change all their license numbers the Station is able to compile a new, complete roster within a matter of weeks.

Costs:

1. General: $19,000 is requested for FY 1972 and $20,000 is requested for FY 1973. It is also requested that the Project be amended for FY 1971 in the amount of $4,260 to provide for the termination of KDFACTOR-1 and KDFACTOR-7.

2. Source of Funds: Project KDFACTOR is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's Operational Program in the amount of $23,735 for FY 1972 and $24,182 for FY 1973.

3. Project Budget:

	FY 1970 Estimated Obligations	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Salaries				
KDFACTOR-2	$ 5,280	$ 5,280	$ 5,808	$ 5,803
KDFACTOR-5	1,728	1,728	1,901	1,901
KDFACTOR-6	2,112	2,112	2,323	2,323
KDFACTOR-8	768	768	845	845
KDFACTOR-9	1,968	1,968	2,165	2,165
KDFACTOR-1	4,400	-0-	-0-	-0-
KDFACTOR-7	2,500	-0-	-0-	-0-
Bonuses	1,374	1,088	1,087	1,087
	$20,130	$12,944	$14,129	$14,129
Base houses				
Rents	$ 6,022	$ 4,350	$ 4,240	$ 4,240
Utilities	400	750	800	800
Maintenance	200	500	500	500
	$ 6,622	$ 5,600	$ 5,540	$ 5,540

Misc Expenses				
Ops entertainment	$ 165	$ 300	$ 100	$ 100
Auto maintenance	80	100	100	100
Ops expenses	590	56	131	131
	$ 835	$ 456	$ 331	$ 331
Total Expenses	$27,587	$19,000	$20,000	$20,000

4. Foreign Currency: There is no special need for foreign funds. No non-JKLANCE funds are used.

5. Commitments: Christmas bonuses are provided in the FY 72 and FY 73 budgets.

6. Funding: Funds are hand-carried from the Station by the case officer and transferred during clandestine meetings. Receipts are obtained for all disbursements according to JKLANCE regulations.

7. Annexes: None.

KDFACTOR - Mexico City, Mexico -- Photographic Surveillance Team Support -- FY 1972, Cost $19,000 and FY 1973, Cost $20,000

Fiscal Year	Approved	Obligated
1971	$23,635	$27,586

Changes:

1. The processing of photographs obtained through this project now is performed inside the Station. KDFACTOR-1, who formerly processed the take in an outside safehouse, was terminated amicably in early March 1971. Security and efficiency have been increased by this change. KDFACTOR-1 was terminated in 1970, but the termination payments were made during FY 1971 causing an increase in that years obligations.

2. Howard T. BAGAUS handled the administration of this project to early April 1971 when project responsibility reverted from the Operations Support Section to the REDTOP Section. At that time Timothy H. ARCHBOLD assumed the inside administrative supervision, and agent meetings were turned over to the outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD. When ARCHBOLD departed PCS on 7 June 1971, Oliver J. MANKUNAS assumed responsibility for this project, including agent meetings.

Accomplishments:

1. This project has provided continuous daily photographic and visual coverage of personnel and vehicles entering or leaving the Soviet Embassy. A total of 530 rolls of film were produced during the reporting period. U.S. citizens, visitors, and TDY personnel are given special attention. Identifications of license plates and automobile descriptions as well as drivers and their companions are identified under this project. Additionally, attendance sheets are maintained to establish who is at the Embassy on any given day and hour.

These photographs and reports have contributed operational support to the Station's Soviet operations which is not attainable elsewhere. For example, whenever the Soviets change all their license numbers the Station is able to compile a new, complete roster within a matter of weeks.

Costs:

1. General: $19,000 is requested for FY 1972 and $20,000 is requested for FY 1973. It is also requested that the Project be amended for FY 1971 in the amount of $4,260 to provide for the termination of KDFACTOR-1 and KDFACTOR-7.

2. Source of Funds: Project KDFACTOR is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's Operational Program in the amount of $23,735 for FY 1972 and $24,182 for FY 1973.

3. Project Budget:

	FY 1970 Estimated Obligations	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Salaries				
KDFACTOR-2	$ 5,280	$ 5,280	$ 5,808	$ 5,808
KDFACTOR-5	1,728	1,728	1,901	1,901
KDFACTOR-6	2,112	2,112	2,323	2,323
KDFACTOR-8	768	768	845	845
KDFACTOR-9	1,968	1,968	2,165	2,165
KDFACTOR-1	4,400	-0-	-0-	-0-
KDFACTOR-7	2,500	-0-	-0-	-0-
Bonuses	1,374	1,088	1,087	1,087
	$20,130	$12,944	$14,129	$14,129
Base houses				
Rents	$ 6,022	$ 4,350	$ 4,240	$ 4,240
Utilities	400	750	800	800
Maintenance	200	500	500	500
	$ 6,622	$ 5,600	$ 5,540	$ 5,540

Misc Expenses				
Ops entertainment	$ 165	$ 300	$ 100	$ 100
Auto maintenance	80	100	100	100
Ops expenses	590	56	131	131
	$ 835	$ 456	$ 331	$ 331
Total Expenses	$27,587	$19,000	$20,000	$20,000

4. Foreign Currency: There is no special need for foreign funds. No non-JKLANCE funds are used.

5. Commitments: Christmas bonuses are provided in the FY 72 and FY 73 budgets.

6. Funding: Funds are hand-carried from the Station by the case officer and transferred during clandestine meetings. Receipts are obtained for all disbursements according to JKLANCE regulations.

7. Annexes: None.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
KDFACTOR Project Renewal

FROM:
Fred Kravcov
WH/1, 3E05

EXTENSION: 4167

NO.:

DATE: 28 October 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/1/FI/CI	28 Oct			FY 71 FUNDS AVAILABLE
2. C/WH/1		29/10/71		FY 72 FUNDS AVAILABLE
3. C/WH/B&F	29 Oct 71	1 Nov		FY 73 FUNDS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE
4. C/WH/SS		1 Nov		
5. ~~SB/X/WH~~ C/WH/FI	3/11/71 15 Nov			— [illegible] no problem on this one.
6. C/WH/Plans		11/19/71	✓	
7. [redacted]				
8. C/WHD			✓	
9. WH/FI	16	71		
10.				
11. [illegible]/BG	19 NOV 1971	15 DEC 1971		
12.				
13. WH/FI	16 DEC 1971			
14. C/WH/1				
15. C/WH/1/FI/CI				— Readvise field requesting action suggested by ADDP

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT KDFACTOR

☐ CA
☒ PI/CI

ACTION		COMPONENT
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION OR STAFF WH
X	AMENDMENT No. 1, FY 72	BRANCH WH/1
	RENEWAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ BIENNIAL	DESK Mexico
	TERMINATION	CASE OFFICER J. Murray — EXTENSION 6955
	EXTENSION	
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY	DATE APPROVED	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
ADDP	30 June 1972	$ 9,844	72	$ 28,844
			FY	$

PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1971 TO 30 June 1972

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL 2135-1009

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

Amendment No. 1 to Project KDFACTOR approved, as per DIR 285255, in the amount of $9,844, increasing the project's authorization from $19,000 to a revised total of $28,844 for FY 72.

SIGNATURE
MPS/BG

DATE 25 JUL

DISTRIBUTION

1	PPB	1	DIV. OR STAFF OF OFFICER	1	CASE OFFICER	3	MPS/BG

FORM 11-70 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT **ZDFACTOR**

☐ CA
☒ FI/CI

ACTION		COMPONENT
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION OR STAFF: WH
	AMENDMENT	
X	RENEWAL ☐ ANNUAL ☒ BIENNIAL	BRANCH: WH/1
	TERMINATION	DESK: Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Fred Kravoov — EXTENSION: 4167
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY: ADDP
DATE APPROVED: 10 December 1971
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1971 TO 30 June 1973

AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
$ 39,000	FY 72	$ 19,000
	FY 73	$ 20,000

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL: 2135-1009

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE
MPS/BG (Signed) E. M. [illegible]

DATE 15 [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION

1	PPB		1	DIV. OR STAFF OF OFFICER	1	CASE OFFICER	3	MPS/BG

FORM 11-70 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(5)

14-00000

S E C R E T
(When Filled In)

FUNDING

NO. 1
(DOCUMENT # FOR THIS PROJECT)

DATE 17 Dec 71

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO: CHIEF OF STATION (~~BASE~~) Mexico City

ATTENTION: FINANCE OFFICER

INFO:

PROJECT KDFACTOR PAN 2135-1009

TYPE OF ACTION PERIOD OF ACTION 15 Nov 71 TO [illegible] 73 AMOUNT $ 39,000

NEW		PREVIOUS ACTION IN THIS FISCAL YEAR	FY-72	FY-73
RENEWAL	X	TOTAL FISCAL YEAR APPROVAL	19,000	20,000
EXTENSION				
TERMINATION		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE	—	—
AMENDMENT		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE	19,000	20,000
OTHER				

CHIEF, WH/B&F

HQS USE ONLY

PROCESSED	APPROVED	TYPE OF ACTION	PERIOD	AMOUNT

S E C R E T
(When Filled In)

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT KDFACTOR

☐ CA
☒ FI/CI

ACTION		COMPONENT
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION OR STAFF WH
X	AMENDMENT No. 1, FY 71	BRANCH WH/1
	RENEWAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ BIENNIAL	DESK Mexico
	TERMINATION	CASE OFFICER Fred Kravcov EXTENSION 4167
	EXTENSION	
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY ADDP	DATE APPROVED 10 December 1971	AMT THIS ACTION $ 4,260	FY 19 71	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION $ 27,890
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1970 TO 30 June 1971		FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL	2135-1009	

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

Amendment No. 1 to Project KDFACTOR approved in the amount of $4,260, increasing the project's FY 71 authorization to a revised total of $27,890.

Whitaker
Horwood

notif list

SIGNATURE (Signed) [illegible]
MPS/BG

DATE 15

DISTRIBUTION

1	CPB	1	DIV. OR STAFF BF OFFICER	1	CASE OFFICER	3	MPS/BG

FORM 11-70 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

26 MAY 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : FI Project LIEMPTY
FY 1970 Amendment
FY 1971 Renewal

REFERENCE : C/FI Memorandum for ADD/P, dated 19 May 1970, subject: "Renewal of Project LIEMPTY."

1. On 22 May 1970 [illegible] for the [illegible] requested [illegible] that the [illegible] on payment of [illegible] and his wife will be on a monthly basis as described in paragraph 4 of reference.

2. Messrs. John C. [illegible] and [illegible] M. [illegible] attended the project [illegible].

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

ADDP Comment of 26 May 70

SECRET

FAN ACCOUNT TREND REPORT
30 NOV 1972

FAN NUMBER: 35-1009 TITLE: KOFACTOR OFFICE: WESTERN HEMIS DIV

BUDGET AREA:
BUDGET COUNTRY: MEXICO
CATEGORY: COLLECTION INTELL
SUBCATEGORY: CLANDESTINE
ELEMENT: CLOSE OPS SUPPORT
SUBELEMENT:

	1972	1973				1974	1975
	ACTUAL	OPERATING	ACTUAL	% OBLG	BAL REMAIN	ESTIMATE	ESTIMATE
RENT COMM & UTIL							
2353 SAFEHOUSES	5,220	5,540	1,056	19.1%	4,484	5,540	
TOTAL	5,220	5,540	1,056	19.1%	4,484	5,540	
OTHER SERVICES							
2553 AGENT B&G	16,626	1,000	695	69.5%	305	1,000	
2554 AGENT C&A	12,404	3,780			3,780	12,780	
2557 OPEXP S&M	203	230			230	230	
2559 OPEXP OTHR	62	100			100	100	
TOTAL	29,295	5,110	695	13.6%	4,415	14,110	
SUPPLIES							
2608 PHOTO		350			350	350	
2699 PROP ENC	350						
TOTAL	350	350			350	350	
TOTAL FAN 35-1009	34,865	11,000	1,751	15.9%	9,249	20,000	

8 DEC 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: MPS/BG

SUBJECT: Renewal of Project KDFACTOR
in 1972 for $19,000
in 1973 for $20,000

1. This project covers photo and visual surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. One observation post covers the front gate of the building, and another covers the rear gate and walled compound. Five salaried agents man the sites, four in front and one in back. An official cover case officer collects the take (rolls of film and logs of visitors) once a week by car meetings with the OP keepers. The films are developed and printed inside the Station.

2. The production from this operation has consistently been rated high by the Bureau (which is the principal customer in the field), by other Government agencies and by SB Division. Photosurveillance of a Soviet Embassy might not be a high priority target in some countries. But the fact that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico is a large and active one and the fact that its primary target is operations against the United States make our effort important and valuable. This is the operation that produced the photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald visiting the Soviet Embassy in 1962.

This is in error,
D/IG,
17 Ap'77

3. This seemingly straightforward operation has not always been so uncomplicated. Both sites have been in operation and served by the same OP keepers for more than a dozen years. At one of the sites the OP keeper's wife and children take turns manning the equipment. A now-terminated principal agent was divorced several years ago from a wife who knew a lot about the operation. Some desk officers believe that the medical doctor who for years was supposed to be developing the films was simply too busy to do so and that the work was probably done by his uncleared secretary. Family relationships keep cropping up among supposedly compartmented agents. All of this is in the files but not in any one place. We

believe it is time for the Station to make an updated security review of the operation with particular attention to the knowledgeability of terminated agents and their families. We also believe that the Station should now address itself to the contingency that the present sites or personnel will be blown and to investigate alternative means of continuing their valuable coverage.

4. The ADDP last approved this project in May 1970 with the condition that termination payments to the principal agent and his divorced wife be made on a monthly basis. This condition has been met.

5. The budgets requested for the next two years are simple and straightforward. Salaries and the traditional bonuses for the five paid agents come to about $13,000. Rent and utilities on the two observation posts come to $5,600. The small balance is for operational expenses. This project action also requests amendment of the FY 1971 budget by $4,260 to cover that part of the cost of termination bonuses to the principal agent and his divorced wife which could not be absorbed by the project. The total of the termination bonuses was $12,500.

6. This is a valuable and productive project which helps fulfill a Priority A-1 Station requirement. The FI Staff recommends approval.

f L. A. Campbell
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

SECRET

PROJECT KDFACTOR

MPS/BG/FI/AFKatein:dr (13 DEC 71)

Distribution:

O & 1 - Addressee
1 - ADD/P
✓1 - WH/1
1 - FI/OPS
1 - CI/OPS
1 - C/CCS/PRG
1 - MPS/BG/FI

SECRET

SECRET

14 DEC 1971

DD/P 1-5899

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: FI Project KDFACTOR
FY 1971 Amendment No. 1
Biennial Renewal
Proposal for Fiscal
Years 1972 and 1973

1. On 10 December 1971 I approved subject actions in the amounts specified below:

a. FY 1971 Amendment No. 1 - For $4,260, increasing the project's FY 1971 funds authorization (from $23,630) to $27,890.

b. FY 1972 Renewal - For $19,000 *

c. FY 1973 Renewal - For $20,000

2. I ask that the Station conduct an updated security review of this operation, giving particular attention to the knowledgeability of terminated agents and their families as discussed in paragraph 3 of referent memorandum.

3. Also, I ask that you provide me (via MPS/BG) with a memorandum report summarizing the results of the above (paragraph 2) security review by 31 March 1972.

Cord Meyer Jr.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

*Amended by [illegible]2-355255 in amount of $9,544, new Total $28,544.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: KDFACTOR

TYPE OF ACTION: X FI/C ☐ CA
NEW PROJECT APPROVAL:
X AMENDMENT NO. 1 FY-71
X RENEWAL FY 1972 & 73
EXTENSION:
TERMINATION:

DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division
FIELD STATION: Mexico City
BRANCH: One
DESK:
CASE OFFICER: Fred Kravcov
DATE: 28 Oct 71
ROOM NO.: 3E05
BUILDING: Hqs
TEL. EXT.: RED 1973 BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray	29/10/71	29/10/71		
C/WH/B&F	Lunsford O. Healy	29 Oct. 71	1 Nov 71		
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright		1 Nov 71		
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch		18/11/71		
C/WH/Plans	John R. Cassidy		11/19/71		
C/WHD	William V. Broe for James E. Flannery		19 NOV 1971		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
SB/X/WH	Haviland Smith Haviland Smith		3/11/71		✓
FI Staff	/s/ Arthur C. Close		8 Dec 71	x	
CI Staff	Frank Hughes /s/		8 Dec 71		x
CCS/PRG	Charles Beckman /s/		26 Nov 71		x
*With the conditions as stated in my memorandum dated 14 December 1971					
	(DD/P 1-5899)				
C/MPS/BG	Paul A. Mozzo	9 Dec 71	9 Dec 71		

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	AMT. THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 JUly 1970	30 June 1971	4,260	71	27,808
1 July 71	30 June 72	$ 19,000	19 72	$ 19,000
1 July 72	30 June 73	20,000	19 73	$ 20,000

APPROVING AUTHORITY: A/DDP
SIGNATURE: Cord Meyer Jr. *
DATE: 10 Dec '71

FORM 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
5-69

SECRET

(5)

KDFACTOR - Mexico City, Mexico -- Photographic Surveillance Team Support -- FY 1972, Cost $19,000 and FY 1973, Cost $20,000

Fiscal Year	Approved	Obligated
1971	$23,635	$27,586

Changes:

1. The processing of photographs obtained through this project now is performed inside the Station. KDFACTOR-1, who formerly processed the take in an outside safehouse, was terminated amicably in early March 1971. Security and efficiency have been increased by this change. KDFACTOR-7 was terminated in 1970, but the termination payments were made during FY 1971 causing an increase in that years obligations.

2. Howard T. BAGAUS handled the administration of this project to early April 1971 when project responsibility reverted from the Operations Support Section to the REDTOP Section. At that time Timothy H. ARCHBOLD assumed the inside administrative supervision, and agent meetings were turned over to the outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD. When ARCHBOLD departed PCS on 7 June 1971, Oliver J. MANKUNAS assumed responsibility for this project, including agent meetings.

Accomplishments:

1. This project has provided continuous daily photographic and visual coverage of personnel and vehicles entering or leaving the Soviet Embassy. A total of 530 rolls of film were produced during the reporting period. U.S. citizens, visitors, and TDY personnel are given special attention. Identifications of license plates and automobile descriptions as well as drivers and their companions are identified under this project. Additionally, attendance sheets are maintained to establish who is at the Embassy on any given day and hour.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

These photographs and reports have contributed operational support to the Station's Soviet operations which is not attainable elsewhere. For example, whenever the Soviets change all their license numbers the Station is able to compile a new, complete roster within a matter of weeks.

Costs:

1. General: $19,000 is requested for FY 1972 and $20,000 is requested for FY 1973. It is also requested that the Project be amended for FY 1971 in the amount of $4,260 to provide for the termination of KDFACTOR-1 and KDFACTOR-7.

2. Source of Funds: Project KDFACTOR is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's Operational Program in the amount of $23,735 for FY 1972 and $24,182 for FY 1973.

3. Project Budget:

	FY 1971 Estimated Obligations	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Salaries				
KDFACTOR-2	$ 5,280	$ 5,280	$ 5,808	$ 5,808
KDFACTOR-5	1,728	1,728	1,901	1,901
KDFACTOR-6	2,112	2,112	2,323	2,323
KDFACTOR-8	768	768	845	845
KDFACTOR-9	1,968	1,968	2,165	2,165
KDFACTOR-1	4,400	-0-	-0-	-0-
KDFACTOR-7	2,500	-0-	-0-	-0-
Bonuses	1,374	1,088	1,087	1,087
	$20,130	$12,944	$14,129	$14,129
Base houses				
Rents	$ 6,022	$ 4,350	$ 4,240	$ 4,240
Utilities	400	750	800	800
Maintenance	200	500	500	500
	$ 6,622	$ 5,600	$ 5,540	$ 5,540

Misc Expenses				
Ops entertainment	$ 165	$ 300	$ 100	$ 100
Auto maintenance	80	100	100	100
Ops expenses	590	56	131	131
	$ 835	$ 456	$ 331	$ 331
Total Expenses	$27,587	$19,000	$20,000	$20,000

4. Foreign Currency: There is no special need for foreign funds. No non-JKLANCE funds are used.

5. Commitments: Christmas bonuses are provided in the FY 72 and FY 73 budgets.

6. Funding: Funds are hand-carried from the Station by the case officer and transferred during clandestine meetings. Receipts are obtained for all disbursements according to JKLANCE regulations.

7. Annexes: None.

PREVIOUS PROJECT ACTION

SECRET

DD/P 6-2735

26 MAY 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : FI Project LIEMPTY
FY 1970 Amendment
FY 1971 Renewal

REFERENCE : C/FI Memorandum for ADD/P, dated 19 May 1970, Subject: "Renewal of Project LIEMPTY."

1. On 22 May 1970 I approved subject action for the amounts requested with the understanding that the termination payments to GERENDE and his wife will be on a monthly basis as described in paragraph 4 of referent.

2. Messrs John C. Murray and Charles M. Bounds attended the project meeting.

Cord Meyer, Jr.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

MPS/BG/FI/ALKatein/sw

Distribution:

O & 1 - Addressee
1 - ADD/P
1 - FI/OPS
1 - CI/OPS
1 - WH/1
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - CCS/PRG
1 - DDP/NSP
1 - MPS/BG

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION	X FI-C		CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division	
1	AMENDMENT NO. FY 70	FIELD STATION: Mexico City	
X	RENEWAL FY 19 71	BRANCH: One	DESK:
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Jack Barry	DATE: 10 April 70
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3E05 · BUILDING Hqs.	TEL. EXT. RED 1973 · BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	for John C. Murray Charles M Smith	10 Apr	10 Apr		x
C/WH/B&F	Elliotte C. Want	10 APR 1970	4/13		✓
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright		4-13-70		
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch		20/4/70		
C/WH/Plans	Robert B. Moore Robert B. Moore	21 APR 1970	4/21		
C/WHD	William V. Broe	21 APR 1970	21 APR 1970		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
SB/WH	LEE C. PIESTDES	14/4	14/4		x
FI Staff		19 MAY 1970	19 MAY 1970	✓	
CI Staff	/S/ Frank W. Hughes		11 May 70		
CCS/PRG	/S/ Charles Beckman		8 May 70		
DDP/NSP	/S/ Gerard Droller		24/4/70		
C/MPS/BG			20 May 70		

APPROVAL

PERIOD		AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
~~1 July 1969~~	~~30 June 1970~~	~~$ 10,498~~	1970	$ 49,468
1 July 1970	30 June 1971	$ 23,635	1971	$ 23.635

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
A/DDP	Cord Meyer Jr.	22 May 70

FORM 5-68 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

LIEMPTY - Mexico City, Mexico -- Photographic Surveillance Team Support -- FY 1971, Cost $23,635.

Fiscal Year	Approved	Obligated
1966	$43,145	$36,294
1967	45,000	42,082
1968	42,185	42,158
1969	43,520	41,416
1970	38,970	49,468 (Projected)

Purpose:

Project LIEMPTY supports a visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The aim is to identify and cover the movements of persons entering and leaving the Embassy, including Soviets and visitors. The intelligence collected through such activity contributes to the Station's overall Soviet operations program, mainly in support of Priority A-1, but to some extent, Priority A-4, of the Operating Directive for Mexico.

Description:

1. The Project operates through two fixed basehouse surveillance posts, a small photographic laboratory, a principal agent, and six sub-agents. A team of four sub-agents, operating from a basehouse, maintains visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy front entrance. One sub-agent, operating from a second basehouse, covers an area in back of the Embassy, where Soviet officials meet, play and work. These units photograph all persons moving in or out of the specific target areas. They also maintain logs and provide written reports on observed activity. All of this material is passed to the principal agent, who passes the film to another sub-agent for processing at a laboratory equipped for that purpose. After the film is processed and printed, the principal agent passes the finished product, plus written reports and logs, to the Station case officer. A brief description of each unit, each agent and his role in the operation follows.

2. LILYRIC (MEXI-132) is a basehouse located near the front of the Soviet Embassy. This house has been in operation since October 1966. It is rented through LIMOUSINE (201-5762), a cleared American businessman. He is the ostensible owner of record and, as the landlord, collects rent from the tenants and then passes it to the Station case officer. LIEMPTY-13 and his family (see paragraph 3 below) live in the LILYRIC house and conduct their surveillance operation from it during daylight hours (0800-1800).

3. LIEMPTY-13 (201-119961) is the key member of the LILYRIC basehouse team. He maintains contact with the principal agent and does some photographic work. However, because LIEMPTY-13 is employed outside as an industrial engineer, he is unable to spend much time operating the LILYRIC photographic equipment, and most of this work is done by his wife, LIEMPTY-14, and their sons, LIEMPTY-26 and LIEMPTY-27 (see paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 below).

4. LIEMPTY-14 (201-167567) is the main photographer and observer at the LILYRIC basehouse. She works closely with her husband, LIEMPTY-13, in running the operation, including the preparation of observation reports and logs. She also does the LILYRIC housekeeping, as any housewife would do.

5. LIEMPTY-26 (201-762111), the son of LIEMPTY-13 and LIEMPTY-14, has been a student at the Mexican Technological Institute. In his spare time he operates the LILYRIC photographic equipment, and helps LIEMPTY-14 in maintaining the arrival and departure logs of target personalities.

6. LIEMPTY-27 (201-762112), another son of LIEMPTY-13 and LIEMPTY-14, has been a prep school student. He assists in operating the LILYRIC photographic equipment and transcribes notes into a finished typewritten log of events.

7. LICALLA (MEXI-03) is a basehouse located behind the Soviet Embassy. It has been in operation since 1957. The building, a four-unit affair, collectively known as LIMUST, is Agency owned. It was purchased through LIMOUSINE in September 1957, and the property is in his name. The LICALLA site is occupied by LIEMPTY-9 (see paragraph 8 below) and he runs the surveillance operation from it.

8. LIEMPTY-9 (201-136454) is the only agent operating from the LICALLA site. He does all the photography, maintains logs and prepares observation reports. He also maintains contact with the principal agent. LIEMPTY-9 is a part-time insurance salesman and is self-employed in the accounting business, which he conducts at the LICALLA site.

9. Raymond H. GERENDE (201-119523) has been the principal agent for this project. He is a Mexican national contract agent who is self-employed as an English teacher and also works as a salesman for a light bulb manufacturer. GERENDE has been mainly responsible for maintaining contact with the LIEMPTY agents, passing instructions to them, and collecting the product for passing to the Station case officer. He has also paid them and handled all other administrative matters. He is being terminated by the end of FY 1970 for security reasons (see Problems, paragraph 1).

10. Bruce H. FERNALD (P) (201-008189) replaced GERENDE (see paragraph 9 above) as the project's principal agent in early December 1969. FERNALD, a U.S. citizen born in June 1915, operates under non-official cover as a retired immigrant. He is responsible for maintaining contact with the LIEMPTY agents and collecting the product for passing to the Station case officer. He also handles administrative matters, including agent salary payments. FERNALD is financially covered under Project AEMAGNIFY.

11. The LIEMPTY photographic laboratory (MEXI-137) is located in a room at GERENDE's residence. It is equipped to process the photographs taken by the LIEMPTY surveillance units. The work is done by LIEMPTY-4. (See paragraph 12 below). Since GERENDE will be terminated by the end of FY 1970, the Station is taking steps to establish a new LIEMPTY photographic laboratory at a new safesite.

12. LIEMPTY-4 (201-117967) processes all the photographic film taken by the LIEMPTY photographers and makes the number of prints required. He does this work at night in the LIEMPTY photographic laboratory. He is self-employed as a medical doctor, and he is a brother-in-law of GERENDE, in whose home the laboratory is located.

Changes:

1. The LIENTRAP mobile unit, consisting of LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, is being removed from Project LIEMPTY and placed under Project LIEMBRACE, which supports a unilateral physical surveillance team. The purpose of this change is to increase the size of the LIEMBRACE team in order to meet a growing demand for operational surveillance support from the various Station operating sections. The transfer will become effective at the beginning of FY 1971 and both FY 1971 project budgets have been adjusted to cover financial aspects of the change.

2. Raymond H. GERENDE was removed as the LIEMPTY principal agent in early December 1969 owing to a security problem (see Problems, paragraph 1). He was replaced on 9 December 1969 by Bruce H. FERNALD, a career agent operating under cover as a retired immigrant. The change has caused some delay in the receipt of photographs because FERNALD is unable to meet LIEMPTY agents as frequently as GERENDE had met them, but operational effectiveness is not significantly reduced by this delay. The key issue is that security and reliability of the principal agent have improved considerably.

Accomplishments:

1. Project LIEMPTY has provided continuous daily photographic and visual coverage (Monday through Saturday) of the front entrance and rear areas of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. All Soviet personnel and their visitors entering or leaving the Embassy have been photographed. In addition, visual surveillance reports were prepared when appropriate. These photographs and reports have contributed essential operational support to the Station's Soviet operations program.

2. Recently, LIEMPTY photographs were exclusively used to produce an updated mugbook on Soviet officials in Mexico. The book has been loaned to the FBI, AF/OSI and the 902nd Military Intelligence Group for operational use in debriefing their agents engaged in dangle operations and double agent operations against the Soviet services in Mexico City. One 902nd controlled agent was identified from an LIEMPTY photograph taken when the agent tried to contact the Soviets at

the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Similarly, an AF/OSI controlled agent scheduled to meet a Soviet contact was unable to do so owing to illness, but LIEMPTY photographed another person who appeared at the meeting site and this person is believed to be the agent's Soviet case officer. Such coverage has been helpful to the 902nd, AF/OSI and the FBI in running their controlled double agent operations against the Soviets in Mexico.

3. Within one week after a biannual change of license plates on Soviet Embassy vehicles, LIEMPTY had provided a complete list of the new tag numbers, along with a complete identification of the vehicles. Among other things, this enabled the Station to identify the companions of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN, a known KGB officer, during his last few days in Mexico.

4. LIEMPTY has also determined that newcomers to the Soviet Embassy frequently gravitate to groupings with their RIS colleagues in the "safety" of the Embassy backyard. This fact enabled the Station to make certain tentative KGB and GRU identifications. In addition, certain TDYers have been linked up with their escort officers and clues to personal relationships have occasionally been exploited.

5. In the field of Soviet patterns of activity and associations, LIEMPTY has been able to report accurate changes in certain specific cases. LIEMPTY coverage showed that NIKITIN, mentioned in paragraph 3 above, changed his activity pattern following the defection of Raisa Yerofeyevna KISELNIKOVA, former secretary in the Commercial Mission in Mexico. The same applies to Oleg NECHIPORENKO, a Second Secretary at the Embassy and a known KGB officer. LIEMPTY also provided information on the patterns and associations of Yuriy Viktorovich KUPLYAKOV, a known KGB officer and on Valeriy Vladimirovich SOKOLIN, a known GRU officer. Coverage of Vladimir Viktorovich GORDEYEV, a suspect KGB officer, showed that he did, in fact, work in a "restricted area" at the Soviet Embassy and also established who some of his associates were. In the case of Oleg Konstantinovich IGNATYEV, who had arrived in Mexico City from Caracas, Venezuela, LIEMPTY was able to observe IGNATYEV entering and leaving in the company of Svyastoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, Press Attache and First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy. IGNATYEV also visited the Soviet Embassy

several other times during his stay in Mexico City and had contact with other known Soviet intelligence officers while visiting. This kind of information is a basic contribution to the Station's continuing efforts to identify and assess certain Soviets for possible recruitment or defection.

6. At Headquarters, the Soviet Bloc Division uses LIEMPTY photographs, particularly photographs of Soviet Embassy officials, for identification purposes in connection with defector cases. The LIEMPTY material also keeps the Station's Soviet section up-to-date on which Soviet officers have been in the Embassy, which ones have been away; who has used which car; who has been in contact with whom; and other similar information useful in the conduct of Soviet operations.

Problems:

1. A security problem has developed involving Raymond H. GERENDE. According to GERENDE, his wife wants a divorce, apparently based mainly on incompatability of personalities. The problem basically is that both want custody of the children and this has sparked a dispute that has become more bitter and violent daily. In addition, the monetary settlement is in dispute. The problem is compounded by the fact that GERENDE's wife knows in some considerable detail of GERENDE's activities on behalf of the Agency. Thus, if the case does go to court, it could lead to the surfacing of GERENDE's Agency employment and possible compromise of LILYRIC, LICALLA and LIENTRAP. Even if the case does not go to court, GERENDE's wife could expose him as an Agency employee. Since late 1969, Mexico City Station has been in touch with both GERENDE and his wife on this problem, and every effort is being made by the Station to have both parties settle the divorce out of court, and to protect GERENDE's cover and that of the project. After weighing all factors, it has been decided that continued employment of GERENDE is not an acceptable risk, and the decision has been reached to terminate him by the end of FY 1970. GERENDE will be paid a termination bonus of $10,000 for 15 years service, about $1,250 more than the $8,750 his contract calls for, in order to ensure that the termination is amicable and thereby preserve

project security. In addition, his wife, LIEMPTY-19 will be given $2,500 as a security measure designed to keep her from revealing what she knows about project operations. The FY 1970 budget is being amended to cover this amount.

2. Other aspects of security continue relatively unchanged. All the agents still have jobs to backstop their Agency wages. The Station is compartmented from the action agents through FERNALD, whose contact with the sub-agents is reasonably well covered by his status as a retired immigrant. FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-9 and LITEMPY-13 since 9 December 1969. Brief meetings are held once each week at pre-arranged times and places, well away from the target area. Occasionally emergency meetings are called, by phone, if special coverage is desired. FERNALD also meets LIEMPTY-4 to exchange films and prints. These meetings are held weekly at pre-arranged times and places. FERNALD can change meeting plans by calling LIEMPTY-4 directly by telephone. In addition, LIEMPTY-4 has been given a special extension in the Station through which he may call as "Dr. Carlos" to leave a message for "Victor" (FERNALD). The Station case officer maintains weekly clandestine contact with FERNALD in order to manage the operation and collect the product.

Coordination:

Ambassador McBride has not been briefed on Project LIEMPTY.

Future Plans:

1. The surveillance units are expected to continue to produce valuable information in the form of photographic coverage and visual surveillance reports on the daily movements, personal associations, and habit patterns of persons frequenting the Soviet Embassy, including Soviet officials. Operational procedures and the project mechanism will continue as it has in the past, except that Bruce H. FERNALD, a new principal agent, will be in charge of the operation (see Changes, paragraph 2).

2. The Project does not include an up-dated plan for emergency contact during violent action or government overthrow. The Station has been requested to prepare an updated emergency contact plan and submit it to Headquarters in the first FY 1971 quarterly progress report.

Costs:

1. General: $23,635 is requested for FY 1971. It is requested that the project be amended for FY 1970 in the amount of $10,498 (from $38,970 to $49,468) in order to cover termination payments to Raymond H. GERENDE and his wife, LIEMPTY-19.

2. Source of Funds: Project LIEMPTY is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's FY 1971 Operating Program in the amount of $40,000. Funds for the FY 1970 amendment will be absorbed in the current WH Division's finance allocation.

3. Project Budget:

	FY 1970 Estimated Obligations	FY 1971 Request	FY 1972 Projection
Raymond H. GERENDE Salary	$ 6,500	$ -0-	$ -0-
LIEMPTY-4 Salary	2,400	2,640	2,640
LIEMPTY-9 Salary	4,320	4,752	4,752
LIEMPTY-10 Salary	4,224	-0-	-0-
LIEMPTY-11 Salary	2,736	-0-	-0-
LIEMPTY-13 Salary	1,536	1,690	1,690
LIEMPTY-14 Salary	1,824	2,006	2,006
LIEMPTY-26 Salary	672	739	739
LIEMPTY-27 Salary	1,728	1,901	1,901
LICALLA Safehouse Rent (MEXI-03)	1,248	1,373	1,373
LILYRIC Safehouse Rent (MEXI-132)	2,880	2,880	2,880
Safehouse Utilities	1,100	1,200	1,300
GERENDE Dark Room Rent (MEXI-137)	960	-0-	-0-
MV-2823* and 2947 Maintenance	1,200	600	600
Property Maintenance and Replacement	500	500	500
Photographic and Other Supplies	1,000	1,000	1,000
Christmas Bonuses	2,140	2,354	2,354
LIEMPTY-19 Termination Bonus	2,500	-0-	-0-
GERENDE Termination Bonus	10,000	-0-	-0-
TOTAL	$49,468	$23,635**	$23,735

*MV-2823 to be sold in FY 1970 and not replaced.

**Decrease from FY 1970 figure due to GERENDE termination. His replacement is covered under Project AEMAGNIFY.

4. Foreign Currency: There is no special need for foreign currency. No non-CIA funds are used.

5. Commitments: Christmas bonuses to all agents totaling $2,354 for FY 1971, and termination pay in an amount to be determined by the agents record and length of service.

6. Funding: Funds are hand-carried from the Station case officer to FERNALD, and from FERNALD to the sub-agents. The transfer of funds takes place under clandestine meeting conditions, and appropriate security measures are always taken.

7. Accountability: FERNALD accounts in detail to his case officer, who in turn submits receipts to the Station and certifies that funds were spent to cover expenses for which it was intended.

8. Annexes: None

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM
LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION

	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	
	AMENDMENT NO.	
X	RENEWAL FY 19 71	
	EXTENSION	
	TERMINATION	

X FI/C ☐ CA ☐

DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division

FIELD STATION: Mexico City

BRANCH: One

DESK:

CASE OFFICER: Jack Barry

DATE: 10 April 70

ROOM NO.: 3E05

BUILDING: Hqs.

TEL. EXT.: RED 1973 BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray				
C/WH/B&F	Elliotte C. Want				
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright				
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch				
C/WH/Plans	Robert B. Moore				
C/WHD	William V. Broe				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 1970	30 June 1971	$ 23,635	1971	$ 23,635

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
A/DDP		

FORM 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
5-69

SECRET

(5)

LIEMPTY - Mexico City, Mexico -- Photographic Surveillance Team Support -- FY 1971, Cost $23,635.

Fiscal Year	Approved	Obligated
1966	$43,145	$36,294
1967	43,000	42,082
1968	42,185	42,158
1969	43,320	41,416
1970	38,970	49,468 (Projected)

Purpose:

Project LIEMPTY supports a visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The aim is to identify and cover the movements of persons entering and leaving the Embassy, including Soviets and visitors. The intelligence collected through such activity contributes to the Station's overall Soviet operations program, mainly in support of Priority A-1, but to some extent, Priority A-4, of the Operating Directive for Mexico.

Description:

1. The Project operates through two fixed basehouse surveillance posts, a small photographic laboratory, a principal agent, and six sub-agents. A team of four sub-agents, operating from a basehouse, maintains visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy front entrance. One sub-agent, operating from a second basehouse, covers an area in back of the Embassy, where Soviet officials meet, play and work. These units photograph all persons moving in or out of the specific target areas. They also maintain logs and provide written reports on observed activity. All of this material is passed to the principal agent, who passes the film to another sub-agent for processing at a laboratory equipped for that purpose. After the film is processed and printed, the principal agent passes the finished product, plus written reports and logs, to the Station case officer. A brief description of each unit, each agent and his role in the operation follows.

2. LILYRIC (MEXI-132) is a basehouse located near the front of the Soviet Embassy. This house has been in operation since October 1966. It is rented through LIMOUSINE (201-5762), a cleared American businessman. He is the ostensible owner of record and, as the landlord, collects rent from the tenants and then passes it to the Station case officer. LIEMPTY-13 and his family (see paragraph 3 below) live in the LILYRIC house and conduct their surveillance operation from it during daylight hours (0800-1800).

3. LIEMPTY-13 (201-119961) is the key member of the LILYRIC basehouse team. He maintains contact with the principal agent and does some photographic work. However, because LIEMPTY-13 is employed outside as an industrial engineer, he is unable to spend much time operating the LILYRIC photographic equipment, and most of this work is done by his wife, LIEMPTY-14, and their sons, LIEMPTY-26 and LIEMPTY-27 (see paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 below).

4. LIEMPTY-14 (201-167567) is the main photographer and observer at the LILYRIC basehouse. She works closely with her husband, LIEMPTY-13, in running the operation, including the preparation of observation reports and logs. She also does the LILYRIC housekeeping, as any housewife would do.

5. LIEMPTY-26 (201-762111), the son of LIEMPTY-13 and LIEMPTY-14, has been a student at the Mexican Technological Institute. In his spare time he operates the LILYRIC photographic equipment, and helps LIEMPTY-14 in maintaining the arrival and departure logs of target personalities.

6. LIEMPTY-27 (201-762112), another son of LIEMPTY-13 and LIEMPTY-14, has been a prep school student. He assists in operating the LILYRIC photographic equipment and transcribes notes into a finished typewritten log of events.

7. LICALLA (MEXI-03) is a basehouse located behind the Soviet Embassy. It has been in operation since 1957. The building, a four-unit affair, collectively known as LIMUST, is Agency owned. It was purchased through LIMOUSINE in September 1957, and the property is in his name. The LICALLA site is occupied by LIEMPTY-9 (see paragraph 8 below) and he runs the surveillance operation from it.

8. LIEMPTY-9 (201-136454) is the only agent operating from the LICALLA site. He does all the photography, maintains logs and prepares observation reports. He also maintains contact with the principal agent. LIEMPTY-9 is a part-time insurance salesman and is self-employed in the accounting business, which he conducts at the LICALLA site.

9. Raymond H. GERENDE (201-119523) has been the principal agent for this project. He is a Mexican national contract agent who is self-employed as an English teacher and also works as a salesman for a light bulb manufacturer. GERENDE has been mainly responsible for maintaining contact with the LIEMPTY agents, passing instructions to them, and collecting the product for passing to the Station case officer. He has also paid them and handled all other administrative matters. He is being terminated by the end of FY 1970 for security reasons (see Problems, paragraph 1).

10. Bruce H. FERNALD (P) (201-008189) replaced GERENDE (see paragraph 9 above) as the project's principal agent in early December 1969. FERNALD, a U.S. citizen born in June 1915, operates under non-official cover as a retired immigrant. He is responsible for maintaining contact with the LIEMPTY agents and collecting the product for passing to the Station case officer. He also handles administrative matters, including agent salary payments. FERNALD is financially covered under Project AEMAGNIFY.

11. The LIEMPTY photographic laboratory (MEXI-137) is located in a room at GERENDE's residence. It is equipped to process the photographs taken by the LIEMPTY surveillance units. The work is done by LIEMPTY-4. (See paragraph 12 below). Since GERENDE will be terminated by the end of FY 1970, the Station is taking steps to establish a new LIEMPTY photographic laboratory at a new safesite.

12. LIEMPTY-4 (201-117967) processes all the photographic film taken by the LIEMPTY photographers and makes the number of prints required. He does this work at night in the LIEMPTY photographic laboratory. He is self-employed as a medical doctor, and he is a brother-in-law of GERENDE, in whose home the laboratory is located.

Changes:

1. The LIENTRAP mobile unit, consisting of LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, is being removed from Project LIEMPTY and placed under Project LIEMBRACE, which supports a unilateral physical surveillance team. The purpose of this change is to increase the size of the LIEMBRACE team in order to meet a growing demand for operational surveillance support from the various Station operating sections. The transfer will become effective at the beginning of FY 1971 and both FY 1971 project budgets have been adjusted to cover financial aspects of the change.

2. Raymond H. GERENDE was removed as the LIEMPTY principal agent in early December 1969 owing to a security problem (see Problems, paragraph 1). He was replaced on 9 December 1969 by Bruce H. FERNALD, a career agent operating under cover as a retired immigrant. The change has caused some delay in the receipt of photographs because FERNALD is unable to meet LIEMPTY agents as frequently as GERENDE had met them, but operational effectiveness is not significantly reduced by this delay. The key issue is that security and reliability of the principal agent have improved considerably.

Accomplishments:

1. Project LIEMPTY has provided continuous daily photographic and visual coverage (Monday through Saturday) of the front entrance and rear areas of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. All Soviet personnel and their visitors entering or leaving the Embassy have been photographed. In addition, visual surveillance reports were prepared when appropriate. These photographs and reports have contributed essential operational support to the Station's Soviet operations program.

2. Recently, LIEMPTY photographs were exclusively used to produce an updated mugbook on Soviet officials in Mexico. The book has been loaned to the FBI, AF/OSI and the 902nd Military Intelligence Group for operational use in debriefing their agents engaged in dangle operations and double agent operations against the Soviet services in Mexico City. One 902nd controlled agent was identified from an LIEMPTY photograph taken when the agent tried to contact the Soviets at

the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Similarly, an AF/OSI controlled agent scheduled to meet a Soviet contact was unable to do so owing to illness, but LIEMPTY photographed another person who appeared at the meeting site and this person is believed to be the agent's Soviet case officer. Such coverage has been helpful to the 902nd, AF/OSI and the FBI in running their controlled double agent operations against the Soviets in Mexico.

3. Within one week after a biannual change of license plates on Soviet Embassy vehicles, LIEMPTY had provided a complete list of the new tag numbers, along with a complete identification of the vehicles. Among other things, this enabled the Station to identify the companions of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN, a known KGB officer, during his last few days in Mexico.

4. LIEMPTY has also determined that newcomers to the Soviet Embassy frequently gravitate to groupings with their RIS colleagues in the "safety" of the Embassy backyard. This fact enabled the Station to make certain tentative KGB and GRU identifications. In addition, certain TDYers have been linked up with their escort officers and clues to personal relationships have occasionally been exploited.

5. In the field of Soviet patterns of activity and associations, LIEMPTY has been able to report accurate changes in certain specific cases. LIEMPTY coverage showed that NIKITIN, mentioned in paragraph 3 above, changed his activity pattern following the defection of Raisa Yerofeyevna KISELNIKOVA, former secretary in the Commercial Mission in Mexico. The same applies to Oleg NECHIPORENKO, a Second Secretary at the Embassy and a known KGB officer. LIEMPTY also provided information on the patterns and associations of Yuriy Viktorovich KUPLYAKOV, a known KGB officer and on Valeriy Vladimirovich SOKOLIN, a known GRU officer. Coverage of Vladimir Viktorovich GORDEYEV, a suspect KGB officer, showed that he did, in fact, work in a "restricted area" at the Soviet Embassy and also established who some of his associates were. In the case of Oleg Konstantinovich IGNATYEV, who had arrived in Mexico City from Caracas, Venezuela, LIEMPTY was able to observe IGNATYEV entering and leaving in the company of Svyastoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, Press Attache and First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy. IGNATYEV also visited the Soviet Embassy

several other times during his stay in Mexico City and had contact with other known Soviet intelligence officers while visiting. This kind of information is a basic contribution to the Station's continuing efforts to identify and assess certain Soviets for possible recruitment or defection.

6. At Headquarters, the Soviet Bloc Division uses LIEMPTY photographs, particularly photographs of Soviet Embassy officials, for identification purposes in connection with defector cases. The LIEMPTY material also keeps the Station's Soviet section up-to-date on which Soviet officers have been in the Embassy, which ones have been away; who has used which car; who has been in contact with whom; and other similar information useful in the conduct of Soviet operations.

Problems:

1. A security problem has developed involving Raymond H. GERENDE. According to GERENDE, his wife wants a divorce, apparently based mainly on incompatability of personalities. The problem basically is that both want custody of the children and this has sparked a dispute that has become more bitter and violent daily. In addition, the monetary settlement is in dispute. The problem is compounded by the fact that GERENDE's wife knows in some considerable detail of GERENDE's activities on behalf of the Agency. Thus, if the case does go to court, it could lead to the surfacing of GERENDE's Agency employment and possible compromise of LILYRIC, LICALLA and LIENTRAP. Even if the case does not go to court, GERENDE's wife could expose him as an Agency employee. Since late 1969, Mexico City Station has been in touch with both GERENDE and his wife on this problem, and every effort is being made by the Station to have both parties settle the divorce out of court, and to protect GERENDE's cover and that of the project. After weighing all factors, it has been decided that continued employment of GERENDE is not an acceptable risk, and the decision has been reached to terminate him by the end of FY 1970. GERENDE will be paid a termination bonus of $10,000 for 15 years service, about $1,250 more than the $8,750 his contract calls for, in order to ensure that the termination is amicable and thereby preserve

project security. In addition, his wife, LIEMPTY-19 will be given $2,500 as a security measure designed to keep her from revealing what she knows about project operations. The FY 1970 budget is being amended to cover this amount.

2. Other aspects of security continue relatively unchanged. All the agents still have jobs to backstop their Agency wages. The Station is compartmented from the action agents through FERNALD, whose contact with the sub-agents is reasonably well covered by his status as a retired immigrant. FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-9 and LITEMPY-13 since 9 December 1969. Brief meetings are held once each week at pre-arranged times and places, well away from the target area. Occasionally emergency meetings are called, by phone, if special coverage is desired. FERNALD also meets LIKMPTY-4 to exchange films and prints. These meetings are held weekly at pre-arranged times and places. FERNALD can change meeting plans by calling LIEMPTY-4 directly by telephone. In addition, LIEMPTY-4 has been given a special extension in the Station through which he may call as "Dr. Carlos" to leave a message for "Victor" (FERNALD). The Station case officer maintains weekly clandestine contact with FERNALD in order to manage the operation and collect the product.

Coordination:

Ambassador McBride has not been briefed on Project LIEMPTY.

Future Plans:

1. The surveillance units are expected to continue to produce valuable information in the form of photographic coverage and visual surveillance reports on the daily movements, personal associations, and habit patterns of persons frequenting the Soviet Embassy, including Soviet officials. Operational procedures and the project mechanism will continue as it has in the past, except that Bruce H. FERNALD, a new principal agent, will be in charge of the operation (see Changes, paragraph 2).

2. The Project does not include an up-dated plan for emergency contact during violent action or government overthrow. The Station has been requested to prepare an updated emergency contact plan and submit it to Headquarters in the first FY 1971 quarterly progress report.

Costs:

1. General: $23,635 are requested for FY 1971. It is requested that the project be amended for FY 1970 in the amount of $10,498 (from $38,970 to $49,468) in order to cover termination payments to Raymond H. GERENDE and his wife, LIEMPTY-19.

2. Source of Funds: Project LIEMPTY is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's FY 1971 Operating Program in the amount of $40,000. Funds for the FY 1970 amendment will be absorbed in the current WH Division's finance allocation.

3. Project Budget:

	FY 1970 Estimated Obligations	FY 1971 Request	FY 1972 Projection
Raymond H. GERENDE Salary	$ 6,500	$ -0-	$ -0-
LIEMPTY-4 Salary	2,400	2,640	2,640
LIEMPTY-9 Salary	4,320	4,752	4,752
LIEMPTY-10 Salary	4,224	-0-	-0-
LIEMPTY-11 Salary	2,736	-0-	-0-
LIEMPTY-13 Salary	1,836	1,690	1,690
LIEMPTY-14 Salary	1,824	2,006	2,006
LIEMPTY-26 Salary	672	739	739
LIEMPTY-27 Salary	1,728	1,901	1,901
LICALLA Safehouse Rent (MEXI-03)	1,248	1,373	1,373
LILYRIC Safehouse Rent (MEXI-132)	2,880	2,880	2,880
Safehouse Utilities	1,100	1,200	1,300
GERENDE Dark Room Rent (MEXI-137)	960	-0-	-0-
MV-2823* and 2947 Maintenance	1,200	600	600
Property Maintenance and Replacement	500	500	500
Photographic and Other Supplies	1,000	1,000	1,000
Christmas Bonuses	2,140	2,354	2,354
LIEMPTY-19 Termination Bonus	2,500	-0-	-0-
GERENDE Termination Bonus	10,000	-0-	-0-
TOTAL	$49,468	$23,635**	$23,735

*MV-2823 to be sold in FY 1970 and not replaced.
**Decrease from FY 1970 figure due to GERENDE termination. His replacement is covered under Project AEMAGNIFY.

4. Foreign Currency: There is no special need for foreign currency. No non-CIA funds are used.

5. Commitments: Christmas bonuses to all agents totaling $2,354 for FY 1971, and termination pay in an amount to be determined by the agents record and length of service.

6. Funding: Funds are hand-carried from the Station case officer to FERNALD, and from FERNALD to the sub-agents. The transfer of funds takes place under clandestine meeting conditions, and appropriate security measures are always taken.

7. Accountability: FERNALD accounts in detail to his case officer, who in turn submits receipts to the Station and certifies that funds were spent to cover expenses for which it was intended.

8. Annexes: None

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request

FROM: WH/1/Robert Hazen

EXTENSION: 4167

NO.:

DATE: 10 April 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/1	10 Apr 70		cmj
2. C/WH/B&F	10 APR 1970		
3. C/WH/LOG	4/13	4/13	
4. C/WH/SS		4-13-70	
5. SB/X/WH			✓
6. C/WH/RE		4/15	m
7. C/WH/FI	15 APR 1970		
8. C/WH/Plans	21 APR 1970	4/21	
9. C/WHD	21 APR 1970		J.H.
10. WH/FI	22 APR 1970		
11. MFS/BG/FI 21 APR 1970	28 MAY 1970		
12.			
13. WH/FI 303113	[illegible]		
14. WH/1			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1-2:
Please take the extra FY 70 funds from Project LIARNICA.
cmj

FY 70 [illegible]

Funds included in the FY 71 Ops Program.
6-7 Not applicable

Field informed and copy sent via HMM-W-17950.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

STAFF REVIEW OF FI/CI PROJECT

RETURN TO:
NPS/BO/FI-CI
Projects
3 C 43

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

FUNDS: FY 70 Amendment $10,498
FY 71 Renewal $23,635

CASE OFFICER: Jack Barry

EXTENSION: 4167

ROOM: 3 E 05

RECEIVED DDP/PG: 23 Apr 70

FORWARDED: 23 Apr 70

DEADLINE:

RETURNED:

DIVISION: WH

STATION: Mexico City

TARGET AREA: Mexico

ACTION		APPROVAL LEVEL		REVIEWING COMPONENTS							
	APPROVAL		DIVISION OR STAFF	X	FI/OPS	X	CI/OPS	X	CCS	X	OTHER
X	RENEWAL	X	DDP		/INT		-				NSP
X	AMENDMENT		DCI		/D						
	EXTENSION										
	TERMINATION										

ROUTING OFFICE COMMENTS

COMMENT FOR INTERNAL STAFF USE (*Not to go forward to the Division*)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (*To go forward to the Division*)

The CI Staff concurs in the renewal of this extremely valuable operational support project. The Staff desires to be kept informed on all security developments and repercussions resulting from the divorce problems of Gerende (P) and his wife. The Staff urges the Station to continue its all-our efforts to keep this divorce out of the courts.

CI STAFF DIV.

DATE 12 MAY 1970

DATE: [illegible]

REVIEWING OFFICER:

FORM 8-67 526 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20)

19 MAY 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH : MPS/BG

SUBJECT : Renewal of Project LIEMPTY

1. WH Division requests renewal of Mexico City Station's Operational Support Project, LIEMPTY, for $23,635 for Fiscal Year 1971 and a $10,498 amendment for FY 1970 to cover termination payments to a former Principal Agent and his wife. Last year LIEMPTY was approved for $38,970. One agent termination and the transfer of the cost of a mobile surveillance unit to another project are responsible for the reduced FY 1971 request.

2. LIEMPTY supports a visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. It includes a Principal Agent, Raymond H. GERENDE (P), and 6 subagents who maintain two separate safehouses, one in front and one in the rear of the Soviet Embassy, from which anyone entering or leaving the Embassy can be observed and photographed. The various members of the team handle and service the photographic equipment, develop and print photographs, keep observation reports and logs, including the arrival and departure of target persons, and maintain the two safehouses mentioned above.

3. This project does not provide positive intelligence, except incidentally. It is designed to furnish a running account, both photographic and in writing, of all Soviet Embassy personnel and their visitors arriving at, or leaving, the Embassy. Photographs taken by LIEMPTY personnel were used to produce an updated "mugbook" on Soviet officials in Mexico which has been loaned to other US security agencies for operational use in activities targeted against Soviet services in Mexico City. LIEMPTY agents also provided information which enabled the Station to identify the companions of known KGB officials, to identify the habit patterns of new arrivals at the Soviet Embassy and provided a wealth of other information of operational value concerning Soviet Embassy activities.

4. A security problem, resulting in a Station decision to restrict the activities of GERENDE, place him on half pay, and replace him with a career agent (a valuable asset who

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

also handles SB operations) arose during the project year. GERENDE has been having marital difficulties which may end in divorce. Along with other incompatible features of the marriage, which have resulted in numerous family fights, there have been long, bitter and violent arguments as to who will have custody of their 4 children and concerning a monetary settlement. The Station has become involved in these altercations because GERENDE's wife is knowledgeable of his CIA relationship and could, if she chose to do so, expose him as an agency employee. She has promised to keep quiet but there is no assurance that she will do so. In view of the risk involved, should GERENDE's wife expose his agency relationship and in view of the fact that, despite his 15 years of service and his undisputed ability and experience, other unfavorable qualities militate against his retention, the Station is considering terminating GERENDE. It is proposed to pay him a termination bonus of $10,000 for 15 years of service in accordance with Mexican law and his wife $2,500 as a security measure designed to keep her quiet. After discussion with the desk, FI Staff believes that, if GERENDE is paid the $10,000 termination money, it should not be given to him in one lump sum but should be paid on a monthly basis, the amount per month to be determined by the Station, thus eliminating the possibility of his squandering it all at once and possibly coming back for more of the same. The same procedure should be followed in the $2,500 payment to his wife. In both cases at least an element of control is assured in that both GERENDE and his wife will know that continued receipt of their monthly payments will depend upon their continued loyalty to the agency. In the meantime, we feel this man, whose morale, and ability have been seriously affected by his marital strife, given time, can perhaps be rehabilitated and once again become a valuable Station asset. This would ensure his continued loyalty and give him an income out of which to pay his alimony. Aside from the foregoing there were no other problems, security or otherwise. All meetings between the case officer and the new Principal Agent are held under secure conditions, or more often if necessary, at prearranged dates, times and places. Meetings between the P/A and the subagents are held under similar conditions. The Station has been requested to submit an updated emergency recontact plan to be included in the first FY 1971 quarterly program report for this project.

5. Agents' salaries, safehouse rentals, motor vehicle maintenance and travel, property maintenance and Christmas bonuses will total $23,635. Despite the security aspects related to the marital difficulties of the erstwhile P/A,

this is an excellent operation which has been described by the Station as representing a highly effective and highly useful support mechanism. SB Division has stated that, although relatively inexpensive, it is a very worthwhile and valuable project. FI Staff recommends approval with the stipulation that the recommendation with respect to payment of termination bonuses to GERENDE and his wife be carried out.

Peer de Silva
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

PREVIOUS PROJECT ACTION

S E C R E T
(When Filled In)

FUNDING

NO. 2
(DOCUMENT # FOR
THIS PROJECT)

DATE 21 Jul 70

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO: CHIEF OF STATION (BASE) Mexico City

ATTENTION: FINANCE OFFICER

INFO:

PROJECT LIEMPTY FAN 0-35-1027

TYPE OF ACTION PERIOD OF ACTION 1 Jul 69 TO 30 Jun 70 AMOUNT $ —

NEW		PREVIOUS ACTION IN THIS FISCAL YEAR	38970
RENEWAL		TOTAL FISCAL YEAR APPROVAL	36500
EXTENSION			
TERMINATION		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE	500
AMENDMENT		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE	36,000
OTHER	✓*	* Funding reduced to $36500	

CHIEF, WH/B&F

HQS USE ONLY

PROCESSED	APPROVED	TYPE OF ACTION	PERIOD	AMOUNT

S E C R E T
(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FUNDING

NO. 1
(DOCUMENT # FOR THIS PROJECT)

DATE [illegible]

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO: CHIEF OF STATION ~~(BASE)~~ Mexico City

ATTENTION: FINANCE OFFICER

INFO:

PROJECT LIEMPTY FAN 0135-1009

TYPE OF ACTION PERIOD OF ACTION [illegible] TO [illegible] AMOUNT $ [illegible]

NEW		PREVIOUS ACTION IN THIS FISCAL YEAR	-
RENEWAL	✓	TOTAL FISCAL YEAR APPROVAL	[illegible]
EXTENSION			
TERMINATION		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE	530
AMENDMENT		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE	[illegible]
OTHER			

CHIEF, WH/B&F

HQS USE ONLY

PROCESSED	APPROVED	TYPE OF ACTION	PERIOD	AMOUNT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT LIEMPTY

☐ CA
☒ FI/CI

☐ PROPRIETARY
☐ SUBSIDY
☐ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION WH
	AMENDMENT	
X	RENEWAL	BRANCH WH/1
	TERMINATION	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Al Malone — EXTENSION 6954
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY ADDP

TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED $ 38,970

FY	AMOUNT
1970	$38,970
196	

PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1969 TO 30 June 1970

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL 0135-1009

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE
MPS/BG (Signed) E. M. [illegible]

DATE 1[illegible] AUG 1969

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1		1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1	CASE OFFICER	2	MPS/BG

FORM 6-66 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(3)

5 JUN 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH : MPS/BG

SUBJECT : FY 1970 Renewal of Project LIEMPTY for $38,970

1. Project LIEMPTY, now in its eleventh year, is the Mexican Station's operation which provides visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy from safehouses at the front entrance and back of the building, as well as from a mobile unit. All Soviet personnel and their visitors coming to the Embassy are photographed. From 1 November 1967 to 31 December 1968, approximately 21,367 photographs were taken and thousands of pages of surveillance reports were completed by personnel in this project. SB Division is pleased with the quantity and quality of the photographs and the Station finds them useful for operational purposes against the SB target. During the past year several U.S. citizens entered the Soviet installation in Mexico City and their photographs were identified by the FBI. There is a good relationship between the Station and the FBI in Mexico City and appropriately sterilized photographs are passed locally.

2. There have been no significant security problems.

3. The only changes in the project have been the elimination of one of the safehouses, which was used as an observation post, and termination of the agent who attended it. No real loss resulted from this change since the safehouse was so located that photographs taken from it overlapped those taken from another safehouse. The agent who serviced the facility was getting too old to do an efficient job and was terminated amicably. Also during the past year a new agent was added to the project.

4. Total funds requested for FY 1970 are $38,970. Salaries and legally required bonuses for nine agents come to $30,080; safehouse rental and maintenance amounts to $6,188; maintenance of two vehicles, $1,200; and photo and operational expenses, $1,500. FY 1969 approval was for $43,520 and estimated obligations for this period are $43,500. A new, $5,000 vehicle was purchased in FY 1969 and none is needed in FY 1970 which accounts for the reduction in costs for the present year.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

5. Project LIEMPTY contributes substantially to the Mexican Station's SB effort. The occasional identification of U.S. nationals in contact with the Soviets could have an important bearing on National Security. The operation is handled by an experienced and capable, outside contract agent under the direction of a Station officer which provides good security and personnel economy. It is a well managed and productive operational support mechanism necessary to Station operations. FI Staff recommends approval.

Peer de Silva
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

SECRET

STAFF REVIEW OF FI/CI PROJECT

RETURN TO: MPS/BG/FI-CI Projects 3 C 43

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

FUNDS: $38,970

CASE OFFICER: Al Malone

EXTENSION: 6954

ROOM: 3 E 04

RECEIVED DDP/PG: 27 May 69

FORWARDED: 27 May 69

DEADLINE:

RETURNED:

DIVISION: WH

STATION: Mexico

TARGET AREA: MEXICO CITY

ACTION		APPROVAL LEVEL		REVIEWING COMPONENTS							
	APPROVAL		DIVISION OR STAFF	X	FI/OPS	X	[✓ CI/OPS]	X	CCS	X	OTHER
X	RENEWAL	X	DDP		/INT						OPSER/P
	AMENDMENT		DCI		/D						
	EXTENSION										
	TERMINATION										

ROUTING OFFICE COMMENTS

COMMENT FOR INTERNAL STAFF USE (*Not* to go forward to the Division)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (*To go forward to the Division*)

The CI Staff concurs in the renewal of this extremely valuable operational support project.

CC SENT DIV.

DATE 10 July 69

DATE: 10 July 1969

REVIEWING OFFICER:

FORM 526 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-40)

50-6-74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION	X	FI/CI		CA		OTHER

	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION	Western Hemisphere Division
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION	Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 19~~69~~ 70	BRANCH: One	DESK:
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Al Malone	DATE: 4 April 69
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 3E04 / BUILDING: Hqs.	TEL. EXT.: RED 9041 BLACK 6954

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman	4/4/69	4/4/69	✓	
C/WH/B&F	Elliotte C. Want	4/7	4/7		
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson		10 Apr 69		✓
C/WH/FI	James B. Noland		18 April 69		
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	21 APR 1969	20/4		
C/WHD	William V. Broe	13 MAY 1969	24 MAY 1969		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
SB/X/WH	L MAESTRES	14-4	14-4		✓
C/FI Staff		5 JUN 1969	5 JUN 1969	✓	
CI Staff	/S/ F. W. Hughes		10 Jul 69		
CCS/PRG	/S/ Walter M. Pillsbury		5 Jun 69		
OPSER/P	/S/ Gerard Droller		28 May 69		
C/MPS/BG		11 Aug 69	11 Aug 69		

ALL FUTURE ACTIONS OF THIS PROJECT REQUIRE APPROVAL OF DD/P OR ADD/P

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
			196	$
1 July 1969	30 June 1970	$ 38,970	19~~6~~70	$ 38,970

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
A/DDP	Cord Meyer Jr.	15 Aug 69

FORM 12-66 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

SECRET

2[illegible] [illegible] 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project Renewal (FY 1970)

1. Renewal is requested for the LIEMPTY Project for the period 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970 (FY 1970) in the amount of $38,970. Funds are available in WH Division. $45,000 was programmed for FY 1970.

2. LIEMPTY is a project supporting Soviet operations of the Mexico City Station. It provides for two basehouses, a photo surveillance vehicle, and personnel for photographic and visual surveillance of the Soviet Embassy. Presently, two fixed surveillance points near the Embassy provide the location from which the photographs are taken and observers are stationed. One basehouse is adjacent to the rear of the Embassy, where Soviet officials meet, play and work. The other basehouse is across the street from the front of the Embassy and gives a direct view of every person entering or leaving. There is also a mobile photographic unit (a VW van) which is now used in support of all Mexico City Station operations and in conjunction with the LIEMBRACE surveillance team (used primarily against Soviet targets). Raymond H. GERENDE, an indigenous contract agent, is the principal agent of the operation and meets daily with the basehouse keepers and subagents.

3. LIEMPTY contributes significantly to the Station's Soviet operations program and is considered an essential element of the Station's support apparatus. During the period 1 November 1967 through 31 December 1968, approximately 21,367 photographs were taken. In response to a request to SB Division for an evaluation of the project, the following comment was received: "There are few such sources of high resolution photographs of Soviets, especially giving good side views. These photos are welcomed by SB Division since they furnish a steady flow of up-to-date identity data..." The photos are useful to the Station in confirming the identities of Soviet personnel and visitors to the

SECRET

Embassy, some of whom are U. S. citizens. During the past year, several of these U. S. citizens were identified with the help of the photos (which were passed to the FBI). Furthermore, the movements and habits of the Soviets are studied, and more knowledge is acquired on their friends and associates, especially Mexican nationals. This information is useful in target studies. For example, the senior TASS representative, a known KGB officer, is a recruitment target. He is under intensive operational scrutiny for leads developed from knowledge of his activities and contacts. LIEMPTY support is an integral part of this current developmental activity.

4. During the past year, one of the three basehouses was closed, leaving two, and the agent attending it was terminated. This was done because the agent was becoming less effective with age, and because there was some overlap between the photos taken from this basehouse and those of another. The termination was amicable, and the working hours of the personnel of the other basehouse were extended slightly. Another agent was also hired to help. This new agent is of the same family as the rest of the personnel occupying the basehouse, and no additional security risks are anticipated from this addition.

5. There have been no security or administrative problems. The Station and GERENDE are constantly on the alert for any sign that the Soviets are aware of the surveillance activities. While it is quite possible that the Soviets are aware of the surveillance, so far indications are that they are at least not fully aware, since no effort is made by them to avoid being photographed, even when having meetings with contacts in the rear of the Embassy.

6. Approval is recommended of this valuable operational support project.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
LIEMPTY Project Renewal for FY 1968

FROM: WH/1/Nancy Perkins

EXTENSION: 6954

NO.:

DATE: 13 December 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/1			
2. C/WH/B&F	12/28		
3. C/WH/Log C/WH/Support	2 Jan 68	1/2	
4. SB/O/~~QM~~ SB.0001 C/WH/RE	3 Jan 68 8 JAN 1968		
5. C/WH4/FI WH/EXO	12 JAN 1968 23 JAN 1968		
6. C/WHD	29 JAN 1968		
7. WH/FI	3[illegible]		
8. MPS/BG/FI	30 JAN 1968		
9. WH/FI 3D3113	14 [illegible] 1968		
10. WH/1/Nancy Perkins			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

FY 68 FUNDS AVAILABLE

Project has 2 vehicles on TVA. If "rental of vehicles" is on a continuing basis exceeding 90 days, will require additional slot on TVA. DSW

To the best of branch knowledge, rental of vehicles would be on an ad hoc, short term basis. NP.

☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT [redacted]

☐ CA
☒ FI CI

☐ PROPRIETARY
☐ SUBSIDY
☐ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION WH
	AMENDMENT	
X	RENEWAL	BRANCH WH/1
	TERMINATION	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	
	OTHER	CASE OFFICER Nancy Perkins EXTENSION 6954

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY ADDP

PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 December 1967 TO 30 June 1969

TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED	FY	AMOUNT
$ 69,725	1968	$26,205
	1969	43,520

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL 8135-1009

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE
MPS/BG

DATE

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1		1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	4	CASE OFFICER	2	MPS/BG

FORM 6-66 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(5)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION: X FI/CI ☐ CA ☐ OTHER

☐ NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division	
☐ AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City	
X RENEWAL FY 196	BRANCH: One	DESK:
☐ EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Nancy Perkins	DATE: 21 Dec 67
☐ TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 3B 4403 BUILDING: Hqs	TEL. EXT.: RED 9041 BLACK 6954

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman WJKaufman		21 Dec 67		
C/WH/B&F	Elliott C. Want Elliott C. Want	12/27	12/28		✓
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson	2 Jan 68			✓
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar	13 Jan			
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	JAN 1968	27/1/68		
C/WHD	William V. Broe by	29 JAN 1968	30 JAN 1968		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
SB/O/WH	Jonathan S. Hanke	3 Jan 68	3 Jan 68		✓
FI Staff	/s/Robert E. Anderson		8 May 68		
CI Staff	/s/Frank W. Hughes		26 Feb 68		
C/MPS/BG			9 May 68		

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 Dec 67	30 June 69	$ 69,725	1968	$ 26,205
			1969	$ 43,520

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
A/DDP	Cord Meyer, Jr.	10 May 68

FORM 12-66 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

Fi LIEMPTY - D/P

SECRET

STAFF REVIEW OF FI/CI PROJECT

RETURN TO: NPS/BG/FI-CI Projects 3 C 43

PROJECT LIEMPTY	FUNDS $69,725 (12 mos)		RECEIVED DDP/PG 1/30
CASE OFFICER Nancy Perkins	EXTENSION 6954	ROOM 3 B 4403	FORWARDED 1/30
DIVISION WH	STATION Mexico City	TARGET AREA Mexico	DEADLINE 2/13 RETURNED

ACTION		APPROVAL LEVEL		REVIEWING COMPONENTS							
	APPROVAL		DIVISION OR STAFF	X	FI/OPS	X	CI/OPS		CCS		OTHER
X	RENEWAL	X	DDP		/INT						
	AMENDMENT		DCI		/O						
	EXTENSION										
	TERMINATION										

ROUTING OFFICE COMMENTS

COMMENT FOR INTERNAL STAFF USE (*Not to go forward to the Division*)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (*To go forward to the Division*)

The CI Staff concurs in the renewal of this extremely valuable project. The Staff strongly urges that the Station continue to be constantly alert for any Sov. interest in the project's agents and installations and in particular any Sov. investigation or activities against same--also, Station contingency plans should be formulated to cope with such Sov. interest or activities.

CC SENT DIV.
DATE 27 Feb 65

DATE	REVIEWING OFFICER

FORM 8-67 526 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-40)

SECRET

MPS/BG/FI
8 May 68

PROJECT BRIEFING

PROJECT : LIEMPTY　　WH - Mexico

ACTION : ADD/P approval of renewal (19 mos.)　　1 Dec 67 - 30 Jun 69

PURPOSE : An operational support project providing three basehouses and a mobile surveillance unit to monitor primarily the Soviet Embassy, its personnel and its visitors, by physical and photographic surveillance.

BACKGROUND: The project covers three properties near the Soviet Embassy (two in front of the Embassy's sole entrance and one behind the garden) from which visual and photographic surveillance is carried out. It also covers a darkroom and a mobile photographic truck. Some of the project personnel are used at times for miscellaneous support tasks such as servicing postal boxes and for counter-surveillance and other protective services.

PROGRESS: During the past year the project provided nearly all of the operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used in the Station's operations against the Soviet Embassy and its personnel. SB Division says, "This rather unique operation has unquestionably made a major contribution to the increasingly effective Soviet Operations program of the Mexico Station."

The project produces primarily operational data and counterintelligence information. It provides leads, evidence of which Soviet officers have been in the Embassy and which ones have been away, who has used which car, who has been talking to whom or going out of the building with whom. (One photograph from this project was ✓ used in the Warren Commission Report.)

FUNDS : $69,725 (19 mos.) (Programmed FY 69 $46,000)

	FY 68 (7 mos.)	FY 69
Salaries (9) and bonuses	$19,475	$32,020
Vehicle maintenance	1,165	2,000
Rent and utilities	4,665	8,000
Equipment	300	500
Operational expenses	600	1,000
	$26,205	$43,520

SECRET

PREVIOUS APPROVALS:	1 Dec 66 - 30 Nov 67	$45,000
	1 Dec 65 - 30 Nov 66	41,500
	1 Dec 64 - 30 Nov 65	45,300
	1 Dec 63 - 30 Nov 64	49,700
	1 Dec 62 - 30 Nov 63	49,900
	1 Dec 58 - 30 Nov 59	95,380

STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS: FI and CI Staffs concur.

8 [illegible] 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: MPS/BG

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY

1. WH Division requests renewal of LIEMPTY for the 19-month period 1 December 1967 through 30 June 1969 in the amount of $69,725. While this represents a slight reduction on a pro rata basis from the $45,000 for which LIEMPTY was approved for the 12-month period starting 1 December 1966, it reflects a proportionately modest increase in cost for the 19-month renewal period over the estimated total disbursement of $40,130 for the past project year. This will provide for small salary increases to meet the rising cost of living for certain of the agents involved in the project who have not received raises in some time as well as for slightly higher rental fees for the various basehouses. The project, now in its tenth year, is designed primarily to provide for the collection of operational information on the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, including the identification and movements of its personnel and visitors. To this end, LIEMPTY provides for the maintenance and exploitation of three basehouses for fixed visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy and a mobile basehouse in the form of a panel truck used for mobile photography against the Polish Embassy, leaders and meeting sites of local communist parties, and other targets of opportunity. An important corollary objective of LIEMPTY is operational support in the form of countersurveillance for Agency personnel and operations, including those of other bases and stations as the needs and requirements of the Mexico Station permit. The funds requested include $43,520 for the period 1 December 1967 through 30 November 1968 and an additional $26,205 to cover the period 1 December 1968 through 30 June 1969. The latter funds are asked for in a supplemental request to put the project on a fiscal year basis.

2. A long-term contract agent and eight other support agents are involved in the management and operation of the

LIEMPTY facilities and in surveillance activities directed at the primary Soviet target. Some of these agents are used also in dark room photographic processing, letter drop, and, on occasion, moving surveillance activities.

3. This project is only part of the complex of Mexico City Station instruments for meeting requirements from a number of U.S. agencies, including the FBI. It is clearly an effective, well-managed support operation serving important needs.

4. No major or significant changes in LIEMPTY personnel or operational techniques have been introduced nor have there been any known incidents adversely affecting the security of the project or its personnel since the previous project renewal period. As a unilateral operational support effort, LIEMPTY continues to be a most useful station asset supporting a number of station activities. In spite of small increases in costs as discussed above, the project is considered to be holding the line on cost and personnel.

5. The objectives of project LIEMPTY are in direct support of priority A objectives 1, 2, and 4 of the current Operating Directive for Mexico. It is considered by SB Division to have made significant contributions to the Station's well developed, high priority Soviet Operations Program. During the past year the various LIEMPTY base-house installations produced valuable information in the form of photographic coverage and physical surveillance reports on the daily movements, personal associations and habit patterns of selected targets of special interest. In numerous instances this coverage confirmed the specific intelligence service connections of Soviet officers in the Embassy. Often the identities of Mexicans and nationals of other countries in contact with the Soviets were established. The mobile panel truck unit was exploited regularly to provide information on not only the Soviets but also the Cuban target as well as local Communist Party targets.

for Glenn Fields
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

LIEMPTY PROJECT RENEWALS

THROUGH FY 1968

(RENEWALS FOR FY 1969 AND
FY 1970 ARE IN PROJECT
RENEWAL FILE)

14-00000

SECRET

MPS/BG/FI
11 Jan 67

PROJECT BRIEFING

PROJECT: LIEMPTY . WH - Mexico City

ACTION : ADD/P approval of renewal 1 Dec 66 - 30 Nov 67

PURPOSE: Provides stationary surveillance against the Soviet Embassy and a mobile photographic basehouse which is used primarily against the Polish Embassy and local Communist party leaders.

PROGRESS: Three basehouses (LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA) provide coverage of both the front and rear of the Soviet Embassy. Throughout the past renewal period each operational component contributed actively and concretely to the fulfillment of the operational tasks levied on the Station. In the first nine-month period approximately 17,000 individual frames of operational photographs were provided from the fixed basehouses. These served to confirm the identities of Embassy personnel and their visitors and provided detailed reporting on the movement and habit patterns of selected targets of special interest. The mobile unit (LIENTRAP) provided over 1,000 individual photographs. Of particular value were photographs of local and exile Communist leaders. Raymond H. GERENDE (p) continued in the role as principal agent for Project LIEMPTY. His overall operational assignment involved at least 12 clandestine meetings per week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY project case officer.

PROBLEMS: In mid 1966 LICOWL/1, who owns a small store near the Soviet Embassy, reported that a Soviet official had approached him and asked him to inform on his neighbors. Reportedly the Soviet named LIEMPTY/6 of the LIMITED basehouse by name and also asked about the tenants of the building housing LILYRIC. However, in view of LICOWL's previous history of lying, it is difficult to assess exactly what the Soviets requested and just what LICOWL/1 may have told them. The Station is still looking into this development.

SECRET

FUNDS : $45,000 . $29,020 in FY 67 $15,980 in FY 68

Programmed for $45,000 FY 67

Salaries:	
GERENDE	$ 7,000
Others (8)	23,900
Vehicle maintenance (2)	5,000
Rent and utilities	7,600
Equipment maintenance and replacement	500
Miscellaneous operational expenses	1,000

PREVIOUS APPROVALS:	1 Dec 65 - 30 Nov 66	$41,500
	1 Dec 64 - 30 Nov 65	45,300
	1 Dec 63 - 30 Nov 64	49,700
	1 Dec 62 - 30 Nov 63	49,900
	1 Dec 61 - 30 Nov 62	49,500
	1 Dec 58 - 30 Nov 59	95,380

STAFF COMMENTS: FI and CI Staffs concur in renewal.

CI STAFF: Strongly urges the Station to continue its close monitoring of Soviet interest in the installation buildings and attempts to obtain information on sensitive project personalities. The Station should devise necessary contingency plans of action to eliminate any security hazards if it is determined that the Soviets are intensifying such efforts and could be getting "too close" to the project installations, personalities and activities.

SECRET

8 JAN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: MPS/BG

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY

1. This action seeks renewal of Project LIEMPTY covering Mexico City Station's stationary surveillance basehouses aimed against the Soviet Embassy. The activity will cost $45,000 for the period 1 December 1966 to 30 November 1967. Approval is recommended.

2. Project LIEMPTY has been in being for nine years. At present it supports three stationary basehouses near the Soviet Embassy and a mobile photographic basehouse. These are used to obtain photographic coverage and logs of Soviet movements and visitors to the Soviet Embassy. The mobile basehouse is used also to cover meeting sites of the local communist parties and targets of opportunity.

3. A principal agent and eight agents are used in the LIEMPTY activity. The agents are variously employed as basehouse keepers, photo lab technicians and surveillance operators.

4. Security has been generally good although one incident occurred in mid 1966 which may have some impact on the future security of the operation. An approach was made to an agent of the Station, who owns a small store near the Soviet Embassy, to report on his neighbors among whom are some of the LIEMPTY agents. One, LIEMPTY-6, was mentioned by name. The Station is watching this development carefully.

4. The LIEMPTY activity proved its worth during the past year when check was made on conflicting stories told by two Station agents. The LIEMPTY surveillance reports proved that one of the agents was lying about his contacts with the Soviets. LIEMPTY is well managed and continues to serve an important Mexico City Station need.

Robert E. Andersen
ROBERT E. ANDERSEN
Acting Chief
Foreign Intelligence

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION	X FI CI	CA	OTHER
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division	
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City	
X	RENEWAL FY 1967-68	BRANCH: One	DESK:
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: C. Bustos-Videla	DATE: 18 Nov. '66
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 332 · BUILDING: Ames	TEL. EXT.: RED — BLACK 3654

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman	[illegible]	
C/WH/B&F	~~Robert Carter~~ Robert D. Carter	9/25/64	
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson	[illegible]	
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar Thomas Polgar	6/8-66	
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	12/12/66	
C/WHD	William V. Broe by J [illegible]	12/10/66	

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
FI Staff	-s/Robert E. Andersen	6 Jan 67		X		6 Jan 67
CI Staff	-s/Frank W. Hughes	16 Dec 66				
C/MPS/BG	S. M. [illegible]	13 Jan 67				

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	REVISED TOTAL
1 December 66	30 Nov 67	$ 45,000.00	1967	$ 29,020
			1968	$ 15,980

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
A/DDP	T. H. Karamessines	1[illegible]

FORM 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

SECRET

10 DEC 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project Renewal

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be renewed for the period 1 December 1966 through 30 November 1967 for a total of $45,000: $29,020 for FY 1967 and $15,980 for FY 1968. The Project is included in the FY 1967 Operational Program for $45,000. Funds are available within WH Division.

2. LIEMPTY covers stationary surveillance basehouses targeted against the Soviet Embassy. These basehouses provide photographic coverage and logs. Two of the basehouses (LIMITED and LILYRIC) cover the activity in the front of the Embassy, and LICALLA provides coverage of the back courtyard area. The LIEMPTY project also covers a mobile photographic basehouse in the form of a panel truck which is used against the Polish Embassy where we have no permanent surveillance basehouse, and against other targets of opportunity.

3. The value of Soviet Embassy photographic coverage during the past year was proven when the logs maintained by LILYRIC were used to double check on an operation involving LIRUSTIC-1 and LICOWL-1 who had told conflicting stories of certain events concerning the activity of some Soviets. Through the surveillance reports of the LIEMPTY Project against the Soviet Embassy, it was proven without a doubt that LICOWL-1 (who had just taken a polygraph without apparent deception) was lying about his contacts with the Soviets.

4. The LIENTRAP mobile photographic basehouse was targeted against leaders and meeting sites of the local Communist parties as well as other targets of opportunity, particularly exile Communist leaders now residing in Mexico. LIENTRAP provided up-dated identification

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

photographs of Communist officers which are of value to both the JMTIGER program and the Station's recruitment/penetration program. The LIENTRAP personnel also regularly service twenty-one postal accommodation addresses used by the Mexico City Station.

5. One development which may affect the security of the LIEMPTY basehouses of LIMITED and LILYRIC occurred in mid 1966 when LICOWL-1 (who owns a small store near the Soviet Embassy) reported that a Soviet official, AEQUALITY-1, had approached him and requested him to inform on his neighbors. Reportedly the Soviet named LIEMPTY-6 (of the LIMITED basehouse) by name and also indicated all the tenants (unnamed) of the new building which now houses LILYRIC. The Soviet pinpointed the building by saying the one being built by a person who fit perfectly the description of LIMOUSINE. LICOWL-1 did not indicate that the Soviet reflected any interest in LIMOUSINE. The occupants of the LILYRIC basehouse were not mentioned. LICOWL-1 indicated to his Station contact that the only person he really suspected in the neighborhood was LIEMPTY-6 (of LIMITED) who doesn't go to work, is always typing, lives comfortably, and owns a car. He claims to have heard it rumored that LIEMPTY-6 was working for the Americans. (Since LIMITED is equipped with a radio and tips off the Station's surveillance team when it is used against Soviet targets, Headquarters has already assumed that the Soviets have identified this basehouse.) LICOWL-1 also listed several persons named by the Soviet who had no connection whatsoever with CIA.

6. The Station instructed LICOWL-1 not to become an informant on his neighbors. According to LICOWL-1, he therefore told AEQUALITY-1 he did not have time to collect the information the Soviet wanted. However, in view of the lies LICOWL-1 has been caught in, it is difficult to assess exactly what the Soviets asked of LICOWL-1 and just what LICOWL-1 may have told the Soviets. The Station is still looking into this development.

7. WHD recommends renewal of this Project.

by Jacob D. Esterline
William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

14-00000

PREVIOUS PROJECT ACTION

DDP/FG/FI
9 Feb 66

PROJECT BRIEFING

PROJECT: LIEMPTY — WH - Mexico

ACTION : ADD/P approval of renewal — 1 Dec 65 - 30 Nov 66

PURPOSE: To provide support for mobile and stationary photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy and a dispatching base for a physical surveillance team.

PROGRESS: Assets included under the project include three basehouses which provide front and rear views of the Soviet Embassy, and a panel truck equipped for spot photo coverage. Raymond H. GERENDE (p), principal agent, meets the basehouse keepers regularly, maintains regular contact with the mobile photo unit and with the developing and processing base. He also performs many other support functions.

The photographs from all these operations have been of value to the Station in operational planning, for identification by surveillance teams, for mug books, and for Headquarters permanent files. The Station believes that this operation is essential to the fulfillment of the overall operational program levied on the Station by the RMD.

FUNDS : $41,500 — $25,520 in FY 66 — $15,980 in FY 67

(Programmed for $50,000 in FY 66)

Salaries	
GERENDE	$ 7,000
Basehouse keepers (3)	10,100
Mobile unit operators (2)	7,000
Lab personnel (2)	3,600
Cut-out	2,200
Vehicle maintenance (2)	2,000
Rent and utilities	7,600
Equipment maintenance	1,000
Miscellaneous ops expenses	1,000

PREVIOUS APPROVALS:	1 Dec 64 - 30 Nov 65	$45,300
	1 Dec 63 - 30 Nov 64	49,700
	1 Dec 62 - 30 Nov 63	49,900
	1 Dec 61 - 30 Nov 62	49,500
	1 Dec 60 - 30 Nov 61	53,000
	1 Dec 58 - 30 Nov 59	95,380

STAFF COMMENTS : FI and CI Staffs concur in renewal.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION	PROJECT CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

	TYPE OF ACTION	XX FI/CI ☐ CA ☐ OTHER	
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION	Western Hemisphere
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION	Mexico City
Y	RENEWAL FY 1966	BRANCH 1	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER C. Bustos-Videla	DATE
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. GH-43 / BUILDING Hdqs / TEL. EXT.	RED 9325 / BLACK 4506

CONCERRENCIES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman	11/29	
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter	2 Dec 65	
WH/SS	W. E. Brooks	12/3	
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar	16/12	
WH/EXO	Donald Marelius	28/12/65	
C/WHD	William V. Broe	30/xii/65	

CONCURRENCIES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
FI Staff	-s/Robert E. Andersen	4 Feb 66		X		4 Feb 66
CI Staff	-s/Frank W. Hughes	7 Jan 66				
	APPROVED					
C/DDP/PG		11 Feb 66				

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMOUNT OF ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 Dec 1965	30 Nov 1966	$ 41,500.00	1966	$ 25,520.00
			1967	$ 15,980.00

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans		11 FEB 1966

FORM 6-65 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

4 FEB 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY Renewal

1. FI Staff recommends approval of the renewal of Project LIEMPTY. This project, costed at $41,500., supports the following Mexico City assets: a panel truck used for mobile photography, three base houses for fixed photographic surveillance, a contract agent manager and eight support agents. One of the base homes is used as a control point to dispatch a surveillance team. (The latter is not a part of the project, however.)

2. The LIEMPTY target is the Soviet Embassy and Soviet activities in Mexico City. LIEMPTY is part of the complex of station instruments by means of which requirements from a variety of U.S. agencies are met. One of the sites provided pictures later used in the Warren Commission Report, and the publication of the report created a security hazard. The Station moved the site and it is now back in operation.

3. The possibility of Soviet intercept of radio commo to the surveillance team has been carefully weighed recently by SR, the desk, O/C and TSD. The decision to accept the risk appears to have been taken with due deliberation.

4. This is clearly an effective, well-managed operation serving an important need. We recommend renewal without hesitation.

W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

SECRET

30 DEC 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY Renewal Request

1. Renewal is requested for the LIEMPTY Project for the period 1 December 1965 through 30 November 1966 for a total of $41,500; of this amount, $25,520 should be alloted for FY 1966 and $15,980 for FY 1967. This Project has been programmed in FY 1966 for $50,000. The last Project Renewal was approved at $45,300. Funds are available within WH Division.

2. The security of this Project appears to be good. The LIENTRAP photo truck was repainted a different color in January 1965 to preserve the security of this vehicle which operates extensively in the same general areas. There have been no apparent ramifications from the publication of the LIMITED Photograph in the Warren Commission Report in September 1964.

3. LIENTRAP is one of two mobile photo surveillance units at the Station, both of which are used extensively because of the many requirements for spot photo coverage of diplomatic installations, agent meetings, and current identification photos of targets among others.

4. Although there are three stationary photo basehouses under this Project all targeted against the Soviet Embassy, there is very little duplication of effort, and the coverage of this Embassy would be weakened through the termination of any of them. LICALLA covers the rear of the Embassy (garden and parking lot) and is in a unique position to observe informal meetings and activity there. In May 1965 a thorough assessment was made of this basehouse to determine whether an audio installation could be based here, directed against these garden conversations. It was determined that due to the high incidence of street and other noises, this was not practical. TSD and SR Divisions are conscious of this requirement, however, and if any new equipment is developed which might make this operation more feasible it will be tested. LIMITED and LILYRIC which both cover the front entrance, provide coverage during different parts of the day, and LIMITED also serves as a fixed radio

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

dispatching base for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team.

5. The photographs from all these operations are of value to the Station in their operational planning, for identification by surveillance teams, for mug books, which are often used by surveillance teams and singleton agents in identifying Soviets, and for Headquarter's permanent files.

6. With reference to the FI Staff comment made last year at the time of the Project renewal that the radio dispatching from the LIMITED installation might have made this base a target for the RIS, the problem was discussed in depth with the Office of Communications, TSD, and SR Divisions. The Station has been alert to the Soviet's monitoring capability and they have developed a signaling system and intercar communications system that will leave the LIEMBRACE surveillance cars on the air for a minimum of time, and with limited open conversation. The result of Headquarters and the Station's research on this problem resulted in the conclusion that, if a surveillance team is to operate with automobiles, radios must be used if there is to be efficient surveillance, and regardless of what presently available type of scrambling or coding is used, radio is susceptible to monitoring by the opposition. It was therefore concluded that if the Station is to use the LIEMBRACE team against members of the Soviet installation, LIMITED must continue to be used as the radio dispatching center and the risk factor must be accepted until some new, more secure yet efficient commo system is devised.

7. The reporting on the administration of this Project is handled through regular quarterly progress reports. The appropriate Soviet, CP, or other Case Officers handle the reporting and exploitation of the product. During the past year there were no positive intelligence reports from this Project.

8. Both SR and WH Divisions recommend renewal of this Project.

by [illegible] D. Esterline
William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

1-058/

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY (Renewal)
WH - Mexico City

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is presented for renewal for the period 1 December 1960 through 30 November 1961. The project provides for physical and photographic surveillance operations in support and exploitation of other Mexico City Station operations, particularly those targetted at Soviet personnel and installations.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $53,000 from the DD/P-WH Division budget: $31,900 in fiscal year 1961, and $21,100 in fiscal year 1962, subject to the availability of funds. The amount includes $38,000 compensation for two principal agents, one clerical support agent on an hourly basis, and eleven surveillance and support agents; $7,000 operational expenses (safehouse procurement, post office boxes, rented automobiles, purchase of information, vehicle maintenance, and operational travel); $2,500 replacement, repair and maintenance of photographic equipment; and $5,500 basehouse rental, utilities, and maintenance.

3. The field's renewal request, supported by a covering memorandum of the Division, sets forth accomplishments of the project in the past year in terms of objectives and estimates effectiveness. It is noted that one principal agent, Simon D. CLACKETT (p), resigned in October 1960, and the four-man surveillance team previously handled by him will be transferred to project LITEMPO, consequently being omitted from LIEMPTY in this renewal. Three basehouses continue to be operated under the project: (a) LIMITED, which compiles daily logs on arrivals and departures from the LIMERICK installation, together with attendance lists of LIMERICK employees, and handles the radio dispatch of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team on LIMERICK personnel and targets

SECRET

of opportunity. This basehouse also provides photographic coverage, concentrated on visitors. (b) LILYRIC which provides clandestine photographs particularly of visitors to, as well as employees of, the LIMERICK installation, prepares weekly reports on LIMERICK employees and their wives, and reports on license numbers of all cars visiting the installation. (c) LICALLA, which concentrates on photographic coverage of LIMERICK employees and their families, as well as providing observation on the apparent positions and jobs of the target employees, and as well as personnel changes. Additional photographic coverage is provided by the mobile LIENTRAP vehicle. Principal agent Raymond H. GERENDE (p) continues to coordinate basehouse activities; principal agent Oliver G. SCANTLING (p) continues to be an independent asset used to follow-up and exploit operational information on target personnel and installations, to case various installations of interest, to acquire property, etc. SCANTLING has managed the surveillance team being transferred to LITEMPO in the interim following the resignation of CLACKETT. The Station notes that activities at the LICALLA basehouse were suspended in September 1960 as the result of the arrest of a knowledgeable TSD technician in another area and it is not known precisely when it will be possible to resume these operations. The Station believes that the GERENDE segment is now operating under optimum arrangements and SCANTLING will soon be relieved from his interim responsibility for the surveillance team being transferred to LITEMPO and can concentrate more on his investigative and casing activities. It is not planned in the coming year to expand project activities.

4. Appropriate Special Staff components concur in recommending renewal. FI Staff notes the Division's assurance that the transfer of the unilateral surveillance team to LITEMPO will not affect its independent status, and remarks that the current project review presents a clearer picture of the usefulness of the several segments than the previous one.

5. I recommend renewal of Project LIEMPTY as presented.

S.M. Hines
S. M. HINES
Chief, DDP/PG

Approved: COP-DD/P   3 FEB 1961
Date

Attachment:
Project Outline LIEMPTY
FI Memorandum

Staff Coordination:
For FI Staff -s/R. Bryant
For CI Staff -s/R. Brown
For CCG -s/F. Youngblood

SECRET

25 JAN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/COPS

THROUGH: DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY

FI Staff recommends renewal, with the assurance of the desk that the transfer of the unilateral surveillance team to LITEMPO will not affect its independent status. This review presents a clearer picture of the usefulness of the several segments than the previous one.

W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

SECRET

8 JAN 60

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY (Renewal)

WH - Mexico

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is presented for renewal for the period 1 December 1959 through 31 November 1960. The project provides for physical and photographic surveillance operations in support and exploitation of other Mexico City operations, particularly those targetted at Soviet personnel and installations.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $84,910 from the DD/P-WH Division operating budget: $48,485 for fiscal year 1960 and $36,425 for fiscal 1961, subject to the availability of funds. These sums include $61,910 compensation for five contract agents (three of whom serve as principal agents for segments of the project), and sixteen support agents; $3,500 for vehicle maintenance and commercial carrier travel; $7,500 for operational equipment; $5,000 for maintenance of three safehouses; $2,000 for additional safehouse, post office box, and vehicle rental; $1,000 exchange commodities; $2,000 "key" money, broken contracts, etc.; and $2,000 for the purchase of information, documents, payment of bribes, etc.

3. The attached renewal request, prepared in the Division and supported by a project review prepared in the Field, reviews the activities of the project during the past year and present a detailed breakdown of the funds requested. The project operates in three segments: (a) Contract agent Oliver G. SCANTLING is an independent asset who is used to follow-up and exploit operational information on target personnel and installations, to case various installations of interest, acquire property, etc.; (b) a photographic surveillance team, under principal agent Raymond H. GERENDE, utilizing three houses or apartments and one photo truck; and (c) a physical surveillance team under principal agent Simon D. CLACKETT, consisting of three trained members at the present time. The attached renewal request reviews the activities and accomplishments of the project in terms of these three segments and in relation to project objectives. SCANTLING's contribution to the collection of operational information pertaining to Soviet personnel and installations is regarded by the Station as unique. He also

trained CLACKETT in radio controlled mobile surveillance. SCANTLING also has rendered valuable support to the LITACIT operation having gained entry to the target under a fabricated cover. He has also cased and prepared reports on the LITABLY target in preparation for future operations and performed investigations of numerous other Station targets of opportunity. He investigated many leads from other audio-surveillance operations enabling the Station to maintain current data on various Soviet contacts and resulting in a recruitment attempt which, while unsuccessful, is believed to indicate future potential along this line. He has further been used to develop radio procedures for the mobile teams and to rent various properties in support of other Station operations. The GERENDE segment, using three base houses for photography, produced upwards of 12,000 photographs during the year. One base has recently begun taking motion pictures of Soviet personnel in the course of conversation which have been forwarded to FI/D for possible exploitation by lip reading analysis. This segment also operates the mobile radio surveillance vehicles. A mobile photography surveillance truck has been used during the project year for coverage of various Station targets which do not warrant the establishment of permanent photographic bases. GERENDE has also served to rent post office boxes, hotel rooms, etc., in support of other Station operations. During the past project year CLACKETT, who returned to Mexico in early April 1959 after Headquarters training, spent the following two months being trained by SCANTLING in mobile surveillance techniques. He then undertook training of a four member team which was judged ready for operational use toward the end of the project year. Two additional contract agents, Wilma J. FIORDALISI and Louise J. MACRINO, performed translation and support functions.

4. Appropriate staff components concur in recommending renewal.

(a) CI Staff notes that the CI value of the project is difficult to judge since it appears that much of the material produced remains in the Station for exploitation. However, CI Staff remarks that the value of the project should be increased when the CLACKETT surveillance team enters into active operation. CI Staff suggests that the Station be queried as to the pretext or circumstances under which SCANTLING frequently visits Inez Perada de Moreno, the occupant of the property adjacent to the Soviet installation.

SECRET

(b) FI/OPS notes that while the project review presents a clear picture of the aims and objectives of the various segments, it does not provide, except in the case of SCANTLING, detailed indication of the value or usefulness of the other segments, particularly the photographic activity. FI/OPS requests that the Station provide such an appraisal during the first quarter of 1960. FI/OPS recommends strongly that the photo coverage be reviewed from the standpoint of value and usefulness with a view to determining whether the LILYRIC activity could not be safely eliminated and the additional photographic coverage conducted on a more selective basis, without materially affecting overall usefulness. FI/OPS notes that, in the absence of further proof of usefulness, the color photography and moving pictures appear to be an unnecessary luxury. FI/OPS commends the careful handling of the CLACKETT segment and requests that the next project action include examples of the team's progress.

5. I recommend renewal of Project LIEMPTY as presented with attention to the staff comments in paragraph 4 above.

W. Lloyd George
W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Approved: Richard Helms
COP-DD/P

JAN 8 60
Date

Attachment:
Project Outline LIEMPTY

Staff Coordination:
For C/FI/OPS -s/R. Bryant
For CI Staff -s/R. Brown
For C/CCD -s/F. Youngblood

SECRET

SECRET

9 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Purchase of One Automobile and Increase of LIEMPTY TVA by One

1. According to the Project Renewal Request for LIEMPTY from the Mexico City Station, they plan to increase the LIEMPTY surveillance team during the coming year by two agents. To maintain the efficiency of an enlarged team, they will require one additional automobile.

2. It is requested that the TVA for LIEMPTY be increased by one automobile and that the Station be authorized to purchase locally this automobile for use under the LIEMPTY Project.

J.C. King
C/WHD

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUPPORT ANNEX - TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

1. PROJECT LIEMPTY		2. SENIOR STAFF	
		4. AREA	
		A. DIVISION	WHD
3. TYPE OF ACTION *(Check one)*		B. BRANCH	III
☐	A. NEW TVA	C. DESK	MEXICO
☐	B. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA		

5. REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	TOTAL PRESENT TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
A.	SEDAN 2 or 4 door used passenger American or foreign		4	5
B.	STATION WAGON			
C.	OTHER *(List below)*			
(1)				
(2)	Panel truck		1	1
(3)				
(4)				
(5)				
D.	TOTALS		5	6

6. REVIEWED BY			7. APPROVAL REQUESTED BY		
SIGNATURE LOGISTICS OFFICER	DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE CHIEF, ADMIN.	DIVISION	DATE
JAMES S. BURWELL James S. Burwell	WH/LOG	11 Dec. 1959	PAUL E. ARNESON	WH/SUPPORT	11 Dec 1959

8. APPROVED		9. AUTHORIZED	
BY DIRECTION OF DDP	DATE	BY DIRECTION OF DD/S	DATE
	12/1/60		

FORM NO. 1116 TEST
1 NOV 58

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(40-38)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY Amendment

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name: J. B. Brady
Room: 2114 Barton Hall
Ext.: 2555
Date: 23 June 1959

1. It is requested that approval be granted to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he works for KUBARK and to raise his salary effective July 1959 from $4,080 to $4,560.00 per year. His last salary increase was granted on 1 September 1957. The date, 18 March 1955, has been suggested by the Station as the beginning date for the computation of GERENDE's termination benefits. The Station believes that this benefit will provide GERENDE with the necessary incentive to make KUBARK a career and at the same time will give the Station an additional element of control.

2. As pointed out in the LIEMPTY Project Approval, GERENDE, an indigenous agent, is one of the Station's most valuable assets. He has a responsible full time job as the LIEMPTY Principal Agent who handles the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA base houses, the LIENTRAP operation, the outside photographic processing and translation service and all the agents participating in these activities. He performs his duties in a conscientious and professional manner and his already excellent abilities are showing continued improvement.

3. Money was already allocated in the LIEMPTY Project approval for the salary increase. With the effective date of 18 March 1955, for the termination clause, GERENDE will already have accrued $1,520 (his salary is $4,560 per year) if he should resign today. The LIEMPTY Project, as approved, has sufficient funds to cover this cost if it is necessary to obligate this amount during the present Project year. Therefore, no additional funds are requested.

Robert N Dahlgren
R. N. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

Attachments:
Folder with past approval
Envelope with true name

for C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

Concur: Richard W. Kline
Chief, FI/OPS

Approved:
for Chief, FI

Approved for Transmittal: R. Gomez
for J. C. King, C/WHD

Date: 14 July 59

Senior Staff Coordination
For C/FI/OPS -s/R. Bryant
For CI Staff -s/R. Brown

Approved: R. Gomez
for J. C. King, C/WHD

16/VII/59
Date

SECRET

SECRET

27 March 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Foreign Intelligence

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY (Amendment)
WH - Mexico City

1. The attached project, originating in the WH Division, provides the services of a surveillance activity to support Mexico City operations and is approved for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959. It is presented for your approval of amendment to include the addition of a contract agent, Louise J. MACRINO, to furnish administrative support, and also to formalize a special commitment made to one of the two principal agents, Oliver G. SCANTLING. A contract prepared in the Field and signed by the agent permits the payment of one year's salary to him or his assigned heirs in event of loss of life or total disability if incurred in the performance of duty. This has not previously been included in the project.

2. The LIEMPTY project has authorization for the expenditure of $95,380. No additional funds are required for the amendment. Sufficient funds remain in the project to absorb the salary expenses for MACRINO and funds to cover the extra year's salary for SCANTLING will not be requested until such time as they are needed.

3. Memoranda prepared in the WH Division supporting the request for amendment are attached, summarizing the important factors involved. These detail SCANTLING's performance and provide a resume of MACRINO's past activities in behalf of the Agency.

4. Staff Components have concurred in amendment to Project LIEMPTY.

5. I recommend approval of amendment of Project LIEMPTY as presented.

Benjamin A. G. Fuller
Chief, FI/OPS Division

Approved: Chief, Foreign Intelligence

30 March 59
Date

Attachment:
Project Outline LIEMPTY

Staff Coordination:
For C/FI/OPS -s/V. Hoffmann
For CI Staff -s/R. Brown
For DC/CCD/NC -s/F. Youngblood

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Amend LIEMPTY Project to Include a Special Benefit for Oliver G. SCANTLING (ps) and to Include Louise J. MACRINO (ps)

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:
NAME J. B. Brady
ROOM 2114 Barton Hall
EXT. 2555 or 3152
DATE 5 March 1959

1. It is requested that approval be granted to give Oliver G. SCANTLING a special benefit of one year's salary to him or his assigned heirs in the event of loss of life or total disability if incurred in the performance of duty. This benefit was included in a contract prepared in the field and signed by Subject on 15 February 1957. The contract was not submitted to Headquarters for approval until December 1958. The Station and WH Division do not want to delete this benefit from Subject's contract at this time and we feel Subject deserves this benefit.

2. SCANTLING, a civil engineer, is a Mexican citizen, who is 40 years old. He was granted an Operational Approval on 2 December 1954. SCANTLING began his employment with KUBARK as a footman on the LIPSTICK physical surveillance team and gradually became a driver of a surveillance automobile, then team leader. As team leader he was responsible for the operational deployment and administrative direction of the entire LIPSTICK team, three automobiles, four photographic and radio dispatching basehouses and the attendant mobile and stationary radio equipment. He collated the fragmentary surveillance reports into finished intelligence reports for study by the Case Officer. SCANTLING developed into a fine investigator and has obtained information where other Station investigative assets have failed.

3. Almost all of SCANTLING's time now is spent following up leads obtained from telephone intercepts and photographic surveillances. From July through December 1958 he made approaches to individuals performing services for the Soviet Embassy and he made a detailed casing report of the West German Embassy. In addition, he conducted many routine investigations and surveillances. The Station plans to have SCANTLING attempt to recruit the landlord of the proposed basehouse for a LINIMENT (FI/D) operation. SCANTLING no longer handles the surveillance team and the Station plans to continue to use him as an independent asset. SCANTLING has in his possession official credentials of the Federal Security Police (DFS). He has used these credentials in making contacts with targets of various sensitive Headquarters' operations (i.e., LCMAYFOWL).

4. As a graduate engineer who has spent at least ten years in house construction in Mexico, he has been invaluable to the Station in submitting detailed casing reports, including detailed and professional plans of technical targets. He has been commended by TSS for the support role he has played for them. He has submitted several casing reports on the Soviet Embassy and is an unparalleled source of information to the Station for information about the Embassy's construction activities, modifications and reasons for same.

5. For your information there is attached the Station's review of SCANTLING for the period July through December 1958. It is believed you will find this report of interest and further support the justification outlined above for the granting to SCANTLING of the special death and disability benefit. This agent assessment states "Oliver O. SCANTLING has continued to perform his assigned tasks in an outstanding manner. SCANTLING's poise, common sense, education, ideology, and native ability for the pursuit of clandestine activities make him one of the most valuable support assets available to the Mexico City Station. The fact that SCANTLING has a full time overt occupation as Chief Engineer and Production Manager for a local manufacturing company adds to his long-range potential as a KUBARK agent". SCANTLING has excellent cover as half-owner of a local firm which manufactures farm instruments and he represents the high calibre of person which KUBARK requires for the institution of their long-term resident agent program.

6. The LIEMPTY Project (now approved for $95,380) will not be amended at this time to include an extra year's salary for SCANTLING ($4,000). In the event it becomes necessary to fulfill this commitment during the project year, and if the expense cannot be absorbed by the present project authorization, an amendment will be submitted.

7. It is also requested that effective 1 March 1959 the LIEMPTY Project be amended to include Louise J. MACRINO, a Contract Agent, who is a Station support asset. Her OA was reinstated on 8 August 1958 (C-41152). She was formerly included under Project LIFEAT. However, the Station requirements for general translation work increased to the extent that it was necessary to use MACRINO to translate reports other than those originating from LIFEAT. It was therefore decided it would be more appropriate to include her under LIEMPTY. She does typing of reports and non-sensitive translations. She is paid on an hourly basis of $2.02, an estimated yearly salary of $3,500. The Station stated that the present LIEMPTY Project could absorb the expense of her salary for the remainder of the Project year.

Robert M. Dahlgren
R. M. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

Charles W. Anderson
C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

R. E. Gomez
R. E. Gomez, AC/WHD

13/March/59
Date

Attachments:
Folder with LIEMPTY Project Approval
Envelope with true names
HMMA 12095 (1 copy) KAPOK

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P 16 JAN 1959

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY (Approval)
WH - Mexico City

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is presented for your approval for an initial period from 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959. The project provides for the development of operational information through physical and photographic surveillance operations in support of other Mexico City operations, particularly those targetted at Soviet personnel and installations. Previously these operations were conducted for the most part under Projects LIPSTICK and LIJERSEY. They are incorporated in this new project because of the June 1958 compromise of LIPSTICK and to accomplish a more orderly administration of certain operational support assets.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $95,380 from the DD/P-WH Division operating budget: $65,580 for the current fiscal year and $29,800 in fiscal year 1960, subject to the availability of funds. These estimates include: (a) funds for the compensation of the presently-recruited fifteen action and support agents, six new agents, and two principal agents: Raymond H. GERENDE (p) (LIEMPTY/1, formerly LIPSTICK/20) and Oliver G. SCANTLING (p) (LIEMPTY/2, formerly LIPSTICK/19); (b) funds for the compensation, travel, allowances and Headquarters' training of two contract agents, Simon D. CLACKETT (p) and Wilma J. FIORDALISI (p), his wife, who are hereby transferred from Project LIMESA; (c) funds for operational expenses and equipment, including the purchase of four new or used vehicles as replacements for previously authorized vehicles and their maintenance, and a CP vehicle for SCANTLING; (d) the rent, utilities and maintenance of safehouses; and, (e) other appropriate operational expenses.

3. The attached Field Project Outline, a covering memorandum from the Division, and an addendum to the Project Outline, review the personnel assets and facilities transferred from the LIPSTICK and LIJERSEY operations following the partial compromise of LIPSTICK in June 1958 and describe the concept of the physical and photographic surveillance operations to be conducted under this project directed primarily at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. These surveillances provide photographs and other operational data of persons entering and leaving the building or present in the garden area, and through additional foot and mobile surveillances, investigative information concerning their contacts and destinations. Agent personnel, particularly the principal agents, are used also to conduct separate investigations, make recruit-approaches to

SECRET

individuals of operational interest, and to rent rooms, and apartments and perform other support activities. The fixed surveillance bases, LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA, have been in operation for almost three years without having been in any compromising situations insofar as the Station knows. The LIPSTICK unit, a panel truck equipped with cameras, etc., is considered a particularly valuable asset by the Field. As a replacement for a staff agent, Wilfred O. CLOWER (p), who directed and trained the LIPSTICK surveillance team, the husband and wife team of CLACKETT and FIORDALISI are proposed as qualified individuals to recruit, train, and direct the new LIEMPTY surveillance team and maintain its records. Appropriate notional cover was arranged for them while in their previous project, LIMESA, as they reside in Mexico under true names. One of the principal agents, GERENDE, will have no contact with the new surveillance team, but will be used to conduct special investigations, counter-surveillances, and for other support activities.

4. The CI Staff comments that LIEMPTY provides several types of physical surveillance, all of which provide information of CI interest, and as a support mechanism, a production review is not appropriate or necessary. The CI Staff states further, that with the compromise of the LIPSTICK surveillance team the Mexico City Station lost its only reliable and efficient surveillance team, LIEMPTY representing the Station's effort to replace that asset. Because of the great number of CI targets in Mexico City, the CI Staff believes it is essential that the Station be given the opportunity, through this project, to build another surveillance team capable of operating against sensitive targets. Additionally, the CI Staff believes the case officer should work at devising ostensible sources of incomes for the agents which will stand the scrutiny of friends, relatives and less friendly forces.

5. FI/OPS suggests that the Division consider a gradual reduction of the considerable financial and personnel commitments in this project in view of the favorably developing LIENVOY liaison relationship. FI/OPS believes that a smaller, more manageable support group, with greater Station emphasis on selectivity of tasks and targets could well result in more effective CI and FI productivity.

6. I recommend approval of the project and the transfer of the contract agents as outlined above. The Division is requested to take cognizance of the suggestions of the CI Staff and FI/OPS in the paragraphs above relative to the security and the overall direction of the surveillance activities to make them more efficient.

Benjamin A. G. Fuller
BENJAMIN A. G. FULLER II
Chief
FI/OPS Division

Thos Karamessines
f W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Approved: Richard Helms
COP-DD/P

16 JAN 1959
Date

Attachments:
Project Outline LIEMPTY
Addendum to Project Outline

Staff Coordination:
For C/CI Staff -s/R. Brown
For C/FI/OPS -s/V. Hoffmann
C/CCD/NC -s/F. Youngblood

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY

DIVISION: Western Hemisphere

STATION: Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

NAME: J. B. BRADY
ROOM: 2120 Barton Hall
EXT.: 2555
DATE: 15 December 1958

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project approval request be amended to include Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) and Wilma J. FIORDALISI (ps) under the LIEMPTY Project effective 1 January 1958. No additional funds are required.

2. It is also requested that the LIMESA Project be amended to delete from this Project these two Contract Agents effective 1 January 1958.

Robert N. Dahlgren
R. N. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

Charles W. Anderson
Charles W. Anderson, WH/FI

for R. Gomez
J. C. King, Chief, WHD

16 Dec 1958
Date

Attachments:
Memorandum (in quad)
Envelope with true names

SECRET

SECRET

Request for Amendment to LIEMPTY Project

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project approval request be amended to include Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) and Wilma J. FIORDALISI (ps), U. S. citizens and contract agents, under this Project in place of the Staff Agent written into the field project outline. At the same time it is requested that the LIMESA Project be amended to delete these contract agents from the latter project.

2. CLACKETT and FIORDALISI are now approved under the LIMESA Project. They were recruited in the United States to occupy a sensitive LIMESA basehouse. Because of the sensitivity of the operation and the equipment to be installed in the basehouse Headquarters decided U. S. citizens should be used. The Station said appropriate documentation and backstopping could be secured for those agents so they could be given false identities under which they could live while they occupied the basehouse.

3. MEXI-2777 (IN 26519), of 14 November 1958, notified Headquarters that security factors and difficulty in obtaining adequate documentation and backstopping precluded the use of U. S. citizens under LIMESA and requested permission to use indigenous agents for this operation. After discussions between John BRADY, Chief of the Mexican desk, with the LIMESA/LIEMPTY Case Officer in Mexico City, and discussions between representatives of FI/D, OC, TSS, and WH at Headquarters, Headquarters concurred in the field's operational decision to use indigenous agents in the LIMESA Project. CLACKETT and FIORDALISI received only a very superficial briefing regarding the LIMESA Project. It is not believed Subject's limited knowledge of this sensitive operation will pose a security hazard.

4. Construction on the LIMEST houses is being kept about two weeks from completion until indigenous agents can be cleared and recruited. The delay in completion is normal because all construction money in Mexico has become extremely tight because of the recent presidential inauguration.

5. The Station believes CLACKETT will be an excellent replacement for Wilfred O. CLOWER (ps), former Staff Agent under Project LIPSTICK, who directed and trained that surveillance team. CLACKETT has shown a remarkable aptitude for clandestine operational activity and surveillance and investigative work in particular. He also is interested and enthusiastic in undertaking this assignment for KUBARK. The Station needs a good bilingual agent to recruit, train, direct, and develop a strong dependable physical surveillance team under LIEMPTY.

6. Clearances and Contacts: CLACKETT was granted a PCSA on 23 July 1958. A POA/CA for use under LIMESA was requested on 19 August 1958. FIORDALISI was granted an OA for use under LIMESA on 14 November 1958. Requests have been submitted to amend their clearances for use under LIEMPTY. CLACKETT and FIORDALISI have signed contracts effective 1 September 1958. The sensitivity of the LIMESA Project required them to leave their young son in

SECRET

the United States. Because of this a special benefit of periodic trips to their home in Arizona was included in their contracts. Under LIMESA their quarters were to be provided. An amendment has been requested to their contracts deleting the special benefit and adding educational and quarters allowances.

7. Motivation and Control: CLACKETT and FIORDALISI are extremely patriotic and highly motivated as evidenced in their willingness to undertake the LIMESA Project and be separated from their son. They have indicated they are more than willing to do whatever is requested of them, no matter what personal sacrifices and hardships are required. Their complete livlihood is dependent on their KUBARK income.

8. Tasks: CLACKETT will recruit, train, and direct the LIEMPTY surveillance team. The Station hopes to develop this team into a major Station support asset. He will receive instructions and direction from the Station Case Officer. FIORDALISI will be used to do all the clerical and administrative work for the LIEMPTY surveillance team.

9. Communication and Contact: CLACKETT will contact the Station Case Officer in a clandestine manner. All necessary security precautions will be taken. CLACKETT will also contact his surveillance agents under a cover which will be determined later by the Station and CLACKETT. In view of his Mexican background, CLACKETT can pass as a Mexican. Details of communication and contact arrangements with KUBARK will be arranged by the Station. Under LIEMPTY CLACKETT will be contacted by the same Case Officer he is now contacted by under LIMESA. CLACKETT and FIORDALISI will be in direct contact with relatives and friends in the United States. The cover company has, until now, been serving as a letter drop and contact point for emergency messages.

10. Cover: CLACKETT and FIORDALISI entered Mexico on United States documentation and it is planned they will continue to live in Mexico under true name. CLACKETT has a notional cover as a public relations consultant which was established by CCD/NC to use with friends and relatives in the U. S. The same cover story can be adopted to cover their proposed use under LIEMPTY vis-a-vis their United States friends. The Station is working on local cover for CLACKETT to use in Mexico.

11. Anticipated Costs: It is anticipated that the following expenses will be incurred by CLACKETT and FIORDALISI:

Compensation:			
CLACKETT	($7750/yr)	7100	
FIORDALISI	($4000/yr)	3700	
			10,800
Allowances:			
Educational allowance		320	
Quarters	($2500/yr)	2500	2,820

Travel:		
PCS	300	
TDY to Headquarters for training (including 30 day per diem at $12 per day)	648	948
	Total	14,368

A total of $14,470 was included under the LIEMPTY Project approval request submitted on 24 November 1958 for a Staff Agent; therefore, no additional funds are required.

SECRET

24 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS-Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Justification for Automobiles under Project LIEMPTY

1. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be authorized to purchase three used sedans for use by the LIEMPTY surveillance team. The Station plans to expand the LIEMPTY surveillance team into a larger, well-trained physical surveillance asset. They will need three automobiles. Private automobiles or commercial transportation will not be satisfactory since the cars must be outfitted with two-way radios.

2. Authority is also requested to purchase a panel truck to be used in the LIENTRAP operation under this Project which mounts mobile photographic surveillances.

3. It is also requested that a quasi-personal car be authorized for Oliver G. Scantling (ps). Scantling is an indigenous agent under oral contract. A car is a prerequisite for his work for KUBARK which includes casings, surveillances, and investigations. Because of the sensitive nature of his work, and the heavy use made of the car, the Station has decided that Scantling should be furnished a QP car.

4. LIEMPTY agents were formerly carried under the LIJERSEY and LIPSTICK Projects. The vehicles used by the LIEMPTY agents under these other Projects will be disposed of and new ones will be purchased after the above TVA has been approved. The vehicles which will be replaced are MV 2148, MV 2147, MV 2138, and MV 2041. One of the surveillance cars will be new and will not replace an old car. It was decided that these vehicles should be replaced rather than transferred to the LIEMPTY Project for security reasons and because of the age of the automobiles. The automobiles are 1951 and 1952 models and have been used for sensitive surveillance work for over two years. The panel truck which was used in the LIENTRAP Operation under the LIPSTICK Project has been operating for two years in all parts of the city and has become a security threat. The fact that the LIPSTICK surveillance team knows that the truck exists, even to the point that one of the team members is the listed owner of the truck, also dictates replacement of this vehicle.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUPPORT ANNEX - TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

1. PROJECT LIEMPTY		2. SENIOR STAFF	
		4. AREA	
		A. DIVISION	WH
3. TYPE OF ACTION (Check one)		B. BRANCH	III
X	A. NEW TVA	C. DESK	Mexico
	B. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA		

5. REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	TOTAL PRESENT TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
A.	SEDAN 2 or 4 door, 5 passenger American of foreign		0	4
B.	STATION WAGON			
C.	OTHER (List below)			
(1)	truck, panel, American or foreign mfg.		0	1
(2)				
(3)				
(4)				
(5)				
D.	TOTALS		0	5

6. REVIEWED BY			7. APPROVAL REQUESTED BY		
SIGNATURE LOGISTICS OFFICER	DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE CHIEF, ADMIN.	DIVISION	DATE
James S Burnwell	WH	26 Nov 1958			18 Nov 58

8. APPROVED		9. AUTHORIZED	
BY DIRECTION OF DDP	DATE	BY DIRECTION OF DD/S	DATE
Benjamin A. Y. Fuller for C/FI	20 Jan. '54		

FORM 9-57 1116 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(20-36)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO RID/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 2-66 2593 (7-13)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component)
WH/1

TO :
IP/AN

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

TO : (Station/Base)
Mexico City

FROM: (Division)
WH

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3-ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8-USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10-ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE: ☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
050	006	074/1

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)
KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION

	OPEN FILE	X	CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
	AMEND FILE TITLE		REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION

X	RETAIN		DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)
HMM

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
050

9. FILES ACTION

X	HOLD IN CS FILES		RESTRICTED	X	UNRESTRICTED		PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER		CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11 ENDORSEMENT	12 COORDINATION	13 RID APPROVAL
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. [illegible] #630	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)	REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE
23 July 1973

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

50	06	74/1

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG 12-65

SECRET

38

1—CS COPY

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Termination of KDFACTOR Project

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-42,197

This is to advise you that the formal termination of the KDFACTOR Project was approved by the Associate WOMACE on 25 May 1973.

James B. KARDENETZ

DISTRIBUTION: 2-COS,Mexico City

E2 IMPDET CL BY:055272

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-19467

DATE
1 JUN 1973
TYPED: 31 May 1973

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

1-WH-1/FI
1-IP

AN
AB X
~~FI~~
~~FI~~
WH/1/FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/FI	Henry Mulloy	cc	1973

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1	31 May 73	Raymond Swider R. Swider

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG 11 69
(40)

DISPATCH

14 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: KDFACTOR Project Amendment and Termination

1. The KDFACTOR Project, which provided photographic surveillance from two vantage points of the Soviet compound in Mexico City, was determined to be compromised due to the VWBLANKET case. The five agents were terminated in July 1972, but the base houses could not be terminated until January 1973 because it was necessary to sell one and the termination of the second was tied to the termination of KDABBEY who owned the second base house. It was necessary to pay rent for several extra months until these other terminations could be effected.

2. The base houses and agents have now all been terminated and the Station already has rented a replacement safehouse with new agents to provide the same coverage (KDALCOVE).

3. Approval of the amendment and termination of Project KDFACTOR is recommended.

Herbert W. Natzke
Acting Deputy Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Summary of KDFACTOR Project Security Review

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded under split transmission for your information is a copy of the KDFACTOR security review. Also included are two memoranda containing C/WOLENS and C/WOMUSE comments on the security review.

Roger W Bicego
Roger W. BICEGO

ATTACHMENTS:
1. Left Side - herewith
2. Right Side - U/S/C

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HCDW-19061

DATE
28 JUN 1972

TYPED: 21 June 1972

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

1-WH/1 Chrono
1-IP Files

AN
AB
IN
PS
EX
DES RFD
~~FI~~
WHL

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	John Davis	cf	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER S SIGNATURE
WH/1		John C. Murray

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
FG. 11 69
(40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

9 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH : MPS/BG/FI

SUBJECT : Project KDFACTOR - Security Review

1. The CI Staff is satisfied with the fine Security Review of the KDFACTOR Project activity and personnel.

2. However, the Staff urges the Station to remain constantly alert to any security repercussions pertaining to all the terminated assets particularly in view of their past knowledge of the project activity and the fact that some of them had family and relatives who also were aware of the project activity. Focus should continue regarding any security problems pertaining to KDFACTOR-7.

3. In addition, the Station should continue to monitor any Soviet investigation or probing of owners and tenants involved in the properties used under this project.

Frank W. Hughes
C/CI/OPS/WH

Distribution:
Orig. & 3 - MPS/BG/FI
1 - WH/1/Mexico ✓
2 - CI/OPS/WH

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

8 - MAY 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Security Review of Project KDFACTOR

1. At the time you approved the renewal of Project KDFACTOR in December 1971 you asked that the Station conduct an updated security review of this operation, which provides photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. You asked that particular attention be paid to terminated agents and their families. The Station has made a security review and a detailed report on the findings, from Chief, WH Division, is attached.

2. The report discusses the history of the operation, describes security problems of the past and steps taken to remedy them, and discusses the security and operational situation of the agents presently covered by the project. The report notes that the two operational sites and their associated agents are compartmented from each other and that processing the film is now being done inside the Station. One section of the report discusses in detail the assets who were formerly involved in these operations but have been terminated. The final section of the report describes current security practices and notes that an alternate photographic surveillance site has been procured and is available for use should the present one be compromised.

3. The report demonstrates that the security of the operation is being kept up to high standards and that there are no potential security threats from former agents that the Station is not aware of. The FI Staff believes that the Station's security review and the attached report satisfy the requirements of your request.

L. A. Campbell
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment

SECRET

9 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH : MPS/BG/FI

SUBJECT : Project KDFACTOR - Security Review

1. The CI Staff is satisfied with the fine Security Review of the KDFACTOR Project activity and personnel.

2. However, the Staff urges the Station to remain constantly alert to any security repercussions pertaining to all the terminated assets particularly in view of their past knowledge of the project activity and the fact that some of them had family and relatives who also were aware of the project activity. Focus should continue regarding any security problems pertaining to KDFACTOR-7.

3. In addition, the Station should continue to monitor any Soviet investigation or probing of owners and tenants involved in the properties used under this project.

Frank W. Hughes

Frank W. Hughes
C/CI/OPS/WH

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DD P 72-1719

17 APR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : FI Project KDFACTOR, Security Review

REFERENCE : ADDP Memo (DD/P 1-5899) to C/WHD dated 14 December 1971

1. In response to reference the following is a summary of the KDFACTOR security review:

The Station summary of the KDFACTOR Project security is as follows:

"There were no known problems of security relating to the Project. In response to the Headquarters request, we have reviewed all phases of the operation and believe that Project security is sound. The Project assets have all been with us for many years and have established themselves as respectable long-time residents of the area. All five assets, four in one family and one in another, are extremely security conscious and have all been SGSWIRLED. The assets derive a substantial portion of their livelihood from their Agency employment and would thus lose a great deal if security factors ever necessitated a termination of their work for us. As an additional safeguard, the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE operations are compartmented from each other, and there has never been any indication that either segment of KDFACTOR knows of the other's existence".

The Headquarters desk has also reviewed the security of the KDFACTOR Project and agrees with the Station that the security is sound. In fact, as presently constituted, the KDFACTOR Project is well compartmented, and each of the two KDFACTOR photo basehouses (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE) is run by long-term assets who draw a minimum of suspicion in their operational activities. Terminated assets could possibly expose the existence

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

of this project, but that seems unlikely from the Headquarters review of terminated agents witting of present KDFACTOR operational activities. A Soviet investigation of property ownership around the Soviet Embassy and their awareness that the Soviet Embassy was under photographic surveillance in the past could result in a Soviet investigation of the activities and contacts of KDABBEY-1, the owner of an apartment building and four houses close to the Soviet Embassy. It is doubtful that KDABBEY-1's activities, which do not inter-relate with the activities of the KDFACTOR agents, would in any way expose the KDFACTOR Project operational activities.

2. A brief history of the KDFACTOR Project:

The KDFACTOR Project had its origins in the LIJERSEY and LIPSTICK Projects, both active in the mid-1950's. In 1958, after the arrest of two LIPSTICK surveillance team members, it was decided to break off the more sensitive, uncompromised LIPSTICK assets manning and supporting two basehouses for photo surveillance of the Soviet Embassy. These assets were consolidated with one photo basehouse against the Soviet Embassy and one surveillance team from the LIJERSEY Project into a new project (LIEMPTY), which was approved on 16 January 1959. The LIEMPTY Project, renamed the KDFACTOR Project in 1971, consisted of three photo basehouses, two viewing the front of the Soviet Embassy (LIMITED and LILYRIC) and one viewing the rear garden of the Soviet Embassy (LICALLA), plus a mobile surveillance team (LIENTRAP) tied closely with the LIMITED basehouse, which was the radio control point for dispatch of the LIENTRAP.

In 1959 the LIENTRAP surveillance vehicle and two team members were arrested at the scene of a Cuban demonstration in Mexico City. A Station review of the security implications of this incident stated that it did not materially affect the security of the project nor expose any of the LIEMPTY basehouse operations. (Note: As the basehouse operations were compartmented, the only exposure possible from this incident would have been of the LIMITED basehouse, which is no longer in existence.)

The LIEMPTY Project operated substantially as above until ✓ the Warren Commission report was published in late 1964. In this publication was a picture of a person entering the Soviet Embassy taken from the LIMITED basehouse. The LIMITED photo basehouse was closed in September 1964, and all photographic surveillance was suspended as a security precaution. In January 1965 the LIMITED basehouse was relocated, and later that year the building it had previously been in was razed by the owner, KDABBEY-1. From 1964 on it must be assumed that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City believes it is under regular photographic surveillance.

Further project changes took place in 1966 when the LILYRIC basehouse was relocated to another apartment with approximately the same view. In May 1968 the LIMITED basehouse was terminated and LIEMPTY-6, the basehouse keeper, retired. This affected the LIENTRAP coverage of Soviet vehicular movement monitored and directed from the LIMITED basehouse. With the closing of LIMITED and the Station decision to replace Raymond H. GERENDE, Mexican national contract agent who handled the LIEMPTY Project since its inception, the LIENTRAP mobile surveillance team was underemployed, and the decision was made to move it to the LIEMBRACE Project. This was done in early 1970, soon after GERENDE had been relieved of operational responsibilities in December 1969.

The photo processing of the KDFACTOR (formerly LIEMPTY) film take is now being done by the Station. In the past, it was done by the Station, by GERENDE, and by KDFACTOR-1, who was terminated amicably in early 1971. The building housing the KDLITERAL (formerly LICALLA) photo basehouse was purchased in 1957 by KDABBEY-1 for the Station. KDLITERAL is in a row of four houses all owned ostensibly by KDABBEY-1 but actually by the Agency. This row also houses a basehouse for FID's KDVAULT Project. The apartment building housing the KDABSINTHE (formerly LILYRIC) photo basehouse is owned outright by KDABBEY-1, who has been most cooperative in assisting the Station in maintaining and occasionally moving (1965 and 1966) photo basehouses. The LIMITED photo basehouse was also located on KDABBEY-1's property when it was active.

The individual basehouse operations are and have always been compartmented one from the other. The only points of breakdown in the compartmentation have been: (a) the LIMITED basehouse was linked to the LIENTRAP mobile surveillance; (b) KDFACTOR-1 was processing films from all the basehouses and could, therefore, be aware of their exact locations; (c) GERENDE was aware of all aspects of the KDFACTOR operation, and has since been terminated; (d) Oliver G. SCANTLING, Station contract agent retired in 1971, was aware of the KDFACTOR Project through his past work with LIEMPTY-6 and with GERENDE on KDFACTOR Project activities; and (e) the fact that the two present basehouse properties are owned by KDABBEY-1, who is witting of the locations and general activity of both KDFACTOR basehouses.

3. Agents and Case Officers presently active in the KDFACTOR Project: ✓

As of March 1972, Oliver J. MANKUNAS is the case officer responsible for handling the operations of KDFACTOR; Bruce H. FERNALD is the alternate case officer. The following is a list of active agents in the KDFACTOR Project:

A. KDFACTOR-2 (201-136454)
DATE OF OA: 27 December 1956
DATE SGSWIRLED: 27 April 1966
PRESENT POSITION: KDLITERAL Basehouse Operator
COVER: Accountant for a local bus line - works cover job in the evenings.

B. KDFACTOR-5 (201-119961)
DATE OF OA: 9 May 1956
DATE SGSWIRLED: 2 March 1966
PRESENT POSITION: KDABSINTHE Basehouse Operator
COVER: Industrial engineer - works cover job during the day.

C. KDFACTOR-6 (201-167567)
DATE OF OA: 16 October 1967
DATE SGSWIRLED: March 1966
PRESENT POSITION: Wife of KDFACTOR-5.
Co-KDABSINTHE Basehouse Operator
COVER: Housewife

D. KDFACTOR-8 (201-762111)
DATE OF OA: 29 November 1965
DATE SGSWIRLED: 3 March 1966
PRESENT POSITION: Son of KDFACTORs-5 and 6.
Part-time KDABSINTHE Basehouse Keeper/Operator.
COVER: Part-time shopping (shopper) investigator for Sears Roebuck de Mexico.

E. KDFACTOR-9 (201-762112)
DATE OF OA: 27 July 1966
DATE SGSWIRLED: 3 March 1966
PRESENT POSITION: Son of KDFACTORs-5 and 6. Part-time KDABSINTHE Basehouse Keeper/Operator.
~~COVER:~~ Medical student

F. KDFACTOR-10 (201-254181)
DATE OF OA: 14 September 1959
DATE SGSWIRLED: Not tested
PRESENT POSITION: Non-salaried. Wife of KDFACTOR-2, (KDLITERAL).
COVER: Housewife

G. KDABBEY
DATE OF OA: 28 April 1954
DATE SGSWIRLED: Not tested
PRESENT POSITION: Non-salaried. President of Construcciones Aztlan. Owner and landlord of KDVAULT and KDFACTOR basehouses.

Regarding the security of the above active KDFACTOR agents, the KDLITERAL basehouse is handled by KDFACTOR-2 with the assistance of his wife, KDFACTOR-10. They have a long-time maid and a 13-year-old son who lives with them in the basehouse. Neither the son nor the maid is believed to be witting. The photographic equipment is kept in a locked room, and the product is kept in a locked safe. KDFACTOR-2 was recruited by KDCALVERT-1, who is an active, long-term Station agent in the KDCALVERT Project and who is not considered a threat to KDFACTOR-2's security. KDFACTOR-2's activities are also known to his brother, the former LIPSTICK-47, who was one of the two LIPSTICK surveillance team members arrested in 1958 and who gave the police considerable information regarding LIPSTICK surveillance activities. LIPSTICK-47 was terminated in late 1958 and is believed to have withheld from the police the information regarding KDFACTOR-2 and the KDLITERAL basehouse. KDFACTOR-2 and his family have occupied the KDLITERAL basehouse since 1957 and have been discreet and security conscious in their dealings with neighbors and relatives.

The KDABSINTHE basehouse is manned by KDFACTOR-5, his wife KDFACTOR-6, and his two sons KDFACTOR-8 and KDFACTOR-9. The SGSWIRL of 2 March 1966 went into detail on who is witting of KDFACTOR-5's work for the Station. The result was that his immediate family, including a married daughter who no longer lives at the basehouse, are aware of the photographic operation. KDFACTOR-5 was recruited by LIEMPTY-12, a U. S. citizen with a private company in Mexico City who is no longer working with the Station but who is considered patriotic and no threat to KDFACTOR security.

4. Terminated Agents Possibly Affecting Present Project Security:

A. Raymond H. GERENDE

GERENDE is a Mexican citizen and was a contract agent until his termination on 26 June 1970. He had been employed by the Station intermittently since 1955 and was used almost exclusively in support activities. Since the start of the LIEMPTY Project in 1958 GERENDE had been directly involved with this project serving as cutout to the basehouses, carrying and processing films, and giving general direction to the project as principal agent. In 1969, after years of excellent service with the Station, GERENDE had serious marital problems which ended in separation from his wife, KDFACTOR-7. From December 1969 to June 1970 GERENDE was not used operationally but was maintained on half pay with the hope the divorce proceedings would be completed quickly. When it became apparent the divorce would drag on interminably, the Station reluctantly terminated GERENDE and his wife. Bruce H. FERNALD, career agent, met with GERENDE monthly from July 1970 through May 1971 while paying him his termination bonus in ten installments. GERENDE is still living in Mexico City, where he owns some property and has an income as an English teacher to employees of two local firms. He visited his wife and children in Holland in December 1970. It appears he may now be financially pressed as his English class schedule has been cut back. The Station as of 10 April 1972 had no information that would indicate GERENDE has violated his secrecy agreement.

There is an indication that GERENDE came to the attention of the Soviets in 1968. A Mexican walk-in to the FBI office in Mexico City, who was later interrogated by the Federal Security Police in 1970, said that in 1968 he had been employed by the Soviet Embassy Second Secretary, Oleg Masksimovich Nechiporenko (201-305870), to investigate persons working with the Mexican Olympic Committee. The persons investigated included GERENDE, who apparently became a specific target of Soviet investigation. It is unclear from the report of the Federal Security Police how far the Soviet investigation of GERENDE had proceeded. Nechiporenko was PNG'd from Mexico in March 1971. GERENDE's possible exposure to the Soviets could have been through his work on the Olympic Committee as a translator or through his work for the Station, which used him for a wide range of support tasks against the Soviet and Cuban targets.

B. KDFACTOR-7 (wife of GERENDE)

KDFACTOR-7 is a Dutch citizen and the former wife of GERENDE. She returned to the Netherlands in July 1970 with her children. She had served as a support agent assisting GERENDE. She is believed witting, in general terms, of GERENDE's activities regarding the KDFACTOR Project. She was terminated on 26 June 1970 and signed both a secrecy agreement and quit claim. After termination it became apparent that she had considerable hard feelings toward both the Agency and GERENDE over financial problems between her family and GERENDE. While the Station was not directly involved in all the financial problems, the Station was involved in regard to her divorce claims against GERENDE's salary, a large part of which came covertly from the Station. In July 1970 KDFACTOR-7 came to the Agency Headquarters and complained about her financial settlement. In September and November 1970 she wrote two letters directly to the Agency on the same subject. In late 1970 she also asked a Hague Embassy political officer to put her in contact with the Agency; however, she did not tell him the nature of her business. In January 1971 the Agency contacted KDFACTOR-7's brother, a U. S. Army civilian with a "Top Secret" clearance living in Alexandria, Virginia, and was able to resolve the financial misunderstandings with KDFACTOR-7. In January 1971 the Hague Station reported KDFACTOR had, without Station influence, obtained a job as social secretary with the Department of State at the Embassy. It is believed that this job has probably solved many of her financial problems and should also inhibit her from exposing her past work with the Mexico City Station, as such exposure could jeopardize her job. The Embassy in the Hague was briefed in general terms on KDFACTOR-7's background.

C. KDFACTOR-1

KDFACTOR-1 is a Mexican citizen and the brother-in-law of GERENDE. He was hired by the Station in 1956 to assist GERENDE in processing the photographic take of the KDFACTOR Project (at that time the LIPSTICK Project and later the LIEMPTY Project). KDFACTOR-1 was later assisted in processing the photographic take by his wife, LIEMPTY-5, who is GERENDE's sister. KDFACTOR-1 was terminated in March 1971, and the photographic processing previously done by KDFACTOR-1 is now done in the Station. The termination was amicable and largely due to delays in film processing as KDFACTOR-1's medical practice expanded. There does not appear to be any security problem in the termination of KDFACTOR-1 as he is discreet and also a close relative of GERENDE. The security of processing the film in KDFACTOR-1's medical office was good as KDFACTOR-1's wife, LIEMPTY-5, was assisting him with the processing and with the security of the darkroom.

D. LIEMPTY-5

LIEMPTY-5 was hired by the Station in 1957 to assist KDFACTOR-1 with the processing of KDFACTOR films. She is the sister of GERENDE and wife of KDFACTOR-1. She was terminated along with KDFACTOR-1 in March 1971. Due to her close relationship with GERENDE and KDFACTOR-1, she is not considered a threat to the Project Security.

E. Oliver G. SCANTLING

SCANTLING is a Mexican citizen who worked as a Station agent from 1954 until his termination without prejudice in February 1971. SCANTLING is in an excellent financial position and has assisted the Station in recent years largely because his strong motivation to work against the Communists. SCANTLING worked as a surveillance team leader from 1954 to 1957 and then in the LIEMPTY (KDFACTOR) Project from 1958 through 1966. He was the cut-out to LIEMPTY-6 and a back-up principal agent for GERENDE. SCANTLING's termination was amicable, and he is not considered a security problem to the Station or the KDFACTOR Project.

F. LIEMPTY-6

LIEMPTY-6, a Mexican citizen and long-term Station asset, was retired in May 1968. He had manned the LIMITED photo basehouse with his wife and son assisting him. He had been working with the Station since 1954, but age and ill health had reduced his efficiency. LIEMPTY-6 knows GERENDE and SCANTLING, but is not aware of the names or locations of any of the present KDFACTOR agents and basehouses. While he could give information on his participation in KDFACTOR activities up to 1968, he has no motive to do this and is apparently happily retired on his Agency termination bonus plus some financial assistance from his son-in-law. He is not considered a threat to the security of this Project.

There was one indication that the Soviets were seeking out the LIMITED photo basehouse and may have had suspicions concerning LIEMPTY-6. This was a report by KDADAGE-10 that in mid-1966 Stanislav Sergeyevich Silnikov (201-271103), a Soviet Embassy guard, asked KDADAGE-10 to report on his neighbors near the Soviet Embassy. Silnikov expressed interest in all the occupants of the new apartment building which houses the KDABSINTHE photo basehouse, but did not mention the KDABSINTHE basehouse keepers by name. Silnikov did name specific persons he was interested in and these included LIEMPTY-6. KDADAGE-10, of unknown reliability, said he did not give Silnikov any information, but added that, between himself and the Station, he suspected LIEMPTY-6 and had heard it rumored he worked for the Americans. In 1966 Headquarters already assumed the Soviets were aware of the LIMITED basehouse because it was used for radio direction of the LIENTRAP mobile surveillance. In any case, the Soviets apparently took no action prior to the closing of the LIMITED basehouse and the relocation of LIEMPTY-6 in May 1968. It is believed this incident has no implications that would threaten the security of current KDFACTOR assets.

5. Current KDFACTOR Security Practices:

The two photo basehouses, KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE remain compartmented, as they have been throughout the history of the Project. The Station case officer responsible for the project meets weekly with KDFACTOR-2, responsible for the KDLITERAL basehouse, and with KDFACTOR-5, responsible for the KDABSINTHE basehouse. In these meetings he picks up the product, provides new supplies, pays salaries and handles miscellaneous administrative matters. These are car meetings usually held in early morning or at night and the pickup points are changed regularly. Meeting time is kept to a minimum and meetings are prescheduled whenever possible. The photographic product is processed in the Station, thus increasing the security and timeliness of its handling over the past practice of having KDFACTOR-1 process it in his office darkroom. The case officer only meets with KDFACTOR-2 and KDFACTOR-5; however, in emergencies other witting family members of either basehouse can be contacted and met. In case the present sites or personnel are compromised, the Station has rented another apartment in the building housing the KDABSINTHE basehouse and has installed members of the KDCALVERT Project as residents. This new apartment offers as good a vantage point for photographic coverage as the KDABSINTHE and could quickly be activated if for any reason the KDABSINTHE basehouse becomes untenable.

Theodore Shackley
Theodore G. Shackley
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

NOTED: Cord Meyer Jr.
ADD/P

12 May 72
Date

14-00000

SECRET

14 DEC 1971

DD/P 1-5899

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: FI Project KDFACTOR
FY 1971 Amendment No. 1
Biennial Renewal
Proposal for Fiscal
Years 1972 and 1973

1. On 10 December 1971 I approved subject actions in the amounts specified below:

a.	FY 1971 Amendment No. 1	-	For $4,266, increasing the project's FY 1971 funds authorization (from $23,630) to $27,896.
b.	FY 1972 Renewal	-	For $19,000
c.	FY 1973 Renewal	-	For $20,000

2. I ask that the Station conduct an updated security review of this operation, giving particular attention to the knowledgeability of terminated agents and their families as discussed in paragraph 3 of referent memorandum.

3. Also, I ask that you provide me (via MPS/BG) with a memorandum report summarizing the results of the above (paragraph 2) security review by 31 March 1972.

Cord Meyer

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

ADDP MEMO of 14 December 1971

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
0 Project LIEMPTY FY 1971 Approval

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: DIRECTOR 038379

1. Project LIEMPTY has been approved for FY 1971 in the amount of $23,635. It has also been amended for FY 1970 in the amount of $10,498 (from $38,970 to $49,468) in order to cover termination payments to Raymond H. GERENDE and his wife, LIEMPTY/19. The approval carried a WOMACE caveat that termination payments to GERENDE and his wife must be made on a monthly basis as described in the referenced cable.

2. In submitting the project renewal request we wrote in paragraph 2 under Future Plans that the Station would submit up-dated emergency contact plans. Please submit these plans in your first quarterly progress report for FY 1971 so that we can meet our obligation to the approving authorities.

3. A copy of the approved FY 1971 renewal request is being forwarded by split transmission for your files.

Spencer N. HUTCHINS

Attachments:
1 - LIEMPTY Project Renewal, left portion h/w
2 - LIEMPTY Project Renewal, center portion usc
3 - LIEMPTY Project Renewal, right portion usc

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

LIEMPTY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-17950	10 June 70 12 JUN 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 050-006-074/1

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

AN [illegible]
AB X
EDI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	W.R.Hazen	lmr	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	10 June 70	John C. Murray

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11-68 (40)

WH/1

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FUNDING

NO. 3
(DOCUMENT # FOR THIS PROJECT)

DATE 1 June '70

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO: CHIEF OF STATION ~~(BASE)~~ Mexico City

ATTENTION: FINANCE OFFICER

INFO:

PROJECT LIEMPTY FAN 0135-1009

TYPE OF ACTION PERIOD OF ACTION 1 July 69 TO 30 June 71 AMOUNT $41,153

NEW		PREVIOUS ACTION IN THIS FISCAL YEAR	53,110
RENEWAL	✓	TOTAL FISCAL YEAR APPROVAL	47,463	~~26135~~
EXTENSION			500	
TERMINATION		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE	43,148	500 ~~23,135~~
AMENDMENT	✓	FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE		
OTHER		subject [illegible] by FY71 funds.		

CHIEF, WH/B&F

HQS USE ONLY

PROCESSED	APPROVED	TYPE OF ACTION	PERIOD	AMOUNT

File LIEMPTY
Development & Plans

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECRET

WH/1

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT LIEMPTY

☐ CA
☒ FI/CI

☐ PROPRIETARY
☐ SUBSIDY
☐ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION WH
	AMENDMENT	
X	RENEWAL	BRANCH WH/1
	TERMINATION	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	
	OTHER	CASE OFFICER Jack Barry — EXTENSION 4167

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY ADDP

PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1970 TO 30 June 1971

TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED	FY	AMOUNT
$23,635	1971	$23,635
	196	

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL 1135-1009

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE (Signed) E. M. [illegible]
MPS/BG

DATE 28 MAY 1970

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1		1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1	CASE OFFICER	2	MPS/BG

FORM 6-66 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

14-00000

SECRET

WH/1

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT LIEMPTY

☐ CA
☒ FI/CI

☐ PROPRIETARY
☐ SUBSIDY
☐ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION WH
X	AMENDMENT	
	RENEWAL	BRANCH WH/1
	TERMINATION	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Jack Barry
	OTHER	EXTENSION 4167

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY: ADDP

PERIOD OF APPROVAL: FROM 1 July 1969 TO 30 June 1970

TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED	FY	AMOUNT
$49,468	1970	$49,468
	196	

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL: 0135-1009

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

Project amended for an additional $10,498 for FY 70.

SIGNATURE
MPS/BG
(Signed) E. M. Harms

DATE
20 MAY 1970

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1		1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1.	CASE OFFICER	2	MPS/BG

FORM 6-66 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(5)

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 10   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY dh PER ______ #

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

MAR 19 9 30 PM '70

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

COPY

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

I

ACTION UNIT WH8   INFO FILE, VR RI/AN. SR8.

ACTION NO. 986

SECRET 192359Z MAR 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2766

DIRECTOR

20 Mar 70 IN 046440
M

LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 018246

1. POUCHING LIEMPTY REPORT 26 MARCH. REGRET DELAY WHICH DUE PRESS OTHER ACTIVITIES REDTOP FIELD.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3. GP-1

SECRET

LIEMPTY - 10 & 11 out - take all away.
[illegible] LIEMBRACE [illegible]

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Approval (FY 1970)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

Project LIEMPTY has been approved in the amount of $38,970 for the period 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970. Of the total FY 70 amount, $38,470 is authorized for field use, and $500 will be retained for Headquarters use.

Anthony B. WELDRAKE

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW - 17472

DATE
12 SEP 1969
9 September 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

RI - 1
CHRONO - 1

~~AN~~ JB
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DES~~ ~~RFD~~
~~PT~~
WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1	J. J. Barry	nks	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1	10 Sept	Ernest J. Tsikerdanos

(40)

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

S E C R E T

17 March 69
Date

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO FIELD FINANCE OFFICER

TO: Chief of Station (~~Base~~) Mexico City

~~INFO~~: Attention: Finance Officer

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

FAN: 9-35-1009

TYPE OF ACTION:

✓ OTHER Reduction in funding

___ NEW

___ RENEWAL

___ EXTENSION

___ AMENDMENT

___ TERMINATION AND DATE ___

PERIOD OF ACTION: ___ AMOUNT ___

FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL:	FY 69	FY
THIS ACTION:	--	
PREVIOUS ACTION:	43520	
TOTAL FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL:	43520	
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE:	7200	
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE:*	36320	

*TO BE USED AS A GUIDE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF OBLIGATION AUTHORITY.

3-6-74

S E C R E T
(When Filled In)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References:
A. HMMA-33455, 8 November 1967
B. HMMA-33614, 8 January 1968
C. HMMW-16419, 21 May 1968
D. HMMA-35080, 22 July 1968
E. HMMW-16984, 13 January 1969
F. HMMA-36272, 22 January 1969
G. MEXICO CITY 9439, 11 March 1969

Forwarded herewith and under separate cover by split transmittal is a request for the renewal of Project LIEMPTY for FY 1970. Funds in the amount of US$38,970 are being requested.

Vincent P. Rizzuto
for/Willard C. CURTIS

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. #1 - Unit WH/4/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

Attachment:
1. Project renewal request, right side h/w
2. Project renewal request, left side u/s/c;

24 MAR 69

Distribution:
② - C/WH w/att h/w and u/s/c
2 - C/SB w/att h/w and u/s/c

2 ATT

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-36710	14 March 1969
X	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 50-6-74/1

SECRET [redacted]

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

PROJECT LIEMPTY

CASE OFFICER Vincent P. Rizzuto
Vincent P. RIZZUTO

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Re-Register
Signed: Gloria Palmore
R.O. #630 - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

[illegible] BY SPLIT [illegible]
[illegible]

CS COPY

X

SECRET [redacted]

H/W ATT #1 + S/C ATT #2 to HMMA-35710

50-6-74/1

SECRET

PROJECT LIEMPTY

REQUEST FOR RENEWAL

1. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

A. The overall objective of Project LIEMPTY, now in its eleventh year of existence, is to collect operational information on the FJSTEAL installation, its personnel and visitors, as well as related targets of opportunity through stationary/mobile photographic and physical surveillance mechanisms. Corollary objectives which are to be fulfilled through use of the LIEMPTY installations, mechanisms, and personnel are as follows:

1. To provide detailed operational information pertaining to the daily movements and activities of FJSTEAL personnel, particularly those individuals of intelligence interest, as well as information on the FJSTEAL physical plant and visitors to the premises.

2. To collect operational information on persons associated with FJSTEAL personnel and on individuals known or suspected to have connections with the FJSTEAL intelligence services or other hostile groups which are inimical to the interests of LNFORT.

3. To provide operational support, counter surveillance, and/or other protective services to KUFIRM personnel and operations, as may be levied upon the Station or as may be deemed necessary.

B. The above objectives are to be fulfilled through continued maintenance and exploitation of the LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses, the LIENTRAP mobile unit, and the services of long-time contract agent, Raymond H. GERENDE. The LIEMPTY Project is the cornerstone of the Station's operational program against the FJSTEAL target and as such is completely responsive to Priority A-1 of the Station's Operating Directive.

C. Throughout the Project year under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to contribute directly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station and Headquarters' requests and requirements for coverage of various targets falling within the above cited framework.

SECRET

During the Project year Project LIEMPTY provided all of the fixed operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations targetted against the FJSTEAL installation and personnel. Specific examples of the LIEMPTY Project's progress and contributions will be found in Section 3 below (EFFECTIVENESS).

2. CHANGES

A. Operational

1. The major change during the preceeding period has been the closing of the LIMITED basehouse and the termination of LIEMPTY-[illegible]. This has resulted in considerable financial saving with no loss in efficiency--to the contrary, as a matter of fact. The major reason for the change was the fact that LIEMPTY-[illegible] was growing less reliable with age. He was not always able to be on the job, and when he was, his fixed surveillance reporting was occasionally inaccurate, and his photography was often poor. There had been considerable overlap between LILYRIC and LIMITED reporting, and with the closing of LIMITED, the LILYRIC working hours were extended slightly so that full working hours of the FJSTEAL installation continued to be covered. The only disadvantage to this arrangement is that the vantage point of the FJSTEAL installation which had been shared by LIMITED and LILYRIC will now go uncovered during periods of annual leave by LILYRIC personnel (the LILYRIC personnel are all members of one family and normally take their leave together).

2. There have been no changes in the operating procedures and techniques of LIEMPTY-9 in the LICALLA basehouse. The refinements described in the previous Project Outline have been effective and have been maintained. The same can be said of LIENTRAP, which has become a much more flexible tool since its partial integration into the LIEMBRACE team. There have been no changes in LILYRIC procedures, other than expansion of coverage to include the entire working week.

B. Financial - LIEMPTY-9 was granted a salary increase, effective 1 May 1968, in recognition of his excellent job performance. LIEMPTY-14 and -27 were granted salary increases on 1 May 1968, largely as compensation for the extra hours they agreed to put in to insure full-time coverage of the FJSTEAL installation by LILYRIC. Memoranda of Oral Agreement covering these three salary increases were forwarded with HMMA-34573, 2 May 1968. Finally, LIEMPTY-11 was granted a salary increase effective 1 January 19[illegible]9, in recognition of his increased work load with the LIEMBRACE team. MOA was forwarded with HMMA-3[illegible]101, 23 December 1968.

C. Personnel

1. As noted above, LIEMPTY-6 was terminated effective 31 May 1968 in connection with the closing of the LIMITED basehouse. Termination was completely amicable, and LIEMPTY-6 received a generous termination bonus.

2. LIEMPTY-26 was hired as of 1 May 1968 to help LILYRIC personnel maintain their expanded coverage. No security factor is involved, as LIEMPTY-26 is part of the same family as the rest of the LILYRIC personnel. LIEMPTY-26 had been granted an OA in 1965 and had been used sporadically since that time.

3. An amendment to GERENDE's contract has been requested. This amendment would guarantee GERENDE termination benefits equal to those provided for by Mexican law, in the event of GERENDE's termination by WOFIRM. The amendment would also provide GERENDE with a graduated scale of benefits should he decide to resign. See HMMA-36312, 27 January 1969, for details.

3. EFFECTIVENESS

Throughout the period under review, each operational component of Project LIEMPTY contributed actively and concretely to the fulfillment of the operational tasks levied on Station Mexico City. High-lights of the accomplishments and the achievements of each component are cited below:

A. Fixed Basehouses

1. LIMITED

Until its termination, the LIMITED installation provided daily photographic coverage and physical surveillance of the main gate of the FJSTEAL installation. During the seven-month period from 1 November 1967 through 31 May 1968, the LIMITED base provided 911 frames of operational photographs. In addition, the LIMITED base provided over 1,000 pages of physical surveillance reports.

2. LILYRIC

During the Project year under review, the LILYRIC installation provided extensive photographic and fixed visual surveillance of the front of the FJSTEAL installation. The LILYRIC basehouse provided the majority of the operational photographs produced by the LIEMPTY Project. During the 13-month period from 1 November 1967 through 31 December 1968, the LILYRIC basehouse provided 15,331 operational photographs and several thousand pages of physical surveillance reports covering the daily movements of all FJSTEAL officers. As a specific example of the importance of LILYRIC coverage, it was LILYRIC photos which made possible the identification of a WCLADY citizen who had been in clandestine contact with an AEGRIP officer. This information was turned over to LNERGO, which was pursuing the case. In general, LILYRIC provides the Station with a large percentage of the CI raw material collected on the FJSTEAL target, such as automobile license numbers, PCS and TDY arrivals ~~and~~ departures, unusual activities such as demonstrations, unusual or lengthy absences of personnel, etc. This information also has positive operational value, but its most important use is as the major source of identification of FJSTEAL personnel and of information on their movements. The Station has frequent requests from LNERGO which can only be fulfilled by LIEMPTY coverage, and this "permanent and complete record" of FJSTEAL activities is invaluable for servicing the CE requirements of both WOFIRM and LNERGO.

3. LICALLA

During the above cited 13-month period, the LICALLA installation provided photographic and physical surveillance coverage of the back of the FJSTEAL installation and its garden and patio area. This coverage provided 5,125 individual photographs as well as numberous surveillance and observation reports. These reports included daily, weekly, and monthly summaries of activities, semi-monthly attendance reports (of FJSTEAL personnel), various special reports, and special intensive coverage of targets selected by the Station. It should be noted that the LICALLA basehouse allows Station Mexico City to observe the FJSTEAL personnel during their off-duty and recreational hours. The LICALLA installation has become the most valuable of the basehouses, not only because of its unique vantage point but also because of the perceptiveness of LIEMPTY-9. His surveillance reports have frequently given us valuable insight into personal associations among the FJSTEAL personnel and have enabled us to introduce greater flexibility and effectiveness into the entire LIEMPTY operation. LICALLA reporting has the greatest positive operational value since it provides raw material for use in target selection. Finally, the LICALLA OP is occasionally used in support of various technical operations conducted from the [illegible] complex.

B. Summary of Fixed Basehouse Effectiveness

The fixed LIEMPTY basehouses (LIMITED, LICALLA, and LILYRIC) provided approximately 21,367 individual frames of operational photographs during the 15-month period reviewed above. This photographic coverage, linked with the physical surveillance reports prepared by each basehouse, has proven to be a most reliable and viable tool for:

1. Following the daily comings and goings of FJSTEAL personnel and indigenous employees.

2. Confirming the identities of FJSTEAL staffers and their visitors (some of whom are ECLADY citizens).

3. Ascertaining and verifying the relative rank and position as well as indicating the specific intelligence service connection of various FJSTEAL officers.

4. Providing detailed reporting on the movement and habit patterns of selected targets of special interest.

5. Providing physical facilities for the support of various operational, technical, and surveillance operations.

C. The Mobile Photographic Unit

1. During the period under review, the LIENTRAP mobile photographic unit covered 40 photographic assignments in support of Mexico City Station's FJSTEAL, PBRUMEN, and Communist Party operations. An average of two to three days is spent on each assigned target, usually rotating the time of day the coverage is provided. The LIENTRAP operators, LIEMPTY-10 and -11, have consistently turned in a useful and excellent quality photographic product.

2. In addition, while not on an assignment, both operators have regularly assigned duties. LIEMPTY-10 has the responsibility for obtaining, renewing, and servicing most of the Station's accommodation addresses. The addresses are serviced three times a week. LIEMPTY-11 has been serving part-time for the past year as the seventh member of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team and has performed well in this capacity.

D. Raymond H. GERENDE - LIEMPTY Principal Agent

During the period under review, Raymond H. GERENDE continued in his role as the Project LIEMPTY principal agent. GERENDE operated as the full-time cut-out to the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and bore the first echelon agent handling responsibility for the related personnel. In addition, GERENDE continued to bear the contact and handling responsibilities for the operator of the LIEMPTY photographic developing/processing laboratory, LIEMPTY-4. GERENDE's overall operational assignment involved at least 10 clandestine meetings per week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY Project case officer. It should also be noted that GERENDE made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive JMROP operation and assisted the Station greatly with his detailed area knowledge in many instances. He is used to make independent investigations and neighborhood checks. He assisted the Station in its MHRAVEL program. As a part of the Station's effort to broaden GERENDE's horizons and to take better advantage of his capabilities, GERENDE was made the handling officer for ERRAIN-3 under close case officer supervision. Similar tasks are envisioned for GERENDE in the future--agent handling as well as the spotting and assessment of operational leads. These tasks are all assigned with due regard for GERENDE's primary responsibilities, with the aim of getting the optimum use out of a capable and experienced field contract agent.

E. Overall Effectiveness

As outlined above, each individual operational component of the LIEMPTY Project, with the exception of the phased-out LIMITED basehouse, contributed regularly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station Mexico City's operational program. Based on the continued excellent performance of Project personnel and the overall contributions of this Project, the Station strongly recommends that this Project be continued during the forthcoming Project year as an essential element of the Station's operational support apparatus.

4. PROBLEMS AND SECURITY

During the Project year under review there were no known incidents which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY or the related personnel. The termination of LIEMPTY-6 caused no problems, nor did the construction of a maid's room on the roof of the LICALLA installation, adjacent to LIEMPTY-9's photo point. There is no indication that FJSTEAL personnel had any suspicions about the construction work. The exposure of a LIEMBRACE surveillance vehicle (see MEXICO CITY 9283, 28 February 1969) caused momentary concern because the vehicle had been bought from a dealer where LIEMPTY-9 has a part-time job. Along with all other employees of the auto dealer, LIEMPTY-9 was questioned about the purchaser of the car. While LIEMPTY-9 was worried because he knew the purchaser of the car and was able to guess what had happened, the investigation was dropped and the case closed without any adverse effect on LIEMPTY-9 or the LICALLA basehouse.

5. LIAISON AND INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

Not applicable to Project LIEMPTY.

6. PLANS

A. The changes made in the period under review have been largely technical. With the exception of a continued expansion of non-LIEMPTY-oriented operational activity by GERENDE, there are no significant operational changes contemplated. LIEMPTY is a project designed to support the Station's REDTOP program and is useful only as long as it supports that program effectively. The Station believes that the support has been effective, and that the product of the operation is valuable. Occasional minor changes will undoubtedly be made in response to specific requirements and to continual efforts toward improvement, but continuing emphasis on the FJSTEAL target for the foreseeable future means, among other things, that the LIEMPTY Project, in essentially its present form, will continue to be a necessary part of the Station's program.

B. No need for expansion, in terms of personnel or facilities, is foreseen, but costs will probably climb slowly but steadily to permit salary increases and to keep up with the rising cost of living as it affects utilities and supplies. Replacement of GERENDE's QI vehicle (which was not foreseen in the previous Project outline, as this was originally written by the Station to cover the period ending 30 November 19[illegible]) became necessary late in FY 19[illegible]. The current Project is being written on the assumption that the vehicle was in fact replaced in FY 19[illegible] and that no further replacement will be necessary in the foreseeable future.

7. COSTS

A. FY 1969 - Project LIEMPTY was approved for FY 1969 in the amount of 43,5[illegible] dollars. Station records project spending for FY 1969 at almost exactly that figure. Semi-monthly accountings with pertinent receipts and/or certifications were submitted by Raymond H. GERENDE to the Station finance officer via the Project case officer for all LIEMPTY Project expenditures made in the field. It is estimated that approximately three hours of case officer and eight hours of analyst time is required each week to fulfill the operational, administrative, and analytical requirements of this project. (This figure does not include the 40 hour-week put in regularly by Raymond H. GERENDE.)

B. FY 1970 - It is requested that Project LIEMPTY be approved in the amount of 38,970 dollars for FY 1970 (this figure represents roughly a 10 percent decrease from the amount programmed for the previous Project year). While no large expenditures are anticipated for the replacement of photographic equipment during the forthcoming period, inflation may result in rising cost of utilities and supplies, and salary increases may be granted as indicated above. A detailed breakdown of Project expenditures for FY 1969, 1970 and 1971 follows.

SECRET [redacted]

	FY 1969	FY 1970	FY 1971
SALARIES			
		7000	7400 ✓
Raymond H. GERENDE (P/A)	$ 6,500	$,500	$ 6,500
LIEMPTY-4 (photo processor)	2,400	2,400	2,400
LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA)	4,320	4,320	4,320
LIEMPTY-10 (LIENTRAP)	4,224	4,224	4,224
LIEMPTY-11 (LIENTRAP)	2,616	2,736	2,736
LIEMPTY-13 (LILYRIC)	1,536	1,536	1,536
LIEMPTY-14 (LILYRIC)	1,824	1,824	1,824
LIEMPTY-26 (LILYRIC)	672	672	672
LIEMPTY-27 (LILYRIC)	1,728	1,728	1,728
LIEMPTY-8 (LIMITED; Termination payment)	2,750	-0-	-0-
Christmas bonuses	2,140	2,140	2,140
Contingency for possible salary increase	500	2,000	4,000
SUB-TOTAL	$31,210	$30,080	$32,080
REAL ESTATE			
GERENDE Dark Room Rent (MEXI 137)	$ 960	$ 960	$ 960
LICALLA (MEXI 03)	1,248	1,248	1,248
LILYRIC (MEXI 132)	2,880	2,880	2,880
S/H Utilities	1,000	1,100	1,200
SUB-TOTAL	$ 6,088	$ 6,188	$ 6,288
VEHICLES			
MV-2 06 maintenance	$ 400	$ -0-	$ -0-
MV-2823 maintenance	600	800	1,000
Purchase of new MV and maintenance	4,000	400	500
SUB-TOTAL	$ 5,000	$ 1,200	$ 1,500
EQUIPMENT			
Maintenance and replacement of photographic equipment	$ 200	$ 500	$ 500
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES			
Purchase of film; rental of post office accommodation boxes; rental of vehicles; contingency fund	$ 1,000	$ 1,000	$ 1,000
TOTAL	$4[redacted]	$38,970	$41,370

SECRET [redacted]

SECRET

C. As in the past, Raymond H. GERENDE will submit semi-monthly accountings for all Project expenditures with appropriate receipts or certifications. There will be no requirements for foreign currency beyond the Station's capability to provide.

8. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

A. In the event of civil disorders or the evolution of complete enforced neutrality on the part of the host government, it is believed that regular operational contact could be maintained with the majority of the active LIEMPTY agents via Raymond H. GERENDE or in his absence, Oliver G. SCANTLING.

B. In the most unlikely event of the establishment of a regime openly hostile to LNFORT, limited contact could probably be maintained with the majority of the active Project agents. However, under these circumstances, it is highly probable that the activities of this Project would be somewhat curtailed.

C. Revised and up-dated emergency contact plans for use with Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING are on file in the Station and at Headquarters (see HMMA-28533, dated 21 February 1966 and HMMA-28252, dated 9 February 1966).

SECRET

50-6-74/1

SECRET

12 March 69
Date

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO FIELD FINANCE OFFICER

TO: Chief of Station ~~(Base)~~ Mexico City

~~INFO~~: Attention: Finance Officer

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

FAN: 9135-1309

TYPE OF ACTION:

✓ OTHER Redistribution of funds $4000 transferred to funds available for HQs use for car purchase.

____ NEW

____ RENEWAL

____ EXTENSION

____ AMENDMENT

____ TERMINATION AND DATE ____

PERIOD OF ACTION: ____ AMOUNT ____

FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL:	FY 69	FY
THIS ACTION:	-	
PREVIOUS ACTION:	43520	
TOTAL FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL:	43520	
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE:	4200	
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE:*	39320	

*TO BE USED AS A GUIDE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF OBLIGATION AUTHORITY.

50-6-74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]RETARIAT DISSEMINATION
[illegible]T NOTIFIED

[illegible]SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

[illegible]TING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

[illegible]CE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO ✓

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/AN, MPS/BG

960

S E C R E T 112211Z MAR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 9439

Mexi

DIRECTOR

11 MAR 69 IN 11841

LIEMPTY

1. PREPARATION LIEMPTY PROJECT RENEWAL REQUEST DELAYED DUE RIZZUTO'S RECENT TDY HQS. WILL POUCH 18 MARCH,.

2. FILE 50-6-74/1.

S E C R E T

m
AN
AR
IH
I
P
[illegible] D
FI
WH/1

CS COPY

SECRET

11 Mar 69
50-6-74/1

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief of Station, Mexico City,		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		MICROFILM
SUBJECT LIEMPTY Project Renewal		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		

Reference: Book Dispatch No. 6769, 25 November 1968

This is a routine reminder that the LIEMPTY Project Renewal for FY 1970 will be due at Headquarters 14 March 1969.

Norris W. DAMICONE

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - COS/Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE 13 JAN 1969
	HMMW-16984	9 January 1969
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

RI-1
CR-1

AN
AR
IM
PS
I
DDO
EX
WH 1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Al Malone	nrg	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH/1	9 Jan. '69	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)
MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Approval of Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Project LIEMPTY has been approved for the period 1 December 1967 through 30 June 1969 in the amount of $69,725. Of the total, $26,205 would be disbursed in FY 1968, and $43,520 in FY 1969, representing no change in the funding you requested. $550 is retained for Headquarters use during FY 1968, and $200 (for photographic equipment) in FY 1969.

T.H.B.
Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-16419

DATE
23 MAY 1968
21 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

RI
CHRONO

AN[illegible] FI LIST WH/1
ABSTRACT X INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Perkins	rc N Perkins	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	21 May 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66
(40)

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

____
Date

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION
TO FIELD FINANCE OFFICER

TO: Chief of Station (Base) ______________________

INFO: ______________________

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

FAN: ______________________

TYPE OF ACTION:

______ NEW

✓ RENEWAL

______ EXTENSION

______ AMENDMENT

______ TERMINATION AND DATE ______________________

PERIOD OF ACTION: ______________________ AMOUNT ______________

FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL: FY ______________ FY ______________

THIS ACTION: ______________ ______________

PREVIOUS ACTION: ______________ ______________

TOTAL FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL: ______________ ______________

FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE: ______________ ______________

FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE:* ______________ ______________

*TO BE USED AS A GUIDE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF OBLIGATION AUTHORITY.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-00000

DISPATCH

[redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith and under separate cover by split transmission is a request for the renewal of Project LIEMPTY for the period 1 December 1967 through 30 November 1968. Funds in the amount of $43,520 are requested for the project year; $26,205 to be alloted in FY 1968 and $17,315 in FY 1969.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: de-Kagok
Signed:
R.O. #030 - Unit
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

Vincent P. Rizzuto
for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
- A - Project Renewal Request, right side (herewith)
- B - Project Renewal Request, left side (under separate cover)

Distribution:
- ~~2~~ - C/WH, w/atts. A & B
- 2 - C/SB, w/atts. A ~~&~~ B

50 16 NOV 67

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 ATT

[illegible]

50-6-74/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-33455	DATE 8 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

SECRET

30 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director Plans

SUBJECT: Supplementary Appropriation for LIEMPTY

It is requested that the figures in the attached field project renewal be amended and that an additional $26,205 be approved to cover the period 1 December 1968 through 30 June 1969 in order to carry the LIEMPTY Project to the end of a fiscal year. This sum is identical to that requested for a similar period in 1968 as there is no present justification for projecting any change in the financial requirements. The supplement would bring the cost of LIEMPTY to a total of $69,725 for 19 months.

by Jacob D. Esterline
William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. #[illegible] - Unit WH/4/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

SECRET

X

Excluded [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project Renewal

1. Renewal of Project LIEMPTY for the period 1 December 1967 through 30 November 1968 in the amount of $43,520 is hereby requested. $26,205 would be spent in FY 1968 and $17,315 in FY 1969. The project was budgeted for $45,000 for FY 1968; funds are available within the Division. Estimated costs for the coming project year are a little less than the amount programmed for the previous year and a little more than what was actually disbursed.

2. LIEMPTY is designed to provide physical surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. It covers three nearby properties (two in front of the Embassy's sole entrance and one behind the garden) from which visual and photographic surveillance are carried out by experienced personnel. The project also covers a darkroom where a technician processes the photographs. In addition to collecting this basic information on a primary target, certain of the LIEMPTY personnel are also available for miscellaneous support tasks, such as servicing postal boxes, and running fixed and moving surveillances. The photo truck which comes under the project is used on other targets as well, such as CP members, satellite embassies, and Latin American exiles. One of the basehouses is also used as a radio dispatch point for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, but this function has been minimized during the past year in an effort to prevent Soviet interception of the signal.

3. a. The Mexican desk asked the appropriate operational component of SB Division for specific comment on the value of LIEMPTY, and received the following:

> "This rather unique operation has unquestionably made a major contribution to the increasingly effective Soviet Operations program of the Mexico Station. On the positive side its principal value lies in the identification of the Mexican and

> third national contacts of the Soviets, from which we must select and develop the access agents so vital to our operations against the Soviet human target. LIEMPTY also provides us with a much clearer picture of the inner relationships and activity patterns within the Soviet mission itself, which in turn facilitates effective targeting. The CE value of a LIEMPTY type project as a monitor of real and potential agent contacts is of course obvious. It is important to note that LIEMPTY is not, as might be the case in stations of lesser overall capability, a simple case of photography (or observation) for the record. Rather it is an important facet of a concerted high priority effort to get at and recruit individual Soviets."

b. Station reporting has been in a similar vein. Information produced is largely for operational purposes and we often lack detail as to specific utility in a given situation, although we can produce statistics on numbers of photographs produced and numbers of pages of surveillance notes. It is clear that the FBI is an interested customer and they have received from LIEMPTY a great many reports on American callers at the Soviet Embassy, and valuable support to double agent operations.

c. During a conversation on 8 December 1967, the officer who heads the station's SB section told the branch that LIEMPTY is basic and essential to all of his branch's operational planning, that he "grabs the LIEMPTY material first thing in the morning" and studies it for leads, evidence of which Soviet officers have been in the Embassy and which ones have been away, who has used which car, who has been talking to whom or going out of the building with whom, etc. etc. New additions to the Embassy staff can be tabbed as KGB or GRU by their associates, their activity patterns and the cars they drive. (The I.S. men are often away from the Embassy, while the legitimate FSO's tend to spend more time in their offices. The KGB, GRU and regular diplomatic groups seldom cross lines but stay within their own tight groups.) When double agents are turned over from one case officer to a new one, known to them only in alias, we are often able, through surveillance and photographs, to establish the true identity of the new case officer, as was done in the case of AEGIMMICK in the spring of 1967.

4. In assessing the security of the operation, the station assumes that the Soviets realize that they are being watched, as was evidenced by a Soviet officer's trying to shield an FBI-directed walk-in from observation. There have been rumors that anyone entering the Soviet Embassy is photographed, but no allegations that the Americans are doing it have come to our attention; the probable assumption is that the Mexicans are doing this. A former source who lives in the neighborhood was asked on several occasions what he knew about LIEMPTY/6, one of the safehousekeepers, and the Soviets have said they think he is watching them. On the security of the LICALLA safehouse there is a difference of opinion. GERENDE, the outside case officer, thinks the Soviets are aware that they are being observed from this post, but station disagrees and produces good justification for its views, citing the fact that the above-mentioned FBI walk-in was not shielded when led into the back garden which LICALLA overlooks. We have no evidence that Soviet interest is any threat to the operation; rather it may be assumed that they accept the surveillance as a fact of life.

by Jacob D. Esterline
William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET [redacted]

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

PROJECT LIEMPTY

CASE OFFICER Vincent P. Rizzuto
Vincent P. RIZZUTO

STATION MEXICO CITY

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

CS COPY

8 Nov 67
50-6-74/1

X

SECRET [redacted]

S/C ATT. #2 to HMMA-33455 _ R.S. de H/W ATT. #1 to HMMA-33455

PROJECT LIEMPTY

REQUEST FOR RENEWAL

1. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

A. The overall objective of Project LIEMPTY, now in its tenth year of existence, is to collect operational information on the FJSTEAL installation, its personnel and visitors, as well as related targets of opportunity through stationary/mobile photographic and physical surveillance mechanisms. Corollary objectives which are to be fulfilled through use of the LIEMPTY installations, mechanisms and personnel are as follow:

1. To provide detailed operational information pertaining to the daily movements and activities of the FJSTEAL personnel, particularly those individuals of intelligence interest, as well as information on the FJSTEAL physical plant and visitors to the premises.

2. To collect operational information on persons associated with FJSTEAL personnel and on individuals known or suspected to have connections with the FJSTEAL intelligence services or other hostile groups which are inimical to the interests of LNFORT.

3. To provide operational support, counter surveillance and/or other protective services to WOFIRM personnel and operations, as may be levied upon the Station or as may be deemed necessary.

B. The above objectives are to be fulfilled through continued maintenance and exploitation of the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses, the LIENTRAP mobile unit, and the services of long-time contract agent, Raymond H. GERENDE. These objectives are in consonance with operational directives and Headquarters requirements as received by Station Mexico City.

C. Throughout the Project year under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to contribute directly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station and Headquarters' requests and requirements for coverage of various targets falling within the above cited framework. During the project year Project LIEMPTY provided nearly all of the operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations targeted against the FJSTEAL installation and personnel. Specific examples of the LIEMPTY Project's progress and contributions will be found in Section 3 below (EFFECTIVENESS).

2. CHANGES

A. Operational - Since the institution of the changes described in the previous renewal request, it has not been found necessary or desirable to make further major changes. The following minor changes in operational technique have been made in an effort to obtain continued improvement in the finished product:

1. LIEMPTY-9's proven effectiveness as an observer (see paragraph 3 A (3) below) has enabled us to institute a system of special coverage on specific FJSTEAL personnel of interest, or special coverage of specific time periods of interest. The purpose is to permit the Station to gain greater insights into the activities and personal associations of certain individuals, or in overall activities during a certain time period. No change in LIEMPTY-9's overall working hours has been made; rather, flexibility has been introduced.

2. Flexibility has also been introduced into the handling of LIENTRAP, which is now working more closely with the LIEMBRACE team in order to take greater advantage of targets of opportunity. To this end, LIEMBRACE-1 has been placed in direct contact with LIENTRAP, relieving Raymond H. GERENDE of this responsibility and permitting GERENDE to devote time to MHRAVEL activity (see sub-paragraph (3) below).

3. In September and October 1967 GERENDE was employed by the Mexican MHRAVEL committee. This position gave him direct access to FJSTEAL and other delegations of interest, and supplemented the Station's MHRAVEL program. It is expected that GERENDE will obtain MHRAVEL employment again in 1968.

B. Financial - LIEMPTY-4 and -11 were granted salary increases effective 1 July 1967. Memoranda of Oral Commitment were forwarded to Headquarters in HMMA-32584 and HMMA-32585, 20 July 1967. There was no change in the salaries of the remaining LIEMPTY agents.

C. Personnel - None.

3. EFFECTIVENESS

Throughout the period under review, each operational component of Project LIEMPTY contributed actively and concretely to the fulfillment of the operational tasks levied on Station Mexico City. High-lights of the accomplishments and the achievements of each component are cited below:

A. Fixed Basehouses

1. LIMITED

Throughout the past project year the LIMITED installations provided daily photographic coverage and physical surveillance of the main gate of the FJSTEAL installation. In addition, the LIMITED base provided for a fixed radio dispatching station which was used to support the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. Due to the stringent security measures instituted in the immediate vicinity of the FJSTEAL installation by local security forces, normal stake-outs by this unilateral team are precluded. However, with the radio dispatching support from the LIMITED radio base, which allows the LIEMBRACE team to work from adjacent safe areas, secure surveillance coverage of this target can be provided. During the 12-month period from 1 November 1966 through 31 October 1967, the LIMITED base provided 1,834 frames of operational photographs. In addition, the LIMITED base provided over 2,500 pages of physical surveillance reports.

2. LILYRIC

During the project year under review, the LILYRIC installation provided extensive photographic and fixed visual surveillance of the front of the FJSTEAL installation. The LILYRIC base provided the majority of the operational photographs produced by the LIEMPTY project. During the 12-month period cited in the LIMITED section above, the LILYRIC base provided 12,137 operational photographs and several thousand pages of physical surveillance reports covering the daily movements of all FJSTEAL officers.

3. LICALLA

During the above cited 12-month period, the LICALLA installation provided photographic and physical surveillance coverage of the back of the FJSTEAL installation and its garden and patio area. This coverage provided 4,917 individual photographs as well as numerous surveillance and observation reports. It should be noted that the LICALLA base allows Station Mexico City to observe the FJSTEAL personnel during their off-duty and recreational hours. The LICALLA installation has become the most valuable of the three, not only because of its unique vantage point but also because of the perceptiveness of LIEMPTY-9. His surveillance reports have frequently given us valuable insight into personal associations among the FJSTEAL personnel and have enabled us to introduce greater flexibility and effectiveness into the entire LIEMPTY operation.

B. Summary of Fixed Basehouse Effectiveness

The fixed LIEMPTY basehouses (LIMITED, LICALLA and LILYRIC) provided approximately 18,888 individual frames of operational photographs during the 12-month period of the past project year. This photographic coverage, linked with the physical surveillance reports prepared by each basehouse, has proven to be a most reliable and viable tool for:

1. Following the daily comings and goings of FJSTEAL personnel and indigenous employees.

2. Confirming the identities of FJSTEAL staffers and their visitors (some of whom are WOLADY citizens).

3. Ascertaining and verifying the relative rank and position as well as indicating the specific intelligence service connection of various FJSTEAL officers.

4. Providing detailed reporting on the movement and habit patterns of selected targets of special interest.

5. Providing physical facilities for the support of various operational, technical and surveillance operations.

C. The Mobile Photographic Unit

1. Throughout the period under review, the LIENTRAP mobile photographic support unit was regularly exploited and used by Station Mexico City, not only on the FJSTEAL target, but also for PBRUMEN and Communist Party operations as well as the JMTIGER program. Over 2,000 operational photographs were provided. In addition, the LIENTRAP personnel and unit was used regularly to service and obtain various postal accomodation boxes used by Mexico City, Headquarters and other field stations.

D. Raymond H. GERENDE - LIEMPTY Principal Agent

During the period under review, with the exception of short vacation periods, Raymond H. GERENDE, continued in his role as the Project LIEMPTY principal agent. GERENDE operated as the full-time cut-out to the LIEMPTY, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses and bore the first echelon agent handling responsibility for the related personnel. In addition, GERENDE continued to bear the contact and handling responsibilities of the LIENTRAP unit (until mid-August 1967 - see paragraph 2 A (2) above) and for the operator of the LIEMPTY photographic developing/processing laboratory, LIEMPTY-4. GERENDE's overall operational assignment involved at least 12 clandestine meetings per week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY Project case officer. It should also be noted that GERENDE made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD operation and assisted the Station greatly with his detailed area knowledge in many instances. He is frequently used to make independent investigations and neighborhood checks. As noted above, he contributed significantly to the Station's MHRAVEL program. Finally, he approached, developed and eventually attempted to recruit an agent for use in PBRUMEN operations.

E. Overall Effectiveness

As outlined above, each individual operational component of the LIEMPTY Project contributed regularly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station Mexico City's operational program. Based on the continued excellent performance and overall contributions of this project, the Station strongly recommends that this project be continued during the forthcoming project year as an essential element of the Station's operational support apparatus.

4. PROBLEMS AND SECURITY

During the project year under review there were no known incidents which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY or the related personnel.

5. LIAISON AND INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

Not applicable to Project LIEMPTY.

6. PLANS

A. As noted above, the technical and operational changes made in the past year have been effective and have resulted in a product which is as closely geared to operational requirements as possible. While no major changes are contemplated, every effort will be made to continue to improve the product, including greater use of GERENDE as an independent investigative asset, and as a spotter and assessor of selected agent candidates. Such utilization of GERENDE will be kept compartmented from other personnel of the LIEMPTY project and will normally be handled by GERENDE in operational alias.

B. The LIENTRAP vehiclo has been replaced, and no major changes in personnel or material are contemplated. Salaries of LIEMPTY personnel will be reviewed, and it is foreseen that the rising cost of living will compel us to recommend salary increases for certain of the agents who have not received raises in some time.

7. **COSTS**

A. Past Project Year - Project LIEMPTY was previously approved for the period 1 December 1966 through 30 November 1967 for the amount of 45,000 U.S. currency. Station records indicate that through 31 October 1967, Project LIEMPTY has expended 37,040 in the field. It is estimated that a total of 40,130 will be expended in the entire project year. Bi-weekly accountings with pertinent receipts and/or certifications were submitted by Raymond H. GERENDE to the Station finance officer via the project case officer for all LIEMPTY Project expenditures made in the field. It is estimated that approximately 5 hours of case officer and 10 hours of analyst time is required each week to fulfill the operational, administrative and analytical requirements of this project. (This figure does not include the 40 hour-week put in regularly by Raymond H. GERENDE).

B. During Project Year - It is requested that Project LIEMPTY be approved in the amount of 43,520 U.S. currency for the period 1 December 1967 through 30 November 1968 (this figure represents a slight decrease from the amount programmed for the previous project year). While no large expenditures are anticipated for the replacement of photographic equipment during the forthcoming period, an increase in the rental of the various basehouses may be encountered as well as the above-cited expectation of salary increases. Of the amount requested above, 26,205 dollars should be allowed for fiscal year 1968 and 17,315 dollars for fiscal year 1969. A detailed breakdown of the project expenditure by category and by fiscal year follows:

SALARIES (INCLUDING CHRISTMAS BONUS)		FY 68	FY 69
Raymond H. GERENDE (P/A)........	$ 7,036		
LIEMPTY-4 (photo lab)...........	2,600		
LIEMPTY-6 (LIMITED basehouse keeper)...............	3,848		
LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA basehouse keepter)..............	4,160		
LIEMPTY-10 (LIENTRAP operator)..	4,576		
LIEMPTY-11 (LIENTRAP operator)..	2,704		
LIEMPTY-13 (Cut-out to LILYRIC).	1,664		
LIEMPTY-14 (LILYRIC basehouse keeper)..............	1,872		
LIEMPTY-27 (LILYRIC operator)...	1,560		
	$30,020	$18,475	$11,545
Contingency for possible salary increases................	2,000	1,000	1,000
TOTALS..............	$32,020	$19,475	$12,545

		FY 68	FY 69
VEHICLE MAINTENANCE			
MV 2606 (GERENDE)..............	$1,000		
MV ~~2889~~ 2823 (LIENTRAP).............	1,000		
	$2,000	$1,165	$ 835
REAL ESTATE (RENT, UTILITIES)			
LILYRIC..........................	$3,200		
LIMITED..........................	2,000		
LICALLA..........................	1,800		
Photo Lab........................	1,000		
	$8,000	$4,665	$3,335
EQUIPMENT			
Maintenance and replacement of photographic equipment.........	$ 500	$ 300	$ 200
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES			
Purchase of film; rental of post office accomodation boxes; rental of vehicles; contingency fund..........................	$1,000	$ 600	$ 400
TOTALS..............	$43,520	$26,205	$17,315

C. As in the past, Raymond H. GERENDE will submit bi-weekly accountings for all project expenditures with appropriate receipts or certifications. There will be no requirements for foreign currency beyond the Station's capability to provide.

8. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

A. In the event of civil disorders or the evolution of complete enforced neutrality on the part of the host government, it is now believed that regular operational contact could be maintained with the majority of the active LIEMPTY agents via Raymond H. GERENDE or in his absence, Oliver G. SCANTLING.

B. In the most unlikely event of the establishment of a regime openly hostile to LNFORT, limited contact could probably be maintained with the majority of the active project agents. However, under the circumstances described above, it is highly probable that the activities of this project would be somewhat curtailed.

C. Revised and up-dated emergency contact plans for use with Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING are on file in the Station and at Headquarters (see HMMA-28333, dated 21 February 1966 and HMMA-28252, dated 9 February 1966).

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Renewal of LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

This is a reminder that LIEMPTY will be up for renewal on 1 December. Please try to let us have your draft at least a month before that time.

T.H.B.
Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-74/1

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15759

DATE
1 September 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	sas N Perkins	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RI
Chrono

AN | FI
ABSTRACT ★ | ~~INDEX~~

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1		J. Fisher

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-30403

1. The LIEMPTY Project was renewed on 13 January 1967 for the period 1 December 1966 through 30 November 1967 for a total of $45,000. Of this, $29,020 is for FY 1967 and $15,980 is for FY 1968.

2. At the Station's convenience, Headquarters would appreciate receiving a sketch showing the exact position of the LILYRIC and LIMITED Basehouses in relation to the target building. We would also like to have a description of LIMOUSINE's new building--how many floors, how many apartments on each floor, who occupies the other apartments (or stores), and exactly where the LILYRIC base is in the building.

3. You are requested to continue reporting any unusual interest displayed by the target in the LIEMPTY Basehouses.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-74/1
23 JAN 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15157

DATE
18 January 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	C. Bustos-Videla	nao	6954

RI
Chrono

AB ~~PP~~ | WH/1
~~PS~~ ~~DSS~~
ABSTRACT X

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	1/18	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG 1-66

(40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

STAFF REVIEW OF FI/CI PROJECT

PROJECT LIEMPTY	FUNDS $45,000		RETURN TO: DDP/PG FI-CI Projects 3 C 43
CASE OFFICER C. Bustos-Videla	EXTENSION 3654	ROOM 332 Ames	RECEIVED DDP PG 12 Dec 66 FORWARDED 13 Dec 66
DIVISION WH	STATION Mexico City	TARGET AREA Mexico	DEADLINE 27 Dec 66 RETURNED

ACTION		APPROVAL LEVEL		REVIEWING COMPONENTS						
	APPROVAL		DIVISION OR STAFF	X	FI/OPS	X	CI/OPS		CCS	OTHER
X	RENEWAL	X	DDP		/ANT					
	AMENDMENT		DCI		/					
	EXTENSION									
	TERMINATION									

ROUTING OFFICE COMMENTS

COMMENT FOR INTERNAL STAFF USE (*Not to go forward to the Division*)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (*To go forward to the Division*)

The CI Staff concurs in the renewal of this very valuable Project. The Staff strongly urges the Station to continue its close monitoring of Soviet interest in the installation buildings and attempts to obtain information on sensitive project personalities. The Station should devise necessary contingency plans of action to eliminate any security hazards if it is determined that the Soviets are intensifying such efforts and could be getting "too close"to the Project installations, personalities and activities.

CC SENT DIV.

DATE 16 Dec 66

DATE 16 Dec 1966	REVIEWING OFFICER W. Hughes

FORM 7-63 526 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-40)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

CASE OFFICER: Cornelius L. Peuvion
Cornelius L. PEUVION

STATION: MEXICO CITY

CHIEF OF STATION: Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

24 of 46

CS COPY SECRET

50-6-74/1

1E ATT. #1 to HMMA-30403

R. Side ATT #1 to HMMA-30403

[redacted]

REQUEST FOR RENEWAL

PROJECT LIEMPTY

1. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

A. The overall objective of Project LIEMPTY, now in its ninth year of existence, is to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, its personnel and visitors, as well as related targets of opportunity through stationery/mobile photographic and physical surveillance mechanisms. Corollary objectives which are to be fulfilled through use of the LIEMPTY installations, mechanisms and personnel are as follow:

1. To provide detailed operational information pertaining to the daily movements and activities of the LIMERICK personnel, particularly those individuals of intelligence interest, as well as information on the LIMERICK physical plant and visitors to the premises.

2. To collect operational information on persons associated with LIMERICK personnel and on individuals known or suspected to have connections with the LIMERICK intelligence services or other hostile groups which are inimical to the interests of [illegible].

3. To provide operational support, counter surveillance and/or other protective services to WOFACT personnel and operations, as may be levied upon the Station or as may be deemed necessary.

B. The above objectives are to be fulfilled through continued maintenance and exploitation of the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses, the LIMOTRAP mobile unit, and the services of long-time contract agent, Raymond H. GERENDE. These objectives are in consonance with and represent partial fulfillment of the following sections of the current Related Mission Directive (RMD) as approved for Station Mexico City:

PRIORITY A
Section 1, subsection f
Section 2, subsections b & e

PRIORITY B
Section 1, subsection a
Section 2, subsection a

C. Throughout the Project year under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to contribute directly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station and Headquarters' requests and requirements for coverage of various targets falling within the framework of the above cited sections of the RMD. During the last 10 months Project LIEMPTY provided the vast majority of the operational photographs (approximately 16,000) and physical surveillance reports (4,000) used in Mexico City Station's operations targetted against

[redacted]

the LIMERICK installation and personnel. Specific examples of the LIEMPTY Project's progress and contributions to the RMD will be found in Section 3 below (EFFECTIVENESS).

2. **CHANGES.**

A. Operational - As noted in the previous Request for Project Renewal, the former LIMITED property was sold to LIMOUSINE, who as per formal agreement with the Station, demolished the old structure and constructed a new edifice. While it was initially contemplated to place the LIMITED (LIEMPTYs -6 and -7) personnel in the new building and to retain the same, equal division of workload between LILYRIC and LIMITED, it was later decided to move the present LILYRIC basehouse personnel (LIEMPTYs-13, -14, -26 and -27) into the new base instead, along with the following ancillary modifications:

An increase in the hours of both the photographic and physical surveillance coverage provided from the new base by the LILYRIC operators (0800-1600 hours) during the weekdays and to have the LIMITED base provide photographic and physical surveillance coverage from 1600-1830 hours on weekdays and from 0900-1300 hours on weekends. These changes were dictated by the following considerations:

1. The new LIMOUSINE building offers a much better vantage point for both photographic and physical surveillance than does the present complex which houses the LILYRIC and LIMITED bases. Therefore, the Station felt that the personnel occupying this new base should be those possessing the highest technical skills and also those able to provide the most thorough and complete coverage. Since the LIMITED base now has only one trained operator while the LILYRIC basehouse has three, the LILYRIC group and a revision of working hours was indicated.

2. Because it was apparent that the coverage of the LIMERICK installation would be a long-range and continuing requirement, the Station desired to staff the new base with personnel of long-range potential. LIEMPTY-6, now almost 60 years old, does not possess this potential; however, the LILYRIC agent complex happily combines experienced personnel with youthful agents.

3. Finally, the social and financial status of the LILYRIC personnel is much more compatible and consistent with the environment of the new building than is that of the LIMITED family.

The above-cited revised work schedule was initiated in July 1966 and the actual movement of the LILYRICs into the new base began in late September 1966.

[redacted]

B. Financial - After a detailed review of the then-existing LIEMPTY agent salary structure, selected agents (LIEMPTYs -6, -9, -10, and -11) were granted salary increases effective 1 January 1966. Formal notification and revised memoranda of oral commitment were forwarded to Headquarters with HMMA-28,136, dated 25 January 1966. There was no change in the salaries of the 8 remaining LIEMPTY agents.

C. Personnel

1. During the Project year under review, LIEMPTY-6, -9, -13, -14, -26 and -27 were afforded their initial ZGSWIRL examinations, all with satisfactory results.

2. LIEMPTY-26 was granted an OA effective 29 November 1965 for use as a cut-out to the LILYRIC basehouse (HMMW-14177, dated 9 December 1965). LIEMPTY-26 has been actively used during the past Project year for the above-stated purpose.

3. LIEMPTY-27 was granted an OA on 27 July 1966 for use as a part-time LILYRIC basehouse operator (HMMW-14757, dated 1 August 1966). While LIEMPTY-27's heavy university schedule has thus far precluded his regular use by the Station, it is anticipated that subject will be regularly employed after the end of the present school term.

3. EFFECTIVENESS.

Throughout the period under review, each operational component of Project LIEMPTY contributed actively and concretely to the fulfillment of the operational tasks levied on Station Mexico City by the RMD and other directives. High-lights of the accomplishments and the achievements of each component are cited below:

A. Fixed Basehouses

1. LIMITED

Throughout the past Project year (with the change in working hours noted in paragraph 2 above), the LIMITED installation provided daily photographic coverage and physical surveillance of the main gate of the LIMERICK installation. In addition, the LIMITED base provided for a fixed radio dispatching station which was used continually to support the LIMGRACE surveillance team. Due to the stringent security measures instituted in the immediate vicinity of the LIMERICK installation by local security forces, normal stake-outs by this unilateral team are precluded. However, with the radio dispatching support from the LIMITED radio base, which allows the LIMGRACE team to work from adjacent safe areas, secure surveillance coverage of this

[redacted]

target can be provided. During the 9-month period from 1 November 1965 through 30 July 1966, the LIMITED base provided 3,775 frames of operational photographs. In addition, the LIMITED base provided over 1,000 pages of physical surveillance reports.

2. LILYRIC

During the Project year under review, the LILYRIC installation provided extensive photographic and fixed visual surveillance of the front of the LIMERICK installation. The LILYRIC base not only provided the majority of the operational photographs produced by the LIEMPTY project, but also provided the most detailed physical surveillance reports. During the 9-month period cited in the LIMITED section above, the LILYRIC base provided over 6,500 operational photographs and 3,000 pages of physical surveillance reports covering the daily movements of all LIMERICK officers.

3. LICALLA

During the above cited 9-month period, the LICALLA installation provided photographic and physical surveillance coverage of the back of the LIMERICK installation and its garden and patio area. This coverage provided over 3,600 individual photographs as well as numerous surveillance and observation reports. It should be noted that the LICALLA base allows Station Mexico City to observe the LIMERICK personnel during their off-duty and recreational hours.

B. Summary of Fixed Basehouse Effectiveness

The fixed LIEMPTY basehouses (LIMITED, LICALLA and LILYRIC) provided approximately 17,000 individual frames of operational photographs during the first 9-month period of the past project year. Within the last year, this photographic coverage linked with the physical surveillance reports prepared by each basehouse, has proven to be a most reliable and viable tool for:

1. Following the daily comings and goings of LIMERICK personnel and indigenous employees.

2. Confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors (some of whom are WOLADY citizens).

3. Ascertaining and verifying the relative rank and position as well as indicating the specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers.

4. Providing detailed reporting on the movement and habit patterns of selected targets of special interest.

5. Providing physical facilities for the support of various operational, technical and surveillance operations.

[redacted]

C. The Mobile Photographic Unit.

1. Throughout the period under review, the LIENTRAP Mobile photographic/support unit was regularly exploited and used by Station Mexico City. This unit provided over 1,000 individual photographs and was used in support of Station operations and activities. Of particular value to Station Mexico City and the JMTIGER program were numerous photographs of local and exile Communist leaders provided by LIENTRAP. In addition, the LIENTRAP personnel and unit was used regularly to service and obtain various postal accommodation boxes used by Mexico City, Headquarters and other field stations.

D. Raymond H. GERENDE - LIEMPTY Principal Agent.

During the period under review, with the exception of short vacation periods, Raymond H. GERENDE, continued in his role as the Project LIEMPTY principal agent. GERENDE operated as the full-time cut-out to the LIEMPTY, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses and bore the first echelon agent handling responsibility for the related personnel. In addition, GERENDE continued to bear the contact and handling responsibilities of the LIENTRAP unit and for the operator of the LIEMPTY photographic developing/processing laboratory, LIEMPTY-4. GERENDE's overall operational assignment involved at least 12 clandestine meetings per week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY Project case officer. It should also be noted that GERENDE made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD operation and assisted the Station greatly with his detailed area knowledge in many instances.

E. Overall Effectiveness

As outlined above, each individual operational component of the LIEMPTY Project contributed regularly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station Mexico City's operational program. Based on the continued excellent performance and overall contributions of this project, the Station strongly recommends that this project be continued during the forthcoming project year as an essential element of the Station's operational support apparatus.

4. PROBLEMS AND SECURITY.

During the Project year under review there were no known incidents which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY or the related personnel. The only significant problem encountered in the operation and administration of this project stemmed from the physical move of the LILYRIC personnel to the new base in the LIMOUSINE building. Numerous delays arising from the faulty performance of the local contractors and construction crews hampered a timely relocation of this base. However, it is anticipated that the new LILYRIC base will be in full operation by the end of October 1966.

5. **LIAISON AND INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION.**

Not applicable to Project LIEMPTY.

6. PLANS.

A. As outlined in paragraph 6 of the Station's previous request for the renewal of Project LIEMPTY, a program was undertaken to reequip and modernize the LIEMPTY photographic processing base. During the past year, a significant portion of the equipment used in the developing and processing laboratory was replaced. As a result of this program, negatives and photographic prints of much higher quality are now being produced. Consequently, only minor changes in the operation of the photographic laboratory and its equipment are contemplated for the ensuing period.

B. The present physical condition, mileage and frequent use of the LIENTRAP unit dictates the immediate replacement of this unit. Station Mexico City has received Headquarters approval for the replacement of this vehicle.

C. Other than noted above, Mexico City plans no significant operational, administrative or personnel changes, since it is generally felt that this Project is now operating at its optimum size and in a highly satisfactory manner. After 1 January 1967, the Station will review the existing LIEMPTY personnel salary schedule and consider possible raises, again on a selective basis or specifically keyed to the rising cost of living.

7. COSTS.

A. Past Project Year - Project LIEMPTY was previously approved for the period 1 December 1965 through 30 November 1966 for the amount of 41,500 U.S. currency. Station records indicate that thus far, Project LIEMPTY has expended 30,598.13 in the field. It is estimated that approximately 1,500 dollars has been expended by Headquarters, principally in the acquisition of new equipment for the LIEMPTY photographic laboratory. Bi-weekly accountings with pertinent receipts and/or certifications were submitted by Raymond H. GERENDE to the Station finance officer via the Project case officer for all LIEMPTY Project expenditures made in the field. It is estimated that approximately 12 hours of case officer and 5 hours of analyst time is required each week to fulfill the operational, administrative and analytical requirements of this Project. (This figure does not include the 40 hour-week put in regularly by Raymond H. GERENDE).

B. Ensuing Project Year - It is requested that Project LIEMPTY be approved in the amount of 45,000 U.S. currency for the period 1 December 1966 through 30 November 1967 (this figure represents only a slight increase over the amount programmed for the previous Project year). While no large expenditures are anticipated for the replacement of photographic equipment during the forthcoming period, an increase in the rental of the various base-houses will be encountered as well as the above-cited replacement of the

[redacted]

LIENTRAP unit. Of the amount requested above, 29,020 dollars should be allowed for fiscal year 1967 and 15,960 dollars for fiscal year 1968. A detailed breakdown of the Project expenditure by category and by fiscal year follows:

SALARIES (INCLUDING CHRISTMAS BONUS)

		FY 67	FY 68
Raymond M. GERENDE (P/A)	$ 7,000		
LIEMPTY-4 (photo lab)	2,600		
LIEMPTY-6 (LIMITED basehouse-keeper)	3,900		
LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA basehouse keeper)	4,000		
LIEMPTY-10 (LIENTRAP operator)	4,400		
LIEMPTY-11 (LIENTRAP operator)	2,600		
LIEMPTY-26 (Cut-out to LILYRIC)	2,200		
LIEMPTY-13 (LILYRIC basehouse-keeper)	2,200		
LIEMPTY-27 (LILYRIC operator)	2,000		
	$30,900	$19,150	$11,750

VEHICLE MAINTENANCE

		FY 67	FY 68
MV 2606 (GERENDE)			
MV 2279 (LIENTRAP unit replace)		(3,500)	
	$ 5,000	$ 4,315	$ 685

REAL ESTATE (RENT, UTILITIES)

		FY 67	FY 68
LIMITED	3,000		
LILYRIC	1,800		
LICALLA	1,800		
Photo Lab	1,000		
	$ 7,600	$ 4,430	$ 3,170

EQUIPMENT

		FY 67	FY 68
Maintenance and replacement of photographic equipment			
	$ 500	$ 375	$ 125

OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

		FY 67	FY 68
Purchase of film; rental of PO accommodation boxes; rental of vehicles; contingency fund			
	$ 1,000	$ 750	$ 250
TOTAL	$45,000	$29,020	$15,960

[redacted]

C. As in the past, Raymond H. GERENDE will submit bi-weekly accountings for all Project expenditures with appropriate receipts or certifications. There will be no requirements for foreign currency beyond the Station's capability to provide.

8. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

A. In the event of civil disorders or the evolution of complete or enforced neutrality on the part of the host government, it is now believed that regular operational contact could be maintained with the majority of the active LIEMPTY agents via Raymond H. GERENDE or in his absence, Oliver G. SCANTLING.

B. In the most unlikely event of the establishment of a regime openly hostile to LNFORT, limited contact could probably be maintained with the majority of the active Project agents. However, under the circumstances described above, it is highly probable that the activities of this Project would be somewhat curtailed.

C. Revised and up-dated emergency contact plans for use with Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING are on file in the Station and at Headquarters (see HMMA-28355, dated 21 February 1966 and HMMA-28252, dated 9 February 1966).

[redacted]

Att #1 HMMA-30403

50-6-74/1

ATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

of Station, Mexico City

Acting Chief, WH Division

LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ON REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The LIEMPTY Project forwarded in HMMA-27569 expires on 30 November 1966. The renewal request should be forwarded to Headquarters by 1 November.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

LIEMPTY CB
50-6-74/1

15 SEP 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-14856	DATE 1 September 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RI
Chrono

WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/C. Bustos-Videla/kaw			3654

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
2EL	5 15 TE SH.22	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1	9/1	J. Fisher

(40)

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

ATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NIR · NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

ef of Station, Mexico City

OM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

REF: HMMA 27569, 2 November 1965

1. The LIEMPTY Project was approved on 11 February 1966 for the period 1 December 1965 through 30 November 1966 for a total of $41,500; $25,520 for FY 1966 and $15,980 for FY 1967.

2. There were no changes made in the Station's request for renewal, and no recommendations were made by the coordinating and approving authorities.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

17 February 1966

Bustos
LIEMPTY
50-6-74/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER CS COPY HMMW 14343	DATE 21 FEB 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

RI
Chrono

WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE · OFFICER · TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/Bustos-Videla:mep	4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/1	2/17	J.H.V. Fisher

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 2.

1. Station Mexico City's Project LIEMPTY expires on 30 November 1965. Forwarded herewith and under separate cover in split transmission is the Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY.

2. It is requested that Project LIEMPTY be renewed for the period 1 December 1965 through 30 November 1966 in the amount of $41,500. Of this total, $25,520 should be allotted for FY 1966 and $15,980 for FY 1967.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: AC-

Signed:

R.O. #(I) - Unit: WH/1/R

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

Attachment:
Left hand side h/w
Right hand side u. s. c.

Distribution:
③ - C/WHD w/att h/w & u. s. c.

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-27369

DATE
2 November 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3

SECRET [redacted]

REQUEST FOR RENEWAL

PROJECT LIEMPTY

1. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

A) The overall objective of Project LIEMPTY, now in its eighth year of existence, is to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation and personnel, as well as related targets of opportunity, through stationary and mobile photographic and physical surveillance mechanisms. Corollary objectives which are to be fulfilled through the use of the LIEMPTY installations and personnel are as follow:

1) To provide operational information pertaining to the daily activities and movements of the LIMERICK personnel, particularly those individuals of intelligence interest, as well as information on the LIMERICK physical facilities and visitors to the premises.

2) To collect operational information on persons associated with LIMERICK and on individuals known or suspected to have connections with opposition intelligence services or other hostile groups which are inimical to the interests of ODYOKE.

3) To provide operational support, countersurveillance, and other protective services to Station personnel and operations as may be deemed necessary.

B) The above objectives are to be fulfilled through the continued exploitation of the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses, the LIENTRAP mobile unit, and the services of long-time contract agent, Raymond H. GERENDE. These objectives are in consonance with and represent partial fulfillment of the following sections of the current Related Mission Directive (RMD) as approved for Mexico City Station:

PRIORITY A

Section 2, subsection b.

PRIORITY B

Section 1, subsection a.
Section 2, subsection a.

C) Throughout the project year under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to contribute directly and significantly to the fulfillment of the Station's and Headquarters' requests and requirements for coverage of various targets falling within the framework of the above cited objectives of the RMD. Specific examples of the LIEMPTY Project's progress and contributions to the RMD will be found in Section 3., EFFECTIVENESS.

SECRET [redacted]

2. CHANGES

A) Administrative - As noted in the regularly submitted LIEMPTY progress reports and the previous Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY (Section VI, subsection E), during the past two years it had become obvious that many of the operational assignments levied on Oliver G. SCANTLING (covered by Project LIEMPTY during six months of the past project year), while completely within the realm of the WHD, were falling outside the proper scope of Project LIEMPTY; consequently, a new Project was prepared by the Station and approved by Headquarters to cover KUBARK's relationship with and the support of SCANTLING. SCANTLING was therefore removed from the aegis of Project LIEMPTY on 1 May 1965 and integrated into the new close support Project LIMATOR.

B) Operational - As noted in the previous Request for Project Renewal, all operational activity was suspended in late September 1964 at the LIMITED basehouse because of the potential security ramifications stemming from the overt publication of a LIMITED photograph in the Warren Commission Report. The Station subsequently acquired an apartment in the immediate vicinity of the LIMERICK installation and moved the LIMITED basehouse keepers into this temporary location. After a prudent cooling-off period, all LIMITED operational activities (photographic, physical surveillance, and radio dispatching) were re-initiated from the new location in early January 1965. During the interim period, and as a result of separate correspondence with Headquarters, the former LIMITED property was sold to LIMOUSINE, who as per formal agreement with the Station, demolished the old structure and began construction of a new edifice. Included in this formal agreement with LIMOUSINE is the proviso that one floor of the new building will be reserved for the sole use of Station Mexico City. Upon completion of the new structure, the LIMITED personnel and operational activity will be securely transferred from the temporary apartment to the new, more ideally located LIMOUSINE building.

C) Finance - After a detailed review of the then-existing LIEMPTY agent salary structure, 3 selected agents (LIEMPTY-9, LIEMPTY-11, and LIEMPTY-14) were granted salary increases effective 1 February 1965. (Formal notification and the pertinent revised Memorandum of Oral Commitment were forwarded to Headquarters with HMMA-26232, dated 1 June 1965). In addition, as per the Headquarters prepared contract ammendment, Raymond H. GERENDE was granted a salary increase effective 1 July 1965. There was no change in the salaries of the eight remaining active LIEMPTY agents.

D) Personnel - LIEMPTY-26 was granted a POA on 13 October 1965 for use as a cut-out to the LILYRIC basehouse. PRQ II information is being compiled and will be submitted in the near future. LIEMPTY-26 was actively used after receipt of the POA.

3. EFFECTIVENESS

Throughout the period under review, each operational component of Project LIEMPTY contributed actively to the fulfillment of the overall operational program levied on the Station by the WHD and other Headquarter's requests. Highlights of the accomplishments and achievements of each component follow:

A) LIMITED - Throughout the past project year, with the exception noted in paragraph 8, section B. above, the LIMITED installation provided daily photo coverage and physical surveillance of the main gate of the LIMERICK installation during the afternoon and early evening hours. (During the morning hours, the LIMITED basehouse keepers prepared the typewritten surveillance reports and photographic logs covering the previous day's activities). In addition, the LIMITED installation provided a fixed radio dispatch base, used regularly to support the LIMEPACE surveillance team. Because of the tight security measures instituted by the local security forces in the immediate vicinity of the LIMERICK installation, normal stakeouts by this unilateral team are precluded. However, with the support of the LIMITED radio base, which can dispatch the team from adjacent safe-areas, secure and effective surveillance coverage of this target can be provided. During the ten-month period from 1 November 1964 through 30 August 1965, the LIMITED base provided 150 rolls of 35mm operational still photographs, which provided the Station with approximately 2,970 individual frames. In addition, the LIMITED base provided bi-weekly physical surveillance summary reports.

B) LILYRIC - The LILYRIC installation also provided extensive photographic and fixed visual surveillance of the front of the LIMERICK installation throughout the period under review, during the morning and early afternoon hours, with evenings being spent in the preparation of written surveillance reports and photographic logs. During the ten-month period from 1 November 1964 through 30 August 1965, the LILYRIC basehouse provided 5,060 individual frames (226 rolls) of 35mm operational photographs. In addition, the LILYRIC basehouse keeper provided 1,060 pages of physical surveillance reports covering the daily movements of the principal LIMERICK officers.

C) LICALLA - During the above-noted ten-month period, the LICALLA installation provided photographic and physical surveillance coverage of the back of the LIMERICK installation, the garden and the patio area. This coverage produced 153 rolls of 35mm film, which produced 4,174 individual photographs as well as bi-weekly physical surveillance summaries. In addition, various Headquarters specialists made night-time entries into the LICALLA basehouse for on-site clandestine surveys in support of a potential sensitive technical operation.

SUMMARY OF FIXED BASEHOUSE EFFECTIVENESS

The fixed LIEMPTY basehouses (LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA) thus produced over 12,000 individual frames of operational photographs during a ten-month period within the last year. This coverage linked with the related physical surveillance reports prepared by each basehouse has proven to be a most reliable and viable tool for:

i) following the daily movements of LIMERICK personnel;
ii) providing and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors (some of whom were PBRUMENers);
iii) verifying the relative rank and position as well as the specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers;
iv) provided detailed reporting on the movement patterns of selected targets of special interest; and
v) providing physical facilities for the support of various technical and surveillance team operations.

D) LIENTRAP - Throughout the period under review, the LIENTRAP mobile unit was heavily used and exploited by Station Mexico City. This unit provided 1,797 individual photographs of various targets of operational interest to Mexico City Station, particularly local Communist leaders and installations as well as various communist exiles now residing in Mexico City. In addition, the LIENTRAP personnel regularly serviced approximately twenty postal accommodation boxes used operationally by Mexico City, Headquarters, and other stations.

Specifically, the LIENTRAP unit:

i) provided and serviced accommodation boxes for the sensitive AMROD operation;
ii) provided photographic/casing coverage of an embassy of interest to KUTUBE/D for use in operational planning;
iii) provided up-to-date photos of individuals and an installation linked with the Spanish Republican (loyalists) group in Mexico; and
iv) provided identifications, locations, and contacts of various local and exile communists in support of recruitment/penetration programs directed against the Partido Comunista Mexicano, the Partido Popular Socialista, and various exile communist leaders.

E) OLIVER G. SCANTLING - During the six-month period in which he was covered by the LIEMPTY Project (see paragraph 2, section a.) Oliver G. SCANTLING contributed heavily to the fulfillment of the KMD. Specifically, SCANTLING: Served as the alternate Station contact to LICALLA-1, the singleton agent in a sensitive and productive LAURICLE operation; prepared numerous detailed casing reports three of which were in support of KUTUBE/D operational programs; conducted several pretext investigations; successfully recruited and handled an agent with access to the PBRUMEN Embassy, which resulted in two technical penetrations (LITOMMICE) of that hostile installation; made essential contributions to the AMROD operation in the form of translations and physical leg-work; and handled various LIEMPTY agents during the absence of the regular LIEMPTY Principal Agent, Raymond H. GERENDE.

F) RAYMOND H. GERENDE - During the period under review, with the exception of short vacation periods, GERENDE continued in his role as the LIEMPTY Principal Agent. This assignment entailed regular meetings with the LILYRIC, LICALLA, and LIMITED basehouse keepers (or cutouts to these bases); regular contact with the operators of the LIENTRAP mobile photo unit; regular contact with the LIEMPTY photographic developing and processing base; and numerous operational tasks in support of the LIERODE operation. Specifically, this effort involved at least twelve clandestine agent or Case Officer meetings per week, the first echelon financial accountability for the expenditure of $36,000 per annum, in addition to various cover-job duties.

SUMMARY OF EFFECTIVENESS

As outlined above, each individual operational component of the LIEMPTY project contributed significantly and regularly to the fulfillment of the overall operational program levied on the Station by the RMD and other directives. Based on the fine performance and overall contributions of this project, the Station concludes that this operation is essential to the fulfillment of the RMD and should be continued during the forthcoming year.

4. PROBLEMS AND SECURITY

The only significant operational security problems which confronted the LIEMPTY project during the period under review, were those which stemmed directly or indirectly from the overt release of the clandestine LIMITED photographs published in the Warren Commission Report. The precise damage occasioned locally by the public disclosure of this clandestinely acquired information still cannot be measured. However, time-consuming personnel moves, with the attendant loss of coverage and additional cost as well as otherwise unnecessary expenditures of Station time and effort were required by this incident. (See paragraph IV of the 1964 LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request for details). Other than the above affair, there have been no operational, administrative, or personnel problems which the Station could not readily and securely resolve.

5. LIAISON AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Not applicable to Project LIEMPTY

6. PLANS

A) As further implementation of a program initiated during the latter portion of the past project year, Mexico City Station will continue to give increased emphasis to improving the quality of the photographic product from the LIEMPTY basehouses. While no concomitant reduction in the quantity of photographs is anticipated, the Project Case Officer, with the assistance of the local KURIOT representative will continue to emphasis the quality rather than the number of photographs. An ancillary objective of this program is to replace a significant portion of the equipment now used in the LIEMPTY developing and processing lab. Much of this equipment is over eight years old and no longer lends itself to the production of high-quality negatives or photographic prints. The total cost of this equipment replacement program is not expected to exceed $500 and sufficient funds have been included in the cost section of this renewal request.

B) Other than noted above, Mexico City Station plans no other significant operational, administrative or personnel changes, since it is generally felt that this project is now operating at its optimum size and in a completely satisfactory manner. After 1 January 1966 the Station will review the existing LIEMPTY salary schedule and consider possible raises, again on a selective basis.

7. COSTS

A) Past Project Year - Station records indicated that Project LIEMPTY expended $30,549.99 during the ten-month period from 1 December 1964 through 30 September 1965. Bi-weekly accountings with pertinent receipts and/or certifications were submitted by GIRENDE and SCANTLING to the Station finance officer via the project Case Officer for all LIEMPTY Project expenditures. It is estimated that approximately fifteen hours of Case Officer and five hours of analyst time is required each week to fulfill the operational, administrative and analytical requirements of this project.

B) Ensuing Project Year - It is requested that Project LIEMPTY be approved in the amount of $41,500 for the period 1 December 1965 through 30 November 1966. (The project was previously programmed for $50,000;

Of this amount, $25,520 should be allotted for FY 1966 and $15,980 for FY 1967. A detailed breakdown of project expenditures by category and by fiscal year follows:

SECRET [redacted]

		FY 66	FY 67
SALARIES (INCLUDING CHRISTMAS BONUS)			
Raymond H. GERENDE (F/A)	$7,000		
LIEMPTY-4 (photo lab)	2,600		
LIEMPTY-5 (photo lab assistant)	1,000		
LIEMPTY-6 (LIMITED basehouse-keeper)	3,900		
LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA basehouse keeper)	4,000		
LIEMPTY-10 (LIEMTRAP operator)	4,400		
LIEMPTY-11 (LIEMTRAP operator)	2,600		
LIEMPTY-16 (Cut-out to LILYRIC)	2,200		
LIEMPTY-13 (LILYRIC basehouse keeper)	2,200		
	$29,900	$18,400	$11,500
VEHICLE MAINTENANCE			
MV 2606 (GERENDE)			
MV 2279 (LIEMTRAP unit)			
	$2,000	$1,190	$810
REAL ESTATE (RENT, UTILITIES)			
LIMITED (to include moving costs)	3,000		
LILYRIC	1,800		
LICALLA	1,800		
PHOTO Lab	1,000		
	$7,600	$4,430	$3,170
EQUIPMENT			
Maintenance and replacement of photographic equipment	$1,000	$750	$250
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES			
Purchase of film; rental of PO accommodation boxes; rental of vehicles; contingency fund	$1,000	$750	$250
TOTAL	$41,500	$25,520	$15,980

SECRET [redacted]

14-00000

C) As in the past, Raymond H. GERENDE will submit bi-weekly accountings for all project expenditures with appropriate receipts and certifications. There are no requirements for foreign currency beyond the Station's capability to provide.

8. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

A) In the event of civil disorders or the evolution of complete or enforced neutrality on the part of the host government, it is now believed that regular operational contact could be maintained with the active LIEMPTY agents via Raymond H. GERENDE or in his absence, Oliver G. SCANTLING.

B) In the most unlikely event of the establishment of a regime hostile to ODYOKE, limited contact could probably be maintained with the active project agents through GERENDE or SCANTLING. However, under the conditions described above, it is doubtful whether this project would be able to operate against more than one or two selected targets.

C) Emergency communications plans for Oliver G. SCANTLING and Raymond H. GERENDE are on file in the Station and at Headquarters (see HMMA-15982 and HMMA-15981, of 25 November 1960). In addition, in late 1964, a review was held with all active agents of their recontact plans and verbal recognition signals.

Encl 1 HMMA-20052

50-6-71/1

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

PAGE 1 OF 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

91

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED Cable Desk

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION DC/WH/C 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH/C TIME 1720

INFO FILE VR, ADDP, C/WH 6, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2

E C R E T 012040Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 4616

41 Sep 65 IN 43837

[redacted] TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY.

1. LIEMPTY-10 RETRIEVED TWO LETTERS NONALCO BOX 25 AUG 65 WHICH GERENDE PASSED STA NEXT DAY. BOTH LETTERS ADDRESSED IN NAME OF BOX HOLDER (AN ALIAS OF L-10) AND CONTAINED RANDOM NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS. G AND STA INITIALLY FELT THESE PROBABLY SCANTLING TEST LTRS AND HELD SAME PENDING G' RETURN FROM GUADALAJARA 31 AUG.

2. SCANTLING EXAMINED LTRS 1 SEPT AND STATED THEY DEFINITELY NOT RPT NOT HIS TEST LTRS. FURTHER EXAMINATION REVEALS ENVELOPES TYPED ON SAME MACHINGE AND ONE BEARS NO POSTMARK OR STAMPS ONLY NOTATION LIBRE DE PORTE. STA ASSUMES THESE LTRS PROBABLY SENT BY LOCAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND THAT BOX COMPROMISED. DOUBT AMRIFT-1 COULD ARRANGE FOR INSERTION OF LIBRE DE PORTE LTR.. L-10 AND G SUSPENDING ALL LIEMPTY ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS SERVICINGS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

3. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

RECORDS C[illegible]

SECRET

The following action is authorized: de-Kajrk

Signed:

R.O. #030 - Unit WH/1/R

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

[illegible]

50-6-74/1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
NIR
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Expiration

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES
REFERENCE: HMMW-13,350

The LIEMPTY Project expires on 30 November 1965. Please forward the renewal request so that it reaches Headquarters by 1 November.

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
0 & 1 - COS, Mexico City

LIEMPTY
[illegible]
50-6-74/1
02 SEP 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-13,941 OS 0024

DATE
1 September 65

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-78/1

RI
Chrono

2 WH/1
4

ORIGINATING
OFFICE · OFFICER · TYPIST
WH/1/Bustos-Videla:mcp
EXT
4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	FEB 8 11 15 AM '02	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		William V. Broe

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

ISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 24650

1. The LIEMPTY Project Renewal request forwarded in reference, was approved on 29 January 1965 for the period 1 December 1964 through 30 November 1965 for a total of $45,300; $27,675 for FY 1965 and $17,625 for FY 1966.

2. At the time of approval, Assistant KUDOVE stated he expects this project to live within the sum authorized for the year, and that there will be no amendment for additional funds.

3. As you were informed in HMMW 13282 in the dispatch on the LIEMBRACE Project Renewal, KUTUBE is interested in the problem of hostile monitoring of any radio communications from LIMITED. You should remain alert to this problem, and inform us if Headquarters can be of any assistance in helping you maintain communications security.

4. You are reminded that the LIEMPTY Project, as approved, only covers the salary for Oliver G. SCANTLING through 31 May 1965. It is suggested that a separate project be written to cover SCANTLING if his new duties do not fall entirely under any other approved project.

John N. CORNISH

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-74/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW 13350

DATE
8 FEB [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

RI
Chrono

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	[illegible]
RID/MIS	
~~RID~~	
~~RID/~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1	CBustos-Videla:jah		4507

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/PO/A		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WHD	3 Feb	RAFORD W. HERBERT

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Removal of Oliver G. SCANTLING from Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-24650 dated 29 October 1964

1. As per section VI, subsection E, of the attachment to Reference (the Request for the Renewal of Project LIEMPTY), Station Mexico City is at present preparing a formal Project Outline to cover KUBARK's relationship with and the operational activities of Oliver G. SCANTLING. This activity involves the conduct and support of various operations targetted primarily against the local Soviet Bloc and PBRUMEN installations.

2. It is requested that Headquarters assign a cryptonym and a four-part file number in the 50-6 series for this proposed project.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-25254	DATE 27 January 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

SECRET

STAFF REVIEW OF FI/CI PROJECT

PROJECT LIEMPTY	FUNDS $45,300		RETURN TO: DDP/PG/FI-CI Projects 3 C 43
CASE OFFICER Charlotte Bustos-Videla	EXTENSION 4506	ROOM 3 B 2607	RECEIVED DDP PG 29 Dec 64 FORWARDED 31 Dec 64 DEADLINE 14 Jan 65
DIVISION WH	STATION Mexico City	TARGET AREA Mexico	RETURNED

ACTION		APPROVAL LEVEL		REVIEWING COMPONENTS							
	APPROVAL		DIVISION OR STAFF	X	FI OPS	X	CI/OPS	X	CCS		OTHER
X	RENEWAL	X	DDP	X	INT						
	AMENDMENT		DCI		D						
	EXTENSION										
	TERMINATION										

ROUTING OFFICE COMMENTS

COMMENT FOR INTERNAL STAFF USE (*Not to go forward to the Division*)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (*To go forward to the Division*)

The CI Staff concurs in the renewal of this extremely valuable CI/CE operational support project.

CC SENT DIV.
DATE 25 JAN 1965

DATE January 1965	REVIEWING OFFICER Frank

FORM 7-63 526 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-40)

17 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EXO

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY

Renewal of this project is recommended. This operation continues to carry out the same type of activity it has engaged in for a number of years and its product continues to be important to our efforts against the Soviets and Communist Party in Mexico. The Station should carefully select the new operational assignment of Oliver G. SCANTLING so as to make best use of this long-time asset's considerable clandestine experience.

John Horton
C/WH/PO/A

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : C. Bustos-V
UNIT : WH/1 X4506
EXT :
DATE : 4 December 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-[illegible]

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 — 55

ROUTINE

TO : Mexico City
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: OL 4, BPA, PGZ, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 68601

LIEMPTY

REFERENCE: MEXI 1799 (IN 35305)*

1. WE DO NOT PLAN MEET LIMOUSINE. PLS PROVIDE INFORMATION REQUESTED DIR 68139** AFTER NEGOTIATING WITH HIM AND BEFORE CONCLUDING AGREEMENT.

2. ANTENNA ROTATOR REQUESTED IS BEING POUCHED WEEK 7 DECEMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

LIEMPTY

OL/RECD/Edward Denison (phone)

WH/Log/McMahon (phone)

WH/PP/A

WH Comment:
*LIMOUSINE in States this week and probably could be reached if Hdqs wished discuss sale of LIEMPTY property in person. Station indicates LIEMPTY would be sold at land value only as house value not pertinent since house to be razed. Asked whether Antenna Rotator would arrive Station by Christmas.
** Headquarters approves in principle selling LIMITED property to LIMOUSINE. Advise complete sales price for hdqs concurrence prior to concluding agreement with LIMOUSINE. Also attempt determine at least approximate rental cost for LIMITED apartment and advise.

RAYMOND H. HERBERT
AC/WHD

[illegible]
Chief, WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

31 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	SS
2	
3	
4	

FROM Mexico City

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, OL 4, BPA, PG 2

SECRET 031833Z

DIR CITE MEXI 1799

13 DEC 64 IN 35305

IMMEDIATE ACTION

LIEMPTY LIMITED LIMOUSINE

REFS A MEXI 1762 (IN 31737)

B DIR 68139 *

* HQS APPROVES IN PRINCIPLE SELLING LIMITED PROPERTY TO LIMOUSINE.

1. LIMOUSINE IN PBPRIME HIS WEEK. PROBABLY COULD BE REACHED THROUGH MATHEW P. DINGHLEY IF HQ DESIRES PERSONAL DISCUSSION. AS STATED REF A, FIRST FIGURES GIVEN REPRESENT LAND VALUE WHICH ONLY ONE WORTH CONSIDERING FOR PURPOSE THIS SALE. HOUSE VALUE NOT PERTINENT SINCE HOUSE TO BE RAZED. OWING AGE OF HOUSE, DOUBTFUL SALE OF MATERIALS WILL EVEN COVER DEMOLITION COSTS. APARTMENT RENTAL NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL LIMOUSINE RETURN AND DECISION MADE AS TO SIZE AND CONFIGURATION OF APT.

2. IF ANTENNA ROTATOR REQUESTED IN HMMA-24630 NOT ALREADY OBTAINED, AND AN OTHER SERVICEABLE ROTATOR AVAILABLE FROM SURPLUS, PLEASE SUBSTITUTE. REQUEST ADVISE IF CAN BE SHIPPED TO BE HERE BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

SACRET

SECRET

LIEMPTY OPS

MESSAGE FORM 17

33 SECRET

ROUTING R1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: C. Bustos Videla:msd
UNIT: WH/1 ☐ INDEX
EXT: 4507 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE: 1 December 1964 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50 6 74/1

TO: MEXICO CITY

30 DEC 64 03z
ROUTINE

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH 8 INFO OL 4, BPA, PG 2, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 68139

LIEMPTY LIMITED

REF: MEXI 1762 (IN 31737)*

HDQS APPROVES IN PRINCIPLE SELLING LIMITED PROPERTY TO LIMOUSINE. ASSUME THIS IS AT TOTAL TAX VALUE INCLUDING LAND AND HOUSE. PER PARA TWO REF, WE APPROVE HIS DEFERRING PAYMENT OF LAND VALUE FOR THREE YEARS. ASSUME HE WILL PAY HOUSE VALUE IMMEDIATELY. ADVISE. COMPLETE SALES PRICE FOR HDQS CONCURRENCE PRIOR TO CONCLUDING AGREEMENT WITH LIMOUSINE. ALSO ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE AT LEAST APPROXIMATE RENTAL COST FOR LIMITED APARTMENT AND ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SBF Carter
C/WH/SS Brooks
WH/LOG McN
WH/FI
OL/RECD Denison

WH COMMENT: *According to Office of Logistics information the original purchase price in 1955 was $12,000 and the Station made $3,500 of repairs and renovation.

R. W. Herbert for
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 12

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3 SECRET

1		5	CA
2		6	
3		7	
4	55	8	Reg

FROM Mexico City

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, PG 2

SECRET 272340Z

DIR CITE MEXI 1762

LIEMPTY

CP

28 Nov 64 IN 31737

REF DIR 65696 (IN 96996)
MEXI 1307, 20 OCT 64

1. STATION HAS TWO BANK EVALUATIONS OF PROPERTY, ONE BY BANCO NACIONAL DE MEXICO OBTAINED BY SCANTLING IN PSEUDO AND OTHER BY BANCO AZTECA AT LIMOUSINE BEHEST. RESPECTIVE EVALUATIONS ARE: LOT 185,266 AND 180,600 PESOS; TOTAL TAX VALUE 255,575 AND 249,242 PESOS WHICH OF COURSE INCLUDES PRESENT HOUSE. DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN TWO APPRAISALS NOT SUFFICIENT WORRY ABOUT SINCE FOR BUILDING PURPOSES ONLY LAND VALUE PERTINENT, AND DIFFERENCE HERE LESS THAN 5000 PESOS, SO BELIEVE CAN DISREGARD OTHER FIGURES.

2. LIMOUSINE HAS ALSO HAD PLANS MADE FOR 4 STORY BUILDING ON PROPERTY, GROUND FLOOR COMMERCIAL AND THREE FLOORS OF APTS, ONE OF WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE RESERVE FOR LIMITED AND ALTER AS STATION WISHES. SMALLER BUILDING NOT DEEMED WORTHWHILE INVESTMENT. COST STUDY SHOWS BUILDING COULD PROBABLY BE PUT UP FOR ABOUT 535,900 PESOS, OF WHICH LIMOUSINE COULD BORROW ABOUT 433,000 FROM BANK. JUDGES BUILDING COULD BE FINISHED WITHIN 5 MONTHS OF BEGINNING DEMOLITION PRESENT STRUCTURE. LIMOUSINE WOULD PUT UP

Liempty Prop

SECRET

FROM OWN FUNDS WHATEVER NEEDED TO SUPPLEMENT BANK LOAN. IN ORDER REGAIN BULK OF OWN INVESTMENT, WOULD LIKE DEFER PAYMENT TO US OF LAND VALUE FOR 3 YEARS. MEANWHILE ALTHO WILL REQUIRE ANOTHER APPRAISAL FROM BANK MAKING LOAN, THIS WILL PROBABLY NOT DIFFER MUCH. FOR PURPOSES GENERAL AGREEMENT BELIEVE AVERAGE OF ABOVE TWO APPRAISAL FIGURES FOR LOT CAN BE TAKEN FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

3. LIMOUSINE NOT YET AWARE OF INDEPENDENT EVAL, BUT WILL INFORM HIM IN ORDER ARRIVE AT FIRM FIGURE FOR NEGOTIATION IF HQ APPROVES IN PRINCIPLE.

4. NOTE THIS SOLUTION IDEAL FOR STATION, SINCE RETURNS PROFIT OF ALMOST 5000 DOLLARS ON ORIGINAL INVESTMENT AND RELIEVES KUBARK OF ONUS OWNING AND ADMINISTERING PROPERTY AS WELL AS GIVING LIMOUSINE FAVORABLE CHANCE PROFIT WITHOUT ANY COST TO KUBARK.

5. WHILE RENT OF LIMITED APARTMENT NOT SET, KUBARK CAN COUNT ON GETTING FAIR SHAKE. DO NOT BELIEVE RENT FIGURE SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN DECISION.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 12

24 SECRET

ORIG: Bustos-Videla:jah
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 27 Nov 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/1

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO: Mexico City
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH-8
INFO: PG-2, VR, File CP

27 Nov 64 20 33z
PRIORITY

SIG CEN

TO PRTY MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 67069

LIEMPTY

SINCE PROJECT MUST BE SUBMITTED BY 30 NOVEMBER REQUEST PRIORITY REPLY TO DIR 65696, 20 NOVEMBER 1964.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: DIR 65696 of 20 November 1964 requested Station to ~~XXXXXXXX~~ clarify question of whether the LIMITED basehouse was to be razed and rebuilt or moved. Costs must be included in project renewal.

Liempty Dal

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : C. Bustos-Videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 20 November 196
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/1

34

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : Mexico City

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE, PG 2, CI/OA

CP

20 Nov 64 21 45z
ROUTINE

SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 85696

LIEMPTY

REF: DIR 58997*

SINCE ANY MONEY REQUIRED FOR CONSTRUCTION COSTS LIMITED BASEHOUSE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN PROJ RENEWAL, AND IN VIEW COMMENTS PARA SIX A OF HMMA 24650 LIEMPTY PROJ RENEWAL REQUEST, PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER YOU PLAN ANY ACTION ON REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Gave hdqs ideas on advisability of razing and reconstructing building containing LIMITED basehouse.

Liempty P+P

J Horan

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO :

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES : FYI

: HMMW-10391, 31 Jan 62

The LIEMPTY project will expire on 30 November 1962. The Station is requested to forward its renewal request as soon as possible.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-74/1

DATE TYPED 27 Sep 62	DATE DISPATCHED 4 - OCT 1962
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-10951	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74 /1	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

1 - RI
~~1 - Chrono~~

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	f
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3 Mexi	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	Lee G. Norris	js	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	28 SEP 1962	J. C. King

(40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROJ POSTED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM

Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT

LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA 17999, 31 October 1961

1. The LIEMPTY Project was renewed on 12 January 1962 for a total of $49,500; $29,500 for FY 1962 and $20,000 for FY 1963. The renewal request submitted in HMMA 17999 was approved without change.

2. Attached for the Station's information and records is a copy of the memorandum prepared at Headquarters forwarding the Station's request for renewal. Please note how Headquarters broke down the cost structure into fiscal years. Next time the project is submitted for renewal, it is requested that this breakdown be supplied by the Station.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 Mexico City, w/att.

DATE TYPED

28 Jan 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

31 JAN 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMW 10391

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

50-6-74/1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

~~RI, w/o att,~~
WH/Registry, w/o att.
WH/3/Mexico/chrono,
w/o att.

RI/FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C/Bustos	rmr C/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
C/WHD		J. C. King	10391

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 61Ob WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See below

REFERENCE : HMMW-10074, 8 September 1961

The LIEMPTY Project will expire on 30 November 1961. The Station is requested to forward its request for renewal as soon as possible.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mex/Chrono

RID/AN
RI/TY
RI/FI

DATE TYPED
2 Nov 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
3 NOV 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-10209

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C. T. Furney	baf	C/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
C/WH	11-2-61	J. C. King	10209

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-17999 [redacted]-1930
TO : Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-74/1
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 31 October 1961
SUBJECT - LIEMPTY Project Renewal		RE: "43 3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED - Renewal of Project.		
REFERENCE(S)		

Attached are the requisite number of copies of the Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

30 October 1961

Attachment:
As stated above.
Even pages herewith.
Odd pages under separate cover.

Distribution:
3 - WHD (with five copies of attachment)
2 - Files (with one copy of attachment)

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: ce Kapok
Signed: Elena Palmer
R.O. #330 - Unit WH/4/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51 28A AND 51 29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION		☒ FI/CI	CA
☐	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: WH	
☐	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City	
☒	RENEWAL: FY 1962	BRANCH: 3	DESK: Mexico
☐	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: J. G. Heyn	
☐	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 1013	BUILDING: Barton Hall / EXTENSION: 2555/3162

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
C/WH/3/Mexico	John G. Heyn John G. Heyn					
C/WH/3	Ned P. Holman Ned P. Holman	21 NOV 1961				
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter Robert D. Carter	22 NOV 1961				
WH/PO/A	Clarke W. Simmons	[illegible]				
C/WH	J. C. King by Jacob D. Esterline	12-5-61				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	YES	NO	DATE

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
1 December 1961	30 November 1962	$ 49,500	1962	$ 29,500
			1963	$ 20,000

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
DDP/PG/FI/Proj		

FORM 6-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

50-6-74/1

(5)

14-00000

DD/P 2-0234

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY (Renewal)

WH - Mexico City

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is presented for renewal for the period 1 December 1961 through 30 November 1962. This project provides for physical and photographic surveillance operations in support of Mexico City Station operations, particularly those directed against Soviet personnel and installations.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $45,500 from the DD/P-WH Division budget: $25,500 in fiscal year 1962, and $20,000 in fiscal year 1963 subject to the availability of funds. This estimate includes $35,500 for salaries of three contract agents and eleven indigenous agents; $5,500 for operational expenses, including QP vehicle operation and maintenance, new safehouse procurement, post office boxes, purchase of information, and rental of vehicles; $1,000 for repair, maintenance, and replacement of photographic equipment; and $3,500 for maintenance of three safehouses.

3. The attached request for renewal discusses project activities in the past period. Contract Agent Oliver G. SCANTLING (p), serving as an investigator, has continued to follow-up on leads developed from other operations; has been the primary source of information on residences of Soviet Embassy personnel; has provided investigative information on several cases of CI interest; and has trained surveillance assets in Monterrey. He also handled the LIMICK surveillance team during the time Contract Agent Simon [illegible]. CLACKETT (p) was absent from Mexico. The project segment under the direction of Contract Agent Raymond H. GERENDE (p) continued to collect operational information on the Soviet Embassy through photographic surveillance; and to provide operational support

SECRET

50-6-74/1

SECRET

to the Station in the form of rental of safe-quarters, counter-surveillance, and procuring and servicing letter drops. The Division feels that both aspects of the project are worthwhile to the Station's activities. It considers that the project is now operating at optimum size and does not plan to expand. In the coming period efforts will be made to refine and better use the existing organizational arrangements.

4. Appropriate Special Staff elements recommend renewal of this project.

5. I recommend renewal of Project LIEMPTY as presented.

S. M. Hines
S. M. HINES
Chief, DDP/PG

Approved: Richard Helms
COP-DD/P

12 JAN 1962
Date

Attachments:
Project Outline LIEMPTY
FI Memorandum

Staff Coordination:
For FI Staff -s/J. Baine
For CI Staff -s/F. Hughes
For CCG -s/J. Southard

SECRET

50-6-94/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

THROUGH: DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY

Foreign Intelligence Staff recommends approval of the renewal of Project LIEMPTY.

for W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

50-6-74/1

SECRET

21 November 1961

LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be renewed for the period 1 December 1962 through 30 November 1963 for a total of $49,500; $29,500 for Fiscal Year 1962 and $20,000 for Fiscal Year 1963. These amounts can be broken down as follows:

	FY 1962	FY 1963
Salaries	24,000	15,500
Transportation	1,100	900
Operational Expenses	3,900	3,100
Operational Equipment	500	500
Totals	29,500	20,000

2. It is not anticipated that any training will be required during the next project year.

3. Emergency recontact instructions for Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING are on file at Headquarters.

4. This project is primarily a support asset and does not provide positive intelligence.

5. WH Division strongly recommends renewal of this project which covers some of the most valuable investigative and support assets available to Mexico City Station.

SECRET

50-6-74/1

SECRET/[redacted]

REVIEW OF PROJECT LIEMPTY

(For the Purpose of Project Renewal)

COVER SHEET

CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

FIELD CASE OFFICER
Quinton N. OUSLER

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

The attached project action is presented for approval for the period 1 December 1961 through 30 November 1962.

SECRET/[redacted]

CS COPY

Review of Project LIEMPTY

(For the Purpose of Project Renewal)

I. CURRENT OBJECTIVES AND PRODUCTION

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities." SCANTLING has continued (See the last two Project Reviews forwarded as attachments to HMMA-14093, 13 November 1959, and HMMA-15979, 18 November 1960) to provide worthwhile information pertaining to this objective.

a. During the past year SCANTLING has continued to be used to follow up leads produced by LIENVOY. For example, operational information recently indicated that the LIMERICK target was using the services of a Mexico City firm to repair safes. Through discreet investigation SCANTLING was able to identify the firm, its location and the name of the owner in the event that we later wished to make an approach to him or to exploit this information in another manner.

b. SCANTLING is still the Station's primary source for keeping current records on the residences of the many LIMERICK personnel in Mexico City. This is accomplished in several ways; the most important being SCANTLING's follow up of all LIENVOY leads which indicate the LIMERICK people are interested in renting a given piece of property. (See previous project renewal request for additional details).

2. "To collect operational information pertaining to other targets of opportunity, foreign official installations and personnel of intelligence interest operating in Mexico." SCANTLING is very useful for collecting information on other Station targets:

CS COPY

Att HMMA-17[illegible]

50-6-74/1

a. On the basis of a request to the Station from the ODACID Chief, SCANTLING was sent to Puebla to be an eyewitness to the 4 June 1961 Catholic inspired anti-CASTRO demonstrations. Not only did SCANTLING obtain the desired information, and samples of many of the leaflets used, but he prepared his report for the Station in time for the COS to give the ODACID Chief a briefing at 1000 hrs., 5 June 1961. SCANTLING does an excellent job on this type of assignment due principally to his ability to observe and report objectively.

b. SCANTLING was instrumental in establishing that Fernando LLANES Cavero and his wife were living at a local Mexico City address. This case has been of considerable counterespionage interest to Headquarters.

c. SCANTLING has continued his contributions to the Paul Frederick KIRSCHHOFF case by periodic interviews with the subject's neighbors and associates.

3. "To exploit operational leads through recruitments, debriefings, and surveillances." SCANTLING has contributed to this objective both directly and indirectly as will be noted by the examples listed below:

a. SCANTLING devoted a lot of time to the surveillance and attempted recruitment of Abel ARTEAGA, a Mexican national employed at the Cuban Embassy. SCANTLING talked with ARTEAGA several times and undoubtedly was primarily responsible for the later success of the recruitment made by another Station agent.

b. Some additional time was devoted to the Cesar GONZALEZ Sanchez case in February 1961 when SCANTLING determined that GONZALEZ was still in Mexico City. See the last renewal for additional details on this case.

c. In connection with the above objective SCANTLING has performed numerous pretext and neighborhood investigations for the Station. SCANTLING also does most of the local investigations requested by ODACID and other ODYOKE components.

d. SCANTLING spent six weeks during July and August of this year giving tradecraft and surveillance training to LIPAILS 5 and 7 from Monterrey. Although this is not a direct contribution to the above objective, it is considered sufficiently related to mention here.

4. In addition to his contributions to the above objectives, SCANTLING is used for miscellaneous support requirements from the Station. For example, SCANTLING is now handling LIEMBROIL-2 and will continue to do so until the return of LIMOTOR-14 in June 1962. Also, during the past project year, SCANTLING handled the LIRICE surveillance team until July 1961 when Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) returned to Mexico City. SCANTLING is also used to spot and rent safe houses and apartments for other Station operations.

5. As stated in the preceeding Requests for Project Renewal, although SCANTLING's LIEMPTY Project objectives can never be completely fulfilled, it is the Station's opinion that SCANTLING has made important and valuable contributions to LIEMPTY Project objectives specifically and to other Station activities in general. SCANTLING's production, measured against monetary expenditures, case officer time and other intangible factors, unquestionably justifies his continuation as an integral part of Project LIEMPTY.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities through use of photographic base houses." Three photographic bases, LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA, contribute to this objective. To avoid repetition, the Station is omitting the usual description of the functions of these three bases and how they contribute to the above objective. There has been no change in the coverage as described in the 1960 Request for Project Renewal.

2. "To collect operational information and identify operational leads pertaining to Station targets of opportunity." The LIENTRAP operation, handled by GERENDE, is still the major contributor to this

objective. In addition to performing numerous photographic assignments in support of other Station operations, LIENTRAP devoted nearly four months, on a fulltime basis, to coverage of the LIERODE operation. For several weeks the entire "take" from the LIERODE target was recorded from the LIENTRAP vehicle. Later, the LIENTRAP agents operated the LIERODE technical gear from the initial LIERODE stationary base.

3. "To provide operational support to Station operations, i.e., rent hotel rooms and apartments, and conduct counter-surveillances." GERENDE is used frequently to rent hotel rooms and apartments for other Station operations and activities. GERENDE's comprehensive area knowledge and personal operational capabilities combine to make him an extremely valuable Station asset for such support activities. GERENDE also procures and services post office box letter drops for the many Station operations requiring them.

4. The quality and quantity of operational information produced by the photographic bases and other activities under GERENDE's control and supervision is considered worthwhile. The Station concludes, therefore, that this segment of the LIEMPTY Project should be continued.

C. Relationship to Related Mission Directive Objectives:

As stated in the previous project renewal, it can readily be noted that Project LIEMPTY has provided support to many Station operations and in this manner has been a contributing factor to the furthereance of the Related Mission Directive. The project has not produced any positive intelligence nor has it been intended that it should do so. The project's sole purpose is to provide a mechanism for the development of operational information in support of other Station operations.

II. CHANGES

There have been no changes in the LIEMPTY Project during the past project year except that SCANTLING relinquished control of the LIRICE (formerly LIJERSEY) surveillance team in July 1961 in accordance with previous plans.

III. EFFECTIVENESS

There has been no change in Project LIEMPTY which would alter the validity of the remarks made in Section III of last year's project renewal request.

IV. PROBLEMS

The security problem in connection with the LICALLA operation, which was described in last year's renewal request, is still present but has not caused any known difficulty. At Headquarters suggestion in HMMW-9736, the LICALLA base was reactivated on 29 May 1961. The base operator has been cautioned to be ever alert for any unusual incidents which might indicate that the base has been compromised. This is the only problem experienced by the LIEMPTY Project during the past project year.

V. PLANS

The Station considers that the project is now operating at its optimum size and does not plan to expand it during the coming year. Rather, efforts will be devoted to refining and better utilizing the existing project organizational arrangements.

VI. COSTS

A. Past Project Year - Station finance records indicate that Project LIEMPTY expended $21,458.00 during Fiscal Year 1961 (1 December 1960 - 30 June 1961) and has thus far during Fiscal Year 1962 (through 30 September 1961) expended about $11,000.00. It is anticipated that about $8,000.00 will be expended during the last two months (October and November 1961) of the project year. This will make a total expenditure during the project year of about $40,500.00, or some $12,500.00 under the budget estimate of $53,000.00.

B. Ensuing Period - Of the total $49,500.00 budget, itemized below, $29,500.00 should be expended during the remainder of Fiscal Year 1962 and the balance, $20,000.00 should be expended during Fiscal Year 1963. Normal accounting procedures will be used for all expenditures.

AGENT	U.S. $ PER ANNUM	
Raymond H. GERENDE	$ 5,520.00	
Oliver G. SCANTLING	5,000.00	
Louise J. MACRINO (@ $2.02 per hour)	1,500.00	
LIEMPTY-4	2,200.00	
LIEMPTY-5 (@ $1.75 per hour)	1,000.00	
LIEMPTY-6	3,000.00	
LIEMPTY-7 (No Salary)	-0-	
LIEMPTY-8	2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-9	3,000.00	
LIEMPTY-10	3,900.00	
LIEMPTY-11	2,800.00	
LIEMPTY-12	2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-13	2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-14	2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-19	1,000.00	
LIEMPTY-24 (No Salary)	-0-	
Christmas Bonuses 1961	2,580.00	
SUB-TOTAL		$ 39,500.00

OPERATIONAL EXPENSES		
Maintenance of MV-2279, 2284 and 2286.	$ 2,000.00	
Procurement of Safehouses, post office boxes and renting automobiles.	1,000.00	
Purchase of information, identification documents, and bribes.	500.00	
SUB-TOTAL		3,500.00

OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT		
Repair, maintenance and purchase of replacement photographic equipment.	$ 1,000.00	
SUB-TOTAL		1,000.00

CS COPY

REAL ESTATE

Rent, utilities and maintenance
of following safehouses:

*LIMITED	$ 3,000.00	
*LICALA	1,500.00	
LILYRIC	1,000.00	
SUB-TOTAL		5,500.00
GRAND TOTAL		$ 49,500.00

*LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to the Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to Station miscellaneous receipts.

VII. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

Please refer to last year's request for project renewal and HMMA-15982, 23 November 1960, and HMMA-15981, 23 November 1960

CS COPY

[illegible] 50-6-74/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

The LIEMPTY Project will expire on 30 November 1961. It is requested that your recommendation for renewal be pouched to reach Headquarters by 1 November 1961.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED
6 September 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
8 SEP

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-10074

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH3/Mexi/Chrono

ROUTING
RI/AN D.K.
RI/TY
WH/3/MEXICO

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	J.A. Brooke 7 Sep 61	bj AC/WH3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. KING /s/ Holman

10074

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
[illegible]	ACTION	[illegible]
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

HMMA-14793, 8 April 1960

1. The LIEMPTY Project Renewal was approved on 3 February 1961 for a total of $53,000; $31,900 in fiscal year 1961 and $21,100 in fiscal year 1962.

2. No comments were made by the coordinating Staffs.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED 13 February 1961
DATE DISPATCHED 15 FEB 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-9491

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C. [illegible]ehrun	new	C/WH/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	2/14/61	Paul P. Payton

C/WH/3/Mexico
C/WH/Mexico

BR
TY OB
WH/3M

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/Request for Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION: See below

REFERENCE: HMMW-8515, 25 February 1960

Project LIEMPTY expires on 30 November 1960. It is requested that your recommendation for renewal be pouched as soon as possible.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED: 15 November 1960

DATE DISPATCHED: [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9261

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono

BR

WH/3M

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	R. Hultslander	bj C/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	[illegible]	J.C. KING. Paul P. Payton

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-15979
[redacted]-1842

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-74/1

TO : Chief, WH Division
INFO

DATE
18 November 1960

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

RE "433" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

SUBJECT
- LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED
- Renewal of Project

REFERENCE(S)

Attached are the requisite number of copies of the Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

16 November 1960

Attachment:
As stated above. (Even pages forwarded herewith)
(Odd pages under separate cover)

Distribution:
3 - WHD (with five copies of attachment)
2 - Files (with one copy of attachment)

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: de-Kegek
Signed:
R.O. #650 - Unit WH/1/K
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET [redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY

OPERATING DIVISION: WH

FIELD STATION: Mexico City

TARGET AREA: Mexico

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER: ✓

Charlotte L. Zehrung

ROOM NO.: 1015 Barton Hall

EXTENSION: 2555/3162

DATE: 13 December 1960

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be renewed for the period 1 December 1960 through 30 November 1961 for a total of $53,000; $31,900 for fiscal year 1961 and $21,100 for fiscal year 1962. The LIEMPTY Project was programmed for $85,000. During the past project year, approximately $59,880 was obligated.

2. This Project provides operational support to the Station and is not a source of positive intelligence. Examples of operational data developed through this project are given in paragraph I of the attached Station Review of Project LIEMPTY. There have been no disseminations made at Headquarters of intelligence produced through LIEMPTY.

3. The only training provided LIEMPTY personnel during the period under review was given to Raymond H. GERENDE. He is being given training in basic flaps and seals techniques so that the Station will have a trained agent outside the Station who will be able to provide this service if required. No further training for GERENDE or any of the other LIEMPTY agents is being contemplated for the coming year.

4. Attached for the information of the Staffs is a dispatch from the Station (HMMA-14793) dated 8 April 1960 which answers the questions raised at the time of the last renewal.

5. With reference to Paragraph VII, Emergency Condition, contained in the attached Project Review, the Mexican desk has on record in the permanent file of Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING, the details of emergency recontact instructions which have been agreed upon between the Station and each Agent.

6. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be renewed on the basis of the attached Project Review.

COORDINATION:

Ned P. Holman
Ned P. Holman, AC/WH/3

C. W. Anderson
C. W. Anderson, WHD Proj. Officer

Approved for Transmittal : R. W. Herbert /for
J. C. King, C/WHD

12/30/60
DATE

ATTACHMENTS: (4)
- Review of Project LIEMPTY
- Copy of HMMA-14793
- Form 680
- Folder with past renewals

SECRET / [redacted]

REVIEW OF PROJECT LIEMPTY

(For the Purpose of Project Renewal)

COVER SHEET

CRYPTONYM	LIEMPTY	FIELD CASE OFFICER	Quinton N. OUSLER
STATION	Mexico City	CHIEF OF STATION	Willard C. Curtis Willard C. CURTIS

The attached project action is presented for approval for the period 1 December 1960 through 30 November 1961.

HMMA-15979

SECRET / [redacted]

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

SECRET/[redacted]

REVIEW OF PROJECT LIEMPTY
(For the Purpose of Project Renewal)

I. CURRENT OBJECTIVES AND PRODUCTION

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities." SCANTLING has continued (See the last Project Review forwarded as an attachment to HMMA-14093, 13 November 1959) to provide worthwhile and significant information pertaining to the above objective. There follow a few examples of SCANTLING's production:

a. A detailed casing of the LIMERICK electrical power supply was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMMA-14496, 12 February 1960. The production of this type of operational information, which takes several weeks to compile accurately, illustrates the unusual talents possessed by SCANTLING together with his valuable contributions to the Station's operational information collection effort.

b. SCANTLING has been used frequently to follow up leads produced by LIFEAT/LIMERICK (now produced by LIENVOY). For example, in May 1960, LIFEAT indicated that the LIMERICK target was having considerable contact with an AGENCIA ROBLES concerning the handling of incoming and outgoing shipments. By discreet investigation, SCANTLING was able to provide the Station with additional pertinent information about the address, owner and type of business engaged in by the firm. Such information then becomes readily available for exploitation should a LIMERICK shipment of particular interest come to the attention of the Station.

c. SCANTLING is the Station's primary investigative asset for keeping track of current residence addressees of LIMERICK personnel. The Station considers it important from the counterespionage standpoint to maintain information on the location of all

CS COPY SECRET/[redacted] 50-6-74/1

LIMERICK residences. In addition, specific targets are continually considered for LICOOL installations. A recent example of SCANTLING's efforts in this connection would be the spotting and acquisition of the LIMOTOR base in the same apartment building with LITALOK -1. Contributions of this type operational information are quite time consuming due to the necessity for checking out several apartments that a LIMERICK individual may initially be considering as a residence.

2. "To collect operational information pertaining to other targets of opportunity, foreign official installations and personnel of intelligence interest operating in Mexico." As indicated below, SCANTLING is also extremely useful for collecting information on targets other than LIMERICK:

a. In March 1960 SCANTLING was instrumental in locating property adjacent to the LITABBY installation which the Station has since rented in anticipation of initiating photographic and technical operations. SCANTLING was able to accomplish this assignment only after a thorough casing and pretext investigations of the several pieces of property appropriate for such operations.

b. SCANTLING is also used to follow up sensitive leads in connection with LIFEAT and LIENVOY production from LITABBY and sister targets (See example as to type under I,A,1, b and c above).

c. SCANTLING was used as an investigative asset to determine the local address and exact employment of Gordon William GROVES (201-220025), a counterespionage case of interest to Headquarters and ODENVY.

3. "To exploit operational leads through recruitments debriefings, and surveillances." As examples of SCANTLING's contribution to this objective, the following cases are listed:

a. SCANTLING devoted a considerable amount of time to his attempts to locate Cesar GONZALEZ Sanchez, a known agent of a Communist Country. He followed various leads on GONZALEZ from March to August 1960 before

GONZALEZ was finally identified and his Mexico City home and business addresses were ascertained. See HMMA-15626, 9 September 1960, for further details on this case.

b. The preliminary investigative work on a KUSODA case of priority interest was conducted by SCANTLING. During this investigation it was necessary for SCANTLING to travel to Aguascalientes, Guanajuato and Minatitlan to obtain the information required by Headquarters. See the attachments to HMMT-1416, 20 May 1960, for the results of the investigation.

4. In addition to his contributions to the above objectives, SCANTLING is used for miscellaneous support requirements of the Station. For example, SCANTLING handled several of Raymond H. GERENDE's (ps) operations while the latter was away from Mexico City during August and September 1960. Also, SCANTLING has been managing the LIJERSEY surveillance team since the departure of Simon D. CLACKETT in August 1960. It is hoped that SCANTLING can be relieved of this assignment as soon as the LITEMPO project is approved. SCANTLING has also been used to spot and rent safe houses for various Station operations, a valuable operational support service.

5. As stated in the preceeding Request for Project Renewal, although SCANTLING's LIEMPTY Project objectives can never be completely fulfilled, it is the Station's opinion that SCANTLING has made important and valuable contributions to LIEMPTY Project objectives specifically and to other Station activities in general. SCANTLING's production, measured against monetary expenditures, case officer time and other intangible factors, unquestionably justifies his continuation as an integral part of Project LIEMPTY.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities through use of photographic base houses." Together with their extensive photographic coverage of the LIMERICK target, the photographic bases also contribute other types of operational information:

a. LIMITED - This base compiles daily logs indicating all arrivals, departures and, where possible, identities of every person visiting or working at the LIMERICK target.

[redacted]

This information is particularly useful in keeping track of LIMERICK personnel and assisting with the identification of visitors to the installation. Also, LIMITED maintains a summary attendance list of LIMERICK employees on a daily basis; this enables the Station quickly to ascertain the presence or absence of an employee on any given day. Finally, one other significant service is performed by this base, the radio dispatching of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team on LIMERICK personnel and targets of opportunity. LIMITED's photographic coverage is still concentrated on visitors, as opposed to employees, to the LIMERICK installation. A recent example of the base's contributions to Station efforts is the case of Joseph Ralph MAURI. In this case, a LIENVOY lead indicated that an American might visit the LIMERICK target on a certain day. The base was alerted to dispatch the radio-controlled surveillance team on any person appearing to be an American. The results of this assignment were indicated in MEXI-6392 and several other cables. LIMITED was also able to provide photographs, which when compared with photographs provided by Headquarters, left no question as to MAURI's identity.

b. LILYRIC - This base's output of high-quality clandestine photographs has been in about the same quantity as last year. In addition, the base operator, LIEMPTY-14, prepares weekly reports on LIMERICK employees and their wives. LILYRIC also performs the assignment of noting and reporting the license plate numbers of all cars bringing visitors to the LIMERICK installation. LILYRIC photographs also are concentrated on visitors to the target, as opposed to employees. It should be noted that LILYRIC operates for photographic coverage during the hours from daylight to 1400 hours each day of the week except Sunday. The LIMITED base maintains photographic coverage from 1400 hours to darkness each day except Sunday.

c. LICALLA - As reported in previous correspondence, the LICALLA base contributes to the collection of operational information through photographic coverage of LIMERICK employees and their families. Also, the base operator, LIEMPTY-9, supplies extremely worthwhile information pertaining to the apparent positions and jobs of the target employees. He accomplishes this objective by careful observation and analysis. LICALLA also maintains a daily attendance roster of all LIMERICK employees. LICALLA coverage of the target, both photographic and physical observations, enables the Station to keep abreast of LIMERICK personnel changes, a vital contribution to the Station's counter-espionage effort.

2. "To collect operational information and identify operational leads pertaining to Station targets of opportunity." The LIENTRAP operation, handled by GERENDE, is the major contributor to this objective. It has been possible for LIENTRAP to take photographs and to perform pretext investigations in support of numerous Station activities. The cases listed below are cited as examples:

a. In the case of Cesar GONZALEZ Sanchez (see I, A, 3, a, above) LIENTRAP was able to procure photographs of GONZALEZ at his Mexico City residence which, when compared to Headquarters provided photographs, left no doubt that GONZALEZ was the subject of interest to Headquarters.

b. LIENTRAP confirmed the identity of Olga CASTILLO de Ledon, a frequent visitor to the LIMERICK installation and an ardent supporter of the present Cuban regime, through a pretext investigation of the residents of an apartment building where CASTILLO was believed to live. Later, LIENTRAP supported the results of the investigation with excellent photographs of the subject.

3. "To provide operational support to Station operations, i.e., rent hotel rooms and apartments, and conduct counter-surveillances." GERENDE is used frequently to rent hotel rooms and apartments for other Station operations and activities. GERENDE's comprehensive area knowledge and personal operational capabilities combine to make him an extremely valuable Station asset for such support activities. GERENDE also procures post office box letter drops for the many Station operations requiring them.

4. It is the Station's conclusion that the money and case officer time expended on this segment of the LIEMPTY project is worthwhile and should be continued in view of the quality and quantity of operational information produced.

C. Simon D. CLACKETT Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information and to identify operational leads pertaining to the LIMERICK target and Station targets of opportunity." During this project year the LIJERSEY surveillance team under the direction of CLACKETT began contributing to the Station's support efforts through pretext investigations and physical surveillances. Some examples of the team's work are listed below:

a. Rafael TISCHLER Guzman (201-64372) is a Guatemalan Communist which the team had under surveillance from November 1959 to April 1960. The surveillance, together with information acquired from other sources, eventually resulted in an unsuccessful recruitment attempt on TISCHLER.

b. Pericles FRANCO Ornes (201-64546) - FRANCO is a Dominican of interest to the Station. The LIJERSEY team devoted portions of five months, January to May 1960, collecting information on subject through physical surveillance.

c. Jose Maria "Chema" LOPEZ Valdizon (201-) was the subject of a physical surveillance during May and June 1960. LOPEZ was later deported from Mexico through the efforts of LITEMPO-2.

d. CLACKETT and the LIJERSEY team performed numerous pretext investigations on Station targets of opportunity and on three separate occasions during the project year served as a counter-surveillance escort for Station officers in other operations.

2. CLACKETT, just prior to his resignation in August 1960, spent about five weeks giving tradecraft and operational skills training to LITEA-1. Although not specifically covered by the project objectives, this ability on CLACKETT's part is considered a significant contribution to the Station's support efforts.

3. In view of CLACKETT's resignation, which was effective 31 August 1960, and the proposed transfer of the LIJERSEY team to the LITEMPO project, this segment of the LIEMPTY project will not be renewed. However, for the record, it is considered that the CLACKETT segment of LIEMPTY was worthwhile and the expenditure of Station assets in connection with LIJERSEY operations were justified.

D. Relationship to Related Mission Directive Objectives:

It can readily be noted that Project LIEMPTY has provided support to many Station operations and in this manner has been a contributing factor to the furtherance of the Related Mission Directive. The project has not produced any positive intelligence nor has it been intended that it should do so. The project's sole purpose is to provide a mechanism for the development of operational information in support of other Station operations.

II. CHANGES

A. Simon D. CLACKETT

The unexpected resignation of CLACKETT in August 1960 has necessitated the decision as how best to utilize the LIJERSEY surveillance team and still benefit from the training and experience gained by the team during the past year. As explained in the LITEMPO project outline, it was decided that the LITEMPO Staff Agent would have the time, the need and the requirements to handle and manage the LIJERSEY team on a regular basis; consequently, the Station believed that such a solution to this problem would permit the Station to continue to profit from CLACKETT's past efforts.

B. Oliver G. SCANTLING

Since CLACKETT's departure, SCANTLING has been handling the LIJERSEY team as an interim measure pending Headquarters approval of the LITEMPO project. SCANTLING has been exposed to, and likewise knows, only one of the team members, LIEMPTY-20. SCANTLING is known to L-20 only by an alias.

C. Personnel Changes

1. LIEMPTY-15 - Member of the LIJERSEY surveillance team - Transferred to Project LITEMPO and cryptonym changed to LITED-2.

2. LIEMPTY-16 - Member of the LIJERSEY surveillance team - Transferred to Project LITEMPO and cryptonym changed to LITED-3.

3. LIEMPTY-20 - Assistant Team Leader of LIJERSEY surveillance team - Transferred to Project LITEMPO and cryptonym changed to LITED-1.

4. LIEMPTY-25 - Most recent addition to the LIJERSEY surveillance team. Transferred to Project LITEMPO and cryptonym changed to LITED-4.

5. There have been no other personnel changes within the LIEMPTY project, excepting the resignations of Simon D. CLACKETT and Wilma J. FIORDALISI.

III. EFFECTIVENESS

A. General comments pertaining to the value of the project efforts to the Station's needs - The Station is of the opinion that its operations are only as good as the support mechanisms backstopping and contributing to them. The availability of unilateral support agents and organizations, such as the LIEMPTY Project, to investigate leads and to collect operational information is an indispensable ingredient to the Station's espionage and counterespionage objectives. The Station would be seriously handicapped in its operational activities should the support services of such agents as GERENDE, SCANTLING and the agents under their control be suddenly made unavailable.

B. LIMERICK Target - The basis for most of the Station's counterespionage activities directed against the LIMERICK target require detailed knowledge of the identity, activities and fellow associates of LIMERICK personnel. The LIEMPTY photographic basehouses undoubtedly provide more of this type information than any other Station operation. The production from LIEMPTY photographic bases and from the LIENVOY project provide the Station with the large majority of LIMERICK leads.

C. Targets of Opportunity - The immediate availability of independent assets to perform investigations, photographic assignments and other essential types of support services in connection with Station targets of opportunity represent an operational advantage which this Station considers highly significant. It is due to such LIEMPTY assets that an agent can be sent to distant areas in Mexico to do investigations, that photographs can be made of individuals and places which are of operational interest and apartments and hotel rooms can be acquired in fictitious names in support of sensitive operations and activities.

D. Although the progress and success of any support project depends upon requirements from other Station operations, it must be concluded that Project LIEMPTY has indeed been effective during the past project year.

IV. PROBLEMS

A. Security - The activities of the LICALLA base were suspended in September 1960 as a direct result of the arrest of three KURIOT technicians by the Cuban Government. One of the technicians was known to have knowledge of the four LIMUST units (LICALLA is located in one of these units) and the Station considered it appropriate to suspend photographic operations pending resolution of the situation. At this time, there is no indication when LICALLA operations will be resumed. The LICALLA base operator has reported that there have been no unusual inquiries or other suspicious actions which might indicate that LICALLA has been compromised to LIMERICK personnel; however, such a possibility will exist until the release of the three technicians. No other security problems have occurred during the past year.

V. PLANS

A. Processing of Photographs - During the past year considerable progress has been made in the Station's handling, i.e., sorting, indexing, identifying leads and filing, of photographs produced by the several bases.

B. Photographic Techniques - The previous LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request indicated that the Station planned to try new techniques using HY-PAN film in night photography. HY-PAN film was used on a trial basis during daylight hours with poor results. Almost invariably, prints from HY-PAN negatives were too grainy and, consequently, were of little use in producing good identified shots of individuals. In view of these experiments, night photography has not yet been attempted. It should be noted that Eastman Kodak's new TRI-X PAN film, which all bases and LIENTRAP now use, is superior to any film previously used by the Station for clandestine photography. The quality of all base photographs have been increased considerably as a direct result of this new film.

C. General Comments - The Station believes that the GERENDE segment is now operating under optimum organizational arrangments and there are no plans for expansion contemplated at this time. It is expected that SCANTLING will soon be relieved of his interim responsibility for the LIJERSEY team and can concentrate more on his investigative and casing activities. The transfer of the LIJERSEY team to Project LITEMPO reduced Project LIEMPTY activities by an appreciable amount. It is not planned, during the coming year, to expand present LIEMPTY activities.

VI. COSTS

A. Past Project Year - Station finance records indicate that Project LIEMPTY expended $19,120.91 during Fiscal Year 1960 (1 December 1959 - 30 June 1960) and has thus far during Fiscal Year 1961 (through 31 October 1960) expended $16,734.69. Contract Agents salaries and allowances paid by Headquarters bring the total expenditures for 11 months of the project year to approximately $50,000.00. An additional $4,000.00 will be obligated during the 12th month of the project year. This will bring total project expenditures to about $54,000.00 for the entire project year.

B. Ensuing Period - Of the total $53,000.00 budget, itemized below, $31,900.00 should be expended during the remainder of Fiscal Year 1961 and the balance, $21,100.00, should be expended during Fiscal Year 1962. Normal accounting procedures will be used for all expenditures.

AGENT	U.S. $ PER ANNUM	
Raymond H. GERENDE C-32143	$ 5,040.00	
Oliver G. SCANTLING C-26803	4,560.00	
Louise J. MACRINO C-41452 (@ $2.02 per hour)	2,500.00	
LIEMPTY-4 C-31872	2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-5 C-58482 (@ $1.75 per hour)	1,500.00	
LIEMPTY-6 C-29948	2,800.00	
LIEMPTY-7 No Salary C-31075	-0-	
LIEMPTY-8 C-31074	1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-9 C-56699	2,800.00	
LIEMPTY-10 C-5598	3,600.00	
LIEMPTY-11 C-41439	2,500.00	
LIEMPTY-12 C-36226	1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-13 C-46945	1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-14 C-61168	1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-19 C-74579	1,000.00	
LIEMPTY-24 No Salary C-75022	-0-	
Christmas bonuses all personnel	2,500.00	
SUB-TOTAL		$ 38,000.00

OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

Maintenance of MV-2279, 2284 and 2286.	$ 2,000.00	
Operational Travel	500.00	
Procurement of Safehouses, post office boxes and renting automobiles.	2,000.00	
Purchase of information, identification documents, and bribes.	2,500.00	
SUB-TOTAL		$ 7,000.00

OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Repair and maintenanceof camera equipment.	$ 500.00		
Purchase of replacement photographic equipment and supplies.	2,000.00		
SUB-TOTAL		2,500.00	

REAL ESTATE

Rent, utilities and maintenance of following safehouses:

*LIMITED	$ 3,000.00		
*LICALLA	1,500.00		
LILYRIC	1,000.00		
SUB-TOTAL		5,500.00	
GRAND TOTAL			$53,000.00

*LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to the Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to Station miscellaneous receipts.

VII. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

As regards the requirement listed in CSI-F No. 230-60, Annex A, for communications arrangments in the event of "Emergency Conditions," the Station does not anticipate that this project would or could continue to function under its present objectives. However, both principal agents, SCANTLING and GERENDE, would very possibly be worthwhile sources of information to maintain contact with under any adverse conditions. Both of these agents identify themselfs, in terms of ideology, motivation and perspective, more as Americans than as Mexican nationals (which they are). It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that SCANTLING and GERENDE would become valuable contacts in any emergency situation.

CS COPY

The Station is aware that the previous project renewal stated that emergency communications arrangments were being made. The Station has finally obtained the U.S. addresses of relatives through whom GERENDE and SCANTLING could be contacted under most situations. This information will be forwarded separately.

COPY

5 6 74/1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMW-8515

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-74/1

DATE:

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

RE "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - Paragraph 2 - Please submit detailed review of usefulness and value of the photo basehouses. Are three justified?

REFERENCE(S) HMMA-14093, 13 November 1959

1. The LIEMPTY Project was renewed on 8 January 1960 for the period 1 December 1959 through 31 November 1960 for a total of $84,910; $48,485 for fiscal year 1960 and $36,425 for fiscal year 1961.

2. The following staff comments were made during the renewal process:

a. KUDESK notes that the CI value of the project is difficult to judge since it appears that much of the material produced remains in the Station for exploitation. However, KUDESK remarks that the value of the project should be increased when the CLACKETT surveillance team enters into active operation. KUDESK suggests that the Station be queried as to the pretext or circumstances under which SCANTLING frequently visits Ines Parada de Moreno, the occupant of the property adjacent to the Soviet installation.

b. KUTUBE/OPS notes that while the project review presents a clear picture of the aims and objectives of the various segments, it does not provide, except in the case of SCANTLING, detailed indication of the value or usefulness of the other segments, particularly the photographic activity. KUTUBE/OPS requests that the Station provide such an appraisal during the first quarter of 1960. KUTUBE/OPS recommends strongly that the photo coverage be reviewed from the standpoint of value and usefulness with a view to determining whether the LILYRIC activity could not be safely eliminated and the additional photographic coverage conducted on a more selective basis, without materially affecting overall usefulness. KUTUBE/OPS notes that, in the absence of further proof of usefulness, the color photography and moving pictures appear to be an unnecessary luxury. KUTUBE/OPS commends the careful handling of the CLACKETT segment and requests that the next project action include examples of the team's progress.

3. The TVA approval for the additional vehicle was forwarded under Dispatch No. HMMS-1211. The MV number assigned by JBECHO is MV 2320. The usual Delegation of Procurement authority is being forwarded by JBECHO channels.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

19 February 1960

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/Log
1 - WH/3/Mexico Chrono
~~1 - RI~~

WH/3/Mexico/E.I. SCALETTI:jmh

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/[redacted]K

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMA-14093
[redacted]K-1733

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-74/1

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 13 November 1959

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

SUBJECT: Renewal of Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED: Renewal of Project LIEMPTY

REFERENCE(S):

Attached is a review of Project LIEMPTY activities during the past year.

Renewal of the project is requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

ZMD.
QNOusler/vps
10 November 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs w/5 copies of attachment

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: Glenn J. Pal[illegible]
R.O. #C30 - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

50-6-74/1

USE PREVIOUS EDITION
REPLACES FOR
51 28 51 28A
WHICH ARE

CLASSIFICATION

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY Renewal

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER

Name C. Zehrung
Room 2121 Barton
Ext. 2555
Date 9 December 1959

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be renewed for the period 1 December 1959 through 30 November 1960 for a total of $84,910.00; $48,485.00 for fiscal year 1960 and $36,425.00 for fiscal year 1961. LIEMPTY was last approved for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959 for a total of $95,380; of which it is estimated $74,259 has been obligated.

2. It is requested that the Project be renewed on the basis of the Project review prepared by the Station which is attached.

3. The security incident referred to in paragraph IV.B on page 6 of the attachment, occurred on 20 September 1959. While on an operational assignment LIEMPTY/10 and the LIENTRAP vehicle were temporarily detained by the Servicio Secreto de Mexico (Mexican Secret Service). At the time of the incident the LIENTRAP vehicle was carrying out an assignment of photographing a Cuban rally which it was expected would be attended by many of the leading Mexican and Central American Communists. The police were also covering the meeting for the purpose of preventing a Communist-inspired demonstration and they searched LIENTRAP believing it might contain Communist propaganda. When they saw the film they seized the film, the truck and LIEMPTY-10 with the belief the Communists had filmed some rough-handed techniques used by the police against some persons attending the rally. LIEMPTY-10 was held under unofficial custody for approximately 26 hours before his release was obtained. When a member of the Station using State Department cover intervened with the police on behalf of LIEMPTY-10, the film, LIENTRAP, and all the equipment were also returned in tact. LIEMPTY-10 had not been interrogated and had not been formally charged or booked. Although the FBI representative and the U.S. Embassy Security Officer also learned of the incident, the Station does not believe that this incident has materially effected the security of the Project. The Station, however, is allowing a one month's cooling off period for the LIENTRAP vehicle and LIEMPTY-10.

Attachments:
- Project review (in quad)
- Envelope with past renewals
- Memo Justification of Purchase of Auto
- Form 680 (in quad)
- Envelope with true names

f. R.N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

Charles W. Anderson
C.W. ANDERSON, WH/FI

for J.C. KING, C/WHD

14/XII/59
DATE

SECRET/[redacted]

PROJECT REVIEW

CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY FIELD CASE OFFICER Q. N. Ousler Quinton N. OUSLER

STATION Mexico City CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis Willard C. CURTIS

Based on the attached REVIEW OF PROJECT LIEMPTY, it is requested that the Project be renewed for the period 1 December 1959 through 30 November 1960.

SECRET[redacted]

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

REVIEW OF PROJECT LIEMPTY
(For the Purpose of Project Renewal)

I. PRODUCT OF THE PROJECT

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities." During the past year SCANTLING has devoted a significant amount of time to the furtherance of this project objective. Although other Station operations and personnel are also concerned with the collection of operational information about LIMERICK personnel, SCANTLING's contributions are unique as to type and complement information received from other sources. For example, SCANTLING is used primarily as the source of information about LIMERICK physical facilities. He is constantly on the alert for building modifications, construction activities and the kinds of outside services utilized by the LIMERICK installation. He regularly visits Inez PARADA de Moreno, the occupant of property adjacent to LIMERICK, for the purpose of obtaining a close view of the interior grounds of LIMERICK and to debrief Senora de Moreno about any unusual activities which she may have observed. At the present time SCANTLING is preparing a thorough casing report on the electrical power supply used by LIMERICK and all other residences and establishments in the same block. This operational information is intended for KURIOT's use and will show all transformers in the block, electrical meters for measuring the amount of electrical power used and the precise points where wires enter each property. Because of his other sensitive activities and because other operational activities provide adequate coverage, SCANTLING has been used sparingly for physical surveillances and investigations which might conceivably impair his future usefulness to the Station. During the time he spent training Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) in radio controlled mobile surveillance, SCANTLING did perform some surveillance work at the LIMERICK installation; however, it was concerned mostly with briefing CLACKETT on dispatching techniques and the procedures used for the control of several vehicles on a surveillance team using two-way radios.

2. "To collect operational information pertaining to other targets of opportunity, foreign official installations and personnel of intelligence interest operating in Mexico." By far the most important contribution made by SCANTLING in connection with this project objective has been his support to the LITACIT operation and just recently actually gained entry to the LITACIT target using a pretext cover story. During this visit SCANTLING managed to collect highly valuable operational information about the security of the installation, which has added materially to KUBARK's knowledge about ~~the~~ target. SCANTLING has also cased and prepared reports on the LITABBY target in anticipation of mounting

a photographic surveillance and in initial preparation for a future LINIMENT type activity. SCANTLING has performed investigations of numerous other Station targets of opportunity which, depending on their significance, have been reported in separate correspondence.

3. "To exploit operational leads through recruitments, debriefings and surveillances." This objective was included in the LIEMPTY project because SCANTLING is used to follow up LIFEAT leads and leads obtained from the LIEMPTY photographic bases. During the past year SCANTLING has investigated a quantity of leads obtained from the above sources. The information resulting from these investigations has enabled the Station to maintain current data on the various firms used by the LIMERICK target and in one instance, Octavio VIDALES (201-), caused the Station to make a recruitment pitch in an effort to carry out a technical penetration of the LIMERICK target. Although VIDALES was not recruited, the Station anticipates that SCANTLING will some day be successful in just this type of activity. SCANTLING is the Station's principal source for the follow-up of LIFEAT/ LIMERICK and LIEMPTY photographic base house leads as they pertain to the primary target.

4. Not covered by a specific project objective but, nevertheless, of significant importance to the Station are SCANTLING's contributions to the overall Station support efforts. In addition to the extensive training given to CLACKETT, SCANTLING also prepared a detailed and sophisticated radio dispatch procedure for use by the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. He devised a superior method for numbering streets which enables the radio surveillance team to specify a location without reference to street names and areas. The entire radio dispatch code, when used properly, practically defies identification as the conversations of a clandestine surveillance team. From the standpoint of Station security, SCANTLING conducted an investigation of LIVESTOCK-2 based on two leads which were 30 years old and reported significant information which contributed to the Station's final decision to terminate LIVESTOCK-2. SCANTLING's other support activities consist of renting hotel rooms and apartments in fictitious names, supporting operations such as LICOOL-12 by performing sentry duty and by serving as a capable and responsible cutout between the Station and agents from other geographical areas.

5. Although SCANTLING's LIEMPTY objectives can never be completely fulfilled, it is the Station's opinion that SCANTLING has made important and valuable contributions to LIEMPTY Project objectives specifically and to other Station activities in general. SCANTLING's production, measured against monetary expenditures, case officer time and other intangible factors, unquestionably justifies his continuation as an integral part of Project LIEMPTY.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities through the use of photographic base houses." This continuing objective is carried out by three photographic base houses, LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA. During the project year, LIMITED produced approximately 3600 photographs and LILYRIC about 4500 pictures of individuals entering and leaving the LIMERICK target. Most of these photographs were of non-LIMERICK individuals of which only a small, but significant, percentage could be identified through license plate checks or other types of routine investigation. The LICALLA base produced approximately 4300 photographs during the year. Most of the LICALLA photographs were of LIMERICK employees and their families and have been of considerable value in maintaining current and accurate listings of LIMERICK personnel in Mexico. The LICALLA base has recently begun taking motion pictures of LIMERICK personnel conversing in the garden area. These movies are being forwarded to KUTUBE/D for the possible exploitation of lip reading analysis. The LIMITED base, in addition to its photographic assignment, is also used as the radio central for dispatching the LIEMBRACE surveillance team on LIMERICK personnel targets. All bases make routine reports on the daily attendance of LIMERICK employees at the installation which facilitates the Station's reporting on the arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel. Also, the bases devote time to reporting the personal associations among the numerous LIMERICK employees. Some of this latter type information is valuable from the standpoint of confirming that LIMERICK intelligence officers have a tendency to associate with their colleagues.

2. "To collect operational information and identify operational leads pertaining to Station targets of opportunity." This is a broad objective and one which is contributed to by the LIENTRAP operation. LIENTRAP is used to provide photographic coverage of important Station targets which do not justify a more permanent photographic base. During the period under review, LIENTRAP has been used for the timely coverage of various Central American exile group activities, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de la America Latina (CTAL) headquarters, several counterespionage targets, the LITACIT and LITABBY targets and other one-time operations of intelligence interest. The operational information produced by LIENTRAP is used by the Station for increasing operational knowledge about a target and, when appropriate, has been incorporated in separate reports to Headquarters with other information about specific targets.

3. "To provide operational support to Station operations, i.e., rent hotel rooms and apartments, and conduct counter-surveillances." GERENDE, because of his area knowledge and operational acumen, is used frequently by the Station for renting hotel rooms and apartments in fictitious names for use on other Station operations. He is also the Station's principal procurer of local Post Office boxes for use as letter drops. This objective pertains entirely to the operational support of other Station operations and is an invaluable ingredient to the security of important Station activities.

4. The production of operational information as represented by LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA and LIENTRAP is an important adjunct to the Station's coverage of the LIMERICK target and Station targets of opportunity. It is the Station's conclusion that the expenditure of KUBARK assets, i. e., money and case officer time, is justified and that these activities should be continued.

C. Simon D. CLACKETT Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information and to identify operational leads pertaining to the LIMERICK target and Station targets of opportunity." Very little production has been realized from this objective in terms of CLACKETT's contributions. CLACKETT returned to Mexico in early April 1959 after receiving surveillance, tradecraft and photography training in Headquarters. He then spent the rest of April, May and part of June being trained by SCANTLING in mobile surveillance techniques. Then LIEMPTYs 15, 16, 17 and 20 were placed under his supervision and he began training these agents in the arts of foot surveillance and mobile surveillance. This team, known as the LIJERSEY team, is just beginning to show the excellent effects of CLACKETT's intensive training sessions. Although LIEMPTY-17 has resigned and the team consists of only four agents, including CLACKETT, the Station believes that the team will be ready within the next month to begin its contributions to the above objective.

2. Based on the training time devoted to CLACKETT and to the LIJERSEY team and the anticipated production during the coming project year, it is the Station's opinion that this activity should be continued.

II. EXTENT TO WHICH THE RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE HAS BEEN FURTHERED.

Project LIEMPTY has provided support, in varying ways, to a majority of Station operations and in this manner has been a contributing factor to the furtherance of the Related Mission Directive. The project is not intended nor designed to produce positive intelligence; its sole purpose is to provide a mechanism for the development of operational information in support of other Station operations.

III. PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE.

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING Segment:

1. SCANTLING's duties and responsibilities are basically the same now as they were when the original LIEMPTY project outline was submitted. Since SCANTLING is the only major factor in this part of LIEMPTY, progress, other than covered in the above section on production, can be measured only by the fact that SCANTLING is a year older and has acquired a few more helpful tricks of the trade

and, consequently, has increased his own operational abilities.

2. Insofar as future planning is concerned, SCANTLING will continue to devote the greater portion of his time to the LITACIT operation. In addition, he will continue his work against the LIMERICK target, i.e., investigating LIFEAT and photographic base house leads in connection with the objectives of the LIEMPTY and LIMESA projects. The Station still plans to maintain SCANTLING as an independent Station asset free from the responsibilities of supervising other agents and operations.

3. SCANTLING will probably continue providing administrative support to LIEMPTY-3 (now covered under the LICOOL project), but will not be responsible for the operational direction of L-3.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE Segment:

1. During the past year the three photographic base houses have been trained in the use of a faster type film (HY-PAN) to facilitate the taking of photographs on dark cloudy days. One base, LICALLA, has made tests and recently begun making 35mm color slides using the new fast type Ektachrome film. This film is now processed in the Mexico Station dark room which heretofore was not possible. It is the Station's opinion that a few color photographs of target personnel will be useful for identification purposes. The LICALLA Base has also, during the past year, begun taking 16mm motion pictures in color with the expectation that Headquarters can eventually provide lip reading analysis of conversations taking place in the garden area of the LIMERICK installation.

2. Other operational progress has been made in connection with relieving GERENDE of responsibility for the LIJERSEY surveillance team. This now leaves GERENDE with a sufficient amount of time to supervise all photographic base houses, LIENTRAP and the outside photographic laboratory.

3. Future planning in relation to this segment does not call for expansion. Rather, the Station plans to perfect some of the photographic procedures now in use and to experiment with night photography possibilities using the fast HY-PAN film with telephoto lens of varying lengths. GERENDE will also concentrate on increasing the security and communications procedures used with each base.

C. Simon D. CLACKETT Segment:

1. CLACKETT's assumption of responsibility for the LIJERSEY surveillance team has been a progressive step for the development of an additional and much needed support asset. Although the LIJERSEY team has been in existence for several years, it was only during the past year, with the assignment of

CLACKETT, that an intensive effort was made to train the team members and to place them under the supervision of a full time team leader. As mentioned above, CLACKETT has done an excellent job during the past few months in getting the team ready for future operational assignments.

2. The Station plans, during the coming year, to increase the strength of the LIJERSEY team by at least two agents and one car. This would then give a total LIJERSEY complement of six agents and three radio cars. The Station will continue to take all necessary precautions not to rush the development of the team nor to give it assignments which are too complicated and too difficult. It is anticipated that the team will begin some surveillance work within the next month on targets connected with plans for an expanded Communist Party penetration program.

IV. PERFORMANCE OF PRINCIPAL AGENTS IN TERMS OF PRODUCTION, SECURITY AND COVER.

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING - As should be expected from a well trained and motivated agent, SCANTLING's production during the period under review was excellent. His production is in the category of operational information rather than positive intelligence and is based on leads and investigations given him by the Station. He never fails to do a thorough and detailed job on all assignments given to him. He is an unusually valuable principal agent. There have been no security problems or developments during the past year in connection with SCANTLING's assignments. Likewise, his cover is very good and places him in a position to maintain his work for KUBARK for many years to come.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE - Since GERENDE's marriage in December 1958, his performance has improved to a marked degree. He has become one of the Station's most dependable agents in terms of promptness for meetings, completing operational assignments as rapidly as possible and in doing any task, regardless of how menial it may be. Insofar as the Station and GERENDE know, his cover with LISTERINE's firm has held up very well. In fact, GERENDE recently was able to negotiate a sales contract with a customer having a very large sales capacity for the product manufactured by LISTERINE's firm. This, of course, endears GERENDE to LISTERINE in addition to contributing to GERENDE's cover employment. The only significant security incident pertaining, in part, to GERENDE was in connection with LIENTRAP (please see HMMA-13951, 16 October 1959, for details).

C. Simon D. CLACKETT - CLACKETT's performance has definitely measured up to the standards expected by the Station. He has proved that he is conscientious, dependable and very quick in grasping the details of clandestine activities. He will undoubtedly continue to improve his personal performance as he gains more experience. There have been no security problems or incidents in connection with CLACKETT's assignment to this Station. Although the notional cover provided by Headquarters has held up very well during the past few months, the Station had hopes of placing him in LILABEL's firm and obtaining Inmigrante papers for him. However, for reasons mentioned in other correspondence, this cover arrangement did not work out. The Station is continuing efforts to locate another suitable local cover job for CLACKETT.

V. CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION.

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING - The Station Case Officer meets with SCANTLING on the average of three times each week. For regular meetings, a total of eight prearranged contact points are used alternately with SCANTLING "walking the beat" and being picked up by the Case Officer in the latter's car. This procedure enables both the agent and the case officer to check themselves and to check each other for possible surveillance. Meetings are generally of short duration, seldom more than 30 minutes, and are held in the car. It is possible for SCANTLING to get in touch with his case officer by telephone, and vice versa, in case an unscheduled meeting is necessary. SCANTLING and the Station are currently working on the details of an emergency means of contact utilizing SCANTLING's wife's relatives in PBPRIME. Headquarters will be advised of these arrangements to facilitate contact with SCANTLING in the event Mexico is overrun by hostile forces and contact with the Station is severed.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE - GERENDE's Case Officer meets with him five times each week. Meetings are conducted in the Case Officer's car using the same procedures as outlined above. GERENDE and his Case Officer have a total of 11 contact points in different areas of the city and generally hold their meetings during the early morning hours, usually about 0800. As in the case of SCANTLING, GERENDE and his Case Officer are preparing an emergency contact procedure which will facilitate Headquarters communications with him through his relatives in PBPRIME Headquarters will be advised of these arrangements just as soon as they are completed.

C. Simon D. CLACKETT - The Station Case Officer meets with CLACKETT on the averageof three times each week. The same type of communications procedures as used for SCANTLING and GERENDE are employed with CLACKETT.

VI. PERSONNEL.

A. Personnel dropped from the Project:

1. LIEMPTY-3 - Now carried under the LICOOL Project.

2. LIEMPTY-17 - Resigned. Termination report forwarded to Headquarters.

3. LIEMPTY-18 - Wife of LIEMPTY-3. Now carried under the LICOOL Project.

B. New personnel not previously listed under the Project:

1. LIEMPTY-19 - Position: Support Agent. Wife of Raymond H. GERENDE. OA granted 13 August 1959 per HMMW-7988, dated 19 August 1959, and amended per DIR-41523, 26 August 1959. See PRQ, Parts I and II, for additional information. C [illegible]

2. LIEMPTY-20 - Position: Agent member of LIEMPTY/LIJERSEY surveillance team. OA granted 2 July 1958 per HMMW-6572, dated 12 July 1958. See PRQ, Parts I and II, for additional information.

3. LIEMPTY-24 - Position: Wife of LIEMPTY-9. She does not receive a salary nor does she actively participate in LIEMPTY-9's activities. OA granted 14 September 1959 per HMMW-8099, dated 25 September 1959. 78022

VII. ESTIMATED COST OF PROJECT FOR COMING YEAR.

Compensation: (Note: Sufficient funds are indicated to provide for later justified raises to agents.)

AGENT		U. S. $ PER ANNUM
Raymond H. GERENDE		$ 4,560.00
Oliver G. SCANTLING		4,200.00
LIEMPTY-4		2,000.00
LIEMPTY-5 at $1.75 per hour		2,500.00
LIEMPTY-6		2,500.00
LIEMPTY-7	No Salary	- 0 -
LIEMPTY-8		1,500.00
LIEMPTY-9		2,500.00
LIEMPTY-10		3,600.00
LIEMPTY-11		2,500.00
LIEMPTY-12		1,800.00
LIEMPTY-13		1,800.00
LIEMPTY-14		1,400.00
LIEMPTY-15		1,800.00
LIEMPTY-16		1,800.00
LIEMPTY-19		1,000.00
LIEMPTY-20		1,000.00
Wilma J. FIORDALISI		4,040.00
Louise J. MACRINO at $2.02 per hour		2,500.00
LIEMPTY-24	No Salary	- 0 -

Four additional agents at $2,000 per year		$ 8,000.00	
Simon D. CLACKETT -			
Salary	$ 7,750.00		
Quarters	1,800.00		
Education Allowance	360.00		
Travel	1,000.00	10,910.00	$ 61,910.00

Operational Expenses:

Automobiles (4 cars and 1 truck) (Maintenance, operational expenses, replacement of parts.)	$ 3,000.00	
Travel of agents by commercial carrier	500.00	3,500.00

Operational Equipment:

Purchase of one used auto for LIJERSEY Surveillance Team	$ 3,500.00	
Purchase of one base radio for LIJERSEY Team	1,000.00	
Repair and maintenance of radio and camera equipment	1,000.00	
Purchase of new photographic equipment and supplies	2,000.00	7,500.00

Real Estate:

Rent, utilities and maintenance of following safehouses:

*LIMITED	$ 2,500.00	
*LICALLA	1,500.00	
LILYRIC	1,000.00	5,000.00

*LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to the Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to Station miscellaneous receipts.

Funds for procurement and servicing of additional safehouses, post office boxes and renting automobiles	2,000.00

Exchange commodities (required as good will gifts)	$ 1,000.00
Damages (broken contracts, "key" money to obtain locations in choice areas, rent deposits, etc.)	2,000.00
Purchase of information, purchase of identification documents, payment of bribes, etc.	2,000.00
TOTAL	$ 84,910.00

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-8136
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-74/1
FROM : Chief, WHD		DATE 6 OCT 1959
SUBJECT : LIEMPTY/Request for Project Renewal		RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED : See below		
REFERENCE(S)		

Project LIEMPTY expires on 30 November 1959. It is requested that your recommendation for renewal be pouched so that it reaches Headquarters prior to 1 November 1959.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

1 October 1959

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - RI

M C Hawkins

WH/3/Mexico/M.C.HAWKINS:ngs

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMW 7899

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-119523
50-6-74/1

DATE

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY Project Amendment
Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

ACTION REQUIRED

RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)
HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959

1. On 16 July 1957, an amendment to the LIEMPTY Project was approved granting permission to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he works for KUBARK and to raise his salary effective July 1959 from $4,080 to $4,560 per year. No additional funds were requested for the Project.

2. A request to amend GERENDE's contract to include the benefits listed above has been submitted. You will be notified when the contract has been amended.

3. A copy of the approved Project amendment is attached for your information and records.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
OLIVER G. GALBOND
The following action is authorized: de-Rybat
Signed: Elvia J Palmer
R.O. #630 - Unit WH/4/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

21 July 1959

Attachment:
1 - (RYBAT)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/III/Mexico RYBAT Chrono
1 - Subject
2 - RI/CRO

WH/III/Mexico/E.I. SCALETTI:jmh

50-6-74/1

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET [redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

RECORD COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMW-7522

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-74/1

DATE

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)
HMMA-12236

1. The LIEMPTY Project Amendment was approved on 30 March 1959 to include the addition of a contract agent, Louise J. MACRINO to furnish administrative support to the Project, and also to formalise a special commitment made to Oliver G. SCANTLING. No additional funds were approved under this amendment.

2. Attached for the Station's information and records is a copy of the approved project amendment request.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

3 April 1959

Attachment:
  2 pages (KAPOK)

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City (w/a)
- 1 - WH/Mailroom (wo/a)
- 1 - WH/Mexico (wo/a)
- 1 - RI (wo/a)

WH/3/Mexico/E.I.SCALETTI:ngs

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CS COPY

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMMW-7342
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 201-163574 50-6-74/1
FROM : Chief, WH		DATE 20 FEB 1959
SUBJECT : Operational/LIEMPTY-20		RE: "43 3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED None, for your information.		

REFERENCE(S): HMMA-12114, 6 February 1959 (PACY)

1. Headquarters appreciates the reference dispatch which forwarded a revised PRQ, Part II, on LIEMPTY-20 and requests that Operational Approval be amended for his use under the LIEMPTY Project. In view of the fact that the Station plans to use Subject in a surveillance capacity, his original clearance, granted on 2 July 1958, authorises use under the LIEMPTY Project.

2. [illegible] has been notified of Subject's present Project status and has been requested to note the change of cryptonym.

3. In view of the fact that the Station has not made any outstanding commitments to LIEMPTY-20 and because the LIEMPTY Project authorizes the recruitment of a surveillance team, it is not necessary to take formal action to include Subject under the Project at this time.

WALTER S. [illegible]

16 February 1959

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - RI
1 ✓ 50-6-74/1

WH/III/Mexico/M.Therrien:jle

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
HMMA-12236

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
201-85613
50-6-74/1

TO Chief, WH Division
INFO

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
19 February 1959

RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Louise J. MACRINO

ACTION REQUIRED
Extend Subject's contract and include under LIEMPTY

REFERENCE(S)
HMMW-7263, 13 February 1959

1. The Mexico City Station regrets overlooking the expiration of MACRINO's contract. During recent months, she has been able to work only a limited amount because of ill health (primarily a heart condition). Most of her work during the past eight months has been devoted to typing selected information reports on report mats and doing routine non-sensitive translation work.

2. It is requested that MACRINO's contract be renewed for one year with the same salary and other provisions. She can appropriately be placed under the LIEMPTY project as a Station support asset. For project administrative purposes, she is being assigned the LIEMPTY/23 cryptonym. Station believes that sufficient LIEMPTY funds are already available to cover her salary payments during the remainder of the LIEMPTY project year.

Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
19 February 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

File 50-6-74/1
Liempty/[illegible]
[illegible]

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-12155

TO Chief, WH Division
INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
201-233889
50-6-74/1
201-229407

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 11 February 1959

SUBJECT LIEMPTY/Change of Cryptonyms

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED Change cryptonyms as requested below.

REFERENCE(S)
HMMW-7257, 30 January 1959, Paragraph 5.

It is requested that the cryptonyms of the individuals named in paragraph five of reference be changed to LIEMPTY/21 and LIEMPTY/22 respectively.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
9 February 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

1) noted crypt cards
2) " carded
5) " WH/Reg
4) " .../CA

50-6-74/1

USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

CS COPY

3 February 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI/OPS

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project

1. Reference is made to your comments on the LIEMPTY Project which was approved on 16 January 1959.

2. The LIEMPTY Project provides for the development of the former LIJERSEY surveillance team, the maintenance of photo surveillance bases, and other support facilities for the Mexico City Station. In their review of the Project before it was approved, FI/OPS suggested that WH Division consider a gradual reduction of the considerable financial and personnel commitments in this project in view of the favorably developing LIENVOY liaison relationship. FI/OPS believed that a smaller, more manageable support group with greater emphasis on selectivity of tasks and targets could well result in more effective CI and FI productivity.

3. The Mexican desk wishes to point out that rather than reducing the assets carried under the LIEMPTY Project, WHD believes that this project is an extremely important one and should receive Headquarters support. The only other Station surveillance teams, LIVESTOCK and LIEMBRACE, are both known to the Mexican authorities. Therefore LIEMPTY remains the Station's only secure surveillance asset. It is a very small untrained unit at present, but through this project it will be developed into a useable, valuable asset.

4. We are not passing FI/OP's comment to the field, because WH Division believes that unilateral assets should not be reduced in favor of liaison. First, the liaison has not yet been firmly established. Secondly, even with a good liaison relationship, the Mexican services must be considered anything but secure, and certainly could not be trusted with any sensitive operations. Thirdly, because of its proximity to the United States, and the activity of hostile intelligence groups there, the Mexico City Station is called upon to support many very sensitive operations which we would never wish to reveal to the Mexican authorities.

5. Experience in other Latin

5. Experience in other latin American countries where liaison has been established, has shown that many Station's tend to reduce their unilateral operations and capabilities in favor of the liaison. Under these circumstances, the production of the Stations have often been at the mercy of the liaison service and a change in the attitude of the service toward cooperating with this Agency has left these Stations virtually helpless. We certainly cannot recommend that the Mexico Station reduce any of it's unilateral support assets in favor of a proposed liaison relationship.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
1 - Subject File

WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:jck

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMW-7257

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-229407
50-6-74/1

DATE: 2 [illegible]

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : Operational/LIEMPTY Project Approval

ACTION REQUIRED:

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCES:

HMMA-11257

1. The Field Project Outline submitted with HMMA-11257 was approved on 16 January 1959 without change, for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959 for a total of $95,380; $65,580 for the current fiscal year and $29,800 for fiscal year 1960.

2. An amendment to the original request for project approval was submitted before the original project was approved. This amendment requested approval to include Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) and Wilma J. FIORDALISI (ps) under the LIEMPTY Project effective 1 January 1959 and remove them from the LIMESA Project. The funds designated in the original FPO for the undesignated Staff Agent were used to cover the expenses for CLACKETT and FIORDALISI. Therefore no additional funds were requested for the project in this amendment. The approval on 16 January 1959 included this project amendment. A copy of the amendment request is being forwarded for your information and records.

3. Among the Staffs' comments on the LIEMPTY Project, the following recommendations were made. KUDESK suggested that the Case Officer should work at devising ostensible sources of incomes for the agents which will stand the scrutiny of friends, relatives and less friendly forces.

4. An amendment to CLACKETT's contract has been requested to allow for a quarters allowance. The educational allowance requested in paragraph 11 of the project amendment was disapproved because CLACKETT was a Contract Agent. The Quarters Allowance of $2,500 was turned down because it was too high in relation to CLACKETT's salary. Therefore, a quarters allowance of $1,800 has been approved and will be written into CLACKETT's contract. If, however, operational and cover reasons require CLACKETT to rent an apartment larger than the one he would normally obtain under his allowance, the Chief of Station can authorize the extra rent as an operational expense which will not be considered as compensation for CLACKETT and therefore not subject to federal income tax.

5. Please advise Headquarters whether you wish to have the cryptonyms for CLACKETT and FIORDALISI charged to LIEMPTY's.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

26 January 1959

Attachment: Project amendment (KYBAT)

Distribution:
  3 - Mexico City
  1 - WH/Mailroom
  1 - WH/3/Mexico
  ~~2~~ 1 - RI (50-6-97/1)

CS COPY

WH/3/Mexico/E.I.SCALETTI:ngs

50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMM-A-11257 [redacted]X-1472
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 50-6- /1
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 8 October 1958
SUBJECT Operational LIEMPTY Field Project Outline		RE ' 43 3 — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED Headquarters expeditious approval of LIEMPTY		

REFERENCE(S)
MEXI 2239, 29 August 1958
DIR 41362, 18 September 1958

1. Attached is the LIEMPTY field project outline, a new Station support project which supersedes the LIJERSEY Project and several portions of the LIPSTICK Project.

2. In addition to approval of LIEMPTY, Headquarters is requested to change the agent cryptonyms as indicated in Section 9 of the attached field project outline.

3. Also, it is requested that the Station be advised of the new LIEMPTY RI file number.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

Encls. (Odd pages herewith
Even pages USC)

QNO/bct
2 Oct 58

Distribution
3 - Hqs w/atchmt
2 - Files

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: as-Report
Signed:
R.O. #030 - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 51 28 51-28A W WHICH ARE OF	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch
CRYPTONYM : LIEMPTY
DIVISION : Western Hemisphere
STATION : Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:
NAME: John B. Brady
ROOM: 2112 Barton Hall
EXT.: 2555
DATE: 24 November 1958

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be approved for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959 for a total of $95,380.00.

2. WH/Personnel has been requested to locate a Staff Agent to fill the BAP-8100 slot formerly under the LIPSTICK Project. This slot will be transferred to the LIEMPTY Project and will be filled by a person who will be responsible for the directions of the physical surveillance team under this project.

Robert N. Dahlgren
R. N. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

Charles W. Anderson
C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

R. Gomez
for J. C. King, C/WHD

2 Dec, 1958
Date

Attachments:
FPO (in quad)
Form 680 (in quad)
Table of Vehicular Allowance
Justification for Purchase of Automobiles
Envelope with true names

Att to HMMA-11257

SECRET

50-6-74/1

14-00000

[redacted]

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

FIELD CASE OFFICER Quinton N. COSLER

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis / Willard C. CURTIS

1. The attached project outline is presented for approval for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959.

2. Headquarters is requested to select a suitable contract or Staff Agent to replace Raymond H. GERENDE as leader of the LIJERSEY surveillance team. From the security standpoint, it is essential that GERENDE be relieved of this responsibility. The individual selected by Headquarters to fill the slot formerly occupied by Wilfred O. CLOWER (BAP-8100) should have had experience in surveillance operations and should speak Spanish fluently.

CS COPY

[redacted]

52-6-74/1

[redacted]

HMM-A-11257
[redacted]-1472

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

PART I

1. Area of Operations

The general area of operations will be Mexico and the specific area will be Mexico, D.F., Mexico.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to provide a mechanism for the development of operational information in support of other Station operations. This purpose is in consonance with the Related Mission Directive for Mexico.

3. Background

As the reviewing authorities will be aware, this project includes several operations which were formerly carried under Projects LIPSTICK and LIJERSEY. Partially as a result of the June 1958 LIPSTICK compromise, when three surveillance team members were apprehended and placedin custody by the Mexican Police, and additionally as a means for the orderly administration of assets, this new project is submitted.

There follows below a background sketch of the separate support assets, excluding details concerning personnel which will be discussed later in the outline, which the Station proposes for inclusion in LIEMPTY:

LIMITED - The LIMITED Base is located in such a position across the street from the LIMERICK installation that photographs can easily be made of persons entering and leaving the LIMERICK main gate. These photographs are later developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4, then returned to the LIMITED operator for the proper annotations. After receipt of the photographs by the Station, the Case Officer reviews them for LIMESA leads, newly arrived LIMERICK personnel, local and other nationals of possible operational interest and PBPRIME citizens who have visited LIMERICK.

KUBARK owns the property housing the LIMITED Base, having purchased it in mid-1955; however, the ostensible owner is LIMOUSINE, to whom LIEMPTY-6 pays his rent each month through LIMOUSINE's bank.

LIMITED, with LIEMPTY-6 as base house operator, has been operating for nearly three years and has not yet been involved in a compromising security situation. Prior to April 1955, when Headquarters authorized the purchase of the LIMITED Base, the Station rented the Base and used LIPSTICK-7 (later LIMESTONE-6 in LIFEAT Project and now terminated) as the operator. This arrangement was in effect for about two years.

[redacted]

[redacted]

LILYRIC - This Base has been in operation for about two and one-half years and is located in an apartment building acros s the street from the LIMERICK installation. As in the case of the LIMITED Base, LILYRIC takes photographs of persons entering and leaving the main gate of the LIMERICK installation. The LILYRIC photographs are handled in the same manner as the LIMITED pictures. In addition to taking photographs, the LILYRIC operators also prepare daily logs on the activities of each LIMERICK employee, record the license plate numbers of most cars carrying people to and from the LIMERICK installation, and prepare an observation diary on all target personnel seen each day. (This permits the Station to tell when a target personality is out of town or not working for some other reason.)

The LILYRIC Base was originally acquired and made operative to provide for continuous coverage of the target in the event LIMITED is ever compromised. This is still the primary value of having two bases cover the same portion of the target. LILYRIC is compartmented from LIMITED and with the possible exception of GERENDE could probably weather any security flap involving LIMITED. Obviously, there is some duplication in the work of LIMITED and LILYRIC; however, the insurance value of having two basis is quite apparent.

LILYRIC has been operating for about two and one-half years and insofar as the Station knows, no compromising security situations have arisen.

LICALLA - The LICALLA Base is located in a position where photographs can be taken of people within the LIMERICK garden area. In addition, the operator of the LICALLA Base submits weekly reports on LIMERICK construction work, daily logs showing when a target individual was seen that day, and reports showing the association of target individuals with one another. LICALLA photographs are processed and handled in the same manner and by the people who handle the LIMITED and LILYRIC pictures.

The LICALLA Base was acquired and operations began about two and one-half years ago with the primary purpose of obtaining additional operational information concerning LIMERICK personnel, and operational leads which could be exploited for the physical penetration of the LIMERICK installation. Approximately one year ago the LICALLA Base was purchased by KUBARK through LIMOUSINE. LICALLA will probably remain at its present location and will continue to submit photographs and reports of the same type as are now being submitted. Other than the fact that LIEMPTY-9, the LICALLA operator, is the brother of former LIPSTICK-47, no security problems are currently known to the Case Officer. However, reports from LIPSTICKs 12 and 30, the local police, the attorneys involved in the case, the foreign embassy concerned and the LCFLUTTER tests give no indications that LIEMPTY-9 was ever mentioned during the LIPSTICK flap.

LIENTRAP - This is a panel type truck equipped with cameras, telescopic lens and other types of photographic equipment. It has been used during the past two years as an investigative asset. The truck is parked about 75 yards from a target of interest (usually a residence or apartment building) and the photographer in the rear of the truck photographs individuals or things of interest to the Station. LIENTRAP is a valuable asset for any station to have and has enabled this Station to get pictures of individuals which could have been obtained in no other way. LIEMPTYs-10 and 11 operate LIENTRAP.

[redacted]

52-6-74/1

[redacted]

The major security threat to LIENTRAP is the fact that it has been operating for about two years in all parts of the city and should soon be replaced by a truck of a different make. Provision for this is made in Section 15 of this Field Project Outline.

LIJERSEY - This is presently an approved project; however, it is believed advisable for administrative efficiency to include the LIJERSEY assets within the framework of the LIEMPTY Project. Other than LILYRIC, which has already been discussed, LIJERSEY consists of a foot surveillance team with three members, LIEMPTYs-15, 16 and 17. LIEMPTYs 15 and 16 have been employed for about one and a half years and LIEMPTY-17 for about one year. They have not developed into as competent a surveillance team as the LIPSTICK team was and probably never will become as good. The LIJERSEY team has been used mostly for stationary surveillances and observations of people of interest. LIEMPTY-17, however, has also been used as a pretext investigator. He has excelled at this type of work and the Station continues to use him in this capacity. The Station has been reluctant to use the LIJERSEY team as much as it could have been used because of the close association of the team with GERENDE and, in turn, GERENDE's knowledge and work on LIFEAT and the LIPSTICK surveillance team. The Station plans to recruit several agents of a type and social level more suitable for all types of surveillance work than the present LIJERSEY team.

Oliver G. SCANTLING - SCANTLING has been associated with KUBARK for several years in a number of different capacities. He was originally used as a member of the LIPSTICK surveillance team and later was head of the same team. He has been used to train new agents in the techniques of surveillance and investigation, to acquire office space and apartments for the Station's operations and to conduct investigations and make recruitment approaches to individuals of operational interest to KUBARK. SCANTLING is currently being used by the Station as an investigator of LIMESA leads andis still actively pursuing the LIMESA/MKLIGHTING operation. SCANTLING also maintains regular contact with LIEMPTY-3 and monitors his elicitation effort against the LICOOL-6 target. In this connection, both SCANTLING and LIEMPTY-3 meet regularly with Doris M. KILLGO for operational guidance. (Note: Please see the LICOOL Field Project Outline for additional details on LICOOL-6).

4. References:

a. LIPSTICK Project Outline and operational papers.
b. LIJERSEY Project Outline and operational papers.
c. Dispatch to follow in next pouch, Subject: Review of Raymond H. GERENDE's operational activities.

5. Objectives:

Oliver G. SCANTLING's activities:

a. To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities.

b. To collect operational information pertaining to other targets of

[redacted]

[redacted]

opportunity, foreign official installations and personnel of intelligence interest operating in Mexico.

c. To exploit operational leads through recruitments, debriefings and surveillances.

Raymond H. GERENDE's activities:

d. To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities through the use of photographic base houses.

e. To collect operational information and identify operational leads pertaining to Station targets of opportunity.

f. To provide operational support to Station operations, i.e., rent hotel rooms and apartments, and conduct counter-surveillances.

Staff Agent's activities:

g. To collect operational information and to identify operational leads pertaining to the LIMERICK target and Station targets of opportunity.

6. Targets:

Oliver G. SCANTLING - The primary target is, of course, the LIMERICK installation and personnel. However, SCANTLING devotes most of his time to following up LIFEAT leads which pertain to services provided the LIMERICK installation by individuals and firms, e.g. construction engineers, floor waxing firms, safe experts, furniture makers, interior decorators, etc. To an extent, these are considered targets of opportunity and it would be impossible to list specifically what future targets will be available. One specific target which SCANTLING is concerned with is the occupant of the LICOOL-6 apartment; however, LIEMPTY-3, whom SCANTLING handles, should more correctly be given credit for information produced on this target.

Raymond H. GERENDE - LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA all have as their target the LIMERICK installation and personnel, plus any local nationals and PBPRIMERS who visit LIMERICK. LIENTRAP is concerned with targets of opportunity and follow-up investigations on operational leads obtained from other Station and Headquarters sources. The same targets apply to the LIJERSEY surveillance team as apply to LIENTRAP.

7. Tasks:

Field Case Officer - Quinton N. OUSLER

a. Supervise and direct the operational activities of Raymond H. GERENDE, Oliver G. SCANTLING, and the staff agent.

b. Provide guidance and maintain supervisory responsibility for all agents under GERENDE, SCANTLING and the staff agent.

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. Coordinate support requests from other Station Case Officers which involve either GERENDE, SCANTLING or the staff agent.

d. Process (indexing, traces, etc.) the photographic and other information from the LIEMPTY outside photographic assets.

e. Prepare operational and administrative correspondence pertaining to LIEMPTY.

Principal agent - Oliver G. SCANTLING:

a. Perform one man surveillances and investigations to identify individuals of operational interest.

b. Perform comprehensive and detailed casings of installations of interest to the Station and Headquarters.

c. Provide administrative support and some operational guidance to LIEMPTY-3.

d. Recruit individuals which have physical access to the LIMERICK installation (basically in support of LIMESA).

e. Spot prospective agent candidates for possible later use by the Station.

Agent - LIEMPTY-3

a. Cultivate and elicit information from the occupant of the LICOOL-6 apartment.

b. Where possible, broaden his contact with the LIMERICK people for the purpose of obtaining information concerning LIMERICK commercial matters in Mexico and to identify LIMERICK personnel who may be susceptible to defection and/or recruitment in place.

c. Support the LICOOL-6 technical operation by operating the recording machines and occupying the monitoring base as his family quarters.

Principal Agent - Raymond H. GERENDE

a. Manage and act as the Case Officer's principal in the supervision of LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA, LIENTRAP, LIJERSEY surveillance teams (until relieved by new staff agent) and LIEMPTYs 4 and 5.

b. Set up and maintain proper clandestine communications procedures with all agents under his supervision.

c. Review periodically all aspects of his operations for possible security, personnel and management problems.

[redacted]

[redacted]

d. Prepare monthly activities reports for all projects under his supervision.

e. Perform investigations on targets of opportunity as directed by the Case Officer.

f. Until a replacement is located, monitor and process the LIFEAT BGMORNING and LIFEAT Cuban Exiles taps.

LIMITED Base House Operator - LIEMPTY-6

a. Photograph individuals of interest who enter and leave the LIMERICK installation through the main gate.

b. Prepare logs and other reports on individuals of interest who visit and/or work at the LIMERICK installation.

c. Maintain the cover of the Base as a family residence.

LILYRIC Base House Operators - LIEMPTYs 13 and 14

Same tasks as the LIMITED Base House Operator

Agent - LIEMPTY-12

a. Serve as a cutout between GERENDE and LIEMPTY-13, the LILYRIC Base House Operator.

b. Insure proper tradecraft procedures are employed by the LILYRIC base.

c. Spot and report on individuals who would make suitable agent recruits for the Station.

LICALLA Base House Operator - LIEMPTY-9

a. Photograph individuals of interest who appear in the garden area of the LIMERICK installation.

b. Prepare logs and other reports on individuals of interest who visit and/or work at the LIMERICK installation.

c. Maintain the cover of the Base as a family residence.

LIENTRAP - LIEMPTYs10 and 11

a. Perform photographic and other investigative assignments as directed by the Station through GERENDE.

[redacted]

b. Protect the security of LIENTRAP and report all operational security developments involving the operation.

Staff Agent (to be selected by Headquarters)

a. Assume operational responsibility of the LIJERSEY surveillance team from GERENDE.

b. Develop the present LIJERSEY assets into a useable surveillance asset.

c. Train new surveillance team members in the art of discreet physical surveillance, including static, foot and mobile methods.

d. Spot, and where feasible, recruit new surveillance team members.

LIJERSEY Surveillance Team - LIEMPTYs 15, 16 and 17

a. Perform surveillances, pretext investigations and other investigative assignments as directed by the Station through GERENDE.

b. Strive constantly to improve their individual and collective investigative techniques.

Support Agent - LIEMPTY-4

a. Process and print film from LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA and LIENTRAP.

Support Agent - LIEMPTY-5

a. Translate and type material as received from the Station through GERENDE.

8. Coordination:

This project will not require coordination with other field stations.

9. Personnel:

a. Pseudonyms and cryptonyms

(1) Raymond H. GERENDE, aka LIEMPTY-1 (formerly LIPSTICK-20),
Position: Principal agent - Contract Agent

(2) Oliver G. SCANTLING, aka LIEMPTY-2 (formerly LIPSTICK-19),
Position: Principal Agent ORAL Contract effective February 1955.

(3) LIEMPTY-3 (formerly LIPSTICK-32), Position: Agent.

(4) LIEMPTY-4 (formerly LIPSTICK-38), Position: Support Agent

[redacted]

[redacted]

HMM-A-11257
KAPOK-1472

(5) LIEMPTY-5 (formerly LIPSTICK-40), Position: Support Agent

(6) LIEMPTY-6 (formerly LIPSTICK-14), Position: Agent, LIMITED Operator
Case contract effective 1 November 1957.

(7) LIEMPTY-7 (formerly LIPSTICK-27), wife of LIEMPTY-6.

(8) LIEMPTY-8 (formerly LIPSTICK-28), son of LIEMPTY-6. Case contract effective 1 December 1955

(9) LIEMPTY-9 (formerly LIPSTICK-39), Position: Agent, LICALLA operator.

(10) LIEMPTY-10 (formerly LIPSTICK-2), Position: Agent, Photo truck operator.
Case contract effective May 1955

(11) LIEMPTY-11 (formerly LIPSTICK-24), Position: Agent, Assistant photo truck operator.

(12) LIEMPTY-12 (formerly LIJERSEY-5), Position: Agent, cutout and spotter.
U.S. citizen.

(13) LIEMPTY-13 (formerly LIJERSEY-2), Position: Agent, LILYRIC Base House operator.

(14) LIEMPTY-14 (formerly LIJERSEY-12), Position: Agent, Assistant LILYRIC Base House operator. Wife of LIEMPTY-13.

(15) LIEMPTY-15 (formerly LIJERSEY-4), Position: Agent, LIJERSEY surveillance team member.

(16) LIEMPTY-16 (formerly LIJERSEY-8), Position: Agent, LIJERSEY surveillance team member.

(17) LIEMPTY-17 (formerly LIJERSEY-13), Position: Agent, LIJERSEY surveillance team member.

b. Personal Data:

Personal data on all personnel listed above have previously been provided to Headquarters, either in projects LIPSTICK or LIJERSEY or in each individual's PRQ, Parts I and II.

c. Operational Approvals:

(1) Raymond H. GERENDE, OA granted 29 February 1955, per HMMW-2067, dated 14 March 1955. C-32743

(2) Oliver G. SCANTLING, OA granted 2 December 1954, per HMMW-1894, dated 29 December 1954. C-26803

(3) LIEMPTY-3, OA granted 10 August 1956, file number C-46955, per HMMW-3412, dated 24 August 1956.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(4) LIEMPTY-4, OA granted 4 October 1956, file number C-51872, per HMMW-3593, dated 12 October 1956.

(5) LIEMPTY-5, OA granted 8 May 1957, file number C-58482, per HMMW-4521, 15 May 1957.

(6) LIEMPTY-6, OA granted 23 September 1954, per DIR 19215, 30 September 1954. C-24948

(7) LIEMPTY-7, OA granted 11 October 1955, per HMMW-2610, dated 25 October 1955. C-35075

(8) LIEMPTY-8, OA granted 14 October 1955, per HMMW-2622, dated 27 October 1955. C-35074

(9) LIEMPTY-9, OA granted 27 December 1956, file number C-56699, per HMMW-3940, dated 10 January 1957. CA dated 14 March 1957

(10) LIEMPTY-10, OA granted 10 April 1953, per HMMW-557, dated 23 April 1953. C-5578

(11) LIEMPTY-11, OA granted 14 September 1955, per HMMW-2542, dated 4 October 1955. C-41439

(12) LIEMPTY-12, OA granted 14 July 1955, per HMMW-2384, dated 22 July, 1955. C-36226

(13) LIEMPTY-13, OA granted 9 May 1956, per HMMW-3113, dated 22 May 1956. C-46945

(14) LIEMPTY-14, OA granted 16 October 1957, per HMMW-5402, dated 29 October 1957. C-61105

(15) LIEMPTY-15, OA granted 30 July 1956, and 15 December 1957 file number C-48284, per HMMW-3359, dated 8 August 1956.

(16) LIEMPTY-16, OA granted 14 February 1957, file number C-54098, per HMMW-4124, dated 20 February 1957.

(17) LIEMPTY-17, OA granted 23 September 1957, per HMMW-5282, dated 1 October 1957. C-62507

10. Cover:

a. Raymond H. GERENDE is the only LIEMPTY agent who has cover provided by KUBARK. GERENDE ostensibly is a salesman for LISTERINE's firm. However, he seldom spends any time pursuing his cover occupation, since his operational activities are so numerous and time consuming. GERENDE's cover with the LISTERINE firm was arranged by the Station and, so far, has been adequate for GERENDE's needs.

[redacted]

b. The Case Officer, Quinton N. OUSLER, is known only to GERENDE and SCANTLING. It would not be possible to develop a suitable cover story that would apply to the frequent meetings between the Case Officer and the Principal Agents; therefore, meetings are clandestine and are usually conducted in the Case Officer's car. However, suitable cover stories have been developed between the Case Officer and SCANTLING and between the Case Officer and GERENDE involving background information as to how we met and how our friendship developed, to be used in the event the Case Officer is apprehended with either of the Principal Agents.

c. None of the status cover occupations of any of the LIEMPTY agents is completely compatible with his operational activities. Action cover stories are decided upon before each assignment and devised to complement each agent's status cover as closely as possible. Base House operators, of course, generally conduct operational assignments within the confines of their quarters; consequently, the need for action cover stories is reduced. Appropriate cover stories exist between GERENDE and the agents in his network and between SCANTLING and LIEMPTY-3.

11. Contact and Communication:

Appropriate clandestine communications arrangements exist between the various echelons of LIEMPTY. At the present time these plans consist of regular and rapid-non scheduled (emergency) means of contact. GERENDE and SCANTLING are both in the process of preparing detailed written communications plans for their respective agents which include complete regular, alternate and rapid-non scheduled meeting arrangements. Provisions will also be made in these plans for oral recognition signals and physical bona fides that will enable a person unknown to the agent to contact him should the need ever arise. The Case Officer is currently working on a Warning System of Communications which will permit the expeditious exfiltration of GERENDE and SCANTLING from Mexico should a security situation arise which would necessitate this.

12. Control and Motivation:

a. Control - All LIEMPTY agents are local nationals. GERENDE and SCANTLING, both of whom spent a great deal of their childhood years in PBPRIME and still have relatives living in PBPRIME, are in many respects more pro-PBPRIME than many PBPRIME citizens. In the past, both GERENDE and SCANTLING have evidenced a high degree of loyalty to Matthew S. DINGLEY, their former Station Case Officer, and appear to be devoting that same loyalty to the present Case Officer. The control over GERENDE and SCANTLING stems directly from their pro-PBPRIME beliefs and their personal loyalty to their past and present Case Officers. The control over other LIEMPTY agents is based in part on pro-PBPRIME attitudes and on the financial remuneration and good handling they received from GERENDE and SCANTLING. Realistically, control over LIEMPTY agents is based on mutual understandings and confidence among individuals and should any agent decide to denounce PBPRIME or KUBARK, as the case may be, there is not much that the Station could do.

b. Motivation - With the exception of GERENDE and SCANTLING, whose primary motivations are ideological, financial compensation seems to be the basic motivational factor surrounding LIEMPTY agents.

[redacted]

13. Equipment and Other Support:

~~No special equipment or other support is required at this time.~~
See budgetary data sheet, pages 3 and 4 and [illegible] annexes

14. Timetable:

The agents and operations listed in this project have previously been carried under the LIPSTICK and LIJERSEY Projects. It is the Station's understanding that the LIPSTICK Project was extended to 1 December 1958 to give the Station time to submit LIEMPTY. The LIJERSEY Project expires in 1959 or upon approval of LIEMPTY.

The LIEMPTY Project represents a major operational support asset of the Mexico City Station and, as such, will run for an indefinite period of time.

[redacted]

[redacted]

HMM-A-11257
KAPOK-1472

PROJECT OUTLINE

PART II

CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

15. **Estimated Cost:**

Compensation:
(Note: Sufficient funds are indicated to provide for later justified raises to agents.)

Agent		US $ Per Annum	
Raymond H. GERENDE (to allow for possible raise)		$ 4,560.00	
Oliver G. SCANTLING		4,200.00	
LIEMPTY-3		2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-4		2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-5 @ $1.75 per hour		2,400.00	
LIEMPTY-6		2,400.00	
LIEMPTY-7 No Salary		- -	
LIEMPTY-8 No Salary		- -	
LIEMPTY-9		2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-10		3,600.00	
LIEMPTY-11		2,500.00	
LIEMPTY-12		1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-13		1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-14		1,250.00	
LIEMPTY-15		1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-16		1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-17		1,800.00	
Six additional agents @ $2,000		12,000.00	
Staff Agent (to be selected by Hqs)			
Salary	$8,330.00		
Quarters	2,500.00		
Education Allowance	640.00		
Travel	1,000.00		
Shipment of HHE	2,000.00		
		14,470.00	
Sub-total			62,380.00

Operational Expenses:

Automobiles (3 autos & 1 truck) Maintenance, operational expenses, replacement of parts.	2,500.00	
Travel of agents by commercial carrier	500.00	
Sub-total		3,000.00

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operational Equipment:		
Replacement of 2 LIJERSEY autos (MV-2148 & MV-2147)	6,000.00	
Replacement of SCANTLING's QP auto (MV-2041)	3,000.00	
Replacement of LIENTRAP (MV-2138)	2,500.00	
Purchase of 1 used auto for LIJERSEY surveillance	4,000.00	
Purchase of 3 two-way radios & one base radio for LIJERSEY team	2,500.00	
Repair and maintenance of cameras and radio equipment	500.00	
Purchase of new photo equipment and supplies	2,500.00	
Sub-total		21,000.00
Real Estate:		
Rent, utilities and maintenance of following safehouses: Per Annum		
* LIMITED	500.00	
*LICALLA	1,000.00	
* LILYRIC	1,000.00	
Sub-total		2,500.00
Funds for procurement and servicing of additional safehouses, post office boxes, or renting automobiles		2,000.00
Exchange commodities (required as godwill gifts)		500.00
Damages (broken contracts, "key" money to obtain locations in choice areas, rent deposits, etc.)		2,000.00
Purchase of information, purchase of identification documents, payment of bribes, etc.		2,000.00
TOTAL		$ 95,380.00 U.S.

*LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to the Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to Station miscellaneous receipts.

[redacted]

50-6-74/1

14-00000

[redacted]

HMM-A-11257
KAPOK-1472

16. Special Problems and Commitments:

a. No commitments, expressed or implied, have been made to any LIEMPTY agent by the present Case Officer, except as stated in the project outline and/or in the contracts of GERENDE and SCANTLING.

b. In the event of compromise to the local government of any LIEMPTY agent, KUBARK is morally responsible for doing all within its power, and within the limitations of security, for resettling or otherwise taking care of the LIEMPTY agents.

c. No special benefit commitments have been made to any LIEMPTY agent except those contained in the contracts of GERENDE and SCANTLING.

d. A change of government or political conditions in Mexico will not affect this project. It is a unilateral effort on the part of KUBARK.

CS COPY

[redacted]

50-6-74/1

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component) WH	**SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION**
TO :	
TO : (Station/Base)	FROM: (Division)

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12

ITEM 3-ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS

ITEM 6-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE

ITEM 7 AND 8-USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES

ITEM 10-ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES. SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED. TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE	2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER		
	COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT	50	6	74/1

3 FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4 ANALYSIS ACTION				5 DISPOSITION			
	OPEN FILE		CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)		RETAIN		DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)
X	AMEND FILE TITLE		REOPEN				

6 REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

FORMERLY LIEMPTY

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)	8 INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
HMM	50

9. FILES ACTION

	HOLD IN CS FILES		RESTRICTED		UNRESTRICTED		PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER		CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

[illegible]

11 ENDORSEMENT	12 COORDINATION	13. RID APPROVAL
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)	REQUEST APPROVED BY Louis W. Armstrong RID/AL

EFFECTIVE DATE	CODE (FILE) NUMBER		
	050	006	074/01

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG. 2-64

SECRET

38

1-CS COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CASE FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 24 October 1958

FROM: (Requester Name) Charlotte Zehrung

COMPONENT	BUILDING	ROOM NO.	TELEPHONE
WH	Barton	2120	2758

1. CASE TITLE

LIEMPTY/ Development & Plans

2. COUNTRY AND NUMBER: 50 (Mexico)

3. CATEGORY AND NUMBER: 6 Operational

4. ACTION REQUESTED

X	OPEN FILE AS INDICATED.
	AMEND FILE AS INDICATED.
	CLOSE FILE
X	RESTRICT FILE TO (DESK) WH/III/Mexico
X	PERMANENT CHARGEOUT TO (DESK). WH/III/Mexico
	PREPARE FILE FOLDERS AND SEND TO REQUESTER.

5. COMMENTS: (Include brief description of file or project)

Photo and physical surveillance coverage and support for station.

RECORD COPY

6. FOR RI USE ONLY

1. PROJECT STATUS: A

2. FIELD STATION(S): MEXI

3. HDQRS. COMPONENT(S): WH/III/M

7. ENDORSEMENT

THIS REQUEST SATISFIES RECORDS REQUIREMENTS.

C Zehrung

RI/ANALYSIS

EFFECTIVE DATE: 29 October 1958

8. APPROVAL

REQUEST APPROVED

RONALD D. MORGEN

FOR CHIEF, RI

RI CASE TITLE NUMBER

50	6	71/1	N.S.

FORM NO. 812 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 DEC 56

SECRET

(34)

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KDBADGER Vol VI
Operations

INCLUSIVE DATES: 3 Jan 1962 - 19 Dec 1963
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LA/DDO
ROOM: 3C34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
26.6.78	6/26	D. HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
6/27/78		D. HARDWAY	D Hardway
26 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	D. Hardway
27 JULY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
~~15 NOV 78~~		~~[illegible]~~	
11/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
[illegible]		GENZMAN	Genzman

14
15.

S MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

FORM 3-62

folder

KDBADGER 50-6-75/3

OPERATIONS

LIENVOY OPERATIONS 50-6-75/
JANUARY 1962 - DECEMBER 1963 VOL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO IP/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM 3-60 2593 (7-13)

Chaw

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

XX

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief, SR Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LCIMPROVE/LIENVOY - Terro de WANSTRAM or WANSTROHM (phonetic)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded under separate cover as Attachment A are two LIENVOY transcripts of 12 November 1963 and two LIENVOY transcripts of 13 November 1963 which Headquarters may consider for transmittal to Station Stockholm.

2. Forwarded under separate cover as Attachment B is a photograph of an unidentified male (who was accompanied by an unidentified female whose photograph the Station asset did not obtain) who visited the Soviet Embassy at 1400 hours on 12 November 1963. The Station believes this male is identical with Subject since the male in the photograph is the only unidentified male who was also accompanied by a woman and, secondly, this male appears to be a nordic type. The Station recognizes, however, that Subject may have only claimed to be a Swede for cover purposes.

3. The following is the comment made by Douglas J. FEINGLASS, the Station's LIENVOY translator, concerning Attachment A:

> "The exact spelling of this name could not be determined. He started by saying that it is - W - Ä - N.. and then stopped, emphasizing the two dots above Ä. It is very strange that he, being a Swede did not seek the aid of his Swedish Consulate, but applied to the Soviet Embassy and asked for a man, whom he met by chance (?) in a restaurant. But stranger still is the response of the Embassy officials, who went out of their way to find a ship for him. Usually requests of this nature are brushed aside and quite often in a very rude manner. Judging from his non-British accent and almost flawless English, he must have lived in the United States or Canada for quite some time." (The Station REDWOOD officer agrees with FEINGLASS' comment regarding the usual reluctance of Soviet Embassy officials to help in a matter of this type.)

4. Station Mexico has no record of any member of the Soviet Embassy travelling to Oaxaca during this period.

5. Station Mexico ~~has~~ no traces on Subject.

D w/O S/S
RID/WH Jum

CS COPY

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

50-6-75/3

Distribution:
2 - WH w/att A & B (u/s/c)
1 - SR w/att A & B (u/s/c)

CROSS REFERENCE TO: T: SR/CI/A

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-22630

DATE: 19 December 1963

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER: Unknown

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIENVOY-8 C-78604 OA 17 Oct 1959

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference:
A. HMMW-12027 dated 23 Oct 1963
B. HMMA-21331 dated 10 May 1963
C. HMMA-20408 dated 19 December 1962

1. Station Mexico regrets the confusion over the status of LIENVOY-8. He was terminated 29 February 1960. An Agent Service Record is attached.

2. The cryptonym LIENVOY-8 in HMMA-20408 dated 19 December 1962 should have been LIENVOY-6. Headquarters noted that LIENVOY-6 had been omitted and called this to the attention of the Station in HMMW-11457 dated 4 April 1963. It was not noticed at that time that LIENVOY-8 had been included in error in the project renewal request instead of LIENVOY-6.

Willard C. CURTIS

Enclosure:
Agent Service Record

Distribution:
3 - WH, w encl

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-22449

DATE
7 November 1963

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-118406

SECRET

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - NOVEMBER 1963

HMMs

HMM 8054
HMM 8046
HMM 8041
HMM 8039
HMM 8030
HMM 8026
HMM 8019
HMM 8018
HMM 8004
HMM 8002

10

+

MEXIs

MEXI 7137
MEXI 7133
MEXI 7127
MEXI 7119
MEXI 7106 (HMM 8079)
MEXI 7068
MEXI 7065
MEXI 7033
MEXI 7028
MEXI 7010 (HMM 8067)
MEXI 7000 (HMM 8057)
MEXI 6975
MEXI 6972
MEXI 6955 (HMM 8047)
MEXI 6937 (HMM 8045)
MEXI 6848 (HMM 8008)
MEXI 6840 (HMM 8001)
MEXI 6838 (HMM 8000)
MEXI 6830 (HMM 7994)
MEXI 6813 (HMM 7990)
MEXI 6810
MEXI 6805
MEXI 6790
MEXI 6757 (HMM 7973)

24

+

HMMAs

HMMA-22518
HMMA-22472
HMMA-22452
HMMA-22449
HMMA-22422

5 = 39

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Monthly Operational Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: None. For Headquarters information.

Reference: HMMA-22135, 13 September 1963.

1. There follows the monthly operational report for Project LIENVOY activities during September 1963.

2. Target Lines - September 1963.

The following lines were covered during the month of September:

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio ✓
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	- Braulio Maldonado Sandez ✓
43-01-85	-Melquiades Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	-Alfonso Aguilar Monteverde MLN
24-61-75	-Jorge L. Tamayo Castellejos MLN
45-59-52	-David Alfaro Siqueiros [illegible]
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-06	-Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero MLN
11-16-48	-Ignacio Acosta Lagunez MLN
19-15-06	-Roberto Romero Adams -

(continued)

Enclosure:
Production Report

Removed from Project KUBARGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 5

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/encl

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA- 22267

DATE
✓ 8 October 1963

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 50-6-75/3

10-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
46-09-50	D.F.S. (disconnected 18 September 1963)
35-36-52	Politica (Revista- Manuel Marcue Pardinas)
46-60-15	Prensa Latina
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy (disconnected 23 September 1963)
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy (apartment of Ramon Sinobas disconnected on 23 September 1963 when apartment became vacant)
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy
20-38-98	Yugoslav Embassy (connected 18 September 1963)
20-68-69	Yugoslav Embassy (connected 23 September 1963)
20-68-23	Yugoslav Embassy (connected 23 September 1963)

Headquarters will note from the above that three lines were disconnected in order to cover three Yugoslav lines. Two of the lines which were disconnected were Cuban Embassy lines, both were not in use by the Cubans. One was in the apartment which had been vacated by Ramon Sinobas and not occupied by other Cubans. The other was a telephone in the Cuban Embassy which was never answered. The Cubans are trying to get Sinobas' line moved to the Embassy. They have also asked for the telephone company to repair 14-92-14. As soon as these lines are working again, coverage of two of the Yugoslav Embassy lines will be dropped in order to pick up all the Cuban lines which are presumed to have a much higher priority.

3. Processing of LIENVOY Information

The Station continues to receive full transcripts in Spanish on the Cuban lines (three), the Soviet Embassy lines (five), and as of 18 and 23 September the Yugoslav lines (three). These transcripts are received each morning for the day before. During September, the LIENVOY monitors transcribed 1396 pages in addition to the daily resumen.

The outside translators now working on LIENVOY transcripts are Orville HORSFALL, staff agent, who is used for almost any backlog which begins to occur.

David B. SCHLAGETER, field contract agent, who transcribes the Czech take.

Victor W. OBOLD, career agent, who transcribes the Yugoslav portion of the Yugoslav take.

Douglas J. FEINGLASS, staff agent, who continues to transcribe the Russian language portion of the Soviet take.

4. Exploitation of LIENVOY Information

Two leads from LIENVOY of operational interest in September 1963 were:

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~S E C R E T~~ / [redacted]T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-22267

a. On 2 September 1963 a Russian speaking female contacted the Soviet Embassy and asked for Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, KGB. She identified herself by name and as a professor from New Orleans. She gave the address of her apartment and asked for a meeting. This lead was promptly followed up by station investigative assets who identified the woman and learned that she was attending a philosophers' conference at the University of Mexico. She returned to the United States on 17 September. All available information was forwarded to Headquarters for passing to ODENVY.

b. MEXI-6135 reported the contact between an unidentified Czech woman and the Czech Embassy.

5. Liaison

On 18 September 1963 Oliver G. GALBOND and Willard C. CURTIS met with LIELEGANT and LIERGO. They also saw LIELEGANT on 20 September.

6. Security

There were no security problems during this month.

7. Technical

There were no technical problems which AREHART could not handle.

8. Personnel

Robert B. RIGGS continues to meet Arnold AREHART each morning before 0800 hours to receive all LIENVOY tapes and trascripts from the previous day. The daily meetings with Victor W. OBOLD and David B. SCHLAGETER, the two EE translators, were transferred on 18 September 1963 from the Station EE case officer to the KURIOT technician, Gregory D. PARMUTH who delivers and receives reels and transcripts from them each day. PARMUTH also acts as a cutout for Douglas J. FEINGLASS.

Paul V. LEVISTER, Headquarters KUTUBE officer, visited the Station from 22 September to 1 October to consult with LIENVOY and LIFEAT case officers in preparation for a report to be written on the two projects as examples of tap operations which produce both positive intelligence and operational leads.

9. Production

There is attached a list of reports,cables and dispatches forwarded to Headquarters during this month.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

50-6-75/3

SECRET

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - SEPTEMBER 1963

MEXIs		HMMAs		HMMs		
MEXI 6333 (HMM 7812)		HMMA 22194		HMM 7795		
MEXI 6332 (HMM 7810)		HMMA 22193		HMM 7783		
MEXI 6319 (HMM 7804)		HMMA 22159		HMM 7770		
MEXI 6302 (HMM 7801)		HMMA 22149		HMM 7767		
MEXI 6271 (HMM 7787)		HMMA 22135		HMM 7742		
MEXI 6215 (HMM 7761)		HMMA 22116		HMM 7725		
MEXI 6205 (HMM 7760)		HMMA 22115		HMM 7724		
MEXI 6135		HMMA 22066		HMM 7723		
MEXI 6133 (HMM 7743)		HMMA 22052				
MEXI 6129 (HMM 7741)						
MEXI 6107						
MEXI 6104 (HMM 7736)						
MEXI 6097 (HMM 7728)						
MEXI 6042 (HMM 7711)						
MEXI 6038 (HMM 7708)						
MEXI 6034						
MEXI 6030 (HMM 7706)						
MEXI 6029 (HMM 7707)						
18	+	9	+	8	=	35

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

50-6-75/3

PERSONALITY BRIEF

1. **General Lazaro CARDENAS del Rio**

As a pro-Communist, anti-United States former (1934-1940) President of Mexico, CARDENAS plays an important role in the political activities of Mexico by virtue of his being the spirtual leader of a great part of the Mexican left. His leftist sympathies appear to fall primarily with the current regime in Cuba (He alledgedly is a close personal friend of Fidel CASTRO), secondarily with Communist China, and lastly with the USSR.

2. Braulio MALDONADO Sandez

MALDONADO is a politically unscrupulous pro-Communist former Governor of Baja California. He is a national leader of at least three Mexican leftist organizations: (1) FEP (People's Electoral Front), united single front of Mexican Communists and Leftists; (2) MLN (National Liberation Movement), rabidly anti-U.S., pro-Cuba Communist Front; and (3) CCI (Independent Peasants' Center), radical, anti-Mexican Government organization. Having been banished from Mexico until after the 1964 elections for anti-government activities, MALDONADO is currently in Europe and seeking admittance to the USSR, obstensibly to visit his daughter who is a student at the Friendship University in Moscow.

3. Alonso AGUILAR Monteverde

AGUILAR is a prominent pro-Communist Mexican intellectual who is the titular head of the MLN (National Liberation Movement), rabidly anti-U.S., pro-Communist front. He is a full-time professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and maintains active contact with several international leftist and Communist figures. He has recently travelled to Cuba and Warsaw.

4. Jorge Leonidas TAMAYO Castillejos

TAMAYO is a Communist professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. He is a leading member of many Communist front activities in Mexico including the CMP (Mexican Peace

50-6-75/3

Committee), the MLN (National Liberation Movement), and the CEM (Circle of Mexican Studies). He has been in contact with several leftist figures of various echelon, including Gen. Lazaro CARDENAS, the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, and Polish, Soviet, and Chinese Communist officials. TAMAYO's son has studied in Warsaw and travelled to the USSR and Communist China.

5. Jose David ALFARO Siqueiros

ALFARO, one of Mexico's most prominent artists, has been imprisoned for eight (8) years as a consequence of the role he played in the Communist-inspired railroad stike of 1959. He is a leader of the PCM (Mexican Communist Party) and has visited the Soviet Union. He fought for the Loyalist Army in the Spanish Civil War and was later arrested in Mexico for complicity in the murder of Leon TROTSKY's secretary. ALFARO has a long history of pro-Communist, anti-U.S. leanings.

6. Roberto ROMERO Adams

ROMERO is an informant for the Cuban Intelligence Service in Mexico.

7. Enrique GONZALEZ Pedrero

Pro-Communist professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, GONZALEZ Pedrero has contributed to the writing or editing of at least five (5) leftist publications in Mexico. He is a member of the National Committee of the MLN, has alledgedly received training in the Soviet Union, and has travelled to Cuba twice in recent times.

8. Ignacio ACOSTA Lagunes

Pro-Communist ACOSTA, a lawyer, is an aide of General CARDENAS and a leading member of the MLN. He frequently has contact with high-level personnel of both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City. His political activities include travel to Cuba and the Soviet Union, aid in the management of the Communist Trade Fair in Mexico, and a great deal of participation in promoting sympathy for the Cuban Revolution in Mexico.

9. Direccion Federal de Seguridad - Federal Security Police

The principal functions of this security unit are to: (1) Provide a plain-clothed security detail for the President, (2) maintain an extensive telephone tap activity on both the Rightist and Leftist political opposition forces, and (3) perform investigations and arrests of primarily political offenses. The unit's agents are largely poorly trained, insecure, and unreliable. Their professional characteristics are best described as being dishonest, cruel, and abusive. The position, at this moment, of Manuel RANGEL Escamilla as Director General of DFS is precarious.

10. Politica

A Marxist anti-U.S. semi-monthly magazine published in Mexico, Politica is printed by Talleres Graficos de Mexico, the same shop which prints La Voz de Mexico. In addition to the modest revenues derived from a circulation of 15,000 to 25,000, Politica is financed by the Soviet Embassy, the MLN, the PPS, and possibly, the Cuban Embassy. As an indication of the Mexican government's assessment of the capability of this magazine to influence public opinion, it is worthwhile noting that Politica frequently experiences a great degree of difficulty in printing and circulating itself due to the government's repressive efforts.

11. Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN)

Organized under the influence of the PCM in August 1961, the MLN today is dedicated to the furtherance of the mutual interests of its adherents who are found primarily in the ranks of the PRI, the PPS, the PCM, the CNC and the UGOCM. The MLN's objective is to gain leftist political representation in the government by inciting PRI to accept leftists into its camp. As a consequence of this objective, the mission of MLN is to generate evidence of popular leftist sympathy by means of fomenting agitation among the popular, labor, and peasant masses.

12. Confederacion de Trabajadores de la America Latina (CTAL)

The CTAL has recently been replaced by the CUTAL (Single Confederation of Latin American Workers). Until recently, the pro-Communist, CTAL, which is described as being the liaison bureau of the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) whose headquarters are in Prague, was headed by Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano.

13. Prensa Latina

Operating directly under the Cuban Communist regime, Prensa Latina is obstensibly a press service. In reality, however, it is the official propaganda organ of the Cuban Government. Prensa Latina works closely with Tass, the Soviet Agency; with Hsinhua, the Chinese Agency; and with Cetepka, the Czechoslovakian Agency.

50-6-75/3

~~SECRET~~

X

: Chief of Station, Mexico City

: Chief of Station, Guatemala City

: Chief, WH Division

: Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ Garvin (201-68248)

Refs: A. HMMW-11838, 16 August 1963

B. HMMA-22262, 8 October 1963

1. Reference is made to your question about the type information needed on GUTIERREZ. Headquarters is interested in "current" information on his activities, and especially on his travels and his contact with Manuel VEGA Perez, Chief of G-2 at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The comment on HMM-7289 regarded only the non-dissemination of the report, and was not intended to discourage the Station from reporting information on meetings between GUTIERREZ and VEGA.

2. Headquarters would appreciate receiving, on a continuing basis, pertinent information on GUTIERREZ extracted from the LIENVOY take.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City
1 - COS, Guatemala

24 October 1963

HMMW-12049

~~SECRET~~ 201-68248

2 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Foreign Intelligence

SUBJECT: TDY to Mexico City

1. After taking a good look at LIENVOY and LIFEAT, I would agree with the persons I talked with in Mexico; they maintain that any well-run tap operation should produce substantial intelligence information, provided the targets are of intelligence interest, and provided also there are people at the station who look for it and are able to recognize it. The case of LIFEAT is interesting in this respect: It has been deprived of its most productive lines in favor of LIENVOY, and yet its intelligence production compares favorably, with that of the other productive taps, except LIENVOY.

2. Mexico has people who can detect any little item of intelligence significance. This includes the Chief of Station, who goes over the highlights of the previous day's take every morning and marks certain items for action by station case officers or reports officers. The reports officers work on copies of the take at the same time.

3. There are several aspects of LIENVOY that make it an excellent operation and an outstanding producer of intelligence. I will describe them in detail when my notes get here from the station. The principal factors in the success of LIENVOY seem to be the following.

a. The agreement made with top Mexican officials, unlike many such agreements elsewhere, is as much in effect today as it was at the start: the targeting is not based on personal politics; the intercept staff has stayed on the job; the equipment is considered to be on loan from CIA.

b. The native monitoring staff has reached a peak of effectiveness that everyone at the station praises very highly.

c. The station is organized to handle the take speedily as soon as it comes in. The Chief of Station, the case officers, the reports officers, all work on it at the same time and exchange views on hot items. They do not let reports backlogs accumulate.

d. Each new item on a target person is linked to a past history; what appears as a fragmentary bit in a conversation becomes a meaningful development in a continuous story. Continuity on the job makes this possible.

e. The equipment is kept in good working order by complete cleaning and checking of each unit once a month. The 32 units in use today are those installed in 1959.

4. A detailed description of LIENVOY and its counterpart LIFEAT should provide good models with which to compare other tap operations. It should give criteria for good procedures. It should give some idea of the desirable size of such operations, considering the available targets, the size of the station, and the other tasks and operations of the station. It should show what the station puts into its tap operations and what it gets out of them. LIENVOY and LIFEAT are an interesting example of two interacting operations, one joint and the other independent.

5. My stay in Mexico was as interesting and fruitful as it was enjoyable. And I hope it was not too great a burden on the station.

gc

cc: C/WH/3

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : J.M. WHITTEN:jpm
UNIT : WH/3
EXT : 5613
DATE : 16 Sept 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

17 SEP 63 15 23z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, RF, VR

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 68906

RYBAT LIENVOY

IDEN IN BRILLARD MESSAGE TO CURTIS TRANSMITTED BY GALBOND IS MR. GERARD CAMPAGNA.

END OF MESSAGE

Lienvoy/oro

J.C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J.M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

1.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/[illegible]~~

PROCESSING ACTION

XX

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM ~~Chief of Station, Mexico City~~

SUBJECT Monthly Operational Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Action: None. For Headquarters' information.

Ref : HMMA-22005, 23 August 1963

1. There follows the monthly operational report for Project LIENVOY activities during August 1963.

2. Target Lines - August 1963.

There were no changes in the target lines during this reporting period. The Yugoslav lines have not yet been connected but one of them should be operating by the end of September.

3. Processing of LIENVOY Information.

HMMA-22000 dated 21 August 1963 transmitted the first group of copies of transcripts against the Cuban lines. Since that time, carbon copies have been forwarded to Headquarters on a weekly basis.

Orville HORSFALL, staff agent, has eliminated the backlog of some fifty reels from the Russian lines and at the present time is working on the Polish LIFEAT coverage which Woodrow GABEOTT (ps) has not been able to handle. HORSFALL will be used in this capacity only until the Station has a higher priority job for him or until his permanent assignment is determined.

There has been no change in Douglas J. FEINGLASS' assignment since the last progress report.

4. Exploitation of LIENVOY Information.

The following are some (not all) of the exploitations during August 1963 of leads from LIENVOY:

a. LIENVOY contributed support to the REDWOOD AEJUMBO operation during this period by confirming several contacts between the principals involved. Details of this case have been reported by the Station SR Case Officer.

b. On 8 August LIENVOY reported indications that an unnamed

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-22135

DATE 13 September 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/[illegible]~~

HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-75/13

DIZTAG diplomat stationed in Caracas planned to travel alone by plane to Mexico City via Panama carrying a diplomatic pouch for turnover in Mexico and return to Caracas with diplomatic mail received from DIZTAG couriers in Mexico. This was reported to Headquarters, Caracas, and Panama as a possible opportunity to obtain or copy these pouches. (MEXI-5681)

c. On 7 August this project revealed contact between the Partido Popular Socialista and the Soviet Embassy. Roberto JARAMILLO Flores, national leader of the Juventud Popular Socialista, the youth organization of the Marxist Partido Popular Socialista, arranged for an urgent meeting with Nikolaiy Sergeyevich LEONOV, Third Secretary and Cultural Officer of the Soviet Embassy. It will be recalled that LEONOV went to the Soviet Union and acted as interpreter for Fidel CASTRO on his visit there earlier this year. MEXI-5705 transmitted a report on JARAMILLO's contact with LEONOV.

d. On 5 August LIENVOY reported the presence in Mexico of one Doctor Paul BARAN who was in contact with Cuban Embassy officials and prominent Mexican Marxist intellectuals. BARAN appeared to be on a trip throughout South America. A check of Station files revealed that this was probably identical with Paul Alexander BARAN, Russian born naturalized U. S. citizen and professor of economics at Stanford University, Palo Alto, California. BARAN has visited Mexico in the past and made contact with American Communists and Mexican leftists. This information was sent to Headquarters in MEXI-5735 for dissemination to ODENVY.

e. On 12 August William ROSE, who identified himself as a student from the United States studying at the University of Mexico (UNAM), asked for an interview with Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, Secretary General of the Popular Socialist Party (PPS). ROSE claimed to have letters of introduction to LOMBARDO from labor leaders in the United States. A check of Station files revealed William Maurice ROSE, 1474 Federal Way, Salt Lake City, Utah, as a student at the UNAM. This report was sent to Headquarters in MEXI-5752 for dissemination to ODENVY.

f. On 1 August Henry WALLSCHMIDT, 3662 Carrington Avenue, Los Angeles, California, contacted the Soviet Embassy and volunteered his services to them. The details of this contact were forwarded to Headquarters via HMMA-21905 for dissemination to ODENVY.

g. On 7 August a person who claimed to be a U.S. citizen with a name which sounded like ARNERO contacted the Soviet Embassy and referred to a previous visit at the Embassy when he discussed information on ship movements. He also asked for asylum and made an appointment to see Oleg NECHIPORENKO, Soviet Vice Consul and KGB officer. A person of American appearance was photographed by LIEMPTY at the time of the arranged appointment. A sanitized copy of this photograph together with information from LIENVOY was passed locally to ODENVY. MEXI-5784 forwarded the report to Headquarters.

h. On 9 August LIENVOY reported that an American pilot with wife and small son were at the Cuban Embassy trying to get a visa to go to Cuba. MEXI-5794 reported details for Headquarters. ODENVY was advised locally after receiving Headquarters' authorization.

i. LIENVOY covered the activities of Barry Terry PRIMUS, New York actor who was expelled from Mexico on 19 August for participating in Marxist-Communist public disturbances on 18 August. See MEXI-5854 and 5855 for further details.

j. On 20 August Moe FISHMAN, Secretary of Veterans of the Lincoln Brigade in the U.S. asked the wife of David Alfaro SIQUEIROS how the Brigade could help free SIQUEIROS. FISHMAN also made an appointment to meet with Margarita NELKEN, prominent Spanish Communist exile. MEXI-5864 transmitted this report to Headquarters for dissemination to ODENVY.

5. Liaison.

As reported in reference Willard C. CURTIS met with LITENSOR to arrange for a sensitive PBRUMEN case on 15 August 1963. The case is still pending.

14-00000

6. Security.

There were no security incidents within the project during this month.

7. Technical.

There were no technical problems which AREHART could not handle.

8. Personnel.

There have been no changes in personnel since the last report.

9. Production.

There is attached a list of reports, cables and dispatches forwarded to Headquarters during this month.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

~~SECRET~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - AUGUST 1963

MEXIs	HMMs	HMMAs
MEXI-5977 (HMM 7698)	HMM 7694	HMMA 21964
MEXI-5976 (HMM 7697)	HMM 7690	HMMA 21963
MEXI-5892	HMM 7672	HMMA 21958
MEXI-5864	HMM 7665	HMMA 21940
MEXI-5863	HMM 7653	HMMA 21936
MEXI-5856	HMM 7650	HMMA 21931
MEXI-5855 (HMM 7644)	HMM 7635	HMMA 21910
MEXI-5854	HMM 7640	HMMA 21905
MEXI-5803	HMM 7631	HMMA 21900
MEXI-5794	HMM 7627	HMMA 21874
MEXI-5789	HMM 7610	
MEXI-5783 (HMM 7633)	HMM 7602	
MEXI-5782 (HMM 7632)	HMM 7599	
MEXI 5757	HMM 7598	
MEXI 5753	HMM 7597	
MEXI 5752	HMM 7595	
MEXI 5705 (HMM 7609)	HMM 7585	
MEXI 5675 (HMM 7601)	HMM 7583	
MEXI 5672	HMM 7581	
MEXI 5644	HMM 7567	
20 +	20 +	10 = 50

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

LIENVOY [illegible] ops
13 September 1963

Mr. Whitten:

I just learned that Mr. George sent his note to Mr. Scott directly to Colonel King. The note mentions my pseudo, Paul V. Levister. Perhaps Col. King would want to jot down my true name somewhere, GERARD CAMPAGNA.

I read our LIENVOY Project file yesterday and got excellent additional information from Tig Puckett. It's always encouraging to get into such good operations

Jerry Campagna

Next week I would like to read further into LIENVOY and LIFEAT, especially the monthly reports and the disseminated reports.

12 September 1963

Dear Willard:

This may seem to you like a voice out of the void, but I always carry in my mind your repeated invitations to visit you and remember clearly your acquaintance and kindness to my brother. Strangely enough it seems to continue to be true that the only escape from this jail-like desk is back to my old area where I never expected to return--I even had one this Spring. Just now I have a specific reason for wanting to visit your place, that is, in addition to our own personal reasons.

For some time I have been bent on trying to push for more positive information from taps and audio. I realize that it is taken for granted around the world that the purpose of taps and audio is for operational leads, particularly in the KUDESK field.

In one or two places in the world, positive production is outstanding and we have been making a study for some time trying to see why it works in some cases and not in others. One of the outstanding examples is LIFEAT and especially LIENVOY. These seem to be far ahead of other similar operations around the world even though they seem to approach the problem somewhat similarly. It occurred to me that we might find out what makes yours so especially effective by having one of my people go to your station for a few days to talk with you and your officers and get the detailed story. I could then take another look at the other operations and see what's missing or what's wrong. I'm sure this would be of great help to the place as a whole. If you agree, I will send Paul V. Levister (Iden), the editor of our Foreign Intelligence Series (our Staff doctrinal papers, the first few of which have been dispatched to you). He could be in Mexico City on or about 23 September, or any time thereafter that is more convenient for you and your people. Could you let us know your reaction by cable, and if it's favorable, when you would prefer to have Levister arrive. We would confirm his ETA by cable.

Galbond is leaving tomorrow to make a visit down your way and I have asked him to be kind enough to pass this to you. The desk here concurs in our interest subject to your approval.

file LIENVOY jps

DISPATCH

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Monthly Operational Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: None. For Headquarters Information.

Reference: HMMA-21845, 30 July 1963

1. There follows the monthly operational report for Project LIENVOY activities during July 1963.

2. Target Lines - July 1963.

The following lines were covered during the month of July:

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
43-01-85	Melquiades Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castellejos
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunez
19-15-06	Roberto Romero Adams

(continued)

Enclosure:
Production Report

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/encl

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

50-6-75/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-22005

DATE
23 August 1963

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/3

[redacted]

~~SECR~~

10-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
46-09-50	D.F.S.
35-36-52	Politica (Revista - Manuel Marcue Pardinas)
46-60-15	Prensa Latina
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Films Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy

On 7 August 1963 the Station EE case officer requested LIENVOY coverage of the Yugoslav lines. Arrangements are being made to put these lines in within the near future.

3. Processing of LIENVOY Information.

The Station continues to receive full transcripts in Spanish from ten lines (five Cuban Embassy and five Soviet Embassy). DIR-60764 dated 13 August 1963 asked the Station to send to Headquarters one copy of the full transcripts from the Cuban Embassy lines. These are being forwarded on a weekly basis. The first group is being forwarded as an attachment to HMMA-22000 dated 21 August 1963. If they do not please Headquarters officers who desire them, it is requested that the Mexico Station be promptly advised with any suggestions for changes.

On 6 August 1963 Orville HORSFALL, staff agent, arrived in Mexico to work presently as a unilateral monitor but eventually as the supervisor of a tap center either under LIENVOY or LITEMPO. He has established himself outside and is presently at work eliminating the backlog of Soviet tapes.

Douglas J. FEINGLASS continues to do the Russian from LIENVOY, the Russian from two LIFEAT lines on Soviet targets, and the Russian from the LIPAWN audio operation. In addition, FEINGLASS sends clipped transcripts to the Station ready for 201 files.

4. Exploitation of LIENVOY Information.

HMMW-11831 dated 6 August 1963 indicated that Headquarters was not well informed on the way the Mexico Station exploits operational leads from LIENVOY. The outside staff agent, Arnold AREHART has instructions to alert the Station immediately if a U.S. citizen or English speaking person tries to contact any of the target installations. This is done by a telephone call from outside the tap center at a pay phone to Robert B. RIGGS inside the Station. Emergency meetings are arranged in double talk (meeting for coffee or lunch). RIGGS meets AREHART within fifteen minutes at a pre-arranged downtown location and receives the reel with an extract of the pertinent conversation. The reel is then taken to the Station and given to the case officer responsible for the target the person was trying to contact. Headquarters is notified by cable of the action taken. Only in rare cases is information on a U.S. citizen passed without prior Headquarters approval.

Other leads appear in the full transcripts or daily resumen. They also are exploited by the Station case officer responsible for the target where the lead appears. For example, on 12 August 1963 Boris KAZANTSEV, recently arrived Counselor of the Soviet Embassy and former defection target in Mexico, called his wife at their residence. The number was not listed but was immediately checked by Raymond GERENDE who determined that the number was the switchboard of the apartment house where KAZANTSEV and several other families live. The reason the Station checked out this number was to put unilateral coverage on it if possible; however, the switchboard was beyond the Station's capability to handle.

Maryknoll priest Felix McGOWAN contacted the Cuban Embassy on 31 July 1963. MEXI-5565 reported details of this contact. This cable was sent to Headquarters for dissemination and action by ODENVY.

Professor WEBB (fnu) of the University of Louisiana contacted Mexican Communist Jorge L. TAMAYO Castillejos, prominent Mexican Marxist intellectual and professor at the University of Mexico, and arranged to meet with him on 31 July 1963. MEXI-5568 reported this contact to Headquarters for dissemination and action by ODENVY.

Bartolo (fnu) contacted former Governor of Baja California, Braulio MALDONADO Sandez on 16 July 1963 regarding the sale of Cuban pesos. MEXI-5569 reported this contact to Headquarters for dissemination and action by ODENVY.

5. Liaison

On 15 August 1963 Willard C. CURTIS met with LITENSOR to arrange for a sensitive PBRUMEN case (MEXI-5789 reported the details of this meeting).

6. Security

There were no security incidents within the project during this month.

7. Technical

There were no technical problems during this period.

8. Personnel

Orville HORSFALL's arrival is the only change in personnel since the last report and he is handled as an independent agent by the Station, with no LIENVOY personnel aware of his presence in Mexico. Robert B. RIGGS sees HORSFALL daily to deliver and pick up tapes.

9. Production

There is attached a list of reports, cables and dispatches forwarded to Headquarters during this month.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

SECRET

PRODUCTION - JULY 1963

MEXIs	HMMAs	HMMs
MEXI-5570	HMMA-21824	HMM-7542
MEXI-5569	HMMA-21802	HMM-7539
MEXI-5565	HMMA-21762	HMM-7502
MEXI-5532	HMMA-21742	HMM-7501
MEXI-5487	HMMA-21709	HMM-7500
MEXI-5465 (HMM-7547)	HMMA-21693	HMM-7499
MEXI-5459	HMMA-21681	HMM-7498
MEXI-5458 (HMM-7543)	HMMA-21673	HMM-7497
MEXI-5457 (HMM-7544)	HMMA-21672	HMM-7496
MEXI-5452	HMMA-21669	HMM-7495
MEXI-5438	HMMA-21655	HMM-7486
MEXI-5412		HMM-7481
MEXI-5377 (HMM-7525)		HMM-7480
MEXI-5353 (HMM-7524)		HMM-7478
MEXI-5351 (HMM-7523)		
MEXI-5340		
MEXI-5334		
MEXI-5296		
MEXI-5295 (HMM-7403)		
19 +	11 +	14 = 44

SECRET [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

50-6-75/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SE~~CRET~~ [redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
References: A. MEXI 5448
B: MEXI 5487

1. The referenced cables describe two recent incidents in which the Mexico City Station made use of LIENVOY information to take investigative or punitive action against security suspects. The first reference reported the identifying and "trapping" of a PBPRIME citizen who was offering his services to the Cuban Embassy, and the second reported the deporting of a Cuban IS agent identified by LIENVOY material.

2. In both of these cases, there seems to have been departure from the extreme caution with which the Mexico Station has always handled the LIENVOY material. Admitting that the cables do not set out enough facts to enable us to make a final judgment, we still feel a little uneasy about this use of LIENVOY material. In the first case, the Station sent an agent to the suspect's hotel, posing as a Cuban Embassy official to "trap" him into revealing his intentions. The scheme, which was admittedly clever, succeeded, but we were concerned about what would have happened if the Cubans themselves had decided to contact the individual. Would not the LIENVOY operation have been exposed to some extent? We grant that the Cubans and other bloc personnel in Mexico City may suspect LIENVOY exists, but they do not know it --- yet. Incidentally, we had no traces on the PBPRIMER involved.

3. The second case involved the detection, apprehension and deportation of a Cuban IS agent whose whereabouts were learned through LIENVOY. From the few facts we know about this case, we cannot really judge the possible risk to LIENVOY. The Mexico Station created LIENVOY and has always guarded its security with scrupulous care. Has there been a change?

4. Finally, please note that both these cases should have been reported to Headquarters before action was taken. In general, arrests, deportation, trapping, or other action against security suspects should be approved by Headquarters, except where in the opinion of the Chief of Station, the added time needed would seriously impair ODYOKE security or the security of our operations. The Mexico Station has always done this, and the coincidence of two recent cases where it was not done inspires us to query you. Please let us know your views.

END OF DISPATCH

Removed from Project KOBSOGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-195/74
Box: 39 Fold: 6

Distribtuion:
2 - Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-11831	7 AUG 1963 6 August 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SE~~CRET~~ [redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER None Lienvoy/ops 50-6-75/3

1 - CI/OPS/WH
1 - C/WH/3
1 - WH/3/MEXI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
C/WH/3	John M. Whitten:cmy		5613

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OPS/WH	6 Aug 63	Frank Hughes

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	SIGNATURE
C/WH		J. C. KING

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

REMOVAL SLIP

DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER: HMMW-11811

DOC. DATE 5 Aug 63

THE CS COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS REMOVED FROM THIS FILE # 50-6-75/3

BY IP/ARD/RPU ON 23 Nov 73 AND FORWARDED TO IP/ANP ✓

IP/EDI ______ BECAUSE

IP/PH ______

IP/FILES ______

1. It was KAPOK and unprocessed.
2. It was RYBAT and unprocessed
3. It was EYES ALONE and unprocessed.
4. It was DEFERRED.
5. It was classified into file # 50-6-75/1
6. It was indexed document.
7. KAPOK

~~CLASSIFICATION~~ DISPATCH | ~~SECRET~~ | HMMA-21845

TO : Chief, WH Division

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT : Monthly Operational Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION : For Headquarters information.

REF : HMMA-21530 dated 14 June 1963

Hqs File No: 50-6-75/4
No Indexing Required

1. There follows the monthly operational report for Project LIENVOY activities during June 1963.

2. Target Lines - June 1963.

The following lines were covered during the month of June:

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
43-01-85	Melquiades Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castellejos
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunez
19-15-06	Roberto Romero Adams
10-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
46-09-50	D.F.S.
35-36-52	Politica (Revista - Manuel Marcue Pardinas)
46-60-15	Prensa Latina
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Films Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy

3. Processing of LIENVOY Information.

Of the lines covered, all are of interest to KUBARK and approximately one half of them are exclusively for KUBARK. The LIENVOY tap center monitors continue to prepare daily summaries of significant items from all lines. In addition, they prepare full transcripts in Spanish for ten lines (five Cuban Embassy lines and five Soviet Embassy lines). These transcripts are used by the Station Case Officers for Cuban and Soviet operations in following leads of interest.

FORM 10-57 53a | [illegible] | CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ | ☒ CONTINUED | PAGE NO ONE

Encl. -1

CS COPY

50-6-75/3

On 5 June 1963 Douglas J. FEINGLASS, Staff Agent, arrived in Mexico to replace Howard G. SAFARANO, the Station translator for Russian language conversations appearing on LIENVOY and LIFEAT lines. SAFARANO departed PCS on 18 June thus freeing an inside slot for use by an operations officer. FEINGLASS' usefulness to the Station is handicapped by his inability to transcribe the Spanish portion of the reels from the Soviet coverage. This, despite Headquarters assurance that he could do these transcriptions. However, he has settled into outside living conditions with a minimum of difficulty. For the present, a monitor from the LIENVOY tap center is transcribing the Spanish portion of the above take. There is a Station backlog of Soviet tapes numbering about 50 which accumulated during the period when FEINGLASS was trying unsuccessfully to transcribe the Spanish. The backlog is being retained until Orville HORSFALL arrives. In addition to the Russian transcriptions, FEINGLASS also clips the transcripts for individual dossiers thus relieving the Station Case Officer for Soviet operations of a clerical task. After the arrival of HORSFALL, the Mexico Station will review requirements for outside translators and make recommendations for future use of FEINGLASS.

In early June to support the AMROD operation, the Station requested full transcripts of the Cuban Embassy lines. In addition, Thomas G. URQUHART (ps) while on temporary duty in Mexico was given access to the LIENVOY tap center to review the traffic on a current basis.

4. Exploitation of LIENVOY information.

Coverage of the Cuban, Czech, and Soviet Embassies provided details of their personnel, their contacts, travel and other useful CE data. In most all cases of official travel, LIENVOY gave the Station advance information when reservations were made. Confirmation of the travel is, of course, obtained through the LIFIRE project.

The traffic is reviewed for English speaking persons who might be U.S. citizens making contact with Soviet or Soviet Satellite Embassies for political or other reasons. On 20 May 1963 an English speaker identifying himself as Albert Kennedy called the Soviet Embassy and requested political asylum for himself, his wife and seven children. Subsequent investigation revealed that he was also a protection case at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico. Appropriate U.S. agencies were advised of Subject's contact with the Soviet Embassy.

5. Liaison.

During this reporting period there were no meetings between the Chief of Station KUBARK and LITENSOR; however, regular contact was maintained with LIELEGANT and LIERGO.

6. Security.

There were no security incidents within the project during this month. As reported in MEXI-5170, 26 June 1963, the true name of a KUBARK case officer was revealed to the Cuban Embassy by a caller who refused to identify himself. From the transcript it appeared that the Cuban Embassy was not interested in making contact with the caller who claimed to have details of KUBARK operations in Mexico.

7. Technical.

Arnold AREHART, staff agent, has kept the equipment working

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | ~~SECRET~~ | HMMA-21845

effectively. As Headquarters is being advised by separate cable, the Mexico Station does not plan to replace the present LIENVOY equipment until the next Presidential candidate is named, assuming of course that this will occur within the next few weeks.

8. Personnel.

On 17 June Robert B. RIGGS resumed meeting Arnold AREHART and routine case officer functions for LIENVOY. Gregory PARMUTH meets Douglas J. FEINGLASS daily to deliver and receive the Soviet Embassy traffic. PARMUTH's assistance in obtaining living quarters and necessary sterile office furniture was responsible for the ease with which FEINGLASS was able to settle into his ~~outside~~ staff agent status.

In the opinion of Thomas G. URQUHART, who has spent some time inside the tap center, Arnold F. AREHART is doing a commendable job in the management of the center. In addition, AREHART has a general awareness of the take from each line. When leads of interest appear, he notifies the Station immediately so that action can be taken.

Willard C. CURTIS contacts LIENVOY-2 when the Station desires contact with the Mexicans directly or when AREHART is absent.

9. Production.

The volume of paper produced by this project is hardly reflected in formal disseminations, operational cables, and dispatches which numbered 39 during June. The daily summaries, the transcripts from two Czech lines, five Soviet lines, and five Cuban lines are retained for background use in Station files. They could be more fully exploited for reporting purposes if personnel were available.

There is attached a list of reports, cables and dispatches forwarded to Headquarters during this month.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
1 ~~3~~ - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

30 July 1963

LIENVOY PRODUCTION

June 1963

MEXI's	HMMA's	HMM's	
MEXI 5170	HMMA 21647	HMM 7466	
MEXI 5169 (HMM 7465)	HMMA 21594	HMM 7467	
MEXI 5128	HMMA 21593	HMM 7461	
MEXI 5111	HMMA 21540	HMM 7457	
MEXI 5089	HMMA 21530	HMM 7448	
MEXI 5072	HMMA 21487	HMM 7442	
MEXI 5071 (HMM 7437)	HMMA 21474	HMM 7435	
MEXI 5066 (HMM 7426)	HMMA 21464	HMM 7405	
MEXI 5048 (HMM 7415)		HMM 7403	
MEXI 5035 (HMM 7412)		HMM 7401	
MEXI 4998 (HMM 7404)		HMM 7335	
MEXI 4966		HMM 7383	
		HMM 7378	
		HMM 7374	
		HMM 7369	
		HMM 7367	
		HMM 7364	
		HMM 7363	
		HMM 7360	
12	8	19	= 39

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING		
1		4
2		5
3		6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : ADDP, CI/IC 2, SAS 8, RF 2

file 50-6-75/3
LIENVOY Ops

SECRET 261754Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5498

26 JUL 63 IN 87722

REF DIR 56443

AGREED HERE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS NOT NEEDED ROUTINELY. RESUMES ALERT CASE OFFICERS TO CONVERSATIONS MAY WANT IN FULL. TAPES CAN BE FARMED OUT TO AREHART OR OTHER CONTRACT PERSONNEL OR HANDLED BY STAFFER CONCERNED. URQUHART AGREES THIS SATISFACTORY FOR HIS PURPOSES AND UNAWARE OTHER SAS NEEDS THIS TIME.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED CURTIS RAISE QUESTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTIONS OF LIENVOY PBRUMEN TAKE WITH DAINOLD WHILE LATTER MEXI.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.
Chief, SAS

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Transmittal of LIENVOY Resumens

ACTION REQUIRED   REFERENCES

TYPIC

REF: DIR 43214

Attached, for addressees, are copies of the LIENVOY Resumens for 9, 10, and 11 May 1963.

Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, w/att
✓2 - C/SAS, w/att e & 1cc w/att to SAS/ESC
4 - Files

CS COPY FILED IN 5-6-6-75/3

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DATE TYPED
DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
13 June 1963

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
HMMA-21580

201-20461
P-579

14-00000

[illegible]

jueves 9 mayo 196[illegible]. 1.

07:58 El Ing. J[illegible] [illegible] pregunta por el periodista [illegible] [illegible]. La sirvienta dice que todavía se encuentra dormido. [illegible] deja el siguiente recado: "que no vaya a la cita que tenía hoy en el despacho pues se acordó cancelarla hasta que yo hable con él".

09:46 VICTOR [illegible] pregunta al [illegible] que si ya leyó la [illegible], refiriéndose al artículo de hoy en la revista [illegible] de [illegible]. [illegible] asiente y agrega que se [illegible], pero que sin embargo tiene un párrafo muy bueno, donde dice que [illegible] lo [illegible]. Continúa [illegible] diciendo que le responderá con argumentos objetivos y [illegible] para nada en la cosa personal, aprovechando el [illegible] para volver nuevamente sobre la Ley Electoral. Cambia [illegible] tema VICTOR pregunta que qué le parece la [illegible], [illegible] al artículo de él en siempre. [illegible] opina que [illegible] bueno y que es lo mejor que [illegible] de este número, [illegible] que "de allí hubiera podido [illegible] un [illegible] de la jerarquía y [illegible]; el artículo es muy [illegible] por el [illegible] a [illegible], [illegible] por el [illegible] en todo". VICTOR comenta que lo de [illegible] dice que lo "[illegible]". [illegible] de [illegible] a la atención". [illegible] a VICTOR que "de lo otro luego platicamos, pues en [illegible] y se aceptó la integración de nuevos miembros; ayer [illegible] la reunión, y aunque no se discutieron [illegible] detalles, sí se aceptó en principio la idea".

09:55 [illegible] pregunta a la Embajada Cubana por [illegible]. Al contestar [illegible] pregunta a su vez a [illegible] cosas que le mandó. [illegible] asiente y agrega que [illegible] gusto que las cosas se han resuelto". [illegible] lo que le extrañaba era que [illegible]. [illegible] que pasó fué que por desgracia [illegible] anterior [illegible] con [illegible] interés en verlo "porque tengo [illegible] pero van [illegible]". [illegible] mismo lugar [illegible] habló la vez [illegible] que sea en otro lugar como por ejemplo [illegible] en las calles de [illegible] por el [illegible] él tiene un cargo sumamente [illegible] tiempo y le gustaría que fuera lo [illegible]. [illegible] responde que ahora [illegible] a las [illegible] aclarando que está vestido con un traje [illegible].

10:[illegible] [illegible], pregunta por el Lic. [illegible]. [illegible] informa que no está y que [illegible] en regresar a México, pero sugiere a [illegible]

(P-3?) las oficinas de Medellín, pues allí hay personas que atiendan cualquier asunto.

10:46 copy to [illegible] CLARA PORCEL ofrece a la Embajada Cubana, 6 cajas de medicamentos, pidiendo a LLAGOSTERA mande a recogerlas. Así lo hará. (653)

(NEW)

10:55 El tico JUAN CARLOS [illegible], desde Prensa Latina y por encargo de [illegible] se comunica al Hotel Fremont con la Sra. TIRSI para decirle que debe alojarse en la casa de [illegible], donde seguramente estará más cómoda. La TIRSI indica que llegó hoy en la madrugada en lugar de a las 21:00 hs. y se extraña de que de Río no les hayan enviado un cable comunicándoles su llegada. [illegible] dice no haber recibido nada y lo lamenta, pues hubieran ido a esperarla. (37 [illegible]) copy [illegible]

11:28 [illegible] pregunta a la hermana de [illegible] si el español [illegible] tiene solicitud de visa. La hermana después de consultar con [illegible] indica que sí y que [illegible] ordenó la autoricen por [illegible]. [illegible] 27

11:35 El Sr. [illegible], que dijo ser amigo de [illegible], pregunta por el nombre completo del nuevo Embajador de [illegible] en México. [illegible] se lo proporciona. El Sr. [illegible] quisiera concertar una entrevista con él, pues "tengo algo importante". [illegible] informa que el señor [illegible] todavía no ha llegado a México. [illegible] entonces quisiera ponerse en contacto con el agregado militar. [illegible] indica que no hay. [illegible] esperará entonces a que llegue el nuevo Embajador. copy [illegible]

12:00 [illegible] Prensa México para el siguiente [illegible] Prensa N.Y. atención [illegible], se encuentra aquí [illegible], compañera de [illegible]. Ve si es posible que [illegible] le envía por telégrafo su visa para que pueda salir en el vuelo de mañana. Saludos J. [illegible]. copy [illegible]

12:25 copy to P-1443 [illegible] S.M. [illegible], indica a [illegible] que [illegible] acompañe esta tarde a la conferencia [illegible] en la [illegible] Mexicana de Periodistas, pues [illegible] tiene interés en asistir ya que tratará el tema de "[illegible] la Paz". [illegible] con gusto irá ya que estos actos "[illegible] sentirse en ambiente".

14:15 El Cap. [illegible] manifiesta a la [illegible] que en las oficinas de Medellín hay una [illegible] para ninguno de los dirigentes [illegible] y ya se [illegible] la [illegible].

[illegible] En vista de [illegible] estando [illegible] con [illegible] a la [illegible] Gral. [illegible] y ésta se encontraba [illegible], [illegible]

14-00000

RESUMEN
jueves 9 mayo 19[illegible] -3.

(14 [illegible]

c-copy P

Vasquez Gomez

1624

ELENA se puso en contacto con [illegible] y [illegible], quien manifiesta que la carta que quedó de enviarle al General no la mandará hasta la semana entrante, porque casi todos estos últimos días ha estado muy enfermo. [illegible] se lo comunicará al Gral. CARDENAS. P-1993

14:28 ELENA VAZQUEZ-GOMEZ comunica al Lic. [illegible] AGUILAR y al Dr. GUILLERMO MONTAÑO, de parte del Gral. CARDENAS, que mañana por ser día de las madres no resultaría cómodo que se vieran, además de que el General tiene otro compromiso previo. Por tal motivo los espera el sábado a las 12:00 hs. en [illegible] de Andes. Ambos aceptan estar presentes. (5757)
Posteriormente el Dr. MONTAÑO indica al Lic. [illegible] PEDRERO que en vista de que el sábado tendrá que ir a casa del Gral. CARDENAS se pospone la reunión que tenían prevista.

(7354) 7752

14:34 VICTOR RICO GALAN queda en desayunar mañana con [illegible] a las 09:30 hs. en Sanborn's de Durango.

19:09 ALONSO AGUILAR dice a NACHO ACOSTA que ELENA tiene un texto y le pide que haga el mismo favor de ayer. NACHO indica que ya lo recogió y lo distribuyó. AGUILAR comenta que está bien, pues es una cosa que tiene actualidad. 2152

19:41 FERNANDO [illegible] felicita calurosamente a ANGELICA [illegible] por el documento de hoy, es excelente. ANGELICA le pregunta que si leyó lo del mitote que se armó con la ida allá (ANGELICA fué a la sesión plenaria del Congreso de Procuradores con un ramo de rosas). FERNANDO asiente. ANGELICA dice que la cosa está un poco cambiada, pero estuvo sensacional. FERNANDO la felicita nuevamente " qué bueno que no te desanimes". ANGELICA comenta que " no, tengo que seguir luchando", y agrega que a DAVID le pareció magnífico el documento del [illegible]. FERNANDO indica que le escribió [illegible], y a pesar " de que andamos con muchos líos, parece que vamos por buen camino, de eso estoy seguro".

Frank Arturo Siqueiros (P-448)

(3004) 3374

21:14 Desde la Escuela de Ciencias Políticas, LUIS [illegible] dice a HERIBERTO CASTILLO quien se encuentra en el MLN, que está platicando con los estudiantes y quieren ir a [illegible]. HERIBERTO no los puede esperar pues tiene un compromiso a las 22:00 hs. LUIS pone a HERIBERTO en contacto con el estudiante VALERO. HERIBERTO explica que en la última reunión se llegó al acuerdo de que el Comité del D.F., sea absorbido por el Comité Nacional " y como a mí me nombraron encargado de la Comisión de Organización del Movimiento, quiero ponerme en contacto con ustedes para llevar adelante lo de las brigadas, así como para que inviten a muchachos serios y responsables que quieran dar parte de su tiempo al Movimiento". VALERO propone conversar ampliamente el sábado en la C.U.

N.A.M.

9-10-3/1

09:50 Una mujer con acento norteamericano, que dice ser amiga de [illegible], pide al Lic. [illegible] le ayude en un problema muy urgente. AGUILAR le propone verse esta tarde a las 17:30 hs. en la planta baja del edificio del Movimiento. La mujer concurrirá.

copy to P-1371

manuel (771) copy to P!

09:50 Un estudiante de la Universidad, con acento sudamericano, manifiesta a [illegible], de la Embajada cubana, que necesita verlo porque necesita despachar unas cosas. [illegible] le sugiere verse mañana a las 07:30 hs. El estudiante acepta esa hora, pues más tarde tiene clase. Ambos quedan de verse como de costumbre "en el número uno".

copy to P

U.N.A.M.

file 50-16-3

copy to P

12:00 Un ayudante de [illegible] se comunica al 27-28-61 (Rodolfo [illegible] Sánchez, Mar Blanco, 69-5) y dice al Sr. [illegible] que "estamos esperando la propaganda". [illegible] indica que ya está lista y que dentro de un rato se las llevará.

12:09 [illegible], de Ovaciones, quisiera que el Lic. [illegible], quien representa un sector fuerte en la política, le hiciera unas declaraciones sobre las pastorales que acaban de publicarse. [illegible], después de consultar, dice que como la cosa es de mucha importancia, mañana se reune la dirección del Partido y el lunes se sabrá qué declaraciones van a expedir.

copy to P-1671

12:16 El Gral. CARDENAS saluda al Lic. [illegible] DELGADO y le agradece la atención que tuvo con el [illegible] de la Comisión, así como la indicación que le hizo sobre cómo resolver el problema. DELGADO dice que fué de acuerdo con la propia indicación del Lic. [illegible]. Agrega que estima mucho el honor de llamarlo, y le brinda la oportunidad de conocer el interesantísimo programa de CARDENAS para la Comisión del Río Balsas. CARDENAS dice que son programas del señor Presidente por el deseo que tiene de ayudar a Oaxaca y sobre todo aquella parte de la Mixteca que es una de las zonas más erosionadas que hay en el país, y de gente con mucha pobreza; y el programa se presentó por la iniciativa del señor Presidente para este año. Le agradece sus frases de estímulo, lo saluda afectuosamente y se pone a sus órdenes. DELGADO replica que al contrario "soy yo quien está a las suyas, oficial y privadamente".

copy to P-1493

copy to P 5420

(731) copy to P (270) (5315)

13:02 HECTOR [illegible], de Prensa Latina, dice a [illegible], de la Revista Política, que fué a hablar con [illegible], del Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda y "se trataba nada más de darme una orientación anónima sobre el voto que dio México, y no quiere él que se publique bajo su nombre, ve?". [illegible] comprende y cree que debe haber servido la información. [illegible]

Copy to P

12

5315

706

979

[illegible] IA dice que como no. Agrega que [illegible] insistió en que quiere una colección completa de la Revista Política, pero parece que sólo hay ya encuadernada. RAQUEL va a ver éso. ANAYA pasará por las oficinas de la Revista hoy a las 16:30 hs.

(1034) Copy to P

16:00 RAFAEL ayudante del Lic. [illegible] MALDONADO pregunta a la imprenta Laura, sita en Fernando Alva Ixtlixochitl 145-A si el libro del Lic. MALDONADO ya ha sido empezado. El sobrino del Sr. DIAZ informa que ya y que pueden mandar a recoger una muestra para que lo lea, corrija y dé su autorización, además de que necesita le mande algo de dinero.

(1038)

17:52 BUENAVENTURA REYES pide a MANOLO, del Consulado de Cuba en Veracruz que tome nota de que en comunicación num. 0581 de fecha 6 de mayo se le concedió visa de turista a AIDA MARIA QUIJANO [illegible]. Cambiando de tema BUENAVENTURA indica que irá a pasar el domingo a Veracruz pues "me hace falta ver a mi gente", por tal motivo saldrá el sábado en la noche en el autobus y regresará el domingo en la noche por avión. MANOLO toma nota de todo.

Copy to P

3578

18:10 El Lic. [illegible] LOMBARDO TOLEDANO comentó con MARIA TERESA PUENTE que ayer tomó parte en una Mesa Redonda, que él en principio creyó se trataba de una conferencia solamente, pero resulta que como a las 5 de la tarde lo llamaron para recordarle que debería asistir a la Mesa Redonda. En fín así lo hizo y no obstante que en el mediodía se sintió enfermo al salir del Instituto Francés ya se sintió perfectamente. Agrega que él nunca en su vida había ido a dicho Institutot y tenía interés en ver qué clase de público asistía y grande fué su sorpresa al ver allí a SILVA HERZOG, [illegible] y [illegible] y unos cinco o seis historiadores pero afortunadamente todo salió bien.

1671

375

Copy to P

Copy to P

18:15 [illegible] del periódico EL DIA tiene interés en saber qué resolvió el Lic. [illegible] de concederle una entrevista. MARIA después de consultar indica que el Licenciado saldrá de la ciudad a descansar y que el lunes lo espera a las 13:00 hs.

762

18:24 ADRIANA LOMBARDO pregunta a MARIA TERESA PUENTE que si el documento que hicieron esta mañana los compañeros fué revisado por "el maestro". MARIA no sabe y comunica a ADRIANA con su papá. ADRIANA pregunta que si va a ir a ver a ese señor. LOMBARDO responde que le hablaron para pedirle su opinión acerca del asunto y que él tiene la impresión de que [illegible] está [illegible], pero que tal vez lo hayan mandado llamar para preguntarle cuales son sus pretensiones y le ofrezcan otra cosa. Probablemente le pregunten que extensión necesita. ADRIANA pregunta que si quiere que le mande esos datos. LOMBARDO dice

Copy to P

C. Agt. Adriana LOMBARDO (P-767)

que no es necesario que solamente se los de por teléfono. ADRIANA indica que se necesitan dos salones, uno para teatro y cine y otro para conferencias, por lo menos 10 salones de clase, otro cuarto para biblioteca y lo que es indispensable es un salón para los compañeros que viene de fuera a estudiar los cursos intensivos, pues "el año pasado tuvimos en un cuarto de 3x3 a ocho compañeros". LOMBARDO toma nota de todo esto. Cambiando de tema ADRIANA informa que hoy en la mañana habló con el Lic. [illegible] y éste le dijo que no había tenido oportunidad de entregar el oficio al Lic. PALMARES, así que ADRIANA sugiere a su papá que llame directamente al Lic. PALMARES.

608 7237 No C/Agt

20:33 A las 18:05 FERNANDO CARMONA preguntó a ESTELA AGUILAR por ALONSO. ESTELA informó que salió hace un momento, que iba a poner gasolina al coche y de allí iba al M.L.N. donde tenía una cita. CARMONA dice que no ha llegado al Movimiento, pues incluso no hay quien abra las oficinas. ESTELA se alarma. Posteriormente ESTELA ha estado tratando de comunicarse a las oficinas del M.L.N. sin lograrlo. A las 20:33 CARMONA vuelve a preguntar a ESTELA por ALONSO. ESTELA indica que no lo ha localizado y que él tampoco ha llamado a la casa y esto ya la está preocupando, agregando que esperará una hora más.

C/Agt Alonso Aguilar (P-2152)

RESUMEN
sábado 11 mayo 1963. copy to [illegible] 1.

03:30 FERNANDO CARMONA comenta con el Lic. AGUILAR que anoche estuvo preocupado. Esto indica que se fué a tomar un café con la norteamericana con quien tuvo una cita, al café Florida [illegible]. Cambiando de tema FERNANDO pregunta que si vió el último número de Avante. AGUILAR niega. CARMONA agrega que "el ilustre Licenciado vuelve a meterse con nosotros". AGUILAR pregunta que en qué forma. CARMONA dice que negando nuevamente que el PPS esté en el M.L.N., además trae una entrevista que el Lic. LOMBARDO concedió al Saturday Evening Post "de lo más chistosa" y CARMONA hasta ha pensado en [illegible] en su artículo. AGUILAR dice que es muy raro, pues él vió hace unos días un documento de la J.C.C.M. de Altar Son. en que manifiestan no comprender la actitud de sus dirigentes en contra del M.L.N. y hasta califican dicha actitud de anti-patriótica. CARMONA lamenta no tener dicho documento en su poder pues podría utilizarlo para atacarlos en su artículo. AGUILAR no está de acuerdo con CARMONA ya que eso sería tanto como colocar a estas gentes contra la pared y "nuestra actitud debe ser al contrario, debemos tratar de irnoslos ganando a ellos y a todos los que se pueda". CARMONA dice que entonces solo colocaría contra la pared al Lic. LOMBARDO, pero que de todas maneras le gustaría que AGUILAR revisara el próximo artículo antes de entregarlo. AGUILAR está de acuerdo y a las órdenes de CARMONA.

1671

LOMBARDO Toledano

copy to P-1671

09:03 El tico JOSE CARLOS FERNANDEZ que trabaja en Prensa Latina, pregunta al francés [illegible] si se interesa por la suscripción del boletín diario informativo de Prela. [illegible] manifiesta que desea además del Boletín un intercambio de noticias. FERNANDEZ comenta que el precio para las noticias es mayor cuando se trata para periódicos "además de que la agencia nuestra no está controlada por nosotros, sino la controlan de La Habana". [illegible] dice que desea la información ya que es corresponsal de la Asociación Extranjera de Prensa y del Movimiento de Liberación Franco-canadiense. FERNANDEZ responde que podría arreglar que la tarifa del Boletín, Panorama Económico y Siglo XX sea especial. [illegible] acepta y pide a FERNANDEZ pase a Benjamín Franklin [illegible] 32 depto. 3 para que le entregue el cheque y que los periódicos se los envíe a la [illegible] de su esposa que está en las calles de Av. Jalisco [illegible]

10:20 [illegible], desde la casa del Lic. [illegible], pregunta por [illegible]. La esposa de éste informa que no [illegible] Dr. [illegible] pregunta que si podría [illegible] algunos trabajos (de imprenta). La señora no sabe pues [illegible] primeramente a la Imprenta. Posteriormente [illegible] logra ponerse en contacto con [illegible] y éste manifiesta que ya va para la casa de BRAULIO.

copy to P-[illegible]

RESUMEN
sábado 11 mayo 1963

10:40 RAMIREZ con acento centroamericano pregunta a VEGA de la Embajada de Cuba que si en el avión de ayer no llegó nada acerca de su visa. VEGA sin contestar a su pregunta le indica que venga a la Embajada, pero que adelante media hora a la que habían fijado. RAMIREZ allí estará.

12:10 RAQUEL necesita con urgencia para el próximo número de Política fotografías de las reuniones que ha habido en la Asociación Mexicana de periodistas en relación a la Paz y además todos los discursos de FIDEL CASTRO en Rusia. Con relación a lo primero BORGES se las proporcionará. Con respecto a lo segundo ALBERU procurará conseguírselos y en caso contrario sugiere a RAQUEL se ponga en contacto con [illegible] a su casa. Posteriormente ALBERU indica a [illegible] que ya le tiene una revista Bohemia y dos periódicos cubanos que contienen algunos de los discursos de FIDEL en Rusia, solo que se los facilitará en calidad de préstamo pues son de TERESA PROENZA. RAQUEL mandará a [illegible] por el material.

13:39 La Dra. MATILDE [illegible] CANO pregunta a ESTELA [illegible] que si no sabe si el Dr. [illegible] es miembro del M.L.N. pues desde antier lo sacaron de su cuarto en el Hospital Colonia unos agentes de la Procuraduría y se lo llevaron, incluso del mismo hospital se han interesado mucho por su paradero pero no han sabido nada. ESTELA dice que ese nombre no le suena, pero de todas maneras lo pondrá en conocimiento de ALONSO.

15:53 [illegible] MAIZ, de la Embajada Cubana, se comunica con el gachupín [illegible] y le indica que lo han destinado nuevamente aquí; que lo han ascendido y está mejor en todo sentido; que llegó ayer procedente de Cuba. Agrega que ha estado tratando de comunicarse con ANTONIO [illegible], pero no le contestan en el banco; y pregunta que si se siguen reuniendo los miércoles. [illegible] responde que sí. MAIZ irá el próximo miércoles para reunirse con los amigos.

20:34 FERNANDO CARMONA pregunta a ANGELICA ARENAL DE SIQUEIROS que cómo se encuentra DAVID. ANGELICA dice que más o menos pasándola, pues no hay ninguna cosa ni ninguna novedad por el momento. CARMONA comenta que "por cierto la semana que entra quiero ver si publicamos ese papel de que te decía; todo depende de que podamos juntar los centavos". Cambiando de tema dice que sería bueno que DAVID tuviera en la celda uno de esos aparatos inalámbricos "Walky Talky" para poder comunicarse con todos. ANGELICA pregunta que si realmente se podría. CARMONA no lo sabe bien, pero sería cosa de que ANGELICA lo consultara con un amigo que sepa; por ejemplo el hijo de [illegible] CIZABAL, que es un buen electrónico, pues a lo mejor sí se pueda. Agrega que esos aparatos tienen un radio como de 5 kiló-

David ALFARO Siqueiros
(P-448)

metros. ANGELICA dice que le alcanzaría hasta la casa y sería fantástico; lo malo es que estarían hablando todo el tiempo y ya no habría ni acción ni trabajo porque élla iba a estarle preguntando a cada rato que cómo se sentía. CARMONA cree que sí habría acción, pues DAVID a cada rato estaría preguntando qué pasó con el abogado; qué pasó con CARMONA; qué pasó con ALONSO, etc. ANGELICA dice que sería tremendo; pero si además le arreglaran un sistema para que DAVID "hablara con todos ustedes!". CARMONA comenta que si éso fuera posible, ya sería lo de menos. ANGELICA cambia de tema e indica que de todas maneras quisiera platicar con CARMONA la semana entrante, porque DAVID insiste en una serie de cosas, desde el punto de vista de la cosa electoral, y ANGELICA quisiera cambiar impresiones. CARMONA arguye que "nosotros tenemos una posición allí que ojalá que él entienda mejor". ANGELICA argumenta que independientemente de éso, élla cree que sí hay algo que se puede hacer. CARMONA dice que "estamos en la enésima fase de reorganización; pero es que no tiene remedio; éso hay que entenderlo; en ésto hay que armarse de paciencia; algunos compañeros pierden la paciencia, de los nuestros mismos muy buenos, como MONTAÑO por ejemplo.....yo hasta le decía: mire Doctor, cien mil veces hemos examinado estas cosas y doscientas mil más las vamos a tener que examinar si no las resolvemos bien; éso no tiene remedio". ANGELICA de todas maneras quisiera conversar con CARMONA. Este arguye que "pero estamos en pleno proceso de reorganización y espero que en dos o tres semanas se va a sentir ésto. A partir del mes que entra yo me voy a hacer cargo del periódico, con el ánimo de hacerlo muy modesto pero que salga quincenalmente". ANGELICA dice que éso será formidable, y a ver si la semana entrante se ven un ratito, pues élla le quiere plantear algunas cosas bastante interesantes. CARMONA acepta.

ALFARO 440 6&1

20:45 MANUEL TAMAYO, desde Salónica, Calif., quiere comunicarse con BRAULIO MALDONADO. CARLOTA la esposa dice que éste no se encuentra en la Capital. MANUEL dice que llegó con felicidad y llamaba a BRAULIO para ver si éste ya se comunicó con el JAMIS a Casa Grandes, Arizona, pues es muy urgente que así lo haga "y me escriba a mi lo más pronto que pueda para ver si le dijo al JAMIS lo que yo le digo en la carta que le mande". CARLOTA dice que BRAULIO ya recibió su carta, pero que va a estar fuera de México unos 10 días. MANUEL dice que están puestos para lo que sea. CARLOTA indica que por allá ha mandado BRAULIO varia propaganda, folletos y todo éso. MANUEL dice que está bien, pues él necesita de éso. Termina deseándoles buena suerte.

21:02 Una mujer que dice llamar desde el Restaurante Janitzio en Culiacán, manifiesta que [illegible] quiere hablar con BRAULIO MALDONADO. CARLOTA indica que está fuera de la ciu-

[illegible]
sábado 11 mayo 963 4

dad. La mujer pregunta que si se encuentra por ahí RAFAEL, un muchacho que viene de Culiacán a buscar al [illegible]. CARLOTA dice que aquí a la casa no, que tal vez a la oficina, pero que allí no tienen teléfono. Asimismo le recomienda que le diga a ese señor ENRIQUE [illegible] que esté pendiente, porque el Licenciado les va a llegar por allá, pues va a recorrer muchos lugares; va hasta Sonora.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/~~RYBAT~~

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING		
PROCESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Monthly Activities Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

The following is the May 1963 report for Project LIENVOY:

A. Target Lines as of 31 May:

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
43-01-85	Melquiades Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castellejos
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunes
19-15-06	Roberto Romero Adams
10-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
46-09-50	D.F.S.
35-36-52	Politica (Revista - Marcue)
46-60-15	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Main Entrance)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)

Removed from Project KOBRODEEK
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

50-6-75/3

(Continued)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
12 june 1963	14 June 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-21530

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/~~RYBAT~~

15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy

B. Material Processed

93 pages of daily resumes
53 reels of Czech Embassy taped conversations
120 reels of Soviet Embassy taped conversations
57 pages of Cuban Embassy transcriptions
41 pieces of miscellaneous material

There was a total of 544 reels of taped conversations recorded during the month.

C. Exploitation of Material

A sample of LIENVOY coverage was the uncovering of a harrassment operation against the Embassy by the use of forged routine forms to embarrass the Embassy and known anti-Communists. (See MEXI 4659 and HMMA-21431).

D. Security

No known security problems.

E. Technical

None

F. Production

During May, LIENVOY produced the fifty-two (52) reports listed in the attachment. The usual large amount of CI/CE personality and operational material was also obtained.

G. Liaison

Chief of Station has seen LITENSOR twice during May and these meetings were reported in MEXI-4544 dated 10 May 1963 and MEXI-4631 dated 22 May 1963.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

50-6-75/3

CS COPY

~~SECRET~~

PRODUCTION FOR MAY 1963

MEXIs	HMMAs	HMMs
MEXI-4795	HMMA-21431	HMM-7351
MEXI-4788	HMMA-21413	HMM-7350
MEXI-4781	HMMA-21401	HMM-7349
MEXI-4754	HMMA-21397	HMM-7347
MEXI-4724 (HMM 7328)	HMMA-21395	HMM-7322
MEXI-4718 (HMM-7327)	HMMA-21345	HMM-7319
MEXI-4710	HMMA-21343	HMM-7317
MEXI-4809	HMMA-21320	HMM-7306
MEXI-4659	HMMA-21290	HMM-7301
MEXI-4652 (HMM-7295)	HMMA-21288	HMM-7299
MEXI-4635 (HMM-7290)	HMMA-21281	HMM-7298
MEXI-4623 (HMM-7289)	HMMA-21278	HMM-7297
MEXI-4616		HMM-7288
MEXI-4598		HMM-7286
MEXI-4596		HMM-7284
MEXI-4572 (HMM-7273)		HMM-7276
MEXI-4490		HMM-7256
MEXI-4474		HMM-7254
		HMM-7253
		HMM-7250
		HMM-7235
		HMM-7234
18	12	22 = 52

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

CS COPY

50-6-75/3

ENCL #1 HMMA-21530

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
: Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO
FROM
: Chief, WH Division
SUBJECT
: LIENVOY Coverage of Cuban Embassy
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACT: FYI

REF: HMMA-21068, 12 April 1963

1. Returned herewith are two reels of LIENVOY coverage of the Cuban Embassy which were forwarded to Headquarters by the referenced dispatch.

2. Three conversations, including the SINOBAS/SCANTLING contact on 8 April 1963 have been excised from EC 11, 8 April, for retention at Headquarters. The conversations immediately before and after the SCANTLING contact were taken out so as not to pinpoint possible interest in that contact.

3. The Station's support in providing these documentary materials is greatly appreciated.

END OF DISPATCH

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 27 Fold: 6

Attachment: 1,
As stated above h/w

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO
1 - RI
1 - Chrono

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-11540

DATE
1 May 1963
3 MAY 1963

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 50-6-75/3

ORIGINATING
OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST
WH/3/Mexico/Carle;dd
EXT.
5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OPS/EE		C. Anderson (in draft)

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL
C/WHD
DATE
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
J. C. King

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
▨	ABSTRACT
▨	MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO : Chief of Station, Panama

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LIENVOY Coverage of Cuban Embassy

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

FYI

1. Forwarded herewith are brief digests of Cuban Embassy calls monitored through LIENVOY during the first days of April 1963 by Thomas G. URQUHART.

2. A copy of this dispatch with attachment is being sent to COS Panama at his request because of that Station's interest in ARELLANO.

3. Owing to the occasional lack of logging, it was not always possible to ascertain the exact date a particular conversation took place. Hence, some of the summaries are attributed to a period greater than one day.

END OF DISPATCH

Removed from Project KUBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JCB # 73-175/77
Box: 29 Fold: 6

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City, W/Att.
1 - COS, Panama, W/Att.

DATE TYPED: 1 May 1963

DATE DISPATCHED: 13 MAY 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11541

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-75/3

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/

1 - RI
1 - Chrono, W/Att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexi/Carley:ds			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OPS/EE	1 May 63	C. Anderson (in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
CWHD		J. C. King

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS WHICH MAY BE USED.

DISPATCH

SECRET

HIGHLIGHTS OF LIENVOY COVERAGE OF CUBAN
EMBASSY, EARLY APRIL 1963

2 or 3 April 63

A man whose name sounds like "Specia" calls Vega, says he must see him very urgently. They will meet at 1400 or 1430.

Victor Rico Galan holds what appears to be social chatter with Sinobas. They mention a mutual friend (unnamed) and note things are getting better.

A man identified only as Horacio calls Buenaventura (Reyes). They talk about hotels and agree to meet at the Embassy at 1730.

The Bolivian Embassy calls for Sinobas about the case of a man named Arrellano or Arellano. Sinobas is out. Bolivian Embassy asks to be called back at telephone 14 08 56.

(Comment: Arrellano is of special interest to PACY)

Maria Lourdes de la Pena calls for Teresa Proenza, who is out. On a further conversation mention is made of Maria Elena (Vazquez Gomez?) and the two parties agree to meet at 2030 at some place located at the corner of Hamburgo and Genova.

Teresa Proenza calls to the fronton for Jose Luis "Azamendi" (probably a jai-alai player). He is out. She leaves a message for him that there is a letter for him at the Cuban Embassy for his daughter and he can come for it.

Vicente Rojo calls Proenza about the bulletin. An envelope was left at the Embassy gate.

Mirna Torres calles Buenaventura Reyes and they hold a sociable talk. She wants to send a package and letter (probably to Cuba) and they discuss the arrival of the plane 6 April. She says she will bring the things to the Embassy before that.

The Bolivian Embassy calls for Sinobas. He is out. (This probably has to do with the Arellano case).

Miss Gomez Sanchez calls for Sinobas, who is out.

Dr. Jaime Brana (visiting Cuban doctor) calls Hotel Carmen room 40 for someone and gets no answer. He then asks for the Cuban nurse in apt. 5, whose name is Graciela "Cuty". She is also out. Brana says he wants to speak with Marta Valdez, something about the medical congress.

Brana calls Dr. Fausto Trejo, with whom he seems to have some social relationship. Trejo is out. Brana asks the woman who answers if he left a Czech notebook from KOVO firm at their home. She looks and says she does not see it there.

SECRET

Guillermo Gomes calls for Vega. Gomes is the man who left a letter this morning, which was a letter Vega asked for. Their business seems to have to do with passport and visa details. Gomes travels a lot and will call back when in town, possibly tomorrow.

A number of calls show that Heberto Jorrin, the gate man, has a local girlfriend he sees quite often and who also visits him at the Embassy. Her name is not known.

4 April 1963

Elena Vasques Gomes and Teresa Proenza agreed to dine this evening.

Teresa Proenza spoke to someone about a passage to Cuba for one Margarita Calderon.

Celia Pascual, telephone 25 10 32, describing herself as the sister of Sara, calls Teresa Proenza. Celia says she can take some things over to "Edith" when she goes (presumably to Cuba). Someone's mother is sick.

(Comment: This could refer to Edith Buchaca, whose preoccupation with her mother has been noted in the past).

5 April 1963

Ascue in Havan calls Mariano Garcia. The connection is very poor and the Havana end is hard to understand. They mention travel approval for Rafael (?) Hernandez at telephone 35 44 35 and mention something was arranged for Eduardo Rodrigues de la Vega.

A woman identifying herself only as Socorro calls for Vega about a matter she says he already knows of. He is out.

An American or Canadian calls long distance and says he plans to leave wherever he is, probably Los Angeles, Cal., via Western Airlines, for Mexico.

Immediately after this call someone in the Embassy mentions reservations for Fred Brown from Canada.

Sinobas calls Tomas Marentes, who is out. Sinobas leaves the message that "Ramon called". (Marentes may be the former Governor of Yucatan. He has a plan to send money or passages to someone in Cuba. Sinobas is very anxious to help him and makes a lot of calls about how to do it. Marentes has told Sinobas he has a son working for Humberto Romero at the Presidencia, indicating the son is at Sinobas's disposition. How much this is a matter of mere courtesy could not be determined).

Arellano (the Bolivian deal) calls for Sinobas, who is out, and then asks for Vega. He asks Vega if there is any news, and Vega tells him to drop by on 7 April.

Miss Gomes Arias calls for Sinobas. He is out but will be right back.

One Mario or Mariano Zevada or Cobada for Sinobas. They talk about a plan the caller had to send money for passages to someone in Cuba and how the bank in Cuba has stated it is impossible.

Sinobas calls the Bolivian Ambassador about Arellano, who is going to travel from one country to another.

Dolores Gomez Arias to Sinobas (first name basis). She seems to be a journalist, says she wants to meet him to tell him some things.

6 April 1963

No conversations of salient interest noted.

7 April 1963

Largely taken up with several conversations between Jorrin and his girlfriend.

8 April 1963

Angel Hidalgo calls in for Vega, who is out. It appears Hidalgo and a couple of others are to drop by the Embassy in connection with passports and visas.

An unidentified man inside calls Cubana de Aviation about a Canadian named Fred Brown who was around to ask about a visa. The man at Cubana says that he knows nothing of the matter.

Armona calls Fred Brown at the Hotel Agnes. He is paged in the restaurant. Armona and someone else will drop by the hotel for Brown at 1645. Brown speaks very little Spanish.

14-0000

71

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1 4
2 5
3 6

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (COPY ISSUED TO SAS AT 1630 19 APR DD)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2

cc Lienvoy

S E C R E T 191845Z

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 4227

RYBAT TYPIC

19 APR 1963

IN21426

REF A DIR 33114

B DIR 32471

1. ON 17 APR 63, AT 1035, SCANTLING CALLED RAMON SINOBAS AND TOLD HIM THAT HE WENT EMBASSY ON 18 APR BUT SAW MANY STRANGE PEOPLE IN AREA AND WAS AFRAID ENTER. SINOBAS THEN ASKED SCANTLING GET TOGETHER WITH HIM SOME PLACE OUTSIDE EMBASSY ON 19 APR, SUGGESTING A CAFE. SCANTLING THEN TOLD SINOBAS THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS FOR SINOBAS TO FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS IN HIS LETTER THAT HE SENT ON 7 APR 63. SINOBAS TELLS SCANTLING THAT THIS IS WHAT HE WANTS TO TALK ABOUT. SCANTLING GUARANTEES SINOBAS THAT IF HE FOLLOWS INSTRUCTIONS IT WILL BENEFIT BOTH SINOBAS AND HIM. SINOBAS THEN ASKED SCANTLING CALL HIM 20 APR AND THEY CAN AGREE ON TIME AND PLACE TO TALK. SCANTLING THEN TOLD SINOBAS THAT IF SINOBAS IS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS HE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ONE OF HIS SUPERIORS. IN REPLY SINOBAS SAID THAT WAS SCANTLING'S PROBLEM NOT HIS. SCANTLING CLOSED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WOULD CALL SINOBAS ON 20 APR. (LIENVOY 8/2).

2. SCANTLING'S WRITTEN REPORT RE CONTACT WITH SINOBAS 17 APR SUBSTANTIALLY SAME.

3. STATION COMMENT: FACT SINOBAS REQUESTED SCANTLING CALL HIM 20 APR POSSIBLY DUE EXPECTED ARRIVAL MANUEL VEGA OR AMSTET-1 19 APR

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1	4	
2	5	
3	6	

ACTION:

INFO :

CUBANA FLIGHT. CUBANA FLIGHT 19 APR CANCELLID UNTIL 20 APR GPU WR MVAHLHEMIDBXSQHYPNTQMI FVC CALL SINOBAS MORNING 20 APR AND ASK FOR MEETING SOMETIME BEFORE 1230 AS HE LEAVING TOWN THAT TIME. IF SINOBAS AWAITING ARRIVAL VEGA OR AM-1 ABOVE MIGHT PROVOKE SINOBAS MAKE REMARK RE SAME. IF SINOBAS AGREES MEET SCANTLING LATTER WILL NOT MAKE MEETING BUT STATION WILL STAKE OUT MEETING PLACE.

4. REGISTERED LETTER PER REF B MAILED 18 APR USING RETURN ADDRESS OROPEZA P.O. BOX.

5. RECORDING LIENVOY PER PARA 6 REF B BEING POUCHED.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED HAVE SCANTLING CALL SINABAS EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE USING NAME JUAN OROPESA.

DISPATCH

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Monthly Activities Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The following is the January 1963 report for Project LIENVOY:

A. Target Lines as of 31 January

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde (out)
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castellejos (out)
28-79-67	Andres Armona
48-14-76	Enrique Cabrera
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero (out)
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunes
19-15-05	Roberto Romero Adams (Cuban target)
11-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
46-64-24	D.F.S. (out)
46-11-30	D.F.S. (out)
35-36-52	Politica(Revista - Marcue)
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
46-60-15	Prensa Latina (out)
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-25	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Main-Entrance)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-59-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

(Continued)

DATE TYPED: 15 Feb. 1963

DATE DISPATCHED: 19 Feb. 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-20737

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-75/3

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/~~[illegible]~~

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-20737

15-61-07 Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64 Soviet Embassy (Film Representative) (out)
45-61-80 Czech Embassy
45-61-81 Czech Embassy

B. Material Processed

In January, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 47 pages of daily resumes from all lines, 10 pages from the Cuban lines, 26 pages from the Czech lines and 57 pages from the Soviet lines. Thirty two pieces of other information were also received.

A total of 285 reels of recording tape were used during the month. (Note F, Technical).

C. Liaison

The Station continues to provide LITENSOR with situation reports on the Red Chinese-Indian border dispute.

D. Exploitation of Material.

Examples of information provided by LIENVOY were the beginnings and organization of the Central Campesina Independiente (CCI) (see MEXIs 3041 and 3053) and the contact made by a Hollywood television station with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in order to set up an interview with Fidel Castro. (see MEXI 3244).

E. Security

There were no known security problems.

F. Technical

The LP was inoperative from 8 January until 18 January. Workmen installing street lights in the neighborhood of the LP cut the cable leading from the telephone central to the LP in several places. Instead of replacing the damaged cable with a new one, telephone company workmen painstakingly repaired it. By the end of the month there were still seven lines out of operation.

G. Production

During January, LIENVOY produced twenty-three (23) reports listed in the attachment. In addition the usual quantity (except for the ten days lost by inoperation - see E above) of CE and biographic materials were obtained.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

PRODUCTION FOR JANUARY 1953

MEXI's	HMM's	HMMA's
MEXI 3244	HMM 6909	HMMA 20494
MEXI 3230 (HMM 6977)	HMM 6911	HMMA 20508
MEXI 3053	HMM 6915	HMMA 20511
MEXI 3041 (HMM 6918)	HMM 6916	HMMA 20564
MEXI 3031 (HMM 6917)	HMM 6933	
MEXI 3020 (HMM 6913)	HMM 6952	
MEXI 3014 (HMM 6910)	HMM 6954	
	HMM 6957	
	HMM 6961	
	HMM 6962	
	HMM 6958	
	HMM 6971	

7 + 12 + 4 = 23

14-00000

file — [illegible] support

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S E C R E T~~

DATE : 27 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 27 04112 63

ROUTINE

DIR CITE MEXI 3575

IN75331

RYBAT

REF A DIR 35657

B MEXI 1919 (IN 20593)

1. LITENSOR HAS ASKED VIA LIELEGANT FOR ANY BRIEFING PAPERS KUBARK CAN GIVE ON FRANCE, YUGOSLAVIA, POLAND, WEST GERMANY, HOLLAND AND ENGLAND.

2. CURTIS WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING HEADQUARTERS CAN MAKE AVAILABLE AND BELIEVE HQS MAY WISH ATTEMPT INFLUENCE LITENSOR ON CERTAIN POINTS IN SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES.

3. WILL NEED REPLY SOON AND, IF HQS WISHES PREPARE PAPERS, APPRECIATE RECEIPT BY 20 MARCH.

K

~~S E C R E T~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SE[redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-49

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Monthly Activities Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

The following is the December 1962 report for Project LIENVOY:

A. Target Lines, as of 2 January

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castillejos
28-79-67	Andres Armona
48-14-76	Enrique Cabrera
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunes
19-15-06	Roberto Romero Adams (Cuban target)
11-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
46-64-24	D.F.S.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
35-36-52	Politica (Revista - Marcue)
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
46-60-15	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Main Entrance)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 75-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

(Continued)

DATE TYPED
15 Jan. 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-20508

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/~~[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/43

15-60-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy

B. Material Processed

In December, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 70 pages of daily resumes from all lines, 38 pages from the Cuban lines, 30 pages from the Czech lines, and 77 pages from the Soviet lines. Fourteen pieces of other material were also received.

The LP was closed for the holidays from 21 December until 2 January.

C. Liaison

As gifts for Christmas, LIELEGANT was given a small, portable Sony television receiver by the Station. He was also given a religious statue by the employees in the LP to which the Station donated part of the cost.

Arnold F. AREHART, LP technician, gave LIELEGANT a paper weight made of plastic with United States coins showing in the center of the weight.

D. Exploitation of Material

Samples of intelligence obtained during the month was the attempt of Vicente Lombardo Toledano to arrange for the entry of a Chinese Communist trade delegation visiting in Brazil to enter Mexico (see MEXI 2839, 14 December 1962), and Japanese Embassy calls on Lombardo Toledano and Lazaro Cardenas to arrange interviews with them for a Japanese professor named (fnu) KATO (phonetic) (see MEXI 2881, 18 December 1962).

E. Security

There were no known security problems.

F. Technical

No technical problems were encountered that could not be handled.

G. Production

During December, LIENVOY produced thirty (30) reports listed in the attachment. As usual, much CI/CE personality and operational material was obtained.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As indicated above.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

~~SECRET~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - DECEMBER 1962

HMMA's	MEXI's	HMM's
20367	MEXI 2727	HMM 6873
	MEXI 2739	HMM 6875
	MEXI 2749	HMM 6876
	MEXI 2775	HMM 6878
	MEXI 2813	HMM 6880
	MEXI 2815	HMM 6883
	MEXI 2839	HMM 6888
	MEXI 2843 (HMM 6884)	HMM 6892
	MEXI 2848 (HMM 6885)	HMM 6893
	MEXI 2880 (HMM 6891)	HMM 6896
	MEXI 2881 (HMM 6890)	HMM 6898
	MEXI 2890 (HMM 6895)	HMM 6899
	MEXI 2891 (HMM 6894)	HMM 6905
	MEXI 2894 (HMM 6897)	HMM 6906
	MEXI 2937 (HMM 6902)	

1 + 15 + 14 = 30

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Monthly Activities Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

The following is the November 1962 report for Project LIENVOY:

A. Target lines, as of 1 December

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-40	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castillejos
28-79-87	Andres Armona
48-14-75	Enrique Cabrera
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-05	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunes
19-15-05	Roberto Romero Adams (Cuban target)
11-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C. T. A. L.
46-64-24	D. F. S.
46-11-30	D. F. S.
35-35-52	Politica (Revista - Marcue)
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
46-60-15	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Main Entrance)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)

KOBADGER.

Removed from Project
CS Classification: 60-6-75/3
JOB # 73-125/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

53-6-75/3

(Continued)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
17 Dec. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-20395

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy

B. Material Processed

In November, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 131 pages of daily resumes from all lines, 78 pages from the Cuban lines, 47 pages from the Czech lines and 110 pages from the Soviet lines. In addition, all of the Soviet and Czech tapes were turned over for the translations of the Russian and Czech conversations. Thirty pieces of miscellaneous material were also received.

C. Liaison

In addition to the PB Band reports passed to LITENSOR, the Station also passed situation reports to him on the India-Red Chinese border war. LITENSOR requested the Station to check a report which LITENSOR had received that 22 boxcars of ammunition was being shipped into Mexico from the United States. (See MEXI 2688)

On 5 November 1962 Chief of Station met with LITENSOR at the request of Ambassador MANN. LITENSOR had LITEMPO/2 sit in on the meeting. Ambassador MANN prepared a memorandum based upon a Department of State cable which The Ambassador asked Chief of Station to read to (but not to leave with) LITENSOR. When Chief of Station told LITENSOR that he was to read the telegram (which concerned GPIDEAL's statements and position on Cuba) to him, LITENSOR asked if he could dictate what Chief of Station read to him into his (new) dictaphone. This he did. Both LITENSOR and LITEMPO/2 were pleased with the strong, definite and concise position of GPIDEAL. They were also grateful that Ambassador MANN had got permission to give them this report.

D. Exploitation of Material

Samples of information obtained during the month shed some light on the private life of Carlos Lechuga, Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations, (see MEXI 2701) and the involvement of Braulio Maldonado Sandez in the uprisings in the State of Guerrero. (See MEXI 2713)

E. Security

There were no known security problems.

F. Technical

Likewise, there were not technical problems.

G. Production

During November, LIENVOY produced the eighteen (18) reports listed in the attachment. The usual large amount of CI/CE personality and operational material was obtained.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment: As stated above.
Distribution: 3 - C/WHD w/att; 2-files

~~SECRET~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - NOVEMBER 1962

HMMA's	HMM's	MEXI's
HMMA-20140	HMM-6853	MEXI-2713 (HMM-6871)
HMMA-20169	HMM-6864	MEXI-2647
HMMA-20262		MEXI-2646
HMMA-20268		MEXI-2616
		MEXI-2489
		MEXI-2486
		MEXI-2483
		MEXI-2465
		MEXI-2462
		MEXI-2443
		MEXI-2433 (HMM-6833)
		MEXI-2414)

4 + 2 + 12 = 18

[illegible] automatic [illegible]

50-6-[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, SR Division, Chief, KUDESK

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Operational/REDCAP/REDSKIN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Transmitted herewith in attachment is a self-explanatory LIENVOY report which may be of interest to the recipients.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment
As stated

Distribution
2 - WH w/2
1 - SR w/1
1 - KUDESK w/1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DATE TYPED: 11 Dec. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-20367

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:

[illegible]

15 Oct 6
LIENVOY

[illegible] asks [illegible] if he will be at the [illegible] the hotel? Yes. [illegible] come at [illegible] called Gallagher but he wasn't in. [illegible] says [illegible] was told that permission was given /for the visit/. [illegible] Cambodian Library to get the visas. [illegible] says he will [illegible] to the phone. Kent takes phone. [illegible] says [illegible] should come over with the passports. [illegible] Cambodian Library asks that "I" come over [illegible] "will I go there?" [illegible] says that he can. [illegible] that everyone appear there. Kent says that [illegible] come personally to the library. [illegible] asks if there [illegible] in the library. No. Kent says that the Cambodians [illegible] the person needed. [illegible] Kent – [illegible] – [illegible] think [illegible]. [illegible] flying out tomorrow. [illegible] doesn't know. [illegible] says that [illegible] is not [illegible] passports" [illegible] says "[illegible] /[illegible]/ about their [illegible] that since "he" is not included in the group [illegible] can't [illegible] can't give "your" consent. [illegible] says that if "you" [illegible] that if Kent has any objection [illegible] says that the [illegible] "[illegible]" and [illegible] "they" will be there a day. [illegible] doesn't know [illegible] thinks they have [illegible]. Kent will [illegible] when the other group is leaving. Leaving on the 17th [illegible].

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SR Division, Chief, KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/LIENVOY Product

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-19729, 31 August 1962

Action: See below

The Station would appreciate a positive or negative reply to the proposal made in reference (and in much earlier correspondence) regarding the assignment of a TDYer to analyze and collate the Soviet LIENVOY product.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

50-6-75/3

Distribution
2 - WH
1 - SR
1 - KUDESK

2cc to SR/10

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~S~~

DATE TYPED
10 Dec. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-20351

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

cc. Hunt

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG: J. R. Reeves:j.
UNIT: CWH/3/Mexico
EXT: 6284
DATE: 4 Dec 62 1781

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

4 Dec 62 23 39z

TO: MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO: ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO PRTY GMEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR 02975

02975

RYBAT LIENVOY

REF MEXI 2733 (IN 28460)*

1. CONCUR COS ADVISE AMB MANN RE LITENSOR REQUEST AND KUDARK REPLY.

2. SUGGEST FOLL FOR PASSAGE LITENSOR ON ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATES OF JUAN JOSE AREVALO IN MEXI:

> CURTIS UNDERSTANDS AREVALO SEEING VARIETY PEOPLE WITH ALL POLITICAL VIEWS INCLUDING NUMBER OF REPUTED COMMUNISTS. ONE OF THESE WHO SAID TO BE INTIMATE ASSOCIATEX IS VICENTE SAINZ, COSTA RICAN JOURNALIST.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *Request Hqs advise what reply COS should give LITENSOR on AREVALO activities & associates. Also, req permission advise Amb Mann of req from LITENSOR & reply.

WH/3/CAN ________

~~WH/COPS~~ ________

J. C. KING
C/WHD

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

Lienvoy/Lopez

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 308
3 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (COPY ISSUED TO WH AT 1320 3 DEC LMG)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, S/C 2

DEC 3 1753Z 62

PRIORITY

PRITY DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2733 IN28460

RYBAT/LIENVOY

1. LITENSOR VIA LIELEGANT ASKED COS FOR A REPORT ON ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATES OF JUAN JOSE AREVALO IN MEXICO.

2. REQUEST HQS ADVISE WHAT REPLY COS SHOULD GIVE; ALSO, REQUEST PERMISSION ADVISE AMB MANN OF REQUEST AND REPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

REMOVAL SLIP

DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER HMMA- 20193

DOC. DATE 15 Nov 62

THE CS COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS REMOVED FROM THIS FILE # 50-6-75/3

BY IP/ARD/RPU ON 23 May 73 AND FORWARDED TO IP/ANP ✓

IP/EDI
IP/PH
IP/FILES

BECAUSE

1. It was KAPOK and unprocessed.
2. It was RYBAT and unprocessed. ✓
3. It was EYES ALONE and unprocessed.
4. It was DEFERRED.
5. It was classified into file # __________
6. It was an indexed document.
7. __________

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

630

DATE : 31 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1800 31 OCT BAS)

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, DDP/SIT 3, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, TFW 5, S/C 2

OCT 31 2319Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 49959

PRITY DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 2396

REF MEXI 2397 (IN 49964)*

ATTN: BRENT, KNIGHT, GALBOND[6]

1. INFO REPORTED IN[1] REF CONFIRMED BY PERSONAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN COS AND LITENSOR[2], LIELEGANT[4], LIERGO[3], LITEMPO/2[1] AND HUMBERTO ROMERO PEREZ. ALSO, LITEMPO/2[1] POSITION CONFIRMED BY LIENVOY[5] REPORT OF HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GALINDO OCHOA AS CITED IN REFERENCE. LITEMPO/2[1] STATEMENTS TO GALINDO OCHOA AMOUNT TO MEXICAN PRESS GUIDANCE THEME.

2. ALL ASSURED COS MEXICO 100 PERCENT WITH U.S.A. HOWEVER, ROMERO POINTED OUT HIS "CHIEF" MUST BE CAREFUL WHAT HE SAYS AND TO WHOM HE SPEAKS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comment: *Reference attached.

GROUP 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG. : John M. Whitten:j:
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 19 Oct 62

1697

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

19 OCT 62 21 10z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO: ADDP; S/C 2

~~SIG CEN~~
☐ DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

OUT89106

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 43543

RYBAT

NO "OFFICIAL" REACTION YET FORMULATED HERE, BUT AS ODACID CABLES AND DISPATCHES FROM VARIOUS POINTS ON LOPEZ MATEOS ITINERARY FILTER IN TO EMBASSY, MEXI ITSE~~XX~~LF MAY WANT TO DISTILL SOME MEANINGFUL AND HELPFUL "COMMENT" WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO LIELEGANT AS THE "OFFICIAL" REACTION.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible]
various places.

J. C. KING
C/WHD

WH/COPS

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ 10

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 594 18 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

OCT 18 2052Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 41954

DIR CITE MEXI 2236

RYBAT 594 IN41954

1. LIELEGANT ASKS IF COS CAN GET WASHINGTON "OFFICIAL" REACTION TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS' TRIP TO FAR EAST AND TO HIS SPEECHES AT VARIOUS PLACES.

2. COS PROMISED TO ASK BUT EXPRESSED DOUBT THIS FORTHCOMING.

3. PLEASE CABLE REPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

K

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Monthly Activities Report on Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The following is the report on the LIENVOY Project for the month of September 1962:

A. Target Lines

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez (Out)
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde (Out)
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castillejos
11-63-34	Ramon Sinobas
28-79-67	Ramon Cesar Cuenca
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
45-15-06	Enrique Gonzales Pedrero (Out)
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta
10-29-69	Movimiento Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C. T. A. L.
46-64-24	D. F. S.
46-11-30	D. F. S.
21-11-01	Politica (Revista - Marcue) (Out)
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy

Removed from Project KDOINGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

(Continued)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
11 Oct. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19990
[redacted]-1959

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/2

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

45-61-81	Czech Embassy
45-61-80	Czech Embassy (Out)

B. Material Processed

In September, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 97 pages of daily resumes, 11 pages of resumes from the Cuban lines and 28 pieces of other material. There were also provided 125 pages of resumes from the Soviet lines and also 74 reels with the Russian conversations. In addition, there were 18 reels from the Czech lines.

C. Exploitation of Material

The following are examples of LIENVOY coverage:

1. A "George Sherman" contacted the Cuban Embassy about meeting with the Cuban Ambassador Carlos Lechuga. Sherman said that he knew Lechuga in Washington. (See MEXI 1925, 12 September 1962).

2. A "Gabino Fernandez", an employee of the Secretariat of the Presidency, made an appointment with Ramon Sinobas, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy, because Fernandez wanted to speak to Sinobas before Fernandez went to Cuba for a visit. (See MEXI 1967, 18 September 1962).

D. Liaison

Briefing papers which were pouched by Headquarters according to DIR 31814 were provided to LITENSOR. LITENSOR requested a further situation report on his forthcoming trip to the Far East. He was ready to call off his trip if KUBARK felt that the world situation was gloomy. (See MEXI 1919, 11 September 1962).

E. Security

There were no security problems for the month of September.

F. Technical

None.

G. Personnel

A PRQ was forwarded to Headquarters for a POA on Guadalupe Hermosillo Quiroz in HMMA-19809.

H. Production

During the month of September, LIENVOY produced the forty-nine (49) reports listed in the attachment. The usual large amount of CI/CE personality and operational material was obtained in addition to the (attached) disseminable reports.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment: As stated above.
Distribution: 3-WHD w/att; 2-files

~~SECRET~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - SEPTEMBER 1962

HMMA's	HMM's	MEXI's
HMMA-19729	HMM-6703	MEXI-1871 (HMM 6707)
HMMA-19743	HMM-6704	MEXI-1899
HMMA-19747	HMM-6705	MEXI-1904
HMMA-19791	HMM-6709	MEXI-1905
HMMA-19795	HMM-6720	MEXI-1919
HMMA-19804	HMM-6722	MEXI-1925
HMMA-19846	HMM-6723	MEXI-1946
HMMA-19848	HMM-6724	MEXI-1952
HMMA-19858	HMM-6726	MEXI-1967 (HMM-6730)
HMMA-19864	HMM-6733	MEXI-1979
HMMA-19868	HMM-6735	MEXI-1984 (HMM-6736)
HMMA-19878	HMM-6738	MEXI-1990
	HMM-6739	MEXI-2024
	HMM-6743	MEXI-2063 (HMM-6756)
	HMM-6744	MEXI-2072
	HMM-6745	
	HMM-6746	
	HMM-6747	
	HMM-6749	
	HMM-6750	
	HMM-6754	
	HMM-6759	

12 + 22 + 15 = 49

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

50-6-75/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

004 JO
.TE : 29 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CCG 2, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 2 0333Z 62
DUPLICATE AND SERVICED COPY

ROUTINE

IN 31052 A MEXI 2087

DIR INFO ROME CITE MEXI 2087

RYBAT

REF: A. DIR 38428 (OUT 80619;)B MEXI 2049 (IN 29411)1. PLAN BRIEF RATIGAN AS FOLLOWS:

A. BACKGROUND RICARDO JOSE ZEVADA AND ALEJANDRO CARRILLO MARCOR AND SUGGEST RATIGAN OBSERVE WHO THEIR CLOSEST CONTACTS IN PRESIDENTIAL PARTY, DEGREE THEIR ACCESS TO PRESIDENT AND OTHER RANKING MEXI OFFICIALS, AND IDENTITIES ANY OBVIOUS FOREIGN CONTACTS IN COUNTRIES VISITED.

B. IDENTITIES INDIVIDUALS IN OFFICIAL PARTY WHO EXPRESS ANTI-U.S. AND/OR PRO CASTRO SYMPATHIES.

C. IDENTITIES INDIVIDUALS WHO SEEM BE CLOSEST TO PRESIDENT.

D. ALL INFO HEARD ABOUT IDENTITY NEXT MEXI PRESIDENT.

2. ABOVE REQUIREMENTS ARE GUIDES ONLY AND STATION AWARE THAT RATIGAN PROBABLY WILL NOT HAVE DEGREE ACCESS TO REPORT OTHER THAN FRAGMENTARY INFO. NEVERTHELESS MEXI WILL APPRECIATE ANY INFO DEVELOPED BY RATIGAN.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

086

DATE : 2 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : ADDP, S/C 2

OCT 2 0638Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 31995

DIR CITE MEXI 2096

1. NAVAL ATTACHE ADVISED THAT REAR ADMIRAL R.C. BENITEZ, U.S.N. (RET), WILL ACCOMPANY MEXI PRESIDENTIAL PARTY ON COMING TRIP.

2. BELIEVE BENITEZ IS EXECUTIVE WITH PAN AM LATIN AMERICAN DIVISION IN MIAMI.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : C. BUSTOS
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 6006
DATE : 1 OCTOBER 1962

1681

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY, ROME

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/WE 2, S/C 2

10 Oct 62 23 11z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT62691

TO PRTY MEXI INFO ROUTINE ROME CITE DIR 39735

RYBAT

REFS: HONG 3795 (IN 30763)*
MEXI 2087 (IN 31052)**

1. ACCORDING LATEST INFO AVAILABLE, RATIGAN (IDEN A OF DIR 38423) WILL NOT ACCOMPANY PANAM CHARTER BUT COMPANY HAS ORDERED HIM ~~XXXXXXX~~ PRECEDE CHARTER BY ONE STOP AT ALL TIMES. WILL NOT TRAVEL MEXI.

2. REGRETTABLY KUBARK WILL NOT HAVE COVERAGE VIA RATIGAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: RATIGAN plans to travel Mexi late 1 Oct and Mexi Station can reach at Hotel Reforma or Panam Station Manager at airport.

** Sets forth Station requirements for RATIGAN.

R.W. Herbert
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WE/4 Wyatt (in draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

283

DATE : 29 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2

INFO : C/WE 2, S/C 2

SEP 29 1907Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 31052

DIR INFO ROME CITE MEXI 2087

RYBAT (PORTION GRBLD WILL FWD)

PORTION GARBLED - BEING SVCD

A. BACKGROUND RICARDO JOSE ZEVADA AND ALEJANDRO CARRILLO MARCOR AND SUGGEST RATIGAN OBSERVE WHO THEIR CLOSEST CONTACTS IN PRESIDENTIAL PARTY, DEGREE THEIR ACCESS TO PRESIDENT AND OTHER RANKING MEXI OFFICIALS, AND IDENTITIES ANY OBVIOUS FOREIGN CONTACTS IN COUNTRIES VISITED.

B. IDENTITIES INDIVIDUALS IN OFFICIAL PARTY WHO EXPRESS ANTI-U.S. AND/OR PRO CASTRO SYMPATHIES.

C. IDENTITIES INDIVIDUALS WHO SEEM BE CLOSEST TO PRESIDENT.

D. ALL INFO HEARD ABOUT IDENTITY NEXT MEXI PRESIDENT.

2. ABOVE REQUIREMENTS ARE GUIDES ONLY AND STATION AWARE THAT RATIGAN PROBABLY WILL NOT HAVE DEGREE ACCESS TO REPORT OTHER THAN FRAGMENTARY INFO. NEVERTHELESS MEXI WILL APPRECIATE ANY INFO DEVELOPED BY RATIGAN.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RA ~~SECRET~~

002

DATE : 29 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HONG KONG

ACTION : C/WH 5* (C/WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 2345, 28 SEP)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 29 0310Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 30763

PRITY DIR INFO PRITY MEXI CITE HONG 3795

RYBAT

RE DIR 38928 (out 81430)**

REF MESSAGE PASSED TO RATIGAN WHO STATES ARRIVING MEXI LATE ON 1 OCTOBER (MEXI TIME). HAS REQUESTED RESERVATIONS AT HOTEL REFORMA; IF STATION CANNOT REACH AT HOTEL, CONTACT PANAM STATION MANAGER AT AIRPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**REQUESTED HONG CONTACT AND TELL RATIGAN HE WILL BE CONTACTED ON ARRIVAL MEXI BY STATION REP WHO WILL DISCUSS HIS COOPERATION WITH KUBARK ON MEXICAN PRESIDENT'S TRIP.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

002
DATE : 27 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (TH COPY SLOTTED AT 2345 26 SEP-DD)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 27 0318Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 29411

PRITY DIR INFO ROME CITE MEXI 2049

RYBAT

REF DIR 38428 (out 80619)*

1. MEXI HAS REQUIREMENTS AND WILL CONTACT PER REF.

2. WILL FORWARD QUESTIONS GIVEN TO HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *STATED IF MEXI HAS ANY REQUIREMENTS FOR IDEN A IN CONNECTION LOPEY TRIP, STATION CAN CONTACT HIM IN MEXI THRU PANAM APR OFFICER. CABLE HQS WHETHER STATION PLANS MAKE CONTACT SO IDEN A CAN BE INFORMED IN HONG TO EXPECT KUBARK CONTACT MEXI.

K

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ORIG : Charlotte Bustos:[illegible]
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 27 Sep 62

1587

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : HONGKONG MEXICO CITY ROME

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

27 SEP 62 19 15z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT61 [illegible]

TO PRTY HONG INFO MEXI ROME CITE DIR 39[illegible]

RYBAT

LEROY K. RATIGAN NOW HONG STAYING PENINSULA HOTEL THRU 29 SEP. PLS CONTACT AND TELL HIM HE WILL BE CONTACTED ON ARRIVAL MEXI BY STATION REP WHO WILL DISCUSS HIS COOPERATION WITH KUBARK ON MEXICAN PRESIDENT'S TRIP. MEXI CONTACT WILL IDENTIFY SELF AS FRIEND IDEN.

END OF MESSAGE

FE/CH/MO/HK-Mcalpine (draft)
CWE/4
CWH/3
WH/3/Mexico
WH/COPS

Desmond FitzGerald
C/FE

J. C. King
for C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECR~~ET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG : Bustos: jz
UNIT : WH/3/[illegible]
EXT : 5740
DATE : 27 SEPT 62

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

27 SEP 62 19 15z

TO : HONGKONG
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/WE 2, S/C 2*

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT01 [illegible]31

TO PRTY HONG INFO CITE DIR 3[illegible]29

REF DIR 38928 (OUT 81430)

IDEN IS MR. JOSEPH DISTEFANO.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

Desmond FitzGerald
C/FE

J. C. King
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : C. BUSTOS 1618

UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO 1618

EXT : 6026

DATE : 25 SEPT 62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

25 SEP 62 22 38z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 30119

TO : MEXICO CITY, ROME

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

TO PRTY MEXI INFO ROME ROUTINE CITE DIR 38328

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1773 (IN 10046)*

1. IDEN A, PANAM SECURITY OFFICER ROME HAS JUST BEEN ASSIGNED ACCOMPANY PANAM PLANE CHARTERED BY MEXI PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS FOR FAR EAST TRIP. IDEN A LEAVES FOR HONG KONG TODAY, WILL ARRIVE MEXI APPROX 30 SEPT WHERE CAN BE CONTACTED AT PANAM OPERATIONS OFFICE.

2. IDEN A, KUBARK AGENT (FORMER STAFFER) OFFERS TO BE OF ASSISTANCE DURING LOPEZ TRIP.

3. IF STATION MEXI HAS ANY REQUIREMENTS IT WISHES PLACE ON IDEN A IN CONNECTION LOPEZ TRIP, STATION CAN CONTACT HIM IN MEXI CITY THRU PANAM OPS OFFICER USING NAME IDEN B, KUBARK STAFFER, IN INTRODUCTION.

4. PLS CABLE HQS WHETHER STATION PLANS MAKE CONTACT SO IDEN A CAN BE INFORMED IN HONG KONG TO EXPECT KUBARK CONTACT MEXI. PLS POUCH HQS COPY INSTRUCTIONS/ PASSED IDEN A.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: President Lopez Mateos plans dep for Far East trip on 26 September 1962.

C/WE/4

FE/CH/Flitcroft (phone)

C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/WH

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : Bustos
UNIT :
EXT : 1619
DATE : XX6X9X

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

0 Z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT80620

TO PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 38429

RYBAT

REF DIR 38428 (OUT OUT80619)

IDEN A MR. RICHARD MCNAMARA

IDEN B MR. JOSEPH DISTEFANO

J. C. KING
C/WHD

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 089
18 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : TAIWAN

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 18 0709Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 23955

DIR INFO MEXI CITE TAMI 5255

PSYCH

REF DIR 35994 (Out 76277) *

DISCUSSED REF WITH GIO AND THEY REPORTED GRC FOREIGN MINISTRY AWARE MATEOS ASIAN TOUR BUT WILL NOT INVITE TAIWAN BECAUSE GRC EMBASSY MEXICO REPORTED MATEOS SCHEDULE VERY TIGHT AND HE ONLY RECIPROCATING VISITS OF NEHRU, SUKARNO AND IKEDA TO MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *HQS REQUESTED TAMI PROCEED PER HQS BELIEF KUBARK ROLE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO PROMPTING GRC TO ISSUE INVITATION THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : A.D. WIEDEMEYER:jp
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940 1678
DATE : 12 Sept 1962

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

13 SEP 62 22 14z

TO : TAIPEI MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FE 6, S/C 2

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☑ ROUTINE

OUT76277

TO TAMI INFO MEXI CITE DIR 35994

REFS: A MEXI 1899 (IN 19806)*
B TAMI 5098 (19908)

ROLE

1. HQS BELIEVES KUBARK/SHOULD BE LIMITED TO PROMPTING GRC TO ISSUE INVITATION THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AS MOVE IN BEST INTERESTS CHINA REPRESENTATION ISSUE IN UN. GRC SHOULD BE TOLD LOPEZ MATEOS WILL PROBABLY HAVE DIFFICULTY ADDING TAIWAN VISIT TO SCHEDULE AT THIS DATE BUT IN ANY CASE GESTURE WOULD BE BENEFICIAL GRC CAUSE.

2. REQUEST TAMI PROCEED PER PARA 1 ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH CMT: LIELEGANT states LOPEZ Mateos should be invited to Taiwan but schedule is now so advanced it may be difficult to add Taiwan visit.

C/WH/3
FE/CH/IO
WH/C/CA P. Oberst (in draft)
WH/COPS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/FE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

002 JO
DATE : 12 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 2345 12 SEP)

INFO : ADOP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 12 0321Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 20593

RITY DIR CITE MEXI 1919

RYBAT

1. LITENSOR (VIA LIELEGANT) ASKED ON 11 SEPTEMBER FOR AN UP TO DATE SITUATION REPORT FROM KUBARK. THIS BECAUSE OF NEWS STORIES SOVIET ATTITUDE.

2. ACCORDING LIELEGANT, LITENSOR WILL, IF KUBARK FEELS WORLD SITUATION GLOOMY, CANCEL VISIT TO FAR EAST.

3. COS WILL ADVISE AMB MANN PERSONALLY OF REQUEST FROM LITENSOR.

4. APPRECIATE CABLED SITUATION REPORT OF WHATEVER COS CAN PASS PERSONALLY TO LITENSOR.

END OF MESSAGE

LIENVOY/OPP

K

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 575
10 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CI, CA/PEG, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FE 6, S/C 2

RI Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RI Index (check one) Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 11 01 18Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 19806

DIR INFO TAMI CITE MEXI 1899

REF DIR 34954 (out 74407)

ON 10 SEPT COS CONTACTED LIELEGANT WHO STATES:

A. PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS SHOULD BE INVITED TAMI;

B. LIELEGANT WILL PUSH FOR AT LEAST A BRIEF VISIT TO TAMI IF INVITATION RECEIVED.

C. SCHEDULE IS NOW SO FAR ALONG IT MAY BE DIFFICULT ADD TAMI, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT'S DESIRE BE OUT OF MEXICO AS BRIEFLY AS POSSIBLE AND MAKE TRIP.*

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE MATEOS' ASIAN TOUR.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/RC~~	
RID/FI	

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

051

DATE : 11 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : TAIWAN

ACTION: FE 8

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 11 0341Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 19908

DIR INFO MEXI CITE TAMI 5098

PSYCH

REF DIR 34954 (OUT 74407)

STRONGLY ENDORSE PROPOSED APPROACH GRC RE MATEOS VISIT TAIWAN. BELIEVE VISIT WOULD PRESENT EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY PROMOTE FAVORABLE GRC INTERNATIONAL IMAGE, PARTICULARLY IN LATIN AMERICA. FEEL WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF INVITATION AND ACCEPTANCE MATEOS VISIT COULD BE LAID ON ASAP IN ORDER EXPLOIT VISIT RE CHINA REPRESENTATION ISSUE IN UN. ALSO FEEL TRIP WOULD HELP OFFSET ADVERSE PROPAGANDA RE GRC WITHDRAWAL DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION LAOS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED STATION VIEWS REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY STATION PROMPTING GRC TO INVITE PRESIDENT MATEOS TO INCLUDE TAIWAN IN HIS TOUR.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ADW

ORIG : A.D. WEDEMEYER:jp
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940 15
DATE : 7 Sept 1962 1865

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : TAIPEI MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, NE 4, FE 6, S/C 2

8 SEP 65 00 44z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

OUT74407

TO TAMI MEXI INFO CITE DIR 34954

1. MEXICAN PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS PLANNING 15-20 DAY ASIAN TOUR STARTING 10 OCT IN NEW DELHI FOLLOWED BY VISITS TO TOKY, DJAK AND POSSIBLY MANI.

2. REQUEST TAMI AND MEXI VIEWS BY 12 SEPT RE ADVISABILITY TAMI STA PROMPTING GRC TO INVITE LOPEZ MATEOS TO INCLUDE TAMI ON TOUR.

END OF MESSAGE

FE/CH/IO L. Hickcox (in draft)
C/WH/3
WH/COPS

L. Ganoe/ops

for DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/FE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SR Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/Transmittal of LIENVOY Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith in Attachment is a self-explanatory LIFEAT report of 28 August. The local speaker is Vladimir Ivanovich SAMOKHIN, Chief of the Soviet Information Bulletin; the Moscow speaker is fnu KALUGIN..

2. The attached report is the first known instance to the Station of Moscow direction of the Bulletin in the informal manner described in the Attachment. The Station will forward any future similar reports.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

2-WHD, w/2 REC'D RI/AN 25-62
2-SRD, w/2
2-Files, w/1

2cc: SR

50-6-75/3

CS COPY

DATE TYPED 31 Aug. 1962	DATE DISPATCHED 4 Sept. 1962
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-19741	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

14-00000

75/Sam/61
28Aug62

In /From Moscow/ ND calling from Moscow introduces himself to Samokhin as Kalugin. Kal says that he is in the office that prepares material for Sam to turn over to the press. Kal wants to have better contact with Sam. Kal says that Sam has to give his preferences to Kal on the kinds of articles that he wants for the press. Kal will be calling Sam to the telephone about two times a month. And then Sam can tell Kal what his preferences are in the way of articles. Secondly, Kal wants Sam to [illegible] to be more observing in informing Kal what is being printed in /Mexico/. That these articles be sent to Kal. Kal says "we" see that there is considerable that is being printed /in Mexico/. But whatever Sam sends to Kal is very irregularly sent. Sam says that "we" always gave quarterly reports. Now Sam is being asked for monthly reports. /seems there part of conversation missing/ Kal says for Sam to send him a two-word cable saying when Sam wants Kal to call. Then Kal will call Sam. For instance, if Sam has anything [illegible] to request, then he could send the cable. Kal asks if, for instance, Sam has any questions right now. Sam says yes, he would like Kal to send him material on the cosmonauts. Sam wants general material by specialists. Kal says that much has been sent to Sam. Sam says unfortunately, no. Not enough. Sam says it would be well if Kal could get [illegible] together articles by Nikolayev and Popovich themselves. With their signature to the articles. For instance, a greeting to the Mexican [illegible] reader. "And with their signature /to the article/." Kal asks if Sam wants this addressed to the reader "of our periodical?" Sam says no, simply to the Mexican reader. This can be published any periodical. Kal will do this. Sam says he wants articles on the situation of education - the middle education, the special education, and higher education. These articles to be based on specialists writing them. Not popular articles. Sam wants information of middle, higher and technical schools. "We are being asked for such material." Sam would also like articles on culture and art. Articles not about some specific art or cultural matter, but the problems in culture and art. Sam wants that more specialized articles be sent to him. Articles for the speacialized reader. Kal understands. Sam then asks when his replacement will be coming. Kal can't answer that. Kal says that he will call Sam on the 10th. Kal will try to give Sam an answer. Sam says he would like very much articles by Nikolayev and Popovich. Sam wants the photos of them also. Kal repeats that he wants very much commentary articles, Sam says this is very difficult to do for the month. "Because not so much is published." Kal asks that nevertheless everything be send for the month that is published. Kal asks Sam to send these articles by air mail. Very well. Kal says that there ar/ticles that have to be answered. Sam asks Kal to give his regards to the comrades.

In Sokolovskaya asks Samokhin if she can come over. Yes.

Samokhin asks Yegorov if there will be any mail today. Yog says no.

31 Aug 62

CS COPY

att to HMMW 19741

50-6-75/3

75/Sam/61
28Aug62

In /From Moscow/ ND calling from Moscow introduces himself to Samokhin as Kalugin. Kal says that he is in the office that prepares material for Sam to turn over to the press. Kal wants to have better contact with Sam. Kal says that Sam has to give his preferences to Kal on the kinds of articles that he wants for the press. Kal will be calling Sam to the telephone about two times a month. And then Sam can tell Kal what his preferences are in the way of articles. Secondly, Kal wants Sam to be more observing in informing Kal what is being printed in /Mexico/. That these articles be sent to Kal. Kal says "we" see that there is considerable that is being printed /in Mexico/. But whatever Sam sends to Kal is very irregularly sent. Sam says that "we" always gave quarterly reports. Now Sam is being asked for monthly reports. /seems there part of conversation missing/ Kal says for Sam to send him a two-word cable saying when Sam wants Kal to call. Then Kal will call Sam. For instance, if Sam has anything to request, then he could send the cable. Kal asks if, for instance, Sam has any questions right now. Sam says yes, he would like Kal to send him material on the cosmonauts. Sam wants general material by specialists. Kal says that much has been sent to Sam. Sam says unfortunately, no. Not enough. Sam says it would be well if Kal could get together articles by Nikolayev and Popovich themselves. With their signature to the articles. For instance, a greeting to the Mexican reader. "And with their signature /to the article/." Kal asks if Sam wants this addressed to the reader "of our periodical?" Sam says no, simply to the Mexican reader. This can be published any periodical. Kal will do this. Sam says he wants articles on the situation of education – the middle education, the special education, and higher education. These articles to be based on specialists writing them. Not popular articles. Sam wants information of middle, higher and technical schools. "We are being asked for such material." S m would also like articles on culture and art. Articles not about some specific art or cultural matter, but the problems in culture and art. Sam wants that more specialized articles be sent to him. Articles for the speacialized reader. Kal understands. Sam then asks when his replacement will be coming. Kal can't answer that. Kal says that he will call Sam on the 10th. Kal will try to give Sam an answer. Sam says he would like very much articles by Nikolayev and Popovich. Sam wants the photos of them also. Kal repeats that he wants very much commentary articles, Sam says this is very difficult to do for the month. "Because not so much is published." Kal asks that nevertheless everything be send for the month that is published. Kal asks Sam to send these articles by air mail. Very well. Kal says that there articles that have to be answered. Sam asks Kal to give his regards to the comrades.

In Sokolovskaya asks Samokhin if she can come over. Yes.

Samokhin asks Yegorov if there will be any mail today. Yeg says no.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

~~S E C R E T~~

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief, WH Division

INFO

Chief, SR Division; Chief, KUDESK

FROM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT

0 Operational/Soviet LIENVOY Product

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action: See paragraph 4 below

1. Transmitted herewith, for purposes of Headquarters familiarization, is a typical one day LIENVOY product of the Soviet lines. (Note that the Station has additional LIFEAT coverage on the personal lines of Colonel Aleksandr Georgiyevich SIDOROV and Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, and on the office line of Vladimir Ivanovich SAMOKHIN).

2. Except for the weekend period, the Spanish language transcript reaches the Soviet case officer on the day following the actual transcription - at the most usually two days after the transcription. The Station's Russian language translator transcribes the Russian language portions immediately, and this product reaches the Soviet case officer about an hour or two after receipt of the Spanish reporting. Simultaneously, flimsy copies of the above have been given to the reports officer and to other interested Station officers. The first copy is kept in a Station chrono file, for purposes of permanent record. It is annotated for ZOHAR purposes.

3. The Soviet officer, Lucy A. Dillinger, and other officers, read the product quickly for the immediate purpose of obtaining exploitable LCIMPROVE or other operational leads, and/or reportable intelligence. After this initial scanning, the product is literally cut up, with each clipping of significant conversation sent to COS and to various Station officers for their information and/or action. Whenever pertinent, the actual LIENVOY clip is sent to Headquarters, for information or action - or a summary of the clip is sent to Headquarters in dispatch form. Each clip is eventually routed to the Station's registry where indexing and filing is completed.

4. The Station finds that this Soviet LIENVOY clipping program provides the files on the individual Soviet staffers with a rather good picture of their activities and personality. (These individual files are of course augmented with information derived from double agent operations, LIEMPTY reporting, Headquarters provided information, ODACID reporting, newspaper clippings and other miscellaneous reporting). In many cases, however, the backbone of a Station file on a Soviet may derive principally from bits and pieces of LIENVOY product.

50-6-75/3

2 - WHD, w/1 att.
1 - SRD, w/1 att.
1 - KUDESK, wo/att.
2 - Files

1cc w/att
to SR/IC

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
30 Aug. 62	31 Aug. 62

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS CO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMA-19729

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

201-

CLASSIFICATION

~~S E C R E T~~

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-19729

Category station files receive the clips pertaining to Soviet commercial activities, propaganda activities, Soviet contacts, etc. Very often, a single clipping may have to be copied to be sent to the files of several individual Soviets and/or to one or more category files.

5. Unfortunately, the Station does not have sufficient personnel available to analyze and collate periodically the LIENVOY and other Station product in the individual Soviet files for transmittal to Headquarters for its information; or possibly more important, for eventual transmittal to another Station where a Soviet from Mexico City is reassigned. Headquarters attention is directed again to MEXI-9885 of 17 January 1962 and allied correspondence regarding the desirability of having a trained Headquarters TDYer work on these materials at the Station. Headquarters may now wish to reinvestigate the possibility of finding a qualified staffer for this TDY assignment.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. Curtis

14-00000

Lee

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

537

DATE : 27 AUG 62 DMCL ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

AUG 28 0100Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 12381

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1797

RYBAT/LIENVOY

REF DIR 30536 (OUT 66927)*

TRIP CANCELLED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RECOMMENDED (LIENVOY-2) TRIP BE POSTPONED.

RIENVOY 0151

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET RYBAT~~

ORIG : LEE O. NORRIS:jp
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 17 August 1962

1590
20

5-62
ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

17 AUG 21 03z

DEFERRED ~~SIG CEN~~
ROUTINE

OUT 66927
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO MEXI (OPIM) INFO CITE DIR 30[illegible]36

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1693 (IN 46143)*

1. WOLLENSACK EQUIPMENT NOT SUITABLE AND NO OTHER NEW EQUIPMENT TYPES AVAILABLE. RECOMMEND TRIP BE POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER CONSIDERATION POSSIBLE.

2. IF TRIP CAN NOT BE DELAYED, WE WILL ATTEMPT ENTERTAIN AND DIVERT LIENVOY 2 WITH AREHART'S HELP. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH CMT: Requested Hqs show LIENVOY-2 Wollensack equipment for New L.P.

TSD/AOB John Castro (in draft)

WH/COPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

~~SECRET RYBAT~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

27 ~~SECRET~~

DATE : 064
16 AUG 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 16 0349Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 46148

DIR CITE MEXI 1693

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1691, PARA 5 Cu 45535)*

1. STATION SUGGESTS AREHART AND LIENVOY-2 TDY HQS WEEK BEGINNING 20 AUG. AREHART TO ARRIVE 20 AUG FOLLOWED BY L-2 ON 22 AUG. PURPOSE TO STUDY AND SELECT SMALLER RECORDING GEAR (PROBABLY WOLLENSACK) FOR LIENVOY USE. PLAN MOVE LIENVOY BASE INTO LIELEGANT OFFICE WHERE PREVIOUSLY LOCATED TO INCREASE OP SECURITY AND OVERALL EFFICIENCY. THIS WAS PROPOSED BY LIELEGANT SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, BUT STATION CONSIDERATION EXPENSE NEW GEAR DELAYED SUGGESTION UNTIL REF PROPOSAL AROSE.

2. BELIEVE TWO DAYS ADEQUATE TIME L-2 REMAIN HQS. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL TRIP.

file 50-6-75/3

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *PARA 5 MEXI SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY PRESENT LIENVOY GEAR COULD BE USED BY LITEMPO.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

643	
DATE : 9 AUG 62	ROUTING
	1
	2 mext
	3
	4
	5
	6
TO : DIRECTOR	
FROM : MEXICO CITY	AUG 9 2311Z 62
ACTION : C/WH 5	
INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, S/C 2	ROUTINE
	IN 42833

DIR CITE MEXI 1652

REFS A EMBTEL 460, 8 AUG 62

B EMBTEL 418

RYBAT

1. AT AMB MANN'S REQUEST CURTIS GAVE REPORT RE CUAUHTEMOC CARDENAS TO LITENSOR ON 3 AUGUST.

2. ON 8 AUGUST LITENSOR SENT WORD TO CURTIS VIA LIELEGANT THAT CUAUHTEMOC CARDENAS WOULD NOT BE A CANDIDATE FOR THE POSITION OF "WATER COMMISSIONER" IN THE MEXICALI AREA. (NOTE: SEE MEXI 1637 (IN 4/5 RE MEETING ON NIGHT OF 7 AUGUST BETWEEN LAZARO CARDENAS AND LITENSOR. CURTIS BELIEVES MATTER OF CUAUHTEMOC ATTEMPT DISCUSSED AT THIS MEETING.)

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : J. R. REEVES 1638
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 31 JULY 1962

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC, C/FE 6, S/C 2

31 JUL 62 21 38z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT60676

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 26750

RYBAT

REF: MEXI 1469 (IN 32427)*

1. HQS PREPARED PROVIDE BRIEFING PAPERS PER PARA 3A REF AND CONCUR EXPERT COMING MEXI PER PARA 3B REF.

2. ASSUME COS WILL BE ABLE PROVIDE HQS SUFFICIENT LEAD TIME TO COMPLETE BRIEFING PAPERS AND MAKE EXPERT AVAILABLE. IS SPANISH NECESSARY FOR LITENSOR MEETINGS.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: COS would greatly appreciate Hqs assistance on briefing papers and expert to brief LITENSOR if Indonesia trip materializes.

CI/ICG/Paul Burke (in draft)

WH/PO/A Clark Simmons

WH/COPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

N. P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/~~[redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSH 43-43

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
HMMA-19432
[redacted]-1906

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
50-6-75/~~4~~ 3

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 24 July 1962

SUBJECT ©Monthly Activities Report on Project LIENVOY

RE "43 3" – (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information.

REFERENCE(S)

The following is the report on the LIENVOY Project for the month of June 1962:

A. Target Lines

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
21-81-32	Gustavo Solorzano (Not being used)
11-42-48	Jorge L. Tamayo Castillejos
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castillejos
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
28-79-67	Ramon Cesar Cuenca (Cuban Embassy)
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
12-13-37	Ricardo J. Zevada (Out of order)
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzales Pedrero (Out of order)
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta
10-29-69	Movimiento Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L. (Out of order)
46-64-24	D.F.S.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
21-11-01	Politica (Revista - Marcue)
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
11-21-93	Cuban Embassy (Out of order)
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Out of order)
45-61-81	Czech Embassy
45-61-80	Czech Embassy

CSB

IP/ARO

Removed from Project KDBADGER
50-6-75/3
CS Classification:
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

B. Material Processed

In June, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 163 pages of daily resumes, 63 pages of transcript from the Cuban Embassy lines, 48 tapes from the Czech Embassy Lines, and 98 tapes and the transcriptions of the Spanish conversations from the Soviet Embassy lines. In addition, there were 29 other pieces of material from the LP.

C. Exploitation of Material

From the material processed above the following were some examples of pro- and anti-Communist information:

✓ 24 JUL 1962
✓ 50-6-75/3

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/~~[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO ONE

RECORD COPY

The Cuban efforts at propaganda in Mexico in which the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico conferred with Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister, and suggested to him that Fidel Castro write a short message to the Mexican people in Siempre on its ninth anniversary of publication (see HMMA 19399).

The negative treatment to a Czech commercial representative by Mexican Immigration authorities (see HMMA 19158).

The refusal by the Pan American Institute of Geography and History of the Organization of American States to permit Teresa Proenza Proenza, Third Secretary and Cultural Attache at the Cuban Embassy, to attend the meeting held by it (see HMM 6438).

The embarrassment caused by the immoral behavior of Mexican female delegates to the Cuban 26 July celebration held in Havana in 1961 according to Manuel Marcue Parinas of the periodical Politica as told to Teresa Proenza Proenza.

D. Liaison

With the approach of the GPIDEAL visit to Mexico 29 June - 1 July, liaison activities greatly increased. COS visited LITENSOR on 28 June. LITENSOR assured that there would be no problems in the GPIDEAL visit and the safety of GPIDEAL was guaranteed and in the hands of LITENSOR. At this meeting LITENSOR indicated his annoyance with the Cubans. (See MEXI 1253).

LIELEGANT turned over to the Chief of Station a list of persons who were put under surveillance in connection with the GPIDEAL visit. The list also indicated those who were arrested. (See MEXIs 1244 and 1264).

At a meeting held on 28 May 1962, the Chief of Station, LIELEGANT, and LIENVOY/2 met with LIENVOY/1 and obtained his agreement to hire LIENVOY/14 to work under LIENVOY/3 as a technical inspector in Telefonos de Mexico. The purpose in putting LIENVOY/14 in this capacity is to have a man who would be more available to the LIENVOY Project and who "would see what others might be tapping telephones" in Telefonos de Mexico. Furthermore, LIENVOY/1 agreed to see to it that LIENVOY/14 would have "the range and authority" to do the work.

Putting LIENVOY/14 as a technical inspector within Telefonos, could create problems for the LIFEAT Project. At the same time WILSTED is restudying the LIFEAT system, improving it, tightening up the security and alerting the base houses to watch for any abnormal activity on present taps. It has been understood by the LIENVOY case officer that this has been done and it will be reported from time to time in future LIENVOY reports.

E. Security

For a report on security of the LIENVOY site for June 1962, see paragraph 2 E of HMMA-19319 (RYBAT-1897) dated 10 July 1962.

As was stated at the end of that paragraph, any surveillance or security threat of the LIENVOY basehouse or personnel can eventually be handled, should this be found necessary, by Chief of Station to LITENSOR.

F. Technical

The floor in the LP was recently covered with a linoleum which has

14-00000

greatly contributed to keeping the dust out of the recording machines and in excellent working condition. According to Arnold F. AREHART, the LIENVOY technician, the machines are operating at top efficiency.

G. Personnel

The personnel remains the same as reported in the previous report.

H. Production

Production for the month of June was higher than usual. This increase was primarily due to the GPIDEAL visit. There were seventy-four (74) reports from LIENVOY material during June 1962. These are listed in the attachment.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

23 July 1962

Attachment:
LIENVOY Production - June 1962

Distribution:
3 - WHD w/att
2 - Files

50-6-75/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ATE : 022 20 JUL 62

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : MEXICO CITY

CTION: C/WH 5

NFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/CI/IC, C/FE 6, S/C 2.

ROUTING

1		4	
2	1	5	
3		6	

JUL 21 0405Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 32427

DIR CITE MEXI 1469

RYBAT

REF DIR 22662 (Out 53750)

1. POINTS IN REF TAKEN UP NIGHT 18 JULY WITH LITENSOR[1] IN MEETING ATTENDED BY LIELEGANT[2].

2. LITENSOR[1] OBVIOUSLY NOT REPEAT NOT HAPPY ABOUT HAVING GOT HIMSELF INTO POSITION OF POSSIBLE VISITS. LIELEGANT[2], AFTER MEETING, EXPRESSED BELIEF LITENSOR[1] WILL NOT MAKE VISITS, WILL FIND REASONS POSTPONE.

3. LITENSOR[1] ASKED COS FOR:

A. BRIEFING PAPERS ON COMMUNISM AND IMPORTANT PERSONALITIES WHO ARE COMMUNIST OR PRO-COMMUNISTS IN INDONESIA, JAPAN AND INDIA. HE REFERRED TO PAPERS GIVEN HIM PRIOR TO HIS VISIT TO SOUTH AMERICA IN JANUARY 1960.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

PAGE 2

IN 32427 MEXI 1469

B. POSSIBILITY OF AN EXPERT "LIKE SR BROOKE" COMING TO MEXICO CITY TO MEET WITH HIM AND COS JUST PRIOR TO HIS "TAKE-OFF" IF HE DOES MAKE TRIP (LIKE "BROOKE"--CEDRIC PAPATE DID PRIOR TO SOUTH AMERICAN VISIT).

4 COS WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE HEADQUARTERS ASSISTANCE ON PARA THREE IF TRIP MADE.

5 WILL ADVISE WHEN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS Comment: Hqs. furnished reasons why the visit to Sukarno was a bad idea.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

ASW

ORIG : AL WEDEMEYER
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 6026
DATE : 12 JULY 1962

1582
1582

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

5-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

12 JUL 62 15 31z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/CI/IC, C/FE 6, S/C 2

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 53750

TO MEXI (PRIORITY) INFO CITE DIR 22662

22662

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1359 (IN 26600)*

1. HQS CONCURS WITH PROPOSAL IN PARA 3 REF.

1 2

2. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH LITENSOR, COS MAY AT HIS DISCRETION INDICATE FOLLOWING REASONS WHY VISIT TO SUKARNO A BAD IDEA:

A. SUKARNO IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN MILITARY OFFENSIVE AGAINST DUTCH IN NEW GUINEA AND HAS THUS FAR FRUSTRATED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

B. DUTCH ARE MEMBERS OF FAST GROWING AND ECONOMICALLY POWERFUL EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET. MEXICO IS SEEKING TO INCREASE TRADE WITH COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES AND TO OBTAIN INVESTMENT CAPITAL FROM THEM. BELIEVE MEXICOS INTERESTS WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY TRIP LIKELY TO OFFEND COMMON MARKET COUNTRY.

1

C. CONSIDER THIS POOR TIME FOR LITENSOR THROUGH HIS PRESENCE GIVE SUKARNO BENEFIT HIS AND HIS COUNTRY'S PRESTIGE.

END OF MESSAGE

1

*WH Comment: LITENSOR planning visit SUKARNO in late Oct or early Nov. Amb MANN mentioned to COS he personally believes this visit not good. COS suggests he can tell LITENSOR that "my chiefs think visit to SUKARNO this year a bad idea." Request Hqs comments.

2 2

C/FE
C/WH/3
WH/C/CA
WH/COPS

Richard Helms
RICHARD HELMS
DDP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

VERN T. GRESHAM
AC/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :	261 10 JUL 62
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	MEXICO CITY
ACTION :	C/WH 5
INFO :	DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2, C/FE 6

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3		6	

JUL 11 1058Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 26600

DIR CITE MEXI 1359

ATTN BRENT AND KNIGHT

RYBAT

1. COS HAS LEARNED FROM RELIABLE SOURCE (LIELEGANT[1]) THAT LITENSOR[2] PLANNING VISIT SUKARNO IN DJAKARTA IN LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER.

2. AMBASSADOR MANN MENTIONED TO COS THAT HE PERSONALLY BELIEVES THIS VISIT NOT GOOD.

3. COS HAS TENTATIVE APPOINTMENT TALK OVER LIENVOY[3] OPERATIONAL WITH LITENSOR[2] ON 13 JULY. CAN, IF HQS APPROVES, TELL LITENSOR[2] THAT "MY CHIEFS THINK VISIT TO SUKARNO THIS YEAR A BAD IDEA".

4. PLEASE ADVISE. SUGGEST CONSULT WITH DAINOLD[4].

END OF MESSAGE

FE/

Forward to [illegible] with [illegible]

LIENVOY/[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

Spinney ops

DISPATCH

~~[illegible]~~

HMMA-19319
[illegible]

50-1-16

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Mexico City Station Security

ACTION REQUIRED
None; for your information.

DATE
10 July 1962

RE "OT" – (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

A. HMMS 2430
B. MEXI 0346

1. As requested in reference, the station has polled all Station Case officers for possible or confirmed cases of surveillance while making operational contacts. The poll indicated five (5) cases of surveillance during recent months. For the sake of clarity and to give Headquarters an exact idea of the circumstances surrounding each incident, this report will treat each case individually with station comments pertinent to each case.

2. The five cases of possible or confirmed surveillance, related in the first person, are as follows:

A. Lewis J. SHOQUIST: 15 May 1962

"Following a meeting with Francis R. HEGARTY at the Hotel Alameda this date I noticed a Mexican standing quite close to us as we were discussing innocuous subjects just before parting. This fellow moved over and joined another Mexican who was standing at the Juarez Avenue entrance to the Alameda Hotel. I called HEGARTY's attention to these two and suggested that he leave, being very careful to check himself, while I checked these fellows to be absolutely certain they were interested in us. HEGARTY crossed Juarez and took a cab. Neither of these Mexicans showed any interest in his movements or made any type of observable signal. I walked back into the Hotel and spent about five minutes browsing at the magazine shop then left the hotel by the side entrance. As I departed I glanced toward Juarez Avenue and saw one of the same two fellows who had been at the Juarez entrance nudge the other and call his attention to me. These two fellows had moved in order to check both hotel entrances from the same spot. I walked to an arcade directly across from the hotel entrance and pretended to be looking in shop windows. I saw both Mexicans position themselves so as to observe the arcade. I made no attempt to dump the surveillance, being interested instead, in determining definitely that I was the target. As I moved out of the arcade, the two above fingered me to another pair of Mexicans who followed me as I moved through the Las Americas parking lot to Calle Independencia. For the next hour and one half to two hours I took these boys on a long tour, mostly on foot. I checked them by starting up streets then changing my mind and doubling back, following an erratic pattern as if shopping aimlessly, stopping in bookshops for periods during which they were forced to stand around somewhat obviously outside, etc. Briefly, it can be summarized by saying that there were at least five members of this team definitely on the surveillance, two others I am quite sure were involved, and one other about whom I am not absolutely sure. When, in my mind, there was no doubt whatsoever that I was the target I caught a taxi and headed toward Reforma Avenue, then to Rio Tiber St. and then toward Melchior Ocampo Street. As if changing my mind, I had the driver cut over to Sullivan St. to Shirley Courts where I went in and had lunch. During the cab ride I did not spot car surveillance but, shortly after my arrival at Shirley Courts, I saw three new men not previously on the job, whose actions indicated they were on me. I paid my bill, went into the bathroom for a minute then left through the covered garage and out into Villalongin St. in back of Shirley Courts. Once out of the Courts, I walked rapidly out of sight of the exit and checked myself for the next ten minutes but could detect no further surveillance. I then walked up to Reforma, caught a cab, got out across the street from the Roble Theater, walked into the drug store at the Hotel Reforma, then out the front entrance, down to Woolworth's, through Woolworth's to the back entrance, up to Pasaje Latinoamericano, into the Pasaje where I stopped at a small counter shop to check as I made a purchase, then retraced my steps to Calle Madrid, on up to Reforma where I turned into the Reforma entrance to Sanborn's, checked for surveillance, then into the Embassy by the entrance from Sanborn's through the perfume section. There is no doubt whatsoever that these men were on me. The surveillance was not sophisticated from the standpoint of keeping me unaware, but was a very persistent one with these men not getting lost on the simpler tricks. Regardless of who is controlling these fellows, I have cancelled all operational contacts for today and will contact HEGARTY, Oliver Q. WIMPHEN and Simon D. CLACKETT tonight or early tomorrow morning to set up entirely new contact arrangements with each. I plan to make my contacts either early in the mornings or later at night in areas where surveillance can be spotted easily. I will instruct all agents to be unusually careful in checking before making any meetings, either with other agents or with me and that if there is any suspicion of surveillance skip the contact and check later at the alternate contact point in each case, if clear by the time of the alternate meeting. I called HEGARTY from a pay phone last night and set up an early morning contact with him to check on whether or not he was followed when he left the Hotel Alameda yesterday. HEGARTY said that he checked carefully but that there was no indication of interest in him. This is quite a relief since it now appears that I must have been picked up at the Embassy and that I, not HEGARTY, was the target. I cautioned HEGARTY to be even more careful than ever in his approaches to the LINLUCK safehouse and told him that, in our contacts, I was setting up entirely new contact arrangements immediately and that we would not use previous points uptown again. HEGARTY was told that we would use previously agreed upon points in the Polanco-Lomas area, that each point and time for the next meeting would be agreed upon at the previous one to avoid phone use as much as possible, and that most of our meetings would be held before 0900 hours or, when that not feasible, after dark. I suggested that he also inform LINLUCK that I had been under surveillance of some persistence and that he (LINLUCK) should be even more careful than ever in his contacts with HEGARTY, and in his approaches to the safehouse. I met WIMPHEN and CLACKETT later that same morning and made similar new contact arrangements with them and advised them of the even greater need for caution. I also advised them to park at least two to three blocks from points of contact and walk in, checking carefully before and after parking to be sure they are not surveilled and, if there is any suspicion of surveillance, do not make contact but make the alternate later if clear by them."

B. Algernon O. FORTYUNE, [illegible] November 1961

The abovementioned noted on the night of [illegible] November 1961 at approximately 2100 hours what seemed to be a suspicious situation in attempting to service the LINLUCK safehouse. As indicated on the attached diagram, the subject parked his automobile two blocks away as indicated on the diagram and approached the target by way of Panuco Street. In the approach run the subject noted a blue Fiat parked at the corner of Lerma and Hudson Streets with two male occupants. As the undersigned, on foot, approached the corner of Panuco and Hudson he noticed another Fiat parked at the very corner with three occupants. Remembering the other Fiat at the end of the block, which was quite visible from the corner of Panuco and Hudson, the undersigned decided to delay entry into the safehouse and casually walk down the block. The undersigned cut across Hudson Street to avoid walking close to the parked car and as he walked on Lerma, noticed the presence of a slow moving car behind him. This did not arouse too much suspicion since this area apparently specializes in street walkers and the local "tenorios" cruise the streets looking for them. As the undersigned reached the parked Q.P. car at the corner of Lerma and Duero the slow moving auto came abreast of the car and the driver almost stopped and stared at the undersigned as he attempted to unlock the car to depart the area. By this time the undersigned got suspicious and attempted to read the license plate, but the plate illumination bulb was out on the suspicious vehicle. The undersigned got in his own car, started down Lerma, passed the suspicious car which immediately fell in behind the undersigned. Not convinced yet of the intent of the following car, the undersigned drove toward Mississippi and made like he was continuing down on Lerma. At the last moment the undersigned swerved into Mississippi, narrowly missing getting clobbered by a vehicle coming down Mississippi. The suspicious vehicle, who was right behind, had to gun his auto to get out of the way so that he had to go straight across Lerma. The undersigned noted as he made the sudden turn into Mississippi that the other vehicle braked as soon as he passed Mississippi and, it seemed to the undersigned, was backing up toward Mississippi. At this point the undersigned poured the coal into the old Green Hornet and left the area. The undersigned then went to the Polanco Bowling Alley instead of home, bowled for approximately an hour and then returned at 2300 hours to inspect the area of action once more. The area was completely free of any parked autos. The undersigned cruised around the area for approximately 35 minutes but could not spot either one of the two Fiats.

Conclusions: (a) As previously stated, there may have been nothing to this incident, and perhaps the autos in question were merely the joy cars looking for customers, but at any rate the set-up looked suspicious therefore the undersigned did not service the safehouse in question.

(b) Douglas NISLEY reported to the undersigned that his records that a suspected Polish intelligence agent, Josef DEJ, resided at Hudson 11, two doors down from the LINLUCK safehouse. It is possible that the surveillance may have been on DEJ and that the undersigned blundered into an unpleasant situation.

(c) LINLUCK reported on 14 November 1961 that it was possible that he was under surveillance and it is possible that he was followed to the safehouse.

Francis R. HEGARTY, the regular case officer handling LINLUCK made the following comments pertinent to FORTYUNE's report of possible surveillance:

"On 22 November, HEGARTY visited safehouse at Rio Hudson to remove the typewriter and paper and inform the maid in charge that he intended to leave the apartment on the following day and also to arrange for the payment of the light bill which was due. After arranging these matters, HEGARTY left the safehouse and purposely took a circuitous route to his car, which had been parked more than a block away on another street. HEGARTY turned two corners and crossed two streets and detected an individual, Mexican in appearance, approximately six feet tall, 170 lbs., brown hair, ruddy complexion, wearing a tan suit and open sport shirt, and carrying a manila folder in his left hand, walking about 30 feet behind him. HEGARTY walked past his car and turned a third corner and walked rapidly to the middle of the block and then turned in his tracks. When HEGARTY reached the last corner he had turned he almost ran into the individual described above. The man opened his eyes wide, hesitated in mid-stride, but then kept on walking in the direction he had been going. HEGARTY walked to his car and after making sure that the individual did not turn back, immediately left the area." HEGARTY is certain that the safehouse at Rio Hudson was not under surveillance up until 10 November, the last time he visited it previously, and that the surveillance is on the house and not on himself.

Station Comment: See 2 a (Conclusions) above. In a later check of this area by HEGARTY, he could detect no surveillance either stationary or moving. SHOQUIST, however, instructed him to get a new safehouse for LINLUCK meetings immediately following his 22 November report and for neither he nor LINLUCK to go near the Rio Hudson safehouse again.

C. Andrew F. MERTON, 1 June 1962

"On 1 June 1962, while leaving a meeting with LITAU-1, I detected what could have been a possible surveillance. The meeting was in the Cafe Blanca on Juarez Avenue, between Lafragua Street and the Caballito Monument. Upon leaving the meeting, to which I had arrived "clean" to the best of my knowledge, I noted a peculiar flash of expression in the face of a tall, young, dark-haired man apparently waiting in the doorway for something. I had left the meeting first, leaving LITAU-1 to pay the check. Upon noting the expression I had a hunch that something funny might be going on. I turned right out of the door of the cafe and walked the short distance to the corner of Juarez and Reforma, doubling around the corner to the right. This left me on the north side of Reforma headed west in which direction I walked about a block. Two good-looking girls passed me headed south, and observing a good old Latin custom, I suddenly swiveled my head to watch them from the rear. I noted that my tall, dark-haired young man was behind me. As he noted that I could see him he suddenly turned right into a store which sells roof water tanks, a fairly obvious maneuver, or so it appeared. I resumed my way towards the Embassy but at a very slow pace [illegible] interest in the show windows. A few minutes later my friend passed me briskly walking towards Reforma and La Fragua, which latter street he crossed, eventually turning left and crossing the Reforma itself. I did a little counter-surveillance myself but soon lost the subject who disappeared somewhere down Avenida M Morelos. My "surveillant" was about [illegible] 30 years old, dark tan skin, youthful looking, well-dressed in a dark suit and slightly nervous in his actions. While the whole matter could be coincidence, his action in ducking into the store, not just turning in as if engaged on legitimate business, made me suspect him all the more. If he were really a surveillant, he must have been on LITAU-1 rather than myself, since the Station had been alerted as to possible surveillance and I was checking myself".

D. Jeremy L. NIARCOS

Jeremy L. NIARCOS reported sometime in May, 1962 that he had spotted what definitely seemed like a one-man surveillance on him. Since he is presently on home leave the submission of a detailed report on the incident will be deferred until his return to duty.

E. Arnold F. AREHART/LIENVOY

"On Friday 15 June 1962, at approximately 0930, the concierge noticed two men standing on the corner of Tonala and Chihuahua, who seemed to have an unusual interest in the activity of the L.P. They were standing directly across the street from the L.P. One of the men was tall and thin with a mustache, well dressed and appeared to be about 30 or 35 years of age. The other was a short fat man and wore a white shirt coat of the Veracruz type and appeared to be around 50 years of age. They stood on the corner of Tonala and Chihuahua for about an hour and showed a great deal of interest in the activity of our building. Around 1030 hours the tall man left and later returned in a 1959 Fiat model 1800, with a brown body and a beige top with District Plates number 21-73-26. Both of these men then proceeded to observe our installation from the car, and from time to time appeared to be making notes on the comings and goings of the installation, as well as making notes on the cars used by the personnel of the L.P. At about 1230 hours AREHART left the L.P. to make a phone call and to see if any attempt would be made to follow any one leaving the building. No attempt was made to follow AREHART, however, his actions were observed from the car through the rear view mirror. Upon AREHART's return to the building it was noticed that the men appeared to be making notes in a small note book. Finally, around 1330 the tall man drove off in the car and the fat one took up a new position, about 50 to 100 feet down the block on Chihuahua where he could observe the front door of the LP. Around 1500 when the first shift was leaving, LIENVOY 18 left to go to lunch and was followed down Chihuahua. On spotting the surveillance he returned to the office. Just as he returned to the office LIENVOY 2 returned to the office and was told of the incident. LIENVOY 2 and LIENVOY 18 immediately approached the fat man (who had also returned to his former position), and asked him to explain his action of the day. They also asked him to identify himself. He showed them a driver's license with the name MARIANO VERA GONZALEZ. This information was checked at the Department of Traffic and found to be the license of another person. At this time it was decided to establish a stake out at the Traffic Department in order to discover and identify anyone who might show an interest in the names and addresses of the cars used by our installation. On the 16th of June, Unit "C" (Victor) informed LIENVOY 2 that around 1300 hours an old friend of his, Guillermo MUNIZ SANCHEZ, who was an agent of the Secret Service of the Police Headquarters, showed up and said that he was looking for a Mister [illegible] in order to obtain some information about the owner of a car with District Plates 7[illegible] (LIENVOY 2). Victor suggested that they check the files for the information. However, the information was not available. During their conversation Guillermo MUNIZ stated that he worked as a supervisor of the medical services of the Central Department and showed Victor his credentials signed by Dr. Julian GARZA TIJERINA. He also said that he had another job at the Health Department. While they were talking, another agent passed by and asked MUNIZ to give his regards to Cormel Manuel [illegible] [illegible]. Therefore, we suspect that Guillermo [illegible] is a member of an investigation group headed by [illegible] [illegible], whose aim is to [illegible] political information for Lic. ERNESTO [illegible] or to another one, that reports political information to Lt. ALVAREZ [illegible]. Since the 15th there have been no further attempts to place our installation under surveillance that have been noticed. The attempted covert surveillance of the 15th was a crude operation and something one would expect to read about in a dime novel or a comic book; and certainly was not carried out by any one who had been trained in surveillance."

(Note: Any surveillance of LIENVOY basehouse or personnel can be handled, should this be found necessary, by COS to LITENSOR.)

3. Station Comments: The Station is unable to make any definitive conclusions relative to the reported surveillance incidents described above. It is not the Station's intention to minimize the seriousness of opposition surveillance attempts; nevertheless, it has not been possible to arrive at any substantive decision concerning which police or intelligence service is interested in the actions of Station Case officers. Based only on the above information, the Station, in fact, cannot be sure that Station officers are the only targets of surveillance in HMVIEW. It is entirely possible that other ODACID employees have been under surveillance, but because of a lack of awareness of this investigative techniques have not observed such actions. All Case Officers and operational personnel have been alerted to watch for and to report any surveillance attempts made against them. Headquarters will be advised promptly should the Station be able to derive any patterns of action pertaining to the above or any future incidents of hostile surveillance.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
- 3 - WHD
- 1 - Chief, KUBARK
- 2 - Files

SECRET/RYBAT

POSSIBLE SURVEILLANCE ENCOUNTERED
IN SERVICING [illegible] SAFE HOUSE

LEGEND: ▭ : POSSIBLE HOSTILE AUTOS
(TWO FIATS)
▬ ▬ : PATH OF AUTOS
▭ : FORTYUNE AUTO
- - - : PATH OF FORTYUNE AUTO
○○○○: FOOT PATH OF FORTYUNE



MELCHOR OCAMPO
← ONE WAY
ONE WAY →
SAFE
HUDSON
(ONE WAY →)
ATOYAC
(→ ONE WAY)
PLATA
(← ONE WAY)
PANUCO
(→ ONE WAY)
LERMA
(ONE WAY →)
(ONE WAY →)

SECRET/RYBAT

Licnvy/Ops

604

DATE : 28 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (MR WHITTEN WH NOTIFIED AND [illegible] SLOTTED AT 1910-28 JUN)

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA, C/CI 2, C/[illegible], [illegible] 2, C/SR 4, C/TFW 5, D/OS 2, S/C 2

JUN 28 2244Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 19328

OPIM DIR CITE MEXI 1253

RYBAT/JMPOOL

REF DIR 19654 (Out 98598)*

1. CURTIS[1] SAW LITENSOR[2] ALONE [illegible] HOURS ON 28 JUNE. THIS AFTER CONSULTATION WITH AMBASSADOR [illegible] [illegible] SUCH VISIT GOOD IDEA.

2. CURTIS[1] FOLLOWED LINE SUGGESTED IN REF AFTER EXPRESSING TO LITENSOR[2] KUBARK[3] AND AMBASSADOR'S [illegible] HIS [illegible] PREPARATIONS AND MUCH WORK HE PUTTING INTO PLANS TO MAKE GPIDEAL[4] VISIT SUCCESS.

3. LITENSOR[2] EXPRESSED THANKS [illegible] BRIEFING AND THEN SAID "PLEASE ASSURE GPIDEAL[4] PERSONALLY VIA [illegible] CHIEF THAT THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM. TELL HIM I PERSONALLY [illegible] FULLY AWARE OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO AND I PERSONALLY [illegible] ALL PRECAUTIONS. SAY TO HIM THAT HIS SAFETY IS [illegible] AND I GUARANTEE IT"

C

4. LITENSOR[2] THEN TOLD CURTIS[1] THAT "OFF RECORD" HE COULD NOT REPEAT NOT CALL IN SOVIET AND CUBAN AMBASSADORS AND WARN THEM WITHOUT DECLARING THEM PERSONAE NON GRATAE. WHEN CURTIS[1] SAID THIS WOULD MAKE OUR WORK MUCH EASIER LITENSOR[2] LAUGHED HEARTILY

BUT SAID NOTHING IN REPLY.

5. LITENSOR[2] TOLD CURTIS[1] "OFF RECORD" THAT HE VERY ANNOYED AT STUPIDITY OF CUBANS BECAUSE:

A. THEY STUPIDLY SENT BLAS ROCA HERE JUST PRIOR TO GPIDEAL[4] VISIT; AND

B. PRENSA LATINA INTERFERING IN STUDENT ACTIVITIES AT UNAM (NOTE: THIS FROM LIENVOY[5]).

6. CURTIS[1] INTENDS PURSUE PRENSA LATINA MATTER AND HOPES GET LITENSOR[2] CLOSE OFFICE IN MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *In view of indications of Soviet/Cuban involvement in plans against GPIDEAL (4), Headquarters suggested COS consider meeting LITENSOR (2) regarding the safety of GPIDEAL (4).

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMMA-19233 [redacted]-1880
TO Chief, WH Division INFO	DESENSITIZED	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 50-6-75/3
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City	per CSN 43-43	DATE 19 June 1962
SUBJECT Monthly Activities Report on Project LIENVOY		RE: "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED For your information		
REFERENCE(S)		

The following is the report on the LIENVOY Project for the month of May 1962:

A. Target Lines

20-30-18	Gral Lazaro Cardenas (Out of Order)
24-18-18	Lic. Braulio Maldonado (Out of Order)
20-83-46	Gral Lazaro Cardenas (Out of Order)
21-81-32	Lic Solorzano
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
11-42-48	Ing Jorge L. Tamayo (Out of Order)
28-79-67	Ramon Cesar Cuenca
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
21-11-01	Revista Politica (Marcue)
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
45-61-81	Chechoslovakian Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
24-61-75	Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo
46-64-24	D.F.S.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy (Out of Order)
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
13-33-37	Ricardo J. Zebada
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero (Out of Order)
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy (Out of Order)
11-16-48	Lic. Ignacio Acosta
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy
45-61-80	Chechoslovakian Embassy
11-21-93	Cuban Embassy (Out of Order)
10-29-69	Movimiento Liberacion Nacional
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy

CHB

LIPIARD

Removed from Project KUBARGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 27 Fold: 6

B. Material Processed

In May, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 152 pages of daily resumes, 47 tapes from three Czech lines and 93 tapes from four Soviet lines. The Spanish transcriptions of the tapes from the Soviet lines were also provided. In addition, 60 transcriptions were provided from the Cuban lines. The Station also received 22 other pieces of material from the LP.

C. Exploitation of Material

An example of the LIENVOY coverage was the long distance call from Habana indicating that a high-level functionary of the Cuban Government

FORM 10-57 (40) 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/~~[redacted]	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO TWO

14 JUN 1962
50-6-75/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-19233 [redacted]-1880

was ill. (See MEXI 0822, 17 May 1962).

D. Liaison

During the period under review the Chief of Station maintained regular contact with LIELEGANT and other individuals connected with the Project.

E. Security

There were no evident security problems for the month of May.

F. Technical

As usual, the equipment in the LP was checked and cleaned. However, during the month several of the lines were out of order. The Cuban Embassy was apparently still working on its telephonic system within the building. Other lines which were out of order were probably due to the inherent problems of the telephone company.

G. Personnel

There was no change in the personnel for the month and it kept the same schedule of work as reported for April.

H. Production

During May, LIENVOY produced the forty-five (45) positive intelligence reports indicated in the attachment and the usual volume of CI/CE personality and operational material.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

18 June 1962

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - WHD w/att
2 - Files

50-6-75/3

~~SE~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION FOR MAY 1962

MEXI 0690 (HMM 6354)
MEXI 0700 (HMM 6360)
MEXI 0705
MEXI 0724 (HMM 6366)
MEXI 0725 (HMM 6365)
MEXI 0737 (HMM 6371)
MEXI 0739
MEXI 0745 (HMM 6376)
MEXI 0748 (HMM 6377)
MEXI 0785 (HMM 6385
MEXI 0789 (HMM 6388)
MEXI 0795 (HMM 6380)
MEXI 0800
MEXI 0819 (HMM 6394)
MEXI 0822
MEXI 0830 (HMM 6401)
MEXI 0831 (HMM 6400)
MEXI 0836 (HMM 6404)
MEXI 0849 (HMM 6407)
MEXI 0868 (HMM 6409)
MEXI 0876 (HMM 6414)
MEXI 0903
MEXI 0935 (HMM 6428)
MEXI 0954 (HMM 6431)

HMMA 19068
HMMA 19072
HMMA 19091
HMMA 19098
HMMA 19100
HMMA 19104
HMMA 19107
HMMA 19111

HMM 6347
HMM 6348
HMM 6351
HMM 6361
HMM 6362
HMM 6363
HMM 6372
HMM 6382
HMM 6383
HMM 6406
HMM 6408
HMM 6412
HMM 6425

24 + 8 + 13 = 45

att To HMMA-19233

50-6-75/3

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted] DESENSITIZED	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-19153 [redacted]-1879
TO Chief, WH Division INFO Chief, KURIOT		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-75/3
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 5 June 1962
SUBJECT LIENVOY/Photos of LP		RE "43 3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		

REFERENCE(S)

RYBAT

Transmitted herewith for the visual appreciation, information, and retention of the addressees are photos of the LIENVOY LP.

Willard C. CURTIS

5 June 1962

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
- 3 - WHD w/att
- 1 - KURIOT w/att
- 2 - Files

Removed from Project KQBAKER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 49 Fold: 6

50-6-75/3

FORM 10-57 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

[redacted]

13 JUN

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

TO: ① – OPS/WH [redacted]
(1a) – CI/o-pa
② – TSD/audio
③ – WH/3 – Connie
④ – WH/3/mexi – Jane

Removed from Project KDBADGER
Classification: 50-6-[illegible]/3
73-175/14
Box: 29 Fold: 6

[redacted]



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE 337
1 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAIGON .

ACTION: FE 8

INFO : CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JUN 1 1555Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 44395

DJAX INFO DIR CITE SAIG 9792

REF MEXI 0950 (IN 44045)*

ON OFF CHANCE THAT IN SPITE OF REF STEADMAN SUCCEEDS IN LATCHING ON TO ALBARRAN AS HE PASSES THROUGH SAIGON, SUGGEST DJAX PROVIDE NAME OF STATION OFFICER EVENTUALLY TO BE GIVEN TO ALBARRAN TO PASS ON CONTACT AS NOTIONAL FRIEND OF STEADMAN. THIS WOULD BE DONE ONLY IF DEEMED DESIREABLE AFTER MEETING THE MAN.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *LIELEGANT UNABLE CONTACT ALBARRAN PRIOR DEPARTURE.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE 572
31 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: FE 8*

INFO : CI/OPS, WH 7, S/C 2, CI/IC 2

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUNE 1 0022Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 44048

SAIC INFO DIR DJAK CITE MEXI 0530

REFS A SAIG 9766 (IN 43751)

B MEXI 0526 (IN 42599)

1. LIELEGANT UNABLE CONTACT ALBARRAN PRIOR DEPARTURE. ALBARRAN SAID TO HAVE LEFT MEXICO ABOUT 26 MAY.

2. LIELEGANT DOES NOT KNOW ALBARRAN PERSONALLY; STATION HAS NOTHING TO ADD TO REF B.

3. EXCELSIOR OF 24 MAY CONTAINED ANNOUNCEMENT ALBARRAN BEING SENT INDONESIA AS AMBASSADOR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR KOBIRD USED.

**QUERIED IF LIELEGANT EVER GOT TO ALBARRAN.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 264
31 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAIGON

ACTION: FE 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WH 7, S/C 2.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 31 1345Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 43751

MEXI INFO DIR DJAK CITE SAIG 9766

REF DJAK 7829 (IN 40807)*
SAIG 9632 (IN 41003)

1. GUILLERMO CONTRERAS GARCES, OFFICIAL OF RELATIONES EXTERIORES, IS IN SAIG ALLEGEDLY ON PLEASURE TRIP BUT ACTUALLY SOUNDING OUT POPULARITY OF DIEM GOVERNEMENT AND GENERALLY LOOKING AROUND. ARRIVED 28 MAY LEAVES ABOUT 3 JUNE.

2. ACCORDING TO CONTRERAS, ALBARRAN IS NOW IN TOKYO BEING BRIEFED BY AMBASSADOR CASTROVALLE (WHO UNTIL NOW ALSO ACCREDITED TO INDONESIA), PLANS ARRIVE IN SAIG FOR BRIEF STOPOVER O/A 8 JUNE.

3. DID LIELEGANT EVER GET TO ALBARRAN PER PARA 2 MEXI 0526? (IN 16996)

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *ODUNIT ATTACHE MEXI ADVISED ATTACHE HERE ON 21 MAY THAT MEXI AMB-DESIGNATE TO INDON LOPEZ WOULD DEPART SHORTLY TAKE UP POST.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMM-A-19105

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

DATE 29 May 1962

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

RE: "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

SUBJECT LIENVOY Targets

ACTION REQUIRED For your information

REFERENCE(S) HMM-W-10,620

1. An error was made by the person preparing HMM-A-18,752 (RYBAT-1833) or by the typist who chose the DFS list of taps (in HMM-A-18,246) instead of the correct LIENVOY list of targets.

2. The only explanation available is that with a change of Case Officers (Malcolm Q. EDELAND departed to become COS, Tegucigalpa), and with the delay in writing monthly reports on LIENVOY and lack of familiarity with the operation, the error was made--either by the drafting officer or by the typist.

3. This error will not occur again.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

26 May 1962

DISTRIBUTION
~~3-WH~~ Division
3-Files

LIENVOY/OPS

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

50 6-75/3

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

CS COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIENVOY Targets

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Per paragraph 3

REFERENCE : HMMA-18752, 23 March 1962 (KUBAT)

1. Referenced dispatch listed the target lines for LIENVOY for December 1961 and January 1962. Your attention is drawn to the fact that the targets listed coincide exactly with the list of IFS taps furnished in HMMA-18246 dated 1 December 1961.

2. The February 1962 LIENVOY target listing also furnished in referenced dispatch appears to be correctly labeled LIENVOY.

3. Your comments on paragraph one above are requested.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

1 - Subject
1 - WH/3/Max/Chrono

RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3M	
~~DESTROY~~	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE TYPED: 8 MAY 1962

DATE DISPATCHED: 17 MAY 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-10620

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-75/3

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C. Z. Bustos-V.	mrd AC/Mexi	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	9 MAY 1962	J. C. KING

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE :	306 28 APR 62 08	ROUTING	
TO :	DIRECTOR	APR 28 2143Z 62	
FROM :	MEXICO CITY		
ACTION :	C/TFW 2 (C/TFW COPY SLOTTED AT 1730 28 APR 62)		
INFO :	DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI, C/WH 2, S/C 2	PRIORITY	
		IN 26974	

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 0669

RYBAT GYROSE PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 06337 (OUT 76339)

1. LIERGO ADVISED COS ON NIGHT OF 27 APRIL THAT LITENSOR HAD WRITTEN PERSONAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT DORTICOS ASKING THAT URRUTIA BE GIVEN SAFE CONDUCT TO MEXICO.

2. LIERGO HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THIS WITH LITENSOR PRIOR TO COS TALK WITH LIELEGANT.

3. LIERGO PLANS NOW TO TELL LITENSOR MORNING 28 APRIL OF COS REQUEST AND TO SUGGEST THAT LITENSOR SEND SECOND LETTER AS IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP.

4. LITENSOR'S REQUESTS ARE FOR URRUTIA AND HIS FAMILY ONLY AND DO NOT INCLUDE OTHER ASYLEES IN MEXICAN EMBASSY IN CUBA.

Lienvoy!

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

5. BOTH LIERGO AND LIELEGANT PROMISE TO REPORT IMMEDIATELY ON REPLY FROM DORTICOS.

6. COS HAS NOT ADVISED AMBASSADOR OF ABOVE. SHOULD HE?

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS HAS DISCUSSED PROBLEM WITH ODACID IN ATTEMPT ASSESS IMPACT IN EXILE COMMUNITIES PBPRIME.

14-00000

069

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING
1
2 5
3 6

DATE : 30 MAR 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/TFW 5

INFO : DDP, COP, C/CI, C/FI, C/WH 2, S/C 2*

MAR 30 05÷22 62

ROUTINE

IN 11142

DIR CITE MEXI 0419

RYBAT PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 00003 (Out 65710) **

1. COS IN CONVERSATION WITH LIELEGANT ON 25 MARCH BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF ASYLEES IN MEXICAN EMBASSY IN HABANA. LIELEGANT SAID INCLUDED IS FORMER "PRESIDENT" MANUEL URRUTIA LLEO.

2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION LIELEGANT STATED FEELS LITENSOR WOULD MAKE PERSONAL REQUEST FOR SAFE CONDUCT OF URRUTIA IF COS GOES TO LITENSOR WITH SUGGESTION.

3. COS RECOMMENDS HE BE AUTHORIZED SEE LITENSOR AND MAKE REQUEST.

4. ICOULD LITENSOR BE TOLD URRUTIA COULD GET U.S. VISA IF BROUGHT MEXICO AND IF WISHED GO U.S.A.?

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT GYROSE PBRUMEN CABLES.
**HQS REQUESTED STA VIEWS RE CURRENT FEASIBILITY AND BEST CHANNEL OF APPROACH TO LITENSOR FOR REQUEST HE ATTEMPT ARRANGE SAFE CONDUCT OUT OF CUBA FOR EX-PRESIDENT MANUEL URRATIA.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

26 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Task Force Washington

ATTENTION : John Caswell

SUBJECT : Feasibility of Effecting Release of Manuel URRUTIA, Ex-President of Cuba, Political Exile in Mexican Embassy, Havana

1. The Mexico City Station has the capability of approaching LITENSOR (Iden A) and requesting him to attempt to arrange for a safe conduct pass for Subject. The approach to LITENSOR can be made through three different channels; LITEMPO/2, (Iden B), LIELEGANT (Iden C), and LIERGO (Iden D). Also, a direct approach by the COS to LITENSOR could probably be arranged if so desired by Headquarters for operational security reasons.

2. No assessment on the success of an approach of this type can be made because of the Mexican interest and position re Cuba.

3. If a decision is made to attempt to obtain a safe conduct pass for Subject, it is recommended that the COS Mexico City be informed in detail of Headquarters minimum and maximum goals and that he be requested to recommend the best channel to LITENSOR.

NED F. HOLMAN
Chief, WH/3

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - LITENSOR
1 - Chrono
1 - Hold File

WH/3/Mexico:JRReeves:mr/2555 (26 Mar 62)

IDENTITIES

Iden A - President of Mexico

Iden B - Minister of Interior

Iden C - Special Advisor to President

Iden D - Minister of Social Security

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 012
28 FEB 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/EE 3 **

INFO : DDP, COP, C/CA, C/FI 2, C/FI/SIG, C/IOD 2, C/SR 4, C/WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 28 0359Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 34469

DIR INFO GNVA BERN CITE MEXI 0200

IN34469

RYBAT ZRSKATE

REF: DIR 42379 (out 52315)*

1. NAMES OF MEXI DELEGATION TO REF CONFERENCE NOT AVAILABLE AS YET. IT PROBABLE HOWEVER LUIS PADILLA NERVO, MEXI UN DELEG WHO NOW IN MEXI FOR PRIVATE GOVT CONSULTATION, (PRESUMABLY FOR ZRSKATE PREPARATIONS) WILL PARTICIPATE AS INFLUENTIAL MEMBER MEXI ZRSKATE GROUP.

2. FYI: MEXI PRESS 27 FEB PUBLISHED PRES LOPEZ MATEOS MESSAGE TO KRUSHCHEV RE MEXICAN POSITION AT REF CONFERENCE, CALLING FOR (A) PRELIMINARY MEETING OF COUNTRY DELEGATES AND REPS: (B) WITH BASIC ACCORD AND RESOLUTIONS REACHED IN (A) ABOVE, CONFERENCE OF CHANCELLORS TO BE HELD FOR FINAL AGREEMENT AND RATIFICATION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * HQS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE REVIEW STA POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL ASSETS POSSIBLY ATTENDING 18 NATION DISARMAMENT CONF. GENEVA 14 MARCH 62. KUDOVE NEEDS PRECISE INFO CONCERNING STA ASSETS WITHIN DELEGATIONS.

**ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR NYXIS USED.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 065
20 FEB 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/TSD 2

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, C/WH 5, S/C 2*

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 20 0709Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 30585

DIR CITE MEXI 0144 (WARE ACTING)

AQUATIC/LIERODE/MKTRAP

1. FAILURE OF AUDIO IN ONE SRT-9 AT LIERODE MAKES IMMEDIATE MKTRAP INSTALLATION HIGHLY DESIRABLE.

2. LATEST INVESTIGATION REVEALS TARGET TELEPHONE IS ERICSSON MODEL DBJ 510-512 WITH DIAL IN BASE.

3. INITIAL TESTS WITH MP-4 AND 4 LAYER DIODES INDICATE DEFINITE SUPERIORITY IN AUDIO QUALITY TO BASIC MKTRAP CIRCUITRY AND FEASIBILITY CONCEALMENT IN INSTRUMENT HANDLE.

4. LINE TO TARGET REPORTED BY GOOD AUTHORITY AS 2.7 MILES NUMBER 20 CABLE PAIR WITH SERIES CONNECTION AT CENTRAL. PLAN INITIAL PHASE OF INSTRUMENT INSTALLATION AND LP EQUIPMENT TESTS USING LIFEAT.

5. IN VIEW POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR SHORTER LINE LENGTH AND QUESTION OF SECURITY OF SERIES CONNECTION OVER EXTENDED PERIOD AT CENTRAL OFFICE, STATION CONSIDERING USE LIENVOY ENGINEER AFTER INITIAL PHASE FOR CABLE SPLICE TO SHORTEN LINE TO 1000 FEET. THIS WOULD REVEAL LOCATION PRESENT LIERODE BASE TO LIENVOY BUT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REVEAL TECHNIQUE. STATION, NOT LIENVOY, WOULD CONTROL BASE AND PRODUCTION.

6. REQUEST HQS COMMENT:

Lienvoy/cp

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MEXI 0144 IN 30585

A. USE LIENVOY AS DESCRIBED.

B. USE OF MP-4 WITH 4-LAYER DIODE.

7. STATION RECOMMENDS APPROVAL PARA 6 DUE IMPORTANCE TARGET PLUS FACT INSTALLATION MAY HELP CONTRIBUTE KUTUBE/D REQUIREMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

002
DATE : 16 FEB 62 WCJ

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : COP, ~~C/CA~~, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, C/FI 2, C/BELL 5, C/IOD 2
S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 16 0340Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 28751

DIR CITE MEXI 0125

RYBAT

1. COS, AT AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST, SAID TO LIELEGANT, LIERGO AND TO LIENVOY/1 THAT AMBASSADOR CONSIDERED FONMIN MANUEL TELLO SPEECH AT PUNTA DEL ESTE (SAYING MARXISM LENINISM INCOMPATIBLE WITH WESTERN HEMISPHERE) WAS A "GOOD STEP FOR MEXICO". COS SAID, HOWEVER, THAT DEEDS NOW NEEDED TO SHOW MEXICANS ARE WILLING TO TAKE ANTI-COMMUNIST, ANTI-CASTRO STAND.

2. ON 15 FEBRUARY LIELEGANT AND LIENVOY/1 REPORTED (SEPARATELY) FOLLOWING:

A. PRESIDENT ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS HAS CANCELLED THE INTENDED GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY TO "SIEMPRE" TO ALLOW FERNANDO BENITEZ (COMMUNIST WHO FIRED FROM "NOVEDADES" NEWSPAPER) TO CONTINUE WRITE SUPPLEMENT ON CULTURE IN MEXICO. (NOTE: IF TRUE THAT THIS INTENDED SUBSIDY CANCELLED PROBABLY PARTIALLY DUE TO FACT THAT LATEST ISSUE COMMUNIST MAGAZINE "POLITICA" ATTACKED PRESIDENT AND BENITEZ IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTOR.)

B. ALONSO AGUILAR MONTEVERDE, LEADING MEXICAN MARXIST, HEAD OF MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL,

HAS BEEN FIRED FROM HIS

Lienvoy/1 op

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

IN 28751 MEXI 0125

GOVERNMENT JOB IN TREASURY.

C. VICTOR MANUEL VILLASENOR, MARXIST HEAD OF GOVERNMENT OWNED DIESEL NACIONAL BEING FIRED.

3. THE ABOVE CITED AS "DEEDS" BY BOTH SOURCES.

4. LIENVOY/1 FURTHER REPORTED THAT MEXICO WILL BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND NOW ONLY NEEDS "INCIDENT". LIENVOY/1 SAID HUMBERTO ROMERO (SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT) SAID PRESIDENT SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING "INCIDENT" SHOWING CUBAN EMBASSY INVOLVED WITH RAILWAY WORKER'S UNION AND DECLARING "SOME CUBAN OFFICIALS PERSONAE NON GRATA" AND THEN BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

5. ABOVE REPORTED TO AMBASSADOR ORALLY.

6. WILL CABLE DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/RYBAT~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-18571 RYBAT 21813
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 9 February 1962
SUBJECT Examples of Marxist Textbooks used in Mexican Schools		RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED PRIORITY: See paragraph 3 below.		

REFERENCES

PRIORITY

1. Attached are copies of:

a. "Breviario de Cultura Economica" (Segunda Edicion-1960) written by (Marxist) Francisco BARRERA Valdes and, as can be seen on the inner first page, approved by the Textbook Commission of the Ministry of Education as the textbook in beginning economics courses in Mexican public schools.

Notes: i. This book is pure Marxism. Pages 19, 43, 44 and many others distinctly praise Marxism and condemn capitalism and capitalist countries (particularly England, the U.S.A. and France).

ii. Also attached is a copy of the work notebook for this text.

iii. This book and its Marxist contents has been called to the attention of LITENSOR, LIERGO and others by COS. To date, however, the approval of this textbook has not been withdrawn.

b. "Cuba, Despertar de America", written by (Marxist) Ramon RAMIREZ Gomez, who is one of the most important professors of economics in the School of Economics at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (U.N.A.M.). This book, which is pure Marxist, praises Castro's Cuba, Communist China and Marxism and condemns the U.S.A. This book was published officially by the National University of Mexico in 1961 and is used in the School of Economics there.

Note: Ramon RAMIREZ Gomez was one of the professors primarily responsible for expelling Luis Felipe COELLO Macias and Guillermo VELEZ Pelayo from the U.N.A.M. because they took part in anti-Castro, anti-Communist activities on 26 July 1961 (see HMMA-17935 and HMMA-18407).

2. Another textbook which is Marxist and which has been the subject of considerable publicity recently is "La Unidad de Trabajo y Estudio" by Clara D. CARDOUNEL, Professor at the Escuela Normal de Matanzas, Cuba, 1960. This book was one of the issues that provoked a mass demonstration against the leftist policies of Governor Eduardo LIVAS Villarreal of Nuevo Leon. (See MEXI-0842 and MEXI-0833.)

3. It will be recalled that on the evening of 31 January 1962 Thomas A. BRENT requested copies of the two (2) textbooks listed in paragraph 1. above, from COS. He wished to consider using them in presentations to (a) [illegible] and (b) possibly to certain Senators and Congressmen.

Willard C. Curtis

Attachments

9 February 1962

Distribution: 3 - Hqs w/atts; 4 - Files

FORM 10-57 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/RYBAT~~	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFIC ON TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	C/WH/3		21
2	J. C. ~~King, C~~/WH		
3	Austin ~~Bricker, Assistant~~ to ~~the Director~~		23 Feb 62
4			
5	WH/3/Mexico. 1015 Barton Hall		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

2 - 3: In accordance with your conversation with the Mexican Desk, it is requested that you bring the attached dispatch to the attention of the Director. The information in the dispatch and the attachments are furnished in response to a request made by the Director (see Paragraph 4).

Materials
forwarded to DCI
on 23 Feb 62,

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Replaces Form 30-4 which may be used.
1 APR 55

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1955—O-342531

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

RFR.
FEB. 60

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/3				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. C/WH/3				
6. WH/3/M		23·II·23		
7. Burton				
8. Bustos				B
9. Reeves		1 Mar		
10. O'Hara			1 Mr	
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

6: Base should have been on distribution of this.

(Okemofax)
Copy put in CP Penetrations file..

file LIENVOY/13

RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO RID FOR MICROFILMING BEFORE IT IS FILED. IF THIS DOCUMENT IS TO BE RESTRICTED, CHECK HERE ☐ RESTRICTED TO ________
Unit Designation

Indexed

17.
RID/~~MP~~/FI 1035 L

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
9 [illegible]

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HMMA 18571

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-18909 RYBAT #1919
TO Chief, WH Division		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
INFO		
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 26 January 1962
SUBJECT Cuban EmbassyActivities		RE "43" - CHECK "X" ONE ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED For information.		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCES

MEXI-9961, Para. 3

1. Attached is a copy of a long conversation obtained by LIEROBE on 18 January 1962.

2. The conversation is amongst: Jose Antonio PORTUONDO Valdor, Cuban Ambassador; Berta PORTUONDO (his wife); Xiomara SANCHEZ Robert (PORTUONDO's secretary) and a Mexican visitor. The visitor pretends to be a student from the Instituto Politecnico Nacional (IPN). The two women--and later PORTUONDO--accuse the Mexican of being a provocateur; and PORTUONDO lectures him on the Cuban Embassy's policy of non-intervention in Mexico.

3. On 23 January 1962 LITALUS/2 reported the visit by one MOTA (new--five months), agent of the Direccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS). LITALUS/2 showed the case officer a copy of MOTA's report on his visit to the Cuban Embassy and his conversation there. (The DFS, according to LITALUS/2, do not believe the report!)

4. A copy of the portion of the tape with this (MOTA) conversation was played for LITEMPO/2. He found it extremely interesting and said the Cuban Ambassador "protested his innocence too much".

5. If Headquarters approves (as requested in reference) a copy of the attached will be given to LITEMPO/2 for him to "make public" as material collected by him. This and the additional materials specified in reference would, it is hoped, have sufficient impact to cause the Mexicans to break relations with Cuba.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

25 January 1962

Distribution:
3 - Hqs w/att
4 - Files

FORM 10-57 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS [illegible] WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

C Lienvoy/Cpm

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-18490 RYBAT [illegible]

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 23 January 1962

SUBJECT: Cuban Embassy Activities

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Headquarters information.

REFERENCES:

a. MEXI-9853
b. DIR-35831
c. MEXI-9913
d. MEXI-9914

1. Attached are copies of:

a. Transcript of the LIERODE tape of 24 November 1961. This is an authentic tape and transcript. The tape was sent to Headquarters with HMMA-18290; it was returned to Mexico City Station on 15 January (see DIR-35297).

b. "Transcript" of "IPN Student/Portuondo" conversation of "1 December 1961". Note: A conversation of almost this content took place on 11 December 1961 between an IPN student and Xiomara SANCHEZ Robert (Portuondo's secretary).

c. Copy of a "photograph" of Teresa PROENZA Proenza, Cultural Attache, in a student riot of 12 July 1960.

d. A copy of a "page" from a personal file on Angel BOAN, (then) Director of Prensa Latina in Mexico City. This "page" is dated 17 July 1961.

e. A brief summary on Francisco DELGADO Garcia. This is an authentic case which was handled by LITEMPO organization and this summary was promised merely as a reminder.

2. Both the tape and transcript of 1.a. have now been furnished to LITEMPO/2. This is authentic.

3. Only the "transcript" of 1.b. was given to LITEMPO/2. This, it was felt, had to be supplied because the Ambassador made a commitment concerning PORTUONDO (Cuban Ambassador) personally paying students at I.P.N., Note: The real tape was of a conversation between Xiomara SANCHEZ Robert (Portuondo's secretary) and an IPN student. No tape exists for this; and LITEMPO/2 will be told it has been erased if he requests it.

4. The "photograph" of Teresa PROENZA Proenza in the student riot of 12 July 1960 (see 1.c. -- and the attached) is a montage made by the capable Station photographer. A copy of this was given by COS to LITEMPO/2.

5. The "page" from the personal file on Angel BOAN, then Director Prensa Latina, Mexico City was put into that file by this Station at the time the file was furnished (for two hours one night) by LIFIG. A copy of this "page" (see 1.d. and attached) was given to LITEMPO/2.

FORM 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

6. The summary of the case of Francisco DELGADO Garcia is authentic and is a case of LITEMPO/2's organization handled.

7. Finally, LITEMPO/2 was orally reminded of the material furnished (personally) to LITEMPO/2 by Manuel VILLAFANA Martinez, Air Attache, Cuban Embassy, who defected. A tape of the interview between LITEMPO/2 and VILLAFANA Martinez was made—and the Station still has a copy.

8. The Ambassador was allowed to believe that all of the above material is authentic.

9. The Ambassador hopes that this material which now has been shown to LITENSOR by LITEMPO/2 will be helpful in convincing Mexico that they should break relations with Cuba. The Station feels that this cooperation in the effort to impress LITENSOR and LITEMPO/2 with these (which were said to be "some examples") illustrations of Cuban interference in the internal affairs of Mexico was good political action for ODYOKE and with the Chief, ODACID.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

Attachments (3)

22 January 1962

Distribution:
3 - Hqs w/att
5 - Files

23 January 1962

If this Headquarters and the Department of State approve, the Chief of Station plans to give to Minister of Governacion Gustavo DIAZ Ordaz:

a. A tape recording of a long conversation of one MOTA, a DFS agent, with Cuban Ambassador FORTUONDO, his secretary and Mrs. FORTUONDO. MOTA entered the Cuban Embassy on 18 January 1962, pretending to be a Politechnic student. The Cubans called MOTA a provocateur and loudly protested their innocence, saying they had not intervened in Mexican internal affairs. (The Chief of Station has played this tape for DIAZ Ordaz, who remarked, "They protest too much.")

b. A tape recording of a conversation between a group of Colombian revolutionaries and Ambassador FORTUONDO, in which the former said an armed insurrection had already begun in practice in Colombia. They said the Colombian revolution was a part of the Cuban and Mexican revolutions and asked for solidarity and collaboration of all revolutionaries. FORTUONDO said he would send their report to Habana so that Cuba would have news of the situation and know who they are.

c. A faked copy of a page from the personal file of Angel BOAN of *Prensa Latina*, who is now in Cuba.

Lienvoy/ops

SECRET

25 January 1962

The following message has been received from Mexico City:

For King and Sayre from Ambassador Mann:

1. As you know, some weeks ago we became convinced that only chance of getting Mexico to break relations with Cuba would be on basis Cuban intervention Mexican internal affairs. This of course was on assumption two thirds Rio treaty vote could not be obtained at Punta Del Este.

2. With this objective in mind Dept and CAS authorized me to turn over materials described in IN 12549 to appropriate Mexican official. I chose Gustavo DIAZ Ordaz.

3. DIAZ Ordaz has informed CAS that he discussed this evidence with Lopez Mateos who expressed surprise and interest. We discount Lopez Mateos statements because as you know he has much better evidence of Cuban Embassy intervention which he keeps strictly to himself and has never told Cabinet about. The evidence we turned over to DIAZ Ordaz has psychological importance because President is now aware that DIAZ Ordaz also knows part of the story. He can never be sure that DIAZ Ordaz will not use this to support his own anti-communist convictions if a showdown between the Commies and anti-Commies should occur in Mexico.

4. DIAZ Ordaz has asked me through CAS whether I would have any objection if the information we furnished him were made public should an appropriate occasion arise in the future. He said there would be no mention of the U.S. Govt and that Gobernacion would present the evidence as collected by it.

5. I recommend that CAS and Dept authorize me to inform DIAZ Ordaz that we have no objection on the basis outlined by him. Reason for my recommendation is that on the one hand we lose little by blowing the microphone operation since battery is scheduled to expire soon in any case. We believe we are in a position where we can safely deny that we had anything to do with placing microphone. In this connection DIAZ Ordaz obviously believes our story that we picked up signal by routine dialing of different frequencies and that microphone was presumably placed by Soviets to check on their satellites. On other hand affirmative answer to DIAZ Ordaz will also implicitly suggest the possibility that the time may come when we ourselves might wish to make this information

SECRET

Lienvoy/Lopo

public. I can think of no better incentive to Lopez Mateos to break relations with Cuba than possibility Mexican public might eventually become aware of extent to which Mexico has tolerated Cuban intervention in spite of its vaunted devotion to the doctrine of non-intervention.

6. Finally I wish to say that I realise all of these maneuvers involve some risk to U.S. but I believe resurgence of Communist influence in last two months requires unusual counteraction on our part.

7. DIAZ Ordaz has returned material to CAS for safe keeping and it is now in our possession. He claims he made no copies and we believe this probably true.

053

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 25 JAN 62 JD

TO : DIRECTOR.

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5 (C/WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 0140, 25 JAN)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/BELL 5, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 25 0534Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 17168

CITE

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 9961

RYBAT

REFS A MEXI 9960 Cin 17139

B HMMA-18490

1. RECOMMEND HQS CONCUR IN AMBASSADOR MANN'S REQUEST IN REF A.

2. FOR HQS INFO HAVE AUTHENTIC LIERODE TAPE OF LONG CONVERSATION OF ONE MOTA, DFS AGENT WHO ENTERED CUBAN EMBASSY ON 18 JAN 62, PRETENDED BE POLITECHNIC STUDENT, HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR PORTUONDO, HIS SECRETARY AND MRS PORTUONDO. CUBANS CALLED MOTA PROVOCATEUR AND LOUDLY PROTESTED THEIR INNOCENCE, NON-INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MEXICO. COPY OF THIS PLAYED FOR LITEMPO/2 BY COS. LITEMPO/2 SAID "THEY PROTEST TOO MUCH".

LIENVOY/op

K

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy N

3. POUCHING COPY THIS TAPE TO HQS.

4. IF HQS AND ODACID APPROVE COS WILL GIVE LITEMPO/2:

A. COPIES OF TWO AUTHENTIC TAPES (ONE OF PARA TWO ABOVE AND COLOMBIAN TAPE OF REFERENCE B).

B. COPY OF PAGE FROM PERSONAL FILE OF ANGEL BOAN (WHO NOW IN CUBA) FROM PRENSA LATINA.

5. STATION WORKING ON PROCUREMENT ADDITIONAL AUTHENTIC MATERIAL; IN PARTICULAR, HOPE HAVE CONSUELO ESPERON, MEXICAN THIRTY-YEAR EMPLOYEE CUBAN EMBASSY, INTERVIEWED BY LITEMPO/2 PERSONALLY. ESPERON HAS REPORTED (TO LITAMIL/2) THAT MEXICAN STUDENTS BROUGHT INTO CUBAN EMBASSY FOR INDOCTRINATION AND IN SOME TALKS CUBAN OFFICIALS HAVE EVEN TALKED AGAINST MEXICAN GOVT.

6. STATION WILL NOT RETURN PHOTO OF TERESA PROENZA (SEE REF B) TO LITEMPO/2. STATION WILL NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE ANY FAKED MATERIAL EXCEPT 3 B ABOVE, WITHOUT PRIOR HQS APPROVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

ORIG: J. G. HEYR
UNIT: WH/3/MEXICO 1616
EXT: 2555
DATE: 29 JANUARY 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE NO. 50-6-75/3

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO: COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/BELL 5, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one).
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one).
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature Cbutn

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

CUT95552

TO: MEXI PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 38386

REF: MEXI 9950 (IN 17139)* MEXI 9961 (IN 17168)**

RYBAT

ROUTING | INITIAL
D.K
LL
~~DESTROY~~
RI/FI

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

041

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

30

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 25 JAN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5 (WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 0030, 25 JAN)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, S/C 2 *

JAN 25 0429Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 17139

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 9960

RYBAT

FOR GALBOND AND SAYRE FROM AMBASSADOR MANN:

1. AS YOU KNOW, SOME WEEKS AGO WE BECAME CONVINCED THAT ONLY CHANCE OF GETTING MEXICO TO BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA WOULD BE ON BASIS CUBAN INTERVENTION MEXICAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THIS OF COURSE WAS ON ASSUMPTION TWO THIRDS RIO TREATY VOTE COULD NOT BE OBTAINED AT PUNTA DEL ESTE.

2. WITH THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND DEPT AND CAS AUTHORIZED ME TO TURN OVER MATERIALS DESCRIBED IN MEXI 9855 TO APPROPRIATE MEXICAN OFFICIAL. I CHOSE GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ.

IN 12549

3. DIAZ ORDAZ HAS INFORMED CAS THAT HE DISCUSSED THIS EVIDENCE WITH LOPEZ MATEOS WHO EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND INTEREST. WE DISCOUNT LOPEZ MATEOS STATEMENTS BECAUSE AS YOU KNOW HE HAS MUCH BETTER EVIDENCE OF CUBAN EMBASSY INTERVENTION WHICH HE KEEPS STRICTLY TO HIMSELF AND HAS NEVER TOLD CABINET ABOUT. THE EVIDENCE WE TURNED OVER TO DIAZ ORDAZ HAS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE BECAUSE PRESIDENT IS NOW AWARE THAT DIAZ ORDAZ ALSO KNOWS PART OF THE STORY. HE CAN NEVER BE SURE THAT DIAZ ORDAZ WILL NOT USE

Lienvoy

SECRET

HIS TO SUPPORT HIS OWN ANTI-COMMUNIST CONVICTIONS IF A SHOWDOWN BETWEEN THE COMMIES AND ANTI-COMMIES SHOULD OCCUR IN MEXICO.

4. DIAZ ORDAZ HAS ASKED ME THROUGH CAS WHETHER I WOULD HAVE ANY OBJECTION IF THE INFORMATION WE FURNISHED HIM WERE MADE PUBLIC SHOULD AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION ARISE IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO MENTION OF THE U.S. GOVT AND THAT GOBERNACION WOULD PRESENT THE EVIDENCE AS COLLECTED BY IT.

5. I RECOMMEND THAT CAS AND DEPT AUTHORIZE ME TO INFORM DIAZ ORDAZ THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION ON THE BASIS OUTLINED BY HIM. REASON FOR MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT ON THE ONE HAND WE LOSE LITTLE BY BLOWING THE MICROPHONE OPERATION SINCE BATTERY IS SCHEDULED TO EXPIRE SOON IN ANY CASE. WE BELIEVE WE ARE IN A POSITION WHERE WE CAN SAFELY DENY THAT WE HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH PLACING MICROPHONE. IN THIS CONNECTION DIAZ ORDAZ OBVIOUSLY BELIEVES OUR STORY THAT WE PICKED UP SIGNAL BY ROUTINE DIALING OF DIFFERENT FREQUENCIES AND THAT MICROPHONE WAS PRESUMABLY PLACED BY SOVIETS TO CHECK ON THEIR SATELLITES. ON OTHER HAND AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER TO DIAZ ORDAZ WILL ALSO IMPLICITLY SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TIME MAY COME WHEN WE OURSELVES MIGHT WISH TO MAKE THIS INFORMATION PUBLIC. I CAN THINK OF NO BETTER INCENTIVE TO LOPEZ MATEOS TO BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA THAN POSSIBILITY MEXICAN PUBLIC MIGHT EVENTUALLY BECOME AWARE OF EXTENT TO WHICH MEXICO HAS TOLERATED CUBAN INTERVENTION IN SPITE OF ITS VAUNTED DEVOTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION.

6. FINALLY I WISH TO SAY THAT I REALIZE ALL OF THESE MANEUVERS INVOLVE SOME RISK TO U.S. BUT I BELIEVE RESURGENCE OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LAST TWO MONTHS REQUIRES UNUSUAL COUNTERACTION ON

OUR PART.

7. DIAZ ORDAZ HAS RETURNED MATERIAL TO CAS FOR SAFE KEEPING AND IT IS NOW IN OUR POSSESSION. HE CLAIMS HE MADE NO COPIES AND WE BELIEVE THIS PROBABLY TRUE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION ON THIS CABLE ASSIGNED PER MR HOLMAN, WH.

110

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 20 JAN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, S/C 2*

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 20 0834Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 14775

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 9914

REFS A DIR 36178 (COUT 91568)**

B MEXI 9913 (IN 14761)***

C/S Comment: ** Hqs. asks if fabricated portions contain elements which Amb. Portuondo could deny or prove false

RYBAT

1. SEE REF B FOR DETAIL AND PARTIAL ANSWER TO PARA ONE OF REF A. AMBASSADOR, IN 12 JAN MEETING WITH LITEMPO-2, DID STATE THAT COS COULD PROVIDE TAPES OF TRANSCRIPTS SHOULD THEY BE NEEDED. COS LATER COVERED, HOWEVER, BY STATING TO LITEMPO-2 THAT HE THOUGHT SOME TAPES HAD BEEN ERASED. THIS STALL WAS STRENGTHENED BY FIRM STATEMENT THAT COLOMBIAN STUDENT TAPE WOULD BE AVAILABLE (IT HAS SINCE BEEN DELIVERED TO LITEMPO-2). AS INDICATED IN REF B, STATION WILL FIND PRETEXT NOT DELIVERED TAPES OTHER THAN AUTHENTIC COLOMBIAN.

2. RE PARA 2 REF A: PORTUONDO CAN CERTAINLY DENY ANY OR ALL OF MATERIALS, AUTHENTIC OR FABRICATED. ONLY WAY HE CAN PROVE REPEAT PROVE FALSITY IS BY PROVING HIS PRESENCE AT PLACE OTHER THAN EMBASSY AT TIME OF CONVERSATION. THIS IMPOSSIBLE SINCE HE THERE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION PER ORIGINATOR.

*** Transcript of Amb. Portuondo's conversation with the Colombian [illegible] tape recently returned to the station by Hqs.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

113

DATE : 20 JAN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 20 0802Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 14761

RITY DIR CITE MEXI 9913

RYBAT

REFS A MEXI 9855 (IN 12549) *

B DIR 35831 (OUT 90998) **

C/S Comment: * Ambassador Mann informed LITEMPO/2 (2) that State Department had certain information on Cuban intervention in Mexican internal affairs.

1. AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE SAID "TRANSCRIPTS" INSTEAD "TAPES" N BEGINNING SENTENCE PARA TWO A OF REF A. TRANSCRIPT OF PORTUONDO CONVERSATION WITH COLOMBIANS IS ACCURATE RESUME OF AUTHENTIC TAPE RECENTLY RETURNED TO STATION BY HQS. THIS TAPE WILL BE PASSED LITEMPO-2 (2) AFTERNOON 19 JAN. SECOND TRANSCRIPT REFERRED TO BY AMBASSADOR SAME SUB PARAGRAPH WAS FABRICATED BY STATION AND BASED ON STATION KNOWLEDGE OF ACTUAL VISIT TO PORTUONDO BY POLITIECHNIC STUDENT. NO TAPE EXTANT NOR HAS EXISTED OF THIS TRANSCRIPT. CONTENT THIS TRANSCRIPT NOT PERTINENT EXCEPT FOR INCRIMINATING STATEMENT QUOTED BY AMBASSADOR CONCERNING PAYMENT TO STUDENTS.

2. THE "GENUINE" DOCUMENT MENTIONED BY AMBASSADOR IN PARA TWO B OF REF A IS STATION FABRICATION. DURING MONTH OF AUGUST 1961 LIFIC (1) PROVIDED STATION WITH PRENSA LATINA PERSONAL FILE OF ANGEL BOAN, THEN MEXI DIRECTOR GENERAL. WHEN FILE WAS PHOTOGRAPHED FOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT STATION INSERTED PHOTO OF FAKE MEMORANDUM DESCRIBED IN REF A. PHOTOS OF FILE, INCLUDING FAB-

6

Lienvoy/am

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

IN 14761 MEXI 9913

RICATION, PASSED GOM. THE FAKE MEMO DESCRIBED PAYMENTS TO UNNAMED MEXICANS IN VARIOUS GOVERNMENT OFFICES. (IT WAS A SECOND COPY THIS FABRICATION, ALONE, WHICH WAS PASSED TO LITEMPO-2[2] ON 13 JAN).

3. CONCERNING PARA TWO C OF REF A: THIS WAS STATION FABRICATED MONTAGE SHOWING PROENZA AS A MEMBER OF CROWD DURING STUDENT RIOT OF 12 JULY 1960. "ORIGINAL" OF FABRICATION WAS PASSED TO LITENSOR[3] VIA LIELEGANT[4] SHORTLY AFTER.

4. PARA TWO SUB PARAS D AND E REFER TO WRITTEN "REMINDERS" OF COVERTLY RECOGNIZED INSTANCES OF CUBAN INTERVENTION ALREADY KNOWN TO GOM. THEY DESCRIBE AUTHENTIC CASES.

5. REPEATING, ONLY AUTHENTIC TAPE OF BONA FIDE COLOMBIAN STUDENT CONVERSATIONS IS AVAILABLE THIS TIME TO LITEMPO-2.[2] STATION BELIEVES "POLITECHNIC" TAPE, WHICH DOES NOT EXIST, WILL NOT BE REQUESTED. SHOULD THIS BE, STATION WILL STALL.

[illegible]

[illegible]

6. POUCHING COPIES OF ALL ITEMS GIVEN TO LITEMPO-2.[2]

C/S Comment: ** Hqs. requested a detailed description of the materials passed to LITEMPO/2 (2).

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

LIENVOY Project Costs

For the period 1 February 1962 through 31 January 1963, it is estimated that the LIENVOY Project costs will be approximately $65,240. Of this total it is estimated that $26,350 will be spent in fiscal year 1962 and $38,890 will be spent in fiscal year 1963.

Agent Salaries:	FY 62	FY 63	Totals	
LIENVOY/2	1,200	1,680	2,880	
LIENVOY/4	1,200	1,680	2,880	
LIENVOY/5	1,200	1,680	2,880	
LIENVOY/6	800	1,120	1,920	
LIENVOY/7	800	1,120	1,920	
LIENVOY/11	1,200	1,680	2,880	
LIENVOY/12	1,200	1,680	2,880	
LIENVOY/14	800	1,120	1,920	
LIENVOY/15	260	364	624	
LIENVOY/16	800	1,120	1,920	
2 sub-agents run by LIENVOY/2 @ $120 per month	1,200	1,680	2,880	
Total Agent Salaries	10,660	14,924		25,584
Xmas Bonus: one months pay		2,132	2,132	
Contingency fund for new agents or severance pay	952	1,332	2,284	
Total Bonus and Contingency Fund				4,416
Total Salaries, Bonus, and Contingency funds	11,612	18,388		30,000
Operational Expenses	830	1,170	2,000	
Local Purchase supplies and equipment	1,040	1,460	2,500	
Upkeep 3 QP vehicles	750	1,050	1,800	
Rent--Intercept Center	600	840	1,440	
Arehart Home Leave Travel		2,000	2,000	
Safehouse rental	1,040	1,460	2,500	
Entertainment and gifts to Mexican Govt. officials	1,250	1,750	3,000	
Salary and cover travel for Arehart and family	8,330	11,670	20,000	
Total	13,870	21,370		35,240
Total Project Funds	25,482	39,758		65,240

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

050
DATE : 6 JAN 62 WCJ

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED WH AT 0145, 6 JAN)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, C/CA, S/C 2

JAN 6 0629Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 47593

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 9792

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR MANN TO SECRETARY WOODWARD:

(MESSAGE CONTINUES NEXT PAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT. ORGANIZATION.

**(IN 45081) - Ambassador Mann suggested that the State Department and CAS give the Government of Mexico (GOM) concrete and irrefutable evidence of Cuban intervention in order to bring about GOM diplomatic break with Cuba.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE: 6 JAN 62 RECEIVED: JAN 6 0629Z 62

FROM: MEXICO CITY 9790 PRIORITY

TO: DIRECTOR IN 47593

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR MANN TO SECRETARY WOODWARD:

"RECOMMEND I BE AUTHORIZED SOONEST RELAY TO TELLO DETAILS ON CUBAN INTERVENTION (PORTION GARBLED-BEING SERVICED) SET FORTH IN MY MESSAGE. (SEE MEXI 9759)."

"I BELIEVE SUCH DOCUMENTED INFORMATION WILL IMPRESS TELLO.

"EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED VARIOUS REPORTS FROM FRIENDLY GOM OFFICIALS THAT HIGH LEVEL CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN DIPLOMATIC BREAK WITH CUBA.

"NOW HAVE SOLID INFORMATION THAT BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR REPORTE TO HIS FON OFF DECEMBER 29 THAT TELLO TOLD HIM GOM WOULD BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA IN NEAR FUTURE. WHILE I CANNOT ESTIMATE CHANCES OF BREAK, POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT WHATEVER INFORMATION I CAN GIVE TELLO MAY CAUSE HIM TO MOVE EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER JANUARY 22".

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

The following cables re passing information to Tello on which he can base a break in relations with Cuba and letting Ambassador use what material he wants to pass to Tello, all cables to be found in C/WH office only.

MEXI 9855 RYBAT

MEXI 9857 (IN 12179) - 16 January 1962 RYBAT

DIR 33993 (OUT 87630) - 8 January 1962 RYBAT

DIR 35[illegible] (OUT [illegible]) - 17 Jan. 62 RYBAT

✓LIENVOY/ops

LITENSOR

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : J. O. HEYN
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 2555
DATE : 3 JANUARY 1962

1744

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

4 JAN 62 01 0

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/BELL 5, S/C 2

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 86

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 33285

REFS: MEXI 9759 (IN 45081)*; MEXI 9767 (IN 45810)**

KYBAT

REF PROPOSALS BEING DISCUSSED WITH ODACID. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * Ambassador Mann proposed pass certain telephone conversation transcripts to Foreign Minister TELLO as evidence of Cuban interventionist activities in Mexico.

** Station planning a series of operations to influence Mexico's vote at OAS Conference.

LiENVOY 105

Raford Herbert
RAFORD HERBERT, AC/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R. P. HOLMAN,
AUTHENTICATING

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

E	505 2 JAN 62
	DIRECTOR
M	MEXICO CITY
ION	C/WH 5
O	COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/BELL 5, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 3 0335Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 45810

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 9767

RYBAT

REF: A. MEXI 9738, PARA 5 (IN 43769)

B. DIR 32614 (Cont 85101)

1. PRESENT STATION PLANNING REF IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. PREPARATION FOR AMBASSADOR MEXICAN VERSION CUBAN SUBVERSIVE PAPER, FOR PASSAGE TO TELLO.

B. PLAN FABRICATE ON TAPE PHONEY CONVERSATION OF CUBAN AMBASSADOR FOR INSERTION LIENVOY MECHANISM.

C. ATTEMPT PERSUADE LONGTIME MEXICAN EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN EMBASSY DEFECT AND MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT CONDEMNING CUBANS FOR INTERFERENCE MEXICAN AFFAIRS. (SUBJ HAS INDICATED DESIRE ABANDON JOB BUT NOT YET AGREEABLE TO PUBLIC STATEMENT).

D. FAILING PUBLIC DEFECTION ABOVE SUBJECT, ATTEMPTING THROUGH SUBJECT OBTAIN INCRIMINATING DOCUMENTS OR PROPAGANDA FROM EMBASSY SUITABLE FOR SENSATIONAL EXPLOITATION. EXAMPLE: SUBJECT CLAIMS CUBANS RUNNING "INDOCTRINATION" CLASSES FOR MEXICAN YOUTHS WITHIN EMBASSY BUILDING.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TE :

:

OM :

TION :

FO :

PAGE 2

IN 45810 MEXI 9767

E. ALL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS PERMITTING, ATTEMPTING ARRANGE "CRASH" OF AUTOMOBILE OF CUBAN DIPLOMAT ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. "CRASH" TO INVOLVE SPECIAL UNDER-CAR DEVICE

WITH WEAPONS AND PROP

EXAMPLES "PROVING" CUBAN INTERVENTION IN LOCAL LABOR PROBLEMS. FYI: MEXICANS NOW SUSPECT RODRIGUEZ ENGAGED IN CASTRO KUCAGE-TYPE OPS.

2. WELCOME HQS COMMENTS ON ABOVE PLANNING AND ANY SUGGESTIONS FROM HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT : *VIEW POSSIBILITY MEXICAN GOVT MAY BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA DESIRED DISCUSS CONTENTS REF A THIS CABLE WITH STATE DEPT.

SECRET

3 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Operations Proposed by Station Mexico City to Influence Mexico to Break Relations with Cuba.

1. In addition to the proposal advanced by Ambassador Mann to pass certain telephone tap transcripts to high Mexican officials, Station Mexico City has just forwarded the following suggested operations designed to influence the Mexican Government to break relations with Cuba prior to the OAS Conference:

A. To prepare the Mexican "version" of the paper on Cuban Subversive Activities for the Ambassador to pass to Foreign Minister TELLO.

B. To fabricate on tape a phoney conversation by the Cuban Ambassador and insert it into the joint telephone tapping operation we operate for the President.

C. To attempt to persuade a longtime Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy to defect and make a public statement condemning Cubans for interference in Mexican affairs.

D. Should it not be possible to have the Subject above make a public defection, attempt through him to obtain incriminating documents or propaganda from the Cuban Embassy that are suitable for sensational exploitation. The Subject has claimed that the Cubans are running "indoctrination" classes for Mexican youth within the Embassy building.

E. If security considerations permit, attempt to arrange a "crash" of the automobile of the Cuban diplomat Rogelio RODRIGUEZ. The "crash" would involve a special under-car device containing weapons and propaganda examples to "prove" Cuban intervention in local labor problems.

2. In view of the highly sensitive nature of the operations proposed above and their timing (prior to 22 January) as related to the forthcoming OAS conference and the announced visit of President Kennedy to Mexico, it

SECRET

is suggested that these operations be discussed with the Department of State in detail. This may be an inopportune time for such activities, since the Mexican Government is likely to scrutinize with special care all events, whether bonfide or contrived, in the intervening period before 72 January.

Ned P. Holman
Chief, WH/3

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

[redacted]

S E C R E T 280759Z
IMMEDIATE DIR CITE SALV 5296
[redacted] AMMUG
REF SALV 5294 (IN 53345)

1. MEETING [redacted] an officer AND [redacted] asset AT HOTEL SAFESITE LASTED 1015 TO 1440 HOURS 27 SEPTEMBER. [redacted]

2. SO FAR NEITHER [redacted] 24 [Police liaison] NOR [redacted] [Intel liaison] 24 AWARE OF THIS OR REF MEETINGS. [redacted] [liaison] 24 AND [PRESIDENT] 24 KNOW [redacted] asset IS [redacted] CIA TARGET AND, AS HOS AWARE, HAVE COOPERATED IN PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT HIM AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN EXPLOITING AMMUG LEADS. IN ADDITION [redacted] asset HAS BEEN CONTINUING TARGET FOR [redacted] [Intel liaison] 24 FOR LONG PERIOD AND LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. HENCE THERE IS HIGH RISK [redacted] [Intel liaison] 24 COULD DISCOVER [redacted] CIA CONTACT IN FUTURE HANDLING. IN VIEW OF FREE HAND GIVEN [redacted] CIA IN THESE OPS BY [PRESIDENT] 24 AND [redacted] [Police liaison] 24, SUCH DISCOVERY COULD DAMAGE [redacted] AND ALL [redacted] USG RELATIONS. FOR FOREGOING REASONS, ALTHOUGH [redacted] officers MUCH DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THIS [redacted] asset OP UNILATERALLY, WE DEEM IT PRUDENT TO INFORM [redacted] [Police liaison] 24 AND PRESIDENT, REQUESTING THEY MAKE NO RECORD OF RECRUITMENT AND SIMPLY ACCEPT FUTURE REPORTS AS COMING FROM TRUSTWORTHY SENSITIVE SOURCE, LEAVING MANAGEMENT TO [redacted].

3. IN LONG INTERVIEW [redacted] asset GAVE CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INFO ON [illegible] ACTIVITIES AND HIS RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMIE PARTIES AND

SECRET

9/PV

RIVEN. HIS INFO SEEMS SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE ALTHOUGH HE HAS WITHHELD
HER INFO. UNDERSTANDABLY HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT ENTRAPMENT, [redacted]
MPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENT TO REMUNERATE HIM, SECURITY LEAK LOCALLY
ICH HE FEARS COULD RESULT HIS DEATH. HE INDICATES WILLINGNESS
NTINUE IN PARTY ACTIVITIES SALV, ATTEND CONFERENCES, STRENGTHEN
TACTS WITH OTHER COMMIE PARTIES, STRIVE GAIN HIGH PARTY POSTS,
ALERT FOR INTEL ON GUERRILLA WARFARE AND Cuba [redacted] ACTIVITIES.

INFO FROM [redacted] INCLUDES FOLL:

A. HE ARRANGED MOSCOW TRAVEL RECENTLY [redacted] FOR FOUR
LVS, LETTING THEIR PARENT GROUPS MAKE SELECTIONS. THOSE
LECTED WERE RENAN RODAS LAZO, PEDRO RAUL FARFAN MEDRANO,
ERTO ARMIJO NAVARRETE AND ONE OTHER WHOSE NAME HE COULD NOT
CALL.

B. HE BELIEVES PCES CENTRAL COMMITTEE INCLUDES SHAFICK HANDAL,
RGE ARIAS GOMEZ, RAUL CASTELLANOS FIGUEROA BUT SAYS HANDAL
ONLY ONE WHOM HE KNOWS ON PCES EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

C. PARTY PSEUDOS FOR SELF, HANDAL AND CASTELLANOS RESPECTIVELY ARE
[redacted] PEDRO AND FERNANDEZ. HOWEVER HANDAL PSEUDO NOW CHANGED
ANOTHER WHICH COULD NOT RECALL.

D. HE AND JOSE MANLIO ARGUETA BOTH WERE TRAINED BY Cuban [redacted] INTEL;
HAD GW TRAINING ALSO.

E. PCES HAS ESTIMATED 600 MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH THIS HIS GUESS RATHER
N HARD INFO. WELL ORGANIZED IN SAN SALV BUT WEAK IN COUNTRY
ANIZATION DESPITE MANY CAMPESINO MEMBERS.

F. FUAR PRACTICALLY INACTIVE.

G. PCES HAS SUPPORTERS FOR CHICOM LINE AS WELL AS SOV LINE BUT
FERENCES HAVE NOT CAUSED SPLIT. LEADERS FAVOR SOV LINE.

6. ROQUE DALTON NOT MEMBER OF PCS NOW BUT [illegible] ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS DISAPPEARANCE. THEY ARE TRYING EXERT PRESSURE ON GOVT THROUGH [illegible], WOULD BE WILLING ACCEPT HIS EXPULSION FROM COUNTRY RATHER THAN HAVE HIM LANGUISH IN SOME LOCAL JAIL. GOVT HAS NOT SAID ANYTHING ABOUT DALTON ARREST OR LOCATION.

7. HE A PCES MEMBER CONTINUOUSLY SINCE 1956. HIS SUSPENSION WAS ORDERED BECAUSE HE TOOK ASYLUM IN MEXI EMB 29 JANUARY 63 BUT WAS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE HE GAVE SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF CONDUCT ON ARRIVING MEXI FEW DAYS LATER.

4. IN LINE PARA 1 REASONING BELIEVE BEST TO INFORM Police liaison 24 [redacted] MEETING WITH HIM SCHEDULED 0900 HOURS LOCAL TIME 28 SEPTEMBER. REQUEST HQS VIEWS BY 0830 HOURS.

5. NEXT [redacted] MEETING 1030 HOURS 29 SEPTEMBER. NEXT Dalton [redacted] MEETING MORNING 28 SEPTEMBER AFTER Police liaison 24 [redacted] MEETING.

S E C R E T

Asset [redacted] ARRIVED EVENING 25 SEPT CIA officer [redacted] [illegible]

Asset [redacted].

[illegible]

2/PV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

WH/SA # 64-749
15 October 1964

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted] Operation 24
Briefing in (Guatemala) of (Chief of State Peralta) 11

1. The briefing was held in a small luxurious government conference room on the afternoon of Friday 6 October 1964, lasting about 2 1/2 hours. (Chief of State Colonel Peralta, Minister of Government Colonel Serrano and Intelligence Chief Colonel Porras attended for the Guatemalans.) [redacted] TWO CIA OFFICERS WERE PRESENT 06.08.06.08.24

2. At the request of the SENIOR CIA OFFICER [redacted] I prefaced the operational briefing with a brief description of how the U.S. Intelligence community operates, of the role of CIA, of the need for compartmentation and security, and specifically of how the foregoing considerations make it imperative for the (Guatemalans) to adopt security precautions which will ensure that the information we provide and the joint operations we undertake are compartmented within the (Guatemalan) government (and, in fact, discussed by the Guatemalan government exclusively with our representatives in the field).) 11 24

3. Following the introductory remarks outlined above, I briefed the group on the DGI structure, the DGI operational techniques, and specifically on DGI aims and operations in (Guatemala). 11 The (president) 24 lent close attention throughout the briefing and examined the exhibits closely, including the DGI intelligence requirements for (Guatemala) 11 and the (Salvadoran "Caso Zapote" file.) 24

4. After the foregoing exposition, I explained our aims in exploiting the information [redacted] In this connection I asked for close cooperation and coordination of activities, promising that we shall do our utmost and making reference to our travel lists and watch list.

10|N

h. The effectiveness 11 of his own actions against guerrillas in Guatemala and his determination to "meet violence with violence;"

i. Recognition of the importance of the information covered in the briefing and of its exploitation;

j. Reference to the 24 case of the 24 Mexican courier working for Cuban intelligence and now detained in Guatemala [redacted]

11

k. Acceptance of security restrictions and his decision to hold the information to those present.

7. In replying to the remarks of Colonel Peralta, 06 I said that we appreciate the cooperation of 11 Guatemala in the OAS and that we shall be most interested in the exploitation of the possibilities in the present case. I added that the matter of using force against Cuba is a policy matter on which I was not competent to comment but that the decisions made by the United States Government are based on careful study of detailed information including information on Soviet intentions and capabilities.

8. At the 29 conclusion of the meeting, 06 Peralta asked for a copy of the DGI requirements (which he already had gone over closely) and took the copy with him to study further.

[redacted]

8/1N

ANOTHER 11

2. With reference to [redacted] case, because of the developments and plans in El Salvador, 24 I explained briefly the status of the DALTON case and the possibility of his being transferred to Guatemala. 11 (This was in line with the discussion in El Salvador 11 which included our [redacted] officer [redacted], the 24 President and the President's intelligence 06,08 advisor, Colonel MEDRANO.) I asked that the Guatemalan 11 government take no action unless 06 requested by President 06 RIVERA or Colonel MEDRANO and said that, if DALTON 06 is transferred, one of our people probably would talk to 06 DALTON in Guatemala.) 11

06,08

3. The Chief of State Peralta made a rather impassioned speech in which he covered the following points:

a. His own long experience in the OAS, in Cuba and in Central America;

b. His early warnings about Castro--which were disregarded;

c. The extent to which Guatemala 11 has lived up to its obligations in the OAS; to which it has cooperated in efforts against Castro; and to which it has looked toward U.S. leadership;

d. The failure of the U.S. to take aggressive action against Cuba and the need for taking a hard line, including the use of force in support of military activity by the free Cubans and the other American countries;

e. His appreciation that the Soviets will not be willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba;

f. Condemnation of Mexico for her dealings with Cuba, for failure to abide by her obligations in the OAS, and for permitting the Castroites to operate out of Mexico against other American countries;

g. The need for action against Mexico;

SECRET

14/R

14-00000

104-10187-10109 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

[redacted]

☐ ☒ SLOTTED ☐

S E C R E T 280059Z
IMMEDIATE DIR CITE SALV 52968
[redacted]
WHDIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTOR
REF SALV 5294 (IN 53395)

1. MEETING CIA OFFICER [redacted] AND CUBAN TARGET [redacted] AT HOTEL SAFESITE LASTED 1015 TO 1440 HOURS 27 SEPTEMBER. [redacted] LIAISON 24 [redacted] SO FAR NEITHER 24 CHIEF INTEL SERVICE [redacted] NOR [redacted] AWARE OF THIS OR REF MEETINGS. CHIEF INTEL SERVICE [redacted] AND PRESIDENT 24 KNOW CUBAN TARGET [redacted] IS CIA [redacted] TARGET AND, AS HQS AWARE, HAVE COOPERATED IN PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT HIM AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN EXPLOITING CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted] LEADS. IN ADDITION CUBAN TARGET [redacted] HAS BEEN CONTINUING TARGET FOR 24 LIAISON [redacted] AND INTEL SERVICE 24 [redacted] FOR LONG PERIOD AND LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. HENCE THERE IS HIGH RISK 24 LIAISON [redacted] AND INTEL SERVICE 24 [redacted] COULD DISCOVER CIA [redacted] CONTACT IN FUTURE HANDLING. IN VIEW OF FREE HAND GIVEN CIA [redacted] IN THESE OPS BY PRESIDENT 24 AND INTEL SERVICE 24 [redacted], SUCH DISCOVERY COULD DAMAGE CIA [redacted] AND ALL U.S. GOVT [redacted] RELATIONS. FOR FOREGOING REASONS, ALTHOUGH CIA OFFICER [redacted] AND CIA OFFICER [redacted] MUCH DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THIS CUBAN TARGET [redacted] OP UNILATERALLY, THEY DEEM IT PRUDENT TO INFORM CHIEF INTEL SERVICE 24 [redacted] AND PRESIDENT 24 REQUESTING THEY MAKE NO RECORD OF RECRUITMENT AND SIMPLY ACCEPT FUTURE REPORTS AS COMING FROM TRUSTWORTHY SENSITIVE SOURCE, LEAVING MANAGEMENT TO CIA [redacted]

2. IN LONG INTERVIEW CUBAN TARGET [redacted] GAVE CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INFO ON FOES ACTIVITIES AND HIS RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMIE PARTIES AND

SECRET

I/PV

CUBA [redacted] HIS INFO SEEMS SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE ALTHOUGH HE HAS WITHHELD OTHER INFO. UNDERSTANDABLY HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT ENTRAPMENT, CIA [redacted] COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENT TO REMUNERATE HIM, SECURITY LEAK LOCALLY WHICH HE FEARS COULD RESULT HIS DEATH. HE INDICATES WILLINGNESS CONTINUE IN PARTY ACTIVITIES [redacted], ATTEND CONFERENCES, STRENGTHEN CONTACTS WITH OTHER COMMIE PARTIES, STRIVE GAIN HIGH PARTY POSTS, BE ALERT FOR INTEL ON GUERRILLA WARFARE AND CUBAN [redacted] ACTIVITIES.

3. INFO FROM CUBAN Target [redacted] INCLUDES FOLL:

A. HE ARRANGED MOSCOW TRAVEL RECENTLY (w 72[illegible]) (SEE SALV 5248) FOR FOUR SALVS, LETTING THEIR PARENT GROUPS MAKE SELECTIONS. [redacted]

B. HE BELIEVES PCES CENTRAL COMMITTEE INCLUDES SHAFICK HANDAL, JORGE ARIAS GOMEZ, RAUL CASTELLANOS FIGUEROA BUT SAYS HANDAL IS ONLY ONE WHOM HE KNOWS ON PCES EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

C. PARTY PSEUDOS FOR SELF, HANDAL AND CASTELLANOS RESPECTIVELY ARE [redacted]. HOWEVER HANDAL PSEUDO NOW CHANGED TO ANOTHER WHICH COULD NOT RECALL.

D. HE [redacted] TRAINED BY CUBAN [redacted] INTEL; HE HAD GW TRAINING ALSO.

E. PCES HAS ESTIMATED 600 MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH THIS HIS GUESS RATHER THAN HARD INFO. WELL ORGANIZED IN SAN SALV BUT WEAK IN COUNTRY ORGANIZATION DESPITE MANY CAMPESINO MEMBERS.

F. FUAR PRACTICALLY INACTIVE.

G. PCES HAS SUPPORTERS FOR CHICOM LINE AS WELL AS SOV LINE BUT DIFFERENCES HAVE NOT CAUSED SPLIT. LEADERS FAVOR SOV LINE.

H. ROQUE DALTON NOT MEMBER OF PCES NOW BUT PCES AND STUDENTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS DISAPPEARANCE. THEY ARE TRYING EXERT PRESSURE ON GOVT THROUGH IDENTITIES SECTORS, WOULD BE WILLING ACCEPT HIS EXPULSION FROM COUNTRY RATHER THAN HAVE HIM LANGUISH IN SOME LOCAL JAIL. GOVT HAS NOT SAID ANYTHING ABOUT DALTON ARREST OR LOCATION.

[redacted]

24

4. IN LINE PARA 1 REASONING BELIEVE BEST TO INFORM (CHIEF INTEL SERVICE) [redacted] MEETING WITH HIM SCHEDULED 0900 HOURS LOCAL TIME 23 SEPTEMBER. REQUEST HQS VIEWS BY 0830 HOURS.

5. NEXT CUBAN TARGET [redacted] MEETING 1030 HOURS 29 SEPTEMBER. NEXT DALTON [redacted] MEETING MORNING 28 SEPTEMBER AFTER (INTEL SERVICE) 24 [redacted] MEETING.

SECRET

ASSET [redacted] ARRIVED EVENING 26 SEPT CIA officer [redacted] MEET WITH CUBAN Target [redacted].

2/17V

104-10187-10110 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

☐ ☐ REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SAN SALVADOR

FROM: WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT WH TIME 1945 BY [illegible]

TO: DDP, WH/SA 2, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, [illegible] CI/OA, SR 7, FE 4, VR, FILE

S E C R E T 281302Z

IN-82908

PRIORITY DIR CITE SALV 5301

WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTOR
[redacted]

28 SEPT 64

REFS A. SALV 5296 (IN 82314

B. DIR 52899 *

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFS [redacted] CIA OFFICER AND [redacted] CIA OFFICER MET [redacted] 24 SALVADORAN INTEL CHIEF MORNING 28 SEPTEMBER IN [redacted] CIA OFFICER OFFICE TO BRIEF HIM ON [redacted] CUBAN TARGET RECRUITMENT, IMPORTANCE AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. [redacted] 24 (SALV INTEL CHIEF) WAS MUCH IMPRESSED AND AGREED EMPHATICALLY ONLY HE AND (PRESIDENT) 24 WOULD KNOW OF RECRUITMENT AND THEY WOULD MAKE NO RECORD OF IT. DURING [illegible] [redacted] CIA OFFICER POINTED OUT [redacted] CUBAN TARGET IS MOST IMPORTANT LOCAL TARGET BECAUSE HE HAS KNOWLEDGE OF AND ACCESS TO COMMIE PARTIES SALV AND OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, [redacted].

2. [redacted] CIA OFFICER SAID ONE OF HIS AGENTS WHO ALREADY HAS LEFT SALV

SOURCES + METHODS

SECRET

3/PV

[redacted]

CUBAN ASSET [SALV. INTEL CHIEF] 24

ARRANGED CONTACT WITH [redacted] [redacted] ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION, MADE NO DEMANDS, ORDERED ALL HIS FACILITIES AND UTMOST COOPERATION TO CIA [redacted]. CIA OFFICER [redacted] AND CIA OFFICER [redacted] BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN NO SECURITY PROBLEM TO DATE.

3. DO NOT PLAN HIT ANY OTHER TARGETS SALV AT THIS TIME, EXCEPT DALTON [redacted], AS CUBAN TARGET [redacted] OF TOO IMPORTANT TO RISK DRAWING ATTENTION TO CIA [redacted] PRESENCE OR RECRUITMENT EFFORTS. PLAN TO CONTINUE DALTON [redacted] INTERROGATION AND RECRUITMENT EFFORT. HIS SILENCE AND COLLABORATION IMPORTANT IN THEMSELVES BUT ALSO FOR FOREGOING REASON. 24 [SALV. INTEL CHIEF] [redacted] AGREES HANDLE EXACTLY AS CIA [redacted] WISHES.

4. [redacted]

SOURCES + METHODS

SECRET

* ONLY ALTERNATIVE APPEARED CUT IN 24 [PRESIDENT] AND 24 [SALV. INTEL CHIEF] [redacted]

4/PN

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1/1

SECRET

ORIG: [redacted]
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: SALV (IMMEDIATE)
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI, VR

20 SEP 64 39z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

(IMMEDIATE) SALV INFO CITE DIR 52899

WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted]

REF: SALV XXXX 5296 (IN 82314)

UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, ONLY ALTERNATIVE THIS POINT APPEARS BE CUT IN PRESIDENT [redacted]

24

[redacted]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

UPV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 3 2
RI ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

FROM SAN SALVADOR	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1	5	
		2	6	
		3	7	
		4	8	
ACTION WH 8	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, CA 2, CA/PEG, SOD 6
VR, FILE

S E C R E T 302210Z

DIR CITE SALV 5312

WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTOR
[redacted]

30 Sep 64 IN 84511

REFS A. SALV 5303 (IN 83009) *

B. DIR 53380

1. CIA OFFICER [redacted] AND CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted], ONCE EACH ALONE AND ONCE TOGETHER SAW DALTON [redacted] MORNING 30 SEPTEMBER. DALTON [redacted] TOOK SAME POSITION AS PARA 2 REF A. DENIED KNOWING CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted] DESPITE CASE OFFICER RELATIONSHIP, REFUSED DISCUSS ANYTHING ABOUT CUBAN INTEL, AND BEGGED FOR RELEASE AND EXILE TO START LIFE ANEW.

2. OBTAINING TRUTH FROM DALTON [redacted] WILL BE TIME CONSUMING. HE FULLY AWARE PROOFS AGAINST HIM BUT PROBABLY HOPES POLITICAL PRESSURE WILL FORCE RELEASE AND PROBABLY FEARS ADMISSION OF HIS COMPLICITY WILL NOT HELP HIM. SALV GOVT MUST CONVINCE HIM HE WRONG ON BOTH COUNTS. HE OF DUBIOUS VALUE INSOFAR AS CONTRIBUTING NEW INFO ABOUT PAST ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN INTEL OR PCES BUT OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AS AGENT IF HE CAN BE TARGETTED AGAINST CUBAN INTEL OR PCES. IF RELEASED WOULD BE DEFINITE OBSTACLE TO FURTHER OPS AGAINST CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted] TARGETS. IF HE SHOULD BE DOUBLED, HIS IMPRISONMENT WOULD COVER RECRUITMENT AND WOULD TEND TO ENHANCE HIS VALUE. PROBABLY WOULD BE MOST USEFUL OUTSIDE SALV INCLUDING MEXI AND CUBA.

SECRET

3. AS MATTERS STAND MOST IMPORTANT TO PROTECT CIA [redacted] EQUITY IN CUBAN Target [redacted] OP OF GREAT PROMISE. THIS OP COULD BE AFFECTED ADVERSELY BY SPREAD OF NEWS ABOUT CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted] EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF CIA [redacted] TO EFFECT RECRUITMENTS. BECAUSE OF VALUE OF CUBAN Target [redacted] PREFER FOR PRESENT NOT TO PROCEED AGAINST OTHERS WHO RECEIVED INTEL TRAINING. AFTER CUBAN Target [redacted] IS PRODUCING AND AFTER PRUDENT INTERVAL CIA [redacted] CAN PROCEED WITH RECRUITMENT EFFORTS AGAINST OTHERS [EITHER UNILATERALLY OR WITH LIAISON] 24 DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS.

4. PROCEEDING WITH ARREST OF GUERRILLEROS TRAINED IN CUBA PROBABLY WOULD BE BENEFICIAL AS LONG AS NOT ATTRIBUTED TO CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted]. [redacted], SOME OF THOSE DETAINED MIGHT BE DOUBLED AND TARGETTED AGAINST GUERRILLA GROUPS OR PCES.

5. APPRECIATE REF B TO WHICH WILL REPLY AFTER DISCUSSING FURTHER PROSPECTS AND GOVT INTENTIONS WITH LIAISON [redacted] [AND POSSIBLY PRESIDENT.] 24

SECRET

[redacted]

2/PV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23 RID ☐ COPY ☐ ISSUED

FROM 16-26 (SAN SALVADOR)	26 SECRET	REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	
ACTION WH 8	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	TIME BY
INFO DDP, WH/SA 8, CI/OA, CI, CI/OPS, FI, VR, FILE		

S E C R E T 012257Z

DIR CITE (SALV) 21-26 5320

WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTOR
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

REF A. (SALV) 21-26 5312 (IN 84511)

IN 05307

B. DIR 53383

1. REF MATTERS DISCUSSED WITH SALVADORAN ASSET [redacted] NIGHT 30 SEPTEMBER. HE CONCURRED IN ALL RESPECTS SAYING WOULD DISCUSS TIMING [redacted] WITH (PRESIDENT) 24 ARRANGED FOR DALTON [redacted] TO GO BACK TO SOLITARY CONFINEMENT SAME NIGHT.

2. PENDING DEVELOPMENTS, CIA OFFICER [redacted] PLANS RETURN HQS AFTER (GUAT) 16-2 STOP. THEREFORE BEST HOLD OFF CUBAN EXILE ASSET'S [redacted] TRAVEL.

S E C R E T

5/PV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

: 4

MESSAGE FORM
S E C R E T

[redacted]

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

8 Sept 1964

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

08 Sep 64 47z

TO SAN SALVADOR

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF. WH 8

INFO DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, [illegible]

SALV INFO CITE DIR

WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEF

[redacted]

48053

REF SALV 5238 (IN 69136)*

24

GRATIFIED AT EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION OF BRIEFING TO [PRESIDENT,] BUT CONCERNED AT KEY ROLE OF (POLICE [redacted]) 24 URGE STATION BE AS TOUGH AS RELATIONS PERMIT IN INSISTING ON PROFESSIONAL HANDLING AND NOT BACKWARD IN POINTING OUT SECURITY BREACHES AND FUMBLES. PERHAPS STATION WILL SEE CHANCE TO DEMONSTRATE TO RIVERA THAT (POLICE [redacted]) 24 IS INCOMPETENT.

END OF MESSAGE

CIA OFFICERS

24 CHIEF EMBASSY

WH COMMENT: *Station SALV advised Hdqs of meeting between Chief [redacted] and Salv (President) concerning Cuban subversion and use of [redacted]s material. Station stated [President] desired [redacted] only local other than himself to be witting of [redacted] and information presented. 24

POLICE

24

CUBAN DEFECTOR

[redacted]

[redacted]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

6/90

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES, 23 RI ☑ COPY ☐ DIRRIT

24 SECRET REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM San Salvador	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1		5
		2		6
		3		7
		4		8
ACTION WH-5	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	TOI UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO DDP, WH/SA 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, VR

S E C R E T 252035Z

DIR CITE SALV 5289 25 Sep 64 IN 81621
WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTORS
[redacted]

REF SALV 5284 (IN 80898) *

24 [CHIEF SALVADORAN INTEL]
1. DISCUSSED [redacted] REF WITH [redacted] [redacted]
24 [WAISON] [redacted]
[redacted] THEN HE DISCUSSED WITH CHIEF [redacted] INFORMING
24 CIA
LATTER [PRESIDENT] WANTS ONLY SUCH ACTION AS [redacted] ADVISOR REQUESTS
24 [CHIEF SALV. INTEL]
AND THIS ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
24 [CHIEF SALV. INTEL] [WAISON] 24 DALTON
2. [redacted] SAYS [redacted] WILL MOVE [redacted] SOONEST TO HOUSE WHERE
CIA OFFICER
[redacted] CAN SEE ALONE.

SALVADORAN ASSET CIA OFFICER
3. MEANWHILE STATION ARRANGING THROUGH [redacted] FOR [redacted] TO
CUBAN TARGET CIA OFFICER
MEET CUTOUT TO [redacted]. IF CUTOUT STORY VERIFIED, PLAN HAVE [redacted]
CUBAN TARGET
MEET [redacted] SOONEST.

S E C R E T DALTON

*Re [redacted] INTERROGATION

SECRET

6/PV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MESSAGE FORM

[redacted]

30 S E C R E T

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

5801
3 September 1964

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

3 SEP 64 [illegible] 49z

TO SAN SALVADOR

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF. WH8

INFO DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, VR

TO SALV INFO CITE DIR 47146

[redacted] WH DIV, CUBA, CUBAN DEF.

REF SALV 5232 (IN 65051)*

24 01

HDQS FEELS IT IMPORTANT THAT [redacted] INTEL SERVICE CHIEF LIAISON ALSO ATTEND PRESIDENT 06 RIVERA BRIEFING, SINCE [redacted] Police Chief WILL MOST LIKELY TRY MOVE IN ON [redacted] CUBAN DEFECTOR LEADS AND TAKE FULL CREDIT. ~~SUGGEST [illegible]~~

~~HEADS [illegible]~~

END OF MESSAGE

06

WH COMMENT: *SALV will arrange briefing for President Rivera to be given by [redacted] CIA OFFICERS [redacted] on [redacted] information. CUBAN DEF,

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

4/90

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MESSAGE FORM

[redacted]
WH 2 CICL
6026
27 August 1964

25 SECRET

12-2 10:12

SAN SALVADOR GUATEMALA CITY

WHC

DIRECTOR

WH 7

INFO DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/IA, FI, CCS 3, VR

SALV GUAT

INFO.

CITE DIR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMMUG

REF DIR 45535

45536

STAFF EMPLOYEES

1. [redacted] WILL TRAVEL SALV AND GUAT UPON COMPLETION TEGU MINISTERS MEETING FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH STATIONS. HDQS WANTS STATIONS TO SET UP BRIEFINGS FOR [PRESIDENT 06 RIVERA] AND [CHIEF GOVT 06 PERALTA] AND ROUNDTABLE TALKS ON CUBAN SUBVERSION BOTH COUNTRIES. SUCH TALKS IDEALLY WOULD ALSO INCLUDE STATION CHIEF AND LOCAL [24 LIAISON] CHIEF, AS WELL AS STAFF EMPLOYEES [redacted] REQUEST ADDRESSEES VIEWS SUCH CONTACTS.

STAFF EMPLOYEE

2. FOR SALV: [redacted] WILL EXPLORE WITH YOU POSSIBLE PITCHES TO [redacted] AMMUG LEADS. PENDING OUTCOME SUCH EXPLORATIONS, HDQS PREPARED MAKE AMMUG ONE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY FOR PITCHES.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	[illegible]
RID/MIS	
[illegible]	
[illegible]	

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]
C/WHD

C/WH/PO/A [redacted]

C/WH/SA/CI

C/WH/2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No

3/20

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, London
[redacted]

INFO: Chief, [redacted], Frankfurt (Attn: [redacted])
COS, Germany

TECHS

FROM: Chief, [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]/Operational
Transmittal of Debriefing Report on use of Fraudulent International Travel Documentation by Cuban Intelligence. Case 4819.

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

Transmitted herewith is a debriefing report on use of Fraudulent International Travel Documentation by Cuban Intelligence for passage to the local [liaison service.] 24

[redacted]

HQS OFFICER
[redacted]

[redacted]

Attachment : 1 envl.
As Stated

Distribution:
3 - COS, London, w/att. (3 copies)
2 - Chief, [redacted], wo/att.
2 - COS, Germany, wo/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OSLW - 21363

DATE: 13 July 1964

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

[redacted]

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
[redacted]		[redacted]
[redacted]		[redacted]
[redacted]		[redacted]

RELEASING

1/90

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : PANAMA CITY [redacted]
ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED 1840 [redacted] (4 DD)
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/RA, FI, WE 6, WH/SA 8, AR

abff
Employee

S E C R E T 022035Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 3363

IN 74652

[redacted] AMMUG

REF: A. DIR 18730 *

B. OTTA 1639 (65502)

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED REPLY TO DIR
*CABLE IS MORE THAN A YEAR

1. TRACES REF B (WHICH RECD 2 MAY) INCLUDE FOLL ONLY:

A. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA AND ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. FORWARDED IN PACY 3312. (IN 71483)

B. JULIO DAMAS VASQUEZ. PROB IDENTICAL TO JULIO DAMASO VASQUEZ. HZP-3054, 15 MAY 59, REPORTED AS CUBAN CITIZEN, MEDICAL STUDENT LACKING ONE YEAR STUDY FOR DEGREE WHO JOINED SIERRA MORENA REBEL FORCES, APPOINTED ARMY DOCTOR WITH RANK OF CAPTAIN, CAPTURED AT PORTOBELLO. HZP-3854, 29 AUG 60, REPORTED AS WORKING WITH CUBAN G-2, OFFERING POSITION WITH RADIO REBELDE TO PANAMANIAN FRIEND.

C. FNU SOSA MAY BE MARIO SOSA NAVARRO, REPORTED HMTA-1534, 7 AUG 59, AS HONDURAN COMMIE THEN CHIEF OF AUTO SALES DEPT OF FIRM KNOWN AS RENE SEMPE; SEC GEN OF TEGU REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF PCH, ACTIVE IN COMMIE AFFAIRS GUAT 1953-54, MEXI 1954-57 (SEE [redacted]). OR MAY BE PABLO ARMANDO SOSA RAMIREZ, HONDURAN, PDOB LA CEIBA, HONDURAS, 8 AUG 34, OCCUPATION: RAILROAD WORKER. ARRIVED KINGSTON,

SECRET

JAMAICA, 22 MAY 63, FROM HAVA EN ROUTE TEGU WITH PASSPORT 23465 ISSUED HONDURAS 19 APR 63 (KNGS-622). **

D. ALEJANDRO GOMEZ MONTANO. HMT-827, 31 JULY 62, REPORTS ONE ALEJANDRO GOMEZ AS A CITIZEN OF HONDURAS INVOLVED IN COMMIE PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES TEGU. HZPA-11329, 9 JUNE 61 REPORTS ALEJANDRO GOMEZ AS NAME ON LIST CARRIED BY IUS DELEGATE.

E. RICARO MARTINEZ. HZPA-13234, 9 MAY 63, REPORTED RICARDO AUGUSTO MARTIÑEZ AS SALVADORAN, PDOB SANTA ANA, SALV, 23 JUNE 36, OCCUPATION: BRICKMASON, RESIDENCE INDEPENDENCIA NO. 76, SANTA ANA, AS POSSIBLE TRAVELLER TO IRON CURTAIN COUNTRY MARCH 63.

2. RE REF A, STA CAPABILITIES INCLUDE [redacted] [redacted]; DIRECT CONTACT WITH [redacted]; UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY (LIMITED BY SIZE OF TEAM) [redacted]; [redacted]

24

(IN [illegible]) (IN [illegible]) (IN [illegible])

3. PLS ADVISE EXTENT TO WHICH OTTA-1603, 1609, 1611 NAMES CAN BE:

A. DISCLOSED TO PANAMANIAN LSN FOR TRAVEL WATCHLISTING.

B. DISCUSSED WITH [redacted]

SECRET

SECRET

c/PN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Technical Surveillance Soviet/Satellite Agents

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
HMMW-10893

1. Station fully agrees with Headquarters concerning the value of concentrating LIFEAT or LIENVOY coverage on suspected and/or known Soviet, Satellite and Cuban agents residing in Mexico City. The Station in the past has undertaken this type coverage and will continue such coverage in the future as LIFEAT and LIENVOY facilities become available for assignment to these targets. As Headquarters is aware, this Station can and will cover any possible target Headquarters considers of high enough priority to cover.

2. For example, Carmen BRUFAU Civit was covered for 1956, 1957, 1960 and 1961; the results were not considered of sufficient value to continue the coverage.

3. Presently, Elena VASQUEZ Gomez, one of the persons referred to in reference, works for General Lazaro CARDENAS del Rio, pro-Communist former President of Mexico. Coverage of CARDENAS by LIENVOY means a certain amount of coverage of VASQUEZ Gomez.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
3 - Hqs
4 - Files

50-6-32/1

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
23 Aug. 1962	31 Aug. 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19700

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : HMMA-19129, 1 June 1962

1. Project LIFEAT has been renewed for the period of 1 July 1962 through 30 June 1963 in the amount of $99,000.00.

2. Please note that this means a cut of $3,193.00 from the Station's original request for $102,193.00 to $99,000.00. WHD was allocated $99,000.00 for this Project for FY 63.

3. This reduction was made by reducing "Miscellaneous Op Expenses" from $4,000.00 to $807.00.

4. KUTUBE and KUDESK Staffs concurred in recommending renewal. KUDESK reiterated that the facilities of this Project could and should be used for the coverage of known or highly suspected agents of the Soviet/Satellite and Cuban intelligence services in Mexico. KUDESK notes that some twenty of these agents have been documented in detailed target studies which were forwarded to the Station.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City
1 - WH/3/Mexi Chrono

50-6-32/1

DATE TYPED: 31 July 1962

DATE DISPATCHED: 3 AUG 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [illegible]-10803

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	J
RID/MIS	[illegible]
~~[illegible]~~S	
~~RID~~/FI	
WH/3 Mexi	
~~[illegible]~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	Lee G. Norris	nr	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/PO/A		Ruth Geary

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	3 AUG 1962	J. C. KING

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

SECRET

3592

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT (Renewal)
WH - Mexico City

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is presented for renewal for the period 1 July 19[illegible] through 30 June 19[illegible]. The project supports a unilateral telephone tap operation which provides daily information on the activities of official foreign installations in Mexico City and personnel thereof, as well as coverage of the activities of selected individuals and groups.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $[illegible],000 from the DD/P-WH Division budget in fiscal year 19[illegible], subject to the availability of funds. Of this amount $[illegible] is estimated for administrative salaries; $[illegible] for field agent salaries; $20,92[illegible] for basehouse rentals; $[illegible] for equipment; $2,100 for local transportation; and $[illegible] for miscellaneous operational expenses.

3. The Field Project Outline and review which are forwarded by the Division with a covering memorandum, give a clear description of the project activity and accomplishments. The project has been in continuous operation since 19[illegible], starting with a single tap against the Soviet Legation in Mexico City and now covering as many as thirty lines in a given month. The project is staffed by an "outside" case officer (Career Agent David M. WILSTED (p) of Project LIMOG), four contract agents who do administrative work, and twenty-one field agents including monitors and linesmen. During the past year the project provided coverage of the home phones of three Soviet Intelligence officers, the Polish Embassy, the Yugoslav Embassy, major firms dealing in the transshipment of U.S. goods to Cuba, American Communists in Mexico, and exile and revolutionary groups in Mexico. CI information was obtained and additional security was provided Station operations. Although coverage of the official Soviet and Czech installations became a joint operation with the Mexican Government in LIENVOY, Project LIFEAT remains available to resume coverage of these installations should a change in the local government or its attitude to CIA participation necessitate such change.

SECRET

SECRET

For the future, the Station has hopes of employing LIFEAT assets in "hot mike" operations which will require access to telephone centrals and cables. It is the opinion of the Station that the support provided the Station operations, the CI/CE information, and the ability to cover sensitive targets without revealing our interest to liaison services justifies the expenditure of funds, time, and personnel under this project. The overall performance of all agents in the complex continued to be good; no security problems were encountered which were not solved by the personnel involved.

4. Appropriate Special Staff components recommend renewal. The FI Staff notes that the project continues to be a most useful operational asset of the Station and in addition has produced thirty-seven positive intelligence disseminations, six of which were of particular interest concerning the illegal transshipment of goods to Cuba. FI/D comments that one item of direct interest to FI/D was received from Project LIFEAT and that the technical coverage of the diplomatic installations would afford valuable assistance to the planning and conduct of any FI/D endeavor to mount operations. The CI Staff reiterates that the facilities of this project could and should be used for the coverage of known or highly suspected agents of the Soviet/Satellite/and Cuban intelligence services in Mexico. CI notes that some twenty of these agents have been documented in detailed target studies which were forwarded to the Station.

5. I recommend renewal of Project LIFEAT and invite the Division's attention to the recommendations of CI Staff in paragraph 4 above.

L. M. Bines
[illegible]
Chief, DDP/PG

Approved: MKaramessines 27 July 62
Signature / Date

Attachments:
Project Outline LIFEAT
FI Memoranda

[illegible] Coordination:
For FI Staff -s/J. Laine
For CI Staff -s/T. Hames
For FI/INT -s/H. Astey
For TFG -s/T. Strange
For FI/D -s/V. Lolenliter

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

19 JUL [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans)

THROUGH: DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT Renewal

FI Staff recommends renewal of Project LIFEAT. This unilateral audio effort continues to be a most useful operational asset of the station as indicated by the specific examples furnished in the renewal request. In addition, it produced 37 positive intelligence disseminations, six of which were of particular interest concerning illegal transhipment of U.S. goods to Cuba.

LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

9 July 1962

Project LIFEAT WH/Mexico

(Audio Operation)

1. FI/INT files contain 37 positive information disseminations attributed wholly or in part to Project LIFEAT during the year 1 July 1961 through June 1962. They were concerned principally with contacts between Mexican Communists or leftists and Cubans or individuals of the Soviet Bloc, and with the travel of Latin Americans to the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. Six reports of particular interest consisted of information on Transcontinental S.A., a company allegedly engaged in the illegal transshipment of US goods to Cuba. Other reports of significance dealt with the contacts and activities of former Guatemalan President Juan Jose AREVALO Barmeja, now living in Mexico. There was reporting on Nicaraguan and Spanish exile activity in Mexico and on the revolutionary sentiment and expectations of other Latin American nationals.

2. LIFEAT has provided positive intelligence of value and of relevance to customer requirements and to objectives of the PNIO. It has been pointed out in the renewal request that the production of positive information is incidental to the projects primary function as a support and CI/CE operation.

3. RENEWAL IS RECOMMENDED.

Hayden Estey

HAYDEN ESTEY
Chief, FI/INT/RE

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Cryptonym

LIFEAT

WH

Mexico City

Type of Project

Provides Mexico City Station with a unilateral telephone tap operation which has been in existence for 11 years.

Case Officer

Lee G. Norris

5940

Room & Bldg

3 B 0003 Hq

Project [illegible]

New

x Renewal

Amendment

Extension

Period

To

1 July 1962

30 June 1963

Comments and Recommendations

KUDESK/ICG concurs in the recommendation that the LIFEAT Project renewal request be approved.

Date of Evaluation

13 July 1962

Signature of CI/ICG Reviewing Officer

Wade E. Thomas

Signature of Chief, CI/ICG

L Metzl by

Form 1490

SECRET

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM	LIFEAT

TYPE OF ACTION		X FI/CI	CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION WH Division	
	AMENDMENT NO	FIELD STATION Mexico City	
X	RENEWAL FY 1963	BRANCH WH/3	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Lee G. Norris	
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO 3 B 0003	BUILDING Hq · EXTENSION 5940

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	CLIP NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
CWH/3/Mexico	John M. Whitten					
CWH/3	Ned P. Holman NHolman	19 JUN 1962				
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter Robert D. Carter	21 JUN 1962				
WH/PO/A	Clark V. Simmons by	26 June 1962				
C/WHD for	J. C. King	26 June 1962				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
1 July 1962	30 June 1963	$ 99,000.00	19	$
			1963	$ 99,000.00

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
DDP/PG		

FORM 8-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

~~SECRET~~

19 June 1963

LIFEAT Project Renewal Request

1. It is requested that the attached LIFEAT Renewal Request be approved for the period of 1 July 1962 through 30 June 1963 in the amount of $99,000.00, all of which falls within FY 1963. $99,000.00 was programmed for FY 1963 in the WHD allocation.

2. This Project provides the Mexico City Station with a unilateral telephone tap operation which has been in existence for the past 11 years.

3. While the primary object of this Project is not the production of positive intelligence, it was in whole or in part the source of 30 positive information disseminations. In addition to this production and support of other Station operations, it provides ODENVY with information concerning the American Communist Group in Mexico.

4. Emergency recontact instructions have not been established for the agents of this Project since it is believed the operation would cease in case a situation should arise where they would be applicable.

5. No training programs for any LIFEAT personnel are anticipated during the renewal period.

6. WH Division recommends renewal of the LIFEAT Project based on the attached field request. WH Division has cut the field request from $102,193.00 to $99,000.00.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
IP/ARD/RETIRED PROJECTS UNIT
G-E-63

EXTENSION:

NO. 73-175/77 Box 30

DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/1/FI 3E05				Please attach Basic to the attached doc. Basic is still classified to file #50-6-32/1 per IP/file -
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11. RETURN TO: IP/ARD/RETIRED PROJECTS UNIT				per our [illegible] - we have retired volumes dating back thru 60-61 so we don't have the document here. WH/1/FI (our files date back to 1969)
12. G-E-63 [illegible]				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROJECT REVIEW AND PROJECT OUTLINE (PARTS I AND II)

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT CASE OFFICER Jeremy L. NIARCOS

STATION MEXICO CITY CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. CURTIS

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # [illegible]
Box: [illegible] Fold: 6

[redacted]

ENCL - 1 - HMMA - 19129 1 Jun 62

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

[redacted]

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT REVIEW

I. Product of the Project

A. Soviet Coverage

As noted in last year's Project LIFEAT renewal request, LIFEAT coverage of the official Soviet installation was discontinued on 22 June 1960 when the parallel liaison project LIENVOY assumed coverage of this target. In early January 1962 LIFEAT undertook coverage of the home phones of three of the most active Soviet Intelligence officers. This was in response to the continuing Station CI program which includes the monitoring of Soviet contacts, and the guidance received from KUDESK Staff at the time of the last LIFEAT renewal. As of this date, this coverage has not been active for sufficient time to fully evaluate its usefulness. However, it is believed that such coverage has the potential to add materially to the Station's effort in the CI field. Although not designed to provide positive intelligence, some by-product of this type has been obtained. Samples are as follows:

HMM-6364, 8 May 1962 (Briefing of Mexican Pro-Marxist Journalist by Soviet Embassy)
HMM-6382, 15 May 1962 (Mexican Traveller to the USSR)
HMM-6376, 11 May 1962 (Refutation of Rumors that Soviet Cosmonaut TITOV will visit Mexico)

B. Polish Embassy

LIFEAT has remained the primary source of information on this target and the only successful, continuing penetration of the target. The information provided to the interested Case Officer has in the past been described as "unique" and "invaluable". This description holds with equal emphasis for the present as well as the past. Selective examples of the valuable positive intelligence product of this coverage are:

HMMA-17448, 28 July 1961 (Henryk POTASZ)
HMMA-17647, (LIFEAT/LAURICLE), 25 August 1961
HMMA-17694, 1 September 1961 (Irena Halina ZORAWSKA)
HMMA-17876, 29 September 1961 (Movement of Polish Nationals)

[redacted]

ENCL. -1- HMMA-19129

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

[redacted]

HMMA-18058, 27 October 1961 (Satellite Trade in Mexico)
HMMA-18074, 31 October 1961 (Activities of Polish Embassies in Mexico and Brazil)
HMMA-18913, 27 April 1962 (RYBAT/Eugeniusz SKOTNICKI)
HMMA-18915, 27 April 1962 (RYBAT/Eugeniusz SKOTNICKI)
HMM-5743, 7 July 1961 (Possible Purchase of Ships from Poland)
HMM-5894, 14 September 1961 (Trade Between Mexico and Poland)
HMM-5921, 26 September 1961 (Polish Plans to Buy Zinc from Mexico)

C. Cuban Coverage

LIFEAT was able to provide coverage of major firms dealing in U.S. goods transshipment via Mexico to Cuba. This technical operation not only provided initial leads which alerted the Station to these companies, but also was able to provide continuing information on the daily activities of the companies involved. Coverage of certain Cuban personages arranging for illegal transshipment of U.S. goods to Cuba was also provided including their contacts and general activities. Samples of the positive intelligence production from this Cuban commercial coverage are as follows:

HMMA-18073, 31 October 1961 (Ruben SAUREZ Y Alvarez, Representative in Mexico of the Cuban Bank of Foreign Commerce)
HMMA-18538, 2 February 1962 (Cuban Commercial Activities)
HMM-5883, 26 September 1961 (Cuban Commercial Activities)
HMM-5915, 22 September 1961 (Transcontinental, S.A.)
HMM-6012, 14 November 1961 (Mexican Firm Shipping U.S. Goods to Cuba)
HMM-6220, 27 February 1962 (Lorenzo L. SAUNDERS, Vice President of Transcontinental, S.A.)

D. American Communists in Mexico

As in the past, most of the targets in this group have been covered at the request of ODENVY, and the raw take has been partially processed by them. During the period July 1961 through May 1962, approximately 680 reels of take were passed to local ODENVY for their processing. The most valuable information gleaned from the targets in this field continues to deal with contacts, travel, and general activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM).

[redacted]

[redacted]

Typical examples of the reporting based on LIFEAT coverage of the ACGM are:

HMMA-17318, 3 July 1961 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-17388, 14 July 1961 (Enos Regnet WICHER, Maria WICHER)
HMMA-17389, 14 July 1961 (Carl SEBORER)
HMMA-17419, 21 July 1961 (Clarina OVERGAARD, Anders OVERGAARD)
HMMA-17455, 25 July 1961 (Dalton TRUMBO, Cleo TRUMBO)
HMMA-17611, 18 August 1961 (Noah SEBORER/Albert MALTZ/ Charles SMALL)
HMMA-17760, 12 September 1961 (Maurice ZEITLIN)
HMMA-17806, 19 September 1961 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-17855, 26 September 1961 (U.S. Citizens Travel to Cuba)
HMMA-17860, 29 September 1961 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-18097, 3 November 1961 (Charles SMALL)
HMMA-18492, 23 January 1962 (Albert MALTZ/Noah SEBORER/ Charles SMALL)
HMMA-18827, 10 April 1962 (Albert MALTZ/Noah SEBORER/ Charles SMALL)

E. Exile and Revolutionary Activities

LIFEAT continues to provide information on the exile and revolutionary groups active in Mexico, which information is of the greatest value to the Station and not available from other sources. The emphasis of the LIFEAT effort in this area has been directed toward coverage of Nicaraguan, Guatemalan, and more recently Spanish Republican exiles. The product has been most rewarding in this coverage. Examples of productivity in this past project year:

HMMA-17489, 4 August 1961 (Alejandro GALINDO)
HMMA-18420, 5 January 1962 (Teodora MARTEN Rodriguez)
HMMA-18468, 16 January 1962 (Travel of Salvadorans to Cuba)
HMM-5920, 26 September 1961 (Activities of Nicaraguan Exiles in Mexico)
HMM-6142, 18 January 1962 (Plans of Guatemalan Army Officers to Attempt Coup)
HMM-6191, 17 February 1962 (Guatemalan Revolutionary Activity)
HMM-6230, 2 March 1962 (Contacts of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo in Mexico City)
HMM-6292, 2 April 1962 (Return to El Salvador of Colonel Oscar OSORIO)
HMM-6311, 13 April 1962 (Contacts of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo)

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

HMM-6344, 1 May 1962 (Activities of Spanish Republicans in Exile)
HMM-6349, 4 May 1962 (Views of Juan Jose AREVALO on Peruvian Presidential Candidate)
HMM-6359, 4 May 1962 (Contact Between Claudio SANCHEZ de Albornoz, President of the Council of Spanish Republic, and Juan Simeon VIDARTE, Spanish Exile in Mexico)
HMM-6379, 11 May 1962 (Opinion of Spanish Republican Exiles on Current Strikes in Spain)

F. Counter-Intelligence Information

By its latest Related Mission Directive, Mexico City Station's major responsibilities continue to lie in the field of CI/CE matters. LIFEAT was able to provide a valuable contribution in the attainment of the Station's objectives in this field. Coverage included that on Carlos Humberto ILLESCAS, who is acting in a covert liaison capacity between the CP and the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Besides the continuing operational support in the CI/CE field, the following informational reporting was provided:

HMM-5742, 7 July 1961 (Travel of Mexican Leftists Behind Iron Curtain)
HMM-5836, 18 August 1961 (Activities of Mexican Student of the University of Peoples' Friendship)
HMM-5977, 24 October 1961 (Interview of Prominent Marxist with Polish Conselor)
HMM-6322, 20 April 1962 (Contacts between Carlos FUENTES Macias, Mexican Communist Writer, and Polish Diplomats)
HMM-6337, 27 April 1962 (Activities of Ernesto AYALA Mercado, Bolivian Ambassador to Mexico)
HMM-6377, 11 May 1962 (Scholarship for Study in Warsaw to Jorge TAMAYO, Jr., Mexican Marxist Intellectual)

G. Operational Support and Leads Provided other Station Operations

During the past project year LIFEAT continued actively supporting Mexico City Station through production of leads unobtainable through other assets and generally providing other Station operations the secure support only available through a unilateral telephone tap operation. The following is a selected list, together with a brief description, of major contributions of operational support and leads provided through LIFEAT:

[redacted]

LIFEAT/Cuban: The most noteworthy LIFEAT contribution to Station efforts in the Cuban operations field was that of providing leads pinpointing the activities of Transcontinental, S.A. in the illegal transshipment of U.S. materials to Cuba via Mexico. LIFEAT was able to continue coverage of the activities of this company despite the efforts of the company to lose itself in the Mexican business community by changing the name it operated under to Inversiones Mexicanas, S.A. and changing its location and telephone number. Valuable information on the commercial commodities needed by the Castro regime, methods and contacts used in their procurement, and information on the contacts of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico were obtained.

LIFEAT/Czechoslovakian: LIFEAT coverage of the home phones of two Czech intelligence officers provided some leads to their contacts, but more importantly, provided greater security to KUBARK when one of their CIS officers, Miloslav CECH, was singled out for a defection attempt. Through LIFEAT "livemonitoring" of both the original and followup defection attempts, the KUBARK assets were provided maximum protection from possible attempts by CECH to alert his coworkers or arrange entrapment of the KUBARK personnel involved.

LIFEAT/Polish: Probably the most "classic" example of the use of a telephone tap in providing a lead which could develop into a vital penetration of the Polish intelligence occurred recently in the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation. LIFEAT provided the initial leads which made the Station aware of the possibilities of an operation and has continued to provide vital information for Station's development of the operation. It is the Station's opinion that this one instance of service by LIFEAT was well worth the cost of the entire project for the year. (Full information forwarded in MEXI 0462 and MEXI 0463). Also of great interest to the Station were the LIFEAT provided leads which revealed Jan SLUSARZ, Attache of the Polish Embassy in Mexico, had purchased an automobile which had been stolen in the U.S. and driven to Mexico. In this operation, in which a defection attempt was considered, LIFEAT provided not only the initial leads, but also daily operational information vital to the Station's efforts in this case.

LIFEAT/Yugoslavian: In this coverage of the Yugoslavian Embassy LIFEAT is providing the basic data necessary in establishing operations against this target. Since the Station is expanding its coverage of Yugoslavian activities, much vital data on personalities, contacts, and services obtained by the target establishment must be provided. It is this exact type of coverage that LIFEAT is geared to provide in addition to the operational leads which will be forthcoming as this coverage progresses. The interested case officer, noting LIFEAT is his only present source of information, feels the take which LIFEAT provides and will

[redacted]

continue to provide in this area is vital and basic to the mounting of any operations against the Yugoslav target.

LIFEAT/Soviet/Double Agent: LIFEAT support has provided needed supporting information in backing Station double agent operations. In this area the success of the operation is obviously dependent upon the veracity of the agent. LIFEAT provides information which enables the interested case officer to determine the veracity of the agent involved. LIFEAT also provides a needed check upon the activities of the double agent.

LIFEAT/Spanish Republican: LIFEAT coverage of Spanish Republican exiles in Mexico City have enabled the Station to monitor the activities of the various groupings of the exiles, including the projected attempt on the life of the senior ODACID official in Mexico. LIFEAT has covered personalities of exile factions both involved in planning this attempt and those opposed to it. Coverage of targets in this area also enables the Station to keep abreast of the plans and activities of the various groups which make up the Spanish Republican exile community in Mexico City.

LIFEAT/CI-CE Coverage: LIFEAT leads in this area are exploited in the reporting of travel of important Communists, particularly to Cuba and Iron Curtain countries, and the travel of U.S. citizens, especially Communists and Leftists, to Cuba. Through coverage of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) LIFEAT has provided ODENVY with an increasing amount of information on the leftist activities of relatives and friends of the ACGM who reside in the U.S. One of the noteable items in this regard is providing data on the overt and covert efforts of the blacklisted "Hollywood Ten" to regain their former status in the U.S. film industry.

Finally, and certainly not of least importance, Station security has been enhanced through LIFEAT periodic coverage of former Station assets, like LIVESTOCK-1 and LIVESTOCK-2, who could be a danger to particular Station operations or personnel. Monitoring of certain terminated agents is considered especially valuable where these agents were involved in the more sensitive operations.

H. Conclusion

It is the opinion of the Mexico City Station that the support provided other Station operations, the CI/CE information and leads, and the ability of the unilateral LIFEAT operation to cover sensitive targets without revealing Station interest

[redacted]

[redacted]

to the liaison forces, well justify the expenditure of funds, time, personnel, and security risk. As it has been noted in the past, that even with the Station's envolvement in the parallel, but liaison, LIENVOY operation, a change in attitude by the present local government administration or a change in government administrations could end KUBARK participation in that liaison project. For that reason, LIFEAT, in addition to maintaining its present heavy coverage, must be available to once again undertake coverage of the official Soviet and Czech official targets in Mexico City. Therefore, LIFEAT's present orientation, though toward supporting Station operations and CI/CE mission rather than toward targets which would provide positive intelligence, leaves it readily available for recall into the Soviet-Czech coverage. It is the Station's firm opinion that the LIFEAT project provides a substantial and vital contribution in fulfilling the several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

I. There is attached a list of the HMMs produced from LIFEAT provided material during the period July 1961 through May 1962 as a by-product of the project's prime responsibility of providing support to Station operations.

II. Progress of the Operation

The objectives of the LIFEAT Project are of a continuing nature and are therefore not considered for fulfillment during any given period of time. For this reason percentage figures as to completion of project objectives cannot be drawn. However, an indication of the coverage provided in working toward fulfillment of the objectives can be noted in that 14,000 pages of raw text were produced in the period July 1961 through May 1962. LIFEAT has been in daily operation during the review period with the average number of lines covered per month being 20, with a high in March 1962 of 28 lines covered.

III. Planning for the Future

As was indicated at the time of the last project renewal, LIFEAT hopes to remain uncommitted to coverages that require the expenditure of a great portion of LIFEAT resources but provide coverage of but one target...such as Soviet Embassy coverage. It is added emphatically, however, that should the need arise for LIFEAT to again assume such responsibilities, it is fully able to do so. Until such time LIFEAT will continue to enjoy greater flexibility in the employment of its assets, especially in the areas in which the Station does not wish to reveal its interest or operations to the liaison forces involved in the LIENVOY operation.

As to particular areas of operations, the Station has hopes of employing LIFEAT assets in "hot mike operations which require access to telephone

[redacted]

centrals and cables. The feasibility of using LIFEAT in this type of operation has already been proven, in a recent operation with the LIERODE installation as a target. Seven reels of "hot mike" take were obtained in test runs on checking both the operation (including installation of the "miked" instrument in the office of the head of the LIERODE official installation) and the equipment which was of radical design and conceived and built by the KURIOT technician assigned to Mexico City Station under deep cover. Unfortunately, before continuous operation could get underway, the LIERODE installation decided upon complete renovation of its telephone system, including the installation of a switchboard. This, at least temporarily, precludes further operation against this particular target, unless a direct line is installed there. However, it is the intention of the Station to attempt coverage of other targets of interest. In these plans LIFEAT plays the key role in installation, line and series cross maintenance, basehouse procurement and maintenance, and processing of take. From the brief test runs via the LIERODE operation noted above, it is believed that "hot mike" operations, supported and maintained by LIFEAT, can greatly aid the Station in its coverage of responsibilities under its present Related Mission Directive.

IV. Performance of Agents

The overall performance of all agents employed in the LIFEAT complex continued to be good during the period of the project review, with security being stressed in all phases of the operation. No security problems were encountered which were not solved by the personnel involved. Since the success of the LIFEAT operation depends largely upon the security of its personnel, Headquarters clearances and evaluation of new personnel will continue to be sought on those new additions who pass a strict field assessment.

V. Expenditures

Approval for renewal of Project LIFEAT was granted 8 September 1961 for FY 1962 in the amount of $98,973.03. The proposed budget for FY 1953 is broken down in the attached Field Project Outline Renewal Request, Part II, and totals ~~$102,168.00.~~ ~~95,993.00~~ 94,000.00

VI. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those noted in the project outline submitted herewith and in the individuals contracts and oral agreements (memoranda of oral agreements were forwarded as necessary) of the various LIFEAT personnel.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Even now with the shift of operational emphasis to Station operations support, it is thought significant to include a list of HMM's produced through April 1962 (10 months of the project year) as a by-product in the LIFEAT operation.

HMM 5742
HMM 5743
HMM 5836
HMM 5883
HMM 5894
HMM 5915
HMM 5920
HMM 5921
HMM 5960
HMM 5975
HMM 5977
HMM 5985
HMM 5987
HMM 6012
HMM 6015
HMM 6142
HMM 6162
HMM 6191

HMM 6220
HMM 6230
HMM 6266
HMM 6292
HMM 6311
HMM 6322
HMM 6337
HMM 6340
HMM 6344
HMM 6349
HMM 6359
HMM 6364
HMM 6376
HMM 6377
HMM 6379
HMM 6382
HMM 6390

[redacted]

[redacted]

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART I

1. Area of Operations

This operation is run from Mexico City Station and is concerned with targets located within Mexico City.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to provide, unilaterally, daily information on the activities of official foreign installations in Mexico and the personnel thereof, as well as coverage of the activities of selected individuals and groups in response to both Station needs and Headquarters requests. Presently, LIFEAT stresses flexibility of coverage with support of Station operations and CI/CE coverage receiving the greatest emphasis.

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was originated on 3 October 1950 as a unilateral telephone tap operation. Actual initiation of operations under this authority occurred on 18 January 1951, and the operation has run continuously from that date. The project was opened with the installation of a single tap and has grown in the past eleven years to coverage of as many as thirty lines in a given month.

The LIFEAT Project is a unilateral operation completely independent from any liaison arrangement. It is staffed by KUBARK contract employees with the majority of personnel being indigenous controlled agents.

During the past eleven years, Project LIFEAT has produced more than 83,500 (estimate) pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of Mexico City Station's specific objectives, and contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Soviet-Satellite Bloc and more recently with the Cuban representatives in Mexico. In addition, LIFEAT has been of considerable value in monitoring the activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM), as well as the activities of the exile groups and local Communists.

[redacted]

[redacted]

With the LIENVOY's assumption of coverage of the Soviet and Czechoslovakian official installations in July 1960, LIFEAT assets were released from continuous coverage of these two targets. These assets were then employed in direct support of Station operations--a role ideally suited for a unilateral operation such as LIFEAT, and extremely important to the security and success of Station operations. LIFEAT, after spending much of Project Year 1961 - 1962 programing to this new role and redirecting its assets, has now adjusted to this role and is fully employed in this vital assignment.

4. References

a. HMMA-17199, 12 June 1961 (LIFEAT Renewal Request for FY 1962)
b. HMMW-10085, 14 September 1961 (Approval of LIFEAT Renewal for FY 1962)

5. Objectives

a. To identify Soviet and satellite intelligence personnel in Mexico and to provide information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information of the Satellite officials both as to their activities as well as information of biographic nature.

c. To support specific Station operations, especially in the recruitment, defection, Communist Party penetration and counter-intelligence fields.

d. To collect information on prominent Mexican Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

e. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexican, active in Mexico, and to identify them and their associates and activities.

f. To collect information on exile groups and individuals active in Mexico.

g. To provide coverage of targets of opportunity in Mexico City in support of Station objectives and Headquarters' requests.

6. Targets

For objectives a and b:

a. Selected Soviet intelligence officers home phones.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. Selected Satellite officials office and home phones.

c. Selected private phones being used by known and suspected Satellite intelligence personnel.

For objective c:

d. Selected telephones as requested by Station Case Officers in support of their going and/or projected operations.

For objective d:

e. Telephone conversations from residences of senior Communists and pro-Communists.

For objective e:

f. Telephone conversations from residences of known American Communists residing in Mexico City.

For objective f:

g. Telephone conversations from the residences or offices of prominent exile leaders or their contacts in Mexico City.

For objective g:

h. Telephone conversations which can be monitored from targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Jeremy L. NIARCOS

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT personnel.

b. Maintain awareness of and provide direction in all matters pertaining to the operational management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of special operational phases of LIFEAT coverages.

[redacted]

[redacted]

d. Coordinate information received from the LIFEAT coverage with other Station operations, and coordinate as necessary with the Station personnel responsible for the parallel LIENVOY operation.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operations.

8. Coordination

a. Information produced by LIFEAT, primarily a Station operational support asset, is closely coordinated with other operations of the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other geographical area, but they are advised of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LINOG which supports the principal "outside" Case Officer, David M. WILSTED, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT.

c. Coordination with the parallel, but liaison project - LIENVOY, is closely coordinated between the responsible Case Officers of both projects, particularly relating to the division of coverage between the two operations, thereby assuring that the unilateral LIFEAT operation will not be endangered by the indigenous personnel of the LIENVOY operation.

9. Personnel

a. Career and Contract Agents

(1) David M. WILSTED (201-009195), principal "outside" Case Officer.
(2) Wayne C. DRABAND (201-255095), outside assistant to David M. WILSTED. DRABAND was introduced into the LIFEAT operation in November 1961 as a replacement for Ralph B. RAFANELLI who was transferred from Mexico PCS in the fall of 1961. His OA was amended 14 November 1961 to cover his use in the LIFEAT Project. Although DRABAND possessed only limited knowledge of clandestine activity when first employed, under WILSTED's instruction and Case Officer guidance, plus his own willingness and capacity for work, it appears he will prove a valuable addition to the LIFEAT complex.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(3) LIEMBRACE-8 (201-111616) has been introduced to the LIFEAT operation as a standby technician backup to WILSTED, but will be actively employed in the operation only in the event of WILSTED's prolonged absence or incapacity. If and when such action is necessary, LIEMBRACE will then be carried under Project LIFEAT. LIEMBRACE-8's OA was amended to reflect this assignment on 7 April 1962.

(4) Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (201-117968), LIFEAT processor/translator and former basehousekeeper who can be temporarily reassigned basehousekeeping duties.

(5) Olga A. PARFINIK (201-117978), LIFEAT processor/translator. OA for LIFEAT employment dated 28 September 1954.

b. Field Agents

(1) LIFEUD-1, OA granted 17 October 1950 (201-182704)
(2) LIFEUD-2, OA granted 14 August 1951 (201-117971)
(3) LIFEUD-3, OA granted 14 December 1953 (201-117971)
(4) LIFEUD-4, OA granted 1 October 1953 (201-117743)
(5) LIFEUD-5, OA granted 16 December 1953 (201-117744)
(6) LIFEUD-6, OA granted 28 September 1954 (201-117978)
(7) LIFEUD-7, OA granted 21 October 1954 (201-117980)
(8) LIFEUD-8, OA granted 31 March 1955 (201-119521)
(9) LIFEUD-9, OA granted 27 April 1956 (201-117984)
(10) LIFEUD-10. OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-114085)
(11) LIFEUD-11. OA granted 21 August 1956 (201-113595)
(12) LIFEUD-12, OA granted 6 August 1956 (201-113569)
(13) LIFEUD-13. OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-115833)
(14) LIFEUD-14. OA granted 26 September 1956 (201-117972)
(15) LIFEUD-15. OA granted 19 January 1957 (201-126315)
(16) LIFEUD-16. OA granted 2 July 1958 (201-222786)
(17) LIFEUD-17, OA granted 13 August 1956 (201-114086)
(18) LIFEUD-18. OA granted 2 October 1957 (201-185370)
(19) LIFEUD-19. OA granted 18 May 1960 (201-262488)
(20) LIFEUD-22. (formerly LILILLY-1), amendment of OA requested 24 April 1962 (201-288248)
(21) LIFEUD-23. (formerly LILILLY-2), amendment of OA requested 24 April 1962, (201-305604)

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. During the past project year the following personnel were dropped from Project LIFEAT:

(1) Ralph B. RAFANELLI (201-176295), staff agent, was reassigned PCS after completing his second tour in Mexico on 8 October 1961.

(2) Olivia N. GLADMON (201-117751), LIFEAT processor, has given notice that due to her planned return to the United States for necessary eye surgery during June 1962, her employment with LIFEAT must be terminated. Agent quit-claim and secrecy agreement have been executed.

(3) Leona C. GANDARA (201-225710), employed by LIFEAT only for standby support during the past year and one half, now is employed for support and clerical work for MKCHARITY.

(4) LIFEUD-20, (formerly LIMITATION-5), (201-102308), and LIFEUD-21, formerly LIMITATION-6 (201-117981) will be terminated as of the end of the present LIFEAT project year (30 June 1962). Plans for use of this couple as basehousekeepers were cancelled when LIFEUD-22 and LIFEUD-23, who are more desirable choices, became available for LIFEAT use. Termination has been discussed fully with these indigenous agents, and termination arrangements were accomplished on a friendly and mutually agreeable basis (as in all LIFEAT terminations, separation is made on the basis of Mexican custom and/or law).

10. Operational Clearances

See Section 9 above.

11. Cover

There are no changes in the cover of personnel who have been previously employed in the LIFEAT operation. With the new agents employed since the last project renewal, cover is as follows:

[redacted]

[redacted]

a. Wayne C. DRABAND has natural cover of a retired U.S. civil servant presently in Mexico with his wife, an employee of a U.S. government agency.

b. LIEMBRACE-8 has natural cover of a retired U.S. businessman of many years residence in Mexico City.

c. LIFEUD-22 has natural cover of a Cuban exile employed by a Mexican firm in Mexico City. He works regular hours at his cover employment and partakes in LIFEAT activities before and after work and during lunch hours.

d. LIFEUD-23, the mother of LIFEUD-22, has natural cover of housekeeper for her son and performs her LIFEAT duties only in their home.

12. Contact and Communications

Daily contact is maintained between the Case Officer and the agents employed in the project. These contacts are made in a clandestine manner with varying patterns established for car pickups, foot contacts, and emergency meetings. Pre-arranged signals are employed in setting and accomplishing the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, meetings are held at night. Entrance to the basehouses by other than the basehousekeepers is made only on the basis of strict necessity; such as need for equipment repair, installation for new line coverages, or line coverage cut off.

Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a minimum. Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents. Alternate and emergency communications have been arranged and are reviewed frequently by the personnel using them.

These systems of contact and communication appear suitable for the project and function adequately from the security and utility standpoints. Locations and times of meetings are reviewed periodically and are changed frequently to decrease the possibility of arousing the suspicions of the residents of areas in which meetings are held.

[redacted]

[redacted]

13. Control and Motivation

Control and motivation are primarily based on two factors: ideology and financial gain. A secondary factor is the fear of reprisal from the local police should discovery occur.

14. Security

During the past project year there were no incidents which were beyond the capability of the personnel immediately involved to isolate and remedy immediately. In contrast to previous years, there was no instance of telephone work crews approaching a basehouse to check or remove the tap lines running to that basehouse. Some of the "crosses" made in the telephone centrals have been removed by the central's workmen, but these are of no danger to the operation unless a full investigation is made of one of these unusual connections. During the past project years no such investigation has been undertaken, and no suspicion of the LIFEAT linemen has been revealed to date.

As for the past few years the telephone company is continuing its efforts toward modernization of the Mexico City telephone system. This effort includes changing from overhead lines to underground cables, cleaning off of the unused overhead "dead lines" and installation of new equipment throughout the city. These innovations will continue to cause security problems for the LIFEAT complex, but it is believed that these problems are not insurmountable. To meet this challange to LIFEAT security and to prepare for the day when access to telephone distribution lines is further reduced by their placement in underground cables, LIFEAT has recently succeeded in having one of its linemen (LIFEUD-2) selected to attend a four month special course in cable work. When he completes this course (in July 1962), LIFEUD-2 will have working access to all cableways and cable termination boards in Mexico City. This access will be invaluable from both the present security and operational standpoints as well as for the future when LIFEAT will be forced to tap directly from the underground telephone cables. As a standard procedure the LIFEAT personnel continuously work to devise new methods to increase security, as well as train in security procedures, so as to continue the high level of security enjoyed by LIFEAT in the past.

15. Training

Initial training of new personnel and continuing refresher training for the experienced personnel are handled primarily by the "outside" case officer, David M. WILSTED. Minor repair and maintenance of equipment as well as emergency security procedures are stressed and continually reviewed with the agents.

[redacted]

16. Equipment and Support

As noted in last year's renewal request, LIFEAT equipment is generally old and much of it is now obsolete. With funds provided in last year's renewal, LIFEAT (within the past month) has begun to acquire some new equipment, particularly audio recorders. A review of the equipment situation in the LIFEAT setup has convinced both WILSTED and the responsible Case Officer that a near-complete modernization program of the equipment used in LIFEAT must be undertaken during the coming project year. The local KURIOT technician has on a number of ocassions expressed his amazement at the superior product produced by LIFEAT with the outmoded and ancient equipment (in terms of use hours) which the LIFEAT complex had to rely on. Therefore, with the funds requested in Part II of this renewal request, LIFEAT should be completely equipped with adequate gear, particularly audio and dial tape recorders, by the expiration of FY 1963. Admittedly, there is involved large, one-time expenses in complete replacement of such expensive items during a single project year. However, it is a necessary move, due entirely to great wear borne by the equipment. This wear is now causing such a rash of breakdowns that the outside principal agent must spend a disproportionate amount of his time in maintenance work.

17. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951, and as a vital Station operational support asset, it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

[redacted]

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART II

18. Estimated Costs

3

The following are the estimated costs for Fiscal Year 1962. All figures are U.S. dollars per year ($US 1.00 equals 12.50 Mexican pesos). Changes in estimated costs for particular items will be noted. These reflect not only the continued inflationary trend in the Mexican economy, but also the shift in operational emphasis from prime coverage of Soviet/Satellite activities to support of Station operations. In this latter case particular line coverage is of shorter duration, causing greater expense in installation and removal of tap lines and crosses. In the agent salary category total expense in contract agent salaries has been reduced somewhat, due primarily to dropping certain contract agents, while expenses for field agent category has risen, due to the granting during past project year of long overdue salary raises to all but three LIFEAT field agents.

a. Salaries

(1) Career and contract agents

David M. WILSTED (GS-12 equivalent) no expenses included in Project LIFEAT as he is supported entirely by Project LINOG		
Wayne C. DRABAND	$ 5,300	
LIEMBRACE-8 (since this agent is not used actively in LIFEAT, and is carried only as standby technician while employed under MKCHARITY he will continue to be funded out of other appropriate project.)		
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER	5,400	
Olga A. PARFINIK	4,500	
Replacement for Olivia N. GLADMON	3,600	
		$18,800

(2) Field Agents

LIFEUD-1	5,860
LIFEUD-2	2,750
LIFEUD-3	1,960

[redacted]

LIFEUD-4	2,115	
LIFEUD-5	3,650	
LIFEUD-6	3,500	
LIFEUD-7	2,640	
LIFEUD-8	2,785	
LIFEUD-9	2,115	
LIFEUD-10 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-11 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-12 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-13 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-14	3,650	
LIFEUD-15	845	
LIFEUD-16	1,585	
LIFEUD-17 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-18 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-19	1,500	
LIFEUD-22	2,400	
LIFEUD-23	1,800	
LIFEUD-1's assistant	160	
Christmas bonus (in accordance with local custom, this amounts to one month's pay) and gifts where necessary	4,100	
		$43,415

b. Basehouse Rentals

ANNEX III	2,688	
ANNEX IV	2,760	
ANNEX VI	2,500	
ANNEX VII	1,728	
ANNEX VIII	3.072	
ANNEX IX	2,880	
ANNEX to replace ANNEX I	2,000	
c. Basehouse utilities and expenses	2,000	
d. Allowance for customary rental increase when lease renewed	1,200	
		$20,828
e. Purchase of new recorders and dial tape recorder for necessary replacement/modernization	12,250	

ENCL -1- HMMA-19129

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

f. Local purchase of replacement parts, wire, expendable supplies (as paper, paper tape, carbon paper, typewriter ribbons, wrapping paper, manila envelopes) and emergency and special equipment	800	
		$13,050

g. Transportation

QP car used by DRABAND	500	
LIFEUD-7, car rent	500	
LIFEUD-8, car rent	500	
LIFEUD-14, car rent	300	
ZINSMEISTER mileage	300	
		$ 2,100

h. Miscellaneous ops expenses (included loss of rent deposits, fund for medical expenses and/or fatalities, termination payments *, bribes, expenses involved in moving and setting up basehouses, and expenses of covering targets of opportunity.)	~~4,000~~ ~~800.00~~ 807.00	
GRAND TOTAL		~~$102,193~~ ~~98,193~~ 99,001.00

NOTE: Station programed LIFEAT at $US 105,948 for FY 1963.

* All terminations of indigenous personnel will be in accordance with Mexican law and will include lump sum separation settlement, transportation and moving expense payments, and any bonus due at the time of the termination.

ENCL. -1- HMMA - 19129

CS COPY

50-6-32/11

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRE~~T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-10085, 14 Sept 1961

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1962. Please forward renewal request to arrive in Headquarters no later than 1 June.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
  2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED 3 April 1962	DATE DISPATCHED 6 - APR 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-10563

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	Sara Prosser	nr	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
C/WHD	4 APR 1962	J. C. KING	10563

ROUTING	INITIAL
1 - WH/3/Mexi/Chrono	
RID/AN	
[illegible]	
~~[illegible]~~	
~~[illegible]~~	
WH/3M	
[illegible]	

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information only

REFERENCE : HMM-A-17199, 12 June 1961

1. The LIFEAT Project was renewed on 8 September 1961.

2. LIFEAT Project was approved for $98,973. Please note that this means a cut of $12,700 from the Station's original request for $111,673. The cut at Headquarters was made for several reasons: 1) to fall within the approved programed figure of $99,000; 2) during FY 1961 only approximately $81,000 was obligated and since no expansion was planned, an increase of almost $30,000 could not be justified; 3) to keep the approving authority within KUDOVE.

The cuts were made in the following places:

	Station request	Approved
Equipment:		
Local purchase	$ 2,500	$1,800
New equipment	4,500	2,500
Other Ops expenses	15,000	5,000

3. KUTUBE and KUDESK Staffs concurred in recommending renewal. KUTUBE/D remarked that the project included coverage of highly selective KUTUBE/D interests through technical means and stated that the project provided several items of operational interest not otherwise obtainable, as well as operational leads and background data useful in target assessment. KUDESK Staff reiterated that coverage should continue to be given to carefully selected known or suspect Soviet/Satellite agents in support of the Station's intensified KUDESK type program.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
14 Sept. 1961

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMM-W-10085

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mex/Chrono

D.K.

WH/3/Mexico

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C. L. Bustos-Videla	mrd	3162

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. King

DISPATCH

~~SECRET~~

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT LIFEAT	☐ CA ☒ FI/CI	☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDY ☒ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION WH
	AMENDMENT	
X	RENEWAL	BRANCH WH/3
	TERMINATION	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	
	OTHER	CASE OFFICER: C. Bustos-Videla EXTENSION: 3162

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY C/-DD/P	TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED $ 90,973	FY 1962 196	AMOUNT $90,973
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1961 TO 30 June 1962	FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL	2135-7001-5906	

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE DDP/PG	DATE 11 SEP 1961

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	~~1~~	~~SSA-DD/S~~	1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1	CASE OFFICER	2	DDP/PG

FORM 5-60 849 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~

(5)

14-00000

SECRET

PROJECT ACTION

LIFEAT

TYPE OF ACTION		
☐ NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION WHD	
☐ AMENDMENT NO	FIELD STATION Mexico City	
☒ RENEWAL FY 1962	BRANCH 3	DESK Mexico
☐ EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Charlotte Bustos-Videla	
☐ TERMINATION	ROOM NO 1015	BUILDING Barton Hall	EXTENSION 3162

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
AC/WH/3/Mexico	Steware D. Burton					
C/WH/3	Ned P. Holman					
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter					
WH/PO/A	John G. Reyn					
C/WHD	J. C. King					

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
1 July 1961	30 June 1962	$ 98,973	1962	$ 98,973.00
			196	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
DDP/PG/FI/Proj		

FORM 6-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~

(5)

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1961 through 30 June 1962 for a total of $98,974. This project has been programmed for $99,000 and funds are available in WH Division for FY 1962. During the last fiscal year approximately $81,000 was obligated.

2. No training programs for any LIFEAT personnel are anticipated for the renewal period.

3. Any number of emergency conditions could be listed which might affect the smooth running of this operation. Among them would be the break in diplomatic relations or hot war between Mexico and the United States or the discovery of this unilateral asset by the Mexican Government. Emergency recontact instructions have not been established for the agents of this project since it seems likely that the operation would cease in case of such conditions and the agents would be of no further value.

4. This project was the source of 128 intelligence reports during the past year, 85 of which were disseminated. The remainder were used for Headquarters background only since the information was either partially previously reported, overt, or of no interest to customer agencies. The following evaluations were received:

"Mexican Technicians Going to Work in Cuba" - State Department said this report was of moderate importance and that the information was new and useful.

"Nicaraguan Revolutionary Activities in Mexico" - State Department said that this report was of moderate importance and that the information was new and useful.

"Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico" - State Department said that this report was of moderate importance and useful as new information. USIA commented that the same report was of major importance.

"Mexican Government Purchase of Soviet Radioisotopes" - OSI reported that this dissemination was of little importance and that the information was already sufficiently known. ORR said that it was of moderate importance and more details were required.

"Projected Arrival in Mexico of Polish Travel Officials" - State Department said that this report was of moderate importance and the information was new and useful. They expressed a continuing interest in this type of reporting.

"New Policy of the Soviet Commercial Office in Mexico" - ORR reported that this information was new but only of moderate importance.

5. WH Division recommends renewal of the LIFEAT Project based on the field request attached. WH Division has cut the field's original request for $111,673 to $98,974.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-17190
[redacted] 1503

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/1

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
12 June 1961

SUBJECT
LIFFAT Project Renewal Request

RE: "43 I" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
As noted

REFERENCE(S)

1. Forwarded herewith and under separate cover for Headquarters processing is the LIFFAT Project Renewal Request covering FY 1962. This consists of a comprehensive review of Project LIFFAT for the period July 1960 through June 1961, and a Project Outline divided into Parts I and II.

2. It is noted that the total of funds requested for the coming project year exceeds that granted for the past year, but it is felt that the additional funds are necessary, and realistically reflect the needs of the operation.

3. It is requested that Project LIFFAT be renewed for the period July 1961 through June 1962 in the amount of $111,673.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

9 June 1961

Attachment:
Project Renewal h/w and u/s/c

Distribution:
4 - Headquarters w/4 cys att h/w and u/s/c
2 - Files

AN
AB
IN
FS
BY
DES | NED
FI
ARD

Remove from Project: [illegible]MANGO
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # [illegible]
Box: 26 Fold: 2

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

50-6-32/1

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

PROJECT REVIEW AND PROJECT OUTLINE (PARTS I AND II)

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT

CASE OFFICER Edward P. Sechen
Edward P. SECHEN

ASSISTANT CASE OFFICER
Jeremy L. NIARCOS

STATION MEXICO CITY

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

25 COPY ~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

12 June 1961

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT REVIEW

I. Product of the Project

A. Soviet Embassy

LIFEAT technical surveillance of the Soviet Embassy and Commercial Office telephone lines was discontinued on 22 June 1960 for security reasons. The withdrawal of LIFEAT from coverage of this target hinged on the 20 June 1960 suggestion by LITENSOR to Chief of Station, Mexico City, that the liaison tap operation LIENVOY undertake operations against the Soviet/Satellite targets located in Mexico City. In order not to reveal to LITENSOR that a unilateral tap operation was already providing coverage of these targets, it was necessary for the Chief of Station to agree to LIENVOY extending its coverage to include Soviet/Satellite operations. LIFEAT immediately severed its coverage of both Soviet and Polish phones so as not to jeopardize the continuing unilateral LIFEAT operation and the personnel involved therein. No security breach resulted from the switch from LIFEAT to LIENVOY coverage due largely to the thoroughness and speed of the LIFEAT personnel. LIFEAT security and compartmentation was not harmed to any degree whatever. (Note: LIFEAT again resumed coverage of the Polish Legation--now Embassy--when it developed that LIENVOY did not have the ready capacity to provide "take" from both the Czechoslovakian and Polish official installations.)

B. Polish Embassy

During the past project year, LIFEAT remained the primary source of information on this target and the only successful, continuing penetration of the target, technical or otherwise. The interested Case Officer has described the LIFEAT contribution as "unique" and "invaluable". Examples of the positive intelligence product of the LIFEAT/Polish coverage are:

HMMA-15431, 3 August 1960 (Aleksander BEKIER)
HMM-5133, 22 August 1960 (Promotion of Polish Minister in Mexico
   to Rank of Ambassador)
HMM-5144, 24 August 1960 (Polish Minister of Shipping to Attend
   Mexican Independence Celebration)
HMM-5186, 22 September 1960 (Projected Arrival in Mexico of Polish
   Travel Officials)
HMMA-15696, 28 September 1960 (Jan SLUSARZ)

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

HMMA-15722, 30 September 1960 (Piotr WASILUK's Order for Tape Recorder)
HMM-5338, 9 December 1960 (Appointments to Polish Missions in Latin America)
HMMA-16255, 11 January 1961 (Gita STERN)
HMMA-16306, 20 January 1961 (SXCORN/RYBAT)
HMMA-16467, 15 February 1961 (Possible Polish Sponsored Audio Operation)

C. Cuban Embassy

The emphasis of the LIFEAT operation during the past year has been placed on coverage of Cuban official, intelligence and propaganda activities. Direct support of Station operations in the JMZIP area has rendered immeasurable assistance to the responsible Case Officers. On various occasions LIFEAT support has involved extended periods of live-monitoring target telephones, thereby providing excellent security for Station assets taking part in sensitive operations. LIFEAT/Cuban coverage has also enabled the Station officers to check the veracity and activities of various penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy, again providing increased operational security and increased exploitation of these agent assets. Although LIFEAT has been employed primarily as an operational support asset in the Cuban area, the following are examples of the valuable and abundant positive intelligence production furnished by LIFEAT:

HMM-5044, 9 July 1960 (Oil From Mexico For Cuba)
HMMA-15499, 17 August 1960 (AMSHAD-1)
HMM-5101, 10 August 1960 (Canadian Delegates to Cuban Youth Congress)
HMM-5207, 6 October 1960 (Dissension at Cuban Embassy in Mexico)
HMM-5330, 9 December 1960 (Cuban Propaganda Activities in Mexico)
HMM-5398, 4 January 1961 (Activities of Prensa Latina, Cuban News Agency)
HMM-5541, 17 March 1961 (Cuban Commercial Activities in Mexico)
HMM-5573, 7 April 1961 (Cuban Request for Mexican Co-sponsorship of UN Resolution)
HMM-5592, 19 April 1961 (Recruitment of Mexican Technicians to Work in Cuba)
HMM-5613, 28 April 1961 (Collection of Medicines for Shipment to Cuba)
HMM-5627, 3 May 1961 (Links Between Cuban Embassy and Pro-Cuba Demonstrations in Mexico City)
HMMA-17001, 12 May 1961 (Travel of U.S. Citizens to Cuba
HMM-5647, 17 May 1961 (Visit of Cuban Petroleum Technicians to Mexico)

D. American Communists in Mexico

As in the past, most of the targets in this group have been covered at the request of ODENVY, and the production has been partially processed by them. During the period July 1960 through May 1961, approximately 280 reels of raw "take" were passed to local ODENVY for their processing. The most valuable information gleaned from coverage of the targets in this field continues to deal with contacts, travel, and activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM). The following is a sample of the reporting based on the LIFEAT coverage provided in this area during the past project year:

HMMA-15467, 10 August 1960 (Travel of Noah SEBORER and Family)
HMMA-15481, 12 August 1960 (Marianne de PERALTA (nee YAMPOLSKY)
HMMA-15917, 9 November 1960 (Berthe Neham SMOLIKOFF)
HMMA-16051, 30 November 1960 (Paul STEVENSON, aka Pablo O'HIGGINS)
HMMA-16111, 9 December 1960 (Max SPARER)
HMMA-16179, 21 December 1960 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-16214, 30 December 1960 (Samuel J. NOVICK)
HMMA-16328, 25 January 1961 (David HALPERIN)
HMMA-16342, 25 January 1961 (Enos Regnet WICHER)
HMMA-16404, 3 February 1961, (Noah, Anna, and Robert SEBORER)
HMMA-16565, 1 March 1961 (Margaret Larkin MALTZ)
HMMA-16747, 29 March 1961 (Enos and Maria WICHER)
HMMA-16802, 7 April 1961 (Noah and Anna SEBORER)

E. Exile and Revolutionary Activities

LIFEAT continues to provide data on the exile and revolutionary groups active in Mexico. The bulk of the LIFEAT effort in this field was directed toward the coverage of the Nicaraguan exiles, and the results were most rewarding in this area. Examples of productivity:

HMM-5264, 2 November 1960 (Nicaraguan Exile Activities in Mexico)
HMM-5193, 27 November 1960 (Edelberto TORRES Espinoza)
HMM-5275, 30 December 1960 (Travel of Honduran Leonel Roberto SAVILLON to Cuba)
HMM-5376, 30 December 1960 (Travel of Nicaraguan Communist)
HMM-5386, 6 January 1961 (Views of Salvadoran Ambassador on Political Situation in El Salvador)
HMM-5452, 8 February 1961 (Americans in Nicaraguan Revolutionary Movement)
HMM-5549, 24 March 1961 (Use of Cuban Embassy as Guatemalan Communist Channel for Messages to Cuba)
HMMA-17025, 17 May 1961 (Travel of Guatemalans)

F. Counter-Intelligence Information

Mexico City Station's major responsibilities continued to lie in the field of CI/CE matters during the past year, and LIFEAT was able to provide a substantial contribution toward the attainment of the Station's objectives in this field. In particular, coverage of the following known

Communists added much to the Station's efforts: Xavier GUERRERO Saucedo and his wife, Clara Porcet de GUERRERO; Carmen BRUFAU Civit; and Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos. Besides the operational support in the CI/CE field, the following informational reporting was provided by LIFEAT:

- HMM-5154, 31 August 1960 (Activities of Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, Mexican Marxist Leader)
- HMM-5333, 9 December 1960 (Clara Porcet de GUERRERO)
- HMM-5339, 9 December 1960 (General Lazaro CARDENAS del Rio)
- HMM-5533, 10 March 1961 (Activities of the Latin American Peace Conference)
- HMM-5652, 19 May 1961 (Communist Support of Student Demonstration at Puebla)
- HMM-5655, 19 May 1961 (Meeting of Luis MARTINEZ Menocal with Communists in Mexico)

G. Operational Leads and Support Provided Other Station Operations

During the past project year, LIFEAT continued to support Mexico City Station through the timely production of useful leads, notably in the field of Cuban operations, and provision of continuing support to other Station operations. The following is a selective list of the use made of leads provided by LIFEAT:

LIFEAT/Cuban: In this phase of the LIFEAT operation the most important operational function has been the use of LIFEAT leads in checking the veracity and activities of the KUBARK agents in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. LIFEAT live-monitoring was employed in the case of Guillermo HERNANDEZ Vega to determine the success of this suspected Cuban penetration of the AMIRON program in contacting Cuban officials or pro-Cuban Mexican officials while he was held in custody by Mexican authorities and Station assets. In another case LIFEAT provided leads which enabled Station assets to monitor a clandestine meeting between a member of the Cuban Embassy staff and one Manuel ROJAS Villa (aka James Bradford STEWART), a fugitive from ODYOKE and a potential CASTRO agent, and ultimately return ROJAS to ODYOKE jurisdiction. LIFEAT was also able to determine the whereabouts of another suspected CASTRO agent, Oscar RODRIGUEZ Moruna. LIFEAT leads and support provided increased security for Station assets involved during the defection of Jose PARDO Llada, CASTRO "propaganda" minister, and provided leads for KUCAGE play on the reaction to the defection within the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

LIFEAT/Polish: LIFEAT provided vital support in the BECORN recruitment attempt which increased the security of the operation and gave a quick and secure means of evaluating the chances of success of the operation. In this effort, LIFEAT support included long periods of live-monitoring three separate telephone lines. LIFEAT leads also pointed out a local cafe which is a front for much Polish intelligence activity in the

Mexico City area. It has been determined through LIFEAT leads that this cafe is headquarters for a suspected Polish technical operation directed against an official U.S. installation in Mexico City. LIFEAT also provided support for a Station mounted audio operation against the Polish Embassy in Mexico City. Through LIFEAT leads proper support for the operation was arranged.

Coverage of a CI/CE nature was exploited in covering travel of important Communists, particularly to Cuba, and the travel of U.S. citizens, especially Communists and leftists, to Cuba. Travel plans of American Communists were provided to ODENVY well in advance of the actual travel. Activities of local Communists and their participation in demonstrations and CASTRO-support projects was shown through LIFEAT information.

H. Conclusion

It is the opinion of the Mexico City Station that the support provided other Station operations, the CI/CE information, and in particular the ability of the unilateral LIFEAT operation to cover sensitive targets without revealing Station interest to liaison forces, well justify the expenditure of funds, time, personnel, and security risk. It is to be noted that even though the Station is involved in the parallel LIENVOY liaison operation, a change in the attitude of the local government or the change in local government administration could well end KUBARK participation in that liaison project. For that reason LIFEAT must be available to resume the coverage of the Soviet/Satellite targets which it previously provided. It is recognized by the Station that the LIFEAT complex, if allowed to disintegrate, could not be readily reorganized if need for its services in the Soviet/Satellite field was required at a future date. Therefore, LIFEAT's present orientation, though toward targets of a CI/CE nature rather than for providing positive intelligence, leaves it available for immediate recall into the field of Soviet/Satellite operations. Of necessity, LIFEAT operations in certain areas have been curtailed to some extent and total coverage reduced during the trial period when guide lines were being formed in relation to operating with a parallel but liaison operation (i.e., LIENVOY). However, it is the Station's opinion that even with the temporarily reduced coverage provided by LIFEAT, this project still provides a substantial and essential contribution in fulfilling the several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

I. There is attached a complete list of the [illegible] produced from LIFEAT provided material during the period July 1960 through May 1961 (see attached page).

II. Progress of the Operation

The objectives of the LIFEAT Project are of a continuing nature and are therefore not considered for fulfillment during any given period of time. For this reason percentage figures as to completion of project objectives cannot be drawn. However, an indication of the coverage provided in working toward fulfillment of the objectives can be noted in that 12,000 pages of raw text were produced in the period July 1960 through May 1961. LIFEAT has been in daily operation during the review period with the average number of lines covered being 12. Generally, this coverage can be broken down as follows:

Cuban Embassy and related lines	4	
Polish Embassy and related lines	3	
American Communists	2	
Targets of Opportunity	3	
	12	TOTAL

III. Planning for the Future

Following the suggestion provided by Headquarters in renewing Project LIFEAT for FY 1961 (FY and project year coincide), the Station is expending every effort to maintain LIFEAT as a secure, compartmented, unilateral operation even though on the presently reduced scale, so as to have readily available for service this flexible support asset with its proven capacity for coverage of almost any target in Mexico City. Also in line with Headquarters suggestion LIFEAT will attempt to increase its coverage of those individuals suspected of maintaining clandestine contact with the RIS.

In the future, the unilateral LIFEAT operation, with the removal from its responsibility the coverage of the Soviet and Czech lines, will tend to be more flexible, with greater percentage of its capacity available for shifting to new targets as they are presented, and able to adjust readily to new situations. It is noted that this may result in a lower quantity of positive intelligence production, but will increase the CI/CE production which has always been basic to the LIFEAT project.

IV. Performance of Agents

The overall performance of all agents employed in the LIFEAT complex continued to be good during the period of the project review, with security being stressed in all phases of the operation. No security problems were encountered which were not solved by the personnel involved. Since the success of the LIFEAT operation depends largely upon the security of its personnel, Headquarters clearances and evaluation of new personnel will continue to be sought on those new additions who pass a strict field assessment.

V. Expenditures

Approval for renewal of Project LIFEAT was granted in August 1960 for the FY 1961 in the amount of $98,901.00. The proposed budget for FY 1962 is broken down in the attached Field Project Outline, Part II, and totals $98,973.00.

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

VI. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those noted in the project outline submitted herewith and in the individual contracts and oral agreements (memoranda of oral agreements were forwarded as necessary) of the various LIFEAT personnel.

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

The following is a complete list of the 118 HMMs which were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT supplied material during the period July 1960 through May 1961. This represents a 21% increase over the same period of last project year. However, with LIFEAT termination of Soviet and Czech coverage, a drop in the total HMM production can be expected during the coming project year.

HMM-5032
5045
5047
5065
5095
5098
5100
5101
5133
5137
5144
5154
5159
5169
5172
5174
5180
5186
5187
5194
5207
5214
5226
5235
5245
5247
5261
5264
5268
5277
5289
5297
5299
5309
5310
5319
5321
5329
5330

HMM-5332
5333
5338
5339
5342
5343
5347
5348
5354
5356
5362
5372
5375
5376
5378
5379
5380
5381
5382
[illegible]
5384
5386
5387
5392
5393
5398
5400
5406
5407
5408
5409
5410
5413
5418
5426
5428
5437
5443
5446
5452

HMM-5462
5465
5473
5480
5497
5503
5505
5507
5511
5532
5533
5534
5536
5541
5545
5549
5550
5552
5560
[illegible]
5570
5573
5575
5587
5588
5590
5592
5613
5625
5627
5630
5639
5641
5642
5643
5647
5652
5655
5660

~~SECRET~~ / KAPOK

12 June 1961

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART I

1. **Area of Operations**

This operation is run from the Mexico City Station and is concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to provide, unilaterally, daily information on the activities of official foreign installations in Mexico and the personnel thereof, as well as coverage of the activities of selected individuals and groups in response to both Station needs and Headquarters requests. Presently, coverage of the official Cuban and Polish installations have top priority in the LIFEAT operation.

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was originally approved on 3 October 1950 as a unilateral telephone tap operation. Actual initiation of operations under this authority occurred on 18 January 1951, and the operation has run continuously from that date. The project was opened with the installation of one tap and has grown in the past ten years to continuous coverage of from 12 to 20 lines.

The LIFEAT project is a unilateral operation completely independent from any liaison arrangement. It is staffed by KUBARK staff and contract employees with the greater majority of personnel being indigenous controlled agents.

During the past ten years, Project LIFEAT has produced more than 76,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's specific objectives, and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Soviet and Satellite Bloc and more recently with the activities of the Cuban representatives in Mexico. In addition, LIFEAT has been of considerable value in monitoring the activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM), as well as the activities of exile groups and local Communists.

4. References

a. HMMA-15252, dated 29 June 1960 (LIFEAT Renewal Request for FY 1961)

b. HMMW-9086, dated 8 September 1960 (Approval of LIFEAT Renewal for FY 1961)

~~SECRET~~ / KAPOK

~~SECRET / KAPOK~~

5. Objectives

   a. To identify Satellite intelligence personnel in Mexico and to provide information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

   b. To collect information on the Satellite officials both as to their activities as well as information of biographic nature.

   c. To identify Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico as well as determine the activities of Cuban officials which are inimical to the interests of the U.S.

   d. To collect biographic information on Cuban officials assigned to Mexico and provide daily coverage of their activities.

   e. To collect information on prominent Mexican Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

   f. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexican, active in Mexico, and to identify them and their associates and activities.

   g. To collect information on exile groups active in Mexico.

   h. To collect information on targets of opportunity in Mexico.

6. Targets

   For objectives a and b:

      a. Selected Satellite officials' office and home phones.

      b. Selected private phones being used by known and suspected Satellite intelligence personnel.

   For objectives c and d:

      c. Telephone conversations from the Cuban Embassy, including long distance calls from Havana, as well as selected telephone calls from residences of Cuban officials.

   For objective e:

      d. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior Communists and pro-Communists.

   For objective f:

      e. Telephone conversations from residences of known American Communists residing in Mexico City.

~~SECRET / KAPOK~~

For objective g:

f. Telephone conversations originating from residences or offices of prominent exile leaders in Mexico City.

For objective h:

g. Telephone conversations which can be monitored from targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward F. SECHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Jeremy L. NIARCOS

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT personnel; staff, contract and indigenous.

b. Maintain awareness of and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases of LIFEAT coverages in the field of Polish, Cuban, and American Communists operations.

d. Coordinate information received from the LIFEAT coverage with other Station operations, and coordinate as necessary with the Station personnel responsible for the parallel LIENVOY operation.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over warehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operation.

8. Coordination

a. Information produced by LIFEAT, primarily a Station operational support asset, is closely coordinated with other operations of the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other geographical area, but they are advised of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LINOG which supports the principal "outside" Case Officer, David M. WILSTED, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT.

c. Coordination with the parallel, but liaison project, LIENVOY is closely organized within the Station in two fields: (1) the daily checking between Case Officers of both projects, particularly relating to the division of coverage between the two operations, to assure that the unilateral LIFEAT operation will not be endangered by the indigenous personnel of the LIENVOY operation; and, (2) the daily processing of LIENVOY/Soviet "take" by the LIFEAT processor and basehousekeeper Carol K. ZINSMEISTER. The Station believes this latter point does not "cross" operations unnecessarily since ZINSMEISTER's long and discrete service within the LIFEAT complex gives her both the sense of security and the background necessary for secure processing of the Soviet "take". (Note: The processed Soviet material is not returned to the liaison forces after receipt from ZINSMEISTER, but is returned to the Station where it is summarized by Station personnel and then passed to liaison as having come from KUBARK Headquarters.) ZINSMEISTER is equally valuable, and indeed essential, in her LIFEAT basehousekeeper assignement because of her experience in dealing with the security problems arising from conducting a technical basehouse, as well as her ideal natural cover as wife of one of Mexico's foremost medical doctors.

9. Personnel

a. Staff agents

Ralph B. RAFANELLI (201-176295), who for the past four years has functioned as the assistant to the "outside" Case Officer for the LIFEAT operation, completes his second tour in June 1961 and will return to Headquarters PCS during the fall or early winter of 1961. It is planned to replace him with a locally recruited person, ODYOKE citizen if possible, who possesses natural commercial cover. Several candidates are presently being considered for this position. As soon as the Station is able to determine the best qualified individual, full PRQ I and II and clearance request will be forwarded for Headquarters processing.

b. Contract Agents/Employees

(1) David H. WILSTED (201-009195), principal "outside" Case Officer.

(2) Olivia N. GLADMON (201-117751), processes tapes and performs clerical duties.

(3) Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (201-117968), LIFEAT basehousekeeper (ANNEX IV) and processes all tapes from LIENVOY/Soviet "take".

(4) Leona C. GANDARA (201-225710), presently employed only on a standby basis for LIFEAT support.

c. Field Agents

(1) LIFEUD-1, OA granted 17 October 1950 (201-182704)

(2) LIFEUD-2, OA granted 14 August 1951 (201-117970)

(3) LIFEUD-3, OA granted 14 December 1953 (201-117971)

(4) LIFEUD-4, OA granted 1 October 1953 (201-117743)

(5) LIFEUD-5, OA granted 16 December 1953 (201-117744)

(6) LIFEUD-6, OA granted 28 September 1954 (201-117978)

(7) LIFEUD-7, OA granted 21 October 1954 (201-117980)

(8) LIFEUD-8, OA granted 31 March 1955 (201-119521)

(9) LIFEUD-9, OA granted 27 April 1956 (201-117984)

(10) LIFEUD-10, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-114085)

(11) LIFEUD-11, OA granted 21 August 1956 (201-113595)

(12) LIFEUD-12, OA granted 6 August 1956 (201-113569)

(13) LIFEUD-13, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-115833)

(14) LIFEUD-14, OA granted 26 September 1956 (201-117972)

(15) LIFEUD-15, OA granted 19 January 1957 (201-126315)

(16) LIFEUD-16, OA granted 2 July 1958 (201-222786)

(17) LIFEUD-17, OA granted 13 August 1956 (201-114086)

(18) LIFEUD-18, OA granted 2 October 1957 (201-185370)

(19) LIFEUD-19, OA granted 18 May 1960 (201-262488)

(20) LIMITATION-5, OA amended for LIFEAT 20 March 1961 (201-102308)

(21) LIMITATION-6, OA amended for LIFEAT 20 March 1961 (201-117981)

d. During the past project year the following personnel were dropped from Project LIFEAT:

(1) Alice M. CAILLETEAU (201-119967) was dropped in July 1960 when she returned to PBPRIME with her husband upon his resignation from KUBARK.

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

(2) Woodrow D. GABBOTT (201-14465) is now employed exclusively as an outside contact for the Station's Satellite Case Officer and should no longer be considered as a member of the LIFEAT complex.

(3) Wallace L. KAWOHL (201-033959) was terminated as an active agent in June 1960 at his own request and with the concurrance of the Station. Agent quit-claim and secrecy agreement were obtained. No security problems are considered likely to occur since KAWOHL's parents continue to be employed as basehousekeepers for LIFEAT and are dependent upon continued LIFEAT salary for their livelihood. At the time of the termination, it was realized that he would continue to enter the basehouse which his parents controlled, and therefore his clearance was amended to reflect this situation. (Reference: HTA-15946).

10. Operational Clearances

See Section 9 above.

11. Cover

There are no changes in the cover of the personnel presently employed in Project LIFEAT from that noted in previous project renewals.

12. Contact and Communications

Daily contact is maintained between the Case Officersand the agents employed in the project. These contacts are made in a clandestine manner with varying patterns established for car pickups, foot contacts, and emergency meetings. Pre-arranged signals are employed in setting and accomplishing the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, meetings are held at night. All movement in and out of the basehouses by Case Officers is done in cars ostensibly owned by the agents residing in those basehouses. Entrance to the basehouses on foot by other than the basehousekeepers is made only in emergency situations.

Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a minimum. Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents.

Alternate and emergency communications have been arranged and are reviewed frequently by the personnel using them.

These systems of contact and communication appear suitable for the project and function adequately from the security and utility standpoints. Locations and times of meetings are reviewed periodically and are changed frequently to decrease the possibility of arousing the suspicions of the residents of areas in which meetings are held.

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

13. Control and Motivation

Control and motivation are primarily based on two factors: ideology and financial gain. A secondary factor is the fear of reprisal from the local police should discovery occur.

14. Security

During the past project year there were no incidents which were beyond the capability of the personnel immediately involved to isolate and remedy immediately. One basehouse was closed for "cooling off" after a telephone company work party came to the basehouse to check the lines running to it. This party was stalled long enough to cut back the "tap" lines at the roof level and the house cleared of all compromising equipment and material. Later the work party entered and checked the lines which proved to be "dead" lines. The extra lines were then removed and the work party left the premises and there was no further trouble. (Note: In Mexico City there is much "dead line" running throughout the city which causes no end of difficulty for the telephone company in installation and repair work. Therefore, the phone company assigns work parties to various areas to clean up the extra unused "dead lines" in order to bring a degree of organization to the telephone system. This work is now being pursued vigorously and is approaching completion in large areas of the city.) The basehouse involved in the above incident has now been moved to a different location and is back in operation.

At the present time the telephone company is making a general effort to modernize the Mexico City telephone system. This effort includes changing from overhead lines to underground cables, cleaning off the unused overhead "dead lines", and installation of new equipment throughout the city. These innovations will cause increasing security problems for the LIFEAT complex, but it is believed that the problems are not insurmountable. Part of the solution will of necessity involve the use of a greater number of basehouses to diversify the coverage and to reduce the number of lines running to any one basehouse. This will cause an increase in expense for the project, but is considered desirable and necessary. It may eventually be necessary for LIFEAT to enter the underground cables in order to provide access to selected targets and maintain the security of the basehouses. The LIFEAT personnel are continually working to devise new methods as well as maintaining training in security so as to continue the high level of security enjoyed by LIFEAT in the past.

15. Training

Initial training of new personnel and continuing refresher training for experienced agents is handled primarily by the "outside" Case Officer, David H. WILSTED. Minor repair and maintenance of equipment as well as emergency security procedures are stressed and continually reviewed with the agents.

~~SECRET / KAPOK~~

16. Equipment and Support

As has been mentioned in last year's renewal request, much of the LIFEAT equipment, upon whose reliability the success of the information collection is based, will require replacement in the near future. The great percentage of the equipment has been in long and continuous service, while much of the special equipment is no longer being manufactured. When present diminishing commercial stocks of replacement parts are exhausted, new units will be required for LIFEAT with the attendant large, one-time purchase expense.

17. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951, and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

~~SECRET / KAPOK~~

12 June 1961

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART II

18. Estimated Costs

The following are the estimated costs for Fiscal Year 1962. All figures are U.S. dollars per year ($1.00 U.S. equals 12.50 Mexican pesos). Some increases in particular items will be noted. These reflect the increased cost of living and especially the continuing rise in rental costs in the Mexico City area, plus the necessity of moving basehouses for security reasons discussed in Part I of this Project Outline.

a. Salaries

(1) Staff and contract personnel

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-9 (for maximum of 6 months)		
Salary	$3,500	
Quarters	1,150	
Deep Cover Differential	525	
Replacement for RAFANELLI	4,000	
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER	5,500	
Plus 10% raise	550	
Olivia N. GLANTON	4,200	
Leona C. GANDARA	900	
		$20,325

(2) Field agents

LIFEUD-1		$5,760
LIFEUD-2		2,496
LIFEUD-3		1,776
LIFEUD-4		1,920
LIFEUD-5		3,648
LIFEUD-6		3,500
LIFEUD-7		2,400
LIFEUD-8		2,400
LIFEUD-9		1,920
LIFEUD-10	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-11	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-12	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-13	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-14		3,648
LIFEUD-15		768
LIFEUD-16		1,440
LIFEUD-17	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-18	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-19		1,200

LIFSUD-1's assistant	144	
LIMITATION-5	760	
LIMITATION-6	300	
Due to the continuing rise in ~~the cost of~~ living, plus the fact that the majority of the above listed agents have not received the pay raise reflected in last year's project renewal, it will be manditory to grant an across the board 10% pay raise during FY 1962.	3,400	
Christmas bonus (in accordance with local customs, this amounts to one month's pay for each agent) and gifts where necessary.	3,200	
		$40,680

b. Basehouse Rentals

ANNEX I (formerly LIMERICK Main Base)	$2,200	
ANNEX IV	2,760	
ANNEX VI	2,200	
ANNEX VII	1,728	
ANNEX VIII	3,072	
ANNEX IX	2,880	
ANNEX X	2,688	
ANNEX to be selected	2,500	
c. Basehouse utilities and expenses	2,000	
d. Allowance for customary (for Mexico City) 10% rental increase when lease renewed	2,000	
		$24,028

e. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	$1,800	
New equipment, especially recorders and reels	2,500	
		$4,300

f. Miscellaneous

(1) Expendable supplies such as paper, carbon paper, paper tape, manila envelopes, wrapping paper,	$2,000

(2) Transportation

RAFANELLI's QP car	$600	
LIFEUD-7 car rent	675	
LIFEUD-8 car rent	675	
LIFEUD-14 car rent	290	
ZENSMEISTER mileage	400	
(3) Other operational expenses (covers loss of rental deposits, fatalities, medical expenses, termination payments,* expenses involved in moving and setting up base-houses, expenses involved in covering targets of opportunity)	5,000	
		$7,640
GRAND TOTAL		$98,973

---

* Any termination of indigenous personnel will be in accordance with Mexican law and will include lump sum separation settlement, transportation and moving expense payments, and any bonus due at the time of termination.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

ACTION		ACTION FINISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED; REFERENCES

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1961. It is requested that your recommendation for renewal be pouched so that it reaches Headquarters prior to 1 June 1961.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED
18 April 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
18 APR 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-9689

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

XXX

1 - RI
1 - WH/Mexico
1 - WH/Mailroom

INITIAL

RI/FI

RI/FI

WH/3M

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	N. Walton	AC/WH/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	18 APR 1961	J. C. KING

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMM-W-9086

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/1

DATE
S

RE "433" -- (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO:

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Operational
LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED: Per paragraph 2

REFERENCE(S):

HMM-A-15252, 29 June 1960

1. The LIFEAT Project was approved on 26 August 1960 for a total of $98,901. Headquarters reduced the original request from the field to bring the total Project budget more in line with the programmed figure of $90,000 and the actual obligations of the previous year, which were only $73,884. The following changes were made on the field's request:

	Field Request	Approved
Salaries: Ralph B. RAFANELLI (to reflect legislative pay raise)	$ 6,505.00	$6,995.00
Miscellaneous Operating Expenses	25,000.00	9,000.00

2. Staff comments on the Project renewal request were:

a) KUTUBE/OPS said that the Station is to be commended on its handling of the requested Bloc coverage by LIENVOY while maintaining LIFEAT capability and limiting coverage to those lines most profitable. KUTUBE noted the increased emphasis on exploitation of operational information. In order to continue this aspect of the operation, the Station is faced with the difficult problem of selectivity in targeting and processing take from these two large projects. Every possible effort should be made to increase the efficiency of processing to maintain LIFEAT at its present high level. In KUTUBE/OPS's opinion, LIFEAT personnel and capability must be carefully maintained in face of the easier but less secure LIENVOY.

b) KUDESK stated that this unilateral asset should be continued despite the fact that we are running a similar operation with the local government. It is hoped that the Station will soon be able to use this asset in the investigation of individuals known to be in clandestine contact with the RIS, for the purpose of determining whether or not they may be recruited.

c) KUTUBE/D notes that the project has been of high value.

3. Attached for the information of the Station is a copy of the memorandum prepared in WH to transmit the project for approval.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

CS COPY

Attachment: 1 (3 pages), KAPOK
Per paragraph 3

2 September 1960

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City

Hqs Distribution:
1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexi/Chrono

WH/3/Mexi/CLZehrung:mrd

50-6-32/1

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

Subject [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT

OPERATING DIVISION: WHD

FIELD STATION: MEXICO CITY

TARGET AREA: MEXICO CITY

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Charlotte L. [illegible]

ROOM NO: 2121 Barton Hall

EXTENSION: 2555 or 3152

DATE: 22 July 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1960 through 30 June 1961 for a total of $98,901.00. Last fiscal year the project was approved for $123,830 of which $73,884 was obligated. The approved programmed figure was $90,000 for Fiscal Year 1961. The extra $ 9,000 required would come from the following programmed projects:

LIMOTOR - $2,000
LIVERY - $1,000
LIENVOY - $6,000

2. Subsequent to the preparation by the Station of the attached Project review and renewal request for LIFEAT, the following situation developed in Mexico which has directly affected the entire LIFEAT Project. At a meeting with the Chief of Station on 25 June 1960, LITENSOR asked the Station and LIELEGANT to immediately begin covering the Soviet, Polish and Czech Embassy under LIENVOY. LITENSOR suggested that the Mexicans translate the Spanish and that the Station forward the tapes to Washington for translation of the Russian, Polish and Czech portions. The Chief of Station had no alternative but to express great interest in the coverage of targets of such importance. In order to protect the security of the LIFEAT operations, the Station stopped the LIMERICK and [illegible] (LIVERY had not been in operation for the past six months for security reasons) coverage on 22 June, prior to the LIENVOY activation. It was determined that LIENVOY would cover 5 Soviet and 2 Czech lines. The take continues to be processed by [illegible] and [illegible]. The LIENVOY monitors extract from the Spanish only the most important points for the daily resumens which are passed to LITENSOR. LIELEGANT has been told we will inform him of pertinent information obtained (ostensibly from Headquarters processing) of the Soviet and Czech text for passing to LITENSOR. LIFEAT will continue its unilateral coverage of Polish and other targets of interest.

3. The Station does not anticipate any problem connected with the exploitation of leads since LIELEGANT has evinced no interest in this matter. In view of the lack of language capabilities by the Mexicans and our ability to control what is passed (ostensibly from Headquarters), the Station sees no problems arising from the present arrangement.

~~SECRET~~

4. The Station does not intend to cut down on independent LIFEAT operations since there are plenty of targets to keep both LIENVOY and LIFEAT occupied.

5. The LIFEAT Project was the source of 99 positive intelligence reports, 72 of which were disseminated. Those not disseminated were considered by Headquarters to be of value for operational background or were outdated. ORR made the following evaluations of LIFEAT reports:

"Mexican Interest in Procurement of Naphthalene from Czechoslovakia," of value, probably true, and of importance to receive further reports.

"Soviet Commercial Activities," of value, probably true, and of importance to receive further reports.

"Soviet Plans to Sell Newsprint to Mexican Government Agency," of little importance.

"Soviet Negotiations for Mexican Cotton," of average value, useful as new information.

The Department of State made the following evaluations of LIFEAT reports:

"Mexican Efforts to Sell Sugar to the U.S.S.R.," of value, possibly true, and of importance to receive further reports.

"Purchase of Soviet Tractors by Mexican Government," of slight value.

"Soviet Negotiations for Mexican Cotton," of average value, useful in confirming other reports.

6. The Station used LIFEAT information in the preparation of memoranda directed to the Embassy and FBI representatives in Mexico in reply to local requests for information. During the period July 1959 through May 1960, 154 memoranda were furnished the Embassy and 69 memoranda were furnished the FBI based on LIFEAT information.

7. WH Division feels that the positive and CE information received from LIFEAT is invaluable. Most of the information is not available from other Station assets. Reports on travel and the identification of target personalities often serve to confirm information previously received. LIFEAT assets also have been used effectively to check on recently-terminated agents to ascertain that the termination was secure. LIFEAT also has been used to check on reports by double agents that they have contacted or been contacted by their respective Soviet or Satellite contacts.

8. Information received from LIERODE is passed to WH/4 and any operations undertaken on the basis of such information are closely coordinated with that Branch.

~~SECRET~~

9. Information received from the LITMUS, LIVEXT, and LIMERICK phases is supplied the EE and SR Case Officers at the Station for exploitation of leads and extracting of pertinent background information. At Headquarters there is close coordination between EE, SR and WH on the dissemination of positive reports and the operational exploitation of CE/CI leads. C/EE/C stated on 18 July 1960 that the Czech desk fully endorses the renewal of the LIFEAT Project and that they have found the information obtained from this project to be especially useful in following the movements of persons of interest and the activity and identification of target personnel. Please see attached memoranda from EE/P and SR which express their support of this project renewal.

10. Project BESWOOTH, which supports Woodrow D. CALDOT, who processes the LITMUS take, is coordinated with Project LIFEAT.

11. Emergency recontact instructions will be arranged with the agents under this project if a situation which might require such instructions threatens Mexico.

12. It is requested that the LIENVOY Project be renewed on the basis of this memorandum and the attached review and renewal request prepared by the Mexico City Station.

COORDINATION:

Ned P. Holman, AC/WH/3

C. W. Anderson, WHD/Proj/Officer

Approved for Transmittal: J. C. King, Chief/WHD

Approved: J. C. King, Chief/WHD

Date

Attachments:
Station Project Review and Renewal Request
Folder with past renewals
Memorandum from SR Division
Memorandum from EE/C
Form 680 (in quad)
Envelope containing true name

~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-15252
[redacted] 1796

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/1

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
29 June 1960

SUBJECT
-9 LIFEAT Project Renewal Request

ACTION REQUIRED
- Renewal of Project LIFEAT

(CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-7955, 14 August 1959

1. There is attached a comprehensive Review of Project LIFEAT for the period July 1959 through June 1960 and a Project Outline divided into Part I and Part II for easier processing.

2. It is to be noted that the amount requested in the attached renewal request, $114,411, is $19,419 under that amount approved for Project LIFEAT for the past project year. Station Mexico feels this reduction in cost will not adversly affect the operational impact of the project.

3. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be renewed for FY 1961 in the amount of $114,411.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

23 June 1960

Attachments:
1. Odd pages (five copies) - attached herewith.
2. Even pages (five copies) - under separate cover.

Distribution:
3 - WHD (with five copies of odd and even pages)
3 - Files (with complete project renewal request)

AN
AB
IN
PS
BY
DES RFD
PI

Remove from Project
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB #
Box: Fold: 2

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/~~ [redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

PROJECT REVIEW AND PROJECT OUTLINE

PARTS I AND II

Edward P. Sechen

Cryptonym LIFEAT

Case Officer Edward P. SECHEN

Willard C. Curtis

Station MEXICO CITY

Chief of Station Willard C. CURTIS

Assistant Case Officer Jeremy L. NIARCOS

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

CS COPY

[illegible]

50-6-32/1

SECRET/KAPOK

PROJECT REVIEW - PROJECT LIFEAT

I. Product of the Project

A. Soviet Embassy

1) Soviet Commercial Activities:

During the past project year, the LIMERICK phase of Project LIFEAT has provided detailed and continuing reports on the increased Soviet efforts to participate in Mexican commercial markets. The following is a partial but representative list of the reports submitted on this subject.

HMM-4322, 12 June 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico.
HMM-4567, 6 November 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico.
HMM-4855, 1 April 1960, Soviet Purchase of Mexican Cotton.
HMM-4857, 6 April 1960, Soviet Purchase of Mexican Pineapple.
HMM-4858, 6 April 1960, Soviet Plan to Sell Newsprint to Mexican Government Agency.

2) Soviet Diplomatic Activities:

Project LIFEAT provided coverage of many of the Soviet Diplomatic activities in Mexico. It was able to show the relationships maintained between the Soviet and Satellite missions in Mexico, as well as the increased official contact between the Cuban and Soviet governments.

MEXI-4304, 21 August 1959, Meeting os Soviet and Cuban Ambassadors to Mexico.
HMM-4618, 20 November 1959, Increased Relations of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico with the Latin American Diplomatic Missions.
HMM-4768, 8 February 1960, Preparation of Soviet Propaganda in Mexico for Shipment to Cuba.

3) Soviet Cultural Activities:

LIFEAT has provided detailed information concerning the Soviet cultural activities in Mexico. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-4415, 5 August 1959, Soviet Plans to Bring Soviet Exposition to Mexico.

all [illegible] CS COPY SECRET/KAPOK

HMM-4449, 28 August 1959, Soviet Plans to Bring Pyatnitskiy Chorus to Mexico from Canada.

HMMA-14677, 16 March 1960, Soviet Cultural Activities.

4) Background Information on, and Movement of, Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT information, the Station has been able to maintain a current roster of the Soviet Embassy personnel assigned to Mexico. LIFEAT has been further utilized to give information on job assignments within the Soviet Embassy, and to determine in advance departures, arrivals, and replacements of Embassy personnel. Large quantities of background personality information concerning the official and private lives of members of the Soviet staff were also provided.

HMM-4323, 11 June 1959, Scheduled Travel of Soviet Officials.
HMMA-14065, 6 November 1959, Activities of Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Ivanovich BAZYKIN.
HMMA-13614, 24 August 1959, Retirement System for Soviet Diplomats.

5) Goods and Services:

Throughout the past year, LIFEAT information has been of use to Project LIMESA. Of particular note have been leads concerning various properties in which the Soviets were interested.

6) Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy:

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their associations and related activities has been reported as necessary.

B. Czech Legation*

Information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review was essentially the same as that obtained from the Soviet Embassy. Although this target was covered only from July 1959 to January 1960 (due to the security problem posed by extensive telephone company cable renovation work in the vicinity of the basehouse serving the target), valuable intelligence was gained during the period of actual coverage. Examples of reports from this source are:

HMMA-13295, 10 July 1959, Czech Legation Activities.
HMMA-13522, 14 August 1959, Czech Embassy Activities.
HMM-4513, 30 September 1959, Czech Interest in Importing Mexican Copper.
HMMA-13919, 9 October 1959, Czech Diplomatic Couriers.
HMM-4576, 6 November 1959, Czech Plans to Setup Commercial Company in the Free Zone of Curacao.

(*Czech Legation raised to Embassy status during July 1959)

C. The Polish Legation

The type of LIFEAT information gathered on the Polish Legation closely parallels that gathered from the Soviet and Czech targets. LIFEAT remains the primary source of information on this target.

HMM-4458, August 1959, Proposed Mexican Art Exhibit in Poland.
HMMA-13718, 11 September 1959, Influence of Polish Minister on Mexican U. N. Voting.
HMM-4482, September 1959, Polish Commercial Interest in Cuba.
HMM-4544, 23 October 1959, Polish Commercial Activities.
HMMA-14843, 20 April 1960, Activities of Polish Technical Investigators.
HMMA-15055, 27 May 1960, Activities of Alexander BEKIER.

D. American Communists in Mexico

Most of the targets in this group have been covered at the request of ODENVY, and the production has been partially processed by them. Approximately 370 reels were passed to ODENVY for their processing during the period June 1959 - April 1960. The most valuable type of information obtained on these targets deals with travel, contacts, and activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM). The following is a sample of the reports furnished through coverage of this target group.

HMMA-13792, 25 September 1959, Albert and Margaret MALTZ.
HMMA-14191, 4 December 1959, Albert MALTZ.
HMMA-14885, 27 April 1960, Maria WICHER.
HMMA-15135, 10 June 1960, Noah SEBORER.
HMMA-15144, 15 June 1960, Maria WICHER.

E. Cuban Embassy

LIFEAT has provided timely information on the activities and personalities of the Cuban Embassy. Of particular interest has been the indications provided by LIFEAT of closer relations and increasing contact between the Cuban and Soviet officials in Mexico. LIFEAT was also able to provide a firm indication of the Soviet-Cuban announcement of resumption of diplomatic relations two weeks in advance of the actual event. Examples of LIFEAT Cuban coverage are:

HMM-4489, 24 September 1959, Recall of Cuban Military Attaches in Mexico.
HMM-4649, 4 December 1959, Pro-Cuba Publication in Mexico.
HMM-4907, 27 April 1960, Projected Joint Announcement by Cuban and Soviet Governments.
HMM-4919, 29 April 1960, Travel to Cuba of Soviet Ambassador in Mexico.

F. Exile and Revolutionary Activities

LIFEAT continued to provide information on the exile and revolutionary groups active in Mexico. Coverage of the Nicaraguan Communist exiles was particularly rewarding for the operational information provided.

HMM-4317, 12 June 1959, Letter from a Guatemalan Communist Concerning the Seventh World Festival of Youth.
MEXI-4271, 13 August 1959, Travel of Nicaraguan Communists.
HMM-4450, 4 September 1959, Nicaraguan Revolutionaries' Efforts to Meet a Former President of Mexico.
MEXI-4488, October 1959, Travel of Dra. Concepcion PALACIOS Herrera, Nicaraguan Communist.
HMM-4967, 25 May 1960, Activities of Rafael RAMIREZ Delgado.

G. LAURICLE Information

During the period of the project review, LIFEAT, as in the past, continued to contribute materially to several matters of LAURICLE interest.

H. Counter-Intelligence Information

CI/CE matters continued to constitute a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives during the review period. Project LIFEAT was able to provide a substantial contribution to the attainment of these objectives. Of particular note in this respect has been coverage provided on known Communist Party members, especially valuable being that provided on Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos.

I. Operational Leads and Support Provided Other Station Operations

During the period covered by this project review, LIFEAT continued to support the Mexico City Station through its timely production of leads which were especially useful, and in most cases essential, in assuring the success of other Station operations. The following is a list, necessarily selective, of the use made of leads from, and support of other projects rendered by Project LIFEAT.

LIFEAT/LIMERICK: 1) Of special note is the support provided to the Station's AEIMPULSE operation. Leads and information rendered by LIFEAT enabled the responsible Case Officer to prepare adequately for this recruitment attempt of an officer of the Soviet Embassy. Following the actual attempt, LIFEAT/LIMERICK was used as a security device to protect the Station assets employed in the operation. 2) As noted in I A. (5) above, Project LIMESA was provided with continuing support by Project LIFEAT. Notable among the information and leads provided were those concerning specific properties which the Soviets were interested in renting and/or buying. 3) LIFEAT has provided a check on double-agent LITARDY-1, giving verification of his activities and contacts. A similar check has also been provided on the activities of informant LIPAGAN-1.

LIFEAT/LIVERY: 1) This phase of LIFEAT closely supported the projected LITACIT physical penetration operation aimed at the LIVERY establishment in Mexico City. LIFEAT provided essential information on the rosters of night duty officers as well as background information on the target. 2) LIFEAT/LIVERY provided support for the installation of technical surveillance against LITACH. Without the information provided by LIFEAT, this operation would have been extremely hazardous at best, and probably would have been entirely impossible.

LIFEAT/LITMUS: 1) LIFEAT provided information which lead to the successful recruitment of agent BEYAN who was in a position to provide information on BESOOT. 2) LITMUS leads also lead to the attempted, but unsuccessful, recruitment of one Una WARREN, believed to have been a contact of Polish officials in Mexico. 3) LIFEAT leads also lead to the surveillance of a clandestine meeting of Alexander BEKIER, Polish Counselor of Legation in Mexico. Due to the advance notice of the meeting given by LIFEAT, MKCHARITY was given time to plan technical coverage of the meeting and prepare especially fabricated equipment for this coverage. 4) LIFEAT was also responsible for the discovery of the location of a Polish Intelligence basehouse. This information was operationally important to the responsible Case Officer.

LIFEAT/LIERODE: In this phase of the LIFEAT project leads have been most rewarding in terms of agents actually recruited and operations supported by LIFEAT provided information. 1) LIERODE produced leads which were directly responsible for the recruitment of agents LITANGO-1 and LITAMIL-3, while providing security check and information which have increased the value of agent LITANGO. 2) The defections of LITAINT-1 and LITAG-1 were greatly aided by LIFEAT leads and information. The internal reaction to the defections in the target establishment were also readily available through LIFEAT. 3) At present LIERODE is providing coverage, both from a security and informational standpoint, of the attempt to place a recruited agent as Mexico-based advisor to a high official of the Cuban Intelligence. This operation is largely dependent upon LIFEAT leads and support for security coverage of the agent's activities. 4) LIFEAT/LIERODE has been unusually successful in providing information which has enabled the Station to identify nearly all the Cuban agents operating in Mexico. Due to the increasing importance of the Cuban target, these revelations are of utmost importance.

Coverage of a CI/CE nature was provided by LIFEAT targeted against a recruited member of the Mexican Communist Party, and has produced leads on semi-clandestine travel of party members behind the Iron Curtain, as well as providing a check on the veracity of the agent.

Project LIFEAT has been employed also in support of the highly sensitive LIEMIT operation.

J. Conclusion

It is the opinion of the Mexico City Station that the support provided to other Station operations, the CE information obtained, and the positive intelligence gathered by Project LIFEAT well justify the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of funds, personnel, time and security risk. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

K. There is attached herewith a complete list of HMMs produced from LIFEAT provided material during the period July 1959 through May 1960. (See attached sheet.)

II. Progress of the Operation

Since the Project LIFEAT objectives are unique in that they are of a continuing nature and not designed to be fulfilled within a given period, no statistics can be cited from which a percentage of coverage on each objective can be calculated. A general indication can be given of the coverage provided by the project when it is noted that approximately 15,000 pages of raw text were provided in the July 1959 to May 1960 period. LIFEAT has been in daily operation during the review period with the number of lines covered varying from 12 to 18. Generally, these can be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy	5 lines	
Polish Legation and Polish Counselor	3 lines	
Czech Legation (Embassy)	2 lines	(Coverage suspended January '60 for reason given in I. B above)
American Communists	2 lines	
Cuban Embassy	3 lines	
Targets of Opportunity	3 lines	

III. Planning for the Future

Following the suggestion and guidance provided by Headquarters when renewing Project LIFEAT for FY 1960, the Station plans to limit its coverage to no more than twenty lines at any given time, with the possible exception of targets of opportunity which could be covered for short periods in addition to the normal coverage. The coverage of Soviet and Satellite installations will remain basic to LIFEAT and will be exploited to the maximum degree possible. Due to the increased importance of information on Cuban activities, coverage of the Cuban Embassy and personnel staffing the Embassy will be increased during the coming project year. Targets of Opportunity will continue to be exploited as permitted by personnel, equipment, and access limitations.

IV. Performance of Agents

The general overall performance of the agents employed under LIFEAT continued to be good with security being stressed in all phases of the operation. No security problems were encountered which were not readily solved by the personnel concerned. Since a high degree of security is required for the operation of LIFEAT, it is planned that any possible agent candidates will be thoroughly screened and Headquarters clearance obtained before they are in any way approached for operational use.

V. Expenditures During the Period Under Review

Approval for the renewal of Project LIFEAT was granted on 16 July 1959, for the period 1 July 1959 through 30 June 1960, in the amount of $123,830. ~~In its continuing attempt to provide practical economy without decreasing operational efficiency, Station Mexico submits the itemized proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1961 (contained in the attached Field Project Outline, Part II) in the amount of $114,411, a reduction of approximately $19,000 from the previous year's approved budget.~~

VI. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the project outline submitted herewith and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

The following is a complete list of the 97 HMMs which were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT supplied material during the period July 1959 through May 1960.

HMM-4351
HMM-4355
HMM-4358
HMM-4364
HMM-4387
HMM-4388
HMM-4397
HMM-4399
HMM-4407
HMM-4415
HMM-4425
HMM-4447
HMM-4449
HMM-4450
HMM-4451
HMM-4452
HMM-4457
HMM-4458
HMM-4459
HMM-4460
HMM-4481
HMM-4482
~~HMM-4484~~
HMM-4485
HMM-4489
HMM-4493
HMM-4520
HMM-4534
HMM-4539
HMM-4550
HMM-4563
HMM-4575
HMM-4544
HMM-4567
HMM-4572
HMM-4513

HMM-4576
HMM-4582
HMM-4588
HMM-4589
HMM-4591
HMM-4613
HMM-4614
HMM-4618
HMM-4631
HMM-4636
HMM-4637
HMM-4640
HMM-4649
HMM-4667
HMM-4672
HMM-4678
HMM-4691
HMM-4703
HMM-4704
HMM-4706
HMM-4707
HMM-4710
HMM-4711
HMM-4712
HMM-4718
HMM-4724
HMM-4726
HMM-4729
HMM-4737
HMM-4742
HMM-4761
HMM-4762

HMM-4768
HMM-4771
HMM-4790
HMM-4803
HMM-4836
HMM-4843
~~HMM-4849~~
HMM-4855
HMM-4857
HMM-4858
HMM-4876
HMM-4877
HMM-4879
HMM-4891
HMM-4892
HMM-4893
HMM-4895
HMM-4904
HMM-4907
HMM-4918
HMM-4919
HMM-4921
HMM-4924
HMM-4943
HMM-4958
HMM-4963
HMM-4964
HMM-4966
HMM-4967
HMM-4971
HMM-4972
HMM-4975

HMM-4979

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

PROJECT OUTLINE

PROJECT LIFEAT

PART I

1. **Area of Operations**

This project is run from the Mexico City Station, and is concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. **Purpose**

The purpose of this project is to determine Soviet and Satellite plans, activities and connections with other Communist elements through the use of technical surveillance. This purpose is in consonance with the Related Mission Directive for Mexico, dated 20 November 1959, Priority A, Objective one.

3. **Background**

Project LIFEAT was originally approved on 3 October 1950 as a unilateral telephone tap operation. Actual initiation of operations was on 18 January 1951, and the project has run continuously from that date. The project was begun with the installation of one telephone tap, and has been expanded to the present average coverage of 18 lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation completely independent from any liaison arrangement. It is staffed by KUBARK staff and contract employees with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the past nine years, Project LIFEAT has produced more than 64,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically, and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Soviet and Satellite Bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of the American Communist community residing in Mexico City as well as activities of Cubans and exiles in Mexico.

4. **References**

a. HMMA-12936, 22 May 1959, Renewal Request for FY 1960.

b. HMMW-7955, 14 August 1959, Approval of Renewal Request for FY 1960

5. **Objectives**

a. To identify Soviet and Satellite intelligence personnel and to collect information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information on Soviet and Satellite commercial, diplomatic, cultural and military personnel and their activities in Mexico.

c. To collect biographic information of Soviet and Satellite officials.

d. To collect information of the movements, assignments and positions of Soviet and Satellite personnel.

e. To collect biographic information on Cuban officials assigned to Mexico and provide coverage of their activities.

f. To collect information on prominent Mexican Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

g. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexicans, active in Mexico and to identify them and their associates.

h. To collect information on exile groups active in Mexico.

i. To collect information on targets of opportunity in Mexico.

6. **Targets** (as related to project objectives)

For objectives "a" through "d",

a. Selected Soviet Embassy and commercial office telephone conversations.

b. Selected Satellite office and home phones.,

For objective "e",

c. Telephone conversations from the Cuban Embassy and selected telephone calls from residences of Cuban officials.

For objective "f",

d. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior Communists and prominent pro-Communists.

For objective "g",

e. Telephone conversations from the residences of known American Communists residing in Mexico City.

For objective "h",

f. Telephone conversations originating from the residences of offices of prominent exile leaders in Mexico City.

For objective "i",

g. Telephone conversations which can be monitored from targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward P. SECHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Jeremy L. NIARCOS

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT staff, contract, and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness of and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITMUS, LIVERY, LIERODE, and the American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

d. Coordinate information received from LIFEAT/LIMERICK with other Station Mexico operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operation.

8. Coordination

a. Information produced by LIFEAT, primarily a Station support operation, is closely coordinated with other operations at the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other area, but they are kept advised of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LINOG which supports the principle outside LIFEAT Case Officer, David M. WILSTED, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT.

9. Personnel

a. Staff Agents:

Ralph B. RAFANELLI - under unofficial commercial cover (201-176295)

b. Contract Agents/Employees:

1. David M. WILSTED (201-009195) - principle outside Case Officer. Career Agent
2. Alice M. CAILLETEAU (201-119967) - clerical work C-47041
3. Olivia N. GLADMON (201-117751) - processes tapes and does clerical work C-46946
4. Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (201-117968) - processes major portion of LIFEAT take. C-24742
5. Wallace L. KAWOHL (201-033959) - basehouse operator C-3977
6. CSR-24 June 1958 → Leona C. GANDARA (201-225710) - LIFEAT clipping. C-61657
7. Woodrow D. GABBOTT (201-14465) - processor for LITMUS tapes under Project LESHUTH

c. Field Agents:

1. LIFEUD-1, OA granted 17 October 1950, (201-183704) C-739
2. LIFEUD-2, OA granted 14 August 1951, (201-117970) C-1412

3. LIFEUD-3, OA granted 14 December 1953, (201-117971) C-7152
4. LIFEUD-4, OA granted 1 October 1953, (201-117743) C-6970
5. LIFEUD-5, OA granted 16 December 1953, (201-117744) C-7496
6. LIFEUD-6, OA granted 28 September 1954, (201-117978) C-30465
7. LIFEUD-7, OA granted 21 October 1954, (201-117980) C-31929
8. LIFEUD-8, OA granted 31 March 1955, (201-119521) C-33172
9. LIFEUD-9, OA granted 27 April 1956, (201-117984) C-45672
10. LIFEUD-10, OA granted 13 September 1956, (201-114085) C-50464
11. LIFEUD-11, OA granted 21 August 1956 (201-113595) C-50455
12. LIFEUD-12, OA granted 6 August 1956 (201-113596) C-50157
13. LIFEUD-13, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-115833) C-50750
14. LIFEUD-14, OA granted 26 September 1956 (201-117972) C-32015
15. LIFEUD-15, OA granted 19 January 1957 (201-126315) C-54096
16. LIFEUD-16, OA granted 2 July 1958 (201-222786) C-70322
17. wife of LIFEUD-14 → LIFEUD-17, OA granted 13 August 1956 (201-114036) C-63109
18. wife of KAWCHL → LIFEUD-18, OA granted 2 October 1957 (201-185370) C-50457
19. LIFEUD-19, OA granted 18 May 1960 (HMMA-14933) (201-262488) C-79348
mother of Raymond H GERENDE (LIEMPTY/[illegible]) resides with LIVERY basehouse.

d. No personnel were dropped from the project during the past project year.

10. Operational Clearances:

See section 9 above.

11. Cover

The cover of personnel employed in Project LIFEAT remains the same as noted in the last project renewal.

12. Contact and Communications

a. Daily contact is maintained between the Case Officers and the agents in this project. These contacts are made in a clandestine manner with varing patterns established for car pickups, foot contacts, and emergency meetings. Pre-arranged signals are employed in setting and accomplishing the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, meetings are held at night. All movement in and out of the basehouses by the Case Officers and Principle Agents is done in cars ostensibly owned by agents, except in the case of LIVERY basehouse where the agents are too old to drive. One of the indigenous agents is used to contact LIVERY base. Entrance to basehouses on foot by other than the residents of the house is made only in great emergencies.

b. Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a minimum. Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents.

c. Alternate and emergency signals have been arranged and are reviewed frequently by the personnel using them.

d. These systems of contact and communication appear suitable for the project and function adequately from a security viewpoint. Locations and times of meetings are reviewed periodically and are changed frequently to decrease the possibility of discovery.

13. Control and Motivation

Control and motivation are primarily based on two factors: ideology and financial gain. A secondary factor is the fear of reprisal from the local police should discovery occur.

14. Training

Initial training of new personnel and refresher training for experienced agents is handled primarily by the outside case officer, David M. WILSTED. Minor repair and maintainance of equipment as well as emergency security procedures are stressed and continually reviewed with the agents.

15. Equipment and Support

It is believed that much of the technical equipment upon which the continued successful collection of LIFEAT material depends will require replacement in the near future. The largest percentage of this equipment has been in nearly continuous operation from the initiation of the project in January 1951 and much of this equipment is no longer being manufactured. When present limited commercial stocks of replacement parts are exhausted, new units will be required for LIFEAT.

16. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

PROJECT OUTLINE

PART II

PROJECT: LIFEAT

17. Estimated Costs

The following are the estimated costs for FY 1961. All figures are U.S. dollars per year. ($1.00 dollar U.S. equals 12.50 Mexican pesos) Due to the continued rise in the cost of living, and especially to the expected increase in rental costs that is a chronic feature of the Mexico City scene, a moderate increase in some LIFEAT costs will be noted, ~~even though the overall total requested is $10,419 under that approved for FY 1960.~~

a. Salaries:

1. Staff and contract Personnel

Ralph B. RAFANELLI GS-10	
Salary	$ 6,~~505.00~~ 995.00
Quarters	2,304.00
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (salary)	5,500.00
Alice N. CAILIETEAU (salary)	2,000.00
Olivia N. GLADMON (piecework)	4,200.00
Wallace L. KAWOHL (salary)	1,728.00
Leona C. GANDARA (salary)	900.00

$ 23,137.00
490.00
$ 23,627.00

2. **Field Agents**

LIFEUD-1		5,760.00
LIFEUD-2		2,496.00
LIFEUD-3		1,776.00
LIFEUD-1's helper		144.00
LIFEUD-4		1,920.00
LIFEUD-5		3,648.00
LIFEUD-6		3,500.00
LIFEUD-7		2,400.00
LIFEUD-8		2,400.00
LIFEUD-9		1,920.00
LIFEUD-10	No Salary	
LIFEUD-11	No Salary	
LIFEUD-12	No Salary	
LIFEUD-13	No Salary	
LIFEUD-14		3,648.00
LIFEUD-15		768.00
LIFEUD-16		1,440.00
LIFEUD-17	No Salary	
LIFEUD-18	No Salary	
LIFEUD-19		960.00

Due to the continued rise in the cost of living, plus the fact that the majority of the above listed field agents have not received a pay raise in recent years even though the work load increased and the quality of work performed has imporved, it is anticipated that the 10% over-all pay raise provided for, but not given, in FY 1960 will be necessary in FY 1961:

3,200.00

Christmas bonus (In accordance with local custom, this amounts to one month's pay for each agent) and gifts where necessary:

3,000.00

$ 38,930.00

b. Basehouse rentals, utilities, and expenses:

LIMERICK Main Base	$ 1,920.00	
LIVERY Relay Base	504.00	
ANNEX IV	2,760.00	
ANNEX VI	1,920.00	
ANNEX VII	1,728.00	
ANNEX VIII	3,072.00	
ANNEX IX	2,880.00	
Proposed Relay Base	480.00	
Plus 10% customary increase in rent when lease contract renewed	1,600.00	
		$ 16,864.00

c. Equipment:

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	$ 2,500.00	
New equipment such as reels and recorders	3,000.00	
		5,500.00

d. Miscellaneous:

1. Expendable supplies such as paper, paper tape, etc.	2,000.00

2. Transportation

RAFANELLI QP Car	600.00
ZINSMEISTER mileage	400.00
LIFEUD-5 car rent	290.00
LIFEUD-7 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-8 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-14 car rent	290.00

att [illegible] 15252

50-6-34/1

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

3. Other operational expenses (covering loss of deposits, fatalities, termination payments*, medical payments, emergency moving bills, renovation of basehouses, expenses in covering targets of opportunity) 9, ~~25~~,000.00

$ ~~29,930.00~~ 13,930.00

GRAND TOTAL 98,401.00 $ ~~114,411.00~~

*Any termination of indigenous personnel will be in accordance with Mexican law and will include lump sum separation settlement, transportation and moving expense payments, and any bonus due at the time of termination.

[illegible] ~~SECRET/KAPOK~~ CS COPY 50-6-32/1

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

253

DATE : 23 JUNE 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : RG 2, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUN 24 13 05Z 60

REC'D [illegible] SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 16026

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 5782

REF: DIR 35879 (OUT 38257) *

FORWARDING LIFEAT RENEWAL TWO POUCHES 29 JUNE 1 JULY DUE KAROK CLASSIFICATION. [illegible] COMING ALONE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED LIFEAT PROJ RENEWAL SOONEST.

Lifeat / [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 2555
DATE : 21 JUNE 1960

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 5

INFO : [illegible] 2, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	JUN 21 23 46 Z 60
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT88257
OUT 88257

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

35879
35879

REQUEST LIFEAT PROJ RENEWAL SOONEST. ADVISE POUCHING DATE.

END OF MESSAGE

Lifeat Durrell

R. D. Johnson
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

Ned P. Holman
N. P. HOLMAN, AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

20 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

SUBJECT : Renewal of WH Division FI/CI Projects over $100,000

1. There is set forth below a list of WH Division FI/CI Projects, with an authorization of over $100,000, which expire as of 30 June 1960:

Project	Authorization
LIFEAT	$123,830

2. Possibly renewal actions are already in course of preparation for the above projects. If not, however, it is strongly urged that appropriate project action be submitted as soon as possible, and in any event not later than 15 July, so that these renewals can be submitted to DDCI for approval in timely fashion.

3. The same request applies to any other WH Division FI/CI projects, currently authorized for amounts under $100,000, if renewal will request authorization in excess of that figure.

S. M. Hines
S. M. HINES
Chief, DDP/PG

~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-7955

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/1

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE [illegible]

SUBJECT : LIFEAT Project Renewal

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED : Exploitation of LIFEAT leads

REFERENCE(S)

1. The LIFEAT Project renewal submitted in HMMA-12936 was approved on 16 July 1959 for the period 1 July 1959 through 30 June 1960 for a total of $123,830 for fiscal year 1960. The Station will note that monies requested for the support of Woodrow D. GABBOTT (ps) were subtracted from the request made by the Station for project funds. GABBOTT is supported by the BESMOOTH Project, an EE support project.

2. The following staff comments were made when the Project was submitted for approval:

a. "RQM has continued its rating of "C" on the disseminated positive information from the Project, noting a slight increase in the disseminations, and commenting that it provides interesting information to customers on the nature and extent of Bloc commercial activities in Mexico, data useful in economic analyses, and reports on exile activities in Mexico.

b. "KUTUBE/D recommended renewal of LIFEAT observing that the leads produced by the operation have been of operational value to LAURICLE activities conducted in Mexico City in the past year. KUTUBE/D comments also that the Project has afforded and can be expected to continue to afford CE protection from time to time for activities of particular LAURICLE interest.

c. "KUTUBE/OPS has observed that Project LIFEAT has been a most useful operational asset in the Mexico City Station for the past nine years, continuously providing KUBARK with a window into important targets. KUTUBE/OPS requests that the next project renewal point out what agent recruitments by the Station have resulted from or been supported by the operational information secured by the project.

d. "KUDESK commented that it well known that Mexico is being used by the RIS as a base for third country operations directed against the United States. Over a period of years LIFEAT has supplied valuable leads which have resulted in the identification of a large number of persons in clandestine contact with RIS officers; further investigation in several cases produced information which strongly indicated that the persons involved were actively assisting the RIS. While such information is, of itself, of interest and importance, our responsibility in the CI field imposes the obligation to determine what those persons are doing for the RIS and this can be done only by recruiting and doubling them. It is therefore suggested that LIFEAT leads and reports of investigations based on them be reviewed for the purpose of selecting a limited number of the more promising targets. Thereafter, Station assets including LIFEAT should be used to obtain the operational data necessary to determine that a target is recruitable, and then a pitch should be made. Much time and effort will be required for such a program, but the potential rewards fully justify it, and the value of LIFEAT, as a CI asset, will be materially increased.

3. Chief, KUTUBE, in recommending the Project for renewal to Deputy Director, KUBARK, requested that at the time of the next Project renewal, the Division should review the relationship and coordination of Project LIFEAT operations with those active and proposed under Project LIENVOY.

50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMMW-7955

4. In addition to the formal comments cited above, during the process of obtaining approval for LIFEAT, the Project was subject to various and sundry criticisms in its present form. Therefore, Headquarters suggests that the Station bear this in mind and during the coming year make every effort to increase the operational value of this Project. If the LIENVOY Project is a success operationally and the leads are followed up and developed, WH Division anticipates that it will encounter difficulty in obtaining approval of a similar Project as large and as expensive as LIFEAT unless it is demonstrated to the complete satisfaction of Headquarters that the expense involved in the LIFEAT Project is justified and that the results of the exploitation of project developed leads prove useful in attaining the Station CS objectives. Among the comments received are:

a. Although the purpose and objectives of the project as stated in the FPO call for the collection of information, the operational intent is to make use of this information for an eventual recruitment of Sino-Soviet and Satellite diplomats and/or their contacts. It is realized that diplomats who are susceptible to defection or recruitment in place are few and far between and that the Station is always alert for such targets and is conscientious in their development. However, the Case Officer should keep in mind the more easily accessible and more vulnerable (though secondary) targets, i.e. the many contacts, friends, employees, etc. whose development could well lead to the primary targets. Headquarters feels it is this secondary category where more emphasis can be made. The recruitment in place of such individuals could be extremely valuable for the entire CI/CE program of the Station.

b. The lack of development and exploitation of leads from LIFEAT operations has been raised many times. In view of the limited reporting to Headquarters on the exploitation of operational leads, it has been difficult to state whether the leads are being followed up, who the targets are, and whether consideration is being given to recruitment approaches. Headquarters requests that in each monthly summary the Station supply more info under the section labeled "Exploitation of Leads". The statement "leads resulting from LIFEAT information are followed up by other Station assets" is meaningless without some explanation of the lead follow ups. Headquarters would like to know the names and some operational information concerning the persons who seem to be of most interest and who have been under investigation during the period covered by the monthly summary.

5. On page 6 of your covering memorandum on the FPO (HMMA-12936), you indicate that during the coming year the Station expects to expand its coverage to approximately 24 lines. Headquarters would like to suggest that consideration be given to limiting coverage to a number of lines which can be effectively exploited.

6. It is requested that Headquarters be informed in more detail in all cases where information obtained through LIFEAT has been used to support other important Station operations.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

6 August 1959

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico

WH/3/Mexico/[illegible]

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMMA-13145
TO Chief, WHD INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 50-6-32/1
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico		19 June 1959
SUBJECT LIFEAT/LIFEAT Agent Status		RE. "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) X MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED Note new cryptonyms		

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-7761, 10 June 1959

1. Agent Service Records are being submitted on LIPSTICK-17, LIPSTICK-22 and LIMESTONE-10. LIPSTICK-17 and LIPSTICK-22 were unable to remain in Station's jurisdiction due to the health of a minor child and have returned to the north of this country.

2. Through oversight*LIQUATION-4(201-185370, OA of 2 Oct. 1957) who is now carried as LIFEUD-17 and*LIMITATION-7(201-114086, OA No. C-50457 dated 13 August 1956) and who is now carried as LIFEUD-18 were omitted from the Project Renewal Request. It is requested that their names be added to the list of Project personnel. They are not paid a salary but due to the occupation of their spouses are witting of the LIFEAT activity.

not eaidable

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

GFB
16 June 1959

Distribution:
3 - HQS

50-6-32/1

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT Renewal

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name: J. [illegible]. Brady

Room: 2114 Barton Hall

Ext.: 25[illegible] or [illegible]

Date: 15 June 1959

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1959 through 30 June 1960 for a total of $135,445.00.

2. Attached is the Field's Project Review, together with a revised Project Outline, which clearly set forth the present status of the Project. It is believed that the activity described herein continues to justify the time and expense involved, and hence merits renewal for the forthcoming year.

3. In March 1959 we asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their evaluation of the usefulness of information on American Communists which originated from LIFEAT and whether they wished to continue receiving such information. On 2 April 1959, the Federal Bureau of Investigation replied that the information has been of value to them from intelligence and investigative viewpoints and they wish to continue receiving such information.

4. LIFEAT was the source of information concerning the plans of Albert MALTZ and his wife for their trip to Europe and behind the Iron Curtain in May, June and July 1959. Through LIFEAT we learned that they were planning to try to contact Alfred Kaufman STERN and his wife Martha Dodd STERN and Maurice and Edith HALPERIN, American Communists who fled behind the Iron Curtain during the past two years. Based on information made available through LIFEAT, Headquarters has made arrangements for the MALTZ' to receive baggage searches and discreet surveillances at various points on their trip.

5. The Czech and Polish Desks in EE Division and the appropriate Desk in SR Division were asked to comment on the value of LIFEAT to them. All desks agreed that LIFEAT was a very valuable source of general background information on the Soviet, Czech and Polish diplomats and often provided information which could be obtained through no other source. The Czech Desk commented that LIFEAT was of most value as a support asset to the Station, providing leads which might be developed into operational assets by the Station personnel. In May 1959 the Polish Desk sent

~~SECRET~~

Woodrow L. GABBOT (ps-see LIFEAT personnel section) to Mexico PCS to process the take from the LITEUS phase of LIFEAT. They feel that with this Contract Agent processing LITEUS, this phase will greatly increase in value during the coming year. GABBOT will be in a position to call operational leads to the attention of the Station Case Officer immediately for exploitation. SR noted that LIFEAT has been an invaluable support asset for REDSKIN and has been at times the only source of information for the important SR operation.

6. The State Department evaluated LIFEAT reports on the following subjects to be of value and probably true. They wish to continue receiving reports on these subjects.

"Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico"
"Soviet Attempt to Barter Equipment for Mexican Coffee"
"Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico"

ORR evaluated a report on "Soviet Attempt to Barter Equipment for Mexican Coffee" and a report on "Polish Embassy Interest in Mexican Copper Concentrates" to be of value.

Attachments:
- FPS (in quad)
- Folder with past approvals
- Form 610 (in quad)
- Envelope with true names

R. E. Wahlren, C/WH/III

C. W. Anderson, AD/PI

J. C. King, C/WH

Date

~~SECRET~~

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMM-7761

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-32/1

DATE: 10 JUN 195

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : LIFEAT/LIFEAT Agent Status

ACTION REQUIRED: See Below

RE 43.3 — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S): HMMA-12936, 22 May 1959 (KAPOK)

1. According to Headquarters records, LIPSTICK-17, LIPSTICK-22, LIQUATION-4, and LIMITATION-7 have been cleared for use in the LIFEAT Project. Since the above mentioned agents are not included in the LIFEAT Field Project Outline, you are requested to notify Headquarters whether or not you wish their clearances to be kept active for future use in the Project. Please forward Agent Service Records on those who have been terminated.

2. You are also requested to submit an Agent Service Record for LIMESTONE-10 who, according to the referenced dispatch, was terminated last year for security reasons.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

5 June 1959

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
- 1 - RI

M. Therrien

WH/III/Mexico/M.Therrien:jlc

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

FORM | USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS | CLASSIFICATION | PAGE NO

~~SECRET~~

5 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : Change of Cryptonyms for LIFEAT Indigenous Personnel

The following agents under the LIFEAT Project have been assigned new cryptonyms as follows:

LIMEWATER	OC 739	LIFEUD-1
LIMEWATER-1	C-50649	LIFEUD-2
LIMEWATER-2	C-[illegible]4357	LIFEUD-3
LIMITATION-3	OC 6970	LIFEUD-4
LIQUATION	OC 7495	LIFEUD-5
LILAC	C-30405	LIFEUD-6
LIMESTONE-4	C-31[illegible]9	LIFEUD-7
LIPSTICK-18	C-33182	LIFEUD-8
LIMESTONE-8	C-45672	LIFEUD-9
LIMESTONE-9	C-59464	LIFEUD-10
LIQUATION-2	C-50455	LIFEUD-11
LIPSTICK-35	C-50157	LIFEUD-12
LIPSTICK-37	C-50750	LIFEUD-13
LIQUATION-1	C-38015	LIFEUD-14
LIQUATION-3	C-54096	LIFEUD-15
LIMEWATER-6	C-70322	LIFEUD-16

R. N. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Memo Chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/M.Therrien:jlc

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMM-A-12936
[redacted]-1631

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/1

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

TO Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE 22 May 1959

SUBJECT LIFEAT Project Renewal Request

RE "43 J" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
Renewal of Project LIFEAT for FY 1960

REFERENCE(S)
REF: HMM-W-6820, 24 Sept. 1958

1. There is attached a Review of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1958 to 30 June 1959.

2. Part I of the Outline has been revised this year. Station Mexico felt that with the number of revisions which have been made since a complete project renewal request was submitted for FY 1958, this was warranted. It should be noted that for purposes of uniformity all indigenous personnel in the LIFEAT complex have now been given on cryptonym and at present this breakdown goes from /1 to /16. Any future personnel changes will be added to this numbering series.

3. Part II is submitted in its entirety.

4. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be renewed for FY 1960 for the amount indicated herein.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments: 1. Odd pages(5 sets)
2. Even pages(5 sets) S.C

AN 4072
AB X
IN
PS
BY
DES | EYD
PI
419

Distribution:

3 - HQS w/5 sets atts

FPS/GFB
21 May 1959

Remove from Project: [illegible] 50-6-32/1
CS Classification:
JOB # 73-75/77
Box: Fold:

50-6-32/1

FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment to
HMM-A-12936
KAPOK-1631

PROJECT REVIEW - LIFEAT

1. **Product of the Project**

The Soviet Embassy

a. Soviet Commercial Activities;

During the past year reports submitted from screening the LIFEAT/LIMERICK take of the two established Soviet commercial offices have provided a great amount of detail concerning Soviet efforts to sell in the Latin American market. Following is a list of a few of the reports submitted as a result of the intelligence gained from this source;

HMM-[illegible], 27 Aug. 1958 - Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

HMM-[illegible], 21 Jan. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

MEXI-[illegible], 2 Feb. 1959, Identity of Soviet Technician

HMM-[illegible], 18 Feb. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

HMM-[illegible], 18 Mar. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

HMM-[illegible], 10 Apr. 1959, Commercial Contact of USSR and Poland in Mexico

HMM-[illegible], 17 Apr. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico.

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities;

This project has provided coverage and details of some of the diplomatic activities of the Soviets in Mexico. It has served to show the relationships maintained, culturally, socially and diplomatically between the Soviets and the members of the Satellite establishments in Mexico.

HMM-A-11723, 17 Dec. 1958, Soviet Embassy Reception on 7 Nov. 1958

HMM-A-11794, 24 Dec. 1958, Soviet Delegates to Inauguration of President Adolfo LOPEZ Mateos

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

52-6-32/1

c. Soviet Cultural Activities:

Information produced by LIFEAT has given details of Soviet activities in connection with cultural activities. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-A-11594, 26 Nov. 1958, Soviet Representative at World Film Festival Held in Mexico City, 10-28 Oct. 1958 - Ivan A. PYRYEV

HMM-A-12225, 25 Feb. 1959, Soviet Participants in Pablo CASALS International Competition Held in Jalapa 18 Jan. - 1 Feb. 1959

HMM-3923 , 31 Dec. 1958, Pablo CASALS Participants

HMM-4004, 2 Feb. 1959, Pablo CASALS Competition Participants

MEXI-3634, 2 Apr. 1959, Contact with Chinese Ballet Troupe

d. Movement of Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT coverage a roster of Soviet personnel currently in Mexico has been maintained by Station Mexico. This has been the primary source of such information. LIFEAT has enabled the Station to determine in advance when departures can be expected and has also been a factor in determining job assignments and replacements for departing personnel.

e. Soviet Embassy Contacts:

Contact reports of the Soviets are compiled and provided for Headquarters as necessary. These reports are of considerable operational value in identifying regular and/or occasional local and foreign contacts of the Soviets. Following are examples of this type of coverage:

HMM-A-12295, 4 Mar. 1959, Soviet Contacts in Mexico - Haile ATSBEHA, Ethiopian

HMM-A-11838, 7 Jan. 1959 - Orville M. MULLIKIN

f. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials;

LIFEAT has provided the Station with the most productive source of information concerning the private and official lives of the Soviets assigned to Mexico. These reports have been submitted on individuals, e.g., HMM-A-11463, 5 Nov. 1958, Activities of Yevgeniy M. POPOV, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, June 1957 - October 1958; HMM-A-11569, 10 Dec. 1958, Boris G. PUTILIN, Employee, Military Attache Office, Mexico City; HMM-A-12755, 30 April 1959, Boris M. STRELTSOV, and HMM-A-12000, 28 Jan. 1959, Aleksandr M. BROVKIN.

g. Goods and Services;

Information on Goods and Services obtained from LIFEAT was used in Project LIMESA.

h. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy;

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their associates and related activities has been reported as necessary.

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review is essentially the same as that from the Soviet Embassy. Representative of the reports submitted from this information are the following personnel reports;

HMM-A-12069, 4 Feb. 1959, Alois LICEK

HMM-A-12067, 4 Feb. 1959, Jaroslav KREJZA

HMM-A-12091, 4 Feb. 1959, Bedrich PISTORA and

HMM-A-12128, 11 Feb. 1959, Oldrich SPORCR.

The Polish Legation

Information on this installation parallels that on the Czech and Soviet installations. The largest amount of information concerning the Polish Legation has been procured from LIFEAT. Following are examples of reports from this source;

HMM-A-12420, 18 Mar. 1959, Contacts of Aleksandr BEKIER, Polish Counselor

HMM-A-10883, 20 Aug. 1958, Mieczyslaw WLODAREK, Polish Minister

HMM-A-12376, 11 Mar. 1959, Antonio O. MARCEYNSKY

HMM-A-12393, 11 Mar. 1959, Polish Legation publication.

Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

[illegible] CP[illegible]

A significant amount of information concerning the Communist Party in Mexico and the Communist front organizations in Mexico was obtained from LIFEAT. Information from LIFEAT has been invaluable in supplementing agent coverage of the front-organizations which exist here. Examples of this type reporting include;

HMM-A-11411, The Narciso BASSOLS Family and Polish Legation

HMM-A-11412, 5 Nov. 1958, Travel of Narciso BASSOLS.

American Communists in Mexico

Most of these targets have been covered at the request of ODENVY and the production has been partially processed by them. A total of 572 reels was provided them for processing during a 10-month period ending 30 April 1959. Samples of the reporting done from this source include;

HMM-A-12719, 24 April 1959, Noah and Anna SEBORER

HMM-A-12013, 28 Jan. 1959, Anna and Noah SEBORER

HMM-A-12460, 20 Mar. 1959, Albert MALTZ

HMM-A-11851, 7 Jan. 1959, Albert MALTZ.

Foreign Dissident Groups in Mexico

LIFEAT provided partial coverage of Cuban exile groups and gave current information on the status of the "26 July Movement" prior to its overthrow of the BATISTA government in Cuba and has continued to provide information on the current status of the Cubans in Mexico.

LAURICLE Information

LIFEAT has contributed materially to several matters having LAURICLE interest.

Counter-Intelligence Information

CI/CE matters constitute a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives. Project LIFEAT has contributed to the attainment of these objectives. The two BGMORNING installations have provided valuable information for the responsible Case Officer on the matters involved therein.

Conclusion

The Mexico City Station believes that the product of the LIFEAT Project measured against the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

2. Progress of the Operation

Definite progress has been made in reporting on the objectives of the LIFEAT Project. However, since LIFEAT objectives are of a continuing nature and are not designed to be achieved, no statistics can be cited as to the percentage of coverage on each objective. A general indication of the coverage can be derived when it is realized that some 10,000 pages of raw text in 10 months are the direct result of the operation from which the statistics cited above were derived. Except for a period in July and August 1958, following the termination of members of the James O. AYCALL family, LIFEAT has been in daily operation with some 12-16 lines being covered. These may be broken down as follows;

Soviet Embassy	5 lines
Czech Legation	2 lines(moved during this period and only in operation for approximately 2 months)
Polish Legation	3 lines(third installed in April 1959)
American Communists	3 lines
Remainder	5 lines.

3. Planning for the Future

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring of approximately 24 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for exploiting important targets of opportunity. At the present time and with the new system effected for LIFEAT lines, Station believes that 24 will be the maximum number of lines which can be properly handled and handled securely by the personnel currently available for LIFEAT.

4. Performance of Agents

In general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good and secure during the past year. The personnel from the AYCALL group were terminated during this period and compartmentation has been employed in the re-assignment of tasks among LIFEAT chain. In view of the high degree of security necessary for the personnel involved in this operation, it is planned to screen very carefully any possible candidates before they are approached for use in this operation after prior approval has been procured from Headquarters for an approach.

5. Expenditures during Period under Review

Approval was granted for the period under review, 1 July 1958 - 30 June 1959 to spend $159,590.00. The proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1960 is contained in the attached Field Project Outline Part II.

6. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the outline and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

PROJECT OUTLINE

PROJECT: LIFEAT

PART I

1. **Area of Operations**

This project is run from the Mexico City Station. It is concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. **Purpose**

The purpose of this project is to determine Sino-Soviet and Satellite plans, activities and connections with other Communist elements through the use of technical surveillance. This purpose is in consonance with the Related Mission Directive for Mexico, Priority A, Objective One.

3. **Background**

Project LIFEAT was initially approved on 3 October 1950. Actual operations began 18 January 1951 and have run continuously since that time. The LIFEAT Project was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has been expanded since that time to where the present coverage averages 18 lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and is staffed by KUBARK staff and contract employees with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the past eight years Project LIFEAT has produced more than 55,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence-gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet and Satellite Bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has major interest.

4. **References**

a. HMM-A-10198, 31 May 1958, Renewal Request for FY 1959

b. HMM-W-6820, 24 Sept. 1958, Approval of Renewal Request for FY 1959.

5. Objectives

a. To identify Soviet and Satellite intelligence personnel and to collect information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico,

b. To collect information on Soviet and Satellite commercial, diplomatic, cultural and military personnel and their activities in Mexico.

c. To collect biographic information on Soviet and Satellite officials.

d. To collect information on the movements, assignments and positions of Soviet and Satellite personnel.

e. To collect information on prominent Mexico Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

f. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexicans, active in Mexico and to identify them and their associates.

g. To collect information on exile groups active in Mexico.

h. To collect information on targets of opportunity in Mexico.

6. Targets

For objectives "a" through "d" -

a. Selected Soviet Embassy and commercial office telephone conversations.

b. Selected Satellite office and home phones.

For objective "e" -

c. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior Communists or pro-Communists.

For objective "f" -

d. Telephone conversations from the residences of known American Communists.

For objective "g"

e. Telephone conversations emanating from the residences and/or offices of selected targets, i.e., LIERODE, in Mexico.

For objective "h" -

f. Telephone conversations which can be monitored of targets of opportunity, e.g., BOMORNING.

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward P. SECHEN

Asst. Case Officer - Gene F. BRADDOCK

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases ~~LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITMUS, LIVERY~~, LIERODE, BOMORNING and American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

d. Coordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses and training of the personnel therein.

8. Coordination

a. Information produced by LIFEAT is closely coordinated with other operations at the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other area but they are kept informed of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LINOG, which supports David M. WILSTED, who is the principal outside LIFEAT Case Officer, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT. MH

c. Project BESMOOTH which supports Woodrow D CABBOT, the [illegible] from the [illegible] has is effected in CO. coordination with Project LIFEAT

9. Personnel

a. Staff Agents;

Ralph B.#RAFANELLI - under unofficial commercial cover(201-176295)

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment
HMM-A-12936
KAPOK-1631
Page 10

b. Contract Agents/Employees;

1. David M. *WILSTED(201-009195) - principal outside case officer
[illegible] Project [illegible] under Project [illegible]
2. Alice M. *CAILLETEAU(201-119967) - clerical work C-47041
3. Olivia N. *GLADMON(201-117751) - processes tapes and does clerical work C-46546
4. Carol K. *ZINSMEISTER(201-117968) - processes major portion of LIFEAT take. C-47572
5. Wallace L. *KAWOHL(201-033959) - basehouse operator OC-3977
(aka LIMITATION)
6. Leona C.*GANDARA(201-) - LIFEAT clipping C-6157
[illegible]
~~7. Woodrow D. *GABBOT(201-144465) - processor for LITMUS take~~

In Project BESMOOTH [illegible]

c. Field Agents;

*LIFEUD-1 formerly LIMEWATER(201-183704) OA 17 Oct. 1950 OC-739

*LIFEUD-2 formerly LIMEWATER-1(201-117970) OA 14 Aug. 1951 OC-1412

*LIFEUD-3 formerly LIMEWATER-2(201-117971) OA 14 Dec. 1953 OC-7452

*LIFEUD-4 formerly LIMITATION-3(201-117743) OA 1 Oct. 1953 OC-6970

*LIFEUD-5 formerly LIQUATION(201-117744) OA 16 Dec. 1953 OC-7476

*LIFEUD-6 formerly LILACE(201-117978) OA 28 Sept. 1954 C-30465

*LIFEUD-7 formerly LIMESTONE-4(201-117980) OA 21 Oct. 1954 C-31459

*LIFEUD-8 formerly LIPSTICK-13(201-119521) OA 31 Mar. 1955 C-33182

*LIFEUD-9 formerly LIMESTONE-8(201-117984) OA 27 Apr. 1956 C-45672

*LIFEUD-10 formerly LIMESTONE-9(201-114085) OA 13 Sept. 1956 C-50464

*LIFEUD-11 formerly LIQUATION-2(201-113595) OA 21 Aug. 1956 C-50455

~~SECRET~~ - KAPOK

*LIFEUD-12 formerly LIPSTICK-35(201-113596) OA 6 Aug. 1956 C-50157

*LIFEUD-13 formerly LIPSTICK-37(201-115833) OA 13 Sept. 1956 C-50150

*LIFEUD-14 formerly LIQUATION-1(201-117972) OA 26 Sept. 1956 C-38015

*LIFEUD-15 formerly LIQUATION-3(201-126315) OA 19 Jan. 1957 C-54096

*LIFEUD-16 formerly LIMEWATER-6(201-222786) OA 2 July 1958. C-70322

d. Personnel dropped from the Project;

Following indigenous personnel were terminated for security reasons during FY 1959;

LIMESTONE-1
LIMESTONE-2
LIMESTONE-3
LIMESTONE-5
LIMESTONE-7
LIMESTONE-10.

Frances M. MENZIE resigned during FY 1959.
Janet N DELACRUZ is not now active but her clearance is being kept open.
Daniel K. BROMUND returned PCS to Headquarters during this period.
Louise J MARINO was transferred to LIEMPTY Project in February 1959.

10. Operational Clearances

Please see 9.

11. Cover

~~Woodrow D. GABBOT enjoys fictional cover as Researcher for a PBPRIME Research Council.~~ Drop per C.O.

Other cover remains the same as that submitted in HMM-A-7063 except for David M. WILSTED who is engaged in insurance business since he has procured his "Inmigrado" status.

12. Contact and Communications

a. Daily contact and communications between the Case Officer and the agents and undercover personnel in this Project is maintained in a clandestine manner. Various patterns have been established by which the agents and case officers follow pre-arranged signals for meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, pre-arranged meetings are held at night. All movement in and out of bases by the Case Officers and Principal Agents is done in cars ostensibly owned by agents except in the case of LIVERY where agents are too old to drive. One of the indigenous agents is used to contact LIVERY base. Entrance to bases on foot is made only in great emergencies.

b. Telephonic contact concerning the Project and with agents is kept to a minimum and code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents.

c. Alternate and emergency signals have been arranged.

d. In general these systems of contact and communication appear to be suitable for the Project and function adequately from a security viewpoint. Locations and times of meetings are changed frequently to prevent discovery.

13. Control and Motivation

Control and motivation seem to be based on two factors primarily; ideological and monetary. A third controlling factor would be fear of reprisal from local police should discovery occur.

14. Equipment and Support

It is believed probable that a great deal of replacement equipment will be required by the Project during FY 1960 since much of the current equipment installed and working has been in use for the length of the Project and since this equipment is no longer being manufactured, replacement parts will be unobtainable soon and new units will be required.

15. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment
HMM-A-12936
KAPOK-1631
Page 13

PROJECT OUTLINE

PART II

PROJECT: LIFEAT

17. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1960. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to the rise in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansion, LIFEAT costs will be higher than in the past.

a. Salaries:

1. Staff and Contract Personnel

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-9	
Salary	$5985.00
Quarters	2304.00
~~Woodrow D. GABBOT~~	
~~Salary~~	~~9890.00**~~
~~**(Since this subject's contract has not been received, this figure is based on statement he is GS-13 and minimum figure taken)~~	
~~Quarters~~	~~1728.00~~
Translator(LIMERICK) GS-12 not yet named(This is established in hopes that the Project will be able to live-monitor portion of LIMERICK traffic)	
Salary	8330.00
Quarters	2400.00
Transportation	1000.00
HHE move	1500.00
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER - salary	5400.00
Alice N. CAILLETEAU - salary	2000.00
Olivia N. GIADMON - piecework	4200.00
Wallace L. KAWOHL - salary	1728.00
Leona C. GANDARA - salary	900.00
TOTAL	$47,365.00
	11,618
	$35,747.00

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

2\.

Field Agents	Presently	Possible Raise
LIFEUD-1	$5764.61	
LIFEUD-2	2498.00	
LIFEUD-3	1633.00	
LIFEUD-1's helper	144.12	
LIFEUD-4	1921.54	
LIFEUD-5	3650.92	
LIFEUD-6	3000.00	
LIFEUD-7	2113.69	
LIFEUD-8	1921.54	
LIFEUD-9	1633.31	
LIFEUD-10 no salary		
LIFEUD-11 no salary		
LIFEUD-12 no salary		
LIFEUD-13 no salary		
LIFEUD-14	3650.92	
LIFEUD-15	768.61	
LIFEUD-16	960.77	

(Due to continued increases in cost of living, it is expected than an over-all raise of 10% will be made during FY 1960 to the agents above listed. Adjustments will be made in peso amounts should devaluation of the peso occur during FY 1960) $3300.00

Christmas bonus (In accordance with local custom this amounts to one-month's pay for each agent) and gifts where necessary $3,000.00

TOTAL $35,961.03

b\. Basehouse rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK Main Base	$1969.55	
LIVERY Relay Base	585.00	
ANNEX IV	3000.00	
ANNEX VI	2260.00	
ANNEX VII	2000.00	
ANNEX VIII	3375.00	
Proposed basehouse	3500.00	
TOTAL		$16,689.55

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment
HMM-A-12936
KAPOK-1631
Page 15

c. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	$2500.00	
New equipment, i.e., reels, recorders	3000.00	
TOTAL		$5,500.00

d. Miscellaneous

1. Supplies(paper,rolls,etc.)2000.00

2. Transportation

RAFANELLI QP car	600.00
ZI SMEISTER mileage	400.00
LIFEUD-7 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-5 car rent	290.00
LIFEUD-8 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-14 car rent	290.00
TOTAL	2930.00

3. Other operational expenses(to cover loss of deposits, fatalities, serious emergencies, separation payments, medical payments, emergency moving bills, renovation of basehouses and expenses involved in covering targets of opportunity)
25,000.00

TOTAL	29,930.00
GRAND TOTAL	$135,445.~~00~~
	11 918
	#123,527

SECRET ~~KAPOK~~

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

039 RAY/JLS

DATE : 19 MAY 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MAY 20 0930Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 18853

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 3899 (WARE ACTING)

CRYPTONYM NUMBER 518 ASSIGNED LIFEAT INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL THROUGH/16 AS FOLLOWS: 1. LIMEWATER; 2. LIMEWATER-1; 3. LIMEWATER-~~2~~5; 4. LIMITATION-3; 5. LIQUATION; 6. LILACE; 7. LIMESTONE-4; 8. LIPSTICK-18; 9. LIMESTONE-8; 10. LIMESTONE-9; 11. LIQUATION-2; 12. LIPSTICK-35; 13. LIPSTICK-37; 14. LIQUATION-1; 15. LIQUATION-3; 16. LIMEWATER-6.

END OF MESSAGE

File Lifeat/[illegible] [illegible]

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-7649

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/1

DATE 13 MAY 1959

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT - LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - See below.

RE: "427" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

HDGM-6820, 24 September 1958

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1959. It is requested that the Station's request for the Project renewal be submitted to Headquarters prior to the expiration date.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

11 May 1959

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono
- 1 - RI

Scaletti

WH/III/Mexico/E. I. SCALETTI:mpm

13 May 59

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMW-6820

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/1

DATE: 24 SEP 1958

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : Operational/LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED : None

RE "413" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

a. HMMA-10198, 31 May 1958
b. HMMW-6555, 3 July 1958
c. MEXI-2031, 22 July 1958

1. Project LIFEAT was renewed on 9 September 1958 for the period 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1959 for a total of $159,590.

2. KUTUBE/OPS recommended that the Station make an increased effort to reduce the amount of paper work for the case officer to allow him sufficient time to go beyond the surveillance-investigative phase of handling the many operational leads and be in a position for more agent recruitment efforts. KUTUBE suggested that several of the lines which are of marginal value be deactivated, temporarily at least, to assist in this effort.

3. The project review forwarded with HMMA-10198 was submitted for approval as prepared in the field with the exception of Part II which had to be retyped in view of the number of changes and additions required. The only changes made in the Project review - LIFEAT section was the deletion of several examples of reports originating from several LIFEAT sources. These deletions (such as the last five examples of reports on Soviet Commercial Activities) were made because the reports did not originate with LIFEAT eventhough they did concern the Subject being discussed. Part I of the Project Outline excerpts submitted by the field was also submitted for approval--the only change made was the omission of the field's request for a change in paragraph 6 of the Project Outline on Objectives. Headquarters did not think subparagraph "f" should be deleted.

4. Attached for our information and records is a complete copy of the Renewal Request. It is requested that you review the memorandum, "WH Division's Comments on the LIFEAT Project Renewal", and the new Part II, paying particular attention to the personnel included therein. This request is being made in view of the conflicting information Headquarters received from the Station Case Officer who was on TDY in Headquarters (DIR 31900-16 July 1958) and from the field (MEXI-2031) in reply to HMMW-6555.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

19 September 1958

Attachments: Even pages (KAPOK)
u/s/c: Odd pages (KAPOK)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City (w/a)
1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom.
1 - RI

Scaletti

WH/3/Mexico/E.I.SCALETTI:ngs

50-6-32/1

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

022 CR/WS/ws

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 11

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 22 JULY 1958

22

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, S/C 2

JUL 24 07 34 58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 19357

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2031

LIFEAT

REF: HMMW 6555

1. PARA 1. ONLY LIEDDY TO BE USED.

2. PARA 2. SUBJECTS IDENTICAL. NO PLANS TO USE.

3. PARA 3. LIMESTONE 10 NOT USED. HUSBANDS SERVICES TERMINATED 15 JULY 58. LIPSTICK 37 NO RECORD EMPLOYMENT AT STATION. LIMESTONE 9 WITTING BUT NEVER USED PER STATION RECORDS.

4. PARA 4. NEW LICOOL PROJECT BEING WRITTEN. DO NOT INCLUDE WITH LIFEAT.

5. PARA 5. SUBJS OF MEXI 1816 (IN 44759) FIRED 15 JULY. PLAN TO REPLACE SO PLEASE ALLOW FOR REPLACEMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

21 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT/LIMERICK

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chief, SR from Chief, WH/III dated 2 July 1958

According to a telephone call from Herb Manell of SR/10 on 23 July 1958 SR Division believes that information produced by Project LIFEAT on the RIS and the Soviets is most valuable. He stated that this project is the chief source of information other than physical surveillance.

The only recommendation that SR Division would make is that the field be more selective in the reporting that is transmitted to Headquarters. (This recommendation has already been passed to the field)

John B. Brady
C/WH/Mexico

~~SECRET~~

17 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT : LITMUS Phase of LIFEAT Project

REFERENCE : WH/III Memorandum dated 2 July 1958

1. Due to a period of dormancy, the LITMUS phase of the LIFEAT Project has furnished a relatively small amount of reporting, during the past year, concerning BEDOX officials and their activities in Mexico. While small in quantity, the information furnished has been of considerable operational value because of the nature of the operation and the fact that it serves as a major source of data on the BEDOX target. The LITMUS operation has furnished accurate travel data, information on the function and scope of activity engaged in by the BEDOX personalities we are interested in and has helped us determine the number of contacts the BEDOX installation maintains with the local citizenry in the course of its activities. In the last case, the LITMUS operation has linked a local citizen, long suspected of Soviet Bloc intelligence activity, with one known and one suspected BEDOX intelligence officer serving under diplomatic cover in Mexico. This local citizen is now the subject of an extensive effort to prove his Soviet Bloc intelligence role and to determine the extent of his activity. Finally, the LITMUS operation has begun to furnish valuable operational data on a BEDOX personality who has recently arrived to assume a consular post. This particular BEDOX official was recommended to the field as a target of interest because of his past intelligence background. We feel confident that the LITMUS operation will aid considerably in our effort to monitor the activities of this individual.

2. Now that the LITMUS phase of the LIFEAT operation has, once again, begun to function, we believe that the information obtained therefrom will show a steady increase in operational value during the coming year.

PETER K. HEIMANN
Chief, SR/P

~~SECRET~~

16 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia from Chief, WH/III, subject as above, dated 2 July 1958

Before its suspension in January 1958, the LIVERY phase of Project LIFEAT provided biographic data on the members of the Czech Legation in Mexico City which EE/C found useful in the evaluation of these individuals as possible targets. If the LIVERY phase of the project is resumed, it is anticipated that it would continue to provide similarly useful information. For this reason EE/C is interested in seeing Project LIFEAT renewed.

PHILO [illegible]
Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia

~~SECRET~~

14-00000

554 MJ/SW/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S E C R E T~~

554

ORIG : C. ZTHRUNG
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 16 JULY 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, TSS 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

16 10 30z

CABLE SEC

	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT50935
OUT 50935

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 31906
31906

REF HMMW 6555

NO NEED REPLY PARAS ONE, TWO, THREE, FIVE REF. DISCUSSED WITH SECHEN. LICOOL NOT INCLUDED LIFEAT RENEWAL REQUEST. RE PARA FOUR REF HQS DOES NOT THINK LICOOL FALLS UNDER OBJECTIVES, TARGETS, ETC MKCHARITY PROJ NOR IS IT AN OP WHICH SHOULD BE FUNDED BY KURIOT. THEREFORE SINCE STATION WISHES WITHDRAW LICOOL FROM LIFEAT REQUEST NEW PROJ SOONEST SO LICOOL EXPENSES CAN BE COVERED BY APPROVED PROJ.

END OF MESSAGE

Lifeat/1

J. C. King

R. N. Dahlgren

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~S E C R E T~~

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM : LIFEAT

DIVISION : Western Hemisphere

STATION : Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER

Name: J. R. Brady

Room: 1211, Barton Hall

Ext.: 2555

Date: 16 July 1958

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1959 for a total of ~~$159,589.76.~~ 159,590 156,055 /MF

2. Attached is a Project Review of LIFEAT which was prepared by the field, a memorandum giving WH Division comments on the LIFEAT Project Renewal, and revisions to those sections of the Field Project Outline Part I which have changed since last year when a new Project Outline was submitted. A new Part II containing a detailed breakdown of the estimated costs for FY 1959 is also attached.

ROBERT N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

J. C. KING, C/WHD

Attachments:
- WH Division Comments on LIFEAT Project Renewal
- Project Review - LIFEAT
- Project Outline Part I (Excerpts)
- Project Outline Part II
- Folder with past Renewals
- Form 680 (in quad)
- Envelope with true names

SECRET

SECRET

WH Division Comments on LIFEAT Project Renewal

1. At the end of January 1958, telephone linemen discovered our tap on the LIVERY installation leading into one of our base houses. As a result of this all LIFEAT operations were suspended as of 31 January and 1 February 1958 pending the outcome of what appeared to be an involved investigation by the Mexican Telephone Company. The LIMEWATER's disclosed that the telephone company was not investigating the situation and the operation was secure. The first line from the LIMERICK group was put in again on 17 March 1958. During the same month coverage of one American Communist was also re-instated. As of the end of April, the Station had coverage on the following lines: 3 LIMERICK, 1 LITCOPPERS, 1 LITMUS, 1 American Communist, 1 Target of Opportunity, and 1 Mexican Soviet Contact. Since the partial re-instatement of LIFEAT coverage there has been no indication that suspicion of the activity exists on the part of the Mexican Telephone Company or security services. In order to provide more secure LIFEAT coverage, a new system of installation of technical surveillance is now in effect. This system prohibits the opposition from detecting any LIFEAT lines with a voltage meter.

2. The following new personnel have been included in this Project renewal request:

a. LIEMPTY (Leona C. GANDARA - ps), a U. S. citizen and wife of a Staff Agent, was issued CSA on 24 June 1958 as a LIFEAT processor. The field is preparing a contract for her. (C-61557)

b. LIMENU-1 (Janet N. DELACOUR - ps), a U. S. citizen, was issued an Operational Approval on 31 January 1958 for use as a LIFEAT processor. She is motivated by patriotic loyalty. Financial remuneration will provide additional control. The field has been requested to prepare a formal contract for her. (C-64393)

c. LIMEWATER-6 is an employee of the Mexican Telephone Company and is LIMEWATER's assistant. His motivation at this time is believed to be financial. A POA was granted LIMEWATER-6 on 14 May 1958. An Operational Approval has been requested. (C-70322)

d. LIQUATION-4, wife of LIQUATION-1, occupies a basehouse with her husband. She received an OA on 2 October 1957. She will receive no remuneration.

3. LIMESTONE-9, LIMESTONE-10, LIQUATION-2, LIPSTICK-35, LIPSTICK-37 and LIMITATION-7 are still active under Project LIFEAT. They receive no remuneration. Therefore, their names do not appear on the list of LIFEAT agents on the attached Part II of the Project Outline.

SECRET

4. LIMITATION-5 (C-24845) and LIMITATION-6 (C-39418) who were included under Project LIFEAT when it was last renewed, have been withdrawn from this project and were included under the LIESTICK Project renewal which was approved on 3 December 1957.

5. The LICOOL phase has been removed from Project LIFEAT since these two technical operations are completely compartmented. The funding for LICOOL and its facilities will be covered by another project.

14-00000

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10196
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT REVIEW - LIFEAT

1. Product of the Project

The Soviet Embassy -

a. Soviet Commercial Activities:

During the past year reports submitted from screening the traffic of the two established Soviet Commercial Offices in Mexico have provided a great amount of detail concerning Soviet efforts to sell in the Latin American market, both heavy industrial merchandise and movies and literature. Knowledge of their methods of transhipping and attempts at concealment of point of origin of products has been gleaned from this take. As a result of this knowledge, reports on the firms with whom they are doing business have been procured and provided for background information. Following are a list of the reports submitted as a result of intelligence procured from this source:

HMM-3083 Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico
HMM-3165, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico
HMM-3286 - Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico, December 1957
~~HMM-3253 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Michoacana del Occidente, S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3264 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Servicio Agricola, S.A.~~
~~HMM-3139 - Anilinas y Productos Quimicos S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3404 - Imports into Mexico from Soviet Union~~
~~HMM-A-9519 - American Cyanid Co., Jalco Chemical Division~~

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities:

This project has provided coverage and details of some of the diplomatic activities of the Soviets in Mexico. It has served to show the relationships maintained, culturally, socially and diplomatically, between the Soviets and the members of the Satellite establishments in Mexico.

HMM-3215, Soviet Attendance at Yugoslav Reception
HMM-3351 - Reception at Soviet Embassy.
HMM-2992 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City
HMM-2849 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City

c. Soviet Cultural Activities:

Information produced by LIFEAT has given details of Soviet activities in connection with publications, cultural institutes, and related activities. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-2870 - Soviet Embassy Reception for Mexican Musicians
HMM-2847 - Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy
HMM-3080, Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

d. Soviet Military Activities:

Monthly reports on the activities of Soviet military personnel, knowledge of which was obtained from LIFEAT, and their contacts in military circles in Mexico have proved to be of especial interest to ODYOKE service attaches in Mexico.

e. Movements of Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT coverage a roster of Soviet personnel presently in Mexico has been maintained by Station Mexico. This has been the primary source of such information. LIFEAT has enabled the Station to determine in advance when departures can be expected for the Soviets, prior to their permanent departure, normally stock up on clothing and occasionally other items throught to be in short supply in the USSR.

f. Soviet Embassy Contacts:

Contacts reports of the Soviets are compiled and provided Headquarters as necessary. These reports are of considerable operation value in identifying local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets are in regular contact. Following are examples of this type of coverage:

HMM-2841 - MONTES y BRADLEY (fnu)
HMM-3199 - Narciso BASSOLS Contacts with the Soviet Embassy.

g. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials:

LIFEAT has provided the Station with the most productive source of information concerning the private and official lives of the Soviets assigned here. These reports have been submitted on dindividuals, e.g. HMM-A-9504, Aleksey N. CHERKASOV, and also under one cover, HMM-A-9656, January 1958 Report of Personnel Activities.

h. Goods and Services:

Periodic reports of the persons and institutions known to be providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy have been of considerable value in developing and mounting a LAURICLE operation. Information of this type has also been of considerable value to the Station in the LIMOSA operation.

i. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy:

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their associates and related activities has been reported as necessary.

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review is essentially the same as that from the Soviet Embassy. To avoid repetition, only a brief summary of the information submitted will be given here.

a. Czech Personnel Reports:

HMMW-3164, Activities of Zdenek KOTA and HMMW-3236, Travel of Czech Legation personnel, are examples of the type of reports made from the personality and activity information acquired from LIFEAT coverage of this installation. HMMW-3262, Cocktail Party at Czech Residence, is an example of the reports from this source on diplomatic activities of this installation.

b. Spot Reports on Czech Legation Activities:

Reports on a spot basis which were of interest included:

~~HMMW-3074, Czech Concern over Possible Expulsion from Mexico.~~
HMMW 3126 [illegible] of Czech [illegible] Legation
and Czech Exposition

Polish Legation

Information on this installation closely parallels that obtained on the Czech Legation and the Soviet installations. The largest amount of information concerning the Polish installation has been procured from LIFEAT. An example of reports from this source is HMMW-3161, Leon KILARSKI, Polish Commercial Attache. Another is HMMW-3130, Suspicious Contact of Edward RUDSKI, Josef Isaak GENSCHAFT.

Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

A significant amount of information concerning the Communist Party in Mexico and the Communist front organizations in Mexico was obtained from LIFEAT. Information from LIFEAT has been invaluable in supplementing agent coverage of the front-organizations which exist here. Examples of this type of reporting are as follows:

HMMW-3193 - Narciso BASSOLS and Family;
HMMW-3176 - Travel of Pro-Communists

American Communists in Mexico:

One of the most extensive and productive coverages maintained through LIFEAT during this past year was directed against American Communists in Mexico. Most of these targets have been covered at the request of ODENVY and the production has been partially processed by them for the justification of one of their slots in their local establishment. A total of 361 reels have been the result of the coverage since 1 July 1957 until 25 April 1958.

Foreign Communists in Mexico and Mexican Communists:

LIFEAT continued to provide partial coverage of Eduardo MACHADO Morales, Venezuelan Communist, until the time of his departure for return to Venezuela. LIFEAT also provided some 50 reels of coverage on Diego RIVERA, well-known Communist Mexican painter, until his dealth in November 1957. From this coverage it was determined that RIVERA was sufficiently concerned over the departure of the former Soviet Cultural Attache, Yuriy PAPOROV, that he arose from his sick bed in order to make the trip to Verecrus by car to insure that PAPOROV's departure was without incident.

Project Review   Attachment to HMMA-10198
KAPOK-1401

-4-

LAURICLE Information:

LIFEAT has contributed materially to several matters having LAURICLE interest.

Counter Intelligence Information:

CI/CE matters constitute a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives. Project LIFEAT has contributed more leads and general information on the Soviet aspect of this subject than all other Station sources. A few representative samples of this type of information are the following:

HMMA-9121, Suspicious Soviet Contact
HMMA-9135 - Sergio KIREEV Rassvetaef
HMMA-8552, Vladimir SOKOLOV; Col. Jesus de LEON Toral, 6 November 1957
LCHAYPOWL

Jewish Communist Activities:

Coverage of the Jewish Communist leader, Samuel MAGIDIN Magidin, has confirmed the continuing decline of the local Jewish Communist movement. It has also provided the Station with information on those former members who continue to meet at irregular intervals on an informal basis.

Conclusion:

The Mexico City Station believes that the produce of the LIFEAT Project measured against the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

2. Progress of the Operation -

Definite progress has been made in reporting on the objectives of the LIFEAT Project. However, since LIFEAT objectives are of a continuing nature and are not designed to be achieved, no statistics can be cited as to the percentage of coverage on each objective. A general indication of the coverage can be derived when it is realized that some 15,000 pages of raw text are the direct result of the operation from which the statistics cited above were derived. Except for a period from 1 February - 11 April 1958 LIFEAT has been in daily operation with some 18 to 23 lines being covered. Generally, these may be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy -	7 lines
Czech Legation -	2 lines
Polish Legation -	2 lines
American Communists -	5 lines
Remainder -	7 lines

Attachment to [illegible]-10198
[illegible]-1401

3. Planning for the Future

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring of approximately 20 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for exploiting pertinent targets of opportunity. At the present time and with the new system being used for LIFEAT lines, Station believes that 20 will be the maximum number of lines which can be handled properly and securely by the personnel presently assigned here for LIFEAT.

4. Performance of Agents

In general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good and secure during the past year. It is hoped that within the coming year the remainder of the [illegible] group will be securely and permanently removed from the Project and replaced by well-compartmented personnel. In view of the high degree of security necessary for the personnel involved in this operation, it is planned to screen very carefully any possible candidates before they are approached for use in this operation after prior approval for an approach has been secured from Headquarters.

Additional comments concerning the production, security and cover of individual agents will be found in the attached amendment to the field outline which was submitted with [illegible]-5708.

5. Expenditures during Period under Review

Approval was granted for the period under review, 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958, to expend $156,647. The proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1959 is contained in the attached field project outline Part II.

6. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the outline and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT OUTLINE
(Excerpts)

PROJECT LIFEAT

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was initially approved 5 October 1950. Actual operations began on 18 January 1951 and have run almost continuously since that time. The LIFEAT operation was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has since expanded to an average of 23 telephone lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and it is staffed by KUBARK personnel, both staff and contract, together with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the time of its operation Project LIFEAT has produced more than 50,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has an interest and also has, at the direction of Headquarters, installed special taps on targets of opportunity.

4. References

HMM-A-7063, 5 June 1957 - Request for Renewal of Project
HMM-W-5708, 16 December 1957 - Approval of Project for FY 1958.

6. Objectives - ~~Omit~~

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward P. SACHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Gene F. BRADDOCK

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all ~~KAPOK~~ LIFEAT staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITHOSPHERE, LIEMUS, LIVENY and American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

14-00000

Attachment to [illegible]-A-10198
KapOk-1401

-2-

d. Coordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses and training of the personnel therein.

9. Personnel

The following are changes from FY 1958 for FY 1959:

Daniel K. BROMUND arrived at Station Mexico to assume duties as translator of LIFEAT/LI[illegible]MUS material and relief translator on LIFEAT/LIMERICK.

14. Equipment and Support

It is considered essential that new equipment be provided for LIFEAT for FY 1959 in view of the fact that much of the equipment in current use has been steadily in operation since the inception of the project in 1951. Also, in view of expected expansion of the project and the possibilities of live monitoring, additional equipment in first-class condition will be necessary. A backlog of 10 new recorders and 300 reels along with repair parts is considered a minimum for efficient continuance of the project.

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment to HMMA-10198 KAPOK-1531

LIFEAT PROJECT OUTLINE - PART II

17. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1959. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to the rise in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansion, LIFEAT costs will be higher than in the past.

a. Salaries:

(1) Staff and Contract Personnel:

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-7 (promotion to GS-9 in the mill)	
Salary	$5985.00
Quarters	2100.00
Daniel K. BROMURE, GS-12	
Salary	8810.00
Quarters	2100.00
Travel & TDY to border to renew tourist visa & to Washington, D.C. to pick up rentista papers.	400.00
Translator (LIMERICK), GS-12 not yet named (This position has been indicated in view of the hope that the Project will be able to live-monitor at least a portion of LIMERICK traffic. There is a Staff Agent slot available under this project).	
Salary	8000.00
Quarters	2100.00
Transportation	1000.00
HHE move	1500.00
Janet N. DELACOUR (2.02/hr)	4000.00
~~Nadine M. CHAROUSEK~~	~~3000.00~~ Delete
Leona C. GANDARA	4000.00
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER - Salary	5400.00
Francis M. MENZIE - Salary	2504.00
Alice N. CAILLETEAU - Salary	2425.00
Olivia M. GLAMMON - Piece work	4200.00
Louise J. MACHIMO - Salary (Will be included under LIPSTICK Project when it is renewed 1 September 1958)	1850.00

TOTAL	56,375 ~~60014.00~~	56,375 ~~60014.00~~

(2)

Field Agents	Presently	Possible Raise
LIMEWATER	5284.22	
LIMEWATER/1	2209.77	
LIMEWATER/2	1441.15	
LIMEWATER's helper	144.12	
LIMEWATER/6	960.77	

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

14-00000

Attachment to HMMA-10198
KAPOK-1401

Field Agent	**Presently**	**Possible Raise**
LIMESTONE/1	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/2	576.46	
LIMESTONE/3	1921.54	
LIMESTONE/4	1922.54	
LIMESTONE/5	768.61	
LIMESTONE/7	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/8	1441.15	
LIPSTICK/18	1729.38	17,[illegible]
LIMITATION	1729.38	
LIMITATION/3	1921.54	
LIQUATION	3650.92	
LIQUATION/1	3650.92	
LIQUATION/3	766.61	
LILACS ($2.58 per hr.)	3,000.00	

(Due to recent increases in the cost of living, it is expected that an over-all raise of 10% will be made to agents during FY 1959. In April 1958 a new import tax of 40-60% was imposed by the government with the resultant increase in commodities in general use. Adjustments will be made in peso amounts should the devaluation of the peso occur during this FY. 3,300.00

Christmas bonus and presents 3,000.00
(One month salary to each agent, in accordance with local custom. Also special gifts in some cases.)

Salary total ~~42,302.38~~
42,305.00

b. **Basehouse rentals, utilities and expenses**

LIMERICK Basehouse	1729.38
ANNEX IV	3050.00
LIFEAT Repair Base	1540.00
ANNEX II	1452.00
ANNEX III	1360.00
ANNEX V	3060.00
LITMUS Basehouse	1452.00
LIVERY Basehouse (replacement for old blown base)	2100.00
LITHOSPHERE Basehouse	2000.00
LIVERY Relay Base	2000.00
Proposed basehouse (German Embassy coverage)	2000.00

Total ~~21,743.38~~
21,745.00

Attachment to HMMA-10198
KAPOK-1401

-5-

c. Equipment		
Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	2500.00	
New equipment, i.e. recorders, reels	3000.00	
Total		5,500.00
d. Miscellaneous		
(1) Supplies (paper, rolls, wire, tubes, tape, plans, parts)	2000.00	
(2) Transportation		
LIMESTONE/3 car rent	600.00	
RAFANELLI QP car expense	500.00	
KIRSMEISTER mileage	350.00	
LIMESTONE/4 car rent	400.00	
LIMITATION car rent	300.00	
LIQUATION/1 car rent	300.00	
LIMESTONE/7 car rent	600.00	
(3) Other operational expenses (to cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills, and to cover targets of opportunity)	25,000.00	
Total	30,130 ~~30,039.00~~	30,130 ~~30,039.00~~
GRAND TOTAL	~~$145,864.76~~ 156,055	

[illegible]/KAPOK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMW-6555

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/1

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : LIFEAT Project Renewal

RE 43 J (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED Cable Reply, Submit Agent Termination Reports where appropriate.

REFERENCE(S)
HMMA-10198

PRIORITY

It is requested that you reply by cable to the following questions so that the request for renewal of the LIFEAT Project can be submitted.

1. Approval to insert the following persons at the salaries indicated. Please correct salaries listed below if they are wrong.

LIEDDY - $4,000
LIMENU/1 - $4,000
Nadine M. CHAROUSEK - $3,640

2. The following have been cleared for use under LIFEAT since the last Project renewal. Since they were not mentioned in your request for renewal, have they been activated under Project LIFEAT and should they be included in our request for renewal? Are any funds required to cover their use?

LIQUATION/4
Subject of HMMW-5906

3. The following agents were included under the LIFEAT Project renewal of last year. Since none of them receive pay their names did not appear on Part II of the Project Outline attached to reference. Therefore, Headquarters does not know whether they are still active under the Project. In our request for renewal we must indicate the names of all agents who have been dropped from the project during the past project year and the present use being made of each agent. Please indicate those agents who are no longer under Project LIFEAT and what use is being made of each. If they are not active, please submit agent service records on them. If they are being used for other work please submit new PRQ II's and requests to amend their Operational Approvals. Unless advised to the contrary, Headquarters will assume the following are still active under Project LIFEAT:

LIMESTONE-9
LIMESTONE-10
LIQUATION-2
LIPSTICK-35
LIPSTICK-37
LIMITATION-7

4. The covering dispatch to your request for LIFEAT Project renewal stated that LICOOL and the provision for Harvey C. MULFORD had been removed from LIFEAT. Since MULFORD is covered by Project MKCHARITY, Headquarters assumes you intend to carry out LICOOL operations under Project MKCHARITY. In view of the fact Project MKCHARITY is a KURIOT Project which supports KURIOT Staff Agents Harvey C. MULFORD and Alice N. HADZELLI and provides for technical equipment and technical services, Headquarters does not believe LICOOL belongs under MKCHARITY. If LICOOL were included under MKCHARITY, the latter project would have to be amended to provide for such operational activity and to provide funds for base houses, base house-keepers, and processors of LICOOL take.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-6555

P R I O R I T Y

We believe LICOOL is best placed under LIFEAT, where it has been included in the past. The only alternative would be a new project to cover LICOOL operations. Therefore, it is requested that you comment by cable on the above by indicating a new Project Outline will be forthcoming, or requesting us to include LICOOL in our LIFEAT Project Renewal. If the latter is the case, please indicate the number of LICOOL base houses, rent per year for each, names and salary of any LICOOL base housekeepers and processors not already included in your request for LIFEAT Project Renewal request, and any additional expenses which should be included. Also indicate how many LICOOL operations are active at the present in addition to the one proposed in MEXI-1577, dated 30 June 1958.

5. With reference to MEXI-1816 (20 June 1958), Headquarters plans to leave LIMESTONE's 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 in the LIFEAT Project when it is submitted for renewal. We will indicate that LIMESTONE's 1, 2 and 7 are not active under the Project but funds for continued payments to them are included because of security reasons emanating from their past use and knowledge acquired under Project LIFEAT. If it is decided to terminate any or all of them the money can be used for that purpose.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

3 July 1958

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 -- WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/Mexico/Chrono
1 - RI

WH/III/Mexico/E.T.SCALETTI:nfs

~~SECRET~~

2 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OPS

ATTENTION : Mr. Robert Brown

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1958 - 30 June 1959.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LCMAYFOWL phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

R. N. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:mpm

[illegible] will make
ready with
comments on CI organization
it is sent to [illegible]
for renewal

~~SECRET~~

DESENSITIZED

[illegible]

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-10198
[redacted] 1401

50-6-32/1

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 21 May 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational
SPECIFIC— LIFEAT Project Renewal

Reference: HMM-W-5708, 16 December 1957

ACTION REQUESTED: Renewal of Project LIFEAT for FY 1959

1. There is attached a Review of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958.

2. In accordance with the suggestion made in reference, Part I of the Project Outline has been revised only in those sections where there have been personnal changes of the operation has been otherwise altered in a basic aspect.

3. Part II is submitted in its entirety. LICOOL and the provision for Harvey C. MULFORD have been removed from this section, thereby cutting the budget from the sum requested for FY 1958.

4. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be renewed for FY 1959 for the amount requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

Encl. (Odd pages herewith
Even pages USC)

EPS/GFB/bct
15 May 1958

Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

AB
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
DES UFD
~~FI~~
ARD

Remove from Project: DMANGO
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # 73-175/78
Box: 30 Fold: 2

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

~~[illegible]~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10196
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT REVIEW - LIFEAT

1. Product of the Project

The Soviet Embassy -

a. Soviet Commercial Activities:

During the past year reports submitted from screening the traffic of the two established Soviet Commercial Offices in Mexico have provided a great amount of detail concerning Soviet efforts to sell in the Latin American market, both heavy industrial merchandise and movies and literature. Knowledge of their methods of transshipping and attempts at concealment of point of origin of products has been gleaned from this take. As a result of this knowledge, reports on the firms with whom they are doing business have been procured and provided for background information. Following are a list of the reports submitted as a result of intelligence procured from this source:

HMM-3033 Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico
HMM-3165, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico
HMM-3286 - Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico, December 1957
~~HMM-3253 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Michoacana del Occidente, S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3264 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Servicio Agricola, S.A.~~
~~HMM-3139 - Anilinas y Productos Quimicos S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3404 - Imports into Mexico from Soviet Union~~
~~HMM-A-9519 - American Cyanid Co., Calco Chemical Division~~

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities:

This project has provided coverage and details of some of the diplomatic activities of the Soviets in Mexico. It has served to show the relationships maintained, culturally, socially and diplomatically, between the Soviets and the members of the Satellite establishments in Mexico.

HMM-3215, Soviet Attendance at Yugoslav Reception
HMM-3351 - Reception at Soviet Embassy.
HMM-2992 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City
HMM-2849 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City

c. Soviet Cultural Activities:

Information produced by LIFEAT has given details of Soviet activities in connection with publications, cultural institutes, and related activities. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-2870 - Soviet Embassy Reception for Mexican Musicians
HMM-2847 - Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy
HMM-3080, Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy

~~[illegible]~~

CS COPY

50-6-52/1

~~SECRET~~

d. Soviet Military Activities:

Monthly reports on the activities of Soviet military personnel, knowledge of which was obtained from LIFEAT, and their contacts in military circles in Mexico have proved to be of especial interest to ODYOKE service attaches in Mexico.

e. Movements of Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT coverage a roster of Soviet personnel presently in Mexico has been maintained by Station Mexico. This has been the primary source of such information. LIFEAT has enabled the Station to determine in advance when departures can be expected for the Soviets, prior to their permanent departure, normally stock up on clothing and occasionally other items throught to be in short supply in the USSR.

f. Soviet Embassy Contacts:

Contact reports of the Soviets are compiled and provided Headquarters as necessary. These reports are of considerable operation value in identifying local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets are in regular contact. Following are examples of this type of coverage:

HMM-2841 - MONTES y BRADLEY (fnu)
HMM-3199 - Narciso BASSOLS Contacts with the Soviet Embassy.

g. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials:

LIFEAT has provided the Station with the most productive source of information concerning the private and official lives of the Soviets assigned here. These reports have been submitted on individuals, e.g. HMM-A-9504, Aleksey N. CHERKASOV, and also under one cover, HMM-A-9856, January 1958 Report of Personnel Activities.

h. Goods and Services:

Periodic reports of the persons and institutions known to be providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy have been of considerable value in developing and mounting a LAURICLE operation. Information of this type has also been of considerable value to the Station in the LIMESA operation.

i. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy:

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their associates and related activities has been reported as necessary.

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review is essentially the same as that from the Soviet Embassy. To avoid repetition, only a brief summary of the information submitted will be given here.

~~SECRET~~ 50-6-32/1

a. Czech Personnel Reports:

HMM-3164, Activities of Zdenek KVITA and HMM-3238, Travel of Czech Legation personnel, are examples of the type of reports made from the personality and activity information acquired from LIFEAT coverage of this installation. HMM-3262, Cocktail Party at Czech Residence, is an example of the reports from this source on diplomatic activities of this installation.

b. Spot Reports on Czech Legation Activities:

Reports on a spot basis which were of interest included:

~~HMM-3954, Czech Concern over Possible Expulsion from Mexico.~~
HMM-3126 New Location of Czech Legation Commercial Office and Skoda Exposition.

Polish Legation

Information on this installation closely parallels that obtained on the Czech Legation and the Soviet installations. The largest amount of information concerning the Polish installation has been procured from LIFEAT. An example of reports from this source is HMM-3161, Leon KILARSKI, Polish Commercial Attache. Another is HMM-3130, Suspicious Contact of Edward RUDSKI, Josef Isaak GENSCHAFT.

Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

A significant amount of information concerning the Communist Party in Mexico and the Communist front organizations in Mexico was obtained from LIFEAT. Information from LIFEAT has been invaluable in supplementing agent coverage of the front-organizations which exist here. Examples of this type of reporting are as follows:

HMM-3193 - Narciso BASSOLS and Family;
HMM-3176 - Travel of Pro-Communists

American Communists in Mexico:

One of the most extensive and productive coverages maintained through LIFEAT during this past year was directed against American Communists in Mexico. Most of these targets have been covered at the request of ODENVY and the production has been partially processed by them for the justification of one of their slots in their local establishment. A total of 381 reels have been the result of the coverage since 1 July 1957 until 25 April 1958.

Foreign Communists in Mexico and Mexican Communists:

LIFEAT continued to provide partial coverage of Eduardo MACHADO Morales, Venezuelan Communist, until the time of his departure for return to Venezuela. LIFEAT also provided some 50 reels of coverage on Diego RIVERA, well-known Communist Mexican painter, until his death in November 1957. From this coverage it was determined that RIVERA was sufficiently concerned over the departure of the former Soviet Cultural Attache, Yuriy PAPOROV, that he arose from his sick bed in order to make the trip to Veracruz by car to insure that PAPOROV's departure was without incident.

LAURICLE Information:

LIFEAT has contributed materially to several matters having LAURICLE interest.

Counter Intelligence Information:

CI/CE matters constitute a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives. Project LIFEAT has contributed more leads and general information on the Soviet aspect of this subject than all other Station sources. A few representative samples of this type of information are the following:

HMM-A-9121, Suspicious Soviet Contact
HMM-A-9135 - Sergio KIREEV Rassvetaef
HMM-A-8552, Vladimir SOKOLOV; Col. Jesus de LEON Toral, 6 November 1957
LCMAYPOWL

Jewish Communist Activities:

Coverage of the Jewish Communist leader, Samuel MAGIDIN Magidin, has confirmed the continuing decline of the local Jewish Communist movement. It has also provided the Station with information on those former members who continue to meet at irregular intervals on an informal basis.

Conclusion:

The Mexico City Station believes that the produce of the LIFEAT Project measured against the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

2. Progress of the Operation -

Definite progress has been made in reporting on the objectives of the LIFEAT Project. However, since LIFEAT objectives are of a continuing nature and are not designed to be achieved, no statistics can be cited as to the percentage of coverage on each objective. A general indication of the coverage can be derived when it is realized that some 15,000 pages of raw text are the direct result of the operation from which the statistics cited above were derived. Except for a period from 1 February - 11 April 1958 LIFEAT has been in daily operation with some 18 to 23 lines being covered. Generally, these may be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy -	7 lines
Czech Legation -	2 lines
Polish Legation -	2 lines
American Communists -	5 lines
Remainder -	7 lines

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

3. Planning for the Future

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring of approximately 28 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for exploiting important targets of opportunity. At the present time and with the new system being used for LIFEAT lines, Station believes that 28 will be the maximum number of lines which can be handled properly and securely by the personnel presently assigned here for LIFEAT.

4. Performance of Agents

In general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good and secure during the past year. It is hoped that within the coming year the remainder of the AYCALL group will be securely and permanently removed from the Project and replaced by well-compartmented personnel. In view of the high degree of security necessary for the personnel involved in this operation, it is planned to screen very carefully any possible candidates before they are approached for use in this operation after prior approval for an approach has been secured from Headquarters.

Additional comments concerning the production, security and cover of individual agents will be found in the attached amendment to the field outline which was submitted with HMM-W-5708.

5. Expenditures during Period under Review

Approval was granted for the period under review, 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958, to expend $156,647. The proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1959 is contained in the attached field project outline Part II.

6. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the outline and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

KAPOK

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT OUTLINE
(Excerpts)

PROJECT LIFEAT

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was initially approved 3 October 1950. Actual operations began on 18 January 1951 and have run almost continuously since that time. The LIFEAT operation was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has since expanded to an average of 23 telephone lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and it is staffed by KUBARK personnel, both staff and contract, together with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the time of its operation Project LIFEAT has produced more than 50,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has an interest and also has, at the direction of Headquarters, installed special taps on targets of opportunity.

4. References

HMM-A-7063, 5 June 1957 - Request for Renewal of Project
HMM-W-5708, 16 December 1957 - Approval of Project for FY 1958.

6. Objectives - ~~Omit "f"~~

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward P. SECHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Gene F. BRADDOCK

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT ~~KAPOK~~ staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITHOSPHERE, LITMUS, LIVERY and American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

~~[illegible]~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KapOk-1401

d. Coordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses and training of the personnel therein.

9. Personnel

The following are changes from FY 1958 for FY 1959:

Daniel K. BROMUND arrived at Station Mexico to assume duties as translator of LIFEAT/LITMUS material and relief translator on LIFEAT/LIMERICK.

14. Equipment and Support

It is considered essential that new equipment be provided for LIFEAT for FY 1959 in view of the fact that much of the equipment in current use has been steadily in operation since the inception of the project in 1951. Also, in view of expected expansion of the project and the possibilities of live monitoring, additional equipment in first-class condition will be necessary. A backlog of 10 new recorders and 300 reels along with repair parts is considered a minimum for efficient continuance of the project.

[illegible]

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10196 KAPOK-1401

LIFEAT PROJECT OUTLINE - PART II

17. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1959. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to the rise in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansion, LIFEAT costs will be higher than in the past.

a. Salaries:

(1) Staff and Contract Personnel:

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-7 (promotion to GS-9 in the mill)		
	Salary	$5985.00
	Quarters	2100.00
Daniel K. BROMUND, GS-12		
	Salary	8810.00
	Quarters	2100.00
	Travel & TDY to border to renew tourist visa & to Washington, D.C. to pick up rentista papers.	400.00
Translator (LIMERICK), GS-12 not yet named (This position has been indicated in view of the hope that the Project will be able to live-monitor at least a portion of LIMERICK traffic. There is a Staff Agent slot available under this project).		
	Salary	8000.00
	Quarters	2100.00
	Transportation	1000.00
	HHE move	1500.00
Janet N. DELACOUR (2.02/hr)		4000.00
~~Nadine M. CHAROUSEK~~		~~3640.00~~ ← delete
Leona C. GANDARA		4000.00
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER - Salary		5400.00
Francis M. MENZIE - Salary		2505.00
Alice N. CAILLETEAU - Salary		2425.00
Olivia N. GLADMON - Piece work		4200.00
Louise J. MACRINO - Salary (Will be included under LIPSTICK Project when it is renewed 1 September 1958)		1850.00
TOTAL		~~60014.00~~ 56375.00

~~60014.00~~ 56375.00

(2)

Field Agents	Presently	Possible Raise
LIMEWATER	5284.22	
LIMEWATER/1	2209.77	
LIMEWATER/2	1441.15	
LIMEWATER's helper	144.12	
LIMEWATER/6	960.77	

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

Field Agent	Presently	Possible Raise
LIMESTONE/1	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/2	576.46	
LIMESTONE/3	1921.54	
LIMESTONE/4	1921.54	
LIMESTONE/5	768.61	
LIMESTONE/7	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/8	1441.15	
LIPSTICK/18	~~1729.38~~ 1732.00	
LIMITATION	1729.38	
LIMITATION/3	1921.54	
LIQUATION	3650.92	
LIQUATION/1	3650.92	
LIQUATION/3	768.61	
LILACE ($2.58 per hr.)	3,000.00	

(Due to recent increases in the cost of living, it is expected that an over-all raise of 10% will be made to agents during FY 1959. In April 1958 a new import tax of 40-60% was imposed by the government with the resultant increase in commodities in general use. Adjustments will be made in peso amounts should the devaluation of the peso occur during this FY.	3,300.00
Christmas bonus and presents (One month salary to each agent, in accordance with local custom. Also special gifts in some cases.)	3,000.00

Salary total ~~42,302.38~~ 42,305.00

b. Basehouse rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK Basehouse	30.00 1729.38
ANNEX IV	3050.00
LIFEAT Repair Base	1540.00
ANNEX II	1452.00
ANNEX III	1360.00
ANNEX V	3060.00
LITMUS Basehouse	1452.00
LIVERY Basehouse (replacement for old blown base)	2100.00
LITHOSPHERE Basehouse	2000.00
LIVERY Relay Base	2000.00
Proposed basehouse (German Embassy coverage)	2000.00

Total ~~21,743.38~~ 21,745.-

50-6-32/1

~~[illegible]~~

Attachment to EGM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

c. **Equipment**

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	2500.00	
New equipment, i.e. recorders, reels	3000.00	
Total		5,500.00

d. **Miscellaneous**

(1) Supplies (paper, rolls, wire, tubes, tape, plans, parts)	2000.00	
(2) Transportation		
LIMESTONE/3 car rent	600.00	
RAFANELLI QP car expense	580.00	
ZINSMEISTER mileage	350.00	
LIMESTONE/4 car rent	400.00	
LIMITATION car rent	300.00	
LIQUATION/1 car rent	300.00	
LIMESTONE/7 car rent	600.00	
(3) Other operational expenses (to cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills, and to cover targets of opportunity)	25,000.00	
Total	~~30,030.00~~ 30130.00	~~30,030.00~~ 30130.00
GRAND TOTAL	~~$145,864.76~~ $156,055.00	

changes made per discussion with [illegible]

~~[illegible]~~ 50-6-32/1

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

50-6-32/1

CLASS SECRET

DATE 18 APR 1958

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - LIFEAT Renewal

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1958. It is requested that the Station's request for project renewal be pouched so that it reaches Headquarters prior to 1 June 1958.

J. C. KING
C/WHD

14 April 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono
- ✓1 - FI
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico [illegible]

COPY

R. R. Dahlgren
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officers)

(Authenticating officer)

J. C. KING, C/WHD

R. R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

50-6-32/1

~~SECRET~~

3 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended to authorize the payment of $1820 compensation to Nadine K. CHARNUSEK for the period 1 January 1958 through 30 June 1958 (the expiration date of the project). Funds now available in Project LIFEAT are sufficient to cover payment to CHARNUSEK.

2. CHARNUSEK will serve as a processor of LIFEAT material. She received Provisional Operational Approval (C-6244) on 12 December 1957. A contract check list to provide a payment of $1.75 an hour compensation has been prepared for Contract Personnel Division.

3. CHARNUSEK has above average motivation to do the work required of her. Motivation is a prime consideration in work of this type. CHARNUSEK will listen to LIFEAT tapes (in English until her Spanish language ability permits work on Spanish tapes). She will type summaries of the material on these tapes. The handling of the tapes and summaries will be between CHARNUSEK and her father-in-law, LINEWATER (C-739). Her cover will be that of housewife.

F. K. DAHLGREN,
C/WH/III

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Memo chrono
1 - WH/III/Mexico chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:jck

~~SECRET~~

19 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended to include the payment of $1820 compensation to Nadine M. CHARCHUK for the period 1 January 1957 through 30 June 1958 (the expiration date of the project).

2. CHARCHUK will serve as a processor of LIFEAT material. She received Provisional Operational Approval (C-66244) on 13 December 1957. A contract check list to provide a payment of $1.75 an hour compensation has been prepared for Contract Personnel Division.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/Mexico/Chrono
VI - Subject

~~SECRET~~

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-48

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5708
50-6-32/1

[redacted] #589

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational/LIFEAT
SPECIFIC - Project Renewal and Amendment

Reference: HMMA-7063

1. Project LIFEAT was renewed on 30 October 1957 for the period 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958 for a total of $130,154 for FY 1958. The Station will note that Headquarters rewrote the Project Outline and Project Review which were submitted in HMMA 7063. This was done to facilitate subsequent renewals of the complex LIFEAT Project. As regards the Project Outline, if no major changes occur during the next project year, the Station will only have to submit a Part II to the Project Outline, and any changes which may have affected Part I, principally those concerning personnel. The rewritten Project Review should be used by the Station as a format for next year's Review. By following these procedures, it is believed that we can avoid the re-writing and retyping of the entire Project and make it simpler for the Field Case Officer to prepare the renewal request.

2. Project LIFEAT Amendment was approved on 5 December 1957 for a total of $26,493 for fiscal year 1958, thus raising the total amount authorized for the present project year to $156,647. This Amendment authorized the establishing of a bank account of $20,000 for Daniel K. BROMUND for cover purposes, against which a Letter of Credit will be obtained so that he may obtain Rentista status in Mexico. (See HMMW-5691 for details on this Letter of Credit).

3. The Amendment also requested authority to incorporate Roland K. WINGSNESS as an additional Staff Agent in the Project. A total of $6,493 for the remainder of the project year was requested to cover WINGSNESS' expenses and this amount was broken down as follows:

Salary ($7,785 per year)	$3,893
Allowances (Quarters up to $2,000)	1,000
Other (Educational-in accordance with R-20-610 dated 9 February 1956 estimated at	300

AN
AB X
IN
PS
RX
DBS | HFD
FI
RID

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

Remove from Project KDMANGO
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # 73-175/78
Box: 32 Fold: 2

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

RECORD COPY

50-6-32/1

[redacted]

Travel (PC3 Air to Mexico for family)	$ 500
Household Effects, Movement	800

This additional obligation for Project LIFEAT was approved with the authorization to add another competent staff agent; however, Roland E. WINGSHES GS 12 was not approved pending completion of the necessary action to waive existing personnel management restrictions on transferring employees from KUCHAI to KUDOVE and until suitable cover has been arranged by Cover Division. This problem has not yet been settled but you will be notified as soon as a definite decision has been reached regarding the transfer of WINGSHES to KUDOVE and subsequently to Mexico City on PCS.

JCKing
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachment:
Project LIFEAT Outline and Project Review, 1/2 of pages herewith and 1/2 of pages, u/s/c

10 December 1957

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City, w/1/att. herewith and w/1/att. u/s/c
- 1 - WH/III/KAPOK Chrono, w/o/att.
- ~~2~~ - Subject, w/o/att.

CZehrung
WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:mjn

for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

[redacted]

14-00000

C. [illegible]
WHD
2555
9 DECEMBER 1957

[redacted]

MEXICO CITY

DIR-48520
OUT-71383
12 Dec

MEXI

REF: MEXI 724 (IN 43718)

1. ~~[illegible]~~ FUNDS AUTHORIZED THESE RENEWALS BROKEN DOWN:

A. LI[illegible]CK: $52,318 FY 58 AND $7,350 FY 59

B. LI[illegible]TICK: $82,417 FY 58 AND $16,483 FY 59

C. LIF[illegible]T: $156.647 FY 58

2. DISPATCHES FOLLOW.

END OF MESSAGE.

LATEST PROJ RENEWALS APPROVED

LIFEAT/A

J. C. KING, [illegible] [redacted] R. W. [illegible], C/WH/III

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ORIG : L. D. PICKETT
UNIT : WHD 504
EXT : 2555
DATE : 9 DECEMBER 1957

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : W 5
INFO : FI/CPS, CE 4, SR 5, CP 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DEC 10 19 46Z 57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

71170
OUT 71170

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 48374

RE: MEXI 0718 (IN 43260)*

1. LIFEAT AMENDMENT APPROVED 5 DEC FOR BROMIND RENTISTA COVER. Now CONVERTING STAFF AGENT AND MAKING FINAL COVER ARRANGEMENTS. ESTIMATE DEPARTURE HQS 18 DEC BY CAR.

2. REGRET IMPOSSIBLE SEND GABBOTT TDY OR PCS PRIOR 1 FEB DUE USUAL DELAY MEXI ENTRY NON-U.S. CITIZEN. SIMILAR TO MOOIMAN CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED IF GABBOTT'S PCS CAN BE EXPEDITED OR TDY IN MEANTIME.

EE/P/MR. SZCZEPANSKI By Phone

WH/PERSONNEL PC Bowers
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. N. Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

~~SECRET~~ 5-6017

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT (Amendment)

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is designed to determine Sino/Soviet/Satellite plans, activities, and connections with other Communist elements through independent audio-surveillance operations in Mexico. It is presented for your approval of two amendments: the first, to permit the utilization of Roland K. WINGSNESS (p) as an additional Staff Agent in the project, and the second, to establish for cover purposes a $20,000 U. S. bank account for Staff Agent Daniel K. BROMUND (p) in order that he may obtain Rentista status in Mexico.

2. Authority is requested to obligate an additional $26,493 from the DD/P-WH Division budget for fiscal year 1958. Sufficient funds are available in the WH Division budget. If approved, these two amendments will raise the total amount authorized for the present project year, 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958, to $156,647. Project LIFEAT was renewed by the DDCI on 30 October 1957 in the amount of $130,154.

3. Attached is the LIFEAT Project Outline, which sets forth the important factors involved in the operation; a WH Division memorandum, dated 31 October 1957, which explains the proposal for securing Rentista status for BROMUND; and a WH Division memorandum, dated 13 November 1957, which requests authority to incorporate WINGSNESS into the project as a Staff Agent.

4. CCB/NC comments that according to Finance Division, establishing a bank account for BROMUND is the only means of satisfying the requirements of the Mexican government. The Letter of Credit must be irrevocable and allow a stated withdrawal per period (as in this case, per quarter) in order that the full amount cannot be liquidated before the expiration of the Rentista. CCB/NC recommends approval in this connection. In addition CCB/NC recommends approval of the proposed use of WINGSNESS, provided that his cover, which has not been determined as yet, be coordinated with CCB/NC sufficiently in advance to allow CCB/NC to state any objections deemed necessary and to take effective action toward establishing sound cover.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. I recommend approval of these two amendments, subject to the conditions as stated by CCB/HC in paragraph four, above.

/s/ W. Lloyd George *
W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Concur: (Signed) Richard Helms
COP-DD/P

3 DEC 1957
Date

Approved: Signed C. P. CABELL
DDCI

5 DEC 1957
Date

Attachments: Project Outline LIFEAT
Memorandum, 31 October 1957
Memorandum, 13 November 1957

Staff Coordination:
For C/FI/OPS s/R. Bryant
For C/CI/OA s/J. Burton
C/CCB/HC s/J. Southard
For C/CI s/H. Brown

Responsible Officers:
Hdqts. - Louis D. Puckett
Field - Charles Anderson

* Amendment approved to extent that a competent additional staff agent may be added to the project and the Letter of Credit underwritten. However the addition of Wingness per se is not approved until the necessary personnel management restriction currently in effect have been complied with.

/s/ L.G.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

1. LIFEAT Project was renewed for the period 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958. It is requested that this Project be amended to include Roland K. WINOSNESS as a Staff Agent.

2. WINOSNESS is a Staff Employee attached to ORR. He recently completed a four month TDY in Mexico City where he performed his work in a highly satisfactory manner and the Chief of Station, Mexico City, has specifically requested his PCS assignment under Project LIFEAT. Approval will be requested of Chief of Operations to transfer WINOSNESS to the DDP from DDI as soon as this Project Amendment has been approved. A Staff Agent slot is already available under Project LIFEAT which can be filled by WINOSNESS. As soon as WINOSNESS becomes a DDP employee, WHD plans to give him intensified language training and to send him to Mexico after the first of the year.

3. Although Daniel K. BROMUND was included in the LIFEAT Project Renewal as a Russian translator, the volume of material produced under LIFEAT in the Russian language is increasing at such a rate that the services of two Russian translators are required. WINOSNESS also will be used as an assistant Case Officer, will administer at least two base houses, will do regular line inspections and make technical repairs at the listening posts, and will be required to prepare finished operational and intelligence reports based on his own and other LIFEAT agents' raw reports. WINOSNESS is well qualified to perform all these tasks.

4. Authority is requested to obligate an additional $6,493 for Project LIFEAT for the last half of the present project year. A breakdown of this amount is as follows:

WINOSNESS Salary: ($7,785 per year)	$3,893
Allowances: (Quarters up to $2,000)	1,000
Other (Educational-in accordance with R-20-610 dated 9 February 56 estimated at-)	300
Travel: PCS Air to Mexico for family	500
Household Effects, Movement	800
TOTAL	$6,493

SECRET

SECRET

File Lifeat

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Project Branch

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT
DIVISION Western Hemisphere
STATION Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name Louis D. Puckett
Room 2111 Barton Hall
Ext. 2555
Date 13 November 1957

It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended to include Roland E. WINDSNESS as a Staff Agent under this project. The additional cost to the project for the remainder of the project year will be $6,493. The attached memorandum sets forth details of this amendment.

ROBERT M. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

CHARLES APPLE, WH/FI

COLLINS ALMON, WH/STAFF/CHIEF

DATE

Attachments
Memoranda (4)
Form No. 680 (4)
Envelope w/True Name Card

SECRET

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: LIFEAT (APPROVAL OF PROJECT) ; ______ (ACCOUNT NO.) ; WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 July 1957 TO 30 June 1958 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $______ AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

______ FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ______ DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR	FISCAL YEAR
	1958	
COMPENSATION	$ 3,593	$
ALLOWANCES	1,300	
TRAVEL	1,300	
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES		
OTHER:		
TOTAL	$ 6,193	$

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one) ☒ REGULAR ☐ SUBSIDY ☐ PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
- ☒ REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (AFR 30-10)
- ☐ RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
- ☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ______ DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ______ CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

______ DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ______ DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. (INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED)

☐ PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE	☐ APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
☐ PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT	☐ OTHER (Explain):
☐ RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION	▨

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
L. D. Puckett	8535		

FORM NO. 680 REPLACES FORM 30-104
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

~~SECRET~~

(3)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

004 HM/JM/ATP

DATE : 01 NOV 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI, S/C 2

NOV 2 06 5? '57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 29930

TO DIR **INFO** **CITE** MEXI 0521

REQUEST REPLY MEXI 739 (IN 24781).*

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AMENDMENT RESEARCH REPORT ON LIFEAT.

FILE TITLE Proj LIFEAT - Development & Plans

INITIALS J

DATE PROC

50-6-32/3

ENCLOSURE

DATE OF DOC 1 Nov 57

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT

AREA DIVISION Western Hemisphere

STATION Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name Louis D. Puckett

Room 2112 [illegible]

Ext. 3555 or 3162

Date 31 October 1957

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT project be amended to include authorization to open a bank account of $20,000 for Daniel K. BROMUND (Staff Agent). Project LIFEAT was approved for renewal for the period 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958.

2. Subsequent to the renewal of Project LIFEAT, it was determined that the cover appropriate for Daniel K. BROMUND would be that of a Rentista. In order to obtain Rentista status from the Mexican Government, it is necessary to show documents which prove that the applicant has an income of approximately $350 per month for a period of five years. On approval of this amendment, it is planned to open an account for Daniel K. BROMUND for the amount of $20,000 against which the bank will issue him a Letter of Credit which will permit him to draw against this account at the rate of $1,000 quarterly. This Letter of Credit will then be used to obtain Rentista status for BROMUND. This Letter of Credit will be held by the Station and will be passed to BROMUND for use once every three months. BROMUND will use this Letter of Credit, withdrawing his $1,000 quarterly, and will immediately deposit this money and the Letter of Credit with the Finance Officer at the Station. These deposits will be accounted for in the Station's accountings.

3. To protect the United States Government's interest, the necessary Declarations of Trust and/or Assignment of Interest as determined by the Finance Division will be executed and filed with the Monetary Branch, Finance Division.

ROBERT N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

CHARLES [illegible], WH/FI

COLLINS ALMON, WH/Staff/Chief

DATE

Attachments
1. Form 680 (quad)
2. Envelope w/true name

SECRET

14-00000

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5390

~~KAPOK-#964~~

50-6-32

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]
CLA

AN
AB X
IN
PS
RI
DES NFD
FI
ARD

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City
DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
GENERAL - Administrative/LIFEAT
SPECIFIC - Procurement of Recorders

Reference: HMMA-8143 (KAPOK 1106), 2 October 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: Clarification of request for recorders.

1. Paragraph four, e, of reference contains a request for ten used EKOTAPE recorders. However, it is not clear whether this request is in addition to or in place of the request contained in MEXI 918, dated 9 August 1957. The recorders requested in MEXI 918 were forwarded to the Station under cargo numbers 20369 and 20370 on 16 and 17 September 1957 (see DIR 35369 and DIR 35748), and probably arrived at the Station after the referenced dispatch was written.

2. There are no used EKOTAPE recorders available at Headquarters for shipment to the Station. However, KURIOT has advised the Desk that should any used recorders become available at Headquarters or at other field stations, they will make every effort to send them to Mexico City. As the Station probably knows, EKOTAPE recorders are no longer manufactured.

3. KURIOT requested that the Station be informed that KURIOT appreciates the technical report contained in the reference. They will investigate further the technical problems experienced by the Station; the Station will be advised of any significant developments. KURIOT considers that six months use from the Revere heads, under LIFEAT operating conditions, is quite good.

4. In view of the unavailability of used EKOTAPE recorders and the recent shipment of ten new REVERE recorders, Headquarters will take no further action on the referenced request unless requested to do so by the Station.

COPY

Remove from Project KDMANGO
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # 73-175/77
Box: 30 Fold: 4
(Releasing officer)

RECORD COPY
(Coordinating officer)

CKing
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET [redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

50-6-32/1

14-00000

[redacted]

HMM-W-5390

16 October 1957

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/Support
- 1 - WH/Logistics
- 1 - TSS/ASD
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono
- ✓1 - RI
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LDPuckett:mjm

WH/Support
WH/Logistics
TSS/ASD Mr. Bartley
50-6-32/1

for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT

DIVISION: Western Hemisphere

STATION: Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name: [illegible]
Room: 2112 Barton Hall
Ext.: [illegible]
Date: 22 Jul 1957

1. The attached project outline is presented for renewal for the period 1 Jul 1957 through 30 June 1958. The project outline is accompanied by a review of LIFEAT activities during the past year.

2. In support of the renewal of Project LIFEAT there are attached memoranda prepared by CI/OPS/WH, EE/P and EE/C.

3. A brief historical resume of Project LIFEAT may be found in Section three of the project outline.

F. [illegible], C/WH/III

G. [illegible], WH/FI

C. [illegible], WH/Staff/Chief

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

DATE

Attachments:
  Review of LIFEAT Project
  Revised LIFEAT PPO
  Form 680 in quad.
  Memoranda from CI/OPS/WH,
    EE/P and EE/C
  LIFEAT Project Approvals
  LICOOL Project Approvals
  Envelope containing true names
    of case officers and agents.

4

REVIEW OF PROJECT LIFEAT TO ACCOMPANY REQUEST FOR RENEWAL

1. Product of the Project

The Soviet Embassy

a. Soviet Commercial Activities

Reports submitted during the past year have conveyed a substantial amount of detail concerning Soviet economic and commercial policy in Mexico, and to a lesser extent, in adjacent areas. This information has reflected the types of products the Soviets are selling and purchasing in Mexico, the names of their intermediaries, details on prices, procedures used for arranging sales and purchases and the manner of affecting shipments. This information has been screened from extensive and prolonged coverage of Soviet Embassy commerical traffic and appears to be accurate and detailed. Within the past year traffic concerning the Soviet commercial office in Mexico has increased considerably and remains the Station's primary source for information on Soviet commercial activities. Pertinent examples of this type of information may be found in:

HMM-2476, dated 1 March 1957 "Tantative Deal for Ecuadorian Coffee"
CS 3,341,351 File

HMM-1973, dated 15 October 1956 "Mexican Exports to the USSR"
CS-1[illegible]737 File

HMM-1760, dated 18 October 1956, "Sale of Soviet Ferrous Metal in the U. S."
CS-1[illegible] File

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities

Project LIFEAT coverage of Soviet diplomatic activities appears to have been quite thorough and enlightening during the past year. Reports submitted on these activities have indicated some relationships the Soviets are developing with the Mexican Government, with other Latin American governments, and with other foreign diplomatic representatives. LIFEAT operations have also established some facts concerning the relations among the Soviets, Poles and Czechoslovakians in Mexico City. Some indication has been received on the relations between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs. Reports of this type provide some evidence as to whom the Soviets seem to be engaged in a drive to establish contacts in various departments of the Mexican

Government and when they appear to be conducting a drive to cultivate other Latin American diplomats. The reactions of both the Mexicans and the Latin Americans to these advances are often shown in later traffic. Briefly, the Soviets do not seem to get a very good reception from the Latin Americans, but are well received by the diplomatic representatives of India and Indonesia. The reports have shown an improvement in Soviet relations with the Yugoslavs, which were practically non-existent for several years in Mexico City. The reports show further that the Soviets, Poles and Czechs have frequent business and social interchanges. The following reports are cited as examples of this type of information:

HMM-2327, dated 16 January 1957, "Diplomatic Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, November 1956."
CS-3/[illegible] 264
[illegible]

HMM-2395, dated 6 February 1957, "Diplomatic Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956."
CS-3/[illegible] 277
[illegible]

HMM-2465, dated 27 February 1957, "Diplomatic Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, January 1957."
CS-3/[illegible]
[illegible]

c. Soviet Cultural Activities

Information produced by LIFEAT reflects in detail Soviet cultural activities in connection with publications, cultural institutes, travel of Mexicans to the USSR for cultural purposes, visits of Soviet cultural figures to Mexico and data concerning how their local arrangements are made. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-2329, dated 18 January 1957, "Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, November 1956."
CS-3/[illegible]
[illegible]

HMM-2377, dated 30 January 1957, "Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956."
CS-3/[illegible]
[illegible]

HMM-2460, dated 27 February 1957, "Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, January 1957."
CS-3/[illegible]
[illegible]

HMM-2326, dated 16 January 1957, "Visit of Soviet Artists to Mexico."

d. Soviet Military Activities

Monthly reports are prepared from LIENVOY information on contacts between Soviet and Mexican military personnel. They reflect the identities of the local military figures with whom the Soviets maintain contact and in most cases contain some data on the reasons for the contact. These reports are of particular interest to the U.S. service attaches in Mexico.

e. Movements of Soviet Officials

The arrivals and departures of Soviet officials have been reported in almost every instance during the past five years through LIENVOY coverage. Frequently the Station has determined forthcoming departures long before they took place by careful study and interpretation of LIENVOY materials indicating Soviet contacts with local clothiers and other merchants selling luxury items - it is the habit of Soviets, prior to departure from Mexico, to stock up on items which are not available in the USSR. This type of coverage is of particular interest to ODENVY.

f. Soviet Embassy Contacts

Monthly reports of contacts by members of the Soviet diplomatic corps are compiled and submitted to Headquarters. These reports are of considerable value in planning agent operations against the Soviets. They are also of operational assistance in identifying local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets maintain regular contact. The following reports are examples of this type of coverage:

25-3 34,772 [illegible] HMM-2376, dated 30 January 1957, "Contacts of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956."

[illegible] HMM-2459, dated 27 February 1957, "Contacts of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, January 1957."

g. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials

LIENVOY has been a very productive source for collecting personality information on Soviets. Such data as Soviet contacts, marital situations, official duties, etc., are of value in determining which officials may be susceptible to recruitment and/or defection. A case in point would be the present Soviet Naval Attache, Grigori NIKIFOROV. A recent study of his background and habits indicated that his wife might be vulnerable to recruitment because she was having amorous relations with one of her husband's subordinates. A sample of the personality report series may be found in [illegible]-4601, dated 1[illegible] May 1957, subject: "Boris Pavlovich K[illegible]".

h. Goods and Services Provided to the Soviet Embassy

Periodic reports of the persons and institutions providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy have been of considerable value in developing and mounting a [illegible] operation. This type of information is valuable in determining the identity of individuals having access to the Soviet Embassy who can later be recruited by the Station as controlled agents. [illegible]-2[illegible]2, dated 27 February 1957, subject: "Goods and Services Used by the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956 - January 1957", is an example of the Station's reporting of this type of operational information.

i. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy

LIFEAT material relating to the Soviet Embassy, which does not fit into any general category, is set forth each month in a series of reports on miscellaneous activities. These reports include such random information as banking transactions, landscaping activities, evidences of internal construction, etc. The following reports are cited as examples of this type of information:

HMM-2375, dated 30 January 1957, "Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956."

HMM-2448, dated 27 February 1957, "Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, January 1957."

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the past year is basically the same as the information obtained on the Soviet Embassy; consequently, to avoid repetition in this review, only the highlights of Czech Legation coverage are mentioned.

a. Data Pertaining to Czech Personnel

The LIFEAT collection effort in this connection has been productive. Reports have reflected personality data, official functions and domestic matters pertaining to Czech staff members and information suitable for use in planning defection approaches.

The following reports are cited as examples of this type of information:

HMM-1896, dated 28 September 1956, "Czech Legation Personnel."

HMM-1959, dated 17 October 1956, "Czech Legation Personnel."

HMM-2330, dated 18 January 1957, "Czech Legation Personnel."

b. Spot Reports on Czech Legation Activities

Spot reports are submitted periodically on matters of interest which pertain to the Czech Legation. Examples of these reports are:

HMM-1779, dated 10 September 1956, "Proposed Czech-Mexican Barter Transaction."
CS-104650

HMM-1814, dated 19 September 1956, "Travel of Czech Commercial Representatives."

HMM-1577, dated 9 October 1956, "Travel of Enrique CASTRO Garcia."
CS-107487

HMM-1987, dated 24 October 1956, "Czech Delegates to the XX International Congress of Geology."

Polish Legation

As with the Czech Legation, information pertaining to the Polish Legation parrallels closely the type of information reported about the Soviet Embassy. By far the largest amount of information obtained on the Polish Legation during the past year has resulted from LIFEAT coverage. Biographic information on Polish staff members has been forwarded to Headquarters. The following examples of spot reports were forwarded for Headquarters' dissemination:

HMM-1744, dated 29 August 1956, "Polish Legation Reception Commemorating 11th Anniversary of Day of Liberation."
CS-103442

HMM-1748, dated 31 August 1956, "Polish Legation Contacts with Polish Delegates to the Eighth International Radiology Congress."

HMM-2631, dated 20 February 1957, "Polish Legation Contacts with Carlos Augusto LEON (Venezuelan Communist)."

HMM-2532, dated 29 March 1957, "Release of Rosendo GOMEZ Lorenzo."

HMMA-5961, dated 9 January 1957, "Julius KATZ-SUCHY."

Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

A significant amount of information was received from LIFEAT during the past year concerning the Mexican Communist Party and Communist Party Front organizations. The latter included information on the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos, the Mexican Peace Movement, the Society of Friends of China and various art fronts. This information has been of value in supplementing agent coverage of these organizations. The following reports are examples of this type of information:

HMM-1657, dated 18 July 1956, "Narciso BASSOLS."

HMM-2285, dated 29 November 1956, "Xavier GUERRERO Saucedo and Clara Porset de GUERRERO."

American Communists in Mexico

One of the most extensive and productive coverages initiated through LIFEAT during the past year was directed against American Communists in Mexico. Most of these targets were covered at the request of ODENVY and the production was processed in part by ODENVY. A total of 342 reels of information were recorded on three separate cases. A fourth case, LCMAYFO-L, was mounted at the suggestion of ODENVY just 15½ hours after the Station received the request from Headquarters. The Station has received three ~~commendations from Headquarters on the LIFEAT coverage of this~~ case and Edward P. SPCHIN received a personal commendation from the DCI for his work on this operation. Over 90 reels of valuable information have been produced since the beginning of this operation on 9 February 1957.

Mexican Government

During the early part of 1957 LIFEAT coverage provided the means for the Station to assess reports from another source concerning the hardening of the Mexican Government's attitude toward foreign Communists. LIFEAT coverage of various individual targets provided reliable information on the arrests of the foreign Communists Mario SOSA Navarro, Joaquin ORDOQUI, Jacobo [illegible]ITZ Zender and [illegible] and tended to confirm data on the same matters obtained through other Station sources. LIFEAT also added details which were not available to other Station sources, such as the names of the persons who sought to help those imprisoned. For example, LIFEAT established that the Venezuelan Communist leader, Eduardo MACHADO Morales, was the person holding the passport of Joaquin [illegible] at the time of his arrest; this fact, among others, makes MACHADO appear to be one of the most important foreign Communists in Mexico. The below listed reports contain information of this type:

HMM-A-6240, dated 6 March 1957

HMM-A-6242, dated 6 March 1957

HMM-1769, para four, dated 12 September 1956, is cited as containing an apparently reliable report to the effect that in 1956 the Mexican president told the editor of one of Mexico's leading newspapers that he should play down or omit anti-U. S. articles and opinions.

LAURICLE Information

LIFEAT has contributed materially to several matters having LAURICLE interest.

Counter Intelligence Information

CI/CE matters constitue a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives. Project LIFEAT has contributed more leads and general information on the Soviet aspect of this subject than all other Station sources combined. A few representative samples of this type of information are listed below:

CSCI-7246
HI

HMM-1958, dated 9 October 1956, and HMM-2286, dated 2 January 1957 describe contacts between Narciso BASSOLS, leading Mexican pro-Communist, and Viktor N. [illegible], his Soviet case officer.

HMM-2420, dated 8 February 1957, sets forth arrangements for clandestine contact between Colonel Jesus de LEON Toral, of the Mexican General Staff College, with his Soviet case officer.

HMM-2270, dated 19 December 1956, sets forth contacts between Nikolay [illegible], Soviet intelligence officer, and Jesus [illegible], Mexican Naval officer.

14-00000

HMMA-4163, dated 23 April 1956, and HMMA-2276, dated 20 December 1956, describe a lengthy series of contacts between "Abrana" HAILE, an Ethiopian student in Mexico, and Boris P. K[illegible], Soviet intelligence officer.

Checks on Double Agents

Several of the Station's double agents have been monitored through LIFEAT while in contact with the Soviet Embassy, thereby enabling the Station to verify portions of their reports and hence providing means for establishing the veracity of the agents' reports to the Station. Among those monitored during the past year were LIBELKA, LIL[illegible], LI[illegible] and LISTOCK-1.

Jewish Communist Activities

LIFEAT coverage of the Jewish Communist leader, Aaron Jose PRZYSNA Margulos, has provided information on the decline of the Jewish Communist movement and the relative inactivity of PRZYSNA in Communist matters.

Coverage of the Jewish Communist leader, Samuel MAGIDIN Hagidin, confirmed the decline of the local Jewish Communist movement and the final liquidation of its headquarters. It also produced the names of the few active members who continue to meet informally. It was of value in covering the arrest of Chone SHEINBAUM, a member of the Jewish Communist group, and the deportation of Jacobo HURWITZ Zender, known Communist agent.

Further, LIFEAT has established that the Liga Popular Israelita, a Jewish Communist front organization, is almost defunct and quite inactive.

Hidden Microphone Operation

One LICOOL type operation is presently active. It is directed against the residence of the Soviet Counselor of Embassy and has caused a great deal of concern with the technical problems of installing the equipment and recording conversations properly in order that acceptable production of operational data might be obtained. A TSS technician is presently at the Station correcting these deficiencies; and, recent cable reports have provided valuable information which tends to confirm previous tentative conclusions that the Soviet Counselor of Embassy is a suitable target for a concentrated defection approach. The Station is currently making the necessary plans to approach the target, having already received Headquarters' approval.

Conclusion

The Mexico City Station and the Headquarters Mexico Desk agree that the product of the LIFEAT Project measured against the expenditure of Agency assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has contributed materially and substantially to several priority objectives of the Mexico City Station's Related Mission Directive.

2. Progress of the Operation

Definite progress has been made in reporting on the objectives of the LIFEAT project; however, all LIFEAT objectives are of a continuing nature and are not designed to be fully achieved. For this reason, no statistics can be cited as to the percentage of coverage on each objective. A general indication can be derived of the scope of the project by realizing that approximately 15,000 pages of summary text have been obtained from LIFEAT during the past year. An average of 23 simultaneous coverages on a 24 hour per day basis has been maintained during this review period. Generally, these coverages may be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy	8 lines
Czech Legation	2 lines
Polish Legation	2 lines
American Communists	3 lines
Remainder	8 lines

3. Planning for the Future

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring approximately 30 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for exploiting important targets of opportunity. At the present time the Station believes that 30 lines are about the maximum load the technical agents assigned to LIFEAT can properly handle and protect. The Station is currently preparing plans for submission to Headquarters which call for the establishment of a similar but separate and compartmented LIFEAT-type operation. Such a project would have new agents not previously associated with or knowledgeable about LIFEAT.

4. Performance of Agents

The Station has reported that in general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good during the past year. However, some of the agents connected with the group based on the family of the former head agent James [illegible] (deceased) have not been performing in a completely satisfactory manner. Those agents are gradually being replaced by new and fully compartmented agents. The Station continues to face recruitment problems, however, since the LIFEAT employment qualifications are quite rigid. The basic qualifications are:

a. Absolute discretion

b. Willingness to cover a base 24 hours daily for long periods of time.

c. Willingness to obey complex orders for long periods of time.

d. Willingness to live in a situation of constant danger.

Additional comments concerning the production, security and cover of individual agents will be found in the attached field project outline.

5. Expenditures During Period Under Review

Approval was granted for the period under review, 1 July 1956 - 30 June 1957, to expend $113,931. The total amount of funds obligated for Project LIFEAT during FY 1957 was $99,167. The proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1958 is contained in the attached field project outline.

6. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the field project outline and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT

PART I

1. Area of Operations

This project will be run from the Mexico City Station. It will be concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to determine Sino-Soviet plans, activities and connections with other communist elements through the use of technical surveillance. This purpose appears to be in consonance with the Related Mission Directive for Mexico (dated 7 May 1957), Priority A, Objective One.

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was approved initially on 3 October 1950. Actual operations began on 18 January 1951 and have run continuously since that time. The LIFEAT operation was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has expanded since that time to an average daily monitoring of 23 telephone lines and from one to four hidden microphone installations (the microphone operations were originally under a separate project—LICOOL).

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and is staffed by Agency staff and contract employees together with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the past six years Project LIFEAT has produced more than 40,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has major interest.

4. References

a. HMMA-4503, 9 May 1956 (Station's request for renewal of LIFEAT Project.)

b. HMMW-3710, 19 November 1956 (Headquarters' notification to the Station of the renewal of the LIFEAT Project.)

5. Objectives

a. To identify Soviet and Satellite intelligence personnel and to collect information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information on Soviet and Satellite commercial, diplomatic, cultural and military activities in Mexico.

c. To collect biographic information on Soviet and Satellite officials.

d. To collect information on the movements, assignments and positions of Soviet and Satellite personnel.

e. To identify and collect information on prominent Mexican Communist Party (PCM) officials.

f. To collect information on the plans and activities of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM).

g. To collect information on the activities of prominent Jewish Communists residing in Mexico.

h. To collect information on the activities of American Communists and other targets of opportunity living in Mexico.

6. Targets

For Objectives "a" - "d":

a. Selected Soviet Embassy and Commercial Office telephone conversations.

b. Telephone conversations from the residences of selected Soviet Officials.

c. Conversations emanating from the residences of selected Soviet Officials (hidden microphone installations).

d. Selected Czech Legation, Czech Commercial Office and Polish Legation telephone conversations.

e. Conversations emanating from the New Polish Legation (hidden microphone installations).

For Objectives "e" and "f":

f. Selected telephone conversations originating within the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) headquarters.

g. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior PCM and other Communist officials' residences.

For Objective "g":

h. Telephone conversations from the residences of selected Jewish Communists.

For Objective "h":

i. Telephone conversations from the residences of known American Communists.

j. Telephone conversations, and other conversations which can be monitored by technical means, of targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Senior Case Officer - Thomas G. URQUHART
Assistant Case Officer for LIMERICK phase - Arthur S. STOUGH

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LIMERICK, LITHOSPHERE and LITHOGRAPHY phases of the LIFEAT Project.

d. Co-ordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

Case Officer - Matthew S. BINGLEY

a. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LICOOL phase of the LIFEAT Project.

b. Conduct the training of all personnel assigned to the LICOOL phase.

c. Maintain LICOOL capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

d. Insure that all operational and intelligence information receives appropriate handling by the LICOOL personnel involved and, where appropriate, other Station personnel.

Case Officer - Harvey P. [illegible]

a. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LIVERY phase of the LIFEAT Project.

b. Conduct the training of all personnel assigned to the LIVERY phase.

c. Insure that all operations and intelligence information receives appropriate handling by the LIVERY personnel involved and where appropriate by Station personnel.

d. Co-ordinate information received from LIVERY with other Station operations.

Case Officer - (To be assigned later)

a. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LITMUS phase of the LIFEAT Project.

b. Conduct the training of all personnel assigned to the LITMUS phase.

c. Insure that all operations and intelligence information receives appropriate handling by the LITMUS personnel involved and where appropriate by Station personnel.

d. Co-ordinate information received from LIVERY with other Station operations.

The tasks of all other personnel assigned to the LIFEAT Project are stated or implied in Sections 9 and 11, below.

8. Co-ordination

a. Information produced by the LIFEAT Project is closely co-ordinated with all other operations at the Mexico City Station. No operational co-ordination is required with any other area, but they are kept informed of any information produced by the Project, which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LIROC, which supports David E. WILSTED, who is the principal outside LIFEAT Case Officer, is effected in co-ordination with Project LIFEAT.

c. LIFEAT Project is co-ordinated with Project [illegible] under which [illegible] and [illegible]-1, who perform work for Project LIFEAT, are carried.

d. In specific instances this project is co-ordinated with ODENVY representatives and activities in Mexico.

9. __Personnel__

The following persons will participate in the LIFEAT Project during Fiscal Year 1958.

a. __Staff Agents:__

(1) Ralph F. RAF[illegible], who is under unofficial commercial cover, acts as assistant Case Officer.

(2) Daniel K. BR[illegible], formerly a Staff Employee with SR Division, will be a Staff Agent with the Mexican Station to do translation of LI[illegible] material. He was granted a Security Approval on 23 February 1951. Until his arrival the Station is utilising the Services of Rowland K. [illegible] on a TDY basis.

b. __Contract Agents/Employees:__

(1) David M. WILSTED. With the death of James O. AYCALL (p) in March 1956, WILSTED has become the principal outside Case Officer in the LIFEAT Project, and also assists with the processing of some of the LIFEAT material. He is supported by and is the only agent under Project LIHOOD which was approved on 24 May 1957. The purpose of the LIHOOD Project is to establish WILSTED as a long-term deep cover asset in Mexico City. WILSTED received an Operational Approval on 2 November 1951.

(2) Alice M. CAIL[illegible] does ZOMAR processing for LIFEAT material. She received a covert security approval on 28 May 1956.

(3) Olivia M. GLA[illegible] (LI[illegible]), is used to process LIFEAT tapes and prepare ZOMAR abstracts. She received an Operational Approval on 30 July 1956.

(4) Frances M. HENZIE does clerical work for Project LIFEAT. She received a covert security approval on 5 August 1955.

(5) Carol K. ZI[illegible] (LICA[illegible]-1) processes a major part of the LI[illegible] material. She received an Operational Approval on 3 June 1955.

(6) Louise J. MACRINO (LITIEST) will process LIFEAT material. She received an Operational Approval on 6 September 1955. A covert security approval is being requested.

c. Field Agents:

(1) LILACS, David M. WILSTED's wife, assists in translating and preparing reports from LIFEAT material. She received an Operational Approval on 28 September 1954.

(2) LIMESTONE-1 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 11 September 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1953.

(3) LIMESTONE-2 is an assistant base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 25 November 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 December 1953.

(4) LIMESTONE-3 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 29 December 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1953.

(5) LIMESTONE-4 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 21 October 1954 and has an oral contract effective 1 November 1954.

(6) LIMESTONE-5 is an assistant base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 21 March 1955.

(7) LIMESTONE-7, wife of the late James O. AYCALL, has been used as a base house operator. She received an Operational Approval on 3 July 1956.

(8) LIMESTONE-8 is an assistant base house operator and processor of tapes. She received an Operational Approval on 27 April 1956.

(9) LIMESTONE-9 received an Operational Approval on 13 September 1956.

(10) LIMESTONE-10, wife of LIMESTONE-3, received an Operational Approval on 13 September 1956.

(11) LIKEWATER is an employee of Telefonos de Mexico, local telephone company. He provides the basic information necessary for running the Project. He received an Operational Approval on 17 October 1950 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1950.

(12) LIMITATION-1 is charged with aspects of the technical portion of the operation. He received an Operational Approval on 14 August 1951 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1953.

(13) LIMITATION-2, works with and has duties similar to his cousin, LIMITATION-1. He received an Operational Approval on 11 December 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 January 1954.

(14) LIMITATION is a base house operator. He received Operational Approval on 3 April 1951 and 30 September 1952 and is under an oral agreement effective 1 May 1951.

(15) LIMITATION-3, LIMITATION's father, is an assistant base house keeper and processor of LIFEAT material. He received an Operational Approval on 1 October 1953 and is under an oral contract effective 1 November 1953.

(16) LIMITATION-5 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 15 February 1954 and on 20 August 1954. He is under an oral agreement effective 1 March 1954.

(17) LIMITATION-6 assists LIMITATION-5, her husband, with the base house. She received an Operational Approval on 3 January 1956.

(18) LIMITATION-7 is an assistant base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 13 August 1956.

(19) LIPSTICK-18 is a base house operator. He received Operational Approvals on 31 March 1955 and 25 October 1955 and is under an oral agreement effective November 1954.

(20) LIPSTICK-35 is an assistant base house operator and is the wife of LIPSTICK-13. She received an Operational Approval on 6 August 1956.

(21) LIPSTICK 37, a relative of LIPSTICK-13, is an assistant base house operator. She received an Operational Approval on 13 September 1956.

(22) LIQUATION has been a base house operator and may retire during the coming project year. He received an Operational Approval on 16 December 1953 and is under an oral contract effective 1 January 1954.

(23) LIQUATION-1, LIQUATION's brother, is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 26 September 1955.

(24) LIQUATION-2, wife of LIQUATION, is a base house operator. She received an Operational Approval on 21 August 1956.

(25) LI[illegible]-3 is an assistant base house operator and processor of LIFEAT material. She received an Operational Approval on 19 January 1957. ✓

(26) Unwitting assistant to LI[illegible] for routine office work. ✓

LI[illegible]RIFORM and LI[illegible]-1, who handle Czech language tapes for the LIFEAT Project, are included under the LI[illegible] Project since the translation of the material and application of it to Czech operations are considered LI[illegible] functions. LI[illegible]RIFORM received an Operational Approval on 3 July 1951 and his wife, LI[illegible]-1, received one on 5 May 1952.

ODENVY's local office processes certain tapes from targets of primary interest to them.

There are a total of 41 persons who work full and part time on the LIFEAT Project. It is expected that two more processors and one additional technician will be added during Fiscal Year 1958.

d. Personnel Dropped from the Project:

The following Staff Agents returned to Headquarters on PCS during the last project year: Lewis O. NICKLAS, Chester D. POLLICOVE, and Norman F. WANGEROW.

LIPSTICK 13 left Mexico City.

10. Operational Clearances

See item 9.

11. Cover

(1) Ralph B. RAFANELLI: Fully documented employee of LIFINGER, who has in the past provided similar cover for undercover agents.

(2) Daniel K. BROWNE[illegible]: The Station is in the process of arranging LI[illegible]'s cover.

(3) David M. WILSTED: Partner in small family-run machinery business. His Mexican documentation is complete and legitimate.

(4) Alice H. CAILLETEAU: Housewife

(5) Olivia N. GLADDEN: Retired woman residing with daughter and known to have independent income from retirement from former job.

(6) Frances M. MENZIE: Housewife

(7) Carol K. ZIMSMEISTER: Housewife

(8) Louise J. MACHADO: Housewife, wife of LIPSTICK-19

(9) LILAC: Housewife

(10) LIMESTONE-1: She is an elderly person and hence can logically have an income from family estate. Does not attract attention.

(11) LIMESTONE-2: Brother of LIMESTONE-1 and resides with her. Is elderly and can pass as a poor relative and retainer.

(12) LIMESTONE-3: Has been engaged in obtaining small government contracts and moves in and out of various government offices. Unfortunately his cover is not really good and steps must be taken to improve it if he is to remain in our employ.

(13) LIMESTONE-4: Elderly woman who has had large business enterprises in the past and who does not need to explain her source of income for this reason.

(14) LIMESTONE-5: Father-in-law of LIMESTONE-3 and ostensibly dependent on him.

(15) LIMESTONE-7: Widow of James O. AYCALL, who was widely regarded as a man of means. Hence she ostensibly lives on his estate. This woman has a tendency to live beyond her means, however, and is a cause for anxiety.

(16) LIMESTONE-8: Relative of LIMESTONE-4. They reside together. This agent is a widow and ostensibly lives on an inheritance.

(17) LIMESTONE-9: Housewife

(18) LIMESTONE-10: Housewife

(19) LIMEWATER: His natural cover is of employee of the local telephone company, which he has been for a number of years.

(20) LIMEWATER-1: Enjoys natural cover as a telephone company employee.

(21) LIMEWATER-2: Enjoys natural cover as a telephone company employee.

(22) LIMITATION: He is an architect and follows an almost full time career in that business while his relatives manage the [illegible] Base.

(23) LIMITATION-3: Very elderly retired person who formerly had a large business and whose income therefore is not open to question.

(24) LIMITATION-5: Accountant with a large firm.

(25) LIMITATION-6: Wife of LIMITATION-5. She handles most of the routine work LIMITATION-5 has done for the Station in the past.

(26) LIMITATION-7: Housewife

(27) LIPSTICK-18: This agent's cover, that of plumber and electrician is not satisfactory. It appears, however, that he may be put into another type of operation sometime this year.

(28) LIPSTICK-35: Housewife

(29) LIPSTICK-37: Dependent relative of LIPSTICK-18.

(30) LIQUATION: Businessman with office in the city. He spends a good deal of time on selling machinery while LIQUATION-2 and LIQUATION-3 mind the base.

12. Contact and Communications

a. Contact and communications between the case officer and the agents and undercover personnel in this operation is maintained in a clandestine manner. Various patterns have been established by which the agents and the case officers follow prearranged signals for the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, the meetings are always held at nights. All movement in and out of bases by the Case Officers and Principal Agents is done in cars ostensibly owned by the base agents, except in the case of LIVERY, where the agents are too old to drive. One of the local agents is usually used to contact the LIVERY base. Entrance to the bases by foot is made only in great emergencies.

b. Telephonic contact concerning the Project is kept to a minimum and a code system of digits and cryptonyms has been devised for use by the agents and case officers for phone conversations.

c. Alternate and emergency signals have been worked out.

d. In general these systems of contact and communication have been in practice for over six years and appear to have been suitable to the work. In detail, locations and times of meetings have been changed frequently.

13. Control and Motivation

The indigenous agents on this project are motivated by the following factors:

a. The LI[illegible] group: Motivated by high salaries and LI[illegible], himself, by pro-PBPRIME feelings. One of his sons is at present studying there. They are further controlled by fear of police action.

b. The LI[illegible] group: Motivated by family loyalty, good salaries and pro-PBPRIME outlook. They are further controlled by fear of police action.

c. The LIMITATION group: Motivated by pro-PBPRIME sentiments, LIMITATION being a PBPRIME citizen and LIMITATION-1 having resided there for many years.

d. The LIPSTICK group: Motivated by family loyalties, good salaries and personal loyalty to LIPSTICK.

e. The LIQUATION group: Motivated by family loyalty and good salary. LIQUATION, himself, is anti-Communist. Control is ideological and monetary.

14. Equipment and Support

It is believed that the supply of equipment for LIFEAT currently at the Station is sufficient to carry the operation through the calendar year 1957, but it is possible that simultaneous breakdown of quantities of the older equipment, dating from 1951 and in constant use since then, would necessitate the placing of separate orders for replacements.

15. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT

PART II

16. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1958. All figures are in U. S. dollars per year. LIFEAT costs will be higher than in the past because of rises in the cost of living (especially increased rents) and intended expansion.

a. Salaries

1. Staff and Contract personnel:

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-7				
	Salary	$4,525.00		
	Quarters	2,000.00		
			6,525.00	
DANIEL K. BREMOND ~~Unnamed~~ LIMERICK processor (GS-12)				
	Salary	7,570.00		
	Quarters	2,200.00		
	PCS Travel	2,000.00		
			11,770.00	
~~Unnamed LITOCK translator~~				
Included under New Project Besmooth	~~Salary~~	~~6,500.00~~		
	~~Quarters~~	~~2,000.00~~		
	~~PCS Travel~~	~~2,000.00~~		
			~~10,500.00~~	
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER	Salary	5,400.00	5,400.00	
Frances M. MENZIE	Salary	2,504.00	2,504.00	
Alice H. CAILLETEAU	Salary	2,425.00	2,425.00	
Olivia H. GLADMON	Salary	3,880.00	3,880.00	
Louise J. MACRINO	Salary	3,360.00	3,360.00	
				~~46,364.00~~ 35,864.00

2. Field agents

	Presently	
LIMEWATER	5280.00 ✓	
LIMEWATER-1	2208.00	
LIMEWATER-2	1440.00 ✓	
LIMESTONE-1	1440.00	
LIMESTONE-2	576.00	
LIMESTONE-3	2208.00	
LIMESTONE-4	22 8.00	
LIMESTONE-5	768.00 ✓	
LIMESTONE-7	1538.00 ✓	
LIMESTONE-8	1728.00 ✓	
LIMITATION	2112.00	
LIMITATION-3	1920.00 ✓	
LIMITATION-5(not hired yet)		
LIQUATION	3840.00 ✓	
LIQUATION-1	3840.00 ✓	
LIQUATION-3	768.00 ✓	
LI TICK-18	1728.00 ✓	
LILACE ($2.02 per hour, 120 hrs. per month)	2504.00 ✓	
LIMEWATER assistant	144.00	
Possible raises	2000.00	
Christmas bonus and presents (One month salary to each agent, in accordance local custom. Also special gifts in some cases)	3000.00	41,250.00

b. Base house rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK base house	2050.00	
LITMUS base house	2000.00	
LIVERY base house	2000.00	
LITHOSPHERE base house	2000.00	
LCMAYFOWL base house	1800.00	
Proposed base house	2900.00	
LIP AT base shop	2000.00	
Proposed base house	2700.00	
Proposed base house	2800.00	
LICOOL-6 base	600.00	
Proposed LICOOL base	600.00	
		21,450.00

c. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	5,000.00	5,000.00

d. Miscellaneous

1. Supplies (paper rolls, wire, tubes, tape, pens, parts)	2,000.00	2,000.00
2. Transportation		
LIMERICK car rent	300.00	
Carol K. ZINGMEISTER mileage	350.00	
LITMUS base car rental	700.00	
LIVANY base car rental	700.00	
LITHOSPHERE base car rental	400.00	
(MV 2047)	1440.00	
Proposed base car rental	700.00	
		4,590.00
3. Other Operational Expenses (To cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills; and to cover targets of opportunity)		20,000.00
Grand Total		~~140,654.00~~ 130,154.00

17. Special Problems and Commitments

None not reflected in the Project Outline

DESENSITIZED
Per CSN 43-43

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-7370
[redacted] #1012

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

M. Dahlgren

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 12 July 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— LIFEAT/Operational

SPECIFIC— Operations report for June 1957

MICROFILMED
JAN 25 1962
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

REF: HMM-A-7141

The following report is keyed to the headings required in FN 52-670 sec 3c2.

a. Processing of information: No change. The LCMAYFOWL phase of the operation was live monitored all day and during the early evening hours. A large number of ZOMAR abstract sheets, made out by Olivia Gladmon and Alice Gailleteau, were forwarded to Headquarters. Gladmon was also used on the processing of the Maurice HALPERIN target. During June the new system of making numerous carbon copies of the traffic was further developed and hence more copies were made available for clipping and putting into "P" (201) files. Routine reporting on monthly developments, particularly pertaining to the LIMERICK phase, was continued on the same basis as in the past.

b. Exploitation of leads: Leads connected with the visit of the alleged Communist agent Jacobo KUCHNIK, from Argentina were followed through the Maurice HALPERIN line and were coordinated with other activities on the case. From LIFEAT coverage it was also ascertained that LCMAYFOWL was in contact with Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV, RIS case officer stationed at the Soviet Embassy. This knowledge, obtained by voice recognition of KOLOMYAKOV in a single contact with the LCMAYFOWL target, resulted in the mounting of a physical surveillance of the LCMAYFOWL target which confirmed the existence of the contact and enable the station to derive further information of importance. In a third instance, LIFEAT contact between a Mexican Army officer and an RIS officer enabled the station to make plans to cover a meeting between them scheduled for 3 July 1957. Finally, coverage of LIMERICK targets commercial lines enabled the station to direct various investigations which resulted in the identification of several commercial contacts of that establishment.

c. Liaison: Not applicable.

d. Security: Security on the project remained without substantial change. Nothing further has developed from the alleged blackmail plot of April 1957. On the other hand, the activities of the local telephone company, which is now more solvent than in many years because of a new financial setup, continued to cause problems and temporary suspensions of work. LITMUS was not run during the entire month and the Maurice HALPERIN phase was suspended after about a week's operation owing to the presence of telephone crews in the same block as the base house as well as at other points along the LITMUS segment of the net. It was observed

Remove from Project KDAAA
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # 73-1735/77
Box: 3 Fold: 4

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

50-6-32/1

[redacted]

that the telephone crew had the habit of putting a high ladder up to the roof of any house upon which they wished to work, whereas in the past it had been their custom to ring the doorbell, ask permission to go to the roof and do so through the house where they wished to work. This new custom brought about the need to study emergency procedures and redraw them. A limited experiment was made on one line with some success. This experiment consisted of leaving the hot stub of one line on the base roof as usual, but instead of leading it directly into the operations room, as previously, it was attached loosely to a lead-in made of softer wire of the type used for interior installations. In the moment of need, the base operator had merely to haul on the soft lead, which therewith parted from the outside wire. Upon reaching the roof, therefore, the telephone men found only a stub ending in random fashion. This emergency method is considered better than none but is satisfactory for no more than one line at a time. It is the further disadvantage in that the outside wire stub is "hot" and could be checked by the telephone crew who, as they have done in the past on a few occasions, might call the target on that hot stub to see where he was located. In general, the station continues to recommend that when telephone crews are working near a base or along its net, crosses should be pulled and the operation suspended till the crews have left the neighborhood. An exception was made in the Halperin case because it was hoped the line would shed light on LCMAYFOWL.

e. Technical: No technical problems were encountered in June 1957.

f. Personnel and Administrative: No problems of a personnel or administrative nature were noted.

g. Miscellaneous: LIFEAT Annex IV was rented early in June and is being readied for use on three to five targets during July. LIMERICK Annex II is still out of service owing to the absence of LICATION and the continuance of work in the zone by the telephone company. LIVERY is out of service owing to the retirement of LIMESTONES 1 and 2 from active duty on account of the alleged blackmail plot of April 1957. LIMERICK Annex III is out of service and will not be recommissioned. One of its LIMERICK target lines was changed over to LIMERICK main base on 28 June. The other two lines from Annex III should be installed at LIMERICK main base during July.

During June 1957 the following lines were monitored part or full time:

- 7 - LIMERICK office lines out of 8 existing. Two were suspended for some two weeks because of the telephone company activity in their zone.
- 2 - LITHOSPHERE lines
- 1 - LCMAYFOWL line
- 1 - Maurice HALPERIN line (for about a week only)

During June the following cables, HMMs and informational HMMAs were based entirely or in part on LIFEAT:

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]

50-6-32/1

MEXI 487
MEXI 498
MEXI 507
MEXI 523
MEXI 525
MEXI 528
MEXI 554
MEXI 563
MEXI 564
MEXI 565
MEXI 578
MEXI 579
MEXI 580
MEXI 581
MEXI 589
MEXI 592
MEXI 595
MEXI 601
MEXI 610
MEXI 618
MEXI 626
MEXI 625
MEXI 627
MEXI 628
MEXI 629
MEXI 634
MEXI 636
MEXI 657
MEXI 659
MEXI 662
HMM-2697
HMM-2698
HMM-2699
HMM-2700
HMM-2713
HMM-2719
HMM-2732
HMM-2734
HMM-2735
HMM-2736
HMM-2745
HMM-2746
HMM-2747
HMM-2757
HMM-2761
HMMA-7102
HMMA-7147
HMMA-7196
HMMA-7204
HMMA-7207
HMMA-7232
HMMA-7237
HMMA-7259
HMMA-7267
HMMA-7281
HMMA-7290
HMMA-7300

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

TGU/ewf
11 July 1957

Distribution:
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

9 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/3 Mexico

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia from Chief, WH, subject as above, dated 3 July 1957

The LIVERY phase of Project LIFEAT continues to provide considerable biographic data on the members of the Czech Legation in Mexico City, which EE/Czechoslovakia finds most useful in the evaluation of these individuals as possible targets for recruitment, either in Mexico City or upon their assignment to another overseas post. For this reason EE/Czechoslovakia is interested in seeing Project LIFEAT renewed.

PHILO DIBBLE
AC/EE/C

SECRET

9 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT/LITMUS

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 3 July 1957 concerning the renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958. The LITMUS portion of this project is of primary interest to the Polish Branch, and as part of the increasing priority of KUBARK interest in Poland and Polish targets, it is strongly recommended that the project be continued.

2. This reaffirmation of our interest in LITMUS is based on the coverage it afforded up to December 1956 at which time the case officer/monitor handling LITMUS departed Mexico. This coverage was mainly of operational value in providing the following types of information:

(a) indications of Legation plans to move which lead to the station's investigating the possibilities of installing microphones in strategic places which would have immeasurably improved our knowledge of Polish activities in Mexbo.

(b) Legation security practices which are useful in predicting or interpreting changes elsewhere.

(c) Repatriation effort which has been of interest in itself and is of potential value in determining what part of this effort is connected with the PIS activity in Mexico.

(d) Travel and other information concerning the TDY presence in Mexico of important PIS personalities which assists in the world wide coverage of these individuals.

(e) Some information about the PIS representatives assigned to the Legation.

(f) Confirmatory information concerning some basic aspects of developmental activities such as LIMETRIC.

(g) Biographic and personality information in varying degrees of completeness about each of the individuals

SECRET

assigned to the Legation and some indication as to their activities and contacts. This data is most useful in assisting in the assessment and selection of these individuals as potential recruitment targets.

(h) Positive intelligence concerning commercial, cultural/propaganda, and diplomatic activities of the Legation personnel. The fact that the disseminations have been relatively few, is due to the usual limitations inherent in this type of audio operation.

3. The method of reporting information from LITMUS (separate reports on Legation officials and on the various subjects of interest) has been extremely well done and most useful to EE/P in assessing any specific personality, or an operational situation. It is hoped that with this basic information from LITMUS now available in each case, the station will be able to put the operational leads to use. Our recommendation for the continuance of LITMUS is based on the assumption that KUBARK operations in Mexico against the Poles will now be aimed primarily at the clarification of the status of the PIS in Mexico, the recruitment of Polish officials within the Legation, and answering the basic question of what the Poles are doing in Mexico. It is believed that LITMUS is essential to the support of this effort.

4. As an example of our interest in Mexico and LITMUS, it is pointed out that a Satellite case officer from the EE Division is currently preparing to depart for Mexico. It is also planned that a Polish speaking contract agent, experienced in Polish operations including monitoring audio efforts, will be sent to Mexico in the near future to work on LITMUS and to assist this case officer.

PETER K. HEIMANN
Chief, EE/P

~~SECRET~~

3 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/CPS

ATTENTION : Mr. Robert Brown

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LCNAYFOWL phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

~~SECRET~~

3 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE/Poland

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LIDRUG phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

WH/III/Mexico/LDPuckett:mjm

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - Subject

~~SECRET~~

3 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LIVERY phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

J. C. KING
for Chief, WHD

~~SECRET~~

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WH/III/Mexico

NO.

DATE 26 June 1957

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/Mexico/LSulc	27 JUN 1957			
2. C/WH/Mexico		1957		
3. C/WH/III	1 July	1		
4.				
5. WH/Staff/Chief	1 VII	1		
6.				
7. C/WHD	1 VII	1		
8.				
9.				
10. FI/OPS - Projects Branch ATTN: Miss Emma Paxson	2 JUL 1957	5 JUL 1957		Attachment being held by your office.
11. WH-Mexico				PROJECT ACTION RECEIVED F[illegible]/Projects Branch 2 July, 1957
12.				
13.				10 & 11 returned per conversation with Mr. Pept (?) Since this is not to be effective until August we will have to await project renewal
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

26 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended, effective 15 August 1957, to permit Daniel K. BROMUND (ps) to replace Lewis D. NICKLAS (ps).

2. BROMUND will monitor LIFEAT coverage and will process the resultant reels. He will be employed in translation and the preparation of reports based on this translation. He will also be employed in analysis of LIFEAT production and the preparation of special reports written on his analysis.

for
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

APPROVED: ______________________
Chief, FI/OPS

Attachment:
1 Envelope containing true names

SECRET

VIA AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO [illegible]-7053
[redacted]986

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 5 June 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Project Plan - LIFEAT

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

1. The attached Project Plan for LIFEAT is submitted for Headquarters approval and renewal.

2. It will be noted that the attached plan calls for an expansion in coverage and additional personnel.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

4 June 1957

TGU/gfb

Cryptonyms - and in some cases real (target) names - have been used in the attached because of the difficulties in writing a pouch with numerous identities.
W.C.

Attachments:

1. Herewith left portion odd-numbered pages
2. UNDER SEPARATE COVER left portion even-numbered pages
3. UNDER SEPARATE COVER right portion odd-numbered pages
4. UNDER SEPARATE COVER right portion even-numbered pages

AN hR
AB X
IN
PS
BX
DES NE:
FI
ARD

Distribution:

3 - HQS(w/5 sets atts)

Remove from Project KDMANE
CS Classification: 51 6-32/1
JOB # 73-175/78
Box: 22 Fold: 2

RECORD COPY

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

50-6-32/1

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

Att HMMA-7063

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]

CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT FIELD CASE OFFICERS Thomas J. URQUHART

Matthew S. DINGLEY

Harvey P. DENHOLZ

Not present

STATION: Mexico City CHIEF OF STATION

Willard C. CURTIS

1. The attached Field Project Outline is submitted for approval for the Fiscal Year 1958. In accordance with Field Instruction No. 236-1, 7(d), (dated 23 October 1953), the following information is submitted.

Product of the basic project

During the current fiscal year production from LIFEAT has been quite voluminous. The Soviet phase alone has accounted for some 8,000 pages of summary text and constitutes somewhat less than half the coverage yielded by the total project. The following general categories of information have been developed through LIFEAT and are cited below with a few examples of production(see references to specific reports and dispatches in the following paragraphs).

2. The Soviet Embassy

Information on the Soviet Embassy derived from LIFEAT has been voluminous and extensive reports have been furnished on the following matters:

a. Soviet Commercial Activities.

Reports such as HMM-2498, 8 March 1957; HMM-2054, 6 November 1956; and HMM-1975, 19 October 1956 have conveyed a substantial amount of month-to-month detail concerning Soviet economic and commercial policy and actions in Mexico and to a lesser extent in adjacent areas. This information reflects the types of products the Soviets are selling or purchasing in the area, the names of their intermediaries, details on prices, manner of arranging deals, and manner of effecting shipments. This information was screened out and briefed from extensive and prolonged coverage of Soviet Embassy commercial traffic and appears to be fully authentic as well as rich in detail. Reference is also made to HMM-2476, 1 March 1957(Tentative Deal for Ecuadorian Coffee); HMM-1973, 18 October 1956(Mexican Exports to the USSR); and HMM-1760, 18 October 1956(Sale of Soviet Ferrous Metal in the US) as examples of specific spot reports based on information derived from the same source. During the past year traffic concerning the Soviet commercial office in Mexico has increased a great deal and remains this Station's primary source on all such matters.

RECORD COPY

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]

Attachment to HMMA-7063
[redacted] 986
5 June 1957

50-6-32/1

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities

Reference is made to HMM-2327, HMM-2395 and HMM-2465 as examples of the type of monthly reports now being submitted relative to the diplomatic activities of the Soviet Embassy. These reports, based almost entirely on LIFEAT, indicate some relationships the Soviets are developing with the Mexican Government, with other Latin American governments, and with other foreign diplomatic representatives. They also shed some light on the relations between the Soviets, Poles and Czechs in Mexico City; and even on the relationships between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs. Reports of this type show when the Soviets seem to be engaged in a drive to establish contacts in various departments of the Mexican Government and when they appear to be conducting a drive to cultivate Latin American diplomats. The reactions of both the Mexicans and the Latin Americans to these advances are often shown in the corresponding traffic. The Soviets, in general, do not seem to get a very good reception from the Latin Americans, but on the other hand, LIFEAT shows that they are well received by the diplomatic representatives of India and Indonesia. The diplomatic reports have also shown an improvement of relations with the Yugoslavs(which were non-existent for several years here). The traffic and reports further show that the Soviets, Poles and Czechs have frequent interchange and other join in days of sport or other entertainment.

c. Cultural and Propaganda Activities

HMM-2329, HMM-2377 and HMM-2460 are cited as examples of the monthly summaries of Soviet cultural activities based on LIFEAT materials. They reflect in detail Soviet activities in connection with publication, cultural institutes, travel of Mexicans to the USSR for cultural purposes, visits of Soviet cultural figures to Mexico and data concerning how their local arrangements are made. HMM-2326 is cited as an example of a separate report on the visit of some Soviet musicians to Mexico.

d. Contacts of the Soviet Embassy

HMM-2376 and HMM-2459 are examples of monthly summaries of contacts of the Soviet Embassy. These are of value in planning agent operations against the Soviets since they list various contacts known to be maintained by them. This type of report also lists the local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets are in contact each month, together with a description of the nature of the contact when known.

e. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy

LIFEAT material relating to the Soviet Embassy, which does not fit into any general category, is set forth each month in a series of reports on miscellaneous activities. These reports include such random information

Attachment to HMMA-7063
[redacted]986
5 June 1957

[redacted]

as banking transactions, landscaping activities, evidences of internal construction, etc. Examples of this type of report are HMM-2375 and HMM-2446.

f. Military Activities of the Soviet Embassy

HMM-2391 and HMM-2450 are examples of monthly reports of Soviet contacts with Mexican military circles and are derived almost entirely from LIFEAT. They reflect the identities of the local military figures with whom the Soviets maintain contact and in most cases contain at least some data on the reasons for the contact. These reports are of considerable interest to American service attaches in Mexico.

g. Goods and Services of the Soviet Embassy

HMM-2452 is an example of periodic reporting on the persons and institutions providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy. These reports have been of particular interest in developing the LIMESA project and resulted in the making of a contact in the cleaning business through which this Station obtained entry for one of its agents into the Embassy. (Cf HMMA-6872).

h. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials

HMMA-6851 is a sample of a series of personality reports on Soviet officers prepared mainly from LIFEAT materials. LIFEAT reflects varying amounts of information on the Soviets. Some are frequently heard and much data accumulated on their contacts, marital situations, official duties, etc. These data have been used on occasion for studying possible defection pitches and will probably be used more in the future. In the case of the current Soviet Naval Attache, Grigori NIKIFOROVS, his habits were studied mainly through LIFEAT and note was made that his wife might be vulnerable because she was having amorous relations with one of her husband's subordinates. (MEXI 524; MEXI 495; MEXI 447).

i. Movements of Soviet Officials

The arrivals and departures of Soviet officials have more often been ascertained through LIFEAT than through any other source. The Station has been able to advise of movements out of Mexico through LIFEAT in almost every case where such travel took place in the past five(5) years. Frequently the Station has received notice of movement long before it took place by studying contacts of the Soviets with local clothiers, etc. since it has been the Soviet custom to stock up on clothing and various luxuries prior to leaving Mexico. The arrivals of many Soviets have been learned of only through LIFEAT, even in a number of cases when the Soviets travelled

Attachment to HMMA-7063
[redacted]986
5 June 1957

[redacted]

through the U.S. MEXI-853, 4 March 1957, is an example of this type of coverage. Notice of this arrival first appeared in the traffic on 26 February 1957. HMM-A-6842 is referred to as an example of this Station's coverage of unusual Soviet "courier" travel, in part based on LIFEAT.

j. Various Spot Reports

HMM-2081, describing the Soviet Embassy reception of 7 November 1956, is cited as an example of numerous spot reports on Soviet Embassy activites on which information was obtained mainly or entirely through LIFEAT. These reports are also put out to cover the travel of Soviets in the country of Mexico(MEXI-907, travel of Pavel IATSKOV, Soviet Consul, to Nuevo Laredo on 11 March 1957).

3. Czech Legation

LIFEAT has provided considerable information on the Czech Legation during the past year. The information thus obtained is roughly parallel to that obtained on the Soviet Embassy, and periodic general summaries have been forwarded in HMM-1605, HMM-1632, HMM-1693, HMM-1997, HMM-1747, HMM-2349 and others.

a. Personnel data

Personnel data on staff members of the Czech Legation have been forwarded in such reports as HMM-1896, HMM-1959, HMM-2330 and others. This data has been of use not only in reflecting personality data, official functions and domestic matters pertaining to Czech staff members but also in planning defection approaches.

b. Spot Reports

From time to time spot reports on matters of especial interest in connection with the Czech Legation have been forwarded, among which reference is made to the following entirely or partially based on LIFEAT:

HMM-1779, Proposed Barter Transaction;
HMM-1814, Travel of Czech Commercial Representatives;
HMM-1935, Vera Marie PIASILOVA;
HMM-1977, Travel of Enrique CASTRO Garcia; and
HMM-1987, Czech Delegation to Geological Congress.

c. LIFEAT Coverage

During most of the year LIFEAT coverage of the Czech Legation was confined to the two phones in the main Legation building but early in 1957 one of the two lines of the Commercial Office was crossed and very high production received. It is projected that this basic coverage will be continued to the extent circumstances permit.

4. Polish Legation

By far the greatest amount of information derived on the Polish

Legation in the past year, as well as every year since 1951, has been through LIFEAT. As in the cases of the Soviets and Czechs, this information is generally forwarded in periodic general summaries, of which HMM-1547, HMM-1610, HMM-1619, HMM-1667, HMM-1787, HMM-2018 and HMM-2173 are cited as examples. Biographic information on Polish staff members has been forwarded in such reports as HMM-1886, HMM-1800 and HMM-1929.

The following reports are cited as examples of spot reports on items believed to be of especial interest relating to the Polish Legation:

HMM-1744, Polish Legation Reception
HMM-1748, Polish Legation Contacts with Polish Delegates to Radiological Congress
HMM-2431, Polish Legation Contacts with Carlos Augusto LEON (Venezuelan Communist)
HMM-2532, Release of Rosendo GOMEZ Lorenzo and
HMMA-5941, Juliusz KATZ-SUCHY.

5. Combined Reports

HMM-1789, entitled "Soviet Bloc Economic Penetration in Mexico" is an example of a report of a general nature based on LIFEAT coverage of Poles, Czechs and Soviets.

6. Counter-intelligence matters

Counter-intelligence matters constitute the major FI portions of this of this Station's related Mission Directive and LIFEAT has contributed more leads and general information on the Soviet aspect of this subject than all other Station sources combined. The following reports are cited as examples of many of this type of reports and information developed in this category:

a. HMM-1958, HMM-2286, describing contacts between Narciso BASSOLS, leading Mexican pro-Communist, and Viktor N. GLOTOV, his Soviet case officer who appears in LIFEAT under the name of "LOPEZ."

b. HMM-2218, HMM-2262 and HMM-1336, dealing with the contacts between the leading Venezuelan Communist, Carlos Augusto LEON and his Soviet case officer, Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV. A comparison of readings from LIFEAT/LIMERICK with LIFEAT coverage on the Venezuelan Communist Party Officer Eduardo MACHADO Morales indicates that LEON is probably the intermediary between the Soviets and the Venezuelan exiles.

c. HMM-2420, setting forth arrangements for clandestine contact between Colonel Jesus de LEON Toral, of the Mexican General Staff College, with his Soviet case officer.

Attachment to HMMA-7063
[redacted]986
5 June 1957

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]

d. HMM-A-4463, HMM-2232, HMM-2276, setting forth a lengthy series of contacts between "Franz" [illegible], an Ethiopian student in Mexico, and Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV, Soviet intelligence officer.

e. HMM-A-6744, which sets forth the history of the contacts between Horacio SANDOVAL, ODENVY agent, and Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV.

f. HMM-2270, setting forth contacts between Nikolay [illegible], Soviet intelligence officer, and Jesus LAZO [illegible], Mexican naval officer.

g. HMM-A-5416 and HMM-A-4216, which deal with the possible contacts of a Mexican parachutist named Edward Albert [illegible] with the Soviet Embassy and which possibly has some importance to counter-intelligence within the U.S.

h. HMM-A-5941, Juliusz KATZ-SUCHY (Polish Intelligence Matter), setting forth this subject's activities and contacts while in Mexico. This report was largely based on LIFEAT.

and i. Many others.

7. Double Agent Checking

During the past year, as in previous years, a number of this Station's double agents have been monitored through LIFEAT in contact with the Soviet Embassy, thus enabling the Station to verify certain portions of their reports and hence leading to a better chance to evaluate the agents. Among those heard in the past year were LIBELER, LIBELER's son, LILEMONADE, LIRACE and LIVESTOCK-1. In each case LIFEAT tended to confirm the Station's good opinion of the agent. On the other hand, several recent contacts former Station agent LIVESTOCK-3 and the Soviets indicate that LIVESTOCK-3 may be "playing" with the Soviets or endeavoring to do so.

8. LAURICLE

Reference is made to HMM-A-5923 ([illegible]-843) which sets forth data on Soviet LAURICLE matters, derived mainly from LIFEAT. Personality data on LAURICLE figures, especially in the Polish and Czech establishments, has been accumulated and studied as a major Station objective.

9. Intentions and Activities of the Mexican Government

During the early part of 1957 LIFEAT enabled the Station to assess reports it was receiving from another source concerning the changing and hardening of the Mexican government's attitude towards foreign Communists. LIFEAT coverage of various individual targets gave solid information on the arrests of the foreign Communists Mario SOSA Navarro, Joaquin ORDOQUI,

Attachment to HMM-A-7063
[redacted] 986
5 June 1957

Jacobo [illegible] Zender and Chone [illegible] and tended to confirm data on the same matters obtained from Station agent LI[illegible]-2. LIFEAT also added details which were not available to other Station sources, such as the names of the persons sought to help those imprisoned. For example, it was learned that the Venezuelan Communist leader Eduardo MACHADO Morales was the person who was holding the passport of Joaquin ORDOQUI at the time of his arrest, which fact, among others, makes MACHADO appear to be one of the most important foreign Communists in Mexico. Reference is made to the following reports which contain information of this general type: HMMA-6240 and HMMA-6242.

HMM-1769(p. 4) is cited as containing a seemingly reliable report to the effect that in 1956 the Mexican president told the editor of one of Mexico's leading newspapers that he should play down or omit anti-US articles and opinions.

10. Information on the Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

During the past year considerable day to day detail was received from LIFEAT concerning the Mexican Communist Party and its fronts. The latter included the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos(the intellectual author of which was covered in LIFEAT) and the Mexican Peace Movement, Society of Friends of China and various art fronts(through coverage of an officer of those movements.) This information was of value in supplementing agent coverage of those organizations and occasionally provided information unknown to the agents. (Cf HMM-1657 and HMM-2285)

11. American Communists in Mexico

One of the most extensive and productive coverages through LIFEAT in the past year was directed against American communists in Mexico. In this period several American targets were covered at the request of ODENVY and the production processed in part by them and in part by this Station. ODENVY assumed the task of reporting most of the information on these subjects but provided the station with carbon copies of their summaries of the pertinent reels and of the reports based thereon. The subjects thus covered for ODENVY were as follows, with a listing of the number of reels passed on each:

a. Noah SEBORER, possible American espionage agent for the Soviets (23 reels)
b. Frederich Vanderbilt FIELD, American Communist, and his wife, Anita Boyer FIELD(254 reels)
c. Asa ZATZ Dolinski, American Communist agent(55 reels.)

12. Of particular importance in the coverage by LIFEAT was the Alfred Kaufmann STERN / which was of particular interest not only to KUBARK but
//
and Martha Dodd STERN case

Attachment to H[illegible]A-7063
[redacted]986
5 June 1957

SECRET [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

also to ODENVY. This case was a part of the Jack SOBLE espionage case; and LIFEAT coverage of the STERNs has been outstandingly excellent. In fact, the Station has had three(3) commendations from Headquarters on the LIFEAT coverage of this case and Edward P. [illegible] had a personal commendation from [illegible] on his work(LIFEAT) on the case. Over ninety(90) reels have been produced by LIFEAT on the STERNs between 9 February and 27 May 1957. Another interesting facet of this coverage is that on 8 February (at 1630 hours) 1957 a cable from Headquarters asked that the Station attempt to institute LIFEAT coverage on the STERNs. At 1000 hours on 9 February 1957 LIFEAT coverage had been completed and was producing.

13. Miscellaneous Coverages

During the past year the following individual targets have been covered for periods of time varying from one month to a full year:

a. Aaron Jose PSZYSMA Margules, Jewish Communist leader. The coverage reflected the decline of the Jewish Communist movement and the relative inactivity of PSZYSMA and was suspended.

b. Noah [illegible], American Communist. He and his wife work for a travel agency and their traffic has reflected many details concerning the movements of Americans in and out of Mexico, many of them Communists.

c. Samuel MAGIDIN Magidin, Jewish Communist leader. This coverage confirmed the decline of the local Jewish Communist movement and the final liquidation of its headquarters. It reflected the names of the few active members who continue to meet informally. It was of especial value in covering the arrest of Chone SHEINBAUM, member of the Jewish Communist group, and in covering the deportation of Jacobo HURWITZ Zender, known Communist agent. From this coverage details were learned concerning the names of the lawyers used by the defendants, together with a considerable view of the methods and secondary contacts.

d. Alfred K. (and Martha Dodd) STERN(see para 12), which was probably the most outstanding technical surveillance operation ever mounted by this Station and which is still continuing.

e. Eduardo MACHADO Morales, Venezuelan Communist. This coverage conveyed a host of details on the machinations and activities of the Venezuelan Communists in Mexico and to a lesser degree provided information on their contacts with the Soviets and Mexican Communists.

f. Xavier GUERRERO. This coverage contained considerable detail on the Communist party, Society of Friends of China, Peace Front and other organizations of which GUERRERO was a member. It also contained details of great interest on various Latin American Communists and Americans with whom the GUERREROs were in contact. Information derived from this line

[redacted]

Attachment to [illegible]-7063
[redacted]-986
5 June 1957

[redacted]

was used in inducing the Mexican Government to deport Mario SOSA Navarro and thus provided the Station with the means to test one of its more potent sources as well as check the accuracy of his progress reports.

g. Narciso BASSOLS. BASSOLS is a leading collaborator of the Soviets in Mexico. Coverage of his traffic showed him in contact with his Soviet case officer and gave details of interest on Mexican political matters and one important Communist front, the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos, of which BASSOLS was the intellectual author though not a member.

h. Asa ZATZ Dolinski, American Communist mentioned above.

i. Headquarters of the Liga Popular Israelita, Jewish Communist front. This coverage reflected that the Liga was almost defunct.

J. Fernando Alberto MILIA, Argentine Naval Attache, who was covered briefly in connection with the proposed defection of a Soviet official with whom he was in contact.

14. Microphone Phase

LIFEAT Project also includes the LICOOL phase. Reference is made to HMMA 006 which describes a current LICOOL installation directed against a Soviet official.

15. Summary

In summary, LIFEAT constitutes one of Mexico City Station's chief assets; and it is the belief of COS Mexico that this operation(which is wholly KUBARK's and has no liaison or other service involved) is by far the best operation of its kind KUBARK has in the world.

a. Accomplishments

On a general average over the past year LIFEAT has consisted of twenty-two(22) to twenty-three(23) simultaneous coverages, each of 24 hours per day. The targets covered have included major coverage of all those which rank highest in the Station's PRD(Soviets, Poles and Czechs) as well as a large number of selected targets of opportunity. Approximately 15,000 pages of summary text have been obtained from the project. This information, though fragmentary at times and at times difficult to understand, is nevertheless documentary in nature. In detail, average coverage of the targets at the Station has been as follows:

Soviets	8 Lines	American Communists	3 lines
Czechs	2 lines	Remainder	8 lines.
Poles	2 lines		

Attachment to HMMA-7063
[redacted]936
5 June 1957

SECRET [redacted]

b. Planning for the Future

Current planning calls for the continuation of about 24 lines of coverage with bases and personnel being assembled to permit an increase to about 30 lines, local circumstances permitting. Basic coverage will be continued to the fullest extent possible on the Soviets, Poles and Czechs, which coverage of individual and targets of opportunity will be shifted so as to produce the greatest possible amounts of important information. At present it is believed that 30 lines is about the maximum the technical agents on this one operation can mount and protect properly. In order to get more coverage, the Station will likely establish (if headquarters approves) a separate, independent LIFEAT-type operation, with new principals.

c. Performance of Agents

While in general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good in the past year, some of those connected with the group based on the family of former head agent James O. AYCALL have not been acting in a satisfactory manner. These are gradually being weeded out and new, more effective and fully compartmented base operators are being substituted for them. The Station's problem in this connection is difficult since it is hard to recruit persons who combine the following qualifications necessary for base house operations:

i) absolute discretion;
ii) willingness to cover the base 24 hours daily, year after year;
iii) suitable cover;
iiii) willingness to obey complex orders to the letter year after year;
and iiiii) willingness to live in a situation of constant potential danger.

d. Status of Approved Commitments

LIFEAT Project (as approved in HMM-W-3740) contains most of the elements which will be necessary in Fiscal 1958. The main difference that will be noted in the attached Field Project Outline is that costs will be higher and one more base house will be added to the current list.

Attachment to HMM-A-7063
[redacted]986
5 June 1957

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]
SECRET / [redacted]

[redacted]

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT FIELD CASE OFFICERS

Thomas J. URQUHART

1. Area of Operations Mexico City, Mexico

Matthew S. DI[illegible]

Harvey P. DE[illegible]HOLZ

(Open)

[illegible]. CHIEF OF STATION

Willard C. CURTIS

2. Purpose

To mount various types of technical surveillance operations, mainly telephonic, against the Soviet, Czech and Polish diplomatic missions in Mexico; against important contacts of these installations; and against leading Mexican and non-Mexican Communists and Communist sympathizers.

3. Background

This project was first approved 3 October 1950 and has been extended each year thereafter. Actual operations began 18 January 1951 and have been continuous, with small breaks for security or other operational reasons from that date. The project was last approved in HMM-W-3740, 19 November 1956.

LIFEAT has been run since its inception without liaison and no plans now exist to change this arrangement.

Over the past 6 years and 3 months LIFEAT has expanded from coverage of one(1) line to coverage of an average of about twenty-four(24) lines, each being covered 24 hours per day. In all, over 40,000 pages of documentary information on prime station targets has thus been obtained from this operation.

4. Reference

HMM-W-3740, 19 November 1956, contains the last renewal of this project.

a. This project has been one of the outstanding KUBARK operations in the world. Certain elements at Headquarters recognize this. Chief, SR/CE states to this Station during his visit in January 1957 that this was the only "LIFEAT-type" operation which was wholly KUBARK's and he said it was

[redacted]

the best such operation. From knowledge COS Mexico has, it is known that (unless something has developed very recently) LIFEAT is the best operation of its kind which KUBARK has.

b. Headquarters has stated:

i. In DIR-03198 of 18 Feb. 1957, "HQS commends Station prompt and effective coverage and handling this case";

ii. In DIR-09968 of 29 March 1957, "Good work";

iii. In DIR-11936 of 12 April 1957, "ODENVY and we(HQS) are most gratified by iniative and success your coverage".

All of these referred to LIFEAT coverages.

c. The Director has personally commended the Station officer for his work in one line's coverage in this operation; and has orally stated to COS, Mexico that this is an excellent operation.

5. Objectives

To carry out this Station's obligations in conformity with its Related Mission Directive, through technical surveillance operations. The product from this operation is coordinated with other Station operations, with especial attention to Soviet, Polish and Czech activities.

6. Targets

Primary targets covered in this operation are:

Soviet Embassy and residences of Soviet officials;
Czech Legation;
Polish Legation; and
Alfred Kaufmann (and Martha Dodd) STERN.

Secondary targets are:

Soviet, Polish and Czech agents;
Mexican and foreign Communists; and
American Communists.

7. Tasks

a. To maintain and operate existing project facilities and establishments;

b. To augment similar coverage when need or opportunity arises;

c. To recruit, train and administer such agents as the project requires;

d. To issue such reports as are deemed necessary, based on material acquired from the project;

e. To coordinate information obtained from the project with other Station operations;

and f. To provide KURIOT with operational information and reports on experience obtained from the project.

8. Coordination

LIFEAT information is very closely coordinated with all other operations at this Station but does not require operational coordination with any other area. However, when the project yields information of interest to other areas, these areas are informed.

9. Personnel

It is intended that the following personnel will participate in the LIFEAT Project during Fiscal Year 1958:

a. Case Officers

Case Officer: Thomas J. URQUHART*
Case Officer for LICOOL phase: Matthew S. DINGLEY*
Case Officer, Czech Legation phase: Harvey F. DEMMHOLZ*
Case Officer, Polish Legation phase: to be named*
General asst. Case Officer: David H. WILSTED(U.S. citizen) - technical - contract agent(has own commercial firm which furnished his cover)
General Asst. Case Officer: Ralph RAFANELLI(U.S. citizen) - commercial
General Asst. Case Officer: Arthur S. STRUGH* /unofficial cover/

* Denotes Diplomatic cover

b. Operations agents

✓ 1. LIMEATER. Field Agent, Operational Clearance 739, dated 17 October 1950. He is an employee of Telefonos de Mexico, local telephone company, who provides the basic information necessary for running the project.

✓ 2. LIMEATER-4. Field agent. Operational clearance 1412, 14 Aug. 1951. He is charged with aspects of the technical portion of the operation.

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. LI[illegible]-2. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7452, 11 Dec. 1953. This agent works with LI[illegible]-1 and has similar duties.

4. LIMESTONE-1. Field agent, Operational Clearance 6799, 11 Sept. 1953. Base house operator.

5. LIMESTONE-2. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7347, dated 25 Nov. 1953. Asst. base house operator.

6. LIMESTONE-3. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7585, 28 Dec. 1953. Base house operator.

7. LIMESTONE-4. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-31989, 21 Oct. 1954. Base house operator.

8. LIMESTONE-5. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-32742, 21 March 1955. Asst. base house operator.

9. LIMESTONE-7. Field agent. Operational Clearance in HMMA-3265, 13 July 1956.

10. LIMESTONE-8. Field agent. Operational clearance in DIR-09743, 1 May 1956. Asst. base operator and processor of tapes.

11. LIMESTONE-9. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50464, 24 Sept. 1956

12. LIMESTONE-10. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50758, 24 Sept. 1956.

14. LIMITATION-3. Field agent. Operational Clearance 5970, 1 Oct. 1953. Asst. base operator and processor.

13. LIMITATION. Field agent. Operational Clearance 5977, 30 Sept. 1952. Base operator.

15. LIMITATION-7. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50457, 13 Aug. 1956. Asst. base operator.

16. LIMITATION-5 and LIMITATION-6. Field agents. Operational clearance in HMM-W-2800, 13 Jan. 1955, and HMM-W-1333, 19 Mar. 1954. To be used as base operator.

17. LIQUATION. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7496, 16 Dec. 1953. Has been base operator but may retire. However, he should be kept on the rolls until a definite decision is made.

[redacted]

SECRET [redacted]

18. LIQUATION-1. Field agent. Operational Clearance forwarded in HMMW-2252, 5 Oct. 1955. Base operator.

19. LIQUATION-2. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50455, 21 August 1956. Base operator.

20. LIQUATION-3. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-54096, 19 January 1957. Asst. base operator and processor.

21. LIPSTICK-18. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-33182, dated 31 March 1955. Base operator.

22. LIPSTICK-35. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50157, 6 August 1956. Asst. base operator.

23. LIPSTICK-37. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50750, 13 Sept. 1956. Asst. base operator.

c. Processors of recorded tapes

24. Carol K. ZIMMEISTER, contract agent. Operational Clearance C-29842, 1 July 1954. Processes major portion of Soviet target material.

25. LILACE. Field agent. Clearance contained in HMMW-1742, 15 Oct. 1954. General processing.

26. Alice M. CAILLETEAU. Contract employee. Clearned in HMMW-3051, 20 April 1956. ZOHAR processing.

27. Frances M. MENZIE. Contract agent. Cleared in HMMW-2763, 28 December 1955. General processing.

28. Olivia GLANNON. Contract agent. Clearance by virtue of contract dated 1 January 1957. General processing and ZOHAR processing.

29. Unwitting assistant to LIEMATE for routine office work.

(NOTE: LIERIBBON and LIERIFORM-1, who handle Czech language tapes, are included in the LILOGTROT Project. In addition to the above processors, assistant Case Officers STOUCH and WILSTED also engage in processing. ODENVY's local office processes certain tapes from targets of primary interest to them. LIMESTONE-8 and LIQUATION-3 alternate assistant base operator duties with those of processing.)

Total personnel, part or full time on Project: 37.

NOTE: It is also expected that two(2) more processors; and one(1) additional technician will be added during Fiscal Year 1958.

Page 15
Attachment to HMMW-7064
[redacted]986
5 June 1957

SECRET [redacted]

[illegible] / [redacted]

10. Operational Clearances

Cf Item 9.

11. Cover

a. Cover for the case officers noted in 9a, diplomatic or commercial (unofficial) see 9 a.

b. Set forth below is a discussion of the cover of the non-diplomatic personnel in the operation.

1. David L. WILSTED: Partner in small family-run machinery business. His Mexican documentation is complete and legitimate.

2. Ralph RAFANELLI: Fully documented employee of [illegible], who has in the past provided similar cover for undercover agents.

3. LIEWATER: His natural cover is of employee of the local telephone company, which he has been for a number of years.

4. LIEWATER-1: Enjoys natural cover as a telephone company employee.

5. LIEWATER-2: Enjoys natural cover as telephone employee.

6. LIMESTONE-1: She is an elderly person and hence can logically have income from family estate. Does not attract attention.

7. LIMESTONE-2: Brother of LIMESTONE-1 and resides with her. Is elderly and can pass as a poor relative and retainer.

8. LIMESTONE-3: Has been engaged in obtaining small government contracts and moves in and out of various government offices. Unfortunately his cover is not really good and steps must be taken to improve it if he is to remain in our employ.

9. LIMESTONE-4: Elderly woman who has had large business enterprises in the past and who does not need to explain her source of income for this reason.

10. LIMESTONE-5: Father-in-law of LIMESTONE-3 and ostensibly dependent on him.

11. LIMESTONE-7: Widow of James O. MCCALL, who was widely regarded as a man of means. Hence she ostensibly lives on his estate. This woman has a tendency to live beyond her means, however, and is a cause for anxiety.

[redacted]

[redacted]

12. LIMESTONE-8: Relative of LIMESTONE-4. They reside together. This agent is a widow and ostensibly lives on an inheritance.

13. LIMESTONE-9: Housewife.

14. LIMESTONE-10: Housewife.

15. LIMESTONE-11: Housewife.

16. LIMITATION: He is an architect and follows an almost full time career in that business while his relatives manage the LIMEAT base.

17. LIMITATION-3: Very elderly retired person who formerly had a large business and whose income therefore is not open to question.

18. LIMITATION-7: Housewife.

19. LIMITATION-5: Accountant with a large firm. His wife (LIMITATION-6) handles most of the routine work he has done for the Station in the past.

20. LIQUATION: Businessman with office in the city. He spends a good deal of time on selling machinery while LIQUATION-2 and LIQUATION-3 mind the base.

21. LIQUATION-1: Has been out of town working on a contract. Previously was a student and had adequate cover for part-time work. When he returns to LIMEAT his cover will be similar to that of LIQUATION.

22. LIQUATION-2: Housewife.

23. LIQUATION-3: Elderly widow who resides part time with her children, hence not likely to arouse suspicion.

24. LIPSTICK-18: This agent's cover, that of plumber and electrician, is not satisfactory. It appears, however, that he may be put into another type of operation sometime this year.

25. LIPSTICK-35: Housewife.

26. LIPSTICK-37: Dependent relative of LIPSTICK-18.

27. Carol K. ZIESMEISTER: Housewife.

28. LILACE: Housewife

29. Alice K. CAILLETEAU: Housewife

[redacted]986
5 June 1957

SECRET / [redacted]

[redacted]

30. Frances H. [illegible]: housewife.

31. Olivia A. [illegible]: Retired woman residing with daughter and known to have independent income from retirement from former job.

12. Contact and Communication

Contact and communication between the case officers and the agents and undercover personnel in this operation is maintained in a clandestine manner in generally the same form as in previous years. Reference is made to [illegible]-A-4503, 9 May 1956, for a general description of this system, which appears to have been successful.

13. Control and Motivation

Reference is made to [illegible]-A-4503 under this heading.

14. Equipment and Other Support

It is believed that supplied of equipment for [illegible] currently at the Station are sufficient to carry the operation through the calendar year 1957, but it is possible that simultaneous breakdown of quantities of the older equipment, dating from 1951 and in constant use since then, would necessitate the placing of separate orders for replacements.

15. Coordination

LIFEAT is coordinated with all other projects at this Station.

16. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

SECRET / [redacted]

SECRET / [redacted]

17. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1958. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to rises in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansions, [illegible] costs will be higher than in the past.

a. Salaries

1. Staff and Contract personnel:

Ralph S. [illegible], GS-7			
	Salary	4,525.00	
	Quarters	2,000.00	
			6,525.00
David M. WILSTED			
	Salary	6,400.00	
	Quarters	2,200.00	
	Educ.All.	500.00	
			9,100.00
Unnamed [illegible] processor(GS-12)			
	Salary	7,570.00	
	Quarters	2,200.00	
	PCS Travel	2,000.00	
			11,770.00
Unnamed [illegible] translator			
	Salary	6,500.00	
	Quarters	2,000.00	
	PCS Travel	2,000.00	
			10,500.00
Carol K. [illegible]			
	Salary	5,400.00	5,400.00
Frances L. [illegible]			
	Salary	2,504.00	2,504.00
Alice H. CAILLETEAU			
	Salary	2,425.00	2,425.00
Olivia H. GLADMON			
	Salary	3,880.00	3,880.00
Harvey C. [illegible]			
	Salary	10,320.00	
	Quarters	2,300.00	
	PCS Travel	2,000.00	
			14,620.00
			66,724.00

SECRET / [redacted]

Page 19
Attachment to [illegible]-7053
[redacted]966
5 June 1957

[redacted]

2. Field agents	Presently	Possible raise
LIMEWATER	5200.00	
LIMEWATER-1	2208.00	(at 2300, up 300)
LIMEWATER-2	1440.00	(at 1500, up 250)
LIMESTONE-1	1440.00	
LIMESTONE-2	576.00	
LIMESTONE-3	2208.00	(at 2300, up 300)
LIMESTONE-4	2208.00	(at 2300, up 300)
LIMESTONE-5	768.00	
LIMESTONE-7	1536.00	
LIMESTONE-8	1728.00	(at 1800, up 300)
LIMITATION	2112.00	(at 2200, up 400)
LIMITATION-3	1920.00	(at 2000, up 550)
LIMITATION-5(not hired yet)		
LIQUATION	3840.00	(at 4000, up 1100)
LIQUATION-1	3840.00(new deal)	
LIQUATION-3	768.00	
LIPSTICK-13	1728.00	(at 1800, up 200)
LILACE ($2.02 per hour, 120 hrs. per month)	2504.00	
LIMEWATER assistant	144.00	
Christmas bonus and presents (One month salary to each agent, in accordance local custom. Also special gifts in some cases)	3000.00	39,250.00

b. Base house rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK base house	2050.00	
LITMUS base house	2000.00	
LIVERY base house	2000.00	
LITHOSPHERE base house	2000.00	
[illegible] base house	1800.00	
Proposed base house	2900.00	
LIFEAT base shop	2000.00	
Proposed base house	2700.00	
Proposed base house	2800.00	
LICOOL-6 base	600.00	
Proposed LICOOL base	600.00	21,450.00

c. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	2,000.00	
New car - [illegible]	3,500.00	
		5,500.00

[redacted]

[illegible] [redacted]

d. Miscellaneous

1. Supplies (paper rolls, wire, tubes, tape, pens, parts)	2,000.00	2,000.00
2. Transportation		
LI[illegible]ICK car rent	300.00	
David [illegible] Auto expense	340.00	
Carol [illegible] mileage	350.00	
LI[illegible]US base car rental	700.00	
LIV[illegible]Y base car rental	700.00	
LI[illegible]OSPH[illegible] base car rental	400.00	
([illegible] 2047)	1440.00	
Proposed base car rental	700.00	
		4,930.00

7

3. Other Operational Expenses

(To cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills; and to cover targets of opportunity)	20,000.00
Grand Total	159,854.00

Page 21
Attachment to [illegible]-7053
[redacted]?36
5 June 1957

[illegible] [redacted]

50-6-32/1

[illegible]

1 February 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/CPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended to include the purchase of a LIFEAT/LIMERICK basehouse in the amount of $20,000. The lease on the present LIFEAT/LIMERICK base expires in April.

2. The LIFEAT/LIMERICK base is the principal base of operations covering Mexico City's number one priority targets. The location of this base must be moved since the lease on the present base cannot be renewed. Furthermore, a decision has been reached whereby new operational techniques will be initiated which will necessitate round-the-clock operations in the base by station cleared personnel in order to satisfactorily cover the targets. This will undoubtedly necessitate the acquisition of a more securely controlled base of operations. The station does not believe such a base can be acquired other than by purchasing the property indicated. However, every effort will be made to lease this property providing leasing arrangements can be made to meet the security requirements of the operation.

3. At present additional funds are not needed in the LIFEAT Project to cover the purchase of a new basehouse. Should more funds be needed before the project expires, they will be requested at a later date.

J. C. KING
CWH

APPROVED: ____________________
CHIEF, FI/CPS

JOSEPH R. GROVES

APPROVED: ____________________
D/ DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-32/4

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

843

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, EUR 8, SR 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

OTTA

ABSTRACT

WH/1

S E C R E T 151600Z CITE OTTAWA 4139

15 FEB 67 01388

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

REF A MEXICO CITY 0121 (IN 88248)

B MEXICO CITY 9919 (IN 77928)

LOCAL LNERGO REP PASSED REF INFO RE LOWRY TO SMABOVE 13 FEB 67.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

LIFEAT

50-6-32/4

15 FEB 67

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO 50-6-74/4

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-74/4

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 41

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

00000087

DISSEM BY AV

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CI 2, EUR 8, SB 8, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

MEXI

AN	~~RI~~	WH/1
PS	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX ✓	

MICROFILMED
APR 14 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

40		33248
	~~DEST~~	WH/1
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~	

S E C R E T 272155Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0121

DIRECTOR INFO OTTAWA [redacted]

REDCOAT

(IN 79928)

REF: MEXICO CITY 9919 (PLS RELAY TO OTTAWA).

1. PER LIFEAT DON LOWRY AGAIN CALLED LEONOV 19 JAN IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS FROM CANADA. LOWRY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CONTACT ESCARTIN AT CUBAN EMBASSY, BUT LEONOV SAID HE COULD NOT HELP HIM AND THAT HE SHOULD KEEP TRYING.

CIT CANADA? In contact w/ Sov. emb. Mex. City

2. LOCAL LNERGO HAS RECORD OF ONE DONALD ROBERT LOWRY, BORN 26 NOV 1914 OR 1915 IN WALKERVILLE OR WINDSOR, ONTARIO. LOCAL LNERGO IS NOTIFYING THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA TO SEE IF LOWRY STILL ON WANTED LIST.

IN CONTACT WITH SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO CITY

3. STATION HAS LIONION PHOTO OF MAN WHO VISITED CUBAN EMBASSY ON 9 JAN AND SHOWS SOME RESEMBLANCE TO VERY OLD LNERGO PHOTO OF DONALD ROBERT LOWRY. CAN POUCH PRINTS IF OTTAWA STATION WISHES.

4. SUBSTANCE OF THE ABOVE AND INFO IN REF MAY BE PASSED TO SMABOVES, DISGUISING SOURCE. REQUEST OTTAWA STATION COORDINATE ANY ACTION WITH LNERGO.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

MICROFILMED
~~MAR 7 1967~~
DOC. MICRO. SER.

50-6-74/4
~~50-6-74/4~~
27 JAN 67

INDEX ☒ YES ☐ NO 7
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-32/4
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. Jicknee

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 29 15

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

January 21

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB 8, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS

MEX W 77928

SECRET 132130Z CITE MEXICO CITY 99

MICROFILMED FEB 21 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.

13 JAN 67

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

1. LIFEAT REPORTS THAT MAN GIVING HIS NAME AS DON [redacted]

aka Morris Lowry cit wa Almengo

LOWRY (PHONETIC), EVIDENTLY AMERICAN, WAS IN CONTACT WITH SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE LEONOV 201-132139 ON 9 JAN AND ALSO WITH CUBAN CULTURAL ATTACHE RICARDO ESCARTIN FERNANDEZ SAME DAY. LOWRY SAID HE HAD NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE EXPERIENCE AND HAD ALSO BEEN RADIO AND TELEVISION ANNOUNCER. ESCARTIN FERNANDEZ HAD AGREED TO SEND HIS LETTER AND WRITING SAMPLES TO CUBA IN NEXT POUCH AND TOLD HIM CHANCES WERE MAYBE TWENTY PERCENT, EVIDENTLY OF HIS GETTING A JOB THERE. LOWRY HAS TO WAIT AROUND MEXICO FOR TWO WEEKS, APPARENTLY UNTIL HE HEARS FROM CUBA.

AN CS RID PS ACT X WH/1 INDEX X

11P

2. LEONOV WAS NON-COMMITTAL BUT SAID HE WOULD INTRODUCE LOWRY TO SOVIET CONSUL ON 10 JAN. CONVERSATION INDICATES THAT LOWRY HAD FIRST ASKED LEONOV ABOUT A JOB AND LEONOV HAD SUGGESTED HE TRY THE CUBAN EMBASSY.

3. REQUEST CABLED HEADQUARTERS TRACES. INFORMING LOCAL LNERGO.

LIFEAT/Reed

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NO HQS TRACES

50-6-32/4
13 JAN 67

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

TO	Chief, WH Division
INFO	Chief of Station, Mexico City
FROM	Chief of Station, Port au Prince
SUBJECT	LIMUD/LIFEAT Disposition of Tapes

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Ref: DIRECTOR 68776, 23 January 1967
Action required. As determined by Headquarters.

1. As requested in reference, Station Port au Prince is pouching to Headquarters all of the LIMUD/LIFEAT cards currently on file at the Station. Please return to Station copies of those cards containing sufficient information to be of value to Station.

2. Station is in agreement with Headquarters that a hard copy of the tapes should be sent directly from Station Mexico City to Headquarters in order that Headquarters may expedite the processing of the material. However, Station suggests that in order to reduce the overall processing time and eliminate what could be duplication of effort, only Headquarters receive a copy of the tapes. Then Headquarters, when processing the original tapes, could retape those Creole portions and send a composite tape to the Station for translation.

3. Station currently has a backlog of the LIMUD/LIFEAT tapes. Please advise whether these tapes also should be sent to Headquarters for processing.

4. Headquarters comments and suggestions are welcome.

Matthew H. ONUS

Distribution:
2-Chief, WH
1-Mexico City

[illegible] by DIR 72017

DEFERRED

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HTPA-1973	DATE 26 January 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Deputy Chief WH/C

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
TYPIC/LIFEAT/Transmittal of Traffic of Subject of 201-735575 and LICLOVE-2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached as A are copies of traffic covering the Subject of 201-735575 for the period 1, 2, 4, and 7 June 1966. This traffic was provided Station Mexico by LIFEAT.

2. Attached as B are copies of traffic covering LICLOVE-2 for the period 30 May - 12 June 1966. This traffic was also provided Station Mexico by LIFEAT.

3. Attachments are being forwarded KAPOK and under separate cover.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
A & B a/s KAPOK u/s/c

Distribution:
✓3 - DCWH/C w/atts u/s/c
1 - C/WHD w/o atts
4 - FILES

LIFEAT
CB
DEFERRED
50-6-32/4

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-29211

DATE
16 June 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/4

2F

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S[illegible]T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, [illegible]
Chief, WHD

HMM

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Port-au-Prince

SUBJECT: LI[illegible]T/[illegible]-1
Translation of Creole Portions of LI[illegible]T Tapes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References:
A. HHMA-28440, 8 March 1966
B. HHMA-28489, 14 March 1966
C. HHMA-28534, 22 March 1966
D. HHMA-28594, 29 March 1966
E. HHMA-28701, 11 April 1966
F. HHMA-28761, 25 April 1966
G. HHMA-28834, 3 May 1966

MICROFILMED
JUN 24 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Action: FYI

1. Attached for addressees information are translations of the Creole language portions of the LI[illegible] tapes forwarded in references. The translations were done by [illegible]-1. Conversations which have no operational or intelligence value have not been included.

2. In 29 CF 22 3.2 the journal Combatant cannot be identified by the Station. Can Headquarters identify the journal?

3. The Judy in 29 CF 98 17.5 is probably Judith [illegible], the Costa Rican Communist friend of the [illegible]-[illegible]'.

4. 29 [illegible] 101 [illegible] is a very interesting conversation. Evidently Pierre [illegible] has just returned from Miami and San Juan, Puerto Rico where he went to meet his mother. Ton Ton CILLA[illegible] is Fritz CIN[illegible] who is believed to have forged a signature while illegally ordering a new Haitian postage stamp issue. CI[illegible] planned to keep the stamps and sell them at a profit to stamp dealers. According to a PAP (Haitian CP) clandestine journal, an Edmond [illegible] was a Haitian delegate to the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana in January 1966. However this name was probably a pseudonym. Per Consulate files, Edmond PI[illegible], DPOB 3 December 1915, Cayes, Haiti traveled to and from the U.S. in June 1960. The Cuban approach to [illegible] in San Juan is the first direct confirmation of Cuban exile activity directed at Haiti in Puerto Rico. Gerard [illegible]. F[illegible]LA[illegible], [illegible]

5[illegible] - [illegible] - 34/4

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: ~~H[illegible]-1877~~

DATE: ~~16 June 1966~~

CLASSIFICATION: S[illegible]T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-4-121

T e.t Haiti II

in San Juan, Puerto Rico

19 June 1934 Gonaives, Haiti is a Haitian lawyer/economist/labor leader. [illegible]-1 knows him as an active intelligent leftist labor lawyer. Subject of HTPA-1715, a station contact, reported that on 29 October 1965, LATORTUE spoke before a symposium on Haiti in San Juan. LATORTUE called for the overthrow of the socio-economic structure of Haiti including the "money-grubbing" bourgeoisie. Past [illegible] reporting reveals LATORTUE as a very capable, energetic intellectual with a genuine gift of leadership. He received a Haitian law degree, studied economics in Paris for six years and received a U.S. Government grant to attend a Harvard seminar on marketing in 1962. While in Haiti he appeared to be pro-American. At the San Juan symposium LATORTUE declared that every Haitian would resist U.S. intervention in Haiti and condemned the U.S. State Department for meddling in Haitian exile affairs. MANIGAT is probably Leslie MANIGAT (201-297822) DPOB 16 August 1930, Port-au-Prince, a resident of [illegible]. Though MANIGAT is a known leftist, this is the first indication from within CP circles of his close ties with the Communist parties. It would appear from the information and implications in the telephone conversation that both LATORTUE and MANIGAT have ties with the Communist parties but that they are not bound by party discipline or dogmatism.

5. The "zero" (ph) mentioned in 29 CP 128 2.0 is unknown to station. Can addressees recognize the name as a clinic or hospital in Mexico or in the Soviet Bloc? The zero is pronounced z e r o (Merriam-Webster pronounciation keys).

6. The [illegible] of 29 CP 137 18.5 is probably Joseph MARRON of HTPA 1791, 24 Feb 1966.

7. The DUVAL in 29 CP 139 8.7 is probably Guy DUVAL, DPOB 28 August 1935, Miragoane who accompanied Gerard PIERRE-CHARLES from Mexico City to Moscow in August 1964. Station notes that some mail for the GPCs is being received by the [illegible].

JOSEPH C. [illegible]

Attachment:
Translation of Tapes

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City w/orig. att.
2-C/WHD w/1cy att.

SECRET

4

Attachment to HTPA-1859

MICROFILMED
JUN 24 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Page 1

29 GP 82 3.2

This conversation is about "The Comedians", a book written about Haiti by Graham Greene. Gerard and Suzie are talking to Pierre Lelong. Pierre says the book was the novel of the month of February in the U.S. Book is about Duvalier. Gerard has heard that foreigners are making money on Haitian heads by writing such stories but he has also heard that Greene was in contact with a person who really gave him full information. Pierre says there was a review of the book in L'Edition and he has saved it. Gerard asks Pierre if he has the latest edition of the newspaper Combatant. Pierre has it and promises to return it.

29 GP 85 3.0

Suzie calls Gerard PIERRE CHARLES. Roger has left Suzie a note. Gerard failed to go where he had planned. Gerard called Dorce but Dorce wasn't there. He went to the Embassy for 15-20 minutes but he couldn't find him. (Conversation probably about Aldi Castor's visa.) Gerard asks how everything came out. The wife of the Chief of Police came over to fix the thing about the little girl. The police never suspected anybody and they don't think anybody like that had it. Suzie says Claudette finally found her passport. Claudette went to a (convent?) and someone stole her handbag which contained her passport, money and license to work. Everything was returned the next day with a check for $500. Claudette had to return the $500.

29 GP 85 9.0

Suzie with Gerard. Suzie asks Gerard if he saw a number on the front or back of something (papers)? No. There is nothing written by hand. Gerard received three copies and they are looking for two more.

29 GP 98 17.5

Suzie calls Gerard. Suzie asks Gerard if Aldi has come by. Suzie says she is going back to the Embassy. Gerard has changed everything and the man will come by around 2:00 to pick him up. Judy called to ask when she should come.

29 GP 103 4.9

Pierre Lelong calling Suzie Pierre-Charles. Suzie asks Pierre when he returned. He just arrived, but without his mother. Suzie asks Pierre how Lillian and her friends were. They were fine. Tonton CINEAS had been arrested and had been shot. Also, something is supposed to start in Haiti. Tonton CINEAS was in touch with someone named Maitre Edomond PIERRE. Clemard CHARLES was also involved

Att 1 to HTPA 1859 SECRET CS COPY. 50-6-32/4 in the affair. $82,000 was involved. The person that gave him the news was a friend of Clemard CHARLES. A newspaper in N.Y. named El Tiempo has written about an invasion of Haiti. El Tiempo reported that someone named Vixama was involved. Pierre was in a store in San Juan, Puerto Rico buying some cloth when a Cuban girl approached him and asked him if he was Haitian. The girl was accompanied by a Cuban man and they asked Pierre questions about Haitian history. They asked Pierre if he knew anything about Duvalier. Pierre explained he was opposed to Duvalier. The Cubans said there were people in San Juan planning to "catch" Duvalier. Pierre implies that the Cuban man lives in Mexico. Gerard PIERRE CHARLES takes the phone. Gerard tells Pierre that someone named Silvie is on the border. Gerard asks Pierre if he has brought the merchandise. Yes. Pierre went to the post office to pick up a package and they were going to open the package to inspect it but Pierre told the clerk it was not necessary to inspect it. The post office clerk said the declared value was too high, and he had to open it. When he opened it he found it was a handwritten manuscript so the clerk asked no more questions. Everything went alright. Pierre mentions that during his trip overseas (San Juan) he met Gerard LATORTUE. Gerard asks Pierre what LATORTUE's financial status was. Pierre thinks LATORTUL is working at the University of Mayaguez. Pierre says there are a lot of Haitians in Puerto Rico that are interested in doing something (against Duvalier?) but most are without families. They are petty bourgeois or engineers working in San Juan. The bourgeois Haitians now have stores in Puerto Rico. Gerard asks Pierre if LATORTUE mentioned anything about his uncle Francois LATORTUE. No, he did not. LATORTUE might come to Mexico soon on a tourist visa. He has to go through some routine to get the visa. Gerard tells Pierre that Francois LATORTUE is up to his neck in politics in Haiti. LATORTUE said that the leftist party was really mistreating MANIGAT and LATORTUL didn't like it. Everytime MANIGAT opens his mouth something happens. The leftist parties likened MANIGAT to Castro. Like Castro, MANIGAT talked too much and did too many things. MANIGAT showed his card too much and that is why they are mistreating him. It was the Communist party that put MANIGAT where he is, just as the CP put Castro where he is. LATORTUE has written an article to counter what has happened to MANIGAT. Gerard says he knew MANIGAT 10 years ago in Haiti. LATORTUE has written an article condemning American intentions of landing in Haiti. LATORTUE x is Professor of Economics at the University of Mayaguez. LATORTUE is trying to leave Puerto Rico and go somewhere else where he can find better work.

29 GP 105 25.7

Gerard is talking to Suzie about a title of property. She cannot find it. She asks about Daniel.

29 GP 106 2.7

Gerard calls Pierre LELONG and asks Pierre to drop by tonight. Has Pierre found 2 packages of papers? One contains papers for Suzie's course and the other is a package of white blank paper for mimeographing.

29 GP 107 20.2

Suzie calls Gerard. Suzie is near the "guy's" house. She wants some money to get a large roll of paper and wants to write a check for the people that are going to send "those things" this afternoon. Gerard asks if she received any news. Yes. Gerard asks Suzie to buy some flash bulbs for his camera.

29 GP 118 3.0

Suzie with Benoit. Benoit excuses himself for not coming. He will come by tomorrow night about 8:00 p.m. when he gets out of school. Has Suzie received any news from Gerard? No. Suzie asks about Pierre Louis. Pierre Louis is doing alright.

29 GP 118 11.2

Suzie calls Vincent. Long time no see. Vincent kids Suzie about her travels, vacation, new house, and car. She asks about Angelica. Benoit is coming over tomorrow. Angelica's brother came in for a vacation. Vincent asks Suzie if there is any other news. No. Still the same as in February from the newspaper Ralliement. The same story. Vincent says that he has no news about Haiti but he got a letter from the family saying that the economic situation is very rough. Vincent asks about Aldi. He scored 9.10 on an exam. Suzie asks Vincent if he has seen CINEAS (ph) (sounds like somebody at the Mexican University). Vincent says everybody at the University is against him.

29 GP 128 2.0

Gerard is talking to an uidentified person. Gerard explains to the person that before he travels "they" will give him a test which will show if he has TB or not. If the test is positive, they will give him medecine to stop or cure it. The unidentified person is afraid and Gerard tries to tell him that it is not serious because if it were, "they" would have given him special treatment in the "zero". The unidentified person says that he has just come out of school and has had pneumonia.

29 GP 128 10.0

Gerard with Suzie. MARRON wants to know what time he should arrive because he is doing something very important. He should come around 2:00.

29 GP 129 12.7

Suzie with Sonya. Susie and Sonya are going to the theater. They mention Maggie who told them that they shouldn't go; they won't understand anything.

29 GP 137 18.5

M calls MA[illegible]CN and asks M to come right away.

29 GP 139 8.7

Pierre LELONG calls Suzie. Suzie has friends with her now. She asks if there is a letter. He said there is an open letter. When Pierre came in he found all the letters opened on the table. There is a letter from DUVAL. They must be yesterday's letters.

29 GP 140 16.2

Suzie with Claudette LELONG. Suzie thanks Claudette for the gift and the translation. There had been a lecture at the University given by someone who spoke only French. The person came Tuesday night and left this morning. How does Suzie feel after all that translating? She is O.K.; its her field. She is moving today. Claudette tells her Gerard is going to be suprised when he comes back. Suzie tells Claudette that she will tell Pierrot to tell his friend in Miami that her brother Aldi is coming up soon.

29 GP 146 7.0

Suzie calls Bernard. They talk about Suzie's new house. She is a big bourgeoise now. She asks for Sonya's address.

22 GP 5 9.5

(Ti Ben is a nickname for Benoit.) Ti Ben with Suzie. B couldn't come because he was busy working but by Saturday he will try to have everything ready. She will call him and let him know. Suzie asks B if they are already on strike. B says medical school hasn't started yet. B proposed a plan for a strike but three of them didn't like the idea. They decided to wait and see what happens. Suzie asks B if he has news from Haiti. He heard some troops had landed in Haiti. Suzie asks what kind of rumors he had heard. B: "Duvalier has burned half of Cap Haitien. A Haitian told him that". Suzie has heard that there was a landing in Haiti and Duvalier killed 15,000 people. One Thursday a newspaper El ? announced a landing in Haiti. The newspaper Veridades announced that there had been a wave of repression in Haiti. Some American boats and airplanes were surrounding Haiti. The Haitian government protested to the Americans but the Americans said that it was just a routine check/protection of the islands. Suzie says that Monrod PHILLIPE was shot because of the CIN[illegible]AS affair. Suzie asks B if he has heard from the Haitian Embassy. No. B's philosophy course had been suspended.

END

From 2050, 7 June (Tuesday) to 0700, 8 June 1966

2.0 Out to 25-20-00. Sergio (Martinez Barroso) with Cecilia, who answers. Has lost the address. It is Dante, behind the Hotel Tecali. Dante #23.

2.5 Out to 03. Time is 2200, 7 June.

2.7 Out to 03. No rings.

From 0700 to 2100, 8 June (Wednesday) 1966

After 0915, 8 June

2.7 In. Sra. Olga (v) with Juanita, who answers. The men aren't going to come to lunch. About what to fix lunch....

After 1115, 8 June

3.2 Out to 03, twice. No rings, complete. Time is 1146, 8 June.

After 1345, 8 June

3.5 Out to 03. Time is 1419, 8 June.

3.7 In. Sra. Olga (v) with maid, who answers. They (she and another woman) are coming home for lunch now...about lunch...

4.0 Out to 17-30-59. MI asks MO, who answers, for Jose Mora. Who is calling? A friend from Cuba.

Jose Mora takes phone. MI has a letter for JM from Carlos Mora. Could he come by tonight to pick it up at Cuban Embassy? ALL RIGHT, but if he can't come by tonight, please leave it with "portero" and MO will pick it up tomorrow. Fine. How is Carlos (Mora)? MO did not see him. He (Carlos) only left the letter there at MI's office.

~~XXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

4.5 Out to 24-39-72. Hangs up.

4.7 Out to 35-40-00. MI asks MO, who answers Aeronaves de Mexico, for 4 reservations for tomorrow's flight to Los Mochis. There is no flight tomorrow. There is one day after tomorrow. They fly Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, at 0945. ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ They have to change planes in Culiacan, flight 125. The return flight leaves Los Mochis at 1335 on Tuesdays Thursdays and Saturdays. Then, they will reserve the tickets for day after tomorrow with return flight on Saturday.

MO checks and says the four are confirmed on flight 1009 to Culiacan and they have requested confirmation from there on. Call back tomorrow. Jose Caveira, Hugo del Pino, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Enrique Lanza and Sergio Martinez are the ones going. Phone 25-09-14, his office phone. His home phone 31-01-06.

After 1500, 8 June

7.0 Out to 09, twice. No rings complete. Olga Martinez Barroso asks for operator 134.

MO takes phone. He Habana call of Civeira. Still no circuit to Habana. They are out of order.

CS COPY

50-6-32/4

7.5 In. MO asks Olga (v), who answers, for Sr. Civeira.
Civeira takes phone. Blasin (?ph) called. Wanted to talk to C. Fine. They have to go by Aeronaves de Mexico before 1300 for tickets to Los Mochis. There is a flight leaving every day. Martinez Barroso called ~~and there~~ is no flight until day after tomorrow.
MI takes phone. There is no direct flight to Los Mochis. In any case they have to go to pay for tickets. Have to go before 1330. MI will go by so MO and MI can go by for tickets.

8.0 In. MO with maid, who answers...wrong number.

8.2 In. MO with maid, who answers. Asks if this is house of Ambassador. Yes, it is house of Sr. Martinez. MO then says it is wrong number. Maid thinks Martinez B. is Amb.

8.5 In. MO with Juana, who answers, for Enriqueta.
Maid comes to phone. About MO's work...maids...MO and (Sra.) went downstairs at 1500. Maid just got back. Sra. went on to the Embassy. About visiting Enriquita this Sunday. MI is not sure if she will be off on Sunday....MO's Mrs. is having guests on Saturday evening...

Reel off at RT 10.2, 2100, 8 June 1966

14-00000

JUN 7 1966

From 2100, 2 June (Thursday) to 0650, 3 June 1966

From 0650, 3 June (Friday) to 0730, 4 June 1966

After 0900, 3 June

2.0 In. WO with WI, her mother (maid), who answers. Both are maid types...about why she has not called...will see one another tomorrow.

2.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers, about fixing the fish....rice.

After 1240, 3 June

3.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers, about lunch....They will be home around 1330 or 1400. Set table in dining room - for four people.

4.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers. They are leaving now so she can start frying the fish.

After 1435, 3 June
After 1930, 3 June

5.0 In. No answer.

After 2120, 3 June

5.2 Out to 03. Time is 2255, 3 June.

From 0730, 4 June (Saturday) to 0855, 5 June 1966

After 0950, 4 June

5.5 In. Sra. with maid, who answers. Is everything all right? Yes. Has Juanita left (for my off)? Not yet.

After 1200, 4 June

5.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers. Has Juanita left? No. Peal some potatoes to fry them...

After 1445, 4 June

6.0 In. HO with Sra., Olga, who answers. HO is her husband. HO is going home now. HO had to come to the Embassy with some things because he got the interview (appt) today. He is coming now.

After 1640, 4 June

6.2 Out to 14-13-26. MI asks MO, who answers at Cuban Embassy, if ????Rubio??? left. About 30 minutes ago. MO is Jerrin.

After 1900, 4 June

6.5 In, 4 times. No answer, complete. WO with maid, who answers.

6.5 contd.
Maid types...WO called a while ago, but got no answer. WI has been here....Is WI going home tomorrow? Yes. WO can't go because she doesn't have money...WI will lend her money....WO is going to quit her job. WI is not happy either....WI is Enriqueta. WO will see if she can go tomorrow....

After 2130, 4 June

11.0 In. WO with Enriqueta, who answers. WO is waiting for her. She has been ringing the bell...about going home...WO is on the corner of Melchor Ocampo right now...WI just awakened....

From 0855 to 1915, 5 June (Sunday) 1966

11.2 In. MO with Juanita (maid), who answers. Asks if ....? (Srá.) is there. Will see. Check to see (if she or he) is asleep.
Juanita takes phone. Yes, someone is asleep because (he or she) had guard duty. All right.

12.0 In. MO with Juanita, who answers. Asks if Sergio is up. No, went to sleep very late. Does MO want to talk to the Sra? No, just tell him when he awakens that they are waiting for him at the Embassy.

12.2 Out to 14-~~31~~13-26. Sergio with MO, who answers. Did MO call? Yes. They wanted to know if he was up. Sergio will be at the Embassy in 30 minutes. About sending a car for him if there is a car there - in 30 minutes. There is no one there now (with a car), but will send one if one arrives.

13.0 Out to 14-13-26. Sergio asks Nico, who answers, for Lasa (ph).
MO takes phone. Hasn't no one gone by (a car)? No one is there. Sergio will go there now.

13.2 In. Lanza (or Lasa) with Olga, who answers. Has Sergio left? Yes. He waited for a while for Hugo to come for him in car. Sergio has no~~t~~ car. But he has left now...Sergio spent all night at Embassy on guard duty.

13.7 Out to 14-13-26. Olga with Nico, who answers. Has Sergio left? He just left.

After 1230, 5 June
After 1530, 5 June

14.0 In. No answer.

Reel off at RT 14.2, 1925, ~~6~~5 June 1966

6DF

From 0810, 1 June (Wednesday) to 0645, 2 June (Thursday) 1966

After 1100, 1 June

2.0 In. WO with WI, who answers. WO needs some pamphlets for schoolwork. She has wrong number. This is house of Amb.

2.2 In. WO with WI, who answers. (Maid types...WI is WO's mother.) Why didn't WO call her yesterday, was worried about her....about what WO has done....will come by to see her in a little bit.

After 1230, 1 June

2.5 Out to 03. Time is 1250, 1 June.

After 1500, 1 June

3.0 Out to 14-13-26. Dials without dial ~~ng~~ tone.
Out to 14-13-26. Olga (inside) with WO, who answers at Cuban Embassy. Olga has to do an errand and will be in a little late. Remember to get ready to go "there." Olga will go, but later on. Is Olga better? A little better...grippe. Olga is at home now.

3.0 Out to 03. Time is 1519, 1 June.

After 1635, 1 June

After 2120, 1 June

3.2 Out to 03. Time is 2251, 1 June.

Reel off at RT 3.2, 0645, 2 June 1966

JUN 6

From 0645 to 2100, 2 June (Thursday) 1966

2.0 Out to 03, twice. No rings, complete. Time is 0737, 2 June.

After 0900, 2 June

2.2 Out to 03. Dials without dial tone.

2.2 Out to 03. Time is 1042, 2 June.

After 1210, 2 June

2.2 Out to 03. Time is 1303, 2 June.

2.5 Out to 17-89-76. WI (maid) with WO, who answers. Want Sr. Torres to go by check a stove - Manuel Todos Santos. He has not come by (although they phoned previously). Manuel Todos los Santos 7-79A.

After 1410, 2 June

2.7 In. WO with Kata (maid), who answers. How is everything? Fine. Has child had lunch? Yes. Juanita is with child - upstairs. Had a good lunch....WO is child's mother.

After 1610, 2 June

3.0 Out to 03. Time is 1638, 2 June.

After 1830, 2 June

3.2 In. WO with WI (maid), who answers. Greetings. (WO is WI's daughter.) How did things go? Fine. Will they go home this weekend? WO can't. Doesn't have money. WI got her money. Is Sra. going to pay her every 2 weeks? Thinks so. How much did she pay her? $200. Sra. told Juanita that she didn't want WI to go to WO's house. Got very angry the other day and made a scene at the Embassy with WO's Sra., that it looked like she was trying to steel her maid. Made a scene in front of everyone. That is why she doesn't want WI to go to WO's house (WO works for a woman of Cuban Embassy too). WO went with the Sra. to Sears. They (people where she works) went out last night. WO was afraid. They were throwing stones from the other house. Sra. said that these were the Americans who are angry with the Cubans. That there may even be war if they continue this way (maids interpretation of U.S.-Cuba relations). WO says neither Sr. nor Sra. were there last night. WI says that she and her husband (that is couple for whom she works) have to be on gaurd duty tonight and won't be home until very late. Also they are not coming to have dinner.

Sra. where WO works paid her for 15 days yesterday, but WO prefers she pay her whole month. Will tell her.

3.2 contd.

WO thinks she won't stay long with Sra. They expect more and more or her. They went to Sears today and walked all the way. She (Sra.) won't pay for a cab. This time el Señor took them (there), but after that and other times, never pays for a cab. A lot of walking and WO's feet are swollen from so much walking. Then, WO is not bad off there. She is alone there (doesn't work with another person), not so much work...Will see about this.

WO will phone WI on Saturday. WI only goes out in the mornings. And not always...Juanita sometimes goes for chicken and tortillas...

Reel off at RT 5.0, 2100, 2 June 1966

LIFEAT

HMM-09776 TDCS0314/09444-65	Travel to Mexico of Family of Emilio Cordero Michel Dominican Exile
HMM-10084 CS-311/01530-66	El Siglo XXI, Publishing House to be Directed by Arnoldo Orfila Reynal
~~MEXI 7065~~ IN-01912 -80416 [illegible]10589	Dissatisfaction of FVP with Max Fastor Parra Leader of the JSC (Communist Youth) Costa Rica

11MM. K196

JUN 1966

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Coverage of Dominican Embassy, Mexico City

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Attached for Addressees' information and retention are copies of the transcripts of the LIFEAT coverage of the Dominican Embassy in Mexico City, reels 21 through 34 for the period 2 to 9 May 1966.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Santo Domingo, w/atts
1 - Chief, WHD, w/atts

CS COPY

1 att

50-6 32/4

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28943

DATE
10 May 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-3

1300

attachment to
HMMA-28843

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
2 mayo 66.
L2-N2-T21-
1045-1730 hrs.-

00- - Entrada.- 1045 hrs.- (conversación iniciada)- HD GUZMAN con HF hacen planes para verse pero GUZMAN dejó ayer el chqfer que tenia y CARLOS no puede salir solo porque tiene licencia de la Republica y que le digas " al amigo que estamos como un clavo arriba de la carretera con la punta para arriba y que no hay que apurarse por la otra cuestión y que le des un abrazo y ya sabes que estamos aquí por si no nos volvemos a ver o a hablar". HF que está bien.- 12-

12- - Bloqueado.- 24-

24- Entrada.- 1048 hrs.- HF pregunta que requisitos hay para sacar visa a Santo Domingo o ir a trabajar por dos meses allá. MARINA pregunta si tienen algún contrato para trabajar. HF que si que es de una oficina de contadores para ir a hacer unas auditorias en Santo Domingo y algunas poblaciones del interior y que la oficina esta acreditada y es la Hans & Hana. MARINA dice que hace falta una carta bancaria y otra de la oficina donde trabaja, certificado de conducta de la policia, tres fotografias y llenar un formulario y si es urgente pagar el cable para su contestación rapida ya que si es por oficio tarda de 20 a 25 dias y urgente son 5 o 6 dias, y que cabe aclarar si van a trabajar para el Gobierno entonces es distinto. HF que despues que pase a verla le dirá como están las cosas.- 59-

att/to HMMA-28843

ES COPY

(hoja uno)

50-6-32/

59- Salida.- MARINA reclama los sobres que no le han llegado. HF BERMUDEZ dice que hoy mismo pasa a dejarlos.- 74-

74- -Bloqueado.- ruidos.- 86-

86- Entrada.- HF por datos para visa para ir a Santo Domingo como turista. MARINA le proporciona los datos.- 108-

108- Salida.- (Carteros Zona Uno)- MARINA saluda al señor INCLAN y pregunta si hay alguna valija para la embajada. Este dice que no hay nada.- 118-

118- Salida al 03 por la hora.-1103 hrs.- 121-

121- Salida.- 1108 hrs.- MARINA por MIGNON. HF dice que no está.- 127-

127- Salida al 13-21-92.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ SAVIÑON. HF dice que anda por la sub-dirección. GUZMAN pide se le diga que le llamará mas tarde porque ahora sale a la calle - 136-

136- Entrada.- 1155 hrs.- HF pregunta por el Embajador, de parte del señor GRULLON de la Republica Dominicana. TAPIA dice que el embajador no está y que el puede atenderlo. Despues HF GRULLON CORDERO saluda a TAPIA y dice que ayer llegó y queria avisarle a MARCIO si es que estaba lista la pelicula de nosotros o sea CAÑA BRAVA para hacer las pruebas. TAPIA dice que MARCIO tiene mas de 15 dias en Santo Domingo. GRULLON que ésta tarde a las seis van a tener la exhibición de la pelicula para que

(hoja dos) ...

... la vean. TAPIA aclara que MARCIO tiene mes y medio en Santo Domingo. GRULLON creia que la semana pasada se habia venido para acá. TAPIA que no que sigue allá y que hay como diez o doce compañeros dominicanos a las conferencias que hay y tiene compromisos con cenas, reuniones, etc. y que veran la forma de reunirse pronto. Despues HD MAZO (?) saluda a FRANK GRULLON CORDERO. Este dice que le manda saludos VICTOR y que anoche llegué. MAZO dice que hoy recibió una carta de FELLO y le dice que tu venias para acá y que iba a tratar en Gobernación lo de la visa. GRULLON dice que ya se la dieron y ya les avisó por cable y que hoy van a tener la exhibición de la película en el Condominio de los Productores de la avenida División del Norte a las seis de la tarde. MAZO tratará de estar allí pues conoce el lugar. GRULLON que trate de llevar a todos los que pueda pues es una pelicula "muy nuestra" y si algo se ofrece estoy en el Hotel Reforma. HD es el Coronel MARCOS JORGE MORENO y dice que tambien el lo puede llamar a su casa al 49-12-92. GRULLON que está bien.- 183-

183- Entrada.- 1208 hrs.- MIGNON saluda a TERE y pregunta por MARINA. Esta dice que acaba de salir y le avisa que ya está viviendo de nuevo en los apartamentos Carmen pues antes vivió dos años allí. MIGNON conoce a la dueña de los apartamentos o sea doña CARMEN y lo mejor que tiene TERE es que tiene su tranquilidad de espiritu y no es espectadora de nada y además eres muy inteligente para llevar bien las cosas. TERE da las gracias y dice que presisamente por eso lo hizo. MIGNON pide diga a MARINA a su regreso que le llamó y que desea a TERE que resuelva sus problemas de sus hijos y se vuelva a casar y cambia de tema y dice que ella se va a fín de mes para la patria. TERE

(hoja tres) ...

...le dá gusto saber que se vá y cree que ya todo está en calma. MIGNON cree que le pueda tocar alguna bala. TERE que nada de eso pues ella hace poco regresó y encontró aquello muy distinto. MIGNON pregunta cual es la impresión que TERE traé de allá. Esta dice que " .. bueno.. pues JUAN BOSH.. tiene la mayoría". MIGNON que entonces nada hay que hablar " y como tu sabes que JUAN y yó somos como dos hermanos, tu puedes tener la absoluta seguridad y eso no te lo digo por hablar, porque a mí no me gusta hablar mucho; que si algo puedo hacer por tí, lo haré". TERE le da las gracias. MIGNON agrega " y con toda justicia porque te lo mereces". TERE sigue dando las gracias y ella bién sabe como MIGNON se lleva con los amigos dominicanos. MIGNON sigue ofreciendo su ayuda y comenta: " ..Pues.. JUAN lo primero que me va a decir.. mira vieja - porque asi me dice "vieja"-- y sientate aquí y dí lo que tu quieres", asi lo que yo pueda hacer por tí TERE basta y sobra que sea madre y tengas dos hijos para que yo te ayude con todo mi corazón. TERE que gracias y gracias.. gracias.- 217-

217- Bloqueado.- 224-

224- Salida.- 1215 hrs.- Coronel FERNANDEZ pide envien un agente de seguros de la AMA para que vean su auto y llenar los requisitos o bien pasar a su domicilio que es Herodoto 30-102 y con teléfono 45-98-23. MF toma nota y ofrece enviar al agente. - 254-

254- Entrada.- 1234 hrs.- MF por el Corl. JORGE MORENO. TAPIA dice que no está. MF es SONIA -pero antes dijo que era MIROSLAVA- y pregunta como está. TAPIA dice que bien pero la otra noche ...

(hoja cuatro)

... ella no se quiso dormir con él. SONIA dice que como querias "que me acostara contigo si allí estaba mi hijo, y ademas estabas muy borracho y traias una pistola que hasta de balazos le querias dar al perro.. y hasta me pusiste bien espantada y dije ..hay. en la madre.." TAPIA si recuerda algo de eso y tuvo que decirle a un chofer de taxi en la calle que se llevara su auto a su casa porque "yo ya no podia manejar". SONIA dice que " vi que estabas muy encabronado y no sabia que hacer" y que se acaba de cambiar de casa y su nuevo teléfono es 43-29-67 y que le avise lo mismo al Corl.MORENO y que alguno de ellos le preste $500.00 para acabar de cambiarse a su departamento nuevo. TAPIA está sin un centavo y están en espera de que llegue "la paga".- 324-

324- Entrada.- 1240 hrs.- HF de la agencia de viajes Ultra-Mar Express para datos o requisitos de visa. TAPIA proporciona los datos.- 355-

355- Salidas ocupadas y sin contestación.- 405-

405- Entrada.- 1250 hrs.- HF con su amor TERESITA para disculparse que ayer no le pudo hablar pues anduvo por la Universidad. TERE por estar esperando su llamada no salió del hotel. HF se apellida CARDOSO y dice que anduvo con ANGEL y con LEONEL y que despues del futbol se fueron a casa de LEONEL y pregunta si tiene dinero que le preste. TERE dice que no le han pagado. CARDOSO necesita dinero para comprarse zapatos y quiere que TERE aunque sea consiga dinero prestado. TERE tratará de ver si consigue porque ella tambien quiere comprarse zapatos.- CARDOSO si consigue el dinero pide le llame antes de las cinco y media al 17-81-00.- 479-

(hoja cinco)

479- Salida.- GUZMAN pide comunicarse a papeleria. MF dice que llame mas tarde porque la señora salió a comer.- 499-

499- Salida.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ. MF dice que salió a comer y no tarda y ella le llamará en cuanto llegue. GUZMAN que sea antes de las dos porque los pasaportes que dijo ENRIQUEZ que iba a enviar no han llegado y los está esperando para sus visas de cortesia tal como lo trataron en la mañana. MF va a investigar eso y despues le avisará.- 516-

516- Entrada.- 1325 hrs.- CRISTINA con GUZMAN y con TERE para saber si se ven mas tarde y se ponen a "cotorrear" sobre vestidos y deudas que tienen.- 569-

569- Salida al 24-51-29.- 1333 hrs.- MARINA con MIGNON para avisar que ya está el Coronel MAURICIO FERNANDEZ en las oficinas pero si le quiere llamar a su casa es el 45-98-23 y que hay otro el de su recamara pero no recuerda bien que número es, y que le llegaron dos cartas y una es para el Patronato de las Actividades de Alta Especialización Docente del Instituto - Politecnico Nacional y otra de Santo Domingo que cree que es de NELSON ANTONIO ARCINIEGA dice que es para ella. MIGNON ofrece pasar o llamarle mañana a FERNANDEZ y recoger esas cartas.- 616

616- Salida.- (Instituto de Cardiología)- MARINA pregunta el teléfono de Nutrición. MF que es el 19-57-00.- 631-

631- Salida al 19-57-00.- 1349 hrs.- (Nutrición)- MARINA pregunta por el Dr. GARCIA PATRONI. MF dice que espere un momento. MARINA espera y despues cuelga.- 684-

(hoja seis)

684- Entrada sin contestación.- 692-

692- Entrada.- HF por YADIRA.- ya salió.- 695-

695- Entrada.- 1602 hrs.- sin contestación.- 750-

750- Salida al 13-21-92.- 1720 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ. HF dice que regresa en una hora. GUZMAN le volverá a llamar.- 767-

767- Salida al 18-07-00.- 1725 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Dr. SCHNKER. HF dice que es la ext.808 pero no contesta. GUZMAN pide se le diga que le llamé.- 810-

810- Entrada.- 1728 hrs.- TERE pregunta que quieren con ella. GUZMAN dice que fué don RENE quien lo llamó y quiere saber si recogió el sobre que le dió YADIRA. TERE lo tiene en el cuarto y que despues le iban a decir con quien habia que mandarlo. TERE pregunta si la monja llegó. TERE no sabe pues ella acabad de llegar. GUZMAN que entonces mañana van a mandar ese sobre con TAPIA y que está lacrado. TERE dice que tiene un sello de la COPREDAL. GUZMAN que asi es.- 855-

855- Entrada.- 1730 hrs.- HF saluda a GUZMAN y pregunta que van a tomar "la fria". GUZMAN está aquí trabajando y que por eso llamó a YADIRA para recoger un sobre, pero ya se solucionó. HF si le da tiempo lo espera para tomar un café.- 890-

- -

. - . (..7.-12- 2 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

2 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T22-

1755-1824 hrs.-

00- Salida al 18-07-00.- 1755 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Dr. SCHEKER.- sin contestación.- 18-

18- Salida al 13-21-92.- 1810 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ. HF dice que espere un momento. Despues ENRIQUEZ se disculpa con "el doctor" GUZMAN porque resulta que la camioneta del banco chocó y alli iban las personas que le entregarian los pasaportes. GUZMAN dice que de eso queria avisar pues llegaron a verlo a las dos y cinco con los pasaportes y ya se les dio la visa por un año con entrada y salida y asi que ya no hay problema y no se les cobró ningún centavo y cambiando de tema sobre el asunto que le consultó en la mañana, ENRIQUEZ que lo tiene pendiente pero uno de los que comisionó para eso se enfermó pero mañana sin falta se lo informa y ya recuerda que es sobre los datos de CORTINA PORTILLA (del Lic.EUSTAQUIO CORTINA PORTILLO de quien piden datos confidenciales para el gobierno dominicano). GUZMAN que si y que tiene entendido que uno de los hermanos de CORTINA es director de la Financiera. ENRIQUEZ va a pedir mayores datos y mañana se los informará. GUZMAN cambia de tema y pregunta si fué a ver al Dr.SCHEKER. ENRIQUEZ dice que no, pero que le consiguió la cita con SANCHEZ MIRELES (del ISSTE) y no se lo pudo comunicar porque tuvo que atender a la delegación belga y todo el dia estuvo con ellos. GUZMAN que entonces mañana le llamará.- 44- (hoja uno)

44- Salida sin contestación.- varias veces.- y ocupado.-75-

75- Salida al 18-52-86.- 1824 hrs.- (Seguros)- GUZMAN pide comunicarse a Papeleria, preguntar por LUCHITA GAMAS. MF dice que espere un momento. Despues MF dice que nadie contesta y si quiere lo ~~puedo~~ dar recado. GUZMAN que le diga que le llame a la embajada.- 122-

122- Entrada.- LUCHITA con su amor GUZMAN para disculparse que a la una salió a comer y hace rato ya iba de salida y que ahora que lo vea le dirá como hacerle para le llame sin problemas. GUZMAN pasará por ella a las siete "y adios chula".-134-

- -

. - . (..2.-L2-2 mayo 66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
3 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T23-
0910-1123 hrs.-

00- Entrada sin contestación.- 04-

04- Salida al 39-66-50.- 0910 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ, pero le informan que no está.- 11-

11- Salida.- HORTENSIA con su otro amor RAFAEL para reprocharle que ayer la dejó esperando. RAFAEL no pudo y se citan para el lunes a la misma hora y mismo lugar.- 23-

23- Salida al 22-68-29.- 0944 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por HERNANDEZ. Despues GUZMAN pregunta a HERNANDEZ si ya tiene las cosas del Coronel. Este dice que no que hasta mañana pasará a dejarlos. GUZMAN que pase hoy por la franquicia de los cigarrillos.- 42-

42- -Bocina descolgada y salida ocupada.- 55-

55- Entrada.- 1030 hrs.- Coronel FERNANDEZ saluda a MARINA y pide diga a don RENE que no podrá llegar a la embajada porque sigue enfermo. Despues GUZMAN dice que se cuide por el mal tiempo y que si algo se ofrece le mandará avisar y ademas hay una invitación de la Presidencia de la Republica para la toma o jura de la bandera el dia 5 en el socalo de la ciudad.- 80-

(hoja uno)

80- Salida al 12-25-73.- 1036 hrs.- (Oficina Internacional del Trabajo)- CARMITA de parte de GUZMAN pide hablar con el Director o Sub-Director. MF dice que espere un momento. Despues GUZMAN saluda a GERALDO DE MELLO EBOLI Director General y dice que acaban de recibir un oficio de la Cancilleria de Santo Domingo para solicitar la inscripción del señor PEDRO MOTA MORILLO que es Director General de Servicios de Empleos y Registro de Desocupados del Ministerio del Trabajo y que figura como candidato del país al curso regional de los servicios de empleos en el Perú para el mes de Agosto y quiere saber si hay que mandar algún oficio o nota. EBOLI que solo una nota confirmando ésta conversación teléfonica y que por vuelta de correo notifique a Santo Domingo que es indispensable que el gobierno me mande los formularios específicos. GUZMAN dice ya tenerlos en la mano y se los podrá proporcionar. EBOLI que está bien y que el mientras mandará un cable a Ginebra notificando este ingreso para continuar con los formularios en la selección de candidatos. GUZMAN que gracias.- 129-

129- Salida.- (Air France)- GUZMAN pregunta el vuelo 700 que ruta tiene. HF que es el 702 y sale México-N.Y.-París- Niza y sale martes, jueves, viernes, sabados y domingos y hasta el 31 de mayo es el 702 pero despues cambia al 700 sin llegar a Niza.- - 142-

142- Entrada.- 1051 hrs.- HF secretario de la Embajada de Corea pregunta por GUZMAN para agradecerle su cooperación para asistir a la ceremonia de las credenciales de la Embajada de Corea y quiere saber cuando es la toma de posesión Presidencial. GUZMAN dice que las elecciones son el primero de Junio, pero no se ..

(hoja dos)

... sabe que día es la toma de posesión. HF que quiere saber la fecha para poder mandar una delegación de su país a esa toma. GUZMAN ofrece comunicarselo a su tiempo. HF que gracias. - 168-

168- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1053 hrs.- y bocina descolgada.- - 175-

175- Salida al 09.- 1056 hrs.- sin contestación.- 182- MARINA desea se le informe sobre unas llamadas que hicieron a Santo Domingo despues de 29 de abril. HF que llame al 18-82-20.- 187-

187- Salida al 18-82-20.- 1058 hrs.- sin contestación.- 196- MARINA desea saber el importe de llamadas de larga distancia a Santo Domingo a partir del 29 de abril pasado. HF dice que necesitan que ellos den las fechas y lugares a donde llamaron. -209-

209- Salida.- HD pregunta el teléfono de la Canada Dry. HF que es el 17-31-27.- 221-

221- Entrada.- 1102 hrs.- HF de una agencia de viajes pide datos para visa a pasaporte mexicano. TURE le proporciona los requisitos.- 247-

247- Salida al 43-37-50.- 1105 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta sobre el asunto o pedido para el Coronel FERNANDEZ. HF dice que todavia no hacen la nota y que mande a su chofer a las cinco a recoger el pedido en las oficinas de Diagonal San Antonio en el 2do.piso. GUZMAN que está bien y en todo caso mandará al hijo del coronel. - 267- (hoja tres)

7- Salida ocupada.- 274-

274- Salida al 19-56-10.- 1111 hrs.- sin contestación.- ocupada. - 300- (Instituto de Cardiología)- GUZMAN pregunta por el Dr. PEGUERO de Consulta Externa. HF dice que espere un momento. -346- HD GRULLON saluda a PEGUERO y pregunta como se siente. Este dice que ya un poco mejor. PEGUERO que hay que hacer planes para ir mañana a Zacahuisco y que se ponga de acuerdo con GUZMAN que tiene auto, y pregunta si le ha llegado algo para él. GRULLON que solo una correspondencia de credito educativo y tambien para el Dr. EDUARDO ALVAREZ porque cree que es dinero. PEGUERO que si es asi se lo recoja y se lo lleve. Despues PEGUERO saluda a TAPIA. Esta pregunta con quien comentó lo de la otra noche que anduvieron " con las viejas". PEGUERO dice que con nadie. TAPIA dice que ayer le llamó la mujer "esa" (SONIA) y que hay que organizarse para verla mañana "pues creo que todavia está borracha".- risas.- Quedan de verse mañana a las siete y media en casa de PEGUERO y que irá tambien PATRONI. Despues GRULLON le informa que tambien hay un sobre de la Dirección de Bellas Artes y de Educación para pedir datos de sus becas para su credito educativo y que está firmado por el Vice-Ministro de Educación RAFAEL GONZALEZ TIRADO. PEGUERO se entera y pide se la lleve para ver ese asunto y llenar el cuestionario.-419-

419- - Bloqueado.- 423-

423- Salida al 12-16-39.- 1121 hrs.- CARMITA con HECTOR RENDON (el maricón) para saber si se ven hoy por la tarde. HECTOR dice que esta trabajando por las tardes. CARMITA quiere ir a la Villa a dejarle unas cosas que le llegaron a SALVADOR (RENDON) - 440- (hoja cuatro)

440- Entrada.- 1125 hrs.- HF de la AMCOSAD pregunta por TAPIA. CARMITA dice que espere. Despues HF cobrador de AMCOSAD para saber si puede pasar a dejar sus recibos. TAPIA dice que está muy flojo de dinero y le pagará los tres juntos en cuanto llegue su cheque. HF que el reglamento es que si se acumulan tres recibos se le dará de baja. TAPIA dice que se los lleve juntos. HF que es difícil localizarlo ni por teléfono. TAPIA que antes de venir le llame para preparar su dinero.- 469-

- -

. - . (..5.-12-3 may.66)

4904..1.-

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-35.
3 mayo 66
L2-M2-T24-
1218-1344 hrs.-

00- Entrada sin contestación fuera y bloqueado.- 15-

15- Salida al 35-56-08.- 1218 hrs.- (Oficialia Mayor de Gobernación)- GUZMAN pregunta por la Licenciada MONTERO para saludarla y avisarle que ayer le mandó unas notas. MONTERO dice que espere un momento. Despues HF dice que sobre sus peticiones de visa de ANTONIO JORGE GARCIA se está localizando y creo que para mañana esté lista y de los otros tres ya están haciendo los oficios y mañana mismo pueden pasar por ellos. GUZMAN que por favor y que sobre todo el del sobrino del agregado militar. HF EMILIANO SANCHEZ PEON dice que está bien.- 41-

41- Salida sin contestación.- 60-

60- Entrada.- 1246 hrs.- MF hija de la señora ALVAREZ pregunta por FRANK TAPIA para saludarlo y explicar que el paquete que le mandan a su hermano es una trampa para cazar tigres. TAPIA que entonces el va a informar a Relaciones porque el no va a poder pedir una exoneración de fuero diplomatico en un bulto que contiene una cosa simple ya que pueden creer que estoy metiendo contrabando y si fuera ropa o alguna cosa de comer lo haría, pero en ese caso se tienen que pagar cerca de mil dolares de impuesto por una simple trampa para caceria. MF que entonces de todos modos gracias.- 83-   (hoja uno)

4901

83- Entrada sin contestación.- 87-

87- Entrada.- 1305 hrs.- HF pregunta por TERESITA PEÑA. TAPIA dice que espere.- cortan.- 98-

98- Salida al ~~[illegible]~~.- (Centro de Capacitación)- TERE PEÑA pregunta por el maestro TENORIO.- cortan.- 112-

112- Salida sin contestación.- 117-

117- Salida al 18-04-40.- 1310 hrs.- MARINA pregunta el precio de los cubiertos que vio el anuncio en Novedades. HF que salió a comer el personal y es mejor que llame mas tarde porque ella no sabe.- 124-

124- Entrada.- 1311 hrs.- HF por GUZMAN, CARMITA dice que no está y que si deja recado.- 131-

131- Salida ocupada.- y sin contestación.- 141-

141- Salida al 46-10-02.- 1321 hrs.- MARINA saluda a LULY y pregunta como han estado .. bla.. bla..- asuntos familiares. - y falta de sirvientas.- 210-

210- Salida al 19-15-09.- 1328 hrs.- ocupado.- 213- MARINA pregunta por la señora NUÑEZ PEÑA para saludarla. Esta dice que no le pegaron y que sigue sintiendose enferma. MARINA dice que mañana pueden pasar por ella para llevarla a Cardiologia y le den una revisada.- bla.. bla..- sin importancia.- 241- (hoja dos

241- Entrada.- 1330 hrs.- HF de la Agregaduria Militar de la Embajada de Venezuela, quiere saber si el Agregado Militar de la Dominicana va a ir a la Asociación de Agregado Militares. MARINA dice que no están los militares y que mañana le podrá informar. HF que resulta que estan en reunión los agregados y lo están esperando. MARINA va a tratar de localizarlo para darle su recado.- HF que ella está en el 14-36-20.- 261-

261- Salida al 49-12-92.- 1333 hrs.- MARINA pregunta por el Coronel MARCO JORGE MORENO. HF EDELINA dice que no está. HD es TITO PEÑA y dice que llamaron de la Asociación de Agregados Militares y que los estan esperando o que llame al 14-36-20. ADEVILA que está bien.-286-

286- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1334 hrs.- 290-

290- Salida al 19-55-90.- 1337 hrs.- (Suits Emperador)- CARMITA pregunta por el señor DEL OLMO de la oficina de Turismo. HF dice que espere un momento, despues le dice que no está.- 307-

307- Entrada.- 1338 hrs.- HF por GUZMAN. HORTENSIA dice que no está. HF LIBONEY (?) pregunta entonces por TAPIA. HORTENSIA dice que espere un momento. Despues LIBONEY saluda a TAPIA y pregunta como está la familia. TAPIA que bien. LIBONEY dice que va a mandar a su esposa a Puerto Rico a que la operen allá porque asi se sientecon mas tranquilidad y aquí tiene muchos problemas y quiere arreglar los documentos sacando pasaporte dominicano. TAPIA dice que no hay problema y que el tiene que hacer un permiso para que su esposa salga o sacando un acta notarial.- TAPIA no sabe muy bien como está eso pero ...
(hoja tres)

... es mejor que se legalice bien o saque un pasaporte mexicano de la niña porque sino despues van a descubrir el truco de que cuando llegó o donde está la visa de la niña, etc. y hay que aclarar que ella nació en México. LIBONEY que está bien y pregunta si TAPIA sale de vacaciones. TAPIA dice que no podrá salir. LIBONEY si algo se le ofrece le llamará a la embajada.
- 353-

353- Entrada.- 1342 hrs.- HF con su amor YADIRA para avisarle que se podrán ver hasta mas tarde porque tiene mucho trabajo.
- 372-

372- Salida ocupada.- 381-

381- Salida al 11-84-20.- 1344 hrs.- YADIRA pregunta por TAPIA primero y despues por la señora AIDA. HF dice que espere un momento.- YADIRA espera y cuelga.- 410-

410- Salida ocupada.- 414-

414- Entrada sin contestación.- 419-

419- Entrada.- RENE FIALLO pregunta por TERE PEÑA. HORTENSIA dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice a TERE que lo espere un momento en unos 10 o 12 minutos para poner unas cosas al escritorio de TAPIA y de GUZMAN.- 437-

437- Entrada.- HF por FRANK. FIALLO dice que no está. HF Es NATACHA SANCHEZ DE TAPIA (esposa de FRANK TAPIA) y saluda a RENE y se despiden familiarmente.- 455- (hoja 4- L2-3 may.66)
. - .

5001

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-95.
3 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T25-
1724-1730 hrs.-

00- Salida al 45-98-23.- 1724 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a la niña AURORA y pregunta por su papá el Coronel MAURICIO FERNANDEZ. Esta dice que está en el baño. Despues doña JOSEFA (esposa de FERNANDEZ) dice que espere un momento. Luego GUZMAN pregunta a "CHIFU" FERNANDEZ como se siente. Este dice que bien. GUZMAN pregunta si puede mandar a su hijo CARLOS por las cosas o GUZMAN mismo va por ellas. FERNANDEZ que mejor vaya el porque CARLOS no está. GUZMAN que está bien.- 24-

24- Salida.- GUZMAN pregunta por la señorita. MF dice que le llame al otro teléfono.- 30-

30- Salida al 43-58-77.- 1730 hrs.- (Importadora Mercantil - Mexican)- GUZMAN pregunta si ya tiene listo el pedido del coronel FERNANDEZ. MF dice que en cinco minutos estará listo. GUZMAN mandará a su chofer con una tarjeta a recoger todo. MF que está bien y que es Diagonal San Antonio 1116-segundo piso. -47-

47- Entrada sin contestación.- 51-

- - - - - (1*- L2- 3 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-35.-
4 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T23-
0930-1032 hrs.-

51- Salidas ocupadas.- 60-

60- Salida al 22-62-29.- 0930 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta a HERNANDEZ si mañana se ven o puede pasar hoy a la embajada. ~~XXXXX~~ HERNANDEZ podrá pasar a verlo mas tarde a su cuarto del hotel. GUZMAN dice que ya no está en el hotel sino en un departamento de la calle Petén #347-5. HERNANDEZ pasará mañana entre diez a once a verlo.-86-

86- Entrada.- 0933 hrs.- HF por el horario de atención de parte de la Volkswagen de México. GUZMAN que de diez a dos de lunes a viernes solamente.- 90-

90- Salida al 35-51-37.- 0940 hrs.- GUZMAN desean comprar 100 ejemplares de la Cartilla Diplomática escrita por LEONARDO - ENRIQUEZ. MT dice que se le pasará el pedido a la persona que se encarga de los pedidos. -113-

113- Entrada.- 0946 hrs.-HF reclama el pago de renta de las - oficinas donde está la Embajada y se debe el mes de abril y el mes que cursa. GUZMAN no sabe de eso y es mejor llamar el jueves porque hoy casi ni vendrán las empleadas.- 127-

127- (hoja dos)

127- Salida al 10-08-17.- 1000 hrs.- CARMITA pregunta por MIGUEL HERNANDEZ. MF que ha de ser MIGUEL GONZALEZ pero no está. CARMITA dice que hay un encargo que entregarle y que se comunique a la embajada. MF que está bien.- 152-

152- Entrada.- 1013 hrs.- MF por GUZMAN para avisar que la persona encargada de surtir las cartillas diplomáticas no contesta su teléfono y tratará de estarle llamando para surtir su pedido.- 163-

163- Entrada.- 1015 hrs.- Dr. CABRERA saluda a GUZMAN y pregunta por TAPIA. GUZMAN dice que no está. CABRERA quedó de llamar hoy con TAPIA para el asunto de una carta que le iba a hacer. GUZMAN dirá a TAPIA sobre su asunto. CABRERA dice que pasará como a la una a la embajada.- 172-

172- Entrada.- HF pregunta la dirección del Consulado. MARINA que es Durango 217 esquina con Valladolid.- 177-

177- Entrada.- MIGUEL GONZALEZ se reporta y pregunta por CARMITA. Esta dice que ella le llamó para avisarle que tiene una carta y un litro de ron que le quiere entregar. MIGUEL pasará a la embajada.- 187-

187- Salida al [illegible]-65-70.- 1032 hrs.- YADIRA con su amiga VICTORIA para saber en que paró la novela de la sirvienta.. bla.. bla..- - Y despues comentan sobre el mal tiempo que hace y que llueve mucho " al carajo".- bla.. bla..- YADIRA recibió carta de su mamá que está en Santo Domingo y que se siente enferma de la presión.- se despiden.- 244-

(hoja tres)

5001

244- Salida ocupada.- 253-

253- Entrada.-HF con MARINA para saber si ha llamado MARCOS. Esta dice que no y comentan lo de una pelicula de DOLORES DEL RIO. - 269-

- -

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
4 mayo 66.
L2-M2-726-
1115-1236 hrs.-

00- - Bloqueado.- 06-

06- Salida al 18-50-40.- 1115 hrs.- (Viana y Cia)- MD pide comunicarse a reparaciones. MF dice que está ocupada la linea y que si espera. MD que está bien.- Despues cuelga.- 77-

77- Entrada.- 1125 hrs.- MF con MARTHA para saludarla y comentar sobre el mal tiempo que hay en la ciudad y quedan de verse mas tarde.-94-

94- Entrada.-1130 hrs.- MF por el Coronel JORGE MORENO. MARTHA dice que no ha llegado.- 97-

97- Entrada.- MF por el Coronel JORGE. MARTHA dice que no ha llegado y solo está FERNANDEZ.- 102-

102- Salida al 18-50-80.- 1133 hrs.- (Viana y Cia)- MD otra vez por el departamento de Reparaciones. MF dice que espere un momento.- despues cuelga.- 146-

146- Salida al 18-50-40.- 1137 hrs.- (Viana)- MD quiere reportar que el refrigerador que compró tiene el foco fundido.- MF dice que espere un momento.- cuelgan.- 199-

(hoja uno)

199- Salida.- 1143 hrs.- (Viana)- HO dice tener tres horas queriendo tratar el asunto de su refrigerador y nadie le hace caso. HF que ella pasa la comunicación al departamento pero nadie contesta.- despues cuelga.- 247-

247- Salida sin contestación.- y ocupado.- 319-

319- Entrada.- 1153 hrs.- HF con MARINA para saber si ha llegado o llamado MARCOS. Esta dice que no, y comentan sobre el mal tiempo que hay en la ciudad y que dicen que en Santo Domingo está nevando, pero no lo creen. Quedan de llamarse mas tarde. - 344-

344- Salida al 12-16-39.- 1157 hrs.- (Petrolizadora)- CARMITA pregunta por HECTOR RENDON. HO dice que espere un momento. - Despues CARMITA con HECTOR (el de la voz de maricón) para saber que hay de su hermano SALVADOR (novio de CARMITA). Este dice que ha tratado de localizarlo y no lo ha visto y va a ver si el viernes se reunen.- 393-

393- Entrada.- 1201 hrs.- HF Ing. PUGIBET pregunta por el Coronel MORENO. MARINA dice que no ha venido y si gusta dejar recado en caso que venga. PUGIBET que le diga que lo llame a al teléfono 13-09-25 o 13-65-15 y que le diga que estará de seis a ocho de la noche y para mayor dato le diga que es el cuñado del Coronel HORTA. MARINA que está bien.- 419-

419- Entrada.- HO por el Corl. MORENO. MARINA cree que ya no regrese hoy.- 424-

(hoja dos)

424- Entrada.- Dr. CABRERA pregunta por el Cónsul TAPIA. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Despues TAPIA informa que ya le dijo a TERE le haga la carta, y puede pasar por ella a eso de la una y media. CABRERA, que está bien.- 443-

444- Entrada.- HF por el Corl.JORGE. MARINA dice que no ha llegado.- 447-

447- Salida.- (Despacho Lomelí)- MARINA desea saber sobre los departamentos que se rentan casi frente a la Embajada Dominicana. HF dice que ya se rentaron.- 460-

460- Salida ocupada.- y sin contestación.-515-

515- Entrada.- HF ALVAREZ se reporta. MARINA dice que le llegó una carta de crédito educativo pero dinero no le ha llegado. ALVAREZ tiene desde febrero que no recibe dinero, y que mejor la carta se la abra porque no puede ir a recogerla. MARINA la abre y da lectura de su contenido de la cual piden rinda una declaración sobre sus ingresos de postgraduado y en que hospitales está haciendo sus servicios, con fines de renovar contrato de becado. Y que esas cartas llegaron igual para LEGUERO, PEÑA MELO, YUBERES y GARCIA PATRONI. ALVAREZ que gracias.- 576-

576- Salida ocupada.- 592-

592- Salida.- (Embajada de Haití)- MARINA confirma la asistencia de RENE FIALLO para visitar al Embajador de ese país hoy en la tarde a la reunión invitada. HF que está bien.- 605-

(Sigue Atrás).

5000

605- Salida ocupada.- 622-

622- Salida.- ~~1224xhrs~~.- (Servicio Internacional)- MARINA pregunta si hay algún mensaje o cable para la embajada. HF que no hay ninguno y que llame al 19-09-06.- 650-

650- Salida al 19-09-06.- MARINA pregunta si hay algún cable para la embajada.-HF dice que no hay nada.- 678-

678- Salida.- 1234 hrs.- (Carteros Zona uno)- MARINA pregunta por INCLAN para saber si hay alguna valija para la embajada. HF dice que no hay nada.- 699-

699- Salida al 49-12-92.- 1236 hrs.- MARINA pregunta por el coronel MORENO. H dice que no está. MARINA pide le diga a su papá (de [illegible])... - (SE TERMINA LA GRABACION POR ROTURA DE LA CINTA MAGNETICA)-- 730----

- -

. - . (..4.-12- 4 mayo.66)

5008

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
4 mayo 66.
L2-[illegible]-T27-
1259-1329 hrs.-

00- Salida sin contestación.- 05-

05- Salida al 39-61-30.- 1259 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ para pedirle el dinero de la renta. ARMANDO se lo lleva el viernes porque hoy no tengo dinero.-31-

31- Entrada.- MP con MARINA para saber si habló MARCOS. MARINA dice que no vino porque tiene el auto descompuesto y que despues llamé a su casa y dijo que no estaba. MP espera a MARINA a las dos para ir a comer juntas.- 42-

42- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1306 hrs.- 45-

1313 hrs.

45- Entrada.- MP por el Coronel [illegible]. YADIRA dice que no vino hoy. MP que entonces con JOHN FRANK TAPIA. YADIRA dice que espere. Despues MP MARTA comenta con TAPIA que MARCOS es un bandido como todo dominicano pues lo está esperando que pase por ella para llevar unos papeles a Gobernación. TAPIA dice que lo puede llamar a su casa al 49-12-92. MARTA dice que ya lo tiene y que no solo le urge su asunto sino la visa de MARTINA RICUR que tiene mas de un mes que no sale. TAPIA que si pidió la visa como MARTA entonces no va a salir nunca. - risas. MARTA termina conque le llamará a MARCOS a su casa.- 69-

(hoja uno)

5008

69- Entrada.- MF equivocado.- 74-

74- Entrada.- MF por GUZMAN. HORTENSIA dice que ya salió y tal vez regrese mas tarde. MF que le diga que llamó la señorita GAMAS (CHELITO GAMAS amor de GUZMAN)-.79-

79- Entrada.- 1320 hrs.- RENE FIALLO pregunta por GUZMAN. MARINA dice que ya salió y que regresa al rato. FIALLO que entonces con TERESITA. Despues FIALLO pregunta a TERE si terminó el texto del mensaje cifrado que hicieron anoche con LEONTE. TERE se lo entregó ya a GUZMAN. FIALLO que vea si no se ha enviado, porque tambien dejó en el escritorio de GUZMAN... CORTAN. -- fuera.- 95-

95- Entrada.- FIALLO continua con TERE y pide vea si GUZMAN comparó el texto corregido en la parte final del cable y que se refiere a una constancia conjuntamente presentada por varios países tales como Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Panamá, Venezuela y Dominicana; porque yo no sé si al corregir puse todos los países. TERE va a revisar eso porque ella no recuerda haber visto eso..- SE CORTA.- 114-

1326 hrs.

114- Entrada.- FIALLO continuá con TERE e insiste que vea esa copia corregida en el escritorio de GUZMAN y vea si hay otros papeles en que hicieron algunas correcciones porque teme que haya omitido alguna cosa en el cable y que tambien tenga bajo su custodia hasta que llegue GUZMAN y en caso que no llegue los meta en alguna de las gabetas del escritorio. TERE que está bien. -Despues FIALLO dice a TAPIA que bajando las escaleras me saltó un pensamiento desagradable pero que no tuvo tiempo de

(hoja dos) ...

... regresar para advertir que GUZMAN tuviera cuidado de dejar el mensaje en clave que dejé sobre su escritorio, ya que TAPIA recordará cuando en dias pasados se le llamó de Cuernavaca para que proporcionara la clave del descifrador, entonces debió GUZMAN tener cuidado de ese trabajo en la inteligencia de que TAPIA tambien se diera cuenta de ese trabajo, para no prestarse a malas interpretaciones. TAPIA dice que " yo lo tengo a usted en un concepto demasiado elevado para dejar se andar con niñerias y cualquier cosa que suceda, quiero que sepa que jamas yo preguntaré porque fué, ni tendré porque pensar mal de usted", o sea que para mi es usted uno de los hombres que he conocido y usted lo sabe en muchas ocasiones en su presencia y en su ausencia. RENE dice que dado a las circunstancias de sus ausencias quiere tener en TAPIA un amigo. TAPIA rie y dice que el puede depositar toda la confianza que guste y que el trabajará junto y de acuerdo y que no soy el tipo que anda con niñerias y esas cosas. RENE lo sabe y agradece sus conceptos.- 165-

165- Entrada.- 1329 hrs.- NF con YADIRA para hacer planes a salir a comer hoy o cenar por la noche entre las amigas de siempre o bien mañana que no trabajan por ser día festivo.-203-

203- Entrada.- EMILIO CORDERO dice a TERE que GUZMAN le pidió le dijera que el cable que lo ayudé en la mañana a pasar y si a las dos no ha llegado GUZMAN por él, que entonces lo mande con HORTENSIA a Gobernación que es en donde están ahorita. TERE que don RENE le dijo que revisara ese cable si estaba completo de los paises en una corrección y que RENE ordenó dejara ese cable en una gabeta del escritorio de mismo RENE, asi que es mejor que GUZMAN le llame para ver que hacer.- 228-

(hoja tres)

228- Entrada.- MT con TERE para citarse en casa de ella por la tarde.- 242-

242- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1343 hrs.- 244-

244- Entrada.- GUZMAN pregunta novedades. HORTENSIA que le devolvieron el pasaporte que le dió y las franquicias las tuvo que llevar a Relaciones y hasta el viernes se las devuelven. - Después GUZMAN con TERE. Esta dice que lo que le dió GUZMAN a copiar no es para cifrarlo, porque don [illegible] llamó y le dijo si ya lo había pasado y que revisara si estaban completos los países y que si GUZMAN no estaba que los dejara en una gaveta. GUZMAN está de acuerdo y el pasará mas tarde.- 268-

268- Salida.- [illegible] con MT para saludarla y decirle que ayer por la tarde le estuvo llamando para invitarla a salir. MT dice que no salió y que el teléfono para nada llamó... bla.. bl...- - y planes para mañana que es día festivo y que no trabajan.-331-

331- Entrada.- MT por YADIRA para saber si van a salir por la tarde. YADIRA acepta. MT se llama VICTORIA.- 354-

- -

. - . (..4.-L2- 4 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

4 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T28-

1825-1924 hrs.-

00- Entrada.- 1825 hrs.- sin contestación.-HF pregunta por su "papi", pero se equivocó.- 06-

06- Salida ocupada y bocina descolgada.- 20-

20- Salida al 19-02-09.- 1844 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta a dondo tiene que hablar para hacer algunas aclraciones sobre la llegada de cables internacionales. HF dice que llame al 19-08-06.- 36-

36- Salida al 19-02-06.- 1844 hrs.- GUZMAN quiere saber si hay algún cable procedente de Santo Domingo. HF que llame al 19-09-06.- 41-

41- Salida al 19-09-06.- GUZMAN quiere saber si ha llegado algún cable de Santo Domingo. HF dice que no ha llegado nada pero en tanto lo tengan se lo enviarán a la embbajada. GUZMAN que en todo caso a la suite Emperador. HF que está bien.- 53-

53- Entrada.- 1924 hrs.- LUCHITA GAMES pregunta a su amor GUZMAN si se van a ver. Este dice que todavia tiene mucho trabajo y pregunta si se acordó del asunto de aquel señor. CHELO que si pero que es conecido por otros lados de la Financiera pero alli nadie lo conoce, pero ella tiene una tarjeta de un despacho que se dedica a investigar personas. GUZMAN dice que uno de los

(hoja uno) ...

... hermanos trabaja en la Financiera. ~~KMXIN~~ LUCHITA que ahora que lo vea le entregará esa tarjeta. GUZMAN le llamará a su casa despues de las seis y media.- Y no tengo para cuando salir ya que me tienen como esclavo. - 71-

71- Entradas sin contestación.- 88-

88- Salidas sin contestación.- y ocupadas.- 107-

~~107-~~ ~~salida~~ - - - - - (..2.- 12- 4 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
5 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T28-
1139-1236 hrs.-

107- Salida.- GUZMAN saluda a HERNANDEZ y dice que va a estar en la embajada hoy. HERNANDEZ le mandará su pedido y pregunta si el tiene la cuenta del Coronel FERNANDEZ. GUZMAN no está seguro pero son como mil ciento ochenta. HERNANDEZ tratará de pasar cuanto antes a verlo.- GUZMAN lo espera antes de las once.- 122-

123- Entradas sin contestación.- 141-

141- Salida.- (Suite Emperador)- GUZMAN pregunta por RENE FIALLO. MF dice que acaba de salir.- 154-

154- Entrada.- MF RENE FIALLO dice estar llamando desde hace rato y nadie contesta. GUZMAN dice que el contestaba pero nadie lo hacia fuere y que el lo llamo al Hotel para avisarle que se recibió un cable confirmando lo de la fecha que se mando en el otro cable, y es junio. RENE dice que se alegra y que pasará al rato a la embajada para ver eso sobre lo que ayer se estuvo escuchando y la razón a las reservas finales y ademas dando cuenta por si hay alguna presión de parte de ellos "allá con los paises interesados" ya que seria algun error lamentable o un mal entendido de compañeros. GUZMAN que está bien.- FIALLO ademas comenta que anoche lo llamó MARIA JOSEFA la esposa de FERNANDEZ CAMINERO

(hoja tres) ...

..y le dijo que habia extrañado su ausencia y que ofreció mandarle un cable y tambien ofrecio acompañarla hoy y para ese caso aunque sea se van en un taxi para ayudarla. GUZMAN que está bien.- 204-

204- Entrada.- 1139 hrs.- LD.- MF pregunta por el Lic. MARCIO VELOZ MAGIOLO. RENE FIALLO dice que no está en México ni regresará al país. MF pregunta entonces por la señora DE VELOZ. RENE que tambien se fué a Santo Domingo. MF pregunta quien se quedó en su lugar. RENE dice " tienen el gusto de hablar con el que se encargó de la Embajada y soy RENE FIALLO Encargado de Negocios y Ministro Plenipontenciario".. MF dice que le habla MARUJA FENEIRO DE LLAVONA de padres gallegos y dominicana de nacimiento y hace un mes y medio mandó a la ciudad de México porque ella vive en Torreón, Coahuila;dos pasaportes de sus hijos para renovarlos y son a nombre de MARIA ISABEL y JOSE ANTONIO LLAVONA FENEIRO y resulta que son menos de 4y3 años y ellos quieren ir a Santo Domingo y quiere tener la seguridad de que están en la embajada porque los mandó con un español VICENTE VIDARRETA - es VILLARDEL y ademas ella quiere ir a Santo Domingo porque ella es española de nacimiento no dominicana y tiene que renovar sus documentos que se vencen el 6 de julio y sus hijos si son dominicanos con domicilio en calle Abelardo Rodriguez Urdaneta #11 en Santo Domingo muy cerca de donde viven los padres de MARCIO VELOZ. RENE ofrece investigar eso y se lo informará despues. MARUJA dice que ella vive en la Avenida Mayrán #580 Colonia Jardín en Torreón o el teléfono de su esposo que es dueño del café Colón y se llama JOSE MANUEL LLAVONA FERNANDEZ - español-, con telefono 2-74-75. RENE que está bien y que va a hacer lo posible por resolver su problema.
-- 356-

(hoja cuatro)

356- Salida.- (Apartamentos Carmen)- GUZMAN pide el departamento 28 con la señora TERESITA PEÑA. MF dice que salió.- 372-

372- Salida al 02.- LD.- 1225 hrs.- GUZMAN quiere hacer una llamada a Torreón con cargo al 2-74-75 con la señora MARUJA FEIXEIRO DE LLAVONA o su esposo JOSE MANUEL LLAVONA FERNANDEZ. MF toma nota y dice que espere un momento.- Despues GUZMAN informa a la señora MARUJA que los pasaportes que dice que mandó con un señor ya le fueron visados hace dos dias y todos sus trámites quedaron arreglados. MARUJA dice que la señora esposa de MARCIO VELOZ es hermana de una cuñada que ella tiene y por eso se valió de enviar los pasaportes a visar. GUZMAN dice que ya quedaron autorizados sus visas y una persona los recogió y los llevó tal vez para Torreón. MARUJA que está bien y que gracias.- (lineas cruzadas)- Y MARUJA reconoce a LEONTE como hermano de JOSE y de JAIME y que ella es muy amiga de doña JOSEFA mamá de LEONTE.. bla.. bla..- Despues se ponen a platicar sobre las amistades y la familia que ambos son - conocidos.- 448-

448- Entrada.- MF Lic. ARRIETA por el Corl. MARCOS JORGE. GUZMAN dice que fué a la ceremonia del zocalo a una jura de bandera del Ejercito Mexicano y no vendrá.- 455-

455- Salida al 14-02-76.- 1236 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta "por su señorita Coronel y etc.. TAPIA". MF pregunta de parte de quien. GUZMAN que " de la embajada de Nigeria". Despues GUZMAN saluda a TAPIA y dice que le quizo llevar sus mariachis para sus mañanitas. TAPIA rie. GUZMAN la felicita en su día. TAPIA da las gracias. GUZMAN dice que acaba de recibir un cable y que ..

(hoja cinco)

.. dice: "Embajador de México, a TAPIA, recibe felicitaciones cumpleaños, abrazos para todos, firma MANUEL LARA Y BOLIVAR". TAPIA se entera y da las gracias, y dice que su esposa y su familia fueron a las piramides de Teotihuacan; cambia de tema y pregunta que lic traia RENE con el cable cifrado. GUZMAN dice que nada y que era otro cable grande y ya quedó todo arreglado, y que " ese hombre es mas bruto que el gobernador", cambia de tema y dice que hay que mandarle un regalo a esa muchacha. TAPIA pregunta por el papelito que le dio de unos cubanos residentes norteamericanos y que hay que ver en Gobernación ese asunto pues son tres cubanos que le trajo MARICH. GUZMAN no tiene ese papel pero lo va a buscar y a la vez pregunta si recuerda que se renovaron dos pasaportes de dos niños hijos de unos españoles que viven en Torreón. TAPIA que si que se lo dió a una vieja española fea. GUZMAN que está bien y saludos.- TAPIA antes de colgar comenta " que el viejo me llamó para pedirme disculpas sobre que no me habia enterado del cable cifrado que habian hecho entre "el viejo" y GUZMAN, y que me pusiera inmediatamente al habla contigo y que estaba molesto porque yo estaba pensando que me habian pasado por arriba, y que no lo tomara asi y que el me daba plena confianza, etc." - risas.- GUZMAN comenta que asi es mejor para que se de cuenta que no quiere nada " entre bastidores".- risas.- TAPIA comenta " que está loco ese viejo". GUZMAN rie y dice que hasta pronto.- 531-

531- Salida.- (Aeronaves)- GUZMAN pregunta por la hora de llegada del vuelo 421 procedente de Miami. MF que a las 16:00 hrs.- 539-

- -

. - .

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
6 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T29-
0851-1046 hrs.-

00- Entrada sin contestación.- 07-

07- Salida al 22-68-29.- 0851 hrs.- (Exclusivas Bennet)- GUZMAN pregunta por HERNANDEZ para pedirle que no vaya a venir hoy a la embajada sino hasta mañana y que se traiga las muestras. Y lo de la vajilla. HERNANDEZ que estará a las diez o diez y media.- 18-

18- Salida ocupada.- 23-

23- Salida al 21-36-70.- 0915 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor MACAÑA y si van a verse hoy. Este dice que hasta el lunes para que pienses lo que te dije. HORTENSIA dice " estás pedo y si no quieres venir entonces mañana si, y no te hagas payaso". - bla.. bla..- sin importancia.- 45-

45- Salida al 17-51-27.- 0916 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por OSCAR RODRIGUEZ de la Cañada Dry, pero alli no trabaja nadie con ese nombre.- 53-

53- Salida ocupada.- 59- equivocada.- y ocupado.- y sin contestación.-103-

(hoja uno)

103- Salida al 13-74-92.- 0925 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor ZAMORATE para saber si se pueden ver. Este dice que mientras siga actuando como niña y siga creyendo en los Santos Reyes no volverá a salir con ella y que ya es una mujer que debe de hacer las cosas por si misma. HORTENSIA se enoja y le dice hasta luego. - 126-

126- Salida sin contestación.- 136-

136- Salida al 33-01-80.- 0931 hrs.- HP pide a MF MARIA ELENA que anote en su libreta que voy a ir a la Embajada Americana, luego a la Dominicana y despues de la Procuraduria. MARIA que está bien.- 143-

143- Entrada.- MIGNON saluda a MARINA y dice que tiene un trabajo que terminar antes del dia 25 porque se quiere ir para el dia 23 "allá". MARINA se alegra. MIGNON invita a MARINA y a TERE PEÑA a comer hoy un mangú de platanos.. - Ambas aceptan.- 168-

166- Salida al 25-59-12.- 1011 hrs.- ocupado.- y bocina descolgado.-180- (Papelería Cosmos)- MARINA pregunta por el señor VIDAL para avisarle que hace tres dias tiene el dinero de la renta del cuarto. VIDAL mandará recogerlo con su recibo.- 204-

204- Salida.-(Información)- MARINA por el número de Agua Electropura. IF que es el 33-13-00.-- 209-

209- Salida al 33-13-00.- 1017 hrs.- equivocado.- con Electrolux.- despues dicen que es 46-29-30.- Y luego MARINA hace pedido de agua electropura.- 1020 hrs.- 245-

(hoja dos)

245- Entrada.- 1021 hrs.- HF pregunta si hay alguna correspondencia para JOSE PEREZ. MARINA dice que no hay nada.- 258-

258- Entrada.- 1033 hrs.- MF desea informes para visa, pues habla de los Establecimientos Nosie y x tambien saber los requisitos para poder legalizar una carta poder para pedir el traspaso de maquinas en la Republica Dominicana. MARINA que primero ir a Gobernación y a Relaciones Exteriores y ya legalizados por esas dependencias puede pasar a la embajada bajo conocimiento de algún notario y que cuesta la legalización la cantidad de cinco dolares. MF que gracias.- 272-

272- Entrada.- 1040 hrs.- HF pregunta por el Corl.JORGE. TERE dice que no está. Despues GARCIA saluda a LORENTE GUZMAN y pide le diga que lo llame al 11-90-43 con ANDRES GARCIA.- 283-

283- Entrada.- 1046 hrs.- CRISTINA saluda a MARINA y pregunta si ha llegado esa gente. Esta dice que no y que anoche llamó y no contestaba el teléfono y que hay que esperar hoy a ver que hay. CRISTINA dice que hoy va a la recepción de la embajada de Etiopía y que vea si en gobernación ya le dieron el permiso de residencia. MARINA pide le llame mas tarde entonces.- 310-

- -

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

6 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T30-

1058-1208 hrs.-

00- Entrada.-1058 hrs.- HF de parte del señor GEORGE KATKINGSON del diario Los Angeles Times que solicitó una visa para ir a Santo Domingo y que es de nacionalidad norteamericana y que ya tuvo una visa de periodista y la quiere renovar. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Después HF GEORGE dice que el - consiguió antes una visa que le dieron en San Juan de Puerto Rico para la Dominicana y que ahora quiere volver para el asunto de llevar la notas periodísticas de las elecciones de su país y se quiere evitar tener que ir a San Juan a renovar. MARINA que hay que hacer todos los trámites de nuevo aquí, ya que son otras reglas y es mejor que deje el número de su teléfono para llamarlo cuando llegue el Cónsul. GEORGE dice que es 35-89-69 y que es GEORGE NATANSON y está ~~xadiza~~ radicado en México para los asuntos de su periódico en Centro America.- 56-

56- Entrada.- 1104 hrs.- LUCHITA GAMES con GUZMAN su amor y saber si se ven hoy. Este dice que si y pregunta por el número de la agencia que le ofreció darlo. LUCHITA a la tarde que se vean se lo dará porque no lo traó consigo. GUZMAN le llamará a las cuatro y media.- 68-

68- -Bocina descolgada.- 83-

83- Salida.-(Embajada de Corea)- MARINA dice que hay una correspondencia que llegó de Santo Domingo para esa embajada y no hay ..

(hoja uno)

... con quien enviarla y de ser posible pasen a recogerla. MARINA aclara que proviene del Ministerio de Relaciones de Santo Domingo. MF que está bien y que gracias.- 93-

93- Salida al 18-29-93.- 1115 hrs.- (Ceremonial)- MARINA pregunta por FLORES TEJADA. MF dice que salió a la calle. MARINA pide se le diga que el señor GUZMAN desea tener una conferencia con él, con fines de tratar un asunto de su - Gobierno y que se le señale una cita. MF que está bien.-104-

104- Salida.- sin contestación.- 110-

110 Entrada.- 1127 hrs.- MF informa que de León,GTO, llaman al Corl.MARCOS JORGE MORENO. Despues MF ANDRES saluda a MARCOS y pregunta si recibió su telegrama de felicitación por el santo de MARCOS. Este dice que si y que gracias. ANDRES que ha estado haciendo gestiones ante la Ferretera el Bajío para el prestamo de unos 200 y que será una letra de cambio a seis meses de pago con intereses. MARCOS le llamará mas tarde para darle la respuesta. ANDRES tiene una comida que [illegible] le da al Obispo para congraciarse. MARCOS lo llamará tarde como a las siete. ANDRES que a su despacho o sea el 3-17-02 y alli espera su llamado. MARCOS que está bien.- 134-

134- Salida al 14-02-76.- 1124 hrs.- YADIRA saluda a TAPIA y dice que si va a venir a la embajada. FRANK TAPIA pregunta que necesita. YADIRA que sobre unos documentos y una visa que pide el corresponsal del diario Los Angeles Times o sea NATANSON que quiere ir a Santo Domingo y que la vez pasada se la dieron en Puerto Rico. TAPIA dice que entonces se vaya a Puerto Rico a sacarla, despues dice que pasa al rato.- 149- (hoja dos)

149- Salida al 19-55-93.- 1125 hrs.- YADIRA por DEL OLMO, pero todavia no llega.- 154-

154- Salida ocupada.-y sin contestación.- 168-

168- Entrada.- 1123 hrs.- Mª ADELINA ELIAS DE MORENO con su esposo el Coronel MARCOS JORGE MORENO para avisar que va al salón y que despues pase por ella. MARCOS que está bien y que solo sacó reintegro en la Loteria.- 180-

180- Salida al 35-56-03.- 1133 hrs.- (Oficialia Mayor)- HORTENSIA pregunta por la señorita MONTERO. Despues GUZMAN saluda a la Licenciada MONTERO. Esta dice que sus dos oficios pendientes de firma desde el miercoles no los tienen sino hasta hoy mas tarde y de los otros dos están pendientes de que se despache. GUZMAN que está bien y explica que hay tres medicos dominicanos que vinieron a México con visa por tres meses y sus pasaportes son oficiales con visa diplomática y se vencen el dia 8 y que Relaciones explica que hay que llamarles o solicitar el cambio por oficio. MONTERO que asi es y que despues le mando los oficios para que se despachen luego.- 201-

201- Salida al 13-21-92.- 1139 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ para saludarlo. Este dice que estuvo un poco enfermo y con mucho trabajo, y que ya logró informes "sobre esa persona y que el último puesto que todavia tiene es en una compañia fraccionadora de terrenos y mas bien es al amparo de su hermano JUAN CORTINA PORTILLO, quien es la cabeza del grupo, y que he ocupado otros puestos siempre bajo la celula de su hermano JUAN y que "él" (EUSTAQUIO CORTINA PORTILLO) es una buena persona..

(hoja tres)

...completamente honorable y digna de todo crédito" y que el ultimo dato como antes le dijo está como Presidente de una compañía de terrenos fraccionados, pero la persona que le dió ese dato dijo que eso era hace seis meses y hasta la fecha no se ha logrado comprobar. GUZMAN pregunta si logró investigar de que filiación politica o social es mas o menos. ENRIQUEZ sabe que es igual que todos sus hermanos o sea de un grupo completamente catolico practicante y siempre ha estado en un circulo de hombres catolicos formados hace tiempo por un grupo de hombres que estuvieron o estudiaron con el padre jesuita RAMON SILVA o RAMON MARTINEZ SILVA. GUZMAN toma nota y dice que se lo agradece mucho porque sus datos son valiosos. ENRIQUEZ que nada tiene que agradecer " doctor" si sus datos son en cierto punto cortos. GUZMAN que no y que verán que dia se reunen con las esposas a cenar juntos. ENRIQUEZ que está bien y que anoche estuvo platicando con el Dr. ROCHAC y dice que los conoce. GUZMAN dice que el Dr. ROCHAC es intimo amigo de mi padre y es una bella persona. ENRIQUEZ dice que salió hoy fuera y no sabe cuando podrá regresar a Santo Domingo hasta " que lo llamen". -296-

296- Entrada.- 1143 hrs.- CRISTINA con MARINA para saber si "está el señor". MARINA que sí que está platicando con don [illegible]. CRISTINA que va a esperar y al rato lo llamará porque lo quiere "coger a como dé lugar".- 248-

248- Entrada.- 1145 hrs.- MF quiere preguntar si para ir a Haiti y Antillas Holandesas se tiene que sacar visa con la Dominicana. MARINA dice que no es necesario porque no tienen que tocar Dominicana para llegar a esos otros paises.- MF platica que ..

(hoja cuatro)

.. ella tiene familiares en Santo Domingo trabajando en la Oficina Sanitaria Panamericana y en caso de poder ir a eso país podría gestionar su visa allá mismo. MARINA que le ayuda en mucho pero de todos modos tiene que hacer las gestiones desde la embajada de aquí.- 292-

292- Entrada.- 1150 hrs.- CRISTINA con MARINA y pregunta por MARCOS (JORGE MORENO). Este dice que espere un momento. Despues CRISTINA dice que sabe que hace mal en llamarle pero para ella es suficiente estar esperando tanto y lo que le hizo el miercoles está muy mal ya que ella desde el 21 de abril está tratando de hablarle por ultima vez sin tener que molestarlo más. MARCOS guarda silencio. CRISTINA que solo le quiere saber su opinión para un viaje a Santo Domingo que ella quiere hacer y que no habia salido antes porque su hija está enferma. MARCOS dice que aquí no se puede hablar para nada. CRISTINA que ya se que te molesta hablar con-migo pero será la ultima vez que lo hago pero yo quiero saber tú consejo para ir a Santo Domingo y lo demas está por demas hablar y quedamos como amigos y total. Y que ya con los desaires que me haces ya es suficiente. MARCOS que no es momento para hablar y menos aquí y que el lunes nos vemos y no puedo seguir hablando porque hay mucha gente. CRISTINA que entonces nos vemos el lunes "enfrente donde ~~xxxxx~~- siempre". MARCOS que está bien.- 328-

328- Salida equivocada.- y sin contestación.- y siguen salidas equivocadas.- 427-

427- Salida al 19-55-90.- 1206 hrs.-(Hotel Emperador)- YADIRA por su amor DEL OLMO, pero no ha llegado y pide le diga que "su esposa lo llamó".- 433- (hoja cinco)

433- Entrada.- 1208 hrs. HORTENSIA pide a MARINA informe a GUZMAN que está en el zocalo, pero que estuvo en Gobernación y que todavia no estaban los oficios, y que si quiere que regrese a Gobernación. MARINA despues de informar dice que se venga mejor para la embajada pero rápido.- 449-

449- Salida sin contestación.- y equivocada.- 474-

474- Entrada.- HF por el Coronel MORENO. GUZMAN dice que ya salió. HF que es el Ing. LUGIBET.- 484-

484- Salida.- equivocada.- 490-

- -

• - •

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
6 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T31-
1354-1402 hrs.-

00- Entrada.- HF para cobrar la renta del local que ocupa la embajada. MARINA dice que hay un cheque por un mes y es por la cantidad de $1,200.00. HF pasará a recogerlo.- 07-

07- Entrada.- HF de la Embajada de Noruega, para saber quien es el encargado de Negocios. MARINA dice que es RENE FIALLO. HF que es para una invitación que le enviarán.- 13-

13- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1241 hrs.- 16-

16- Salida sin contestación y ocupado.- y equivocado.-31- - al 03 por la hora.- 1313 hrs.- 34-

34- Entrada.- HF de la Embajada de Dinamarca quiere saber si todavia es Ministro de Relaciones en Dominicana el Dr. CARLOS FEDERICO PEREZ Y PEREZ. GUZMAN dice que si. HF que es para enviar una correspondencia y tambien saber el nombre del Vice-Ministro. GUZMAN que es el Dr. MANUEL GUERRERO POUS porque el anterior Lic. RAMON MENDIA LISTER es representante ahora en las NNUU. HF que tambien el Jefe del Protocolo lo es todavia FRANCISCO JOSE [illegible] RINCON. GUZMAN dice que si. HF que gracias.- 47-

47- -Salida.-(Ceremonial)- GUZMAN por FLORES TEJADA. HF que llame despues de las cinco porque ya salió al aeropuerto.- 54-

54- Entrada.- ~~133xxxxx~~.- HF ANGEL por YADIRA. MARINA dice que salió la suegra y esposa de FRANK TAPIA. ANGEL que está bien. (es el esposo de YADIRA y se llama ANGEL DEL ~~xxxx~~ OLMO y trabaja en el servicio de turismo del Hotel Emperador)- 60-

60- Entrada.- MF con MARINA para comentar que su hija está enferma y que hace rato estuvo hablando con MARCOS JORGE MORENO y que le dijo que tenia que hablar con ella el lunes.(MF es CRISTINA amante del Corl. MORENO)- Y que a la noche van a la recepción de la Embajada de Etiopiá.- 107-

107- Entrada.- Corl. MAURICIO FERNANDEZ pregunta por LEONTE para saber si puede firmar el giro al portador. Este dice que si. - 118-

118- Salida.- equivocada.- 123- y sin-contestación.- y ocupada. - 146-

146- Entrada.-HF dice ser pasante de Medicina y quiere irse a la Dominicana en calidad de interno en algún hospital. MARINA que solo hay que cubrir los requisitos de visa y se le podrá aceptar. HF dice que termina sus estudios a fín de año y tiene tiempo de ir tramitando sus asuntos. MARINA que está bien.-165-

165- Salida equivocada.- 172- y salida al 03 por la hora.- 1350hs - 175-

175- Entrada.-1354 hrs.- MF con TERESITA PENA para saber a donde vá mas tarde. esta dice que iba a ir con CRISTINA a la recepción de la Embajada de Etiopía pero antes van con MARINA a casa de

(hoja dos) ...

.. MIGNON en un carro. HF que está bien. TERE dice que vino el doctor CABRERA - dominicano- quien se va para la patria y anda vendiendo el auto en mil dolares y que vale como 30 mil, y que es un Ford. HF se interesa y pregunta a donde hablar con CABRERA. TERE que al 19-56-52 y 19-56-53, y que sale mañana a Pachuca y el domingo se va a Miami para despues a Santo Domingo.- 216-

216- Salida.- HORTENSIA pregunta por [illegible] RODRIGUEZ.- - equivocado.- 226-

226- Salida sin contestación.- 240-

240- Salida al 21-36-70.- 1402 hrs.- HORTENSIA por el señor MAGAÑA para avisarle que "le habló aquel y que quiere verla con el niño". MAGAÑA que entonces lo dejan para el lunes. HORTENSIA le dice: " estás pedo y quiere verte hoy", MAGAÑA que primero arregla tus asuntos personales y despues nos vemos y despues le corta.- 270-

270- Salida equivocada.- y sin contestación.- 288-

288- Entrada sin contestación.- 310-

- -

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-55.
6 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T32-
1736-1900 hrs.-

00- Salida al 19-55-90.- 1736 hrs.- (Hotel Emperador)- GUZMAN pregunta por don RENE FIALLO. MF MERCEDES FERNANDEZ DE FIALLO dice que salió para la embajada Suiza y que despues iba a pasar a las oficinas. GUZMAN vino porque se lo dijo y va a tener que esperarlo. MERCEDES porque se va a entrevistar con el embajador suizo. GUZMAN lo va a esperar de todos modos y si no viene mas tarde entonces mañana vendrá.- 22-

22- Entrada.- HF ROLAND DALLAS de la Agencia de Noticias Reuter de Londres, quiere saber si hay una reunión de productores de azucar en México y si la Dominicana está representada. GUZMAN no sabe y pregunta cuando comienza esa reunión. ROLAND que tiene informes de Londres que debe de comenzar hoy y que participan Perú, Brasil, Dominicana, Colombia y México. GUZMAN dice que espere un momento. Despues dice que si le quiere llamar mañana a las once porque yo soy un empleado de la embajada y no sé de eso. ROLAND que gracias.- 44-

44- Salida.- RENE pide el apartamento 201 con el señor TAPIA. - MF dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice a TAPIA que tienen aquí una dificultad en un cable cifrado que estámos trabajando y resulta que el sello de la embajada no está en el escritorio de doña MARINA y que GUZMAN le dice que el se lo dió a RENE para un visado de cortesía en la mañana y de modo que no ...

(Hoja uno)

.. está el sello y necesitan mandar esos cables hoy mismo. TAPIA tarda en llegar unos diez minutos. RENE que está bien.63-

63- Salida al 18-52-86.- 1830 hrs.- ocupado y sin contestación.- - 87-

87- Salida al 14-02-86.- 1835 hrs.- RENE por TAPIA.- equivocado. - 94-

94- Salida al 14-02-76.- 1835 hrs.- RENE pregunta por FRANK TAPIA. IT' dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice a TAPIA que no hay necesidad que se venga. TAPIA que el no sabe de ese asunto de descifrar y que yo tenia la cable pero es en mensajes de llegada, mas no para salidas y eso a lo pudo... risas. RENE que entonces va a dejar a GUZMAN que haga todo y que ya encontraron el sello de la embajada que MARINA dejó en el escritorio mio y ya se lo he dicho que yo no la quiero acusar de que las cosas se le olvidan y todavia asegura de no hacer las cosas. TAPIA que si y que así se pasa el tiempo olvidandosele las cosas. Y que hoy en la mañana decia que estaban perdidos unos cheques que al final los encontrarón. RENE que es una pobre mujer que está perdiendo la memoria y se despiden.- 130-

130- Entrada.- 1845 hrs.- MARINA pregunta a GUZMAN si se le quedó en su auto un broche de ella. GUZMAN lo recogió y lo tiene guardado.- 140-

140- Entrada.- 1847 hrs.- TERESITA PEÑA con GUZMAN para saber que se ofrece. GUZMAN que es por el sello que no aparecia.- pero ya lo encontraron y acaba de llegar otro cable cifrado y "el viejo ya se fué a la recepción de Hiti".- 158- (hoja dos)

135- Salida al 18-29-93.- 1850 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el señor FLORES TEJADA del Ceremonial de Relaciones. [illegible] dice que ya no vino por la tarde a trabajar pero ella dirá que le llamó si es que llega o hasta mañana.- 174-

174- Entrada.- 1900 hrs.- CHELITO GAINES con su amor GUZMAN y saber a que horas se ven. GUZMAN que dentro de media hora allí en su casa. CHELITO la espera en la puerta de la casa.-181-

- -

. - .

(..3.- L2- 6 mayo.66)-

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-65.
7 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T33-
1046-1454 hrs.-

00- Entrada.- sin contestación.- 03-

03- Entrada.- HF CHELITO GAMES saluda a su amor GUZMAN y pregunta que hace. Este dice que trabajando. CHELITO dice que se " va a quedar seco de tanto trabajar". GUZMAN que si " y si tú no me cuidas peor". CHELITO si lo quiere atender y se verán hoy. GUZMAN le llamará mas tarde a las doce a su oficina.- 08-

08- Entrada.- CRISTINA con GUZMAN y con TERESITA PEÑA para comentar que su hija IRMITA está un poco enferma y que citó a MARINA para mañana en casa y comer juntas.. bla.. bla..- sin importancia.- 38-

38- Salida al 12-04-93.- 1046 hrs.- (Carteros Zona Uno)- GUZMAN pregunta por INCLAN para saber si ha llegado alguna - valija o correspondencia para la embajada. Este dice que no y que le llame mas tarde.- 45-

45- Entrada.- HF por CARMITA CASTILLO de parte de SALVADOR - RENDON. GUZMAN dice que los sabados no trabaja .- 49-

50- Entrada.- 1056 hrs.- SONIA por JORGE MORENO o por TAPIA. GUZMAN dice que hasta el lunes estarán porque hoy no vienen.- - 53-

(hoja uno)

55- Salida al 18-29-93.- 1100 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a FLORES TEJADA del Ceremonial de Relaciones y dice que le llama porque el Encargado de Negocios RENE FIALLO acaba de recibir un cable de nuestro gobierno y de que tiene que comunicarle ciertas cosas al Canciller CARRILLO FLORES y para ello solicita una audiencia . FLORES dice que el Ministro salió de viaje a los Estados Unidos o sea por Nueva York y Washington, pero en cuanto regrese se le solicitará la entrevista o si es urgente se podrá gestionar con el Primer Sub-Secretario. GUZMAN que como es una cosa directa con el Canciller entonces van a esperar por la semana si es que no tarda mucho en regresar, y que el lunes lo avisará. FLORES que está bien.- 74-

74- Salidas ocupadas.- 110-

110- Salida al 12-04-93.- 1150 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por INCLAN para saber si llegó siempre valija. Este dice que no. GUZMAN a la vez pregunta los requisitos que se necesitan para enviar valija de aquí de México a la Dominicana. INCLAN no sabe ya que son cosas diferentes al servicio de correo y para ello es mejor preguntar a Comunicaciones. GUZMAN que gracias.- 127-

127- Salida ocupada.- 136-

136- Salida al 19-80-04.- 1158 hrs.- (Oficina de Personal de Comunicaciones)- RENE FIALLO desea saber a quien hay que dirigirse para los trámites de envió de una valija por via aerea para el gobierno Dominicano. MP que debe de llamar al 18-06-60 ext.271 que es el Departamento de Transportes.- 159-

(hoja dos)

159- Salida sin contestación.-178-

178- Salida al 21-70-51.- 1200 hrs.- (Jefatura de Correos)- FIALLO pide informes sobre como y donde depositar una valija diplomática para Dominicana. MF que en las oficinas centrales de las calles de Tacuba y Ruiz de Alarcón.- 194-

194- Salida sin contestación.- y ocupadas.- 220-

220- Entrada.- 1210 hrs.- HF de la Administración Central de Correos avisa a GUZMAN que les llegó una valija diplomática y como es sabado tiene que pasar a recogerla mas temprano y que es de parte de INCLAN y estarán hasta las dos de la tarde. GUZMAN que gracias.- 227-

227- Entrada.- 1211 hrs.- CHELITO GAMES con su amor GUZMAN para comentar que llegó valija, y que GUZMAN va a ir a retirarla del correo y le llamará despues para verse mas tarde.-235-

235- Salida al ~~24~~- 23-41-54.- 1232 hrs.- ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ MERCEDES DE FIALLO se interesa por el departamento que se renta en las calles de Lerma esquina con Tiber o sea atrás del Hotel Maria Isabel. MF con acento de norteamericana le informa y que renta $4,500.00 al mes.- ~~XXXXXXXX~~ MERCEDES quiere uno mas barato para dos personas.- 268-

268- Salida sin contestación.-275-

275- Salida.- ~~XXXXXXXX~~ MERCEDES por un departamento que rentan y que ella necesita por tres meses.- HF ofrece los que tiene en Rhin 29 (Apartamentos Carmen donde habita TERESITA PEÑA) y otros mas en Petrarca y Newton, Polanco.- 321- (hoja tres)

321- Salida ocupada.- 327-

327- Entrada.- 1250 hrs.- MF por GUZMAN. MERCEDES DE FIALLO dice que salió a recoger una valija y regresa mas tarde o bien hasta el lunes. MF es CHELITO GAMES y dice que llama de Seguros Progreso y que es sobre un cobro de un seguro (?).(Efectivamente CHELITO que es amor de GUZMAN trabaja en Seguro Progreso de la calle de Madero 69)- 344-

344- Salida al 14-83-89.- 1254 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pide informes sobre el apartamento de Herodoto 30. MF dice que lo puede pasar a ver a la hora que guste.-371-

372- Salida.- MERCEDES por informes de un departamento pero ya está rentado.- 379-

379- Entrada.- sin contestación fuera.- 383-

383- Salida sin contestación.- 390-

390- Salida al 13-70-44.- 1301 hrs.- (Cine Mundial)- GUZMAN pregunta por RAMON CARVAJAL para saludarlo y ponerse de acuerdo en caso que llame la NENA para hacer planes y salir de paseo mañana. RAMON está de acuerdo.- 411-

411- Salida al 45-72-69.- ~~xx~~- 1302 hrs.- MB MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta por el departamento que rentan amueblado.- 427-

427- Salida al 11-25-10.- MERCEDES por informes del departamento amueblado que rentan en la calle Venecia 34, Colonia Juarez.-
- 438- (hoja cuatro)-

458- Entrada.- 1310 hrs.- CHULITO GAMES pregunta a GUZMAN si se van a ver porque ella ya sale del trabajo y se va para su casa. GUZMAN entonces le llamará mas tarde a su casa porque tiene mucho trabajo y qué sobre el dinero del cobrador lo xxxxxx resuelve el lunes pero hoy de todos modos se han de ver.- 481-

481- Salida sin contestación.- 512-

512- Salida al 46-23-24.- 1331 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO se interesa por los apartamentos de la calle de Lerma MF que los puede pasar a ver con el velador JOSE./- 525-

525- Salida al 46-41-07.- 1333 hrs.- MERCEDES por datos del departamento de rentan en la calle de Pachuca. MF lo corta.- 542-

542- Salida al 20-99-05.- 1454xxxxx.- MERCEDES pregunta por la señora CEBRIAN para saber lo del departamento que se renta y que a ella la recomienda la Agencia (?). MF dice que la señora no está y que tarda en regresar.- 563-

563- Salida al 20-99-05.- 1454 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO con la señora CEBRIAN para saber sobre el departamento que renta y que es por tres meses porque no tiene la seguridad de continuar ya que pasando las elecciones de su país tal vez salgan del país o tal vez nó. Y quedan de llamarse el lunes para ponerse de acuerdo en que si lo rentan o no por el tiempo antes mencionado. - 708-

708- -Salida.-(Suits Emperador)- RENE FIALLO pide a MF le mande un taxi a la embajada.- 750-

(hoja cinco)

750- Salida.-(Emperador)- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta si mandaron el taxi. MF que si y que tarda cinco minutos en llegar.- 766-

766- Entrada sin contestación.- 812-

- -

. - . (..6.-L2- 7 mayo 66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
9 mayo 66.
~~Ext~~- L2-H2-T34-
0904-1212 hrs.-

00- Entradas sin contestación.- 16-

16- Salida al 22-66-29.- 0904 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a HERNANDEZ y dice que el sabado lo estuvo esperando y quiere verlo hoy. HERNANDEZ lo espera por la tarde en su casa. GUZMAN que está bien porque necesito eso hoy. (HERNANDEZ es de la distribuidora Benot quien les vende vinos, cigarrillos, etc. de importación). - 25-

25- Entrada.- 0910 hrs.- HD MARCOS JORGE MORENO se reporta. GUZMAN dice que espere un momento. Despues HD saluda a MORENO y pregunta si no lo recuerda que es su viejo amigo de Santo Domingo y que tu estabas de Comandante de la Guardia en Palacio. MORENO lo recuerda y pregunta si es MINELLA. HD dice que si y que llegó ayer a dar un paseo y a saludar a los amigos y como no conocia esto a eso vino, y vino con su esposa y están en el Hotel Oxford en la calle Mariscal 67 y que vino a conseguir las visas de Guatemala. MORENO va al rato a llegar a la embajada. Despues otro HD saluda a MORENO y le dice "vagabundo" - risas. Y que se vino manejando desde Guatemala pero ahora que está en la ciudad de México no se atreve a meterse a las calles por el tráfico enorme. MORENO pide lo esperen un rato pues no tarda en llegar. HD dice que en Santo Domingo le mandaron un libro de PEREZ FERREIRA que se titula "Guerra o Patria" y lo dejó en ...
(hoja uno)

... Guatemala, pero en la pagina 128 te mencionan y dice sobre una forma brillante de las actuaciónes de MORENO o sea que dice: " el Coronel MARCO ANTONIO JORGE MORENO fué relevado de la - Victoria despues de haber derrotado a mas de cinco mil presos politicos y que eso le costo que lo sacaran de allí", asi que quiere decir que tu nombre está para la historia ya porque figuras en un libro. MORENO se alegra de saber eso y dice que al rato se verán. HD vino con GALLARDO con su esposa e hijos y despues irán a buscar a BRUNO para verse todos juntos.- 77-

77- Entrada.- 0959 hrs.- HF de parte de HORTENSIA pregunta por MARINA para avisarle que está enferma y que se tuvo que ir al Seguro y que llegará mas tarde. GUZMAN que está bien.- 85-

85- Entrada.- 1001 hrs.- LD.- HF en INGLES pregunta por RENE FIALLO. MARINA en mismo INGLES informa que no está y que llega en una hora; o que llame al Hotel Emperador.- 110-

110- Entrada.- 1012 hrs.- HF por JOSE FRANK TAPIA el Cónsul. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Despues HF ARNEDOS pregunta si le manda eso. TAPIA que si que lo espera. ARNEDOS se lo manda en un sobre y pregunta como está la familia. TAPIA que bie tódos y pide qùe la carta que le va a mandar se la haga llegar lo mas pronto posible porque es urgente.- ARNEDOS si debe de suspender por algo el viaje se lo avisará, porque va a hablra con DENIS para ver si ella tambien va y que le manda a la persona para que le arreglo el pasaporte y la visa. TAPIA que está bien.- 126-

126- Entrada.- 1015 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta si les han llamado. Doña MARINA que a don RENE le llamaron de Estados

(hoja dos) ...

... Unidos que les dijo que estaba en una junta y que llamaran mas tarde. MERCEDES que si llama le diga que ya sale para el Congreso a buscarlo. MARINA que está bien.- 134-

134- Salida al 46-65-70.- 1019 hrs.- YADIRA dice a MARINA que por la tarde se ven para comer juntas.- 142-

142- Entrada.- 1021 hrs.- HM por la dirección de la Embajada. GUZMAN se la proporciona.- 145-

145- Salida al 46-65-70.- 1024 hrs.- MARINA pregunta de parte de MARINA como amaneció el niño. HM dice que ya bien y que ella va a esperar a su hombre que llegue hoy.- 158-

158- Salidas sin contestación.- 174-

174- Entrada.- 1049 hrs.- CRISTINA con CARMITA y con MARINA para saludarse y preguntar como sigue la hija de MARINA o sea LILIANA. MARINA dice que ya mejor. CRISTINA está esperando porque MARCOS JORGE la cito a las dies y media en la puesta de Palacio de Hierro de Durango, y estará llamando para saber si llega a la embajada. MARINA que está bien.- 193-

193- Entrada.- 1108 hrs.- HM por el agregado de Prensa. YADIRA dice que llame al 24-31-29 (~~xxxxx~~ -- es con la MIGNON)- 204-

204- Entrada.- 1110 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta si llegó su esposo RENE. GUZMAN y despues MARINA dice que la están esperando. Despues MERCEDES reclama a RENE que la hiso ir a buscarlo. RENE le dice " mi vida perdoname, y me tuve que venir". MERCEDES
(hoja tres) ...

... fué al banco a hacer el deposito. RENE que está bien y que el está en espera de una llamada de Estados Unidos, pero no dejaron dicho de que ciudad era, pero si es de Estados Unidos lo primero que he pensado es en ABRIL, pero tiene que estar esperando de nuevo la llamada. MERCEDES que no ha de ser nada grave de lo contrario te hubieran dejado recado.- 240-

240- Entrada.- 1119 hrs.- CRISTINA pregunta por MARINA para saber si llegó a la embajada MARCOS JORGE MORENO. Esta dice que vino por un rato pero va a salir de nuevo porque anda con los agregados militares del Salvador y otros que lo vinieron a buscar. CRISTINA creía que lo estaba huyendo y pregunta si anda uniformado. MARINA dice que no. CRISTINA que entonces si regresa le diga que el miercoles tratará de hablar con el, porque yo no puedo estarlo esperando mas hoy.- 260-

260- Entrada.- 1127 hrs.- CRISTINA ahora con TERESITA para decirle que MARCOS la tuvo esperando casi una hora y que ahora tendrá que esperar otro dia para ver cuando se digna verla.. bla. - bla..- Y quedan de verse mañana.- 346- bloqueado.-352-

352- Salidas sin contestación y ocupadas.- 373-

373- Salida.- Coronel FERNANDEZ reclama a la empresa Tele-Rex que del televisor que compraron está en malas condiciones y necesita que lo vayan a ver a su domicilio de Herodoto 30-102 y que lo vendió JUAN VALDEZ. -EF toma el reporte.- 402-

402- Salida al 45-45-86.- 1140 hrs.- ocupado.-y sin contestación. -418- equivocado.-427- FERNANDEZ con su hija y despues con su

(hoja cuatro) ...

... esposa JOSEFA NUÑEZ y pide que llame a la agencia en que compraron la televisión para que de los datos de factura y démas. Y que mañana va a tener que hacer mas cena porque invitó a unos amigos militares y a MARCOS.- 454-

454- Salida al 37-03-16.- 1143 hrs.- MD por MANUEL. MF dice que no está. MD que le diga que no le quieren pegar en la - embajada porque la maquina no está aquí. MF dice que se espere y que ahora van a reclamar.-496-

496- Entrada.- 1145 hrs.- CRISTINA avisa a MARINA que ya va de salida y tiene que estar a una misa y que despues hacen planes para mañana.- 515-

515- Entrada.- 1147 hrs.- MF MERCEDES LERO pregunta por GUZMAN. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Despues MERCEDES pregunta si ya llegó la visa del Dr. (?). GUZMAN que van a esperar que se la manden de Relaciones. MF MERCEDES que son tres visas y que una de ellas es de su mamá. Despues MD TERESITA dice que llame despues para mientras llegan esas visas.- 354-

554- Entrada.- 1155 hrs.- MIGNON saluda a MARINA y dice que acaba de recibir una carta del xx señor ese de Santo Domingo preguntandole por su visa. MARINA va a ver eso y pregunta si se va siempre el 23 para que aproveche la toma de posesión. MIGNON se quiere ir antes y quien sabe si espere para la fecha de la toma de posesión. Despues MIGNON informa a GUZMAN que acaba de recibir una carta de FEDERICO que quiere saber sobre sus visas. GUZMAN que ya salió el chofer por ellas a Gobernación. MIGNON se quiere ir para el dia 18 y quiere llevarse la visa para FEDERICO. GUZMAN le arregla el asunto el miercoles.- 597-

597- Entrada sin contestación.- fuera.- y salida sin contestación.- y ocupado.- 635-

635- Salida.- (Ceremonial)- TERESA pregunta el número de teléfono donde se celebró la conferencia de desnuclearización. HF dice que es el 26-25-60.- 659-

659- -Bocina descolgada.- 667-

667- Salida al 26-25-60.- 1205 hrs.- (COPREDAL)- TERESA pide comunicarse con alguna persona del archivo, pues RENE FIALLO desea solicitar unos documentos sobre las ultimas declaraciones del COPREDAL. HF dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice que es el delegado de la Dominicana ante la COPREDAL y necesita con urgencia de las dos ultimas sesiones que no fueron repartidas por falta de tiempo o sea con el acta final que suman tres y sus mociones conjuntas que se sometió a la mesa en el momento de cerrar y que fueron los paises actuantes Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Perú, Panamá, Dominicana y Venezuela. HF toma y ofrece mandar esos documentos a mas tardar mañana. RENE que en todo caso si a las dos no le llegan puede pasar por ellos porque tiene que hacer su comunicación oficial ante su gobierno.- 738-

738- Salida al ~~46-09-73 1212 hrs~~.- CARMITA pide comunicarse a la oficina de Turismo del Hotel Emperador, pero no hay nadie. - 757-

757- Salida al 46-09-73.- 1212 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a MARTIN y pregunta que hay de nuevo. Este dice que nada que en el trabajo fecundo y creador. GUZMAN pregunta si ya sabe que llegó un nuevo

(hoja seis) ...

... Jefe de Misión. MARTIN no lo sabia y pregunta si entonces ya renunció a su cargo MARCIO VELOZ. GUZMAN que no que este nuevo que viene llega como Encargado de Negocios, y cambia de tema y dice que está en éstos momentos escribiendo una carta para ROBERTO ZUÑIGA y compañia que es la agencia aduanal y que en su nombre va JOSE FRANCISCO TAPIA para hacer esas gestiones de la franquicia diplomatica de libre importación del automovil en forma ~~[illegible]~~ temporal según acuerdo de la oficina de Registro Federal de Automoviles. MARTIN está de acuerdo y el mismo puede darle contestación a esa solicitud. GUZMAN que es conveniente hacer el endoso de la factura y demás documentación..... - SE TERMINA EL ROLLO.- 835-

- -

. - .   (..7.-L2- 9 mayo 66)

50-6-32/4

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
DCWHD/C

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMROD/LIFEAT

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: Pass to Thomas G. URQUHART

Forwarded herewith is verbatim conversation between Judith FERRETTO and Adelina ZENDEJAS on 20 November 1965. (Source: LIFEAT)

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
As stated - Herewith

Distribution:
2 - DCWHD/C w/att (h/w)
1 - C/WHD w/o/att
3 - Files

50-6-32/4

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 27885

DATE
15 December 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
201 - 020481

99 FER No. 13   20 Nov 65

JUDY: Mujer, ya te arreglaron el teléfono?

AZ: Ya

JUDY: Te he llamado.

AZ: Sí, lo tuve muy mal, se mojaron los cables, porque los acomodadores de los teléfonos vinieron y lo plantaron y yo les dije que todavía no estaba puesto y dijeron no importa, ahora voy a tener que pagar la nueva instalación.

JUDY: Y eso no va por cuenta de ellos?

AZ: No. Y como le haces cómo lo haces si no te quedas sin telefono.

JUDY: Ah sí hay cosas que no puede uno ni pelearlas.
Cómo llegó tu mamá, quería en primer lugar saber eso.

AZ: Pues llegó muy cansada con la altura luego pues le dió gripa y luego pues la impresión, si a uno le produce impresión un viaje así, imagínate para ella que a su edad va a consumar el sueño de su vida y a ver de bulto todo lo que se imaginaba

JUDY: Pues fíjate que el otro día te quise decir, pero como estabas tan ocupada con..te acuerdas? allá en el Instituto que había recibido carta de Carlos y habla de ti por supuesto y me pone además..te voy a leer donde dice: Recibí también carta de ADELINA donde me dice cosas muy bonitas tuyas. Bueno me encanta que hayas conocido a (no entiendo nombre) me dices cuando viene...(Judita termina de leer y dice:, el muchacho se fué sin avisarme desgraciadamente, yo quería mandarle una botella de Tequila y se fue;(pero está internado desde 2 días antes de que mi mamá llegara a Roma,- AZ habla)..JUDY: El muchacho? AZ: No, Carlos. JUDY: Ah sí él habla aquí de eso, que le traerá óptimos resultados.

Poro Sans [illegible]

AZ: Llegando a Roma lo internaron y estará hasta hoy en el hospital.

JUDY: Depende mucho de las enfermeras me pregunta (se ríen) (continúa leyendo la carta)..."tardaste mucho en escribirme, te espero la próxima vez en Trieste, un abrazo para tí, un abrazo para Adelina, dile que a pesar de mi buena voluntad no he encontrado a su madre.

— Contreras?

AZ: No la pude encontrar porque se puso muy malo en Trieste; exactamente los días que mi mamá estaba en Roma él ya estaba en camino a Ferrara, porque le escribió a Carlitos y le dijo lo mismo y le dijo que me buscara y el maldito muchacho si no me encuentra en El Día no me lo dice, por cierto que le pregunté por su mamá y me dijo: "bueno, vive en Cuautla más tranquila, tú sabes.."

JUDY: Esta carta es del 30 y el muchacho salió el 30 y me dice: pasado mañana ingreso al hospital. Le voy a contestar esta semana-

AZ: Le voy a escribir yo también, él quisiera que todos los días le escribieran.

(cont..

cc # 16 HMMA-27835 (15 Dec 65) CS COPY 50-6-32/4 (cont...

JUDY: De pasada le mandaré un traguito de Tequila como recuerdo de este hermoso país.

AZ: Tú sabes que no puede tomar nada, por eso lo encerraron

JUDY: No, lo encerraron por lo de su pierna.

AZ: Pero por eso, no puede tomar nada, Carlitos me dijo eso, que no se había querido internar y lo había estado alarga y alarga porque iba a tener una dieta tremenda entre ella ni gota de alcohol ni gota de vino, dice: "y tú ya sabes cómo es mi papá".

JUDY: qué otra cosa te iba a decir...mira, de lo de Carlos Pellicer que hablamos para digo tan a la carrera...

AZ: (interrumpe) yo hablé con él

JUDY: Sí él me dijo. te enteraste bien de todo como fué (AZ la interrumpe y dice: Sí la leí.) Judy continúa: Ah leíste la carta..

AZ: Después me dijo, no hay nada que hacer, yo le hable al otro día. me dijo: mira vino el secretario del señor con su montón de excusas y me hizo un montón de halagos, se estuvo más de media hora conmigo y ante eso me ha desarmado completamente.

JUDY: Sí, pero sí se puede publicar la carta.

AZ: Pero en dónde, en El Día no la publican.

JUDY: No la publican? Yo la mande a todos los lugares que pude, me entiendes? fuera.

AZ: No, ni de chiste, yo le dije: mira, yo podría hacer un comentario y me contestó: lo entiendo, además creo que no se puede hacer, así me dijo ese día.

JUDY: Yo estuve con él, en la casa.

AZ: (interrumpe) me dijo que había hablado a "Política" a ver si acaso pero a cualquier revista o periódico que la publique, le quitan el papel, así tranquilamente, yo compré "Siempre" pensando que ya saliera algo y ni una palabra, ni Sucesos fíjate tú.

JUDY: Ah, antes de que se me olvide, qué hay en lo de MADRAZO Angelina

AZ: Bueno mira él ya no aguantó, porque los intereses creados en el PRI son superiores a la buena intención de él.

JUDY: Espérate un segundito.,,, Ya perdona.

AZ: Bueno, entonces, él pues en verdad trataba de hacer un partido y.. de purificarlo vamos.. y los intereses creados más la propaganda en contra de él, pagada por esos intereses no le permitió realizar lo que él quería.

JUDY: Verdad que es un hombre muy honrado?

AZ: El es honrado, muy muy honrado, un poco desbocado como buen Tabasqueño, un poco arbitrario, porque él en su vida ha ido así a brincos y ha superado las cosas, pero pues las mañas de todo esto y además intereses personales terribles, en Chihuahua, en Sinaloa, en donde el latifundismo de los nuevos ricos de los nue-

(cont..

vos Porfiristas, pues no se deja ganar para nada y luego cuando no hay en realidad un movimiento popular desde la base, organizado donde no hay una militancia verdadera ningún partido e incluyo al (JUDY la interrumpe diciendo "claro, claro" y no se escucha el nombre del partido) qué puedes tu hacer, si yo a veces pienso que cómo López Mateos no aventó todo al diablo se fue a la Derecha completamente.

JUDY: Tú sabes que está muy enfermo.

AZ: López Mateos?

JUDY: Sí, porque yo tengo de cliente a la señora Alvarez Amezquita, que son muy amigos, bueno y un día de estos me estuve [illegible] las quejas de cómo está de mal el doctor, entre otras cosas, dice que está bueno, una cosa tremenda, que no quiere hacer caso y que se está matando, bueno y que va a ir con el Lic. López Mateos, van a Chile no? entonces yo misma le dije: pues si nadie tiene influencia sobre él porque usted no le habla como amiga del Lic. López Mateos que le hable a él, porque tiene una diabetes y no hace ningún caso, está malísimo, tiene una úlcera, toma tragos, en fin matándose no? pero entonces me contesta ella, pero si López Mateos está igual o peor, porque un día de estos casi se les muere de un dolor de cabeza, casi casi se les muere, me dice: pero ya usted sabe lo que es la cosa de la política y del poder y eso, dice: él estaba feliz esperando el nombramiento este, porque no pueden estar sin esas cosas.. me lo dijo ayer.

AZ: Yo me imagino que algo tenía porque..

JUDY: Interrumpe.. me lo dijo como cosa seria, que se les quiso morir..

AZ: Yo tengo una carta de él, contestando el telegrama del día de su santo y ..(JUDY interrumpe y le pide que espere un momento).. AZ continúa: me puso una carta pero además le he tenido algunas cosas, sobre todo con esto de la Olimpiada y he estado llamando y entonces me pareció tan extraño que inclusive la secretaria de Humberto aparecía como enferma y el ayudante que por última vez tomó el teléfono me dijo: Ay maestra, si es usted, le voy a dar el teléfono de San Jerónimo pero no diga usted que yo dije que la señora está enferma, me entiende usted?... Y yo pensé algo le ha de pasar, quizá allí se la ha arrebatado la gentetante a Adolfo que ha preferido encerrarse en su casa y hacerse todo y ya Humberto ya está allá, trasladado parte de su oficina y está trabajando allí. Luego le hablé a la Sra. Greger y me dijo: mire, el Lic. Romero está muy ocupado porque el señor tiene muchas cosas, pero yo no le pregunté porque ya sé cómo Patricia, pero sí me dió [illegible] porque dije que estaba enfermo, porque eso de que se encierre en su casa es muy extraño, por eso algo debe saber.
Yo quise hablar con Eva y le hablé a Amelia su hermana que es mi conducto porque aunque ya no es Presidenta todavía tiene una ola de gente allí y me dijo: vamos a hacer una cosa, espere a que pase el 15 de noviembre y que termine toda la preparación del viaje de Aldolfo (corr. Adolfo) y ya hacemos una cita para que la vea aquí mejor. Ahora que no sabía si Eva acompañaría a Adolfo y también eso me hizo pensar qué cosa será, porque los dos van uno por un

(cont..

lado y otro por otro cuando tienen trabajo, pero si ya Eva va a acompañarlo es que él está enfermo.

JUDY: No pues yo sse sé, que estuvo seriamente mal.

AZ: Tiene diabetes emocional, se le sube la azucar por horas y se le baja por horas. Yo lo había visto bastante bien y de repente se ha desaparecido, yo creía que estaba trabajando en la intervencion, en esto, en lo de Chile, pero mira las gentes que se ponen graves graves durar mucho.

AZ: Se murió Ana Mayeb, tenía anemia hemolítica. Del páncreas, no hay nada que hacer, además le dio bronconeumonía y se fué volando. Murió el martes 9, tú llegaste un día antes del acto verdad? bueno, entonces yo era la que iba a hablar, yo tenía 39 de calentura, ese día me viste muy mal.

JUDY: No hablamos por teléfono el día que tú estabas preparando el discurso. Entonces fué cuando quería yo hablar contigo de todas estas cosas, excepto de lo del Lic. López Mateos.

AZ: Era ese el día, había muerto un día antes, había tenido tanto lío y tanta cosa, me había emberrinchinado porque me habían nombrado y no puedo dar conferencias, no tengo tiempo para preparar y así me dá mucho coraje ir a hacer por serías y más en el club de la Unión Soviética, entonces lo había escrito pero lo tenía que resumir porque eran muchas hojas y no tenía más del tiempo preciso para terminar, revisar y corregir y luego pues otras veces yo puedo hablar, pero ahora que tengo este ruidito en el oído, tú no sabes qué desesperación porque me pongo nerviosísima, luego tenía calentura, total al entrar al acto me dijeron murió Ana Mayeb.

JUDY: Yó hace mucho no la veía, porque yo donde solía encontrarme con ella era allá, ya tú sabes, con esta amiga que vive en la Av. Veracruz. Esa noche cenó allí con nosotros, pues todavía estaba [illegible] aquí.

AZ: Bueno pues ella fue la primera que me dijo que era un caso muy difícil en que en otra situación se podría hacer algo, pero que cómo íbamos nosotros a pedir cosas.

JUDY: Ah bueno, de esto te quería hablar también, de lo que me contó Carlos Pellicer, tú lo debes saber bien, de la gestión de un grupo de hombres de lo más destacado de México, de personalidades en todos los campos, de la gente muy honrada, etc. y pusieron en manos de Carlos Pellicer una petición al "barbón" no para que le libere ni nada de eso no? sino para que se sep. de ella y las razones, es una cosa muy respetuosa, me dijo Carlos y perfectamente humana. Entonces Carlos debió haber ido en representacióndel grupo a depositar en manos de...

AZ: No le van a contestar nada.

JUDY: No, no no, ir personalmente a la isla, me entiendes?

AZ: Pues no le van a hacer caso.

JUDY: Y resulta que entonces él se queja con mucha razón porque aquí estaba Luisa cuando eso, y estaba furiosa porque hagan cosas así. Entonces se fue aquí, donde una es su amiga o amigo, que es el

(cont..

embajador, porque son muy amigos, y le dijo y le pidió el visado y le negaron el visado. Francamente Adelina, eso da vergüenza.

AZ: Pues no me extraña.

JUDY: Y me dijo, están haciendo un Gobierno democrático o qué.

AZ: Bueno, eso no lo entienden.

JUDY: No, no Adelina no, ya esas líneas no se pueden tener a estas alturas.

AZ: Bueno, puesmira, ese día del entierro, yo hablé con una gente de allá, que fue porque esta mujer ayudó mucho en toda la represión y eso, fue al entierro, entonces yo fui en la mañana a las 8:30 y me estuve allí hasta las 10:30 en que me fuí a mi trabajo ... (JUDY la interrumpe y le pide que espere un momento) AZ continúa: y le dije: yo no voy a ir al cementerio pero volveré al salir del trabajo, y efectivamente en la noche con todo y la calentura me fuí pero andaba muy mal, la tarde estaba horrible. Estuve hablando con esa gente que ha estado allí en mayo de este año y me dijo que el "Chino" negaba todo y que allí había aconsejado todo, para absolutamente todo.

JUDY: Sí, el asunto no es que sea o no

AZ: (interrumpe) y grita que se está quemando pues se le derramó el té.

AZ: Te voy a decir que para mí es una cosa muy grave, porque esto debe haber creado una situación para los compañeros terrible, desde que el papá fué a verla, que no lo dejaron hablar más que 10 minutos...

JUDY: (interrumpe) bueno mira nadie está pidiendo que la liberen, es una cosa de un respetuoso de los valores muy grandes de México que respetan a ese Gobierno y que yo creo que si a gentes que son como son se les ha dado visa...

AZ: Ya no se les da visa a nadie.

JUDY: Bueno, pero aquí hay gente que ha ido y ha vuelto y sigue allí y es asquerosa, para esos sí hay visados y que no hay visado para un individuo que ha defendido todo el tiempo este gobierno que lo respeta como se debe, que se dirige en nombre e que va en representación de la gente más limpia de México, que no le están diciendo al DR. CA[illegible]O pónganla y le rogamos que haga esto o lo otro, me entiendes? porqué no le dan un visado que vaya personalmente y le diga tenemos pruebas aquí concretas, no se las podemos decir y se fue y ya, eso es lo que hacen Adelina eso lo hacen en todos los países del mundo sin excepción, entonces esto sí da una vergüenza y lo que ayuda aquí es a aumentar a que este grupo de gentes tenga que empezar con justa razon a hablar mal de este gobierno.

AZ: Bueno yo creo que Carlos ya no será más Presidente del Instituto

JUDY: El está invitado además para presidir el jurado de algo, que hay allí, un concurso, en la Casa de las Américas, entonces lo que cont..)

quería yo Adelina, es que tú le escribieras a tu papá.

AZ: Yo no puedo escribir, porque lo tengo que mandar la carta abierta, yo escribo con un gran cuidado, mira, lo operaron, tú sabes cómo es su estado? yo no, al fin supe de qué lo habían operado, porque una amiga mía que me ha mandado pedir medicinas y que me mandó los dos últimos libros de mi papá, fue la que me lo dijo, entonces yo metí una carta para la hija, le pregunto de los niños, de mi papá y le digo que estoy muy angustiada porque no sé de qué lo habrán operado, que me tiene muy intranquila la operación de mi papá, le platico cosas totalmente familiares, entonces esta persona me contestó diciéndome: a su papá lo operaron de hemorroides y ya está mejor, cosa que me dió gusto porque yo inmediatamente l mandé el "Herrolé" que es lo que yo tomo y que me escapé de la tercera operación. No he recibido contestación, no sé nada, pero yo por intuición comencé a no escribir más de cosas permitidas, eso lo envié por correo, pero lo que yo llevo allí, a la Embajada, le digo al embajador aquí está la carta y el me dice: no Angelina no faltaba más, y le repito: léala, yo no me voy contenta si usted no la lee.

JUDY: Y porqué tú no hablas con él

AZ: No, porque entonces va a resultar lo siguiente: que no vuelvo a entrar a la Embajada, porque yo sé de una gente que hizo eso y no la dejan entrar.

JUDY: Entonces yo no quiero ir allí, ni que haya otra revolución, con toda honradez te lo digo, porque eso no es lo que uno quiere, así como lo oyes se lo suelto al primero que encuentre.

AZ: Te voy a decir una cosa, las otras revoluciones están consolidadas y aceptadas.

JUDY: No y no, no se trata de estar dejando entrar al enemigo ni mucho menos, ni se les está irrespetando. O respetan las normas democráticas o que no hagan revoluciones.

AZ: Pues no te puedo decir muchas cosas por teléfono, ya sé,

JUDY: Luisa estaba indignada, me dijo: eso da vergüenza, lástima que estuvo aquí nuestro papá días antes, si él hubiera estado aquí é. hubiera cambiado, si hubiera ido a plantear esta cosa como dá vergüenza.

AZ: Pues sí, no la ve nadie, mis hermanas la vieron en julio, los dos días que estuvieron, dicen que está muy avejentada muy [illegible] a ellas les dijo que no sabía nada, entonces mi otra persona, que es una persona que a mí me merece toda crédito, me dijo, bueno la cosa es que el estado y la [illegible] han dicho que no y que no.

JUDY: Pero ellos están presos o qué

AZ: Sí, Joaquín estuvo muy enfermo, lo dejaron ir a la casa que le han desmantelado a la señora, ella está totalmente aislada, pero estaba con su mujer y con su hijo en cuanto se mejoró lo volvieron a encerrar.

JUDY: Pues eso era lo que quería yo hablar contigo, porque realmente cont..)

pues... ah, y ya la retacharon a [illegible].

AZ: absolutamente. Ya la retacharon.

JUDY: Mira, un día de estos el ex-marido de [illegible], estaba yo con unos amigos en la Comercial Mexicana y andaba él allí como sonámbulo hecho un viejito, ya no tiene ni pelo, pero qué barbaridad.

AZ: Yo lo vía él hace días y le pregunté por ella, porque siempre le pregunto y me dijo: ella... Yo le dije que la había visto en enero, que iba con los niños, así y allá, me ~~visto~~ que está allá. Entonces me dijo: sí vino sola [illegible] se regrese, pero me lo dijo así con una cosa de amargura terrible y entonces le dije ¿y se va a quedar definitivamente? no, me dijo, regresa en tres días y creo que no volverá, entonces después alguien me dijo que seguro no la volverían a dar la visa.

JUDY: Pues qué barbaridad, que tenga la gente así que hablar, con la razón en la mano.

AZ: Quien sabe, yo ahora no adelanto juicios, yo no sé qué habrá.

JUDY: No, mira por grave que sea, nadie se está metiendo a ver la gravedad o no gravedad.

AZ: Que al canoso lo llevaron a Checoslovaquia, custodiado a carearlo etc etc, lo llevaron a París a carearlo y la investigación ha sido poco...

JUDY: Eso yo no lo discuto, ni discuto culpabilidad o no, justicia o no nadie se está metiendo en eso, es una cosa sumamente respetuosa la petición.

AZ: Bueno, te voy a decir a qué grado están las cosas de extremas, yo junto medicinas porque sé que hay casos de gastroenterolo la que no pueden tratar, la gente se los muere.

JUDY: Yo estoy horrorizada por lo a mi [illegible] que la acaban de operar de cáncer en Praga la trasladaran para allá.

AZ: No, no tengas eso.

JUDY: No Adelina, si ese cáncer está maligno, está pésimo,

AZ: Bueno pues medicinas sí puedes mandar.

AZ: Eso no se cura con medicinas Adelina sino con tratamiento.

JUDY: Los grandes especialistas no están ya allí y la experiencia es la experiencia. Está al cuidado de una de las mejores especialistas de allá, que la ve cada mes, imagínate.

AZ: Pues, yo mando medicinas y siempre llevo la caja, en eso he sido muy chinga siempre, cuando el portero no me dice: voy a avisarle al embajador, le digo: aquí está la caja, le dice que es de parte mía y que puedo revisar todito. Ahora cuando se abre la puerta y va a avisarle al embajador, entro y saco y todo lo extiendo, y le digo ahora usted lo empaqueta como quiera. A mí no me han vuelto a invitar a nada, yo sé que tienen recepciones muy cerradas a mí no me han invitado a nada, a nada.

(cont..

JUDY: Sí, ya se, aunque para uno es mejor.

AZ: A nada, siempre yo invito a los agregados culturales, a los [illegible]. Antes siempre iban, ahora no van. Creo que esta actitud les va a hacer perder al Instituto Mexicano-Cubano.

JUDY: Como no van a perder, pues no te digo la calidad de gentes, pregúntale a Carlos cuando regrese de Tabasco que te diga la lista más o menos de la gente, creo que serán 40 o algo así. Gentes escogidísimas.

AZ: Y ya te digo, de mi papá, directamente bueno ni su hija, ni la mamá, nadie de ellos me escribe, yo me [illegible] a través de esta persona y te digo, quiero que consiga usted esto que me imagino son parte de [illegible] para ellos, cómo me los podemos pagar. Inclusive yo le dije bueno mire si hay ocasión con algún diplomático, y me lo mandó que fuera con diplomático, mínimas 4 botellas de ron, que son las que pueden salir de allá y ojalá me llegaran para Navidad, salen en 90. pesos mexicanos así de que son como [illegible] mil, cada una. Y yo me estado ajustando a lo que me pueden enviar porque yo no estoy ahora en condiciones de enviar 500 pesos de regalos como antes lo hacía con tanto sacrificios porque JUDITH, me ha quedado una deuda de la casa de 20 mil pesos que yo tengo que salir en el año que entra y yo me jubilo, yo voy a tener una casa muy cómoda, muy agusto para trabajar, claro que hasta donde yo pueda sostener el coche, mientras me dan gasolina y chofer, el día que no, lo agarro lo vendo y me acabé, yo no puedo manejar con este oído lo intenté hace poco y me dí una mareada tan horrible que a las tres cuadras le dije al chofer, mire tome el volante, yo no puedo.

JUDY: Bueno, vamos a ver cuando nos vemos de todas maneras Adelina.

AZ: Sí yo te tengo tu regalo

JUDY: Tenemos que hablar de verdad y vernos, tú me avisas porque ya sales en vacaciones.

AZ/ Cuáles vacaciones? Tengo vacaciones sólo en la escuela, pero nada más, lo que puedo hacer es fugarme del Instituto una tarde para que nos veamos, porque de otra manera no nos podremos ver y aquí hay todavía tanto polvo que no me atrevo a invitarte a comer.

JUDY: Ya tengo aquí a una muchacha, y por cierto ya te dejo porque le tengo que estar diciendo, es nueva, muy buena me está saliendo, voy a descansar un poco porque ya no aguantaba, 3 años y medio de estar como animal de carga.

AZ: Yo prefiero pagar para que me trabajen, desde a qué hora me pongo a hacer las cosas. Salgo a las 8 de la mañana regreso a las 3, como y con esto del oído son las 2 de la mañana y yo no me he dormido, [illegible].

JUDY: Bueno, me le da un abrazo a su mamá, dígale que pregunté por ella.

HMMA-27555

cont..)

AZ: Sí ya sabe que eres tú, nos vemos adiós.

JUDY: Adiós.

W/

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ORIG : DAVID [illegible]/hdp
UNIT : WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 23 September 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-776046

DE. ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : ROME MEXICO CITY

24 SEP 65 18

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WE 2 INFO: VR, FILE 8 RID COPY, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, [illegible]

TO ROME INFO MEXI CITE DIR

45331

PER OIRN-24382 PARA 7, PLS ADVISE WHETHER YOU CONCUR DISCONTINUING LI[illegible] COVERAGE CARLO COCCIOLI (201-776046) WHILE CONTINUING WATCHLIST HIS TRAVEL OUTSIDE MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] Rome

C/WE/[illegible] WH/1 Mr. Fisher (telecoord) C/WE/[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION		
TO Chief, WH Division			MARKED FOR INDEXING
		XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Enrique SEMO Calev

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached for Headquarters' information and retention are copies of the LIFEAT coverage on Subject, reel #269 through reel #272 for the period 2 through 14 July 1965 and reel #1 through reel #16 for the period 31 July through 16 August 1965.

2. This coverage was temporarily discontinued from 15 through 30 July because of technical difficulties with the instrument in the Semo home.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated in paragraph 1

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att

Files
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26,933	19 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-745927

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief, EED
INFO.	Chief, WHD
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT	DMLET/LIFEAT/Operational Transmittal of LIFEAT Tapes and Transcripts
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

1. Forwarded herewith for translation of the Yugoslav portions are the following LIFEAT tapes: 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14. Also forwarded are the following Spanish transcripts: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14.

2. Because of the DMSAUCE/1 flap, the Spanish transcripts of the LIFEAT tapes will continue thru the end of this week (10 April), after that there will be no transcribing done in the field.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
2 - EED w/att h/w
X - WHD w/o/att
2 - Files

File
LIFEAT Prod.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-25814	DATE 8 April 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-8-2/9

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State

EVALUATING AGENCY

Liaison /
Subject /
[illegible]
12 March 63

DATE OF DISTRIB.	February 1963	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/538,352
CHIEF COUNTRY	Yugoslavia/Mexico	FIELD NUMBER	HMMA-20443

PLEASE RETURN EVALUATION BY WAY OF INR/CS - ROOM 6[illegible]

SUBJECT Yugoslav Commercial Activities in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within __ days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A

☐	1. *Major*	IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.
☒	2. MODERATE	
☐	3. LITTLE	
☐	4. NO	

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:

☐	1. SIGNIFICANTLY.
☐	2. SUBSTANTIALLY.
☒	3. MODERATELY.
☐	4. NEGLIGIBLY.

C ACCURACY.

☐	1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE.
☒	2. CREDIBLE.
☐	3. *Doubtful.*
☐	4. *False.*
☐	5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.

☒	1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION.
☐	2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION.
☐	3. *Sufficiently known.*
☐	4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS.
☐	5. *Conflicts with previous information.*
☐	6. *Appears to be fabrication.*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:

☐	1. *More detail.*
☐	2. *Less detail, more summary.*
☐	3. *Less fragmentary approach.*
☐	4. *Better organization.*
☐	5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
☐	6. (STATED IN COMMENT.)
☒	7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:

☒	1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
☐	2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
☐	3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
☐	4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:

☐	1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
☐	2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
☐	3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
☐	4. NEGLIGIBLY.

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)

☐	1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
☐	2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

We would appreciate your comments evaluating this report.

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

As a status report, document is of moderate value. Generally negative progress of Yugo attempts to establish a commericial foothold in Mexico not in itself of great interest to this office, at this time, but would increase in interest in direct relation to information on decision of Belgrade to grant a loan to Mexican govt.

EVALUATOR	NAME (*Please print*) P. Adler	COMPONENT INR/RSB/EA	PHONE x 3803
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED. Mar 1	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED Mar 6	

FORM 39 10-58, 5-60 EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

(20)

CONFIDENTIAL
(COLLECTOR/E[illegible]UAT[illegible] RECLASSIFY ACCORDING T[illegible] ATA [illegible]ED BELOW)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY State Department
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB. 27 January 1961	DISSEM. NUMBER CS-3/463,061	[illegible] data
Chief Country Mexico/Cuba	FIELD NUMBER HMM-5400	10 Apr 61

Subject Mexican Technicians Going to Work in Cuba

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is ~~priority~~ standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one x in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- ☐ 1. *Major*
- ☒ 2. MODERATE
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NO

} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- ☐ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ☒ 3. MODERATELY
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.
- ☐ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ☒ 2. CREDIBLE
- ☐ 3. *Doubtful*
- ☐ 4. *False*
- ☐ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- ☐ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ☒ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- ☐ 3. *Sufficiently known*
- ☐ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- ☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- ☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- ☐ 1. *More detail*
- ☐ 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- ☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- ☐ 4. *Better organization*
- ☐ 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- ☒ 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- ☐ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
- ☐ 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- ☐ 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- ☐ 2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- ☐ 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
- ☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- ☐ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

This report would have been of greater value if it had included some comment on the political orientation of the technicians (if any) and whether they were being sent by the Mexican Government or were hired on a purely personal basis.

EVALUATOR	NAME (*Please print*)	COMPONENT	PHONE
	Lawrence S. Eagleburger	State/INR/RAR/MAB	182-2097
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED March 17, 1961	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED March 22, 1961.	

FORM 10-35 EDITION

CONFIDENTIAL

22 (20)

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVA TC RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO A ED BELOW)

LIFEAT
Evaluation

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	2 November 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3,454,933 RAI	L. Bright L. Font Lumsel
Chief Country	Mexico/Nicaragua	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5264	20

Subject Nicaraguan Revolutionary Activities in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXX/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- ☐ 1. *Major*
- ☑ 2. MODERATE
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NO

} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- ☐ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ☑ 3. MODERATELY
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.
- ☐ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ☑ 2. CREDIBLE
- ☐ 3. *Doubtful*
- ☐ 4. *False*
- ☐ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- ☐ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ☑ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- ☐ 3. *Sufficiently known*
- ☐ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- ☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- ☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- ☐ 1. *More detail*
- ☐ 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- ☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- ☐ 4. *Better organization*
- ☐ 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- ☐ 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- ☐ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
- ☐ 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- ☐ 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- ☐ 2. *partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- ☐ 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
- ☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- ☐ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME *(Please print)* RT Morrison	COMPONENT INR/RAR-P	PHONE 3327
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED Nov 15/60	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED Nov. 16/60	

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

[illegible]

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	1 November 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/454,903	[illegible]
Chief Country	Mexico/Cuba	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5245	17 [illegible]

Subject: Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXX/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- ☐ 1. *Major*
- ☑ 2. MODERATE
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NO

} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- ☐ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ☑ 3. MODERATELY
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.
- ☐ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ☑ 2. CREDIBLE
- ☐ 3. *Doubtful*
- ☐ 4. *False*
- ☐ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- ☐ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ☑ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- ☐ 3. *Sufficiently known*
- ☐ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- ☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- ☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- ☐ 1. *More detail*
- ☐ 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- ☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- ☐ 4. *Better organization*
- ☐ 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- ☐ 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- ☐ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
- ☐ 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- ☐ 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- ☐ 2. *partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- ☐ 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
- ☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- ☐ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (*Please print*) RT Merrison	COMPONENT INR/RAR-P	PHONE 3327
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED Nov 18 '60	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED Nov 18 '60	

10-59

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO [illegible] A ADDED BELOW)

LIFEAT
Prod Folder

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY OSI

EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB. 26 September 1960

DISSEM. NUMBER CS 3/451,014

Chief Country [✓ Mexico]/Soviet Union

FIELD NUMBER HMM 5159

Lifeat
18 Jun 61

Subject Mexican Government Purchase of Soviet Radioisotopes

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 30 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXXX standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one x in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

1. MAJOR
2. MODERATE
A3 3. LITTLE
4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:

1. SIGNIFICANTLY
2. SUBSTANTIALLY
3. MODERATELY
B4 4. NEGLIGIBLY

ACCURACY.

1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
C2 2. CREDIBLE
3. *Doubtful*
4. *False*
5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.

1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
D3 3. *Sufficiently known*
4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
5. *Conflicts with previous information*
6. *Appears to be fabrication*

USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:

1. *More detail*
2. *Less detail, more summary*
3. *Less fragmentary approach*
4. *Better organization*
5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
E7 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

OTHER REPORTING MEETS:

F1 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

(ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:

1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
3. PARTIALLY BUT NEED CONTINUES.
4. NEGLIGIBLY

(IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)

1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON
H2 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Coordinated with LSD/SI - C. W. DeLong

EVALUATOR

NAME (Please print) WALLACE W. HOWARD

Wendell P. Clark

COMPONENT OSI/NED

PHONE 3955

DATE REQUEST RECEIVED

DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED

FORM 5-58 39

CONFIDENTIAL

5

(20)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

LIFEAT
Production

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY United States Information Agency
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	1 November 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/454,933	
Chief Country	Mexico/Cuba	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5245	23 [illegible]

Subject Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 30 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is ~~XXXXXX~~/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- X 1. *Major*
- 2. MODERATE
- 3. LITTLE
- 4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- X 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- 3. MODERATELY
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:
- 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- 2. CREDIBLE
- 3. *Doubtful*
- 4. *False*
- X 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- X 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- 3. *Sufficiently known*
- 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- 1. *More detail*
- 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- 4. *Better organization*
- 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- X 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
- X 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- 2. *partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
- 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Information on Cuban propaganda activities in Latin America is of major and continuing importance to this office, which must evaluate the nature, scope, and extent of these activities in order to combat them.

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print) Flora M. Roth	COMPONENT Office of Research and Analysis, USIA	PHONE 182-5475
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED November 8, 1960	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED November 14, 1960	

FORM 5-60 39 [illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(20)

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

LIFEAT
Prod [illegible]

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State.

EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	3 October 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/451,671	[illegible]
Chief Country	Mexico/Poland	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5186	4 [illegible] 60

Subject Projected Arrival in Mexico of Polish Travel Officials

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within (2) days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is ~~XXXXX~~ standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- ☐ 1. *Major*
- ☑ 2. MODERATE
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NO

} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- ☐ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ☑ 3. MODERATELY
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.
- ☐ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ☑ 2. CREDIBLE
- ☐ 3. *Doubtful*
- ☐ 4. *False*
- ☐ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- ☑ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ☑ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- ☐ 3. *Sufficiently known*
- ☐ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- ☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- ☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- ☑ 1. *More detail*
- ☐ 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- ☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- ☐ 4. *Better organization*
- ☐ 5. *Better observation, better explanation of source, or both*
- ☐ 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- ☐ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
- ☐ 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- ☐ 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- ☐ 2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- ☐ 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT):
- ☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- ☐ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

Is this information of sufficient use or value to warrant dissemination?

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Information of this nature is of value to RAR, for it provides new data and/or corroboration of information from other sources on Latin American-Bloc contacts. RAR has continuing interest in receipt of reports of this nature.

57

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print) [illegible]	COMPONENT INR/RAR-C	PHONE [illegible] 7
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED [illegible]	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED [illegible]	

3

LIFEAT
Production

CONFIDENTIAL
(COLLECTOR EVA TOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO . A ADDED BELOW)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR [illegible] 60
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	26 September 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/451,014	Lifeat
Chief Country	Mexico/Soviet Union	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5159	31 Oct 60

Subject Mexican Government Purchase of Soviet Radioisotopes

Rec 27 October 1960

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is ~~XXXXX~~/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:
- 1. *Major*
- [✓ 2. MODERATE] 2
- 3. LITTLE
- 4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- [✓ 3. MODERATELY] 2
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

ACCURACY.
- 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- [✓ 2. CREDIBLE]
- 3. *Doubtful*
- 4. *False*
- 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE B.

RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- 3. *Sufficiently known*
- 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- 1. *More detail*
- 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- 4. *Better organization*
- 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

THE REPORTING MEETS:
- OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

(IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT MEETS IT:
- FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- *partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- NEGLIGIBLY

(SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
- WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- THE NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

It is impossible to tell if the USSR prices to Mexico are in line with world prices or not. According to a 1957 Soviet price list, potassium is 3 rubles per millicurie, iodine is 8 to 13 rubles per millicurie and gold is 1 to 3 rubles per millicurie depending upon the form of the carrier. According to the report the average price is $0.15 per millicurie. The quantities of each isotope however, are not given.

Radio isotope prices have changed in the US markedly over the past few years. For example, the price for gold 198 has changed from 20 cents per millicurie prior to May 1959 to 6 cents per millicurie after May 1959. Unless more detailed information is obtained, the information has only moderate value to us.

NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
WILLARD S. SMITH	ORR/[illegible]	x3942

DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED

CONFIDENTIAL
Rec'd. 10 Jun '60

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED ON FRONT) 17 JUN 1960

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR
EVALUATING AGENCY

DISSEM. NUMBER	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER	
CS-3/439,064	1 June 1960	HMM-4913	Lifeat (3)

Chief Country Mexico/Soviet Union Due 5 July 1960 19 July 60

Subject New Policy of Soviet Commercial Office in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this valuation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one x in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
1. *Major*
X 2. MODERATE
3. LITTLE
4. NO
IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
1. SIGNIFICANTLY
X 2. MODERATELY
3. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:
1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
X 2. CREDIBLE
3. *Doubtful*
4. *False*
5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION
1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
X 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
3. *Sufficiently known*
4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
5. *Conflicts with previous information*
6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
1. *More detail*
2. *Less detail; more summary*
3. *Less fragmentary approach*
4. *Better organization*
5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
6. STATED IN COMMENTS
7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS

REQUIREMENTS

F (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
2. *Partially. Part of requirement may be closed.*
3. PARTIALLY. [illegible] CONTINUES.
4. NEGLIGIBLY

G DEGREE TO WHICH [illegible] REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
1. FULLY
2. SUBSTANTIALLY
X 3. LITTLE
4. NONE

H (IF IN G YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF WE HAVE [illegible] NO REQUIREMENT.)
1. WE [illegible] PRESENT A REQUIREMENT WITHIN [illegible] DAYS.
X 2. OUR [illegible] DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR [illegible] REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
EVALUATOR Robert Naper	ORR/S/TF/SP	5036
REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVALUAT RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ED ON FRONT) 29 JU

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY CRR

EVALUATING AGENCY

DISSEM. NUMBER	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER
CS-3/439,528	8 June 1960	HMM-4963

Chief Country Mexico/Soviet Union Due 15 July 1960 17 July 60

Subject Disagreement between Mexican Businessman and Soviet Commercial Officer over Money Owed for Tractors Purchased by the Mexican Government

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- ☐ 1. *Major*
- ☐ 2. MODERATE
- ☒ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NO

} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- ☒ 2. MODERATELY
- ☐ 3. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:
- ☒ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ☐ 2. CREDIBLE
- ☐ 3. *Doubtful*
- ☐ 4. *False*
- ☐ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION:
- ☒ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ☐ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- ☐ 3. *Sufficiently known*
- ☐ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- ☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- ☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- ☐ 1. *More detail*
- ☐ 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- ☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- ☐ 4. *Better organization*
- ☐ 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- ☐ 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- ☐ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

REQUIREMENTS

F (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- ☐ 2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- ☒ 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

G DEGREE TO WHICH OTHER (NON-CS) REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY
- ☒ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NONE

K (IF IN G YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAVE CITED NO REQUIREMENT.)
- ☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT WITHIN 30 DAYS.
- ☐ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
	Robert Naper	ORR/S/TF/SP	8036
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	
		11 July 1960	

FORM 10-58 39 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

2(3) CONFIDENTIAL [illegible] Rec in ORR

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA [illegible]ED ON FRONT) 96 [illegible]

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR

EVALUATING AGENCY

DISSEM. NUMBER CS-3/434,304	DATE OF DISTRIB. 18 April 1960	FIELD NUMBER HCM-4858

Chief Country Mexico/Soviet Union Due 17 May 1960

Subject Soviet Plan to Sell Newsprint to Mexican Government Agency

EVALUATOR: Please complete this valuation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- ☐ 1. *Major*
- ☐ 2. MODERATE
- ☒ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT.

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- ☒ 2. MODERATELY
- ☐ 3. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:
- ☐ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ☐ 2. CREDIBLE
- ☐ 3. *Doubtful*
- ☐ 4. *False*
- ☒ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- ☐ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ☐ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- ☐ 3. *Sufficiently known*
- ☒ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- ☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- ☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- ☐ 1. *More detail*
- ☐ 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- ☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- ☐ 4. *Better organization*
- ☐ 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both*
- ☐ 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- ☐ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

REQUIREMENTS

F (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED
- ☐ 2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- ☐ 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

G DEGREE TO WHICH OTHER (NON-CS) REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY
- ☐ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☒ 4. NONE

H (IF IN G YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT.)
- ☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT WITHIN 30 DAYS.
- ☒ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print) Eugene Erro	COMPONENT ORR I/HS	PHONE 4285
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED 26 May 60	

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
Operational/LAURICER	2. RI FILE NO.	50	6	32/4	
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-15007			4. DATE 18 May 1960	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.		9. EVALUATION	

5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

	12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFER [illegible] SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN T[illegible] CONTROL
SECTION BY . TS-175906 ....

18 May 1960

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO ➔ [illegible]

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL file LIFEAT Proj

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED ON FRONT)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR Ruth H Mesch
EVALUATING AGENCY

DISSEM. NUMBER CS-3/428,266	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER HMM-4761

Chief Country Mexico / Soviet Union

Subject Soviet Negotiations for Mexican Cotton

Inc 25 March 1960

EVALUATOR: Please complete this valuation within ___ days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF: (IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.)

A
- ☐ 1. *Major*
- ☒ 2. MODERATE
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NO

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- ☒ 2. MODERATELY
- ☐ 3. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.
- ☐ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ☒ 2. CREDIBLE
- ☐ 3. *Doubtful*
- ☐ 4. *False*
- ☐ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- ☐ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ☒ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- ☐ 3. *Sufficiently known*
- ☐ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- ☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- ☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- ☐ 1. *More detail*
- ☐ 2. *Less detail more summary*
- ☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- ☐ 4. *Better organization*
- ☐ 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- ☐ 6. LISTED IN COMMENTS
- ☒ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

REQUIREMENTS

F (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED
- ☐ 2. *Partial. - Portion of requirement may be [illegible]ed.*
- ☐ 3. PARTIAL, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

G DEGREE TO WHICH LIMITED (NON-CS) REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY
- ☐ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NONE

H (IF IN G YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT.)
- ☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT WITHIN 30 DAYS.
- ☐ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (*Please print*) POPE, FLETCHER, Jr.	COMPONENT ORR/M/AG	PHONE x3552
	REQUEST RECEIVED 15 Mar. 1960	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED 29 Mar. 1960	

FORM OBSOLETE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Swisher file LIFEAT Prov

(COLLECTOR/EVAL OF: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO PA ADDED ON FRONT)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State
EVALUATING AGENCY

REPORT NUMBER	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER	
S-3/423,266	19 February 1960	HMM-4761	Lifeat [illegible] Mar 60

Chief Country: Mexico/Soviet Union [illegible]

Subject: Soviet Negotiations for Mexican Cotton

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
1. Major
[✓ 2. Moderate]
3. Little
4. No
} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
1. Significantly
[✓ 2. Moderately]
3. Negligibly

C APPEARS:
[✓ 1. Substantially true]
2. Credible
3. Doubtful
4. False
5. Cannot be judged - see D

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION:
[✓ 1. Useful for confirmation]
2. Useful for new information
3. Sufficiently known
4. At variance or lack other information to judge accuracy or usefulness
5. Conflicts with previous information
6. Appears to be fabrication

E COMPARED TO OTHER INFO WE RECEIVED:
1. More detail
2. Less detail, more summary
3. Less fragmentary approach
4. Better organization
5. Better presentation or better explanation of source or both
6. Specify in comments
[✓ 7. No marked qualitative difference]

REQUIREMENTS

F WHICH OF YOUR REQUIREMENTS IS THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO:
1. Fully. Requirement can be closed
2. Partially. Portion of requirement can be closed
3. Partially, but must continue
4. Negligibly

G [illegible] OTHER [illegible] INFORMATION PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
1. Fully
2. Substantially
3. Little
4. None

H (IF YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT.)
1. We will present a requirement within 90 days
2. Our needs does not warrant a requirement for CS reporting.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

Is this information of sufficient use or value to warrant dissemination? Please comment.

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Information of the commercial activities [illegible] in Mexico is often difficult to obtain in [illegible]. Although the general subject of this [illegible] was [illegible] known, the more complete information [illegible] the extent and nature of possible Soviet [illegible] activities.

Information of similar type [illegible] also would be valuable. [illegible] Are other deals on [illegible], purchases of cotton pending?

96

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
	Donald P. Swisher	[illegible]	[illegible]
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	
	Feb 29, 1960	March 4, 1960	

14-00000

LIFEAT
Production

15 December 1959

CS 3/421,576

HMMA-45767

15 February 1960

SUBJECT: Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

What specific aspects of this report are of use? Of value? Please indicate and comment.

Information on the type of machinery offered or sold to Mexico or to Latin America is available from overt sources.

Information on prices is interesting and useful. Price quotations would be more helpful if specifications as well as serial numbers were available. Information indicating whether Soviet prices conform to or vary from world market prices.

Information on goods that the Soviets are interested in buying is of some importance, although this is generally available from overt sources.

SECRET

See HMMW 8486, 11 Feb 1960, LAURICLE, filed C/WHD's office.

This dispatch was written by FI/D in reply to HMMA 14362, 20 Jan 1960 and should be reviewed before LIFEAT or LIPHIT are submitted for renewal.

IMPORTANT

LIFEAT/[illegible] prod
LIPHIT/ops

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMM-A-14372
KAPOK-1737

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO: Chief, KUDOVE:
Attn: Division D

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 20 January 1960

SUBJECT: Projects LIFEAT and LIEMIT

RE: "433" (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See para. 5

REFERENCE(S):
HMM-A-13934, 16 Oct. 1959
HMM-A-13828, 2 Oct. 1959

1. During the recent TDY visit to this Station of David M. FREDLUND(p) of KUTUBE D, the interrelationship between the conversations recorded under Project LIFEAT which bear on Soviet Communication and the regular provision of the hard copy of Soviet official diplomatic communications obtained by the LIEMIT activity were discussed. The Station indicated that frequently LIFEAT obtained conversations which referred directly to specific messages: by content; by seeking clarification of garbled or missing groups; by officials who are to or have signed the message in question; and on one or two occasions the messages(admittedly not sensitive) were dictated to secretaries over the telephone.

2. Examples of the above conversations were forwarded to Headquarters in reference dispatches. The conversations with FREDLUND resulted in the suggestion that KUTUBE D should regularly receive the LIFEAT material when it relates to Soviet messages. Also that KUTUBE D in forwarding this type of LIFEAT material to ODENCH would record that the drop copies of the Soviet messages are normally forwarded to ODENCH (source LIEMIT) and that if there is any value to ODENCH in tying the two sources together for further processing by ODENCH, the Station would cross-reference the forwarding dispatch numbers. This Station would appreciate receiving, at an early date, any Headquarters comments.

3. This Station is willing to continue to exploit LIFEAT material for LAURICLE purposes should this be judged of value by Headquarters. At the present time Willard C. CURTIS is personally handling this phase of LIFEAT reporting.

4. KUTUBE D should note that at the present time the LIEMIT source is providing Soviet, Japanese, Czech and Polish drop copies to the Station. The traffic is over one-month old upon receipt and is in Station's hands only for a few hours. The source is capable however of obtaining traffic from all sources filing officially in Mexico City and the Station can do this without increasing the operational risk.

5. The Mexico City Station would appreciate any comments or guidance on either this phase of LIFEAT reporting or of LIEMIT which KUTUBE D could give.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

18 Jan. 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS(1 - Chief, KUDOVE:
Attn: Division D)

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMM-A-14393 KAPOK-1739
TO	Chief, WHD	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 50-8-11
INFO		
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico	22 January 1960
SUBJECT	Soviet Communications	RE 433 (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED	Please route this dispatch via KUTUBE/D	

REFERENCE(S)

A. HMM-A-14372;

B. HMM-A-14383

SOURCE: LIFEAT

1. Under reference B photographs of hard copies of Soviet traffic for November 1959 were forwarded to Headquarters. (SOURCE: LIEMIT)

2. On 27 November 1959 the following conversation took place:

> "Anatoliy Alekseyevich PAVLENKOV tells Vladimir KOLOKOLNIKOV that he just spoke with New York. PAVLENKOV says that BEGLOV(ph) called. PAVLENKOV says that Moscow wants to know how many luncheons and dinners there were yesterday. PAVLENKOV says he counted 3 luncheons and one dinner. PAVLENKOV says that a cable should be sent saying that on the 26th the bankers gave a luncheon for MIKOYAN and that MIKOYAN gave a dinner for the officials of the Government. Another thing Moscow wants to know what word was left out in KOLOKOLNIKOV's cable which was about KOLOKOLNIKOV's account at Poza Rica. In BELTRAN's speech there apparently was one word left out by the operators. KOLOKOLNIKOV will look at the text and see what it is. PAVLENKOV will come over and then they will send the cable. KOLOKOLNIKOV then suggests that they call BEGLOV in New York and give him this information. KOLOKOLNIKOV will do that.
>
> "KOLOKOLNIKOV tells WO(woman outside) to write down what he tells her. KOLOKOLNIKOV tells her that yesterday the Ministry of Industry and Trade, SALINAS, and the President of the Banco Exterior, ZEVADA, gave a luncheon for MIKOYAN at the Hotel Ambassador. In the evening A.I. MIKOYAN gave a dinner for officials of the Mexican Government. KOLOKOLNIKOV adds that the speech that ROLDAN(should be ROLDAN instead of BELTRAN) made the works "to show" were left out. KOLOKOLNIKOV tells her to send this to Moscow. KOLOKOLNIKOV will call tomorrow and let WO know when he will return. KOLOKOLNIKOV has to get his visa from the American Embassy."

words?
[illegible]

Willard C Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

20 January 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

COPY FILED IN 50-6-64

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-A-14392
KAPOK-1738

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-8-11

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

DATE: 22 January 1960

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT: Soviet Communications

ACTION REQUIRED: Call to Attention of KUTUBE/D

(CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S):
A. HMM-A-13934
B. HMM-A-14372

SOURCE: LIFEAT/LIMERICK

1. The following is a quotation of a conversation held on 2 December 1959:

> A man outside called the Soviet Embassy, introduced himself as Yevgeniy N. VOYEVODIN and asked Yelena Ivanovna FILIPOVA, secretary of the Commercial Office, if he could still send a cable off (that late) on that date. FILIPOVA promised to try to get the cable off. VOYEVODIN then said he wished the cable sent to: RAZNOEKSPORT, Moscow, 9019, 9021 and then dictated:
>
> "Exposition will close on 15th of December. To deliver the souvenirs is too late.
>
> VOYEVODIN."

2. It is requested that this pouch be routed via KUTUBE/D.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

20 Jan. 1960

Distribution:
3 - HQS

FILED IN 4 / - 6 -

SECRET/KAPOK

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMM-A-14374
KAPOK-1760

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-8-11

DATE
22 January 1960

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT: Soviet Communications

ACTION REQUIRED: Please route this dispatch via KUTUBE/D

RE "X" - CHECK "X" ONE

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S):

A. HMM-A-14372;
B. HMM-A-14333.

1. Under reference B photographs of hard copies of Soviet Embassy traffic (Source: LIMIT) for November 1959 were forwarded to Headquarters.

2. On 28 November 1959 Vladimir KOLOKOLNIKOV spoke with Ivan Ivanovich (possibly [illegible]) in New York. KOLOKOLNIKOV said he wished a cable sent to Moscow concerning the departure of Anastas I. MIKOYAN (Soviet Vice Premier who had been visiting Mexico, 18-26 November 1959). KOLOKOLNIKOV said he himself would fly out "on Monday." A woman took the telephone and KOLOKOLNIKOV dictated the following:

> "Today at 0900 local time the First Deputy Minister of the Council of Ministers USSR, A.I. MIKOYAN, and his escorting party flew out of the Capital of Mexico on the Il-18 for the Fatherland. MIKOYAN was seen off at the airport by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Manuel TELLO; the Minister of Foreign Trade, Raul SALINAS; Minister of Education, TORRES Bodet; and officials of the Foreign Ministry. The Soviet Ambassador to Mexico also saw A.I. MIKOYAN off, V.I. BAZYKIN, and workers of the Soviet Embassy. Before the flight out A. I. MIKOYAN made a short speech in which he thanked the President of Mexico, LOPEZ Mateos, members of the Mexican Government, the whole Mexican people for the warm reception which was shown him and his escorting party in their country."

3. KOLOKOLNIKOV then dictated another cable. This cable was the message that MIKOYAN sent from aboard his plane to the President of Mexico thanking him for the reception that he received in Mexico. (NOTE: The translator "slipped" and did not transcribe this cable verbatim.)

Willard C. CURTIS

20 January 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

FORM
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK
☐ CONTINUED
PAGE NO.

SECRET

From: Mexico, Mexico City
Report No: HMM-1831
Local File No:

No. of Pages: 1
No. of Enclosures: 1(for Station files only)

Report Made By: Thomas G. URQUHART
Approved By: Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
By copy to: 3 - Hqs(1 for KUWRAP)
2 - Files(1 w/att)
Orally to:

Source Cryptonym: A. LIKAYAK-2
B. LIFEAT/LIMERICK
References: HMM-1765, 12 Sep, 1956, p.9

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

SUBJECT: Alicia ROMERO G. (Garzun)

Source obtained the information contained in the attached report from his sister, who is a journalist, and from a copy of the magazine on which subject is employed. He also obtained information from an address investigation on subject. Owing to the type of information developed on ROMERO, she is being included in this Station's series of LCIMPROVE subjects.

Classification

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-59
FEB 1948

1 COPY

50-6-32/4

SECURITY INFORMATION

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO: HMM-1331

SUBJECT: Alicia ROMERO G.(Garzun)

DATE OF INFO: May - August 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 12 Sept. 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 19 Sept. 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Source A: Mexican business with contacts in journalistic circles B-2 (paras 1, 3, 4 and 5)
Source B: Source with access to Soviet official circles in Mexico B-doc (para 2)

The following information has been developed on Alicia ROMERO a suspicious contact of Grigori NIKIPORETS, Soviet Naval Attache, MEXICO

201-166041

1. An investigation of Avenida Coyoacan 624-2, the residence given as that of subject, showed it to be occupied by Maria Eugenia Romero de HARO. Her husband is related to Captain Antonio HARO Oliva, husband of Nadia HARO Oliva, who is an actress in a show called "The Four Colonels."

201-220883

2. It has been ascertained that on 7 May 1956 a man described as Major HARO Oliva, a movie producer, was in contact with Iuri PAPOROV, Soviet Cultural and intelligence officer. MEXICO

201-082455

3. Alicia ROMERO G. has been identified as in charge of the photographic department of a magazine named [illegible]RAZ, published at Avenida Juarez 20-22 in Mexico City.

COMMENT: A copy of this magazine is being retained in Station files.

The director of the magazine is Jorge HARO Cabrera, husband of Maria Eugenia Romero de HARO (noted above) and he resides at Avenida Coyoacan 624-2. He pays 750 pesos per month rent.

4. Alicia ROMERO G. is the sister-in-law of Jorge HARO Cabrera. She is the daughter of Maria de la Luz (widow) de ROMERO. Alicia ROMERO reportedly is the mistress of various politicians. She claims her home to be at Av. Coyoacan 624-2. Alicia ROMERO is reported to be pro-Communist and to be a member of the PRI. She is to be supported by that party in the forthcoming elections for the post of Federal Deputy.

COMMENT: Her connections with politics and politicians explain some of the report noted in the reference.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 51-58 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.
APR 1953

50-6-32/14

(20)

YURIY ZR PAPOROV. 201-82485 CIT: USSR SOVIET CULTURAL AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. Δ MEXICO A SCERTAINED THAT ON 7 MAY 56 SUBJ WAS IN CONTACT WITH MAJOR HARO OLIVA, A MOVIE PRODUCER DOI SEPT. 1956

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

KDMANGO 50-6-32/2

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KDMANGO Support (Vol. 2)
50-6-32/2

INCLUSIVE DATES: 9 Jul 1957 - 6 Aug 1968
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LA/DDC
ROOM: 3C34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
29 JUNE 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
27 JULY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

fb

Support, 2/2 9 July 1957 t

RETIRED
DESENS

lder 5 U

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO RID/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 16

3 4

SECRET

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

#137 WH 8

☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR, RI/AN, CI/IC 2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 062300Z AUG 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6630 6 Aug 68 IN 65508

DIRECTOR

LIFEAT

1. REQUEST PRIORITY HANDLING TO OBTAIN POA ON IDENTITY FOR USE AS LIFEAT BASEHOUSE KEEPER. IDENTITY TO REPLACE LIFEUD-5 AND LIFEUD-15 WHO ARE RESIGNING EFFECTIVE 31 AUGUST 68 AND MOVING TO GUADALAJARA.

2. POUCHING COMLETED PRQ PART ONE. HQS WILL NOTE THAT IDENTITY IS UNMARRIED SISTER OF LIFEUD-24.

3. STATION AND LNPURE TRACES NEGATIVE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY 26 PER ______

ACTION
#138 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/IC 2, CI/OA

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 062300Z AUG 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6631

6 Aug 68 IN 65503

DIRECTOR

LIFEAT

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 6630 (IN 65508)

IDENTITY: EMMA (ZUECK) RUFFINI

DPOB: 22 SEPT 18 IN SIERRA MOJADA, COAHUILA

CIT: MEXICAN

ADDRESS: XOCHICALCO 329 APT 7, MEXICO 13, D.F

MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE

FATHER: FIDEL (ZUECK) S. (DECEASED)

MOTHER: VIERGINIA RUFFINI DE ZUECK (DECEASED)

OCCUPATION: PRESENTLY UNEMPLOYED. LAST POSITION WAS SECRETARY AT OFFICE CIVIL REGISTRY IN CHIHUAHUA, CHIHUAHUA FROM 1955 TO 1968. RESIGNED POSITION TO MOVE MEXICO CITY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

5. Effective 1 July 1968 LIFEUD-2, LIFEUD-3, LIFEUD-24, [illegible] and LIFEUD-[illegible] were granted small salary increases. Also, [illegible] A. PARFINIA was placed on a monthly salary, which replaced the previous hourly pay rate. Amended Memorandums of Oral Commitments were forwarded to Headquarters.

6. As is normal in this Project, daily operational meetings were held with David A. WILSTED and LIFEUD-24 in order to pick-up LIFEAT production and to discuss various operational aspects [illegible] [illegible] the continual maintenance of activities.

BASEHOUSES

7. On 2 April 1968 LIRISK employees started extensive renovation work in the area around LIFEAT Annex 6. Because of this the basehouse was shut down and all of the LIFEAT lines were removed. This renovation work was completed on 21 June and the basehouse was back in operation in early July.

8. LIRISK work in the area around LIFEAT Annex 8 caused the closure of this basehouse from 19 April until early May.

9. In June 1968 the Station made the decision to close down LIFEAT Annex 5 and move the basehousekeepers, LIFEUD-35 and 36, to another area. The reasons for this decision were two-fold: A) LIFEUD-35 and -36 now have four children and Annex 5 was too small for them, and B) the annex needed extensive repairs which the landlord refused to have done because he was planning to sell the building. A new basehouse, Annex 9, was located and Annex 6 was closed on 20 June. The basehousekeepers are now in Annex 9 and target coverage commenced in early July.

10. Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 explain the reduced coverage provided by LIFEAT during the three month period under review.

SECURITY

11. No known security incidents occurred during this period.

PLANS

12. It presently appears that LIFEUD-5, basehousekeeper, will be transferred by his company to the Guadalajara area. If this occurs, we will accept the resignation of LIFEUD-5 and -15 and close down Annex 3. In view of this Project Officers presently are looking for replacements and Operational Approvals will be requested as soon as suitable candidates are located.

for Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES 14
7

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO

DISSEM BY 15 PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION Logs 4 ☐ RID COPY

INFO. FILE, VR, WH 8

S E C R E T 011530Z JUN 68 CITE LOGISTICS 6544

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

1 JUN [illegible]

JBECHO

REF MEXICO CITY 6039 (IN [illegible] 51)

REGRET SEARCH HDQS FILES FAILED DISCLOSE RENTAL LEASE OR CONTRACT FOR ELECTRIC SERVICE.

S E C R E T

BT

File LIFEAT support

SECRET

Perkins

26 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/MPS

VIA: WH/LOG

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT - Request for Increase in Transportation Vehicle Allowance (TVA)

1. It is requested that the TVA for Project LIFEAT be increased from six to eight to cover the use of two additional cars:

POV of Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (P), translator	$300 per annum
POV of LIFEUD/35, safehousekeeper	$250 a month

2. Funds for the above POV allowances in lieu of reimbursement by the mile are included in the project renewal.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief/WHD
Chief/Finance Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: C LIFEAT/Forwarding of Amended MOCs

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

1. Forwarded herewith are amended Memorandum of Oral Commitments for several assets involved in the LIFEAT Project. These MOCs reflect salary changes effective 1 July 1968 as follows:

ASSET	HQ 201	INCREASE PER MONTH
LIFEUD-2	201-117970	$ 25.60
LIFEUD-3	201-117971	20.80
LIFEUD-6 (Olga A. PARFINIK)	201-117978	See below
LIFEUD-24	201-119525	30.00
LIFEUD-32	201-749002	24.00
LIFEUD-35	201-740227	24.00

2. The salary for LIFEUD-6 (Olga A. PARFINIK) was changed from an hourly rate to a flat monthly rate. The figure reached was calculated from a six-month average of payments. The actual increase amounted to slightly less than $10.00 per month.

Continued.....

Distribution:
② - Chief/WHD w/att h/w
2 - Chief/Finance Division w/att h/w

Attachments:
As stated herewith – attachments detached and filed in various 201 files –

CS COPY

50-6-32/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO 50-6-32/2	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 34916	DATE 25 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER Pertinent 201s

14-00000

3. The increase per month section was added to this dispatch because a review of the files indicated that several of the previous MOCs had been submitted incorrectly, e.g., the salary for LIFEID 2 shown on the previous MOC was actually the half-month salary.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

LIFEAT supp

In May 1968 FEINGLASS processed 44 special reels of LIFEAT material.

HMMA 34880, 13 June 68

(no indication of what was "special" about them)

LIFEAT/Budget

25 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/MPS

VIA: WH/LOG

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT - Request for Transportation Vehicle Allowance (TVA)

1. It is requested that a transportation vehicle allowance under Project LIFEAT be authorized to cover the use of 5 POVs;

one for LIFEUD/3 in the amount of $24 a month or $288 per annum

one for LIFEUD/5 in the amount of $24 a month or $288 per annum

one for LIFEUD/7 in the amount of $40 a month or $480 per annum

one for LIFEUD/8 in the amount of $40 a month or $480 per annum

one for LIFEUD/24 in the amount of $40 a month or $480 per annum

2. Funds for the above POV allowances in lieu of reimbursement by the mile are already provided in the project.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

LIFEAT Copy

File LIFEAT support

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-8928

10 April 68

LICOOKY: To support a $40.00 a month payment to LICOOKY-2 for the use of his POV.

DAVANE: To support a $50.00 a month payment to Bruce H. FERNALD for use of his POV.

LIDOOTROT: To support a $50.00 a month payment to LIERIFOZ-1 for use of his POV.

LIFEAR: Increase the LIFEAR TVA from one to two authorizations, the second authorization to support a $36.00 a month payment to LIFEAR-3. The existing authorization is occupied by EV-2788.

LIFEAT: Increase the LIFEAT TVA from one to six authorizations as follows:

EV-2857
$24.00 monthly to LIFEED-3
$24.00 monthly to LIFEED-5
$40.00 monthly to LIFEED-7
$40.00 monthly to LIFEED-8
$40.00 monthly to LIFEED-24

Although HMMW-4632, dated 22 December 1965, stated that a TVA was not necessary for the LIFEED's, it is requested that their determination be reviewed in the light of the comments in the September 1966 Audit Report.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

50-6-35/3

29 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : Amendment of OA for Antonio DOUBLETTE (201-312729)

REFERENCE : Form 124 dated 22 November 1966

1. In accordance with Reference, Subject was granted an OA on 22 November 1966 to permit the WH/7/Haiti Desk to utilize Subject as a Creole translator of unclassified tapes. Subject was recruited in December 1966 and has been performing this function satisfactorily since that time.

2. It is now requested that Subject's OA be amended to permit WH/7/Haiti Desk to utilize his services to translate sensitive telephone tapes (LIFEAT) from the Spanish, French and Creole languages into English. To date the Mexico City Station has been providing Headquarters with a translation of the Spanish and French portions of this intelligence take, with Port-au-Prince Station assisting with translation of the Creole portions. Recently, however, the Port-au-Prince asset departed Haiti and, at present, neither Station has the capability to translate the Creole portions. Since it is believed that the Creole portion may contain important operational information from a CI standpoint, the Haiti Desk proposes to utilize Subject to fulfill this gap. Subject will be polygraphed before he is given this added task. Your expeditious attention to the above request would be appreciated.

3. If you desire further information, please call Ruth Lehman, WH/7/Haiti, x5595.

Robert W. Berg
Chief, WH/7/Haiti

CONCUR:

C/WH/1

DIST: O&1 - CI/oa; 1 - EVMOW-1 ① - C/WH/1; 1 - Chrono

SECRET

file [illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

ORIG: S.L.Yaxley
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 12 July 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY K. PER ____ # ____

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE VR, C/CI 2, [illegible]

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 19154

12 22 27 Z

TO MEXICO CITY

LIFEAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 2084 (IN-09503)*

1. DISPOSAL MV-2539 APPROVED.

2. PURCHASE OF RAMBLER APPROVED, AT A COST OF APPROXIMATELY $4100.00. MV-2857 APPLIES.

3. COMPLY WITH BOOK DISPATCH 5373 RE DISPOSITION AND PURCHASE OF VEHICLES.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENTS: References attached

WH/B&F ____

WH/1 Mr Fisher (Telecon) RLK

Distribution:

OL/SD/FS3/VS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

LIFEAT Support

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

21

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	55	5	C
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

BY TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CI/IC2, LOGS 4

SECRET 112345Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2084

DIRECTOR

11 Jul 67 09 50z

REF MEXICO CITY 2000 (IN 05093)
LIFEAT

PLEASE PROVIDE AUTHORITY FOR LOCAL PURCHASE OF VEHICLE REQUESTED REF SINCE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF BASE HOUSE EQUIPMENT CAN BE SATISFIED ONLY BY VEHICLE WITH TRUNK LARGER THAN COMPACT VEHICLE TRUNK. RAMBLER CLASSIC IS CHEAPEST VEHICLE AVAILABLE FOR THIS NEED.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

Reviewed + approved
12 July 67

[illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM 30

ACTION LOGS 4 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, [illegible] WH8, [illegible]

SECRET 060001Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2000

DIRECTOR

6 JUL 67 IN 05093

JBECHO LIFEAT

1. REQUEST AUTHORITY TO REPLACE MV-2539 BY SALE ON LOCAL MARKET AND PURCHASE OF 1967 RAMBLER CLASSIC 4 DOOR SEDAN AT APPROXIMATE COST OF $4100 US. FUNDS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED IN PROJECT RENEWAL.

2. REPLACEMENT NECESSARY FOR SECURITY, MILEAGE, AND REPAIR REASONS. ODOMETER READING OF OVER 71,000 MILES, POOR STATE OF REPAIR, AND CAR HAS BEEN USED IN SENSITIVE OPERATION SINCE PURCHASE IN 1962 AND SECURITY DICTATES REPLACEMENT.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

Monty in Log says he talked to Joe McMahon about this - latter was irked at higher cost estimate than that in project and asked Monty to take no action but to wait till McM is back in Mexico City (by now) and has communicated with us further on subject. N Perkins, 10 July 67

See HMMT 8049 of 30 June 67 which requests info on Transcribing Machines.

says LIFEAT is presently using EKOTAPES for playback and they are reaching a point of no return as far as maintenance goes. Requests two trial machines per TM 918885 of 26 June 67 and if they perform satisfactorily, station will probably order 12 to 18 of them sometime in future, primarily for transcribing (LIENVOY & LIFEAT) (this current FY 68 project [illegible] needs no provision for new allocation.)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIFEUD Salaries

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The salaries listed for LIFEUD in the project renewal request do not jibe in most cases with the memoranda of oral commitment which we have on file, and in some instances (LIFEUDs 7, 8 and 9) the salaries are almost doubled. Would you please verify for us that the salaries as submitted in the renewal are those being paid, and if this is the case, would you also prepare revised MOCs and send us copies.

T.H.B.
Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

12 JUN 1967
50-6-32/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15534

DATE
7 June 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/2

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1	N. Perkins	bas	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	6/7	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(40)

DISPATCH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	1	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	SS	8	

FROM 23

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, MPS/BGZ

SECRET 052345Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1654

5 JUN 67 IN 82373

DIRECTOR

LIFEAT

REF A HMMA-32038, 19 MAY 1967

B HMMT-3953, 19 JUNE 1963

1. REF A PROVIDES BACKGROUND ON DECREASE IN SALARY OR TERMINATION PROPOSED TO LIFEUD-1.

2. ON 1 JUNE 67 LIFEUD-1 OPTED FOR FINAL TERMINATION. DURING DISCUSSIONS THIS MATTER WITH WILSTED, LIFEUD-1 FRIENDLY AND SAID HE REALIZED HE RECEIVING TOO LARGE A SALARY FOR WORK HE PERFORMING. SAID HE DECIDED ACCEPT TERMINATION BECAUSE A) WANTED TO IMMIGRATE TO WOLADY, B) DID NOT DESIRE USE HOME AS BASEHOUSE, AND C) AFRAID OTHER PERSONS INVOLVED IN LIFEAT WOULD LOOK DOWN ON HIM FOR ACCEPTING REDUCTION IN SALARY. (LIFUED-1 HAS NOT ASKED FOR NOR WILL STATION OFFER ASSISTANCE IN POSSIBLE IMMIGRATION.)

3. LIFEUD-1 VOLUNTEERED HE HAS KEPT COMPLETE LOG OF ALL HIS ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF LIFEAT AND WOULD TURN THIS LOG OVER TO WILSTED. ALSO SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY IN FUTURE IF NEEDED, WHETHER ON PAYROLL OR NOT. ENTIRE

SECRET

b) 5 July

~~[illegible]~~

Don, See LIFEUD/1 file
re final termination - no problems

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 1654 S E C R E T

SECRET

MEETING AMICABLE. LIFEUD-1 AGREED SIGN LETTER OF TERMINATION AND SECRECY AGREEMENT.

4. COST OF TERMINATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH LOCAL CUSTOM WILL BE DOLLARS 11,125.00. TERMINATION THIS MANNER IN FULFILLMENT MOC FORWARDED REF B.

5. IF FUNDS AVAILABLE, STATION CAN TERMINATE IMMEDIATELY THUS SAVING DOLLARS 541.00 LIFEUD-1 SALARY FOR MONTH OF JUNE. TERMINATION FUNDS REQUESTED IN REF A, HOWEVER THESE FUNDS FOR FY 68. PLS ADVISE IF HQS PREFERS TERMINATE AFTER PROJECT LIFEAT APPROVED OR IF FUNDS CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE TERMINATION.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET - RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief/WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Agent Evaluation/David M. WILSTED.

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Attached herewith is an Agent Evaluation report for David M. WILSTED, Career Agent and outside Case Officer for the sensitive LIFEAT Project.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated herewith

Distribution:
3 - Chief/WHD w/att

50-6-32

file
LIFEAT
Support

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 31970

DATE
10 May 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET - RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-009195

AGENT EVALUATION

DATE: 10 May 1967

1. NAME (P): David M. WILSTED - Career Agent GS-13

2. PROJECT : LIFEAT

3. OVERT JOB TITLE: Technical Supervisor

4. COVERT JOB TITLE: Outside Case Officer for the LIFEAT Project.

5. JOB DESCRIPTION :

A. OVERT : a) Assure proper maintenance of machinery
b) Categorize and schedule incoming production orders
c) Public relations with customer businesses

B. COVERT: a) Overall supervision of all LIFEAT technical penetrations or other technical installations involving LIFEAT personnel
b) Supervision of technical penetration routing and security
c) Resolution of the complex technical and maintenance problems inherent in a Project such as LIFEAT

d) Accounting for expenditures in the neighborhood of $6,000.00 US per month as well as being responsible for about $25,000.00 US in WOFACT property

e) Responsible, with the Station Case Officer, for the day-to-day handling of 21 active LIFEAT agents.

6. EVALUATION

a. Performance of duties set forth in paragraph 5 above without prejudice to either: WILSTED presently devotes about 80 percent of his working time to his LIFEAT duties. The remainder is devoted to his cover duties. This time allotment has the agreement of the owner/manager of his cover organisation. WILSTED's cover manager, LIFINGER-1, likes and respects WILSTED and they have a good working arrangement. WILSTED, LIFINGER-1 and the Station believe that the present arrangement is satisfactory for all concerned. WILSTED in conjunction with a production manager whom WILSTED hired, has assisted in converting the cover company from a losing proposition into a profitable enterprise. The owner is grateful to WILSTED for this.

b. Attitude towards WOFACT, Cover Organization and present assignment. WILSTED has an excellent attitude toward his employment with WOFACT and has never been heard to be critical of it or its objectives. He is happy with his present assignment since he now considers Mexico City to be his home. WILSTED's wife, who is a Field Agent, also has a good attitude toward WOFACT and its objectives. She understands the reasons behind the long and varied hours worked by WILSTED and the need for security. She is a definite asset to WILSTED in supporting his cover in conversations with friends and relatives.

c. Security and Discretion: WILSTED is very security conscious and is discreet in his conversations. He is prompt for operational meetings and follows directions to the letter when meeting sites are changed or emergency meetings established. WILSTED has no known problems in living and maintaining his cover. WILSTED's wife is also very security conscious.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem by 21

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, Secur-4, LOGS-4, CI/OA

SECRET 232310Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2252

DIRECTOR

REF: HMMS 5334

24 J[illegible] 64578

1. DAVID M. WILSTED WILL PROCURE A SAFE ON THE LOCAL MARKET AS AUTHORIZED IN PARA 3(B) OF THE REFERENCE.

2. AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF A SIMILIAR SAFE FOR DOUGLAS J. FREAPANE WHOSE NEED FOR A SAFE PARALELLS THAT OF WILSTED.

SECRET *[illegible]

RT

SECRET

Bustos

LITEAT/Support

6 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CCS

FROM : WH Division

SUBJECT : Project Funding Plan, Project LIFEAT (FI)

A. Identification of Activity

1. Project cryptonym: LIFEAT

2. Approved for. 1 July 1966 - 30 June 1967: $100,000

FY 1967 - $100,000

3. Proposed successive fiscal year budget: Same

4. Brief statement of project aims, character and structure:

The purpose of this project is to provide unilateral telephone tap coverage in Mexico City. A U. S. Career Agent serves as Outside Case Officer and personally handles the thirteen sub-agents who are responsible for the technical phase of the Project which is run out of seven basehouses. A Station Case Officer directly handles five translators who are also funded out of this Project.

B. Funding History

1. The Career Agent (GS-13) receives his salary and allowances split between bank deposits in the United States made directly by Monetary and a field allotment received from the Station. He pays the thirteen sub-agents their salaries which total $2,337/month, basehouse expenses (rent and utilities), and ops expenses. The Station Case Officer directly pays the five translators their salaries (total $1,675/month) and expenses. All equipment is furnished by CIA and is replaced when necessary

2. Funds have always been handled in this manner.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: Charlotte Bustos/mr
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 8 June 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-32/1

DISSEM BY 17 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 18 ☒ RID COPY
INFO: VR , FILE MPS/BG2, CI/IC2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

19 16 57 Z CITE DIRECTOR 11078

TO MEXICO CITY

LIFEAT

HQS SUBMITTING PROJECT FOR AMOUNT REQUESTED BY STATION. SINCE FUNDS FOR LIFEAT PROJECT FOR FY 67 ARE EXTREMELY TIGHT SUGGEST WILSTED PURCHASE HIS QP CAR BEFORE END FY 66 IF POSSIBLE SINCE MONEY AVAILABLE THIS FISCAL YEAR.

END OF MESSAGE

Lifeat Support CB

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/BF

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
C Memoranda of Oral Commitments LIFEAT

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are three copies of subject memoranda covering each of the following agents used with Project LIFEAT and reflecting salary adjustments which become effective 1 March 1966:

MOC	for	LIFEUD-2	[illegible]	201-117970	made [illegible] HMMA-28382/01
"	"	LIFEUD-3	"	201-117971 "	" HMMA-28382/02
"	"	LIFEUD-7	" "	201-117980 "	" HMMA-28382/03
"	"	LIFEUD-8 "	"	201-119521 "	" HMMA-28382/04
"	"	LIFEUD-9 "	"	201-117984 "	" HMMA-28382/05
"	"	LIFEUD-15 "	"	201-126315 "	" HMMA-28382/06
"	"	LIFEUD-24 "	"	201-119525 "	" HMMA-28382/07
"	"	LIFEUD-25 "	"	201-332335 "	" HMMA-28382/08
"	"	LIFEUD-26 "	"	201-119974 "	" HMMA-28382/09
"	"	LIFEUD-35 "	"	201-740227 made [illegible] HMMA-28382/10	

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
As stated herewith

Distribution:
3-Chief, WHD

LIFEAT
50-6-32/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28382

DATE
25 February 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/2

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 13

SECRET

☐ ...Y ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : J. WILSON
UNIT : WH/7/H
EXT : 5595
DATE : 4 FEB 66

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : PORT-AU-PRINCE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-8 INFO: VR . FILE ☐ RID COPY, CI/OA, CI/IC-2

TO PRIN INFO MEXI CITE DIR 77833

EVMOHAIR LIFEAT

REF: PRIN 3683 (IN 44967)

POA ON EVMOHAIR-1 AMENDED 4 FEB 66 TO INCLUDE CLEARANCE TRANSLATE CREOLE PORTIONS LIFEAT TAPES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref. requested POA on EVMOHAIR-1 be amended to include clearance translate Creole portions LIFEAT tapes.

CI/OA - Jack Lally (Telecoord)
WH/1 - Charlotte Bustos (Telecoord)

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

John H. Wilson
RAYMOND A. WARREN
C/WH/7
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NIR NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT LIFEAT/Assignment of Cryptonyms

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: FYI

REFS: A. HMMA 27865, 13 December 1965

B. HMMA 27918, 20 December 1965

C. HMMA 27929, 20 December 1965

The cryptonym LIRIOT has been assigned to IDENTITY A of Reference B, and the cryptonym LIRIPE was given to IDENTITY B.

Laura J. UTSTINE

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

5 January 1966

LIFEAT

50-6-32/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER CS COPY HMMW 14247	DATE 10 ... 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-32/2

RI
Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/Zerance:mep			4523

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/1	1/1/	J.H.V. Fisher

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WH Division

Admin/Logistics TVA for Project Agents

Reference: HMMT-5994, dated 2 December 1965

1. It is considered that the relationship between KUBARK and LIFLUD-2,-5,-7,-8,-24 does not fall in the category of contract personnel and, therefore, the provisions of FR 23-5 (a) (1) do not apply.

2. With respect to Carol A. [illegible], it is DYVOUR practice where an approved project provides funds for transportation, including use of POV's that a TVA is not necessary unless a GO vehicle is required.

Howard B. MYNARD

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City

22 DEC 1965

-4185

SECRET

WH/Logistics R.E. Roush jtw 21/12/65 6282

1 - WH/LOG
1 - WH/REG
1 - C/WH/1

DC/WH/1

Mr. J. Fisher (in draft)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division ATTN: WH Logistics

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT ADMINISTRATIVE/Logistics
TVA for Project Agents

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Furnish new TVA for LIFEAT Project if necessary.

REFERENCES : A. LIFEAT Project TVA, dated 5 October 1965
B. HMMW-13913, dated 23 August 1965
C. HMMA-26216, dated 27 May 1965

1. Please furnish this Station with a revised LIFEAT Project TVA with a total of 7 (seven) vehicle authorizations, 6 more than now listed on the TVA, if this increase is deemed necessary for the continuing transportation allowances/mileage reimbursement paid to 6 of the project agents as approved by reference B.

2. Paragraph I. 2) d. of the project renewal request forwarded by reference C included an annual amount of $500.00 each for the use of LIFTUD-2, LIFTUD-8, and LIFTUD-24 POV's; $400.00 each for the use of LIFTUD-5 and LIFTUD-7 POV's; and $300.00 per year for mileage reimbursement to Carol K. [illegible]. These agents have been paid these amounts over the years in accordance with project approvals. However, in view of the FR-45-3F and FR-23-5 regulation revision in August 1964, which established the requirement for a TVA slot for POV's used on a continuing basis, the question of the need for a TVA is raised to preclude a possible audit exception.

3. The POV's are used by the agents in transporting tapes and other material between various operational points. Daily use averages from 20 to 50 miles per day and from 1 to 4 hours per day depending upon the assignment. Use of pooled vehicles is not possible because of the widely separated points of contact, the need for simultaneous use and the impracticability of coordinating the use of pooled vehicles from a cover standpoint. Public transportation is not practical again because of the widely separated points of contact and government transportation cannot be used because of cover.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-5904

DATE
2 December 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 15

18

ORIG : C. Bustos-Videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 30 Nov 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-9195

26/30 SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO CITY

30 [illegible] 23 11E

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY LOGS 4

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 61709

REF HMMT 5901 ~~[illegible]~~ WMS

TRANSPORTATION ALLOWANCE $84.00 PM APPROVED BUT WMS

IF WILSTED HAS NOT PURCHASED POV AT THIS TIME, AND IN VIEW IMMINENT DEPARTURE ON HOME LEAVE, HQS APPROVES HIS USE OF MV 2539. HE WILL BE ENTITLED REIMBURSEMENT FOR ALL ACTUAL COSTS OPERATING VEHICLE WHILE AWAY FROM POST. ANY PERSONAL MILEAGE WHILE ON HOME LEAVE OR DEVIATIONS TO OR FROM HOME LEAVE POINT WILL BE CHARGED WILSTED AT STATION MILEAGE RATE FOR PERSONAL USE OFFICIAL VEHICLE. WMS

END OF MESSAGE

* Requested permission for WILSTED to use OP car on home leave since has no POV at this time, and for cover reasons cannot own two cars.

[illegible]

William V. Broe
Chief, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/SS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J.H.V. Fisher
AC/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

ABSTRACT

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Admin/Logistics - Transportation Allowance for David WILSTED

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. HMMT-5605, 27 September 1965
B. HMMW-13913

1. Headquarters records indicate that Project LEMOG was terminated 30 June 1965 as reported by reference B. WILSTED and MV-2539 were both transferred to Project LIFEAT. An amended TVA was forwarded to the Station by TW #0561324, dated 9 July 1965.

2. The establishment of a transportation allowance is predicated on a reduction in the number of Organization vehicles and a savings to ODYOKE. Considering vehicle depreciation over a period of several years and charges for gas, oil and maintenance, it is deemed economical for ODYOKE to pay the transportation allowance of $50.00 per month. The availability of a POV, which is intended primarily for personal transportation and used only incidentally for official use, makes it advantageous for the employee to receive a transportation allowance.

3. In the case at hand it is noted that 90% usage of a vehicle by WILSTED, representing 1500 miles per month and a proposed $80.00 per month transportation allowance, is for official business. Since the vehicle is used almost exclusively and very extensively for official use, it seems more appropriate, as well as to the advantage of ODYOKE and WILSTED, that it should be an official vehicle.

4. Headquarters appreciates Station desire to reduce the number of QP vehicles. However, each case must be decided on the basis of the circumstances involved and, particularly, ODYOKE interest. We request that the Station reconsider this case before we submit it to higher authority for approval.

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-4372	DATE
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

A

1 - WH/Log
1 - WH/Reg
1 - C/WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Logistics	R.E. Roush	emo (14 Oct. 1965)	6282

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/SS	10/14/65	

53

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division ATTN: Chief, WH Logistics

INFO.
Chief,

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Transportation Allowance for David W. WILSTED Against the [illegible] Project TVA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REFERENCE: A. FR 45-3F(1)
B. FR 23-5A(2)

1. Authority is requested to pay David W. WILSTED a transportation allowance of $80.00 per month for the use of a POV for official business. It is planned to dispose of MV-2539, a 1962 Chevrolet Biscayne 4 door sedan that has been driven for approximately 50,000 miles in favor of a transportation allowance for WILSTED. The vehicle has been used for a total of 30 months with mileage averaging 1,665 miles per month, 90% of which was official business travel.

2. The recommended transportation allowance is based on costs computed as follows:

a.	Gasoline: 1498 miles per month (1665 miles per month less 10% personal mileage) @ 15 miles per gal. 99.8 gallons @ $.32.	$ 31.94
b.	Insurance: Approximately $215.00 per year; less 10% for personal use (193.50 ÷ 12)	16.13
c.	Maintenance: Tire repairs, lubrication, oil change, washing, battery & tire replacement, estimated at $6.00 per month less 10% for personal use.	5.40
d.	Depreciation: Estimated Cost.........$ 3,200 Value after 30 months.. 2,000 Depreciation 1,200 less 10% (1080 ÷ 30)	36.00
		89.47

File

CONTINUED......

Distribution:
3 - WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-5805

DATE
27 Sept. 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [illegible]

Page 2

3. The recommended allowance is not based solely on extraordinarily high costs, although insurance costs are relatively high in Mexico City, but rather the great number of miles traveled by WILSTED every month in connection with [illegible] and cover company business. If WILSTED were to be reimbursed on a mileage basis at Station's rate of $.10 a mile for a 6 cylinder vehicle, he could be paid approximately $[illegible] per month based on past mileage. WILSTED will agree to an $80.00 a month allowance in lieu of the mileage rate with the understanding that a periodic review of use and costs will be made, with resultant adjustments of the allowance if necessary.

4. Since WILSTED will have to purchase his POV in Mexico because of his cover status, he will have to pay an estimated 50% more than the [illegible] recommended retail price, approximately $3,200 for the 1965 Ford Falcon, 4 door sedan he plans to purchase. It is requested that Headquarters advise in regard to the factory recommended retail price as of August or September in ZRMETAL on the above described vehicle, equipped with white side wall tires and radio, to facilitate the computation of the Station contribution to offset the higher cost of the vehicle in Mexico. This amount less the proportionate depreciation will be recoverable at the time the vehicle is disposed of.

5. Considering the amount recoverable upon the disposal of the vehicle, the cost to ODYOKE will be the same or less than the cost of shipping a POV to an overseas post, and will therefore be comparable to the costs of many staff employees overseas who use their POV's for official business.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 5-60 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 2

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 90

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : C. Busto's-Videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 14 Sep 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-91/2

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	C
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO CITY

15 SEP 65 22 03z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY C/OA, OPSER, C/FI, SOD 6

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 43118

LITEMPO

1. MEXICANS HAVE TOLD THEIR MENTOR AT ACADEMY (WHO IS KUBARKER) THAT THEIR EXTRA MONTHS TRAINING AT END OF COURSE WILL BE GIVEN BY "KUBARK" AND THEY HAVE REQUESTED MENTOR TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TRAINING AFTER CLASS HOURS DURING THREE MONTH PERIOD AT ACADEMY. HDQS HAS TOLD MENTOR NOT TO GIVE NIGHT TRAINING, BUT HE WILL PROVIDE THEM ADDITIONAL READING MATERIAL.

2. BOTH COURSES PARA FOUR B ONE AND TWO/ HMMW 13753, (THE ACADEMY AND POLICE SERVICES) ARE AID COURSES. ONLY THE FEW EXTRA DAYS TUTORIAL MENTIONED PARA THREE DIR 30719 WERE TO BE GIVEN BY KUBARK AND THEY WERE TO BE GIVEN BY THE INSTRUCTORS OF THE POLICE SERVICES AND UNDER AID COVER.

3. HDQS PROPOSES HAVE MENTOR INFORM STUDENTS THAT AFTER CHECKING ABOUT THEIR FUTURE TRAINING HE FOUND THAT KUBARK IS NOT GIVING ANY TRAINING, BUT THAT KUBARK WAS THE SPONSOR AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS/ WITH AID FOR ENTIRE TRAINING. HE WILL EXPLAIN THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING. HDQS DOES NOT WISH BLOW KUBARK/ENDOMORPH

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

TO : PAGE TWO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 43116

INVOLVEMENT IN THESE TRAINING COURSES.

4. PLEASE CABLE YOUR IMPRESSION OF BRIEFING RECEIVED BY STUDENTS AND YOUR CONCURRENCE OR IDEAS PARA THREE ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

CI/PG

William V. Broe
Chief, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM [illegible]

ACTION [illegible]

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO

FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T 261502

DIR CITE MEXI 4556

NYXIS DMLET LIFEAT

26 Aug 65 IN 40248

REF DIR 37259

1. ALL LIFEAT RECORDING DONE ON 60 CYCLE MACHINES. LIFEUD-7 WHO TRANSCRIBES SPANISH PORTIONS OF DMLET TAKE REPORTS NO DISTORTION OR TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF UNUSUAL OR CONTINUING NATURE. WILSTED REGULAR CHECKS OF INSTALLATIONS REVEALED BOTH FUNCTIONING PROPERLY.

2. MOST LIFEAT TECH-RECORDING PROBLEMS CORRECTED WITHIN 48 HOURS. ADVISE IF DISTORTION CONTINUES.

S E C R E T

CFN 4556 DIR 37259 LIFEAT 60 CYCLES LIFEUD 7 SPANISH DMLET NO DISTORTION WILSTED 48 HOURS

BT

SECRET

Lifeat/Support

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE
ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : JAMES G. JUNG: dms
UNIT : EE/YA
EXT : 4277
DATE : 19 AUGUST 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

31 S E C R E T

20 AUG 65 22 02

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: EE 6 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY WH 6 TSD 6 CI, CI/OPS, FI,

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 37299

NYXIS DMLET

REF: HMMA 26855 *

OBOLD ADVISES REF TAPES DISTORTED. BELIEVES MAY BE DUE RECORDING ON 60 RATHER THAN 50 CYCLE MACHINE. PLS CHECK. ALSO NOTES LENGTHY BLANK SPOTS BETWEEN TIME ANNOUNCEMENTS. SUGGESTS LP OPERATOR BE REMINDED INSERT INPUT PLUG ONLY HALF WAY.

END OF MESSAGE

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENT: * Forwarded LIFEAT/DMLET tapes to Hqs.

LIFEAT file

EE/COPS

C/WH/1

C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/EE/YA

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : ~~Tracy~~ Lumsden
UNIT : WH/Logistics
EXT : 7282
DATE : 8 July 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

17 S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

9 JUL 65 14 00z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF : WH8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY Logs 4

TO ~~XX~~ MEXI INFO CITE DIR

26259

REF: MEXI 4015 (IN 04465)*

1. SALE TO LIFEUD-24 APPROVED IF STATION FEEL JUSTIFIED REASONS ENHANCEMENT OPS VALUE. OTHERWISE MUST SELL HIGHEST BIDDER.

2. VIEW SCARCITY PARTS AS INDICATED PARA 1 REF, SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD KUBARK WILL NOT RENDER FUTURE SUPPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Station requested dispose MV-2455 to LIFEUD-24, due to inability dispose on local market.

[illegible]

②

C/WH/1 W. KAUFMAN - Tilson

OL/SD

For
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for R. E. ROUSH
C/WH/LOG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	SS	5	
2		6	FL
3	1	7	Rg
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
OLY

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 7, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 022253Z

DIR INFO LGIS CITE MEXI 4015

JBECHO LIFEAT

2 JUL 65 IN 04465

REF A MEXI 2798 (IN 24319)*

B LGIS 9599 (IN **

1. VARIOUS STA ATTEMPTS DISPOSE MV 2455 AS AUTHORIZAED REF B UNSUCCESSFUL. SINCE LOCAL DISTRIBUTION THIS MAKE AUTO DISCONTINUED AND REPLACEMENT PARTS MOST DIFFICULT OBTAIN, HAVE RECD NO SERIOUS BIDS NEAR FAIR MARKET VALUE OF US $560.

2. VIEW ABOVE AND IN LIGHT PROJECT LIFEAT OPS NEEDS, REQUEST AUTHORIZATION SELL MV 2455 TO LIFEUD-24 FOR US $400. THIS WOULD SOLVE DISPOSAL PROBLEM AND GREATLY AID LIFEAT SINCE L-24 NEEDS VECHICLE FOR DAILY OPS USE.

3. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CFN

* AS PER HQS DESIRE REDUCE MEXI TVA, REQUEST AUTHORIZATION DISPOSE MV 2455 NOW ASSIGNED PROJECT LIFEAT.

** NO RECORD IN CS AS OF 0035 2 JULY 65.

SECRET

Lifeat | Siggnort

SECRET

TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

PROJECT

LIFEAT

X a. NEW TVA

b. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA

REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	EXISTING TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
a.	SEDAN 2-dr 5 pass.	0	0	1
b.	STATION WAGON			
c.	OTHER (Specify below)			
(1)				
(2)				
(3)	There are no existing slots on the WH/TVA that can be reallocated to meet this requirement.			
(4)				
(5)	Vehicle transferred from LIMGC, LIMGG AT cancelled. V-2350			
(6)				
d.	TOTALS	0	0	1

R. L. [illegible]
CHIEF, [illegible]

6/29/65

L. L. [illegible]
CHIEF, [illegible] SUPPORT [illegible]

(signed) L. E. Moranda 30 JUN 1965

SECRET

FORM 1116

SECRET

TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

PROJECT

[illegible]

A. DIVISION [illegible]

B. BRANCH

C. DESK

TYPE OF ACTION (Check one)

A. NEW TVA

X B. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA

REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	TOTAL PRESENT TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
A.	SEDAN CANCEL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
B.	STATION WAGON			
C	OTHER (List below)			
(1)				
(2)				
(3)	This vehicle authorization transferred to [illegible].			
(4)	[illegible]			
(5)				
(6)				
D.	TOTALS			

R E Clark

CHIEF, [illegible]

6/29/65

30 JUN 1965

(signed) L. E. Moranda

SECRET

FORM 1116

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, KUROAR

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Training of David M. WILSTED

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a memorandum prepared by Andrew S. PARMERS for Chief of Station, Mexico City concerning the formal training of David M. WILSTED. Station Mexico City appreciates PARMERS' assistance and feels that WILSTED has benefited by this training.

for Tomás L. Pinion
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att h/w
1 - C/KUROAR w/att

CS COPY

50-6-32/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-26233	DATE 1 June 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-32/2

SECRET

1 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Andrew S. PARMERS

SUBJECT : Completion of Training Report on David M. WILSTED

1. In a Mexico City Station Safesite, Subject received training on a part time basis from 17 through 27 May 1967. The instructor was Andrew S. PARMERS (known to trainee as Pablo ZELAYA) from KUROAR, Headquarters. Subjects covered were clandestine communications, operational security, Soviet Bloc intelligence activities, and operational reporting.

2. As a student, Subject was cooperative, participated with enthusiasm, and performed all requirements well. Although he has had very little previous formal training, he has had much practical experience and assimilates theory rapidly.

3. As a person, Subject is mature, calm, friendly, has a sense of humor, practical, a doer rather than a thinker, aggressive, and confident. He has broad area knowledge, is satisfied with his cover employment and with his KUBARK employment. He had no complaints and showed good emotional stability. He likes Mexico and Mexicans, and speaks excellent Spanish.

4. He has a very limited knowledge of KUBARK functions and organization, but he considers himself to be a careerist in this organization.

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

Att #1 to HMMA - 26233

CS COPY

50-6-32/2

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
LIFEAT/Support

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMW-13482

1. Station Mexico City appreciates Headquarters forwarding of the dial recorder pressure tape for project LIFEAT. While trying to expend the regular tape on hand, Station had experimented with the new fiber-tipped pen as a substitute for the standard ball point pen in the dial recorder. However, either the altitude or the dry climate (or a combination of both) dried out the fiber-tipped pen after short periods of use.

2. Station believes that the pressure tapes will provide a satisfactory solution to this problem which has plagued the Project for some time.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

50-6-32/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-25717	DATE 31 March 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-32/2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT LIFEAT/Support

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Thomas C. LUND reported on returning to Headquarters after his TDY in Mexico that one of the LIFEAT basehouse keepers, possibly LIFEUD-1, was having difficulty in getting the pens for the dial recorders to write. Therefore, Headquarters has shipped by transmittal manifest to the Station 100 reels of pressure tape for the LIFEAT basehouses to use with the dial recorders. Headquarters hopes that this will be a satisfactory solution to your problem, and if not, please advise.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-32/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER CS COPY HMMW 13482	DATE 25 MAR 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-32/2

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1	C. Bustos-Videla	jah	4507

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		DESMOND FITZGERALD

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

TOTAL COPIES

28 **SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	SS	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	1	8	

FROM LOGISTICS

ACTION OL 4

MAR 19 10 24 AM '65

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, WH 7

SECRET 181725Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE LGIS 9599

JBECHO

REF MEXI 2798

18 MAR 65 IN 25857

DISPOSAL OF MV 2455 AUTHORIZED PER FR 45 1 M. REPORT DETAILS OF SALE BY DISPATCH USING JBECHO INDICATOR.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

27 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION OL4

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE WH/7, CI, CI/OPS, FI

SECRET 17[illegible]55Z

DIR CITE MEXI 275[illegible]

[illegible]/LIFEAT

1. PER HQS DESIRE REDUCE MEXI TVA, REQUEST AUTHORIZATION DISPOSE IV 2455 NO ASSIGNED PROJECT LIFEAT. IV 2455 WITH 57,000 MILES PURCHASED SECOND HAND EARLY 1962. DAVID H. WILSTED WILL SELL TO HIGHEST BIDDER ON OPEN MARKET AND VEHICLE WILL NOT BE REPLACED.

SECRET

CFN

17 MAR 65 IN 24319

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

019

DATE : 20 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 6

INFO : CI/IC 2, CI/OA, TSD 4, C/MS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 20 0329Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 42857

DIR CITE MEXI 2256

1. CAREER AGENT DAVID N. WILSTED BECAME ELIGIBLE FOR HOME LEAVE AUG 62. REQUESTS TRAVEL ORDERS FOR HOME LEAVE TWO MONTHS BEGINNING 1 DEC 62. SUBJECT AND 2 DEPENDANTS WILL TRAVEL VIA CPV TO SCRANTON, PENNA. STATION DESIRES 5 DAYS TDY HEADQUARTERS FOR CONSULTATION KURIOT AND PHYSICAL EXAM HOME LEAVE POINT. WILSTED TO PAY FOR ALL PERSONAL MILEAGE DURING TRIP.

2. LIEMBRACE-8 ASSUMING WILSTED LIFEAT DUTIES DURING HOME LEAVE PERIOD.

END OF MESSAGE

Lifeat

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG: FOLLY PIKE CP.
UNIT: WH LOGISTICS
EXT: 5501
DATE: 1 MARCH 1962 1062

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

2 MAR 62 22 03z

☐ DEFERRED SIG CEN
☒ ROUTINE

OUT56919

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 44950

APPROVE MEXI-0197 (IN 34939*). MV 2455 APPLIES

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *REQUESTED APPROVAL TO PURCHASE REPLACEMENT VEHICLE FOR LIFEAT AT COST NOT TO EXCEED $1800.

TO CABLE SECRETARIAT: SEND COPY OF CABLE TO OL/SD/VS.

LIFEAT / Support

C/WH/3

TELECOORD:
OL/SD/VS - Mrs. Herman CP.
OL/PO - Mr. Wagner

PAUL E. ARNESON
Chief, WH Support
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Edward McNeil
EDWARD F. McNEIL
Chief, WH Logistics
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

481

:ATE : 28 FEB 62

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : MEXICO CITY

CTION : WH 8

FO : CI/IC 2, OL 3, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 28 2016Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 34939

DIR CITE MEXI 0197

REF HMMT-2430

REQUEST APPROVAL PURCHASE FOREIGN COMPACT CAR TO REPLACE LIFEAT MV 2244 SOLD ON DEPARTURE RALPH B RAFANELLI. COST NOT TO EXCEED US $1,800. AS IN PAST THIS CAR NECESSARY FOR CONTINUING LIFEAT OP.

END OF MESSAGE

LIFEAT Support.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 020
21 FEB 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

ROUTING
1
2
3

FEB 22 0420 62

ROUTINE

IN 31890

DIR CITE MEXI 0159 (WARE ACTING)

RPF A MEXI 9437 (IN 23597) **

B DIR 06847 **

AQUATIC

1. CONTINUING CARDIOGRAMS DAVID M WILSTED INDICATE NO CHANGE CONDITION NOTED REF A.

2. TO GIVE STATION LATITUDE ITS CONTINGENCY PLANNING THIS MATTER

3. REQUEST AMEND LIEMBRACE-8 OA PROVIDE USE IN LIFEAT PART TIME AS STAND BY REPLACEMENT WILSTED WHILE CONTINUING MKCHARITY DUTIES. HARVEY C MULFORD CONCURS RECOMMENDATION.

4. REQUEST CABLE REPLY.

AND ASSURE CONTINUANCE LIFEAT OP IN EVENT WILSTED PARTIALLY OR FULLY INCAPACITATED IN FUTURE, STATION DESIRES INTRODUCE LIEMBRACE-8 PART TIME INTO LIFEAT FOR TECHNICAL BACKUP TO WILSTED. WAYNE C

LIFEAT/

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 020

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE 2

IN 31890 MEXI 0159

DRABAND WOULD CONTINUE AS ASSISTANT OUTSIDE LIFEAT CO BUT BELIEVE HE CAN NOT HANDLE MORE TECHNICAL AREAS ESPECIALLY VIEW HIS RECENT INTRODUCTION TO OP. LIEMBRACE-8 PROVEN COMPETENCE ELECTRIC AND ELECTRONIC FIELDS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

**RE PHYSICAL EXAM OF WILSTED INDICATING HEART CONDITION.

***CABLE PRE-DATES CS FILES. COPY MAY BE SEEN IN SIGNAL CENTER ARCHIVES.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : C. BUSTOS-VIDELA
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 2555
DATE : 23 FEBRUARY 1962

1703

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, TSD 4, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

24 FEB 62 20z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 54710

OUT 54710

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 43762

43762

REF: MEXI 0159 (IN 31890)*

1. HQS CONCURS PROPOSAL REF. PROCESSING AMENDMENT LIEMBRACE-8 OA.

2. SUGGEST STATION CONTINUE CHARGE L-8 TO MKCHARITY. AT TIME LIFEAT SUBMITTED FOR RENEWAL IN JUNE STATION SHOULD REASSESS SITUATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER L-8 SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED LIFEAT.

3. REQUEST PROGRESS REPORT ACTIVITY L-8.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Request Hqs concurrence to use LIEMBRACE-8 TO TEMPORARILY relieve David WILSTED (ps) LIFEAT Case Officer.

LIFEAT

TSD/ASB/Bartley (by phone)

CI/OPS/WH/Hughes (in draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

1720

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : S.J. BURTON
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 26 SEPTEMBER 1961

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

26 SEP 61 23 55z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO : S/C 2

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT51096

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 14216

IS MEXI EXPECTING HQS PROVIDE STAFF INDIVIDUAL TO REPLACE RAFANELLI? IF SO, PLS CONFIRM AND EXPLAIN AS MEXI HAS HERETOFORE SAID INDIVIDUAL KNOWN TO STATION PERSONNEL WOULD BE HIRED UNDER CONTRACT.

END OF MESSAGE

LIFEAT [illegible]

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

N. P. HOLMAN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DIRECTOR

: MEXICO CITY

FEB 7 2326Z 61

[illegible]ON: [illegible] 6 *

: CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WH 4, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 42092

DIR CITE MEXI 7272

DIRTAC

REF DIR [illegible] (out 70[illegible])

LIBRIFORM NOW PLANNING LEAVE [illegible]. STATION WILL PROBABLY HAVE SPANISH TRANSLATOR AVAILABLE BY THEN. ANY CASE CHECK CONVERSATIONS MUST U[illegible] PART OF [illegible] [illegible] TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR NYXIS USED.

**CONCERNED REPLACEMENT FOR LIBRIFORM.

LIFEAT

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMT-1824

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
1 February 1961

SUBJECT
LIFEAT/Memorandum of Oral Commitments

RE: 43 3 — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
Place attachments in appropriate agent files

REFERENCE(S)

1. Attached are memoranda of oral commitments (three copies) for the following Station agents:

   a. LIFEUD/1
   b. LIFEUD/2
   c. LIFEUD/3
   d. LIFEUD/4
   e. LIFEUD/7
   f. LIFEUD/8
   g. LIFEUD/9

2. It is requested that Headquarters file the attached memoranda of oral commitments in their corresponding agent files. The above agents operate under Project LIFEAT and the attachments are intended to formalize commitments made to these agents some years ago.

Willard C. Curtis

30 January 1961

Distribution:
3 - Hqs
8 - Files

FORM
USE PREVIOUS EDITION
REPLACES FORMS
51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

Lifeat/project (3)

SECRET

OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/OPS; BUDGET AND FISCAL BRANCH, FI/SG

SUBJECT: LIFEAT (APPROVAL OF PROJECT); ______ (ACCOUNT NO.); WH/3/MEXICO (OPERATING DIVISION AND COUNTRY)

SECTION 1. BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED FUNDS *(To be completed from data in project outline)*

THE TOTAL FUNDS BEING REQUESTED FOR ABOVE PROJECT, AMOUNTING TO $ ______, ARE BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:

BREAKDOWN AND TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR		
	1961		
COMPENSATION	$ 60,303.00	$	$
ALLOWANCES	2,304.00		
TRAVEL	2,930.00		
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	25,864.00		
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES	7,500.00		
OTHER:			
TOTALS	$ 98,901.00	$	$

SECTION 2. ADMINISTRATIVE *(To be completed by project officer)*

INDICATE ANY DETAILS THAT WILL ASSIST FINANCE DIVISION IN MAKING ADVANCES, DISBURSEMENTS AND ACCOUNTINGS

A. TYPE OF PROJECT *(Check one)*

☐ REGULAR ☒ SUBSIDY ☐ PROPRIETARY

B. METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

C. FUNDS WILL BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY *(Check one)*

1	☒	REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS *(FHB 30-1500-1 or FHB 30-1500-4)*
2	☐	RECEIPTS ONLY *(R 230-200)*
3	☐	OTHER *(Explain)*:

SECTION 3. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS *(To be completed by operating division budget officer)*

I CERTIFY THAT, TO MEET THE ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED IN SECTION 1:

A. -- FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE IN THE DIVISION'S BUDGET FOR THE FY 1961

B. -- FUNDS HAVE BEEN PROGRAMMED FOR THE FY 1961.

SIGNATURE OF OPERATING DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER	DATE

SECTION 4. AUTHORIZATION *(To be completed by Projects Branch, FI/OPS)*

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM ______ TO ______ IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ ______ AS BROKEN DOWN IN SECTION 1.

SIGNATURE FOR PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/OPS	DATE

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
C. L. Zehrung	2555	Ned P. Holman, AC/WH/3	25 July 1960

FORM 4-59 680 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(3)

Finance Division

WH/B&F

WH/3/Mexico

Ralph B. RAFANELLI LIFEAT 27 Dec 59 - 19 Mar 1960

Agent's Bank Account

File

Spec. Support

R.N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
HMMW-7922

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
50-6-32/2

DATE
[illegible]

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : LIFEAT/ZONAR

ACTION REQUIRED : None

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)
HMMA-13043, 5 June 1959

The following system which will give the Station 26 new target symbols for use in LIFEAT/ZONAR has been assigned to Mexico City:

An additional Station symbol "N" has been assigned. Now, repeating the A through Z series in column number 2 will make 26 new combinations. The former targets should be called MA, MB, MC, etc. The new targets will be NA, NB, NC, etc.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

28 July 1959

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - DDP/MIU/OPEX
1 - RI

Scaletti

WH/3/Mexico/E.I.SCALETTI:ngs

Coordinated by phone with:

DDP/MIU/OPEX

CS COPY

50-6-32/2

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-7923
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-72/2 50-[illegible]-32/2
FROM : Chief, WHD		DATE 31 JUL 1959
SUBJECT : LIFEAT/LIENVOY ZONAR		RE 43 3 - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED : Reply to paragraphs 2 and 3		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-13320

1. Headquarters approves the suggestions made in reference for adapting the ZONAR format to LIENVOY needs. The Station will use the first two columns for numbers running from 01 to 30 to designate the recording machine on which the material was received, and the 6 spaces in column three will be used for the dossier number assigned the target. Under this system, the Station has room for expansion up to 999,999 targets. The name IN, name OUT, and telephone number columns will be the same for LIENVOY as for the system applied to LIFEAT/ZONAR abstracts.

2. Headquarters has several questions on the remaining columns.

a. First of all, will the Station have the ZONAR abstract sheets filled out in Spanish or English? If the runs appear in English, they will be of limited value to the Mexicans; if they appear in Spanish, the Spanish and English abbreviations for the same Subjects will not fall together in alphabetical consolidated runs for the subject type runs. (See paragraph 3 below.)

b. According to paragraph 3 and 6 of reference the Station wants the following IBM ZONAR listings every two months:

LIENVOY: 1 copy NAME IN, NAME OUT, TELEPHONE

LIFEAT/LIENVOY consolidated run: 1 copy NAME IN, NAME OUT, TELEPHONE

The Station now receives two runs of LIFEAT and in addition to the runs listed above, also receives listings by Subject, symbol and diacritical mark. Does the Station no longer need these three types of listings and will one instead of two LIFEAT runs be satisfactory for the Station's needs? The Station receives an extra (third) copy of the yearly cumulative run. Will the Station want one extra copy of the LIFEAT/LIENVOY yearly cumulative ZONAR run also?

c. Does the Station want the ZONAR run for LIENVOY to bear the classification of SECRET?

3. With respect to the use of Subject and Symbol codes for LIENVOY ZONAR abstracting: Whether the runs are in English or Spanish, LIENVOY can use the same symbol column symbols as those which appear in the sterile manual. (Some symbols such as H which indicates LCHARVEST material have been deleted from the symbols passed to Liaison services.)

With respect to the subject codes, the field may translate directly into Spanish the English words against which subject codes have already been assigned, and then abbreviate these words into four letter groups. If the Spanish is used, please submit your list of Spanish abbreviations for Headquarters information records.

CS COPY

50-6-72/2

FORM 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-7923

All new subject codes must be sent to Headquarters for approval as is the custom for English codes.

Example: Appointments - APPT : Cita - CITA

Purchase - PRCH : Compra - COMP

4. One thousand [illegible] abstract sheets for use in LIENVOY will be pouched to you in the near future.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

28 July 1959

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/3/Mexico
- 1 - DDP/[illegible]/OPEX
- 2 - RI

WH/3/Mexico/[illegible]:ngs

Coordinated in draft with :

DDP/[illegible]/OPEX

CS COPY

31 JULY 59

50-6-72/3

FORM 53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: [illegible] (APPROVAL OF PROJEC.); ______ (ACCOUNT NO.); WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 July 1959 TO 30 June 1960 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 135,[illegible]5 AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

______ FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ______ DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1960	FISCAL YEAR
COMPENSATION	$ 76,594	$
ALLOWANCES	6632	
TRAVEL	5600	
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	13559	
OTHER: Equipment	5500	
TOTAL	$ 135[illegible]5	$

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one)	☒	REGULAR	☐	SUBSIDY	☐ PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)	☒	REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (AFR 3C-10)
	☐	RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
	☐	OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE [illegible] DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 19[illegible] CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

______ DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ______ DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

☐	PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE	☐	APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
☐	PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT	☐	OTHER (Explain):
☐	RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION	▨	

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

Ralph . [illegible]
Woodrow . [illegible]
Carol . [illegible]
Alice . [illegible]
Olivia . [illegible]

Wallace . [illegible]
Leona . [illegible]
[illegible] through [illegible]15

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
J. B. [illegible]	2555		15 JUN 1959

FORM NO. 680 REPLACES FORM 59-124
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(3)

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMMA-13019
TO Chief, WH Division INFO Chi[illegible]		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 29 May 1959
SUBJECT Cormac Unibath Six Minute Photographic Developer		RE [illegible] — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		

REFERENCE(S)

1. Enclosed is a clipping advertising a UNIBATH developer, one step photo developing solution, that replaces the three separate solutions now used by the operational darkroom technician who processes the take from the LIMERICK basehouses.

2. We now have a time lag of one to two weeks in receiving the take from these basehouses. Most of this time lag is caused by the lengthy developing process in use. If there is anything to the UNIBATH developer, its use in our outside darkroom would be a decidedly worthwhile investment. Inquiries at the local photographic stores revealed that they had never heard of this product. It is requested that a sample of this developer be sent to the Mexico Station, marked: For Quinton OUSLER so that it will reach the proper basehouse processor. If it proves successful, arrangements will be made through a local firm to place an order for the quantity necessary to meet the operational requirements.

Willard C. CURTIS

RBR/vpo
28 May 1959

Distribution
3 WH Division
2 KURIOT

TSS will [illegible]

LIFEAT [illegible]

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS [illegible] WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

SECRET

March 4, 1959

TO: WH/Logistics

FROM: WH/III/Mexico

160

SUBJECT: Request for 50 Recording Tapes

1. In response to the Mexico City Station's request in HMMA 11269 of February 1959, it is requested that 160, 5835-H03-8050 7" tapes, 1000 feet long. The cost should be charged to the LIFEAT Project.

2. Shipping instructions have been requested from the Station.

Paul Oberst
Acting Chief, WH/III/Mexico

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3

440 BD/MI
25 NOV 58 440

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

[illegible]

[illegible]

: DIRECTOR

M : MEXICO CITY

CTION: C/WH 2

INFO : COP, C/CI, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 30843

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2835

RYBAT

REF ~~HMMS~~ 484

1. VIEW REF STATION DEEMS ADVISABLE MOVE CURRENT LIFEAT BASE HOUSES KNOWN TO SUBJECT. WILL ADVISE HQS WHEN CHANGE COMPLETED.

2. PLEASE ADVISE STATION SUBJECTS PLANS RESIDENCE MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

file -
Lifeat support
K

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-11537

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

DATE 12 November 1958

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Project LIFEAT
Request for Spare Parts

ACTION REQUIRED That the Items Below be procured and Forwarded to/ Station Mexico

RE "RE" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY.

REFERENCE(S)

1. It is requested that the following items be procured and forwarded to Station Mexico for use in Project LIFEAT:

A. Vacuum Tubes:

6V6	100 each
6J5	200 each
6X5	200 each
6K6	50 each
6SN7	25 each
6SL7	50 each
6AU6	50 each
12AX7	50 each

B. Grommets for EKO recorder:

These grommets are listed in the EKO parts catalog as symbol E40 Motor Mounting grommets (3), part number p9477. It is requested that the soft live rubber (flat) grommets be sent since the rounded ones are hard and transmit a lot of noise and rumble. If these grommets are available, Station Mexico could use approximately 120 of them.

C. Fast Forward Cable Assy:

Number 242-12297	25 each

D. Take Up Reels:

Empty take up reels	30 each

2. If there is a kit with assorted condensers for the Pulse Recorders (DR-2) and for the Revere Recorders, it is requested that such a kit be forwarded.

Willard C. CURTIS

EPS/vps
10 November 1958

Distribution
3 Hqs

Lifeat [illegible]

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE 1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-11333

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/2

DATE
22 October 1958

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT
Purchase of Correspondence Course

ACTION REQUIRED
See paragraph 1

REFERENCE(S)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

1. It is requested that Headquarters arrange for the purchase of the correspondence course described in the attachment.

2. It is believed that Lessons 1 and 2 would be of interest to those persons involved in the technical aspects of Project LIFEAT. In addition to being a possible training aid, it is believed that the literature will tend to add a measure of interest to the essentially difficult and tedious work of these persons.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

eps
EPS/vps
15 October 1958

Distribution
3 Hqs w/one copy attach.

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

3 copy

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

S E C R E T

ATTACHMENT TO [illegible]



The World's Only Correspondence Course in Wire Tapping

A complete course in Electronic and Photographic Surveillance Equipment illustrated with photographs, drawings, and schematics of special equipment.

This course written for professional detectives, presents many new techniques in Wire Tapping and Bugging. A catalog of Electronic and Photographic Surveillance Equipment is included. Each lesson is concluded with a fiction story example showing the practical uses of the material of that lesson. Personalized Quizzes are given, and questions answered, a certificate of completion is awarded.

The following is an outline of the course:

LESSON I "Wire Tapping"
- The Wired Tap
- Wireless Wire Tapping
- Fiction "Tom Makes a Tap"

LESSON II. "Bugging"
- Wired Bugs
- Wireless Bugs
- Directional Microphones
- Recording Equipment and Techniques
- Fiction "All Hell Breaks Loose"

LESSON III "Micro & Infra Photography"
- Microphotography
- Film Processing
- Invisible Photography
- Remote Photography
- Fiction "Tom and the Nude Spy"

LESSON IV "Telescopic Photography"
- Aerial Photography
- Telescopic Photography
- Geometric Ramifications of Aerial Photography
- Fiction "Tom Spots An 'Owl' House"

LESSON V. "Tailing"
- The Wireless Tail
- Radio Direction Finders
- Fiction "The Canned Con-Artist"

The FULL COURSE just $22.50, Complete.

C. CARRIER CO.

Dept. JE 1880 Hollywood Blvd. Hollywood 28, Calif

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMMA-11333

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 50-6-32/2

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE 22 October 1958

SUBJECT Purchase of Correspondence Course

(CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED See paragraph 1

REFERENCE(S)

1. It is requested that Headquarters arrange for the purchase of the correspondence course described in the attachment.

2. It is believed that Lessons 1 and 2 would be of interest to those persons involved in the technical aspects of Project LIFEAT. In addition to being a possible training aid, it is believed that the literature will tend to add a measure of interest to the essentially difficult and tedious work of these persons.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

EPS/vps
15 October 1958

Distribution
3 Hqs w/one copy attach.

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐

CHARGE NO. B 46145

REQUESTER'S NAME Thomas A. Ogden

DATE OF REQUEST 28 October 1958

OFFICE/DIVISION DDP/WH BR III

ROOM NO. AND BUILDING 2112 Barton Hall

EXTENSION 2555

AUTHOR/ORIGINATING AGENCY AND POST C. Carrier Co.

THIS COPY FOR REQUESTER'S RECORD

TITLE OF PUBLICATION The World's Only Correspondence Course in Wire Tapping

NEED ☐ DOCUMENT WITH ENCLOSURE ☐ WITHOUT ENCLOSURE ☐ ENCLOSURE ONLY

PUBLISHER AND ADDRESS *(Needed only if item is to be purchased)* C. CARRIER CO. Dept JA 5860 Hollywood Blvd. Hollywood 26, Calif.

DOCUMENT NO.

IAC CONTROL NO.

PUBLICATION DATE

DOC. CLASSIFICATION

☐ NEED LOAN ONLY ☐ NEED RETENTION COPY ☐ NEED EXPENDABLE COPY

APPROVAL IS REQUIRED FOR ITEMS TO BE PURCHASED → APPROVED

DEADLINE DATE (IF ANY) →

NUMBER OF COPIES NEEDED →

REMARKS *(Source of citation, sensitivity, subscription period or specific issues, state price if known).*

In view of the type of material involved and because of operational considerations, it is requested that this publication be purchased through sterile channels.

FOR LIBRARY USE ONLY

DUE DATE

PURCHASE ORDER NO.

SEQUENCE NO.

SEA/AIR	ACCT./EXP.
TYPE	POST/DLR.
OR DATE	EST. COST
OR COPIES	OFFICE
REC. DATE	REC. COPIES
REORDER	PRICE

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

Lifeat Support

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
HMMA-11332

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
50-6-32/2

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
22 October 1958

SUBJECT
Project LIFEAT Supplies

RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
Forwarding of supplies requested in paras. 1 and 2

REFERENCE(S)
HMMW-6820, 24 Sept 58, para 14

1. It is requested that ten Revere Recorders be forwarded to this Station for use under Project LIFEAT.

2. It is also requested that 300 Magnetic recording tapes be forwarded. These tapes are to be used to replace those destroyed at this Station and those forwarded to Headquarters.

3. The above supplies should be charged to Project LIFEAT.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

559-110-59

EPS/vps
15 October 1958

Distribution
3 Hqs

FORM 10 57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51 28, 51 28A AND 51 29

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

TO; TSS/Logistics Branch:

1.	5835-003-9856	Recorder/Reproducer, Sound, magnetic, 1/4 Tape, 1 channel, in-3 [illegible] SC-2 Revere Model T-705-D, 110V/50 cycles	10 ea.	145.712 $ 1,457.12
2.	5835-003-8089	Tape, Sound recording, 1/4" 1800' 7" diameter MMM 190-18 SC 2	300 reels	2.419 $ 725.70 1457.12 $ 2,182.82

559-110-59
9-3570-53-906 [illegible]

Item #1 shipped on 5 Dec.
The recorders [illegible] in stock,
[illegible] ordered and will be
shipped as soon as received.
TM 6 Jan 59

Lifeat Support

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
HMMT-451

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
50-6-32/2

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
8 October 1958

SUBJECT
Reverse Telephone Listings

RE: "MARK" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
See paragraph 2

REFERENCE(S)

1. There is attached one copy of the September 1958 issue of the telephone directory for the Federal District, Mexico.

2. It is requested that a reverse listing be made to correspond to the phone numbers in this book and that 5 sets of these listings be forwarded for use at Station in addition to those to be provided to the desk.

3. This request for new listings is based on the fact that the phone system in Mexico City has undergone so many changes since the 1956 directory was issued and processed by Headquarters that a portion of this is now obsolete.

Willard C Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attach.
GFB/vps
1 October 1958

Distribution
3 Hqs (w/attach)
2 Files

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-10586

50-6-32/2

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 9 July 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— LIFEAT

SPECIFIC— Daniel K. BROMUND (P)

ACTION REQUESTED: None, informationonly

1. Subject's application for "rentista" status in Mexico is being processed by Gobernacion and LIKAYAK/2 has been requested by Gobernacion Undersecretary Fernando ROMAN Lugo to check with ODYOKE as to whether Subject has any derogatory background. ROMAN Lugo is particularly interested in preventing any American with Communist connection from settling in Mexico.

2. Subject is described as a North American of Russian origin; the origin is probably what brought about the request for traces, and the Station for the time being attaches no other significance to the query.

3. LIKAYAK/2 is being told that there is no derogatory information on Subject and that if any are developed through a query to Headquarters, he will be notified. No further action is contemplated.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

HLS/bct
7 July 58

Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

FORM NO. 51-28 A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

50-6-32/2

CS COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: LI?AT (APPROVAL OF PROJECT) ; ______ (ACCOUNT NO.) ; WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 July 1958 TO 30 June 1959 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 159,569.16 AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

______ FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ______ DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

150 83

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1959	FISCAL YEAR
COMPENSATION	$ ~~[illegible]~~	$
ALLOWANCES	6,300.00	
TRAVEL	5,900.00	
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	54,[illegible]	
OTHER:		
TOTAL	$ ~~159,569.16~~	$

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one) ☒ REGULAR ☐ CUSTODY ☐ PROPRIETARY

156,336

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
☒ REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (AFR 30-10)
☐ RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ______ DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ______ CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

______ DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ______ DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

☐ PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE
☐ PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
☐ RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION
☐ APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]/1/2/6	[illegible]/3
[illegible]	[illegible]RA	[illegible]'s helper	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]/1/2/3/4/5/7/8	[illegible]/2/3
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]/16	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
[illegible]	2535		July 58

FORM NO. 680 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-104 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(3)

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-6418

50-6-32/2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 10 JUN 1958

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - LIFEAT

Returned under separate cover (by sea pouch) is LIFEAT equipment which were inadvertently packed with the personal effects of Thomas G. URQUHART and forwarded to the Headquarters area.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

COPY

3 June 1958

Attachment: Confidential
u/s/c as described above.

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono
- 1 - RI
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/[illegible]

(Releasing officer)
J. C. KING, C/WHD

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)
R. K. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

50-6-32/2

167

167 FLG/SW/

20 MAY 1960

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 21 14 23 58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 31124

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1588

RE: DIR 19150 (OUT 70224) *

1. CONSIDERING SUBJECT FILL BAF 8095. STATION NEEDS MULTI-LANGUAGE LIFEAT TRANSLATOR AND LIVE MONITOR.

2. REQUEST SUBJECT TDY MEXI FOR APPRAISAL SUITABILITY LIFEAT WORK PRIOR DECISION PCS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED ASSIGNMENT AS TRANSLATOR FOR BAF-8095.

K.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA [illegible]
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible] 6143

50-6-32/1

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 1 APR 1958

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
{ SPECIFIC - Project LIFEAT

Ref: H[illegible]A-9407, 23 October 1957(K[illegible])

Action Requested: None

1. On 24 February 1958 Project LIFEAT was amended to authorize payment of $1320 compensation to Nadine H. CHAR[illegible] (201-2[illegible]674[illegible]) for the period 1 January 1958 through 30 June 1958 (the expiration date of the project).

2. A contract for CHAR[illegible] is being prepared and will be forwarded to the Mexico City Station when it is complete.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

26 March 1958

WH/III/Mexico/Dulcinga

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1-WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI
1 - Subject

(Releasing officer)
J. C. KING, C/WHD

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)
J. M. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

50-6-32/2

VIA. Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-9655

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 7 March 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/LIFEAT Suppprt

SPECIFIC— The Daniel K. BROMUND Bookcase

Reference: HMM-W-5865

As directed in HMM-W-5982, the three copies of attachment to reference were destroyed by the Station on 6 March 1958.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

BCT
7 Mar 58

Distribution
3 - Hqs
3 - Files

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28 A

CS COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

50-6-32/2

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5982

50-6-32/2

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 14 FEB 1958

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational/LIFEAT Support
SPECIFIC - The Daniel K. BRONHEIM Bookcase

REFS: A. HMMW 5865, 21 January 1958
B. MEXI 1020, 4 February 1958
C. DIR 06768, 5 February 1958
D. MEXI 1032, 7 February 1958

ACTION REQUESTED: Destroy or return all copies of the attachment to reference A to Headquarters.

In view of references B and D, it is requested that the copy, or copies, of the attachment to reference A be destroyed by the Station or returned to Headquarters. If destroyed by the Station, please advise Headquarters by dispatch as to the date of destruction. This procedure is necessitated to insure the security of the device should KURIOT later use the bookcase in another area.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

10 February 1958

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI
1 - Subject

WH/III Mexico/L.Puckett:jck

COORDINATION:

WH/Logistics E. R. Hileman

(Coordinating officer)

(Releasing officer)
J. C. KING, C/WHD

(Authenticating officer)
J. W. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

50-6-32/2

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

[illegible]
[illegible]
2355
5 FEBRUARY [illegible]

[illegible] CITY

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] ____________
[illegible] ____________

FEAT
[illegible]

[illegible] / [illegible]

SECRET

AIR

S-15

50-6-32/2

: Chief of Station, Mexico City

: Chief, WHD

- Administrative/LIFEAT

- Personnel for REDCAP reporting

8 FEB 1958

REFS: HMMA-9069, 31 December 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for information only.

1. The Station's request for the assignment of either a PCS or TDY clerk-typist experienced in REDCAP reporting has been discussed with the SR Division. Both the SR and WH Divisions recognize the Station's need for such an individual; however, it is at this time impossible to acquire an additional slot for the PCS assignment of an employee and it is not believed feasible to assign individuals on an extended TDY basis.

2. Although the rotational field training program suggested by the Station would appear initially to be an excellent way to solve the referenced problem, Headquarters believes that the long-run effect would not achieve the desired results. This opinion is based primarily on the lack of qualified Headquarters employees suitable for such a TDY assignment. Also significant is the fact that [illegible] would have to provide a slot for the TDY employee, thereby reducing by one the total slots normally available to that office - a troublesome problem under the present personnel ceiling.

3. The SR Division has suggested that they would be glad to provide REDCAP training to the next competent lady employee scheduled for PCS assignment to the Station. This, of course, would not increase the Station's T/O; it would only transfer an employee from one station job to another. Should you have any desires along this line, please advise Headquarters.

1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI
1 - Subject

27 January 1958

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

COORDINATE WITH:

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom

WH/Support ______________

SR/IO ______________

WH/ III/Mexico/LPuckett:jck

J. C. KING, C/WHD

R.N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET

AIR

[illegible]S-15

50-6-32/2

3 Feb 58

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: - Administrative/ [illegible]
- Personnel for [illegible]AP reporting

REF: HMMA-[illegible]9, 31 December 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for information only.

1. The Station's request for the assignment of either a PCS or TDY clerk-typist experienced in [illegible]AP reporting has been discussed with the SR Division. Both the SR and WH Divisions recognize the Station's need for such an individual; however, it is at this time impossible to acquire an additional slot for the PCS assignment of an employee and it is not believed feasible to assign individuals on an extended TDY basis.

2. Although the rotational field training program suggested by the Station would appear initially to be an excellent way to solve the referenced problem, Headquarters believes that the long-term effect would not achieve the desired results. This opinion is based primarily on the lack of qualified Headquarters [illegible]. Also of difficulty is the fact that [illegible] would have to provide a slot for the TDY employee, thereby reducing by one the total slots normally available to that office - a troublesome problem under the present personnel ceiling.

3. The SR Division has suggested that they would be glad to provide [illegible]AP training to the next competent lady employee scheduled for PCS assignment to the Station. This, of course, would not increase the Station's T/O; it would only transfer an employee from one Station job to another. Should you have any desires along this line, please advise Headquarters.

1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI
1 - Subject

27 January 1958

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

COORDINATE WITH:

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom

WH/Support ____________

SP/IO ____________

WH/III/Mexico/LPuckett:jck

J. C. KING, C/WHD

C.H. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: A I R
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-5865

50-6-32/2

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 21 JAN 58 10 34

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational/LIFEAT Support
SPECIFIC - Concealment Device for Use by Daniel K. BROMUND (201-210541)

1. In answer to a special request by Daniel K. BROMUND and approved by the WH Division, KUTRIOT has constructed a bookcase containing a concealment area for his use in connection with the LIFEAT Project. This bookcase is now being packed for shipment. The Station will be advised later of the method of shipment and the ETA. Instructions for its use are u/s/c. If the Station has no objection to its use by BROMUND it is requested that it be delivered to him.

2. If the Station believes that additional similar concealment devices would be of use under LIFEAT Project, it is requested that you forward to Headquarters your suggestions and comments, furnishing details as to quantity, size and prospective use. Your request will then be referred to KUTRIOT.

COPY

R N Dahlgren
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachment: u/s/c
3 copies of memorandum

10 January 1957

10 January 1958

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City w/att. u/s/c
1 - WH/III/Chrono w/o/att.
1 - WH/Mailroom w/o.att.
1 - TSS/Joe Baglio w/o/att
1 - RI w/o/att.
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:gtc

R N Dahlgren
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

R N Dahlgren
(Authenticating officer)

J. C. KING, Chief/ WHD

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

50-6-32/2

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

SECRET

20 December 1957

CONCEALMENT - BOOKCASE
Work Order 2176
(CDB-106)

A bookcase 42" x 48" x 12" was made with a concealment area. The bookcase was made from pine and painted flat black. The concealment area is 1-5/8" x 10-1/2" x 46" and is located under the bottom shelf and covered by the kick panel.

The kick panel must be opened in order to gain access to the concealment area. This panel is held in place with a positive locking device. The locking device is located under the front-center section of the bottom shelf. It is located beneath a filled nail hole. The locking device is released by inserting a table knife blade - or similar piece of metal - between the bottom shelf and kick panel and by pushing toward the rear of the case, a distance of approximately 2", at the above-designated point. To facilitate inserting the blade on a loaded shelf, lift upward on the center part of the bottom shelf until the lock releases. When the lock is released, the kick panel may be moved by pressing inward on the bottom edge of the panel. After the panel has been moved slightly withdraw the knife so that the under surface of the shelf is not marked; then complete opening the panel. It is important that the kick panel not be forced beyond its maximum opening point approximately 70 degrees from vertical.

To close the panel, return it to its original position by pressing inward on the top edge until the lock snaps into place. Test for locking by pushing inward on the bottom edge.

SECRET

14-00000

~~599/SE/REL/LSH~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

ORIG : L. D. [illegible]
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 27 DECEMBER 1957

599

LIFEAT SUPPORT

27 DEC 57
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, EE 4, SR 4, OP 2, S/C 2

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT77338

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

C0941

RE A. DIR 48374 (OUT 71170)

B. MEXI 457 (IN 27072)

1. PER MEXI LAWYER INSTRUCTIONS, DANIEL K. BROMUND ATTEMPTED ON 16 DEC OBTAIN MEXI VISA WHICH LAW FIRM HAD TOLD BROMUND WAS IMPORTANT MATTER ARRANGE PRIOR LEAVING U.S. EVEN THOUGH BROMUND HAD LETTER OF CREDIT, MEXI CONSUL REFUSED ISSUE VISA STATING COULD OBTAIN TOURIST CARD ONLY UNTIL RENTISTA APPROVED. CONSUL ADVISED ALSO THAT RENTISTA MUST BE INITIATED AT MEXI CONSULATE IN U.S. BASED SIMILAR EXPERIENCE CLAGMORE RENTISTA AND BROMUND INABILITY COMPLY ALL MEXI LAWYER DIRECTIONS, HQS INSTRUCTED BROMUND INITIATE RENTISTA APPLICATION [illegible] AND THEN PROCEED MEXI ON TOURIST CARD.

2. DELAYS HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY MEXI CONSUL INSISTANCE THAT LETTER OF CREDIT TERMS BE CHANGED, WHICH NOW DONE AND ACCEPTED BY MEXI CONSUL ON 26 DEC. BROMUND WILL BE ADVISED OF RENTISTA APPROVAL THRU SISTER'S CHICAGO ADDRESS. UPON RECEIPT APPROVAL RENTISTA BROMUND WILL COME HQS TDY PICKUP PAPERS.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

RELEASING OFFICER

Bromund

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE TWO

		DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

DIR 00941
OUT 77338

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

3. MEXI CONSUL ADVISED BROMUND WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY OBTAIN IMPORT PERMIT FOR CAR EVEN IF WILLING PAY TAX. BROMUND MUCH UPSET THIS MATTER AND STATES UNWILLING SELL LOW MILAGE 1950 FORD FOR SMALL AMT MONEY. SUGGEST STATION ATTEMPT USE LOCAL CONTACTS ASSIST BROMUND OBTAIN IMPORT PERMIT.

4. BROMUND DEPARTING BY CAR 31 DEC. WILL GET TOURIST CARD AT BORDER.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: LIFEAT AMENDMENT APPROVED 5 DEC FOR BROMUND RENTISTA COVER.

COORDINATED BY PHONE WITH:
CCB/NC/MR. MILLARD

WH/PERSONNEL

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FROM:

ACTION

CABLE

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 44545
Date Received SA

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Support		10 DEC 195	10/		
2. PER		10 Dec		sc/3	
3. C/WH/III		10 Dec			
4. C/WH/MEXI					2 to 4 - Mr. Brady taking action per telephone conversation of 10 Dec. Let me know if we can be of help re TDY processing. Bowers
5. Puckett					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					

Bill
LIFEAT SUPPORT

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer designations should be used in *To* column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to registry.
For officer designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-19
JAN 1947

240 BD/RFL/LR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 9 DEC 57

240

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 9 21 12 z57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 44545

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS, SR 4, OP 2, S/C 2

TO DIR **INFO** **CITE** MEXI 729

DEPARTURE STOUGH LEAVES STATION WITHOUT TRANSLATOR LIMERICK. STATION REQUIRES ONE TRANSLATOR WITH OFFICIAL COVER BESIDES BROMUND. RECOMMEND MISS ANN STEFEN WHO PERFORMED EXCELLENTLY TDY HERE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

WH/WC/CP/AFT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 9 DECEMBER 1957

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 10 23 27 Z 57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT71383

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 48520

REF: MEXI 724 (IN 43718)

1. LATEST PROJ RENEWALS APPROVED: [illegible].

A. LIVESTOCK: $32,318 FY 58 AND $7,350 FY 59

B. LIPSTICK: $82,417 FY 58 AND $16,483 FY 59

C. LIFEAT: $156,647 FY 58

2. DISPATCHES FOLLOW.

END OF MESSAGE.

C-6
LIFEAT
Support

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

[illegible], C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET

AIR HMMA-8831

4 December 1957

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Operations/AQUATIC

LIFEAT

It is requested that ten fast forward cables for Ekotape recorders be forwarded to this station.

Willard C. Curtis

TOU/cpe

2 December 1957

Distribution:
  4 - Hqs (1 - KURIOT)
  2 - Files

SECRET

LIFEAT/Supp

SECRET

19 November 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Logistics

SUBJECT : Purchase of Metal Storage Cans and Deluxe Carrying Cases

1. The Mexican desk has received an oral request from the field for metal cases to replace the cardboard boxes which are now used for audio tapes in the LIFEAT Project. The cardboard boxes used to protect the tapes wear out in a very short time because of the frequent handling which they receive at the Station.

2. It is requested that you purchase and ship to the Mexican Station, the following items which can be purchased from LAFAYETTE RADIO, 165-08 Liberty Avenue, Jamaica 33, New York (seen in catalog 305):

100 Metal Storage Cans for 7" 1200 foot reels	$ .39 each (in lots of 6)
3 Deluxe Carrying Cases - hold 35 reels in case	$5.40 each

3. The costs of the above items should be charged to Project LIFEAT.

Robert W. DAHLGREN
C/WH/III

WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:mjm

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Mexico/Chrono
1 - Subject (LIFEAT/Support)

SECRET

RI COPY

SECRET

AIR

12 Nov 57 13 30

HMM-W-5516
50-6-32/2

C COPY

Chief of Station, Mexico

Chief, WHD
Administrative
Request for Supplies and Equipment

REFERENCE: HMMA-8472

1. Referenced request has been received by Headquarters and appropriate requisitions have been placed.

2. Shipping documents and shipping information will be forwarded to you as soon as they are made available.

J.C. King
J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - Mexico
1 - WH/Chrono
1 - WH/mailroom
1 - RI

WH/ERH/nk 6 November 1957

C/WH/SUPPORT

RI COPY

J. C. King
J. C. KING

C/WH/III

C. P. Hileman
C/WH/LOG

50-6-32/2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH. FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: LIFEAT (APPROVAL OF PROJECT) ; ______ (ACCOUNT NO.) ; WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM ______ TO ______ IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ $20,000 , AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

______ FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ______ DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1958	FISCAL YEAR
COMPENSATION	$	$
ALLOWANCES		
TRAVEL		
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	20,000	
OTHER:		
TOTAL	$ 20,000	$

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one) ☒ REGULAR ☐ SUBSIDY ☐ PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
- ☒ REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (AFR 30-10)
- ☐ RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
- ☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ______ DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ______ CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

______ DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ______ DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

- ☐ PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE
- ☐ PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
- ☐ RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION
- ☐ APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
- ☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
L. [illegible]. Puckett	2555		X

FORM NO. 680 REPLACES FORM 59-104
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-8472

50-6-32/2

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 30 October 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL—Logistics/AQUATIC

SPECIFIC—Request for Supplies - LIFEAT/Support

It is requested that six pairs of Brush crystal headphones be forwarded to this station for use on LIFEAT.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

TGU/cps

29 October 1957

Distribution:
4 - Headquarters (1 KURIOT) -1cc - To TSS
3 - Files

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

50-6-32/2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

076 SE/LB/J

DATE : 25 OCTOBER 1957

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI, S/C 2

Proj LIFEAT - Support

Oct 26 13 28z57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 27472

St!

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 457

1. DANIEL K BROMUND DEPARTED MEXI 25 OCT. STATION REQUESTS HE RETURN WITH RENTISTA COVER. HE HAS FULL DETAILS INCLUDING RETURN ON SIX MONTHS TOURIST CARD AND ARRANGEMENT RENTISTA STATUS WITH LOCAL LAW FIRM WHICH HE MADE WITHOUT STATION INTERVENTION.

2. REQUEST INCREASE LIFEAT FUNDS TO COVER $500 U.S. DUTY ON PERSONAL CAR, $350 IMMIGRATION AND VISA FEES AND $250 LAWYER FEE. WILL ALSO BE NECESSARY ESTABLISH $20,000 DEPOSIT ORDER BACK COVER AS RENTISTA. SIMILAR CLAGMORE COVER.

3. RECOMMEND LIBERAL TRAVEL ADVANCE VIEW POSSIBLE BORDER DIFFICULTIES.

4. REQUEST CABLE ETA.

END OF MESSAGE

50 | 6 | 32/2

ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX ☐

DATE 25 Oct 57

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

REMOVAL SLIP

DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER HMMW-5390

DOC. DATE 16 Oct 57

THE CS COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS REMOVED FROM THIS FILE # 50-6-32/2

BY IP AND RPU ON 24 May 72 AND FORWARDED TO: IP/AEB ______

IP/[illegible] ______ BECAUSE:

IP/[illegible]

IP/FILES ______

1. ~~It~~ was KAPOK and unprocessed.
2. It was RYBAT and unprocessed.
3. It was EYES ALONE and unprocessed.
4. It was DEFERRED.
5. It was classified into file # ______
6. It was an [illegible]
7. ______

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA [illegible]

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]190

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 3 OCT 57 14 18

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Administrative/LIFEAT
{ SPECIFIC - Personal Papers for Daniel K. [illegible]

Action Required: Deliver Attached Material to Daniel K. [illegible]

Forwarded as a separate cover enclosure are 12 pamphlets containing classified personal working papers for Subject to be used in his translation duties.

COPY

JCKing
J. C. KING
C/WHD

Attachment: 2 u/s/c

13 September 1957

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City, w/att, u/s/c
- 1 - WH/Mailroom, w/o/att
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono, w/o/att
- 2 ✓ - RI, w/o/att
- 1 - Subject, w/o/att

WH/III/Mexico/LDPuckett:fem

(Releasing officer)
for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

(Coordinating officer)
WH/Support

R n Dahlgren
(Authenticating officer)
R. DAHLGREN, CHIEF, WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1948

50-6-32/2

RI COPY

SECRET

AIR

HMM-W-5174
50-6-32/2

12 SEP 57 14 15

Chief of Station, Mexico

Chief, WHD

Administrative
Request for Supplies and Equipment

REFERENCE: HMMA-7752

1. Referenced request has been received by Headquarters and appropriate requisitions have been placed.

2. Shipping documents and shipping information will be forwarded to you as soon as they are made available.

J. C. King
J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - Mexico
1 - WH/Chrono
1 - WH/mailroom
1 - RI

WH/ERH/nk 9 September 1957

C/WH/SUPPORT

J. C. King
J. C. KING

C/WH/III

RI COPY

C. P. Hileman
C/WH/LOG

50-6-32/2

313 GK/JM/J

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 09 SEPT 1957

313

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

Req LIFEAT Support

SEP 10 2[illegible] [illegible]:57

[illegible] CABLE [illegible]

ROUTINE

IN 48569

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 169

RE: A. MEXI 155 (IN 48155)
B. MEXI 164 (IN 48542)

SUBJECTS TO BE USED AS RELIEF LIFEAT OPERATORS. SUBJECT REF A IS SISTER IN LAW CAROL K. ZINSMEISTER.

END OF MESSAGE

13 SEP 1957

050.	006	0032/2
ABSTRACT		INDEX ☐
DATE 9 Sep 57		

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

013 ER/BP/WS

DATE : 04 SEPTEMBER 1957

SEP 5 05 14 '57 REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : DIRECTOR

Proj LIFEAT-Support

FROM : MEXICO

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/RI 2, SR 4, OP 3, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 46377

TO DIR **INFO** **CITE** MEXI 121

1. GENE F. BRADDOCK WHO PREPARES REPORTS ON TRAVEL SOV EMB PERSONNEL AND RELATED SR MATTERS DEPARTING MEXI APPROX 1 OCT FOR HOME LEAVE AND TRAINING.

2. REQUEST SERVICES CLERK STENO 90 DAYS TDY REPLACE BRADDOCK AND ASSIST PREPARATION LIFEAT REPORTS. PREFERABLE PERSON SR DIV TRAINING.

END OF MESSAGE

8 SEP 19

050 | 006 0032/2

ABSTRACT ~~INDEX~~

DATE 4 Sep 57

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO HMM-A-7752

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WHD

DATE: 23 August 1957

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT: GENERAL—Administrative/LIFEAT

SPECIFIC—Supplies

ACTION REQUIRED: Shipment of items listed below

For the proper maintenance and service of the Revere Recorder it is considered desirable to have on hand at this Station the following listed parts:

Quantity	Part Name	Part Number
10	Take-up belt	TR-7924
5	Idler, high speed	TR-7812
3	Take-up spindle assy.	TR-7924
5	Pressure rollers	TR-7920 3-3/4
10	E-Rings	TR-7521
20	Record indicator lamps	TRA-106
5	Idler, flywheel	TR-7811
3	Rewind spindle Assy.	TR-7927
10	E-Rings	TR-7524
10	E-Rings	TR-7523
10	Head plug sockets	(no number)
20	Tires for take-up and rewind assys.	(no number)
10	Insulating studs	TR-7249
10	Sound heads	TR-5B
30	Pressure pads	TR-2601
10	Record pad spring	TR-7610
10	E-rings	TR-7520
3	Record pad assy.	TR-7915
3	Erase pad assy.	TR-7916
10	Erase pad spring	TR-7615
10	Sockets for motor plug	(no number)(for plug TRA-1024)
10	Spindle screws	TR-7260
20	Take up clutch felt	TR-7617
5	Motors	TR-7801 110 volt
50	Grommets	TR-7807
20	Solenoid plunger pins	TR-7258

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

50-6-32/2

Quantity	Part Name	Part Number
10	E-rings	TR-7520(for 1/8" shaft)
10	E-rings	TR-7525(for 5/16" shaft)
5	Volume control knobs	TR-7005
50	Vacuum tubes	12AX7
50	Vacuum tube	6K6
50	Vacuum tube	6AU6
25	Vacuum tube	6SL7
25	Vacuum tube	6SN7
25	Vacuum tube	6SJ7
25	Vacuum tube	5Y3.

Willard C Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

20 August 1957
TGU/B

Distribution:

3 - HQS

50-6-32/2

320 ERB/JM/RAC 320 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ATE : 15 AUGUST 1957

Aug 15 11 46 a57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

O : DIRECTOR
ROM : MEXICO CITY
CTION : WH 5
FO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, TSS 4, S/C 2

eWB

IN 39088

•Project LIFEAT - Support

O DIR INFO CITE MEXI 959

Subj RE: MEXI 918 (IN 36956)

REPEAT 60 CYCLES IS CORRECT.

END OF MESSAGE

AUG 1957 AEW

ESC 006 50-32/12

DATE 15 aug 57

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

04?/CWT/CP/CWT 4

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 57

[illegible] CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

DATE : 09 AUGUST 1957

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY-

ACTION : TSS 4

INFO : CI, CI/OPS CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, WH 4, S/C 2

• [illegible] LIFEAT / SUPPORT

IN 36956

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 918

SUBJ: REQUEST 10 REVERE T-700 RECORDERS 60 CYCLES FOR USE ON LIFEAT.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR TECHS USED.

AUG 1957

850 006 [illegible]/2

9 Aug 57

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

141 HD/RFL/SW

DATE : 9 AUGUST 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO-CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, TSS 4, S/C 2

AUG 12 1607Z 57

ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

MEXI 918
IN 36956 A

TO INFO CITE

C/S COMMENT: ON 12 AUG 57 ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM TSS TO WH AT THE REQUEST OF MRS. STROHL, TSS, EXT 8003, IN COORDINATION WITH MR. HILEMAN, WH, EXT 4591

50-6-32/2

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-7613

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 7 August 1957

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/LIFEAT

SPECIFIC— Supplies

It is requested that the following supplies for LIFEAT be forwarded to this Station:

a. 100 Shaeffer ball point pen refills for Panacoustic dial recorders;

b. 50 rolls Scotch mending tape for magnetic recording tapes;

c. 100 rolls paper for Panacoustic dial recorders;

and d. Six Amplicorp Model 200C Degaussers. It is planned that one Degausser will be placed at each LIFEAT base for emergency purposes.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

5 August 1957
TGU/gfb

Distribution:

3 - HQS

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

50-6-32

SECRET

AIR

HMMW-[illegible]72

24 Jul 57

: Chief of Station, Mexico City

: Chief, WHD

- LIFEAT

- Serialized Mexico City Telephone Directory

Reference: HMMA-7337, 3 July 1957 (50-6-32/3)

1. Reference requested serialization of the Mexico City telephone directory by street address. The matter was discussed with the Headquarters units concerned with this type of work. Due to the time required to complete this job and because of the existing heavy work load, they are unable to undertake this requirement. The requirement could be filled by another government agency after the directory was reduced to abstracts based on a numerical coding system. The outside agency would then punch the coded addresses and indices onto cards at a cost of $75 per thousand or $8,250 for 110,000 addresses. A full time person with a knowledge of Spanish would have to be assigned by WHD for this work.

2. The major part of the job would be the first step—the coding—which it is estimated would require a person's full time for eight to ten months. The second step—the key punching—would take about two months. The third step—a machine listing—would be a fairly rapid process.

3. Because of the cost and the shortage of personnel, Headquarters regrets that it is unable to undertake the serialization job at this time.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

17 July 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mjm

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET

R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DI. .CH NO. HMM-A-7393

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 12 July 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative/LIFEAT

SPECIFIC— Request for Vacuum Tubes

ACTION REQUESTED: Pouching of Vacuum Tubes

1. It is requested that the following vacuum tubes be pouched to this Station:

50	AU 6
50	6K6
50	6X5
50	6J5

2. Whereas at times these tubes, or some of them, can be purchased locally, the local market often deals in "seconds" which are unsatisfactory for our work.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. Curtis

TGU/bct
11 July 1957

Distribution
3 - Hqs
3 - Files

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

RI COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

50-6-32/2

14-00000

REMOVAL SLIP

DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER HMMA-7370

DOC DATE 12 July 57

THE CS COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS REMOVED FROM THIS FILE # 50-6-32/2

BY IP AND RPU ON 24 May 73 AND FORWARDED TO IP ARP ✓

IP EDI

IP [illegible]

IP FILES

BECAUSE

1 X It was KAPOK and unprocessed

2 It was RYBAT and unprocessed.

3. It was EYES ALONE and unprocessed

4 It was DEFERRED.

5. It was classified into file #

6. It was an indexed document

7.

159

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

159 BO/DM/ATP

DATE : 9 JULY 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

[illegible] LIFEAT [illegible]

JUL 10 01 29 57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 24410

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 733

REQUEST LIFEAT CLEARANCE FOR LIPSTICKS 17 AND 22. TO BE USED ON NEW LIFEAT BASE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS

ABSTRACT | INDEX

DATE JUL [illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

John M. Whitten:js
CWH/3
5613
: 28 June 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3	LOGS	6	

: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 50937

50937

LIFEAT

REF MEXI 5162 (IN 68160)*

REF MISTAKENLY SLUGGED TYPIC. TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE TAPES BEEN TRANSCRIBED? IF NOT TRANSCRIBED, CAN MEXI DO IT? IF TRANSCRIBED, ERASE TAPES. IF NOT AND MEXI CANNOT HANDLE, POUCH TO DIR. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *Mexi queried Hqs as to its desire have pouched tapes LIFEAT ESLARD-1 coverage for period resided Hotel Maria Angelos.

WH/COPS

W Hood
J. C. KING
C/WHD

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

N. Judkins

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

file LIFEAT Ops

ORIG : N. JUDKINS:dd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 22 APRIL 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62
ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/RA, ~~FI, TSD~~ 5, S/C

25 APR 63 18 58z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 35066

REF: MEXI 4201 (IN 19807)*

1. HQS APPROVES LOAN OF ONE STERILE SPARE B-10 DIAL PULSE RECORDER TO DURKIN.

2. HQS URGES CLOSE SUPPORT TREASURY/NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS. MEXI MAY PROVIDE DURKIN WITH OCCASIONAL LIFEAT COVERAGE PROVIDED NO LIFEAT TAKE GIVEN TO MEXICANS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *William J. Durkin, Treasury rep assigned to Mexico investigating narcotics traffic, approached Station re dial recorder for phone tap on Mexican target.

TSD BRUCE LA ROSE (BY PHONE)
CI/OPS FRANK HUGHES F. M. Hughes
WH/COPS
CI/R&A/TC

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

1 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Personnel

SUBJECT: Recruitment of a Retired CIA or Military Officer for Contract Status in Mexico.

1. Mexico City needs a replacement in September or October 1963 to work on a technical operation. The Station does not want a staff employee, but a Contract Agent.

2. The Contract Agent would need the following requirements:

   a. Must be retired, and move permanently to Mexico under cover of a retired U. S. citizen, with the appropriate guaranteed income required under Mexican law. ($320 for husband and wife per mo.)

   b. Must have technical training which would enable him to work on a technical operation, possibly involving the care and upkeep of recorders, etc.

   c. Must have a working knowledge of Spanish, or the ability to acquire this fluency prior to arrival in Mexico.

   d. It will be necessary for the employee to work with people, make early and late meetings, and to spend a good deal of time driving around town. Therefore, the candidate must drive a car and be physically fit to work long hours.

3. It is requested that information on any candidates be furnished WH/3/MEXICO or C/WH/3 for consideration.

John M. Whitten
C/WH/3

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/FEAT/SUPPORT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
ACTION		ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LIFEAT Security

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: HMMA 20305, 3 December 1962

1. Reference problem was discussed by KURIOT with David N. WILSTED, during the latter's TDY at Headquarters in early December 1962.

2. KURIOT recommends the following solution and has furnished the attached material for delivery to WILSTED for his use:

a. The terminal identification system consists of two fluids. Vial "A" is collodion in which is mixed a small amount of phenolphthalein and is intended to be used by the person who originally connects the wires. Generously daubed on the end of the screw, this solution dries almost immediately in a water repellent, invisible coating.

b. The second vial "B" contains household ammonia. If the bauber in this bottle is drawn down the row of terminals in the connection box, the tip of any screw which was previously treated with the phenolphthalein will immediately turn a dark red color and then will vanish after a minute. The ammonia can be reapplied and this reaction will repeat itself a couple of times before more phenolphthalein has to be reapplied.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
1 box with two vials of liquid (U/S/C)

Distribution:
C&l - COS, Mexico City w/att (USC)

50-6-32/3

DATE TYPED: 7 January 63

DATE DISPATCHED: [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11200

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	INITIAL
1 - Chrono 1 - TSD/AOB/Mr. McBee	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/PI~~	
C/WH/3	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	Bustos	rlr	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
TSD/AOB		Mr. McBee (draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	7 JAN 1963	J. C. King

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W Attn: Willard NAUMAN

INFO.
Chief, WH; Chief, KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
GYROSE/ Jose Ordoqui

ACTION REQUIRED; REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith are the following items pertaining to Subject:

a. LIFEAT references;

b. Salient reports from other agent sources;

c. References to close contacts of Subject;

d. Exemplars of various types of Mexican police agent reporting;

e. Roughed-out drafts of police agent reporting. These have been viewed and tentatively approved by COS, Mexico. Copies have been retained at the Station.

2. Station Mexico is submitting separately its proposals on the technical and operational aspects of this operation.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
2 - TFW w/att
1 - C/WH w/o att
1 - Chief, KUDESK w/o att
2 - Files

DATE TYPED
2[illegible] Dec. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
28 Dec. 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-20425

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S~~ECRE~~T

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, KURIOT

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Ⓢ LIFEAT Security

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See below.

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to request Headquarters' assistance in a problem involving clandestine markings for terminals in a telephone cable cross box.

2. Specifically, it is desired to have the capability of recognizing which cable terminals in a box are being used for telephone tapping without having any markings apparent to unauthorized persons. This system is needed for use in the event that taps must be disconnected quickly under the threat of a possible security problem.

3. The tap connections are made by LIFEAT telephone company personnel and the terminals could be marked by them at the time the tap is made. The connections sometimes have to be removed by another person who is not familiar with the connections.

4. It is felt that a quick drying, transparent glue or lacquer that would fluoresce brightly under UV illumination would be appropriate. A material that could be removed later by wiping or chipping it away would be desirable but this characteristic is not vital.

5. The system must be usable in open shade, although some additional shade might be had by partially closing the doors of the box, and the light source must be portable and if possible have the appearance of an ordinary flashlight. The light source can be brought within two inches of the terminals.

(Continued)

50-6-32/3

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S~~ECRET~~

DATE TYPED
3 Dec. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-20305

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-20305

6. This sytem is needed as soon as possible for use during December 1962 and January 1963. Therefore, Headquarters' early assistance or recommendation would be greatly appreciated.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
~~2~~ - C/KURIOT
1 - C/WHD
3 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. TWO

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Progress Report for October 1962

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AN
AS
IN
PS
SX
DES SPE
FI

Ref: A. HMMA-20156
B. MEXI 2384

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSFHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1).

A. EXPLOITATION OF LEADS

(1) LIFEAT/Soviet During the reporting period, LIFEAT coverage of Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV provided an important and valuable check confirming the reporting of a number of KUBARK controlled double agents targeted against this Soviet officer. Also, coverage of the Soviet Bulletin Office, although not considered vital, does complete Station coverage of the Soviet target and does provide daily information on the activities and contacts of the Bulletin Office personnel.

(2) LIFEAT/Polish LIFEAT continued to provide vital information concerning the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation with coverage of both individuals and their daily activities.

(3) LIFEAT/Yugoslav Besides the usual coverage of day-to-day activities of the official installation, LIFEAT leads have indicated the possibility of a successful recruitment of a Mexican employee of that installation. LIFEAT information will become even more valuable for continuing assessment of the potential agent and forming of a plan for approach to the Mexican in question.

(4) LIFEAT/Communist Party Coverage in this area gave Station its first information concerning the second arrest of LINLUCK, as well as providing some information on important persons in the Mexican Communist movement.

(Continued)

Remove from Project:
CS Classification:
JOB #
Box:

CROSS REFERENCE TO

RECORD COPY

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DATE TYPED 28 Nov. 1962	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-20261	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER ✓50-6-32/3	

(5) LIFEAT/Exile LIFEAT provides continuing coverage of the daily activities and contacts of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo. Although most of the leads gathered will depend on future exploitation, one contact with an ODYOKE official was noted by LIFEAT (see reference b).

(6) LIFEAT/Cuban Of late, much of the emphasis of the LIFEAT operation has been directed toward support of Station operations in this area. Coverage included monitoring of the activities of AMSTET-1 for the interested Case Officer. This information provided daily leads for the Case Officer in his contacts with AMSTET-1. LIFEAT also covered three lines in support of the AMSTRUT operation. Of this support the interested Case Officer has noted LIFEAT provided very valuable coverage of the important AMSTRUT operation during October. The coverage gave valuable operational leads and resolved what would otherwise have been areas of uncertainty or groundless suspicion. This allowed the case officers to move with more certainty in developing the operation than would otherwise have been prudently possible. It is noted that LIFEAT's continuing coverage is proving to be most helpful.

(7) LIFEAT/American Communists LIFEAT continued to provide information of interest to ODENVY. Travel and contacts of the ACGM are particularly worthwhile.

(8) LIFEAT/Miscellaneous LIFEAT continued its coverage of former Station asset LIVESTOCK-2. This was in keeping with Station's policy of making periodic checks of the activities of former, potentially dangerous agents.

It should be noted that it is the Station's opinion that LIFEAT's excellent overall service, plus its ability to provide unilateral coverage of targets of opportunity on short notice (sometimes on as little as two hours notice), make LIFEAT a dependable daily contributor to the fulfilling of the Station's mission.

B. PROCESSING OF TAKE

No change from previous report.

C. LIAISON

During the month of October the two playback recorders used by the ODENVY processor broke down. These were repaired by the LIFEAT technician, David M. WILSTED. ODENVY continued to process take from the LIFEAT/American Communists in Mexico lines.

D. SECURITY

There have been no known adverse security incidents effecting the LIFEAT operation during the reporting period. LIFEAT meeting sites continue to be changed periodically. The fourteen regular and six alternate sites used for daily contact between the Station Case Officer and WILSTED and Wayne C. DRABAND are considered adequate. Numerous meeting sites are used for contacts between WILSTED/DRABAND and the basehouse keepers.

E. TECHNICAL

Audio and dial tape recorders ordered by the Station in support of the LIFEAT operation began to arrive at the end of October. These were placed in immediate service. It is noted that the automatic tape stop on the new model Revere audio recorder has thus far proven to be of no use to the operatio and on occasion has caused some minor problems. It is believed that these problems are temporary and will be eliminated when WILSTED has time to by-pass this cut off switch.

The new Annex VI (see reference A) was placed in full operation on 23 October and presently provides coverage of four target lines.

F. COVERAGE

During the month of October 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 25 target lines. Coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. and 5. Polish Embassy (two lines)
6. 7, 8, 9, and 10. Yugoslav Embassy (five lines)
11, 12, and 13 BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation
14. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
15. Peter WATKINS
16. AMSTET-1
17, and 18. AMSTRUT operation
19. Psychiatrist attending AMSTRUT-2
20. Carlos ILLESCAS
21. Suspected PCM safehouse
22. LIVESTOCK-2
23. Albert (Margaret) MALTZ
24. Charles SMOLIKOFF (aka SMALL)
25. Noah SEBORER

G. PERSONNEL

LIEMBRACE-8 was reintroduced to LIFEAT in order that he may brush up on its daily operation. LIEMBRACE-8 will temporarily replace David M. WILSTED as LIFEAT technician during the latter's home leave December 1962 and January 1963.

Steps were initiated to amend the clearance of LIEMPTY-19 for work as a part time LIFEAT processor/translator.

2. During the reporting period, LIFEAT operation provided a total of 62 reels of raw take from ACGM lines to local ODENVY for their processing. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based wholly or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

Willard Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
✓	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

AN	
AB	X
~~IN~~	
~~FI~~	
~~EX~~	
DES	NPD
~~FI~~	
ARD	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
~~Chief of Station, Mexico City~~

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Progress Report for September 1962

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Ref: HMMA-19843

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSFHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, Paragraph 2 (d) (1).

A. EXPLOITATION OF LEADS

(1) LIFEAT/Soviet In this reporting period LIFEAT provided vital information and live-monitoring support during the installation phase of a successful Station technical operation targeted against Aleksandr G. SIDOROV, Soviet Military Attache in Mexico.

(2) LIFEAT/Cuban This coverage provided valuable operational support during the period leading up to the recruitment of AMSTRUT-2 giving timely advance information of AMSTRUT-2's arrival in Mexico, as well as his day to day activities and contacts. Following AMSTRUT-2's recruitment, LIFEAT gave an excellent account of AMSTRUT-2's activities for those periods he was not under the control of his case officers. This was invaluable proof of his full cooperation with KUBARK and added a safety factor for the case officers making the recruitment and initial handling which would not have been otherwise available.

(3) LIFEAT/Polish and LIFEAT Yugoslav These coverages continue to provide excellent information of the daily activities of the Satellite officials assigned to Mexico. The LIFEAT support of the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation continues as noted in reference.

(4) LIFEAT/Exile LIFEAT coverage of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo provides information and operational leads which, though valuable now, would be invaluable if ODYOKE's policy toward AREVALO becomes sufficiently defined to fully exploit all the information provided by LIFEAT.

(Continued)

RECORD COPY

DATE TYPED
8 Nov. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[redacted]
HMMA-20156

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/3

Remove from Project [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # [illegible]
Box: 2 Fold: 6

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~[redacted]

(5) LIFEAT/American Communists LIFEAT continues to provide information of interest to ODENVY (who initially requested this coverage and processes this take.) Local ODENVY has noted recently that the information concerning travel of American leftists to Mexico and their contacts while here are particularly worth while.

(6) LIFEAT/Miscellaneous LIFEAT coverage was reinstituted on LIVESTOCK-2 in Station periodic check on the activities of this former agent.

B. PROCESSING OF TAKE

No change from previous report (see reference).

C. LIAISON

No change from previous report (see reference).

D. SECURITY

There have been no known adverse security incidents effecting the LIFEAT operation during the reporting period. The "coyote" incident noted in reference, paragraph 1.D. is now settled and should pose no further difficulty to this operation.

E. TECHNICAL

No change from previous report (see reference).

F. COVERAGE

During the month of September 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 16 target lines. Coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. BECHICK's place of employment.
5. Individual considered for cut out in BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation
6. and 7. Polish Embassy (two lines)
8., 9., and 10. Yugoslav Embassy (three lines)
11. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
12. Peter WATKINS
13. LIVESTOCK-2
14. Albert MALTZ
15. Charles SMOLIKOFF (aka SMALL)
16. AMSTRUT Operation

G. PERSONNEL

LIFEUD-24 and LIFEUD-26 obtained a basehouse on 29 September which will take the place of the old Annex VI (closed when LIFEUD-5 and LIFEUD-11 were terminated due to their pending divorce). It has been decided to retain the same annex designation, i.e., Annex VI, since the area of coverage is the same as that provided by the old basehouse.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-20156 [redacted]-1887

2. During the month of September 1962, LIFEAT operation provided a total of 54 reels of raw take from the ACGM lines to the local ODENVY office for their processing. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based wholly or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 1-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. THREE

~~SECRET~~

memo outgoing

5 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF DAVID M. WILSTED (ps)

1. On 1 June 1960 Mr. John G. Hayn and Mr. John Kennedy of WHD, Mr. Robert Brown of CI/OPS, Mr. Robert Bryant of FI/OPS and Mr. Charles Bray of FI/D met with David M. WILSTED (ps).

2. WILSTED emphasised that the whole telephone system in Mexico City is undergoing a reformation. The company Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., has sub-contracted this work of cleaning up and reorganising the phone system to the independent firm, Intel. They are cleaning up unused and old lines, putting in new and spare lines, redefining exchange areas, laying underground cables, etc. Eventually we should be better off because there should be more surplus lines. The renovation work has hampered much of the LIFEAT work, principally because many of the lines now are underground and we cannot get access to them before they enter the central. This is particularly true with respect to the Czech Embassy, to whose telephone lines we cannot obtain access from the vantage point we now occupy.

3. WILSTED said that we try to keep track of the activities of "Intel" but since they seem to attack "Colonias" at random, we have no prior warning of their presence in a certain area.

4. In the recent past, Mexico has been using houses for listing posts for security reasons. We have more control over the access of phone company inspectors or repairman to houses. However, under new regulations, all new apartment buildings must have telephone lines installed in the building by the phone company during the construction phase. This means that the lines and their destination are concealed. WILSTED proposed that this will mean we can again use apartments since we can siphon off a line destined for use by another tenant in such a way that the phone company cannot trace its destination without tearing the building apart and we can then install a separate line to the building and hook up the subscriber to this line which, if checked, will belong to a legitimate subscriber.

5. One system which has been used effectively is to take one-half of two separate pairs which have one faulty line each. These two half pairs then form one good pair which we can use.

6. WILSTED explained that it cost about 3000 pesos to get a regular telephone. This entails the purchase of a telephone company bond, which later can be sold.

~~SECRET~~

7. Personnel involved in the tapping of the lines are:

Rene - who has access to the centrals. He contacts the following men:
Two brothers
Jose - does exchange connections.

8. The take from each basehouse is collected early in the morning before office hours by RAFANELLI. He only enters one basehouse which is occupied by an elderly couple. All other contacts are in automobiles made at different spots each day of the week. RAFANELLI then takes the material to a meeting between him, WILSTED and SECHEN where RAFANELLI turns the material over to SECHEN and they all discuss the problems and plans for the day.

9. According to WILSTED there is no live monitoring done by any of the basehouse keepers.

10. There follows a list of the basehouses and the lines covered at each base:

a)	Calero 39	- formerly covered American consules, now no lines. Being held for future use.
b)	Juanacatlan 179	- Cuban residence Russian Commercial E. T. (Nicaraguan)
c)	Atlixco 47	- 2 Polish Seborer Tropete Bekier
d)	Tenansingo	- Cuban military office Cuban Ambassador's office Campos (travel agency) 1 spare
e)	Aristoteles 80	- UAR Ejercito Nacional 540 (name of person unknown)
f)	Suderman & Horacio	- facilities for three lines. Formerly processed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open.
g)	Cuautla 131	- 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the Central) 1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~S E C R E T~~

PROCESSING

ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, JMWAVE

INFO.
Chief, Task Force W Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
GYROSE/AMSTRUT - Transmittal of LIFEAT Coverage

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Attention Martin O. HIBBERT

Attached in accordance with conversations with Martin O. HIBBERT, are LIFEAT transcriptions in the AMSTRUT-2 case for 11-26 and 28-30 September and 1 October 1962.

Willard C. CURTIS

CS 19-6-56/3 —— LIFEAT OPS

Attachment:
52 pages

Distribution:
2 - TFW w/o att. CS file
3 - WHD w/o att.
1 - JMWAVE w/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO
X-TFW/REG

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 October 1962	9 October 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19988

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
~~S E C R E T~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, EE

INFO
Chief, WH; COB, Monterrey

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
BEDOX/LIFEAT

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
DIR-38331, 26 September 1962

Attached herewith find a copy of MNTY 0600 requested by Headquarters in reference.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
2 - WH w/att; 1 - COB, Mnty w/o att
1 - EE w/att
3 - Files

50-6-32/3

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
26 Sept. 1962	28 Sept. 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19882

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/3

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

14-00000

TO MEXI INFO MNTY 6600

NUMBER

LIRUIS 1 SAID UNKNOWN [illegible], DESCRIBED AS DOCTOR, BLOND [illegible] HAIR, TALL, AGE APPROX 25, IN TORREON 2 AUGUST 1 DAY ONLY. CONTACTED JOSE LUNA ORTIZ, YOUTH [illegible] OF COAHUILA STATE COMMITTEE PCM. PURPOSE OF VISIT WAS CONTACT HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

CS COPY

07/1542Z

Cite HMMA-19882

50-6-32/3

Where is

Aug 61 - June 62

?

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

AN
AB
~~TS~~
~~EX~~
DES ~~NFD~~
~~PI~~
ARD

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Progress Report for August 1962

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref : A) HMMA 19641
B) HMMA 19129

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1).

A. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/SOVIET With the departure of Vladimir G. NOVIKOV during the month of August 1962, it was decided that LIFEAT should pick up coverage of his replacement Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV. The continued coverage of Aleksandr G. SIDOROV, which includes extensive periods of live-monitoring and special processing of the take, is considered essential to those Station assets involved in the attempt to place the technical surveillance noted in last month's report (see reference A). Coverage of the Soviet Bulletin Office continues to provide interesting personality data on Soviet officials assigned to Mexico.

(2) LIFEAT/POLISH LIFEAT coverage in support of the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation continues to be vital to that operation. Additional coverage for this operation has been undertaken, leads from which will probably determine future direction of the operation as well as aid KUBARK in controlling the operation.

(3) LIFEAT/YUGOSLAV In this area LIFEAT provided the information that a cousin of a recently assigned KUBARK deep cover agent, Victor W. OBOLD (ps) will be travelling to Mexico in the near future. This cousin is a long-time Communist Party official and a chance meeting with him could have destroyed OBOLD's carefully prepared cover. Due to LIFEAT advanced warning, proper security safeguards have been arranged. LIFEAT has also provided travel information on Yugoslav officials from the United States which was of great interest to ODENVY.

(Continued)

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 20 Sept. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-19843
[redacted] 1942

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
50-6-32/3

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: [illegible]
JOB # 73-175/21
Box: 74 Fold: 6

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

(4) LIFEAT/EXILE LIFEAT coverage in this area has been most rewarding in providing leads to the contacts of Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo, former Guatemalan President. Spanish Republican Exiles were covered for approximately one-half month in August, at which time it was decided that the coverage no longer provided sufficient leads and information to justify continued LIFEAT effort.

(5) LIFEAT/American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) This coverage is at the request of the local office of ODENVY and the processing of take in this area is done by that office. One of the most interesting items provided from this coverage was the fact that the American Communists Albert MALTZ and Margaret Larkin MALTZ had separated and that Albert MALTZ would probably reside in the U.S. with Margaret remaining in Mexico. Concerning the LIFEAT coverage of the ACGM, the local office of ODENVY wrote on 23 August 1962: "This office feels that the coverage mentioned is quite valuable and many useful leads are obtained from this coverage, particularly with regard to travel in and out of Mexico of American Communists who are in contact with individuals on whom coverage is maintained".

B. Processing of Take

No change from that noted in reference A.

C. Liaison

No change from that noted in reference A.

D. Security

During the early part of August 1962 a group of "coyotes" was uncovered in the telephone company in Mexico City and a number of arrests were made. This group had organized a unit including linemen, centralmen, installation crew, warehousemen, and workers in the office responsible for providing service to new clients. It was the purpose of the "coyote" group to provide service, for a price, to those individuals whose requests for installations had been turned down by the telephone company due to limited availability of cables and contacts. (Note: The company generally keeps a certain number of "spare pairs" in each cable for its own use in providing special service, company phones, and for rerouting during repairs to other cables. It was these spare pairs and contacts which the "coyotes" used to provide illegal phone service.) This telephone company within the telephone company would also collect monthly fees from their "subscribers". When the story came out, the telephone company had special police stationed in each central and spot checks made of linemen and crews to prevent recurrence. It was therefore necessary for the LIFEAT linemen to refrain from any clandestine activity for a period of almost four weeks so as not to be accidentally picked up as a member of the "coyote" group. LIFEUD-1 has reported that the situation is now back to normal with the special police details and special checkups terminated. No compromise of the LIFEAT operation resulted from the above incident.

E. Technical

In addition to re-supplying LIFEAT with audio recorders (as reported in reference A), the Station has ordered ten new dial tape recorders for the project. Funds for this purpose were included in the latest Project Renewal Request (forwarded by reference B).

F. Coverage

During the month of August 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 15 target

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-19843 [redacted] 1942

lines. The coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. BECHICK's place of employment (and place of contact with BEKNAVE)
5. and 6. Polish Embassy (two lines)
7., 8., and 9. Yugoslav Embassy (three lines)
10. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
11. Peter WATKINS
12. Juan Simeon VIDARTE Franco Romero
13. Dr. Eugenio ARAUZ
14. Albert MALTZ
15. Charles SMOLIKOFF (aka SMALL)

G. Personnel

The basehouse operators for LIFEAT Annex VI, LIFEUD-5 and LIFEUD-1[illegible], after a long period of family disagreements, have mutually decided on a divorce. Both are being terminated by KUBARK since their usefulness as basehouse keepers for the project will end with their divorce. The agents have agreed to the termination and it will be accomplished on a friendly basis. (Agent Service Records will be forwarded). Therefore, it has been necessary to close Annex VI and terminate coverage of the lines provided by that basehouse. LIFEUD-24 and LIFEUD-26 have been recruited to replace the terminated couple and are presently looking for a suitable basehouse which could fully replace the old Annex VI. (Note: POA was granted for LIFEUD-24 on 28 June 1962 and OA was requested. Also, OA was requested for LIFEUD-26 on 30 August 1962.)

During the absence of Woodrow B. GABBOT (ps), the processor of the Polish language portions of the Polish Embassy take, a replacement in the person of contact agent BETUMBLE was provided by Headquarters. He performed well with no known security hazard to himself or LIFEAT. BETUMBLE departed Mexico City on 17 September 1962. Until GABBOT's return Polish portions of this take are being translated by the Station Satellite Case Officer.

2.A. During the month of August 1962, the LIFEAT operation provided a total of 45 reels of raw take from the ACGM lines to the local ODENVY office for their processing. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based in whole or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

B. The following reports were based in whole or in part on positive intelligence which is provided as a by-product of the LIFEAT operation:

HMM-6605
HMM-6626
HMM-6663
HMM-6667
HMM-6670

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~[redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. THREE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SR Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/Transmittal of LIFEAT Report

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Ref: HMMA-19741, 4 September 1962
Action: Per Paragraph Two.

1. Transmitted herewith in attachment is a LIFEAT report of 10 September 1962, of a second telephone call from Moscow to Vladilan Ivanovich SAMOKHIN, Head of the Soviet Information Bulletin Office in Mexico City.

2. Headquarters is requested to advise if it has interest in receiving any further such reports.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
2 - WH w/att
1 - SR w/att
3 - Files

lifeat ops

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
18 Sept. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19826

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
20 -

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

AT	
AB	X
TN	
PS	
~~SN~~	
~~DES~~	HPD
~~PI~~	
ARD	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Progress Report for July 1962

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

A. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/SOVIET LIFEAT coverage in this area was concentrated on known RIS officers: Vladimir G. NOVIKOV and Aleksandr G. SIDOROV. The most rewarding lead from this coverage during July was that SIDOROV would be absent with his entire family from his apartment for nearly two months, and more importantly, that no one would be continuously watching the apartment during that time. Based on this information, the Station has been able to make the necessary preparations for establishing technical surveillance of this apartment. LIFEAT coverage of the Soviet Bulletin Office, in addition to the above coverages, has provided information on the daily activities of individual Soviet officials assigned to Mexico, including collection of travel and biographical data.

(2) LIFEAT/POLISH LIFEAT coverage has been vital to the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation. LIFEAT has even provided live-monitoring of an international call to BECHICK from a former admirer. Also in the Polish area, LIFEAT provided names of Polish Embassy contacts who were invited to Polish national holiday celebrations at the Polish Embassy, as well as information concerning the impending arrival of the new Polish Ambassador.

(3) LIFEAT/YUGOSLAV In the Station's increased operations against this target, basic biographical, personnel assignment, and personnel daily activity information is essential. LIFEAT has been providing just this type information since coverage commenced in May.

(continued)

RECORD COPY

DATE TYPED
21 August 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19641 [redacted]-1922

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

Remove from Project
CS Classification:
JOB # 1/2-475/77
Box: 38 Fold: 2

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

(4) LIFEAT/EXILE LIFEAT coverage of exile and revolutionary groups has been concentrated on coverage of Central American and Spanish Republican groups and individuals. Coverage of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo, former President of Guatemala, has provided the Station with valuable information concerning his contacts and future plans. Further, LIFEAT covered LIGIRD-1's contact with AREVALO and later revealed AREVALO's conviction that the Station asset, LIGIRD-1, is involved in a plot to assassinate AREVALO. Coverage of Spanish Republicans displayed the internal dissentions aroused by the plans of a small group of the Mexico-based exiles to assassinate certain prominent persons with plastic bombs, and ultimately told of the departure from Mexico to Cuba of two individuals implicated in the plot.

(5) LIFEAT/American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) Targets covered in this category are in answer to a long standing requirement laid on by ODENVY and approved by Headquarters. In the past ODENVY has noted the coverage as valuable and worthwhile to them. As in the past reliable information was provided on the activities, travel, and contacts of the ACGM.

B. Processing of the Take

LIFEAT processors continue to process all take for the LIFEAT operation except for the three ACGM lines which are processed by the local ODENVY office.

C. Liaison

No change.

D. Security

No security incidents directly affecting the operation or future of LIFEAT were noted during July 1962. The assignment of special telephone company crews to make a survey of spare telephone lines available for use of new subscribers may cause problems when these crews uncover a "spare" line used in a LIFEAT coverage. However, since these crews have no authority (or desire) to trace down the lines to their ultimate destination, normal LIFEAT security practices should negate this danger. A second development which could cause future problems is the possible assignment of a LIENVOY technician to check telephone centrals to see exactly who else may be carrying on LIENVOY type work. As of this date LIFEAT personnel, who have been provided with the true name of this individual, have never heard of him working in any central in Mexico City. As of this moment it appears this will not develop into a threat to LIFEAT operations.

E. Technical

New recorders provided in May to LIFEAT are now in operation and appear superior to previous models used. It is planned, with the approval of Project LIFEAT for FY 1963, to completely re-equip LIFEAT with new recorders and possibly dial tape recorders.

F. Coverage

During the month of July 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 16 target lines. Specifically, the coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Viadimir G. NOVIKOV

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
	~~SECRET~~/[redacted]	HMMA-19641 [redacted] 1922

3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. BECHICK
5. and 6. Polish Embassy (two lines)
7. and 8. Yugoslav Embassy (two lines)
9. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
10. Peter WATKINS
11. Juan Simeon VIDARTE Franco Romero
12. Dr. Eugenio ARAUZ
13. LINEB-1 (one line covered for this double agent operation)
14. Albert MALTZ
15. Noah SEBORER
16. Charles SMOLIKOFF

G. Personnel

Clearance was received on LIFEUD-24 and he will commence work shortly to fill the gap left with the resignation of Olivia N. GLADMON (ps). (See project renewal forwarded HMMA-19129.) A deep-cover agent, OBOLD, was made available to process completely the take from the Yugoslav lines. He is working out well with no evident security danger to either himself or LIFEAT.

2. A. Since submission of the last Project LIFEAT Renewal Request and Project Review, 72 reels of LIFEAT on the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) have been passed to the local office of ODENVY. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to the local ODACID and ODENVY based in whole or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

B. Despite the fact that LIFEAT is used primarily to support Station operations, some positive intelligence is gathered as a by product of the operation. The following reports were forwarded to Headquarters based on LIFEAT material:

HMM-6421
HMM-6452
HMM-6479
HMM-6499
HMM-6565

3. The Station has applied the RYBAT control to this dispatch to ensure the Desk's control of the information contained herein.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

21 August 1962

Distribution:
~~3~~ - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. THREE

Mexico 3735

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-17815
[redacted] 1920

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/3

TO
INFO
Chief, WH Division

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
22 September 1961

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Report for April, May, June, July, and August 1961

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information

RE: "43 S" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LIERODE with related lines continued to provide valuable information for use in support of Station operations. However, coverage of the LIERODE official installation was cut on 19 May for security reasons. The following leads were provided: As a result of a LIFEAT provided lead, the Station was able to develop an operation in cooperation with the Mexican Government whereby Mario CHAVEZ, Guatemalan who is representative of the Castroite Bohemia, was placed under Mexican surveillance and ultimately arrested. LIFEAT also provided a check on the activities of LITANGO-1. Further, provision of travel information to and from Cuba by Nicaraguan and Guatemalan exiles was of continuing importance.

(2) LIFEAT was employed as a check of the activities of former KUBARK agents LIVESTOCK-2 and LIVESTOCK-3. This coverage has contributed measurably to Station security.

(3) LIFEAT/LITMUS provided vital coverage of the LITMUS official installation during the DECORN recruitment operation. Also of value were the leads pointing to two suspected LITMUS Intelligence Service agents. Other Station assets are now investigating these leads.

(4) LIFEAT coverage of the American Communist Group in Mexico City (ACGM) continues to provide excellent coverage of the activities, travel, and contacts of the American Communists living in Mexico. This information is of primary importance to ODENVY.

b. Processing of Material

LIFEAT processors continue to process the take from the LIENVOY/LIMERICK coverage.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

No adverse incidents were noted during the reporting period. However, coverage of the LIERODE official installation was cut when LIENVOY technicians began regular checks of those lines.

e. Technical

No change.

AB
AB X
IN
PS
BX
DESENSITIZED
PI
ARD

Remove from Project [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # 73-175[illegible]
Box: 2 Fold: 6

CS COPY

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

f. Coverage

The number of lines covered by LIFEAT during the reporting period varied greatly due to the moving of two basehouses. However, the number covered averaged 12, with the breakdown as follows:

LIERODE, and related lines	2
LITMUS, and related lines	3
American Communists	3
Local Communists	2
Targets of Opportunity	2

g. Personnel

The assistant outside case officer, Ralph B. RAFANELLI (ps), will depart Mexico City for a new assignment within the next month. David M. WILSTED (ps) will undertake complete outside work for LIFEAT for a temporary period while a locally obtained replacement for RAFANELLI is being cleared and trained.

2a. During the reporting period information from 236 LIFEAT reels on coverage of the American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY. In addition, numerous memos were prepared by the Station for passing to the local ODACID and ODENVY based on LIFEAT provided material.

b. The following reports were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material:

HMM-5570	HMM-5625	HMM-5652
5573	5627	5655
5575	5630	5659
5587	5639	5660
5588	5641	5717
5590	5642	5742
5592	5643	5743
5613	5647	5836

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

19 September 1961

Distribution:
- 3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

[illegible]

52-6-32/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-16838
[redacted] 1881

TO
: Chief, WH Division
INFO

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/3

FROM
: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
14 April 1961

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Report for March 1961

RE "43 3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
- Information Only.

REFERENCE(S)

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V. paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LIERODE, with related lines, continued to receive emphasis from the LIFEAT operation during the reporting period. The appropriate Case Officer considers the check of penetration agents LITAMIL-3, LITAINT-7, and LITALUS-3 through LIFEAT to be of utmost value in controlling these agents and checking their activities. In addition, LIFEAT provided extremely valuable information in the defection of Jose PARDO Llada, giving leads for both FI and PP exploitation. Aid was also given in providing a check of the AMIRON AWOLS in Mexico. In a related occurance, LIFEAT provided information that indicates the Cuban Embassy in Mexico is being used as a Guatemalan Communist communication channel to exiles in Cuba. LIFEAT also provided daily information on travellers to Cuba.

(2) LIFEAT/LITMUS provided information for use in the BECORN operation. It is also of continuing importance as a daily check on the activities of the LITMUS personnel in Mexico.

(3) During the recent Latin American "Peace Conference", LIFEAT provided information on the delegates to the Conference, especially the U.S. delegates, as well as the activities of the Conference.

(4) LIFEAT coverage of Noah SEBORER provided advance information on the travel to the United States of Anna SEBORER and Maria and Enos WICHER. The actual departure and return of these American Communists was also confirmed through LIFEAT.

b. Processing of Material

There has been no change in the processing of the internally produced LIFEAT take. LIFEAT processors continue to process the take from the LIENVOY/LIMERICK coverage.

c. Liaison

No change.

Remove from Project [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # [illegible]
Box: ____ Fold: ____

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
PS
~~RX~~
DES
~~FI~~
ARD

d. Security

No adverse occurances were noted during the reporting period.

e. Technical

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | ~~SECRET~~/[redacted] | HMMA-16838
[redacted]-1881

No change.

f. Coverage

The number of lines covered by LIFEAT during the month of March 1961 was 12. The breakdown follows:

LIERODE, and related lines	4
LITMUS, and related lines	4
American Communists	1
Local Communists	2
Targets of Opportunity	1

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the reporting period, information from twenty-nine LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY. In addition, numerous memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based on LIFEAT provided material.

b. The following reports, cables, and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material:

HMM-5497
HMM-5505
HMM-5507
HMM-5511 (MEXI-7492)
HMM-5532 (MEXI-7577)
HMM-5533 (MEXI-7580)
HMM-5534 (MEXI-7585)
HMM-5536
HMM-5541
HMM-5545 (MEXI-7639)
HMM-5549
HMM-5550 (MEXI-7681)
HMM-5552
HMM-5560
HMM-5563

MEXI-7494
MEXI-7502
MEXI-7561
MEXI-7564
MEXI-7600
MEXI-7613
MEXI-7615
MEXI-7626
MEXI-7677

HMMA-16555
HMMA-16564
HMMA-16565
HMMA-16600
HMMA-16607
HMMA-16608
HMMA-16625
HMMA-16627
HMMA-16633
HMMA-16639
HMMA-16664
HMMA-16665
HMMA-16687
HMMA-16710
HMMA-16725
HMMA-16728
HMMA-16735
HMMA-16738
HMMA-16740
HMMA-16747
HMMA-16771

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

12 April 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Automobile License Check

MICROFILMED MAY 2? 1961 DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

HMMA 16477, 15 February 1961

The results of Headquarters investigation revealed that the automobile noted at home of [illegible] -1 mentioned in reference is registered to one Lewis *CIMINO, Δ 2711 Chesley Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland. Headquarters traces on CIMINO were negative. auto noted at [illegible] 201-183704

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED: 21 March 1961

DATE DISPATCHED: 23 MAR 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9610

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3 ✓

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

RO[illegible]
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/Mexico

R/	BR
R TY	
(WH/BM	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C.Cudney	ngw	AC/WH/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	22 1961	J. C. KING

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~[illegible]~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-16767
[redacted] 978

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 29 March 1961

SUBJECT: e
LIFEAT Report for February 1961

RE "43" – (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only

REFERENCES: HMMA-16605

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHP-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d)(1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LIROBE continued to be an essential check on the activities and veracity of the penetration agents LITALUS-3, LITALUS-4, LITAINT-7, and LITAMIL-3. It also provided daily information on the activities of the Cuban official installation as well as coverage of long-distance calls received by that installation from Havana, Cuba. In relation to the AMIRON AMOLS in Mexico, LIFEAT was able to help confirm that none of the AMOLS contacted the Cuban Embassy. LIFEAT also picked up the return from Cuba of Oscar RODRIQUEZ Moruna (person who desired employment as a Cuban G-2 agent).

(2) LIFEAT/LITMUS continued to provide the interested Case Officer with daily information on the activities of the officials of the LITMUS installation in Mexico City.

(3) LIFEAT, through coverage of Xavier GUERRERO Saucedo and his wife, Clara Porcet de GUERRERO, was able to provide information on preparation activities of the recent Latin American Peace Conference held in Mexico City. This line also provided information of GUERRERO's contacts with other Communists, particularly Francis W. and Libby Campbell PARK, Canadian Communists now residing in Mexico.

(4) Coverage of Noah and Anna SPEORER revealed the plans of Anna SPEORER to travel to the U.S., and gave precise itinerary and flight schedule for this travel. LIFEAT was also able to provide the plans and travel schedule on Enos and Maria WICHER's travel to California. This information is of interest to ODENVY and was passed locally to that office.

AN 1.2
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DES~~ ~~NED~~
~~FI~~
AID

b. Processing of Material

No change.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

Contractual arrangements for a new basehouse, Annex VIII, have been all but completed. It is believed that this move will once again enable full secure use of the experienced basehouse keepers who were envolved in the security question noted in paragraph 1 (a)(c) of Reference. In order to further improve LIFEAT's coverage and security, the Station is also considering a move of Annex I if a suitable new site can be located. Headquarters will be advised of any progress made in this respect.

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # [illegible]3/77
Box: [illegible] Fold: 6

e. Technical

No change.

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

f. Coverage

The total number of LIFEAT lines varied from eight to eleven during the reporting period. The normal breakdown is as follows:

LIFRODE and related lines.	4
LITMUS and related lines.	3
American Communists.	1
Targets of Opportunity	3
Total	11

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the reporting period, information from 28 LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY for its information. Memos to ODACID and ODENVY were also based on LIFEAT provided material.

b. The following reports, cables and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the reporting period:

HMMA-16535	HMM-5507	MEXI-7241
16534	5505	7248
16533	5503 (via MEXI-7462)	7335
16503	5497	7345
16500	5475	
16498	5480 (via MEXI-7381)	
16495	5462	
16478	5465	
16456	5452	
16455	5443	
16440	5446	
16404		
16397		
16394		
16390		

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

28 March 1961

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-16605 [redacted]

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

TO	Chief, WH Division
HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.	50-6-32/3
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City
DATE	8 March 1961
SUBJECT	LIFEAT Report Covering August, September, October, November, December 1960, and January 1961
ACTION REQUIRED	Information only

RE 433 (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCES:

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d)(1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LIERODE, with related lines, provided overall coverage of the local Cuban and exile activities, and was considered extremely valuable in support of Station operations in the Cuban area. LIFEAT coverage of the Cuban Embassy enabled the appropriate Case Officer to check the veracity and activities of the penetrations of that installation; particularly LITAMIL-3, LITALUS-3, and LITAINT-5. It was also invaluable in the debriefing of LICOOZE-1. LIFEAT material was the basis of an effective KUBARK inspired press release concerning derogatory activities of Cuban Embassy personnel.

LIFEAT leads were of special value in two "one-time" operations. The first of these was the ability of LIFEAT to provide advance information on a meeting arranged between Major ROJAS Villa (aka James Bradford STEWART) and a Cuban Embassy official. As a result of the lead time given by LIFEAT, the Station was able to provide surveillance of the meeting and arrange for the detention of ROJAS. Ultimately, ROJAS (a fugitive from ODENVY) was returned to ODYOKE jurisdiction through Station action. In a second case LIFEAT provided follow-up information which, when provided to ODURGE, lead to the apprehension of Thomas Howard GRIGGS (aka Carl JOHNSON). He, too, had attempted to arrange a meeting with Cuban officials in Mexico, and was under warrant for abduction in Chicago, Illinois.

AN	[illegible]
IAB	X
IN	
PS	
EX	
DES	[illegible]
FI	
	[illegible]

LIFEAT information was heavily drawn upon in the case of Guillermo HERNANDEZ Vega, possible Castro agent, who was suspected of penetrating the AMIRON program. Through LIFEAT the Station was able to monitor HERNANDEZ's attempts to contact various Mexican and Cuban officials and to arrange for his return to MADD before any such contacts were made.

(2) LIFEAT/LITMUS continued to provide daily information on the official Polish installation in Mexico City which is described by the interested Case Officer as "invaluable and unique." During this reporting period, major contribution has been in providing the leads which determined that a local cafe is a front for much Polish intelligence activity in the area. It has been further indicated that this cafe is the Headquarters for a suspected Polish operation directed against the ODACID installation (previously fully reported to [illegible], KURIOT, and KUTUBE/D in HMMA-15914, HMMA-15995, and HMMA-16222. The telephone of this cafe has been added to the LIFEAT coverage with resulting increase of Station knowledge of Polish Intelligence activity.

Also of major interest was the LIFEAT support of a Station audio operation against the Polish Embassy in Mexico City. In this, LIFEAT provided the information on delivery date of a KUBARK "bugged" piece of equipment ordered by the Polish Embassy. As a result of the lead time provided, the Station was able to promptly initiate base house procurement and other support for this operation.

Remove from Project HD in H1160
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # 75-173/11
Box: 50 Fold: 6

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

50-6

As a continuing asset, LIFEAT provided daily notice of the activities and movements of Polish officials. In one case LIFEAT provided advance information concerning travel plans of one Jan KRZYWICKI, a person on the Polish Watch List.

(3) During the reporting period LIFEAT added to the security of the Station in checking on present and past agent assets. Of particular note was the coverage of the activities of LIFIRE, LIVESTOCK-1, and LIVESTOCK-2.

(4) Until terminated for security reasons (see SECURITY, below), LIFEAT coverage of the U.A.R. Embassy provided independent check of the activities of the members of that installation. Of note were the LIFEAT revealed meetings between Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, former Mexican President Lazaro CARDENAS and the previous U.A.R. Ambassador Anouar HATEM. This coverage also provided information concerning the visit of an Algerian rebel delegation to Mexico.

(5) LIFEAT provided coverage of the local Communists, the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM), and lately on two important Canadian Communists living in Mexico. In its coverage of local Communists LIFEAT provided coverage of Carmen BRUFAU Civit (admitted former Soviet agent), Xavier GUERRERO Saucedo and his wife, Clara Porcet de GUERRERO, and Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos. LIFEAT provided leads indicated the place of employment of BRUFAU, as well as much of her daily routine, thereby allowing the Station to initiate physical surveillance of her. LIFEAT coverage of CAMPOS, of interest to the Station's Communist Party Penetration Program, revealed his insincerity in cooperating with KUBARK, and as a result efforts toward his full recruitment were terminated with minimum danger to Station assets. Recently, at Headquarters request, LIFEAT reinitiated its coverage of the GUERREROS. This coverage has already provided information of the continuing contact between the GUERREROS and Frank and Libby PARK, Canadian Communist "inmigrantes" to Mexico and members of the Labor Progressive Party (Canadian CP). The Station hopes to mount a more comprehensive coverage of the PARKS as a result of the LIFEAT lead. In the LIFEAT coverage of the ACGM, of particular interest was the advance travel plans of Albert MALTZ, Noah and Anna SEBORER (as well as the travels of their sons Carl and Robert SEBORER), Maria and Enos WICHER, and Grace and Sam NOVICK. Daily activities of the ACGM are provided through LIFEAT to the local office of ODENVY.

(6) The LIFEAT complex provided the security check of the private office telephones of the Chief of Station and Deputy Chief of Station, as well as checks of the home telephones of certain of the Station officers (as reported in HMMA-16465). Since this service is unique and of value to Station security, it will be utilized periodically to guard against hostile audio surveillance.

b. Processing of Material

There has been no change in the processing of the internally produced LIFEAT take. LIFEAT processors continue to process the take from the LIENVOY/LIMERICK coverage.

c. Liaison

In November 1960, the local office of ODENVY requested that coverage of Albert MALTZ be re-initiated. This was done for a short period. However, due to the start of telephone company cable work in the area of basehous Annex IV, coverage had to be terminated. Technical surveillance will be resumed when cable work has been completed.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~
[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-16005
[redacted]-1967

d. Security

Operations at basehouse Annex VIII had to be discontinued on 10 October 1960 when the telephone company's installation crews moved into the area of that basehouse and actually approached the annex to investigate the number of lines entering the house. The crew was put off until the next day with the standard, and normal for Mexico City, excuse that the "Senor" was not at home and they could not enter without his permission. By the time the crew returned on the following day, the basehouse had been completely cleared of all equipment, the lines cut back to the roof-line and their ends treated with acid to give them an aged appearance. The crew was allowed to enter the basehouse to check (and ultimately remove) the extra lines, with the admonition that it was about time they cleaned up that mess on the "Senor's" roof. Operations will be resumed when a suitable new basehouse site has been located and equipment installed. There have been no security repercussions since the removal of the extra lines by the telephone company.

The only other security note was in relation to Annex IV and was covered in LIAISON section above.

f. Coverage

The number of lines covered by LIFEAT during the reporting period has ranged from 9 to 15, but has averaged 12. The normal breakdown of the LIFEAT coverage is as follows:

LIERODE and related lines...........3
LITMUS and related lines............3
American Communists.................1
Local Communists....................2
Targets of Opportunity..............3

It is hoped that once the telephone company has completed its present city-wide cable and installation work, at least in the areas of the basehouses, LIFEAT will be able to increase its coverage to 15 or 18 lines. The targets for this 3 to 6 line increase are already noted by the Station.

g. Personnel

No change since last report. Headquarters is reminded that the second tour of Ralph B. MAFANELLI (ps) will end in June 1961. It is requested that a qualified replacement be provided from Headquarters.

2. a. During the reporting period, information from one hundred thirty LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY for its information.

b. The following reports, cables and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the reporting period:

HMM-5095 (via MEXI-6008)
5098
5100
5101
5133
5137
5144 (via MEXI-6171)
5154
5159
5168
5172
5174 (via MEXI-6346)
5180 (via MEXI-6359)

HMM-5186
5187
5193
5207
5214
5226
5235
5245
5247
5261
5264
5268
5277

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~
[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-16605
[redacted] 1967

HMMW-5289
5297
5299
5309
5310
5319
5321
5329
5330
5332
5333
5338
5339
5342
5343
5347
5348
5354
5356 (via MEXI-6937)
5362
5372 (via MEXI-6979
5375
5376

HMMW-5378
5379
5380
5381
5382
5383
5384
5386
5387
5392
5393
5398
5400
5406
5407
5408
5409
5410
5413 (via MEXI-7187)
5418
5426 (via MEXI-7187)
5428
5437 (via MEXI-7212)

HMMA-15431
15467
15472
15480
15481
15499
15537
15552
15571
15580
15655
15657
15695
15696
15697
15701
15722
15734
15762
15765
15778
15792
15799
15814
15877
15895
15917

15936
15971
16037
16051
16052
16078
16103
16111
16114
16147
16179
16185
16214
16234
16235
16255
16270
16304
16306
16320
16328
16330
16342
16370

MEXI-6000
6048
6062
6114
6371
6429
6433
6437

MEXI-6511
6561
6587
7052
7055
7078
7096
7119

FORM 10-57 53a (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION
REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~
[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-16605 [redacted] 1967

In addition to the above, approximately 30 memos based on LIFEAT procured information were passed to local ODACID, and 20 memos were passed to local ODENVY.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

3 March 1961

Distribution:
  3 - Headquarters
  2 - Files

FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 5

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-16477

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/3

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
15 February 1961

SUBJECT
Automobile License Check

(CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
- See below.

REFERENCE(S)

1. It is requested that a prompt check of the following license plate be made and the results forwarded to Mexico City Station:

Maryland 1960 plate
CE 5574
1960 Grey Ford

2. This automobile was observed in front of the home of LIFEUD-1 on 9 February 1961. The driver, an English speaking man, was accompanied by a woman of latin features. The man entered LIFEUD-1's home at about 1030 on the above date.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

13 February 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CS COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Carmen BRUFAU Civit

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: [illegible]-9065, 1 September 1960

The interested Headquarters component has expressed a desire to review the LIFEAT take to date on Subject. Please forward copies to Headquarters and send copies of future take on a monthly basis.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
16 December 1960	[illegible] DEC [illegible]
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
HMMW-9314	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
50-6-32/3	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexi/Chrono

BR

WH/3M

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexi	John G. Heyn	bj C/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. KING

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

076

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~[illegible]~~

DATE : 8 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2, ADDP/A

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 9 08142 60

ROUTINE

IN 40047

DIR INFO SALV CITE MEXI 6594

REFS: A. DIR 09836 (OUT 55644)

B. DIR 09975 (OUT 55758)

C. DIR 09835 (OUT 55643)

1. MEXI PLANS MOUNT LIFEAT COVERAGE SALV EMB AND LIENVOY COVERAGE "EDITORIAL POPULAR" (MIGUEL ANGEL VAZQUEZ E. SALV COMMIE LEADER) SOONEST.

2. LIMUD NOW COVERING "EDITORIAL POPULAR" AND CARLOS BARRIENTOS MORAN SALV STUDENT AND MEMBER FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO SANDINO (FRS). PLAN LIMUD COVERAGE MAURICIO DE AL SELVA SALV COMMIE MEXI.

3. MEXI HAS NO PENETRATIONS OR LEFTISTS FOR TASK BUT PLAN SEND LIMASK CENTRAL AMERICA INCLUDING SALV SHORTLY. LIMASK "COVER" THAT OF EDITOR "VOZ DE AMERICA LIBRE". PLANS WILL BE SET FORTH

LIFEAT

~~[illegible]~~

SEPARATE CABLE.

4. NO INFO RE NEW SALV REGIME FROM MEXI SOURCE THUS FAR. ON 6 NOVEMBER LIOOZE-1 REPORTED NO INFO SALV SITUATION. HE WILL QUERY PORTUONDO CUBAN AMB RE ABOVE WHEN OPPORTUNE.

5. MEXI REQUESTS HQS AND SALV APPROVAL SHYROCK TDY SALV FEW DAYS ORDER FAMILIARIZE SELF BACKGROUND EVENTS AND PERSONALITIES COUP AND CONSEQUENTLY BETTER EVALUATE INFO RECEIVED MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED STATIONS CONDUCT FULLEST POSSIBLE COVERAGE OF INCOMING MAIL FROM EL SALVADOR AND CABLE PRIORITY SALIENT INTEL ON SITUATION THERE.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : CHARLES W. ANDERSON
UNIT : WH/FI
EXT : 3995 648
DATE : 3 NOVEMBER 1960

ROUTING			
1	MEXI	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	3 23 01 '60	
	ROUTINE	CABLE SEC	
X	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT 88628

TO MEXI PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 09820

1. DESIRE MOUNT LIFEAT OR LIENVOY COVERAGE SALVADORAN EMBASSY SOONEST AND CABLE PRIORITY PERTINENT INFO POLITICAL SITUATION SALVADOR.

2. CAN STATION SUGGEST COVERAGE ANY OTHER TARGETS WHICH MAY PRODUCE ON THIS VITAL MATTER?

END OF MESSAGE

LIFEAT Ops

R. D. Gahagan
CWHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/3/MEXICO
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 20 17 SEP 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2 (MR HEYN WH NOTIFIED 1855 17 SEP 60)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, C/CI, C/CI/RA, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, C/FE 4, D/OC 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 17 2214Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 14365

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 6348

file LIFEAT/OPS

RYBAT

REF A DIR 00992 (Out 70506) *

B DIR 01206 (Out 70522) **

1. STATION TAKING FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. MKCHARITY[1]-PREPARING MOVE SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT TO SAFE AREA. MULFORD[2] TO SPEND MORE TIME IN LIFINGER[3] COVER OFFICE. STEHLIK[4] INSTRUCTED STAY AWAY FROM MKCHARITY[1] BASE. LIMAT[5] OPERATION INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED. DUE PHILIP L. ALPHER[10] KNOWLEDGE MKCHARITY[1] CONSIDER THIS OP COULD BE MOST SERIOUSLY AFFECTED.

B. LIMESA[6]/LIMUST[7]-PLAN MOVE ALL TECH GEAR FROM UNIT 11 AND SUSPEND UNIT 15 LICALLA ACTIVITIES.

C. LIFEAT[8]-REVISING AND REVIEWING LP CUTOFF AND EVACUATION

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE 2

IN 14365 MEXI 6348

PLANS. DUE COMPARTMENTATION AND BELIEVED LIMITED ALPHER 10 KNOWLEDGE THIS OP, DO NOT CONSIDER COMPROMISE LIKELY.

D. LIENVOY 9 -NO DEFINITIVE ACTION BEING TAKEN NOW DUE LIAISON NATURE OP.

2. HQS REQUESTED PROVIDE CONTINUING ADVICE LATEST APPRAISALS ALPHER'S 10 AND OTHER ARRESTED TECHS KNOWLEDGE ABOVE AND ALL OTHER STATION OPS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comments:

* Headquarters informed the field stations that LCHARVEST(11) audio operation against NCNA in Havana was compromised.

** Stated that all security precautions should be taken since it was possible that all audio perations could be affected.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-15595
[redacted] 1445

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 31 August 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Monthly Report

RE: (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only.

REFERENCE(S):

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

1) LIFEAT/LIERODE provided information which assisted in the press exploitation of the story of Gladys Izquierdo Martinez de DELGADO, wife of the recently deported (with the help of LIFEAT provided material) Cuban agent Francisco DELGADO Garcia. LIERODE coverage was also the origin of the lead which gave access to Cuban agent Elpi CASANOVA.

2) LIFEAT coverage was reactivated 18 July on LIVESTOCK-2 as a Station security operation to check the activities of the potentially dangerous former agent.

3) LIFEAT also continued to provide the only independent means of checking the veracity of Jose Luis CAMPOS Villalobos who is of interest to the Station's Communist Party Penetration Program.

4) LIFEAT coverage of the American Communist Noah SEBORER provided the itinerary of SEBORER's trip, which commenced 17 August, to Havana, New York, Moscow, and Tel Aviv.

b. Processing of Material

The LIFEAT complex continues to process the take from the LIENVOY Soviet coverage.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

No change.

e. Technical

No change.

f. Coverage

LITMUS and related lines	4 (two initiated in July)
LIERODE and related lines	4
American Communists	1
U.A.R. Embassy	1
Targets of Opportunity	2
Total	12

AN [illegible]
AB ✗
IS
PS
SX
DES NFD
FI
RID

Remove from Project [illegible]
CS Classification: [illegible]
JOB # [illegible]
Box: [illegible] Fold: [illegible]

RECORD COPY

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-15595

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
[redacted] 1445

TO

INFO

FROM

DATE

SUBJECT

(CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

PAGE TWO

REFERENCE(S)

g. Personnel

David M. WILSTED (ps) returned from home leave and resumed duties as outside Case Officer for Project LIFEAT on 23 July.

2 a. During the month of July 1960, twenty-seven (27) reels were passed to the local ODENVY office for processing from the LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of American Communist Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material.

b. The following reports, information dispatches, cables, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the month of July 1960:

HMM-5032 (via MEXI-5835)
HMM-5045
HMM-5047
HMM-5065

HMMA-15275
HMMA-15277
HMMA-15307
HMMA-15309
HMMA-15328
HMMA-15402
HMMA-15408

MEXI-5835
MEXI-5941
MEXI-5943

c. Four (4) memoranda were passed to ODACID and two (2) to ODENVY during the month which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

29 August 1960

Distribution:
~~3~~ - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-15394
[redacted]1835

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 27 July 1960

SUBJECT O - LIFEAT Monthly Report, June 1960

ACTION REQUIRED - None. For your information.

REFERENCE(S)

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

AN
AB X
IP
~~FS~~
~~SX~~
DES | KCD
~~FI~~
KCD

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, Paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

LIFEAT/LIMERICK continued to provide advance information on arrivals, departures, work assignments, and contacts of the Soviet officials in Mexico City. In this area LIFEAT provided the following: advance travel information on the return of First Secretaries Yevgeniy BOCHKOV and Yuriy ALEKSANDROV from consultations in the USSR, advance information on the arrival in Mexico of the Georgian Ballet on 1 June and its subsequent departure for Cuba on 20 June accompanied by Assistant Cultural Officer Aleksandr BROVKIN, and advance information on the assignment and arrival of new Consular Officer Serafim V. DUNIN. LIFEAT leads provided on the continuing attempts of the Soviets to rent apartments are being checked by the Station surveillance team.

LIFEAT/LIERODE continued to provide excellent coverage of the activities of the Cuban Embassy staff, particularly providing exploitable coverage of Cuban intelligence activities. Of major importance during the month of June was the acquisition of leads on the activities of Cuban "tourist" Francisco DELGADO Garcia. As a result of these leads, passed to the Mexican government in disguised form, DELGADO was arrested on the night of 7 July and thereafter deported. LIFEAT information also enabled the responsible Case Officer to alert agent LIMASK to threats made by DELGADO to have LIMASK arrested. The LIERODE related coverage of the telephone of Santiago GARCES Arroyo has enabled the Station to maintain a check on the activities of AMSHAD-1, including his possible role as middle-man in a "frozen pesos for sugar" deal reported in MEXI-5794.

LIFEAT/LITMUS provided information on the activities of the Polish Legation during June, particularly noting the travel plans of Polish Intelligence Officer Thadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI.

LIFEAT coverage of a member of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) is used in checking the veracity of Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos who is of interest to the Station's Communist Party Penetration Program.

LIFEAT also agreed to support Project LIENVOY in the processing of the Soviet take when LIENVOY picked up coverage of the Soviet lines LIFEAT was forced to relinquish on 22 June 1960 (See SECURITY below). LIFEAT, though short of processors, agreed to the processing when it was learned that LIENVOY would be unable to process the added coverage it had undertaken.

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: [illegible]
JOB # [illegible]
Box: [illegible] Fold: 6

b. Processing of Material

Due to the desire of COS that ZINSMEISTER continue to process the take it obtains from the Soviet lines, LIFEAT processor Carol ZINSMEISTER (ps) will undertake the processing of the take of these lines

FORM 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

X CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

50-6-32/3

which LIENVOY now provides. This is exactly the work previously done by ZINSMEISTER and the only difference is that tapes are made at a different location. However, this does require close coordination within the Station of these two operations.

A problem which has arisen with the withdrawal of the Soviet coverage from LIFEAT responsibility (see SECURITY below) and the "outage" experienced earlier in June on two of the most productive Soviet lines, is the extreme drop in the production of positive intelligence from LIFEAT coverage. It is hoped that with more intensive exploitation of the coverage still available, plus exploitation of new lines being installed by LIFEAT, that the production of positive intelligence will again measure up to that previously provided by LIFEAT.

c. Liaison

No change other than the closer inter-office liaison with Project LIENVOY due to the above noted LIFEAT processing of LIENVOY take and the increased reel and finished product exchange this entails.

d. Security

On 21 June 1960 LITENSOR suggested to COS that LIENVOY begin operations against the Soviet and Satellite targets in Mexico City. In order not to indicate that the unilateral LIFEAT operation was providing this coverage, it was necessary for COS to agree to this suggestion. So as not to jeapordize LIFEAT operations and personnel, LIFEAT coverage was suspended on the Soviet Embassy and Polish Legation, and the applicable "crosses" were pulled and cleaned. This was accomplished by 1030 on 22 June 1960. Coverage continued on the home of Aleksandr BEKIER, Polish Conselor of Legation, since no security problem seemed to be raised by continued coverage of this line.

e. Technical

The arrival in early June of a portion of the replacement parts requested for LIFEAT use has enabled LIFEAT personnel to perform much needed repair and maintenance work on the aging LIFEAT equipment.

f. Coverage

LIMERICK	5 lines (All pulled 22 June for security reasons)
LITMUS	3 lines (2 pulled 22 June for security reasons)
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line
U.A.R. Embassy	1 line (Initiated 7 June)
Target of Opportunity	1 line

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the month of June 1960, eleven (11) processed reels from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico were passed to the local office of ODENVY as well as seventeen (17) reels from ODENVY's processing. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of American Communist Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material during the month of June 1960.

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-15394 [redacted]1805

b. The following reports, cables, information dispatches and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the month of June 1960:

HMM-4983 (via MEXI-5665)
HMM-4990 (via MEXI-5686)
HMM-5014

HMMA-15088
HMMA-15116
HMMA-15129
HMMA-15134
HMMA-15135
HMMA-15144
HMMA-15168
HMMA-15175
HMMA-15180
HMMA-15196
HMMA-15203
HMMA-15232
HMMA-15239
HMMA-15246
HMMA-15266

MEXI-5710
MEXI-5745
MEXI-5771
MEXI-5786
MEXI-5794
MEXI-5799
MEXI-5818

c. Eight (8) memoranda were passed to ODACID and ten (10) to ODENVY during the month of June 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired material.

Willard C. CURTIS

25 July 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

FORM 10-57 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

DISPATCH

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

HMMA-15400
RYBAT-1625

50-6-75

TO : Chief, WH Division

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

27 July 1960

SUBJECT - Monthly Activities Report on LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - None. For your information.

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

REF: HMMA-15170, RYBAT-1402

On the evening of 15 June COS met with LITENSOR at the home of LIELEGANT (see MEXI-5761). Among other subjects discussed, LITENSOR urgently suggested that COS arrange coverage of the Soviet/Satellite installations. Since this coverage is obviously one of great interest to KUBARK, COS was left with no alternative but to enthusiastically accept LITENSOR's suggestion. LIELEGANT was equally enthusiastic about the suggestion and requested COS to furnish a list of target lines as soon as possible. On 21 June Malcolm Q. EDELAND passed to LIENVOY/2 a list of 4 Soviet, 2 Polish, 2 Czech and 2 Yugoslav lines. The Polish, the Czech, Yugoslav and 1 Soviet line were placed within two days. Meanwhile all LIFEAT Soviet/Satellite lines were removed. After due consideration it was decided to advise LIENVOY/2 that we would prefer to drop the 2 Polish lines and at least one Yugoslav line and use all remaining available lines (LIENVOY can handle a maximum of 30 lines, always keeping two spares) to cover a total of five Soviet lines and keeping the two Czech lines already in operation. This was agreed to but the four additional Soviet lines could not be placed immediately due to the temporary absence from the city of LIENVOY/3 whose aid was needed to fulfill this assignment.

The eventuality of a request from high Mexican officials for LIENVOY coverage of Soviet/Satellite with its attendant affect upon LIFEAT had been foreseen by the Station for sometime. On at least two previous occasions when a hint was made to COS by lesser officials than LITENSOR, COS was able to dissuade these officials on the basis of lack of qualified personnel for processing, transcribing, and exploiting the take that would come from taps against Soviet/Satellite installations. However, on the above occasion when LITENSOR even went so far as to suggest that the translations could be handled by language experts at Headquarters COS was in no position to argue this point with LITENSOR. The actual implementation of the change over of Soviet/Satellite coverage from LIFEAT to LIENVOY (LIFEAT went back on Polish Legation in late June) was accomplished smoothly, with no flaps and the Station does not envision any problems, certainly, in the immediate future.

The processing and transcribing is being handled in exactly the same fashion as before i.e., LIENVOY is doing the taps only, LIFEAT personnel are processing the tapes from LIENVOY. As far as the Mexicans are concerned, the tapes are being forwarded to Headquarters for processing with the transcriptions being sent back to the Station for our information. The Station has promised LIENVOY/2 and LIELEGANT a monthly summary of any interesting highlights that appear in these transcriptions.

file

2(3)

53

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

X

1

Between the dates 9 to 14 June during the visit of DORTICOS, LIENVOY covered 10 of the 20 lines of the Del Prado Hotel where the DORTICOS party was staying. This coverage was for 24 hours daily and the LIENVOY personnel monitored all calls coming to and going from the DORTICOS suite (see MEXI-5731). This service was requested by the Station the day before DORTICOS arrival in Mexico City and was readily agreed to and immediately put into affect thru the efforts of LIENVOY/2. Considerable information of interest and value was obtained from this operation as well as quantities of operational data.

Also, during the month of June LIENVOY/9 was dispatched to Cuba on a special assignment per HMMW-5766. LIENVOY/9 successfully accomplished his mission, returning on 6 July. The results from this mission will be forwarded to Headquarters in a separate dispatch.

1. There follows the third monthly activities report on LIENVOY covering the month of June 1960:

A. Exploitation of Material Obtained

During the month of June a total of 29 lines were in operation against the following targets:

1. Gral. Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
2. Sam Brooks
3. Gral. Lazaro Cardenas Del Rio
4. Lic. Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
5. CTAL
6. Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo
7. Russian Embassy
8. Leopoldo Arenal Bastar
9. David Alfaro Siqueiros
10. Problemas Agricolas y Industriales
11. Vicente Lombardo Toledano
12. Czech Embassy
13. Joaquin Basanta Lopez
14. Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo
15. D. F. S.
16. D. F. S.
17. Jorge L. Tamayo
18. Francisco Galindo Ochoa
19. Francisco Galindo Ochoa
20. Amalia Solorzano de Cardenas
21. Dr. Lauro Ortega
22. Manuel Sousa Hermida
23. Lic. Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
24. Czech Embassy
25. Prensa Latina
26. Embajada Cubana
27. Czech Embassy
28. Yugoslav Embassy
29. Armando Lopez Betancourt

Plus 10 lines - Hotel Del Prado - DORTICOS suite 9-14 June (see MEXI-5731)

B. Processing of Material

With the closing of Unit C (see HMMA-15200) the two processors retained under the project, LIENVOY/6 and LIENVOY/7 were transferred to the Intercept Center where they are now responsible for doing the full transcription of the tapes covering lines of interest to KUBARK.

C. Liaison

During the month of June COS was in contact with LIELEGANT on the average of four times each week. As stated in paragraph one above, COS met with LITENSOR on 18 June.

D. Security

It is believed that the security of the project has been improved with the closing of Unit C and the elimination of all Unit C personnel with the exception of LIENVOY/6 and 7 who were transferred to the Intercept Site. During the absence of Arnold F. AREHART, Malcolm Q. EDELAND was in direct contact with LIENVOY/2 and took advantage of this contact to repeatedly stress the necessity for tight security of this operation as well as personal security of the various LIENVOYs. For operational efficiency, contact once a week will be maintained between LIENVOY/2 and EDELAND.

E. Technical

Early in June AREHART returned to Headquarters to convert to Staff Agent and pick up his family to return Pcs Mexico City. He and his family arrived 24 June. AREHART reported on his return that some of the equipment was in need of attention but that there were no technical problems during his absence.

F. Personnel

With the elimination of Unit C the following personnel were terminated during the month of June:

LITABLE/2
LITABLE/3
LITABLE/4
LIENVOY/13

G. Production

The following fifty-seven (57) reports, cables and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIENVOY during the month of June 1960.

HMMA-15084
HMMA-15093
HMMA-15094
HMMA-15095
HMMA-15103
HMMA-15107
HMMA-15142
HMMA-15147
HMMA-15170
HMMA-15172
HMMA-15200
HMMA-15201
HMMA-15217
HMMA-15249

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
	~~SECRET/RYBAT~~	HMMA-15400 RYBAT-1425

HMMA-15260
HMMA-15262

MEXI-5682
MEXI-5688
MEXI-5689
MEXI-5698
MEXI-5703
MEXI-5717
MEXI-5731
MEXI-5732
MEXI-5736
MEXI-5746
MEXI-5754
MEXI-5761
MEXI-5762
MEXI-5763
MEXI-5764
MEXI-5779
MEXI-5786
MEXI-5788
MEXI-5803
MEXI-5813

HMM-4974
HMM-4989
HMM-4991 (MEXI-5705)
HMM-4992
HMM-4993
HMM-4997
HMM-4998 (MEXI-5719)
HMM-4999 (MEXI-5720)
HMM-5001
HMM-5014
HMM-5016
HMM-5018
HMM-5019 (MEXI-5797)
HMM-5022
HMM-5023
HMM-5025

Willard C. CURTIS

26 July 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

Secret [illegible]/Ops

2(3)

Attachment to: HMMA-15328

Subject: Douglas J. NISLEY's (p) Report for June 1960

13 July 1960

1. During June the LIENVOY project put taps on the telephones of the Czech and Yugoslav Embassies. Anticipating a possible LIENVOY tap on the Polish Legation, the LIFEAT project removed its tap on this installation lest it be discovered by LIENVOY. The Station now receives Czech and Yugoslav reels every day from LIENVOY. The LIFEAT tap on Aleksander BEKIER's line continues, a tap on Stanislaw ADAMOWICZ has just begun to produce, and a tap on the Polish Commercial Office is under consideration. Eventually, when the Station is confident that the LIENVOY project will not tap the Polish Legation lines, the LIFEAT project will be able to reinstitute its coverage of this target.

2. A daily flow of photographs is coming from Richard Z. SPATHAR (p) in the LIHABIT/2 installation. The Station now has possession of the LITABBY/2 basehouse, but for various reasons it will not be useable for a while, and consideration is being given again to using LITABBY/1 as a base for photographic surveillance of the Polish Legation. No photographic site is available, or under consideration, for the Yugoslav Embassy.

3. As of 30 June, then, the situation is as follows:

a. Czech Embassy: Daily photographic and telephone coverage, augmented by a considerable quantity of information from LIPIRE air passenger manifests, visa requests submitted to the U.S. Embassy, and LIMAT mail intercepts.

b. Polish Legation: No photographic coverage. Telephone coverage limited to the taps on the BEKIER and ADAMOWICZ lines. Relatively slight information from visa requests, since there are fewer Poles than Czechs in Mexico City, and also because the Poles are apparently unable to take home leave. Little information from LIPIRE air passenger manifests, for the same reasons. Rather more information from LIMAT.

c. Yugoslav Embassy: Telephone but no photographic coverage. Very little information from visa requests or from LIPIRE. LIMAT is a good source of information, but mostly on commercial topics.

d. Other EE Targets: No information worth mentioning, because of the lack of any other diplomatic installations. LIPIRE submits occasional reports on the arrival and departure of individual EE satellite personalities.

Secret

4. Processing the source material listed above absorbs a large part of NISLEY's time. LIBRIFORM handles the translation of the Czech material, and BESMOOTH of the Polish material. There is no translator for the Yugoslav mail and telephone intercepts. NISLEY listens to the Spanish conversations on the Yugoslav reels, and attempts an occasional translation of the more interesting bits of Serbo-Croat correspondence with the aid of the dictionary kindly supplied by Headquarters. NISLEY meets BESMOOTH every day to pick up the Polish translations; LIBRIFORM and SPATHAR are still being met daily by Harvey P. DENENHOLZ (p); after his PCS departure in July this will become NISLEY's responsibility, as will the handling of LIMITATIONs 4 and 5, LIFEBLOOD, LINILE and LIBALSA.

5. Beside the daily scanning of source material, one of the month's more important activities was the updating of the table of organization of the Czech Embassy. This has now been completed. Photographs of departed Czech personnel were forwarded to Headquarters in HMMA-15081, 15106, and 15120. Of the sixty Czechs (including wives, but not children) known to be stationed in Mexico City, photographs are lacking for twenty. SPATHAR has photographed about the same number of unidentified people repeatedly entering the Czech Embassy; copies of these photos are being given to the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, and it is expected that one by one these people will be followed home and identified.

6. The Polish table of organization had already been determined, with the possible exception of one newcomer to the Polish Commercial Office who has not yet been completely identified, and there were no changes during the month. It is believed that most of the Yugoslavs have been identified.

7. The process of accumulating information on Czech personnel has not yet gone far enough for the Station to pick one or two likely targets for concentrated attention. A newcomer, positively identified as a Czech Intelligence officer, arrived on 30 June and will naturally receive all possible coverage. The Station received a proposal from Headquarters for special attention to be paid to Jaroslav VALENTA, the Commercial Attache; unfortunately, VALENTA had just departed on home leave, so action is being deferred until his return in August.

8. Among the Poles, concentrated attention is being paid to Aleksander BEKIER and Stanislaw ADAMOWICZ by means of telephone taps. The newly arrived Polish Intelligence officer will, if technically possible, receive the same coverage as soon as his permanent address is determined, although this will probably mean dropping the BEKIER line. Physical surveillance was run on Tadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI and Henryk POTASZ during the month, the former being

an identified and the latter a suspected intelligence officer; in both cases the surveillance was dropped after the subject showed signs of becoming tail conscious. The ZIOLKOWSKI surveillance lasted several days and revealed a number of possible IS contacts which are now being followed up. The POTASZ surveillance was blown practically immediately.

9. File studies have now been completed and Target Personality Data Forms executed on all Poles except the custodial personnel, Henryk POTASZ (whose form is in the process of completion), and the three newcomers about whom little is yet known. As a result of this activity, Roman CZYZYCKI and Mieczyslaw WLODAREK have tentatively been selected as worthy of closer concentration, the former on a long-term basis and the latter on a short-term basis. CZYZYCKI is interesting because he is ambitious and apparently not intellectually committed to the regime, he is the close assistant of Aleksander BEKIER and hence has access to information of value, his entire family is with him, and he is young enough to be able to make a new life for himself if flight should become necessary. Attempts are now being made to develop a contact to him through one of his many acquaintances in the Mexican press.

10. WLODAREK is interesting mainly because he is Minister, and because he seems to be dissatisfied with his prospects. HMMA-15177 of 17 June transmitted information about a possible avenue of approach to him. Information received more recently disclosed that the doctor, who had been tentatively spotted as a means of access to Mrs. WLODAREK, is indeed anti-Communist but is also on unfriendly terms with Mrs. WLODAREK. ODACID personnel, who had been asked to cultivate WLODAREK at diplomatic functions, have reported that WLODAREK has not attended any at which they have been present. No likelihood is now foreseen of any means of contact to WLODAREK, and indications are that his recall may take place some time this summer.

11. An attempt early in June to recruit a source close to Tadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI failed when it was discovered that the individual did not have the access she had been believed to have. Details were sent to Headquarters in HMMA-15116 of 8 June.

12. Information on a possible source of operational intelligence on Czech personnel was obtained from LIKAYAK/2 and forwarded to Headquarters in HMMA-15082 of 3 June and HMMA-15199 of 22 June. The mail intercept on the Czech accommodation address has begun to function, but so far has produced nothing of value.

13. MEXI-5633 of 6 June and HMMA-15195 of 17 June transmitted information from and about BEFUNNY obtained from LIFEBLOOD.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-15319
[redacted] 1503

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/3
JCK

TO
: Chief, WH Division

INFO

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM
: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
13 July 1960

SUBJECT
0
- LIFEAT Monthly Report, May 1960

RE (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
- For your information.

REFERENCE(S):

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BT~~
DBS ~~NPD~~
~~FI~~
AGP

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

During the month of May 1960, Project LIFEAT continued to provide excellent coverage of the activities of the official Soviet and Cuban installations in Mexico City, the Station's top priority targets. The following are specific, though necessarily selective, contributions made by LIFEAT through provision of exploitable leads and support to Mexico City Station.

1) The most outstanding single contribution of the LIMERICK phase of Project LIFEAT during the period of this monthly review was the providing of information to the responsible Case Officer which confirmed the validity of agent LITARDY-1. This double agent turned himself into ODENVY, and thus to KUBARK, during the latter part of the review period. LIFEAT/LIMERICK provided data on the activities and Soviet contacts of LITARDY-1, thus enabling the case officer to adequately plan productive use of this new asset.

2) LIMERICK continued to provide Project LIMESA with support in the form of information on goods and services provided to the Soviets from the local economy. Of special interest was information on specific apartments which the Soviets were considering renting. LIMERICK also continued to provide valuable information on Soviet commercial activities which has been reported separately.

3) Also provided was information of a CE nature concerning specific assignments of personnel within the Soviet Embassy, advance travel plans of Soviet officials, and arrivals, departures, and addresses of Embassy staff members. The following are examples of this category of information:

a) Vitaliy Borisovich SHUBIN arrived 11 May 1960 and is probably the Intelligence Officer replacement for Yevgeniy LAPSHEV. The address of SHUBIN was also provided by LIFEAT.

b) Aleksandr BROVKIN was assigned duties as Assistant Cultural Officer to replace Vladimir NOVIKOV during the latter's home leave.

c) Valentin BAKULIN was appointed Soviet Film Officer in charge of distribution of Soviet films, including propaganda films.

d) Advance notice was given of the 20 May arrival of the Soviet delegation to the International Cotton Conference held in Mexico City, and noted that the delegation would be composed of Dmitriy MAITOV, Boris FIRSOV, Abdulla SULTANKHODZKAYEV, and Vladilyena TERESHCHINA.

Remove from Project KOMHNES
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # 73-177/71 [redacted] 6
Box: 76 Fold: ______

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

3) Advance information was provided on the following travel: Soviet Ambassador BAZYKIN to leave 21 June 1960 for home leave in the USSR; planned departure of Vladimir NOVIKOV, Cultural Officer, for home leave in the USSR and return to Mexico; departure for home leave 31 May 1960 of known RIS officer Colonel Dmitriy KUZNETSOV; that thirteen Soviet officials are returning to the USSR during the months of July and August 1960 with no indication that these are to be replaced (Five of these are known RIS officers; Yuriy CHELPANOV, Pavel KOVALEV, Yevgeniy LAPSHEV, Vladimir MAKOVKIN, and Grigori YEFREMOV).

4) Due to advance information provided through LIFEAT/LITMUS, the Station was able to cover a clandestine meeting of Alexandr BEKIER, Polish Counselor of Legation in Mexico, and provide identification of BEKIER's contact. Through coordination with MKCHARITY and the Station's KURIOT representative, both audio and photo surveillance of the meeting were arranged.

5) LIFEAT/LIERODE significantly supported the Station's efforts in the Cuban operations field by providing leads that lead to and assisted in the recruitment of agent LITALUS-3, a penetration of the Cuban Embassy who is to be handled by LITALUS-1. LIERODE is also utilized as a continuing check on the activities of the newly recruited agent.

6) The Station's CE priority has been supported through coverage of the phone used by PCM members Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos and Mario PEREZ Martin. This coverage has provided information of value concerning addresses, phone numbers, and contacts of other PCM members. It has also been employed as a cross-check of statements made by CAMPOS to Howard O. MOSCHIANO.

7) LIFEAT provided information on travel planned and accomplished by associates of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) particularly that of Maria WICHER to Moscow, the return of Albert MALTZ to Mexico, and the planned travel of Noah SEBORER to Moscow in August.

b. Processing of Material

During the month of May 1960, the quantity of raw information processed was noticeably reduced, and thus the amount of positive intelligence derived was also reduced, due to the "outage" on certain of the most productive LIFEAT lines. Principally involved were the Soviet lines, including one week break on an Embassy line, three weeks on the Soviet Motion Picture Office line, and one week on the Soviet Commercial Office line. These "outages" were primarily due to the telephone company pulling the LIFEAT crosses, or the target telephone being out of order.

c. Liaison

As in the past, the only liaison connected with Project LIFEAT is in passing reels from coverage of the American Communists in Mexico to ODENVY for their processing. No other liaison is considered necessary or desireable.

d. Security

No security problems arose that were not readily solved by the personnel concerned, nor did these jeopardize the operation.

e. Technical

The only technical problems encountered were those falling within the province of the telephone company, as noted in 1. b above, or the normal malfunctions encountered in the aging LIFEAT equipment. These last were repaired as rapidly as possible with the aid of the replacement parts recently forwarded by Headquarters. No major "outages" were due to LIFEAT originated technical problems.

f. Coverage

LIMERICK	5 lines (outages as noted in 1. b above)
LITMUS	3 lines
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line
Targets of Opportunity	2 lines

g. Personnel

David M. WILSTED (ps) departed Mexico City on 21 May 1960 for home leave and Headquarters consultation of approximately two months duration. His duties as outside Case Officer and principal technician have been undertaken by Ralph B. RAFANELLI (ps) and LIFEUD-8.

2. a. During the month of May 1960, information from twenty-three LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico were passed to the local ODENVY office for its information. During the period 10 May through 16 June LIFEAT processed this take as the ODENVY processor was on home leave. Twenty-six reels of LIENVOY coverage of Sam Brooks were also passed to the local ODENVY office under the guise of LIFEAT material.

b. The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during May 1960:

HMM-4921
HMM-4924
HMM-4943
HMM-4958 (via MEXI-5610)
HMM-4963
HMM-4964
HMM-4966
HMM-4967
HMM-4971
HMM-4972
HMM-4975 (via MEXI-5640)
HMM-4979 (via MEXI-5643)

HMMA-14942
HMMA-14950
HMMA-14956
HMMA-14969
HMMA-14991
HMMA-15004
HMMA-15040
HMMA-15049
HMMA-15055
HMMA-15053

MEXI-5662
MEXI-5615
MEXI-5593
MEXI-5586
MEXI-5575
MEXI-5566
MEXI-5521

c. Seven (7) memoranda were passed to ODACID and ten (10) to ODENVY during the month of May 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

402

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ATE : 30 JUN 60

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : MEXICO CITY

CTION : C/WH 7

NFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2*

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JUL 1 2139Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 19430

5813

DIR CITE MEXI 5813

RYBAT LIENVOY

REF DIR 35367 (OUT 89228)**

1. RE PARA 4, LIENVOY WILL COVER FIVE SOVIET AND TWO CZECH LINES WITH TAPES PROCESSED BY ZINSMEISTER AND LIBRIFORM. LIENVOY MONITORS WILL EXTRACT FROM SPANISH FOR RESUMEN WHAT IS CONSIDERED OF INTEREST LITENSOR. LIELEGANT TOLD WE WILL INFORM HIM OF PERTINENT INFO OBTAINED (OSTENSIBLY FROM HQS PROCESSING) OF SOVIET AND CZECH TEXT FOR PASSING LITENSOR. LIFEAT WILL COVER POLISH AND OTHER CURRENT TARGETS. FOR SECURITY REASONS CZECH LINES HAVE NOT BEEN COVERED BY LIFEAT FOR PAST SIX MONTHS.

2. RE PARA 5; (A) NO CURRENT PROBLEM RE EXPLOITATION LEADS SINCE LIELEGANT HAS EVINCED NO INTEREST THIS MATTER. (B) PERSONNEL UNIT C TERMINATED AND BASE CLOSED. VIEW LIENVOY LACK LANGUAGE AND EXPLOITATION CAPABILITY AND OUR ABILITY CONTROL WHAT IS PASSED (OSTENSIBLY FROM HQS), STATION SEES NO IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. WILL POUCH DETAILS JUNE LIENVOY MONTHLY ACTIVITIES REPORT.

3. THIS DEVELOPMENT FORESEEN BY STATION SINCE LIENVOY BEGAN; NO INTENTION CUT DOWN ON LIFEAT (INDEPENDENT) OPS AND HAVE SUFFICIENT WORK FOR BOTH.

~~SECRET~~

END OF MESSAGE

Lifeat/98

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ATE :

O :

ROM :

CTION :

NFO :

PAGE 2

IN 19430 MEXI 5813

IO INFO CITE

C/S COMMENTS: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT JMNET CABLES.

**CONCERNED PHONE TAPS AND LITENSOR OFFER RE OVERTHROW CASTRO.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

410

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 24 JUN 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 6 (MR HEYN, WH DIV NOTIFIED 1910 24 JUN)

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

JUN 24 2226Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 16468

5786

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 5786

RYBAT LIENVOY LIFEAT JMNET

REF DIR 36367 (out 89228)*

1. RE PARA 6 REF, STATION HAS TAKEN ADEQUATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS. LEFEAT COVERAGE CUT PRIOR LIENVOY ACTION. LIMERICK AND LITMUS COVERAGE TERMINATED 22 JUNE 1020 HOURS.

2. WILL REPORT SOONEST ON FUTURE HANDLING THESE PORTIONS LEFEAT AND LIVENVOY.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *SUGGESTED LIFEAT COVERAGE BE CUT ON LINES TO BE COVERED BY LIENVOY.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

8 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/3/Mexico

SUBJECT: LIFEAT

1. During my recent visit to Mexico I had a good chance to go over many of the ins-and-outs of this project with the Case Officer and with other officers in the Station. At Station staff meeting I stated that reporting on CI material derived from the project was inadequate and COS appeared to go along with this view. The concensus I got from the Case Officers was that the SR Case Officer is not sufficiently alert to the need for reporting on the CI aspects of the matter and is limiting himself to strictly servicing SR Division matters. Various Case Officers cited instances to me of conversations pointing to new clandestine relationships or containing previously known clandestine relationships in the Soviet field which have not been reported. Owing to a lack of time, I was unable to examine the records myself, but I am inclined to accept those statements as true.

2. The Case Officer gave me a general run-down of the situation of the agents on this project and it appears that everything is running very well. He told me that in his new project outline, which will be up in a week or two, he is including some raises to some of the agents. He told me that on his last round of pay raises he had some difficulty here at headquarters. If any difficulty seems forthcoming this time, I should like to have the matter brought to my attention because, as you know, I feel very strongly on this matter and fought the same battles with headquarters for at least five years.

3. In speaking with the Case Officers on the Cuban side, as well as on the CI, it was apparent that LIFEAT remains probably the biggest single source of information available to the Mexico City Station and that every effort should be made to continue its smooth functioning. If this means a couple of hundred pesos increase to each agent semi-annually or annually, it does not seem to be too much of a strain and I do not see why we should have any trouble. When I compare the salaries of the base operators and processers on this project, especially considering the illegal position they are in, with those of relatively unproductive agents elsewhere in Mexico and in many other Stations, I cannot help but feel that we are buying a great deal for our money in this project.

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

cc: CI/OPS/WH (Mr. Brown)

SECRET

6 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF DAVID M. WILSTED (ps)

1. On 1 June 1960 Mr. John G. Heyn and Mr. John Kennedy of WHD, Mr. Robert Brown of CI/OPS, Mr. Robert Bryant of FI/OPS and Mr. Charles Bray of FI/D met with David M. WILSTED (ps).

2. WILSTED emphasized that the whole telephone system in Mexico City is undergoing a reformation. The company Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., has sub-contracted this work of cleaning up and reorganizing the phone system to the independent firm, Intel. They are cleaning up unused and old lines, putting in new and spare lines, redefining exchange areas, laying underground cables, etc. Eventually we should be better off because there should be more surplus lines. The renovation work has hampered much of the LIFEAT work, principally because many of the lines now are underground and we cannot get access to them before they enter the central. This is particularly true with respect to the Czech Embassy, to whose telephone lines we cannot obtain access from the vantage point we now occupy.

3. WILSTED said that we try to keep track of the activities of "Intel" but since they seem to attack "Colonias" at random, we have no prior warning of their presence in a certain area.

4. In the recent past, Mexico has been using houses for listing posts for security reasons. We have more control over the access of phone company inspectors or repairman to houses. However, under new regulations, all new apartment buildings must have telephone lines installed in the building by the phone company during the construction phase. This means that the lines and their destination are concealed. WILSTED proposed that this will mean we can again use apartments since we can siphon off a line destined for use by another tenant in such a way that the phone company cannot trace its destination without tearing the building apart and we can then install a separate line to the building and hook up the subscriber to this line which, if checked, will belong to a legitimate subscriber.

5. One system which has been used effectively is to take one-half of two separate pairs which have one faulty line each. These two half pairs then form one good pair which we can use.

6. WILSTED explained that it cost about 3000 pesos to get a regular telephone. This entails the purchase of a telephone company bond, which later can be sold.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

7. Personnel involved in the tapping of the lines are:

Rene - who has access to the centrals. He contacts the following men:
Two brothers
Jose - does exchange connections.

8. The take from each basehouse is collected early in the morning before office hours by RAFANELLI. He only enters one basehouse which is occupied by an elderly couple. All other contacts are in automobiles made at different spots each day of the week. RAFANELLI then takes the material to a meeting between him, WILSTED and SECHEN where RAFANELLI turns the material over to SECHEN and they all discuss the problems and plans for the day.

9. According to WILSTED there is no live monitoring done by any of the basehouse keepers.

10. There follows a list of the basehouses and the lines covered at each base:

a) Calero 39 - formerly covered American commies, now no lines. Being held for future use.

b) Juanacatlan 179 - Cuban residence
Russian Commercial
E. T. (Nicaraguan)

c) Atlixco 47 - 2 Polish
Seborer
Tropete
Bekier

d) Tenanzingo - Cuban military office
Cuban Ambassador's office
Campos (travel agency)
1 spare

e) Aristoteles 30 - UAR
Ejercito Nacional 540 (name of person unknown)

f) Suderman & Horacio - facilities for three lines. Formerly processed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open.

g) Cuautla 131 - 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the Central)
1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
RID/

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

COMMENTS

DESENSITIZED
per CSM 43-43

[redacted]

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.				
2.				
3. AC/WH/3		27/5/60		7
4. MEXICO/Hqs			31 V	
5. Burton				
6. Hughes				
7. Reports		1 June 1 June 3 June		mv
8. Br 4				
9. WH/FI		3 June	6	
10. Tarasi ~~C/OPS/WH~~			7 June 60	cp
11.			9 JUN 1960	
12. F1/D/Bray		13 Jun	13 Jun	CB
13. SB/10 1700		15 JUN 1960	16 JUN 1960	eB
14.				
15.				
16. Remove from Project CS Classification: JOB #				
17. Box: ___ Fold: ___				
18. WH/3/M				
19.				
20. ~~[illegible]~~ 1400L				

RECORD COPY

Copy

4 to 9 & 10: This is the first expanded Monthly Report since my visit to the Station. The inclusion of this section on Exploited Leads marks a signal improvement over former monthly reports.

Nice

Copy detached

[illegible]

file

[redacted]

2(3)

ENCLOSURE	~~ABSTRACT~~ ~~INDEX~~	FILE NUMBER
DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER HMMA-14991

FORM 4-58 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-14991
[redacted]-1773

TO: Chief, WH Division

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 20 May 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Monthly Report, April 1960

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only.

RE: (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

1) The LIMERICK phase of the LIFEAT operation is able continuously to provide the interested case officers with background personality information on the members of the Soviet Embassy staff, as well as travel information on Soviet officials and diplomatic couriers. During the month of April 1960, this type of information was exploited for the following:

a) Viktor Nikolayevich GLOTOV, First Secretary, will be the replacement for Vladimir Georgiyevich NOVIKOV as Cultural Officer when the latter leaves for the USSR on 29 May 1960. He will also act as the Soviet Ambassador's executive secretary during the home leave of Vladimir Ivanovich CHERNYSHEV. CHERNYSHEV departed for leave on 17 April.

b) Nikolai ZHOUGANOV was the replacement for Anatoliy Konstantinovich YEMELYANOV, Commercial Office employee who works "upstairs" in the Chancellery rather than in the Commercial Office. This indicated that ZHOUGANOV may be a code clerk.

c) Confirmation that four aliens are employed in the Chancery as teachers, one of whom teaches English.

d) Indications of increased contact between the Soviet and Cuban officials as noted in the travel of Soviet officers to Havana and conversations between the Cuban Embassy and the Soviet Ambassador indicating an announcement of importance was to be made on 8 May, possibly concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USSR.

e) Through the review of past LIFEAT traffic and the direct statements of the Soviet Embassy personnel in discussions of "duty rosters", it has been determined that a reduction in the Embassy staff is in progress. Future LIFEAT information should disclose whether this reduction is of a permanent or temporary nature.

f) Advance travel notice on Soviets such as CHERNYSHEV, NOVIKOV, Semeon FEDOROV, and couriers Vladimir BYKOV and Valentin KUZNETSOV.

AN
AB
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DES~~
~~PI~~

LIFEAT/LIMERICK also revealed a serious rift which has developed between the Soviet Commercial Office and one of its primary commercial

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

contacts, Mony DESWAAN, over the latter's failure to pay the Soviets for two shipments of Russian farm tractors for which DESWAAN has received payment from the Mexican Government, the ultimate purchaser. LIFEAT indicates DESWAAN has made himself unavailable to the Soviets since two of his checks have "bounced" for lacks of funds. LIFEAT further noted that the Soviets are concerned over reports that DESWAAN is planning an early summer trip to Europe with his entire family.

LIMERICK provided valuable support to the Station's AEIMPULSE operation by furnishing detailed information on the DeSwaan and Esteve Brothers commercial dealings with the Soviets. It was also employed as a security device after the conclusion of the above operation.

Leads were provided on two properties of interest to the Soviets, Calle Mazatlan #208 and Calle Chilpancingo #13, which were a valuable contribution to the LIMESA Project.

II) LIFEAT/LITMUS was the source of information on the arrival in and departure from Mexico City of Polish officials Jozef WINEWICZ, former Polish Ambassador to Washington, and Boleslaw JELEN.

III) LIFEAT/LIERODE continued to provide excellent operational leads concerning Cuban and exile operations. Of particular note was the ability of Station Mexico to warn an ODACID officer of a possible "walk-in" provocation attempt by an agent of the Cuban Embassy. LIERODE also provided information on four American citizens who entered Mexico on their way to Honduras to join an anti-Somoza revolutionary attempt.

b. Processing of Material

Although the LIFEAT project must be considered primarily a Station support project, an effort to further exploit LIFEAT for positive intelligence has been made by assigning the assistant case officer the task of coordinating the efforts of the appropriate area case officers and the Station reports officer in matters concerning LIFEAT produced information. Although this system has been tested only during the month of April, it is hoped that it will prove of value in increasing the positive intelligence take from LIFEAT provided material.

No change was made in the manner of processing the raw LIFEAT reels during the month of April.

c. Liaison

As in the past, the only liaison connected with Project LIFEAT is in passing reels from coverage of the American Communists in Mexico to ODENVY for their processing. No other liaison is considered necessary or desireable.

d. Security

LIFEAT/LIVERY continued to remain out of operation due to the extensive telephone company installation and renovation work being carried on in the vicinity of the LIVERY basehouse. No definite date can be given for the completion of the telephone company work.

e. Technical

No change.

f. Coverage

LIMERICK	5 lines	
LITMUS	2 lines	
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines	(one terminated 27 April due to lack of value.)
American Communists	1 line	
Targets of Opportunity	2 lines	(one installed 1 April, and one installed 25 April.)

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the month of April 1960, twenty-two (22) reels were passed to the local ODENVY office from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of American Communist Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material until 12 April at which time LIENVOY coverage of BROOKS was discontinued.

b. The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the month of April 1960:

HMM-4855
HMM-4857
HMM-4858
HMM-4876
HMM-4877
HMM-4879
HMM-4891
HMM-4892
HMM-4893
HMM-4895
HMM-4904 (via MEXI-5485)
HMM-4907 (via MEXI-5490)
HMM-4918 (via MEXI-5507)
HMM-4919 (via MEXI-5508)

HMMA-14762
HMMA-14843
HMMA-14855
HMMA-14885
HMMA-14892

MEXI-5373
MEXI-5424
MEXI-5435
MEXI-5441
MEXI-5451
MEXI-5453
MEXI-5463
MEXI-5467
MEXI-5494
MEXI-5496

c. Eleven (11) memoranda were passed to CDACID and ten (10) to ODENVY during the month of April 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

17 May 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-14856
[redacted] 1764

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/3

DATE 20 April 1960

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT C - LIFEAT Monthly Report - March 1960

ACTION REQUIRED - Information only.

REFERENCE(S)

RE "ZI3" (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads.

LIMERICK continues to be extremely useful in providing background information on Soviet personalities for the SR case officer as well as movement reports on these personalities which are of interest to the local ODACID chief. The LIMERICK phase of LIFEAT also provided support to the Station's AEIMPULSE operation.

LITMUS provided information concerning the impending transfer of Polish Consul Tadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI.

LIERODE has provided important information enabling the Station to follow closely the defection of LITAG-1 as well as the ensuing reaction in the target establishment, and was employed as a security device and information media in the preparations for the defection of LITAINT-1.

LIFEAT provided excellent leads on Nicaraguan exile activities while also providing an independent check on agent LITANGO-1.

LIFEAT was employed for protective security in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2 until 18 March, at which time it was decided that LIVESTOCK-2 no longer posed a threat to the Station's security.

AN [illegible]
AB X
IN
PS
RX
DES | NFD
FI
AKD

b. Processing of Material

No changes have been made in the processing of either LIFEAT reels or LIFEAT derived intelligence.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

LIVERY remained out of operation due to the extensive telephone company renovation work being carried on in the vacinity of the LIVERY basehouse.

e. Technical

No change.

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # 73-125/77
Box: 30 Fold: 2

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

50-6-32/3

f. Coverage

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line
Targets of Opportunity	3 lines (two of these lines terminated mid-March, and one terminated 3 March.)

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a) During March 1960, twenty-seven (27) reels were passed to ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material for their processing.

b) The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT during the month of February 1960:

HMMA-14618
HMMA-14624
HMMA-14672
HMMA-14677
HMMA-14683
HMMA-14700
HMMA-14711
HMMA-14718
HMMA-14719
HMMA-14731

HMM-4803
HMM-4836
HMM-4843
HMM-4849

MEXI-5267
MEXI-5275
MEXI-5283
MEXI-5287
MEXI-5296
MEXI-5332
MEXI-5353
MEXI-5361
MEXI-5367

Twenty-one (21) memoranda were passed to ODACID and one (1) to ODENVY during the month of March 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

19 April 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50 6-32/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-14688

[redacted] 1756

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 16 March 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Monthly Report - February 1960

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only.

REFERENCE(S)

[illegible]

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

AN	[illegible]
AB	X
IN	—
PS	—
BX	—
DES	NPD
FI	—
ARD	

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with FN 52-670, paragraph 3 (c) (2):

a. Processing of information

No changes have been made in the manner of processing LIFEAT material.

b. Exploitation of leads

LIMERICK provided the identitites of several contacts of RIS officer, Alexander PRIKHODKO. This coverage also revealed the possible sale of property located near the Soviet Embassy to the Soviets. LIMERICK further provided coverage of the activities of suspect RIS agent, Gabriel UKAEGBU. LIMERICK also provided support for the AEIMPULSE operation.

LIFEAT continued to be employed as a protective security aid in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2.

LIERODE has provided an independent check on agent LITANGO-1, and coverage of Cuban intelligence operations. LIERODE also provided a lead on Santiago GARCES Arroyo, who is to establish a Cuban secret service.

c. Liaison

No change

d. Security

LIVERY continued to be out of operation due to telephone company renovation work in the vicinity of the LIVERY base house.

e. Technical

No new developments.

f. Personnel and Administration

Jeremy L. NIARCOS (p) reported to Mexico City Station to replace Gene F. BRADDOCK (p) as assistant case officer in the LIFEAT operation.

Remove from Project: ODIANC
CS Classification: 50-6-32/2
JOB # 73-175/77
Box: 2 Fold: 2

FORM 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

g. During February 1960, the following lines were in operation:

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line (coverage was resumed on 23 February)
Targets of Opportunity	1 line

2. During February 1960, seven (7) reels were passed to ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS, American Communist residing in Mexico City, were passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material for their processing.

3. The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT during the month of February 1960:

HMMA 14448	MEXI 5076	HMM 4761
14457	5079	4762
14458	5086	4768
14468	5088	4771
14504	5094	4790
14511	5155	
14512	5158	
14514	5160	
14517	5213	
14571	5221	

Twenty-three memoranda were passed to ODACID and six to ODENVY during February 1960 which were based on LIFEAT produced information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

15 March 1960

Distribution:
✓3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/7

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: [redacted]-1751

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 2 March 1960

SUBJECT: C Operational
LIFEAT Monthly Report - January 1960

RE: "ARE" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only

REFERENCE(S): HMMA-14403, 22 January 1960

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with FN 52-670 paragraph 3(c)(2):

A. Processing of Information

No changes have been made in the manner of processing LIFEAT material.

B. Exploitation of Leads

LIFEAT continues to be utilized as a protective security measure in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2.

LIVERY provided several useful leads for the Case Officer.

LITMUS provided information enabling the Station to identify a safehouse presently used by the Polish IS.

LIRODE continues to be a major source of information regarding exile activities.

LIMERICK material provided information on Soviet communications which was forwarded to HQS for KUTUBE D processing.

C. Liaison

No change.

D. Security

LIVERY lines were suspended due to the activity of telephone company personnel involved in the installation of new cables in the area contiguous to the LIVERY basehouse. No other security problems were encountered.

E. Technical

No new developments.

F. Personnel and Administration

No change.

G. Miscellaneous

During the month of January 1960 the following lines were in operation:

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIVERY	2 lines(off for security reasons for a part of the month)
LIRODE and related lines	7 lines(one discontinued during this period)
American Communists	1 line(off on 13 January)

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
DES ~~NED~~
~~PI~~
ARD

Remove from Project:
CS Classification:
JOB # 13-175/77
Box: 2 Fold: 3

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

CS COPY

50-6-32/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	~~SECRET~~ [redacted]	HMMA-14573 [redacted]-1751

Eleven reels were given ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in addition to which reels from LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS, American Communist, were also passed to ODENVY for processing as being LIFEAT material.

2. The following reports, dispatches, cables and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during January 1960:

MEXI-4898 MEXI-4912 MEXI-4913 MEXI-4915 MEXI-4917
MEXI-4919 MEXI-4926 MEXI-4938 MEXI-4939 MEXI-4941
MEXI-4954 MEXI-4960 MEXI-4990 MEXI-5004 MEXI-5021
MEXI-5028 MEXI-5031
HMMA-14355 HMMA-14372 HMMA-14392 HMMA-14393 HMMA-14394
HMMA-14403 HMMA-14411 HMMA-14415 HMMA-14417 HMMA-14421
HMMA-14317 HMMA-14418 HMMA-14422 HMMA-14425 HMMA-14433
HMMA-14436 HMMA-14444 HMMA-14448
HMM-4703 HMM-4704 HMM-4706 HMM-4707 HMM-4710
HMM-4711 HMM-4712 HMM-4718 HMM-4724 HMM-4726
HMM-4729 HMM-4737 HMM-4742

During the month of January 1960, nineteen memoranda were passed to ODACID, five to ODENVY and two each to ODIBEX, ODUNIT and ODOATH attaches which were based on LIFEAT information.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

26 February 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

5-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO 2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-A-14403
[redacted]-1741

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 22 January 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Monthly Report - December 1959

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only

RE: (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S): HMM A-14253, 15 Dec. 1959

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with FN 52-670, paragraph 3(c)(2):

A. Processing of Information

No changes have been made in the manner of processing LIFEAT material.

B. Exploitation of Leads

LIMERICK provided information for Station action and also through live-monitoring gave protection to personnel involved in the activity with the LUNIK.

LIFEAT is still being used as a protective security measure in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2.

LIERODE has revealed the identities of Cuban agents on the outside, i.e., in an unofficial position.

LIVERY provided the CO with information used in the KACHTIK Operation. (HMM-A-14317, RYBAT-1300, 13 Jan. 1960.)

C. Liaison

No change.

D. Security

No problems encountered which have not been readily resolved by the personnel involved.

E. Technical

Nothing new to report.

F. Personnel and Administrative

No change.

G. Miscellaneous

During December 1959 the following lines were in operation:

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIVERY	2 lines
LIERODE and related lines	6 lines
Targets of Opportunity	2 lines
American Communists	1 line

AN X
AB X
TN
FS
BI
ES NFD
FI
RD

Remove from Project ORANGE
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # 13-125/77
Box: 32 Fold: 6

FORM 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

50-6-32/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMM-A-14403 [redacted]1741

2. During December 1959 thirty-one(31) reels were given ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS, American Communist, were passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material for their processing.

3. The following reports, cables, information dispatches and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT during December 1959:

HMM-A-14191
HMM-4667
HMM-4678
MEXI-4734
MEXI-4792
MEXI-4844
HMM-4672
HMM-4649
MEXI-4735
MEXI-4814
HMM-4691
HMM-4640
MEXI-4773
MEXI-4831
HMM-4712
MEXI-4789
MEXI-4842

Fifteen memoranda were passed to ODACID and five to ODENVY during December 1959 which were based on LIFEAT provided information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

20 Jan. 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~[redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: [redacted] Vol I
Development & Plans

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 Jan 1965 - 2 Oct 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LAD/DDO

ROOM: 3C 34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
24 MAY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
5 July 78		D HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
21 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/21/78			

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

SECRET

3-62

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KDAEGHAN Vol I
Development + Plans

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 Jan 1965 - 2 Oct 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LAD/DDO

ROOM: 3C 34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
24 MAY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
5 July 78		D HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
21 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/21/78		[illegible]	Kark

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

SECRET

3-62 OP-61 (3-70)

RETIRED

Project Renewal Requests

for
LIONION

1 of 4

(7-13)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO IP/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 2-66 2593

(7-13)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Headquarters component) WH/1

TO : IP/AN

TO : (Station/Base) MEXICO CITY

FROM: (Division) WHD

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE

☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
50	6	122/1

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

KDAFGHAN Development & Plans

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION

☐	OPEN FILE	☒	CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
☐	AMEND FILE TITLE	☐	REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION

☒	RETAIN IP/ARD	☐	DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

[illegible]:

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)

MEXI

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)

50

9. FILES ACTION

☐	HOLD IN CS FILES	☐	RESTRICTED	☒	UNRESTRICTED	☐	PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER	CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

VERIFIED

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.
Gloria Palmer, #630

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY
Charles D. Corner

EFFECTIVE DATE
1 March 1973

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

50	06	122/1

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MF6 12-65

SECRET

38

1—CS COPY

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE OF CRYPTONYM CHANGE - 20/04/71

KDAFGAN

FORMER CRYPTONYM - LIONION

CRYPTONYM CHANGE AUTHORIZED BY - ARMSTRONG
(SC OR RID SECTION CHIEF)

COMPONENT - RID/AN

CABLE OR DOCUMENT REFERENCE (FROM ITEM 10 OF FORM 812) - HMMS-7138

N-O-T-I-C-E

THIS IS AN RID NOTICE OF A CHANGE IN FILE TITLE CRYPTONYM CAUSED BY COMPROMISE. IT IS TO BE PLACED IN THE FILE INDICATED AND TO REMAIN THEREIN AS A PERMANENT OFFICIAL CS RECORD.

S-E-C-R-E-T

FILE IN - 050-006-122/01

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Termination of Project KDAFGHAN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The KDAFGHAN Project was officially terminated on 22 September 1972. The reason for termination was VWBLANKET contamination.

Edward K. LAUBOCKER

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

E2, IMPDET
CL BY: 055272

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-19157

DATE
2 OCT 1972

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-122/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Perry Smith	md (27 Sept 72)	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/FI	27 Sept 72	
WH/Plans		

AN
AB
IN
PS
BX
DES RFD
FI

ICI 10

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		John C. Murray

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 11-69

(40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

20 September 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Termination of Project KDAFGHAN

1. Project KDAFGHAN, approved for FY 72 and FY 73 in the amount of $11,950 each year, covered Mexico City Station's observation post targetted against the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico. OP operators KDAFGHAN-1 and his dependent mother KDAFGHAN-2, Cuban exiles resident in Mexico since 1960, were the only human assets in the project.

2. As a result of the JMYAK damage assessment and other security considerations it was decided that the project should be terminated and the agents resettled in another country. DIRECTOR 285255 amended the project for FY 72 to a total of $20,950 to provide for the termination and resettlement of the agents. The agents were terminated in August 72 and are now being resettled in Spain. DIRECTOR 300167 concurred in terminating the project as of 31 August 72.

3. In view of the developments in paragraph 2, above, WH/FI recommends approval of this termination request.

Robert D. Wiecha
C/WH/FI

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1 of 4

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: KDAFGHAN

TYPE OF ACTION		X FI/CI		CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere		
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico		
	RENEWAL FY 19	BRANCH: WH/1	DESK	
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: John Davis		DATE: 25 Aug 72
XX	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 3E04	BUILDING: Hqs	TEL. EXT.: RED 9424 BLACK 6924

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray	29 Aug 72	29 Aug 72		X
C/WH/COG	✓ Lawrence Sternfield	30 AUG 1972	30/8/72		X
C/WH/B&F	John T. Boeck J Boeck	31 AUG. 72	1 Sept 72		
C/WH/SS	✓ Richard B. Wright		1 Sept 72		
C/WH/FI	Robert D. Wiecha RWiecha	Sept 21		✓	
C/WH/Plans	John H. Wilson John H. Wilson	21 SEP 1972			✓

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
		$	19	$
			19	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD		22/9/72

FORM 5-69 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

25 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Project KDAFGHAN Termination

1. A request for termination action is contained in paragraph four, herein.

2. Project KDAFGHAN is a support project which provides the Mexico City Station with fixed photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The objectives of the project are to furnish photographic coverage of the Cuban installation during daylight hours, to assist the Station in compiling dossiers on officials of the installation, and to fulfill various requirements in support of other Station Cuban operations. The KDAFGHAN project encompasses two assets, KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2, who have been associated with the project since 1962.

3. While this project may be of some value to the FBI (FBI compares KDAFGHAN photographs with the photographs of known leaders of extremist groups in the U.S. as well as with photographs of persons who are subjects of identification orders prepared on badly wanted fugitives in the U.S.), it is of little value, as presently constituted, to Mexico City Station. There are other means of obtaining photographs of PCS and TDY Cuban personnel.

4. In early 1972 the Station mounted a thorough CI review of all Cuban operations in an attempt to improve their overall security. Although KDAFGHAN-1 passed the SGSWIRL with no apparent deception, his Cuban exile status, the long period of time he has been operating his OP site in close proximity to the Cuban Embassy, and the potential (perhaps immediate) danger presented by his and KDAFGHAN-2's Cuban relatives made

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 055272
WN-SISM

it clear that the agents should be terminated. In view of the aforementioned, as well as security considerations in the JMYAK case, WH/1 requests approval to terminate this project effective 31 July 1972. In order to meet termination commitments, project KDAFGHAN was amended on 30 June 1972 by DIRECTOR 285255 in the amount of $9,000, increasing the project's authorization from $11,950 to $20,950 for FY 1972. KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2 were terminated on 1 August 1972. There were no security incidents during the termination.

John C. Murray
C/WH/1
for

Murray:md

1972

TOTAL COPIES 25-2

SECRET

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

FILE IN CS FILE NO ______

[illegible] ADDP, C/FI, D/SECUR, C/FIN, OGC

"Eyes Only"

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 285255

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY

TYPAT PLUMYAK

REF: MEXICO CITY 20301 (IN 649510)

1. IN ORDER PROVIDE FOR COSTS OF AGENT TERMINATIONS FOLLOWING PROJECTS ARE AMENDED FOR FY 72:

A.	KDTUCK	$8,451	(NEW TOTAL $ 48,451)
B.	KDULSTER	10,500	(NEW TOTAL 20,350)
C.	KDADORN	7,136	(NEW TOTAL 22,856)
✓ D.	KDAFGHAN	9,000	(NEW TOTAL 20,850)
E.	KDFACTOR	9,844	(NEW TOTAL 28,844)
F.	KDACROBAT	7,728	(NEW TOTAL 44,197)
G.	KDVAULT	6,296	(NEW TOTAL 15,420)
✓ H.	KDCALVERT	80,950	(NEW TOTAL 160,950)
I.	KDLADDER	1,940	(NEW TOTAL 17,552)
J.	KDABSCOND	3,150	(NEW TOTAL 24,785)
✓ K.	KDADAGE	21,354	(NEW TOTAL 72,921)

(CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 285255

PAGE 2

L. KDRAIL 2,400 (NEW TOTAL 10,400)

M. KDBACIFY 1,800 (NEW TOTAL 7,800)

N. KDSALEM 8,800 (NEW TOTAL 31,200)

2. FILE: 50-6-128/1, 50-6-89/1, 50-6-80/1, 50-6-122/1, 50-6-74/1, 50-6-114/1, 50-6-58/1, 50-6-72/1, 50-6-131/1, 50-125-27/1, 50-6-144/1, 50-6-126/1, 50-6-110/1, 50-6-38/1. EX-2 APDIR WH-[illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/1

WH/SS

WH/B&F

C/MPS/BG

C/WH/CA

DDP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

T. Shackley
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Project KDAFGHAN Renewal FY 1972 and FY 1973

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The Project KDAFGHAN Renewal for the period 1 July 1971 to 30 June 1973 was approved by the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division on 29 June 1971 in the amount of $11,950 for FY 1972 and $11,950 for FY 1973.

Roger W. Bicego
Roger W. BICEGO

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-18507	DATE 2 JUL 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

Internal Dist:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/John Davis/kk/30 June 71			6955

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH 1	30-6-71	John C. Murray for

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

CRYPTONYM: KDAFGHAN

TYPE OF ACTION		
NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION	Western Hemisphere Division
AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION	Mexico City
X RENEWAL FY 1973	BRANCH: WH/1	DESK: WH/1
EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: John Davis John Davis	DATE: 16 June 71
TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 3 E 04	BUILDING: Hqs · TEL. EXT.: RED 9354 · BLACK 6955

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (AND SIGNATURE)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray	16/6/71	16/6/71		
C/WH/COG	Lawrence Sternfield	17 June 71			✓
C/WH/B&F	for L. O. Healy	12 Jun 71	6-11-71		
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright		6-23-71		✓
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch		6/25/71		
C/WH/Plans	John R. Cassidy J Cassidy	28 JUN 1971	28 JUN 1971		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 71	30 June 73	$ 23,900	1972	$11,950
			1973	$11,950

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD for		29 JUN 1971

FORM 5-69 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

KDAFGHAN - Mexico City, Mexico - FI/CI Support Project Targetted Against the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. FY 1972 Cost: $11,950. FY 1973 Cost: $11,950.

KDAFGHAN Project Finance History

	APPROVED	OBLIGATED
FY 1970	$11,165	$11,165
FY 1971	$11,094	$11,094

Purpose

KDAFGHAN is a support project which provides the Mexico City Station with fixed photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The objectives of the project are to furnish photographic coverage of the Cuban installation during daylight hours, to assist the Station in compiling dossiers on officials of the installation and to fulfill various requirements in support of other Station Cuban operations.

Description

The KDAFGHAN Project continues to encompass two assets, KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2, who have been associated with the project since 1962. Both agents continue to furnish information on a timely basis on the personalities and activities of the Cuban target. A description of the individual assets is set forth below:

a. KDAFGHAN-1 (201-288248): A Cuban lawyer in exile in Mexico who left Cuba in 1960. He has been the principal agent of the KDAFGHAN Project since 1962. KDAFGHAN-1's cover is that of a translator and would-be writer. Family holdings from his deceased father also provide financial backstopping. All photographic coverage of the main Embassy gate through final printing and mounting is processed by KDAFGHAN-1.

b. KDAFGHAN-2 (201-305604): KDAFGHAN-2 is the mother of KDAFGHAN-1. Her cover is that of a dependent mother. KDAFGHAN-2 acts as KDAFGHAN-1's assistant and fill-in whenever he is away from the basehouse.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Changes

The only major change during the project year was the installation of a TV monitor/robot camera combination during October 1970, the month designated as "Cuban month." This added coverage contributed to the compilation of target studies on several Cuban officials. These studies will be used as a starting point for future operations, namely the recruitment/defection of these officials.

Accomplishments

1. The main value of the production of the KDAFGHAN Project has been in establishing the pattern of various Cuban Embassy employees. The monitoring has also revealed which automobiles the various employees usually drive. Photographic coverage of the visitors to the main gate of the Cuban Embassy and logs of the movement of Cuban Embassy personnel have proved very useful in identifying new Cuban PCS employees in Mexico. Normally the Station has been able to match movements of new and old employees during the initial period when duties and contacts were being turned over to the new employees and so identify their duties. KDAFGHAN has provided current photographs of TDY and transiting Cuban officials and Headquarters has often provided positive identifications of these persons. Norberto Hernandez, a DGI headquarters officer visiting Mexico, was identified in this way.

2. The Station utilizes KDAFGHAN photographic coverage and logs to verify the visits of Station assets to the Cuban Embassy.

3. KDAFGHAN also provides coverage of what appears to be American visitors to the Cuban Embassy main gate. In the case of Americans who arrive in automobiles bearing U.S. license plates, the license plate number, car description, and sterile copies of photographs are given to the FBI for identification. A significant result of the KDAFGHAN operation included a photographic of a specific individual - an old FBI target - who had been seen visiting the Cuban installation.

4. KDAFGHAN also provided useful coverage for the KDACOUSTIC-3 operation, an operation aimed at the recruitment or defection of a DGI officer. This coverage enabled the Station to determine KDACOUSTIC-3's movements, an important factor in timing the calls and visits of our access agents. This use of the operation should prove extremely valuable during the coming year since a more aggressive recruitment program against the Cuban target is planned.

Problems and Security

No agent control or operational problems have been reported. Neither were there any security problems encountered during the period. Gerald D. FAHLANGER continues to be the Case Officer and handler of KDAFGHAN-1. FAHLANGER has met and could continue to meet KDAFGHAN-2 in an emergency. The alternate Case Officer is Terence D. SISTONE who meets KDAFGHAN-1 when FAHLANGER is not available. Both Case Officers are known to the assets in alias, and both meet KDAFGHAN-1 in a safehouse. During February 1971 the safehouse was changed in compliance with normal operational security. Meetings are generally held once a week. More frequent contact can be made by telephone. In an emergency, anyone can call KDAFGHAN-1 at his home and say they are a friend of "Pepe Simon." KDAFGHAN-1 will reply "I haven't seen him since last Christmas." KDAFGHAN-1 speaks English.

Coordination:

The Ambassador is aware of our efforts against the Cuban target in general. He has not been specifically briefed on this operation.

Future Plans:

The Station is constantly examining the possibility of an audio installation at the main gate of the Cuban Embassy. A successful audio device would serve, in most cases, to identify the individuals who are photographed by KDAFGHAN-1 since they normally identify themselves to the gate house attendant. There are a few Station assets who have occasional access to the gate house, and it is conceivable that one of them could place a quick plant device, provided security conditions are favorable. The Station currently has under consideration a recruitment effort against a lower level employee of the Cuban Embassy who would be of tremendous help in such an operation.

Costs:

1. General: This renewal request is for FY 1972 in the amount of $11,950 and FY 1973 in the amount of $11,950.

2. Source of Funds: Project KDAFGHAN is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's Operating Program in the amount of $10,844 for FY 1972 and $10,844 for FY 1973. The additional Funds required are to be absorbed from within the WH Division allocation.

3. Project Budget: The following is a cost breakdown for the preceding, current, and next fiscal years:

	FY 1971 Obligations (Estimated)	FY 1972 Request	FY 1973 Projection	FY 1974 Projection
KDAFGHAN-1 Salary	$ 4,800	$ 5,088*	$ 5,088	$ 5,088
KDAFGHAN-2 Salary	1,920	2,112*	2,112	2,112
Christmas Bonus	560	600*	600*	600
KDAFGHAN Basehouse Rent (Observation Post)	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
KDAFGHAN Safehouse (for Station meetings with KDAFGHAN-1)	864	1,200	1,200	1,200
Utilities for Safehouse and Basehouse	500	500	500	500
Miscellaneous Expenses (film, paper, chemicals, stationary)	1,250	1,250	1,250	1,250
TOTALS	$11,094	$11,950	$11,950	$11,950

*Increases reflect the "cost-of-living" granted effective 1 January 1971.

4. Foreign Currency: There are no special requirements for foreign currency.

5. Commitments: Upon termination, the agents will be paid a termination bonus not to exceed three month's salary.

6. Funding: Case officers pay the assets directly. The funds are accounted for with end receipts obtained from the assets. KDAFGHAN-1 has sufficient private income to cover the JKLANCE funds he receives.

7. Accountability: All funds are accounted for by receipts and/or certifications as required by Agency regulations.

Annexes:

None.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Project LIONION Renewal FY 1971

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The Project LIONION Renewal for FY 1971 was approved by the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division on 26 June 1970 in the amount of $11,094. A copy of the Renewal is being forwarded by split transmission.

Douglas F. TASSELL

Attachments:
- A) Left Side h/w
- B) Center u/s/c via split transmission
- C) Right Side u/s/c via split transmission

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w & u/s/c via split transmission

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-17977	1 JUL 1970 30 June 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

RI - 1
CHRONO - 1

AN NS
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PC~~
~~DX~~
~~DES~~ ~~NFD~~
~~FI~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Scott Holloway	nh	6924

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		John C. Murray

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)
MFG. 11-68

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION	PROJECT CRYPTONYM LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION	X FI/CI		CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division	
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Mexico City	
X	RENEWAL FY 1970	BRANCH One	DESK
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Fred Kravcov	DATE 24 June 70
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3E04 · BUILDING Hqs	TEL. EXT. RED 9041 · BLACK 6954

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
AC/WH/1	Charles M. Bounds	24 June	24 June		
AC/WH/B&F	Wyatt B. Thompson	6/24	6/25		
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright		6-25-70		✓
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch		26/6/70		
C/WH/Plans	Robert B. Moore Robert B. Moore	26 JUN 1970	6/26		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 1970	30 June 1971	$ 11,094	1971	$ 11,094
			19	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD		[illegible] JUN 1970

LIONION - Mexico City, Mexico - FI/CI Support Project Targetted Against the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. FY 1971 Cost $11,094.

	Approved	Obligated
1966	$10,718	$ 9,142
1967	11,328	11,590
1968	11,466	9,726
1969	11,258	10,803
1970	11,994	10,844 (Estimated)

Purpose:

The LIONION Project provides the Mexico City Station with fixed, selective photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. It is designed to provide information in support of Priority A, paragraphs 2 and 4 of the current Operating Directive, that is, the Cuban target present in Mexico and the support rendered by Cubans in Mexico to exile and other leftist groups in Mexico.

Description:

1. The LIONION Project currently encompasses two agents, LIONION/1 and LIONION/2, a basehouse directly across from the Cuban compound, and a safehouse for meetings with Station Case Officers. The two agents furnish photographic coverage during daylight hours of the main entrance to the Cuban Embassy. In addition, on a spot basis, photographic coverage and visual surveillance of the Cuban Consulate entrance is possible. The agents also act as dispatchers for the unilateral LIEMBRACE surveillance team when the LIEMBRACE team is being used against Cuban target individuals. A description of the individual assets is set forth below.

2. LIONION/1 (201-288248): A Cuban lawyer in exile in Mexico who left Cuba in 1960. He has been the principal agent of the LIONION Project since 1962. LIONION/1's cover is that of a translator and would-be writer. Family holdings in

Tampa, Florida, inherited from his deceased father also provide financial backstopping. LIONION/1 received his "immigrado" (permanent immigrant) status in 1965 and now has a good deal of immunity from harassment from Mexican immigration authorities. All photographic coverage of the main Embassy gate through final printing, cropping, and mounting is processed by LIONION/1. LIONION/1 and LIONION/2 maintain a log which indicates when a photograph was taken, and pertinent identifying data. License numbers of cars used by various Cuban Embassy personnel are recorded as well as license numbers of cars of unidentified persons visiting the Cuban Embassy.

3. LIONION/2 (201-305604): Mother of LIONION/1. Her cover is that of a dependent mother. As with LIONION/1, she has "immigrado" status and has been associated with the LIONION Project since 1962. LIONION/2 acts as LIONION/1's assistant and fill-in whenever he is away from the LIONION basehouse.

Changes:

During the project year, the pulse camera coverage of the Cuban Consulate entrance was discontinued. Little or no use was being made of the product from this camera. One reason for limited use was that there was no real way to readily fix the time--or the day-- a particular photo was taken. There were no other significant changes in the project during FY 1970.

Accomplishments:

1. The LIONION production for FY 1970 consisted almost entirely of photographic coverage of visitors to the Cuban Embassy main entrance and of logs of the movement of Cuban Embassy personnel and visitors. This proved very useful in identifying new Cuban Embassy PCS employees in Mexico. The monitoring also revealed which cars the various employees usually drove.

2. LIONION also took photographs of what appeared to be American visitors to the Cuban Embassy front gate. In the case of Americans who arrived in automobiles bearing U.S. license plates, the license plate numbers, car descriptions, and sterile copies of photographs were given to LNERGO for identification.

3. The Station also used the LIONION photographic coverage and log to check on the reports of Mexican and other JKLANCE assets who claimed to have visited the Cuban Embassy. In the case of some assets, LIONION/1 was given a photograph of the agent and told to be particularly alert at certain times of certain days to confirm the agent's entry and exit. This proved particularly useful in checking AVDIME/1's story of contact with the Cubans. It also confirmed LIRELIC/1's visit to the Cuban Embassy at an early stage in Station recontact with LIRELIC/1.

Problems:

1. No agent control or operational problems have been reported. Neither were there any security problems encountered during the period. LIONION/1 was met in a safehouse on an average of once per week by Andrew E. PELLEMENT, in alias. Following PELLEMENT's departure in late May, Gerald D. FAHLANGER took over the responsibility for the LIONION Project. FAHLANGER, in alias, meets LIONION/1 approximately once per week. In January 1970, the Station had LIONION/1 change the safehouse used for meetings with Station officers. He signed a one-year lease on the new apartment, in alias. LIONION/1 uses the apartment on weekends and evenings to lend credence to the cover story he used in renting; i.e., that he lives out-of-town and maintains this small apartment in Mexico City for use during his frequent visits.

2. Station visits to the LIONION basehouse were limited to three during the reporting period. These were made during non-daylight hours. LIONION/1 picked up the Station officer away from the LIONION basehouse area and drove the officer to the basehouse in LIONION/1's own car. The basehouse has a driveway off the street entrance-way which facilitates entry during non-daylight hours.

3. During the Project Year, the pulse camera and the electronic equipment used with the LISAMPAN operations were removed from the basehouse, thus reducing the amount of compromising equipment in the basehouse.

Coordination:

The Ambassador is aware of our efforts against the Cuban target in general. He has not been specifically briefed on this operation.

Future Plans:

1. The Station is re-examining the various points of view which the LIONION basehouse provides of the Cuban Embassy complex in order to determine what steps can be taken to improve the usefulness of the LIONION product. For instance, from the window in the room where the pulse camera previously was installed, an excellent view can be had of the Cuban Embassy garden and the walkways between the three Cuban Embassy buildings--as well as the Consulate. The Station plans to have LIONION/1, on a spot-check basis, observe the garden area. In this way, the Station hopes to update its information on the location of the various officers' offices, the general pattern of movement and activity, etc. This area will also be observed during the night to see if it can be determined which areas are being used for living quarters or offices.

2. It is also planned to assess LIONION/1's ability to observe and draw appropriate conclusions from his observations, and to write these up for the Station.

3. Depending on the need for Consulate coverage, the installation of closed circuit TV coverage of the Consulate entrance is being considered.

4. The Station is being queried as to emergency contact arrangements with LIONION/1.

Costs:

1. General: This renewal request is for the period 1 July 1970 through 30 June 1971 (FY 1971), in the amount of $11,094.

2. Source of Funds: Project LIONION is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's FY 1971 Operating Program in the amount of $10,000.

3. Project Budget: The following is a cost breakdown for the preceding, current and next fiscal years:

	FY 1970 Estimated Obligations	FY 1971 Request	FY 1972 Projection
LIONION/1 Salary	$ 4,800	$ 4,800	$ 4,800
LIONION/2 Salary	1,920	1,920	1,920
Christmas Bonuses	560	560	560
LIONION Basehouse Rent (Observation Post)	1,200	1,200	1,200
LIONION Safehouse (for meeting with case officers)	864	864	864
Utilities for both	500	500	500
Miscellaneous Expenses (Film, paper, chemicals, etc.)	1,000	1,250	1,000
TOTALS	$10,844	$11,094	$10,844

4. Foreign Currency: There is no need for foreign currency which the Station cannot provide. There are no non-JKLANCE funds involved in this project.

5. Commitments: LIONION/1 and LIONION/2 receive, in addition to their regular salary, the equivalent of one month's salary as a Christmas bonus. LIONION/1 is reimbursed for operational expenses related to the project. In the event of termination, each agent will receive thirty days actual notice.

6. Funding: All funds are passed by the case officers during the safehouse meetings with LIONION/1 who receipts for the funds on the spot. The amount of funds used under this project are not enough to arouse the suspicion of LIONION/1 by the authorities should he be apprehended. He has sufficient private income to cover the JKLANCE funds he receives.

7. Accounting: All funds are accounted and certified for in accordance with JKLANCE regulations.

8. Annexes: None.

CMBOUNDS
WH/1/R
IT: 6924/9424
DATE: 8 September 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 21 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH-8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, TSD-6, FI-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 00 23 46Z SEP 69 CITE DIRECTOR 36226

TO MEXICO CITY

LIONION

REF: MEXICO CITY 1132 (IN 19170)*

1. IN ORDER ASSIST HEADQUARTERS EVALUATION LIONION PULSE CAMERA COVERAGE WOULD APPRECIATE STATION ADVICE FOLLOWING:

A. IF NO VISITORS ENTERING LIRING MAIN GATE, DOES LIONION/1 AUTOMATICALLY SHIFT AND COVER LIRING CONSULATE EVEN THOUGH CONSULATE BEING COVERED BY PULSE CAMERA?

B. IF INDIVIDUAL ATTEMPTS ENTER MAIN GATE AND THEN PROCEEDS TO CONSULATE, DOES LIONION/1 FOLLOW AND PHOTO ENTERING AND DEPARTING CONSULATE?

C. WHAT IS STATION'S ESTIMATE OF PERCENTAGE OF LIONION/1 COVERAGE OF INDIVIDUALS ENTERING AND DEPARTING CONSULATE? FROM PAST CORRESPONDENCE HEADQUARTERS HAS GAINED IMPRESSION LIONION/1 COVERS CONSULATE AS EFFECTIVELY AS PULSE CAMERA.

D. IS LIONION/1 STILL LOCATED SAME BASEHOUSE AS PULSE CAMERA?

mw

AN	JB
AB	
IN	
PS	
BX	
DES	IFD
FI	
WH/1	

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

04 Sep 69

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY SEP 18 10 47 AM '65 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO 35 ... BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: RECEIVED
RID/E FILE, VR.

PAGE TWO
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 36226

TO

2. FILE: 50-6-122/1.

END OF MESSAGE

* WH Comment: Station advised presently obtains many pictures of LIRING Consulate visitors since most first time visitors try enter through main gate which primary LIONION photo target.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

CI/SO

pr AC/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION EH 8 ☐ RID COPY

#203

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR. RI/AN, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI 2, TSD 6,

S E C R E T 072247Z AUG 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1132

MEXI

DIRECTOR

7 Aug 69 IN 18170

LIONION

1. IN ATTEMPT ELIMINATE MARGINAL OPS, STATION INTENDS TERMINATE LIONION-1 PULSE CAMERA COVERAGE EFFECTIVE 1 SEPTEMBER UNLESS HQS INDICATES IT CONSIDERS PRODUCT OF SUFFICIENT VALUE TO WARRANT RETENTION. STATION PRESENTLY OBTAINS MANY PICTURES OF LIRING CONSULATE VISITORS SINCE MOST FIRST-TIME LIRING VISITORS TRY ENTER THROUGH MAIN GATE WHICH PRIMARY TARGET LIONION PHOTO COVERAGE. ALSO MANY CONSULATE VISITORS LATER PHOTOGRAPHED AT AIRPORT. IT NOT POSSIBLE HAVE LIONION-1 COVER BOTH ENTRANCES SIMULTANEOUSLY, BUT HE ABLE MOVE EQUIPMENT TO COVER CONSULATE IF NEED ARISES.

2. FILE 50-6-122/3.

S E C R E T

AN PU
AB
PX
DE
UH

CS COPY

SECRET

50-6-122/1
07 AUG 69

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LIONION Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-37024, 25 April 1969

Project LIONION has been renewed for FY 1970 in the amount of $11,994, as forwarded by the Station.

Norris W. DAMICONE

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-17364

DATE
8 July 1969
11 JUL 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-122/1

RI - 1
CHRONO - 1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/A1	Malone	cms	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC WH/1	8 Jul 69	Ernest J. Tsikerdanos

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)
MFG. 11-66

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION		X FI/CI	☐ CA	☐ OTHER
☐	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division		
☐	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City		
X	RENEWAL FY 1970	BRANCH: One	DESK:	
☐	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Al Malone		DATE: 16 June 69
☐	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 3E04	BUILDING: Hqs.	TEL. EXT.: RED 1973 BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
AC/WH/1	Ernest J. Tsikerdanos	16/6/69	17/6/69	✓	
C/WH/B&F	Elliotte C. Want	6/17	6/17		
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson	18 JUN 1969	[illegible]		
AC/WH/FI	David L. Smock	21 June 69		✓	
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	23 JUN 1969	20 Jun		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 July 69	30 June 70	$ 11.994	1970	$11,994
			196	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD		5 JUL 1969

FORM 12-66 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

[redacted] SECRET [redacted]

16 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : LIONION Project Renewal Request

1. Approval is requested of the LIONION Project for the period 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970 (FY 1970) for $11,994. Funds are available.

2. Project LIONION is a support project which provides the Mexico City Station with fixed photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The surveillance is conducted by two indigenous agents located in a basehouse directly across from the Cuban compound. At times the principal agent also acts as a dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. Information is radioed to the team concerning the departure of Cuban officials, thus allowing the team to remain a more discreet distance from the target.

3. As reflected in the attached Project Renewal, an audio device planted in the gatehouse of the compound could be monitored at the LIONION basehouse, aiding greatly in identifying visitors. Since the time the Station submitted the renewal, however, this device ceased to function along with the rest of the LISAMPAN devices. This installation was monitored through carrier current from the LISAMPAN/LISASH basehouse, also situated in front of the compound. Since the connection between the two basehouses was by carrier current only, and since the agents in each basehouse are unaware of the other's activity, a possible compromise of the LISAMPAN/LISASH activity should not affect LIONION security.

4. Although the LIONION Project does not produce disseminable positive intelligence, it is considered by the Station as essential to its Cuban operations. The 4,100 or more selective individual photographs produced annually,

SECRET

coupled with the visual observations, were effective in providing timely operational information. In addition, over 8,000 feet of pulse camera film is produced annually, recording the image of each visitor to the Consulate. The years of experience of the principal agent have given him intimate knowledge of the target personalities. He often brings matters to the immediate attention of the Station without having been levied the specific requirement to do so. As a result, the Station is aided greatly in keeping abreast of the day to day activities of the Cuban compound.

5. In recent months, the LIONION Project was useful to the Station in checking out statements made by ESMARROW-1.

6. In March 1969, the Project provided photos of three U.S. citizens who visited the Cuban Embassy and were suspected of being draft dodgers. The photos were passed to the FBI within three hours of the request for information.

7. Other than the loss of the audio device in gatehouse, there have been no changes. The operation continues to run smoothly.

8. Approval is recommended.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
Acting Chief, WH/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/LIONION
LIONION Project Renewal for FY 1970

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Renewal of Project

Reference : HMMW-17154, 11 April 1969

1. Attached is the Station's renewal request for Project LIONION. The Project should be submitted for renewal for the period 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970 for a total of $11,994.

2. Information concerning the performance of LIONION-1 and the project operations during the second and third quarters of FY 1969 has been elaborated, and a separate LIONION Progress Report for this period will not be prepared. The Station will submit a regular progress report to cover the period 1 April through 30 June 1969 in July 1969.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. Renewal, right side; h/w
2. Renewal, left side, u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/att - 2 copies)

CS COPY

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 37024

DATE
25 April 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-122/1

14-00000

S E C R E T

LIONICH PROJECT RENEWAL REQUEST

Project LIONICH

Station Mexico City

Field Case Officer Andrew E. PELLEMENT

Chief of Station Willard C. CURTIS

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

S E C R E T

S/c att: 1
HMMA- 37024

CS COPY

50-6-10

S E C R E T

LIONION PROJECT RENEWAL

A. Objectives

1. Project LIONION, a long-term support project designed to provide fixed photographic, technical, and physical surveillance of the PBRUMEN Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City, has the following specific objectives:

a. To furnish photographic coverage during daylight hours of the main entrances to the target installation.

b. To operate as a listening post in support of technical operations against this target to complement the photographic coverage.

c. To radio dispatch physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the target.

d. To assist the Station in compiling information for individual dossiers on officials of the target installation.

e. To fulfill various requirements in support of other Station PBRUMEN operations.

2. The above-cited objectives are in agreement with the over-all objectives of Station Mexico City.

B. Changes

Oliver D. CIMOCH assumed administrative and operational responsibility for Project LIONION in December 1967 and continued this responsibility until his departure in December 1968. Pending arrival of CIMOCH's replacement, the Project was handled by Station Officer Gerald D. FAHLANGER and Station WOACRE representative, Walter W. CORNBURY. On 28 February 1969, LIONION-1 was introduced to Andrew E. PELLEMENT, who assumed Project responsibility effective that date.

C. Intelligence Production

As an operational support project, Project LIONION does not produce disseminable positive intelligence. Quantitatively, during CY 1968, the Project provided over 4,000 selective individual photographs of persons and/or vehicles entering the target installation and over 8,000 feet of pulse camera film. There has

S E C R E T

[illegible] TRANSMISSION
NO [illegible] DISSEMINATION

been no formal audio product from Project LIONION since July 1968 when the transcription of the LISAMPAN/DOG traffic was terminated. As reported extensively in HMMA 36553, 19 February 1969, the Station has been unable to activate LISAMPAN/BAKER since 16 January 1969. A qualitative analysis of the LIONION product is discussed in paragraph D below. The Station is unable to evaluate the worth of the pulse camera operation since the bulk film, undeveloped, is pouched directly to Headquarters. The cost of this portion of the operation is minimal, however, since it is limited to the cost of the film and development at Headquarters. The camera works automatically and requires only minimal maintenance.

D. Effectiveness

1. Project LIONION is considered by Station Mexico City as essential to its PBRUMEN operations. It has consistently proven highly effective and responsive to Station requirements of both long and short range nature. LIONION-1, the Project's only full time agent, continues to furnish on a timely basis, information on the personalities and activities of the target personnel. LIONION-2 continues to backstop LIONION-1 and substitute for him when he is away from his post. At the age of 70, she is not able to man the LIONION base full time, and her sight is failing. She is able to photograph visitors, however, and live monitor the LISAMPAN/DOG traffic. LIONION-2's role as a backstop to LIONION-1 insures continuous coverage of the target during daylight hours, five days a week. LIONION-1's more than six years of experience working on the same target continue to produce an increasingly complete and accurate identification of the staff and visitors to LIRING. These years of experience have developed an agent knowledgeable of WOFIRM operational and security requirements who will often bring to the Station's attention those matters which he feels are of immediate interest without having special requirements levied upon him and without waiting for the next regularly scheduled meeting with his Station contact. He has on numerous occasions notified the Station of the presence of suspect PBRUMEN security types. He has also frequently passed along operational leads of use to the Station in other aspects of its PBRUMEN operations.

2. The addition of LISAMPAN/DOG to the LIONION basehouse has noticeably increased LIONION-1's ability to identify new visitors to the target and at times, determine the nature of their business. The LISAMPAN/DOG product was channeled to the LIONION basehouse by carrier current from LISAMPAN/LISASH on 10 April 1968. Since its primary value is as an aid to LIONION-1 in identifying LIRING visitors, its product has not been recorded

or transcribed since July 1968. LIONION-1 live monitors the traffic from his basehouse. LISAMPAN-1 who mans the LISASH base has been told nothing of the LIONION base and LIONION-1 was offered no explanation concerning the manner in which LISAMPAN/DOG production is channeled to him. Thus a possible compromise of the LISASH basehouse, linked directly to LIRING, would not compromise the LIONION basehouse which has no direct link with the target.

3. Project LIONION was of direct assistance to the Station on two separate occasions in recent months:

a. As a result of information received on a priority basis (the same day as requested) from LIONION-1, the Station was able to verify certain statements made by ESMARROW-1 concerning the location of LIRING officials at specific times. LIONION-1 reported the times at which these officials came in and out of the LIRING compound and provided a description of the clothes they were wearing at the time. LIONION-1's information raised the possibility that ESMARROW-1 might at least have been confused in his reporting of the times at which he met LIRING personnel, etc.

b. In March 1969, LIONION-1 was able to provide pictures of three WOLADY males, who, although unidentified, fitted the general description and time frame furnished by LNERGO. The latter suspected that two or three WOLADY draft dodgers might visit LIRING to arrange travel to PBRUMEN. The Station was able to furnish LNERGO with pictures of the three together with a report of their arrival and departure from LIRING within three hours of its request for information. Additional information was promptly forwarded to LNERGO as it became available from LIONION-1.

4. During the past year, LIONION-1 acted as a dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team on a number of occasions. By utilizing his vantage point in the area of the target, he is able to radio information to the LIEMBRACE team on the arrival and departure of LIRING officials thus allowing the team to remain at a distance from the target unseen by possible counter-surveillance from the target. The Station plans to use LIONION-1 in this role more extensively in the coming year whenever surveillance of LIRING personnel entails the team's presence near the LIRING compound. Such utilization of LIONION-1 should lessen the risk of exposure of the team to the PBRUMEN IS.

5. LIONION-1, himself, continues to provide the consistently high level of productivity that has characterized his work in past years. As mentioned above his response to priority requirements continues to be most gratifying. He is prompt in submitting both operational and administrative reports to the Station. He is ready, at a moments notice, to change personal plans when a need for his services arises. After five years without a substantial vacation, LIONION-1 plans a three week trip from 4 - 25 May to Europe (Italy, Greece, France) and the U.S.A. He originally requested five weeks to make this trip for which he has long saved his money, but quite willingly shortened the trip to three weeks at the Station's request and added that he would postpone the entire trip if the Station thought his services were more needed at home. In order to help defray the cost of making a second trip to Europe to complete his original itinerary, the Station will give LIONION-1 a gift of $250 on 1 May 1969 and will tell him that consideration will be given in 1970 to providing an equal amount, but no decision can be made on that second gift until mid-1970.

E. Problems

1. LISAMPAN/BAKER: As reported in HMMA 36553, 19 February 1969, LISAMPAN/BAKER was turned off for security reasons on 16 January 1969 at 1345 hours. All subsequent attempts to reactivate it have been unsuccessful. Headquarters was requested to review all available Station information on this to decide whether BAKER's abrupt end was the result of a compromise or whether it was somehow connected with the installation of TELEX equipment at LIRING.

2. LISAMPAN/DOG: The LISAMPAN/DOG/METRAP installation is generally working well. There have been numerous occasions when due to unknown circumstances the audio reception has either been bad or non-existent. Walter W. CORNBURY and PELLEMENT visited the LISAMPAN/LISASH basehouse and found no problem with the monitoring equipment there. The trouble may have resided with the central office of the LIRISK company and was probably not the result of technical counter-surveillance of LIRING. As of 3 April 1969, LISAMPAN/DOG was working properly and automatically.

3. There have been no significant personnel, security, morale or administrative problems since the last project renewal.

F. Liaison

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

[illegible] TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

G. Interagency Coordination

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

H. Plans

1. The Station plans to continue to exploit LIONION-1's experience, training and location to provide the photographic and technical coverage cited above. In addition, the Station will continue to make use of LIONION-1 as a dispatcher in surveillances of LIRING personnel.

2. In order to check the LISAMPAN/DOG take for items of possible value to other Station operations, LISAMPAN/1 will be instructed to record the DOG traffic for the three week period while LIONION-1 is on vacation. These tapes will be given to Richard C. HABOUSH for an analysis of their operational worth and technical quality. HABOUSH will transcribe them if the contents warrant.

I. Costs

1. For the past project year, 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1969, it is estimated that the total project cost will be about $16,250. It is approved for $16,632.

2. For the renewal period of 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970, it is requested that $11,894 be approved. Estimated figures for FY 1971 are provided below together with the breakdown for FY's 1969 and 1970. The major addition to the FY 1971 figures is a possible raise for LIONION-1 and LIONION-2. These figures are broken down as follows:

	FY 1969	FY 1970	FY 1971
Salaries:			
LIONION-1	$ 4,704	$ 4,800	$ 5,200
LIONION-2	1,860	1,920	2,000
Xmas bonuses	550	560	610
Rents:			
LIONION Basehouse	1,200	1,200	1,200
LIONION Safehouse	864	864	864
Utilities for both	500	500	500
Operational Expenses:			
Film	700	1,000	1,000
Paper	400	450	450
Chemicals	250	300	300

[illegible] TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

Miscellaneous:			
Operational	50	150	350
Special gift to LIONION-1	250	250	
Total	$11,328	$11,994	$12,474

3. A detailed accounting was prepared each month by LIONION-1 covering expenses chargeable to his revolving fund. His accounting has been most satisfactory in all respects, and such accountings will be continued during the ensuing project year.

-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Processing and Exploitation of Photographic Coverage of LIRING by the AMOT Organization.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: HMMA-33841, 17 January 1968

1. The following comments are for the information and assistance of those officers who are in the process of determining the future of the LIONION operation:

a. The AMOTs have received and reviewed a number of the prints from the LIONION operation and report that it is a time-consuming and largely unproductive effort.

b. The practical results of such a review, i.e., the identification of the greatest number of visitors to LIRING, can be realized best through the widest circulation of the prints among the AMOT staffers, contacts, and informants. This practice would result in wide knowledge of the existence of the operation, and in the expenditure of many man-hours which, it appears, could be more productively spent in other pursuits.

c. The AMOT organization currently does not have either the qualified personnel or available space and equipment to process the film as suggested in paragraph three of reference. Until they move into new quarters, (in, hopefully, mid-1968, the single AMOT photographer will be working in very tight quarters.

2. It would appear from JMWAVE's experience with AMOT exploitation of the LIONION operation, that further activity in this connection at JMWAVE would be unwarranted.

James N. AHAMANOS

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - COS/Mexico City
2 - WH/COG

DATE TYPED
12 Feb 1968

DATE DISPATCHED
FEB 13 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-21267

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LIONION Renewal of Project

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 33595, 5 December 1967

Project LIONION has been renewed for the period of 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1969 for the sum of $16,632. This figure includes $5,374 for FY 68 and $11,258 for FY 69.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

Cuban co

50-6-122/1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

5 FEB 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	HMMW 16131	1 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/3

RI

CHRONO

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Daly	bb	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	2 Feb	W. J. Kaufman

ABPW	✓	
✓	/	WH/1
ABSTRACT	Y	INDEX ✓

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-68

(40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LIONION/Processing and Exploitation of Impulse Camera Film by AMOTS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 33841, 17 January 1968

Headquarters concurs in the proposal made in reference that the LIONION impulse camera film be processed and reviewed by the AMOTS.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-122/1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW 16106	DATE 1 FEB 1968 29 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

RI

CHRONO

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Daly	bb	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG	30 Jan 68	

AN PW
WH 1
ABSTRACT
INDEX

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	29 Jan 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

(40)

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

CRYPTONYM [illegible]

TYPE OF ACTION		FI/CI		CA		OTHER

	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 1968-69	BRANCH One
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER [illegible]
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. [illegible]

DESK

DATE 10 Jan 68

BUILDING

TEL. EXT. RED 0011 BLACK 6054

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WHD	[illegible] J. [illegible]				
C/WH/[illegible]	Elliot C. [illegible]	1/19	1/18		
C/WH/SS	George R. Thom	22 Jan 68			✓
C/WH/CI	Thomas Polgar	24 Jan 68			
WH/[illegible]	Donald C. [illegible]	[illegible]	29/1		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 Jan 68	30 June 69	$ 13,632	1968	$ [illegible]
			1969	$ 11,[illegible]

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD	William V. Broe	[illegible] JAN 1968

FORM 12-66 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

SECRET

10 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Renewal of Project LIONION

1. Approval is requested to renew Project LIONION for the period 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1969 for $16,632 including $5,374 for FY 1968 and $11,258 for FY 1969. WH Division programmed $11,800 for this activity for FY 1969 and funds are available. Funds requested for this renewal are slightly less than the previous year due to a reduction in support costs.

2. This project provides Station Mexico City with photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. In addition, the project principal agent is able to observe and record the patterns of activity and personal associations of various Cuban personnel and visitors to the Embassy and Consulate. This effort has been of assistance in planning recruitment attempts against target personnel. The principal agent also performs ad hoc functions for the Station such as dispatching the surveillance team against selected Cuban personnel and renting and maintaining a safehouse. This project naturally does not produce positive intelligence.

3. Plans for the forthcoming period include using the project basehouse and the two project agents as LP operators in the expansion of an existing technical operation targeted against the Cuban Embassy. There is also a possibility that the photo coverage of the Cuban Consulate entrance will cease shortly as this coverage has not proved particularly useful. It is not anticipated that these changes will substantially affect the cost of the project.

4. It should be noted that the $4,800 operational loan made to LIONION-2 in February 1966 has been completely repaid. The security of this project is considered satisfactory.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

Project LIONION

Field Case Officer Cornelius L. Peuvion
Cornelius L. PEUVION

Station Mexico City

Chief of Station Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Renewal of the LIONION Project is requested for the period 1 January through 31 December 1968 for a total of $11,258--$5,374 for FY 1968 and $5,884 for FY 1969.

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

S/C ATT. # 2 to HMMA-33595

H/W ATT. # 1 to HMMA-33595

PROJECT LIONION RENEWAL REQUEST

A. Objectives:

1. Project LIONION is a long-term support project designed to provide fixed photographic, technical, and physical surveillance of the PBRUMEN Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The specific objectives are:

    a. To furnish photographic coverage during the daylight hours of the main entrances to the target installations.

    b. To maintain in readiness a listening post to support technical operations against the targets.

    c. To radio dispatch physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the targets.

    d. To provide for a mechanism which can fulfill various miscellaneous PBRUMEN support requirements.

2. The above-cited objectives are in agreement with the overall objectives of Station Mexico City.

B. Changes:

In late January 1967 the operational and administrative responsibilities for Project LIONION were transferred from Howard A. TRECKLER to Cornelius L. PEUVION. No agent handling, control, or administrative problems were encountered during the past year.

C. Intelligence Production:

As noted in Section A above, Project LIONION is an operational support project and does not produce disseminable positive intelligence. During the past year this project did provide over 5000 individual photographs of persons and/or vehicles entering or leaving the target installations, as well as approximately 8000 feet of pulse camera film. Information on the comings and goings of target personnel and visitors to the installations, which LIONION-1 provides in daily logs, has been incorporated into Station files and on occasion made available to other stations or LNHARP agencies, i.e., LNERGO. LIONION has been particularly useful in spotting new employees whose photos are then passed to LITAMIL-7 for identification.

D. Effectiveness:

1. Project LIONION is considered by the Station to be highly effective and essential. In addition to providing the valuable photographic coverage cited above, LIONION-1 continues to provide interesting observations on the personalities and activities of the personnel working in the targets. LIONION-1 reporting is being incorporated into the recruitment operations targeted against LIRING-2 and LIRING-16.

2. In early July LIONION-1 obtained and furnished a new safe apartment which is being used for sensitive or lengthly meetings with LIRESORT-1 as well as LIONION-1. The safe site has been stocked with a sufficient supply of food so as to allow two persons to live there for at least three days in the event the Station ever needs a cooling-off site for an agent or defector.

3. Throughout the past project year LIONION-1 continued to function effectively as the radio dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE Surveillance Team. Much of this effort was expended in estimating the movement/habit pattern of LIRING-2, a prerequisite for his pending recruitment.

E. Problems:

1. On 27 June LIONION-1 was hospitalized for emergency surgery to treat a perforated ulcer. Since LIONION-2's presence was required at the hospital during the operation and also throughout the postoperative convalescence period, photographic coverage was suspended until 10 July.

2. Other than a temporary postoperative morale slump on the part of LIONION-1, there have been no significant personnel, security, or administrative problems.

F. Liaison:

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

G. Interagency Coordination:

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

H. Plans:

1. The Station plans to continue to exploit LIONION-1's experience, training, and location to provide the photographic coverage cited above. In addition, the Station plans to make more extensive use of the operational log books and personality observations provided by LIONION-1 in support of an intensive physical penetration program.

2. During the ensuing period, the Station plans to utilize LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 as LP operators for a portion of the LISAMPAN technical penetration operation. It is anticipated that this additional task will not be levied on LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 until after 1 January 1968.

I. Costs:

1. For the past project year, 1 January through 31 December 1967, it is estimated that the total project cost will be about $9,000. It is approved for $11,666.

2. For the renewal period of 1 January through 31 December 1968, it is requested that $11,258 be approved. This is broken down as follows:

	FY 1968	FY 1969	Total
Salaries: (Including Xmas bonus)			
LIONION-1	$ 2,208	$ 2,576	$ 4,784
LIONION-2	900	1,050	1,950
Rents:			
LIONION Basehouse	450	450	900
LIONION Safehouse	264	264	528
Utilities	150	150	300
Supplies:			
Film	600	600	1,200
Paper	312	304	616
Chemicals	150	150	300
Miscellaneous	90	90	180
Miscellaneous Operational Expenditures	250	250	500
Total	$ 5,374	$ 5,884	$11,258

3. It should be noted that the operational loan made to LIONION-2 to enable her to qualify for inmigrado status in Mexico (see Cost Section of previous project renewal request) has been completely repaid. The loan, which was placed in an escrow-type account, was withdrawn in monthly increments by LIONION-1 and incorporated into his revolving fund. A detailed accounting was prepared each month by LIONION-1, a practice which will be continued during the ensuing project year.

J. Technical Annex:

Project LIONION continues to receive excellent technical support from the local WOACRE representative, Walter W. CORNBURY.

K. Other:

While LIONION-2's failing eyesight precludes her filling in for LIONION-1 over any extended period of time, she has continued to perform in an excellent manner in support of LIONION-1.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT LIONION

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Below

1. Prior to submitting the LIONION project for renewal 1 January 1968, Headquarters requests the Mexico City station comment on the desireability of continuing the photography of persons entering and leaving the PBRUMEN Consulate. As the station is aware this film is no longer reviewed at JMWAVE and there are no present plans to resume this practice since in the past it proved unproductive and costly. The film has never been reviewed on a regular basis at Headquarters and has been referred to only once for identification purposes during the past year. At present the film as received at Headquarters is developed (negatives only) and placed into storage.

2. Headquarters realizes this coverage is potentially valuable and undoubtedly this film contains photographs of assorted revolutionaries and others of CI/FI interest; but the value lies in the ability to identify the persons being photographed and until we have this capability - and personnel to sort out and follow-up the leads - there seems

(Continued..)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City
2 - COS, JMWAVE

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-16029	DATE 15 December 67
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/Daly		sl	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG	15 Dec 67	Carl J. Williamson

RI
CHRONO

ABSTRACT X

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	15 Dec	W.J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMW-16029

little justification in continuing this coverage.

3. It would be appreciated if along with the station's recommendations an estimate of the cost of this particular portion of the LIONION activity could be included.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

50-6-122/1

FORM 8-64 1401 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
	SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET [redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIONION Project Renewal Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

DESENSITIZED per DOI 70-12

Reference: HMMW-15195, 24 January 1967

Attached is the Station's renewal request for Project LIONION. The Project should be submitted for renewal for the period 1 January through 31 December 1968 for a total of $11,258.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
  A. Renewal Request, right side (h/w)
  B. Renewal Request, left side (u/s/c) ATT'd 15 DEC 67 RIDER

Distribution:
  Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 2 copies each)

2 ATT

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 33595	DATE 5 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN LIONION - Approval of Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-30793, 7 December 1966

Project LIONION was renewed as submitted in reference on 23 January 1967 in the amount of $11,666.00 for the period 1 January through 31 December 1967.

Andrew F. MERTON

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15195

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE
26 JAN 1967
24 January 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-122/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	J. Stewart	pem	6954

RI
Chrono

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

CK
WH/1
ABSTRACT X

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	1/25	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-64

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION	X	CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 1967-68	BRANCH: One
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Jack Stewart — DATE: 4 Jan '67
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 332 — BUILDING: Ames — TEL. EXT.: — RED.: — BLACK: 3654

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE In	DATE Out	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman	5 Jan 67		
C/WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter	[illegible]	[illegible]	
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson	[illegible]	[illegible]	
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar	[illegible]	[illegible]/67	
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marcelius	20 JAN	[illegible]/67	

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO	MEMO ATTACHED DATE

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	REVISED TOTAL
1 Jan 1967	31 Dec 1967	$ 11,666.00	1967	$ 5,574.00
			1968	$ 6,092.00

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD	William V. Broe	23 JAN 1967

FORM 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

SECRET

4 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Renewal of Project LIONION (Photographic/Technical Coverage of Cuban Embassy in Mexico)

ACTION REQUIRED: Approvals Requested Paragraphs One and Four

1. Approval is requested to renew Project LIONION for the period 1 January through 31 December 1967 at an annual expenditure of $11,666.00, including $5,574.00 for FY 1967 and $6,092.00 for FY 1968. WH Division programmed $12,000.00 for this activity for FY 1967 and funds are available. The Project cost has been increased by $668.00 over the previous year, occasioned by a small monthly raise for the Principal Agent and a new provision for miscellaneous operational expenditures.

2. Although this two-man Project does not produce positive intelligence, it contributes substantially and directly to the coverage of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico, producing photographs in bulk of personnel and visitors as well as information on patterns of activity and personal associations, and supporting recruitment attempts. It is contemplated that the Project will afford support to the extensive technical penetration of the Cuban Embassy (LISAMPAN) currently scheduled for installation in mid-January 1967. One of these penetrations is scheduled for the Embassy gatehouse where visitors would normally identify themselves upon entering. Information from the gatehouse is to be transmitted securely to the LIONION basehouse as well as to the LISAMPAN listening post. By collating this and other LISAMPAN information with the photography, it is hoped to be able to identify photographically many of the visitors to the Embassy.

SECRET [illegible]

3. The physical security of the photo-basehouse has been improved and the overall security of the Project is considered to be satisfactory.

4. It will be noted that in February 1966 the Station assisted LIONION-2, a Cuban citizen, to qualify for Mexican immigrant status with a loan of $4,800.00, which was reduced to $2,640.00 as of 31 December 1966 at a repayment rate of $240.00 per month. This loan is being protected by an appropriate Memorandum of Trust. Approval is requested to continue this arrangement until LIONION-2's immigration status is settled, estimated to occur by 30 November 1967.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET [redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NIR

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

DESENSITIZED
per DOI 20-17

MICROFILMED

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/OPERATIONAL/Transmittal of LIONION Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith and under separate cover for addressee are an original and five copies of the LIONION Project Renewal request.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
LIONION Project Renewal
Left hand side herewith
Right hand side under separate cover

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - FILES

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-30793	Dec. 7 ~~November~~ 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRE[redacted]	50-6-122/8

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET/KAPOK

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

Project LIONION

Field Case Officer Howard A. Treckler
Howard A. TRECKLER

Station Mexico City

Chief of Station Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

[illegible]
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

CS COPY

SECRET/KAPOK

50-6-122/1

L. Side ATT. #1 to HMMA-30793

R. Side ATT. #2 to HMMA-30793

LIONION PROJECT RENEWAL

A. Current Objectives:

There have been no changes in the objectives of the LIONION Project as set forth in the renewal request of last year.

B. Changes:

Howard A. TRECKLER has assumed the duties of Case Officer for LIONION since the departure of Lawrence F. BARKER in August 1966. TRECKLER is known to LIONION-1 and 2 as "Jose" or "Joe". TRECKLER meets with LIONION-1 at least once each week and sees LIONION-2 only if he visits the LIONION basehouse. With the departure of Hugh T. FRANCOTTE (P) in August 1966, Walter W. CORNBURY (P) assumed the duties of technical consultant for the project. CORNBURY is known to LIONION-1 and 2 as "Jack". LIONION-1 is being given a pay increase of $8.00 (U.S.) per month effective 1 January 1967. There are no other changes contemplated for the coming year.

C. Intelligence Production:

The intelligence production is the same as that reported in the renewal request for last year. It is difficult to estimate the intelligence value in numbers of reports as there are so few positive reports made from this type of production on the photographic end of the project. But this photographic coverage is of inestimable operational intelligence value in coverage of the PBRUMEN target. Should the LISAMPAN operation become active, part of LIONION's time will be used in support of that operation.

D. Effectiveness:

The Station's estimate of the value of this project has not changed from that expressed in the renewal request of last year. LIONION has further established his importance to the Station's operational activities by demonstrating his ability to spot surveillance targets at LIRING from only a physical description provided by the Case Officer. If the planned LISAMPAN activity gets underway, LIONION observations and insight into activities of LIRING will be increased greatly.

The apartment spotted by LIONION-1 and obtained by the Station across from LIRING that was mentioned in last year's renewal request is scheduled to be utilized in the LISAMPAN operation. The location of LIONION-1 across from the target and his background knowledge built up over the years are invaluable assets to the Station's coverage of the primary target of the Related Mission Directive.

E. Problems:

There were no major problems during the past year. One security problem involved the claimed spotting of some of the photographic equipment from the street by David M. WILSTED (P). A thorough check of the basehouse by LIONION-1 and the Case Officer failed to reveal any such equipment as being visible from the street. However, additional security measures were taken by darkening the background in the room behind the equipment through hanging of heavier drapes on the window, drapes on the wall, and putting up a portable screen behind the equipment. This also serves as a security check against the prying eyes of the household servant as LIONION-1 can now open the door fully to the room when the servant pages him and she cannot see the equipment. The other problem is the obtaining of inmigrado status for LIONION-2. This involves the depositing of funds to a bank account and is discussed under paragraph I.

F. Liaison:

There is no liaison involved in the project.

G. Interagency Coordination:

Not applicable.

H. Plans:

It is planned to have LIONION-1 keep special logs on the activities of selected targets in LIRING as he has done over the past year. With the case officer handling LIONION-1 directly on a weekly basis, it is planned to continue picking his brains for additional details on the LIRING target. Hopefully LIONION-1 and 2 will be utilized for assistance in covering the proposed take from the LISAMPAN operation.

I. Costs:

For Calendar Year 1966:

1. In the period 1 January through 30 June 1966, $4,500.00 was expended. The projected expenditure for July 1966 through 31 December 1966 is $5,000.00. This total project year expenditure is approximately $1,000.00 under that approved by Headquarters. However, this amount is probably due to having drawn film and other supplies from overall Station support without their having been charged off against the Project

2. For the period 1 January 1967 through 31 December 1967

Expenditures for	FY 1967	FY 1968
Salaries:		
LIONION-1	$2,210.00	$2,578.00
LIONION-2	900.00	1,050.00
Rents:		
LIONION Basehouse	600.00	600.00
LIONION Safehouse	264.00	264.00
Utilities	150.00	150.00
Supplies:		
Film	600.00	600.00
Paper	360.00	360.00
Chemicals	150.00	150.00
Miscellaneous	90.00	90.00
Miscellaneous Operational Expenditures	250.00	250.00
TOTAL	$5,574.00	$6,092.00

The total for FY 1967 is $11,666.00. Approval of this amount is requested. Note that the salary figures include the salary raise for LIONION-1 and the usual one month pay Christmas bonus for LIONION-1 and 2. An additional provision has been made for miscellaneous operational expenditures as there may be a recurrence of same as in the past project year for which no provision was made. Provision is being made for charging of funds for supplies to the LIONION Project which was not done last year in order that more accurate bookkeeping may be followed.

In addition, the Station has had to make a loan to LIONION-2 for gaining status to qualify for inmigrado status in Mexico. This loan is held in a savings account in a Mexican bank to prove to the Mexican authorities that LIONION-2 can support herself. Funds are withdrawn from this account monthly, sometimes with interest, and deposited to a checking account where LIONION-1 withdraws the funds and they are applied to the revolving account for financing the operation. The initial balance deposited to the account in February 1966 was $4,800.00. Withdrawals have been made at the rate of $240.00 per month and as of 30 October 1966, the total account had been reduced by $1,680.00, leaving a balance in the account of $3,120.00 which should carry the account through November 1967. A separate dispatch follows with the Memorandum of Trust and necessary details on the account. Approval is requested for continuance of this account in order that LIONION-2 may obtain her inmigrado status.

J. Other:

LIONION-2 continues to perform in an excellent manner in support of LIONION-1.

SECRET/KAPOK

PROJECT RENEWAL REQUEST

CRYPTONYM LIONION

FIELD CASE OFFICER Lawrence F. Barker
Lawrence F. BARKER

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

The attached Project is presented for renewal.

CS COPY

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION.

SECRET/KAPOK

50-6-122/1

L. SIDE OF ATT. #1 to HMMA-27754 R. SIDE OF ATT. #1 to HMMA-27754

A. Current Objectives. The original objectives of the project have not changed but have been added to in the last year. The project is functioning well as a technical (primarily photographic) surveillance operation against the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico City. It is designed to:

1. Furnish photographic coverage during daylight hours of the two entrances of the target installation.

2. Dispatch physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the target.

3. Keep in readiness a listening post (LP) for the monitoring and recording of technical penetrations of the target.

4. Assist the Station in building up individual dossiers on officials of the target installation.

5. Monitor Station activities involving direct contact with the target, and furnish an observation post (OP) for other Station assets.

Objectives 4 and 5 are additions to those objectives set forth in the original project outline.

B. Changes. There have been no changes in personnel and none are contemplated in the coming year. It is being proposed in separate correspondence that some of the work load now on LIONION-1 be shifted to Headquarters, specifically the development of film.

LIONION-1's pay was increased 40 dollars a month effective 15 March 1965.

C. Intelligence Production. The operation has produced thousands of excellent photographs, many of which are shared with Headquarters and Station JMWAVE. Information on the comings and goings of target personnel and visitors to the target installation has been incorporated into many Station files (primarily personality files -- individual dossiers). No precise statistics are available on this production. It has been very heavy. Station JMWAVE should perhaps be called upon for an independent evaluation of LIONION production it has received .

D. Effectiveness. The project is considered both highly successful and essential by the Station. In addition to excellent photographic coverage provided by the LIONION agents, the Station has found in LIONION-1 a first class asset for other operational duties. The LIONION basehouse was essential to mounting and monitoring the LIRHYME recruitment (and harassment) operation. C/O Wallace B. ROWTON sat with LIONION-1 for several weeks, observing the movement pattern of LIRHYME-1. LIONION-1 manned one of three radios used by the Station when LIRHYME was invited to appear for confrontation outside the Embassy. Without the LIONION base and the expert knowledge of LIONION-1 of target personnel and activities, such an operation as LIRHYME could not have been mounted. It might be noted that this operation was an attempt to satisfy the top priority requirement laid on Station Mexico by Headquarters. It is expected that additional similar operations will depend to a large extent on the facilities provided by the LIONION operation.

Another very effective performance by LIONION-1 was his obtaining -- by sharp observation and quick, intelligent, secure action -- an apartment in a building directly across the street from the target Embassy. The Station had been seeking an apartment in this building for many years.

E. Problems. The problem of cover for LIONION-1 worked out well during the year to the point where it ceased being a problem. By living his cover as a translator he was enabled to build in strong self protection when called upon to do some translations for the office of the President of Mexico. Toward the end of the year, LIONION-1 received the coveted status of "inmigrado" which confers a great deal of immunity from harrassment by Mexican authorities.

The only problem now besetting the project is LIONION-1's excessive work load. As indicated above, an attempt is being made to alleviate this load.

F. Liaison. The operation has no liaison connection. LIONION-1's connection with the Mexican Presidency is non-operational.

G. Interagency Coordination. Not applicable.

H. Plans. It is planned to make better use of LIONION-1's observations and operational log books during the coming year rather than settle for his excellent photographs alone. It has been found that he can often supply valuable additional information because of his "feel" for those persons who are under constant observation from the LIONION base. LIONION-1 can read significance into activity which might go unnoticed or be misinterpreted by observers with less experience. LIONION-1 will also be called upon for assistance in future recruitment operations as in LIRHYME. Several such operations are being contemplated for calendar 1966, the period for which project is being requested.

I. Costs.,

1. For calendar 1965:

In the period 1 January through 31 October 1965 $7,218.20 had been expended. At this rate some $9,200.00 will be expended in the concluding project year.

2. For the next period (calendar 1966):

Monthly costs

Salaries:	LIONION-1	$ 360.00
	LIONION-2	150.00
Rents:	LIONION Basehouse	100.00
	LIONION Safehouse	44.00
	Utilities	25.00
Supplies:	Film	95.00
	Paper	60.00
	Chemicals	25.00
	Miscellaneous	15.00
	Monthly total	$ 874.00

Allowing for customary year-end bonuses of one month's salary for both agents, the figures for FY 1966 and FY 1967 would be $5,244.00 and $5,754.00 respectively, or a total for the calendar year 1966 of $10,998. Approval of this amount is requested.

J. Other. LIONION-2, although not specifically mentioned above, continues to perform in a splendid manner as assistant to LIONION-1.

-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION 3X
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division
INFO:
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/Renewal Request for Project LIONION
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW 14073, 1 November 1965

Attached by split transmission is a renewal request for the LIONION Project.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Left Side - Herewith
Right Side - Under separate cover

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA 27754	29 November 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK 3X	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/LIONION - Transmittal of Approved Project

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: HMMA-27754, 29 November 1965.

ACTION: FYI

Project LIONION was approved on 22 January 1966 in the amount of $10,998.00 for the period 1 January 1966 through 31 December 1966. The foregoing amount is broken down into $5,244.00 for Fiscal Year 1966 and $5,754.00 for Fiscal Year 1967.

Andrew F. MERTON

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

LIONION
50-6-122/1

25 January 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-14301	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

RI
CHRONO

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/Mexico	J. Stewart	sav	4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/1		J.H.V. Fisher

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION					
X FI/CI	☐	CA	☐	OTHER	

☐	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION	Western Hemisphere
☐	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION	Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 1966	BRANCH: 1	DESK: Mexico
☐	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Stewart J. Stewart	DATE: 1 Jan 66
☐	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: GH-43 · BUILDING: Hdqs	TEL. EXT.: RED 9325 · BLACK 4506

CONCURRENCIES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman	11 Jan 66	
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter	11 Jan 66	
WH/SS	W.E. Brooks	[illegible]	
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar	19/1/66	
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	22/1/66	

CONCURRENCIES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO	MEMO ATTACHED DATE

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMOUNT OF ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 Jan 66	31 Dec 66	$ 10,998.00	1966	$ 5,244.00
			1967	$ 5,754.00

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
Chief, WHD	William V. Broe	22/1/66

FORM 8-65 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Renewal of Project LIONION (photographic/
technical coverage of Cuban Embassy in
Mexico)

1. Approval is requested to renew Project LIONION for the period 1 January through 31 December 1966 at an annual expenditure of $10,998.00, including $5,244.00 for FY 1966 and $5,754.00 for FY 1967. WH Division programmed $10,750.00 for this activity for FY 1966. Funds are available. The Project cost has been increased by $520.00 over the previous year, occasioned by a small raise for the Principal Agent.

2. The Project has contributed substantially and directly to coverage of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico and is considered highly successful and essential by Station Mexico City. It has produced a large quantity of excellent photographs of target personnel and visitors and has furnished valuable data on their patterns of activity and personal associations. It has also rendered valuable support to Station recruitment attempts against Cuban Embassy personnel and maintains an ever ready facility for support of any technical penetrations of this target accomplished by other Station activities. The Project has had no security or administrative problems. The Station has submitted regular progress reports.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

14-00000

LIONION PROJECT RENEWAL

A. Current Objectives: This Project is a technical, currently primarily photographic, surveillance operation against the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. Its original objectives, still current, include furnishing photographic coverage during daylight hours of the Embassy and Consulate entrances; furnishing a control point for dispatching physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the target; and furnishing a listening post (LP) in readiness to monitor and record technical audio penetrations of the target. Two new objectives added during the Project year include assisting Station Mexico City to build up individual dossiers on target officials; and affording an observation post for Station activities involving direct contact with the target. These new objectives are in consonance with Priority A, Objective 1 of the current Related Mission Directive for Station Mexico City.

B. Changes: There have been no changes in personnel and none are contemplated during the coming year. Headquarters is assuming the task of developing some of the film exposed under this Project. LIONION-1's pay was increased $40 per month effective 15 March 1965.

C. Intelligence Production: The Project is not designed to produce disseminable information. It produced thousands of excellent photographs during the year which were shared with Headquarters and Station JMWAVE. Information on the comings and goings of target personnel and visitors to the target have been incorporated into many Station files, principally the dossier files. No precise statistics are available, but at least 100 exposures are made daily during target working hours.

D. Effectiveness: The Project is considered highly successful and essential by the Station. In addition to the excellent photographic coverage provided, LIONION-1, the Principal Agent, has developed into a first-class asset for other operational duties. The Project Basehouse was essential to mounting and monitoring the Station's attempt at recruitment and subsequent harassment of a sensitive target employee. The Case Officer in charge of the attempt sat with LIONION-1 for several weeks observing the movement pattern of the target employee. LIONION-1 manned one of the radio dispatch posts used to control the physical surveillance of the target employee while near the Basehouse.

Without the Basehouse and LIONION-1's expert knowledge of the target personnel and activities, such an operation could not have been mounted. The operation itself was an attempt to satisfy the top priority requirement laid on Station Mexico City by Headquarters. It is expected that future similar operations will depend to a large extent on the facilities provided by this Project.

Another very effective performance by LIONION-1 was his obtaining, by sharp observation and quick, intelligent and secure action, an apartment in a building directly across the street from the target. The Station had been seeking an apartment in this building for many years.

E. Problems: The only problem currently besetting the Project is the excessive work load on the Principal Agent. To alleviate this, Headquarters is assuming the task of developing some of the film produced by the Project.

Cover for LIONION-1 has ceased to be a problem. He has received his permanent immigrant status and now has a good deal of immunity from harassment from Mexican immigration authorities. He was able to get his translator cover backstopped directly out of the Office of the President of Mexico and thus has a strong protective security factor built into it.

F. Liaison: The Project has no liaison connection. LIONION-1's cover backstop with the Office of the President of Mexico is non-operational.

G. Interagency Coordination: Not applicable.

H. Plans: It is planned to make better use of LIONION-1's observations and operational logbooks during the coming year rather than to settle for his excellent photographs alone. It has been found that he can often supply valuable additional information because of his "feel" for those persons who are under constant observation from the Basehouse. He can read significance into activity which might go unnoticed or be misinterpreted by observers with less experience. He will also be called upon for assistance in future recruitment operations similar to the case mentioned in paragraph D above. Several such operations are being contemplated for calendar year 1966, the period for which the Project renewal is being requested.

I. Costs: For calendar year 1965:

In the period 1 January through 31 October 1965, $7,218.20 has been expended. At this rate, some $9,200.00 will be expended by the end of the calendar year 1965.

Monthly costs:

Salaries:	LIONION-1	$ 360.00
	LIONION-2	150.00
Rents:	LIONION Basehouse	100.00
	LIONION Safehouse	44.00
	Utilities	25.00
Supplies:	Film	95.00
	Paper	60.00
	Chemicals	25.00
Miscellaneous Operational Expenses:		15.00
	Monthly Total:	$ 874.00

One-time costs:

It is customary in Mexico to give a year-end bonus amounting to one month's salary:

LIONION-1	$ 360.00
LIONION-2	150.00
Total:	$ 510.00

3. Calendar Year Total

Fixed monthly expenses	$ 10,488.00
One-time expenses	510.00
Total	10,998.00

4. Fiscal Year Breakdown

Fiscal Year 1966	$ 5,244.00
Fiscal Year 1967	5,754.00
	10,998.00

J. Other: LIONION-2, although not specifically mentioned above, continued to render excellent support as an assistant to LIONION-1.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Project Approval PBRUMEN/LIONION/Plans

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 25110, 6 January 1965

1. Project LIONION, as submitted in reference, has been approved by Headquarters for the period 1 January 1965 through 31 December 1965. The two agents have been redesignated LIONION-1 (201-288248) and LIONION-2 (201-305604).

2. In order to assist Headquarters evaluation of the LIONION Project, we request that periodic progress reports on LIONION include details of CI/CE data furnished, and examples of leads developed from such information.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW 13406
CS COPY

DATE

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-123/1

RI
Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	DM
RID/MIS	VH

164/1

~~DESTROY~~

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: WH/1
OFFICER: R. Scutt:jah
EXT: 4507

COORDINATING
OFFICE SYMBOL | DATE | OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WHD
DATE
OFFICER: DESMOND FITZGERALD

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LICHICK

TYPE OF ACTION		FI-CI	CA
XX	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere	
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City	
	RENEWAL FY 196	BRANCH: WH/1	DESK: Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: R. Leuht	
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3D2607	BUILDING: Hqs. / EXTENSION: [illegible]

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman by D. G. Speira	28 Jan	✓			
WH/D&F	Robert Carter	1 Feb 65				
C/WH/CS	W. E. Brooks	2/3				
C/WH/RC	H. Littell	2/4				
WH/PCA	Gerard Droller Droller	2/16/65				
WH/EXO	Samuel Halpern	19 Feb 65				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
1 January 1965	31 December 1965	$ 10,478	1965	$ 5,004
			1966	$ 5,474

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
Chief, WH Division	SHalpern	19 Feb 65

FORM 6-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(5)

16 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/EXO

SUBJECT : LIONION Project

1. LIONION is a new project which is submitted in the amount of $10,478. This is a photographic surveillance operation targetted against the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Two agents are involved; LIONION-1, a young Cuban lawyer in exile, and LIONION-2, his mother. The agents act as observers and photographers. LIONION-1 is also used as a dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, from which he is compartmented, to cover individuals associated with this target. These agents were previously used in connection with the unilateral telephone tap operation against the Cuban Embassy. The current photographic operation began in the latter part of 1962, and was previously funded under Cuban FI funds. The operation has provided valuable data for the identification of Cuban Embassy personnel and visitors, and on their patterns of action and personal associations.

2. The security of this operation, particularly the agent's cover for status and the communications arrangements, appear reasonably sound. Both agents know that they are working for AIS, and LIONION-1 was successfully FLUTTERED in October 1963. However, LITAMIL-7 and LITAMIL-9, who are penetrations of the Cuban Embassy, are aware of this activity, as they are used to help identify individuals photographed.

3. Approval for the LIONION Project is recommended. It is requested that, in order to assist Headquarters' evaluation, project reporting include details of CI/CE data furnished, and examples of leads developed from such information.

GERARD DROLLER
C/WH/POA

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Approval of Project LICHION

1. Approval is requested of the attached LICHION Project Outline, and authorization of an annual expenditure, effective 1 January 1965, of $10,478 (FY 65-$5,004; FY 66-$5,474). Funds are available for this project.

2. Mexico Station agents LITAMIL-7 and LITAMIL-9, penetrations in place of the Cuban Embassy, are aware of the existence of the LICHION photographic activity. This knowledge on the part of these two assets is essential to the exploitation of the photographic take.

3. WH/1 recommends approval of the LICHION Project.

A.G. Spera

W. J. Kaufman
Chief
WH/1

Attachment:

Project Outline

ITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CH

2. RETURN THIS DOC
RM GA-50, ON C E/VOLUME: KDAFGHAN VOL. I.

3. IF YOU FORW SUPPORT
INDIVIDUAL 50-6-122/2

VE DATES: 25 SEPT 64 - 14 MAR 72

179 IAL UNIT/LOCATION: LAD/DDO

ROOM: 3C34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
26 MAY 78	5/26/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
5 July 78 21 JUL 1978		D. HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/12/78		Bork	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

OP-61 (8-74)

PROJECT KDAFGHAN
VOLUME I
SECTION SUPPORT
N EA/122/2

Folder 2

LE

RETIRED FILE
DESENSITIZED

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO RID/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 2-65 2593 (7-13)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component)
WH/1

TO :
IP/AN

TO : (Station/Base)
MEXICO CITY

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Division)
WHD

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12

ITEM 3-ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS

ITEM 6-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8-USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES

ITEM 10-ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE
☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
50	6	122/2

3 FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)
KDAFGHAN Support

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION

☐	OPEN FILE	☒	CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
☐	AMEND FILE TITLE	☐	REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION

☒	RETAIN IP/ARD	☐	DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7 INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)
[illegible]

8 INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
50

9. FILES ACTION

☐	HOLD IN CS FILES	☐	RESTRICTED	☒	UNRESTRICTED	☐	PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER	☐	CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.
Gloria Farmer #630

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY
Charles M. Conner

EFFECTIVE DATE
1 March 1973

CODE (FILE) NUMBER
50 06 122/2

FORM 812 -63 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG 12-65

SECRET

39 1—CS COPY

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE OF CRYPTONYM CHANGE - 20/04/71

KDAFGAN

FORMER CRYPTONYM - LIONION

CRYPTONYM CHANGE AUTHORIZED BY - ARMSTRONG
(RO OR RID SECTION CHIEF)

COMPONENT - FIO/AN

CABLE OR DOCUMENT REFERENCE (FROM ITEM 10 OF FORM 812) - HMMS-7138

N-O-T-I-C-E

THIS IS AN RID NOTICE OF A CHANGE IN FILE TITLE CRYPTONYM CAUSED BY COMPROMISE. IT IS TO BE PLACED IN THE FILE INDICATED AND TO REMAIN THEREIN AS A PERMANENT OFFICIAL CS RECORD.

S-E-C-R-E-T

FILE IN - 050-006-122/02

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 10-1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN B

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

6 - KDAFGHAN/Sup

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT JSD-E00

FILE, VR IP/AN, WH8, DDP, FI

ACTION NO.

S E C R E T 141955Z MAR 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19236

560483

DIRTECH INFO PANTECH, DIRECTOR

AQUATIC KDAFGHAN KDFACTOR

REF A. HMMA-41502

B. PANTECH 18798 (IN 559398)

1. PLS PROCURE TWO 1000 MM CATADIOPTRIC LENSES WITH CAMERAS AS REQUESTED REF A.

2. FOR PANTECH: NOT NECESSARY PROCURE SPOTMATICS UNLESS ADVISED DIFFERENTLY BY DIRTECH. GP-1.

S E C R E T

Davis

SECRET

SECRET

TO: Chief, MHSPICE XX

INFO.: Chief, WH Division; Chief, WOACRE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: AQUATIC KDAFGHAN KDFACTOR
Replacement of Telephoto Lenses

Reference: MEXICO CITY 15654

1. Two of the Station photographic operations, KDFACTOR and KDAFGHAN, have been using the [illegible] and [illegible] Balscope and Exakta camera combination for approximately twelve years. These two operations provide valuable photographic coverage of two important targets and new equipment is required to improve the photographic quality and increase the capability for longer coverage during the day when light conditions are poor.

2. The Balscope in the KDAFGHAN-1 OP has a 15X eyepiece and is located in a very small room. A full length true telephoto lens of 1000 mm will not fit into the space without taking out a concrete wall partition. Therefore a compact catadioptric lens is required for the project.

3. The Balscope in the KDFACTOR-2 OP should also be replaced by the same type of lens system mentioned in paragraph 2. The Balscope now in use is operated from the top of a table where KDFACTOR-2 must also stand to take pictures over a high wall in the foreground. The system must be removed from the table when not in use and stored in a locked foot locker. For these reasons the lens and camera should be light and compact to facilitate their use and storage.

4. As can be seen from paragraphs two and three a light weight compact lens system is desired for both projects and the Station

-continued

Distribution:
2 - C/EKSPICE
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/WOACRE 2 cc to TSD/PEG

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-42,502

DATE: 13 January 1972

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-18

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

S E C R E T

[illegible] anxious to replace the old units. The operators are starting to climb the walls after these many years of peering through the [illegible]. A verbal request had been [illegible] to [illegible] to obtain two 1000 mm catadioptric optical systems with [illegible] [illegible] cameras. Please advise when these units can be obtained and the costing procedures. [illegible] has started the action on at least one of these systems through [illegible].

Charles F. [illegible]

2531

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOACRE

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, MKSPICE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
AQUATIC/KDAFGHAN
Renewal of Passports for KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-17955, 11 June 1970

The WOACRE-issued Cuban passports for Subjects have expired. It is requested that new passports be prepared for them. According to KDAFGHAN-1, the new passports should carry the same numbers as the old passports. The passports, and current photographs of Subjects, are being forwarded under separate cover. It is requested that the old passports be returned.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Attachment:
As stated u/s/c

Distribution:
✓Orig. & 1 - Chief, WOACRE (w/att. u/s/c)
1 - Chief, WHD (w/o/att)
1 - Chief, MKSPICE (w/o/att)

CS COPY

50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 41480	7 January 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~201-305604~~ FF~~N: P-7,097~~

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ... ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1	Beckwith	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY _____ AT _____ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER _____ #

C- KDAFGHAN/Support

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR Logs 4 ④

ACTION NO 125

S E C R E T 091856Z NOV 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 18173 9Nov IN 465586

DIRECTOR

ADMIN LOGS KDAFGHAN

1. REQUEST OBTAIN AND POUCH TO STATION ON PRIORITY BASIS FOR KDAFGHAN ONE EACH: APRON, CLOTH, F/U/W PAKONOMY PRINT DRYER MODEL 13-S.N.-5932. MFR: PAKO CORPORATION, MINNEAPOLIS 40, MINN.

2. REQN 559-19-72 APPLIES. GP-1

S E C R E T

[illegible] has answered

SECRET

☐ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33 ______ PER ______ # ___

ACTION UNIT
TSDE-00

INFO FILE, VR IP/AN WH 8 DDP FI (6)

ACTION NO.
—

24

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

		5	
		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 211720Z OCT 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 18014 (ROSTEDT ACTING)

DIRTECH INFO DIRECTOR, PANTECH

AQUATIC/KDAFGHAN

2 OCT 451868

1. KDAFGHAN-1 HAS FOR YEARS USED BALSCOPE LENS WITH 20 X EYEPIECE FOR ID PHOTOGRAPHY OF VISITORS AND EMPLOYEES ENTERING KDACOUSTIC. TO IMPROVE QUALITY PHOTOGRAPHY AND INCREASE CAPABILITY DURING EVENING HOURS WHEN LIGHTING POOR STATION PREFERS A PHOTOGRAPHICALLY CORRECTED 1000 MM TELEPHOTE LENS FOR PROJECT. PLS ADVISE AVAILABILITY OF ABOVE LENS FROM WOACRE STOCK. IF PROJECT TO BE CHARGED FOR LENS NOTIFY STATION.

2. MKSPICE DOES NOT HAVE THIS TYPE LENS IN STOCK. GP-1.

S E C R E T

pls file in
KDAFGHAN - Support 7/26

~~Davis~~

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

ACTION UNIT C/TSD 3

INFO FILE, VR C/R/AN, C/EUR 8, DDP, C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 133

S E C R E T 222053Z OCT 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4653

22 OCT 70 IN 191057

DIRTECH INFO PANTECH, DIRECTOR

m

RYBAT AQUATIC

REF: DIRTECH 0131 (IN 189977)

1. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF EQUIPMENT USED IN PROJECTS (ONE EACH OF ITEMS LISTED):

A. LILYRIC:

TELESCOPE, BALSCOPE BAUSCH AND LOMB.;

CAMERA, SP, 35 MM, EXAKTA W/O LENS;

CAMERA, PENTAX MDL H3V;

B. LICALLA:

TELESCOPE, S-E, BAUSCH AND LOMB., BALSCOPE;

CAMERA, SP, 35 MM, EXAKTA, WO/LENS;

C. LIONION:

BINOCULARS, 10Z50, TASCO, JAP MDL;

TELESCOPE, BAUSCH AND LOMB BALSCOPE SR.;

CAMERA, PENTAX 35 MM;

DRIER, PHOTO PAKONOMY MDL 13.;

ENLARGER, LEITZ WETZLER FOCOMAT IC;

MOTOROLA HANDIE-TALKIE FM RADIOPHONE;

C

D

Wheeler

SECRET

FILE: LIONION/SUP

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

2		5	
3		6	
4		7	
		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 4653 SECRET

MOTOROLA RADIOPHONE;

CAMERA, RETINA;

LENS, RETINA 50MM;

LENS, RETINA 35MM;

LENS, RETNA 80MM.

50-6-32/2.

2. FILE: ~~TPAAEWXWM~~ GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 Transmittal of Document Receipt for LIONION Passports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW - 17955, 11 June 1970

Forwarded under separate cover is the document receipt for the LIONION passports.

for/Horace E. PRALLETT

Attachment:
document receipt (u/s/c) 7 July 1970
1att

Distribution:
✓Orig. and 2 - Chief, WHD (w/att, u/s/c)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 39115	26 June 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓50-6-122/2

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM
SUBJECT PBRUMEN LIONION TECHS/Request for Renewal of PBRUMEN Passports for LIONION-1 and LIONION-2		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		

Action Required: Renew passports and return

Reference : HMMW - 13,672, 3 June 1965

1. Forwarded under separate cover in true name pouch are the WOACRE PBRUMEN passports for LIONION-1 and LIONION-2, issued by Reference. These passports have expired, and the Station understands that they can be renewed for another period. Due to the sensitivity of the LIONION operation, Subjects cannot obtain regular PBRUMEN documentation locally, and must have them in order to leave Mexico and return.

2. It is requested that WOACRE revalidate the passports and return them to the Station for re-issuance to Subjects.

for/John A. PROBERT

7 May 70

Distribution:
Orig. and 2 - Chief, WHD w/att. USC

160

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 38843	DATE 27 April 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LIONION/Impulse Camera Film

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See below

References:
A. HMMA-33841, 17 January 1968
B. UFGT-21267, 12 February 1968
C. UFGT-21342, 22 February 1968

1. In view of references A and B and the small cost involved in operating the impulse camera Headquarters will continue to process this film.

2. Request JMWAVE pouch the film cited in reference C to Headquarters for processing.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City
1 - COS, JMWAVE

CS COPY

50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-16194	1 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/2

RI

CHRONO

ABSTRACT
INDEX
WH/1

ORIGINATING			
OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Davy	rc	6954

COORDINATING		
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG	3/5/68	Paul E Oberst

RELEASING		
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	1 Mar 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

AUDIT Report

[illegible]-51CC787

November 1963, and we recommended that the matter be investigated. The current audit disclosed that little or no action has been taken on this matter.

Recommendation: We recommend that the Station determine whether FREAPANE owes WOFIRM for 1963 [illegible] company profits, and notify FREAPANE of the results of the investigation.

Safehouse Rent in Excess of Lease Not Adequately Documented

[illegible] The most recent lease for the LIONION safehouse (MEXI-82) was dated in 1962 and provides for monthly rental payments of MN 650. Since then, the rental payments have been increased to MN 1,450 per month, but the lease has not been changed because, in accordance with local custom, the landlord is reluctant to enter into a new lease due to the costs involved and the income tax implications.

Recommendation: We recommend that a memorandum for the record showing the revised rent be prepared and approved by the Chief of Station or other designated Station official.

Revision of Education Allowance Requires Adjustment of Amounts Paid

Education allowances for Mexico City were revised for some grades during the current school year; however, the Station did not retroactively adjust the allowances already paid, as required by section 276 [illegible] of the Standardized Regulations.

Recommendation: We recommend that education allowances paid for the current school year be recomputed and adjusted to the revised allowances.

Proceeds of Property Sale Not Recorded in Finance Records

[illegible] In our review of property transactions, we noted two instances (Vouchers [illegible] and [illegible]) where accountability was dropped because, according to the property vouchers, the property

SECRET

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City
Attn: Walter W. CORNBURY
Chief of Station, Panama City

Chief, WOACRE

AQUATIC/LIONION
Technical Information

Reference: HMMA 31767 dated 11 April 1967

1. LIONION 1 photographic results continue to be satisfactory for all concerned. It is therefore advisable that no changes in procedure be made at this time.

2. It is apparent that LIONION 1 releyed the incorrect developing formula for the pulse camera film. Perhaps this error is due to his inactivity in processing such film for over a year. Since the conception of this operation all pulse camera film has been developed in Microdol X. On the other hand, Tri X film used in the LIONION 2 operation (Pentax camera and Balscope) has traditionally been developed in Acufine.

3. All pulse camera film is processed at Headquarters by an automatic Huston system. Time and temperature information which the lab uses would be of little value to your development procedure. The results of your recent test indicate that it should be satisfactory for an occasional check on the equipment.

4. The difference between Plus X Negative and Plus X Pan film is worth only one half "f" stop, which should cause no problem if you decide to use the latter.

Albert J. LASCOFF

Distribution:
  2 - COS/Mexico City
  1 - COS/Panama City

50-6-122/3

Group 1 - Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

LIONION
Support

HMMS 5358

35 April 1967

SECRET

TSD/POB RWH ery 2378

1 - TSD/Reg
1 - WH/1
1 - WH/2
1 - TSD/TOPS
2 - POB files

WH/1 25 Apr Mr. Stewart by phone x6955

WH/2 " Mr. Hidalgo " x5421

TSD/TOPS " Mr. Rosing in draft

TSD/COP

QUENTIN C. JOHNSON

14-00000

ORIG. Polly Pike/cmo
UNIT WH/Logistics
EXT. 6282
DATE 4 April 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ____ # ____

CONF. WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR , LOGS 4, TSD 6

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 5 1901Z CITE DIRECTOR 89630

TO MEXICO CITY File support

LIONION

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 0912 (IN 34374)*

PX PAN-417 FILM ASA 125 CAN BE USED BY CLOSING DOWN CAMERA LENS ONE HALF F-STOP SMALLER OPENING. ALTERATION TO HQS PROCESSING NOT NECESSARY. REQN 559-59-67 WILL FURNISH ASA 80, PXN-417 WHICH IS A NON-STOCKED FILM. FYI, STOCK NUMBER 6750-H03-0513 IS FOR PX PAN-417 ASA 125. DO NOT RE-ORDER PXN-417 FILM BY THIS STOCK NUMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: LIONION Pulse Camera has been using PXN-417 film ASA 80, but supply just received is PX Pan 417 ASA 125.

50-6-122

Telecoord:
TSD/POB, Dick Thayer
OL/SD/CCDB, Catherine Van Combos
WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

File Lionion support

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

R.L. KING
C/WH/LOG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

25/1
ACTION

WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR TSD6, LOGS4,

SECRET 311750Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0912

DIRECTOR

LIONION TECHS

REF A MEXICO CITY 0681 (IN 21452)

31 Mar 67 34374

B RQN NO 559-59-67

LIONION PULSE CAMERA HAS BEEN USING PXN-417 FILM ASA84. SUPPLY JUST RECEIVED IS PX PAN 417 ASA 125. IF LATTER USED WITH SAME SETTING IN LIONION CAN HQS COMPENSATE IN DEVELOPMENT? IF NOT PLEASE MONITOR REF (B) AND EXPEDITE SHIPMENT OF PROPER FILM.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

NNNN

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		PROCESSING ACTION MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WOACRE Attn: Geoffrey K. BLOXALD		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH; COS, Panama City (Clement L. BROCK)			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
AQUATIC/LIONION Pulse Camera

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See paragraph 5.

1. The LIONION Pulse Camera has been working for well over a year with no major technical problem. A few months ago the 100 foot film magazine had to be repaired because the supply spindles had tightened and put an excessive strain on the motor.

2. More recently, the battery supply had dropped to about 22.5 volts or so causing erratic operation. The sensor relay between the VLS-2 and the camera suffered the most because of chattering and consequently arcing between the points.

3. To prevent failures of this type in the future, Raymond L. BARCENAS is making a small battery charger at a nominal cost that can be floated across the batteries keeping them fully charged. We are doing it this way rather than ordering a DC power supply because it is less expensive than a commercial model and will not be bothered by house current interruptions or fluctuations. If however, WOACRE/PB foresees any problems by doing it this way, please inform us.

4. On a recent visit to LIONION and a check of the equipment, it was found that the lens of his FOCOMAT 1C enlarger has a fungus like smudge between the elements. We cannot detect any degradation in print quality but would like to have a new one in case this is a fungus and it gets worse.

5. In summation it is requested that WOACRE/PB provide the following to Mexico City, charge 7135-2403.

a. Sensor Relay believed to be a Potter-Bromfield 5A5089 but please check;

b. Comments on the power supply;

c. Lens for a Leitz FOCOMAT 1C.

See HMMS-5277 [illegible]

Distribution:
2 - WOACRE
1 - WH
1 - Panama

CS COPY

for Willard C. CURTIS

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-31294	DATE 7 February 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/2

50-6-122/2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, KURIOT Attn: Peter T. SWINEHART

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
AQUATIC/PBRUMEN/LIONION -- Transmittal of 35mm Pulse Camera

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MEXI-3960

1. The attachment contains the defective 35mm Pulse Camera previously reported in referenced cable. Very little additional information can be supplied, concerning this mechanical failure, other than that reported in the reference. This particular camera was installed on 16 June 1965 and operated normally from that date until the afternoon of 28 June, at which time it began to continually blow fuses. Hugh T. FRANCOTTE entered the LIONION photographic basehouse that night, and when it was found that the problem could not be corrected on the scene, the camera was removed and taken to MKCHARITY for further troubleshooting. It was finally discovered that the shutter motor was malfunctioning and partially burned-out. Joseph M. RESCIGNO stated that since there was a definite "short" in the motor, this would cause the camera fuses to constantly blow.

2. Also included in the attachment are two (2), one hundred foot capacity, film magazines. Both of these magazines are faulty, causing the film to jam. They were both in use with the previous Pulse Camera which became inoperative during late May and was forwarded to KURIOT Headquarters for repair. FRANCOTTE had two (2) new magazines in stock, and they were issued to LIONION/1 for use with the camera presently being returned for repair or replacement.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Camera
Film magazines

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-18

Distribution:
2 - KURIOT, w/atts
1 - WH, w/o atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-26520

DATE
1 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-18

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: COS, Mexico City ATTN: Hugh T. FRANCOTTE and ATTN: Lawrence F. BARTER

INFO.

FROM: Chief, KURIOT

SUBJECT: AQUATIC
Passports for LIONION -1 and 2. Case 5670, 5670-A

PRIORITY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Paras 2, 3

REF: HMMA-26017, 4 May 1965

1. New passports were issued for LIONION -1 and for LIONION -2 in accordance with your request. These documents as well as the 2 old passports are being sent to you in true name pouch.

2. The documents have a validity period of 5 years from date of issue; however, please return them to KURIOT after the passports have served their purpose. Please sign one copy of the document receipt form accompanying the documents.

3. When the LIONIONS -1 and 2 have received their immigration papers, please try to send the original documents to KURIOT for a brief examination. If they cannot be sent, KURIOT would like to have color-annotated photocopies of them.

LEON T. CISSEL

ATTACHMENT: 1 envl.
1. Documents, U/S/C/T/N/P

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - COS, Mexico City, w/att

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO 19 - 137 - 415	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-13,672 PRIORITY	DATE
27 May 1965	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50 - 6 - 122/2

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
TSD/AB/4	Wesley Parcells	vco	3284

1 - TSD/REG
2 - WH/1
1 - Case 5670
1 - Case 5670-A
1 - AB/4 Files
1 - AB/4 Chrono
✓1 - RID/AN

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/1		Mr. Spera, by Phone X-4507

AH/M	~~FI~~	WH/1
~~PB~~	~~DESP~~	
ABSTRACT	~~INDEX~~	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/TSD/OA		ROBERT BUSSEY

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

1/2 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CD

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION TSD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TSD TIME 1330

INFO FILE, VR, WH 7, FI, WH/C 8

S E C R E T 291651Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3960

29 J[illegible] IN 01384

AQUATIC PBRUMEN LIONION

PB[illegible]ULSE CAMERA BEGAN CONTINUALLY BLOWING FUSES AFTERNOON 28 JUNE. FRANCOTTE PERFORMED BASIC CHECKS THAT NIGHT AND REMOVED CAMERA FOR FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING MKCHARITY. TROUBLE BELIEVED TO BE CENTERED AROUND DEFECTIVE SHUTTER MOTOR. MOTOR CHECKED MKCHARITY AND FOUND PARTIALLY BURNED OUT. REPAIRS CANNOT BE MADE MEXI. REQUEST REPLACEMENT CAMERA SOONEST. MALFUNCTIONING UNIT TO BE POUCHED HQS 1 JULY. TEMPORARY PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT INSTALLED LIONION BASE HOUSE MORNING 29 JUNE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29

26/25 SECRET GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	[illegible]
2		6	FI
3		7	Reg
4		8	

FROM
Mexico City

ACTION
TSD 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT. TIME BY

INFO.
FILE VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7

SECRET 171815Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3829

17 JUN 65 IN 92775

AQUATIC PBRUMEN LIONION

REF TN 593898, 8 JUNE 1965.

PULSE CAMERA CABLES FORWARDED VIA REF, RECD 16 JUNE. CAMERA INSTALLED AND TESTED SAME NIGHT AND IS OPERATING SATISFACTORILY.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 9 1973
MICROFILMED

TO: Chief, KURIOT

INFO.: Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: AQUATIC/PBRUMEN/Issuance of LIONION Passports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

2P

References: (A) MEXI 3234, 28 April 1965
(B) DIR 06231, 1 May 1965

1. Attached (USC) are the expired genuine PBRUMEN passports of LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 together with two photographs and five signature specimens of each agent.

2. It is requested that new PBRUMEN passports be prepared by KURIOT and pouched to the Station as soon as possible.

3. The assumption of reference B that passports obtained at the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico City are actually issued in the PBRUMEN Capitol City is correct.

4. The old passports should be returned to the Station as the Mexican immigration visas appearing of pages 11 and 19 of the LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 passports, respectively, must be in the possession of the Subjects until they are granted their final immigration documents.

continued

Remove from Project DAFGHAN
CS Classification: 50-6-122/2
JOB # 75-442/77
Box: 24 Fold: 2

Attachment:
As stated - (USC)

ABSTRACT
MARGUERITE

TSD/18
Case No.
5670-A

Distribution
✓ 2 - C/KURIOT w/att (USC)
1 - C/WHD w/o/att To WH/1
1 - COS, JMWAVE w/o/att - Out Pouch
3 - Files

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN 11 May 65

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

50-6-122/2

No att to Hqs.

CROSS REFERENCE TO D-50-137-415	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-26017	DATE 4 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/2

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-26017

5. The Station is investigating through LICRAFT-1 the passport issuing service in the Miami area, as mentioned in reference cables, and will forward details in separate correspondence. Examples of Miami-issued passports will be made available for Headquarters perusal.

6. The Station wishes to express its appreciation to KURIOT for prompt action in response to reference A.

Lawrence F. Barker
for Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

INDEX ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-122/2
X-REF TO FILE NO. D-19-137-415
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☒ SIG. T. C. Kim

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 9 1973
MICROFILMED

FROM C/TSD/AA/4
MEXICO CITY

ACTION TSD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH/C8, WH 7, C/OPS, FI, [illegible]

C/WH/1

S E C R E T 290026Z

CDIR WAVE CITE MEXI 3234

PAQUATIC TYPIC LIONION

29 APR 65 IN 54659

1. PBRUMEN ORDINARY PASSPORTS FOR LIONIONS 1 AND 2 HAVE EXPIRED. SUBJS CANNOT TRAVEL FROM MEXI BECAUSE MEXI GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ISSUE REENTRY PERMIT IN EXPIRED PASSPORT, PBPRIME GOVT WILL NOT ISSUE VISA IN ABSENCE MEXI REENTRY PERMIT. MEXI GOVT STANDS PAT EXPLAINING, RIGHTLY, THAT PBRUMEN EMB WILL ISSUE NEW PASSPORT TO ANY PBRUMEN CITIZEN REGARDLESS OF POLITICIAL LEARNINGS HENCE LIONIONS MUST GET NEW PASSPORTS.

2. FOR REASONS OPERATIONAL SECURITY LIONIONS CANNOT VISIT EMB FOR NEW PASSPORTS SINCE THEY KNOWN BY SIGHT TO EMB PERSONNEL AS MEXICAN NEIGHBORS. THIS SITUATION RESULTED IN COMPLICATED AND EXPENSIVE CXO ESCORTED "BLACK" BORDER CORSSINGS BY LIONIONS LAST YEAR WHEN THEY VISITED RELATIVES IN PBPRIME.

3. CAN HQS OR JMWAVE ISSUE NEW PBRUMEN PASSPORTS FOR BOTH AGENTS? PLS CABLE PROCEEDURE. MEXI PREPARED POUCH OLD PASSPORTS AND SPARE PHOTOS. LIONIONS WISH TRAVEL SOON.

4. FYI JMWAVE: LICRAFT-1 RECENTLY PURCHASED TWO EXCELLENT NEW PBRUMEN PASSPORTS IN JMWAVE AREA FOR HIS SONS, AT COST 75 DOLLARS

50-6-122/2
29 Apr 65

SECRET

D19-137-415

Remove from Project KDAFGHAN/
CS Classification: 50-6-122/2
JOB # 73-442/79
Box: 24 Fold: 2

TSD/IB

FORM 1-64 1389 RI COPY RI COPY (35)

RID/AN [illegible] SECRET

EACH. IF HAVE [illegible] THIS BUSINESS, BELIEVE STA CAN GET THEM FROM LICRAFT.

SECRET

CFN

PLEASE [illegible] HQ [illegible] 4001 RE ACTION INDICATORS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, KURIOT Attn: Peter T. SWINEHART

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
AQUATIC/Operational -- Availability of the Nikon Television System

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. At the time of Hugh T. FRANCOTTE's departure from Headquarters, KURIOT had recently begun an extensive evaluation of the Nikon closed circuit television system. If this particular system is now considered "operational", FRANCOTTE wishes to be so advised, as there may be a possible application for it in support of an operation at the Mexico City Station. Lawrence F. BARKER was recently briefed by FRANCOTTE on the Nikon system, and is now interested in obtaining additional facts concerning it. BARKER, who is responsible for the LIONION Project, foresees a possibility for its use in the LIONION photographic basehouse.

2. It was thought that perhaps the system could be further "operationally tested" at this basehouse, and at the same time, the Station could examine the possibility of a permanent installation. Presently, LIONION/1 is utilizing a Balscope and Pentax camera for obtaining photographic coverage of the entrance to the PBRUMEN Embassy. Provided the television camera could be equipped with a telephoto lens of about the same focal length as the combination of the Balscope and 20X eyepiece, this system might be a suitable substitute for the equipment now in service.

3. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be advised if the Nikon television system is available, and Headquarters thoughts concerning the testing of it at the LIONION basehouse.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - KURIOT
1 - WH

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO [illegible]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-25981	DATE 29 April 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : ..Sprague/ozy
UNIT : TSD/AOB
EXT : 2373
DATE : 15 Sept 64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

15 Sep 64 R 39z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : TSD 6
INFO : WH 7, CI, CI/OPS, FI, VR

Bustos

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 52651

AQUATIC LIONION

REF MEXI 0982 (IN 79741)*

1. PULSE CAMERAS BEING MODIFIED AND RECONDITIONED BY CONTRACTOR TO CORRECT FAULTS SURFACED DURING LIONION OP. ~~MINIMUM TIME OF~~ AVAILABILITY FIRST CAMERA THREE WEEKS PROVIDING NO UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES OCCUR.

2. IF PRESENT CAMERA INOPERABLE SUGGEST RETURN TO ROBOT AND VLS-2 OR K-100 WITH BURST BRACKET AND VLS-2 FOR INTERIM OPERATIONAL COVERAGE.

3. A SECOND CAMERA WILL BE SENT MEXI AS SOON AS RECONDITIONING COMPLETED FOR USE STANDBY.

- END OF MESSAGE -

TSD/COMMENT: *LIONION pulse camera malfunctioning. Request Hq forward replacement.

Lionion

WH/1/Mexico Miss Bustos by phone x4523

TSD/FB Mr. Ericlson in draft

Robert Bussey
ROBERT BUSSEY
C/TSD/OA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

C/TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Headquarters component) WH/1

TO: IP/AN

TO: (Station/Base) Mexico City

FROM: (Division) WHD

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE: ☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
050	006	074/2

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION

☐	OPEN FILE	☒	CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
☐	AMEND FILE TITLE	☐	REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION

☒ RETAIN ☐ DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY) HMM

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST) 050

9. FILES ACTION

☒ HOLD IN CS FILES ☐ RESTRICTED ☒ UNRESTRICTED ☐ PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER ☐ CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.
#630

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE: 23 July 1973

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

50	06	74/2

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

38

1—CS COPY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1-1 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 38 PER ______

ACTION UNIT
TSD-EOO

FILE, VR 10/bx WH/8, DDP, EI
ACTION NO.
cable: WH/8(bcm) #147 VR

S E C R E T 141955Z MAR 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19235

560183

DIRTECH INFO PANTECH, DIRECTOR

AQUATIC KDAFGHAN KDFACTOR

REF A. HMMA-41502

B. PANTECH 18798 (IN 559398)

1. PLS PROCURE TWO 1000 MM CATADIOPTRIC LENSES WITH CAMERAS AS REQUESTED REF A.

2. FOR PANTECH: NOT NECESSARY PROCURE SPOTMATICS UNLESS ADVISED DIFFERENTLY BY DIRTECH. GP-1.

S E C R E T

030 WH(ALMEN) 20 NOV 73D 11/M

File
KDAFGHAN
and
KDFACTOR
Supply files

YEP - WH/LO & manual high command.

While
Does this mean
WH/COG handling?

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY: 15 PER ________ #

C29

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR, TSD 6

ACTION CHANGE

ACTION NO.

MEXICO CITY 19236 (STATION & NUMBER)

IN 560463-A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : TSD (DIVISION)

TO : WH (DIVISION)

BY : TSD 3121 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : WH 6252 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

SECRET

RW

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
KDFACTOR Project Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

1. Project KDFACTOR was amended 10 December 1971 for $4,260 for FY 1971 to cover the termination bonuses for KDFACTOR-1 and KDFACTOR-7. The Project amendment also provides funds of $19,000 for FY 1972 and $20,000 for FY 1973.

2. One of the provisos of the Project amendment is that the Station furnish Headquarters an updated security review of this operation with particular attention of the knowledgeability of terminated agents and their families. The Station should also address itself to the contingency that the present sites or personnel will be blown and investigate alternate means of continuing the KDFACTOR coverage. Please forward the security review to arrive at Headquarters no later than 15 March 1972.

Leslie D. CLEBANOFF

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

Dist:
2 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-18773	23 DEC 1971 typed 21 Dec 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/2

1 - WH/1
1 - IP

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/FI/CI	EH Hernandez	dm	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	21-12-71	Clarence C. Lane for John C. Murray

(40)

EVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Turnover of LIEMPTY Project

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None. For your information.

REFERENCE : HMMA-39,679, 28 October 1970

1. Primary responsibility for the operational and administrative handling of the LIEMPTY Project was transferred, effective 1 December 1970, within the Station from the REDTOP to the Operational Support Section. This transfer was made as part of our effort to consolidate basic support functions in the Operational Support Section, and to relieve the REDTOP Section of activities which do not contribute directly to the pursuit of priority recruitment targets. However, the REDTOP Section will continue to be the principal consumer of the LIEMPTY product as received from the LILYRIC and LICALLA photo surveillance points. It will also be the main provider of guidance and requests for special LILYRIC/LICALLA coverage.

2. The previous REDTOP Case Officer (Bruce H. FERNALD) introduced the new Case Officer, Howard T. BAGAUS, to LIEMPTY-9, -13, and -14 in early December. LIMOUSINE, owner of the LILYRIC property, will continue to be handled by Timothy M. ARCHBOLD of the REDTOP Section.

Howard J. Archable
Howard J. ARCHABLE

DISTRIBUTION:
~~2~~ - C/WHD
1 - C/SBD

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-39,832	9 December 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY Ef PER ______ #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR LoGS-4

767

S E C R E T 112130Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0915 11 JUL 69 IN 00900

m

DIRECTOR

ADMIN/LOGS/LIEMPTY

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 19485

B. BOOK DISPATCH 6678

C. HMMTA-9673

1. KEYED TO REFERENCE B.

A. RAMBLER AMERICAN SEDAN

B. 1969

C. SERIAL AK-17560

D. MV-2947

E. 3258.25 USD PURCHAS PLUS 97.75 USD MEXICAN TAX; TOTAL 3356.00 USD.

G. REGISTERED AS GERENDE PERSONAL VEHICLE. RECORDED ON FINANCE VOUCHER 00038 DTD 9 JULY 1969

2. DISPOSAL MV - 2606 REPORTED REFERENCE C.

S E C R E T

Liempty 202

50-6-74

SECRET

5

ORIG: Damon Watters/sah
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 10 July 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

7 SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH-8 INFO FILE, VR, LOGS-4,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

10 22 02z JUL 69

CITE DIRECTOR 19485

IL 9 [redacted]

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN LOGS LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 83554

REQUEST STATION ADVISE STATUS MV-2947 AND DISPOSITION MV-2606. INFO NEEDED SOONEST FOR COMPILING NEW BUDGET ESTIMATES.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WH/1

DISTRIBUTION:
OL/SD/FSB/VS

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG

50-6-74

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

S E C R E T

ORIG: H. Peverill/jt
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 13 March 1969

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY A PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR , RI/AN, LOGS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 13 23 11 MAR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 83554

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN LOGS LIEMPTY

REF: MEXICO CITY 9438 (IN-11843)*

AN
AB X

1. STATION AUTHORIZED DISPOSE MV-2606 PER FR 45-31(3) AND REPLACE LOCALLY WITH 1969 RAMBLER, COST NOT TO EXCEED $4000.00. MV-2947 APPLIES TO NEW VEHICLE.

2. ADVISE DESCRIPTION MV-2947 AND DISPOSAL ACTION MV-2606 WHEN ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BD-6678.

3. FILE: 50-6-74/2

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Reference requested approval to replace locally a 1963 Rambler which has reached 78,000 miles and is in need of repairs.

WH/BGF David W. McElhatton
WH/1 A Moline

DISTRIBUTION:
OL/SD/FSB/VS

George A Thompson
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CS COPY

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG
13 Mar 69
50-6-74/2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ________ AT ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY 76 PER ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION
WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO
FILE VR. RI/AN, LOGS 4, MPS/BG

959

Mexi

S E C R E T 112210Z MAR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 9438

DIRECTOR

11 Mar 69 IN 11843

AN
AF X
LH
I D
PC
WH/1

LIEMPTY LOGS

1. REQUEST APPROVAL REPLACE MV-2606, USED BY RAYMON H. GERENDE AS LIEMPTY PRINCIPAL AGENT. REPLACEMENT REQUESTED ON FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

J. VEHICLE NEARLY SIX YEARS OLD AND HAD 72,000 MILES AS OF 1 MARCH 1969.

B. IN NEXT SIX MONTHS VEHICLE WILL NEED REPAIRS TO ENGINE, BRAKES, STEERING AND BODY, ESTIMATED COST OF WHICH EXCEEDS 50 PER CENT OF CURRENT CASH VALUE OF CAR, WHICH ESTIMATED AT 1000 DOLLARS.

2. PLAN REPLACE MV-2606 WITH EQUIVALENT VEHICLE, COST NOT TO EXCEED 4000 DOLLARS. BELIEVE LOW-PRICED AMERICAN BRAND SEDAN SUCH AS RAMBLER AMERICAN WILL FIT OPERATIONAL, SECURITY, AND COVER REUIREMENTS. NECESSARY MONHDCAVAILABLE IN PROJECT AS STATION PROJECTS FY69 LIEMPTY OBLIGATIONS AT 35,000 DOLLARS AGAINST PROJECT APPROVAL OF 43,320 DOLLARS FOR FY69.

3. IF APPROVED, PLS INCREASE FIELD PROCUREMENT ALLOTMENT.

4. FILE: 50-6-74/2.

S E C R E T

CS COPY

SECRET

11 Mar 69
50-6-74/2

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 17

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

1 SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 76 PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, LOGS 4, MPS/BG

959

S E C R E T 112210Z MAR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 9438

DIRECTOR

11 MAR 69 IN 11643 m

LIEMPTY LOGS

1. REQUEST APPROVAL REPLACE MV-2606, USED BY RAYMON H. GERENDE AS LIEMPTY PRINCIPAL AGENT. REPLACEMENT REQUESTED ON FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

J. VEHICLE NEARLY SIX YEARS OLD AND HAD 78,000 MILES AS OF 1 MARCH 1969.

B. IN NEXT SIX MONTHS VEHICLE WILL NEED REPAIRS TO ENGINE, BRAKES, STEERING AND BODY, ESTIMATED COST OF WHICH EXCEEDS 50 PER CENT OF CURRENT CASH VALUE OF CAR, WHICH ESTIMATED AT 1000 DOLLARS.

2. PLAN REPLACE MV-2606 WITH EQUIVALENT VEHICLE, COST NOT TO EXCEED 4000 DOLLARS. BELIEVE LOW-PRICED AMERICAN BRAND SEDAN SUCH AS RAMBLER AMERICAN WILL FIT OPERATIONAL, SECURITY, AND COVER REQUIREMENTS. NECESSARY MONHDCAVAILABLE IN PROJECT AS STATION PROJECTS FY69 LIEMPTY OBLIGATIONS AT 38,000 DOLLARS AGAINST PROJECT APPROVAL OF 43,320 DOLLARS FOR FY69.

3. IF APPROVED, PLS INCREASE FIELD PROCUREMENT ALLOTMENT.

4. FILE: 50-6-74/2.

S E C R E T

SECRET

HMMA 35208, 8 August 1968

LIEMPTY/6 terminated amicably and resettled by his son-in-law - was content with termination bonus of $4,736. Following termination, effective 31 May 1968, the LIMITED base house went out of existence - station did not retain apartment since coverage from LILYRIC is completely satisfactory. LILYRIC personnel have done such good work that station now has better coverage than ever and at less cost.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

ORIG: Nancy Perkins/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 19 Apr 68

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 30

BY ___ PER ___ #

CONF: WH8

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR MPS/BGZ ADDP C/OA.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 19 22 22 Z CITE DIRECTOR 93000

TO MEXICO CITY

File LIEMPTY Support

REF: MEXICO CITY 5263 (IN 93773)*

1. LIEMPTY PROJECT STILL BEING PROCESSED. IF APPROVED AS SUBMITTED, WILL ~~CONTAIN~~ APPROVE TOTAL OF $42,185 FOR FISCAL 68. STATION SHOWS $31,071 OBLIGATED AS OF 31 MARCH, LEAVING BALANCE OF $11,114. ON BASIS PAST EXPENDITURES, CAN PROJECT ROUTINE DISBURSEMENT OF ABOUT $10,000 DURING APRIL, MAY AND JUNE, WHICH WOULD INDICATE INSUFFICIENT FUNDS TO PAY $4,736 [illegible] BONUS, BARRING UNLIKELY POSSIBILITY YOUR UNLIQUIDATED OBLIGATIONS CAN BE LIQUIDATED SO AS TO COVER IT.

2. RATHER THAN RETRIEVE PROJECT BEFORE APPROVAL IN ORDER TO AMEND IT, SUGGEST YOU TERMINATE LIEMPTY/6 AND CLOSE LIMITED (IN MAY), AND PAY BONUS 1 JULY FROM FY 69 FUNDS [redacted].

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Wish terminate LIEMPTY/6 and pay bonus. Will project funds cover this?

Calvin M. Blaytte
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WH/B&F

for W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-74/2

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

15

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OA, CI/OPS/BG 2

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 181745Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY [illegible] Mexi

18 APR 68 IN 53773

DIRECTOR

LIEMPTY

1. STATION PLANS TERMINATE LIEMPTY-6 AND CLOSE LIMITED BASE HOUSE EFFECTIVE 31 MAY 68. LIMITED COVERAGE NO LONGER COMPLETELY RELIABLE OR THOROUGH DUE ADVANCING AGE AND FAILING HEALTH LIEMPTY-6. LILYRIC BASE HOUSE WILLING AND ABLE INCREASE WORKING HOURS TO PROVIDE FULL SIX DAY COVERAGE. LICALLA TO CONTINUE UNCHANGED. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SALARY INCREASES PLANNED FOR LILYRIC AND LICALLA PERSONNEL, ESTIMATE ANNUAL SAVINGS OF 4000 DOLLARS THRU LIMITED TERMINATION.

2. REQUEST APPROVAL PAY LIEMPTY-6 TERMINATION BONUS OF 59,200 PESOS (4736 DOLLARS) BASED ON STANDARD MEXICAN FORMULA OF THREE MONTHS SALARY PLUS ONE MONTH FOR EACH FULL YEAR OF SERVICE (THIRTEEN YEARS), AT CURRENT SALARY RATE 3,700 PESOS.

3. PLS ADVISE STATUS LIEMPTY PROJECT RENEWAL ACTION AND INFORM STATION TOTAL FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FY 68. NEED INFO TO DETERMINE IF SUFFICIENT FUNDS AVAILABLE TO COVER LIEMPTY-6 TERMINATION BONUS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

AN FW	FI	
RS	DEPT	LOH/1
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

18 April 68
50-6-74/2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH
INFO Chief, SB
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT LIEMPTY/Memoranda of Oral Commitments
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are authentic copies of Memoranda of Oral Commitments reflecting salary increases for the following LIEMPTY agents:

a. LIEMPTY-9 : Salary increased from 4,000 pesos to 4,500 pesos per month.

b. LIEMPTY-14 : Salary increased from 1,800 pesos to 1,900 pesos per month.

c. LIEMPTY-26 : Initial salary set at 700 pesos per month.

d. LIEMPTY-27 : Salary increased from 1,500 pesos to 1,800 pesos per month.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
MOCs (4)

Distribution:
2 - C/WH, w/atts.
2 - C/SB, w/atts.

CROSS FILE COPY
DO NOT REMOVE

CS COPY

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34573	2 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	50-6-74/2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief, SB

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
C LIEMPTY Properties

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-15952, 27 November 1967

1. Headquarters' confusion regarding the various LIEMPTY properties is understandable, although each change in location was duly reported as it occurred, and at various times project renewal requests, progress reports, and other correspondence has pinpointed the locations of the base houses involved. The confusion undoubtedly stems from the unfortunate fact that LIMITED and LILYRIC in effect exchanged approximate locations in 1966 without changing cryptonyms. Up to this point, LIMITED had been in a building owned by WOFIRM (with LIMOUSINE fronting for WOFIRM). LILYRIC had been renting an apartment in a building in which WOFIRM had no financial interest. In 1965, however, LIMOUSINE bought the property containing the building in which LIMITED had been located, razed the building, and built a new building in which an apartment was rented to the Station (the rent, however, was to be returned to the Station for three years as partial payment on the loan which the Station had given LIMOUSINE so that he could buy the building). For various operational reasons it was decided to put the LILYRIC personnel into the new building, instead of the LIMITED crew. LIMITED was therefore moved into the building which LILYRIC had occupied. At this point, of course, new cryptonyms should probably have been assigned in order to avoid the confusion which has evidently developed. (This was not, however, simply a switch of personnel - each base house retained its organizational integrity, which is undoubtedly why crypts were not changed). As far as LICALLA is concerned, the confusion

........continued

Distribution:
2 - C/ WH, w/att.
2 - C/SB, w/att. [illegible]

Attachment:
Identity Sheet (under separate cover)

18 Jan 68

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-33814

DATE
8 January 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/2

probably stems from the fact that, while its location has not changed, it is located within the LIMUST building, which is owned by WOFIRM (with LIMOUSINE acting as "front") and which is administered within the LIMESA project. As stated, however, all of this has been carefully documented for Headquarters. The LIMOUSINE purchase of the old LIMITED building generated considerable correspondence (see particularly MEXI 2159 and DIR 77745 of January 1965). HMMA-28322 and HMMA-30403 spelled out the reasons for switching LILYRIC and LIMITED, and the completion of the move was reported in HMMA-30687. Finally, sketches and plans of the LILYRIC and LIMITED houses in their new locations were forwarded with HMMA-31303, dated 7 February 1967. As far as LICALLA is concerned, its location and status was never open to question, and its location in the LIMUST complex is regularly mentioned in LIMESA progress renewal requests. The Station understands that a memo describing the locations of the various base houses was attached to the most recent LIMESA project renewal request when it was submitted to the staffs by WH/1.

2. Personnel within the base houses is also well-documented (most of the LIEMPTY progress reports have identified each agent in each house), and the personnel have never been switched from house to house. Perhaps the best rundown of these personnel is Raymond H. GERENDE's security review, forwarded with HMMA-31164, 24 January 1967.

3. Station Real Property reports are also, with one exception (MEXI-41), up-to-date and they reflect current conditions. MEXI-03 does, of course, include LICALLA. Nevertheless, the Station asked for $1800 for rent and utilities for the following reasons: first of all, utilities are an unrecoverable expense no matter who owns the apartment. Secondly, the rent, even though returned to the Station because WOFIRM owns the building, must physically be paid by the occupant of LICALLA. He, in turn, is reimbursed by the Station via GERENDE. LIMOUSINE eventually returns the money, at which time it is credited to expense. This could, of course, be handled differently, but the Station has always found it convenient to finance in this manner, largely because finances with LIMOUSINE are handled on a semi-annual basis. The reimbursement, therefore, often comes many months after the payment.

4. The Station neglected to cancel MEXI-41, which should be done as it refers to LILYRIC in its old location, before the move in 1966. LILYRIC is now MEXI-132, and is in the building owned by LIMOUSINE. Rent payments are, as originally intended, being used to help liquidate LIMOUSINE's debt, and, as instructed in HMMS-4814, 15 June 1966, the Station is crediting this money to miscellaneous receipts. There can be, therefore, no question of the need to include money for LILYRIC rent and utilities in the LIEMPTY project. LILYRIC rent is, and has been since the apartment was occupied in October 1966, 3,000 pesos per month, which amounts to $2,880 per year ($3,200 has been requested in order to include utilities). Headquarters is correct in stating that the agreed-upon figure for the rent in this new building was 2,300 pesos per month. Station files indicate that the reason for the increase (and this apparently was not reported to Headquarters) was that the bank which holds the major part of LIMOUSINE's loan had determined that 3,000 pesos was a fair price for the apartment. The Station had, of course, no choice but to go along with this.

5. The Station has no record of MEXI-02, but it is likely that this is the old LIMITED apartment, which was indeed purchased by WOFIRM (via LIMOUSINE) in 1955. But since that building was later purchased and razed by LIMOUSINE, the old LIMITED apartment ceased to exist. The LIMITED base house was subsequently transferred to the building which had previously housed LILYRIC (but not to the same apartment), and LIMITED is

now carried, in its current location, as MEXI-113. As was the case with old LILYRIC, the rent money is not returned to the Station; WOFIRM has no financial interest in the building. Thus it is evident that the LIEMPTY project renewal, which used to say "LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to Station miscellaneous receipts" should now carry the footnote "LICALLA rent is returned to the Station and credited to expense; LILYRIC rent is, and will be through September 1969, returned to the Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to miscellaneous receipts as partial payment on Station loan to LIMOUSINE."

6. Finally, the LIEMPTY darkroom is the room where the films taken by LICALLA, LILYRIC, LIMITED, and LIENTRAP are developed, printed, and (on request) enlarged by LIEMPTY-4. This darkroom is located in GERENDE's apartment, and he is paid 1,000 pesos per month for maintenance of the darkroom in recognition of the fact that one room in his living quarters has been turned into a darkroom, and his electric and water bills are substantially higher than they would normally be without a darkroom on the premises. GERENDE is building a house which he expects to occupy in February 1968. His plans for the house specifically include a LIEMPTY darkroom, and he will continue to be paid 1,000 pesos per month for this. To cover this payment in the new house, MEXI-137 has been written and will be forwarded to Headquarters shortly.

7. In answer to paragraph 5 of reference, it is hoped that the following summary will end the confusion:

a. LICALLA

(1) MEXI-03

(2) Address under separate cover (Identity-1). [illegible]

(3) LICALLA has been in operation at its present location since 1956, originally as a rented property. In September 1957 the building in which LICALLA is located (which consists of four units, collectively known as LIMUST) was purchased by the Station, with LIMOUSINE acting as a front.

(4) Actual cost is nothing, since property is owned by WOFIRM. The original purchase price for the four units was $40,000.00 with an additional $20,000.00 spent on renovation. Rent is paid for cover purposes at the annual rate of $1,248.00

(5) Cost of utilities is estimated at $552.00 annually.

(6) Since June 1957, LIEMPTY-9 (originally LIPSTICK-39) has operated the LICALLA base house. No other LIEMPTY agents are associated with LICALLA.

b. LIMITED

(1) MEXI-113

(2) Address under separate cover (Identity 2)

(3) LIMITED has been in its current location since December 1964, and it is a rented property. At its previous location, the LIMITED base had been in operation from 1953 until September 1964.

(4) Annual rent is $1,440.00

(5) Annual cost of utilities is estimated at $560.00.

(6) LIEMPTY-6 (originally LIPSTICK-14) has operated the LIMITED base house (in both locations) since 1955. No other LIEMPTY agents are associated with LIMITED.

c. LILYRIC

(1) MEXI-132

(2) Address under separate cover (Identity 3)

(3) LILYRIC has been in its present location since October 1966, when the new building was completed and ready for occupancy. It is a rented property, although for three years beginning 1 October 1966 the rent is to be returned to the Station as partial payment on a loan to LIMOUSINE. This loan was made to permit LIMOUSINE to purchase the property and construct the building in which LILYRIC is located. This property had previously belonged to WOFIRM and had contained the building in which LIMITED had been located. LILYRIC was previously (November 1956 to September 1966) located in a rented property (the same building, but not the same apartment, in which LIMITED is now located).

(4) Annual rent is $2,880.00.

(5) Estimated annual cost of utilities is $320.00.

(6) LIEMPTY-13 (originally LIJERSEY-2) has operated the LILYRIC base house (in both locations) since LILYRIC was established in 1956. He is supported by his wife (LIEMPTY-14), and his son (LIEMPTY-27). Another son, LIEMPTY-26, has also worked in LILYRIC. (Because LIEMPTY-13 has a full-time job, LIEMPTY-14 does most of the photographic work, assisted by LIEMPTY-27. LIEMPTY-13 does some of this work, and makes all meetings with GERENDE.)

d. LIEMPTY photo lab.

(1) MEXI-137

(2) Address (as of February 1968) under separate cover (Identity 4).

(3) Actually, no property as such is involved here. The Chief of Station authorized payment to GERENDE for the use of a room in his quarters as a darkroom in 1964, after GERENDE was moved out of a base house in which he lived (rent-free) and maintained the dark room.

(4) and (5) Annual cost is $960.00, including utilities.

(6) The occupant is GERENDE, although the photo processing is normally done by LIEMPTY-4.

8. It is hoped that the above will shed some light on the problem; the Station will be glad to answer any further questions Headquarters may have.

Vincent P. Rizzuto
FOR/Willard C. CURTIS

50-6-74/2

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:
HMMA-33814, 9 January 1968

IDENTITY SHEET

Identity (1)	Benjamin Hill 15
Identity (2)	Pedro Antonio de los Santos 104, apt. 17
Identity (3)	Gelati 2 (as this is a corner house it is also known as Pedro Antonio de los Santos 100), Penthouse
Identity (4)	Calle Bezares, Colonia Molino de Bezares, Mexico 10, D.F.

S/c ATT #1 HMMA 33814

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

SECRET

F: LIEMPTY Support

DISPATCH S E C R E T

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Admin/Finance - Station Accounting for December 1967.

ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 3.

REFERENCE : A. HMMT-8387
B. Book Dispatch 0279

1. Attached is a copy of the subject accounting. The original was forwarded to the Office of Finance by reference A.

2. As requested in reference B, there are no FY-1966 unliquidated obligations. FYI: FY-1967 unliquidated obligations are as follows:

SUPPORT	$1,784.05
LIHALO	232.15
LIP	169.45
LILISP-X	2,023.30

In [illegible] upon receipt of [illegible] refunds for safehouse rent collections for the period January thru June 1967, Projects LIMESA and LIEMPTY will be credited in like amounts.

3. It is requested that FY-68 advices of suballotments for all Station's activities be forwarded as soon as available and that "Notifications of Project Approval Action" for Projects LICONGA and [illegible] be amended to increase FY-68 funds available in the field as follows:

LICONGA - to $9,700 (for quarters, operational travel, rental of safehouse, and miscellaneous operational expenses).
[illegible] - to $20,000 see HMMA-33689.

Attachment:
As Stated Above.

for/WILLARD C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att.

HMMT-8583

12 January 1968

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Properties

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The presence of so many new desk personnel at headquarters - people who are unfamiliar with station history - means that we must turn to you with questions oftener than you might wish. Our present question concerns property involved in LIEMPTY. (We are submitting the project as received from the field, but do not understand the background very well.)

2. HMMA-11257 of 16 January 1959, a project renewal, said that "approximately one year ago the LICALLA base was purchased by KUBARK through LIMOUSINE", and we have not found any cables or dispatches which would show a change in that status. Does MEXI 03 LIMUST/LIMESA (see Real Property Report of August 1967) include LICALLA? If so, and if we own LICALLA, why does it cost us $1800 a year for rent and utilities? (Up until the submission dated 1963 the project renewal used to say "LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to station by LIMOUSINE and credited to station miscellaneous receipts" but after that time this sentence was eliminated.)

(Continued..)

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-15952

DATE: 27 November 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/2

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	sl	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RI
CHRONO

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		W. J. Kaufman

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

(40)

DISPATCH

3. LIMITED is a different problem complicated by the fact that we are no longer sure what the name refers to. Originally we bought LIMITED and then sold it in January 1965 to LIMOUSINE who put up a new building on the lot and saved an apartment for our use. LIMOUSINE now owns the new building, but "MEXI 02, LIMITED Safehouse" is shown on the Real Property Report as "purchased" by WOFIRM in 1955 - should this not be corrected? A further complication is that HMMA -31164, GERENDE's January 1967 security review, speaks of LILYRIC in its present new location, inhabited by LIEMPTY/13, /14 and /27. Has the old LIMITED been re-christened LILYRIC because of its new inhabitants? When was it completed and are we still withholding rent from LIMOUSINE in settlement of his payment to us for the property. The REAL Property Report shows LILYRIC, MEXI 41, as having been leased in 1958 and costing $1030 to maintain ($856 rent, $44 reparis, and $130 utilities). It also shows MEXI 132 LIMEPTY, LIMOUSINE, LILYRIC as having been rented in October 1966 for $2880 a year. (Which is more than the 2,300 MN monthly rent for the flat in his new building which LIMOUSINE agreed that we would withhold for a period of two years after completion in partial settlement of his purchase of the LIMITED property.) (HMMA 25310, 3 February 1965.)

4. What does the LIEMPTY darkroom consist of?

5. We are, as you can see, confused. Would you be kind enough to send us a brief summary of each of the four LIEMPTY properties.

a. name and property (MEXI) number

b. address (under separate cover)

c. date purchased, sold, rented, etc.

d. Basic cost (original cost if purchased, annual cost if rented)

e. cost of utilities

f. occupants

6. If rental money which we pay out for cover reasons is subsequently returned to us, should it be included in a project?

H.B.

Theresa H. BACHARDY

File LIEMPTY/[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	Support
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 1[illegible] OCTOBER [illegible]

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY________PER________#________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: HMMA 33059*

~~FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES PLEASE LEAVE LI[illegible] TRUCK UNDER LIEMPTY AND DO NOT INCLUDE IN LIEMBRACE RENEWAL.~~

~~END OF MESSAGE~~

~~WH COMMENT: *Plan transfer LIENTRAP truck to Project LIEMBRACE.~~

Not sent. Msg. carried by Langdon (?) on 17 Oct.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief/WHD
INFO.	
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT	LIEMBRACE/LIEMPTY - Transfer of Responsibility for the LIENTRAP Vehicle

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information

References : MEXICO CITY-2600
MEXICO CITY-2654

1. In July 1967 the responsibility for the LIEMPTY Project passed from the Station Support Section to the REDTOP Section, where it more reasonably belongs. However, the LIENTRAP segment of the LIEMPTY Project has little to do with REDTOP activities and more rightly belongs in the Support Section. The Station, therefore, decided to transfer the LIENTRAP vehicle, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 to the LIEMBRACE Project with LIEMBRACE-3 to be the Principal Agent. This decision was based on both security and operational efficiency considerations. The formal change of command was made on 10 August 1967 in a meeting between GERENDE, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMBRACE-3.

2. Certain members of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team were already knowledgeable of the existence of the LIENTRAP vehicle and its operators from past operations and also from the old LIPSTICK Project. Conversely, LIEMPTY-10 was knowledgeable of the existence of the surveillance team and knew some of the members of the team (LIEMBRACE-4 is the step-son of LIEMPTY-10). By placing the vehicle under the command of LIEMBRACE-3, there was no breakdown of compartmentation.

continued...

Distribution:
3 - Chief/WHD

16 Oct 67: Oral message sent back to station via Al Reynolds to the effect that we feel it impolitic to present a surveil ance poject in the neighborhood of $62,000, so please keep the truck under LIEMPTY for admin. purposes (and use it anyway you want.) C/WH/1 did not want to send a written message on this. NP

CROSS REFERENCE TO 50-6-74	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 33059	DATE 12 September 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-72/1

GROUP 1

3. On the other hand, the LIENTRAP vehicle was the most vulnerable part of the LIEMPTY complex and a roll-up of the truck could lead to Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for LIEMPTY, and from GERENDE to the sensitive LIEMPTY photo basehouses. Thus, by attaching the LIENTRAP vehicle to the LIEMBRACE surveillance team we have actually improved the security of the LIEMPTY Project somewhat.

4. On the operational efficiency side, the benefits which will accrue from having the truck tied-in with the surveillance team for use in dispatching are obvious. In many areas of the city, such as around the market areas and third class hotels, an ostensibly empty truck attracts much less attention than a person on foot or even a passenger car. The ability to dispatch a target and at the same time take photographs of the target and any companions has its operational advantages. Hopefully, in some of the target-of-opportunity coverages now provided by the surveillance team, it will be possible to take photographs of the person with whom the PJSTEAL officer meets. Certainly, if the team takes an unidentified subject home after a target-of-opportunity discovery, by allowing the team leader to place the photo truck on the home we will speed-up the receipt of photographs.

5. LIEMBRACE-3 was told that LIEMPTY-10 and 11 have certain accomodation addresses which they must check on a routine basis and that any assistance given the LIEMBRACE team should not interfere with this task. It was stressed to LIEMBRACE-3 that under no circumstances should team members transport or otherwise assist in the servicing of the accomodation addresses. LIEMBRACE-3 was briefed on the normal activity of the LIENTRAP truck in providing photographic coverage of addresses in which the Station has an interest. As for handling the use of the truck, the following caveats were laid upon LIEMBRACE-3:

a. LIEMBRACE-3 should discuss the normal activities of LIENTRAP only with LIEMBRACE-1, the assistant team leader.

b. The truck is not to be used in active mobile surveillance without the approval of the Station.

c. The truck will be used for dispatching purposes only in those areas in which passenger vehicle and/or foot dispatching are not feasible.

d. LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 will not be used for active surveillance nor will they be introduced to team members who do not presently know their true identities.

6. Operationally, the efficacy of the use of the LIENTRAP truck in coordination with the LIEMBRACE team has been proven in the coverage and surveillance of a letter-drop on Mexico City. Please see references for details of this operation, which could not have been accomplished in a secure manner without the truck assisting the team. No problems have been noted as a result of the change in command structure for the LIENTRAP truck.

7. Financially, one possible problem is evident in the new arrangement. Headquarters has limited the costs of the LIEMBRACE Project to US$ 50,000 per year and it will not be possible for the Project to remain within this figure with the LIENTRAP vehicle and personnel included therein. The Station does not see this as a great problem because the Operational Program includes the cost of these assets in the LIEMPTY Project and the transfer will merely mean a decrease in LIEMPTY equal to the increase in LIEMBRACE.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

[illegible] Support

14. As approved by Headquarters, the present LIENTRAP vehicle will be replaced by a new Ford "Econoline" truck in the near future. Before the old LIENTRAP vehicle is sold, it will be used to cover residences of the FUSPEAL/NYXIS opposition who are living in Mexico City.

HMMA - 32068
23 May 67

" The LIENTRAP vehicle has been replaced." HMMA 33455, 8 Nov 67, Project Renewal

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIMOUSINE/LIEMPTY/LILYRIC - Occupants of Building at Gelati #2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

References : A. HMMW-15157, 18 January 1967
B. HMMA-31303, 7 February 1967

1. Station wishes to correct somewhat the information provided in Reference B. Because of changing of plans and an error on Raymond H. GERENDE's part, the number of floors of the building located at Gelati #2 was given incorrectly in Reference B. The plans forwarded as attachments to Reference B were correct. The description in the dispatch should be corrected to show a ground-floor, three floors with two apartments each and a penthouse.

2. The occupants of the building, all of whom were checked and approved by the Station before leasing are:

Ground Floor Business - A beauty salon is located on this floor which is operated by Nelly Infante de Garcia. Her lease was signed on 1 December 1966 and is valid until 31 May 1969. She pays $152.00 US per month rent.

Second Floor - Apartment 1 - Dr. Hector MUNOZ Franco. His lease was signed on 1 September 1966 and is valid until 31 August 1967. He pays $128.00 US per month rent.

Apartment 2 - Alicia MADRIGAL Osorio rented this apartment on 1 November 1966 and she plans to vacate at the end of April 1967. She pays $64.00 US per month.

continued...

Distribution:
③ - Chief/WHD

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 31837

DATE
18 April 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

Third Floor - Apartment 3 - This apartment is rented by the Eighth Electoral District for use as an area office. The contract was signed on 1 February 1967 and is valid until 31 July 1968. The rent paid on this apartment is $112.00 US per month.

Apartment 4 - Edmundo GONZALEZ. His contract was signed on 1 December 1966 and is valid until 30 November 1968 with a rent of $80.00 US per month.

Fourth Floor - Apartment 5 - Wilfreid and Edith ASCHENBRENNER. Under the terms of their lease, which was signed on 1 October 1966 and is valid until 30 September 1967, they pay $96.00 US per month rent.

Apartment 6 - This apartment is rented by Richard P. MAPES who pays $72.00 US per month. His contract was signed on 1 October 1966 and is valid until 30 September 1967.

Penthouse - The penthouse is leased by Andres GOYENECHEA O. who pays $240.00 US per month rent. His contract was signed on 1 September 1966 and is valid until 30 August 1967.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ORIG: S.L.Yaxley/sly
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 7 April 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ______ # ______

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/1

INFO: FILE , VR . LOGS 4,

(classification) SECRET (date and time filed) 7 22 29 Z (elite) (reference number) (pica) CITE DIRECTOR 90695

TO

MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: MEXICO CITY 0996 (IN-38335)*

PURCHASE OF MV-2823 FOR $3440.91 AUTHORIZED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Station requested approval to increase amount of Ford Econoline from $3200.00 to $3440.91.

WH/1 Nancy Perkins
WH/B&F

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH8 ~~☐~~ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, MFS/BG2

S E C R E T 060035Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0996

6 APR 67 IN 38335

DIRECTOR

REF A DIRECTOR 88210

B DIRECTOR 46928

REQUEST AUTHORIZED AMOUNT FOR MV-2823 BE INCREASED FROM $3200.00 TO $3440.91 WHICH NEW PRICE OF FORD ECONOLINE NOW GOING INT~~M~~O ~~CI~~ PRODUCTION AFTER 6 MONTHS LAPSE. NEW PRICE INCLUDES MANDATORY SAFETY EQUIPMENT INCLUDING FIRE EXTINGUISHER, SEAT BELTS AND WINDSHIELD WASHER NOT PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED BY MEXICAN LAW AND RADIO WHICH NECESSARY TO COVER TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT TO BE INSTALLED BY WOFACT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Status of LIEMPTY-5

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference : HMMW-15270, 23 February 1967

1. LIEMPTY-5 is the wife of LIEMPTY-4, the operator of the photography base used in processing the pictorial take received from the various units within the LIEMPTY complex. As such, she sometimes assists LIEMPTY-4 in the photo processing work. She is carried as a part-time basehousekeeper because she must remain at home as added security when photographs are being processed and/or being held until the scheduled meeting between LIEMPTY-4 and Raymond H. GERENDE takes place and the photographs passed for onward transmittal to the Station.

2. The Station regrets that LIEMPTY-5 was not included in the last Project Renewal Request, but the oversight probably resulted because LIEMPTY-5 does not receive a salary at the present time. The Station wishes to keep her present Memorandum of Oral Commitments, which calls for an hourly salary, in effect in case her services as a salaried asset are needed in the future.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - Chief/WHD

LIEMPTY/Support
50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-31515	6 March 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-150615

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

ORIG: A. C. Kumro/sly
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 26 October 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

	ROUTING		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 21 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , LOGS 4

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 26 18 31Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 46928

TO MEXICO CITY

LOGS LIEMPTY

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 8920 (IN-22107)*
B. DIRECTOR 45720**
C. MEXICO CITY 8962 (IN-25013)***

MV-2823 APPLIES. COST NOT TO EXCEED $3200.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: *Requested authority replace MV-2279 with panel truck at maximum cost of $3200.
**Approved disposal of MV-2279 and authorized replacement if project funds available.
***Provide MV number. Approximately $10,000. available.

WH/1 C. Bustos (telecon)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	SS	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

~~DISSEM BY~~ B/ 7

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT 1 TIME BY

INFO FILE VR LOGS 4

SECRET 251500Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8962

DIRECTOR

25 Oct 66 IN 25013

REF: DIRECTOR 45720

PLEASE PROVIDE MV NUMBER FOR NEW TRUCK.

APPROXIMATELY TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AVAILABLE.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

NNNN

Bustos

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

SECRET

ORIG: R. L. King/sly
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 21 October 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 52 PER ___ # ___

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE LOGS 4, MPS/EG 2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 21 20 42 Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 45720

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: MEXICO CITY 8920 (IN-22107)

APPROVAL GRANTED SELL MV--2279, CAN REPLACE IMMEDIATELY ONLY IF CURRENT PROJECT FUNDS CAN ABSORB COST, WHICH HDQS. DOUBTS. OTHERWISE MUST INCLUDE COST IN NEXT PROJ APPROVAL AND PURCHASE AFTER 1 DECEMBER. ALSO ASSUME THAT FY-67 PROGRAMMED AMOUNT OF $45,000 CAN ABSORB COST OF NEW TRUCK. SEE HMMS-4969. PLS COMPLY WITH BOOK DISPATCH 5373, DATED 7 MARCH 1966.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Requested disposal and replacement of MV-2279.

WH/1, C. Bustos (telecon)

WH/B&F, Mr. Connor (in draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSEM BY 38
ACTION
WH 8
☒ RID COPY
INFO
FILE, VR, 6064

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT
TIME
BY

S E C R E T 210017Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8920

DIRECTOR

1. REQUEST AUTHORITY TO REPLACE MV-2279 LIEMPTY TVA SLOT NUMBER 2 WITH FORD ECONOLINE PANEL TRUCK. MAXIMUM COST $3200.00.

21 OCT 66 IN 22107

2. MV-2279 PURCHASED 1959. ODOMETER READING 4900 MILES. EXCESSIVE OIL USE INDICATES NEED FOR MAJOR OVERHAUL OR REPLACEMENT OF ENGINE. TRUCK SINCE USED AGAINST MANY TARGETS. CONTINUED USE HAZARDOUS FROM SECURITY STANDPOINT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

6

6 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CCS

FROM : WH Division

SUBJECT : Project Funding Plan/Project LIEMPTY (FI)

A. Identification of Activity

1. Project cryptonym: LIEMPTY

2. Approved for: 1 December 1965 - 30 Nobember 1966: $41,500
   FY 1966 - $25,520
   FY 1967 - $15,980

3. Proposed successive fiscal year budget: Same

4. Brief statement of project aims, character and structure:

   The purpose of this project is to provide support for mobile (1 truck) and stationary (3 base houses) photographic surveillance; one base house is also used as a dispatching base for a physical surveillance team. This project covers one Mexican Contract Agent who serves as Principal Agent for the eight Mexican field agents under the Project.

B. Funding History

1. The Contract Agent receives his salary directly from the Mexico City Station Case Officer ($540/month). He also receives money from the Station which he uses to pay the field agents their salaries (total of $1.700/month) and operational expenses. Receipts are received.

2. Funds have always been handled in this manner.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 12 TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Di[illegible] BY 24

ACTION LOGS-4 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, SOD-6, WH/C-8

S E C R E T 161803Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7641 IN 39026 16 June 66

LOGISTICS INFO DIRECTOR

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 02750 [illegible]

JBECHO

PLEASE SHIP 240 ROLLS OF STOCK NUMBER 6750-292-9666 FILM TRI-X 35MM, 36 EXP ROLLS ON REF IURADIAL FLIGHT. $158.60
NEEDED FOR UNEXPECTED HIGH DEMAND FOR LIEMPTY PROJECT.
CITE REQUISITION NUMBER 559-73 66 FAN 6135-2990.

S E C R E T

SI

SECRET

o.K.

☐ YES ☐ NO
ASSIGN TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH/C

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CA 3, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, ...

SECRET 282130Z

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE MEXI 6403

28 FEB 65 IN 64419

REF WAVE 9343 (IN 63107)x

RESERVATIONS CONFIRMED AT GENEVA. ADVISE IF NECESSARY TO MEET.

SECRET

CFN

6400 9343 GENEVE

BT

SECRET

ETA 1 MAR

LIEMPTY // LCFLUTTER

[illegible]

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memoranda of Oral Commitments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are three authentic copies of Subject memoranda covering the following agents used within Project LIEMPTY and reflecting recent salary adjustments:

MCC of — LIEMPTY-6 [illegible] 201-082444 [illegible]
" " ——> LIEMPTY-9 " ——> 201-136454
" " ——> LIEMPTY-10 " ——> 201-121190
MCC of ——— LIEMPTY-11 " ——> 201-119960 [illegible]

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
③ - Chief WH Division
Atts herewith
Atts detached in RID/AC
[illegible]
and filed in 201's as
indicated above.

CROSS REFERENCE TO
P-2464
P-2488
P-2453
P24-73

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28138

DATE
25 January 1966

50-6-74/2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memoranda of Oral Commitments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are three copies of subject memoranda covering the following agents used within Project LIEMPTY and reflecting recent salary adjustments:

LIEMPTY-9	201-136454
LIEMPTY-11	201-119960
LIEMPTY-14	201-167567

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
~~3 MOC ea. h/w~~

filed in individual
201 files

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26232	1 June 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/2

MESSAGE FORM 15

78 SECRET

ORIG: C.Bostos - Videla
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4507
DATE: 10 March 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-5762

R1

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

10 [illegible] 65 22 39z
ROUTINE

SIG CEN

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: OL 4, BPA, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 91467

LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE

REF: MEXI 2732 (IN 19326)*

APPROVAL GRANTED DELAY INTTIAL PAYMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Limousine wishes delay initial payment for limitdd property for 90 days.

WH/Log J. Wisniewski

TELCCORD OL/RECD Bill Cabanis, DC/RECD/OL

TeCOORD DC/LOG, GEORGE MELLON

Liempty [illegible]

A. G. Spear

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Raford W. Herbert
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 14

SS SECRET

ORIG : Joseph F. McMahon
UNIT : WH/Logistics ☐ INDEX
EXT : 7282 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 4 December 1964 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1	SS	5	
2		6	
3	1	7	
4		8	

4 DEC 64 21 14 z

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO OL 4, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 68656

REF: A. DIR 66008
B. MEXI 1798 (IN 34773)*

REQUEST FOR $500 INCREASE FOR MV 2676 PER REF B APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Requested increase from $3000 to $3500.

LIEMPTY [illegible]

C/WH/1 by Spera

Telecon:
OL/PD, Mr. Gauvreau

RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WH DIVISION
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOSEPH F. MCMAHON
CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : John T. Martin
UNIT : WH/Logistics
EXT : 7282
DATE : 23 November 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM
SECRET

ROUTING
1 | 5
2 | 6
3 | 7
4 | 8

23 Nov 64 19 45z
SIG CEN

Busses

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO OL 4 VR FILE

TO MEXI
INFO:
CITE DIR 66008

REF MEXI 1667 (IN26899)*

DISPOSAL OF MV 2284 AUTHORIZED AND LOCAL PROCUREMENT REPLACEMENT VEHICLE COST NOT TO EXCEED $3000 APPROVED. MV2676 APPLIES. DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Request authority dispose of MV2284 and replace with new compact cost not to exceed $3000;

DC/WH/1

Telecon:
OL/TD/VSB, Maj. Fred
OL/PD. Mr. Gauvreau

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, WH DIVISION
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOSEPH F. MCMAHON
CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 13

32 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Mexico City

ACTION OL4

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

VR. FILE WH 7

S E C R E T 192300Z

CP

20 Nov 64 IN 26899

DIR CITE MEXI 1667 (EASBY ACTING)

JBECHO

1. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION DISPOSE MV 2284 WITH 75,000 MILES. COST NEEDED REPAIRS AND OVERHAUL EXCEED 30 PERCENT LOCAL MARKET VALUE.

2. WISH REPLACE WITH NEW COMPACT 8 CYLINDER FORD WITH STANDARD EQUIPMENT FOR USE OLIVER C. SCANTLING. DUE SCANTLING BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH LOCAL FORD CAN GET 15 PERCENT DISCOUNT AND GOOD TRADE IN ALLOWANCE MV 2284 WHICH ALSO FORD. COST NOT TO EXCEED $3,000. DUE ALTITUDE, TRAFFIC CONDITIONS, NATURE SCANTLING ASSIGNMENTS, 8 CYLINDER VEHICLE NEEDED.

3. SUFFICIENT FY 1965 FUNDS AVAILABLE PROJECT LIEMPTY THIS PURCHASE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

4-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

47 SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : OL 4, RF, VR

SECRET 240224Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6642

24 Oct 63 IN 46326

LIEMPTY

1. REQ AUTHORITY DISPOSE MV 2286 CHEVROLET 1958. MILAGE 65,000. NEEDS EXTENSIVE REPAIR DUE AGE AND USE.

2. REQUEST AUTHORITY REPLACE WITH LOCAL PURCHASE RAMBLER CLASSIC 4 DOOR AT $US 3,050. STANDARD FACTORY INSTALLED EQUIPMENT INCLUDES RADIO, WHITE WALL TIRES, CIGARETTE LIGHTER, CLOCK.

3. ABOVE ASSIGNED RAYMOND H. GERENDE. FUNDS AVAILABLE PROJECT LIEMPTY THIS PURCHASE.

SECRET

Liempty Support
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memoranda of Oral Agreement

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information

Forwarded herewith are three copies of Subject memoranda covering the following agents employed under Project LIEMPTY and reflecting recent salary adjustments:

LIEMPTY - 4	201-117967
LIEMPTY - 6	201-082444
LIEMPTY - 8	201-121189
LIEMPTY - 9	201-136454
LIEMPTY - 10	201-121190
LIEMPTY - 11	201-119960
LIEMPTY - 14	201-167567

Cover and KUBARK job assignments of above agents remain as previously reported.

for Willard C. CURTIS

50-6-74/2

Attachments:
As stated above

Distribution:
3 - WH w/3 cpy ea att.
2 - Files

Encl -7

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE TYPED 11 Jan 1963	DATE DISPATCHED 15 Jan 1963
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-20491
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/2

[illegible]

DISPATCH

[illegible] Chief, [illegible]

FROM: Chief of Station, [illegible] City

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY [illegible]

Cancel MV Authority

REFERENCES: HMMA-1667, 13 December 1960

[illegible] 1961

Project LIEMPTY [illegible] requested that Headquarters cancel this MV authority.

[illegible]

9 February 1961

Distribution:
3 - [illegible]
3 - Files

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-16426

TO
INFO
Chief, WH Division

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
8 February 1961

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Memoranda of Oral Commitments

RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
None, for Hqs. info only

REFERENCE(S)

Attached for Headquarters files are copies of recently revised Memoranda of Oral Commitments on several LIEMPTY agents:

LIEMPTY-4	201-117967
LIEMPTY-6	201-82444 201- (No Station record of 201 number)
LIEMPTY-8	201-121189
LIEMPTY-9	201-136454
LIEMPTY-11	201-119960
LIEMPTY-13	201-119961
LIEMPTY-14	201-167567

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

3 February 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD w/3 cys ea of 7 atts
2 - Files

50-6-74/2

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-0000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING		
ACTION		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH

SUBJECT: Field Procurement of MV-2320 - Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: HMMS-1241, dated 5 Feb. 1960

1. Reference dispatch gives authorization to procure one 2-4 door, used sedan for Project LIEMPTY, MV-2320. Authorization was valid until 3 May 1960.

2. Headquarters has no record of procurement of this vehicle. If this sedan has been purchased please comply with paragraph 2 of reference and return signed Declaration of Trust.

3. If the purchase has not been made at this date please advise Headquarters if the Station still intends to secure the sedan and give justification for an extension of authority to purchase.

END OF DISPATCH

3 - Mexi

DATE TYPED: 9 Dec. 1960

DATE DISPATCHED:

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMS-1667

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:

CLASSIFICATION

Distribution:

1 - WH/LOG
1 - WH/REG
1 - OL/SD/VS

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/LOG	P. G. PIKE	nd	4591

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/3		
Tele coord: OL/SD/VS	9 Dec. 60	with J. Herman

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH/SUPPORT		Paul E. Arneson

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED.

DISPATCH

SECRET

OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/OPS; BUDGET AND FISCAL BRANCH, FI/SG

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY (APPROVAL OF PROJECT) ; ______ (ACCOUNT NO.) ; WH/3/Mexico (OPERATING DIVISION AND COUNTRY)

SECTION 1. BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED FUNDS *(To be completed from data in project outline)*

THE TOTAL FUNDS BEING REQUESTED FOR ABOVE PROJECT, AMOUNTING TO $ ______, ARE BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:

BREAKDOWN AND TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR		
	1961	1962	
COMPENSATION	$ 23,000	$ 15,000	$
ALLOWANCES			
TRAVEL	1,500	1,000	
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	5,900	4,100	
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES	1,500	1,000	
OTHER:			
TOTALS	$ 31,900	$ 21,100	$

SECTION 2. ADMINISTRATIVE *(To be completed by project officer)*

INDICATE ANY DETAILS THAT WILL ASSIST FINANCE DIVISION IN MAKING ADVANCES, DISBURSEMENTS AND ACCOUNTINGS

A. TYPE OF PROJECT *(Check one)*

X REGULAR ☐ SUBSIDY ☐ PROPRIETARY

B. METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

C. FUNDS WILL BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY *(Check one)*

1	X	REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS *(FHB 30-1500-1 or FHR 30-1500-4)*
2		RECEIPTS ONLY *(R 230-200)*
3		OTHER *(Explain)*:

SECTION 3. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS *(To be completed by operating division budget officer)*

I CERTIFY THAT, TO MEET THE ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED IN SECTION 1:

A. -- FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE IN THE DIVISION'S BUDGET FOR THE FY 1961.

B. -- FUNDS HAVE BEEN PROGRAMMED FOR THE FY 1961.

SIGNATURE OF OPERATING DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER | DATE

SECTION 4. AUTHORIZATION *(To be completed by Projects Branch, FI/OPS)*

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 Dec 1960 TO 30 Nov 1961 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 53,000 AS BROKEN DOWN IN SECTION 1.

SIGNATURE FOR PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/OPS | DATE

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

Raymond G. GERENDE
Oliver G. SCANTLING
Louise G. MACRINO

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER C.L.Zehring	EXTENSION 2535	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE

FORM 4-59 680 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(3)

14-00000

013

DATE : 22 SEP 60

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : TSD 4

INFO : WH 4, OL 3, S/C 2

SEP 23 0210Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 16961

DIR CITE MEXI 6378

6378

AQUATIC

1. POUCH SOONEST TWO ENLARGER BULBS FOR MODEL 57100 EXACT 35 ANDREAS VEIGEL STUTTGARD-BAD CANNSTATT. MACHINE WILL TAKE PHILIPS 125 V 100 W P28 TYP 6257 C/05 SOCKEL UNTEN WITH SOCKET MARKING A 032. NONE AVAILABLE MEXI.

2. FOR LIEMPTY BASE WHICH PROCESSES ALL LIMMERICK OP PHOTOS. ADDRESS QUINTON N. OUSLER FOR PROPER DELIVERY.

END OF MESSAGE

Liempty

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: ____ APPROVAL OF PROJECT; ____ ACCOUNT NO.; ____ COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM [illegible] TO [illegible] IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 54910.00 AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

____ FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ____ DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1962	FISCAL YEAR [illegible]
COMPENSATION	$ 32600	$ 26100
ALLOWANCES	1260	900
TRAVEL	2225	1825
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	1000	5000
OTHER: [illegible]	5000	2200
TOTAL [illegible]	$ 42485	$ 36425

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one) ☑ REGULAR ☐ SUBSIDY ☐ PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
- ☑ REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (ASR 30-10)
- ☐ RECEIPTS ONLY (CPB 9.4)
- ☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE [illegible] DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 196[illegible] CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

____ DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ____ DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

☑	PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE	☐	APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
☐	PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT	☐	OTHER (Explain):
☐	RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION	▨	

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

[illegible] H. [illegible]
[illegible] G. [illegible]
[illegible] 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, [illegible] 34
[illegible] J. [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
[illegible]	[illegible]		

FORM NO. 680 REPLACES FORM 59-104
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(3)

SECRET

9 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Purchase of One Automobile and Increase of LIEMPTY TVA by One

1. According to the Project Renewal Request for LIEMPTY from the Mexico City Station, they plan to increase the LIEMPTY surveillance team during the coming year by two agents. To maintain the efficiency of an enlarged team, they will require one additional automobile.

2. It is requested that the TVA for LIEMPTY be increased by one automobile and that the Station be authorized to purchase locally this automobile for use under the LIEMPTY Project.

J.C. King
C/WHD

Distribution:
  Orig & 2 - Addressee
  1 - Subject
  1 - Chrono

LIEMPTY/Support

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY (APPROVAL OF PROJECT); ______ (ACCOUNT NO.); WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 [illegible] 1959 TO 30 [illegible] 1959 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 95,300.00, AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

______ FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ______ DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1959	FISCAL YEAR 1960
COMPENSATION	$ 57,710.00	$ [illegible]3,320.00
ALLOWANCES	1,500.00	[illegible]
TRAVEL	4,750.00	1,[illegible]50.00
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	5,250.00	3,750.00
OTHER:	21,000.00	———
TOTAL	$ 87,580.00	$ [illegible]

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT *(Check one)*	☑	REGULAR	☐	SUBSIDY	☐ PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: *(Check one)*
- ☑ REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS *(APR 30-10)*
- ☐ RECEIPTS ONLY *(CFR 9.4)*
- ☐ OTHER *(Explain)*:

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ______ DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ______ CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

______ DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ______ DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

☐	PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE	☐	APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
☐	PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT	☐	OTHER *(Explain)*:
☐	RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION	▨	

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

Raymond H. [illegible]orende (P8;
Oliver G. Scantling (P8;

LIEMPTY - 3,-4,-5,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10,-11,-12,-13,-14,-15,-16,-17

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
John [illegible]. Brady	2555		

FORM NO. 680 REPLACES FORM 53-104
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(3)

File
[illegible]
Support

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUPPORT ANNEX - TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

1. PROJECT [illegible]	2. SENIOR STAFF
	4. AREA
	A. DIVISION: WHD
3. TYPE OF ACTION (Check one)	B. BRANCH: III
A. NEW TVA	C. DESK: [illegible]
✓ B. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA	

5. REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	TOTAL PRESENT TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
A.	SEDAN 2 or 4 door [illegible]		4	5
B.	STATION WAGON			
C.	OTHER (List below)			
(1)				
(2)	[illegible]		1	1
(3)				
(4)				
(5)				
D.	TOTALS		5	6

6. REVIEWED BY			7. APPROVAL REQUESTED BY		
SIGNATURE LOGISTICS OFFICER	DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE CHIEF, ADMIN.	DIVISION	DATE

8. APPROVED		9. AUTHORIZED	
BY DIRECTION OF DDP	DATE	BY DIRECTION OF DD/S	DATE

FORM NO. 1116 TEST
1 NOV 58

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(20-36)

316 RLF/SW/ ~~DO~~ LV

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 31 JUL 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 1 2057Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 48642

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 4204

RE HMMS 761

HMMS 737

REQUEST MV AUTHORITY FOR LOCAL PURCHASE NOT EXCEED $3500 OF FOURTH LIEMPTY CAR AUTHORIZED BY REF B. WILL BE USED BY LIJERSEY SURVEILLANCE TEAM.

END OF MESSAGE

file LIEMPTY/Lijersey

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ORIG : JAMES S. BURWELL
UNIT : WH LOGISTICS
EXT : 4591
DATE : 3 APRIL 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 5

INFO : DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE

	DEFERRED	APR 3 19 43 59
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT89600

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 20062

RE: A. MEXI 3593 (IN 37255)
B. MEXI 3630 (IN 39968)*

1. REF A APPROVED. COST NOT TO EXCEED $3500. MV 2283 APPLIES.

2. AUTHORITY GRANTED REPLACE REF B VEHICLES NOT TO EXCEED $3000 EACH. MV 2284 MV 2285 AND MV 2286 APPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AUTHORITY REPLACE MV'S [illegible], 2147 AND 2148.

Tele Coord
OL/SD - S. DePyssler

JAB file

Support

PAUL E. ARNESON
C WH SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

Robert N. Dahlgren
C WH BR III
COORDINATING OFFICERS

James S. Burwell
JAMES S. BURWELL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

470/DMCL/CG/555 Pp

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 2 APR 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

APR 3 0338Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 39968

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 3630

LIEMPTY

RE: A. HMMA 11257

B. HMMA 11368

C. HMMS 637 PARA 4

1. REQUEST CABLE AUTHORITY REPLACE MV'S 2041, 2147 AND 2148 FOR SECURITY REASONS IMPLIED REFS A AND B.

2. HQS AWARE EFFORTS INCREASE SECURITY AND COMPARTMENTATION SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. ABOVE 1952 MODEL VEHCILES HAVE BEEN USED ON MANY INVESTIGATIONS BY SEVERAL DIFFERENT AGENTS. CONSIDER IMPERATIVE INCREASE LIEMPTY SECURITY BY IMMEDIATE REPLACEMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] LIEMPTY / S.P

S-E-C-R-E-T-

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

COLITHO - PRTD. BY MOORE BUSINESS FORMS, INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

618/[illegible]

ORIG : R. M. HERMAN
UNIT : SUPPLY
EXT : 2553
DATE : 17 FEBRUARY 1959

619

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 17 21 47 '59
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : CL 3

INFO : WH 4, CO/S, SSA, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				INITIALS
		DEFERRED	PRIORITY	
	X	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT73536

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 13232

LIEMPTY/JBECHO

APPROVE MEXI 3318(IN 20248) FOR PANEL TRUCK. MV 2279 APPLIES

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comments: Requested replace MV 2138 ~~on~~ by trade-in plus $2000.

Support [illegible]

[illegible] LIEMPTY

Telecon Coord - J. Burwell
WH/LOG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W M Dause
For CHIEF, SUPPLY DIVISION

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

R. M. Herman
VEHICLE SECTION

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 141 WCJ/LSB/LSB/ 13 FEBRUARY 1959

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : DO/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

[illegible] COPY

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 14 10 21 [illegible]

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 20248

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 3316

LIEMPTY

RE: A. HMMW 7257

B. HMMA 12095 PARA 10 D

C. HMMT 669

CAN REPLACE LIENTRAP (MV-2138) ON TRADE-IN PLUS $2,000.

PLEASE CABLE AUTHORIZATION.

END OF MESSAGE

LIEMPTY/Bug

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

SECRET
(When Filled In)

File
Br. 3

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY (APPROVAL OF PROJECT) ; 2/3570-33-164 (ACCOUNT NO.) WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 October 1958 TO 30 November 1959 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 95,500.00 AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH

DATE 3 Apr 59

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1959	FISCAL YEAR 1960
COMPENSATION	$ 32,710.00	$ 23,500.00
ALLOWANCES	1,870.00	1,420.00
TRAVEL	4,750.00	1,250.00
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	5,250.00	3,750.00
OTHER:	21,000.00	————
TOTAL	$ 65,580.00	$ 29,920.00

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one) ☒ REGULAR ☐ SUBSIDY ☐ PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
☒ REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (AFR 30-10)
☐ RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE WH DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1959 CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

DATE 26 NOV 1958

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

☐ PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE
☐ PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
☐ RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION
☐ APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

Raymond H. Gerendo (ps)
Oliver G. Scantling (ps)

LIEMPTY - 3,-4,-5,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10,-11,-12,-13,-14,-15,-16,-17

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
John D. Brady	2555		

FORM NO. 680 REPLACES FORM 59-104
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(3)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA- 11710

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-25/3
50-6-74/2

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 10 December 1958

SUBJECT: Operational/LIEMPTY Station File Breakdown

RE: "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Headquarters information only

REFERENCE(S): (A) HMMW-6958, 31 October 1958, Paragraph one.
(B) HMMA-11257,

In reply to the request contained in reference (A), listed below is the Station's file breakdown for the LIEMPTY Project:

50-6-74/1 - Plans & Developments
/2 - Support
/3 - Operations (General)
/3A - Operations (GERENDE Contact Reports)
/3B - Operations (SCANTLING Contact Reports)
/4 - Production

50-6-74/5 - LIMITED Administration
/5A - LIMITED Operations
/5B - LIMITED Logs

50-6-74/6 - LILYRIC Administration
/6A - LILYRIC Operations
/6B - LILYRIC Logs

50-6-74/7 - LICALLA Administration
/7A - LICALLA Operations
/7B - LICALLA Logs

50-6-74/8 - LIENTRAP Administration
/8A - LIENTRAP Operations
/8B - LIENTRAP Logs

50-6-74/9 - LIJERSEY Administration
/9A - LIJERSEY Operations

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

WCC:anc
5 December 1958

Distribution:

3 - Hqs

2 - Files

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM : LIEMPTY

DIVISION : Western Hemisphere

STATION : Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

NAME: John H. Brady
ROOM: 2112 Barton Hall
EXT.: 2552
DATE: 24 November 1958

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be approved for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959 for a total of $95,380.00.

2. WH/Personnel has been requested to locate a Staff Agent to fill the BAP-[illegible] slot formerly under the LIPSTICK Project. This slot will be transferred to the LIEMPTY Project and will be filled by a person who will be responsible for the directions of the physical surveillance team under this project.

R. W. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

J. C. King, C/WHD

Date

Attachments:
FPO (in quad)
Form 680 (in quad)
Table of Vehicular Allowance
Justification for Purchase of Automobiles
Envelope with true names

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMW-6930

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-21/2

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE:

SUBJECT : Operational/LIJERSEY Agents Not Included under Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED : Agent Service Records

REFERENCE(S): HMMA-11257

RE "(CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

The following LIJERSEY Agents have active Operational Approvals but were not included under Project LIEMPTY. It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters whether these agents were ever recruited and whether the Station wishes to have their Operational Approvals remain active. Please submit Agent Service Records on those agents where appropriate.

LIJERSEY-14	(201-200231)
LIJERSEY-15	(201-209991)
LIJERSEY-16	(201-209153)
LIJERSEY-17	(201-208615)
LIJERSEY-19	(201-207439)
LIJERSEY-20	(201-215073)

OLIVER G. GALBOND

28 October 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
- 6 - Subject files
- 1 - RI

WH/3/Mexico/E.I.SCALETTI mgs

CS COPY

50-6-21/2

RECORD FILE COPY
DO NOT REMOVE

50-6-21/2

FORM 10-57 53

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

24 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS-Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Justification for Automobiles under Project LIEMPTY

1. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be authorized to purchase three used sedans for use by the LIEMPTY surveillance team. The Station plans to expand the LIEMPTY surveillance team into a larger, well-trained physical surveillance asset. They will need three automobiles. Private automobiles or commercial transportation will not be satisfactory since the cars must be outfitted with two-way radios.

2. Authority is also requested to purchase a panel truck to be used in the LIEMTRAP operation under this Project which mounts mobile photographic surveillances.

3. It is also requested that a quasi-personal car be authorized for Oliver C. Scantling (ps). Scantling is an indigenous agent under oral contract. A car is a prerequisite for his work for KUBARK which includes casings, surveillances, and investigations. Because of the sensitive nature of his work, and the heavy use made of the car, the Station has decided that Scantling should be furnished a QP car.

4. LIEMPTY agents were formerly carried under the [illegible] and LIPSTICK Projects. The vehicles used by the LIEMPTY agents under these other Projects will be disposed of and new ones will be purchased after the above TVA has been approved. The vehicles which will be replaced are MV 2148, MV 2147, MV 2138, and MV 2041. One of the surveillance cars will be new and will not replace an old car. It was decided that these vehicles should be replaced rather than transferred to the LIEMPTY Project for security reasons and because of the age of the automobiles. The automobiles are 1951 and 1952 models and have been used for sensitive surveillance work for over two years. The panel truck which was used in the LIEMTRAP Operation under the LIPSTICK Project has been operating for two years in all parts of the city and has become a security threat. The fact that the LIPSTICK surveillance team knows that the truck exists, even to the point that one of the team members is the listed owner of the truck, also dictates replacement of this vehicle.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUPPORT ANNEX - TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

1. PROJECT: LIEMPTY

2. SENIOR STAFF:

4. AREA
A. DIVISION: WHD
B. BRANCH: III
C. DESK: Mexico

3. TYPE OF ACTION (Check one)
☒ A. NEW TVA
☐ B. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA

5. REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	TOTAL PRESENT TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
A.	SEDAN 2 or 4 door, 5 passenger American or foreign		0	4
B.	STATION WAGON			
C.	OTHER (List below)			
(1)	Truck, panel, American or foreign mfg.		0	1
(2)				
(3)				
(4)				
(5)				
D.	TOTALS		0	5

6. REVIEWED BY
SIGNATURE LOGISTICS OFFICER / DIVISION / DATE

7. APPROVAL REQUESTED BY
SIGNATURE CHIEF, ADMIN. / DIVISION / DATE

8. APPROVED
BY DIRECTION OF DDP / DATE

9. AUTHORIZED
BY DIRECTION OF DD/S / DATE

FORM 9-57 1116 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(20-38)

29 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Personnel

SUBJECT : Request for Staff Agent ~~to fill BAP-8100~~ Slot in Mexico City

1. It is requested that WH/Personnel locate a Staff Agent to fill the BAP-8100, IO (FI), GS-12 slot in Mexico City which was recently vacated by Wilfred O. CLOWER(ps).

2. This Agent must be bilingual in Spanish and should have operational experience, especially in physical surveillance techniques. It would be helpful if the candidate also has area knowledge. He will be expected to spot, develop, recruit, and direct surveillance assets.

3. It is requested that a suitable candidate be located as soon as possible so that the Contract Agent now performing these functions can be relieved of this responsibility and can devote his time to other tasks.

R. R. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

WH/3/Mexico/CZehrung:ngs

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
1 - Subject

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component)
WH

TO :

TO : (Station/Base)

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Division)

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE

ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE
☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
50	6	74/02

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)
KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION
☐ OPEN FILE
☐ CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
☒ AMEND FILE TITLE
☐ REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION
☐ RETAIN
☐ DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)
FORMERLY LIEMPTY

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)
HMM

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
50

9. FILES ACTION
☐ HOLD IN CS FILES
☐ RESTRICTED
☐ UNRESTRICTED
☐ PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER
☐ CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.

EFFECTIVE DATE

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

050	006	074/02

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG. 2-64

SECRET

38

1-CS COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CASE FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 24 October 1958

FROM: (Requester Name) Charlotte Zehrung

COMPONENT	BUILDING	ROOM NO.	TELEPHONE
WH	Barton	2120	2758

1. CASE TITLE

LIEMPTY/Support

2. COUNTRY AND NUMBER

50 (Mexico)

3. CATEGORY AND NUMBER

6 Operational

4. ACTION REQUESTED

☒	OPEN FILE AS INDICATED.	
☐	AMEND FILE AS INDICATED.	
☐	CLOSE FILE	
☒	RESTRICT FILE TO (DESK).	WH/III/Mexico
☒	PERMANENT CHARGEOUT TO (DESK).	WH/III/Mexico
☐	PREPARE FILE FOLDERS AND SEND TO REQUESTER.	

5. COMMENTS: (Include brief description of file or project)

Photo and physical surveillance coverage and support for station.

6. FOR RI USE ONLY

1. PROJECT STATUS ☐

2. FIELD STATION(S)

3. HDQRS. COMPONENT(S)

RECORD COPY

7. ENDORSEMENT

THIS REQUEST SATISFIES RECORDS REQUIREMENTS.

C L Z

RI/ANALYSIS

EFFECTIVE DATE

29 Oct. 1958

8. APPROVAL

REQUEST APPROVED

[illegible]

FOR CHIEF, RI

RI CASE TITLE NUMBER

			N.S.
50	6	712	

FORM NO. 812 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 DEC 56

SECRET

(38)

Attachment "3"

HMMA-31303 - 7 February 1967


piedra
pasta.
pasta


pasta.
pasta
piedrin

FACHADA SUR


2.40
.30
240
aparente
aparente
.30
150
.90
.30
1.50
90
.30
1.50
.90
.30
2.60
.15

FACHADA

esc 1:50


piedra
pasta
c. servicios
toilet
cocina
cocina
cocina
comercio
R-5
AL COLECTOR
ORIENTE
CORTE


reg
w.c
col
B.A.P.
B.A.N
baño
baño
baño
baño
escalera
garage
R·1
R·2
cisterna.
R·4
R·3

this floor not added in an economy measure.

LBANAL DE TUBO DE CONCRETO DE 15 cms ø CON 2% min. de pendiente

23

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3 SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

DIRECTOR

EL SALVADOR

ON: WH 8

DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, VR

FCB INT SS S3

S E C R E T 282140Z

DIR CITE SALV 5229 28 AUG 64 IN 62861

WH DIV CUBA CUBANDEF
[redacted]

* Provide details of approach made to [redacted] Target By [redacted] Liaison asset

REF DIR 44137

1. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PARA 3 REF, Liaison OPS Summary [redacted] Liaison asset Target Liaison S [redacted]

Liaison asset Liaison
[redacted] TOLD [redacted] THAT Target [redacted] HAD REFUSED TO SERVE AS INFORMANT FOR GOES ON SECURITY GROUNDS; CITED CASE OF STUDENT WHOSE REPUTATION RUINED IN UNIV A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO AFTER BEING COMPROMISED AS POLICE AGENT. Target [redacted] THEN RAISED POSSIBILITY OF WORKING FOR U.S. [redacted], PROBABLY BECAUSE IT WELL KNOWN AROUND UNIVERSITY THAT Liaison asset [redacted] ENJOYS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH USIA [redacted] CULTURAL ATTACHE, AND ONCE GIVEN US. [redacted] SCHOLARSHIP.

2. AT MEETING WITH Station asset [redacted] ON 27 AUG, CU officer [redacted] TOLD HIM THAT WE HAVE DECIDED TO LET THE DUST SETTLE ON THE RUSSIAN PROFESSORS FLAP BEFORE FOLLOWING UP PITCH TO Target [redacted], AND TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION THIS CASE UNTIL ADVISED. Station asset [redacted] DID NOT QUESTION THIS RATIONALE AND PROMISED TO COMPLY.

3. PLS IDENTIFY WH DW [redacted] REP MENTIONED PARA 2 REF.

S E C R E T

SECRET

FBI

29 Dec. 67 Miami
Re: MDC
Confidential

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM 15

MICROFILMED
DEC 1 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AKULE/MHSPAWN/AMMOP
Plans for ODCA Mid-April Congress

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REF: JMWAVE 0180

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to report the comments of AMMOP-1 on 30 November regarding the forthcoming Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA) Congress. AMMOP-1 said that the precise date of the Congress is yet to be set though it is still scheduled for mid-April. He now feels that he will have a copy of the formal agenda by the end of December which is a full month earlier than reported in the reference. While AMMOP-1 is not a member of the committee preparing the agenda, he said that he is being kept generally informed of developments and that once the agenda is prepared he should be in a position to influence a revision of the agenda in the event that there are no items concerning Cuba or that the items listed are not satisfactory. He said that the principal person with whom he is in contact on this matter is Rafael CALDERA and that it will be through CALDERA that he would hope to make his influence felt. AMMOP-1 also said that he has been assured by CALDERA that the Cuban case will be prominent in the agenda.

2. We will continue to keep Headquarters informed of developments on this end.

Roger E. Marchbank
Roger E. MARCHBANK

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

19-300-10

COPY

DEC 1 1967

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-767219	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-29068	DATE 1 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-300-10

FBI

20 Oct. 67 Miami
Re: ADC
Confidential

-00000

FBI

30 Aug. 67
Miami
Re: MDC no Class.

5 June 67 Miami
Re: MDC
Confidential

C/WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chiefs, All WH Stations and Bases

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Christian Democracy in Latin America

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI.

The following analysis has been prepared in WH Division and is transmitted to all WH Division Stations and Bases as a review of the current status of Christian Democracy in Latin America and an updating of Headquarters' view on the movement. We believe the subject matter merits close and careful study by all Station operations and reports officers whose comments are solicited. FYI, this material, in a shorter and sanitized form was published in the 3 March issue of the Current Intelligence Weekly Review, and will thus be widely disseminated throughout the intelligence community. However, the WOGEAR study could not include much of the "Conclusions" section since it was interpretative and had operational overtones. Thus we've decided to send the full text herein in book dispatch form.

1. The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean Presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy might develop significantly throughout Latin America competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress. Christian Democracy's advocacy of "Third Force" concepts plus frequent manifestations of anti-Yankee syndrome caused some observers to swallow hard, but there was no denying that these concepts had an emotional appeal. This political charisma, coupled with a commitment to basic social reform and opposition to Communism, and presented within an ideological framework stressing the dignity of the human person, comprised a package of considerable attractiveness to the Latin American, particularly the student and middle class elements. This dispatch will review the current status of the CD parties and the role of organizations -- ODCA, CLASC, Party youth and student wings and European CD groups -- which

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
BOOK DISPATCH 5961

DATE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/CA	Joseph DiStefano gb (8 March 1967)	5006

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/1		(in draft)
WH/2		(in draft)
WH/3		(in draft)
WH/4		(in draft)
WH/5		(in draft)
WH/6		(in draft)
WH/7		(in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		William V. Broe

DISPATCH

represent key factors in the development of the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America. Our major purpose is to determine, some two years after the Frei victory, whether the generally enthusiastic assessment of Christian Democratic prospects engendered by this highly significant election was justified.

I - CURRENT BALANCE SHEET OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

2. Parties of Current Significance. Christian Democratic parties are generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El Salvador and Peru.

a. The Chilean PDC is the only party with the responsibility of governing; the solid victory of Frei in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the Party's reform program is being implemented with less than deliberate speed, no progress has been made in weakening Marxist leadership domination of the urban labor force, and indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly challenged by the left wing of the PDC.

b. The COPEI Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean Party in 1968 and appears to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent of the electorate in 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica Party (32 percent). COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the Party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency.

c. In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 29 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame-educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

d. The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with the Popular Action (AP) Party in 1963; it currently holds two cabinet positions. Some would argue that the Peruvian CD (with only 4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in competition with the dominant AP and the long-established APRA, both reformist parties, and thus should not be included in a listing of significant CD parties. Some weight is added to this argument by the very recent split off of a dissident faction of the PDC into a separate party. However, the inclusion of the Peruvian party here is based primarily on the fact that it is the only CD group participating in a coalition government and thus contributes an element of stability to the political scene in Peru.

3. Parties of Moderate Potential. Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgement of potential, there are not more than four CD parties -- in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil and Guatemala -- that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

a. The Dominican PRSC stands as a prime example of CD irresponsibility from the time Caonabo Javier took over Party leadership in the wake of the Dominican Revolution in April 1965. It has collaborated with the entire spectrum of Marxist-lining parties, and moderation of its extreme militancy in the near future appears unlikely. The PRSC has developed a small but talented cadre of leadership, primarily from the university ranks, and is buttressed by the strongest CLASC affiliate (CASC) in the Hemisphere.

b. The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a miniscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacking by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. If the Panama CD succeeds in expanding its middle-class base and attracts militants from the predominantly negro and mestizo population, it could become a force of some importance.

c. While the Brazilian PDC polled a mere 4 percent of the vote in 1964, the Party has significant strength in three key states of the Center-South (Parana, Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other pre-Castello Branco political parties, the PDC was unable to campaign under its own banner in the presidential and parliamentary elections of late 1966. Expanded political activity will probably be permitted after the seating of President Costa e Silva in March 1967, but it is expected that the number of legally recognized political parties will be limited. It appears likely that the PDC will have to merge with another party if it is to compete in the legislative life of the country. If the PDC joins with a party that has strength outside the present PDC strongholds, and the PDC message and mystique sets the tone for such a new political entity, the net result could be expanded importance for Christian Democracy in Brazil.

d. The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This nascent group has good strength in the youth and student movement and growth potential in the important campesino sector. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; PDC leader Rene de Leon appears honest and intelligent but he has little organizational flair or charisma. His leadership is being challenged by a group of militant "Young Turks" on the left. With more vigorous leadership and the development of middle echelon cadres the party could develop significantly.

4. Parties of Insignificance. The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties -- in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay -- show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Allende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia

(Remo di Natale). These parties appear doomed to the role of bridesmaids to the handful of parties that really count.

II - PARTY YOUTH WINGS

5. Cn Strength in Universities Ahead of Party Strength. As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants are drawn from the ranks of student appendages active in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much more significant than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the Party polled 3.1 percent of the vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), while its University youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 election. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of the Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966. These comparitive figures suggest some conclusions which are presented in Paras. 19 and 20 below.

6. Radicalization of Youth Wings. Several CD leaders, most notably Frei and Caldera, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. That youth groups of every political stripe assume positions to the left of their parties is nothing new, but the situation in several CD groups has gotten badly out of hand. In several countries only an opaque line divides the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) from the stance assumed by Marxist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far-out" it has earned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is in danger of becoming Marxist. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University is allied with the Communist students.

7. Youth Tending to Push Parties Further Left. The great concern of responsible party leaders is that youth input to the parties will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Some observers believe that the CD youth problem has been exaggerated and that the "hot heads" will mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. While this is partially true, we would take issue with this relaxed view. The raw material to be molded is far different than it was ten years ago; since that time the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed -- and among the youth the cry has assumed din proportions. The natural mellowing process will no longer produce the same magic.

8. Need for Training. Some believe that the only way of arresting the CD youth drift to the left in the foreseeable future lies in massive and intensive youth and political cadre training. Efforts in this direction to date (at IFEDEC, several national political training institutes, ORMEU and various student training

courses) have been discouraging. In most instances the teachers share identical biases with the students with the result that misconceptions are reinforced and no new horizons are opened up. Frei and Caldera have asked the German Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field, but the Germans, while recognizing the serious need, have thus far declined to increase their commitment. To accomplish anything significant, the Germans believe a massive program must be launched (which would tax their current resources), and they wonder whether the CD youth situation has been permitted to drift too long to salvage.

III - THE IMPACT OF CLASC ON THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

9. CLASC Poses Serious Danger for CD Movement. A KUMONK study points out that "Organized labor could contribute substantially to the development of well-organized CD political parties in the hemisphere, but it also offers the best chance for CD extremists to cause harm to the movement." Few would argue that how the CD movement fares and the image it projects depend in not insignificant measure on the posture assumed and progress achieved by CLASC. More often than not, the judgement of a mass movement is based on the worst element comprising it -- and in this regard CLASC is challenged only by the party youth and student wings. As an organized labor force CLASC has been a dismal failure (with the exception of its campesino arm); its only impact and sole raison d'etre up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. It is unlikely that CLASC, under Maspero leadership, will mellow as do parties when they achieve the responsibility of government.

10. CLASC Has Maintained Posture of Independence. Despite its "Christian" label, CLASC has consistently maintained that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic movement or any member party. The statement cannot be disputed, for while CLASC is guilty of most of the same aberrations as the least responsible of the CD parties, it invariably commits its follies independently, (often, in fact, setting an example that is emulated by the parties). But while CLASC can defend its claim of independence, it is also true that CLASC does not discourage the belief that it is the chosen labor instrument of the Christian Democratic movement, although this label has never been formally bestowed.

11. Closer Ties Between CLASC and CD Movement Appear Likely. It appears likely that a more organic participation of CLASC in CD affairs is in the offing. A Seminar was held in Montevideo from 11 - 23 April (sponsored by the Christian Democratic Formation Institute -- IFEDEC) for officials of CLASC who are also officers of Christian Democratic parties. The Seminar, called for the specific purpose of arranging closer coordination between the CD political movement and the Christian labor movement, resulted in the signing of the "Carta de Montevideo" on 20 April. The Act calls for formal representation of ODCA in both the Christian labor organization and CD party labor departments. To this end, a Coordinating Committee was formed -- the Comite Relacionador Y Coordinador De Organizaciones Laborales Y Funcionales De Los Partidos Democrata Cristianos. The Act appeals to the CD parties

to request ODCA approval of the creation of this Coordinating Committee and ODCA recognition of CLASC as its chosen hemispheric labor instrument. The eventual approval of the ODCA leadership appears likely; indeed, it is doubtful that the Act would have emerged from the Montevideo Seminar if informal agreement of the ODCA leadership had not been obtained in advance.

12. Negative CLASC Influence on Party Youth Wings. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement will likely rub off negatively on the CD youth wings which invariably are further left than their parent parties and identify much more closely with the revolutionary image and mystique CLASC has sown and propagated. It is perhaps significant that CLASC has intensified its efforts since January to establish youth appendages to the Christian labor movement. This initiative appears to have made greatest progress in Central America.

IV - THE ROLE OF ODCA

13. ODCA Contributes Little Positive Direction. The Latin American CD parties formed their regional organization in Montevideo in 1949 -- the Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA). The current officers of ODCA are:

President : Rafael Caldera, Venezuela

Vice President : Hector CORNEJO Chavez, Peru

Vice President : Rene DE LEON Schlotter, Guatemala

Secretary General: Tomas REYES Vicuna, Chile

ODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankee posture on a broad range of key issues (most forcefully on the American intervention in the Dominican Republic) but on balance has been less strident in its criticism than several of its member parties (notably the Chilean, Bolivian and Dominican CD's), probably because of Caldera's restraining hand. The Organization would merit much closer attention than we have given it to date if it had substantial influence on or authority over member parties, or could apply sanctions against national groups. But ODCA amounts to little more than a fraternity. Its member parties have little ideological homogeneity and the cement of their union appears to be based more on revolutionary mysticism (which most parties are careful to qualify with adjectives like peaceful, democratic and Christian) and on negative factors (hostility to the U.S., capitalism and the oligarchies), than on a foundation of CD doctrine or basic agreement on just what they want.

14. Efforts to Firm Up the ODCA Role. We have asked contacts in European CD circles to prod ODCA to set criteria for membership and behavior and that the Europeans weigh petitions for support from the Latin American parties and organizations against these criteria. DYVOUR officers have argued that while the Europeans cannot realistically require nascent and ill-trained CD groups in Latin America to hold to the same rigid standards of political morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should the Europeans

continue to tolerate and thus abet the irresponsibility of the Latin CD parties because there are no standards at all. ODCA leader Caldera appears to recognize the need for at least some basic ideological common ground among ODCA-member parties. But no signal success has been achieved in this direction to date and we are not at all sanguine that even modest progress will be made in this regard in the foreseeable future. Reporting on the Congress of the World Christian Democratic Union (WCDU) held in Lima in April 1966 indicates clearly that the Latin American parties will not submit without combat to any effort (whether initiated by the European financial backers of the CD movement or by ODCA) that aims at imposing standards and controls that will impinge on their complete freedom of action.

15. Formation of Central American Regional Grouping. The Central American CD parties met in El Salvador in July 1966 to establish a smaller regional grouping, The Union Democrata Cristiana de CentroAmerica (UDCCA). This action does not appear to reflect any element of pique with ODCA (the relations of COPEI and Rafael Caldera with the Central American parties appear close and cordial) but rather a desire to establish a smaller and more cohesive unit that can better address itself to the problems common to the area and, to a lesser extent, to the individual CD parties. UDCCA is comprised of five parties (in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama), with the possibility that a sixth party will be formed in Honduras.

V - EUROPEAN CD ROLE AND INFLUENCE

16. The European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). The European CD parties were first to establish a regional organization, the Nouvelle Equipe Internationales (NEI) in 1947. The NEI never played a major role in world Christian Democratic affairs. From the outset the Latin American parties maintained their closest ties with individual leaders of the CD movement in Europe, particularly those involved in financial operations with the sister parties and CLASC in Latin America. The NEI became progressively less significant and in recent years was virtually moribund. But in mid-1965 the organization was revamped and re-christened as the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). Its newly elected President, Mariano Rumor, Secretary General of the Italian PDC, appears intent on making the ECDU a strong organization which will at least match the Socialist International in stature.

17. European Financial Support to the CD Parties. The two CD organizations which have contributed most heavily to the support of the Latin American CD parties and related organizations are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them they will contribute an estimated $800,000 to $1,000,000 to the CD parties and CLASC in Calendar Year 1967. It was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive $480,000 for the 1968 election from FIS at the rate of $160,000 per year commencing in 1966.

a. The IIS. The Institute for International Solidarity, headed until recently by Dr. Peter Molt (the new Director is Adolf Herkenrath), is an arm of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Like its

Social Democratic counterpart (the Friedrich Ebert Foundation), the bulk of IIS's operating budget comes from the German Government. IIS maintains several permanent representatives in Latin America and supports several CD activities directly. But it also contributes more than fifty percent of the FIS budget.

17. ~~The FIS~~ -- The International Solidarity Fund was formally created on 30 March 1964 to avoid duplication of financial support efforts on the part of the European CD parties and other CD-oriented groups in Latin America. The name was later changed to the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS) to avoid confusion with the solidarity fund of CISC and other organizations. The FIS operates as an arm of the ECDU, with headquarters in Rome. Its most important leaders are: Dr. Johannes Schauff (President of the FIS, a German national and close personal friend of Konrad Adenauer), Mariano Rumor, Adolf Herkenrath and August Vanistendael (Secretary General of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions -- CISC).

18. Difference in Function of IIS and FIS. From the start of its activities, the Germans and Italians have contributed almost the entire FIS budget (in 1964, for example, Vanistendael contributed only $15,000 from the CISC International Solidarity Fund). FIS appears to be the exclusive European CD channel for organizational support to the Latin American CD parties. While the IIS is the rich partner in the IIS-FIS tandem and could easily fund the Latin American parties directly, the FIS channel is preferred by the Germans and has two major advantages: First, since FIS is a regional solidarity instrument with representation (but not contributions) from all the European parties, the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CD's collectively. Thus a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CD's cannot easily make a formal demarche to the IIS or the German government. Second, it is easier to obfuscate the magnitude of European organizational support to the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America if it is channeled through a multi-party organization. The Germans have limited IIS funding to less controversial areas -- support to youth and student formation, political training institutes and CLASC training institutes. (See Attachment A for a detailed flow chart.)

CONCLUSIONS

19. CD's Challenge Communist Domination of the University. It was noted in Para. 5 above that almost without exception CD strength in the university greatly exceeds the voting strength of the parent party. The same is true of the Communists, and it is a fact that Communist/Christian Democratic strength on the campus is overwhelmingly dominant throughout the hemisphere. Few would take issue with the conclusion that the vast majority of university youth are attracted to movements projecting an inspirational message (the word "inspirational" more accurately characterizes the CD movement than does "ideological") or an aura of revolutionary mystique. During the past few years Communist voting losses in the university have been picked up mainly by the Christian Democrats -- the vote has shifted from one movement with a message to another. It would appear that the Christian Democrats are the only political group capable of challenging the Communists' hemispheric domination of the campus.

20. CD Strength in University No Indicator of CD Party Strength or Potential. From the foregoing, however, it does not follow that the growth of CD strength in the university presages a corresponding increase in CD party strength. While voting patterns in the university provide valuable insights on population (particularly youth) attitudes and aspirations, these patterns are not a reliable barometer of either organized party strength or future potential. In no country of Latin America is the voting strength of the CD's or the Communists nearly as strong among the population at large as it is on the campus. One reason is that the university population of Latin America is less than 2 percent of the total population. The CD campus leader almost invariably graduates from student politics to more direct party involvement when he leaves the university -- even if the party has no discernable future. It would appear, however, that the non-university youth (lacking the pseudo-intellectual pretensions and the self-bestowed elite label of the university-trained) are much less inclined to vote and militate for Christian Democracy simply because it has emotional or inspirational appeal.

21. CD Failure to Transform Affinity of Lower Classes Into Votes. The inadequately educated and the lower social classes in Latin America are inevitably motivated by the pragmatism of the possible; to vote for a party that has limited potential to achieve national power, simply because it espouses views that hit responsive chords, is a luxury he believes he cannot afford. Better, he thinks, to vote for the least objectionable of the traditional parties. Christian Democracy remains basically a middle-class movement. With few exceptions (Chile, the Dominican Republic and to a lesser extent Venezuela) it has scant worker or campesino appeal. By and large, Christian Democracy has failed to reach those on the lower rungs of the social ladder.

22. Individual Party Fortunes Appear Unaffected by CD Progress Elsewhere. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the Frei victory in Chile would give impetus to the development of the CD movement throughout the hemisphere. This has not happened. There is no evidence that individual CD parties were either assisted or hindered in their development by the Chilean success story. And yet the view persists that the Chilean victory was a boon to the movement's potential and progress. During the past year COPEI leader Rafael Caldera has broadcast a variation on this theme that several European CD leaders have taken up. They argue that COPEI must emerge victorious in the 1968 election if the CD movement is to maintain its momentum, for an ideologically based movement cannot avoid peaking off, and gradually down, if it has only one significant victory to cite over a period of several years. We would reject the view -- based on election results in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay -- that individual party fortunes will be affected in any significant measure by the successes or failures of sister parties elsewhere. What appears to emerge from these elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on their own devices, based largely on leadership abilities, the development of middle echelon cadres, organizational talents, appeal to the "socially disinherited," and the pragmatism of local issues and considerations. International events (with rare exception) count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties even less.

23. Growth Potential Exists, But Much Less Than Originally Anticipated. The CD movement has made only modest progress the past two years. Indications are that the development of the movement will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory, for it has many problems to resolve. Chief among these, perhaps, is CD failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. The chances of CLASC contributing positively to correct this failure appear remote. Another major problem is the absence of an ideological commonground, despite the lip service paid to the Papal Encyclicals and the Catholic social philosophers, and the failure to enunciate minimum behavioral standards that these philosophical roots would impose. This deficiency is the root cause of two manifestations: First, a propensity to consort with Communist and assorted Marxist groups (e.g., in Colombia, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Panama). Second, the progressive radicalization of party youth wings which threatens to push the parent parties further left. The fact, remains, nevertheless, that Christian Democracy is the most unified non-Communist movement in Latin America. It cannot be labeled democratic or anti-Communist because of the behavioral aberrations of several national parties.

24. Need for Eclectic Operational Approach to CD's. The ranks of those who viewed Christian Democratic prospects with great enthusiasm two years ago -- including the European financial backers of the movement -- have dwindled considerably. But those who have been critics of Christian Democracy from the outset (many of whom might be described as the "visceral denigrators") have displayed no more perception in evaluating CD prospects. The head-in-the-sand generalization that Christian Democracy has no future does not stand the challege of investigation. Neither does the assertion that Christian Democracy is the hemispheric wave of the future. The only valid generalization that might be made on CD prospects is that all generalizations are false. We would submit that the only valid approach to the CD phenomenon is to assess the movement and make operational judgements on a country-by-country basis. There are some countries where the collapse of the party would be no loss. The key question is: Can the party develop as a positive element in national political stability? If so, it is incumbent on the Station to develop assets within the party and to examine the need for operational involvement. Station posture toward the CD movement must be based on the raw realities of the local situation, case by case.

RUTHERFORD J. LYNER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION: SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: ECOX DISPATCH 5961

Field Distribution:

(1 copy each)

Buenos Aires
La Paz
Rio de Janeiro
Belo Horizonte
Brasilia
Porto Alegre
Recife
Sao Paulo
Santiago, Chile
Bogota
Georgetown
San Jose
Santo Domingo
Quito
Guayaquil
San Salvador
Guatemala City
Port au Prince
Tegucigalpa
Kingston
Mexico City
Monterrey
JMWAVE
Panama City
Asuncion
Lima
Paramaribo
Port of Spain
Montevideo
Caracas
Santiago de los Caballeros
Managua

Hqs Distribution:

(1 copy each)

WH/Branch Chiefs
WH/Country Desks
WH/EXO
C/WH/CA
C/WH/FI
WH/Registry
RI

EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS

GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU)

KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION

Eichholz Academy

Political Leadership Academy

Student Institute

Institute for International Solidarity (IIS)
DIRECTOR
Adolf Herkenrath

WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (WCDU)

European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU)

Christian Democratic Organization of Latin America (ODCA)

Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (UCDEC)

International Union of Young Christian Democrats (UIJDC)

International Solidarity Foundation (FIS)
PRESIDENT
Johannes Schauff

SOME BUDGETARY SUPPORT

Support To:
Political Training Institutes
Training Institutes of CLASC
(Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)
Youth and Student Training

Organizational Support To:
Political Parties

63061 3 67

Secret
No Foreign Dissem

File:
CD file
DW

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report

Christian Democracy in Latin America

Secret
Nº 1100

3 March 1967
No. 0279/67A

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy would develop significantly throughout Latin America, competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress.

No such trend has yet developed. The Christian Democratic movement's appeal is to students and middle class, a relatively small percentage of the population in most Latin American countries. Its concepts of basic social reform and the dignity of the human person may appeal to the workers, but they still cast their vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable of the established parties that have an immediate chance of governing.

The movement's progress is likely to be hampered by its lack of strong leaders and effective labor organizations to compete against the entrenched positions of other political movements.

Current Balance Sheet

The Christian Democratic movement is generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries--Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and El Salvador.

In only one of these--Chile--is the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) the governing party. Frei's solid victory in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the party's reform program has run into difficulty in the upper house of Congress, which is still controlled by the opposition; no progress has been made in weakening Marxist domination of the urban labor force; and Frei's moderation has been increasingly challenged by the left wing of his own party, which may capture control in the next two or three years.

The only other Christian Democratic party with a claim to a role in government is the one in Peru. It was brought into a pre-election coalition by the dominant Popular Action Party in 1963 and, although it gained only four percent of the votes, it holds two cabinet posts. Its voting strength has been weakened recently by the defection of a dissident faction which formed a separate Popular Christian Party.

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA


○ Country with active Christian Democratic Party
○ Country with weak Christian Democratic Party
○ Country without Christian Democratic Party
MEXICO
CUBA
HAITI
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
BRITISH HONDURAS
HONDURAS
GUATEMALA
EL SALVADOR
NICARAGUA
COSTA RICA
PANAMA
VENEZUELA
GUYANA
SURINAM
FRENCH GUIANA
COLOMBIA
ECUADOR
PERU
BRAZIL
BOLIVIA
PARAGUAY
URUGUAY
CHILE
ARGENTINA

EDUARDO FREI
President of Chile,
Latin America's Christian Democratic leader.

RAFAEL CALDERA
Venezuelan presidential aspirant and
number-two Latin American Christian Democrat

65860 3-67
Classified material on reverse side of page

Venezuela's Christian Democrats (COPEI) have strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean party in 1968 and appear to have narrowed the gap between their 22 percent of the electorate in 1963 and the governing Democratic Action's 32 percent. COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency. He has recently come out in favor of a politically expedient move to the right, thus filling the vacuum of the center-right of the Venezuelan political spectrum and opening new sources of support.

In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 31.2 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame - educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgment of potential, there are not more than four other CD parties--in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil, and Guatemala--that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

The Dominican Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC), led by Coanabo Javier, has abandoned, at least for the time being, the irresponsible policies it adopted after the April 1965 revolt and has moved toward the political center. The party has made its opposition to the Balaguer government clear, but has also indicated that it intends to operate within bounds acceptable to the President. The PRSC hopes that this moderate line will increase its following and enable it to improve on the poor showing it made in the 1966 elections. The party has developed a small but talented cadre, primarily from the university ranks.

The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a minuscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacked by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. The PDC is currently negotiating with the mass-based Panamenista Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's largest--in hopes of forming a coalition for the May 1968 elections. The CDs have offered to provide the Panamenistas with much-needed administrative skills in return for a share of the assembly seats in the next election. A long-range goal would be to acquire support within Arias' party and inherit his mass following when he passes from the scene.

The Brazilian PDC polled only four percent of the vote in

1962, but the party had significant strength in three important south-central states (Parana, Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other Brazilian parties, it was abolished during a political reorganization under the Castello Branco administration. Most of its members then affiliated with the progovernment ARENA party and campaigned under its banner in the November 1966 congressional elections. It is unlikely that there will be any significant expansion in the number of political parties--the new Brazilian constitution sets down stringent standards that virtually eliminate the possibility of a repetition of the former proliferation of parties. The former PDC has made no attempt to reconstitute itself, but its former members will probably join with like-minded congressmen to pursue policies consistent with Christian Democratic ideology.

The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This group, which is being financed by Catholic sources in Germany and Belgium, has some strength in the youth and student movement and some growth potential among the campesinos who make up more than half the population. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; its leader, Rene de Leon, appears honest, but he has little organizational flair or popular appeal. With more vigorous leadership and the development of a middle-echelon cadre, the party might develop significantly--particularly if the incumbent Revolutionary Party (PR) administration fails to resolve basic problems confronting it.

The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties--in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay--show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Alende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia (Remo di Natale).

Party Youth Wings

As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants come from student organizations in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much greater than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the party polled 3.1 percent of the national vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), but its university youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 campus election and 24.4 percent in January 1967. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966.

Several CD leaders, most notably Frei in Chile and Caldera in Venezuela, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. In several countries the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) are almost indistinguishable from those of pro-Communist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far out" it has earned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is moving dangerously far to the left. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University, while differentiating itself from the Communist students on certain issues, has frequently taken a parallel line.

The great concern of responsible party leaders is that these students, as they progress from campus to parent party, will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Other observers, however, expect the "hotheads" to mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. Both views can be defended. Some mellowing is inevitable, but in the past ten years the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed--and among the youth the cry has assumed much greater proportions.

Both German and American observers have commented that massive and intensive political training of youth and political cadres might arrest this drift to the left. Frei and Caldera have specifically asked the West German CD party's Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field. However, the Germans, who have long been proponents of organizational programs in Latin America, appear inclined to the position in the youth and student field that party leaders have permitted the situation to deteriorate too long for even a massive training program to produce a moderating trend.

The Labor Arm

A major influence in the development of the Christian Democratic movement will be the actions and attitudes of its labor organization, the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists (CLASC). So far, as an organized force, it has been a dismal failure except among the campesinos. Its only impact and sole purpose up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. In this role, it has earned a reputation for independent action and irresponsibility that has reflected negatively on the whole movement despite CLASC's vigorous claims that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic political leaders.

In spite of the apparent differences between CLASC and the CD movement, a closer and more formal relationship appears to be in the offing. Last April, officials of CLASC who are also officers of the Christian Democratic parties met in Montevideo to arrange closer coordination between the two groups. To accomplish this goal, they proposed that both the CD party labor departments and CLASC be granted formal representation in the Christian Democratic Organization of America (ODCA), the regional grouping formed in 1949.

The plan has not yet been implemented, but eventual ODCA approval appears likely. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement may have an adverse effect on CD youth wings, which--being further left than their parent parties--have identified more closely with CLASC's revolutionary image. Since the first of the year, CLASC has intensified its efforts to create its own youth groups and appears to have made some progress, especially in Central America.

The Role of ODCA

In its 17 years of existence, ODCA has not evolved beyond a sort of fraternity held together more by negative factors such as hostility to the US, to capitalism, and to the oligarchies, than by any basic agreement among its members on doctrine or principles. Moreover, the individual parties have made very clear that they will fight any effort--whether initiated by ODCA or by the European financial backers of the CD movement--to impose standards and controls that will impinge on their freedom of action.

In general, ODCA takes a slightly less hostile line on US policies than that of its member parties. This probably results from the influence of its president, Rafael Caldera of Venezuela. The organization's two vice presidents are Hector Cornejo Chavez of Peru and Rene De Leon of Guatemala. Tomas Reyes Vicuna of Chile is its secretary general.

Only in Central America has there been any move toward a more cohesive unit geared to area problems. A smaller regional group, the Christian Democratic Union of Central America, was organized last July. It now has five member parties, in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, and a sixth may be formed in Honduras.

European Role and Influence

Although Latin American Christian Democracy like the European variety, has its roots in the profoundly humanistic and democratic ideas of the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, it does not contain the European fascist concept of the corporate state. The European reaction to the growth of Communism in the 1930s had little effect on the Latin American CDs; consequently the Americans were moving to the political left as the Europeans were moving to the right.

Not until 1947 did the newly important and affluent European

EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS

GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU)

KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION

Eichholz Academy

Political Leadership Academy

Student Institute

Institute
for
International Solidarity
(IIS)
DIRECTOR
Adolf Herkenrath

WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (WCDU)

European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU)

Christian Democratic Organization of Latin America (ODCA)

Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (UCDEC)

International Union of Young Christian Democrats (UIJDC)

International Solidarity
Foundation
(FIS)
PRESIDENT
Johannes Schauff

SOME BUDGETARY SUPPORT

Support To:
Political Training Institutes

Training Institutes of CLASC
(Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)

Youth and Student Training

Organizational Support To:
Political Parties

Classified material on reverse side of page

CDs attempt to coordinate international CD activity through an organization they called the New International Team (NEI). This organization never achieved any significance because European influence in Latin America had already been undermined by a basic difference in political philosophy and because the Latin American parties had been maintaining individual relations with the various European groups. These ties were strictly on vague ideological grounds and for financial reasons.

The two heaviest European contributors to the Latin American parties are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them they will contribute an estimated $800,000 to $1,000,000 to the American CD parties and CLASC in calendar year 1967. In addition, it was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive $480,000 for the 1968 election from FIS.

The IIS, under the direction of Adolf Herkenrath, is an arm of the West German Christian Democratic Union with the bulk of its budget coming directly from the German government. It maintains several permanent representatives in Latin America and supports youth and student groups, political training institutes, and CLASC organizations.

The FIS, under the leadership of Dr. Johannes Schauff, operates as an arm of the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU), successor to the NEI. Since its creation in 1964, Germans and Italians have contributed almost its entire budget. FIS appears to be the exclusive European channel for organizational support to the Latin American parties. It has assumed this responsibility because it is composed of representatives of all the European parties. Thus the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CDs collectively. Furthermore, a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CDs cannot formally protest its funding activities to the German government.

Outlook

The modest progress made by the Christian Democratic movement in the past two and a half years suggests that its development will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory.

One major problem is its failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. Its strength in the universities and its ability to compete with Communist groups on the campus create unfounded optimism. The "inspirational" approach that attracts the college student has no comparable appeal among the inadequately educated lower classes.

Neither does a victory for one party seem likely to have any major effect on the fortunes of another. What appears to emerge from CD gains or losses in recent elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on the basis of their own leadership abilities, organizational talents, and approach to local issues. International events count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties for even less. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

* * *

7 FEB 1967 Miami
RE : MDC
SECRET

25 Nov. 1966 New Jersey
RE: IGNACIO VALLADARES RODRIGUEZ CONFIDENTIAL

31 Oct. 1966 Miami, Fla.
RE: MDC CONFIDENTIAL

30 SEPT. 1966 NEW JERSEY
IGNACIO VALLADARES RODRIGUEZ
CONFIDENTIAL

29 Aug. 1966 Miami, Fla.
RE: MDC SECRET

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM JMWAVE	REPORT NO. UFG-8473	COVER SHEET XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Henry J. SLOMAN	DATE OF REPORT 8 August 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED RID DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER John C. TARBELL/vkl	PROJECT	CS DISSEMINATION 61
APPROVING OFFICER Philip G. ELMARD	SOURCE CRYPT AMOT-245	FOCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs	State
1 - DCS	FBI
2 - Santo Domingo HDC	I&NS
2 - Santiago de los Caballeros	Customs
2 - Caracas HVC	Border Patrol
2 - Guatemala City HGG	USCG

MICROFILMED
AUG 18 1966

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

TYPIC

SOURCE: AMOT-245 in AMOT reports as follows: Para. 2: DD-1874 from Palacio BARBEITE, 10 June 1966, and DD-1888, 6 July, from BARBEITE and Angel HERNANDEZ; paras. 3 to 7 and source comment 2, DD-1888; para 8 and source comment 5, DD-1883, 23 June, which included a copy of the document; para. 9: DD-1892, 15 July, from HERNANDEZ, DD-1895, 21 July, from a conversation between HERNANDEZ and Jorge MAS, and DD-1902, 3 August; para. 10, DD-1892; para. 11, DD-1874 from Ignacio VALLADARES; source comment 1: DD-1874 and DD-1890, 14 July, from Laureano BATISTA.

AMCRUMP-1's true name appears in this report. Information available in his 201 indicates that he was "suspended" on 25 February 1966, and there is no record of contact since that time.

RID: Index ✓ 201-265277

Name: BATISTA Falla, Laureano
Sex : M
DPOB: 1 May 1935, Havana, Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: <Elected organization secty of Natl Executive Committee of MDC at congress 25-27 Feb 66. Trip to DR on behalf of MDC, June 66.> 22

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

19-300-10

SECRET

Page two of Cover Sheet UFG-8473

Name: BAZAN, Arnaldo
Sex : M
DPOB: ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in DR. Connection with MDC base. Formerly with La Salle College of Camaguey, Cuba.

Name: HERNANDEZ Rojo, Angel ([illegible])
Nickname: Baby, El Baby
Sex : M
DPOB: 4 Sept 33, Havana Cuba,
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Second in command of military dept of MDC.

Name: BARBEITE Freyre, Placido A.
Sex : M
DPOB: 19 Nov 38, Batabano, Havana Prov, Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Chf of military dept of MDC.

Name: PALACIOS San Juan, Armando
Sex : M
DPOB: ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre. President of MDC in Puerto Rico.

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE. A Completely reliable. B Usually reliable. C Fairly reliable. D Not usually reliable. E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2 Probably true. 3 Possibly true. 4 Doubtful. 5 Probably false. 6 Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba/Dominican Republic

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT C Activities of the MDC; Possibility of Reactivating a Base in the Dominican Republic, Condition of Boats, Possible Alliances ~~With~~ with Other Emigre Organizations

DATE OF REPORT 8 August 1966

NO PAGES 4

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 29 May to late July 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ United States, Miami ~~(10 June to 3 August 1966)~~

UFG-8473

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

A member of a group of Cuban émigrés trained in the techniques of information collection. This group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. Summary: Laureano Batista Falla, leader of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC, Christian Democratic Movement), returned to Miami in late June 1966x from the Dominican Republic, where he allegedly obtained pledges of support for his anti-Castro undertakings from the Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, pending ~~xxxxxxxx~~ the approval of President Balaguer. However, the military department of the MDC recently issued a document in which it voiced its discouragement, primarily [illegible] lack of funds. xx Although representatives of the MDC have discussed the signing of agreements with representatives of the Students' Revolutionary Directorate (DRE), and the Cuban Representacion in Exile, (RECE), no alliances have yet been formed.

leader of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano ... returned to Miami from the ... with rep... (DRE) and the Cuban Representation ... alliances have been made.

2. Laureano Batista Falla, organization secretary of the National Executive Committee of the MDC, left Miami on 6 June 1966 for Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, and returned to Miami on 26 June. On 29 June he met with other leaders of the MDC to inform them of the results of his trip.

3. Batista said that during ~~thxxxxx~~ discussions held with General Juan N. Folch Perez, Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, he had requested ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxMDC~~ that Folch cooperate with the MDC by allowing the MDC to maintain ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ Base Luna, located at Estero Balsa, near the town of Pepillo ~~xxx~~ Salcedo (N 19-43, W 71-45). (3) ~~According xxx to~~ Batista, Folch ~~xxxxxxxxxxx indicated his~~ — indicated his willingness to cooperate ... offered the following assistance, subject to the approval of President Balaguer, whom Folch said he will consult:

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

E / DIA ARMY NAVY AIR NSA OCR FBI /2

SO # USIA ( ) I&NS (✓)

FI 1 WHC/SI 1 E/IB/R 1
RR 1 WHC/WAVE 1 E/MADR 1
RE 3 WHC/CA 1
CICS 1
MO 1 CI/OPS/WH 2 WH/PACY(CINCSO) 1

CS

COORD. RELEASE.

LS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO/H 1,

Liaison *

UFG-8973

a. The use of five islets facing Santiago de los Caballeros City for a military base. (sic.).

b. Authorization for MDC personnel to move ~~into~~ in and out of the Dominican Republic in a clandestine manner.

c. Transportation of MDC war materiel from Miami aboard Dominican Air Force planes.

4. ~~Kata~~ Batista ~~said~~ that he had visited Base Luna and on several occasions talked with Arnaldo Bazan, a Cuban ~~xkpxiixaxxix~~ residing in Santiago de los Caballeros, ~~A~~ who is the recipient of $ 3500. per month ~~xkiex xxxxxzxxzxxxthxxMD~~ sent by the MDC to the Dominican Republic for the maintenance of Base Luna. Bazan, ~~xrxxxxxixBatistatax~~ ~~xxntixxxxitkxxxikx~~ who had arranged Batista's meeting with Folch, was described by Batista as having ~~of~~ formerly been with the La Salle College of Camaguey. Batista claimed that [illegible] chief of Santiago de los Caballeros had made arrangements for ~~thexhxxxxxx~~ the ~~procurement~~ of a house to be occupied by the MDC members who are in charge of Base Luna.

~~[illegible]~~ had made arrangements ~~for the~~ house which is occupied by the MDC members who are in charge of Base Luna?

5. Batista expressed enthusiasm regarding Folch's proposals, and stressed the necessity of acting immediately, including sending MDC personnel to the Dominican Republic. He directed Angel Hernandez Rojo, second in command of the military department, to prepare a plan to operate from the Dominican Republic, and Placido Barbeite Freyre, chief of the military department, to prepare an estimate of the cost of the plans ~~in order~~ that the necessary money ~~can~~ be obtained.
could

6. Although Barbeite agreed with Batista ~~s~~ regarding the need for preparation of operational plans and an estimate of the cost, ~~xfxixpixxxtixgxthxmpx~~ he basically ~~wxxxxxxxxxts~~ ~~Batixtx~~ opposed Batista's advocation of initiating immediate action. He felt that it was inadvisable to attempt the implementation of the plans until Balaguer's reaction is known. Hernandez' views coincided with those of Barbeite. ~~Nxxxixtixxxtxxthxxxxxblxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxxhxxixbyxxthxxxxixxfxthxxxx~~ The meeting ended without a solution to the disagreement.

~~[illegible] ended without a solution to the disagreement.~~

7. At the meeting Batista reported that dissension ~~xithixx~~ exists ~~bxtwxxxxixx~~ within the MDC in Puerto Rico, particularly between Armando Palacios ~~xxixxxx~~ San Juan and Humberto Perez ~~Rxxxxxxx~~ Herrera, president and military chief respectively. ~~[illegible]~~ Palacios ~~feels~~ claims that Perez does not report to the president on military plans and activities. However, Barbeite defended Perez' action with the argument that military matters do not really fall ~~xxixxxxthx~~ ~~Rxxxxixxxxixxtxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxlly~~ within the scope of responsibilities of the president.

president.

8. The military department of the MDC set forth its views in a document dated 29 May. This document included the following points:

a. Discontent is becoming evident because of the lack of activity which, in turn, results from the lack of funds. The sum mentioned is $10,000.[5]

b. No change in United States policy ~~regarding action against Cuba from the U.S.~~ is anticipated. A base of operations outside of the United States is considered to be so vitally important that the military department would be willing to operate an illegal base if the resources were made available.

c. The condition of the boats is such that the MDC has no sea transportation. The boats are described as follows:

(1) The CADELLO I is docked across from Brito's Boat Yard at Stock Island, Florida.[6] The boat is in need of repairs on the deck and superstructure, and the installation of electronic navigational equipment would be required to put it in operational condition. Current docking and routine maintenance costs are not being paid. Efforts to make commercial use of this boat have not been successful. This boat is considered ideal for activities which might be undertaken if there were a base from which to operate, but under the present circumstances the expense which this boat represents is not justifiable. It is recommended that consideration be given to selling the CADELLO I if an operational base is not established within four months.

(2) The KYA-ORA[7] which was donated to the MDC by a member of the military department, is in drydock at Nuta's Boat Yard in Miami. There are leaks in the hull.

(3) The LANCHA AZUL[8] is in need of repairs, as well as trailer. Repairs on this boat are being given priority, and will proceed as money becomes available.

d. Informal discussions have been held with representatives of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students' Revolutionary Directorate), and there is an "agreement in principle" to coordinate future actions. There is no political commitment.

9. In July Jorge Mas Canosa, chief of press and propaganda of Representacion Cubana en el Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile), proposed that the MDC enter into a pact with RECE, and indicated that some members of MDC ~~will~~ be offered full-time employment preparing military plans for the RECE. As of late July no formal agreement had been reached.

10. Hernandez, who feels that Ramon Font Saumell[9] is incapable of formulating military strategy, favors the formation of a pact between the MDC and RECE xgax which would exclude Font from participating in the preparation of plans for military operations. Hernandez also said that he plans to attempt the reorganization of the military department of the MDC in order to replace Barbeite in a less important position than that which he currently occupies.

department of the MDC in order
from his present position to an unimportant
position in the department.

11. In early June Ignacio Valladares Rodriguez[10] expressed a desire to participate in action against Cuba with the MDC. Barbeite agreed to inform Valladares when an operation is to be carried out. Before Valladares left Miami on 6 June for Dover, New Jersey, he said that within a month he would send a 57mm recoilless rifle, a 50-caliber machine gun, and an unstated number of M-1 and Garand rifles. His address in Dover is Dover Cliff Apartments, apartment 21.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

UFG-8473

1. Source Comment. At the time of his departure, Batista told the executive committee that he was going directly to Caracas, Venezuela. It was not until after his return that it was learned that he had not gone to Caracas or to Guatemala as he had planned. He later explained that while he was in Puerto Rico he telephoned his relative in Guatemala and was informed that the latter had "failed in his efforts."

Field Comment. Presumably he was referring to an interview with President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro which Batista had earlier said had been arranged by his cousin. (Cf. ~~UFG-8328)~~

3. Headquarters Comment: In early August 1964, Folch was reported to have been in charge of Dominican ~~xixxtox~~ Armed Forces aid in a ~~xe~~ caching operation for Cuban exiles in the Monte Cristi area. See TDCS-314/01722-66. ~~In TDCSDB-315/00798-66.~~ Another source reported ~~that~~ in September 1964 approximately 30 Cuban exiles were taking training at a camp near Punta Presidente (N 19-47, W 71-46). See TDCSDB-315/00798-66 for more information.

4. The location of the house was not given.

5. Source Comment. The document, as originally drafted, was modified because Barbeite felt that the tone was too strong. Also, the amount of money requested was reduced to $10,000.

Field Comment. An earlier report from the same source reported that the document was being prepared, and that $75,000 would be requested. (Cf. UFG-8327) CSDB-3[illegible]/01[illegible]-66)

Field Comments.

6. The CADELLO I (FL 7579 F), an 83-foot boat, is a former U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat. The boat yard referred to is the Syncrolift Boat Yard on Stock Island which is owned by Mike Brito. Stock Island is on U.S. Highway 1, between Key West and Boca Chica.

7. The KYA-ORA, or KIA-ORA, has Florida registration FL 8665 E.

8. The LANCHA AZUL has been described as a high-speed launch. (Cf. ~~UFG-8327)~~. CSDB-3[illegible]/01727-66) Besides the CADELLO I, the MDC has been reported to own the VICKY I, a blue V-23; the PUNCHIN CHIA (FL 9256 SC), a 33-foot boat; and BERNARDO II.

9. Font is chief of military operations of Comandos L, which has an alliance with RECE. (Cf. UFG 8423) CSDB-315/02202-66),

10. Valladares arrived in Miami on 27 May with weapons which he gave to the MDC. He offered to supply weapons to the MDC and the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs (Brigade 2506).

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FBI

29 June 66 New York
Re: MOC Secret

7 June 66 Florida
Re: MOC Secret

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

XX

Chief, WHD
ADMIN/TYPIC
Station Files on Cuban Counterrevolutionary and Exile Organizations

REFERENCE: UFGT-16343, 31 May 1966

1. We are returning Volume VII of the MDC file which you sent with the reference for Headquarters to review as a sample of a group of 80 files which are no longer useful to the Station. Headquarters appreciates your interest in this aspect of records improvement, considering the need for retrieval, but would like to defer a decision until IDENTITY, a KUBARK employee who is retiring soon but is now engaged in writing historical studies, can visit the Station to survey these files with others.

2. IDENTITY plans to visit JMWAVE for several days about the end of July to size up and review certain records for writing a history of the Station. Therefore, we would like the 80 background files to be left intact for his visit. Afterwards a decision will be made on their retirement or other disposition.

3. If space for storing the files is critical we will authorize forwarding them to Headquarters, but will prefer your holding them temporarily to assist with the historical research cited above.

Claude F. GOTTFRIED

Attachment:
1. Identity, u/s/c
2. MDC File, h/w

Distribution:
3-COS/JMWAVE, w/att. 1 & 2

UFGS-8398

SECRET

1-WH/RMO, w/att.1
1-WH/C/ESEC, w/att.1
1-WH/C/CA/PP, w/att.1
1-Historical Staff

WH/RMO NOEL C. WILSON/pap

C/WH/C/CA/PP STEPHEN G. CHACONAS

C/WH/C/CA

C/WH/C/MO

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

TO UFGS-6398

IDENTITY - Paul Loeb

SECRET

FBI

Miami, Fla.
3 June '64
Re. MDC Confidential

14-00000

ES ☐ NO
TO FILE NO.
TO FILE NO.
LE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

C. IED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

26 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
File M. D. C

1	PP—	5	El
2		6	[illegible]
3	MO	7	[illegible]
4		8	

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WHC 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, CI/OA, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT, WH 8

ACTION

RE LIMA CONF 25-26 APRIL,

21 APR 65 [illegible]58

S E C R E T 210017Z

LIMA INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0321

TYPIC AMMOP

REF A. WAVE 0031 (IN 89790)*

B. DIR 75895

AMMOP-1, IDEN, DEPARTING MIAMI 0200 HRS 21 APRIL ON PERUVIAN AIRLINE FLIGHT 65 TO ATTEND REF CONFERENCE.

S E C R E T

CFN 0321 0031 75895 AMMOP-1 MIAMI 0200 HRS 21 PERUVIAN 65

BT

SECRET

5

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

C IED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES

26 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	FI
2		6	
3	MO	7	
4		8	

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH/C8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, CA/OA, CA2, CA/PROP, OA/04, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT, WAB,

ACTION
21 APR 66 IN 00953

S E C R E T 210017Z

LIMA INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0322

TYPIC AMMOP

REF WAVE 0321 (IN 00958)

IDEN: ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ, MDC SECRETARY
FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

S E C R E T

CFN 0322 0321 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ MDC

BT

SECRET

M 27

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

15 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP-	5	EI
2		6	CA
3	MD	7	
4		8	

FROM JM WAVE

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, SOD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA

SECRET 151851Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0194 15 APR 66 [illegible] 7580

DYVOUR AMMOP

57

1. AMCRIB-1 (IDEN) CONTACTED BY DULCE DE LA MAZA RODRIGUEZ, NIECE OF PRSC LEADER ANTONIO ROSARIO, WHO TRAVELED THROUGH JMWAVE AREA. DE LA MAZA HAND CARRIED LETTER TO AMCRIB-1 DATED 4 APRIL FROM FRANCISCO CORDOVA, PRSC SECY OF INTL AFFAIRS, WHICH REQUESTED AMCRIB-1 ARRANGE FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT OF TWO OR THREE USED CARS TO BE USED FOR PRSC PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ACTIVITIES IN DOMREP. LETTER WAS ACCOMPANIED WITH $1400 FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT COSTS OF CARS.

2. AMCRIB-1 TELEPHONED ROSARIO EVENING 11 APRIL TO CONFIRM LETTER AND AGREED TO PROVIDE AID IN PROCURING CARS. ROSARIO INFORMED AMCRIB-1 THAT HE EXPECTED RECEIVE NOMINATION AS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF PRSC AT PARTY ASSEMBLY ON 17 APRIL AND STATED HE WOULD SELECT CESAR ESTRELLA AS HIS RUNNING MATE. ROSARIO ALSO INDICATED HE EXPECTED SOME ELECTORAL SUPPORT FROM UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF APJ MEMBERS.

SECRET

CFN: 0194 AMCRIB-1 DULCE DE LA PAZA RODRIGUEZ PRSC ANTONIO ROSARIO JMWAVE AMCRIP-1 4 FRANCISCO CORDOVA PRSC -1 PRSC DOMREP $1400 -1 11 -1 PRSC 17 CESAR ESTRELLA APJ

PT

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 18 TOTAL COPIES 27

15 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	RP	5	FI
2		6	
3	RO	7	5
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, SOD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 151742Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0195 15 APR 66 IN 97588

DYVOUR AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0194 (IN 97530)

IDEN: JESUS ANGULO CLEMENTE, SECRETARY OF MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO ~~DE~~ OF CUBA.

S E C R E T

CFN: 0195 0194 JESUS ANGULO CLEMENTE MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO CUBA

SEC267

BT

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JM WAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/8, CI/ICZ, CI/OA, FI, FI/INTZ, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4

SECRET 141654Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167

14 [illegible] 8625

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0132 (94948)*

AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND WILL DEPART 0245 HOURS 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. HE INSTRUCTED MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DEBRIEFING ON RETURN.

SECRET

*RE PRETRIP BRIEFING FOR ATTENDANCE WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMO

CFN: 0167 0132 AMCRIB-1 0245 14 LIMA

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 18 TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4

S E C R E T 141634Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0168

14 APR [illegible] 96626

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0167 (IN 96625

IDEN: JULIO MONCAGATTA

S E C R E T

CFN: 0168 0167 JULIO MONCAGATTA

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES

1/R SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

— File MDC [illegible]

1	PP—	5	RR
2		6	CI
3	CA	7	FI-TC
4	HQ	8	[illegible]

FROM

JMWAVE

ACTION

[illegible] 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

INFO

FILE, VR, WHE, CI/IC 2, C/CA, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O4

SECRET 141654Z

14 APR [illegible] 36625

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0132 (IN 94245)*

AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND WILL DEPART 0245 HOURS 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. HE INSTRUCTED MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DEBRIEFING ON RETURN.

SECRET

*RE PRETRIP BRIEFING FOR ATTENDANCE WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMO

CFN: 0167 0132 AMCRIB-1 0245 14 LIMA

BT

SECRET

SC

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[illegible]SIFIED MESSAGE 18 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP—	5	RR
2		6	C/
3	CA	7	FHC
4	HD	8	D

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

DATE TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI/ICG, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4

S E C R E T 141654Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0168

14 APR 66 IN 96626

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0167 (IN 96675

IDEN: JULIO MONCAGATTA

S E C R E T

CFN: 0168 0167 JULIO MONCAGATTA **SECRET**

BT

NNNN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief of Station, Santiago

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT AMMOP/Operational
AMMOP Circular Letter to Identity A Leaders and Organizations

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR : FYI

REF: WAVE 9754

1. As indicated in reference, the AMMOP organization on 15 March 1966 sent a circular letter based on Fidel Castro's 13 March speech to Identity A individuals and organizations. The letter, which was signed and composed by AMMOP/1 and which was accompanied by transcripts of the speech, condemned Castro's attack on Chilean President Eduardo Frei; requested support for Frei's position; and asked the recipients to join the struggle maintained by the Cuban people to overthrow Fidel Castro and prepare for the freedom of Cuba from Communism.

2. The youth wing of the AMMOP group, headed by AMCRIB/1, mailed a letter to its Identity A youth contacts based on the 13 and 20 March speeches by Fidel Castro along the lines cited above. Included in this letter were the strong anti-Castro statements made by Identity B. Copies of both letters are forwarded under separate cover.

3. According to AMMOP/1, his letter was replayed by FUSEE and was the basis for an article in a Santiago newspaper by Identity C.

Sylvia [illegible]
Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments:
A. Identities - u/sc
B. Cys of Ltrs - u/sc

Distribution:
3 - WH/C w/atts
2 - COS, Santiago w/atts - [illegible]
2 - C/WH - w/atts

*Please furnish HQS File Number

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-24893

DATE
APR 4 1966
31 March 66

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
*

SECRET

To WH/C
U/sc att #A to
UFGA-24893

IDENTITIES: A. Christian Democratic Party
B. Alfredo Lorca
C. Jorge Roman

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

[illegible] CS COPY

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]
[illegible] RIVERSIDE STATION, [illegible]

Marzo 15 de 1966.

Estimado demócratacristiano:

Después de leer una copia literal del discurso pronunciado por Castro, en la escalinata de la Universidad de La Habana, el pasado 13 de marzo, me considero obligado con el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno, que fueron innoblemente atacados por Castro durante el transcurso de su alocución, a expresar mi opinión con relación a dicha ofensa.

Digo obligado, porque el hecho de ser demócratacristiano cubano, integrante de esa gran comunidad de seres humanos que un día se dieron a la tarea de realizar una revolución en libertad y que lamentablemente vieron tronchadas sus aspiraciones al comprobar que las mismas eran ahogadas por la sangre vertida en los paredones de fusilamientos por héroes como Porfirio Ramirez, Presidente de la FEU de la provincia de Las Villas en Cuba y el Dr.Humberto Sorí Marín, Comandante del Ejército Rebelde y autor de la primera Ley de Reforma Agraria; debe servirme de experiencia para expresar lo que pienso decir a través de estas lineas. Digo obligado, porque en igual forma que nosotros hemos pedido en múltiples oportunidades, colaboración y solidaridad con nuestra lucha, solicitud que lamentablemente no ha sido respondida por algunos, alegando unas veces desconocimiento y otras imputándonos incomprensión con el "proceso revolucionario" que se está llevando a cabo en Cuba, no queremos que en esta oportunidad en que son los compañeros chilenos los que necesitan de nuestra solidaridad, vayamos a encontrar a alguien que por desconocimiento, no se decida a respaldar públicamente al Gobierno, Partido y pueblo de Chile en la actitud cívica y valiente adoptada frente a las ofensas expresadas por Castro durante su discurso, entre las cuales transcribimos las siguientes: "A decir verdad, siempre he creido que Frei es un representante de la burguesía chilena, que su gobierno es un gobierno de la burguesía. Jamás he creido que Frei vaya a hacer ninguna revolución".... posteriormente, al referirse a los sucesos provocados por los comunistas en la mina de cobre del Salvador donde murieron varias personas dijo: "Frei es un reaccionario Frei ha demostrado con este hecho, no ser un individuo de mano firme, sinó un individuo cobarde, que abusa del poder,......

SECRET
1/2

Frei ha demostrado ser un mentiroso. Frei ha demostrado ser un politiquero vulgar que para justificar su sanguinario gesto, trata de culpar a la Tri-Continental. Frei se desenmascara. Frei demuestra al pueblo de Chile y al mundo qué tipo de revolución es la que va a hacer, qué tipo de gobierno es el que va a llevar adelante. Es decir, no una revolución sin sangre, sinó una política de sangre sin revolución; sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de Frei, sangre sin revolución, ese es el gobierno de Frei, sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de la Alianza para el Progreso".

Después de estas expresiones, no podemos menos que salirle al paso a Castro y a la camarilla que desgobierna hoy a Cuba, e instar y pedir mayor colaboración con los patriotas que hoy ofrendan sus vidas por liberar a Cuba, a fin de evitar no solo la continuada masacre de cubanos que se lleva a cabo en la Isla, sino tambien ponerle fin a todos estos incidentes bochornosos para la historia, en los que aparece un cubano, ofendiéndo públicamente ante el mundo a un Presidente, a un Partido y a un pueblo que a contrario sensus de lo que él esta haciendo en Cuba, sí está realizando una revolución en libertad, sí ha defendido en todo momento el sano nacionalismo, sí se ha puesto de frente cuantas veces las circunstancias lo han requerido a los oligarcas y explotadores.

Para terminar, sólo me queda reiterarle, que en nombre de la solidaridad que une a todos los demócratacristianos, exprese públicamente, su deseo de colaborar con la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo y poder realizar en Cuba, una verdadera revolución en libertad, así como su respaldo a la actitud asumida por el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno en los actuales momentos.

Pendiente de su atención y respuesta y dejando constancia de mi mayor consideración, quedo suyo

Cordialmente,

Ernesto Rodriguez
Sec. de Relaciones Internacionales del
MDC de Cuba

14-00000

SECRET

JUVENTUD DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANA DE CUBA.
1732 N.E. 7th St.
MIAMI, FLA. U.S.A.

Miami, Marzo 17 de 1966

Estimado compañero:

La JDC de Cuba, fiel al pensamiento de nuestro Apostol José Martí que dice:"ver en silencio un crimen es cometerlo", no ha querido marginarse del daño que Castro quiere hacerle a la Revolución en Libertad, que está realizando el Presidente Eduardo Frei, su Gobierno y el Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile.

Consciente de que es posible que no te hayan llegado muchas de las informaciones relacionadas con los innobles ataques públicos de Castro a Frei y su Gobierno, calificándo al Presidente de "representante de la burguesía chilena", "reaccionario" "mimado del imperialismo yanqui y guardián de sus intereses en Chile".....etc. Hemos querido comunicarte, no sólo los ataques de Castro a Frei, sino una de las muchas respuestas que se le han dado a Castro. Nos referimos a la que en dias pasados hiciera el Diputado Demócrata-Cristiano Chileno, Alfredo Lorca y que a continuación transcribimos "Realmente, Fidel Castro es un caso digno de análisis. Hace pocos dias atrás, según expresaron diputados que estuvieron en Cuba, Castro dijo que Frei era un gran Presidente. Agregó que si el hubiera estado en Chile, habría hecho lo mismo que Frei.

Pero ahora, porque se le ha tocado la epidermis de la Tri-Continental, Frei se transforma en un Castro Cualquiera.

Yo estuve en Cuba -añadió Lorca- en 1959 cuando Castro subió al poder. En esa ocasión le pregunté al ver a tantos hombres armados, si pensaba reorganizar al ejército. Y él me contestó, con ese modo tan tropical: "chico, armas para qué cuando se tiene al pueblo".

Sin embargo, -añadió Lorca- en los siete años que Fidel tiene al pueblo detrás de él, anda mas armado que un militar en plena guerra. En Chile, todos los Presidentes que yo recuerdo, los

1/2

SECRET

radicales, el Sr. Ibáñez, el Sr. Alessandri, el propio Sr. Frei, han recorrido todo el pais sin gendarme, ni pistoleros a sueldo como los que utiliza Castro.

No se puede decir que Frei sea un cobarde, un mentiroso y un déspota como Fidel Castro afirma - añadió Lorca- . En cambio él está resguardado por metralletas y no puede dormir, ni se le conoce domicilio fijo porque los hijos de los muertos en el paredón le buscan. Además -puntualizó Lorca- vale la pena destacar que nadie se ha ido de Chile. En cambio, es público y notorio que más de 300 000 personas han huido del paraiso fidelista. Y me atrevo a pensar que si Fidel Castro diera libertad a quienes quieren irse de Cuba, se quedaría solo con sus barbas y su hermano Raúl, porque Camilo Cienfuegos ya no está. Dicen que se cayó de un avión.

Finalmente, Lorca recordó el caso del que fuera Presidente de los tribunales populares de Cuba, Sorí Marín."Es un hombre íntegro, puro y extremadamente justo", decía Castro de él. "Estoy seguro que núnca condenaría a quien no mereciera la pena de muerte". No obstante una mañana amaneció de mal genio y el Sr. Sorí Marín se convirtió en un agente de la Central de Inteligencia de los Estados Unidos. Resultado: hizo fusilar a ese hombre puro, íntegro y justo."

Estas palabras, expuestas por el Diputado D.C. Alfredo Lorca, señalando algunas de las muchas contradicciones de Castro, ratifican una vez más lo que la JDC de Cuba a través de sus dirigentes, le ha venido diciendo a toda la juventud demócratacristiana de América y que hoy, con más fuerza y moral que núnca nos permite pedirte en nombre de la solidaridad que nos une, que expongas públicamente tu respaldo a la Revolución en Libertad que viene realizando el Pueblo, Gobierno y Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile así como tu colaboración a la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo existente en nuestra Patria.

Consciente de que nuestra solicitud será escuchada por tí, y seguros de que nos darás a conocer la atención que has de prestarle, quedo a tu entera disposición

Jesús Angulo

Jesús Angulo
Presidente de la JDC de Cuba

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 31

26 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1	PP	5	MO
2		6	EI
3	CA	7	D
4	CI	0	

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/INT, CI/OA, CI/IC2

SECRET 042230Z

File M. D. C. Mov. Dem. Christiano

DIR INFO LIMA QUITO CITE WAVE 0031 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC AMMOP

REF A DIR 75895 *
B WAVE 9034 (IN 51776)

4 APR 65 IN 89790

1. AMCRIB-1 ADVISED BY IDEN A THAT REF A LIMA CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 23-26 APRIL, PRECEDED BY YOUTH SEMINAR 15-22 APRIL.

2. AMCRIB-1 HOPES OBTAIN TICKET THRU EFFORTS OF IDEN B. IF NOT SUCCESSFUL, STATION PLANS FINANCE AMCRIB-1 TRIP TO ATTEND BOTH MEETINGS UNLESS ADVISED CONTRARY.

3. AMMOP INVITED IDEN C, 201-749991, FORMER WAVE ASSET WORKING IN QUITO, ATTEND REF CONFERENCE AS MEMBER AMMOP DELEGATION. IF IDEN C ATTENDS, WILL PAY OWN WAY.

4. PLS NOTE AMCRIB-10 OF REF B SHOULD BE AMCRIB-1.

SECRET

* WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS SCHEDULED LIMA 11-14 MARCH.

CFN 0031 75895 9034 AMCRIB-1 A A 23-26 APRIL 15-22 APRIL AMCRIB-1 B NOT SUCCESSFUL AMCRIB-1 AMMOP C 201-749991 AMMOP C AMCRIB-10 B AMCRIB-1

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 31

26 SECRET GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP—	5	HQ
2		6	EI
3	CA	7	5
4	RR	8	2

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/INT, CI/OA, CI/IC2

ACTION

S E C R E T 042230Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0032 INGHURST ACTING 4 APR 66 IN 89798

TYPIC AMMOP

REF WAVE 0031 (IN 87790)

IDEN A. UIJDC

IDEN B. JULIO MONEAGATTA, JUDCA SECY. GEN.

IDEN C. JOSE M. ILLAN

S E C R E T

CFN 0032 0031 A UIJDC B JULIO MONEAGATTA JUDCA SECY GEN C JOSE M ILLAN

SECRET

BT

REPORT COVER SHEET

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

JMWAVE

REPORT NO.: UFG-7960

Henry J. SLOMAN
Sylvia B. MONESTIER

DATE OF REPORT: 15 February 1966

PROJECT:

REPORTS OFFICER: John C. TARBELL/vkl

SOURCE CRYPT: AMOT-245

Philip G. ELMARD

COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED
OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY

CS DISSEMINATION

TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY		EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs 1 - DCS 2 - Caracas 2 - Lima 2 - Santiago 2 - Bogota	1 - JMBAR	State FBI I&NS Customs USCG

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

TYPIC

SOURCE: AMOT-245 in DD-1768, 11 February 1966. Field Comment 2 was received from AMCRIB-10, orally, on 14 February.

RID: No Index

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

HQS RI COPY

-p DC

19-300-10

CS COPY

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY **Cuba**

REPORT NO. [illegible]

SUBJECT C **Christian Democratic Movement to Hold Congress in Miami, 24 to 27 February 1966**

DATE OF REPORT 15 February 1966

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. **Early February 1966**

PLACE & DATE ACQ. **United States, Miami (7 to 14 February 1966)**

UFG-7960

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: **A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.**

1. **The Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC, Christian Democratic Movement) in Miami will hold a congress from 24 to 27 February 1966.[1] Delegations of Christian Democrats from Venezuela, Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Germany will attend the congress.[2]**

2. **The MDC is preparing to hold elections for positions on the executive committee.**

Field Comments:

1. The Eighth National Congress of the MDC was held in Miami from 19 to 21 February 1965. Delegations from Puerto Rico and Mexico attended. (Cf. CSDB-312/00790-65)

2. Another source, who is a member of the MDC, reported that invitations had been extended to delegations from these countries, but that no replies have been received, except from Peru, which only acknowledged receipt of the invitation.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

DATE : 7 MAY 60
TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION : IWOG 2
INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PMD, CA/PRO, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/RQM 6, FI/D, WH 10, DD/I, AD/CI, OS 2, S/C 2.

MAY 7 2154Z 60
ROUTINE
IN 36643
TDCS-3/436,741

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 4513

INTEL 05, 08

SUPDATA SOURCE HANS ARTURO BODEWIG 7 LEUENBERGER WHO GAVE INFO TO HAVA STATION REPR REF HAVA 4414 (IN 33466)* FILED 062225Z REPORT CLASS SECRET HKH-2283 (ALSO RCVD 2783) CUBA SUBJ SETTING OFF OF BOMBS BY JUVENTUD ACCION CUBANA ANTICOMUNISTA DOI 30 APR - 3 MAY 60 PADA CUBA HABANA 5 MAY 60 APR 2 SOURCE CUBAN WHO CLAIMS CONTACTS IN JACA (F)

C/S COMMENT: *A report regarding Cuban youth plans for sabotage on 30 April.

IWOG COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

C/WH	2	WH/4	2	OS/SSD/BAUMAN	1		
WH/REG	2	WH/FI	1				
WH/EXEC	1						
WH/RE	1						
WH/PW	1						

TDCS PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY

BASED ON:
HKH 2783
NO PROJECT

LIAISON: *

RELEASING IWO:
Charles J Beckman
CHARLES J. BECKMAN

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
8 MAY 1960
0005Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

INFO FILE, VR, CS/FE, DCI, D/DCI, DCI (Goodwin), DDP, ADDP, CA2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, SOD6, COS, EUR 8, S/PA, DDI, DO/H3

7 Oct 66 IN 11050

S E C R E T [illegible]542 CITE JMWAVE 3413

DIRECTOR

BELLA NAPOLI

TYPIC

1. EVENING 5 OCTOBER ORLANDO BOSCH GIVEN THREE YEAR
SUSPENDED SENTENCE BY NAPLES COURT WHEN FOUND GUILTY OF
TRANSPORTING EXPLOSIVES WITHOUT LICENSE IN APRIL 66. TWO
COMPANIONS TO BE TRIED SEPARATELY.

2. EVENING 5 OCTOBER AMOT REPORTED THAT AMTAUP-2 HAD
BEEN TELEPHONED BY JORGE CUITERREZ ULLA, CHIEF OF
PROPAGANDA OF MIRR, TO ATTEND PRESS CONFERENCE 6 OCTOBER.
AMTAUP-2 ALSO REPORTED THAT AT TRIAL JORGE VEGA, BOSCH
DEFENSE ATTORNEY, HAD MADE STATEMENT TO COURT TO EFFECT THAT
BOSCH SHOULD NOT BE CONVICTED BECAUSE HE WAS TRYING TO FREE
HOMELAND FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION AND IN DOING SO WAS NOT
ACTING ANY MORE ILLEGALLY THAN WAS KUBARK, WHICH WAS
CONDUCTING "SAME TYPE OF ACTIVITY" FROM A BASE LOCATED AT
THE "CAYO GORDO" SECTION OF NAPLES.

3. "CAYO GORDO" UNDOUBTEDLY IS GARBLE FOR GORDON PASS
AREA OF NAPLES AT WHICH BERTHING SITE FOR JMWAVE MARK I SWIFT

SECRET

[illegible] WHERE IT LOCATED. HOWEVER, RIGGER HAS NOT BEEN AT [illegible] SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER WHEN REMOVED FOR OPS USE AND REPAIRS. WAS SCHEDULED RETURN TO BERTH CIRCA 1 OCTOBER BUT THIS POSTPONED BECAUSE OF HURRICANE INEZ. RIGGER NOW AT TARPON PROPERTIES BERTH, KEY LARGO, WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO NAPLES SITE. AS HQS AWARE LATTER SITE ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR TERMINATION OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 66.

4. UPON RECEIPT AMOT INFO JMWAVE CONTACTED AND BRIEFED AGENTS SERVING AS CUSTODIANS AT NAPLES SITES. TO DATE THEY HAVE NOT REPORTED ANY QUERIES. OFFICIALS OF COVER CORPORATION, 29 (GULFLANT,) WHICH OWNS RIGGER AND RENTS BERTHING SITE WERE ALERTED AND BRIEFED 6 OCTOBER.

5. MORNING 6 OCTOBER AMTAUP-2 REPORTED PRESS CONFERENCE NOT HELD BY VEGA BUT THAT GUTIERREZ STATED HE HAD PHONED UPI, AP, MIAMI HERALD TO GIVE THEM PRESS RELEASE INCLUDING VEGA CLAIM RE [illegible] ACTIVITIES NAPLES AREA.

6. AS OF 1400 HRS 6 OCTOBER STATION HAD NOT SEEN ANY MENTION IN PRESS OF ALLEGED VEGA STATEMENTS. MIAMI HERALD AND MIAMI NEWS COVERAGE OF [illegible] TRAIL DID NOT MENTION [illegible] REVIEWING NAPLES PRESS COVERAGE OF TRIAL.

SECRET

7. AT GUTIERREZ REQUEST AMTAUP-2 2 TAPED STATEMENT FOR RADIO PROGRAM. REVIEW OF STATEMENT BY AMOT 1 SHOWS THAT WOFACT 3 NOT MENTIONED.

8. ALTHO NO FIRM EVIDENCE TO DATE ANTICIPATE THAT MIRR MAY SEEK PUBLICIZE FURTHER "REVELATIONS" RE JMWAVE ACTIVITY, NOTABLY RE COMBINED OPS FACILITIES, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL. INFO FROM AMOT 1 AND OTHER CONTACTS IN EXILE COMMUNITY INDICATES FELIPE RIVERO AND HIS ANC GROUP ALSO TALKING OF "EXPOSING" WOFACT 3 ACTIVITIES. STATED AIM OF BOTH GROUPS IS TO SHOW "TWO-FACED" ATTITUDE OF U.S. GOVT WHICH STOPS ANTI-COMMUNIST EXILE FIGHTERS FROM USING U.S. AS BASE FOR ACTION AGAINST CASTRO CUBA BUT ALLOWS WOFACT 3 TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTIVITY. FURTHER AIMS ARE TO SHOW EXILE COMMUNITY THAT MIRR AND ANC ARE "ACTIVIST" GROUPS AS COMPARED WITH OTHER EXILE ORGS AND TO RIDICULE AND TRY INTIMIDATE THOSE CUBANS WHO WORK FOR JMWAVE.

9. STATION EVALUATES INCIDENT AS HAVING NO SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPS OR GENERAL STATION SECURITY. STATION HAS DIRECTED INCREASED STATE OF VIGILANCE AT ALL COMBINED OPS SITES BUT DOES NOT ENVISAGE ANY BASIC CHANGES IN COVER

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible] SECURITY PROCEDURES WHICH HAVE PROVIDED REQUIRED LEVEL OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL PLUS EFFECTIVE MASKING OF SENSITIVE DATA RE COMBINED OPS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

91/RF

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2	PA/PROP	5	
3		6	

DATE : 4-53 27 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: TFW 10(MR CHARLES MATT, TFW, NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1830 27 MAY)

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, S/C 2

MAY 27 2216Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 41885

OPIM DIR CITE WAVE 4277

GYROSE

1. MIAMI HERALD 27 MAY CARRIES FRONT PAGE ITEM BY JAMES BUCHANAN
ENTITLED "MIRO FADES AS EXILE CHIEF: THREE LATIN LEADERS BEHIND RAY".
ARTICLE FLATLY
STATES MIRO AND COUNCIL HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY MANUEL RAY WITH
[illegible] GOV MUNOZ MARIN, PRES ROMULO BETANCOURT AND FORMER PRES
JOSE FIGUERAS, THAT RAY HAS TAKEN OVER POST "WITH THE BLESSING OF THE
UNITED STATES". FURTHER, ARTICLES STATES "FROM VARIETY SOURCES HERALD
LEARNED THAT MIRO WAS NOTIFIED OF CHANGE ONLY THIS
WEEK" AND THAT RAYS REAPPOINTMENT AS "CHIEF IN EXILE" CAME FROM "UNDER-
GROUND IN CUBA" ACCORDING TO JOAQUIN GODOY, PROVISIONAL MRP HEAD IN
MIAMI. AFTER FURNISHING RESUME CUBAN ACTIVITIES SINCE ORIGIN OF AMBUD,
ARTICLE CREDITS CUBANS IN MIAMI WITH SAYING "NEW MAN IN FIELD" IS ADOLF
A. BERLE JR. WHO HAS BEEN SPECIAL ASST TO STATE DEPT AND IS ALSO
"MEMBER OF PRES KENNEDY'S SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA".
IMPLICATION BEING THAT BERLE IS RUNNING NEW UNITED STATES SPONSORED
CUBAN EFFORT.

2. THIS RELEASE CAUSING SOME FUROR IN LOCAL CUBAN COLONY TO EXTENT
AT LEAST ONE OPS AGENT DESTINED FOR (ISOLATION) TRAINING HAS
ASKED TO BE RELIEVED IF THERE ANY TRUTH THIS STORY. MEANWHILE WAVE

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

WAVE 4077 IN 41885

CHECKS WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACTS HAS PRODUCED LITTLE OTHER THAN WILLIAM S. WIBALDA'S[2] STATEMENT THAT BUCHANAN JOURNALISTIC REPUTATION INDICATES HE INACCURATE AND SENSATIONALIST. AMCLATTER-1[3] AND PASSAVOY[4] ATTEMPTING DISCREETLY TRACE BUCHANAN SOURCE FOR "U.S. BLESSING."

3. BUCHANAN HAS PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED MIRO IE DURING RETURN PLAYA GIRON PRISONERS MIAMI. HAVE NO REAL INSIGHT INFO SIGNIFICANCE THESE ATTACKS BUT BELIEVE THEY COULD REFLECT BUCHANAN OR MIAMI HERALD ATTEMPTS FORCE CHANGES IN UNITES STATES POSTURE RE CUBA.

4. EXPECT ARTICLE WILL HAVE FURTHER REPROCUSSIONS AS IT SPREADS. WISH ALERT HQS THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY INITIATE ACTION DISCREDIT BUCHANAN STORY AS WELL AS REASSURE MIRO. WILL FORWARD SUGGESTIONS THIS REGARD AFTER WE HAVE OPPORTUNITY FURTHER ASSESS STORY'S IMPACT.

5. POUCHING CLIPPING 28 MAY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

536

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 24 OCT 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LONDON

ACTION : IW 2

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, ~~CA 2~~, CA/PMO, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/ INT 6, FI/D, BELL 5, WH 16, WE 7, DD/I(A), DD/I(L), AD/CI, OS, S/C 2.

MRP

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

OCT 24 2131Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 11257

TDCS -3/490,978

DIR INFO CARA CITE LOND 8769

1

ANDRE ACTING

INTEL DYVOUR

SUPDATA SOURCE (SNOTH) 2 01

TIME FILED 1310Z

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL OEL-30,995 CUBA

SUBJ STATEMENTS OF MANOLO RAY

DOI OCTOBER 1961

PADA ENGLAND LONDON 24 OCTOBER 1961

SOURCE (OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE) FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS".

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

WH/REG	5	WH/4/PM	2	WE/R	1			TDCS PRECEDENCE
WH/RE	1	WH/PACY	2	WE/6/R	2			
WH/FI	2	WH/1/V	1				XX	ROUTINE
WH/PW	1	OS/SSD	1					PRIORITY
WH/4	2	WE/P	4					

RELEASING IWO:

EJM Delaney
E.J.M.DELANEY

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 24 OCTOBER 2244 Z 61

BASED ON: OEL-30,995 (HP/SNOTH) 01

LIAISON: C

file
pa/PRI ✓

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3/17

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In) NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	CUBA	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/490,978
SUBJECT	STATEMENTS OF MANOLA RAY, EXILE LEADER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT	DATE DISTR.	24 OCTOBER 1961
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	OCTOBER 1961	REFERENCES	IN 11257
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	ENGLAND, LONDON (24 OCTOBER 1961)	FIELD REPORT NO.	OCL-30,995
APPRAISAL	3		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE (OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE) FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS". 24

1. MANOLO RAY, EXILE LEADER OF MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT) SAID IN EARLY OCTOBER THAT HE WAS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY INVASION OF CUBA, INSISTING THAT CASTRO'S OVERTHROW WAS TO BE ACHIEVED BY INTERNAL RESISTANCE AND THIS HAD ALREADY STARTED.

2. THE MRP WAS ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND AND SUPPORTED BY ALL CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. IT HAD MEMBERS IN ALL 33 TRADE UNIONS, THE G-2, MILITIA AND THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION. RAY ESTIMATED 80 PERCENT OF POPULATION WERE OPPOSED TO CASTRO, THOUGH MAJORITY WERE NOT ACTIVELY SO, HE CONSIDERED THE MRP AT PRESENT ENJOYED MORE SUPPORT THAN THE ORIGINAL REVOLUTION HAD

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET . NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	EXO	FBI

I&NS TREASURY REPCINCLANT

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

HAD AGAINST BATISTA.

3. THE MRP WAS PRESENTLY SHORT OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES BUT THE POSITION WAS IMPROVING (A MILITIA CAPTAIN WAS RECENTLY SENTENCED TO 30 YEARS IN PRISON FOR PASSING ARMS TO THE MRP). NO HELP WHATSOEVER HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE FROM THE "SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES, WHO PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THE INVASION". THESE SOURCES WERE STILL THINKING INEFFECTUALLY IN TERMS OF A FURTHER INVASION.

4. THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE RESISTANCE IN CUBA TOWARDS THE EXILES WAS ONE OF INDIFFERENCE MOUNTING TO CONTEMPT FOR SPECIFIC MOVES SUCH AS THE PROPOSED PROMOTION OF A CUBAN GOVT IN EXILE. WHAT THE RESISTANCE WANTED WAS FUNDS AND THE RETURN, BY INFILTRATION, OF TRAINED EXILES, PARTICULARLY COMMUNICATION EXPERTS.

5. ON THE TIMING OF CASTRO'S OVERTHROW, RAY SAID CASTRO WOULD NOT LAST ANOTHER YEAR. HE ADDED THAT THE SITUATION IN CUBA IMMEDIATELY AFTER CASTRO'S DOWNFALL WOULD BE DANGEROUS AND COULD DEVELOP INTO A CIVIL WAR.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE. CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROCESSED	ACTION	ACTION PUSHED
XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
Debriefing Report - Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCES: (A) WAVE 2733, dated 15 August 1963
(B) MEXI 5507, dated 26 July 1963

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 1 0 19[illegible]

Transmitted herewith, FYI, is a debriefing report on Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre. Subject arrived ~~in the U. S.~~, via Mexico in late August, 1963. The debriefing contains information re the MRR roll up in May, 1962. Attachment "A" contains a list of subject's friends that are currently employed in power plants in Cuba. Attachment "B" is a debriefing report on Angel BENCOMO who Sanchez believes was responsible for the MRR roll up.

END OF DISPATCH

ATTACHMENTS:
Debriefing Reports, 1 cy ea. herewith

INDEX - X

RECLASSIFIED	
RI/AN	
RI/MIS	
NIP/15	
~~RI/Files~~	

Distribution:
3-C/SAS, w/atts/h/w

GROUP 1
[illegible]

Encl 3

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
4 Oct. 63	OCT 11 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-11653

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-5-96/3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

14-00000

3 September 1963 5P

DEBRIEFING REPORT : Santiago *SANCHEZ de la Torre - aka "Jose Antonio"

DATE & PLACE : Safehouse #182, 29-30 August (0900 - 1300 hrs)

CASE OFFICER : Clarence E. SMERYAGE

1. Subject began to work against the CASTRO regime with the MRP in 1960. At that time he was employed in the Santa Clara power plant as a technician. His job was controlling the amount of electric current that was distributed. (Attachment "A" contains a list of Subject's friends currently employed in power plants in Cuba). On 17 April 1961 Subject made contact with a KUBARK infiltration team and began to assist the team. Team consisted of Segundo 04 *BORGES, "Pepe" 04 *GONZALES and *AMARGO/1. Case Officer Comment: AMARGO/1 has confirmed the fact that Subject worked with his team in Cuba. Subject permitted the team to install their RS-1 set in his house located at #219 Carretera de Camajuani in the City of Santa Clara. He also safehoused the team on occasion and permitted them to hold meetings at his house. After the failure of Playa Giron the team reorganized the MRR in Las Villas Province, selecting Subject to be the Civil Coordinator of the movement in that province. Enrique 04 *ORTEGA was selected as the Military Coordinator. On 21 July 1961, while 04 ORTEGA and Subject were in Havana for discussions with MRR leaders (*AMHOOK/1 and Juan *FALCON) 04 the KUBARK infiltration team and many other members of the MRR in Las Villas, including Subject's wife, were arrested. (Discussions were about actions to take place 26 July 1961).

2. Maria 04 *RODRIGUEZ Posa, from Santa Clara, age 50/55 yrs, called 04 ORTEGA in Havana and told him not to return to Santa Clara as many people had been arrested. 04 ORTEGA passed the information to Subject but as subject thought it applied only to ORTEGA 04 he returned to Santa Clara late at night on 22 July. He went to his home and on 23 July proceeded to work at the power plant. Maria RODRIGUEZ Posa 04 intercepted him on his way home for lunch and told him that the G-2 was at his home and that they also were going to the power plant to arrest him. Subject also learned that there was surveillance on his home on the night of 22 July 1961, but the person watching the house had gotten drunk and did not see subject when he returned from Havana. From that moment until entering an Embassy on 6 September 1962, subject lived "black".

3. Subject proceeded to the outskirts of Santa Clara where a friend, Efrain *WAREN, resided. His friend told him to go to Havana. While driving to Havana Subject met another person who informed him that the G-2 had a roadblock on the highway at Colon, Matanzas, and that all cars were being searched. On 24 July 1961, Subject went to a beach called "GANUZA" located on the north coast of Las Villas near Corralillo. Subject's sister has a home at "Ganuza" so he left his car there and proceeded to Havana with some friends of his sister. Later the G-2 confiscated his auto. (It is interesting to note that the G-2, after confiscating subject's auto at the beach, believed that Subject had departed from Cuba. Subject thereafter communicated with his wife by sending her letters in jail via Miami where they were postmarked).

~~[illegible]~~
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

~~POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION~~
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

Att #6 UFGA-11653

SECRET
CS COPY

~~19-300-11~~

10/BR

4. On 25 July 1961 Subject went to the house of an MRR leader, FNU 04 JIMENEZ in Havana. When Subject approached JIMENEZ' 04 house he noticed a "blind move as if someone was watching" so he did not go in. He walked two blocks to a bus stop. From the bus stop he could observe the house and he noticed that a car departed at a "high rate of speed". Later that day Subject made contact with ORTEGA at the house of Mario *IRIVE in 04 Fontanar, Havana. 04 (IRIVE still lives in Havana) 04 ORTEGA told Subject of the MRR plans for the following day (26 July). 04 ORTEGA said that the movement was "going ahead with their plans" even though they were aware 04 of JIMENEZ' arrest. 04 Subject resided for approximately one week at the home of Jose *MELGAREJO in Varadero. 04 MELGAREJO continues to work for the GOC at this time. He is the Deputy Chief of "Asphalt Consolidated" for 08 the entire country. (In April 1962 Subject's wife escaped from the Womens' Prison at Guanajay, Pinar del Rio. She also was safehoused at 04 MALGAREJO's house). Subject claims that 04 MALGAREJO is a "good man" who also has a home located at Avenida de los OCUJES #221 in Santa Catalina 08 (outskirts of Havana). MALGAREJO's wife and sons reside with him. 08 Subject spent approximately one month in the above house (Aug.-Sept. 61).

5. From October 1961 Subject resided with 04 Ester *CRUZ, a person he had known for 10 years. While living with CRUZ he changed his appearance - 04 lost much weight, dyed and curled his hair, obtained contact lenses. (C/O Comment: 04 Ester CRUZ was arrested approximately 9 May 1962 during the "roll up" of the MRR. She is in jail at this time). In November 1961, Subject met 04 Jose Luis *ARANGO from Camaguey 04 ARANGO was at that time military coordinator for the MRR and used the name "Angelito". FNU *REYES 04 Aka LUCAS, who was the MRR Coordinator of Las Villas introduced Subject to 04 ARANGO. 04 REYES is from Yaguajay, Las Villas. Subject met 04 REYES through Oscar *MADRUGA 04 Aka "Anibel" whom he had known since 1959. 04 ARANGO encouraged Subject to begin working for the MRR again. An ID card in alias from a medical laboratory was obtained for Subject. 04 He then obtained a briefcase and began selling medical supplies. MADRUGA's cousin, 04 Jose *FERNANDEZ, owned the laboratory *ROMBERG LABORATORY. 08 04 FERNANDEZ worked for AMBRONC/5. After AMBRONC/5 was captured two actual MRR members met FERNANDEZ 04 and requested that he continue to work. 04 FERNANDEZ did not know the men and denied that he worked for the movement).

6. In late November, 1961 Subject moved into a "guest house" where several other MRR members resided. House is called *House of Maria de la 08 *GALLEGA" and is located on "J" Street between 21st and 23rd Streets, 10 Vedado. Subject met "Fernando", the Security Chief of the MRR at the guest house. Fernando continues to work in the underground. He also met 04 Oscar MADRUGA there. He met Roberto *SANCHEZ 04 who also continues to work 04 in the underground. 04 MADRUGA had gone to the hills of Las Villas but returned to Havana. Another MRR man residing there was Roberto *FERNANDEZ. 04 Arturo *MUGARRA and *AMSALON/1 visited the house on occasion. Subject was once picked up at the house by AMSALON/1. During this period FNU 04 REYES, Aka Lucas, was arrested and Subject began to work with MUGARRA. 04 In December 1961 ARANGO 04 took asylum. There was much conflict in the MRR during this period between AMHOOK/1 and AMBRONC/5. (Subject has many letters pertaining to this conflict but they were left in Mexico. AMBIDDY/1 is having someone pick up the letters. Case Officer will attempt to obtain these letters and review them. Subject claims he did not hand carry them to the U.S., as he thought our officials would seize them).

421BR

7. In January 1962, 04 Arturo MUGARRA and 04 Roberto SANCHEZ were preparing to depart from Cuba. When AMJAVA/4 and AMBRONC/5 arrived in Havana they changed their minds. (C/O Comment: A woman named Emilia del *MAS was 04 living with MUGARRA 04 This girl later came to the USA via the Brazilian Embassy) 04 MUGARRA's group consisted of Roberto *SANCHEZ, 04 Angel *CANETE, 04 04 Eddy *GALENO who "is bad, likes money, women, etc"., and subject. 04 GALENO called Subject here in Miami on 28 August and wants to talk with him).

8. 04 MUGARRA informed AMBRONC/5 that he had doubts about Juan *BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly", as he had asked too many questions re what AMBRONC/5 had brought to Cuba. AMBRONC/5 decided to call a "false meeting" of the chiefs of the movement to test BUSTAMENTE but "someone objected to this". In February 1962, a meeting of the leaders of the MRR took place and AMBRONC/5 reorganized the movement. 04 Subject met AMBRONC/5 only twice - once in February 1962 at the house 04 of Angel CANETE and another time in March, 1962 when the assassination of Juan *MARINELLO failed. The Operation failed as the automobile to be used in the assassination attempt was stolen on the day of the proposed Operation. The driver of the car was to be Orlando *CRUZ, brother of Ester CRUZ. The MRR suspected Orlando CRUZ after this incident as he is a person who "likes money" and the theft was"quite a coincidence". (Orlando CRUZ is presently in Miami. He called Subject on 28 August and wants to see him). AMBRONC/5 informed the group in March to suspend all operations until he returned from a 04 trip he was taking to the USA with 04 MUGARRA and Jose *RODRIGUEZ Pecheco. 04 AMBRONC/5 placed 04 Angel *CANATE in charge of the radio sets. CANATE was 04 selected to be the only person in direct contact with the RADOP in place of Juan BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly" 04 MUGARRA gave subject two radio sets; one was placed in the apartment of a sister-in-law of subject located 08 08 at *23rd and I Sts., Vedado, Apt. #11. The other set was located at *A 08 Street between 3rd and 5th Sts., Vedado, the home of Carlos *CADENAS. 04 The only persons who knew the locations of the sets were the Radop, Juan 04 FALCON, the MRR Chief and Angel CANATE. 04 During AMBRONC/5's trip to the USA in April, 1962, Juan BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly" discovered where the radios were hidden. Subject had contact with FALCON and CANATE during April.

04 04 04

9. 04 On 2 May 1962 AMBRONC/5 and MUGARRA returned from the USA. Enrique *CEPERO and MUGARRA's 04 common-law-wife waited for them in the Blue Studebaker Lark. AMBRONC/5 and MUGARRA were late in arriving, however, and the group had departed from the area. 04

10. Subject later discovered that the G-2 had captured a "large radio" in the apartment of a radio technician named *TROVADIUS. TROVADIUS, when captured, fired at the G-2 and was himself wounded in the shoulder. Later TROVADIUS reported that he had seen Juan FALCON in prison and that FALCON had said "people in the G-2 had told me that no one would be wounded or killed".

01

11. The Radop *(AMBUMP/1) informed subject on Wednesday (9 May 1962) to take the radio set out of the house. Rumors were already circulating that the Radop and FALCON were captured. Owners of the house where the radio was cached had moved to Santa Clara for Mothers' Day. As Subject was in contact with Congo PECHECO during this time he did not attempt to pick-up the radio until Thursday (10 May) at 0700 hrs. Subject entered the apartment building (12 stories high) by the rear. Upon arrival he discovered that the glass doors on the terrace were opened (apartment was located on the eleventh floor). These windows are seldom opened.

51/BR

Subject entered the building with his briefcase containing a pistol. He noticed two men "loitering in the lobby". He took the elevator to the 9th floor, departed, and walked to the eleventh floor. Subject was wearing soft shoes. He walked quietly to the apartment and heard a voice say "don't talk so loud as no one will come in". Subject then proceeded to the next apartment occupied by a friend of the movement. The friend said she had heard noises since the preceding night in the apartment. Subject then took the stairs to the 9th floor and entered the elevator. He got off on the ground floor and proceded to the house on Carlos 08 Tercero Ave. where the other radio was cached (Owner's name is CABANES) 04. Upon arrival at the house he discovered that the woman who owned the house was outside in her housecoat talking to a stranger. Subject then departed from the area, called a friend of CABANES 04 who went to the house. The friend was arrested, held a week and released. Subject then tried to pass this information to Arturo 04 MUGARRA but MUGARRA 04 had disappeared. He later discovered that MUGARRA knew that the radios were discovered and that TROVADIUS had been shot. 04

12. On 9 May Juan FALCON 04 the radio operator (AMJUMP/1) 01, Pepe 04 *GUTIERREZ, Aka 04 Peluza, Estar CRUZ and Jose 04 *SEOANE were arrested. When subject heard of these developments he hid in the Guanabo area. During this period 9th to 28th of May, he saw 04 MUGARRA approximately eight times. He later heard that the G-2 had taken over a house in Guanabo, located 3 blocks from where he was hiding. Subject heard that the G-2 had taken a "blond thin man there" (Possibly AMBRONC/5). G-2 remained at the house for four days.

13. Subject then departed from Guanabo for a few days. When he returned in June 1962 he met Sylvia LNU, the person who resided at the house where the "blond thin man named CARLOS" was taken. Sylvia and subject met in the water in front of their houses. Sylvia is the wife of a BATISTA Naval Captain who lives in Miami. She has two "little girls". Sylvia said that "CARLOS" used to live at her house and after being captured he was returned there with the G-2. The G-2 was searching for a "plastic case and envelopes" (pads and crystals). Sylvia told subject that she had seen the envelope and that when Enrique CEPERO's family informed her that he was captured she hid everything in the house that could incriminate "Carlos" under the dog house in the back yard". "Carlos" talked as if he had been drugged when he returned to the house with the G-2. They searched the entire house bringing "Carlos" back and forth several times for four days. Sylvia was forced to open the door whenever anyone arrived and the caller was arrested. Sylvia was interrogated and the house was under surveillance for approximately a month. A friend of Sylvia's from outside Cuba visited her during this period and was arrested and held for a week. Sylvia said the items she buried looked like "pads and maps wrapped in plastic". Although she claimed the material was turned over to the MRR subject has doubts that this was done.

14. During September 1962 Subject and his wife entered the Uruguayan Embassy to remain in asylum until 19 June 1963 when they arrived in Mexico City via Safe Conduct.

15. Attachment "B" is a report on Angel BENCOMO who subject believes was responsible for the MRR "roll-up".

Clarence E. SMERYAGE

ATTACHMENT "A"

IP

*TALLAPIEDRA - (Power Plant)

1. Ing. Manolito *FERNANDEZ - Superintendente
2. Ing. Luis F. de *LEON - Superintendente Auxiliar
(Bomb Thrower)
3.

* *

REGLA - (Power Plant)

1. Delfin *RODRIGUEZ - Operator Control Room
2. Ing. *ROSS - Superintendent

* **** ***

DESPACHO NARANJITO - (Sub-Station)

1. Jaime *GUIU

****** *

OFICINA PRINCIPAL DE DESPACHO

1. Carlos *MANUEL Pena - Auxiliar of Superintendent
(May be throw a bomb)- He can give good information.

* **

DESPACHO SANTA CLARA (Santa Clara Dispatching Office)

1. Pedro *LUCAS Galvez (Jefe Despacho) - Dispatch Chief
2. Agustin *GARCIA Cabalet - Despachador - (Dispatcher)

* *

Vladimir S. *KLITTING.

[illegible]ED
[illegible] 1 0 1954
DOC. [illegible]

SECRET

Att. "A" to UFGA-11653

19-300-11

11P

ATTACHMENT "B"

Debriefing of Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre

SUBJECT: Angel X BENCOMO (BENCOMO reportedly was responsible for the MRR roll-up per SANCHEZ - See MEXI-5507)

1. Angel BENCOMO is approximately 19 years old, has brown skin, short, stocky, approximately 150 lbs. BENCOMO was formerly a miliciaman in Camaguey and a friend of Arturo *MUGARRA 04 BENCOMO entered the MRR via Eddy *GALENO 04 during March 1962, when he was employed by the Abras Publicas in Camaguey. BENCOMO had trouble with his superiors; quit the militia, etc 04 GELENO brought BENCOMO to Havana where BENCOMO began working in resistance with Jose 04 RODRIGUEZ Pecheco and Santiago SANCHEZ. (BENCOMO did not meet Arturo 04 MUGARRA in Havana). SANCHEZ "tested BENCOMO" and he appeared to be OK i.e., disciplined, quiet, etc. SANCHEZ then began using BENCOMO to pick-up radios, minox cameras, etc. This activity took place between March and May 1962.

2. Arturo MUGARRA was arrested in May 1962 in a cafeteria in Havana where he went to dispose of an automobile. GALENO was to 04 meet MUGARRA at the cafeteria. MUGARRA and his brother arrived at the cafeteria, turned the car (Cadillac) over to the prospective buyer and sat down. A mechanic drove the car to test it and returned with two G-2 cars. Although GALENO was present and was questioned he was not arrested. 04

3. From May to September 1962, SANCHEZ saw BENCOMO often. In September SANCHEZ went into an Embassy but "heard that BENCOMO was arrested and held until November". In January 1963 SANCHEZ heard from BENCOMO via SANCHEZ' sister. BENCOMO wrote a letter (which SANCHEZ still has) saying that he was working for the MRR in the streets. BENCOMO said he did not want to seek asylum but was 04 considering going to the house of Luis 04 *PERALES in Oriente (PERALES formerly was operating in the hills of Yayuajay but went to Havana to hide out in Jan.-Feb. 1962). In February 1963, SANCHEZ received another letter from his sister saying that BENCOMO was a G-2 man. BENCOMO identified himself as a G-2 man to 04 PERALES in December 1962, 04 and asked PERALES to cooperate with him 04 PERALES told SANCHEZ' sister of BENCOMO's proposition in January 1963. Since that time PERALES has disappeared. 04

c' no.3

Att "B" to UFGA-11193

19-300-11

13/BR

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Burke, William P. Jr.
01775

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1947 - 1962

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CS Files

ROOM: 5E 13

DELETIONS, IF ANY: NONE

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2:20 27 Dec 78		Chuck Berk	Chuck Berk
2:45 27 Dec		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

BURKE WILLIAM P
TERMINATED
01775
4/63

STANDARD FORM 56
Revised November 1959
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER I-1-F P.M. 56-103

AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS
Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954

1. FULL NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle)
Burke William P., Jr.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)
October 22, 1900

3. CHECK THE REASON FOR TERMINATING INSURANCE

(a) ☐ SEPARATED.
(b) ☒ RETIRED
(c) ☐ DIED
WAS EMPLOYEE AT TIME OF DEATH, AN APPLICANT FOR CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO
(d) ☐ 12 MONTHS NON-PAY STATUS
(e) ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX CONCERNING S. F. 54, DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

(a) ☐ CURRENT S. F. 54 ATTACHED
(b) ☒ A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS NOT ON FILE WITH THIS AGENCY
(c) ☐ A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (OR EQUIVALENT)

NOTE: IF EMPLOYEE (A) DIED OR (B) IS RETIRING OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION UNDER CONDITIONS ENTITLING HIM TO RETAIN FREE LIFE INSURANCE, ATTACH CURRENT S. F. 54, IF ANY, TO ORIGINAL S. F. 56 AND CHECK BOX 4 (a) ON ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF S. F. 56. IF NO CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE, CHECK BOX 4 (b). IN ALL OTHER CASES, SHOW WHETHER OR NOT CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE BY CHECKING BOX 4 (b) OR (c). A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN CANCELED BY EMPLOYEE OR AUTOMATICALLY BY TRANSFER OR PRIOR TERMINATION OF INSURANCE.

5. DATE OF EVENT CHECKED IN ITEM 3 (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)
October 27, 1962

6. ANNUAL COMPENSATION RATE (CONVERT DAILY, HOURLY, PIECEWORK, ETC. RATE TO ANNUAL RATE) ON DATE IN ITEM 5.
17,925.00 PER ANNUM

7. DATE OF NOTICE OF CONVERSION PRIVILEGE (SF 55) TO EMPLOYEE (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)

8. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM, AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS OFFICIAL RECORDS, AND THAT THE EMPLOYEE NAMED WAS COVERED BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 5. (SIGN ORIGINAL ONLY)

(Personal signature of authorized agency official)

17 DEC 1962
(Date)

B. DeFelice
(Type name of authorized agency official)

Insurance Officer - Alternate
(Title)

Central Intelligence Agency
(Name of agency)

2430 E St., N. W., Washington 25, D. C.
(Mailing address of agency)

SEE OTHER SIDE
FOR
INSTRUCTIONS TO EMPLOYING AGENCY

PART 3 — FILE COPY

31 OCT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 001775
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BURKE WILLIAM P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (OPTIONAL)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 10 DA 27 YR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

X	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3242 2221 4000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI OO
CONTACT DIVISION
U.S. FIELD
NEW ORLEANS OFFICE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: NEW ORLEANS, LA.

11. POSITION TITLE: IO CONTACT
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0195
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: OC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.21
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 8
17. SALARY OR RATE: 17925
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA 22 YR 00
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC / 3 - FICA / 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 03H0000
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE / 1 - 5 PT / 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER / 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE / 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE / 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) / 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-2-62

1150 Use Previous Edition

Bar 10/31/62

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

PSC: 31 OCT 22

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 001775	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BURKE WILLIAM P JR			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT (OPTIONAL		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR [illegible] 3[illegible] 2	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3242 222 [illegible]	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
11. POSITION TITLE IO CONTACT		12. POSITION NUMBER 0155	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION CC	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 17325	
18. REMARKS				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-61)

Executive Registry
62-[illegible]

23 OCT 1962

Mr. William P. Barke
6300 Saint Charles Avenue
New Orleans 18, Louisiana

Dear Mr. Barke:

As you bring to a close eighteen years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed much to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend warmest wishes in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

(Signed) JOHN A. McCONE

John A. McCone
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DC/EAB/SO
1 - D/Pers
1 - C/BSD
1 - OPF
1 - BCB Retirement
1 - BCB Reader

Originator: /s/ Harry W. Little, Jr.
Director of Personnel
22 OCT 1962

Concur: SIGNED
DC/EAB/SO
19 OCT 1962

OP/BSD/RSagat:emt (18 October 1962)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1958, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
BURKE WILLIAM P JR	001775	82500	V	15 0	$15810	15 8	$17925

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

'1' FILE

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

DATE: 2 October 1962

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

NAME: (Last) BURKE, (First) William (Middle) Patrick, Jr.

POSITION TITLE: Chief, New Orleans Field Office

PRESENT GRADE: GS-15

OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: DDI/OO

STATION: New Orleans

BE AWARDED: **Intelligence Medal of Merit**

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION, ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE DURING THE PERIOD

☒ APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION ☐ DISAPPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION

☐ APPROVES, BUT IN LIEU THEREOF, RECOMMENDS THE AWARD OF:

CITATION

Mr. William P. Burke, Jr., is hereby awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit for his outstanding service to the Central Intelligence Agency. As Chief of the New Orleans Field Office since its inception in 1947, Mr. Burke labored unceasingly in developing programs which have produced important information on a continuing basis. In his role as Agency representative, he has been successful in establishing relationships which have furthered the mission of the Agency and enhanced its reputation in the area. In his role as office chief, he has provided leadership of the highest order to his associates, and leaves behind him a legacy of achievement in keeping with the best traditions of service to the United States.

(Recommendation approved by DD/I on 14 September 1962)

REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF RECOMMENDED AWARD

APPROVED

(Signed) Marshall S. Carter

Deputy DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

5 OCT 1962

DATE

SIGNATURE /s/ Harry W. Little, Jr.

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD: HARRY V. LITTLE, JR.

SIGNATURE /Sgd/ Robert M. Gaynor

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER: ROBERT M. GAYNOR

FORM 8-62 382 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 September 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 1775 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BURKE, William P., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: ~~VOLUNTARY~~ RETIREMENT (optional)

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 7 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS ▶ ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3242-2221-4000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/OO
Contact Division
U.S. Field
New Orleans Office

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: New Orleans, La.

11. POSITION TITLE: IC Contact ~~Intelligence Officer, Chief~~

12. POSITION NUMBER: K 0195

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: OC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.21

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15-8

17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~$15,810~~ 17,925

18. REMARKS:

cc Payroll; Security

Subject is re-employable.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: S. M. ASHCRAFT, Chief, Contact Division, OO

DATE SIGNED: 30 Oct 62

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: J. LAROCQUE, JR., Acting Assistant Director, OO

DATE SIGNED: 30 Oct 1962

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: US

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 18

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE:

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOURS CODE: 2

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 32 YR. [illegible]

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 3 EH,00,0,0

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 pt., 2 = 10 pt.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. CLEARANCE CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-1-62

46. O.P. APPROVAL: H. F. Heggen By—

DATE APPROVED: 31 Oct 62

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ____________ (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

OCT 31 2 03 PM '62

[illegible]

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE: [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

[illegible] Ave.,
[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular
Part Time
Temporary
Temporary - Part Time
Summer
Detail Out
Detail In
WAE
Consultant
Military

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE:
- Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
- Office, Major Staff, etc.

Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
Branch
Section
Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-500-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 01775	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 15 Jul 1944

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Burke, William Patrick, Jr.	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH Oct 1900	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 18 Sep 1947

6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee) ➧	NO. 1	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1937	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS ➧	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS Rejected	10. LAST MED. RPT. Oct 1957	QUAL. FOR US Field	EVAL. FOR Annual

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS ➧	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. *1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. *2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT. *3	RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE 9 Jul 1947	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1925-42 Self-Employed, New Orleans, La - Lawyer
1942-45 Military Service, US Marine Corps, Major - Division Legal Officer
1945-47 Administered Financial Matters Concerning Family Estate

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1915-19 Loyola Univ, New Orleans, La - AB Arts & Sciences
1920-23 Harvard Law School - LLB
1923-24 Trinity College, Cambridge, England - English Literature Research
1924-25 Tulane Univ., New Orleans, La - LLB

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested) None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1954 CIA Orientation
1959 Mgmt for Contact Div

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1947	I.O.	0132.21	P-7		00/Contact/Contr/Actg R Mgr IAC	New Orleans
Sep 1948	"	0132.21	P-8		CO/Contact Br/Reg Mgr N. O.	"
Mar 1952	"	0132.21	15	0	000/ContactDiv/Ch, N.O. Off	"
Jul 1960	LWOP					"
Sep 1960	I.O.-Contact	0132.21	15	OC	DO/ContactDiv/Ch,New Orleans Off	"

20. DATE REVIEWED	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY 25 Sep 1962 OP/POD/QAB/hms	22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE ➧	2 Dec 1957

FORM NO. 1200 (PART I) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART I) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET PROFILE

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 01775

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle) BURKE, William Patrick, Jr.

DATE OF BIRTH Oct 1900

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Letter of Appreciation 1948 from AD/Operations prior to leaving Agency for having created an effective field office in less than a year, excellent relations with clients and local Armed Forces Representatives and high morale of office.

Commendation 1954 from DD/P for thorough and expeditious contribution made by DDI Personnel to urgent need for intelligence about Guatemala.

27. DATE REVIEWED 25 Sep 1962

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY OP/POD/QAB/hms

FORM NO. 1 FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1080 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

MAY 1962 Mid Per

0 2 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief, New Orleans Field Office continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. He is extremely conservative by nature and finds it difficult to act without the most careful consideration of all factors involved. While this approach might be a handicap in some areas it tends to be an asset in New Orleans. In spite of this tendency he willingly and efficiently devotes all his time and energy to the solution of a problem in an emergency. He represents the Agency well and maintains the highest respect in his community.

E M Ashcraft
E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey
GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

Dup

SECRET

MAY
1962
mel Ret

0 2 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief, New Orleans Field Office continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. He is extremely conservative by nature and finds it difficult to act without the most careful consideration of all factors involved. While this approach might be a handicap in some areas it tends to be an asset in New Orleans. In spite of this tendency he willingly and efficiently devotes all his time and energy to the solution of a problem in an emergency. He represents the Agency well and maintains the highest respect in his community.

EMAshcraft
E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey
GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

SECRET

21 June 61

Memo for File - William P. Burke

Subject: Longevity Step Increase

In reviewing this file under the Security reinvestigation program, it was noted that the 3rd LSI (as GS-15) was proposed to be made effective on 18 Sept 60, but that the effective date had been changed by Payroll to show 16 Oct 60. Reason for the change is presumed to be due to LWOP. Form 560 shows 225 hours of LWOP during the waiting period. If those figures are correct, then there was no "excess" LWOP, since the law provides that a maximum of 240 hours of LWOP is creditable toward completion of the waiting period in the case of LSI's.

I called this case to the attention of Joe Tracy, C/Payroll, who will review LWOP records and, if required, issue a memorandum to correct the effective date of the last LSI.

Gene C. Stevens

SECRET

7 JUL 1961

30 JUN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. Mr. Burke is a conservative who sometimes finds it difficult without most careful and protracted consideration of all factors involved to adjust to changes in methods and objectives particularly those peculiar to clandestine support. While his conservatism added to his meticulous legalistic approach might be something less than desirable in certain areas it is a definite asset in New Orleans. When called upon in emergency he willingly and efficiently devotes his entire time and energy to the solution of the problem regardless of personal inconvenience. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area and readily maintains respect in the community.

E. M. Ashcraft

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey

George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations

3 JUL 1961

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible] 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. Mr. Burke is a conservative who sometimes finds it difficult without most careful and protracted consideration of all factors involved to adjust to changes in methods and objectives particularly those peculiar to clandestine support. While his conservatism added to his meticulous legalistic approach might be something less than desirable in certain areas it is a definite asset in New Orleans. When called upon in emergency he willingly and efficiently devotes his entire time and energy to the solution of the problem regardless of personal inconvenience. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area and readily maintains respect in the community.

EMAshcraft
E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey
George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations

3 JUL 1961

SECRET

14-00000

1960

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
101775	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	DDI/CONT 7	V-40	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR				MO	DA.	YR
GS 15	9	$15,550	09	21	58	GS 15	Z	$15,810	10	26	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☒ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP 2 4/6
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION ☐ P.S.I. ☒ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS Employee has served an aggregate of 10 years in present, equivalent, or higher grade and at the top of present grade since 9-19-48. This is the third longevity step increase.

14. AUTHENTICATION

E. D. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

V to V	V to UV	**SECRET** (When Filled In)	**REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION**	DATE PREPARED Mo 9 Da 14 Yr 60
UV to V	UV to UV			

1. Serial No. 101775	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) [illegible]RKE WILLIAM P JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo 10 Da 22 Yr 03	4. Vet. Pref. None 0, 5 Pt 1, 10 Pt 2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS EOD Mo 03 Da 13 Yr 47	
7. SCD Mo 01 Da 15 Yr 44	8. CSC Retmt Yes 1, No 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes 1, No 2 Code	12. LCD Mo 03 Da 13 Yr 47	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes 1, No 2 Code 2

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDI - CO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	Code 2531	15. Location Of Official Station NEW ORLEANS, LA.	Station Code 75033

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld - Frgn. Code 4	17. Position Title INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	18. Position No. 0195	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0132.21

21. Grade & Step 15 9	22. Salary Or Rate $15550	23. SD OC	24. Date Of Grade Mo 09 Da 19 Yr 48	25. PSI Due Mo XX Da XX Yr XX	26. Appropriation Number 1242 2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action RETURN TO DUTY FROM LWOP	Code 57	28. Eff. Date Mo 9 Da ~~17~~ 7 Yr 60	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code	30. Separation Data

7

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 2531	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code 75033

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld - Frgn. Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo 09 Da 19 Yr 48	42. PSI Due Mo 09 Da 15 Yr 60	43. Appropriation Number

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) E. M. ASHCRAFT, Chief, Contact Division, OO	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) [illegible] T. Carey GEORGE G. CAREY Assistant Director for Operations	Date Approved 15 SEP 1960
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Ann L. Budresky		

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	LS	9-16-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	D V Mulcahy MD	9/16/60

Remarks

CK per M. Derosier

☐ Continued On Reverse Side

FORM NO. 3-59 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION 9-16-60 LS (4)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BLT: 7 SEPT 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - ECD Mo	Da	Yr	
101775	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	10	22	00	1	M 1	09	15	47	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit Ltd Yes-1 No-2 Code
07	15	44	1	50 USCA 403 J			09	18	47	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	2531	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	75033

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
4	INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC	09 19 48	XX XX XX	1242 2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
RETURN TO DUTY FROM LEAVE WITHOUT PAY	50	09 07 60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	2531	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	75033

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
4	INTELL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC	09 19 48	09 18 60	1242 2221

44. Remarks

POSTED
9-22-60

DT

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

V to V	V to UV	REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED	Mo 5 Da 27 Yr 60
UV to V	UV to UV			

1. Serial No. 1775	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) BURKE, William P., Jr.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 10 Da 22 Yr 00	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Yes - 1 No - 2

7

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDI/OO Contact Division New Orleans Office	Code	15. Location Of Official Station New Orleans, La.	Station Code

16. Dept.- Field Dept.- Usfld. XX Frgn - Code 4	17. Position Title Intelligence Officer (Contact) (CH)	18. Position No. 195	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0132.21

21. Grade & Step 15-~~7~~ 9	22. Salary Or Rate $ ~~14,450~~ 15550	23. SD OC	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr 09 [illegible] 45	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 0242-2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action LEAVE WITHOUT PAY*	Code 1	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr ~~888~~ 7 19 60	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 96	30. Separation Date

~~NTE 19 Aug 60~~
(THRU COB 10 Sept 60)

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 3036	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code 95033

33. Dept.- Field Dept.- Usfld.- Frgn.- Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) E. M. Ashcraft, Chief, Contact Division	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) GEORGE G. CAREY George G. Carey Assistant Director for Operations	Date Approved 1 Jun 60
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Ann L. Budresky 2271		

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		[illegible]	E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved B.	[illegible]	[illegible]

Remarks *Personal reasons. It is requested that Mr. Burke be granted 25 days of leave without pay commencing 18 July and ending ~~19 August 1960~~ 10 Sept 60 per
To [illegible]
[illegible] Mauney [illegible]

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 8-53 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 26 AUGUST 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
101775	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	10	22	00		1	M	1	09	18	47	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. EOD Mo.	Da.
07	15	44		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	18

12. EOD Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. EOD Yes-1 No-2	Code
47		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE		NEW ORLEANS, LA.	

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USHd-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	4	INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC							0242 2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
LEAVE WITHOUT PAY (THRU COB 10 SEPT 1960)	61	BOB 07	29	60	REGULAR	70	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	2531	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	75033

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USHd-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	4	INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC	09	19	48	XX	XX	XX	1242 2221

44. Remarks

POSTED
9-30-60 WR

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OC	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	101775	25 31	GS-15 9	$14,450	$15,550

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

10 MAY 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

1. William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office most efficiently and to demonstrate thorough knowledge of his area. His inherent conservatism and somewhat legalistic approach tend to make it difficult for him to accept change and methods peculiar to clandestine support without most careful consideration of all the factors involved.

2. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area. His conservatism is to a degree an asset in New Orleans; it could conceivably be a handicap elsewhere.

EMAshcraft

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey 20 MAY 1960

George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 24 Feb. 1960

52

PROT. 0-60

TO : Chief, OO/CD
Director of Security
Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Revocation of Cryptographic Clearance - **William P. Burke**

1. The cryptographic clearance held by Subject has been revoked under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Revocation is effective 9 Feb 60.

2. Subject is not authorized to have continued custody of, access to, or otherwise gain further knowledge of staff cryptographic material or information. Subject has been informed of this revocation, has been debriefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Debriefing Statement acknowledging continuing responsibility for the protection of all cryptographic information obtained during the tenure of his cryptographic clearance.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
1 - OO/CD
1 - Security Office (Debriefing Statement Attached)
1 - Personnel Office (Wing 1-H Curie Hall)
1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-53 1597b

(9)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 101775

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BURKE, William P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/22/1900	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Contact)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OO/CD/New Orleans	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐ NOT ELIGIBLE	☐ MEMBER	☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING	☑ DECLINED	☑ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 May 1959	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To Sept 58 - Mar 59	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Management of a domestic field office.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Obtaining cooperation of non-governmental sources in his area.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area.	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Planning and carrying out effective intelligence collection.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Support of other elements of CIA in his area.	RATING NO. 3

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 29 12 12 PM '59
MAIL ROOM

Subject possesses complete integrity and thorough knowledge of his area. He is able to assess the potential of sources and to obtain their full cooperation. He is inclined toward a legalistic approach which makes him somewhat less than receptive to new ideas and methods particularly when understanding support of the clandestine services is required. His conservatism is, to an extent, an asset in his area; it could be undesirable in some other assignments.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 100	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject is located in New Orleans.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 23 April 59	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CD/OO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE E. M. Ashcraft E M Ashcraft

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 28 APR 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AD/O	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE George G. Carey George G. Carey

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
101775	BURKE, WILLIAM P.	DDI/CONT 7	V-40	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			NO.	DA.	YR.				NO	DA.	YR.
GS 15	5	13,970	09	16	51	GS 15	X & Y	14,210 14,450	09	21	58

REMARKS
EMPLOYEE HAS SERVED AN AGGREGATE OF 10 YEARS IN PRESENT, EQUIVALENT, OR HIGHER GRADE AND AT THE TOP OF PRESENT GRADE SINCE 16 Sep 51. THIS IS THE FIRST AND SECOND LONGEVITY STEP INCREASES.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
E. M. ASHCRAFT	24 Feb. '59	EM Ashcraft

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2 NAME	3 ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
101775	BURKE, WILLIAM P.	DDI/CONT	V-40	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	5	13,970	09	16	51	GS 15	X & Y	14,210 14,450	09	21	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING.
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS
EMPLOYEE HAS SERVED AN AGGREGATE OF 10 YEAR IN PRESENT, EQUIVALENT, OR HIGHER GRADE AND AT THE TOP OF PRESENT GRADE SINCE 16 SEP 51. THIS IS THE FIRST AND SECOND LONGEVITY STEP INCREASES.

14. AUTHENTICATION

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

1958

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It ~~is~~ recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): BURKE, William P.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 10/22/00
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OO/Contact/New Orleans
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Officer (Contact) (CH)
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 9 September 1958
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 9/9/57 - 9/8/58
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Subject not available in Washington area.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

x	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 12 Sept 58 ~~27 August 1958~~

C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: E. M. Ashcraft E. M. ASHCRAFT

D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, CD/OO

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

DATE
9-28-58
[illegible] /58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 18 Sept 58

B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: George G. Carey GEORGE G. CAREY

C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: AD/O

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Need to list docs Bates

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 19 9 58 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Management of domestic field office	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Obtaining the effective support of non-governmental sources and contacts in his area	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 The planning and carrying out of effective intelligence collection	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Support of other elements of CIA in his area	RATING NUMBER 3

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject possesses complete integrity and thorough knowledge of his area. He has the ability to assess the potential of sources and to obtain their full cooperation. He is inclined toward a legalistic approach which renders him somewhat less than receptive to new ideas and methods, particularly where understanding support of the clandestine services is required. This conservatism is to a degree an asset in the area and the duties to which he is assigned but could be undesirable in some other assignments.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BURKE, William P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/22/00	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/Contact/New Orleans	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Contact) (CH)		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 9 Sept. 1958	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 9/9/57 - 9/8/58	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 17 Sept. 58 ~~27 August 1958~~	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR E. M. ASHCRAFT	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, CD/OO

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 18 Sept '58	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL George G. Carey GEORGE G. CAREY	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AD/O

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 2

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 454 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

92

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject will leave New Orleans only for an overseas post. He will not do so for duty in Washington. In view of the fact that his intelligence experience is entirely in the field of domestic collection, it is difficult to conceive of such an overseas assignment. He is eminently qualified to continue in his present assignment.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL:

No training or experience planned or required except periodic meeting of Contact Division Field Chiefs.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

See Section G.4. above.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
101 775	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
BURKE, William P.	October	22	1900

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
	April	9	1957	☑ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.
2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.
3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.
4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.
5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.
3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.
2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.
3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.
4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 9 Apr 57.	SIGNATURE William P. Burke
(46)	(47)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BURKE WILLIAM P JR	101775	GS-15-5	$12,690	$13,970

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1 yr 1)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE 8 SEP 58

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

GENERAL

SECTION I

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
BURKE William Patrick Jr.

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
6300 St. Charles Ave.,
New Orleans 18, La.

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
6300 St. Charles Ave.,
New Orleans 18, La.

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
Twinbrook 7-2485

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
Louisiana

PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

SECTION II

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
BURKE Mrs Frances Kittredge

2. RELATIONSHIP
Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country).
6300 St. Charles Ave., New Orleans 18, La.

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
none

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
Twinbrook 7-2485

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
none

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
none

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
none

MARITAL STATUS

SECTION III

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ▷ ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
Never separated, divorced nor marriage annulled

BURKE WILLIAM P JR 01775

NAME OF EMPLOYEE 63-545 B-72	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE ☒ YES ☐ NO	TELEPHONE EXT. 2271	SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE, SPINDLE, OR MUTILATE

RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

INSTRUCTIONS

THIS FORM MUST BE RETURNED WHETHER YOU HAVE HAD OVERSEAS SERVICE OR NOT.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCOMPANYING CARD, THEN FILL OUT THIS FORM AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE.

DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 29-31	WHERE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED	PCS - 1 TDY - 2 (ENTER NO.) 32	DATES FROM MO 33-34	DATES FROM YR 35-36	DATES TO MO 37-38	DATES TO YR 39-40	SERVICE AS CIVILIAN - 1 MILITARY - 2 (ENTER NO.) 41	RESPONSIBLE U.S. GOV'T. DEPT. OR AGENCY	DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 42-44
310	Territory of Hawaii	1	05	45	10	45	2	US Marine Corps	540

IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED CHECK HERE ☐ AND ASK YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CARDS

SECRET

FORM 1451

(If unemployed, last two employers)

Occupation: Housewife

Not employed. Once employed by Town & Country., N.O.La.

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
not employed

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
1

FORM 444b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
4-57

1958 doc

Per'l
HISTORY
STATEMENT
w/atts (1394)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
Sep 1942 - Dec 1945

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE U S Marine Corps	23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED U. S.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
CIA, New Orleans Field Office, Sept 1947 to date.

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) None	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
2	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
Dividends on stocks, capital gains, interest, rents and an annuity.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

1. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS:

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Whitney National Bank Hibernia National Bank	New Orleans, La. " " "
National American Bank National Bank of Commerce	" " " " " "

2. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

3. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 2 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI — CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
U. S.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE:
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS
- - -

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)
- - -

SECTION VII — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Loyola University of the South	Phil	Eng	1915	1919	AB	1919	?
Harvard Law School	Law		1920	1923	LLB	1923	?
Cambridge Univ., England	Eng	--	1923	1924	none	--	?
Tulane University Law School	Law		1924	1925	LLB	1925	?

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	
none				

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty at specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	
Headquarters US Marine Corps	Military Law	Oct 1944	Feb 1945	about 18

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE
—

SECTION VIII — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Cambridge, Eng.	General only	1923-4	X		X	

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

I attended Trinity College, Cambridge, for about nine months.

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HDQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING
None					

SECTION IX — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.) 20 ?

2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.) none

3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.) None

SECTION X — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Golf, Fishing, Tennis, Badminton, Bridge, Piano. Proficiency - Fair.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK None

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC. None

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN

Member of the Bar of Louisiana. Also licensed to practise before Federal Courts

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue) 1925

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue) 1958

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(Do not submit copies unless requested)* INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)*

None

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

None

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

None except public speaking incident to legal practise.

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

None.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From- and To-)* Sep 1947 to Date
2. GRADE GS 15
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Office of Operations/ Contact Division/ N.O.
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 10 (inc. 3 WAEs)
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief, New Orleans Field Office.
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Supervision and direction of professional and clerical employees. Carrying out policy and operational directives issued by headquarters. Maintaining liaison with other governmental agencies. Collecting and reporting positive foreign intelligence information. Appropriate duties incidental to the above.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From- and To-)*
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From- and To-)*
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From- and To-)*
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From- and To-)*
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII	CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS		
1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷	1 x	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷	1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Mrs Frances K Burke	wife	1906		x	US	6300 St. Charles Ave New Orleans 18, La.
Patricia W Burke	daughter	1937		x	US	" " " "

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

14-00000

7P.P.
Doc 1947
Doc

doc date,
26 may 1947

APPLIC[illegible]TION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOY[illegible]ENT

Standard Form 57 - June 1946
U. S. Civil Service Commission

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-2046.

4257

[illegible]TIONS.—Answer every question [illegible] completely. Typewrite or print [illegible] if you are applying for a [illegible] Civil Service examination, read the [illegible] announcement carefully and follow its instructions. Mail this application to the office [illegible] the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by [illegible] announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in [illegible]

1. Name of examination, or kind of position applied for:

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. Place of employment applied for:

4. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
William Patrick Burke, Jr.

5. Street and number or R. D. number.
6300 St. Charles Ave.

City or post office (including postal zone), and State.
New Orleans, La.

6. Legal or voting residence (State). Louisiana | 7. Office phone No. UP 1447 | Home phone UP 1447

8. Place of birth (city and State, if born outside U. S., name city and country):
New Orleans, La.

9. Date of birth (month, day, year) 22 Oct. 1900 | 10. Age last birthday: 46 | 11. ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. ☒ Married ☐ Single | 13. Height without shoes 6'1½" ...... feet ...... inches | Weight: 202 ...... pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No
If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade:
Major USMCR (inactive duty) 15 Aug. 1945

APPLICATION No.
ANNOUNCEMENT
SELECTION No.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Appor. ☐ Nonappor.	Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned	Entered register:
Notations	App. review	
	Approved:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disab.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		X
3 to 6 months?		X
6 to 12 months?		X
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— in Washington, D. C.?		X
anywhere in the United States?		X
outside the United States?		X

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations:
New Orleans, La.

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept? $ 8000.00 per year.
You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify: ☒ Occasionally ☐ Frequently ☐ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the spaces provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience).
(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.
(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment: (Month, year)
From: To present time

Exact title of your present position:
See appendix "A".

Salary or earnings:
Starting $ per
Present $ per

Place of employment (city and State):

Description of your work:

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment and division:

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfr. of locks, etc.):

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for desiring to change employment:

16—47799-3

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE.—In order to make [illegible] detailed information [illegible] about the training and experience that have [illegible] in the Armed Services. [illegible] attended no special or technical schools while in the service, write in Item (a) "No attendance at service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all [illegible] in duty assignment, showing dates of such assignment.

(a) First Special Service School attended:

See appendix "B"

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(b) What were you taught in First Special Service School?

(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School).

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From: To:

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?

(e) Second Special Service School attended:

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(f) What were you taught in Second Special Service School?

(g) Duty assignment after this training:

Dates of duty assignment (months, years).

From: To:

(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION.—Circle highest grade completed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of:

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(b) Give name and location of last high school attended

Jesuits High School, New Orleans, La.

(c) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired.

English, History.

(a) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended		Years Completed		Degrees Conferred		Semester Hours Credit
		From—	To—	Day	Night	Title	Date	
Loyola University, N.O. La	A & S	1915	1919	x		AB	1919	?
Harvard Law School, Cambridge	Law	1920	1923	x		LLB	1923	?
Tulane University, N.O. La	Law	1924	1925	x		LLB	1925	?

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
Philosophy, Eng. Science	?	Law and English Litt. Spent year (1923-1924) at Trinity Coll. Cambridge Univ. England in Eng. Litt. research.	

(e) Other training such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school), or in service training in a Federal agency:

Judge Advocate General of Navy;
USMC Institute

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended From—	To—	Years Completed Day	Night
Military Justice	1944	1945	x	
Post-Exchange Acctg.	"	"	x	

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.	Reading Exc.	Good	Fair	Speaking Exc.	Good	Fair	Understanding Exc.	Good	Fair
French			x			x			

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?

School and private lessons

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries, indicate (1) names of countries (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e.g. business, education, [illegible]):

England, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, etc. Study and recreation.

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short wave radio, [illegible], comptometer, key-punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices.

Approximate number of words per minute in typing 40 shorthand

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed [illegible] member of any trade or profession such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)

☒ Yes ☐ No Give kind of license and State:

Lawyer; Louisiana

First license or certificate (year):

Latest license or certificate (year): Continuous.

22. Give [illegible] in your application such as (a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested) (b) your patents or inventions (c) public speaking and public relations experience (d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

Practising lawyer in New Orleans for about fifteen years; member New Orleans and Louisiana State Bar Associations.

RECEIVED
JUN 7 8 51 AM '47

23. REFERENCES.—List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. James Gilly, Jr.	V.P. Whitney National Bank, N.O.La	Banker
2. Judge W. . Westerfield	Court of Appeals, New Court House Bldg., N. O. La.	Judge
3. Fred N. Ogden	American Bank Bldg. N. O. La.	Broker.

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☐ Yes ☐ No Not employed.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now, or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		X
28. Since your 16th birthday have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years service, amount of retirement pay, and state what retirement act, and rating if retired from military or naval service.		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 38.		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? (If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.)	X	
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?	X	
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?	Inactive Reserve.	
(c) Was service performed on an active full time basis with full military pay and allowances?	X	

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service	Date of separation or separations
8 Sept. 1942	Inactive duty 19 Dec. 1945

Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	Serial No. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation.)
USMCR	013458 Major USMCR

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY, OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		X
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		X
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		X
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service-connected disability?		X

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d) IS "YES" AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ______________ 19____

Appointing Officer ______________ Title

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions. Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	
	35. Defective distant vision, corrected by glasses		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80).

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date 26 May 1947.

Signature of applicant
(Sign your name in ink, using your given name, initial, and surname. If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name, as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe.")

WILLIAM P. BURKE

APPENDIX "A"

HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT.

(Sec. 21 in Form [illegible]; Sec. 16 in USCSC Std. Form 57)

The following is a complete account of my business and professional activities since my return to New Orleans, from England, in the fall of 1924.

I had obtained a law degree from Harvard in 1923, but, as the law of Louisiana differs in many important respects from the Common Law, I entered Tulane University Law School, in October 1924, to study Louisiana Civil Code subjects. In the afternoons I worked as a researcher for the law firm of Spencer, Gidiere, Phelps and Dunbar, (now Phelps, Dunbar, Marks and Claverie) [illegible] United Fruit Co. Bldg., New Orleans, La.

In July 1925 I received the degree of LLB from Tulane, passed the Louisiana Bar examinations, and entered practise as an associate of the firm named above. My salary was, as I recall it, $100.00 per month, plus 75% of the fees on the business which I originated. Such fees were negligible. My work consisted in research on matters assigned by members of the firm, and the handling of minor matters of litigation.

Among the clients of the Spencer firm was the New Orleans Bank & Trust Co., a small bank which had been organized a few years previously. In 1928 the bank decided to open a Trust Department, and offered me the job of organizing and running it, at a salary of $4000.00 per year. I accepted, organized the department and operated it successfully until 1931. My work consisted in soliciting wills, trusts and custodianship accounts, investing the funds of beneficiaries, administering estates and handling receiverships.

In 1931 the discount department of the New Orleans Bank & Trust Co. got into difficulties, and, for the protection of the depositors, the entire bank was taken over by the Interstate Trust & Banking Co., of New Orleans. No loss was suffered by any of the customers of the Trust Department. I became Assistant Trust Officer of the Interstate Bank, and could have remained there indefinitely, but I disliked the environment and the policies of the management, and I could see very little prospect for advancement, so I resigned when the trust accounts had been transferred.

In the fall of 1931 I organized a corporation which was to erect a moving-letter on Canal St., similar to the one on the Times Building in New York. Revenues were to be derived from the sale of advertising which was to be interspersed among news dispatches. It proved impossible, however, to sell sufficient contracts to make the operation profitable, and I liquidated the corporation in the early part of 1932.

Two of my classmates at Tulane, Eberhard P. Deutsch and R. Emmett Kerrigan had been practising law together since graduation, and were becoming quite successful. They asked me to join them, and, in the summer of 1932, I became a member of the firm of Deutsch, Kerrigan & Burke. For the next five years we engaged in the general civil practise of law in all City, State and Federal Courts. Among others, we represented the Billingsley Engineering Co., the Item Co., Ltd., publisher of one of the local daily papers, the Standard Dredging Co., and a number of insurance companies, and local corporations and individuals.

My work covered the whole field of civil corporate and individual practice: the preparation of pleadings, interviewing witnesses, conducting litigation, writing briefs, arguing cases in the instant and appellate courts, examining titles, administering estates, handling taxation matters, etc. My income averaged approximately $7000.00 per annum.

I resigned from the firm in 1937 and continued practise, as an individual, with offices in the Canal Bank Building, until I entered military service in 1942. My income during that period varied between five and eight thousand dollars.

I was on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps from September 1942 to December 1945. While I was overseas my mother died, leaving a considerable estate. I was named executor in her will, and, after my return, I spent several months in administering

APPENDIX "A"

the estate, transfering the securities and working out some rather complicated taxation matters.

I had decided, while in service, that I did not want to return to active law practise. The clients I had had before the war were being adequately served by other attorneys, and it would have meant starting all over again from scratch. I did not want to do that, so I began looking for a business in which I could invest capital and my services. Naturally, I have found quite a few, but none, as yet, which meets my requirements.

I am a member of the Board of Directors of the following corporations: The National Service & Appraisal Co., of Chicago, Ill., which is in the credit reporting business; the Cahill Realty Co., of St. Louis, Mo., a family real estate company; The Equitable Real Estate Co., Ltd., of New Orleans; and Miracle Services, Inc., a company which some of my associates and I organized recently to operate "Launderettes" in this territory.

I have been active in Civic matters, acting as team captain in drives of the Community Chest, and have taken part in drives by the Red Cross, The Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the Cancer Society, etc. I am a member of the Board of the Children's Bureau, a Chest agency, and a member of its finance committee.

WILLIAM P. BURKE

APPENDIX "B"

MILITARY SERVICE.
(Sec. 16 in Form 2105; Sec. 17 in USCSC Std. Form 57)

In the spring of 1942 the war came pretty close to New Orleans. There were submarines in the Gulf, tankers were being torpedoed as they left the river, and the hospitals were filled with horribly burned seamen. I was anxious to do what I could, but I felt that at my age there was little hope of taking an active part. I became an Air Raid warden, and helped sell some War Bonds, and I thought that was about all I would be able to do.

Then the Marine Corps came out with an announcement that commissions were open in Aviation Intelligence to men up to 45 years of age. I saw the Recruiting Officer, and he recommended me for such a commission. Nothing happened for some time, so when I was next in Washington on business I went to Marine Corps Headquarters and looked up Colonel Welford, whom I had known in New Orleans.

He ascertained that Aviation Intelligence was filled up, but stated that he would be glad to have me in the Recruiting Division, and that I might transfer to Aviation Intelligence later on. I was delighted to get into the Marine Corps, and accepted a commission as Captain on 8 September 1942.

After an indoctrination course at Quantico, Va., I was ordered to San Antonio, Tex., as assistant recruiting officer. I remained there for three months, devoting most of my time to the Student Officer procurement program in the various Texas colleges.

In December, 1942, the Marine Corps, which had, prior to that time, been an exclusively volunteer organization, was placed under the Selective Service System, and Marine Corps Headquarters decided to follow the lead of the Navy and appoint a Marine officer as liaison to each state Selective Service Headquarters. I was one of those appointed, and was ordered to Raleigh, N.C. on 12 January 1943.

The post at Raleigh was one of some importance because of the large Marine Corps bases at New River, Cherry Point and Edenton, at which over one hundred thousand Marines were in training, and at which construction and maintainance programs involving several hundred millions of dollars were in operation. It was my duty to supervise the induction of all North Carolina selectees who were assigned to the Marine Corps through the Selective Service System, and to represent the various Marine Corps installations in their dealings and disputes with local draft boards concerning the deferment of about five thousand civilian employees.

In addition, I took an active part in the administration of the Selective Service Headquarters in Raleigh and throughout the state, interviewing registrants, their employers and dependents, advising local and appeal boards, setting up replacement schedules for various industries and passing on the merits of about eleven thousand appeals.

The work was interesting and productive, and living in Raleigh was certainly "good duty", but I had never lost my desire for overseas duty and made two attempts to transfer to Aviation, both of which were unsuccessful. Then, in September 1944 I heard that Marine Divisions overseas were badly in need of Legal Officers, and I immediately applied for transfer. I was ordered to Headquarters for indoctrination, and, after a tour of duty in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, I was sent to Camp Lejeune in February 1945 for further training. In April 1945 I sailed from San Francisco, and in May I joined the Fourth Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, at Maui, as Division Legal Officer. I continued in that post until the war ended and I procured a transfer to the inactive list.

A Marine Division consists of approximately [illegible] men. The Division Legal Officer is directly responsible to the Commanding General for the administration of military justice throughout the command, and supervises the work and findings of all General, Summary and Deck Courts, as well as those of all Boards of Investigation and Courts of Inquiry. He advises the Commanding General on the action to be taken as Convening Authority or Immediate Superior in Command. In addition he advises the Commanding General and Chief of Staff on all legal matters arising out of contact with natives, with civilian and military authorities and with the owners of training areas

WILLIAM P. BURKE

APPENDIX "B"

used by the troops. Moreover, he acts as Legal Assistance Officer to the Division, which involved, during my term of office, the giving of legal advice and service to about eight hundred individuals.

I returned to the United States on 25 October 1945, and completed my terminal leave on 1? December 1945.

During my term of service my superiors rendered reports on my fitness each ninety days. All of these reports were favorable, and many of them contained commendations. I was promoted to Major in August 1945, to rank from May 1943, and I hold a permanent commission as Major in the Reserve. My file number is 013458.

Rec. rcd: 6 Jan 1947

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): BURKE, William P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 22 Oct 1900
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO (Contact) (Ch)
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 9 September 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 9/9/56 - 9/8/57

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one):
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:
Subject is stationed in Louisiana.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify)

B. THIS DATE: 31 Oct 57
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: EMAshcraft E. M. Ashcraft
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY GW DATE 11-1-57
Posted Pos. Control
Reviewed by PCO Rctt 11/4/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 31 Oct 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: George G. Carey George G. Carey
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I)
1 NOV 55
REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 12 36 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Management of domestic field office	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Obtaining the effective support of non-governmental sources and contacts in his area	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 The planning and carrying out of effective intelligence collection	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Support of other elements of CIA in his area	RATING NUMBER 3

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Complete integrity; knowledge of area, familiarity with source potentials and attitudes, ability to obtain close cooperation of non-governmental sources at high level; loyalty to staff. Somewhat inclined to take legalistic approach to relationships with other elements of CIA and other IAC local representatives, with consequent loss of flexibility.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual,....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): BURKE William P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 22 Oct 1900
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO (Contact)
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 9 September 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 9/9/56 - 9/8/57
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 31 Oct 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: EMAshcraft E. M. Ashcraft
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 31 Oct 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: George G. Carey George G. Carey
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 2

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV [illegible]
ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

80

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

He is willing to leave the New Orleans area for an overseas tour, but not for duty in Washington. Since his background has been entirely in the general collection field, and since he has no substantive training, it is difficult to conceive of such an overseas position. He is eminently suited to continue in his present assignment.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

No further training or experience planned or considered necessary, with the exception of periodic meetings of the CD/OO field chiefs.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

See Section G(4) above.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) [redacted]	(First) William	(Middle) P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 22 Oct 1900	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO (Contact)

7. GRADE: GS-15

8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 9 September 1956

9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 9/9/55 - 9/8/56

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:
Subject is stationed in Louisiana.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 7 Nov 56

C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: E. M. Ashcraft E. M. ASHCRAFT

D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY gw DATE 11-13-56
Posted For. Control
Reviewed by [illegible] 11/15

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 8

B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: George G. Carey GEORGE G. CAREY

C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 13 2 23 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Management of domestic field office.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Obtaining the effective support of non-governmental sources and contacts in his area.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area.	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 The planning and carrying out of effective intelligence collection.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Support of other elements of CIA in his area.	RATING NUMBER 3

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

The ability to obtain high degree of cooperation from important industrial and educational sources in his area; ability to plan and direct the operations of his office with efficiency and exceptionally high standards; complete integrity. This integrity, coupled with a somewhat legalistic approach to many problems, tends to make him somewhat inflexible in his approach to the sometimes unusual requirements of Intelligence, particularly when they concern clandestine matters.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): BURKE William P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 22 Oct 1900
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO (Contact)
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 9 September 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 9/9/55 - 9/8/56
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 7 Nov 56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: EMAshcraft E. M. ASHCRAFT
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 8 [illegible] 1956
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: George G. Carey GEORGE G. CAREY
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 2

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

70

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

He has indicated his unwillingness to leave the New Orleans area, he is eminently fitted to continue in his present job and, with the possible exception of logistics, it is difficult to conceive of another area in CIA to which he would readily adapt.

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

No further training or experience planned or considered necessary, with the exception of periodic meetings of the CD/OO field chiefs.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

See Section G (4) above.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15 RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service: and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

CODED

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: - Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

BY DATE
Posted Pos. Control WLR OCT 18 1955
Reviewed by FID 10/20/55

annual 9-9-56 next report due

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BURKE, William P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 22 Oct 1900	3. SEX M	4. CAREER DESIGNATION ✓ OC
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 9 September 1947	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO Operations	7. DIVISION Contact	8. BRANCH New Orleans Office
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION: New Orleans, Louisiana		11. GRADE GS-15
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 9 September 1955	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) ✓9/9/54 - 9/8/55		

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Chief, New Orleans Office GS-0132.21-15
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 19 September 1948

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

The active management of a major domestic field office. This includes: (1) the supervision and direction of the professional and clerical personnel of that office; (2) within the broad directives of the Contact Division, the assessment of the intelligence capability of his assigned area, the conduct of methodical exploitation of the intelligence sources within his area, and the maintenance of close and affective relationship with Contact Division Headquarters for the purpose of directing local exploitation along the lines of current requirements and priorities; (3) the effective support of all elements of the Agency, required within his area; and (4) the maintenance of all Federal, State and local liaisons necessary to the accomplishment of his mission.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ has ☑ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE 5 October 55	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) EMAshcraft E. M. ASHCRAFT

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE 6 Oct 55	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) George G. Carey GEORGE G. CAREY

FORM NO. 45
1 JAN 55
REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at each statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have a definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 2 05 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	CATEGORIES												
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN, WHEN NEED ARISES.											X			
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.												X		
4. HAS INITIATIVE.											X			
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.												X		
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.											X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X						
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.							X							
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA: CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.											X			
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.											X			
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.								X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.									X					
24 EVEN DISPOSITION								X						
25 ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT											X			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.									X					
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".										X				
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.												X		
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.	X													
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.												X		
36. DELIBERATE.											X			
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.							X							
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.											X			
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.											X			
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.													X	
45. VERSATILE.										X				
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Complete integrity, high standards of behavior and accomplishment, the ability to induce cooperation at a high level, experience in domestic collection.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Somewhat inflexibly high moral and ethical standards.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 2 05 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

Integrity and general competence.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None, beyond periodic visits to Division headquarters.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

See B above.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

None applicable. He is capable of greater responsibilities in certain areas

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET

ISSUED IN LIEU OF FORM 50

NATURE OF ACTION CHANGE IN OCCUPATIONAL CODE AND/OR TITLE.

EFFECTIVE DATE 31 MARCH 1955

[redacted]

POSITION TITLE	NEW CODE	NAME	POSITION NUMBER	
IO-CONTACT-CH	GS-0132.21	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	K 195	101773

POSTED
MAY 16 1955

[redacted]

APPROVED HARRISON G. REYNOLDS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

Pers adj
5/11/55

SECRET

WILLIAM P. BURKE
Post Office Box 1016
New Orleans, La.

6 December 1954

Mr. C. F. Camp
Chief, Personnel Procurement
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Camp:

I am today in receipt of your letter of 1 December 1954 concerning Mr. Clapp's visit and Mr. McBride.

I was not in New Orleans at the time when Mr. Clapp was here and accordingly did not have the pleasure of seeing him.

I am sorry that Mr. Clapp did not succeed in making contact with Mr. McBride. If I happen to learn of a more recent address of Mr. McBride, I shall pass the information on to you.

Very truly yours,

William P. Burke

WPB/gn

SECRET

DD/P - 1-1931-b

SEP 16 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Commendation of DD/I Personnel

1. For the past several months my office has had an urgent and a continuing need for intelligence about Guatemala -- for intelligence in such variety that at one time or another almost every DD/I component contributed.

2. Each of them -- offices as well as individuals within the DD/I area -- responded with a highly impressive alacrity and completeness. Their contributions were thorough in their coverage and fast in their preparation.

3. It is difficult to cite the work of particular individuals and components of DD/I, because much inconspicuous but essential labor must never have come to my attention. Risking the chance that such work might unfairly be unrecognized, I nevertheless believe that the work of the following individuals and units deserves special recognition:

John V. Armstrong, Milton H. Brown, Archie C. Bush and David L. Campa, OCI.

Miss Dorothy A. Brandao, William P. Burke, Hunter C. Leake and Lloyd A. Ray, New Orleans field office, OO/C.

William Buchanan, Kansas City field office, OO/C.

Miss Betty Didcoct and David F. Maley, Geography Division, ORR.

Norman E. Greenawalt, Charles D. Stockton, Milton S. Venezky and Robert J. Voskuil, Cartography Division, ORR.

Zygmund Lenchert, Richard V. Shamp and John E. Wilson, Photo Intelligence Division, ORR.

Harry A. McCrea and David R. McLean, OO/C.

Lawrence Snitzer, New York field office, OO/C.

SECRET

Office of Research and Reports which put its major resources at our disposal. ORR's geographic research area freely gave us the time of trained cartographers and interpreters. Without their skills, and the endless hours they applied those skills for us, our operations would have been most difficult. ORR's economic research area contributed less only because we asked for less; economic intelligence was not as vital as geographic intelligence to this operation. In addition, the major economic contribution was recognized and commended in my 7 June 1954 memorandum to you.

Foreign Broadcast Information Division which monitored Guatemalan and related broadcasts with more than its usual care, and, among other special activities, arranged a direct wire service so that our field headquarters unit received the monitored broadcasts immediately. The entire division turned to its task with such unity that singling out for commendation the work of any of its people is impossible.

Foreign Documents Division which gave us translations quickly and in the priority needed. Its service was the more remarkable for its lack of a Western Hemisphere unit. Initiative, flexibility, and willingness were substituted for this organizational lack.

Contact Division which provided a wide variety of services we requested, and on its own initiative proposed other useful services. It re-doubled collection of Central American intelligence information by its net-work of domestic field stations, it carefully watched the southern ports of entry into the United States on a 24-hour day basis, it provided us with commercial news clipping services and the texts of news broadcasts, and it located, surveilled and in many cases interviewed Guatemalans within the United States in whom we were interested.

CIA Library, especially its Book Branch. All components, however contributed. Its clipping service was reliable, alert, and keen to render maximum service. The Information Section promptly handled numerous spot requests and gave resourceful assistance well beyond the confines of its routine duties. The Book Branch surveyed periodical and scholarly literature meticulously, and thus uncovered much information useful to a psychological campaign.

Graphics Register whose Photo Branch and Film Branch both gave services much beyond the normal course of duty, and showed ingenuity in locating and preparing special materials.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

SEP 28 1954
BY DATE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Offices

1. NAME (Last) BURKE, (First) William (Middle) P., Jr.
2. GRADE GS-15
3. POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Chief) CD-00
4. OFFICE DDI/OO
STAFF OR DIVISION Contact
BRANCH New Orleans
☐ DEPT'L.
☒ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 9/9/53 To 9/8/54
6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special
☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

General and detailed supervision, direction and support of the activities of personnel attached to the New Orleans Office, with a view to insuring the highest standard of professional and clerical performance and the most complete coverage of the area within this office's jurisdiction. Interpretation and implementation of policies originated by higher echelons. Maintenance of liaison with field installations of other IAC agencies for the purpose of effecting coordination of domestic intelligence collection. Collection and reporting of positive foreign intelligence information from domestic nongovernmental sources. Provision of support to other components of CIA.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
None			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

In the type of work in which I am presently engaged.

10. DATE 31 August 1954
SIGNATURE W P Burke Jr

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

He performs these duties conscientiously and efficiently.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

By the maintenance of his office and official relationships in an area of peculiar traditional independence and integrity, on a firm and high level.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 28 10 55 AM '54
MAIL ROOM

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

To continuing his present efforts to reach a broader understanding of the whole intelligence problem, both within CIA and in the IAC complex. To a more tolerant approach to support problems.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He is capable of greater responsibilities now.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None, other than periodic visits to OO/C headquarters.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

24 Sept. 54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

27 Sept '54
DATE

George G. Carey
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

BURKE, William P. Jr.

OFFICE: OO
DIVISION: Contact
BRANCH:
SECTION: New Orleans Off.

I. FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Central Intelligence Agency	New Orleans, La.	✓	9	1947	5	1	52	27	3	4
Total Civilian Service										

SCD - 13 [illegible]
OK
5.5
9/1/51

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
U S Marine Corps (Reserve)	8	9	1942	31	10	1945	26	/	/
Total Military Service							26	/	/

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

11 Dec 1951.
DATE

W. P. Burke Jr.
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
23	5	7

1. Agency and organizational designation
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OO [illegible]act—New Orleans Office

2. Pay roll period [redacted]

3. Block No. 4238

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name
Mr. William P. Burkes Jr

6. Grade and salary
G-15 $10,750.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	TAX	RET.	BOND			NET PAY
7. Previous normal										
8. New normal										
9. Pay this period										

10. Remarks:
PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 24 OCT. 1951
SALARY ADJUSTED TO $ 11,800.00

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase. ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. (a) Efficiency rating is good or better than good and service and conduct requirements certified: (b) (Signature of Other Authentication)	19. Suspense date
9/16/51	3/17/50	$10,750.00	$11,000.00		10/12/51

20. LWOP date (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP .... Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Feb. 3, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

10/1/51 g

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN POSITION SLOTTING AND OR CHANGE IN POSITION DESIGNATION

NO CHANGE IN GRADE IS INVOLVED

DATE OF T O APPROVAL 6 FEB 1952
EFF DATE OF POSITION SLOTTING 24 MARCH 52

OO CONTACT DIVISION

NAME & TITLE	PERSONS GRADE SERIES	POSITION NUMBER
BURKE WILLIAM P IO CHIEF	GS 132 15	K195
RAY LLOYD ANTHONY INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 14	K196
LEAKE HUNTER C II INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 14	K19601
BRANDAO DOROTHY A ADM ASSISTANT	GS 301 7	K197
LATNO JOAN MCT INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 7	K198
NAGEL GERTRUDE G SECRETARY STENO	GS 318 5	K199
DUFFY GLADYS E SECRETARY STENO	GS 318 5	K19901
ANDERSON MAY HELEN CLERK STENOGRAPHER	GS 312 4	K200

HOUSTON OFFICE

NAME & TITLE	PERSONS GRADE SERIES	POSITION NUMBER
RISCHE ERNEST A IO CHIEF	GS 132 15	K201
HAYNES BEN P INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 14	K202
IVES GEORGE O INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 13	K203

CONFIDENTIAL

Public Law 513, approved May 13, 1950, 81st Congress (2nd Session), is quoted verbatim herewith:

"AN ACT

"To enhance further the security of the United States by preventing disclosures of information concerning the cryptographic systems and the communications intelligence activities of the United States.

"BE IT ENACTED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED. That whoever shall knowingly and willfully communicate, furnish, transmit, or otherwise make available to an unauthorized person, or publish, or use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information (1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government or (2) concerning the design, construction, use maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or (3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government, or (4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign government knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

"Sec. 2. (a) The term 'classified information' as used herein shall be construed to mean information which, at the time of a violation under this Act, is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution

"(b) The terms 'code' cipher', and 'cryptographic system' as used herein shall be construed to include in their meanings, in additions to their usual meanings, any method of secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, significance, or meanings of communications.

"(c) The term 'foreign government' as used herein shall be construed to include in its meaning any person or persons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign country, or for or on behalf of any government or any person or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country, whether or not such government is recognized by the United States.

"(d) The term 'communication intelligence' as used herein shall be construed to mean all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"(e) The term 'unauthorized person' as used herein shall be construed to mean any person who, or agency which, is not authorized to receive information of the categories set forth in section 1 of this Act, by the President, or by the head of a department or agency of the United States Government which is expressly designated by the President to engage in communication intelligence activities for the United States.

"Sec. 3. Nothing in this Act shall prohibit the furnishing, upon lawful demand, of information to any regulary constituted committee of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States of America, or joint committee thereof."

I, William P. Burke, do hereby certify that I have read, and thoroughly understand, Public Law 513, quoted above.

Signed: Wm P Burke

Date : 6 Nov. 1950

Witness : Jean M. Latos

Position: Communicator, N.C.

Date : 6 November 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 50 (6 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER 6-1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

RM (gk) 130

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. William P. Burke, Jr. 01775	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/22/1900	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 4/11/50

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Periodic Step Increase *	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 3/19/50	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY CIA Admin. Inst. 20-3 Dated 12/9/49

FROM		TO
Regional Manager GS-15 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Regional Manager GS-15 (Intelligence Officer)
GS-15 $10500.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-15 $10750.00 per annum
Operations Contact New Orleans Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Operations Contact New Orleans Office
New Orleans, Louisiana	11. HEADQUARTERS	New Orleans, Louisiana
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL	
		X		Bu.#V-192

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2105900 TO: 529-303	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Louisiana

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

*Last equivalent salary increase 9/19/48

Efficiency Rating: Excellent
Approved 3/20/49

Conduct Report: Satisfactory
Dated 3/6/50

vrp 4/11/50

Andrew E. Van Esso
ANDREW E. VAN ESSO
Chief, Administrative Staff
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1949

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 3/19/50 based on performance during period from 3/22/49 to 3/19/50

William E. Burke, Jr. Intelligence Officer GS-15
(Name of employee) (Title of position, service, and grade)

OO, Contact
(Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE		CHECK ONE:
✓ if adequate − if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☐ All others ☐

- ____ (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
- ____ (2) Mechanical skill.
- ____ (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
- ____ (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
- ✓ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
- ____ (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
- ____ (7) Accuracy of operations.
- ____ (8) Accuracy of final results.
- ✓ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
- + (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
- ____ (11) Industry.
- ____ (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
- ✓ (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? Yes) (Yes or no)
- ____ (14) Ability to organize his work.
- + (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
- ____ (16) Cooperativeness.
- ____ (17) Initiative.
- ____ (18) Resourcefulness.
- + (19) Dependability.
- ____ (20) Physical fitness for the work.
- + (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
- ____ (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
- ____ (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
- + (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
- ____ (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
- ____ (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
- ____ (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
- ____ (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
- ____ (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
- ____ (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
- ____ (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

____ (A) ____

____ (B) ____

____ (C) ____

STANDARD
Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form

	Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory

Adjective Rating
Rating official E
Reviewing official E

Rated by Lyman Kirkpatrick (Signature of rating official) Chief, Contact Div. (Title) 16 March 1950 (Date)

Reviewed by (Signature of reviewing official) AD/OO (Title) 20 Mar 1950 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 3/20/50 (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—30177-6

14-00000

PERIODIC PAY INCREASE REPORT

TO
Mrs. Firrin Contact

THIS DATE
3/2/1950

In order to determine whether the employee named below is eligible for a periodic pay increase it is necessary that his (or her) immediate supervisor execute the following "Conduct Report" and obtain the signature of the highest supervisor having knowledge of the employee's conduct.

CONDUCT REPORT

NAME OF EMPLOYEE
William P. Burke

POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE
Intell. Off. GS-15

☒ This employee's conduct has been satisfactory.

☐ This employee's conduct has been unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

Last equivalent salary increase 9/19/48
Eff Rating - E - 8/20/49
Effec. Date 8/19/50
2105908
529-368

F. McClellan

SIGNATURE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Lyman Kirkpatrick

DATE
6 March 195

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE

FORM NO. 37-105
OCT 1949

RETURN TO: PERSONNEL DIVISION
ATT: TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS BRANCH

1949

STANDARD FORM NO. 50 PART I
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R064.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PM (sm) 130

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST) Mr. William P. Burke, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/22/1900	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 10-28-49

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Conversion-Class. Act of 1949	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 10-30-49	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Letter - DCI - 10-28-49

FROM		TO
Regional Manager P-8 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Regional Manager GS-15 (Intelligence Officer)
P-8 $10,305.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	GS-15 $10,500.00 per annum
Operations Contact New Orleans Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Operations Contact New Orleans Office
New Orleans, Louisiana	11. HEADQUARTERS	New Orleans, Louisiana
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

R. L. McClellan
Acting Chief, Personnel Division
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
	X				X		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	S. A.	REAL
		X	

Bu. CF-192 mm 11/10/49

17. SEX M	18. RACE W	19. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2105900 TO: 529-303	20. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE Louisiana

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1948 630940

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.

✓

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 3/19/49 based on performance during period from 9/19/48 to 3/19/49

William P. Burke, Jr. (Name of employee) Intelligence Officer, P-8 (Title of position, service, and grade)

OO, Contact (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE **✓ if adequate** **− if weak** **+ if outstanding**	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	**CHECK ONE:** Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☐ All others ☐

...... (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
...... (2) Mechanical skill.
...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
...... (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
...... (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
+ (7) Accuracy of operations.
+ (8) Accuracy of final results.
+ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
......(10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
......(11) Industry.
......(12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
......(13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? .... (Yes or no))
......(14) Ability to organize his work.
+ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
+ (16) Cooperativeness.
+ (17) Initiative.
+ (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
......(20) Physical fitness for the work.

...... *(21) Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
...... *(22) Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
...... *(23) Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
+ *(24) Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
+ *(25) Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
...... *(26) Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
+ *(27) Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
...... *(28) Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
...... *(29) Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
+ *(30) Ability to make decisions.*
+ *(31) Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

...... (A) ....
...... (B) ....
...... (C) ....

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	*Adjective Rating*
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory

	Adjective Rating
Rating official..	E
Reviewing official..	E

Rated by Lyman Kirkpatrick (Signature of rating official) Chief, Contact Br. (Title) 23 March 1949 (Date)

Reviewed by (Signature of reviewing official) Dp AD/OO (Title) 24 March 1949 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 3-28-49 (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)

ST

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME BURKE, WILLIAM P.	NATURE OF ACTION E.O.D.
TITLE OF POSITION Regional Manager	GRADE P-8
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Field	

Subject was found physically ☒ fit ☐ unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position. 11 September 1947

RECOMMENDATIONS:

28 December 1948
DATE

John R. Pretzer
SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 36-57
NOV 1948

14-00000

RESTRICTED

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

NAME: William P. Burke, Jr.

NATURE OF ACTION: Transfer + Promotion

EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 September 1948 ~~Immediately~~

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS
LAST WORKING DAY:

FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

CLASSIFICATION — INITIAL: CKK — DATE: 9-21-48

VICE ☐
IA ☐
VV ☐
NEW ✓

Bu. # F-172
12-4-47
Di

QUALIFICATION & REVIEW — INITIAL: GCA — DATE: 9-21-48

219590
5 29-308
Scha-45 Law 9-23-48

APPROVED: 5 1946

Walter C. Ford
SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR)

J. T. Simmon - 15 Sept '48
SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE FOR A&M)

J. F. Kelley 15 Sept '48
SIGNATURE (CHIEF, PERSONNEL BRANCH)

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Asst. Regional Manager (Intelligence Officer) P-7	Regional Manager (Intelligence Officer) P-8
GRADE AND SALARY	P-7, ~~$8179.50~~ 8509.50 p.a.	P-8, $10,305.00 p.a.
OFFICE	Operations	Operations
BRANCH	Contact	Contact Br
DIVISION	Control	New Orleans Office
SECTION	Southern I.A.O.	—
OFFICIAL STATION	New Orleans, Louisiana	New Orleans, Louisiana
DEPT. OR FIELD	Field	Field 130

REMARKS:

RECOMMENDED: George G. Carey
ORGE G. CAREY
Assistar. Director for Operations

DATE: 15 Sept, 1948.

FORM NO. 37-3
OCT 1946

RESTRICTED

(1514)

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R066

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

130

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION [illegible] (cs) 130

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - FIRST - MIDDLE INITIAL - LAST) Mr. William P. Burke, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/22/1900	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 9/17/1948

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Transfer & Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 9/19/1948	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-45

FROM		TO
Asst. Regional Manager P-7 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Regional Manager P-8 (Intelligence Officer)
P-7 $8509.50 per annum Bu.#7800	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	P-8 $10,305.00 per annum
Operations Contact Control Southern I.A.O.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Operations Contact Branch New Orleans Office
New Orleans, Louisiana	11. HEADQUARTERS	New Orleans, Louisiana
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

DOG - 09/19/48
CSED - 09/15/47
LCD - 09/18/47

WJP 9/24/48

WILLIAM J. KELLY
Chief, Personnel Branch
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
	X				X		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION Bu.#7-192 12/4/47

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL
		X	

17. SEX M	18. RACE W	19. APPROPRIATION FROM 2195900 TO 529-308	20. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE Louisiana

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1948 783384

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Executive Registry
0-1833

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Executive for Administration and Management DATE: SEP 15 1948

FROM : Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion of Mr. William Patrick Burko, Jr.

1. It is requested that the attached recommendation for promotion of Mr. William P. Burke, Jr. from P-7 to P-8 be approved even though Mr. Burke has not served the required time in-grade as established in Paragraph 4c of Administrative Instruction No. 20-1. This recommendation is based upon the fact he has served in his present capacity as Acting Chief, New Orleans Office, OO/C, for approximately one year and his performance of duty has been outstanding.

2. Mr. Burke entered on duty as Acting Chief, New Orleans Office, OO/C, on 9 September 1947 in which capacity he is still serving. The position of Chief, New Orleans Office, has been allocated as a P-8.

3. Subsequent to assuming his duties as Acting Chief of the New Orleans Office, Mr. Burke displayed great initiative and unusual ability in planning his organization and without any loss of time, placed it on a highly productive basis. Mr. Burke has not overlooked any possible sources of intelligence within his area, and is submitting extremely valuable reports, particularly those that pertain to Latin America. In addition, Mr. Burke's office has produced comprehensive reports on the intelligence potentialities of Houston, Texas and Tulsa, Oklahoma, convincing this office that field offices in both localities will be justified.

4. Mr. Burke's accomplishments as Acting Chief, New Orleans Office have been outstanding. Due to his unusual leadership the morale of his office personnel has been maintained at a high level, despite heavy working conditions.

5. Mr. Burke received an A.B. degree from Loyola University, New Orleans, in 1919 and LLB degrees from Harvard Law School and Tulane University in 1923 and 1925 respectively. In addition, he spent one year of study at Cambridge University, England. Upon graduation from law school, he became affiliated with various prominent law firms in New Orleans, and in 1937 established his own firm which he operated on a successful level until his entry into the military service during World War II.

6. Mr. Burke has an outstanding military record, having served approximately three years in the U. S. Marine Corps during World War II, and being honorably released from duty with the rank

CONFIDENTIAL

of Major. During his tour of duty with the U. S. Marine Corps, he served in the capacity of liaison officer with Selective Service and later, as legal officer with the Fourth Marine Division in the Pacific.

7. By reason of his civilian and military experience and wide acquaintanceship in New Orleans, Mr. Burke is exceptionally well qualified for his present assignment and is performing his duties in an outstanding manner. In view of his superior accomplishments and contributions to the successful operation of the Contact Branch, it is strongly recommended that Mr. Burke's promotion to the grade of P-8 be approved.

George G. Carey

GEORGE G. CAREY

19 May 1948

Mr. William P. Burke
P. O. Box 1016
New Orleans, 6, Louisiana

Dear Bill:

Prior to leaving CIA, I want to record my sincere appreciation of the fine job done by you in New Orleans.

Your achievement is all the more noteworthy when it is remembered that you started in your city singlehanded and with little guidance or precedence. Within the space of less than a year, you have created an effective field office which is now making a significant contribution to national intelligence.

Inspections reveal that your relations with the local Armed Forces representatives as well as with your clients are excellent. Noted also is the high morale in your office.

Please accept my congratulations for this splendid record and accept my gratitude for your loyal support.

With best wishes for your continued success,

Very sincerely,

EDWIN L. SIBERT
Brigadier General, GSA
Assistant Director for Operations

ELS:rn

cc: Personnel Files ✓
Chief, OO/C

Standard Form No. 51, Rev.
Approved Dec. 1943
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 458

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.
Approval expires Mar. 30, 1945.

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (✓) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL or TRIAL PERIOD ( )

As of 3/31/48 based on performance during period from 9/9/47 to 3/31/48

William F. Burke (Name of employee) Intelligence Officer P-7 (Title of position, service, and grade)

Operations, Contact (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE		CHECK ONE:
V if adequate − if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☑ All others ☐

...... (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
...... (2) Mechanical skill.
...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
+ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
...... (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
...... (7) Accuracy of operations.
...... (8) Accuracy of final results.
+ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
+ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
...... (11) Industry.
...... (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
...... (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? .... (Yes or no))
...... (14) Ability to organize his work.
+ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
...... (16) Cooperativeness.
...... (17) Initiative.
+ (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
...... (20) Physical fitness for the work.

+ (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
...... (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
...... (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
+ (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
+ (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
+ (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
+ (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
+ (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
...... (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
+ (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
...... (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

...... (A) ....
...... (B) ....
...... (C) ....

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	Adjective rating		Adjective rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and no minus marks	Excellent	Rating official	E
Plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements, and no minus marks	Very good		
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and any minus marks overcompensated by plus marks	Good	Reviewing official	E
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and minus marks not overcompensated by plus marks	Fair		
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory		

Rated by [illegible] (Signature of rating official) Chief F/D (Title) .... (Date)

Reviewed by Lyman Kirkpatrick (Signature of reviewing official) [illegible] (Title) [illegible] April 1948 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee [illegible] (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—28177-8

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

10856

Assistant Director for Operations 9 October 1947

Executive Director

Identification for Contact Specialists

1. Attached are:

a. Three original letters of introduction dated 9 October 1947, signed by the Director of Central Intelligence, registration number 104, copy 1 - 3, to be issued to Mr. William P. Burke, Jr., Chief of the New Orleans office of your Contact Branch, and copies 4 and 5 for record purposes.

b. Three original letters of introduction dated 9 October 1947, signed by the Director of Central Intelligence, registration number 105, copy 1 - 3, to be issued to Mr. Jay B. L. Reeves, Chief of the Pittsburgh office of your Contact Branch, and copies 4 and 5 for record purposes.

c. Three original letters of introduction dated 9 October 1947, signed by the Director of Central Intelligence, registration number 106, copy 1 - 3, to be issued to Mr. Harrison G. Reynolds, Chief of the Boston office of your Contact Branch, and copies 4 and 5 for record purposes.

d. Sample of letter of introduction to be used in connection with above letters, to be written and signed in each case by the field office chief concerned.

2. The Assistant Director for Operations may request additional similar letters when new field offices of the Contact Branch are established and when field office chiefs are changed.

3. Instructions relative to accounting for the registered letters signed by the Director will be issued to you direct from the Central Records Division of the Services Branch, A&M.

4. The Chief, Personnel Branch, A&M, will place a notation with the personnel records of each field office chief to whom these letters are issued, and will be responsible that these individuals are not reassigned or separated until these registered letters have been accounted for and withdrawn for destruction.

5. The Assistant Director for Operations and the Executive for Inspection and Security will cause such inspections to be made of the use of these means of identification as will insure maintenance of adequate security in connection therewith.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

L. T. SHANNON
~~Acting Executive Director~~
ExecDir ArM.

4 Enclosures
1. Ltr from DCI re William P. Burke (copies 1-5)
2. Ltr from DCI re J[illegible] L. Reeves (copies 1-5)
3. Ltr from DCI re H[illegible]on G. Reynolds (copies 1-5)
4. Sample ltr of introduction to be used by chiefs of [illegible] offices

cc: Chief, Pers Br.
cc: Chief, Svcs Br (for C.R.)
cc: Exec for I&S

[illegible]

12 September 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Personnel Branch
Executive for A & M

SUBJECT: Detail of William P. Burke, Jr.

REFERENCE: 37-3, "Personnel Action Request," dated 10 July 1947

It is hereby requested that your records be marked to show that Mr. Burke has been designated Acting Manager of the New Orleans Interagency Office. It is not intended to recruit anyone against the P-8 Manager position.

Hayden Channing
HAYDEN CHANNING
Executive Officer
Contact Branch

AFFIDAVIT

STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(DEPT. OR ESTAB.)

(BUREAU OR OFFICE)

WASHINGTON, D. C.
(PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT)

I, WILLIAM P. BURKE, JR., DO HEREBY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I AM NOT ENGAGED IN ANY STRIKE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT I WILL NOT SO ENGAGE WHILE AN EMPLOYEE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; THAT I AM NOT A MEMBER OF AN ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES THAT ASSERTS THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT I WILL NOT WHILE A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE BECOME A MEMBER OF SUCH AN ORGANIZATION.

Wm P Burke Jr
(SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE OR APPOINTEE)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 11th ~~tenth~~ DAY OF September, 19 47 AT Washington, STATE OF D. C.

Elizabeth Morrison
Appointment Clerk

Chapter 145, Title II, Sec. 206
Act of June 26, 1943

FORM NO. 37-24
SEP 1946

(1590)

Standard Form No. 61a
Approved January 28, 1941
U. S. Civil Service Commission
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 409

OATH OF OFFICE, AFFIDAVIT, AND DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP (Department or Establishment) .... (Bureau or Division) WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of Employment)

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I, WILLIAM P. BURKE, JR.
Do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT

Do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence; and that during such time as I am an employee of the Federal Government, I will not advocate nor become a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence.

C. DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

Do further certify that (1) I have not paid or offered or promised to pay any money or other thing of value to any person, firm, or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment; (2) I will inform myself of and observe the provisions of the Civil Service law and rules and Executive orders concerning political activity, political assessments, etc., as quoted on the attached Information for Appointee, and [strike out either (3) or (4)]

(3) the answers given by me in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this sheet are true and correct;

(4) ~~the answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. ...., dated ...., 19...., filed with the above-named department or establishment, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date, except for the following (if necessary, use additional sheet; if no exceptions write "none"; if (4) is executed, the reverse of this sheet need not be used):~~

W. P. Burke Jr.
(Signature of Appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this ~~10th~~ 11th day of September A. D. 19 47

at Washington (City), D. C. (State)

[SEAL] Chapter 145, Title II, Sec. 206
Act of June 26, 1943

Elizabeth Morrison
(Signature of Officer)

Appointment Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown

16—32804-2

~~10~~ 9 September 1947 (Date of Entrance on Duty) Asst. Regional Manager, P-7, $5179.50 (Position to which appointed) 22 Oct 1900 (Date of Birth)

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form, if required, is to be completed before entrance on duty. Every question must be answered. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancelation of application or dismissal after appointment. False personation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. Present Address 6300 St. Charles Avenue, New Orleans 15 La.
(Street and Number) (City and State)

2. Who should be notified in case of emergency? Mrs Wm P. Burke wife
(Name) (Relationship)
6300 St. Charles Ave New Orleans La
(Street and Number) (City and State)

3. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (either by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? Yes or No? NO If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

Name	Post office address (Give street number, if any)	(1) Bureau and (2) Temporary or not, and (3) Department or office in which employed	Relationship	Married or single	Age
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

4. Place of birth New Orleans La
(Town) (State or Country)

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	Yes	No
5. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
6. If foreign born, have you furnished proof of naturalization or citizenship to (1) the U. S. Civil Service Commission?		X
(2) this agency in connection with this appointment?		X
7. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, has there been any change in the status of your citizenship or of the persons through whom you gained your citizenship?		X
8. (a) Do you hold any position or office under the United States or any State, Territory, County, or Municipality? If so, state the place, position, and salary under Item 12.	X	
(b) Are you willing to resign such position or office if it becomes necessary to do so in order to hold the Federal position?	X	
9. Do you receive any pension or other benefit for military or naval service or an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any Retirement Act? If so, give details under Item 12, stating whether you were retired for age, length of service, or disability; amount of retirement pay and under what retirement act, and rank, if retired from military or naval service.		X
10. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been discharged for misconduct or unsatisfactory service, or forced to resign from any position? If so, give under Item 12 where employed, name and address of employer and the reason for discharge in each case.		X
11. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been arrested, or summoned into any civil or military court as a defendant, or indicted for or convicted of any offense (felony or misdemeanor)? If so, for each case give under Item 12 (1) the date, (2) the name and location of the court, (3) the nature of the offense or violation, and (4) the penalty, if any, imposed, or other disposition.		X

12. Space for detailed answers to other questions.

ITEM NO.	Write in left column numbers of items to which detailed answers apply
8	U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
	Inactive duty status

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable civil-service rules, the War Service Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, purchase of office, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, promise to observe provisions regarding political activity, and particularly for the following:

(1) **Identity** of appointee with the applicant whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) **Age.**—If discrepancy exists between the date of birth and that on application and if definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment.

(3) **Citizenship.**—The responsibility for observance of provisions of appropriation acts prohibiting or restricting the employment of [illegible] lies with the appointing officer. The Civil Service Commission indicates on applications showing foreign birth that citizenship has been verified. The appointing officer should verify citizenship if the list of eligibles or the letter of authority from the Commission makes the appointment subject to proof of citizenship, or if the application shows foreign birth but does not indicate on its face that citizenship has been proved. If the answer to question 4 of this form shows foreign birth and the application shows birth in the United States, the case should be referred to the Civil Service Commission.

(4) **Members of Family.**—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of the family in the classified service, no other member of such family is eligible for appointment in that service. Minors do not establish a different family merely by living at an address different from that of the parents. Doubtful cases involving more than two members of family, including all pertinent evidence, should be referred to the Civil Service Commission or its duly authorized representatives for decision. Under War Service Regulations, the members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments for one year or less.

U. S. G. PRINTING OFFICE 16—52304-1

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED.
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R084

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

MI(gw)
130

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. FIRST - MIDDLE INITIAL - LAST): **Mr. William P. Burke, Jr.**
2. DATE OF BIRTH: **10/22/1900**
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: **9 September 1947**

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): **Excepted Appointment**
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: **9/9/1947**
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: **Schedule A-20**

	FROM	TO
8. POSITION TITLE		Assistant Regional Manager P-7 (Intelligence Officer)
9. SERVICE GRADE, SALARY		P-7 $8179.50 per annum
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		Operations Contact Control Southern I.A.O.
11. HEADQUARTERS		New Orleans, Louisiana
12. FIELD OR DEP'T'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

No-Strike Affidavit has been properly executed.

This appointment is made subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.

Pay adj
7/1/48

WILLIAM J. KELLY
Acting Chief, Personnel Branch

14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
	X				X		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL
		X	

Bu. #F-~~21.84~~ 200.
3/2/47

17. SEX	18. RACE	19. APPROPRIATION	20. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO)	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	2185900.001 FROM: 528-143 TO	Yes	11 September 1947	Louisiana

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1947 722549

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

Investigation Report

Date: 28 August 1947

Number: 32458

Subject: BURKE, William J., Jr.

To: Chief, Personnel Branch

1. Investigation directed by: EPG

2. Sources of information:

3. Remarks

4. Recommendation:

SECURITY APPROVAL RECOMMENDED, THOUGH SUBJECT TO THE RECEIPT OF DEROGATORY INFORMATION AT SOME FUTURE DATE. INTERVIEW WAIVED
UNLESS THE APPLICANT ENTERS UPON DUTY WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM ABOVE DATE, THIS APPROVAL BECOMES INVALID.

By
Security Officer
ERNAL P. GEISS ✓

jm

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
DEC 1946

(178

E

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

5/11

NAME: William P. Burke, Jr.	BUDGET ~~21 85-900 5-28-104~~ 2185900.001 5-28-143	INITIAL EK	DATE 8-8-47 9-2-47
NATURE OF ACTION: ~~New~~ Excepted Appointment	CLASSIFICATION	INITIAL	DATE 8-6-47
EFFECTIVE DATE: ~~3~~ 9 September 1947	VICE ☐ IA ✓ VV ☐ NEW ☐	An # F-21.04 3/2/41	
FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS LAST WORKING DAY:	EMPLOYMENT	INITIAL	DATE 7/28/47
FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:	Schedule A-20 8-11-47 CHIEF, PERSONNEL DIV	INITIAL	DATE 8/5/47

	FROM	TO
TITLE		asst ~~Acting~~ Regional Manager (Intelligence Officer) P-7
GRADE AND SALARY		P-7 @ $179.50
OFFICE		Operations
BRANCH		Contact
DIVISION		Control
SECTION		~~N.I.A.O.~~ Southern I A.O.
OFFICIAL STATION		New Orleans, La. ~~Washington, D.C.~~
DEPT. OR FIELD	*	Field

REMARKS: * According to travel regulations. Secry. 7/21

Forms 38-1, 57, copy of Priority Request letters attached.

No Control

Approved for appointment in grade P-7 at entrance salary of $8179.50 subject to security clearance.

FOR THE DCI:

advised branch 8-29
branch O.K. 8-29

Walter C. Ford
WALTER C. FORD
Captain, USN
Executive Director

130

RECOMMENDED: OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF, OR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER For Hq. Chairman	DATE 7.10.47

FORM NO 37-3
OCT 1946

(1514)

WILLIAM P. BURKE

6300 St. Charles Avenue, New Orleans 15, La.

6 July 47 11 July 47

CONTACT: Invited to Washington for interview & introductory course

5 1/4 days	$6.00		31.50
		Fr: New Orleans, La. to D.C. & return	92.35
Taxi from station to hotel & return			.40
			$124.25

10 JULY 1947

JAMES H. DUNN, CHIEF
ADMINISTRATION & SERVICES

DONALD V. MULCAHY, CHIEF
PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT SECTION

CONFIDENTIAL

9 July 1947

MEMORANDUM: Executive for Inspections and Security

SUBJECT: William Patrick Burke, Jr.

In compliance with CIO Directive 15 and with authority from the Projects Review Committee, this branch will open an Inter Agency Office in New Orleans, Louisiana as soon as the necessary personnel may be processed for employment. This Southeastern area of the United States represents a fertile field for the operations of the Contact Branch and it is deemed advisable to open a New Orleans office at the earliest possible date.

Mr. William Patrick Burke, a native of New Orleans, a graduate of Harvard and Tulane University Law Schools and a former Major in the U. S. Marine Corps is under consideration for employment as the Acting Regional Manager for this office. In order that his employment may be effected in the shortest possible time, it is respectfully requested that a priority security investigation be granted on this individual. It is realized that the total number of allowable priority investigations is very limited, but in the instant case, the circumstances are such that the compliance with this request will measurably aid in the accomplishment of the mission of this branch.

John F. Blake
Assistant Executive Officer
Contact Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ASSIGNMENT DESCRIPTION FORM

(This form fully completed (see note * at bottom of sheet) in duplicate must accompany request for admission of candidate to Assessment or Training Classes)

Request for:
(a) Assessment XXXX
(b) Training

Candidate's name in full: WILLIAM PATRICK BURKE, Jr.

Cover name if necessary: Date: July 7, 1947

Age 46 Sex M Marital Status: Married Branch: Contact Desk: Field

Specific station to which candidate is going: New Orleans, La.

For consultation call:

George E. McManus	2311	2210 E. St.	103
Branch Officer Sponsoring Candidate	Phone Extension	Bldg	Room No.

Has Security Check been completed?

Type of Cover:
(Military; Govt. Official; Professional; Business; etc.)

Title of projected assignment: (a) Contact Specialist (b) Acting Regional Manager

Civil Service classification and salary level of projected position: P-7 @ 8179.50

What will be the specific duties of the candidate? (A detailed and concrete description is essential; a general job title is not satisfactory.): Will organize and run the New Orleans Inter-agency office in the initial stages Has to establish and maintain contact with the top executives of American business, industrial and educational institutions. Must be able to sell CIG to them, gain their confidence and establish a discreet channel through which all foreign intelligence available to those organizations can flow to his office.

What are the promotional opportunities in the projected position? Good

What will be the administrative or supervisory responsibilities of the candidate?

(If none, write "none".) May eventually have to direct the activities of one P-6 and one CAF-7.

Will the candidate work alone or with other people? With others.

If the latter, how many and what will be the candidate's actual working relationship to them, e.g., closely cooperative or relatively independent? The two mentioned above. Close cooperation.

Will the candidate be working directly under a supervising officer? No

If not, how will his work be directed and reviewed? By Washington

What will be the living and working conditions under which the candidate is expected to operate?

---

* For reasons of security, details such as student's true name or specific mission may be omitted in the case of undercover personnel, if so desired by the Desk.

FORM NO. 51-1 (Edition of [illegible] 1946
OCT 1946 may be used)

SECRET
(over)

SECRET

What special qualifications do you wish the candidate tested for? Sense of security as he must live a normal life in his own home town while conducting a discreet operation. Ability to discriminate between valuable intelligence information and worthless. Ability to arrange facts cogently on paper. Tact and discretion.

What period and type of training is considered necessary for the candidate before placement in the field? About three weeks in Head Office and then Inter-Agency Offices.

What special skills or knowledge related to the job does the candidate possess?

Loyola University, New Orleans, AB, 1919, Harvard Law School, LLB, 1923. Legal banking, business and Marine Corps experience.

Indicate knowledge of foreign languages:
("Slight", "Fair", "Good")

	Read	Speak	Write
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			

The following information is required only in the case of candidates scheduled for training:

Previous background in intelligence work:

Foreign residence and foreign education

Occupational history: (job descriptions and dates only)

Signed: For George R. [illegible]

83

Branch Officer Sponsoring Candidate

SECRET

(over)

(2491)

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Deputy Director, CIG

THROUGH: Chief, Personnel Division

Subject: Assessment of William Patrick Burke~~, Jr.~~

Reference: Procedures Governing Payment of Per Diem and Travel, Approved Under Project 00-5.

In accordance with the above referenced procedures, it is hereby requested that approval be granted for payment of per diem and travel for the purpose of bringing Mr. Burke to Washington for assessment.

Mr. Burke was recently interviewed in New Orleans by Chief, Control Division, and Chief, Field Division, of the Contact Branch of this Office and is recommended as being well qualified for the Regional Managership of the New Orleans Interagency Office. It is considered that, in view of the importance of the proposed position to the accomplishment of the Contact Branch mission, no final decision as to his employment should be made without the benefit of assessment.

This office is anxious to activate the New Orleans Interagency Office as soon as possible and requests your approval in order that an early date for Mr. Burke's visit to Washington may be made.

E. L. Sibert
E. L. SIBERT
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Assistant Director for Operations

24 June
Approved Edwards
Actg. Ex. Dir.

CONFIDENTIAL

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Personnel file:
Thomas B. CASASIN

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Sources and methods

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
9.8.78	10:10	Betsy WOLF	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

THIS FOLDER CONTAINS ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION/DOCUMENTS FROM CASASIN'S (P) PERSONNEL FOLDER FOR PERIOD 1955-1962. (IN MID 1962 CASASIN WENT OVERSEAS.)

14-00000

casasin

SERIAL NO. ..2	[redacted]	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART	DOB: 7	192.
NAME [redacted] [redacted]	SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH Jan 1924	EOD DATE 20 Nov 1949	
MARITAL STATUS Married	DEPENDENTS (Includ. employee) 3	YEARS OF BIRTH 1923 1950 1952	US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA	NA
CAREER STAFF STATUS ✓	MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954	OTHER STATUS	LAST RECOMM. Jul 1962	QUAL. FOR PCS C/S
				EVAL. FOR PCS C/S
CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT #1 / RELEASE MIL. SER. CAT #2 / TO BE DEFERRED CAT #3 / RETIRED
ASSESSMENT DATE None	PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None		

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1943-48 Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt. - Civil Censorship Officer, Japanese Translator & Instructor, Liaison Officer

1949 Guido Publishing Co, Baltimore, Md - County Editor of weekly paper

1949 Baltimore Housing Authority, Md - Administrative Officer

NON-CIA EDUCATION

1942 Trinity College, Conn - French

1940-42 Sir George Williams College, Montreal, Canada - French

1945 Univ of Michigan, Army Language School - BA(1947), Oriental Civilization, Japanese

1951-52 Georgetown Univ Graduate School - International Relations

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French - R, P, S, U, High; W, Inter(Feb 1962), Trans & Interp Aug 1957

Japanese - P, S, U, Inter(Mar 1962); R, W, Elem; Trans & Interp Aug 1957

AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1949-50 [redacted]

1950 [redacted]

1950 [redacted]

1950 [redacted]

1954 [redacted]

1954 [redacted]

1954 [redacted]

1954 [redacted]

1960 Cland Serv Review

1962 [illegible]

1962 [illegible] Officer's Inst

1962 French

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE - OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
[redacted]						
Jan 1955	" " "	0136.01	14	DI	DDP/SR/FE Area	Tokyo
Feb 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	DDP/SR/Ch, Br 6	HQ
Sep 1962	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/SR/NE Area	[redacted]
[redacted]						

DATE REV. 0 Apr 19..	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY [illegible]	22. ITEMS 1-16 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE No

SECRET PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCS. SERIAL NO. [illegible]	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
[redacted]	DATE OF BIRTH Jan 192[illegible]

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS

[redacted]

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUT[illegible] REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION [illegible], 1955 from Director, FBI and the DCI for service in connection with Soviet Defectors.

Commendation 1955 from CIA Defector Coordinator for cooperation and competence in the handling of the defectors.

Commendation 1955 from the DCI for high degree of personal competence and devotion to [illegible].

Letter of Appreciation 1960 for suggestion which proposed revisions of Form 1050.

Appreciation [illegible] from Commandant, USAF Command and Staff College for fine lecture.

27. DATE REVIEWED 20 Apr 1964	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY [illegible]

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57
SECRET
PROFILE
(4)

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

37833

Instructions:
1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

CASASIN

A. FULL NAME Mr. Mrs. Miss (Use No Initials) [redacted] (First, Middle, Last)

Telephone: Office: NOT Ext. APPLICABLE

Home: HO-7983

PRESENT ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST - BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No., City, State, Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST - BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No., City, State, Country)

B. NICKNAME [redacted] WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? NONE

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NOT APPLICABLE

HOW LONG? ______ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ______ (Where? By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 20 JAN 1924 PLACE OF BIRTH BALTIMORE, MD, USA (City, State, Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE? ______

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # NOT APPLICABLE ISSUED ______ (Date) BY ______ (Court)

AT ______ (City, State, Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? NO (Yes or No) ______ (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ______ TO ______ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ______ (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NOT APPLICABLE

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS ______

FORM NO.

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? N/A

PORT OF ENTRY? ______ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ______

LAST U.S. VISA ______ (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 24 SEX MALE HEIGHT 5'9½" WEIGHT 140

EYES BROWN HAIR BROWN COMPLEXION DARK SCARS FOREHEAD

BUILD SLENDER OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES NONE

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE YES MARRIED ______ DIVORCED ______ WIDOWED ______

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR SEPARATION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT ______

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDE ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE NOT APPLICABLE (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ______

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE ______ (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______ (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______ (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______ (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS ______ (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ______ (Date) TO ______ (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

______

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME NOT APPLICABLE RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME JOHN BENJAMIN [redacted]
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST, BALTIMORE-18-MD-USA
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 21 NOV 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH CENTREVILLE, MARYLAND, USA
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION AUTO DEALER LAST EMPLOYER EAST END AUTO CO- BALTIMORE

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS [redacted] PULASKI HWY, BALTIMORE, MD, U.
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM 1915 TO 1919 BRANCH OF SERVICE ARMY AVIATION
Date Date

COUNTRY USA, GT. BRITAIN DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

NONE

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ADRIENNE MARGUERITE [redacted]
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE 5 DEC 1947 CAUSE CANCER

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS [redacted] MILFORD AV, BALTIMORE, MD, USA
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 14 AUG 1900 PLACE OF BIRTH ROMANS, DROME, FRANCE

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? 1921 (?) WHERE? BALTO, MD, USA
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOV. 1919 - NEW YORK

OCCUPATION MILLINERY BUYER LAST EMPLOYER EMPORIUM WORLD MILL'Y CO.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS UNKNOWN, CHICAGO, ILL, USA (St. & No., City, State, Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NONE TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

NONE

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including ~~half-, step-~~, and adopted brothers and sisters)

DL
73452

1. FULL NAME HENRI (First) ADRIEN (Middle) [redacted] (Last) AGE 23

PRESENT ADDRESS [redacted] SIMMONS AV, BALTIMORE, MD, USA - USA (St. & No., City, State, Country, Citizenship)

2. FULL NAME ______ (First, Middle, Last) AGE ______

PRESENT ADDRESS ______ (St. & No., City, State, Country, Citizenship)

3. FULL NAME ______ (First, Middle, Last) AGE ______

PRESENT ADDRESS ______ (St. & No., City, State, Country, Citizenship)

4. FULL NAME ______ (First, Middle, Last) AGE ______

PRESENT ADDRESS ______ (St. & No., City, State, Country, Citizenship)

5. FULL NAME ______ (First, Middle, Last) AGE ______

PRESENT ADDRESS ______ (St. & No., City, State, Country, Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE (First, Middle, Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______ (St. & No., City, State, Country)

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______ (City, State, Country)

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________
City State Country

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME HENRY [redacted] RELATIONSHIP GREAT-UNCLE AGE 65(?)
CITIZENSHIP FRENCH ADDRESS 27 RUE EDITH CAVELL, NICE FRANCE
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME CHARLES GRANDGERARD RELATIONSHIP SECOND COUSIN AGE 55(?)
CITIZENSHIP ITA ADDRESS % OTIS ELEVATORS, BUENOS AIRES AR
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME CMDR. ROBT LEE [redacted] RELATIONSHIP COUSIN AGE 30
CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS N.O.B., NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
St. & No. City State
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

2. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

SEC. 12. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PS #63 Mc DONOGH SCH. ADDRESS BALTIMORE, MD, USA PIKESVILLE, MD, USA
City State Country
DATES ATTENDED 1930-34-37 GRADUATE? YES
HIGH SCHOOL LOYOLA HIGH, MONTREAL, ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA
City State Country
DATES ATTENDED 1937-1940 GRADUATE? YES
COLLEGE SIR GEO WILLIAMS COLL, ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA
City State Country
DATES ATTENDED 1940-1942 DEGREE NONE
COLLEGE U OF MICHIGAN ADDRESS ANN ARBOR, MICH, USA
City State Country
DATES ATTENDED 1945 (see P13) DEGREE B.A.

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE—U.S. OR FOREIGN

USA ARMY 1/LT FEB 1943-OCT 1948
Country Service Rank Dates of Service
GHQ FEC-TOKYO, JAPAN 0-937200 HONORABLE
Last Station Serial No. Type of Discharge
REMARKS: WHILE ENLISTED, SERIAL WAS 31316266

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 5-A ADDRESS HARTFORD, CONN.
IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

SEC. 14. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

FROM 15 AUG 45 TO 30 SEP 48
EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY
ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, U.
St. & No. City State Country
KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR ROBT. SPAULDING
(MILITARY) TITLE OF JOB LIAISON OFFICER SALARY $ 251 PER MONTH
YOUR DUTIES INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; REPORTS COORDINATOR & WRITER
REASONS FOR LEAVING RETURN TO USA FOR SEPARATION FROM ARMY.

FROM 1 APR 45 TO 15 AUG 45
EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT/ARMY.

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO, US
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY)

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR VINCENT MERCOLA
TITLE OF JOB DEPUTY CHIEF, News Agency SALARY $ 251 PER MONTH
YOUR DUTIES Asst chief of principal Allied press censorship bureau in Japan.
REASONS FOR LEAVING CENSORSHIP SECTION ELIMINATED

FROM 1 NOV 46 TO 31 MAR 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY
ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 309 - POSTMASTER - SAN FRANCISCO USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY)

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR ROBT. SPAULDING
TITLE OF JOB CHIEF CENSORSHIP SUB-ST. SALARY $ 331 PER MONTH
YOUR DUTIES Operated field censorship surveillance detachment
REASONS FOR LEAVING TRANSFERRED TO HQ IN TOKYO

FROM 15 MAR 46 TO 15 AUG 46

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY
ADDRESS ARMY LANGUAGE SCHOOL {FT. SNELLING, MINN, USA / PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY CAL, USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY)

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL AFFAIRS TNG NAME OF SUPERVISOR YUTAKA MUNAKATA
TITLE OF JOB RESEARCH EDITOR SALARY $ ARMY PER SGT.
YOUR DUTIES REVISED ARMY MANUALS, PREPARED CIVIL AFFAIRS COURSES.
REASONS FOR LEAVING COMMISSIONED; TRANSFERRED TO JAPAN

FROM NOV 1941 TO JUL 1945

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY T. EATON CO, LTD.
ADDRESS ST. CATHERINE ST, MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA
St. & No. City State Country
KIND OF BUSINESS DEPT. STORE NAME OF SUPERVISOR F.T. CLAYDON
TITLE OF JOB PHOTOGRAPHIC SALESMAN SALARY $ 20 PER WEEK
YOUR DUTIES SOLD CAMERAS AND PHOTO SUPPLIES
REASONS FOR LEAVING WAS PART-TIME JOB ACCEPTED WHILE IN COLLEGE

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NOT APPLICABLE

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	CAPT. GORDON WALLACE	BUS. ADD.	AIS-PRESIDIO/	MONTEREY	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	2160 COOLEY,	PALO ALTO	CAL.
2.	MR. GEORGE MOORE	BUS. ADD.	U/CALIFORNIA	BERKELEY,	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	571 NORTH,	OAKLAND,	CAL.
3.	MR. JOHN CHEATHAM	BUS. ADD.	117 E. PATRICK	FREDERICK,	MD.
		RES. ADD.	101 E. CHURCH	FREDERICK,	MD.
4.	MR. T. G. DRISCOLL	BUS. ADD.	1131 K ST. NW	WASH.	DC.
		RES. ADD.	705 S. ROYAL	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
5.	MR. R. H. KUNZMAN	BUS. ADD.	UP BUREAU	DES MOINES	IOWA
		RES. ADD.		UNK	

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	MR. GEORGE FINNEY	BUS. ADD.	DEPT/AF	WASHINGTON	DC.
		RES. ADD.	2310 VALLEY DR.	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
2.	DR. MORRIS CRANE	BUS. ADD.	BALTIMORE AV.	PHILADELPHIA	PA.
		RES. ADD.	"	"	"
3.	MR. BRADFORD COOLIDGE	BUS. ADD.	DEPT/STATE	WASHINGTON	DC
		RES. ADD.			
4.	MISS FLORENCE MIDDLEBROOK	BUS. ADD.		NONE	
		RES. ADD.	11 ARNOLDALE	WETHERSFIELD,	CONN.
5.	MR. ANTHONY GAS	BUS. ADD.		UNK	
		RES. ADD.	[illegible]	BALTIMORE,	MD.

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. MR. FRANK DUCHARME	BUS. ADD.	TRAVELERS INS.	HARTFORD,	CONN.
	RES. ADD.	26 LILLEY	W. HARTFORD	CONN.
2. MR. JAMES KNOX	BUS. ADD.	G. FOX CO.	HARTFORD,	CONN.
	RES. ADD.		UNK	
3. MRS. LOUIS FRANKLIN	BUS. ADD.	ALBERT STEIGER	HARTFORD,	CONN.
	RES. ADD.		UNK	

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS BALTIMORE NATIONAL BANK, HIGHLANDTOWN BRANCH, BALTIMORE, MD.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? NO

GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

1. NAME LEE'S INC ADDRESS 3424 EASTERN AV, BALTIMORE, MD.
2. NAME MONTGOMERY WARD ADDRESS 340 AV, OAKLAND 16, CAL.
3. NAME ADDRESS

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	St. No.	City	State	Country
1933	1937	[redacted] PRESSTMAN ST	BALTIMORE	MD	USA
1937	1939	[redacted] HARVARD AV	MONTREAL	QUE	CANADA
1939	1942	[redacted] MOUNTAIN ST	MONTREAL	QUE	CANADA
1942	1942	[redacted] LILLEY RD	W. HARTFORD	CONN	USA
1942	1942	MILITARY SERVICE			
1948	PRESENT	[redacted] ST. PAUL ST	BALTIMORE,	MD,	USA

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

	FROM	TO	City or Section	Country	Purpose
A.	JUN 1927	SEP 1927	PARIS	FRANCE	VISIT
	JUL 1934	JUL 1934	NIAGARA PENINSULA	CANADA	VISIT
	SEP 1937	JUL 1942	MONTREAL	CANADA	RESIDENCE

FROM OCT 1944 TO JAN 1945 NORTHERN EUROPE WAR SERVICE
City or Section Country Purpose

FROM SEP 1946 TO OCT 1945 TOKYO, SENDAI JAPAN MIL OCCUPATION
City or Section Country Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________
City or Section Country Purpose

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT—NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: UNKNOWN

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? NONE GIVE APPROXIMATE

DATES: ________

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: ________

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

✓ 1. AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE (MEMBER AT LARGE)
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: NOV 1945 - JAN 1948

2. RESERVE OFFICERS ASS'N WASHINGTON DC USA
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: OCT 1948 - PRESENT

3. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

4. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

5. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

6. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

7. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE JAPANESE SPEAK FLUENT READ FAIR WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE FRENCH SPEAK FLUENT READ FLUENT WRITE FLUENT

LANGUAGE ____ SPEAK ____ READ ____ WRITE ____

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

SWIMMING, SKIING, HORSEMANSHIP, FOOTBALL - GOOD.
BASEBALL, ICE HOCKEY, LACROSSE, VOLLEYBALL, BATMINTON - FAIR.
PHOTOGRAPHIC PROCESSES - STRONG AMATEUR INTEREST.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

HAVE AN ABILITY TO WRITE, EITHER REPORTORIAL OR EDITORIAL, WHICH MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR RESEARCH OR SPECIAL REPORTS WRITING.

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

NONE OTHER THAN DEPT OF ARMY FOR COMMISSION AS OFFICER.

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIV, WAR DEPT, + FBI CONDUCTED LOYALTY CHECK SOMETIME BETWEEN FEB 1947 AND JUN 1947.

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? NO

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: ______

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? YES IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? OCCASIONAL WINES AND LIQUOR

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME JOHN B. [redacted] RELATIONSHIP FATHER

ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST. BALTIMORE MD USA

St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

NO

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA DATE 25 NOV 1948
City and State

Henriette C. Driscoll [redacted]
Witness Signature of Applicant
CASASIN

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

14.- I HAVE NEVER HELD A FULL-TIME CIVILIAN JOB, SINCE I ENTERED THE ARMY DIRECTLY FROM COLLEGE.

19.- I HAVE NEVER BOUGHT ANYTHING ON CREDIT. THEREFORE, I HAVE LISTED THREE CONCERNS WITH WHICH I HAVE TRANSACTED NORMAL BUSINESS.

12.- I ACQUIRED SUFFICIENT CREDITS FROM THE ARMY JAPANESE SCHOOL AT THE U OF MICHIGAN TO RECEIVE A B.A. DEGREE, IN ABSENTIA, WHILE STILL ON ACTIVE SERVICE.

FROM SEP 1942 TO DEC 1942 I COMPLETED ONE SEMESTER AT TRINITY COLLEGE, HARTFORD, CONN.

Casasin

[redacted]

STANDARD FORM 50 (6 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Canc. 6 Jan. 1955 rwc

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. [redacted] Cuasin
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 11 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: E.O.D. 16 Jan 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) BC-171-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 per annum 8560	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR/5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: 5-3400-55-015
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

POSTED
JAN 17 1955

TRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

puty Assistant Director for

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

r/s

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. [redacted] Casarin
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 19 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION (AMENDMENT)*
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: B.O.B. 16 Jan 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) SC-171-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-13 $8560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR/5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DI
~~SD-DI~~

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-3400-20
TO: 5-3400-55-015
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSION, ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Ill.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

*This action amends Item #9, on the "from" side, on Notification dated 11 Jan. 1955, to show the correct salary, previously shown as $8360.00 per annum.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

POSTED
my 1/20/55

ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

uty Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954—313735

★ U [illegible] VMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 997976

[illegible]pational designation	2. Pay [illegible]	3. Sheet No. 5-3400-20	4. Slip No.
name (and [illegible] number when appropriate) [redacted] Cassen	6. Grade and salary GS-13 $8360.00		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
[illegible]											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks $ 8990 SALARY ADJUSTED TO: EFFECTIVE 13 MAR. 1955 PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE	11. Appropriation(s) SR 7	12. Prepared by RZ 9 Nov 54 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date Jan 55	15. Date last equivalent increase 5 Jul 53	16. Old salary rate $8360.00	17. New salary rate $8560.00	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better. (Signature or other authentication)

[illegible]OP date (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP [illegible]lowing periods)

GEORGE F. [redacted]

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

[illegible] LWOP Total excess [illegible] Initials of Clerk

[illegible]ORM NO. 1126d—Revised
[illegible]d by Comp. Gen., U. S.
General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. [redacted] Casasin
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 26 Sept. '56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 21 OCT 1956

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL (D)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

RE-SLOTTING FOR NEW APPROVED T/O.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Robert D. Lovelace
Robert D. Lovelace

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 4407

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD: DI CK

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 7-3400-55-015
TO: 7-3400-55-015

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
R.A. Skeels (Guss), FI/CMO
DATE: 2 Oct. 56

USED IN LIEU OF SF50
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	PE	11 OCT 1956
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	FEB:	10-9
E.		

REMARKS:

POSTED
11 OCT 1956
PE

F. APPROVED BY Robert A. [illegible] per FE Dar, Jr. 9 Oct '56

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	[redacted]	DDP/SR	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

8. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS 4 7-4-19 4305

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

J.H.
TMK 1/25

G.M. STEUART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a
1 MAR 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Casasin	506102	GS-14-3	$10,750	$11,835

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3 ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4 FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	Cazasin [redacted]	DDP/SR 8	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
BELIC, GEORGE	15 Jan 1958	George M Belic

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	[redacted] Castren	506102	48 40	GS-14 4	$12,075	$12,990

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	Castren [redacted]	DDP/SR 10	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	3	$11,835	01	12	58	GS 14	4	$12,075	07	12	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS
4 742

14. AUTHENTICATION
JHP 8/5/59
HF 7/31/59
C.M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

560

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

ARF: 30 SEPT 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Cavasin [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 10 DA. 02 YR. 60
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
X	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1234 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP SR
SR 6
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER BR CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0050
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12990
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 60300 ALPHABETIC SR
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS 10-2-60

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

G E 10/18/60

(4-31)

14-00000

134-1000-10

3040
80
3120

1 Serial No.	2 Name			3 Cost Center Number				4 LWOP Hours		
006102	[illegible] [redacted]			60 300 V 7						
5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 14	5	$13,250	01/08/61	GS 14	6	$13,510	07/08/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY..

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME					3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.			4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT	
006102	[illegible] [redacted]					DDP/SR 7			V-20		
6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO	DA.	YR.
GS-14	4	$12990	07	12	59	GS-14	5	$13250	01	08	61

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☒ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

BAS: 16 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Caesar [redacted]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 08 04 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3234 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR SR/6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER BR CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0050	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 13510
18. REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
45	10						01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 6 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
				1B00091					

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

POSTED

dg 8-20-62

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

LLG 8/16/62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(4-31)

14-00000

SECRET

13 September 1960
(Date)
File No. K-1328

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : [redacted] cassin

1. Cover arrangements ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/or~~ have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 12 September 1960, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~xxxxxxx~~ to deny ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. Operating component must take necessary action to block ~~xxxxx~~ telephone locator by submitting the Personnel Information Card, "Office File Copy," Form No. 642, to Machine Records Division, Office of the Comptroller, Room 107 Curie Hall, Attention: Miss Wenkenbach.

~~4xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS
Operating Division - SR

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

580

SECRET

(4-13-40)

D7

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR [redacted] Casasin

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 13 Dec 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 5 Jan. '55
B. APPROVED: 18 Jan 1955

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch.) BC-171-13		Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 p.a.		GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR/5		DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.		Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary) PERIODIC STEP INCREASE 2 Jan 55

PLEASE TRANSFER FROM VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS. $560.00 MZ.

Memo stating why fitness report not necessary. MZ

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Robert [illegible] W Muenster

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [illegible]
Title: DD/P Admin.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SR:FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: 5-3400-55-015
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 52 REMARKS

Effective date per Jackson BE 1-11-55 MZ

Conc. by Osborne 1-11-55 1-11-55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	MZ	4 Jan
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	NW Kaz	5 Jan 55
E.		

REMARKS.

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: DEC 21 1954

F. APPROVED BY [illegible]
1-5-55

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER
[illegible] [redacted]	Unk	58-201

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, ~~or death~~ incurred on 4 Feb 1958.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
15 July 1958	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

(4-21-35)

(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
[redacted] Casasin		57-41

[redacted]

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, ~~or death~~ incurred on 3 December 1958.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
28 AUG 1959	B.

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 9-58 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

	V to V		V to UV
XX	UV to V		UV to UV

DATE PREPARED Mo	Da	Yr
09	12	60

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date of Birth Mo / Da / Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2 / Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo / Da / Yr
006102	[redacted] Carrier	01 20 24	1	M	

7. SCD Mo / Da / Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 / Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo / Da / Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 / Code	12. LCD Mo / Da / Yr	13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT LCD Yes-1 No-2 / Code
				1		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP SR FAR EAST AREA TOKYO STATION SOVIET BRANCH		TOKYO, JAPAN	

16. Dept.-Field (Dept.-1, Unlid.-, Fron.-) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
3	OPS OFFICER BR CH	189	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo / Da / Yr	25. PSI Due Mo / Da / Yr	26. Appropriation Number
14 4	$ 12,990	D	1 16 55	7 8 61	1134 7000 3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo / Da / Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER OF FUNDS to Voucher		10 02 60	REGULAR		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP SR SR 6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		WASH., D. C.	

33. Dept.-Field (Dept.-1, Unlid.-, Fron.-) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	OPS OFFICER - BR CH	50 D-15	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo / Da / Yr	42. PSI Due Mo / Da / Yr	43. Appropriation Number
14 4	$ 12,990	D			1234 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): ANDREW L. BUSBY CH/SR/PERSONNEL A. Busby

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): E. C. JOHNSON X4407

C. Request/Approved By (Signature And Title):

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	Russell Gage	9/16/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		10-10-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	F. Sull[illegible]	10-[illegible]

Remarks Two copies of this action have been forwarded to the Office of Security.

Recorded by CSPD
10-5-?
w/p file

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITI

SECRET

(4)

NO[illegible]ICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 306102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Casasin [redacted]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 5 DA. [illegible]4 YR. 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ☒ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3234 [illegible]	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFF CLR DR CH	12. POSITION NUMBER [illegible]5[illegible]	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.0[illegible]	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 6	17. SALARY OR RATE [illegible]35[illegible]0

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

16-Aug-62

(When Filled In)

XXF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1952

1. ~~SERIAL NUMBER~~ 006102 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [redacted] Casasin	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Resignation	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 05 DAY 04 YEAR 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3234 1000 1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel) EE
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR SR/6 Office of the Chief	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE Ops Officer (Br Ch)	12. POSITION NUMBER 0050	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 06
17. SALARY OR RATE $ ~~13250~~ 570 pa 13510 ✓		

18. REMARKS

Copy furnished Vouchered Payroll.

Recorded by CSPD
Dix

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL A. Busby ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 7/24/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 60300 ALPHABETIC SR	22. STATION CODE 15013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HCOTPS CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 1,60,00,9,1	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX	35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE				

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION Ag 8-15-62	46. O.P. APPROVAL Emmett F. Heggins	DATE APPROVED 7/24/62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (4)

SECRET

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE 4 August 62 FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:
(Date)

To accept private employment.

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE -	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 August 62	23 July 62	[redacted]

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

- Regular
- Part Time
- Temporary
- Temporary - Part Time
- Summer
- Detail Out
- Detail In
- WAE
- Consultant
- Military

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE:
- Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
- Office, Major Staff, etc.
  - Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
    - Branch
      - Section
        - Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET.

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force.* The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*) CASASIN [redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
None CIA	49	11	20				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
United States Army	43	Feb	15	48	Oct	27	Yes; honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. CASASIN

1 August 51
(DATE)

[redacted]
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ 1952 at ______
(MONTH) (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
5	8	12

12. TOTAL SERVICE 5 8 12

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

CASASIN.

[redacted]

[redacted]

WITNESS:

Lorene E. Norbeck

Office of Personnel
Lorene E. Norbeck

Date: 9 August 1957

FORM NO. 911a REPLACES FORM NO. 55-104
1 FEB [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

4011

SECRET

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CSB

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 - [redacted] CASASIN - ①

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

1. The SR Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo (FJTT-1950, attached) recommend the promotion of [redacted] to GS-15. ① ①

2. Mr. [redacted] was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 17 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior SR officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency.

①

3. The very facts of Mr. [redacted] youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. Most careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. [redacted] deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level.

Charles Katek
CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addr

SECRET

TO: Chief, SR

INFORMATION ADDRESSEE: Chief, FE

FROM: Chief of Station, Tokyo

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: FJTT-1950

DATE:

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/ADMINISTRATIVE (7)
Promotion of [redacted]

REFERENCE(S): FJTW-11531 (RYBAT), dated 11 October 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2

[redacted] - 1
Baker - 2
Maury - 3
Nelson - 4

1. In line with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on [redacted] under cover of FJTT-0801 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as [redacted] was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assured that in doing so he would also discuss with [redacted]'s promotion, which both he and [redacted] felt was to be strongly recommended.

2. [redacted] was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss [redacted]'s promotion with [redacted]. In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending [redacted] for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0801 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress.

[redacted]

20 November 1958

Distribution:
2 - Chief, SR
2 - Chief, FE

[illegible] ROUTING
Pers/5/Pers
✓ Pers

☐ CONTINUED

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FORM NO. 53 TEST
1 SEP 56

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]

14-00000

Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360 18 June 1957

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : Chief, Soviet Branch

SUBJECT: [redacted] - Recommendation for Promotion
[redacted] CASASIN

1. [redacted] has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of [redacted] as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

2. [redacted] operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organization as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, [redacted] has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations [redacted] has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider [redacted] to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. [redacted] is not without his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the

SECRET

SECRET

st reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relations but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

4. In sum, [redacted]'s qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

[redacted]

Edward MARFLIUS [redacted]

[redacted]

Print Through of previous document

SECRET

SECRET

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/[illegible]

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 - [redacted] CASASIN - ①

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

REFERENCE: [illegible]-11531 ([illegible]) dated [illegible]

1. The SR Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo ([illegible], attached) recommend the promotion of [redacted] to GS-15. ① ①

2. Mr. [redacted] was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 17 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior CI officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency. ①

3. The very facts of Mr. [redacted]'s youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. That careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. [redacted] deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level. ①

CHARLES [illegible]
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addr

SECRET

C O P Y

FJTT-1950

TO: Chief, SR 25 November 1958

FROM: Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Promotion of [redacted] CASASIN ①

REFERENCE: FJTW-11531 (RYBAT) dated 11 Oct 1957

1. In line with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on ① [redacted] under cover of FJTT-0801 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as Baker was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assumed that in doing so he would also discuss with Maury [redacted] promotion, which both he and Nelson felt was to be strongly recommended. ①

2. Baker was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss [redacted] ① promotion with Maury. In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending [redacted] for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0801 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress.

①

WILLIAM E. NELSON

COPY
Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360   18 June 1957

TO: Chief of Station

FROM: Chief, Soviet Branch

CASASIN

SUBJECT: [redacted] Recommendation for Promotion

① = CASASIN

①

1. [redacted] has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of [redacted] as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

①

2. [redacted] operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organization as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, ① [redacted] has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In ① the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations, [redacted] has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

①

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider [redacted] to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. [redacted] is not without ① his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the best reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relationships but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

CASASIN'S

4. In sum, [redacted] qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

EDWARD MARELIUS

1 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT : Nominations for Promotion to GS-15

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 14 May 1958 from Secretary, CS Career Service Board

1. After reviewing GS-14 employees assigned to the SR Division, I wish to again recommend the promotion of CASASIN [redacted] Chief, Soviet Branch, Tokyo to GS-15. I concur also in the attached recommendation for the promotion of [redacted] prepared by the Chief of Base, Berlin. CIA officer

2. The Chief of Station, Tokyo and I recommended CASASIN'S [redacted]'s promotion in December 1958. This earlier recommendation presented the personal qualities of Mr. [redacted]. I wish simply to point out at this time that since early 1954, Mr. [redacted] has more than fully discharged responsibilities at the GS-15 level. I believe that it is definitely time to elevate him to the level at which he has been performing more than satisfactorily for over 5½ years.

Charles Katek
CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 Addressee w/att

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 90 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to ensure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

BY DATE 29 NOV 1955
Posted Pos. Control P9S
Reviewed By PCD 12/1/55

FIELD REPORT

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

CASASIN

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY [redacted]	1. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION (1) FI, (2) FP
4. GRADE GS-14	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) USSR Base, Tokyo		SR 829
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 September 1955	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 17 February - 30 September 1955		

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Chief, USSR Base, Tokyo 0136.01	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 19 February 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

A. As Chief of Operating Base:
   1. Manage and direct all operations against target area, and monitor products.
   2. Supervise system of development and exploitation of operational leads.
   3. Supervise proper administration and support of operations, including finances.
   4. Conduct or supervise effective liaison with other KUBARK elements, with other Government agencies abroad and, when appropriate, with representatives of other governments.

B. As Senior SR Division Officer in Area:
   1. Consult with or advise other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units on target area, government, and IS characteristics.
   2. Make available to other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units area specialists, as required.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Carleton B. Swift	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) W. Lloyd George
3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.	
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. Nov. 1955	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES Phyllis M. Lanham

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
JUL 54

SECRET

(4)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X	
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.												X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.														X
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.												X		
11. CALM.													X	
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.														X
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.													X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.												X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.													X	

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.														X
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.												X		
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.														X
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												X		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.													X	
36. DELIBERATE.													X	
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													X	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												X		
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.														X
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													X	
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.													X	
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.													X	
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Capable operations officer with broad understanding of Soviet problems.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SIN STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTH CONSIDERATIONS:

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 22 11 07 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating: skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. CHASAN **GENERAL**

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Japan Station (REDWOOD)	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. **CERTIFICATION**

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 15 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Edward M Chelius	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 21 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL W. Lloyd George	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ~~Chief of Operations~~

SECTION G. **ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL**

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

(when filled in)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. C95951N GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Japan Station (REDWOOD)		6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer	
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 15 November 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Edward M Arelius	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY R DATE 19 JAN 1957
Posted Pos. Ur
Reviewed By JPM 1-22-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 21 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL W. Lloyd George	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

B. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).*

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 3 11 15 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy to Branch Chief	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervising	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts Foreign Liaison	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares correspondence and reports	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares and manages projects	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Handles admin routine	RATING NUMBER 4

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has really superb natural equipment for work in this Organization in terms of mental capacity, psychological bent and affinity for the things and people he comes against. He tops this off with industry and language ability among other natural aptitudes. On the debit side and measured against the best, he is a bit shy of humor and personal understanding in some situations, qualities which mitigate more against acceptability than job competence.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Subject is an all around performer capable of a primary, in place of his present secondary, responsibility.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF THS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER Y SUPERVISION

Six

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL.

Subject has a high all around potential. With respect to supervision below, he tends to support subordinates from his own energy rather more than to bring them along the hard way, and a normal tendency to avoid the categorical "no" - both tendencies easily correctable.

JAN 3 11 13 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Routine refresher training as appropriate.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

All normal. No limiting factors.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. c 45AS/N GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [redacted]
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Tokyo Station REDCOD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 23 OCT 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Lloyd GEORGE
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: CCS, Tokyo

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 16 Oct 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH SECRET Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

15

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is well suited for this business and the business for him. He should progress steadily to positions of great responsibility.

PERSONNEL
OCT 30 4 50 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Normal refresher a/o preparatory training as required.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

No limiting factors or personal circumstances known to the rater

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Stevens.

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

CASASIN

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [redacted] -
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Tokyo Station REDWOOD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.
Completed at Headquarters; subject not available (Copy sent to field.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 16 Oct 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Edward Marclin
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

DATE 7 NOV 1957
Ju
Posted Pe[illegible]
Reviewed by [illegible] 11/12

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 23 Oct 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Lloyd GEORGE Lloyd George
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: COS, Tokyo

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

B. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 30 1 50 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:
- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy to Branch Chief	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervising	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts Foreign Liaison	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares correspondence and reports and handles administrative routine	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares and Manages Projects	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Developes and handles Agents	RATING NUMBER 5

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has excellent natural equipment for employment in this organization in terms of his intelligence and natural apptitudes. Additionally, he brings a great deal of area knowledge and language ability to his present assignment. During the period covered by this report he has displayed great industry and devotion to duty in a variety of circumstances and achieved notable results in production and in the creation of both short and long-term assets for his unit. On the debit side I would say that he is somewhat too businesslike in many personal situations to the point of being almost humourless. This, however, is a quality which he does not permit to intrude upon the necessities of his operational work although it often shows in office relationships.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITN. S REPORT (Part II) POTEN. .L

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. EASASIA GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John E. Baker	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER SUPERVISION

10 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

His potential for advancement is excellent. He has the right blend of operational know-how and supervisory talent to undertake positions of wider scope than he now holds. Although his advancement has been rapid for his age, his maturity, poise and common sense almost completely eliminate age as a factor in his potential for a more senior job.

OF PERSONNEL
21 FEB 56
MAIL FROM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject deserves at sometime within the next year or two the opportunity to broaden his experience either by command of a small station or advancement to a more responsible job in a large one.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS, HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE [illegible]
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SK 8.

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. 0A5151N GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one) ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

x	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		14 JUL 1958
Reviewed by TOD	OLO	7/24/58

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED UNDER CRITERIA
[illegible] AT THIS STATION AND IN CONSONANCE
WITH [illegible] IN ORDER TO MAKE FITNESS
REPORTS AS REALISTIC AND MEANINGFUL AS POSSIBLE

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John E. Baker	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

5/6
INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 1 NOV 55 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 25 2 18 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY.
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As branch chief directs and plans operations of denied area branch.	RATING NUMBER 5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with other U.S. agencies	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local security services.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and handles agents	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is an exceedingly well-equipped operations officer. He is mature, intelligent, has a thorough background in operations in his area and the ability to grow in his job. His operational planning and execution is usually impeccable. He has the loyalty of his subordinates and the respect of his equals and supervisors. He is particularly effective in dealing in the liaison field where his good sense and disinterest in "fighting the problem" produces a maximum of cooperation and good will. If he has any minor fault as a supervisor, it is not in impatience with his subordinates, as reflected in previous evaluations, but in an occasional unwillingness to say no to them.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

6/16/59

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A CADASIN GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT SR, Tokyo, Japan	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS					
	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT			
	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 May 1959	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 10 Apr 58 - 31 Mar 59	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and directs operational branch of some 17 persons	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local intelligence and security services.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with U.S. military and civilian intelligence services	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 45 [illegible]

SECRET

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

APR 22 11 19 AH '59 MAIL ROOM

Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the Station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 27 April 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE signed on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC Tokyo Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William Nelson signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/Tokyo Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John E. Baker signed on transmittal

SECRET

20 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/Tokyo Sta/SR

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 Apr 59-~~31~~ 24 June 60	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Soviet Branch, responsible for activities of 24 staff and 6 contract employees	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	RATING NO. 5/6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for station SR planning, budgeting, and operating activities	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Representing the station at varied levels in all SR matters	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his "host" country; an excellent and proven degree of operational "know-how"; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty. He can be expected to continue his dynamic and imaginative pursuit of a most difficult target. It is my opinion that this officer has great potential and is ready for increased responsibilities which would involve the promotion for which he has been recommended. As for training, a good managerial course might help to bring into even sharper focus his many talents.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 23 June 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]/s/ on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (*Specify*):

DATE 23 June 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Adam Brindle(P) signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS, Tokyo	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John Baker/s/ on transmittal

SECRET

DEC 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Recorded by CSPD

Casasin [redacted]

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER ✓

SECTION A [redacted] GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Branch Chief		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OC/SR/6

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: July 1960-October 61

SPECIAL (Specify):

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises large functional branch of thirty-seven staff and fifteen contract personnel.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with various components of the Agency and with other agencies.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and programs for operations support, including initiation of new support activities.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares and presents briefings.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises preparation of, and sometimes personally prepares, special studies both on own initiative and on request.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises maintenance of SR Division records on Soviet defectors, supports exploitation of defectors and participates in their resettlement.	5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECTION E	**NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstra n current position. Indicate suggestions for employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

MAIL ROOM

Mr. [redacted] has a good knowledge of Soviet matters and generally is very well informed. He continually demonstrates much initiative and a high degree of productivity. He is stimulating to his associates, businesslike and delegates work easily. He appears very self-confident and he is dynamic.

Mr. [redacted] supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well.

SECTION F	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.	
DATE 9 November 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]	b/
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Twelve	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
	IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.	
☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS	
☐ OTHER (*Specify*):		
DATE 9 November 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR SR/Chief of Plans and Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE QUENTIN C. JOHNSON Q. Johnson
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
☒	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.	
☐	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.	
☐	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.	
☐	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 21 NOV 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, SR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOHN M. MAURY

SECRET

SECRET

JUN 1962

61c4

6 August 1962

[redacted]

CASASIN

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report [redacted]

Subject: [redacted]

Casasin

My last statements concerning the performance of [redacted] should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

[redacted]

Quentin C. Johnson

QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

CONCUR: Howard J. Osborn
HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

6101 Casasin

[redacted]

6 August 1962

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

Subject: [redacted]

My last statements concerning the performance of [redacted] should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/3. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

[redacted]

Quentin C. Johnson
QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

CONCUR: ______________________
HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HARVEY, WILLIAM K.
O.P. FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONAL & UNRELATED TIME PERIOD MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10 50 15 AUG 78		DAN HARDWAY	Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HARVEY, WILLIAM K.
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONAL & UNRELATED TIME PERIOD MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
15 AUG 78 ✓		DAN HARDWAY	Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

NEW YORK TIMES
14 JUNE 1976

W. Harvey, C.I.A. Aide, Dead; Linked to Anti-Castro Plotting

William K. Harvey, reportedly the head of a special Central Intelligence Agency group set up in the 1960's to plan the removal of foreign leaders by means including assasination, died of a heart attack last Wednesday in an Indianapolis hospital.

Mr. Harvey, who was 60 years old, was said to have been in charge of the agency's efforts against Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba. He was among 10 agents whose identities were disclosed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence after an investigation in 1975 of alleged assassination plots by the United States.

William E. Colby, then Director of Central Intelligence, had argued that disclosure of the names of agents would put them in jeopardy of retaliation by "irrational groups."

Mr. Harvey testified before the Senate committee that he had been told by superiors that the Castor assasination plot had been aproved at the highest levels of the government, and that he had discussed the efforts with his immediate superior, Richard Helms, who later became director of the agency.

Mr. Harvey moved to Indianapolis in 1969 after retiring from the agency, where he had worked for 22 years. He worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1940 to 1947.

At the time of his death, Mr. Harvey was law editor for Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Company.

He was buried Saturday at South Cemetery in Danville, just west of Indianapolis. He is survived by his wife, Clara Grace, a daughter, Sally, and a son, James D. Harvey.

68-134

13 FEB 1968

Mr. William King Harvey
28 West Irving Street
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015

Dear Bill:

I am sorry that due to a busy schedule and my absence for several days during the Christmas holidays I didn't have an opportunity to see you prior to your retirement at the end of the year.

Red White has told me of his visit with you, and I am particularly appreciative of your expression of continued loyalty to the Agency and your offer to be of assistance should an appropriate occasion arise.

I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

OP/BSD/RB/MJRoper:jsc
Rewritten:ExDir:sbo
Distribution:
0 - Adse
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
~~1~~ - OPF
1 - RB

(Concurred in by C/EAB/OS on 8 Jan 68)

NOTE: Covert correspondence

Mr. William King Harvey
28 West Irving Street
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015

Dear Bill:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your more than twenty-six years of service to your country. The success with which you have met them should be a source of lasting pride and satisfaction to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
- O - Addressee
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - C/EAB/CS
- 1 - D/Pers
- 1 - OPF
- 1 - RB
- 1 - RB Reader

/s/ Emmett D. Echols [illegible]

Originator: ______________________
Director of Personnel

Concur: [illegible] **
C/EAB/CS

OP/BSD/RB/[illegible]JRoper:jac (26 December 1967)

**NOTE: Covert correspondence.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 December 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 051164

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, William K.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Retirement - CIA Retirement System (Voluntary) and disability

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 31 YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 8136-1186

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sec. 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR Development Complement

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 18 1

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 27055

18 REMARKS

Mr. Harvey is not recommended for the Agency Reserve List.

Coord w/ Mike Ryker, R.B. by telecon 12/29/67.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 HDQTRS. CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 09 DA. 13 YR. 16

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR

CBJ CCOD.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO.

34 SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1-9-68 m.w.

46 OP APPROVAL: Emmett D Echols

DATE APPROVED: 28 Dec 1967

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

1-3 DEC

Executive Registry
[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement - William K. Harvey

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. William K. Harvey, GS-18, Operations Officer, European Division, Clandestine Services, has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j, to be effective 30 December 1967.

3. Mr. Harvey has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for voluntary retirement under the System. He is 52 years old with over 26 years of Federal Service. This service includes over 20 years with the Agency of which more than 9 years were in qualifying service overseas. The CIA Retirement Board has recommended that his application for voluntary retirement be approved. I endorse this recommendation.

4. It is recommended that you approve the voluntary retirement of Mr. William K. Harvey under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

[illegible]

/s/ [illegible]

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

[illegible]

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

[illegible]

/s/ Richard Helms

Director of Central Intelligence

15 DEC 1967

Date

SECRET

Distribution:
0 - Return to D/Pers
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/Pers
~~1~~ - OPF
1 - RB Soft file (w/hold)
1 - RB Reader

.C 13 3 25 PM '67

OP/FSD/RE/MJRoper:tlh (7 December 1967)
Retyped: OP/FSD/BDeFelice:jas (11 December 1967)

DEC 16 10 18 AM '67

Personal Information

7:25 - [illegible]
not in

Gp 18
25,890

Gp officer

Conv. 2-25-67

EOD. 20 Sept. 47

9:25 - w/ clerk

10 --
12. not in
12.45 not in
1:15 not in
1:30 not in
2:00 not in

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	04/09 05/06	01	1361186	000

CD	EARNINGS NORMAL	EARNINGS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
01	199200		REG SAL

NOTE:
THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS NORMAL	DEDUCTIONS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
41	35014		F/TAX 1
53	1102		INS WEAPA
54	1000		INS FEGLI
57	750		INS UBLIC
61	1374		0820 HOSP 2
75	12948		AGY RET

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	HT/HRS	ND/HRS	RATE	O/T-HT AMT	N/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
											99	147012	

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.
147012

FORM 8-63 1315

SECRET

(10-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 February 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 61164

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 25 YEAR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	XX	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7136-~~1207~~ 1186

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
~~FOREIGN FIELD~~ Dci Conf
~~SOUTHERN REGION~~
~~ROME STATION~~
~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF (UNASSIGNED)~~

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ~~ROME, ITALY~~ Wash, D.C

11. POSITION TITLE: ~~CHIEF OF STATION~~ Ofc Officer

12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~0000~~ 4997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: ~~0136.05~~ 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 18-1

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 25,890

18. REMARKS

[illegible]

cc payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Richard F. Westerman
Richard F. Westerman, C/E/Personnel

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 2/28/67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODINGS NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	09 13 16	

27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV PROV, TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-15-67 mw

46 OP APPROVAL: [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 2 Mar 67

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

A SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 February 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 061164 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 24 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / XXX V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7136-1186
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR ~~CS/CS~~ DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C
11. POSITION TITLE: 1st Secretary OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 01-? 18-1
17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~$ 24,224~~ 24770 $ 25,890

18. REMARKS From: ~~DDP/EUR/FF/COS, ROME~~
Subject departed the Station 21 March 1966.

Other.

cc security

Security [illegible] SB/SS 3/15/67
{ Lc 3/16/67

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Richard F. Westerman
Richard F. Westerman, E/E/Personnel

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 2/28/67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 32
20 EMPLOY CODE: R
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 44997 ALPHABETIC [illegible]
22 STATION CODE: [illegible]
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HDQTRS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 09 DA. 13 YR 16
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA. YR
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION-CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA. YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO.
34 SEX
35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA. YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-15-67
46 O P APPROVAL: R. Brand
DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Rome

Director of Personnel

WOLLOGAGE - - Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

Action: As indicated
REF: Book Dispatch 5096 & OIRS - 7586

1. You have been found to be qualified as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System and have been so designated effective 21 November 1965.

2. Although such designation under present statutes is viewed favorably by most persons, the regulation governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interests. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, you are hereby notified of your right to appeal. An appeal with reasons therefore must be received in Headquarters within 60 days of the date of this dispatch or acceptance of designation will be assumed. Any questions that you may have in connection with your designation that cannot be answered by referring to Book Dispatch 5096 should be forwarded to Headquarters.

3. We believe that the benefits of the Organization Retirement System are superior to the benefits of the Civil Service Retirement System. However, there are a few situations in which an employee at the time of retirement may have so many years of service (almost 37) that he would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service system. Because of this, the policy decision has been made that a participant in the Organization system who would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service system may, not later than one year prior to his retirement, apply to be removed from our system and transferred to the Civil Service system. Thus, you should not anticipate this contingency as a factor in deciding whether you regard your designation as a participant adverse to your best interests.

21 DEC 1965

/s/ Richard B. Egan 15 DEC 1965

RICHARD B. EC

OIRS - 7779

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 16 November 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER	061164
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)	HARVEY, WILLIAM K.
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	11 / 21 / 65
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6 FUNDS	V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF XXX
7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	6136-1267
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	PL 88-643 Sect. 203
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE ROME STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	ROME, ITALY
11 POSITION TITLE	FIRST SECRETARY CHIEF OF STATION
12 POSITION NUMBER	0262
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	FSR GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.05
16 GRADE AND STEP	01 2 18 1
17 SALARY OR RATE	24,284 $ 25,382

f
54

18 REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

1 cc to OP/BSD/RB
1 cc to CCS
1 cc to Finance through CCS

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	Philip C. B
DATE SIGNED	18 NOV 1965
18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	
DATE SIGNED	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	28
20 EMPLOY CODE	10
21 OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC	50630
21 OFFICE CODING — ALPHABETIC	WE
22 STATION CODE	36533
23 INTEGREE CODE	
24 HOGTRS CODE	3
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO / DA / YR)	09 / 13 / 16
26 DATE OF GRADE (MO / DA / YR)	05 / 17 / 59
27 DATE OF LEI (MO / DA / YR)	05 / 17 / 59
28 NTE EXPIRES (MO / DA / YR)	
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE) CODE	2
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE / MO / DA / YR)	
EOD DATA	
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34 SEX	
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT)	
36 SERV. COMP. DATE (MO / DA / YR)	
37 LONG COMP. DATE (MO / DA / YR)	
38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR TEN-A PROV TEMP / CODE)	
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES / HEALTH INS. CODE)	
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42 LEAVE CAT CODE	
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO TAX CLAIMED / STATE CODE)	
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	11-22-65
46 OP APPROVAL	for D/Pers
DATE APPROVED	18 Nov 65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 MARCH 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER 061164	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 6 DAY 30 YEAR 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF CC	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3136-6300-1014	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WE ROME STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE Secretary CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0262	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		02 0	15,900
GS ~~(00)~~ 5775	0136.01	18 1	20,000

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP ~~TASK FORCE W~~/OFFICE OF THE CHIEF/0662. Trans 1

APPOINTMENT MEMO TO DCI SENT ON 27 MARCH 1963.

259 SENT TO MEDICS ON 15 MARCH 1963. Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/SS 4/2/63 6/24

REQUEST ALL NECESSARY CLEARANCES BE GRANTED PRIOR TO 1 JUNE 1963.

COPIES SENT TO FINANCE AND SECURITY. CSPD

06/27/63

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL THOMAS M. FISHER, C/WE/PT	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER McLean	DATE SIGNED 24 June 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 6230	ALPHABETIC 10E	22. STATION CODE 31533	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS CODE 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 09 13 15	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXP RES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 6/27/63	46. O.P. APPROVAL B. L. Bond for	DATE APPROVED 26 June 63

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.
1-62

SECRET

(4)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CD/P 3-5554

12 JUN 1963

Executive Registry
63-4940

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey
Chief of Station, Rome, Italy

1. This is to make a matter of written record the appointment of Mr. Harvey as Chief of Station, Rome, Italy, effective on or about 30 June 1963. Mr. Harvey will replace Mr. Francis I. G. Coleman, who is scheduled to attend the next session of the National War College. Verbal approval was given by you and by the Director.

2. A biographic data sheet, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

William D. O'Ryan
WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
Chief
Western Europe Division

Attachment
Biographic Profile (Part I)

CONCUR:

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

[illegible] JUN 1963
(Date)

APPROVED:

Marshall S. Carter
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

22 June '63
(Date)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

22 May 1963

Mr. William K. Harvey

Dear Bill,

I wish to express my real appreciation for the time you have devoted to Agent Panel affairs. Your operational experience and personal knowledge of many of the individual staff agents and career agents have provided a sound basis for your contributions to Panel decisions concerning their promotions and reassignments. I look forward to the time, after your overseas assignment, when we may have the pleasure of your service in a similar capacity.

Sincerely,

W. Lloyd George

W. Lloyd George
Chairman, CS Agent Panel

Bill, may I add in my own hand and words real appreciation for your wisdom, objectivity and help.

Lloyd

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 August 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 561164 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 6 DAY 8 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3132 - 1000 - 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: Task Force W
Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer – CH ~~Chief~~ Spl Asst to Coord
12. POSITION NUMBER: BA-662
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR GS ~~15~~
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 02-0 18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $14900 $18500 ✓
18. REMARKS: ~~PRA for the duration of Task Force W~~ from FI staff tray 4

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: for Louis Armstrong
DATE SIGNED: 8/27/62
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Richard D
DATE SIGNED: 8/28/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 61100 ALPHABETIC TF10
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. [illegible] CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 09 DA. 31 YR. 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LE: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSR 3 = FICA 5 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 = NO LIFE 1 = YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T. Kearny 08/25/62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: B.J. [illegible] for OP [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 29 Aug 62

152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

Pre - 1959 personnel
actions

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 061164

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 15 Jan 1941

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HARVEY, William King
3. SEX M
4. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Sep 1915
5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 29 Sep 1947

6. MARITAL STATUS Remarried
7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclude employee) NO. 3 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH ? ? ?
8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE ?

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS MEMBERSHIP ?
OTHER STATUS
10. LAST MED. RPT. May 1967
QUAL. FOR Current Duties
EVAL. FOR Annual Exec

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS NONE X
SERVICE
GRADE
ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1
RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2
TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3
RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE
13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE
14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1931-33 Danville Gazette, Indiana - Reporter & Printer
1934-35 Indiana Univ, Bloomington - Publicity Writer (athletics)(PT)
1937-40 Self-employed, Maysville, Kentucky - Attorney-at-Law
1940-47 Dept of Justice, FBI, DC/NYC/Pittsburgh, Pa - Special Agent & Supervisor/

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1933-37 Indiana Univ, Bloomington - LLB (with Distinction) Law, Psych, Philos, Journalism

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

German - R,High; W,P,S,U,Inter; Interpret - Oct 1961

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1963 Italian

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1947	Intel Of	P-6		OSO/FBS/Ch, Inf'TUSSRDIV	Hq
May 1948	" "	P-7		OSO/COPS/FBS/DCh, ForeignBr	"
Dec 1948	" "	P-7		OSO/COPS/DOPC/DCh, ForeignBr	"
Mar 1949	" "	P-7		OSO/COPS/DCh, Ops for CE	"
Oct 1949	" "	GS15		OSO/Ch, Stf-C&ACh, Stf-D	"
Feb 1951	Chief Stf E	16		OSO/Ch, Staff E	"
Dec 1951	I O	16		OSO/Ch, Plans Staff	"
Dec 1952	Ops Of	16		DDP/EE/GerMis/BOB/COB	Bonn
Nov 1953	I O	16	FI	DDP/EE/GerMis/BOB/COB	Berlin
Dec 1954	Area Ops Of 0136.01	16	FI	" " " " " "	"
Jan 1956	" " " 0136.01	17	DI	DDP/EE/GerSta/BOB/COB	"
May 1959	Chief of Base 0136.01	18	DI	" " " " " "	"
	Sep 1959 return to Hq				
Oct 1959	Ops Of 0136.01	18	DI	DDP/Ch, FI/D	Hq
Jun 1962	" " 0136.01	18	D	DDP/Ch, Task Force W	"
Jun 1963	Chief of Sta 0136.01	18	D	DDP/WE/Rome Sta/COS	Rome
Jun 1965	" " " 0136.05	18	D	" " " " "	"
Feb 1967	Ops Of 0136.01	18	D	DDP/EUR/Dev Comp	Hq
Dec 1967	Retirement (voluntary - CIARDS)				

20. DATE REVIEWED 22 Sep 1971
21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY obs
22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE No

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
061164

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Harvey William K.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Sept 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-18	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Italian		8. CURRENT STATION Rome	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Station, Rome	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises CA Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 15 JUN 1965	O

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

P

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Harvey has continued to manage the Agency's activities in Italy with the same enthusiasm and drive which characterized the description of his approach to the Station Chief role in his past Fitness Report.

In his efforts to reorient the Rome Station's FI program toward Soviet-Satellite targets Mr. Harvey has devoted considerable energy to acquiring the basic information needed for this task. This has been well reported and the responsibilities for carrying out this shift in operational approach have been precisely delegated. It is still early to assess the results operationally but the reorientation has been well organized. As an early indication of the trend this is taking, several successful technical operations have been established which are well on target.

To accomplish the objectives of the CA responsibilities of the Rome Station Mr. Harvey has acquired the most competent officers with this highly specialized skill and has staunchly supported their efforts to prosecute this program which remains extensive. He has considerably improved the Station relationship with Embassy officers, including the Ambassador, by devoting greater effort to this necessary phase of the Station Chief's role and the Ambassador, during a recent trip to Washington, made special mention of the degree of confidence he had in the Station's reporting and in the extent to which it has kept him properly informed.

During the period under review Mr. Harvey acquired a Deputy Station Chief - for whose arrival he had waited more than 6 months. He has delegated general management of the Station's activities to this officer, who has applied himself diligently to this task and the results have been promising. Mr. Harvey has been receptive to headquarters guidance, is extremely prompt and thorough in replying to his correspondence.

(cont'd)

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	Employee at Field Station

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
24		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
2 June 1965	C/WE	William D. O'Ryan W D O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 June 65	ADDP	Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

William K. Harvey

Fitness Report for Period 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

Section C (cont'd)

Some administrative details, such as the reports on the performance of officers whose evaluation he was reluctant to make, Mr. Harvey has had a tendency to postpone despite repeated efforts to provoke him into timely response.

I have rated Mr. Harvey's overall performance outstanding in recognition of his superior supervisory ability, his unusual skill in expressing his views and his determination to accomplish his basic objectives regardless of the obstacles which he encounters. The Rome Station is complex, is engaged in some highly sensitive operations which must be guided with a strong hand and by an officer with a degree of professionalism which Mr. Harvey is well able to supply as a result of his extensive operational experience.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
061164

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) HARVEY (First) William (Middle) K.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Sept 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-18	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Italian		8. CURRENT STATION Rome		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1965 - 27 September 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Station, Rome	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises CA Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

28 OCT 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

My rating of the performance of this officer remains the same as the description of his performance which is contained in his fitness report for period ending 31 March 1965.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William K. Harvey

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 30	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Mr. Harvey is currently at his overseas post.

DATE 27 September 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WE Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan William D. O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluations given Mr. Harvey on duties No. 2, 3 and 4. I believe duty No. 2 could have been rated "outstanding" rather than "strong," with justification. I also think, however, that duty No. 1, involving the overall administration and management of the Station and its personnel, should more appropriately be rated "proficient," or perhaps "strong."

DATE 21 October 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADDP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE THKaram Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

what date?

Colored photograph removed this date and forwarded with Biographic Profile to Mr. McCone via Mr. Henry Oosthoek, WH/Pers. Mr. Oosthoek cleared with Mr. Gene Stevens, Chief, T&R Branch, POD/OP, the removal of picture.

V. Graham, OP/POD/CAB
5E-2508 HQS
Ext. 7771


ARVEY WILLIAM K
JANUARY 1961
77
KODAK GRAY SCALE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SE: 9 JAN 68

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 061108
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HARVEY WILLIAM K
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 12 31 67
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 8136 1186 0000
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: P.L. 88-643 SECT. 233
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: CS OFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 1
17 SALARY OR RATE: 27055
18 REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45
20 Employ. Code: 18
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE:
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 Hdqtrs. Code:
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 09 13 18
26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE; CODE:
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: CSJ0000
32 Correction Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO:
34 SEX:
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36 SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 2 WAIVER 1 YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE:
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

D. ECHOLS

POSTED

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FLW

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	44 997	CF	GS 18 1	$25,890	$27,055

SECRET
(When Filled In)

E.I. 16 MAR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 061164
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HARVEY WILLIAM K
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. DA. YR. CCE 02 25 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7136 1186 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 25890
18. REMARKS:
OTHER
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 56
20. Employ. Code: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 44997 ALPHABETIC EUR
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Headqrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 09 DA 13 YR 16
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRE: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJT: 16 MAR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 061164
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HARVEY, WILLIAM K
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 02 24 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7136 1186 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR
DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: FIRST SECRETARY
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 01 2
18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 24770
25890
18. REMARKS: OTHER
ROME, ITALY

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 44337 ALPHABETIC EUR
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE: 1
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 08 13 16
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; NO. DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
3-17-67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

261

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	50 630 CF	GS 18 1	$25,382	$25,890

14-00000

S

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	50 630	CF	GS 18 1	$24,500	$25,382

JGD: 19 NOV 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OD/pers

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 061164	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 11 21 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	6136 1267 0000	PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE ROME STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE FIRST SECRETARY CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0262	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP 01 2 18 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 24284 25382

18. REMARKS

ROME, ITALY
EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28	10	50630	WE	36533	1	3	09 13 16	05 17 59	05 17 59

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 8 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE (MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX
		2					

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-26-65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

56

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 04/16/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 061144	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) HARVEY WILLIAM K								
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION SERIES CODE ADJUSTMENT						4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 06 DA 07 YR 65		5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF		7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE 5136 1267 0000		8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF					
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE DIVISION						10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION ROME, ITALY			
11 POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF STATION						12 POSITION NUMBER 0262		13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS LB etc) GS			15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05			16 GRADE AND STEP 18		17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

POSTED
6-21-65

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 11508 1-63 MFG 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZR: 28 JUNE 63

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 061164	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 06 30 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3136 6300 1014	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE ROME STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE 1ST SECRETARY CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0262	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 02 0 18 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 15300 20000

WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	10	62630 WE	36533	1	3	09 13 16		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAN, RES/, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES), HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

POSTED
07/02/63 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

28 JUN 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	261164	61100	CF	18 1	$18500	18 1	$20000

PSC: 12 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OKF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
061164	HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT (CORRECTION)	06 08 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		3132 1000 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP TASK FORCE W OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
SP ASST TO COORD OPS OFFICER CH	0662	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	02 0 18 1	14900 18500

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 06/08/62 TO SHOW THE INTEGRATED TITLE, CLASSIFICATION, GRADE, STEP, & SALARY WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY OMITTED.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
57	10	61100	TFW	75013	1	1	09 13 16		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA YR	EOD DATA → 33. SECURITY REQ NO. / 34. SEX
					37	06 08 62	

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROJ, TEMP)	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

BAB 9/12/62

09/18/62 DK

FORM 8-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-81)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

DATE: 31 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HARVEY WILLIAM K
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): [illegible] 09 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3102 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: TASK FORCE W
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: [illegible] 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 18500
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 27
20. Employ Code: [illegible]
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 61100 ALPHABETIC TFW
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): [illegible] 13 [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA. YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR PROV RES TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9/5/62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

8/31/62 dcm

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	HARVEY WILLIAM K	561164	41 09	GS-18 1	$17,500	$18,500

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 18 AUGUST 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
561164	HARVEY WILLIAM K	09	13	15		0	M 1	09	29	47	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo. / Da. / Yr.
12	09	40		1	50 USCA 403 J						09 / 29 / 47

13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Yes-1 No-2 Code: 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DOP FI STAFF DIVISION D OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	4109	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series	
	1	SP ASST TO COORD OPS OFFICER CHIEF	0872	FSR GS	0136.01	
21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number	
02 18 1	$ 14900 18500	D	05 17 59	XX XX XX	0122 1003 1000	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
CONVERSION TO PERMANENT SUPERGRADE RANK *		07 27 60	REGULAR	QM	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DOP FI STAFF DIVISION D OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	4109	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	SP ASST TO COORD OPS OFFICER CHIEF	0872	FSR GS	0136.01
38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
02 18 1	$ 14900 18500	D	05 17 59	XX XX XX	1123 1003 1000

44. Remarks

* THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON 27 JULY 1960 APPROVED YOUR PERMANENT GRADE AS GS-18.

CODED

2.29.60 WI

E.D.ECHOLS

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a

SECRET

(4)

Pre 1960
Personnel actions

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 061164

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) HARVEY	(First) William	(Middle) K.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Sept 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-18	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Italian		8. CURRENT STATION Rome		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1965 - 27 September 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Station, Rome	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises CA Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

2 8 OCT 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

My rating of the performance of this officer remains the same as the description of his performance which is contained in his fitness report for period ending 31 March 1965.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William K. Harvey	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 30	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Mr. Harvey is currently at his overseas post.	
DATE 27 September 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WE Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan William D. O'Ryan
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluations given Mr. Harvey on duties No. 2, 3 and 4. I believe duty No. 2 could have been rated "outstanding" rather than "strong," with justification. I also think, however, that duty No. 1, involving the overall administration and management of the Station and its personnel, should more appropriately be rated "proficient," or perhaps "strong."

DATE 21 October 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADDP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 061164

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Harvey William K.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Sept 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-18	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Italian	8. CURRENT STATION Rome		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Station, Rome	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises CA Program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

15 JUN 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Harvey has continued to manage the Agency's activities in Italy with the same enthusiasm and drive which characterized the description of his approach to the Station Chief role in his past Fitness Report.

In his efforts to reorient the Rome Station's FI program toward Soviet-Satellite targets Mr. Harvey has devoted considerable energy to acquiring the basic information needed for this task. This has been well reported and the responsibilities for carrying out this shift in operational approach have been precisely delegated. It is still early to assess the results operationally but the reorientation has been well organized. As an early indication of the trend this is taking, several successful technical operations have been established which are well on target.

To accomplish the objectives of the CA responsibilities of the Rome Station Mr. Harvey has acquired the most competent officers with this highly specialized skill and has staunchly supported their efforts to prosecute this program which remains extensive. He has considerably improved the Station relationship with Embassy officers, including the Ambassador, by devoting greater effort to this necessary phase of the Station Chief's role and the Ambassador, during a recent trip to Washington, made special mention of the degree of confidence he had in the Station's reporting and in the extent to which it has kept him properly informed.

During the period under review Mr. Harvey acquired a Deputy Station Chief - for whose arrival he had waited more than 6 months. He has delegated general management of the Station's activities to this officer, who has applied himself diligently to this task and the results have been promising. Mr. Harvey has been receptive to headquarters guidance, is extremely prompt and thorough in replying to his correspondence.

(cont'd)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	Employee at Field Station

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
24	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
2 June 1965	C/WE	W D O'Ryan William D. O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 June 65	ADDP	Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

SECRET

William K. Harvey

Fitness Report for Period 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

Section C (cont'd)

Some administrative details, such as the reports on the performance of officers whose evaluation he was reluctant to make, Mr. Harvey has had a tendency to postpone despite repeated efforts to provoke him into timely response.

I have rated Mr. Harvey's overall performance outstanding in recognition of his superior supervisory ability, his unusual skill in expressing his views and his determination to accomplish his basic objectives regardless of the obstacles which he encounters. The Rome Station is complex, is engaged in some highly sensitive operations which must be guided with a strong hand and by an officer with a degree of professionalism which Mr. Harvey is well able to supply as a result of his extensive operational experience.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 061164

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Harvey	(First) William	(Middle) K.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 18	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station, Rome			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Italy		8. CURRENT STATION Rome	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY	☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):	☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 March 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Station, Rome	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and Station Bases.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises correspondence with headquarters on entire complex Station program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises CA Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Engaged in reorientation of Station FI program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 12 AUG 1964	O

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 11 11 19 AM '64

Mr. Harvey's management of the Agency's program in Italy has to date been characterized by the forcefulness and drive which have gained for him in previous assignments a reputation for dynamism. He has undertaken to reorient the Rome Station's FI program toward Soviet-satellite targets and any delay in this reorientation has been due fully to our inability for administrative reasons to supply the personnel he desires on the time schedule which he would prefer.

Although not by inclination oriented toward the objectives of CA, he has preserved and guided the most complex CA program in Western Europe with understanding and skill. To accomplish this it has been necessary for Mr. Harvey to learn the intricasies of an extremely complex local political situation. This he has set about to do with confidence. His accumulated experience in earlier assignments has equipped Mr. Harvey with a self-assurance and confidence which I have rarely seen equalled in any other officer. The continuance of ideal relationships with the key Embassy officials in Rome has been somewhat handicapped by the sudden death of the principal officer in the Embassy who was knowledgeable of our program and the impossibility of bringing into knowledge of our activity the next lower level echelon of Embassy officials for reasons beyond Mr. Harvey's control. This handicap has been overcome over the past year and Mr. Harvey is currently supervising extremely sensitive political operations and contacts to the satisfaction of the Ambassador and his headquarters.

He delegates responsibilities skillfully to those officers under his command who are best qualified and by his own outstanding performance, which is always at its best under heavy stress, he earns an intense loyalty from these personnel. He demonstrates cost-consciousness and outstanding supervisory ability.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 27/2/65

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 12

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: Report will be shown to employee upon return from overseas.

DATE: 28 July 1964

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/WE

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: William D. O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE: 7 AUG 1964

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Deputy Director for Plans

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Richard Helms

SECRET

SECRET

6 1164

18 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Mr. William K. Harvey

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1962 to 15 January 1963 during which Mr. Harvey was Chief, Task Force W.

2. As a senior officer in the Clandestine Services, Mr. Harvey has behind him a long record of professional accomplishment achieved during tours in Washington as well as seven years in Berlin. He is thoroughly grounded in the tradecraft of clandestine activities, and has brought to each and every assignment an intelligent, thorough, and uncommonly conscientious approach. His qualities of leadership are attested to by the loyalty and devotion of those colleagues who have worked under his direction. If anything, there has tended to grow up within the Clandestine Services a coterie of officers who have come to regard themselves as "Harvey men", a development which Mr. Harvey himself has not encouraged but which demonstrates the strong emphasis on first-class tradecraft which he has insisted upon in each assignment.

3. As Chief, Task Force W, Mr. Harvey had the task of organizing and developing a large operational team devoted to the acquisition of intelligence and the handling of special operations directed at Cuba. He was obliged to work within a complicated bureaucratic framework, a fact which made the clearing of actions a laborious and time-consuming exercise. Under his direction, the Task Force grew substantially in size and in professional competence with the result that when the Cuban crisis arrived in October intelligence assets were in place to make a significant contribution to the overall intelligence picture. Mr. Harvey devoted considerable ingenuity, long hours of personal time, and great energy to this enterprise, and, although certain aspects of the intra-governmental coordination of the operations had rough sledding, his net achievement was the establishment of an effective, going concern with momentum which carries on to the present.

4. Mr. Harvey, after a strong performance as Chief, TFW, has been assigned as Chief of Station, Rome, and is now preparing himself to take over at that post in the coming months.

Thos H Karamessines
Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director (Plans)

Read 23/4/63

29 APR 1963

Reviewing Official:
Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET

OD/Pers

OCT 1967

15 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: William K. Harvey - Memorandum in lieu of fitness report for period 30 March 1960 - 10 May 1962

1. It is difficult to prepare a fitness report on this outstanding officer, largely because forms do not lend themselves to measuring his many unique characteristics. His strengths are in professional knowledge and competence in the operational field, in a toughness of mind and firmness of attitude, while the latter in past years have moved him into positions that were sometimes stronger than superior officers, with a responsibility for adjustments necessary in matters of policy in relation to Agency position in the community, were able to handle easily, his own closeness to policy positions of the Agency within the U.S. community in the last two years has found him with a real ability to handle policy matters and to adjust to necessities, without losing his firmness and his independence of thought.

2. He is sometimes accounted to be less than outgiving of information about operational matters in which he is engaged, yet it should be remembered that this characteristic has been part and parcel of a sound operational attitude in his career. He has a wide knowledge of personalities within the officer corps of the DD/P and is for the most part a good selector of officers to accomplish necessary tasks. He handles people well. He has a tremendous energy and is a loyal officer both to his superiors and to the purposes of the Clandestine Services of CIA.

3. He is one of the few distinctly outstanding officers in the DD/P.

W. Lloyd George

W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

8 September 1960

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

The following statement relates to the performance of William K. Harvey, GS 18, Chief of FI, Division D.

This officer has held a series of responsible positions in DD/P and its predecessor clandestine intelligence organization for well over ten years. He excels in the field of clandestine operations in general and especially so in that phase of clandestine staff and operational activities concerned with the procurement, handling and exploitation of highly sensitive and critical intelligence and operational materials.

His performance generally over the recent years has proved him to be one of the outstanding officers of the DD/P organization. He has demonstrated clearly superior performance both in staff responsibility at Headquarters and as Chief of Base in a very important field station where he was directly engaged in supervising and carrying on operations successfully against targets of the highest priority.

In the period under review, June 1959 to March 1960, he took over and directed functioning of one of DD/Ps most sensitive components charged with achievement by special means against targets of the highest importance. This included carrying on negotiations and liaison with other components of CIA and other Agencies and Departments of the U. S. Government concerned with his special field. His performance of this responsibility in many respects has been outstanding. He has continued to demonstrate his fitness to handle a wide range of positions of major responsibility within the clandestine service.

Among his outstanding characteristics are: thorough understanding of his profession and ability to make this clear to persons of high level whose knowledge of the Clandestine Services is general. He is firm, tenacious, and on occasions strongly aggressive in pursuit of his point of view. While this may sometimes make for difficulty on the part of those in higher echelons who wish to dispose of a complicated problem easily and quickly, this officer's persistence in carefully

presenting his arguments and in holding to them until their fact and logic prevail or until policy factors override, makes him a highly valuable asset to CIA.

Rater W. Lloyd George
W. Lloyd George
C/FI

Reviewer Richard Helms
Richard Helms
COPS

010

SECRET

14 January 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION: Chief, Records and Services Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - William K. Harvey
November 1957 - January 1959

1. Subject's abilities and performance are too generally known to require detailed comment. One of the very senior officers in KUDOVE he has been chief of what is probably the largest and most productive overseas Base of KUBARK for approximately seven years. During this period Subject has been personally responsible for a number of operational successes, some of which have been of national importance. Possessed of driving energy, determination and initiative, he has few equals in professional experience and competence. Throughout his administration of the Base he has established and maintained exceedingly high standards of accomplishment, discipline and endeavor. Subject's judgement, on occasion, is impulsive and proposals of the Base have been, from time to time, advanced and defended with greater vehemence and more exhaustively than the occasion, objectively speaking, required. Subject's basic self-discipline, good sense and loyalty, however, have prevented any such incidents, which are in large measure manifestations of the highly charged atmosphere and insistent operational pressures of Berlin, from developing into serious friction with the German Station or Washington headquarters.

2. It has been a pleasure to serve with this officer and, during his assignment, he has consistently rendered dedicated and effective service of the very highest order.

John A. Bross

John A. Bross

CONCUR:

James H. Critchfield

CHIEF, EE DIVISION

RYBAT
SECRET

Harvey, W. K. EE —
Chief of Base 6518-811320
Berlin

18 June 1959

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION: Chief, Records and Services Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - William K. Harvey
January 1959 - June 1959

I have nothing to add to the memorandum dated 14 January 1959. Subject continues to render an outstanding performance.

John A. Bross
John A. Bross

I certify that I have seen
this Fitness Report

William K. Harvey

CONCUR:

James Critchfield
Chief, Eastern European Division

18 Nov 59

SECRET

Pre 1959 Fitness Reports

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Harvey, William K.	Son-James	68-0535

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 7 March 1967.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
3 January 1968	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) Harvey, William	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* Self	CLAIM NUMBER 68-0533

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 30 July 1964.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 3 January 1968	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE Felice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Harvey, William K.	Daughter-Sally	68-0534

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 3 August 1967.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
3 January 1968	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

14-00000

Items indicated by a Star are to be Completed by the Payee.

1. (Agency)

TRAVEL REIMBURSEMENT VOUCHER

2. D.O. VOUCHER NO.

3. BU. VO. NO.

*4. PAYEE'S COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS

William K. Harvey
28 West Irving Street
Chevy Chase, Md. 20015

*5. TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

A. Number	B. Dated
6-69348 6-69348A	2/23/66 5/13/66

6. D.O. PAID BY

*7. EMPLOYEE NUMBER (State Only)

253900

*8. TRAVEL ADVANCE STATUS

A. Old Balance	$ -0-
B. Applied This Voucher	$ -0-
C. New Balance	$ -0-

9. OFFICIAL STATION (State Only)

Rome to Dept.

*10. STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT FURNISHED TRANSPORTATION

A. GTR or Req. No.	B. Valuation	C. Carrier*	D. Class	E. Point to Point Travel (1) from	(2) to
LI 302,207	$1302.90	SS.Constitution	1st	Naples	New York
IO 359,316	271.35	AF TWA	Economy	Munich	Washington

*11. PAYEE CERTIFICATE: I hereby certify that this voucher and attachments are correct and just in all respects, and that payment or credit has not been received.**

A. Date: March 17 1967

B. Signature: William K. Harvey

12. PAYMENT CALCULATION

*A. Amount Claimed (See Item 19.) $ 649.61

B. Differences, if any $

C. Amount Allowed (Verified correct to Approp. ________) $

D. Applied to Advance (See Item 8B.) $

E. Net to Payee $

13. ADMINISTRATIVE APPROVAL: Recommended for approval.

A. Date

B. Signature

Name:

Title

*14. PREVIOUS PAYMENTS: The next previous Vo. paid under same travel auth. was:

A. D.O. Vou. No.	B. Paid (mo. & yr.)	C. D.O. Name and Symbol

15. CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT: *Pursuant to authority vested in me, I certify this voucher is correct and proper for payment:*

A. Date

B. Authorized Certifying Officer's Signature

Name:

Title:

16. METHOD OF PAYMENT (For Paying Office Use Only)

A. Cash or Dep. Check Amt.	B. Exchange Rate	C. U.S. $ Equivalent	*D. Date

E. Treasury or Depository Check No. and Name of Depository

*F. Payment Received

(Payee's Signature)

17. ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION

A. Fund	B. Allotment	C. Oblig. (T/A) No	D. Organization (State Only) USIA: Activity/Sub-Activity	E. Function (State Only)	F. Object	G. Paying Office (State Only)	H. Paying Date (State Only)	I. Amount

* Item 10C. - If carrier was foreign ship registry, attach certificate of readiness.

** FRAUDULENT CLAIM - Falsification of any item in an expense account works a forfeiture of the claim (28 U.S.C. 2514) and may result in a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both (18 U.S.C.).

FORM FS-286
6-65

FORM FS-288 (THIS SIDE MAY BE USED AS A SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET) Page 2

*18. CLAIM (Show complete itinerary, and transportation expenses for persons and things for which reimbursement is claimed, or excess [illegible] weights, measures and attach all receipts.)

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Concurrent travel
Wife
Daughter, Sally, Age 7
Separate travel
Son, James, born December 1947

Lire 625/$1 DM 4/$1

Dates 19 66 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount Per Diem (F)	Amount Other (G)
			FORWARDED			
Mr. Harvey, Wife, and Daughter						
Mar.21	0700	LV. Rome via private auto				
	1130	AR. Naples				
		163 miles at 12¢				19.56
		Autostrada tolls L.1750				2.80
		Required fees for auto (Ford)				
		at dock				
		Preparation of car L.1500				
		Auto check-in fee L.1000				
		L.2500				4.00
		Baggage transport Rome				
		to Naples L.3500				5.60
		Baggage transfer charges				
		for hold baggage L.9350				14.96
	2300	LV. Naples	3/4	6	11.25	
Mar.22 thru30		At sea	9	6	135.00	
Mar.31		At sea	1	2	5.00	
*19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to Item 12A. on face of voucher)					151.25	46.92

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1960 O—753-320—(188)

FORM FS-285 (THIS SIDE MAY BE USED AS A SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET) Page 2

#18. CLAIM (Show complete itinerary, ... of transportation expenses for persons and things ... which reimbursement is claimed; as effects, show weights, measures and attach all receipts.)

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Dates 19 66 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount Per Diem (F)	Amount Other (G)
		FORWARDED			151.25	46.92
April 1	0800	AR. New York				
	1200	LV. New York via personal auto				
	1830	AR. Washington				
		269 miles at 12¢				32.28
		Tolls				4.55
		Dock charge for release of car				2.50
		Baggage transfer charge				
		at New York pier	1	16.00	40.00	15.00
		Railway express charges for				
		shipment of 337 lbs. of				
		baggage from New York to				
		Washington				23.40
Travel	of son	James				
June 2		LV. Munich via AF				
		AR. Paris				
June 5	1200	LV. Paris via TWA 803				
	1500	AR. New York				
#19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to Item 12A. on face of voucher)					191.25	124.65

FORM FS-285 (THIS SIDE MAY BE USED AS A SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET) Page 2

*18. CLAIM (Show complete itinerary [illegible] for transportation expenses for persons and things [illegible] which reimbursement is claimed; on effects, show weight, measures and attach all receipts.)

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Dates 1966 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount Per Diem (F)	Amount Other (G)
			FORWARDED		191.25	124.65
June 5	1630	LV. New York via TW 203				
	1807	AR. Washington Nat'l Airport				
		Air travel from Munich is				
		less expensive than $302.90				
		economy air FARE from Rome				
		to Washington				
		Airport tax in Munich DM500				1.25
		Direct scheduling from Munich				
		via air				
June 2	0740	LV. Munich via LH 161				
	0830	AR. Frankfurt				
	1215	LV. Frankfurt via PA 107				
	1745	AR. Washington				
		Per diem ½ @ 16.00 less 35%			5.20	
		Shipment of air freight from				
		Munich to Washington (85lbs.)				67.10
		Deferred home leave travel for				
		Mr. Harvey, James and Sally				
*19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to item 12A. on face of voucher)					196.45	193.00

FORM FS-288 (THIS SIDE MAY BE USED AS A SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET) Page 2

*18 CLAIM (Show complete itinerary [illegible] transportation expenses for persons and things [illegible] which reimbursement is claimed, on effects, show weights, measures and attach all receipts.)

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Dates 19 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount Per Diem (F)	Amount Other (G)
		FORWARDED			196.45	193.00
June 28	0900	LV. Washington via personal auto	3/4	16.00	30.00	
June 29	1500	AR. Indianapolis	3/4	16.00	30.00	
		Mileage 584 @ 12¢				70.08
July 22	0900	LV. Indianapolis via personal	3/4	16.00	30.00	
		auto				
July 23	1500	AR. Washington	3/4	16.00	30.00	
		Mileage 584 miles @ 12¢				70.08
		Cost by auto is less than				
		cost by rail with scheduling				
		as follows:				
June 28	1900	LV. Washington via rail				
June 29	1205	AR. Indianapolis				
July 22	1505	LV. Indianapolis via rail				
July 23	0915	AR. Washington				
		Per diem 2 x $16.00 x 2.5 $80.00				
	RT 1st	class rail (Family Plan) 169.40				
	RT Sleeping accomodations (Bed-room, plus roomette is least expensive)	76.96 $326.36				
*19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to Item 12A. on face of voucher)					316.45	333.16

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
<• 2	6-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH			5. DATE CODED			
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.
•			•			

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 3	• 061164	• HAR	• BF71	4	3	3	3	3	2	61

5. DATE SUBMITTED			6. DATE OF BIRTH			
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)
• 10	02	61	• 09	13	15	

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 5	•	•	•	•							

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST			
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.
•								•			

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME	
		3-LETTERS	ENTER UNDER "TYPE" - A - ADDITION TO RECORD C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD
<• 4	•	•	

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
061164	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
HARVEY, William	7	13	15

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
German				☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

[✓ 2.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

CODED
TO
NOV
DATE

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-49)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

[✓ 3.] I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

[✓ 2.] I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER. -- [illegible]

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 10/2/61	SIGNATURE William K Harvey
(46)	(47)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
0 61164	HARVEY	WILLIAM	K.	50

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		
	3				03	21	66	ITALY	565

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
IN 80062	22 March 1966

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☒	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	C & L DIVISION	DATE 3/29/66		SIGNATURE JP Jackie E. Persinger
☒	C & T DIVISION			

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

ER

66-3525

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

Office of the Director General

G.P.O. BOX No. 510BB.,
MELBOURNE

24 May, 1966.

My dear Admiral

My Liaison Officer in Rome has told me of the tremendous assistance and co-operation that he and his section received at all times from Mr. W.K. Harvey.

I understand that Mr. Harvey has now returned to Washington and I would like to say how much I appreciate all that he has done to assist the work of my officers in Rome.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Charles Spry

(C.C.F. SPRY)

The Honorable W.F. Raborn,
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency,
WASHINGTON.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E [illegible] Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST FIRST MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	*(Print)* 7-24	25-26
061164	HARVEY, WILLIAM K.	50

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	ARRIVAL				DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1				01	08	66	ITALY	365

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	DEPARTURE				RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
IN 26160	4 Jan. 1966

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ C & L DIVISION ☒ C & T DIVISION	DATE 13 Jan. 1966	SIGNATURE Beverly Y. C.

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
61164	Harvey	William	K	50

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	CMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	06	30	63				ITAly	365

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	CMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. Rome 9550 IN 70227	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE
☒	FINANCE DIVISION		

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

130470 FEB 961

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5	(Print)	6-23		24-25
[illegible]	[illegible]			34

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-39		39-41
		04			05				801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION ☐ FINANCE DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE

FORM 8-58 1451a

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

130471 FEB 961

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print) FIRST MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5	6-23	24-25
[illegible]	[illegible]	34

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		39-41
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		39-41
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		
	[illegible]	~~[illegible]~~ 10	[illegible]	[illegible]	~~[illegible]~~ 11	0[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
[illegible]	

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION ☐ FINANCE DIVISION	DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE [illegible]

FORM 6-58 1451a SECRET (4-10)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

0/P - [illegible] T + R

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle)
HARVEY William KING

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE
68 W. IRVING St. Chevy Chase, Md

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE Berlin	DATE OF MARRIAGE 3/2/54
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE ClARA GRACE, Nee Follick	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) Above	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	AGE
JAMES	Same	M	12
SAlly		F	18 Mo.
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian) Deceased	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian) SARA K. HARVEY	ADDRESS 1615 NoRthwood DRive Indianapolis, Ind	TELEPHONE NUMBER L 2579	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES?
Mother

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) WiFe - Above	RELATIONSHIP
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER OL 4-5178
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☒ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☒ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☒ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS HAMILTON NATIONAL BANK & BANK OF SilveR SPRING

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JAN 57

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

self & wife Jointly

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

wife

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE 11/4	SIGNATURE William K Harvey

CONFIDENTIAL

OD/Pers

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

TUTORIAL TRAINING REPORT

03/11/63 - 06/17/63

Student : William K. Harvey

Office : WE

Year of Birth: 1915

Service Designation: D

Grade : 18

No. of Students : 1

EOD Date : 09/47

Instructor: Mrs. M. Lutyk

This is to certify that William K. Harvey received 92 hours of tutorial training in ITALIAN language.

Beginner : X

Non-beginner : ______

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Bengt C. Herder

BENGT C. HERDER
Chief Instructor

10/21/63
Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

Pre 1961 Personnel
material

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 28 November 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Harvey, William K.

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH:

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6765

Room 3E 30

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☒ ANNUAL - Executive
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQDS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:
ROOM NO. & BUILDING:
EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES AT HEADQUARTES

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 24 MAY 1967

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:
JOHN E. FRALLIC
PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST 31 January 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) HARVEY, William K.

3. POSITION TITLE

4. GRADE

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH WH

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD

STATION

TDY OR PCS

TYPE OF COVER

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA

STATION

NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

ROOM NO. & BUILDING

EXT.

10. COMMENTS

Qualified for Current Duties

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

31 January 1966

DATE 31 January 1966

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF Petar J. Gaughan

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 17 March 1965

2. NAME (*Last, First, Middle*) HARVEY, William K.	3. POSITION TITLE COS	4. GRADE GS-18
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH WE DIVISION		6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT. 7157

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 10 March 1965
STATION: Rome
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 2
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (*SF 89*) ATTACHED: 0

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (*One block must be checked*)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: MARGE GROSTEPHAN, WE/PT
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 B 4404
EXT.: 7157

10. COMMENTS

259 forwarded at request of Joe Cline. QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED O S PCS

JOE W. CLINE

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 3 22 65

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 17 March 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Dependents of HARVEY, William K.

3. POSITION TITLE: COS

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: WE DIVISION

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 7157

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

Dependents:

Wife: Clara G.
Dau : Sally J., 10 Aug 58

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 10 March 1965

STATION: Rome

TDY OR PCS: PCS

TYPE OF COVER: Integree

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 2

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED: 0

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: MARGE GRISTEPHAN, SS/PT

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 E 4404

EXT.: 7157

10. COMMENTS

259 forwarded at request of Joe Cline.

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED O S
PCS
JOE W. CLINE

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 3 22 65 SECRET (28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1/2

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 16 May 1963

2. NAME (*Last, First, Middle*): William K. Harvey

3. POSITION TITLE: Chief of Station

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: WE Division

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: o/a 1 July 1963
STATION: Rome
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 3
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (*SF 89*) ATTACHED: 0

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (*One block must be checked*)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: MARGE GROSTEPHAN

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 B 4404

EXT.: 7157

10. COMMENTS

Request evaluation for above PCS.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: [illegible]

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 16 May 1963

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Dependents of William K. Harvey

3. POSITION TITLE: Chief of Station

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: WE Division

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5356

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: o/a 1 July 1963
STATION: Rome
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 3
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED: 0

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Marge Grostephan
MARGE GROSTEPHAN

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 B 4404

EXT.: 7157

10. COMMENTS

89's on file in medical office - per telephone conversation 16 May 63

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR [illegible] ASSIGNMENT

DATE: JUN 1963

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 25 January 1962

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

3. POSITION TITLE: Chief

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: FI/Division D

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 8471

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

☒ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 28 January 1962

STATION: Panama City, Panama

TDY OR PCS: TDY

TYPE OF COVER: Official State Department

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: NONE

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1505 - L Building

EXT.: 4464

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

[illegible]

DATE: [illegible] 1962

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION		1. DATE OF REQUEST 20 October 1960	
2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Harvey, William K.	3. POSITION TITLE Division Chief		4. GRADE GS-18
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH FI Staff, Division D		6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT. 8471	

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ OVERSEAS RETURN

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ XX OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 28 October 1960
STATION: Germany and Switzerland
TDY OR PCS: TDY
TYPE OF COVER: State Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: none
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

☒ XXX YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: G.A. Kennedy, Jr.
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1505 L
EXT.: 4464

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Subject departed on another TDY prior to evaluation. However is Qualified for proposed TDY.

DATE: 2 NOV 1960
SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I. REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY G.A. KENNEDY, FI/D ADMIN

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): HARVEY, William K.

2. DATE: 9 April 1960

3. TO POSITION:

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: FI/Division D

5. GRADE: GS-18

6. TYPE OF POSITION
- ☒ Departmental
- ☐ U.S. Field
- ☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
- ☐ EOD
- ☒ Overseas TDY
- ☐ Returnee
- ☐ Pre-Employment
- ☐ Annual
- ☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
- ☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
- ☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
- ☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
- ☐ Disqualified

Remarks:

QUALIFIED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DUTIES
AND PROPOSED TDY O/S ASSIGNMENT

14 JUN 1960

SECRET

Roland

MEDICAL OFFICE

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I. REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY 1004-

1. NAME (Last) HARVEY (First) William (Middle) K.

2. DATE Sept 1957

3. TO POSITION Germany

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH DDP/EE/

5. GRADE GS-06

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☒ Overseas PCS

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☒ Overseas PCS
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)
Second tour.

(CL 10)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Please notify Corinne L. Hassell, x3041, of results.

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED PCS O/S ASSIGNMENT OCT 9 1957

MEDICAL OFFICER

SECRET

..EPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS

NAME: Harvey, William King #1

DATE: 8/21/52

FOR VOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

NATURE OF ACTION:

TITLE OF POSITION:

GRADE:

☐ DEPT. ☐ FIELD

SUBJECT FOUND ☐ FIT ☐ UNFIT FOR DUTY IN THE ABOVE GRADE AND POSITION.

FOR UNVOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY FI

SUBJECT QUALIFIED FOR:

☐ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☒ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (MILITARY ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS:

Non-arduous O.K. for TDY
O/S where medical
facilities are
available.

PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-32
NOV 1951 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 37-32 AND 37-57, WHICH MAY BE USED. (26)

OSO

REPOR[illegible] PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS [illegible] DUTY

31 Jan 51 194__

Harvey, William K. WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL

EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR

#1 Overseas

☐ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED:

Approved for TDY. To report to Medical after TDY

JOHN R. TIETJEN, M.D.

FORM NO. 37-32
DEC 1948

14-00000

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME HARVEY, WILLIAM K.	NATURE OF ACTION E.O.D.
TITLE OF POSITION Intelligence Officer	GRADE P-7
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Departmental	

Subject was found physically ☒ fit ☐ unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position. 10 May 1948

RECOMMENDATIONS:

2 February 1949
DATE

John R. Tietjen
SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 38-57
NOV 1948

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR DUTY

15 December 194 8

Harvey, William C'O WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR

#1
☒ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED: None

Capt., MC

FORM NO. 37-32
NOV 1947

(1093)

7-ll

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR DUTY

[illegible] 194___

[illegible] WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL

EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR
[illegible] Overseas

☒ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED:
None

John R. Tietjen

FORM NO. 37-32
JAN 1947

JOHN R. [illegible], CAPT MC

(18833)

14-00000

Standard Form 57—June 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R044.

INSTRUCTIONS.—Answer every question below ... Typewrite or print in INK. If you are applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination read the examination announcement carefully and follow its instructions. Send this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

1. Name of examination, or kind of position applied for.

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement):

3. Place of employment applied for:
C.I.O.

4. Mr. Mrs. Miss (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
William King Harvey

5. Street and number or R. D. number
2627 39th Street N.W.

City or post office (including postal zone) and State
Washington, D. C.

6. Legal or voting residence (State) 7. Office phone No. Home phone
Kentucky OR 2914

8. Place of birth (city and State; if born outside U. S. name city and country).
Danville, Indiana

9. Date of birth (month, day, year) 9/13/15 10. Age last birthday. 31 11. ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. ☒ Married ☐ Single 13. Height without shoes 5 feet 11 inches Weight 185 pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No
If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade:

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Approved ☐ Disapproved	Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned	Entered register
Notations	App. Review: Approved	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		X
3 to 6 months?		X
6 to 12 months?		X
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— in Washington, D. C.?	X	
anywhere in the United States?	X	
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations:

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept CAF 13 / P 6 per year.
You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify ☐ Occasionally ☒ Frequently ☐ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the spaces provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience).
(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for such position, the name used.
(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (Month, year)
From To present time

Exact title of your present position:

Salary or earnings
Starting, $ per
Present, $ per

Place of employment (city and State):

Description of your work:

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division.

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfr. of locks, etc.)

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for desiring to change employment:

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16—47530-3

28 CONTINUED

Dates of employment (month, year) From 12/9/40 To 8/22/47

Place of employment (city and State) Washington, D. C.
N.Y., N.Y., Pittsburgh, Pa.,

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: FBI - Dept. of Justice

Kind of business or organization (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of, etc.): Law Enforcement-counter Intelligence

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: various

Name and title of immediate supervisor: D. M. Ladd

Reason for leaving: voluntary

Exact title of your position: Special Agent & Supervisor

Salary or earnings: Starting $3200 per annum; Final $7000 per annum

Description of your work: Supervision of Counter-Intelligence operation

---

Dates of employment (month, year) From 9/37 To 12/40

Place of employment (city and State): Maysville, Ky

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Self

Kind of business or organization (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of, etc.): Practice of Law

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

Name and title of immediate supervisor: None

Reason for leaving: Voluntary

Exact title of your position: Attorney-at-law

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $ per

Description of your work: General Practice of Law

Dates of employment (month, year) From 6/31 To 9/33

Place of employment (city and State): Dansville, Indiana

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Danville Gazette
Danville, Indiana

Kind of business or organization (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of, etc.): Newspaper

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: None

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Alvin Hall, Editor

Reason for leaving: Voluntary

Exact title of your position: Reporter & Printer

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $ per

Description of your work: General Newspaper Publishing business

---

Dates of employment (month, year) From To

Place of employment (city and State)

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division:

Kind of business or organization (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of, etc.)

Number and kind of employees supervised by you

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for leaving:

Exact title of your position

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $ per

Description of your work:

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

14-00000

17. MILITARY [illegible] In order to make the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] If you [illegible] special or technical schools while in the service, write in item (a) "No attendance at [illegible] schools" and indicate in item (c) all important [illegible] in duty assignment, showing dates of such [illegible]

(a) First Special Service School attended **NONE**

(b) What were you taught in first Special Service School?

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From To

Rating received at end of this training.

(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School):

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From To

(e) Second Special Service School attended:

(f) What were you taught in Second Special Service School?

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From To

Rating received at end of this training:

(g) Duty assignment after this training.

(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From To

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization

18. EDUCATION—Circle highest grade completed:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(a) Name and location of last high school attended **Wiley High School Terre Haute, Indiana**

(b) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired:

(c) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended		Years Completed		Degrees Conferred		Semester Hours Credit
		From—	To—	Day	Night	Title	Date	
Indiana University Bloomington, Indiana	LAW	1933	1937	6		LLB	9/37	180

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
Journalism	20	Law	95
Phil & Psych	20		

(e) Other training, such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school), or "in service training" in a Federal agency:	Subjects Studied	Dates Attended		Years Completed	
		From—	To—	Day	Night

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	Exc	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc	Good	Fair
German			x						

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?

Study

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries, indicate (1) names of countries (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e. g., business, education, recreation)

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices:

Approximate number of words per minute in typing 50 shorthand ....

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession, such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)

☒ Yes ☐ No Give kind of license and State **Attorney**

First license or certificate (year) **'37 at Law - Ind. & Ky**

Latest license or certificate (year) **'47**

22. Give any other qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application such as:
(a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(b) your patents or inventions
(c) public speaking and public relations experience
(d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

16—67799-6

23. REFERENCES.—List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. **B. F. Small**	**Sycamore Bldg-Terre Haute, Indiana**	**Atty**
2. **E. L. Zeigler**	**Cochran Bldg., Maysville, Ky.**	**Atty**
3. **A. M. Thurston**	**C.I.O.- Washington, D. C.**	

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		X
28. Since your 16th birthday, have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes" list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes" give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating if retired from military or naval service.		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes" give details in Item 38.		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? If your answer is "Yes" show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by whom employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? If your answer is "Yes" give complete details in Item 38.		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? If your answer is "Yes" give complete details in Item 38.		X
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?		X
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?		
(c) Was service performed on an active full time basis, with full military pay and allowances?		

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service:	Date of separation or separations:

Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	Serial No. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation.)

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY, OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service award?		
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		X
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		X
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service-connected disability?		X

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d) IS "YES" AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19....

Agency .... Title ....

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions (indicate item numbers to which answers apply).

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80)

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date ....

Signature of applicant ....
(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name, "Mary L. Doe.")

16—17285-4

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS COMPLETELY. IF QUESTION DOES NOT APPLY WRITE "NOT APPLICABLE". WRITE "UNKNOWN" ONLY IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER AND CANNOT OBTAIN THE ANSWER FROM PERSONAL RECORDS. USE A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER FOR EXTRA DETAILS ON ANY QUESTION OR QUESTIONS FOR WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ROOM. ATTACH TWO RECENT PASSPORT SIZE PICTURES TO THIS FORM. DATE TAKEN WRITTEN ON THE BACK OF EACH. TYPE, PRINT OR WRITE CAREFULLY; ILLEGIBLE OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL NOT RECEIVE CONSIDERATION

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS? YES ☒ NO ☐

SECTION 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

NAME MR. ☒ MISS ☐ MRS. ☐ FIRST: William MIDDLE: King LAST: Harvey TELEPHONE: OR 2914

PRESENT ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: 2627 39th Street N.W. CITY: Washington, D. C. STATE: COUNTRY: U.S.A.

LEGAL RESIDENCE STREET AND NUMBER: Maysville CITY: Kentucky STATE: COUNTRY: U.S.A.

NICKNAMES: None

OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED: None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? None

HOW LONG? None

IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (WHERE, WHEN AND BY WHAT AUTHORITY): None

DATE OF BIRTH: 9/13/15

PLACE OF BIRTH CITY: Danville, STATE: Indiana COUNTRY: U.S.A.

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: US

ACQUIRED BY: BIRTH ☒ MARRIAGE ☐ NATURALIZATION ☐

NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NUMBER: DATE ISSUED: NAME OF COURT:

LOCATION OF COURT CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

PREVIOUS CITIZENSHIP: None DATE HELD FROM: TO:

OTHER CITIZENSHIPS (GIVE PARTICULARS): None

STEPS TAKEN TO CHANGE PRESENT NATIONALITY (GIVE PARTICULARS): None

LAST U.S. PASSPORT NUMBER: None DATE: - PLACE OF ISSUE: -

ALL OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS YOU HAVE HAD (GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES): None

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: None

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN THIS COUNTRY: - PORT OF ENTRY: - PASSPORT OF COUNTRY: -

LAST U.S. VISA NUMBER: - TYPE: - DATE: - PLACE OF ISSUE: -

SECTION 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR
31	M	5'	185	Green	Blonde

COMPLEXION: Fair

SCARS: triangular scar rt. cheek

BUILD: Medium stocky

OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: mustache

FORM NO. 38-1
SEP 1946



SECTION 3. MARITAL STATUS

MARRIED ☒ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ -
SINGLE ☐ DIVORCED ☐

DATE OF SEPARATION OR DIVORCE: -

PLACE: -

REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE: -

NOTE: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

NAME OF WIFE OR HUSBAND: FIRST Elizabeth Howe MIDDLE (FOR WIFE, MAIDEN) McIntire LAST Harvey

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 4/4/34

PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Bloomington, Indiana

(HIS OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE: STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY: Flemingsburg, Kentucky U.S.A.

LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: -

CAUSE: -

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER 2627 39th Street N.W. CITY Washington, D. C. STATE COUNTRY U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH: 2/3/16

PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY Flemingsburg, Kentucky STATE COUNTRY U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP: USA

DATE ACQUIRED: Birth

WHERE ACQUIRED: CITY STATE - COUNTRY -

OCCUPATION: Housewife

LAST EMPLOYER: War Department - MDW - 1942-'44

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER Pentagon Bldg CITY Washington D. C. STATE COUNTRY USA

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE: FROM: - TO: -

BRANCH OF SERVICE: -

COUNTRY: -

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): See above, War Dept., MDW - Washington, D. C. 1942-1944

SECTION 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (INCLUDE PARTIAL DEPENDENTS)

NONE

NAME: RELATIONSHIP: AGE:

CITIZENSHIP: ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

NAME: RELATIONSHIP: AGE:

CITIZENSHIP: ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

NONE

NAME: RELATIONSHIP: AGE:

CITIZENSHIP: ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

SECTION 5. PARENTS

NOTE: FOR STEPFATHER, STEPMOTHER AND/OR GUARDIAN, GIVE THE SAME INFORMATION AS REQUIRED BELOW ON SEPARATE SHEET

NAME OF FATHER: FIRST Drenan MIDDLE R. (only) LAST Harvey

LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☒

DATE OF DECEASE: 7/25/16

CAUSE: Spinal Meningitis

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER S. Tennessee St. CITY Danville, STATE Indiana COUNTRY U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH: 1888

PLACE OF BIRTH: Danville CITY Indiana STATE COUNTRY U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP: USA

DATE ACQUIRED: Birth

WHERE ACQUIRED: CITY STATE - COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: Attorney

LAST EMPLOYER: Self

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER Danville CITY Indiana STATE COUNTRY U.S.A.

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2)

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE — FROM: None — TO: - — BRANCH OR SERVICE: - — COUNTRY: -

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): None

NAME OF MOTHER — FIRST: Sara — Jewel — MAIDEN: King — LAST: Harvey — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: - — CAUSE: -

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 607½ South Center Street — CITY: Terre Haute, — STATE: Indiana — COUNTRY: U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH: 1890 — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: Danville — STATE: Indiana — COUNTRY: U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP: USA — DATE ACQUIRED: Birth — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY — STATE: - — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: Professor — LAST EMPLOYER: Indiana State Teachers College

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: Terre Haute, — CITY — STATE: Indiana — COUNTRY: U.S.A.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): None

SECTION 6. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (INCLUDING HALF-, STEP-, AND ADOPTED BROTHERS AND SISTERS)

NAME — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST: None

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

NAME — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST: None

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

NAME — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

SECTION 7. PARENTS-IN-LAW

NAME OF FATHER-IN-LAW — FIRST: James — MIDDLE: Marvin — LAST: McIntire, Sr. — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: - — CAUSE: -

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 480 Mt. Carmel Avenue — CITY: Flemingsburg, — STATE: Kentucky — COUNTRY: USA

DATE OF BIRTH: 1880 — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: Fleming County, — STATE: Kentucky — COUNTRY: usa

CITIZENSHIP: USA — DATE ACQUIRED: Birth — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY — STATE: - — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: Attorney — LAST EMPLOYER: Self

NAME OF MOTHER-IN-LAW — FIRST: Nannie — MAIDEN: Ross — LAST: McIntire — LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☒

DATE OF DECEASE: 1942 — CAUSE: Arteris-scleroscis

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 480 Mt. Carmel Avenue — CITY: Flemingsburg, — STATE: Kentucky — COUNTRY: USA

DATE OF BIRTH: 1886 — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: Fleming County, — STATE: Kentucky — COUNTRY: USA

CITIZENSHIP: USA — DATE ACQUIRED: Birth — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY — STATE: - — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: Housewife — LAST EMPLOYER: ——

SECTION 8. RELATIVES

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO LIVE ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A FOREIGN POWER, ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS.

NAME NONE	RELATIONSHIP	AGE

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NAME NONE	RELATIONSHIP	AGE

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION
NONE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE (UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN)

NAME Dwight Harvey	RELATIONSHIP Cousin	AGE 45 approx.

CITIZENSHIP USA-Birth	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY Not known to me as present

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)
Colonel - U.S. Army

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

SECTION 9. EDUCATION

SCHOOL Public Schools	ADDRESS CITY STATE Danville, Indiana Terre Haute, Indiana		COUNTRY USA
DATES ATTENDED	FROM 1921	TO 1928	DEGREE 8 yrs. Elementary Credit
SCHOOL Wiley High School	ADDRESS CITY STATE Terre Haute, Indiana		COUNTRY USA
DATES ATTENDED	FROM 1928	TO 1931	DEGREE H.S. Diploma
COLLEGE Indiana University	ADDRESS CITY STATE Bloomington Indiana		COUNTRY USA
DATES ATTENDED	FROM 1933	TO 1937	DEGREE LLB with Distinction (2 yrs. credit)
COLLEGE -	ADDRESS CITY STATE - -		COUNTRY
DATES ATTENDED	FROM -	TO -	DEGREE -

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS (CONTINUED TO PAGE 5)

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS

CLASSIFICATION II-A- IV-A	ORDER NUMBER 1194	APPROXIMATE INDUCTION DATE None	BOARD NUMBER K 113

ADDRESS OF BOARD	STREET AND NUMBER Maysville, Mason County,	CITY Kentucky	STATE USA

IF DEFERRED, STATE REASON
Yes, 1940-1947 Special Agent- FBI- US Dept of Justice

SECTION 11. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE - UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN

COUNTRY USA	SERVICE FBI-US D of J	SERVICE DATES	FROM: 12/9/40	TO: 8/22/47

GRADE Special Agent	SERIAL NUMBER ----------	TYPE OF DISCHARGE Voluntary Resignation

LAST STATION Washington, D. C.	COMMANDING OFFICER ----------

REMARKS:

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (USE ADDITIONAL SHEET IF NECESSARY)

NOTE: INCLUDE BELOW PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 15 YEARS.

EMPLOYER R. H. King Construction Co.			JOB TITLE Laborer	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Danville, Indiana			KIND OF BUSINESS Bridge Construction	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY Construction Worker			NAME OF SUPERVISOR R. H. King	
DATES COVERED	FROM: 5/26	TO: 9/26	SALARY $10	PER week
REASONS FOR LEAVING Return to school				
EMPLOYER Danville Gazette			JOB TITLE Reporter & Printer	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Danville Indiana			KIND OF BUSINESS Newspaper	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY Editoral and Mechanical Work			NAME OF SUPERVISOR Alvin Hall, Editor	
DATES COVERED	FROM: 1931	TO: 1933	SALARY $10-$15	PER week
REASONS FOR LEAVING To Enter University				
EMPLOYER Indiana University			JOB TITLE Publicity Writer	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Bloomington Indiana			KIND OF BUSINESS See above	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY Writing Athletic Publicity			NAME OF SUPERVISOR Various	
DATES COVERED	FROM: Partime 1934	TO: 1935	SALARY $10-(Approx)	PER week
REASONS FOR LEAVING Voluntary Resignation				
EMPLOYER Self			JOB TITLE Attorney-at-law	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE 210 Covert Street Maysville Ky			KIND OF BUSINESS Practice of Law	

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 6)

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY: General Legal Practice
NAME OF SUPERVISOR: None
DATES COVERED FROM: 1937
TO: 1940
SALARY: $1500-2200
PER: year
REASONS FOR LEAVING: To enter FBI

EMPLOYER: Federal Bureau of Investigation
JOB TITLE: Special Agent & Supervisor
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: Department of Justice Bldg.
CITY: Washington,
STATE: D. C.
KIND OF BUSINESS: Law Enforcement and counter intelligence
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY: Counter-Intelligence
NAME OF SUPERVISOR: J. Edgar Hoover
DATES COVERED FROM: 12/9/40
TO: 8/22/47
SALARY: $3200-$7000
PER: Annum
REASONS FOR LEAVING: Voluntary Resignation

EMPLOYER:
JOB TITLE:
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER:
CITY:
STATE:
KIND OF BUSINESS:
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY:
NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
DATES COVERED FROM:
TO:
SALARY:
PER:
REASONS FOR LEAVING:

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW GIVE DETAILS CONCERNING ANY POSITION FROM WHICH YOU MAY HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED OR WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE.

DETAILS: Absolutely None

SECTION 13. CHARACTER REFERENCES-FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
D. F. Newell	Jersey Ridge Rd.	Maysville,	Ky.
B. F. Small, Atty	Sycamore Bldg.	Terre Haute	Indiana
J. H. Finch, Sr.	Bank of Maysville	Maysville,	Ky.
Harry Stewart	Chief of Police PD	Maysville,	Ky.
E. L.Zeigler, Atty	Cochran Bldg.	Maysville,	KY

SECTION 14. SOCIAL ACQUAINTENCES-FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
A. H. Thurston	% C.I.G.	Washington, D. C.	
Matthew McGuire	U.S. District Court	Washington, D. C.	
J. A. Bennet, Lt. Col.	Andrews Field,	Maryland	
L. Whitson	Room 1734 Dept. of Justice	Washington, D. C.	

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 7)

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
Richard Frear	2627 39th St. N.W.	Washington,	D. C.
H John Holzberg	2629 39th St. N.W.	Washington,	D. C.
Richard Gallaher	2629 39th St. N.W.	Washington,	D. C.

SECTION 16. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? YES ☐ NO ☐
IF ANSWER IS "YES" EXPLAIN BELOW:

DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS? In Moderation

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENCE, AND DISPOSITION OF CASE.

NO

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? YES ☐ NO ☒
IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

SECTION 17. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES ☒ NO ☐ IF ANSWER IS "NO", STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME.

NAMES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
Peoples Bank of Fleming County, Flemingsburg, Kentucky
State National Bank, Maysville, Kentucky (Acct recently closed)

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? YES ☐ NO ☒ IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE PARTICULARS:

SECTION 18. CREDIT REFERENCES-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
Peoples Bank of Fleming County	Flemingsburg,	Kentucky	
State National Bank	Maysville,	Kentucky	
J. Garfinckel & Co.	Washington, D. C.		

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS

FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
3/1942	Date	2627 39th St. N.W.	Washington,	D. C.	
2/1942	3/1942	Gracen Court, Center Avenue	Pittsburgh,	Pa.	
1/41	2/1942	40-71 Elbertson Street	Elmhurst, L.I.	N.Y.C.	N.Y.

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 8)

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7)

FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
9/1937	12/1940	[illegible]	Maysville,	Ky.	USA
1933	1937	Various	Bloomington,	Ind.	USA
1931	1933	E. Main	Danville	Ind.	USA
1928	1931	[illegible] S. Center St.	Terre Haute,	Ind.	USA

SECTION 20. RESIDENCES OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES NONE EXCEPT VISIT CANADA

FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
9/40	9/40	Canada	(S.Ste. Marie)	Fish

SECTION 21. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ALL KINDS TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS. INCLUDE ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR A BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OR TO WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT.

NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
Sigma Chi		Bloomington,	Indiana	USA
Phi Delta Phi		"	"	"
Order of Coif		"	"	"
Rotary International		Maysville	Ky.	USA
Natl. Rifle Association		Various		
Boy Scouts of America		Various		
FBI Recreation Association		Washington, D. C.		

SECTION 22. LANGUAGES-FOREIGN (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT", "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
German		Slight	

SECTION 23. GENERAL QUALIFICAT[illegible]

INDICATE ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING YOU HAVE, ALSO, SET FORTH ANY QUALIFICATIONS AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION.

Specialist in counter Intelligence, operations, analysis, and evaluation -

SECTION 24. SPORTS AND HOBBIES

Fishing, hunting, firearms

SECTION 25. EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE

NAME Mrs. Elizabeth M. Harvey	RELATIONSHIP wife

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER 2527 39th Street N.W.	CITY Washington, D. C.	STATE	COUNTRY	TELEPHONE OR 2914

SECTION 26. INFORMATION AND FINAL COMMENTS

NOTE: YOU ARE INFORMED THAT CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION, IF SO, DESCRIBE, IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO".

NONE

SECTION 27. CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR MY IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT ______________________ City ______ State   DATE ______________________

______________________ Witness   ______________________ Signature of Applicant

SECRET

27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT OF WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL: Birth: September 13, 1915 Place: Danville, Indiana
Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky

PARENTAGE: Father: Drenan R. Harvey
Birth: 1888 Place: Danville, Indiana
Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey
Birth: 1890 Place: Danville, Indiana

RELATIVES ABROAD: None

EDUCATION: Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana
Dates: 1928 to 1931
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree

EXPERIENCE: Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana
Dates: 1931 to 1933
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937
Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky
Dates: 1937 to 1940
F.B.I., Special Agent
Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947

MILITARY: None

TRAVEL: Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.

MARITAL STATUS: Married to: Elisabeth Howe McIntire Harvey
Birth: February 3, 1916 Place: Flemingsburg, Kentucky
Dependents: None besides wife
Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Ky.
Birth: 1880 Place: Fleming County, Ky.
Mother-in-law: Nannie Rose McIntire - now deceased
Birth: 1886 Place: Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

Emergency Addresses: Mrs. Elisabeth M. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

SECRET

27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ON WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL: Birth: September 13, 1915 Place: Danville, Indiana
Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky

PARENTAGE: Father: Dronan R. Harvey
Birth: 1888 Place: Danville, Indiana
Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey
Birth: 1890 Place: Danville, Indiana

RELATIVES ABROAD: None

EDUCATION: Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana
Dates: 1928 to 1931
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree

EXPERIENCE: Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana
Dates: 1931 to 1933
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937
Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky
Dates: 1937 to 1940
F.B.I., Special Agent
Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947

MILITARY: None

TRAVEL: Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.

MARITAL STATUS: Married to: Elizabeth Howe McIntire Harvey
Birth: February 3, 1916 Place: Flemingsburg, Kentucky
Dependents: None besides wife
Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Sr.
Birth: 1880 Place: Fleming County, Ky.
Mother-in-law: Hannie Ross McIntire - now deceased
Birth: 1886 Place: Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

Emergency Addresses: Mrs. Elizabeth M. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

SECRET

27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ON WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL:
Birth: September 13, 1915 Place: Danville, Indiana
Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky

PARENTAGE:
Father: Drenan R. Harvey
Birth: 1888 Place: Danville, Indiana
Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey
Birth: 1890 Place: Danville, Indiana

RELATIVES ABROAD:
None

EDUCATION:
Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana
Dates: 1928 to 1931
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree

EXPERIENCE:
Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana
Dates: 1931 to 1933
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937
Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky
Dates: 1937 to 1940
F.B.I., Special Agent
Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947

MILITARY:
None

TRAVEL:
Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.

MARITAL STATUS:
Married to: Elizabeth Howe McIntire Harvey
Birth: February 3, 1916 Place: Flemingsburg, Kentucky
Dependents: None besides wife
Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Sr.
Birth: 1880 Place: Fleming County, Ky.
Mother-in-law: Nannie Ross McIntire - now deceased
Birth: 1886 Place: Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

Emergency Addresses:
Mrs. Elizabeth M. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

SECRET

SECRET

27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ON WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL: Birth: September 13, 1915 Place: Danville, Indiana
Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky

PARENTAGE: Father: Drenan R. Harvey
Birth: 1888 Place: Danville, Indiana
Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey
Birth: 1890 Place: Danville, Indiana

RELATIVES ABROAD: None

EDUCATION: Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana
Dates: 1928 to 1931
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree

EXPERIENCE: Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana
Dates: 1931 to 1933
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937
Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky
Dates: 1937 to 1940
F.B.I., Special Agent
Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947

MILITARY: None

TRAVEL: Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.

MARITAL STATUS: Married to: Elisabeth Howe McIntire Harvey
Birth: February 3, 1916 Place: Flemingsburg, Kentucky
Dependents: None besides wife
Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Sr.
Birth: 1880 Place: Fleming County, Ky.
Mother-in-law: Nannie Ross McIntire - now deceased
Birth: 1886 Place: Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

Emergency Addresses: Mrs. Elisabeth M. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY OFFICE

Investigation Report

Date: October 8, 1947

Subject: HARVEY, William King

Number: 32814

To: CPD (2)

1. Investigation directed by: RHC

2. Sources of information: OSO

3. Remarks

4. Recommendation:

SECURITY APPROVAL RECOMMENDED. THOUGH SUBJECT
RECEIPT OF DEROGATORY INFORMATION AT SOME
RE DATE. INTERVIEW WAIVED.
LESS THE APPLICANT E[illegible]S UPON DUTY WITHIN
DAYS FROM ABOVE DATE. THIS APPROVAL BECOMES
INVALID.

Branch notified of
this approval. Copy (orig.) sent to
Spatial [illegible] 9 Oct. 1947.

By RHC/[illegible]
Security Officer
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

CC: Mr. Judson H. Lightsey

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
DEC 1946

(1784)

MEMORANDUM

Re: William King Harvey

A complete and thorough investigation has been conducted on this employee and he was found suitable for employment in this agency.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TO : Chief, Communications
Acting
FROM : Chief, Security Division
SUBJECT: HARVEY, William King
32814

DATE: 8 August 1952

In reply to your memorandum this is to advise that subject meets the current requirements for cryptographic clearance and is approved for such duties as of this date.

E. P. Geiss
E. P. Geiss

SECRET

Personal + 3rd Agency Material

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HICKS, CALVIN
OP. FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: [illegible]

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
0 6 AUG 1978		HARDWAY / FONZI	Hardway
8/28/78		ORR	Orr

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

LMP: 19 FEB 75

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 453381	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W					
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT ELIGIBILITY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA		4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 12 DA 22 YR 74		5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR		
6 FUNDS	V	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 5222 4116 [illegible]	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT 231
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS					10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	
11 POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER					12 POSITION NUMBER 0J25	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DAA
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS		15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.07			16 GRADE AND STEP 13 9	17 SALARY OR RATE 27582
18 REMARKS						

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Mfg 8-73 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

6

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 January 1975

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056361 ✓
2. NAME (Last–First–Middle): HICKS, Calvin W. ✓ COB 1700 HOURS
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Retirement (Disability Under CIA Retirement & Disability System & Cancellation of NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 27 YEAR 74
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 5222-4116 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643, Section 231
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/Operations Staff
Intelligence Group
Intelligence Watch Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Watch Officer (14)
12. POSITION NUMBER: BJ25 0947
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAA
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 9
17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~26,189~~ 27,632
18. REMARKS:

LWD: 27 December 1974

Orig - CMG/MID
1 - Payroll
1 - OPS/SP

Co-ordinated with Paul Seidel/ROB
30 January 1975.

Kathleen A. Ball

M:SB/RS 1/28/74

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: S. G. Harding, C/OPS/SP
DATE SIGNED: 24/01/75
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 27/1/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE. CODE:
24. HQTRS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH ✓: MO 11 DA 08 YR 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0,HE,00,0,0
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: G 02-07-75 07 FEB 1975
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 1/30/75

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 01-0332

EX-2 APDIR

8

(4)

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Board of Medical Examiners

SUBJECT : Request for Medical Evaluation -
Mr. Calvin W. Hicks

1. Subject, a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System, has applied for disability retirement under the provisions of Section 231 of Public Law 88-643, Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees. It is requested that a medical examination be arranged for Subject and that a written report of the Board of Medical Examiners as prescribed in paragraph f.(4) of HR 20-50 be submitted to the Director of Personnel.

2. Attached are copies of the Supervisor's Statement, the Application for Disability Retirement, and a private physician's statement.

3. Subject intends to remain on duty until a decision is made regarding his application for disability retirement.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Deputy Director of Personnel
for Special Programs

Attachments:
a. Supervisor's Statement
b. Application
c. Physician's Statement

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader
OP/RAD/ROB/P Seidel:jat/3257 (4 November 1[illegible]4)

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Administrative - Internal Use Only

10 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Career Management Group

SUBJECT: Promotion of Mr. Calvin W. Hicks

1. I would solicit Career Management Group and the Promotion Panel to consider the overall career of Calvin W. Hicks when deciding on the current cycle of promotions from GS-13 to GS-14.

2. After Mr. Hicks EOD in 1950, he advanced rapidly in three years to GS-11. He was promoted to GS-12 in 1956, six years later to GS-13 in 1962, and since then has been almost 12 years in grade. He has had overseas tours with FE and NE Divisions, has served as a training instructor, on a PM task force, and with Miami Ops and area branches in WH. In these assignments he consistently received Strong ratings. Despite a largely paramilitary background, in 1967 he adjusted to the intelligence production cycle and developed the skills of an operations officer doing operations-oriented reports work in the Intelligence Watch. As of this date he has the longest continuity in the Intelligence Watch and is rated as a mature and thoughtful individual who exercises excellent professional judgment. He was recommended for promotion from GS-13 to GS-14 in April 1968 and in April 1969. In 1970 he was recommended for a QSI by FI Chief, Peer deSilva. He was again recommended for promotion in March 1971, in November 1972, and in November 1973.

3. Admittedly, promotions are competitive and the rankings are relative and must be adjusted to the headroom available. The overall history of his career would seem to argue the equity of granting the often recommended promotion to Mr. Calvin Hicks as he nears the end of a career. Mr. Hicks is 49 years old and has a family of five children. He has a medical hold which will not allow him to serve overseas at this time and he therefore, contemplates retirement at age 50 (in late 1974). He is and will be until then a valuable member of the Intelligence Watch.

4. I recommend that the promotion which has escaped him in the last decade be granted at the time of this year's promotion cycle.

L A Campbell

L. A. Campbell
Chief, Operations Staff

Administrative - Internal Use Only

13 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Career Management Group
Mid-Career Officer Branch

SUBJECT : Recommendation for the Promotion of Calvin W. Hicks (056361) to GS-14

1. I would again like to recommend the promotion of subject officer from GS-13 to GS-14. Mr. Hicks has been with the Intelligence Watch since June 1967 and his performance has been characterized consistently by exceptional proficiency. He serves on a rotating schedule with seven other officers doing identical work, some of whom are currently in GS-14.

2. A medical hold has precluded any further overseas assignments and for this reason his stay in IW has been extended until November 1974, when he will be 50-years-old at which time he plans to retire under the Agency retirement system.

3. Mr. Hicks' resourcefulness and ability to apply the multitude of reporting instructions and techniques have been convincingly demonstrated in crisis situations such as the recent Chilean coup and the Middle-Eastern crisis. He has consistently displayed initiative and good judgment in meeting unforeseen crisis with rapid and effective action and has clearly demonstrated his ability to continuously adjust to rotating shifts and the irregular flow of traffic.

4. For his sustained high level of performance in 1972 Mr. Hicks received a quality step increase in recognition and as proof of the high esteem in which he is held by his superiors. He occupies a GS-14 slot. His promotion is again recommended in recognition of his long years of Agency service.

Joseph A. Procaccino
C/OPS/INT/IW

Eloise R. Page

Concur: Eloise R. Page, C/OPS/INT

E2 IMPDET CLBY 002025

Calvin Hicks

SECRET

26 September 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Operations Staff

SUBJECT: Appreciation of IW Performance During Chilean Upheaval

1. The officers of the Intelligence Watch (IW) performed admirably in swiftly processing the heavy flow of intelligence engendered by the recent political upheaval in Chile. In many instances, reports were in the hands of customers in the intelligence community within minutes of being filed in Santiago.

2. Please extend to the IW officers concerned the appreciation of this Division for their fine performance. I suggest that a copy of this memorandum be placed in the personnel folder of each of the officers concerned.

David A. Phillips
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 039964

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CJCS 07/21/73

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 01 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6. FUNDS ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSLA 4222 4116 0001	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/FI STAFF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0947	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.07	16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

POSTED
7-25-73

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

J.F. BLAKE

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

13 APR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Calvin W. Hicks

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase

1. I was pleased to learn that you have been granted a Quality Step Increase. Such recognition is proof of the high esteem in which you are held by your supervisors in the Clandestine Service.

2. Please accept my personal best wishes. I am confident that your future performance will be of a continuing high quality.

/S/ Cord Meyer, Jr.
For
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

CSPS/SOB/Hileberman;rv(11Apr72)

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
(1 - OP/Files
2 - DDP/Registry
1 - 8/SOD
1 - C/SOD/Pers
1 - CSPS/Subject File

CONFIDENTIAL

10 APR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, DDP/QSI - HMA Panel

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - Calvin W. Hicks

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. As this award is designed to encourage excellence by recognizing and rewarding the employee, may I ask that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

[illegible] 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Foreign Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT : Intelligence Watch Assistance to European Division

1. As I am preparing to leave the European Division, a note of appreciation is in order for the services rendered to us for the four years of my tenure here by the officers of the Intelligence Watch.

2. At a time of increasingly complicated intelligence collection and reporting problems, our Agency has come of age. We have recognized that information often cannot be allowed to wait for attention until sunrise, and that we must be able to respond to national needs and world events around the clock. The Intelligence Watch, more than any other single institution, has made it possible for us to do this. We have benefited from its cooperation particularly under strained reporting conditions -- during Presidential trips abroad, for instance -- but have also found IW's presence and judgment helpful at other times. I know that my staff relied on IW extensively.

3. I am making a point of recognizing this because the Intelligence Watch -- a bit like our Agency as a whole -- is apt to get more attention with an occasional slip than with a record of continuing accomplishment and success in coping with problems. From what I have been able to observe, the job has been well done.

4. I hope you will bring this memorandum to the attention of those concerned.

John L. Hart
Chief
European Division

Joseph Procaccino
Walter Kuzmuk
Robert Heron
James Pekich
Frank Levy

Howard Orr
✓Calvin Hicks
George Papadopolos
Robert Sawicki
Pat Coble

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED 22 December 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Hicks, Calvin W.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 12 DAY 23 YEAR 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular

6. FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 2222-4116	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

H
9.

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FI Staff Intelligence Group Intelligence Watch	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE Watch Officer (14)	12. POSITION NUMBER 0947	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.07	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 7	17. SALARY OR RATE $21,313

18. REMARKS

HB: SOD

Reassigned from Position FI/INT/IW 1032

Distribution:
Orig. - CSPS/SOB
1 - FI/Pers

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL S. G. Harding C/FI/SG	DATE SIGNED 22 Dec 71	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 12-23-71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS CODE /	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. 11 DA. [illegible] YR. 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA. YR.	EOD DATA ⇨	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV. TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 12-23-71	46. O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 12-23-71

FORM 9-78 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET P.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

5 March 1971

Not approved

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSPS/Section A

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Promotion of Calvin W. Hicks (056361) to GS-14

1. I recommend the promotion of subject officer from GS-13 to GS-14. Mr. Hicks has been assigned to the Intelligence Watch/FI Staff since June 1967 and serves on a rotating schedule with seven other officers doing identical work, four of whom are currently in grade GS-14.

2. Mr. Hicks has been in the Intelligence Watch (IW) for almost four years and his work, both quantitatively and qualitatively, has been consistently of a very high caliber.

3. His keenly developed sense of operational security resulting from his extensive paramilitary experience, coupled with his clear understanding of the relationship between operations and intelligence, has made him a very fine officer and a valuable asset to IW. He has been under my supervision for 18 months and I have had ample opportunity to observe his performance under conditions of stress. He very ably applies a multitude of detail and general reporting instructions to the different situations manifest in each incoming report and displays initiative in meeting unforeseen crises with rapid and effective action. Since the intelligence information is the face that the Clandestine Service puts out to the Intelligence Community, the performance of Watch Officers is of great importance. This factor becomes apparent when it is noted that over 75 percent of all cabled intelligence reports are disseminated by IW.

4. Mr. Hicks has an extensive background in paramilitary operations both in the field and at headquarters. All of his fitness reports for the six years preceding his assignment to IW have borne the overall rating of "strong." He has been described as "highly motivated, sincere, and capable." Also, "he works well with others and his knowledge and ability are respected." Other supervisors during the years prior to this assignment have described him as "serious, hard-working and dependable." His performance in his present assignment has demonstrated these same qualities.

5. Mr. Hicks is a distinct asset to IW and I highly recommend his for promotion to GS-14.

Joseph A. Procaccino

JOSEPH A. PROCACCINO
Chief, FI/INT/IW

SECRET

2 FEB 1970

Not approved

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DDP QSI and Honor and Merit Awards Panel

SUBJECT : Request for Quality Step Increase
Mr. Calvin W. HICKS, GS-13 (05C361)

1. I recommend that a Quality Step Increase be awarded to Mr. Calvin W. Hicks.

2. Mr. Hicks is one of three officers in the Intelligence Watch, FI Staff, on whom identical recommendations are being submitted. These officers, all in grade GS-13, have for several years done responsible and demanding work, identical to that done in the same office by five other officers, GS-14 and 15, and all three have been rated "Strong."

3. The Intelligence Watch is the primary intelligence dissemination office of the Clandestine Service. Its output of over 2,000 reports a month is the chief end-product of CS collection operations. Watch Officers serve on a rotating schedule. When an officer draws the night shift he serves alone. He must make quick, independent dissemination decisions. Mr. Hicks has done well at this work. He is alert and conscientious and has a sharp operational sense which is extremely useful in the handling of CS intelligence information. He has been recommended several times for promotion to GS-14.

4. The high quality of Mr. Hicks's performance has continued for more than two years. There is no reason to expect any decline in it. His enthusiasm continues, and his tour has recently been extended for another two years.

5. Consideration has been given to recommending him for an Honor and Merit Award, but on balance I believe that a Quality Step Increase would be more appropriate.

Peer de Silva

Peer de Silva
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SUBJECT: Request for Quality Step Increase
Mr. Calvin W. HICKS, GS-13 (056361)

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Chairman, CS QSI Panel ____________ Date

Director of Personnel ____________ Date

SECRET

SECRET

6 MARCH 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI Staff

SUBJECT : Performance of the Intelligence Watch
During the President's Trip to Europe

1. Now that the President's trip to Europe has been concluded, I feel that a special commendation for the Intelligence Watch (IW) is in order.

2. The contribution that is being made by the officers in the Intelligence Watch is often taken for granted. Thus it was natural for us, when we formed our task force for the President's trip, to build our arrangements for positive intelligence disseminations around the IW's twenty-four-hour-a-day availability. We were not disappointed. The system worked smoothly and efficiently.

3. In addition to that, it became clear that the Intelligence Watch officers were willing and able to go beyond the simple call of duty. We came to admire their competence, courtesy, and cooperation, without which effective intelligence coverage would have been immeasurably more difficult. Since the IW's were working under an unusual strain, caused by the simultaneous outbreak of crises in different parts of the world, their performance is that much more to be commended.

4. Please convey our appreciation to all officers who had a part in this fine effort.

John L. Hart
Chief,
European Division

CALVIN M. HICKS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
de...

SECRET

7 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Edward J. Carroll
Chief, Intelligence Watch

SUBJECT: Performance of the Intelligence Watch during President Nixon's recent Visit to Europe

1. I wish to commend you and each member of your staff who participated in the support which the Agency was called on to render to the Presidential party during its recent travel abroad. From several quarters I have had verbal expressions of praise and commendation and to these I wish to add my own in writing. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum from the Chief, European Division, which reflects both my thoughts and the reactions I have heard from others.

2. I hope you will take appropriate action so that the personnel files of each of your participating officers will reflect this appreciation. You may wish to make copies of my memorandum and Mr. Hart's memorandum to serve this purpose.

Peer de Silva

Peer de Silva
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Enclosure

CALVIN M. HICKS

SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

Not Approved by
CS Career Service
Panel A Sect. I

24 JUN 1969

9 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSPS/Section A

SUBJECT : Recommendation for the promotion of Calvin W. Hicks (056361) to GS-14

1. I recommend the promotion of subject officer from GS-13 to GS-14. Mr. Hicks has been assigned to the Intelligence Watch/FI Staff since June 1967, and serves on a rotating schedule with seven other officers doing identical work, five of whom are currently in Grade GS-14.

2. Mr. Hicks has been with IW for almost two years and his work, both quantitatively and qualitatively has been consistently of a very high caliber. Normally six months are required before an officer newly assigned to the Intelligence Watch is able to handle a shift by himself. At least a year is required before a Watch Officer can perform at a high level of proficiency. However, in the case of this officer, in a little more than a year he had earned the rating of "Strong" and has maintained it ever since. Although most of his Agency experience had been in para-military operations, he adapted quickly to the demands of his new assignment. His keenly developed sense of operational security, coupled with his clear understanding of the relationship between operations and intelligence, has made him a very fine officer and a valuable asset to IW. He has been under my supervision for 16 months and I have had ample opportunity to observe his performance under conditions of stress. He is even tempered and level headed. His mistakes are few and infrequent and these are usually of the clerical variety, not in matters of judgment. I continue to be impressed with his thoroughness in handling information; with the evidence of his coordination when the interests of more than one division are involved. Since operations have to be submerged and the intelligence is the portion of the iceberg which shows to the intelligence community, the performance of the Watch Officers is of great importance. This factor becomes apparent when it is noted that about 80% of all cabled intelligence reports are disseminated by the Intelligence Watch. Recently the Watch Officers were commended by the Chief, FI Staff and the Chief, Europe Division for their performance during the President's trip to Western Europe. The simultaneous outbreak of crises in different parts of the world further added to the burdens of the Watch Office at that time. Mr. Hicks made a real contribution during that period and deserves the commendation personally in a high degree.

SECRET

3. Prior to his assignment to the Intelligence Watch, Mr. Hicks served with WH Division and with the Cuban Operation. He has an extensive background in paramilitary operations both in the field and at headquarters. All of his Fitness Reports for the six years preceding his assignment to the Intelligence Watch have borne the overall rating of "strong." He has been described as "highly motivated" "sincere and capable." He has been further complimented as "working well with others and his knowledge and ability are respected." Other supervisors have described him as "serious, hard-working and dependable." His performance in his present assignment has demonstrated these same qualities. He has managed the transition from active operations to the life of a desk bound intelligence officer with ease. I recommend him with enthusiasm for promotion to GS-14.

Edward J Carroll

Edward J. Carroll
Chief, FI/INT/IW

SECRET

Not Approved By:
CS Career Service

C 1968

24 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSPS/Section A

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Promotion of Calvin W. HICKS (056361) to GS-14

1. I recommend the promotion of subject officer from GS-13 to GS-14. Mr. Hicks has been assigned to the Intelligence Watch/FI Staff since June 1967, where he serves on a rotating schedule with seven other officers doing identical work; five of whom are currently in grade GS-14.

2. Mr. Hicks has been with IW for about 16 months and his work, both quantitavely and qualitatively, has been consistently of very high caliber. Normally six months are required before an officer newly assigned to the Intelligence Watch is able to handle a shift by himself. At least a year is usually required before a man can advance from "Adequate" to "Proficient." At present, Mr. Hicks has already progressed to the rating of "Strong." He is alert and conscientious and has an operational sense which is invaluable in the handling of intelligence. With his extensive operational and paramilitary background, Mr. Hicks has a fine sense for the relationship between operations and its primary product, the Clandestine Services intelligence report. This officer has been under my supervision for 11 months and during that period I have had ample opportunity to observe his conduct under conditions of stress. He is even tempered and level headed. His mistakes are few and infrequent. I am particularly impressed with his thoroughness in handling information; with the evidence of the coordination which he so often attempts with several Area Divisions when necessary before disseminating a report to the intelligence community. Since the Intelligence Information Report is the face that the Clandestine Services shows to the intelligence analyst and the policy officers of the Government, the performance of the watch officers is of great importance. This factor becomes apparent when one notes that about 80 percent of all cabled intelligence reports are disseminated by the Intelligence Watch.

3. Prior to his assignment to the Intelligence Watch, Mr. Hicks served with WH Division and with the Cuban Operation. He has an extensive background in paramilitary operations both in

SECRET

the field and at headquarters. All of his Fitness Reports for the six years preceding his assignment to the Intelligence Watch have borne the overall rating of "Strong." He has been described as "highly motivated, sincere and capable." Also, "he works well with others and his ~~knowledge~~ and ability are respected." Other supervisors during the years immediately prior to this assignment have described him as "serious, hard-working and dependable." His performance in his present assignment has demonstrated these same qualities. Although it might seem surprising that a man of his out-going personality with an extensive background in paramilitary operations could adjust to the life of a desk-bound producer of intelligence reports, Mr. Hicks has managed this transition with the greatest of ease. He is a distinct asset to this office and the undersigned will feel grateful if he should decide to extend his tour in the Intelligence Watch beyond the normal two years. I recommend him with enthusiasm for promotion to GS-14.

Edward J Carroll

EDWARD J. CARROLL
Chief, FI/INT/IW

Attachment

5 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSPS/Section A

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Promotion of Calvin W. HICKS (056361) to GS-14

1. I recommend the promotion of subject officer from GS-13 to GS-14. Mr. Hicks has been assigned to the Intelligence Watch, FI Staff since June 1967 where he serves on a rotating schedule with seven other officers doing identical work, five of whom are currently in grade GS-14.

2. Although Mr. Hicks has been with IW less than a year, his work both quantitatively and qualitatively is of very high caliber. He is alert and conscientious and never takes the easy way out in handling cabled field intelligence reports. Log cards which record the action taken on each report indicate the seriousness with which he approaches his daily tasks. These cards frequently indicate time spent by him in consultation with as many as three Area Divisions on occasion before issuing a report which will be disseminated to the intelligence community. The exercise of good judgment is an essential element in the proper functioning of this office, upon which the Agency's reputation to a certain extent depends. Since the finished intelligence information report is the face that the Clandestine Services shows to the intelligence analysts and the policy officers of this government, the performance of the Watch Officers is of paramount importance. This factor becomes extremely obvious when one notes that more than 80% of all cabled intelligence reports are disseminated by the Intelligence Watch.

3. Prior to his assignment to the Intelligence Watch, Mr. Hicks served with the WH Division and with the Cuban Operation. He has an extensive background in paramilitary operations both in the field and at headquarters. All of his Fitness Reports for the six years preceding his assignment to the Intelligence Watch have borne the overall rating of "Strong." He has been described as "highly motivated, sincere and capable." Also, "he works well with others and his knowledge and ability are respected." Other supervisors during the years immediately prior to this assignment have described him as "serious, hard-working and dependable." His performance in his present assignment has

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DEMONSTRATED THE SAME QUALITIES HERE. HE HAS VOLUNTARILY CONTRIBUTED EXTRA TIME DURING CRISIS SITUATIONS, NOTABLY DURING THE RECENT TET OFFENSIVE IN VIETNAM WHEN HE CAME IN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TWO HOURS BEFORE HIS SHIFT WAS DUE TO START AND REMAINED AFTER ITS APPOINTED TERMINATION. ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT SEEM SURPRISING THAT A MAN OF HIS OUT-GOING PERSONALITY WITH AN EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND IN PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS COULD ADJUST TO THE LIFE OF A DESK-BOUND PRODUCER OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, MR. HICKS HAS MANAGED THE ADJUSTMENT WITH THE GREATEST OF EASE. HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET TO THIS OFFICE AND THE UNDERSIGNED WILL FEEL GRATEFUL IF HE SHOULD DECIDE TO EXTEND HIS TOUR IN THE INTELLIGENCE WATCH BEYOND THE NORMAL TWO YEARS. I RECOMMEND HIM WITH ENTHUSIASM FOR PROMOTION TO GS-14.

EDWARD J. CARROLL
CHIEF, FI/INT/IW

ATTACHMENT

I heartily endorse this recommendation that Mr. Hicks be promoted to GS-14. As his supervisor points out, Mr. Hicks, when he came to the Intelligence Watch, was essentially a guerrilla warfare field operational officer. Positive intelligence information reporting and the handling of reports were new to him, and called for professional skills and other qualities radically different from those which most of his previous experience had brought into play. Yet in a relatively short time, Mr. Hicks has developed the skills required of a Watch Officer, and thanks to this and to other strengths has become one of the most valuable officers in the unit.

Wallace R. Deuel
Chief FI/INT

24 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSPS/Section A

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Promotion of Calvin W. Hicks (056361) to GS-14

1. I recommend the promotion of subject officer from GS-13 to GS-14. Mr. Hicks has been assigned to the Intelligence Watch/FI Staff since June 1967; where he serves on a rotating schedule with seven other officers doing identical work; five of whom are currently in grade GS-14.

2. Mr. Hicks has been with IW for about 16 months and his work, both quantitavely and qualitatively, has been consistently of very high caliber. Normally six months are required before an officer newly assigned to the Intelligence Watch is able to handle a shift by himself. At least a year is usually required before a man can advance from "Adequate" to "Proficient." At present, Mr. Hicks has already progressed to the rating of "Strong." He is alert and conscientious and has an operational sense which is invaluable in the handling of intelligence. With his extensive operational and paramilitary background, Mr. Hicks has a fine sense for the relationship between operations and its primary product, the Clandestine Services intelligence report. This officer has been under my supervision for 11 months and during that period I have had ample opportunity to observe his conduct under conditions of stress. He is even tempered and level headed. His mistakes are few and infrequent. I am particularly impressed with his thoroughness in handling information; with the evidence of the coordination which he so often attempts with several Area Divisions when necessary before disseminating a report to the intelligence community. Since the Intelligence Information Report is the face that the Clandestine Services shows to the intelligence analyst and the policy officers of the Government, the performance of the watch officers is of great importance. This factor becomes apparent when one notes that about 60 percent of all cabled intelligence reports are disseminated by the Intelligence Watch.

3. Prior to his assignment to the Intelligence Watch, Mr. Hicks served with WH Division and with the Cuban Operation. He has an extensive background in paramilitary operations both in

SECRET

PROMOTION RECOMMENDATION - CALVIN W. HICKS (CONTINUED) PAGE 2

THE FIELD AND AT HEADQUARTERS. ALL OF HIS FITNESS REPORTS FOR THE SIX YEARS PRECEDING HIS ASSIGNMENT TO THE INTELLIGENCE WATCH HAVE BORNE THE OVERALL RATING OF "STRONG." HE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS "HIGHLY MOTIVATED, SINCERE AND CAPABLE." ALSO, "HE WORKS WELL WITH OTHERS AND HIS KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY ARE RESPECTED." OTHER SUPERVISORS DURING THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THIS ASSIGNMENT HAVE DESCRIBED HIM AS "SERIOUS, HARD-WORKING AND DEPENDABLE." HIS PERFORMANCE IN HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT HAS DEMONSTRATED THESE SAME QUALITIES. ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT SEEM SURPRISING THAT A MAN OF HIS OUT-GOING PERSONALITY WITH AN EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND IN PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS COULD ADJUST TO THE LIFE OF A DESK-BOUND PRODUCER OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, MR. HICKS HAS MANAGED THIS TRANSITION WITH THE GREATEST OF EASE. HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET TO THIS OFFICE AND THE UNDERSIGNED WILL FEEL GRATEFUL IF HE SHOULD DECIDE TO EXTEND HIS TOUR IN THE INTELLIGENCE WATCH BEYOND THE NORMAL TWO YEARS. I RECOMMEND HIM WITH ENTHUSIASM FOR PROMOTION TO GS-14.

Edward J Carroll

EDWARD J. CARROLL
CHIEF, FI/INT/IW

ATTACHMENT

SECRET

5 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSPS/Section A

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Promotion of Calvin W. HICKS (056361) to GS-14

1. I recommend the promotion of subject officer from GS-13 to GS-14. Mr. Hicks has been assigned to the Intelligence Watch, FI Staff since June 1967 where he serves on a rotating schedule with seven other officers doing identical work, five of whom are currently in grade GS-14.

2. Although Mr. Hicks has been with IW less than a year, his work both quantitatively and qualitatively is of very high caliber. He is alert and conscientious and never takes the easy way out in handling cabled field intelligence reports. Log cards which record the action taken on each report indicate the seriousness with which he approaches his daily tasks. These cards frequently indicate time spent by him in consultation with as many as three Area Divisions on occasion before issuing a report which will be disseminated to the intelligence community. The exercise of good judgment is an essential element in the proper functioning of this office, upon which the Agency's reputation to a certain extent depends. Since the finished intelligence information report is the face that the Clandestine Services shows to the intelligence analysts and the policy officers of this government, the performance of the Watch Officers is of paramount importance. This factor becomes extremely obvious when one notes that more than 80% of all cabled intelligence reports are disseminated by the Intelligence Watch.

3. Prior to his assignment to the Intelligence Watch, Mr. Hicks served with the WH Division and with the Cuban Operation. He has an extensive background in paramilitary operations both in the field and at headquarters. All of his Fitness Reports for the six years preceding his assignment to the Intelligence Watch have borne the overall rating of "Strong." He has been described as "highly motivated, sincere and capable." Also, "he works well with others and his knowledge and ability are respected." Other supervisors during the years immediately prior to this assignment have described him as "serious, hard-working and dependable." His performance in his present assignment has

SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

DEMONSTRATED THE SAME QUALITIES HERE. HE HAS VOLUNTARILY CONTRIBUTED EXTRA TIME DURING CRISIS SITUATIONS, NOTABLY DURING THE RECENT TET OFFENSIVE IN VIETNAM WHEN HE CAME IN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TWO HOURS BEFORE HIS SHIFT WAS DUE TO START AND REMAINED AFTER ITS APPOINTED TERMINATION. ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT SEEM SURPRISING THAT A MAN OF HIS OUT-GOING PERSONALITY WITH AN EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND IN PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS COULD ADJUST TO THE LIFE OF A DESK-BOUND PRODUCER OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, MR. HICKS HAS MANAGED THE ADJUSTMENT WITH THE GREATEST OF EASE. HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET TO THIS OFFICE AND THE UNDERSIGNED WILL FEEL GRATEFUL IF HE SHOULD DECIDE TO EXTEND HIS TOUR IN THE INTELLIGENCE WATCH BEYOND THE NORMAL TWO YEARS. I RECOMMEND HIM WITH ENTHUSIASM FOR PROMOTION TO GS-14.

EDWARD J. CARROLL
CHIEF, FI/INT/IW

ATTACHMENT

I heartily endorse this recommendation that Mr. Hicks be promoted to GS-14. As his supervisor points out, Mr. Hicks, when he came to the Intelligence Watch, was essentially a guerrilla warfare field operational officer. Positive intelligence information reporting and the handling of reports were new to him, and called for professional skills and other qualities radically different from those which most of his previous experience had brought into play. Yet in a relatively short time, Mr. Hicks has developed the skills required of a Watch Officer, and thanks to this and to other strengths has become one of the most valuable officers in the unit.

Wallace R. Deuel

Wallace R. Deuel
Chief FI/INT

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

H-8

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 May 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056361
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HICKS, CALVIN W.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 04 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 13 0007 7235-0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FI ~~DDP/WH~~
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13
17. SALARY OR RATE: $
18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
DATE SIGNED
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY CODE
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HDQTRS CODE
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE: 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 06-07-67 LK
46. OP APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 1 JUN 1967
DATE APPROVED

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
OP-1 1-68

SECRET

Posted

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 May 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056361 L
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HICKS, Calvin W. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 04 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7223-0007
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FI STAFF
Intelligence Group
Intelligence Watch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C.

8
H

11. POSITION TITLE: Watch Officer (13)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1032
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 ~~4~~ 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~$14,217~~ 14665

18. REMARKS

Reassigned from: DDP/WH/Branch 3/Colombia Section, Position No. 1359,
Cost Center No. 7235-0620.

36
E

Concur:

Security Approval [illegible] by Para. [illegible] 5/4/67
[illegible] 5/23/67

Robert Cashman (by phone)
WH/Pers

Distribution:
Orig. - CSPS/B 1 - FI/Pers 1 - Security 1 - Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: El. M. [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 5/22/67
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: J. Gilbert [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 22 May 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 32500 ALPHABETIC FZ
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 07 YR. 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA. YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT.
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES# PROV. TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5-23-67 WH FROM WH
46. O P APPROVAL: E. Mayo
DATE APPROVED: 5/25/67

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 APRIL 67

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 056361

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HICKS, CALVIN W.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 23 YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7235-0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
COLOMBIA SECTION
13

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1358

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: $14217

18 REMARKS:

FROM: 1359

1 Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Edward K. O'Malley
Robert D. Cashman C/WH/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 24 April

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 26 April 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 5142[illegible] ALPHABETIC WH

22 STATION CODE: 7502

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HOOTRS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 05 YR. 2[illegible]

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. XX DA. XX YR. XX

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO.:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT

36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: C 4-27-67 JJ

46 OP APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 4/27/67

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

7 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Calvin W. Hicks**

VIA : **WH/RMO**

SUBJECT : Records Officer Appointment

1. In accordance with a request received from your component, you are hereby appointed a Records Officer in the Clandestine Services. Your functions are described, in summary, in CSI 43-1, Para. 4.b.(3). You have also participated in a training course in which these functions were reviewed in some detail.

2. The essence of your appointment is that you now occupy a position of trust in which you are expected to draw on your knowledge and experience to exercise responsible and sound judgment in building and maintaining a professionally useful records system in the Clandestine Services. You are, at the same time, expected to train and guide others within your component in these respects.

3. A copy of this memorandum will be placed in your official personnel folder.

Peter D. Dyke

PETER D. DYKE
DDP Records Management Officer

cc: Personnel File of Addressee

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 SEPT 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 056361

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HICKS, CALVIN W.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 15 YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
COLOMBIA SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER ~~(13)~~ (12)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1359

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

31

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 14,217

18 REMARKS:

FROM: DDP/WH/BRANCH 3/LIMA SECTION/1392

PRA IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-17 c (d)

1

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Edward K. O'Malley
Robert D. Cashman C/WH/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 16 Sept 66

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 20 Sep 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLCY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51400 ALPHABETIC wh

22 STATION CODE: 75013

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HOOTRS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 08 YR. 24

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. 09 DA. 14 YR. 68

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE: 84

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO.:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE 00 NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 09-22-66 N

46 OP APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 056361
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HICKS, CALVIN W.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 31 YEAR 66
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: X V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7235 0620
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
LIMA SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (13)
12 POSITION NUMBER: 1392
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 4
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 14,217

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/CS & DEV COMP/9997

MR. HICKS IS REPLACING MR. POSNER WHO IS BEING REASSIGNED.

1 - FINANCE
1 - SECURITY

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SO/DS 7/27/66

Jle 8/18/66

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Edward F. O'Malley
ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 2 Aug 66

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED: 3 Aug 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51400 ALPHABETIC wh
22 STATION CODE: 75C13
23 INTEGREE CODE
24 HOOTRS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 08 YR. 24
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA. YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 3—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 00
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 08-08-66 H
46 OP APPROVAL: H Milton
DATE APPROVED: 08-08-66

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 September 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056361

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HICKS, Calvin W.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY YEAR 65

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235-0623

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: 51 DDP/WH

6 CS/CS Development Complement

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: CPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~XXXX~~ 9947

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 (4)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,335

18. REMARKS

From DDP/WH/[illegible]C, MOB, PM Sec., #1140, D.C.

33 6 Subject is enrolled in extensive language training from September 1965 to January, 1966.

Recorded CS CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Edward F. O'[illegible]

ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/Pers.

DATE SIGNED: 10 Sept 65

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 9/14/65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HQQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR.
37	13	51947	wh	75013		1	11 08 24		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV. TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER, 1—YES; HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 9-15-65 wp

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 9/14/65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION		DATE PREPARED 3 May 1962
1. SERIAL NUMBER 056361 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HICKS, Calvin W.	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 05 DAY 13 YEAR 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS X V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2235-1400-1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP Task Force W Paramilitary Branch	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER (2)	12. POSITION NUMBER 0715	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS (3)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 (1)
17. SALARY OR RATE $10,635 ✓		

3

18. REMARKS

Recommendation and Fitness Report previously submitted.

VS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Louis W. Armstrong LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/~~Fers.~~	DATE SIGNED 3 May 62	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 5/10/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 61450	ALPHABETIC TFW	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VETERANS CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 11 08 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. MIL SERV CREDIT LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION J. Kearney 05/10/62	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 5/10/62

452 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(4)

EYES ONLY
SECRET

28 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section B)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-13 - Mr. Calvin W. Hicks

1. It is recommended that Calvin W. Hicks be promoted from Grade GS-12 to Grade GS-13 in recognition of his outstanding performance as a member of JMATE Project.

2. Mr. Hicks was assigned to JMATE Project in October 1960 as an operations officer in the Paramilitary Section. His years of Agency experience and varied operational assignments enabled him to immediately take hold and perform the many functions required in the Paramilitary Operations Section in a most outstanding manner. This included recruitment, training, briefing, debriefing and in-exfiltration of agents; supervision of the infiltration of supplies and bodies by air for the Paramilitary Operations Section; case officer for certain high level agents and their W/T operators inside the target area. Mr. Hicks' maturity, common sense and varied experience enabled him to operate with the minimum of supervision. He trained certain agents in tradecraft, air and maritime reception, mapping, and guerrilla warfare with the result that these agents received the only completely successful air drops. In addition, some of these agents handled and trained by Mr. Hicks became our most trusted and important agents, and a large measure of their willingness to go on after continued frustrations was due to their respect for, and trust and confidence in, Mr. Hicks.

3. Mr. Hicks has continuously demonstrated the ability to perform duties in a higher grade. He has the leadership, maturity, common sense, stability, and ability to make decisions and to operate with minimum supervision so necessary to senior officers in the Agency. He is aggressive and capable of fighting for his views; at the same time he will listen to advice and once a decision has been handed down, will give it his full support even though he might have opposed it before the decision was made.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. Mr. Hicks has been an Agency staff employee since August 1950 and was last promoted in November 1956. He is in every way fully qualified to perform the duties of a higher grade and has been doing so in an outstanding manner on JMATE Project. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that Mr. Hicks be promoted to Grade GS-13 at the earliest date.

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 August 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056361 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HICKS, Calvin W.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT And Transfer to Vouchered Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 8 DAY 20 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2635-5000-8021

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH, Divn.
Branch 4
Paramilitary Sec.

3H

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0716

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LP, etc.): GS (12)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 (4)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 9,735 ✓

18. REMARKS:

From: DDP/WH, Br. 4, Unass.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Herbert V Juul
HERBERT V. JUUL, C/WH/Pers.
HHP

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Orville C Dawson

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGR. CODE	24. HQSTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	44150	WH	75013		1	11 08 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE: MO. DA. YR.:
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE: 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:
38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED: 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE: 0 = WAIVER 1 = YES HEALTH INS. CODE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE: 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE: NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS:
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE: NO. TAX EXEMP.: STATE CODE:

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney OS 8/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Orville C. Dawson

OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 October 1960

1. SERIAL NUMBER 556361	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HICKS, Calvin W.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT (TEMPORARY)*	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 10 DAY 30 YEAR 60 11-64-65 per ms
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 1535-5000-0021	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH Division Branch 4 4617	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE GUERILLA WAR[redacted] OF[redacted]	12. POSITION NUMBER XXXXXA
12A. PCR CONTROL NO.	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LP, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.14
16. GRADE AND STEP 12 (3)	17. SALARY OR RATE $9475

18. REMARKS CS/CS/DC

DDP/NE/~~5-Cherat, Pakistan #812~~

*UPON TERMINATION OF THIS TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT YOU WILL BE REASSIGNED AS THE HEAD OF YOUR CAREER SERVICE DIRECTS.

10-18-60

DOG: 11-18-56
PSI: 05-14-61

Concur. S. Kilewald Jr.
C/NE/Pers
no detail

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Herbert V. Juul HERBERT V. JUUL, C/WH/2/Pers.	19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Orrill C. Davison

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INCOME TAX CODE	24. POSITION CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
57 57	01 10	64450	WH			1	11 03 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT 2 = 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. FULL SERV. CREDIT LCD 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 = WAIVER 1 = YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL
W. Kearney 11/ /60	Orrill C. Davison

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

REQUE FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 556361	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) HICKS CALVIN W	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 11 Da. 08 Yr. 24	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 07 Da. 18 Yr. 58
7. SCD Mo. 05 Da. 26 Yr. 48	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 12. LCD Mo. 08 Da. 05 Yr. 50	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code 1

;3

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP NEA SOUTH ASIA BRANCH CHERAT BASE, PAKISTAN	Code 5045	15. Location Of Official Station CHERAT, PAKISTAN	Station Code 55544

16. Dept.-Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code 6	17. Position Title GUERILLA WAR OFF	18. Position No. 0812	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.14

21. Grade & Step 12 ~~2~~ 3	22. Salary Or Rate $ ~~8570~~ 9475	23. SD DM	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 11 Da. 18 Yr. 56	25. PSI Due Mo. ~~11~~ Da. ~~15~~ Yr. ~~59~~	26. Appropriation Number 9 3373 02 174

ACTION CS 14 61

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~	Code 67	28. Eff. Date Mo. 10 Da. 02 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 25 ~~[illegible]~~	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP/NE ~~NE/5~~ CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	Code 4088	32. Location Of Official Station WASHINGTON, D.C.	Station Code 7543

33. Dept.-Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code 1	34. Position Title ~~XXXXX~~ GUERILLA WAR OFF	35. Position No. 8260 [redacted] 4497	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.14 ✓

38. Grade & Step 12 3	39. Salary Or Rate $ 9475	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number 1120 1998 ✓

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
Frank J. Dewald Jr
FRANK J. DEWALD, JR. CNE/PERSONNEL

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Donna Bobin x3671

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[illegible]	9/30/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	[illegible]	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	10/21/6

Remarks

2 cc - Security
1 cc - Finance

PCS RETORNEE
Subject awaiting reassignment

[illegible] CSPD
10/19/60

FORM NO 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
HICKS, Calvin W.	dau. Lisa malaria dau. Mary tonsillectomy son. Michael tonsillectomy	60-391D 60-392D 60-393D

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on April 1960.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
10 Aug 60	R. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 9-58 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

Pre 1960
Requests for
Personnel action
& similar docs

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
056651

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Hicks, Calvin W.	8 Nov 24	M	GS-13	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Watch Officer	DDP/FI/INT/IW	HQS

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 October 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 Nov 71 - 31 Oct 72

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 (Note: D010 is the closest qualification code to describe the work of a Watch Officer) --Prepares ID dissems from Intel Cables and releases them to the U.S. Intel Community for the CS expediting their delivery by electrical transmission when appropriate. Also dissems certain FI/D Cables.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consults with area division officers, as necessary in his judgment, regarding disseminability of the info and to ensure adequate protection of sources and methods with minimum impairment to info reaching policy levels.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Reviews supdata and authentication statement in intel cables and deletes any sensitive operational data before any distribution is made. Effects distribution of the deleted portion within the DDP on a strict need to know basis.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Keeps current on the general and special requirements of customer agencies including the White House for cabled info, i.e., info on narcotics, hijacking, protection of U.S. and foreign dignitaries, etc.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 After hours, grants clearances (in consultation with responsible area division) for the use of dissemed CS information in finished intel publications in a manner denied by dissemination controls	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Maintains good working relations not only with DDP area divisions and staff, but with Signal Center and Cable Secretariat at all levles to expedite the dissem of significant reports; works closely with CSDOs and SDOs to keep one another alert to significant events.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

25 Oct

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be described, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Hicks continues to perform with exceptional proficiency. In April 1972 he was granted a Quality Step Increase in recognition and as proof of the high esteem in which he is held by his supervisor in the Clandestine Service.

Mr. Hicks' services have been particularly valuable during this reporting period because of DDP's increased concern regarding the strict maintenance of operational security in the dissemination of its intelligence information. Mr. Hicks has been instrumental in referring many reports when in the opinion of IW officers, the authentication statement and the manner in which the report is written would help to pinpoint the source of the information if the report fell in unauthorized hands. Mr. Hicks' notations on the IW log cards which record the action taken on each report indicate the seriousness in which Mr. Hicks approaches his daily tasks and his contributions in reminding Divisional personnel about the essential elements of good reporting and the need to comply with the prescribed format.

The exercise of good judgment in referring or consulting on an Intel Cable prior to its dissemination to the Intelligence Community is an essential element in the proper functioning of this office and upon which depends to a certain extent the Agency's reputation.

With the retirement and reassignment of several IW officers during this reporting period, Mr. Hicks is now the IW officer with the most experience and continuity on the job. This together with his maturity of judgment and ability to withstand the rigors and pressures inherent in an around-the-clock activity, make Mr. Hicks a distinct asset in the unit.

The assignment carries no supervisory responsibilities and does not require any significant demonstration of cost consciousness.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 16 October 1972
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Calvin W. Hicks

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 38
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 16 October 1972
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/FI/INT/IW
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Joseph A. Procaccino

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I can add nothing to this evaluation. I share the rater's high opinion of Mr. Hicks' work and characteristics.

DATE: 24 Oct. 1972
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/FI/INT
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Thomas F. Thiele

SECRET

BIOG... PROFILE (PART I) SOD: 28 May [illegible]

NAME (Last-First-Middle): HICKS, Calvin Wilson	SEX: M	4. DATE OF BIRTH: 8 May 1924	CONTINUITY COMP. DATE: 5 Aug 1950
MARITAL STATUS: Married	DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee) NO.: 7	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 1925 '53 '54 '55 '57 '59	US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA SPOUSE: ?
CAREER STAFF STATUS MEMBERSHIP: Jul 1954	OTHER STATUS:	10. LAST ACC. APPT.: May 1965 QUAL. FOR: PCS O/S	EVAL. FOR: PCS O/S
CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NONE X SERVICE:	GRADE:	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1: RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2:	TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3: RETIRED:
ASSESSMENT DATE: None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: Aug 1954	

5. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1943-45 Military Service, US Army, Pvt

1946 National Geophysical Co, Dallas, Texas - Shooter (for seismography) (1 mo)

1948; 49 Marine Exploration Co, Houston, Texas - Laboratory Helper (5 mos)

6. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1945-50 Texas Agricultural & Mechanical College, College Sta, Texas - BS Geology /(Geophysics)

1949 Univ of Houston, Houston, Texas - Geology

7. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): None

8. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1950 [redacted]

1950 [redacted]

1952 [redacted]

1952 C[redacted]

1953 [redacted] Ops

1955 [redacted] Ops

1962 Records Of Orgn

1962 Anlysn Sem

1963 CS [illegible]

1965-66 Spanish [illegible]

1969 Management [illegible]

1969 Read Improve

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SO	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Au[redacted]					
Dec [redacted]					
Oct 1960	" " " 0136.14	12	D	DDP/CS Dev Comp/NE	Hq
Nov 1960	" " " 0136.14	12	D	DDP/WH-4	"
Aug 1961	Ops Off 0136.01	12	D	DDP/WH-4/Paramil Sec	"
May 1962	" " 0136.01	13	D	DDP/Task Force "W"/Paramil Br	"
Jun 1964	" " 0136.01	13	D	DDP/SAS/MiamiOpsBr/Ch, PM Sec	"
May 1965	" " 0136.01	13	D	DDP/WH/C/MiamiOpsBr/Ch,PM Sec	"
Sep 1965	" " 01[illegible].01	1[illegible]	[illegible]	DDP/WH/CS [illegible]	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: [illegible] 21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: [illegible] 22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: (continued) 20 May 19[illegible]

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I - Continued)

[illegible]361

NAME (Last-First-Middle): HICKS, Calvin Wilson

DATE OF BIRTH: 8 Nov 1924

12. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 ("Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details")

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Jul 1966	Ops Of	0136.01	13	D	DDP/WH/Br-3/Lima	Hq
Aug 1966	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/WH/Br-3/Colombia	"
Jun 1967	Watch Of	0132.07	13	D	DDP/FIStf/IntelGrp/IntelWatch	"

DATE REVIEWED	PROFILE REVIEWED BY
20 Aug 1973	[illegible]/jmk

EMPL. SERIAL NO.
056361

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle)
HICKS, Calvin Wilson

DATE OF BIRTH
8 Nov 19[illegible]

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1960 from former Chief of Base, Cherat, for outstanding performance of duty while on the staff of ACLEVER Project, 7 January - 25 August 1960.

Appreciation and Commendation 1967 from Ch, NE & SA Div for the performance of the FI/Intel Watch during the height of the recent Middle East crisis.

Appointed 1967 a Records Officer in the Clandestine Services.

Appreciation 1969 from Ch, Eur Div for the performance of the Intelligence Watch during the President's trip to Europe with endorsement by Ch, FI.

Award 1972 Quality Step Increase for sustained superior performance.

27. DATE REVIEWED
20 Aug 1973

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
umm/jmb

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 67

SECRET [illegible] PROFILE (4)

Unsanitized Bioprofile

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

25 Oct 1974

FILE NO. 2925

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP	SS NUMBER 504-16-4912
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP	EMPLOYEE NUMBER 056361
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) OPS STF	ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: RETIREMENT

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED X DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: HICKS, Calvin

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ____

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER *(Specify)*

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ *(HHB 20-7)*

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ____ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*

SUBMIT F[illegible] OR [illegible] CHANGES AFFECTING THIS COVER. ([illegible])

SUBMIT [illegible] 23 [illegible] TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. ([illegible])

EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

X **CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:** EOD

X SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ *(HHB 20-7)*

NA EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Subject will be acknowledged as CIA for entire period of employment and is not to reveal specific places or locations of cover assignments.

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SR&CD
COPY 4 - OC-DO/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

PB:jp

James L. Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER STAFF

FORM 1-74 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622

(13-20-43)

SECRET

THIS MEMORANDUM MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF THIS FILE

Keep on top of file —

16 May 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT : Credit Reference for Mr. Calvin W. Hicks

1. Mr. Calvin W. Hicks has had the following history of employment with the Agency:

a. August 1950 - EOD Headquarters
b. December 1950-April 1952 - FE Division, stationed overseas
c. April 1952-March 1954 - OTR, Headquarters
d. March 1954-May 1955 - OTR, ISOLATION

During his time at Headquarters he was a student and did not establish credit. While overseas, his cover was that of a Department of the Army civilian, although he told casual friends that he had been recalled to active duty. From April 1952 to March 1954, he used a nominal cover of a Department of Defense civilian. He used the Commanding Officer of ISOLATION (as locally known) to establish credit there.

2. Mr. Hicks will abide by the above story. Therefore, he should admit no affiliation with the Agency, and his employment with the Agency will be denied.

PERSONNEL OFFICER, OTR

CONCUR:

Calvin W. Hicks

Calvin W. Hicks

CONCUR:

Security Officer, OTR

CONCUR:

Asst. Administrative Officer, OTR

SECRET

L[illegible] 1 FEB 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 055351
2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): HICKS CALVIN W

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (DISABILITY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA
4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 12 DA 27 YR 74
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS ▶ V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7 FAN AND NSCA: 5222 4116 [illegible]
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 231

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/OPERATIONS STAFF
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE WATCH BRANCH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: WATCH OFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER: 0J25
13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAA

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.17
16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 9
17 SALARY OR RATE: 27632

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45
20 Employ. Code: 11
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE
23 INTEGREE CODE
24 Hdqtrs Code
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 11 DA [illegible]
26 DATE OF GRADE
27 DATE OF LEI

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: [illegible]
32 Correction/Cancellation: TYPE; MO DA

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39 CODE; FEGLI: 0 - WA[illegible] 1 - YES

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION


HICKS, CALVIN W
1924
790-101-47 OCTOBER '69

FORM 1150
9-72 Mfg 8-73
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OJCS C7/31/73

1 SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W					
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT				4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 07 / DA 02 / YR 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NO. A 4222 4115 0001	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/OS DDO/CS/PEND REASS				10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER				12 POSITION NUMBER 0000	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS		15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.07		16 GRADE AND STEP 13	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

POSTED
7-1-73

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

J.F. BLAKE

Form 1152B Use Previous Edition
8-72 MFG. 9-72

SECRET

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible] 10/31/73

1 SERIAL NUMBER 03[illegible]1	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W					
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT				4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 10 26 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND ROCA 4222 4114 0001	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS CDC/OS CDC/OS/IG/IWB				10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER				12 POSITION NUMBER 0947	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS		15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.07		16 GRADE AND STEP 13	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

POSTED
11-8-73
MD

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 8-72 MFG 9-72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4-51)

14-00000

#9

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 07/08/72

1 SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W					
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT				4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 01 72	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 3223 4116 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FI STAFF				10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER				12 POSITION NUMBER 0947	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS		15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.07		16 GRADE AND STEP 13	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7-27-72

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition
7-66 MFG. 2-72

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEH: 03 JAN 72

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056361
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HICKS CALVIN W
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 12 DA 23 YR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 2222 4116 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FI STAFF
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE WATCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: WATCH OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0947
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: 21313
18. REMARKS:

HOME BASE: SOD

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 32500 ALPHABETIC FI
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 11 DA 08 YR 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CS 2 CA 3 FICA 4 NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVED 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
5 JAN 1972

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition
Mfg 6-70

SECRET

BS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

H8 SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 07/24/71

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) ICKS CALVIN W

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 01 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 2222 4110 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FI STAFF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1032	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.07	16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
26 AUG 1971

Form 1150B 7-66 MFG. 11-69 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4 51)

35

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

HICKS CALVIN W 056361 42224116

E 47

1 SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
056361	HICKS CALVIN W	32 400	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	8	$25,500	05/02/71	GS 13	9	$26,189	04/28/74		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE 7 February 1974

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
056361	HICKS CALVIN W	32 500 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-13	7	$22,487	05/02/71	GS-13	8	$23,112	04-16-72			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ H.B. FISHER DATE: 04-06-72

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Mfg. 3-65 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
056361	HICKS CALVIN W	32 500 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-13	7	$22,487	05/02/71	GS-13	8	$23,112	04-16-72			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ H.B. FISHER DATE: 04-06-72

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Mfg. 3-65 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

118

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
056361	HICKS CALVIN W	32 500	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	6	$20,721	05/04/69	GS 13	7	$21,313	05/02/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 10 [illegible] 1971

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP
☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	32 500	V	GS 13 7	$22,487

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	32 500 V	GS 13 5	$14,665	$15,307

---

c/wH/3 G-36 FF H 8

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
056361	HICKS CALVIN W	51 400 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	4	$14,217	05/09/65	GS 13	5	$14,665	05-07-67 ~~05/21/67~~			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/✓/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg 3-65 (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	32 500	V	GS 13 6	$20,721

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	32 500	V	GS 13 6	$19,555

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	32 500	V	GS 13 5	$18,447

H8

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
056361	HICKS CALVIN W	32 500	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	5	$16,329	05/07/67	GS 13	6	$16,809	05/04/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 6 Mar 1969

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY DH

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

DB

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	32 500	V	GS 13 5	$15,307	$16,329

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	32 400	V	GS 13 8	$25,500

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	32 500	V	GS 13 8	$24,299

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	32 400	V	GS 13 9	$27,632

BJT: 14 JUN 67

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 06 04 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7223 0007 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 20	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FI	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., DC		
11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE
18. REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE 2	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY LAN RES PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ajm 6/14/67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

plw

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SUT: 2 JUN 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 06 04 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V. TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7223 0007 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FI STAFF INTELLIGENCE GROUP INTELLIGENCE WATCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1032	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.07	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 14665

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	32500	FI	75013		1	11 08 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RES TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: WH

POSTED
6/5/67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Plw

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-5)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJT, 27 APR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CSF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 058361	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 23 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 3 COLOMBIA SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1358	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 4
17. SALARY OR RATE 14217		

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51400	WH	75013		1	11 08 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
XX XX XX									

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RES. PROV. TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
04

1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BJT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-5)

(When Filled In)

‹ZF: 27 SEPT 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056361
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HICKS CALVIN W
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 09 15 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
COLOMBIA SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1359
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 14217
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51400 | ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR): 11 08 24
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA. YR): 09 14 68
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 84
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES | HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
09.30.66

1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

ZF: 10 AUG 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 31 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 3 LIMA SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1392	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 14217

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51400 ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 11 08 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY. CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

087066N

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	51 997	V	GS 13 4	$13,815	$14,217

14-00000

RZF: 21 SEPT 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 21 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6235 0623 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER			12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16. GRADE AND STEP 13 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 13335	
18. REMARKS TRAINING					

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	13	51997	WH	75013		1	11 08 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
dlb 9/23/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	51 997	V	GS 13 4	$13,335	$13,815

MAY 12 4 23 PM '65

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
056361	HICKS CALVIN W	49 300 38F V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 13	3	$12,915	05/10/64	GS 13	4	$13,335	05/09/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS KW AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 5/4/65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-31)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/27/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 31 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6 FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE 5235 1162 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION WH C MIAMI OPS BR PM SEC	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 1140	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

POSTED
6-9-65 HL

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition
63 MFG. 1-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4 51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 07/01/64

1 SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 06 DA 19 YR 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS: X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE 4232 1000 1000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS M O B PM SEC	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12 POSITION NUMBER U930	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

232-1200

1. Serial No. 056361	2. Name HICKS CALVIN W	3. Cost Center Number 49 450 39F V	4. LWOP Hours

5 OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	6. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	7. TYPE ACTION PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	2	$12,110	05/12/63	GS 13	3	$12,495	05/10/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS
AUDITED BY ck

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [redacted] DATE April '64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

REC. PAYROLL BRANCH
MAY 5 4 53 PM '64

L1

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	49 450	V	GS 13 2	$11,515	$12,110

---

1 Serial No	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
056361	HICKS CALVIN W	61 450 V 3	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 13	1	$11,150	05/13/62	GS 13	2	$11,515	05/12/63			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

p.CR

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 25 MAR 63

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 961 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

BWS: 11 MAY 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
056361	HICKS CALVIN W

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	05 13 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	2235 1400 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP TASK FORCE W PARAMILITARY BRANCH	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0715	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	13 1	10635

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	61450	TFW	75013		1	11 08 24	05 13 62	05 13 62

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05/23/62 WK

Form 8-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-61)

101

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS. EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
HICKS CALVIN W	056361	61450	V	13 1	$10635	13 1	$11150

PSC: 18 AUG 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 08 20 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2635 5000 8021	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 4 PARAMILITARY SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0716	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 9735

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 16	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC: 64450 ALPHABETIC: WH	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 11 08 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE NO. DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

CODED
08/29/61 VK

L1

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-61)

SWS: 4 NOV 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICKS CALVIN W	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT (TEMPORARY)*	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 11 04 60	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V. TO V / CF TO V / X V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 1535 5000 0021	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 4	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE GUERILLA WAR OF	12. POSITION NUMBER 0000	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.14	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE 9475		

18. REMARKS
*UPON TERMINATION OF THIS TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT YOU WILL BE REASSIGNED AS THE HEAD OF YOUR CAREER SERVICE DIRECTS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	10	64450	WH	75013		1	11 08 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO. DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA. YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA. YR)	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCO (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11/17/60 ZK

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

a 5 11/9/60

SECRET

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
556361	HICKS CALVIN W	DDP/WH UN UV'	

5. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	6. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	7. TYPE ACTION PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	3	$ 9,475	11/15/59	12	4	$ 9,735	05/14/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ X / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

US AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED
1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DM	HICKS CALVIN W	556361	50 45	GS-12 3	$ 8,810	$ 9,475

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BLT. 21 OCT 1960

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056361
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HICKS CALVIN W
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 10 02 60
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1120 1993 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP NE
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: GUERILLA WAR OFF
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.14
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 9475
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 16
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 58997 ALPHABETIC NE
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 11 08 24
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NR.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; CODE 2 - WAIVER 4 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

14-00000

Pre 1960 Personnel actions

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (last, first, middle) HICKS, Calvin W.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Nov 24	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-13	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Watch Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/OPS/INT/IW	9. CURRENT STATION HQS	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS. ☐ OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT X SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to): 1 October 1973 - 30 September 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 October 1974

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. No

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 (NOTE: D010 IS THE CLOSEST QUALIFICATION CODE TO DESCRIBE THE WORK OF A WATCH OFFICER) — Prepares TD disseminations from DDO intel cables and releases them to the U.S. Intel Community expediting their delivery by advance electrical transmission when appropriate. Also disseminates certain DIV/D cables.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reviews intel cables for adherence to established reporting procedures and operational security; when necessary deletes objectionable data from the SUPDATA and/or authentication statements.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 After hours grants or denies clearances (in consultation with the responsible area division) for use of DDO information in finished intel publications.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Keeps current on the general and special requirements of both internal and external Agency customers particularly when the information involves the security and protection of U.S. and foreign dignitaries, hijacking, etc.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains good working relations not only with DDO area divisions and staffs but with Signal Center, Cable Secretariat at all levels to expedite the dissemination of significant reports; works closely with DDO Duty Officers and SDOs to keep one another alert to significant events.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 28 OCT 1974	RATING LETTER S

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2, IMPDET CL BY 002025

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During this reporting period Mr. Hicks' performance has continued to be characterized by exceptional proficiency. The record is already replete of laudatory comments regarding his performance not only in IW but in previous assignments. Mr. Hicks is retiring from the Agency at the end of this year on a medical disability.

Since his assignment to IW, 7 1/2 years ago, he has had a medical hold and because of his deep roted motivation and strong belief in the Agency's mission, he has held on tenaciously until he reached the age of 50. In addition to being a very effective IW officer throughout these years, Mr. Hicks has also performed in a superior manner as a paramilitary officer during the early years of his career, overseas and in Headquarters.

We wish him Godspeed, and our best wishes for good health throughout the coming years.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 64	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION RETIRED

DATE 24 December 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/OPS/INT/IW	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Joseph A. Procaccino

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☒ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Calvin W. Hicks

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the rating official's comments. Mr. Hicks turned in a creditable performance during his extended tour on the Operations Staff, and well deserves his supervisor's "Strong" rating. We all hope that his years of retirement are rewarding and fruitful.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/OPS/INT	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Eloise R. Page Eloise R. Page

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE Employee retired on 27 December 1974	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 056361	2. NAME (last, first, middle) HICKS, Calvin W.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Nov 24	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-13	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Watch Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/OPS/INT/IW	9. CURRENT STATION HQS			10. HQ CD 1

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 Nov 72 - 30 September 73

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 October 1973

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. [illegible]

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 (Note: DDIO is the closest qualification code to describe the work of a Watch Officer)--Prepares TD disseminations from DDO Intel cables and releases them to the U.S. Intel Community expediting their delivery by advance electrical transmission when appropriate. Also disseminates certain DIV/D cables	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reviews intel cables for adherence to established reporting procedures and operational security; when necessary deletes objectionable data from the SUPDATA and/or authentication statements.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 After hours grants or denies clearances (in consultation with the responsible area division) for use of DDO information in finished intel publications.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Keeps current on the general and special requirements of both internal and external Agency customers particularly when the information involves the security and protection of U.S. and foreign dignitaries, hijacking, etc.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains good working relations not only with DDO area divisions and staffs but with Signal Center, Cable Secretariat at all levels to expedite the dissemination of significant reports; works closely with DDO Duty Officers and SDOs to keep one another alert to significant events.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

15 NOV 1973

Form 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

(4)

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment, and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

There has been no change in Mr. Hicks' performance from the last reporting period. It is still characterized by exceptional proficiency. He continues to display initiative, resourcefulness and good judgment in the performance of the duties assigned to an IW officer.

Mr. Hicks has been with the Intelligence Watch since June 1967. A medical hold has precluded any further overseas assignments and for this reason his tour in IW has been extended until he reaches age 50 (November 1974) at which time he plans to retire under the Agency retirement system. Throughout this period he has continuously applied himself with diligence and enthusiasm. Even after some protracted sick leave periods he has returned ready to step in and pick up where he left off which is the best proof of his mastery of details and the mechanics of dissemination, as well as his ability to adjust to the stresses and strains resulting from this type of assignment.

Since the inception of his IW assignment he has borne the same responsibilities and carried the same burdens as his colleagues in the GS-14 category and continues to perform at this level. For this sustained high-level of performance in 1972 he received a quality step increase in recognition and as proof of the high esteem in which he is held by his superiors.

Mr. Hicks' resourcefulness and ability to apply the myriad of reporting skills and techniques has been clearly demonstrated in crisis situations such as the recent Chilean political upheaval and the current Near Eastern crisis. The presence of IW officers such as Mr. Hicks enables the DDO to effect electrical dissemination of the high precedence traffic to the Intelligence Community in a matter of minutes on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

While his assignment carries no supervisory responsibilities he gives all indications of being cost-conscious.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, C AND D OF THIS REPORT

DATE 23 October 1973	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Calvin W. Hicks Calvin W. Hicks

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 50	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 October 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/OPS/INT/IW	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Joseph A. Procaccino

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have observed Mr. Hicks' performance in various capacities over the years and concur with Mr. Procaccino's rating. His contribution to the Intelligence Watch has, I know, been substantial.

DATE 13 November 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/OPS/INT	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Eloise R. Page

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
056361

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) Hicks,	(First) Calvin	(Middle) W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8Nov 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Watch Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FI/INT/IW	8. CURRENT STATION HQS

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
X CAREER
RESERVE
TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
INITIAL
REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X ANNUAL
REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 October 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 Nov 71 - 31 Oct 72

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 (Note: DDIO is the closest qualification code to describe the work of a Watch Officer) --Prepares TD dissems from Intel Cables and releases them to the U.S. Intel Community for the CS expediting their delivery by electrical transmission when appropriate. Also dissems certain FI/D Cables.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consults with area division officers, as necessary in his judgment, regarding disseminability of the info and to ensure adequate protection of sources and methods with minimum impairment to info reaching policy levels.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Reviews subdata and authentication statement in intel cables and deletes any sensitive operational data before any distribution is made. Effects distribution of the deleted portion within the DDP on a strict need to know basis.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Keeps current on the general and special requirements of customer agencies including the White House for cabled info, i.e., info on narcotics, hijacking, protection of U.S. and foreign dignitaries, etc.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 After hours, grants clearances (in consultation with responsible area division) for the use of dissemed CS information in finished intel publications in a manner denied by dissemination controls	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Maintains good working relations not only with DDP area divisions and staff, but with Signal Center and Cable Secretariat at all levles to expedite the dissem of significant reports; works closely with CSDOs and SDOs to keep one another alert to significant events.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

25 OCT 197

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Hicks continues to perform with exceptional proficiency. In April 1972 he was granted a Quality Step Increase in recognition and as proof of the high esteem in which he is held by his supervisor in the Clandestine Service.

Mr. Hicks' services have been particularly valuable during this reporting period because of DDP's increased concern regarding the strict maintenance of operational security in the dissemination of its intelligence information. Mr. Hicks has been instrumental in referring many reports when in the opinion of IW officers, the authentication statement and the manner in which the report is written would help to pinpoint the source of the information if the report fell in unauthorized hands. Mr. Hicks' notations on the IW log cards which record the action taken on each report indicate the seriousness in which Mr. Hicks approaches his daily tasks and his contributions in reminding Divisional personnel about the essential elements of good reporting and the need to comply with the prescribed format.

The exercise of good judgment in referring or consulting on an Intel Cable prior to its dissemination to the Intelligence Community is an essential element in the proper functioning of this office and upon which depends to a certain extent the Agency's reputation.

With the retirement and reassignment of several IW officers during this reporting period, Mr. Hicks is now the IW officer with the most experience and continuity on the job. This together with his maturity of judgment and ability to withstand the rigors and pressures inherent in an around-the-clock activity, make Mr. Hicks a distinct asset in the unit.

The assignment carries no supervisory responsibilities and does not require any significant demonstration of cost consciousness.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
16 October 1972	Calvin W. Hicks Calvin W. Hicks

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
38	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 October 1972	C/FI/INT/IW	Joseph A. Procaccino Joseph A. Procaccino

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I can add nothing to this evaluation. I share the rater's high opinion of Mr. Hicks' work and characteristics.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 Oct. 1972	C/FI/INT	Thomas F. Thiele Thomas F. Thiele

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
056361

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS CALVIN W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Nov 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FI/INT/IW	8. CURRENT STATION HEADQUARTERS		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 JANUARY 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 JANUARY - 31 DECEMBER 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
NOTE: DD10 (REPORTS OFFICER ACTIVITIES) IS THE CLOSEST QUALIFICATION CODE TO DESCRIBE MR. HICKS' WORK AS A WATCH OFFICER. SPECIFIC DUTIES ARE: SPEC.DUTY NO.1--PREPARES TD DISSEMINATIONS FROM CABLED FIELD INFORMATION REPORTS	S.
AND RELEASES THEM TO U.S. INTEL. COMMUNITY, EXPEDITING DELIVERY BY ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION WHEN APPROPRIATE.	RATING LETTER
SPEC.DUTY NO.2--RELEASES JBHURRIED CABLES AS DISSEMINATION TO INTEL. COMMUNITY, INTERPRETING BROAD FI/D INSTRUCTIONS ON VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF CABLES DISSEMED.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 --CONSULTS AREA DIVISION OFFICERS, AS NECESSARY, TO INSURE ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS WITH MINIMUM IMPAIRMENT TO THE VALUE OF THE INFORMATION REACHING POLICY LEVELS.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4--SEEKS AND RESPONDS TO GUIDANCE RE MOST EFFECTIVE SERVICING OF THE INTEL. COMMUNITY, INCLUDING WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, WITH CS-ACQUIRED INFORMATION; INCLUDING AFTER-HOURS SERVICING OF REQUESTS FOR CLEARANCE OF CS-DISSEMINATED INFORMATION IN FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS ON BEHALF OF FI/INT/RC.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 ADVISES AND ASSISTS AREA DIVISION OFFICERS IN PREPARATION OF TD DISSEMINATIONS BASED ON INFORMATION OTHER THAN THAT CONTAINED IN INCOMING CABLED FIELD INFORMATION REPORTS; AND PROVIDES ADVICE TO CSDO ON REQUEST.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 FACILITATES AND MAINTAINS GOOD WORKING RELATIONS WITH THE CABLE SECRETARIAT AND SIGNAL CENTER AT ALL LEVELS TO EXPEDITE DISSEMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT REPORTS.	RATING LETTER S

14 JAN 19

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by CI/SPD/PPB

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JAN 14 9 33 AM '71
MAIL ROOM

THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN MR. HICKS' OVERALL PERFORMANCE FROM THE LAST RATING PERIOD. IT IS STILL CHARACTERIZED BY EXCEPTIONAL PROFICIENCY. HE CONTINUES TO BE A HIGHLY MOTIVATED, HARD-WORKING AND DEPENDABLE OFFICER.

SINCE JOINING IW IN JUNE 1967 HE HAS SERVED ON A ROTATING SCHEDULE WITH SEVEN OTHER OFFICERS DOING IDENTICAL WORK, THREE OF WHOM ARE CURRENTLY IN GRADE GS-14 AND ONE IN GRADE GS-15. THERE HAVE BEEN AS MANY AS FIVE GS-14 OFFICERS SERVING AT THE SAME TIME AS MR. HICKS. HE HAS, THEREFORE, BEEN PERFORMING DUTIES COMMENSURATE WITH A GRADE HIGHER THAN HIS PRESENT ONE.

HIS OUTGOING PERSONALITY AND EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE IW OPERATION HAS GAINED HIM THE CONFIDENCE AND RESPECT OF NOT ONLY HIS COLLEAGUES BUT ALSO OF THE NUMEROUS DIVISION REPRESENTATIVES WITH WHOM HE DEALS.

HE HAS NO SUPERVISORY DUTIES AND IS COST CONSCIOUS.

THERE HAS BEEN FREQUENT CONSULTATION WITH MR. HICKS CONCERNING THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1970
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 16 MONTHS
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1970
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE WATCH
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: JOSEPH A. PROCACCINO

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

While I am physically separated from this officer and not in daily contact with him or his work, all secondary evidences are that this is a conservative but generally accurate evaluation.

DATE: 12 Jan 1971
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/FI/INT
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Thomas F. Thiele

Thomas F. Thiele

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
056361

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) HICKS	(First) CALVIN	(Middle) W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 3 NOV 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FI/INT/IW	8. CURRENT STATION HEADQUARTERS

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 JANUARY 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
13 AUGUST - 31 DECEMBER 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
NOTE: THERE IS NOTHING IN THE CHECK LIST OF FUNCTIONS (CSI-20-24) WHICH ADEQUATELY COVERS MR. HICKS. THE CLOSEST IS REPORTS OFFICER ACTIVITIES (DD10). HIS SPECIFIC DUTIES ARE: SPEC.DUTY NO.1--PREPARES TD DISSEMINATIONS FROM CABLED FIELD INFORMATION REPORTS	
& RELEASES THEM TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, EXPEDITING THEIR DELIVERY BY ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION WHEN APPROPRIATE.	S
SPEC.DUTY NO.2--RELEASES UNHURRIED CABLES AS DISSEMINATIONS TO INTEL.COMMUNITY, INTERPRETING BROAD FI/D INSTRUCTIONS ON VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF CABLES DISSEMINATED.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3--CONSULTS WITH AREA DIVISION OFFICERS DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS, AS NECESSARY, TO INSURE ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS WITH MINIMUM IMPAIRMENT TO THE VALUE OF THE INFORMATION REACHING POLICY LEVELS.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4--ADVISES AND ASSISTS AREA DIVISION OFFICERS DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS IN THE PREPARATION OF TD DISSEMINATIONS BASED ON INFORMATION OTHER THAN THAT CONTAINED IN INCOMING CABLED FIELD INFORMATION REPORTS.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5--SEEKS AND RESPONDS TO GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE MOST EFFECTIVE SERVICING OF THE INTEL.COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, WITH CLANDESTINE SERVICE-ACQUIRED INFORMATION AND PROVIDES AFTER-HOURS ADVICE ON DISSEMINATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES TO THE CS/DO ON REQUEST.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6--FACILITATES AND MAINTAINS GOOD WORKING RELATIONS WITH CABLE SECRETARIAT AND SIGNAL CENTER AT ALL LEVELS TO EXPEDITE DISSEMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT REPORTS.	S

2 6 JAN 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JAN 23 10 40 AM '70

MR. HICKS' PERFORMANCE DURING THE 3½ MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION HAS CONTINUED AT THE SAME HIGH LEVEL NOTED IN HIS LAST FITNESS REPORT. HE EXERCISES GREAT CARE AND ATTENTION TO THE MULTITUDE OF DETAILS ENTAILED IN THE PROCESSING OF INTEL CABLES. HE WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE AND IS CONGENIAL AND TACTFUL IN DEALING WITH DIVISIONAL PERSONNEL.

HIS TOUR IN IW WILL BE EXTENDED FOR ANOTHER TWO YEARS. HIS CONTINUED PRESENCE IN IW WILL BE OF INESTIMABLE VALUE TO NEW OFFICERS WHO WILL BE JOINING THE INTELLIGENCE WATCH AS OTHERS ARE REASSIGNED OR RETIRE.

I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT HE BE RECONSIDERED FOR PROMOTION TO GS-14. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT HE HAS BEEN PERFORMING AT THIS LEVEL FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME.

There has been frequent consultation with Mr. Hicks concerning his performance of his duties. He has no supervisory duties and is cost-conscious.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 16 JANUARY 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Calvin W. Hicks

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 3½ MO.	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 JANUARY 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR CHIEF/INTELLIGENCE WATCH	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Joseph A. Procaccino JOSEPH A. PROCACCINO

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I do not know Mr. Hicks well having been assigned to the FI staff only a relatively short period of time, plus the fact that direct contacts with officers of the Intelligence Watch are not always frequent owing to their schedules. I would concur however in the rating and narrative comments above in view of my knowledge of the supervisors.

DATE 20 January 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, FI/INT	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Raymond Villemarette Raymond Villemarette

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 056361

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) HICKS,	(First) CALVIN	(Middle) W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 NOV. 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FI/INT/IW		8. CURRENT STATION HEADQUARTERS	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 JAN 1969 - 12 AUG 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 PREPARES TD DISSEMINATIONS FROM CABLED FIELD INFORMATION REPORTS AND RELEASES THEM TO THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE, EXPEDITING THEIR DELIVERY BY ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION WHEN APPROPRIATE.	RATING LETTER 10 S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 RELEASES UNHURRIED CABLES AS DISSEMINATIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, INTERPRETICH BROAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM FI/D ON VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF CABLES DISSEMINATED.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 CONSULTS WITH AREA DIVISION OFFICERS DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS, AS NECESSARY, TO INSURE ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS WITH MINIMUM IMPAIRMENT TO THE VALUE OF THE INFORMATION REACHING POLICY LEVELS.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 ADVISES AND ASSISTS AREA DIVISION OFFICERS DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS IN THE PREPARATION OF TD DISSEMINATIONS BASED ON INFORMATION OTHER THAN THAT CONTAINED IN INCOMING CABLED FIELD REPORTS.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 SEEKS AND RESPONDS TO GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE MOST EFFECTIVE SERVICING OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, WITH CLANDESTINE SERVICE-ACQUIRED INFORMATION AND PROVIDES AFTER-HOURS ADVICE ON DISSEMINATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES TO THE CSDO ON REQUEST.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 FACILITATES AND MAINTAINS GOOD WORKING RELATIONS WITH CABLE SECRETARIAT AND SIGNAL CENTER AT ALL LEVELS TO EXPEDITE DISSEMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT REPORTS.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

1 AUG 1969

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 14 3 25 PM '69

MR. HICKS HAS BEEN A WATCH OFFICER IN IW FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS AND IS A DEPENDABLE AND THOROUGHLY RELIABLE MEMBER OF THE TEAM. HE HAS A FINE OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND AND A KEEN SENSE OF SECURITY. HIS JUDGMENT IS VERY SOUND AND HE FAR EXCEEDS THE DEMANDS OF HIS POSITION IN THE EXTENT OF HIS COORDINATION WITH THE AREA DIVISIONS ON MATTERS WHERE HE FEELS THAT DIVISION JUDGMENT SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON AN INTELL CABLE. HE IS METICULOUSLY CORRECT IN HIS APPROACH TO HIS DUTIES AND KNOWS HOW TO BALANCE CUSTOMER NEED FOR ENLIGHTENMENT ON SOURCES TO THE AGENCY'S REQUIREMENTS FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. HE STANDS UP WELL UNDER PRESSURE, IS COOPERATIVE AND CONGENIAL. HE HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR PROMOTION TO GS-14 THREE TIMES DURING HIS TOUR IN IW AND IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO PROMOTE HIM. HIS PERFORMANCE IS SIMILAR TO THAT OF HIS COLLEAGUES WHO ARE IN GRADE GS-14.

NEITHER COST CONSCIOUSNESS NOR SUPERVISION IS A FACTOR IN HIS PERFORMANCE.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
12 AUGUST 1969	Calvin ... Hicks

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
21	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 August 1969	CHIEF, FI/INT/IW	Edward J. Carroll EDWARD J. CARROLL

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
18 AUG 1969 13 August 1969	Chief, FI/INT	TL Feyer T. L. Feyer

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 056361

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS, Calvin W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Nov. 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Watch Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FI/INT/DS	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion Submission		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 24 October 1968 - 28 March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Prepares TD disseminations from cabled field information reports and releases them to the U.S. intelligence community for the Clandestine Service, expediting their delivery by electrical transmission when appropriate.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Releases JEHURRIED cables as disseminations to the intelligence community, interpreting broad instructions from FI/D on various categories of cables disseminated.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Consults with area division officers during off-duty hours, as necessary, to insure adequate protection of sources and methods with minimum impairment to the value of the information reaching policy levels.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Advises and assists area division officers during off-duty hours in the preparation of TD disseminations based on information other than that contained in incoming cabled field reports.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Seeks and responds to guidance concerning the most effective servicing of the intelligence community, including the White House Situation Room, with Clandestine Service-acquired information and provides after-hours advice on dissemination policy and procedures to the CSDC on request.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Facilitates and maintains good working relations with Cable Secretariat and Signal Center at all levels to expedite dissemination of significant reports.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-68 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

3 13 PM '60

Mr. Hicks has been with IW for almost 2 years and is a dependable and thoroughly reliable member of the team. He brings to his work a fine operational background and a sense of operational security which is of great assistance in the exercise of sound judgment on dissemination matters. He has an instinct for prompt recognition of problem cases and is imaginative in his approach to problems of under-enlightenment of the reader and the opposite extreme of lax source protection.

He is careful and meticulous in his work, level headed and sound in his judgments. He knows how to balance the customer demand for speed and enlightenment against the equally important demands for source protection. He stands up well under pressure, is cooperative and congenial with his colleagues and with the divisional personnel with whom he is in contact.

Neither cost consciousness nor supervision is a factor in his performance.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 28 March 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 16	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 28 March 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, FI/INT/IW	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward J. Carroll Edward J. Carroll

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in this report primarily on the basis of my confidence in the judgment of the supervisor, as I have had no opportunity to evaluate closely the performance of individual officers in the Intelligence Watch. Such direct contacts as I have had with Mr. Hicks have tended to confirm the overall rating of "Strong." I am satisfied that he is performing at the GS-14 level.

DATE 29 March 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, FI/INT	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE T L Beyer T. L. Beyer

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
~~056361~~

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS, CALVIN W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 NOV 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FI/INT/IW	8. CURRENT STATION HQS			

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 NOV 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 JAN - 31 OCT 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M–Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P–Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S–Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O–Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

XXXXXXXXXXXXX1 /NOTE; ~~DD10~~ IS THE CLOSEST QUALIFICATION CODE TO DESCRIBE THE WORK OF A WATCH OFFICER/ 1: PREPARES TD DISSEMS FROM INTEL CABLES AND RELEASES THEM TO THE U.S. INTEL COMMUNITY FOR THE CS EXPEDITING THEIR DELIVERY BY ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION	RATING LETTER S
XXXXXXXXXXXX2 WHEN APPROPRIATE. ALSO DISSEMS CERTAIN FI/D CABLES 2: CONSULTS WITH AREA DIVISION OFFICERS, AS NECESSARY IN HIS JUDGMENT; REGARDING DISSEMINABILITY OF THE INFO AND TO INSURE ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS WITH MINIMUM IMPAIRMENT TO INFO REACHING POLICY LEVELS.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 REVIEWS SUPDATA AND AUTHENTICATION STATEMENT IN INTEL CABLES AND DELETES ANY SENSITIVE OPERATIONAL DATA BEFORE ANY DISTRIBUTION IS MADE. EFFECTS DISTRIBUTION OF THE DELETED PORTION WITHIN THE DDP ON A STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 KEEPS CURRENT ON THE GENERAL AND SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS OF CUSTOMER AGENCIES INCLUDING THE WHITE HOUSE FOR CABLED INFO, I.E., INFO ON NARCOTICS, HIJACKING, PROTECTION OF U.S. AND FOREIGN DIGNITARIES, ETC.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 AFTER HOURS, GRANTS CLEARANCES (IN CONSULTATION WITH RESPONSIBLE AREA DIVISION) FOR THE USE OF DISSEMED CS INFORMATION IN FINISHED INTEL PUBLICATIONS IN A MANNER DENIED BY DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 MAINTAINS GOOD WORKING RELATIONS NOT ONLY WITH DDP AREA DIVISIONS AND STAFF, BUT WITH SIGNAL CENTER AND CABLE SECRETARIAT AT ALL LEVELS TO EXPEDITE THE DISSEM OF SIGNIFICANT REPORTS; WORKS CLOSELY WITH CSDOS AND SDOS TO KEEP ONE ANOTHER ALERT TO SIGNIFICANT EVENTS.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper. MR. HICKS CONTINUES TO TURN IN AN EXCELLENT ALL AROUND PERFORMANCE. HE EXERCISES A VERY HIGH DEGREE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN CARRYING OUT HIS DUTIES. HE IS ALERT, CONSCIENTIOUS, STRONG-WILLED AND STRAIGHTFORWARD BUT VERY PLEASANT IN DEALING WITH PEOPLE OF ALL LEVELS.

BECAUSE OF HIS CONSTANT AWARENESS THAT CS REPORTS MAY FALL IN UNAUTHORIZED HANDS, MR. HICKS HAS BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE IN MAINTAINING SECURITY DISCIPLINE IN THE REVIEW OF THE INTEL CABLES, PARTICULARLY THE AUTHENTICATION STATEMENTS TO INSURE THAT ANY DATA WHICH MAY PRESENT A SECURITY HAZARD TO THE SOURCE, IS OMITTED FROM THE DISSEMINATION OF THE INFORMATION.

MR. HICKS HAS BEEN WITH THE INTELLIGENCE WATCH SINCE JUNE 1967. HIS OVERALL PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY CHARACTERIZED BY EXCEPTIONAL PROFICIENCY. HE HAS FOR SEVERAL YEARS BEEN PERFORMING DUTIES COMMENSURATE WITH A GRADE HIGHER THAN HIS PRESENT ONE. A CONCERTED EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO PROMOTE HIM TO A GS-14. HE HAS BEEN PUT IN FOR PROMOTION AS AN INTELLIGENCE WATCH OFFICER SINCE 1968.

WITH THE RETIREMENT AND REASSIGNMENT OF SEVERAL IW OFFICERS, BY NEXT YEAR, HE WILL BE THE IW OFFICER WITH THE MOST CONTINUITY ON THE JOB. THIS WILL BE A GREAT ASSET TO IW AND IN PARTICULAR TO THE NEWER OFFICERS WHO WILL PROFIT FROM HIS EXPERIENCE.

ATTACHED TO THIS FITNESS REPORT IS A RECENTLY PREPARED POSITION DESCRIPTION OF AN IW OFFICER WHICH CHARACTERIZES MR. HICKS IN EVERY RESPECT. THIS DESCRIPTION SHOULD HELP TO BETTER APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE DDP ATTACHES TO THE FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF IW OFFICERS AS WELL AS THE SCOPE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE WORK.

IT IS NOT EASY TO FIND SUITABLE OFFICERS TO SERVE IN IW. IT CALLS FOR INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE HIGHLY MOTIVATED, WITH MATURITY OF JUDGMENT, TEMPERAMENT, MANNER AND BEARING TO WITHSTAND THE RIGORS OF SHIFT WORK, AND ABOVE ALL TO MAINTAIN CORDIAL RELATIONS

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS** SEE ATTACHED PAGE

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 28 Oct. 1971

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Calvin W. Hicks Calvin W. Hicks

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 26

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 28 OCTOBER 1971

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/FI/INT/IW

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Joseph A. Procaccino JOSEPH A. PROCACCINO

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully endorse the ratings and the narrative. We shall continue to try to promote Mr. Hicks in recognition of his ability and of his service.

DATE: 29 Oct 71

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/FI/Int

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Thomas L.

SECRET

CALVIN HICKS, SECTION C CONTINUED

WITH PEOPLE AT ALL LEVELS IN EXPEDITING THE DISSEMINATION OF INTEL CABLES ON A 24-HOUR BASIS.

THE ASSIGNMENT CARRIES NO SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES AND DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY SIGNIFICANT DEMONSTRATION OF COST CONSCIOUSNESS.

THERE HAVE BEEN FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS WITH MR. HICKS CONCERNING THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES.

JOSEPH A. PROCACCINO
CHIEF/INTELLIGENCE WATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 056361

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS CALVIN W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 NOV 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FI/INT/IW	8. CURRENT STATION HQS		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☒ SPECIAL *(Specify)*: PROMOTION SUBMISSION

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*: 1 DECEMBER 1967-24 OCTOBER 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 PREPARES TD DISSEMINATIONS FROM CABLED FIELD INFORMATION REPORTS AND RELEASES THEM TO THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES, EXPEDITING THEIR DELIVERY BY ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION WHEN APPROPRIATE.	O S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 RELEASES UNHURRIED CABLES AS DISSEMINATIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, INTERPRETING BROAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM FI/D ON VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF CABLES DISSEMINATED.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 CONSULTS WITH AREA DIVISION OFFICERS DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS, AS NECESSARY, TO INSURE ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS WITH MINIMUM IMPAIRMENT TO THE VALUE OF THE INFORMATION REACHING POLICY LEVELS.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 ADVISES AND ASSISTS AREA DIVISION OFFICERS DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS IN THE PREPARATION OF TD DISSEMINATIONS BASED ON INFORMATION OTHER THAN THAT CONTAINED IN INCOMING CABLED FIELD REPORTS.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 SEEKS AND RESPONDS TO GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE MOST EFFECTIVE SERVICING OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, WITH CLANDESTINE SERVICES-ACQUIRED INFORMATION AND PROVIDES AFTER-HOURS ADVICE ON DISSEMINATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES TO THE CSDO UPON REQUEST.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 1 NOV FACILITATES AND MAINTAINS GOOD WORKING RELATIONS WITH CABLE SECRETARIAT AT ALL LEVELS TO EXPEDITE DISSEMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT REPORTS.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 6-65 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Nov 7 1 41 PM '68

MR. HICKS HAS COMPLETED HIS APPRENTICESHIP AND ADVANCED BY GRADUAL STAGES FROM ADEQUATE TO PROFICIENT TO THE POINT WHERE HIS OVERALL PARFORMANCE MUST BE DESCRIBED AS STRONG. HE BRINGS TO HIS WORK A FINE OPERATIONAL AND PARAMILITARY BACKGROUND AND HE HAS ADJUSTED QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY FROM THE OUTDOOR ACTIVE LIFE TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF BECOMING CHAIR-BORNE. HE IS PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE ON "PROBLEM" TYPE DISSEMINATIONS WHICH OFTEN INVOLVE TWO OR MORE AREA DIVISIONS. HE IS ALERT TO OPERATIONAL DETAILS WHICH OCCASIONALLY SLIP INTO THE INTELLIGENCE PORTIONS OF CABLED TRAFFIC. MR. HICKS IS A REAL PROFESSIONAL IN THE BEST SENSE OF THE WORD. HE IS CAREFUL, THOROUGH, AND VERY PERSISTENT IN MAKING CERTAIN THAT INTELLIGENCE IS HANDLED CORRECTLY. HE IS COURTEOUS AND PATIENT IN DEALING WITH PEOPLE. HE STANDS UP WELL UNDER PRESSURE AND IS COMPLETELY DEPENDABLE.

NEITHER COST CONSCIOUSNESS NOR SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES IS INVOLVED IN MR. HICKS' PRESENT POSITION.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
24 OCTOBER 1968	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
11		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
24 OCTOBER 1968	CHIEF, FI/INT/IW	Edward J. Carroll EDWARD J. CARROLL

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

On the basis of the fine performance of the IW as a group and the high regard for the judgment of the supervisor, I concur in the above evaluation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 OCTOBER 1968	DC/FI	Robert E. Andersen ROBERT E. ANDERSEN

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
056361

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS CALVIN W.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 3 Nov 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FI/INT/IW		8. CURRENT STATION HQS.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 JANUARY 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
[illegible] ~~5 June~~ - 31 DECEMBER 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
C - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE NOTE ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 15 Feb 69 (T)	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

MAIL ROOM

NOTE: MY ASSIGNMENT AS CHIEF/IW, EFFECTIVE 13 NOVEMBER 1967, HAS BEEN OF SUCH SHORT DURATION THAT I CANNOT AT THIS TIME ADD ANYTHING--EXCEPT THAT I AM IN GENERAL AGREEMENT THEREWITH--TO THE FITNESS REPORT FOR MR. HICKS SUBMITTED BY MY PREDECESSOR, MR. RICHARD A. FULLER, FOR THE PERIOD 5 JUNE THROUGH 12 NOVEMBER 1967.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 10 Jan 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 1½ MO.	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 12 JAN 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR CHIEF/IW	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE EDWARD J. CARROLL

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 1 2 JAN 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL CHIEF, FI/INT	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE ~~WALLACE S. DEUEL~~

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 056361

SECTION A **GENERAL**

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS CALVIN W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Nov 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE WATCH OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FI/INT/IW		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY	☐ INITIAL X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):	☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1968	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 5 June 1967 - 12 November 1967

SECTION B **PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 PREPARES TD DISSEMINATIONS FROM CABLED FIELD INFORMATION REPORTS AND RELEASES THEM TO THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES, EXPEDITING THEIR DELIVERY BY ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION WHEN APPROPRIATE.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 RELEASES UBHURRIED CABLES AS DISSEMINATIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, INTERPRETING BROAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM FI/D ON VARIOUS CATEGORES OF CABLES DISSEMINATED.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 CONSULTS WITH AREA DIVISION OFFICERS DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS, AS NECESSARY, TO INSURE ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS WITH MINIMUM IMPAIRMENT TO THE VALUE OF THE INFORMATION REACHING POLICY LEVELS.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 ADVISES AND ASSISTS AREA DIVISION OFFICERS DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS IN THE PREPARATION OF TD DISSEMINATIONS BASED ON INFORMATION OTHER THAN THAT CONTAINED IN INCOMING CABLED FIELD REPORTS.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 SEEKS AND RESPONDS TO GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE MOST EFFECTIVE SERVICING OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, WITH CLANDESTINE SERVICES-ACQUIRED INFORMATION AND PROVIDES AFTER-HOURS ADVICE ON DISSEMINATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES TO THE CSDO ON REQUEST.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 FACILITATES AND MAINTAINS GOOD WORKING RELATIONS WITH CABLE SECRETARIAT AT ALL LEVELS TO EXPEDITE DISSEMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT REPORTS.	RATING LETTER S

29 NOV 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

MR. HICKS' TENURE IN IW HAS BEEN TOO SHORT TO PERMIT A REAL EVALUATION OF HIS PERFORMANCE. NORMALLY, AN EXPERIENCED OFFICER REQUIRES THREE MONTHS ON-THE-JOB TRAINING PLUS ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT OF TIME ON SHIFT BEFORE HE IS READY TO COPE, WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT OR SUPERVISION, WITH ALL THE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THIS ASSIGNMENT. MR. HICKS JOINED THE UNIT ON 5 JUNE, COMPLETED A SHORTENED OJT PERIOD AND HAS BEEN ON SHIFT ONLY SINCE LATE SUMMER. HE HAS APPLIED HIMSELF WITH DILIGENCE TO LEARNING THE PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES OF TD DISSEMINATIONS FROM CABLED FIELD INFORMATION REPORTS. ALTHOUGH EXPERIENCED OPERATIONALLY, HE HAS QUITE NATURALLY LACKED THE DETAILED KNOWLEDGE THAT THIS JOB REQUIRES. HE HAS MADE VERY GRATIFYING PROGRESS, BUT HE STILL MUST MASTER KNOWLEDGE IN DEPTH PECULIAR TO THE IW FUNCTION; WHILE I HAVE NO DOUBTS THAT HE CAN HANDLE ROUTINE DISSEMINATION MATTERS WITHOUT MUCH DIFFICULTY, AND SOME "PROBLEM" DISSEMINATION CASES, HE HAS YET TO MEET A REAL CRISIS SITUATION WHEN HE IS ON DUTY BY HIMSELF. I THINK HE HAS MOVED FROM ADEQUACY OF PERFORMANCE TO PROFICIENCY--IT BEING VERY DIFFICULT TO DRAW A LINE BETWEEN THE TWO--AND HE IS LARGELY BEYOND THE POINT WHERE HE NEEDS CLOSE SUPERVISION. HE WILL PROBABLY BE A STRONG OFFICER GIVEN TIME. HE HAS ADAPTED WELL TO THE PRESSURES OF THIS ASSIGNMENT AND APPEARS TO HAVE THE PHYSICAL AND MENTAL STAMINA TO WITHSTAND ITS RIGORS. HE IS EXTREMELY CONSCIENTIOUS AND VERY ACCOMMODATING IN ACCEPTING SCHEDULE CHANGES NECESSITATED BY THE ILLNESS OR ABSENCE OF HIS FELLOW OFFICERS. HE GETS ALONG WELL WITH CABLE SECRETARIAT PERSONNEL, WITH WHOM IW MUST WORK VERY CLOSELY, BECAUSE OF AN OUTGOING AND FRIENDLY PERSONALITY. HE RESPONDS WELL TO DIRECTION. I AM SURE THAT HIS COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SMOOTH OPERATION OF THE OFFICE. THIS ASSIGNMENT CARRIES NO SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES AND DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY SIGNIFICANT DEMONSTRATION OF COST CONSCIOUSNESS.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 16 Nov 967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 NOV 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR CHIEF, FI/INT/IW	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Richard A. Fuller RICHARD A. FULLER
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE [illegible] NOV 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL CHIEF, FI/INT	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE WALLACE R. DEUEL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

(3-69)

MANAGERIAL GRID SEMINAR (50 hours) DATES: 2-7 February 1969

Student	: Calvin W. Hicks	Office	: FI
Year of Birth:	1924	Service Designation:	D
Grade	: GS-13	No. of Students	: 43
EOD Date	: July 1958		

COURSE OBJECTIVES AND METHOD

Course objectives are to aid participants to: learn the managerial theories contained in the Grid; understand their personal managerial styles in Grid terms; evaluate convictions about managerial values; develop team action skills; increase candidness of communication; strengthen the use of critique for problem-solving and learning; and acquire an appreciation of Organization Culture and Development.

The method of learning offers a challenge to all participants regardless of level or experience. A Grid Seminar is not "taught" in the usual sense. In Grid teams, participants solve complex management problems. Objective solutions are made available. Individual and team performance is repeatedly assessed. Various measuring instruments are used to evaluate effectiveness.

Critique sessions assist each participant to understand how he might change his own behavior to increase his problem-solving effectiveness. Thus managers are not told the best way to manage, but they learn by convincing themselves.

About twenty to thirty hours of study are completed as prework. Insights gained are deepened and personalized during the intensive 50-hour Seminar.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Charles O. Ford 10 FEB 1969
Chief Instructor Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 056361

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Hicks, Calvin W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH Nov 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3	8. CURRENT STATION HQ		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	✓	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 Jan 67

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1/66 - 12/66

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Headquarters case officer for all Station Bogota Communist party operations, including insurgency and other related matters.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Headquarters case officer for several operational support projects. DB/10	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

1 FEB 1967

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

NOTE: This report covers the period from 10 August 1966 to 15 January 1967 during which time Mr. Hicks worked on the Colombia Desk. This report is being submitted because of reassignment of the rating officer.

Although Mr. Hicks is an experienced officer with strong qualifications and abilities, it should be noted that some aspects of his present job were a new experience for him, since his past experience has been entirely in the PM field. However, Mr. Hicks adapted well and quickly to the new environment, showed a great deal of initiative and resourcefulness in familiarizing himself with the work, and by bringing sound operational and administrative experience to bear, carried out his duties in a thoroughly competent manner. He demonstrated uncommon ability to organize his work, anticipate problems or requirements, and take effective action promptly. In dealings with his associates he exercised a good balance of persuasiveness and friendliness which paid dividends in terms of getting a job done. He can be relied on absolutely to carry out a given task promptly and well.

I would welcome any occasion which permitted Mr. Hicks to work with me again.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS
1.	BY EMPLOYEE
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT
DATE 19 Jan 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Calvin W. Hicks

2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 17 Jan. 67	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WH/3/C	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE David L. Smock David Smock

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Hicks is a mature and thoughtful individual who made the switch from PM to FI activities at his own volition. He was originally scheduled for a field assignment to a WH Station in the fall of 1966, but for medical reasons will probably be staying at Headquarters for some time. While this restriction may limit his ability to get that feel for FI field operations which a Headquarters desk officer should have, he has previous field experience in a PM capacity to compensate for this.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 January 1967	Deputy Chief, WH/3	Jonathan G. Hanke

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAINING REPORT - LANGUAGE	COURSE TITLE SPANISH BASIC - [illegible]
INSTRUCTOR [illegible] Marquez	PROGRAM Daytime - Full-time
NO. OF STUDENTS / NO. OF HOURS 1000	DATE OF COURSE [illegible] - [illegible] (Special)*

STUDENT

NAME	YOB	EOD DATE	OFFICE	GS	SD
HICKS, CALVIN W.	[illegible]	[illegible]	WH	13	5

(See reverse side for definitions of proficiency levels)

LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY AT **ENTRY** INTO TRAINING ☒ INSTRUCTORS ESTIMATE ☐ OFFICIAL TEST

BEFORE	NO PROFICIENCY	SLIGHT	ELEMENTARY	INTERMEDIATE	HIGH
READING	X				
WRITING	X				
PRONUNCIATION	X				
SPEAKING	X				
UNDERSTANDING	X				

LANGUAGE TRAINING OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

The general aims of language training are attainment of proficiency in speaking, understanding, reading and writing. The specific objectives are (1) ability to produce and distinguish the sounds of the language; (2) ability to use a stock of basic sentences and expressions; (3) ability to recombine the elements of basic sentences and expressions and to apply them to new situations; (4) ability to comprehend the language spoken at normal speed in various situations; (5) ability to write and read the language commensurate with ability to speak.

Methods used in all courses stress oral drills and free conversation based at first on memorized material and, at a later stage, on varied reading materials. Written and oral tests are given at intervals. Listening to and recording on tapes in the Language Lab is essential for class preparation.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	EXCELLENT
ACHIEVEMENT	X		
ATTITUDE			X
ATTENDANCE	X		

LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY AT **COMPLETION** OF TRAINING ☒ INSTRUCTORS ESTIMATE ☐ OFFICIAL TEST

AFTER	NO PROFICIENCY	SLIGHT	ELEMENTARY	INTERMEDIATE	HIGH
READING			X		
WRITING		X			
PRONUNCIATION			X		
SPEAKING		X			
UNDERSTANDING			X		

Foreign Language Aptitude Test: 4

Credit: 800 hrs.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: W. Ray Rackley
W. RAY RACKLEY
SIGNATURE, HEAD OF DEPARTMENT, LT/LAS/OTR

03/17/66
DATE

FORM 5-65 2222 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(45)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
056361

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS, Calvin	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Nov 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF. DIV. BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C	8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1966	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1965 - 31 December 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Paramilitary Section in the Miami Operations Branch of WH/Cuba and senior Headquarters Case Officer on all PM operations conducted by the Miami Station.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reviews all PM and Maritime operational plans submitted for approval by the Miami Station and recommends approval, changes or disapproval.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares Agency papers requesting Special Group (303 Committee) approval of PM operations.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Briefs senior officials on status of PM plans, capabilities and operations with respect to Cuba.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Participates in technical planning by various Agency groups to provide technical guidance to Miami Station.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Works closely with Paramilitary and Maritime Branches of Miami Station on all problems regarding the PM effort directed against Cuba.	RATING LETTER P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

3 FEB 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

FEB 3 3 25 PM '66
MAIL ROOM

NOTE: Subject spent full time on Spanish language training from 1 Sept through 21 December 1965.

NOTE: The difference in the letter rating between this report and the preceding fitness report does not reflect in any way on Subject's performance but is due rather to a different rating scale used by the originators.

Subject turned in an excellent all-around performance as Chief of the Headquarters Paramilitary Section supporting Miami Station operations. He strives hard to do a good job and is most anxious to please his superiors. He is aggressive and conscientious in carrying out his functions; strong-willed and persistent in seeking to achieve his goals; straightforward but pleasant in dealing with colleagues and other Government officials; determined in resisting encroachments in his area of authority; and finally he is motivated by strong patriotic ideals.

He is well-informed and competent in paramilitary operations with a particular gift for ferreting out technical improvements and innovations, and bringing them to bear on operations. Finally, Subject adapts smoothly and efficiently to operational and policy changes affecting his programs.

(see Continuation Sheet)

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 Jan 1966	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
12		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 January 1966	C/WH/C/MO	Wa[illegible] T. C[illegible]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This officer is serious, hard working and dependable. Through a pleasant personality he commands the respect of his co-workers. Mr. Hicks is an unusually well qualified and competent officer, and is especially effective in the paramilitary field.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 January 1966	ADC/WH/C	John T. Flynn John T. Flynn

SECRET

Continuation Sheet **FITNESS REPORT** **HICKS, Calvin**

Section C (continued)

Subject has no significant weaknesses although there is still some room for improvement in making concise oral and written presentations. On every occasion, Subject has proven to be sound and wise in considering costs.

MAIL ROOM
FEB 3 3 52 PM '88
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 056361

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS, Calvin W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Nov 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer CH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SAS	8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See Instructions - Section C)*
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*: 1 January 64 - 31 December 64

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Is Chief of Paramilitary Section in the Miami Operations Branch (WH/SA) and is the senior Headquarters Case Officer on all PM operations conducted by the Miami Station. [illegible] PE 38	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reviews all PM and Maritime operational plans submitted for approval by the Miami Station and recommends approval, changes or disapproval. PG 40	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares Agency papers requesting Special Group (303) approval of PM operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Briefs senior officials on status of PM plans, capabilities and operations with respect to Cuba.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Participates in technical planning by various Agency groups to provide technical guidance to Miami Station. PE 38	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Works closely with Paramilitary and Maritime Branches of Miami Station on all problems regarding the PM effort directed against Cuba.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

19 FEB 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERS...

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

FEB 1965
MAIL ROOM

Mr. Hicks' primary responsibility has been to provide Headquarters support and guidance for the PM activities directed by the Miami Station against the Cuban target. Mr. Hicks has shown a high degree of professional judgment in carrying out his duties, and his judgment is respected by senior officials who are required to submit the PM programs for high-level approval. During operational phases of the PM programs, Mr. Hicks is frequently required to be on call to act on emergency situations on a 24-hour basis. He has accepted this responsibility willingly. He has consistently taken the initiative in investigating technical developments which might provide assistance to the Station in the conduct of PM operations. He now supervises two professional and two clerical employees in his Section and runs his unit smoothly with no discernible friction. He does a good job of briefing and indoctrinating junior officers. While his experience has been predominantly in the PM field, he has acquired FI experience in the last two years because of the unique nature of Cuban PM (FI) operations. In his consideration of budgetary matters, he has demonstrated an understanding of the need to curtail expenses, where feasible. I would be glad to have Mr. Hicks work with me at any future time.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
19 Jan 1965	[illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
24	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1-14-65	Chief, WH/SA, Miami Operations Branch	John S. Tilton

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur. Though I have reservations as to characterizing this officer as "Strong," (in point of intrinsic ability when compared to others who are clearly strong performers) such reservations are vague and impressionistic and not related to the actual performance and period to which this report is addressed.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 February 1965	Under Deputy Chief, WH(SA)	Edward A. Marelius

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
056361

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS CALVIN W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Nov 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SAS		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 JANUARY 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 JANUARY 1963 - 31 DECEMBER 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, PM Section, Miami Operations Branch of DDP/SAS and Senior Headquarters Case Officer for PM Operations conducted against target country. DE 23 DG 10	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Provision of operational guidance to field.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Review and comment on operational plans submitted by station.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 DF 31 Insuring that necessary training, logistics and technical support are provided for conduct of PM operations against the target country.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

10 MAR 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

MAR 6 4 25 PM '64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hicks' personal experience and long association with paramilitary operations give him high competence in this type of activity. Personnel who have official business with Mr. Hicks respect his knowledge and ability in this field. He assumes responsibility and can be counted on to get a job done with minimum supervision. When required, he works irregular hours without complaint. His review of operational plans submitted by the field is prompt, complete and professional. Mr. Hicks exerts maximum economy in the use of funds, equipment and personnel. He is consistently cooperative, even tempered and patient in the face of frustrations inherent in this type of work. He has established an excellent working relationship with his opposite numbers in the field.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4 March 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 4 March 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/SAS/MOB	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John S. Tilton

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above comments and rating.

DATE 5 March 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/SAS/MOB	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE ~~Col~~ Arthur A. Maloney

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 056361

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS Calvin W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Nov. 1924	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/Task Force W	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.			

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1962 to 31 December 1962

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Hqs. case officer for PM Operations conducted by field station against target ~~company~~. country DE 38 [illegible]-10	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Prepares requirements for and/or insures the provision of training, logistics and other support required for conduct of PM operations against target country. DE 31	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

15 FEB 1963 ✓

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hicks has an exceptional knowledge of and experience with the problems involved in the conduct and support of covert PM operations. He has shown a high degree of initiative in providing the training and other support required and in preparing material for staff presentation to higher echelons. His attention to detail is a strength in accomplishing his duties but he must try harder to overcome a tendency for too much detail in his staff communications, oral and written. His written work in particular shows a weakness in synthesizing which it is believed could be overcome by available courses of training. Mr. Hicks has also reached the point where he must broaden his outlook as to the wider political and operational implications of PM operations. To this end, it is intended that Mr. Hicks will attend the Inter-Agency Counterinsurgency Course in the near future. Under an experienced Chief of Operations, Mr. Hicks could handle PM operations at most Field Stations; in a major operation such as Viet Nam or Cuba, he could adequately handle a large segment such as PM Training, the handling of a large indigenous group, or the duties of Chief/PM Operations or Deputy Chief, PM. He would be a definite asset, in the field or at Hqs., in any type of task force operations.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 5 Feb. 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 2 Jan 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/SAS/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE C. W. Matt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The undersigned has been Mr. Hicks' supervisor for approximately six months, for the period ending December 31, 1962. Mr. Hicks is a highly motivated, sincere and capable person. He works well with others, and his knowledge and ability are recognized and respected. He assumes responsibility and can be counted on to get a job done without close supervision. He is capable of assuming greater responsibility. He is continuously striving for greater knowledge and broader fields of activity.

DATE 8 February 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/SAS/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE A. A. MALONEY

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

Clandestine Services Review No. 39 (64 hours, full-time)

4 - 15 February 1963

Student :	Calvin W. Hicks	Office :	SAS
Year of Birth:	1924	Service Designation:	D
Grade :	GS-13	No. of Students :	33
EOD Date :	Aug 1950		

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

This course aims to develop in the Clandestine Services officers and others recently returned from the field an up-to-date awareness of the role of CIA in the United States intelligence community, the relations of the DDI and DDR areas with the CS, and the support available from the offices of the DDS.

The course is presented by lectures given by CIA officials who are directly responsible for the missions, functions, programs, and services discussed. Each lecture is usually followed by a short question period. Approximately 10 per cent of the students' time is scheduled for reading pertinent up-to-date regulations and background summaries.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only; no attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

A. F. Schermerhorn

Augustus F. Schermerhorn
Chief Instructor

18 Feb 1963
Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FEB 1962

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	[illegible] CSPD

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) HICKS	(First) Calvin	(Middle) [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] Nov. 19[illegible]	3. SEX Male
4. GRADE GS-12				
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible], Br. 4

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1962	11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 Apr 61 To 31 Dec 61	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Hqs PM Case Officer for agents dispatched into the target country.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 General PM Operations Officer. DG-10	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Hqs PM Case Officer for all agent requests for air delivery into a denied area.	RATING NO. 6/7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepare contact reports and other reports to document & give background to agent operations.	RATING NO. 5/6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Handle and train certain select agents for dispatch into the target country. DA2C VE-3	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Hicks has an excellent understanding of clandestine operations and has demonstrated an outstanding ability to be flexible enough to cope with an ever changing program. He has performed his duties in a superior manner at all times, exercising mature judgement and firm action. He has continued to keep his objectivity and make a fine contribution to a Project that has had more than its share of frustrations. It is believed that Mr. Hicks should be considered for promotion to Grade GS-13 at the earliest opportunity. He has continuously demonstrated his ability to perform the functions and assume the responsibilities of a higher level in an outstanding manner. Mr. Hicks has worked long, irregular hours, and without complaint, to get the job done.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 13 Feb. 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Calvin W. Hicks

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☑ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (*Specify*):

DATE 13 Feb 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WH/4/PM/Ops	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE James S. Pekich

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☒ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The above ratings are based primarily on duties performed prior to the assumption, in November 1961, of present duties by the reviewing officer. Since November 1961, Mr. Hicks has shown superior ability to adapt himself to new and changing conditions and has performed well

~~(Continued)~~

DATE 14 FEB. 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH/4/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Charles W. Matt

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT - Calvin W. Hicks (Continued)

SECTION F

Comments of Reviewing Official (Continued)

in situations requiring individual initiative and imaginative thinking. I feel quite certain that Mr. Hicks has the capabilities and should earn a superior or outstanding rating in his next fitness report.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	056361

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS Calvin W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Nov. 19[illegible]	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Guerrilla Warfare Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE, Br. 4, D.C.

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From [illegible] To 31March61

SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Hqs PM case officer for all agent requests for air delivery into a denied area. DG 7	RATING NO. 6/7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepare contact reports and other related reports as required to properly document air and selected agent ops.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer and training officer for certain selected agents dispatched into the target country. DG 7	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Generally utility PM operations officer. DG 1C	RATING NO. 5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

MAY 17 11 38 AM '61
ROOM

Mr. Hicks has done a superior job in the performance of his duties. He has demonstrated unusually good judgement and has an excellent basic understanding of covert operations. During the period of this report, he has been able to utilize this knowledge in a real situation and has personally profited and greatly matured in the process, as well as making a fine contribution to the operation in a denied area. It is felt he is now ready to assume greater responsibilities in the Clandestine Services. Mr. Hicks worked long and irregular hours without complaint.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 12 May 1961
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Calvin W. Hicks

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: Seven months
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.
☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 10 May 1961
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Deputy Chief, WH/4/PM/Ops
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: ~~[illegible]~~ W. Kuzmuk

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE: 12 May 1961
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, WH/4/PM/Ops
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: James S. Pekich

SECRET

X SECRET RYBAT
(When Filled In)

1961

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HICKS CALVIN W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 3 Nov 1924	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DM	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE GUERILLA WAR OFF		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Cherat Base, Pakistan

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS					
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From 7 Jan 60 To 24 [illegible] 60	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief Ops officer for Base supporting Allied PM force	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 With Allied officers, prepares and supervises training of personnel clandestine P.	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 With allied officers, prepares plans for clandestine PM force.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Advises Allied Hqs in instructing and preparing plans for large semi-overt PM force	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 With allied officers, directs clandes/tine PM development	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Ops staff officer to Chief of Base	RATING NO. 7

DES 0

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify): Staff advice to Chief of Base							X

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET RYBAT (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 14 11 28 AM '61
MAIL ROOM

Subject is one of the most practical, hard-headed, down-t[illegible] persistent, and competent operations and operations staff officers this supervisor has ever known in our organization. He fights tenaciously and resourcefully in support of his staff advice to the time his chief makes a decision; from that ti[illegible]ts just as tenaciously and resourcefully to support the decision as he did previously for his position, whether or not the decision follows his advice. He gives 100% loyalty to his country, his organization, and his chief. His approach to plans and ops of the clandestine program has always been practical, and with the long-range requirements solidly in view. He is forceful and firm in dealing with allied opposite numbers, at the same time earning and retaining their respect. He is skillful and persistent in eliciting intelligence information. His development of contacts in the country assigned has been surprisingly good, even though outside his assigned responsibilities; in other words, he has constantly exercised initiative to place himself in a position to collect intelligence information should the requirement be placed on him. Altogether an outstandingly fine operations and staff officer whom I shall always welcome on my staff. His training, experience, and demonstrated ability in the field all well demonstrate his qualification to fill assignments in the next higher grade.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 22 August 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE S/Calvin W. Hicks

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE 20 August 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE S/William T. ~~XX~~ Hornaday

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL It is probably because of the isolated location of the base and the "togetherness" of its personnel but this rating officer as well as his predecessors have all rated on the high side. While my contacts with subject officer have been infrequent and any evaluation would largely be based on paper-work subject has originated my assessment is that subject is an average officer for his age, grade, and experience in his rather specialized field. In comparison with other officers I have known in this ~~(continued separate page)~~ kind of assignment as well as in others he is not yet ready for promotion to the next higher grade.

DATE 2 September 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE S/Williard Burke

SECRET

Pre 1960 Fitness Rpts

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Request for Disability Retirement Under the Provisions of the CIA Retirement and Disability System - Mr. Calvin W. Hicks

Based upon my review and evaluation of the evidence listed below, I hereby approve the request of Mr. Calvin W. Hicks for disability retirement under the provisions of the CIA Retirement and Disability System and, on the basis of medical evidence submitted in this case, I have determined that the disability of Mr. Hicks is permanent:

a. Supervisor's statement dated 30 October 1974 submitted in accordance with the provisions of paragraph f.(3) of HR 20-50.

b. Written report of the Board of Medical Examiners dated 20 December 1974 as submitted by the Chairman of that Board in accordance with the provisions of paragraph f.(4)(c) of HR 20-50.

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Return to ROB
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat/3257 (24 December 1974)

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

31 DEC 1974

Mr. Calvin W. Hicks
10207 Forest Avenue
Fairfax, Virginia 22030

Dear Mr. Hicks:

This is to inform you that the Director of Personnel has approved your request for disability retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System. On the basis of medical evidence, the Director of Personnel has determined that your disability is of a permanent nature; therefore, no further medical review of your case will be required.

Your annuity will commence retroactive to 28 December 1974, the day following the date on which your salary terminated. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first annuity check following completion of the administrative details required to effect your retirement.

Sincerely yours,

Ronald Gage
Chief
Retirement Affairs Division

Distribution:
0 - Addressee (CIA Letterhead)
1 - D Career Service
1 - OMS
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat/3257 (30 December 1974)

Executive Registry
75-344

27 JAN 1975

Mr. Calvin W. Hicks
10207 Forest Avenue
Fairfax, Virginia 22030

Dear Mr. Hicks:

As you bring to a close your active career of service to your country, I join your friends and colleagues in wishing you well in your retirement.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I extend to you my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
~~1~~ - OPF

Originator: Janney
Director of Personnel

OP/PAD/ROB/PJSeidel:ls (15 January 1975)

Mr. Calvin W. Hicks
10207 Forest Avenue
Fairfax, Virginia 22030

Dear Mr. Hicks:

For your information and convenience, an Annuity Statement has been forwarded to you. That statement relates basically to the payment for the period 28 December 1974 through 28 February 1975.

Enclosed is a retiree identification card. Before using the document, please sign your name in ink on the reverse side of the card.

This office is in receipt of your signed statement wherein you elected to receive payment under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) in lieu of a retirement annuity under the CIA Retirement and Disability System. Accordingly, your annuity ceased as of 28 February 1975 and you will henceforth receive benefits under FECA. An adjustment will be made in the payment issued by FECA retroactive to 28 December 1974. If, at a later date, the determination is made that you are not permanently nor totally disabled, your FECA payments might by reduced or stopped, at which time you may request the initiation of your retirement annuity.

If you elect to receive an annuity instead of benefits under FECA, you must so advise the Office of Federal Employees' Compensation, indicating the date of this election. In addition, you should send a copy of your correspondence with that office to the Agency.

[illegible] Sincerely yours,

1 - [illegible]
1 - [illegible]
1 - [illegible]
1 - [illegible]
[illegible]

Ronald Cage
Chief
Retirement Affairs Division

S E C R E T
(When Filled In)

27

EOD: [illegible] December 1974

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE

Name (Last-First-Middle)

HICKS, Calvin W.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks). continue to bank
✓	6. Only applicable to Retiree - Returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being.
	7. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	8. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee: Calvin W. Hicks

Date Signed: 26 Dec. 1974

Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code)

MR. CALVIN W. HICKS
10207 FOREST AVE.
FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA 22030

Correspondence

OVERT CORRESPONDENCE

☐ Overt ☐ Covert

S E C R E T

21 MAY 1975

Mr. Calvin W. Hicks
10207 Forest Avenue
Fairfax, Virginia 22030

Dear Mr. Hicks:

I am happy to send to you, under separate cover, your Agency Retirement Medallion. The Medallion is a tangible form of recognition and appreciation of your service to the Agency. It should serve as a lasting reminder of an honorable career, rewarding associations and the knowledge that you played your part in a vital activity.

Let me, therefore, add my congratulations and wish you the very best for the future.

Sincerely,

/ F. W. M. Janney

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

ENLISTED RECORD AND REPORT OF SEPARATION
HONORABLE DISCHARGE

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL: [illegible] W
2. ARMY SERIAL NO.: 37 563 694
3. GRADE: PVT
4. ARM OR SERVICE: [illegible]
5. COMPONENT: AUS
6. ORGANIZATION: 335th [illegible]
7. DATE OF SEPARATION: 28 Aug 45
8. PLACE OF SEPARATION: [illegible] Center [illegible] Colo
9. PERMANENT ADDRESS FOR MAILING PURPOSES: [illegible], S DAK
10. DATE OF BIRTH: 8 [illegible] 24
11. PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible]
12. ADDRESS FROM WHICH EMPLOYMENT WILL BE SOUGHT: SEE 9
13. COLOR EYES: [illegible]
14. COLOR HAIR: [illegible]
15. HEIGHT: 5'[illegible]
16. WEIGHT: 137 LBS.
17. NO. DEPEND.: [illegible]
18. RACE: WHITE | NEGRO | OTHER (specify)
19. MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE | MARRIED | OTHER (specify)
20. U.S. CITIZEN: YES | NO
21. CIVILIAN OCCUPATION AND NO.: Student [illegible] C-X

MILITARY HISTORY

22. DATE OF INDUCTION: 18 Jun 43
23. DATE OF ENLISTMENT:
24. DATE OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE: 2 Jul 43
25. PLACE OF ENTRY INTO SERVICE: Ft Snelling Minn.
SELECTIVE SERVICE DATA: 26. REGISTERED: YES | NO
27. LOCAL S.S. BOARD NO.: 1
28. COUNTY AND STATE: Walworth S Dak
29. HOME ADDRESS AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO SERVICE: See 9
30. MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY AND NO.: Mortar G[illegible] 1607
31. MILITARY QUALIFICATION AND DATE (i.e., infantry, aviation and marksmanship badges, etc.): [illegible] M1 [illegible] 4-19-44
32. BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS: Rhineland
33. DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS: NAME Ribbon 1 [illegible] Star Purple Heart Good Conduct Ribbon
34. WOUNDS RECEIVED IN ACTION: 30 Nov 44 Germany

35. LATEST IMMUNIZATION DATES

SMALLPOX	TYPHOID	TETANUS	OTHER (specify)
[illegible]	[illegible]	8-11-43	Typhus 9-17-44

36. SERVICE OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S. AND RETURN

DATE OF DEPARTURE	DESTINATION	DATE OF ARRIVAL
27 Sep 44	ETO	10 Oct 44
21 Feb 45	USA	6 Mar 45

37. TOTAL LENGTH OF SERVICE

CONTINENTAL SERVICE YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS	FOREIGN SERVICE YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
1	9	4	0	5	7

38. HIGHEST GRADE HELD: [illegible]
39. PRIOR SERVICE: None
40. REASON AND AUTHORITY FOR SEPARATION: [illegible] for discharge [illegible] 615-[illegible]
41. SERVICE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: None
42. EDUCATION (Years): Grammar 8 | High School 4 | College 2

PAY DATA

43. LONGEVITY FOR PAY PURPOSES: YEARS 2 | MONTHS 2 | DAYS 11
44. MUSTERING OUT PAY: TOTAL $ 100 | THIS PAYMENT $ 100
45. SOLDIER DEPOSITS: None
46. TRAVEL PAY: $
47. TOTAL AMOUNT, NAME OF DISBURSING OFFICER: [illegible]

INSURANCE NOTICE

IMPORTANT [illegible] TO THE [illegible] OF THE U.S. AND FORWARD TO COLLECTIONS SUBDIVISION, VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

48. KIND OF INSURANCE: N.S. Serv. ☒ | U.S. Govt. | None
49. HOW PAID: Allotment ☒ | Direct to V.A.
50. Effective Date of Allotment Discontinuance: 31 Aug 45
51. Date of Next Premium Due: 30 Sep 45
52. PREMIUM DUE EACH MONTH: $6.50
53. INTENTION OF VETERAN TO: Continue ☒ | Continue Only $ | Discontinue

54. RIGHT THUMB PRINT

55. REMARKS (This space for completion of above items or entry of other items specified in W. D. Directives)
[illegible]
[illegible] 21 Jun 43 to 1 Jul 43
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 2nd [illegible] 21 May 44

56. SIGNATURE OF PERSON BEING SEPARATED: [illegible] W. [illegible]
57. PERSONNEL OFFICER (Type name, grade and organization - signature): [illegible]

WD AGO Form 53-55
1 November 1944

This form supersedes all previous editions of WD AGO Forms 53 and 55 for enlisted persons entitled to an Honorable Discharge, which will not be used after receipt of this revision.

3. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION REGIONAL OFFICE COPY
(For Regional Office responsible for address shown in Item 9)

CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR DISCHARGE I, AR 615-361)

REPORT OF BOARD OF MEDICAL OFFICERS (NOT UNDER PROVISIONS OF SECTION [illegible])

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL HICKS, Calvin W.	2. ARMY SERIAL NUMBER 37 568 694	3. GRADE Pvt	4. DATE OF BOARD MEETING 24 Aug 45
5. LAST PERMANENT ORGANIZATION (Regiment and Arm or Service) Co M, 335th Inf, APO # 84		6. PLACE OF MEETING (Station or Hospital) Hosp Center SCU 1763 Camp Carson, Colorado	

7. AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF ALL INFORMATION OBTAINABLE AND A CRITICAL EXAMINATION, WE FIND THIS INDIVIDUAL UNFIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE BECAUSE OF:

(25) Feet, disorders of, incurred during service

Trench foot, bilateral, moderate. Incurred prior to 30 Nov 44 in Belgium after exposure to cold and wet weather. Disability manifested by pain and swelling of feet on prolonged weight bearing, excessive perspiration, and sensitivity to heat and cold.

	DATE OF ONSET OF DISEASE OR INJURY	DATE BECAME UNFIT FOR DUTY (Enter One Date)	AGGRAVATED BY ACTIVE SERVICE (1)		INCURRED WHILE AWOL (2)		EXISTED PRIOR TO ENTERING INTO SERVICE (3)		INCIDENT TO SERVICE (4)		INCURRED IN PRIVATE AVOCATION (5)		DUE TO OWN MISCONDUCT (6)		IN LINE OF DUTY (7)	
			YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
a.	Nov 44	30 Nov 44		x		x		x	NOT REQUIRED					x	x	
b.																
c.																
d.																

REMARKS (Identify by Box Number)

Incurred in authorized military activity - Yes

X-RAY OF CHEST HAS BEEN TAKEN WITHIN 90 DAYS AND REPORT IS FILED IN CURRENT CLINICAL RECORDS

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE FINDINGS, WE RECOMMEND THAT INDIVIDUAL BE DISCHARGED

8. PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE (Sign Original only)	9. RECORDER'S SIGNATURE (Sign Original only)	10. THIRD MEMBER'S SIGNATURE (Not Required)
11. TYPED NAME AND GRADE WILLIAM H. GUTHRIE Capt, MC	12. TYPED NAME AND GRADE AARON TAYLOR 1st Lt, MC	13. TYPED NAME AND GRADE (Required) JAMES F. LYMAN Capt, MC
APPROVAL: C. O. HOSPITAL	APPROVAL: DISCHARGE AUTHORITY	APPROVAL:
14. DATE	15. DATE 25 Aug 45	16. DATE
17. SIGNATURE (Sign Original only)	18. SIGNATURE (Sign Original only)	19. SIGNATURE (Sign Original only)
20. TYPED NAME AND GRADE	21. TYPED NAME AND GRADE By Order of Colonel FOX: FRED P. GRAHAM, 1st Lt, MAC Registrar	22. TYPED NAME AND GRADE

TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL — HEADQUARTERS Hosp Center, Cp Carson, Colo. — DATE 28 Aug 45

23. DATE INDIVIDUAL ENTERED ACTIVE SERVICE 2 Jul 43	24. PRIOR SERVICE, IF ANY (YEARS / MONTHS) None	25. DATE OF LAST DISCHARGE, IF ANY	26. IF ABSENT FROM UNIT WHEN DISEASE WAS CONTRACTED OR INJURY RECEIVED, STATE CAUSE, PLACE, AND DATE

27. DATE INDIVIDUAL WAS DISCHARGED 28 Aug 45	28. DISCHARGED AT Cp Carson, Colo.	29. HONORABLY ✓X	30. OTHER THAN HONORABLE (state)	31. HAS INDIVIDUAL MADE PENSION CLAIM YES X NO	32. HAS INDIVIDUAL BEEN ON FOREIGN DUTY? YES X NO	33. DOES SERVICE RECORD SHOW PARTICIPATION IN ACTIONS, BATTLES, ENGAGEMENTS OR OTHER [illegible] YES X NO NO S/R

PERMANENT ADDRESS FOR MAILING PURPOSES (OR LEGAL GUARDIAN OR VETERANS' FACILITY IF FURTHER CARE REQUIRED)

34. STREET OR R.F.D. NUMBER, CITY, COUNTY, AND STATE

Java, Walworth County, South Dakota ✓

INDIVIDUAL WAS GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO APPLY FOR PENSION — INDIVIDUAL WAS FURNISHED WITH A DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE

35. TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER REID D. [illegible], 2nd Lt, MAC Asst Chief, Mil Pers Br	36. PERSONNEL OFFICER'S SIGNATURE (This signature on copies two and three will serve as certification of true copy)

INSTRUCTIONS: Prepare original and two copies for: 1. The Adjutant General (in Service Record), 2. The Veterans Administration, 3. Discharging organization

W.D., A.G.O. FORM NO. 40 20 MAY 1944 SUPERSEDES W.D., A.G.O. FORM NO. 40, 31 AUGUST 1943, WHICH WILL NOT BE USED AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS REVISION.

10 APR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, DDP/QSI - HMA Panel

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of
Quality Step Increase -
Calvin W. Hicks

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. As this award is designed to encourage excellence by recognizing and rewarding the employee, may I ask that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

Robert [illegible] Freeman
Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

Distribution:w
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF - HICKS
1 - D/Pers Chrono
1 - C/SPD
1 - CSPS
OP/SPD/RLStaten:whg (6 Apr 72)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

17 March 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA : DDP/OP

SUBJECT : Request for Quality Step Increase
Mr. Calvin W. Hicks

1. The GS-13 Evaluation Board for FY 1972, having carefully reviewed the performance of all officers in grade GS-13 according to the standards of HR 20-31a(3)(b), recommends Mr. Calvin W. Hicks for a Quality Step Increase.

2. Mr. Hicks performed in a superior manner as a paramilitary officer during the early years of his career, overseas and in Headquarters. A medical hold on overseas duty led to his assignment in 1967 to the Intelligence Watch/FI Staff where he has remained up to the present. Mr. Hicks has received overall ratings of "strong" from 1968 through 1971, with his performance characterized as exceptionally proficient. Of the seven officers with whom he serves on a rotating basis, four are GS-14's. The FI Staff has recommended Mr. Hicks for promotion in 1968, 1969, 1971 and 1972, with a recommendation for QSI in 1970. None of these recommendations were approved.

3. The Board has noted that Mr. Hicks plans to retire in 1974 at the age of 50. In view of the very high regard in which he is held by the FI Staff; his record of sustained superior performance and his high dedication to the Agency, the Board recommends recognition in the form of a Quality Step Increase for Mr. Hicks.

Arthur E. Callahan

Arthur E. Callahan
Chairman
GS-13 Evaluation Board (FY 72)

CONCUR:

Mar 24 72
Chief, SOD Date

Cord Meyer Jr. 31 Mar 72
A Deputy Director for Plans Date

APPROVED:

for Director of Personnel Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444i, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
056361	Hicks, Calvin W.	8 Nov 24	D	GS-13

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (*Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried*) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (*Last*) (*First*) (*Middle*) (*Maiden*)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (*City, State, Country*)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-68 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

71 AUG END

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY: CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED		
			☐	RESIDENT
			☐	AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE 8 Jan 1971

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Calvin W. Hicks

SECRET

FILE COPY OF STANDARD FORM 56
"AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS—
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM"

on file with the Retirement Operations Branch,

Office of Personnel (x3257).

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) HICKS, CALVIN WILSON 056361	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) NOV. 8, 1924
	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 504 16 4918
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
Calvin W. Hicks

DATE
14 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1965
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-102

14-00000

SECRET

31 AUG 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Expression of Appreciation and Commendation for the Intelligence Watch.

1. I wish to express my appreciation and personal praise for the performance of the FI/Intelligence Watch during the height of the recent Middle East crisis. I am informed that the Arab-Israeli war and its aftermath were primary factors which resulted in the Watch processing for the month of June the highest number of disseminations since its establishment. The Watch was particularly helpful to this Division in ensuring that the dissemination of the reporting on the Middle East situation was not only rapidly disseminated locally to the Intelligence Community but also promptly relayed to interested overseas military commands and CIA field stations.

2. The judgment shown by Watch officers, often under trying circumstances, was invariably sound and helpful. The worth of the Watch, particularly during the crisis situation, was once more demonstrated to all of us in NE Division.

JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
Chief, Near East and
South Asia Division

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - Addressee
1 - C/NE
1 - C/FI/INT
1 - C/FI/INT/IW
1 - Official Copy

CALVIN HICKS

CNE/INTEL:DLConnelly:vb/5425 (30 August 1967)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE: LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5	6-23			24-25
56361	HICKS	CALVIN	W	50

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		39-41
	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		
	1	08	27	58				CHERAT	555

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		39-41
	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: IN 33511

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 08/27/58

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
☒	FINANCE DIVISION	16 SEPTEMBER '58	Agnes E. McMillen

FORM 6-58 1451a

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

560282 MAY 4 65

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
056361	HICKS	Calvin	W.	49 ~~WH~~

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* X 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39	211	40-42
	2	04	01	65	04	06	65	~~WH-(San Juan,~~ PR)	

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER WH-881-65		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
4/1/65 @ 1045 - 4/6/65 @ 1900

REMARKS

No leave

PREPARED BY			REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
X	C & L DIVISION	X	DATE	SIGNATURE
	C & T DIVISION		4/23/65	dsv

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	7-24			25-26
56361	HICKS,	CALVIN	W.	58

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		
	1				04	25	60	PAKISTAN	555

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☑	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
C HER 1081	SEPT 5 1960

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION	☑	SIGNATURE
☑ FINANCE DIVISION	DATE 9/20/	Harrison L. Fahrner

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET

Recorded by
CSPD

9 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, NE

FROM : William T. Hornaday, formerly COB Cherat

SUBJECT : Letter of Commendation for Calvin W. Hicks

1. This is a letter of commendation for Calvin W. Hicks for the period of 7 January - 25 August 1960. During this time he served under my command on the staff of ACLEVER Project. His assignment was Operations Officer on the ACLEVER staff, and Chief Operations Officer for the United States element of the Joint Operations Staff, serving opposite a like officer from the Allied service.

2. Hicks at all times was an outstanding member of the staff. He was zealous in his efforts to improve operational techniques, to increase operational assets, and to insure that those assets were of trustworthy nature and were highly trained and qualified. His foremost thoughts were always centered on what was best for the interests of the United States. He was practical, unremitting in his efforts, and hard-headed in his analysis of how best to deal with the Allied partners for the best interests of the United States. He was a sound staff officer, offering sound operational advice to his commander, and always submitting staff work in completed form. After giving strong support to the courses of action recommended by him, he never failed to give complete support to his commander after a decision was made, even though it controvened the course he favored.

3. Mr. Hicks has been a GS-12 since November 1956. He has amply demonstrated his complete qualifications to perform the duties of the next higher grade, and it is my conviction he has earned the right to early consideration for promotion.

4. I shall always welcome any opportunity that permits Mr. Hicks to serve with me again.

William T. Hornaday

SECRET

SECRET

25 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM : Chief, WH/4/Support Staff

SUBJECT : Premium Pay

Due to the recent reduction in heavy workload requirements, the following employees are no longer entitled to Premium Pay. It is requested that this entitlement be discontinued effective C.O.B. 27 May 1961. Their salaries are chargeable to Allotment #535-5000-8021.

BLAIR, William E.
DOUGLAS, Jesse S.
HICKS, Calvin W.
ISAMINGER, John W.
KUZMUK, Walter P.
NAPOLI, Louis P.
SEEHAFER, Ralph G.
SILEO, Anthony L.
WARNER, Thomas D.
WHEDBEE, Robert E.

EESchmidt/fr
Chief, WH/4/Support

Distribution:
2 - Chief, Finance Division (ea. employee)
2 - Director of Personnel (ea. employee)

SECRET

S E C R E T

11 January 1961

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Additional Compensation in Lieu of Overtime Payment

REF: Memo dated 11 January 1961 from SSA/DDS to DD/S, approved by DD/S, Subject: "Employee Benefits for JMATE Personnel"; and Memo dated 22 December 1960 from ADD(P) to Deputy Director (Plans), Subject: "Employee Benefits for Personnel Assigned to JMATE".

In accordance with referenced memoranda, it is requested that the personnel listed below be authorized to receive additional compensation effective 8 January 1961, at the rate of 15% of their respective rates of basic annual compensation (but not to exceed the minimum ~~maximum~~ rate for a GS-9) in lieu of payment of the regular overtime rates for irregular, unscheduled and frequent overtime.

NAME	EMPLOYEE Serial No.	TITLE	SALARY
~~ESTERLINE, Jacob D.~~	~~56788~~	~~OPS Officer~~	~~$14,055~~
WHEDBEE, Robert E.	509360	OPS Officer	12,990
DOUGLAS, Jesse S.	229350	OPS Officer	14,055
PHILLIPS, David A.	654800	OPS Officer	12,730
[illegible]LI, Louis F.	012616	OPS Officer	12,210
KUZMUK, Walter P.	064736	OPS Officer	12,730
PETERS, John D.	56093	OPS Officer	11,675
WARNER, Thomas D.	59794	Instructor (OPS)	9,955
HINKS, Calvin W.	56361	Guerrilla Warfare Officer	9,475
RILEY, James	60471	OPS Officer	9,060
SILBO, Anthony L.	559127	OPS Officer	7,320
BLAIR, William S.	60218	Instructor (OPS)	8,955
KENDALL, Sidney S.	059517	OPS Officer	11,155
REYNOLDS, Robert	55407	OPS Officer	12,470
SPARKS, Ernest W.	62285	Instructor (OPS)	12,470
BROWN, Fravel S.	61901	OPS Officer	9,475
CARTWRIGHT, Cecil J.	57840	OPS Officer	9,215
CHELLIN, Samuel J.	56622	ADM Officer	7,820
MORALES, David S.	63389	OPS Officer	12,210
ZENT, William [illegible].	559198	OPS Officer	9,215

All the above employees are on Allotment 1535-5000-8021.

APPROVED:
Emmett D. Echols
EMMETT D. ECHOLS

J C King
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

S E C R E T

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

7 x R

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) HICKS (First) CALVIN (Middle) WILSON

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: JAVA, S. DAK.

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: JAVA, S. DAK.

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE: PETERSBURG VIRGINIA — DATE OF MARRIAGE: 29 Dec. 1951

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE: — DATE OF DECREE:

IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED: — DATE SPOUSE DIED:

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE CATHERINE LOUISE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) JAVA, S. DAK.	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	AGE
THERESA LOUISE	JAVA, S. DAK.	FE	5
MICHAEL CALVIN		M	4
MARY CATHERINE		FE	2
LISA ANNE		FE	9 mos.
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian) GEORGE W. HICKS	ADDRESS JAVA, S. DAK.	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian) ANGELINE JOAN	ADDRESS JAVA, S. DAK.	TELEPHONE NUMBER	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES?
GEORGE HICKS (Father)

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr, ~~Mrs, Miss~~) (Last-First-Middle): HICKS, GEORGE WILSON — RELATIONSHIP: FATHER

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): BOX H, JAVA, S. DAK. — HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER:

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: BOX H JAVA, S. DAK. — BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☒ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☒ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☒ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JAN 57

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

I have a safety deposit Box with instructions concerning my personal and financial affairs listed in the First National Bank in Mobridge, S. Dak.

Only GEORGE N. HICKS (father)
Angeline J. Hicks (mother)
Charles L. HICKS (Uncle)
have access to this box.

SIGNED AT Washington, D.C.	DATE 14 July 1958	SIGNATURE Calvin W. Hicks

CONFIDENTIAL

Various pre 1960
personnel documents
i.e. applications, etc

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Goodpasture, Ann L.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 10 Feb 1944 – 28 June 1973

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: Office of Personnel

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
6/26/78	6/28/78	DAN HArdwAy	Dan Hardway

ENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

178207

GOODPASTURE, ANN L. TERMINATED 57303 D

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 June 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER	057303 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	GOODPASTURE, Ann L. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	Disability Retirement Under CIA Retirement & Disability System FWP. ESL
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 06 DAY 30 YEAR 73 COB
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	Regular
6. FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA	3227-0183 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	Public Law 88-643 Section 231
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDO/CI Staff Development Complement
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	Ops Officer
12. POSITION NUMBER	9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	13 7
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 23,642 ✓

18. REMARKS

Subject has been on Extended sick leave & Disability retirement since 14 June 1972

cc: Finance and Security

Janet Roth
DDO/Pe

George Mott
ADDO/PER

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	M. D. McCallum M. D. McCallum, CI Staff
DATE SIGNED	6/28/73
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	
DATE SIGNED	6-29-73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	45
20. EMPLOY CODE	40
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	
22. STATION CODE	
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. HOOTRS CODE	1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	11 28 18
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC 2-ORGN 3-FICA 5-NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	0, HE, 00, 0, 0
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO DA YR	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT)	
36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	
37. LONG. COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP) CODE	
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0-WAIVER 1-REG 2-REG/OPT 3-INELIGIBLE) / HEALTH INS CODE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES 2-NO) / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES 2-NO) / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	7-5-73 T ~~05 JUL 1973~~
46. O P APPROVAL	
DATE APPROVED	7/5/73

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREV (4)

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY: 01-0332

EX-2 APDII

Executive Registry
[illegible]

4 September 1973

Miss Ann L. Goodpasture
4200 Cathedral Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20016

Dear Miss Goodpasture:

As you bring to a close your active career of service to your country, I join your friends and colleagues in wishing you well in your retirement.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I extend to you my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: /s/ John F. Blake
Director of Personnel

OP/RAD/ROB/WFM/lks

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

OPF

6-30-73

6 September 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OPS

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Career Intelligence Medal
for Miss Ann L. Goodpasture

The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Career Intelligence Medal has been approved for Miss Ann L. Goodpasture. You are requested to inform her of the award and of the security considerations contained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security. Arrangements for presentation may be made with the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 3645, room 412, Magazine Building.

/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Att

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF w/forms 382 & 600
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

23-3474
Off

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

DATE: 14 August 1973

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO. 057303	NAME (Last-First-Middle) GOODPASTURE, Ann L.	BIRTHYEAR 1918	SEX F	TYPE EMPLOYEE Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DO/CI	SD D	SCHEDULE GS	GRADE 13	STATION

BE AWARDED

Career Intelligence Medal

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD September 1947 - June 1973

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Miss Ann L. Goodpasture is hereby awarded the Career Intelligence Medal in recognition of her exceptional achievement for more than 25 years. A charter member of the Central Intelligence Agency, Miss Goodpasture has excelled as an operations officer both overseas and in headquarters. Her performance throughout her career has been outstanding and marked by a high degree of competence and unusual dedication to duty. Miss Goodpasture has contributed substantially to the mission of the Agency, reflecting credit on her and the Federal service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by ADD/O on 2 August 1973)

APPROVED /s/ W. E. Colby	SIGNATURE /s/ John F. Blake
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD John F. Blake
4 SEP 1973	SIGNATURE /s/ R. L. Austin, Jr
DATE	TYPED NAME OF RECORDER R. L. Austin, Jr.

FORM 552 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4)

OPF

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A — PERSONAL DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.: 057303
2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle): Goodpasture, Ann Lorene
3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
4. GRADE: GS-13
5. SD: D
6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: DDO/CI Staff
7. OFFICE EXT. (If Hqs):
8. STATION: ☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD (Specify location)
9. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code): 4200 Cathedral Ave., Wash., D.C.
10. HOME PHONE: 244-1657
11. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED: U.S. Birth
12. RECOMMENDED AWARD: Career Intelligence Medal
13. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT: 23 October 1973
14. POSTHUMOUS: ☐ YES ☒ NO
15. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: C. H. Goodpasture
16. RELATIONSHIP: Father
17. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code): Livingston, Tenn.
18. HOME PHONE:

SECTION B — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF HAZARD

19. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

20. FULL NAME	21. ORGN. TITLE	22. GRADE	23. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

24. FULL NAME	25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

26. LOCATION:
27. INCLUSIVE DATES:
28. TIME OF DAY:
29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED:
30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED:
31. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO
32. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION C — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT, SERVICE, OR PERFORMANCE

33. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☐ YES ☐ NO
34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: Headquarters
35. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location): DDO/WH
36. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSIGNED POSITION:

Operations officer completing 30 years of service in the Agency and its predecessor organizations.

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED: 1947 - 1973
38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☒ YES ☐ NO
39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

PERSONNEL WHO ASSISTED OR CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE

40. FULL NAME	41. ORGN. TITLE	42. GRADE	43. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT
Mr. Winfield Scott		GS-18	Mexico City

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE PERFORMANCE

44. FULL NAME	45. TYPE OF AWARD
Mr. Winfield Scott	

FORM 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
9-68

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION D NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act. Enclose unclassified citation.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. (Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C, include dates of assignment and relief.) What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation. Enclose unclassified citation.

Miss Goodpasture has been on sick leave since July 1972 awaiting medical retirement in October 1973. She is a charter member of the Agency, having entered on duty from OSS and its successor organizations. Her career is highly distinguished by virtue of consistently strong to outstanding performance, all of which is fully documented.

In addition to several staff and desk assignments, Miss Goodpasture served in support of the successful coup against the communist government in Guatemala in 1954 and completed tours of duty in Bombay, Monterrey and Mexico City. Undoubtedly, the high point of her career occurred during her service in Mexico City from 1957 through 1970, where she served as a "trouble-shooting" case officer for the incomparable Winfield Scott (deceased), who was then the Chief of Station. Mr. Scott, a stern taskmaster, described Miss Goodpasture over these years as "intelligent, hard-working, conscientious, versatile, valuable and unquestionably one of the most competent CI/CE officers he ever had the privilege of working with." Miss Goodpasture's fitness reports were totally consistent with this appraisal, and were characterized by outstanding ratings. In her final assignment prior to acute medical problems, she worked for the CI Staff (October 1970-October 1971), earning the following remarks from her supervisor: "...I venture to rate her overall performance, thirty years of it, as Outstanding. Ann is one of the tough warp-threads on which this organization is woven, and when she retires the fabric of this organization will be weakened." The reviewing official agreed with the above and recorded his hope that Miss Goodpasture get the official Agency recognition she so richly deserves for the many years she has made substantive

☒ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES (List individually) IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR PERFORMANCE. ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESSES OR INDIVIDUALS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY David A. Phillips	48. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION Chief, WH Division	49. DATE 21 JUN 1973

SECTION E RECOMMENDATION FORWARDED THROUGH OFFICIALS CONCERNED FOR THEIR INFORMATION

50. HEAD OF D CAREER SERVICE (Career service of nominee)	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item #52	DATE
51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item #52	DATE
52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	TITLE AND SIGNATURE for David H. Blee Deputy Director for Operations	DATE 2 AUG 1973

SECRET

[illegible] C-Non Money

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 October 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 057303
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): GOODPASTURE, Ann L.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Extended Sick Leave / Disability Retirement
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 23 YEAR 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3227-0183-0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/CI Staff Development Complement
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 22,487
18. REMARKS

X other

NTE: 10-23-73

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: McCallum
M. D. McCallum, CI Staff
DATE SIGNED: 10/10/72

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED: 12 Oct 1972

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 31
20. EMPLOY CODE: 40
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51997 ALPHABETIC CI
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 28 YR. 18
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO 10 DA. 23 YR. 73
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: SL
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP DATE: MO DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV, TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-17-72
46. O P APPROVAL: R Dutt
DATE APPROVED: 10/17/72

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

19 OCT 1972

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ______________ *(Date)* FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE—	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)*

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a — The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains *only* to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 — "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular
Part Time
Temporary
Temporary-Part Time
Summer
Detail Out
Detail In
WAE
Consultant
Military

Item 9 — "Organizational Designations" should show *all* levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE: Major Component *(Director, Deputy Director, etc.)*
Office, Major Staff, etc.
Foreign Field or U.S. Field *(if pertinent)*
Division or Staff *(subordinate to first line)*
Branch
Section
Unit

Items 11 and 15 — "Position Title" and "Occupational Series" should be the standard abbreviated title and corresponding occupational series in Handbook of Official Occupational Titles and Codes for the duties actually to be performed by the employee. If different from the title and series of the position occupied as shown on the most current edition of the Position Control Register or Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization, explain under Item 18—Remarks.

Item 18b — Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, *the gaining Career Service should approve* and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING— The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel *through* the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1; which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of Finance, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

7/25/72 **REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION**

DATE PREPARED: 12 July 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 057303

2. NAME (Last–First–Middle): GOODPASTURE, Ann L.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment ← Transfer to [illegible]

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 23 YEAR 72

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: XX CF TO V

	V TO V		V TO CF
XX	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3227-0183

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/CI Staff
Development Complement

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 ~~6~~ 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: 22,487 ~~$21,862~~

18. REMARKS

FROM: Pos. No. 0073

NOTE: Subject will be on CIARDS Disability Retirement until 23 October 1973

CCS CIA W/R

CCS/PCS/L

cc: Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: CI Staff

DATE SIGNED: 7/12/72

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Jay R [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 13 July 1972

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16

20. EMPLOY CODE: 18

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31997 ALPHABETIC [illegible]

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOUSING CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 28 YR. 18

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—CIARDS 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 07-20-72

46. O P APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 7/20/72

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ______________ FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:
(Date)

JUL 14 9 55 PM '72

JUL 26 11 [illegible]

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE—	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)*

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a — The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains *only* to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 — "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular	Summer	WAE
Part Time	Detail Out	Consultant
Temporary	Detail In	Military
Temporary-Part Time		

Item 9 — "Organizational Designations" should show *all* levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE:
Major Component *(Director, Deputy Director, etc.)*
  Office, Major Staff, etc.
Foreign Field or U.S. Field *(if pertinent)*
  Division or Staff *(subordinate to first line)*
    Branch
      Section
        Unit

Items 11 and 15 — "Position Title" and "Occupational Series" should be the standard abbreviated title and corresponding occupational series in Handbook of Official Occupational Titles and Codes for the duties actually to be performed by the employee. If different from the title and series of the position occupied as shown on the most current edition of the Position Control Register or Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization, explain under Item 18—Remarks.

Item 18b — Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, *the gaining Career Service should approve* and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING— The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel *through* the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1; which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of Finance, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check)	☐ CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION	SS NUMBER
	☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION	EMPLOYEE NUMBER
	☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)	ID CARD NUMBER

DATE:

FILE NO.:

ATTN: [illegible]

REF: [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:
☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ________	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ________ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
SUBMIT FORM 3254 ________ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ________ HOSPITALIZATION CARD
SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐	
SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TE&SVC
COPY 5 - OF
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 12-71 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

EXPERIENCE

Employed by Central Intelligence Agency and World War II predecessor agencies from 1942 - 1972. Served as clerk, administrative assistant, photo technician, research analyst, and intelligence officer. Assignments were in Washington, D.C., the Far East, and Latin America.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) GOODPASTURE, ANN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employers' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks). CONTINUE DEPOSIT TO BANK
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee Ann L. Goodpasture	Date Signed 7 June 72
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) 4200 Cathedral Ave N.W. #412A Wash. D.C. 20016	Correspondence ☒ Overt ☐ Covert

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

12 JUN 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR : Miss Ann L. Goodpasture

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Disability Retirement

1. This is to inform you that the Director of Personnel has approved your request for disability retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System. On the basis of medical evidence, the Director of Personnel has determined that your disability is of a permanent nature; therefore, no further medical review of your case will be required.

2. Your retirement will become effective 23 October 1973, the expiration date of your accrued sick leave and excess annual leave. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative details required to effect your retirement.

/s/ B. DeFelice
B. DeFelice
Deputy Director of Personnel
for Special Programs

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - OMS
1 - CS Career Service
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/WFMadigan:jat/[illegible] 1972)

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

5 JUN 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Request for Disability Retirement Under the Provisions of the CIA Retirement and Disability System - Miss Ann L. Goodpasture

Based upon my review and evaluation of the evidence listed below, I hereby approve the request of Miss Ann L. Goodpasture for disability retirement under the provisions of the CIA Retirement and Disability System and, on the basis of the medical evidence submitted in this case, I have determined that the disability of Miss Goodpasture is permanent:

a. Supervisor's statement dated 14 March 1972 submitted in accordance with the provisions of paragraph h. (3) of HR 20-50.

b. Written report of the Board of Medical Examiners dated 25 May 1972 as submitted by the Chairman of that Board in accordance with the provisions of paragraph h. (4)(c) of HR 20-50.

/s/Harry B. Fisher

Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Return to ROB
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/WFMadigan:jat/3257 (31 May 1972)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED 23 June 1970

1 SERIAL NUMBER 057303	2 NAME (Last–First–Middle) GOODPASTURE, ANN L.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 10 DAY 15 YEAR 70	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular

6 FUNDS	☒	V TO V	☐	V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE [illegible]-0170 ~~0333-0170~~	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
		CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/CI Staff Operations Group WE Branch	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE Ops Officer (14)	12 POSITION NUMBER 0073	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13 6	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 19,555

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/Dev. Comp/Pos. No. 9997

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 6/30
DB 10121

Coordination: ~~Henry L. Berthold~~
C/WH/Personnel

CC: Finance and Security

Home Base: WH

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL CI STAFF	DATE SIGNED 6-23-70	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	31400	CI	95013		1	11 [illegible] 18		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OHGN 3—FICA 5—NONE	30 CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32 MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV, TEMP	38 CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVER 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	43 CODE	43 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	44 CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION FROM. WH. 10-14-70	46 OP APPROVAL C. Beck	DATE APPROVED 10-20-70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

31 MAR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Board of Medical Examiners

SUBJECT : Request for Medical Evaluation - Miss Ann L. Goodpasture

1. Miss Ann L. Goodpasture, a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System, has applied for disability retirement under the provisions of Section 231 of Public Law 88-643, Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees. It is requested that a medical examination be arranged for Miss Goodpasture and that a written report of the Board of Medical Examiners as prescribed in paragraph h (4) of HR 20-50 be submitted to this office.

2. Miss Goodpasture plans to remain on duty pending a decision on her application for retirement.

3. Attached is a copy of the Supervisor's Statement, a copy of the Application for Disability Retirement, and a private physician's statement.

Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

Attachments:
a. Supervisor's Statement
b. Application
c. Private Physician's Statement

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/W ladigan:jat/3257 (28 March 19)

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

8 MAR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR : Miss Ann L. Goodpasture

THROUGH : Administrative Officer, CI Staff

SUBJECT : Application to Purchase Service Credit

1. This is to advise you that your application to purchase service credit under the CIA Retirement and Disability System has been processed. The period of your service which is not covered by retirement deductions and the amount due to cover this period are as follows:

Redeposit Period	Total Amount Due
11 Mar 1942 - 8 Sep 1943	$241.00

2. Postponing payment will cause the amount due to increase because of additional interest at the rate of 3 per cent compounded annually. However, so long as the amount is not paid, you have the use of this money for other purposes. You may postpone payment until you retire.

3. If the redeposit is not made you will receive no credit in the computation of annuity for the period of service covered by the refund. This usually results in a sharp reduction in the amount of your annuity.

4. If you wish to make payment for the redeposit period, please make your check payable to the Treasurer of the United States and forward it to the Chief, Retirement Operations Branch, 205 Magazine Building. If you prefer, you may make installment payments or arrange for bi-weekly payroll allotments of $25.00 or multiples thereof. A receipt showing a statement of your account will be sent to you acknowledging each installment payment.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

RONALD GAGE

Ronald Gage
Acting Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

OP/RAD/ROB/WFMa :an:jat/3257 (7 March 1972)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 NOVEMBER 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER 057303	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) GOODPASTURE, ANN L.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 12 DAY 01 YEAR 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XXX CF TO CF ☐	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 9135 0623	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D.C.	
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 9997	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13 6	17 SALARY OR RATE $ 16809

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/FOREIGN FIELD/BRANCH 1/MEXICO CITY/POS.# 0418

Pending Relo Date — 26 NOV 1968

[illegible] 1565. [illegible] has been granted for request

[illegible] SA/CSPS 21 Nov 68

1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Henry L. Berthold C/WH/Personnel	DATE SIGNED 19 Nov 68	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 FOOTES CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
57	18	51297	CDH	25013		1	11 28 [illegible]		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO.	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV, TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVER 1—YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 OP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
11-21-68		11-25-68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Goodpasture, Ann	Self	69-0577

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 13 September 1968

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
24 January 1969	[illegible]

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (*use pseudo only if SA*) Ann L. Goodpasture	DATE (*from item S-1*) 4/24/67	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (*true*) Winston Scott	DATE (*from item S-2*) 4/24/67
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 5/4/67	DISPATCH NUMBER: HMMT-7821	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE GS-13 Ops Officer	4. STATION OR BASE Mexico City	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER LNGOLD

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 5 May 1957	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 1 Sept 1967	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 10 Sept 1967	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 31 October 1967

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

None

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

None

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (*see special note on transmittal form*).
(*also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8*)

Case Officer for operational support and liaison projects sponsored by high-level contacts of COS.

Liaison with other agencies on CE cases.

Special projects assigned by COS

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

None

FORM 5-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

CE/CI Officer for Mexico Station

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ________ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ________ (DATE).

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ________ 2ND CHOICE ________ 3RD CHOICE ________

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE ________ 2ND CHOICE ________ 3RD CHOICE ________

☒ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Chief of Station, Mexico City strongly recommends that this officer be allowed to return to Mexico City for another tour after home leave.

This officer is a very important and essential member of the Mexico City Station Staff; and this officer's services are need very much by this Station.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

WH Division recommends that Miss Goodpasture be approved for another tour in Mexico City.

DATE 5/17 TITLE C/WH/Pers SIGNATURE Robert D. Cashman

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT: Returned second tour.

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. HMMW-2250 DATED: 29 May 67

CABLE NO. ________ DATED: ________

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ________ (SIGNATURE) DATE 29 May 1967

SECRET

SECRET

Received in CSPO 28 Aug 63

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE • FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true)	DATE (from item 8-1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 8-2)
Ann L. GOODPASTURE	18 June 1963	Winston M. Scott	18 June 1963

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES, AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW: R. Farina, WH/Personnel

DATE: 28 August 1963

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 November 1918
2. GRADE: GS-13
3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer - CE
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known): [redacted]
5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE: Mexico City
7a. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD:
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR: None
7b. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS:

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

1. Liaison with the Legal Attache. (requests for traces and investigations).
2. Case Officer for miscellaneous CE operations such as short term physical or technical surveillances.
3. Alternate contact with [redacted] inside officer responsible for processing take from three anti-Soviet photo surveillance bases.
4. Alternate for station photographer, flaps and seals.
5. Prepares briefing papers and other materials used by COS for special briefing of representatives from Headquarters or other U.S. Government and private agencies.
6. Case Officer handling [redacted] who supervises the intercept center for a semi-official telephone tap operation covering 30 lines simultaneously.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

8. (continued)

7. Alternate contact for [redacted] who supervises a semi-official support project.
8. Pending assignment additional SR ops officer, case officer fo[redacted] unilateral outside translator.

----

9. For next assignment, have no particular preference.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

To be determined by Headquarters or Chief of Station, based on next assignment.

FORM NO. 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

FORM 1451

NAME OF EMPLOYEE [illegible]

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO

COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE ☐ YES ☐ NO

TELEPHONE EXT.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE, SPINDLE, OR MUTILATE

INSTRUCTIONS

THIS FORM MUST BE RETURNED WHETHER YOU HAVE HAD OVERSEAS SERVICE OR NOT.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCOMPANYING CARD, THEN FILL OUT THIS FORM AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE.

DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN	WHERE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED	PCS - 1 TDY - 2 (ENTER NO.)	DATES FROM MO	DATES FROM YR	DATES TO MO	DATES TO YR	SERVICE AS CIVILIAN 1 MILITARY - 2 (ENTER NO.)	RESPONSIBLE U.S. GOVT. DEPT. OR AGENCY	DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN
330	India/Ceylon	1	08	44	03	45	1	CIA	100
145	China	1	08	45	02	46	1	"	100
330	India	1	03	47	12	48	1	"	100
450	Mexico	1	07	51	10	53	1	"	100
300	Guatemala	2	04	54	05	54	1	"	100
450	Mexico	1	05	57	07	58	1	"	100

IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED, CHECK HERE ☐ AND ASK YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CARDS

SECRET

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 9-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

WH Division recommends that Subject return to Mexico City for another tour of duty.

16. NAME OF PERSONNEL OFFICER
ROBERT D. Cashman
DATE 28 August 1963

SIGNATURE Robert D. Cashman
ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/Pers

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT
XXXX

18. REFERENCE Dispatch HMMS-3143 (20 Sep 63)
DISPATCH NO. ________ CABLE NO. ________

19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME
George W. Dumont

20. SIGNATURE George W. Dumont

21. TITLE
Personnel Officer/CSPO

22. DATE
20 Sep 63

23. COMMENTS

CS Personnel Management Committee approved retention of Miss Goodpasture at Mexico City through January 1965, followed by return to Hq. PCS.

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE • FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(true)* GOODPASTURE, Ann L.	DATE *(from item 8-1)* 24 Jan 61	NAME OF SUPERVISOR *(true)* Winston M. Scott	DATE *(from item 8-2)* 24 Jan 61
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:	Washinko, WH/Pers Ofcr		DATE 3 Feb 61

DO NOT COMPLETE

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 28 November 1918	2. GRADE GS-12	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer	
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION *(if known)* KUTUBE	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Mexico City		7A. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD August 1961
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7B. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

Case Officer - CE Operations. Operational support for five anti-soviet, CE, support-type and technical projects. Flaps and seals, and photo for special projects when other techs not available. Other duties assigned by COS.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

Continuation of above.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*:

Believe no additional training needed unless decided change in duties.

FORM NO. 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 MAR 57

SECRET

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT *(continued)*

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 *(for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choi*ce) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION.

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE WH 2ND. CHOICE ______ 3RD. CHOICE ______

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:

1ST. CHOICE WH 2ND. CHOICE WH 3RD. CHOICE WH

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 45

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

None

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

It is strongly urged by COS that this extremely valuable and all-round officer be returned to the Mexico City Station.

RIGGS would be one of the most difficult persons to replace in the Mexico City Station because of the variety of types of work he does (and all well and efficiently) and because of his detailed knowledge of CE operations, Soviet personalities and targets, and general capabilities.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Concur in COS recommendation

28 FEB 1961

16. NAME OF PERSONNEL OFFICER P.C.BOWERS, DATE 3 Feb 61	SIGNATURE PC Bowers

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. ______ CABLE NO. ______
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME	20. SIGNATURE
21. TITLE	22. DATE

23. COMMENTS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/R Y B A T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion -- [redacted] (Ann Goodpasture)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. HMMT-7514
B. HMMT-6090

Action : See paragraph 1.

Not approved
Ck
24 1967

1. It is strongly recommended that [redacted] be promoted to GS-14.

2. This officer has performed outstandingly at this Station for many years; he is a dedicated hard-working employee who is conscientious about and careful with WOFACT funds. This officer has for years been involved in managerial capacities in some of the most sensitive and highly successful operations run by this Station -- one of which has been cited by Headquarters as a model of its type and the most successfully productive (technical) operation in WOFACT.

3. [redacted] is an officer of outstanding capabilities of a wide range and variety.

4. All these attributes, performance, time in grade, and service time with WOFACT should combine to cause the promotion of this deserving officer.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

GROUP 1
Excluded fr [illegible]

Distribution:
✓3 - WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-7559	8 February 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T/R Y B A T	

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION:
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Recommendations for Promotion

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. WH Field Memorandum No. 20-2, 28 January 1966
B. CSI-F-20-18, 5 May 1961
C. HMMT-7514, 24 January 1967
D. HMMT-7558, 8 February 1967

1. COS, Mexico City, has recommended that both [redacted] Ann Goodpasture and [redacted] of this Station be considered for promotion from GS-13 to GS-14 (references C and D).

2. These two officers are ranked in the following order in the Station's recommendations for promotion:

a. [redacted] Ann Goodpasture

b. [redacted] Benjamin Pepper

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WH

REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-7617	27 February 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

23 February 1966

Ann L. Goodpasture

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

THROUGH : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : Book Dispatch 5096, dated 12 August 1965

Recent correspondence on the above subject informed you that I had determined that you met the criteria specified in the applicable regulation for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System. On the basis of this determination and your recently executed election to remain in the System, your designation as a participant was made effective 13 February 1966.

Richard B. Egan

RICHARD B. EGAN

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

G 42

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 January 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER 057303	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) GOODPASTURE, ANN L.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 02 DAY 13 YEAR 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6135-0990	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel) PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH I MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0418	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 4	17. SALARY OR RATE $13,815

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION [redacted]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Philip C. Bowers	DATE SIGNED 19 JAN 1966	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR.
28	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3	11 28 18	11 11 62	11 08 64

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 3-FICA 5-NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
			2						

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA. YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0-WAIVER 1-YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 01-21-66 N	46. OP APPROVAL R. L. Bord for [illegible]	DATE APPROVED 21 Jan 66

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Goodpasture, Ann L.	Self	66-691

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 29 December 1965.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
14 FEB 1966	B.

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 31 OCTOBER 1

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 057303 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): GOODPASTURE, ANN L.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 11 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135 5700 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
8 DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER ~~INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (~~
12. POSITION NUMBER: 852 ~~400~~
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01 ~~0136.51~~
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 11,515 ✓
18. REMARKS:
FROM: SAME

awe

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: PC Bowers
C. BOWERS C/WH/Personnel
DATE SIGNED: 10/31/62
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 11/9/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64900 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 45075
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 28 YR. 18
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NO.F 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T. Kearney 11/1-62
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 11/9

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section A)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-13
Miss Ann L. Goodpasture

1. Miss Ann L. Goodpasture has been in Mexico City for five years and during this period has functioned as a Case Officer supporting operations against Soviet and Satellite targets. She was recommended for promotion in February 1961 and September 1961.

2. Miss Goodpasture is a seasoned and able employee who excels in the field of CE analysis. Her diligence, imagination, and experience have made her indispensable to the Station, which processes a great mass of information on Soviet and Satellite CE targets. Her knowledge of this field is encyclopedic, and the profundity of her analyses is equal to any occasion. She is a steady, cheerful worker who has the respect and affection of all her colleagues. She does her job without assistance and she is always willing to help with special Station projects.

3. It is recommended that Miss Goodpasture be promoted to GS-13.

R. W. Herbert
J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

15 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section B)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-13 - Miss Ann L. Goodpasture

1. Miss Ann L. Goodpasture has been assigned to the Mexico City Station since early 1957 as a Case Officer in support of CI/CE operations directed against Soviet targets in Mexico. The Chief of Station recommended Miss Goodpasture for promotion in February of 1961.

2. Miss Goodpasture is a highly competent employee who has shown great strength in performing operational tasks which require a high degree of analitical ability, patience, and initiative. She is particularly strong in the CI/CE field and has made an invaluable contribution to the Mexico City Station's program directed against personnel of the Soviet Embassy and other individuals believed to be engaged in Soviet Bloc espionage activities. Miss Goodpasture is highly motivated, performs all her assignments with great dispatch in a most professional manner, and does have the qualifications found in more senior Case Officers.

3. It is recommended that Miss Goodpasture be promoted to grade GS-13.

J. C. KING
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

Approved
Nov 1962

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER
GOODPASTURE, Ann	Unk	58-400

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 12 May 58.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
24 Sep 58	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

1076

(4-21-35)

15 February 1957

Baskin and Company, Real Estate
724 - 9th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

At the request of Miss Ann Goodpasture, we are writing to confirm the fact that on or about 1 March 1957, Miss Goodpasture will be transferred to a location away from the Washington, D. C., area for the convenience of the Government.

Any consideration you may give Miss Goodpasture with regard to the termination of the lease she holds with your company will be appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

OP/CS/dav(Counseling)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED TO UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Miss Ann L. GOODPASTURE	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 30 Jan 57
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 18 Mar 57	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
I.O. (FI) BE-571	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BAF-400
GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 p.a.
DDP/NEA FI Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch III Mexico City, Mexico Station
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Mexico City, Mexico
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

12
(DI)

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Transfer TO Unvouchered Funds FROM Vouchered Funds

2 copies to Security

CONCUR:
NEA

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: C. Dawson
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) J. KOELLOVICH X8242	Title: CS/MC

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE						14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION				
NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER	NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
x										SD-DI

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
F	FROM 7-3300-20 TO 7-3570-55-060	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JD	1/25/57
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	O C D	2/4/57
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

C. Dawson 4/21/57

10—66437-2

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19-- FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instru
If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Miss Ann L. Goodpasture	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov. 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQU. 24 Oct.56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED:	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
IO(FI) BE 27·12	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO (FI) BE 571
GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 p.a.
DDP/NEA FI Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/NEA FI Staff
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

T J Hester

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
T. J. Hester, NEA/ADM/PERSONNEL

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Shirley Matthews ext. 8671

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: FI/C NO

13 VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
X					

14 POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

SD-DI

15 SEX: F

16 APPROPRIATION
FROM 7-3300-20
TO: SAME

17 SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19 LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20 STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		6 Nov 56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	DLL	11/2/56
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
Dr Ready 11/2/56

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER

SECRET

VOUCHERED

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr. - Miss - Mrs - One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Miss Ann L. Goodpasture	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 21 Aug 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED.
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
Promotion
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
10 (FI) BE-28	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	10 (FI) BE-27-12
GS-0136.51-11 $6605.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 per annum
DDP/NEA* FI Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/NEA FI Staff
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL (DI)

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
for T. J. HESTER, NEA/ADM/PERSONNEL

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Audrey Meadows, Ext 8671

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Robert G. Shields (a/c)
Signature: Gordon M. Stewart
Title: C/FI

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL

SD-DI

15. SEX
F

16. Funds/Positions Available:
Chargeable No. 6-3300-20
Charge Allot. No. 7-3300-20

17. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Slotting purposes only pending establishment of position

APPROVED BY NEA PROMOTION AND POSITION BOARD Aug 56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL OR POS CONTROL		12 Sept 56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		9/7/56
E.		

REMARKS.

SEP 11 10 28 AM '56

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

F. APPROVED BY
Robert H. Nicholson 9/7/56

SECRET

SECRET

17 July 1956.

MEMORANDUM FOR: NEA/ADM

SUBJECT : Ann L. Goodpasture

1. It is requested that subject employee be promoted from GS-11 to GS-12.

2. Miss Goodpasture was recently assigned to the NEA Division to act as Case Officer on Project PACT, a world-wide project of interest to high ranking officials in the Agency, State and Defense Departments. In addition to all material handled by Miss Goodpasture being slugged RYBAT, there is a further indicator assigned which allows distribution only to DCI, DDCI, DD/P and CNEA, together with the undersigned.

3. Information received under Project PACT is disseminated by the Case Officer to officials mentioned above in addition to DDI, Chief, CI, CPP, and CFI, and other interested Division Chiefs. Material received is reproduced by subject and disseminated as above. In addition to the above duties, Miss Goodpasture analyzes information for dissemination, handles her own carding and writing of operational reviews.

4. Subject employee has been in grade since 4 July 1954 and her performance on her present assignment has been excellent. It is therefore recommended that this request for promotion be considered at the next NEA Promotion Board meeting.

NEA/CFI

NEA/CFI/FSH:me
Distribution:
Addressee - orig. and 1
NEA/CFI - 1
NEA/FEPS - 1
NEA/CADM - 1

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER R-

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.*

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Miss Ann L. Goodpasture	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 23 May 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 17 JUN 1956		7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Operations Off. (CE) BB 574-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO (FI) BE-28
GS-0132.52-11 $6605.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $6605.00 per annum
DDP/WE FI Staff Counter Espionage Section, Wash, D.C.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/NEA FI Staff Reports & Requirements Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Two Copies to Sec 5/23/56

E. k. Anally WE/PT

T. J. Hester

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) T. J. HESTER, NEA/ADM/PERSONNEL	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Robert A. [illegible] (WAN) Title: ACMO 4 June '56
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) Rose M. Mazzucco - Ext 3671	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL	
				SD-DI

I certify Funds Available

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION FROM 6-3600-20 TO 6-3300-20	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) YES	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Oklahoma

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible]
26 May 56
[illegible] 6/15/56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS.
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	[illegible]	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	RKR	6/5/56	
E.			

SECRET

F. APPROVED BY

[illegible] Reedy 6/7/56

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Miss Ann L. GOODPASTURE	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 29 Sept55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment : B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP B. APPROVED: 1955	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Para-Mil. Off. BB 101-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Operations Officer(CE) BB 574-11
GS-0136.11-11 $6390.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.52-11 $6390.00 p.a.
DDP/WE French Branch, FI, PP, PM	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE FI Staff Counterespionage Section [redacted]
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL FI

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)
No change of duties & supervision

I certify funds available:
Oblig. Ref. No.
Charge Allot. No. 6-3600-20

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
A M Gregg
A. M. GREGG, Personnel Officer, WE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
H. E. EISSNER, x 3124

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Auth. Officer
Signature:
Title: FI/Co. 7 Oct 55

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
x					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL

SD-DI

15. SEX F	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-3600-20 TO: same	18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Okla.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL		13 OCT 1955	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		10 Oct 55	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
L. Byrd 10 Oct 55

SECRET

10—57330-6

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 195—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED TO VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.- One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Miss Ann L. GOODPASTURE	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov. 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 10 Feb 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc*) Reassignment		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc*)		B. APPROVED:	

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops. Off. BKF 387	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Para-Mil. Off. BB 101-11
GS-0136.01-11 $5940.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.11-11 $5940.00 p.a.
DDP/NEA India, Pakistan, Afghanistan Br.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE French Branch, FI, PP, PM
New Delhi, India	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM Unvouchered Funds. W-4 following
~~XXX~~ Subject recently returned from the field, and has been assigned various temporary positions, pending permanent reassignment, therefore, no fitness report has been prepared on her, as it was felt she could not be properly evaluated.

CONCUR FOR NEA: F. J. [illegible] / GJF.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
A M Gregg HC
A. M. GREGG, Personnel Officer, WE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
H. E. EISSNER, X 3422

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [illegible]
Title: [illegible]

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD - ~~PP~~ PE

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-3340-55-013 TO: 5-3600-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Okla

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

~~Approved~~ Concur:
FEB 15 1955
DmCollins
PP/Career Service

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	CFB	2-21-55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]		
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
Ralph L. [illegible]

25 FEB [illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UN[illegible] STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH
THRU : WH/Admin

DATE: AUG 27 1954

FROM : Acting Chief, Security Control Staff/SO

SUBJECT: Clearance, Private Foreign Travel - GOODPASTURE, Ann L.

Reference: Memo dtd 19 Aug 54 to Chief, SCS from Miss Goodpasture

1. This Office interposes no objection to the proposed tour by Miss Goodpasture to Ireland, France, Italy and Portugal between the dates 8 October and 5 November 1954.

2. It is suggested that Miss Goodpasture review the provisions of Agency Regulation 10-10, dated 1 April 1951, and that she contact Miss Richter, extension 692, to make an appointment for a security briefing prior to her departure.

3. If feasible, it is requested that Miss Goodpasture submit to this Office a detailed itinerary of her prospective trip (in triplicate) prior to her departure.

4. Immediately upon return from private foreign travel, Miss Goodpasture will again contact the Security Control Staff and have her passport in her possession when she reports for a security de-briefing.

W. H. Lyon

SO/CDS:mkr

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - SO File
1 - SCS File
1 - Chrono., SCS

CONFIDENTIAL

HMYA-187
5 October 1953

TO : Chief, WHD
FOR : Chief, FD

FROM : Chief of Substation,
Monterrey, Mexico

Goodpasture, Ann L.

SUBJ : Administrative
Settlement Sheet [redacted]

REF : HMYA-114 dated 21 September 1953

Subject is returning to headquarters on PCS and will settle the reference differential overpayment on his arrival there which should be on or before 20 October 1953.

David R. Kenan

RBR:rbr

Distr:
3-Hqtrs
2-Mexico City
2-Monterrey

HMYA-187
5 Oct 53

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-114

SECRET
Security Classification

TO : Chief of Station, Monterrey

DATE SEP 21 1953

FROM : Finance Division

SUBJECT GENERAL Administrative
SPECIFIC Settlement Sheet-[redacted]

REFERENCE: HMYA-135 and Attachment

1. Receipt is acknowledged of above reference dispatch and attachment.

2. Headquarters finds that there is no adjustment due on the quarters allowance for the periods covered.

3. Due to the information in item #7 of PSI from $5079 to $5259 effective 7 June 1953, there has been an overpayment made to subject for the period 7 June thru 15 August 1953 in the net amount of $30.74 as evidenced by attached payroll change notice #271 for the period 16 August-12 September 1953.

4. Since the difference between the KUBARK and ODACID salaries is less than 100.00 per annum and settlement is to be made only once a year, it is suggested that a personal check for $30.74 made payable to Paul Levantral be forewarded to Headquarters to liquidate this overpayment.

Elbert T. Overlunt
ELBERT T. OVERLUNT

10 September 1953
Attachment: PCN (1)
Distribution:
3 Monterrey

Answered in HMYA-187
5 Oct 1953

RECEIVED OCT 5 1953

SECRET
Security Classification

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

SECRE SECURITY INFORMATION

HMYA-135
20 July 1953

TO : Chief, WHD
FOR : Chief, FD

FROM : Chief of Substation,
Monterrey, Mexico

SUBJECT : Administrative
Settlement Sheet - Robert B. RIGGS

REF : Fiscal, Fld Reg 20-8 dated 13 August 1951

Attached is settlement sheet for the undersigned.

RBR:rbr

Robert B. Riggs

Attachment: 1

Distribution:
3-Hqtrs
2-Mexico City (w/o attachments)
2-Monterrey

HMYA-135
20 July 53

SECURITY INFORMATION

SETTLEMENT SHEET

(Submit so as to arrive at Headquarters no later than 15 Aug.)

I certify that during the period 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953, I received the following compensation, salary and allowances from ODACID.

1.	Quarters Allowances	$200 p.a.
2.	Post Allowances	0
3.	Additional Dependency Allowances	0
4.	Actual cost of quarters, including utilities	906 pa

5. Traveled outside my country of assignment on official business or annual leave during the period or periods indicated:

   Annual leave in excess of 5 days:

   19 May 1953 to June 2, 1953 (11 days)

6. Promotion from $ 0 p.a. to $ 0 p.a.
7. Periodic pay increase from $5079 p.a. to $5259 p.a. effective 7 June 1953.
8. Took one day of sick leave.
9. Worked no overtime for which compensation was claimed.
10. On no leave without pay.

30 June 1953

Robert B. Riggs

HMYA-105
3 June 1953

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Chief of Substation,
Monteroy, Mexico

SUBJECT : Administrative
[redacted]

Robert B. RIGGS returned to Monterrey on 2 June.

Please advise the appropriate KUCLUB individual.

DBK:rbr

David B. Kenan

Distribution:
3-Wash
2-Mexico City
2-Monterrey

HMYA-105
4 June 1953

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Dispatch No: HMYA-7
30 October 1952

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Chief of Substation,
Monterrey, Mexico

SUBJECT : Administrative [redacted]
Personnel - [redacted]

1. David Konan has asked that I state my preference with regard to home leave and reassignment. I will be eligible for home leave in July 1953 but it is not urgent that my leave be scheduled exactly when due. I would like, however, to know what opportunities exist with headquarters and whether I should be looking elsewhere for employment after July 1953.

2. With regard to another two year tour of duty in Monterrey, I would prefer a more responsible job than is forseeable here. Now that the station files are set-up and the administrative routine is established, my job, while termed Administrative Assistant, is mainly that of a clerk-typist. The practice in typing has been good for me but I would like to look forward to a more responsible job for the next tour of duty. For instance, as a GS-9 I am performing the same type job which I did in 1945 at a CAF-4 and a considerably less responsible job than the one performed at headquarters as a P-2. While I have been taking Spanish lessons, I know that I am not proficient enough in the language for an assignment in Latin America, and feel that I would be better off in another area.

3. For the benefit of the case officer in assigning a replacement, Konan has suggested that I outline the duties which my replacement should be trained to perform. The routine can be learned in the field within two or three weeks.

a) Copy typing. About 75% of the time will be taken up with routine typing.

b) Index carding. About 600 index cards a week are now being typed for the card files and for the visa section files.

c) Preparation of courier mail. Couriers usually go to the border approximately every two weeks but there is no regular schedule, and pouches are sometimes prepared on a few hours notice.

d) Communications. The incumbent should have complete training for our codes for he will not have much practice in the field as only two or three messages are transmitted monthly.

CONFIDENTIAL

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMY-W-20

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 31 DEC 1952

TO : Chief of Station, Monterrey, Mexico

FROM : Chief, Western Hemisphere

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Personnel
SPECIFIC- [redacted]
Ref: HMY-A-7

1. At the present time, it is headquarters' plan to replace RIGGS with a young officer who is expected to arrive in May 1953. Biographic data will be provided in a subsequent pouch.

2. With regard to RIGGS' future assignment, he may be assigned to a headquarters position, which will offer more responsibility than his present assignment, if he so desires.

Oliver G. Galbond
OLIVER G. GALBOND

File

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

RECEIVED JAN 7 1953

FORM NO. 51-28
MAR 1949

10—63327-1 GPO

e) Photography. At the present time, considerable operational use is being made of a darkroom at my residence. In addition to my own photographic equipment, the station photographic equipment is used there. My replacement should be trained in the use of the duo-printer and in 35mm copy work. If he has no personal photographic equipment, headquarters may wish to issue him a camera as there is only one camera at the station. Most of the copy work has been done with my personal rolleiflex and enlarger.

f) Administrative Reports.

(1) Station Funds. He will be responsible for dispensing funds, keeping records and preparation of the monthly accounting reports.

(2) Property. He will be responsible for keeping records of government property and preparation of periodic reports and inventories.

(3) Exchange commodities. He will be responsible for keeping records and preparing periodic reports and inventories.

g) Maintenance of Files. The station files are set-up along the lines recommended by headquarters, and should require little time for upkeep.

h) Information Reports. Dependent upon the clerical workload, he may assist Konan in the preparation of information reports.

i) Cover Job. None. If there are only two people at the station, the replacement for my job would not have time to perform a cover job and consequently, would have no regular working relationship with the DYMAROCH employees.

4. A resourceful person can find Monterrey a very enjoyable post. From a social point of view, the city is not a dull place and either a single girl or man can find plenty of things to do. There are a limited number of single persons here, but one can always find somewhere to go and something to do. The American colony, as a whole, is the friendliest group that I have known at any post and they are very gracious with invitations to their homes. If headquarters has someone in mind for this post and would like elaboration on living conditions in Monterrey, I shall be glad to forward them on request.

RBR:rbr
Distribution:
2-Mexico City
3-Hqtrs
2-Monterrey

Robert B. Riggs

14-00000

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-5

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE SEP 7 - 1951

TO : Chief Sub-station, Monterrey

FROM : Acting Chief Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative

SPECIFIC- [redacted]

1. You are hereby notified that approval has been granted for subject to take Spanish lessons at Government expense abroad.

2. The following conditions govern this authorization:

a. That the employee should receive this training under secure circumstances for reasons of immediate operational necessity;

b. That the cost to the Government will not exceed $250.00 during any fiscal year for subject; and

c. That such language lessons will directly benefit the Government.

3. You may reference this dispatch as authority for payment when recording the disbursements in your monthly accounting reports.

Dennis K. Copeland
DENNIS K. COPELAND

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
MAR 1949

10-42357-1 GPO

10 July 1951

Department of State
Division of Foreign Service Personnel Records
Room-A, SA-12
Washington 25, D. C.

GOODPASTURE, Ann Lorane

Reference Clerk CAF-5 $2770.00 Oct.20,1946 to Apr. 17, 1947.
Administrative Asst. CAF-7 $3397.20 Apr.17,1947 to Dec. 14,1947.
Administrative Asst. CAF-9 $4479.60 Dec.14, 1947 to Dec 6,1948.
Administrative Asst. CAF-7 Dec 7,1948 to 3 Febr.1951.
Administrative Asst. GS-9 4 Febr.1951 to7 June 1951.

14-00000

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1951

Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington 25, D.C.

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter RI-35 of the Federal Personnel Manual, it is requested that the official personnel file and leave record of Ann Lorene Goodpasture Administrative Assistant who e.o.d. June 8, 1951 with this agency, date of birth Nov. 28, 1918, employed by CIA from December 1948 to March 1951 at Washington, D.C. be forwarded to the following address at the earliest practicable date:

Department of State,
Division of Foreign Service Personnel Records,
Room-A, SA-12,
Washington 25, D. C.

Very truly yours,

Wm. E. Goodyear
Chief, Field Operations Branch
Division of Foreign Service Personnel

DSL-534
11-17-50

File .mn

Form FS-349 June 7, 19[illegible]

Goodpasture Ann Lorene 11-23-1918 PL-724-79th

FSS

Indefinite appointment (E. O. 10180) 6-8-51 6-8-51

Administrative Assistant

Monterrey

FSS-9 $4470

1a 2 992 110

MX-10

Indef X

X X

Female Single

Items: A, b, c, d, i (61a)

SF 84 and 87 executed 6-8-51

No military reserve status

Appointed FSS-9 $4290 and immediately promoted to FSS-9 $4470 in accordance with FSR 102-669 (c), Previously employed by another Government agency as GS-9 $4600

6-11-51

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME: GOODPASTURE, Ann L.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: COB 26 May 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Resignation *

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE: Ann L. Goodpasture

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops) GS-9	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9 $4600.00	
OFFICE	OSO	
DIVISION	DZ/SEA	
BRANCH AND SECTION	Branch I	
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐

REMARKS: * To accept other employment.

TRANSFER LEAVE TO UV FUNDS

#665

RECOMMENDED:

23 April 1951
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED 4/24/51

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE

SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
1801	1241	12-19-47

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		X	

DATE

SIGNATURE

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2115900

ALLOTMENT:

C. S. C. AUTHORITY: 951-108

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
6-26-51	

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE
	JKM

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—62489-1

SECRET

APR 12 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ATTENTION: Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Subject: Request for Appointment in the Foreign Service as Administrative Assistant at Monterrey for Miss Ann Lorene Goodpasture.

Enclosure:
a. Forms [illegible]-34
b. Standard Forms 86 and 57
c. Proposed Biography

1. It is requested that Miss Ann Lorene Goodpasture be appointed in the Foreign Service with the title of Administrative Assistant, FSS-[illegible], $4,470.00, for duty in the American Consulate at Monterrey, Mexico.

2. Miss Goodpasture received her B.A. Degree from the University of Oklahoma. She has had approximately seven years of administrative and secretarial experience in Government service and also served for one year and eight months as Administrative Assistant in the American Consulate General at Bombay, India. It is believed that Miss Goodpasture is fully qualified to serve as Administrative Assistant in the American Consulate at Monterrey. She will receive from CIA a basic salary of $4,600.00 per annum.

3. Miss Goodpasture will perform the administrative duties for the CIA station to be opened in Monterrey.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

W. G. WYMAN
Assistant Director

SECRET

PERSONN ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO. 3019

NAME GOODPASTURE, Ann L.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE 4/7/51
NATURE OF ACTION Promotion	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: 1/16/56 EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops) GS-7	Intelligence Officer (Ops) GS-9
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-7 $4325.00	GS-9 $4600.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDZ/SEA	FDZ/SEA
BRANCH AND SECTION	Branch 1	Branch 1
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

/30

S-7
Employee has been in grade since 17 April 1947.

RECOMMENDED:

20 January 1951
(DATE)

B. M. Vandervoort
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ALM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED
2/3/51 F G [illegible]

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE	SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO. 1801	C. S. C. NO. 1741	DATE APPROVED 12/9/47

NEW	VICE	I. A. /	REAL

DATE 2 Feb 51	SIGNATURE Austin J. Thomas

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2115900
ALLOTMENT: 951-108
C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch A 116(d)

DATE SIGNATURE 2-5-51	SIGNATURE R. A. [illegible]

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE JMEH

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE
DATE 2 Feb 51	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF H. C. [illegible]

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—62450-1

PERSONN ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO. 28[illegible]3

NAME GOODPASTURE, Ann E.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE 24 Dec 50
NATURE OF ACTION Reassignment	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: # 4025 EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Reports Officer Intell. Off ~~(Ops)~~ GS-7	Intell. Off. (Ops) GS-7
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-7 $4325.00 p.a.	GS-7 $4325.00 p.a.
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDE/SEA	FDE/SEA
BRANCH AND SECTION	Branch I	Branch I
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

S-7

RECOMMENDED:

13 December 1950
(DATE)

B M Underwood
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: 12/21/50 F G Jarema

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE:
SIGNATURE:

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
1803	1740	10/19/47

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		—	

DATE: 20 Dec 50
SIGNATURE: Austin J. Flores [illegible]
EFFECTIVE DATE:

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2115900
ALLOTMENT: 95-1-108
C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sched 6.116(k)

DATE SIGNATURE: 12-22-50
SIGNATURE: [illegible]

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE:
SIGNATURE:

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE:
SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE:

DATE: 21 Dec
SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF:

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—63430-1

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

[illegible] Pleas 3/15

NAME: GOODPASTURE, Ann L.	**CLASSIFICATION**	**INITIAL** gj	**DATE** 2-9-49
	VICE 1A ✓ VV NEW	Bw # 1499 CSC # 1445 10-10-47 MM	
NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment	**QUALIFICATION & REVIEW**	**INITIAL** [illegible]	**DATE** 3-8-49
EFFECTIVE DATE 21 March 1949	2193-90 359-108 [illegible]-45 [illegible] 3-10-49		
FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS **LAST WORKING DAY:**	**APPROVED:** SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR)		
FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY **SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:**	SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE FOR ADM) George E. Meiser 2-10 [illegible] SIGNATURE (CHIEF, PERSONNEL BRANCH)		

	FROM	
TITLE		~~Intelligence Officer P-2~~ Reports Officer (Intelligence Officer) ~~(Rptr)~~ P-2
GRADE AND SALARY		P-2 $3978.00 pa.
OFFICE		OSO
BRANCH		COPS - FBZ
DIVISION	Previously employed at	SEA
SECTION	$ 3978 per annum.	Division #1
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D.C.
DEPT. OR FIELD		Departmental 130

REMARKS:

Charge against P-4 ~~[illegible]~~ Reports Officer

Slot 48

This action cancels CONTROL #1434. Security concurrence requested 7 February 1949. Please transfer accrued leave from unvouchered funds. From the only records available at this office, it appears subject EOD in February 1944 as a Steno., CAF-4. She went to the field thereafter as a CAF-5. She received her first periodic pay increase as a CAF-5 on 10 March 1946 and returned from the field on 30 March 1946. She returned to departmental rolls on 5 June 1946. She returned to unvouchered funds for duty in the field on 1 December 1946. She received a p.p.i. on 6 April 1947; and a promotion to Ad. Assistant, CAF-7, on 17 April 1947.

(OVER)

RECOMMENDED: OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF, OR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER B[illegible]	**DATE** 7 February 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

Searched 10/11/19/49

FORM NO. 37-3
OCT 1946

(1514)

CONFIDENTIAL

file

28 April 1949

TO : Personnel Officer
Attention: Betty Morrison

FROM : Covert Personnel Branch

SUBJECT : Ann L. Goodpasture

This is to certify that subject's "Transfer and Change to Lower Grade" has been amended as follows:

From	To	Effective Date
CAF-9, $4479.60	CAF-7, $3852.60	7 December 1948.

Subject's last periodic pay increase has been amended as follows:

From	To	Effective Date
CAF-7, $3852.60	CAF-7, $3978.00	26 December 1948.

Harold E. Ballou
Harold E. Ballou

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Goodpasture

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : George E. Meloon

DATE: 25 March 1949

FROM : Transactions & Records Division

SUBJECT:

The unvouchered records of the following employees appointed on Vouchered funds effective 21 March 1949, have revealed an error in computing periodic pay increases. In order to determine their last salary increase to establish a date they will be eligible for a periodic on vouchered funds the following information is furnished for action you deem necessary.

Goodpasture, Ann L.

(Temporary) Promotion effective 14 December 47, from CAF-7, $3397.20 per annum to CAF-9, $4149.60 per annum.

Return and Change to Lower Grade effective 7 December 1948, to CAF-7, $3727.20 per annum.

Pay Increase (Periodic) effective 8 December 1948, from $3727.20 to $3978 per annum. (This is a jump of 2 steps)

The employee was not eligible for the above periodic until the first pay period following 14 December 1948, at which time she would have completed the one year waiting period since her last salary increase. Then the increase should have been from $3727.20 to $3852.60.

Heineman, Erma R.

(Temporary) Promotion effective 16 November 1947 from CAF-5, $2770.20 per annum to CAF-6, $3146.40 per annum.

Return and Change to lower grade effective 28 July 1948, to CAF-5, $3100.20 per annum.

Pay Increase (Periodic) effective 29 July 1948, from $3100.20 to $3225.20 per annum.

This employee was not eligible for the above periodic until the pay period following 16 November 1948.

Hennings, Willie May Cormick

(Temporary) Promotion effective 16 November 1947, from CAF-6,$3146.40 per annum to CAF-7, $3522.60.

Return and Change to lower grade effective 4 August 1948, to CAF-6, $3601.80 per annum.

This employee was eligible for a periodic pay increase the first pay period following 16 November 1948, provided she met the requirements.

[illegible] 2/15

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

NAME: GOODPASTURE, Ann L.

CLASSIFICATION INITIAL DATE

VICE
IA
VV
NEW

NATURE OF ACTION: Appointment

QUALIFICATION & REVIEW INITIAL DATE

EFFECTIVE DATE: 21 March 1949

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS
LAST WORKING DAY:

FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

APPROVED:

SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR)

SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE FOR A&M)

SIGNATURE (CHIEF, PERSONNEL BRANCH)

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer (Rpts.)
GRADE AND SALARY		P-2 $3978.00
OFFICE		OSO
BRANCH		COPS - FBE
DIVISION		SEA
SECTION		Division #1
OFFICIAL STATION	4/2/49	Washington, D.C.
DEPT. OR FIELD		Departmental

REMARKS:

Slot 48

This action cancels CONTROL #1434. Security concurrence requested 7 February 1949. Please transfer accrued leave from unvouchered funds. From the only records available at this office, it appears subject EOD in February 1944 as a Steno., CAF-4. She went to the field thereafter as a CAF-5. She received her first periodic pay increase as a CAF-5 on 10 March 1946 and returned from the field on 30 March 1946. She returned to departmental rolls on 5 June 1946. She returned to unvouchered funds for duty in the field on 1 December 1946. She received a p.p.i. on 6 April 1947; and a promotion to Ad. Assistant, CAF-7, on 17 April 1947.

(OVER)

RECOMMENDED: OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF [illegible] OFFICER

Rec'd 2/

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 7 February 1949

FORM NO. 37-3
OCT 1946

(1514)

She received a temporary promotion to CAF-9 on [illegible] December 1947. She returned from the field on 7 December 1948 and reverted to her CAF-7. She received a periodic pay increase on 8 December 1948 to $3978.00 per annum.

24 February 1949

Concur for the Chief of Inspection and Security.

ERMAL P. GEISS
Chief, Personnel Security Division

PERSONNEL PERSONNEL
FEB 25
1949 MAR 29 AM 11 16
O.S.O.
PERSONNEL
FEB 15 2 PM '49
FEB 16 2 01 PM '49
I & S

SECRET

gm file ⑥

DEC 2 1 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ATTENTION: Mr. Fisher Howe

Subject : Cancellation of Foreign Service Title of Administrative Assistant at Bombay for Miss Ann Lorene Goodpasture

1. This is to advise you that Miss Ann Lorene Goodpasture, CIA representative who has been serving at Bombay, India with the Foreign Service title of Administrative Assistant, has been transferred to Washington for a permanent change of station. It is requested, therefore, that the Foreign Service title for Miss Goodpasture be cancelled.

/s/ W. G. Harp.
for DONALD H. GALLOWAY
Assistant Director

Attachment: Special Passport No. 713

HP:jlm

SECRET

COPY

(2)

To: George E. Meloon

From: Transactions & Records Division

The unvouchered records of the following employees appointed on Vouchered funds effective 21 March 1949, have revealed an error in computing periodic pay increases. In order to determine their last salary increase to establish a date they will be eligible for a periodic on vouchered funds the following information is furnished for action you deem necessary,

✓ Goodpasture, Ann L.

(Temporary) Promotion effective 14 December 47, from CAF-7, $3397.20 per annum to CAF-9, $4149.60 per annum

Return and Change to Lower Grade effective 7 December 1948, to CAF-7, $3727.20 per annum.

Pay Increase (Periodic) effective 8 December 1943, from $3727.20 to $3978 per annum. (This is a jump of 2 steps)

The employee was not eligible for the above periodic until the first pay period following 14 December 1948, at which time she would have completed the one year waiting period since her last salary increase. Then the increase should have been from $3727.20 to $3852.60.

Heineman, Erma R.

(Temporary) Promotion effective 16 November 1947 from CAF-5 $2770.20 per annum to CAF-6, $3146.40 per annum.

Return and Change to lower grade effective 28 July 1948, to CAF-5 $3100.20 per annum.

Pay Increase (Periodic) effective 29 July 1948, from $3100.20 to $3225.20 per annum.

This employee was not eligible for the above periodic until the pay period following 16 November 1948.

Hennings, Willie May Connick

(Temporary) Promotion effective 16 November 1947, from CAF-6 $3146.40 per annum to CAF-7, $3522.60.

COPY

Return and Change to lower grade effective 4 August 1948, to CAF-6, $3601.80 per annum.

This employee was eligible for a periodic pay increase the first pay period following 16 November 1948, provided she met the requirements.

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

SIGNAL SECURITY AND CONTROL SECTION

COMMUNICATIONS DEBRIEFING

I, Anne L. Goodpasture, DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) NOT TO DIVULGE ANY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS TO ORGANIZATION, PERSONNEL, LOCATION, METHODS OF OPERATION, CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS, COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS AND FACILITIES USED.

I DO FURTHER SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I SHALL NOT DISCUSS, DIVULGE, PUBLISH OR CAUSE TO BE PUBLISHED ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC FACILITIES, SYSTEMS, OR PROCEDURES EMPLOYED BY OTHER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES OF WHICH I AM COGNIZANT BY VIRTUE OF MY COMMUNICATIONS DUTIES WITH C.I.A.

I DO FURTHER SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I SHALL NOT DISCUSS, DIVULGE, PUBLISH OR CAUSE TO BE PUBLISHED ANY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE OF WHICH I AM COGNIZANT BY VIRTUE OF MY COMMUNICATIONS DUTIES WITH C.I.A. UNLESS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED IN WRITING IN EACH CASE BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

I HAVE READ THE PROVISIONS OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT AND UNDERSTAND THAT AFTER SEVERING MY RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, C.I.A., I AM STILL BOUND BY THAT ACT AND IF IT IS VIOLATED, I AM SUBJECT TO ITS PENALTIES.

I DO FURTHER SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT NO CLASSIFIED PAPERS, BOOKLETS, MATERIAL, OR EQUIPMENT REMAIN IN MY POSSESSION AND THAT ALL COMMUNICATIONS PROPERTIES, CLASSIFIED AND UNCLASSIFIED, HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO THE PROPER AUTHORITIES OF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, C.I.A.

I TAKE THIS OBLIGATION FREELY, WITHOUT ANY MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION.

SIGNED: Anne L. Goodpasture

DATED: 9 Dec 48

WITNESS:

POSITION:

DATE: 9/12/48

SECRET

3

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ANN L. GOODPASTURE

The subject entered on duty with the predecessor organization in February 1944. She served in India and in China from November 1944 to March, 1946. She arrived at her present overseas post on 17 April 1947 under an 18 month overseas agreement. She is being returned PCS to the United States upon completion of her present tour of duty for reassignment, which will be determined upon her arrival in Washington. No per diem will be paid the subject while on duty in the United States.

JER

PFB

SECRET

SECRET

Files

ZIBW-136

Air

Chief of Station, Bombay, India 29 March 1948

Chief, Administration and Services

Administrative

[redacted] ANN GOODPASTURE ✓

APR 6

1. In reference to ZIBA-85 and enclosure, you may inform Robert H. Riggs that he will be returned to the United States at the completion of his 18-month tour of duty. However, because of the fact that this tour of duty will not be completed until October, 1948, authorization for return will be pouched at a future date. In the meantime, efforts will be made to recruit a replacement for the slot which Riggs is now occupying.

E. M. TERRELL

O.S.O.

1948 APR 6 PM 2 53

PERSONNEL

James H. Drum R.S.W. W. Lloyd George

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO: ZIBA-85

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch Z

DATE: 8 March 1948

FROM : Chief of Station, Bombay, India

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative
SPECIFIC [redacted]

APR 6

1. The enclosed memorandum was given to me by [redacted] [redacted] this date and its contents are self explanatory. I want to emphasize the fact that Riggs has definitely made up his mind and intends to comply with the plan as stated in the enclosure.

2. I desire to convey my unqualified commendation for the attitude and performance of duties offered by [redacted] during the past 11 months. In every instance he has been 100% cooperative with never a display of selfishness. All members of the Consulate are very fond of [redacted] as are the people of Bombay.

L. E. Y.

Lester E. Yorke

REGISTRY COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

MEMORANDUM

8 March 1948

TO : Lester E. Yorke

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJ: Return to US within 7½ months.

1. It is my desire to be returned to the United States upon completion of 18 months' overseas duty for the purpose of resignation after my arrival at headquarters.

2. This notice is given so that the organization will have ample time to replace me prior to October '48 should they desire to do so. Should they replace me immediately, all expenses incurred by the organization in connection with my return transportation will be reimbursed.

APR 6

3. I desire to depart for the United States immediately upon completion of 18 months' overseas which will be October 18, 1948. Travel at that time will be at the expense of the organization in accordance with an agreement prior to my departure for overseas duty.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE #1

SECRET

File

(2)

17 December 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS

THROUGH: Chief, Administration and Services

DEC 22

SUBJECT: Temporary Promotion of Anne L. Goodpasture

1. Forwarded herewith is a memorandum and attachments from the Chief, FBZ, to Chief, Personnel Division, recommending a temporary promotion from CAF-7 to CAF-9 of Anne L. Goodpasture.

2. The memorandum from the Branch and the attachments, an excerpt from the Consul General's dispatch to the Secretary of State, indicate that the cost of living at her station has reached a most burdensome point.

3. This office concurs in the recommendation that such temporary promotion be made.

Robert S Wattles
ROBERT S. WATTLES
Acting Chief, Personnel Division, OSO

RECOMMEND APPROVAL: James H. Dunn
Chief, Administration and Services

APPROVED: Subject to concurrence Personnel Rev Com.
Donald H Galloway
Assistant Director, Special Operations

56

16

Recommend approval
WBJ.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

②

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CPD

DATE: 12 December 1947

FROM : Chief, FBZ

SUBJECT: Ann L. Goodpasture

Temporary Promotion

1. Subject is administrative assistant at our installation in Bombay, India. Due to the increased cost of living in Bombay, request is made that she be given a temporary promotion from a CAF-7 to a CAF-9. The increase in salary, plus the additional cost-of-living and quarters allowances, will be sufficient to permit Miss Goodpasture to meet the highly inflated cost of living in Bombay, an impossibility for the past several months.

2. A review of subject's reports on living conditions in Bombay reveals that since her arrival in April, she has had to live in temporary quarters on a day-to-day or week-to-week basis. The rooms occupied by subject have been shared with at least one other girl and sometimes two or three. Bathroom facilities are also shared with the other occupants of the hotel. During a period of several months, subject and her roommate occupied a nine by twelve room on the fifth floor of a "walk-up" and shared a bath with four men. This room cost them $150 a month each. At the present time subject and her roommate are living in a single room, without private bath, and for the privilege are paying $ Rs. 200 a week each (approximately $60.).

3. In a dispatch dated 28 November, subject stated that "I am now spending more than my combined salary and allowances to maintain only a moderate standard of living. It appears at present that it is unlikely that any permanent quarters will be found for unmarried members of the staff. . .since four officers' families are en route to Bombay and three such families presently in Bombay are without places to live. Any accomodations secured through the Consulate will of course be made available first to the highest ranking officer in need of housing. Any accommodations found through other channels have so far been prohibitive in price. . . ."

4. In support of subject's statement of conditions she attached, at the Consul General's suggestion, a copy of his report to the State Department dated November 7, 1947. Pertinent portions of the Consul General's dispatch have been

SECRET

SECRET

excerpted and are appended to this memorandum.

5. Subject's present salary, minus retirement and income tax, is $105.12 per two-week pay period; her present living and quarters allowance amounts to $78.45. The proposed increase to a CAF-9 would bring her net salary to $127.42 per two-week pay period and her living allowance to $103.07 - a difference of $46.92 every two weeks. A promotion to a CAF-8 would be insufficient, since her allowances would remain the same and the salary increase would amount only to $10.75 per pay period.

Lloyd George
Lloyd George
Chief, FE.

ORIGINATOR : Virginia Pryor VP
DEPUTY CHIEF FOR SEA: Don S. Garden DSG

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

Despatch No. 537
File No. 125.42
JOHN J. MACDONALD, ad

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Bombay, India, November 7, 1947

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my despatches numbered 93, 281 and 480 dated April 3, June 19 and September 13, 1947 respectively, and to report that the housing situation in Bombay is getting more critical daily.

****

Not only is living at hotels unsatisfactory in this climate, but it is far more expensive than any member of this staff can afford. So far the staff has accepted the unsatisfactory and expensive living conditions without undue complaints but this situation cannot continue without seriously affecting morale and forcing resignations, or requests for transfers which I cannot conscientiously disapprove. The local authorities have been requested on numerous occasions to assist this office in obtaining living quarters and, although they have been making vague promises ever since my arrival last February, no houses or apartments have materialized. It is not likely that anything will be obtained through the Government unless a substantial bribe known locally as "pugree" is paid. It is generally recognized now that only persons and firms paying "pugree" get living accommodations.

An endeavor is being made to find a suitable residence for the Consul General and staff quarters that can be purchased, but the demand for all types of dwellings has resulted in fantastically high prices and it is doubtful that anything will be obtained.

This office had an opportunity of leasing a floor of a building that could have been made into three apartments as reported in my telegram No. 366 dated October 13, 1947. This request was disapproved by the Department and it is most unlikely that another opportunity of this sort will arise. It must be pointed out that if any places do become available, the landlord will demand a lease on behalf of the Department before he will even consider renting the place. Landlords with whom I have talked informed me that if any of their places do become available they will not lease them to members of the staff but will lease them to the Department.

I cannot stress sufficiently the seriousness of the present situation particularly, from the financial standpoint and request that the Department increase the rent allowance for members of the staff who are forced to live in temporary quarters. If this is not done it will be impossible for them to live within their income if they remain at this post......................

Respectfully yours,

John J. MacDonald,
American Consul General

SECRET

Special Funds 30 April 1947

Acting Chief, FBZ

Ann L. Goodpasture

1. Above subject arrived in Bombay, India 17 April 1947 according to a letter received from her last week.

2. Subject's promotion to CAF-7 becomes effective upon arrival.

Harry W. Little, Jr.
Acting Chief, FBZ

ORIGINATOR: Virginia Pryor

ACTING CHIEF, DIV. 1, FBZ: Don S. Gardan DSG

cc: Captain Roger Hillsman

SECRET

SECRET

6 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING CHIEF, FBZ
Through: ACOPS

Subject: Request for Designation of Ann Lorene Goodpasture

Reference: Memorandum for Mr. Zagier via Mr. Penrose from Mr. Joyce, subject, "Request from FBL for Foreign Service Title for Mr. Eric W. Timm", dated 14 January 1947

Enclosure: Memorandum for Control via COPS from FBZ, subject, "Request for Designation of Ann Lorene Goodpasture", dated 30 January 1947 (triplicate)

1598

1. There is returned herewith the branch request for a Foreign Service title for Miss Ann Lorene Goodpasture. Before this title can be requested from the Department of State, complete information must be furnished.

2. EDUCATION is not to be combined with EXPERIENCE, but is to be set up as in sample personal history statement furnished on 13 September, and is to include names and locations of schools and colleges, dates attended and degrees conferred. The sample statement also specified that language qualifications are to be indicated by speaking, reading and writing abilities.

Robert P. Joyce
Control

SECRET

SECRET

30 January 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Control

VIA : COPS

FROM : Acting Chief, FBZ

SUBJECT : Request for Designation of Ann Lorene Goodpasture

1. Will you please request the State Department to designate Ann Lorene Goodpasture as administrative assistant to the United States Consulate in Bombay, India.

(1) This station is not, and has never been, in operation by CIG. However, an intelligence officer has completed his training and will depart from the United States in February to implement the station.

(2) An intelligence officer will depart in February for assignment to the Bombay station. No CIG personnel are on duty there now.

(3) Miss Goodpasture has been an employee of OSS, SSU, and CIG since February 1944.

(4) Miss Goodpasture is now residing in Washington, D. C. She will complete her CIG training course on 7 February 1947, and will then be ready for entry in the Department of State's Foreign Service School.

(5) There has been no previous request for a designation for Miss Goodpasture.

(6) Miss Goodpasture will serve CIG in the capacity of administrative assistant to the senior intelligence officer.

(7) Miss Goodpasture will be the second employee to be assigned to the Consulate in Bombay.

(8) Miss Goodpasture's previous experience with OSS in India and China qualify her for the position of administrative assistant.

(9) For the present it is contemplated that Miss Goodpasture and the senior intelligence officer will be sufficient CIG representation in Bombay.

Interviewed by Mr. [illegible]

SECRET

(10) Miss Goodpasture's present salary is $2644.80 base, per annum, CAF-5. Upon her arrival in Bombay her base salary per annum will be $3397.20, CAF-7.

(11) Miss Goodpasture's personal history statement is attached.

REQUEST FOR OVERSEAS TRANSPORTATION

SECRET

SEC. A **TO:** Assistant Executive for Personnel — 8 January 1947

YOUR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR THE OVERSEAS TRANSPORTATION OF ANN [illegible] GOODPASTURE
NAME OF TRAVELER

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TRIP IS:

Miss Goodpasture is being transferred from Washington, D. C. to Bombay, India, where she will be assigned as Administrative Assistant at the American Conlate in Bombay.

Designation has not been requested.

8 January 1947
DATE

Lloyd George
SIGNATURE (INITIATING OFFICER)

THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS CONCERNING THE ABOVE TRAVELER WERE COMPLETED ON THE DATES INDICATED BELOW:

DATE ASSESSED AND APPROVED 25 August 1944	DATE SECURITY APPROVED 19 February 1944	
DATE ENTERED ON DUTY 1 December 1946	DATE OF OVERSEAS PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 9 December 1946	DATE IMMUNIZATION INITIATED 6 December 1946

10 January 19
DATE

SIGNATURE (TRANSPORTATION CLEARANCE OFFICER)

DATE 8 Jan 47

TRANSPORTATION ACTION SHEET

NAME Goodpasture, Ann L. BRANCH 7DZ

Letter of Committment

Draft Status

Navy or Marine Reserve

FORM 36-23
Sec. A.
Justification
Assessment
Security
EOD
Overseas Physical
Immunizations

Sec. B.
Travel Sponsor
Availability Date

Sec. C.
Completed

Transfer Letter
PCS
TDY
Auth. For Auto
To Duggan
To ADSO
Returned From ADSO
Approved
Disapproved
Copy to Special Funds
Copy to Strohl 7 March 47

FORM 36-27
Trans. for Family
Person to be contacted

Date of Movement
Trans. of Household effects
Person to be contacted

Date of Movement
Strohl
Pfeifer
To ADSO
Returned from ADSO
Copy to Special Funds
Copy to Strohl

FORM 36-5 Cargo No. 11575
Completed 5 March 47
2 copies to Strohl 5 March 47
Pick-up date
Strohl
Pfeifer

FORM 36-5 (Auto.) Cargo No.
Completed
2 copies to Strohl
Pick-up Date
Strohl
Pfeifer

FORM 36-4 Cargo No. 11575
Completed 5 March 47
Copy to Strohl 5 March 47
Misc.

FORM 36-4 (Auto.) Cargo No.
Completed
Copy to Strohl
Misc.

Agreement for Auto.
Completed
Notorized

Cardex Card checked 5 March 47

Passport No.

Misc.

Filed 9 April 47

Departed 13 April '47

8 JAN 47
(Date)

Central Intelligence Group
New War Department Building
21st & Virginia Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Section 7, Public Law 600, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, approved 2 August 1946, I hereby agree to remain in the Government service for the twelve months following my appointment, unless separated for reasons beyond my control. In case of a violation of this agreement, any moneys expended by the United States on account of my travel, expenses of transportation of my immediate family and expenses of transportation of my household goods and personal effects from any place of actual residence at time of appointment to place of employment outside the continental United States, and for such expenses on my return from such post of duty to my place of actual residence at time of assignment to duty outside the United States, shall be considered as a debt due by me to the United States.

It is further understood and agreed by me that I shall be required by Central Intelligence Group to serve a minimum period of 18 * ~~twenty-four~~ months at my place of employment outside the continental United States, and, if I wish to resign or terminate my appointment or return to the United States before the expiration of 18 ~~twenty-four~~ months after the date of departure for my overseas post, the Central Intelligence Group will not pay my return travel expenses from such station outside the United States.

Ann Louise Goodpasture

WITNESS:

Harold P. Pfeifer

* agreement with this individual made before 24 mon. order was promulgated.

George

SECRET

22 November 1946

TO : Assistant Executive Officer.

FROM : FBZ.

THROUGH: ADO.

SUBJECT: Request For Waiver of Assessment of Ann Lorene GOODPASTURE.

Will you please grant a Waive of Assessment for the proposed assignment of Ann Lorene GOODPASTURE as administrative assistant attached to the American Consulate at Bombay, India?

Miss GOODPASTURE was previously assessed in August 1944. She has been employed by OSS, SSU and CIG continuously since February 1944. From February 1944 to November 1944, she served as secretary to the Chief, East Asia Economic Section, Far East Division, R&A Branch. From November 1944 to October 1945, she served as secretary and chief clerk to the Chief, OSS, R&A Branch, India, Burma and China Theaters, in New Delhi, India, Kandy, Ceylon and Kunming, China. From October 1945 to December 1945, she was assigned as secretary and chief clerk, IRIS, China Theater in Kunming, China and Shanghai, China. From December 1945, until the present time, she has been assigned as reference clerk, Order of Battle Section, SI, Shanghai, and to Registry, Washington.

0/14

SECRET

FORM 1001
(Rev. 4-11-41)

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
(TO BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN TRIPLICATE)

NAME GOODPASTURE, Ann L.

NATURE OF ACTION: Termination to accept excepted appointment.

EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 November, 1946

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS
LAST WORKING DAY 15 November 1946

FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
1 FOR MILITARY LEAVE WITHOUT PAY — ATTACH 3 COPIES OF MILITARY ORDERS AT LEAST ONE OF WHICH MUST BE A PHOTOSTAT OR CERTIFIED COPY.
2 EFFECTIVE DATE SHALL BE FILLED IN BY THE LEAVE UNIT, FINANCE BRANCH, FOR SEPARATIONS OR RESIGNATIONS.

	INITIAL	DATE
CLASSIFICATION		12-11-46
VICE ☐ IA ☐ VV ☐ NEW ☐	Rec. # 916 CSC # 9, 7-10-42	
BUDGET		12-2-46
EMPLOYMENT		12-22-46
CHIEF, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BRANCH		12-22-46

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Clerk	
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-6 $2770.20	
BRANCH	Director's Office, Executive Office	
DIVISION	Registry	
SECTION	FIELD ~~[illegible] Analysis~~	
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	
DEPT. OR FIELD	Departmental	

REMARKS OR PROPOSED DUTIES:

Please transfer leave to Special Funds.

APPROVED
DEC 26 1946

RECOMMENDED: J Gilbert DATE 9/12/46

OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF, OR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

SECRET

ENGAGEMENT SHEET

1. To be filled out in duplicate by the Unit Administrative Officer for all prospective employees to be paid from Special Funds.
2. To be accompanied by detailed job description, complete biographical sketch, and a formal notice of security clearance, and Personnel Action Request if engagement is overseas.
3. To be approved or accepted by the officers in the order listed below.
4. Original to be retained by S.F.; copy to be returned to initiating Administrative Officer.

12 November 1946

1. NAME: Ann L. GOODPASTURE
2. LEGAL RESIDENCE: Oklahoma
3. ADDRESS OF LOCAL LIVING QUARTERS: 1514 17th St., NW Apt. 111 TEL. De 0300, X-1118
4. ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE: ~~17 November~~ 1 December 1946
5. ANNUAL SALARY: ~~$2644.80~~ 2770.80 CLASSIFICATION: CAF-5
6. PERMANENT STATION: Bombay
7. POSITION: Clerk CONTROL NO.
8. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED, STATE BUREAU, BRANCH, OR DEPARTMENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FROM WHICH TRANSFERRED: [illegible]
9. GENERAL REMARKS: Please request leave balances from vouchered payroll.

APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE
(in accordance with existing personnel engagement procedures)

A. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER DATE 13 Nov
B. BRANCH CHIEF DATE
C. CHAIRMAN, PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMITTEE DATE
D. (For the) ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Wm G. Harvey DATE 15 Nov 1946
E. CHIEF, SPECIAL FUNDS Emmett D. Echols DATE 18 Nov 46

FORM NO. 33-1
SEP 1946

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ADO
Through: Acting Chief, FBZ
FROM : Acting Chief, Div. 1, FBZ

DATE: 5 November 1946

SUBJECT: Ann Lorene Goodpasture

Division 1, FBZ, requests that the above subject be transferred from SSU Registry to Div. 1, FBZ. Three copies of her Form 57 are attached.

It is planned to send Miss Goodpasture to Bombay upon completion of her CIG and State Department training. Her present grade is a CAF-5, but her duties in her new position entitle her to a promotion to a CAF-7 upon her arrival in Bombay. A job description is attached.

When Miss Goodpasture first made known her desire to return to the Far East, this division contacted Registry and found that they were willing to release her for an overseas assignment. A replacement has already been obtained for her and Miss Goodpasture will be on leave from 4 November to 2 December, 1946. Registry agreed to carry her on their rolls until their personnel is terminated by SSU or until she can be picked up by CIG—which ever is sooner.

SECRET

SECRET

JOB DESCRIPTION

Junior Intelligence Officer

Clerk in State Department establishment abroad -- CAF-7

Perform cryptographic duties for Senior Intelligence Officer; set up and maintain counter-intelligence card files and such other personality or intelligence files and records as are necessary for the use and information of the Principal State Department officer and the Senior CIG representative; assist in preparation of positive and counter-intelligence reports to Washington; collect and report to the Senior CIG officer such intelligence as she may be requested to obtain; perform secretarial and clerical duties as are required by Senior CIG officer.

SECRET

OSS FORM 7001
(Rev. 4-11-44)

OSS PERSONNEL ACTION REQUES

(TO BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN TRIPLICATE)

NAME: Ann L. Goodpasture

NATURE OF ACTION: Transfer w/SCU

EFFECTIVE DATE: 5 June 1946 ~~As soon as possible~~

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS
LAST WORKING DAY:

FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
1. FOR MILITARY LEAVE WITHOUT PAY—ATTACH 3 COPIES OF MILITARY ORDERS AT LEAST ONE OF WHICH MUST BE A PHOTOSTAT OR CERTIFIED COPY.
2. EFFECTIVE DATE SHALL BE FILLED IN BY THE LEAVE UNIT, FINANCE BRANCH, FOR SEPARATIONS OR RESIGNATIONS.

		INITIAL	DATE
CLASSIFICATION	Eul		5/31/46
VICE			
IA	✓ Cl#9 Bu#916 7/1/42		
VV			
NEW			
BUDGET	135		5/29
EMPLOYMENT			6/3
	Reg XVI		
CHIEF, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BRANCH			6/5

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Clerk-Steno	Clerk
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-5, $2430 per annum	CAF-5, $2430 per annum
BRANCH	SI	Registry
DIVISION		
SECTION		Field
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
DEPT. OR FIELD	Field	Departmental

REMARKS OR PROPOSED DUTIES:

Miss Goodpasture is on an A-1-7 which expires on 30 June. She is to be assigned to the position being vacated by Louise M. White.

RECEIVED JUN 5 1946

JUN 5 1946

RECEIVED MAY 31 1946

RECOMMENDED:

DATE: 24 May 46

Mr. Karlow, Secretariat
via Mr. May
C. J. Gilbert, Registry

22 May, 1946

Anne Goodpasture

It is requested that action be started to transfer Mrs. Anne Goodpasture, CAF-5, to Registry, Document Analysis Unit, to replace Mrs. Louise White, CAF-5, who is being transferred to Files.

SS Form 1035
(Rev. 3/31/44)

No. ______________
(Not to be filled in by traveler)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Date: 2 April 1946

REQUEST FOR DOMESTIC TRAVEL ORDER

Anne L. Goodpasture (Name) — CAF-5, $2320 p.a. (Grade and Title) — (Serial No.)

SI (Office or Branch) — Washington, D. C. (Official Station)

1. Itinerary and justification of proposed travel (all stop overs must be specifically indicated and the need for the travel fully explained).

Embarked 1800 hrs	**4 March**
Left Shanghai	**5 March**
Arrived Seattle	**20 March)Involuntarily detained by**
Left Seattle	**26 March)POE Emb. Officer**
Arrived Chicago	**29 March**
Left Chicago	**29 March**
Arrived Washington	**30 March**

2. Duration of travel or authority requested: From **4 March** To **30 March**
3. Mode of travel (Check "X"):

*☐ Personally owned automobile. ☐ Common Carrier. (Commercial) ☐ Government vehicle. (Commercial)

*☐ Extra fare train ☐ Airplane (Military) ☒ Vessel (Military)

*4. Allowance for personally owned automobile recommended on following basis (check):

☐ (a)___cents per mile, as being more economical and advantageous to the Government.
Justify: ______________

☐ (b)___cents per mile when not practicable to use common carrier.

☐ (c)___Actual expense.

*5. Per diem allowance recommended: **Usual allowance**

6. Number of transportation requests required:___Tax exemption certificates required
7. Estimated cost: $ **200.**
8. Allotment Account No.: **2101**
9. Special provisions:

Approved:

Louis M. Denman
(Office or Branch Chief)

Adm. Asst. Staffs I and III
(Title)
SI

5

---

* Not to be filled in by military or naval travelers.
(37189)

20131-462

Leave Unit 2 April 1946

Staffs I and III, SI

(1)

Miss Ann L. Goodpasture

Miss Ann L. Goodpasture reported back to SI Washington from Shanghai on 1 April 1946. On the trip back, she developed a rather serious ear ailment, and it is feared that an operation may be necessary. Dr. Thompson of the Medical Division was going to attempt to have her admitted to a hospital Monday night for further attention and treatment. After release from the hospital she will go to her home in Tipton, Oklahoma.

In view of the above facts, we shall show Miss Goodpasture as being on sick leave (approximately one month) until her return to duty, at which time she will fill out the form 71 and any other necessary papers.

Livia M. Demian

PE25731

Mr. Chester J. Botticelli
Payroll Section

2 April 1946 (1)

Staffs I and III, SI

Miss Ann L. Goodpasture

Miss Ann L. Goodpasture who returned from Shanghai on 1 April 1946 has informed me that she has cancelled her "Power of Attorney" in writing and that she has not been paid since 9 February.

It is requested that her case be checked and necessary steps be taken to reimburse her. Miss Goodpasture has been a Clerk-Steno, CAF-5, $2320 with the SI office since 16 Dec. 1945. She departed from Shanghai on 5 March and arrived in Washington on 30 March.

Miss Goodpasture is being hospitalized immediately, due to a serious ear ailment which developed on the trip back, and will probably be out for approximately one month. Any payments should be mailed to her in Tipton, Oklahoma (no Street address), until further notice.

Livia M. Demian

OSS FORM 1001
(Rev. 4-11-44)

OSS PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

(BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN TRIP TE)

NAME: Goodpasture, Ann L.

NATURE OF ACTION: ~~Change in official station~~ Transfer

EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 March 1946

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS
LAST WORKING DAY:

FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

1. FOR MILITARY LEAVE WITHOUT PAY—ATTACH 3 COPIES OF MILITARY ORDERS AT LEAST ONE OF WHICH MUST BE A *PHOTOSTAT* OR CERTIFIED COPY
2. EFFECTIVE DATE SHALL BE FILLED IN BY THE LEAVE UNIT, FINANCE BRANCH, FOR SEPARATIONS OR RESIGNATIONS.

		INITIAL	DATE
CLASSIFICATION	Civil	B.C.	4/4/46
VICE			
IA			
VV			
NEW			
BUDGET			4-3
EMPLOYMENT			4-5
CHIEF, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BRANCH		B.C.	8 Apr 46

F-5065

A-1-7

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Clerk-Steno	Clerk-Steno
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-5, $2320 per annum	CAF-5, ~~$2320~~ 2420 per annum
BRANCH	SI	SI
DIVISION		
SECTION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Shanghai, China	Washington, D. C.
DEPT. OR FIELD	Field	Field x

REMARKS OR PROPOSED DUTIES:

x Not to exceed 90 days within continental U.S.

RECEIVED
Apr 10 1 44 PM '46
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

APPROVED COPY
APR 8 1946

RECEIVED
APR 3 3 49 PM '46
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

RECOMMENDED: Livia M. Kernan
OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF, OR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

DATE: 2 April 1946

OSS FORM 1001
(Rev. 4-11-44)

OSS PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
(TO BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN TRIPLICATE)

NAME: Goodpasture, Anne

NATURE OF ACTION: Transfer

EFFECTIVE DATE: 16 Dec 45

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS
LAST WORKING DAY:

FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
1. FOR MILITARY LEAVE WITHOUT PAY—ATTACH 3 COPIES OF MILITARY ORDERS AT LEAST ONE OF WHICH MUST BE A PHOTO-STAT OR CERTIFIED COPY
2. EFFECTIVE DATE SHALL BE FILLED IN BY THE LEAVE UNIT, FINANCE BRANCH, FOR SEPARATIONS OR RESIGNATIONS.

		INITIAL	DATE
CLASSIFICATION	E-5065	[illegible]	1-22-46
VICE			
IA			
VV			
NEW			
BUDGET			1-14
EMPLOYMENT			1-24
CHIEF, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BRANCH			1-25

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Clerk-Steno	Clerk-Steno
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-5, $2320	CAF-5, $2320
BRANCH	R&A	SI
DIVISION		
SECTION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Shanghai	Shanghai
DEPT. OR FIELD	Field	Field

REMARKS OR PROPOSED DUTIES:

Information from Cable #30712, 5 Jan 46

RECEIVED
JAN 25 1 43 PM '46
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC SERVICES

APPROVED
COPY
JAN 29 1946

RECEIVED
JAN 14 11 51 AM '46
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC SERVICES

Elizabeth B. Campbell

DATE: 9 Jan 46

Form 2803 Revised
U. S. Civil Service Commission
April 1941

REQUEST FOR SERVICE RECORD

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Department, bureau, independent office, and branch)

march 3, 1944
(Date)

Chief, Retirement Division,
U. S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D. C.

It is requested that the complete official service record and retirement deductions by fiscal years be furnished for the following-named employee:

1. Name in full Goodpasture, Ann L.
(Surname, first name, and middle initial; if married woman give maiden name)

2. Date of birth November 28, 1918 3. Date last appointed to this office February 29, 1944

4. Date deductions began

5. Service claimed as follows:

Department, Branch, or Independent Office	Bureau, Agency, Etc., and Location	Title of Position	Salary	Date Appointed			Date Separated		
				Month	Day	Year	Month	Day	Year
War Relocation Authority	Personnel Mgm Wash. D. C.	Clk. Steno	1620	12	1	43	2	28	44

Remarks:

(Signature of appointing officer)

(Title) Director of Personnel

FOR USE OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Date	2806 Forwarded to—	Basic earnings	Additional service

To

Please furnish the Commission with a certified record of service and retirement deductions on Form 2806 for the periods indicated by mark (X) on the above schedule, together with a copy of this request. Prompt compliance with this request will be appreciated.

By direction of the Commission:

Very respectfully,

Lewis H. Fisher

LEWIS H. FISHER,
Chief, Retirement Division.

(Read carefully instructions on back)

16—417

[illegible]

Strategic Services   February 10, 1944

2987

xxxxxxxx Indefinite   for the duration of the
xxxxxxxx   emergency.

1   F   Clerk-Stenographer   CAF-4, $1800 Research & Analysis
Far East
Manpower and Military
Supply

REGULATION IX

The transfer of Miss Ann L. Goodpasture from War Relocation Authority, $1620 per annum, under Regulation IX is requested. Date of birth: November 23, 1918, place of birth: Celina, Tennessee, address: 247 Delaware Avenue, S. W., Apartment 308, Washington, D. C.

Under the general supervision of the Chief, Manpower and Military Supply Section, serves as his secretary; assembles and digests information and data for use by her superior in preparing intelligence and research reports and documents; takes and transcribes difficult dictation consisting of correspondence, memoranda and reports involving foreign geographic terminology; determines priority on office work distribution; takes verbatim transcripts of important telephone calls, conferences and meetings; independently composes correspondence in reply to requests for specific strategic information; receives callers and disposes of their business personally or refers them to the proper official; answers telephone inquiries requiring an intimate knowledge of the activities of the Section; arranges appointments, meetings and conferences; maintains leave and attendance records for the Section; is responsible for the maintenance of complex office files of research documents,   (OVER)

Form 57 attached.

C.S.C. No. D-98
2/21

Acting Chief, Employment and
Placement Division

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. EMPL. SERIAL NO. 057303

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 2 Jun 1941

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) GOODPASTURE, Ann Lorene

3. SEX F

4. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918

5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 18 Sep 1947

6. MARITAL STATUS Single

7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee) NO. 0 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954 OTHER STATUS

10. LAST MED. APT. May 1972

QUAL. FOR Dis abil Reg Retirement

EVAL. FOR MedRetIrCIA

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS NONE X SERVICE GRADE ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1 RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2 TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3 RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1941-32 Elko Photographic Finishing Co, Okla City, Okla - Photo Tech(?)
1942-43 Office of Price Administration, DC - Clerk-Typist, Employee Services Officer
1943-44 Office of Emergency Management, DC - Clerk-Stenographer
1944-47 OSS, SSU & CIG, DC, India, Ceylon, China - Clerk, Clerk-Stenographer, Administrative Assistant

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1937-41 Univ of Oklahoma - BS Education, Arts & Science
1941-42 Hills Univ, Oklahoma City, Okla - Business Administration; Typing

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

Spanish - R,W High; P,U Interm; S, Slight; T, None May 1962 (disclaims pro Apr 1969)/

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1947 State Orient
1947 OSO Training
1949 Intel Orient
1949 Ops Famil
1951 Photo
1951 CI Tech
1951 Secret Writing
1951 Admin Proc
1951 Commo Briefing
1951 Comm Party Org & Ops
1951 Confid Funds (tutorial)
1951 Picks & Locks
1956 Cable Writing Refresher
1955 Countespionage Ops
1955 CI Ops

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1947	Admin Asst	0341.02	7		OSO/FBZ	Bombay
Dec 1947	"	0341.02	9		" "	"
Dec 1948	"	0341.02	7		" "	Hq
Mar 1949	Reports Off	0132.58	P-2		OSO/COPS/FBZ/SEA/Div #1	"
Dec 1950	I.O. (Ops)	0132.00	GS-7		OSO/FBZ/SEA/Branch 1	"
Feb 1951	" "	0132.00	9		" " " " "	"
May 1951	" "	0132.00	9		OSO/FDT	Monterrey
Mar 1953	I.O.	0132.00	9		DDP/WH-3	"
Feb 1954	I.O. (FI)	0132.06	9	FI	DDP/WH/PBSUCCESS	Hq
Jul 1954	" "	0136.51	11	FI	" " "	"
Dec 1954	Area Ops Off	0136.01	11	FI	DDP/NEA/IndiaPakistanAfghanBr	"
Feb 1955	Paramilitary Off	0136.11	11	DI	DDP/WE/French Br/FI,PP,PM	"
Oct 1955	Ops Off (CE)	0132.52	11	DI	DDP/WE/FI Staff/CE Section	"
Jun 1956	I.O. (FI)	0136.51	11	DI	DDP/NEA/FI Stf/Rpts&RqmtsSec	"
Sep 1956	" "	0136.51	12	DI	DDP/NEA/FI Staff	"
May 1957	" "	0136.51	12	D	DDP/WH-3/Mexico Sta	Mexico City
Nov 1962	Ops Off	0136.01	13	D	" " " "	" "
Jan 1964	" " Nov '68 re	0136.01	13	D	DDP/WH-1/Mexico Station	" "
Dec 1968	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/WH/Rev Comp (Other)	Hqs

20. DATE REVIEWED 6 Mar 1973

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY E 2 IMPDET hms/cal CL BY 010025

22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE (continued) no

FORM 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 057303	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I - Continued)
NAME (Last-First-Middle) GOODPASTURE, Ann Lorene	DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
	Oct 1969 - Oct 1970 -		DDP/WH		Historical Staff - Hq	
Oct 1970	Ops Officer	C136.01	13	D	DDP/CIStf/OpsGp/WEBranch	Hq
Jul 1972	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/CIStaff/Dev Comp	"

DATE REVIEWED 6 Mar 1973	PROFILE REVIEWED BY h-s/cal	E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010025

FORM 7-67 1200-1a SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 057303	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
NAME (Last-First-Middle) GOODPASTURE, Ann Lorene	DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1954 from the DCI for splendid contribution to a project of special sensitivity and importance.

Commendation 1959 from COS, Mexico City, for contribution to the preparation of charts for General Cassidy's visit.

27. DATE REVIEWED 6 Mar 1973	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hms/cal	E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010026

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1060 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 67

SECRET

PROFILE (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 057303

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
GOODPASTURE ANN L.	11/28/18	F	13	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR. OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/CI/OPS	Washington, D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 November 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 18 October 1970 - 31 October 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Monitors all operational correspondence from the Far East Division Stations for counterintelligence leads and evidence of hostile espionage operations.
RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reviews field project outlines for evidence of penetrations, provocations, or foreign intelligence relationships. Advises Headquarters officers in preparation of security reviews. Represents CI Staff at DDP project review meetings when the ~~XXXXXXXXXXX~~ senior officer is not available.
RATING LETTER

3 Alternate Headquarters case officer to the Chief, CIOPS/FE for sensitive Prescribed and Limited Distribution counterintelligence projects handled by CI Staff.
RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinates cables and dispatches from FE Division Headquarters to field stations on CI cases and agent clearances.
RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains background files for use in consultation with FE Division officers on CI problems.
RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepares for Chief, CI, summaries of counterintelligence incidents which suddenly develop such as arrests, defections, and newspaper exposures.
RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.
RATING LETTER

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

FEB [illegible] '72

See memorandum in lieu of Fitness Report.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Ann L. GOODPASTURE
18 October 1970 - 31 October 1971

To the immense regret of this writer Ann Goodpasture is retiring very soon. It would be silly to rate her competitively against any of her colleagues, male or female, young or merely well-preserved. Concerning her fitness be it recorded that she is very fit indeed to perform any of the tasks listed as her current ones or almost any others I can think of at almost any grade. I venture to rate her over-all performance, thirty years of it, as OUTSTANDING. Ann is one of the tough warp-threads on which this organization is woven, and when she retires the fabric of this organization will be weakened.

William R. Johnson
Chief, CI/OPS/FE

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE:

Ann L. Goodpasture
Ann L. Goodpasture

06 FEB 1972
Date

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Miss Goodpasture is indeed a fine officer who consistently turns in a Strong performance when she is not doing an outstanding job. She is an excellent office and project manager who is cost conscious and she is a careful thorough instructor and briefer. Her retirement will leave a great gap in CI/OPS and, as Mr. Johnson has said, in the organization. I hope she gets the official Agency recognition she deserves for the many years she has made substantive contribution to the CS.

N. Scott Miler
N. Scott MILER
Chief, CI Operations

17.2.72.

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 14 June 1972

FILE NO.: 336

TO: (Check)	x	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION
	☐	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
	x	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) CI

SS NUMBER: 446-14-9768

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 057303

ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: Chief Support Staff

REF: Retirement Debriefing

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: GOODPASTURE, Ann L.

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS
	☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______ ☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER *(Specify)*
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*
	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR 240-2e)*
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR 240-2e)*
	EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS
x	EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD
x	SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*
x	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*
NA	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
x	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
NA	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

MUST REMAIN

FILE

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Subject will be acknowledged as CIA for entire period of employment and is not to reveal specific places or locations of cover assignments.

Forwarding address: 4200 Cathedral
Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Employment address: None

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CO
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - OF
COPY 6 - OCS - FILE

JF:ss

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 12-71 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 13 May 1971

FILE NUMBER: 336

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 057303

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)

X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION
	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH

ATTN: Chief/WH Support Staff

REF: Form 1413 dated 11 May 1971

OFFICIAL COVER:

	BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
X	DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: GOODPASTURE, Ann L.

UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	X	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
	A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF		DATE From EOD
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	NA	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X	ASCERTAIN THAT CIA W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	NA	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)		
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Subject is to indicate CIA as place of employment for entire period and not to reveal specific places or locations of cover assignments.

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CO
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - OF
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

RF:km

James A. Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 12-70 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

14-00000

VIA Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WH Division

DATE 5 June 1957

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT. GENERAL— Administrative

SPECIFIC— [redacted] Anne Goodpasture

ACTION REQUESTED: See Para 5.

1. The following is submitted for the information of C/WH/ADMIN and the additional dissemination as considered necessary.

2. On 25 May 1957 the personal automobile owned by subject was hit by a tornado, removing the hood and other parts of the body. The auto was in custody of subject's brother (in the United States) who contacted the Lawton, Oklahoma, claims adjuster for subject's car insurance (the GEICO Government Employees Insurance Company, Washington, D.C.) who authorized complete coverage. Subject was unaware of the accident until repairs had been completed. There were no personal injuries and no newspaper accounts as this loss was insignificant compared to catastrophic flood and tornado damages in the area.

3. On the insurance policy taken out in [illegible], Subject's employment was shown as U.S. Government with the [illegible] address. The claim to be valid had to show the same. The policy could not be amended to reflect subject's ostensible employment as this type of insurance is available only to U.S. Government employees.

4. Subject brought his automobile into Mexico on 1 June 1957 and is advising the GEICO that he expects to be in Mexico indefinitely and desires that his U.S. insurance be cancelled with receipt of the letter (probably about 10 June 1957.)

5. If queried by GEICO, it is requested that HQ acknowledge subject's KUBARK employment to cover the period of the accident.

Willard C. Curtis

THIS [illegible] REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

RBR
3 June 57
Distribution:
3-Hqtrs
2-Files

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

51-28 A

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RCS: 5 JULY 73

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 057303

2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): GOODPASTURE ANN L.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (DISABILITY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM FROM ESL

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA 30 YR 73

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS ▶ X | V TO V | | V TO CF | | CF TO V | | CF TO CF

7 Financial Analysis No Chargeable: 3227 0183 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 231

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/CI STAFF DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 9997

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 7

18. REMARKS

GOODPASTURE ANN L
013914 1918
710-101-14 JULY 69

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF

19 ACTION CODE: 45

20 Employ Code: 40

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 Hdqtrs Code

25 DATE OF BI: MO 11 DA 28

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: CHE0000

32 Correction / Cancellation: TYPE | MO. DA

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV. TEMP | CODE

39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVER 1 YES | HEALTH INS CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 1-6-73

1150 Mfg. 11-71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

DMS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4 51)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L	057303	31 997	V	GS 13 7	$23,642

7(

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LML: 24 OCT 72

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 057303
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST MIDDLE): GOODPASTURE ANN L

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXTENDED SICK LEAVE DISABILITY RETIREMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 10 DA 23 YR 72
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No Chargeable: 3227 0183 0000
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/CI STAFF DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 7
17 SALARY OR RATE: 22457

18 REMARKS: OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 31
20 Employ Code: 40
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31997 ALPHABETIC CI
22 STATION CODE: 75013
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 Hdqtrs Code:
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 11 DA 28 YR 18
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO 10 DA 23 YR 73
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: SL
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 5 NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0-NONE 1 5 PT. 2-10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0-WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ER

POSTED
11-[illegible]-72

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 11-71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

MLH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

_H: 28 JUL 72

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
057303	GOODPASTURE ANN L

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	07 23 72	REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	3227 0183 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/CI STAFF DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	9997	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	13 7	22487

18 REMARKS
OTHER
W2 INFO: CIA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
16	18	31997	CI	75013		1	11 28 18		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE)	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction Cancellation Data (TYPE MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT)	36 SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY (CODE; CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP)	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 1 WAIVER, 2 YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
07.28.72

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

MLH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DB

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L	057303	31 600	CF	GS 13 7	$22,487

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L	057303	31 400	CF	GS 13 7	$21,313

I 52 [redacted]

1 SERIAL NO.	2. NAME			3 ORGANIZATION		4. FUNDS		5 LWOP HOURS	
057303	GOODPASTURE ANN L			51 997		CF			
6 OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	6	$19,555	11/03/68	GS 13	7	$20,114	11/01/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Paul E Oberst

DATE 9/16/70

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

FVD: 3 NOV 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 057303	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) GOODPASTURE ANN L		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT (CORRECTION)	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 10 18 70	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO V ☒ / CF TO CF ☐	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1127 0170 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/CI STAFF OPERATIONS GROUP WE BRANCH	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0073	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13 6	17 SALARY OR RATE 19555

18 REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE 10/18/70 AS FOLLOWS: ITEM #6 FUNDS WHICH READ V TO V TO READ CF TO CF. ITEM #7 FAN WHICH READ 1227 0170 0000 TO READ 1127 0170 0000.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Health Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 11 28 18	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR		EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS. CODE			40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS		44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-4-70

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-66 Mfg 6-70

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

FVD: 27 OCT 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 057303	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) GOODPASTURE ANN L

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 10 18 70	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1227 0170 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/CI STAFF OPERATIONS GROUP WE BRANCH	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0073	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13 6	17 SALARY OR RATE 19555

18 REMARKS

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 31400 ALPHABETIC CI	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 11 28 18	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: WH

POSTED
10-27-70

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

DMB

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L	057303	51 997	CF	GS 13 5	$19,555

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L	057303	51 997	CF	GS 13 6	$18,447

SF: 2 DEC 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 057303	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) GOODPASTURE ANN L

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 12 01 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No Chargeable	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	9135 0623 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 9997	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 16809

18 REMARKS
OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	18	51997	WH	75013		1	11 28 18		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO	34 SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12-3-68
C

FORM 5-66 1153 Use Previous Edition
Mfg. 10-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

651

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
057303	GOODPASTURE ANN L	51 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	5	$16,329	11/06/66	GS 13	6	$16,809	11/03/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

2
S09

CLERKS INITIALS R.S.WATTLES

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-65 560-E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

J.P.

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L	057303	51 620	CF	GS 13 5	$15,307	$16,329

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L	057303	51 620	CF	GS 13 5	$14,665	$15,307

14-00000

C/WH/1 C46

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
057303	GOODPASTURE ANN L	51 620 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 13	4	$14,217	11/08/64	GS 13	5	$14,665	11/06/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ ✓ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 1- Sept 66

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg 3.65 (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L	057303	51 620	CF	GS 13 4	$13,815	$14,217

14-00000

PJH: 11 FEB 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 057306	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) GOODPASTURE ANN L

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 02 13 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6135 0980 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY SECTION 203 P.L. 88-643
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH I MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0418	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 13815

18. REMARKS
EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28	10	51620	WH	45075		3	11 29 13	11 11 62	11 09 64

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
			2						

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

02-9/66 ED

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L.	057303	51 620	CF	GS 13 4	$13,335	$13,815

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/27/65

1. SERIAL NUMBER 057303	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) GOODPASTURE ANN L	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 05 DA 31 YR 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5135 0990 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0418	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

POSTED
6.9.65

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150b
1-63 MFG. 1-63

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

13

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
057303	GOODPASTURE ANN L	470 51 700 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	3	$12,915	11/10/63	GS 13	4	$13,335	11/08/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

04
559

EH

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE DATE 25 Sep 64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-31)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L	057303	51 700	CF	GS 13 3	$11,880	$12,495

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
057303	GOODPASTURE ANN L	64 700 CF 8	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	2	$11,515	11/11/62	GS 13	3	$11,880	11/10/63 4			

8. Remarks and Authentication

559

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

CL 11/7

BC 11/20/63

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: E.D.ECHOLS DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

LLG: 9 NOV. 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 057303
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): GOODPASTURE ANN L
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 11 DA 11 YR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135 5700 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0852
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 11515
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64700 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 45075
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 11 DA 28 YR 18
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 11 DA. 11 YR 62
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 11 DA 11 YR 62
28. NTE EXPIRES: NO. DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE NO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11/19/62 WK

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

Clg 11/16/62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-31)

14-00000

10C

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS:
EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR_ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR_ST	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L	057333	64700	CF	12 5	$ 9995	12 5	$10735

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
057303	GOODPASTURE ANN L	64 700 CF 8	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	4	$ 9,735	03/19/61	GS 12	5	$ 9,995	09/16/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

4

559

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP MB 9/11/62

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
557303	GOODPASTURE ANN L	DDP/WH 8 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	3	$ 9,475	09/20/59	12	4	$ 9,735	03/19/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/√ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D.ECHOLS WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition SECRET (4-51)

359

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	GOODPASTURE ANN L	557303	46 52	GS-12 3	$ 8,810	$ 9,475

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

eS

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
557303	GOODPASTURE ANN L	DDP/WH 8	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA	YR.				MO.	DA	YR.
GS 12	2	$ 8,570	03	23	58	GS 12	3	$ 8,810	09	20	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS 4 V59

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

C.M. STEWART

RB 9/21/59

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a
1 MAR. 58

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85-462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
GOODPASTURE ANN L	557303	GS-12-2	$ 7,785	$ 8,570

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
557303	GOODPASTURE ANN L	DDP/WH	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
12	1	$ 7,570	09	23	56	12	2	$ 7,785	03	23	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS 4 377420
4705

14. AUTHENTICATION

3/23/58

C. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO 560a
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (5 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ere

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MISS ANN L. GOODPASTURE 157303
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Nov 1918
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 13 November 56

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): REASSIGNMENT 56
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 18 Nov 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE	BE-27-12		IO (FI) BE-571
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 per annum		GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 per annum
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	501600		DDP/HEA FI Staff
11. HEADQUARTERS	2		Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
				SD-DI

O

R

15. SEX: F W
16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-3300-20 750-13 TO: Same
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 09/18/47

POSTED

L Cunne

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

E-11/14/56

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-373647

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MISS ANN L. GOODPASTURE 157303	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 20 Sep 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) PROMOTION 30	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 23 Sep 56	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
BB-28	8. POSITION TITLE	IO (FI) BB-27-12
GS-0136.51-11 $6605.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 501600	DDP/NEA FI Staff
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT O. VET
X					

0

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX F W	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-3300-20 750-13 TO: Same	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

2

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 09/18/47

POSTED
Hmc 25 Sept 56

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956-37

S-E-C-R-E-T

Combined Personnel Action Page 2 of 43 pages

Vouchered to Vouchered **Allotment No.** 7-3300-20

Used in lieu of SF-52 and SF-50 to document actions involving the movement of employees into current NEA Division T.O. Positions in accordance with T.O. authorisation No. 972 approved 25 June 1956, and effective 29 July 1956.

Headquarters

Serial No.	Name	Position Number	Occupational Series	Organ. Code	Organizational Title
					FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE STAFF
	Kaiser, Minnie, R.	BE-27	GS-0136.51-13		I.O. FI
	Morgan, D. Kathryn	BE-28	GS-0136.51-09		I.O. FI
	Goodpasture, Ann, L.	BE-28	GS-0136.51-11		I.O. FI
	Parish, Johnny, E.	BE-357	GS-0132.44-07		REPORTS OFFICER
	Steele, Belle, S.F.	BE-329	GS-0301.28-07		Intelligence Assistant
	Carlson, Mabel	BE-29	GS-0322.01-06		Clerk Typist
	Chandler, Deloros, A.	BE-404	GS-0322.01-05		Clerk Typist
	Leidy, Mildred	BE-38911	GS-0322.01-05		Clerk Typist

Approved: NEA Division — Date 26 July 1956

Records & Services Division, Office of Personnel — Date 22 July 56

S-E-C-R-E-T

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[illegible]

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1v1

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): Miss Ann L. Goodpasture 557303

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Nov 1918

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 7 Mar 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment 06

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: BOB 10 Mar 1957

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
IO (FI) EE-571	8. POSITION TITLE	I. O. (FI) BAF-400
GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 per annum
DDP/EEA FI Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 465250	DDP/WH Branch III Mexico City, Mexico Station
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Mexico City, Mexico
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L 5	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X					

0

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD/DI

2

15. SEX: F

16. APPROPRIATION: W
FROM: 7-3300-20 450-75
TO: 7-3570-55-060

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. REMARKS:

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

POSTED
11 MAR 1957
Rv

3 EOD 09/18/47

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOV'T

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1v1

1. NAME (MR – MISS – MRS – ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME) Miss Ann L. Goodpasture	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 19 Jun 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment 57	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 17 Jun 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Operations Off. (CE) BB-574-11	8. POSITION TITLE	IO (FI) BE-28
GS-0132.58-11	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $6605.00 per annum
DDP/WE FI Staff Counter Espionage Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 500130	DDP/NEA FI Staff Reports & Requirements Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13 VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
X					

0

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DI

15 SEX F	16. APPROPRIATION W FROM: 6-3600-20 TO: 6-3300-20 750-13	17 SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19 LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

2

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD

POSTED
22 June 56

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

X

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 - 350000

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

MJ 6/21/56

14-00000

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-320030

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Payroll period

3. Block No. 6-3600-20

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
GOODPASTURE, Ann L.

6. Grade and salary
GS-11 $6390.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
WB 1

12. Prepared by
mms 11-8-55

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

14. Effective date
1 Jan56

15. Date last equivalent increase
4 Jul 54

16. Old salary rate
$6390.00

17. New salary rate
$6605.00

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
ARE SATISFACTORY

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ Date [illegible] and [illegible] waiting period.
☐ [illegible] at [illegible] waiting period.

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

dah

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Miss Ann L. Goodpasture	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 21 Oct 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 23 Oct 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Para-Mil. Off. BB-101-11	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Off. (CE) BB-574-11
GS-0136.11-11 $6390.00 Per Annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.52-11 $6390.00 Per Annum
French Branch, FI, PP, BM	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE FI Staff Counter Espionage Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD XX DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
x					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DI

15. SEX F	16. APPROPRIATION W FROM: 6-3600-20 TO: Same	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

POSTED
31 OCT 1955

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 - 350809

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

113 10/24/55

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

See Corr 10 Feb [illegible]

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) s Ann L. Goodpasture	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION No.	4. DATE 25 Feb 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE B.O.B. 27 Feb 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Area Ops. Off. BEF 387	8. POSITION TITLE	Para—Mil. Off. BB 101—11
GS-0136.01-11 $5940.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.11—11 $5940.00 per annum
DDP/NEA India, Pakistan, Afghanistan Br.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE French Branch, FT, PP, PM
New Delhi, India	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
F	W	FROM: 5—3340—55—013 TO: 5-3600-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Oklahoma

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE [illegible] AMENDED TO 6390

EFB 1 Mar 55

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Deputy Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950—815738

[illegible] 2-28-55

SECRET

12/14/54

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MISS ANN L. GOODPASTURE
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Nov. 1918
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 21 Nov. 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 19 DEC 1954
7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Officer (FI) BA(P) 808	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Off. BEF 387
GS-0136.51-11 $5940 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-11 $5940 p a
DDP/WH Project PBSUCESS	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/NEA India Pakistan Afghanistan Br.
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	New Delhi, India
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Grade of position BEF 387 is GS-12.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): THOMAS J. HESTER, NEA/ADM/PERSONNEL
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Zella Neel X 8671
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: James P. Humphries (wmn)
Title: FI/CMO 23 Nov '54

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:FI

I Certify Funds Available:

15. SEX: F
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: Oblig. Ref. No. 5-3500-51-001
FROM: Charge Allot. ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~
TO: Auth. for NEA/[illegible] 5-3340-55-013
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: OKLA.

21. STANDARD FORM 52 REMARKS

Concurred
C.L. [illegible] 12-10-54
CW 12-13-54
Em Logan
E D ok to OK
[illegible] Neel [illegible]
12/14/54 [illegible]

OFFICE/DIVISION WITHIN CEILING
12/10
Date
Position Con. Clk.

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		12-8-54
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS

POSTED
12/17/54

F. APPROVED BY
SECRET /0 A. [illegible]

6/24/54
8am

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr—Miss—Mrs—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Miss Ann L. Goodpasture
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Nov. 1918
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 10 June 1954
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion *
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 1 July 54
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Officer (FI) BA(P)-803	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer (FI) BA(P) 8085
GS-0136.51-9 $5435 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $5940 per annum
DDP/WH Project PBSUCCESS	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Project PBSUCCESS
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): P. C. BOWERS, Personnel Officer
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Marion Mazuzan, X-4161
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: HOWARD J. PRESTON
Title: Administrative Officer, PBS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REC.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX: F
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3500-51-081
TO: 4-3500-51-081
18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: OKLAHOMA

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

*This action also corrects Reassignment notification dated 4 Dec. 53, to show the correct salary, previously shown as $5310.00 per annum.

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: JUN 21 1954

POSTED

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		6/23
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		23 June 54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

Dayton 23 June 54

SECRET

10—67329-8

SECRET

COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION
UNVOUCHERED TO UNVOUCHERED

USED IN LIEU OF SF-52 TO DOCUMENT PERSONNEL ACTIONS INVOLVING THE MOVEMENT OF EMPLOYEES INTO CURRENT T/O POSITIONS AND REFLECT CHANGES IN TITLE AND/OR ADDING SIX DIGIT CLASS SERIES NUMBERS.

DATE OF T/O APPROVAL: 29 April 1954 EFFECTIVE DATE OF ACTION: 23 May 1954

DDP/WH
PROJECT PBSUCCESS

	FROM			TO		
Name	Title	Code/Grade	Pos No.	Title	Code/Grade	Pos No.
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS						
PRESTON, Howard J.	Admin Off.	GS-0301.01-15	BAP-29	Admin Off.	GS-0301.03-15	BAP-8002
DUDLEY, Thomas J.	Fin. Ops. Off.	GS-0510.15-12	BAP-30	Fin.Ops.Off.	GS-0510.15-12	BAP-8003
SHOEMAKER, M. P.	Log. Off.	GS-2010.01-12	BAP-31	Log. Off.	GS-2010.01-12	BAP-8004
BOWERS, Philip C.	Personnel Off.	GS-0201.01-11	BAP-32	Personnel Off.	GS-0201.01-11	BAP-8008
BERTRAND, Eileen A.	Dispatch Anal.	GS-0305.12-7	BAP-33	Dispatch Anal.	GS-0305.12-7	BAP-8011
STONE, Cynthia H.	Clerk Typist	GS-0322.01-5	BAP-35	Clerk Typist	GS-0322.01-5	BAP-8014
HARRISON, Cynthia M.	Clerk Steno	GS-0312.01-4	BAP-36	Clerk Steno	GS-0312.01-4	BAP-8015
STATION LINCOLN						
HANEY, Albert R.	Ops Off (Ch,FI)	GS-0132.06-15	BAP-1	Ops Off, PP	GS-0136.31-15	BAP-8016
HOBBINS, Enno R.	Ops Off (Dep Ch)(PP)	GS-0136.31-14	BAP-2	Ops Off, PP	GS-0136.31-14	BAP-8018
DOUGHERTY, John S.	Ops Officer	GS-0132.06-13	BAP-3	Intel Off (FI)	GS-0136.51-13	BAP-8019
JACOBSON, Harry G.	Ops Officer	GS-0132.06-13	BAP-4	Intel Off (FI)	GS-0136.51-13	BAP-8020
NOLAN, William F.	Air Ops Off	GS-0136.16-13	BAP-13	Air Ops Off	GS-0136.16-13	BAP-8021
KING, Michael J.	Fiscal Acct	GS-0501.03-11	BAP-11	Fiscal Acct.Asst.	GS-0501.03-11	BAP-8022
STEWART, Jack	Intel Off (FI)	GS-0132.06-9	BAP-12	Intel Off (FI)	GS-0136.51-9	BAP-8023
BAUMAN, Jack McV.	Invest. (Gen)	GS-1810-12	BAP-18	Security Off.	GS-1810.01-12	BAP-8024
ROCKETT, Alice E.	Reports Off.	GS-0132.44-9	BAP-6	Reports Off.	GS-0132.44-9	BAP-8025
SANCHEZ, Nestor D.	Intel Off (FI)	GS-0132.06-11	BAP-23	Intel Off (FI)	GS-0136.51-11	BAP-8028
STARK, Robert L.	Sec. Ops. Off.	GS-1810.03-10	BAP-24	Security Off	GS-1810.01-10	BAP-8029

SECRET

DDP/WH
PROJECT PBSUCCESS

	FROM			TO		
Name	Title	Code/Grade	Pos No.	Title	Code/Grade	Pos No.
STATION LINCOLN (Continued)						
Trettin, Carl E.	Intel Asst	GS-0301.22-7	BAP-9	Intel Asst	GS-0301.38-7	BAP-8031
Ebert, Louis V.	Intel Off (FI)	GS-0132.06-7	BAP-10	Intel Off (FI)	GS-0136.51-7	BAP-8032
GOODPASTURE, Ann L.	Intel Off (FI)	GS-0132.06-9	BAP-13	Intel Off (FI)	GS-0136.51-9	BAP-8033
CANN, Ruth E.	Trng Instr (F.L.)	GS-1710.04-9	BAP-26	Trng Instr (F.L.)	GS-1710.04-9	BAP-8034
MIRUS, Lucille V.	Admin Asst	GS-0301.02-7	BAP-19	Admin Asst	GS-0301.02-7	BAP-8037
BRENNAN, Raymond J.	Admin Asst	GS-0301.02-7	BAP-46	Admin Asst	GS-0301.02-7	BAP-8038
MORRIS, Dorothy J.	Secretary	GS-0318.03-7	BAP-27	Secretary	GS-0318.03-7	BAP-8039
MAGGARD, Peggy M.	Secretary (Gen)	GS-0318.03-7	BAP-14	Secretary	GS-0318.03-7	BAP-8040
OYLER, Mary C.	Secretary (Gen)	GS-0318.03-4	BAP-16	Secretary	GS-0318.03-4	BAP-8041
WEBER, Lydia F.	Secretary (Gen)	GS-0318.03-6	BAP-15	Secretary	GS-0318.03-6	BAP-8042
KEIRSTEAD, Rosemary J.	Secretary (Gen)	GS-0318.03-4	BAP-21	Secretary	GS-0318.03-4	BAP-8043
BROWNLIE, Muriel F.	Secretary	GS-0318.03-4	BAP-22	Secretary	GS-0318.03-4	BAP-8045
LOVELL, Nancy J.	Secretary (Gen)	GS-0318.03-4	BAP-12	Secretary	GS-0318.03-4	BAP-8046
CONNELLY, Jean	Secretary (Gen)	GS-0318.03-4	BAP-20	Secretary	GS-0318.03-4	BAP-8047
BEYERS, Barbara C.	Secretary	GS-0318.03-5	BAP-28	Secretary	GS-0318.03-5	BAP-8048
DALRYMPLE, Joan	Secretary (Steno)	GS-0318.01-5	BAP-49	Secretary (Steno)	GS-0318.01-5	BAP-8049
ADAMES, Hilda	Clerk Typist (Sp)	GS-0322.01-4	BAP-45	Clerk Typist	GS-0322.01-4	BAP-8051
KUNZ, Laureen M.	Secretary (Typ)	GS-0318.02-4	BAP-47	Secretary (Typ)	GS-0318.02-4	BAP-8052
HENNESSEY, Geraldine C.	Clerk Steno	GS-0312.01-4	BAP-50	Clerk Steno	GS-0312.01-4	BAP-8053
FJHOPEFUL						
STULLER, Thomas L.	Supply Off	M.Sgt	BAP-53	Supply Off.	M/Sgt	BAP-8056
SANDY, James M.	Med Tech (Gen)	GS-0645.01-9	BAP-55	Med Tech (Gen)	GS-0645.01-9	BAP-8058
KENNEY, Edward T.	Supply Clerk	GS-2040.5	S-71	Supply Asst	GS-2001.01-5	BAP-8059
WASHINKO, John	Admin Asst	GS-7	S-59	Admin Asst	GS-0301.02-7	BAP-8060

APPROVED BY: Joseph S.

SECRET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 237374

1. Agency and organizational designations [redacted]

2. Pay [redacted]

3. Block No. UV

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) GOODPASTURE, Ann E.

6. Grade and salary GS-9 $5310

PAY-ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s) DDP/WH 8

12. Prepared by nnk 27 Nov. 53

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
31 Jan 54	1 Feb. 53	$5310	$5435 ~~$[illegible]~~	KW (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s).

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ ... end of waiting period

☐ LWOP ... at end of ... of work

☐ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

2-14-54
YR

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Miss Ann L. GOODPASTURE
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Nov. 1918
3. REQUEST NO.: -
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 4 Dec 53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: FEB 14 1954 *
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
	INTEL OFCR, BA-182	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	INTEL OFFICER (FI) PA(P)-13
	GS-132-9, $5310.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.06-9, $5310.00 p.a.
	DDP/WH III	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH
	Monterrey, Mexico	11. HEADQUARTERS	PROJECT PBSUCCESS ~~[illegible]~~ Washington & Field *
	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary):
Slot #13
Presently at hdqtrs.
* Field established & Hqs. unified [illegible] per [illegible] 15 Dec 53.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): [illegible] AC/WH
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): V. C. LYNCH, x-457
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY: Signature: Dorin B. Powell
Title: FI/CMOO.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD: FI

15. SEX: F
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3570-55-060 TO: 4-3500-51-081
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:
21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS:
[illegible]
[illegible] 2-3-54 [illegible]

FOS-ED
VRU 2/19/54

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	15 Dec
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	[illegible]
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY: [illegible] OK [illegible]

10-67330-8

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

SECRET
Security Information

UNVOUCHERED

12/17/53
54

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Miss Ann L GOODPASTURE	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov. 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 30 Nov. 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED.
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
Conversion from FSS Status

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: cob 12 Oct 53*
B. APPROVED: Eob 13 Oct 53

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Administrative Assistant, FSS-9 Intel officer BA-182	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	INTELL OFFICER BA-182
FSS-9 $4470.00 GS-132-9 $5310.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-9 $5310.00
DDP/WH III	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH III
Monterrey, Mexico	11. HEADQUARTERS	Monterrey, Mexico
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

BA-182

*Resigned from State in field.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) V. C. Lynch X457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Davis B. Powell
Title: F/CMO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX: F
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: ~~3592-00-000~~ 4-3570-55-060
TO: ~~3532-00-000~~ Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

ICS-ED

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL		4 Dec
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET
Security Information

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL
CHAPTER R1

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

FE 98 17 Mar 53

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B* and *7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss-Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Miss Ann L. Goodpasture	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 7 Mar 1953
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 29 Mar 53	7. C-S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
(Adm Assistant) Intell Ofcr (Ops)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	(Adm Assistant) INTELL OFFICER BA-182
(FSS-9 $4470.00) GS-9 $5310.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	(FSS-9 $4470.00) GS-132-9 $5310.00
~~[illegible]~~ DDP ~~[illegible]~~ WH	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DD/P WH III
Monterrey, Mexico	11. HEADQUARTERS	Monterrey, Mexico
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

BA-182

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) C/WH	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Edward C. McNamara
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) V. C. LYNCH X-457	Title: for FI/PO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
		FROM: TO: 3532-00-000			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

W

POSTED
JM 17 Mar

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
8-17-53

16—67820-2

14-00000

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951-O-83488

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Pay roll	3. Block No. IV	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) GOODPASTURE, Ann L.	6. Grade and salary GS - 9 $5185		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX____	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation (s) 14

VR

12. Prepared by ba 1/29/53

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
1 Feb 53	3 Feb 52	$5185	$5310	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.
Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U.S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

1. Agency and organizational designations
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2 Pay period

3. Block No. UV

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
GOODPASTURE, Ann L.

6. Grade and salary
GS-9 $5060.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10 Remarks
Please return to PDC prior to 14 Feb 62

11. Appropriation(s)
WH 56-24

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
5 Feb 62	4 Feb 61	$5060.00	$5135.00

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better
(Signature or other authentication)

19 LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods).
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1176d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—61511-2e U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME Ann L. Goodpasture

DATE 7 June 1951

NATURE OF ACTION Integration

EFFECTIVE DATE 8 June 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-9	Administrative Assistant FSS-9
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9 $4600.00	FSS-9 $4470.00 *
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDT	FDT
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION	Monterrey	Monterrey

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER 6/7/51	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 21 OCT. 1951
SALARY ADJUSTED TO $ 5060

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

* Subject integrated into the Department of State as FSS-9, with a salary of $4470.00. Subject is to be paid the difference between CIA salary of $4600.00 and salary of $4470.00 to be paid by the Department of State and allowances in accordance therewith.

Subject is due a lump sum payment for annual leave to be paid up to 7 June 1951.

POSTED

COPY IN PERSONNEL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16—63200-1

(2)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: GOODPASTURE, Ann L.

DATE: 23 April 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 27 May 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence officer (Gen.) ~~Admin. Asst.~~ GS-9 Ling
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-9 $4600.00
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		EDT
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION		Monterrey

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS Grace Greene	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE 3532.00
CLASSIFICATION 11 May 51 A-594 Thomas M. Fisher	PERSONNEL OFFICER C. Kinsach 1 May 51	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 22 May 1951

SECURITY CLEARED ON Concurrence

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 22 May 1951

ENTERED ON DUTY 27 May 1951

Approved 4-27-51

Helen McKeil
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

301

Slot 2.

Please transfer leave from V funds.

24 April

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16—63206-1

(3)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(ml)

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Miss. Ann L. Goodpasture
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 08 Nov. 1918
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: #6655
4. DATE: 27 June 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Resignation*
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: cob 5/26/51
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer (Ops.)	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-9-130 $4600.00 per. annum.	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
OSO FDZ/SEA Branch I	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE ☒ | WWII | OTHER | 5-PT. | 10-POINT: DISAB. | OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | L.A. | REAL.
Bu.#1801
CSC#1741
12/19/47

15. SEX: F
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 8115900
TO: 951-168
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Oklahoma

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

*To accept other employment.

LWD: 5/25/51
LSL: 90 hrs., 5/28/51 thru 2 hrs., 6/13/51
inc 1 holiday 5/30/51

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

DV Mulcahy
D. V. MULCAHY
Personnel Division
AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
OCTOBER 1945
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(mfa)

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Miss Ann L. Goodpasture	28 Nov. 1918	#4656	3 Feb. 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Promotion	4 Feb. 1951	Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer (Ops) GS-7	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops) GS-9
GS-7-132-$4325.00 per annum Bu.#1803 CSC#1740	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-9-130-$4600.00 per annum
OSO FDZ/SEA Branch I	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO FDZ/SEA Branch I
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ XXX DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ XXX DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE						14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION				
NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER	NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.	
X								X		Bu.#1801 CSC#1741 12/19/47

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
F	W	FROM: 2115900 TO: 951-100	Yes		☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Oklahoma

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

H. C. Clinkscale

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

H. C. CLINKSCALE
Personnel Branch

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1946-[illegible]

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

1. Agency and organizational designations: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2. Pay roll period:
3. Block No: 252-200
4. Slip No.:
5. Employee's name: [illegible], Ann L.
6. Grade and salary: GS-7 $4200.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND			NET PAY
7. Previous normal										
8. New normal										
9. Pay this period										

10. Remarks:
OCO, FDZ, SEA
DIVISION #I

11. Appropriation(s):

12. Prepared by:

13. Audited by:

DEC 11 1950

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. (a) Efficiency rating, conduct and service satisfactory; (b) [illegible]	19. Suspense date
24 Dec 50	25 Dec 49	$4200.00	$4325.00	(Signature or other authentication)	8 Dec 50

20. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods:)
Periods:

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP none nb Initials of C.

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Feb 3, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—61111-1 U. S. GOV

STANDARD FORM 50
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION (mfs)

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Miss Ann L. Goodpasture	28 Nov. 1918	#4025	22 Dec. 1950

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment	24 Dec. 1950	Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Reports Officer, GS-7 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops) GS-7
GS-7-130-$4325.00 per annum Bu.#1489 CSC#1445	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-7-132-$4325.00 per annum
OSO FDZ/SEA Branch I	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO FDZ/SEA Branch I
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
		X		Bu.#1803 CSC#1780 12/19/47

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
F	W	FROM: [illegible] TO: 951-108	Yes		☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Oklahoma

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

H. C. Clinkscale
H. C. CLINKSCALE
Employment Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1949-839428

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER S-1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(mef) 130

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Miss Ann L. Goodpasture
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Nov. 1913
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO: #1809
4. DATE: 2/13/50

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment.

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Pay Increase - (Periodic)*
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 12/25/49
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: CIA Admin. Inst. 20-1 Dated 12/9/49

FROM		TO
Reports Officer, GS-7 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Reports Officer, GS-7 (Intelligence Officer)
GS-7, $4075.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-7, $4200.00 per annum
OSO COPS - FDZ SEA Division #1	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO COPS - FDZ SEA Division #1
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WOW	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL	
		X		Bu. #1489 CSC 1445 10/19/47

15. SEX: F
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: 2105700 930-100
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Oklahoma

21. REMARKS THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

*Last Salary Increase 12/26/48

Efficiency Rating ..... Excellent
Dated 12/20/49

Conduct Report .... Satisfactory
Dated 12/23/49

Robert S. Wattles
ROBERT S. WATTLES
Employees Division

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (6 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R054.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

lba 130

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST) Miss Ann L. Goodpasture	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. 526	4. DATE 10-28-49

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Conversion-Class. Act of 1949	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 10-30-49	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Letter - DCI - 10-28-49

FROM		TO
Reports Officer P-2 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Reports Officer GS-7 (Intelligence Officer)
P-2 $3978.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	GS-7 $4075.00 per annum
OSO COPS SEA DIVISION #1	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO COPS - FDZ SEA DIVISION #1
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

Acting Chief, Employees Division

14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
X							

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
		X		Du.#1489 CSC#1445 10/10/47

17. SEX	18. RACE	19. APPROPRIATION	20. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE
F	W	FROM: 2105900 TO: 950-108	Yes		Oklahoma

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1949

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (5 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO 50-R064

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION [illegible] (pl) 130

1 NAME (MR – MISS – MRS FIRST MIDDLE INITIAL LAST) Miss Ann L. Goodpasture	2 DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3 JOURNAL OR ACTION NO	4 DATE 21 March 1949

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment

5 NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Excepted Appointment	6 EFFECTIVE DATE 21 March 1949	7 CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-45

FROM		TO
	8 POSITION TITLE	Reports Officer P-2 (Intelligence Officer)
	9 SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	P-2 $3978.00 per annum
	10 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO COPS - FBZ SEA Division #1
	11 HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12 FIELD OR DEPT L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13 REMARKS

Previously employed at $3978.00 per annum

No-Strike Affidavit has been properly executed.

This appointment is subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of six months.

WILLIAM J. KELLY
Personnel Officer
14 SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15 VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
X							

16 POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL	
		X		Bu.#1489 CSC#1445 10/10/47

17 SEX	18 RACE	19 APPROPRIATION	20 SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	21 DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22 LEGAL RESIDENCE
F	W	FROM 2195900 959-108 TO	Yes	21 March 1949	Oklahoma

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1948 783384

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side.

NAME GOODPASTURE, Ann L.			DATE 7 February 1949
LEGAL ADDRESS Oklahoma			MARITAL STATUS Single
LOCAL ADDRESS			NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS
TELEPHONE	CITIZENSHIP USA	SEX F	AGE 30
NATURE OF ACTION Resignation			EFFECTIVE DATE 20 March 1949

	FROM	TO
Title	Administrative Assistant	
Grade and Salary	CAF-7 $3978.00	
Office - Branch	OSO - FBZ	
Division		
Section		
Official Station	Washington, D.C. (Field)	
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)		
Quarters		
Cost of Living		
Special Foreign Living		

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

Please transfer accrued leave to vouchered funds.

POSTED 3/20/49

APPROVAL

FIELD		HEADQUARTERS U.S.	
CHIEF OF STATION	DATE	PERSONNEL OFFICER	DATE
SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	DATE	BRANCH CHIEF	DATE
	DATE	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	DATE 3-10-49
	DATE	CHAIRMAN PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMITTEE	DATE 3/16/49
	DATE	SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	DATE

SECRET

FORM NO. 37-1
JUN 1947 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: GOODPASTURE, Ann L.

DATE: 1 April 1949

RESIDENCE AT TIME OF EMPLOYMENT:

LOCAL ADDRESS:

CITIZENSHIP	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	MARITAL STATUS	NO. OF DEPENDENTS	DATE OF APPOINTMENT
USA	F	28 Nov. 1918	Single		

NATURE OF ACTION: Amendment to Periodic Pay Increase

EFFECTIVE DATE: 26 December 1948

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Administrative Assistant	Administrative Assistant
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-7 $3852.60	CAF-7 $3978.00
OFFICE	OSO - FBZ	OSO - FBZ
BRANCH		
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C. (Field)	Washington, D.C. (Field)

APPROVAL

FIELD	HEADQUARTERS
	COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CHIEF OF STATION	FOR THE ASSISTANT CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH Omw INITIALS
	PERSONNEL OFFICER George E. Melom Deputy Personnel Office

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

POSTED
HE. 4/27/49

AUTHENTICATED BY

REMARKS

Original action amended to reflect the correct effective date.

FORM NO. 37-1 FEB 1949 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

B

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side.

NAME Ann L. GOODPASTURE	DATE 7 December 1948
LEGAL ADDRESS Oklahoma	MARITAL STATUS Single
LOCAL ADDRESS	NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS

TELEPHONE	CITIZENSHIP USA	SEX F	AGE 30

NATURE OF ACTION Periodic Pay Increase	EFFECTIVE DATE 8 Dec 48

	FROM	TO
Title	Administrative Assistant	Administrative Assistant
Grade and Salary	CAF-7 $3727.20	CAF-7 $3978.00
Office - Branch	OSO - FBZ	OSO - FBZ
Division		
Section		
Official Station	Washington, D.C. (Field)	Washington, D.C. (Field)
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)		
Quarters		
Cost of Living		ATE 2/3/49
Special Foreign Living		

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

Subject has received no increase in salary since 14 December 1947 when she received a temporary promotion to a CAF-9, effective only while at her field post. Subject returned from the field on 7 December and was downgraded to CAF-7, $3727.20. Subject was promoted to CAF-7 on 17 April 1946. I certify that subjects service and conduct have been satisfactory in all respects.

APPROVAL

FIELD		HEADQUARTERS U.S.	
CHIEF OF STATION	DATE	PERSONNEL OFFICER	DATE 8 Dec 48
SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	DATE	BRANCH CHIEF	DATE
	DATE	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	DATE 13 Dec 48
	DATE	CHAIRMAN PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMITTEE	DATE
	DATE	SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	DATE 12/17/48

SECRET

FORM NO. 37-1
JUN 1947 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME GOODPASTURE, Ann L.				DATE 1 April 1949	
RESIDENCE AT TIME OF EMPLOYMENT					
LOCAL ADDRESS					
CITIZENSHIP USA	SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov. 1918	MARITAL STATUS Single	NO. OF DEPENDENTS	DATE OF APPOINTMENT
NATURE OF ACTION Amendment to Transfer and Change to a Lower Grade				EFFECTIVE DATE 7 December 1948	

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Administrative Assistant
GRADE AND SALARY		CAF-7 $3852.60
OFFICE	[illegible]	OSO - FBZ
BRANCH	[illegible]	
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D.C. (Field)

APPROVAL

FIELD	HEADQUARTERS
CHIEF OF STATION [illegible]	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
	PERSONNEL OFFICER Acting Personnel Officer

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ [✓ NO ☐]

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____________

ENTERED ON DUTY ____________

POSTED 4/26/49

AUTHENTICATED BY

REMARKS

Original action amended to reflect correct salary.

FORM NO. 37-1 FEB 1949 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

B

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side.

NAME Ann L. GOODPASTURE	DATE 7 December 1948
LEGAL ADDRESS Oklahoma	MARITAL STATUS Single
LOCAL ADDRESS	NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS

TELEPHONE	CITIZENSHIP USA	SEX F	AGE 30

NATURE OF ACTION Transfer ~~and Downgrade~~ Change to lower grade	EFFECTIVE DATE 7 December 1948

	FROM	TO
Title	Administrative Assistant	Administrative Assistant
Grade and Salary	CAF-9 $4479.60	CAF-7 $3727.20
Office - Branch	OSO - FBZ	OSO - FBZ
Division		
Section		
Official Station	Bombay	Washington, D.C. (Field)
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)		
Quarters		
Cost of Living		
Special Foreign Living		

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

Subject has completed tour of duty in the field.

[illegible] 2/3/49

APPROVAL

FIELD		HEADQUARTERS U.S.	
CHIEF OF STATION	DATE	PERSONNEL OFFICER	DATE 12/8/48
SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	DATE	BRANCH CHIEF	DATE
	DATE	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	DATE
	DATE	CHAIRMAN PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMITTEE	DATE
	DATE	SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	DATE 12/17/48

SECRET

FORM NO. 37-1
JUN 1947
PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

SECRET cmw

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side.

NAME Anne L. Goodpasture	DATE 23 December 1947
LEGAL ADDRESS Oklahoma	MARITAL STATUS Single
LOCAL ADDRESS	NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS

TELEPHONE	CITIZENSHIP USA	SEX F	AGE 29

NATURE OF ACTION Temp Promotion	EFFECTIVE DATE 14 Dec 47

	FROM	TO
Title	Administrative Assistant	Administrative Assistant
Grade and Salary	CAP-7 $3397.20 In accordance with Federal Employees Salary Act of 1948.	CAP-9 $4149.60 330. $4479.60
Office - Branch	OSO-FBZ	OSO-FBZ
Division		
Section		
Official Station	Bombay	Bombay
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)	▨	▨
Quarters		
Cost of Living		
Special Foreign Living		

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

Subject has had no pay increase since 17 April 1947.
See attached justification. This promotion to be effective while on duty in Bombay only.

DOG 02/04/51
AdjEOD 09/18/47
LCD 04/18/47

APPROVAL

FIELD		HEADQUARTERS U.S.	
CHIEF OF STATION	DATE	E. M. Jewell PERSONNEL OFFICER	26 Dec 1947 DATE
SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	DATE	Harry W. Little BRANCH CHIEF	23 Dec 47 DATE
	DATE	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	29 Dec 47 DATE
	DATE	CHAIRMAN PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMITTEE	DATE
	DATE	SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	31 Dec 47 DATE

FORM NO. 37-1
JUN 1947 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

DISTRIBUTION OF SALARY

To be paid by Bombay (FIELD) Office	$	148.50
Tax withheld in the United States		48.40
Insurance to be withheld in the United States (Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased)		12.50
Retirement withheld in United States		15.96
Other (Specify in detail)		-----
Allotments		93.84

Name of Allottee C.H. Goodpasture

Address Box [illegible], Tipton, Okla.

Total Gross Salary Per Pay Period	$	319.20

I HEREBY AUTHORIZE AND DIRECT THE DISBURSING OFFICE TO MAKE THE ABOVE ALLOTMENTS FROM MY COMPENSATION. ALL ADJUSTMENTS IN SALARY TO BE EFFECTED ON:

NET OVERSEAS PAYMENT ____________

INITIAL ONE

U. S. ALLOTMENT ____________

____
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

REMARKS: (Continued from reverse side)

FUNDS BRANCH
DEC 20 14 30

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Prepare in triplicate. 2. Note under "Remarks" whether action is transfer from vouchered funds or another government agency. 3. [illegible] form is prepared in the field, enter di[illegible]bution of salary over signature of employee. 4. If job descripti[illegible] other information is appropriate, ente[illegible] "Remarks."

SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST ✓

This form is to be initiated in triplicate by the appropriate Branch or Office Chief for processing in accordance with existing personnel procedures. Upon approval, the original and one copy will be retained by the Disbursing Office and one copy returned to the originating office.

NAME Anne L. GOODPASTURE
DATE 12 November 1946
NATURE OF ACTION Promotion - ~~transfer~~
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS
EFFECTIVE DATE ~~Upon Arrival~~ 17 Apr. 1947
LOCATION OF DEPENDENTS
MARITAL STATUS Single
CITIZENSHIP USA SEX F AGE 27

FROM		TO	
POSITION	Clerk	POSITION	Administrative Assistant
CONTROL NO.		CONTROL NO.	
CLASSIFICATION	CAF-5	CLASSIFICATION	CAF-7
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	~~3264.80~~ 3770 20 4 May	ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	$3397.20
OFFICIAL STATION	Bombay	OFFICIAL STATION	Bombay
ALLOWANCES:		ALLOWANCES:	
QUARTERS		QUARTERS	
COST OF LIVING		COST OF LIVING	
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING		SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING	
TOTAL		TOTAL	
OFFICE:		OFFICE:	
BRANCH	Special Operations A-FBZ	BRANCH	Special Operations A-FBZ
DIVISION	D	DIVISION	D

TO BE PAID BY (Field) OFFICE	$ 150.00
TAX WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	38.00
INSURANCE TO BE WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES (Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased)	12.50
SAVINGS BONDS	
RETIREMENT WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	
OTHER (Specify in detail) $175.00 Unliquidated Travel Advance.	
ALLOTMENTS (Name of Allottee)	60.82
Address	
TOTAL GROSS SALARY PER PAY PERIOD	$ 261.32

I hereby authorize and direct the Disbursing Office to make above allotments from my compensation.

X

Form No. 37-1
Sep 1946

(Signature of Employee)

JOB DESCRIPTION:

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS	REASONS FOR ACTION	DATE OF LAST PROMOTION

APPROVED ______________ OFFICE
(Field)

______________ Date ______
(Chief of Mission)

______________ Date ______
(Security Officer)

______________ Date ______
(Special Funds Officer)

Wm G. Sharp 15 Nov 1946

APPROVED — U.S. OFFICE

______________ Date 13 Nov
(Administrative Officer)

Lloyd George Date 14 Nov
(Branch Chief)

______________ Date ______
(Chairman, Pers. Review Com.)

Emmett D. Echols Date 18 Nov
(Special Funds Officer)

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

This form is to be initiated in triplicate by the appropriate Branch or Office Chief for processing in accordance with existing personnel procedures. Upon approval, the original and one copy will be retained by the Disbursing Office and one copy returned to the originating office.

SECRET

NAME GOODPASTURE, ANN L.

DATE 12 March 1947

NATURE OF ACTION Periodic Increase

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS

EFFECTIVE DATE 6 April 1947

LOCATION OF DEPENDENTS

MARITAL STATUS Single

CITIZENSHIP U.S. SEX F AGE 28

FROM		TO	
POSITION	Clerk	POSITION	Clerk
CONTROL NO.		CONTROL NO.	
CLASSIFICATION	CAF-5	CLASSIFICATION	CAF-5
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	$2770.20	ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	$2895.60
OFFICIAL STATION	Bombay	OFFICIAL STATION	Bombay
ALLOWANCES:		ALLOWANCES:	
QUARTERS		QUARTERS	
COST OF LIVING		COST OF LIVING	
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING		SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING	
TOTAL		TOTAL	
OFFICE:		OFFICE:	
BRANCH	OSO-FBZ	BRANCH	OSO-FBZ
DIVISION		DIVISION	

TO BE PAID BY ______ (Field) OFFICE	$ 150.00
TAX WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	30.00
INSURANCE TO BE WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES (Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased)	12.50
SAVINGS BONDS	
RETIREMENT WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	
OTHER (Specify in detail)	
ALLOTMENTS ______ (Name of Allottee)	29.[illegible]
Address	
TOTAL GROSS SALARY PER PAY PERIOD	$ 222.75

I hereby authorize and direct the Disbursing Office to make above allotments from my compensation.

Form No. 37-1
Sep 1946

(Signature of Employee)

SECRET

JOB DESCRIPTION:

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS REASONS FOR ACTION DATE OF LAST PROMOTION

Periodic Pay Increase - Last Salary Increase - 10 March 1946

APPROVED ____________ OFFICE
(Field)

____________ Date ______
(Chief of Mission)

____________ Date ______
(Security Officer)

____________ Date ______
(Special Funds Officer)

APPROVED — U.S. OFFICE

____________ Date ______
(Administrative Officer)

Lloyd George ____________ Date 26 Mar 47
(Branch Chief)

____________ Date ______
(Chairman, Pers. Review Com.)

____________ Date ______
(Special Funds Officer)

14-00000

WAR DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION
(DEPARTMENTAL)

mp/htw

1. Date 6 January 1947

13. Date of Birth: 11/2[illegible]/1918

2. TO Ann L Castrature S. S. NO.
First Name — Middle Initial — Last Name

14. Civil Service or Other Legal Authority.

4. THROUGH: SSU
Office in which Employed or to be Employed

This is to notify you of the following action concerning your employment, which is subject to the provisions on the reverse hereof. This form is an official record of your service history in the War Department and should be retained for future reference.

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology): Termination* **

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: ~~22~~ 30 November 1946

15. Male ☐ Female ☒

	(FROM)	(TO)
7. POSITION TITLE	Clerk	
8. SERVICE GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-5 $2770.20 p.a.	
9. FORCE SERVICE OFFICE	SSU, WD	
10. DIVISION BRANCH AND SECTION	Registry	
11. DUTY STATION AND LOCATION	Washington, D.C.	WASHINGTON, D. C.

16. Non Veteran ☒ — VETERAN: No Pref ☐ 5Pt ☐ 10Pt ☐

17. Civil Service Retirement: Yes ☒ No ☐

18. White ☒ Negro ☐ Other ☐

19. Nature of Position: New ☐ Vice ☐ Iden. Add'l ☐ Vice Vacancy ☐

(Reference Name No. Etc.) Bu.#916 CSC #9

20. Date of Oath, Accession Action Only.

21. Journal or Action No. SSU-3

mgP

12. REMARKS

*To accept an Excepted Appointment

**Correction of action dated 12/13/46 to show correct effective date.

By order of the Secretary of War

John W. Martyn
Administrative Assistant

WD FORM 1 AUG 45 50A

201 FILE

WAR DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION
(DEPARTMENTAL)

mr/htw

1. Date 13 December 1946

2. TO Ann L Goodpasture (First Name / Middle Initial / Last Name) 3. S S NO.

4. THROUGH (Office in which Employed or to be Employed)

This is to notify you of the following action concerning your employment, which is subject to the provisions on the reverse hereof. This form is an official record of your service history in the War Department and should be retained for future reference.

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology): Terminations*

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 November 1946

	(FROM)	(TO)
7. POSITION TITLE	Clerk	
8. SERVICE GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-5 $2770.20 p.a.	
9. FORCE SERVICE OFFICE	SSU, WD	
10. DIVISION BRANCH AND SECTION	Registry	
11. DUTY STATION AND LOCATION	Washington, D.C.	WASHINGTON, D. C.

12. REMARKS: *To accept an Excepted Appointment

13. Date of Birth: 11/23/1918

14. Civil Service or Other Legal Authority:

15. Male ☐ Female x

16. Non Veteran x — VETERAN: No Pref ☐ 5Pt. ☐ 10Pt ☐

17. Civil Service Retirement: Yes x No ☐

18. White x Negro ☐ Other ☐

19. Nature of Position: New ☐ Vice ☐ Addl ☐ [illegible] ☐

Reference (Name, No., Etc.): Bu.#916 CSC #9 7/10/42

20. Date of Oath (Accession Action Only):

21. Journal or Action No.: SSU-17

n:r

By order of the Secretary of War

John H. Martyn

Administrative Assistant

WD FORM 1 AUG 45 50A

201 FILE

Form OSS 102

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~OFFICE~~ OF STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name GOODPASTURE, Ann L. (Miss)   Date: 5 June 1946

This is to notify you that the ~~Office~~ of Strategic Services/ Unit has taken the following action concerning your employment:

Nature of action: Transfer

Effective date: 5 June 1946

	FROM—	TO—
Position	Clerk-Stenographer	Clerk
Grade and salary	CAF-5, $2430 per annum F-5065	CAF-5, $2430 per annum
Branch	SI	Registry
Division		
Section		
Headquarters	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
Departmental or Field	Field	Departmental

REMARKS:

LBWP.R.
6-6-46

☒ Subject to 5% deduction for the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of ~~OSS~~ SSU.

☐ This transfer is for the best interests of the Government. Reimbursement of your expenses and cost of transfer of your household effects is authorized in accordance with existing orders and regulations.

James B. Opsata
Chief, ~~Civilian~~ Personnel Division

CSC Report No.	Dept.
Civil Service or Other Legal Authority	Reg. XVI Section 2
Appropriation	212/60425.001 1010-410 1022-46 #135
Date of birth	11/28/1918
Legal residence	Oklahoma
Sex	Female

NATURE OF POSITION

V		Bu #916 CSC #9 7/10/42
IA	x	
VV		
New		

Annual Post Allowance

SUBJECT TO—

Investigation ☐

1 year trial period ☐

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—24723 4

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

mm MM:ao 420

Form OSS 1032

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~OFFICE OF~~ STRATEGIC SERVICES Unes.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: Goodpasture, Ann L. (Miss)

Date: 4 March 1946

This is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services has taken the following action concerning your employment:

Nature of action: Transfer

Effective date: 30 March 1946

	FROM—	TO—
Position	Clerk-Steno	Clerk-Steno
Grade and salary	CAF-5 ~~$2320~~ 2430 per annum	CAF-5 ~~$2320~~ 2430 per annum
Branch	SI	SI
Division		
Section		
Headquarters	Shanghai, China	Washington, D.C.
Departmental or Field	Field	Field*

REMARKS: *Not to exceed 90 days within continental U.S.

☒ Subject to 5% deduction for the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund. 63 to PP 4-15-46

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of OSS.

☒ This transfer is for the best interests of the Government. Reimbursement of your expenses and cost of transfer of your household effects is authorized in accordance with existing orders and regulations.

Chief, Civilian Personnel.

CSC Report No.
Field

Civil Service or Other Legal Authority
A-1-7

Appropriation
2160160.001
1020-420
C 2101-46

Date of birth
11/28/1918

Legal residence
Oklahoma

Sex
Female

NATURE OF POSITION

V	
IA	
VV	
New	x

F-5065
3/30/46

Annual Post Allowance

SUBJECT TO—

Investigation ☐

1 year trial period ☐

nff

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—24723

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

310 HM:htw

Form OSS 102

WAR DEPARTMENT
XXXXXXXX STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: GOODPASTURE, Ann L. (Miss)   Date: 10 March 1946

This is to notify you that the XXXXXXX Strategic Services has has taken the following action concerning your employment:

Nature of action: Periodic Pay Increase

Effective date: 10 March 1946

	FROM—	TO—
Position	Clerk-Stenographer	Clerk-Stenographer
Grade and salary	CAF-5, $2320 per annum F-5065	CAF-5, $2430 per annum *
Branch	SI	SI
Division		
Section		
Headquarters	Shanghai, China	Shanghai, China
Departmental or Field	Field	Field

CSC Report No.
Field (a)

Civil Service or Other Legal Authority
Public Law 200
Section2b

Appropriation
1161300
0 2101-46

Date of birth
11/28/1918

Legal residence
Oklahoma

Sex
Female

NATURE OF POSITION

V	
IA	
VV	
New	x

F-5065
12/16/45

Annual Post Allowance

REMARKS: Last pay increase 3/1/45

*Plus living and quarters allowance at the rate authorized in Budget Circular A-8.

63 W.P.
5-22-46

☒ Subject to 5% deduction for the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of XXX SSU.

☐ This transfer is for the best interests of the Government. Reimbursement of your expenses and cost of transfer of your household effects is authorized in accordance with existing orders and regulations.

SUBJECT TO—
Investigation ☐
1 year trial period ☐

James B. Opsata
Chief, XXXXXX Personnel Division

Mi:ae 310

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

Form OSS 1001

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: GOODPASTURE, ANN L. (MISS) Date: 29 January 1946

This is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services has taken the following action concerning your employment:

Nature of action: Appointment by Transfer *

Effective date: 16 December 1945

	FROM—	TO—
Position	Clerk-Stenographer	Clerk-Stenographer
Grade and salary	CAF-5, $2320 per annum	CAF-5, $2320 per annum **
Branch	Research & Analysis	SI
Division	Far East	
Section		
Headquarters	Shanghai, China	Shanghai, China
Departmental or Field	Field	Field

REMARKS:

* From I.R.I.S., State Department

43WPB
2-6-46

☒ Subject to 5% deduction for the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of OSS.

☐ This transfer is for the best interests of the Government. Reimbursement of your expenses and cost of transfer of your household effects is authorized in accordance with existing orders and regulations.

Louis L. Bird

Chief, Civilian Personnel.

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CSC Report No.
Field

Civil Service or Other Legal Authority
Schedule A-1-7

Appropriation
1161300
C 2101-46

Date of birth
11/28/1918

Legal residence
Oklahoma

Sex
Female

NATURE OF POSITION

V	
IA	
VV	
New	X

F-5065
12/16/45

Annual Post Allowance
**
$1980 per annum

SUBJECT TO—

Investigation ☐

1 year trial period ☐

ak 310

mm

Form OSS 1008

IRIS
STATE DEPARTMENT
~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: GOODPASTURE, ANN L. (MISS)   Date: 29 January 1946

This is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services has taken the following action concerning your employment:

Nature of action: Separation (Transfer) *

Effective date: 15 December 1945 COB

	FROM—	TO—
Position	Clerk-Stenographer	
Grade and salary	CAF-5, $2320 per annum * F-5018	
Branch	Research & Analysis	
Division	Far East	
Section		
Headquarters	Shanghai, China	
Departmental or Field	Field	

REMARKS:

* To War Department, S.S.U.

☒ Subject to 5% deduction for the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.

☐ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of OSS.

☐ This transfer is for the best interests of the Government. Reimbursement of your expenses and cost of transfer of your household effects is authorized in accordance with existing orders and regulations.

Chief, Civilian Personnel.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—26723-3

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CSC Report No.
IRIS - Field

Civil Service or Other Legal Authority

Appropriation
1161300
C 2201-46

Date of birth
11/28/1918

Legal residence
Oklahoma

Sex
Female

NATURE OF POSITION

V	
IA	
VV	
New	

Annual Post Allowance
*$1980 per annum

SUBJECT TO—
Investigation ☐
1 year trial period ☐

MM:ak 310

mm

Form OSS 1608

IRIS
STATE DEPARTMENT
~~[illegible]~~
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: COODPASTURE, Ann L. (Miss) Date: October ~~25~~ 19, 1945

This is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services has taken the following action concerning your employment:

Nature of action: Transfer *

Effective date: October 25, 1945

	FROM—	TO—
Position	Clerk-Stenographer	Clerk-Stenographer
Grade and salary	CAF-5, $2320 per annum	CAF-5, $2320 per annum **
Branch	Research & Analysis	Research & Analysis
Division	Far East	Far East
Section		
Headquarters	Chungking, China	Shanghai, China
Departmental or Field	Field	Field

REMARKS:

* Per Cable #SHAN 4017

[illegible]

CSC Report No.	IRIS - Dept.
Civil Service or Other Legal Authority	Schedule A-1-7
Appropriation	1961097.001 DTT #1
Date of birth	11/28/1918
Legal residence	Oklahoma
Sex	Female

NATURE OF POSITION

V	
IA	
VV	
New	x

F-5018
~~11/~~/45

Annual Post Allowance
** $ 1980 p.a.

SUBJECT TO—

Investigation ☐

year trial period ☐

☒ Subject to 5% deduction for the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of OSS.

☒ This transfer is for the best interests of the Government. Reimbursement of your expenses and cost of transfer of your household effects is authorized in accordance with existing orders and regulations.

Chief, Civilian Personnel

NM:ts 310

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

Form OSS 1002

IRIS
STATE DEPARTMENT
~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: Goodpasture, Ann L. (Miss) Date: 1 October 1945

This is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services has taken the following action concerning your employment:

Nature of action: Appointment by transfer*

Effective date: 1 October 1945

	FROM—	TO—
Position		Clerk-Stenographer
Grade and salary		CAF-5, $2520 per annum**
Branch		Research & Analysis
Division		Far East
Section		
Headquarters		Chungking, China
Departmental or Field		Field

REMARKS:

*From Office of Strategic Services

**Living and quarters allowance at the base rate of $1500 per annum plus $600 per annum when government quarters are not provided.

☒ Subject to 5% deduction for the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of OSS.

☐ This transfer is for the best interests of the Government. Reimbursement of your expenses and cost of transfer of your household effects is authorized in accordance with existing orders and regulations.

Chief, Civilian Personnel.

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CSC Report No.
Field

Civil Service or Other Legal Authority
E.O. 9621
9/20/45

Appropriation
1961097.001
C LTT #1

Date of birth
11/23/1913

Legal residence
Oklahoma

Sex
Female

NATURE OF POSITION

V	
IA	
VV	
New	X

F-5013
9/28/45

Annual Post Allowance

SUBJECT TO—

Investigation ☐

1 year trial period ☐

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—24723-3

ML:ejg 310

14-00000

Form OSA 1009

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: GOODPASTURE, ANN L. (MISS) Date: 10 Sept. 1945

This is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services has taken the following action concerning your employment:

Nature of action: Transfer

Effective date: 23 September 1945

	FROM—	TO—
Position	Clerk-Stenogr[illegible]	Clerk-Stenographer
Grade and salary	CAF-5, $2320 [illegible]	CAF-5, $2320 per annum *
Branch	Research & Analysis	Research & Analysis
Division		Far East
Section		
Headquarters	New Delhi, India	Chungking, China
Departmental or Field	Field	Field

CSC Report No.
Field

Civil Service or Other Legal Authority
Schedule A-1-7

Appropriation
1161300
C 2201-46

Date of birth
11/28/1918

Legal residence
Oklahoma

Sex
Female

NATURE OF POSITION

V		
IA		F-5018
VV		9/23/45
New	X	~~9/23/45~~

Annual Post Allowance

REMARKS:

* Living and quarters allowance at the base rate of $1500 per annum plus $500 per annum when government quarters are not provided.

63 to P.D.
10-24-45

☒ Subject to 5% deduction for the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of OSS.

☐ This transfer is for the best interests of the Government. Reimbursement of your expenses and cost of transfer of your household effects is authorized in accordance with existing orders and regulations.

SUBJECT TO—

Investigation ☐

1 year trial period ☐

C. J. Francis

Chief, Civilian Personnel.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—36723-1

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

[illegible]:ak 310

Form OSS 1002

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: Goodpasture, Ann L. (Miss) Date: 30 September 1945

This is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services has taken the following action concerning your employment:

Nature of action: Separation (transfer)*

Effective date: 30 September 1945 COB

	FROM—	TO—
Position	Clerk-Stenographer	
Grade and salary	CAF-5, $2320 per annum**	
Branch	Research & Analysis	
Division	Far East	
Section		
Headquarters	Chungking, China	
Departmental or Field	Field	

REMARKS:

*To State Department in accordance with Executive Order 9621, dated 20 September 1945.

**Living and quarters allowance at the base rate of $1500 per annum plus $600 per annum when government quarters are not provided.

☒ Subject to 5% deduction for the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.

☐ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of OSS.

☐ This transfer is for the best interests of the Government. Reimbursement of your expenses and cost of transfer of your household effects is authorized in accordance with existing orders and regulations.

C. J. [illegible]

Chief, Civilian Personnel.

CSC Report No.
Field

Civil Service or Other Legal Authority

Appropriation
1161300
C 2201-46

Date of birth
11/28/1913

Legal residence
Oklahoma

Sex
Female

NATURE OF POSITION

V	
IA	
VV	
New	

Annual Post Allowance

SUBJECT TO—

Investigation ☐

1 year trial period ☐

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-36723-1

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

M:ejg 310

Form OSS 61A

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: **Goodpasture, Ann L. (Miss)** Date: **May 31, 1945**

This is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services has taken the following action concerning your employment.

Nature of action: **Excepted Appointment**

Effective date: **June 1, 1945** **DOO-2/29/44**

	FROM	TO
Position		Clerk-Stenographer
Grade and salary		CAF-5, $2000 per annum*
Branch		Research & Analysis
Division		
Section		
Headquarters		New Delhi, India
Departmental or field		Field

Remarks: * Plus living allowance at the rate established by the Strategic Services Officer not to exceed $1377.00 per annum authorized by Budget Circular A-8.

C. S. C. Report No.
Field

Civil Service or other legal authority
Schedule A-1-7

Appropriation
1151300
8322-45

Date of birth
11/28/1918

Legal residence
Oklahoma

Sex
Female

Nature of Position	
New	Additional identical
X	
Vice	Vice vacancy

Reference (Name, number, and date, etc.)
F-5018
6/1/45
3/0

Subject to Retirement Act?
Yes

This action is subject to the provisions of paragraphs checked below:

☒ Under this appointment you are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act as amended, and accordingly 5% will be deducted from your basic salary for deposit to your credit in the Retirement Fund.

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of the Office of Strategic Services.

William

Director of Personnel.

TM:mel

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—31723-2

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

Form OSS 43A

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: Goodpasture, Ann L. (Miss)

Date: May 31, 1945

This is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services has taken the following action concerning your employment.

Nature of action: Termination *

Effective date: May 31, 1945 COB

	FROM—	TO—
Position	Clerk-Stenographer	
Grade and salary	CAF-5, $2000 per annum	
Branch	Research & Analysis	
Division		
Section		
Headquarters	New Delhi, India	
Departmental or field	Field	

Remarks: * To accepted An Excepted Appointment, Schedule A-1-7.

This action is subject to the provisions of paragraphs checked below:

☒ Under this appointment you are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act as amended, and accordingly 5% will be deducted from your basic salary for deposit to your credit in the Retirement Fund.

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of the Office of Strategic Services.

William C.

Director of Personnel.

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

DM:mel

C. S. C. Report No.: Field

Civil Service or other legal authority:

Appropriation: 1151300 8322-45

Date of birth: 11/28/1918

Legal residence: Oklahoma

Sex: Female

Nature of Position	
New	Additional identical
Vice	Vice vacancy

Reference (Name, number, and date, etc.):

Subject to Retirement Act? Yes

Form OSS 41A

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: Goodpasture, Ann L. (Miss) Date: March 1, 1945

This is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services has taken the following action concerning your employment.

Nature of action; Transfer and Promotion and Change in Limitation

Effective date: March 1, 1945

	FROM–	TO–
Position	Clerk-Stenographer	Clerk-Stenographer
Grade and salary	CAF-4, $1800 per annum	CAF-5, $2000 per annum*
Branch	Civilian Personnel	Research and Analysis
Division	Training	
Section		
Headquarters	Washington, D. C.	New Delhi, India
Departmental or field	Field	Field

Remarks: * Plus living allowance at the rates established by the Strategic Services Officer not to exceed $1377.00 per annum authorized by Budget Circular A-8.

This action is subject to the provisions of paragraphs checked below: 63 to PR, 3/2/45

☒ Under this appointment you are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act as amended, and accordingly 5% will be deducted from your basic salary for deposit to your credit in the Retirement Fund.

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of the Office of Strategic Services.

William L. McCutcheon Jr.
Director of Personnel.

C. S. C. Report No.: Field

Civil Service or other legal authority:
Dept. Cir. 257
Rev. #
Schedule A-1-7

Appropriation:
1151300
8322-445

Date of birth: 11/23/1918

Legal residence: Oklahoma

Sex: Female

NATURE OF POSITION

New	Additional identical
X	
Vice	**Vice vacancy**

Reference (Name, number, and date, etc.): 9/30/44

Subject to Retirement Act? Yes

EM:asg

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—34723-2

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

✓

Form OSS 63A

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: Goodpasture, Ann L. (Miss)

Date: September 15, 1944

This is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services has taken the following action concerning your employment.

Nature of action: Transfer and Change in Limitation

Effective date: September 16, 1944

	FROM--	TO--
Position	Clerk-Stenographer	Clerk-Stenographer
Grade and salary	CAF-4, $1800 per annum B-#1381 CSC#68	CAF-4, $1800 per annum
Branch	Research and Analysis	Civilian Personnel
Division	Far East	Training
Section	Military Supply	
Headquarters	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.
Departmental or field	Departmental	Field*

Remarks: *Pending transfer overseas.

Subject to investigation.

63c to Pay Roll 9/16/44

This action is subject to the provisions of paragraphs checked below:

☒ Under this appointment you are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act as amended, and accordingly 5% will be deducted from your basic salary for deposit to your credit in the Retirement Fund.

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of the Office of Strategic Services.

Director of Personnel.

C. S. C. Report No.: Field(s)

Civil Service or other legal authority:

Appropriation: 1151300.002
6005-45
From#2234

Date of birth: 11/28/1918

Legal residence: Oklahoma

Sex: Female

NATURE OF POSITION	
New	Additional identical
X	
Vice	Vice vacancy

Reference (Name, number, and date, etc.): 9/6/44

Subject to Retirement Act? Yes

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

Bell

EDM:mbg

Form [illegible]

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name: Goodpasture, Ann L. (Miss)   Date: February 29, 1944

This is to notify you that the Coordinator of Information has taken the following action concerning your employment.

Nature of action: Appointment by Transfer

Effective date: February 29, 1944 - EOD

	FROM—	TO—
Position	Clerk-Stenographer	Clerk-Stenographer
Grade and salary	CAF-3, $1620 per annum	CAF-4, $1800 per annum
Branch	War Relocation Authority	Research and Analysis
Division	Personnel Management	Far East
Section	Replacement and Training	Military Supplies
Headquarters	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D. C.
Departmental or field	Departmental	Departmental

Remarks:

This appointment is subject to a favorable report of the character investigation being made by the United States Civil Service Commission

A copy of the United States Civil Service Commission authorization is enclosed.

63c [illegible] to Pay Roll
634 [illegible] 3/3/44

DOO: February 29, 1944

This action is subject to the provisions of paragraphs checked below:

☒ Under this appointment you are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act as amended, and accordingly ~~3½%~~ will be deducted from your basic salary for deposit to your credit in the Retirement Fund. 5%

☒ This appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of the office of the Coordinator of Information.

Personnel Officer.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—24733-1

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

C. S. C. Report No.: 9861

Civil Service or other legal authority:
DOA: 2/21/44
Reg. IX, Sec. 2a
E.O. 9243
File D-9834

Appropriation:
1141300
2207-44

Date of birth: 11/28/1918

Legal residence: Oklahoma

Sex: Female

NATURE OF POSITION

New	Additional identification

Vice	Vice vacancy
	X

Reference (Name, number, and date, etc.):
2/1/43
Du. #1381
CSC #68

Subject to Retirement Act? Yes

ED:deb

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
057303

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) GOODPASTURE ANN L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11/28/18	3. SEX F	4. GRADE 13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/OPS	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 November 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
18 October 1970 - 31 October 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Monitors all operational correspondence from the Far East Division Stations for counterintelligence leads and evidence of hostile espionage operations.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reviews field project outlines for evidence of penetrations, provocations, or foreign intelligence relationships. Advises Headquarters officers in preparation of security reviews. Represents CI Staff at DDP project review meetings when the XXXXXXXXXXXX senior officer is not available.	RATING LETTER
3 Alternate Headquarters case officer to the Chief, CIOPS/FE for sensitive Prescribed and Limited Distribution counterintelligence projects handled by CI Staff.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinates cables and dispatches from FE Division Headquarters to field stations on CI cases and agent clearances.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains background files for use in consultation with FE Division officers on CI problems.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepares for Chief, CI, summaries of counterintelligence incidents which suddenly develop such as arrests, defections, and newspaper exposures.	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 7-60 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

FEB 17 2 [illegible] '72

See memorandum in lieu of Fitness Report.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Ann L. GOODPASTURE
18 October 1970 - 31 October 1971

To the immense regret of this writer Ann Goodpasture is retiring very soon. It would be silly to rate her competitively against any of her colleagues, male or female, young or merely well-preserved. Concerning her fitness be it recorded that she is very fit indeed to perform any of the tasks listed as her current ones or almost any others I can think of at almost any grade. I venture to rate her over-all performance, thirty years of it, as OUTSTANDING. Ann is one of the tough warp-threads on which this organization is woven, and when she retires the fabric of this organization will be weakened.

William R. Johnson
Chief, CI/OPS/FE

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE:

Ann L. Goodpasture
Ann L. Goodpasture

16 FEB 1972
Date

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Miss Goodpasture is indeed a fine officer who consistently turns in a Strong performance when she is not doing an outstanding job. She is an excellent office and project manager who is cost conscious and she is a careful thorough instructor and briefer. Her retirement will leave a great gap in CI/OPS and, as Mr. Johnson has said, in the organization. I hope she gets the official Agency recognition she deserves for the many years she has made substantive contribution to the CS.

N. Scott Miler
N. Scott MILER
Chief, CI Operations

17.2.72.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

Cable Writing Refresher

Training Certification

TO: Registrar, Office of Training

I certify that I completed the Cable Writing Refresher No. 1 on 23 April 1956.

Paul L Good[illegible] WE

Name Staff or Division

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

1 MAY 1956

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS COURSE No. 1

NAME	SEX	DATES OF COURSE	NO. OF STUDENTS
Goodpasture, Ann L.	Female	19 March - 6 April 1956	15
DATE OF BIRTH	EOD DATE	GRADE OR RANK	OFFICE
28 November 1918	February 1944	GS-11	WE/FI
PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION			
FI Operations Officer			

I. Course Objectives: to familiarize the students with the various types of CE operations and with methods and procedures peculiar to CE in the field and at Headquarters, to outline CE objectives, and to increase proficiency in the recognition and exploitation of leads.

II. Course Characteristics: The Counterespionage Operations Course is of three weeks' duration. The curriculum material is presented by means of lectures, seminars, and directed reading. It is divided into sections as follows:

A. Introduction (definition of terms, the CI Staff, operational Security and risk assessment, sources of CE leads, CE reporting and records)

B. Interrogation

C. Foreign Intelligence Services (with emphasis on currently hostile services including a lecture on CE in Liaison)

D. Penetration and Defection

E. Double Agent Operations

During the course each student is required to present orally a CE case and to submit a written version of the case. Evaluations are based on problems, the case analysis presented by the student, and objective tests.

S-E-C-R-E-T

III. Evaluation

A. Two double agent problems requiring case analysis. This analysis involves thorough study of the case:

1. To determine areas of missing, inadequate, or questionable information
2. To pick out information which can be checked through other sources
3. To recognize all possible leads
4. To assess the risk involved
5. To propose appropriate action (operational decisions)

	Fail	Poor	Satis	Exc	Sup
Ratings in this class			12*	3	

B. Case analysis (student presentation):

	Fail	Poor	Satis	Exc	Sup
Ratings in this class			10	5*	

C. Objective tests based on all sections of the course:

	Fail	Poor	Satis	Exc	Sup
Ratings in this class		3	5*	4	

This student's rating is indicated by asterisk.

S-E-C-R-E-T

IV. COMMENTS: Miss Goodpasture's handling of the problems indicated that she is capable of shrewd analysis. She overlooked some points which might have been considered in one problem and dealt with the other problem in too brief fashion, but in general her analysis reflected her actual experience and suggested that she is perhaps stronger in analysis than in making operational decisions. She presented a rather complex case and demonstrated that she not only understood the case but was able to give a clear account of it.

V. EXPLANATION OF ADJECTIVAL RATINGS:

SUPERIOR The student demonstrated outstanding ability or proficiency in meeting this course goal or objective; he indicated an unusually thorough knowledge of the material presented, or, if skills are involved, he demonstrated that he is one of the most effective individuals in this area.

EXCELLENT The student showed unusual competence, skill, or ability in meeting this objective or goal; he demonstrated a thorough grasp of the presented material, or if skills are involved, he demonstrated that he can perform in an extremely effect manner in this area.

SATISFACTORY The student met this objective in a competent and adequate manner; he demonstrated a good understanding and grasp of the information presented, or, if skills are involved, he demonstrated sufficient competence to operate effectively in this area.

POOR Although the student may have met some of the standards set for minimum achievement of this course goal or objective, he demonstrated serious gaps in knowledge or sufficient lack of skill to be of doubtful competence.

FAILURE The student was unable to grasp the concepts or information presented, or demonstrated that he had not acquired the necessary information and skills to operate at even minimum capacity in this area.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Alfonso Rodriguez
Chief Instructor
COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS COURSE

Shown to subject on 7 May. 1956.
F.G. Ahman
C/WE/FI

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: EF. 24 Sept. 56
18 Oct. 56

NAME: Ann L. Goodpasture

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION: ☒ PROMOTION ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ OTHER (Explain) ☐ ROTATION ☐ TRAVEL

FROM: IO (FI) GS-11

TO: IO (FI) GS-12

EOD: Feb. '44

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN
	BASIC ORIENT. ALSO BIC, BITC, SOC, BTP, PH I	'49		AIR OPS. 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. M & T ALSO OC, PH II			MAR. OPS 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. OPS. ALSO [✓ AIC] AITC, AOC, CAT, PH III	'49		CLAND. FLD. ACT. 1 2 3 4 5 6	
	RESISTANCE OPS ALSO PM, I-II-III RAFT			SURVIVAL 1 2 3 4 5 6	
	CLAND. SERV. REV			BASIC PHOTO	46
	WORLD COMMUNISM	CPO '51		DOCUMENTATION	
	ANTI-COMM. OPS.			LOCKS	Nov 51
	ADMIN ~~PROCEDURES~~	'51		SECRET WRITING	51
	OPS. SUPPORT			FLAPS & SEALS	
	TRADECRAFT PHASE			SMALL ARMS FAM.	
	ADMIN PHASE			OTHER TRAINING	
	REPORTS			OSO	47
	ORDER OF BATTLE				
	COUNTERESPIONAGE	cc 8/55.		[illegible] Wrtg	22 Apr 56
	ADV. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE	Mar-Apr 56			
	OPS. SECURITY				
	WAR PLANS				
	CLAND. POL. WARF.				
	STAYBEHIND OPS.				
	TECH. DEV. ORIENT.				
	INSTR. TECH.				
	EVASION-ESCAPE				
	SAB. OPS.				
	INVEST. TECH. ALSO CI TECH.				
	ADMIN REFRESHER				
	RDG. IMPROVE.				
	BASIC SUPV.				
	BASIC MGMT.			PRE-TEST	
	BALLOON OPS.			ASSESSMENT	

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.
2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

TRAINING OFFICER COMMENTS:

☑ A. THIS [✓ DOES] (NOT) MEET TRAINING STANDARDS ~~RE~~ QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.
☐ NO FURTHER TRAINING RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN "S". THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY BASIC QUALIFYING STANDARDS.

☐ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ☐ QUALIFYING ☐ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT:
☐ SOONEST
☐ UPON RETURN TO HQ.

☐ D. WAIVER AND CC. SHOULD BE REQUESTED FOR THOSE COURSES MARKED WITH A "W".

☐ E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING WERE MADE ________ (DATE). THESE RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MET.

DIVISION TRAINING OFFICER

STAFF TRAINING OFFICER
Margaret F. Strumbeck

TO: Personnel Officer,

FROM: Career Management Officer

The above projected personnel action has been ☑ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE: 23 September 1956

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 467 REPLACES FORM 59-77
1 JAN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(2-4-45)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section A below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Goodpasture	(First) Ann	(Middle) L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918	3. SEX F	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION FI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/FI Staff	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer (CE)

7. GRADE GS-11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 18 May 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 Dec 1955 to 18 May 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐	SPECIAL (Specify)
☐	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
☒	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 7 June 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Thomas F. Thiele Thomas F. Thiele	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE DC/WE/FI

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
Posted Pos Control [illegible] 15 Jun 56
Reviewed [illegible]

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 7 June 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Francis G. Coleman F G Coleman	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WE/FI

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 15 11 05 AM '56
ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Makes CE Analysis of Cases	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assists in the Preparation of CE Notebooks	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Prepares Case Summaries	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assists in Reviewing and Releasing Correspondence	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Miss Goodpasture has a natural aptitude for analysis, a shrewd and inquiring mind, and an enthusiasm for FI/CE work. She is markedly interested in CIA and its mission, well-informed, and energetic. She displays an intelligente initiative and makes good use of her extensive agency experience. She has no significant weaknesses, but could use to advantage more experience in case-summary type writing.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Miss Goodpasture has recently accepted a position in NEA which offers her greater opportunity than the job for which this report is made.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS COURSE NO. 1

NAME	SEX	DATES OF COURSE	NO. OF STUDENTS
Goodpasture, Ann L.	Female	19 March - 6 April 1956	15

DATE OF BIRTH	EOD DATE	GRADE OR RANK	OFFICE
28 November 1918	February 1944	GS-11	WE/FI

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION

FI Operations Officer

I. Course Objectives: to familiarize the student with the various types of CE operations and with methods and procedures peculiar to CE in the field and at Headquarters, to outline CE objectives, and to increase proficiency in the recognition and exploitation of leads.

II. Course Characteristics: The Counterespionage Operations Course is of three weeks' duration. The curriculum material is presented by means of lectures, seminars, and directed reading. It is divided into sections as follows:

A. Introduction (definition of terms, the CI Staff, operational Security and risk assessment, sources of CE leads, CE reporting and records)

B. Interrogation

C. Foreign Intelligence Services (with emphasis on currently hostile services including a lecture on CE in Liaison)

D. Penetration and Defection

E. Double Agent Operations

During the course each student is required to present orally a CE case and to submit a written version of the case. Evaluations are based on problems, the case analysis presented by the student, and objective tests.

S-E-C-R-E-T

III. Evaluation

A. Two double agent problems requiring case analysis. This analysis involves thorough study of the case:

1. To determine areas of missing, inadequate, or questionable information
2. To pick out information which can be checked through other sources
3. To recognize all possible leads
4. To assess the risk involved
5. To propose appropriate action (operational decisions)

	Fail	Poor	Satis	Exc	Sup
Ratings in this class			12*	3	

B. Case analysis (student presentation):

	Fail	Poor	Satis	Exc	Sup
Ratings in this class			10	5*	

C. Objective tests based on all sections of the course:

	Fail	Poor	Satis	Exc	Sup
Ratings in this class		3	8*	4	

This student's rating is indicated by asterisk.

S-E-C-R-E-T

IV. COMMENTS: **Miss Goodpasture's handling of the problems indicated that she is capable of shrewd analysis. She overlooked some points which might have been considered in one problem and dealt with the other problem in too brief fashion, but in general her analysis reflected her actual experience and suggested that she is perhaps stronger in analysis than in making operational decisions. She presented a rather complex case and demonstrated that she not only understood the case but was able to give a clear account of it.**

V. EXPLANATION OF ADJECTIVAL RATINGS:

SUPERIOR The student demonstrated outstanding ability or proficiency in meeting this course goal or objective; he indicated an unusually thorough knowledge of the material presented, or, if skills are involved, he demonstrated that he is one of the most effective individuals in this area.

EXCELLENT The student showed unusual competence, skill, or ability in meeting this objective or goal; he demonstrated a thorough grasp of the presented material, or if skills are involved, he demonstrated that he can perform in an extremely effect manner in this area.

SATISFACTORY The student met this objective in a competent and adequate manner; he demonstrated a good understanding and grasp of the information presented, or, if skills are involved, he demonstrated sufficient competence to operate effectively in this area.

POOR Although the student may have met some of the standards set for minimum achievement of this course goal or objective, he demonstrated serious gaps in knowledge or sufficient lack of skill to be of doubtful competence.

FAILURE The student was unable to grasp the concepts or information presented, or demonstrated that he had not acquired the necessary information and skills to operate at even minimum capacity in this area.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Alfonso Rodriguez
Chief Instructor
COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS COURSE

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

CODED

13 DEC 1955

Reviewed by PUD

A
1 DEC 56

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) GOODPASTURE (First) Ann (Middle) L
2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Nov 1918
3. SEX F
4. CAREER DESIGNATION DI
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY Feb 1944
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO DDP
7. DIVISION WE
8. BRANCH FI Staff
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE GS-11
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 1 December 1955
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) February 1955-1 December 1955

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION OPS. Officer (CE) 0132.52
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

A. To help select and to carry out detailed operational reviews and security critiques of operations, particularly those involving the RIS.
B. To analyze and recommend procedures in connection with operational security problems.
C. When required, to review and to release Division dispatch traffic.
D. To serve as the Division's ~~XX~~ defector coordinator.
E. To assist in processing STD clearances for the Division.
F. To assist the Division C/FI as required.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ *has* ☐ *has not been shown to the individual rated.*

THIS DATE Dec. 7, 1955

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) Thomas F. [illegible]

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE 7. XII. 55

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) DC/WE

FORM NO. 45 1 JAN 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 13 11 00 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The description is to be interpreted literally.

On the left-hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left and then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	CATEGORIES												
						4			5			6		
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.										X				
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.												X		
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.										X				
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.											X			
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.											X			
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.											X			
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.											X			
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.												X		
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.											X			
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT												X		

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".										X				
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.										X				
31. CAPABLE.											X			
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.										X				
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.										X				
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.											X			
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X			
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.											X			
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.											X			
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.											X			
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.										X				
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.	X													

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

1. A great capacity for work and responsibility.
2. Initiative
3. An interest in and ability for making cogent operational analyses.
4. A cheerful willingness to accept suggestion.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

No outstanding weaknesses have been observed.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 13 11 00 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

An interest in and capacity for FI/CE work.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Advanced OE training is planned for her.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

None

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: 10 February 1955

NAME: O[illegible]D ASTURE, Ann L.

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION

☐	PROMOTION	☒	REASSIGNMENT	OTHER (Explain)
☐	ROTATION	☐	TRAVEL	

FROM: Area [illegible] Off GS-11 [illegible] New Delhi

TO: [illegible]ra-411, Off GS-11 WA Washington MOS

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	OTHER TRAINING COURSES	DATE TAKEN
	BIC(CS), ALSO BIC, BITC, SOC, STP AND BOC	49		050	47
	BTP II, ALSO OC				
	BTP III, ALSO AIC, AITC, AOC AND CAI	49	X	OBR	
	PO, ALSO PM I, II, III AND RAFT				
	ITC ALSO CI	46			
	TECH				
	ADMIN	51			
	SIC				
	SUP				
	CFA				
	RPTS				
	OB				
	OSC (CE)				
	E & E				
	CPW				
	WPSOC				
	CPO	51			
	STB				
	CEW				
	IT				
	GW				
	SAB				
	AO				
	MO				
	SUR				
	BFOT	46			
	DOC				
	LOCKS				
	S/W	51			
	F & S				
	SAF				

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.

2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

STAFF TRAINING OFFICE COMMENTS:

☑ A. THIS ☑ DOES ☐ DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN S, THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY MINIMUM STANDARDS.

☑ C. U[illegible] SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE, WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ☐ QUALIFYING ☑ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT.

SIGNATURE OF STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,
[illegible].G. JAR[illegible]A

FROM: Career Management Officer
J[illegible]ES P HU[illegible]PHRIES

The above projected personnel action has been ☑ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE: 14 Feb 55

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 59-77 PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED
1 JAN 54 REPLACES FORM NO. 59-112 AUG 1953 WHICH MAY BE USED

SECRET (2-4-45)

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: 4 January 195[illegible]

NAME: GOOD[illegible]RE, Ann L.

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION: ☐ PROMOTION ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ ROTATION ☐ TRAVEL OTHER (Explain)

FROM: Area Ops Off [illegible]

TO: T.O. [illegible] Washington

AOS

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	OTHER TRAINING COURSES	DATE TAKEN
	BIC(CS), ALSO				
	BIC, BITC, SOC,	49		OSO	47
	BTP AND BOC				
	BTP II, ALSO OC		X	QS Report	
	BTP III, ALSO				
	AIC, AITC, AOC	49			
	AND CAI				
	PO, ALSO PM I,				
	II, III AND RAFT				
	ITC ALSO CI	51			
	TECH				
	ADMIN	51			
	SIC				
	SUP				
	CFA				
	RPTS				
	OB				
	OSC (CE)				
	E & E				
	CPW				
	WPSOC				
	CPO	51			
	STB				
	CEW				
	IT				
	GW				
	SAB				
	AO				
	MO				
	SUR				
	BFOT	46			
	DOC				
	LOCKS				
	S/W	51			
	F & S				
	SAF				

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (C.) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.
2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

STAFF TRAINING OFFICE COMMENTS:

☑ A. THIS ☐ DOES ☐ DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN S, THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY MINIMUM STANDARDS.

☑ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE, WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ☐ QUALIFYING ☑ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT.

SIGNATURE OF STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,
F.C. Jerome

FROM: Career Management Officer
[illegible]

The above projected personnel action has been ☑ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE: 4 Jan 55

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 59-77
1 JAN 54
PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED
REPLACES FORM NO. 59-112
AUG 1953 WHICH MAY BE USED

SECRET

(2-4-45)

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE
16 June 1954

NAME
Miss Ann Goodpasture

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION
☒ PROMOTION ☐ REASSIGNMENT OTHER: (Explain)
☐ ROTATION ☐ TRAVEL

FROM:
I.O. GS-9 WH/Washington

TO:
I.O. GS-11 WH/Washington

AOS

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	OTHER TRAINING COURSES	DATE TAKEN
	BIC(CS), ALSO				
	BIC, BITC, SOC,				
	BTP AND BOC				
	BTP II, ALSO OC				
	BTP III, ALSO				
	AIC, AITC, AOC				
	AND CAI				
	PO, ALSO PM I,				
	II, III AND RAFT				
	ITC ALSO CI				
	TECH				
	ADMIN				
	SIC				
	SUP				
	CFA				
	RPTS				
	OB				
	OSC (CS)				
	E & E				
	CPW				
	WPSOC				
	CPO				
	STB				
	CEW				
	IT				
	GW				
	SAB				
	AO				
	MO				
	SUR				
	BFOT				
	DOC				
	LOCKS				
	S/W				
	F & S				
	SAF				

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.
2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

STAFF TRAINING OFFICE COMMENTS:

☐ A. THIS ☐ DOES ☐ DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN S, THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY MINIMUM STANDARDS.

☐ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE, WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ☐ QUALIFYING ☐ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT.

SIGNATURE OF STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,
Virginia Lynch

FROM: Career Management Officer
James P. Humphries

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 59-77 PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED
1 JAN 54 REPLACES FORM NO. 59-11
AUG 1953 WHICH MAY BE

SECRET

Anne L. Goodpasture

FORM NO. 51-55
Dec. 1947
Replaces Form No. 55-2 which may continue to be used.

CONFIDENTIAL

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE. TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE.

1. NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY
[redacted]	GS-9	$5310.00	8 June 1951

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)
No change

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
I.O.	No preference

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO   NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO   EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO   LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

25 August 1953
DATE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT: DATE FROM Feb 53 DATE TO Aug 53

OCCASION FOR REPORT: ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☒ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES Intelligence Officer

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO   DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? GS-11; Intelligence Officer

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						X	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS							X
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							X
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						X	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION						X	
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.	✓						
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT						X	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP	✓						
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						X	

10. ... YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU ...

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

This employee should be given duties of a responsible nature which will take advantage of his ability and wide experience with this organization. Such assignment, with attendant promotion, is recommended.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEET)

1 September, 1953
DATE

David B. Kenan
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

J C King
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO

FORM NO. 55-5
Dec. 1949
Replaces Form No. 55-2 which may continue to be used.

CONFIDENTIAL

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE. TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE)	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY
[redacted]	CAF-9	$5310.	8 June 1951

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES ... PORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)
No change. Administrative assistant, Substation, Monterrey, Mexico

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING EXC	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
None									

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)
TYPE OF DUTY / LOCATION
None
(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?
MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO
EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO
LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

18 March 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR.

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM: 1 July,52
DATE TO: 28 Feb,53

OCCASION FOR REPORT:
ANNUAL ☐
REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☒ XX
PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐
COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ XX YES ☐ NO
IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☒ XX YES ☐ NO
IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES Intelligence officer

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ XX YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11
HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ XX YES ☐ NO
DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ XX YES ☐ NO
IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? GS-11, Intelligence officer

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						✓	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						✓	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						✓	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						✓	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						✓	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE					✓		
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE					✓		
H. DISCRETION						✓	
I. INITIATIVE						✓	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE	✓						
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						✓	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION					✓		
M. TACT					✓		
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						✓	
O. LEADERSHIP	✓						
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA	✓						
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						✓	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐
PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐
BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐
BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐
PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☑

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF - WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

Note: This report is occasioned by the resignation of the Chief of Mission, Mexico City, under whose supervision the Substation, Monterrey operates. He suggested that the undersigned submit this report as being more familiar with Riggs' work than he is.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEET)

18 March 1953
DATE

David B. Keenan
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMST

Dec. 1947 35-23
Replaces Form No. 35-2 which
may continue to be used.

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE — TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE.

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	GS-9	$5185.00	8 June 1951

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Administrative Assistant, Monterrey, Mexico. Under general supervision of the Chief of Substation is responsible for all administrative reports, maintenance of files, communications duties, custodian of property, preparation of pouches and performance of such other duties as may be assigned.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
French			x			x			x
Spanish		x							

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Reports Officer	Headquarters
Operations Officer	Headquarters

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRAIGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

GOSSFASTURE, Fran LAGERIE

1 June 1952
DATE

[redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM 1 OCT. 1951 DATE TO 1 JUNE 1952

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☑ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☑ YES ☐ NO
IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☑ YES ☐ NO
IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES REPORTS AND/OR OPERATIONS OFFICER

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☑ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO
DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☑ YES ☐ NO
IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? GS-11, OPERATIONS OFFICER

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						✓	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							✓
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS							✓
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS							✓
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							✓
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						✓	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						✓	
H. DISCRETION						✓	
I. INITIATIVE						✓	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.	✓						
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						✓	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						✓	
M. TACT						✓	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						✓	
O. LEADERSHIP	✓						
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						✓	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA							✓

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☑

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

[redacted] qualifications, experience & general ability have been invaluable in the activation of this small substation.

RO-OSO
1952

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEET)

1 June 1952
DATE

David B. Kenan
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

FORM NO. 51-55
Dec., 1947
Replaces Form No. 55-2 which
may continue to be used.

[illegible] CONFIDENTIAL

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE. TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE.

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST RIGGS,	FIRST Robert	MIDDLE B.	CAF RATING CAF-9	SALARY $4600.00	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT POST June 8, 1951

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST; DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)
Intelligence Assistant, Monterrey Substation, Monterrey, NL, Mexico

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED: None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
French		x				x			x

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS (IF IN US-SO STATE) TYPE OF DUTY LOCATION
No preference at this time other than present assignment and present location.
(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?
MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO   NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO   EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO   LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

17 October 1951
DATE

Robert B. Riggs
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT DATE FROM 9 July 51 DATE TO 9 Oct 51
OCCASION FOR REPORT: ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS ~~OF EMPLOYMENT~~ at station ☒

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☑ YES ☐ NO   IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☑ YES ☐ NO   IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☑ YES ☐ NO   IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11
HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO   DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☑ YES ☐ NO   IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? GS-10, INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						✓	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							✓
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS							✓
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS							✓
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						✓	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						✓	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						✓	
H. DISCRETION							✓
I. INITIATIVE						✓	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.	✓						
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						✓	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION	✓						
M. TACT						✓	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						✓	
O. LEADERSHIP	✓						
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						✓	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						✓	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☑

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

Riggs' experience and general ability have been invaluable in organizing the new station. He has willingly assumed the [illegible] current and administrative [illegible], leaving the undersigned free for development of new sources.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATACH EXTRA SHEET)

RI .080
1951
[illegible]

17 October 1951
DATE

[illegible] M. [illegible]
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

Chief [illegible] Sub Station
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

Conf. Jacket

SECRET

JUN 13 1951

TO : Chief, FDT

FROM : Chief, Investigative Techniques Section, TRD

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Techniques Course

1. Ann Goodpasture was enrolled in the counterintelligence techniques course for the period 29 May through 5 June 1951. He received instruction in the following elements:

a. Familiarisation with the techniques of long range photography (taking of telephoto pictures)	X
b. Instruction in methods of intensifying and reducing of negatives	X
c. Field expedient for the taking of extremely long range pictures	X
d. Simple technique for producing small images of documents for concealment purposes	X
e. Work with the Speed Graphic camera and accessories	X
f. Practice in the taking of photo-flash pictures	X
g. Work with the Photo-Record and Recordak cameras	X
h. Continued practice in darkroom techniques	X
i. Locking devices, their relative security, methods of picking safes and combination locks	X
j. Instruction and demonstration of microphones and wire-tapping and recording equipment	
k. Surreptitious entry methods, opening of sealed documents	
l. Fingerprints, possibilities, limitations, and laboratory practice	
m. Scientific aids, identification of tool marks, string, paper, etc.	

2. This student completed all phases of the training in a satisfactory manner.

3. Additional comments: Miss Goodpasture had to leave the course before the end of the second week.

SECRET

R. L. Melegro

R. L. MELEGRO

2

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Chief, FDT 29 May 1951

FROM : Chief, Investigative Techniques Section, TRD

SUBJECT: Basic Photographic Course (Second Week)

1. Miss Ann Goodpasture was enrolled in the Basic Photographic Course (second week) for the period 21 May through 23 May 1951.

2. This course provides intensive practice in all the techniques covered in the first week Basic Photographic Course. The student works under a minimum of supervision and field conditions are simulated as nearly as possible.

3. Other photographic techniques in which this student received training:

4. This student completed all phases of this course in a satisfactory manner.

Although Miss Goodpasture was present for only three days of the second week's course she appeared to have a working knowledge of the work covered.

R L Melberg

R. L. MELBERG

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

(2)

Date 29 May 1951

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

FROM : Chief, Communications Division

SUBJECT: Completion of Communications Training

1. **Ann L. Goodpasture** has satisfactorily completed the cryptographic and communications security **Briefing Course** which was given for a specific assignment at **Monterrey, Mexico.**

2. Student listed above is/~~is not~~ qualified to perform cryptographic duties.

(Comments: **Has previous experience. Is capable of performing communications duties with limited supervision or the use of reference materials.**)

3. Prior to departure for the field, the above-named person should report to Communications Security Branch, Communications Division, for final briefing. This briefing will require approximately two hours, and must be scheduled in advance at least one week before departure. Appointments can be made by contacting the Communications Security Branch. If training was given outside CIA headquarters, arrangements should be made for a final briefing on the outside.

4. If departure has not occurred within two months after completion of the course, student will be required to return to Training Branch, Communications Division, as soon as possible for a review. This review will require approximately 8 hours, and will be repeated at the end of each two-month delay. (The foreign division will be notified when a two-month period has elapsed and arrangements for the review will be made.)

5. It is requested that this office be notified at once, in writing, of any changes in assignment. The training given was specific for the assignment indicated in Paragraph 1 and additional training may be required if the assignment is changed.

6. If the assignment is cancelled, it is requested that this office be notified at once, in writing, and that the student report to Communications Security Branch as soon as possible for a communications debriefing.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

Charles M Kelley

JOSEPH J. CANDELA

for Chief, Communications Training Branch

CC: CSB
~~TBB~~
~~FD~~

FORM NO. 35-71
NOV 1950

SECRET

(45)

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief, FDT 23 May 1951

[illegible] Photographic [illegible] Section, [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible] Photographic Course

1. Miss Ann Goodpasture [illegible] during the period 14 May [illegible] 17 May [illegible] received instruction in the following [illegible]

[illegible] camera [illegible]	X
[illegible] in film [illegible]	X
[illegible] Photographic [illegible]	X
[illegible]	X
[illegible] in taking [illegible]	X
[illegible] on film [illegible]	X
[illegible] of film	X
[illegible] in use of [illegible]	X
[illegible] in use of [illegible]	X
[illegible] photography [illegible] camera and [illegible] lens and [illegible]	X
Document photography with [illegible] 2 camera [illegible] 2, and 3 copy lens, and [illegible] film	X
Document photography with [illegible] camera [illegible] lens, [illegible] film	X
[illegible] of the [illegible] camera	X
Practice in [illegible]	X
Practice in [illegible]	X
Practice in [illegible] of [illegible]	X
Discussion of [illegible] of cameras and other photographic techniques [illegible] available for [illegible] purposes on request	X

2. Other photographic techniques in which this student completed training are:

3. This student completed all phases of this course in a satisfactory manner.

4. Additional comments: Although Miss Goodpasture was out for a day and 1/2 on sick leave she has a working knowledge of the material covered during her absence.

CONFIDENTIAL

R L Melberg
R. L. MELBERG

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may within his discretion show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations, and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

STUDENT'S NAME GOODPASTURE, Ann

DATE OF REPORT 1 May 1951

TRAINING COURSE Administration Course #22

DIVISION FDT/OSO GRADE GS-9

TRAINING PERIOD 16 - 28 April 1951

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Admin. Ass't - Monterrey, Mexico

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

	Possible Score	Achieved Score
Headquarters and Field Problem	100	86
General Exam	100	89
		175

Overall Adjectival Rating - Excellent - 87

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait has not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, the higher indicating above average.

	Rating
(1) Ability to get along and work with people	
(2) Ability to grasp instructions	See Comment
(3) Enthusiasm and interest in work	
(4) Industriousness	
(5) Practical intelligence	
(6) Astuteness	
(7) Adaptability	
(8) Effectiveness	
(9) Stability	
(10) Initiative	
(11) Imagination	
(12) Ability to handle and direct people	

3. COMMENT. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths and weaknesses.) This employee who has been with the Agency since 1944 and has had both Headquarters and Field experience exhibited outstanding cooperation, understanding and adaptability of the highest degree throughout the entire course.

William S. Renehan
CHIEF INSTRUCTOR
WILLIAM S. RENEHAN

APPROVED. L. B. Shallcross
CHIEF, STR
L. B. SHALLCROSS

REVIEWED. Kingsley
CHIEF, TRD

FORM NO. 51-87
JAN 1950

SECRET

6

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

VOUCHERED

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.2

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 31 March 1950 based on performance during period from 21 Sept. '49 to 31 March 1950

GOODPASTURE, Ann L.
(Name of employee)

Intelligence Officer GS-7
(Title of position, service, and grade)

OSO, FDZ, Div. I
(Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE		CHECK ONE:
✓ if adequate − if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☒ All others ☐

...... (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
...... (2) Mechanical skill.
...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
+ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
...... (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
...... (7) Accuracy of operations.
...... (8) Accuracy of final results.
+ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
+ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
...... (11) Industry.
...... (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
...... (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? ....) (Yes or no)
+ (14) Ability to organize his work.
+ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
+ (16) Cooperativeness.
✓ (17) Initiative.
...... (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
...... (20) Physical fitness for the work.

...... *(21) Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
...... *(22) Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
...... *(23) Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
...... *(24) Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
...... *(25) Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
...... *(26) Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
...... *(27) Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
...... *(28) Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
...... *(29) Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
...... *(30) Ability to make decisions.*
...... *(31) Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

+ (A) Security
...... (B) ....
...... (C) ....

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	*Adjective Rating*		*Adjective Rating*
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent	Rating official	Excellent Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good	Reviewing official	Excellent
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good		
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair		
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory		

Rated by A. D. Hutcheson (Signature of rating official) — Chief, Br. I, FLE/SEA (Title) — 4 April 1950 (Date)

Reviewed by Harry W. [illegible] (Signature of reviewing official) — Deputy Chief, FD7 (Title) — 12 April 50 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 8 June 50 (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—66177-6

ERO-040-DMG 28 May 50

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.2

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 9/21/49 based on performance during period from 3/21/49 to 9/21/49

Ann L. Goodpasture (Name of employee) Intelligence Officer P-2 (Reports) (Title of position, service, and grade)

OSO, COPS (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE ✓ if adequate − if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	CHECK ONE: Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☒ All others ☐

- ...... (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
- ...... (2) Mechanical skill.
- ...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
- ...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
- ...... (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
- ✓ (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
- ...... (7) Accuracy of operations.
- + (8) Accuracy of final results.
- + (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
- + (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
- + (11) Industry.
- ...... (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
- ...... (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? .... (Yes or no))
- ✓ (14) Ability to organize his work.
- + (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
- + (16) Cooperativeness.
- + (17) Initiative.
- ✓ (18) Resourcefulness.
- + (19) Dependability.
- ...... (20) Physical fitness for the work.
- ...... (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
- + (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
- ...... (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
- ...... (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
- ...... (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
- ...... (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
- ...... (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
- ...... (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
- ...... (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
- ...... (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
- ...... (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

- ✓ (A) Sense of security
- + (B) Skill in English usage
- ...... (C)

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	Adjective Rating	Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent	Rating official.. EX
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good	
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good	Reviewing official.. EX
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair	
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory	

Rated by Byron C Sarvis Byron C. Sarvis (Signature of rating official) Chief, Br. I, FDZ/SEA (Title) 11 October 1949 (Date)

Reviewed by Lloyd George (Signature of reviewing official) Chief, FDZ (Title) 21 Oct 49 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 1-20-49 (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—20177-3

O.I.C. ERO-RMS DEC 17 1951

(See reverse side)

14-00000

FORM NO. 55-8
APR 1947

CONFIDENTIAL
STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE. TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE.

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY
RIGGS	Robert	B.	9	$4.149.60	17 April 47

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

No change since last efficiency report

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
No Change									

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY LOCATION

No preference

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER? None

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRAIGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

1 June 1948
DATE

Robert B. Riggs
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM DATE TO

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☑ YES ☐ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☑ YES ☐ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES Processing CE reports, duties other than field operations.

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☑ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☑ YES ☐ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND/OR WHAT POSITION? Next Grade

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						✓	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						✓	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS							✓
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS					✓		
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						✓	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						✓	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						✓	
H. DISCRETION						✓	
I. INITIATIVE						✓	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE					✓		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)					✓		
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION					✓		
M. TACT						✓	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)					✓		
O. LEADERSHIP					✓		
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						✓	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						✓	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☑

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATACH EXTRA SHEET)

Feb. 18 '49
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

FORM NO. 37-42
FEB 1949

TEST RECORD

A. EVALUATION OF TEST RESULTS

On the basis of test scores, subject appears qualified for assignment to position #1489, Reports Officer, P-2.

R. S. McKellar

CONFIDENTIAL - Not to be Discussed with [illegible]

DATE 3/4/49

[illegible]VALOGRAPH

T	L	1	2	3	4	A	6	7	8	9

NAME (*Last, First, Middle Initial*)
Goodpasture, Ann L.

SERVICE, GRADE, POSITION
P 2 Intell. Ana.

B. PERSONAL DATA

AGE 30
SEX: MALE ☐ FEMALE ☒
STATUS: NEW ☐ EMPL. ☒
EDUCATION: ELEM. ☐ H. SCH. ☐ COLLEGE ☐ DEGREE ☐ MAJOR:

C. RAW TEST DATA

DATE	TYPING GROSS NET ERRORS	SHORTHAND 1 2 3 TOT. TIME
3/4/49		

TYPE OF TEST	RAW SCORE	PERCENTILE	TYPE OF TEST	RAW SCORE	PERCENTILE
DIRECTIONS			DIRECTIONS	15	
DAT: CLERICAL			LA-5	70	94
SPELLING			GEN. TEST I	42	
SENTENCES			FRENCH LL		
NUMERICAL AB.			FRENCH UL		
ABSTR. REAS.			GERMAN LL		
SPACE REL.			ITALIAN LL		
VERB. REAS.			SPANISH LL		
MECH. REAS.					
SUPV. TEST: FORM					

TYPE OF TEST	RAW SCORE	PERCENTILE
AREA INFO (AFFAIRS)		
AREA INFO (PEOPLE)		
BENNETT LIBRARY INFO		
CIA CLASSIF. I		
CIA CLASSIF. II		
CORR. AND EFF. OF EXP.	99	91
OSU TEST: FORM		
TECHNICAL READING		
WATSON-GLASER:		
GENERALIZATIONS		
INFERENCES		
DISC. ARGUMENTS		
RECOG. ASSUMPTIONS		
GEN. LOG. REAS.		
CONSISTENCY		
APPL. LOG. REAS.		

947 33-8 (2181)

CONFIDENTIAL

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE. TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE.

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY
RIGGS	ROBERT	B.	7	$6397.20	17 April 1947

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Administrative Assistant to Chief of Mission.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
French		x			x			x	

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY — LOCATION

Indeterminable.

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

7 July 1947
DATE

Robert B. Riggs
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT DATE FROM ____ DATE TO ____

OCCASION FOR REPORT: ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☒

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES ____

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION?

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE					X		
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							X
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						X	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION						X	
I. INITIATIVE					X		
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION					Not observed		
M. TACT				X			
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)					X		
O. LEADERSHIP				X			
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA					X		
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						X	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU: DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

(3.5)

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATACH EXTRA SHEET)

DATE ____

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

Lloyd George
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. In order to arrive at an unprejudiced and independent evaluation, this report was prepared without any knowledge of Appraisal results.

3. This report summarizes the important facts and the relevant observations which have been discovered about the student by the various instructors during the student's course of training. The more complete data on the student are available in the files of the Training Branch, and may be examined by contacting the Chief of the Staff Training Division.

STUDENT'S NAME Ann L. Goodpasture

BRANCH FBZ, Div. 1

TRAINING PERIOD OSO Class II
6 Jan to 7 Feb 1947

DATE OF REPORT 13 February 1947

This student does qualify for the projected assignment as administrative assistant. Her understanding of the general aims and nature of intelligence work, of the mission of this organization and of foreign intelligence services is adequate for purposes of her assignment. She shows good judgment and common sense, is observant, methodical, and careful in the collection of her facts, and writes clear and concise reports. Her work in reporting was well above average. Under good supervision she may be capable of handling in addition to her assigned duties, also those of an editorial analyst.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF, TRB:

John Gerry
JOHN GERRY
Chief, Staff Training Division

Orig: Acting Chief, FBZ
cc : Chief, Div. 1
cc : Chief of Operations

ADDRESS
MANAGER
BRANCH REGIONAL OFFICE
FOURTH U. S. CIVIL SERVICE REGION
[illegible] INDIANA AVENUE NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FOURTH UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE REGION
BRANCH REGIONAL OFFICE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN YOUR REPLY REFER TO
FILE 4BRO:IC:LW
AND DATE OF THIS LETTER

June 6, 1945

Chief, Civilian Personnel Branch
Office of Strategic Services
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

As a result of investigation the person named below has been rated eligible on suitability.

Name and Address	Position
Miss Ann Lorene Goodpasture c/o Office of Strategic Services Washington 25, D. C.	Clerk Stenographer Regulation IX, section 2b O. S. S. - Outpost (New Delhi, India)

Very respectfully,

T. D. Dunn

T. D. Dunn
Associate Regional Director

cc: Miss Goodpasture

Address
Manager
Branch Regional Office
Fourth U. S. Civil Service Region
[illegible] Indiana Avenue NW.
Washington 25, D. C.

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FOURTH UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE REGION
BRANCH REGIONAL OFFICE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN YOUR REPLY REFER TO
FILE 4BRO:IC:LW
AND DATE OF THIS LETTER

June 6, 1945

Chief, Civilian Personnel Branch
Office of Strategic Services
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

As a result of investigation the person named below has been rated eligible on suitability.

Name and Address	Position
Miss Ann Lorene Goodpasture c/o Office of Strategic Services Washington 25, D. C.	Clerk Stenographer Regulation IX, section 2b O. S. S. - Outpost (New Delhi, India)

Very respectfully,

T. D. Dunn

T. D. Dunn
Associate Regional Director

cc: Miss Goodpasture

14-00000

Standard Form No. 51, Rev.
Approved Dec. 1948
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 458

Form approved
Budget Bureau No 50-R012.
Approval expires Mar. 30, 1946.

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR ( ) SPECIAL
PROBATIONAL or TRIAL PERIOD (✗)

As of 31 March 1945 based on performance during period from 26 Jan 1945 to 31 March 1945

Ann L. Goodpasture — Clerk-Steno CAF-5 $2000.p.a.
(Name of employee) (Title of position, service, and grade)

Office of Strategic Services P & A New Delhi, India
(Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE ✓ if adequate – if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	CHECK ONE: Code 24 Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☒ All others ☐

+ (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
___ (2) Mechanical skill.
+ (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
+ (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
___ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
+ (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
+ (7) Accuracy of operations.
___ (8) Accuracy of final results.
___ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
___ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
+ (11) Industry.
+ (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
___ (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? ________ (Yes or no))
___ (14) Ability to organize his work.
___ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
+ (16) Cooperativeness.
___ (17) Initiative.
___ (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
___ (20) Physical fitness for the work.

___ *(21) Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
___ *(22) Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
___ *(23) Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
___ *(24) Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
___ *(25) Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
___ *(26) Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
___ *(27) Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
___ *(28) Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
___ *(29) Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
___ *(30) Ability to make decisions.*
___ *(31) Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

___ (A) ________
___ (B) ________
___ (C) ________

+5 | +4

STANDARD
Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form

	Adjective rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and no minus marks E	Excellent
Plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements, and no minus marks	Very good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and any minus marks overcompensated by plus marks	Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and minus marks not overcompensated by plus marks	Fair
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory

Adjective rating
Rating official E
Reviewing official E

Rated by Joseph R. Coolidge (Signature of rating official) Chief, R+A Sec. Det 303 (Title) 24 April 1945 (Date)

Reviewed by E W Ryan (Signature of reviewing official) Major AC CO #389 (Title) 28 April 1945 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 6/1/45 (Date) Report to employee Excellent (Adjective rating)

16—20177-6

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) Goodpasture	(first) Ann	(middle) Lorene	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) November 28, 1918	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 446 14 9768
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY 057303			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
Ann L. Goodpasture

DATE
12 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 7 October 1963, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

Signature — 21 Nov 1968 — Date

[illegible] L. [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) Goodpasture	(First) Ann	(Middle) L

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED CELINA TENN	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) SAME
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE SAME	

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE NA	DATE OF MARRIAGE —
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE NA	DATE OF DECREE —
IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED NA	DATE SPOUSE DIED —

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
NA

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE NA	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) —	TELEPHONE NUMBER —	
NAMES OF CHILDREN NA	ADDRESS —	SEX —	AGE —
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian) C.H. Goodpasture	ADDRESS PO 822, TIPTON, OKLA	TELEPHONE NUMBER NORTH 7-4124	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian) ANN M. Goodpasture	ADDRESS " "	TELEPHONE NUMBER " "	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES?
NONE

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr, Mrs, Miss) (Last-First-Middle) C H. Goodpasture	RELATIONSHIP FATHER
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) P.O. Box 822 TIPTON OKLA	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER NORTH 7-4124
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE "	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☐ YES ☒ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☐ YES ☒ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☐ YES ☒ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
Riggs NATIONAL BANK, 17th G, WASH D.C.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 1 JAN 57 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

AnN L GoodpATURE

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

Riggs BANK

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

NONE

SIGNED AT	DATE 15 Jun 59	SIGNATURE Ann L. Goodpasture

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

19 February 1959

MEMORANDUM TO: GOODPASTURE, ANN L.
GUINAND, Alice B.

SUBJECT: Commendation for Extra Work in Connection With Visit of General Cassidy

1. Please accept my personal thanks for the spirit in which you engaged in long and tedious hours of work in connection with the preparation of the charts for General Cassidy's visit.

2. Because of the voluntary nature of this contribution on your parts, and the inability on my own part to adequately demonstrate the appreciation of our mutual employer in a more practical manner, I am asking Headquarters to place a copy of this letter in your personnel files.

Winston M. Scott

Distribution
Orig - GOODPASTURE
GUINAND

cc - Station personnel file GOODPASTURE
cc - Station personnel file GUINAND
cc - Hqs personnel file Goodpasture
→ cc - Hqs personnel file Guinand

SECRET

14-00000

OP Copy

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY. ST

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true) GOODPASTURE, Ann L.	DATE (from item 8-1) 3 Oct 58	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Winston M. Scott	DATE (from item 8-2) 3 Oct 58
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:	J. Washinke, WH/Pers		DATE 23 Oct 58

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 28 November 1918	2. GRADE GS-12	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known) KUTUBE	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Mexico City	7A. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD 5 May 1959
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR		7B. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

CE Officer working on anti-Soviet sensitive operations.
Flaps and Seals and photographic processing.
[redacted]

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

CE Officer
Any job for which my past experience and training qualifies me.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

Three months intensive language training.

FORM NO. 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE ______ 2ND. CHOICE ______ 3RD. CHOICE ______

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:

1ST. CHOICE WH Div (post to be selected by HQS) 2ND. CHOICE Lisbon 3RD. CHOICE ______

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 27 10 10 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 30

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

None

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

It is requested that this officer be returned to Mexico City for another two (2) year tour. This officer is one of the most able CE officers COS has known and his transfer from this Station would leave a vacancy very, very hard to fill with an equally capable person. Attempts to arrange other than tourist cover will be made for this next tour.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

If regular Embassy cover can be arranged, recommend additional tour Mexico City

16. NAME OF PERSONNEL OFFICER
Robert N. DAHLGREN
DATE 21 October 1958

SIGNATURE Robert N Dahlgren

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT

18. REFERENCE
DISPATCH NO. ______ CABLE NO. ______

19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME

20. SIGNATURE

21. TITLE

22. DATE

23. COMMENTS I would like to return to Mexico City. I like the people at this Station and the work; however, I am on a tourist card which, in my case, I don't feel can be securely stretched over another two-year tour. Since there is no prospect of other cover, I would like to be assigned to another WH Station. In view of my grade and type of experience, If eel that WH Div personnel officer can best determine the location where I could be most useful if such a vacancy exists in WH. My 2nd choice is Lisbon because I have previously worked with the present Chief of Station there.

SECRET

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

3 APR 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ann L. Goodpasture

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 1 July 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:
Ann L. Goodpasture

Date: 9 April 1956

Career Service Staff
Office of Personnel

15 MAY 1956

SECRET

12 July 54

SECRET

CAREER SERVICE QU NAIRE

SECTION I (To be completed by ee)

NAME (Last) GOODPASTURE	(First) Ann	(Middle) L.	AGE 35	GRADE GS-11	NO. OF MOS. IN GRADE 1	CAREER DESIGNATION CD-FI
STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH		POSITION TITLE Intel. Officer			
NO. OF MOS. IN PRESENT POSITION	NO. OF MOS. IN OSS 20		NO. OF MOS. IN CIG 22		NO. OF MOS. IN CIA 84	

DATA ON ALL PERMANENT DUTY OVERSEAS OR IN U.S. FIELD (Include any TDY during last two years)

APPROXIMATE DATES OF SERVICE		LOCATION		TDY	PCS	COMMENTS
FROM	TO	COUNTRY	STATION			
Oct 44	March 46	India	New Delhi		x	
		Ceylon	Kandy	x		
		China	Kunming		x	
			Shanghai		x	
Apr 46	Feb 47	U.S.	Hqtrs		x	
Feb 47	Feb 49	India	Bombay		x	
Mar 49	May 51	U.S.	Hqtrs		x	
June 51	Oct 53	Mexico	Monterrey		x	Apr-May 54 TDY Guatemala
Nov 53	Jul 54	U.S.	Lincoln	x		Guatemala City.

INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SERVE TOUR OF DUTY OVERSEAS PCS

A ☒ YES B ☐ ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS C ☐ NO

INDICATE ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE IF PRECEDING ANSWER IS "A" OR "B"

PREFERENCE	COUNTRY	STATION	TYPE OF POSITION
1ST	Germany	No preference	Intel. Off.
2ND	Any European Country		
3RD	Any Country		

IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "B," STATE CONDITIONS; IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "C," EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS

INDICATE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OVERSEAS IN WHICH YOU WILL NOT SERVE AND EXPLAIN REASONS

None

INDICATE RELATIONSHIP AND AGE OF EACH DEPENDENT TO BE MOVED OVERSEAS

None at present time.

INDICATE KNOWN MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH THE AGENCY HAS IMPOSED ON YOUR SERVICE

Hearing impairment which in the past has not prevented overseas duty.

FORM NO. 59-174
1 JUN 54

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS ON REVERSE SIDE.

(4)

SECRET

INDICATE ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING DEPENDENTS *(old age, chronic illness, need for special educational facilities, etc.)* OR ANY UNUSUAL PERSONAL SITUATION WHICH WOULD AFFECT YOUR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

None at present time.

DESCRIBE TYPES OF HEADQUARTERS AND U.S. FIELD POSITIONS FOR WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE CONSIDERED AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO SERVE

Intelligence Officer or case officer. I am willing(but not eager) to do administrative work.

REMARKS

DATE 12 July 1954	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Ann L. Goodpasture

SECTION II *(To be completed by employee's supervisor)*

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME *(months)* WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE	INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME *(months)* WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER HEADQUARTERS OR U.S. FIELD ASSIGNMENT

COMMENTS ON AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYEE'S PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

DATE	SIG [redacted] SUPERVISOR HC [redacted] . PRESTON, Administrative Official

PERSONNEL OFFICER WILL FORWARD ORIGINAL TO OFFICE OF PERSONNE [redacted] ST COPY TO APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE BOARD

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS

14-00000

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

FD2/50

PLEASE R[illegible] INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING [illegible] FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE ~~[illegible]~~

DIVISION

BRANCH

SECTION

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Organization		28	Feb	1944 ✓	31	12	51	4	10	7
Executive Office of the President-OEM-War Relocation	OK Wash., D.C.	2	Dec	1943 ✓	27	Feb	1944 ✓	[illegible]	2	1
Executive Office of the President-OEM-Price Adm.	OK	11	Mar	1942 ✓	18	Sept	1943	24 3	5 6	1
							Total Civilian Service	5	7	10

SCD - 06/02/41
Verified 4/25/57

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
						Total Military Service			

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

[illegible]

[illegible]
DATE

[redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

as of 31 Dec 51

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
~~5~~ 29	~~7~~ 6	10

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Date 28 May 1951

Dear Miss Ann Goodpasture

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective

Position: Intelligence Officer

Base Salary: $4600.00

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave in accordance with Civil Service Commission rules and regulations, or such other provisions of law or regulations as may be established in lieu thereof.

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with CIA Regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside continental United States, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by CIA Regulations.

3. As a condition of your employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the continental United States. Each time you are so assigned, unless otherwise specified in advance by CIA, you will be required to remain at the post to which assigned for a period of 24 months from the date of arrival thereat, unless sooner transferred, reassigned or separated for reasons beyond your control. If you wish to return to the United States for personal reasons during that period, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

4. If this employment is for assignment to an overseas post, it is understood and agreed that, unless earlier separated for reasons beyond your control, you will remain in Government service for 12 months after your arrival at your first overseas post, and if you violate this agreement, any money expended by the United States on account of your travel and the transportation of your immediate family and household goods will be considered a debt due to the United States.

5. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of six months from date of employment. In the event

either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

6. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of CIA. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by Civil Service rules and regulations.

Donald V. Mulcahy
Official authorized to sign letters of appointment.

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by CIA.

Ann L. Goodpasture
Employee

1 June 1951
Date

Form No. 51-104
June 1948

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1948)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A4 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, ANN L. GOODPASTURE, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. 57, dated ____________, 19____, filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

Ann L. Goodpasture
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 21st day of March, A. D. 1949,

at Washington (City) D. C. (State)

Chapter 14[illegible], Title II, Sec. [illegible]
[SEAL] Act of June 26, 1943

Elizabeth Morrison
(Signature of officer)

Appointment Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—53160-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS *(street and number, city and State)*
5425 CONN AVE N.W. APT. 19, WASH, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH	(B) PLACE OF BIRTH *(city or town and State or country)*
Nov. 28, 1918	CELINA, TENNESSEE, U.S.A.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY	(B) RELATIONSHIP	(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE	(D) TELEPHONE NO.
C. H. Goodpasture	FATHER	752 E. MAIN ST. TIPTON, OKLA.	125

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS *(Give street number, if any)*	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED *(Check one)*	SINGLE *(Check one)*
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case. (1) The date (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—66160-1

AFFIDAVIT

STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT	OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY/SSU
(Dept. or Estab.)	(Bureau or Office)

WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Place of Employment)

I, Ann L. Goodpasture, do hereby swear (or affirm) that I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not while a Government employee become a member of such an organization.

Ann L. Goodpasture
(Signature of Employee or Appointee)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of July, 1946 at Washington State of D.C.

M. K. Haller

Act of June 26, 1943, Section 206

M. K. HALLER
Admin. Asst
SSU, War Dept.

Standard Form No. 61a
Approved January 28, 1943
U. S. Civil Service Commission
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 409

OATH OF OFFICE, AFFIDAVIT, AND DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

Office of Strategic Services (Department or Establishment)
Research & Analysis Far East Military Supplies (Bureau or Division)
Washington, D. C. (Place of Employment)

A.
OATH OF OFFICE

I, Ann L. Goodpasture,
Do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. SO HELP ME GOD.

B.
AFFIDAVIT

Do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence; and that during such time as I am an employee of the Federal Government, I will not advocate nor become a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the United States by force or violence.

C.
DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

Do further certify that (1) I have not paid or offered or promised to pay any money or other thing of value to any person, firm, or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment; (2) I will inform myself of and observe the provisions of the Civil Service law and rules and Executive orders concerning political activity, political assessments, etc., as quoted on the attached Information for Appointee, and [strike out either (3) or (4)]

(3) the answers given by me in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this sheet are true and correct;

~~(4) the answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. ...., dated .... 19......, filed with the above-named department or establishment, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date, except for the following (if necessary, use additional sheet; if no exceptions write "none"; if (4) is executed, the reverse of this sheet need not be used):~~

Ann L. Goodpasture
(Signature of Appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 29th day of February A. D., 19 44.

at Washington, (City) D.C. (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of Officer)

Notary Public
(Title)

NOTE.—If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown

My commission expires: 12/21/46

16—32904-1

February 29, 1944 (Date of Entrance on Duty)
Clerk-Steno, CAF-4-$1800 per annum (Position to which appointed)
11-28-1918 (Date of Birth)

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form, if required, is to be completed before entrance on duty. Every question must be answered. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancelation of application or dismissal after appointment. False personation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. Present Address 247 Delaware Ave S. W. (Street and Number) Washington D. C. (City and State)

2. Who should be notified in case of emergency? C. D. Broadpicture (Name) Father (Relationship)
Tipton, Oklahoma (Street and Number) (City and State)

3. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (either by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? Yes or No? No If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

Name	Post-office address (Give street number, if any)	(1) Position and (2) Temporary or not, and (3) Department or office in which employed	Relationship	Married or single	Age
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

4. Place of birth Celina (Town), Tennessee, Clay County (State or Country)

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	Yes	No
5. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
6. If foreign born, have you furnished proof of naturalization or citizenship to (1) the U. S. Civil Service Commission?		
(2) this agency in connection with this appointment?		
7. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, has there been any change in the status of your citizenship, or of the persons through whom you gained your citizenship?		X
8. (a) Do you hold any position or office under the United States or any State, Territory, County, or Municipality? If so, state the place, position, and salary under Item 12.		X
(b) Are you willing to resign such position or office if it becomes necessary to do so in order to hold the Federal position? None		
9. Do you receive any pension or other benefit for military or naval service or an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any Retirement Act? If so, give details under Item 12, stating whether you were retired for age, length of service, or disability; amount of retirement pay and under what retirement act; and rank, if retired from military or naval service		X
10. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been discharged for misconduct or unsatisfactory service, or forced to resign from any position? If so, give under Item 12 where employed, name and address of employer and the reason for discharge in each case		X
11. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been arrested, or summoned into any civil or military court as a defendant, or indicted for or convicted of any offense (felony or misdemeanor)? If so, for each case give under Item 12 (1) the date, (2) the name and location of the court, (3) the nature of the offense or violation, and (4) the penalty, if any, imposed, or other disposition.		X

12. Space for detailed answers to other questions.

ITEM NO.	Write in left column numbers of items to which detailed answers apply

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable civil-service rules, the War Service Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, purchase of office, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, promise to observe provisions regarding political activity, and particularly for the following:

(1) **Identity** of appointee with the applicant whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) **Age.**—If discrepancy exists between the date of birth and that on application, and if definite age limits have been established for the position it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment.

(3) **Citizenship.**—The responsibility for c provisions of appropriation acts prohibiting or restricting the employment ans lies with the appointing officer. The Civil Service Commission indicates on applications showing foreign birth that citizenship has been verified. The appointing officer should verify citizenship if the list of eligibles or the letter of authority from the Commission makes the appointment subject to proof of citizenship or if the application shows foreign birth but does not indicate on its face that citizenship has been proved. If the answer to question 4 of this form shows foreign birth and the application shows birth in the United States, the case should be referred to the Civil Service Commission.

(4) **Members of Family.**—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of the family in the classified service, no other member of such family is eligible for appointment in that service. Minors do not establish a different family merely by living at an address different from that of the parents. Doubtful cases involving more than two members of family, including all pertinent evidence should be referred to the Civil Service Commission or its duly authorized representatives for decision. Under War Service Regulations, the member y provision does not apply to temporary appointments for one year or le

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—32066-1

Cler.

FORM 3078A
AUGUST 1943

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED
MAR 24 2 04 PM '44
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC SERVICES

FILE NO. XS:T:[illegible] D-9834
DATE February 21, 1944

☐ REAPPOINTMENT FROM
☒ TRANSFER FROM

War Relocation Authority
(Office For Emergency Management)
Washington, D.C.

NAME Ann L. Goodpasture
D. O. B. 11/28/18
POSIT. $204.00 per Mo.
LOCAT. Placement & Trng. Unit, Pers.Mag.Sec.
Washington, D.C.

☐ REAPPOINTMENT TO
☒ TRANSFER TO

Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D.C.

POSIT. Clerk-Stenographer
GR & SAL. CAF-4, $1800 p.a.
LOCAT. Research & Analysis Far East
Manpower and Military Supply
Washington, D.C.

UNDER AUTHORITY DERIVING FROM WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION DIRECTIVE NO. 10 AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS 9243 AND 9063 THE ABOVE TRANSFER OR REAPPOINTMENT IS

☒ AUTHORIZED
UNDER WAR SERVICE REGULATION IX, SECTION 2b, EFFECTIVE ON OR AFTER THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, AS AGREED UPON BY THE TWO AGENCIES CONCERNED, BUT IN NO CASE LATER THAN 10 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, EXCEPT AT THE OPTION OF THE RECEIVING AGENCY, OR UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS (IF ANY) Investigation

☐ DISAPPROVED
☐ (A) THE PERSON PROPOSED IS NOT ELIGIBLE
☐ (B) SUCH TRANSFER IS CONTRARY TO DIRECTIVES OF THE WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION

☐ CANCELED ON ADVICE FROM REQUESTING AGENCY.

Appointment of the applicant proposed by you is authorized. Your attention is called, however, to the nature of his reply or absence of a reply to question 16 on C.S. Form 57 concerning physical condition.

WAR TRANSFER UNIT
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

ENCLOSURE (IF APPROVED UNDER SECTION 4):
STATEMENT OF REEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
TO BE FURNISHED TO EMPLOYEE

[illegible] - GPO [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

PWB

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
057303	GOODPASTURE, Ann L.	11/28/18	D	13

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR	FROM-- TO--			
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

JUN 14 9 22 AM '71

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO	2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS	4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT	6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	Anne L. Goodpasture

SECRET

LLC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO	2. NAME (Last First Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE, GRADE/STEP
057303	Goodpasture, Ann L.	F	11/28/18	13

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
D	Ops Officer	DDP/WH/1	Headquarters

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
OSS WWII Overseas not included			
India	PCS	4/47	12/48
Mexico	PCS	?/51	11/53
Guatemala	TDY	4/54	5/54
Mexico	PCS	5/57	10/68
Uruguay	TDY	3/67	4/67

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 08 JUL 1969 INITIALS: RI

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR

FORM 1-67 444J
Mfg 2-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

6 9 AUG ENTD

14-00000

FORM DSP-34
9-3-48
FORMERLY FS-372

DEPARTMEN STATE

APPLICATION F EMPLOYMENT IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

BU BUREAU NO. 47-R071.1
APPR . EXPIRES AUGUST 31, 1950

THIS SPACE FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

INSTRUCTIONS—Answers to all questions must be typed or printed. All questions must be answered fully. If sufficient space has not been provided for your answer to any question, complete your answer under item #-37.

—— PREVIOUS —— CARDED —— ACKNOWLEDGED
—— INDEXED —— INVESTIGATED —— ACTION
CODE —— OTHER ——

DATE OF APPLICATION [illegible]

POSITION APPLIED FOR Foreign Service Staff

THIS SPACE FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) GOODPASTURE, Ann Lorene

2. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN KNOWN BY ANY OTHER NAME? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

3a. PERMANENT ADDRESS (Place from which transportation will be authorized if appointed. Street number and name) 3101 P Street, N.W.

3b. CITY, POSTAL ZONE, STATE Washington, 7, D.C.

4. STATE OF WHICH YOU ARE A LEGAL RESIDENT Oklahoma

5. PRESENT ADDRESS IF DIFFERENT FROM ABOVE Same as above

PRESENT BUSINESS PHONE Executive 6115

PRESENT HOME PHONE Dupont 2854

6. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year) 28 November 1918

7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, state, or country) Celina, Tennessee

8a. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED? Not applicable

8b. IF A NATURALIZED CITIZEN, PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE Not applicable

9. SEX ☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE

10. HEIGHT 5 FT. 3 IN.

11. WEIGHT 115 LBS.

12. MARITAL STATUS ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ SEPARATED

13. WHAT IS THE LOWEST BASE SALARY, EXCLUSIVE OF ALLOWANCES YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ PER ANNUM

14. WHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE IF ANY ON YOUR IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY FOR DUTY IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD? None

15. FULL NAME OF HUSBAND/WIFE (If wife, maiden name) Not applicable

b. DATE OF BIRTH Not applicable

c. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, state, or country) Not applicable

d. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED? Not applicable

e. IF NATURALIZED, PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE. Not applicable

16. DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH
None	Not applicable	Not applicable

17. WHICH DEPENDENTS WOULD YOU WISH TO ACCOMPANY YOU ABROAD? None

18a. FATHER'S NAME C.H. Goodpasture

b. PLACE OF BIRTH Celina, Tennessee

c. OCCUPATION Retired

d. PRESENT ADDRESS Post Box 822, Tipton, Oklahoma

e. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DID FATHER EVER OBTAIN U.S. CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO Not applicable

19a. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME Anna W. Goodpasture

b. PLACE OF BIRTH Rickman, Tennessee

c. OCCUPATION IF ANY None

d. PRESENT ADDRESS Post Box 822, Tipton, Oklahoma

e. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DID MOTHER EVER OBTAIN U.S. CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO Not applicable

20a. CAN YOU TAKE DICTATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO 100 W.P.M.

b. ARE YOU A STENOTYPIST? ☒ YES ☐ NO 100 W.P.M.

c. CAN YOU TYPE BY TOUCH SYSTEM? ☒ YES ☐ NO 65 W.P.M.

d. NAME OTHER OFFICE MACHINES YOU OPERATE Adding Machine

21. MILITARY STATUS

a. IF YOU HAVE BEEN IN THE ARMED FORCES OR IN THE MERCHANT MARINE IN WHAT SERVICE AND BRANCH DID YOU SERVE? *(e.g. U.S. Army: Field Artillery)* Not applicable

b. SERVICE OR SERIAL NUMBER Not applicable

c. DATE OF ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY Not applicable

d. RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF ENTRY Not applicable

e. DATE OF HONORABLE DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION Not applicable

f. RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION Not applicable

g. PRESENT RATE OR RANK IF ON ACTIVE DUTY Not applicable

22a. WHAT PERTINENT FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS HAVE YOU TAKEN? *(Give year, title, and grade received)*
None

b. DO YOU HAVE A PERMANENT CIVIL SERVICE STATUS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

c. IF NOW EMPLOYED IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GIVE PRESENT GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE GS-9 Feb 4, '51

23. HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR A POSITION UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR TAKEN AN EXAMINATION FOR A POSITION UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE PARTICULARS UNDER ITEM #37.

24. HAVE YOU EVER HELD A POSITION UNDER A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? *(Including service in the Armed Services of a Foreign power)* ☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

25. OUTLINE YOUR TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE ABROAD GIVING DATES, PURPOSE, AND PLACES. *(If not while in the Armed Forces give number, date, and place of issuance of American passport.)*

War Dept. India, Ceylon, China 1944-1946 SP dated 1944, Washington, D.C.
American Consulate General, Bombay, India, 1947-1948 SP#713, 13 March 1947, Washington, D.C.
Nov-Dec 1948 Travel Bombay to U.S. leave enroute: Egypt, Greece, Italy, Switzerland, France, England.

26. FOREIGN LANGUAGES *(Name and indicate the extent of your competence, i.e. Excellent, Good, Fair)*

a. LANGUAGE	b. READ	c. WRITE	d. SPEAK	e. UNDERSTAND
French	fair	fair	fair	fair

27. EDUCATION

a. GRADE SCHOOL — CIRCLE HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [✓ 8]

	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED		DEGREES CONFERRED	MAJOR SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
b. HIGH SCHOOLS OR PREPARATORY SCHOOLS	Senior High School Tipton, Oklahoma	1932	1936	4		H.S. Diploma	General Arts and Sciences	
c. COLLEGES OR UNIVERSITIES	University of Oklahoma Norman, Oklahoma	1937	1941	4		B.S.	Education, Arts and Sciences	127
d. OTHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OR TRAINING SCHOOLS	Hills' University Oklahoma City, Oklahoma	Sept. 1941	Feb. 1942	½		None	Bus. Admin. Stenotypy	

28. EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS. *(In the spaces provided below describe every position which you have held since you first began to work. Start with present position and work back to the first position which you held. Account for all periods of unemployment and state reasons of any unemployment indicated). Use continuation sheet if more space is required.*

PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)* FROM: Mar. 1949 TO: March 1951

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION Admin. Assistant

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 3978 PER YR. PRESENT $ 4600 PER YR.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(City, state)* Washington, D.C.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER CIA

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU None

NAME AND TITLE OF YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR W.B. Smith

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

General administrative, personnel, and procurement duties. Preparation of reports in accordance with administrative procedures.

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMP[illegible]T Desire to join Forei[illegible]ervice

IF CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, [illegible] APPROACH PRESENT EMPLOYER? ☒ Y[illegible] ☐ NO

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year)
FROM: Mar 1947 TO: Marc[illegible]9

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Admin. Assistant

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $2880 PER YR.
FINAL $4100 PER YR.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state)
Bombay, India

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
American Consulate General
Bombay, India

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
None

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
John J. Macdonald, Consul General

REASON FOR LEAVING
Return to U.S.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
General administrative duties, including preparation of correspondence, administrative reports; handled certain Seaman and Shipping duties; assisted in preparation of pouches and other duties as assigned.

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year)
FROM: Feb 1944 TO: March 1947

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Admin. Assistant

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ 1800 PER YR.
FINAL $ 2644 PER YR.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state)
Washington, DC, India, Ceylon, China

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
War Department, Washington, D.C.

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
1-3

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
C. Martin Wilbur, Section Chief

REASON FOR LEAVING
To take above position

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Chief Clerk handling personnel actions, files, information reports, administrative correspondence; preparation of pouches; dictation and stenographic duties.

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year)
FROM: Mar 1942 TO: October 1943

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Senior Stenographer and Jr. Employee Services Officer

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $1440 PER YR.
FINAL $2000 PER YR.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state)
Washington, DC

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
Executive Office of the President, Office of Emergency Management, Central Personnel and Price Administration

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
1-3

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Edwin Felker, Personnel Officer

REASON FOR LEAVING
Left DC (temporary illness of parent)

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Employee counselling, aided in case work involving clerical personnel placement problems; stenographic duties, including dictation and transcription of conferences; Maintained accounts for Credit Union, and employee contributions for welfare campaigns.

29. OTHER POSITIONS HELD FOR LESS THAN THREE MONTHS AND PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. (List—Beginning with most recent)

DURATION FROM	DURATION TO	POSITION	NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER OR REASON FOR UNEMPLOYMENT	STARTING AND FINAL SALARY PER ANNUM
Dec 1943	Jan 1944	Personnel and Placement Clerk	OEM/War Relocation Authority Washington, DC	$1620. 1620.
Sept 1941	Jan 1942	Photographic Technician (part time while in school)	Elko Photographic Finishing Co. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma	12.50 per wk approx 20.00 per wk

30. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION?
☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

31a. HAVE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO

b. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER TREATMENT FOR A MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISORDER? ☐ YES ☒ NO

c. WITHIN THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS, HAVE YOU FREQUENTLY USED INTOXICATING BEVERAGES TO EXCESS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

d. HAVE YOU EVER HAD TUBERCULOSIS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

e. WERE YOU EVER MEDICALLY DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED FORCES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF ANY OF YOUR ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES", GIVE FULL PARTICULARS UNDER ITEM #37.
Not applicable

32a. DOES YOUR FINANCIAL POSITION PERMIT DISCHARGE OF ALL DEBTS INCURRED? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "NO" STATE UNDER ITEM #37 THE NAMES OF CREDITORS, AMOUNTS DUE TO EACH, AND DATES ON WHICH THE OBLIGATIONS WERE CONTRACTED.	b. IF NOW RESIDING ABROAD HAVE YOU EVER PAID A U.S. INCOME TAX? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE YEAR AND OFFICE OF LAST PAYMENT. Now residing in U.S.

33. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION THAT ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE?

☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

34. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY CIVIL OR MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN THE UNITED STATES OR IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY *(other than for minor traffic violations where the fine did not exceed $25?)* ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF SO, STATE UNDER ITEM #37 THE NAME AND LOCATION OF THE COURT, DATES AND DETAILS OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITIONS.

35. LIST THREE COMPETENT AND RESPONSIBLE PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY DEFINITE INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY *(do not give names of supervisors listed in answer to questions no. 28 or 29).*

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
Mr. George H. Greene	1312 29th St.N.W. Wash.,DC	U.S. Govt.
Dr. I.R. Howard	1120 Ramblewood Road Baltimore, Maryland	Surgeon
Hubert H. Humphrey	Coquelin Terrace Chevy Chase, Maryland	U.S. Senator

36. MENTION HERE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS OR ACHIEVEMENTS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN THIS APPLICATION. INCLUDE SUCH ITEMS AS ANY BOOKS OR ARTICLES YOU HAVE WRITTEN, SPECIAL RESEARCH WORK, TECHNICAL SKILLS, HONORARY OR PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY MEMBERSHIPS, AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION YOU CONSIDER PERTINENT. YOU MAY INCLUDE ANY PERTINENT RELIGIOUS, CIVIC, WELFARE, OR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY WHICH YOU HAVE PERFORMED EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, SHOWING THE NUMBER OF HOURS PER WEEK AND NUMBER OF WEEKS PER YEAR IN WHICH YOU WERE ENGAGED IN SUCH ACTIVITY.

37. USE THIS SPACE FOR COMPLETING ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE FOREGOING QUESTIONS, NUMBERING ANSWER TO CORRESPOND WITH QUESTIONS. USE EXTRA SHEETS OF PAPER IF NECESSARY.

23. In October 1945 transferred by Executive order to Department of State,IRIS/ Kunming, China; however, transfer cancelled in December 1945 and remained with War Department, Shanghai.

28. Under present position am included in the provisions of the U.S. Retirement Act.

CERTIFICATION

False Statement on this Application is Cause for Dismissal.

I DO SOLEMNLY AFFIRM THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.

DATE

NAME AS USUALLY WRITTEN AND WHICH WILL BE USED AS OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

GPO 050 2-288

Standard Form 57 Revised 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50-R046

INSTRUCTIONS—[illegible] in INK. If you are applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all instructions. Mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

1. Name of examination, or kind of position applied for:

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. Place of employment applied for:

4. ~~Mr.~~ Miss (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
ANN L. GOODPASTURE

5. Street and number or R. D. number.
1514-17th St., N.W.

City or post office (including postal zone), and State
Washington, D.C.

6. Legal or voting residence (State) | 7. Office phone No. | Home phone DE 0300

8. Place of birth (City and State, if born outside U. S., name city and country)
Celina, Tennessee,

9. Date of birth (month, day, year) 28 November 1918
10. Age last birthday 30
11. ☐ Male ☒ Female

12. ☐ Married ☒ Single
13. Height without shoes 5 feet 2½ inches Weight 104 pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No
If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade
temp CAF-9 Dec 14, 1947

APPLICATION No.
ANNOUNCEMENT No.
SELECTION No.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

Material
☐ Approv. ☐ Submitted
☐ Nonapprov. ☐ Returned
Entered register
Notations
App. Review
Approved

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disab.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment, if offered for—	X	
1 to 3 months?		
3 to 6 months?		
6 to 12 months?		
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered—		
in Washington, D. C.?	X	
anywhere in the United States?	X	
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept. $............ per year.
You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify:
☒ Occasionally ☒ Frequently ☒ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the spaces provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal duties which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience)
(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.
(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (Month, year)
From: November 1946 To present time

Exact title of your present position
Administrative Assistant

Salary or earnings
Starting, $ per
Present $ per

Place of employment (city and State)
Bombay, India

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) (If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):
American Consulate General

Description of your work General administrative and routine consular duties.

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfr. of locks, etc.)
U.S. Foreign Service

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
none

Name and title of immediate supervisor
Lennox C. Fogg, Vice Consul

Reason for desiring to change employment
Return to U.S.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

Dates of employment (month, year) From: June 46 To: Nov 46

Place of employment (city and State): Washington, D.C.

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: SSU-CIG Registry

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfr. of locks, etc.): US GOVT

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: -

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Mrs. C. Gilbert, Chief, Registry

Reason for leaving: transfer

Exact title of your position: Reference Clerk

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $ 2770 per yr

Description of your work: General reference, indexing of classified documents on far east.

Dates of employment (month, year) From: October 45 To: May 46

Place of employment (city and State): Shanghai, China

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: IRIS-SSU

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfr. of locks, etc.): US GOVT

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: -

Name and title of immediate supervisor: C. M. Wilbur, Chief, IRIS and Col. R. J. Delaney

Reason for leaving: Transfer

Exact title of your position: Reference Clerk

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $ 2560 per yr

Description of your work: Clerk, general administrative assistant, and secretary for Chief, IRIS, China and reference clerk for OB of SSU, China

---

Dates of employment (month, year) From: February 44 To: September 45

Place of employment (city and State): Washington, D.C. New Delhi, India, Ceylon & Kunming, China

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: OSS-R&A-CBI

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfr. of locks, etc.): US GOVT

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: -

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Geo. Greene, Cora DuBois & Col. Joseph Spencer Chiefs of R&A

Reason for leaving: Transfer

Exact title of your position: Clerk and Stenographer

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $ 2560 per yr

Description of your work: Secretary, clerk, stenographer, and general administrative assistant for East Asia Economics section in D.C. and R&A branch in field.

Dates of employment (month, year) From: 11 Mar 42 To: February 44

Place of employment (city and State): Washington, D.C.

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: OEM-Price Admin. & WRA Personnel

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfr. of locks, etc.): US GOVT

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: -

Name and title of immediate supervisor: R.C. Procky, Chief, Employee Services Section

Reason for leaving: Transfer

Exact title of your position: Jr. Employee Services Officer & Personnel Clerk 1620

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $2000 per

Description of your work: General employee services functions for Personnel Division, OEM-Price Admin. General personnel clerk for WRA (OEM)

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 59) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Prior employment during o[illegible]ege not applicable

QUALIFICATIONS & EXPERIENCE

12 Nov. 1946

NAME: Ann Lorene GOODPASTURE

PERSONAL: Date of Birth - 23 November 1918
Place of Birth - Celina, Tennessee
Legal Residence - Oklahoma

PARENTAGE: Father: C. H. Goodpasture, Born 12 February 1894
Citizenship - U.S. by Birth
Mother: Anna W. Goodpasture, Born 21 February 1891
Citizenship - U.S. by Birth

EDUCATION: 1926-30 Grammar School - Tennessee & Oklahoma
1930-32 Ward Jr. High School, Tipton, Oklahoma
1932-36 Tipton Sr. High School, Tipton, Oklahoma
1937-41 University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma BS 1941
9/41 - 2/42 Hill's University, Oklahoma City. Special courses
no degree conferred

EXPERIENCE: 1937-41- University of Oklahoma. Secretarial & clerical duties - part-time while attending school $20-30 month
9/1941-2/1942 - Elko Photographic Finishing Co., Oklahoma City. Secretary and Photographic technician - part-time while in school. $60-85. month
3/1942-1/1944 - Office for Emergency Management, Central Personnel and Price Administration. Steno & Jr. Employee Services Officer. $1440-2000. yr
2/1944-Present - Office of Strategic Services. Far East Division, RAA Branch. Secretary to Chief, East Asia Economics Section to Nov. 44, Washington, DC. $1800. yr

New Delhi, India; Kandy, Ceylon; Kunming, China
Secretary & Chief Clerk to Chief, OSS/RAA, IB and China Theaters to Oct. 1945 $2000-2300 yr

Kunming, China; Shanghai, China
Secretary & Chief Clerk to Chief, IRIS/CT, Dept. of State to December 1945. $2320. yr

Shanghai, China; Washington, DC
WD, OASW, SSU. Reference Clerk, Order of Battle Section, SI, Shanghai and Registry, SI, Washington. $2320-2770. yr.

LANGUAGES: French, Speak, Write, Read fair

TRAVEL: Nov. 1944-Sept. 1945, India & Ceylon (2 months temporary duty in Ceylon - Jun, July 1945).
Sept. 1945 - March 1946, China

14-00000

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE: [illegible] In the service, write in Item (a) "No attendance at service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all important changes in duty assignment, showing dates of each assignment.

(a) First Special Service School attended:	(b) What were you taught in first special service school?
Location:	
Dates attended (months, years): From To	
Rating received at end of this training:	
(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School):	(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?
Dates of duty assignment (months, years): From To	
(e) Second Special Service School attended:	(f) What were you taught in second special service school?
Location:	
Dates attended (months, years): From: To:	
Rating received at end of this training:	
(g) Duty assignment after this training.	(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?
Dates of duty assignment (months, years): From: To	

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION —Circle highest grade completed.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of:

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(a) Give name and location of last high school attended.
Tipton, Okla. Tipton High School

(b) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired:
No specialized curriculum

(c) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended From—	Dates Attended To—	Years Completed Day	Years Completed Night	Degrees Conferred Title	Degrees Conferred Date	Semester Hours Credit
	Education							
University of Oklahoma, Norman	English	1937	1941	x 4		B.S.	1941	127 (?)
Hills' University, Okla. City	Bus Ad.	9/41	2/42	½	½	-	-	

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
English	16- 20 ?	Bus. Ad. & Stenotypy	
Commercial Arts	50 ?		
Education	24		

(e) Other training, such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school), or "in-service training" in a Federal agency.

none

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended From—	Dates Attended To—	Years Completed Day	Years Completed Night

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages:	Reading Exc.	Reading Good	Reading Fair	Speaking Exc.	Speaking Good	Speaking Fair	Understanding Exc.	Understanding Good	Understanding Fair
French			x			x			x

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?
Formal instruction

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries indicate (1) names of countries (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e. g., business, education, recreation).
See experience. Oct 48 - 6 Dec 48 travelled to US via Europe stopping all countries enroute - purpose: visit.

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key-punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices:

Approximate number of words per minute in typing ..?... shorthand ..?

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)
☒ Yes ☐ No Give kind of license and State: Teacher
First license or certificate (year): Life certificate obtained 194
Latest license or certificate (year)

22. Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application such as:
(a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(b) your patents or inventions
(c) public speaking and public relations experience
(d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

16—67209-8

23. REFERENCES.—List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item [illegible].

	FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.	H.B. Smith	2430 E. Street, N.W. D.C.	US GOVT
2.	Edward Saunders	Same	US GOVT
3.	Mrs. D. Johnson	Same	US GOVT

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		X
28. Since your 16th birthday, have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned or placed on probation or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes" list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating if retired from military or naval service.		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county or municipality? If your answer is "Yes" give details in Item 38.		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by whom employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?		X
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?		
(c) Was service performed on an active full time basis with full military pay and allowances?		

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service	Date of separation or separations.

Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	Serial No. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation.)

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER **PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY,** OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service-connected disability?		

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d), IS "YES," AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19.....

Agency .... Title ....

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions (indicate item numbers to which answers apply).

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80).

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date .... Signature of applicant ....

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs., and if married use your own given name (Mrs. Mary L. Doe).)

GPO 16—47708-8

Standard Form 57—June 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R048.

INSTRUCTIONS – Answer every question [illegible] fully and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. If you are applying for [illegible] States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow its directions. Mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION No.

1. Name of examination, or kind of position applied for:

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement):

3. Place of employment applied for.

4. ~~XXX~~ Miss (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
ANN LORENE GOODPASTURE

5. Street and number or R. D. number.
1514 - 17th St., N. W., Apt. 111

City or post office (including postal zone), and State:
Washington, 6, D. C.

ANNOUNCEMENT

6. Legal or voting residence (State): OKLAHOMA
7. Office phone No.: Ext. 2215
Home phone: DE 0300 Ext. 111

8. Place of birth (city and State, if born outside U. S., name city and country)
CELINA, TENNESSEE

9. Date of birth (month, day, year): 28 NOV 1918
10. Age last birthday: 27
11. ☐ Male ☒ Female

SELECTION No.

12. ☐ Married ☒ Single
13. Height without shoes: 5 feet 2 inches
Weight: 115 pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No
If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade.
CAF-5, 1 March 1945

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Appor. ☐ Nonappor.
Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned
Entered register:
Notations:
App. Review:
Approved:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		
3 to 6 months?		
6 to 12 months?	X	
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered—	X	
in Washington, D. C.?		
anywhere in the United States?	X	
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations.

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept: $________ per year.
You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify:
☒ Occasionally ☒ Frequently ☒ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the spaces provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience).

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (Month, year)
From: May 1946 To present time

Exact title of your present position:
Reference Clerk

Salary or earnings:
Starting, $ per
Present, $2770 per annum

Place of employment (city and State):
Washington, D. C.

Description of your work: Indexing and logging incoming classified reports on Far East. Processing obsolete and outdated field and Hqtrs document files.

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division.
WD, OSAW, SSU, Registry

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.):
U.S. Government

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
1 - Reference clerk

Name and title of immediate supervisor:
Mrs. C.J. Gilbert, Actg. Chief.

Reason for desiring to change employment:
Liquidation of Agency

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

Dates of employment (Month, year) From Dec 45 To April 46
Place of employment (city and State): Shanghai, China
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: War Dept, OASW, Hq. SSU/CT
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg of locks, etc.): U.S. Government
Number and kind of employees supervised by you: -
Name and title of immediate supervisor: Capt. Wayne Richardson, Chief
Lt.Col. R.J. Delaney, CO
Reason for leaving: Deactivation of HQ SSU CT
Exact title of your position: Secretary - Research Assistant
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 2320 per; Final $ 2430 per annum
Description of your work: Secretarial duties, assisted in composing classified Order of Battle reports. Set-up biographical file of military personalities. Spotted troop movements on situation maps.

Dates of employment (Month, year) From Sept 45 To Dec 45
Place of employment (city and State): Kunming and Shanghai, China
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: State Dept./IRIS/CT
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg of locks, etc.): U.S. Government
Number and kind of employees supervised by you: 1 - 3 EM clerks & typists
Name and title of immediate supervisor: Lt. Col. J.E. Spencer, Chief/R&A
Mr.C.M. Wilbur, Chief, IRIS/CT
Reason for leaving: Deactivation of IRIS CT, Transfer to SSU.
Exact title of your position: Secretary and Chief Clerk
Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $2320 per annum
Description of your work: Responsible for secretarial and general administrative duties for R&A Branch -after 1 Oct 45, IRIS/State Dept. Separate Registry and document library. Allocation of typing and clerical duties to EM clerks & typists. Reproduction of R&A analytical reports and dissemination to State Dept Washington and appropriate Consulates. Prepared periodic reports to State, Washington; Consulate-General, Shanghai; and SSU/CT. Requisitioning and accountability for expendable & non-expendable property for IRIS.

Dates of employment (Month, year) From Dec 44 To Sept. 45
Place of employment (city and State): New Delhi, India & Kandy, Ceylon
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: OSS - R&A Branch - IB Theater
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg of locks, etc.): U.S. Government
Number and kind of employees supervised by you: 1 - 3 clerks and typists
Name and title of immediate supervisor: Capt. J. R. Coolidge, Chief, R&A/IBT
Reason for leaving: Transfer requested by China Theater.
Exact title of your position: Secretary and Chief Clerk
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 2000 per; Final $ 2320 per annum
Description of your work: Duties same as above except R&A was under jurisdiction of OSS rather than Dept. of State. (2 months temporary duty in Ceylon, June - July 1945; Immediate supervisor: Miss Cora DuBois)

Dates of employment (Month, year) From Feb 44 To Dec 44
Place of employment (city and State): Washington, D. C.
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: OSS-R&A - East Asia Economics Sect.
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg of locks, etc.): U. S. Government
Number and kind of employees supervised by you: 1 Clerk typist
Name and title of immediate supervisor: G.H. Greene, Jr., Section Chief
Reason for leaving: Transfer to Far East.
Exact title of your position: Secretary to Section Chief
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 1800 per; Final $ 1800 per
Description of your work: Responsible for performance and allocation of all secretarial and clerical duties pertaining to work of East Asia Economics Section. Responsible for files, correspondence, periodic reports, etc.

If more space is required, use a continuation [illegible] dard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size a [illegible] Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to [illegible] application.
16—10—47[illegible]

Standard Form 58
Issued in 1945
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50-R048

CONTINUATION SHEET

For Question 16, "Application for Federal Employment," Standard Form No. 57

Fill in this form only when necessary for completion of Question 16, "Experience" on Standard Form No. 57. Enclose unattached, with your application. Typewrite or write legibly in ink.

1. Date of this continuation sheet

2. ~~Mr.~~ Mrs. ~~Miss~~ (First name) ANN (Middle) LORENE (Maiden, if any) GOODPASTURE (Last)

3. Date of birth: 28 Nov. 1918

4. Name of examination

Dates of employment (Month, year): From: March 1942 To: Jan 1944

Exact title of your position: Jr. Employee Services Officer

Salary or earnings: Starting $ 1440 per; Final $ 2000 per annum

Place of employment (city and State): Washington, D. C.

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Description of your work: Began as Clk-steno in Central Personnel/OEM. Various stenographic and clerical duties. Transferred to Price Administration to assist in setting up Employee Services program under Employee Relations Division. Dec 43 - Jan 44 was Placement and Training Clerk for War Relocation Authority (Also originally under OEM).

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Government

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: 1 CAF-3

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Prosky, [illegible] (CAROL) Chief/Employee Services.
Benson, Mark: Chief, Placement

Reason for leaving: Transfer

Dates of employment (Month, year): From: Sept 41 To: Feb 42

Exact title of your position: Secretary & Photographic Technician

Salary or earnings: Starting $ 50 per; Final $ 85 per mo.

Description of your work: Part-time employment at Company while attending school.

Place of employment (city and State): Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: ELKO PHOTOGRAPHIC FINISHING CO.

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Commercial Photographic Finishing

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: 1 to 15 unskilled technicians

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Mr. Geo. Dempsey, Gen'l Mgr.

Reason for leaving: Full time employment in D.C.

Dates of employment (Month, year): From: 1937 To: June 41

Exact title of your position: Secretary - clerk

Salary or earnings: Starting $ 20 per; Final $ 30 per mo.

Place of employment (city and State): Norman, Oklahoma

Description of your work: On University pay-roll while attending University. Part-time employment in offices of Faculty members, library and University Press.

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: University of Oklahoma

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): University

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: None

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Mrs. Peters, Dean, FA.

Reason for leaving: End of school

(OVER)

16—47453-1

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE – In order to m[illegible] effective placements of war veterans, detailed infor[illegible]eded about the training and experience they have acquired in the Armed Services. Fill i[illegible] space for each service school you have attend[illegible] attended no special or technical schools while in the service; write in Item (a) "No [illegible] at service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all [illegible] changes in duty assignment, showing dates of such assignment.

(a) First Special Service School attended:

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(b) What were you taught in First Special Service School?

(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School):

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From: To:

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?

(e) Second Special Service School attended:

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(f) What were you taught in Second Special Service School?

(g) Duty assignment after this training:

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From: To:

(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION – Circle highest grade completed.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of:

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(a) Give name and location of last high school attended.
TIPTON SR. HIGH SCHOOL, Tipton, Oklahoma

(b) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired.

(c) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended		Years Completed		Degrees Conferred		Semester Hours Credit
		From—	To—	Day	Night	Title	Date	
University of Oklahoma, Norman	Arts & Science	1937	1941	4		B.S.	June 41	127
Hills University, Okla. City	Business	9/41	2/42	½				

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
Arts & Sciences (Commercial)	50	Business Administration	
English	20	Reporting - Secretarial Science	
Education	24		
History	12		

(e) Other training such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school), or "in-service training" in a Federal agency:

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended		Years Completed	
	From—	To—	Day	Night

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERST'NG		
	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair
French			X			X			X

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?
School

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries, indicate (1) names of countries, (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e. g., business, education, recreation):
Given in Item 16 this application

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key-punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices:
Typewriter, duplicating machines, stenotype
Approximate number of words per minute in typing 60 shorthand 100

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)
☒ Yes ☐ No Give kind of license and State: Teacher
First license or certificate (year): 1941 (Life)
Latest license or certificate (year)

22. Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application such as:
(a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(b) your patents or inventions
(c) public speaking and public relations experience
(d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

23. REFERENCES.—List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. MR. EDWARD SAUNDERS	2430 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. Telephone EX 6115, ext. 445	Government
2. MISS OLIVE REDDICK	Hood College, Frederick, Md.	Professor
3. MISS RHEA BLUE	23rd and E Sts., N.W., Washington DC State Department/CRI	Government

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess.		X
28. Since your 16th birthday, have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail, for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating if retired from military or naval service.		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 38.		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous break-down? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?		X
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?		
(c) Was service performed on an active full time basis with full military pay and allowances?		

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service.	Date of separation or separations.
Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	**Serial No. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation.)**

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY, OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		X
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		X
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service-connected disability?		X

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d) IS "YES" AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19.....

Agency

Title

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions (indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80).

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date ....

Signature of applicant ....
(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name, as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe.")

GPO 49—16 67706-2

Standard Form No. 57
Approved April 9, 1942
(Revised July 1942)
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
U. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 332

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS—Answer every question clearly and completely. Typewrite or write legibly in BLACK INK, to assure clear photographic copies for appointing agencies. *If you are applying for a specific United States Civil Service Examination*, read the Examination Announcement carefully, follow all directions, and mail this application to the office named therein. If none, mail with an explanatory letter to the U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., unless otherwise directed. Notify same office of any change of address.

ANNO. APP. NO. SEL. NO.

This space for U. S. Civil Service Commission

1. Name of examination, if any, or name of position applied for:

2. Place of examination (if a written test), or place of employment applied for (City and State)

3. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement):

AV.

To U. S. Civil Service Commission

Assem. Vouchers

O. S. Cr. E & E. P & D. Ini.

4. .. Mr. .. Mrs. x Miss **Ann Lorene Goodpasture** (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)

5. 247 Delaware Ave., Apt. 308, S. W. (R. D. or street and number)
Washington, D. C. (City, post office and State)

6. Date of birth (month, day, year): 11-28-1918

7. Age last birthday: 25

8. Date of this application: 1-1944

9. Legal or voting residence: State Oklahoma

10. Telephone numbers: (Residence phone) .... RE 7500 Ext. 71452 (Business phone)

11. (a) Check one: .. Male x Female
(b) Check one: .. Widowed. x Single. .. Separated. .. Married. .. Divorced.

12. Height, without shoes: 5 ft 1 in. Weight: 110 lb

13. Where were you born? Celina, Tennessee (City and State or country)

.. Preference: Allowed— .. Veteran. .. Disability. .. Wife. .. Widow. .. Disallowed. .. Closed.

.. Indian.

Adm'd exam. Approved by Exam. date Not. Ex. Date Req. .. Material att'd. .. Material filed. .. Material ret.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	Yes	No
14. Are you a citizen of the United States? Unless otherwise instructed, naturalized citizens must submit, along with this application, Naturalization Certificate, other foreign-born documentary proof of citizenship. Documents will be returned.	X	
15. Have you ever been arrested, or summoned into court as a defendant, or indicted, or convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or has any case against you been filed, or have you ever been ordered to deposit collateral for alleged breach or violation of any law or police regulation or ordinance whatsoever? If so, list all cases, without any exception whatsoever, under Item 45, page 4, giving in each case (1) the date, (2) your age at the time, (3) the place where the alleged offense or violation occurred, (4) the name and location of the court, (5) the nature of the offense or violation, (6) the penalty, if any, imposed, or other disposition. The above question includes arrests by military or naval authorities and disciplinary action imposed by courts martial as well as in civil cases. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.		X
16. (a) Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever?		X
(b) Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? If your answer to either (a) or (b) is yes, give full particulars under Item 45, page 4.		
17. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If so, give complete details under Item 45.		X
18. Have you ever been discharged for misconduct or unsatisfactory service, or forced to resign from any position? If so, state (under Item 45) when and where employed and give the name and address of your employer and the reason for your discharge or forced resignation in each case.		X
19. Within the past 12 months, have you used intoxicating beverages? If so, specify: X Occasionally .. Habitually. .. To excess	X	
20. Are any members of your family or relatives (either by blood or by marriage), employed by the United States Government, excluding persons in the armed forces? If so, give name, address, relationship, and branch of service of each such relative under Item 45.		
21. Are you NOW employed by the Federal Government?	X	

(a) If so: War Relocation Authority
Barr Building, Washington, D.C. (Location)

(b) If you now are or have ever been so employed, give dates: from .... (Month) 19.... (Year) to .... (Month) 19.... (Year)

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	Yes	No
22. (a) Were you ever in the U. S. military or naval service? If so, give branch of service and date of last discharge. .. Army. .. Navy. .. Marine. .. Coast Guard. Date		X
(b) Were all discharges granted under honorable conditions?		
(c) Have you already established military preference with the Civil Service Commission? If so, check kind of preference below. .. Veteran. .. Disabled veteran. .. Wife of disabled veteran. .. Widow of veteran. If you are applying for a specific examination, and wish to claim veteran preference in connection with it, attach C. S. C. (Preference) Form 14, together with the evidence specified therein.		
23. Have you registered under the Selective Service Act? If so, give address and number of local board ...... If classified, give your classification ...... Your order number		X
24. (a) Are you now a member of any branch of military or naval reserve? If so, give name of organization		X
(b) Are you now on active duty?		
25. Give number of persons completely dependent on you, other than husband or wife: none		
26. Would you accept short term appointment? .. 6 months .. 3 months .. 1 month	X	
27. (a) Would you accept appointment anywhere offered in the United States? Give location preferences	X	
(b) Would you accept appointment outside the United States? Give locations acceptable	X	
(c) Would you accept appointment in Washington, D. C.? If so, and if you are applying for a specific examination, refer to the examination announcement to see if the Certificate of Residence (C. S. C. Form 12) is to be submitted. Proof of residence is required for many kinds of positions.	X	

28. What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept? $ 1800 to 2000 yr. per ...... You will not be considered for positions paying less.

29. If you are willing to travel, specify: X Occasionally .. Frequently. .. Constantly.

30. How much notice will you require to report for work? ......

Print or type your name here as in Item 4 **Miss Ann Lorene Goodpasture**

31. (a) Have you ever filed applications for any Federal civil service examinations? (If so, list them below.) Yes No

Titles of examinations	Examined in what cities	Month and year	Ratings

(b) Have you passed any State or other civil service examination (other than the above) within the last 3 years? (If so, give details under Item 45.) Yes No

32. EDUCATION. (a) Circle highest grade completed: elementary or high school 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12] Did you graduate? X Yes No

Name and location of school	Dates attended From—	To—	Years completed Day	Night	Degrees conferred Title	Date	Semester hours credit
(b) College or university University of Oklahoma Norman, Oklahoma	1937	1941	4		B.S.	1941	127

(c) Other Business University — Business Administration — Studies
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma — Accounting and Stenotypy

List your four chief undergraduate subjects	Semester hrs.	List your four chief graduate subjects	Semester hrs.
Commercial & Advertising	50	Business Administration	
English	20	Accounting	
Psychology	12	Stenotypy	
History	12		

33. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.

	READ Exc.	Good	Fair	SPEAK Exc.	Good	Fair	UNDERSTAND Exc.	Good	Fair
French		X			X			X	

34. Are you now a licensed member of any trade or profession (such as electrician, radio operator, pilot, lawyer, CPA, etc.)? X Yes No

If not, have you ever been licensed?

Give kind of license and State Instructor, Okla.

Earliest license (year) 1941

Most recent license (year) 1941

35. REFERENCES. List five persons, who are not related to you by blood or marriage, who live in the United States, and who are or have been mainly responsible for close direction of your work, or who are in a position to judge your work critically in those occupations in which you regard yourself as best qualified.

Full name	Address (Give complete address, including street and number)	Business or occupation
Hall	Elko Photographic Finishing Co.	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
h. C. Prosky	Office of Price Administration	Washington, D. C.
n Howard	OPA Economist	Washington, D. C.
H. Sanders	Tipton, Oklahoma	Pres. First Nat'l Bank

36. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? X Yes No

37. EXPERIENCE. In the space furnished below give a record of every employment, both public and private, which you have had since you first began to work. Start with your present position and work back to the first position you held, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Describe your field of work and position, and, except for employments held less than three months, give your duties and responsibilities in such detail as to make your qualifications clear. Give name you used on pay roll if different from that given on this application.

PRESENT POSITION

Place Washington, D. C.

From Dec. 7 (Month) 43 (Year) to Date (Month) 19 (Year)

Name of employer:

Address

Kind of business or organization:

Number and class of employees you supervised

Name and title of your immediate supervisor

Exact title of your position

Salary Starting, $ Per Final, $

Duties and responsibilities

See attached sheet

Machines and equipment you used

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

14-00000

Place Washington, D. C.
From June 1943 To Sept. 1943
Name of employer: OPA
Address Washington, D. C.
Kind of business or organization: Government
Number and class of employees you supervised 1 CAF-3
Name and title of your immediate supervisor Ruth C. Prosky Supervisor, Employee Services Section, Personnel Division
Reason for leaving Mother's illness (needed at home)

Exact title of your position Jr. Employee Ser. Officer Financial Advisor
Salary Starting $ 2000. Per yr. Final $ 2000.
Duties and responsibilities Advisor on all financial activities pertaining to collection and disposition of funds for all campaigns for personnel of OPA. Responsible for setting up accounts, handling of cash, and submitting reports. Under bond. (Emergency Loan Fund of approx. $1500; Recreation Fund $1000. (employee contributions); War Savings Bonds (pay roll and cash); Group Hospitalization collections, $800. monthly; Asst. Treas. of OPA Credit Union. Responsible for 3 bank accounts. Investigated insurance & credit companies. Wrote reports and memoranda. Excellent efficiency rating
Machines and equipment you used Typewriter, adding machine & Calculator

---

Place Washington, D. C.
From Oct. 1942 To June 1943
Name of employer: OPA
Address Washington, D. C.
Kind of business or organization: Government
Number and class of employees you supervised 1 CAF-3
Name and title of your immediate supervisor Ruth C. Prosky
Reason for leaving Promotion

Exact title of your position Transportation Officer Employee Services Clerk
Salary Starting $ 1800. Per yr. Final $ 2000.
Duties and responsibilities Employee Relations duties involving interviewing, organization of various agency campaigns, responsible for safe, setting up and maintaining accounts for above mentioned funds. Transportation Officer - organized car clubs (500) certified applicants for supplemental rations. Wrote reports and memoranda. Worked with various sections of agency (Administrative Officers) in selecting representatives for promoting agency campaigns & war bonds sales. Administrative Assistant to Head of Section.
Machines and equipment you used Typewriter, adding machine, & calculator

---

Place Washington, D. C.
From April 1942 To Oct. 1942
Name of employer: same as above
Address
Kind of business or organization:
Number and class of employees you supervised
Name and title of your immediate supervisor
Reason for leaving promotion

Exact title of your position Personnel Clerk
Salary Starting $ 1620 Per Final $ 1800
Duties and responsibilities Transportation Officer for OPA personnel in organization of car clubs. Responsible for planning and setting up of war bonds pay roll allotment plan. Disseminated information regarding all agency campaigns such as Community War Fund, Red Cross, United Relief, etc. Wrote reports and memoranda. Various bookkeeping and accounting assignments. Excellent efficiency rating
Machines and equipment you used Typewriter, adding machine & calculator

---

Place Washington, D. C.
From March 1942 To April 1942
Name of employer: OEM-OPA
Address Washington, D. C.
Kind of business or organization: Government
Number and class of employees you supervised none
Name and title of your immediate supervisor Ruth Prosky
Reason for leaving Promotion

Exact title of your position Clerk
Salary, Starting $1440 Per yr. Final $1620
Duties and responsibilities General personnel clerk. Performed various clerical and secretarial duties in the personnel section.
Machines and equipment you used Typewriter & Stenotype

If more space is required, use a Continuation Sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper, size 8 x 10½ inches. Write on each sheet your name, full address, date of birth, and examination title (if any). Enclose, unattached, with application.

38. Do you hold any position or office under any State, Territory, county or municipality? .... Yes [✓ No]
If so give details under Item 45

39. Do you receive any pension or other benefit (exclusive of Adjusted Service Certificate) for military or naval service, or an annuity from the U. S. Government under any Retirement Act? .... Yes [✓ No]
If so give details under Item 45

40. Show name and address of wife's (or husband's) employer (if none, write "None").

none

41. (a) Were any of the following members of your family born outside Continental U. S. A.? .... Yes [✓ No]

.... Wife ...... Husband ...... Father ...... Mother

If so, indicate which by marking the appropriate space, and show under Item 45 for each (1) full name, including maiden name of wife or mother, (2) birthplace, (3) native citizenship, and (4) if U. S. naturalized, date of naturalization.

(b) Have you any relatives, by blood or by marriage (excluding persons in the U. S. armed forces), now living in a foreign country? .... Yes [✓ No]

If so, for each relative show under Item 45 the (1) name, (2) relationship, (3) place of residence, (4) birthplace, (5) present citizenship, and (6) whether transient or resident.

42. List any special skills not shown in Question 37 such as operation of short-wave radio, multilith, key-punch, turret lathe, or scientific or professional devices.

SKILL .... SKILL ....

SKILL .... SKILL ....

Words per minute in typing 60-65 ...... stenography ....

Do you have a license to operate an automobile? .... Yes [✓ No]

43. State what kind of work you prefer ....

44. Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application, such as (a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested), (b) your patents or inventions, (c) hobbies, construction of instruments, etc.

45. Space for detailed answers to other questions:

Item No.	Write in left column numbers of items to which detailed answers apply.

If more space is required, use a sheet of THIN paper, size 8 x 10½ inches. Write on each sheet your name, full address, date of birth, and examination title (if any). Use one side only. Enclose, unattached, with application.

If you claim preference for the Indian Service as an Indian, you must file with this application a certificate from the superintendent of the Indian agency where you are registered, or from the Commissioner, Bureau of Indian Affairs, showing that you have at least one-fourth Indian blood.

JURAT (OR OATH).—This jurat (or oath) must be executed.

The following oath must be taken before a notary public, the secretary of a United States civil service board of examiners, or other officer authorized to administer oaths, before whom the applicant must appear in person. The following are among those not authorized to administer this oath: Postmasters (except in Alaska), Army officers, post-office inspectors, and chief clerks and assistant chief clerks in the Railway Mail Service.

The composition and work in connection with any material required to be submitted for this examination are entirely my own, except where I have given full credit for quoted matter or the collaboration of others by quotation marks and references, and in the composition of the same I have received no assistance except as indicated fully in my explanatory statement.

I, the undersigned, DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) that the statements made by me in answer to the foregoing questions are full and true to the best of my knowledge and belief, SO HELP ME GOD.

If female prefix "Miss" or "Mrs." and if married use your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe."

(Signature of applicant) Ann L. Goodpasture
(Sign WITH PEN AND INK your name—one given name, initial or initials, and surname)

Subscribed and duly sworn to before me according to law by the above-named applicant this 25 day of Jan, 1944 at city [or town] of Wash
county of .... and State [or Territory or District] of D C
(Signature of officer) Edna D. Miller
(Official title) Notary Public

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE O—29004-1

Standard Form No. 58
Approved April 9, 1942
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 332

CONTINUATION SHEET

For Question 37, "Application for Federal Employment," Standard Form No. 57

Fill in this form only when necessary for completion of "Record of Previous Employment" question on Standard Form No. 57. Enclose, unattached, with your application. Typewrite or use BLACK ink and print. USE ONE SIDE ONLY.

1. Title of examination (if submitted as an application for same):

2. Date of birth (Month, day, and year): 11-28-1918

3. Applicant's first, middle, and last names, and full address: Miss Ann Lorene Goodpasture

---

Place: Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
From: Sept. 1941 To: Feb. 1942
Name of employer: Elko Photo Finishing Company
Address: Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Kind of business or organization: Private industry
Number and class of employees you supervised: 1 to 15
Name and title of your immediate supervisor: Geo. Dempsey, Manager
Reason for leaving: came to Washington

Exact title of your position: Secretary & Photographic Finisher
Salary: Starting, $ 60.00 Per mo. Final, $ 85.00
Duties and responsibilities: Bookkeeper, pay roll clerk, and secretary to Manager. During his absence was in complete charge of office (approximately 35 to 40 employees who did photographic finishing). During rush weeks, I worked overtime as a photographic printer, enlarger, or at any place where the workload was particularly heavy. (I have had my own darkroom laboratory since a child so that I was quite familiar all types of photographic finishing). I figured time cards weekly and made out pay roll. Kept the accounts for approximately 300 drug stores and other firms which acted as representatives of the finishing company in sending films for processing and developing. Prepared monthly statements for each organization. This was in addition to the other office accounts.
Machines and equipment you used:

Place: (City) (State)
From (Month) 19 (Year) To (Month) 19 (Year)
Name of employer:
Address:
Kind of business or organization:
Number and class of employees you supervised:
Name and title of your immediate supervisor:
Reason for leaving:

Exact title of your position:
Salary: Starting, $ Per Final, $
Duties and responsibilities:
Machines and equipment you used:

Place: Norman, Oklahoma
From (Month) 19 (Year) To (Month) 19 (Year)
Name of employer: Oklahoma University
Address: Norman, Oklahoma
Kind of business or organization: Fine Arts Department
Number and class of employees you supervised: none
Name and title of your immediate supervisor: Mrs. Peters
Reason for leaving: end of school

Exact title of your position: Office Clerk
Salary: Starting, $ 15. Per mo. Final, $ 20.
Duties and responsibilities: General office work while attending college. Graduated from the University of Oklahoma in 1941. I do not recall the exact dates which I worked. A substantial part of my school expenses was paid by work at the University and also typing of theses. Also was a free lance photographer. Average combined earnings per month from 1937 to 1941 were approximately $30.
Machines and equipment you used:

Place: (City) (State)
From (Month) 19 (Year) To (Month) 19 (Year)
Name of employer:
Address:
Kind of business or organization:
Number and class of employees you supervised:
Name and title of your immediate supervisor:
Reason for leaving:

Exact title of your position:
Salary: Starting, $ Per Final, $
Duties and responsibilities:
Machines and equipment you used:

If more space is required use another continuation sheet or a sheet of THIN paper, size 8 x 10½ inches. Write on each sheet your name, address in full, and examination title (if any). Use one side only. Enclose, unattached, with application.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942—O-455240

Attachment

Present Position:

At the present time I am working in two places: one position is with the War Relocation Authority in the Placement and Training Unit of the Personnel Management Section which consists principally of clerical duties; the other position is with Congressional Intelligence, a private news service, the work consists of preparing for publication various legislative reports, press releases and current congressional information. The combined salaries amount to $204. per month.

The Civil Service position which I now have is a grade CAF-3 $1620. Although I am now doing personnel work, I do not feel that I am utilizing to the fullest extent my experience and educational qualifications and would be interested in transferring to any position for which I am qualified. I would prefer a position with a salary which would not necessitate my being on two jobs at one time.

I have no objection to a secretarial position if it is of a responsible nature, however I feel that I am better qualified for a Junior Administrative, Personnel or clerical accounting position.

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS COMPLETELY. IF QUESTION DOES NOT APPLY WRITE "NOT APPLICABLE". WRITE "UNKNOWN" ONLY IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER AND CANNOT OBTAIN THE ANSWER FROM PERSONAL RECORDS. USE A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER FOR EXTRA DETAILS ON ANY QUESTION OR QUESTIONS FOR WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ROOM. ATTACH TWO RECENT PASSPORT SIZE PICTURES TO THIS FORM, DATE TAKEN WRITTEN ON THE BACK OF EACH. TYPE, PRINT OR WRITE CAREFULLY; ILLEGIBLE OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL NOT RECEIVE CONSIDERATION.

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS? YES ☐ NO ☐

SECTION 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

NAME MR. ☐ MISS ☒ MRS. ☐ FIRST Ann MIDDLE Lorene LAST Goodpasture TELEPHONE Bombay 30083

PRESENT ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER American Consulate General CITY Bombay STATE Bombay Province COUNTRY Dominion of India

LEGAL RESIDENCE STREET AND NUMBER American Consulate General CITY Bombay STATE Bombay Province COUNTRY Dominion of India

NICKNAMES none

OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED Not applicable

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? nil

HOW LONG? nil

IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (WHERE, WHEN AND BY WHAT AUTHORITY) not applicable

DATE OF BIRTH Nov. 28, 1918

PLACE OF BIRTH CITY Celina STATE Tennessee COUNTRY U.S.A.

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP American

ACQUIRED BY: BIRTH ☒ MARRIAGE ☐ NATURALIZATION ☐

NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NUMBER not applicable DATE ISSUED nil NAME OF COURT nil

LOCATION OF COURT Not applicable CITY STATE COUNTRY

PREVIOUS CITIZENSHIP Not applicable DATE HELD FROM: nil TO: nil

OTHER CITIZENSHIPS (GIVE PARTICULARS) None

STEPS TAKEN TO CHANGE PRESENT NATIONALITY (GIVE PARTICULARS) None

LAST U.S. PASSPORT NUMBER SP-713 DATE March 1947 PLACE OF ISSUE Washington, D.C., USA

ALL OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS YOU HAVE HAD (GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES) Special Passport issued 1944 at Washington D.C.,USA number unknown

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS None

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN THIS COUNTRY Not applicable PORT OF ENTRY nil PASSPORT OF COUNTRY nil

LAST U.S. VISA NUMBER nil TYPE nil DATE nil PLACE OF ISSUE nil

SECTION 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 29 SEX female HEIGHT 5'2½" WEIGHT 98 lbs. EYES brown HAIR brown

COMPLEXION fair SCARS scar on right thumb (broken nail) BUILD small

OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES None

SECRET

FORM NO. 38-1
SEP 1946



SECTION 3. MARITAL STATUS

MARRIED ☐ SINGLE ☒	WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐	SEPARATED ☐	DATE OF SEPARATION OR DIVORCE	PLACE

REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE: not applicable

NOTE: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES. not applicable

NAME OF WIFE OR HUSBAND	FIRST	MIDDLE (FOR WIFE, MAIDEN)	LAST	DATE OF MARRIAGE
PLACE OF MARRIAGE	(HIS OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY / STATE / COUNTRY	
LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☐	DATE OF DECEASE	CAUSE		
PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
CITIZENSHIP	DATE ACQUIRED	WHERE ACQUIRED	CITY / STATE	COUNTRY
OCCUPATION	LAST EMPLOYER			
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE	FROM:	TO:	BRANCH OF SERVICE	COUNTRY

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS)

SECTION 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (INCLUDE PARTIAL DEPENDENTS) none

NAME		RELATIONSHIP		AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME		RELATIONSHIP		AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME		RELATIONSHIP		AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

SECTION 5. PARENTS

NOTE: FOR STEPFATHER, STEPMOTHER AND/OR GUARDIAN, GIVE THE SAME INFORMATION AS REQUIRED BELOW ON SEPARATE SHEET

NAME OF FATHER	FIRST C.	MIDDLE H.	LAST Goodpasture	LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐
DATE OF DECEASE not applicable	CAUSE nil			
PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER North Main	CITY Tipton	STATE Oklahoma	COUNTRY USA
DATE OF BIRTH between 1890 and 1900 (?)	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITY Celina	STATE Tennessee	COUNTRY USA
CITIZENSHIP American	DATE ACQUIRED by birth	WHERE ACQUIRED	CITY birthplace	STATE / COUNTRY
OCCUPATION Real Estate	LAST EMPLOYER self			
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER North Main	CITY Tipton	STATE Oklahoma	COUNTRY USA

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED [illegible]GE 3)

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUE[illegible]M PAGE 2)

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE — FROM: not applicable — TO: — B[illegible] OR SERVICE — COUNTRY

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): not applicable

NAME OF MOTHER — FIRST: Ann — MAIDEN: West — LAST: Goodpasture — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: not applicable — CAUSE: nil

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: Box 822 — CITY: Tipton — STATE: Oklahoma — COUNTRY: USA

DATE OF BIRTH: between 1890 and 1900 (e) — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: Hickman — STATE: Tennessee — COUNTRY: USA

CITIZENSHIP: American — DATE ACQUIRED: by birth — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY: birthplace — STATE — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: none — LAST EMPLOYER: not applicable

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: not applicable — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): none

SECTION 6. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (INCLUDING HALF-, STEP-, AND ADOPTED BROTHERS AND SISTERS)

NAME — FIRST: Robert — MIDDLE: J. — LAST: Goodpasture

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY: Tipton — STATE: Oklahoma — COUNTRY: USA

NAME — FIRST: C. — MIDDLE: M. — LAST: Goodpasture USA

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY: Tipton — STATE: Oklahoma — COUNTRY: USA

NAME — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

SECTION 7. PARENTS-IN-LAW not applicable

NAME OF FATHER-IN-LAW — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST — LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

DATE OF BIRTH — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

CITIZENSHIP — DATE ACQUIRED — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION — LAST EMPLOYER

NAME OF MOTHER-IN-LAW — FIRST — MAIDEN — LAST — LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

DATE OF BIRTH — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

CITIZENSHIP — DATE ACQUIRED — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION — LAST EMPLOYER

SECTION 8. RELATIVES none

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO LIVE ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A FOREIGN POWER, ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS.

NAME | RELATIONSHIP | AGE
CITIZENSHIP | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER | CITY | STATE | COUNTRY
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NAME | RELATIONSHIP | AGE
CITIZENSHIP | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER | CITY | STATE | COUNTRY
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NAME | RELATIONSHIP | AGE
CITIZENSHIP | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER | CITY | STATE | COUNTRY
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE (UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN) none

NAME | RELATIONSHIP | AGE
CITIZENSHIP | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER | CITY | STATE | COUNTRY
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

NAME | RELATIONSHIP | AGE
CITIZENSHIP | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER | CITY | STATE | COUNTRY
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

NAME | RELATIONSHIP | AGE
CITIZENSHIP | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER | CITY | STATE | COUNTRY
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

SECTION 9. EDUCATION

SCHOOL Grammar School	ADDRESS		CITY Celina	STATE Tennessee	COUNTRY USA
DATES ATTENDED	FROM 1925	TO 1930	DEGREE		
SCHOOL Junior and High School	ADDRESS		CITY Liang & Tipton	STATE Oklahoma	COUNTRY USA
DATES ATTENDED	FROM 1930	TO 1936	DEGREE HS Diploma		
COLLEGE University of Oklahoma	ADDRESS Norman Oklahoma		CITY	STATE Oklahoma	COUNTRY USA
DATES ATTENDED	FROM 1937	TO 1941	DEGREE Bachelor of Science		
COLLEGE Hill's University	ADDRESS		CITY Oklahoma City	STATE Okla.	COUNTRY USA
DATES ATTENDED	FROM 1941	TO 1941	DEGREE Graduate work in reporting and stenograph.		

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS (CONTINUED TO PAGE 5)

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE [illegible]US Not applicable

CLASSIFICATION	ORDER NUMBER	APPROXIMATE INDUCTION DATE	BOARD NUMBER

ADDRESS OF BOARD	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE

IF DEFERRED, STATE REASON

SECTION 11. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE - UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN none

COUNTRY	SERVICE	SERVICE DATES	FROM:	TO:

GRADE	SERIAL NUMBER	TYPE OF DISCHARGE

LAST STATION	COMMANDING OFFICER

REMARKS:

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (USE ADDITIONAL SHEET IF NECESSARY)

NOTE: INCLUDE BELOW PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 15 YEARS.

EMPLOYER University of Oklahoma	JOB TITLE score Orchestra/transposing & Secretarial
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Norman, Oklahoma	KIND OF BUSINESS University
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY free lance photography secretarial and transposing of music	NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mrs. Peters, Dean, Fine Arts

DATES COVERED	FROM: 1937	TO: 1941	SALARY $30-35	PER per mo.

REASONS FOR LEAVING
Graduated from University

EMPLOYER Elks Photo Finishing Company	JOB TITLE Photo technician
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Okla City, Okla	KIND OF BUSINESS Commercial photography
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY General Office and photo technician	NAME OF SUPERVISOR Geo. Dempsey, Mgr.

DATES COVERED	FROM: Sept 1942	TO: Feb 1942 parttime	SALARY 30.	PER mo.

REASONS FOR LEAVING
part time employment while going to University

EMPLOYER U.S. Government	JOB TITLE (present) Administrative Assistant
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Wash. D.C., India, Ceylon, China	KIND OF BUSINESS Government
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY Secretarial and administrative	NAME OF SUPERVISOR)listed in See Section 13)order.

DATES COVERED	FROM: Mar. 1942	TO: date	SALARY (present) 4149.60 (temp.)	PER annum

REASONS FOR LEAVING
still here

EMPLOYER	JOB TITLE
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE	KIND OF BUSINESS

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 6)

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY			NAME OF SUPERVISOR	
DATES COVERED	FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
REASONS FOR LEAVING				
EMPLOYER			JOB TITLE	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	KIND OF BUSINESS	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY			NAME OF SUPERVISOR	
DATES COVERED	FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
REASONS FOR LEAVING				
EMPLOYER			JOB TITLE	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	KIND OF BUSINESS	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY			NAME OF SUPERVISOR	
DATES COVERED	FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
REASONS FOR LEAVING				

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW GIVE DETAILS CONCERNING ANY POSITION FROM WHICH YOU MAY HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED OR WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE. None

DETAILS:

SECTION 13. CHARACTER REFERENCES—FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE
R. C. Prosky	Office for Emergency Management, Wash.,D.C.
Geo. Greene c/o Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. 55 Wall Str et, New York, N.Y.	
Cora DuBois	Department of State, Washington, D.C.
Lt.Col.J.W. Spencer	University of Southern Calif.,Los Angeles.
C.H. Wilbur	Department of State, Washington, D.C.

SECTION 14. SOCIAL ACQUAINTENCES—FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE
M. McFarland	Office of Senator Tobey,US Senate,Wash D.C.
J. Blades	IRO,1344 Conn Ave.,N.W. Wash., D.C.
Dr. L.R. Howard	c/o USPHS, Savannah, Georgia
Hubert Humphrey	Office of Mayor, Minneapolis, Minn.
John McDonald	J.H. McDonald Insurance Co., Tipton, Oklahoma

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS—THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 7)

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
M. Maurer	1514 17th St. N.W.	Wash.,D.C.	USA
L. Herber	1514 17th St. N.W.	Wash.,D.C.	USA
A. Haynes	1514 17th St. N.W.	Wash.,D.C.	USA

SECTION 16. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? YES ☐ NO ☒

IF ANSWER IS "YES" EXPLAIN BELOW:

DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS?

I have.

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRSFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENCE, AND DISPOSITION OF CASE.

No.

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? YES ☐ NO ☒

IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

SECTION 17. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES ☒ NO ☐ IF ANSWER IS "NO", STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME.

NAMES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

First National Bank, Tipton, Oklahoma, USA

National City Bank of New York at Bombay, India.

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? YES ☐ NO ☒ IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE PARTICULARS:

SECTION 18. CREDIT REFERENCES-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
First National Bank		Tipton	Oklahoma
Union Trust Company	14th & G sts N.W.	Wash.,D.C.	USA
Mrs. R. Trafton	Resident Mgr.,Copley Courts	Wash.,D.C.	

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS

FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
1933	1937	Tipton, Okla., Colina and Nashville,Tenn.			
1937	1941	722 Chatauqua St. &U.of O.	Norman	Oklahoma	USA
1941	1942	512 N.W. 9 Street	Oklahoma City	OKla	USA

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 8)

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7)

FROM: 1942	TO: 1944	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY 2628 Tunlaw Rd N.W. Washington D.C. USA
FROM: 1944	TO: 1946	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY Far East (APOs 885, 432, 435, 627, 907 & 908)
FROM: 6/1946	TO: 4/1947	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY 1514 17th St. N.W. Washington D.C. USA
FROM: 4/1947	TO: date	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY American Consulate General, Bombay, India.
FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

SECTION 20. RESIDENCES OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY U.S.	PURPOSE GOVT.
11/44	5/1946	India, Ceylon, China (APOs 885, 432, 435, 627, 907, 908)		
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
4/1947	to date	Bombay	India	U.S. Govt.
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE

SECTION 21. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS not applicable

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ALL KINDS TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS. INCLUDE ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR A BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OR TO WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT.

NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

SECTION 22. LANGUAGES—FOREIGN (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT", "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE French	SPEAK fair	READ fair	WRITE fair
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE

SECTION 23. GENERAL QUALIFICA

INDICATE ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING YOU HAVE; ALSO, SET FORTH ANY QUALIFICATIONS AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION.

SECTION 24. SPORTS AND HOBBIES photography, horseback riding, music, crafts.

SECTION 25. EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE either ~~parents' address or~~

NAME C.H. Sanders

RELATIONSHIP nil

ADDRESS AND NUMBER First National Bank Tipton Oklahoma

COUNTRY USA

TELEPHONE

SECTION 26. INFORMATION AND FINAL COMMENTS

NOTE: YOU ARE INFORMED THAT CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION. IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO".

None that I recall

SECTION 27. CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR MY IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT Bombay, India (City, State)

DATE 25 February 1948

Witness

Signature of Applicant

GOODPASTURE ANN L.

NOV.	23	1918

OKLAHOMA

	Appt.	Services Off.		$2000	5/11/42	O.P.A. DC	
	Rep.				6/15/43	" " "	
	Appt.	Clerk-Steno.		$1620	12/1/43	War Relocation Authority DC	
	Rep.				2/28/44	" " " "	
		Not Verified					
	Appt-Trans	Clerk-Steno. CAF-4		$1800	2/29/44	OfficeofStrategicServicesDC	
	Prom.	Clerk-Steno. CAF-5		$2000	3/1/45	" " " "	2y [illegible]
	Terminated			eob	5/31/45	" " "	
	Exc. Appt.	Clerk-Steno. CAF-5		2000	6/1/45	" " "	
	R. Trans. to U.S. STATE DEPT		c.o.b. 9-30-45	by E.O.	9621		
	A. Trans. to U.S. STATE DEPT.		10-1-45	by E.O.	9621		
	R. Trans.	War Dept. - SSU		eob	12/15/45	State Dept. - IRIS	
	A. Trans.	Clerk-Steno. CAF-5		2320	12/16/45	War Dept. - SSU	
	Pay Inc.P.L.	Clerk-Steno CAF-5		2450	7/10/46		
	Term.			c.o.b.	11/22/46	War Dept. SSU DC	

1944	30.00	4.00	26.00			26.00	Ded. began 2/29/44
1945	91.11	12.00	79.11		26.00	105.11	
1945	53.64	6.00	47.64		105.11	152.75	
1946	112.00	11.00	311.89		152.78	464.64	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Ret. Oler	[illegible]

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE 1 AUG 1974 BK

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (WEST GERMAN) & ITS ACTION GROUP HITLER WELLE.

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
19 SEP 78		PHOEBE ORR	Phoebe Orr

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

NPD

Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany)

Combined Deutsche Rechtspartei, Deutsche Reichspartei, the split off Sozialistiche Reichspartei and the Deutsche Partei.

In August 1964 von Thaden arranged a meeting with other right-wingers to promote unification of all nationalist forces. Friedrich Thielen served as both front man and financial backer. A committee of 10 drafted a constitution which was accepted in November 1964 by representatives of the DRP, DP, GLP and the DVNP (Deutsche-National Volkspartei). The DRP officially disolved in December 1965 although the NPD had, in fact, long been the nationalist party. At the 21 March 1967 meeting of the NPD Executive Committee, the more moderate Thielen (former Deutsche Partei) was ousted from the NPD by the more extreme von Thaden forces (DRP).. There was no major rush to leave the NPD, however. Recent reporting has indicated that those who did leave the NPD, even including Thielen, are being invited back into the NPD.

NPD SCORE CARD

1. Bundestag Elections 1965 - - NPD's first Effort	664,187 votes = 2%
2. 13 March 1966, communal Elections, Schleswig-Holstein. (NPD Has directive not to participate. A few did)	In 11 communities where NPD ran candidates, averaged 10.5% of vote compared with 6% in same towns in 1965.
3. 13 March 1966, Bavarian Communal Elections NPD major effort concentrated only in Franconia.	1.6 % of total Bavarian vote but: Middle Franconia = Ansbach - 5.1% Erlangen - 8.2% Nürnberg- 7.3% Scwhabach-5.6% Upper Franconia Bayreuth - 8.4% Coburg - 5.3% Kulmbach - 5.8% + 2 village mayors
4. 27 March 1966 Hamburg Burgerschaft Election	3.9 % (1.8% in 1965) no candidates elected
5. 10 July 1966 Northrhein-Westphalia Landtag Election No NPD candidates elected none entered.	
6. 16 October 1966 Hamlin Byelection(Communal Council)	8.4% ('65=) 2 seats
7. 6 November 1966 Hesse Landtag Elections	22[illegible],5[illegible] votes = 7.9%+ 8 Seats in Landtag Marburg,Wiesbaden, Darmstadt and Giesson =ca 10% Ff/M = 8.4%
7. 20 November 1966 Bavarian Landtag Elections	votes= 7.4% 15 Seats in Landtag
8. 23 April 1967 Rheinland-Palatine	4 Seats, 6.9 % of vote
9. 23 April 1967 Schleswig-Holstein	4 Seats, 5.7 % of vote
10. 4 June 1967 Lower Saxony	10 Seats, 7 % of vote
11. 11 October 1967 Bremen Burgerschaft	8 Seats, 8.8 % of vote
12. 28 April 1968 Baden-Wuerttemberg	12 Seats, 9.8 % of vote
13. 28 Sept 1969 Federal	0 Seats, 4.3% of vote

JUNE 8, 1974

The Hitler Boom

WP2.4

by Charles Lam Markmann

Heidelberg

Had he lived Adolf Hitler would have been 85 years old on April 20. And it was on this April 20 that the forces responsible for the ouster of Chancellor Willy Brandt—for things must be called by their right names—had almost finished preparing West Germany for her start on the short march back to the past. One hears everywhere: "If we only had a strong man again." On the fashionable North Sea resort island of Sylt, Hitler's birthday was celebrated in the best National Socialist style by several dozen Germans, none over 35 [illegible] youngest 15, and all of them arrested on [illegible] having circulated or displayed Nazi sym[illegible] young men wore brown shirts and swastika armbands; the girls frumped themselves up in the dowdy blue skirts and white middy blouses of the *Bund deutscher Mädeln* (League of German Girls), the auxiliary of the *Hitler Jugend*. The walls of the room in which they held their party were decorated with pictures of Hitler and other National Socialist emblems for which they had scoured Schleswig-Holstein. After they had listened to records of Hitler's and other Nazi leaders' speeches and of old party march music, they drank a toast to the *Fuhrer*.

When they were arrested, one of the young men said the party had been planned merely as "*ein guter Gag*." Perhaps so. But for millions of other Germans the re-creation of "the Nazi time" is serious business: for some, because they want those good old days back, and for a few because they fear the others may very easily get their wish when the Federal Republic of Germany must at last put its democracy to the test. The fear is heightened by the steady and at times spectacular rise in what is called *die Hitlerwelle*—the Hitler wave, or Hitler boom—which has kept pace with the economic crisis, price levels and unemployment. The number of jobless has doubled since December.

It is as much a Hitler and Hitler-associated boom as a Nazi boom. This is not to say that Nazi thinking has no following in West Germany—quite the contrary, as the letters-to-the-editor columns of newspapers demonstrate. In Bavaria—Nurnberg (indeed where else?), in a 17th-century Franconian castle, a 25-man "army" of youths trains regularly, with the same steel helmets and rifles that the *Wehrmacht* used from 1939 to 1945. Their leader is a sign-painter named Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, whose goals are simple: the destruction of communism and big capital, the end of parliamentary rule, government by an unelected *elite*, the annexation of Austria (which, as the Weimar Constitution makes clear in Article 61, was also the goal of the first German "republic"), and the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

There is a core of some 120,000 regular readers of the *National Zeitung*, which for two decades has been whitewashing the Nazi era, "proving" that the only concentration and extermination camps were those built *after* the war by German prisoners under American orders, for propaganda purposes (there are even pictures); promoting a brisk trade in Nazi medals, uniforms, weapons and other memorabilia, as well as books and recordings of speeches, party congresses, narrations of military campaigns (victorious ones), and engaging in a fairly subtle anti-Semitism. There is no need for blatancy, after all the Jews were only the first and most conspicuous of Nazi targets. Twelve or so million non-Jews murdered by the Germans died just as painfully—facts that are almost daily branded as "lies" in letters to newspapers, occasionally in demonstrations, less infrequently in swastika-daubings and cemetery vandalism.

But these things—the Sylt birthday party, Hoffmann's "army" (which ought to be taken seriously—the Nazi party's strength rose to *seven members* when Hitler joined it), the *National Zeitung*, the "antiquarians" whose windows and shops are filled exclusively with Wilhelmine and especially National Socialist *objets de vertu*—are only symptoms of the *Hitlerwelle*. The real thing is far more widespread, far deeper and more "respectable." In West Berlin alone there are more than 500 cars bearing registration plates that, after the mandatory "B" (for Berlin), carry such letter combinations as SS, SA, HJ, KZ before the various numerals. These designations—for *Schutzstaffel* (Elite Guard), *Sturmabteilung* (Storm Troops), *Hitler Jugend*, *Konzentrationslager* (concentration camp)—have not been issued routinely. They are issued by request, and Karl Koenig, the Social Democrat who heads the city's Economics Department, the issuing office, explains that under West German law such requests cannot be refused. (I am not for one moment implying that the law should be revised: one does not fight ideas, or even brute hatreds, with muzzles.) The

---

CHARLES LAM MARKMANN, *critic, translator and journalist, is at work on a book about the two German republics.*

same kinds of plates are visible in many other parts of Federal Germany.

There are now in print literally thousands of paperback titles dealing with every possible aspect of the Third Reich and its personalities. There are serious, analytical histories that sacrifice success for integrity; on the other hand two big, exhaustive, expensive biographies of Hitler are selling more than well, and one of them, by Joachim C. Fest, an editor of the arch-reactionary *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, has gone well past 275,000 copies at almost $20 apiece—the publishers have 25,000 more ready and waiting in the warehouse. This book makes much of Hitler's "modernity," little of his barbarities: he was necessary to his time. The other, which is much more overtly an apologia—is by Werner Maser, who teaches the Hitler era at the University of Munich. It has sold 30,000 copies. It endeavors to create the impression that, had he not had certain problems arising out of misguided medication in 1938, Hitler would have done more good (and less harm).

In addition there are the big hardcover editions of Hitler's speeches (four volumes) and Propaganda Minister Paul Joseph Goebbels' (two volumes); four new books about Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy who is now, at 80, the last prisoner in Spandau, innumerable radio and television programs dealing with various aspects and personalities of the period; and, most lately, a fortnightly publication, *Das dritte Reich*, planned to cover the whole "*NS-Zeit*" for popular consumption in two years, and then expire.

The Allies—especially the Americans—for a long time forbade any mention whatever of the Hitler period, and West Germany, once it became a more or less independent state, continued these bans for years. Even more than other peoples, Germans have the touching notion that censorship and repression will effectively eliminate ideas and facts; and, against this, neither the left nor the right has the faintest concept of civil liberties. Thus it is still forbidden, even though the German Communist party has been legalized again, to form a "Nazi" or "National Socialist" party. Consequently the old SA and SS men organized the totally Nazi *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*,

In England and in the US there has been a revival of interest in the Hitler era paralleling the one in West Germany. At least 12 English and American publishers have capitalized on this interest. Here's a sampling of their recent books:

Pictures: *Sieg Heil!*, an illustrated history of Germany from Bismark to Hitler, by Stefan Lorant (Norton), more than 700 photographs and a literate text. *Hitler Close-up* (Macmillan), interesting because these are the pictures taken by Hitler's friend Heinrich Hoffmann, with commentary by confidant and diarist Henry Picker.

History: *Hitler's Rise to Power, The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923-1933*, by Geoffrey Pridham (Harper & Row). In-depth answer to the question, what made people support Hitler in the early '20s? Careful and scholarly.

Military: *Hitler's War Aims, The Establishment of the New Order*, by Norman Rich (Norton). The second volume of a huge, hugely detailed study dealing with Hitler's foreign policies. *The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe*, by David Irving (Little, Brown), the life of Field Marshall Erhard Milch who was second in command to Goering and who survived to tell much of this to the author. *The Admiral's Wolf Pack*, by Jean Noli (Doubleday), containing authentic first-hand accounts of U-boat (Grey Wolves) actions. *Battle Over the Reich*, by Alfred Price (Cambridge University Press), contains pictures and text about the bombing and strafing of German cities and towns. Part of the revival because it is Germany seen as destroyed from the air. *Hitler's Strategy, 1940-1941 The Balkan Clue*, by Martin van Creveld (Cambridge University Press), a new view of Hitler's interest in the Mediterranean and his relations with Italy.

Religion: *The German Church Struggle and the Holocaust* (Wayne University Press), a collection of essays that grew out of the First International Scholars' Conference in 1970.

Refugees: *Island Refuge*, by A. J. Sherman (University of California Press). An interesting study of how Britain changed her policy about refugees from the Third Reich from 1933 to 1939 and why.

Persons: *Target: Heydrich*, by Miroslav Ivanov (Macmillan). Play-by-play account of the assassination of Czech occupation head Reinhard Heydrich and the Nazi revenge that culminated in Lidice. *Hitler*, by Joachim Fest (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), the English translation by Richard and Clara Winston of the biography in which Fest concludes that if Hitler had died or been killed in 1938 "few would hesitate to call him one of the greatest of German statesmen," which may be why the book is seven-eighths over before we come to the Hitler of the war years. Werner Maser's *Hitler Legend: Myth and Reality* (Harper & Row). Enormously detailed with so many facts they obscure the man and his works.

Future: To be published by Viking in August, already published in England (Secker & Warburg), *The Loneliest Man in the World*, the "inside story of the 30-year imprisonment of Rudolf Hess," inside because the author, Eugene K. Bird, was former commandant of Spandau Prison, and seems to have won Hess' confidence. Despite its promises it says very little that has not already been known or surmised.

—The Editors

which, after some initial successes, took cover in the hardly inhospitable Christian Democratic and Christian Social Unions but has recently announced its determination to purge itself of this "taint." In addition in spite of the constitutional ban (Article 18) on any use of civil liberties to endanger the undefined "free democratic basic order," the state of Lower Saxony alone has 34 active Fascist and Nazi organizations, publishing houses, and mail-order book distributors. No one knows how many members and customers they have because they operate furtively, as the rather stupid law compels them to do. *Mut* (*Courage*), a monthly magazine addressing a frankly Fascist if not Nazi program to the young in that state, has a circulation of 10,000 and is regarded by the Lower Saxon Minister of the Interior as potentially or latently dangerous.

Everywhere there is curiosity about those mysterious 12 years. The teachers who taught then are still teaching, unless superannuated, but very few of them dare to teach what they used to teach, or even to talk about "the past." That is why *Das dritte Reich* was founded this year: to make money out of that curiosity. The idea was that of Hans-Peter Dietze, now its managing editor, according to his editor-in-chief, Dr. Christian Zentner, who stakes a pious claim to a desire to show his young compatriots how the Third Reich came to pass, in order to prevent its ever happening again. After four issues, Dr. Zentner is not so sure that his publisher, the big Hamburg house of John Jahr Verlag KG, will do much more than break even, because, he told me, what millions of people are insatiably interested in is not "the abstractions" of nazism and its history but its personalities, and in particular Adolf Hitler. These, he says, are "simple" people who do not read books but who watch television and read magazines, and it was they whom he set out to capture—to clarify the past for them.

His magazine is expensive—about $1.50 a copy. A tremendous advertising campaign, of dubious taste, resulted in first-issue sales some 150,000 above the 250,000 copies that the editors and publishers expected. The second issue sold between 330,000 and 340,000 copies, the third something over 250,000 so far, and the fourth—which is still on the newsstands—more than 200,000. The overwhelming majority of the purchasers and subscribers, Zentner admits, seems to include *few* of those young people he was looking for. the real circulation is among the people old enough to remember, the Nazis who write furious letters to the editor because he tarnishes their legends. Both Dietze and Zentner told me that the greatest sales of *Das dritte Reich* are not in cities but out in the country and the small towns, in Bavaria and Franconia especially.

One of the reasons for the phenomenal success of a television program called *"Ein Herz und eine Seele"* ("One Heart and One Soul") is its enthusiastically enjoyed derogations of the sub-men, by name: the Slavs, the Jews, the Latins, the Levantines. A German exaggeration of "All in the Family," the program plays also on the hysterical dread of "the Communists" that has been endemic here ever since the general staff realized in 1918 that it had made a terrible mistake in helping Lenin in 1917. Ex-Chancellor Willy Brandt was a constant target because of his illegitimate birth and his "traitorous" conduct from 1935 to 1945, when he fought against nazism, as well as his "selling out" to "the Reds." The program regularly attracts 60-65 per cent of the national audience, and only an occasional editorial writer or commentator dares to see its popularity for the danger it is. Its "left-liberal" creator, Wolfgang Menge, claims it to be a satire and so recognized because people say its protagonist, Alfred Tetzlaff, sounds just like Franz Josef Strauss, the head of the CSU: but then in each regional election this year more of them vote for the Strausses.

In mid-March the Bavarian State Radio and Television broadcast a long interview with Hitler's (and Franklin Roosevelt's) old friend, Ernst (Putzi) Hanfstaengl, who is now 87. Though in the end—through a rather gruesome practical joke—he felt he had to flee to the United States in 1937, and was materially assisted by Roosevelt, his old Harvard classmate, in gaining entry (later he became an adviser on policy to the American forces!). Hanfstaengl spent his whole time on camera telling what fine fellows Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Himmler and the others really were, when all was said and done—and masters of their trades to boot: fine soldiers, geniuses at propaganda, *und so weiter*. Their Weimar predecessors he belittled and dismissed as nothings, though he admitted he had never known much about their aspirations or their achievements. Moreover in spite of having, with his wife and sister, lavishly and almost singlemindedly supported Hitler from the days before the 1923 Munchen *Putsch* to his own abrupt departure for the decadent democracy, Hanfstaengl insisted that he had never thought for a moment that the unremitting virulent anti-Semitism of his friend and hero would ever amount to anything serious ("some of my best friends were . . ."), or that his protege would ever have been "stupid enough to start a war."

The real danger of a Hitler renascence, in the view of Dr. Hugo Marx, a scholar who suffered under the original, lies in the combination of a romantic nostalgia and the millennial German faith in authoritarian rule as the solution to all problems. Weimar, after all, failed primarily, as both William B. Shirer and Karl Dietrich Bracher have shown, because no one, including the Social Democrats who proclaimed it out of desperation when they could find neither a Hohenzollern nor any other royalty to accept the throne, wanted a republic. When the economic crash came after 1929, the millennial search for the "strong man" lost its last restraint.

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS -311/01424-72

DATE DISTR. 14 March 1972

Pr file
WP 2.4

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI March 1972

SUBJECT Intention of the Executive Committee of the National Democratic Party to Urge Non-participation of the Party in Baden-Wuerttemberg Election

ACQ Germany, Hamburg (10 March 1972)

FIELD NO. EGG-1825

SOURCE An official West German security service at the Land level. Analogous information from other West German services should not be construed as confirmation. The sub-source is an NPD official who had access to the information.

1. The executive committee of the West German National Democratic Party (NPD) will meet on 18 March with officials of the Baden-Wuerttemberg NPD organization and attempt to persuade the Land organization not to contest the 23 April Land election. The executive committee will point out that if the NPD does not run candidates in this election, the chances for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to obtain a majority in the Baden-Wuerttemberg election will be enhanced. This would enable the CDU to retain its Bundesrat majority and improve the chances of defeating the Eastern treaties of the Social Democratic Party/Free Democratic Party government.

2. The background of the executive committee's desire to avoid contesting the Baden-Wuerttemberg election is its estimate that the NPD would capture only two per cent of the vote this year compared with 9.4 per cent in the last election, a result which the executive committee is most anxious to avoid.

3. Field Dissem: Sent to Bonn and Berlin.

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

E/INTEL	1		EGG-1825 Hamburg-21038 IN 557585 CAEROTIC/3
E/G/R	2		
E/G/R/BD	1		
E/G/R/LD	1		
E/G/W	1	NOT FOR LIAISON	
TOTALS IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, FR 1, EUR 6		LIAISON	COORDINATING
			RELEASING HM JM LB:kmb

OF

TDCS INFORMATIC REPORT

#064

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OP'G. LOIS BARNAAL/kmb

UNIT E/G/R

EXT. 7118

DATE 1 DECEMBER 1971

CONF. EUR 11

INFO. FI 5, IW, CSDO, DO 4.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TDCS -314/12543-71

DATE DISTRIBUTED 1 DECEMBER 1971

PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

E/R	2	E/G/R/WP 2.4-1	
E/G/R	2	E/G/W	1
E/G/R/BD-1		E/F/R	2
E/G/R/JE-1			
E/G/R/LB-1			NO LIAISON

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
EGG-1781
HAMBURG 20722
IN 479259
CAEROTIC/3
LIAISON *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ AIR ☐

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS (Place X in appropriate space. List electrical addressees.)

CABLE SEC
- RECOMMEND EXO ☐
- BASIC DOCUMENT NOT MADE AVAILABLE DCI ☐
- RELAY CABLE ATTACHED ☐
- SHOW IW ☐

IW
- DISSEM ELECTRICALLY ☐ TO:

OTHER
- EXCLUSIVE FOR USIB ☐
- USIB PERSONAL ATTN ☐
- ZRWAHOO CABLE SENT ☐
- NOT FOR LIAISON ☒

WP 2.4

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
John R Mapother
C/E/G/R JOHN MAPOTHER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RELEASING OFFICER
C/E/R HANS MOSES

COPY NO.

FORM 3-69 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (15-10-44-47)

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 479259

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS XXXXXXXXXX
TREAS XXXXXXXX

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDCS -314/12543-71

DIST 1 DECEMBER 1971

COUNTRY WEST GERMANY

DOI NOVEMBER 1971

SUBJECT SUMMARY OF ADOLF VON THADDEN'S 3 DECEMBER SPEECH TO THE NORTHWEST MINING ASSOCIATION

ACQ GERMANY, HAMBURG (23 NOVEMBER 1971) FIELD NO. EGG-1721

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL WEST GERMAN SECURITY SERVICE AT THE LAND LEVEL. ANALOGOUS INFORMATION FROM OTHER WEST GERMAN SERVICES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS CONFIRMATION. THE SUB-SOURCE IS AN NPD OFFICIAL WHO HAD ACCESS TO A COPY OF THE DRAFT SPEECH.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: ADOLF VON THADDEN, FORMER NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE WEST GERMAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NPD), HAS BEEN INVITED TO SPEAK TO THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF THE NORTHWEST MINING ASSOCIATION, SPOKANE, WASHINGTON, ON 3 DECEMBER ON THE TOPIC: A EUROPEAN'S VIEW OF THE AMERICAN CURRENCY PROBLEM. SEE AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL HAMBURG TELEGRAM 767, 10 NOVEMBER 1971. DESPITE VON THADDEN'S RECENT RESIGNATION FROM HIS NPD POST HE STILL PLANS TO ATTEND THE MEETING AND

TO PRESENT THE SPEECH WHICH IS SUMMARIZED BELOW.)

2. VON THADDEN BEGINS BY TRACING THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES' RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE PRESENT, DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO THE 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH. HE GIVES CREDIT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR HELPING EUROPE BACK ON ITS FEET AFTER WORLD WAR II THROUGH THE MARSHALL PLAN. BUT POINTS OUT THAT THE NATIONS WHICH WERE HELPED USED THE AID TO BUILD AN EXPORT BASE WHICH NOW IS CONTRIBUTING TO AMERICA'S FINANCIAL TROUBLES. HE SAYS THAT GERMANY AND OTHER COUNTRIES BECAME INFECTED WITH AN "EXPORT HYSTERIA" AFTER THE WAR WHICH HAD SHORT TERM BENEFITS FOR WORLD TRADE, BUT WHICH IN THE LONG RUN DAMAGED THE DOMESTIC ECONOMIES OF THE EXPORTING COUNTRIES.

3. THE 15 AUGUST 1971 SPEECH BY PRESIDENT NIXON IS COMPARED WITH THE 24 OCTOBER 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH, AND VON THADDEN SAYS THAT THE SPEECH WILL HAVE JUST AS PROFOUND AN EFFECT ON THE WORLD'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM AS DID THE CRASH. HE DEPICTS THE SPEECH AND THE RESULTING CONTROLS AS SPELLING THE END OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ESTABLISHED AT BRETTON-WOODS.

4. IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE TYPE OF WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM WHICH SHOULD FOLLOW THE CURRENT AMERICAN CONTROLS AND FLOATING OF THE DOLLAR, VON THADDEN DRAWS HEAVILY FROM THE 23 SEPTEMBER PRESS CONFERENCE OF FRENCH PRESIDENT POMPIDOU. HE SAYS THAT THE DOLLAR CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED THE SINGLE WORLD CURRENCY. THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF EUROPE MAKES IT NECESSARY THAT A EUROPEAN RESERVE CURRENCY BE AVAILABLE AS A SECOND WORLD CURRENCY. THIS CANNOT BE THE BRITISH POUND AS MANY PEOPLE AT ONE TIME WOULD HAVE BELIEVED, BUT MUST BE A CURRENCY ACCEPTED BY BOTH FRANCE AND GERMANY AND ADMINISTERED BY A COMMON GERMAN-FRENCH BANK SUPPORTED BY GOLD. ALL EUROPEAN STATES WOULD USE THIS BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS. VON THADDEN VIEWS POMPIDOU'S SPEECH AS A SIGNAL TO THE UNITED STATES THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT WILLING TO STAY PERMANENTLY UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM WASHINGTON, AND AS PROVIDING AN OUTLINE OF THE TYPE OF ECONOMIC ORDER EUROPE SHOULD HAVE IN THE FUTURE. HE CRITICIZES THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT FOR NOT TAKING A SIMILAR STAND, SAYING THAT WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE STATE TO PUT ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON OTHER STATES, THE SITUATION CAN LEAD TO

POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURES WHICH WOULD BE PROFITABLE ONLY TO THE COMMUNISTS.

5. VON THADDEN SEES TWO ALTERNATIVES IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, I.E., EITHER A RETURN TO FIRM PARITY WITH A DEVALUED DOLLAR, OR A CHANGE TO FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AGREED TO BY THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND GUARANTEED BY INDIVIDUAL CURRENCIES. HE BELIEVES THE DOLLAR MUST BE DEVALUED BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES CANNOT EXPECT EUROPEANS TO CONTINUE TO BUY THE DOLLAR AT A RATE WHICH IS NOT LEGALLY FIXED. HE VIEWS FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AS DESIRABLE FOR EUROPE, BUT NOT REALIZABLE AT PRESENT BECAUSE THIS SYSTEM WOULD EXCLUDE THE "THIRD WORLD" AND THUS WOULD BE OPPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES.

6. SUMMARIZING, VON THADDEN STRESSES THE NECESSITY FOR THE FREE WORLD TO REMAIN STRONG AND FOR EACH EUROPEAN COUNTRY TO RETAIN ITS NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DIGNITY TO PREVENT DOMINATION BY COMMUNIST AND FAR-LEFT FORCES. HE CRITICIZES THOSE WHO SAY THAT AMERICA IS NO LONGER NEEDED AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE USSR, DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO OTHER COUNTRY WHICH CAN SERVE IN THIS CAPACITY, ESPECIALLY NOT PRESENT DAY WEST GERMANY. HE SAYS THAT THE WEST

GERMAN PEOPLE, THROUGH COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND LEADERS WHO ARE FRIENDLY TO COMMUNISM, HAVE LOST THEIR NATIONAL CHARACTER AND ARE TOO WEAK TO OPPOSE THE USSR. HE ENDS BY CALLING FOR A CHARACTER RENAISSANCE IN THE FREE WORLD TO MAKE IT STRONG ENOUGH TO COUNTER COMMUNISM. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE STATEMENT OF VON THADDEN IN SPOKANE MAY ATTRACT PRESS INTEREST DUE TO THE NOTORIETY HE GAINED IN RECENT YEARS AS LEADER OF A GERMAN NATIONALIST PARTY WIDELY DESCRIBED AS NEO-NAZI. IN FACT, THE PARTY HAS DECLINED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO THE POINT WHERE IT IS THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION, AND VON THADDEN'S RECENT RESIGNATION FROM THE PARTY DEPRIVES HIM OF ANY POLITICAL PLATFORM IN WEST GERMANY.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: NONE (SENT BONN).

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. CS-311/01861-71

DATE DISTR. 10 March 1971

2JP 24

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI March 1971

SUBJECT Intention of Adolf Von Thadden to Resign As Chairman of the National Democratic Party

ACQ Germany, Hamburg (8 March 1971) FIELD NO. EGG-1682

SOURCE An official West German Security Service concerned with right and left radical organizations, from sources described as NPD officials, who have access to the information. Similar information received through other West German intelligence channels should not be construed as confirmation.

1. In early March 1971 Adolf Von Thadden indicated to close associates including members of the Executive Committee of the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands - NPD) that he plans to resign as Chairman of the NPD in the near future. Von Thadden has not announced the date when he plans to resign but close associates believe it will be sometime during the period 1 April to 1 June 1971.

2. Von Thadden's decision has been prompted by his discouragement over prospects for the NPD, serious financial difficulties of the party and by severe internal bickering within the NPD Executive Committee during the past several weeks. Von Thadden is basically more moderate than many members of the Executive Committee. Among other disagreements, Von Thadden has opposed certain aspects of the "Resistance Action" - (Aktion Widerstand) in which NPD members have recently staged demonstrations which erupted into violence. Von Thadden was also personally humiliated when his sister and other relatives asked him not to attend the funeral of Von Thadden's brother-in-law, the well-known historian Percy Schramm who died in Goettingen in January 1971.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

E/R	1	CA/INT	2
E/G/R	2	CA/PEG	1
E/G/R/JE	1		
E/G/R/BM	1		
E/G/R (WP 2.4) 1			

TOTALS
IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 6, CA 3

LIAISON
32

EGG-1682
HAMBURG 19934
IN 282656
CAEROFIC

COORDINATING

RELEASING
HM:JM:
Cc:sam

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

3. (Source Comment: Von Thadden's resignation will in all probability mean the end of the NPD as an effective political organization. With the possible exception of the Bavarian District Chairman of the NPD, Dr. Siegfried Poehlmann, the NPD lacks effective and dynamic leaders. Poehlmann, however, has health problems and also does not have the stature of Von Thadden. The disintegration of the NPD will probably result in a number of smaller right-wing groups coming into existence, some of which, like the recent "Aktion Widerstand" may have a propensity for violence. After the NPD disintegrates, most of its former supporters will probably cast their votes for one of the three major political parties in West Germany. The CDU and CSU stand to gain most of these votes.)

4. Field Dissem: None.

5
4
3
2
1

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

6
4
3
2
1

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. CS -311/02895-70

DATE DISTR. 3 April 1970

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI Mid-February 1970

SUBJECT Analysis of the West German National Democratic Party's Election Chances and Cohesiveness

ACQ Germany (27 February 1970)

FIELD NO. ~~OGA-953~~

SOURCE A medium-level West German government official who follows the activities of the National Democratic Party (NPD), from an NPD official who attended the party congress. The report is the NPD official's analysis of the party's situation in the wake of the congress. The information is also passed to an official West German service, from which similar information should not be construed as confirmation.

1. Adolf von Thadden, NPD chairman, remains firmly in control of the party following the 14-15 February 1970 NPD congress in Wertheim.

2. Skepticism about the future of the NPD is increasing among party leaders. The NPD is definitely planning to wage vigorous campaigns in all 1970 Land elections, but there appears to be little chance that the party will do even as well in these elections as it did in the 1969 Bundestag elections, when it failed to obtain five percent of the total vote.

3. At the congress, several prominent NPD leaders emphasized the need for party unity; these appeals were well received by the delegates. There are many unresolved questions and problems, however, which will continue to plague the party. For instance, the "national-conservative" concept, which was adopted in the manifesto issued by the congress, came under strong attack. One group, which includes both older and younger members, rejects the concept of the NPD as a conservative party, because they consider that this term conveys the idea that the party is an out-of-date and reactionary political group. On the other hand, the proponents of the national-conservative concept consider themselves as upholding "positive values" in the face of manifestations of disintegration. Von Thadden is the party's unifying force, and one delegate accurately summarized the situation by saying: "Von Thadden, by virtue of the charisma of his speeches, succeeded in bridging the many cracks in the party."

4. Field Dissem: Embassy Bonn, USBER.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	[illegible]	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

E/G/W	1			OGA-953 CATERROR
E/G/R	2			
C/E/G/W	1			
E/R	1			
E/G/R/WP	2,4	1	NO LIAISON	COORDINATING / RELEASING HM:CHW lah
TOTALS IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 6			LIAISON	

(20)

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET

REPORT NO. CS-311/08556-69

DATE DISTR. 26 September 1969

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI June 1968, 1 September 1969

SUBJECT West German Ministry of Interior Evaluation of the Prospects of Banning the National Democratic Party

ACQ Germany (1 September 1969)

FIELD NO. OGA-913

SOURCE A medium-level West German government official who follows the activities of the National Democratic Party and who had access to the study during his official duties. The information was extracted from the original document and is believed to be an accurate summary of its highlights.

Summary: In June 1968, the West German Ministry of the Interior prepared a basic study of the prospects of banning the West German National Democratic Party (NPD). The summary of this study given below describes the major charges which the government could bring against the NPD, the defenses the NPD could be expected to make against these charges, and the probable political results which would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful case against the NPD. According to the source, this study is still considered the basic Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the NPD and is being studied by senior federal government and state (Land) officials. End of Summary.

1. (Field Comment: For several years, West German political and government leaders have debated seeking a constitutional court ban on the NPD. On 13 November 1968, Ernst Benda, West German Interior Minister, advised Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger that there was sufficient evidence to warrant bringing a suit against the NPD. Kiesinger, however, opposed bringing a suit, and the subject became embroiled in West German politics. On 23 April 1969, the Federal Cabinet decided not to seek a court ban of the NPD, at least until after the September elections. This decision was prompted by evidence that the NPD was making no membership gains and apparently was losing popular support.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

C/E/R	1	E/G/R/C	1					OGA-913 CATERROR
E/G/R	2	E/G/R(WF	2	4)	1			
E/G/W	1	E/BERLIN	2					
C/E/G/W	1							
E/G/R/P	1					NO LIAISON	COORDINATING	RELEASING
TOTALS IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 8(2)						LIAISON 32		HM:CH: sro

FORM 11-68 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20)

2. In June 1968, the West German Interior Ministry prepared a 50-page study of the prospects for banning the NPD entitled "Considerations Regarding a Ban of the National Democratic Party." The study was well prepared and carefully written. It is still considered the basic Interior Ministry paper on the NPD and is being studied by senior officials of both the federal and state governments. It avoids giving an opinion on the prospects of obtaining a court decision against the NPD, but from the content of the study, it is clear that the authors believed that the courts would probably reject a government proposal to ban the NPD. (Field Comment: If the study is still considered current, it is unclear how it fits with Benda's November 1968 statement that there was sufficient evidence to obtain a ban against the NPD.)

3. The study summarized the case which could be brought against the NPD as follows:

a. It could be shown that there was a similarity between the NPD and the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) which has been outlawed.

b. It could be argued that the goals, and parts of the party platform, of the NPD are contrary to the principles of a free democratic state.

The study concludes that a sufficiently strong case could be presented to prevent the case being thrown out by the courts without a hearing.

4. The study lists the following points which the NPD could be expected to use in its defense:

a. The party could prove that it has given firm instructions to its members not to engage in rowdyism or violence.

b. It could show that a sizeable number of former NSDAP members have been forced out of the party as part of the Selbstreinigung (self-cleaning) process.

c. It could point out many features of its program which are in accord with democratic principles.

d. It could show that its elected representatives have worked with other parties and have not disrupted the Landtage (state diets) and other elected bodies in which they participate.

e. It could point out that other political parties have many ex-Nazis and ex-communists as members and could claim that the majority of the 28,000 NPD members are not opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic.

f. It would charge that the government's charges were one-sided, unfairly presented, and out of date.

g. It would claim that not all of Professor Ernst Anrich's points were included in the party platform. (Field Comment: Anrich is a former university professor from Darmstadt whose proposals were apparently more extreme than those incorporated in the party platform.)

h. It could claim that the increased violence (Verrohung) of the political climate in West Germany is the fault of the New Left and not of the NPD.

5. The study states that it would be very difficult to refute these NPD defenses in court. The government would have to admit that since early 1968 there have been very few statements made by NPD leaders, or incidents caused by the NPD, which could be used to support the government's case. Objectively, it would have to be admitted that many incidents of violence in which the NPD has been involved were initiated by opponents of the party.

6. The study predicts the following probable results should the government win its case against the NPD:

a. The NPD would probably respect the prohibition. It is very unlikely that the NPD would attempt to go underground as the illegal Communist Party of Germany (KPD) did.

b. NPD members and sympathizers would not change their opinions because of a ban. Many would join other groups or parties and continue to work for their political beliefs.

c. NPD and rightist sympathizers would begin a campaign for the banning of the new German Communist Party (DKP) and other leftist groups.

d. A ban of the NPD would be well received in foreign countries.

7. The study concludes that if the government should lose a case against the NPD, it would be the result of the lack of valid evidence (Beweisschwierigkeiten). In such an event, the following adverse effects would occur:

a. The NPD would receive a new impetus and valuable publicity.

b. The policy of Selbstreinigung which has had some success in keeping former Nazis out of key positions would be halted.

c. Many middle-class persons who sympathize with the NPD, but who have refrained from open support because of the stigma of being associated with a party which could be declared illegal, would join the party or become active supporters.

d. The party would undoubtedly attract more members. (Field Comment: The NPD leadership is known to be worried because the party's membership has not increased significantly during the past 18 months.)

8. Field Dissem: Embassy Bonn, USBER.

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Base, Berlin

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief, European Division

CALL/INTEL
NPD Activities

REF: EGBT-14589, dated 9 September 1969

WP 2.4

1. We are very pleased with the quality of the information on the NPD which has been made available through CATERROR. It is particularly useful during this pre-election period, but we also appreciate not having to wait 6 to 8 weeks for CAWHISPER to digest the material and pass it on.

2. After looking over the Reference, we are inclined to stick with the requirements mentioned in DIRECTOR 39284 for items worthy of intel dissemination. In this context Bonn State Department Telegram 12253 dated 17 September quotes Foreign Minister Brandt as saying that there has been evidence that the East Germans, undoubtedly with Soviet approval, had given financial support to von Thadden. While we are inclined to think that Brandt's comment may be wishful thinking, evidence of East German financing for the NPD would be of great interest and utility. Material not bearing on the requirements in DIRECTOR 39284 should be forwarded now to Headquarters for review. The NPD, as you know, is a subject of interest beyond its proportions as a political force, and we are grateful for the timely opportunity to keep up with the ins and outs of it.

Harriet G Cocollato
Harriet G. COCOLLATO

2 - COB/Berlin
2 - COS/Germany

Group I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: EGBS-6522

DATE: 30 SEP 1969
25 September 1969

HQS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

2 - E/G/R
1 - E/G/IS
1 - E/REG/Chrono
1 - C/EUR/R
1 - C/E/G/R

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
E/G/R	Cassandra Horton	sro	6196

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/E/G/R	26 Sept '69	John R Rapsdhe

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/E/R		

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. CS -311/0S430-69

DATE DISTR. 22 September 1969

WP 2.4

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI Early August 1969

SUBJECT Miscellaneous Information on the National Democratic Party

ACQ Germany, Hamburg (15 August 1969)

FIELD NO. EGG-1444

SOURCE Member of the National Democratic Party in Schleswig-Holstein whose reliability has not yet been established. He obtained the information from two district officials of the Party.

1. According to a ranking official of the Kiel district of the National Democratic Party (NPD), Karl-Heinz Knipphals, the chairman of the Kiel district of the NPD, and Adolf von Thadden, the national chairman of the NPD, are personal enemies. (Source Comment: In January 1969 Knipphals was elected to be his party district's candidate for the West German Parliament. Knipphals, a Kiel lawyer, is in his early 50's. He was severely wounded during World War II and has only one arm.)

2. Von Thadden is aware of, and unhappy about, the fact that Knipphals, prior to joining the NPD, participated in Easter Marches and received unfavorable publicity. Furthermore, von Thadden is concerned about Knipphals' strong and ruthless political ambitions. He has referred to Knipphals as a "second Hitler", and he welcomes and encourages the fact that there is strong opposition to Knipphals even within the Kiel district of the party. Von Thadden, for the above reasons, would very much like to see Knipphals remain on the district level and is anxious to keep him out of the West German Parliament.

3. The same official who made the remarks about von Thadden and Knipphals also stated that many wealthy industrialists contribute funds to the NPD anonymously, because they do not wish their association or sympathy with the party to become known.

4. The chairman of another NPD district in Schleswig-Holstein stated that, in view of the fact that each new

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

C/E/R	1						EGG-1444 CAINFER
E/G/R	2						
E/G/R/P	1						
E/G/R/C	1						
E/G/W	1				NO LIAISON		COORDINATING
TOTALS	IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 6				LIAISON *		RELEASING HM:CH sro

session of the West German Parliament is opened by its oldest member, the NPD will insure that the oldest member of the next Parliament will be an NPD man. (Headquarters Comment: The possibility that an NPD Deputy might open the Bundestag has already been considered by the CDU. See CS-311/08164-69.)

5. Field Dissem: None (sent Bonn, Berlin)

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT NO. CS LT-313/01123-69

DATE DISTR. 9 July 1969

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI 1 January 1969

SUBJECT German Government Evidence against the National Democratic Party (NPD)

WP 2.4

ACQ Germany, Bonn (26 March 1969) FIELD NO. EGN-4107

SOURCE An official West German security service.

1. A 77-page German-language report, describing the National Democratic Party (NPD) and presenting documentary and testimonial evidence of possibly unconstitutional aspects of the NPD, has been deposited in the files of the CIA Document and Pictorial Services Division, from which copies may be obtained upon request. The report is the shorter of two versions prepared by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz). This shorter version is said to be complete in substance and is the version which was made available to West German Cabinet members in preparation for Cabinet discussion of whether the NPD should be banned. The longer, two-volume version has not been obtained.

2. Appraisal of the legal validity of the evidence against the NPD was omitted from the report at the order of the Minister of the Interior, who reserved to himself an assessment of the NPD's legality. Also, pages 9 to 13--a section entitled Chief Features of the Ideology (Grundzuege der Ideologie)--was omitted from the report at the request of the Minister of the Interior. (Headquarters Comment: The evidence in the report appears to be overt and less than conclusive. The West German Cabinet decided in the spring of 1969 not to request a ban of the NPD; substantial doubt existed as to whether there were sufficient grounds to obtain a legal ban of the NPD. The omissions from the text, referred to in this paragraph, may reflect realization by the Interior Ministry of the weakness of the case against the NPD.)

4. Field Dissemination: U. S. Embassy Bonn (limited).

Distribution of Attachment:
CRS/ADD

CONFIDENTIAL (classification) NO FOREIGN DISSEM (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

C/E/R	1	E/G/R (WP2.4) - 1			CAWHISPER EGN-4107
C/E/G	1	E/G/R/L	1		
E/G/INT	1	E/G/R/P	1		
E/G/CE	1	E/Bonn	2		
E/G/R	2			COORDINATING	RELEASING RM:JL rmm
TOTALS IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 9(2)				LIAISON 32	

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. CS -311/06103 -69

DATE DISTR. 7 July 1969

COUNTRY West Berlin/West Germany

DOI March to Mid-May 1969

SUBJECT Status Report on Problems, Activities and Plans of the West Berlin National Democratic Party

WP 2.4

ACQ. Germany, Berlin (March - Mid-May 1969)

FIELD NO. EGB-24,611

SOURCE Intercepted communications, supplemented by information from a member of the West Berlin National Democratic Party (NPD) with close contacts among members of the Berlin NPD Executive Council and a record of accurate reporting.

Summary: The Berlin NPD has been plagued by a split between the Berlin City leadership, which is loyal to the Party's national leaders, and the "Loyalists" headed by the Berlin district leaders, who opposed the dissolution of the Berlin NPD ordered by National Party Chairman Adolf von Thadden in October 1968. Court action led to the thwarting of the plan for dissolution. In an effort to keep the Berlin Party alive, in mid-March von Thadden ordered a cessation of open Party activities until after the September parliamentary elections. Subsequently, von Thadden arranged a postponement of a scheduled Berlin Party convention until October, because of the possibility of a ban on the Berlin NPD by the Allies and the threat of trouble from the militant left. At the end of March, Berlin City NPD Chief Rudolf Kendzia resigned in an effort to promote party unity in Berlin, but he remains active behind the scenes. Since early April, the Berlin NPD leadership has followed von Thadden's guidelines. The influence of the Loyalists has been greatly reduced, and in accordance with von Thadden's instructions party activities have been circumspect. Both the Berlin and the National leadership are hoping that the NPD will obtain 25 to 35 Bundestag seats in September, which, they feel, will make the party more acceptable to right-wing voters in Berlin and enhance NPD chances during the 1971 Berlin communal elections. Berlin is planning to send volunteer workers to campaign for the NPD in West Germany, especially in North Rhine-Westphalia, the NPD stronghold. End of Summary.

1. (Field Comment: In October 1968, the West Berlin NPD had approximately 480 dues-paying members. According to a senior party official, more than 100 members have officially dropped their

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

C/E/R	1	E/G/CE	1	CA/INT	1	EGB-24,611 CAYANK CAVANISH
E/G/R	2	E/G/INT	1	CA/PROP	2	
E/G/R/L	1	E/SI	1			
E/G/R/P	1	CIOP/EU	2			
E/G/R(WP2	4)	✓ - 1				COORDINATING
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 9, CA 3					LIAISON *	RELEASING HM/JL rmm

membership and others are dropping out quietly. In March the paid-up membership was about 300.)

2. Following the abortive attempt by the National Democratic Party (NPD) leadership to force the Berlin NPD to dissolve itself for tactical reasons in October 1968, routine party activity resumed almost immediately. It was characterized by a split between the leadership of the Berlin City (Landesverband) party unit and that of district (Kreisverband) party units. The former are generally loyal to National Party Chairman Adolf von Thadden and the national leadership in Hanover and their broader tactical concepts, while the latter, referred to as the "Loyalists" (Satzungstreue), defend the letter of the Berlin NPD statutes. The Loyalists initially objected primarily to the method of the attempted dissolution, but the friction with the city Executive Committee (Landesvorstand) headed by Rudolf Kendzia led to total mutual mistrust, disloyal statements to the press, and efforts to get each other expelled from the party by a party court (Schiedsgericht).

3. At a general membership meeting in Berlin on 15 March 1969, von Thadden attempted to achieve a truce within the party and ordered that there be no "political organizational activity" until after the September 1969 parliamentary elections. At this meeting von Thadden approved the scheduling of a Berlin party convention (Landesparteitag) for 26 April 1969, at which a new and hopefully more stable city Executive Committee was to be elected.

4. The 15 March meeting provided an indication that the Berlin NPD may well stick together under von Thadden's guidance until 1971, in spite of the friction between city and district leadership. Although the eight spokesmen for the local leadership, who took the floor after Kendzia's situation report and von Thadden's keynote speech, approved the action of the Berlin NPD districts in opposing the self-dissolution of the local party, and no one contradicted them, all but 31 of the 140 members present then voted for a resolution condemning District Chiefs Johann Ratzek (Schoeneberg) and Philipp Goelles (Wilmersdorf), leaders of the Loyalists, for anti-party activity. This vote amounted to a vote of confidence in the tactics of the Berlin City leadership, and according to members present was due solely to von Thadden's presence and influence. In the view of these members, a meeting without the attendance of representatives of the Hanover headquarters would have led to a no-confidence vote in the Kendzia leadership. During the meeting, von Thadden also rejected Kendzia's "Berlin Program," which called for a softer line on East Germany and on German reunification.

5. At the 15 March session, left-wing, anti-NPD protestors assaulted a number of NPD members and forced the NPD twice to change its meeting site. This leftist action and the obvious fact that the militant left has a penetration of the Berlin NPD have had a seriously dampening effect on the NPD's willingness to meet in the open. The party is now tentatively planning to hold future meetings on a rented excursion boat whose location would not be announced until the time of the meeting.

6. The Berlin NPD has made strenuous efforts to determine which left-wing organizations made up the task force which tried to disrupt the 15 March meeting. The Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO) claimed the honor, but the NPD investigation showed definitely that all but a handful of the protestors were an organized group dispatched by the Spandau branch of the West Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SEW) whose actions are part of a long-range program of harassment by the East Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SED).

7. Because of the subsequent possible threats of prohibition by the Allies (signalled by a letter from Governing Mayor Klaus Schuetz to the Allies asking that the NPD in Berlin be banned) and of further counter-demonstrations by the militant left, on 27 March von Thadden wrote a letter to the Berlin City leadership asking that

the Berlin party convention be postponed until October 1969, the normal expiration date of the term of the present city Executive Committee and well after the national elections. The letter, which was read at several district meetings, also stipulated that the city and district organizations were to restrict themselves to routine monthly meetings with no speeches and no invited guests until next October.

8. In a tactical move to promote party unity, Party Chief Kendzia resigned on 28 March. In response to von Thadden's letter, the Berlin district ~~party~~ unit leadership, which otherwise remained intact, called a session of the Berlin Party Council (Landesausschuss) on 10 April to approve the postponement of the party convention. (Field Comment: The Party Council consists of the Executive Committee plus the 12 district leaders.) Walter Seezen, a member of the national leadership, was present. The situation was ticklish because the Berlin NPD statutes provide that if full membership meetings in four of the 12 districts had voted for holding of the party convention in April, the postponement motion would fail; there was a distinct danger that this could occur. At the 10 April meeting, the district leaders grumbled but approved the postponement until 11 October.

9. On Kendzia's resignation, Guenther Mensel, a member of the Executive Committee, was selected as Acting Party Chief and Speaker of the Party Council until a new Executive Committee is elected in October. Mensel, an attorney, was hesitant about accepting the job because of its possible effect on his practice, and did not commit himself until the 10 April executive meeting. Mensel's age (62) and stability were the main reasons for his selection. The only other replacement considered was Guenter Kleinert, also on the Executive Committee, whom Kendzia did not trust. Mensel's duties are to consist of calling and chairing pro-forma monthly Executive Committee meetings and of presiding at the party congress next October.

10. Kendzia considers his resignation a temporary tactical retreat caused by disagreements with the NPD national and Berlin district leaders, by von Thadden's public rejection of his "Berlin Program," loss of business because of unfavorable publicity, and a hit-and-run car accident involving a bicyclist on 27 March. Kendzia promised Mensel to remain active behind the scenes and set up a vacant office in his place of business as party headquarters, with desks for himself and Executive Committee members Frank Schwerdt, Joachim Rebuschat and Hans Werner Andreas, the de facto heads of the Berlin NPD.

11. Kendzia and a majority of the NPD leaders hope that the fall elections will bring some 25 to 35 NPD members into the Bundestag. This, they feel, will make the party more acceptable to potential right-wing voters in Berlin and thus enable the NPD to make a showing in the 1971 Berlin communal elections. (Source Comment: The Berlin NPD's major problem in Berlin is to keep its membership intact and its machinery functioning until 1971. Whether Kendzia will hold to his promise to direct the Berlin NPD from behind the scenes indefinitely, and whether he will emerge as leader in 1971, are open questions, because Kendzia has shown an interest in the current program and policies of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and particularly in its "General-Contract" concept, which fits in with his "Berlin Program." A close friend of Kendzia's, (fnu) Nerchert, resigned from the NPD to protest its participation in the presidential election in Berlin on 5 March and has already made overtures to the FDP.)

12. Since Kendzia's resignation and the 10 April executive meeting, the Berlin City Executive Committee (under Kendzia's behind-the-scenes tutelage) has kept the Berlin NPD functioning and loyal to the Hanover leadership. Executive Committee members (especially Schwerdt, Rebuschat and Andreas) have attended annual election meetings in all 12 party districts. Through their influence, pro-von Thadden or neutral District Executive Committees have been elected in each case. The district officers who led the opposition to the self-dissolution

of the Berlin NPD last fall have been effectively expelled or neutralized. As of early May, Loyalist influence had been greatly reduced. Although there is now no significant internal opposition group, there was a call pending for formation of an informal group representing both the city organization and the districts to propose organizational changes. Routine monthly district meetings with "guests" from West Germany, whenever possible, are to be continued, under the watchful eye of the pro-tem Executive Committee, until next October when the party convention of the Berlin NPD will elect a new leadership.

13. Schuetz' attempts to have the NPD banned in Berlin have not been taken seriously. Local party activists are preparing to support the NPD election campaign in West Germany by sending volunteer workers. A letter appealing for such help states that the decisive electoral campaign which will determine whether or not the NPD gets into the Bundestag will be waged in North Rhine-Westphalia. Air fare and living expense subsidies are being offered to volunteers who are to distribute leaflets, put up posters and ring doorbells. (Field Comment: The NPD made inroads in North Rhine-Westphalia during the economic recession of 1965-66, and the NPD national leadership is counting heavily on salvaging their foothold in the Bielefeld-Ruhr area.)

14. The main NPD weapons in the national election campaign are to be pamphlets describing the party's election platform. One is to be distributed between 1 and 15 June; a follow-up pamphlet, between 15 and 30 August; and a third pamphlet on the eve of the election. Each will be printed in 15,000,000 copies. Distribution will be handled by two firms--Velbringer Company and Erdmann Company.

15. Ruediger Krauss, head of the NPD's student organization, the National University League (Nationaler Hochschulbund - NHB), has moved from Berlin to Bonn to assume the post of chairman of the Bonn City NPD Executive Committee. Von Thadden plans to use the tactic of moving reliable leaders into critical areas after the elections. For example, he plans to move a Bavarian NPD officer to Berlin and assume the chairmanship of the Berlin NPD. In an attempt to obtain legal recognition for the NHB in Berlin, (fnu) von Hindy, a Hungarian law student and good friend of Krauss, is to be appointed Krauss' successor.

16. Field Dissem: USBER, DCSI/USCOB (Also sent Bonn).

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S E C R E T

June 1969

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI June 1968

SUBJECT West German Ministry of Interior Evaluation of the Prospects of Banning the National Democratic Party

ACQ Germany (1 September 1969) FIELD NO. OGA-813

SOURCE A medium-level West German government official who follows the activities of the National Democratic Party and who had access to the study during his official duties. The information was extracted from the original document and is believed to be an accurate summary of its highlights.

Summary: In June 1968, the West German Ministry of the Interior prepared a basic study of the prospects of banning the West German National Democratic Party (NPD). The summary of this study given below describes the major charges which the government could bring against the NPD, the defenses the NPD could be expected to make against these charges, and the probable political results which would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful case against the NPD. According to the source, this study is still considered the basic Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the NPD and is being studied by senior federal government and state (Land) officials. End of Summary.

1. (Field Comment: For several years, West German political and government leaders have debated seeking a constitutional court ban on the NPD. On 13 November 1968, Ernst Benda, West German Interior Minister, advised Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger that there was sufficient evidence to warrant bringing a suit against the NPD. Kiesinger, however, opposed bringing a suit, and the subject became embroiled in West German politics. On 23 April 1969, the Federal Cabinet decided not to seek a court ban of the NPD, at least until after the September elections. This decision was prompted by evidence that the NPD was making no membership gains and apparently was losing popular support.)

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2. In June 1968, the West German Interior Ministry prepared a 50-page study of the prospects for banning the NPD entitled "Considerations Regarding a Ban of the National Democratic Party." The study was well prepared and carefully written. It is still considered the basic Interior Ministry paper on the NPD and is being studied by senior officials of both the federal and state governments. It avoids giving an opinion on the prospects of obtaining a court decision against the NPD, but from the content of the study, it is clear that the authors believed that the courts would probably reject a government proposal to ban the NPD. (Field Comment: If the study is still considered current, it is unclear how it fits with Benda's November 1968 statement that there was sufficient evidence to obtain a ban against the NPD. There have been other reports, however, that the evidence was not as clear-cut as Benda would have had the Chancellor believe. See, for example, ZGN-3894.)

3. The study summarized the case which could be brought against the NPD as follows:

a. It could be shown that there was a similarity between the NPD and the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) which has been outlawed.

b. It could be argued that the goals, and parts of the party platform, of the NPD are contrary to the principles of a free democratic state.

The study concludes that a sufficiently strong case could be presented to prevent the case being thrown out by the courts without a hearing.

4. The study lists the following points which the NPD could be expected to use in its defense:

a. The party could prove that it has given firm instructions to its members not to engage in [illegible] or violence.

b. It could show that a sizeable number of former NSDAP members have been forced out of the party as part of the Selbstreinigung (self-cleaning) process.

c. It could point out many features of its program which are in accord with democratic principles.

d. It could show that its elected representatives have worked with other parties and have not disrupted the Landtage (state diets) and other elected bodies in which they participate.

e. It could point out that other political parties have many ex-Nazis and ex-communists as members and could claim that the majority of the 28,000 NPD members are not opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic.

f. It would charge that the government's charges were one-sided, unfairly presented, and out of date.

g. It would claim that not all of Professor (fnu) Anrich's points were included in the party platform. (Field Comment: Anrich is apparently a rightist whose proposals were more extreme than those incorporated in the party platform.)

i. It could claim that the increased violence (Verrohung) of the political climate in West Germany is the fault of the New Left and not of the NPD.

5. The study states that it would be very difficult to refute these NPD defenses in court. The government would have to admit that since early 1968 there have been very few statements made by NPD leaders, or incidents caused by the NPD, which could be used to support the government's case. Objectively, it would have to be admitted that many incidents of violence in which the NPD has been involved were initiated by opponents of the party.

6. The study predicts the following probable results should the government win its case against the NPD:

a. The NPD would probably respect the prohibition. It is very unlikely that the NPD would attempt to go underground as the illegal Communist Party of Germany (KPD) did.

b. NPD members and sympathizers would not change their opinions because of a ban. Many would join other groups or parties and continue to work for their political beliefs.

c. NPD and rightist sympathizers would begin a campaign for the banning of the new German Communist Party (DKP) and other leftist groups.

d. A ban of the NPD would be well received in foreign countries.

7. The study concludes that if the government should lose a case against the NPD, it would be the result of the lack of valid evidence (Beweisschwierigkeiten). In such an event, the following adverse affects would occur:

a. The NPD would receive a new impetus and valuable publicity.

b. The policy of Selbstreinigung which has had some success in keeping former Nazis out of key positions would be halted.

c. Many middle-class persons who sympathize with the NPD, but who have refrained from open support because of the stigma of being associated with a party which could be declared illegal, would join the party or become active supporters.

d. The party would undoubtedly attract more members. (Field Comment: The NPD leadership is known to be worried because the party's membership has not increased significantly during the past 18 months.)

8. Field Dissem: Embassy Bonn, USBER.

Secret
No Foreign Dissem

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report

West Germany's National Democrats and the Grand Coalition

Secret

№ 919

31 May 1968
No. 0022/68A

WEST GERMANY'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATS AND THE GRAND COALITION

Germany's far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) showed another increase in strength in recent elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, while the Social Democrats (SPD) lost heavily. This outcome in a traditionally liberal and prosperous state appears to stem in part from the dissatisfaction of many Socialists and trade unionists in the SPD with their party's cabinet cooperation with the Christian Democrats (CDU). Another factor was the discontent of farmers and refugees with the policies of the Grand Coalition in Bonn. Concern over student disorders contributed to the NPD gains, but this was not as decisive as some have supposed. Despite these gains, the NPD is unlikely to achieve a growth comparable to that of the Nazi Party in the early 1930s.

The outcome in Baden-Wuerttemberg confirmed the belief of many Socialists that their cooperation with the CDU at both the national and state level is proving to be unprofitable for the party. As a result, they have already decided at the state level not to renew cabinet cooperation with the CDU in Baden-Wuerttemberg, thus making prospects for the Bonn coalition appear less favorable. Nevertheless, SPD leaders in Bonn remain committed to the Grand Coalition and serious instability at the federal level seems unlikely. Over the long run the outcome of this latest election may have certain implications nationally, including the possibility that Bonn leaders may be encouraged to take a more nationalist line.

The NPD's Success

The West German state elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg on 28 April brought the far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) 9.8 percent of the vote, the most impressive total it has yet attained in any state. About 71 percent of the voters turned out, approximately three percent more than in the last Baden-Wuerttemberg state election in 1964, but 15 percent less than in the 1965 federal election.

Christian Democratic Union (CDU) strength fell slightly to 44.1 percent (1964: 46.2 percent), while the Social Democratic Party (SPD) achieved a vote of only 29.1 percent (1964:



90630 5 68

37.3 percent). The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), made a slight gain, winning 14.4 percent of the vote (1964: 13.1 percent). Against the background of last October's Bremen elections, in which the National Democratic Party won what was then a record percentage of 8.9, the Baden-Wuerttemberg results brought renewed cries of alarm over the dangers of neo-Nazism in the Federal Republic. More important, the results also raised doubts as to the future of a coalition government by the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, not only in Baden-Wuerttemberg but at the federal government level as well.

Baden-Wuerttemberg: A Test Case

Baden and Wuerttemberg traditionally have been strongholds of liberal, nonsocialist democracy in Germany. In the early 1930s, the Nazi vote in this area was almost always appreciably lower than elsewhere in Germany. The hotbeds of Nazism lay in other regions, for example in Franconia, East Prussia, and Schleswig-Holstein.

The economic and social picture in Baden-Wuerttemberg would lead to expectations of stability there. The proportion of the population now employed in industry is higher than in any other state. The economy of the state was virtually untouched by the recent West German recession, during which unemployment never exceeded one percent. Per capita income is above average. Protestants and Catholics are almost evenly balanced in population, while the proportion of protestants in the Federal Republic is slightly higher.

A few observers correctly forecast the outcome, but the general expectation was that the vote for the National Democratic Party would be lower than in Bremen. The two major West German polling organizations had predicted in March that the NPD would receive five percent of the vote.

Federal-level politicians had campaigned actively in the state. Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, a popular native son, made a three-day speaking tour, in which he sharply attacked "arrogant, thoughtless, and dangerous nationalism." He stressed this theme in the Hohenlohe area, where the NPD later received its highest vote in the state. Willy Brandt also appeared to speak for the Social Democrats.

NPD Representation in West German States



90020 5 68

The participation by national figures reflected a feeling in Bonn that this state election, the last before the 1969 federal election, might influence national politics. The analogy to the federal scene was pointed up by the existence in Baden-Wuerttemberg of a coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, similar to that in Bonn.

Reaction to Student Riots

In looking for explanations of the NPD gains, German observers have emphasized the public reaction against the Easter student rioting, and dissatisfaction with the federal grand coalition. Conservatives lean to the former explanation, while students and trade unionists stress the latter. The NPD did not receive less than 6 percent in any electoral district. This suggests that the sentiment expressed by the vote is widespread, and may extend throughout the FRG.

Reaction to student rioting probably contributed something, but this aspect seems to have been exaggerated as a factor in NPD gains. In Heidelberg, the NPD vote rose to 11.9 percent, but in three other university towns, the party's vote fell below the state average of 9.8 percent. In industrial Esslingen, where there had been two student riots, the NPD only attained 9 percent. Some voters may have been influenced by student demonstrations to transfer their votes from the SPD to the CDU, whose spokesmen have generally advocated a stern treatment of rioters.

At the same time, the "new left" certainly failed to win popular support. The Democratic Left, supported by radical students, won only 2.3 percent in the state as a whole, while making better showings in certain university and industrial localities. While the Democratic Left's state-wide average was better than the far left had attained in recent elections under other names, it fell below the last, low figure gained by the Communists before they became illegal: 3.2 percent.

Hostility to the Grand Coalition?

There is dissatisfaction with the coalition within the CDU, and it can be assumed that some of the party's right wing voted for the National Democrats. The Socialists, however, suffered the greater loss. Left-of-center Socialists often complain that the party has compromised its principles and lost public favor. There is an undercurrent of feeling in these quarters that the party has endangered German democracy by abandoning its longtime position of opposition and entering into collaboration with the CDU.

Although the SPD has provided much of the impetus to the grand coalition's economic and foreign policies, and although the coalition in Baden-Wuerttemberg has generally functioned well, dissatisfaction undoubtedly exists among idealistic members of the left and among traditionally class-conscious union members. Middle class voters of this persuasion probably turned to the Free Democratic Party, which has assumed the role of respectable opposition. The connection between this left-liberal criticism and the NPD gains on 28 April is not immediately apparent.

Some commentators including some Socialists, conclude that many SPD voters defected to the NPD. The respected Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung fudged some of the election data to support its argument that workers had gone over to the NPD, but a more careful analysis has shown that the NPD did indeed win above-average support in some working-class neighborhoods.

Many old Socialists and trade unionists, such as Willi Bleicher, the powerful boss of the metalworkers in this state, are cool to the coalition and hostile to intellectuals, and some of them are repelled by anarchic student leftism. Even so, most workers are unlikely under conditions of full employment to cast what they would consider a neo-Nazi vote; certainly Bleicher would never favor such action. SPD electoral losses would seem to be due less to defection to the NPD than to the failure of lower-level SPD functionaries, apathetic, or even hostile toward the coalition, to get out the vote, and to the failure of many trade union and normally SPD voters to go to the polls.

In traditionally socialist Mannheim, only 58 percent of those entitled to vote turned out. SPD percentages dropped 14 percent in one district and 13 percent in another. The percentage of NPD strength rose to 12.1, 10.9, and 11.2 in the three city districts, but working class votes would not be needed to provide these percentages, especially in the face of a low SPD turnout. These votes probably came mainly from the CDU, the FDP, or from those who had not voted before.

NPD Activity Pays Off

The NPD organization worked hard during the campaign, conducting more meetings than all the other parties put together. The party has overcome its former inexperience and disunity, and is developing into a well-oiled political machine. The organization fields speakers and provides canned speeches and propaganda materials to local groups. The NPD's heritage is not purely Nazi. It encompasses more respectable antecedents, such as the Deutschnationaler (German Nationalists) and other conservative elements. In the interests of avoiding a government ban, the National Democratic Party shuns blatantly Nazi appeals and tactics.

Adolf von Thadden, the national leader of the NPD, is a smooth personality from a Junker family who denies charges that he was an active Nazi. He seems to model himself more on De Gaulle than on Hitler. The Baden-Wuerttemberg leader of the party, Wilhelm Gutmann, is a former Nazi. During "the good old days," he was Buergermeister of Tiengen on the Swiss border, where he sponsored anti-Semitic activities in 1938. He refused to permit the raising of white flags when the Allied forces arrived in 1945. Despite his past, he won 15,000 votes in Karlsruhe. In one commune in the northern end of the state, the NPD gained an absolute majority with 55 percent of the vote; this was the home of an NPD candidate named Valentin Goetz, who had been voted out as Buergermeister two years before.

The NPD won its greatest relative successes in three northern districts: Oehringen (14.8 percent), Crailsheim (14.5 percent), and Tauberbischofsheim (14.3 percent). The first two of these districts are largely protestant; the latter is predominantly Catholic. This northern area, and especially its Hohenlohe section, is filled with dissatisfied small farmers, who now face Common Market competition and who have recently suffered the loss of a state subsidy on milk. Rural dissatisfaction provides opportunities for the NPD, but this is not a promising base for a mass movement, particularly since the farm population in the Federal Republic has dropped in the last ten years from 20 percent to 11 percent. Another important voting factor in this northern area is the relatively high proportion of refugees, who were probably aroused by recent statements by Willy Brandt about the Oder-Neisse line and by the failure of the CDU to react more forcefully against Brandt.

As was the case in the early 1930s, overwhelmingly Catholic areas, where the Church influences its members politically, had the lowest right extremist vote. One overwhelmingly Protestant district, Freudenstadt, also produced a

ADOLF VON THADDEN

WILHELM GUTMANN

low NPD vote. A postelection poll of 1967 voters in Bremen showed that, unlike the Hitler movement, the National Democrats do not yet attract many women and youth. More than two thirds of the voters for the party were males, and the strongest participation was in the 45 to 60 age bracket.

FDP Gains and Losses

The FDP profited from its position in the opposition. Ralf Dahrendorf, a sociologist from the University of Konstanz with an international reputation, has recently entered the party and has assumed a leading role, influencing the FDP in a leftward direction and attracting left-liberal support. In the Stuttgart district where he was a candidate, the party vote rose by 6 percent. On the other hand, the new pattern is not acceptable to many old members of this traditionally business-oriented party, who looking askance at Dahrendorf's readiness to debate and discuss with Rudi Dutschke and other radical students. Two of the three districts with heaviest NPD gains also showed heavy FDP losses, as did some other former FDP areas of strength.

Perspectives on the Vote

The over-all picture appears to be that while both the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats lost to the NPD, they gained at the expense of the Socialists. The Socialists suffered from apathy and incurred some loss to both the NPD and Democratic Left. The NPD probably garnered some new and uncommitted votes. It is fortunate for the SPD leaders in Bonn that the annual party congress came before the Baden-Wuerttemberg election. It is hardly likely that the congress would now defeat a motion withholding endorsement of the coalition, as it did by a four-vote margin in March. Assuming the SPD remains faithful to the Bonn coalition now, the prospects are for further erosion of its strength and for greater difficulties within its ranks.

Meanwhile, the NPD probably will continue to grow in influence. It now is probably stronger in some other areas than in Baden-Wuerttemberg. A change from proportional representation to single-member constituencies, which might have



served to block NPD growth, has now become even less acceptable than before to the SPD, which would have lost three-fifths of its Baden-Wuerttemberg seats under this system.

A ban of the NPD appears unlikely unless the party commits some flagrant violation of accepted rules. A Bonn press office spokesman has stated that the government will seek a political debate with the NPD, and not a ban. On present form, the NPD may get 40 seats in the 1969 Bundestag elections. An attempt to set a higher minimum percentage of votes (present minimum: five percent) for Bundestag representation would arouse violent FPD opposition, and does not seem to be under serious consideration at the moment. It would violate German tradition, and might produce a reaction in favor of the NPD, enabling it to overstep even the new margin.

Although the growth of the NPD is disturbing, alarm does not seem to be warranted. In the early 1930s, Germany suffered from depression and high unemployment, and had bitter memories of a recent inflation which wiped out savings. Powerful elements in the government and society, including President von Hindenberg, the army, the courts, and heavy industry, were highly reactionary and either cool or hostile to republican democracy--as were the professors and students. Racism was rampant and more or less respectable, and unwillingness to accept defeat in World War I provided endless opportunities for demagoguery. All these conditions are now virtually absent. The defeat in 1945, and subsequent disclosures, work to discredit any real Nazi manifestations. Moreover, the fact that no other state will elect a new assembly before the 1969 federal elections may help to prevent a real bandwagon development. It must be emphasized that the NPD is still a small party, if no longer a mere splinter group.

The Coalition Problem

German observers tend to be more worried about the effect of the NPD showing on foreign opinion than about the increase in NPD strength itself, and their greatest concern is over the prospects for the grand coalition, resulting from the SPD losses. A Baden-Wuerttemberg SPD convention voted on 18 May against continuing the coalition in Stuttgart, and the old state SPD leaders resigned. This would seem to make the prospects for the Bonn coalition less favorable.

At the same time, the FDP appears not to be in a mood to return to a coalition in either Bonn or Stuttgart. Dahrendorf has suggested that there might be a CDU minority government in the state. State CDU leaders may, however, prefer to call new elections if a coalition cannot be formed. In this event, they would appeal for an absolute majority from the voters. If they got it and if the NPD vote declined, this would be encouraging, but new elections might also have a less favorable outcome.

If the 1969 federal election follows the pattern of the 28 April election, the same problems will arise in Bonn. With this kind of a breakdown of the vote, the FDP and the SPD together cannot form a majority, and a refusal on the part of both of them to join the CDU means that the latter cannot organize a majority government either--unless the CDU invites NPD collaboration, which it is far from ready to do.

A collapse of the grand coalition in Bonn either before or after 1969 and a return by the SPD to opposition positions would signify more than a passing cabinet crisis. In the past, parties tended to harden into intransigence, committed to particular ideological and material interests, and unable to reach pragmatic compromises with each other. In recent years, West German politicians have tried to break with this tradition and to work on the consensus principle. A failure of these efforts would have serious implications. If--as does not seem likely at present--the three major parties were unable to form a majority government, this might lead to severe instability and the discrediting of parliamentary government.

Bonn and Weimar

Many misleading analogies have been drawn between the Bonn and Weimar republics. One Weimar precedent may help, however, to explain why some observers view the coalition problem seriously. In March 1930, another grand coalition with SPD participation collapsed over the question of cuts in unemployment insurance, leading to the formation of a conservative majority government under Heinrich Bruening. Bruening was later replaced by the reactionary Franz von Papen, who in turn was followed first by a wire-pulling general, Kurt von Schleicher, and then by Adolf Hitler. The worst aspect of the SPD withdrawal was that it made the parliament ineffective and powerless.

Once minority government was embarked on, supported by presidential prerogatives, there was no effective test for legitimacy except the will of Hindenburg by then susceptible and old. The Nazis ultimately came to power, not by a majority vote, but through the paralysis and impotence of the constitutional system and through intrigues in the presidential palace on the part of those, especially Papen and Schleicher, who thought they could "use" Nazi mass support.

In contrast to the 30s, the presidential powers now are far weaker,* and aside from all the other factors inhibiting a recurrence, the Weimar precedent itself must influence SPD leaders in Bonn. They are completely committed personally to the present coalition. A decision to go into opposition is unlikely under Brandt and Wehner.

**The absence of executive emergency powers is not of course without dangers. In a bitter parliamentary deadlock, an illegal assumption of power, perhaps by extragovernmental elements, might be the only way out.*

Another possibility might be a left-wing withdrawal from the SPD, although the leadership for a dissident faction has yet to emerge. This might provide a healthy outlet for criticism of the system without a turn to minority rule. Unlike the early 1930s, virtually all West German politicians now would do their best to maintain a functioning constitutional system. Real dangers will probably not arise unless, as in the late Weimar period, the government finds itself confronted with economic or political problems which seem to defy compromise settlement or rational solution.

Immediate Prospects

Assuming that the Bonn coalition lasts until the 1969 elections, its leading members may still modify their policies somewhat in the light of the Baden-Wuerttemberg experience. The adverse vote of the refugees in the recent election could act as a brake on the policy of detente with Czechoslovakia and Poland, although there is no sign of this as yet. Chancellor Kiesinger has attributed NPD gains partly to "years of agitation against our own history and against healthy self-confidence," which suggests that he may try to sound a more nationalistic note. To the extent to which the results continue to be attributed to student activities, this will strengthen the demand for firmness. Even before the election, Brandt sent a telegram to SPD state headquarters, advising that speakers should react "completely hard" against student demonstrations.

Although the antistudent reaction does not seem to have been as important a factor as some have believed it to be, constant violence and provocation on the part of the students, accompanied by constant press attention, could lead to severe official or unofficial counteraction. This, in turn, could bring more serious student violence, perhaps with the support of other elements.

Some matters of student concern have appeal for others. Thus students and many trade unionists oppose emergency laws, and this question is again being agitated. Because of the Nazi experience, there is widespread aversion among left-of-center elements to the use of force in the name of "order," however great the provocation. But also because of the Nazi experience, a really large increase in NPD votes does not seem likely in the 1969 election, or in an earlier new election in Baden-Wuerttemberg, should that come to pass. (CONFIDENTIAL)

14-00000

Secret

Secret

SCORE CARD

1. Bundestag Elections 1965 -.- NPD's first Effort	664,157 votes = 2%
2. 13 March 1966, Communal Elections, Schleswig-Holstein. (NPD Hqs directive not to participate. A few did)	In 11 communities where NPD ran candidates, averaged 10.5% of vote compared with 6% in same towns in 1965.
3. 13 March 1966, Bavarian Communal Elections NPD major effort concentrated only in Franconia.	1.6 % of total Bavarian vote but: Middle Franconia = 5.. Ansbach - 5.1% Erlangen - 3.2% Nurnberg - 7.3% Schwabach - 5.6% Upper Franconia Bayreuth - 8.4% Coburg - 5.3% Kulmbach - 5.8% 3 + 2 village mayors
4. 27 March 1966 Hamburg Burgerschaft Election	3.9 % (1.8% in 1965) no candidates elected
5. 10 July 1966 Northrhein-Westphalia Landtag Election No NPD candidates elected none entered.	
6. 16 October 1966 Hamlin Byelection (Communal Concil)	8.8% (1965=) 2 seats
7. 6 November 1966 Hesse Landtag Elections	[illegible] votes = 7.9%+ 8 Seats in Landtag Marburg, Wiesbaden, Darmst and Giessen won 10% Ff/M = 8.4%
7. 20 November 1966 Bavarian Landtag Elections	votes= 7.4% 15 Seats in Landtag
8. 23 April 1967 Rheinland-Palatine	4 Seats, 6.9 % of vote
9. 23 April 1967 Schleswig-Holstein	4 Seats, 5.7 % of vote
10. 4 June 1967 Lower Saxony	10 Seats, 7 % of vote
11. 11 October 1967 Bremen Burgerschaft	8 Seats, 8.8 % of vote
12. 28 April 1968 Baden-Wuerttemberg	12 Seats, 9.8 % of vote

14-00000

Secret
No Foreign Dissem

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

The National Democratic Party in West Germany

Special Report
WEEKLY REVIEW

Secret
№ 310
9 June 1967
SC No. 00773/67B

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN WEST GERMANY

The poor showing of the ultranationalistic National Democratic Party (NPD) in recent elections in several West German states clearly disproves the party's claim of providing an acceptable alternative to the policies and programs of the country's major parties. The NPD's failure to maintain the momentum suggested by the successes scored in two state elections last fall is directly attributable both to its own well-publicized internal dissension and to voter preference for the Christian Democrats and Socialists deriving from the image of vigor and decisiveness imparted by their "grand coalition" under Chancellor Kiesinger. Barring some serious reversal in the fortunes of the Kiesinger government--which is unlikely--it is doubtful that the NPD will be any more successful than other fringe groups have been in seeking to rally latent right-radical sentiment in Germany and revive it as a dynamic political force.

Election Setbacks

The NPD has claimed wide attention both in Germany and abroad and led many observers to conclude that it was a force to be reckoned with. Within two and a half years of its founding in November 1964, the party elected representatives to the legislatures in five of West Germany's ten states (11 counting West Berlin). In elections this April the party was expected to obtain close to 10 percent of the vote in Rhineland-Palatinate and 12 to 15 percent in Schleswig-Holstein but actually won only four seats in each parliament with 6.9 and 5.8 percent of the vote respectively. In the 4 June election in the party's "home base bastion" of Lower Saxony, the NPD's performance was similarly unimpressive--7 percent of the vote and 10 Landtag seats.

Emphasis by party leaders on their success in gaining representation in all the states where the party has competed during the past year has not masked their disappointment that the NPD's momentum of growth has leveled off. The party's failure to make a good showing in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony--areas considered particularly susceptible to nationalist appeals--is especially damaging, and raises fundamental doubt about the party's future prospects.

NPD Representation in West German States


5.8% (4 seats)
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN
HAMBURG
BREMEN
LOWER
SAXONY
7% (10 seats)
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA
7.9% (8 seats)
HESSE
6.9% (4 seats)
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE
SAAR
BADEN-
WUERTTEMBERG
7.4% (15 seats)
BAVARIA
66840 6 67

Origins and Early Successes

Formed from the remnants of the defunct German Reich Party (DRP)--one of a number of ultranationalistic splinter groups which have dotted the political landscape of postwar Germany--the NPD quickly established a political apparatus capable of functioning throughout the country. The new party soon distinguished itself by its relative success in attracting the support of other ultranationalistic elements and a variety of political malcontents. Earlier attempts by other groups to unite disparate nationalists invariably had foundered on personal rivalries and tactical disagreements. Some were no more than platforms for self-expression by leaders advocating a particular set of extremist notions. Even the most successful, the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), which at its high water mark obtained 11 percent of the vote in the Lower Saxony Landtag elections in 1951, was unable to establish effective working relations with rival rightist groups before it was outlawed by the West German supreme court in 1952.

During its first year, the NPD encountered many of the problems experienced by its predecessors. The party was unable to put on an effective campaign for the September 1965 national elections and obtained only 2 percent of the votes--short of the 5-percent minimum required for representation in the Bundestag. In local elections in Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein in March 1966, however, the NPD showed that it could command pockets of strength. In the Bavarian cities of Nuremberg and Bayreuth, it received between 7 and 10 percent of the vote and elected representatives to the local governing councils. These gains were facilitated by concentrating the party's efforts in selected areas such as the Protestant centers of Middle and Upper Franconia in heavily Catholic Bavaria.

The first clear demonstration that the NPD could attract more than the ultranationalist vote came two weeks later in Hamburg, where the party nearly doubled its vote as compared with the Bundestag election the year before. Although the NPD failed to elect any deputies, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists were concerned about its ability to secure even 3.9 percent of the vote. The threat to the traditional third party, the conservative Free Democrats (FDP) became apparent. The FDP fell a third below its 1965 vote and lost 4 of its 12 seats in the Hamburg city council. Profiting from a decline in the economy which was already under way and the increasing public disenchantment with the leadership of then Chancellor Erhard in Bonn, the NPD accelerated both its organizational effort and its public relations campaign.

The stage was then set for the party's breakthrough in the Hesse and Bavaria state elections last fall in which it won 7.9 and 7.4 percent of the vote and elected 8 and 15 deputies respectively. In Bavaria the NPD emerged as the only small party in the Landtag, causing the FDP to lose its representation in the legislature for the first time in its history. By underlining the weakness of the FDP, the election outcome contributed to the formation of the grand coalition government in Bonn by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists.

For the major parties, the NPD's successes had disturbing implications. In contrast to its various predecessors, the NPD appeared capable of mobilizing urban as well as rural support and of altering the general trend long evident in most West German elections toward a two-party system. In Hesse, the combined vote of the Christian Democrats and Socialists was a lower percentage of the total vote than in the previous election four years earlier. Still more significantly, however, Hesse and Bavaria provided further evidence of the NPD's ability to attract "protest" votes from various disaffected lower-middle-class elements including small businessmen and farmers unhappy with their lot in present-day Germany.

Basic Characteristics and Sources of Support

In spite of its direct lineage from the old German Reich Party, the NPD has tried to dispel the impression among the general public that it is the spiritual heir of Hitler's National Socialists. The party has sought acceptance as a legitimate political party and insists that it intends to function within the established democratic order. Party spokesmen maintain that it differs from the established parties primarily in its allegedly superior devotion to the national interest, which they accuse the governing parties in Bonn of having failed to protect. The NPD says it offers the voter a genuine choice between bankrupt policies of the major parties and a return to national morality.

As much as some NPD supporters might wish to play down the party's Nazi associations, however, it has been clearly established that the leadership consists of a nucleus of former Nazis who have been active in neo-Nazi parties throughout the postwar years. According to police reports, some 2,000 of the estimated 25,000 members of the NPD belonged to the Nazi party before 1933. This ratio is roughly eight times that for the public as a whole. The party has lost libel suits in which it has challenged charges of neo-Nazism. The German Interior Ministry notes the parallels in political outlook and philosophy between the NPD and the Nazis, and maintains that the party's activities "approach" unconstitutionality. In the words of one former party member, the NPD is made up of people "who have forgotten nothing and learned nothing" from Germany's past.

The Bonn government is generally reluctant, however, to ban the NPD, believing that it would be imprudent to drive the ultra-rightists underground. If the NPD were to score impressive new successes in future elections, however, the resulting concern in the major parties might prompt a reconsideration of this policy. Interior Minister Luecke favors banning the party as soon as enough evidence can be obtained to assure successful court action. It is also possible that new NPD gains would motivate the established parties to make proposed changes in the electoral law that would make it more difficult for the NPD to obtain Bundestag representation.

Although the NPD program is strongly reminiscent of Hitlerian National Socialism, the party's electoral supporters in Hesse and Bavaria also include persons who have no prior Nazi affiliations or any particular susceptibility to Nazism per se. It has managed to attract impulsive youngsters, as well as political malcontents of all ages. Its membership includes individuals from a broad range of occupations. The NPD's special appeal among the lower-middle-class, and particularly among the small businessmen and farmers is reinforced by the economic squeeze these groups are experiencing as a result of government economy measures. In Hesse and Bavaria, the party did especially well in areas noted for traditional German nationalism and in areas which are predominantly Protestant. Many NPD adherents are expellees from the territories lost at the end of World War II.

The makeup of the formal NPD membership is not radically different in age or occupation group from a cross section of the general public. However, there are certain characteristics of NPD supporters which set them apart from supporters of the three major parties. The NPD tends to attract a somewhat larger number of older persons as well as young adults, and the number of lower middle class members, including pensioners, is disproportionately large. Formal membership among students, however, is very small and only 350 of a total of 244,000 university students are on the party rolls.

There is no evidence that the NPD receives significant financial support from German industrialists. It is, however, able to operate in the black. The sound state of its finances is in part a result of its practice of charging admission to its rallies. This serves the double function of making the rank and file feel that they have a stake in the party and of making it necessary for its opponents to pay for the right to heckle. The party also derives considerable sums from membership dues, subscriptions to party publications, and donations from members and sympathizers.

Party leader Von Thadden at Second NPD Congress
at Karlsruhe, June 1966

NPD audience: a characteristic cross section

66527 6 67 CIA

Rumors of clandestine financial support from the Communists or from sympathizers among Nazi emigrants to Latin America have not been confirmed.

Despite NPD claims of widespread sympathy in the West German armed forces, there is no evidence of this. German security officials estimate that no more than 2 percent of armed forces members are card-carrying NPD members. Since the NPD is a legal political organization, military leaders are constrained from openly influencing members of the armed forces to oppose it.

Many Germans are probably reluctant openly to admit their support for an organization like the NPD. It is significant, however, that only 6 percent of respondents to a national opinion poll in January 1967 indicated a preference for the NPD.

Leadership Problems

The most notable single handicap confronting the NPD is the weakness of its leadership. None of its leaders possesses any great talent or stature. Certainly no individual with Hitler's demagogic genius has yet appeared. The absence of strong leadership in what has been called a "fuehrer-oriented party" has left it divided and weakened by factionalism. This was clearly demonstrated in March 1967 when then party chairman Fritz Thielen and Deputy Chairman Adolf von Thadden engaged in a public feud which further damaged the party's reputation. An outgrowth of long-standing personal antagonism, the dispute was triggered by Thielen's resistance to Von Thadden's attempted take-over as party chairman in Lower Saxony. Thielen claimed that Von Thadden's election to the state chairmanship had been illegal and would hurt the party's reputation. The party's federal executive, however, turned the tables on Thielen and not only voted to reinstate Von Thadden but also to drop Thielen from the national chairmanship and expel him from the party. Thielen clung to the helm under a temporary court order until finally throwing in the sponge in early May with an announcement of his formation of a new, rival party, the National Peoples Party (NVP).

More of an archconservative than a neo-Nazi, Thielen was never more than a figurehead. Real authority and leadership--as well as ideological guidance--was provided by Von Thadden. Von Thadden is a 45-year-old native of Pomerania, a member of a prominent and aristocratic Prussian family, a number of whose members were prominent in the anti-Nazi resistance. Although Von Thadden applied for Nazi party membership he apparently was never formally admitted. An ardent nationalist, Von Thadden aspires to become a German De Gaulle rather than a re-creator of the German Reich.

Other leaders of some prominence include Otto Hess, party propaganda chief, and Waldemar Schuetz, editor of the NPD's official weekly, Deutsche Nachrichten. Both were active Nazis.

Thielen's departure clears the way for Von Thadden formally to take over leadership of the NPD. It is doubtful that Thielen has the personal force or following to organize a party with significant strength. The impact of the new party on the NPD will probably be small since the bulk of the NPD membership appears to prefer the leadership and ideology of the Von Thadden group. On the other hand, the strengthening of extremist tendencies within the NPD signaled by the triumph of Von Thadden may hurt the party's interests in the long run. The result is also likely to assist those actively seeking a formal government crackdown on the party.

Program

In addition to its leadership difficulties, another failing of the NPD is its inability as yet to offer a clear, positive program relevant to existing problems. Xenophobic and opportunistic, the NPD feeds upon nostalgia for an older German nationalism, discontent with the existing social order, and Germany's international standing and frustration over the fact that reunification remains as distant a prospect as ever. Its stated objectives are ill defined, when not deliberately ambiguous, and are sometimes inconsistent. Its electoral approach is generally negative and destructively critical rather than affirmative. Its principal targets include foreign interests and culture which undermine old values and "de-Germanize the fatherland." It attacks the renunciation by those in power of what the NPD regards as justified German objectives. It deplores what it considers the miseducation and corruption of youth, "crime in the streets," foreign aid, and the competition of foreign workers.

The NPD demands an end to German dependence on the US and calls for the revival of German national consciousness. It attempts to draw a parallel between West German - US relations and those between the East German regime and the USSR. In order to free Germany from foreign domination, NPD spokesmen maintain, American "occupation" forces must go, although not before the withdrawal of Russian troops, which the NPD would have occur simultaneously with that of US troops. Germany must again become master of its own fate, party leaders insist, and the "lie" of war guilt and war crimes trials must be ended and a new German general staff created. A key demand is that the reunification of Germany cannot be limited to uniting West and East Germany but must include the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse border now held by Poland. Although it does not advocate the use of force to achieve this objective, the party holds out hope that recovery will be possible by a Machiavellian deal of some sort. NPD spokesmen at present renounce a national nuclear capability for Germany.

The party puts forth slogans proclaiming "Germany for the Germans" and "Europe for the Europeans." Indeed, the NPD favors a united Europe somewhat along the lines advocated by De Gaulle. Europe, it holds, should be completely independent of the US, and possess its own nuclear deterrent. It should be built on a Franco-German alliance that smaller European countries sooner or later would have to join. The NPD would welcome the decay of NATO as signaling the end of sterile policies which do not serve Germany's real interests.

In seeking to gain the broadest popular acceptance, the party avoids affirming the more extreme aspects of Nazi ideology. There is, for example, no obvious anti-Semitism in the party program and Jews technically could become party members. The private attitudes of the leadership, however, are said to resemble traditional Nazi anti-Semitism closely. The NPD makes vague references, moreover, to the importance of "blood ties," rejects evidence relating to the Nazi extermination policy, makes derogatory references to the Jews in the party press, and denounces aid to Israel.

In recent campaigning in Lower Saxony, NPD spokesmen shifted tactics somewhat by no longer stressing issues obviously associated with the Nazi period such as war guilt and reparations. Instead, they sought to exploit current grievances including the economic recession, unemployment, lack of progress on reunification, and what they called the unreliability of NATO.

Future Prospects

The NPD's failure to maintain the momentum of last fall's successes in this year's state elections in Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Lower Saxony is a serious blow to the party's hopes. The squabble among the leadership apparently reinforced the feeling among uncommitted elements that casting a protest vote for the NPD was not worthwhile under present circumstances. The widespread discontent among farmers over government economy measures did not result in a significant shift of votes to the NPD. Moreover, there has been a strong resurgence of general confidence in the Bonn government. Although the NPD benefited last fall from the popular dissatisfaction with the Erhard government, the grand coalition headed by CDU Chancellor Kiesinger has displayed vigor and decisiveness which has been rewarded at the polls.

Even if the NPD were to follow its forerunners into oblivion it would not mark the end of rightist extremism. A portion of the German electorate will remain receptive to this kind of appeal. In the absence of a party such as the NPD, right-wing voters tend to give their support to one of the insignificant splinter parties, or to one of the more conservative established parties, such as the FDP, when they vote at all.

14-00000

It is possible--although increasingly unlikely--that the NPD could turn out to resemble other parties of a national-conservative stamp. Despite the radical views of some of their members, such groups have managed to operate without subversive manifestations. The German Party (DP), for example, which had been represented in several North German state legislatures and in the Bundestag conducted itself in a responsible fashion.

The NPD at present draws a good deal of this traditional right-wing vote from the old Refugee Party, the DP, and small conservative regional parties such as the Bavarian Party. The total extremist vote, however, has increased very little since the establishment of the NPD. Estimates of the extent of hard-core ultranationalist sentiment in Germany vary between 5 and 15 percent of the electorate. Under present conditions this does not constitute a threat to German democratic institutions and is not greater than the degree of extremist sentiment in other Western European countries.

Outlook

Assuming the NPD survives the current period of internal strife, its potential for further growth beyond its present 6- to 8-percent range appears to be limited under conditions now prevailing in West Germany. The NPD is still capable of capitalizing on circumstances which might present themselves as a result of a protracted economic recession or major political blunders which would discredit the present government leadership. The outcome of recent state elections, however, tends to confirm that the overwhelming majority of German voters continues to prefer the moderate, albeit increasingly independent and nationalist, policies of the major parties and the government, and rejects the radical alternatives advocated by the NPD. (SECRET)

* * *

Secret

Secret

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
~~CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

COUNTRY West Germany

REPORT NO. CS DB-312/00003-67

SUBJECT BfV Program to Monitor and Counter the Activities of the National Democratic Party

DATE DISTR. 5 JAN 1967

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 23 November 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Germany, Bonn (25 November 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A qualified American official from a senior official of the West German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). This official is responsible for monitoring the activities of right radical organizations throughout West Germany. The information is probably true.

1. (Summary: The West German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and its regional affiliates (LfV) have undertaken a program to monitor and counter the activities of the National Democratic Party (NPD). Included in this program are efforts to penetrate the NPD at all its levels, to monitor its membership and finances, and to counter its influence.)

2. Report: For a number of years the BfV has been engaged in penetrating and monitoring the activities of right radical organizations. Since the establishment of the NPD in [illegible] ago, 1964, the BfV has made a concerted effort to penetrate it at both the national and regional levels. This effort has resulted in the recruitment of about 60 sources with access to the NPD organizations at all levels. In several cases the BfV or LfV have been able to recruit local NPD county chairmen and in six Laender have access to the minutes and files of the Land organizations. The BfV has also penetrated the national headquarters of the NPD in Hannover.

3. Through its penetration of the national organization, the BfV has been able to obtain and photograph the entire membership rolls, which currently contain about 20,000 names. The national list has been augmented by additional membership applications obtained via penetrations of the [illegible] Land organizations. The BfV is currently in the process of tracing all of these membership applications against the master Nazi Party membership files at the American

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTROLLED DISSEM

/Continued/

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE #	DIA	ARMY #	NAVY	AIR #	NSA	XX	OCR

(Note. Field distribution indicated by "•".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

FI/D/E	1	E/G/INT	1
E/R	1	E/G/CE	(1)
E/CR/R	2	E/SAS	1
E/G/R	1		
E/G/R/W	2		

EGN-3098
CAVATA-1

NO LIAISON

TOTALS IE 2, CI 2, FI 4, EUR 9, DO/H 1.

LIAISON 32

COORDINATING

RELEASING HM/ CS:uj

controlled Berlin Document Center. Although this tracing activity has not been completed and is handicapped by lack of personnel at the Berlin Document Center, the BfV estimates its current file on the NPD is far more accurate than the files at the NPD headquarters. Because of its access to the Berlin Document Center, the BfV will eventually have a better estimate of the number of NPD members who are former Nazi Party members than does the NPD itself.

4. The BfV is also making a concerted effort to obtain documentary evidence on the NPD's sources of income. The recruitment efforts to do this are directed at spotting and recruiting clerical help who work in NPD offices and have access to files. Information in the BfV's possession to date, which includes considerable documentary evidence regarding finances, indicates that the party is not receiving any substantial financial assistance from abroad. The principal sources of funds are as follows:

   a. The monthly DM 3.- membership dues. For the 20,000 members, this amounts to DM 60,000 per month or DM 720,000 a year.

   b. Subscription fees for publications.

   c. Single donations from financially well-to-do members and supporters.

   d. Admission fees for political rallies. The BfV has registered, since May 1966 when the NPD began its campaign in Bavaria, a total of more than 2000 political rallies in Bavaria. Although at times more than one third of those attending such rallies were estimated to be opposed to the NPD, everyone attending the rally paid an admission fee. The BfV estimates that the NPD has been able through the above sources of income to collect from DM 3,000,000 to DM 4,000,000. The LfV are watching this funding quite closely, particularly for evidence of financing from Communist countries. Thus far they have been unable to substantiate the existence of any such support. Although there is no firm evidence of actual financial support of the NPD from Communist sources, the BfV is aware of an interest on the part of the Eastern intelligence services to penetrate the NPD and monitor its activities.

5. At the instigation of Federal Minister of Interior Luecke, the BfV has undertaken to establish a confidential all-party committee consisting of members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Trade Union Movement (DGB) to counter the NPD in Rheinland-Pfalz prior to the upcoming elections in spring 1967. All of the parties have agreed to participate and this activity is moving ahead. Recently at a two-day conference chaired by the BfV in a village on the Mosel River, it was decided not only to counteract NPD propaganda during the election campaign, but also to undertake orientation lectures for all officials in the Rheinland-Pfalz and other local governments who have shown NPD leanings. These courses will be launched as soon as the campaign gets underway. A similar propaganda and orientation activity is also being planned for the elections in Schleswig-Holstein in 1967.

6. The BfV has persuaded the DGB to set up an action group aimed at organizing the Labor movement into countering the

/Continued/

influence of the NPD. The BfV is assisting the DGB in working out methods for the infiltration of workers into NPD organizations to report and counteract their influence within factories and workers councils. The BfV has also established contact with the German Industrial Institute in Cologne, which is sponsored by the German equivalent of the U.S. National Association of Manufacturers. The BfV used as an argument with the industrialists the fact that increasing influence of the NPD in German industry would have a negative effect upon foreign trade.

7. The BfV undertook a survey of the election results at the village and county level in Land Hesse. This survey showed that the NPD had substantial success in areas containing German military installations. It was further determined that the NPD had considerable appeal among non-commissioned professional soldiers who feel they have failed to find acceptance in the postwar German society. This negative attitude has been less among Bundeswehr officers and draftees than among non-commissioned officers, who feel themselves underpaid and lacking in social acceptance. The BfV has contacted the security organizations of the Bundeswehr to undertake a program of orientation to counter the influence of the NPD within the Bundeswehr.

Headquarters Comment: CS-311/16288-66 from a different source reported that the President of the West German Association of Military Reservists had stated that a large percentage of older reserve officers and non-commissioned officers had voted for the NPD in the Land Hesse election.

14-00000

Anlage 1

Stellenbesetzung des Bundesparteivorstandes der NPD

(Stand: 1.10.1966)

Parteivorsitzender:

THIELEN, Friedrich (Fritz) geb. 25.9.16 in Bremen,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Schönebeck, Brauteichen 19
Beruf: Betonfabrikant

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Gründungsmitglied der CDU,
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften,
1957 Mitglied und später Landesvorsitzender der "Deutschen Partei" (DP) in Bremen.

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

1. Stellvertreter:

GUTMANN, Wilhelm, geb. 9.6.1900 in Basel,
wohnhaft: Karlsruhe, Kaiserallee 30
Beruf: Angestellter

1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Baden-Württemberg der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
"Gesamtdeutsche Partei" (GDP/BHE),
ehem. Funktionär des "Bundesverbandes ehem. Internierter- und Entnazifizierungsgeschädigter" (BIE).

NSDAP: 1.3.1932
1933 Bürgermeister in Tiengen

von THADDEN, Adolf, geb. 7.7.1921 in Trieglaff,
wohnhaft: Benthe, Lärchenweg 6
Beruf: Chefredakteur

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1949 Mitglied der "Deutschen Rechts-Partei" (DRP),
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion "Nationale Rechte",
1950 Mitgl. u. Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP),
1955-1959 Mitglied des niedersächsischen Landtages.

NSDAP: 1.9.1939

WINTER, Franz Florian, geb. 23.3.1923 in Amberg,
wohnhaft: Tegernsee, Bahnhofstr. 11
Beruf: Metzgermeister u. Fachredakteur

1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Bayern der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
CSU-Mitglied u. Mitglied der Landesleitung
GDP-Mitglied u. Mitglied des Vorstandes des Landesausschusses und des Kreisverbandes

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

III. Praesidium:

BROUWER, Otto Theodor, geb. 31.5.1906 in Paris,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Vegesack, Gerhard-Rohlfs-Str. 61,
Beruf: Kaufmann
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Bremen der NPD.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
"Deutsche Partei" (DP),
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaft

NSDAP: 1.8.1931

HESS, Otto, geb. 19.12.1908 in Rossdorf,
wohnhaft: Bissendorf, Weidendamm,
Beruf: Oberregierungsrat a.D. (Jurist), Kaufmann,

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitglied u. Funktionar der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP),

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner,
1938 Referent im Berichts- und Rechtsamt der
obersten SA-Führung, SA-Obersturmbannführer.

LANKER, Dr. Karl, geb. 22.9.1913 in Theesen,
wohnhaft: Bielefeld, Paderborner Weg 24 a
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt und Notar

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Nordrhein-Westf.d.NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NADAP: 1.5.1933

SCHÜTZ, Waldemar, geb. 9.10.1913 in Dausenau,
wohnhaft: Göttingen, Felix-Klein-Str. 4
Beruf: Schriftleiter u. Verlagsinhaber

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.11.1936,
1929 Eintritt in die HJ,
1934 Adjutant des Gau-Pressechefs,
1937 Kreiswart u. Gaureferent "Kraft durch
Freude" (KdF),
1938-1939 Junker der Ordensburg Vogelsang,
anschließend Beauftragter der NSDAP im Gau Hessen,
SS-Hauptsturmführer der Waffen-SS

SCHWEIMER, Horst-Günther, geb. 11.2.1913 in Essen,
wohnhaft: Hamburg-Groß-Flottbek, Hochrad 7,
Beruf: Reedereibesitzer

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Hamburg der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: 1.4.1932
SS-Hauptsturmführer und Adjutant
Legationsrat im Auswärtigen Amt

[illegible], geb. [illegible] in Berlin,
wohnhaft: Vlotho/Weser, Hochstr. 6,
Beruf: Dipl. Politologe

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitglied der CDU, des [illegible], der [illegible] und der NE-Freunde.

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

WINKELMANN, Fritz, geb. 21.5.1909 in Wittingen/Krs.Gifhorn
wohnhaft: Wittingen, Stackmannstr. 4
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt und Notar

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitglied der "Deutschen Partei" (DP) und
Mitglied des niedersächsischen Landtages

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

IV. Parteivorstand:

a) gewählte Mitglieder:

BRANDES, Anneliese, geb. 7.10.07 in Hargarten/Lothringen
wohnhaft: Herzberg, Enzianstr. 7

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionar

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

LAUER, Peter, geb. 30.11.1940 in Löhnhorst,
wohnhaft: Hannover, Auf dem Lärchenberge 15,
Beruf: Student

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

MAIER-DORN, Emil, geb. 26.9.1908 in Kaufbeuren,
wohnhaft: Großaitingen, Bahnhofstr. 45
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionar

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
1934 Gauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF)
1936 Leiter der Gauschulungsburg Gau Schwaben
1937 Reichsschulungsleiter im Amt für Technik, München.

PRINZ zu SALM, Karl, geb. 8.11.1911 in Coesfeld,
wohnhaft: Breitscheid ü.Düsseld., Kahlenbergweg 7
Beruf: Kaufmann/Oberst a.D.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

WINKELVOSS, Gertraud, geb. 18.2.1917 in Prettin,
wohnhaft: Lüneburg, In der Techt 1
Beruf: Hausfrau

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Gründerin und Leiterin des "Deutschen Kinderschutzbundes" Oldenburg
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.9.1938

b) Sonstige Angehörige des Parteivorstandes:

[illegible], Adolf, geb. 21.3.1906 in Saarbrücken,
wohnhaft: Saarbrücken, Enkircher Weg 23
Beruf: Versicherungskaufmann
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Saarland der NPD

Fruhere Organisationszugehörigkeit: nicht bekannt

NSDAP: 1.6.1933

M A Y, Fritz, geb. 26.10.1914 in Osthofen,
wohnhaft: Osthofen, Mainzer Str. 20
Beruf: Winzer/Weinhändler

Vorsitzender des LV Rheinland-Pfalz der NPD

Fruhere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.3.1933
SS-Sturmbannführer

FASSBENDER, Heinrich, geb. 24.5.1899 in Solingen,
wohnhaft: Rothenburg/Fulda, Oberer Hausberg 4
Beruf: Kaufmann

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Hessen der NPD

Fruhere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1918 Mitglied der "Deutsch-Nationalen-Volkspartei" (DNVP)
1946 FDP-Mitglied und Mitglied des hessischen Landtages,
1949 Mitglied des Bundestages,
1955 Ubertritt zur "Deutschen Partei" (DP) u. Mitglied
der Fraktion der DP im Deutschen Bundestag.

NSDAP: 1.10.1931
Austritt erfolgte im November 1932

KÜHNE, Dr. jur. Lothar, geb. 2.1.1908 in Steinbach/Thür.,
wohnhaft: Hannover, Im Moore 12,
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt,
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Niedersachsen der NPD

Fruhere Organisationszugehorigkeit:
FDP-Mitglied u. stellv. Landesvorsitzender

NSDAP: 1.12.1931
1934 Reichssicherheitshauptamt,
1936 Referent in der "Parteiamtlichen Prüfungskommission" im Stab des Stellvertreters des Führers,
1937 Buro des Botschafters von Ribbentrop,
SS-Untersturmführer

LOBER, Karl-Ernst, geb. 6.8.1927 in Namslau/Schl.,
wohnhaft: Schleswig, Kolonnenweg 31,
Beruf: Bäcker und Jugendpfleger

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Schleswig-Holstein der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
SRP-Mitglied und Funktionär,
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär auf Kreisebene.

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

V. Ämter im Präsidium:

Organisationsabteilung: Adolf v. THADDEN (s.Stellvertreter)

Finanzabteilung: Otto Theodor BROUWER (s.Präsidium)

Rechtsabteilung: Fritz WINKELMANN (s.Präsidium)

Propaganda- u.Schulungsabteilung: Otto HESS (s.Präsidium)

Presseabteilung: Waldemar SCHÜTZ (s. Präsidium)

Referat z.b.V.: Fritz WINKELMANN (s.Präsidium)

VI. Referenten im Parteivorstand:

Außenpolitik:

von THADDEN, Adolf (s. Stellvertreter)

Innenpolitik:

HERRMANNDÖRFER, Benno, geb. 20.3.1916 in Altötting,
wohnhaft: München, Heckenstaller Str. 178,
Beruf: Senatsrat

Mitglied des geschäftsführenden Vorstandes des Landesverbandes Bayern der NPD,
Vorsitzender des Bezirksverbandes Oberbayern der NPD.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: nicht bekannt

NSDAP: 1.1.1938
HJ-Mitglied seit 1933

Agrarpolitik:

RUDOLPH, Heinz, geb. 7.6.1922 in Elberberg,
wohnhaft: Klein-Ilde 5,
Beruf: Bürgermeister, Dipl.Landwirt, Hauptmann d.R.

Referent für Agrarfragen im LV Niedersachsen der NPD,
Redner auf Landesebene im LV Niedersachsen der NPD,
1. Vorsitzender im Kreisverband Hildesheim der NPD.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
CDU-Mitglied

NSDAP: 1.9.1940

- 6 -

Wirtschafts-, Finanz- und Steuerpolitik:

FASSBENDER, Heinrich (s. Parteivorstand)

Verkehrspolitik:

SCHWEIMER, Horst-Günther (S. Präsidium)

Jugendfragen:

LOBER, Karl-Ernst (s. Parteivorstand)

Sozialpolitik:

KNUPFER, Kurt, geb. 7.6.1913 in Rippien,
wohnhaft: Neuenhaus, Jahnstr. 2,
Beruf: Elektromonteur

Geschäftsführer und Kassenleiter im Kreisverband Grafschaft Bentheim der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.5.1930

Frauen- und Familienfragen:

WINKELVOSS, Gertraud (s. Parteivorstand)

Kulturpolitik:

DEHNEN, Dr. Dietrich, geb. 19.4.1924 in Duisburg,
wohnhaft: Duisburg-Meiderich, Haferacker 13
Beruf: Oberstudienrat

2. stellv. Vorsitzender im LV Nordrhein-Westf. d.NPD
Landesredner des LV Nordrhein-Westfalen der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: nicht bekannt

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

Vertriebenenfragen:

GUTMANN, Wilhelm (s. Stellvertreter)

Arbeitskreis Bundeswehr:

NITSCHE, Dieter, geb. 4.7.1934 in Zittau,
wohnhaft: Oldenburg, (z.Z. Putlos)
Beruf: Hauptmann der Bundeswehr

NPD-Stadtrat im Stadtparlament Oldenburg

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
AKON- Mitglied

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

- 7 -

VII. Sonstige Funktionen im Parteivorstand

Leiter der Abteilung Kasse:

SCHÜTZ, Waldemar (s. Präsidium)

Leiter der Revisionsabteilung in der Finanzabteilung:

SCHIMMEROHN, Dr. Heinz, geb. 22.1.1911 in Chemnitz,
wohnhaft: Hannover, Raimundstr. 1
Beruf: Versicherungs-Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
SRP-Mitglied und Funktionär
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.6.1930
SS-Obersturmbannführer

Bundesgeschäftsführer:

SCHWARZ, Martin, geb. 16.9.1912 in Oels/Schles.
wohnhaft: Porz-Ensen, Charlottenstr. 14
Beruf: Hauptmann d.Bw. a.D.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: 1.5.1932

Anlage 2

Gesellschafter des Verlages
"Deutsche Nachrichten" (DN) GmbH.

SCHÜTZ, Waldemar, geb. 9.10.1913 in Dausenau,
wohnhaft: Gottingen, Felix-Klein-Str. 4
Beruf: Schriftleiter und Verlagsinhaber

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP - Mitglied und Funktionar

NSDAP: 1.11.1936,
1929 Eintritt in die HJ,
1934 Adjutant des Gau-Pressechefs,
1937 Kreiswart und Gaureferent "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF),
1938 - 1939 Junker der Ordensburg Vogelsang,
anschließend Beauftragter der NSDAP im Gau Hessen,
SS-Hauptsturmführer des Waffen-SS.

von THADDEN, Adolf, geb. 7.7.1921 in Trieglaff,
wohnhaft: Benthe, Larchenweg 6
Beruf: Chefredakteur

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1949 Mitglied der "Deutschen Rechts-Partei" (DRP),
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion "Nationale Rechte",
1950 Mitglied und Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP),
1955 - 1959 Mitglied des niedersachsischen Landtages.

NSDAP: 1.9.1939

HESS, Otto, geb. 19.12.1908 in Rossdorf,
wohnhaft: Bissendorf, Weidendamm,
Beruf: Oberregierungsrat a.D. (Jurist), Kaufmann, .

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitgl. u. Funktionar der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP)

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner,
1938 Referent im Berichts- und Rechtsamt der obersten SA-Fuhrung,
SA-Obersturmbannführer.

MAIER - DORN, Emil, geb. 26.9.1908 in Kaufbeuren,
wohnhaft: Großaitingen, Bahnhofstr. 45
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP - Mitglied und Funktionar

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
1934 Gauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF)
1936 Leiter der Gauschulungsburg Gau Schwaben
1937 Reichsschulungsleiter im Amt für Technik, München

[illegible], Dr. [illegible], geb. 24.5.1910 in Berlin,
Wohnhaft: Wiesbaden-Sonnenberg, Tennelbachstr. 23
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.5.1928
Referatsleiter der Haupttreuhandstelle Ost, Berlin

[illegible], Dr. Heinz, geb. 22.1.1911 in Chemnitz,
Wohnhaft: Hannover, [illegible]str. 1
Beruf: Versicherungskaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.6.1930
SS-Obersturmbannführer

von GRÜNBERG, Prof. Dr. Hans-Bernhard, geb. 30.5.1903
in Protzig/Pommern
Wohnhaft: Wuppertal-Vohwinkel, Am Osterholz 55
Beruf: Universitats-Professor z.Wv.
zur Zeit Lehrer an einer Privatschule

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.2.1931
Gauamtsleiter der NSDAP (Gau Ostpreußen)
Gauheimstätten-Amtsleiter,
Gaudozentenbundführer.
Ordentlicher Professor der Staatswissenschaften
Rektor der Albertus-Universitat in Königsberg.

[illegible], Walter, geb. 6.10.1906 in Breslau,
Wohnhaft: Hamburg-Altona, Arnoldstr. 24
Beruf: Angestellter

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.4.1932

[illegible], Peter, geb. 22.10.1930 in Greifswald,
Wohnhaft: Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, SPreuergasse 45
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

SEETZEN, Walter, geb. 25.11.1916 in Hamburg,
wohnhaft: Bremen, Kulenkampffallee 162
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
SRP - Mitglied und Funktionär
DRP - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.4.1936

THIELEN, Friedrich (Fritz), geb. 25.9.1916 in Bremen,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Schönebeck, Brauteichen 19
Beruf: Beton-Fabrikant

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Gründungsmitglied der CDU,
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften,
1957 Mitglied und später Landesvorsitzender der
"Deutschen Partei" (DP) in Bremen

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

BROUWER, Otto Theodor, geb. 31.5.1906 in Paris,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Vegesack, Gerhard-Rohlfs-Str. 61
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
"Deutsche Partei" (DP)
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften.

NSDAP: 1.8.1931

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

18 July 1963

GERMANY AFTER THE WAR, A BACKGROUND READING LIST

BOOKS

ABOSCH, HEINZ. The menace of the miracle: Germany from Hitler to Adenauer. London, Collet's, 1962. 277p. DD259.A683 1963 DLC; DD259.A1E5 CIA.

NOT AVAILABLE

ARNTZ, HELMUT. Germany in a nutshell. 2d ed., rev. and enl. Bonn, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany, 1960. 116p. DD43.A8 1960 DLC.

BENGTSON, JOHN ROBERT. Nazi war aims; the plans for the thousand year Reich. Rock Island, Ill., Augustana College Library, 1962. 155p. (Augustana Library publications, no.30) DD256.5.B37 DLC.

BITHELL, JETHRO, ed. Germany, a companion to German studies. 5th ed., rev. and enl. London, Methuen, 1955. 578p. DD61.B56 1955 DLC; DD61.B6 1955 CIA.

BOSSENBROOK, WILLIAM JOHN. The German mind. Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1961. 469p. DD76.B677 DLC.

BRANT, STEFAN, pseud. East German rising. London, Thames and Hudson, 1955. 202p. DD261.4.B713 DLC; DD261.4.B8E5 CIA.

BULLOCK, ALAN LOUIS CHARLES. Hitler; a study in tyranny. Rev. ed. New York, Harper, 1960. 776p. DD247.H5B85 DLC; DD247.H5B85 1960 CIA.

CLAY, LUCIUS DU BIGNON. Decision in Germany. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1950. 522p. DD257.C55 DLC; DD257.C6 CIA.

COLLIER, DAVID S., and KURT GLASER., eds. Berlin and the future of Eastern Europe. Chicago, Regnery, 1963. 251p. (Foundation for Foreign Affairs series, no.7) DR48.5.C6 DLC; D843.C7 CIA.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONANT, JAMES BRYANT. Germany and freedom; a personal appraisal. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958. 117p. (The Godkin lectures at Harvard University, 1958) DD259.2.C64 DLC; DD259.2C62 CIA.

CROCE, BENEDETTO. Germany and Europe, a spiritual dissension. New York, Random House, 1955. 83p. DD76.C74 DLC.

DAVIDSON, EUGENE. The death and life of Germany; an account of the American occupation. London, J. Cape, 1959. 422p. DD257.D33 DLC; DD257.D33E5 CIA.

DEHIO, LUDWIG. Germany and world politics in the twentieth century. New York, Knopf, 1959. 141p. DD232.D413 DLC; DD232.D5 CIA.

DICKINSON, ROBERT ERIC. Germany; a general and regional geography. 2d ed. London, Methuen; New York, Dutton, 1961. 716p. DD43.D5 DLC; DD43.D5 1961 CIA.

DLC has 1953 ed. only.

DILL, MARSHALL. Germany; a modern history. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1961. 467p. DD89.D5 DLC; DD89.D5 CIA.

DONNER, JOERN. Report from Berlin. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1961. 284p. DD881.D633 DLC; DD881.D62 CIA.

Translation from the Swedish.

DORNBERG, JOHN. Schizophrenic Germany. New York, Macmillan, 1961. 302p. DD259.2.D6 DLC; DD259.2.D6 CIA.

DULLES, ALLEN WELSH. Germany's underground. New York, Macmillan, 1947. 207p. DD256.D8 DLC; Y1838.D8 CIA.

A simple, clear account of the opposition to Hitler during the war.

EPSTEIN, FRITZ THEODOR. Germany and the United States: basic patterns of conflict and understanding. Lawrence, Kansas, 1959. 284-314p. E183.8.G3E6 DLC.

"Reprinted from Issues and Conflicts, University of Kansas Press, 374p. 1959."

ERHARD, LUDWIG. Prosperity through competition. New York, Praeger, 1958. 260p. HC286.5.E7313 DLC.

EYCK, ERICH. A history of the Weimar Republic. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962. DD237.E913 DLC.

FLENLEY, Ralph Modern German History (1953)

FREUND, GERALD. Germany between two worlds. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1961. 296p. DD259.4.F78 CIA.

GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC) CONSTITUTION, 1961. The basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany; amendments as of 31 December 1961. New York, German Information Center, 1961. 62p. JN3971.A3A5 1961 CIA.

GOERLITZ, WALTER. History of the German general staff, 1657-1945. New York, Praeger, 1953. 508p. DD101.G614 1953 DLC; DD101.G61 1953E5 CIA.

GOLAY, John The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (1958)

GOTTLIEB, MANUEL. The German peace settlement and the Berlin crisis. New York, Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1960. 275p. DD257.G68 DLC; DD257.G68 CIA.

GT. BRIT. FOREIGN OFFICE. Selected documents on Germany and the question of Berlin, 1944-1961. London, HMSO, 1961. 483p. (Its Germany, 1961, no.2. Gt. Brit. Parliament. Papers by command, cmnd. 1552) DD257.4.G75 1961 DLC.

GROSSER, ALFRED. The colossus again; Western Germany from defeat to rearmament. New York, Praeger, 1955. 249p. DD257.G7413 DLC; DD257.G7E5 CIA.

HEIDENHEIMER, ARNOLD J. The governments of Germany. New York, Crowell, 1961. 224p. JN3971.A58H4 DLC; JN3971.A58H4 CIA.

HELLER, DEANE, and DAVID HELLER. The Berlin Wall. New York, Walker, 1962. 242p. DD881.H39 DLC; DD881.H42 CIA.

HERTZ, FRIEDRICH OTTO. Development of the German public mind; a social history of German political sentiments, aspirations, and ideas. London, Allen & Unwin, 1957. 524p. DD112.H44 DLC.

HEYDECKER, JOE JULIUS, and JOHANNES LEEB. The Nuremberg trial; a history of Nazi Germany. New York, World Pub. Co., 1962. 398p. KI836.1.G3H6145 CIA.

HISCOCKS, RICHARD. Democracy in Western Germany. London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1957. 324p. DD259.4.H5 DLC; DD259.4.H6 CIA.

HOETTL, WILHELM. The secret front; the story of Nazi political espionage. New York, Praeger, 1954. 327p. DD256.5.H563 DLC; Y1832.5.H69E5 CIA.

Translation from the German.

HOLBORN, HAJO. A history of modern Germany. New York, A. Knopf, 1959- DD175.H62 DLC.

v.1: The Reformation.

HOLBROOK, SABRA. Capital without a country: The challenge of Berlin. New York, Coward-McCann, 1961.

HORNE, ALISTAIR. Return to power; a report on the new Germany. New York, Praeger, 1956. 415p. DD259.4.H65 1956 DLC; DD259.4.H8 1956 CIA.

HUEBENER, THEODORE. The schools of West Germany; a study of German elementary and secondary schools. New York, New York University Press, 1962. 181p. LA721.82.H8 DLC; LA721.82.H8 CIA.

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANISTIC STUDIES. The Third Reich; a study published under the auspices of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies and with the assistance of UNESCO. New York, Praeger, 1955. 910p. DD256.5.I58 1955a DLC; DD256.5.I5 CIA.

JARMAN, THOMAS LECKIE. The rise and fall of Nazi Germany. New York, New York University Press, 1956. 388p. DD256.5.J3 1956 DLC; DD256.5.J3 CIA.

JOHNSON, UWE. Speculations about Jakob. New York, Grove, 1962.

A novel reflecting life during the last decades in Germany.

KITZINGER, UWE W. German electoral politics, a study of the 1957 campaign. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960. 365p. JN3971.A95K5 DLC; JN3971.A956 1957.K7 CIA.

KOCHAN, LIONEL. The struggle for Germany, 1914-1945. Edinburgh, University Press; Chicago, Aldine Pub. Co., 1963. 150p. DD240.K57 DLC; D443.K7 CIA.

KOHN, HANS. The mind of Germany; the education of a nation. New York, Scribner, 1960. 370p. DD76.K59 DLC; DD76.K59 CIA.

KRIEGER, LEONARD. The German idea of freedom; history of a political tradition. Boston, Beacon Press, 1957. 540p. DD112.K82 DLC.

LAQUEUR, WALTER ZE'EV. Young Germany; a history of the German youth movement. London, Routledge & Paul, 1962. 253p. HM19.L3 DLC; HQ799.G5L3 CIA.

LIDDELL HART, BASIL HENRY. The German generals talk. New York, Morrow, 1948. 308p. D757.L5 1948a DLC; D757.L5 CIA.

LOEWENSTEIN, Prince HUBERTUS, and VOLKMAR VON ZUEHLSDORFF. NATO and the defense of the West. New York, Praeger, 1962. 383p. UA646.3.L8E5 CIA.

LOWIE, ROBERT HARRY. Toward understanding Germany. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954. 396p. HN445.L68 DLC; HN445.L6 CIA.

MCINNIS, EDGAR, RICHARD HISCOCKS, and ROBERT SPENCER. The shaping of postwar Germany. London, Dent, 1960. 195p. DD257.M35 1960a DLC; DD257.M35 1960 CIA.

MCCLELLAN, GRANT S., ed. The two Germanies. New York, Wilson, 1959. 184p. (The Reference shelf, v.31, no.1) DD257.M27 DLC; DD257.M2 CIA.

MANDER, JOHN. Berlin, hostage for the West. Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1962. 124p. (A Penguin special, S209) DD881.M27 DLC; DD881.M2 CIA.

MANVELL, ROGER, and HEINRICH FRAENKEL. Goering. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1962. 442p. DD247.G67M3 DLC; DD247.G67M2 CIA.

MEINECKE, FRIEDRICH. The German catastrophe; reflections and recollections. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950. 121p. DD256.5.M42 DLC; DD256.5.M4E5 CIA.

Translation from the German.

MERKATZ, HANS JOACHIM VON, and WOLFGANG METZNER, eds. Germany today: facts and figures. Frankfurt a.M., A. Metzner, 1954. 413p. DD259.M372 DLC; DD259.M372 CIA.

METCALF, JOHN C. Our stake in Germany. Washington, Washington College Press, 1961. 96p. DD259.2.M42 DLC.

NEAL, FRED WARNER. War and peace and Germany. New York, W. W. Norton, 1962. 166p. DD257.25.N38 DLC; DD257.25.N3 CIA.

NESSELRODE, FRANZ VON. Germany's other half; a journalist's appraisal of East Germany. London, New York, Abelard-Schuman, 1963. 207p. DD261.N45 DLC; DD261.2.N4 CIA.

PASSANT, ERNEST JAMES. Short history of Germany 1815-1945. London, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1959. 255p. DD232.P35 DLC; DS; DD232.P2 CIA.

PINNEY, EDWARD L. Federalism, bureaucracy and party politics in Western Germany. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1963. 268p. JN3971.A77P5 DLC.

✓ PINSON, KOPPEL SHUB. Modern Germany, its history and civilization. New York, Macmillan, 1954. 637p. DD203.P5 1944 DLC; DD203.P5 1954 CIA. *

A useful survey, particularly of the intellectual background.

PLISCHKE, ELMER. Contemporary government of Germany. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961. 248p. JN3971.A5P55 DLC; JN3971.A5P7 CIA.

POLLOCK, JAMES KERR, and others. Germany in power and eclipse; the background of German development. New York, Van Nostrand, 1952. 661p. DD89.P64 DLC; DD89.P6 CIA.

POUNDS, NORMAN JOHN GREVILLE. Divided Germany and Berlin. Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1962. 128p. DD257.25.P6 DLC; DD257.25.P7 CIA.

PRITTIE, Hon. TERENCE CORNELIUS FARMER. Germany divided. Boston, Little, Brown, 1960. 380p. DD257.P72 1961 DLC; DD257.P7 CIA.

DLC has English ed.

REINHARDT, KURT FRANK. Germany: 2000 years. Rev. ed. New York, F. Ungar Pub. Co., 1961. 2v. DD89.R36 1961 DLC; DD89.R36 1961 CIA.

ROBSON, CHARLES B., ed. Berlin--pivot of German destiny. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1960. 233p. DD881.B4553 DLC; DD881.R62 CIA.

ROTHFELS, HANS. The German opposition to Hitler, an appraisal. 2d rev. ed. Chicago, Regnery, 1962. 166p. (Foundation for foreign affairs series, no.6) DD256.3.R6 1962 DLC; Y1838.R84 1962 CIA.

SHIRER, WILLIAM LAWRENCE. The rise and fall of the Third Reich; a history of Nazi Germany. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960. 1245p. DD256.5.S48 DLC; DD256.5.S55 CIA.

This is issued also as a paperback ed.

SMITH, BRUCE LANNES R. The governance of Berlin. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1959. 171-230p. (International conciliation, no.525) JX1907.A8 no.525 DLC.

✓ SNYDER, LOUIS LEO. Basic history of modern Germany. Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1957. 192p. DD175.S58 DLC; DD175.S58 CIA.

SPEIER, HANS. German rearmament and atomic war; the views of German military and political leaders. Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1957. 272p. UA710.S56 DLC; UA710.S7 CIA.

SPEIER, HANS, and W. PHILLIPS DAVISON, eds. West German leadership and foreign policy. Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1957. 323p. DD259.4.S6 DLC; DD259.487 CIA.

STAHL, WALTER, ed. The politics of postwar Germany. New York, Praeger for Atlantic-Bruecke, 1963. 480p. DD259.4.S8 DLC; DD259.4.S71 CIA.

STERN, FRITZ RICHARD. Cultural despair and the politics of discontent; a study of the rise of the "Germanic" ideology. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1961. 367p. DD76.S72 1961 DLC.

STOLPER, WOLFGANG F. The structure of the East German economy. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960. 478p. HC287.A2S7 DLC; HC287.A2S7 CIA.

TAYLOR, ALAN JOHN PERCIVALE. The course of German history; a survey of the development of Germany since 1815. New York, Coward-McCann, 1946. 230p. DD203.T3 1946 DLC.

TETENS, TETE HARENS. The new Germany and the old Nazis. New York, Random House, 1961. 286p. DD259.2.T4 DLC; DD259.2.T3 CIA.

THAYER, CHARLES WHEELER. The unquiet Germans. New York, Harper, 1957. 275p. DD257.T45 DLC.

VERMEIL, EDMOND. Germany in the twentieth century; a political and cultural history of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. New York, Praeger, 1956. 288p. DD232.V413 1956 DLC; DD232.V5E5 CIA.

VIERECK, PETER ROBERT EDWIN. Metapolitics, the roots of the Nazi mind. New York, Capricorn Books, 1961. 364p. (A Capricorn book, CAP45) DD253.V5 1961 DLC.

WHEELER-BENNETT, JOHN WHEELER. The nemesis of power. London, New York, Macmillan, 1953. 829p. DD240.W5 DLC; DD240.W56 CIA.

Revised ed. 1963

✓ WOHLRABE, RAYMOND A., and WERNER KRUSCH. The land and people of Germany. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1957. 118p. DD17.W6 DLC.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: FRONT NATIONALE
(NATIONAL FRONT)
LOOSE DOCUMENTS

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENT

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:30 15 SEPT 78	✓	PHOEBE ORR	Phoebe C. Orr

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE MEMORANDUM DATED 20 DECEMBER 1948
(FRONT NATIONALE FRANCE)

THIRD AGENCY

14-00000

SECRET

LONDON

9 August 1944

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-21

COUNTRY France
SUBJECT Resistance and Labor organization in Normandy; Civilian Attitudes.

ORIGINAL REPORT NO SV-130
DATE OF REPORT 24 July 1944
EVALUATION B-2

CONFIRMATION
SUPPLEMENT
CORRECTION

SOURCE OSS - 3rd Army
SUB SOURCE

DATE OF INFORMATION Undated
PLACE OF ORIGIN France

NUMBER OF PAGES 2
ATTACHMENTS
THEATRE ETO-London

JBP/fb.

THEATRE DISTRIBUTION
Mr. Phillips
Cmdr. Kittredge
G-2 SHAEF
G-2 12TH A G
MI6
SFHQ
EWD
R&A
MO
OWI PWD
PWE CAS
EAC USEmb (Cros)
X-2 WASH ✓
AL

1. The Conseil de la Resistance in Cherbourg is composed of three main groups: the O.C.M., Liberation and the Front National:

The Chief of the Conseil de la Resistance, M. Groslin, is an O.C.M. leader and his organization holds the majority of seats in the Conseil. The O.C.M. is generally composed of merchants, landowners and notables who, prior to the armistice, were Rightists or extreme-Rightists.

Liberation, which claims to have been the most active and efficient movement in the Department, is led by and generally composed of Socialists and C.G.T. men. In fact all the Resistance Socialists and Union men are members of Liberation.

As in the rest of France, the Front National is here the Communist Party's resistance organization. It is not as influential here as it is reported to be in other regions.

2. The right hand man to M. Groslin is M. Bocher (Beauchet), who seems to be as well the most prominent labor leader of the department. Bocher is at the same time secretary of the Regional Socialist Federation, secretary of the Merchant Sailor's Union, secretary of the Union des Syndicats, representative of the I.T.F. and head of the local Liberation movement. He is a very efficient man and seems to be respected and esteemed even by his political adversaries.

3. The enthusiasm in favor of the Allies described in the newspapers should not be overestimated. The Norman did not like the Germans and is glad that they have been thrown out. But a very

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 26-780 BOX 160

MID	ONI	A-2	STATE	TREAS.	OWI	FEA	ANS	NC	FCC	JCA		

320457

great number of people here are suspicious of Resistance because of the presence of Communists and Socialists. Moreover, they are very reserved towards foreigners as a rule, and they are not sure of what the Allies intend to do. They are also puzzled about the currency which has been introduced. On the part of Labor, there is a sincere enthusiasm for the victories of the democracies somewhat tempered by the way local problems are handled by military authorities. For example, the ~~Army or the Navy~~ have hired dozens of workers to repair the Cherbourg harbor, but ~~they have done it~~ without consulting the unions. (They have Thus given work to ~~a lot of~~ former Todt workers, more or less reliable, while skilled workers who were in Resistance Movement are left unemployed. Instances of this kind are frequent.

[illegible]

[redacted]

Report No. [illegible]
Report from [illegible]

[illegible]

Information Date	: 7-10 [illegible]
Report Date	: 18 [illegible]
Dissemination Date	: [illegible]
Value	: [illegible]
Source	: [illegible]

[illegible]

✓

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] is in full [illegible] The [illegible] political parties, and their strong [illegible] It is difficult to estimate [illegible] unwilling [illegible] figures [illegible] to be about equal [illegible]

[illegible] in 1939, of [illegible] were [illegible] he stated that if elections were held [illegible]

[illegible] the political situation is confused by the existence of the [illegible] and that since the [illegible] political parties [illegible] He states that [illegible] will not be accomplished, [illegible]

[illegible] in private conversation, [illegible] in a speech before the [illegible] of the [illegible]

[illegible] it is impossible that the [illegible] of the [illegible]

[illegible]

ho[illegible] [illegible] probably [illegible] [illegible]udo.

6. [illegible] influenced by the cler[illegible] [illegible] February.

7. [illegible] the CIC [illegible] [illegible]

8. [illegible]

9. [illegible]

10. [illegible]

11. [illegible]

that the CGT [illegible] not maintaining a sufficiently independent and oppositional attitude.

12. Regarding relations of the Socialist Party with resistance groups, [illegible] Soldani, member of the [illegible] of the party for the [illegible] and member of the [illegible], expressed his deep regret over the fact that fusion between the Socialist Party and the [illegible] now seems impossible. He said he had hoped this fusion of the [illegible] of the [illegible] with the best elements of the Socialist Party would constitute a great rejuvenated Socialist Party of the future. During the [illegible] on this subject, [illegible] took exception to an insinuation by [illegible], member of the Bureau Directeur of the party, that the leaders of the [illegible] were simply a group of arrivistes who were trying to take advantage of the situation to gain political power.

13. As for foreign policy, the Congress expressed itself as opposed to the hegemony of any one great power, whether it be Britain, the United States or Russia, and in favor of a system of collective security, with all the democratic nations of the world equally represented in an international association of nations. This association should have its own army, credit, transport, etc. in order to be able to guarantee the peace. Regarding the treatment of Germany, the Congress voted its opposition to any dismemberment of the country, but approved a long occupation with a severe allied control of all German industry and approved also a long-range program for the re-education of German youth.

14. Communist Party. According to [illegible], secretary of the [illegible] section of the Socialist Party, the Communists claim to have 4,000 registered members in the [illegible]. Communist leaders interviewed declined to quote any figures.

15. [illegible], president [illegible] member of [illegible], maintained that the Communists have gained many new followers in the [illegible] since the war, at the expense of the Socialists. He claims this is due to a large extent to the Communists' nationalist policy and also to their young, vigorous leaders as compared with the Socialists [illegible] the [illegible] leaders representing the old regime. He stated that the policy of the Communist Party would remain nationalist in the future; that it would be difficult to return to a revolutionary program.

16. [illegible] asserted that the Communists get along better with the Christian Democrats than with the Socialists, since the latter - as he put it - place party interests above the national interests.

17. The Communists are opposed to the holding of elections next February. Their reasons [illegible] as follows: the elections were scheduled before the recognition of the [illegible] government by the Allies [illegible] of holding [illegible] popular [illegible] the Allies that [illegible] and the country [illegible]. [illegible] the Allies have recognized the de Gaulle government the pressing need for [illegible] no longer exists. Besides, it would be [illegible] fair [illegible] three million prisoners and deportees [illegible] to the polls. According to [illegible], however, the real reason the Communists are opposed to the elections is their fear of losing [illegible] strength which they [illegible] in the various departments.

mental and [illegible] liberation committees. [illegible], M. [illegible] indicated his personal opposition to the holding of elections at the present time since the women's vote constituted an experiment and he was [illegible] of conducting such experiments while France was still at war. (He [illegible] may well feel that to hold elections now would mean a loss of strength for the [illegible] as well as for the [illegible].) [illegible] Allegre, Communist municipal delegate, stated flatly that he believed the elections would be postponed, although the party is making its plans so as to have everything in readiness in case the elections are held in February.

18. Both [illegible] and [illegible] criticized the [illegible] of the Var, M. [illegible], for not being [illegible] enough in his [illegible] of the departement, particularly the procurement of adequate food supplies. [illegible] for his personal courage and for his active participation in resistance activities but pointed out that he was formerly secretary of the sous-prefecture at Toulon and that he had not broken away from the old habits of the plodding permanent fonctionnaire.

19. [illegible] described Admiral [illegible], prefet maritime of Toulon, as a reactionary of the old tradition - along with the great majority of high naval officers at the Toulon naval base.

20. According to [illegible], the Toulon edition of Rouge-Midi, the Communist paper published in Marseille, has a daily circulation of [illegible],000 and a Sunday circulation of [illegible].

21. Mouvement Republicain Populaire: The Toulon section of the MRP was formed about [illegible] months ago. The officers are: [illegible], president; M. [illegible], secretary; M. [illegible], [illegible] at the Naval [illegible], treasurer. A departmental federation of the MRP is in the process of organization; [illegible] hopes to have it organized before the end of the year. [illegible] a membership in the Toulon section of [illegible] - but this appears to be an exaggeration. [illegible] stated that the Toulon edition of the Christian Democrat newspaper, Le [illegible], published in Marseille, has a local circulation of [illegible]. This Toulon edition was started [illegible].

22. The Union [illegible] ([illegible]) is the women's adjunct of the [illegible] at Toulon. [illegible] is making serious efforts to capture the women's vote [illegible], series of three free weekly political lectures, starting 13 December 194[illegible] has been organized by the [illegible].

23. Radical-Socialist Party: It is reportedly stated that the Radical-Socialists are [illegible] as a political force in the Var. No party headquarters has been established in Toulon, and aside from one brief newspaper announcement, no sign of any Radical-Socialist activity was discovered.

24. [illegible] and [illegible] Cotajer, of the PS, is optimistic over the possibility of fusion between the [illegible] and the PS in the Var [illegible] after the agreement just reached between the two groups in the Department of the Gard. On the other hand, [illegible], of the [illegible], points out that many members of his organization are hesitant about uniting with the PS, because they see in this an attempt

[illegible] of [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible]. However, [illegible] [illegible] are still [illegible] between the two groups. [illegible] at length [illegible] of the [illegible] not Communists [illegible] the positions [illegible] responsibility in [illegible] or held by Communists.

[illegible] according to [illegible], representative of the [illegible] in the [illegible] [illegible] members of the [illegible] October 19[illegible], [illegible] 24,9[illegible] members in 1937. [illegible] one of the most urgent [illegible] before the [illegible] in the [illegible] to be [illegible] of the [illegible] of salaries. [illegible] workers are too highly paid [illegible] to the salaries of [illegible] skilled workers in other trades. This [illegible] was created by [illegible] was paid very well in order to [illegible] labor [illegible] certain high. [illegible], for example, workers in the building trades [illegible] getting up to 3[illegible] francs per hour, while skilled [illegible] earn only 1[illegible] francs per [illegible]. [illegible] points out [illegible] it is not possible to raise all salaries to [illegible] levels [illegible] by the Germans, since this [illegible] cause an inflationary [illegible]. Therefore the [illegible] faced with the delicate task of working [illegible] for the [illegible] to a certain extent [illegible] some salaries and [illegible] others.

[illegible] and Military [illegible]

2[illegible]. [illegible] Maquis [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. The [illegible] [illegible] total [illegible] of [illegible] officers and [illegible] [illegible] Colonel [illegible] Derrat, [illegible] headquarters [illegible], about 7 km [illegible] of [illegible], [illegible] a [illegible] private estate formerly occupied by [illegible] ([illegible]) [illegible].

2[illegible]. [illegible] commanding [illegible] four [illegible] of the [illegible] of the 15[illegible] Military Region [illegible], Hautes Alpes, Basses Alpes, Alpes Maritimes [illegible] [illegible] by Regional [illegible] placed [illegible] the [illegible] official, [illegible] under the [illegible] of the 15th Military Region [illegible] collaborators and black [illegible] political [illegible] [illegible] officers [illegible].

2[illegible]. [illegible] that he [illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible], and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Barret [illegible] that it [illegible] for [illegible] of [illegible] if [illegible] would [illegible] be [illegible] and equipped. He [illegible] that in spite of [illegible], [illegible] inspection tour of the [illegible], however, [illegible] a [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] that the military [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] working on the [illegible] than the [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible]. Colonel [illegible].

[illegible]. [illegible] that he had sent detachments out on expeditions [illegible] the

29 [illegible] stated [illegible] elements of [illegible] been reported [illegible] but [illegible] elements [illegible] circulating in [illegible] in Toulon to [illegible] Thus [illegible] for all [illegible]

30 [illegible], who was formerly [illegible] of the [illegible] still a member of [illegible] (Surveillance [illegible]), claims [illegible] of the [illegible] of the [illegible] that [illegible] were [illegible] civilians [illegible] their spare time to [illegible].

31. [illegible] According to Lt. Colonel [illegible] of the [illegible] in [illegible] command of Colonel [illegible] consists of [illegible], and is preparing [illegible] shortly for the front to join the [illegible]. In Toulon, [illegible] formed [illegible] to one of the [illegible]

[illegible] Relations

32 [illegible] stationed in [illegible] report [illegible] principally [illegible]. The feeling [illegible] at Toulon [illegible] French would [illegible] possible

33 [illegible] side, the French are, to a greater or lesser degree, resentful [illegible] Toulon [illegible] of the city [illegible] food [illegible] the civilian population [illegible] about [illegible] required for [illegible] of [illegible] were sold at [illegible]

34 [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] diplomatic representatives [illegible] the possibility of [illegible] a new French [illegible] Government.

35. [illegible] also stated that more people seem to [illegible] to the [illegible] the decision of the Government to [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]. In that connection, he stated that [illegible] had no confidence in the [illegible] of the [illegible] who are [illegible] regime.

[illegible] Situation

36. [illegible] Destruction. [illegible] has suffered heavily from [illegible] the [illegible] but [illegible] destruction was [illegible] in the center of town as well. [illegible] the [illegible] Bureau of Reconstruction, of a total of 36,[illegible] houses in [illegible], [illegible] were entirely destroyed, 1,[illegible] percent destroyed and [illegible] suffered damage. Since it is [illegible] difficult to obtain building [illegible] houses which were [illegible] partially [illegible] from [illegible] of the weather. Many people who are homeless are temporarily living with friends and relatives, [illegible] from the [illegible] normal population of [illegible] of [illegible]; [illegible] to 3[illegible] of [illegible].

37. [illegible] building material [illegible] follows:

8,[illegible] tons of tile shingles for roofing
3,[illegible] tons of bricks
5,[illegible] tons of plaster
1,[illegible] tons of cement
1,[illegible] tons of lime
200,[illegible] square meters of window panes.

[illegible] repairs [illegible] with [illegible].

38. [illegible] food conditions in [illegible], [illegible] being [illegible] children, and [illegible] there is only [illegible] to [illegible] infants up to [illegible] months [illegible] for the [illegible] children of [illegible] 6 [illegible] of [illegible] 1,5[illegible] [illegible] effect [illegible] possible [illegible] of this [illegible] recommended [illegible] the [illegible] distributed [illegible] coal [illegible] for [illegible] material;

39. [illegible] fact [illegible] of [illegible] there [illegible] According [illegible] in [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] However, [illegible] place,

41. [illegible] The streets [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	President	[illegible]
[illegible]	Vice President	[illegible]
[illegible]	Vice President	[illegible]
[illegible]	Secretary	[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

	[illegible]	Parti ou Tendance Politique
[illegible]	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] (Chr[illegible] Démocrate)
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] et aux arts. Sports, [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] et [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] communaux, [illegible] des [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] quais, [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] des [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] de la [illegible] Nationale
[illegible]	[illegible]	Union [illegible] Françaises
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] de la [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] et [illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

Report No. F-489
Report from France

O S S P A R I S

Distribution:
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
X-2
[illegible] ✓
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Station

Information Date	: 7-10 December 1944
Report Date	: 28 December 1944
Dissemination Date	: 2 January 1945
Value	: B-2
Source	: [illegible]

FRANCE: [illegible]

Notes on [illegible]

OSS-163

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] Oct [illegible] 47

Notes on Toulon

1. [illegible] is in full political [illegible], with [illegible] towards [illegible] elections [illegible] for next [illegible]. The Communists and Socialists are the [illegible] of the [illegible] political parties, and their strength [illegible] divided. The Christian Democrats ([illegible]) are lagging [illegible] place [illegible] the Radical-Socialists [illegible] a very [illegible]. As for the [illegible] organizations, both the [illegible] ([illegible]) and the [illegible] ([illegible]) are [illegible] strong [illegible] in the public eye. It is difficult to estimate the extent of their popular following [illegible] leaders [illegible] unwilling to [illegible] any figures [illegible] but both appear to be about equal in strength to the [illegible] Communists.

2. [illegible] According to Mr. [illegible], [illegible] of the [illegible] Toulon [illegible], the Socialist Party has [illegible] registered [illegible] in Toulon (as compared [illegible]) and the [illegible] in the department of the Var (as compared with [illegible] before the war). He pointed out that the Var was traditionally a Socialist stronghold: in 1939, of [illegible] conseillers generaux, [illegible] were Socialists and [illegible] Communists; he stated that if elections were held [illegible], the Socialists [illegible].

3. [illegible] feels that the political situation is confused by the existence of the [illegible] and the [illegible], and that since the work of the [illegible] is over, these groups should disappear and give way to the political parties. He maintains that the leaders of the [illegible] are motivated by [illegible] of personal interest, their object being to replace the [illegible] and the old leaders. He states that [illegible] of the Socialist Party with the [illegible] will not be accomplished, and that [illegible] Socialists joined the [illegible] simply to [illegible] the [illegible] elements in that organization and to counteract the influence of the [illegible].

4. [illegible] Mr. [illegible], in private conversation, and [illegible], Socialist [illegible] of Marseille, in his speech before the Congress of the Socialist Federation of the Var at Toulon, [illegible] September 1944, stressed the need for holding [illegible] elections in [illegible]. They pointed out that present [illegible] of [illegible] Liberation were not representative of the will of the people [illegible] public opinion. [illegible] proof of popular support before he could [illegible] considered [illegible] the [illegible] Liberation [illegible] in favor of the Communists, [illegible] the people. [illegible] the [illegible] ([illegible]) [illegible] of the [illegible] (almost always a [illegible]) [illegible].

5. [illegible] feels it possible that the [illegible] may [illegible] pressure on the government [illegible]. [illegible] a [illegible] of the elections [illegible] order in France although he does

CONFIDENTIAL

not [illegible] the attention here would [illegible] to the [illegible] of [illegible] because of the [illegible] popular support of General De Gaulle.

6. The Socialists [illegible] a certain [illegible] of the women's vote. They feel that the women are likely to be strongly influenced by the clergy when they go to the polls. Despite this fact, however, the Socialists want the elections to be held next February.

7. The Socialist party [illegible] on the Blvd. [illegible] the [illegible] of Toulon, with [illegible] display of posters and propaganda material, and huge paintings of Leon Blum and Jean Jaures. The Toulon edition of Le Provencal, the Socialist paper published at Marseille, [illegible] the daily [illegible] Le Petit Varois [illegible] a small knot of [illegible] Frequent meetings of the Toulon Section and of local sub-sections are held.

8. Congress of the Socialist Federation of the Var: The first Socialist Congress of the Department of the Var was held Sunday, 16 December, at Toulon, under the chairmanship of [illegible] of [illegible] of the party and Mayor of [illegible]. About 300 delegates and [illegible] each party section in the Department being represented by 3 delegates. The meeting lasted all day, with a break for lunch. It was conducted in a serious, business-like manner.

9. The [illegible] debate centered on the [illegible] of the activities in the Front National of [illegible] one of the Socialist deputies of the Var. The Congress unanimously adopted a motion [illegible] by the Bureau Federal whereby [illegible] would be permitted to continue in the Front National on the condition that all his public propaganda appearances were devoted exclusively to the interests of the Socialist Party. [illegible] of the impossible position in which he was placing himself and the Socialist Party by [illegible] an active part in the leadership of the [illegible], the question of the trade unions was raised; the [illegible] is in favor of the trade unions, [illegible] opposed. [illegible] refused to accept the conditions imposed on him by the Congress, and resigned from the party. [illegible] the Congress unanimously voted a resolution rejecting his resignation and excluding him from the party.

10. There was also [illegible] on the question of collaboration with the Communist party, [illegible] a motion in favor of [illegible] with the [illegible] working class [illegible]. However, a motion was finally voted unanimously approving the continuation of discussions [illegible] national [illegible] unity of the working class, and [illegible] the desire of the Socialists for harmonious relations with the [illegible]. The [illegible] anti-Communist but expected, in return, that the Communists would not be anti-Socialist.

11. During the debate, there was sharp criticism of the conditions forced against the Socialists in the [illegible] and local Comités de Libération by the Communists through the [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

that the CGT was not maintaining a sufficiently independent and apolitical attitude.

12. In discussing relations of the Socialist Party with resistance groups, M. Soldani, member of the Bureau Federal of the party for the Var and member of the MLN, expressed his deep regret over the fact that fusion between the Socialist Party and the MLN now seems impossible. He said he had hoped this fusion of the socialists of the MLN with the best elements of the Socialist Party would constitute a great regenerated Socialist Party of the future. During the debate on this subject, he took vigorous, almost explosive exception to an insinuation by Cdt. Mistral, member of the Bureau Directeur of the party, that the leaders of the MLN were simply a group of arrivistes who were trying to take advantage of the situation to seize political power.

13. As for foreign policy, the Congress expressed itself as opposed to the hegemony of any one great power, whether it be Britain, the United States or Russia, and in favor of a system of collective security, with all the democratic nations of the world equally represented in an international association of nations. This association should have its own army, credit, transport, etc. in order to be able to guarantee the peace. Regarding the treatment of Germany, the Congress voiced its opposition to any dismemberment of the country, but approved a long occupation with a severe allied control of all German industry and commerce and a long-range program for the reeducation of German youth.

14. Communist Party: According to Mr. [illegible], secretary of the Toulon section of the Socialist Party, the Communists claim to have 4,000 registered members in the Var. Communist leaders interviewed declined to quote any figures.

15. M. Rothier, prominent Communist member of the MLN, maintains that the Communists have gained many new followers in the Var since the war, at the expense of the Socialists. He claims that this results to a large extent from the Communists' nationalist policy and also from their young, vigorous leaders, as compared with the Socialists who still have the same leaders representing the old regime. He stated that the policy of the Communist Party would remain nationalist in the future; that it would be difficult to return to a revolutionary program.

16. Rothier asserted that the Communists get along better with the Christian Democrats than with the Socialists, since the latter - as he put it - placed party interests above the national interest.

17. The Communists are opposed to the holding of elections next February. Their reasoning, ostensibly, is as follows: the elections were scheduled before the recognition of the Provisional Government by the Allies as a means of holding a popular referendum and thus showing the Allies that De Gaulle had the country behind him. Now that the Allies have recognized the De Gaulle government, the pressing need for immediate elections no longer exists. Besides, it would be only fair to wait for the return of the three million prisoners and deportees before proceeding to the polls. According to M. [illegible] of the MLN, however, the real reason the Communists are opposed to the elections is their fear of losing some of the strength which they now hold on the various departmental [illegible]

mental and local liberation committees. Incidentally, M. Arrighi himself indicated his personal opposition to the holding of elections at the present time, since the women's vote constituted an experiment and he was not in favor of conducting such experiments while France was still at war. (Arrighi may well feel that to hold elections now would mean a loss of strength for the MRP as well as for the Communists.) Etienne Allegre, Communist municipal délégué, stated flatly that he believed the elections would be postponed, although his party is making its plans so as to have everything in readiness in case the elections are held in February.

18. Both Allegre and Pothier criticized the Prefect of the Var, M. [illegible], for not being vigorous enough in his handling of the affairs of the département, particularly the procurement of adequate food supplies. Pothier praised [illegible] for his personal courage and for his active participation in resistance activities but pointed out that he was formerly secretary of the sous-préfecture at Toulon and that he had not broken away from the old habits of the plodding government fonctionnaire.

19. Pothier described Admiral Lambert, Préfet Maritime of Toulon, as a reactionary of the old tradition - along with the great majority of higher naval officers at the Toulon naval base.

20. According to Allegre, the Toulon edition of Rouge-Midi, the Communist paper published in Marseille, has a daily circulation of [illegible] and a Sunday circulation of 15,000.

21. Mouvement Républicain Populaire: The Toulon section of the MRP was formed about one month ago. The officers are: M. Labrosse, president; M. Jouzien, attorney, secretary; M. Cornier, worker at the Naval Arsenal, treasurer. A departmental federation of the MRP is in the process of organization; Labrosse hopes to have it organized before the end of the year. Labrosse claims a membership in the Toulon section of 1,000 - but this appears to be an exaggeration. Labrosse stated that the Toulon edition of the Christian Democrat newspaper, Le Méridional, published at Marseille, has a local circulation of 2,000. This Toulon edition was started two weeks ago.

22. The Union Féminine Civique et Sociale (UFCS) is the women's adjunct of the MRP at Toulon. As in Paris, the MRP in Toulon is making serious efforts to capture the women's vote. A series of three free weekly political lectures, starting 13 December 1944 has been organized by the UFCS.

23. Radical-Socialist Party - It is universally stated that the Radical-Socialists are practically absent as a political force in the Var. No party headquarters has been established in Toulon, and aside from the brief newspaper announcement, no sign of any Radical-Socialist activity was discovered.

24. MLN and FN. Pothier, of the FN, is optimistic over the possibility of fusion between the MLN and the FN in the Var echelon after the agreement just reached between the two groups in the department of the Gard. On the other hand, Arrighi, of the MLN, points out that many members of his organization are hesitant about uniting with the FN, because they see in this an attempt

[illegible] of the FN to absorb the MLN. However, he states that discussions are still continuing between the two groups. [illegible] asserts that although many members of the FN are not Communists all the positions of responsibility in that organization are held by Communists.

25. CGT. According to M. Bessone, representative of the CGT on the CDL, there were [illegible] registered members of the CGT in the Var on 1 December 1944, as compared with 24,907 members in 1937. Bessone considers one of the most urgent problems before the CGT in the Var to be that of the stabilization of salaries. Some workers are too highly paid [illegible] in comparison to the salaries of equally skilled workers in other trades. This state of affairs was created by the Germans who paid very well in order to attract labor to certain high-priority jobs. For example, workers in the building trades are getting up to 31 francs per hour, while skilled pâtissiers and boulangers earn only 12 francs per hour. Bessone points out that it is not possible to raise all salaries to the highest levels established by the Germans, since this would cause an inflationary trend. Therefore, the CGT was faced with the delicate task of working at the same time for the reduction -- to a certain extent -- of some salaries and the raising of others.

Police and Military Units

26. Groupes Republicaines de Securite and Gardes Civiques [illegible]. The Forces Republicaines de Securite have a total strength of [illegible] officers and men in the Var, under the command of Lt. Colonel (FFI) Barrat. Their headquarters are at [illegible], about 7 km. west of Toulon, at the Chateau [illegible], a requisitioned private estate formerly occupied by the Vichyite GMR (Groupes Mobiles de Reserve).

27. The two companies under Barrat form part of the FRS of the 15th Military Region (Vaucluse, Hautes Alpes, Basses Alpes, Alpes Maritimes, Bouches-du-Rhone, Var) organized by Regional Commissioner [illegible] and placed under the command of General [illegible]. The FRS are an official, paid militia, working under the prefect in each Department of the 15th Military Region, with the principal task of combatting traitors, collaborationists and black marketeers and of maintaining order. In the Var, the FRS has the additional task of guarding the [illegible] political prisoners at the camp of [illegible]. Members of the FRS in the Var are all former FFI. The men are paid 2,0[illegible] francs monthly; officers and non-commissioned officers receive regular army pay.

28. Barrat stated that he is badly in need of arms and equipment for his men. There are rifles for only [illegible] percent of his [illegible] men, and their total arms consist of [illegible] German [illegible] and two light machine guns. Barrat pointed out that it would mean a great deal for the discipline of his men if they could all be properly armed and equipped. He hastened to add that in spite of circumstances, discipline was good. An inspection tour of the quarters, however, revealed a rather relaxed discipline; the men lacked the military smartness and bearing of trained soldiers. German prisoners working on the premises were more prompt than the members of the FRS to come to attention and salute at the approach of Lt. Colonel Barrat.

29. Barrat stated that he had sent detachments out on expeditions against the

29. [illegible] stated that he had sent detachments [illegible] on expeditions against the [illegible] blanc -- elements of which had been reported in various localities in the [illegible] -- but so far without success. The [illegible] was not in radio contact with these elements anywhere in the [illegible]. [illegible] also has men circulating in civilian clothes in Toulon to help stamp out the black market. Thus far, the [illegible] made 250 arrests in [illegible], for all offenses.

30. [illegible], who was formerly departmental chief of the Milices Patriotiques, and who is still a member of the departmental committee of the Gardes Civiques Républicaines (ex-Milices Patriotiques), claims the credit for the [illegible] in the Var [illegible]. Barral stated the men of the [illegible] were the same as those of the [illegible], but that the former were unpaid civilians devoting only their spare time to this task.

31. [illegible]. According to [illegible], Colonel [illegible], all the remaining FFI of the Var are grouped in the Demi-Brigade des Maures at [illegible], under the command of Colonel (FFI) Salvatori. This unit consists of about 3,000 men, and is preparing to leave shortly for the front to join the 1st French Army. In Toulon, former FFI members have formed an Amicale des FFI. According to one of the members, the Amicale has a total membership of [illegible].

Franco-American Relations

32. American sailors stationed in Toulon report a number of cafe fights and arguments between themselves and Frenchmen, principally over women. The feeling is fairly general among American sailors at Toulon that the French would overcharge an American at every opportunity possible.

33. On their side, the French are, to a greater or lesser degree, resentful over the American bombing of Toulon, which destroyed a large part of the city; over American treatment of German PW's; and over the fact that American food supplies for the civilian population have not arrived in greater quantities. [illegible] (a Corsican, about 55, veteran of the last war and maquisard for over two years during this war) remarked bitterly that American soldiers had sold cigarettes, rations and soap at high black market prices and had not given anything away, contrary to what was expected of them. Cigarettes were sold at 50 to 100 francs a pack; soap at 50 francs a cake.

34. [illegible], Communist member of the [illegible] and director of La Liberté du Var, stated that he noticed a general feeling that General Leahy, as Ambassador to Vichy, had continued relations with the Vichy Government even after his recall; that Washington was not pleased with the De Gaulle government and would have preferred a Giraud or a Chautemps to De Gaulle; that a report was circulating in [illegible] newspaper circles to the effect that three days before the liberation of Paris, American diplomatic representatives had penetrated into the city and had discussed with Vichy officials the possibility of setting up a new French government replacing the De Gaulle Government.

35. [illegible] also stated that many people were wondering whether the Allies had consented to [illegible] the decision of the Government to dissolve the [illegible] Civiques [illegible]. In that connection, he stated that the [illegible] and the FTP [illegible] great necessity, since the people had no confidence in the police [illegible] many of the same men who had served the Vichy regime.

Economic Situation

36. Housing Destruction. Toulon has suffered heavily from Allied bombing. The port area was particularly hard hit, but a good deal of destruction was caused in the center of town as well. According to the municipal bureau of Reconstruction, of a total of 16,[illegible] houses in Toulon, 993 were entirely destroyed, 1,3[illegible] more than 50 percent destroyed and [illegible] were suffered damage. Since it is extremely difficult to obtain building materials to make repairs, houses which were only partially damaged are deteriorating rapidly from the effects of the weather. Many people made homeless are temporarily living with friends and relatives, in makeshift quarters; a large number have not yet returned to Toulon from the interior, where they had sought refuge during the bombings. Toulon's normal population of 160,000 had dropped to [illegible] at the end of August; it had risen to [illegible] at the end of October, and is now around [illegible].

37. The municipal Service [illegible] Reconstruction estimates needs of building materials for repairs as follows:

8,[illegible] tons of tile shingles for roofing
3,[illegible] tons of bricks
5,[illegible] tons of plaster
1,[illegible] tons of cement
1,[illegible] tons of lime
200,[illegible] square meters of window panes.

Temporary roofing repairs are being made with wood planks.

38. Food. Food conditions in Toulon are bad, the most serious shortages being milk for children, and fats and oils. There is only enough milk to permit distribution to infants up to 9 months. According to Dr. [illegible], in order to provide milk for the 1,677 children of 9-18 months, 600 cans of condensed milk would be required daily. Another [illegible] cans daily would be needed for the 1,500 children 18 months - 3 years of age. [illegible] stressed the urgency of this problem. Dr. [illegible] recommends that if American milk is shipped to Toulon, it be given directly to the municipality for distribution, instead of to the Red Cross. (He claims that on previous occasions when American milk was distributed through the French Red Cross, much of it found its way into the black market and never reached the children for whom it was intended.)

39. Despite the fact that the Var is an important producer of olive oil, there is a serious shortage of this product on the market. According to [illegible], municipal [illegible] in charge of Ravitaillement, whatever stocks of olive oil do exist in the region are blocked by the Ministere de Ravitaillement for distribution throughout France. This is a source of discontent among the people

however, distribution of [illegible] [illegible] present time, and [illegible] with the [illegible] [illegible]. It is expected that the [illegible] will improve by the end of the year. At present, olive oil sells [illegible] francs per litre on the black market, but it is not constantly even on the black market. When available, it sold for [illegible] francs per [illegible] [illegible] supply.

40. The bread ration of [illegible] [illegible] is [illegible] considered satisfactory and the meat ration of about [illegible] grams weekly is felt to be a considerable improvement over the 90 grams monthly received during the occupation. However, people seemed to expect a more immediate and greater improvement in the food situation with the coming of the Allies than has actually taken place.

41. Public Services: Electricity, gas and water supply are normal. The streets are partially lighted at night. Public services are functioning in Toulon and its suburbs. There is one [illegible] train daily to Marseille, and one alternately daily with connections with the Marseille-[illegible] train.

* * *

ANNEX

[illegible] LIBERATION IN TOULON

		[illegible] Resistance Movement
Frank Arnal	President	[illegible]
Amiges	Vice President	[illegible]
[illegible]	Vice President	[illegible]
[illegible]	Secretary	Communist
Bertolini		Communist
[illegible]		Socialist
[illegible]		[illegible] (Franc-Tireur)
[illegible]		Franc-Tireur
[illegible]		Catholique
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
Legier, Dr.		[illegible] (Italiens
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		CGT
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		Comité de [illegible]
		[illegible]
Mme. [illegible]		Union des Femmes Françaises

[illegible]

	Responsibility	Party or Resistance Movement
[illegible]	[illegible] de Délégation (Sûreté Police)	FIN
[illegible]	Finances	FIN (Chrétien Démocrate)
[illegible]	Reconstruction, Hébergement	FIN
[illegible]	Instruction publique, Beaux Arts, Sports, Théâtre	FIN
[illegible]	Oeuvres de guerre et pupilles	FIN
[illegible]	Radio, [illegible]	FN
Pothier	Travaux d'entretien des bâtiments communaux, voirie, jardins publics, contrôle des travaux neufs	FN (Communist)
Allegro	Ravitaillement	Communist Party
[illegible]	[illegible], affaires militaires, Défense passive, quais, port et [illegible]	CS
[illegible]	Réquisitions, sinistres et Réfugiés	Socialist
[illegible]	Etat-civil, contributions, octroi	Socialist
[illegible]	Personnel, régie des trams	CGT
[illegible]	Cimetières, pompes funèbres, abattoirs	CGT
[illegible]	Services publics [illegible]	CGT
Mme. [illegible]	[illegible]	Mouvement Unifié de la Libération Nationale
Mme. [illegible]	Emplacements, [illegible], Maison, [illegible]	Union des Femmes Françaises
[illegible]	Jeunesse, Sports	Fédération de la Jeunesse Patriotique
[illegible]	Hygiène, Laboratoire	Loge Maçonnique
Mme. [illegible]	Contentieux	(Indépendante)
[illegible]	Service des Eaux, Nettoiement, Assainissement, Usine d'incinération et [illegible]	(Indépendant)

9 452

K 6

Toulouse 12 Septiembre 1945.

INFLUENCIA DE LOS COMUNISTAS EN TOULOUSE

Los comunistas influyen totalmente en el "FRONT NATIONAL" y su diario "LE PATRIOTE", de Toulouse.

Asimismo en el COMITE FRANCE-ESPAGNE, cuyo Presidente Jean CASSOU, a pesar de no pertenecer al Partido Comunista, se deja maniobrar por el.

Igualmente en el Comite FRANCE-U.R.S.S.

- - - - - -

SECRET

Report No. : F-6937
Date of Report : 28 April 1946
Information : Current

FRENCH POLITICAL

Reported Replacement of "Front National" by a New Paper

The following report is from a member of the staff of "Front National" and is a close friend of Thorez. This information was disclosed directly to a well-tried source, who has extensive contacts in French press circles:

1. It appears improbable that "Front National" will continue to be published after the elections, because of the breaking down of this political formation, which is of no further interest - except perhaps a marginal one - to the Communist Party. However, until now, Thorez has been opposed to its disappearance.

2. At present the leaders of the CP are planning to replace it by a more effective organ, and are studying three possible solutions:

(a) A newspaper which might be called "Ce Matin", and which would be supplementary to "Ce Soir" which would be responsible for its publication. The directors of "Ce Soir", which is a successful paper, are opposed to this idea, because they do not see the necessity for placing an additional load on the budget.

(b) A paper exclusively for women and which would treat all questions interesting to women: the home, the factory, food, the child, clothing, education, etc. But it is wondered if women have not adopted the habit of reading their husbands' paper, and would not be reluctant to indulge in the expense of an extra paper.

(c) An evening paper which would sell for 3 fr., and which would be similar to "Le Monde" in form, and would be the leftist opposite number of that paper. This paper would be destined particularly for the elite, and would stress cultural matters, accurate documentation, etc. The difficulty lies in assembling a first rate editorial staff to handle the political, economic, financial and artistic departments of such a paper.

3. It appears likely that a decision will be reached before the end of May.

SECRET

Distribution: 3 May 1946
Embassy/Paris
LO
MA

Washington
Amzon
Bern

SSU/SD PARIS

Hampshire/Bramley II

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Code Name ✓ **Other Code Names**	**REF. MAPS**	**CARD NO.** F 65

Name FRONT NATIONAL ([illegible])

Pre-D-Day **D-Day**

Address (i) (ii)

Hides (i) (ii) (iii)

Proof of Identity

Description: Height **Weight** **Build** **Colour of Eyes**

Distinguishing Peculiarites

Zones of Operations Z N

~~**Sub**~~**Organisors** COLBERT represents the MOVEMENT CONSEIL DE LA RESISTANCE

W/T Operator

Experience

Remarks Resistance movement supposed to be run by the Communists strongest in the North but has some following in Z S.

1219

From: Marseille Report No: WM-833 Local File No:

No. of Pages: 8 No. of Enclosures:

Report Made By: H. R. SHERIDAN HRS Approved By:

Distribution:
By copy to: 0 Orally to: 0

a.j C.F.D.I [illegible] P.S. [illegible]

Source Cryptonym: HOMOHEDRAL References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Although this report is based principally on information received from HOMOHEDRAL, the chief facts have been confirmed by HOMESTRETCH and HOMOGENE. Much of the information, especially the excerpts from CADI reports, was taken from the original CADI documents which HOMOHEDRAL lifted from the CADI files. (One of HOMOHEDRAL's sub-agents got the char-woman who cleans the CADI offices to lift a few reports each night for a period of a week.) The Italian immigrant sent by this station to the CADI office is Ettore GUIDETTI.

Copies to:
Pari-2
Wash-2
Mars-1

Classification **SECRET**

Form No. 51-88
Feb 1947

REGISTRY COPY

29-4-11-2

Subject: Comite D'Action et de Defense des Immigres
Report No.: WFM-333
Date of Information: See below
Place Acquired: Marseille
Date Acquired: 22 April 1949
Evaluation: C-2
Date of Report: 29 April 1949
Source: HOMOHEDRAL

1. The Comite d'Action et de Defense des Immigres (CADI) was organized at Paris in November 1944 and operated overtly until ordered dissolved as a subversive group by a decree of the Ministry of the Interior in December 1948.

2. The principal organisations which joined to form CADI are as follows:

Parti Communiste Francais
Confederation Generale du Travail
Conseil National de la Resistance
Front National
Union des Femmes Francaises
Union des Patriotes Sovietiques
Comite Italien de la Liberation
Comite d'Unite de la Defense Juive
Union National de la Colonie Tcheco-Slovaque en France
Union Democratique des Hongrois en France
Aide a la Patrie Polonais
Front National Armenien
Italia Libera
Front National Roumain
Union de la Jeunesse Republicaine de France
Union Nationale Espagnole en France
Federation des Espagnols Residant en France

3. As the name CADI implies, the organisation was formed to aid foreign immigrants in France. It was not ostensibly founded as a political organisation, nor was it ostensibly designed to support any particular political party. Its apparent purpose was rather to give social and legal aid to any and all immigrants in France. Its social program was quite simple and was largely devoted to the distribution of food, clothing, shelter, and money to needy immigrants. Its legal program was two-fold: first, it offered legal assistance to the individual immigrants through its lawyers; and secondly, it sponsored a series of measures in the Chamber of Deputies which were designed to benefit the status of all immigrants.

Classification
SECRET

FORM NO. 51-60
FEB 1949

REGISTRY COPY

39-4-11-2

SECRET

4. The measures which CADI sponsored were officially known as the "resolutions pour la promulgation d'un Statut Juridique des Immigres", and demanded the following benefits for the immigrants:

a. That "Cartes de residence privileges" be granted to all immigrants, without exception, after three years residence in France.

b. That immigrants be allowed to choose their place and type of employment.

c. That immigrants be granted all the social benefits to which a French citizen is entitled.

d. That expulsion from France be made dependent on a court order, rather than on a decree of the Ministry of the Interior.

5. CADI sponsored the above measures for all immigrants. For those certain immigrants who had volunteered for service in an Allied army, or had taken part in the Resistance, or had been deported to Germany, CADI made the following demands:

a. That naturalization be granted by judges of the peace upon simple proof of the immigrant's claim to be in one of the above categories, and that all other naturalization requirements be waived.

b. That all invalids, deportees, and widows of men of this category be entitled to the same social benefits as French citizens of similar classification.

c. That the term "Mort pour la France" be added to the titles of the deceased of all immigrants of this category.
5

6. For those immigrants of the above category (para 6) who preferred to maintain their original citizenship, CADI demanded:

a. That they be allowed to choose their place and kind of work and that they be permitted to change their profession whenever they so desired.

b. That they receive all social benefits granted to French citizens.

c. That all "administrative measures resulting from their antifascist activity before and during the War be annulled." (Field comment: This is a direct translation from the French and refers to any legal actions taken against immigrants who, as Communists, refused to obey the orders of the French government between September 1939 and the German attack on Russia.)

SECRET 29-4-11-2

WFM 533

7. CADI was largely successful in realising its demands, for the Statute of Immigrants which was passed by the Consultative Assembly (the Statute was composed of the ordonnance of 24 March 1945, the ordonnance of 2 November 1945, the ordonnance of 19 October 1945, the ordonnance of 15 October 1945, and the decree of 25 December 1945) gave to immigrants an equality of rights approximate to those enjoyed by a French citizen. The most active supporter of the CADI measures in the Consultative Assembly in 1945 was Madeleine BRAUN, prominent Communist and one of the leaders of the Front National. The Communist Party and the CGT also heavily backed these measures.

8. Paragraphs 4 through 6 represent CADI's original program; it was overt, it was designed to benefit all immigrants, and it was supposedly non-political. To implement its program, CADI established branch offices throughout France in the cities which had large numbers of immigrants. These branch offices were known as Centres d'Action de Defense des Immigres. CADI also took the lead in organising the annual National Congress of Immigrants (Congres National des Immigres), the first one of which was held in Paris on 25 January 1945. M. [illegible]RACHA, representative of the Ministry of Industrial Production presided. In 1946, CADI again sponsored the congress, now called the International Congress of Immigrants in France (Congres International des Immigres en France), which took place in Paris 15 February to 17 February. Some 15,000 delegates, representing 3 million immigrants of all nationalities, attended. Justin GODARD, president of CADI, made the principal speech. Louis SAILLANT, secretary-general of the CGT and president of the CNR, was a member of the sponsoring committee and sat on the speakers' platform. The sponsors' committee for the 1947 Congress which was also held at Paris in February, consisted of Justin GODARD, Louis SAILLANT, Jacques DUCLOS, Albert BAYET (delegate of the Ligue des Droits de L'Homme), PINEAU (director of the Union de Jeunesse Republicaine de France), Madeleine BRAUN, and Joseph NORDMANN (lawyer for the Lettres Francaises in the KRAVCHENKO TRIAL).

9. Although the ostensible and apparent purpose and activities of CADI were those outlined in paragraphs 3 to 6, its true purpose and its clandestine activities were quite different. CADI was not the non-political organisation that it professed to be, but was in fact a tightly controlled Communist organisation. To be sure, the legislative measures it supported benefited all immigrants, but they were designed primarily to help Communist immigrants. Similarly, CADI's program of aid to immigrants was restricted solely to Communist or pro-Communist immigrants. The true purpose of CADI was to aid Communist and

29-4-11-2

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

pro-Communist immigrants to enter France; to aid them in establishing themselves in France; to place them in industries, mining, and agriculture; to organise them into faithful followers of the Communist Party; and finally to control them.

10. In order to realise its true purpose, CADI embarked on a clandestine program which may be divided into three major parts: the supplying of certain necessary identification papers, to illegal Communist immigrants, the placing of these immigrants in certain jobs, and the organising of these particular immigrants, along with all the foreign laborers in France, into submissive groups which would follow the orders of the CGT and the Communist Party.

11. Evidence of this first activity is found in the CADI office in Marseille. This office is currently operating a program whereby any avowed Communist immigrant coming to the office is furnished a "carte de travailleur etranger", [illegible] given a job in industry or agriculture, and, for the sum of 5,000 francs, is furnished with a naturalisation decree.

12. (Field Comment:

Having heard from two sources that CADI was operating such a program, this station sent on 10 March 1949 one of source's sub-agents, an Italian immigrant who had entered France clandestinely, to the Marseille CADI, at 8 Place de la Prefecture, to ascertain if these reports were true. At CADI our sub-agent was received by George LINIVER. Our sub-agent then presented himself as an Italian immigrant who entered France clandestinely and asked that he be given a "carte de travailleur etranger". LINIVER asked our sub-agent who had sent him to CADI, to which the sub-agent replied, "I am a Communist." LINIVER asked to see the sub-agent's Party card, and the latter showed it to him. LINIVER then asked the sub-agent if he had a job in France, to which the sub-agent replied in the negative. LINIVER told the sub-agent to return in two weeks at which time he would give him an "autorisation de sejour", and in three weeks, he would provide him with a "carte de travailleur etranger". LINIVER also promised to give our sub-agent an agricultural job in Sete (Herault). Finally, LIHIVER told our sub-agent that for 8,000 francs he would provide him with naturalisation papers. Our sub-agent replied that he wanted such papers, but that he would first have to acquire the money. The interview ended with both men raising their fists in the Communist salute.

13. From questioning our sub-agent, it appears that the papers CADI furnishes are genuine papers which they obtain through the connivance of certain individuals in the Marseille Prefecture.

29-4-11-2

The sub-agent's sister unfortunately died in Paris on 12 March. The sub-agent then left immediately for Paris and has not yet returned. Upon his return to Marseille, this station will send him back to CADI to claim his "carte de sejour" and "carte de travailleur etranger". We will also give him 5,000 francs with which to acquire his naturalisation papers and we will direct him to accept the proferred job in Sete.)

14. Additional evidence that CADI is engaged in supplying these papers is found in the fact that on the 24, 25, and 26 of January 1949 four foreigners presented themselves at the office of the "Confederation Generale des Internes et Deportes Politiques de la Resistance et des Victimes de l'Oppression Nazie et du Racisme" where, thinking they were at the CADI office, they asked that they be given "cartes de sejour". These men were:

MILLER, Robert - born in Baden, Germany
JACOBSOHN, Carl - born in Hamburg, Germany
GEORGES, Morice - born in Sockelyncmakely, Hungary
LASZLO, Alexandre - born in Marsvahely, Hungary

These four had entered France clandestinely and each had been told before leaving his own country to apply to CADI for his French papers.

15. The following excerpts from CADI reports indicate CADI's activity in placing immigrants in industries and in agriculture.

a. "The Poles sent by CADI into the iron and coal mines number 60,000. In addition CADI has placed 80,000 Polish agricultural workers in France." (Field comment: From a report by LOUKA, delegate of the Conseil National Polonais en France.)

b. "In the large chemical and metallurgical factories of Marseille one-third of the employees are immigrants. In the Acieries du Nord, 340 workers are foreigners; the Cotel Plant, 485 workers are immigrants. CADI has placed many of these men and will continue to place as many again." (Field comment: From a report of Guido ZAMIS, CADI secretary in Marseille.)

c. "There are 3,800 foreigners in the coal mines at Carmaux-les-Mines. CADI has placed 80% of these men." (Field comment: From a report of the CADI representative for the TARN department.)

29-4-11-2

1.

S E C R E T

16. The following excerpts from CADI documents indicate CADI's activity in organising the immigrant laborers into submissive groups ready to follow CADI-CGT-Communist orders:

a. "It is necessary that CADI take the lead in organising these foreign laborers in strong and democratic unions. We must protect them from their capitalist oppressors and we must aid them in their struggle against their employers. In CADI and in the CGT, the immigrant finds his strength." (Field comment: From a report by Louis PETIT, one of the organisers and national leaders of CADI.)

b. "It is through CADI that the immigrant masses are able to mobolise for the tasks which lie before the whole country. It is CADI which must educate the immigrants in the ways of true democracy and it is for CADI to lead them in their struggle." (Field comment: From a report of LAROCHE, secretary-general of CADI.)

c. "Before the war, the countries from which these immigrants came were under the control of Fascist and reactionary regimes. The immigrants left their homes without hope of returning. Now things have changed; the countries from which they came are today true democracies and they now have the problem of helping those of their former citizens who are now living outside their borders. It is CADI who, working with these democratic governments, is attempting to obtain the rights of liberty and democracy for these immigrants now in France." (Field comment: From a letter written by Louis PETIT.)

d. "We are proud to be from a region where the majority are immigrants, the immigrants who organised the great strike of 100,000 workers during the occupation under the leadership of Auguste LECOEUR. In those times, all orders were executed clandestinely, and we will execute them today with the same enthusiasm. CADI must lead the way." (Field comment: From a speech by the CADI secretary in the Pas-de-Calais.)

e. "The control of the recruiting of immigrant workers must be done in a rigorous manner by CADI and the French workers unions. We must prevent the immigrant worker from becoming a tool in the hands of the capitalists." (Field comment: From a speech by GIOVETTI, (fnu), delegate of Italia Libera.)

17. Further evidence of CADI's activity in organising the immigrant workers is found in ~~CADI files.~~ Report after report from various CADI delegates throughout France list by

S E C R E T 29-4-11-2

nationality the number of immigrants in their areas, and in addition many of the reports note the number of these immigrants who are under CADI control. These reports are all similar, and it is sufficient to quote from one: "More than 50% of the miners in the Loire basin are immigrants; of these, the following percentages adhere to CADI: 95% of the Poles, all the Yugoslavs, 80% of the Portuguese, 60% of the Italians, and 75% of the Hungarians." (Field comment: From a report by CADI secretary from the Loire.)

18. Although supposedly dissolved by Ministerial decree in December 1948, CADI continues to operate clandestinely throughout France. Its present national president is Justin GODARD, former minister; FRYDMAN, (fnu), a member of the Comite d'Unite de la Defense Juive, is vice-president; LAROCHE, (fnu), is secretary-general. National Headquarters are located at 108 rue de l'Universite, Paris. The principal organisations supporting CADI today are those listed in paragraph 8, except for those of these organisations which have ceased to exist.

19. CADI functions in conjunction with these organisations and in addition it has its own delegates scattered throughout France in the industrial and mining regions. Among the CADI delegates are the following:

HORCADO - delegate of the Federation des Espagnols Residant en France
LOUKA - delegate of the Conseil National Polonais en France
GIOVETTI - delegate of Italia Libra
KOVACS, Muranyi - secretary-general of the Union Democratique des Hongrois en France
PANAS - member of the Front National Hellenique
MELIK - member of the Front National Armenien
VINCIGUERRA - president of the Union des Voluntaires Etrangers
SORU - delegate of the Front National Rouman
CONTI, Mme. Germaine - secretary of the CADI in Paris
ZELENY - delegate of the Union Nationale de la Colonie Tchesco-Slovaque en France
GUERRIERO - member of the Federation des Immigres Portuguais
HOLLAND - delegate of CADI on Eastern France
FRYDMAN - vice-president of CADI; delegate of the Comite d'Unite de la Defense Juive.
PETIT, Louis - one of the organisers and responsibles of CADI

29-4-11-2

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

(Field comment: It is realised that some of the organizations of which these men are listed as delegates have been dissolved, notably Italia Libra and the Front National Armenien. However, the names of the individuals and their affiliations are shown exactly as they appeared on CADI documents.)

20. CADI is well-financed. Its principal financial support comes from the Communist Party and the CGT. (Field comment: CADI documents acknowledge unspecified contributions from these organisations. One of source's informants, the chief of the Foreigners' Section of the Marseille Prefecture, has stated that he knows the Marseille CADI has an undetermined quantity of rubles, presumably received from the Communist Party.)

21. In Marseille, the CADI office was established by Guido ZANIS and George LINIVER in March 1946. It was originally located on the Blvd. du Muy, but in September 1947 it transferred to 3 Marche des Capucins. In February 1948 it moved to 97 rue Longue des Capucins and then, after it was ordered dissolved, it continued to function clandestinely at 2 Place de la Prefecture, where it remains today. ZANIS remains the director of the Local CADI, assisted by LINIVER.

29-4-11-2

WFM-339
5 Aug. 1948

SECRET

Subject: [illegible]

Report No: [illegible]

Date of Information: [illegible] August 1949

Place Acquired: Wien

Date Acquired: [illegible] August 1949

Evaluation: B-3

Date of Report: [illegible] August 1949

Source: [illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. A [illegible]

4. [illegible]

5. [illegible]

③

Classification SECRET

REGISTRY COPY 29-4-5-236

FORM 23. [illegible] 51-00

SECRET

WFM-[illegible]

-6-

[illegible] combined Carbon [illegible] Five Copies [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET 37-4-5-206

BEST OBTAINABLE FROM [illegible] SUBMITTED

22 November 1948

From: Paris

Report No. [illegible]-1192

Local File No:

No. [illegible]

No. of Enclosures: 1 rpt

Report Made by: Kenneth L. [illegible]

Approved by: [illegible] L. Ackerman

Distribution

By copy to: Wash - 2

SOG - [illegible]

[illegible] - 1

Orally to

Source Cryptonym: [illegible]

References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments

Attached is a report entitled "Further Arrests and Restrictive Measures by the French Surete to Halt Rumanian CP Activity."

SCDB-[illegible]773

Classification SECRET

REGISTRY [illegible]

FORM NO. [illegible]
FEB 1948 [illegible]

[illegible] Further Arrests and Restrictive Measures by the French Surete to Halt Rumanian CP Activity

Place Acquired France, Paris

Evaluation [illegible]

Source [illegible] 1

Report No. [illegible]-4150

Date of Information 15 - 17 Nov 1948

Date [illegible] 18 Nov 1948

Date Acquired [illegible] 12 Nov [illegible]

1. The following persons, all of whom have been particularly active in connection with Rumanian Communist Party affairs, especially within the Paris legation, were arrested by the French Surete on 15 November:

Ilie [illegible], a cobbler, and member of the Front National Roumain (Field Comment: [illegible] has previously been reported by source as a rich man, though cobbler by profession. He has property at [illegible] (Seine et Oise). At Paris, he lives at [illegible] rue Anjou. He is a frequent visitor and telephone caller at the Rumanian Embassy.)

[illegible], member of the Front National Roumain

Marta-[illegible], legation employee ([illegible]

[illegible] VILLARD, a French citizen and noted Communist.

In addition to the above and belonging to the same category is [illegible], who was arrested on 17 November.

2. The apartments of the foregoing were searched, but apparently nothing of importance was found. Subsequently, the five incriminated persons were released.

3. The Association des Roumains Amis de la France (Front National) was dissolved by order of the Surete, which has also forbidden the publication of the newspaper "La Roumanie Libre."

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

③

SECRET

REGISTRY

FORM NO. [illegible]
FEB 1948 51-56

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

MEMA-0295

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief, [illegible] 29 April 1949
Attn: [illegible] Benson
Chief of Station, Marseille

Prominent Communist in Cannes
Dr. [illegible]RICARD

Ref: [illegible]-44, MEMA-[illegible]

DATA

1. Subject is a prominent Communist in Cannes and is currently one of the leading members of the "Combattants de la Liberte" in that city. He was one of the organizers of the "Front National" in the Alpes-Maritimes.

2. In 1945 he was elected mayor of Cannes (which also made him mayor of La Bocca, a quarter of Cannes). He ran for re-election as mayor in October 1947, but was defeated.

3. In 1945 he was also elected as a Conseiller General in the canton of Cannes, but was defeated when running for re-election to this office on March 20-27, 1949.

4. In 1947, he was elected as a Conseiller Municipal in Cannes and currently holds this office.

5. Subject is married and has one daughter, aged 20. His address is Chalet [illegible], Cannes (on the road to Antibes).

H. R. Sheridan

H. R. SHERIDAN

3

Copies to:
Wash-2
Mars-1

INDEX

CONFIDENTIAL

REGISTRY COPY

68

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO WFPA-7526

SECRET CONTROL
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief, FDW
DATE: 26 March 1951
FROM: Chief of Station, Paris
SUBJECT: GENERAL- Transmittal
SPECIFIC- List of Alleged Communist dominated organizations

1. Attached is a copy of a list given to Leon H. S[illegible]man recently by Jack West, Legal Attache. The attachment was originally given to West by Keith Angell, Security Office, ECA-OSR, Paris. Mr. Angell advised that he had received this list from a source in the Prefecture of Police, Paris, and that it is based upon information in Prefecture files and investigation by that agency.

2. It will be noted that this list is apparently of quite recent date in that these international organizations recently expelled from France (IFDW, WFDY, WFTU) are noted as "dissolved".

3. Mr. West also transmitted a copy of this list to Mr. William Crawford in the Embassy here.

Gustav Peterson
Gustav Peterson

FDW - 3 (3 copies 5 pg att)
Files - WFPA - 1
Comm - 1 (1 att)

2

INDEX

SECRET CONTROL
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
CLASSIFICATION

[redacted]

29-4-13-727

28-6-44

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

[illegible]-129 75226

[illegible] COMMUNISTES

Parti Communiste Français, 4[illegible] rue le Peletier; 120 rue Lafayette.

Amicale des Anciens de la Mer Noire, 23 rue Fremicourt (15eme).

Amicale des Veuves de Guerre, 3[illegible] rue Rene Boulanger (10eme) Bot. 21.31.

Amicale des Volontaires de l'Espagne Republicaine, 46 rue du Fg Montmartre,
(9eme) - Prov. 02.49

Amicale Nationale des Elus Municipaux communistes de France, 1 rue de Maubeuge
(9eme) Tru. 78.31

Amicale Nationale des Elus Republicains de France, 1 rue de Maubeuge (9eme)
Tru. 78.31

Amis de la Commune, 37 rue du Louvre (2eme)

Amis de la Nature, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme) - Tru. 49.88

Amies de la Paix, 37 rue Jouvenet (16eme) - Jas. 86.04

Amities Franco-polonaises 9 boulevard des Italiens (2eme) - Ric. 01.85.

Association des Travailleurs Scientifiques, 37 rue Geoffroy St-Hilaire (5eme)

Association d'Etudes et d'informations municipales, 1 rue de Maubeuge (9eme)
Tru. 78.31

Association Nationale des Anciens F.F.I. - F.T.P.F. et de leurs Amis,
17 boulevard des Italiens (2eme) - Ric. 46.27

Association Nationale des Cheminots Anciens Combattants, 9 rue Lauten-court,
Mar. 04.97

Association Nationale des Familles de Fusilles, 10 rue Leroux (16eme) Kle. 71.80

Association Nationale des Rapatries d'Indochine, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme)
Tru. 09.88

Association des Veuves Orphelins Ascendants Victimes des deux Guerres,
3 rue de Tilsitt (8eme)

Association Republicaine des Anciens Combattants, 46 Fg Montmartre (9eme)
Pro. 32.49

Centre de Diffusion du Livre et de la Presse ([illegible]), 142 Boulevard Diderot
(12eme) Dor. 41.39 - 45.05 - [illegible].

Centre Laique de Formation du Personnel d'Encadrement des Oeuvres pour l'Enfance,
8 av. Mathurin Moreau (19eme) - Bot [illegible].50

Combattants de la Paix et de la Liberte, 3 rue des Pyramides (1er) Ope. 35.87

Comite Francais de Defense des Immigres, 15 Fg Montmartre ([illegible]eme) Prov. 82.78

Comite Francais de la Jeunesse Democratique, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme)
Tru. 00.88

Confederation Generale de l'Agriculture, 11 bis, rue Scribe (9eme) Ope. 52.90

Comite National des Ecrivains, 2 rue de l'Elysee (8eme) Anj. 05.79

Comite National des Journalistes, 2 rue de l'Elysee (8eme) .

Comite National des Pharmaciens, 13 rue Ballu (9eme)

Confederation Nationale des Locataires, 23 rue Arthur Rozier (19eme) Nord. [illegible].51

Confederation Generale du Commerce et de l'Industrie, 169 rue du Temple
(3eme) - Tur. 52.15

Confederation Generale Unifiee de l'Artisanat, 10 rue des Filles du Calvaire
(3eme) - Tur. 53.29

Conseil National de la Resistance, 1 rue Vernet (8eme) - Ely 30.53.

Cooperative de Production et de Diffusion du Film, 31 rue de Chabrol (9eme)
Pro. 07.05

Editeurs Francais Reunis, 33 rue St-Andre des Arts (6eme) - Ode. 73.24

Editions de la Jeunesse, 9 rue Humblot (15eme) - Seg. 12.91

Editions Sociales, 64 Bld Auguste Blanqui (13eme) - Gob. 45.41

Federation des Chorales et Groupes Artistiques de la Jeunesse, 9 rue Humblot
(15eme) - Seg. 15.01

Federation des Locataires, 32 bis, Bld Richard Lenoir (11eme)
Roq. 9[illegible].20

Federation Francaise des Cine-Clubs, 2 rue de l'Elysee (8eme)
Anj. 9 .54

[illegible] PA - 7526

Federation Musicale Populaire, 2 rue de l Elysee (8eme) - Anj. 91.54

Federation Nationale des Deportes Internes et Resistants Patriotes,
10 rue Leroux (16eme) - Kle. 71.50, 59.10, 87.52.

Federation Nationale des Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre, 46 rue Copernic
(16eme) - Cop. 43.92

Federation Nationale des Deportes du Travail, 5 rue du Fg Poissonniere (10eme)
Prov. 15.01

Federation Nationale des Directeurs de Colonies de Vacances,
29 rue St-Merri (4eme)

Federation Nationale de Lutte Anti-Tuberculeuse, 2 av. Mathurin Moreau (19eme)
Bot. 56.65

Federation Nationale des Prisonniers de Guerre, 62 rue Chaussee d'Antin (9eme)
Tri. 43.23

Federation Nationale des Sinistres, Mairie de Noisy le Sec, Nord. 96.59

Federation Sportive et Gymnique du Travail, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme) Tru. 49.88

France - Panama, 4 Cite Ponthiere (9eme) Tri. 05.26

France - Roumanie, 16 rue Vezelay (8eme) Lab. 26.88

France - Tchecoslovaquie, 18 rue Bonaparte (6eme) - Ode. 20.20

France - U. R. S. S., 29 rue d'Anjou (8eme), Anj. 19.54

France - Vietnam, 40 rue d'Argout (8eme), Lou. 08.20

Front National, 19, rue St-Georges (9eme) Tru. 40.84

Ligue Francaise de l'Enseignement, 3 rue Recamier (6eme) Lit. 88.71

Mouvement des Intellectuels Francais pour la Defense de la Paix,
3 rue des Pyramides (1er) Ope. 39.02

Mouvement National Judiciaire, Palais de Justice, Bd du Palais (4eme)

Plein Air Jeunes, 9 rue Humblot (15eme) Seg. 11.01

Radio - Liberte, 5 rue Lamartine (9eme) Tru. 71.82

Secours Populaire Francais, 11 Bld Montmartre (2eme) Cent. 27.70

724

4 -- 75126

Travail et Culture, 5 Rue des Beaux-Arts - Paris (6) Dan. 09.09

Tourisme et Travail, 58 rue d'Hauteville (9). Pro. 90-48 et 39.19

Union de la Jeunesse Republicaine de France, 9 Rue Humblot (15)
Segur 10.44

Union des Architectes Francais, 14 Rue du Cherche-Midi (6)

Union des Artistes Modernes, Club Mallet-Stevens, Rue Mallet-Stevens

Union des Arts Plastiques, 2 Rue de l'Elysee (8) Anj 91.54

Union des Camps et Palais de la Jeunesse, 9 Rue Humblot (15)
Segur 11.01

Union des Chirurgiens Dentistes Francais, 22 Rue Emile Menier (16)

Union des Femmes Francaises, 12 Bis rue d'Astorg (8). Anj. 38.66

Union des Ingenieurs et Techniciens Francais, 2 Rue de l'Elysee (8)

Union des Jeunes Filles de France, 9 Rue Humblot (15). Seg. 11.70

Union des Juifs pour la Resistance et l'Entr'Aide, 14 Rue de Paradis

Union des Medecins Francais, 2 Rue de Sese (8). Opera 74.40

Union des Vaillants & Vaillantes, 5 Bd Montmartre (9). Cen. 75.51

Union Francaise des Anciens Combattants, 20 R. de la Chaussee d'Antin

Union Francaise des Auberges de la Jeunesse, 140 Bd Haussmann (8)

Union Francaise Universitaire, 19 Rue de Jussieu (5). Por. 13.38

Union Nle des Etudiants de France, 15 Rue Soufflot (5) Dant. 71.40

Union Nle des Intellectuels, 2 Rue de l'Elysee. Anj. 91.54

Union Nle des Spectacles, 2 Rue de l'Elysee, Anj. 91.54

Union Nle des Vieux Travailleurs, 8 av. Mathurin Moreau (19)
Nord. 17.23.

724

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

[illegible]

[illegible]

Bureau du Congres Mondial des Partisans de la Paix, 2 rue de l'Elysee Anj. 18.20

Bureau de Liaison des Intellectuels pour la Defense de la Paix, (Issu du Congres de Wroclaw), 2 rue de l'Elysee, Anj. 1154

Federation Democratique Internationale des Femmes, 37 rue Jouvenet (16) Jasmin 85.04 (Dissolved)

Federation Internationale des Anciens Prisonniers Politiques, 10 rue Leroux (16) Kle. 71.50

Federation Internationale des Juristes Democrates, chez Me. Joe Nordmann, 12 Quai Bourbon (4) Dant. 72.45

Federation Mondiale de la Jeunesse Democratique, 21 rue de Chateaudun (9) Tru. 16.95 (Dissolved)

Federation Syndicale Mondiale, 1 rue Vernet (8), Ely. 30.50 (Dissolved)

11P

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

WFMA-0186

6 October 1948

TO: Chief, FBW Communist Activities

THROUGH: Chief of Station, Paris,

FROM: Chief of Station, Marseille

SUBJECT: Organisation of the French Communist Party in the Marseille Area

[illegible] - [illegible]

INTEL

The following is a survey of the organisation and membership of the French Communist Party in the Marseille Area:

Departmental Federation: headquarters, 18 Allees Leon Gambetta

Federal Secretary: Denis BIZOT

Federal Secretariat: of French CP, marseille area:

Pierre DOIZE
Josette REIBAUT
Marius COLOMBANI

Federal Bureau:

Denis BIZOT - in charge of political section
Pierre DOIZE
Josette REIBAUT
Marius COLOMBANI
Lucien MOLINO - 19 Blvd. Bordillat
Jean CRISTOFOL
Pierre EMMANUELLI - in charge of Press-Propaganda
Ludovic TROUIN - in charge of organisation
Pascal POSADO
Henri BERTINI
Rene LALLEMAND
Yvonne ESTACHY
Paul COURTIEU
Jean CLAVERIE (alias POLLUX) - in charge of recruiting and interior police. A particularly dangerous person.

Federal Committee

SECRET 29-4-5-233

RECORD COPY

TIONNAIRE
SUBMITTED

D C

[illegible]:

Francois [illegible]
Lucien [illegible]
Joseph [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Jean [illegible]
[illegible]

CI [illegible]

Foreigners in the French Communist Party [illegible] about 7,000, and are divided as follows:

Italians	1,[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	2,[illegible]	(of which 200 are [illegible])
[illegible]	600	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

5

ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Union des Femmes Françaises, Marseille area

Headquarters: 41 Cours Lieutaud

Departmental Office:

Secretary: Simone [illegible]
Members: Catherine [illegible]
(4,000) Jeanne [illegible]

Union de la Jeunesse Républicaine de France, Marseille area

Headquarters: 53, Rue de Rome

Fed. Sec'ty.: Lucien [illegible]

Secretary: RIGAUD

About 1,100 members

Union des Jeunes Filles de France, Marseille area

Secretariat: [illegible]

[illegible]

Headquarters: [illegible]

President: [illegible]

Vice President: [illegible]

Sec'y. Gen'l: [illegible]

Treasurer: [illegible]

Propaganda: [illegible]

Asst. Sec'y: Paul [illegible]

(cont'd.)

62

14-00000

WFMA-186

Honorary Members of the Committee:

CALLAS (Ex chief of FTP in the Bouches-du-Rhone)
CAPORALI (Cmdt)
CLAUDIE (Cmdt)
GILETTE (Lt. Col.)
GRANVILLE (Colonel)
MORVAN (Cmdt)
PELLETIER (Colonel)
PETRE (Colonel)
POZZO DI BORGO (Cmdt)
SIMON (Colonel)
SENATORE (Cmdt)

Membership: 3,600, of which 3,000 are members of CP, 300 are CP sympathisers and 200 non-sympathisers

Organ[illegible] [illegible]

Secours Populaire Francais [illegible]

Headquarters: 5 rue Villeneuve
Secretary: OLIVI
Fed. Officers: DEVIL
CHERRI
MANETTI
ROIG
BOSCHESCHI
ARNOUX
CATALA

Vaillants et Vaillantes

Fed. Commissaire: Charles LECA
Fed. Director: Paul ESTEVE
This movement is directed as youths of less than 18 yrs.

Université Nouvelle

Members: Casimir JOUSSERON, Prof. at University of Aix
Georges MOUNIER, Writer
Francis HALBWACHS, Fellow at University of Aix
This movement is directed at university groups.

Amies de la Paix

President: Perrine 8008

②

SECRET

29-4-5-233

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

LFMA- 186

Association France-Roumanie

Committee Members:

CERMOLACE
CLERISSY
COHEN
FROLY
GLOCARTY
HAINICLE
LION
MONTROONON
Dr. PETIT
RUYSSEN
ROOLIAND
SACHTER
SEBAN
THERAN
TOSTET

Association France-URSS

Headquarters: 68 rue Montgrand

Association Nationale des Fusilles et Massacres

Sec'y. General: Mme. GEORGES
Legal Counselor: Mlle. JUIFFRA

Association des Volontaires pour l'Espagne Republicaine

Headquarters: 4 rue St. Jacques

[illegible] ARCAC, P

Association Republicaine des Anciens Combattants Marseille area

Headquarters: 4 rue St. Jacques
President: Adrien MOUTON
Secretariat: SENATORE and J. MOUTET
Treasurer: J. CLERC
This organization is made up of 60 sections

Union Francaise des Anciens Combattants

President: RIEU-ROY
Vice-Pres: DUPUY
Sec'y-Gen: GUERINI
Treasurer: BRISSEC

Officiers de Reserve Republicains

Headquarters: 20 Blvd. Paul Peytral
Honorary Presidents: GRANIER and PETRE
Secretary: BAUD
Asst. Sec'y: PAC
Treasurer: CLOT

⑤

SECRET

Front National

Headquarters: 18 Allees Leon Gambetta

Groupement National des Refractaires et Maquisards

Headquarters: 41 and 43 rue Grignan
Dept. Sec'y: FROLY

Milices Patriotiques

President: RIPERT
(RIPERT was in command of a CRS unit which was dissolved after the events of December 1947, and is now chief of a Communist shock troop group.)

Federation Nationale des Deportés et Internés Patriotes

Headquarters: 54 La Canebiere
President: Colonel PETRE
Vice-Pres: Abbe COGNAC

Italia Libera

Headquarters: 55 rue d'Alger
President: Mario MAGLIOCCO
Secretary: Aurelio BERTINO

Front National Armenien

Headquarters: 67 rue Longue des Capucines
President: SAATDJIAN
Secretary: HATORIKIAN

PC Espagnol

Departmental Director: Fausto JIMENEZ

VARIOUS OTHER COMMUNIST-AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS

②

MUR
Union Republicaine et Resistante pour l'Union Francaise
Benjamins et Benjamines
Pionniers et Pionnieres
Federation Nationale des Sinistres
Association des Veuves de Guerre
Comités d'Entreprises
Comité de Vigilance
Comité de Defense de la Republique
Bureau Annexe Sud des Vietnamiens, An affiliation of the
  Delegation Generale des Vietnamiens de France

SECRET

UFMA - 186

IMPORTANT COMMUNIST CENTERS

Marseille
Arles
Aubagne
La Ciotat
Martigues
Miramas
Port de Bouc
Marignane
Gardanne
St. Louis du Rhone
St. Chamas

In case of Communist insurrection, it would be necessary to count on 12 to 15 thousand "die-hards", and 20 to 25 thousand who would be apt to side with the Communists.

RESULTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1946

Votes case	404,231
Communist votes	157,452 (38.9% of total)

RESULTS OF THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS OF 1947

Number of mayoralities to be elected	117
Number of Communists defeated	26 (22%)
Number of Communists elected	17 (14.5%)

POLITICAL MAJORITIES IN MUNICIPALITIES

Prior to 1947 - 19 municipalities Communist controlled (16.2%)
After 1947 - 12 municipalities Communist controlled (10.3%)
Municipal elected jobs held by Communist:
1945 - 498 1947 - 408

3

SECRET

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

14-00000

WFMA-186

COMMUNIST PARTY SECTION ADDRESSES IN MARSEILLE

1er Arrondissement: Headquarters, 62 rue de Lorette
Political sec'y., Louis CALISTI

2eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, 20 rue St. Saens
Political sec'y., Leon MERINO

3eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, 31 rue Guerin

4eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, rue Mourel, Maison du Peuple

5eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, 100 Bard Baille

6eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, 109 Blvd. Vauban, Maison du Peuple

7eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, 191 rue d!Endoume

8eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, Chemin du Rouet
Political sec'y., PELLEGRINI

9eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, 12 route de Cassis

10eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, Bor Port, 69 Ave. Delessert

11eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 162 Route Nationale, St. Marcel

12 emeArrondissement: Headquarters, St Barnabe, 18 Chemin de St. Julien

13eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 92 Ave. de St. Just

14eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, Bard de Pons, Bon Secours

15eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 10 Route de Lyon

16eme Arrondissement: Estaque Gare, Bordure du chemin de fer

Section de Saint Louis: Political secretary, BERT

Section de la Belle de Mai: headquarters, 31 rue Guerin

Section St. Lazare: headquarters, 3 Place de Strasbourg

Section Marine: headquarters, 25 Blvd. des Dousnes

Section Plaine: headquarters, 39 Place Jean Jaures

②

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

SECRET

29-4-5-233

NAMES AND LOCATIONS OF COMMUNIST PARTY CELLS IN MARSEILLE

Name	Location
Cheminots	Gare St. Charles
APAL	Vieux Marseille
Abattoirs	
Air France	Marignane
Albert BOS	Sebastopol
Alexandre BLANC	Sorgues
AUDIAS	PTT, rue Honnorat
"	La Madrague
BACCI	Trousat
BARBUSSE	Quartier Lodi
CAPATIINI	Bar du Telephone, 20 rue de Lyon, ARENC
CHAINAND	Estaque Bar du Littoral
COLLOMB	3 Marche des Capucins
DEVERGER	Porte d'Aix, 3 PAace de Strasbourg
DI BUSTO	Bar Moderne, Avenue d'Arenc
Des Douanes	Bar Robert, 40 rue Emile Zola
Freche	60 rue de Lorette
Entreprise Paoli	Rue Kleber
Excelsior	Blvd. Pons
FIFI TURIN	12 Chemin de Cassis, Ste. Marguerite
FLEURY	3 Marche des Capucins
Hopital de la Timone (under leadership of SEASSEAU)	
Jean PEREZ	60 rue de Lorette
IVALDI	Bar des Amis, 9 rue Pautrier
Jean THINQUET	Bar de la Veranda, rue des Grands Carmes
LAFFORGE	Bar Amer Picon, 3 Blvd. National
Louis PORTA	3 Place de Strasbourg
MANTAUZIER	60 rue de Lorette
Paul LANGEVIN	2 rue Moisson
Securite Sociale	3 rue Moutet
Vieux Marseille	60 rue de Lorette

SECRET

WFMA-186

COMMUNISTS HOLDING ELECTED OFFICES IN BOUCHES-DU-RHONE

Deputies

Francois BILLOUX, Marseille
Paul CERMOLAGE, Marseille
Jean CRISTOFOL, Marseille
Lucien LAMBERT, Marseille
Adrien MOUTON, Arles
Raymonde NEDELEC, Marseille

Counselors of the Republic

Marcelle BOUVET (alias DUMONT, Mireille)
Charles COSTES
Leon DAVID

Members of the General Council

Jean BARAILLER
Marcel BADUIN
Denis BIZOT
Pierre EMMANUELLI
Edmond GARCIN
Louis GAZAGNAIRE
Rene GAUTHIER
Martin GONTIER
Jean LAPRO
Clement MILLE
Raymonde NEDELEC
Josette REYBAUT
Jean SENATORE
Ludovic TROUIN

F. D. Noyes
F. D. NOYES

②

SECRET

29-4-5-257

104-10194-10001 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: TARASOFF, BORIS D.
OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: C/LAD

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
28 June		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

TARASOFF, BORIS D. 019477

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled in)

60 9
73-39 B60

TeKin,
11-3070

27 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch, Control Division, Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : Custody of Honor and Merit Award presented to Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff

Because of security restrictions, the Honor and Merit Awards Board is acting as custodian of the subject's Honor Award and related papers listed below:

Certificate of Merit

When security restrictions no longer prevail, the Awardee may obtain his award by calling the Executive Secretary.

Ellin B Glenn
Ellin B. Glenn
Executive Secretary
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
Original - Subject's OPF (No. 019477)
1 - C/WH Support Staff
1 - HMAB Case File

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY | Ad. 70

5 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Certificate of Merit

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the award named above will be conferred on you in recognition of the excellent service you have rendered this Agency. Security considerations relevant to the award are explained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security.

2. The award will be presented to you at a ceremony to be held in the near future. Members of your family, Agency associates, and intimate friends who are aware of your Agency affiliation may attend the ceremony.

3. Invitations to the ceremony will be extended by the Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, Office of Personnel, extension 3[illegible]. Please send to that office the names and phone numbers of the guests you would like to have invited, and indicate any dates on which you will not be available for such a ceremony.

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
- Orig - Addressee
  - 1 - C/WH
  - 1 - D/Pers Reader Chrono/OPF
  - 1 - Sec't, HMAB
  - 1 - Recorder, HMAB

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 November 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible] [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (MANDATORY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 30 | YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135 0990

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): L. 88-643 Sect. 235c

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0489

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 16,084

18. REMARKS:

Not Recommended for [illegible] List

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Pers | DATE SIGNED: 4 Nov 70

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Carl J. Taylor | DATE SIGNED: 4 Nov 70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQOTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
45	10				3	11 [illegible] 08		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
			DEEU000				

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE)	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-5-70 [illegible]

46. O P APPROVAL: Dow H. [illegible] | DATE APPROVED: 11/05/70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Tarasoff, Boris	Self	70-0502

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 2 Jan 69-3 Oct 69 .

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
14 January 1970	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) Tarasoff, Boris	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* Wife-Anna	CLAIM NUMBER 68-0264

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 22 June 1967.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 25 September 1967	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (4-21-55)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VIS

DATE PREPARED: 25 AUGUST 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Tarasoff, Boris [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 | DAY 10 | YEAR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8135 0990

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0489 HXXX

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 11685

18. REMARKS

FROM: SAME/0418 [redacted]

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 25 August

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 9/11/67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 56620 ALPHABETIC WH

22. STATION CODE: 45075

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HDQTRS CODE: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 | DA. 2 | YR. 28

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OASDI 3—FICA 4—NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46. OP APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 6 Sep 67

(4)

FORM 1152 3-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

2 AUG 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : DDP/OP

SUBJECT : [redacted]
Request for Early Home Leave

1. In accordance with HR 20-30b(3), it is requested that approval be granted for [redacted] [redacted] to begin home leave short of tour.

2. [redacted] has been [redacted] in Mexico City since 5 June 1963. He last returned from home leave on 13 January 1966 but because his wife's parents are in very poor health, the Station has requested on his behalf that the date of his home leave be advanced to 23 September 1967.

3. The Station and [redacted] are aware of the requirements to extend his next tour in Mexico City by the number of days his present tour will be reduced.

4. [redacted], a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System, will reach mandatory retirement age in November 1968. At that time he will be converted to contract employee status in order that the Division may retain his unique skills. (There is a continuing requirement for [redacted]' services as the Station's Russian and Spanish translator which could not be met as effectively by the utilization of other personnel.)

5. If this request is approved, please coordinate on the attached cable to Mexico City.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

[illegible]

SUBJECT: [redacted]S, Request for Early Home Leave

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment:
Bio Profile

CONCUR:

A DDP/OP 3 Aug 1967
Date

APPROVED:

for Director of Personnel 3 Aug 67
Date

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

OP-865

SUBJECT. (Optional)

FROM: ppm
Patricia P. MacDougall
WH/Personnel 3D5309

EXTENSION 6815

NO.

DATE 1 August 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/Personnel				
2. C/WH/1 3B4403				Call Linda x 4516
3. SB/Pers 5B4804				
4. C/WH/SS 3D3102				Hand Carry
5. C/WHD 3D3107		2 AUG 1967		
6. Mr. Collins CSPS/AP GG10	3 Aug. '67		Dmc	Subject has had 24 months continuous service in Mexico since 6 September 1960. CCS has no objection 6 to 10. This is in accord with the agreement you reached discussing this with Chief, WH. 6 to 10 & 12. Recommend approval. Douglas M. Collins
7.				
8. [redacted]				
9.				
10. DDP/OP 3C29	3 AUG 1967	3 Aug		
11.				
12. D/Pers 5E56				
13. WH/Pers 3D5309				
14. C/WHD 3D3107				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: WH PERSONNEL
EXT: 6815
DATE: 1 AUGUST 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER

CONF: QWH6 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR C/OPSER, D/OP, C/CCS3, C/CSPS,

S E C R E T

0 22 30Z

CITE DIRECTOR 23[illegible]66

TO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT/

REFS: A. HMMT-7717
B. FR 20-145 (3)
C. HMMT-7964

1. DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL APPROVES REF A REQUEST FOR HOME LEAVE SHORT OF TOUR. NEXT TOUR WILL BE EXTENDED BY NUMBER DAYS PRESENT TOUR SHORTENED.

2. HQS HAS DECIDED NOT TO GRANT EXCEPTION RETURNING FEINGLASS TO CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT ~~EE~~ SYSTEM BUT INSTEAD PLANS HIS USE AS A CONTRACT EMPLOYEE FOLLOWING RETIREMENT UNDER AGENCY SYSTEM IN NOVEMBER 1968. (SEE HD-5495 RE EMPLOYMENT OF ANNUITANTS)

3. WILL ADVISE RE TDY REPLACEMENT AND EXACT TIMING.

Mr. Conner (SB) x6412 will find TDYer.

//END OF MESSAGE//

D/PERS ______
DDP/OP ______
C/CSPS ______
C/WH/1 ______
C/WH PERS ______

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

GEORGE R. THOMPSON
C/WH/SS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

XX 13

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	29 MARCH 1967
1. SERIAL NUMBER	019477
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	[redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 04 DAY 09 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ XX CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	7135-0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH I MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0418
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	12 ~~2~~ 3
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ ~~11306~~ 11685

18. REMARKS

FROM: SAME/0400

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	Robert D. Cashman Chief, WH Personnel
DATE SIGNED	29 March
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	
DATE SIGNED	4 April 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	37
20. EMPLOY. CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	5162
21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	WH
22. STATION CODE	45075
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. HOOTERS CODE	3
25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	11 02 08
26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.) CODE	
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (2—WAIVER 1—YES) HEALTH INS. CODE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	C4-11 CPN
46. O.P. APPROVAL	Don H. Luetscher
DATE APPROVED	7 Apr 67

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

6 5 /

XXB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 December 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 18 YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7135-0990

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE:
20 EMPLOY CODE:
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE:
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HOOTRS CODE:
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA. YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE:
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-1364N

46 O P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 30 NC 19

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
OP-4-7-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

XXB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 APRIL 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH APR | DAY 11 | YEAR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | ~~CF TO CF~~ X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5135 0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH 97 / BRANCH 3 / MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION G
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0400
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 10,250

18. REMARKS

FROM: GS-11.3/$9,240

TO BE EFFECTIVE 11 APRIL 1965

Recorded by CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 4/9/65
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Collins
DATE SIGNED: 9 Apr 65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
22	10	51700	WH	45075		3	11	02	08	4	11	65	4	11	65

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV, PROV. TEMP) CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER, 1—YES) HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 04/09/65
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. Rogers - JbK
DATE APPROVED: 9 APR 1965

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) Tarasoff, Boris D	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* Self	CLAIM NUMBER [illegible]

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on [illegible] 1961. Virus infection

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 5 SEP 1963	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-55 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 MAY 1963

CIC

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]

06/05/63

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT Career

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 05 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135-5700-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): /

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 400

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $8575

18. REMARKS:

1 COPY TO FINANCE DIV.

1 COPY TO SECURITY

C - 02/57 ✓

Recorded by
CSPD

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 5/14/63

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: D. H. Collins

DATE SIGNED: 21 May 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 4700 ALPHABETIC WH

22. STATION CODE: 45075

24. [illegible] CODE: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 30 YR. 28

26. DATE OF GRADE: 25 [illegible]

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 6 DA. 28 YR. 52

30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE /

EOD DATA

33. SECUR. REQ. NO.: [illegible]

34. SEX: M 1

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 1 (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.)

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. 06 DA. 02 YR. 51

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. 02 DA. 20 YR. 56

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE C

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 1 (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 6

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) CODE 0 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0

44. STATE TAX DATA: —

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 6/05/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 27 May 63

(4)

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 May 1963

CSF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 019477	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) TARASOFF, BORIS D. ✓ 06/04/62
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH ~~05~~ DAY ~~15~~ YEAR ~~63~~
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	

6. FUNDS ▶

X	V TO V		V TO CF	
	CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235-1990-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: I O FOREIGN DOC

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.62

16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 8575 ✓

18. REMARKS

FROM: SAME

1 COPY TO FINANCE DIVISION

Received by
CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS	DATE SIGNED 5/14/63	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER for Myron Smith	DATE SIGNED 21 May 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ~~34997~~	ALPHABETIC ~~WH~~	22. STATION CODE ~~[illegible]~~	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VOTERS CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 11 62 03	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.:

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.:

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE:

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1,1049 71

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.:

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.:

36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:

37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:

38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE:

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE:

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS):

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS:

44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE:

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION W Kearney 06/03/63	46. O.P. APPROVAL Charles W. Claxon	DATE APPROVED 28 May 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ______________ (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE ·	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Boris D. Tarasoff

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular
Part Time
Temporary
Temporary - Part Time
Summer
Detail Out
Detail In
WAE
Consultant
Military

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE
- Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
  - Office, Major Staff, etc.
    - Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
      - Branch
        - Section
          - Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

MHC: 5 JUNE 63

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 019477	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) TARASOFF BORIS D		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 04 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3235 1890 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	
11. POSITION TITLE I O FOREIGN DOC		12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.82	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 8575

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 OCTOBER 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): TARASOFF, BORIS D.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT ~~+ chg of SD~~

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 26 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235-1990-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: I O Foreign Dev

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: OD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.62

16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~8310~~ 8,575

18. REMARKS:

FROM: DDI/FDD/USSR BR/MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT./WASH. D.C.

CONCURRENCE

D. Segull

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: P C Bowers
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERS OFCR

DATE SIGNED: 10/31/62

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul C Wilson

DATE SIGNED: 5 Nov 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 3
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 4997 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 02 YR. 08
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Sec Cover FDD
W. K[illegible] 11/21/62

46. O.P. APPROVAL: M D Dhue

DATE APPROVED: 11/23/62

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

21 April 1960

1. Serial No. 119477	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) TARASOFF BORIS D	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 11 Da. 02 Yr. 08	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 02 Da. 20 Yr. 56
7. SCD Mo. 06 Da. 02 Yr. 51	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code 12. LCD Mo. 02 Da. 20 Yr. 56	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Ecd. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDI 00 FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.	Code 2720	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code 2	17. Position Title 10 FOREIGN DOC	18. Position No. 1146	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0132.48

21. Grade & Step 10 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6505	23. SD OD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 14 Yr. 59	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 12 Yr. 60	26. Appropriation Number 0243-1010-0000 ~~5 4300 20 001~~

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Promotion	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. 5 Da. 1 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Data

25

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch Materials & Industry Section	Code 2720	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code 2	34. Position Title IO (Foreign Doc)	35. Position No. 1146	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0132.48

38. Grade & Step 11 01	39. Salary Or Rate $7,030	40. SD OD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 5 Da. 1 Yr. 60	42. PSI Due Mo. 10 Da. 24 Yr. 61	43. Appropriation Number 0243-1010-0000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Talbot Bielefeldt Chief, USSR Branch	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) Bagnall J. J. BAGNALL Chief, Foreign Documents Division
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Myron Shpur, Ext. 4876	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	4/29/60

Remarks

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

N/c file 4/26/60

(4)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

5 June 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) TARASOFF, Boris D.	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 11 Da. 02 Yr. 08	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo. 02 Da. 20 Yr. 56	
7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No. - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Eod Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch Materials & Industry Section	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code 2	17. Position Title IO (Foreign Doc)	18. Position No. 1147	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0132.48

21. Grade & Step 09 03	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6285	23. SD OD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 5 17 57	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 5 15 60	26. Appropriation Number 9-4300-20-001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Promotion	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. 6 14 59	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch Materials & Industry Section	Code	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code 2	34. Position Title IO (Foreign Doc)	35. Position No. 1146	36. Serv. GS-	37. Occup. Series 0132.48

38. Grade & Step 10 01	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6505	40. SD OD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 6-14 59	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 6 17 60	43. Appropriation Number 9-4300-20-001

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Talbot Bielefeldt Chief, USSR Branch	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) J. J. BAGNALL Chief, Foreign Documents Division
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Myron Shpur, Ext. 576	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		10 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

(4)

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 - FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.- One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov 1908

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 2 May 57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Promotion
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: asap
B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Foreign Docs. Officer - K653.04-~~7~~	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Foreign Docs. Officer - K653.04
GS-0132.48-7, $4660.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.48-9, $5440.00 p.a.
DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) Talbot Bielefeldt
Chief, USSR Branch

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Myron Shpur, ext. 576

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: J.J. BAGNALL, Chief, Foreign Docs. Div.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-OD

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM
TO: 7-4301-20

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	gw	5/7/57
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

16—57320-4

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 - FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 27 Sep 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP B. APPROVED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	

FROM—		TO—
Foreign Documents Off. - K777.99(01) GS-0132.48-7, $4525.00 per annum	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	Foreign Documents Off. - K653.04-7 GS-0132.48-7, $4525.00 per annum
DDI-Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Present incumbent (James Whalen) will be resigning cob 28 September.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) Talbot Bielefeldt Chief, USSR Branch	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Benjamin F. Cain BENJAMIN F. CAIN Title: Acting Chief, Foreign Documents Division
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) Myron Shpur, Ext. 576	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-OD

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-4301-20 TO:	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JW	10/2/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

OCT 11 [illegible]

F. APPROVED BY

CONFIDENTIAL

10—67329-4

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov. 1908
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 25 June 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment and Change of Service Designation
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
7 Sept. 56
~~1956~~

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Intell. Assistant - BVP - 8141	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Foreign Docs. Officer - K777.99(OL)
GS-0301.28-7, $4525.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.46-7, $4525.00 per annum
DDP/FI Staff Division D Project PBJOINTLY Office of the Chief Branch 2 Section B.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Action has been coordinated with Career Service Boards concerned.
Two copies forwarded to Office of Security.
Loss Notice attached.
Concur for PB Jointly: RB Ledford 8/29/56

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Talbot Bielefeldt
Chief, USSR Branch

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Myron Shpur, Ext. 576

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J J Bagnall
Title: J. J. BAGNALL, Chief, For. Docs. Div.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

From: SD-D
To: SD-OD

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-2306-23
TO: 1-4301-20
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	gJ	8/16/56	8-16-56
C. CLASSIFICATION			no FI Rpt - only move sptl & Project.
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY Robert L. Stuckey for [illegible] 9/7/56

10—67320-4

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER 9

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname*) TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri	2. DATE OF BIRTH Nov. 2, 1908	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 18 Aug. 1955
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 20 Feb. 56	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intell Asst ~~Intel-Analyst~~ (Gen) BVP-6141 ~~[illegible]~~01
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	~~GS-0132.36-07~~ $4525 GS-301.28-7
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DD/P FI Staff PB Jointly Division D Project [redacted] Office of the Chief Branch 2 Section B
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL DI

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Request Expedite Clearance for PB Jointly Action Coordinated with "D" and DI CS [illegible]

B. REQUESTED BY: Frank B Rowlett
FRANK B. ROWLETT, Chief, FI/SPD

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Harriet Conner x3030
~~[illegible]~~

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

SD:D

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: TO: 6-2300-23			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JB	22 Aug	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY R. H. Stricklin — RG Lofland 8/19/55

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

1. DATE OF INTERVIEW
6/12/55

2. PLACE
Berkeley, Calif.

3. PREVIOUS APPLICATION
☐ Yes ☒ No

4. INTERVIEWER
JFWinter

5. REFERRED BY
Busby/FR

6. NAME (Last name first, in caps)
TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri

7. PERMANENT ADDRESS
16315 Bevil Way, San Leandro, Calif.
TELEPHONE
FR 60718

8. BUSINESS ADDRESS
TELEPHONE

9. TEMPORARY ADDRESS
TELEPHONE

10. DATE OF BIRTH
11/2/03

11. PLACE OF BIRTH
EKATERINOSAV, Russia

12. CITIZENSHIP
☒ U.S. ☐ OTHER (List Country) ____
ACQUIRED BY: ☐ Birth ☒ Naturalization (Date) ____

13. ☐ Single ☐ Married ☐ Widow(er) ☐ Divorced

14. NO. OF DEPEND. (Excluding Wife)

15. FOREIGN RELATIVES, INCLUDING WIFE (REG. 10-9)
None

16. EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, THESIS TITLE, GRADE AVERAGE OR CLASS STANDING, EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES, ETC.)

Russian University, New York, N.Y. 1924-26. General Course.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

17. MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (EMPLOYERS, POSITIONS, DUTIES, SALARIES, REASONS FOR LEAVING)
1/52 to present: YWCA, Oakland, Calif. Building Eng. $305. mo.
12/45-10/51: American National Red Cross, Cleveland, Ohio. Building Maintenance man. $265 mo

18. MILITARY EXPERIENCE (BRANCH, SERIAL NO., STATIONS, TRAINING DUTIES, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES, RANK HELD, RESERVE STATUS, CURRENT PROFICIENCY AND INTEREST). INCLUDE ALSO DRAFT, ACTIVE MILITARY OR RETIRED STATUS.
USArmy. T/4. 2/41-11/45. Honorable Discharge. 20248233. Was Special Agt. in Germany and was used as interpreter between US and Soviet forces for short while.

FORM NO. 37-117
OCT 1952

CONFIDENTIAL

(4.11)

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

19. AREA KNOWLEDGE (AREAS, TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE, HOW ACQUIRED, ETC.)

Ger., WW II

20. LANGUAGE FACILITY (GIVE TESTS WHEN SKILL WARRANTS AND RATE BELOW)

Language	Native Fluency	Fluent but Foreign	Adequate for Translator	Adequate for Research	Adequate for Travel	Limited	Acquired By
Russian		r,s,w,u					Study and home
German					r,s,w,u		Residence
French					r,s,w,u		Study

21. SALARY REQUESTED GS 7

22. POOL INTEREST ☐ Yes ☐ No

23. ACCEPTABLE STATION
Washington, D.C. ☒ Yes ☐ No
Anywhere in U.S. ☒ Yes ☐ No
Overseas ☒ Yes ☐ No

PREFERENCE LIMITATIONS

24. HEALTH Good

25. FORMS GIVEN ☒ PHS ☒ App. 1 ☒ Med. ☒ Sec. Agree. ☐ [illegible] Required

26. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION (APPEARANCE, MANNERS, PERSONALITY, MATURITY, MOTIVATION, FLEXIBILITY, INTELLIGENCE, EMOTIONAL STABILITY, QUALIFICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE WORK, CAREER PLANNING, OVER-ALL IMPRESSION, PERTINENT UNFAVORABLE FACTORS)

PROFESSIONAL

There's nothing outstanding about Tarasoff - just an average joe trying to make a living and without the ambition, energy, perspicaity to make use of a saleable article: knowledge of Russian. Physically he's sort of soft, tends to be overweight - he's about 5'8"tall, and about 190 in weight. His personality is on the negative side, his manner dull.

Tarasoff was greatly interested in the possibility of working for the US Government. He wants that security. And he has about reached the end of the line salary wise as a maintenance man or building superintendent. Tarasoff is willing to work in D.C. but insists on a GS 7 because he has to support a wife and two children. He does not mind the sedentary aspects of Project Detail - I doubt if he'd be interested in anything that wasn't sedentary. He also liked the the other aspects of Detail and I would think from talking with him that he would be quite able to handle a job on Detail. He can translate - reads with a great deal of ease. His PHS I notice indicated he's interested only in o/s - this is not what he told me; he is interested in US also but he will go o/s if necessary.

I recommend Tarasoff for a GS 7 on Project Detail.

27. RECOMMENDED FOR

~~Pusey/Project Detail~~

28. SERIAL NUMBER(S)

29. TESTS

30.

JRWinter
JRWinter
Signature of Interviewer

7/4/55
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 019477

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 2 Jun 1951

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [redacted]

3. SEX M

4. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908

5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 20 Feb 1956

6. MARITAL STATUS Married

7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee) NO. 3 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1923 1965 1949

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) 1936 Russia Spouse: NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS MEMBERSHIP Feb 1959

OTHER STATUS

10. LAST MED. EXT. Mar 1963 QUAL. FOR PCS O/S EVAL. FOR PCS O/S

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS NONE X SERVICE

GRADE

ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1

RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2

TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3

RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE Feb 1956

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1936-40 J. F. Sullivan, General Contractor, Bronx, NY - Supervisor of Crews
1941-45 Military Service, US Army, CIC, T/4 - Special Agent
1945-51 American National Red Cross, Cleveland, Ohio - Building Maintenance
1951 Aero-Tech, Oakland, Calif - Shop Maintenance (2 mos)
1952-56 YMCA, Oakland, Calif - Building Engineer

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION Born and lived in Russia until 1920, in Istanbul 1920-23
1924-26 Russian Univ of New York, NYC - Russian English, History
1927 Cooper Union Art School, NYC - Fine Arts (10 mos)
1944-5 MITC, Camp Ritchie, Md - CIC (2 mos); 1945 Univ of Pa - German Lang
1950-51 Cooper School of Art, Cleveland, Ohio - Commercial Art
1953-54 Oakland Art Institute Oakland Calif - Advertising Art

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)
Russian - R,W,P,S,U Native; Transl & Interpr - Apr 1957
Ukranian - R,W,S,U Inter; P High - Apr 1957 - Interpr
White Russian(Byelo) - R,W,S,U Inter; P High; Interpr - Apr 1957
(Continued on next page)
1962-3 Spanish

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING
1956 English Usage Review
1957 Intel Orient
1957 Basic Country Surv-USSR for FDD
1958 Non-clerical Basic Typing
1959 Writing Workshop

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Feb 1956	Intel Asst	0301.28	7	D	DDP/FIStf/DivD/PBJOINTLY	Hq
Jun 1956	" "	0132.48	7	OD	OO/FDD/USSR Br	"
Sep 1956	For Docs Off	0132.48	7	OD	" " " "	"
May 1957	" " "	0132.48	9	OD	" " " "	"
Jun 1959	I.O.(For Doc)	0132.48	10	OD	OO/FDD/USSR Br/Mater&IndusSec	"
May 1960	" " "	0132.48	11	OD	" " " " " " "	"
Nov 1962	" " "	0132.48	11	OD	DDP/WH/CS/CS Dev Comp)	"
Jun 1963	Ops Off (SA)	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-3	Mexico City
Apr 1965	" " "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/WH-1	" "

20. DATE REVIEWED 10 Nov 1969

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hms /hc

22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE 14 Jun 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.
019477

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I - Continued)

NAME (Last-First-Middle)
[redacted] Tarasoff, Boris

DATE OF BIRTH
2 Nov 1908

17. Foreign Language Abilities - Continued:
Bulgarian - R,W Inter (Apr 1959) P,S,U Slight; T None - Apr 1959
Slovak - R,U High; P Native; W,S,T None - Apr 1957
Polish - R (Inter) P,S,U Slight; W,T None - Jun 1959
Czech - R Inter (Feb 1960)
Serb-Croat(Serb) - R Inter (May 1959)
French - R Inter; W,P,S,U,T None - Disclaims proficiency Feb 1967

DATE REVIEWED
10 Nov 1969

PROFILE REVIEWED BY
hms/hc

SECRET
(when filled in)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 19477	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)	
NAME (Last-First-Middle) TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri		DATE OF BIRTH Nov 1908

25. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS


TARASOFF Boris
FEBRUARY 1961

Color Photo Inserted Behind
Biograhpic Profile in
TRUE NAME


TARASOFF Boris
FEBRUARY 1961

27. DATE REVIEWED 10 May 1960	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY OP/POD/QAB/hms

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET

57

PROFILE

RET
(W... ...led In)

BI... ...PHIC PROFILE (...RT 2)

PERS. SERIAL NO.: 019477

NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Tarasoff, Boris D.

DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov 1968

23. PHOTOGRAPH



[redacted]

24. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

25. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

26. DATE REVIEWED: 10 Nov 1969

27. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: hms/hc

FORM 2-68 1200 (PART 2) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

PROFILE (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
019177

SECTION A GENERAL

Tarasoff Boris

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify):*

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify):*

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*: 1 January 1968 thru 31 December 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language product into English transcript	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Translation of Russian letters into English	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Transcription of English language conversations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 [illegible]	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

FEB 25 1 45 PM '69

This officer continues to consistently perform at the excellent level which has characterized his work in this Station for several years. His high level of personal dedication and professional competence have become standard.

From his daily work he has an intimate knowledge of and insight into the personalities of individual Soviets and the personal inter-relationships existing between members of the local Soviet colony. The character analyses which he prepares are excellent and an invaluable aid to our Soviet program.

He has had no professional, administrative, or personal problems during the reporting period.

His knowledge of Spanish continues to improve and aids him considerably in his work.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1\.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 28 Jan 60

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 41 months

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 28 Jan 69

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Ops Officer

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Paul L. Dillion /s/

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs with the ratings given in Section B and in the narrative evaluation of this officer's performance in Section C. He continues to perform his duties in a superior fashion.

DATE: 28 Jan 69

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief of Station

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] Nov 193[illegible]	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See Instructions - Section C)*
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: [illegible] February 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*: 1 January 1967 - 1 January 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language telephone product into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Translation of Russian letters into English.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Transcription of English language conversations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 24 [illegible]	

22 MAY 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective. their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

MAY 22

This officer continues to perform his duties in the excellent manner that we have come to expect during the 4 1/2 years that he has served in the Station. His work is an indispensable part of the Station's program.

He has had no professional, administrative or personal problems during the reporting period.

He continues to study Spanish in which he shows satisfactory improvement.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	/s/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
29		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Ops Officer	Paul Dillon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs in the ratings given this officer and in the narrative evaluation of his performance.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 February 1968	chief of Station	Winston Scott

SECRET

SECRET

C-2532 (Biladeau)
5 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Transactions and Records Branch
Office of Personnel

ATTENTION: Mary Coriden

SUBJECT: Boris D. TARASOFF — 1
Anna TARASOFF

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/or, have been completed for the above-named subjects.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly blocked to deny subjects' current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

THOMAS K. STRANGE
Deputy Chief, CCS/NC

cc: ID/SO

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

DT

BBG: 30 NOV 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 019477	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Tarasoff Boris D [redacted]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT (MANDATORY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM		4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 11 30 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1135 0990 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY P.L. 88-643 SECT. 235 B
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0489	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 16084

18. REMARKS

T-P.1??

---

1. LAST NAME TARASOFF FIRST NAME Boris INITIAL(S) D

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
11/30/70 RETIREMENT

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty F/T P/T
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ______ Annual Leave Bal. ______

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
Years Months Days
☐ More than 15 years

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)

	ANNUAL	SICK
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 19 70	360	900
6. Current leave year accrual through 11/28 19 70	184	92
7. Total	544	992
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9. Total leave taken	168	0
10. Balance	376	*992

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 360 hrs + 2 holidays
12. Salary rate(s) $16,084.00
13. Lump sum leave dates
From 0830 12/1/70 to 2/03/71 1700 (Hours)

24. Certified correct by
(Signature)
FOR CHIEF PAYROLL (Title)
1/5/71 (Date)
(Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______
15. Current balance as of ______ 19__ ______
16. 12-month accrual rate ______
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______
18. Monthly accrual date ______
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date ______
20. Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr. ______ to ______
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr. ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension
23. During leave year in which separated	0	
24. During step-increase waiting period which began on 4/5/70	0	
25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates) ______		

REMARKS
SCD: 6/2/51
*Unused Sick Leave—992hrs—"U.S.C. Ch 63"

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
019477	[redacted]	51 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 12	4	$14,727	04/07/68	GS 12	5	$15,173	04/05/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 7-1-70

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY Dow H [illegible]

FORM 7-56 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[redacted]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 4	$15,611

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[illegible] [redacted]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 3	$11,685	$12,225

1011

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME				3. ORGANIZATION		4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS	
019477	[illegible] [redacted]				51 620		CF		
6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 12	3	$12,225	04/09/67	GS 12	4	$12,607	04/07/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE [illegible] DATE 7 Feb 68

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

[illegible]

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[illegible] [redacted]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 4	$12,607	$13,392

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SE: 12 SEPT. 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 019477	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Lazasell, Berco D [redacted]			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 09 10 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	V TO V CF TO V X	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 3135 0990 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0459	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 11685	

18. REMARKS

18 Sep 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51620	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 11 02 08	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR	28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA. YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE CAR PROV. TEMP.	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9/13/67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET MAH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EJT: 13 APR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCE

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible] D [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 04 DA. 09 YR. 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V · V TO CF · CF TO V X · CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7135 0990 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH I
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0418
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 11685
18. REMARKS:

POSTED ON
OF-4b

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
32	10	51620	WH	45075		3	11 02 08		

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC · 2 - CIA · 3 - FICA · 4 - NONE · CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE · MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE · 0 - NONE · 1 - 5 PT · 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR · RESV · PROV · TEMP · CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE · 0 - WAIVED · 1 - YES · HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE · 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE · 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE · 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) · 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO · CODE · NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO · CODE · NO. TAX EXEMP. · STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible] ECHOLS

POSTED

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

dwp/!

Serial No.	Name		
019477	[redacted]	51 672 CF	

Old Salary Rate				New Salary Rate				Type Action		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PA		ACT
GS 12	2	$11,306	04/10/66	GS 12	3	$11,665	04/09/67			

8. Remarks and Authentication

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

POSTED ON
OF-40

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 15 Feb 67

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 560E 3-65 (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Jassell D. Boris D [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. DA. YR. 12 11 3 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7135 0990 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS: EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ Code
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE; CODE 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR / RES / PROV / TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 2	$10,987	$11,306

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 1	$10,250 ✓	$10,619 ✓

Bcl

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
019477	[redacted]	51 620 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	6. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	7. TYPE ACTION PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	1	$10,619	04/11/65	GS 12	2	$10,987	04/10/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

8 APR

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLC: 9 APR 65

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 013477
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 04 DA. 11 YR. 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5135 0990 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0400
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 10250
18. REMARKS:

POSTED ON
OF-4b
PK
14 APR 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51700 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 45075
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 11 DA. 02 YR 08
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 04 DA. 11 YR 65
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 04 DA 11 YR. 65
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR PROV RESV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE.
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
04/13/65 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

WH

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
019477	[redacted]	64 700 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 11	3	$ 8,575	10/28/62	GS 11	4	$ 8,840	10/27/63			

POSTED ON
-4b

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY Joseph B. Ga

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE [illegible] 63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

WH

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted]	019477	51 700	CF	GS 11 4	$ 8,840	$ 9,250

TED
-4b
5 JAN 1964

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLG: 5 JUNE 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (CAREER)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 06 05 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135 5700 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0400
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 8575
18. REMARKS:

POSTED ON
JUN 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. Emplov. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64700 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 45075
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 11 02 08
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.): 05 01 60
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.): 10 28 62
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE): CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.):

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 00000
34. SEX: M1
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT): CODE 1
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 06 02 51
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 02 20 56
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP): CODE C
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES): CODE 1; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS): CODE 1
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 6
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE 0; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06/11/63 DK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

5 JUN 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JGD 28 AUG 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 019477	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) TARASOFF BORIS D

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION (CORRECTION)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 06 04 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4235 1990 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE I O FOREIGN DOC	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION OD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.62	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 8575

18. REMARKS
THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 06/04/63 AS FOLLOWS:
ITEM # 13 SERVICE DESIGNATION WHICH READ, D TO READ, OD.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ. Code 18	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 11 02 08	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 1BD0091	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.		EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE		40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

POSTED
09/25/63 WK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 28 AUG 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MHC: 5 JUNE 63

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): TARASOFF BORIS D
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR): 06 | 04 | 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235 1890 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: I O FOREIGN DOC
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.62
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 8575
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ. Code: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR): 11 | 02 | 08
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1BD0091
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06/06/63 WK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

5 JUN 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

ABM: 26 NOV 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 019477	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) TARASOFF BORIS D		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 11 26 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3235 1990 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE I O FOREIGN DOC		12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION OD
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.62	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 8575

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 18	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 64997 ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 11 02 08	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.		EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12/6/62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

11/26/62 abm

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-31)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND OCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1962 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
TARASOFF BORIS D	019477	86100	V	11 2	$ 7820	11 2	$ 8310

2-13-1010

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
019477	TARASOFF BORIS D	86 100 V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-11	2	$ 8,310	10/29/61	S-11	3	$ 8,575	10/28/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS JWH AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE: 10/24/62

E O ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name			3. Cost Center Number				4. LWOP Hours		
19A77	TARASOFF BORIS D			DDI/FED 2 23						
5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 11	1	$ 7,560	05/21/60	11	2	$ 7,820	10/29/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

SECRET

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

L_1

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OD	TARASOFF BORIS D	119477	27 20	GS-11 1	$ 7,030	$ 7,560

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

BWS: 29 APR 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	11	02	08		1	M	1	02	20	56			
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 / Code
06	02	51		1	50 USCA 403 J						02	20	56	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI 00 FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.	2720	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	10 FOREIGN DOC	1146	GS	0132.48

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
10 1	$ 6505	OD	06	14	59	06	12	60	9 4300 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	05	01	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI 00 FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECTION	2720	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	10 (FOREIGN DOC)	1146	GS	0132.48

39. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
11 1	$ 7030	OD	05	01	60	10	29	61	0243 1010 0000

44. Remarks

POSTED
19 MAY

STEWART

FORM NO 1150
1 MAR 57

15-3-60

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 12 JUNE 59

1. Serial No. 119477	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) TARASOFF BORIS D	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 11 Da. 02 Yr. 08	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1	5. Sex M 1
7. SCD Mo. 06 Da. 02 Yr. 51	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1.	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code

6. CS-EOD Mo. 02 Da. 20 Yr. 56	12. LCD Mo. 02 Da. 20 Yr. 56	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDI OFFICE OF OPERATIONS FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.	Code	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6) Code 2	17. Position Title 10 FOREIGN DOC	18. Position No. 1147	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0132.48

21. Grade & Step 09 3	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6285	23. SD 00	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number 9 4300 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. 06 Da. 14 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDI OO FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.	Code 2720	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6) Code 2	34. Position Title 10 FOREIGN DOC	35. Position No. 1146	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0132.48

38. Grade & Step 10 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6505	40. SD 00	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 14 Yr. 59	42. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 12 Yr. 60	43. Appropriation Number 9 4300 20 001

44. Remarks

FO[illegible]
16 JUN 1959

SECRET

FORM NO 1150
1 MAR 57

a E 6/15/59

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS.D	DDI/FDD -25	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR.				MO	DA	YR.
GS 9	2	$ 6,135	05	18	58	GS 9	3	$ 6,285	05	17	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

PAYROLL BRANCH
MAY 11 11 50 AM '59

S.M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 THIS NOTIFICATION EFFECTS RESLOTTING RESULTING
FROM R-20-250

SER #	NAME	SD	OLD SLOT	NEW SLOT	DATE
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	OD	0653.04	1147	02/24/59

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN. 25	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD ~~24~~	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 9	1	$ 5,440				GS 9	2	$ 5,575	05	18	58

REMARKS

Bd

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
TALBOT BIELEFELDT	1 April 1958	T Bielefeldt

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 9	1	$ 5,440			7	GS 9	2	$ 5,575	05	18	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

MAY 3 [illegible]
[illegible] PAYROLL BRANCH

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
TARASOFF BORIS D	119477	GS-09-2	$ 5,575	$ 6,135

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (3 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 8, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

are

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. BORIS D. TARASOFF 119477	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 17 May 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) PROMOTION 30	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 19 May 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Foreign Documents Off. K-653.04
GS-0132.48-7 $4660.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.48-9 $5440.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 232040	DDI/CO Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-OD

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION W FROM: 7-4301-20 750-13 TO: Same	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

20. REMARKS:

4 EOD 02/20/56

POSTED
27 MAY 1957
JW

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

7/7-#123/57

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4.	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD -25	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR
7	1	$ 4,525	02	20	56	7	2	$ 4,660	02	24	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Talbot Bielefeldt	7 Jan 57	T. Bielefeldt

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 50

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

STANDARD FORM 50 (3 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. BORIS D. TARASOFF 119477	2 Nov 1908		3 October 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
REASSIGNMENT 56	7 Oct 1956	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
K-777.99	8. POSITION TITLE	Foreign Documents Off. K-653.04-7
GS-0132.48-7 $4525.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.48-7 $4525.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 232940	DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER	14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
1			X							SD-CD

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
1 M W	FROM: 7-4301-20 750-13 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

4 ECD 02/20/56

POSTED
OCT 5 1956

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

1v1

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov 1908
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 13 Sep 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): 57 Reassignment (Change of Service Designation)
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 9 Sep 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Intell. Asst. BVP-0141	8. POSITION TITLE	Foreign Docs. Off. K-777.99
GS-0301.28-7	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.48-7 $4525.00 per annum
DDP/FI Staff Division D, Project FB Jointly Office of the Chief Branch 2, Section B	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 232040	DDI/OO FDD USSR Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

From: SD/D
To : SD/CD

15. SEX: M W
16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-2306-83 750-13
TO: 7-4301-20

1

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. REMARKS:

4 EOD 02/20/56

LOGGED
SEP 20 1956

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956-378667

773 9/14/56

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC

P.C. 14 Dec. 1955
C.-1235 tat

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. BORIS D. TARASOFF
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov. 19[illegible]
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 20 Feb. 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 20 Feb. 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel. Asst. BVP-S141
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-301.28-7 $4525.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff Division D Project PBJOINTLY Office of the Chief Branch 2 Section B
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:D ECC

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: W 6-2396.23
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 20 Feb. 1956
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

20. REMARKS:

Subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.
Subject to the satisfactory completion of a medical examination.

RC-93

DOG: 2/20/56
CSFOD: 2/20/56
LCD: 2/20/56
SCD: 6/02/51

PSI Due: 2/24/57

POSTED

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

~~Director of Personnel~~

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 - 353000

[illegible] 2/20/56

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A Tarasoff, Boris GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov. 08	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Off	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Br.1	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- XX REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January - 15 July 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language materials into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Transcription of English language conversations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

14 AUG 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer has continued to perform his assigned tasks in superior fashion. Not only is he a skilled transcriber/translator, he is also able to put his experience and knowledge into words in preparing character analyses which have been of great value to the Station's operational program. Although his work load is often quite heavy, he can always be counted on to complete his assignments promptly and he willingly puts in the extra time frequently needed.

His team spirit and dedication are shown by the fact that on several occasions, in spite of advancing age and recent illness, he spent long hours in base houses on live-monitoring assignments. He will be greatly missed when he retires in the near future.

As previously noted, this officer does not handle operational funds or have supervisory responsibilities. He has had no cover problems, nor has he required any unusual administrative support, other than that which is to be expected in connection with his forthcoming retirement.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	/s/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
19 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Ops Officer	Donald F. Vogel /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above ratings and comments. I am not able to add any meaningful comments due to the highly specialized nature of Subject's duties.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Deputy Chief of Station	Paul V. Harwood /s/

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 019477

SECTION A [illegible] **GENERAL**

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Br.1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE	TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)			
	SPECIAL (Specify):			

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
28 February 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January thru 31 December 1969

SECTION B **PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language materials into English transcript.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Transcription of English language conversations.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 1-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer continues to perform his assigned duties in a superior fashion. Illness put him out of action for some time, but otherwise the Station received the fine performance which has come to be routine with him. This officer's experience and dedication make it possible for him to work effectively with an absolute minimum of supervision. He responds instinctively to items of operational significance, and his experience and knowledge make it possible for him to write penetrating analyses of target personalities, and interrelationships among these persons, based solely on what he hears.

This officer has also been called upon to transcribe material from audio operations, in addition to the telephone material which is his normal assignment. He has also handled this well, although his advancing age and less acute hearing make this task much more difficult for him.

While not called upon to use Spanish normally, he has sufficient fluency to handle material in Spanish when required.

This officer uses his time well and takes good care of the equipment assigned to him. He does not handle operational funds nor does he have any supervisory responsibilities.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
20 January 1970	[redacted] /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
12 months	[illegible]

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 January 1970	Donald F. Vogel /s/	Ops Officer

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I can add nothing substantive to the above report since I have little opportunity to deal at first hand with Subject's output. The rating officer is both meticulous and fair and I have full confidence in his evaluation of Subject.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 January 1970	Chief, Ops Officer	Paul V. Harwood /s/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
019477

SECTION A GENERAL

Tarasoff Boris N.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov. 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
28 February 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1968 thru 31 December 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language product into English transcript	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Translation of Russian letters into English	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Transcription of English language conversations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
6-65

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

FEB 25 1 46 PM '69

This officer continues to consistently perform at the excellent level which has characterized his work in this Station for several years. His high level of personal dedication and professional competence have become standard.

From his daily work he has an intimate knowledge of and insight into the personalities of individual Soviets and the personal inter-relationships existing between members of the local Soviet colony. The character analyses which he prepares are excellent and an invaluable aid to our Soviet program.

He has had no professional, administrative, or personal problems during the reporting period.

His knowledge of Spanish continues to improve and aids him considerably in his work.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 28 Jan 60	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 41 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 28 Jan 69	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Paul L. Dillion /s/

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs with the ratings given in Section B and in the narrative evaluation of this officer's performance in Section C. He continues to perform his duties in a superior fashion.

DATE 28 Jan 69	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1928	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF DIV OR BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- XX CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- XX SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*: 1 January 1967 - 1 January 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language telephone product into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Translation of Russian letters into English.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Transcription of English language conversations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 241441	

22 MAY 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

SECTION C

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer continues to perform his duties in the excellent manner that we have come to expect during the 4 1/2 years that he has served in the Station. His work is an indispensable part of the Station's program.

He has had no professional, administrative or personal problems during the reporting period.

He continues to study Spanish in which he shows satisfactory improvement.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

SECTION D

BY EMPLOYEE

1\.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 29	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Paul Dillon

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs in the ratings given this officer and in the narrative evaluation of his performance.

DATE 16 February 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston Scott

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
~~253336~~

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible] [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH-1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
XX CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
28 February 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1966-31 December 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language telephone tap product into English transcript.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Translation of Russian letters into English.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Translation of Spanish language telephone product into English and transcription of English conversations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

27 MAR 1967

14 JUN 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

[redacted] continues to show a high degree of competence in his primary responsibility, which is translating and transcribing Russian telephone conversations. He works quickly and accurately and has a fine feeling for the subleties of the Russian language. His character analyses of Soviets have been of great assistance in the Station's operational planning. He continues to maintain his deep cover status well and presents no problem of either an administrative or a personal nature. His wife continues to assist him with his work, and together they make an excellent team.

Subject is very cost conscious in his operational duties.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1\.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 3 Feb 67	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 3 Feb 67	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Cynitha Hausmann

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the rating officer's evaluation. The Station is fortunate that [redacted] intends to remain permanently in Mexico where he makes an invaluable contribution to the SB Section's program and presents no difficulties whatsoever.

DATE 3 Feb 67	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Paul L. Dillon

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Tarasoff, Boris L. [redacted]
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov 08
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-12
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/1
8. CURRENT STATION: Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- XX ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 16 August 1965 - 31 December 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian telephone and audio products into English transcript	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Processing transcribed telephone materials into a format which allows for immediate analysis and filing	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets on the basis of the above material	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON
OF-4b

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

JUN

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 15 2 02 PM '66
JUN 24 4 26 PM '66

There has been no change in the excellent performance of this officer and his wife, a contract employee, who assists him in all phases of his work.

There have been no problems of either a professional or personal nature during the reporting period.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 16 June 1966

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: [redacted] /s/

BY SUPERVISOR

2.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 9 1/2

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 16 June 1966

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief/SR/Mex.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Paul J. Dillon /s/

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

DATE: 16 June 1966

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief of Station

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Winston M. Scott /s/

12 AUG

FITNESS REPORT (CONTINUED)

Jaradoff, [illegible] D

[redacted]

Subject has not been in a supervisory position and his present assignment outside on unofficial cover working as a loner gives no indication as to his supervisory ability. It is believed Subject probably serves best as an independent analyst without supervisory responsibilities.

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
0 1 7 4 7 7
~~264216~~

SECTION A [illegible] GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT /WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 Sep 1964 - 15 Aug 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language telephone and audio product into English transcript.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of characterization-assessment personality reports on the Soviet complement.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Processing of transcribed telephone materials into format facilitating immedicte analysis and handling by the Station.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

25 APR 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has continued to demonstrate a very high level of interest and competence in his work. Beyond the relatively technical aspect of producing transcriptions, which he accomplishes with timeliness, accuracy and thoroughness, he strives to provide the Station and Headquarters with an insight in depth on the local Soviet complement. He does this capably, particularly when one understands the limitations of his technical access. His wife, a contract employee, assists him in the preparation of the technical product. However, her over-all contribution goes beyond this, since Subject and his wife work together in effort to distill the meaning of their product in terms of personality assessment. They are uniquely well adjusted to their deep cover circumstances, are of little burden administratively to the Station, and are presently interested in continuing their assignment in Mexico City indefinitely.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 4 February 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] [redacted] /s/	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 26	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 22 Dec 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Herbert Manell /s/
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Chief of Station, Mexico City concurs in this Fitness Report as submitted by [redacted]s supervisor for the period reported.

[redacted]

DATE 12 April 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

38

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
[illegible]

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible] [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE [illegible]	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH 3	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 November 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
8 June - 30 November 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language telephone and audio product into English transcript.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON
[illegible]

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

21 NOV 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

The relatively limited period of Subject's assignment to the Station, coupled with the normal complications attendant to a staffer's conversion to the DDP and to a deep cover status on a first assignment abroad, compels the supervisor to make a tentative assessment only at this time. However, from all indications to date it would appear that Subject and his family are acclimating themselves very well to the environmental, cover and work situation. Subject is interested in his work, applies himself conscientiously and is prompt in completing his assignments whether the work load for a day is light, or is heavy and requires unpaid overtime concentration. The translation product is presently exact and conforms to the Station's standards for such work. As Subject becomes more familiar with specific Station requirements, through experience and with closer supervision than afforded to date, he will be able to make a more imaginative contribution to his work, an effort that he has already begun.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 October 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 October 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Herbert Manell

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 15 NOV	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/3	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

TRAINING REPORT

Spanish Basic Reading, Speaking, Writing
(900 hours, full time)

09/24/63 - 02/15/63

Student	: Boris D. Tarasoff	Office	: WH
Year of Birth	: 1908	Service Designation:	D
Grade	: 11	No. of Students	: 4
EOD Date	: 02/56	Instructor:	Mrs. L. Edwards

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHOD

This is a 20-week, full-time course. The general aim of the course is to enable the student to use the spoken language with moderate facility and accuracy in a large number of everyday situations while providing a basis for further learning of the language either by actual use in the area or by further formal study. The major objectives of the course are to develop an ability; 1) to distinguish and produce the sounds of the language; 2) to use a large variety of basic sentences and expressions in the spoken language and apply them by re-combination to new situations; 3) to comprehend spoken Spanish in a variety of current everyday situations; 4) to develop the skills and techniques needed to read Spanish texts with minimum use of the dictionary; 5) to write the language in basic form, including letters, telegrams, short composition, etc.

The entire working day, 5 days a week, is devoted exclusively to language study. Four to five hours daily (a maximum of 25 hours a week) are devoted to guided drill and conversation practice with native speakers. The balance of the day is devoted to language laboratory drill and preparation of assigned material. Three days at mid-term and the final week of the course are spent in a special language-house in which Spanish is spoken exclusively.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student progress is evaluated primarily on oral recitation in the form of drills and free conversation based on memorized material. In addition, several tests are given during the course. The number of students receiving each adjectival rating on overall course performance is shown below. This student's rating is indicated by the asterisk.

Incomplete	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Excellent
1		2*	1

Mr. Tarasoff's application and interest throughout the course was unstinting. Progress in all course objectives was modest but steady. In future study particular attention should be given to pronunciation and structure.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: LAWRENCE C. [illegible] 11 Jun 63
Chief Instructor Date

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

25 OCT 1962
Seen by Employee

SECRET
(When Filled-In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
019477

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Tarasoff Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD OD	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Foreign Doc)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	8. CURRENT STATION Hq.			

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
☐ CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ TEMPORARY	☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			☐ ANNUAL	☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE	
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):			☐ SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 21 October 1962

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Oct 61 - 20 Sept 1962

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Reads Russian-language newspapers, periodicals and books to find information of intelligence value on Soviet heavy and construction machinery industries	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Evaluates materials found in published sources for processing through internal reports or through contract translations	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Extracts and translates items for internal reports	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Compiles Quarterly Scheduled report, Commodity Output of USSR Union Republics	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Scans Russian-language newspapers, periodicals, and books and selects items of interest to the entire Industry and Materials Section of USSR Branch, FDD	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

9 24 [illegible] '62

During his rating period, as during his entire tour of duty in FDD, Mr. Tarasoff has demonstrated himself to be a mature highly-capable intelligence officer. His professional ability and personality contributed greatly to the smooth operation of his section.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 20 Sept 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Boris D. Tarasoff

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 1 yr, 10 mos.	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE ~~24~~ 19 ~~19~~ Sept 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Industry and Materials Section, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE EDWIN R. STRAKNA

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with this rating. Mr. Tarasoff has common sense and intelligence sense. He appreciates the significance of information, for intelligence purposes, both in the fields for which he is responsible and in other fields as well.

His ability to scan rapidly a great volume of Russian-language material, and extract or note items of value, will be sorely missed.

DATE 24 ~~19~~ Sept 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE T. Bielefeldt TALBOT BIELEFELDT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 19477

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Tarasoff, Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 November 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION OD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Foreign Doc.)		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL *(Specify)*

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 Oct 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD
From 1 Oct 60-31 Sep 61 To

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Reads Soviet newspapers, journals, and books for information on Soviet heavy machine building, industrial organizations, on subjects covered by other section members.	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Compiles quarterly scheduled report Commodity Output of USSR Union Republics	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Judges value of information in Soviet publications, and selects such information for publication in scheduled reports or for contract translation.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Performs special assignments for other CIA components, such as interpreting from tapes and writing reverse translations.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Writes and compiles articles for scheduled reports.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING				
			1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER *(Specify)*:							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Serious-minded, hard-working, well-informed. Has profound knowledge of the USSR, its people, and its institutions. Innately an intelligence officer, he has the ability to discern news of intelligence value where others see nothing. Maintains an image of the world, the USSR, the US and the CIA in his mind, and seldom makes incorrect prediction or estimate regarding World or Soviet affairs.

His intellectual maturity of the Russian language makes him adaptable to a large variety of assignments. Is characterised by resolutnes, steadfastness, and ability to resist pressure or propaganda.

His work in the section has been excellent throughout, and he covers subject fields equivalent to the work of 3 people in 1955. He works very well as part of a team.

His qualifications are an asset both for work in FDD and for assignments involving personal contacts and utilizing spoken Russian.

SECTION F **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 25 October 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Is at present on detached duty. Will be dhown copy on his return.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 25 October 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Industry & Materials Section	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edwin R. Strakna

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This supervisor tends to rate a little high in his over-all evaluations; Mr. Tarasoff's performance is not*outstanding in every respect; however, he is a superior employee, and has an unusual amount of native common sense and intelligence insight.

*literally

DATE 25 October 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE T. Bielefeldt Talbot Bielefeldt

SECRET

31 OCT 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Seen by OD/CSB

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 19477

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Tarasoff (First) Boris (Middle) D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION CD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (For. Doc)		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT CO/FDD/WSR Branch

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS						9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED	☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED	☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 Oct 60

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 1 Oct 59-30 Sep 60

SPECIAL (Specify):

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Scans Soviet documents for information on a wide range of industrial subjects for use in his own and others' reports	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Writes intelligence information reports on chemical, metallurgical, construction, and power machinery	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Handles special projects, oral and written, as required	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING				
			1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assumption of greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

His native Russian language facility is of tremendous assistance to the section and the agency. His rapid scanning of Soviet documents for his own projects turns up valuable bits of information on other subjects, which he is always careful to refer to the proper persons. He is always ready to assist with language problems and if he doesn't know the answer he exhausts all possible means to find it. He is called on for special branch or division projects involving reverse translations, and he has held a number of TDY assignments requiring spoken Russian. The morsels of intelligence gleaned for his own reports from the masses of material which he scans are briefly and tersely stated. Is a systematic worker, keeps good files, and avoids duplication. Plans and organizes his activities carefully so that he always manages to complete a project well ahead of the target date. Has constant informal contact with all his consumers and goes to any length to give them what they want, provided that their request is reasonable and justifiable. If they ask for something which he knows is of no value or which has been duplicated elsewhere, he has no difficulty in persuading them to cancel the requirement, since they have learned that they can trust his work and his genuine desire to help. It is not hard to discern that he sometimes gets bored with the monotony of his work, but an occasional tour of TDY is generally sufficient to revive his enthusiasm for another year at his desk. Has an uneven temperament, sometimes gloomy and sometimes bantering, but only rarely does this affect his working relationships.

NOV 3 9 04 AM '60
MAIL ROOM

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1\.

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 52

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: Employee on TDY

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS

☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 Oct 60	Chief, Materials and Industry Section, USSR Branch	Rosamund E. Deutsch

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

X I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 October 1960	Chief, USSR Branch	Talbot Bielefeldt Bielefeldt

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3 NOV 1959

Seen by OD/CSR

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 19,477

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Tarasoff, Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION OD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Foreign Documents)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 Oct 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 20 Nov 58-30 Sep 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Scans Soviet documents for intelligence information on a wide range of industrial subjects	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Writes reports based on the above material	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Does special scanning, translation, and research jobs as required	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY				X			
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions. Shows skill and good judgment in extracting data on a wide range of technical subjects from Soviet documents, which he scans with great rapidity. His written reports based on this material present good intelligence information. However, they suffer slightly from small inaccuracies in syntax and grammar, and there are occasional passages where the meaning is vague or the logical connection between facts has not been made clear. This type of passage may be further complicated by his lack of native familiarity with the precise English idiom and his tendency sometimes to use the wrong connective. However, any such failings in the use of English are entirely offset by his superior knowledge of Russian. His promptness in submitting reports and in completing other assignments is exceptional. Maintains close relations with consumers and goes out of his way to fill all their requirements to the letter. His greatest asset to the section, branch, and division is his native Russian fluency and his knowledge of the USSR. He not only serves as consultant and authority on ~~XX~~ the Russian language for the section and branch, but takes on extra jobs as translator or interpreter as required by the division or the agency. His natural intelligence has enabled him to do on-the-spot or rush jobs in fields in which he has had no background. He continues to learn and to retain his knowledge. During a period when his well-deserved promotion was blocked because of thelack of a slot, a situation which was unfortunate but the fault of no one in his office, he became a bit rebellious and reluctant to take on extra duties which he otherwise would have accepted. He feels, and rightly so, that he is capable of more challenging and perhaps more interesting assignments which require the use of spoken Russian. Every opportunity has been given him to find such a permanent assignment, and he has just been on extended TDY involving such activities.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 29 Oct 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Boris D. Tarasoff

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 3 yrs, 4 mo	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	☐	REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DATE 28 Oct 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Industry and Materials ~~XXXXXX~~ Section, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E. Deutsch

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 29 October 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE T. Bielefeldt TALBOT BIELEFELDT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) TARASOFF, (First) Boris (Middle) D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 November 1908	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION CD
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Foreign Doc)		
7. GRADE GS-09	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 December 1958	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 November 1957 - 20 November 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐	SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
☒	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 20 Nov 58	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E. Deutsch	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Sec. USSR Br. Chief, Materials & Industry

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

DATE
11-26-58

[illegible]

Nov 12 1/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 29 Nov 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Talbot Bielefeldt T Bielefeldt	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the most important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 21 9 00 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Scans Soviet documents for intelligence material on a wide range of technical fields	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintains technical files	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Writes technical reports	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Serves as language consultant	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job. Works hard. Reads Russian rapidly and looks out for material of interest to others as he scans. Is adaptable and flexible and handles several different technical fields with equal facility. Can tackle almost any subject without previous experience and turn out a good job. His native knowledge of Russian is of considerable benefit to the whole section. Selects the salient points from masses of useless or repetitive material with intelligent judgment, and compiles reports which are pointed and concise. His only deficiency of any consequence is the slight awkwardness and occasional lack of clarity in his written English style. His English has improved considerably during the past two years, but sometimes the failure to use the most precise term or the right connective complicates for the reader a conception which is perfectly clear to the writer.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Not necessarily better suited, but a position requiring the use of native Russian speaking ability would also be suitable.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) TARASOFF Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 November 1908	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OD
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Foreign Doc)		
7. GRADE GS-09	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 December 1958	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* 21 November 1957 - 20 November 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 20 Nov 58	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E Deutsch	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Sec. USSR Br. Chief, Materials & Industry

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 20 Nov 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Talbot Bielefeldt	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION.

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
28

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL Should have been promoted months ago, but has been prevented by lack of a slot. His inherent intelligence should enable him to learn rapidly any new fields, processes, or policies required. He is patient in dealing with people, and goes out of his way to help those who come to him for assistance. He has the ability to carry responsibility without worrying about it.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

He is anxious to have a tour of duty overseas, and since he has not been able to advance in his present job because of conditions beyond his control, his efforts to find such a position have not been discouraged.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

After a single tour of overseas duty, which he will not accept unless his wife can accompany him without losing her CIA status, he would like to settle down permanently in the U.S.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section 'A' below.

GENERAL

SECTION A.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) TARASOFF Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 November 1908	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OD
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Foreign Documents Officer		
7. GRADE GS-9	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 November 1956 - 20 November 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
			SPECIAL (Specify)

CERTIFICATION

SECTION B.

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1, OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 13 Nov 57	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E Deutsch	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Industrial Sec USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	[illegible]	[illegible]
Reviewed by [illegible]	[illegible]	11/19/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 15 Nov 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Talbot Bielefeldt T. Bielefeldt	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch

JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SECTION C.

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER	
5	1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT. 2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES. 3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS. 4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER. 5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL. 6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 13 12 10 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 **Analyzes Soviet documents and selects intelligence information**	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 **Compiles intelligence reports**	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 **Serves as consultant on linguistic matters**	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present jo

Minor difficulties with English usage do not prevent him from turning out reports which are concise and to the point. Ideas are in general clearly formulated, although there are occasional instances of inexactness of expression. Because of his native facility in the Russian language, on the other hand, he is frequently consulted on all levels throughout the branch on matters involving interpretation of the foreign text. He is not an eager beaver, and because of his language fluency can accomplish as much as others in less time and with less effort. Probably works at full capacity only under pressure, and for this reason some of his best contributions have been on special projects with target dates, several of which have covered material outside his field of responsibility. His disposition is generally patient, stable, and unruffled.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY

Although present performance is entirely satisfactory, he is not in a position here to utilize fully his Russian language speaking facility.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

GENERAL

SECTION E.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) TARASOFF Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 November 1908	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OD
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Foreign Documents Officer		
7. GRADE GS-9	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 November 1956 - 20 November 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

CERTIFICATION

SECTION F.

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 13 Nov 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E. Deutsch	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Industrial Sec USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 15 Nov 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Alfred Bielefeldt Bielefeldt	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch

ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

SECTION G.

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing his supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PROGRAMS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND [illegible] SPECIALIZATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

DATE
BY
Posted Pos. Control
11/19/57

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

16

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 18 12 [illegible] PM '57
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Because of his innate capacity I would judge that after initial adjustments, and with application, he will always be able to meet the requirements [illegible]en situation. His day to day activities will not always give evidence of this versatility, and it may sometimes come as a surprise.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

He is now getting teaching experience by teaching one class in Basic Russian and another in Russian Conversation.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Because of his age, he would like to have a tour of overseas service within the next two or three years, before he settles down here to a permanent assignment.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	3	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	,	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) TARASOFF Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SI-OD
5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Foreign Documents Officer		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 Dec 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) June 56 - 20 Nov 56	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☒ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)	
☐ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ~~☒ HAS NOT~~ BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: ~~Supervisor temporarily in another office.~~

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 4 Dec 56	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Rosamund E/ Deutsch Rosamund E. Deutsch	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Industrial Section, USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER FORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY jw DATE 12-11-56

Posted Pos. Control 2

Reviewed by PUD [illegible] 12/19

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 10 Dec 56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Talbot Bielefeldt T Bielefeldt	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

Performance (4)

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 11 10 13 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 extracts information from Soviet documents	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 compiles technical intelligence reports	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 maintains files of machine models and plants	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

I feel that Mr. T. has not yet been on the job long enough to demonstrate his maximum capacities. Although he came with no background in his specialized field, he has shown considerable facility in acquiring technical information and building up his technical vocabulary. He has a good eye for intelligence. Although he has not native English fluency, his reports are pointed, concise, and, except for occasional minor points of grammar, very well expressed indeed. Owing to his persistence and application, he was rated second highest in a class in English usage. Soon after his EOD, the analyst whem Mr. T. was assisting was transferred, leaving him with full responsibility for covering a field which was still very new to him. He has done an exceedingly good job under the most unpropitious circumstances. He needs to develop fuller utilization of varied research methods, but this will be easier as he becomes more familiar with the materials and problems with which he has to deal. His native Russian fluency is a decided asset. He is calm, cooperative, and easy to work with.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

His native Russian fluency might be better utilized in some other type of position, although his performance on his present job is entirely satisfactory.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) TARASOFF Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD-OD
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Foreign Documents Officer		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 Dec 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) June 1956 - 20 Nov 56	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☒ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
4 Dec 56	Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E Deutsch	Chief, Industrial Section, USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10 Dec 1956	Talbot Bielefeldt T Bielefeldt	Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 3

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	0	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	0	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	0	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify) For the reasons stated on the Performance Report, I feel it is not possible to make a fair estimate of his supervisory potential at this time.

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 10 12 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

4 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

I feel ~~xx~~ very definitely that Mr. Tarasoff's overall potentials are greater than he has had an opportunity to show thus far. This will doubtless be reflected in his next evaluation.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Since Mr. T. has been on duty such a short time, present plans are simply to give him further training in his present job and to allow him to develop to his maximum capacity there. He will soon be enrolled in the I.O.C.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

His native Russian fluency should be taken into account.

REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS: I do not think he so nearly average in all respects as indicated in Sec. I, below. I do not know him well enough to disagree with most of the ratings, but I would rate him "4" on items 7, 15 and 29, at least. Quiet, unobtrusive, modest, cooperative. Have seen few indications of initiative, but such not to be expected while he is learning a new job; no reason to assume incapable of initiative. T.Bielefeldt

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	3	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	3	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	3	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
3	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : CSPS
CCS/NOC
Office of Security
CI Staff

SUBJECT : Summary of Agency Employment -
Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff. [redacted]

1. Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff, a Translator/Transcriber with the Agency since February 1956, will retire effective 30 November 1970. Your approval is requested for him to use the attached employment history.

2. For your information, we have been advised by the Mexico City Station that once Mr. Tarasoff has retired to Guadalajara, Mexico, except for establishing new social relationships, he will probably not be asked to go into any detail about his past cover jobs that would require anyone to call upon these firms for backstopping confirmation. In the event he should become involved in any post-retirement activities that might require checking into his past, Mr. Tarasoff will contact Headquarters for instructions.

Richard B. Wright
Chief, WH Support

Attachment:
Employment Resume

[illegible]

SECRET

SUBJECT: Summary of Agency Employment -
Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff, [redacted]

CONCUR:

Carl F. Taylor
C/CSPS — 4 Nov 70 Date

Ray G. McClard
C/CCS — 6 Nov 70 Date

Carpenter for
Director of Security — 10 Nov. 70 Date

for Fred E Hubbard
C/CI Staff — 18 Nov 70 Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1956-1959: I worked for various establishments in Washington, D.C., as a translator from Russian into English, such as the Library of Congress, and various other translating firms, which abound in Washington, with a salary varying in accordance with the output of translated material, from $500.00 to 1,000.00 per month.

1959-1963: I was employed by ~~I joined~~ USJPRS Bureau of Standards, Dept of Commerce Wash, D.C. on Western Avenue in ~~Washington, D.C., which is a company under contract to the Dept. of State, the Dept. of Defense and on occasion to the Dept. of the Interior (fish hatcheries division)~~. I worked as an analyst and translator, at home most of the time, translating and analyzing articles from newspapers and technical magazines. I was paid $8.00 for 1,000 words for ordinary material, $10.00 for technical and $12.00 for scientific subjects. Also, I was [illegible] ~~hired~~ by the Dept. of State to be an interpreter for two Soviet delegations at $25.00 per diem plus expenses. I spent five weeks with each of them.

1963-1970: After leaving USJPRS I came to Mexico with my wife and children to avoid the weather extremes of the USA XXXXXXXX and to look into possibilities of profitable investments that could aid me financially after my retirement. My income during this period came from annuities and the moneys lent to my brother-in-law in Cleveland, Ohio, who is a successful real estate man and the owner of an amusement machines business (Cadillac Music Co.) in which I had invested some money previously. ~~I was also connected by mail with a Linguistics Studies firm, Room 212, 419 Boylston St., Boston 16, Mass. Frequently some of my friends from USJPRS would send me some special articles for translation. I would charge the above organizations in accordance with the time spent in translating. This amounted to roughly $10,000.00 a year.~~

H MMT-10577

1956-1959: I worked for various establishments in Washington, D.C., as a translator from Russian into English, such as the Library of Congress, and various other translating firms, which abound in Washington, with a salary varying in accordance with the output of translated material, from $500.00 to 1,000.00 per month.

1959-1963: I was employed by USJPRS Bureau of Standards, Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D.C. I worked as an analyst and translator, at home most of the time, translating and analyzing articles from newspapers and technical magazines. I was paid $8.00 for 1,000 words for ordinary material, $10.00 for technical and $12.00 for the scientific subjects. Also, I was utilized by the Dept. of State to be an interpreter for two Soviet delegations at $25.00 per diem plus expenses. I spent five weeks with each of them.

1963-1970: After leaving USJPRS I came to Mexico with my wife and children to avoid the weather extremes of the USA and to look into possibilities of profitable investments that could aid me financially after my retirement. My income during this period came from annuities and the moneys lent to my brother-in-law in Cleveland, Ohio, who is a successful real estate man and the owner of an amusement machines business (Cadillac Music Co.) in which I had invested some money previously.

201

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): [illegible] [redacted]

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): 1908

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: [illegible]

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ **(A)**

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ **(B)**

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ **(C)**

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

X [redacted]

DATE 14 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

[illegible]

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY [illegible]
(For use only until April 10, 1968)
176-[illegible]

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

3 JUN 1965

Jaraoli. Bew D.

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. The established policy of the Agency favors early retirement of its employees who, as you know, are normally expected to retire when they become eligible for a full annuity. The prospect of retirement deserves serious thought and planning, and you should therefore know that you will be eligible for retirement, according to our records, during **November, 1970.**

2. Planning ahead can bring about, with each passing year, definite progress toward your retirement goals. The Agency is anxious to assist you in planning for your retirement. It is even more important, as an employee, that you begin now to plan for this occasion.

3. You deserve to know as much as possible about the general subject of retirement and more specifically about the retirement policy itself, your annuity, life and health insurance protection, opportunities for other employment, Social Security benefits, and educational materials available on the subject. The Agency feels that this type of information and advisory service should be made available to you at least five years prior to the date of your eligibility.

4. You are requested to call the Executive Secretary of the Board, Mr. Howard G. Phillips, on extension 6872 to arrange an appropriate time to discuss any plans you may have and benefits available to you upon retirement.

/s/ Howard G. Phillips

Lawrence R. Houston
Chairman
Agency Retirement Board

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if 54) [redacted]	DATE (from item S-1) 15 Oct '64	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Herbert Manell	DATE (from item S-2) 22 Oct 1964
DATE RECEIVED	DISPATCH NUMBER: HMMT-4961	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 1908	2. SERVICE DESIGN D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Intell Officer GS-11	4. STATION OR BASE Mexico D.F. Mexico	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 5 June 1963	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 5-6 Dec. 1965	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 13 Dec 1965	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 15 Jan. 1966

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Wife - 43
Son - 17

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

There are no health or other personal circumstances perventing a return to post or assignment to another foreign post. However two factors, of operational and personal nature, should be considered: Subject and family have already initiated and are in the process of completing the relatively complicated procedure of legalizing their continued residency in Mexico as "rentistas" (retired persons). Secondly, Subject's son's secondary school education is being completed in Mexico. Transfer to another foreign post could negatively affect the completion of his secondary schooling.

(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

1. Translation and transcription of Soviet technical product.

2. Preparation of characterization and assessment studies on the local Soviet complement.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

If returned to post for a second tour, continuation of Spanish language instruction.

FORM 5-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

N.A.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

[2] EXTEND TOUR 18 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ~~30 November 1966~~ (DATE)

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Spain 2ND CHOICE Uruguay 3RD CHOICE Buenos Aires

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION (Please note that planned departure is Dec 65, due to factor that son finishes his school year on 30 Nov 65.)

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

The Station recommends and urges that Headquarters approve Subject's return to Station. His performance meets every Station requirement. For Subject's work, continuity is essential to obtain maximum effective product.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

WH Division recommends that FEINGLASS' tour of duty in Mexico City be extended until December 1965 as requested in section 6 B, and that he return for a second tour of duty following home leave.

DATE ______ TITLE C/WH/PERS SIGNATURE ROBERT D. CASHMAN

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:
Approved extension to end of 1965 followed by home leave and second tour.

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. HMMS-3905 DATED: 22 Dec 1964
CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

Dwight M. Collins/gf

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: Dwight M. Collins (SIGNATURE) DATE: 22 Dec 1964

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : C. Bustos
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 17 Feb 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

7-1

SECRET

12 62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

17 FEB 64 20 04z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH-8
INFO : CCS-3, OP-2, CI/OA, VR

SIG CEN DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 01920

REF: MEXI 8219 (IN 19281)*

HDQS HAS POLICE STATEMENT OF GOOD CONDUCT FOR [redacted] HAS NOTARIZED STATEMENT FROM BANK ATTESTING ANNUAL DEPOSITS $5,500. SINCE BANK WOULD NOT INCLUDE IN LETTER MORE THAN ACTUAL DEPOSITS, HDQS OBTAINED NOTARIZED LETTER FROM COVER DIVISION NOTIONAL FIRM STATING FEINGLASS HAS YEARLY INCOME $6,000 FROM VARIOUS INVESTMENT SOURCES HANDLED BY THEM. HDQS PLANNING MAIL THESE THREE DOCS TO MEXI CONSULATE ASKING THEM AUTHENTICATE DOCUMENTS AND MAIL TO PO BOX WASHINGTON WHICH USED BY DYVOUR. UPON RECEIPT HDQS WILL POUCH MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Requested what action Hdqs taking to get bank statement for FEINGLASS to facilitate his processing a rentista petition.

CCG/NC Baladeau (by phone)
WH/PERS ~~Baladeau~~ RENEHAN (by phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

J. M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

[illegible]
[redacted]

~~26~~ 15 JUN 1963

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]

[illegible] have been [illegible] to you while [illegible] and obligations [illegible]

2. [illegible] as reflected in your Staff Agent Personnel [illegible] $8575.00 [illegible] and GS 11^3 [illegible], respectively [illegible] allowances and [illegible] periodical variations [illegible] as follows:

(a) [illegible] your cover [illegible] the gross emoluments [illegible] from this organization [illegible] except as [illegible] as a Staff Agent [illegible] is to be remitted [illegible] period [illegible] specified.

(b) Your Federal income taxes will be withheld and reported in conformance with HR 20-[illegible] or any subsequent regulations or procedures promulgated by this organization. For your information [illegible] withheld from [illegible] payments due you Federal income taxes [illegible] when added to the income tax withholdings normally made from [illegible] in connection with this organization [illegible] insufficient, you will be required to make [illegible] with HR 20-66 [illegible] the procedures to be followed [illegible] taxes imposed upon you.

(c) This organization [illegible] due you an amount equal [illegible] your gross salary [illegible] Fund. This amount will be [illegible] this organization [illegible] you will be [illegible] satisfactio[illegible]

d) [illegible] allowance will [illegible]

If your position [illegible] Social Security [illegible] For such contr[illegible] contributions for [illegible] and retirement [illegible] may be [illegible] such case all monies you receive as a result of your participation in such program must be returned to this organization. Whether participation in a particular cover facility program is involuntary will be determined by this organization.

2. Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay. You are hereby authorized Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay in conformance with applicable organizational issuances. For your information, currently this premium pay is ten per cent of your base salary [illegible] additional taxable compensation to you and [illegible] payable for that period of time you are assigned under nonofficial cover.

3. Equalization Allowance. You are hereby authorized an equalization allowance in accordance with applicable organizational issuances.

4. Travel [illegible]. You will be entitled to travel, transportation and [illegible] expenses in accordance with the regulations of this organization [illegible] integrated personnel will be [illegible] in accordance with [illegible] of their cover organizations [illegible]

5. Travel Restrictions. You hereby agree that your assignment abroad will be for a minimum of **two years** from the date of your arrival at your permanent post of duty, unless such assignment shall be sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience. Your violation of such agreement may result in regulatory travel penalties. HR 22-6 provides that if the agreement is violated during the first year of duty abroad, [illegible] expenditures for travel and transportation to the post, including per diem while at headquarters and storage of effects, shall be reimbursed by the employee. If the agreement is violated after the first year of duty, but before the completion of the minimum tour agreed to above, return travel at Government expense shall not be allowed.

AGREED: [redacted]

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this Supplement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Personnel Officer

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: See # 20-1000 and 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "N/A" when items are not applicable. Forward original and two copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: [illegible]
DIVISION: [illegible]
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] 1963

SECTION I GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
[illegible]
[redacted]

2A. PROJECT:

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Mexico City, Mexico

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 3135-5700-1000

3A. FUNDS ☐ V ☒ UV

4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: None

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Staff employee 20 Feb 1956 - Present GS-11

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Staff

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE ☒ OBTAINED ☐ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Staff Agent

SECTION II PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: [illegible]

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): [illegible]

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Washington, D.C.

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): 5109 45th St., N.W. Wash., D.C.

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate) ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife, 40
Son, 14
Dau, 17

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO RELATIONSHIP:
Brother
Wife

SECTION III U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: No

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat): N.A.

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U.S. Army

24. RANK OR GRADE: Enl.

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: GS-11 3 $8575

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: ---

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): ---

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER	CIA
YES	☐	☒
NO	☐	☐

SECTION V ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS w/family $3,000

32. POST: ---

33. OTHER: Allowances applicable to staff agent under non-official cover.

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): ---

SECTION VI TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☒ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
Wife, U.S., 40, 5 May 1923
Son, U.S., 14, 20 Mar 1949
Dau, U.S., 17, 22 Dec 1945

[illegible] Agent Panel
3 June 63
D. Collins
Secretary, [illegible] Panel

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes

43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes

44. OTHER:

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: [illegible]

DIVISION: [illegible]

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: [illegible]

DATE: 16 May 1963

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

All benefits applicable to Staff Agent

Non-official cover premium pay.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☒ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

NA ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)

☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION Indefinite ☐ DAYS ☐ MONTHS ☐ YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE 31 May 1963

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days) ---

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION Per Agency regulation ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other)

FI

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Translator - Russian, Spanish

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

20 Feb 56 - Sep 1962 - FDD/USSR Branch/ Hqs

Sep 62 - Present - Full time Spanish Language Training

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☒ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☒ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE

☒ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Russian	X			X			X		
Spanish		X			X			X	

All Slavic languages intermediate on Agency exams

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

Russia

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

USSR, Turkey, All Western Europe in war, 6 mos Mexico

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING.

See staff employee official file

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): Tarasoff, Boris Dimitri

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov. 1908

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
CIA	56	02	20				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U. S. ARMY	1941	2	3	1945	Oct	20	Honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☐ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

20 Feb. 1956 (DATE)

Boris D. Tarasoff (SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 20th day of Feb. (MONTH) 1955 at Washington, D. C. (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

12. TOTAL SERVICE
4 yrs. 5 mo. 15 days

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

PART III.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 15*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)			

ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)	56	02	20
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)	4	05	18
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*Leave purposes*)	51	04	02

verified
4/29/57

PART IV.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES

(To be completed only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes)

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 14*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			

ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)			
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*RIF purposes*) *(Enter as the "service computation date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF-7)*			

REMARKS:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—60459-1

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) TARASOFF	(First) BORIS	(Middle) DIMITRI	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 079-05-9624

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED 5109 - 45 St. N.W., Wash D.C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) 5109 - 45 St. N.W., Wash. D.C.
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE as above	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE as above

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Cleveland, Ohio	DATE OF MARRIAGE
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE na	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED na	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
na

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE Anna	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 5109 - 45 St., N.W. Wash D.C.	TELEPHONE NO. 363-1944	

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Barbara	as above	f	22 Dec 45
Raymond		m	20 Mar 49

NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian) TARASOFF, DIMITRI	ADDRESS deceased	TELEPHONE NO.
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian) TARASOFF, [illegible]	ADDRESS deceased	TELEPHONE NO.

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. Mrs. C.C. CONELLA

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) CONELLA, HENRY Mrs.	RELATIONSHIP SISTER-IN-LAW
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 31599 GATESMILLS BLVD, PEPPERPIKE, OHIO	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)	YES	☒
	NO	☐
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)	YES	☒
	NO	☐
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	☒
	NO	☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 61 4-60 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

NOTE: LIST NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

UNION TRUST COMPANY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BORIS D. + ANNA TARASOFF

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

in our own possession

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

[illegible] Blvd
Mr. & [illegible] 3677 [illegible] [illegible], OHIO

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington D.C.	29 May 1963	Boris D Tarasoff

CONFIDENTIAL

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on MAR 15 1956 (DATE) I have attended the Induction Course specified by Regulation 25-110.

BORIS DIMITRI TARASOFF
(NAME) - Please print

☐ CLERICAL ☐ STENOGRAPHIC ☑ OTHER

OFFICE DDP / FI

GS- 7 (Grade)

FORM NO. 487 REPLACES FORM 31-121
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(6)

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) .... (Bureau or division) .... Washington, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, Boris Dimitri Tarasoff, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

20 Feb. 1956 (Date of entrance on duty) .... Boris D. [illegible] (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 20th day of Feb., A. D. 1956;

at Washington, D. C. (City) .... (State)

[SEAL] .... (Signature of officer)

Appointment Clerk (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*) WESLEY HALL 426 21st STR. N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH NOV. 2 1905.

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*) EKATERINOSLAV RUSSIA

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY ANNA TARASOFF

(B) RELATIONSHIP WIFE

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE 16315 BEVIL WAY, SAN LEANDRO CALIF.

(D) TELEPHONE NO. BR 6-0172

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE (*Check one*)
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY
	HAVE YOU RECEIVED OR DO YOU EXPECT TO RECEIVE A LUMP-SUM PAYMENT [illegible] UNDER PRIOR FEDERAL OR D.C. GOVERNMENT [illegible]?
	☐ YES ☐ NO
	HAS LEAVE PERIOD COVERED BY SUCH PAYMENT EXPIRED?
	☐ YES ☐ NO

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

```
                                         GS -12    D      nH      AA0810500310
019477  [redacted]                       SCHD-GR   SD     ORG       AA-ITEM
EMP#              NAME

                                                  EC004ZUZI845 VF061ZUXXX45
     AE0100014936   AB0020200023   VR00G99HAF23 TA04G99HAU26
     EC00G99HRK45   VJ06G99HBK45   PH206SYXJK51 FL005SYKAA40
     TC00G99HAK54   PM004SAUXA56   BQ2740504457 BQ301       60
     BK5070000467   BQ2110111459   BQ5455555357 BC5733433257
     BQ361       59 BQ5111111459   ZM5 XXXXXX69
     BQ6033433257   ZYP169690000
```

Retired Nov 1979
"Not Recc'd for Reserve"

71 [illegible] (F)

S-E-C-R-E-T

1 FEB

SECRET

119477

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Return to QAB 1K04 Curie

THIS DATE: [illegible] 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

DATE 25 OCT 1957

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: TARASOFF, BORIS DIMITRI

2. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State)* 2819 - Gainsville Str. S.E. Washington, D.C.	3. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State)* 2819 - Gainsville Str. S.E. Washington, D.C.
4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER LUdlow 4-1380	5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S. Tarasoff, Anna	2. RELATIONSHIP wife

3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*: 2819 - Gainsville Str. Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*. INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: 2430 - E Street, Washington, D.C.

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER LUdlow 4-1380	6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER EXecutive 3 - 6115	7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION 8491

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME	*(First)*	*(Middle)*	*(Maiden)*	*(Last)*
	Anna		Adamoviez	Tarasoff

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE 10 March 1945	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)* Cleveland, Ohio

6. HIS *(or her)* ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: 13610 - Benwood Ave., Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.

7. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO	8. DATE OF DEATH	9. CAUSE OF DEATH

CODED FOR QUALIFICATIONS DATE 25 OCT 1957

10. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address, if deceased)*: 2819 - Gainsville Str., S.E., Washington, D.C.

11. DATE OF BIRTH 5 May 1923	12. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)* Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.
13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY	14. PLACE OF ENTRY

15. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)* U.S.A.	16. DATE ACQUIRED At birth	17. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)* Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.

18. OCCUPATION Temporary clerical position	19. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)* CIA

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: 2430 - E Street, Washington, D.C.

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM NO. 444b 1 DEC 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
~~3 Feb 1941 - 20 Oct 1945~~

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
~~Army~~

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
~~U.S.A.~~

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Anacostia National Bank	2844 - Alabama Ave, S.E., Washington, D.C

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

I had been adjudged bankrupt by the U.S. District Court of New York on 29 Oct 1940 in the case of Orel Delicateesen, 1456 Lexington Ave. N.Y.C.

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI — CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*: U.S.A.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☒ OTHER *(Specify)*: Naturalized

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First papers, etc.)*

SECTION VII — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☒	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Russian University of N.Y., N.Y.C.	General		1924	1926			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
Cooper Union Art School in New York City	Fine Arts	1927	1927	10
Cooper School of Art in Cleveland, Ohio	Commercial Art	1950	1951	21

4. MILITARY TRAINING *(Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)*

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
MITC Camp Richie, Md	CIC Course	1944	1945	2
University of Penn. Philad. Pa.,	German Language, CIC	April	1945	1

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

Advanced CIC Course, Oberursel, Germany, in July 1945

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK																		
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD

SECTION IX GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE". INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Russia (Ukraine)	General	1908 - 1920	Native			
Turkey (Istambul area)	General	1920 - 1923	Yes			
Germany (U.S.Zone)	General	May 1945 -Oct 1945				U.S. Army

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE
Russia - I am a native of that country
Turkey - I lived there as a stateless person for 3 years
Germany - I was with the U.S. Army of Occupation

SECTION X TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.) 30
2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)
3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

SECTION XI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH Badminton - fair, Soccer - Fair, Photography - good, Philately - good, Oil-painting - good, Reading - good.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK My training and experience with the CIC would indicate the type of work for which I am best qualified.

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIAL OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested) INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

Public Speaking and public relations experience on the Executive Board of Greater Alameda County C.I.O. Council

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

Chairman of the Circle of Youth "Russian Culture", New York, N.Y. 1937 - 1940
The National CIC Association, 1956 - present

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): 2 Mar 1956 to 27 Jun 1956
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FI/CI/ICD
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: none
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Assistant
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Research, analysis, and translation of materials in the Russian Language, including extensive work with microfilmed materials.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): 27 Jun 1956 - 9 Sep 1956
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OO/FDD/BU
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: none
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Assistant
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Reading newspapers and periodicals, abstracting information of intelligence value and compiling it into reports.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): 9 Sep 1956 - present
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OO/FDD/BU
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: none
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Foreign Documents Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Abstraction of intelligence information from Soviet newspapers and periodicals and compiling it into reports.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

OFFICE OF ... APR 22 ... 32 PM '57

CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

SECTION XIII

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	2	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Anna Tarasoff	wife	1923		x	USA	2819 - Gainsville Str. S.E., Washington, D.C.
Barbara Tarasoff	duaghter	1945		x	USA	same as above
Raymond Tarasoff	son	1949	x		USA	same as above

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

EOD Date: 20 Feb 1956

Places of residence:

18 Feb 1956 - 7 Jul 1956 Wesley Hall, 1426 21st Str., Washington, N.W., D.C.

7 Jul 1956 - 1 Dec 1956 3605 - Minnesota Ave. S.E., Washington, D.C.

1 Dec 1956 - Present 2819 - Gainsville Str. S.E., Washington, D.C.

DATE COMPLETED April 1957	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Boris D. Tarasoff

SECRECY AGREEMENT

June 12, 1955
Date

1. I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures.

2. I agree to honor the requests of the Central Intelligence Agency relative to my application for employment or rendition of services whether it be accepted or rejected.

3. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in the Central Intelligence Agency, unless specifically authorized by a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

4. I agree not to disclose processing procedures I have observed in the Central Intelligence Agency.

5. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application for employment to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Boris D. Tarasoff
Signature

Witness

(12)

FORM NO. 270
1 OCT 54

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

[illegible]

BACKGROUND

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST [illegible] YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS, INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT [illegible]

[illegible]

14-0000

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

STAFF AGENT CLEARANCE

DATE : 28 May 1963

YOUR REFERENCE: Request for Security Clearance dated 28 May 1963

CASE NO. : 104887

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN. : Staff Agents Branch

SUBJECT [illegible] [redacted]

1. This is to advise that a security clearance is granted for the employment of the Subject as a Staff Agent, GS-11, by DDP/WH/3, in the capacity of

Operations Officer at Mexico City, Mexico.

2. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of the Subject, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

3. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

4. As a part of entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged by your office.

☒ XX A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

WAOsborne
W. A. Osborne
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 14 December 1955

Your Reference: C-1235 DDP FI

Case Number: 104887

TO: Chief, Records & Services Division
Personnel Office

FROM: Chief / Security Division
Personnel

SUBJECT: TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of EOD procedures.

EB McNamara advised 12/6/55
Tat
will call
[illegible]

Ermal P. Geiss
Ermal P. Geiss
m

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

(5)

Dear Mr. Moore:

As you bring to a close your active career of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find your retirement filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Mr. James W. Moore
5145 Rexton Lane
Dallas, Texas 75214

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - OPF

Originator: Acting Director of Personnel

OP/RAD/ROB/JLBaker:ck (5 December 1977)

14-00000

3 JAN 1978

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 December 1977

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003820

2 NAME (Last–First–Middle): MOORE J. WALTON

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT - OPTIONAL - CSC AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 | DAY 31 | YEAR 77

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7 CAN AND NSCA: 5042 3500 0000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/DCD
U.S.FIELD
DALLAS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TEXAS

11 POSITION TITLE: IO CONTACT CH

12 POSITION NUMBER: DA42

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYD

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.21

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: $43,407

18 REMARKS: LWD: 30 December 1977

Co-ordinated with Joe Falatko, ROS, 21 December 1977.

[illegible]

Wykle
CM/TMSB 12/29/77

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Charlotte M. Tully, C/DCD/ADMIN
DATE SIGNED: 14 Dec 77

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CM/PE
DATE SIGNED: 12/16/77

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 54

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 HOURS CODE: 2

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 | DA 05 | YR 17

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA. | YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO | DA. | YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO | DA. | YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0,BE,CJ,0,0

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO | DA | YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO | DA. | YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR

38 ~~CAREER CATEGORY~~: CAR RES PROV TEMP | CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-21-77

04 JAN 1978

46 OP APPROVAL: A. O. Burkhart

DATE APPROVED: 22 Dec 77

FORM 1152 9-72 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

Administrative - Internal Use Only

7 NOV 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Domestic Collection Division

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

FROM : William O. Brunkhorst
Recorder, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT : Career Intelligence Medal
Mr. James Walton Moore

The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Career Intelligence Medal has been approved for Mr. James W. Moore in recognition of his career contributions to this Agency. You are requested to inform him of the award and of the security provisions governing it as set forth in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security. Arrangements for presentation may be made with the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 4473, room 1 D 70, Headquarters.

William O. Brunkhorst

William O. Brunkhorst

Att

Distribution:
O+1 - Addressee
~~1~~ - OPF w/Forms 382 & 600
1 - ExecSec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

Administrative - Internal Use Only

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 7 June 1973

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003820

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): MOORE, J. Walton

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 24 YEAR 73

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XXX V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3242-3500 0300

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/DCS
U.S. FIELD
DALLAS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Dallas, Texas

11 POSITION TITLE: IO Contact Ch (15)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1479

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IT

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.21

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15-~~5~~ 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~30,480~~ 31,383

18 REMARKS

cc: Payroll

DDO/Pers

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JACKSON R. HORTON, Deputy Director, DCS — DATE SIGNED: 7 June 73

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: James R. Murphy — JAMES R. MURPHY, Director, DCS — DATE SIGNED: 7 June 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HQTRS. CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
32	10	535 56[illegible]	DCS	75083		2	10 05 19	06 24 73	06 24 73

28 NTE-EXPIRES MO. DA. YR. | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OFGH, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR. | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ. NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR. | 37 LONG. COMP DATE MO. DA. YR. | 38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR-RESV PROV/TEMP CODE | 39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER, 1—REG, 2—REG/OPT, 3—INELIGIBLE) HEALTH INS. CODE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 6-19-73

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 22 Jun 73

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

26 JUN

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

2 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Walton Moore
THROUGH : Head of Career Service
SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. In order to assist employees in planning for their eventual retirement, it is the practice of the Agency to notify each employee well in advance of the date he is scheduled for retirement. I am, therefore, taking this opportunity to advise you that you are scheduled to retire on 5 October 1979.

2. The prospect of retirement from the Agency deserves serious thought and careful planning so that you may make the transition to the next phase of life with purpose and confidence. To assist you in this regard, the Agency offers various resources which are attuned to the needs of prospective retirees. You will, in the near future, be invited by the Retirement Counselor for your Directorate to an individual pre-retirement counseling session, or more than one if you wish. This phase of retirement planning will be tailored solely to your own particular situation and circumstances and will be within the context of the retirement system under which you will retire. The individual counseling sessions are intended to give you a wide range of information on such matters as estimates of your annuity, survivor benefits, life and health insurance, Social Security, taxes, relocation and movement of household effects and assistance in obtaining other employment. In addition, you will be invited to attend a Retirement Information Seminar that will be offered in the autumn of 1974.

3. Some persons who wish to retire voluntarily prior to the scheduled date and who wish to commence their planning as early as possible, prefer to work with their Retirement Counselor well before the time he would normally contact them. If you believe you would benefit from such an earlier start on your personal planning, you are entitled to contact the Retirement Counselor responsible for your Directorate at the Retirement Affairs Division, 212 Magazine Building, on telephone extension 3328.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Retirement Planning

4. Experience has amply demonstrated that careful planning facilitates the transition to retirement. I recommend, strongly, that you avail yourself of the services the Agency offers you in planning your own retirement.

5. It is requested that you indicate receipt of this memorandum by signing below. The original of this memorandum should be returned to Retirement Affairs Division, Retirement Operations Branch, Room 205, Magazine Building, as soon as possible.

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

Memorandum Received:

J Walton Moore
Signature

5 Feb 77
Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 22 May 1973

SERIAL NUMBER: 003820 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): MOORE, J. Walton ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 27 YEAR 73

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS	XXX	V TO V		V TO CF	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: ✓ 3242-3500-0000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/DCS
U.S. FIELD
DALLAS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Dallas, Texas

11. POSITION TITLE: IO Contact Ch (15)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1479

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IT

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.21

16 GRADE AND STEP: 14-8 ✓

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 28,478 ✓

18. REMARKS

From: DDI/DCS/Dallas Office #1480

cc: Payroll
Security

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Carroll Delaney
CARROLL DELANEY
Executive Officer, DCS

DATE SIGNED: 22 May 73

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: James R. Murphy
JAMES R. MURPHY
Director, DCS

DATE SIGNED: 22 May 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 VOUCHER CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA. YR.
37	10	56535	DCS	75033		2	10 05 19		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO.	34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR REST PROV, TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5-29-73

46 O P APPROVAL: BJ Cooper

DATE APPROVED: 5/29/73

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

05 JUN 1973

P

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE

☒ VOUCHERED
☐ UNVOUCHERED

NAME (Last, First, Middle): Moore, James Walton

SERIAL NUMBER: 103820

OFFICE (and division): DDI/OO

☐ ORIGINAL
☒ CORRECTION

LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE: 9-18-47

THIS DATE: 8/5/59

SIGNATURE (Office of Personnel): R. Forslund

FORM 11-58 171a

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

SECRET

16 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. J. Walton Moore**

THROUGH : Head of IT Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the system, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the system may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you have 15 years or more of Agency service, but have not as yet performed 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees".

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room GE-1319 Headquarters (extension 6001). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

Group 1
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible] ONLY

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr – Miss – Mrs – One given name, initial(s), and surname) lton Mr. ~~James~~ W. Moore	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Oct 1919	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 2 Jan 57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Promotion
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED:

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
IO (Contact) K 204	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO (Contact) K 1043
GS-0132.21-13 $9635.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.21-14 $10,320.00 p.a.
DDI/OO Contact Division Houston Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/OO Contact Division Houston Office
Dallas, Texas	11. HEADQUARTERS	Dallas, Texas
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
S. M. ASHCRAFT, Chief, Contact Division

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Carolyn Houghton x 2271

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J. LAROCQUE, JR.
Title: Deputy Assistant Director for Operations

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WW2	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-OC

15. SEX

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM 7-4239-40
TO Same

17. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: [illegible]

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		10 [illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	WJ	1/4/57
E.		

REMARKS

[illegible]

F. APPROVED BY
Robt A. Franklin
Mc Mc[illegible]

SECRET

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
in the CAREER STAFF of the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

To the Director of Central Intelligence

Sir:

I submit herewith my application for membership in the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency as defined below:

> "The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency is a group of carefully selected and trained individuals who accept an obligation to devote themselves to the needs of the Agency, and who intend to make a career with the Agency."

In accordance with this definition, I desire to devote myself to the faithful performance of duty in the Central Intelligence Agency, and I accept the obligations and conditions of that service which are determined to be essential to the furtherance of its mission.

I am aware of the many restrictions necessarily placed upon me by virtue of the security requirements inherent in my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency. I am also aware that as a member of the Career Staff, it will be my obligation to serve anywhere and at any time and for any kind of duty as determined by the needs of the Agency, and I have been assured that in order to carry out this policy, full consideration will be given to my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances. By virtue of this application for membership and upon my acceptance in the Career Staff, I am assured that, with continuing satisfactory work performance and conduct on my part, just and equitable attention will be accorded my personal progress during my tenure in the Career Staff. I am also assured that, on my satisfactory completion of any assignments, I will be offered reassignments which are compatible insofar as possible with my abilities and career interests, and that I shall be entitled to the benefits now available or to be made available in the future to members of the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency.

J. Walton Moore
(Signature)

27 Sept. 1954.
(Date)

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CAREER STAFF OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1 JUL 1954
APPROVED, TO TAKE EFFECT

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
THE CIA SELECTION BOARD

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAVEL ORDER

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.
G-75 [illegible]-5-56

ALLOTMENT/ACCOUNT SYMBOL
[illegible]-4. [illegible]-[illegible]-01

NAME J. Walton Moore	OFFICE PHONE	GRADE AND SALARY G-13 $8,560
TITLE Intelligence Officer	OFFICIAL STATION Houston, Texas	

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY

[illegible] Texas; New Mexico

PURPOSE

To engage in the collection of foreign intelligence information and support missions.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

(1) Official entertainment of sources leading to the acquisition of intelligence information.
(2) Official telephone calls.
(3) Rental of automobile when no other means of transportation is available or when it represents a savings to the Government.

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. Advance of funds is authorized.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL
$ [illegible]

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT
1 July 1955

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY
30 June 1956

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY)
common carrier, airplane, vessel, privately-owned [illegible] Govt transp., airplane,

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER.

☒ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT

~~to contact sources.~~

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.

SIGNATURE

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE)

[illegible] A. [illegible]
Chief, Houston Office

~~June 1955~~

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27 SUPERSEDES FB EDITIONS OF FORMS 33-27, 33-28, 34-A, 34-4A, -807 AND 37-40 WHICH MAY NOT BE USED.
OCT 1951

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

TRAVEL ORDER

TRAVEL ORDER NO: OO/C H-3-55XG

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL: 5-4739 40

NAME: **JAMES W. MOORE**

OFFICE PHONE: 2272

GRADE AND SALARY: GS 13 - $8,560

TITLE: **Administrative Officer**

OFFICIAL STATION: **Dallas, Texas**

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY: **Dallas, Texas to Washington, D. C. and return.**

PURPOSE: **To attend the OO/C Refresher Course, 2-55 commencing 6 June 1955 through 17 June 1955.**

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. Advance of funds is authorized.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: $ 300.00

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT: **5 June 1955**

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY: **18 June 1955**

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY): **Plane**

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.

DMGray
SIGNATURE

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE NOT TO EXCEED COST OF COMMON CARRIER.

☐ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE

XX TEMPORARY DUTY

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE)

J. LAROCQUE, JR.
Deputy Assistant Director, OO

31 May 1955
(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27
OCT 1951

[illegible] EDITIONS OF FORMS 33-27, 33-28, 34-4, 34-14 [illegible] WHICH MAY NOT BE USED (28-48)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1953 257127

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL, CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.— One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. ~~James~~ Walton Moore

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 5 Oct 1919

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 5 May 1954

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 23 April 1954
B. APPROVED: 23 MAY 1954

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
~~Intelligence Officer K204~~	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer K204
~~GS-132-13 $8560.00 per annum~~	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-13 $8560.00 per annum
~~DD/I OO~~ ~~Contact Division~~ ~~Houston Office~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DD/I OO Contact Division Houston Office ~~Dallas Resident Agency~~
~~Houston, Texas~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Dallas, Texas
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Jay B. L. [illegible] for H. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Ferne F. Firmin x 2271

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J. LAROCQUE, JR.
Title: Deputy Assistant Director for Operations

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT	
				DISAB	OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.	
				CD-OO

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-4239-40
TO: Same

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	Gw	5/11/54	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	E. R. C.	5/13/54	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

TRAVEL ORDER

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.: 00/5 H-3-538

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL: 4235-00-02.1

NAME: James W. Moore

OFFICE PHONE: 2272

GRADE AND SALARY: GS-13, $8360

TITLE: Administrative Officer

OFFICIAL STATION: Houston, Texas

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY

Houston, Texas to Washington, D.C. and return.

PURPOSE

To attend CIA Indoctrination Course.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. ~~Advance of funds is authorized.~~

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: $ [illegible]

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT: 8 February 1953

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY: 14 February 1953

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY): Plane

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.

DM
SIGNATURE

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER.

☐ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

FEB 13 [illegible]

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE)

J. LAROCQUE, JR.
Deputy Assistant Director, CO

2 Feb 1953
(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27
OCT 1951

SUPERSEDES PRE[illegible]IONS OF FORMS 33-27, 33-16, 34-4, 34-4A, 34 AND 37-60 WHICH MAY NOT BE USED. (3-1-49)

[illegible]VERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 195[illegible]

14-00000

8

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO. 9141

NAME: MOORE, J[illegible] Walton

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 1/20/52

NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion

SECURITY INFORMATION

WHILE LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-12	Intelligence Officer GS-13
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12 7640.00 p.a. (130)	GS-13 [illegible].00 p.a.
OFFICE	~~Office [illegible]~~	Office of Operations
DIVISION	~~Contact Division~~	Contact Division
BRANCH AND SECTION	~~Houston Field Office~~	Houston [illegible] Office
OFFICIAL STATION	~~Houston, Texas~~	Houston, Texas
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☒	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☒ 132

REMARKS:

Slot No. 15301.
A job description is attached. (Retain in classification file)

Job audit of Slot No. 15301 has been requested for the purpose of upgrading same from GS-12 to GS-13.
No recruitment request is cancelled by this action.

APPROVED:

Jay B. L. Reeves
~~[illegible]~~

RECOMMENDED: Chief, Contact Division

(DATE)

George G. Carey
GEORGE G. CAREY

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: 1/14/52 Elmer R. Wargione

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE: SIGNATURE:

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
F-258		7/14/48

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

DATE: 1-4-52 SIGNATURE: Roberta A. Stricklin

EFFECTIVE DATE:

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2123900

ALLOTMENT: 4239

C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(b)

DATE SIGNATURE: 1-18-52 SIGNATURE: M. Meier

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE: SIGNATURE:

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE: SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE:

DATE: 1-16-52 SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF: Joseph B. Rogers

wDJ

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—62480-1

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO: [illegible]

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL: [illegible]239-[illegible]1

NAME: James [illegible]

OFFICE PHONE: 2[illegible]

GRADE AND SALARY: [illegible]-13, [illegible]

TITLE: Administrative Officer

OFFICIAL STATION: Houston, Texas

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY: Houston, Texas, to Washington, D. C., and return.

PURPOSE: To attend the Covert Training Course in Washington, D. C. for the period 7 January 1952 to 1 February 1952.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION):

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE):

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. Advance of funds is authorized.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: $ [illegible]

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT: 6 January 1952

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY: 1 February 1952

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY): [illegible]

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE:

☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER.

☐ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.

HMS

SIGNATURE

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE): Deputy Assistant Director, SO

2 Jan 52

(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27
OCT 1951
SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 33-27, 33-30, 34-4, 34-4A, 34-5, AND 37-60 WHICH MAY NOT BE USED. (28-48)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951 - 972700

STANDARD FORM NO. 64 File

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Chief, Personnel Division,
Administrative Staff

DATE: 8 September 1950

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Branch

SUBJECT: MOORE, James Walton 23024

Subject's case is currently under consideration for routine re-investigation. Examination of the Personal History Statements that he recently submitted reveal that subject failed to complete all of the sections.

It is requested that the subject complete sections 16, 17, and 18 of the Personal History Statement so that pending security action may be concluded.

ERMAL P. GEISS

Rec'd 9-12-50

[illegible] 9-15-50

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Medical Division

FROM: Transactions & Records

SUBJECT: James W. Moore

Request that above named subject be given a physical examination.

POSITION: Intelligence Officer

GRADE: GS-12

BRANCH: OO, Contact

1/26/50

SERVICE: Field

NATURE OF APPOINTMENT: Exc. Appt. (Transfer of Funds)

4 Oct 49

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

RESTRICTED

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Personnel Branch **DATE**: 5 January 1950

FROM : Chief, Contact Division

SUBJECT: J. Walton Moore

This is to advise that J. Walton Moore entered on duty in the Houston office, Contact Division, OO, at 8:30 A. M., 5 January 1950.

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK

Reg. 37-3 · 1-6-1950 Bym

RESTRICTED

[illegible] 1-10

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NUMBER: [illegible]

NAME J. Walton Moore	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE 1-5-1950
NATURE OF ACTION Intra-Agency Transfer	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-12	Intelligence Officer GS-12
GRADE AND SALARY	6800.00 GS-12, ~~[illegible]~~ P.a.	6800.00 GS-12, ~~[illegible]~~ p.a. WS
OFFICE	Operations	Operations
BRANCH	Contact	Contact Division
DIVISION AND SECTION	Administrative Staff	Houston Office
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Houston, Texas
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☒ 130

REMARKS:

1. Subject reported for duty in the Houston office 5 January 1950.

security concurrence on appt.
[illegible] 1-17-50

RECOMMENDED:

9 January 1950
DATE

FERNE F. FIRMIN
Acting Executive Officer, CC/C
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: [illegible] 1-13-50

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE:
SIGNATURE:

CLASSIFICATION mm

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
F-259		7-14-48

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
✓			

DATE: 1-13-50
~~SIGNATURE~~ W. Lawrence

EFFECTIVE DATE:

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2105900
ALLOTMENT: 520-309
CCC Authority: Sch A-6.116(b)

DATE SIGNATURE: 1-17-50
SIGNATURE: [illegible]

PERSONNEL RELATIONS
DATE:
SIGNATURE:

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE:
SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE:

DATE: 16 Jan '50
SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER: F. M. McClellan

FORM NO. 37-9
JUL 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

file

4 January 1950

(1.)

Fiscal Division
Attention: Miss Kwedar
Employees Division

James Walton Moore

Per your request this is to advise that subject served with Central Intelligence Agency and predecessor agencies from 29 August 1946 until his transfer to Contact Office cob 5 December 1949.

All of this service since 20 October 1948 was on Unvouchered Funds.

CONFIDENTIAL

file

8 December 1949

TO : Chief, Personnel Division, North Building

FROM : Deputy Chief, Employees Division

SUBJECT: Employment Record of James Walton Moore, Jr.

This is to certify that the above-named individual began his employment with this organization on 29 August 1946 as a CAF-12, Intelligence Officer. On 8 March 1948, he received a periodic pay increase to $6144.60. On 18 September 1949, he received a periodic pay increase to $6714.00. He was converted to GS-12, $6800.00 on 30 October 1949. He resigned cob 5 December 1949 to accept a position on departmental rolls.

ROBERT S. WATTLES
Employees Division

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

8 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SED

DATE: 8 December 1949

FROM : Chief, FDZ

SUBJECT: Evaluation of James W. MOORE

1. Mr. James W. Moore entered on duty with SSU in December 1945 in a military capacity, and entered on civilian employment on 29 August 1946. During this period he served as commanding officer in Tsing-tao and was later assigned as Vice Consul to Dairen. Mr. Moore was never able to reach Dairen and so was attached for temporary duty to Tsing-tao and Shanghai until April 1948, when he assumed the duties of Chief of Station, Calcutta, India. On or about 7 December Mr. Moore was transferred from OSO to Contacts Division, OO.

2. Mr. Moore's performance as Chief of Station, Calcutta, has been excellent. He has been given an "Excellent" efficiency rating by the Consul General and also received a special commendation for some of his biographic reporting. Mr. Moore was well liked by Consulate personnel, the British, and the natives with whom he came in contact. He is a man of good judgment and commonsense and has carried on OSO operations in a secure and efficient manner.

Lloyd George
Chief, FDZ

ORIGINATOR : Byron C. Sarvis

DEPUTY CHIEF, FDZ/SEA: Don S. Garden

SECRET

DATE 12/6/1949

TO : Mrs. Kirwin, Contact

FROM: Personnel Officer

Processing for entrance on duty of James W. Moore
(name of applicant)

Intelligence Officer, GS-12, $6400.00 per annum
(title, grade, and entrance salary)
has been completed and the applicant meets all standards for full employment with CIA. Signed clearance for entrance on duty has been received from Inspection and Security and made a part of the personnel file of this individual. Effective this date he/she is assigned to duty with your office.

Signed R. D. McMillan

Geiss 11-30

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NUMBER: 7816

NAME: James W. Moore

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 12-6-49

NATURE OF ACTION: ~~Transfer and Reassignment~~ Excepted Appointment

WHEN LEAVING (ENCUMBERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Operations)	Intelligence Officer ~~(Operations)~~ GS-12
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12, $6400.00 p.a.	GS-12, ~~$6400.00 p.a.~~ 6800
OFFICE	Special Operations	Office of Operations
BRANCH		
DIVISION AND SECTION	FDD Division	Contact Division, Administrative Staff
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	~~Houston Office~~ ~~Houston, Texas~~ Wash. D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☑ FIELD ☒

WJS 12-20-49

130

Letter of availability on file with SO personnel.

trans. from UV.

Concurrence 12/1/49
E. P. Geiss

CCN 12/2/49

RECOMMENDED:

29 November 1949
DATE

FERNE F. FIRMIN
Acting Executive Officer, OO/C
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

EFFECTIVE DATE

FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: RKH 12-6-49

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE:
SIGNATURE:

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
2158 ~~[illegible]~~	2087	~~[illegible]~~ 6-25-48

NEW ✓ | VICE | P.A. | REC.

DATE: 12-5-49
SIGNATURE: W Dance

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 315-900
ALLOTMENT: 520-101
CSC Authority: Sch A-6.116(b)

DATE SIGNATURE: 12-12-49
SIGNATURE:

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE:
SIGNATURE:

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE:
SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE:

DATE: 6 Dec '49
SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER: McClellan

FORM NO. 37-3
MAY 1948

WJS 12-4-49

SOURCE FIELD ☐ CASUAL ☐	**REPORT OF INTERVIEW**	CONTROL NUMBER DATE 12-5-49

RECOMMENDED FOR BRANCH	DESK	REFERRED BY

NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE) Moore, James H.	GRADE	DEPT., OFFICE OR BRANCH

SERIAL NUMBER	ORGANIZATION	DATE OF BIRTH

ADDRESS (BUSINESS OR MILITARY)	TELEPHONE
ADDRESS (HOME) LOCAL Francis Scott Key - 600 20th St	TELEPHONE Na 5425

CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED) or CIA Ex-465

NAME (HUSBAND OR WIFE)	DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED)

EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, GRADES, AND EXTRA CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES)

LANGUAGES (DEGREE OF FLUENCY, HOW ACQUIRED)

FOREIGN EXPERIENCE (EXTENT AND PURPOSE)

PRINCIPAL CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE (MAIN OCCUPATION, SPECIAL SKILLS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ELECTIVE OFFICES)

Job in Shanghai shown in June '47 was with SSU & continued until Nov '47 at which time he was ret'd to U.S. for reassignment. Several assignments under State cover had to be cancelled because of Russian objection & he was finally assigned as Chief of Station

MILITARY EXPERIENCE (PRINCIPAL DUTIES, SERVICE SCHOOLS. IF OFFICER: MANNER OF PERFORMANCE RATINGS; IF EM: AGCT SCORE, DEGREE OF SKILLS, MOS AND MCO TITLES.

in Calcutta in Apr of '48 at GS-12. Held that post until return to U.S. in Oct 3 '49.

FORM NO. 38-1
NOV 1948

(1338)

CANDIDATE MUST NOT SEE THIS PAGE

UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES (CIVIL OR MILITARY)

REMARKS: (ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION)

Excellent appearance & manner. Is now winding up his work on India desk in L Bldg & wants to leave for Texas on Wed.

Is checking with McNally on ~~[illegible]~~ retirement amount.

Wonders if another physical exam is necessary. Had one about 60 days ago

I am to phone him before noon tomorrow if

CLEARED FOR CONSIDERATION BY

everything is not in order.

SERVICE RECORD CHECKED: FORM NO. 55 ☐ FORM NO. 20 ☐

RATINGS

FACTORS	SUP	E	VS	S	INS	EXPLANATION
MOTIVATION - ENERGY, EFFORT, INITIATIVE, INTEREST IN ASSIGNMENT.						
PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE - JUDGMENT, DECISIVENESS, ALERTNESS, PERCEPTION.						
STABILITY - EMOTIONAL CONTROL AND MATURITY, ABSENCE OF NERVOUS SYMPTOMS.						
ABILITY TO WORK WITH OTHERS - TACT ABSENCE OF ANNOYING TRAITS.						
LEADERSHIP - ORGANIZING ABILITY ABILITY TO WIN COOPERATION						
PHYSICAL ABILITY - APPEARANCE, PRESENCE, VIGOR, STAMINA.						

SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

Number Amend. #1 to UN-237-49
Date 15 November 1949

Name	Title	Grade	Salary
JAMES W. MOORE (DESIGNEE)	CHIEF OF STATION	GS-12	$6600.00

Office or Branch FE
Official Station CALCUTTA, INDIA

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Travel Regulations ______, subject to the following limitations:

☐ Maximum Living and Quarters Allowance authorized in accordance with S. G. C. A. R.

Purpose: Original Order amended to authorize travel by privately-owned automobile @ 7¢ per mile not to exceed cost of common carrier for subject alone and as being more advantageous to the Govt., if accompanied by dependents as shown below.

Itinerary and Special Provisions:

All other terms of the original order to remain in effect.

Date effective:
Terminating Approximately:

Mode of Travel:

- ☒ Common Carrier
  - ☐ Airplane
  - ☐ Vessel
- ☒ Privately Owned Automobile
- ☐ Government Transportation
  - ☐ Airplane
  - ☐ Vessel
  - ☐ Motor Vehicle

*Allowance for privately owned automobile as follows:

☒ (a) 07 cents per mile, not to exceed cost by common carrier. if subject alone
☒ (b) 07 cents per mile, as being more advantageous to the Government. if accompanied by dependents.

☐ The change of official station indicated is effected in the interest of the Government and not for your personal convenience.

☐ In connection with change of station, you are authorized to transport your immediate family, your household goods, personal effects and automobile, subject to weight limits, restrictions and provisions as set forth in GAI No #11.

☐ Travel to first post of duty abroad, including expenses of transportation of immediate family, household goods, personal effects and automobile, is authorized.

☐ Dependents to travel with employee.
☐ Dependents to travel within one year of employee.
☐

✓
2 Travel 2 P&O 1 CFD 1 File 1 station

Availability Date ______ Signature: ______

Advance of Funds: $ ______ Title Acting Chief, Finance Division

FORM NO. [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

FOREIGN TRAVEL REQUEST

NUMBER: Amendment #1 to UV-287-49

DATE: 15 November 1949

NAME: James W. Moore	TITLE: Chief Of Station	GRADE AND SALARY: GS-12, $6600.
OFFICE OR BRANCH: FDZ	OFFICIAL STATION: Calcutta, India	AVAILABILITY DATE (Outgoing Personnel):

ITINERARY (Specifically indicate temporary duty and leave points enroute, and the amount of leave.)

JUSTIFICATION FOR TRIP (Indicate whether traveller is designee or non-designee.)

Designee. Amendment to UV-287-49 to authorize travel by privately owned automobile @ .07 per mile not to exceed cost of common carrier for subject alone and as being more advantageous to the Government, if accompanied by dependents. All other provisions of the original order remain in effect.

DATE OF TRAVEL FROM ____ TO ____

☐ PERMANENT CHANGE ☐ TEMPORARY DUTY ☐ HOME LEAVE

MODE OF TRAVEL

COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION
☐ COMMON CARRIER
☐ AIR
☐ SEA

GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION
☐ MOTOR VEHICLE
☐ AIR
☐ SEA

PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE @ .07 CENTS PER MILE.

☒ NOT TO EXCEED COST OF COMMON CARRIER subject alone

☒ MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOVERNMENT (JUSTIFY) if accompanied by dependents.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (Extra fare train or plane, official courier designations, excess baggage, travel advances, separation allowances, etc.) Define and justify.

DEPENDENTS TRAVELING WITH EMPLOYEE OR TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH

SHIPMENT OF PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS		SHIPMENT OF PERSONALLY OWNED CAR	
FROM	TO	FROM	TO

PER DIEM RECOMMENDED:

SHIPMENT OF PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS AND PERSONALLY OWNED AUTOMOBILE (RETURNEES AND FIELD TRANSFERS ONLY)

☐ We are unable to designate next post of duty; therefore personal and household effects are to be packed for shipment and placed in storage as employee will be transferred to new post.

☐ We are unable to determine whether or not employee will be returned to present post of duty upon completion of leave and/or temporary duty, therefore personal and household effects are to be loose-packed and placed in storage at Government expense providing employee gives up his quarters during absence from post.

☐ Personal and household effects and privately owned automobile are to be shipped to next post of duty in connection with PCS.

HOME LEAVE ONLY
1. Employee (is, is not) to report to Washington for consultation prior to home leave.
2. Consultation not to exceed ________ days.
3. Employee (will, will not) be reassigned to his present post of duty.

TYPE OF FUNDS: Unvouchered

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL:

s/

APPROVING OFFICER

PERSONNEL OFFICE

FORM NO 37-60
FEB 1949

SECRET

File
[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

October 24, 1949

TO : R - Mr. Fisher Howe

FROM : PER:FP - Louis E. Mundy

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Robert A. Schow dated October 13, 1949.

The American Consulate at Calcutta, India has been notified by airgram dated October 21, 1949 that the assignment of Vice Consul James W. Moore has been cancelled.

OCT 26 1949

ENDORSEMENT

TO : CIA

ATTENTION: Mr. Robert M. Gaynor

FROM : R - Fisher Howe

Forwarded for information

Fisher Howe

SECRET

SECRET

file
98

6.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ATTENTION: Mr. Fisher Howe

Subject : Cancellation of Foreign Service
Title of Vice Consul at Calcutta
for Mr. James W. Moore

1. This is to advise you that Mr. James W. Moore, CIA representative who has been serving at Calcutta, India with the Foreign Service title of Vice Consul, has returned to the United States for a permanent change of station. It is requested, therefore, that his Foreign Service title be cancelled.

ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director

Enclosure: Special Passports No. 1207 and 1201

SECRET

file

①

CASUAL LEAVE REQUEST

Date: 11 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, FDZ:

Subject: Request for Annual Leave.

1. I herewith request 25 days of Annual Leave, commencing 12 October 1949 (Date) and ending 15 November 1949 (Date). During leave, I may be reached at 857 Rose Avenue, Abilene, Texas (Street, Town, and State) 6083 (Telephone Number).

2. I certify that my presence is not required in Washington for training or processing in any manner during this period.

3. If my return to Washington becomes necessary during this leave period due to any official reason, I will return promptly at my own expense upon receipt of your instructions.

4. During the present calendar year, I have had none days of Annual Leave, and have 73 days of Annual Leave accumulated as of 11 October 1949 (Date).

(Name)

CONCURRENCES:

Chief, Passenger Section,
Transportation Division: ____________

Chief, Overseas Division, CPB: ____________

APPROVED:

for Chief

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CPD

DATE: 6 October 1949 (2.)

FROM : Chief, FDZ

SUBJECT: James W. MOORE

The following extract from a dispatch received from the Acting Chief of Station, Calcutta, India, is forwarded to you for inclusion in Mr. Moore's personnel file:

> This station is in receipt of despatch No. 132 from the State Department in which James W. Moore is commended for his biographic report on Surendra Mohan Ghose.

Lloyd George
Chief, FDZ

ORIGINATOR : A. W. Hennig

DEPUTY CHIEF, FDZ/SEA: Don S. Garden

SECRET

TO: OCS Security Officer
Mr. John Bonnet

DATE: 10/3/69

FROM: CCB

SUBJECT: Communications Debriefing of J. Walter Moore

The above named individual has been debriefed by this office and a copy of the debriefing statement is attached for inclusion in his individual files.

[illegible] CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS [illegible]

Louis P. Napoli
for [illegible]

cc with attachments
OS ✓
CCIS

SECRET

COMMUNICATIONS DEBRIEFING

I, J. WALTON MOORE do solemnly swear (or affirm) not to divulge any classified information concerning the department of the U.S. Government to which I am attached as of this date, including but not limited to its communications, communication channels and facilities, cryptographic systems, personnel, location, and methods of operation.

I do further solemnly swear (or affirm) that I shall not discuss, divulge, publish or cause to be published any information concerning the cryptographic facilities, systems or procedures employed by other departments or agencies of the U.S. Government of which I am cognizant by virtue of my communications duties or otherwise.

I do further swear (or affirm) that I shall not discuss, divulge, publish or cause to be published any classified information of which I am cognizant by virtue of my duties with the U.S. Government unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Head of the department to which I am attached this date.

I have read the provisions of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 40 Stat. 217, as amended, and it is my clear understanding that I am subject to the penalties of the Act for violation of its provisions.

I do further solemnly swear (or affirm) that no classified papers, booklets, material, or equipment remain in my possession, and that all communications properties, classified and unclassified, have been returned to the proper authorities of this department.

I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

SIGNED J. Walton Moore.
DATE 2 Dec 49

WITNESS Louis P. Napoli
TITLE
DATE 2 Dec 49

SECRET

SECRET

TO: CALCUTTA ROUTINE
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 26 AUG 49
Confirmation: FBZ (1-2) OUT 88189
Information: Adso (3-4), CoPS (5), CRD (6), PERS (7)

WASH 9074

TO: CALC CITE: WASHF

[redacted] WITH WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN WILL ARRIVE CALCUTTA ABOUT 20 OCTOBER REPLACING RAFORD. ADVISE FARLEY AND INQUIRE WHAT HOUSING WILL BE AVAILABLE. CABLE REPLY. IDENTITY FOLLOWS.

K. PRUDEN	AWH	L. GEORGE
Releasing Officer	Originating and Coordinating Officer	Authenticating Officer

SECRET

TOD: 2124Z 26 AUG 49 Copy No. 7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 18, 1949

SECRET

TO : R - Mr. Fisher Howe

FROM : PER:FP - Louis E. Mundy LM

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Robert A. Schow dated June 8, 1949.

A telegram was sent to Calcutta on July 15, 1949 authorizing Mr. James W. Moore to return to Washington for reassignment about August 1, 1949, TO 0-0301 chargeable allotment OA-237245.

ENDORSEMENT

JUL 21 1949

TO : CIA

ATTENTION : Mr. Robert M. Gaynor RMG

FROM : R - Fisher Howe

Forwarded with concurrence

FH

Fisher Howe

SECRET

Original sent to CM.

FORM DS 17
REV. 4

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOTICE OF AUTHORIZATION OF OFFICIAL TRAVEL

Mr. James M. Moore, Esquire,
American Vice Consul
Calcutta, India

A–Authorization Number: 0-0301 6. file 9m

B–Authorization Date: July 14, 1949

D–You are hereby authorized by the Department of State to perform official travel at Government expense as indicated herein. This travel is not ordered at your request nor for your convenience, except as provision is made for leave as allowed by law. You are to proceed in accordance with the instructions contained herein or as amended. Travel via the most direct route by any feasible means is authorized. Unless otherwise noted, all expenses and the maximum per diem under the regulations checked below are authorized. Vouchers should be submitted promptly as provided in the applicable regulations. Officers and employees of the Foreign Service are directed to submit an estimate of expenses on form No. FS-287 and report dates of travel.

E–Official Station (If Transfer, Post Traveler is Leaving): Calcutta, India

F–If Transfer or new assignment, Post to Which Traveler is Proceeding: Washington, D. C.

G–Itinerary, Purpose, Remarks, and Special Instructions and Authorizations

Transfer - from Calcutta, India, to Washington, D.C.

Effects - group 3
Family authorized to travel.

Fees in connection with obtaining necessary inoculations, photographs, and visas are authorized.

H–Status of Traveler				I–Applicable Regulations			
☒	Foreign Service Officer or Employee	☐	Recipient of Cultural Cooperation Grant	☒	Foreign Service Regulations	☐	Act of Aug. 2, 1946 and Executive Order 9805
☐	Departmental Employee	☐		☐	Standardized Government Travel Regulations	☐	Departmental Regulation I, Section

J–Travel Requested By:	OFFICE	OFFICER
	FP	Mundy

K–Authorizing Officer: dh

H. A. Blundin, Chief,
Transportation Branch, Division of Central Services

This Travel is Chargeable to the Appropriation, Limitation and Allotment Indicated in Items L Through O.

L–Appropriation Title	
☐	Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Service
☐	Cooperation with the American Republics
☒	Salaries and Expenses, Department of State
☐	International Activities

L–Other

M–Fiscal Year: 1950

N–Allotment Number: 0A-237245

O–Appropriation–Limitation Symbol: 1900113.001

IMPORTANT. Every Voucher and Message Concerning This Travel Must Refer to Authorization Number and Date at Top

COPY FOR TRAVELER—SEE REVERSE SIDE

1

Original sent to [illegible].

FORM DS 17
REV 4

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOTICE OF AUTHOR TION OF OFFICIAL TRAVEL

A–Authorization Number: G-0301

C–Name and Address of Traveler:
Mr. James A. Moore, Esquire,
American Vice Consul
Calcutta, India

B–Authorization Date: July 14, 1949

D–To the Officer in charge of the post named in Item F: The travel indicated herein has been ordered by the Department. If this is a case in which the traveler should have provisional recognition, you are directed to make all necessary arrangements through the proper channels. Any question as to the date of the traveler's arrival should be taken up direct with the post which he is leaving or at which he will stop en route. Upon his arrival you are to facilitate the settlement of his official accounts. The estimated cost shown below is not a limitation.

E–Official Station (If Transfer, Post Traveler is Leaving): Calcutta, India

F–If Transfer or new assignment, Post to Which Traveler is Proceeding: Washington, D. C.

G–Itinerary, Purpose, Remarks, and Special Instructions and Authorizations.*

Transfer – from Calcutta, India, to Washington, D.C.

Effects – group 3
Family authorized to travel.

Fees in connection with obtaining necessary inoculations, photographs, and visas are authorized.

H–Status of Traveler				I–Applicable Regulations			
x	Foreign Service Officer or Employee		Recipient of Cultural Cooperation Grant	x	Foreign Service Regulations		Act of Aug 2, 1946 and Executive Order 9805
	Departmental Employee				Standardized Government Travel Regulations		Departmental Regulation I, Section

J–Travel Requested By: OFFICE: PF OFFICER: Munly

K–Authorizing Officer: ch
Certified true copy of signed original.
R. A. [illegible], Chief,
Transportation Branch, Division of Central Services

This Travel is Chargeable to the Appropriation, Limitation and Allotment Indicated in Items L Through O

L–Appropriation Title	
	Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Service
	Cooperation with the American Republics
x	Salaries and Expenses, Department of State
	International Activities

L–Other:

M–Fiscal Year: 1950

N–Allotment Number: [illegible]

O–Appropriation–Limitation Symbol: 1900113.001

P–DF Encumbrance

Q–Object Class	R–Increase	S–Decrease	T–Estimated Cost (Net)
023 Per Diem			
029 Travel			
030 Transportation of Things			
119 Grants			
Total			

IMPORTANT: Every Voucher Message Concerning This Travel Must Refer to Aut ion Number and Date at Top.

COPY FOR POST NAMED IN ITEM F

6

FORM NO. 35-6
DEC 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

TO: CALCUTTA — ROUTINE

FROM: SPECIAL OPERATIONS — 13 JULY 49

CONFIRMATION: FBZ (1-2) — OUT 85058

INFORMATION: ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), PERS (7)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 6593
TO: CALC CITE: WASHF
RE: CALC 154 (IN 36841)

James W. Moore

AUTHORIZATION [redacted] TRAVEL ORDERS DUE CALC PRIOR 20 JULY.

K. PRUDEN — **RELEASING OFFICER**

JSR [illegible] — **ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS**

HARRY W. LITTLE — **AUTHENTICATING OFFICER**

SECRET

TOD: 0040Z 14 JULY 9

COPY NO. 7

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

JUN 3 1949

(6)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ATTENTION: Mr. Fisher Howe

Subject : Request for Clearance for Return of Mr. James W. Moore

Reference: a. Memorandum for Mr. Neal from this office, subject Mr. James Walton Moore, dated 5 December 1947

1. This is to advise you that Mr. James W. Moore, CIA representative who is presently serving at Calcutta, India with the Foreign Service title of Vice Consul, is returning to the United States on or about 1 August 1949 for a permanent change of station.

2. It is requested that clearance be arranged for Mr. Moore's return to the United States and that an unclassified message, to include a travel order for Mr. Moore and his three dependents, be issued by the Department of State.

ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director

GS:jlm

SECRET

341

7 June 1949

[illegible]

Name James W. Moore, Jr.
Station Calcutta
Branch FBZ
Title Vice Consul
Destination U. S.
Date of Departure o/a 1 August 1949
Purpose of Travel P.C.S.
Date of Return to Post (Or Length of TDY, etc.) ——
Travel orders Requested: Yes ✓ ~~No~~
[illegible] No

[illegible] 7 June 1949
[illegible]

[illegible]

Date 7 June 1949

[illegible]

Margaret

13 July 49 - Orders to be sent them today [illegible]

14 July '49 - Telegram has been signed will be dispatched today.
Jm

31 Aug 49 - Departed from post 20 Aug 49 - per State Dept.

SECRET

28 February 1949

PERSONNEL TRANSFER LETTER
(This is not a travel order)

TO: **Mr. James W. Moore**

1. Pursuant to authority vested in me, your official station is hereby established as Washington, D.C. Upon receipt of proper Travel Orders you will proceed from Calcutta, India to such station, via Abilene, Texas for home leave.

2. The travel to your new station is to be accomplished as soon as practicable after receipt of proper Travel Orders. This transfer is not for your convenience or benefit, or at your request, but in the best interests of the Government.

3. In accordance with the provisions of applicable agency regulations, and subject to the availability of funds, the shipment at Government expense of your household goods and personal effects, including packing, crating, unpacking, uncrating, drayage, and temporary storage not to exceed ninety days, within the prescribed weight allowance, is authorized.

4. Subject to the availability of funds, the movement of your immediate family at Government expense is authorized in accordance with agency regulations.

5. Authorization for the shipment of a personally owned automobile at Government expense, when consistent with agency regulations, is hereby authorized.

Dy Personnel Officer 2-28-49

Deputy Personnel Officer

SECRET

SECRET

FOREIGN TRAVEL REQUEST

NUMBER

DATE 28 February 1949

NAME James W. Moore	TITLE Chief of Station	GRADE AND SALARY $ CAF-12 $6474.60
OFFICE OR BRANCH FB2	OFFICIAL STATION Calcutta	AVAILABLE DATE (Outgoing Personnel)

ITINERARY (Specifically indicate temporary duty and leave points enroute, and the amount of leave.)

Calcutta, India to Washington, D.C., for consultation, to Abilene, Texas for home leave to Washington, D.C., for PCS for reassignment.

JUSTIFICATION FOR TRIP (Indicate whether traveller is designee or non-designee.)

DESIGNEE. Subject arrived in Shanghai, China on his present tour of duty on 8 May 1947, and arrived in Calcutta, India on 17 April 1948.

DATE OF TRAVEL FROM 1 August 1949 TO

☒ PERMANENT CHANGE ☐ TEMPORARY DUTY ☒ HOME LEAVE

MODE OF TRAVEL

COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION
☒ COMMON CARRIER
☐ AIR
☒ SEA

GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION
☐ MOTOR VEHICLE
☐ AIR
☐ SEA

PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE @ _______ CENTS PER MILE.
☐ NOT TO EXCEED COST OF COMMON CARRIER ☐ MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOVERNMENT (JUSTIFY)

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (Extra fare train or plane, official courier designations, excess baggage, travel advances, separation allowances, etc.) Define and justify.

DEPENDENTS TRAVELING WITH EMPLOYEE OR TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH
Alice Patricia Moore	Wife	28 November 1919
Michael Walton Moore	Son	Age 5
Margaret Lee Moore	Daughter	Age 4

SHIPMENT OF PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS		SHIPMENT OF PERSONALLY OWNED CAR	
FROM	TO	FROM	TO
Calcutta, India	Washington, D.C.	Calcutta, India	Washington, D.C.

PER DIEM RECOMMENDED: Maximum while in travel only.

SHIPMENT OF PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS AND PERSONALLY OWNED AUTOMOBILE (RETURNEES AND FIELD TRANSFERS ONLY)

☐ We are unable to designate next post of duty; therefore personal and household effects are to be packed for shipment and placed in storage as employee will be transferred to new post.

☐ We are unable to determine whether or not employee will be returned to present post of duty upon completion of leave and/or temporary duty, therefore personal and household effects are to be loose-packed and placed in storage at Government expense providing employee gives up his quarters during absence from post.

☒ Personal and household effects and privately owned automobile are to be shipped to next post of duty in connection with PCS.

HOME LEAVE ONLY
1. Employee (is, xxxx) to report to Washington for consultation prior to home leave.
2. Consultation not to exceed 10 days.
3. (Employee xxxx will not) be reassigned to his present post of duty.

TYPE OF FUNDS: Confidential

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL:

APPROVING OFFICER

PERSONNEL OFFICE

FORM NO. 37-60
FEB 1949

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

26 January 1949

MEMORANDUM

TO : Deputy Budget Officer

FROM : Deputy Personnel Officer

SUBJECT: Foreign Post Differential

1. In accordance with Part 325, Sub-Chapter B, Chapter III, Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations,

James W. Moore

is eligible to receive foreign post differential pay as prescribed by regulations.

George E. Meloon

Deputy Personnel Officer

George E. Meloon
Deputy Personnel Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OPD 9 February 1949

Chief, FBZ

Memorandum to All Stations—"Review of Home Leave Procedure", 13 Sept. 1948.

1. In compliance with subject memorandum the following information is furnished for paragraphs 3 and 4:

3. a. James W. MOORE
   b. Chief of Station.
   c. Arrived Shanghai 5 May 1947; arrived Calcutta 17 April 1948.
   d. No leave taken.
   e. 1 August 1949.
   f. Sea.
   g. Three dependants; wife, 28 yrs. and two children aged 5 and 4.
   h. Because of family desire reassignment in more healthful climate, probably Europe or South America.

4. a. No.
   b. No. Must have replacement before leave is taken.
   c. No.
   d. Chief of Station.
   e. Moore would like to leave Calcutta by 15 August 1949 at the latest and replacement should arrive approximately one month before his departure.

Lloyd George
Chief, FBZ

ORIGINATOR : A. W. Hennig

DEPUTY CHIEF, FBZ/SEA: Don S. Garden

SUBJECT IS ELIGIBLE FOR HOME LEAVE 8 May 1949

Joseph S.
OVERSEAS DIVISION

RECOMMEND APPROVAL:

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

APPROVED:

DEPUTY PERSONNEL OFFICER

Personnel
[illegible]

Chief, Central Processing Branch 23 January 1952

Chief, Contact Division

Cancellation of Travel Order

It is requested that Travel Order No. 00/C H- 5-52XC, dated 2 January 1952, in favor of James Moore be cancelled inasmuch as Mr. Moore did not attend the training course in Washington, D. C.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

[illegible] Signed Copy To File
In [illegible] Processing Branch. Returned.
As Change Necessary.
Amended As Indicated.

LE Healy

FORM NO. DEC 1947 35-6

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To:	CALCUTTA	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	23 AUG 48
Confirmation:	TSD (1)	OUT 67539
Information:	ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), FDZ (6-7), CAS (8), SFD (9), CPD (10)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 1358

TO: CALC CITE: WASHE

RE: ZIZA-83 AND ZIZA-84

James W. Moore

1. IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCE DISPATCHES, THE FOLLOWING IS AUTHORIZED:

A. RENTAL OF SUITABLE QUARTERS AT A COST NOT TO EXCEED $300 PER MONTH FOR OCCUPANCY BY [redacted] AND FAMILY.

B. OCCUPANCY BY [redacted] AND FAMILY OF TEMPORARY QUARTERS, IF NECESSARY IN A HOTEL, FOR AN ADDITIONAL PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 90 DAYS WITH THE ACTUAL COST THEREOF BEING REIMBURSED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

IF EITHER OPTION EXERCISED REIMBURSE SELF FROM OPERATIONAL FUNDS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN QUARTERS ALLOWANCE NOW BEING PAID THROUGH STATE, AT THE RATE OF $6.318 PER DAY, AND THE ACTUAL COST OF QUARTERS PROVIDED IN A. OR B. ABOVE.

2. IF IT WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT OR IF NECESSARY FOR SECURITY REASONS WE SHALL REQUEST THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO AUTHORIZE THEIR REPRESENTATIVE IN CALCUTTA TO EXECUTE LEASE AUTHORIZED UNDER PARAGRAPH 1A ABOVE IN THE NAME OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE. IF THERE IS NO ADVANTAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT OR IF SECURITY REASONS NON-EXISTANT [redacted] AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE LEASE IN OWN NAME, IN WHICH CASE DISCLOSURE OF HEADQUARTERS INTEREST IN MATTER TO ANY SOURCE NOT AUTHORIZED. CONSIDER AND ADVISE.

RELEASING OFFICER ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD:

SECRET

COPY NO. 16

IT IS BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS SSAGE

3. ADVISE HEADQUARTERS IMMEDIATELY OF ALL ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER THIS AUTHORIZATION.

A. R. MAC CRACKEN WGT TFB TKS VRT CND L. GEORGE

SECRET

TOD: 0125Z 24 AUG 48

SECRET

5

MAY 1 8 1948

MEMORANDUM

To : Chief, Special Funds Division

FROM : Director, CIA

THROUGH: ADSO

SUBJECT: Group II Classification Under Bureau of Budget Circular A-8

1. The following official of the Office of Special Operations is approved for the Group II classification for overseas quarters, under provisions of Bureau of the Budget Circular A-8, and Administrative Instruction No. 30-1.

Mr. James W. Moore ✓ CAF-12
Chief of Station, Calcutta, India

2. This authorization will remain valid only so long as the above named individual remains in his present position and directly subordinate to Washington, D.C.

3. This authorization will be effective as of the date the individual concerned assumes his duties at the overseas post.

(Signed) R. H. Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.
Director of Central Intelligence

SECRET

Form No. 35-5
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(750)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE No.

FROM:	CALCUTTA	PRIORITY	[illegible] ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	11 MAY 48	
ACTION:	SFD (1)	IN 42510	[illegible]
INFORMATION:	ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRC (5), FBZ (6-7), CAS (8), CPD (9)		[illegible]

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

CALC 055

TO: WASHT CITE: CALC

RE WASH 6671 (OUT 62506) AND CALC SITUATION REPORT Z.I.Z. 15 CONCERNING TEMPORARY LIVING ALLOWANCE.

HOW DO YOU WISH ME TO HANDLE THIS?

J. Walton Moore

TOR: 20252 11 MAY 48 **SECRET** COPY No. 9

IT [illegible] BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF TH[illegible]SAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

SECRET

10 May 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Subject: Administrative Instruction No. 30-1

1. Administrative Instruction No. 30-1, dated October 31, 1946, makes provision for Group II classification for civilian employees who are Chiefs of Missions or principal officers directly subordinate to Washington, D.C. The order specifies that these officials will fall in Grades CAF-13 or P-6 or above, unless otherwise approved by the Director.

2. I recommend the Group II classification for Mr. James M. Moore, who will be a Chief of Station and directly subordinate to Washington, but whose Grade is below the CAF-13 or P-6 level. It is believed that the fulfillment of the obligation at the Station concerned justifies the Group II classification.

3. Therefore, there is attached a proposed letter of authorization for the Director's signature. The Director's approval of this proposed letter will permit Special Funds to pay the Group II classification to the individual concerned.

4. It is recommended that the payment under the Group II classification be made effective as of the date of his assumption of duties at the overseas post.

(Signed) DONALD H. GALLOWAY
Assistant Director

14-00000

FORM NO. 35-8
DEC 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

TO:	CALCUTTA	ROUTINE
FROM:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	6 MAY 48
CONFIRMATION:	SFD (1)	OUT 62506
INFORMATION:	ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CID (5), FBZ (6-7), CAS (8), CPD (9)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 6671

TO: CALC CITE: WASHT

RE CALC 049 (IN 40994)

[illegible] W. [illegible]

PAY [redacted] $235.84 SALARY FOR PERIOD 4 APRIL TO 1 MAY 1948 AND $180.40 ALLOWANCES FOR THE PERIOD 17 APRIL THROUGH 1 MAY 1948. MAKE NO FURTHER PAYMENTS AS STATE PAYMENTS TO BEGIN EFFECTIVE 2 MAY 1948.

T. F. BLAND ADMIN.	CID EDE	L. GEORGE
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 1821Z 6 MAY 48 **SECRET** COPY NO. 9

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CPD ATTENTION: Mr. Pfeifer **DATE:** 5 May 1948

FROM : FBZ

SUBJECT: Quarters Allowance

1. Effective 19 April 1948 James W. Moore assumed the duties of Chief of Station, Calcutta India.

2. It is requested that provisions be made for Mr. Moore to receive Group II Quarters Allowance in accordance with Bureau of Budget Circular A-8.

Lloyd George

Lloyd George
Chief, FBZ

ORIGINATOR : Byron C. Carvis
DEPUTY CHIEF, FBZ/SEA: Don S. Garden DSG

CAF-12

SECRET

SECRET

ast2

30 April 1948

TO : Security Branch, OSO

FROM : Personnel Division, OSO

SUBJECT : James W. Moore

This is to notify your office of the change of station for Mr. James W. Moore from Dairen to Calcutta effective 19 April 1948. Subject is Chief of Station, CAF-12, $6144.60 per annum.

SECRET

SECRET

AIR

Chief of Station
Saigon
Attn: Ernest N. Safford
Special Funds

29 April 1949

Administrative
Periodic pay increase

1. Effective with pay period beginning 9 March 1949, Ernest N. Safford received a periodic pay increase from CAF-12 at $5905.20 per annum to a CAF-12 at $6144.60 per annum. His salary data will be:

Gross	Tax	Ret.	Paid Abroad	Net to [illegible]
$472.66	$39.60	$23.64	$233.84	$175.88

2. Forwarded for employee's information.

GLENN A. MALLORY

James Drum
(ADMIN)

GNY:rr
ENT

Michael Mitchell

SECRET

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(750)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM:	CALCUTTA	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	24 APR 48
ACTION:	FBZ (1-2)	IN 40994
INFORMATION:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CAS (7), TRANS (8), CPD (9-10), SFD (11), CSS (12)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

CALC 049

TO: WASHF CITE: CALC

James W. Moore

[redacted] ARRIVED 17 APRIL 48. SITUATION REPORT FOLLOWING SHORTLY. POST RESUMED DUTIES 23 APRIL.

TOR: 1531Z 24 APR 48 **SECRET** COPY NO. 9

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—63333-1

(6)

4/19/48

Per telephone conversation with BLC and Steele, the salary on James W. Moore will reflect $4,860 per annum. No action necessary until integration program completed.

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(7-48)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE NO.

FROM:	CALCUTTA	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	7 APR 48
ACTION:	CPD (1-2)	IN 39309
INFORMATION:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), FBZ (7-8), CAS (9), CSS (10), SFD (11)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as CONFIDENTIAL Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

CALC 047

TO: WASHF CITE: CALC

Cate, Robt. B.

Moore, James Walton ✓

[redacted] RESUMED DUTIES 5 APRIL 48. [redacted] SCHEDULED ARRIVE 19 APRIL 48.

S/ BSW
EMT

TOR: 1444Z 7 APR 48

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 7

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

FORM NO. 35-5
DEC. 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET PAGE No.

FROM:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	5 APR 48
ACTION:	CPD (1-2-3-4)	IN 39079
INFORMATION:	ADSO (5-6), COPS (7), CRD (8), FBZ (9-10), CAS (11), SFD (12)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

TSIN 74

TO: WASHF CITE: TSIN

RE WASH ZCIW 2 PARA 7 AND TSIN ZCIA 8 PARA 12.

Moore, Samuel Walter Tsi-enosky, Harry

DEPARTURE [redacted] AND ~~BURBACK~~ AND ARRIVAL NEW CONSUL GENERAL WILLIAM TURNER AND CONSUL ROBERT STRONG WHO ARE FULLY COOPERATIVE HAS CLARIFIED SITUATION HERE WITH RESPECT AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE

Hein, George Morton

~~PRINCE.~~ VISA AND IMMIGRATION AND CONSULAR DUTIES PARTICULARLY OF ROUTINE NATURE CONTINUE TAKE ALMOST ALL OFFICE TIME. DEFINITELY REQUIRE CLERK SO MORE TIME MAY BE GIVEN AGENCY MATTERS. CONSUL GENERAL AGREEABLE CLERK BE EXPEDITED SOONEST. REQUEST BARBER (Barber) IF STILL AVAILABLE; OTHERWISE REQUEST RUSSIAN LINGUIST WHO IS STENOTYPIST. CLERK MUST BE SENT AS BONA FIDE STATE EMPLOYEE FOR SECURITY REASONS WITH (A) FSS CLASSIFICATION AND PAY GRADE (B) WITH STATE TRAVEL ORDERS (C) WITH PAY AND ALLOWANCES SET UP THROUGH CONSULATE SO CLERK WILL NOT APPEAR BE IN SPECIAL CATEGORY TO LOCAL ALIEN EMPLOYEES.

TOR: **SECRET** COPY No. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

TGIN 74 IN 39079

ALSO INADVISABLE THAT STATE IN ANY WAY THROUGH CODED TELEGRAM TO CONSULATE INDICATE CLERK'S SPECIAL STATUS SINCE SECURITY DEMANDS CLERK'S SPECIAL STATUS BE WITHHELD SO FAR AS FEASIBLE FROM FEMALE CLERK PRESENTLY ON DUTY IN OFFICE CODE ROOM AND REFERRED TO IN ZCIA 4 AND 6.

TOR: 1452 9 APR [illegible]

1 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: James Falton Moore

Although no official personnel actions have been processed transferring subject from Washington to Dairen, China, subject departed from Washington on 7 April 1947 and sailed from San Francisco on 18 April 1947 to his overseas destination.

On his arrival in China he was unable to accept his assignment due to certain difficulties, and as a result is being transferred to Calcutta, India. Effective 29 January 1948 the State Department approved Mr. Moore's designation as Vice Consul.

H. C.

FORM NO. 35-8
DEC 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

TO:	CALCUTTA	ROUTINE
FROM:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	27 FEB 48
CONFIRMATION:	FBZ (1-2)	OUT 59271
INFORMATION:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CAS (7), CPD (8)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60-4 AR-380-5

WASH 3279

TO: CALC CITE: WASHF

SUBJECT OF WASH 3278 (OUT 59270) MR. JAMES W MOORE.

D DE BARDELEBEN
OPERA

L. GEORGE

RELEASING OFFICER ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 00452 28 FEB 48

SECRET

COPY NO. 8

IT IS [illegible]BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS [illegible]SAGE

SECRET James W. Moore

TO: CALCUTTA ROUTINE
FROM: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 27 FEB 48
CONFIRMATION: FBZ (1-2) OUT 59270
INFORMATION: ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CPD (7), CAS (8)

WASH 3278

TO: CALC CITE: WASHF

Rob't Jantzen James Moore ✓

SPALDING'S REPLACEMENT ~~ERNEST K.~~ [redacted] SAILING FROM SHANGHAI 12 MARCH ABOARD SS SANGOLA. WILL ARRIVE CALCUTTA EARLY APRIL. POUCH FOLLOWS.

D. DE BARDELEBEN
OPERA BCS RSW LLOYD GEORGE

TOD: 0046Z 28 FEB 48 COPY NO. 7

SECRET

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(TSO)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM:	TS [illegible]	[illegible]
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	[illegible] 8
ACTION:	FB[illegible] ([illegible])	1[illegible]
INFORMATION:	AD[illegible] ([illegible]), [illegible] (S), [illegible] ([illegible]), [illegible], [illegible]	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

James W. Moore

[illegible] 05[illegible]

T [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [redacted]

[illegible] CASH [illegible] OUT [illegible] 7)

SA[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] S.[illegible]. [illegible]A. [illegible]

A [illegible] [illegible] EARLY APRIL. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

TOR: [illegible]

SECRET

COPY NO. 8

IT IS [illegible]BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS [illegible]SSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—63333-1

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(720)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

Page No.

From:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
To:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	17 FEB 48
Action:	SFD (1)	IN 35342
Information:	ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), ORD (5), FBZ (6-7), CAS (8), CPD (9)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.A AR-380-5

TSIN 058

James W. Moore

TO: WASHT CITE: TSIN (FROM [redacted]

RE WASH 2370 (OUT 58421)

ACCOUNTING FROM 6 APRIL LAST YEAR TO 29 FEBRUARY BEING POUCHED. $6,440 TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR. BREAKDOWN FOLLOWS: SALARY MYSELF AND Frianosky [redacted] $5,094.24. PER DIEM $3,001. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES $184. THIS LEAVES BALANCE OF $160.76. REQUEST ADDITIONAL FUNDS BE MADE AVAILABLE PRIOR ANTICIPATED DEPARTURE 8 MARCH. SHOULD Klein ~~PRINCE~~ BE AUTHORIZED ADVANCE ADDITIONAL FUNDS PLEASE HAVE SHANGHAI FORWARD HIM FUNDS.

copy Frianosky

TOR: 14022 17 FEB 48 **SECRET** Copy No. 9

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—63283-1

SECRET Moore, J. Wilcen

FROM : TSINGTAO ROUTINE
TO : SPECIAL OPERATIONS 8 FEB 48
ACTION : SFD (1) IN 34708
INFORMATION: ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), FBZ (6-7), CPD (8), CAS (9)

TSIN 051
TO: WASHT CITE: TSIN

1. RE WASH 2037 (OUT 58068). HARRY TRIANOSKY WOULD HAVE OCCUPIED SINGLE ROOM AND PAID COMPLETE COST IF HE HAD NOT BEEN REQUESTED MAINTAIN DOUBLE ROOM FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS. LOUISE LYONS PAID DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COST SINGLE ROOM AND DOUBLE ROOM HENCE TRIANOSKY FEELS ENTITLED FULL PER DIEM SINCE LOUISE LYONS ADVISED HIM THAT EXPENSES RESULTING FROM ASSIGNMENT WOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH OPERATIONAL FUNDS. PLEASE ANSWER SOONEST SINCE TRIANOSKY NEEDS FUNDS FOR LIVING EXPENSES.

2. IN VIEW MOORE'S PENDING DEPARTURE HERE HANDLING TRIANOSKY'S FINANCES AS OF 8 FEBRUARY UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED.

TOR: 1340Z 8 FEB 48

COPY

SECRET

Form No. 35-5
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE (753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET PAGE NO.

TO: TSINGTAO ROUTINE

FROM: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 5 FEB 48

CONFIRMATION: SFD (1) OUT 53421

INFORMATION: ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), FBZ (6-7), CAS (8), CPD (9)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 2370 J. Walton

TO: TSIN (FO[redacted] CITE: WASHT

RE TSIN 043 (IN 33533)

ACCOUNT SUBMITTED 15 JUNE CREDITS YOUR ADVANCE WITH $560.00 LEAVING BALANCE OUTSTANDING $6440.00. UPON YOUR ARRIVAL CALCUTTA, SUBMIT ITINERARY OF ALL TRAVEL AND LISTING OF ALL PAYMENTS MADE FOR PER DIEM, SALARY, TRANSPORTATION AND OPERATIONAL EXPENSES.

T. F. BLAND
ADMIN.
RELEASING OFFICER

CND VRT
ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

L. GEORGE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0121Z 5 FEB

SECRET COPY No. 9

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62323-1

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

TO:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
FROM:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	29 JAN 48
CONFIRMATION:	FBZ (1-2)	OUT 58070
INFORMATION:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CAS (7), CPD (8), SFD (9),	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 2039 James W. Moore ✓

TO: TSIN (FOR [redacted] CITE: WASHF

STATE CABLING TRAVEL ORDERS AND AUTHORITY TO PAY YOUR TRAVEL TO CALCUTTA. WHEN CONSUL RECEIVES, YOU MAY PROCEED. ADVISE DEPARTURE AND ETA CALCUTTA.

D. GALLOWAY	TFB EDE EMT	L. GEORGE
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 2328Z 29 JAN 48

SECRET

COPY NO. 8

IT IS ____BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS____SAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—63320-1

S

SECRET

Date 29 January 1948

TRANSFER LETTER AUTHORIZING PERMANENT CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION

TO: **James W. Moore**

1. Pursuant to authority vested in me, the transfer of your official station from **Dairen** to **Calcutta** is hereby ordered and approved.

2. This change of official station is to be effected as soon as practicable and is to be effective upon arrival at your new post. The transfer is not for your convenience or benefit, or at your request, but in the best interests of the Government. The reimbursement of travel expenses is authorized. Per diem in lieu of subsistence is authorized, and shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Service travel regulations. Living and quarters allowances at the rates authorized by Budget Circular A-8 shall be paid, effective upon arrival.

3. In accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Service travel regulations, and subject to the availability of funds, the shipment at Government expense of your household goods and personal effects, including packing, crating, unpacking, uncrating, drayage, and temporary storage not to exceed ninety days, within the prescribed weight allowance is authorized.

4. Subject to the availability of funds, the movement of your immediate family at Government expense is authorized in accordance with the Foreign Service travel regulations.

5. Authorization for the shipment of a personally owned automobile at Government expense, when consistent with the regulations of the organization as set forth in current directives, is hereby granted.

WASH 2039 (OUT 58070)

William B. Sharp

(Approving Officer)

See covering memo in file of Oliver Heatwole.

OSO/PD Form 3

SECRET

FEB 2

~~[illegible]~~

2

[illegible]

[illegible]   January 29, 1948

TO: Edward J. [illegible],
[illegible] Budget [illegible],
Central Intelligence Agency.

FROM: Jack D. Neal, JDN
Chief, Division of
Foreign Activity Correlation.

Reference is made to the memorandum from

Asst. Director Galloway dated Dec. 5, 1947.

The request for foreign service title of

Vice Consul at the American

Consulate General, Calcutta, India

for Mr. James Walton Moore has

been approved.

The post was notified of this assignment by

telegram dated Jan. 28, 1948.

FORM NO. 35-6
DEC 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	28 JAN 1948
Confirmation:	SFD (1)	OUT 57997
Information:	ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), FBZ (6-7), CAS (8), CPD (9).	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 1978 Moore, James W.

TO: TSIN (FOR [redacted] CITE: WASHT

FURTHER TO WASH 1166 (OUT 57022) PER DIEM RATES QUOTED APPLY TO TSINGTAO. RATES VARY IN DIFFERENT LOCALITIES. CHECK WITH STATE DISBURSING OFFICER FOR RATES AND REGULATIONS AS FOREIGN SERVICE TRAVEL REGULATIONS APPLY IN YOUR CASE. FOR INSTANCE, SHANGHAI WOULD BE $12.00, $12.00 AND $6.00 AND SEA TRAVEL $5.00, $5.00 AND $2.50.

T.F. BLAND ADMIN	CRD EDE	LLOYD GEORGE
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 2317Z 28 JAN 1948

SECRET

COPY No. 9

IT IS IDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS SAGE

Form No. 35-5
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(750)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	23 JAN 48
ACTION:	SFD (1)	IN 33535
INFORMATION:	ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), FBZ (6-7), CAS (8), CPD (9)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

TSIN 049

TO: WASHF, WASHT CITE: TSIN (FROM ~~PRINCE~~ Geo. Hein)

James W. Moore

1. RE WASH 109 (OUT 56851). PRINCE ADVANCED [redacted]2,000 JANUARY 13.

2. ~~SURBANK~~ Irianoly REQUESTING PAYMENT PER DIEM FROM 1 SEPTEMBER THROUGH 14 OCTOBER LAST AT $12 PER DAY WHILE IN SHANGHAI AND FROM 15 OCTOBER THROUGH 31 DECEMBER LAST AT $7 PER DAY IN TSINGTAO. PER DIEM TOTALS $1074. REQUEST ~~PRINCE~~ Geo. Hein BE AUTHORIZED PAY ~~SURBANK~~ Irianoly HEREAFTER.

3. REQUEST ~~PRINCE~~ Geo. Hein BE ADVANCED ADDITIONAL STATION FUNDS SOONEST.

TOR: 0309Z 24 JAN 48

SECRET

COPY NO. 9

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	23 JAN 48
ACTION:	SFD (1)	IN 33533
INFORMATION:	ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), FBZ (6-7), CAS (8), CPD (9)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

TSIN 048

James Moore

TO: WASHF, WASHT CITE: TSIN (FROM [redacted])

RE WASH 1166 (OUT 57022).

THIS APPRECIATED AND WILL STRAIGHTEN ME OUT FINANCIALLY. ACCOUNTING IN LETTER FORM POUCHED BY PRINCE ABOUT 15 JUNE. WOULD LIKE TO BE ADVISED OF AMOUNT NOW OWED EXCLUDING PAY SO I CAN TURN IN ACCOUNTS. PLEASE RECHECK.

Paul Eckel

ACCOUNTING LETTER WAS ADDRESSED TO KNOX ~~VAGALPIN~~.

TOR: 0309Z 24 JAN 48

SECRET

COPY NO. 9

IT IS BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS SAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—53323-1

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE (753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET PAGE No.

To:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	19 JAN 48
Confirmation:	FBZ (1-2)	OUT 57376
Information:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CAS (7), CPD (8-9)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 1600

TO: TSIN CITE: WASHF

RE TSIN 047 (IN 32770), TSIN 041 (IN 31970)

Trianosky ~~BURBANK~~ ACCEPTANCE APPRECIATED. HAVE MADE STRONG REQUEST ✓ TO STATE DEPARTMENT FOR PRIORITY INTEGRATION Trianosky ~~BURBANK~~ AND James Moore [redacted] INTO FOREIGN SERVICE FOR SECURE TRANSFER TO NEW POSTS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW PRESENT FREEZE ON STATE DESIGNATIONS FOR OUR PERSONNEL CANNOT ESTIMATE DEPARTURE DATE ALTHOUGH HOPE FOR ACTION WITHIN MONTH. REGRET DELAY BUT BOTH CASES ENTIRELY IN HANDS OF STATE.

C. GILPATRIC OPERA	RSW JL	L. GEORGE
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 2113Z 19 JAN 48

SECRET COPY No. 9

IT BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF T SAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62323-1

Form No. 35-5
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(750)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM: TSINGTAO — ROUTINE
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS — 13 JAN 48
ACTION: FBZ (1-2) — IN 32770
INFORMATION: ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CAS (7), CFD (8)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

TSIN 047

TO: WASHF CITE: TSIN

FOR YOUR INFORMATION PRINCIPAL OFFICER THIS STATION SENDING CABLES TO DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY BRIEFLY DESCRIBING CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH James Moore [redacted] AND Orianosky ~~[illegible]~~ TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED HERE AND REQUESTING EARLY CONSIDERATION THEIR TRANSFER AND ADVISE AS TO WHETHER ORDERS PRESENTLY BEING PROCESSED. IN VIEW OF FACT THAT TWO NEW OFFICERS ASSIGNED THIS POST AND NEW CONSUL GENERAL ARRIVING SOON THERE HAS BEEN LACK OF OFFICE SPACE AND Moore [redacted] AND Irianosky [redacted] HAVE BEEN CROWDED INTO Geo. Hein PRINCES SMALL OFFICE. BELIEVE THAT FOR REASONS GOOD MORALE SOME DEFINITE WORD OF PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT WITH POSITIVE DATE OF DEPARTURE BE GIVEN Moore [redacted] AND Irianasky ~~[illegible]~~ SOONEST.

TOR: 2330Z 13 JAN

SECRET

COPY NO. 8

IT IS BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS SAGE

Form No. 35-6
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	9 JAN 48
Confirmation:	SFD (1)	OUT 57022
Information:	ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), FBZ (6-7), CAS (8), CPD (9)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 1166 James W. Moore

TO: TSIN (FOR [redacted] CITE: WASHT

RE TSIN 042 (IN 31971)

THROUGH 9 DECEMBER 1947, YOU ARE ENTITLED TO $7.00 PER DIEM FOR YOURSELF ONLY. SPECIFIC APPROVAL HAS BEEN GRANTED TO PAY YOU $7.00 PER DIEM FOR YOURSELF, $7.00 PER DIEM FOR YOUR WIFE AND $3.50 PER DIEM FOR EACH CHILD UNDER 11 YEARS OF AGE, BEGINNING 10 DECEMBER 1947. THESE AMOUNTS ARE AUTHORIZED UP TO DATE OF ARRIVAL AT PERMANENT STATION.

NO ACCOUNTINGS RECEIVED FROM YOU TO DATE.

T.F.BLAND ADMIN	CND VRT	L. GEORGE
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 1920Z 9 JAN 48

SECRET

COPY No. 9

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

Form No. 35-5
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(750)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM:	TSINGTAO	PRIORITY
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	2 JAN 48
ACTION:	SFD (1)	IN 31971
INFORMATION:	ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), FBZ (6-7), CAS (8), CPD (9)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.1 AR-380-5

TSIN 042

James Walton Moore

TO: WASHF CITE: TSIN (FROM [redacted]

RE WASH 0109 (OUT 55651)

REGRET HAVE NOT KEPT RECEIPTS OR ACCURATE RECORD OF ORDINARILY NON-REIMBURSABLE LIVING EXPENSES. COVER DEMANDS CERTAIN STANDARDS AND WHILE PRESUMABLY DRAWING STATE ALLOWANCES ON TEMPORARY DUTY EXPECTED TO LIVE UP TO SUCH. REALIZE DIFFICULTY HOWEVER AND WILL TURN IN REGULAR ACCOUNTING UPON ARRIVAL PERMANENT STATION. BELIEVE YOU HAVE ACCOUNTING UP TO 9 JUNE. PLEASE ADVISE AMOUNT ALLOWED, NOT INCLUDING PAY, AS HAVE NO DUPLICATE RECEIPTS.

TOR: 2226Z 3 JAN 48 **SECRET** COPY NO. (1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

Form No. 35-6
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(755)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	30 DEC 1947
Confirmation:	SPD (1)	OUT 56062
Information:	ADSO (1-3), COPS (4), SRO (5), FBK (6-7), CAS (8) CPD (9).	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 9709 James W. Moore

TO: TSIN [redacted] CITE: [illegible]

RE TSIN #35 (IN 31413).

STATE DEPARTMENT WILL DIRECT CONSULATES IN SHANGHAI AND TIENTSIN TO SHIP YOUR EFFECTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. CONTACT CONSULATES AND GIVE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS. ARRANGE FOR INSURANCE THROUGH THEM. DO NOT HAVE SHIPPED TO CALCUTTA UNTIL CLEARANCE GIVEN FROM HERE.

[illegible] ADMIN.	[illegible]	HARRY LITTLE
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 1522 30 DEC [illegible]

SECRET

COPY NO. 9

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL Page No.

From:	[illegible]
To:	[illegible]
Action:	[illegible]
Information:	[illegible] (9), SPD (10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as CONFIDENTIAL Correspondence per Par. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

[illegible]

[illegible] [redacted]

James Walton Moore

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL Copy No. 1

TOR:

. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

Form No. 35-6
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE No.

To: TSINGTAO ROUTINE
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 11 DEC 1947
Confirmation: SFD (1) OUT 55851
Information: ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), FBZ (6-7), CAS (8), CPD (9)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.1 AR-380-5

moore, James walton

WASH 0109

TO: TSIN (ATTENTION [redacted] CITE: WASH

RE TSIN 032 (IN 30065).

George Hein

[redacted] AUTHORIZED ADVANCE YOU TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS WHICH WILL BE ACCOUNTED FOR IN FULL ON ARRIVAL NEW STATION. EFFECTIVE APPROVAL YOUR INTEGRATION FAMILY WILL RECEIVE STATE PER DIEM ALLOWANCES WHILE IN TRANSIT STATUS. REFERENCE SPENDING PERSONAL FUNDS FORWARD BY POUCH DETAILED REPORT OF YOUR LIVING EXPENSES SINCE ARRIVAL FOR OUR INFORMATION AND CONSIDERATION.

T.E. BLAND
ADMIN
RELEASING OFFICER

CPD
ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

LLOYD GEORGE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 01252 12 DEC 1947

SECRET

COPY No. 9

IT . . .BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF TH . . SAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—[illegible]

#341

Change of Post 11 Dec. '47

Moore, James W. FB2

Vice Consul

5 Dec. '47

[illegible]

approved 29 Jan '48

Form No. 35-5
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(750)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE No.

FROM:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	5 DEC 47
ACTION:	SFD (1)	IN 30065
INFORMATION:	ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), FBZ (6-7), CPD (8), CAS (9)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

TSIN 032

James W. Moore

TO: WASHT

CITE: TSIN (FROM [redacted]

RE TSIN 018 (IN 26037)

WILL BE WITHOUT FUNDS BY JANUARY. IN ORDER MAINTAIN STANDARD NECESSARY FOR CONSULAR OFFICIAL WHILE FAMILY AND SELF ARE LIVING ON TEMPORARY BASIS HERE I AM EXCEEDING SALARY AND PER DIEM BY OVER $100 PER MONTH. TRANSFER CALCUTTA WITH FAMILY WILL BE ADDITIONAL HEAVY EXPENSE AND PERSONAL SAVINGS ARE RUNNING LOW. BELIEVE THAT IN ORDER MAINTAIN PROPER STATE COVER I SHOULD RECEIVE SAME PER DIEM ALLOWANCES STATE GIVES FOR FAMILY WHILE IN TRANSIT STATUS. ANY ASSISTANCE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

TOR: 0349Z 7 DEC 47

SECRET

COPY No. 8

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(750)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM: TSINGTAO ROUTINE
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 5 DEC 47
ACTION: CPD (1-2) IN 30058
INFORMATION: ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), FBZ (7-8), SFD (9), CSS (10), CAS (11)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

TSIN 031

TO: WASHF CITE: TSIN (FROM RAFORD)

RE WASH 9560 (OUT 55224)

1. HAPPY ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT CALCUTTA. DOES THIS ALSO APPLY TO [redacted]: FOR SECURITY REASONS BELIEVE BETTER ASSIGN [redacted] DIFFERENT POST. HAVING WAITED TOGETHER THIS LONG FOR ASSIGNMENT DAIREN WOULD LOOK SUSPICIOUS IF PROCEED CALCUTTA TOGETHER. IF CONCUR ARRANGE CLERK-STENOGRAPHER PREFERABLY MALE TO ARRIVE CALCUTTA SHORTLY AFTER MY ARRIVAL.

Harry Ilianosky

Harry Ilianosky

2. SECURITY REASONS NECESSITATE FOLLOWING PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR CALCUTTA:

A. CLASSIFICATION AS FOREIGN STAFF OFFICER.

B. BONA FIDE STATE TRAVEL ORDERS.

C. PAY CARD WITH ACCOUNT NUMBER SAME AS STATE OFFICIAL.

D. AUTHORITY TO TURN IN PER DIEM ACCOUNT FROM TIME DEPARTURE TSINGTAO TO ARRIVAL CALCUTTA TO FINANCE CLERK THERE.

TOR 0349Z 7 DEC 47

SECRET

COPY NO. 2

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-55323-1

14-00000

ADCI xxxxx DEC 8

5 December 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JACK D. NEAL
CHIEF, DIVISION OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject : Mr. James Walton Moore

Reference: a. Memorandum of 17 February 1947 from Mr. Galloway to Mr. Neal requesting Title of Vice Consul at Dairen, China for Subject

1. Pursuant to a suggestion from the Department of State in view of the unsettled conditions at Dairen, it is requested that subject be transferred on permanent change of station from his temporary location in Tsingtao to Calcutta, India, where we should like to have him serve as our senior representative with the title of Vice Consul.

2. For reasons of security and operational efficiency that would be mutually advantageous to the Department and to this Agency, it is requested that arrangements be made for a closer financial and administrative integration into the Foreign Service prior to Mr. Moore's transfer.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

DONALD H. GALLOWAY
Assistant Director

cc: FBZ
CPD

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To: CALCUTTA

ROUTINE

From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

2 DEC 47

Confirmation: FBZ (1-2)

OUT 55263

Information: ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CFD (7), CAS (8)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 9595
TO: CALC CITE WASHF
RE CALC 022 (IN 21553)

James W. Moore

APPROVAL GRANTED FOR YOUR TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT TO FULL-TIME CONSULAR DUTIES. YOUR FUTURE SITUATION WILL BE GOVERNED BY GOI #3, INTENT OF WHICH IS THAT OUR PERSONNEL WILL PROVIDE PRINCIPAL OFFICER WITH WHATEVER SERVICES POSSIBLE PROVIDING SUCH DO NOT INTERFERE WITH PERFORMANCE OF PRIMARY FUNCTION.

POUCH SOONEST COMPLETE DESCRIPTION CONSULAR DUTIES INCLUDING AMOUNT OF TIME DEVOTED TO EACH ACTIVITY. IN ORDER THAY WE MAY UNDERSTAND YOUR PROBLEMS POUCH SUMMARY YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH YORKE AND MELLON. ARRANGING TRANSFER OF SPALDING'S REPLACEMENT FROM ANOTHER AREA. WILL CABLE ETA WHEN ARRANGEMENTS COMPLETED.

D OC GARDELESSEN
OPE/A

L. GEORGE

RELEASING OFFICER — ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0334Z 3 DEC 47

SECRET

COPY NO. 7

IT [illegible]BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF TH[illegible]SAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—53253-1

14-00000

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(733)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	1 DEC 47
Confirmation:	FBZ (1-2)	OUT 55224
Information:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CFD (7), CAS (8)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 9560 James Welton Moore ✓

TO: TSIN (FOR [redacted]) CITE: WASHF

RE WASH 8147 (OUT 55490).

AFTER FURTHER DEFINITE EFFORTS, UNABLE PLACE YOU IN ANY SIGNIFICANT CHINA OR KOREA POST. BELIEVE YOUR ABILITIES CAN BE BEST UTILIZED IN CALCUTTA AND WE CAN EFFECT TRANSFER HERE. DURING INTERIM CONTINUE AS YOU ARE. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

GLENN F. HALL OPERA	RG	L. GEORGE
RELEASING OFFICER	**ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS**	**AUTHENTICATING OFFICER**

TOD: 05042 2 DEC 47

SECRET

COPY NO. 7

IT [illegible]BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF TH[illegible]SSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—52325-1

Form No. 35-5
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(750)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM:	SHANGHAI (PYGMY)	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	24 NOV 47
ACTION:	FBZ (1-2)	IN 29002
INFORMATION:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CAS (7), CPD (8)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

SHAN 121

TO: WASHF CITE: SHAN (FROM KANE)

James Walton Moore

CONCERNING [redacted] SITUATION BELIEVE INADVISABLE TO TRANSFER OTHER MAN AT TSINGTAO HERE DUE TO IMPOSSIBLE HOUSING CONDITIONS. CAN OFFER NO SOLUTION OTHER THAN CALCUTTA FROM HERE.

TOR: 1426Z 24 NOV 47 **SECRET** COPY NO. 8

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—53333-1

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE No.

FROM:	MUKDEN	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	17 NOV 1947
ACTION:	FBZ (1-2)	IN 28535
INFORMATION:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CPD (7), CAS (8).	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

MUKD 035

TO: WASHF CITE: MUKD

HAVE HEARD INDIRECTLY MOORE STILL USING 2. IF NO OTHER SLOT PLANNED FOR HIM, COULD CERTAINLY USE HIM HERE. KNOW WARD WOULD CONCUR BECAUSE HAS OFTEN EXPRESSED HOPE ANOTHER MAN WOULD BE STATIONED HERE TO ASSIST ME WHEN OUR WORK EVENTUALLY DEVELOPS TO EXTENT I WILL NOT BE ABLE DEVOTE MAJORITY TIME POLITICAL REPORTING. KNOW MOORE AND ENJOY WORKING WITH HIM. DO NOT FEEL PAST CONNECTIONS WITH HIM WOULD JEOPARDIZE COVER. BRINGING THIS YOUR ATTENTION SOLELY AS POSSIBLE USE MOORE PENDING TRANSFER TO PERMANENT POST. HAVE NOT DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH ANYONE.

TOR:

SECRET

COPY No. 7

22562 17 [illegible] BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THI[illegible]SSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

Form No. 35-8
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(750)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM:	TSINGTAO	PRIORITY
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	7 NOVEMBER 1947
ACTION:	FBZ (1-2)	IN 27809
INFORMATION:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CPD (7), CAS (8), SFD (9)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

TSIN 024

TO: WASHF CITE: TSIN

RE WASH 8589 (OUT 54044)

James Wilton Moore

[redacted] REGRETS THAT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES CANNOT ACCEPT
ASSIGNMENT KOREA. WILL BE HAPPY ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT CALCUTTA
IF NOT FILLED. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF CHINA BACKGROUND AND
KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE BELIEVE COULD BE MORE USEFUL CHINA POST.
WHAT IS POSSIBILITY TRANSFERRING SINGLE MAN FROM PEIPING TO
Moore Irianosky
KOREA AND ASSIGNING [redacted] TO PEIPING? [redacted] DESIRES REMAIN
Moore
WITH [redacted] IF POSSIBLE. WHAT IS POSSIBILITY ASSIGNMENT AT
HONGKONG?

FE

TOR: 1232Z 7 NOV 1947 **SECRET** COPY NO. 1

IT IS .BIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS .SAGE

Form No. 35-6
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

Page No.

To: TSINGTAO PRIORITY
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 5 NOV 47
Confirmation: FBZ (1-2) OUT 54044
Information: ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), SPD (7), CAS (8), SFD (9)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 8589

a Moore, James Walton

TO: TSIN (ATTENTION [redacted] CITE: WASHF

RE WASH 8147 (OUT 53490) AND TSIN 025 (IN 26916).

MUST QUALIFY OFFER OF SEOUL ASSIGNMENT IN LIGHT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

(1) NEW FEC RULING SINCE REFERENCE PROHIBITS SHIPMENT OF DEPENDENTS TO AREA FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD. APPARENT ALTERNATIVES ARE TO LEAVE FAMILY TSINGTAO OR RETURN THEM TO STATES. GOVERNMENT WILL BEAR EXPENSES OF LATTER AND OF SHIPMENT TO KOREA WHEN AREA IS REOPENED TO DEPENDENTS.

(2) IN EITHER CASE WE WILL ATTEMPT SECURE FOREIGN SERVICE SEPARATION ALLOWANCE OF ABOUT $2100 PER YEAR FOR PERIOD FAMILY NOT PERMITTED IN AREA. NO REGULAR LIVING AND QUARTERS ALLOWANCE AUTHORIZED KOREA, AS QUARTERS PROVIDED AND FOOD PURCHASED THROUGH COMMISSARY.

RELEASING OFFICER ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD:

SECRET

Copy No. 7

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

(3) REGRET THIS LIMITATION, IN VIEW YOUR EARLIER ACCEPTANCE. PLEASE INDICATE PREFERENCE ON BASIS ABOVE. HOPE DECISION UNAFFECTED.

A.R.MACRACKEN L.GEORGE

WGT CDEB RSW EDE JSW TEB JEL

TOD: 2353Z 6 NOV 47 SECRET

Form No. 35-5
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(750)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE No.

FROM:	TSINGTAO	URGENT
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	28 OCT 47
ACTION:	FBZ (1-2)	IN 26916
INFORMATION:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CPD (7-8), CAS (9), SFD (10), TSD (11)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

TSIN 023

TO: WASHF CITE: TSIN

James D. Moore Trianosky

[redacted] AND [redacted] HAPPY ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT SEOUL KOREA.

Moore

[redacted] JUDGES HIS BACKGROUND WILL BE BETTER UTILIZED THERE THAN CALCUTTA. HE REQUESTS URGENTLY THAT STATE DEPARTMENT

TRIANOSKY

ISSUE BONAFIDE TRAVEL ORDERS FOR HIM AND FAMILY AND [redacted] WITHOUT SUCH ORDERS SECURITY IS COMPLETELY RUINED AND IT WILL ALSO BE MOST DIFFICULT TO PROCEED. ADVISE SOONEST SO HE CAN ARRANGE TERMINATION OF HOUSE CONTRACT AND MAKE OTHER NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

Branch action.
Very confused case

TOR 2202 28 OCT 47 **SECRET** COPY No. 7

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

Form No. 35-6
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE No.

To: TSINGTAO — PRIORITY

From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS — 22 OCTOBER 1947

Confirmation: FBZ (1-2) — OUT 53490

Information: ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CPD (7), CAS (8), SFD (9)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 8147 Moore, James W.

TO: TSIN (ATTENTION [redacted] CITE: WASHF

RE TSIN 018 (IN 26097)

INABILITY TO REACH DAIREN DISAPPOINTING. CHANGE OF ASSIGNMENT ADVISABLE. NEED EXPERIENCED MAN FOR CHIEF KOREA UNDER STATE COVER. ALSO HAVE OPENING AS CHIEF OF CALCUTTA STATION. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE. IF YOU ACCEPT KOREA POSITION, DESIRE Kiasosky [redacted] ACCOMPANY YOU TO SEOUL. REQUEST HIS REPLY ON KOREA ASSIGNMENT. WILL TAKE MONTH TO ARRANGE NEW STATE DESIGNATIONS. IN VIEW OF IMMINENT CHANGE OF ASSIGNMENT DO NOT UNCRATE FURNITURE.

RE PARAGRAPH 3, ANSWER WILL FOLLOW.

D. DELARDELEBEN — RELEASING OFFICER

RSW PE — ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

HARRY W. LITTLE, JR. — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD 2292 24 OCTOBER 1947

SECRET

COPY No. 7

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—63330-1

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To: TSINGTAO ROUTINE
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 22 OCT 47
Confirmation: FBZ (1-2) OUT 53566
Information: ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CPD (7), CAS (8), SFD (9)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 8212

TO: TSIN CITE: WASHF

James W. Moore

RE TSIN 018 (IN 26097) RE PARAGRAPH 3 FOR [redacted].

YOU ARE ON PER DIEM BASIS NOT L AND Q UNTIL YOU ARRIVE FINAL STATION. IN VIEW OF FACT THAT TRIP TO CHEFOO WAS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE COVER AND WAS ON COMPETENT ORDERS, ACTUAL, REASONABLE EXPENSES OF TRIP NOT TO EXCEED PER DIEM WHICH WOULD NORMALLY BE PAID FOR STATE PERSON MAKING TRIP IS AUTHORIZED TO BE PAID FROM STATION FUNDS. ITEMIZED ACCOUNT OF EXPENSES SHOULD BE SUBMITTED WITH REGULAR ACCOUNTING.

T.F. BLAND
ADMIN
RELEASING OFFICER

CND RK/DDEB EDE/VRT JSW
COORDINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

LLOYD GEORGE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0607Z 25 OCT 47

SECRET

COPY NO. 7

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-[illegible]

Form No. 35-6
April 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(750)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE No.

FROM:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	4 SEPTEMBER 47
ACTION:	TRANS (1)	IN 22427
INFORMATION:	ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), FBZ (6-7), CPD (8), CSS (9), TSD (10), SFD (11), CAS (12)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

TSIN 009

TO: WASHF CITE: TSIN

RE WASH 5548 (OUT 50380)

[redacted] HAS RECEIVED NO REPLY FROM TIENTSIN REGARDING CARGOES.

RE WASH 5838 (OUT 50695)

[redacted] AND FAMILY PRESENTLY WELL. [redacted] REPORTS HIMSELF AND FAMILY READY PROCEED DAIREN ANY TIME PASSAGE CAN BE SECURED. HAS MADE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH DESTINATION. DIFFICULTY CAUSED BY RUSSIAN REFUSAL ALLOW ENTRY TO OTHER THAN RUSSIAN SHIPS. PRESENT PLAN IS TO PROCEED VLADIVOSTOK BY RUSSIAN SHIP AND TRANSFER THERE TO SHIP BOUND FOR DAIREN. APPLICATIONS FOR VISA TO VLADIVOSTOK FOR [redacted] AND FAMILY REQUESTED BUT NOT YET GRANTED. [redacted] DOES NOT DESIRE OTHER POST IF POSSIBILITY PROCEEDING DAIREN NEAR FUTURE. [redacted] HEREWITH ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT

TOR: **SECRET** Copy No. 8

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

TSIN 009 IN 22427

OF FUNDS IN POUCH NUMBER 5.

TOR: 2024 4 SEPTEMBER 47

Form No. 35-6
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To:	TSINGTAO	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	26 AUGUST 1947
Confirmation:	FBZ (1-2)	OUT 50695
Information:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CPD (7), CAS (8)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.A AR-380-5

WASH 5838

TO: TSIN CITE: WASHF

MESSAGE FROM SHANGHAI STATES [redacted] AND FAMILY HAVE PNEUMONIA. HOW SERIOUS IS ILLNESS AND WILL IT PREVENT TRANSFER DAIREN WHEN ARRANGED?

T.F. BLAND
ADMIN
RELEASING OFFICER

ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

L. GEORGE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 1940 27 AUGUST 1 7

SECRET

COPY NO. 7

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

[illegible]

Pfeffer

VENDOR'S SHIPPING DOCUMENT

Contract or P.O. No.: 10005-C

FINAL

OVERSEA COPY

Date shipped: 15 July 1948 ✓

Consignee and address:

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
CALCUTTA, INDIA
(JTI)
Care: Receiving Clerk
American Export Lines
Pier "D" Jersey City
New Jersey
SS: EXCELSIOR

Carrier: Truck

Acct: U.S. Despatch Agent

RECAPITULATION BY CONTENTS

✓	No.	Pkg	Contents	Weight	Cube
	1	cs	Radio	55	3/5
	1	TOTAL		55	3/5

Item No.	Stock No. and Description of Articles	Unit	No. of Pkgs.	Type of Pkg.	Pkg. No.	Quantity to be Shipped (7)	Quantity Shipped (8)	Wt Unit Cost (9)	Cu Total Cost (10)
1	Household effects, (radio)	Ea	1	cs	1	1	1	55	3/5

COLUMN HEADED TOTAL

RECEIVED EXCEPT AS NOTED

DATE

LOCATION

IN-TRANSIT STORAGE

TALLY NO

DATE

LOCATION

REC'D BY

PIER OPERATIONS

REC'D BY

DATE

DATE LOADED

HATCH CHECKER

(CONTRACTOR'S NAME)

FORM NO. 35 2
OCT 1946

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

L(342)
PAGE NO.______

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

TO: SHANGHAI (PYGMY) ROUTINE

FROM: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 18 JULY 1947

CONFIRMATION: EXEC (1) OUT 4511 ✓

INFORMATION: ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), REG (5), FBZ (6-7), SP FD (8)

SECRET

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. HANDLE AS CORRESPONDENCE PER PARA 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5.

SECRET COPY #1

WASH 4511

TO: SHAN CITE: WASHF

PASS FOLLOWING TO [redacted] James H. Moore: $3,000 BEING POUCHED FROM WHICH YOU WILL ADVANCE YOURSELF NECESSARY FUNDS. PAY WILL NOT BE SET UP AT YOUR TEMPORARY STATION. LETTER FOLLOWS.

JAMES H. DRUM
RELEASING OFFICER
ADMIN

TLB PEE CND TFI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

TOD: 1331 22 JULY 1947

LLOYD GEORGE

AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

14-00000

VENDOR'S SHIPPING DOCUMENT

OVERSEAS COPY

CONTRACT OR P.O. NO.	12734-A
DATE SHIPPED	1 November 1947 ☑
CONTRACTOR AND ADDRESS	Francis F. Strohl P.O. Box 3647 Georgetown, Washington, D. C.
SHIP TO	AMERICAN CONSULATE DAIREN, CHINA (330) VIA: TAKU BAR SS: LAURA MAERSK
(13)	14 April 1947
SHP. NO.	1
NO. SHTS.	1

(ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER WHEN SHIPMENT)

SUB CONTRACTOR

RECAPITULATION OF SHIPMENT

NO. PKGS.	TYPE PKG.	Contents	TOTAL WEIGHT	TOTAL CUBE
1	cs	Automobile	4880	526.7
	TOTAL			

STOCK NO. AND DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES

ITEM NO. (1)	STOCK NO. AND DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES (2)	UNIT OF ISSUE (3)	NO. OF PACK. (4)	QUANTITY SHIPPED (8)	GROSS WEIGHT (9)	CU. FEET COST (10)
1	Automobile	cs		1	4880	526.7

IN-TRANSIT STORAGE

PIER OPERATIONS

INSPECTION POINT

TERMS

(DATE) (CONTRACTOR'S NAME)

Duggan

UP APR 8

FINAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR OVERSEAS TRAVEL

DATE 7 April 1947

TO: Mr. William Duggan

FROM: Robert B. Sheppard, Capt., AGD, Chief, TRANS. Section

SHIPMENT NUMBER (NAME OF TRAVELER(S))

James W. Moore, Dairen, China, No orders

ITINERARY The above individual will depart Washington, D. C. by rail 11.45 pm 7 April 1947 to San Francisco for scheduled departure from San Francisco by Marine Lynx 18 April 1947 to his overseas destination. He should have in his possession his passport and immunization records.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (BAGGAGE, TICKETS, ETC.)

CONFIDENTIAL

(1306)

FORM NO. 36-11
OCT 1946

REQUEST FOR OVERSEAS SHIPMENT OF C

SECRET

INSTRUCTIONS: CONTACT CAR CER BEFORE COMPLETING THIS FORM. CARGO O CER WILL ASSIGN IDENTIFICATION NUMBER BY PHONE WHEN NUMBER SHOULD APPEAR ON EACH UNIT OF YOUR SHIPMENT. FORWARD ORIGINAL COPY TO CARGO UNIT. RETAIN DUPLICATE.

CARGO NO. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS) 12065

TO: CHIEF, CARGO UNIT (NAME) Frances Strohl

DATE 4 April 1947

FROM: AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (NAME) L. George

DIVISION FBZ

BUILDING Que

ROOM NO. 2005

PHONE NO. 2014

NO. OF UNITS (CRATES, BOXES, ETC.) IF LARGE SHIPMENT ATTACH MANIFEST OR REQUISITION
One (1)

GENERAL CONTENTS FOR CUSTOMS AND CENSORSHIP
Automobile

PACK'G OR CRAT'G REQUIRED YES ☐ NO ☐

ADDRESS OF CONSIGNEE (INDICATE NAME AND DESTINATION OF SHIPMENT IN THE CLEAR)
James W. Moore
Dairen, China

INDICATE WAREHOUSE OR OTHER PLACE MERCHANDISE WILL BE ACCUMULATED FOR CARGO UNIT TO SHIP

REQUESTED IN LETTER DATED

REQUESTED IN CABLE NO.

REMARKS:

Car purchased through Mrs. Fisher and to be shipped by Howard Fife via State Department facilities.

Original to Strohl -4/4/47

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

SECRET

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 36-4
SEP 1946

(1296)

AGREEMENT

IN CONSIDERATION OF the GOVERNMENT'S undertaking to transport, without cost to me, to my official overseas station, the vehicle described below which is my personal property;

I hereby undertake not to sell or in any other manner dispose of said vehicle during the term of my employment by the GOVERNMENT overseas without prior written authority from properly authorized representatives of the GOVERNMENT; and

I understand that I will be held personally liable to the full extent of the cost of such transportation, and will reimburse the GOVERNMENT to the full extent of such cost in the event that I do sell or otherwise dispose of the said vehicle without such authorization.

MAKE: ____________________

TYPE: ____________________

YEAR MODEL: ____________________

MOTOR NUMBER: ____________________

SERIAL NUMBER: ____________________

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 3rd day of April 1947.

J. Walton Moore (L.S.)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)
) SS
CITY OF WASHINGTON)

On this 3rd day of April 1947, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, J. Walton Moore, to me known and known by me to be the person who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed.

Evelyn K. Hall
Notary Public

My Commission Expires Feb. 20, [illegible]

C
O
P
Y

File

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE MEMORANDUM • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ADSO Date: 3 April 1947
THRU : Chief, PSD
FROM : Acting Chief, FBZ

SUBJECT : Approval of Shipment of Personal Automobile under S. O. Directive No. 15

1. It is requested that approval be granted for the shipment at government expense of the personally owned Chevrolet car for Mr. James W. Moore, assigned as Chief of Station at Dairen, China.

2. It is requested that additional weight allowance be authorized for this shipment.

3. It is requested that authority be granted Mr. Moore to use such car for official purposes and to be reimbursed for such use.

4. Transportation is necessary at Dairen for Mr. Moore to carry out his duties.

5. No "Official" or "Quasi-personal" car will be shipped to Dairen during Mr. Moore's tour of duty.

/s/

Harry Little, Jr.
Acting Chief, FBZ

APPROVED:

/s/
DONALD H. GALLOWAY

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

/s/
JAMES H. DRUM

cc: ~~[illegible]~~ Pfeifer
Davis
Bland
Woodward
Drum

CONFIDENTIAL

APR 17

SEC

FORM NO.
SF-2
SEPT.1946

SPECIAL FUNDS DIVISION
FOREIGN DUTY DATA SHEET

(This form to be prepared in quadruplicate - original to Special Funds Division, duplicate to pouched to office of destination, triplicate to Administrative Officer, quadruplicate to indiv ual to be carried to destination and surrendered to Special Funds Officer)

1. NAME **J. Walton Moore** Date **13 March 1947**
2. POSITION **Operations Officer** **CAF-12** ANNUAL GROSS SALARY **$5905.20** CONTROL NO. ____
3. DESTINATION **Dairen, China**
4. HOME ADDRESS **857 Ross Avenue, Abilene, Texas**
5. SALARY DATA: (FOR EACH FOUR WEEKLY PAY PERIOD)

A - To be paid by **State** Station Office $ **235.84**

B - Tax withheld in U.S. $ **19.60**

C - Insurance withheld in U.S. $ ____

D - Bond deductions withheld in U.S. $ ____

E - Retirement deductions withheld in U.S. $ ____

F - Other - (specify in detail) $ ____

G - To be paid to allottee by Washington Office $ **168.80**

Total Gross Salary Per Pay Period $**454.24**

6. Overseas payment to begin with payroll period **6 April 1947** Through **3 May 1947**
7. Allotment Instructions:
Mail or deliver four weekly check to **J. Walton Moore**
Name as it should appear on check
At the following address **Farmers & Merchants National Bank, Abilene, Texas**
8. All adjustments in salary to be effected in: (initial one)
A - Net overseas payment ____ B - U.S.Allotment **X**
9. Leave balance as of **4/5/47** (Approximate date of departure) **4/5/**
No leave used from 4/5/47 to departure date.
A - Annual leave **48** Hours B - Sick Leave **68** H
10. Classification of Assignment: (Check one) Temporary ____ Permanent **X**
11. Payment of allowances for quarters and/or cost of living is **X** is not ____ authorized (check one)
12. Authorization of allowances for quarters and/or cost of living is in accordance with **Bureau of the Budget Circular A-8.** (cite author
13. Allowance for quarters and cost of living data:
(To be stated in cases where deemed necessary by Special Funds Division - if filled in i will be the responsibilty of person making payment to ascertain that the maximum, as sho is allowable under existing regulations in each individual case, and that all proper ded tions are made)

Current Maximum Rate Authorized	Annual	Per Four Weekly Pay Period
Quarters	$ —	$
Cost of Living	$ —	$
Other (specify)	$ ~~2520.00~~ 2140.–	$ ~~193.84~~ 164.61

14. Dependency Status:
____ Married withdependents in area **X** Married without dependents in area
____ Single with dependents in area ____ Single without dependents in area
15. Advances transferred **None** as per T/A attached
16. REMARKS: **For per diem while enroute see reverse side**

APPROVED:
Administrative Officer JHD
Branch Chief
Personnel Officer

I hereby authorize and direct the Special F Division to make the above allotments from m compensation.

J. Walton Moore

14-00000

SUBMIT IN DUPLICATE
WHEN MATERIAL AVAILABLE

REQUEST FOR PICK-UP AND DELIVERY PREPARATORY FOR OVERSEAS SHIPMENT

CARGO NO. 10925

SECRET

TO: CHIEF, CARGO UNIT

DATE 6 March 1947

FROM: James Walton Moore

SHIPMENT INSTRUCTIONS: IT IS REQUESTED THAT MATERIAL INDICATED BELOW BE PICKED UP AND DELIVERED TO OUR WAREHOUSE FOR PREPARATION OF OVERSEAS SHIPMENT. NO FREIGHT SHALL BE PICKED UP UNLESS ALL PIECES ARE CLEARLY MARKED WITH THE CARGO NUMBER INDICATED ABOVE. IF THIS SHIPMENT CONTAINS PERSONAL EFFECTS THE SUBMISSION OF THIS FORM CERTIFIES THAT IT CONTAINS NO ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES OR OTHER CONTRABAND.

MATERIAL (GENERAL DESCRIPTION): Personal and household effects

NO. OF CASES:

APPROXIMATE WEIGHT: 8,700 lbs.

LOCATION	ALTERNATE PERSONS TO CONTACT	
BUILDING 2457 Idlewild St.	NAME Alice P. Moore	TELEPHONE 6088
ROOM NO. Abilene, Texas	NAME	TELEPHONE

SIGNATURE OF CONSIGNEE

FORM NO. 34-5
SEP 1946

(1237)

SECRET

6 March 1947

TRANSFER LETTER AUTHORIZING PERMANENT CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION

TO: James W. Moore

1. Pursuant to authority vested in me, the transfer of your official station from Washington, D.C. to Dairen, China is hereby ordered and approved.

2. This change of official station is to be effected as soon as practicable and is to be effective upon arrival at your new post. The transfer is not for your convenience or benefit, or at your request, but in the best interests of the Government. The reimbursement of travel expenses is authorized. Per diem in lieu of subsistence is authorized, and shall be in accordance with the provisions of Administrative Order No. 42. Living and quarters allowances at the rates authorized by Budget Circular A-8 shall be paid, effective upon arrival.

3. In accordance with the provisions of EO 9805, and subject to the availability of funds, the shipment at Government expense of your household goods and personal effects, including packing, crating, unpacking, uncrating, drayage, and temporary storage not to exceed 60 days, within the prescribed weight allowance, is authorized.

4. Subject to the availability of funds, the movement of your immediate family at Government expense is authorized in accordance with regulations prescribed in EO 9805.

(Signed) Donald H. Galloway
(Approving Officer)

SECRET

DATE 5 March 47

TRANSPORTATION ACTION SHEET

NAME Moore, James W.
BRANCH 7 B2

Letter of Commitment 22 Jan 47
Draft Status
Navy or Marine Reserve

FORM 36-23
Sec. A.
Notification 5 Mar. 47
Assessment Feb. 45 OK
Security [illegible] Dec. 44
EOD 29 August 46
Overseas Physical 21 Jan 47
Immunizations 21 Jan 47
Opr. file CAF-112
Sec. B.
Travel Sponsor P. Cahil
Availability Date
17 March 47
Sec. C. Dairen, China
Completed Yes

Transfer Letter
PCS Yes
TDY
Auth. for Auto None
To Duggan 6 March 47
To ADSO 6 March 47
Returned from ADSO 7 Mar. 47
Approved Yes
Disapproved
Copy to Special Funds 7 Mar. 47
Copy to Strohl 7 Mar. 47

FORM 36-27
Trans. for Family Wife + 2 children
Person to be contacted
Wife
Date of Movement To follow
Trans. of Household effects Yes
Person to be contacted
Wife
Date of Movement Upon request
Strohl
Pfeifer
To ADSO 6 Mar. 47
Returned from ADSO 7 Mar. 47
Copy to Special Funds 7 Mar. 47
Copy to Strohl 7 March 47
copy to Haupt 7 Mar. 47

FORM 36-5 Cargo No. 10925
Completed 6 March 47
2 copies to Strohl 7 Mar. 47 Ayland
Pick-up date
Strohl
Pfeifer

FORM 36-5 (Auto.) Cargo No.
Completed ~~6 March 47~~
2 copies to Strohl
Pick-up Date None
Strohl
Pfeifer

FORM 36-4 Cargo No. 10725
Completed 6 March 47
Copy to Strohl 7 March 47
Misc.

FORM 36-4 (Auto.) Cargo No. 12065
Completed
Copy to Strohl None
Misc.

Agreement for Auto.
Completed [illegible] 3 April 47
Notarized 3 April 47
Copy to [illegible] 4 April 47
Cardex Card checked 5 March 47

Passport No.

Misc.

Filed

REQUEST FOR OVERSEAS TRANSPORTATION

SECRET

SEC. A TO: Director, CIG

5 March 1947

YOUR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR THE OVERSEAS TRANSPORTATION OF Mr. James Walton Moore
NAME OF TRAVELER

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TRIP IS:

1. Subject will be Chief CIG station in the American Consulate in Dairen, China.

2. Subject's designation as Vice Consul, American Consulate, Dairen, China.

5 Mar 1947
DATE

SIGNATURE (INITIATING OFFICER)

THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS CONCERNING THE ABOVE TRAVELER WERE COMPLETED ON THE DATES INDICATED BELOW:

DATE ASSESSED AND APPROVED February 1945		DATE SECURITY APPROVED 8 December 1944
DATE ENTERED ON DUTY 29 August 1946	DATE OF OVERSEAS PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 21 January 1947	DATE IMMUNIZATION INITIATED 21 January 1947

6 March 1947
DATE

SIGNATURE (TRANSPORTATION CLEARANCE OFFICER)

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST FOR MOVEMENT OF FAMILY AND/OR HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS

Name of Employee: **James Walton Moore**	Title & Branch: **Operations Officer, FBZ**
Present Official Station: **Washington, D.C.**	Station to which employee is being transferred: **Dairen, China**
Type of Funds from which Employee's Expenses Will be Paid: ☒ Special ☐ Vouchered	Approximate Date Employee is to start travel: **After 17 March 1947**

Movement of Family to be Requested (If "Yes", complete spaces below) ☒ YES ☐ NO

Immediate Family for whom Transportation is Requested:

Name		Relationship
Alice Patricia Moore		**Wife**
Michael Walton Moore	**3½ yrs.**	**Son**
Margaret Lee Moore	**2 yrs.**	**Daughter**

Name, Address & Tel. No. of Person to be contacted in connection with movement:
Mrs. Alice P. Moore **Tele. 6088**
2457 Idlewild St.
Abilene, Texas

Approximate Date it is desired that Family be moved: **To follow**

Movement of Household Goods and Personal Effects Requested: (If "Yes", complete spaces below) ☒ YES ☐ NO

Address and Location of Household Goods and Personal Effects:
2457 Idlewild St.
Abilene, Texas

Name, Address & Tel. No. of Person to be contacted in connection with movement:
Mrs. Alice P. Moore, 2457 Idlewild St., Abilene, Texas **Tele. 6088**

Estimated Weight or General Description of effects to be moved: (If household goods, multiply number of rooms by 1000 to arrive at estimated weight)
Personal and household effects
8,700 lbs. crated

Approximate Date Movement is desired: **Upon request**

REMARKS:

J. Walton Moore

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY HAND

TO : Control
Thru : COPS S.P.
FROM : Acting Chief, E[illegible]

DATE: 25 February 1947

SUBJECT: Issuance of Passport for James [illegible] Moore, Semi-Covert Representative for Dairen, China.

1. The assignment of the representative is Dairen, China.

2. Estimated date of departure, March 17, 1947.

3. Estimated date of arrival at field station, April 5, 1947.

4. Countries through which representative will travel: China, Japan and Korea.

Reported to Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, State on 28 February 1947 — (See file No. C.013)

SECRET

See Cont. [illegible]

14-00000

17 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FREDERICK B. LYON
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CONTROLS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Request for Foreign Service Title as Vice Consul at Dairen for Mr. James Walton Moore

Enclosure: Personal History Statement of James Walton Moore

1. It is requested that the Department of State grant to Mr. James Walton Moore the Foreign Service title of Vice Consul of Consulate in Dairen, China.

2. Mr. Moore received his B.A. Degree from Hardin-Simons College, Texas, and completed one year of graduate work at George Washington University. He has over six years of experience in the Government, including three years as a special agent in FBI. It is believed that he possesses the professional qualifications for the duties planned for him and, in addition, has the representative qualifications expected of an American official serving abroad.

3. Mr. Moore will receive from CIG a basic salary of $5,905.20 per annum.

4. There is transmitted herewith a biographical sketch on Mr. Moore which sets forth in detail pertinent information on him and on his special qualifications for the duties it is intended that he perform at Dairen.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

DONALD H. GALLOWAY
Assistant Director

Passport recd. at [illegible] State
on 3 April 1947
[illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Control
Thru : COPS
FROM : Acting Chief, FBZ

DATE: 12 February 1947

SUBJECT: Request for Designation of Mr. James Walton Moore

1. Will you please request the State Department to designate Mr. James Walton Moore as Vice Consul to the U. S. Consulate in Dairen, China.

(1) This station is not, and has never been, in operation by CIG.

(2) No CIG personnel are on duty now at this station.

(3) In January 1945 Mr. Moore joined the Navy, was attached to ONI and became intelligence officer in Shanghai, China. In August 1946 he was attached to the Strategic Services Unit as Ensign, was civilianized in China, and became the CO in Tsingtao.

(4) Mr. Moore is now residing in Washington, D. C.

(5) There has been no previous request for a designation for Mr. Moore.

(6) Mr. Moore will serve CIG as an intelligence officer (operations) concerned with positive and counter-intelligence, and as a communications channel for deep cover agents. His State Department duties will consist of visa and passport control.

(7) Mr. Moore will be the first employee to be assigned to the Consulate in Dairen.

(8) In addition to his extensive intelligence experience with ONI, SSU and CIC Mr. Moore was for several years an investigator with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(9) A designation will later be requested for a female Administrative Assistant, CAF-7 to assist Mr. Moore. No additional requests for designations are at present contemplated for this station.

(10) Mr. Moore's base salary per annum will be $5905.20, CAF-12.

(11) Mr. Moore's Personal History Statement is attached.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

12 February 1947

To : Assistant Executive for Personnel

From : FBZ

Subject: Cancellation of Transportation Requests

It is requested that the following transportation applications for personnel scheduled for ESD 44 be cancelled:

✓1) James W. Moore
2) Fred E. Hubbard
3) George M. Hein

All three of the above personnel will be scheduled for other assignments in the near future and new requests will be submitted shortly.

Lloyd George per

Lloyd George
Chief, FBZ

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Chief, FEZ DATE: 22 January 1947

FROM : Mr. J. Walter Moore J. Walter Moore

SUBJECT: Transportation of Car to China

1. In view of my recent appointment in Shanghai, China to head up SI operations in that area, it is respectively requested that I be allowed to take my car to this port.

2. It is anticipated that a considerable part of my work will of necessity be done at night when office transportation would not be available. The poor transportation system in Shanghai will also make going to and from work very difficult without an automobile.

3. Am willing to reimburse the government funds for all charges in the delivery of my car from the United States to my station.

1st Ind. 23 January 1947

To : ADSO

Through: Asst. Executive for Personnel

1. Basic communication requesting the transportation of privately owned auto is forwarded with a recommendation for approval.

2. It is felt that since Mr. Moore will reimburse this Agency for all expenses connected with the transportation of his private auto, there is no objection to such an arrangement. It will indeed materially aid Mr. Moore in his work to have a car at his disposal. It is understood by Mr. Moore that he will not rent or lease this vehicle to the Government for official use. Should it become necessary for the personnel of the station to use this car for official travel, Mr. Moore will be reimbursed at only the rates allowed by regulations which govern the use of privately owned autos in Government Travel.

Lloyd George

Lloyd George
Actg Chief, FEZ

CONFIDENTIAL

22 January 1947
(Date)

Central Intelligence Group
New War Department Building
21st & Virginia Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Section 7, Public Law 600, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, approved 2 August 1946, I hereby agree to remain in the Government service for the twelve months following my appointment, unless separated for reasons beyond my control. In case of a violation of this agreement, any moneys expended by the United States on account of my travel, expenses of transportation of my immediate family and expenses of transportation of my household goods and personal effects from any place of actual residence at time of appointment to place of employment outside the continental United States, and for such expenses on my return from such post of duty to my place of actual residence at time of assignment to duty outside the United States, shall be considered as a debt due by me to the United States.

It is further understood and agreed by me that I shall be required by Central Intelligence Group to serve a minimum period of twenty-four months at my place of employment outside the continental United States, and, if I wish to resign or terminate my appointment or return to the United States before the expiration of twenty-four months after the date of departure for my overseas post, the Central Intelligence Group will not pay my return travel expenses from such station outside the United States.

J. Walton Moore.

WITNESS:

Harold Pfeifer

CONFIDENTIAL

21 January 1947

file

TO : Dispensary

FROM : **M. K. Haller**

SUBJECT: Overseas Physical Examination - **James Walton Moore**

It is requested that an overseas physical examination be given to subject who is scheduled for assignment with OSO ~~Xxxx~~ Branch in China.

Subject has/~~xxxxxxx~~ reported for duty.

Inoculations should/~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ be started.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

16 December 1946

TO: Special Funds

FROM: M. K. Haller

SUBJECT: James Walton Moore

1. Subject returned from Shanghai on Permanent Change of Station and reported to Washington Headquarters 10 December 1946. Personnel Action Form 37-1 transferring him to FBZ Washington has been prepared and will be forwarded to you in the near future.

2. Mr. Moore will be on annual leave until 20 January 1946 plus LWOP and will report back to Washington for duty. This will be reported on Standard Form 1130.

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] RETURNEE CHECK SHEET

Name James Walton Moore

P/S ( ) TD ( )

3. Orders T.D. ____ Date 19 Oct 46 Completed ✓

4. Returned from Shanghai 3 Dec 46 Reported 10 Dec 46

5. Ltr. to Spec. Funds ____ Form 1001 ____

6. Leave: Overseas None Leave: US Fro. ____ To ____

7. Ltr. of Resignation signed ____ Accepted ____

8. US Leave Address 1571 Ross Ave / Abilene Texas Tel No ____

9. Remarks on future plans: Discharged 26 Aug 46 - - Want leave to 20 January 46 Annual leave then LWOP

J.E. Duggan
Personnel Officer

Referred to: Mr. Eckel FBZ

5

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
EXTERNAL SURVEY DETACHMENT 44
U.S. NAVY, SHANGHAI, CHINA

370.5 (018) 19 December 1946.

SUBJECT: Travel Orders.

TO: Mr. James Walton Moore, American Civilian.

1. You are relieved from further duty with the External Survey Detachment #44, Shanghai, China, and are hereby authorized and invited to proceed via first available military and/or naval air transportation to Washington, D.C., reporting upon arrival to the Director, Strategic Services Unit, 25th & E Sts, NW, for further instructions.

2. Travel by military or commercial aircraft, rail and/or motor is authorized. Organization furnishing air transportation is requested to authorize Air Priority FOUR for this movement.

3. Civilian travel directed is necessary in the military service. The above named civilian is authorized to travel on official business for the Strategic Services Unit in accordance with Standardized Government Travel Regulations and Public Law, 78th Congress.

4. Appropriation chargeable:

A2175900 610-1020 P420-02 2 -999

5. Any direct cost will be charged to and/or reimbursed by the Strategic Services Unit for expenses incident to travel. Army Finance Officers will not honor any claim pertinent to the travel performed.

6. You will notify your correspondents and publishers to discontinue sending mail matter to you until further advised of your new address.

7. You are authorized to act as official courier for this organization for the duration of this travel and are further authorized to carry a .38 cal. automatic pistol for this purpose.

BY ORDER OF LT COLONEL [illegible]:

Garth B Oswald

GARTH B OSWALD
Captain, AC
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
5

RESTRICTED

P1

②

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
24TH & F STREETS, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 May 1945

370.5 (7 May 45)

SUBJECT: Invitational Travel Orders, Shipment IJ-B804-LL.

TO : Personnel Concerned.

1. On or about the dates indicated the following named personnel of the Office of Strategic Services are authorized and invited to proceed by rail from Washington, D.C. to the 137?th AAF Base Unit, North Atlantic Division, ATC, Fort Totten, Long Island, New York, reporting upon arrival to the Commanding Officer thereat for processing and air transportation to an overseas destination under Shipment IJ-B804-LL, via IJ-B203 and IJ-B291. Upon arrival at overseas destination personnel should report to the Commanding General thereat for duty with the Office of Strategic Services:

Lt. Roy L. Taylor, USNR	295745	(UST-3-1212-WDP-May)	10 May 45
Sp(x) 2/c Michael T. Angelos USNR	7263646	(UST-3-1172-WDP-May)	19 May 45
Sp(x) 2/c George H. Psoinos USNR	7615108	"	"
Lt. (jg) John S. Thomson, USNR	287733	(UST-3-1042-WDP-May)	27 May 45
Ensign James W. Moore, USNR	445046	"	"

2. This is a TEMPORARY change of station. Travel by military aircraft is directed for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission. Necessary immunizations should be completed prior to departure from the United States. All expenses will be borne by the OSS. If transportation by water is provided on an Army transport, or by air on aircraft of Air Transport Command, no fare will be assessed.

3. The officer in charge of the port of aerial embarkation is requested to issue such items of equipment deemed necessary by him for the travel involved. Baggage to accompany personnel by air will be limited to sixty-five (65) pounds each, should be marked with owner's name, rank, serial number, and should accompany owner to the port of aerial embarkation. Baggage should not be marked so as to disclose the overseas destination. Lt. Thomson and Ensign Moore are authorized an excess baggage allowance of fifty (50) pounds per person.

4. Just prior to departure for the port of aerial embarkation personnel should advise correspondents that their post office address until further notice will be: Name, rank, serial number; APO 14699 - c/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y. Upon arrival at destination overseas personnel should contact the nearest Army Post Office to arrange for receipt and dispatch of official and personal mail matter.

5. This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

6. AUTHORITY: WD TAGO ltr, file AG 210.31(30 Apr 45)OB-S-E dated 7 May 1945, subject: Travel Orders, Shipments IJ-B804-KH, etc.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL FITZ:

H. W. Kunkle
H. W. KUNKLE,
Captain, CMC,
Asst. Adjutant.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

PE 17894

OSS Form 2213
(Rev. 10/12/44)

⑤

DATE: 27 April 1945

TO: Mr. Charles E. Ford.

FROM: A. van Beuren, Security Officer. A.v.B. per avS.

SUBJECT: Overseas Travel Approval

In reply to your request of 18 April 1945, the following subject is hereby approved for overseas travel:

MOORE, James W., Ensign., 23024

Two photos of subject are requested.

A completed fingerprint card is not requested.

The overseas travel approval granted in this letter expires ninety days from date. Extension of this approval beyond expiration date will be determined by the Security Office, upon request.

Subject is not authorized to carry classified documents overseas.

REMARKS:

Subject's S Report should be considered.

CONFIDENTIAL

(54280)

CONFIDENTIAL (SSU) file

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
HEADQUARTERS, STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
CHINA THEATER
APO ~~280~~ ~~907~~ 908

10 September 1946

TO: Chief, Civilian Personnel Branch, SSU,
Washington, D. C.

FROM: Nick J. Steichen

SUBJECT: Mr. James Walton Moore, Appointment of

1. In connection with the appointment of Mr. James Walton Moore there are transmitted the following documents:

(a) Form 61a, Oath of Office, Affidavit, and Declaration of Appointee.

(b) No strike Affidavit.

(c) Two (2) photostatic copies of Mr. Moore's discharge from the United States Navy.

(d) Form 6569, Power of Attorney by Individual for the Collection of Checks Drawn on the Treasurer of the United States.

2. This office will pay Mr. Moore $81.52 of his four weeks' salary. The balance will be paid by the Washington Office, $350.00 to his Power of Attorney and $22.72 retirement.

3. Should there be any questions or additional information needed, please advise.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

NICK J. STEICHEN
Finance Officer

Attachments.

cc: Mr. K. E. Woodring
Chief, Fiscal Section

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

.ce Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

:William G. Tharp, Chief of Personnel
:James b. Cpsata, Chief, Personnel Division
:John L. Cronkrite, Acting Chief,
Classification and Personnel Utilisation Section
JECT: James W. Moore

DATE: 16 July 1946

In accordance with Personnel Branch Order No.1 dated 3 May 1946, we are forwarding for review the personnel action for the appointment of James W. Moore as Intelligence Officer, CAF-12, $5905.20, with FSRC-FRG at Shanghai, China.

The duties and responsibilities of the position to be occupied by Mr. Moore were discussed with Mr. Vaughn and Mr. Duggan and it was found that he is to serve as a Senior Intelligence Officer with responsibility for directing all intelligence activity within a specified area.

It is the recommendation of the Classification Section that the position be approved at CAF-12.

OK
7/17/46

William G. Tharp, Chief of Personnel
VIA : James b. Opsata, Chief, Personnel Division
John L. Cronkrite, Acting Chief,
Classification and Personnel Utilisation Section
James W. Moore

16 July 1946

In accordance with Personnel Branch Order No.1 dated 3 May 1946, we are forwarding for review the personnel action for the appointment of James W. Moore as Intelligence Officer, CAF-12, $5905.20, with FSRO-FRO at Shanghai, China.

The duties and responsibilities of the position to be occupied by Mr. Moore were discussed with Mr. Vaughn and Mr. Duggan and it was found that he is to serve as a Senior Intelligence Officer with responsibility for directing all intelligence activity within a specified area.

It is the recommendation of the Classification Section that the position be approved at CAF-12.

OSS Form 1001

OSS PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
(To be signed and submitted in Triplicate)

Inf Lye 7/15/46
F-8529

7-8-46

NAME : [illegible]

NATURE OF ACTION : ~~APPOINTMENT~~ Accepted

EFFECTIVE : 29 Aug. 1946 ~~[illegible]~~ DOO 8/29/46

2170425
1413-423
2001-47

SHAN 686 IN 41151

edq 7/16/46
ACS 7-17-46

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer ~~Field Representative~~
GRADE AND SALARY	~~Discharge from the Navy~~	$5905.70 CAF-12, $5180 p.a.
BRANCH		~~SI Branch~~ FSRO - F3Z FRG-A
OFFICIAL STATION		Shanghai
DEPT. or FIELD		Field

REMARKS :

Plus Living and Quarters allowance in accordance with Bureau of the Budget directive A-8

130

RECOMMENDED : [illegible]
[illegible] JR.
Lt Colonel Inf
Commanding

DATE: 10 June 1946

Waller

7/1

RECEIVED JUL 9 1946 S.P

RECEIVED JUL 18 1946

RECEIVED JUL 9 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
HEADQUARTERS, STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
CHINA THEATER
APO 907

MC/emc

10 June 1946

TO : L. Grier DuHant, Chief, Civilian Personnel Section

FROM : Milo Crissman, Fiscal Officer, SSU, China

SUBJECT : James Walton Moore, Appointment of

1. With reference to cable Kr Chan 249 there are attached the following papers :

Application for appointment Form #205a

To Hallie → OSS Form #1001
6/17.

OSS Form #1004a

2. It is requested that you please process these papers thru classification in co-operation with the SI Branch and cable this office your decision as soon as possible.

FOR THE STRATEGIC SERVICES OFFICER:

Milo Crissman
MILO CRISSMAN
Fiscal Officer
SSU, China

3 Incls:

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

SCD: 8 Apr 1940

1. EMPL. SERIAL NO.: 003820

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MOORE, J(ames) Walton

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 5 Oct 1919

5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE: 16 Sep 1947

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married

7. DEPENDENTS (Excluding employee): NO. 3 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1919 1951 1954

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA SPOUSE NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS: MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954

OTHER STATUS:

10. LAST ANNUAL: Mar 1971 QUAL. FOR Annual

EVAL. FOR: Annual

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NONE X

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1940-45 Dept of Justice, FBI, DC, Ill, Calif - Clerk; Special Agent
1945-46 Military Service, US Navy - Ensign (1945-46, SSU, China)
1946 War Dept, SSU, Shanghai, China - Intel Officer
1946-47 CIG, Shanghai, China/OC - Intel Officer

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1920-36 Resided in China with missionary parents
1936-40 Hardin-Simmons Univ, Abilene, Texas - BS Pol Sci, Eng
1940-41 George Washington Univ Law School (night)
1945 Catalina Island, Calif, OSS School - Intelligence (3 mos)

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

Chinese(Mandarin) - P High; S,U Slight; R,W,T None - Apr 1957-disclaims proficiency Sep 1969

18. AGENCY-SPONSORED TRAINING

1947 Intel Orient
1950 CIA Orient
1950 OO/C Orient
1952 CIA Indoct
1955 OO/C Refresher
1957 OO/C Refresher
1959 " "
1961;62 OO/C Refresher
1969 Adv Mgt (Plan)
1971 Adv Intel Seminar
1973 Foreign Affairs Exec Sem/FSI

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
						Tsingtao
Sep 1947	I.O.(Ops)		12		OSO/FE2	Calcutta
Apr 1948	" "		12		OSO/FE2/COS	DC Field
Oct 1949	" "		12		OSO/FE2/SEA	Houston
Jan 1950	I.O.		12		OO/Contact/Houston Office	"
Jan 1952	"	132	13		" " " "	Dallas
May 1954	"	132	13	CO	" " " "	"
Jan 1957	I.O.(Contact)	0132.21	14	OC	" " " "	"
Apr 1964	" "	0132.21	14	OC	" " " "	"
Apr 1965	" "	0132.21	14		DCS/USF/HoustonOffice	
	Jul - Dec 1972 - assigned -				DCS/ActingDCh,SovietBlocDiv-Hq (trng)	
Jan 1973	IO Contact	0132.21	14		DCS/USF/DallasOffice/Hq	Dallas
Jun 1973	IO Contact Ch	0132.21	15	D	DDO/DCD/USF/Ch,DallasOffice	"
Jul 1974	" " "	0132.21	15	DTD	" " " " "	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: 20 Feb 1975

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: mel/cbs

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 007622

22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: 3 Sep 1959

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. [illegible]	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle) MOORE, J(ames) Walton	DATE OF BIRTH 5 Oct 1919

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1949 from Acting COS, Calcutta for biographic report on Surendra Mohan Ghose.

Commendation 1956 from J. B. Crosman, PPD recruiter, for outstanding cooperation Subject has given to our recruitment activities in Dallas.

27. DATE REVIEWED 20 Feb 1975	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY mcl/ops

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING	FILE
TO: Retirement Operations Branch Office of Personnel	DATE

RETIREE	CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Central Cover Staff the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT		CIVIL SERVICE		CIARDS	DATE			
COVER		OVERT ROUTINE		COVERT *(OFFICIAL COVER)* LOCK-UP		COVERT (NOC) SPECIAL	**RETENTION OF AWARDS**		YES		NO
CORRESPONDENCE		OVERT		COVERT		THRU CCS		

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE		U.S. GOV'T. CHECK				OTHER *(Payment instructions follow)*
TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE		CIA		CSC		OTHER *(MEMO FOLLOWS)*
REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION		YES		NO		INTERNAL TRANSFER

INSURANCE

FEGLI		OVERT		COVERT		MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD:

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE		YES		CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE		YES		NO		OVERT		COVERT
CREDIT UNION		OVERT		COVERT				

REMARKS:

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH
CENTRAL COVER STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

____________________ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FORM 7-77 3429 SECRET E-2 IMPDET CL BY 063857

7 - OFF. PERS. FILE ROOM

SEA 010678

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003820

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MOORE J WALTON

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT - OPTIONAL - CSC AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 12 DA 31 YR 77

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ | | V TO V | | V TO CF |
| | CF TO V | | CF TO CF |

7. FAN AND NSCA: 8042 3500 | 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/DCD
U.S. FIELD
DALLAS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TEXAS

11. POSITION TITLE: IO CONTACT CH

12 POSITION NUMBER: DA42

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WC, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.21

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: 43407

18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
45	10						10 05 19		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	30. CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	32 MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
				OBH0000					

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	38 CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	43 CODE	43 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	44 CODE	44 NO TAX EXEMP.	44 STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12 Jun '78

FORM 1150 Use Previous
5-74 Mfg 10-74 Edition

SECRET SEA

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SEA 010678

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 003820	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MOORE J WALTON

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT - OPTIONAL - CSC AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 12 31 77	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶	☐	V TO V	☐	V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 8042 3500 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	☐	CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11 POSITION TITLE DO CONTACT CH	12 POSITION NUMBER 0A42	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D/D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21	16 GRADE AND STEP 15 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 43407

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

W.M. JANNEY

FORM 1150
5-74 Mfg 10-74

Use Previous
Edition

A11 L60 200 105

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12010 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 09 OCTOBER 1977

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	CCD	GS 15 7	$43,407

10826

All

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5308 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 27 FEBRUARY 1977

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	56 535	V	GS 15 7	$40,545

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OJCS 01/29/77

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 003820	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) MOORE J WALTON

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 01 14 77	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS	☒	V TO V	☐	V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 7242 3500 0001	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	☐	CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/DCD	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION DALLAS, TEXAS

11. POSITION TITLE DO CONTACT CH	12. POSITION NUMBER DA42	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DYD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21	16. GRADE AND STEP 15	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION FROM DTE TO DYD



NATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150B
8-72 MFG 3-76

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (4 51)

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5.
063820	MOORE J. WALTON	56 535	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last WI Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	W.G.	QSI	ADJ.
GS 15	6	$34,700	06/24/73	GS 15	7	$35,784	06/22/75			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE C/Ops/DCD

DATE 11 Jun 75

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS F.W.M. JANNEY

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions. PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1976

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	063820	56 535	V	GS 15 7	$35,600

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OJCS 01/31/75

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER CC3820	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) MOORE J WALTON				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHANGE IN N.S.C.A.			4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 01 21 75	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V	V TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA 5242 3500 0001	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/DCD			10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION DALLAS, TEXAS		
11 POSITION TITLE TO CONTACT CH			12 POSITION NUMBER 1479	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DTD	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21		16 GRADE AND STEP 15	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JK 1/10/75

Form 1150B
8-72 MFG 9-72

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	56 535	V	GS 15 6	$34,788

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OJCS 04/15/74

1. SERIAL NUMBER 0C3820	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MOORE J WALTON				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHANGE IN N.S.C.A.			4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 03 DA 27 YR 74	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 4242 3500 0002	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/DCD			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION DALLAS, TEXAS		
11. POSITION TITLE TO CONTACT CH			12. POSITION NUMBER 1479	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21		16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE	

18. REMARKS

POSTED
LR

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

W.M.JANNEY

Form 1150B 8-72 MFG 9-72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11883 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 12 OCTOBER 1975

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	56 535	V	GS 15 7	$37,573

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	56 535	V	GS 15 6	$32,973

I-24

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
003820	MOORE J WALTON	66 535	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 14	8	$28,478	06/28/70	GS 14	9	$29,248	06/24/73		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 10 April 1973

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

KHN: 26 JUNE 73

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 003820	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MOORE J WALTON		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 24 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 3242 3500 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/DCS U.S. FIELD DALLAS OFFICE HEADQUARTERS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION DALLAS, TEXAS		
11. POSITION TITLE IO CONTACT CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 1479	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION IT	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 31383

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	56535	DCS	75083		2	10 05 19	06 24 73	06 24 73

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1-5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1-YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7-2-73

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 11-71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET LML

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51) (When Filled In)

PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY U.S.A.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

6 JUNE 73

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NUMBER 03820	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MOORE J WALTON

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 27 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 3242 3500 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/DCS U. S. FIELD DALLAS OFFICE HEADQUARTERS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION DALLAS, TEXAS

11. POSITION TITLE IO CONTACT CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 1479	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION IT

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 28478

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 56535 ALPHABETIC DCS	22. STATION CODE 75083	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 2	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 05 19	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO. DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1/9/73

LML

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-60 Mfg. 10-62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS : 01/21/73

1. SERIAL NUMBER 0C3620	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MOORE J WALTON

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 01 DA. 23 YR. 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 3242 3500 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS OCI/OCS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TEXAS, USA

11. POSITION TITLE IC-CONTACT	12. POSITION NUMBER 140C	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION IT

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21	16. GRADE AND STEP 14	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

POSTED
2-22-73
MAL

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 8-72 MFG. 9-72 | Use Previous Edition | SECRET | "E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622" | (4-37)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11591 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM 7 JAN 1973 TO 1 OCT 1972 UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11777, DATED 12 APR 1974.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	66 535	V	GS 14 8	$28,478

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DCS 08/31/72

1 SERIAL NUMBER 003820	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MOORE J WALTON		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 08 DA 16 YR 72	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS: X V TO V; V TO CF; CF TO V; CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 3242 5000 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI/DCS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TEXAS, USA		
11 POSITION TITLE IO-CONTACT	12 POSITION NUMBER 1480	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION IT	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21	16 GRADE AND STEP 14	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[illegible]

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962".

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	013820	66 935	V	GS 14 8	$27,084

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DCS 08/31/71

1 SERIAL NUMBER 003820	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MOORE J WALTON					
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT				4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 08 22 71	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 2242 3500 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI/DCS US FIELD/DALLAS OFFICE				10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TEXAS, USA		
11. POSITION TITLE IU-CONTACT				12 POSITION NUMBER 1430	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION 11	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21			16 GRADE AND STEP 14	17 SALARY OR RATE	
18 REMARKS						

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7 SEP 1971

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	66 525 V	GS 14 8	$25,673

I-23

JUL 23 '70

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME				3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS	
003820	MOORE J WALTON				66 525	V		
6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI / ADJ
GS 14	7	~~$22,339~~ 23,573	07/02/67	GS 14	8	~~$22,857~~ 24,228	06/28/70	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 14 April 1970

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

jld

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	66 525 V	GS 14 7	$23,573

173

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
003820	MOORE J WALTON	66 000	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 14	6	$17,721	07/04/65	GS 14	7	$18,244	07/02/67		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Ernst A. Riche DATE 8 May 67

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS DMP E.D. ECHOLS AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	66 525	V	GS 14 7	$22,239

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	66 525	V	GS 14 7	$19,009	$20,336

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206, PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
003820	MOORE J WALTON	82 525 V 7	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 14	4	$14,120	07/09/61	GS 14	5	$14,545	07/07/63			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 14 May 63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	66 525 V	GS 14 6	$17,220	$17,721

I23

1. Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
003820	MOORE J WALTON	66 525 V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 14	5	$16,130	07/07/63	GS 14	6	$16,620	07/04/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS KW AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 14 May 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	66 525	V	GS 14 5	$14,545	$15,415

4.1/

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003820	66 525	V	GS 14 6	$16,620	$17,220

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

SECRET

NOTICE OF EMPLOYER DESIGNATION FOR TAX PURPOSES

003820 MOORE J WALTON /K

EMPLOYER IS CIA AS OF 7 JUNE 1964

SECRET

SECRET

NOTICE OF EMPLOYER DESIGNATION FOR TAX PURPOSES

MOORE J WALTON 003820

EMPLOYER DESIGNATION IS CIA AS OF 26 MAY 1963

SECRET

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OC	MOORE JAMES W.	103820	25 31	GS-14 3	$11,835	$12,730

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
103820	MOORE JAMES W	DDI/CONT 7 V-40	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 14	3	$12,730	01/10/60	14	4	$12,990	07/09/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/✓/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

EW

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition SECRET (4-51)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
103820	MOORE JAMES W	DDI/CONT 7	V-40	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR				MO	DA	YR.
GS 14	2	$11,595	07	13	58	GS 14	3	$11,835	01	10	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G.M.STEWART

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 560

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MOORE JAMES W	103820	GS-14-1	$10,320	$11,355

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1 EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3 ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
103820	MOORE JAMES W	DDI/CONT 7	V-40	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR.				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 14	1	$10,320	01	13	57	GS 14	2	~~$10,535~~ 11,595	07	13	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
ERNEST A. RISCHE	6 June 1958	Ernest A Rische

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1 EMP SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4 FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
103820	MOORE JAMES W	DDI/CONT	V-40	✓

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO	DA	YR.
GS 14	1	$10,320	01	13	57	GS 14	2	~~$XXXXXX~~ 11,595	07	13	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

✓

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

STANDARD FORM 50 (R PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

are

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. J. WALTON MOORE 103820	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Oct 1919	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO	4. DATE 11 January 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment.

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) PROMOTION 30	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 13 Jan 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
K-204	8. POSITION TITLE	IO (Contact) K-1048
GS-0132.21-13 $9635.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.21-14 $10,320.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 233140	DDI/OO Contact Division Houston Office
	11. HEADQUARTERS 4	Dallas, Texas
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

1

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-OC

1

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-4239-40 750-83 TO: Same	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS.

4 EOD 12/06/49

[illegible]TED
JAN 19 1956

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956-373647

713 1-22-57

14-00000

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION   CONFIDENTIAL

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-320080

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Payroll period

3. Block No. 5-4239-40

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) [illegible]

6. Grade and salary GS-13 $9420.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s) Contact 7

12. Prepared by RM 5/2/56

13. Audited by

X☐ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 5 Jul 56

15. Date last equivalent increase 16 Jan 55

16. Old salary rate 9420.00

17. New salary rate $9635.00

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
[illegible]
(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

☐ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 25, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-320030

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Payroll period

3. Block No. 5-4239-40

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) MOORE, JAM[illegible]

6. Grade and salary GS-13 $8560.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s) Contact 7

12. Prepared by RM 5/4/55

13. Audited by

☐ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 7/15/55

15. Date last equivalent increase 7/19/53

16. Old salary rate $8560.00

17. New salary rate $8760.00

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

☐ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 25, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

SECRET

ISSUED IN LIEU OF FORM 50

NATURE OF ACTION CHANGE IN OCCUPATIONAL CODE AND/OR TITLE.

EFFECTIVE DATE 31 MARCH 1955

POSITION TITLE	NEW CODE	NAME	POSITION NUMBER
IO-CONTACT	GS-0132.21	MOORE J WALTON	K 204

[illegible]
MAY 14 1955

APPROVED HARRISON G. REYNOLDS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Jm

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): **Mr. J. Walton Moore**

2. DATE OF BIRTH: **5 Oct 1919**

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: **21 May 1954**

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): **Reassignment (Correction)***

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: **23 Apr 1954**

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: **50 USCA 403 J**

	FROM		TO
		8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer K 204
		9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-13 $8560.00 per annum
		10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/OO Contact Division Houston Office
	Houston, Texas	11. HEADQUARTERS	Dallas, Texas
	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-00

15. SEX: **M**

16. RACE: **W**

17. APPROPRIATION FROM: **4-4239-40** TO: **Same**

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): **Yes**

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: **Texas**

21. REMARKS. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

***This action corrects Item #6, on notification dated 18 May 1954, to show the correct effective date, previously shown as 23 May 1954.**

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 — 240347

MAY 2 1954

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

.ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible]

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. J. WALTON MOORE	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Oct. 1919	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 18 May 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 23 May 1954	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer K 204
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-13 $8560.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/OO Contact Division Houston Office
Houston, Texas	11. HEADQUARTERS	Dallas, Texas
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-OO

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-4239-40 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Texas

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953

[illegible] 5-19-54

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

MAY 19 1954

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952-[illegible]

1. Agency and organizational designations CEN[illegible]L INTELLIGENCE AG[illegible]CY
00 Contact Division- Houston

2. Pay roll

3. Block No. 4239-40

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
Mr. James W. Moore

6. Grade and salary
GS-13 $8360.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation (s)

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 7/19/53

15. Date last equivalent increase 1/20/52

16. Old salary rate $8360.00

17. New salary rate $8560.00

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better

(Signature or other authorization)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s)

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN POSITION SLOTTING AND OR CHANGE IN POSITION DESIGNATION

NO CHANGE IN GRADE IS INVOLVED

DATE OF T O APPROVAL 6 FEB 1952
EFF DATE OF POSITION SLOTTING 24 MARCH 52

OO CONTACT DIVISION

NAME & TITLE	PERSONS GRADE SERIES	POSITION NUMBER	
MOORE JAMES W INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 13	K204	
MELCHER MAX ALLEN INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 12	K205	
MITCHELL PEARL ADM ASSISTANT	GS 301 7	K206	
DRANYON GLORIA L SECRETARY STENO	GS 318 4	K207	4
ST CYR JACQUELINE M TELEC TYPWR OPR	GS 385 4	K208	
PITTSBURG OFFICE			
KAUFMANN CHARLES IO CHIEF	GS 132 13	K209	13
STEWART BLAINE K JR INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 13	K211	
BOWDLER ROBERT G INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 13	K21101	
WHITE LESTER M INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 13	K21102	
BERKAW ERNEST D JR INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 13	K21103	
DUFFETT NORMAN INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 12	K21201	

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R-1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Imp

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. J. Walton Moore	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/5/19	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 1/18/52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 1/20/52	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer GS-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-13
GS-130-12 $7640.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-13 $8360.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Office of Operations Contact Division Houston Office
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Houston, Texas
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL	
				Bu.77-258 7/14/48

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM 2123900 TO 4239	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Texas

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

This action corrects all previous actions to show correct birth date.
Previously shown as 8/5/19.

Slot #15801

JOSEPH B. RAGAN
Chief, Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1962, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
MOORE J WALTON	003670	82525	V	14 4	$12990	14 -	$14120

---

1. Agency and organizational designation: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CO- act-Houston Office
2. Pay roll period:
3. Block No. 521-309
4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name: Mr. J. Walton Moore
6. Grade and salary: GS-12 $6800.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	TAX	RET.	BOND			NET PAY
7. Previous normal										
8. New normal										
9. Pay this period										

10. Remarks:

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 24 OCT. 1951
SALARY ADJUSTED TO $ 7640.00

11. Appropriation(s)
12. Prepared by
13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase. ☐ Pay adjustment. ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. (a) Efficiency rating is good or better than good, and service and conduct requirements certified: (b) (Signature or Other Authentication)	19. Suspense date
3/18/51	9/18/49	$6800.00	$7000.00		1/2/52

20. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods:)
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP none

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Feb. 3, 1948 General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER 9-1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

E:bma 130

1. NAME (MR. — MISS — MRS. — ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. J. Walton Moore	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/5/19	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 1/5/50

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Intra-Agency Transfer	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 1/5/50	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer GS-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-12
GS-12 $6800.00 per annum Bu#2158 CSC#2007	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12 $6800.00 per annum
Operations Contact Division Administrative Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Operations Contact Division Houston Office
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Houston, Texas
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
X				Bu#F-259 7/14/48

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2105900 TO: 520-309	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES — NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Texas

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

wmp 1/19/50

R. F. McClellan
R. F. McCLELLAN
Acting Chief, Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1948

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (4 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER B-1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

F.C. 12/1/49
HH (sk) 130

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) 2 Mr. J. Walton Moore	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/5/19	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 12/6/49

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment.

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Excepted Appointment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 12/6/49	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116 (b)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer · GS-12
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12 $6800.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Office of Operations Contact Division Administrative Staff
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	F.A.	REAL	
				Su.#2158 CSC#2037 6/25/48

15 SEX	16 RACE	17 APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2109900 TO: 520-101	Yes	12/6/49	☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Texas

21. REMARKS THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

This appointment is subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of six months.

Previously employed at $6600.00 per annum.

DOG- 01/20/52
C SEOD - 12/10/49
ACD 12/10/49

R. F. McClellan

OPP 12/21/49

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

R. F. McCLELLAN
Acting Chief, Personnel Division

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1948

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: MOORE, James Walton, Jr.

DATE: 6 December 1949

NATURE OF ACTION: Resignation

EFFECTIVE DATE: cob 5 December 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-12 (Ops)	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12, $6800.00	
OFFICE	OSO	
DIVISION	FDC	
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C. (Field)	

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE COPY IN PAYROLL FILES CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH Date INITIALS
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER Robert S. [illegible]	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____________

ENTERED ON DUTY ____________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Please transfer leave to Vouchered Funds.

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: MOORE, James Walton, Jr.

DATE: 9 November 1949

NATURE OF ACTION: Conversion - Classification Act of 1949*

EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 October 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Offr.(Ops.)	Intelligence Offr. (Ops.)
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-12 $6714.00	GS-12 $6800.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	FDZ	FDZ
DIVISION	SEA	SEA
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C. (Field)	Washington, D.C. (Field)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE COPY IN PAYROLL & CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS Crew
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER Hopkins	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ______

SECURITY CLEARED ON ______

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ______

ENTERED ON DUTY ______

______
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

*Per Authority contained in Letter DCI 10-28-49.

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
AUG 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME MOORE, James Walton, Jr.	DATE 5 October 1949
NATURE OF ACTION Transfer	EFFECTIVE DATE 3 October 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops)CAF-12	Intelligence Off. (Ops)CAF-12
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-12, $6714.00	CAF-12, $6714.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	FDZ	FDZ
DIVISION	SEA	SEA
OFFICIAL STATION	Calcutta	Washington, D. C. (Field)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Knox P Pruden	EXECUTIVE [illegible] CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ______

SECURITY CLEARED ON ______

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ______

ENTERED ON DUTY ______

______
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Subject completed a tour of duty.

POSTED

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
AUG 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME MOORE, James Walton		DATE 5 October 1949
NATURE OF ACTION Periodic Pay Increase		EFFECTIVE DATE 18 September 1949
	FROM	TO
TITLE	(Chief) Intelligence Officer (Ops)CAF-12	Intelligence Off. (Ops)CAF-12
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-12, $6474.60	CAF-12, $6714.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	FDZ	FDZ
DIVISION	SEA	SEA
OFFICIAL STATION	Calcutta	Calcutta

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Employee received last periodic increase on 8 March 1948.

I certify that the conduct and service of the employee during the period have been satisfactory in all respects.

Branch Chief

POSTED
11 Mar

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
AUG 1949

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

B

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side.

NAME James Walton Moore			DATE 30 April 1948
LEGAL ADDRESS Texas		MARITAL STATUS Married	
LOCAL ADDRESS			NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS
TELEPHONE	CITIZENSHIP USA	SEX M	AGE 28
NATURE OF ACTION Change of Station			EFFECTIVE DATE 19 April 1948

	FROM	TO
Title	Chief of Station	Chief of Station
Grade and Salary	CAF-12 $6144.60	CAF-12 $6144.60
Office - Branch	OSO - FBZ	OSO - FBZ
Division		
Section		
Official Station	Darien	Calcutta
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)	▨	▨
Quarters		
Cost of Living		
Special Foreign Living		

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

Slot #1. Security requested 30 April 1948.

WSE 5/18/48

APPROVAL

FIELD		HEADQUARTERS U.S.	
CHIEF OF STATION	DATE	E. M. Terrell PERSONNEL OFFICER	MAY 5 1948 DATE
SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	DATE	BRANCH CHIEF	DATE
	DATE	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	DATE
	DATE	CHAIRMAN PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMITTEE	DATE
	DATE	SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	10 May 48 DATE

SECRET

FORM NO. 37-1
JUN 1947 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

File

B.

SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side.

NAME James Walton Moore			DATE 1 April 1948
LEGAL ADDRESS Abilene, Texas			MARITAL STATUS Married
LOCAL ADDRESS			NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS 3
TELEPHONE	CITIZENSHIP USA	SEX Male	AGE 39
NATURE OF ACTION Periodic Pay Increase			EFFECTIVE DATE 8 March 1948

	FROM	TO
Title	Intelligence Officer, Ops.	Intelligence Officer, Ops.
Grade and Salary	CAF-12 $5905.20	CAF-12 $6144.60
Office - Branch	OSO-FBZ	OSO-FBZ
Division		
Section		
Official Station	Calcutta, India	Calcutta, India
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)		
Quarters		
Cost of Living		
Special Foreign Living		

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

Subject has received no salary increase since 29 August 1946

I certify that the service and conduct of the employee during the period was satisfactory in all respects.

Acting Branch Chief

POSTED in Darien
AE 5/1/46

APPROVAL

FIELD		HEADQUARTERS U.S.	
CHIEF OF STATION	DATE	K. C. C PERSONNEL OFFICER	4/6/48 DATE
SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	DATE	BRANCH CHIEF	DATE
	DATE	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	4/14/48 DATE
	DATE	CHAIRMAN PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMITTEE	DATE
	DATE	SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	4/17/48 DATE

SECRET

FORM NO. 37-1
JUN 1947
PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

DISTRIBUTION OF SALARY

To be paid by Calcutta (FIELD) Office $ 235.84

Tax withheld in the United States 39.60

Insurance to be withheld in the United States ---
(Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased)

Retirement withheld in United States 23.64

Other (Specify in detail) ---

Allotments 173.58

Name of Allottee Subject' Bank

Address

Total Gross Salary Per Pay Period $ 472.66

I HEREBY AUTHORIZE AND DIRECT THE DISBURSING OFFICE TO MAKE THE ABOVE ALLOTMENTS FROM MY COMPENSATION. ALL ADJUSTMENTS IN SALARY TO BE EFFECTED IN:

NET OVERSEAS PAYMENT

INITIAL ONE

U. S. ALLOTMENT

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

REMARKS: (Continued from reverse side)

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Prepare in triplicate. 2. Note under "Remarks" whether action is transfer from vouchered funds or another government agency. 3. [illegible] form is prepared in the field, enter distribution of salary over signature of employee. 4. If job description or other information is appropriate, enter under "Remarks."

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

This form is to be initiated in triplicate by the appropriate Branch or Office Chief for processing in accordance with existing personnel procedures. Upon approval, the original and one copy will be retained by the Disbursing Office and one copy returned to the originating office.

NAME **James Dalton MOORE**
DATE **17 December 1946**

NATURE OF ACTION **Transfer**
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ____

EFFECTIVE DATE **15 December 1946**
LOCATION OF DEPENDENTS ____

MARITAL STATUS ____
CITIZENSHIP ____ SEX ____ AGE ____

FROM		TO	
POSITION	**Operations Officer**	POSITION	**Operations Officer**
CONTROL NO.		CONTROL NO.	
CLASSIFICATION	**CAF-12**	CLASSIFICATION	**CAF-12**
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	**$5905.20**	ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	**$5905.20**
OFFICIAL STATION	**Shanghai, China**	OFFICIAL STATION	**Washington, DC**
ALLOWANCES:		ALLOWANCES:	
QUARTERS		QUARTERS	
COST OF LIVING		COST OF LIVING	
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING		SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING	
TOTAL		TOTAL	
OFFICE:		OFFICE:	
BRANCH	**OSO-FBZ**	BRANCH	[illegible]
DIVISION		DIVISION	

TO BE PAID BY ____ (Field) OFFICE $ ____

TAX WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES ____

INSURANCE TO BE WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES (Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased) ____

SAVINGS BONDS ____

RETIREMENT WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES ____

OTHER (Specify in detail) ____

ALLOTMENTS ____ (Name of Allottee) ____

Address ____

TOTAL GROSS SALARY PER PAY PERIOD $ ____

I hereby authorize and direct the Disbursing Office to make above allotments from my compensation.

Form No. 37-1
Sep 1946

(Signature of Employee)

JOB DESCRIPTION:

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS	REASONS FOR ACTION	DATE OF LAST PROMOTION
	Returned from field. To be carried as casual while on leave pending determination of future assignment.	

APPROVED ______________________ OFFICE
(Field)

______________________ Date ________
(Chief of Mission)

______________________ Date ________
(Security Officer)

______________________ Date ________
(Special Funds Officer)

APPROVED — U.S. OFFICE

______________________ Date 12/11/46
(Administrative Officer)

Floyd George Date 12/12/46
(Branch Chief)

______________________ Date ________
(Chairman, Pers. Review Com.)

Emmett Echols Date 18 Dec 46
(Special Funds Officer)

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

This form is to be initiated in triplicate by the appropriate Branch or Office Chief for processing in accordance with existing personnel procedures. Upon approval, the original and one copy will be retained by the Disbursing Office and one copy returned to the originating office.

NAME Moore, J. Walton
DATE 10/20/46
NATURE OF ACTION New Appointment
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS
EFFECTIVE DATE 20th October 1946
LOCATION OF DEPENDENTS
MARITAL STATUS
CITIZENSHIP SEX AGE

FROM		TO	
POSITION		POSITION	Intelligence Officer
CONTROL NO.		CONTROL NO.	
CLASSIFICATION		CLASSIFICATION	CAF-12
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY		ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	5905.20
OFFICIAL STATION		OFFICIAL STATION	Shanghai
ALLOWANCES: QUARTERS		ALLOWANCES: QUARTERS	
COST OF LIVING		COST OF LIVING	
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING		SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING	
TOTAL		TOTAL	
OFFICE: BRANCH		OFFICE: BRANCH	
DIVISION		DIVISION	

TO BE PAID BY Shanghai (Field) OFFICE	$ 81.52
TAX WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	—
INSURANCE TO BE WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES (Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased)	—
SAVINGS BONDS	—
RETIREMENT WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	22.72
OTHER (Specify in detail)	—
ALLOTMENTS Mrs. Patricia Moore (Name of Allottee)	350.00
Address 807 Ross Ave. Abilene, Texas	
TOTAL GROSS SALARY PER PAY PERIOD	$ 454.24

I hereby authorize and direct the Disbursing Office to make above allotments from my compensation.

Form No. 37-1
Sep 1946

(Signature of Employee)

JOB DESCRIPTION:

RECEIVED
SPECIAL FUNDS BRANCH
1946 OCT 24 11 14

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS	REASONS FOR ACTION	DATE OF LAST PROMOTION

APPROVED ____________________ OFFICE
(Field)

____________________ Date ________
(Chief of Mission)

____________________ Date ________
(Security Officer)

____________________ Date ________
(Special Funds Officer)

APPROVED — U.S. OFFICE

____________________ Date ________
(Administrative Officer)

____________________ Date ________
(Branch Chief)

____________________ Date ________
(Chairman, Pers. Review Com.)

____________________ Date ________
(Special Funds Officer)

WAR DEPARTMENT
REPORT OF PERSONNEL ACTION
(FIELD)

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] (sv)

1. Date 17 October 1946

2. TO J. Walton Moore (First Name, Middle Initial, Last Name)

3. S. S. NO.

4. THROUGH: SSU (Office in which Employed or to be Employed)

This is to notify you of the following action concerning your employment, which is subject to the provisions on the reverse hereof. This form is an official record of your service history in the War Department and should be retained for future reference.

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology): Involuntary Separation*

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 October 1946

	(FROM)	(TO)
7. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer CAF-12	
8. SERVICE GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-12 $5905.20 per annum	
9. FORCE AND SERVICE OR COMMAND	SSU	
10. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION		
11. ORGANIZATION UNIT		
12. DUTY STATION AND LOCATION	Shanghai, China	

14. Civil Service Report Series (Temp.) (Perm.)

15. Date of Birth: 10/5/1919

16. Civil Service or Other Legal Authority

17. Appropriation or Fiscal Authority

18.	Male X	Female	
19. Non Veteran	VETERAN No Pref	5Pt. X	10Pt
20. Civil Service Retirement	X Yes	No	
21. Subject to Bureau of Budget Determination	Yes	No	
22. White X	Negro	Other	

23. Position Reference or Job Description Manual Number: D-5529

24. Date of Oath (Accession Action Only)

13. REMARKS:

*Liquidation
LAST WORKING DAY: 18 October 1946
TERMINAL LEAVE : 8:30 21 October thru COB 23 October 1946
(Twenty-four hours,)

CONFIDENTIAL

wtl

For the Commanding Officer:

(Signature)

WM. C. Tharp, Chief of Personnel (Rank and/or Title)

WD FORM 50, 1 MAY 46

201 FILE

WAR DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION
(FIELD)

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Date 29 August 1946

2. TO J. Walton Moore
First Name Middle Last Name

3. S. S. NO

4. THROUGH SSU
Office in which Employed or to be Employed

This is to notify you of the following action concerning your employment, which is subject to the provisions on the reverse hereof. This form is an official record of your service history in the War Department and should be retained for future reference.

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology) Excepted Appointment

6. EFFECTIVE DATE 29 August 1946

	(FROM)	(TO)
7. POSITION TITLE		Intelligence Officer
8. SERVICE GRADE AND SALARY		CAF-12 $5905.20 per annum*
9. FORCE AND SERVICE OR COMMAND		SSU
10. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION		
11. ORGANIZATION UNIT		
12. DUTY STATION AND LOCATION		Shanghai, China

13. REMARKS *Plus quarters and cost of living allowance at the rate authorized in Budget Circular A-8.

14. Civil Service Report Series: Temp. ☐ Perm. ☒

15. Date of Birth 10/5/1919

16. Civil Service or Other Legal Authority A-1-7

17. Appropriation or Fiscal Authority 2170425 1413-423 2001-47

18. Male ☒ Female ☐

19. Non Veteran ☐ VETERAN: No Pref ☐ 5Pt ☒ 10Pt ☐

20. Civil Service Retirement: Yes ☒ No ☐

21. Subject to Bureau of Budget Determination: Yes ☐ No ☒

22. White ☒ Negro ☐ Other ☐

23. Position Reference or Job Description Manual Number F-5529 8/29/46

24. Date of Oath (Accession Action Only) 8/29/46

CONFIDENTIAL

For the Commanding Officer:

Signature

Wm. O Tharp, Chief of Personnel

201 FILE

WD FORM 50 AUG 45

14-00000

f/u

MAR 28

HKA

WAR DEPARTMENT

REPORT OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(FIELD)

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Date 17 October 1946

2. TO J. Walton Moore (First Name, Middle Initial, Last Name) 3. S. S. NO. -

4. THROUGH SSU (Office in which Employed or to be Employed)

This is to notify you of the following action concerning your employment, which is subject to the provisions on the reverse hereof. This form is an official record of your service history in the War Department and should be retained for future reference.

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology) Involuntary Separation*

6. EFFECTIVE DATE 19 October 1946

	(FROM)	(TO)
7. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer CAF-12	
8. SERVICE GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-12 $5905.20 per annum	
9. FORCE AND SERVICE OR COMMAND	SSU	
10. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION		
11. ORGANIZATION UNIT		
12. DUTY STATION AND LOCATION	Shanghai, China	

13. REMARKS

CONFIDENTIAL

*Liquidation
LAST WORKING DAY: 18 October 1946
TERMINAL LEAVE : 8:30 21 October thru COB 23 October 1946
(Twenty-four hours,)

For the Commanding Officer

Wm. G. Tharp
(Signature)

WM. G. Tharp, Chief of Personnel
(Rank and/or Title)

WD FORM 1 MAY 46 50

EMPLOYEE

OSS 1... 1001

Grade ok: 051

OSS PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
(To be Signed and Submitted in Triplicate)

Inf LYW 7/15/46
F-5529

NAME : JAMES WALTON MOORE

NATURE OF ACTION : Excepted APPOINTMENT

EFFECTIVE : ~~AS SOON AS POSSIBLE~~ 29 August 1946

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer ~~Field Representative~~
GRADE AND SALARY	~~By discharge from the Navy~~	CAF-12, ~~$5180.p.a.~~ $5905.40
BRANCH		~~SI Branch~~ - FSKC - FBZ
OFFICIAL STATION		Shanghai FRG - A
DEPT. or FIELD		Field

REMARKS :

Plus Living and Quarters Allowance in accordance with Bureau of the Budget directive A-8

130

RECOMMENDED :
AMOS D. MOSCRIP JR.
Lt Colonel Inf
Commanding

DATE: 10 June 1946

7/1/46

RECEIVED
JUL 23 1946

RECEIVED
JUL 9 1946

Prop File
K

OSS FORM 1001
(Rev. 6-11-44)

C O P Y

OSS PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

(TO BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN TRIPLICATE)

NAME: MOORE, James Walton

NATURE OF ACTION: Appointment

29 Aug 1946 effec

EFFECTIVE DATE: As soon as possible

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS
LAST WORKING DAY:

FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
1. FOR MILITARY LEAVE WITHOUT PAY — ATTACH 3 COPIES OF MILITARY ORDERS AT LEAST ONE OF WHICH MUST BE A PHOTOSTAT OR CERTIFIED COPY
2. EFFECTIVE DATE SHALL BE FILLED IN BY THE LEAVE UNIT, FINANCE BRANCH, FOR SEPARATIONS OR RESIGNATIONS

	INITIAL	DATE
CLASSIFICATION		
VICE		
IA		
VV		
NEW		
BUDGET		
EMPLOYMENT		
CHIEF, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BRANCH		

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Field Representative
GRADE AND SALARY	By discharge from the Navy	CAF-12, $5180.p.a.
BRANCH	in the field	SI Branch
DIVISION		~~Shangh~~
SECTION		
OFFICIAL STATION		Shanghai
DEPT OR FIELD		Field

REMARKS OR PROPOSED DUTIES:

Plus Living and Quarters allowance in accordance with Bureau of the Budget directive A-8

RECOMMENDED: Amos D. Moscrip Jr. Lt Col Inf, Command. DATE: 10 June 1946

OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF, OR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 003820	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Moore J. Walton	3. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Oct 19	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD DYD
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Contact Ch	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/DCD/Dallas	9. CURRENT STATION Dallas		10. CODE (Ck. 1) HQS. X OF	

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY
CONTRACT	SPECIAL	OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

INITIAL	ANNUAL	X Supervisor REASSIGNMENT	SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO) 1 Jan 77 - 31 May 77

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT.

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2. IMPDET CL BY 018877

CONFIDENTIAL

27 May 1977

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Moore, J. Walton

1. This is a reassignment report covering the period 1 January to 1 June 1977. It is prepared due to the reassignment of the rating officer.

2. During the period under review, Mr. Moore continued in his assignment as Chief of the Dallas Office. He has directed effectively the attention of the office to the collection of priority intelligence information which has resulted in the submission of an assortment of well-prepared reports on important intelligence topics. In managing the full range of collection and support functions, Mr. Moore's performance as Office Chief continues to be marked by exceptional proficiency.

3. Overall Rating: STRONG.

ELBERT H. WATTS
Deputy Chief of Operations, DCD

I certify that I have seen this report.

Not Available For Signature. A copy of this report
with the Reviewing Official's comments has been
furnished to the employee.

J. Walton Moore   Date

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 018877

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 003820	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Moore J. Walton	3. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Oct 19	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD DTD
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Contact Ch	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/DCD/Dallas	9. CURRENT STATION Dallas		10. CODE (ck one) ☐ HQS. ☒ DF	

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 Jan 1976 - 31 Dec 1976

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 1 Feb 1977

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACH TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WOF "O" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate a ositive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to signment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this r should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in th ner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 9-73 45

CLASSIFICATION

E2, IMPDET CL BY 018877

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in Mr. Watts' evaluation. Mr. Moore is a very good administrator and his office has performed its collection mission very well and provided excellent operational services and support. They have not been tested in our emigre program because of a lack of potential but I am confident they will do the job well as required. I rate Mr. Moore superior in his ability to represent CIA and the Intelligence Community on the outside and he does a very good job in representing DCD within CIA and the Community. In a pinch I feel that I could depend on Mr. Moore more than almost any other DCD field chief of his grade.

DATE 14 April 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, DCD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Jackson R. Horton

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [illegible] copy of this report

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

10 February 1977

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Mr. J. Walton Moore

1. During the period under review, Mr. Moore continued in his assignment as Chief of the DCD Field Office in Dallas, with responsibility for the supervision of a Resident Office in Tulsa and a Residency in Austin. The Houston Resident Office was raised to Field Office status on 1 September 1976, and the New Orleans Resident Office was placed under the newly formed Houston Field Office. Both of these offices were formerly subordinate to the Dallas Field Office.

2. Under Mr. Moore's able direction, the Dallas Field Office has continued to perform the full range of collection and support tasks exceptionally well. The office produces well prepared reports on subjects of priority intelligence interest. Mr. Moore is a quiet and efficient manager with high personal and professional standards. He is well liked and respected.

3. During this rating period, Mr. Moore and the Dallas Field Office were formally commended by the Office of Strategic Research for timely reporting of information which resulted in substantial improvement of an estimate on Soviet military medical staffing. The information supplied by Mr. Moore "...resulted in a reduction of over 500,000 in the Community's estimate of the total number of Soviet military personnel."

4. Extraordinarily fine work has been done under Mr. Moore's direction during this rating period supporting the activities of the FR Base. The FR Base is relatively new and has depended heavily on Mr. Moore's readiness to support it in the early stages of development. In November 1976, Mr. Moore was formally commended by the FR Base Chief "...for his outstanding support to the new Dallas Base during the period October 1975 to October 1976. ...The level of overall support from DCD Dallas was consistently outstanding." Under Mr. Moore's management, the Dallas Office support of FR objectives is among the most effective and comprehensive in DCD.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 018877

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT
J. Walton Moore, 10 February 1977

5. Mr. Moore is a strong supporter of the Emigre Task Force Program, and the Dallas Office is responsive to cases and requests assigned by this project. The potential in the Dallas area is not as great as in other major cities of equivalent size, but the office has performed very well against those targets available.

6. Mr. Moore is an experienced and effective officer; the Dallas Field Office under his careful and tactful management is a productive and smooth functioning office.

7. Rating: Strong.

Elbert H. Watts, Jr.
ELBERT H. WATTS, JR.
Deputy Chief of Operations, DCD

I certify that I have seen this report.
Not available for signature. A copy of this report
with the Reviewing Official's comments has been
furnished to the employee.

J. Walton Moore

Date

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 003820	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) MOORE, J. Walton	3. DATE OF BIRTH 10/05/19	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 15	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Chief)	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/DCD/Dallas	9. CURRENT STATION Dallas	10. CODE (ck one) HQS. ☐ OF ☒

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT										12. TYPE OF REPORT					
X	CAREER		RESERVE		CONTRACT		OTHER (Spec)		TEMPORARY	X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) 1 January - 31 December 1975	14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1976

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

E2, IMPDET CL BY 018877

5/76

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J Walton Moore

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Moore's long and unique experience in the FBI, OSS, and CIA coupled with his background in China and his admirable personal qualities make him a very valuable asset to DCD. When he recommends something to me, I know he will be correct; when he is asked to represent the Agency in some highly important contact, I know he will do it well and make an excellent, professional impression, and I can count on him to run a very good office with a high level of productive activity.

I feel very comfortable and very confident with Jim Moore in Dallas.

DATE 22 April 1976	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Domestic Collection Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Jackson R Horton JACKSON R. HORTON

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

20 April 1976

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Mr. James Walton Moore

1. Mr. Moore continued in his assignment as Chief of the DCD Field Office in Dallas, during the period under review, with responsibility for the supervision of the Resident Offices in Houston, New Orleans and Tulsa and a Residency in Austin. His Letter of Instruction remains current.

2. The Dallas Field Office, under Mr. Moore's perceptive and competent direction, produces a good volume of quality foreign intelligence reporting. DCD headquarters officers consider the Dallas Field Office performance to be of high caliber. The office is highly responsive to headquarters direction, and there is a strong commitment to quality performance. Mr. Moore has the Dallas Field Office fitting smoothly into the DCD organizational framework. Morale is high and Dallas field personnel, both professional and clerical, feel a sense of importance in their mission. This spirit and pride in their work stems directly from the positive tone set by Mr. Moore.

3. Mr. Moore has extended the hand of cooperation unstintingly to the FR Base which is in an embryonic phase of development. Base officers are enthusiastic about the cooperation received from the Dallas office and the willingness of Mr. Moore to be of assistance. Cooperation between the Dallas office and FR is among the very best in DCD. In addition to the fine support supplied to FR, Dallas had made an important contribution, during the period under review, to the cost-analysis program of Format. Support to operations, through the Operations Services Group, is excellent and a good variety of operational leads and operational reporting is received from the Dallas office.

4. Mr. Moore is a capable and efficient manager. The Dallas office structure presents a complex and difficult management challenge. Through his experience and mature judgment, Mr. Moore has directed the activities of the office smoothly and effectively.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018877

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT,
James Walton Moore, 20 April 1976

5. In the full range of intelligence activity during this period, the Dallas Field Office has performed with exceptional proficiency. Mr. Moore is involved in all phases of activity in the Dallas office, yet encourages a healthy degree of independence by his officers.

6. Rating: Strong.

Elbert H. Watts

ELBERT H. WATTS, JR.
Deputy Chief of Operations, DCD

I certify that I have seen this report.

James Walton Moore
James Walton Moore

May 5, 1976.
Date

SECRET

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 003820	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) MOORE, J. Walton	3. DATE OF BIRTH 10/05/19	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 15	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Chief)	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/DCD/Dallas	9. CURRENT STATION Dallas	10. CODE (ck one) HQS. ☐ X ☒ DP ☐		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
1 January - 31 December 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1975

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E2. IMPDET CL BY 010736

(4)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE		DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
☐ HAVE ATTACHED	☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED		

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in this evaluation. My principal interaction with Jim Moore during the year has been the result of our mutual concern for the well-being of a capable officer who performs well and has growth potential but who is difficult to work with and has, on occasions, apparently been on the brink of a physical breakdown brought on by tension, overwork and other factors. In his approach to this problem, Jim has been concerned, compassionate, responsible, and thoroughly professional.

Under Jim's direction, the Dallas complex has achieved a high ranking among DCD offices and is holding it.

While Jim Moore is a long-time DCD officer, he seems to have lost none of his enthusiasm and drive. He is a valued and respected colleague.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 February 1975	Chief, Domestic Collection Division	Jackson R. Horton JACKSON R. HORTON

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

[illegible] copy of this report [illegible] comments has been furnished [illegible] the employee.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

6 February 1975

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: MOORE, J. Walton

1. Jim Moore continued in his assignment as Chief of the DCD Field Office in Dallas during the period under review, with responsibility for the supervision of Resident Offices in Houston, New Orleans and Tulsa, and a new Residency in Austin. His Letter of Instruction dated 7 November 1973 remains current.

2. The Dallas Field Office with its four satellite offices represents the most complicated field office structure in DCD. While Mr. Moore's staff consists of only nine officers and seven secretaries, more than half are located outside the field office. The Dallas Office requires a chief who is experienced in resident office operations, is able to motivate and manage people from a distance, and who can keep personally familiar with a wide variety of activities. Mr. Moore is admirably qualified. He has been able to coordinate these essentially independent activities most efficiently. His entire organization performs in a responsive and highly effective manner and produces timely, well balanced reporting.

3. Although Mr. Moore's staff was relatively stable during 1974, two of his key officers were incapacitated for extended periods, both at times when the work load was especially heavy. The operating procedures which he has established enabled the office involved to continue to handle priority matters effectively in each instance.

4. On at least two occasions in 1974 Mr. Moore had to intercede in complicated and difficult situations, and in each instance his judgment and highly professional approach resulted in successful solutions.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010736

SECRET

SUBJECT: MOORE, J. Walton

5. Mr. Moore is a calm, mature, respected and popular officer who handles his complicated job with the easy assurance that comes only from experience and past success. I believe that it is largely due to Mr. Moore's personal reputation that so many of our junior officers want to work in Dallas.

6. During 1974 Mr. Moore recommended the establishment of a one-man residency in Austin as a more efficient way to handle our responsibilities in that part of Texas. We agreed, and the Residency was established in mid-1974. Although it has been in operation only a few months, the wisdom of Mr. Moore's recommendation is already apparent, and I am confident that the success of the Residency will continue.

7. Rating: Strong.

8. A copy of this memorandum, with reviewer's comments, will be forwarded to Mr. Moore.

Robert K. Starling
ROBERT K. STARLING
Acting Deputy Chief
Domestic Collection Division

I certify that I have seen this report.

[illegible] copy of this report
with [illegible] comments has been
furnished to the employee.

J. Walton Moore

Date

SECRET

18 March 1974

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT (Form 45)

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Performance

MOORE, J. Walton

003820	Career Appointment
DOB: 10/05/19	Annual Report
Male	Due: 28 February 1974
GS-15	Reporting Period: 1 January 1973 - 31 December 1973
SD: D	
IO DCD (Chief)	
DCD Dallas	

1. Mr. Moore became Chief of the DCD Field Office in Dallas in June 1973 and was promoted to grade GS-15 in the same month. He had been selected for this position approximately one year earlier, and spent the interim in DCD headquarters as Acting Deputy Chief of the then Soviet Bloc Division. He now supervises one of our most complicated Field Office organizations, with people located in four cities (Dallas, Tulsa, Houston and New Orleans). More than half of the people under his supervision are located outside of Dallas. Perhaps because of his long service as one of our most successful Resident Officers, Mr. Moore excels in supervising this type of operation as a Field Chief. His three Resident Offices are among the most responsive and productive in DCD. He delegates duties well and permits his staff the freedom to exercise individual judgment and responsibility. He is both liked and respected by his staff, which shows excellent morale and esprit de corps.

2. Mr. Moore maintains excellent relationships with other Government agencies in his territory, as appropriate, and also with other components of CIA. He manages his many responsibilities efficiently and effectively, and with proper attention to security. He is quick to identify members of his staff who have potential for greater professional advancement, and to give them the necessary encouragement and guidance.

SECRET

2 010650

APR 1974 /19

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Performance
MOORE, J. Walton

3. Rating: Strong.

ROBERT K. STARLING
Deputy for Field Operations

J Walton Moore
J. Walton Moore

25 March 74
Date

Reviewing Official:

I concur. I am very pleased with the performance of the Dallas Field Office complex which has improved greatly under Mr. Moore's leadership.

JACKSON R. HORTON
Chief, Domestic Collection Division

J Walton Moore
J. Walton Moore

25 March 74.
Date

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 003820	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) MOORE, J. Walton	3. DATE OF BIRTH 10/05/19	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 14	6. SD IT
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO General	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DCS/Soviet Bloc Div.	9. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.			10. HQ CD 1

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		CONTRACT		OTHER (Spec.)

12. TYPE OF REPORT

	TEMPORARY	X	ANNUAL		REASSIGN-MENT		SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) July - December 1972	14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. May 1973

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT.

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Training Assignment as Acting Deputy Chief, Soviet Bloc Division.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

Form 8-72 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

E2 IMPDET CL BY 16 MAY 1973 (4)

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Moore is the prospective Chief of the Dallas Field Office. He was assigned to DCS headquarters in July 1972 for a familiarization and training tour prior to assuming that post. For approximately six months he served as Acting Deputy Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, during which he was required to fulfill that role as though it were a permanent assignment. Although he had never been active in headquarters before, he quietly and efficiently familiarized himself with the operations of the division. Through his friendly personality, experience and interested approach he quickly and effectively made what was basically a training role into one of real contribution on a daily basis.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, C AND D OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 7	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Has returned to Dallas Field Office	
DATE 14 May 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Soviet Bloc Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE F. [illegible]. SHERIDAN

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 14 May 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Director, DCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE James R. Murphy JAMES R. MURPHY

CLASSIFICATION

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXECUTIVE SEMINAR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE • UNITED STATES OF AMERICA •

TRAINING COMPLETED
Request No. 37260
Date 22 FEB 1973

This is to certify that

J. Walton Moore

has successfully completed the interdepartmental seminar on Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C.

January 8-26, 1973

Howard E. Haugerud
CHAIRMAN

A TRUE COPY OF SIGNED ORIGINAL
DIRECTOR of FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE

UNCLASSIFIED

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXECUTIVE SEMINAR

TRAINING REPORT

Student: **J. Walton Moore** Date: **January 26, 1973**

Grade or Rank: **GS-14** Department, Agency or Service Branch: **CIA**

This certifies that the above-named officer has satisfactorily completed the three-week interdepartmental course at the Foreign Affairs Executive Seminar in the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State.

Objective, Content and Method of Training

The objective of the interdepartmental Foreign Affairs Executive Seminar is to provide an advanced, short-term course on the current formulation, coordination, and execution of U.S. foreign policy to senior foreign affairs executives of U.S. government agencies serving either in the U.S. or abroad. While the focus of the Seminar is on policy problems in foreign affairs in general, special emphasis is given in the course's regional seminars to a coordinated interagency approach to policy formulation and implementation in Washington and in the field. In the process of the three-week course, the Seminar gives special attention to the Nixon Doctrine, foreign economic and trade policies, domestic factors affecting U.S. foreign policy, and problems of modernization and internal defense.

The course is conducted through lectures, readings and Interagency Regional Seminar discussions. These seminars, organized by geographic regions with representatives from the participating agencies, analyze specific problems in their areas, consider appropriate courses of action for the United States, and emphasize inter-agency coordination in Washington and at the overseas Mission.

For the Director of the Foreign Service Institute:

Departmental or Agency
Faculty Representative

HEH/sda
Seminar Chairman

UNCLASSIFIED

2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
003820

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MOORE,	(First) J.	(Middle) Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10-05-19	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD IT	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Contact			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DCS/Dallas Field Off.		8. CURRENT STATION Dallas, Texas		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. May 1972	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1971 - 31 March 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Locates and develops the potential of domestic organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Collects intelligence information; briefs and debriefs.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Initiates leads and furnishes operational support to other elements of the Agency.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares reports, memoranda and other communications.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 As Deputy Chief assumes the responsibilities and duties of the Chief in his absence.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises 13 employees in the absence of the Chief.	RATING LETTER S

6 JUN 1972

12 JUL 1972

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Moore has been under my direct supervision for nine months. During that period he has demonstrated sound judgment and a thoroughly professional approach to his duties. His reporting is consistently high in both quality and quantity. Because of his length of service in the area and pleasant personality he has achieved exceptional rapport with his sources and prominent members of the community. He responds to requirements promptly and effectively.

Mr. Moore is a conscientious and dedicated employee who requires a minimum of supervision. His security and cost-consciousness are excellent, as is his performance of supervisory duties.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 9 May 1972	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Dalton Moore

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 9 May 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Dallas Field Office	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Justin F. Gleichauf

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur. We plan to transfer Mr. Moore to DCS Headquarters in the Summer of 1972 to broaden his experience and thus prepare him for possible assumption of greater responsibility.

DATE 22 May 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy for Field Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE R. K. STARLING

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003820

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MOORE, J. Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10-05-19	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 14	5. SD IT
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Contact	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DCS/Houston Office	8. CURRENT STATION Dallas, Texas		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: May 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1970 - 31 March 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serves as Resident Agent in Dallas, Texas	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and develops potential of domestic organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects intelligence information; briefs and debriefs	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates leads and furnishes operational support to other elements of the Agency.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares reports, memoranda and other communications.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises one military and one clerical personnel. 10 MAY 1971	RATING LETTER O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

MAY 18 1 36 PM '71

Mr. Moore continues management of the Dallas Resident Agency in an exceptionally proficient manner.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT		
DATE 30 April 1971	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 20 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 30 April 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office, DCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische Ernest A. Rische
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 10 May 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Director, DCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE James R. Murphy JAMES R. MURPHY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003820

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MOORE,	(First) J.	(Middle) Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10-05-19	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 14	5. SD IT	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Contact			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DCS/Houston Office		8. CURRENT STATION Dallas, Texas		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
X	CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY		INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	X	ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. May 1970		12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970	

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serves as Resident Agent in Dallas, Texas	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and develops potential of domestic organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects intelligence information; briefs and debriefs.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates leads and furnishes operational support to other elements of the Agency.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares reports, memoranda and other communications.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises one military and one clerical personnel.	RATING LETTER O

30 JUN 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUN 30 12 24 PM 70

Mr. Moore continues management of the Dallas Resident Agency in an exceptionally proficient manner.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 30 April 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 19 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 30 April 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office, DCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische Ernest A. Rische

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I would not rate Mr. Moore "O" in specific duty No. 2, but concur in the overall Strong rating.

DATE 22 May 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Director, DCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE James R. Murphy JAMES R. MURPHY

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 4
(100 hours, full-time) (3 - 19 March 1971)

Student: Moore, James W.

Year of Birth:	1919	**Grade:**	GS-14
EOD:	July 1947	**Service Designation:**	IT
Office:	DCS	**Number of Students:**	28

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The basic objectives of the Advanced Intelligence Seminar (AIS) are to increase the awareness of experienced Agency personnel to: major international and domestic trends affecting US foreign policy and intelligence; key problems and possible organizational changes, facing the intelligence community; recent and projected developments within CIA to meet current and future Agency responsibilities; and major problems of collection, production, coordination and support of intelligence.

Methods of instruction include formal presentations by academic experts, government officials, senior Agency and intelligence community officers, and substantive experts from the Agency. Students are encouraged to participate actively in follow-up discussions both with the speakers and within the class itself. Emphasis is also placed on in-class discussions, using the talents and experiences of the students as a primary resource. For purposes of encouraging open, meaningful exchange, sections of the course are held at Warrenton and ISOLATION, where a more relaxed seminar atmosphere can be developed. Finally, attempts are made to provide provocative-type readings to the students both prior to, and during, the course itself.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only; no attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Course Chairmen

31 March 1971
Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003820

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MOORE, J. Walton		2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/05/19	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 14	5. SD IT
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Contact		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DCS/Houston Office		8. CURRENT STATION Dallas, Texas	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. May 1969	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 Apr 68 - 31 Mar 69

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serves as Resident Agent in Dallas, Texas	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and develops potential of domestic organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects intelligence information; briefs and debriefs.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates leads and furnishes operational support to other elements of the Agency.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares reports, memoranda and other communications.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises one military and one clerical personnel.	RATING LETTER O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-63 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Moore continues to manage the affairs of the Dallas Resident Agency in a superior manner. His office has concentrated its efforts on priority collection matters and has increased its production output.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 April 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 18 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 April 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office, DCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Although I agree with an overall rating of Strong for Jim Moore, I would not have rated him Outstanding in the three specific duties, particularly specific duty No. 2. In this duty I would have rated him Proficient.

DATE 16 May 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Director, DCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JAMES R. MURPHY

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

ADVANCED MANAGEMENT (PLANNING) SEMINAR (50 hours) (6-69)

Student	: James Moore	Dates of Course	:15-20 June 1969
Year of Birth:	1919	Office	:DCS
Grade	: GS-14	Service Designation:	IT
EOD Date	: December 1949	No. of Students	:32

COURSE OBJECTIVE:

Course objective is to increase individual effectiveness on-the-job by developing better understanding of planning as a managerial skill and by providing familiarization with the Agency's overall planning system.

The course seeks to meet this objective by: a) providing an overall and systematic framework for managerial planning; b) identifying and analyzing basic styles of planning; c) covering selected techniques useful in planning; d) providing an orientation of the PPB system in use in the Agency and Federal Government; and by e) permitting feedback to students on their personal planning styles as revealed during course exercises.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Charles O Ford 24 JUN 1969

Chief Instructor Date

CONFIDENTIAL

(When filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003820

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MOORE,	(First) J.	(Middle) Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/05/19	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 14	5. SD IT	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Contact			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DCS/Houston Office		8. CURRENT STATION Dallas, Texas		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. May 1968				12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 Apr 67 - 31 Mar 68			

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serves as Resident Agent in Dallas, Texas.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and develops potential of domestic organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects intelligence information; briefs and debriefs.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates leads and furnishes operational support to other elements of the Agency.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares reports, memoranda and other communications.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises one military and one clerical personnel	RATING LETTER O

16 APR 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

APR 11 10 13 AM '68
MAIL ROOM

Mr. Moore has demonstrated his outstanding capabilities in handling operational support matters during the forced phase out of certain funding activities which required exceptionally good judgment and much tact.

During this period he has also become responsible for the activities of an Air Force officer from the 1127th Field Activities Group. Through his guidance and effective direction he has been able to integrate this new officer into the production of the Dallas RA in an efficient manner.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 29 March 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 17 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 29 March 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office, DCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Although Jim Moore is an above average employee I would not rate him Outstanding in specific duties 1, 2 and 6. Duties 1 and 2 because it is difficult to compare his performance with anyone else as he has always held this position. Duty 6 because supervision of 2 other people should not be much of a chore. We are studying the possibility of moving Jim to another assignment to determine how he can perform in a more demanding job.

DATE 1 April 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Director, DCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JAMES R. MURPHY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 003820

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD	
MOORE,	J.	Walton	10/05/19	M	14	IT	

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
IO Contact	DCS Houston Office	Dallas, Texas

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: May 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Apr 66 - 31 Mar 67

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serves as Resident Agent in Dallas, Texas.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and develops potential of domestic organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects intelligence information; briefs and debriefs.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates leads and furnishes operational support to other elements of the Agency.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares reports, memoranda and other communications.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises one clerical personnel.	O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Moore continues to run the activities of the Dallas Resident Agency in a superior manner. He is a highly capable intelligence officer, whose long experience in both overt and covert operations are apparent in his highly capable manner of performance.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 10 April 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 16 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION - - -	
DATE 11 April 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 1 May 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Director, DCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JAMES R. MURPHY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
003820

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) Moore	(First) J.	(Middle) Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/05/19	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 14	5. SD IT

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I O Contact	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DCS Houston Office	8. CURRENT STATION Dallas, Texas

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
May 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1965-31 March 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serves as Resident Agent in Dallas, Texas	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and develops potential of domestic organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects intelligence information; briefs and debriefs	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates leads and furnishes operational support to other elements of the Agency	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares reports, memoranda and other communications	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises one clerical personnel	O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

3 MAY 1966

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Moore continues to perform his duties in an outstanding manner. His report production has continued well above average in quantity and exceedingly high in quality.

In addition, his support activities consume approximately 25 per cent of his effort. He manages the affairs of his Resident Agency in an efficient, economical and outstanding manner.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 11 April 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore J Walton Moore

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 15 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION - - -	
DATE 11 April 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 19 April 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Operations, DCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John W McConnell JOHN W. McCONNELL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003820

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
MOORE J. Walton	10/05/19	M	14	IOC

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
I O Contact	OO/CD Houston	Dallas, Texas

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
May 1965	1 April 1964-31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serves as Resident Agent in Dallas, Texas	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and develops potential of domestic organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects intelligence information; briefs and debriefs	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates leads and furnishes operational support to otner elements of the Agency	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares reports, memoranda and other communications	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises one clerical personnel	O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

2 MAY 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 30 1 36 PM '65
MAIL ROOM

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This officer has continued to perform his duties in a superior manner. The drop in rating from outstanding to strong reflected in this report does not indicate a drop in performance. It is the result of guidance from headquarters and represents an adjustment in order to make the rating officers base of evaluation reflect a more uniform standard of evaluation within the division.

Mr. Moore is an outstanding and well qualified intelligence officer with many years experience in both overt and covert work. As a Resident Agent he not only performs the duties of a Contact Specialist but also manages the affairs of the Dallas Resident Agency. He supervises one clerical employee and is effective in maintaining high morale and high productivity. He manages the affairs of his Resident Agency in an efficient, economical and outstanding manner. As a C/S his production is large and the quality is good.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 21 April 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore J. Walton Moore

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 14 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION - - -	
DATE 21 April 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

DATE April 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Contact Division, OO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JAMES R. MURPHY James R. Murphy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003820

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MOORE,	(First) J.	(Middle) Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10-05-19	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD OC

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I. O. Contact	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OO/CD Houston FO	8. CURRENT STATION ~~Houston,~~ DALLAS, Texas

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
May 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1963-31 March 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervising and managing a Resident Agency	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Exploitation of source's complete intelligence potential by debriefing thoroughly	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Writing reports clearly and concisely without coloring	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Cultivation of contact to develop trust and confidence in both the Agency and the Contact Specialist himself	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Keeps informed on foreign situations and intelligence requirements in order to better orient and exploit sources	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Searches for and develops new sources	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 13 MAY 1964	RATING LETTER O

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 1964

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Moore is an exceptionally outstanding and well qualified employee. His many years and varied experiences in intelligence activities contribute to his capabilities. As a Resident Agent he not only carries out the duties of a Contact Specialist, but is responsible for managing the affairs of the Dallas Resident Agency. In carrying out these duties he is conscious of the necessity for economy of operation, and determines that the actions taken are handled in the most efficient and economical manner. Since the last Fitness Report Mr. Moore has trained and directed the activity of a new employee in such effectiveness that from the beginning his performance has been outstanding.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 30 April 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 13 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION - - -	
DATE 30 April 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree that J.Walton Moore is an exceptionally fine officer but think that in comparison with others of his grade throughout the Division his rating should be "S" rather than "O".

DATE 11 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Acting Chief, Contact Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOHN W. McCONNELL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
[illegible] 3820

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MOORE, J. Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1919	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD OC

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I. O. Contact	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DO/CD Houston F. O.	8. CURRENT STATION Dallas, Texas

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1962-31 March 1963

MAY 3 47 PM '63
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervising and managing a Resident Agency	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Exploitation of source's complete intelligence potential by debriefing thoroughly	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Writing reports clearly and concisely without coloring	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Cultivation of contact to develop trust and confidence in both the Agency and the C/S himself	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Keeps informed on foreign situations and intelligence requirements in order to better orient and exploit sources	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Searches for and develops new sources	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

28 MAY 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Moore is an outstanding intelligence officer. He has had many years of varied experience in intelligence activities which contribute to his ability. The results of his performance as an RA bear out the high ratings in this report.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 22 April 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore J Walton Moore

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION - - -	
DATE 22 April 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A Rische Ernest A. Rische

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I would have rated Moore as Outstanding. I believe he has the capacity to head a field office or undertake comparable higher responsibilities....

DATE 23 May 1963 ~~29 April 1963~~	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Contact Division, OO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE E. M. ASHCRAFT EMAshcraft

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

OO/C Refresher Course No. 17

80 hours, full time   27 February - 10 March 1961   22 students

Student : **MOORE, James W.**   Year of Birth: **1919**

EOD Date: **December 1949**   Grade: **GS-14**   Office: **(Houston)**

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The objectives of the course are to review Division policies, techniques and procedures, with special emphasis on current priority intelligence and support requirements, and to provide an opportunity for field collectors to discuss collection problems with OO/C Headquarters personnel and consumer analysts.

The course is designed for experienced OO/C personnel. The first part of the course reviews techniques of collection and the preparation and processing of reports and other collected material. Students are then assigned to seminar groups for consideration of collection problems pertinent to their field of specialization. In the second part of the course OO/C Branch Chiefs discuss the needs of the Division's principal consumers and review general collection requirements. A survey of the current world situation in selected areas is also included.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only; no attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course. The above named person attended the entire course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty   31 March 1961 Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

APR
1962

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
003820

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MOORE, J. Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1919	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I. O. (Contact)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OO/CD/Houston	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1962

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 1 Apr 61-31 Mar 62

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervising and managing a Resident Agency	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Cultivation of contact to develop trust and confidence in both the Agency and the C/S himself	RATING NO. 7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Exploitation of source's complete intelligence potential by debriefing thoroughly	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Keeps informed on foreign situations and intelligence requirements in order to better orient and exploit sources.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Writing reports clearly and concisely without coloring	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Searches for and develops new sources	RATING NO. 7

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Moore is an outstanding intelligence officer who continues to do his job in every respect in an outstanding manner. The results of his job bears out the high performance ratings contained in this report.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 2 April 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore J Walton Moore

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 11 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION - - -

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE 2 April 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische Ernest A. Rische

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 10 April 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Contact Division, OO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE E. M. ASHCRAFT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

10 APR 1961

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
103820

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MOORE, J. Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/5/19	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Contact)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OO/CD/Houston	

8.	CAREER STAFF STATUS					9.	TYPE OF REPORT		
	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED	X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 May 61	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To Mar 60 - Mar 61	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervising & managing a Resident Agency.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Cultivation of contact to develop trust and confidence in both the Agency and the C/S himself	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Exploitation of source's complete intelligence potential by debriefing thoroughly.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Keeps informed on foreign situations & intelligence requirements in order to better orient and exploit sources.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Writing reports clearly and concisely without coloring.	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Searches for and develops new sources.	7

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS	X						
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 7 3 32 PM '61
MAIL ROOM

This employee's many years experience in varied intelligence activities has made him an outstanding officer in almost all phases of intelligence work. He continues to do an outstanding job as Resident Agent of the Dallas Office. The results of his job bears out the high performance ratings contained in this report.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 31 Mar 61	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore J. Walton Moore

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION - - -

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 31 Mar 61	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische Ernest A. Rische

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 5 April 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Acting Chief, CD/OO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE George O. Forrest

SECRET

27

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 103820

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MOORE, J. Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/5/19	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Contact)	7. OFF/DIV/BR. OF ASSIGNMENT OO/CD/Houston	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 60

11. REPORTING PERIOD From – To: Mar 59 - Mar 60

SPECIAL (Specify):

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervising & managing a Resident Agency.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Cultivation of contact to develop trust and confidence in both the Agency and the C/S himself	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Exploitation of source's complete intelligence potential by debriefing thoroughly.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Keeps informed on foreign situations & intelligence requirements in order to better orient and exploit sources.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Writing reports clearly and concisely without coloring.	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Searches for and develops new sources.	RATING NO. 7

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "F" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This employee's many years experience in varied intelligence activities has made him an outstanding officer in almost all phases of intelligence work. He continues to do an outstanding job as Resident Agent of the Dallas Office. The results of his job bears out the high performance ratings contained in this report.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 11 Apr 60	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION - - -

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 30 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 11 Apr 60	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische Ernest A. Rische

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 28 April 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Acting Chief, CD/OO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE George C. Forrest

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

CO/C [illegible] COURSE NO. 13

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION			
[illegible]	[illegible] DATES OF COURSE		NO. OF STUDENTS
MOORE, James Walton	**M 6 - 10 April 1959**		**15**
[illegible]	EOD DATE	GRADE OR RANK	OFFICE
5 October 1919	**6 Dec 1949**	**GS-14**	**Dallas Resident Agency**
[illegible]			
Contact Specialist			

SECTION II: OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE

[illegible] of the course are to review Division policies, techniques [illegible], with special emphasis on current priority intelligence and [illegible], and to provide an opportunity for field collectors to [illegible] collection problems with CO/C Headquarters personnel and consumer [illegible]

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

The course is designed for experienced CO/C personnel. The first part of [illegible] techniques of collection and the preparation and processing [illegible] and other collected material. Students are then assigned to seminar [illegible] problems pertinent to their field of [illegible]. In the second part of the course CO/C Branch Chiefs discuss [illegible] principal customers and review general collection [illegible]. A survey of the current world situation in selected areas is [illegible]

SECTION IV: CERTIFICATION OF COURSE COMPLETION

[illegible] has attended the entire course.

[illegible]

James T. [illegible]

Chief, Intelligence Production
Faculty, IS

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 103320

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MOORE, J. Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/5/19	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION CC	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Contact)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OO/CD/Houston	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL *(Specify)*

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From Dec 57-Mar 59 To

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervising and managing a Resident Agency.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Cultivation of contact to develop trust and confidence in both the Agency and the C/S himself.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Exploitation of source's complete intelligence potential by debriefing thoroughly.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Keeps informed on foreign situations & intelligence requirements in order to better orient and exploit sources.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Writing reports clearly and concisely without coloring.	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Searches for and develops new sources	RATING NO. 7

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS	X						
OTHER *(Specify)*:	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2 47 PM '59

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This employee's many years experience in varied intelligence activities has made him an outstanding officer in almost all phases of intelligence work. He is expremely well qualified for his present activity as Resident Agent of the Dallas Resident Agency. His performance has demonstrated his outstanding ability.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 3 April 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore J Walton Moore

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8 years	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION - - -

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE 2 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Houston Office	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische Ernest A Rische

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 13 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CD/OO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE E. M. Ashcraft EM Ashcraft

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

✓

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* MOORE, James W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Oct 1919	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/Contact/Houston Office	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Contact)		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 6 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* 12/6/56 - 12/5/57	

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*: ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1 FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS.

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE *(Specify)*:
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 12 Dec. 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Ernest A Rische ERNEST A. RISCHE	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Houston Office

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY gw DATE 1-14-58

WD 2/3/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 30 Dec 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING EMAshcraft E. M. ASHCRAFT	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Contact Division

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

6
INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS.

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55
REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC [illegible]

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 14 12 58 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty con[illegible] ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability t[illegible] be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary*).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervising and managing a Resident Agency.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Cultivation of contact to develop trust and confidence in both the Agency and the C/S himself.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Exploitation of sources' complete intelligence potential by debriefing thoroughly.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Keeps informed on foreign situations & intelligence requirements in order to better orient and exploit sources.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Writing reports clearly and concisely without coloring.	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Searches for and develops new sources.	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

An exceptional employee who has demonstrated his ability to perform all duties of a Resident Agent in an outstanding and exceptional manner. His many years of varied experiences in intelligence work has made him a well-rounded officer, extremely well qualified for his present work.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual.. *productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY.. WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE ..BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MOORE,	(First) James	(Middle) Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 October 1919	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Operations/Contact/Houston Office
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO (Contact)
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 6 December 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 12/6/56 - 12/5/57
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 12 Dec. 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Ernest A. Rische ERNEST A. RISCHE
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Houston Office

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 30 Dec 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Ninety-five.

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

A fine employee, capable of assuming greater responsibilities than at present assigned.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 14 12 57 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

OO/C Resident Agent courses.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

OO/C REFRESHER COURSE NO. 9

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME	SEX	DATES OF COURSE	NO. OF STUDENTS
Moore, James W.	M	9-18 September 1957	14
DATE OF BIRTH	EOD DATE	GRADE OR RANK	OFFICE
5 October 1919	December 1949	GS-14	Houston

PRESENT POSITION

Resident Agent

SECTION II: OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE

The objectives of the course are to review Division policies, techniques and procedures, with special emphasis on current priority intelligence and support requirements, and to provide an opportunity for field collectors to discuss collection problems with OO/C Headquarters personnel and consumer analysts.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

The course is designed for experienced OO/C personnel. The first part of the course reviews techniques of collection and the preparation and processing of reports and other collected material. Students are then assigned to seminar groups for consideration of collection problems pertinent to their field of specialization. In the second part of the course OO/C Branch Chiefs discuss the needs of the Division's principal consumers and review general collection requirements. A survey of the current world situation in selected areas is also included.

SECTION IV: CERTIFICATION OF COURSE COMPLETION

The above named person has attended the entire course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Kurney B. Bennett
Course Supervisor

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
103820	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
MOORE, James Walton	October	5	1919

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
Mandarin Chinese 199	April	23	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-43)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS: I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS: I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE: I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE: I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE: I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE: I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 23 April 1957	SIGNATURE J. Walton Moore
(46) 0	(47) 0

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be ~~completed and forwarded~~ to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* MOORE, James Walton	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 October 1919	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Operations/Contact/Houston Office
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO (Contact)
7. GRADE: GS-13
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 6 December 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)*: 12/6/55 - 12/5/56

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK *(X)* APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS.

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE *(Specify)*:
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 4 January 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Ernest A Rische ERNEST A. RISCHE	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Houston Office

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY [illegible] DATE 1-15-57
Posted Pos. Cont. [illegible]
Reviewed by PCC [illegible] 1-23

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 10 Jan 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL E. M. ASHCRAFT	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Contact Division

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JAN 15 12 23 PM '57

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Exploitation of sources' complete intelligence potential by debriefing thoroughly.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Cultivation of contact to develop trust and confidence in both the Agency and the C/S himself.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Writing reports clearly and concisely without coloring.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Keeps informed on foreign situations & intelligence requirements in order to better orient and exploit sources.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervising and managing a Resident Agency.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Searches for and develops new sources.	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

An exceptionally competent individual with many years experience in varied intelligence jobs, all of which make him more qualified for his present work.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual ...*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): MOORE, James Walton
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 5 October 1919
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Operations/Contact/Houston Office
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO (Contact)
7. GRADE: GS-13
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 6 December 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 12/6/55 - 12/5/56
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 4 January 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: ERNEST A. RISCHE
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Houston Office

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 10 Jan 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: E. M. ASHCRAFT
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, Contact Division

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 15 12 23 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Eighty-three.

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

A fine employee, capable of assuming greater responsibilities than at present assigned.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

OO/C Refresher courses.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13 ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14 ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15 RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26 IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8 HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS CONVINCING	4	28 HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:

1. *The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

CODED

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A FR due 12/6/56

JW 12/19/55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

EJ 12/29/55

SECTION I *(To be filled in by Administrative Officer)*

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): MOORE, James Walton
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 5 Oct 1919
3. SEX: M
4. CAREER DESIGNATION: OC
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY: 6 December 1949
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: Operations
7. DIVISION: Contact
8. BRANCH: Houston Office
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT: ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION: Dallas, Texas
11. GRADE: GS-13
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE: 6 December 1955
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)*: 12/6/54 - 12/5/55

SECTION II *(To be filled in by Supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION: I.O. (Contact) Resident Agent - C/S, Dallas, Texas 01328
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 1 May 1954
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*:

He has the complete responsibility for the operation of the Dallas Resident Agency under the supervision of the Chief, Houston Field Office.

His primary mission is the collection of foreign positive information from domestic sources.

In addition to the above, he handles support activities for other divisions of the Agency and performs certain liaision functions between other Government offices.

He is responsible for the supervision of a Resident Office and a Secretary.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ *has* ☐ *has not been shown to the individual rated.*

THIS DATE: 5 December 1955
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER *(Employee's immediate supervisor)*: Ernest A. Rische ERNEST A. RISCHE

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT *(Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)*

THIS DATE: 8 December 1955
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(Official next higher in line of authority)*: for E. M. ASHCRAFT

FORM NO. 45 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
1 JAN 55 THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relatio[illegible] assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow [illegible] distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 19 3 35 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	CATEGORIES: DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.										X				
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.												X		
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5 UNEMOTIONAL.												X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.											X			
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.									X					
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.											X			
9 HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.												X		
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14 GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.										X				
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.										X				
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.												X		
18. HAS STAMINA. CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.													X	
19 HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION										X				
20 SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES												X		
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION												X		
24 EVEN DISPOSITION												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.												X		

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.										X				
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.										X				
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES, A "SPARK PLUG".										X				
29. TOUGH MINDED.										X				
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.											X			
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.										X				
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.												X		
36. DELIBERATE.												X		
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.												X		
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X			
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.												X		
42 GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.												X		
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44 IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.													X	
45. VERSATILE.								X						
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS										X				
48 FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50 A GOOD SUPERVISOR.	X													

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

His outstanding strength is steadiness.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

He has no real outstanding weakness.

SECRET

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 19 3 35 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL

Periodic re-orientation in Headquarters, Washington.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

His athletic ability (Dallas Athletic Club) is an asset in carrying out his duties.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON, WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CODED

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A SD-30

FR due 12/5/53

Posted Pos. Control

Reviewed by PCD ERR 12-14

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MOORE, James W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Oct 1919	3. SEX M	4. CAREER DESIGNATION OO
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 6 December 1949	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO Operations	7. DIVISION Contact	8. BRANCH Houston Office
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION: Dallas, Texas		11. GRADE GS-13 132
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 5 December 1954	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 12/5/53 - 12/4/54		

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Resident Agent - Dallas	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 3 May 1954

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

Moore has complete charge of the Dallas Resident Agency, under the supervision of the Chief, Houston Field Office. His most important job is the collection of foreign positive information of value to the intelligence community. As a Resident Agent, however, he has the additional responsibility of supervision of an office and a secretary.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ *has* ☐ ~~*has not*~~ *been shown to the individual rated.*

THIS DATE [illegible] December 1954	SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) Robert E. Rasche
I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)	
THIS DATE December 1954	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) E. Mildebrandt

FORM NO. 1 MAY 54 37-189 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.										X				
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.												X		
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.												X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.									X					
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.											X			
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.												X		
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.										X				
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.										X				
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.												X		
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.													X	
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.										X				
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X						
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.												X		
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.												X		
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT												X		

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.										X				
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.										X				
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".										X				
29. TOUGH MINDED.										X				
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.											X			
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.										X				
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.												X		
36. DELIBERATE.												X		
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.												X		
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X			
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.												X		
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.												X		
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.													X	
45. VERSATILE.								X						
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.										X				
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.	X													

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

His outstanding strength is steadiness.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

He has no real outstanding weakness. He is somewhat shy which is as much an asset at times as it is a weakness.

SECRET

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS: NO.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

DEC 13 5 16 PM '54

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Periodic re-orientation in Headquarters, Washington.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

His athletic ability (Dallas Athletic Club) is an asset in carrying out his duties.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) MOORE	(First) James	(Middle) W.	2. GRADE GS-13	3. POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer	
4. OFFICE OO	STAFF OR DIVISION Contact	BRANCH Houston	☐ DEPT'L. ☒ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION Houston	

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 6 Dec 52 To 5 Dec 53

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

1. Contact of officials of US business concerns, scientific, educational, and religious organizations to establish sources for and to obtain information of intelligence significance.
2. Handling of general work in Houston, with emphasis on shipping, contacting of missionaries, particularly from the Far East, and exploiting [redacted] Universit[redacted]. In addition full coverage of our work in Ft.Worth, Waco, Abilene & part coverage of Dallas, necessitating approximately two field trips a month.
3. On instructions of the Chief of the Houston Office, handle certain special and sensitive operational projects originated by other branches of the Agency.
4. Have, on occasion, answered teletypes to Washington, signed correspondence & similar matters handled by the Chief or his Assistant when they are not in the office.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
CIA Indoctrination Course	Washington, D.C.	9-13 Feb 53	13 Feb 53

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Collection of foreign intelligence from domestic sources.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

5 January 1954
DATE

J. Walton Moore
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE IN THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

This officer has continued to exercise exception judgment & tact in capably carrying out his primary mission as a C/S. His past experience in many fields of intelligence activity has given him a background of valuable assets. This experience, coupled with his resourcefulness and energetic exploitation of his contacts, has resulted in high quality and valuable reporting.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

This officer has continued to exercise sincere, dependable judgment, which has resulted in an intelligent approach to the solution of tasks in connection with the performance of his duties.

PERSONNEL
JAN 25 11 57 AM '54
BRANCH

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Although improvement has been noted, he should continue to concentrate on overcoming a slight shyness in his manner.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

I believe this person is capable of handling greater responsibility.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE. Not applicable.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

12 January 1954
DATE

Ernest A. Rische
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

20 January 1954
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

EAR

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

✓

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MOORE, James W.	2. GRADE GS-13	3. POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer

4. OFFICE Operations	STAFF OR DIVISION Contact	BRANCH Houston Office	☐ DEPT'L. ☒ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION Houston, Texas

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 11/6/51 To 11/5/52	6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

1. I contact high-ranking officials of American business concerns, scientific, educational and religious organizations to establish sources of intelligence information.
2. I handle general work in Houston, with emphasis on shipping, contacting missionaries, the University of Houston and import-export traders. In addition I am assigned full coverage of our work in Ft. Worth, Waco, Abilene and part coverage of Dallas which necessitates approximately two field trips a month.
3. Upon instructions of the Chief of the Houston office, handle certain special and sensitive operational projects originated by other branches of the Agency.
4. During occasions when the Chief and certain other Contact Specialists are out of the office, have answered teletypes to Washington and handled similar matters that would be handled by the Chief if he were in the office.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
	NONE		

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?
Collection of foreign intelligence from domestic sources.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

31 December 1952
DATE

J. Walton Moore.
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

This officer is extremely capable and competent in carrying out his primary mission of establishing and exploiting sources of foreign positive intelligence information. He is resourceful and exercises exceptional judgment and tact in relations with contacts. He is cooperative and dependable and has the necessary ability to accurately report collected information. He creates an excellent impression with top company officials which creates a high regard not only for the Houston Field Office but the agency as a whole. He has the ability to obtain results and has demonstrated stability under pressure on occasions requiring great tact and sound judgment. This officer's past experience with the FBI, Naval Intelligence, OSS, and CIC has been an invaluable asset to the current activities of the Houston [illegible] Office. [illegible] on this experience has materially assisted all Houston [illegible]'s. (Over)

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

ECW

(4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

His dependability, sincerity and his intelligent approach to the solution of tasks in connection with the performance of his duties.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

He should concentrate on appearing more forceful to overcome an apparent shyness in his manner.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

I believe this person is capable of handling greater responsibilities now. In this office all C/S' have approximately the same degree of responsibility because of the very nature of the work and area involved.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

The CIA Orientation Course. (He is scheduled to attend one soon.)

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE. Not applicable.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20. None

15 January 53
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

27 Jan 53
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.2.

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 6/6/50 based on performance during period from 12/6/49 to 6/6/50

J. Walton Moore (Name of employee) Intelligence Officer GS-130-12 (Title of position, service, and grade)

OO, Contact (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE		CHECK ONE:
V if adequate − if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☐ All others ☐

____ (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
____ (2) Mechanical skill.
____ (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
____ (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
+ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
✓ (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
____ (7) Accuracy of operations.
____ (8) Accuracy of final results.
+ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
+ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
____ (11) Industry.
____ (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
____ (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? ____ (Yes or no))
+ (14) Ability to organize his work.
+ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
+ (16) Cooperativeness.
✓ (17) Initiative.
____ (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
____ (20) Physical fitness for the work.
____ (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
____ (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
____ (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
____ (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
____ (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
____ (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
____ (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
____ (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
____ (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
____ (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
____ (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

____ (A) ____
____ (B) ____
____ (C) ____

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	Adjective Rating	Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent	Rating official EXCELLENT
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good	Reviewing official Excellent
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good	
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair	
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory	

Rated by Ernest A Rische (signature of rating official) [illegible] (Title) 6/12/50 (Date)

Reviewed by [illegible] (Signature of reviewing official) Actg Chief, OO/C (Title) 11 Aug 1950 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee ____ (Date) Report to employee E (Signature)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—58177-6

FORM NO. 38-8
APR 1947

(2191)

CONFIDENTIAL

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE. TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE.

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY
Moore	James	W.	CAF-12		Apr. 48

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Chief of Station, Calcutta: planning projects: briefing and handling agents: liaison with Indian officials: monthly Communist report.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED.

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRAIGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

20 August 1949
DATE

J Walton Moore
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

DATE FROM: April 48
DATE TO: Aug 49

OCCASION FOR REPORT

ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☒ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION?

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						X	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK					X		
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS					X		
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						X	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE					X		
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE					X		
H. DISCRETION						X	
I. INITIATIVE					X		
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.						X	
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION					X		
M. TACT						X	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP					X		
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA							

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -

DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEET)

14 October 1949
DATE

Byron C [illegible]
Byron [illegible] Br. I. [illegible]

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER IS CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

OO/C REFRESHER COURSE NO. 2

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME **Moore, James Walton**	SEX **M**	DATES OF COURSE **6 June-17 June 1955**	NO. OF STUDENTS **22**
DATE OF BIRTH **5 October 1919**	EOD DATE **June 1946**	GRADE OR RANK **GS-13**	OFFICE **OO/C**

PRESENT POSITION

Contact Specialist in Houston Field Office

SECTION II: OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE

The objectives of the course are to review changes in organization, policy, and procedures in the intelligence community with special emphasis on those areas of the intelligence community which the Contact Division serves.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

The course is designed for experienced OO/C personnel. The first part of the course reviews the organization for national security, with emphasis on the intelligence community. The second part of the course includes a survey of the current world situation. Lectures are supplemented by discussion periods and tours. The students have opportunities to discuss general collection requirements and OO/C services with representatives of producing offices.

SECTION IV: CERTIFICATION OF COURSE COMPLETION

James Walton Moore has attended the entire course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Geoffrey R Norman
Geoffrey R. Norman
[illegible]
[illegible]

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

OPF

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD
(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A

1. EMPLOYEE NO. 003820	2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED *(Last, First, Middle)* Moore, James Walton	3. POSITION TITLE Field Office Chief

4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD DYD	6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT Dallas Field Office	7. RECOMMENDED AWARD Career Intelligence Medal

8. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED 1940 - 1977	9. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT December 1977	10. POSTHUMOUS YES X NO

11. HOME ADDRESS
5145 Rexton Lane
Dallas, Texas 75080

12. HOME PHONE
214-368-4199

SECTION B

LIST ANY PERSONNEL GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD WHO ASSISTED IN THE ACT OR PARTICIPATED IN THE PERFORMANCE.

13. FULL NAME	14. TYPE OF AWARD

SECTION C

ATTACH NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PERFORMANCE OR SERVICE WARRANTING AWARD, ANY SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND A PROPOSED, UNCLASSIFIED CITATION.

1. Attached narrative description of performance.
2. Attached proposed citation.

SECTION D

15. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION		DATE
Jackson R. Horton JACKSON R. HORTON Chief, Domestic Collection Division		24 August 1977
16. HEAD OF D CAREER SERVICE *(Career service of nominee)*	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item 18.	DATE
17. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item 18.	DATE
18. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	TITLE AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert D. Brown, Jr. Deputy Director for Operations	DATE 11 OCT 1977

FORM 11-73 600 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 010650 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

Section C

Mr. James Walton Moore is hereby nominated for a Career Intelligence Medal in recognition of his substantial contributions to the missions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Strategic Services, the Strategic Services Unit and the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 37 years.

J. Walton (Jim) Moore spent most of his boyhood (1920-27, 1930-36) in Shantung Province, China with his missionary parents. Following graduation from Hardin-Simmons University in 1940, Jim joined the FBI and served as a Special Agent in both Chicago and San Francisco. During the latter assignment he reported on pro-Communist elements in Chinatown and directed a US Government panel to interview aliens and US citizens returning home to ensure that enemy agents were not slipping into the US as refugees or foreign businessmen.

Jim joined OSS in November 1944 and was commissioned as an Ensign, USNR. His first assignment was in Kunming where he recruited and trained Chinese agents to infiltrate Japanese lines. While in Kunming he took parachute training and on August 17, 1945 jumped into the Japanese internment camp at Weihsein. Following evacuation of refugees he became Chief of Mission in Tsingtao. Returning to the US in December 1946, he was reassigned as Vice Consul and Chief of Station in Dairen. Soviet intransigence prevented his reaching Dairen so he remained in Tsingtao for an additional year until transferred as Chief of Station in Calcutta, arriving there in April, 1948.

Jim returned to the United States in October 1949 and joined the Contact Division, Office of Operations, CIA. CD/OO policy favored continuity and Jim was no exception. From 1949 to 1954 he served in the Houston Field Office and from 1954-1972 as the Resident Officer in Dallas. The Contact Division evolved into the Domestic Contact Service and a reallocation of resources raised the Dallas Resident Office to Field Office status. Jim was the obvious choice for the job. After nine months training and preparation in Washington (where he performed admirably) he was assigned as Chief of the new office with responsibility also for Resident Offices in Tulsa, Houston, New Orleans and, eventually, Austin.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

CONFIDENTIAL

Section C (continued)

Jim's work in Dallas has been consistently excellent. Under his leadership the Dallas complex has provided timely foreign intelligence in response to worldwide priorities and requirements. As an example, in April 1975 the Acting Director, Stratetic Research commended Jim for "outstanding performance" for urgent special efforts to obtain information which resulted in a reduction of over 500,000 in the Intelligence Community's estimate of the total number of Soviet military personnel.

Similarly, the Dallas Office has provided excellent support to the Clandestine Service. In November, 1976 the Chief, FR Division commended Jim and his staff for "outstanding support" from October 1975-October 1976 in efforts which were "indispensable" to the establishment of FR assets in Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana and in identifying and assessing prospective targets for recruitment.

There are very few persons of potential consequence to the Intelligence Community in Texas who Jim Moore does not know and little that he cannot accomplish there on behalf of Community and Agency requesters.

The assassination of President Kennedy in Dallas in November 1963, the subsequent allegations against CIA and Jim Moore's long association with Agency interests and programs in Texas have made him a repeated target for media attention and scurrilous innuendo. Although under various forms of severe external pressure as a result, Jim Moore never lost his calm, cool demeanor and has been absolutely dependable in adversity.

An experienced professional, a true gentleman, a delightful person, and an example to be emulated, Jim Moore has been a real credit to the intelligence profession. As he approaches retirement, he richly deserves recognition in the form of the Career Intelligence Medal.

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD [illegible]	DATE 18 October 1977

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO. 003820	NAME (Last-First-Middle) MOORE, James Walton	BIRTHYEAR 1919	SEX M	TYPE EMPLOYEE Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/DCD	SD D	SCHEDULE GS	GRADE 15	STATION

BE AWARDED

Career Intelligence Medal

DD/A Registry
77-5800

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD 1940 - 1977

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. James Walton Moore is hereby awarded the Career Intelligence Medal in recognition of his exceptional achievement with the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 30 years. A charter member of the Agency, Mr. Moore held a series of increasingly responsible positions in which he consistently used his many talents in advancing foreign intelligence objectives. His strong leadership, professionalism and dedication to duty not only enabled his office to provide timely and effective support to worldwide priorities and requirements but also earned for him the admiration and respect of all with whom he worked. Mr. Moore's overall career contributions to the mission of the Agency were substantial and reflect credit on him and the Federal service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by C/CMS/DDO on 11 October 1977.)

APPROVED	SIGNATURE
	TYPED NAME OF/CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD Acting B. DeFelice
Acting DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	SIGNATURE William O. Brunkhorst
1977 DATE	TYPED NAME OF RECORDER William O. Brunkhorst

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		
MOORE,	James	Walton	October 5, 1919	450	26	2532
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)			
Central Intelligence Agency			Dallas, Texas 75221			

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

DATE

February 19, 1969

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

[illegible]

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1964
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-151

10 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Domestic Collection Division, DDO

SUBJECT : Appreciation for Outstanding DCD Performance

1. I want to express the appreciation of the Office of Strategic Research for the special effort recently made for us by J. Walton Moore of your Dallas field office. Mr. Moore responded quickly to our urgent request to obtain information on Soviet military medical services from DS-2172 and provided it to us on very short notice.

2. Let me give you some background. The subject of Soviet medical personnel emerged as an important issue in a recent community-wide effort to reassess total Soviet military manpower. The community reassessment was stimulated by DIA reporting of several months ago that existing estimates of total Soviet military manpower were low by almost one million men. If correct, the DIA appraisal had potentially serious implications for the ongoing MBFR negotiations as well as a host of intelligence judgments about the dimensions of the Soviet military threat.

3. During the ensuing interagency review of the individual estimates contributed by various agencies in the Washington area, we came to the conclusion that the number of Soviet medical manpower estimated by an Army intelligence group was much too high. A rapid search of headquarters' files turned up barely enough intelligence to prepare an estimate of a portion of the medical services, but no direct evidence on total medical manpower. At this point it became clear to us that an improved estimate might be made with information from DS-2172. As we had to present our case to the manpower study Steering Group early in the week of March 24, speed in contacting the Soviet source was essential.

4. The data submitted by the Dallas field office as a result of a specially arranged debriefing provided us with the basis for a much improved estimate of Soviet military medical staffing. Furthermore, Mr. Moore's questions elicited some new information of value to future work. Most important, the results of DCD's efforts contributed significantly to convincing the working group that the original Army estimate was far too high. Eventually the estimate we submitted based upon the information supplied by DS-2172 was accepted by the manpower Steering Group and resulted in a reduction of over 500,000 men in the intelligence community's estimate of the total number of Soviet military personnel.

5. The efforts of your people struck a mighty blow for good intelligence. Many thanks.

Noel E. Firth

NOEL E. FIRTH
Acting Director
Strategic Research

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE

This Outline, when completed, is a documented description of the individual's career interests and proposed career activities together with the comments of his supervisor and his Career Service. The original will be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder and will serve as a guide for future personnel actions affecting him. Implementation of career preferences must depend upon the needs of the Organization.

- CONSULT ATTACHED INSTRUCTION SHEET PRIOR TO COMPLETING THIS OUTLINE -

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) MOORE, James W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Oct 1919	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC	4. GRADE GS-14
5. ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE Resident Agent, Dallas	6. POSITION TITLE IO (Contact)	7. OCCUPATIONAL CODE GS-0132.21	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OO/Contact/Houston Office

SECTION B. CAREER INTERESTS

9. GENERAL TYPE OF ACTIVITY

Collection of foreign intelligence from domestic sources.
Support activity.

10. SPECIFIC TYPE OF ACTIVITY (Including assignments)

A. IMMEDIATE (Within next 1 to 2 years)

Usual duties of a Resident Agent in Contact Division.

B. LONG-RANGE (Within next 3 to 5 years)

SECTION C. TRAINING

11. ORGANIZATIONAL, EXTERNAL, AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

A. IMMEDIATE (Within next 1 to 2 years)

Believe regular inservice training now received sufficient for present duties.

B. LONG-RANGE (Within next 3 to 5 years)

12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Believe my capabilities are being well utilized and am very happy in present post.

I RECOGNIZE THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MY CAREER PREFERENCES MUST DEPEND UPON THE NEEDS OF THE ORGANIZATION. I UNDERSTAND THAT MY PERFORMANCE, CAPABILITIES AND INTERESTS WILL BE GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION.	13. DATE COMPLETED 16 Dec 57	14. SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. Walton Moore.

SECTION D. COMMENTS BY SUPERVISOR

15. RELATIVE TO CAREER INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEE

No comment.

16. RELATIVE TO TRAINING FOR EMPLOYEE

I agree that employee is probably in a position in which his capabilities are exploited to the fullest.

17. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR Ernest A. Rische	18. SIGNATURE Ernest A. Rische
19. TITLE Chief, Houston Field Office	20. DATE 19 December 1957

SECTION E. FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

21. COMMENTS

The CD/CSB concurs
in this outline.

22. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME	23. SIGNATURE
24. TITLE	25. DATE

LEAVE BLANK

RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

MOORE J WALTON | 03F20 | 2531

NAME OF EMPLOYEE	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE	TELEPHONE EXT.	SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
MOORE J WALTON	03F20	X YES	2271	

DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE, SPINDLE, OR MUTILATE

INSTRUCTIONS

THIS FORM MUST BE RETURNED WHETHER YOU HAVE HAD OVERSEAS SERVICE OR NOT.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCOMPANYING CARD; THEN FILL OUT THIS FORM AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE.

DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 29-31	WHERE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED	PCS - 1 TDY - 2 (ENTER NO.) 32	DATES FROM MO 33-34	DATES FROM YR 35-36	DATES TO MO 37-38	DATES TO YR 39-40	SERVICE AS CIVILIAN - 1 MILITARY - 2 (ENTER NO.) 41	RESPONSIBLE U.S. GOVT. DEPT. OR AGENCY	DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 42-43
145	China	1	04	45	11	46	2	Navy-OSS	100
145	China	1	04	47	04	48	1	CIA-State	100
330	India	1	04	48	08	49	1	CIA-State	100

IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED, CHECK HERE ☐ AND ASK YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CARDS

SECRET

FORM 5-55 1451

24 November 1956

To: Chief, SFB. PPD
Subject: Mr. J. Welton Moore, Agent, Contact Office, Dallas, Texas

I should like to call attention to the outstanding cooperation given our activities in Dallas by J. Walton Moore, resident representative in Dallas, Texas.

Mr. Moore has not only extended the normal hospitality of his offices, but has gone out of his way to nominate and talk with exceptional people who come to his attention as potential employes for the Agency. Mr. Moore has contacted me from time to time with names and comments on individuals, and in every way attempted to serve as an active personnel scout in his area. I feel his efforts and time consumed in interviewing people have gone a good deal beyond the normal expectations of our agency, and that this attitude best represents the unified type of teamwork which our organization subscribes to in this work.

While my experiences with the resident offices in my area have been uniformly a pleasant experience, it is a matter of real satisfaction to find a man who is thinking in terms of the Agency as a whole and not of one sharply defined activity. I believe the spirit that Mr. Moore shows should be brought to the attention of his superiors as a prime example of teamwork in the field. It is not only a personal satisfaction to do business with Mr. Moore, but it greatly contributes to the morale of our efforts by knowing that other offices are as concerned as we are in producing results.

Sincerely,

Byron Crosman

J. Byron Crosman

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 DEC 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Walton Moore

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 1 July 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:

J. Walton Moore

Date: 26 March 56.

Career Service Staff
Office of Personnel

15 MAY 1956

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

[illegible] J. [illegible]
Name: Last, First Middle

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 22 OCT

TO: All C. I. A. Personnel

FROM: Personnel Director

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The Agency is currently revising the system for machine coding employee qualifications, thereby permitting more complete and accurate data on all personnel. The new system will aid in implementing Agency policies on promotion from within by facilitating the selection of personnel with desired education and experience for vacancies which may occur. It is also expected that the new system will provide readily accessible statistics for planning and management purposes.

2. The attached questionnaire is designed to cover adequately those factors in which the Agency is interested. Although the information is, in a large measure, already reflected in previous forms submitted by you, it is felt that your time within the organization may enable you to emphasize those qualifications pertinent to its needs. The questionnaire also serves to bring your education and qualifications record up to date.

3. Your cooperation is requested in completing the questionnaire as thoroughly and accurately as possible and returning it to your Administrative Officer within the time allotted.

George E. Meloon

George E. Meloon
Personnel Director

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry) 3820	2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) Moore J. Walton	3. Office Operations

4. Date of Birth Oct. 5, 1919	5. Sex: x male (1) ___ female (2)	Martial Status ___ Nr. Dependents ___	6. CIA Entry Date: Fall of 1946 *

7. Citizenship: x U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) x Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other(specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ________

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school	4. Two years college, or less	8. Masters degree
2. High school graduate	5. Over two years, no degree	9. Doctors degree
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate	[✓ 6.] Bachelor degree	
	[✓ 7.] Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)	

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	
Hardin-Simmons Univ. Abilene, Texas	Pol. Science	En.	Sept 1936	Feb 1940	4		BA	Feb 1940	120
George Washington Univ Law School, Wash. D.C.	Law		Sept 1940	Dec 1941		1			20

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
None				

4. Military or Intelligence Training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, command & staff, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
None				

* [illegible]

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. CIA Experience: State the specific nature of duties performed with CIA and CIG, starting with your present position. Take position titles from your official personnel papers, if you have personal copies. Please do not request your Official Personnel Folder. Include geographic area and subject matter dealt with, if applicable. Position Title is your classification title such as Geographer, Intelligence Officer, etc. Duty Title indicates your organization position such as - Section Chief, Branch Chief, Administrative Assistant, etc., and is to be filled in only if different to the Position Title. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From [illegible] To Present Tot. mos. 33 Grade [illegible] Salary [illegible] Office Operations Position Title: Intelligence Officer Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Under general direction of the Chief, Houston Office, am responsible for contacting high-ranking officials of American business concerns, scientific, educational and religious organizations for the purpose of establishing sources for obtaining valuable intelligence information. Duty Station, if overseas:
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mos. 20 Grade [illegible] Salary [illegible] Office OSO Position Title: Intelligence Officer Duty Title: Vice-Consul	Description of Duties: In charge of OSO operations at Calcutta, India. Duties consisted of gathering intelligence and [illegible] agents to gather intelligence on the activities of Soviet officials and the Communist Party. Consular duties consisted of writing political reports. Duty Station, if overseas: Calcutta, India.
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mos. [illegible] Grade [illegible] Salary [illegible] Office OSO Position Title: Intelligence Officer Duty Title: Vice-Consul	Description of Duties: Ascertaining [illegible] activities of Communist [illegible] Soviet citizens, [illegible] Duty Station, if overseas: [illegible]
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mos. Grade [illegible] Salary [illegible] Office OSO Position Title: Intelligence Officer Duty Title: Chief of Mission	Description of Duties: [illegible] activities of Mission consisting of three intelligence officers, [illegible] code clerks and two Chinese interpreters. [illegible] intelligence under directive [illegible] Duty Station, if overseas: [illegible]

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.)

From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) [illegible]	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas: [illegible]
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer FBI Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Government agency	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] were [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: None Employer FBI Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Government Agency	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 ___ Civil Police
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 ___ FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 ___ Office of Strategic Services
24 ___ Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 ___ Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 ___ Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study (Inc. CIA training)

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ___________

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ___________

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.)

From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) [illegible]	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas: [illegible]
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Government agency	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Government agency	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Searcher Description of Duties: Clerical duties. Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 ___ Civil Police
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 x FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 ___ Office of Strategic Services
24 ___ Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 ___ Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 x Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED				
LANGUAGE	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study (Inc. CIA training)
Chinese				x				x		
French					x					x

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ______________

____

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ________

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
North China	[illegible]	x		
India	[illegible]			

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specalized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained
North China	Industries, political	Through residence and assignment as Vice-Consul
	parties.	at Tsingtao, North China.
India	Political	Residence and assignment as Vice-Consul in
		Calcutta, India.

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION) NONE

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No

Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc. No licenses. Training as paratrooper, 3 jumps.	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership.

None

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.
None

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented	
None	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No

SEC. X. CIA TESTS

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken in CIA:

Type of Test	Date Taken
None	

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

None

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour ___ (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested at present time.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment in CIA do you think you are best qualified?

Contact specialist

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status

Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ___ Yes _x_ No.

If yes, indicate your present draft classification ____________

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status

Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status _x_ Yes ___ No.

If yes, complete the following.

1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. _x_ Inactive Reserve Status

Service USNR Grade Lt. J. Location Dallas, Texas

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated ____________

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ____________

Location of Service Records, if known Dallas, Texas, or Washington, D.C.

SEC. XV. CIA TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken while in the CIA.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates	(to)	Hours
CIA Orientation Course	[illegible] June	[illegible] June [illegible]	20
OO/C Orientation Course	2 June 1950	1[illegible] Jun 50	20

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

None

DATE 9-17-52

SIGNATURE J. Walton Moore.

SECRET
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

MOORE, J. Walton

OFFICE: Operations	DIVISION: Contact
BRANCH: Houston	SECTION: - -

I. FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
		DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
CIA,O/O	Houston, Texas	6	1	50	5	[illegible]	52	[illegible]	[illegible]	2
CIA, OSO	Overseas	~~20~~ 17	~~20~~ 8	46	[illegible]	1	50	10	2	3
FBI	San Francisco, California	16 ~~10~~	~~42~~		20	1	45	2	2	
FBI	Springfield, Illinois		~~6~~	~~42~~		~~10~~	~~42~~		4	
FBI	Washington, D.C.	8	4	40	12	4	42	4		2
Total Civilian Service								16	8	7

continuous service
SCD = 4/8/40
ccl 9-30-59

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
US Navy	6	1	45	24	8	46	[illegible]	7	1
Total Military Service							24	[illegible]	

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

14 December 1951
DATE

J. Walton Moore
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

SCD-4-8-40
verified
gsk
7/16/52

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

ZIZA-146

Attn: Special Funds

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

Instructions

For use by staff officers and employees only. Submit in duplicate on entering Service and whenever designated place of residence or marital or dependency status changes. IMPORTANT in determining travel expenses and transit salary allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of officer or employee or member of family.

Name of officer or employee
~~Ernest K. Raford.~~ James W. Moore

Place of residence when appointed to service
857 Foss Ave, Abilene, Texas.

If appointed abroad, last place of residence in continental United States
857 Foss Ave, Abilene, Texas

Place in continental United States designated permanent or legal residence
Abilene, Texas.

MARITAL STATUS

☐ Single ☒ Married	Place of marriage Washington D.C.	Date of marriage 12 April 1941
☐ Divorced	Place of divorce decree	Date of divorce decree
☐ Widowed	Place spouse died	Date spouse died

Members of Family
(As defined in CAT No.11)

Identification of Members of Family	Relationship	Date of Birth
Patricia A. Raford	wife	Nov 18, 1919
Michael Raford	son	July 2, 1943
Margaret Lee Raford	daughter	Sept 10, 1946

12 January 1949
Date of submission

Ernest K. Raford.
Signature

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1947)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A4 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Central Intelligence Agency (Department or agency) .... (Bureau or division) Houston, Texas (Place of employment)

I, James W. Moore, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. 57, dated 19 October, 1946, filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

J. Walton Moore.
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 6th day of December, A. D. 1949,

at Houston (City) Texas (State)

Chapter 143, Title II, Sec. 206
Act of June 26, 1943
[SEAL]

Elizabeth Morrison
(Signature of officer)

Appointment Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—84180-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State) 2457 Idlewild Ln. Abilene, Texas.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH Oct. 5, 1919.

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country) Hartwell, Georgia. U.S.A.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY Mrs. Patricia A. Moore

(B) RELATIONSHIP wife

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE Same as above.

(D) TELEPHONE NO.

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATION-SHIP	MAR-RIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

(Check one)

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10*		✓
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating if retired from military or naval service*		✓
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		✓
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		✓

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that appointee is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—43180-1

Standard Form No. 61a
Approved January 28, 1943
U. S. Civil Service Commission
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 409

OA OF OFFICE, AFFIDAV ,
AND
DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

WAR DEPARTMENT (Department or Establishment) — STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT (Bureau or Division) — SHANGHAI, CHINA (Place of Employment)

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I, James W. Moore,
Do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT

Do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence; and that during such time as I am an employee of the Federal Government, I will not advocate nor become a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence;

C. DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

Do further certify that (1) I have not paid or offered or promised to pay any money or other thing of value to any person, firm, or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment; (2) I will inform myself of and observe the provisions of the Civil Service law and rules and Executive orders concerning political activity, political assessments, etc., as quoted on the attached Information for Appointee, and [strike out either (3) or (4)]

(3) the answers given by me in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this sheet are true and correct;

(4) the answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No: 205a, dated 27 May, 19 6, filed with the above-named department or establishment, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date, except for the following (if necessary, use additional sheet; if no exceptions write "none"; if (4) is executed, the reverse of this sheet need not be used):

James Walton Moore.
(Signature of Appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 29th day of August A. D., 19 46

at Shanghai, China (City) ____ (State)

[SEAL]

Bowman M. [illegible]
(Signature of Officer)

Bowman M. [illegible], 1st Lt. CMP
(Title)

NOTE.—If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown

16—23046-2

29 August 1946	Intelligence Officer	5 October 1919
(Date of Entrance on Duty)	(Position to which appointed)	(Date of Birth)

AFFIDAVIT

"I, James W. Moore, do hereby swear or affirm that I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the UNITED STATES; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the government of the UNITED STATES, and that I will not while a Government employee become a member of such an organization.

James Walton Moore
signature of employee

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of August 1946 at Shanghai, China".

Bowman M. MacArthur, 1st Lt. CMP
ADJUTANT

(Form No.205a)

APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT

All questions must be fully answered in the applicant's handwriting

Date: 27 May 1946

I, the undersigned, hereby make application for appointment as a ______________________.

1. (a) Name in full: **James Walton Moore**

(b) Name as usually signed **J. Walton Moore**
(One Christian name at least should be used, and not initials only)

2. Permanent post office address: **c/o W. O. Ansley Jr.**
807 Ross Avenue, Abilene, Texas

3. Place and date of birth: **Hartwell** (City) **Georgia** (State)

5 (Day) **October** (Month) **1919** (Year)

4. Married or single: **Married**

5. If married, give names of wife (xxxxxxxxx) and children and ages of children; if other dependents, give names and status:

Mrs. Patricia Ansley Moore	**Wife**	
Michael Walton Moore	**Son**	**3 1/2 yrs**
Margaret Lee Moore	**Daughter**	**2 yrs**

6. Place of birth of wife (xxxxxxxxx): **Houston, Texas**

7. Length of residence of wife (XXXXXXXX) in the United States: **Total life - 26 Yrs**

8. Name of State of which you are a legal resident, and the length of legal residence therein: **Texas - 6 yrs**

9. If a foreigner, state country of which a citizen or subject: - - - - - -

10. If a native citizen, a certified copy of birth certificate should be transmitted with application. (If such certificate can not be obtained from office of record, a sworn statement showing place and date of birth should be furnished by your father or mother, if living; otherwise, a person competent to make the statement).

If a naturalized citizen, certificate of naturalization should be transmitted with application. State how and when citizenship was acquired: - - - - - -

- - - - - -

11. Name, nationality, and permanent address of father:

J. Walton Moore, American Deceased

12. Maiden name and permanent address of mother:

Minnie Lee Foster, 711 South 5th Street
Waco, Texas

13. Place and date of birth of father **Murphy Co. N Carolina 1893**

14. Place and date of birth of mother **Mc Laen, Texas 1896**

15. If parents are dead, state name, relationship, and address of nearest living relative or friend:

16. Describe your present physical condition, and state whether you have any physical defect or infirmity. Is your health and physical condition such that you can serve in any climate? (The right is reserved to require the applicant to submit to a medical examination.) Physical condition good

Any climate

17. At what institutions educated? Give dates covering time spent in each and state general courses of study pursued; degrees, if any, obtained; and years when conferred:

AB Degree Hardin-Simmons U, Abilene, Texas, 1936-1940

20 hrs law George Washington U, Washington D. C. 1940-1941.

18. State briefly the extent of your knowledge of foreign languages; also the length of time you have resided abroad, if at all: Speaking - Language of Mandarin Chinese

16 Years residence in North China

19. Are you a stenographer? If so, how experienced?

No

20. Are you a typist? If so, how experienced?

Yes - Fair

21. State fully every kind of occupation you have followed including when and where you were employed; the addresses of the

different employers; the length of time employed by each; salary paid in each instance, and the nature of the work performed; whether you resigned voluntarily or were discharged:

April 1940 to Jan 1942 Employed as Clerk - Federal Bureau of Investigation. Salary when departed $1620 per annum. Jan 1942 to Nov 1944 - Special Agent FBI - Salary when departed $4424.00 per annum. Resigned voluntarily both instances.

Ensign - USNR - Since 6 Jan 1945. Worked in North China with SSU since June 1945.

22. Have you any outstanding financial obligations? If so, state names of creditors (individuals or firms), amounts due to each, and date on which such obligations were contracted:

No

23. Were you ever in the public service of the United States, military, naval, or civil; State or municipal? Name

offices and dates covering period of service in each:

Department of Justice - April 1940 to Nov 1944

U. S. Navy 6 Jan 1945 to present date

24. Do you now hold, or have you ever held, any position under any foreign government? If so, state the position or positions: No

25. What is the lowest salary you would accept, ~~as a clerk?~~

XXXXX XXXXX

26. Give name of five responsible persons for references:

N. J. L. Pieper, FBI -111 Sutter St., San Francisco
Chester L. Jacoby, FBI - 111 Sutter St. San Francisco
Mr. William Harrison, #1 Toledo Way, San Francisco
Mr. Buford Ellis, Farmers & Merchants Bank, Abilene, Texas
Dr. N. A. Richardson, President, Hardin Simmons U, Abilene, Texas.

27. Are your services immediately available for duty in any part of the world? Yes

J. Walton Moore
(Signature of Applicant)
J. WALTON MOORE,
Ensign - USNR

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 8 March 1971

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Moore, James H.

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE:

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DCS

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 2265

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- ☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- ☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- ☐ TDY STANDBY
- ☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ RETURN TO DUTY
- ☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
- ☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- ☐ HDQS/TDY
- ☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

- ☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

- ☐ YES
- ☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:
ROOM NO. & BUILDING:
EXT.:

10. COMMENTS:

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified XXXXXX Annual

4 May 0830
11 May 1445

DATE: 15 March 1971

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Peter Zrowka, OMS/pre

FORM 8-68 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) MOORE, (First) J. Walton (Middle)

2. DATE 24 March 1959

3. TO POSITION Intelligence Officer (Contact)

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH OO CONTACT/HOUSTON

5. GRADE GS-14

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☒ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☒ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks:

10 APR 1959

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES

SECRET

Martin J.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) MOORE, (First) James (Middle) W.

2. DATE 11 Sept ~~28 August~~ 1957

3. TO POSITION IO

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH OO/Contact Division, Field

5. GRADE GS-14

11 SEP 57

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☒ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☒ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks:

Subject is qualified for U. S. Field. (9/16/57)

MEDICAL OFFICE

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION

NAME Moore, James Walton #14Returnee

DATE 2/27/53

FOR VOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

NATURE OF ACTION

TITLE OF POSITION

GRADE

☐ DEPT. ☐ FIELD

SUBJECT FOUND ☐ FIT ☐ UNFIT FOR DUTY IN THE ABOVE GRADE AND POSITION.

FOR UNVOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

SUBJECT QUALIFIED FOR

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME LOCKE, James W.	NATURE OF ACTION Transfer Funds
TITLE OF POSITION Intelligence Officer	GRADE GS-12
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Field	

Subject was found physically ☒ fit ☐ unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

[illegible]

Paul V. Hanglund

[illegible]
DATE

SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 38-37
NOV 1948

OSS Form 1180D
(Rev. 5/12/45)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D. C.

FD2

MAR 18

22 January 1947

Moore, James Walton was given a physical examination on this date and found qualified for

☒ Full Duty Overseas

☐ Limited Duty Overseas

☐ Duty in USA Only

Profile Serial (For Army EM only)

Defects Noted:

Repeat X-Ray in six months.

John R. Tietjen

JOHN R. TIETJEN, 1st. Lt. MC

5

BWS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444), "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
003820	MOORE, J. Walton	10-05-19	T	GS-14

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				(5)

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

23 JUN (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAY 30 2 13 PM '72

SECTION V — **GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL**

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2							

SECTION VI — **TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS**

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — **SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS**

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — **MILITARY SERVICE**

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — **PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP: FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — **REMARKS**

DATE: 9 May 1972

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: J. Walton Moore

J. Walton Moore

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Moore, J. Walton

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
‹• 2	6-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR •	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
‹• 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR •	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
‹• 5	• 003821	• MOO	• C	• BD93	0	0	8	0	0	4	69

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST			
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR	
• NO++	L	A	N	G	U	A	GE	• 09	19	69	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME	ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
‹• 4	•	3-LETTERS •	A - ADDITION TO RECORD C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not. Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
003820	MOORE, J. Walton	10-05-19	IT

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - - TO - -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried)* SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden)*

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				(U)

FORM 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-68

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V	GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL						
NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESI-DENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGN-MENT
1.		MAY 10	35 AM '71				
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO	2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS	4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT	6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE 30 April 1971	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J Walton Moore J. Walton Moore

SECRET

PLW

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, ~~Office of~~ Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
003820	MOORE, James Walton	10-05-19	IT

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-68 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(3)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

JUN 30 [illegible]

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
5 June 1970	J Walton Moore J. Walton Moore

SECRET

14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.
Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.
If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.
Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
003820	MOORE, James Walton	5 Oct 1919	IT

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR				
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-68 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

70 NOV [illegible] (4-51)
(2)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V	GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL						
NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.			JAN 27 3 22 PM '70				
2.							

SECTION VI	TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS	
1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO	2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS	4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT	6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX	PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS		
NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE 12 January 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James Walton Moore James Walton Moore

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444), "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
003820	MOORE, James Walton	10/05/19

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR				
1							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY.

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☒ DELETE	Daughter	12 Sep 44 San Francisco, Calif.	US	5145 Rexton Ln., Dallas
2	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

SECRET

(4-51)

(1)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

NOV 12 1 37 PM '68
MAIL ROOM

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT	AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE
4 November 1968

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Walton Moore

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE GRADE STEP
083820	MOORE J WALTON		10/05/19	GS -14-06
6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)	
IT	IO-CONTACT	OCS	TEXAS, USA	

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
CHINA	PCS 82	47/09/18	48/04/01
INDIA	PCS 82	48/04/01	49/08/01

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: INITIALS:
25 May 61

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	POLITICAL SCIENCE (GOVERNMENT), GENERAL	HARDIN-SIMMONS UNIV TEX	40

FORM
1-67 444j
Mfg 2-67

SECRET

07 OCT ENTD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (X))			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM): None
2. SHORTHAND (WPM): None
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Handball - Good

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

None

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

None

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

None

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

None

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

None

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII	AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY	
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) 1950 to 1954	2. LOCATION (Country, City) Houston, Texas USA	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH Contact Division
4. TITLE OF JOB Contact Specialist		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-13
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Regular duties of Contact Specialist		

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) Sept. 1947 to April 1948	2. LOCATION (Country, City) Tsingtao, North China	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH DDP
4. TITLE OF JOB Chief of Station for Darien		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-12
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Assisted Consul General while awaiting transportation to Darien. After seven months when it was obvious Darien authorities would not permit official US representation in that city, I was transferred to Calcutta, India.		

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) April 1948 to August 1949	2. LOCATION (Country, City) Calcutta, India	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH DDP
4. TITLE OF JOB Chief of Station		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-12
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES DDP Representative to Consulate General		

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX — **MARITAL STATUS**

1. PRESENT STATUS Single Married Widowed Separated Divorced Annulled Remarried SPECIFY No Change

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER	
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X — **DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE**

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Margaret Lee Moore	Daughter	12 Sep 44 San Francisco, Calif.	US	5145 Rexton Ln., Dallas, Tex.
Mary Monique Moore	Daughter	13 Apr 51 Houston, Texas	US	5145 Rexton Ln., Dallas, Tex.
Deborah Dallas Moore	Daughter	1 Nov 54 Dallas, Texas	US	5145 Rexton Ln., Dallas, Tex.

SECTION XI — **PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
31 March 67	J Walton Moore

Standard Form 57—[illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50-R046.

INSTRUCTIONS: Answer every question [illegible] and completely. Type or write in INK. If you are applying [illegible] examination announcement [illegible] Mail this application to the office named in the announcement. [illegible] any other forms required [illegible] the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION No.

ANNOUNCEMENT No.

SELECTION No.

1. Name of examination or kind of position applied for

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. Place of employment applied for

4. Mr. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
XXX James Walton Moore

5. Street and number or R. F. D. number
807 Ross Avenue, Abilene, Texas

City or post office (including postal zone) and State
Abilene, Texas

6. Legal or voting residence (State) Texas	7. Office phone No.	Home phone 6088

8. Place of birth (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country)
Hartsell, Texas

9. Date of birth (month, day, year) 5 Oct. 1919	10. Age last birthday 27	11. ☒ Male ☐ Female
12. ☒ Married ☐ Single	13. Height without shoes 6 feet ... inches	Weight 200 pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No

If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade
CAF-12, April 1944

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Approved ☐ Not approved	Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned	Entered register
Notations	App. Review	Approved

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment if offered for— 1 to 3 months?		
3 to 6 months?		
6 to 12 months?	X	
(b) Would you accept appointment if offered— in Washington, D. C.?		
anywhere in the United States?		
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept? $ 5905.20 per year

You will not be considered for positions paying less

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify: ☐ Occasionally ☒ Frequently ☐ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to [illegible] for the position for which you are applying. [illegible] describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. [illegible] Start with your PRESENT position and work back [illegible] all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal duties which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services [illegible] Military Experience.
(a) If you were ever employed [illegible] under a name different from that shown in Item 4 [illegible] give under "Description of your work" [illegible]
(b) If you have never been employed [illegible] state that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (month, year)
From 28 Aug. 1946 To present time

Exact title of your present position
Intelligence Officer

Salary or earnings
Starting $ 5905 per yr.
Present $ per

Place of employment (city and State)
Shanghai, China

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) (If Federal, name department, bureau, or establishment and division)
Navy Department

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, etc.)
Government (Federal)

Number and kind of employees supervised by you
Intelligence & administrative.

Name and title of immediate supervisor
Col. Moscrip, CO

Reason for desiring to change employment

Description of your work: Commanding Officer, Field Team, Tsingtao. Duties consist of directing intelligence operations of 6 employees, as well as locally hired interpretors and agents. Handling administrative matters for Field Team of 15 persons. Maintaining liaison with official US and Chinese military and civilian officials. Directing activities of sub-base at Tainan.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

16 CONTINUED

Dates of employment (Month, year)
From Jan.12,1942 To 1 Jan., '45
Place of employment (city and State)
Washington, D. C.
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment and division
FBI, Dept. of Justice
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.)
Federal Government
Number and kind of employees supervised by you
N.J.L. Pieper, San Francisco
Name and title of immediate supervisor
Enter military service
Reason for leaving

Exact title of your position
Special Agent
Salary 3200 yr.
Starting $ per
Final $ per
Description of your work
Investigation of violations of Federal laws coming under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice.

Dates of employment (Month, year)
From Apr.8 1940 To Jan.12,(42
Place of employment (city and State)
Clerk, FBI, Washington, D.C.
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment and division
FBI, Department of Justice
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.)
Federal Government
Number and kind of employees supervised by you
Name and title of immediate supervisor
Reason for leaving
Acceptance of position of Special Agent

Exact title of your position
Special Straggler Searcher
Salary or 1440 yr.
Starting $ per
Final $ per
Description of your work:

Dates of employment (Month, year)
From To
Place of employment (city and State)
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment and division
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.)
Number and kind of employees supervised by you
Name and title of immediate supervisor
Reason for leaving

Exact title of your position
Salary or earnings
Starting $ per
Final $ per
Description of your work:

Dates of employment (Month, year)
From To
Place of employment (city and State)
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.)
Number and kind of employees supervised by you
Name and title of immediate supervisor
Reason for leaving

Exact title of your position
Salary or earnings
Starting $ per
Final $ per
Description of your work:

If more space is required, use a continuation she[illegible] Form No. 58 or a sheet of paper the same size as this [illegible] Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth and examination title. Attach to inside of [illegible]ation.

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE [illegible] in the Armed Services. [illegible] each service school you have attended [illegible] attended no special or technical schools while in the service, write in Item (a) "No attended [illegible] service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all important changes in duty assignment, showing dates of such assignment.

(a) First Special Service School attended

Location

China

Dates attended (months, years)

From Jan. 6 1945 To Aug. 28, '46

Rating received at end of this training

(b) What were you taught in First Special Service School?

(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School)

Dates of duty assignment (months, years)

From To

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?

Intelligence Officer , OSS

Ensign, USNR, 445046

(e) Second Special Service School attended

Location

Dates attended (months, years)

From To

Rating received at end of this training

(f) What were you taught in Second Special Service School?

(g) Duty assignment after this training

Dates of duty assignment (months, years)

From To

(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION —Circle highest grade completed

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(a) Give name and location of last high school attended

(b) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired

(c) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended From—	Dates Attended To—	Years Completed Day	Years Completed Night	Degrees Conferred Title	Degrees Conferred Date	Semester Hours Credit
Hardin-Simmons College, Texas	Pol. Sci.					BA		

1 yr. Graduate Work - George Washington Univ., Wash., D.C.

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours

(e) Other training such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school) or "Inservice training" in a Federal agency

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended From—	Dates Attended To—	Years Completed Day	Years Completed Night

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages

	Reading Exc	Reading Good	Reading Poor	Speaking Exc	Speaking Good	Speaking Fair	Understanding Exc	Understanding Good	Understanding Fair
Chinese						X			

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?

travelled in China

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries, indicate (1) names of countries, (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e.g., business, education, recreation)

Europe

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices

Approximate number of words per minute in typing 50 shorthand

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)

☐ Yes ☒ No Give kind of License and State

First license or certificate (year)

Latest license or certificate (year)

22. Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application such as
(a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(b) your patents or inventions
(c) public speaking and public relations experience
(d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

23. REFERENCES – List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Buford Ellis	Farmers & Merchants National Bank. Abilene, Texas	Bank Pres.
Dr. N. A. Richardson	President of Hardin Simmons Univ.	Pres. of Univ.
Mrs. J. N. Robnett	1738 Q St., Wash., D.C.	

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes" give complete details in Item 38		X
27. Within the past 12 months have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess		X
28. Since your 16th birthday have you ever been convicted or fined, or imprisoned or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes" list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the Court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes" give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating if retired from military or naval service		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes" give details in Item 38		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? If your answer is "Yes" show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by whom employed, and (5) kind of appointment		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? If your answer is "Yes" give complete details in Item 38		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes" give complete details in Item 38		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? If your answer is "Yes" give complete details in Item 38		X
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?	X	
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation? Honorable		
(c) Was service performed on active duty in time of war with full military pay and allowances? Yes		

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service	Date of separation or separations
6 Jan. 1945	28 Aug. 1946

Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	Grade (rank) or rating at time of separation	Serial No.
Navy	Ensign USNR	445046

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (36) DO INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. **IF APPOINTED**, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER **PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY**, OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you **participate in a campaign or expedition** and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		X
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service connected disability?		

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d) IS "YES" AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14, TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19.....

Agency .... Title ....

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions (indicate item numbers to which answers apply).

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80).

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date ~~XX~~ 19 Oct. 1946

Signature of applicant /s/ J. Walt– 'oore

(Sign your name in INK, one given name, initial or initials, and surname. If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name, e.g., Mrs. Mary L. Doe.)

Return to CD 166 Curie

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DEC

103920

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE: 8 January 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): MOORE, James Walton

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 5145 Rexton Lane, Dallas, Texas

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Same

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: EMerson-1-0749

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: USA

SECTION II PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: Moore, Patricia Ansley

2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 5145 Rexton Lane, Dallas, Texas, USA

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country) - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: NA

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: EMerson-1-0749

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: NA

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: NA

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Mrs. M. F. Moore, 711 So. 5th St., Waco, Texas

SECTION III MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
NA

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First): Alice (Middle): Patricia (Maiden): Ansley (Last): Moore

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 12 April 1941

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Washington, D. C.

6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 857 Ross Ave., Abilene, Texas

7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH: NA

9. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 5145 Rexton Lane, Dallas, Texas

11. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Nov 1919

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Houston, Texas

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY: NA

14. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): USA

16. DATE ACQUIRED: NA

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA

18. OCCUPATION: Housewife

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers): NA

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): NA

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM NO. 444b REPLACES FORM 275
1 SEP 56 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE *(From and To)* BY MONTH AND YEAR
NA

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE NA	23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED NA

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
NA

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* NA	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
2	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES NA		
	5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES NA		
	5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES NA		
	5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES
NA

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME
NA

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*
Republic National Bank	Dallas, Texas

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)
NA

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS
NA

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country)
USA

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS
NA

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)
NA

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Hardin Simmons University, Abilene, Tex	Political Science	Eng.	1936	1940	BA	Feb 40	
George Washington Univ., Wash. D. C. (night school)	Law		1940	1941			20

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
FBI Special Agent School Quantico, Virginia	--	Jan 1942	Apr 1943	3 mos.

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
OSS School at Catalina Island California	Intelligence	Jan 45	Apr 45	3 mos.

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE
NA

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED															HOW ACQUIRED			
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
	R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK																		
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Mandarin Chinese												X					X		
French													X	X	X				X

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

Two year high school
One year college

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD

NA

SECTION IX — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE", INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Shantung Province North China	General Knowledge	1920 - 1936 1945 - 1947	x			X
Calcutta, India	General Knowledge	1948 - 1950				X

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

In China with parents - 1920-1936, with OSS 1945-1947
In India with CIA - 1948-1950

SECTION X — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.) 40
2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.) NA
3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.) NA

SECTION XI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Handball - Good
Tennis, Swimming, Soccer, Ping Pong - Fair

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

Qualified as paratrooper with OSS ✓

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

NA

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

NA

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of Issue) NA

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue) NA

SECRET

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

NA

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NA

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

NA

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

NA

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) Jan 1950 -April 1954	2. GRADE 12	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/C
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION None	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Contact Specialist	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Duties of a Contact Specialist		

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) April 1954 - Jan 1957	2. GRADE 13	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/C
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION One	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Contact Specialist and Resident Agent in Dallas	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Duties of a C/S and RA		

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) NA	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) NA	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) NA	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XIII

CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	4	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	5

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Michael Walton Moore	Son	1943	X		US	5145 Rexton Lane Dallas, Texas
Margaret Lee Moore	Daughter	1944		X	US	5145 Rexton Lane
Mary Monique Moore	Daughter	1951		X	US	5145 Rexton Lane
Deborah Dallas Moore	Daughter	1954		X	US	5145 Rexton Lane

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Jan 1950 - Jun 1950	2600 Pemberton, Houston, Texas
Jun 1950 - Apr 1954	3502 Underwood, Houston, Texas
Apr 1954 - Jul 1954	3406 Dartmouth, Dallas, Texas
Aug 1954 - Present	5145 Rexton Lane, Dallas, Texas

DATE COMPLETED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
8 January 1957	J Walton Moore

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office:
Ext.
Home:

A. FULL NAME ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ (Use No Initials) James (First) Walton (Middle) Moore (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 2600 Pemberton Ave., Houston, Texas USA (St. & No, City, State, Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 2457 Idlewild St., Abilene, Texas USA (St. & No., City, State, Country)

B. NICKNAME Jim - Jimmie WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? Not applicable.

HOW LONG? IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

Where? By What Authority

C. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Oct 1919 PLACE OF BIRTH Hartwell (City) Georgia (State) USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP US (Country) BY BIRTH? Yes BY MARRIAGE?

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # ISSUED (Date) BY (Court)

AT (State) (Country)


APR 1948

A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) (Country)

WHAT DATES? TO ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

LARS

EN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS:

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ____

PORT OF ENTRY? ____ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ____

LAST U.S. VISA ____ Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 30 SEX Male HEIGHT 6' WEIGHT 190 lbs.

EYES brown HAIR brown COMPLEXION medium SCARS none

BUILD average OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ____

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE ____ MARRIED x WIDOWED ____ DIVORCED ____

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR SEPARATION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT ____

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE — INCLUDE ANNULMENTS — USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Alyce (First) Patricia (Middle) Ansley (Maiden) Moore (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE Washington D. C., April 12, 1941

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 857 Rose Ave., Abilene, Texas (St. & No. City State Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE ____ CAUSE ____

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 2600 Pemberton Ave., Houston, Texas USA (St. & No. City State Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 23 Nov 1919 PLACE OF BIRTH Houston Texas USA (City State Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ____

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? ____ WHERE? ____ (City State Country)

OCCUPATION housewife LAST EMPLOYER FBI

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS Washington D C USA (St. & No. City State Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ____ (Date) TO ____ (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ____

COUNTRY ____ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN ____

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME Michael Walton Moore RELATIONSHIP Son AGE 6

CITIZENSHIP US ADDRESS 2600 Pemberton, Houston, Texas USA
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME Margaret Lee Moore RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 5

CITIZENSHIP US ADDRESS 2600 Pemberton, Houston, Texas USA
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME James Walton Moore
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED Deceased DATE OF DECEASE Dec. 1938 CAUSE Cancer

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS 1701 Sandefer St., Abilene, Texas USA
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 1889 PLACE OF BIRTH Murphy County, N. Carolina
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION Missionary LAST EMPLOYER Baptist Foreign Mission Board

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS Louisville, Kentucky USA
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM 1917 TO 1923 BRANCH OF SERVICE US Army
Date Date

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

______

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Minnie Lee Moore
First Middle

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 711 South 5th St., Waco, Texas USA
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 1892 PLACE OF BIRTH McLean, Texas

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM TO BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME (First) Martha (Middle) Jane (Last) Hutchins AGE 32
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) Monna Carroll, Illinois (State) (Country) USA (Citizenship) US
2. FULL NAME (First) Julia (Middle) Miriam (Last) Safford AGE 27
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) Pittsburg, Penn. (State) (Country) USA (Citizenship) US
3. FULL NAME (First) Betty (Middle) Ruth (Last) Parker AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. & No.) 711½ S. 5th St., (City) Waco, (State) Texas (Country) USA (Citizenship) US
4. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME (First) William (Middle) O. (Last) Ansley

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST ADDRESS (St. & No.) 857 Ross Ave., Abilene, Texas (Country) USA

DATE OF BIRTH 1889 PLACE OF BIRTH Houston, Texas

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE? Hoffman Electrical Supply Co. (City) (State) (Country)

Partner of Hoffman Electrical Supply Co.

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME First Margaret Middle Last Ansley

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS St. 857 Ross Ave., City Abilene, State Texas Country USA

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH San Antonio, Texas

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______ City State Country

OCCUPATION housewife LAST EMPLOYER ______

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME Not applicable. RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME Not applicable. RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

SEC. 12. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL China Inland Mission
Public School
DATES ATTENDED 1925 - 1929
GRADUATE? Chefoo, Shantung, N. China (City, State, Country)
Yes

HIGH SCHOOL China Inland Mission
DATES ATTENDED 1930 - 1936
ADDRESS Chefoo, Shantung, N. China (City, State, Country)
GRADUATE? Yes

COLLEGE Hardin Simmons University
DATES ATTENDED 1936 - 1939
ADDRESS Abilene, Texas USA (City, State, Country)
DEGREE BA

COLLEGE George Washington Law School
DATES ATTENDED 1940 - 1941
ADDRESS Washington D. C. USA (City, State, Country)
DEGREE - -

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

Country US
Service Navy
Rank Ensign
Dates of Service Jan 6, 45 to June 46

Last St: China
843-046
Type of Discharge Honorable

REMARKS:

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER ADDRESS

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS

SEC. 14. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

1. FROM June 1946 TO Present

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY CIA

ADDRESS St Washington D. C. City State Country USA

KIND OF BUSINESS NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB SALARY $ 6800. PER annum

YOUR DUTIES

REASONS FOR LEAVING

2. FROM Jan 6, 1945 TO June 1946

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY US Navy

ADDRESS Washington D. C. City State USA

KIND OF BUSINESS NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB SALARY $ PER

YOUR DUTIES

REASONS FOR LEAVING Honorable discharge.

3. FROM Jan 1942 TO Jan 1945

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY FBI

ADDRESS Washington D. C. City State USA

KIND OF BUSINESS NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB Special Agent SALARY $ CAF-11 PER

YOUR DUTIES

REASONS FOR LEAVING

4. FROM April 1940 TO Jan 1942

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY FBI

ADDRESS Washington D. C. City State USA

KIND OF BUSINESS NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB Special Straggler Searcher SALARY $ CAF-4 PER

YOUR DUTIES

REASONS FOR LEAVING

5. FROM TO

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

ADDRESS St & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB SALARY $ PER

YOUR DUTIES

REASONS FOR LEAVING

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 16 GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
2.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
3.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
4.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
5.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
2.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
3.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
4.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
5.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
2.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
3.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
Farmers & Merchants National Bank, Abilene, Texas

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

	NAME	ADDRESS St. & No.	City	State
1.				
2.				
3.				

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	St. No.	City	State	Country
1936	1940		Abilene	Texas	USA
1940	1942		Washington D. C.		USA
1942	1945		San Francisco,	California	USA
1945	1947			North China	
1947	Apr 1948		Tsingtao	N. China	
Apr 1948	Sept 1949		Calcutta,		India

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

	FROM	TO	City or Section	Country	Purpose
A.	1920	1936	Chefoo	N. China	with parents
	1945	1949		China and India	CIA

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Chinese SPEAK Fair READ - WRITE -

LANGUAGE French SPEAK Slight READ Slight WRITE Slight

LANGUAGE ______ SPEAK ______ READ ______ WRITE ______

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Tennis, golf, handball - fair

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

Department of Justice

CIA

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

FBI - 1940

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: No

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? Yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Slight extent

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Mrs. Patricia A. Moore RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS No. 2600 Pemberton St., City Houston State Texas Country USA

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Houston, Texas (City and State) DATE 11 January 1950

Witness

J. Walton Moore
Signature of Applicant

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

STATE OF GEORGIA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
[illegible]
ATLANTA

CERTIFIED COPY



BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS

[illegible]

SEPTEMBER 28, 1944

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

NR Resigned

TO : Chief, Communications DATE: 25 March 1953

FROM : Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: MOORE, James Walton
#23024

In reply to your memorandum, this is to advise that Subject meets the current requirements for Cryptographic clearance and is approved for such duties as of this date.

E. P. Geiss

E. P. Geiss

OSS Form 2201
(Rev. 12/30/43)

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY OFFICE

Investigation Report

Subject: MOORE, James Walton **Date:** 8 December 1944

To: C. W. Grandy FE/SI **Number:** 23024

1. **Investigation directed by:** HWB

2. **Sources of information:**

3. **Remarks:**

4. **Recommendations:**

Security approval recommended, [illegible] to the receipt of derogatory information [illegible] future date. Interview waived.

Final interview is in this case unnessary if originating official will provide two (unsigned) passport size photographs and completed finger-print card of Subject.

By H W Bousfield
Security Officer
H. W. Boysfield jlh

umb
cc: Civilian Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(30243)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

National Personnel Records Center
(Military Personnel Records)
9700 Page Boulevard
St. Louis, MO 63132

DATE: AUG [illegible] 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: NC[illegible]W-CA/ac

SUBJECT: Service information on MOORE, JAME W. 475046

J. Walton Moore
P.O. Box 50107
Dallas, Texas 75250

The military service information provided on this form has been extracted from records on file at this center and may be used for any official purpose, including application for and adjudication of veteran's benefits.

☐ This method of reply is the routine procedure used to respond to requests such as yours. If additional information is required return your request with a detailed statement outlining the specific data needed and the purpose for which it is to be used.

☐ Subject person served in the ____________________ from __________ to __________.

☐ Type and character of separation: ____________________.

☐ Active service: __________ to __________, __________ to __________.

☐ __________ was honorably retired __________ by reason of permanent physical disability incurred in line of duty, but not as a result of armed conflict or an instrumentality of war. The percentage of disability is __________.

☐ Report of separation physical is attached.

☐ The medical records you requested:

- ☐ Are enclosed.
- ☐ Are not in file.
- ☐ Have been lent to the Veterans Administration and
- ☐ Will be forwarded under separate cover.
- ☐ May be obtained from the VA office shown below. *(Please refer to VA Claim No. C- __________.)*

☑ A statement of service is shown on the reverse side.

☐

[illegible] V. McCann
Chief, Navy Reference Branch

Keep Freedom in Your Future With U.S. Savings Bonds

14-00000

STATEMENT OF SERVICE	DATE	YOUR REFERENCE REQ DTD 7-25-77
NAME (Last, first, middle) Moore, James W.	SERVICE NUMBER 445046	SSN 450-21-2532

SERVICE DATA

NATURE OF ACTION (Show component for each entrance into service; and type of each separation.)	EFFECTIVE DATE	ACTIVE SERVICE (Asterisks after dates in columns C and D denote ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING ONLY)		THIS SPACE FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS APPROPRIATE, SUCH AS REASON FOR SEPARATION; GRADE, RANK, OR RATING; PLACE OF ACTION; ETC.
		FROM	TO	
A	B	C	D	E
APPT USNR	Feb 15, 45			
Rep AD	Feb 20, 45			
RAD	Oct 5, 46			
HON DISCH	Oct 15, 54	Feb 20, 45	Oct 5, 46	

TIME LOST (Inclusive dates)

FROM	TO	FROM	TO	FROM	TO
NONE					

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

AD - Active Duty
APPT - Appointed(ment)
AUS - Army of the U.S.
BCD - Bad Conduct Discharge
CG - Convenience of Gov't
CR - Change of Rating
DD - Dishonorable Discharge
DEMOB - Demobilized(ation)
DISCH - Discharge
EE - Expiration of Enlistment
ENL - Enlisted(ment)

EOS - Expiration of Obligated Service
ERC - Enlisted Reserve Corps
ETS - Expiration Term of Service
GD - General Discharge
HON - Honorable
IND - Induct(ed)(ion)
NAS - Naval Air Station
NG - National Guard
NRS - Naval Recruiting Station
NTC - Naval Training Center

NTS - Naval Training Station
ORC - Officer Reserve Corps
OTH - Other Than Honorable
PROM - Promot(ed)(ion)
R - Received
RA - Regular Army
RAD - Released from Active Duty
RECSTA - Receiving Station
REENL - Reenlist(ed)(ment)
REPAD - Reported For Active Duty

RS - Receiving Ship
T - Transfer(red)
TERM - Terminat(ed)(ion)
UA - Unauthorized Absence
UD - Undesirable Discharge
UHC - Under Honorable Conditions
UOHC - Under Other Than Honorable Conditions
USNH - U.S. Naval Hospital

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 6851 (REV. 1/77) BACK

THE

President of the United States of America

NAVY DEPARTMENT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Expresses the sincere appreciation of his fellow-countrymen for the loyal service rendered by

JAMES WALTON MOORE, ENSIGN, USNR

on active duty in the United States Navy during World War II.

In testimony whereof I am privileged to bestow this

Certificate of Satisfactory Service

Done in the City of Washington, D.C. this 28th day of August Nineteen hundred and forty six.

For the President:
James Forrestal
Secretary of the Navy

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: OCONNELL, JAMES
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4PM 19SEP78		PAT ORR	
2[illegible] SEP 1978		ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

OCONNELL, JAMES P. TERMINATED 84

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

OPF

6-29

28 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Intelligence Medal of Merit for Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr.

The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Intelligence Medal of Merit has been approved for Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr., and requests that you inform him of the award. Arrangements for presentation may be made with the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 3645, room 412, Magazine Building.

/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF w/forms 382 & 600
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

DD/M&S 3362 OP

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD	73-4966	DATE 10 August 1973

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BIRTHYEAR	SEX	TYPE EMPLOYEE
009784	O'CONNELL, James Patrick, Jr.	1917	M	Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	SD	SCHEDULE	GRADE	STATION
D-M&S/OS	SS	GS	16	

BE AWARDED

Intelligence Medal of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD September 1965 - June 1973

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr. is hereby awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit in recognition of his especially meritorious service with the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 21 years. Mr. O'Connell's broad knowledge of Agency security activities and his unusual executive talent are factors that have been instrumental in his making a truly significant contribution to the mission of this Agency. Throughout his career, Mr. O'Connell, an unusually dedicated officer, has consistently displayed a high degree of professionalism, reflecting great credit on him and the United States Government.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by A-DD/M&S on 16 July 1973)

APPROVED

/s/ Vernon A. Walters

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

27 AUG 1973

DATE

SIGNATURE /s/ John F. [illegible]

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

John F. Blake

SIGNATURE

(Signed on Original)

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER

R. Austin, Jr.

FORM 8-69 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4)

14-00000

OIF

SECTION A

[illegible] O'CONNELL, [illegible]

Security | 7041

1333 Elsinore Ave, McLean, Virginia 22[illegible]

U.S.

Intelligence Medal of Merit

June 1973

15. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN | 16. RELATIONSHIP

Virginia | Wife

SECTION B

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN [illegible]

20. FULL NAME

24. FULL NAME | 25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED

26. LOCATION | 27. INCLUSIVE DATES | 28. TIME OF DAY

29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED

SECTION C | [illegible]ATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT [illegible] IN PERFORMANCE

34. OFFICIAL [illegible] OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE [illegible]

Deputy Director for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

35. COMPONENT [illegible] (Designation and location)

Office of Security, Headquarters

Executive direction and supervision of all Office of Security activities in the [illegible]as of physical, technical, and overseas security for the Agency. This additional [illegible]luded the supervision and guidance to area Security Officers assigned to other [illegible] components throughout the world. This position [illegible] to [illegible]

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED

September 19[illegible] - June 1973

40. FULL NAME

44. FULL NAME

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Off

SECTION [illegible]

Award for [illegible] Act or an Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? [illegible] was outstanding, and if it was more [illegible] normally expected. [illegible]

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character [illegible] for which recommended. Give complete [illegible] of administrative, technical, or [illegible] and responsibilities [illegible] Include dates of assignment and results. [illegible] the individual [illegible] was the outstanding [illegible] grade and position [illegible] If appropriate, [illegible] Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to [illegible] Letters of Commendation, or other documents [illegible] on file which support this recommendation. Enclose unclassified [illegible]

Mr. James P. O'Connell has responsibility for providing executive direction and guidance to a highly sensitive and complex area of Agency security. This included physical, technical and overseas security areas since August 1968. Previous to this he served in the positions of Chief, Security Policy and Executive Staff, Assistant Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support and as Chief, Regional Security Officer for the Far East. All of these positions required not only a broad knowledge of Agency and security activities but also an unusual executive ability, which in Mr. O'Connell's case has been consistently rated as "Strong" to "Outstanding." Further evidence of his many contributions and dedication to the Agency and Office of Security are the many kudos he has received to date. He received commendations in 19[illegible] [illegible] two in 1959, in 1961, 1965, 1969; letters of appreciation in 1969, 1971, and 1973. While space and the sensitivity of many of these recognitions do not permit a full and complete analysis, they are indicative of the caliber of professionalism and dedication that has been expected of him.

In summation, Mr. O'Connell has demonstrated, particularly after assuming executive responsibilities in this Office, an unusual and selfless dedication and professionalism that has become a hallmark of his service to this Agency and the country. His record to date will be difficult to emulate and is a distinct credit to the Office and the Agency.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES (List individually) IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT IN CHAIN [illegible] OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE [illegible] THE ACT [illegible] AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESSES [illegible] HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE [illegible]

1. [illegible]

2.

3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY: Charles W. Kane

48. [illegible] TITLE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION: Deputy Director of Security

49. DATE: [illegible] JUL 1973

SECTION E [illegible]

50. HEAD OF Security CAREER SERVICE (Career Service of nominee) [illegible] JUL 1973

51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE [illegible] Management & Services

52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT [illegible] Management & Services [illegible] 73

CIF

36. Duties and Responsibilities. (Continued)

senior Agency officials on a broad range of security matters with senior advisor status to the Director of Security. The incumbent also formulated, recommended and implemented security policies, procedures and measures to protect the security integrity of Agency activities.

201

4 September 1973

Mr. James P. O'Connell
1333 Elsinore Avenue
McLean, Virginia 22101

Dear Mr. O'Connell:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your many years of service to your country. The success with which you have met this challenge should be a source of lasting pride and satisfaction to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: ______________
Director of Personnel

OP/RAD/ROB/PJS/lks

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

29 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement - **Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr.**

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

Grade : **GS-16** Position : **Security Officer**
Career Service : **Security**
Office/Division : **Office of Security**
Date Requested for Retirement : **29 June 1973**
Age at that Date : **56**
Years of Creditable Service : **27**
Years of Agency Service : **21**
Years of Qualifying Service : **5**

3. The applicant's Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommended that the request be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

/s/ Harry B. Fisher

Director of Personnel

4. The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Deputy Director for Management and Services

Date

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Distribution:
- 0 - Return to Director of Personnel
- 2 - DD/M&S
- 1 - D/Pers
- 1 - Applicant
- ✓1 - OPF
- 1 - ROB Soft File
- 1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/DEChickering:baw/3257 (29 June 1973)

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT

NAME: James P. O'Connell
ADDRESS: 1333 Elsinore Avenue, McLean, Virginia
HOME TELEPHONE: 356-9666

Central Intelligence Agency December 1951 - June 1973

Employment consisted of:

Executive direction, supervision and acted as principal advisor on physical, technical and overseas security matters. This entailed global responsibilities in providing security support for all Agency activities and operations.

Formulated and recommended security policies and procedures on an Agency-wide basis along with providing advice and guidance to senior Agency officials on a broad range of security matters.

Executive supervision of Agency investigative and operational intelligence support, some of which are unique to foreign intelligence operations. This required providing guidance and direction to such activities and ensuring the investigative efforts or supportive functions adequately fulfilled the needs of Agency-wide security.

Principal senior security liaison contact with other U.S. Government agencies and departments engaged in security and counterintelligence efforts.

Senior Security Officer responsible for providing overall personnel, physical, and technical security protection for Agency intelligence operations, facilities, and personnel in the Far East area.

Senior Investigator responsible for planning and reviewing investigative efforts in the tri-state area of Washington, D.C. and in the support of foreign intelligence operations. This included support to the Agency's employment and personnel security program and required liaison with Federal, state, and local officials who could assist in such activities.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 June 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., JR. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT & DISABILITY SYSTEM (CANCELLATION N.S.C.A.
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 29 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3271-0500-0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643 Section 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DD/M&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD/PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL & OVERSEAS SECURITY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0459
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): OS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16/7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000 ✓
18. REMARKS:

Subject's last working day is 29 June 1973.

Szypczak

cc/CSB - info
cc/payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Edward K. O'Malley
Edward K. O'Malley, C/A&TS/PB
DATE SIGNED: 6/21/73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOOTHS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 19 YR. 17 ✓
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE Ø
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: BJ, ØØ, Ø
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE Ø MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: BB 6-28-73
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher
DATE APPROVED: 21 June '73

FORM 8-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

03 JUL 1973

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 June 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

2. NAME (Last–First–Middle): OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 24 YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3271 0500 [illegible]

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect.203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDM&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: [illegible]

17. SALARY OR RATE: $

18. REMARKS:

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:

20. EMPLOY. CODE:

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE:

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. NOOTRS CODE:

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE 2

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: BB

46. O.P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 6/11/73

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

OP-1 1-71

20 JUN 1973

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

73-0574

7 February 1973

75-2641

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia 22101

Dear Mr. Schlesinger

Please convey to Mr. Howard J. Osburn, your Director of Security, my sincere appreciation for the excellent briefing which was recently provided for me by personnel of the Office of Security. The briefing and technical demonstrations accompanying it were both personally informative and professionally rewarding.

A special note of thanks is due to Mr. Ermal Geiss, Deputy Director of Security, Mr. James O'Connell, Deputy Director for Physical, Technical, and Overseas Security, and Mr. Edward F. Sayle, Chief, Special Activities Operations Branch. Their considerate attention, sincere interest, and cooperative spirit were deeply appreciated.

Sincerely

William A. Temple
WILLIAM A. TEMPLE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

CONFIDENTIAL

1 MAR [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: James P. O'Connell

SUBJECT : Frank G. Wisner Dedication Ceremony

1. In a memorandum to the Deputy Director for Support, the Director of Central Intelligence expressed his thanks and appreciation to all who participated in making the Frank G. Wisner Memorial Service a dignified and tasteful ceremony. The Deputy Director for Support also expressed appreciation and thanks.

2. I wish to add my appreciation also for your contribution in making the ceremony an outstanding success.

3. A copy of this memorandum is being placed in both your Administrative and Official Personnel Files.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 [illegible] 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 000791

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 01 | YEAR 68

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: XX | V TO V | | V TO CF | | CF TO V | | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 5271-0500

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/Office of Security
DD/Physical, Technical & Overseas Security
Office of the Deputy Director

R
37

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Security Officer

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0450

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16/5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ [illegible]

18 REMARKS

From: DDS/OS/Executive Staff/CC #0701

CC:Payroll

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Edward K. O'Malley
[illegible] O'Malley

DATE SIGNED: 19 July 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 16240 | ALPHABETIC SEC

22. STATION CODE: 7501B

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24 HDQTRS. CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 | DA. 19 | YR. 17

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO.:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV. COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37 LONG. COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-1-68
mw

46 OP APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 26 JUL 1968

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITI

p SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

DD/S 69-4658

15 OCT 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. The Committee on the Security of Headquarters Building in a series of twelve meetings between May and August 1969 conducted a detailed study and analysis of each facet of security of the Headquarters Building. I know that considerable time and effort were given to preparation of the detailed briefings, supplemental studies and reports, contributions to the formal report and implementation of the recommended corrective measures. I am appreciative of the efforts and contribution made by your staff to this important piece of business. Although I am sure that many of your staff have worked on this project, my attention has been drawn particularly to these officers:

Buckley, Robert
Carrico, H. Clifton
Elliott, Robert N.
Farrell, Francis M.
Fennessey, Robert E.
Geiss, Ermal P.
Good, Charles B.
Green, James P.
Griffin, Robert B.
Hayes, Robert J.
Herlihy, John F.
Kane, Edward J.
King, Joseph F.
Mantoni, Rudolfo
McCord, James W., Jr.
McGinn, John B.
O'Connell, James P.
Parr, Laurence
Petit, Alan F.
Sullivan, Arthur H.
Todd, Orin H.

2. I would appreciate it if you would pass this commendation on to the individuals concerned. Copies of this commendation have been forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in the Official Personnel File of each of the above officers.

R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
[illegible]

14-00000

O'CONNELL. James P.

69-T30311

10 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John W. Coffey

I want to express my appreciation to you personally and through you to Howard Osborn and the other of your associates who contributed so effectively to the visit of the President on Friday. The arrangements were flawless; the security first-class without being intrusive. I am well aware of the amount of work and planning which went into the successful outcome. I particularly want to commend the good sense and judgment which prevailed throughout. It is easy to push people around. It is difficult to take proper precautions and at the same time make everyone feel as though it were his or her party. Thank you very much. Well done!

Richard Helms
Director

cc: Acting Executive Director

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/S [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 January 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER	009784
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)	O'Connell, J[illegible] P. JR
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	Reassignment
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 01 DAY 15 YEAR 67
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	Regular
6 FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE	7771-0103
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	50 USC 403J
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security Security Policy & Executive Staff Office of the Chief
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.
11 POSITION TITLE	Security Officer
12 POSITION NUMBER	0701
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	SS
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	1810.01
16 GRADE AND STEP	16 ~~3~~ 4
17 SALARY OR RATE	$21,415 22085

18 REMARKS

The present incumbent, Mr. Edward J. Kane, will be reassigned, effective 29 January 1967.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	
DATE SIGNED	
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	Ernest L. Hardt Chief, PersPr/A&TS/OS
DATE SIGNED	20 Jan 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	37
20 EMPLOY CODE	10
21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	16130
21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	SEC
22 STATION CODE	7503
23 INTEGREE CODE	
24 HOURS CODE	1
25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	03 19 15
26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	
27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	
28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CS 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE	
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	
EOD DATA	
33 SECURITY REQ NO	
34 SEX	
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	
36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	
37 LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	
38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS CODE	
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS	
42 LEAVE CAT CODE	
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS STATE CODE	
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	1-26-67
46 OP APPROVAL	
DATE APPROVED	23 Jan 67

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

APPLICATION FOR SERVICE CREDIT PROCESSED
THROUGH REGULAR CHANNELS PER CENTRAL
COVER.

DATE: 15 February 1966

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr.** **25 February 1966**

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the system, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the system may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you do not have sufficient time prior to completing 15 years of service with the Agency in which you could complete a minimum of 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees."

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 6E-1319 Headquarters (extension 6001). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols

Emmett Echols

GROUP 1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 6 OCTOBER 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J.P. Jr.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and transfer to vouchered funds. (CORRECTION)

A

40

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 26 YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS:

	V TO V		V TO CF	
X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 0271-0300

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DEP ~~DD~~ INVESTIGATIONS + ~~AND~~ OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
DIR OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0522

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16-3

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 20,[illegible]

18 REMARKS: Corrects effective date of previous action which read 08-15-65. to 09-26-65

Date 7 OCT 1965
Security approval has been granted for [illegible] request
Chief, Personnel Security Division

cc

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ernest L. Hardt, Chief/P[illegible]/A&TS

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
23	10	[illegible]	SEC	[illegible]		1	02 1917	

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 DATE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 16 MO. DA. YR. [illegible]

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR DISP PROB TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10/13/65

46 CP APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 10/4/65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 August 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 15 YEAR 65

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS				
	☐	V TO V	☐	V TO CF
	☒	CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6271-0300

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DEP ~~OS~~ INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF~~
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER (S Ca)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0522

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20,045

18. REMARKS

Telephonic Concurrence, Jay Newman, DDP/FE Personnel, 13 August 1965.

Date: 18 AUG 1965

Security Approval has been granted the use contemplated by this request

Steven J. Kuhn

A/Chief, Personnel Security Division

lcc Cl. Br.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ernest L. Hardt
Ernest L. Hardt, Chief/Pers./ARPS

DATE SIGNED: 18 Aug 65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 16395 ALPHABETIC SEC
22. STATION CODE: 2.0.3
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOOTERS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 19 YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: from FE 9/27/65
46. O.P. APPROVAL: for
DATE APPROVED: 27 Sept 65

FORM 1152 8-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 June 19

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 09784

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 18 YEAR 1965

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6137-1600 ~~5271-0301~~

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
~~DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY~~
~~INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION~~
~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF~~
Regional
DDP FE Foreign Field
FE JAO OKINAWA STATION
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION
SECURITY UNIT

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ~~WASHINGTON, D. C.~~ Okinawa Island, US POSS

11 POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER (15)

12 POSITION NUMBER: ~~0411~~ 4171

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): CS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16 ~~2~~ 3

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~19,590~~ 20,245

18. REMARKS

I certify that this promotion is absolutely necessary in accordance with Action memorandum A-436, dated January 23, 1965.

SS Career Service

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: for Ernest L. Hardt, Chief, PersBr/

DATE SIGNED: 15 June 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE

20 EMPLOY CODE

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 HOURS CODE: 3

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 19 YR. 17

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV, TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-13-65 wr

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 12 July 65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 August 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009784	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) O'Connell, J[illegible] P. JR			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment		4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 09 DAY 13 YEAR 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3137-7000-3361	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FE/JAO-Okinawa Station Administrative Section Security Unit			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Okinawa ~~[illegible]~~ Island, US POSS	
11. POSITION TITLE Security Officer ~~GS-15~~			12. POSITION NUMBER 4171	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1810.01		16. GRADE AND STEP 15 2 3	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 14,0[illegible]

18. REMARKS

From DDP/FE/Undetermined

[illegible]

1 - Security
1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Lee Austin, CFE/Pers	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER H. E. [illegible]	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 56400 ALPHABETIC FE	22. STATION CODE 15513	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VOUCHERS CODE 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. 2 DA. 1 YR. 1917	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY NO. 34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE		40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS SEP 4 10 29 AM '62	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION Lee Con[illegible] FE 9-5-62			46. O.P. APPROVAL SEP 3 AM '62				DATE APPROVED 9-11-62	

FORM 1152 4-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 May 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): OCONNELL, ~~James~~ P. Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Confidential Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 27 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2137-7000-3361

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO~~- Atsugi Base~~ *
~~Administrative Section~~
~~Security Unit~~ Unassigned

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: [illegible]
~~Atsugi, Japan~~

11. POSITION TITLE: Security Officer ~~88-15~~

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000 ~~3169~~

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 ~~3~~ 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~14,300~~ [illegible],055

18. REMARKS:

From: DDS/OS/DD Invest-Oper Sup/SS Div/OC/0370

259's submitted to Medical Staff
Subject to depart o/a 8 June 1962
Any questions inquire FE/PE/JAO-KOR x5271 H.E. Eissner
*For slotting purposes only until slots transferred to Okinawa. Subject to be physically located at Okinawa

1cc - Finance Div.
1cc Security

6/1/62
6/4/62

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: R. L. Staten ACFE/Pers

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGRITY CODE	24. POSITION CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
20	10	56 000	FE	99999		3	02 19 17	

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: See Career Sec 05-31-62

46. C.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 5-31-62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

CIA [illegible] ONLY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

28 July 1960

1. Serial No.: [illegible]
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): [illegible] J F JR
3. Date Of Birth — Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
4. Vet. Pref. — None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2 — Code: [illegible]
5. Sex: [illegible]
6. C.S. [illegible] — Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
7. SCD — Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
8. CSC Retmt. — Yes-1, No-2 — Code: [illegible]
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA [illegible]
10. Apmt. Affidav. — Mo. Da. Yr.:
11. FEGLI — Yes-1, No-2 — Code:
12. LCD — Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
13. Mil. Serv. Credit, Ltd. — Yes-1, No-2 — Code: [illegible]

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

Code: [illegible]

15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.

Station Code: [illegible]

16. Dept.-Field — Dept-, USfld-, Frgn- — Code: 2
17. Position Title: INVESTIGATOR
18. Position No.: [illegible]
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: [illegible]
21. Grade & Step: 15 1
22. Salary Or Rate: $13,730 [illegible]
23. SD: SS
24. Date Of Grade — Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
25. PSI Due — Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
26. Appropriation Number: [illegible]

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: **REASSIGNMENT**

Code: [illegible]

28. Eff. Date — Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
29. Type Of Employee: Regular

Code: [illegible]

30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDS Office of Security
DD Invest & Operational Support
Sec. Sup. Div., Office of the Chief

Code: [illegible]

32. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D.C.

Station Code:

33. Dept.-Field — Dept-, USfld-, Frgn - D — Code: 2
34. Position Title: Security Officer
35. Position No.: 370
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 1810.01
38. Grade & Step: 15-1
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 13,730.00 pa
40. SD: SS
41. Date Of Grade — Mo. Da. Yr.:
42. PSI Due — Mo. Da. Yr.:
43. Appropriation Number: 1271-1030-1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): J. Marlene Reimers, Ext. 2063

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): H. E. Steele
Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	[illegible]	
B. Pos. Control		[illegible]	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(4)

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

24 X February 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	02	19	17	1	M 1	12	17	51	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2	Code
11	07	45	1	50 USCA 403 J			12	17		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3125	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
4	INVESTIGATOR	0187	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$12770	SS	06 28 59	12 25 60	0271 2051 0000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT*	62	3 16 60	Regular		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS Office of Security DD Invest & Operational Support Security Support Division Office of the Chief		Washington, D.C.	

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - D Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	Investigator	436.83	GS	1810.22

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15-1	$ 12,770.00 pa	SS	6 28 59	12 25 60	0271-1030

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS	H. E. Steele
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)	Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS
J. Marlene Reimers, Ext. 2063	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks "This request for PRA is to permit the utilization of this employee's unusual background and qualification in a Headquarters assignment for a period of approximately 2 years."

H. E. Steele

H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

Grade is maximum [illegible] position No. 436 and no [illegible] is contemplated [illegible]

[illegible] (4)

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

PRA

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 502734	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) OCONNELL J P JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 02 Da. 19 Yr. 17	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1
5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo. 12 Da. 17 Yr. 51	7. SCD Mo. 11 Da. 07 Yr. 45	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code /	12. LCD Mo. 12 Da. 17 Yr. 51
13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST . OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	Code 3.25	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept. - Field (Dept -, USfld -, Frgn -) Code 3	17. Position Title INVESTIGATOR	18. Position No. 0187	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 1810.22	21. Grade & Step 15 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 12770	23. SD SS
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	25. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 25 Yr. 60	26. Appropriation Number 9 7100 30 041	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Transfer [illegible] VOUCHERED FUNDS	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. 12 Da. 27 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee R	Code	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

B 11

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
33. Dept. - Field (Dept -, USfld -, Frgn -) Code 4	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.
37. Occup. Series	38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD
41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number 0271-2051-0000	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
H. E. Steele, Ch., Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Delphia Nutter Ext. 2064

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		21 DEC 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

REQUEST CHANGES BE MADE
BY SECURITY ONLY

(4)

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

V to V X V to UV
UV to V UV to UV

DATE PREPARED: Mo 6 Da 25 Yr 59
1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, James P.
3. Date of Birth: Mo 2 Da 19 Yr 17
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code
5. Sex: Male
CS - LOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

9

14. Organizational Designations:
DDS Office of Security
DD Invest & Operational Support
Security Support Division
Support Branch, Office of the Chief

Code:
15. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D. C.
Station Code:
16. Dept.-Field (Dept - Usfld - Frgn -): D Code 2
17. Position Title: Investigator
18. Position No.: 311
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 1810.22
21. Grade & Step: 14-3
22. Salary Or Rate: $11,835.00 pa
23. SD: SS
24. Date Of Grade: Mo 11 Da 20 Yr 55
25. PSI Due: Mo 06 Da 15 Yr 60
26. Appropriation Number: 9-7100-2[illegible]-003

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: ~~PROMOTION~~ Transfer to C Funds
Code: ~~03~~ 07
28. Eff. Date: Mo 06 Da 28 Yr 59
29. Type Of Employee: Regular
Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

11

31. Organizational Designations:
DDS Office of Security
DD Invest & Operational Support
San Francisco Field Office

Code: 3125
32. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D. C.
Station Code: 750/3
33. Dept.-Field (Dept - Usfld - Frgn -): U Code 3
34. Position Title: Investigator
35. Position No.: 187
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 1810.22
38. Grade & Step: 15-1
39. Salary Or Rate: $12,770.00 pa
40. SD: SS
41. Date Of Grade: Mo 06 Da 28 Yr 59
42. PSI Due: Mo 12 Da 25 Yr 66
43. Appropriation Number: 9-7100-30-041

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): H. F. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	25 JUN 1959	
B. Pos. Control		27 JUN 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F.		26 June 59

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request
Personnel Security Division

Remarks
Transfer to Unvouchered Funds from Vouchered Funds. W-4 D-4A Forms attached.

[illegible]

REQUEST CONTACTS BE MADE BY SECUR. Y ONLY

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITI

SECRET

(4)

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

V O U C H E R E D

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. JAMES Patrick O'CONNELL JR.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb '17
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 6-23-55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
   A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
   B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
   A. PROPOSED: 2[illegible]
   B. APPROVED:
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—	TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator ~~[illegible]~~ T311-13	Investigator T311
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 ~~$8560.00 pa~~ 9205	GS-1810.22-14 ~~9600~~.00 pa 10,320.00
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security ~~DDA-Security Office~~ DD/Invest + Operational Support ~~Special Security Division~~ Security Support Div. ~~District Field Office~~ Support Branch Off. of Chief	DD/S Office of Security DD/Invest. & Operational Support Security Support Division Support Branch, Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): E. W. Schmidt

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): H. E. Steele Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature:

Title: Executive Officer/OS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			✓		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-SE

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION FROM: ~~[illegible]~~ TO: 5-7103-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): YES

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	6/23/55
C. CLASSIFICATION	[illegible]	[illegible]
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [illegible] for [illegible] 11/18/55

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED
VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) MR. JAMES P. Patrick O"CONNELL Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb '17	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST [illegible]/18/55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) REASSIGNMENT	6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:		7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)	B. APPROVED: 5 JUN 1955 6/5/55		

FROM—		TO—
Investigator T523 GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 pa	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	Investigator 311-13 GS-1810.22-13 $85[illegible].00 pa
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District Field Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Securit DD/Invest & Operations Support Security Support Division Support Branch/ Off of Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM UNVouchered Funds. W-4 Form attached.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
H.E.Steele, Ch, Pers. Br., ASTD, SO

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Jane Giesler Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: H. E. Steele
Title: Ch, Personnel Branch, ASTD, SO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-SE

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-7130-30 TO: 5-7103-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Date: 20 MAY 1955
Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request
Chief, Personnel Security Division

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	SMC	6-1-55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
H C Clenbaim for 6/8/55

SECRET

19—67339-2

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 — FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr—Miss—Mrs—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. JAMES Patrick O'CONNELL, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] '17
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 11/8/54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: [illegible] 1954

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Investigator T-511	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator T-525
GS-1810.22-13 $[illegible].00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.22-[illegible] $8[illegible].00 pa
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Cover Support/Sp Inq Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District [illegible] Office
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Transfer from Vouchered Funds to Unvouchered Funds. [illegible] form attached.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): [illegible], [illegible], Pers. [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): [illegible], [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: H. E. [illegible]
Title: [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]

13 VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

SD-5[illegible]

15 SEX:
16. RACE:
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-1203-20
TO: 5-1150-[illegible]

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): YES

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21 STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Concurred by
[illegible]
17 Nov 1954
Rec'd 3 Dec '54

Effective date
[illegible]
[illegible] '54

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	[illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	12/21/54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Ralph [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

10—67339-2

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): [illegible] RICK [illegible], JR.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] 1917

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: [illegible]

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): [illegible]
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: 25 apr 54

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Investigator ([illegible]) T311	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator T311
GS-1810-13 [illegible]0.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.??-13 [illegible].00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp[illegible] Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp[illegible] Section
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE DUE 2 May 1954

TO SALARY $ 8560.00

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): [illegible] Schmidt, Chief, [illegible]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): [illegible] Ext. [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [illegible]
Title: Chief, [illegible]

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX: [illegible]
16. RACE: [illegible]
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: [illegible]-[illegible]103-20
TO: [illegible]-[illegible]103-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	21 apr 54
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	[illegible]
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Ralph S. [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950 – FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER 31

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

V O U C H E R E D

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): MR. JAMES P. O'CONNELL, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2/19/17
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 12/1/53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 20 DEC 53
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Investigator(Gen) T126	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator(Gen) T311
~~GS-1810-13 $8300.00 per annum~~	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810-13 $[illegible].00 per annum
Inspection & Security Office ~~Special Security Division~~ ~~Operations Branch~~ Project Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper.Support/Sp.Inquiry Section
~~Washington, D. C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): Ervin W. Schmidt, Chief, AS&TS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): F. F. Cyrus, Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: Chief, [illegible] Staff

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WW II	OTHER	S-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CS-SE

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: 4-7103-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	12/1
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	P.L.[illegible]	12/7/53
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Ervin W. Schmidt 12/1/53

SECRET

10—67829-8

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL, CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): MR. JAMES P. O'CONNELL, JR.

2. DATE OF BIRTH:

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 10/14/52

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 9 Nov 52

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Sch. A

FROM—		TO—
Investigator(Gen) T126.04-12	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator(Gen) T126.04
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810-13 $8360.00 pa.
Inspection & Security Office Special Security Div. Operations Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: EXECUTIVE OFFICER

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION 11X2100
FROM: 7103-00
TO: Sch. A [illegible]

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C Taylor	29 Oct 52
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY 11-3-52

14-00000

PERSONNEL TION REQUEST

GISTER NUMBER

NAME: O'CONNELL, James P.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 12 [illegible] 50

NATURE OF ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)
LAST WORKING DAY:
EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Investigator(Gen) T127.10	Investigator(Gen) T126.04-12
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-1810-12 $7040.00 pa	Same
OFFICE	Inspection & Security Office	Same
DIVISION	Special Security Division	Same
BRANCH AND SECTION	Admin Pool - Operations Staff	Operations Staff
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Same
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

RECOMMENDED:

5 September 1952
DATE

EWSchmidt
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: 28 Sept 52 C Taylor

CLEARANCE REQUESTED: DATE / TYPE
CLEARANCE APPROVED: DATE / TYPE
DATE / SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO. / C.S.C. NO. / DATE APPROVED
NEW / VICE / I.A. / REAL
DATE / SIGNATURE
EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION:
ALLOTMENT:
CSC AUTHORITY: 9-3-52
DATE / SIGNATURE / SIGNATURE: 30

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE / SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE / SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE: 9-[illegible]-52 SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
NOV 1949

14-00000

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

ROSTER NO.

NAME: O'CONNELL, James Patrick, Jr.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: MAR 31 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: New Appointment

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

7-P

5 March 52

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Investigator General
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-12 $7040.00 pa
OFFICE		Inspection & Security Office
DIVISION		Special Security Division
BRANCH AND SECTION		Admin Pool Operations Staff
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐ 1810

REMARKS:

C#1915

Transfer leave from UV Funds.

Slot #7 JM

I concur for the chief of I & S Staff W. A. Osborne Mar 5, 1952

[illegible] 54

RECOMMENDED:

13 February 1952
(DATE)

C. F. HENEY C F Heney
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. [illegible])

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE | SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
6893		2-28-51

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL

DATE: 3/6/52 SIGNATURE: Eugene P. Wilson

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2123 9 [illegible]

ALLOTMENT: 710 [illegible]

C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch. A-6-112 (d)

DATE SIGNATURE: 3/6/52 SIGNATURE:

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE | SIGNATURE: JMR

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE | SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE: 3-10-52 SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF: D Mulcahey

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mrs. Grim 1313 L Bldg

TO : Personnel, Room ~~1001 "L" Building~~ DATE: 10 January 1952

FROM : Special Security Division

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P., Jr. - Administrative

1. Due to the nature of the assignment of this employee at this time, there is no objection in mentioning our Agency in connection with transferring the necessary papers and leave record from the former Agency.

2. It is requested that this be done by Personnel as soon as possible.

Ervin W. Schmidt

ERVIN W. SCHMIDT
Assistant to the Chief
Special Security Division

CONFIDENTIAL

To: CFD, Payroll Section

I hereby authorize and direct CFD Payroll Section to mail [illegible] future payroll checks to my bank to be credited to my checking account.

Name of Depositor JAMES P. O'CONNELL JR.

Account No. S 8545

Name of Bank NATIONAL SAVINGS & TRUST CO.

Address of Bank NEW YORK AVE & 15 ST N.W.

James P. O'Connell Jr.

Signature of Employee

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency, by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures. I agree to honor the requests of CIA relative to my application whether it be accepted or rejected. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in CIA. If questioned directly, I will say that I have applied for positions in various government agencies, and if pressed for an answer will acknowledge that CIA is one of them but will attach no particular significance to such application. I agree not to disclose personnel procedures I have observed in CIA. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application to CIA.

Signed: James P. O'Connell Jr
Date: Dec. 17, 1951

SECRET

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

1. EMPL. SERIAL NO. [illegible]				
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) O'CONNELL, James Patrick, Jr.	M	19 Feb 1917		
6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENTS (Exclude em-ployee)	2	[illegible] 1954	
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS ☑	MEMBERSHIP Dec 1954		Sep 1967	Prop TDY
10. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS ☑	X	SERVICE	GRADE	
12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST None		14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST None	DATE

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1940-41 US Gypsum Co, Jersey City, NJ - [illegible] Clerk
1941-43; 1946-47 James P. O'Connell [illegible] Co, NYC - Foreman, Office [illegible]
1943-44 Manufacturers Machine & Tool Co, NYC - Warehouse Supervisor
1944-46 Military Service, US Navy, [illegible]
1947-51 Dept of Justice, FBI, DC - Special Agent

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1935-39 St John's Univ, Brooklyn, NY - BS, [illegible]
1945 Navy Cryp [illegible], [illegible] Univ - [illegible] & Cypher (4 mos)
1947 FBI Academy, Quantico, Va - [illegible] (3 mos)

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Profi-ciency, Date Tested) None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1952 Spec Sec Trng	1962 Ops Support	1962 Sec Off Fld Crs
1952 Nat'l Intel Orient	1962 Spec Sec [illegible]	1967 [illegible]
1954 Staff Crypto	1962 [illegible] to [illegible]	1969 [illegible]
1955 Basic Mgt	1962 [illegible]	1966 [illegible]

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE EOD [illegible] /(Continued on next page)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & COMPONENT	STATION
Dec 1951	Investigator (Gen) 1810.03	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
Nov 1952	" " 1810.03	13		[illegible]/OpsBr/Ch [illegible]	"
Mar 1953	" " 1810.03	13		[illegible]/Dep Ch, [illegible] Br	"
Oct 1953	" " 1810.03	13	SS	[illegible]/OpsSpt/Ch, SpecIn [illegible]	"
Mar 1954	Investigator 1810.22	13	SS	[illegible]/Ch, Ops Support Br	"
Oct 1954	" 1810.22	13	SS	[illegible]/Ch, District Fld [illegible]	DC Field
Dec 1954	" 1810.22	13	SS	OS/[illegible]/Ch, Support Br	Hq
Nov 1955	" 1810.22	14	SS	" " " " "	"
Jun 1959	" 1810.22	15	SS	OS/Dep Ch, Security Sp. [illegible]	"
Apr 1960	" 1810.22	15	SS	OS/Chief, Security Su[illegible]	"
Jul 1962	Security Off 1810.01	15	SS	[illegible]	[illegible]
Sep 1962	" " 1810.01	15	S	DDP/FE/JAO/Security Unit	"
Jul 1965	[illegible]-Jun 1965 Acting [illegible] Security Off [illegible]	[illegible]	CS	DDP/FE/JAO/Security Unit	"
Sep 1965	" " 1810.01	16	SS	OS/[illegible]	Hq
Jan 1967	" " 1810.01	16	[illegible]	OS/Ch, Security Policy & [illegible]	"
Aug 1968	" " 1810.01	16	SS	OS/[illegible]/Deputy Director	"

20. DATE REVIEWED 1 Jun 1973	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY [illegible] [illegible]/cal CL BY 010026	22. [illegible] VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE [illegible]

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 104- PROFILE

SECRET

EMPL. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I - Continued)	
NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible], J[illegible] [illegible], Jr.		DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]

[illegible] - Continued:

1967 [illegible] Lecture
1967 [illegible] Sem [illegible] /[illegible]
1969 [illegible] on [illegible] Ops/Brookings



[illegible] JR
1917
770101 4 JULY 69
6.73

DATE REVIEWED	PROFILE REVIEWED BY	
1 Jun 1973	[illegible] cal	E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010026

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 066??? | BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle)
O'CONNELL, James Parrish, Jr.

23.

[illegible] 1967

26. Additional Information - Continued:
Appreciation 1962 from DCI to OS personnel who contributed so effectively to the visit of the President to the Agency 7 Mar 1962.
Appreciation 1971 from D/OS for Subject's contribution in making the Frank G. Wisner Dedication Ceremony a success.
Appreciation 1973 from Brigadier General Temple, USAF to the DCI for the excellent briefing provided by the Office of Security.

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Commendation 1954 from C/SR for contribution to successful management of the PEPILTER Project; concurrence by the Dir of Security.
Commendation 1959 from Dir of Security for many years of outstanding performance in Operational Support, upon his assignment as Deputy Chief, SSD.
Commendation 1960 from Chief of Ops for imaginative handling of many aspects of Project HARPSTAR.
Commendation 1961 from Director, Security USIA, for assistance rendered the USIA.
Commendation 1965 from COS for performance of assigned duties in a superior manner while serving in the capacity of Acting D/OS.
[illegible] made by OS personnel in connection [illegible] the Headquarters Building.
(Continued above)

27. DATE REVIEWED
1 Jun 1973

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
cmm/ cal

FORM NO. 1-FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET 105 PROFILE E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010025

SECRET
EYES ONLY

24 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1971 to 31 March 1972. The rating period covers the third full year that Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security.

2. The directorate which Mr. O'Connell supervises is geographically widely separated in the Headquarters area. This separation adds complexities to the task of supervising the directorate and coordinating the activities of three Divisions, operating over a broad spectrum of activities and responsibilities. During the reporting period, one of the Divisions of Mr. O'Connell's directorate took on an important, added responsibility--the security of automatic data processing. This function covers the complexity of maintaining security in a rapidly expanding activity replete with serious security problems because of the severe compaction of information resulting from rapid advances and acceptability of technology in the field of data handling. The achievements of the Physical Security Division, the Technical Division, and the Overseas Security Support Division require a high degree of coordination in order to avoid contradictions detrimental to a unified security policy.

3. In spite of the difficulty of supervising divisions remotely located from his office, Mr. O'Connell has applied and achieved effective supervision. The Divisions moved forward in an

SECRET
EYES ONLY

[illegible]

SECRET
EYES ONLY

innovative manner and have been effective in discharging their responsibilities.

4. Mr. O'Connell also spearheads the security program which furnishes Security Officers to overseas stations and domestic operations as necessary. Mr. O'Connell has taken a personal interest in this activity and has been of considerable assistance to the Office of Security Career Board in the assignment of Security careerists to those positions.

5. During the last Fitness Report, the description of Mr. O'Connell's performance was raised from "Strong" to "Outstanding." He has continued his performance in such a manner as to warrant an OUTSTANDING rating.

6. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell — 24 April 1972
James P. O'Connell — Date

CONCURRENCE:

Howard J Osborn — 28 April 1972
Howard J. Osborn — Date
Director of Security
Reviewing Official

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
0097

GENERAL

SECTION A

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 02/19/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16 SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/PTOS/ODD	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- X ANNUAL
- SPECIAL (Specify):
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1971 - 31 March 1972

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SECTION B

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 4 MAY 15	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

26 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report -16
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This is a narrative Fitness Report which covers the period from 1 April 1970 through 31 March 1971.

2. During this entire period, Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security. The rating period covers his second full year in that position. The Directorate which Mr. O'Connell heads has gained added importance and increased attention during the year. It encompasses an area of activity which is vitally important to the Office of Security and the Agency as a whole. Mr. O'Connell has given considerable attention to efforts which decrease our vulnerability at the hands of foreign opposition as well as from domestic efforts resulting from national unrest. Mr. O'Connell has shown improvement in the over-all coordination of his responsibilities throughout the current rating period. He supervises his people in an effective manner and anticipates problems so as to simplify their solutions.

3. During the previous rating period, Mr. O'Connell's performance was considered to be STRONG with several outstanding features. During the year, I consider that there has been sufficient addition to the outstanding areas of his performance to raise his over-all rating to OUTSTANDING.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

Jim P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

29 April 71
Date

CONCURRENCE:

Howard J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Reviewing Official

30 APR 1971
Date

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

29 APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

OC 7784- SEC-SS

1. ~~This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1968~~ through 31 March 1969.

2. Mr. O'Connell was appointed Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security in August 1968 and this Rating covers his performance during this period as well as his performance as Executive Officer from 1 April 1968 to 1 August 1968.

3. Mr. O'Connell, as Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security, is responsible for the supervision of three large and complex divisions of this Office. In addition, he is responsible for providing policy and technical guidance to our Area Security Officers assigned to other components of the Agency and in the field. Upon assuming his duties in August 1968, Mr. O'Connell was quick to grasp the general scope and nature of these varied and complex activities. He is an alert and intelligent supervisor and he recommended and put into effect several significant personnel and organizational changes within his Directorate which have resulted in significant improvement in the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Directorate. Recently, he was instrumental in creating a new Overseas Security Support Division made necessary by the dissolution of this Office's regional security staff in Frankfurt, West Germany. He is an astute manager and an

22 MAY 1969 CK

EYES ONLY
SECRET

[illegible]

effective supervisor. He brings to the performance of his duties broad knowledge and experience of security procedures and practices. He has been most effective in keeping a close rein on budgetary obligations within his Directorate.

4. Mr. O'Connell is personable and articulate and is able to express himself well in both written and oral form. His career is marked by steady advancement and consistently high level performances. He possesses all of the requisite qualities of a senior Security executive. However, I feel that he has not as yet applied all of these qualities to their maximum potential in his performance as DD/PTOS. Mr. O'Connell has one Division Chief who is extraordinarily capable and effective in producing results. Conversely, however, he presents one of the most difficult supervisory problems in the Office because of certain personal characteristics. I don't feel, and I believe that Mr. O'Connell would agree with me, that he has yet gotten on top of this individual as well as he should. I am convinced, however, that he is fully aware of the problem and is working hard to achieve the proper supervisory balance. I rate his performance, on balance, as STRONG with many outstanding features. I have complete confidence in Mr. O'Connell's ability, judgment and excellent potential. He is a valued career asset to this Office and the Agency.

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Howard J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

EYES ONLY
SECRET

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

29 APR 1969
Date

CONCUR:

for Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official

16 May 1969
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - ~~DDS~~ [illegible]

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

DD/S 68-2461

29 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
James P. O'Connell
Chief, Executive Staff

1. Mr. O'Connell has served as Chief, Executive Staff of this Office from 1 April 1967 to 31 March 1968, the rating period covered by this Fitness Report.

2. Mr. O'Connell has been most effective in the administration and direction of the complex and varied activities encompassed in the functions in the Executive Staff of this Office. He has been effective in directing the staff in the formulation and implementation of basic security policies and procedures. In addition, he has performed diligently in continuing review of the considerable volume of paper that transits the Office of the Director of Security. He has been meticulous in ensuring that staff work and correspondence leaving this office is up to the highest standards and has been very effective in arranging priority action in meeting short deadlines. As the initial professional recipient of the majority of correspondence received by this Office for action, he has been very effective in applying his knowledge of the basic organization of the Office to the assignment of action with appropriate coordination.

3. Mr. O'Connell is a personable and articulate senior executive who writes particularly well. He has had extensive experience as a Security careerist, both in Headquarters and overseas, and his career has been marked by rather rapid advancement and a record of fine performances in positions of increasing responsibility. I have no reservations about rating his performance in this position over the past year as OUTSTANDING.

20 MAY 1968
04

EYES ONLY
SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded [illegible]

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. In searching for an area where Mr. O'Connell might strive for further improvement, I am hard put to find any in the light of his consistently high performance record. I do believe, however, that Mr. O'Connell has lost or appears to have lost some of his enthusiasm and eager initiative which marked his performance for the first six months in this position. It is possible that this is due to the fact that the problems we encounter today require more measured and considered judgment as opposed to enthusiasm and initiative. Nonetheless I would like to see Mr. O'Connell strive for a better balance in these essential performance characteristics

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this report.

Howard J Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

2 9 APR 1969
Date

CONCUR:

for Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official

15 May 1969
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DD/S

[illegible]

EYES ONLY
SECRET

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING

Retirement Operations Branch Office of Personnel	FILE DATE 7 June 19[illegible]
RETIREE [illegible]	CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Central Cover Staff, the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT		CIVIL SERVICE		CIARDS	DATE				
COVER		OVERT ROUTINE		COVERT (OFFICIAL COVER) LOCK-UP		COVERT (NOC) SPECIAL	RETENTION OF AWARDS		YES	NO
CORRESPONDENCE		OVERT		COVERT		THRU CCS			

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE		U.S. GOV'T. CHECK				OTHER (Payment instructions follow)
TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE		CIA		CSC		OTHER (MEMO FOLLOWS)
REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION		YES		NO		INTERNAL TRANSFER

INSURANCE

FEGLI		OVERT		COVERT		MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD:

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE		YES		CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE		YES		NO		OVERT		COVERT

REMARKS

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

_______________ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FORM 4-73 3429 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET E-2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622 (4-5-13)

7 - OFF. PERS. FILE ROOM

S E C R E T

31 March 1959
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : James P. O'Connell

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/or, have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 11 November 1951, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~[illegible]~~ to deny ~~acknowledge~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. Operating component must take necessary action to block ~~[illegible]~~ telephone locator by submitting the Personnel Information Card, "Office File Copy", Form No. 642, to Machine Records Division, Office of the Comptroller, Room 107 Curie Hall, Attention: Miss Wenkenbach.

4. This memorandum confirms an oral request of 30 March 1959, Mr. R. A. Leigh, 1608 L Building, Ext. 4571.

HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS
Operating Division

S E C R E T



SECRET
(When Filled In)

RCS: 5 JULY 73

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	009784
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	06 29 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	3271 0500 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	PL 88-643 SECT 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDM&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY DEP DIR PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL AND OVERSEAS SECURITY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0459
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	16 7
17. SALARY OR RATE	36000

18. REMARKS

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	45
20. Employ. Code	10
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	
22. STATION CODE	
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. Hdqtrs Code	
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	02 19 17
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 5-NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	CBJ0000
32. Correction / Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT.)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.) CODE	
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0-WAIVER 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE: 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
BB
7 9 73

DMS: 21 JUNE 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA 24 YR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3271 0500 0001
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDM&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS: "IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:
20. Employ Code:
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1. CSC 2. CIA 3. FICA 5. NONE — CODE 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1. 5 PT 2. 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 WAIVER 1. YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1. NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1. YES 2. NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1. YES 2. NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-27-73

SECRET

DMS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

(4-57)

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 200	V	GS 16 7	$36,000

DD/PTOS Jan 13

A 37

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	16 200	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	6	$34,623	07/12/70	GS 16	7	$35,612	07/09/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE [illegible]

☒ NO EXCESS LWOPO 0

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS NB H.E.FISHER

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 200	V	GS 16 6	$34,623

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-65[illegible] AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 240	V	GS 16 6	$32,819

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 240	V	GS 16 5	$30,087

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 [illegible] 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 24[illegible]		GS 16 5	$[illegible]8,364

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009764	16 130	V	GS 16 4	$23,079	$25,118

EXEC STAFF
SF

A 37

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
009764	OCONNELL J P JR	16 130	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	4	~~$23,079~~ 25,118	07/17/66	GS 16	5	~~$23,978~~ 25,879	07/14/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE Howard J Osborn

DATE

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

21 37

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CS 0 / 31 / 72

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009[illegible]

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible] JR.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible]CELLATION OF [illegible].S.C.A.

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 0[illegible] DA [illegible] YR 72

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No Chargeable: [illegible] 0.00 [illegible]

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/SECURITY

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: [illegible]

11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [illegible]

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1.[illegible]01

16. GRADE AND STEP: [illegible]

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ. Code
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 5-NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECUR. REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVER 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPT.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-16-72 20[illegible]

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 11-71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

A-37

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	16 240	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	5	$30,087	07/14/68	GS 16	6	$30,972	07/12/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

☐ CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Howard J Osborn

DATE 5/7/70

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS mgs

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

FLW: 6 AUG 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	009734
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	08 | 01 | 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8271 0500 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY DD/PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL & OVERSEAS SECURITY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0459
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	16 5
17. SALARY OR RATE	25879
18. REMARKS	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	16240	SEC	75013		1	02 | 19 | 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA — 1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 4 NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction/Cancellation Data — TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE — CODE; 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE
37. LONG COMP DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY — CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE — CODE; 0 WAIVER, 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE — CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8-4-68 m

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	1[illegible] 375	V	GS 16 3	$20,24[illegible]	$20,975

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	15 130	V	GS 15 4	$22,085	$23,079

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJT: 27 JAN 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 01 15 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ X | V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7271 0103 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
SECURITY POLICY & EXECUTIVE STAFF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0701
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 22085
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC: 16130 — ALPHABETIC: SEC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 02 19 17
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE — CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — TYPE — MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE — CODE: 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA. YR):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — CODE — 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE — CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES 2 - NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES 2 - NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP. — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

11F

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	45 400	CF

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	15	
GS 15	4	$18,170	06/23/63	GS 15	5	$18,740	06/20/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

4

776

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY EB

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 375	V	GS 16 3	$20,975	$21,415

A40

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	16 375	V

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI		ADJ.
GS 16	3	21,415 ~~$20,975~~	07/08/65	GS 16	4	22,055 ~~$21,415~~	07/17/66			

8 Remarks and Authentication

NO EXCESS LWOP

IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS , AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NCN. 14 OCT 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

INF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009794
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS (CORRECTION)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 09 26 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF: X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6271 0300 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD/INVESTIGATIONS & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0522
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 20245
18. REMARKS:
THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 TO CHANGE THE EFFECTIVE DATE WHICH READ, 08/15/65, TO READ, 09/26/65.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 53
20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC: 16375 ALPHABETIC: SEC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HEADQRS. CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 2 19 17
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE: 16 MO DA YR: 08 15 65
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY GEO NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP; CODE:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS., 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 6

FORM 1150 11-62 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

NJM: ~~8~~ 13 ~~8~~ AUG 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 15 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS				
		V TO V		V TO CF
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6271 0300 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DEP DIR INVESTIGATIONS & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0522
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 20245
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
16	10	16375	SEC	75013		1	02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	30. CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32. MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY	38. CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	43. CODE	43. NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	44. CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM FEB

POSTED

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

372, 12 JUL 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009784	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) OCONNELL J P JR		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 18 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V X · CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6127 1600 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD FE/JKO - OKINAWA STATION ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION SECURITY UNIT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION OKINAWA ISLAND, US POSS		
11. POSITION TITLE SECURITY OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 4171	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION SS	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1810.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 20245

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 45400 ALPHABETIC FE	22. STATION CODE 75513	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA. YR 02 19 17	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR 07 08 65	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 07 08 65
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE · MO DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA. YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR · RESV PROV · TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPT STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

2/19/65 lin

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(14-91)

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS. EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	45 400	CF	GS 15 4	$16,005	$17,210

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	56 400 CF 16	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	3	$15,525	06/24/62	GS 15	4	$16,005	06/23/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

4
770

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

6/18/63

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [illegible] DATE 15 August 1963

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 330 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LA 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS: EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	56400	CF	15 3	$14330	15 3	$15525

ABM: 13 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009784	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 09 13 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3137 7000 3361	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP FE FE JAO OKINAWA STATION ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION SECURITY UNIT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION OKINAWA ISLAND, US POSS

11. POSITION TITLE SECURITY OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 4171	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1810.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 14380

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 56400	ALPHABETIC FE	22. STATION CODE 75513	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) 02 19 17	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9/13/62

09/24/62 25

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81)

Serial No.	Name	Cost Center Number	LWOP Hours
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	~~24-435~~ V	

Old Salary Rate: Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	New Salary Rate: Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	Action: SI	ADJ
GS 15	2	$19,055	12/25/60	GS 15	3	$19,380	06/24/6.		

8. Remarks and Authentication

to V [illegible]

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

ABM: 25 MAY 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 05 27 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2137 7000 3361
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP FE
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: UNDETERMINED
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 19055
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 20
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 56000 ALPHABETIC FE
22. STATION CODE: 99999
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 02 19 17
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR:
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES, 2 - NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: COST; CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

OSTED

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	[illegible]	[illegible]	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR
GS 15	1	$13,730	06	28	59	GS 15	2	$14,055	12	25	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-60 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 5 AUG 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	02	19	17		1	M	1	12	17	51

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes-1 No-2	Code
11	07	45		1	50 USCA 403 J						12	17	51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	3119	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	INVESTIGATOR	0436.83	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 13730	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	0271 1030

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	08	07	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SEC. SUP. DIV., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	3119	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	SECURITY OFFICER	0370	GS	1810.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 13730	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	1271 1030 1000

44. Remarks

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SS	OCONNELL J P JR	109784	31 19	GS-15 1	$12,770	$13,730

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 1 MAR 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	02	19	17		1	M	1	12	17	51	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
11	07	45		1	50 USCA 403 J						12	17	51

13. Mil. Serv. Credit Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3125	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	4	INVESTIGATOR	0187	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	0271 2051 0000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	67	03	06	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	3119	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	INVESTIGATOR	0436.83	GS	1810.22

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	0271 1030

44. Remarks

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 22 DEC 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	02	19	17		1	M	1	12	17	51	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Code
11	07	45		1	50 USCA 403 J				1	12	17	51	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3125	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	3	INVESTIGATOR	0187	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	9 7100 30 041

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	01	12	27	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3125	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	4	INVESTIGATOR	0187	GS	1810.22

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	0271 2051 0000

44. Remarks

SECRET

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JEC:26 JUNE 59

1. Serial No.: 509784
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): OCONNELL J P JR
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 02 Da. 19 Yr. 17
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M 1
6. CS - EOD: Mo. 12 Da. 17 Yr. 51
7. SCD: Mo. 11 Da. 07 Yr. 45
8. CSC Rqmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA 403 J
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code 1
12. LCD: Mo. 12 Da. 17 Yr. 51
13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
SECURITY SUPPORT DIV
SUPPORT BRANCH, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

Code:

15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.

Station Code:

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 1, USfld - 3, Frgn - 5): Code 2
17. Position Title: INVESTIGATOR
18. Position No.: 0311
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 1810.22
21. Grade & Step: 14 3
22. Salary Or Rate: $11835
23. SD: SS
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. Da. Yr.
25. PSI Due: Mo. Da. Yr.
26. Appropriation Number: 9 7100 20 003

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: PROMOTION TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
Code: 07
28. Eff. Date: Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR
Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE

Code: 3125

32. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.

Station Code: 75013

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 1, USfld - 3, Frgn - 5): Code 2
34. Position Title: INVESTIGATOR
35. Position No.: 01[illegible]
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 1810.22
38. Grade & Step: 15 1
39. Salary Or Rate: $12770
40. SD: SS
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. 06 Da. [illegible] Yr. 5[illegible]
42. PSI Due: Mo. 12 Da. 25 Yr. 60
43. Appropriation Number: 9 7100 30 041

44. Remarks

FO[illegible]ED

J. STEWART

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	2	$11,595	05	19	57	GS 14	3	$11,835	11	16	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
H. E. Steele	10 Oct, 1958	H. E. Steele

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560 1 MAR. 56 SECRET PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	2	$11,595	05	19	57	GS 14	3	$11,835	11	16	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

MAIL ROOM

G. M. STEWART

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b 1 MAR 56

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
		-14-2	$10,535	$11,595

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5.	[illegible]
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20		

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
14	1	$10,320	11	20	55	14	2	$10,535	05	19	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR

13. REMARKS

✓

14. AUTHENTICATION

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
14	1	$10,320	11	20	55	14	2	$10,535	05	19	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Hi Eastland Steele	5 April 1957	H. E. Steele

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-320080

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Payroll period

3. Book No. 6-8103-20

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) O'Connell, James P., Jr.

6. Grade and salary GS-13 - $9205.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s) Security - 8

12. Prepared by MG - 10/4/55

13. Audited by

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

dab

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR - MISS - MRS - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr. 109789
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb 1917
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 18 Nov 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 20 Nov 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator T-311-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T-311
GS-1810.22-13 $9420.00 Per Annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-14 $10,320.00 Per Annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security DD/Invest and Operational Support Security Support Division Support Branch Office of Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
				SD/SS

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-7103-20 TO: Same
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

POSTED

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

H. G. [illegible]

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Director of Personnel

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950 - 380000

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PA)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Rec. 20 May 1955 rwb

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. JAMES PATRICK O'CONNELL, JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 1917	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 3 June 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT	6. EFFECTIVE DATE B.O.D. 5 June 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator T-323	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T-311-13
GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District Field Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security DD/Invest & Operational Support Security Support Division Support Branch Off of Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-SR

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-7130-30 TO: 5-7103-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
DATED 1[illegible] MAR. 1955
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: $9265

POSTED
14 JUN 1955

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1950—[illegible]

TJ 6/13/55

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 17 Nov. 1954

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. JAMES PATRICK O'CONNELL, JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 1917	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 3 Dec. 1954
This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:			
5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT	6. EFFECTIVE DATE B.O.B. 5 Dec. 1954	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J	

FROM		TO
Investigator T-311	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T-323
GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp Inq Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District Field Office
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-82

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-7103-20 TO: 5-7130-30	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

FO[illegible]ED
12-6-54

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director [illegible]

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Pay roll 10/[illegible] [illegible]-20

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
O'CONNELL, JAMES P. Jr.

6. Grade and salary
GS 13 $8360.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY		TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.		NET PAY
7. Previous period										
8. New period										
9. Pay this period										

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
SECURITY 8

12. Prepared by
reh/3/10/54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
[illegible]	[illegible]	$8360.00	$8560.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Periods

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ [illegible] status of [illegible] period.
☐ LWOP [illegible] period.

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950 General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

neo

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.	19 Feb 1917		23 Apr 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment	25 Apr 1954	50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen) T311	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T311
GS-1810-13	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $8360.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp Inq Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWP	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-SE

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

-ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC-

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. 17
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 9 Dec. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 20 Dec. 53
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen) T126	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (Gen) T311
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810-13 $8360.00 per annum
Inspection & Security Office Project Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper. Support/Sp. Inquiry Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

verified

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ L.A. ☐ REAL. ☐ CD-3E

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Personnel Director

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

12/10/53

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

Inspection & Security Office

Page 2 of 7 Pages

VOUCHERED

Used in lieu of SF-52 &/or or SF-50 to document the following types of personnel actions involving no change in grade or salary; (a) Change in Title (b) Change of Position No. (c) Reassignment within Division without series Code change

All Class series are the same on the From and To sides.

Eff. Date: 2/15/53

T/O App.: 1/14/53

NAME	ORG.INF.& POS.TITLE	SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	SLOT NOS.	ACTION	ORG.INF.& POS.TITLE	SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	SLOT NOS.
Interrogation Research Branch	(cont'd.)					Interrogation Res.Branch	
Greenwood, Austin E.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-11	T95.06	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-11	T95.07-11
Wuerth, Howard J.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-9	T96.03	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-9	T96-9
Kuhn, Steven L.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-9	T96	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-9	T96.01-9
O'Connor, James P.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-9	T96.04	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-9	T96.02-9
Bittorf, Walter F.	Polygraph Tech.	GS-11	T222	b	Polygraph Tech.	GS-1671-11	T278
SSD Office of the Chief						SSD Office of the Chief	
Gromek, Helen	Secy.Steno.	GS-5	T130.04	b,c	Secy.Steno.	GS-318-5	T284
Special Referral Branch						Special Referral Branch	
Livingstone, John A.	Inv.CE	GS-11	T108.01	a,b,c	Inv.Gen.	GS-1810-11	T286.02-11
Sprouse, James M.	Inv. CE	GS-9	T108.04	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T108.01-9
Hoatson, Chester R.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T128.05	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T108.02
Collins, Wallace C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T128.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T108.04
Lach, Stanley	Inv. CE	GS-9	T109.02	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T109
Stembridge, Sidney D.	Inv. CE	GS-9	T109	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T109.01
Cox, Thomas A.	Inv. CE	GS-7	T109.01	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-7	T109.02-7
Lunsden, Dorothy S.	Secy.Steno.	GS-5	T110	b	Secy. Steno.	GS-318-5	T287-5
Ryan, Mary P.	Clerk Steno.	GS-4	T52	b,c	Clerk Steno.	GS-312-4	T111-[illegible]
Banks, Isabelle	Clerk typing	GS-3	T141.01	b,c	Clerk typing	GS-301-3	T141-3
Operations Branch, Project Section					Operations Br.	Project Section	
O'Connell, James P.	Inv. Gen.	GS-13	T126.04	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-13	T126
Kroppy, Joseph F.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T127.07	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T127.01
Hamby, Louis L.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T127.08	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T127.03-11
Carver, Carol J.	Secy.Steno.	GS-5	T130.01	b,a	Secy.Steno.	GS-318-5	T130
Brodeur, Ruth C.	Clerk Steno.	GS-4	T131.03	b,a	Clerk Steno.	GS-312-4	T131
Delmar, Margaret J.	Clerk Steno.	GS03	T131.07	b,a	Clerk Steno.	GS-312-3	T131.01-3
Benini, Tulia Anne	Clerk Steno.	GS-4	T131	b,a	Clerk Steno	GS-312-4	T131.02
Covert Security Branch						Covert Security ~~Branch~~ Sect	
Olson, Edwin C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T127.03	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T289-12
Carter, Albert T.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T127.05	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T290

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

App.by: ____________ Staff or Div. Chief

App. by: ____________ Class & Wage Div.

App. by: ____________ Personnel Div.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PRESCRIBED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. '17
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 7 Nov. 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 9 Nov. 52
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: ScheduleA-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen.) T126.04-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (Gen.)T126.04
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810-1‍3 $8360.00 per annum
Inspection and Security Office Special Security Division Operations Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: 11X2100
FROM: 7103-00
TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Assistant Chief, Personnel Division

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

SIGNATURE OR AUTHENTICATION

1P

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952-810794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. '17
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 30 Sept '52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 12 Oct. '52
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: ScheduleA-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen.) T127.10	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (Gen.) T126.04-12
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12
Inspection and Security Office Special Security Division Admin. Pool-Operations Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Operations Staff
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 11X2100 TO: 7103-00
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or cancelled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Chief, Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

lp

EMJ 9.30.52

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952-810794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

Security Information

INSPECTION & SECURITY OFFICE

CODE "T"

SPECIAL SECURITY DIVISION

NAME	TITLE	GRADE SERIES	POSITION NUMBER
OPERATIONS STAFF CONTINUED			
FERRALL, Francis I.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-9	T128-9
MOONEY, James J.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-7	T128.01-7
DIEDRICH, Robert C.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T128.02
BELT, Charles	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T128.03
KOHN, Patricia	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T129-5
BLACK, Dorothy M.	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130
VASS, Carol J.	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130.01
NICKLAU, Elaine	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130.02
PIRRONE, Marie	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-4	T130.03-4
ST.IVANYI, Elaine	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-4	T130.04-4
BAIWIR, Frances E.P.	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130.05
GROMEK, Helen	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131
OLDHAM, Katherine B.	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.01
MASCIOCCHI, Norma	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.02
CHECHILE, Rose Mary	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.03
BRIGHTMAN, Joan Lois	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.04
LEITH, Elizabeth A.	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.05
ADMINISTRARIVE POOL			
OPERATIONS STAFF			
GREENER, William E., Jr.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T126.05-11
CARROLL, Thomas M.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T127.08
PARR, Laurence G.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T127.09-11
O'CONNELL, James P.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T127.10
LAFFERTY, LaVerne	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.07

h- Cl. - 5 March 1952
ACD

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. 1917
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: # 2
4. DATE: 31 March 1952

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Excepted Appointment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 31 Mar. 1952
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Sch. - A - 6.116 (3)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator General GS — 12
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS — 12 1810 $7040.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Inspection & Security Office Special Security Division Admin. Pool Operations Staff
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL	
				Da. #6393 23 Feb. 1951

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2123900 TO: 7103
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 31 March 1952
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS

(7)

This appointment is subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of three months.

SF # 61 Affidavit executed.

Chief Personnel Division 09

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-899675

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

FD + MR
26 MAR

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: O'CONNELL, James P. ~~Patrick~~, Jr.

DATE: 13 February 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: RESIGNATION

EFFECTIVE DATE: COB ~~18~~ 30 March 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Investigator General	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12 $7040.00 pa	
OFFICE	Inspection & Security Office	
DIVISION	Special Security Division	
BRANCH	SSD Pool Admin Pool	
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

C. F. HENEY C F Heney

PERSONNEL OFFICER

D Mulcahy 3-16-52

CLASSIFICATION

EXECUTIVE

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

Please transfer leave to "V" funds.

RED

2 27

JM2

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16—63300-1

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: O'CONNELL, James ~~Patrick~~ P., Jr.

DATE: 5 December 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: New Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 December 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Investigator General
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-12 - $7040.00 p.a.
OFFICE		Inspection and Security Office
DIVISION		Special Security Division
BRANCH		SSD Pool Admin Pool
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS G C Ball 9534	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. J. KING Administrative Officer	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION Gilbert 12/14/51	PERSONNEL OFFICER D Mulcahy	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☑ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO-STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 17 December 1951

SECURITY CLEARED ON 10 December 1951

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED NA

ENTERED ON DUTY 17 December 1951

DoG 11/04/50
EOD 12/17/51
LCD 12/17/51

SERVICE DATES VERIFIED
BY Rmw DATE 2 DEC 1954

Robert J. Hayes
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

1810

REMARKS:

Slot No. 6
1 PHS attached. Security has retained the necessary papers for processing.

Recruitment Request No. 1862

Posted JM 1 2 Jan
ofw 5/3/54

REQUEST CONTACTS BE MADE
BY SECURITY ONLY

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

24 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1971 to 31 March 1972. The rating period covers the third full year that Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security.

2. The directorate which Mr. O'Connell supervises is geographically widely separated in the Headquarters area. This separation adds complexities to the task of supervising the directorate and coordinating the activities of three Divisions, operating over a broad spectrum of activities and responsibilities. During the reporting period, one of the Divisions of Mr. O'Connell's directorate took on an important, added responsibility--the security of automatic data processing. This function covers the complexity of maintaining security in a rapidly expanding activity replete with serious security problems because of the severe compaction of information resulting from rapid advances and acceptability of technology in the field of data handling. The achievements of the Physical Security Division, the Technical Division, and the Overseas Security Support Division require a high degree of coordination in order to avoid contradictions detrimental to a unified security policy.

3. In spite of the difficulty of supervising divisions remotely located from his office, Mr. O'Connell has applied and achieved effective supervision. The Divisions moved forward in an

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
EYES ONLY

innovative manner and have been effective in discharging their responsibilities.

4. Mr. O'Connell also spearheads the security program which furnishes Security Officers to overseas stations and domestic operations as necessary. Mr. O'Connell has taken a personal interest in this activity and has been of considerable assistance to the Office of Security Career Board in the assignment of Security careerists to those positions.

5. During the last Fitness Report, the description of Mr. O'Connell's performance was raised from "Strong" to "Outstanding." He has continued his performance in such a manner as to warrant an OUTSTANDING rating.

6. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell — 24 April 1972
James P. O'Connell — Date

CONCURRENCE:

Howard J. Osborn — 28 April 1972
Howard J. Osborn — Date
Director of Security
Reviewing Official

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 009784

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 02/19/17
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-16
5. SD: SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Security Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/PTOS/ODD
8. CURRENT STATION: Washington, D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1972
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1971 - 31 March 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 1 MAY 1972	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER

EYES ONLY
SECRET

26 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report -16
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This is a narrative Fitness Report which covers the period from 1 April 1970 through 31 March 1971.

2. During this entire period, Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security. The rating period covers his second full year in that position. The Directorate which Mr. O'Connell heads has gained added importance and increased attention during the year. It encompasses an area of activity which is vitally important to the Office of Security and the Agency as a whole. Mr. O'Connell has given considerable attention to efforts which decrease our vulnerability at the hands of foreign opposition as well as from domestic efforts resulting from national unrest. Mr. O'Connell has shown improvement in the over-all coordination of his responsibilities throughout the current rating period. He supervises his people in an effective manner and anticipates problems so as to simplify their solutions.

3. During the previous rating period, Mr. O'Connell's performance was considered to be STRONG with several outstanding features. During the year, I consider that there has been sufficient addition to the outstanding areas of his performance to raise his over-all rating to OUTSTANDING.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

5 MAY 1971

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell 27 April 71
Date

CONCURRENCE:

Howard J. Osborn 30 APR 1971
Director of Security
Reviewing Official
Date

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

29 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1969 through 31 March 1970.

2. The rating period covers the first full year that Mr. O'Connell has served as Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security at the GS-16 level.

3. The year encompassed in the rating period has seen myriad complex and varied additional responsibilities develop within Mr. O'Connell's Directorate. Specifically, he has supervised the activation and implementation of the Overseas Security Support Division, a new component within the Office and an extremely important one. He has supervised the first full year of implementation of the Interagency Training Center at Hedgeneck, Maryland, which falls within the purview of the Chief, Technical Division. Finally, he has been a participant in an overall survey of the security of the Headquarters Building and has supervised the Chief, Physical Security Division in developing and applying new physical security techniques and realistic principles of physical security. Mr. O'Connell is a capable and efficient supervisor. He is a veteran in the Office of Security and has a knowledge of all of the various ramifications of the Agency's total security mission.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

[illegible] 1970

4. Mr. O'Connell is poised and expresses himself very well, both in oral and written form. I evaluate Mr. O'Connell's performance over the past year as STRONG with several outstanding features. I have confidence in his judgment and ability and consider him a valuable career asset of this Office. His has been a difficult task in that as well as assuming new and additional functions, he has been burdened with the supervision of one Division Chief who has proven to be extremely difficult to handle over the years. In fairness to Mr. O'Connell, I should add that no one in this Office has been particularly effective in supervising this individual who is now slated for early retirement. I believe that with this individual's departure Mr. O'Connell should be able to achieve a more coherent integration of his Directorate's functions in the interest of further efficiency and effectiveness.

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

15 MAY 1970
Date

CONCUR:

Howard J Osborn

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Reviewing Official

29 APR 1970
Date

14-00000

CERTIFICATION OF ATTENDANCE

NAME OF SCHOOL OR FACILITY: BROOKINGS INSTITUTE

COURSE : CONF. FOR FED. EX. ON BUSINESS OPS.

COURSE DATES : 18 - 23 MAY 1969

GRADE (IF GIVEN) :

EXTERNAL TRAINING REQUEST NUMBER : 024745

I certify the above to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

James P. O'Connell 5/26/69
SIGNATURE DATE

NOTE: This form is to be used only when the facility attended does not give official completion information.

TRAINING COMPLETED
Request No. 024745
Date [illegible] 1969

EYES ONLY
SECRET

29 APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

OC 7784- SEC-SS

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1968 through 31 March 1969.

2. Mr. O'Connell was appointed Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security in August 1968 and this Rating covers his performance during this period as well as his performance as Executive Officer from 1 April 1968 to 1 August 1968.

3. Mr. O'Connell, as Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security, is responsible for the supervision of three large and complex divisions of this Office. In addition, he is responsible for providing policy and technical guidance to our Area Security Officers assigned to other components of the Agency and in the field. Upon assuming his duties in August 1968, Mr. O'Connell was quick to grasp the general scope and nature of these varied and complex activities. He is an alert and intelligent supervisor and he recommended and put into effect several significant personnel and organizational changes within his Directorate which have resulted in significant improvement in the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Directorate. Recently, he was instrumental in creating a new Overseas Security Support Division made necessary by the dissolution of this Office's regional security staff in Frankfurt, West Germany. He is an astute manager and an

OC

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

effective supervisor. He brings to the performance of his duties broad knowledge and experience of security procedures and practices. He has been most effective in keeping a close rein on budgetary obligations within his Directorate.

4. Mr. O'Connell is personable and articulate and is able to express himself well in both written and oral form. His career is marked by steady advancement and consistently high level performances. He possesses all of the requisite qualities of a senior Security executive. However, I feel that he has not as yet applied all of these qualities to their maximum potential in his performance as DD/PTOS. Mr. O'Connell has one Division Chief who is extraordinarily capable and effective in producing results. Conversely, however, he presents one of the most difficult supervisory problems in the Office because of certain personal characteristics. I don't feel, and I believe that Mr. O'Connell would agree with me, that he has yet gotten on top of this individual as well as he should. I am convinced, however, that he is fully aware of the problem and is working hard to achieve the proper supervisory balance. I rate his performance, on balance, as STRONG with many outstanding features. I have complete confidence in Mr. O'Connell's ability, judgment and excellent potential. He is a valued career asset to this Office and the Agency.

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

EYES ONLY
SECRET

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell

29 APR 1969
Date

CONCUR:

for Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official

16 May 1969
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee ✓
1 - ~~DDS~~ OS/HATS/FD

EYES ONLY
SECRET

14-00000

EYES ONLY
SECRET

DD/S 68-2461

2 9 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
James P. O'Connell
Chief, Executive Staff

1. Mr. O'Connell has served as Chief, Executive Staff of this Office from 1 April 1967 to 31 March 1968, the rating period covered by this Fitness Report.

2. Mr. O'Connell has been most effective in the administration and direction of the complex and varied activities encompassed in the functions in the Executive Staff of this Office. He has been effective in directing the staff in the formulation and implementation of basic security policies and procedures. In addition, he has performed diligently in continuing review of the considerable volume of paper that transits the Office of the Director of Security. He has been meticulous in ensuring that staff work and correspondence leaving this office is up to the highest standards and has been very effective in arranging priority action in meeting short deadlines. As the initial professional recipient of the majority of correspondence received by this Office for action, he has been very effective in applying his knowledge of the basic organization of the Office to the assignment of action with appropriate coordination.

3. Mr. O'Connell is a personable and articulate senior executive who writes particularly well. He has had extensive experience as a Security careerist, both in Headquarters and overseas, and his career has been marked by rather rapid advancement and a record of fine performances in positions of increasing responsibility. I have no reservations about rating his performance in this position over the past year as OUTSTANDING.

30 MAY 1968

EYES ONLY
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. In searching for an area where Mr. O'Connell might strive for further improvement, I am hard put to find any in the light of his consistently high performance record. I do believe, however, that Mr. O'Connell has lost or appears to have lost some of his enthusiasm and eager initiative which marked his performance for the first six months in this position. It is possible that this is due to the fact that the problems we encounter today require more measured and considered judgment as opposed to enthusiasm and initiative. Nonetheless I would like to see Mr. O'Connell strive for a better balance in these essential performance characteristics

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this report.

Howard J Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

2 9 APR 1968
Date

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official

15 May 1968
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DD/S

069284-Sec

EYES ONLY
SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM : Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT : Completion of External Training

26 SEP 1967

This is to advise you that James O'Connell training request # 020602 attended the following external training program :

COURSE : Exec. Seminar in Automatic Data Processing

INSTITUTION: Civil Service Commission

DATE : 7-8 September 1967

GRADE : None

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Jean A. Stilwell

Attachments:

— Grade Report
— Certificate of Completion
— Roster of Participants
X Training Report by Student
— Training Report by Institution
— None
— Other: ____________

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF TRAINING AT NON-CIA FACILITY
(Forward Original and One)

TO : Director of Training ATTN : Registrar/TR THROUGH: Training Officer	FROM : James P. O'Connell OFFICE: Office of Security DATE : 12 September 1967
1. FACILITY ATTENDED Civil Service Commission 1900 E Street, N.W. Washington, D. C.	2. DATES OF TRAINING 7 - 8 September 1967

3. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM

Executive Seminar in Automatic Data Processing

4. YOUR TRAINING OBJECTIVES

A broad orientation of the ADP field both in and out of government.

5. EVALUATION OF PROGRAM *(Include: a. Strengths and weaknesses of program. b. Identify any outstanding speakers and their specific topics or area of instructional competence.)*

I found the seminar extremely informative and worthwhile from the standpoint of examining the historical progression of the ADP from several points of view. All the speakers were highly qualified in their particular field and their presentations were well prepared. All were exceptionally apt in fielding questions.

Mr. Bert Engelhardt, Associate Director, ADP Management Center, CSC, was a gracious host and handled his role as moderator in a truly professional manner. He has an engaging, friendly personality and is effectively articulate. If I were to single out any weakness it would be Mr. Engelhardt's lecture. He spoke on the Systems Analyst. In his presentation he seemed not to take into consideration the professional level of the group and devoted an inordinate amount of time on basic managerial precepts. This seemed to have an irritating effect on the participants who by virtue of their positions had considerable experience in the management field.

Overall I would say, notwithstanding the above observation, it is an interesting and effective program.

6. ATTACHED ARE	TRANSCRIPT OF GRADES		YES	X	NO
	CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION		YES	X	NO

7. I CERTIFY THAT I ATTENDED THE TRAINING PROGRAM DESCRIBED ABOVE.

James P. O'Connell
SIGNATURE

NOTE: Upon receipt of this report, with attachments as applicable, a certification of completion will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in your official folder.

FORM 4-63 1049 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (38-45)

SECRET

009784
55
16 GR
4
1

18 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : James P. O'Connell
Fitness Report

1. This memorandum will supplement the information contained in Mr. Victor R. White's memorandum of 10 April 1967, since Mr. O'Connell was reassigned to the position of Chief, Security Policy and Executive Staff on 9 January 1967.

2. This then covers the period from 9 January 1967 to 31 March 1967. During this period, Mr. O'Connell quickly justified the selection for this key position in the Office of Security and has already begun to demonstrate his executive talents in this position.

3. Although the period for which he is being rated in this position is too short to be characterized definitively or finally, I would say that his progress thus far justifies an unqualified rating of "Outstanding".

Howard J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

27 [illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

10 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
(Outstanding Fitness Report)

The attached Fitness Report reflects an Outstanding performance. Mr. O'Connell is a senior executive in the Office of Security who has recently been assigned to an important Staff Chief function. In view of Mr. O'Connell's career progress, no special recognition for this outstanding performance is considered necessary at this time.

Victor R. White
Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

Attachment

[illegible] 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible] and
[illegible]

SECRET

10 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

This is an annual Fitness Report on the above employee for the period ending 9 January 1967. Mr. O'Connell was reassigned from Assistant Deputy Director of Security (IOS) to Chief, Security Policy and Executive Staff, and the Director of Security will add comments for the remainder of the rating period ending 31 March 1967.

As Assistant to the DDS(IOS), Mr. O'Connell applied exceptional executive talent in sharing with me the responsibility for the direction of the investigative and operational support programs in the Office of Security. It is felt that Mr. O'Connell made an outstanding contribution to the management of IOS at a time of the heaviest work pressures in our history. Mr. O'Connell has a calm, clinical approach to work problems, and his solutions to these problems reflect the soundness of his judgment and the breadth of his experience. He expresses himself clearly and concisely in both writing and speech. As Assistant DDS(IOS), he demonstrated sound management concepts and acute cost consciousness. His strength as a supervisor is reflected in the universal respect he enjoys among all subordinates.

I regard Mr. O'Connell's performance as ADDS(IOS) as "Outstanding."

Victor R. White

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

Noted by Employee:

James P. O'Connell 10 April 1967
Date

Reviewing Official Comments:

Howard J. Osborn 4/16/67.
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Date

* See memo.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 02/19/17
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-16
5. SD: SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Security Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/IOS/Off. of DD
8. CURRENT STATION: Washington, D. C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE	
	SPECIAL (Specify):			

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 25 April 1966
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 16 August 1965 - 31 March 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached Memorandum	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

22 APR 1966

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

18 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

1. This is an Annual Fitness Report on the above employee for the period ending 31 March 1966. Mr. O'Connell is currently assigned as Assistant Deputy Director of Security (IOS), a position he assumed in September 1965. He was promoted to GS-16 at the time he assumed these responsibilities on the basis of a long period of distinguished service that was culminated in his assignment as Regional Security Officer for the Far East.

2. As my Assistant, Mr. O'Connell shares with me the responsibility for the direction of the investigative and operational support programs of the Office of Security. He brings to this position a wealth of experience, sound management concepts, and the ability to meet and solve complex administrative problems. I have implicit confidence in his judgment, and he enjoys the full respect of all of his associates. Mr. O'Connell has made an outstanding contribution to the management and direction of IOS at a time when our work load is the highest in history. He is susceptible to innovation and has a keen appreciation of cost factors in meeting his managerial responsibilities. He has a unique ability to put work problems in the proper focus, does his job without fanfare, and maintains extremely high standards of work accomplishment.

3. Mr. O'Connell's performance fully justifies his promotion to the supergrade level and, in the relatively short time he has been in his current assignment, his overall performance is considered unusually strong with many outstanding aspects.

Victor R. White

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

18 April 1966

Noted by Employee:

James P. O'Connell

18 April 1966
Date

Reviewing Official:

Howard J Osborn

19 April 1966
Date

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

MANAGERIAL GRID SEMINAR (50 hours) DATES: 8-13 May 1966

Student : James P. O'Connell, Jr.
Office : OS
Year of Birth: 1917
Service ~~Designation~~ SS
Grade : 16
No. of Students : 33
EOD Date : December 1951

COURSE OBJECTIVES AND METHOD

Course objectives are to aid participants to: learn the managerial theories contained in the Grid; understand their personal managerial styles in Grid terms; evaluate convictions about managerial values; develop team action skills; increase candidness of communication; strengthen the use of critique for problem-solving and learning; and acquire an appreciation of Organization Culture and Development.

The method of learning offers a challenge to all participants regardless of level or experience. A Grid Seminar is not "taught" in the usual sense. In Grid teams, participants solve complex management problems. Objective solutions are made available. Individual and team performance is repeatedly assessed. Various measuring instruments are used to evaluate effectiveness.

Critique sessions assist each participant to understand how he might change his own behavior to increase his problem-solving effectiveness. Thus managers are not told the best way to manage, but they learn by convincing themselves.

About twenty to thirty hours of study are completed as prework. Insights gained are deepened and personalized during the intensive 50-hour Seminar.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor

7 JUN 1966
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) OCONNELL JAMES P. JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE ACTING DCOS	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE OKINAWA		8. CURRENT STATION Okinawa	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- XX REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 31 March 65 - 15 June 65

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Memo in lieu of Fitness Report (See Section C)	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 14 10 18 AM '65
MAIL ROOM

The period of this report is less than 90 days from the date of subject's annual report.

A Memo in Lieu of Fitness Report was prepared on subject for the period 12 September 1964 - 31 March 1965 and all comments in that memo remain in effect.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 29 June 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE JAMES P OCONNELL JR. /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 29 June 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JAMES D. ANDREWS/s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Comments of reviewing officer of last report remain in effect.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET

8 April 1965

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: [redacted] James P. O'Connell
Period 12 September 1964 - 31 March 1965

[redacted], chief of the Regional KUSODA Support Staff for nearly three years, is 43 years old and a career employee with more than 13 years service. Although this has been his first overseas tour, he and his family are well adjusted to foreign assignment, and he is apparently able and willing to serve in any position offered.

As the senior KUSODA officer in the Far East, he directs the activities of six officers on his own staff as well as supervises and provides guidance to all other KUSODA officers assigned in the Far East; in addition he monitors the performance of three other KUSODA officers attached to this Station. In this supervisory role, he has an excellent insight into the abilities of his staff and definitely holds the respect of his subordinates.

As the senior KUSODA officer he is my principle adviser on many KUSODA matters. His judgment is mature, his evaluations usually sound. He is dependable and I believe his loyalty to our service and his superiors is above question.

He operates his staff well, is cost conscious and requires an absolute minimum of supervision from Station command.

He maintains excellent liaison relationships with other island services.

[redacted] will continue to develop and can assume positions of greater responsibility.

I rate this officer as Strong--on the high side.

/s/ James D. Andrews, COS

READ: /s/ James P. O'Connell

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 009784

SECTION A **GENERAL**

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'Connell James P	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Okinawa	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
	SPECIAL *(Specify):*				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL *(Specify):*		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
May 65

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
12 Sept 64 - 31 March 65

SECTION B **PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Memo in lieu of Fitness Report attached	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

2 MAY 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAR 30 2 08 PM '65
MAIL ROOM

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 8 April 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James P. O'Connell

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 8 April 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James D. Andrews

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attachment

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

O'CONNELL, James P.

Comments of Reviewing Official:

I agree with the rating officer's comments. Mr. O'Connell has been a credit to the Okinawa Station and to his parent Career Service.

Signature of Reviewing Official: W E Colby

William E. Colby

Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'Connell James P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [redacted] DDP/FE/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Okinawa	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 64 - 11 Sept 64

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the ~~manner in which employee~~ performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Memo in lieu of Fitness Report attached	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

30 SEP 1964

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 1 9 08 AM '64
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 11 Sep 64	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James P. O'Connell

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 11 Sep 64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Alan Warfield

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the comments of the rating officer. Though I am not in a position to deal directly with Mr. O'Connell, I am aware of responsibilities and fully appreciative of excellent support rendered to the COS, Okinawa and to Area FE Stations of the Security Staff at Okinawa.

DATE 25 SEP 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Acting Chief, Far East Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert J. Myers

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

2 September 1964

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: [redacted]
Period 1 April 1964 - 1 September 1964

A full fitness report was prepared by me on this officer on 15 April and therefore this memorandum, being prepared in connection with my transfer, will merely supplement the previous report.

During the past five months I have had further evidence to substantiate the statements made concerning [redacted]s maturity and dependability. He has been my chief counselor in a recent reappraisal of standards of behavior from a security standpoint. His opinions and advice are always carefully thought through, devoid of fear induced over caution, and realistic.

[redacted] continues to be a good supervisor. He knows his people, their capabilities and limitations. They respect him for his leadership.

In liaison with other security activities [redacted] has established excellent relationships which have frequently proven their value. He has considerable talent for liaison which should be kept in mind in selecting his next assignment.

[redacted]

[redacted]

/s/ Alan Warfield

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009734

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'Connell James P Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT RSS /		8. CURRENT STATION Okinawa	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify): Memo in lieu of FR		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 31 March 63 - 31 March 64

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

27 MAY 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible]

11 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Administration and Training Staff

SUBJECT : Fitness Report of James O'Connell

I concur in the attached evaluation of Mr. James O'Connell's performance for the period 31 March 1963 to 31 March 1964. In addition, I wish to add that Mr. O'Connell has accomplished his fine performance with a minimum of supervision and direction from this Office which is responsible for support to the Overseas Security Officers.

E M Winters

E. M. WINTERS
Deputy Director of Security (PPS)

Attachment:
Fitness Report

[illegible]

[illegible]

27 MAY 1964

SECRET

15 April 1964

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: [redacted] James O'Connell, GS-16

Period 31 March 1963 - 31 March 1964

James O'Connell

[redacted] is Chief, Regional Security Staff, FE. As such he has performed a fine job in meeting the requirements of FE Stations for security services and in gaining acceptance for the security program. The requirements have been considerably accelerated during past months due to the unsettled conditions in the FE Area. Also support to Headquarters projects has been added to the security office. Perhaps too frequently a job which falls to the station and which cannot be properly identified with one component falls to the Regional Security Staff. O'Connell [redacted] while keeping his eye on his primary responsibilities has been most helpful and cooperative in handling secondary duties.

He is a mature officer, seasoned by experience and training. He is calm and poised in crisis situations. His dependability and personality are genuine assets to the Station.

O'Connell

[redacted] is a good supervisor who promotes team work among his people, who is opposed to waste, and has demonstrated his interest in efficiency and economy.

O'Connell

[redacted] makes a sincere effort to separate the Regional Security office from the Station Security office, however, this is difficult if not impossible to do. Perhaps the Station is as much to blame as the overlapping of the various security functions. Surely it is understandable that the Chief of Station wants the best advice he can get on a security matter of concern to him and will turn to the senior officer available. This is an especially tempting recourse with such a fine officer as [redacted] close at hand.

O'Connell

He has responded well to the call for economy and although he has little latitude in this respect he has instituted some restrictions that will result in savings. He writes lucidly and succinctly.

I am pleased that he is to be at this Station for another year.

[redacted]

[redacted]

/s/ Alan D. Winfield

[illegible]

READ: [redacted]

[redacted]

27 MAY 1964

SECRET

ECRET
n Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'Connell James P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 February 17	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SS	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/IOS/[illegible]SD/CC

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	~~DENIED~~

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	✓	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 62

11. REPORTING PERIOD From March 61 - ~~March~~ 27 Nov 62 To

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							
THINKS CLEARLY							
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 9-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]
[illegible]
DEN

10 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

Mr. O'CONNELL is completing eleven years of Agency service. He holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from St. John's University and his experience qualifications include four years of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This evaluation covers Mr. O'CONNELL's performance as Chief of the Security Support Division. During this period the accomplishments of the Division reflected a high caliber of leadership. Mr. O'CONNELL has displayed outstanding executive ability and a broad understanding of the investigative, support, and security problems inherent in the job. Mr. O'CONNELL applies his abilities well and obtains a high level of work productivity and quality. He has considerable capacity for further development and is currently assigned as Chief, Regional Security Support Staff, FE.

It is felt that Mr. O'CONNELL's present assignment will add to the breadth of his experience and coupled with his proven talents for administration will insure the development of his potential for greater responsibility at the executive level.

Victor R. White

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

Reviewing Official:

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Noted By Employee:
(Mr. O'Connell is on PCS assignment and not available. A copy of this Fitness Report will be furnished him.)
James P. O'Connell

SECRET

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

James P. O'Connell

has attended and successfully completed the

SECURITY OFFICE
SPECIAL TRAINING COURSE

Security Officer Field Course #12

during the period 14 May *to* 25 May 1962

William A. Kotapish
FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA

WASHINGTON, D.C.

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

James P. O'Connell

has attended and successfully completed the

SECURITY OFFICE

SPECIAL TRAINING COURSE

Physical Security Training Course #8

during the period **23 April** *to* **11 May 1962**

William Kotapish

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA

WASHINGTON, D.C.

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Introduction to Intelligence No. 50
40 hours, full-time 19 - 23 March 1962 45 students

Student : **O'Connell, James P., Jr.** Grade: **GS-15** Year of Birth: **1917**

EOD Date : **December 1951** Office : **Security**

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

Introduction to Intelligence has four objectives: (1) to instruct the student in the basic concepts of intelligence and the role of national intelligence within the Government; (2) to describe the intelligence community: its members, their duties, and their relationship to CIA; (3) to define and describe the functions of CIA and identify the components performing them; and (4) to explain the processes and means by which CIA fulfills its responsibilities for collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence.

Lectures given by Orientation Faculty members and guest speakers take up about half the time; seminar and review exercises, about one fourth; and study periods and training films, the remaining quarter. An Intelligence Products Exhibit, representing all the Offices of the DD/I, puts on display the products of those Offices and by visual aids demonstrates the activities of each Office.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student achievement is judged on the basis of a 40 item multiple choice test on course content given the last day of the course. On the basis of this test each student is given an adjectival rating. The number of students in this class receiving each adjectival rating is shown below. This student's rating is indicated by the asterisk.

Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Excellent
0	22	23*

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: ______________________ 23 March '62
Chief, Orientation Faculty Date

S E C R E T

TRAINING REPORT

Counterintelligence Familiarization Course No. 30
80 hours full-time 29 January - 9 February 1962

Students: 17

Student: **O'CONNELL, James P.,Jr.**

Year of Birth: **1917**

EOD Date: **December 1951**

Grade: GS-15

Office: **OS/Ops.Support Div.**

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

This course, designed for the staff employee who requires a basic knowledge of counterintelligence doctrine and methodology, aims to increase his understanding of this activity by (a) acquainting him with current counterintelligence concepts and objectives and the organization and functions of counterintelligence targets, (b) familiarizing him with skills and techniques employed in detecting, investigating, and operating against targets, and (c) showing him how to report, record, and disseminate counterintelligence information.

The student is instructed through the media of lectures, directed reading, tours, training films, examinations, class exercises, and discussions.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

The overall adjectival rating and comments below are derived from a review of the student's performance in class discussions, three written problems, and two objective tests. The written problems involve name tracing, an examination of a counterintelligence interrogation and the dissemination of information about an individual of counterintelligence interest.

OVERALL ADJECTIVAL RATING

EXCELLENT

COMMENTS

Mr. O'Connell contributed significantly to class discussions. His performance throughout the course demonstrated a sound comprehension of the instruction. His handling of the problem situations was thoroughly professional.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: M.E. O'Brien
Chief Instructor

27 Feb. 1962
Date

S E C R E T

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Operations Support No. 50
120 hours, full-time, Phase I 2 - 20 April 62 8 Students
80 hours, full-time, Phase II 23 April - 4 May 62 10 Students

Student : O'CONNELL, James P., Jr. **Year of Birth:** 1917

EOD Date: December 1951 **Grade:** GS-15 **Office :** OS

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The Operations Support Course emphasizes the role of support personnel in clandestine activities and their responsibility in originating material of a support nature at headquarters and in the field. The Course objectives are to provide the student with (1) an appreciation of the interrelationship between operating functions and support functions; (2) an understanding of some of the basic principles and techniques of Agency operations; (3) a knowledge of procedures, regulations and problems pertinent to the necessary support of operational activities.

a. Phase I covers instruction on organization, functions and responsibilities of the Clandestine Services; basic principles of clandestine activity accompanied by practical exercises; project and agent management; familiarization with defensive and offensive audio surveillance.

About fifty per cent of Phase I consists of lectures, briefings, and discussions; about thirty-five per cent is devoted to field exercises, practical written assignments, practice problems, and observing films as training aids in basic tradecraft. The remainder of the time is devoted to studying and testing.

b. Phase II includes name checks, records procedures, foreign travel, finance and property accounting, dispatch, pouch, cable and message-writing procedures. For this phase, problems have been developed to represent situations as they normally occur at a Class B Station.

About thirty-five per cent of Phase II is composed of lectures, briefings, and discussions; about fifty per cent is devoted to practice problems and practical written assignments. The remainder of the time is devoted to studying and testing.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

The adjectival ratings on this student for each major area of this course are the result of an evaluation of his work on his individual projects, on the other exercises, and on the final examination. Comparative judgment takes into account students in preceding classes as well as the present one. The numbers show how many students received each rating. An asterisk (*) shows the rating this student received. The rating the student receives represents the student's performance in the course with no allowance made for difference in age, education, experience and so forth.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

NAME O'CONNELL, James P. Jr.

MAJOR CATEGORIES

PHASE I	UNSAT	SAT	EXCELLENT
1. Tradecraft - Recognition of elementary principles.	0	2	6
2. Casing - Written observation of an assigned site.	0	2	6
3. Personal Meeting Plan - Written paper emphasizing techniques of effecting clandestine meeting.	0	5	3
4. Personal Meeting - Carrying out student's plan.	0	4	4
5. Contact Report - Written report of clandestine personal meeting.	0	2	6
6. Operational Support Procedures - General knowledge of Clandestine Services Organization and Functions; Agent and Project Management.	0	2	6
PHASE II			
1. Originating Headquarters and Field Dispatches. Indexing Requirements. Field Pouch Manifest.	0	2	8
2. Preparation of Headquarters and Field Cables. Writing and Indexing Messages. Use of Message Writing Techniques.	0	7	3
3. Type II Property Accounting - Fundamentals and Execution of Records.	0	1	9
4. Foreign Travel - Currency Conversion and Completion of Travel Voucher.	0	4	6
5. Familiarization with Class B Accounting and Preparation of Records.	0	0	10
6. Clandestine Services Headquarters and Field Support Procedures.	1	4	5

COMMENTS

Student cancelled per Office of Security, 6 April 1962.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Chief Instructor

18 May 1962
Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

3 AUG 1961

28 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Security

FROM: Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

Mr. O'Connell is completing ten years of Agency service and his experience qualification includes four years of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from St. John's University.

This evaluation covers Mr. O'Connell's first year assignment as Chief of the Security Support Division. It is felt that the outstanding accomplishments of this Division during this period are in large measure attributable to Mr. O'Connell's managerial skill. During this time the Security Support Division, without additional personnel, has increased its production substantially and in the area of operational support has handled many unique and diverse assignments.

Mr. O'Connell has a keen and analytical intellect and a broad understanding of the investigative and security problems inherent in his job. He applies these qualities with his talent for administration to make for an overall outstanding performance.

Mr. O'Connell has the capacity for further development and his future training should be directed to senior management courses to insure the full development of this potential.

Victor R. White
Victor R. White

Reviewing Official:

R L Bannerman
R. L. Bannerman
Acting Director of Security

Noted by Employee:

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

SECRET

SECRET

16 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

1. This report constitutes an evaluation of Mr. O'CONNELL's performance as Deputy Chief, Security Support Division and as Chief, Security Support Division.

2. It is pertinent to note that by virtue of a sustained performance of outstanding proportions Mr. O'CONNELL was promoted on 4 May 1959 to the position of Deputy Chief, Security Support Division, and on 4 April 1960 to the position of Chief, Security Support Division.

3. During the rating period Mr. O'CONNELL's performance amply justified and confirmed the previous assessments of his potential executive caliber. He has demonstrated in his recent assignments highly advanced administrative ability and judgment of an excellence considerably more than that required in the discharge of his increased responsibilities.

4. He has continued to display a marked dedication to the welfare of his office and the Agency. His approach to the discharge of responsibilities within his purview has been progressive and sound in all respects. His contribution has been invaluable.

5. In terms of potential, Mr. O'CONNELL's overall performance and his demonstrated talents and gifts of personality continue to constitute him as being qualified for a future of increasingly important service.

David E. Hanlon
Assistant Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Fred H. Hall
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

NOTED BY EMPLOYEE:

James P. O'Connell

SECRET

14-00000

23 Jul

RECEIVED
FOR SS/CSB
CFH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 February 1917	3. SEX male	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD-SS	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Investigator		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL *(Specify)*

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 12/17/57 To 3/31/59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							
THINKS CLEARLY							
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER *(Specify)*	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECRET

4 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.
(Fitness Report)

1. This report constitutes a continuing evaluation of Mr. O'CONNELL's performance as Chief, Support Branch, Security Support Division.

2. Mr. O'CONNELL's performance in terms of productivity and quality has been outstanding in every respect. His responsibilities have been most exacting and demanding, not only because of the administrative requirements involved, but also because of the urgent and unprecedented nature of the problems he is called upon to handle. Many of these problems have had Agency-wide implications and have been of interest to high Agency officials. He has met the challenges presented to him in a superb fashion and in a manner reflecting credit upon himself and the Security Office. In addition to this statement of evaluation, it should be noted that Mr. O'CONNELL, upon the recent completion of his assignment as Chief, Support Branch, SSD, and his promotion to Deputy Chief, SSD, received a commendation from the Director of Security commending him for his over-all splendid performance with particular reference to his handling of an ultra sensitive matter of interest to the highest authorities of the Agency.

3. In terms of potential, Mr. O'CONNELL's performance, his impressive physical appearance and personality, coupled with his proven powers of judgment and administration, in the opinion of the rater constitute him as being of potential executive caliber.

David E. Hanlon
Acting Assistant Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Fred H. Hall
Acting Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

NOTED BY EMPLOYEE:

James P. O'Connell

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

8

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb. 1917	3. SEX male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD - SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Investigator		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 17 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 17 December 1956 - 17 December 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☑ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

✓	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
✓	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 25 November 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR FRED H. HALL	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Ass't Dep. Dir. of Sec. (I & S)

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

Action Processed EP DATE 19 DEC 1957
Reviewed lcHD 12/23/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 25 November 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Dep. Dir. of Security (I & S)

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 13 2 33 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only)*.

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SUPERVISES	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 RECOGNIZES AND SOLVES INVESTIGATIVE PROBLEMS	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 DEVELUPS NEW PROGRAMS	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 PREPARES CORRESPONENCE	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. O'CONNELL is an excellently trained and widely experienced investigator who has demonstrated the ability to coordinate and supervise the unique and diverse investigative and security ~~as~~ problems inherent in the work of the Agency. He willingly discharges his responsibilities and cheerfully accepts the necessity to meet these responsibilities at all hours of the night, on weekends, holidays, etc. He is a dedicated Career employee and has no significant weaknesses.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb. 1917	3. SEX male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD - SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Investigator		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 17 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 17 December 1956 - 17 December 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
25 November 1957	[illegible] H. HALL	Ass't Dep. Dir. of Sec.(I & S)

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
25 November 1957	ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM	Dep. Dir. of Security(I & S)

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☑ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (*truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds*) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (*First line supervisor*)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (*Second line supervisors*)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (*Executive level*)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (*Specify*)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 13 2 33 PM '57

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
69 MONTHS

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

The fine performance which Mr. O'CONNELL has given over a period of years in several different assignments indicates a good potential for development and advancement.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Mr. O'CONNELL is obtaining fine developmental experience in the varied responsibilities of his position as Chief, Support Branch, Security Support Division. No specific, formal training is planned at this time.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

As a matter of personal choice, Mr. O'CONNELL would prefer not to go overseas on a PCS assignment at this time. However, as a Career employee, he recognizes his responsibility to serve wherever the requirements of the Agency may dictate.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSTINATE	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. 1917
3. SEX: male
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD-SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Investigator
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 17 December 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 16 December 1955 - 16 December 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☑ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- ☑ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- ☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- ☑ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- ☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- ☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 27 November 56
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Fred H. Hall
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Security Support Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pers. Card		21 DEC 1956
Reviewed		12/66

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 30 Nov 56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: [illegible]
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Dep. Dir. of Security (I&S)

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1. - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2. - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3. - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4. - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5. - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6. - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 12 3 05 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SUPERVISING	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 COMPREHENSION OF INVESTIGATIVE PROBLEMS	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. O'Connell is a versatile, intelligent employee who always promptly accepts and discharges his responsibilities willingly. He is an experienced, able investigator and a capable supervisor. He has no significant weaknesses.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. 1917
3. SEX: male
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD-SS
5. OFFICE DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Investigator
7. GRADE: GS-11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 17 December 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 16 December 1955 - 16 December 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 27 November 56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Fred H. Hall
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Security Support Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 30 Nov 56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING: Robert H. Cunningham
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Dep. Dir. of Security (I&S)

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

DATE
21 DEC 1968

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☑ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

57

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 12 3 09 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. O'Connell's potential is excellent. He is intelligent, interested in his work and is a career minded employee.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Mr. O'Connell has already capably handled several different positions in the Security Office, both at Headquarters and in the domestic field office organization and has completed several training courses. No specific training is planned at this time.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

As a matter of personal choice, Mr. O'Connell would prefer to remain in a domestic assignment at this time. However, as a Career employee, he recognizes and accepts his responsibility to serve wherever his services are required.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

CODED

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A 17 Dec 56 next report due

Posted Pos. Co[illegible] WLL 11/11 12-27-55
DATE DEC 20 [illegible]

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I *(To be filled in by Administrative Officer)*

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): O'CONNELL, James ? P. Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. 1917
3. SEX: Male
4. CAREER DESIGNATION: SD-SE ✓
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY: 17 December 1951
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: Security
7. DIVISION: Security Support
8. BRANCH: Support
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT: ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE: GS-14
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE: 17 December 1955
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 5 November 1954 to 16 December 1955 ✓

SECTION II *(To be filled in by Supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION: 1810.22 Chief, Support Branch, Security Support Division
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 14 December 1954
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*:

From 5 November 1954 through 13 December 1954, Mr. O'Connell was Assistant Special Agent in Charge of a Security Support Division field office where he supervised a large number of clerical and professional employees engaged in investigating individuals and/or organizations to be employed or used by the Agency ad in conducting investigations in support of various Agency activities. From 14 December 1954 to date, Mr. O'Connell has been Chief of the Support Branch, Security Support Division, where he has supervised the activities of clerical and professional employees engaged in directing the very complex and highly important Operational Support and Cover Support activities.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ *has* ☐ *has not been shown to the individual rated.*

THIS DATE: 8 December 55
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER *(Employee's immediate supervisor)*:

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT. *(Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)*

THIS DATE: 14 Dec 55
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(Official next higher in line of authority)*:

FORM NO. 45 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
1 JAN 55 THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of description. Each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

Dec 28 [illegible] '55

STATEMENTS	NOT OB-SERVED	CATEGORIES												
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.							X							
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.										X				
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.											X			
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.												X		
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.												X		
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X		
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.												X		
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.											X			
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.												X		
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.											X			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X		
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X		
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES: A "SPARK PLUG".											X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.										X			
30. OBSERVANT.											X		
31. CAPABLE.											X		
32. CLEAR THINKING.										X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.										X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.											X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X		
36. DELIBERATE.										X			
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.											X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.											X		
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X		
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.											X		
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X			
43. HAS DRIVE.											X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X	
45. VERSATILE.											X		
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X			
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X		
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.											X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.											X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X	

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Mr. O'Connell is an experienced and highly skilled investigator and investigative supervisor. He obtains and maintains the respect of his subordinates, associates and supervisors. He willingly accepts and discharges responsibilities.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

None.

SECRET

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

No.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐

DEC 28 '10 43 AM '95

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None, at this time.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☒ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT .... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

10

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:

1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate ~~with his previous supervisor to make sure~~ the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

Posted [illegible] EMC 11/29/54

Re[illegible] 12/30

A Next due date 17 Dec 55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'Connell James P.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb '27	3. SEX M	4. CAREER DESIGNATION SD-SE
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 17 December 1951	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO DD/Security	7. DIVISION Special Security		8. BRANCH Operations Br.
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:			11. GRADE GS-13 4
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 22 November 1954	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 12-16-53 to 11-5-54			

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Chief, Operational Support/Special Inquiry Desk

2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: October 1953

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

He has been responsible at the supervisory level for supervising all investigative cases of an operational support or special inquiry nature. In this field he has worked in major and delicate areas of Agency activity directing matters of utmost sensitivity and import to the Agency. The normal demands of the matters referred to him require expert, skilled, sensitive investigative activity which can only be accomplished when supervised with outstanding judgment and overall knowledge. He has also served as Deputy Chief of the Operations Branch, handling at the administrative level normal and involved matters arising in Branch level operations. He has also served as Assistant to the Deputy Chief, Special Security Division, where his duties were in the major field of coordination.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ has ☒ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE 12 November 1954	SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) David E Hanlon DAVID E HANLON

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE 12 November 1954	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) Robert [illegible]

FORM NO. 1 MAY 54 37-189 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 22 3 12 PM '74
MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

CATEGORIES

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													☒	
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													☒	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.													☒	
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													☒	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.														☒
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.													☒	
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													☒	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													☒	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.														☒
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.													☒	
11. CALM.														☒
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.													☒	
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													☒	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													☒	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.													☒	
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.														☒
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													☒	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.													☒	
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.													☒	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.													☒	
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.														☒
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.													☒	
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													☒	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.														☒
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.														☒

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.	☒	
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.	☒	
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".	☒	
29. TOUGH MINDED.	☒	
30. OBSERVANT.	☒	
31. CAPABLE.	☒	
32. CLEAR THINKING.	☒	
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.	☒	
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.	☒	
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.	☒	
36. DELIBERATE.	☒	
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.	☒	
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.	☒	
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.	☒	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.	☒	
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.	☒	
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.	☒	
43. HAS DRIVE.	☒	
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.	☒	
45. VERSATILE.		☒
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.	☒	
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.	☒	
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.	☒	
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.		☒
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.	☒	

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

An highly outstanding versatility in Division operations at the administrative, supervisory, and operational levels. He has a highly developed ability to handle with firm, deliberate, and excellent judgment matters of great urgency and import. He also possesses a highly developed skill in handling personnel, analyzing performances, and recommending adjustments and reassignments.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

NA

SECRET

PERSONNEL
NOV 22 3 12 PM '54
MAIL ROOM

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS [illegible] OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

NA

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Training in the Agency Management Program.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

NA

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.

☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.

☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.

☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.

☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.

☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.

☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.

☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.

☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.

☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.

☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.

☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.

☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.

☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.

☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.

☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.

☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.

☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.

☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.

☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.

☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.

☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

BY DATE
16 November 1953
[illegible] Pos. Control

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	2. GRADE GS-13	3. POSITION TITLE Investigator (Gen.)	
4. OFFICE Security	STAFF OR DIVISION Special Security Dir.	BRANCH Operations Br.	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD

IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT
From 17 Dec 52 To 16 Dec 53

6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special
☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

During the first period of this report from December 1952 to May 1953, I served as Chief, Project Unit. This involved the direction of six supervisors and five clerical employees. This Unit concerned itself with the handling of covert clearances on personnel being utilized in the larger Agency projects. In addition, I was designated the Security Office representative of the Projects Administrative Planning Staff which required my making spot decisions regarding security aspects of the projects under discussion. From May 1953 until October 1953, I was designated Deputy Chief, Operations Branch. This assignment carried with it administrative and supervisory duties as delegated by the Chief, Operations. I also assumed the duties of the Chief in his absence. This involved the supervision of the Covert Records Section and the six desk components of the Operations

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.
26 March 1954
DATE

James P. O'Connell Jr.
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. "'Connell's performance is described as outstanding. It is pertinent also to note that Mr. O'Connell's performance has been characterized by a splendid motivation flowing from an obvious disposition on his part to place the interest of the Agency and Division above personal considerations.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

He has demonstrated that he possesses to an extremely high degree the ability to analyze and evaluate problems often times on an emergency basis and to recommend courses of action or to act on the basis of very sound judgment. He has also demonstrated an advanced ability in the field of administration at all levels (continued below - Item 20)

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

By familiarising himself as far as possible with problems in the Divisional administrative and policy making fields with a view to analyzing for his own knowledge high level approaches and solutions.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. O'Connell has the present potential of handling greater responsibilities. This ability should constantly develop in degree to the point where his future potential would be increased.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. O'Connell's abilities are such that it may be observed that at this point his assignments may be regarded in terms of his abilities being utilized where most needed.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Agency training and rotation in the field of management and, generally, training which will provide Mr. O'Connell with more specific and detailed knowledge of the administration and problems of other components of the Agency.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

14 May 1954
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

20 May 54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

with which he has been concerned. His approach in this respect is from a general overall standpoint with considerations and actions taken which indicate his ability to consider problems in terms of their general implications to the Division rather than to his specific operation. More specifically, his performance has been noteworthy because it demonstrates a comprehensive knowledge of security problems and the administration of the Security Office. Constantly he is called upon to represent the Division and SO in negotations and conference with representatives of other components of the Agency regarding specific operational problems. He has handled such assignments with a high degree of tact and good judgment demonstrating a definite public relations ability.

SECRET

Section 7 (Cont.)

Branch. Since October 1953, I have served as Chief of the OS/SI Desk. I am charged with the direction of five case supervisors and five clerical employees. The unit handles all requests for operational support assistance emanating from other components of the Agency. This includes the setting up and servicing of covert letter drops; supervision of all escort and courier missions, and the scheduling of appropriate type surveillances. The unit also supervises cases and projects that are by their nature extremely sensitive.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

BY DATE
3 May 54

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) O'CONNELL, (First) James (Middle) P., Jr.

2. GRADE GS-12

3. POSITION TITLE Investigator (Gen.)

4. OFFICE I&S

STAFF OR DIVISION SSD

BRANCH Cps.

☒ DEPT'L.
☐ FIELD

IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 11-17-51 To 11-17-52

6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial
☒ Annual
☐ Special
☐ Reassignment
☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated.

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

As unit chief of the Project Desk, I am charged with supervision of the processing of security clearances for covert personnel to be utilized on the larger projects of the Agency. This involves the directing of seven case supervisors and five clerical employees. These supervisors are engaged in the scheduling of field investigations, making security appraisals and ultimately issuing a security determination for the covert personnel concerned. As an adjunct to this I also supervise necessary operational support to projects as requested. My position further requires that from time to time I represent the Division in conferences with operational units in regard to pertinent security aspects of covert projects.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Agent's Basic Training Course	Washington, D.C.	3 Weeks	1/7/52 to 1/25/52
CIA Orientation Course	Washington, D.C.	4 Days	11/18/52 to 11/21/52

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Security.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10. 3/13/53
DATE

James P. O'Connell Jr.
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 13 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. O'Connell has shown his ability in the position of Desk Chief to organize his work and supervise personnel on his "Desk" in such a way as to operate the Desk at maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Mr. O'Connell handles himself in a most impressive and effective way in dealing with other personnel of the Agency in problems relating to security factors in major projects of the Agency. Established deadlines have always been met by Mr. O'Connell and his judgment in rendering decisions has been most adequate.

(Over) (4)

SECRET

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR "OUTSTANDING"?

Mr. O'Connell's ability to organize his work and supervise others and make proper decisions are items in his performance that are considered outstanding.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Mr. O'Connell's services are excellent in all respects.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Greater responsibilities could immediately be assigned to Mr. O'Connell if a suitable vacancy existed in the Division.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. O'Connell is well suited for his present position. It is felt that at this time his service in his present position is of most benefit to Mr. O'Connell and the Agency.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

No rotation is recommended at this time. The Division is planning a training program for Headquarters agents which Mr. O'Connell will attend.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE. Services have been satisfactory.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

6 April
DATE

Edward Kane
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

1 April 53
DATE

Fred Hall
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

Qg

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

✓

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type): 009784

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
O'CONNELL	JAMES	P.	FEB 19, 1917	104 03 8105
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY 009784			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

James P. O'Connell

DATE

12 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

FEB 15 2 55 PM '68
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
BENE[illegible]NSELING

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968.
176-101

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): O'CONNELL JAMES PATRICK

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): 2/19/17

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 104 03 8105

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code): LANGLEY VIRGINIA

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED AN "ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE"? ☒ YES ☐ NO

If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one. (See Instructions for Employees on page 4.)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): Jim P O'Connell

DATE: 9 Feb 1973

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
APRIL 1968
FPM Supplement 870-1
176-102

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): O'CONNELL, James P.

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): Feb. 19, 1917

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 104 03 8105

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: CIA

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code): Washington, D. C. 20505

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED AN "ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE"? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one. (See Instructions for Employees on page 4.)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): James P. O'Connell

DATE: 20 March 1970

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

[illegible]

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
APRIL 1968
FPM Supplement 870-1
176-102

SECRET (When Filled In)

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	SEX	YEAR OF BIRTH
O'Connell	James	P., Jr., [illegible]	M	1917

GRADE	E.O.D. DATE (Mo. Da. Yr)	OFFICE, STAFF, DIVISION
GS-[illegible]	Dec. 1951	[illegible]

EDUCATION (Level attained and major subjects)

B. S. Economics Degree

TESTING

P.E.T.I.N.

F.L.A.T.B.

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (or equivalent)	19 Mar.	[illegible] 1962	(1st two weeks only)
OPERATIONS SUPPORT ([illegible] Phase)	2 Apr.	20 Apr. 1962	
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION (or equivalent)			
CI OPERATIONS			
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES			
MANAGEMENT	4 April	15 April 1955	
SUPERVISION			
Int. Intell. Orient.	18 Nov.	21 Nov. 1952	

SECRET

FORM [illegible] 618

TRAINING RECORD

NAME (Last)	First	Middle	SERIAL NO.	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
O'CONNELL, James P.		(2)			

SECRET (When Filled In)

GRADE	EOD DATE (Mo-Da-Yr)	ASSIGNMENT

MISCELLANEOUS (Code)

EDUCATION (level attained and major subjects)

SCHOOL

DEGREE AND DAY

MAJOR

MINOR

	DATE TESTED	SCORE
P.E.T.I.N.		
F.L.A.T.B.		
WRITING		
[illegible]		
[illegible]		

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (or equivalent)			
OPERATIONS SUPPORT			
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION			
CI FAMILIARIZATION			
MANAGEMENT			
WRITING WORKSHOP			
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW			
Staff Crypto		1954	

[illegible] TRAINING RECORD [illegible]

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
SPECIAL AGENTS COURSE			
S. O. FIELD COURSE			
PHYSICAL SECURITY			
Special Security Training		1962	
Protect Intel Against Espionage & Theft		1966	
ADP Lecture		1967	

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY INFORMATION

LANGUAGE	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE		REMARKS
	ENTERED	COMPLETED	
CI Familiarization	29 Jan.	9 Feb. 1962	
PHOTOGRAPHY (TSS)			
LOCK PICKING (TSS)			
Am. Abroad (Okinawa)	13 Dec.	14 Dec. 1961	
Writing Workshop (OTR)	13 Feb.	8 Mar. 1962	(DD/S Special)
SPECIAL AGENTS #7	8 Jan.	25 Jan. 1952	
SOFC #12	14 May	25 May 1962	
PHYSICAL SECURITY Co. #8	23 April	11 May 1962	
OS AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES			
Sr. Mgtment. Seminar	8 May	13 May 66	ISO
Exec. Seminar in ADP	7 Sept	8 Sept 67	CSC
Conf. for Federal Execs on Busi. Ops	18 May	23 May 69	Brookings

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	SEX	YEAR OF BIRTH
O'Connell	James	[illegible]	X M	1927

GRADE	E.O.D. DATE (Mo. Da. Yr)	OFFICE, STAFF, DIVISION
[illegible]	Dec. 1951	[illegible]

EDUCATION (Level attained and major subjects)

B. S. Economics Degree

TESTING

P.E.T.A.	
F.L.A.T.B.	

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (or equivalent)	19 Mar.	[illegible] 1962	(1st two weeks only)
OPERATIONS SUPPORT ([illegible] Class)	2 Apr.	20 Apr. 1952	
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION (or equivalent)			
CI OPERATIONS			
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES			
MANAGEMENT	[illegible] April	15 [illegible] 195[illegible]	
SUPERVISION			
[illegible] Intell. Orient.	18 Nov.	21 Nov. 1952	

SECRET

FORM 513 TRAINING RECORD (45)

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	SERIAL NO.	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	SECRET (When Filled In)
O'CONNELL,	James P.	(2)				

GRADE	EOD DATE (Mo-Da-Yr)	ASSIGNMENT	MIDCAREERIST (date)

EDUCATION (level attained and major subjects)		DATE TESTED	SCORE
SCHOOL	P-E-T-B		
	F-L-A-T-B		
DEGREE AND DATE	WRITING		
MAJOR	TYPING		
MINOR	SHORTHAND		

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (or equivalent)			
OPERATIONS SUPPORT			
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION			
CI FAMILIARIZATION			
MANAGEMENT			
WRITING WORKSHOP			
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW			
Staff Crypto		1954	

FORM 11-61 513 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

TRAINING RECORD

Dupl

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
SPECIAL AGENTS COURSE			
S. O. FIELD COURSE			
PHYSICAL SECURITY			
Special Security Training		1962	
Protect Intel Against Espionage & Theft		1966	
ADP Lecture		1967	

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY INFORMATION

LANGUAGE	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE		REMARKS
	ENTERED	COMPLETED	
CI Familiarization	29 Jan.	9 Feb. 1962	
PHOTOGRAPHY (TSS)			
LOCK PICKING (TSS)			
Am. Abroad (Okinawa)	13 Dec.	14 Dec. 1961	
Writing Workshop (OTR)	13 Feb.	3 Mar. 1962	(DD/S Special)
SPECIAL AGENTS #7	8 Jan.	25 Jan. 1962	
SOFC #12	14 May	25 May 1962	
PHYSICAL SECURITY Co. #8	23 April	11 May 1962	
SS AUDIO-COUNTERMEASURES			
Sr. Mgtment. Seminar	8 May	13 May 66	ISO
Exec. Seminar in ADP	7 Sept	8 Sept 67	CSC
Conf. for Federal Execs on Busi. Ops	18 May	23 May 69	Brookings

SECRET

SECRET

13 March 1967

As per Directive dated, 17 February 1967, the following Office of Security personnel attended a two hour ADP lecture given by the Office of Computer Services in the Main Auditorium on 9 March 1967:

ANDERSON, Theodore M.
BICKINGS, Betsy Ann
BIELSKI, Christine A.
BRECHBIEL, Beulah
BRIDGETT, Thomas L., Jr.
BRINSON, Mabel H.
BUCCI, Frederick F.
BUCKLEY, Richard F.
BURNS, Donal J.
BUTLER, Paul J.
BYNAKER, Marian K.
CALLAHAN, James W., Jr.
CANTY, William J.
CAPONE, Michaelann
CARPENTIER, Patrick L.
CARROLL, Kenneth F.
CARROLL, Patricia Jean
CASEBOLT, Maxine
CLAYTON, H. Kenneth
COLLINS, Wallace C.
COULTRY, Jean C.
CULLEN, Daniel A.
CULLINAN, Peggy T.
CURTIS, Dorothy V.
DALY, John T.
DALY, Thomas J.
DAVIS, Georganne Francis
DEEGAN, Helen
DEPOY, Flossie Louise
DETERS, Bernadette
DE VAUGHN, Lindal Gail
DIXON, Shirley M.
EIGENBRODE, Pauline S.
FARGO, Edward I.
FARR, James R.
FLOYD, Lewis
FOOTE, Phyllis N.
FULLERTON, Stanley
GARDINER, John F.
GEISS, Ermal P.
GOODRICH, Kenneth S., Jr.
GREEN, James P.
HALL, Delphian H.
HAMBY, Louis L.
HARDT, Ernest L.
HARRINGTON, John T., Jr.
HASTY, Bunia V.
HASTY, Rufus B.
HAUGHERY, William M.
HICKS, Eartha'
HILLIER, Floyd W.
JUSELL, Ralph H.
KELLAM, Sandra E.
KELLEHER, William V.
KING, Joseph F.
KUBISKEY, Rollis A.
LAMM, Frances
LATTANZE, Richard F.
LIGHT, Judith Marie
LOCKMAN, Louis Lee

Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

LONG, Joan Patricia
LUIBL, Dolores M.
LYON, N. Harris
MAHONEY, Frank M.
MAKINSON, Rae
MANTONI, R. J.
McGREW, William M.
McLEOD, Loretta B.
McMAHON, Francis J.
MELKERSON, Carroll A.
MORGAN, Patsy
MORRISSEY, Raymond
MULLANE, Jeremiah J.,
MURPHY, Joseph E.
MURTEN, Russell E.
NEWMAN, William M.
NOE, T. P.
NOFFSINGER, Martha
O'CONNELL, James P.
O'REILLY, Edward T.
PAINTER, Alana A.
PALMER, Harold L.
PAYNE, Leonard H., Jr.
PETIT, Alan F.
PILLAR, Raymond
PITTMAN, Elizabeth G.
RAINES, John W.
RECTOR, Harry C.
REIMER, Charles F.
ROMAGNOLI, Julius S.
ROMIG, Clyde E.
RUBINO, Dominic J.
SANDELS, John M.
SAVELSBERG, Lillian
SCANLAN, Frank J.
SCHWEGMANN, George C.
SNELSON, Frances Arlene
STEGMAIER, John E.
STEPHAN, James M.
SULLIVAN, Edmond A.
SWIFT, Gerald J.
TACKETT, Charles L.
TAVENNER, Patricia A.
THOMAS, Henry E., III
TUGGLE, Holcombe T.
VASALY, L. W.
VASS, Frances Jean
VERY, Patricia L.
WALLS, William M.
WELSH, Vera D.
WETRICH, Thomas D.
WIENCKOWSKI, Louis
WRIGHT, Richard H.

Robert E Leidenheimer

Robert E. Leidenheimer
Chief, Training Branch, A&TS/OS

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 7 October 1963, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

James P. O'Connell
Signature

18 August 1965
Date

JAMES P. O'CONNELL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1965

James P. O'Connell, Jr.

SUBJECT: Commendation for [redacted]

Ernest.dem Berkaw

1. When [redacted] was moved to Saigon/O'Connell on rather short notice, I named [redacted] as Acting D/COS. He served in this capacity from early April until his departure on 16 June 1965.

2. Within a matter of days he was performing the assigned duties in a superior manner. He most certainly demonstrated sound judgment, dependability and mature tolerance. The latter is an essential for the daily problems unique to any post type service.

3. As to his executive or leadership qualities I believe I can save several paragraphs by stating simply that within a week of assuming his new assignment I left on a 6-day TDY and within 30 days departed south for over 3 weeks and in each case departed with absolute assurance the Station was in good hands, and it was.

4. I would appreciate it if this document could be passed to Chief, KUSODA and if appropriate a copy placed in his personal file.

/s/ James D. Andrews, COS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in duplicate when ordered overseas or whenever designated place of residence, marital or dependency status changes. This information is important in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or member of family.

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) O'Connell (First) James (Middle) P.

2. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ HOME LEAVE POINT

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: Arlington, Virginia

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (if appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Home Leave Point
c/o John J. Deane, 426 N. Casey Key, Osprey, Florida (Father-in-law)

3. MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED	PLACE OF MARRIAGE Brooklyn, New York	DATE OF MARRIAGE 24 May 1941
☐ DIVORCED	PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE
☐ WIDOWED	PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

4. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE	
Virginia P. O'Connell	826 Whispering La., Falls Church, Va.		
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	SEX	AGE
Maureen P. O'Connell	SAME	F	23
Virginia D. O'Connell		F	19
James P. O'Connell		M	17
John D. O'Connell		M	11
NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE	
Deceased			
NAME OF MOTHER (or female guardian)	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE	
Deceased			

5. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME: John J. O'Connell
RELATIONSHIP: Brother
ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): #2 Old Hills Lane, Port Washington, New York
TELEPHONE: PO5 3312

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 4 ABOVE WILL ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, DUE TO HEALTH OR OTHER PERTINENT REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE UNDER "REMARKS."

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

THE FOLLOWING AGENCY ENDORSED LIFE AND HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE POLICIES ARE IN FORCE IN MY NAME: THE "POLICY NO." SHOULD BE ENTERED IF POSSIBLE, SINCE THIS INFORMATION WILL ASSIST IN EXPEDITING ACTION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD A CLAIM BECOME PAYABLE.

6. FULL NAME OF COMPANY	ADDRESS OF HOME OFFICE	POLICY NO.

7. I HAVE COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING: WILL ☐ YES ☐ NO POWER OF ATTORNEY ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. REMARKS:

Change in Home Leave
Point APPROVED:
[illegible]
[illegible] Personnel
13 Apr 61

[illegible] 15 [illegible]

SIGNED AT: Okinawa, R.I.
DATE: 30 March 1965
SIGNATURE:

FORM NO. 61 REPLACES FORM 37-78
1 JUL 56 WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) James P. O'Connell, Jr.	DATE (from item S-1) 26 Oct 64	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) James Andrews	DATE (from item S-2) 26 Oct 64
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: FE/P/JKO 10 Nov 64	DISPATCH NUMBER: TW# 376517	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 1917	2. SERVICE DESIGN SS	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE C/~~Regional~~ Security Support Staff,GS-15	4. STATION OR BASE Okinawa	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER ODIBEX

6A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 26 Jul 62	6B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 15 Jun 65	6C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 15 Aug 65	6D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 15 Aug 65

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU: 4 Dependents

Wife - 48 yrs. Son - 17 yrs.
Daughter- 22 yrs. Son - 11 yrs.

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

None.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (*see special note on transmittal form*). (*also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8*)

SEE ATTACHED SHEET.

10. TRAINING DESIRED: INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Management courses.

(4)

FORM 1-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I would prefer to be assigned to a position that would allow me to use my past experience in investigative or operational support activities.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE)

[1] BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE Investigations Division 2ND CHOICE Operations Support Div. 3RD CHOICE Field Office

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION; INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Station concurs in Subject's preferences. He would be eminently qualified for an assignment, for example, as chief, investigations division. Although a good supervisor, it is recommended that the training he requests in the field of management be approved; despite his grade, the organization's mid-career program would probably be more effective than some external programs.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

FE Division defers to the SS Career Service for determination of Subject's next assignment.

DATE 13 Nov. 64 TITLE CFE/PERS SIGNATURE Robert L. Staten

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

Chief, Investigations Division in accordance with request in Sec. 11b (above)

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ~~FGOS - 4659~~ DATED: ~~13 Jan 1965~~

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: Robert E O'Brien (SIGNATURE) Robert E. O'Brien DATE: 13 January 1965

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR:

As Senior Security Officer in the Far East, I have the following responsibilities and duties:

1. The overall security responsibility for all stations and bases within the cognizance of the area division.

2. Administers and supervises the Regional Staff whose mission includes conducting Security Audits of all FE stations and bases; administering polygraph examinations, audio countermeasure inspections, physical and technical security matters and air ops security support.

3. Monitors the performance of Career Security Officers assigned to individual stations from the standpoint of effectiveness and productivity.

4. Security Officer to the Senior War Planner, Honolulu.

5. COMINT Security Officer for all FE installations.

6. Security and alternate Control Officer for the clearance system governing special projects in the Far East of the Office of Special Activities.

7. Furnishes security advice and guidance to the Chief of Station, Okinawa as requested.

8. Maintains a regional liaison capability with other U.S. Government agencies in the FE area.

9. Performs sensitive security inquiries as directed by Headquarters.

SECRET

669784
FE-FF
SF GS.
65-15

ATTACHMENT HEREWITH TO FCOT-6937
dtd 22 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] James P. O'Connell ①
Period: July 62 - May 63

1. In accordance with FR 20-8 b (2) this memorandum is written in lieu of submission of Form 45.

2. ① [redacted] has been attached to Okinawa Station since 24 July 1962. As Chief, Regional KUSODA Staff, Okinawa, he has the responsibility of providing KUSODA support to all FE and SEA Stations. Although as Chief of Station, Okinawa I do not have supervisory responsibility over the Regional KUSODA Program, I am pleased to state that in my opinion he has carried out his work in a commendable manner.

3. In addition to carrying out his Regional responsibilities, ① [redacted] has been very helpful to Okinawa Station. He has established excellent rapport with the military and has ably assisted the Station in several delicate problems. In approaching any problem [redacted] is objective, tactful, and exercises good judgment. ①

4. It would be a pleasure to serve with him at any time.

Ernest F. Saylor
ERNEST F. SAYLOR
COS, Okinawa

READ: [redacted] ①
James P O'Connell

2 0 JUN 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTACHMENT HEREWITH TO FCOT-6937
dtd 22 May 1963

James P. O'Connell, Service Designation--SS, Security Officer, DDP/FE/JKO
for period 24 July 1962 - 22 May 1963, GS-15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] James P. O'Connell

1. In accordance with FR 20-9 b (2) this memorandum is written in lieu of submission of Form 45.

2. [redacted] has been attached to Okinawa Station since 24 July 1962. As Chief, Regional KUSODA Staff, Okinawa, he has the responsibility of providing KUSODA support to all FE and SEA Stations. Although as Chief of Station, Okinawa I do not have supervisory responsibility over the Regional KUSODA Program, I am pleased to state that in my opinion he has carried out his work in a commendable manner.

3. In addition to carrying out his Regional responsibilities, [redacted] has been very helpful to Okinawa Station. He has established excellent rapport with the military and has ably assisted the Station in several delicate problems. In approaching any problem [redacted] is objective, tactful, and exercises good judgment.

4. It would be a pleasure to serve with him at any time.

/S/ George E. Meloon, COS

READ:

/S/ James P. O'Connell

Reviewer Comments: Subject has placed emphasis on his required responsibility as contrasted to Okinawa security problems. This emphasis plus his personality and professional reputation has enabled a definite contribution to the Regional Far East security function, in spite of the fact that there is an inherent tendency to bypass Okinawa on security matters since it is not in the command channel to all FE Stations.

/s/ Raymond F. Drummond
CFE/Support

CONFIDENTIAL

28 JUN 1963

3 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Administrative & Training Staff

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
Personal Matter (Last Will and Testament)

On June 28, 1962, Mr. O'Connell communicated with the undersigned and asked that the following information be properly recorded:

> He advised that on 28 June 1962, both he and his spouse had executed Last Wills and Testaments. He is maintaining in his possession a copy of the mutual Wills. The originals are in the custody of Joseph Keating, Esq., 150 Little Falls Road, Falls Church, Virginia. Mr. Keating is the Attorney who drew up the Testaments.

David E. Hanlon
David E. Hanlon
Executive Officer

file
7/6
ed

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

T/R

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) O'CONNELL (First) JAMES (Middle) P.
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 104-03-8105

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE FALLS CHURCH, VA.

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE BROOKLYN NEW YORK
DATE OF MARRIAGE MAY 24 ~~APRIL 4~~ 1941
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE
DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED
DATE SPOUSE DIED
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S).

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE VIRGINIA P. O'CONNELL
ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 826 WHISPERING LANE
TELEPHONE NO.

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
MAUREEN	FALLS CHURCH	F	22 APR 42
VIRGINIA D.	VIRGINIA	F	26 FEB 4
JAMES P.		M	17 AUG 47
JOHN D.		M	4 JAN 5

NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)
ADDRESS
TELEPHONE NO.

NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)
ADDRESS
TELEPHONE NO.

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. MOTHER AND BROTHER

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME ([✓ Mr.], Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) O'CONNELL, JOHN
RELATIONSHIP BROTHER
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 2 OLD HILLS LANE, PORT WASHINGTON N.Y.
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER PO
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES ✓ NO ☐

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES ✓ NO ☐

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 5.) YES ✓ NO ☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 5 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. **VOLUNTARY ENTRIES**

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

NATIONAL SAVINGS AND TRUST CO.
15 + PENN. AVE N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.
VIRGINIA P + JAMES P. O'CONNELL JR.

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☑ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

6. **ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS**

SIGNED AT	DATE 20 April 1967	SIGNATURE James P. O'Connell

CONFIDENTIAL

1 JAN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD(IOS)

SUBJECT : James O'Connell
Ervan Kuhnke

1. I am pleased to forward the attached letter from the Director, Office of Security, USIA commending Messrs. O'Connell and Kuhnke for assistance rendered the United States Information Agency.

2. Please bring this correspondence to the attention of Messrs. O'Connell and Kuhnke with my personal thanks for their good work.

3. After it has served its purpose, this correspondence should be forwarded to A&TS for filing in appropriate Administrative and Personnel files.

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Attachment

Distribution:
Orig. & 3 - Addressee
1 - Commendation File
1 - Chrono

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1961

Dear Shef,

I would like to take this opportunity to belatedly express the sincere appreciation of both my office and the Broadcasting Service of this Agency for the assistance rendered by employees of your staff, Mr. James O'Connell and Mr. Ervon Kuhnke in September and December of last year. This assistance consisted of picking up tape recordings prepared by Radio Moscow in the possession of Mr. Paul Frederick Dauer, 1923 De La Vina Street, Santa Barbara, California and delivering them to my office for the information of our Broadcasting Service. In addition to this service, Mr. Kuhnke of your staff readily volunteered to see that these tapes were returned to Mr. Dauer and this latter service was performed last month.

The excellent spirit of liaison co-operation evidenced by your staff is most gratifying to me and it is hoped that I might be of service in some similar matter in the future.

Sincerely,

Paul J. McNichol, Director
Office of Security

Colonel Sheffield Edwards
Director, Office of Security
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

SECRET

DD/P 4-432

27 FEB 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

SUBJECT : PROJECT HARPSTAR

1. With the successful launching of Project "HARPSTAR" I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for the efficient support given FE Division in this matter.

2. I wish especially to compliment Mr. James P. O'Connell of your staff for his imaginative handling of the many aspects of this complicated operation.

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Chief of Operations

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

4 May 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James P. O'Connell

THROUGH : Deputy Director (IOS)

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. Upon your reassignment from Chief, Operational Support Branch to Deputy Chief, SSD, I wish to forward my personal commendation for your many years of outstanding performance in operational support. You have displayed not only an unusual aptitude in the security handling of support, but have evidenced a highly professional intelligence approach to the many problems given you. As example, I cite a recent case where through certain assets of this office, you arranged for and directed the spotting, recruitment, briefing, cover and cut-out arrangements for an agent engaged in a very sensitive operation of interest to the highest authorities in the Agency, and conducted it on an "Eyes Only" basis.

2. In this operation, as in many others, you have exercised imagination with both judgment and discretion; all of which has brought great credit to this office, the Deputy Director (IOS), your Division, and, of course, yourself.

3. I congratulate you and am confident of your continued success in the office and in the Office of Security Career Service.

4. I am arranging to file copies of this letter in your Personnel and Administrative files.

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Distribution:
- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - DD(IOS)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 DEC 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: James O'Connell, Jr.

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 17 December 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:
James O'Connell Jr.
Date: 10 Jan. 1956

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

CAREER SERVICE QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION I (To be completed by employee)

NAME (Last) O'CONNELL	(First) James	(Middle) F.	AGE 37	GRADE 13	NO. OF MOS. IN GRADE 21	CAREER DESIGNATION CD-SE

STAFF OR DIVISION SSD	BRANCH Operations	POSITION TITLE Investigator General, Desk Chief	
NO. OF MOS. IN PRESENT POSITION 10	NO. OF MOS. IN OSS 0	NO. OF MOS. IN CIG 0	NO. OF MOS. IN CIA 32

DATA ON ALL PERMANENT DUTY OVERSEAS OR IN U.S. FIELD (Include any TDY during last two years)

APPROXIMATE DATES OF SERVICE		LOCATION		TDY	PCS	COMMENTS
FROM	TO	COUNTRY	STATION			
None						

INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SERVE TOUR OF DUTY OVERSEAS PCS

A ☐ YES B ☒ ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS C ☐ NO

INDICATE ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE IF PRECEDING ANSWER IS "A" OR "B"

PREFERENCE	COUNTRY	STATION	TYPE OF POSITION
1ST	Germany	Frankfurt	Security Officer
2ND	Netherlands	The Hague	" "
3RD	Switzerland	Zurich	" "

IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "B" STATE CONDITIONS; IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "C," EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS

Wish to have family reside with me.

INDICATE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OVERSEAS IN WHICH YOU WILL NOT SERVE AND EXPLAIN REASONS

I do not wish an assignment which would interfere with childrens' education or health.

INDICATE RELATIONSHIP AND AGE OF EACH DEPENDENT TO BE MOVED OVERSEAS

wife - 37 yrs	son - 7 yrs
daughter - 12 yrs	son - 8 mos.
daughter - 8 yrs	

INDICATE KNOWN MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH THE AGENCY HAS IMPOSED ON YOUR SERVICE

None

FORM NO. 59-174
1 JUN 54

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS ON REVERSE SIDE. (4)

14-00000

SECRET

INDICATE ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING DEPENDENTS (old age, chronic illness, need for special educational facilities, etc.) OR ANY UNUSUAL PERSONAL SITUATION WHICH WOULD AFFECT YOUR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

None.

DESCRIBE TYPES OF HEADQUARTERS AND U.S. FIELD POSITIONS FOR WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE CONSIDERED AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO SERVE

Security Officer in any agency component.

REMARKS

DATE 2 Sept. 54

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James P. O'Connell

SECTION II (To be completed by employee's supervisor)

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (months) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE

3 months

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (months) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER HEADQUARTERS OR U.S. FIELD ASSIGNMENT

3 months

COMMENTS ON AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYEE'S PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Mr. O'Connell is presently supervising an all important Desk in the Division and in connection with his overall versatility in the administrative field, his ~~abilityxx~~ availability is limited by the fact that he would have to assist in training a replacement. His preference is logically stated with the further comment that his ability is so advanced that he would qualify as a top ranking Security Officer.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR 9/3/54

PERSONNEL OFFICER WILL FORWARD ORIGINAL TO OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND FIRST COPY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE BOARD

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS

COPY

Chief, Special Security Division   26 April 1954

Director of Security

Commendation for Messrs. James P. O'Connell, Jr. and William J. Cotter

1. The attached memorandum from the Chief, SR, dated 23 April, commending the services of Messrs. James P. O'Connell and William J. Cotter of the Special Security Division is forwarded to you with great pleasure.

2. Please bring this to the attention of Messrs. O'Connell and Cotter and extend to them my personal commendation and thanks for the excellent services which the subject memorandum reflects. Copies of these commendations are to be included in the Security and Personnel files of Messrs. O'Connell and Cotter.

Sheffield Edwards

COPY

COPY

20 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Commendation of Security Office Personnel

1. It is with pleasure that I wish to pass to your Special Security Division a personal commendation of two officers who have assisted materially in the establishment and continued successful management of the AEFILTER project.

2. Confronted with a sudden requirement to deploy several security officers to a new activity here in the United States, Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr., contributed materially to the project in the coordination of several neighborhood checks, re-assignment of several Security Office personnel, the preparation of two safe houses on short notice, and the reception of sensitive alien personnel under the strictest security precautions. Mr. O'Connell has put in many hours on this project, well beyond his normal routine, and several times at great personal inconvenience.

3. I wish, at the same time, to commend specifically the security officer who went under the operational alias of [redacted] [redacted]. This officer supervised five other highly qualified and experienced officers in the preparation of elaborate house-breaking safeguards for the first safe house acquired under Project AEFILTER. [redacted] Carter did his job not only thoroughly but quite cheerfully, despite actual personal hardship.

William J. Carter

4. It is all too seldom that the Divisions get around to giving credit where it is due, even in the domestic activities of DD/P. In these two cases, however, I feel that this commendation is the least token that can be proffered to two devoted and skilled civil servants.

5. I suggest that copies of this memorandum be included in the personnel files of both Mr. O'Connell and [redacted] Carter

DANA B. DURAND
CSR

COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): O'CONNELL, JAMES P. JR.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 FEB 1917

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C.	41	3	3	51	11	30	SPECIAL AGENT
CIA	51	12	17	52	12	31	

SCD 11/7/45
12/9/57

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (Hon. or dishon.?)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U.S. NAVY	44	10	4	46	2	15	HON.

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☑ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

_______________ (DATE)

James P. O'Connell Jr. (SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ (MONTH) 1952 at ______ (CITY) ______ (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
4	8	28
1	—	5
1	4	12

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 7-1-15

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

10—[illegible]

[illegible] that

JAMES P. O'CONNELL

[illegible] the

[illegible]

8 January 1952 25 January 1952

C. F. Henry

28 January 1952

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Central Intelligence Agency
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, James P. O'Connell, Jr., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

17 December 1951
(Date of entrance on duty)

James P. O'Connell Jr.
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 17th day of Dec., A. D. 1951,

at Wash. D.C.
(City) (State)

[SEAL]

Robert J. Hayes
(Signature of officer)

Appt. Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*) 3212 SOUTH 9 ST. ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH FEB 19 1917

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*) ELMHURST NEW YORK

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY VIRGINIA P. O'CONNELL

(B) RELATIONSHIP WIFE

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE 3212 SO. 9 ST. ARLINGTON VIRGINIA

(D) TELEPHONE NO. JA2-3622

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*	X	
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—55100-2

14-00000

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

DMB

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS.

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444), "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
009784	O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.	02/19/17	SS	16

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR				
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.	Brookings Institution - Seminar on	Public and Business Policy	17 May	18 May 1972	
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY [illegible]3 MAY [illegible]

(4-51)

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

	NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
					RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.								
2.								

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND(WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY(Active) ☐ STANDBY(inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

	NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
			FROM	TO
1.				
2.				
3.				

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE 4/5/73

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James P. O'Connell

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

[illegible]

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
009784	O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.	19 Feb 1917	SS.	GS-16

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - - TO - -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE 30 April 1972

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James P. O'Connell

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
009784	O'CONNELL, James P.	2/19/17	SS

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1. Brookings Institute	Federal Executive Seminar	May 1969		1 week
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

20 OCT Entd

(4-31)

FORM 10-60 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAY 6 10 54 AM '70

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 13 April 1970

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James P. O'Connell

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
009784	O'CONNELL, James P.	19 Feb. 1917

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

SECRET

(4-5?)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1. Japan, Okinawa, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Laos, Rangoon,		2 Oct. 1967					TDY
2. Philippines	none	to 6 Nov. 1967					TDY

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT	AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE 25 April 1968

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James P. O'Connell

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLC

65-16
55

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
009784	O'CONNELL, James P.	19 Feb 1917

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR				
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1 PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

SECRET

FORM 444n
3-68

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

MAY 1 11 00 AM '69
MAIL ROOM

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP: FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 2 March 1969

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO 009784	2. NAME (Last First Middle) OCONNELL J P JR	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH 02/19/17	5. SCHEDULE, GRADE, STEP GS -16-04
6. SD SS	7. POSITION TITLE SECURITY OFFICER	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT SEC	9. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	59/04/04	59/04/18
~~VOLCANO ISLANDS~~ OKINAWA, RYUKU IS.	PCS 45	62/07/25	65/06/18

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: [illegible]
4 AUG 67

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	ECONOMICS, GENERAL	ST JOHNS UNIV NY	39

FORM
1-67 444J
Mfg 2-67

SECRET

SECTION IV — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY — CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

SECTION V — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) NONE
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER-SPECIFY
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

BASKETBALL - GOOD
PIANO-ORGAN - ABOVE AVERAGE
CARPENTRY - GOOD

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

NONE

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Include license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE, CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

NONE

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NONE

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

NONE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify)
NONE

2. BRANCH OR CORPS

3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty)
FROM TO

4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify)

5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation if past service)

6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☒ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS NONE

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
1. NONE			☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
2.			☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
3.			☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
4.			☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
5.			☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII

AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): SEPT 65 - JAN 67

2. LOCATION (Country, City): HEAD QUARTERS

3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: OFFICE OF SECURITY

4. TITLE OF JOB: ASSIST DEP DIR SECURITY, INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS 16

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

ASSISTED THE DDS/IOS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF DOMESTIC FIELD OFFICES, SUPERVISED OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AND THE PROCESSING OF COVERT INVESTIGATIONS AND CLEARANCES.. THIS INVOLVED THE SUPERVISION OF THREE DIVISION CHIEFS, ONE STAFF CHIEF AND EIGHT SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE ALL OF WHOM WERE AT THE GS 15 LEVEL. REPRESENTED THE OFFICE AT INTRA AND INTER AGENCY MEETINGS ON MATTERS CONCERNING OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND INVESTIGATIONS. FUNCTIONED AS THE DDS/IOS IN HIS ABSENCE.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): JULY 1962 - JUNE 65

2. LOCATION (Country, City): OKINAWA, RYUKU ISLANDS

3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: FE DIVISION

4. TITLE OF JOB: CHIEF FE REGIONAL SECURITY STAFF

5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS 15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY PROGRAM IN THE FAR EAST. FUNCTIONED WITH A STAFF COMPOSED OF AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES TEAM, 3 POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS AND TWO GENERALISTS. SCHEDULED SECURITY AUDITS WHICH WERE PERIODICALLY WERE CONDUCTED AT ALL FE STATIONS AND BASES AND UPON REQUEST AT SOD AND DDS+T INSTALLATIONS. WAS AVAILABLE TO PERSONALLY HANDLE SENSITIVE SECURITY MATTERS AT THE REQUEST OF HEADQUARTERS AND CHIEFS OF STATIONS. RESPONDED TO ALL REQUESTS FOR POLYGRAPH COVERAGE, PHYSICAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TECHNICAL NEEDS SUCH AS AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES AND ALARM SYSTEMS. WORKED IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH COMSEC IN INSPECTING COMMO FACILITIES IN THE AREA. MADE RECOMMENDATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH THE FE ENGINEERS, FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND INNOVATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY. MAINTAINED LIAISON WITH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COUNTERPARTS. WAS SECURITY ADVISOR TO SR WAR PLANS OFFICER, HAWAII.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): JUNE 1959 - JUNE 62

2. LOCATION (Country, City): HEAD QUARTERS

3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: DDS/IOS

4. TITLE OF JOB: CHIEF, OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DIVISION

5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS 15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

ADMINISTERED ACTIVITIES PERTAINING TO THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES AND OTHER AGENCY COMPONENTS. THIS CONSISTED OF ACCEPTING REQUIREMENTS AND ANALYZING THE BEST METHODS OF IMPLEMENTING THEM THROUGH THE O/S FACILITIES. SUPERVISED HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL WHO GAVE THESE ASSIGNMENTS TO THE DOMESTIC FIELD OFFICES. THE NATURE OF REQUESTS RANGED FROM SIMPLE TYPE SUPPORT SUCH AS A LETTER DROP TO THE COMPLEX HANDLING OF A HIGH LEVEL DEFECTOR WHICH INVOLVED ESCORTS, SAFE HOUSE FACILITIES, SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES ETC.

PERSONALLY HANDLED SENSITIVE CASES FOR DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION VIII AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) NOV 55 - JUNE 59	2. LOCATION (Country, City) HEADQUARTERS	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH SECURITY SUPP. DIV./OS
4. TITLE OF JOB CHIEF, SUPPORT BRANCH		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS 14

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

THIS WAS BASICALLY SAME AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED ASSIGNMENT THE SUPPORT BRANCH BECAUSE OF IT'S EXPANSION OF ASSIGNMENTS WAS ELEVATED TO DIVISION STATUS.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) DEC 54 - NOV 55	2. LOCATION (Country, City) WASHINGTON, D.C.	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE SPECIAL SECURITY DIV./OS
4. TITLE OF JOB ASSIST. SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS13-GS 14

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

ASSISTED THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE IN ADMINISTERING THE DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE. THIS ENTAILED THE SUPERVISION OF FIFTY INVESTIGATIVE AGENTS WHO CONDUCTED INVESIGATIONS ON AGENCY APPLICANTS, INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE OF INTEREST OF THE AGENCY IN EITHER AN OVERT OR COVERT MANNER. WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATIONAL AGENCY CHECKS CONDUCTED BY DFO IN THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. ALSO HAD SUPERVISORY COGNIZANCE OVER THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ASSIGNMENTS GIVEN THE DFO.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) JULY52 - DEC 54	2. LOCATION (Country, City) HEADQUARTERS	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH SPECIAL SECURITY DIV/OS
4. TITLE OF JOB CHIEF PROJECT DESK		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS 13

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

RESPONSIBLE FOR SEVEN SUPERVISORS WHO PROCESSED COVERT CLEARANCE ACTIONS ON INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE TO BE EMPLOYED WITH OR ASSOCIATED WITH THE AGENCY. REPRESENTED OS AT INTRA AGENCY COMMITTEE MONITORING PROPRIETARY PROJECTS. GAVE ADVICE AND GUIDANCE ON SECURITY PROBLEMS INVOLVING OPERATIONAL PROJECTS. DELIVERED LECTURES ON SECURITY MATTERS FOR OTR.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY NO CHANGE

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U. S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
JAMES P JR	SON	8/17/47	U.S	1893 ELSINORE AVE McLEAN, VIRGINIA
JOHN D	SON	1/4/54	U.S.	" "

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
SOCIETY OF FORMER FBI AGENTS (WASHINGTON D.C.)	WASHINGTON, D.C.	1952	DATE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
31 March 1967	James P. O'Connell

SECRET

14-00000

O CONNELL JAMES P (1) 652 OS (2) (3) 665 (4)

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF GRANTING OR OF REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE

THE ABOVE-NAMED INDIVIDUAL (ITEM 1) HAS BEEN GRANTED A CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE (OR THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE HELD BY THIS INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN REVOKED) UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF HR 92-4. THE CLEARANCE (ITEM 2) OR REVOCATION (ITEM 4), IS EFFECTIVE AS OF THE MONTH AND YEAR SHOWN ABOVE. SUBJECT HAS BEEN BRIEFED OR DEBRIEFED, AS APPROPRIATE, CONCERNING CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND RELATED COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MATTERS AND HAS SIGNED A BRIEFING/DEBRIEFING STATEMENT, AS APPROPRIATE, ACKNOWLEDGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION. UPON REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE SUBJECT IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO HAVE CONTINUED CUSTODY OF, ACCESS TO, OR OTHERWISE GAIN FURTHER KNOWLEDGE OF STAFF CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL OR INFORMATION.

WHEN EMPLOYEE NO LONGER REQUIRES THE CLEARANCE IN ORDER TO PERFORM HIS HER ASSIGNED DUTIES, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY STAFF, OC, BE NOTIFIED THAT THE CLEARANCE MAY BE REVOKED.

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - EMPLOYEE'S COMPONENT (ITEM 3)
1 - OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS
Jean Paul DeBlois
CHIEF, ~~[illegible]~~ BRANCH, OC-S
DOCTRINES

FORM 12-63 1597b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

Return to CAB 1604 Curie

SECRET (When Filled In)

DEC

109734 **PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT**	THIS DATE

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*): O'CONNELL JAMES PATRICK JR.

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State*): 826 WHISPERING LANE FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State*): SAME AS 2.

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: CLEARBROOK 6-1891

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: VIRGINIA

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (*Last-First-Middle*) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: O'CONNELL VIRGINIA

2. RELATIONSHIP: WIFE

3. HOME ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*): 826 WHISPERING LANE FALLS CHURCH VIRGINIA

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*)- INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: HOUSEWIFE

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: CL6-1891

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER:

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION:

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (*Spouse, Mother, Father*) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
ANNA C. O'CONNELL (MOTHER) 2 OLD HILLS LANE, PORT WASHINGTON, N.Y.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: *If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.*

3. NAME (*First*) VIRGINIA (*Middle*) P. (*Maiden*) DEANE (*Last*) O'CONNELL

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE:

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (*City, State, Country*): BROOKLYN, N.Y.

6. HIS (*or her*) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (*No., Street, City, State, Country*): 1815 MADISON PLACE, BROOKLYN N.Y.

7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH:

9. CAUSE OF DEATH:

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (*Give last address, if deceased*): 826 WHISPERING LANE FALLS CHURCH, VA.

11. DATE OF BIRTH: 18 JAN 1917

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (*City, State, Country*): NEW YORK, N.Y.

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY:

14. PLACE OF ENTRY:

15. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*): U.S.

16. DATE ACQUIRED: BIRTH

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (*City, State, Country*):

18. OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (*Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers*): HARRY WINSTON (194[illegible])

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, State, Country*): 5TH AVE N.Y.C.

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
NATIONAL SAVINGS + TRUST CO.	15 ST + NEW YORK AVE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First papers, etc.)*

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING *(Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)*

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) DEC 1951 - MAY 1952
2. GRADE 12
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 5
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CHIEF, COVERT SECURITY CLEARANCE DESK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SUPERVISED THE ACTION REQUIRED TO INITIATE INVESTIGATIVE ACTION FOR ULTIMATE CLEARANCE DETERMINATION ON COVERT EMPLOYEES

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) MAY 1952 - MAY 1953
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 10
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CHIEF, PROJECT DESK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES BASICALLY SAME AS PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT ONLY ON THIS DESK PERSONNEL INVOLVED WERE ASSOCIATED WITH LARGE PROJECTS AND NOT ONLY WERE INDIVIDUAL CLEARANCES HANDLED BUT THE OVERALL SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE PROJECTS WERE EXAMINED

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) MAY 1953 - MARCH 1954
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 40
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE DEP. CHF. OPERATIONS BRANCH
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SUBORDINATE TO CHF. OPERATIONS AND PERFORMED HIS FUNCTIONS IN HIS ABSENCE. ALSO REGULARLY HANDLED DELEGATED DUTIES FOR HIM. INVOLVED SUPERVISION OF FIVE CLEARANCE & ONE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DESKS.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) MARCH 1954 - OCT 1954
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 10
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CHIEF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DESK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SUPERVISED ALL REQUESTS FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT MADE TO THE OFFICE OF SECURITY. THIS INCLUDED CASES INVOLVING TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, SURVEILLANCES, CUSTODIAL DETAILS ETC. I WAS ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT TO HANDLE ITS REORGANIZATION

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) OCT 1954 - DEC 1954
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT ASST. SPEC. AGT IN CHGE. DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION/OS
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 50
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES ASSISTED SAC IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FIELD OFFICE. THIS INCLUDED SUPERVISING THE SCHEDULING OF CASES TO THE AGENTS, GIVING THEM GUIDANCE IN INVESTIGATING THE CASES (Use additional pages if required) REVIEWING COMPLETED INQUIRIES

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XIII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
MAUREEN	DAUGHTER	1942		✓	U.S.	Whitting Lane
DIANE	"	1946		✓	"	Falls Church, VA
JAMES	SON	1947	✓		"	"
JOHN DEANE	"	1954	✓		"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

FORMER ADDRESS
1317 SOUTH BUCHANAN ST. ARLINGTON, VA.
(1952-55)

SECTION 7

5. DEC. 1954 TO PRESENT CHIEF, SUPPORT BRANCH
20 EMPLOYEES GRADE 14
ADMINISTER 3 UNITS THAT HANDLE (A) OPERATIONAL SUPPORT MATTERS OF A GENERAL NATURE (B) SPECIAL SUPPORT PROJECTS INCLUDING DOMESTIC MAIL DROPS (C) CASES INVOLVING SECURITY/COVER ASPECTS INCLUDING COVERT SITE SURVEYS, ADJUDICATION OF ~~ID~~ REQUEST FOR BUILDING BADGES TO COVERT EMPLOYEES. AS CHIEF OF THIS BRANCH I'M CALLED UPON FROM TIME TO TIME, TO REPRESENT OS AT INTER + INTRA AGENCY CONFERENCES, GIVE LECTURES REGARDING ACCOMPLISHMENTS + POTENTIAL OF OS IN SUPPORT FIELD AND PERSONALLY HANDLE HIGHLY SENSITIVE ASSIGNMENTS.

DATE COMPLETED: 12 April 1957

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James P. O'Connell Jr

SECRET

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office
Ext.
Home JA2-3622

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs~~ JAMES (First) PATRICK (Middle) O'CONNELL JR (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 3212 SOUTH 9 ST. (St. and Number) ARLINGTON, (City) VIRGINIA, (State) USA (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS ABOVE (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME JIM WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? NONE

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NA

HOW LONG? NA IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS NA

(Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 2/19/17 PLACE OF BIRTH ELMHURST (City) NEW YORK (State) (Country)

IP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE?

I CERTIFICATE NO. NA ISSUED NA (Date) BY NA (Court)

(State) (Country)

REVIOUS NATIONALITY? NA (Yes or No) (Country)

AT DATES? NA TO NA ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? NA (Country)

NA

TEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS:



E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? NA ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? NA

LAST U. S. VISA (Number) NA (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 34 SEX MALE HEIGHT 6'3" WEIGHT 210 LBS

EYES BLUE HAIR BROWN COMPLEXION FAIR SCARS NONE

BUILD LARGE OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE MARRIED ✓ DIVORCED WIDOWED

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS NA

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE VIRGINIA (First) PATRICIA (Middle) DEHNE (Maiden) O'CONNELL (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE NEW YORK, NY. 5/24/41

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 1815 MADISON (St. and Number) PLACE (City) BKLYN (State) NY. (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 3212 So. 9 ST. (St. and Number) ARLINGTON (City), VIRGINIA (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1/18/17 PLACE OF BIRTH BROOKLYN (City), NEW YORK (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BRTH WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER DEANE FLYING SCHOOL

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS FLOYD BENNETT (St. and Number) AIRFIELD (City), BKLYN, (State) NY. (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN COUNTRY NA

NA

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME MAUREEN RELATIONSHIP DAUGHTER AGE 9

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS 2212 So. 4 ST. ARLINGTON, VA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME DIANE RELATIONSHIP DAUGHTER AGE 5

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS SAME AS ABOVE (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME JAMES RELATIONSHIP SON AGE 4

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS SAME AS ABOVE (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME JAMES PATRICK O'CONNELL (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED DEC. DATE OF DECEASE 11/12/51 CAUSE HEART AILMENT

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 8833 ST. JAMES AVE, ELMHURST, N.Y. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 5/12/80 PLACE OF BIRTH BROOKLYN, NEW YORK (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP NA WHEN ACQUIRED? NA WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION TRUCKING & WAREHOUSING LAST EMPLOYER OWN BUSINESS

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 69 GUERNSEY ST. BKLYN, NY (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ANNE JENKINS O'CONNELL (First) (Middle)? (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 8833 ST. JAMES AVE, ELMHURST, NY (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 3/19/91 PLACE OF BIRTH CORONA, NEW YORK

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER NA

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA TO NA BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME JOHN J. O'CONNELL (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE 28
   PRESENT ADDRESS 8133 ST. JAMES AVE, ELMHURST N.Y. USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME JOHN J. DEANE (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Box #40B [illegible] Florida (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 4/24/90 PLACE OF BIRTH BROOKLYN, N.Y.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? N.Y. (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION [illegible] LAST EMPLOYER [illegible]

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME KATHRYN (First) LANTRY (Middle) DEANE (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Box # 46 B (St. and Number) Route 1 (City) Nokomis (State) FLORIDA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 4/19/97 PLACE OF BIRTH New York City, N.Y.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER NA

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA

CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA

CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA

CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA

CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

2. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA

CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA

CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR INVESTIGATIVE

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? 2040.00
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY ✓
FREQUENTLY ...., CONSTANTLY ....

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C ✓
ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ...., OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES NO

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:
PREFER EASTERN STATES

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ST. BARTHOLOMEW ADDRESS ELMHURST (City) N.Y. (State) (Country)
DATES ATTENDED 1/23 TO 1/31 GRADUATE? YES
HIGH SCHOOL XAVIER H.S. ADDRESS 30 W. 16 ST. (City) NEW YORK (State) N.Y. (Country)
DATES ATTENDED 1/31 TO 1/35 GRADUATE? YES
COLLEGE ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY ADDRESS BROOKLYN (City), NEW YORK (State) (Country)
MAJOR AND SPECIALTY ECONOMICS YEARS COMPLETED 4
DATES ATTENDED 1/35 TO 1/39 DEGREE B.S. IN ECO.

COLLEGE .... ADDRESS (City) (State) (Country)
MAJOR AND SPECIALTY .... YEARS COMPLETED ....
DATES ATTENDED .... DEGREE ....

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ACCOUNTING, ECONOMICS
ENGLISH

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ....

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

U.S.A (Country) NAVY (Service) ENSIGN (Rank) 10/2/44 3/11/46 (Date of Service)

ARMED GUARD CENTER N.Y. (Last Station) 404347 (Serial Number) ~~INA[illegible]~~ RESERVE (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS:

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 256 ADDRESS JACKSON HEIGHTS, N.Y.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON USNR

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS NONE

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS 12

FROM 3/2/47 TO 11/30/51

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ADDRESS WASHINGTON (St. and Number) D.C. (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS INVESTIGATIVE NAME OF SUPERVISOR R. B. Hood

TITLE OF JOB SPECIAL AGENT SALARY $7040.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES INVESTIGATE MATTERS OF CRIMINAL NATURE, THOSE PERTAINING TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY, CONDUCT BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS ON PROSPECTIVE & PRESENT EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT

REASONS FOR LEAVING TO SEEK A POSITION WITH GREATER ADVANCEMENT POSSIBILITIES

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

FROM 3/15/46 TO 3/1/47

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY JAMES P. O'CONNELL TRUCKING CO.

ADDRESS 69 GUERNSEY ST (St. and Number) BROOKLYN (City) NEW YORK (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS TRUCKING & WAR HOUSING NAME OF SUPERVISOR J. P. O'CONNELL SR.

TITLE OF JOB SPACE MGR. SALARY $3900.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES OPERATED BUSINESS CONSISTING OF 10 TRUCKS AND WAREHOUSE. MANAGED ALL PHASES, SUCH AS MAINTENANCE, BILLING, DISPATCHING, IN ABSENCE OF MY FATHER WHO WAS IN SEMI-RETIREMENT DUE TO ILLNESS

REASONS FOR LEAVING FATHER RETIRED

FROM 3/2/43 TO 11/1/44 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY MANUFACTURERS MACHINE & TOOL CO.

ADDRESS 11 LAFAYETTE ST. (St. and Number) NEW YORK (City), N.Y. (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS PRECISION PARTS NAME OF SUPERVISOR WILLIAM GELSTON

TITLE OF JOB WAREHOUSE SUPERVISOR SALARY $3380.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES IN COMPLETE CHARGE OF LARGE WAREHOUSE IN WHICH WERE STORED FINISHED & SEMI-FINISHED PARTS OF THE NORDEN BOMBSIGHT AND OTHER NAVAL ORDNANCE MATERIAL

REASONS FOR LEAVING TO ENTER NAVAL SERVICE

FROM 9/41 TO 3/43 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY JAMES P. O'CONNELL TRUCKING CO

ADDRESS 64 GUERNSEY ST. (St. and Number) BROOKLYN (City) N.Y. (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS TRUCKING NAME OF SUPERVISOR J.P. O'CONNELL SR.

TITLE OF JOB FOREMAN SALARY 2080.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES SUPERVISED LOADING & UNLOADING OF TRUCKS TO & FROM RAILROAD YARDS TO THE WAREHOUSE.

REASONS FOR LEAVING TO OBTAIN A DEFENSE JOB

FROM 3/40 TO 9/41 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. GYPSUM COMPANY

ADDRESS 63 HENDERSON ST. (St. and Number) JERSEY CITY (City) N.J. (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS BUILDING MATERIALS NAME OF SUPERVISOR B. ALLEN

TITLE OF JOB PRICE CLERK SALARY $[illegible] PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES PRICED MATERIALS FOR THE EASTERN SALES DISTRICT AND HANDLED ORDERS AND CORRESPONDENCE FOR SALES DIVISION

REASONS FOR LEAVING FOR ADVANCEMENT

15—62833-1

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NO

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE FRENCH SPEAK SLIGHT READ FAIR WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

BASEBALL FAIR

BASKETBALL FAIR

RADIO FAIR

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION? AS [illegible] SUPERVISOR

AT MY LAST PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT I WAS DESIGNATED ASSISTANT FIELD SUPERVISOR AND AS SUCH WAS REQUIRED ON OCCASION TO ADMINISTER THE WORK OF SEVERAL TO 100 MEN. THIS INCLUDED THE ASSIGNING OF WORK, SUPERVISING CASES SUBMITTING EFFICIENCY RATINGS ON EMPLOYEES AND BEING GENERALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THEIR ACTIVITIES

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 45 SHORTHAND ....

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC.

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE NA

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) NA LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR)

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

NA

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

NO

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

NO

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES IN THE U. S. WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY. (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. MR. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

2. MR. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

3. MR. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

4. MR. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

5. MR. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS. (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. MR. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

2. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

3. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

4. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

5. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S. (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. MR. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

2. MR. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

3. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? — IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

[illegible]

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: [illegible]

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.
1. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible] (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible] (St. and Number) (City) Wash. D.C. (State)
3. NAME Sears [illegible] Co. ADDRESS (St. and Number) Erie, PA (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM 4/50 TO Present [illegible] (St. and number) (City) (State) Virginia (Country)
FROM 2/48 TO 2/50 3009 So. 25 St. (St. and number) " (City) (State) " (Country)
FROM 5/47 TO 2/48 [illegible] St. (St. and number) Erie (City) PA (State) (Country)
FROM 3/46 TO 5/47 4432 [illegible] Ave. (St. and number) Elmhurst (City) N.Y. (State) (Country)
FROM 10/44 TO 3/46 Box [illegible] (St. and number) (City) [illegible] (State) [illegible] (Country)
FROM 6/43 TO 10/44 1332 E 31 St. (St. and number) Brooklyn (City) N.Y. (State) (Country)
FROM 5/41 TO 6/43 U.S. Marine [illegible] (St. and number) (City) " (State) " (Country)
FROM 2/23 TO 5/41 [illegible] St. [illegible] Ave. (St. and Number) Elmhurst (City) N.Y. (State) (Country)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM NA TO NA NA (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

2. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: NA

3. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

4. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

5. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

6. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

7. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES," EXPLAIN: NO

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? YES IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? MODERATION

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

FBI - FEB 1947

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Virginia F. O'Connell RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS 3212 S. 7 St. Arlington Virginia
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Arlington Virginia DATE 1/4/57
(City and State)

William Coles
(Witness)

William F. O'Connell Jr.
(Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

SEC. 15 EMPLOYMENT

9/39 TO 3/40 SEVERAL PART TIME JOBS DOING
BOOKKEEPING + SALES WORK

5/39 TO 9/39 GARDEN CITY BEACH CLUB
ATLANTIC BEACH, LONG ISLAND NY
ASSISTANT MGR. 100.00 PER MO.
REASON FOR LEAVING: SEASONAL WORK

1/39 TO 5/39 ABRAHAM + STRAUSS INC.
BROOKLYN NEW YORK
DEPARTMENT STORE
CREDIT DEPARTMENT - INTERVIEWER
INTERMITTENT EMPLOYMENT DEPENDING
UPON STORES NEED FOR HELP.

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 6 September 1962

PROT 2-230

TO : **Director of Security**
Director of Security
Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Notification of Cryptographic Clearance - **James P. O'Connell**

1. Subject employee has been granted a cryptographic clearance under the provisions of ~~CIA Regulation 90-500~~ HR 90-4. Clearance is effective 8 June 1962.

2. Subject has been informed of the granting of clearance, has been briefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Briefing Statement acknowledging responsibility for the protection of cryptographic information.

3. When Subject employee no longer requires the clearance in order to perform his assigned duties, it is requested that the Communications Security Staff (2411 "I" Bldg., Ext. 3021) be notified by **Director of Security**, that the clearance may be revoked.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Jean Paul DeBlois
JEAN PAUL DeBLOIS
Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
1 - **Director of Security**
1 - Security Office (Briefing Statement attached)
1 - Personnel Office
1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

(9)

FORM 3-59 1597a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY APPROVAL

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Date: 10 December 1951

TO: Chief, Personnel Division

Your Reference:

Case Number: 66483

FROM: [illegible]
Chief, Special Security Division

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is an applicant for a position in I&S.

Robert H. Cunningham
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

Jer

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14-00000

RECORD OF

PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT

SERVICE RETURNED TO

FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN

ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE 1 AUG 1974 RK

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: TARASOFF, ANNA
OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: C/LAD

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
[illegible] June		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

SECRET

26 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of Finance/C&TD

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Service for Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (P), Terminated Contract Employee

1. During period 8 April 1957 through 8 September 1953, subject served as an Agency Staff Employee. During this period, subject was a participating member of the Civil Service Retirement System.

2. During period 15 July 1964 through 19 October 1970, subject served as a part-time contract employee on a prearranged regular scheduled tour of duty. With respect to this period of service:

(a) Period 15 July 1964 through 7 September 1967 is creditable for purposes of Civil Service Retirement. Since subject was covered by Social Security during this period, Civil Service Retirement deductions were not withheld.

(b) During period 8 September 1967 through 19 October 1970, subject was a participating member of the Civil Service Retirement System.

3. Action Required:

(a) Office of Finance: Please post the above information to subject's retirement records.

(b) DDP/WH/Contracts: For your information.

/s/ [illegible]
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig - O/F/C&TD
1 - WH/Contracts
1 - CPD subject file
1 - CPD chrono

[illegible]

SECRET

11 MAR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Civil Service Retirement Credit

1. It is requested that information be provided as to the creditable service for the Civil Service Retirement program for the following individuals.

Kurt B. CANEPA
Sandra B. CAZAZZUS
Ralph M. SAMOSKA
Jesse D. WITCHARD

2. Although the named individuals are no longer employed by the Organization, the creditable service can be of particular significance to each.

3. Your early attention to the request will be appreciated.

for William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

23 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Following are the total number of hours for each year worked by Sandra B. CAZAZZUS under contract. The information was provided this office by Payroll.

Period of Service			Actual Hours Worked
From	To		
15 Jul 64	Dec	1964	551 hours
JAN 65	Dec	1965	789
Jan 66	Dec 66	1966	1091
Jan 67	Dec 67	1967	1092
Jan 68	Dec	1968	1486
Jan 69	Dec	1969	1414
Jan 70	19 Oct	1970	1217

Dow:

This gal had two contracts. The first one included a leave benefit. This first K ended and was immediated replaced by a 2nd K, which included Civil Service Retirement.

From the number of hours worked I feel we can make a determination that ~~she~~ during the full period she worked [illegible] in a part-time basis on a prearranged reg. sch. tour of duty. If you concur, I will write a std. type memo to O/Finance.

Subject is now terminated, but in WH field with her husband. Bill Kenehan has a dispatch in asking that Hqtrs. verify her total K service.

Paul.
23 Mar 71

ok — DK

SECRET

Contract Service — Sandra B. CAZAZO (P)

Date	Action	Compensation	GS Equivalent
8 Apr 57 8 Sep 63	CIA Staff Employee service		
15 Jul 64	Contract Employee with Social Security. No LPAs or PSIs.	$2.59 p.h.	
14 Aug 64	Pay increase	2.72	
10 Oct 65	Pay increase Authorized future LPAs.	[illegible] 2.62	
3 Jul 66	LPI	2.90	
7 Sep 67	Contract terminated	2.90	
8 Sep 67	Contract Employee with ~~Social~~ Civil Service Retirement and LPAs. No PSIs.	2.90	
8 Oct 67	LPI	3.03	
14 Jul 68	LPI	3.12	GS-05/5
13 Jul 69	LPI	3.37	GS-05/5
28 Dec 69	LPI	3.57	GS-05/5
19 Oct 70	Contract terminated	3.57	"

NOTE: On 24 Mar 1971, subject's official Staff Employee file was reviewed. It reflected; (a) staff employee service from 8 Apr 57 to 8 Sep 63; (b) during entire period was a participating member of the Civil Service Retirement System; (c) she was on LWOP during period 12 Jun-8 Sep 63; and her SF-144 dated 8 Apr 57 reflect no prior Federal Service.

1. LAST NAME TARASOFF FIRST NAME ANNA INITIAL(S) A

Cazzaros, Sandra

2. APPOINTMENT DATA Entered on duty 9/8/67 F T P T X

Subject to Sec 203(d), 1951 Leave Act Yes ☐ No ☐

Ceased to be subject to Sec 203(d) on ______ Annual Leave Bal ______

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)

Years	Months	Days

☐ More than 15 years

4 DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION

Contract terminated 10/19/70

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)

	ANNUAL	SICK
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 19 70	275	256
6 Current leave year accrual through 10/17 19 70	89	56
7. Total	364	312
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)		
9 Total leave taken	0	0
10. Balance	364	312

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 360hrs 2 holidays

12. Salary rate(s) $3.57 p/h

13 Lump sum leave dates From 0800 10/17 to 1700 12/22/70 0 (Hours)

26 Certified (correct)

(Signature)

Auth cert.officer

(Title)

(Date)

(Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes NONE

15 Current balance as of ______ 19__ ______

16 12-month accrual rate ______

17 Dates leave used prior 24 months ______

18. Monthly accrual date ______

19 Calendar days credit for next accrual date ______

20 Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr. ______ to ______

22 Dates during preceding calendar yr. ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23 During leave year in which separated	0	0
24 During step-increase waiting period which began on 8/14/64	0	0
25 During 12-month HL accrual period (dates) ______		

REMARKS

SCD 7/15/64

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 013175
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CAZAZZUS SANDRA B

PREPARED:07/.3/7.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONTRACT TERMINATION (1BCHL01)

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 10 DA [illegible] YR. 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CONTRACT-TYPE A (S)

6. FUNDS: V TO V | CF TO V | ☒ V TO CF | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 1135-C9?0

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP DIRECTORATE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: UNSPECIFIED

11. POSITION TITLE: TRANSLATOR

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (PART TIME) GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1045.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 05 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 3.76 LCD: 071564 LEI: 071564

18 REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:        23   SEX: F       MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 00
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH   LONGEVITY COMP: 071564   FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC                  HOSPITILIZATION: F    PLAN:
FEGLI: YES              PREV. GOVT SERV: 5        SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: H            A/L INC: 3                S/L INC: 3
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 090367 EXPIRATION DATE: 090771 DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 071564
REFERRING OFFICER: WH ADMIN        REFR ORG: WH        PHONE: 4-60
- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y     FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: NNN      OPS EXPNSE: N          HOUSING: N           POST/EQUAL: N
HOME LEAVE: 0    DIFFERENTIAL: N        OFFSET CLAUSE: N     STD GOVT: N
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : N        ALLOWANCE COMM: N    EDUCATION: N
STEP INCRS: N    OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N    SEPARATION: N

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

(4-51)

Form 7-66 11503 MFG. 11-69 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

DUPLICATE

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN DUPLICATE

DATE: 25 January 1971

PERSONAL DATA

NAME (*Last, First, Middle - true or pseudonym*) CAZAZZUS, Sandra B. (P)	OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1
LOCAL ADDRESS Mexico City, Mexico	PERMANENT ADDRESS Cleveland, Ohio
PERMANENT STATION OR BASE Mexico City, Mexico	POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE Contract Employee, Type B

CONTRACT DATA

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
15 July 1964	8 September 1970	7 September 1971	19 October 1970

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

Retirement of husband.

INTERNAL STAFF OR DIVISION CLEARANCES (*Add or delete as applicable*)

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE			
LOGISTICS			
XXXXXX			
Security			

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER	CLEARED BY (*Signature*) W.S. Renehan, C/WH/Contracts	DATE

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES

(*OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE*)

OFFICE	SCHEDULE			INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL
	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	
CENTRAL COVER STAFF				CLEARED BY (*Signature*) DATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY PSD			OS #131 751 13 July 64	CLEARED BY (*Signature*) DATE
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CPD				CLEARED BY (*Signature*) DATE

REVIEWED:

REMARKS (*Please initial*)

Duplicate - advance copy to OF/C&TD/CEAS 30 October 1970.

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Cont[illegible] Officer

STAFF OR DIVISION AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	SIGNATURE OF STAFF OR DIVISION RESPONSIBLE OFFICER	DATE
C/WH/1		

FORM 1689 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
3-67

SECRET

(9)

HIGH 3 BASED ON LAST 3 YEARS AS CONTRACT

OCT 67 - DEC 67	$609.02
JAN - DEC 68	4549.34
JAN - DEC 69	4935.06
JAN - OCT 70	4335.49

$14428.89 ÷ 3 = $4809.63

HIGH 3 AVERAGE

1½% x 4809.63 x 5 = $360.70
1¾% x 4809.63 x 5 = 420.85
2% x 4809.63 x 2.5 = 240.48

$1022.03 ANNUITY

HIGH 3 BASED ON LAST 3 YEARS AS STAFF

JUN 62 - JUN 63	$5545	GS 6/4
JUN 61 - JUN 62	5160	6/3
JAN 61 - JUN 61	2497	6/2
JUN 60 - DEC 60	2255	5/2

$15457 ÷ 3 = $5152.33

HIGHER ANNUITY

1½% x $5152.33 x 5 = $386.45
1¾% x $5152.33 x 5 = 450.85
2% x $5152.33 x 2.5 = 257.63

$1094.93 ANNUITY

CHZ.22415 (P) TARASOFF 8 FEB

1. She is not eligible for retirement annuity until she's 62 yrs old - on 5 May 1985.

STAFF (CSR) Apr 57 - Jun 63 . Sept 63
→ CONTRACT (SS) Jul. 64 - Sept 67
" (CSR) Sept 67 - Oct 70

for Fitzhalan NO Refund of Retirement deductions has been made, either from Staff or Contract employment.
Form 2802

Resignation effective 7 Sept 1963 } ~~$1781.83~~

57-63	CS Deductions while a Staffer	$1781.83
67-70	" " " Contract	961.24
	TOTAL	$2743.07

Sept $2.90
8 Oct 67 $3.03
14 Jul 3.12
Same →
Sept 67 $6.09 Dec 67
68 $4549.34
69 4935.06
Oct 70 4335.47

Oct 70
Apr 57
13 yrs 6 MONTHS
5152.33
3)15457.00
15
3 6
15 10
15

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, W H Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT ADMIN/CONTRACTS - Termination Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Sandra B. CAZAZZUS' contract was terminated effective 19 October 1970. Since her husband is retiring, she will no longer be available for employment.

2. Submitted herewith is a signed contract termination and termination secrecy oath.

Zachary T. Abarta
Zachary T. ABARTA

Attachments:

Contract termination - - - Orig & 1 h/w
Termination secrecy oath - Orig & 1 h/w

Distribution:

Orig & 2 - Chief, WH Division w/att.

Rec'd 30 OCT 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT 10,578	DATE 22 October 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, Sandra B. CAZAZZUS, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of our country. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of our government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims I may have against the Organization or our government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of the Organization concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

30 OCT 1970

mg OS/ID

5. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to our government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of our government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and our government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 16 day of

October 19 70.

Sandra B. Cazazzus (SEAL)
Signature Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Witnessed by me this 16 day of October 19 70,

at Mexico City, Mexico.

SIGNATURE

[redacted] [redacted] S E C R E[redacted] [redacted]

Miss Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Dear Miss CAZAZZUS

You are hereby notified that your services under a contract with the United States Government, effective 8 September 1967, are to be terminated at the convenience of the United States Government pursuant to paragraph 4 of said contract, and that the 30 days' notice required by the contract begins 19 September 1970.

You are reminded of the contents of paragraph 4 of said contract which read as follows:

> "_____. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the United States Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under applicable laws and regulations."

Your signature in the space provided below is acknowledgement of the contents hereto.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

By ____________________
Field Contracting Officer

Acknowledged:

Sandra B. Cazazzus

Witness:

Grace H. Farmelant

Reviewed:

____
Contract Approving Officer

Rec'd via HMMT-10578
30 Oct 70
orig routed with
term. sheet (1489)

S E C R E T

SECRET

NON-STAFF PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

DATE
12 Oct 70

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. SUBMIT FOR:
   A. CONTRACT EMPLOYEES *(TYPE A, B AND CAREER)*
   B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT OR NOC *(US CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS ONLY)*
2. THIS FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR OPERATIONAL OR FIELD AGENTS
3. COPIES OF THE FORM WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ORIGINATING COMPONENT *(NUMBER OF COPIES AT ITS DISCRETION)* AND BY CSPS/AGENT BRANCH *(1 COPY ONLY)*

NAME *(LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)* CAZAZZUS, Sandra B. (P)			SEX Female	DATE OF BIRTH 5 May 23
MARITAL STATUS Married	NO. DEPENDENTS 2	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1945, 49	NATIONALITY U.S.A	LAST MEDICAL EXAM Unknown
DATE OF LATEST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL Type B, 13 July 1964		JOB TITLE Transcriber		COMPONENT DDP/WH/1
CONTRACT CATEGORY Type B	EFFECTIVE DATE 15 July 64	EXPIRATION DATE 7 Sep 71	SALARY $3.67	GRADE EQUIVALENT GS-5/6	PROJECT OR FAN # SUPPORT

BENEFITS	YES	NO
SOCIAL SECURITY		X
FECA DEATH AND DISABILITY	X	
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE	X	
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT	X	
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERCIAL CIA ANNUITY		X
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE	X	
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		X
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS	X	
OTHER *(EXPLAIN)*		

NON-CIA EDUCATION

High School Graduate

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

DATES FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
1944-45	Cleveland Trust Company	Cleveland, Ohio	Bookkeeper	
1955-56	American Trust Company	San Leandro, California	Commercial Bookkeeper	

CIA TRAINING

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY *(BEGINNING WITH EOD)*

DATES FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR. CAT.	LOCATION	PROJECT	SALARY	GRADE EQUIV.
Apr 57-Jun 63	Clerk-Typist	Staff	Hqs		EOD as Resign.as	GS-4 GS-6
Jul 64-present	Transcriber	B	Mexico City	SUPPORT	$3.67	GS-5/6

SECURITY

FACTORS AFFECTING SUBJECT (PUBLIC EXPOSURE - PRESS, RADIO, TV); KNOWN OR SUSPECTED IDENTIFICATION TO OTHER THAN CIA STAFF PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE, OR SECURITY SERVICES.

COVER

A. PRESENT COVER IS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NON-OFFICIAL Performed her secretarial/transcribing duties outside the Static

DIVISION EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY:

Satisfactory

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE:

Satisfactory

ADAPTABILITY (SUBJECT AND FAMILY) TOWARDS DUAL LIFE

No problem.

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☒ OFFICIAL ☐ NON-OFFICIAL (GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

None

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

Bill Montgomery
CCS/CTS
6697
12 October 1970

ILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 35 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

NF: CCS 2 INFO FILE, VR, WH8, OCC2, OF3, OP3

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 13 OCT 70 21 47z CITE DIRECTOR 077157

MEXICO CITY

JBCENT/ADMIN

1. PLEASE ADVISE DOUGLAS J. FEINGLASS AND SANDRA B. CAZAZZUS THAT THE FLAT RATE TAX HAS INCREASED TO 18.4 PER CENT EFFECTIVE WITH PAY PERIOD ENDING 20 SEPTEMBER 1970.

2. STATION SHOULD START WITHHOLDING TAX AT HIGHER RATE IMMEDIATELY. DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: WH/1

WH/CON

WH/FI/NCC

C/WH/SS

C/CCS/CTS

14 00...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

5
4
3
2
1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

Miss Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Dear Miss CAZAZZUS

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 8 Sept. 1967, as amended, which expires 8 Sept. 1970.

Effective 8 Sept. 1970, said contract, as amended, is extended for one (1) year.

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

By ______________________
Contracting Officer

Accepted:
Sandra B. Cazazzus

Witness:
____

Approved:
____

Concur: ______________________
DDR
Date : 6 OCT 1970

REVIEWED:
/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WH Division

ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Sandra B. CAZAZZUS, Contract Provisions

Reference: HMMT-9892

1. Reference indicated Sandra B. CAZAZZUS is a Contract Employee who is required to perform her duties during various hours of the day as well as a varying number of hours in order to meet operational deadlines.

Reference asked that the contract for CAZAZZUS be amended to provide reimbursement of six hours per day when in a leave status and for paid holidays retroactively to 8 September 1967.

2. The request is answered by the Station's explanation--unless and until there has been established in advance a regular tour of duty, an individual is not eligible for leave or holiday pay (see FHB 20-1 and FR 20-13).

In the event the basic criteria is met (FHB 20-1), the effective date could not be retroactive.

Hugh E. WESTBY

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMS-6559

DATE: [illegible] SEP 1969

CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET**

HQS FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Contracts	SRenehan md (17 Sept 69)	4460

1-WH/1
1-WH/Contracts
1-WH/Registry

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/SS		George R. Thompson

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Anna A. Tarasoff

FROM: RID/D&P/INCOMING GB-12	EXTENSION x7737	NO. [illegible] 9892 DATE 10 SEP 1969	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief/WH/Reg.	11 SEP 1969			
2.				
3. CWH/SS				
4.				?
5. WH/contract	13 Sep 69	13 Sept		
6. C/WH/1				Your comments please. Subject's contract already provides for sick and annual leave effective 15 July 64, and she is considered a part-time contract employee on a regularly scheduled tour of duty. Subject's contract does not provide for overtime and holiday time. Her contract would have to be amended to include this provision.
7.				
8. WH/Contracts				6-8 Pls advise Dalton that under terms of contract cannot approve Para 3 request.
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (C/E) (132830) - Contract Entitlements

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. Book Dispatch - 6496
B. Book Dispatch - 6144

1. Subject is a contract employee who is required to perform her duties during various hours of the day (including a varying number of hours) in order to meet operational deadlines.

2. Even though CAZAZZUS' contract allows her annual and sick leave benefits, she has not been reimbursed for any leave during the period 8 September 1967 to the present. In addition, the Station has not reimbursed her for any holidays, WOLADY or local, while other contract employees whose contracts call for a regularly scheduled tour of duty, have received compensation.

3. Since subject has worked an average of 30 hours per week, with Headquarters concurrence, it is recommended that she be reimbursed six hours per day when in a leave status and for paid holidays retroactively to 8 September 1967, the effective date of her present contract.

for/John A. KAUBERT

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT - 9892	3 September 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for.
[illegible] B [illegible]
[redacted]

1. Effective 8 September 1969 the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 8 September 1967 is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

RB/DH
5 Sept 69

SECRET

Group 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension

It is requested that the contract for the following named individual(s) be amended to extend the term as indicated.

Taranett, Anna C.
CAZAZZUS, Sandra B. Through 7 September 1970

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

DATE:

CTC No. ____________

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for ____________

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. An acknowledged Letter of Tax Instruction has been ☐ will ☐ will not ☐ be forwarded. The Station/Base will be ☐ has been ☐ advised of this assessment.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
seventeen and three-tenths (17.3) per cent	14 December [illegible]

2. This is a new assessment ☐ a revised assessment ☐.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

CONTACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher

Chief, C.P.D.

APPROVED:

Executive Secretary, Covert Tax Board

DISTRIBUTION: Orig & 1 - Addressee: 1 Copy CPD: 1 Copy Area Division: 2 Copies CCS

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WOGAME
Douglas J. FEINGLASS (p)
ADM/JBCENT - Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (p) - Revision of Tax Assessment Rate

REFERENCE: Letter of Tax Instruction, HMMS-5711, 14 Dec 1967

1. Please advise FEINGLASS that his flat rate percentage tax assessment has been revised by the Tax Staff from thirteen and nine-tenths (13.9) per cent, established by reference, to twenty and eight-tenths (20.8) per cent, effective 29 June 1969, T/Y 1969. This revision is necessary as his income and tax position have changed to such a degree as to make the previous tax assessment rate unrealistic. A computation of the revised tax rate is attached.

2. This assessment revision is incorporated by reference as an amendment to FEINGLASS' Letter of Tax Instruction.

3. From the information submitted to the Tax Staff, it appears that FEINGLASS' daughter qualifies as a dependent. The new tax computations are based on five exemptions. Also, FEINGLASS should list five exemptions on his 1969 tax return.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

Attachment: As Noted

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS (w/att)
1 - C/CPD (wo/att)
1 - OF/C&TD/CPB (wo/att)
1 - C/WH/1 (wo/att)
1 - WH/Contracts

HMMS-6524

11 August 1969

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NOTE FOR FILE:

CAZAZZUS' husband's (FEINGLASS) retirement date extended to Nov. 70.

25 JUN 1969

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

PROCESSING

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Annual Fitness Report - Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached are copies of an Annual Fitness Report on Sandra B. CAZAZZUS.

2. CAZAZZUS and her husband make a good and efficient team on the duties assigned to them.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

orig routed to:
WH/CXO, 11 Feb 69
DC/WHD 11 Feb 69
WH/1 ?
WH/contracts, 18 Feb 69
CPD 19 FEB 1969

Attachment: herewith

Distribution:
(2) - C/WH Division w/att.
1 - C/SB Division w/o att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-9523	DATE 29 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7
SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Sandra B. CAZAZZUS Sandra B. Cazazzus

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Francis J. COIGNE Francis Coigne
DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Willard C. CURTIS Willard C. Curtis

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): CAZAZZUS Sandra B.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 5 May 1923
3. SEX: F
4. GRADE:
5. SD:
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Contract Employee
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/1
8. CURRENT STATION: Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☒ SPECIAL (Specify): Contract employee

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1968 thru 31 December 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into workable format for Station analysis and filing.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handling administrative matters for her husband.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

GROUP 1 [illegible]

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
4-65

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This employee continues to assist and compliment her husband, a Staff Agent, in an unusually efficient team. She pre-edits transcribed materials and puts usable material into a form roady for filing, thus saving analytical and clerical time in the Station. Her knowledge of Russian and Spanish, analytical ability, overall efficiency and interest in her work all contribute to a fine performance.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 January 1969	Sandra B. CA[illegible]US (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 January 1969		(signed in pseudo on Field Paul L. Dillon Transmittal)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs with this report. Subject and her husband continue to form an efficient and valuable team.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 January 1969	Chief of Station	(signed in pseudo on Field Winston M. Scott Transmittal.)

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOMOLD

INFO.
Chief, WH Division Contacts

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMINISTRATIVE/TRAINING
Language Training

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: Information Only

As of 1 March 1968 the below listed personnel were receiving voluntary Spanish language training paid for by the organization or LNGOLD:

Sandra B. CAZAZZUS
Francis J. COIGNE
Humphrey K. FEADSHIP
Douglas J. FEINGLASS
Henry N. LANGDON
Keith R. LEVENDERIS
Wanda G. PANKPINTO
Clarice F. PARDECK
Cora B. RAUSKIND
Joseph F. TRECANTI

and the wives of Walter W. CORNBURY and Gerald D. FAHLANGER.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - Chief, WOMOLD
2 - Chief, WH Division

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-8919

DATE
9 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) CAZAZZUS Sandra B	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) 1923	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
Sandra B. Cazazzus

DATE
14 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY
(official receiving date stamp)

MAR 5 '68

CONT [illegible]

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

DUPLICATE COPY—For Agency Use

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

Approved BoB 50-R0 385

Statistical Stub (SF 176-T)

To be completed only by employees who checked either box "A" or box "C" on the election form.
The purpose of this stub is to furnish statistics on the initial registration under the liberalized life insurance program.

1. Which box did you check?	Box A	☐	1
	Box C	☐	2
2. Did you have regular insurance under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program on January 1, 1968?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
3. Your sex?	Male	☐	1
	Female	☐	2
4. Are you now married?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
born?			

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Sandra B. CAZZAZUS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please forward a completed form 89 on Sandra B. CAZZAZUS for review by the Medical Staff.

Hugh E. WESTBY

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMS-5798	DATE
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/Personnel	PPMacDougall	lvr *6 Feb.68	681

1 - WH/Pers
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/1

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/Pers		
C/WH/1		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/SS		George R. Thompson

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CAZAZZUS Sandra B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 May 1923	3. SEX F	4. GRADE	5. SD	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Contract Employee	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)			XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Contract employee				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1968 thru 31 December 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into workable format for Station analysis and filing.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handling administrative matters for her husband.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This employee continues to assist and compliment her husband, a Staff Agent, in an unusually efficient team. She pre-edits transcribed materials and puts usable material into a form ready for filing, thus saving analytical and clerical time in the Station. Her knowledge of Russian and Spanish, analytical ability, overall efficiency and interest in her work all contribute to a fine performance.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 28 January 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 28 January 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal) Paul L. Dillon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs with this report. Subject and her husband continue to form an efficient and valuable team.

DATE 28 January 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal.) Winston M. Scott

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmittal to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7
SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Francis J. COIGNE
DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Willard C. CURTIS Willard C. Curtis

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WOGAME

SUBJECT: AIR/JECENT - FEINGLASS/CAZAZZUS - Tax Administration

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMT-8732, 15 December 1967

1. Forwarded under separate cover is the name and address of the notional organization for FEINGLASS to use on his tax return. Also forwarded under separate cover is a brief outline of the nature of the notional.

2. As previously discussed in a Headquarters tax briefing, this notional would not issue any tax documentation and was not to be used for any purpose other than their tax return. This return was to be kept in a safe place, since the return would indicate a different cover than what they are using in Mexico.

3. In the event FEINGLASS ever indicates that the use of the notional is necessary for purposes other than the tax return, this requirement should be cleared by Headquarters prior to actual use.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS (w/SCA)
1 - WH/Contracts (wo/att)

Attachment (USC)

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmittal to Headquarters:

SECTION A, Items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, Items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 16 FEB. 68	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (In pseudonym) Sandra B. CAZAZZUS Sandra B. Cazazzus

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 16 Feb 1968	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (In pseudonym) Francis J. COIGNE Francis J. Coigne
DATE 16 Feb 1968	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (In pseudonym) Willard C. CURTIS Willard C. Curtis

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CAZAZZUS Sandra B.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 May 23	3. SEX F	4. GRADE	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Contract Employee		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER	RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)			
XX	SPECIAL (Specify): Contract Employee			

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1967 - 31 December 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into workable format for Station analysis and filing.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handling administrative matters for her husband.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C
NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject continues to complement her husband as a part of an efficient team. Her expeditious processing of transcript materials (so that they come to the Station ready for filing) saves the Station a great deal of work and time. Her language and analytical abilities are utilized to pre-edit material and cut out the superflous. She continues to show interest in her work at which she is very efficient.

SECTION D
CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 16 Feb 68	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 29	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 Feb 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Francis J. COIGNE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs in this Report. This employee and her husband form an efficient and valuable team.

DATE 16 Feb 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

If typewriter is not available, bear down with ballpoint pen to make legible copies.

Standard Form No. 2809
U.S. Civil
Service Commission
FPM Supplement 890-1
June 1967

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM
(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ballpoint pen.)

New Carrier's Control No. 11252435

TO EMPLOYING OFFICE: SHOW OLD CARRIER'S CONTROL NUMBER ONLY IF ELECTION IS TO CANCEL ENROLLMENT OR TO CHANGE OPTIONS OR TYPE OF ENROLLMENT IN THE SAME PLAN.

Old Carrier's Control No.

PART A

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): Tarasoff, Anna A.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH DAY YEAR

3. ARE YOU NOW MARRIED? YES ☐ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY) (STATE) (ZIP CODE)

5. SEX MALE ☐ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

IMPORTANT

IT IS ILLEGAL FOR AN EMPLOYEE OR A MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY TO BE COVERED UNDER MORE THAN ONE ENROLLMENT. IF YOU ARE ALREADY COVERED THROUGH THE FAMILY ENROLLMENT OF ANOTHER FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEE OR ANNUITANT YOU MUST REGISTER NOT TO ENROLL OR THE OTHER ENROLLMENT MUST BE CANCELED OR CHANGED TO SELF ONLY. SIMILARLY, IF A FAMILY MEMBER LISTED BY YOU IN PART B IS COVERED THROUGH HIS (OR HER) OWN ENROLLMENT, YOU CANNOT ELECT A FAMILY ENROLLMENT UNLESS THE FAMILY MEMBER CANCELS HIS (OR HER) ENROLLMENT.

PART B

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL OR CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2.

IF YOU ARE CHANGING YOUR ENROLLMENT ALSO FILL IN PART D.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from back page of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 22, including (a) legally adopted children and (b) stepchildren, foster children, and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 22 who became disabled before age 22 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 22 or over, if one is not already on file.) DO NOT LIST PARENTS OR OTHERS WHO ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FAMILY MEMBERS. THEY WILL NOT RECEIVE BENEFITS, EVEN IF THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON YOU AND ARE LISTED.

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

PART C

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES

1. I ELECT NOT TO ENROLL IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM. ☒

Covered on husb's policy

2. I ELECT TO CANCEL MY PRESENT ENROLLMENT UNDER THE CODE NUMBER SHOWN BELOW ☐

Present Enrollment Code Number

PART D

FILL IN THIS PART, AS WELL AS PART B, TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

ANSWER ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 TO SHOW ENROLLMENT CODE BEING CHANGED AND ELIGIBILITY FOR CHANGE

1. ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER OF PRESENT PLAN

2. NUMBER OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)

3. DATE OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

Norma Sue Carpenter for
Anna A. Tarasoff
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT)

12-28-67
(DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F

TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS (INCLUDING ZIP CODE) OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER
(ALTERNATE)

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 12-28-67

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 12-31-67

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. SF 2811 REPORT NO.

REMARKS

FOR USE ONLY BY AGENCY.

Contract Emp.
9-8-67
WH

5132830

2809-109

Triplicate—For Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

DATE 22 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/OP
Benefits and Services Division

This is to advise you that Anna A. Tarasoff has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 8 September 1967. The Contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/WH.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Sandra B. CAZAZZUS, Contract

Action Required: As Noted

References : A. BD-6144
B. MEXICO CITY 2718

1. In view of Reference B and inasmuch as Sandra B. CAZAZZUS was in the Headquarters area, a new contract was prepared granting her the benefits of Reference A. The contract was signed by CAZAZZUS and has been forwarded for related processing.

2. Attached is a copy of the contract effective 8 September 1967 for CAZAZZUS. She elected FEGLI but declined the health insurance as she is included under her husband's policy. CAZAZZUS was thoroughly briefed on the provisions of the contract as well as the provisions of her previous contract.

STATION ACTION:

As CAZAZZUS is payrolled by the Station, related deductions for the new benefits (Civil Service Retirement and FEGLI) are to be made by the Station. Social Security deductions will, of course, cease as there is no cover requirement for mandatory Social Security coverage.

3. During the briefing, CAZAZZUS inquired about the use of sick leave. She was informed sick leave can be used in the same manner and per the same regulations as when she was formerly a

(continued)

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City, w/att, h/w

HMGS - 5679

S E C R E T

WH/Contracts/WSRenehan: gms (17 Nov 67) 4460

1-WH/Contracts w/att
1-WH/1 w/att
1-WH/Reg wo/att

C/WH/1

staffer. The point involved was whether she had been granted sick leave during her "maternity leave" in 1965. She was advised that possibly she did receive payment covering the period which her accrued sick leave represented; and, possibly at that time she had only a minimal balance accrued.

STATION ACTION:

It is suggested the Station review her leave/pay account for the above cited period and advise her of the details involved.

Should the records reflect she had a balance but was not provided the leave, a pay adjustment may be made up to the balance at that time with an appropriate reduction of her current sick leave balance. NOTE: She was advised she could not have sick leave accrued since that time applied retroactively.

It is further suggested the Station Admin or Finance Officer conduct the briefing due to the necessity for the briefer to have a rather technical knowledge of leave.

Hugh E. WESTBY

8 Sep 67

Miss Sandra B. Cazazzus

Dear Miss Cazazzus:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer of this organization, hereby contracts with you, as a contract employee under the terms and conditions set forth below:

1. New Benefits. By virtue of your employment relationship under this agreement you are:

(a) Covered under the Civil Service Retirement Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. From the basic compensation paid you hereunder there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6-1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Social Security deductions required by virtue of your cover activities will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

(b) Covered under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization unless you execute a written waiver of such coverage. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder.

(c) Eligible for coverage under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Because of your eligibility under this Act (whether or not you choose to enroll), your coverage under the contract employees health program shall cease thirty-one (31) days after the effective date of this agreement.

2. Your previous contract with the United States Government, effective 15 July 1964, is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto.

3. All provisions of said previous contract not in conflict with this agreement are incorporated by reference into and made a part of this agreement.

SECRET

4. This agreement is effective as of 8 September [illegible] and shall continue thereafter for two (2) years unless sooner terminated as set forth in your previous contract. If this agreement becomes effective during an overseas assignment nothing contained herein shall be construed as extending that assignment beyond its originally contemplated duration or invalidating your entitlement to return travel expenses (if applicable) upon completion of that assignment.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Sandra B. Cazazzus

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT
[illegible] - [illegible]/CAZAREZ - Tax Handling

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The [illegible] Tax Committee has approved a flat rate assessment of [illegible]/CAZAREZ's Federal tax obligation, beginning with tax year 1967. Attached is the letter of tax instruction which [illegible] should review. The original must be signed and returned to Headquarters.

VICTOR D. [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS (w/att)
1 - [illegible]/Contracts (w/att)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[illegible]-5711	6 December 1967 14 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

Letter of Tax Instruction for FEINGLASS/CAZAZZUS

1. Based on discussions held with tax representatives of the Organization, an assessment of your Organizational income has been approved to satisfy your Federal tax obligation.

2. The assessment computation is based on an estimate of your taxable compensation from the Organization and your estimate of other income from outside sources. The assessment computation results in a percentage of your salary being withheld each pay period to completely satisfy your tax obligation. For tax year 1967 thirteen and nine-tenths (13.9) per cent will be withheld, effective 28 August 1967. The computation is attached.

3. In computing your assessment rate, you have been granted a basic tax credit of $250.00. This credit is not guaranteed, but is granted to give reasonable assurance that you will not pay a higher tax than you would under ordinary reporting procedures.

4. Future changes in your income or tax status may justify a revision of the assessment rate. In this event this agreement would be amended accordingly.

5. It is important that you file a tax return directly with Internal Revenue that is consistent with your cover status. Care and accuracy in preparing this return are necessary. Any tax liability resulting from the tax computation on this return will be satisfied by your own funds. A certified true copy of this tax return must be forwarded to us upon your submission of the original to Internal Revenue. Provided below are specific criteria to assist you in the preparation of the tax return:

A. You will be provided with the name of a notional organization to be used on your 1967 tax return. The only income you will report will be income shown on your (FEINGLASS) earning statement. You will not report your wife's income or tax withholding nor will you report any withholding that was made from your salary.

B. The income that is shown (using the notional as a source) will be reported on the Form 2555 (Statement to Support Exemption of Income Earned Abroad) and will be exempted from tax, due to your residence overseas. You will base your exemption on physical presence abroad. For tax year 1967 you will report your income as being earned prior to home leave and therefore fully excludable because the qualifying period, which ended on the date you left Mexico for home leave, included an eighteen-month period abroad.

C. Other income must also be reported on this tax return, including interest from the Credit Union, which will be indicated without identifying the Credit Union by name.

6. You may request an advance of funds for payment of foreign income or related (income) taxes assessed against income received from or guaranteed by the Organization. Accounting for these funds will be made in the form of copies of the receipted tax bills (or other acceptable tax documents) which will be forwarded to the home office for approval and write-off of expense.

7. Please acknowledged the original of this letter and return to Headquarters, attention: Covert Tax Committee.

8. We appreciate your cooperation in arranging these details.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY
Secretary
Covert Tax Committee

Acknowledged:

____

Date____________________________

SENDER WILL CHE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[illegible]		
2			
3		11/17 2:25	
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Mr. Kaufman reviewed and declined to coordinate, feeling that time was no longer appropriate for this message.

file

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[illegible]	

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

FORM 7-66 12 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

1. MESSA[illegible] ARE CONSIDERED ROUTINE UNLESS A HIGH PRECEDENCE IS INDICATED IN THE ADDRESS LINE.
2. SEN[illegible] NAL AND YELLOW COPY TO CABLE SECRETARIAT. RETA[illegible] SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.
3. DO NOT ERASE[illegible] OUT AND CONTINUE TYPING. DO NOT EXCEED [illegible] TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE. INCLUDING SP[illegible] END TEXT LINES WITHIN THE RIGHT MARGIN GUIDE [illegible]PROPRIATE FOR YOUR TYPEWRITER.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 12 September 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______ PER______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR 34619

IN DISCUSSING REF WITH FEINGLASS PLEASE EXPRESS OUR SYMPATHY DEATH OF CAZAZZUS MOTHER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref advised CAZAZZUS can take physical on return Mexico.

C/WH/1 ______________

5
4 WILLIAM V. BROE
3 C/WHD
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN 5
C/WH/CONTRACTS 4
3
2
1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 8

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1 SS

FROM
ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB 8, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2, D/MS 2

8 Sep 67 IN 47516

SECRET 072355Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2718

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

1. SANDRA B. CAZAZZUS DEPARTING SEP WITH MINOR SON FOR MOTHER'S FUNERAL IN CLEVELAND, OHIO. SHE UNABLE COMPLETE PHYSICAL HERE, PLANS DO SO AT HQS.

2. ALSO INCOMPLETE IS CONTRACT REVIEW FOR NEW BENEFITS PER BOOK DISPATCH 6144. STATION SUGGESTS THIS BE ACCOMPLISHED AT HQS DURING FEINGLASS CONSULTATION 31 OCT.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

A Contract

1 JM 9/8/67

Anna Tarasoff D.

Physical as dependent
will be taken at Hqs. 7375
259 cont 9/8/67

Mr. Fisher will DIR
brief Subject will contact 91184
Designated & husband
when she &
arrive in Hqs JM 9/8/67

PPMacDougall/lvr
WH/Personnel
6815
18 August 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

FILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
3 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO. FILE VR [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 29114

10 22 00Z

MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 2499 (IN 34006)
B. HMMS-5433

1. TDY HQS INCLUDED IN FEINGLASS TRAVEL ORDER. SHOULD PLAN ARRIVE HQS 31 OCTOBER 1967.

2. FAMILY SHOULD TAKE PHYSICALS IN FIELD AND FORWARD RESULTS. FEINGLASS WILL TAKE PHYSICAL WHILE HQS.

3. REF B POUCHED 16 AUGUST ANNOUNCES ARRIVAL TDY REPLACEMENT 18 SEPTEMBER 1967.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref A requested home leave beginning ~~18~~ 23 Sept. with TDY Hqs. to discuss 1968 retirement.

Ref B gave info on TDY replacement for FEINGLASS.

C/WH/1

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Edward K. O'Malley
EDWARD K. O'MALLEY
AC/WH/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

7

ACTION D/MS 2 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR WH 8 CCS 3 IPS OP 2

S E C R E T 261615Z CITE MEXICO 1893

DIRECTOR

26 Jun 67 IN 98383

HBDRAW

REF: MEXICO CITY 1888 (IN 97294)

CAZAZZUS ILLNESS DIAGNOSED AS FLOATING KIDNEY. RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL 24 JUNE 1967. NO OPERATION PLANNED.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted] 28

ACTION D/MS 2 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
• FILE, VR, WH 8, CCS 3, OP 2

SECRET 240020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1888 24 JUN 67 IN 97294

DIRECTOR

HBDRAW

SANDRA B. CAZAZZUS ADMITTED TO AMERICAN BRITISH COWDRAY HOSPITAL 22 JUNE 1967 WITH SEVERE ABDOMINAL PAIN. PRELIMINARY DIAGNOSED AS KIDNEY DISORDER. WILL ADVISE FURTHER.

SECRET **SECRET**

BT

June 26

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 132830

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX F	4. GRADE	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- XX INITIAL
- ANNUAL
- XX SPECIAL (Specify): Contract Employee
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1966-31 December 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into a workable format for Station analysis and filing	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handling administrative matters for her husband and herself.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This is the first time a fitness report has been prepared on CAZAZZUS herself, although previous fitness reports on her husband, Douglas J. FEINGLASS, have mentioned ~~her~~ valuable contribution. She and FEINGLASS continue to work as an excellent team. CAZAZZUS works conscientiously and quickly and saves the Station a great deal of time in the routine processing of paper and tapes. Her interest in the subject matter and her analytical ability enable her to weed out superfluous material and assist FEINGLASS in his translations and analyses.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

BY EMPLOYEE

1.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

BY SUPERVISOR

2.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 7 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the rating officer's evaluation of CAZAZZUS. She compliments her husband perfectly

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7
SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 8 Feb 67	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Sandra B. Cazazzus Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 7 Feb 67	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Jonathan L. WEENING
DATE 28 Feb 67	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Francis J. COIGNE Francis Coigne

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 6-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

Miss Anna A. Tarasoff

Dear **Miss Tarasoff**:

Reference is made to your current contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective **22 August 1966**, said contract is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"**3**. Taxes. As an employee of the Government you must satisfy your Federal tax liability on taxable income paid to you under paragraph **one (1)** above. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income tax liability on said income. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 -- Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE: [illegible]

CTC No. 3 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for [illegible]

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee as indicated below. An acknowledged letter of tax instruction ☐ is ☐ will be forwarded.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
[illegible]	[illegible]

2. Other payroll factors pertinent to this Covert Tax Committee tax assessment action are as follows:

[illegible]

[illegible]

Approval Chief, CPD

Secretary, Covert Tax Committee

SECRET

Anna A. Tarasoff

4 June 1966

MISS [redacted]

Dear Miss [redacted]

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 15 July 1966, as amended, which expires 14 July 1966.

Effective 15 July 1966, said contract, as amended, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Willard C. Curtis

ACCEPTED:

[redacted]

WITNESS: Irving G. Chonsky

APPROVED:

WH CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Office of Finance

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Admin/Finance-Salary Increase-Sandra B. C'ZAZZUS, Employee Number 132830

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only.

REFERENCE: HPMS-4512, dated 6 January 1966

Furnished herewith is a copy of a contract amendment for Sandra B. CAZAZZUS covering the legislative salary increase as of 10 October 1965. The amendment was not prepared in time for CAZAZZUS to sign it before going on home leave and consequently had to await her return.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As Stated Above

Distribution:
2 - Office of Finance, w/att
1 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-6164

DATE
17 January 1966

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

Anna H
Claroff

[redacted]

Dear Miss [redacted]

Reference is made to your present contract with the United States Government as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective 10 October 1965, said contract is amended by includi therein provision for compensation increase of the Federal Emplo. alary Act of 1965, in conformance with policies and procedures of th Organization. Said contract is amended also to include the fol sentence in paragraph one, entitled "Compensation":

> "Compensation will be increased based on legislative pay increases."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in fu force and effect.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNME

BY Willard C. Curtis

ACCEPTED:

WITNESS:

Irving A. Cronsky

[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Office of Finance

Salary Increase - [illegible], Employee Number [illegible]

The Office of Finance has not received a contract amendment for the 10 October 1965 salary increase which the Station has paid Subject as reflected on Station T/-489-66. Therefore, in the absence of a contract amendment, it would appear that [illegible] is being overpaid. Please advise.

SHIRLEY K. [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - COS/Mexico City

HMMW - 4512 6 January 1966

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C&TD/APB/CFAS/E.Landry/rkm 2294

2 - WH Division WH/BF
3 - C&TD/APB/CFAS
1 - RI/DP
1 - OF/Registry
/ - CPD

WH/SS

14-00000

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

D/ SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, OF 2, CCS 3

S E C R E T 081945Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5550

8 Dec 65 IN 10658

REF: DIR 62414

1. 1964 COVERT TAX RETURNS FOR BENADUM, LIMOTOR 19 (BARBARA C. HUFIG), PINEINCH, SANDAMANIE BEING SENT BY HMMT 6018 10 DEC POUCH. NOT POUCHED EARLIER AS OVERLOOKED IN STATION ADMIN FILES.

2. RETURN FOR CAZAZZUS SENT HMMT 5399 APR 23 (JOINT WITH S.A. DOUGLAS J. FEINGLASS). RETURN FOR LIFUED 30, NOW RITA N. BLAZIK, SENT HMMT 5908, 28 OCT 65.

3. LIHUFF 1 SUBMITTED RETURN THROUGH OVERT CHANNELS: SIGNED COPY BEING POUCHED HQS.

4. WILL REPORT ON TICHBORN SEPARATELY.

S E C R E T [illegible]
TAX RECORDS REQUESTED [illegible]

CFN 5550 62414 1964 BENADUM LIMOTOR 19 BARBARA C HUFIG PINEINCH SANDAMANIE HMMT 6018 10 NOT POUCHED CAZAZZUS HMMT 5399 APR 23 DOUGLAS J FEINGLASS LIFUED 30 RITA N BLAZIK HMMT 5908 28 65 LIHUFF 1 HQS

BT

SECRET

Dec 23

SECRET

ANNA H. TARASOFF
[redacted]

Dear Miss [redacted]

Reference is made to your present contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective 14 August 1964, said contract is amended by including therein provision for compensation increase of the Government Employees Salary Reform Act of 1964, in conformance with the policies and procedures of this organization.

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

O/K

New rate $2.72 ~~[illegible]~~ P/hour

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Willard C. Curtis
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

APPROVED:

REVIEWED:

/s/ Joseph B. Ragan
Special Contracting Officer

DISPATCH

C/WH/SS

CPD

~~BD 4659 Sec Info~~

c/o CCS - Mar 19 - Higgat 5270.

DISPATCH

TO
Chief, [illegible]

FROM
Chief of Station, [illegible]

SUBJECT
Effective Date for Contract - [illegible]

REFERENCE: A. [illegible]
B. [illegible], [illegible] July 196[illegible]

The effective date of [illegible] Contract [illegible] July 196[illegible]. Station [illegible] for [illegible].

[illegible]

Distribution:
3 - [illegible]

Orig rec'd + fwd - 17 Aug 64
WH/B&F
CPD-5E69
CFD/CEAS-2276.t

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

DATE
[illegible] August 196[illegible]

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 48769 A

DATE 29 July 1964

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE) Anna Tarasoff

Anna Tarasoff
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

WITNESS: Herbert Mancll
Herbert Mancll

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

SECRET

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 48769 B

DATE 29 July 1964

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) Sandra B. Cazazzus

Sandra B. CAZAZZUS
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

WITNESS:
Gerald F. GESTETNER

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CONTRACT TYPE B SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 15 July 1964

YOUR REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 13 July 1964

CASE NO. : 131751

TO : WH/PERS

SUBJECT : TARASOFF, Anna A.

1. This is to inform you of Security Approval of the Subject person for Contract Type B employment as specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-53.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days to contract with Subject within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

3. This office is to be advised when a Contract is signed by Subject and when the Contract is terminated.

4. As a part of this contracting process:

☐ A polygraph interview must be arranged by your office.

☒ A polygraph interview is not necessary.

☐

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

FORM 10-62 1992a

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(9-40)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 13 July 1964

TO:
☐ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
☒ Personnel Security Division/Office of Security

FROM: WH/PERS
GH-4408

SUBJECT: (True name) Tarasoff, Anna

PROJECT: Station Support

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO. 131751

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☒	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL Type B	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Mexico City, Mexico

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Her principal responsibility will be to assist her husband, a Staff Agent, in the transcribing and processing of the Station's LIENVOY/LIFMRICK product.

Subject resigned from staff employee status on 8 September 1963.

She has been with her husband in Mexico during interim period

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
W.S. Renehan	6577	W.E. Brooks

FORM 1-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SR Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT ADMINISTRATIVE/[illegible]
WAE Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXI-9691

1. Transmitted under separate cover attachment are three copies of a signed field contract completed on the Subject of reference.

2. Her principal responsibility will be to assist her husband Douglas J. FEINGLASS (P) in the transcribing and processing of the Station's LIENVOY/LIMERICK product. The part-time employment of Subject will permit FEINGLASS to devote considerably more effort and concentration on the preparation of assessment studies on the TUSTAL complement.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD. C. CURTIS

Orig + 1 cut - 17 July 64
C/wt/SS
wt/BAF
CPD 5669
CFD/REAS 6/65

Attachment:
As stated above (USC)

Distribution:
2 - WHD, w/att
1 - SRD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-[illegible]

DATE
12 June 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

15 Jul [illegible]

Tarasoff
Mrs. Anna A. Tasaroff

Dear Mrs. Tasaroff:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you, as a Contract Employee, for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties, you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $2.59 per hour. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by the United States Government.

2. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by the Government in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government employees. Such annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government.

(c) You will be entitled to continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(d) The Government will withhold from the compensation due you under this agreement social security deductions in conformance with the basic social security legislation, as amended, and the procedures of this Organization. For reasons of security, all inquiries concerning your relationship to the social security system shall be made directly to this Organization, and in no event may any such problem be presented by you or on your behalf to any representative of the governmental unit responsible for implementing the social security program.

3. Execution of Documents. If in the performance of services under this contract you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has, in fact, been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

4. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

5. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

6. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

7. Term. This contract is effective as of [illegible], and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by the Government in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Winston M Scott
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Anna A. Tasaroff
Anna A. Tasaroff

WITNESS: Herbert Maund

APPROVED:

REVIEWED:

Special Contracting Officer

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SR 7, VR

S E C R E T 220015Z

2 Jun 63 IN 95704

DIR CITE MEXI 9621

REDCOAT

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF: HMMS-2052, 11 JUNE 1963

1. PER DISCUSSIONS WITH WALLACE A. DEMOLAT, STATION WISHES EMPLOY WIFE OF DOUGLAS J. FEINGLASS ASAP TO ASSUME PART OF LATTER'S LIENVOY TRANSLATION AND TRANSCRIPTION DUTIES. WOULD FREE HIM TO CONCENTRATE MORE ON PREPARATION ASSESSMENTS-CHARACTERIZATIONS OF SOV COMPLEMENT.

2. REQUEST HQS INITIATE CLEARANCE. FORWARDING FIELD CONTRACT WHICH WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE REF.

S E C R E T

Recd July 9
A.M.
July 13
Clearance granted!
Cable

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico XX

Chief, WHD

Wife of Douglas J. FEINGLASS

Please inform Subject that her resignation from staff employee status has been processed and made effective as of 8 September 1963.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 Mexico City

HMMS-3145 23 September 1963

S E C R E T

WH/PERS W.S.Renehan ecm 7555

Distribution:
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/PERS

C/WH/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Wife of Douglas J. FEINGLASS

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. The wife of Douglas J. FEINGLASS has asked that she be considered for employment in a contractual capacity. She was advised that biographic information would be forwarded and that whether or not her services were used would be up to the Station.

2. Subject has previously submitted her resignation from staff status and was processed out effective 7 June and placed on 90 days LWOP. In the event there is a requirement for her services within the 90 day period, she may be hired in a contract capacity without further clearances. Her contract should contain provision for Civil Service coverage; other benefits would be in accord with her contractual status as outlined in FHB 20-1000-1. At the time the contract is forwarded Headquarters, a functional description of her duties should also be forwarded.

3. Subject is scheduled to leave with her two children by train in 16 June. She and the children will enter on tourist cards. They have also applied for regular passports.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Biographic Profile, USC

Distribution:
3 Mexico City, w/att. USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMM-S-2980	11 June 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

14 JUN 1963

Distribution:
1 - WH/Pers

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Pers	W.S.R[illegible]	blr.	7535

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/[illegible]	14 JUN 1963	

RELEASING

SECRET/RYBAT

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

HMM-S-2980

DOB: 5 May 1923

POB: Cleveland, Ohio

HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE: 1942

CHILDREN: Daughter - Barbara, 21 Dec 1945 4
Son - Raymond, 20 Mar 1949

EXPERIENCE:	1944 - 1945	Cleveland Trust Co., Cleveland, Ohio Commercial Bookeeper
	1955 - 1956	American Trust Co., San Leandro, Calif. Commercial Bookeeper
	8 Apr 1957	EOD KUBARK, Clerk, GS-4
	14 Jul 1957	PBJointly, Clerk
	9 Mar 1958	KUDESK, Intell Clerk
	2 Nov 1958	Promotion, GS-5
	8 Jan 1961	Promotion, GS-6
	7 Jun 1963	LWOP for 90 days at end of which time resignation will be effected.

FITNESS REPORT: 30 June 1961 - 30 June 1962, Overall Rating "A" (Transliterates Russian Material "P")

TRAINING: Basic Supervisors, 2-13 May 1960

TEST: Russian, Reading "E"

SECRET/RYBAT

MEMORANDUM RECEIPT

7 June 1963
DATE

TO: W.S.Renehan, WH/Pers

FROM: Mrs. Anna Tarasoff

SUBJECT: Receipt of Advance of Funds for Transportation from Washington, D. C. to Mexico City

I hereby acknowledge receipt of the following:

$525.00 in conjunction with Subject. It is understood that this advance is for lowest first class rail travel Washington to Mexico City, Mexico and related costs, and anticipated per diem for three days for myself and two dependent children. Accounting for the advance will be submitted to the Mexico City Station.

Anna Tarasoff
Anna Tarasoff
SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT

7 June 1963
DATE RECEIVED

Please return ________ signed copy(ies) of this receipt

To ________________________________

FORM NO. 752 REPLACES FORM 38-80
1 AUG 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(33)

SECRET

7 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Personnel Security Division,
Office of Security

SUBJECT: Mrs. Anna Tarasoff, Contract
Employee Clearance

1. It is requested that clearance be granted for the employment of Mrs. Anna Tarasoff as a Contract Employee, Type A or B at the Mexico City, Mexico Station to provide clerical services.

2. Mrs. Tarasoff is presently a GS-6, staff employee. She is being reassigned to the CS Development Complement and placed on a 90 day LWOP status effective COB 7 June in order to join her husband.

3. In the event the Mexico Station can use her services she would be employed in a contractual capacity and her resignation from staff employee status would be effected the day prior to the effective date of contract.

4. In the event additional information is desired, please contact Mr. William Renehan, extension 7555.

W. E. BROOKS
Chief, WH Support

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Paul Jones

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 June 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER 045935	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) TARASOFF, ANNA			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION LWOP AND REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 6 DAY 7 YEAR 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 327-1770-1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP CI STAFF CI DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE INTELL CLERK		12. POSITION NUMBER $1 3971	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0313.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 6 4	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 5,545.	hourly rate 2.67 2.54

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP CI STAFF/SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP/PROJECTS BR/INTELL CLK/WASH., D.C/0151

Employee's last working day 7 June 1963.

LWOP (HHB 20-1 Para. 10 a.) Leave of absence to accompany husband to new station - not to exceed 90 days.

cc to security and finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Byron B. Burns CI STAFF	DATE SIGNED 5 Jun 63	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTE NEE CODE	24. POSITION CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV. PROV/TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 = WAIVER 1 = YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE					
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. C.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED						

(4)

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PUBLIC SCHOOLS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WOODROW WILSON HIGH SCHOOL

PUPIL'S PERMANENT RECORD

LAST NAME OF PUPIL: TARASOFF
FIRST NAME: BARBARA
MIDDLE NAME:
Translator (jr)
PARENT OR GUARDIAN: Boris Dmitri Tarasoff
OCCUPATION: Analyst - U.S.Government
RESIDENCE: 5109 - 45th Street, N.W.
TEL. EM 2-6990
RESIDENCE:
TEL.
PLACE OF BIRTH: Ohio
DATE OF BIRTH: 12.22.45
SEX:

DATE OF ENTRY 9.6.61 FROM Kramer Jr.
DATE OF WITHDRAWAL TO
DATE OF RE-ENTRY FROM
DATE OF WITHDRAWAL TO
DATE OF RE-ENTRY FROM

NINTH GRADE

SUBJECT	GRADE	UNIT
English	A	1
Anc. & Med. History	A	1
9th Algebra 1 & 2	[illegible]	2
French		
Gen. Math		
Latin 1 & 2	A	2
Typing		
Gen. Science		
Biology	A	1

UNOFFICIAL

TEST RECORD

UNOFFICIAL

YEAR BEG. 9.6.61 SECTION 112-2 RCS

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English 2H	ALQ	A	A	1
Mod. History				
Pl & Solid Geom.	ANG	C	B	1
French 1H	ALF	A	A	1
Latin 3H	[illegible]	A	A	1
Spanish				
Chemistry				
Biology				
Chem. H	ANL	B	B	1
US History	SS"		A	1
Physical Ed. 10-B	CCR ON	B	B	1/2
Military Science				

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Deportment	A	A
Days Present	91½	81
Days Abs. Ex.	1	1½
Days Abs. Unex.	-	-
Times Tardy	-	-

YEAR BEG. 9.5.62 SECTION 112-3 RCS

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English 3H	LRG	A		
U.S. History				
French 2H	UHF	A		
Latin 4H	SWA	A		
Spanish				
German 1P	RAM	A		
Physics R	JE	A		
Physical Ed. 9	CSR	A		
Military Science				

UNOFFICIAL

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Deportment	A	
Days Present	90½	
Days Abs. Ex.	2½	
Days Abs. Unex.	0	
Times Tardy	0	

YEAR BEG. SECTION

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English				
Government				
French				
Latin				
Spanish				
Chemistry				
Physical Ed.				
Military Science				

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Deportment		
Days Present		
Days Abs. Ex.		
Days Abs. Unex.		
Times Tardy		

YEAR BEG. SECTION

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English				
Physical Ed.				
Military Science				

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Deportment		
Days Present		
Days Abs. Ex.		
Days Abs. Unex.		
Times Tardy		

Son - Raymond

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: VITALE, GUY
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONNEL MATTERS OUTSIDE TIME FRAME

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3:30 25AUG78		GAETON FONZI	
26 AUG 1978 0950		HARDWAY/FONZI	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

VITALE, GUY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 Feb 69

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, GUY

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT - CIA & DISABILITY SYS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 28 YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ X | V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 9235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sect. 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
OPERATIONS BRANCH
WH SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST (S)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1685

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.26

16 GRADE AND STEP: 08 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 8984

18. REMARKS

Last working day is 28 February 1969.

1152 telecoord. w/Paul Seidel, R.D. - dmw 3/3/69

INTEL ASST OCCUPYING INTEL ANALYST SLOT

1 - Finance
~~1 - Security~~

SA/CSPS 2/../69

15A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 17 Feb 69

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23 INTEGREE CODE
24. VETERANS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 2 DA. 16 YR. 17
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: OBJ code
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO.
34 SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV/TEMP | CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 3—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-6-69 JE
46 OP APPROVAL: Lowden
DATE APPROVED

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 Feb 69

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, GUY

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT - CIA & DISABILITY SYS.

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 28 YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 9235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sect. 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
OPERATIONS BRANCH
WH SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST (S)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1685

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.26

16 GRADE AND STEP: 08 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 8984

18. REMARKS

Last working day is 28 February 1969.

1152 telecoord. w/Paul Seidel, R.B. - dmw 3/3/69

INTEL ASST occupying INTEL ANALYST SLOT

1 - Finance
~~1 - Security~~

SA/CSP 20 Feb 69

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 17 Feb 69

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 6 DA. 16 YR. 17
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—CSCH 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0.BJ.00.0.0.
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV PROV, TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-6-69 JE
46 O P APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

JLB: 10 MAR 69

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): VITALE GUY

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 02 DA 28 YR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 9235 0620 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: P.L. 88-643 SECT. 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION:

11 POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1685

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28

16 GRADE AND STEP: 08 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: 8984

18 REMARKS:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET

28 FEB 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Guy Vitale

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Request for Voluntary Retirement

1. I am pleased to inform you that your request for voluntary retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System has been approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Your retirement will become effective 28 February 1969 and your annuity will commence as of 1 March 1969. The annuity is payable on the first day of the month following that for which it accrued. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative processing required to effect your retirement.

3. You will receive a lump-sum payment for your accrued annual leave up to 30 days or for whatever amount of leave credit you carried over from the last calendar year if that amount is more than 30 days.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OP Files
1 - Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP BSD ROB/PJSeidel:jef (27 February 969)

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) VITALE, GUY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
✓	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employers' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks).
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee Guy Vitale	Date Signed 28 Feb. 69
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) 1730 "H" St. N.W. Wash. D.C.	Correspondence ☐ Overt ☒ Covert

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE 18 February 1969

FILE NUMBER 11326

EMPLOYEE NUMBER 003620

ID CARD NUMBER

TO: (Check)

- ☐ CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

ATTN: Chief Support Staff

REF: Retirement Debriefing

SUBJECT VITALE, Guy

OFFICIAL COVER ☐ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

UNIT

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	☒ CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF COB	DATE (as of COB) FROM EOD
☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ______ W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	OK RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)	
☐ SUBMIT FORM 2688 ☒ FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

COVER HISTORY:
Oct 49 - Jan 57 Hqs/Overt
Jan 57 - Mar 60 Greece/DAC
Mar 60 - Present Hqs/DAC

FORWARDING ADDRESS: UNKNOWN

EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS: UNKNOWN

SUBJECT IS TO INDICATE CIA AS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR ENTIRE PERIOD, BUT IS NOT TO REVEAL SPECIFIC PLACES OR LOCATIONS OF COVER ASSIGNMENTS.

RF/kas

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - RCD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - CCS - CHRONO
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

(13-20-43)

FORM 8-68 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SDF: 20 FEB 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): VITALE, GUY
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 02 | DA 23 | YR 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 9235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:
20. Employ. Code:
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hqtrs Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO / DA / YR
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO / DA / YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO / DA / YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO / DA / YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 5 NONE — CODE: 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE / MO / DA / YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE — 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO / DA / YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO / DA / YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP — CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE — 0 WAIVER, 1 YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE — 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES, 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES, 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
22 .69
je

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-5)

(When Filled In)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 7 FEBRUARY 1969

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): VITALE, GUY

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 23 YEAR 69

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 9235 - 0620

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP:

17. SALARY OR RATE: $

18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:

20. EMPLOY CODE:

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC: ALPHABETIC:

22. STATION CODE:

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HDQTRS. CODE:

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE: 2

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. TEMP. CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 2—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
- 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
- 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
- 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
- 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:

46. O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 13 FEB 69

FORM 6-53 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

OP-1 1-66.

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14

69-1750

Executive Registry
69-2024

17 APR 1969

Mr. Guy Vitale
1730 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Vitale:

As you bring to a close more than twenty-six years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: __________
Director of Personnel

Concur: SIGNED 2 APR 1969
C/EAB/OS

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jef (1 April 1969)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement
Guy Vitale

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. Guy Vitale, GS-08, Intelligence Analyst, Western Hemisphere Division, Clandestine Services, has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j, to be effective 28 February 1959.

3. Mr. Vitale has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for voluntary retirement under the System. He is 51 years old with over 28 years of Federal service. This service includes over 2[illegible] years with the Agency of which 5 years were in qualifying service. The Head of the Clandestine Services Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board have recommended that his application for voluntary retirement be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

4. It is recommended that you approve the voluntary retirement of Mr. Guy Vitale under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

/s/ Richard Helms

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 December 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 | DAY 28 | YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235-1162

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/C
Miami Operations Branch
PM Section

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: INTELL. ~~Assist~~ Officer ASST. (D)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1506

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (07)

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.23

16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 (4)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 7553

18 REMARKS:
From WH/C/MOB,PM Sec.,#1142

P.R.A. per HR 20-21c(3) NTE December 1967.

Recorded By
CSPD
[illegible]

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/Pers.

DATE SIGNED: 20 Dec 65

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: W. J. [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 21 DEC 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51500 | ALPHABETIC WP

22 STATION CODE: 25015

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 VOUCHERS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 | DA. 16 | YR. 17

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. 12 | DA. 27 | YR. 67

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE: .83

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-23-65 H

46 OP APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 12-23-65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. Guy Vitale** **20 October 1965**

THROUGH : Head of **D** Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees ~~in the~~ Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the system, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the system may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you have 15 years or more of Agency service, but have not as yet performed 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees".

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 6E-1319 Headquarters (extension 6001). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 December 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 20 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3232-1000-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP
Task Force W
FI/CI Branch

2
A

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (D)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0683
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (09)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 (3)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $6500 ✓
18. REMARKS: Promotion recommendation attached. Fitness Report submitted previously.

Recorded by
CSPD
Awe

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Louis W. Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: 14 Dec 62
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 1/7/63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VOUCHERS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
33	10	61300	TFW	75013		1	10 16 17	✓	

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPEC. R. REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 57 CODE 15 01 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Kearney 01-11-63
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 December

1. SERIAL NUMBER 003620	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) VITALE, Guy

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH | DAY | YEAR

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3232-1000-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP
Task Force W
FI/CI Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0633

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (09)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 (3)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $6500

18. REMARKS

Promotion recommendation attached. Fitness Report submitted previously.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/Pers.

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HDQTRS. CODE
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. | DA. | YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC; 3 - FICA; 5 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.
EOD DATA ⇒
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT.; 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV; PROV/TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVER; 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES; 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES; 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46. O.P. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 -62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITI AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 March 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy (NMI)

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 DAY 18 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235-1400-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
Branch 4
FI/CI Sec.

3
D

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE:
igence
INTELL ASST (P)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0685

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (P)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28

16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 (3)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 5685

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/EE/CS/Dev.Compl., D.C.

Security [illegible] 3/6/62 CONCURRENCE: Frank Driscoll (per phone)
EE/Personnel Officer

mm 3/16/62

1 copy to Security

19. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES DURHAM, WH/4/Pers.Officer

DATE SIGNED:

18a. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: W Brumbaugh

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	16	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	10 16 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSR, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECUR. REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T. J. Kearney 03/2 /62

46. O.P. APPROVAL: W Brumbaugh

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

6 June 196 0

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
503620	VITALE GUY	10	16	17		1	M 1	09	13	49	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit, LCD Yes-1 No-2	Code
10	24	42		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	13	49		2

25

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE ATHENS STATION OPERATIONS STAFF RECORDS INTEGRATION SECTION	5231	ATHENS, GREECE	29501

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	INTELL ASST	1809	GS	0301.28

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ 4980	DS	09	06	59	09	04	60	0139 9350 3018

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	17	06	12	60	REGULAR	25	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT EE DIVISION	5268	WASH., D.C.	25013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1		[illegible]		

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
	$	D							0320 1998

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) 6 7 60

C/EE/Personnel

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)

Annell M. Weiland X3884

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		6/8/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		14 JUN 1960	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

COPD 6-13-60

Remarks In-casual

FCS RETURNEE

Pre 1960 Requests for
Personnel Action

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 03620	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)	SCD: 24 Oct 1942

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) VITALE, Guy (nmn)	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH Oct 1917	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 13 Sep 1949

6. MARITAL STATUS Single	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee)	NO. 0	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. RPT. Apr 1960	QUAL. FOR Dept Duties	EVAL. FOR O/S Returnee

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE x	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3	RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1938-41 Various jobs for short periods of time; also unemployed during part of this time.
1942-46 Military Service, US Army, Sgt
1946-49 Library of Congress, DC - Book Room Attendant

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1937-38 Kents Hill Jr College, Maine
1948-50 George Washington, DC - Poli Sci

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1962 Reds Off Crs

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SO	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1949	Messenger	0302.01	CPC 3		C&D/Admin/Mail&CourierSect	Hq
Sep 1950	File Clerk	0305.01	GS-3		R&E/Map/Proc&RefBr	"
Jul 1951	" "	0305.01	4		RR/Geo/Map Library Br	"
Nov 1952	" "	0305.01	4		ORR/Ch,GeoRes/MapLibrary/ProcBr	"
Sep 1956	" "	0305.01	5	IR	" " " " " " "	"
Dec 1956	Clerk	0301.26	5	DS	DDP/SE/OpsDiv/Rpts,Index&Biog	Athens
Oct 1957	"	0301.26	6	DS	" " " " " " "	"
Aug 1958	Intel Asst	0301.28	6	DS	DDP/SE/OpsStf/RI Section	"
Sep 1959	" "	0301.26	7	DS	" " " " " "	"
Jun 1960	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/EE/CS/CSDevComp	Hq
Mar 1962	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/WH/Br-4/FI/CI Sec	"
Jan 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	8	D	DDP/TFW/FI/CI Br	"

20. DATE REVIEWED 25 Jan 1965	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hc	22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE No

FORM 3-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

PERS. SERIAL NO.: 03620

NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy (nmn)

DATE OF BIRTH: Oct 1917

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1960 from Ch, EE Logistics for services rendered while on a temporary assignment to EE Division Logistics Office.

27. DATE REVIEWED: 25 Jan 1965

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: hc

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

SCD: 24 Oct 1942

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: 003620

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy (nmn)

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 Oct 1917

5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE: 13 Sep 1949

6. MARITAL STATUS: Single

7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee): NO. 0 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH:

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA SPOUSE:

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS: MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954 OTHER STATUS:

10. LAST MED. RPT.: Apr 1960 QUAL. FOR: Dept Duties EVAL. FOR: O/S Returnee

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NONE x SERVICE: GRADE: ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1: RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2: TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3: RETIRED:

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1939-41 Various jobs for short periods of time; also unemployed during part of this time.
1942-46 Military Service, US Army, Sgt
1946-49 Library of Congress, DC - Clk; Libr Asst

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1937-38 Kents Hill Jr College, Maine
1948-50 George Washington, DC - Poli Sci
1957 American Mission Sch, Athens, Greece - Greek (3 mos)

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1962 Rcds Off Crs

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1949	Messenger	0302.01	CPC 3		C&D/Admin/Mail&CourierSect	Hq
Sep 1950	File Clerk	0305.01	CS-3		R&E/Map/Proc&RefBr	"
Jul 1951	" "	0305.01	4		RR/Geo/Map Library Br	"
Nov 1952	" "	0305.01	4		ORR/Ch,GeoRes/MapLibrary/ProcBr	"
Sep 1956	" "	0305.01	5	IR	" " " " " " "	"
Dec 1956	Clerk	0301.26	5	DS	DDP/SE/OpsDiv/Rpts,Index&Biog	Athens
Oct 1957	"	0301.26	6	DS	" " " " " " "	"
Aug 1958	Intel Asst	0301.28	6	DS	DDP/SE/OpsStf/RI Section	"
Sep 1959	" "	0301.26	7	DS	" " " " " "	"
Jun 1960	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/EE/CS/CSDevCorp	Hq
Mar 1962	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/WH/Br-4/FI/CI Sec	"
Jan 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	8	D	DDP/TFW/FI/CI Br	"
May 1965	" "	0136.01	8	D	DDP/WH/C/Miami Ops Br	"
Dec 1965	Intel Asst	0301.28	8	D	" " " " " "	"
May 1968	Intel Anal	0132.35	8	D	DDP/WH/C	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: 6 Feb 1969

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: hc

22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: No

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

PROFILE

(8)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 03620	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle) VITALE, Guy (nmn)	DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct 1917

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1960 from Ch, ES Logistics for services rendered while on a temporary assignment to ES Division Logistics Office.

27. DATE REVIEWED 6 Feb 1969	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hc

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Vitale, Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/16/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Asst.	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT				
X	CAREER		RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE	
	SPECIAL (Specify):					SPECIAL (Specify):			

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. July 1968	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 July 67 - 30 June 68

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analysis and Research of clandestine service documents for information pertinent to the criteria of the CUIS/LA Subversive machine program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assists personnel with machine name traces and other operational support assistance.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Preparation of biographic input sheets for machine processing into the Cuban IS program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 As Branch Records Officer insures compliance with CS Records directives including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 9 AUG 1968	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Vitale since he was assigned to me initially on a part-time basis and later as a full time assistant has performed adequately as an input analyst in addition to his proficient work as a Records Officer and General support assistant. The quality of his input has been good and his production has helped considerably in cutting down the size of the input backlog. Mr. Vitale also continues to perform the Records Officers function for the branch with a sound knowledge of general records procedures. His attitude and attendance record continue to reflect a willingness to assist the branch in whatever way necessary. In addition Mr. Vitale's valuable background knowledge on a former vital portion of the branch's effort continues to be utilized to a considerable extent. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office.

Mr. Vitale is presently within 2 years of retirement or 4 years, if he does not receive an overseas assignment. He has told the career panel, he would accept an overseas assignment to either Vietnam or Laos. In view of his experience with paramilitary operations, it is felt this would be a more fitting assignment for him than the present one, even though he has been performing quite satisfactorily.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
7/18/68	Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
9		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
18 July		Alva King Alva King

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluation of this employee as presented above.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 July 1968	C/WH/COG/OS	Thos. J. Barrett

SECRET

SECTION C/Continued NARRATIVE COMMENTS

For approximately four months during 1967, Mr. Vitale worked with me in providing Headquarters' support to JMWAVE in its conduct of special operations into PBRUMEN. In such a role, Mr. Vitale's knowledge of the history, mechanics, requirements and PBRUMEN personnel of these operations was invaluable in (1) the preparation of operational proposals for the 303 Committee, (2) the provision of timely operational information periodically requested by the front offices of both WH/COG and WHD, and (3) the briefing of WOFIRM personnel newly assigned to JMWAVE to assist in these operations. While under my supervision, Mr. Vitale was a conscientious, loyal, cooperative employee who readily and willingly performed all tasks assigned to him in an exceptional manner. He always expressed his willingness to work as many hours as necessary to finish the task at hand. He has a very pleasant personality, gets along well with his fellow workers and exhibits a good sense of cost consciousness in the use of government equipment and materials. The rating letter "S" most accurately reflects the level of performance of Mr. Vitale during the period he was under my supervision.

Robert J. Weatherwax

Robert J. Weatherwax

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intell Asst	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG		8. CURRENT STATION Washington	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July 1966 - 30 June 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains project and agent 201 files for the Branch's paramilitary program.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and maintains material for use in briefings and in the conduct of liaison with other government agencies.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Aids in conducting name traces and in processing operational clearances.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 As Branch Records Officer, insures compliance with CS records directives, including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Assists in conduct of input to Cuban I.S. Machine Records Program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 31 AUG 1967	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 31 [illegible]

Mr. Vitale continues to perform his duties as an operational support assistant capably. His background knowledge of Cuban paramilitary operations has provided the Branch with very useful continuity. His ability and experience in locating material and in handling records for headquarters support to WH/COG Special Operations contribute substantially to the Branch's operational support effort. Mr. Vitale carries out his assigned duties in a willing, loyal and highly dependable manner. He recently has been given an additional assignment on the CUIS Machine Input Program which he is handling in a highly efficient manner. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office. He does not have supervisory responsibilities, but does show concern for efficient and economical use of government property.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 Aug '67	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 August 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Section Chief, PM Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest Chiocca

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As noted in the last Fitness Report, I concur generally in the supervisor's ratings of Mr. Vitale's performance as listed; but I must again note that these are duties which could be performed by a more junior clerical type and that Mr. Vitale should not be considered as performing GS-8 level Intelligence Assistant work at a Proficient rating. Indeed, he is, in my opinion, not qualified for such a role and his official position title should be changed to prevent any misunderstanding as to the somewhat unique nature of his value to the Agency.

DATE 28 AUG 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/COG/MO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert A. Ortman

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

11 May 1960
File K-1849

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : VITALE, Guy, nmi

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and /// have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 1 April 1960, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ///////// to deny ////////// Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. // ____.

Paul P. Stewart
HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

FORM 1-59 1580a

(4-13-40)

5-17-60
WR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ALB: 10 MAR 69

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): VITALE GUY

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 02 28 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 9235 0620 0000

8 ~~CSC OR OTHER~~ LEGAL AUTHORITY: P.L. 88-643 SECT. 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
OPERATIONS BRANCH
WH SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1685

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.26

16 GRADE AND STEP: 08 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: 8984

18. REMARKS:

---

1. LAST NAME: VITALE FIRST NAME: GUY INITIAL(S):

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty: 9-13-49 F.T: X P.T:
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ______ Annual Leave Bal. ______

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)

Years	Months	Days
26	4	4

☐ More than 15 years

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION: 2-28-69 RETIREMENT CIARDS

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	ANNUAL	SICK
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1-11-19 69	274	1655
6. Current leave year accrual through 3-08-19 69	24	12
7. Total	298	1667
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9. Total leave taken	4	0
10. Balance	294	1667

11 Total hours paid in lump sum 274 hrs

12. Salary rate(s) $8984.

13. Lump sum leave dates:
from 0830 3-3-69 to 4-18-69 1030 (Hours)

26 Certified correct by ______ 4/17/69
(Signature) (Date)

FOR CHIEF PAYROLL 143-2585
(Title) (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______
15. Current balance as of ______ 19__ ______
16. 12-month accrual rate ______
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______
18 Monthly accrual date ______
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date ______
20. Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr. ______ to ______
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr. ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23. During leave year in which separated	0	0
24 During step-increase waiting period which began on 1-14-68	0	0
25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates): ______		

REMARKS: SCD 10-24-42

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 215 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 9 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	51 500	V	GS 08 6	$ 8,614	$ 8,984

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Q.C. 5/10/68

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 00362
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): VITALE GUY
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 05 DA. 04 YR. 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH DIVISION
WH SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTEL ANALYST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1665
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.35
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
5/17/68

C/WH/COG

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
003620	VITALE GUY	51 500	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 08	5	$ ~~XXXXXX~~ 8368	01/16/66	GS 08	6	$ ~~XXXXXX~~ 8614	01/14/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Earl J. Williamson DATE 17 Nov 67

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS NM AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	51 500	V	GS 08 5	$ 7,781	$ 8,008

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
V TA						

421

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 4 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	51 500	V	GS 08 4	$ 7,290	$ 7,553

G-33

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
003620	VITALE GUY	51 500 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 08	4	$ 7,553	01/19/64	GS 08	5	$ 7,791	01/16/66			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 23 Nov 65

JAN 2

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg. 3-65 (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PJH: 29 DEC 65

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): VITALE GUY
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 12 28 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235 1162 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/C
MIAMI OPERATIONS BR/PM SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1506
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 7553
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51500 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 10 16 17
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.): 12 27 67
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 83
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAN RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12 29 65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/27/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): VITALE GUY

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 05 31 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE: 5235 1162 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH DIVISION
WH C MIAMI OPS BR PM SEC

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1142

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 08

17 SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS

POSTED
6-10-65 ltt

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition
1-63 MFG 1-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

MAR 13 4 18 PM '64

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
003620	VITALE GUY	37F 49 300 V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 08	3	$ 6810	01/20/63	GS 08	4	$ 7020	01/19/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY flr
SALARY CONTINGENT ON CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE: 3 Dec 63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	49 300	V	GS 08 3	$ 6,500	$ 6,810

BAB: 18 JAN 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 003620	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) VITALE GUY

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 01 20 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3232 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP TASK FORCE W FI/CI BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0683	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 08 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 6500

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 61300	ALPHABETIC TFW	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 16 17	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 01 20 63	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 01 20 63

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSR 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RESV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
02/21/63

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

23 JAN 1963 Bab

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-81)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS. EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	61000	V	07 4	$ 5850	07 4	$ 6095

232-1220

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
003620	VITALE GUY	61 000 V 2A	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 07	3	$ 5,685	09/03/61	GS 07	4	$ 5,850	09/02/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
03620	VITALE GUY	DDP/FE UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PIl. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 07	2	$ 5,520	09/04/60	07	3	$ 5,685	09/03/61	X		

8. Remarks and Authentication

[illegible]

/✓/ NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9/26/61

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-61)

L. I

ABM: 20 MAR 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): VITALE GUY
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 03 DA. 18 YR. 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235 1400 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 4
FI CI SEC
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0685
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 5685
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	10	64450	WH	75013		1	10 16 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR)
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
503620	VITALE GUY	DDP/FE C	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR.				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 07	1	$ 5,355	09	06	59	GS 07	2	$ 5,520	09	04	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS 2 [illegible]

14. AUTHENTICATION

HLF 7/23/60

E.D.ECHOLS

EC

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-58 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b.

SECRET

OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	VITALE GUY	503620	52 88	GS-07 1	$ 4,990	$ 5,355

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 10 JUNE 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth			4. Vet. Pref.		5. Sex	6. CS-EOD		
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.
503620	VITALE GUY	10	16	17		1	M 1	09	13	49

7. SCD			8. CSC Retmt.		9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav.			11. FEGLI		12. LCD			13. Mil. Serv. Credit, LCD	
Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes - 1 No - 2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes-1 No-2	Code	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
10	24	42		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	13	49		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE ATHENS STATION OPERATIONS STAFF RECORDS INTEGRATION SECTION	5231	ATHENS, GREECE	29501

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	INTELL ASST	1809	GS	0301.28

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade			25. PSI Due			26. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
07 1	$ 4980	DS	09	06	59	09	04	60	0139 9350 3018

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date			29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
REASSIGNMENT	67	06	12	60	REGULAR	25	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT EE DIVISION	5288	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	INTELL ASST	061260	GS	0301.28

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade			42. PSI Due			43. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
07 1	$ 4980	D	09	06	59	09	04	60	0320 1998

44. Remarks

CASUAL (PCS RETURNEE)

POSTED
16 JUN 1960

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

[illegible]

SECRET

Pre 1960 Notifications
of Personnel Action

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
003620

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Vitale, Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/16/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Asst.	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
July 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July 67 - 30 June 68

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analysis and Research of clandestine service documents for information pertinent to the criteria of the CUIS/LA Subversive machine program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assists personnel with machine name traces and other operational support assistance.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Preparation of biographic input sheets for machine processing into the Cuban IS program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 As Branch Records Officer insures compliance with CS Records directives including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 9 AUG 1968	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 6 1968

Mr. Vitale since he was assigned to me initially on a part-time basis and later as a full time assistant has performed adequately as an input analyst in addition to his proficient work as a Records Officer and General support assistant. The quality of his input has been good and his production has helped considerably in cutting down the size of the input backlog. Mr. Vitale also continues to perform the Records Officers function for the branch with a sound knowledge of general records procedures. His attitude and attendance record continue to reflect a willingness to assist the branch in whatever way necessary. In addition Mr. Vitale's valuable background knowledge on a former vital portion of the branch's effort continues to be utilized to a considerable extent. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office.

Mr. Vitale is presently within 2 years of retirement or 4 years, if he does not receive an overseas assignment. He has told the career panel, he would accept an overseas assignment to either Vietnam or Laos. In view of his experience with paramilitary operations, it is felt this would be a more fitting assignment for him than the present one, even though he has been performing quite satisfactorily.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 7/18/68

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 9

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 18 July

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR:

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Alva King
Alva King

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluation of this employee as presented above.

DATE: 13 July 1968

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WH/COG/OS

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Thos. J. Flores

SECRET

SECTION C/Continued NARRATIVE COMMENTS

For approximately four months during 1967, Mr. Vitale worked with me in providing Headquarters' support to JMWAVE in its conduct of special operations into PBRUMEN. In such a role, Mr. Vitale's knowledge of the history, mechanics, requirements and PBRUMEN personnel of these operations was invaluable in (1) the preparation of operational proposals for the 303 Committee, (2) the provision of timely operational information periodically requested by the front offices of both WH/COG and WHD, and (3) the briefing of WOFIRM personnel newly assigned to JMWAVE to assist in these operations. While under my supervision, Mr. Vitale was a conscientious, loyal, cooperative employee who readily and willingly performed all tasks assigned to him in an exceptional manner. He always expressed his willingness to work as many hours as necessary to finish the task at hand. He has a very pleasant personality, gets along well with his fellow workers and exhibits a good sense of cost consciousness in the use of government equipment and materials. The rating letter "S" most accurately reflects the level of performance of Mr. Vitale during the period he was under my supervision.

Robert J. Weatherwax

F-I Control

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
003620

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intell Asst	7. OFF. DIV. BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG		8. CURRENT STATION Washington		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
☐	CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ TEMPORARY	☐	INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):			☐	SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July 1966 - 30 June 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains project and agent 201 files for the Branch's paramilitary program.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and maintains material for use in briefings and in the conduct of liaison with other government agencies.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Aids in conducting name traces and in processing operational clearances.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 As Branch Records Officer, insures compliance with CS records directives, including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Assists in conduct of input to Cuban I.S. Machine Records Program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 31 AUG 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 31 9 26 AM '67

Mr. Vitale continues to perform his duties as an operational support assistant capably. His background knowledge of Cuban paramilitary operations has provided the Branch with very useful continuity. His ability and experience in locating material and in handling records for headquarters support to WH/COG Special Operations contribute substantially to the Branch's operational support effort. Mr. Vitale carries out his assigned duties in a willing, loyal and highly dependable manner. He recently has been given an additional assignment on the CUIS Machine Input Program which he is handling in a highly efficient manner. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office. He does not have supervisory responsibilities, but does show concern for efficient and economical use of government property.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 Aug '67	Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
12		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
25 August 1967	Section Chief, PM Operations	Ernest T. Chiocca Ernest Chiocca

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As noted in the last Fitness Report, I concur generally in the supervisor's ratings of Mr. Vitale's performance as listed; but I must again note that these are duties which could be performed by a more junior clerical type and that Mr. Vitale should not be considered as performing GS-8 level Intelligence Assistant work at a Proficient rating. Indeed, he is, in my opinion, not qualified for such a role and his official position title should be changed to prevent any misunderstanding as to the somewhat unique nature of his value to the Agency.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 AUG 1967	C/WH/COG/MO	Robert A. Ortman

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003620

SECTION A **GENERAL**

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Analyst	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C		8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			XXXX	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):	
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.			12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 July 1965 - 30 June 1966		

SECTION B **PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains project and agent 201 files for an extensive paramilitary program.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and maintains material for use in briefings and the conduct of liaison with other government agencies.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Aids in conducting name traces and processing clearances.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 As Branch Records Officer, insures compliance with CS records directives, including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 29 JUL 1966	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUL 26 4 07 PM '66

Mr. Vitale's principal qualification is his background knowledge of the operational history of Cuban paramilitary operations. This has afforded the branch considerable continuity. He is a very willing worker who gets along well with fellow employees. His knowledge of and experience in handling records and locating material makes him valuable in headquarters support of WH/Cuba paramilitary case officers - a task he performs in a loyal and dependable manner.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 11 July 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/C/MO/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Bryan Mills

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have had opportunity to observe subject's performance closely for nine months and while I generally concur in his supervisor's ratings of the duties as listed, it should be noted that these same duties could be performed equally well by a more junior Intel Clerk or Intel Assistant and, therefore, the overall rating as a GS-8 Intel Assistant does not accurately reflect his capability. In my opinion it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for subject to perform competitively with other Intel Assistants at a GS-8 level, and I recommend his position title be changed to Ops Support Assistant, a role in which he performs capably.

DATE 25 July 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/C/MO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert A. Ortman

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003620

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE, Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C		8. CURRENT STATION Washington D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
☐	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 July 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*: 1 July 64 - 30 June 65

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Processes name traces and clearances; traces and maintains agent 201 files.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains office files on a complex project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS records, directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

22 JUL 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUL 23 12 00 PM '65

Mr. Vitale's longevity on the project makes his services increasingly valuable. This is particular true, in briefing and orienting new officers. He continues to do an exceptional job in assisting his office on a most complex project where [illegible] many of his colleagues have transferred primarily because of the many demands and frustrations caused by this extraordinary project. Mr. Vitale continues to be a most loyal, cooperative and willing worker, getting along well with all hands. His maturity and many years of experience in his field, in addition to his great general knowledge, make him a most valued employee when compared to colleagues of similar rank. It is because of this that I have again rated Mr. Vitale very high. Although Mr. Vitale has no supervisory responsibilities and fully realizing his limited potential as a senior operations officer, I feel he is still undergraded and should be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest opportunity. Because Mr. Vitale's job and performance have remained almost exactly the same as during the previous year, this fitness report is also very similar.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 13 July 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 46 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 13 Jul 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/C/MO/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Calvin Hicks

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing official does not use the same rating scale as the supervisor; therefore, would rate subject one letter lower in the first three duties and P in the overall performance. Subject is conscientious, pleasant and has an excellent "stay-on-the-job" approach.

DATE 20 July 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/C/MO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Walter T. Cini

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
49300 66 5652

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SAS		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 July 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 July 1963 - 30 June 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Processes name traces and clearances; traces and maintains agent 201 files.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains office files on a complex project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS records, directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

14 AUG 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Vitale continues to do an exceptional job in assisting his office on a most complex project. His longevity on the project, coupled with his continued objectivity, makes his services increasingly valuable. This is in contrast to many of his colleagues who have transferred because of the many extreme demands and frustrations caused by this extraordinary project. Mr. Vitale continues to be a most loyal, cooperative and willing worker, getting along well with all hands. His maturity and many years of experience in his field, in addition to his great general knowledge, make him a most valued employee when compared to colleagues of similar rank. It is because of this that I have again rated Mr. Vitale very high. In addition, and fully realizing his limited potential as a senior operations officer, I feel he is still undergraded and should be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest opportunity.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE July 23, 64	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 34 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 July 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/SA/MOB/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Calvin W. Hicks

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Undersigned concurs in the ratings of the specific duties and performance in current position of Mr. Vitale. Mr. Vitale has been concerned with the Cuban effort for several years and his personal knowledge of past events is extremely helpful.

DATE 28 July 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/SA/MOB	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Colonel Arthur A. Maloney

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

81

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
003620

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct. 1917	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-8	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 July 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Processes name traces and clearances. Traces and maintains agent 201 files.	RATING LETTER S/O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains office files on a complex project.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS records, directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

9 AUG 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 9 8 40 AM '63
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to do an exceptional job in assisting his office in the formulation of reports and plans by his research and ability to quickly make name traces and ferret out information from the various agency sources.

During the past year subject has continued to be a most cooperative, loyal and willing worker on a project that due to its nature is more frustrating, and demands more with less apparent return than most projects. As on his previous fitness report, I have rated him very high, primarily due to the fact that ~~he's mature~~ his maturity and many years experience with the Agency have made him of much more immediate value than most of his colleagues in the GS 7-9 level. Consequently, although he has made GS-8 within the past year, I feel he is still undergraded and should be promoted to GS-9 at the earliest opportunity.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
June 13, 63	Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
22 mths.		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
12 June 63	DC/SAS/MOB/FM	Calvin W. Hicks

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

While not wishing to detract from the value of subject's duties or from the manner in which he performs them, I do have strong doubts as to whether the nature of his duties warrant promotion to GS-9 even if they were performed in an outstanding manner. During the next year additional duties of a more demanding nature will be placed on subject and I will want to weigh his performance under those circumstances before recommending promotion.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
6/13/63	C/SAS/MOB/FM	Charles W. Matt

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy		2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct. 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intell. Asst.		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TFW/FI Br.		8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 July 1962

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 Sept. 1961 to 30 June 1962

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Processes name traces and clearances - Traces and maintains agent 201 files.	RATING LETTER S/O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains office files on a complex project.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS Records, Directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has done an exceptional job in assisting his office in the formulation of reports and plans by his research and ability to quickly make name traces and ferret out information from the various agency sources concerned.

He at all times has been a most cooperative, loyal and willing worker with good security habits. Although, he does not have the ambition or drive to get to the top of the ladder that many younger officers may have (not everybody can or wants to be Chief, but can still be one of the best indians in the business), his great store of general knowledge and many years of agency experience have made him of much more immediate value than most of his colleagues in the GS-7-9 level, and it is because of this that he has received such a high rating. Consequently, it is recommended that Mr. Vitale be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest opportunity.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	**BY EMPLOYEE**	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE Aug 21, 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Guy Vitale	
2.	**BY SUPERVISOR**	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 MONTHS	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 21 August 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR TFW/PM/OPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE C.W. HICKS
3.	**BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 21 August 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/TFW/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE C.W. MATT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] by
CSPD

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 30 Oct. [illegible]	3. SEX [illegible]	4. GRADE [illegible]
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION [illegible]	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE [illegible]		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible] WH/4

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS					
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From 31 AUG 67 To	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Research Work Required in the Preparation of Reports.	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assistant to C/O (leg man)	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintenance of Office Files	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Safehouse Keeper	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Intel Ass't.	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					X		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):		▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions:

Subject is very versatile and can be utilized effectively on an assignment involving heterogeneous duties. His ability to function as an agent handler is extremely commendable. Subject is able to communicate equally well with "high or low level agents." He further demonstrated his usefulness in the preparation of research papers and the maintenance of files. Supervisor feels that Subject's productivity and effectiveness is dependent on whether he is in a position that he personally likes (It should be noted that Subject is 44 yrs old).

Subject has demonstrated that he can assume greater responsibilities. (During the period covered he travelled to Puerto Rico and New Orleans on assignments not under control of the Supervisor)..

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 28 Feb. 62	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION ~~Employee at Hqs~~

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING DE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 12 FEB 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/O	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Thomas G. Clines THOMAS G. CLINES

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☑ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject was assigned activities for which reviewing official was responsible for a period of two months.

DATE 13 Feb. 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL FM Relations Off. WH/4	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Glenn J. Farnsworth GLENN J. FARNSWORTH

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

7 DEC 1960

[illegible] CSED

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	✓

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/16/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DS	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Assistant	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT EE/Germany (casual)	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 1 May 60 - 15 Nov 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Process name traces	RATING NO. 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Process POA's.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 3

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES				X			
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES				X			
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT				X			
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):					X		

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

DEC 6 11 32 AM '60

Mr. Vitale was assigned to the S&T Section of the German Branch on a casual basis from 1 May to 15 November 1960. His duties consisted entirely of processing name traces and POA's. Although he had little experience in this type of work, he performed his duties in a thoroughly satisfactory manner. He was always polite to his fellow employees and did his best to contribute to the smooth operation of the section.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6 1/2	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Already reassigned prior to preparation of this fitness report.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 21 Nov 60	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/EE/G/S&T	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Herbert W. Natzke Herbert W. Natzke

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached sheet.

DATE 23 Nov 60	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/EE/Germany	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William J. Graver William Graver

SECRET

Section 3. **Comments of Reviewing Official:**

This employee had no qualifications for assignment in the German desk or German operational field. He was carried in the German Branch in a casual status while an assignment suitable to his talents was being located. The fitness report for the period of his duty with the German Branch is accordingly only a record of the fact that he loyally and diligently carried out assigned tasks to the best of his ability.

William J. Graver
Chief, EE/Germany

SECRET

Pre 1960 Fitness Reports

SECRET

2 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE Personnel

SUBJECT : Commendation - Mr. Guy Vitale

1. The Eastern European Division Logistics Office wishes to commend Mr. Guy Vitale for the manner in which he conducted himself while on temporary assignment in this office. Rather than sit idle awaiting a new assignment, Mr. Vitale volunteered his services and was given various logistical general services jobs and duties which he carried out with enthusiasm and effort rarely seen in a person in his status. We found him as an enthusiastic-willing worker who gave selflessly of his time and showed a strong devotion to duty.

2. A copy of this commendation should be made a part of the employee's permanent 201 file.

S. Daniluck

S. DANILUCK
Chief, EE Logistics

SECRET

Pre 1960 FRQ &
certifications for insurance
and retirement

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When Filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 083620	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) VITALE GUY	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 10/16/17	5. SCHEDULE GRADE STEP GS -08-05

6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE ASST	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT AH	9. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH., D.C.

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
GREECE	PCS-52	57/01/01	60/01/24
Vieques Island, Puerto Rico	TDY-10 days	61/4/01	61/04/10

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 10 JUL 67
INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		

FORM 1-67 444J
May 2-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

6 7 JUL ENTD

(4-51)

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION III — EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS City, State, Country	YEARS ATTENDED From-To	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM / QTR HRS (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
1.								
2								
3.								
4								

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2.					
3					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1	American Mission School, Athens, Greece	Greek Language	57/2	57/4	3 mo.
2					
3.					
4					
5					

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2					
3.					
4					
5					

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried. SPECIFY)

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

DATE
5 June '67

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Guy Vitale

SECRET

Pre 1960 - PHS, CLEARANCE
request &
appl. forms

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE May 1970

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Personnel file:
Thomas B. CASASIN (J. Richardson)

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Sources and methods

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
9.8.78	10/10	Betsy WOLF	Betsy Wolf

RICHARDSON, JACQUES G. 006102

322037

E-TPIC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DEB

DATE PREPARED: 5 April 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Richardson, Jacques [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 05 DAY 14 YEAR 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9136-1231

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION, FOREIGN FIELD
FRENCH AREA
PARIS STATION
PARIS ANNEX

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0668	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 8	17. SALARY OR RATE $31,554

18. REMARKS

24065

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL William C. Booley, C/E/Pers	DATE SIGNED 8 Aug	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 9 Aug 72

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. EMPLOY CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC — ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. MOOTRS. CODE 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: [illegible]

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-9-72 MW

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Don H. Lustiche

DATE APPROVED: 9 AUG 1972

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

10 AUG 1972

(4)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VYB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 JULY 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible] [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [redacted]
EXTENSION OF PRA ~~NTE 24 FEB 1971~~

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 20 | YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | XX CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1136-1231

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
FRENCH AREA
PARIS STATION
PARIS ANNEX

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0668

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 27,463

18. REMARKS:
cc: PAYROLL

NTE 24 Feb 1971

*PRA per HR 20-17 e(1)(b)

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E Pers
DATE SIGNED: 7/12/70

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 14 Jul. 1970

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 32
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 446.20 | ALPHABETIC EUR
22. STATION CODE: [illegible]
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. [illegible] DA. 20 YR. [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. 02 DA. 24 YR. 71
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 82
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OASI 3—FICA 4—NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-23-70 MW
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: [illegible]-70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(8)

XX.B

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 FEB 1969

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Richardson, [illegible]
[redacted]

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 1 year

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 25 YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9136 1231

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
CENTRAL REGION
PARIS STATION
ANNEX, PARIS

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (CO)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0668

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 ~~5~~ 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: 23,734 — $ ~~23,075~~

18 REMARKS:

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 2/26/69

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 3-4-69

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HQOTRS. CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
37	10	41 LLC	EUR	24065		3	01	20	24						

28 NTE EXPIRES MO.	DA.	YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—URGH 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO.	DA.	YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO.	34 SEX
02	24	70	52										

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT.	36 SERV COMP DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	37 LONG COMP DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV. TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVER 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-7-69 mw

46 OP APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 3/7/69

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VKB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 February 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Williamson, Jacques P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 20 YEAR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	XX	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7136-1231

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

A
19

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
CENTRAL REGION
PARIS STATION
ANNEX, PARIS

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0668

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15-6

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20,585

18. REMARKS: ~~X~~PRA-per HR ~~21c~~ 21-17D(B) (2) for ~~duration~~ of present ~~tour~~.

Slotting for new T/O.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Richard F. Westerman
Richard F. Westerman, C/E/Personnel

DATE SIGNED:

D M Coll

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 2 MAR 1967

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		3	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
03 [illegible] 69	82						

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER 1—YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-3-67 DMW

46. OP APPROVAL: Dave H. [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

7 55

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XYB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 March 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Richardson, Jacques [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 10 YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6136-1231

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WE
FOREIGN FIELD
PARIS STATION
INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0885

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $19,415

18. REMARKS: EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 28

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 5064 ALPHABETIC [illegible]

22. STATION CODE: 24065

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HDQTRS. CODE: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. [illegible] DA. 23 YR. [illegible]

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. [illegible] DA. [illegible] YR. 63

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 01 DA. 31 YR. 65

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: .82

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE 2

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV, TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 04-01-[illegible]

46. OP APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 31 MAR 1966 BK

DATE APPROVED: 31 Mar 66

FORM 5-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

OP-2
3-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 FEBRUARY 1964

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Richardux, Jacques

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 DAY 15 YEAR 64

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V CC CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4136-6250-1012

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
7 DDP WE
PARIS STATION
6 INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0885

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 17,210

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP WE/PARIS STATION/0886.

PRA IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-21c (2) FOR DURATION OF TOUR.

NTE ~~November 1967~~
03/14/66

CS/PD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: G. McGannam
GEORGE MOGANNAM, AC/WE/PT

DATE SIGNED: 6 Mar 64

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: L. M. Collins

DATE SIGNED: 10 Mar 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24 HDQTRS. CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
31	10	50600	WE	54015		3	01 [illegible] 24		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO. DA. YR.	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
03 14 66 ~~11 30 67~~	182					

EOD DATA

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37 LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP / CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES / HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3/19/64

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 17 Mar 64

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 AUGUST 1963

XXB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [redacted]
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Richardson, Jacques [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH | DAY | YEAR
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF CC CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4136-6250-1012
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
PARIS STATION
EXTERNAL OPS SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~0887~~ 0886
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 16,005
18. REMARKS:

FROM: DDP SR FOREIGN FIELD/WE AREA/FRANCE/PARIS/0240

PRAed IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-580, PARA 4 (b). 10/12/63

COPIES SENT TO FINANCE AND SECURITY.

ROOOD COPYD cm

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: GEORGE MOGANNAM, AC/WE/PT
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 15 Oct. 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 50 600 ALPHABETIC WE
22. STATION CODE: 24065
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HQTRS. CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 6 DA. 28 YR. 21
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. 10 DA. 12 YR. 65
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 84
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVER 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 10/22/63
46. C.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 25 Oct 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XXI

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 January 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: ~~[illegible]~~ 402
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Richardson, Jacques
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 03 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3134 4008 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR - FOREIGN FIELD
Western European Area
France
Paris
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Paris, France
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0240
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 16005
18. REMARKS:
From same slot.

PRA in accordance with HR 20-21c(3) for a period not to exceed 2 years.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: A. Busby
ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: D. Collins
DATE SIGNED: 24 Jan 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 60000 ALPHABETIC SR
22. STATION CODE: 21265
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HQ/FLD CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 30 YR. 34
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 02 DA. 03 YR. 63
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 02 DA. 03 YR. 63
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 80
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: MMC 8 FEB 1963
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Emmett B. Reynolds
DATE APPROVED:

(4)

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1962

X:B

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [redacted]
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Excepted Appointment (Career)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 05 | YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3134 4008 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Cdc
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR
Western European Area
France
Paris
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Paris, France
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer D
12. POSITION NUMBER: 240
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS 14
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 06
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13[illegible] 510 pr.
18. REMARKS:

~~[illegible] 16 July 62;~~ Last day at Headquarters will be 31 July 1962 Departing U. S. around XXXXXXXXXX end of August 1962.

259's submitted.

Copy furnished Office of Security.

c 7/54

WE concurrence on the telephone 11 July by Roland Aulin, Acting DC/WE
DM Collins

Recorded
CSPD
DM

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: A. L. Busby
ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: DM Collins
DATE SIGNED: 24 July '62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 56600 | ALPHABETIC SR
22. STATION CODE: 24665
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS. CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 | DA. 20 | YR. 24
26. DATE OF GRAD: MO. 01 | DA. 16 | YR. 55
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 01 | DA. 05 | YR. 61
28. NTE EXP RES: MO. | DA. | YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 4 = NONE): CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 66102
34. SEX: M
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.): CODE 1
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. 03 | DA. 07 | YR. 44
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. 11 | DA. 20 | YR. 49
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT (1 = YES, 2 = NO):
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 = WAIVER, 1 = YES): CODE C | CODE 1 | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 042-20-5339
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)): CODE 1
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 8
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) | CODE C | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0 —
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. — | STATE CODE —
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: fgs 15-62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. Ragan DSI
DATE APPROVED: 7/24/62

(4)

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

[illegible]

[redacted]

6 August 1962

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

Subject:

My last statements concerning the performance of should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

CONCUR: HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1962

VXF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): RICHARDSON / JACQUES Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Resignation
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 04 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 8234 1300 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

DDP/SR
SR/6
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer (Br Ch)
12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]50
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 06
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13[illegible] 570 13516
18. REMARKS: Copy furnished Vouchered Payroll.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ANDREW L. BUSSY, C/SR/PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 7/23/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. [illegible] NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE: [illegible]13
23. [illegible] CODE
24. [illegible] CODE
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 24
26. [illegible] MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF [illegible] MO. DA. YR.
28. [illegible] EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPEC. [illegible] REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSR 2 = FICA 3 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1 P2 00 9.1
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: CODE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECUR. [illegible] REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. [illegible]: 1 = YES 2 = NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERV. OF LESS THAN 12 MOS. 3 = BREAK IN SERV. OF MORE THAN 12 MOS.
42. [illegible] CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Jul 15 62
46. C.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 7/24/62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE 4 August 1962 (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

To accept private employment.

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE - 4 August 62.	DATE SIGNED 23 July 62	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Augustus G. Richardson

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular
Part Time
Temporary
Temporary - Part Time
Summer
Detail Out
Detail In
WAE
Consultant
Military

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

First Line
Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
Office, Major Staff, etc.
Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
Branch
Section
Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

[illegible] 16 AUG 62

[illegible]

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]6122	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RICHARDSON JACQUES

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. [illegible] DA. [illegible]4 YR. 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3234 [illegible]	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFF [illegible] BR [illegible]	12. POSITION NUMBER [illegible]5	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION [illegible]

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES [illegible]136.[illegible]	16. GRADE AND STEP [illegible]4 6	17. SALARY OR RATE [illegible]35[illegible]

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-61)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo 09 Da 12 Yr 60		XX	V to V UV to V	V to UV UV to UV
1. Serial No. 006102	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) JACQUES G RICHARDSON RICHARDSON, JACQUES	3. Date of Birth Mo 01 Da 20 Yr 24	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT. LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP SR FAR EAST AREA TOKYO STATION SOVIET BRANCH	Code	15. Location Of Official Station TOKYO, JAPAN	Station Code
16. Dept.-Field Dept. - Usfld. - Frgn. - Code 3	17. Position Title OPS OFFICER BR CH	18. Position No. 189	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01
21. Grade & Step 14 4	22. Salary Or Rate $ 12,990	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo 1 Da 16 Yr 55	25. PSI Due Mo 7 Da 2 Yr 61	26. Appropriation Number 1134 7000 3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER OF FUNDS to Vouchered	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo 10 Da 02 Yr 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP SR SR 6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code
33. Dept.-Field Dept. - Usfld. - Frgn. - Code 1	34. Position Title OPS OFFICER - BR CH	35. Position No. 50 D-15	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01
38. Grade & Step 14 4	39. Salary Or Rate $ 12,990	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number 1234 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) ANDREW L. BUSBY CH/SR/PERSONNEL A. Busby

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) E. C. JOHNSON X4407

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		9/16/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		10-15-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks Two copies of this action have been forwarded to the Office of Security.

CSPD
10 5 60

w/o file

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDIT.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
[illegible] Jacques G.	X	59-41

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, ~~or death~~ incurred on 3 December 1958

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
28 AUG 1959	B. DeFelice

NOTICF OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 9-58 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER
RICHARDSON, Jacques G.	Unk	58-201

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, ~~or death~~ incurred on 4 Feb 1958.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
15 July 1958	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

(4-21-35)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950 FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR JACQUES G. RICHARDSON
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 13 Dec 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 5 Jan. '55
B. APPROVED: 16 Jan 1955
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch.) BC-171-13		Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
9. SERVICE, GRADE AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 p.a.		GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR/5		DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.		Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

16 Jan 55

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

PLEASE TRANSFER FROM VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS. $560.00 M.J.

Memo stating why fitness report not necessary. M.J.

Humphrey C/CMO

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Robert W. Muenster
Robert W. Muenster

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: R. Ledford
Title: DD/P Admin.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-3400-20
TO: 5-3400-55-015
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Effective date per Jean in BR
Revs 1-11-55
MJD

Conc by Osborne
1-11-55
rws 1-11-55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	MJ	4 Jan
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	NW aag	5 Jan 55
E.		
F. APPROVED BY	Rolfe S. Kingsley 1-5-55	

REMARKS:

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: DEC 21 1954

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: Jacques G. Richardson AGE: 31 DATE: 13 Dec 1954

STATION Washington, D.C.
AND DUTIES: Area Ops Off. DD/P UNIT: SR
(Br. Ch.)

PRIMARY CAREER
DESIGNATION: SD:FI

PRESENT GRADE: GS-13

PRESENT T/O SLOT BC-171
NUMBER AND GRADE: GS-15

PROPOSED GRADE: GS-14

PROPOSED T/O SLOT BCF-189
NUMBER AND GRADE: GS-15

CIA TRAINING:
SOC - 9 Jan - 3 Feb 1950
Ops Course - 20 Feb - 17 Mar 1950
Adv. Ops Course 27 Mar - 21 Apr 1950
CE Course 4 Jan - 22 Jan 1954
Audio-Surveillance 29 Nov - 1 Dec 1954 - Flaps & Seals 2 & 3 Dec 1954

EDUCATION:
University of Michigan, 1945 - BA
Georgetown University - 1951 to 1952

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Japanese & French - Fluent
Mandarian, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese & German - Fair

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
Feb 1943 to Aug 1946 - US Army
Sept 1946 to Mar 1948 - Civil Intell. USA
Apr 1948 to Oct 1948 - Civil Intell. 1st Lt. (over)

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
APT - 7-18-50 - Intell Asst. GS-7 - OPC/FE/FE-3, Japan
PRO - 10-1-50 - Intell Officer, GS-9 - OPC/FE/FE-3, Japan
PRO & REAS - 4-29-51 - Intell Officer, GS-11 - OPC/FE/FE-3
PRO - 1-20-52 - Ops Officer - GS-12 - OPC/FE/FE-3
REAS - 2-17-52 - Ops Officer - GS-12 - OPC/EE/EE-4, Great Russian Sec., Wash, D.C.
REAS - 12-7-52 - Intell Officer(Dep.Ch.) GS-12 - DDP/SR - SR-5 O/C
PRO - 7-5-53 - Intell Officer (Dep. Ch) -GS-13 - DDP/SR - SR-5 O/C
REAS - 2-28-54 - Area Ops Off. (Br. Ch.) GS-13 - DDP/SR - SR-5

RECOMMENDED BY: CONCURRENCES:

Chief, SR/Admin Chief, SR

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS)

Publications "Press Censorship in Japan" Army Info Digest Nov 1949 to Numerous news items, 2 editorials while editor, graduate term papers on Yugoslavia, China, Korea & Afghanistan.

MAIL ROOM
DEC 28 2 39 PM '54
OF E OF PERSONNEL

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible]

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Jacques G. Richardson
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 [illegible]
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST:
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 14 Feb 1954
B. APPROVED:
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
DEPUTY CHIEF (TO) ~~Intell Officer (Dep Chief)~~ EC-190-13	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch.) FC-171-13
GS-132-13 $8360.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00
~~DDP/SR~~ SR-5 (Far East Branch) Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR-5
~~Washington, D.C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Charles H. Dixson
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Charles H. Dixson
Title: SR Personnel Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	SEN.

CD:FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-3400-20
TO: 4-3400-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:
21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE:	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	RW	2/16
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	2/15
E.		

REMARKS:

[illegible]

F. APPROVED BY [illegible] 2/16/54

10—52

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Jacques D. Richardson
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 30 ~~Mar.~~ May 1953
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 5 July 53
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Deputy Chief I.C. BC-190-12	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Deputy Chief I.O. BC-190-13
GS-132-12 $7040.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-13 $8360.00
DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

BC-190

LT Bl
DDP/ADMIN 25 June 53

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: JUN 24 1953

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): ~~Chief~~ Charles H. Dixson

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Dorris B. Powell
Title: FI/CMO.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

FI

15. SEX
16. RACE
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	1 July
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
[illegible] L. [illegible] [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

16—67829-8

REGISTER NO.

PERSONN ACTION REQUEST

NAME RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE 17 Feb.

NATURE OF ACTION Reassignment

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Operations Officer	Operations Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12 $7040	GS-12 $7040
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH AND SECTION	FE-3	FE-4 Great Russian Section
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS

~~S.617~~

(3. 480)

132

~~#~~ 510

KJR

RECOMMENDED

5 Jan. 52

(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE	SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.		DATE APPROVED
9845			1/17/52
NEW	VICE	I. A. ✓	REAL

DATE	SIGNATURE
2/5/52	O P Gilbert

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2 123900

ALLOTMENT: 2011

C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch A 6 x (6 d)

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
2-15-52	B. L.

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE
DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—02409-1

PERSONN ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO:

NAME
RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE
20 Jan. 52

NATURE OF ACTION
Promotion

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)
LAST WORKING DAY:
EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Operations Officer	Operations Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-11 ~~$5400.00~~ 5940	GS-12 ~~$6400~~.00 7040
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH AND SECTION	FE-3	FE-3
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:
S-617

132

9930

RECOMMENDED:
30 Oct. 51
(DATE)

George O. Rudy, Jr. Exo/FE
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT
DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED
W Jarrett

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
9845		1/17/52
NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		✓	

DATE 1/17/52 SIGNATURE V. Gilbert

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS
APPROPRIATION:
ALLOTMENT: 2 2 3800
C. S. C. AUTHORITY: 2017 Sch A 6.116 (b)

DATE SIGNATURE 1-18-52
SIGNATURE

PERSONNEL RELATIONS
DATE
SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE
DATE
SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE JAN 1 1952
SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
Mulcahy

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62480-1

REGISTER NO. [illegible]

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

NAME: RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.

NATURE OF ACTION: ~~Transfer~~ Promotion

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 29 April 51

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-9	Intelligence Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9, $4600 p/a	GS-11, $5400 p/a
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH AND SECTION	FE-3 Japan Sec.	FE-3
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS: 178 In grade since ~~14 Feb 51~~ 1 Oct 50

S-14

#3729

RECOMMENDED:

14 March 1951
(DATE)

George A. Kuhn
RICHARD G. STILWELL, Chief, FE Division
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: 30 Mar. 51

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
2992	3032	6-2-49

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		✓	

DATE 3/31/51 SIGNATURE

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2115900

ALLOTMENT: 841-101

C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch a 6.116 (A)

DATE SIGNATURE: 5-1-51 SIGNATURE

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE SIGNATURE

APPROVALS

SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE 27 Apr SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF Charles W Oeaxon

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62159-1

14-00000

PERSONNEL :TION REQUEST

EGISTER NUMBER 2938

NAME RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE 17 Feb 1951
NATURE OF ACTION Excepted Appointment	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	1-19-51	Intelligence Officer
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-9, $4600 p/a
OFFICE	J.C.	OPC
DIVISION		FE
BRANCH AND SECTION		FE-3, Japan Section
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS: 132

S-6 FE-39 JBEDICT # 4998

Transfer leave & unvouchered funds.

Please move Holland, Anthony from S-6 to S-7, FE-3, Japan, Washington Hdqrs.

Concur for chief Inspection and Security
Emil P. Leis 1/19/51
Ch, Pers. Security Br. 1/25/51

RECOMMENDED:

9 January 1951
DATE

for RICHARD G. STILWELL, Chief, FE Division
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED
23 Jan 51

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE | SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.		DATE APPROVED
2977	3051		6-2-49
NEW	VICE	I.A. ✓	REAL

DATE 1/17/51 SIGNATURE Austin J. Thomas

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2113900
ALLOTMENT: 541-101
CSC AUTHORITY: Sch A 6.110(f)

DATE SIGNATURE 2-21-51 | SIGNATURE

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE | SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE | SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE | SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
NOV 1949

GPO 050 50-278

SECRET

SECRET

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, RICHARDSON, JACQUES C ~~Dallas L. Caunter~~, understand that by virtue of my duties in the C/A I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to standards set in the State, War, and Navy Departments. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the C/A, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the C/A.

4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States.

5. I understand that my employment by the C/A is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regulations ____," and the appendices thereto.

6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 21st day of November 1949.

x Dallas L. Caunter ~~(Seal)~~

Sworn to before me this 21st day of November 1949.

at Washington, D.C.

Joseph S. Re

SECRET ~~SECRET~~

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) [illegible]: 7 [illegible] 1964

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: [illegible]

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] [illegible]

3. AGE: [illegible]
4. DATE OF BIRTH: Jan 19[illegible]
5. SVC. COMP. DATE: 29 Nov 1949

6. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): [illegible]

7. MARITAL STATUS: Married
8. CHILDREN: 3
9. YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 1923 1950 [illegible]

10. CAREER STAFF STATUS: Membership Jul 1954

OTHER STATUS

LAST MED. APPT. QUAL. FOR: Jul 1962 POS O/S

EVAL. FOR: POS O/S

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: X

NONE SERVICE

GRADE

ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA DATE(S)

RELEASE MIL. SER. DATE(S)

TO BE RETIRED DEFERRED DATE(S)

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None

14. LANGUAGE AP: None

TEST DATE

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1943-48 Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt. - [illegible] Censorship Officer, Japanese Translator & Instructor, Liaison Officer

1949 Guide Publishing Co, Baltimore, Md - County Editor of weekly paper

1949 Baltimore Housing Authority, Md - Administrative Officer

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1942 Trinity College, Conn - French

1940-42 Sir George Williams College, Montreal, Canada - French

1945 Univ of Michigan, Army Language School - [illegible] (1947); Oriental Civilization, Japanese

1951-52 Georgetown Univ Graduate School - International Relations

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French - R, P, S, U, High W, Inter(Feb 1962) Trans & Interp Aug 1957

Japanese - P, S, U, Inter(Mar 1962), R, W, Elem; Trans & Interp Aug 1957

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1949-50	UTCA	[illegible]	[illegible] Ops	[illegible]	[illegible] Officer's Inst
1950	Intel Orient	[illegible]	Audio Surv Mgmt	1962	French
1950	Ops	[illegible]	[illegible] Audio Surv [illegible]		
1950	Ops Famil	[illegible]	[illegible] Seals		
		1960	Cland Serv Review		

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECT. DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Nov 1949	I.O.	0132.06	7		OPC/[illegible] SE/[illegible]	HQ
Oct 1950	" "	0132.06	9		OPC/[illegible]	"
Apr 1951	" "	0132.06	11		OPC/[illegible] Ch, FE Br	"
Jan 1952	Ops Off	0136.01	12		" " " " "	"
Jul 1953	" "	0136.01	13		DDP/SR/[illegible] Ch, FE Br	"
Feb 1954	Area Ops Off	0136.01	13	FI	DDP/SR/Ch, FE Br	"
Jan 1955	" " "	0136.01	14	DI	DDP/SR/FE Area	Tokyo
Oct 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	DDP/SR/Ch, Br 6	HQ
Sep 1962	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/SR/WE Area	Paris
Feb 1963	" "	0136.01	15	D	" " " "	"
Oct 1963	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/WE/Internal Ops	"
Mar 1964	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/WE/Internal Ops	"
Feb 1967	" "	0135.01	15	D	DDP/EUR/FF/CenReg	"

20. DATE REV.: 20 Apr 19[illegible]

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: [illegible]

22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: No

SECRET PROFILE

FORM 1200 [illegible]

SECRET

PERS. SERIAL NO.	[illegible] PROFILE (PART 2)
NAME [redacted] [illegible]	DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] 192[illegible]

22. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATION REPORTS FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS

[redacted]

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE [illegible] QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION [illegible] 1955 from Director, FBI and the DCI for service in connection with [illegible].

Commendation 1955 from CIA Defector Coordinator for cooperation and competence in the handling of two defectors.

Commendation 1955 from the DCI for high degree of personal competence and devotion to [illegible].

Letter of Appreciation 1960 for suggestion which proposed revisions of Form 1050.

Appreciation 1962 from Commandant, USAF Command and Staff College for fine lecture.

27. DATE REVIEWED 20 Apr 1964	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY rwh

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET

PROFILE (4)

14-00000

006102

30 Jan 1924

Married

Jul 1954 Jul 1962

None

1943-46 Military Service, US Army, [illegible] - Civil Censorship Officer, Japanese Translator & Interpreter, Liaison Officer
1949 Guide Publishing Co, Baltimore, Md - County Editor of weekly paper
1949 Baltimore Housing Authority, Md - Administrative Officer

1941 Trinity College, Conn - French
1940-42 Sir George Williams College, Montreal, Canada - French
1945 Univ of Michigan, Army Language School - [illegible], Oriental Civilization, Japanese
1951-52 Georgetown Univ Graduate School - International Relations

French - R, P, S, U, [illegible] W, Inter([illegible] 1960), Trans & Interp Aug 1957
Japanese - R, S, U, Inter(Mar 1962); R, W Elem; Trans & Interp Aug 1957

1949-50 [illegible]
1950 Intel Orient
1950 Ops
1950 Ops Famil
1951 [illegible]
1954 Audio Surv Tech
1956 Open Audio Surv Equip
1954 Maps & Scale
1960 Cland Surv Review
196[illegible] [illegible]
1962 French

Nov 1949	I.O.	0132.03	7		CPC/Ops [illegible]	
Oct 1950	" "	0132.03	9		CPC/[illegible]	"
Apr 1951	" "	0132.03	11		CPC/[illegible]	"
Jan 1952	Ops Off	0136.01	12		[illegible]	"
Jul 1953	" "	0136.01	13		[illegible]	"
Feb 1954	Area Ops Off	0136.01	13	[illegible]	[illegible]	Tokyo
Jul 1955	" " "	0136.01	14	[illegible]	[illegible] Area	"
Oct 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	[illegible]	"
Aug 1962	(Resignation from SE Status)					
Aug 1962	(Excepted Appt to SA Status)					
Sep 1962	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	SR/WE Area	Paris
Feb 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	SR/WE Area	"
Oct 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	WE/External Ops	"
Mar 1964	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	WE/Internal Ops	"
Feb 1967	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	EUR/FF/CentReg ParisSta	"

20 Apr 196[illegible]

Form 1200 [illegible] SECRET PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
[illegible]102

SECTION A

GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)			2. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]	3. SEX [illegible]	4. GRADE [illegible]	5. SD [illegible]
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Off			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT EUR		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE	
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):			
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. [illegible]			12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) [illegible] 1970 to 31 March 1971			

SECTION B

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 [illegible] employment as a [illegible] of a foreign scientific publication for the purpose of further developing access to Station targets and [illegible] the overall cost of the [illegible]	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to gain access to [illegible] and [illegible] on eventual access and [illegible] directed against the local [illegible] and [illegible]	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and assesses [illegible] with whom he has made contact as well as access prospects to the local [illegible] and [illegible] targets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reports on the above activities.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-60 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review, Subject managed to gain full-time employment as a senior executive of an [illegible] government subsidized scientific publication at a time of economic slowdown when jobs were not easy to get. He did this without help from Headquarters or the Station. Such an achievement is a tribute to Subject's fluency in French, his ability to write, his general scientific know-how and his good business sense. Over half of his salary therefore is now paid by this company. In converting to full-time employment, a major adjustment, Subject's contribution to the Station operations in the [illegible] and [illegible] fields against which he is targetted temporarily decreased somewhat. Subject continued, however, to maintain contact with three local [illegible] officials and initiated contact with three others. He also continued to search for new leads to personalities in the priority areas assigned to him. Subject has the capability to call on local scientists or technicians of just about any nationality with the possible exception of [illegible] citizens. He has used this near-unique potential well.

Subject has had occasional difficulty switching from "professional" or intellectual subjects in his development of [illegible] personalities or access prospects to more down-to-earth interests necessary --con't-

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 9 June 1971

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 18 months

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Handling Officer

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Station submitted comments on Subject officer recently in [illegible]-16549 (8 April 1971), to which we should add that Subject has, largely on his own merits, acquired a solid and potentially highly useful cover employment. However, this new employment will demand a very substantial amount of time and energy from Subject, and the unanswerable question at the moment relates to his availability for Organizational tasks. We shall need additional time and careful working with this officer to determine the answer, since the fiscal outlay from the Organization to support his continued stay in Paris is still quite

DATE: 24 [illegible] 1971

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: [illegible]

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

Section C (continued)

to the development of human relations. His forte is therefore more in the field of spotting and making operational contacts than in that of more than short-range operational development. Subject's operational situation makes it impossible for him to attempt recruitments. Thus, his very real achievements are not by essence of the spectacular variety.

Subject's reporting has been satisfactory and continues to be copious. He could, however, further improve the selectivity of the leads provided the Station and make more of an effort to "digest" the information contained in his reports.

Although Subject has, at present, no supervisory function, he has repeatedly requested such a responsibility. He is careful with operational expenses and has exercised good security.

During the period under review, additional efforts have been made to make full use of Subject's potential and integrate him further in the work of the Station component with which he works. He is a particularly valuable asset for the Station programs directed against the local [illegible] and [illegible] targets.

Section E (continued)

substantial. In a word, is it worth it? We do not yet know, although our initial impressions are favorable.

On the fitness report itself, this rater would have preferred an "A" rating for specific duty number one; Subject may ultimately deserve an "S", but it does not seem warranted at the present time. However, I believe the overall rating would more properly have been in the higher range of the "[illegible]" category, rather than "S", but it is of course a subjective judgment of the rating officer, who is more intimately and directly involved with Subject on a frequent basis.

In sum, the cover is superb, and only time will reveal to what extent the cover requirements permit a full measure on behalf of the Organization. We are following this aspect closely and will be commenting upon it subsequently as we gain experience and knowledge.

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)			2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible]			30 Jan 1924	M	GS-15	D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT		8. CURRENT STATION	
[illegible]			[illegible]		Berlin	
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):	
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.			12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)			
			1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970			

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Established and maintains a legitimate [illegible] publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to develop leads on eventual access or support type assets to be used by the Station against the local [illegible] target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates contact with selected local [illegible] targets and undertakes to develop sufficient rapport with them to provide operational assessments.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	-
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be described, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The comments of the rating officer are limited to the period from October 1969 to March 1970 during which he worked with Subject. The previous rating officer has added his comments to allow coverage of the total indicated period from April 1969 to March 1970. During this period Subject was integrated in a new team assigned to the local S&T and Commercial [illegible] target. Subject's recent activity has been very productive indeed. Subject used the excellent potential given to him by his cover to skillfully spot and assess access agent candidates. As Subject's operational situation in Paris precludes making recruitment, the most promising of these candidates was placed in contact with a Station officer during social events Subject organized. At the same time, Subject continued his efforts to develop personal relationship with several [illegible]. The beginning of personal, as opposed to purely professional, relations with a major [illegible] target enabled him to obtain insight into the target's beliefs and personality which was the best the Station had to date. Subject also managed to establish contact with two other [illegible] representatives of interest. This, in one case, required almost six months to accomplish via a combination of patience, skill and determination. Subject is an experienced officer. He is cost conscious and practices good security. The Station has no other asset with the necessary scientific and editorial know-how, fluent French and local knowledge to replace Subject. In view of this and the recent progress made by Subject in response to very specific requirements and his willingness to try to establish personal and, hopefully, social relations with access prospects and [illegible] targets, the Station recently recommended that he be extended in Paris. At the same time, the Station recommended that Subject's cover be reinforced by full-time employment with Subject's current [illegible]

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Handling Officer	/s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL /s/

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As previous Station correspondence and fitness reports will reflect, this officer has been the subject of varying evaluations and projections in recent years. In fairness to him, however, it is equally true that an officer under non-official cover reflects, in the level and quality of his performance, the amount and type of guidance, direction and push he receives from the responsible inside case officer. Making allowances for these variables, this officer's past record has not been impressive; however, it is also correct to note that he has improved substantially during the latter part of the period under review, and that if the Station can work out some fiscal arrangement which will reduce the heavy financial input

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 May 1970	[illegible]	/s/

Section [illegible] 3 continued

from the Organization. His continued presence at this Station definitely appears to be warranted for a suitable period to reach more definite conclusions concerning the level of sustained performance over a somewhat longer period than that reflected by this report.

On balance, we are pleased that this officer has responded so well to greater case officer direction and that he has undertaken somewhat more aggressive efforts to expand his personal contacts in immediate proximity to the primary Station targets. This officer does bring many talents to bear on his operational activity: he has [illegible] fluent French, a solid and exploitable cover, and a vast range of contacts in the local community. Nonetheless, it will require additional drive to explore these contacts in depth, select those which appear to be operationally viable, and pursue them actively either to the point of recruitment by another officer or elimination from further development, for whatever reason.

In sum, in spite of the recognized and commendable improvement in this officer's performance during the period under review, the reviewer submits that the letter grade for specific duties 2 and 4 would more properly have been a "P", and that the overall rating, at this point, would more accurately be set at a level between "P" and "S", probably closer to the former than the latter.

This reviewing comment has been read by the officers who prepared the Fitness Report.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
037350

FITNESS REPORT

[redacted]

SECTION A

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible]
2. DATE OF BIRTH 25 [illegible]
3. SEX M
4. GRADE GS-15
5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible]
8. CURRENT STATION Paris
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
CAREER
RESERVE
TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify)
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
INITIAL
REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X ANNUAL
REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1963
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
[illegible] 1962 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishment and maintenance of cover as a genuine working member of his profession.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting and assessing persons of operational interest to Paris Station and to other stations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Investigating of organizations and phenomena of operational interest to the Station.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Collection of positive and operational information using his cover for entree.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 11 July 63	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER
S

FORM 45 4-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

See attached sheet.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 15 May 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
THIS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6½ months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Flint
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached sheet.

DATE 20 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL CPS Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Edward Ryan

SECRET

[redacted]

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

The assignment of this employee to the field under non-official cover was designed to compensate for the loss of an employee in an official cover slot which was cut from the Station's CE.SID allotment of personnel positions.

During the reporting period this employee has accomplished with success the convincing establishment of his cover in a complex milieu, and has been accepted as legitimate by his professional colleagues, the persons whom he meets under cover, and the French authorities. It should be noted that his ability to assume his cover has been largely the result of his own efforts over a period of years to acquire and maintain a familiarity with the general scientific field.

During the reporting period he has developed a wide circle of contacts in the scientific and journalistic fields and applies a long background in a variety of assignments in KUBARK to the determination and assessment of operational potential among these contacts. At the same time his cover organization, in which only four persons are witting of his actual status, has shown itself to be more than satisfied with his performance of his cover duties.

This employee requires a minimum of detailed operational supervision; it is necessary in specific cases only to indicate the operational or informational objectives.

From the point of view of administrative support, his attention to detail and meticulousness reduce the problems of his support by the Station to a minimum.

This employee uses the French language continuously, and his facility is such as to permit him to handle himself excellently in a broad range of complex technical subjects. He has in addition undertaken specialized French language training to develop this capability further. His operational reporting is excellent both with regard to clarity and pertinence.

In the immediate future he will be assigned case work, for the most part in fields where it will complement, and be complemented by, his independent operational activities and cover work.

SECRET

13 September 1960
(Date)
File No. K-1328

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : Jacques G. RICHARDSON

1. Cover arrangements ~~[illegible]~~ have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 12 September 1960, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~[illegible]~~ to deny ~~[illegible]~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. Operating component must take necessary action to block ~~[illegible]~~ telephone locator by submitting the Personnel Information Card "Office File Copy," Form No. 642, to Machine Records Division, Office of the Comptroller, Room 107 Curie Hall, Attention: Miss Wenkenbach.

~~4. [illegible]~~

Paul P.
HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS
Operating Division - SR

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

27

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EOD: 10 AUG 72

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OLE

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] Richardson, Jacques
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA 14 YR 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3132 1231 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
FRENCH AREA
PARIS STATION
PARIS ANNEX
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0368
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 8
17. SALARY OR RATE: 31554
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA 30 YR 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 5-NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: GAHMEOG
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVER 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8-11-72 m

H. B. FISHER

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition Mfg. 10-67

SECRET

WEB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
006102	Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	44 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 15	7	$29,099	01/26/69	GS 15	R	$29,907	01/23/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE George K [illegible]

DATE 20 Dec 71

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORG.,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Richardson, Jacques.	006102	44 735	CF	GS 15 7	$30,701

SECRET

BEG: 01 JUN 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CCB

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Richardson, Jacques [redacted]

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXTENSION OF PRA-
NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1973

4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 02 | 25 | 71

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1136 1231 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
FRENCH AREA
PARIS STATION
PARIS ANNEX

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0668

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: 29099

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 Employ Code: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 44620 ALPHABETIC EUR

22 STATION CODE: 24065

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 Hdqtrs Code: 3

25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 01 | 20 | 24

26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):

27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR): 02 | 24 | 73

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE: 82

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-2-71

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition
Mfg. 6-70

SECRET

ARS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Richardson, Jacques	006102	44 620	CF	GS 15 7	$29,099

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BBG: 17 AUG 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): Richardson, Jacques [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1971
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 20 YR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1136 1231 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
FRENCH AREA
PARIS STATION
PARIS ANNEX
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0668
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15-7
17. SALARY OR RATE: 27463
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 44620 ALPHABETIC EUR
22. STATION CODE: 24065
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA 20 YR 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO 02 DA 24 YR 71
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 32
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

R.S.WATTLES

POSTED

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Richardson, Jacques	006102	44 600	CF	GS 15 7	$25,909

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Richardson Jacques	006102	44 620	CF	GS 15 7	$27,463

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	006102	44 600	CF	GS 15 6	$20,585	$21,469

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson Jacques [redacted]	006102	44 600	CF	GS 15 6	$21,469	$23,075

EUR

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
006102	Richardson Jacques [redacted]	44 600	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
S 15	6	$23,075	01/29/67	GS 15	7	$23,734	01/26/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 11 Dec 68

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY Dow H Lutscher

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EJH: 8 MAR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Richardson, Jacques [redacted]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 02 26 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ X CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7136 1231 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD CENTRAL REGION PARIS STATION ANNEX, PARIS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0668	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 20585

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
10 MAR 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44600 ALPHABETIC EUR	22. STATION CODE 24065	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 01 20 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR. 02 25 69	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 82	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FLAV 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. SERVICE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E. D. ECHOLS

POSTED
3-3-67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	006102	50 600	CF	GS 15 5	$19,415	$19,978

---

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006102	Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	50 600 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	5	$19,978	01/31/65	GS 15	6	$20,565	01/29/67			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

25 JAN 1967

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE:

DATE 11 Jan 67

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg. 3-65

(4-51)

RZF: 7 APR 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted] [illegible], Miguel

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 10 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6136 1231 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY SECTION 203 P.L. 88-643
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE FOREIGN FIELD PARIS STATION INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0885	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 19415

18. REMARKS
EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28	10	50600	WE	24065		3	01 20 24	02 03 63	01 31 65

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
	82		2						

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

WE

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006102	[redacted] Richardson, Jacques	50 600 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	4	$18,170	02/03/63	GS 15	5	$18,740	01/31/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY BK

25 JAN 1965

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

L I

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	006102	50 600	CF	GS 15 5	$18,740 ✓	$19,415 ✓

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

MHC: X 13 MAR 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Richardson, Jacqueline [redacted]			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 03 15 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V CF TO V	X V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4136 6250 1012	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WE PARIS STATION INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER			12. POSITION NUMBER 0885	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16. GRADE AND STEP 15 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 17210

18. REMARKS

[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 50600 ALPHABETIC WE	22. STATION CODE 24065	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 01 20 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR. 03 14 66	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 82	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FOSTED
03/23/64 DK

E. D. ECHOLS

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 20 MAR 1964 J Fd

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51) (When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	006102	50 600	CF	GS 15 4	$16,005	$17,210

POSTED
CF-4b
8 JAN 1964

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MHC:1128 OCT 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Richardson, Jacques [redacted]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 13 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO CF ☒	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4136 6250 1012	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WE PARIS STATION EXTERNAL OPS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0886	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 16005

18. REMARKS

POSTED
CF-4b
5 [illegible] 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 50600	ALPHABETIC WE	22. STATION CODE 24065	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 20 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR 10 12 65	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 84	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RES PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

(P)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AUPD 08/17/63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Richardson Jacques [redacted]		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 01 63	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V X CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4136 6250 1012	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR DIV	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE		
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0240	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

POSTED

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E. D. ECHOLS

Form 1150B 1-63 MFG. 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

19 AUG 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-51)

EAB: 1 FEB 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: CCC/C2 ~~037367~~
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Richardson, Jacques [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 02 | 03 | 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3134 4008 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP SR FOREIGN FIELD
WESTERN EUROPEAN AREA
FRANCE
PARIS
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0240
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 16005
18. REMARKS:

[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	60600	SR	24065		3	01 20 24	02 03 63	02 03 63

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 80
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
FEB 27 1963

FORM 1150 1-62 Use Previous Edition

11 FEB 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

AUTOMATED PSI RECORD ADJUSTMENT

	SERIAL NO.		LEI YR MO DA		PSI DUE DATE YR MO DA		ORGANIZATION CODE OFFICE	DIVISION		CURRENT GRADE	STEP
<		●	62 07 08	●	64 07 05	●	DDP/	SR	●	GS-14	6

	PROJECTED GRADE	STEP		NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAX. 20 CHARACTERS
●	GS-14	7	●	Richardson, Alfred [redacted]

	FUND V/CF		SCHED.		CURRENT SALARY (OR HOURLY RATE)		PROJECTED SAL. (OR HOURLY RATE)		ID CODE	>
●	CF	●	GS	●	$14,970	●	$15,865	●	C	

REMARKS

Subject received a PSI 07/08/62 to GS-14-6 so will not be due another until 07/05/64.

(2/27/62)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Alfred [redacted]	006162 ~~[illegible]~~	40600	CF	14 6	313510	14 6	$14970

14-00000

PSC: 20 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [redacted]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Richardson, Jacques

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (CAREER)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 08 DA. 05 YR. 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V: X / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3134 4008 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP SR
WESTERN EUROPEAN AREA
FRANCE
PARIS

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0240
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 13510

18. REMARKS:

POSTED ON
[illegible]
Jw 20 Aug 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. Employ. Code: 10.
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 60600 ALPHABETIC SR
22. STATION CODE: 24065
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 01 DA. 16 YR. 55
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 01 DA. 08 YR. 61

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE): CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 06102
34. SEX: M1

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT): CODE 1
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO 03 DA 07 YR 44
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO 11 DA 20 YR 43
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP): CODE C
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES): CODE 1; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 042205339

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)): CODE 1
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 8
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE 0; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

C. D. ECHOLS

POSTED
8-21-6

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

[illegible] 8-20-62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

DAB: 16 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): RICHARDSON JACQUES
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 08 DA. 04 YR. 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3234 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR
SR/6
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER BR CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0050
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 13510
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA 20 YR 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1BD0091
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REC. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO DA. YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV. PROV. TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8 20 62

E.D.ECHOLS

LLG 8/16/62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81)

(When Filled In)

234-1010-10

3040
80
3120

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
006102	RICHARDSON JACQUES	60 300 V 7	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 14	5	$13,250	01/08/61	GS 14	6	$13,510	07/08/62			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
006102	RICHARDSON, JACQUES D.	DDP/SR 7	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS-14	4	$12990	07	12	59	GS-14	5	$13250	01	08	61

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☒ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

1

6320

ARF: 30 SEPT 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RICHARDSON JACQUES

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERDO FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 02 60	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 1234 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP SR SR 6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER BR CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0050	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 12990

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 16	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 60300	ALPHABETIC SR	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 01 20 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE NO. DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

D. ECHOLS fg 10-22-60

L I

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-21)

GS 10/18/60

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-310030

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Payroll period

3. Block No. UV

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) [illegible]

6. Grade and salary GS-14 $10,320

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s) SR 9

12. Prepared by pcs 3 May 56

13. Audited by

☑ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 15Jul56

15. Date last equivalent increase 16Jan55

16. Old salary rate $10,320

17. New salary rate $10,535

18. ~~Performance rating is satisfactory or better.~~
SERVICE AND CONDUCT
ARE SATISFACTORY (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

4 SEP 1956

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1934, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	RICHARDSON JACQUES	506102	48 40	GS-14 4	$12,075	$12,990

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO. 506102	2. NAME RICHARDSON JACQUES	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN. DDP/SR 10	4. FUNDS UV	5. ALLOTMENT

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	3	$11,835	01	12	58	GS 14	4	$12,075	07	12	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS
4 742

14. AUTHENTICATION
CF
JHP 5/5/59
HCF 7/31/59
G.M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER
(4)

S E C R E T

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
RICHARDSON JACQUES	506102	GS-14-3	$10,750	$11,835

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

S E C R E T

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO. 506102	2. NAME RICHARDSON JACQUES	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN. DDP/SR 8	4. FUNDS UV	5. ALLOTMENT

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR BELIC, GEORGE	DATE 15 Jan 1958	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR George N Belic

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO. 506102	2. NAME RICHARDSON JACQUES	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN. DDP/SR	4. FUNDS UV	5. ALLOTMENT

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 - FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs. - One given name, initial(s), and surname*): MR. JACQUES S. RICHARDSON
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 26 Sept. '56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 21 O

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL (D)

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

RE-SLOTTING FOR NEW APPROVED T/O.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): Robert D. Lovelace
Robert D. Lovelace

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 4407

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD: DI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 7-3400-55-015
TO: 7-3400-55-015

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

USED IN LIEU OF SF50
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

R.A. Skeels(ews), FE/EAO
2 Oct 56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		11
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	7&3	10-9
E.		

REMARKS:

POSTED
11 OCT 1956

F. APPROVED BY
per
9 Oct '56

SECRET

14-00000

Agency and organizational designation

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 967876

1. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
RICHARDSON, Jacques D.

2. Pay roll

5. Block No. 5-3400-20

4. Slip No.

6. Grade and salary GS-13 $8360.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous period											
8. New period											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:
$ 8990

SALARY ADJUSTED TO:
EFFECTIVE 13 MAR. 1955
PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE

11. Appropriation(s)
SR 7

12. Prepared by
BZ 9 Nov 54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
2 Jan 55	5 Jul 53	$8360.00	$8560.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s).

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ LWOP status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R-, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

rvs

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. JACQUES G. RICHARDSON
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jun 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 19 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION (AMENDMENT)*
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: B.O.D. 16 Jun 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) BC-171-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-13 $8560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR/5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE:

NONE	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION:

NEW	VICE		REAL.

SD-DT
~~SD-[illegible]~~

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: ~~5-3400-55-015~~
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: [illegible]

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

*This action amends Item #9, on the "from" side, on Notification dated 11 Jan. 1955, to show the correct salary, previously shown as $8360.00 per annum.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

my 1/20/55

ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

puty Assistant Director for Personnel

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-313798

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 6 Jan. 1955 rws

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. JACQUES O. RICHARDSON	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 11 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) PROMOTION	6. EFFECTIVE DATE E.O.D. 16 Jan 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) BC-171-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 per annum 8060	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR/5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: 5-3400-55-015	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

[illegible]
JAN 17 1955

NTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

puty Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Jacques G. Richardson
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 24
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 16 Feb. 54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 28 Feb. 54
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Deputy Chief (IO) DC 190-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops. Officer(Br. Ch) DC171-13
GS-132-13	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 per annum
SR-5 (Far East Branch) Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR-5
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

CD-FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3400-20 TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

3/19/54

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 — 249347

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

2/17/54

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Jacques G. Richardson	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 24	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 3 July 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 5 July 53	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Sch. A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Deputy Chief I. O. BC-190-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Deputy Chief I. O. BC-190-13
GS-132-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-13 $8360.00 per annum
DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION 11X2100 FROM: 3400-20 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Acting Chief, Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

RAH 7.3.53

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1952-210794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM NO. 50 (PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER Y-1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.——ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Jacques G. Richardson	20 Jun 24	5510	16 Feb 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment	17 Feb 52	Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Operations Officer	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer
GS-12-132 $7040.00 p. a.	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12-132 $7040.00 p. a.
OPC FE FE-3	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC EE EE-4 Great Russian Section
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X				

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL	
		X		DD 9845 1/17/52

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 2123900 TO 2011	Yes		☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(S.LEO)

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

DV Mulcahy

D. V. MULCAHY
Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Rating

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 [illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION(bur)

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Jacques C. Richardson
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO: 9930
4. DATE: 18 Jan. 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 20 Jan. 52
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer GS-11	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer GS-12
GS-11-132 $5940.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12-132 $7040.00 per annum
OPC FE FE-3	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC FE FE-3
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		X	

Bu. 9845
1/17/52

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM 2123900 TO 2017
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE Maryland

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(517)

W Mulcahy

C. V. MULCAHY
~~Personnel Division~~

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1950 899878

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(ml)

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Jacques G. Richardson	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION No. #5729	4. DATE 23 April 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Transfer and Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 29 April 1951	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6,116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer, GS-9	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer, GS-11
GS-9-132 $4600.00 per. annum. Bu.#2974	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-11-132 $5400.00 per. annum.
OPC FE FE-3 Japan Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC FE FE-3
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL X	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL X

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
X			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.
		X	

Bu.#2996
CSC#3032
6/2/49

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2115900 TO: 841-101
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

(778)

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE

5/48

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

H. C. Clinkscale

H. C. CLINKSCALE
Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE AND AUTHENTICATION

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950-899285

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

ER

12

STANDARD FORM 50 (6 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R 1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

F.C. 1/19/51
(ml)

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Jacques G. Richardson	20 Jan. 1924	14938	19 Feb. 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Excepted Appointment	19 Feb. 1951	Schedule A-6.116(h)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer, GS-9
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-9-132-$4600.00 per. annum.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC FE FE-3, Japan Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		X	

Du.#2974
CSC#3051
6/2/49

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2115900 TO: 841-101	Yes	19 Feb. 1951	☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

Trial period has been completed.

H. C. Clinkscale

H. C. CLINKSCALE
Personnel Division
09
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

5-3-51

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1950-899878

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.	DATE 9 January 1951
NATURE OF ACTION Resignation	EFFECTIVE DATE Cob 18 Feb 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer V	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9, $4600 p/a	
OFFICE	OPC	
DIVISION	FE	
BRANCH	FE-3 Japan Section	
OFFICIAL STATION	Tokyo, Japan	

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Cummings for RICHARD G. STILWELL Chief, FE Division	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____

ENTERED ON DUTY ____

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

S-49 FE-39 JBEDICT

Transfer leave ~~from~~ to unvouchered funds.

Jr

-Not due US for travel costs

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 83-500333

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: Jacques G. Richardson

DATE: 7 September 1950

NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion

EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 October 1950

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Assistant	Intelligence ~~Assistant~~ Officer ✓
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-7 $3825 p/a	GS-9 $4600 p/a
OFFICE	OIC	ORC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH	FE 3	FE 3
OFFICIAL STATION	Japan	Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS:

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: Richard G. Stilwell
[illegible], FE

EXECUTIVE:

CLASSIFICATION: F-757 9/13/50 Audrey C. Thomas

PERSONNEL OFFICER:

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____________

ENTERED ON DUTY ____________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS: Employee EOD with CIA 20 Nov 49 as GS-7 130

Charged to FE-11, JBEDICT, Position No. ~~X~~ 49, Japan

BRD

44

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

GPO OSO 50-284

SECRET

8

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

ENTRANCE ON DUTY RECORD

DATE: 18 July 1950

TO: OPC

BUILDING: "K"

ROOM: 1044

FROM: PERSONNEL OFFICER

EOD DATE: 18 July 1950

NAME OF EMPLOYEE: RICHARDSON, Jacques

POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Assistant

GRADE: GS-7

SALARY: $3825.00 per annum

PAYROLL: unvouchered funds

DUTY STATION: Japan

DATE SECURITY CLEARED: 10 June 1949

DATE OATH OF OFFICE ADMINISTERED: 18 July 1950

DATE PERMANENT IDENTIFICATION REQUESTED: 18 July 1950

DATE FINGERPRINTED: 18 July 1950

DATE BRIEFED BY SECURITY: 18 July 1950

DATE OF PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Not Applicable

DATE 24 MONTH AGREEMENT SIGNED: 18 July 1950

EMPLOYEE'S EMERGENCY ADDRESS:
Mrs. Harriette D. Richardson (Wife)
6601 Old Bladensburg Road,
Silver Spring, Maryland Tele: SL 3933

EMPLOYEE'S LOCAL ADDRESS: Same as above

REMARKS:

POSTED

SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER
ROBERT S. KATTLES

FORM NO. 37-75
DEC 1949

RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME RICHARDSON, JAQUES G. ~~[illegible] (Pseudo)~~		DATE 15 July 1950
NATURE OF ACTION Resignation		EFFECTIVE DATE COB 17 July 1950
	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Assistant	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS 7, $3825 p/a	
OFFICE	OPC	
DIVISION	Operations	
BRANCH	FBD	
OFFICIAL STATION	~~Unassigned~~ Tokyo, Japan	

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR RICHARD G. STILWELL Acting Chief, FE	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER Robert A. Waits	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____

ENTERED ON DUTY ____

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Subject to be entered on duty on unvouchered funds in his true name of Jacques G. Richardson. The effective date of his true name appointment is 18 July 1950.

JGR

Frederick W. Richards
Authorized Certifying Officer

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.
[redacted]

DATE 7 November 1949

NATURE OF ACTION Excepted Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE 20 November 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer GS-7
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-7, $3825.00
OFFICE		CPC Ops Staff
BRANCH		FID Area III
DIVISION		SO-12-JBEDICT
OFFICIAL STATION		Tokyo, Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 21 November 1949

SECURITY CLEARED ON 10 June 1949

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 21 November 1949

ENTERED ON DUTY 20 November 1949.

DCG-07/05/53
CSECD - 11/10/49
NOA 11/26/49

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Opendory acknowledged 21 November 1949 JSK

VERIFIED
BY AA DATE 1-13-55

Frederick W. ...
Authorized Certifying Officer

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
AUG 1949

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Richardson, Jeffrey [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Off	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1970 to 31 March 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Gained full-time employment as a senior executive of a foreign scientific publication for the purpose of further developing access to Station targets and appreciably lowering the overall cost of the operations in which he is involved.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to gain access to MHHARSH personnel and spot leads on eventual access and support-type assets directed against the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and assesses MHHARSH officials with whom he has made contact as well as access prospects to the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reports on the above activities.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-60 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review, Subject managed to gain full-time employment as a senior executive of an HBSPRITE government subsidized scientific publication at a time of economic slowdown when jobs were not easy to get. He did this without help from Headquarters or the Station. Such an achievement is a tribute to Subject's fluency in French, his ability to write, his general scientific know-how and his good buisness sense. Over half of his salary therefore is now paid by this company. In converting to full-time employment, a major adjustment, Subject's contribution to the Station operations in the MHHARSH and TPFAST fields against which he is targetted temporarily decreased somewhat. Subject continued, however, to maintain contact with three local MHHARSH officials and initiated contact with three others. He also continued to search for new leads to personalities in the priority areas assigned to him. Subject has the capability to call on local scientists or technicians of just about any nationality with the possible exception of TPFAST citizens. He has used this near-unique potential well.

Subject has had occasional difficulty switching from "professional" or intellectual subjects in his development of MHHARSH personalities or access prospects to more down-to-earth interests necessary --con't--

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT and D.

DATE: 9 June 1971

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

BY SUPERVISOR

2. MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 18 months

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Handling Officer

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Francis S. Sherry

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Station submitted comments on Subject officer recently in OFPT-16549 (8 April 1971), to which we should add that Subject has, largely on his own merits, acquired a solid and potentially highly useful cover employment. However, this new employment will demand a very substantial amount of time and energy from Subject, and the unanswerable question at the moment relates to his availability for Organizational tasks. We shall need additional time and careful working with this officer to determine the answer, since the fiscal outlay from the Organization to support his continued stay in Paris is still quite

DATE: 24 May 1971

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: DCOS

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

Section C (continued)

to the development of human relations. His forte is therefore more in the field of spotting and making operational contacts than in that of more than short-range operational development. Subject's operational situation makes it impossible for him to attempt recruitments. Thus, his very real achievements are not by essence of the spectacular variety.

Subject's reporting has been satisfactory and continue to be copious. He could, however, further improve the selectivity of the leads provided the Station and make more of an effort to "digest" the information contained in his reports.

Although Subject has, at present, no supervisory function, he has repeatedly requested such a responsibility. He is careful with operational expenses and has exercised good security.

During the period under review, additional efforts have been made to make full use of Subject's potential and integrate him further in the work of the station component with which he works. He is a particularly valuable asset for the Station programs directed against the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.

Section D (continued)

substantial. In a word, is it worth it? We do not yet know, although our initial impressions are favorable.

On the fitness report itself, this rater would have preferred an "S" rating for specific duty number one; Subject may ultimately deserve an "O", but it does not seem warranted at the present time. Moreover, I believe the overall rating would more properly have been in the higher range of the "P" category, rather than "S", but it is of course a subjective judgment of the rating officer, who is more intimately and directly involved with Subject on a frequent basis.

In sum, the cover is superb, and only time will reveal to what extent the cover requirements permit a full measure on behalf of the Organization. We are following this aspect closely and will be commenting upon it subsequently as we gain experience and knowledge.

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Richardson J.

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) [redacted]	DATE (from item S-1) 17 Oct 69	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Murat Natirboff	DATE (from item S-2)
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 12 December 1969	DISPATCH NUMBER: OFPT-15240	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 20 I 1924	2. SERVICE DESIGN CS	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE S&T project manager, Area Ops Off, GS 15	4. STATION OR BASE Paris	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER

6A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 5 Sep 1967	6B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE Please see 11B	6C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ Summer 1970	6D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE o/a 1 October, 1970

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

2: (at that time) 42 and 17

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

I would like very much to use my fluent French in my next assignment, as well as make use of my extensive exposure to science and technology -- both operations and and the larger world of the scientist and the engineer in today's evolving societies and economies. I would most especially hope to use my long experience in non-official cover activities and the managerial exposure accumulated thereby.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR *(see special note on transmittal form).*
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

- I planned, established and operated a long-range S&T spotting-assessment activity against sensitive targets, and a shorter range similar local activity during a period marked largely by an adverse political climate.
- I planned, developed and exploited, and modified a non-official cover in order to mask our operational activity, and integrated these into the broader ranging overall activities of a major field Station.
- I managed the non-official cover activity of viable professional/commercial cover organizations. The tasks included many business and production aspects as well as management of the firm's /unwitting/ personnel in the field and from the home office.
- I assisted other Stations and Bases, upon their request, in spotting-assessment activities, in local search and surveillance of targets, and in recruitment.
- As my original non-official cover became modified as a result of mergers, I was able to develop, alone, continuing cover to serve our needs of operational access as well as those of 'status' cover.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

(a) the senior-most management course offered through the Organization;
(b) a review course of activities within the CS and the Organization as a whole;
(c) at least audit the S&T course, if that is still being offered.

If (a) is possible through a civil school away from Headquarters, I would have no objection to the displacement involved.

FORM 5-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

First choice: to manage a large-scale non-official cover project in a French-speaking technically advanced locale.
Second choice: chief of station or base (cover non-official or official) in an area where I can combine my experience and linguistic ability.
Third choice: to be assigned to Staff training, preferably training (a) senior unit or project managers, or (b) JCTs.
Fourth choice: to be assigned to Staff personnel work -- above the Division level -- where new personnel are screened, tested and evaluated, then assigned.
Fifth choice: to work on the Intelligence side of the house.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 *(for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice)* IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE)

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE Staff Training 2ND CHOICE Personnel 3RD CHOICE Intelligence

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Brussels 2ND CHOICE Geneva 3RD CHOICE Ottawa

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION; with different responsibilities

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Station recommends that Subject return PCS to Headquarters at the end of his current tour. We would welcome a replacement who is capable of functioning in the same general cover context, but any such individual must also be able to spot and thoroughly access agent candidates. He should also handle a number of agents in the same field. We are, in short, seeking an officer who will aggressively exploit his cover.

---- continued----

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

No decision has been made concerning next assignment

DATE 24 Aug 70 TITLE C/E/PERS SIGNATURE Willford C. Taylor

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ______ DATED: ______
CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

Field Reassignment Questionnaire (continued)

12. develop new operational leads on his own initiative, and at the same time be prepared to take over and run assets related to his own cover employment.

14-00000

Eal

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006102

SECTION A Richardson, Jacques GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Off	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/F	8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
X CAREER
RESERVE
TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
INITIAL
X ANNUAL
SPECIAL (Specify):
REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Established and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to develop leads on eventual access or support type assets to be used by the Station against the local MHMARSH target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates contact with selected local MHMARSH targets and undertakes to develop sufficient rapport with them to provide operational assessments.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	-
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

29 JUN 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 [illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The comments of the rating officer are limited to the period from October 1969 to March 1970 during which he worked with Subject. The previous rating officer has added his comments to allow coverage of the total indicated period from April 1969 to March 1970. During this period Subject was integrated in a new team assigned to the local S&T and Commercial MHMARSH target. Subject's recent activity has been very productive indeed. Subject used the excellent potential given to him by his cover to skillfully spot and assess access agent candidates. As Subject's operational situation in Paris precludes making recruitment, the most promising of these candidates was placed in contact with a Station officer during social events Subject organized. At the same time, Subject continued his efforts to develop personal relationship with several MHMARSHers. The beginning of personal, as opposed to purely professional, relations with a major MHMARSH target enabled him to obtain insight into the target's beliefs and personality which was the best the Station had to date. Subject also managed to establish contact with two other MHMARSH representatives of interest. This, in one case, required almost six months to accomplish via a combination of patience, skill and determination. Subject is an experienced officer. He is cost conscious and practices good security. The Station has no other asset with the necessary scientific and editorial know-how, fluent French and local knowledge to replace Subject. In view of this and the recent progress made by Subject in response to very specific requirements and his willingness to try to establish personal and, hopefully, social relations with access prospects and MHMARSH targets, the Station recently recommended that he be extended in Paris. At the same time, the Station recommended that Subject's cover be reinforced by full-time employment with Subject's current WOLADY part-time employer.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Handling Officer
Chief, SR II

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Francis Sherry
/s/ Murat Natirboff

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As previous Station correspondence and fitness reports will reflect, this officer has been the subject of varying evaluations and projections in recent years. In fairness to him, however, it is equally true that an officer under non-official cover reflects, in the level and quality of his performance, the amount and type of guidance, direction and push he receives from the responsible inside case officer. Making allowances for these variables, this officer's past record has not been impressive; however, it is also correct to note that he has improved substantially during the latter part of the period under review, and that if the Station can work out some fiscal arrangement which will reduce the heavy financial input

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
19 May 1970	DCOS	/s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

Section D3 continued

from the Organization, his continued presence at this Station definitely appears to be warranted for a sufficient period to reach more definite conclusions concerning the level of sustained performance over a somewhat longer period than that reflected by this report.

On balance, we are pleased that this officer has responded so well to greater case officer direction and that he has undertaken somewhat more aggressive efforts to expand his range of contacts in immediate proximity to the primary Station targets. This officer does bring many talents to bear on his operational activity: he has absolutely fluent French, a solid and exploitable cover, and a vast range of contacts in the local community. Nonetheless, it will require additional time to explore these contacts in depth, select those which appear to be operationally viable, and pursue them actively either to the point of recruitment by another officer or elimination from further development, for whatever reason.

In sum, in spite of the recognized and commendable improvement in this officer's performance during the period under review, the reviewer submits that the letter grade for specific duties 2 and 4 would more properly have been a "P", and that the overall rating, at this point, would more accurately be set at a level between "P" and "S", probably closer to the former than the latter.

This reviewing comment has been read by the officers who prepared the Fitness Report.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/France		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
1 October 19[illegible] - 31 March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet WOLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 20 OC	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OCT 9 1 35 PM '69

During this reporting period subject had very markedly increased the tempo of his activities and contacts. Many agent prospects have been screened and contacts were established with people of interest to several elements of the Station. Subject is particularly thorough and outstanding on specific investigations where he utilized cover in a skillful and imaginative way. He has improved in terms of people development but in this respect he is still best with people in a professionally related context rather than a contrived social context. As mentioned in the previous report subject's cover assignment does not allow him to make recruitments. Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness and does not exercise any supervisory responsibilities.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
11 June 1969	/s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2. MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
5 June 1969	Ops Officer	/s/ Murat Natirboff

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I do not concur in this rating. I would have given the employee STRONG in the performance of his cover responsibilities, that is to say in the manner in which he has created and expanded his cover. I would have restricted myself to PROFICIENT, however, in assessing his exploitation of that cover for operational purposes. For a fuller treatment of this staff agent's performance, suggest that reference be made to the KCC Status Report, submitted 26 May 1969, via OFPA-39925.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 JUNE 1969	Chief of Station	/s/ David kE. Murphy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A GENERAL

Richardson, Siegfried

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D'	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/France		8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)						ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1967 - ~~31 March~~ 30 September 196

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet WOLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Since the last reporting period subject's efforts were directed by the Station toward the spotting, developing and assessing WOLADY S&T agent candidates in terms of recruitment and inclusion in the Station's S&T spotting network.

Subject has done thorough and at times imaginative spade work in this field despite the fact that the mission was not as successful as anticipated. Recent progress however would indicate that the next reporting period would be more productive.

Subject continues to respond to ad-hoc specific assignments in an exemplary manner.

Because of the nature of his cover assignment Subject is not authorized to make recruitments.

Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness. He does not exercise any supervisory responsibilities under his cover assignment.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 24 Oct. 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 28 Oct. 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Murat Natirboff
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL See attached.		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David E. Murphy

SECRET

ADDENDUM, Form 45 (Fitness Report), for period March 67-March 68.

Section D

As the individual being rated, I would like to add some remarks to those prepared by the rating officer.

The assignment I have includes managerial responsibilities which (a) are essential to the continued existence and security of the cover mechanism as a vehicle for operational exploitation, and (b) are not necessarily visible to those "on the inside."

In the case of (a), I must engage in a constant orchestration of the cover and the facilities it offers. This means maintaining a managerial equilibrium to insure that cover work will not become, of itself, so demanding that it negates the cover's utility to the CS. In effect, the top officers and middle managers of the cover corporation [who are not cleared and witting] have to be satisfied that their demands are met (or cannot be), or else manipulated in order to neutralize or reject their demands. After all, the cover position is to them a legitimate, normal, workaday post in their firm. What work is done at their bidding, it follows, must be accomplished according to the high standards of thoroughness and accuracy which they have set.

In the case of (b) -- which derives from (a) -- and can prove to be so demanding that the needs of the CS could no longer be served, the incumbent is required to manage a span of human contacts at several levels in order to preserve his cover position and enhance its value to the CS. This means planning, directing and managing the work of multinational, multicultural teams of technical correspondents, as well as meetings and negotiations to improve the [cover firm's] relations with similarly widespread individuals at the levels of editor-in-chief, publisher, corporate vice-president, president, and chairman of the board. These levels are scattered not only through industry, but have their analogs as well in government, higher education, and professional societies.

Having previously managed both a CS base and the principal denied-areas operating component of a major field Station, I can report quite honestly that my present managerial responsibilities exceed the former -- despite the apparent lack of "supervisory responsibilities" in my present position.

S E C R E T

3. It is difficult to place in the proper perspective the contribution of this senior staff agent to Paris Station operations. On the one hand, Subject has established superb cover in the scientific and technical field which should have afforded him virtually unlimited access to persons of interest to us, both Soviet and potential access agents. In evaluating the manner in which the employee set up and managed this cover, I would tend to agree with his comments to the fitness report on the managerial demands on him although these comments are somewhat overdrawn.

The principal difficulty has been the time it has taken to relate the cover potential to the specific operational requirements of the Station. We have not received from CASASIN as many leads and assessment reports to persons of operational interest in the S&T field as we think he could have produced. It may be that the earlier listing of the project (viewed as a regional undertaking) contributed to this.

Recently we have noted significant improvement in that we have received responses to requests we have made for assessment and development of potential access agents within a cover context. We hope, therefore, that this last year of CASASIN's stay will be the most productive ever. It is unfortunate that the cover must end because of the cover company's decisions over which we had no control.

/s/ David E. Murphy

S E C R E T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

Richardson Eugene

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted] [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/France	8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					XXX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Soviet S&T personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet, assess, and recommend as agent candidates WOLADY and Third Nationals in the HBFAIRY S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Contacts and develops local Soviet Bloc personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops cover pretexts to attend selected scientific conferences.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Responds to local Station adhoc operational requirements.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 31 AUG 1967	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to maintain a secure effective cover mechanism. In this reporting period the whole thrust and objectives of this cover facility have been changed from pursuit of targets designated by Headquarters at international conferences to pursuit of the local Soviet presence. This has caused a major readjustment and Subject is now beginning to produce the type of leads that help the Station achieve its local operational objectives.

Subject continues to show a well organised methodical approach to his cover and operational tasks.

Subject is cost conscience.

HQRS. NOTE: Subject has no supervisory responsibilities.

Seth T. Crawford
Chief, E/F

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Employee is on h/l. Report will be shown to him upon his return.	
DATE 9 August 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Murat Natirboff

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I rarely see the written product of this employee's efforts and know little of his work except as I am informed of it by his supervisor in the Station. I have the impression, however, that the employee is responding to his supervisor's guidance and is not by any means simply drifting along paths indicated by his cover work, which can be a temptation when an employee has, as is true in this case, rather limited contact with his colleagues who work under official cover on the same target. I thus concur in the evaluation on the basis of limited knowledge.

DATE 9 August 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Robert E. Owen

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

P

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/French		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
3 June 1965 - 31 March 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could rang ... ig on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe actio
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfacto ... or excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are b
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

List up to six of the most important specifi ... Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY ... in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Soviet S&T personnel	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to attend selected scientific conferences where targeted Soviet S&T personnel are expected	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Contacts, develops and assesses Soviet S&T personalities at international conferences.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Participates as an inside spotter, manager and key team member in recruitment operations against Soviet S&T personnel	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Spots, develops and assesses Soviet, third national and PBPRIME agent candidates in HBFAIRY	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
[illegible]

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has done an outstanding job in creating a JUG/9 mechanism which enables direct access to an important target group. This job was performed artfully, securely, intelligently and imaginatively. Subject is an experienced, highly capable senior professional officer in every sense of the term. He is a thoroughly organized self-disciplined person who can operate effectively outside a normal Station complex. He has the supple mind required to learn highly technical cover tasks and perform these in a skilled manner. He organizes the performance of these cover duties in such a manner as to extract the most operational mileage. Subject has spotted, assessed, developed, and in special cases recruited. He is extremely articulate, and an excellent writer. Despite his deep cover status, he submits timely finished operational and information reports. His management, administration, and record keeping of both his cover and operational duties is excellent.

Although Subject has had long experience in supervisory capacities, his present singleton cover status does not require supervisory duties.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4 May 1966
SIGNATURE /[redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	
4 May 1966	Ops Officer	/s/Murat Natirboff

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 May 1966	Ops Officer	/s/Robert E. Owen

SECRET

14-00000

[redacted] **SECRET** [redacted]
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/French		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					
☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	INITIAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1964 - 2 June 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Contact, cultivation and assessment of, and collection of biographic and operational intelligence on Soviet scientific and technical targets, and on other Soviets and other nationalities to whom he has access through his cover.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting and assessment of potential operational assets to be used against the targets specified under Specific Duty No. 1.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Execution of operational assignments as directed by Hqs and field stations concerned, whether of a KUTUBE, KUWOLF or KUDESK nature.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation or acquisition of cover firm written material as operational information to increase his access and flexibility in furtherance of Specific Duties Nos. 1 through 3.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Planning, directing and managing overseas bureau of cover firm, with emphasis on exploitation of the cover to meet operational requirements.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON
BK OF-4b
6 JUL 1965

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O *

30 JUN 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 7 1 56 PM '65
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

During the reporting period this employee as a staff agent has continued the solidification of his cover and the expansion of his operational activity within his cover to a point where he represents as deeply buried a staff officer as can be found in anyone with his past organizational background. From the point of view of the host country authorities he appears to be completely legitimate. From the more important point of view of his targets, he also apparently has been accepted, and not through a lack of opportunity for scrutiny, for what he claims to be. He thus represents for KUBARK an asset who has not only solid status and access cover, but also the demonstrated capability for exploiting his cover for specific and aggressive operational undertakings.

As has been stated in past fitness reports, his present capability directly and openly to approach operational targets through the vehicle of his cover is the result of his own efforts, in which he has devoted a tremendous amount of work not only to establish and enhance the foundations of the cover, which requires a considerable amount of work for the cover company, but to devise and exploit ways and means by which the cover activity may be applied directly to operational tasks and programs. In addition to operational activity in his country of assignment, he has also been used in Hqs-directed activity in other countries, usually involving direct contact with target individuals, and in addition he has contributed greatly to the acquisition of operational information for the use of Hqs components in their overall approach to Soviet scientific and technical targets.

It would be difficult to fault this employee with respect to energy, professional skills, and mental capacity. He is a keen student of his operational environment and very skillful in analyzing the possibilities it offers for application toward operational objectives. He shows considerable resourcefulness in devising logical and credible

(continued)

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 1 June 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 1 June 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James M. Flint

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Since the Reviewing Officer in the field has not indicated his views on this Fitness Report, I would like to make a comment of my own. Without wishing to detract from anything the Supervisor has said about Subject's performance, I feel obliged to note that the ratings given him in this report are higher than those given, for example, to any Branch Chief in this Division, and, as such, are inconsistent with the grading pattern of the Division as a whole.

Reviewing Officer

2 June 1965 Chief, External Operations Section /s/ Robert E. Owen

DATE 24 June 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward Ryan Edward Ryan

SECRET

SECTION C continued SE... [redacted]

approaches to operational problems and personalities, and expends considerable effort in maintaining a level of specialized knowledge sufficient to backstop his cover and to ensure the maximum exploitation of his contacts with target organizations and individuals. His command of spoken, written, and technical French is excellent.

From the point of view of supervision, this employee in his present position requires guidance only insofar as to identify specific targets and for him to protect himself in situations where he does not have, by virtue of his not having access to official files, specialized information. Otherwise, he requires no supervision other than the periodic provision of policy and operational directives.

This employee has always been conscious and punctillious in his preparation of operational and administrative reports, including financial accountings, and his reporting in general, despite the burdens imposed by the necessity for minimizing the risks inherent in the lack of access to classified storage, leaves nothing to be desired.

Other than the funds for operational activities, this employee currently has no responsibility for the programming and use of personnel, space, equipment, and funds.

With respect to dedication to his job, this employee has practically speaking single-handedly built his present cover/operational position despite a number of negative factors inherent to his situation such as relative isolation, meager opportunity for contact with his professional group, and expensive area of assignment, and an exposed cover situation where the necessity for living cover is compounded by the necessity of avoiding mistakes which might jeopardize cover. His dedication to and enthusiasm for accepting the challenge ofthis assignment, and his willingness to continue on in it, deserve particular mention, particularly since he would perhaps justifiably feel that his present assignment may leave him outside the mainstream of competitive organization progression.

This employee's health and family situations leave nothing to be desired, as his proven mobility in the execution of operational assignments attests.

It should further be noted that with respect to the problem endemic to deep-cover assignments of allocation of time between cover work and operational activity, this employee comes very close to the happy norm of making cover work complement operational work, and making operational work contribute where possible to the enhancement of cover.

While this employee's assignment to date has essentially been a one-man show, it is recommended that serious consideration be given to expanding the operational complex which he has created in order to capitalize on his experience, the work he has put in to date, and his own management capabilities.

---

*(Section B) - No special recognition of Subject's "Outstanding" overall performance is being requested at this time.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer	7. OFF. DIV. BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/France		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					
☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 May 1964					

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964			

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Finding, cultivating unwittingly and assessing new target personalities among Soviet scientists, engineers and other technical specialists.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Continuing the assessment and unwitting development of established targets in the same category.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Development of similar leads on target personalities from other denied areas; making recruitments outside base country.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Development and assessment of technical personalities of interest to Station's internal (domestic) programs.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Managing and directing cover company's foreign bureau and its assets to strengthen own cover and diversify access for KUTUBE, KUWOLF and KUDESK purposes.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Researching, writing and editing own and others' material published by cover company to strengthen cover and diversify access for KUDOVE operational purposes.	RATING LETTER O

POSTED ON
OF-4b

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

26 JUN 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUN 26 11 28 AM '64

This employee combines the relatively rare combination of a senior and broadly experienced intelligence officer under working cover providing both long-term status in his country of residence (and in Europe in general) and access for a variety of operational functions, including spotting, assessing, contact with Soviet bloc nationals of specific interest, investigative measures, assessment in depth of ostensibly cover-company hired persons, and attendance at a broad range of national and international specialized meetings. Development of the capability operationally to exploit his cover has been the achievement of the employee himself. In so doing he has at the same time achieved genuine acceptance by his cover company associates (most of whom are unwitting) and his colleagues in his cover profession and related professions.

In undertaking operational tasks this employee has consistently shown initiative imagination, security consciousness, and application of both operational and substantive background to the problem at hand. He has put a conscious effort into improving his already excellent command of the French language, and his grasp of a variety of specialized scientific and technical fields has been achieved basically as a result of his own efforts.

His management of operational reporting, finances, and the administrative problems connected with his cover status has been exemplary.

It should be noted that during the reporting period, this employee has not had the benefit at all times of specific pinpointed operational direction. As of the end of the reporting period, Headquarters assumed control of his activities against specific Soviet targets on a Europe-wide basis.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 May 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Eighteen	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops. Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 25 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops. Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert E. Owen

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Richardson, Jacques

FITNESS REPORT [redacted]

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
037367 006112

GENERAL

SECTION A

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 May 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 10 September 1962 - 31 March 1963

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SECTION B

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishment and maintenance of cover as a genuine working member of his profession.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting and assessing persons of operational interest to Paris Station and to other stations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Investigating of organizations and phenomena of operational interest to the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Collection of positive and operational information using his cover for entree.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON
16 July 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

15 JUL 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

See attached sheet.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 May 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] /S/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6½ months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached sheet.

DATE 20 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL OPS Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Edward Ryan

SECRET

Richardson, Jacques

[redacted]

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

The assignment of this employee to the field under non-official cover was designed to compensate for the loss of an employee in an official cover slot which was cut from the Station's ODACID allotment of personnel positions.

During the reporting period this employee has accomplished with success the convincing establishment of his cover in a complex milieu, and has been accepted as legitimate by his professional colleagues, the persons whom he meets under cover, and the French authorities. It should be noted that his ability to assume his cover has been largely the result of his own efforts over a period of years to acquire and maintain a familiarity with the general scientific field.

During the reporting period he has developed a wide circle of contacts in the scientific and journalistic fields and applies a long background in a variety of assignments in KUDOVE to the determination and assessment of operational potential among these contacts. At the same time his cover organization, in which only four persons are witting of his actual status, has shown itself to be more than satisfied with his performance of his cover duties.

This employee requires a minimum of detailed operational supervision; it is necessary in specific cases only to indicate the operational or informational objectives.

From the point of view of administrative support, his attention to detail and meticulousness reduce the problems of his support by the Station to a minimum.

This employee uses the French language continuously, and his facility is such as to permit him to handle himself excellently in a broad range of complex technical subjects. He has in addition undertaken specialized French language training to develop this capability further. His operational reporting is excellent both with regard to clarity and pertinence.

In the immediate future he will be assigned case work, for the most part in fields where it will complement, and be complemented by, his independent operational activities and cover work.

SECRET

SECRET

JUN 1962

6101

6 August 1962

[redacted]

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report Richardson, Eugene

Subject: [redacted]

My last statements concerning the performance of [redacted] should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

Quentin C. Johnson
QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

CONCUR: Howard J. Osborn
HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

14-00000

DEC
1961.

Recorded by
CSPD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

Richardson, Jacques

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER ✓

SECTION A [redacted] GENERAL

1. NAME [redacted]	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Branch Chief		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OC/SR/6	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To July 1960-October 61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises large functional branch of thirty-seven staff and fifteen contract personnel.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with various components of the Agency and with other agencies.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and programs for operations support, including initiation of new support activities.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares and presents briefings.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises preparation of, and sometimes personally prepares, special studies both on own initiative and on request.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises maintenance of SR Division records on Soviet defectors, supports exploitation of defectors and participates in their resettlement.	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - *Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.*
2 - *Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.*
3 - *Performance clearly meets basic requirements.*
4 - *Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.*
5 - *Performance in every important respect is superior.*
6 - *Performance in every respect is outstanding.*

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF [illegible] 1961 [illegible] AM '61 MAIL ROOM

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. [redacted] has a good knowledge of Soviet matters and generally is very well informed. He continually demonstrates much initiative and a high degree of productivity. He is stimulating to his associates, businesslike and delegates work easily. He appears very self-confident and he is dynamic.

Mr. [redacted] supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 9 November 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Twelve	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE 9 November 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR SR/Chief of Plans and Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE QUENTIN C. JOHNSON Q. C. Johnson

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 21 NOV 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, SR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOHN M. MAURY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON Jacque	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/Tokyo Sta/SR

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS
☐ NOT ELIGIBLE ☐ MEMBER ☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING ☐ DECLINED ☐ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD
From 1 Apr 59-24 June 62

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Soviet Branch, responsible for activities of 24 staff and 6 contract employees	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	RATING NO. 5/6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for station SR planning, budgeting, and operating activities	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Representing the station at varied levels in all SR matters	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
							X
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS	▨	▨					
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

(4)

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his "host" country; an excellent and proven degree of operational "know-how"; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty. He can be expected to continue his dynamic and imaginative pursuit of a most difficult target. It is my opinion that this officer has great potential and is ready for increased responsibilities which would involve the promotion for which he has been recommended. As for training, a good managerial course might help to bring into even sharper focus his many talents.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 23 June 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Jacque Richardson/s/ on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 23 June 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Adam Brindle(P) signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS, Tokyo	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John Baker/s/ on transmittal

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON, Jacques	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 192[illegible]	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT SR, Tokyo, Japan	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 10 Apr 58 - 31 Mar 59

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and directs operational branch of some 17 persons	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local intelligence and security services.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with U.S. military and civilian intelligence services	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

JUN 22 11 19 AM '59
RI MAIL ROOM

Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the Station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1\.

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 27 April 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE signed on transmittal

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC Tokyo Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William Nelson signed on transmittal

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/Tokyo Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John E. Baker signed on transmittal

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SR 8

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

GENERAL

SECTION A.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON JACQUES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

CERTIFICATION

SECTION B.

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE *27 May 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		11 JUL
Reviewed by PUD	CEB	7/24/58

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN [illegible] UNDER CRITERIA [illegible] AND IN COMPLIANCE [illegible]

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John E. Baker	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SECTION C.

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5/6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 26 2 18 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As branch chief directs and plans operations of denied area branch.	RATING NUMBER 5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with other U.S. agencies	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local security services.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and handles agents	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is an exceedingly well-equipped operations officer. He is nature, intelligent, has a thorough background in operations in his area and the ability to grow in his job. His operational planning and execution is usually impeccable. He has the loyalty of his subordinates and the respect of his equals and supervisors. He is particularly effective in dealing in the liaison field where his good sense and disinterest in "fighting the problem" produces a maximum of cooperation and good will. If he has any minor fault as a supervisor, it is not in impatience with his subordinates, as reflected in previous evaluations, but in an occasional unwillingness to say no to them.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON JACQUES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS-11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John E. Baker	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 1 NOV 55 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

10 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

His potential for advancement is excellent. He has the right blend of operational know-how and supervisory talent to undertake positions of wider scope than he now holds. Although his advancement has been rapid for his age, his maturity, poise and common sense almost completely eliminate age as a factor in his potential for a more senior job.

... OF PERSONNEL
JUN 26 2 18 PM '50
MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject deserves at sometime within the next year or two the opportunity to broaden his experience either by command of a small station or advancement to a more responsible job in a large one.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

11 57 PERS.

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section A below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON (First) Jacques (Middle)
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Tokyo Station [illegible]
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Completed at Headquarters; subject not available (Copy sent to field.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.

☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.

☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.

☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM OR A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.

☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 16 Oct 1957

C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Edward Marchin

D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY Ju DATE 7 NOV 1957
Posted Per Card, [illegible]
Reviewed by [illegible] 11/[illegible]

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section. ☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

A. THIS DATE: 23 OCT 57

B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Lloyd GEORGE Lloyd George

C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: COS, Tokyo

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 30 1 50 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy to Branch Chief	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervising	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts Foreign Liaison	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares correspondence and reports and handles administrative routine	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares and Manages Projects	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Developes and handles Agents	RATING NUMBER 5

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has excellent natural equipment for employment in this organization in terms of his intelligence and natural apptitudes. Additionally, he brings a great deal of area knowledge and language ability to his present assignment. During the period covered by this report he has displayed great industry and devotion to duty in a variety of circumstances and achieved notable results in production and in the creation of both short and long-term assets for his unit. On the debit side I would say that he is somewhat too businesslike in many personal situations to the point of being almost humourless. This, however, is a quality which he does not permit to intrude upon the necessities of his operational work although it often shows in office relationships.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

GENERAL

SECTION E.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON Jacques
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Tokyo Station REDWOOD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

CERTIFICATION

SECTION F.

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 23 OCT 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Lloyd GEORGE
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: COS, Tokyo

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 16 Oct 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

SECTION G.

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PROGRAMS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

DATE
NOV 1957

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
15

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is well suited for this business and the business for him. He should progress steadily to positions of great responsibility.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
Oct 30 1 50 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Normal refresher a/o preparatory training as required.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

No limiting factors or personal circumstances known to the rater

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON Jacques	2. DATE OF BIRTH ?0 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Japan Station (REDWOOD)	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 15 November 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Edward M'Arelius	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
Coded F...
1957
1-22-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 21 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL W. Lloyd George	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ~~Chief of Operations~~

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 3 11 18 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy to Branch Chief	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervising	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts Foreign Liaison	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares correspondence and reports	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares and manages projects	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Handles admin routine	RATING NUMBER 4

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has really superb natural equipment for work in this Organization in terms of mental capacity, psychological bent and affinity for the things and people he comes against. He tops this off with industry and language ability among other natural aptitudes. On the debit side and measured against the best, he is a bit shy of humor and personal understanding in some situations, qualities which mitigate more against acceptability than job competence.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Subject is an all around performer capable of a primary, in place of his present secondary, responsibility.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON JACQUES
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Japan Station (REDWOOD)
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)*: 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*: ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 15 November 1956
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Edward Marelius
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 21 November 1956
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: W. Lloyd George
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: ~~Chief of Operations~~

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Six

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 3 11 15 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has a high all around potential. With res[illegible] below, he tends to support subordinates from his own ene[illegible] rather than to bring them along the hard way, and a normal tendency to avoid the categorical "no" - both tendencies easily correctable.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Routine refresher training as appropriate.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

All normal. No limiting factors.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors [illegible] the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

DEC

BY
DATE 29 NOV 1955
Posted Pos. Control P&S
Reviewed by PUD [illegible] 12/7/55

FIELD REPORT

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY Jacques Richardson	1. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION (1) FI, (2) PP
4. GRADE GS-14	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) USSR Base, Tokyo	SR 5-34	
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 September 1955	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 17 February - 30 September 1955		

SECTION II *(To be completed by field supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION Chief, USSR Base, Tokyo 0136.01	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 17 February 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*

A. As Chief of Operating Base:
   1. Manage and direct all operations against target area, and monitor products.
   2. Supervise system of development and exploitation of operational leads.
   3. Supervise proper administration and support of operations, including finances.
   4. Conduct or supervise effective liaison with other KUBARK elements, with other Government agencies abroad and, when appropriate, with representatives of other governments.

B. As Senior SR Division Officer in Area:
   1. Consult with or advise other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units on target area, government, and IS characteristics.
   2. Make available to other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units area specialists, as required.

SECTION III *(To be completed at headquarters only)*

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Carleton B. Swift	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) W Lloyd George
3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED	
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 7 Nov. 1955	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES Phyllis M. Landrum

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 JUL 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 22 [illegible] '55
MAIL ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale under each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X	
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.												X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.														X
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.												X		
11. CALM.													X	
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.														X
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.													X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.												X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.													X	

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.														X
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.												X		
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.														X
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												X		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.													X	
36. DELIBERATE.													X	
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													X	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												X		
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.														X
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													X	
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.													X	
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.													X	
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Capable operations officer with broad understanding of Soviet problems.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 22 11 07 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES,

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

F. OTHER COMMENTS *(Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):*

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CY 7 DATE [illegible] 8/1/54
R.P. 8/18/54

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) Richardson (First) Jacques (Middle) G.
2. GRADE GS-13
3. POSITION TITLE Area Ops. Officer CD-FI
4. OFFICE DDP
STAFF OR DIVISION SR
BRANCH SR/5
☐ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 18 July 1953 To 17 July 1954
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☐ Reassignment ☒ Annual ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor ☐ Special

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

18 July 53 - 31 Jan 54

a. Manage and direct the activities of an overseas operating branch.
b. Assist the division chief of operations in the planning of new and continued oper'ns.
c. Assist the division chief in personnel programming in support of branch and field station activities.

1 Feb 54 - 17 Jul 54

a. Establish new domestic activities branch.
b. Develop and manage operational program of this branch, insuring (1) continuity of treatment by qualified personnel, (2) processing of intelligence requirements, and (3) expeditious movement of finished intelligence.
c. Multilateral liaison with other elements of CIA, the Government, and foreign IS.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Counterespionage (OTR)	Washington	3 weeks	22 January 1954

(In addition to the duties indicated in §7 above, I also give a 3-hour lecture at the CE course (advanced phase) approximately every six weeks.)

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am primarily interested in a foreign assignment where I could apply the various espionage and CE techniques it has been my responsibility to manage and plan for in recent years.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

My work at headquarters has become somewhat narrowing in that I am losing language abilities and opportunity for direct contact with foreigners.

10. 3 July 1954
DATE

Jacques G. Richardson
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Richardson is a superior officer in the performance of his duties. He is efficient, precise, and energetic, and brings considerable imagination and foresight to the operational problems confronting him. His concept of staff organization and responsibility is of a high caliber. In handling personnel, he is perceptive and serious, and his judgment and motivation are of the highest quality.

(Over) (4)

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

This officer has been outstanding as a staff officer. He is unusually talented in his balancing of jurisdictional equities. This ability reflects a broad competence, however, and should not be construed so as to limit his future duties.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

This officer's devotion to his duties and professional convictions sometimes inclines him toward inflexible declarations of position. This fault, a minor one in officers of considerable potential, will be corrected by increased responsibility and experience.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

This officer is prepared for promotion and for increased responsibilities in command or staff duties.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Richardson is presently well placed. See below.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Tradecraft training and a field assignment. Both are planned in the next six months.

FI\Training

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

29 July 54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

21 July '54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CW

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON	(First) Jacques	(Middle) D G.	2. GRADE GS-13	3. POSITION TITLE Exp. Intell.Off. (Chief) CD FI
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION SR	BRANCH SR 5 FE Br.	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 2-18-53 To 7-18-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

a. Supervise and manage a foreign geographic branch; this includes a total of 51 authorized personnel at Hq and in the field stations. b. Direct and coordinate all project development. c. Detect and explore potential operational leads. d. Coordinate intra-division activities with appropriate branches, inter-division activities with appropriate divisions, senior staffs, and elements outside DD/P and CIA. e. Determine the suitability of new personnel, continued employment and rotation of incumbent personnel, and make available incumbent personnel on loan basis to other divisions, etc. f. Apportion the operational and administrative workloads within the branch sections and desks, and their personnel. g. Adapt changing field situations and problems to the organization and operation of the branch, making the branch best serve the needs of the field stations. h. Review continuously all requirements imposed on the branch, and transmit them clearly to the field.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed

None (I was overseas part of the time covered by this report).

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am principally interested in the building and successful operation of American intelligence abroad, both in theory and in practice.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS). The only remark I can make here is the one I stated in the previous report: the administrative responsibilities of a branch chief do not enable him to be a purely operational individual. If it were possible to carry less of an administrative load, I would enjoy devoting all of my time to the refinement of the intelligence process and its techniques in my area of concern.

10.

22 October 1953
DATE

Jacques G. Richardson
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

During this period Mr. Richardson was promoted from Deputy Branch Chief to Branch Chief, in recognition of his extremely good performance. Not enough time has elapsed to be able to evaluate him fully on all aspects of his new position. However, his handling of the Branch has been unusually good from a management point of view and there is every reason to believe that in the planning and direction of operational activities the same high standard will prevail.

JPH

(Over)

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

He is a good organizer and a good leader. He is methodical and thorough in his planning and supervision of substantive activities, while at the same time he maintains close and sympathetic relations with his subordinates. His knowledge of them and of their personalities and problems is outstanding.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

He should continue to develop his knowledge of operations and operational procedures.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He is well equipped to advance through increasing levels of responsibility.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Well placed at present.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Assignment to a field position in the not-too-distant future.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

26 October 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

26 October 1953
DATE

Dana B Durand
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON, Jacques G.	2. GRADE GS-12	3. POSITION TITLE I.O. (Dep. Chief)	
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION SR	BRANCH SR-5 Far East	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 2-18-52 To 2-18-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

Assist the Branch Chief in management of the Branch and its overseas stations (3); at present, I act as Branch Chief about 25%-30% of the year. Supervise the planning and preparation for approval of all basic plans, programs, and projects. This involves thorough discussion with each of seven (7) desk chiefs of the purposes and procedures for accomplishing any single mission under any given project, including target analysis (whether FI or PP), preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements, specific personnel needs, etc. Am responsible for working directly with the Division's Intelligence Branch for control of requirements, ops intelligence, and reports. Am responsible for maintaining liaison with appropriate staffs and other Divisions who must coordinate any action or document. Assist or direct, as required, specific mission planning at overseas stations on TDY. Supervise preparation of all periodic reports; interview candidate empl'

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
International Politics, 102	Graduate School Georgetown University, Washington.	4 months: 3 hours' credit	5 June 1952

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

I am primarily interested in the conception, planning, and operational management of FI and PP activities, and ops policy and control.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

This differs from my present assignment essentially in that a Branch Chief or his Deputy becomes so involved in administrative detail that he cannot always give his undivided attention to project management and agent handling problems. Otherwise, I feel that my background and experience qualify me for the functions I aspire to perform.

10.

7 February 1953
DATE

JRichardson
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE. As Deputy Branch Chief, Mr. Richardson has performed his duties, taken as a whole, in a superior manner. His timely and efficient preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements and reports has been particularly outstanding. During three to four months of the past year, Mr. Richardson has acted as Branch Chief. The review of Branch operations under Mr. Richardson's direction, during the writer's absence, indicated his complete competence in supervising Branch activities. His supervision of the planning and preparation for approval of basic plans and projects of the seven (7) desk chiefs has been superior. Mr. Richardson also participated in the planning and dispatch of a difficult operational mission, acting in the capacity of Senior Case Officer. On this mission his liaison with representatives of one of the Military Services was conducted in a manner which enhanced cooperation between that Service and this Agency.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Richardson's performance was noticeably outstanding with respect to his thorough knowledge of every activity of the Branch. He was in position to assume direction of Branch activities at any time. He also kept himself thoroughly briefed on Division policies and planning in order to give timely instruction and guidance to the Branch overseas stations.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Mr. Richardson has a very thorough background in two (2) languages, French and Japanese. He would benefit substantially by learning the Russian language. He is meticulous with respect to his attention to details, sometimes to the point of concealing the broader picture from his view. It would be well for Mr. Richardson to direct his attention to the broad scope of Branch activities rather than to concentrate on its details.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Richardson is fully qualified to assume the duties of the chief SR Division representative at a field station. In order to assume this responsibility in the most efficient manner, it is recommended that Mr. Richardson serve a minimum period of time of approximately six (6) months as the assistant to the present chief of the field station.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. Richardson could serve effectively in a staff function for either FI or PP activities. This does not mean, however, that his present duties are not better suited to his qualifications.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Mr. Richardson has already been recommended for overseas assignment in the Far East during the past year. He has area knowledge and command of the Japanese language, having served in Japan previously with the United States Army. His duties at Headquarters have been so pressing that his departure for overseas assignment is being delayed until an adequate replacement may be trained.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

March 31 1953
DATE

George G Kisevalter
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

March 30 1953
DATE

Dana B Durand
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

WARNING—Do not fill out this form until you have read all instructions.

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM

STANDARD FORM NO. 2808 JUNE 1966
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 831-1 2808-104

A. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DESIGNATOR

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON (First) Jacques (Middle) Gabriel
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month) Jan (Day) 20 (Year) 1924
3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 042 20 5339
4. DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH PRESENTLY OR LAST EMPLOYED, INCLUDING BUREAU OR DIVISION
5. CLAIM NUMBER IF RETIRED CSA—

I, the employee or former employee identified above, canceling any and all previous designations of beneficiary heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any lump-sum benefit which may become payable under the Civil Service Retirement Act after my death. I understand that this designation of beneficiary will not affect the rights of any survivors who may qualify for annuity benefits after my death, and that this designation will remain in full force and effect unless or until canceled by me in writing.

B. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES

DUPLICATE

TYPE OR PRINT FIRST NAME, MIDDLE INITIAL, AND LAST NAME OF EACH BENEFICIARY	TYPE OR PRINT ADDRESS (Including ZIP Code) OF EACH BENEFICIARY	RELATIONSHIP	SHARE TO BE PAID TO EACH BENEFICIARY (See Example)
Pamela A. Richardson	5 villa Madrid, 92 Neuilly, France	Dau	One half
Michelle D. Richardson	5 villa Madrid, 92 Neuilly, France	Dau	One half

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary or beneficiaries who may die before a lump-sum benefit becomes payable shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. If none of the beneficiaries are alive when the lump-sum benefit becomes payable, this designation shall be void.

January 12, 1972
DATE OF THIS DESIGNATION (MONTH) (DAY) (YEAR)

(SIGNATURE OF DESIGNATOR—DO NOT PRINT)

C. WITNESSES (A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary)

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, CERTIFY THAT THIS INSTRUMENT WAS SIGNED IN OUR PRESENCE.

Richard W Butler (SIGNATURE OF WITNESS—DO NOT PRINT) 13219 Allerton Ave (NUMBER AND STREET) Rockville, Md. (CITY, STATE, AND ZIP CODE)

(SIGNATURE OF WITNESS—DO NOT PRINT) (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY, STATE, AND ZIP CODE)

PRINT OR TYPE YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS (Including ZIP Code) TO INSURE RETURN OF COPY

Jacques G. Richardson
c/O Mrs T. G. Driscoll
722 South Royal Street
Alexandria VA 22134

(Reserved for Receiving Stamp of U. S. Civil Service Commission)

MAR 2 10 43 AM '72
PERSONAL AFFAIRS

THIS DUPLICATE WILL BE RETURNED TO YOU

Standard Form No. 1152
Form prescribed by
Comptroller General, U. S.
October 23, 1950
(Gen. Reg. No. 104, Supp. No. 1)

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

UNPAID COMPENSATION OF
DECEASED CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EMPLOYEE:

NAME— (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
RICHARDSON	Jacques	Gabriel	Jan 20 1924

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED

(Department or agency) (Bureau) (Division)

I, the employee identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any UNPAID COMPENSATION *due and payable under existing law after my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary relates solely to Unpaid Compensation as defined in section 2 of the act of August 3, 1950, Public Law 636, and in nowise will affect the disposition of any benefit which may become payable under the Retirement Act applicable to my Government service. I further understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, unless or until canceled by me in writing, so long as I am continuously employed in the above department or agency.*

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES:

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Pamela A. Richardson	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	Dau	One half
Michelle D. Richardson	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	Dau	One half

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change any designation of beneficiary at any time in the manner and form prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States, and without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

January 12 1972
(Date of execution—month, day, year)

(Signature of employee)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE:

(Signature of witness) 13219 [illegible] (Number and street) [illegible] Md (City, zone number, and State)

(Signature of witness) (Number and street) (City, zone number, and State)

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYEE

Jacques G. Richardson
c/o Mrs [illegible]. G. Driscoll
722 South Royal Street
Alexandria VA 22314

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING DATA OF EMPLOYING AGENCY

[illegible]

(Indicate date and by whom received)

DELIVER BOTH COPIES TO THE PROPER OFFICER OF YOUR AGENCY—DUPLICATE WILL BE NOTED AND RETURNED

16—62919-1

DUPLICATE

Standard Form No. 54
January 1968
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 990-1
54-106

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INSURED:

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)

PLACE AN "X" IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW TO SHOW WHETHER YOU ARE:

☐ — AN EMPLOYEE ☐ — RETIRED, OR AN APPLICANT FOR RETIREMENT ☐ — RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION BENEFITS OR AN APPLICANT FOR SUCH BENEFITS

IF YOU ARE RETIRED OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION GIVE YOUR "CSA," "CSI," "A," or "X" NUMBER

(CSA, CSI, A, or X number)

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH PRESENTLY EMPLOYED (If retired, former department or agency):

(Department or agency) (Bureau) (Division) (Location—City, State, and ZIP Code)

I, the individual identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any amount of LIFE INSURANCE and ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE due and payable at my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, with respect to any amount payable, unless or until canceled by me in writing, or until such time as it is automatically canceled (see regulation "f" on reverse side of duplicate copy).

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES (SEE EXAMPLES OF DESIGNATIONS):

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address (including ZIP Code) of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary

For each type of insurance (regular and optional): (1) I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. (2) I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change this Designation of Beneficiary at any time without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

(Date of execution—month, day, year) (Signature of insured)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE (*A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary*):

Richard [illegible] 13219 [illegible] Rockville, Md.
(Signature of witness) (Number and street) (City, State, and ZIP Code)

(Signature of witness) (Number and street) (City, State, and ZIP Code)

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS (including ZIP Code) OF INSURED

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING AGENCY

[illegible]

(Indicate date and by whom received)

SEE REVERSE SIDE OF DUPLICATE COPY FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON WHERE TO FILE THESE FORMS.
DO NOT FILE WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE.

DUPLICATE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, European Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT
ADMIN/Personnel
[redacted] - Change of Beneficiary Forms 4A

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Richardson, Jacques

Forwarded herewith and under separate cover are change of beneficiary forms completed [redacted] Since [redacted] will be at Headquarters during home leave towards the end of February, it is suggested that he be contacted during his TDY if additional information is required.

Carolyn A. TANZOLA

Attachments:
1. Flight & Accident Plan, h/w [illegible]
2. SF-2808, U/S/C via TNP
3. SF-54, U/S/C via TNP
4. SF-1152, U/S/C via TNP

CABLE BOARD
24 FEB

Distribution:
3-Chief, Eur-Div w/att #1-h/w; #2,3,4-usc-tnp

Dick

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
GROUP 1	OFPT-17469	10 February 1972
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

52 74-57

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (middle) Richardson [redacted]

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) 20 Jan 1924

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

[redacted]

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance	☒ (A)	**ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE** I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.
Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance	☐ (B)	**DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE** I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.
Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance	☐ (C)	**WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE** I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print) Richardson, Jacquie [redacted]

DATE 1 March 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

MAR 19 3 47 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1963
(For use only until April 14, 1966)

6 52 56 74-57

SECRET

SECRET

31 July 1962
Date

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT [illegible] AWARE OF THE PROVISIONS OF REGULATION [illegible] FEBRUARY 1959 CONCERNING THE PERSONAL CO[illegible] OF [illegible] EMPLOYEES OVERSEAS.

[redacted]
Signature

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 17 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ______ # ______

ACTION UNIT C/EUR 2

INFO FILE, VR c/WOCHD 2 c/CCS 2 D/OP D/SECUR 4

ACTION NO 071

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TRB

SECRET 011654Z JUN 72 CITE PARIS 28959 (RILANDER ACTING)

1 JUN IN 625469

DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN PERS TOPSY WODEEP WOGAME

REF: DIRECTOR 271979

1. APPRECIATE REF ACTION WHICH WILL HELP AVOID ANY SECURITY PROBLEM FOR CASASIN. RE PARA TWO REF THERE IS NO CHANCE THAT UNCAIRD WILL QUERY FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER DIRECTLY. UNCAIRD CONDUCTS NO APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS ITSELF. SECURITY CLEARANCE FOR AMERICAN APPLICANTS IS U.S. GOVT, NOT UNCAIRD, REQUIREMENT. THEREFORE, BELIEVE UNNECESSARY TO TAKE ANY FURTHER ACTION TO BACKSTOP PRIOR EMPLOYMENT. ONLY REQUIREMENT NOW IS FOR ROUTING REPORT FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INDICATING FAVORABLE SECURITY DETERMINATION FOR [redacted] Richardson, Jacques

2. NO FILE. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

[illegible]

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) [redacted]	DATE (from item S-2) 3 Feb. 1969	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) David Murphy	DATE (from item S-3) 3 Feb. 1969
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 20 February 1969	DISPATCH NUMBER: TM-798947	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 20 I 1924	2. SERVICE DESIGN CS	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE S&T project manager, Area Ops Off, GS 15	4. STATION OR BASE Paris	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER LPCVER

6A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 5 Sep 1967	6B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE Please see 11B	6C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ Summer 1970	6D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE o/a 15 August 1970

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

3: (at that time) 42, 19 and 16

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

My younger daughter should graduate from high school in Europe in June, 1970. Because she should not be transferred at that critical scholastic juncture, I would like to remain in the field another nine months to see her through her senior year.

In my next assignment, I would like to use my fluent French from time to time, if possible.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

- I planned, established and operated a long-range S&T spotting-assessment activity against sensitive targets, and a shorter-range similar local activity in an adverse political climate.
- I planned, developed and exploited an adapted non-official cover to mask the operational activity, integrated into the further-ranging overall activities of a major Station.
- I managed the non-official cover activity as a viable professional/commercial activity, including many business and production aspects, as well as the local handling of the firm's [unwitting] personnel.
- I assisted other Stations and Bases, at their request, in spotting-assessment activities, in local search and surveillance activities, and in recruitment.
- As part of my original non-official cover withered because of a corporate merger, I developed independently continuing cover to serve operational access needs as well as those of status cover.

10. TRAINING DESIRED: INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

I would like to take (a) the seniormost management course offered by or through the Organization as well as (b) a review course of activities within the CS and the Organization as a whole. In addition, I would also like to (c) audit, at least, the S&T course, if that is still being offered.

If (a) is possible through a civil school away from Headquarters, I would have no objection to the displacement involved.

(4)

FORM 5-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

First choice: to manage a large-scale non-official cover project in another French-speaking, technically advanced area (such as metropolitan Geneva or Brussels).
Second choice: chief of station or base (cover official or non-official) in an appropriate area.
Third choice: to be assigned to Staff training, preferably training (a) senior unit or project managers or (b) JOTs.
Fourth choice: to be assigned to Staff personnel work -- above the Division level -- where new personnel are screened, tested and evaluated, then assigned.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 *(for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice)* IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

[1] EXTEND TOUR nine MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO o/a 15 June 1970 (DATE)

[4] BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Geneva 2ND CHOICE Brussels 3RD CHOICE [illegible]

[3] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION, with different responsibilities.

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

We are anxious to have this employee remain in his present assignment until 1970. You will note his first choice in para 11-A, to manage a large scale non-official cover project. It is possible we will have such a requirement here by 1970, but cannot yet be definite. If this develops positively, we will discuss with the employee.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

EUR Division recommends that [redacted] request for an extension of his current tour until June 1970 be approved.

DATE 3/11/69 TITLE C/E/PERS SIGNATURE Willford C. Taylor

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT: Extended to June 1970

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. OFPS-11268 DATED: 11 July 69

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: Charles B. [illegible] (SIGNATURE) DATE: 7/16/69

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true) [redacted]	DATE (from item 5.1) 9 Dec 1963	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) James Flint	DATE (from item 5.2) 27 Dec 1963
NAME [redacted] OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:			DATE

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	2. GRADE GS-15	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE Operations Officer, GS-15	7a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR 10 September 1962
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known)	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Paris		7b. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD September 1965
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7c. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

Staff agent assigned to a major overseas station, exploiting the cover provided by a major firm of technical periodical publishers. I take my instructions from a section chief within the station, and report in writing on the progress of my cover development and its operational exploitation.

For operational reasons, I develop and assess operational leads in the FI, CI and CA areas, principally against denied area targets. I also handle local investigations and such cases as the station determines will fit into my cover, or which I can otherwise handle in alias. I travel to other field stations to handle such tasks as they request or Hq directs. I handle all cover tasks as they appear.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

I would like to continue to serve essentially in the same ~~x~~capacity as described above, although I would like eventually to add more supervisory and managerial functions to my responsibilities. I would like to expand the operating base provided by the cover organization by taking ~~one~~ several journeymen case officers to work with me against both denied area and host country targets, and to make the cover facility and the access it provides of more versatile use to both the station and to KUDOVE as a whole.

My second choice would be to return to Hq, and use the knowledge and experience I have gained in my present job to (1) select staff personnel who will be placed in non-official cover, (2) select the cover mechanisms propmer, (3) train our personnel for the proper discharge of their total responsibilities while serving under such cover.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

The completion of work toward a master's or doctor's degree in the physical or life sciences, or in the management/administration of the sciences and their personnel.

FORM 3-53 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT *(continued)*

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 *(for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice)* IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION , after a one-year extension of my present tour

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:
1ST. CHOICE CTR 2ND. CHOICE Cover Group 3RD. CHOICE Office/Personnel

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:
1ST. CHOICE Geneva 2ND. CHOICE Brussels 3RD. CHOICE New Zealand/Canada

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS? INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 25

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife, will be 37 in 1965; two daughters, 15 and 12 in 1965

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Next post should have high school facilities teaching in French or in English.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Chief, External concurs in subject's wish for one year extension and return for second tour after home leave in the fall of 1965. However, subject's wish as expressed in 9.A. of having case officers working under him is not feasible at this time.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Recommend Home Leave and return for another tour.

SR Concurs. A. B 2-20-64

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER DATE 6 February 1964	SIGNATURE G K Mogannam (Ed) G.K.Mogannam

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. OFPS-7995 CABLE NO.
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME Dwight M. Collins	20. SIGNATURE
21. TITLE Secretary, CS Agent Panel	22. DATE 26 February 1964

23. COMMENTS

Approved extension of present tour to September 1965, followed by home leave, and then second tour.

SECRET

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Use R 20-10.2 and HR 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: Ruth W. Paul X6356

DIVISION: SR

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: For contract info call Ev Johnson X5965

DATE: 9 July 1962

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE [redacted]

2A. PROJECT: NA

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Paris, France

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 3234-4008-1000

3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☒ CF

4. SLOT NO.: 240

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: James M. Kennicott (P) John F. Reynolds John R. Williams, John F. Martin (A)

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.) Staff Employee since 1949

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): SI

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: ☐ OBTAINED ☒ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.) [redacted]

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 38

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): January 20, 1924

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Alexandria, Virginia

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Alexandria, Virginia

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:

Three - Wife, age 34
Daughter, age 8
Daughter, Age 11

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: NA

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U. S. Army

24. RANK OR GRADE:

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO NA

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: Pay entitlements equating to GS-14 (step 6) including premium pay $13,570

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL:

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING: COVER ☒ YES ☐ NO; CIA ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS / 32. POST: In accordance with regulations

33. OTHER

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife, U. S. Citizen, age 34, DOB 19 June 1928
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 8, DOB 5 September 1953
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 11, DOB September 1950

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☒ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: As authorized

43. ENTERTAINMENT: As authorized

44. OTHER: As authorized

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☐ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER Ruth Paul X6356	DIVISION SR
TELEPHONE EXTENSION For contract info	DATE 9 July 1962

SECTION VIII OTHER BENEFITS call Ev Johnson X5923

46. BENEFITS *(See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)*

All Staff Employee benefits

SECTION IX COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check)	☐ PROPOSED	48. TYPE (Check)	☐ PROPRIETARY	☐ CULTURAL	XX COMMERCIAL	☐ TOURIST
	XX ESTABLISHED		☐ SUBSIDIZED	☐ EDUCATIONAL	☐ MILITARY	☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)*

☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI TERM

51. DURATION						52. EFFECTIVE DATE	53. RENEWABLE
	DAYS		MONTHS		YEARS		XXXX ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(CI, FI, PP, other)*

FI and CA

SECTION XIII DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Handling and supervision of field agents already recruited.
Spotting, assessment and development of agent candidates or projects.
Recruitment of agent candidates outsideFrance when necessary.
Clandestine support of own and other station operations.

SECTION XIV QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Photographic equipment salesman
Newspaper assistant XXXXX editor
Assistant to planning division of housing authority of a major city
Operations Officer for past 12 years

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐ GRADE SCHOOL	☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE			
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE				
☐ COLLEGE *(No degree)*	X COLLEGE DEGREE	☐ POST GRADUATE	☐ MA	☐ PHD	

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
French		X			X			X	
Japanese		X				X		X	
Russian	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	X

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Canada, Japan, Western Europe thru residence, study and travel

SECTION XV EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Newspaper assistant editor - $2,100
Assistant to planning division of housing authority $3,100

SECTION XVI ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERAT.	DATE	TYPED NAM

SECRET

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CSB

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 - Jacques G. RICHARDSON

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

1. The SR Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo (FJTT-1950, attached) recommend the promotion of Jacques G. Richardson to GS-15.

2. Mr. Richardson was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 17 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior SR officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency.

3. The very facts of Mr. Richardson's youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. Most careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. Richardson deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level.

Charles Katek

CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addr

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

TO
Chief, SR

INFORMATION ADDRESSEE
Chief, FE

FROM
Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/ADMINISTRATIVE 2
Promotion of [redacted]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
FJTT-1950

DATE

REFERENCE(S)
FJTW-11531 (RYBAT), dated 11 October 1957
ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2

Richardson - 1
Baker - 2
Maury - 3
Nelson - 4

1. In line with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on [redacted] under cover of FJTT-0601 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as [redacted] was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assured 2 that in doing so he would also discuss with [redacted] [redacted]s promotion, which both he and [redacted] felt was to be strongly recommended. 4

2. 3 [redacted] was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss 2 [redacted]s promotion with [redacted]. 3 In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending 2 [redacted] for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0601 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress.

4
[redacted]

20 November 1958

Distribution:
2 - Chief, SR
2 - Chief, FE

Pers/5/Pers
✓ Pers

☐ CONTINUED →

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FORM NO. 53 TEST
1 SEP 56

CLASSIFICATION

(40)

COPY
Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360 18 June 1957

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : Chief, Soviet Branch

SUBJECT: [redacted] - Recommendation for Promotion
Jacques RICHARDSON

1. [redacted] has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of [redacted] as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

2. [redacted] operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organization as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, [redacted] has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations, [redacted] has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider [redacted] to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. [redacted] is not without his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the

SECRET

best reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relations but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

4. In sum, [redacted] qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

Edward MARELIUS [redacted]

SECRET

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CSB

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 - Jacques G. RICHARDSON

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

1. The SR Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo ([illegible], attached) recommend the promotion of Jacques G. Richardson to GS-15.

2. Mr. Richardson was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 17 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior SR officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency.

3. The very facts of Mr. Richardson's youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. Most careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. Richardson deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level.

CHARLES [illegible]
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addee

C O P Y

FJTT-1950

25 November 1958

TO: Chief, SR

FROM: Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Promotion of Jacques G. RICHARDSON

REFERENCE: FJTW-11531 (RYBAT) dated 11 Oct 1957

1. In line with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on RICHARDSON under cover of FJTT-0801 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as Baker was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assumed that in doing so he would also discuss with Maury RICHARDSON's promotion, which both he and Nelson felt was to be strongly recommended.

2. Baker was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss RICHARDSON's promotion with Maury. In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending RICHARDSON for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0801 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress.

WILLIAM E. NELSON

COPY
Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360

18 June 1957

TO: Chief of Station

FROM: Chief, Soviet Branch

SUBJECT: Jacques RICHARDSON - Recommendation for Promotion

1. Jacques Richardson has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of Richardson as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

2. Richardson's operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organisation as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, Richardson has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations, Richardson has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider Richardson to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. Richardson is not without his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the best reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relationships but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

5. In sum, Richardson's qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

EDWARD MARELIUS

1 June 1959

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT : Nominations for Promotion to GS-15

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 14 May 1958 from Secretary, CS Career Service Board

1. After reviewing GS-14 employees assigned to the SR Division, I wish to again recommend the promotion of Jacques Richardson, Chief, Soviet Branch, Tokyo to GS-15. I concur also in the attached recommendation for the promotion of Paul Haines prepared by the Chief of Base, Berlin.

2. The Chief of Station, Tokyo and I recommended Mr. Richardson's promotion in December 1958. This earlier recommendation presented the personal qualities of Mr. Richardson. I wish simply to point out at this time that since early 1954, Mr. Richardson has more than fully discharged responsibilities at the GS-15 level. I believe that it is definitely time to elevate him to the level at which he has been performing more than satisfactorily for over 5½ years.

Charles Katek

CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 Addressee w/att

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R3

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*)
RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

2. DATE OF BIRTH
20 January 1924

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
None CIA	49	11	20				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
United States Army	43	Feb	15	48	Oct	27	Yes; honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
5	8	12

12. TOTAL SERVICE
5 8 12

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

1 August 57
(DATE)

Jacques G. Richardson
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ (MONTH) 1952 at ______ (CITY) ______ (STATE)

SEAL

______

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

(OVER)

16—66480-2

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

Jacques G. Richardson
(Employee)
Jacques G. Richardson

WITNESS: Lorene E. Norbeck
Office of Personnel
Lorene E. Norbeck

Date: 9 August 1957

FORM NO. 911a REPLACES FORM NO. 55-104 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 56

CONFIDENTIAL

12-1

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON (First) Jacques (Middle) G.

2. THIS DATE 28 Dec 54

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME:

☒ WAR AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA)
☒ MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA
☒ AIR TRIP INSURANCE
☒ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance):

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FOLLOWING INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
GEHA - Health		✓			
Fed. Emp. Ins.		✓			

J.G. Richardson
SIGNATURE

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

SIGNATURE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY:

CPB: RWSloan
SIGNATURE

I&CB:
SIGNATURE

8. REMARKS:

These forms were returned to me 17 Feb 55 in envelope. The forms have not been signed by the Insurance office indicating that individual did not report to that office. RWS

Per phone info from insurance office 21 Feb 55 P/R deductions are to start eff. 26 Feb 55 RWS

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to T&RB for incorr ation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPB fil

(4)

FORM NO. 37-190
1 MAR 54

1-3688

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

G2-AP

3 DEC 1954

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: Director of Central Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: Deputy Director of Plans

Jacques G. Richardson

1. I have received a letter from Major General Boniface Campbell, Commanding General, Army Intelligence Center, expressing appreciation for a presentation by Mr. [redacted] at Fort Holabird in October 1954. Mr. [redacted] also arranged for presentations by two other speakers at the Army Intelligence Center. A copy of General Campbell's letter is attached.

2. The remarks contained in this letter are a source of real satisfaction to me, and I take this opportunity to add my appreciation to that expressed by General Campbell.

Arthur G. Trudeau

ARTHUR G. T
Major G
A. C. of

1 Incl
Cy ltr fr Gen
Campbell dtd
12 Nov 54

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1948)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 44, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA (Department or agency) OPC (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, Jacques Gabriel Richardson, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. SF-57, dated ______________, 19____, filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

Jacques Gabriel Richardson
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 13th day of July, A. D. 19 50,

at Washington, (City) D. C. (State)

Frank G. [illegible]
(Signature of officer)

[SEAL]

____
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—65100-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*): 8601 Old Bladensburg Rd Silver Spring Md.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*): Baltimore, Md.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY	(B) RELATIONSHIP	(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE	(D) TELEPHONE NO.
HARRIETTE D. RICHARDSON	WIFE	8601 Old Bladensburg Rd-SS-Md.	SL-3783

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—[illegible]

ESPIONAGE

1. Unlawfully obtaining or permitting to be obtained information affecting national defense.—That (a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defence, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, coaling station, fort, battery, torpedo station dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, or other place connected with the national defense, owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any of its officers or agents, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, or stored, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place within the meaning of section 6 of this title; or (b) whoever for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts, or induces or aids another to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or (c) whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this title; or (d) whoever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being intrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal, book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, willfully communicates or transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or (e) whoever, being intrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, or information, relating to the national defense, through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years and may,

in the discretion of the court, be fined not more than $10,000. (Sec. 1, Title I, act 15 June 1917 (40 Stat. 217), as amended by sec. 1, act 28 March 1940 (54 Stat. 79; 50 U.S.C. 31)).

2. Unlawfully disclosing information affecting national defense.—(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to, or aids or induces another to, communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years: Provided, That whoever shall violate the provisions of subsection (a) of this section in time of war shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years; and (b) whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, shall collect, record, publish, or communicate, or attempt to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years. (Sec. 2, act 15 June 1917 (40 Stat. 218; 50 U.S.C. 32)).

I have read and understand the provisions of the above.

[redacted]

Witness:

Joseph S. Riff

21 November 1949

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1947)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA	OPC	WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Department or agency)	(Bureau or division)	(Place of employment)

I, [redacted], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. SF-57, dated 1 October, 19 48, filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

[redacted]

Subscribed and sworn before me this 21st day of November, A. D. 19 49,

at Washington, (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

Chief [illegible]
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—64100-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS *(street and number, city and State)*

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH *(city or town and State or country)*

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY	(B) RELATIONSHIP	(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE	(D) TELEPHONE NO.
HARRIETTE D. [redacted]	WIFE	7[illegible] S. LOYAL ST., ALEXANDRIA, VA.	TE 8506

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS *(Give street number, if any)*	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED *(Check one)*	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO	ITEM NO.	10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?				NONE
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*				
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*				
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*				
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*				

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1604 Curie

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

56102 QAB

THIS DATE: 7 August 1957 NOV

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*): RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State*):
Box 888 APO 500
San Francisco, California

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State*):
722 South Royal Street
Alexandria, Virginia

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Tokyo 2636-3928

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Virginia

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (*Last-First-Middle*) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: DRISCOLL, Theodore Gotzian

2. RELATIONSHIP: Father-in-law

3. HOME ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*): 722 South Royal Street, Alexandria, Virginia

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: Council of State Governments, 1025 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C.

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: TEmple 6-8506

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: EXecutive 3-6715

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION:

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (*Spouse, Mother, Father*) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Mr Henri A Richardson (Brother), 3039 Macomb Street NW, Washington, D.C. (EM-3-6093)

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ▷ ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS:

SPOUSE: *If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.*

3. NAME (*First*) (*Middle*) (*Maiden*) (*Last*)

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE:

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (*City, State, Country*):

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (*No., Street, City, State, Country*):

CODED
18 DEC 1957

7. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH:

9. CAUSE OF DEATH:

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (*Give last address, if deceased*):

11. DATE OF BIRTH:

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (*City, State, Country*):

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY:

14. PLACE OF ENTRY:

15. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*):

16. DATE ACQUIRED:

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (*City, State, Country*):

18. OCCUPATION:

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (*Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers*):

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, State, Country*):

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From and To - by month and year)

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Mme Henry Bit (pronounced Bee)
2. RELATIONSHIP: Mother's aunt
3. AGE: 65?
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: 27, avenue Edith Cavell, Nice, Alpes Maritimes, France
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country): France
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: About 3 times a year, by mail
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: May 1957

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): M. Felix Breton
2. RELATIONSHIP: Mother's 2d cousin
3. AGE: 70?
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: 13, rue Greneta, Paris III^{e}, France
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country): France
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: Once a year, by mail
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: Christmas, 1956

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

I have met each of the above relatives only once in my life.

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.

Annual dividends on modest investments in stocks, credit union, and cooperative.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Clarendon Trust Company,	Arlington 10, Virhinia

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
USA

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE:
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS
☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
XX GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐ MASTER'S DEGREE
☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Graduate School, Georgetown University	Int'l	Rel'ns	Jun 51	May 52	N o	n e	24 hours

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

[redacted] SECRET [redacted]
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
Am an experienced intelligence briefer.

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.
Member, British Interplanetary Society, London.
Associate member, American Astronautical Association, New York.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) Nov 1949 - Oct 1951
2. GRADE 7 - 11
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OPC/FE/3 - Desk intelligence officer
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION One to three
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Soviet desk officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Prepared, conjointly with OSO/FDS/FE, operational plans against Soviet Far Eastern targets.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) Oct 1951 - Dec 1953
2. GRADE 12- 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT - DDP/SR/5; deputy chief, then chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION up to 23
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Branch deputy chief, then Branch chief
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Supervised and directed SR plans and projects targeted against Soviet Far East.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) Jan 1954 - Dec 1954
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR/COPS/DR - Chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 18
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of special defector reception project
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Direct and supervise the reception, debriefing, intelligence exploitation, resettlement and legalization of two high level Soviet intelligence officers granted political asylum in the USA.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) Feb 1955 - Mar 1956
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR - NA/SR Base, Tokyo - Chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 22
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Base
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Direct and supervise field plans and projects based in Japan and Okinawa, targeted against Soviet Far Eastern targets.

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) Mar 1956 - Jun 1957
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR - Tokyo Station Soviet Branch Deputy Chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 28
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy chief of branch
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Assist Branch Chief in development and management of all Japan and Okinawa-based operations against USSR and Soviet Embassy, Tokyo.

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN *(Including stepchildren and adopted children)* WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 2

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS *(Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.)* WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 3

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Harriette D. Richardson	Wife	1928		X	USA	Same as mine
Pamela A. Richardson	Daughter	1950		X	"	"
Michelle D. Richardson	"	1953		X	"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED
7 August 1956

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

37833

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Miss~~ Mr. Mrs. JACQUES (First) GABRIEL (Middle) RICHARDSON (Last)

Telephone: Office: NOT Ext. APPLICABLE Home: 40-7983

PRESENT ADDRESS 2908, ST. PAUL (St. & No.) ST - BALTIMORE (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 2908 ST. PAUL (St. & No.) ST - BALTIMORE (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

B. NICKNAME JACK WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? NONE

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NOT APPLICABLE

HOW LONG? IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

(Where?) (By Whom Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 20 JAN 1924 PLACE OF BIRTH BALTIMORE (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE?

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # NOT APPLICABLE ISSUED (Date) BY (Court)

AT (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? NO (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? TO ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NOT APPLICABLE

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS

FORM NO. 30-1
APR 1949

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? N/A

PORT OF ENTRY? ______ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ______

LAST U.S. VISA ______
Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 24 SEX MALE HEIGHT 5'9½" WEIGHT 140

EYES BROWN HAIR BROWN COMPLEXION DARK SCARS FOREHEAD

BUILD SLENDER OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES NONE

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE YES MARRIED ______ DIVORCED ______ WIDOWED ______

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR SEPARATION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT ______

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE — INCLUDE ANNULMENTS — USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Maiden Last

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ______

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE ______
St. & No. City State Country

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ______ TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______
Date Date

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

______

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME NOT APPLICABLE RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME JOHN (First) BENJAMIN (Middle) RICHARDSON (Last)
LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______
PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS 2906 ST. PAUL ST., BALTIMORE-18-MD-USA (St. & No. City State Country)
DATE OF BIRTH 21 NOV 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH CENTREVILLE, MARYLAND, USA (City State Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A
CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? ______ City State Country
OCCUPATION AUTO DEALER LAST EMPLOYER EAST END AUTO CO- BALTIMORE
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 6505 PULASKI HWY, BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No. City State Country)
MILITARY SERVICE FROM 1915 (Date) TO 1919 (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ARMY AVIATION
COUNTRY USA, GT. BRITAIN DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.
NONE

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ADRIENNE (First) MARGUERITE (Middle) BIT (Last) RICHARDSON
LIVING OR DECEASED DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE 5 DEC 1947 CAUSE CANCER
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 3103 MILFORD AV, BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No. City State Country)
DATE OF BIRTH 14 AUG 1900 PLACE OF BIRTH ROMANS, DRÔME, FRANCE
CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? 1921 (?) WHERE? BALTO, MD, USA (City State Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOV. 1919 - NEW YORK

OCCUPATION MILLINERY BUYER LAST EMPLOYER EMPORIUM WORLD MILL'Y CO.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS UNKNOWN, CHICAGO, ILL, USA
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NONE TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

NONE

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

DL
73452

1. FULL NAME HENRI ADRIEN RICHARDSON AGE 23
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS 5724 SIMMONS AV, BALTIMORE, MD, USA - USA
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

2. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

3. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

4. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

5. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______ (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______ (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME HENRY BIT RELATIONSHIP GREAT-UNCLE AGE 65(?)
CITIZENSHIP FRENCH ADDRESS 27 RUE EDITH CAVELL, NICE, FRANCE (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME CHARLES GRANDGERARD RELATIONSHIP SECOND COUSIN AGE 55(?)
CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS % OTIS ELEVATORS, BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11 RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME CMDR. ROBT LEE CLARK RELATIONSHIP COUSIN AGE 30
CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS N.O.B., NORFOLK, VIRGINIA (St. & No.) (City) (State)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No.) (City) (State)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No.) (City) (State)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

SEC. 12. EDUCATION DS #63

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL McDONOGH SCH. ADDRESS BALTIMORE, MD, USA PIKESVILLE, MD, USA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1930-34-37 GRADUATE? YES

HIGH SCHOOL LOYOLA HIGH, MONTREAL, ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1937-1940 GRADUATE? YES

COLLEGE SIR GEO WILLIAMS COLL. ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1940-1942 DEGREE NONE

COLLEGE U OF MICHIGAN ADDRESS ANN ARBOR, MICH, USA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1945 (see P13) DEGREE B.A.

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

USA (Country) ARMY (Service) 1/LT (Rank) FEB 1943-OCT 1945 (Dates of Service)

GHQ FEC-TOKYO, JAPAN (Last Station) 0-937200 (Serial No) HONORABLE (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: WHILE ENLISTED, SERIAL WAS 31316266

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 5-A ADDRESS HARTFORD, CONN.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

SEC. 14. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

FROM 15 AUG 45 TO 30 SEP 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO, USA (St. & No, City, State, Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR KURT SPAULDING

(MILITARY) TITLE OF JOB LIAISON OFFICER SALARY $ 251 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; REPORTS COORDINATOR + WRITER

REASONS FOR LEAVING RETURN TO USA FOR SEPARATION FROM ARMY.

FROM 1 APR 45 TO 15 AUG 45

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

ADDRESS CCD · GHQ · FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, USA
St. & No. City State Country

~~(MILITARY)~~

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR VINCENT MERCOLA

TITLE OF JOB DEPUTY CHIEF, NEWS AGENCY SALARY $ 251 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES Asst chief of principal Allied press censorship bureau in Japan.

REASONS FOR LEAVING CENSORSHIP SECTION ELIMINATED

FROM 1 NOV 46 TO 31 MAR 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

ADDRESS CCD · GHQ · FEC APO 309 - POSTMASTER - SAN FRANCISCO, USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY)

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR ROBT. SPAULDING

TITLE OF JOB CHIEF, CENSORSHIP SUB-STA SALARY $ 221 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES Operated field censorship surveillance detachment

REASONS FOR LEAVING TRANSFERRED TO HQ IN TOKYO

FROM 15 MAR 46 TO 15 AUG 46

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

ADDRESS ARMY LANGUAGE SCHOOL {FT. SNELLING, MINN, USA / PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CAL, USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY)

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL AFFAIRS TNG NAME OF SUPERVISOR YUTAKA MUNAKATA

TITLE OF JOB RESEARCH EDITOR SALARY $ ARMY PER SGT.

YOUR DUTIES REVISED ARMY MANUALS, PREPARED CIVIL AFFAIRS COURSES.

REASONS FOR LEAVING COMMISSIONED; TRANSFERRED TO JAPAN

FROM NOV 1941 TO JUL 1947

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY T. EATON CO, LTD.

ADDRESS ST. CATHERINE ST, MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS DEPT. STORE NAME OF SUPERVISOR E.T. CRAYDON

TITLE OF JOB PHOTOGRAPHIC SALESMAN SALARY $ 30 PER WEEK

YOUR DUTIES SOLD CAMERAS AND PHOTO SUPPLIES

REASONS FOR LEAVING WAS PART-TIME JOB ACCEPTED WHILE IN COLLEGE

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NOT APPLICABLE

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	CAPT. GORDON WALLACE	BUS. ADD.	ALS-PRESIDIO/	MONTEREY	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	2160 COOLEY,	PALO ALTO	CAL.
2.	MR. GEORGE MOORE	BUS. ADD.	U/CALIFORNIA	BERKELEY,	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	571 NORTH,	OAKLAND,	CAL.
3.	MR. JOHN CHEATHAM	BUS. ADD.	117 E. PATRICK	FREDERICK,	MD.
		RES. ADD.	101 E. CHURCH	FREDERICK,	MD.
4.	MR. T. G. DRISCOLL	BUS. ADD.	1151 K ST. NW	WASH.	DC.
		RES. ADD.	705 S. ROYAL	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
5.	MR. R.H. KUNZMAN	BUS. ADD.	U.P. BUREAU	DES MOINES	IOWA
		RES. ADD.		UNK	

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	MR. GEORGE FINNEY	BUS. ADD.	DEPT/AF	WASHINGTON	DC.
		RES. ADD.	2310 VALLEY DR.	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
2.	DR. MORRIS CRANE	BUS. ADD.	BALTIMORE AV	PHILADELPHIA	PA.
		RES. ADD.	"	"	"
3.	MR. BRADFORD COOLIDGE	BUS. ADD.	DEPT/STATE	WASHINGTON	DC
		RES. ADD.			
4.	MISS FLORENCE [illegible]	BUS. ADD.		NONE	
		RES. ADD.	11 ARNOLDALE	WETHERSFIELD,	CONN.
5.	MR. ANTHONY SAX	BUS. ADD.		UNK	
		RES. ADD.	303 E. 21th	BALTIMORE,	MD.

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. MR. FRANK DUCHARME	BUS. ADD.	TRAVELERS' INS.	HARTFORD,	CONN.
	RES. ADD.	26 LILLEY	W. HARTFORD,	CONN.
2. MR. JAMES KNOX	BUS. ADD.	G. FOX CO.	HARTFORD,	CONN.
	RES. ADD.		UNK	
3. MRS. LOUIS FRANKLIN	BUS. ADD.	ALBERT STEIGER	HARTFORD,	CONN.
	RES. ADD.		UNK	

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS BALTIMORE NATIONAL BANK, HIGHLANDTOWN BRANCH, BALTIMORE, MD.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? NO GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

1. NAME LEE'S INC ADDRESS 3421 EASTERN AV, BALTIMORE, MD.
2. NAME MONTGOMERY WARD ADDRESS 24TH AV. OAKLAND 16, CAL.
3. NAME ADDRESS

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	St. No.	City	State	Country
1933	1937	3110 PRESSTMAN ST	BALTIMORE	MD	USA
1937	1939	4561 HARVARD AV	MONTREAL	QUE	CANADA
1939	1942	1461 MOUNTAIN ST	MONTREAL	QUE	CANADA
1942	1942	26 LILLEY RD	W. HARTFORD	CONN	USA
1942	1942	MILITARY SERVICE			
1948	PRESENT	2905 ST. PAUL ST	BALTIMORE,	MD,	USA

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

	FROM	TO	City or Section	Country	Purpose
A.	JUN 1927	SEP 1927	PARIS	FRANCE	VISIT
	JUL 1924	JUL 1924	NIAGARA PENINSULA	CANADA	VISIT
	SEP 1937	JUL 1942	MONTREAL	CANADA	RESIDENCE

FROM OCT 1944 TO JAN 1945 NORTHERN (City or Section) EUROPE (Country) WAR SERVICE (Purpose)

FROM SEP 1946 TO OCT 1948 TOKYO, SENDAI (City or Section) JAPAN (Country) MIL OCCUPATION (Purpose)

FROM ______ TO ______ ______ (City or Section) ______ (Country) ______ (Purpose)

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT—NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: UNKNOWN

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? NONE GIVE APPROXIMATE

DATES: ______

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: ______

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

✓ 1. AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE (MEMBER AT LARGE) (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: NOV 1945 - JAN 1948.

2. RESERVE OFFICERS ASS'N (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) WASHINGTON (City) DC (State) USA (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: OCT 1948 - PRESENT

3. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

4. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

5. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

6. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

7. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE JAPANESE SPEAK FLUENT READ FAIR WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE FRENCH SPEAK FLUENT READ FLUENT WRITE FLUENT

LANGUAGE ______ SPEAK ______ READ ______ WRITE ______

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

SWIMMING, SKIING, HORSEMANSHIP, FOOTBALL - GOOD.
BASEBALL, ICE HOCKEY, LACROSSE, VOLLEYBALL, BADMINTON - FAIR.
PHOTOGRAPHIC PROCESSES - STRONG AMATEUR INTEREST.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

HAVE AN ABILITY TO WRITE, EITHER REPORTORIAL OR EDITORIAL, WHICH MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR RESEARCH OR SPECIAL REPORTS WRITING.

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

NONE OTHER THAN DEPT OF ARMY FOR COMMISSION AS OFFICER.

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIV, WAR DEPT, + FBI CONDUCTED LOYALTY CHECK SOMETIME BETWEEN FEB 1947 AND JUN 1947.

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? NO

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: __________

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? YES IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? OCCASIONAL WINES AND LIQUOR

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME JOHN B. RICHARDSON RELATIONSHIP FATHER

ADDRESS 2908 ST. PAUL ST. (St. & No.) BALTIMORE (City) MD (State) USA (Country)

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

NO

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA (City and State) DATE 25 NOV 1948

Henriette C. Driscoll (Witness) Jacques G. Richardson (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

14. - I HAVE NEVER HELD A FULL-TIME CIVILIAN JOB, SINCE I ENTERED THE ARMY DIRECTLY FROM COLLEGE.

19. - I HAVE NEVER BOUGHT ANYTHING ON CREDIT. THEREFORE, I HAVE LISTED THREE CONCERNS WITH WHICH I HAVE TRANSACTED NORMAL BUSINESS.

12. - I ACQUIRED SUFFICIENT CREDITS FROM THE ARMY JAPANESE SCHOOL AT THE U OF MICHIGAN TO RECEIVE A B.A. DEGREE, IN ABSENTIA, WHILE STILL ON ACTIVE SERVICE.

FROM SEP 1942 TO DEC 1942 I COMPLETED ONE SEMESTER AT TRINITY COLLEGE, HARTFORD, CONN.

Jacques G. Richardson

Note: information contained herein is supplemental.

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions:
1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? ________ Yes or No

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ (Use No Initials) JACQUES (First) GABRIEL (Middle) RICHARDSON (Last)

Telephone: Office: VE-4810 Ext. 13 Home: ________

PRESENT ADDRESS ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country

PERMANENT ADDRESS ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country

B. NICKNAME ________ WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? ________

________ UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ________

HOW LONG? ________ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ________

________ Where? ________ By What Authority

C. DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________ City ________ State ________ Country

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP ________ Country BY BIRTH? ________ BY MARRIAGE? ________

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # ________ ISSUED ________ Date BY ________ Court

AT ________ City ________ State ________ Country

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? ________ Yes or No ________ Country

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ________ TO ________ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ________ Country

GIVE PARTICULARS ________

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ________ GIVE PARTICULARS:

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ________

PORT OF ENTRY? ________ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ________

LAST U.S. VISA ________
Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE ________ SEX ________ HEIGHT ________ WEIGHT ________

EYES ________ HAIR ________ COMPLEXION ________ SCARS ________

BUILD ________ OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ________

X SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE ________ MARRIED ✓ DIVORCED ________ WIDOWED ________

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ________

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE — INCLUDE ANNULMENTS — USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE HARRIETTE McCLURE DRISCOLL RICHARDSON
First Middle Maiden Last

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ALEXANDRIA, VA; 25 JUN 1949

~~HIS (OR~~ HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 705 S. ROYAL ST., ALEXANDRIA VA.
St. & No. City State Country

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 1619 DOOLITTLE RD., ESSEX, MD.
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 19 JUN 28 PLACE OF BIRTH MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? — WHERE? —
City State Country

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER —

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS —
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM — TO — BRANCH OF SERVICE —
Date Date

COUNTRY — DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN ________

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ______ TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

______

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
2. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
3. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
4. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
5. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

X SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME THEODORE (First) GOTZIAN (Middle) DRISCOLL (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 705 S. ROYAL ST, ALEXANDRIA, VA.
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 14 OCT 92 PLACE OF BIRTH ST. PAUL, MINN.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

______

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? — WHERE? —
City State Country

OCCUPATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR LAST EMPLOYER COUNCIL OF STATE GOVTS., 1737 "K" ST, NW, WASH DC.

X SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME HARRIETTE (First) BELL (Middle) CASWELL DRISCOLL (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 705 S. ROYAL ST, ALEXANDRIA, VA (St. & No. City State Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 13 APR 00 PLACE OF BIRTH MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

CITIZENSHIP — WHEN ACQUIRED? — WHERE? — (City State Country)

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER —

X SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME NONE, other than mine RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. City State Country)

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. City State Country)

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. City State Country)

X SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME NONE, other than mine RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. City State)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. City State)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. City State)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: __________

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? __________ IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? __________

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: __________

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME MRS. J. G. RICHARDSON RELATIONSHIP WIFE

ADDRESS 1619 DOOLITTLE ROAD, ESSEX, MD.

St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

X SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Baltimore, Maryland (City and State) DATE Oct 18 49

Sylvia F. Chaillou (Witness) Jacques G. Richardson (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

14. Since August 29, 1949, I have been employed as Administrative Assistant to the Director of Planning, Housing Authority of Baltimore City, at the salary range of $3,100 - $3,900.

MILITARY RECORD AND REPORT OF SEPARATION
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

RICHARDSON, JACQUES G. | 0 937 200 | 1ST LT | INF | ORC

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE * | 27 OCT 48 | SEPARATION CENTER, FORT LAWTON, WASHINGTON

2906 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET,
BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND

20 JAN 24 | BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

SEE 9

BROWN | BROWN | 5'10" | 145 | 0

X | X | X | STUDENT, COLLEGE X-02

X | 5 A | HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT | 1625 RICKENBACKER ROAD, ESSEX 21, MARYLAND

27 JUN 46 | (PRESS) CENSORSHIP OFFICER 9335

NONE

WW II VICTORY MEDAL; OCCUPATION, JAPAN

NONE

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE LANGUAGE SCHOOL, FT SNELLING, MINN. | 12 SEP 46 | JAPAN | 25 SEP 46

RR 1-1 | 9 OCT 48 | USA | 23 OCT 48

0 | 2 | 19 | 2 | 1 | 12 | 8 | 1 | 5

X | X | 31 OCT 48 | 30 NOV 48 | 6.50 | X



*SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
LAPEL BUTTON ISSUED

Jacques G. Richardson | ALVIN R BARNETT
CAPT USAF
Alvin R Barnett

Army of the United States

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that

JACQUES G. RICHARDSON 0 937 200 1ST LT
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

honorably served in active Federal Service in the Army of the United States from

27 JUN 46 *to* 27 OCT 48

Given at SEPARATION CENTER, FORT LAWTON, WASHINGTON

on the 27 *day of* OCTOBER *19*48

Thomas B Hammond
THOMAS B HAMMOND
MAJOR AGD

ENLISTED RECORD AND REPORT OF SEPARATION

HONORABLE DISCHARGE



MILITARY HISTORY

PAY DATA

Army of the United States

Honorable Discharge

This is to certify that

Army of the United States

is hereby Honorably Discharged from the military service of the United States of America.

This certificate is awarded as a testimonial of Honest and Faithful Service to this country.

Given at

Date

Copy Copy

STANDARD FORM 57--NOV. 1947
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

PLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOY NT

INSTRUCTIONS: In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: CIG

2. OPTION(S) (*if mentioned in examination announcement*)

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (*City and State*): As required.

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION

5. ~~Mr.~~ (*First name*) (*Middle*) (*Maiden, if any*) (*Last*): JACQUES GABRIEL RICHARDSON

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 1620 Rickenbacker Road, Mars Est.

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (*including postal zone*) AND STATE: Essex 21, Maryland

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (*State*): Maryland

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE

(B) HOME PHONE

9. DATE OF BIRTH (*month, day, year*): January 20,1924

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (*city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country*): Baltimore, Maryland

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 10 INCHES (B) WEIGHT: 145 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE: Second Lt.,16 July 1946

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON-APPOR.	MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED	ENTERED REGISTER
NOTATIONS:	APP. REVIEW. APPROVED:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 3,750 PER YEAR

You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED, FOR:

☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☒ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY:

☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:

☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES

☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS:

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(*a*) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(*b*) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (*month, year*) FROM TO PRESENT TIME	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (*if in Federal Service*)	SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING, $ PER PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (*city and State*)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (*firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division*)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (*e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.*)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

WAR DEPARTMENT

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

15. CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: Nov.1941 TO: Jul 1942
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Salesman*
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 25 PER Wk; FINAL $ 30 PER Wk
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Montreal, Quebec
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. Fred T. Claydon
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): T.Eaton Co. Ltd. Montreal
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Retail Department Store
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: None
REASON FOR LEAVING: Return to USA
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Salesman of all types photographic materials and equipment; demonstrator, all types black-and-white and color motion picture equipment.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: Oct. 1940 TO: Jun 1941
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Photographic technician*
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 20 PER Wk; FINAL $ 25 PER Wk
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Montreal, Quebec
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. Harry Jacoby
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Jacoby, Photographers, Crescent St, Montreal
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Portrait photographers
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: None
REASON FOR LEAVING: Desire of more interesting work.
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Darkroom apprentice, copier, equipment maintenance.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: TO:
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER; FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:
REASON FOR LEAVING:
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

*Please Note: The tw[illegible]ositions listed were part-time [illegible]bs only, while the applicant was a college student. I have never applied for, nor held, a full-time civilian position.

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)	NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)	KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU	REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES		LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
FROM	TO		
Jan.45	Dec.45	Ann Arbor, Michigan AIJLC, U. of Michigan	Japanese language, customs, sociology, how and why of Japan's history and economic aggression. Written Japanese. (Continued)

18. EDUCATION. (Circle highest grade completed):

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF:

☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED
High School of Montreal

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED
English, French, physics, history.

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED		DEGREES CONFERRED		SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
		FROM	TO	DAY	NIGHT	TITLE	DATE	
Sir Geo Williams College	Fren	Sep 40	May 42	2				66
Trinity College, Conn.	Fren	Sep 42	Dec 42	½				12
U. Michigan, Ann Arbor	Jap.	Jan 45	Dec 45	1		B.	Feb 47	45

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
French	15		
English	12		
Japanese	24		

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN-SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED	
		FROM	TO	DAY	NIGHT
USAFI	Journalism	Apr 47	Pres		

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR
Japanese		x		x				x	
French	x			x			x		

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR):

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES, (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

France: 3 mos, 1927; 3 mos. 1944
Canada: 5 yrs, 1937-1942 Japan 1 yr.

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

All cine equipt; teletypes; short-wave-receivers & transmitters.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ..... SHORTHAND .....

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

Public relations as interpreter in ETO and Japan. Censor and review-editor of Japanese press, radio and motion-picture fields.

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Col Kai E. Rasmussen	(Washington 25 DC) Diplomatic Sec, War Dept, GS	Mil Attache
2. Mr. Yutaka Munakata	Presido of Monterey, Academic Sec, MISLS, Calif.	Instructor
3. Lt. L.B. McNeill	1928 McKinley Ave, Honolulu, T.H.	CIC

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF, OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*	X	
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?		
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D)

DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
15 Feb 1943	Present
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	**SERIAL NO.** (*If none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).
Army	31316266; 0-937200

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		X
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19....

Agency: ....

Title: ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
33	Hernia, inguinal - repairable.		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT ....

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

JACQUES GABRIEL RICHARDSON

17.MILITARY TRAINING(continued)

Rating received at end of this training:Tec 4
Duty assignment or rating after this training:Assignment to MISLS.
Dates of duty assignment:Jan 1946 to Aug.1946

Second Special Service School attended: MISLS,Fort Snelling,Minn.
Location: Fort Snelling, 11, Minnesota
Dates Attended: Jan 1946 To:Aug.1946
Rating received at end of this training:Second Lieutenant
What were you taught in Second Special Service School? Order of battle, military terms of the Japanese armed forces.
Civil affairs, military administration of occupied areas, propaganda writing.
Duty assignment after this training: Student; translator: instructor.
What did you do during this duty assignment? Translated newspaper articles, ordinances, SCAP directives, etc. flown from Japan. Made instructor's guides for civil affairs courses.

SECRET

Date: 13 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Personnel Security Division/Office of Security

Richardson [illegible]

SUBJECT : [redacted] (P): Your Number 37833

1. In compliance with paragraph four (4) of your latest memorandum, subject as above, clearance to cover the following proposed change in Subject's status and/or use is hereby requested:

Ops Officer	Position Title	Ops Officer
GS-15	Grade	GS-15
DDP/SR Foreign Field Western European Area Paris, France	Orgn Designation	DDP/WE Paris Station External Ops Station
Paris, France	Headquarters	Paris, France

2. Changes other than specified above:

3. The proposed effective date of this change is: 13 October 1963.

Joseph B. Ragan
JOSEPH B. RAGAN
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Date 18 OCT 1963

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request

Chief, Personnel Security Division

SECRET

SECRET
(When filled in)

DATE: 31 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION : Staff Agents Branch

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Division

SUBJECT : [illegible] [redacted] #37833

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 24 July 1962 in which a covert security clearance was requested to permit Subject's use as a Staff Agent, GS-14, by DDP/SR in the capacity of Operations Officer at Paris, France.

2. This is to advise that a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

4. This clearance becomes invalid in the event that Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne

SECRET
(When filled in)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT - (Appendix I)

Listed below are names of organizations identi~~fied by~~ the Attorney General, under his responsibility pursuant to Executive Order 9835, dated 21 March 1947, to list the names of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which he, after appropriate investigation and determination, designates as Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Each applicant must review the following list of organizations for certification purposes, and signature on the last page.

Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
The American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee for National Unity
American Croatian Congress
American League Against War and Fascism
American League for Peace and Democracy, successor to American League Against War and Fascism and predecessor of American Peace Mobilization
American Patriots, Inc.
American Peace Mobilization
American Polish Labor Council
American Russian Institute of San Francisco
American Slav Congress
American Youth Congress
American Youth for Democracy
Armenian Progressive League of America
Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party
Black Dragon Society
California Labor School, Inc., 215 Market Street, San Francisco, California
Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent, also known as Central Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian Women
Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai)
Central Japanese Association of Southern California
The Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance (Deutsche-Amerikanische Einheitsfront)
The Citizens Protective League
Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations and branches.

The Columbians
Communist Party, U.S.A., formerly Communist Political
  Association, and its affiliates and committees,
  including:

- Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)
- Committee to Aid the Fighting South
- Dennis Defense Committee
- Labor Research Association, Inc.
- Southern Negro Youth Congress
- United May Day Committee
- United Negro and Allied Veterans of America

Congress of American Revolutionary Writers
Congress of American Women
Connecticut State Youth Conference
Council on African Affairs
Council for Pan-American Democracy
Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of
  Japan or Military Art Society of Japan)
Dante Alighieri Society
Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U.S.A., Inc.
  (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani,
  Federazione degli Stati Uniti d' America)
Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)
Friends of the Soviet Union and its successor
  American Council on Soviet Relations, both predecessors
  of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship
George Washington Carver School, New York City
German-American Bund (Amerikadeutscher Volksbund)
The German-American Republican League
German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische
  Berufsgemeinschaft)
Heimuska Kai, also known as Hokubei Heieki Gimusha Kai,
  Zaibei Nihonjin, Heiyaku Gimusha Kai, and Zaibei
  Heimusha Kai (Japanese Residing in America Military
  Conscripts Association)
Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)
Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society - a group of
  Japanese War Veterans)
Hokubei Zaigo Shoko Dan (North American Reserve Officers
  Association)
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy
International Labor Defense
International Workers Order, including People's Radio
  Foundation, Inc.
Japanese Association of America
Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)

Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940
Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City
Jewish Peoples Committee
Jikyoku Iin Kai (Current Affairs Association)
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of Japanese Ancestry who have returned to America after studying in Japan)
Ku Klux Klan
Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League (Kyffhaeuser Bund), Kyffhaeuser Fellowship (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)
Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)
League of American Writers
Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts)
Macedonian-American People's League
Mario Morgantini Circle
Michigan Civil Rights Federation
Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military Friends Group or Southern California War Veterans)
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners
National Committee to Win the Peace
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
National Negro Congress
Nature Friends of America (since 1935)
Negro Labor Victory Committee
New Committee for Publications
Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fuji Theatre)
Northwest Japanese Association
Ohio School of Social Sciences
The Peace Movement of Ethiopia
Peoples Educational Association (Incorporated under name Los Angeles Educational Association, Inc.), also known as Peoples Educational Center, Peoples University, People's School
People's Institute of Applied Religion
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art
Photo League (New York City)
Proletarian Party of America
Protestant War Veterans of the U.S., Inc.
Revolutionary Workers League
Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association - composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War)
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts
School of Jewish Studies, New York City
Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Serbian Vidovdan Council
Shinto Temples

Silver Shirt Legion of America
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee
  for European Workers' Relief
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
Suiko Sha (Reserve Officers Association Los Angeles)
Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia,
  Pennsylvania
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York
United Committee of South Slavic Americans
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey
Washington Book Shop Association
Washington Committee for Democratic Action
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation
Workers Alliance
Workers Party, including Socialist Youth League
Young Communist League

I certify that I have read the names of the above-listed organizations, and that I am not, nor have I been, a member of; that I have not contributed to, received literature from, or attended meetings of any organization listed, except as indicated and explained below:

(Organization)	(Dates of Membership)

Remarks:

SIGNED AT Washington, D.C. (City and State)   DATE 11 January 1949

Kenneth W. Doyle (Witness)   Jacques L. Richardson (Signature)

I. D. R. (Address)

FORM NO. 38.1A
AUG 1948

SECRET [redacted]

SECURITY APPROVAL

To : [redacted] Deputy Personnel Officer Date: 10 June 1949

From : Chief of Inspection and Security Number: 37833

Subject: **RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel**

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

☒ Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Your memorandum dated 14 March 1949 stated Subject is an applicant for OPC.

AC 17 July 50

ERNAL P. GEISS
Chief, Personnel Security Division

Branch notified 14 June CA

[redacted]

SECRET

FORM NO. 38-101
MAY 1949

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HIDALGO, B.H.
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONAL MATERIAL & SENSITIVE OPS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
9 [illegible]	9/9/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

Personal - Post agency
activity

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 26 FEBRUARY 1970

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 027630 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, B[redacted] N. JR. ✓

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (DISABILITY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 28 YEAR 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 643 [illegible] Sect. 231

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 2
PANAMA SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1318

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D.

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: $15,173 ✓

18 REMARKS:
[illegible] 27 Feb 70

SUBJECT HAS SIGNED WAIVER FOR SICK AND EXCESS ANNUAL LEAVE ACCUMULATING AFTER 28 FEBRUARY 1970.

Not Recommend in Agency Rescue Program due to Health [illegible] to B. Dulanky WH/PSS

1 - FINANCE

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD, C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 26 Feb 70

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul M. [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 27 Feb 70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE:
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 VETERAN CODE:
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 DA 27 YR 19
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - DRGN 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 03-04-70 [illegible]
46 C.P. APPROVAL: [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 3/4/70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ______________________ (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON

MAR 2 [illegible] '70

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE —	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)*

403 Shires Creek Rd.
Rockville, Maryland 20851

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7, and Items 9 thru 18a — The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains *only* to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 — "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular
Part Time
Temporary
Temporary-Part Time
Summer
Detail-Out
Detail In
WAE
Consultant
Military

Item 9 — "Organizational Designations" should show *all* levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE
- Major Component *(Director, Deputy Director, etc.)*
- Office, Major Staff, etc.

Foreign Field or U.S. Field *(if pertinent)*
  Division or Staff *(subordinate to first line)*
    Branch
      Section
        Unit

Items 11 and 15 — "Position Title" and "Occupational Series" should be the standard abbreviated title and corresponding occupational series in Handbook of Official Occupational Titles and Codes for the duties actually to be performed by the employee. If different from the title and series of the position occupied as shown on the most current edition of the Position Control Register or Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization, explain under Item 18—Remarks.

Item 18b — Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, *the gaining Career Service should approve* and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING— The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel *through* the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of Finance, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

MEDICAL

25 JUL 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Balmes N. Hidalgo, Jr.

SUBJECT : Exceptional Service Emblem

1. Your request for consideration to receive the Exceptional Service Emblem has been reviewed by this office to determine your eligibility for the award. With considerable regret, I must concur in the assessment that the injuries you suffered in the line of duty do not fall under the special criteria governing award of the Exceptional Service Emblem. Hazardous duties, in the meaning of the governing regulation, relate to duties performed in areas in which internal strife, civil disturbances or hostile action by armed forces or persons unfriendly to the United States were present at the time the injury was incurred, or, relate to duties performed in an assignment defined as hazardous due to unusual geographic or other natural conditions.

2. You may be sure that this decision has been based upon thoughtful deliberation. Please accept my personal thanks for a job well done under difficult conditions.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - C/WH/Pers
1 - OPF/Hidalgo
1 - D/Pers
2 - BSD/HMAB

S E C R E T

24 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Balmes N. Hidalgo

VIA : WH/RMO

SUBJECT : Records Officer Appointment

1. In accordance with a request received from your component, you are hereby appointed a Records Officer in the Clandestine Services. Your functions are described, in summary, in CSI 70-1, Para. 4.d. You have also participated in a training course in which these functions were reviewed in some detail.

2. The essence of your appointment is that you now occupy a position of trust in which you are expected to draw on your knowledge and experience to exercise responsible and sound judgment in building and maintaining a professionally useful records system in the Clandestine Services. You are, at the same time, expected to train and guide others within your component in these respects.

3. A copy of this memorandum will be placed in your official personnel folder.

E. A. Marelius

EDWARD A. MARELIUS
DDP Records Management Officer

cc: Personnel File of Addressee

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S E C R E T

SENSITIVE OPERATIONAL

1968

SECRET
(When Filled In)

G 38

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 August 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, E[redacted] N., JR.
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 08 DAY 14 YEAR 66
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7235-0620
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel) PL 88-643 Sect. 203	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D.C.
11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP 12
17 SALARY OR RATE $	

18 REMARKS

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED OF YOUR RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS ACTION TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-50. SUCH APPEAL MUST BE RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACTION.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE
20 EMPLOY CODE
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE
23 INTEGREE CODE
24 HDQTRS CODE
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE 2
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV.-TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-16-64

46 O.P. APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 26 JUL 1966

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 DECEMBER 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, BALMES N.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH DEC DAY 19 YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235 - 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DOP/WH
BRANCH 2
PANAMA SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (GS-12)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1318

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 2

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 10,987

18 REMARKS

FROM: WH/C/MIAMI OPS BR/FI SECTION/5235 - 1162/1145/WASHINGTON, D. C.

Recorded by
CSPD

1 - FINANCE

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN
C/WH/PERSONNEL

DATE SIGNED: Dec 65

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 57

20 EMPLOY CODE: 11

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 5130 ALPHABETIC WH

22 STATION CODE: 3513

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 ROUTES CODE

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46 C.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 12/15/65

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE

☒ VOUCHERED
☐ UNVOUCHERED

NAME (Last, First, Middle): HIDALGO B. N. Jr

SERIAL NUMBER: 027650

OFFICE (and division): DDP/WH

☐ ORIGINAL
☒ CORRECTION

LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE: 02-13-52

THIS DATE: 12-13-65

SIGNATURE (Office of Personnel):

FORM 11-58 171a

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 October 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]7030
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible], [redacted] [illegible], Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY | YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: [illegible]235-1162
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Special Affairs Staff
Counter-Intelligence Staff
Operations Section
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 (1)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $10,250

18. REMARKS:
From: DDP/SAS/CS/OS Pos. [illegible] Pay 43G

Security Approval [illegible] 10/28/64
LCG 11/2/64

Recorded by CSPD
CL

[illegible]

[illegible] of Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [illegible], C/SAS/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: 10/29/64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: A. Burg
DATE SIGNED: 10-30-64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 49150 | ALPHABETIC SAS
22. STATION CODE: 75023
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 | DA 27 | YR 19
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA | YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO | DA | YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO | DA | YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO | DA | YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO | DA | YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Sup Div Opp ② T. Keating 11-2-64
46. O.P. APPROVAL: A. Burg
DATE APPROVED: 10-30-64

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

XXF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 April 1964

1 SERIAL NUMBER 027[illegible]	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, B. N. Jr.		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT ([illegible])	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 04 DAY 26 YEAR 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V V TO CF CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 423[illegible]-1000-1000	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP Special Affairs Staff *CS/CS Development Complement		10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.	
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12 POSITION NUMBER ~~XXXX~~ [illegible]	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 12 (1)	17 SALARY OR RATE $9980.

43
F

Recorded by
CSPD

18. REMARKS * [illegible]

~~[illegible]~~.

*For ~~medical reasons. Not to exceed one year.~~

For duration of period that the individual is on sick leave; not to exceed one year

[illegible]
for CSCS

3/5[illegible]

1 cy Payroll;
1 cy Security

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Orrell C. Dawson ORRELL C. DAWSON, [illegible]	DATE SIGNED 9 April 64	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER [illegible]	DATE SIGNED 13 Apr 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
13	10	49497	SAS	75013		1	05 27 19	12 22 63	12 24 63

28 RTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO	34 SEX
		1				00060	[illegible]

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI CODE (0—WAIVED 1—YES)	39 HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
[illegible]	[illegible] 46	[illegible]	2	1		-

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
1	1		0	0			-	

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION [illegible] 4/27/64	46 O P APPROVAL [illegible]	DATE APPROVED 13 Apr 64

FM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 April 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 02[illegible]3[illegible]
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Hidalgo B. [illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible]
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 0[illegible] DAY ~~2~~ 3 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4132-2001-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/Special Affairs Staff
U. S. Field
Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE
CI Section
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0[illegible]
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 (1)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ [illegible]
18. REMARKS:

Recorded by
CSPD
[illegible]

1 cy Security
1 cy Payroll

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Orville C. Da[illegible] ORVILLE C. DA[illegible]SON, WH/SA/Pers.	9 April 64	[illegible]	[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
45	10				2	5 27 19		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE) CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
			[illegible]				

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV TEMP) CODE	39 FEGLI CODE (0—WAIVED 1—YES)	HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE)	

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
[illegible] 4/27/64	[illegible]	[illegible]

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
HIDALGO, BALMES N.	self	60-264

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 30 May 1963. Broken left foot.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF REPRESENTATIVE
	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 April 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 28 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / X V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3132-2001-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/Special Affairs Staff
U. S. Field
Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE
CI Section

3
A

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0732
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 (4)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 8840
18. REMARKS:

P - 359

Recorded by
CSPD

1 cy Security

19. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Louis W. Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/SAS/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: 18 Apr 63
19A. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: D McCollin
DATE SIGNED: 11-4-63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 61770 ALPHABETIC SAS
22. STATION CODE: 99999
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. VETERANS CODE: 2
25. DATE OF BIRTH: 05 | 27 | 19
26. DATE OF GRADE: [illegible] | 17 | 53
27. DATE OF LEI: 9 | [illegible] | 62
28. NTE EXPIRES:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA:
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 27630
34. SEX: M
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE [illegible]
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: 07 | [illegible]
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: [illegible]
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE 2
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: 1
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: X
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 1
0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 8
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: CODE 1 | TAX EXEMPTIONS 0
44. STATE TAX DATA:
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: J. Kearney 04/22/63
46. D.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. Bagnell
DATE APPROVED: 19 Apr 63

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.
4-62

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(41)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XAF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

		DATE PREPARED 18 April 1963
1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, [redacted] N., Jr.	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 04 DAY 27 YEAR 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V; V TO CF; CF TO V; CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3232-1000-1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP Special Affairs Staff FI/CI Branch	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0682	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 (4)
17. SALARY OR RATE $ 8840		

2
A

18. REMARKS

Recorded by
CSPD

1 cy Security

19a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Louis W. Armstrong LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/SAS/Ops.	DATE SIGNED 18 Apr 63	19b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 18 Apr 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	24. 1	25. 05 27 19

FOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 14 Apr 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

RZR: 25 APR 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 27 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3232 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0682	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 8840	

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150
11-62

Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 December 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER	027630 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	[redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH DAY YEAR)	2 1 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	4132-2001-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP Special Affairs Staff U. S. Field Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE CI Section
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	JMWAVE
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER (D)
12. POSITION NUMBER	0731
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS (87)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	12 (1)
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 9475
18. REMARKS	

RECORDED BY
CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	ORVILLE C. DAWSON, C/SAS/Pers.
DATE SIGNED	12/11/63
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	
DATE SIGNED	12 Dec 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.
22	10	49730	SAS	99900		2	3 27 49	12 22 63	12 22 63

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46. C.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 12 Dec 63

FORM 8-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: [illegible] November 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
C27630	[illegible], Alla [illegible]., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	11 | 20 | 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
	X				[illegible]	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
2
A
DDP
Task Force W
FI-CI Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER (D)	[illegible]	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS (GS)	0136.01	11 (D) 4	$[illegible]

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/WH/PI [illegible], [illegible] Sec. A, [illegible] Trng 1

Recorded By
CSPD

CONCURRENCE: [illegible]
(Phillip C. [illegible], WH/Pers.Off.

[illegible] 11/20

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Louis W. Armstrong [illegible], C/TFW/[illegible]	6 Nov 62		[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTPS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
37	10	61300	TFW			1	5 | 27 | 19		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT, 2 = 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
Z. T. Kearney 11/19/62	[illegible]	

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A. SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 January 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, BALMES H. JR. ø No
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 1 DAY 12 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235 1000 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
SECTION A
PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: BR-641
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $8,080
18. REMARKS:

3B FROM: DDP/WH/4/FI-CI/#681

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JC Bowers
P. C. BOWERS C/WH/Personnel
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: R Kiedy
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:
20. EMPLOY. CODE:
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. NOUTRS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 27 YR. 19
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT 2 = 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT: 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1/16/62 M
46. C.P. APPROVAL: R Kiedy
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 August 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, B. H., Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT (And Transfer to Vouchered Funds)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 | DAY 20 | YEAR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2635-5000-8021
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH Div.
Branch 4
FI-CI Sec.

3

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (D)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0681
12A. FCB CONTROL NO.:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (12)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 (3)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 8,080

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/WH, Br. 4, #0626

CSPS

RS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Herbert V. Juel
HERBERT V. JUEL, Ch/WH/4/Pers. HVJ

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: D K Reedy

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ...	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
14	10	60452	WH	75013		1	05 27 19		

28. ... 29. SPEC. REFERENCE 30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 4 = NONE CODE 31. ... 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — EOD DATA 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT. 36. SERV. COMP. DATE 37. ... 38. ... 1 = YES 2 = NO 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.) 42. ... 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T. J. Kearney 08/11/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL: D K Reedy

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS FGD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
	HIDALGO, BALMES N., JR.	05	27	19	1	M 1					
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code
			1									

2]

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS/OTR OPERATIONS SCHOOL COVERT TRAINING		WASH., D. C.	

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
1	INSTRUCTOR OPERATIONS	1014	GS	1711.50

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 7270	D	03 17 59	03 17 61	0175-2533

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	17	06 26 60	REGULAR	71	

3A

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 4	417	WASH., D. C.	

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	OPS OFFICER	BA-626	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 7270	D			0135 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ex.)
JOHN WASHINKO X8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
Elmer R Wingrove 17 June 60
ELMER R. WINGROVE PERSONNEL OFFICER

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		6-21-60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		6-23-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		6-23-60

Remarks

6/21/60

6/24/60

6-22-60

2 copies to Security. 1 Loss Notice.

L : 1

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo 5 Da 20 Yr 59	V to V		XX	V to UV
	UV to V			UV to UV

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.	3. Date of Birth Mo 5 Da 27 Yr 19	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo Da Yr / 13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code

3

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch III Central America Section	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field Dept.-Ustld.-Frgn.- D Code	17. Position Title Area Ops Officer	18. Position No. 0486	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01

21. Grade & Step 11 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 7,030	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo 03 Da 17 Yr 58	25. PSI Due Mo 09 Da 20 Yr 59	26. Appropriation Number 8-3500-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment + Transfer to Confidential Funds	Code 05	28. Eff. Date Mo 06 Da 11 Yr 59	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

2

31. Organizational Designations DDS/OTR Operations School Covert Training	Code 1172	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code 75063

33. Dept.-Field Dept.-Ustld.-Frgn.- D Code 3	34. Position Title Instructor Operations	35. Position No. 1014	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 1711.50

38. Grade & Step 11 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 7,030	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number 9-7500-30-018

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Mr. Glen Moorhouse, C/OS

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Mr. Elmer R. Wingrove, x-3078

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) MATTHEW BAIRD Director of Training

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		June 59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	CP	11 JUN 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	C. Powell	11 JUN 1959

Remarks

One copy forwarded to UNVOUCHERED Payroll. Two copies forwarded to Security.

Recorded by
CSPD

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITI

SECRET

Security Approval Ref. Pers. SD/OS 6/17/59

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[redacted]

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO, Balmes	DATE OF BIRTH Unk	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER 58-112

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 1 Oct 57.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 24 Sept 58	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1 SEP 56 1076

14-21

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

E-2266

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

7 Mar 58

1. Serial No. 12[illegible]	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MR. BALMES N. HIDALGO, ~~JR.~~	3. Date Of Birth Mo 5 Da 27 Yr 19	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo 3 Da 17 Yr 58	
7. SCD Mo 7 Da 16 Yr 46	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo 3 Da 13 Yr 58	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

3/17/58

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field Dept-Ustld-Fran- Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate $	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Excepted Appointment	Code 13	28. Eff. Date Mo 3 Da 17 Yr 58	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch III Central America Section	Code 4613	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code

33. Dept.-Field Dept-Ustld-Fran- x Code	34. Position Title Area Ops Officer	35. Position No. # BA-486-11	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01

38. Grade & Step 11-3	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6390	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo 3 Da 17 Yr 58	42. PSI Due Mo 9 Da 17 Yr 59	43. Appropriation Number 8-3500-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) P.C. Bowers P.C. BOWERS WH Personnel Officer	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext) JOHN WASHINKO X 8242	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		3/17/58	D. Placement		3/14/58
B. Pos. Control		3/17/58	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert [illegible]	12 MAR 1958

Remarks

Subject is presently engaged as a Contract Employee with the WH Division.

# For slotting purposes Only.

Approved for DDP purposes

SSA [illegible]

FORM 5-57 1152a

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Balmes N. HIDALGO, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 8 July 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment; promotion, separation, etc.*) Excepted Appointment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED:	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I. O. (FI) BAF-277
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-11, $6390.00 p.a. OK
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Panama City, Panama
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Subject is presently a contract employee with Project HYPOTHESIS.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) P. C. Bowers, x3692

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature:

Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:D 9/26

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: TO: 6-3525-56-051	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		3 Aug 55
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		7-20
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Robert A. Stone, Jr. 7/28

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 027630	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) COD: 16 Jul 1976					
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, B. N., Jr.		3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Nov 1919	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 18 Feb 1952		
6. MARITAL STATUS Remarried	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee)	NO. 2	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1914 1892	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA Puerto Rico NA		
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP Mar 1961	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. APT. Jul 1967	QUAL. FOR Dept Only	EVAL. FOR TDY O/S	
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3	RETIRED
12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE Feb 1958	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None				

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1940-43 Military Service, US Army, Cpl - Infantry
1944-45 Jersey City Quartermaster Depot, Jersey City, NJ - Inspector
1945-47 Francis H. Leggett Co (Food Wholesaler), NYC - Correspondence Clerk
1946-49 Dept of Justice, FBI, NYC - Contract Agent on a Penetration Project
1948-50 Colonial Trust Co (Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1950-51 American Trust Co (Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1951-52 Dept of Defense, New York QM Procurement Agency, NYC - Inspector

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION High School Graduate
1945-46 New York University - Foreign Trade, Business Law

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)
Portuguese - R Interm; W, P, S, U None (Oct 1959); T None - May 1958
Spanish - R High; W Interm; P, S, U Native (Nov 1959); Translate, Interpret - May 1958

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1958 Comm Party Org & Ops
1958 CI Famil
1958 Info Rptng,Rpts&Rqmts
1958 Operations
1958 Intel Orient
1959 Picks & Locks
1959 Audio Surveil Mgmt
1966 Undetermined Entry (Cnt)

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
	Feb 1952 - Mar 1958, Contract Employee for DDP/WH/Project HYPOTHESIS				Panama
Mar 1958	Area Ops Off 0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-III/Central America	Hq
	Jan - Feb 1959, TDY Mexico and Guatemala				
Jun 1959	Instructor(Ops) 1711.50	11	D	OTR/Ops School/Covert Trng	Hq
Jun 1960	Ops Off 0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4	"
Aug 1961	" " 0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4/FI-CI Sec	"
Jan 1962	" " 0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH/Plans & Ops Stf/Sec A	"
Apr 1963	" " 0136.01	11	D	DDP/SAS/US Fld/Forward Ops Sta	JMWAVE
Dec 1963	" " 0136.01	12	D	" " " " " " "	"
Apr 1964	" " 0136.01	12	D	DDP/SAS/CS/CS Dev Comp	Hq
Nov 1964	" " 0136.01	12	D	DDP/SAS/CI Staff/Ops	"
May 1965	" " 0136.01	12	D	DDP/WH/C/Miami Ops Br	"
Dec 1965	" " 0136.01	12	D	DDP/WH-2/Panama	

20. DATE REVIEWED 22 Jun 19[illegible]	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hm/obs	22. ITEMS 1-16 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE 9 Feb 1960

FORM 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
SECRET
PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.
022630

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle)
HIDALGO, B. N., Jr.

DATE OF BIRTH
27 May 1919

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS

HIDALGO, B. N., Jr

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appreciation 1968 from TSD/AP/CAS for the postal intercept exemplars which are invaluable to that office.

27. DATE REVIEWED
23 Jun 1969

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
hms/obs

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1000 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET

PROFILE

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Hidalgo Balmes N.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 05/27/19	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/2		8. CURRENT STATION HQS	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY	☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					XX	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):					☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1969	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1968 - 31 December 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Panama Desk Case Officer for Panama City Station FI operations. Prepares cables and dispatches to Panama City and other Stations and internal Headquarters correspondence.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts required coordination with other offices within the agency.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises and/or maintains files and regulates indexing relating to his cases.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Hidalgo is a man of unusual background even in our unusual organization. This background undoubtedly affords him qualifications for our work, but nevertheless, on the professional level he suffers from disadvantages as well--overcoming some but not others. He is not well-educated in a formal sense, and in our world of words is not adequately equipped to prepare finished written correspondence. He has difficulty in organizing his work systematically, thus at times, giving an impression that the preparation has not been thorough--which might not really have been true.

On the other hand, Mr. Hidalgo has the advantage of native fluency in Spanish and an obvious understanding of the Latin thinking process and culture. He is broadly experienced in operations, not only as a case officer but as an actual agent himself, having served four years as a Bureau penetration of the CPUSA. He is operationally imaginative and unquestionably possesses the ingenuity and courage to translate ideas into action. In this respect, however, his efforts must be channeled and selectivity exercised. On the Panama Desk this officer provides the valuable service of operational history and continuity; he served six years in the Station and has been on the desk for three.

Continued

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 9 Jan 1969
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 4
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 9 January 1969
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/WH/2/P
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Thomas Doolittle

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Hidalgo is an experienced and well qualified operations officer, and it is indeed unfortunate that there are medical problems which do not allow him to be assigned overseas. Since Mr. Hidalgo cannot be assigned overseas, I too endorse his desire to be assigned to OTR or to another assignment of his choice.

DATE: 9 JAN 1969
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WH/2
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: E. M. Terrell
Edwin M. Terrell

SECRET

SECTION C Continued

Hidalgo, Balmes N.

Mr. Hidalgo is a gregarious uncomplicated person, generally pleasant, and generous in his instincts--but not entirely without his quixotic side--and one whose natural Latin emotionality has been intensified by a life of experiences outside the norm, e.g. years as a CP penetration, air crashes, war wounds, etc.

This officer is aware that his intellectual background and medical debilities are obstructions to his advance. Understandably, he has developed outside interests, apparently as compensation. Expectedly, his attitudes at times so reflect.

In sum, Mr. Hidalgo serves a satisfactory function on the Panama Desk and no doubt could continue to perform so indefinitely, but in view of his limitations in a desk-bound situation and the medical restrictions, both of which will continue to inhibit his advance in his present component, this supervisor endorses Mr. Hidalgo's desire to be considered for transfer to another component, namely OTR (specifically covert training), where his attributes would likely come more directly into play. He has the operational experience, competency in a foreign language, an outgoing personality, and experience in lecturing and teaching.* Finally, regardless of the shortcomings reflected in this evaluation, the grading officer finds much to admire in Mr. Hidalgo personally.

*Should a suitable opening in that field be unavailable, it is felt there would be merit also in considering Mr. Hidalgo's other stated interests, i.e., the technical interrogation section of the Office of Security or OO Contacts Division.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/2		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) [illegible] 12-66

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for all FI/CI Projects for the Desk	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Initiates, prepares and coordinates all operational communications to the field on FI/CI matters	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares project renewals, studies and papers on FI/CI matters	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Translates Spanish language material for the Branch	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Coordinates FI/CI matters for the Desk with other Hqs components	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Occasionally handles visiting indigenous assets	S

31 MAR 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Comment by Mr. Tsikerdanos, previous supervisor: 1 51 Fil '67

Mr. Hidalgo is a very capable case officer who is more suited to a field position. He is adept at handling indigenous personnel and has a keen operational mind. He is good at grasping operational leads but is not a capable writer. He has trouble expressing himself on paper. His Spanish language capability is a decided asset to the Branch. A longstanding illness has limited his effectiveness at the Desk. He is cost conscious and has no supervisory responsibilities.

Comments by Present Supervisor:

I concur in the above estimate of Mr. Hidalgo's operational capabilities. During the months (Oct 1966 - March 1967) I have worked with Mr. Hidalgo I have not found his health to be a factor in his performance of his duties.

Ken Knaus

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 10 March 67	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [illegible] C. Hidalgo	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 11	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 9 MAR 1967 [illegible] MAR [illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Formerly C/WH/2/P Present C/WH/2/P	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernesto J. Tsikerdanos Ken Knaus
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Hidalgo's health caused him to be absent from his duties several times during the first part of 1966 but these absences were for a limited period. From my observation, his health has not presented a serious problem to the performance of his duties.

Several times during the absence of Mr. Tsikerdanos in the year 1966 Mr. Hidalgo was the acting desk officer. His performance was most satisfactory, and his supervision of the other desk employees, albeit for a limited period, was fully satisfactory.

DATE [illegible] MAR [illegible]7	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/2	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edwin M. Terrell

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO, Balmes [illegible], Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CI Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 16 [illegible] - 30 November 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Headquarters desk officer responsible for the support of Miami Station CI/CE activities and operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Advisor to various components of the WH and WE Divisions on Cuban operations with specific reference to the Cuban Security Intelligence Service, organization, modus operandi and personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Briefing representatives of foreign liaison services and selected agents visiting in Washington on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services and his ~~own unique experience in the Communist Party.~~	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Translator/interpreter: Served as consultant to WH Division on Cuban Spanish.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

4 JAN 1966

FORM 45 4-63 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo is an able intelligence officer, devoted to his profession and selfless in his desire to be of service to the Government. Although he has suffered ill health in recent years, he was insistent that he be among the first to be sent to the Dominican Republic when the crisis occurred.

An intense person, Mr. Hidalgo is industrious, works well under pressure and sets high standards for his performance. Because he is intent on getting things done, he is occasionally hasty in judgment and in written presentation of the results of his research and conclusions. He is perceptive, quickly accepts suggestions and offers counter-proposals with cogent argument. Mr. Hidalgo was not in a supervisory capacity. He was cost conscious; always endeavoring to be conservative where possible.

He is an effective and cooperative member of an office, ready to assume responsibility and to help his colleagues. Thanks to his unique experience on the Cuban target, he has wide knowledge of the Cuban problem and is, in fact, an expert on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 9 December 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 9 December 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/C/MO/FI-CI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Susan L. Darling Susan L. Darling

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the supervisor's assessment of Mr. Hidalgo with an exception to the statement that Subject works well under pressure. He is indeed an intense person and, under great pressure, his involvement affects his performance; and even more important, it has a very bad effect on his health. With this consideration noted, the undersigned thinks very highly of Mr. Hidalgo and would be pleased to be associated with him again.

DATE 9 December 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/C/MO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Walter T. Cini

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 27630	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 16 Jul 1946		
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible], Carlos Nieves, Jr.	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH May 1919	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 17 Mar 1958

6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Excluding employee)	NO. 3	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1927 1945 1950	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA Puerto Rico NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS Pending	10. LAST MED. RPT. QUAL. FOR Sep 1962 Dept Only	EVAL. FOR TDY O/S

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3	RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE Feb 1958	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1940-43	Military Service, US Army, Cpl - Infantry
1944-45	Jersey City Quartermaster Depot, Jersey City, NJ - Inspector
1945-47	Francis H. Leggitt Co (Food Wholesaler), NYC - Correspondence Clerk
1946-49	Dept of Justice, FBI, NYC - Contract Agent on a Penetration Project
1948-50	Colonial Trust Co (Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1950-51	American Trust Co(Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1951	Dept of Defense, New York QM Procurement Agency, NYC - Inspector

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1945-46 New York University - Foreign Trade, Business Law

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

Portuguese - R Interm; W, P, S, U Zero (Oct 1959); T None - May 1958
Spanish - R High; W Interm; P, S, U Native (Nov 1959); Translate, Interpret - May 1958

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1958 Comm Party Org & Ops
1958 CI Famil
1958 Info Rptng,Rpts&Rqmts
1958 Operations
1958 Intel Orient
1959 Picks & Locks
1959 Audio Surveil Mgmt

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
	Feb 1952 - Mar 1958, Contract Employee for DDP/WH/Project HYPOTHESIS					Panama
Mar 1958	Area Ops Off	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-III/Central America	Hq
	Jan - Feb 1959, TDY Mexico and Guatemala					
Jun 1959	Instructor(Ops)	1711.50	11	D	OTR/Ops School/Covert Trng	Hq
Jun 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4	"
Aug 1961	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4/FI-CI Sec	"
Jan 1962	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH/Plans & Ops Stf/Sec A	"
Apr 1963	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/SAS/US Fld/Forward Ops Sta	JMWAVE

20. DATE REVIEWED 24 Oct 1963	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY OP/POD/[illegible]/hms/rwh	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE 9 Feb 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 27630	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, Balmes Nieves, Jr.	DATE OF BIRTH May 1919

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY OP/POD/QAB

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1060 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. 1 FEB 57 SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO, BALMES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH P&O SEC A.		8. CURRENT STATION	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 October 1962

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 17 Jan 62 - 30 Sep 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for initiation and development of WH Division durable assets program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Collate and maintain files on espionage laws of LA countries.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Served as interpreter and translator for Division LA contacts.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinated with Branch 1 of WHD on FI and CI matters.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Gives lectures as guest instructor to students attending School of International Communism.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

Group 1 [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comments on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo joined WH/PO/A in November 1961 and took up those responsibilities listed above. However, Mr. Hidalgo's performance of duties was interrupted on two occasions by serious illness, 9-27 March and 15 April-31 May 1962. He was twice hospitalized. From 25 June-9 August 1962, Mr. Hidalgo was on TDY for WH/3 as escort officer for Latin American trainees. Although beset by health and other personal problems, Mr. Hidalgo seized upon each new assignment with his customary energy. He proved particularly adept in working as interpreter and escort officer for Latin American trainees, and demonstrated high interest and proven competence in counterintelligence work. His excellent memory and quick perception were distinct assets in these undertakings.

It is recommended, however, that Mr. Hidalgo's next assignment not carry responsibility for submission of finished papers or staff studies, but be one entailing duties commensurate with his ability to work effectively with indigenous personnel and to pursue CI leads through records investigation.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 18 Sept 62	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 18 September 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/PO/A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE CLARK W. SIMMONS

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have had insufficient personal contact with Subject to make any meaningful comments.

DATE 13 September 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/OPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE VERNET L. GRESHAM

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO Balmes N., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH, Br. 4, D.C.	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 October 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD
From Oct60 To 30Sep61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Hqs. C.O. for 3 major CI/FI Projects-at one time comprising 301 Agents. Originates operational traffic, Support traffic and maintains records and files.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responsible for spotting, interviewing and recruiting of Cuban students in the U. S. for return to Cuba for operational purposes.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Hqs. C.O. for 8 unilateral independent Agents, including originating operational and Support traffic, and maintaining proper records and files.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Interviewing, briefing and debriefing Spanish only speaking Agents and contacts for all operational Sections of the Branch.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee.

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-59 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled-In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Hidalgo has done a fine job during the reporting period, while assigned to the CI Section of the Branch when it was in its most active period of buildup and operations. The manner in which he accepted any assignment is unusual and he was often working under pressure. During the period, he was on several temporary duty trips in connection with operational activities, which he completed very well.

He has a talent for getting along with and understanding Latin Americans, and with his fluent Spanish language capability, he has performed in a commendable manner. While Mr. Hidalgo has never shunned responsibility, his assignment did entail the delegation of extensive responsibility. It is the feeling of the Rating Officer that he should be given the opportunity for greater responsibility, and training, which will qualify him for a supervisory role. After that, he should be qualified in all respects for promotion to GS-12.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 11

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: Subject hospitalized.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 20 March 62

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: D/Chief, WH/4/CI

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Robert W. Andrews
Robert W. Andrews

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE: 21 March 1962

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WH/4/CI

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Clark W. Simmons
CLARK W. SIMMONS

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 14 September 1966

TO: (Check)
- [✓ ☒] CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For Action)
- ☒ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION WH

SUBJECT: Hidalgo, Balmes N., Jr.

ATTN: Mr. Hannah

REF: Form 1322 dated 9 September 1966

FILE NO. 9927

OFFICIAL COVER DISCONTINUED: Joint Operations Group

ID CARD NO. 1140 (Returned)

EMPLOYEE NO.

☒ **Unblock Records:** *(OP Memo 20-800-11)*

Effective EOD.

☒ **Submit Form 642 To Change Limitation Category.** *(HB 20-800-2 to be redesignated HHB 20-7)*

☒ **Return All Official Documentation To CCS.**







1-PSD/OS

~CRET

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP	DATE 9 April 1964
TO: (Check) ☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT , SAS	ESTABLISHED FOR HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.
ATTN: Mr. Dawson	FILE NO. K-7412
REF: Request for Cover, 9 April 1964	ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED US Army Element, Joint Operations Group	NA

☒ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________.

X b X CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

'S MEMO MUST REMAIN
P OF FILE

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin

CD/sll CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE
23 April 1963

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT SAS

ESTABLISHED FOR
HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.

ATTN:
Mr. Durham

FILE NO.
K-7412

REF:
Verbal request for cover

ID CARD NO.

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
US Army Element, Joint Operations Group

☒ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ______________.

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ____ EOD ______________.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

Ja[illegible] Franklin

CD/pp CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

D7

[illegible]

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 9 March 1962

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT - WH Div

ATTN: WH/SS 1405 Barton Hall

REF: Your request of 1322 dated: undated

SUBJECT: HIDALGO, BALMES N. JR.

FILE NO. K-7412

MILITARY COVER DISCONTINUED: US Army Element, Joint Operations Group

ID CARD NO. 832

☒ UNBLOCK RECORDS: *(OP memo 20-800-11)*

EFFECTIVE 27 October 1960

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HB 20-800-2)*

☐ RETURN ALL MILITARY DOCUMENTATION.

☐ REMARKS:

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

39165

Robert E. Young

EDF CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-SS/DS, 1-PSD/OS: 1-WRD COMPT

FORM 12-61 1551a

SECRET

(13-20-43)

14-00000

S E C R E T

7 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Personnel Security Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : Balmes N. HIDALGO, Jr., Contract Employee

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly (blocked) (XXXXXXXXX) to (deny) (XXXXXXXXXXX) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer. **Subject is to be converted to Staff Employee status within the next few days.**

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of 7 March 1958.

Howard J. Barton
for JOSEPH K. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCD

cc: PSD/CS
EN

THIS [illegible] SECRET [illegible]

93—

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT:

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP		NEW SALARY
HIDALGO, B. N., JR.	027630	51 350	V	12	5	$16,034

---

1 LAST NAME FIRST NAME INITIAL(S): HIDALGO, B. N. JR.

2 APPOINTMENT DATA

Entered on duty | F. T | P. T

Subject to Sec 203(d) 1951 Leave Act Yes ☐ No ☐

Ceased to be subject to Sec 203(d) on ______ Annual Leave Bal ______

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of ______ of separation)

Years	Months	Days

☐ More than 15 years

4 DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION: RETIREMENT-DISABILITY-UNDER CIA RET AND DIS SYSTEM EFF 2/28/70

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	ANNUAL	SICK
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 1970	46	8
6. Current leave year accrual through 2/21 1970	24	12
7 Total	70	20
8 Reduction in credits, if any (current year)		
9 Total leave taken	4	20
10. Balance	66	-0-

11 Total hours paid in lump sum 66 hrs

12 Salary rate(s) $15,173.00

13 Lump sum leave dates From 0830 3/02/70 to 3/11/70 1030 (Hours)

26 Certified correct by ______ (Signature) 3/13/70 (Date)

for Chief Payroll (Title) 143-2585 (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14 Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______

15 Current balance as of ______ 19__ ______

16 12 month accrual rate ______

17 Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______

18 Monthly accrual date ______

19 Calendar days credit for next accrual date ______

20 Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr ______ to ______

22 Dates during preceding calendar yr ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough	AWOL or Suspension
	(Hours)	
23 During leave year in which separated		
24 During step-increase waiting period which began on 12/15/68		
25 During 12-month HL accrual period (dates) ______		

REMARKS

SCD 7/16/46

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

14-00000

3-31-70

70-1271

70-1556

31 MAR 1970

Mr. Balmes N. Hidalgo, Jr.
403 Silver Rock Road
Rockville, Maryland 20851

Dear Mr. Hidalgo:

As you bring to a close more than twenty years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: ____________________
Director of Personnel

*Concur: ____________________
C/EAB/OS

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat/3257 (5 March 1970)

8 SEP 1970

Mr. Balmes N. Hidalgo, Jr.
403 Silver Rock Road
Rockville, Maryland 20851

Dear Mr. Hidalgo:

It is the practice of the Organization to follow up with former employees six months after their retirement. We hope by such inquiry to obtain information on what our retirees are doing and where they are located, invite suggestions for improving the retirement program and to learn if the Organization might be of some assistance on any post-retirement matters.

We should like very much to hear from you on the above points and on any other topics you think would be useful to us.

For your convenience in replying, we have enclosed a sheet somewhat akin to a form on which we have listed those standard items of information we'd like to have on every retiree. The remainder of the sheet, including the reverse side, is for your comments and suggestions. We shall be most appreciative of your fullest response to this inquiry.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Carroll A. Duchay
Personnel Officer

Enclosures:
Questionnaire
Return Envelope

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - OPF
1 - RAD Subject's File

OP/RAD/EFAB/MLShobe:dag (31 Aug 70)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BSJ: 4 MAR 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

GEF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO, B R JR

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT-DISABILITY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 02 [illegible] 70	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 0235 [illegible] 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY P.L. 88-643 SECT. 231
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 2 PANAMA SECTION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 1312	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 12 5	17 SALARY OR RATE 15173

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 45	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 05 27 1[illegible]	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE [illegible]	32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO / 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE / 0 WAIVER 1 YES / HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

R. C. WATTLES

POSTED
03-05-70 jlc

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BBG

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

BSJ, 4 MAR 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO D N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT-DISABILITY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 28 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 0235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY P.L. 88-643 SECT. 231
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1310	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 15173

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition (8-51)

PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY U.S.A.

PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 202 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED OCTOBER 1962

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	51 390	V	GS 12 5	$15,173

2

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
027630	HIDALGO B N JR	51 390	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 12	4	$13,392	12/18/66	GS 12	5	$13,798	12/15/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 10 October 68

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☑ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-62 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

JC

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 215 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	51 350	V	GS 12 4	$12,607	$13,392

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT, 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	51 350	V	GS 12 4	$12,064	$12,607

C/WH/2 G 30

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
027630	HIDALGO B N JR	51 390 V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 12	3	$11,685	12/19/65	GS 12	4	$12,064	12/18/66			77.33

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE Dec 12 1966

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HIDALGO B N JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO DA YR [illegible] 14 60
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: [illegible]
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 2
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS: YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED OF YOUR RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS ACTION TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-50. SUCH APPEAL MUST BE RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACTION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY. CODE | 21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 [illegible] CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH | 26 DATE OF GRADE | 27 DATE OF LEI

28 [illegible] EXPIRES | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY RQ. NO. | 34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE | 37 LONG. COMP. DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42 LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO H N JR	027630	51 350	V	GS 12 3	$11,355	$11,685

G 33

027630	HIDALGO H N JR	51 500 V	

OLD SALARY RATE				NEW SALARY RATE				TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	[illegible]	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PI	[illegible]	ADJ
GS 12	2	$ 10,987 xxxxxx	12/20/64	GS 12	3	$ 11,355 xxxxxx	12/19/65			

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE E. D. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

JH: 17 DEC 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 12 19 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 2 PANAMA SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1318	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 11355

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51350	WH	75013		1	05 27 19		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSR 2 FICA 3 NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RES / TEMP / CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES / HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO R N JR	027630	51 500	V	GS 12 2	$10,605	$10,987

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/27/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 05 31 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	
7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 1162 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY				
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION WH C MIAMI OPS BR FI SEC	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.				
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 1145	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D			
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 12	17 SALARY OR RATE		

18 REMARKS

POSTED
6-9-65

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150a
1 63 MFG 1 63
Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

3CF

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
027630	HIDALGO B N JR	49 997 43F	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	1	$10,250	12/22/63	GS 12	2	$10,605	12/20/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS ~~W~~ AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

OFC PAYROLL BRAN
DEC 22 11 06 AM '64

L1

MHC: 2 NOV 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR) 11 02 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V · CF TO V · V TO CF · CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 1162 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STAFF OPERATIONS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0887	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 10250

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 49150	ALPHABETIC SAS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 05 27 19	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: DEV COMP 2

E. D. ECHOLS

POSTED
11/02/64 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

RZP: 23 APR 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027530	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CAREER PROVISIONAL EXCEPTED APPT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 04 23 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4232 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 2227	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) CS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 9980

18. REMARKS
OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 13	20. Employ Code 18	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 43237	ALPHABETIC SAS	22. STATION CODE 25013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 05 27	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) 12 22 63	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR) 12 22 63

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE 1	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO 00000
							34. SEX M

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR) 07 17 46	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) 03 17 59	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV / REG TEMP	CODE P	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO								

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 1	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE 6	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE 0	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS 0	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
4.29.64 WCM

E. ECHOLS

FORM 11-62 1150 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

26 APR 1964

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RIR: 28 APR 64

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CEB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027830	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted] Hidalgo, B. H. Jr		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 25 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / CF TO V X / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4132 2001 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS US FIELD FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION-JMWAVE CI SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION JMWAVE		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0731	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 9980

18. REMARKS

FILED ON
29 April 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 05 27 19	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 1800031	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP / CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES / HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible] D
4-29-64 [illegible]

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

28 APR 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

5/25

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted]	027630	49 730 CF	GS 12 1	$ 9,475	$ 9,980

Hidalgo, B. H. Jr.

POSTED ON
OF-4b
8 [illegible] 1964

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PPD: 20 DEC 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCE

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027536	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted] Hidalgo B. R. Jr.	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 12 22 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4132 2001 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF U. S. FIELD FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION-JMWAVE CI SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION JMWAVE	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS. OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0731	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 1
17. SALARY OR RATE 9475		

18. REMARKS

30 Dec 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	49730	SAS	33349		2	05 27 19	12 22 63	12 22 63

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 FICA, 3 NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 WAIVER, 1 YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO) CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

D

12/27/63 K

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 20 DEC 1963

I/C

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLG: 25 APRIL 63

OAB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted] Harvey W. N. J.	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT CAREER PROVISIONAL	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR) 04 28 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V; CF TO V; V TO CF; X CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3132 2001 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF U. S. FIELD FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION-JMWAVE CI SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION JMWAVE	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0732	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 4
17. SALARY OR RATE 8840		

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
6 MAY 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
13	10	61730	SAS	99939		2	05 27 19	03 17 58	09 16 62

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
		1				27630	M1

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
0	07 16 46	03 17 58	P	1		

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
1	8		0	0				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
5/6/63 WK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 25 APR 1963

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZR: 25 APR 63

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALCO D N JR		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 27 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS X	V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3232 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF FI/CI BRANCH		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0592	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 8340

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 05 27 19	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 1ED0031	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA		33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05/01 3 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

ABM: 20 NOV 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICALGO B N JR		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 11 20 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3232 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP TASK FORCE "W" FI-CI BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0682	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 8840
18. REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 61300	ALPHABETIC TFW	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 05 27 19	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX		
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RES PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO				
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE						

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12/11/62 VK

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-81)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	64075	V	11 4	$ 8340	11 4	$ 8840

235-1000

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
027630	HIDALGO B N JR	64 075 V /	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 11	3	$ 8,080	03/19/61 ✓	GS 11	4	$ 8,340	09/16/62			

8 Remarks and Authentication

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS JMG AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-61 360 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-31)

AES: 17 JAN 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 01 17 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2235 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF SECTION A	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0641
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE 8080	18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	64075	WH	75013		1	05 27 19		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVES 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXE 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

1/18/62 JM

Form 1150 841 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ARE: 18 AUG 1961

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 20 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2635 5000 8021

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 4
FI CI SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0681

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: 8060

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 16
20 EMPLOYEE CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC): 64450 WH
22 STATION CODE: 75013
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 MAJOR CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 05 27 19
26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 MIL SERV. CREDIT/LED: 1 - YES 2 - NO
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 MOS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 MOS.)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

08/21/61 WK

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
527630	HIDALGO B N JR	DDP/WH 3A UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 11	2	$ 7,820	09/20/59	11	3	$ 8,080	03/19/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ X / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D.ECHOLS WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(5-41)

43

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 09/21/64

1 SERIAL NUMBER 827630	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MICALGO R N JR

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONV. TO CAREER EMPLOYEE STATUS	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 03 DA 17 YR 61	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	4232 1990 1000	

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150S
1-63 WFG 1-63

Use Previous
Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(6-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	HIDALGO B N JR	527630	46 17	GS-11 2	$ 7,270	$ 7,820

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

AES: 24 JUNE 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 527630	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO B N JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 05 Da. 27 Yr. 19	4. Vet. Pref. Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58
7. SCD Mo. 07 Da. 16 Yr. 46	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidavit Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58
13. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS OTR OPERATIONS SCHOOL COVERT TRAINING	Code 1172	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept. - Field (Dept. - 1, USfld - 3, Frgn. - 5) Code 3	17. Position Title INSTRUCTOR OPERS	18. Position No. 1014	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 1711.50	21. Grade & Step 11 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 7270	23. SD D
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58	25. PSI Due Mo. 09 Da. 20 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 7500 30 018	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 57	28. Eff. Date Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 4	Code 4617	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field (Dept. - 1, USfld - 3, Frgn. - 5) Code 1	34. Position Title OPS OFFICER	35. Position No. 0626	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.01	38. Grade & Step 11 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 7270	40. SD D
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 03 Da. 19 Yr. 61	43. Appropriation Number 0135 1000 1000	

44. Remarks

06-27-60 WK

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 59

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
527630	HIDALGO B H JR	DDS/TRNG 21	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 11	1	$ 7,030	03	17	58	GS 11	2	$ 7,270	09	20	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS U 75C.

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

fly 9/28/59
mc 9/6/59

C. M. STEWART

VV

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560a

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

JEC:12 JUNE 59

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 527630	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO B N JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 05 Da. 27 Yr. 19	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1
6. CSC/ESC Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58				
7. SCD Mo. 07 Da. 16 Yr. 46	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA ~~403.6~~ 403.2	10. Apmt. Affidav Mo. Da. Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1
12. LCD Mo 03 Da 17 Yr. 58	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code 2			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 1P1 CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION	Code 4613	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013	
16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 2	17. Position Title AREA OPS OF	18. Position No. 0486	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01
21. Grade & Step 11 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 7030	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo 03 Da 17 Yr 58	25. PSI Due Mo 09 Da. 20 Yr 59
26. Appropriation Number 8 3500 20				

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	Code 05	28. Eff. Date Mo. 06 Da. 14 Yr 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS OTR OPERATIONS SCHOOL COVERT TRAINING	Code 1172	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013	
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 3	34. Position Title INSTRUCTOR OPERS	35. Position No. 1914	36. Serv GS	37. Occup. Series 1711.50
38. Grade & Step 11 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 7030	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 09 Da. 20 Yr. 59
43. Appropriation Number 9 7500 20 018				

44. Remarks

POSTED
CP

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE
12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI
DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	127630	GS-11-1	$ 6,390	$ 7,030

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

LVL 16 MAY 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth			4. Vet. Pref.		5. Sex	6. CS - EOD				
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	None-0 5 Pt.-1 10 Pt.-2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
127630	BALMES N. HIDALGO, JR. HIDALGO B N JR	05	27	19		1	M 1	03	17	58		
7. SCD			8. CSC Retmt.		9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav.			11. FEGLI		12. LCD	13.
Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes - 1 No - 2	Code		Mo	Da.	Yr.	Yes-1 No-2	Code	Mo. Da. Yr	Yes - 1 No - 2 / Code
07	16	46		1	50 USCA 403 J	03	13	58		1	03 17 58	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
	$				

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT CORRECTION*	13	03 17 58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION	4613	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	AREA OPS OF	0486	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
11 1	$ 6390	0	[illegible] 17 58	03 29 59	[illegible]

44. Remarks

*THIS ACTION CORRECTS SF 1150 EFF 17 MAR 58, ITEM #2, THE NAME, WHICH READ BALMES N. HIDALGO TO READ BALMES N. HIDALGO, JR.

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

LVL 17 MAR 58

1. Serial No. 127630	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) BALMES N. HIDALGO HIDALGO BALMES N	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 05 Da. 27 Yr. 19	4. Vet. Pref (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58	7. SCD Mo. 07 Da. 16 Yr. 46	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. 03 Da. 13 Yr. 53	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1	12. LCD Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 53
13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.
20. Occup. Series	21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate $	23. SD
24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT	13	03 17 58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH III CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION	Code 4613	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code 2	34. Position Title AREA OPS OF	35. Position No. 0486	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.01	38. Grade & Step 11 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6390	40. SD D
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 09 Da. 20 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 8 3500 20	

44. Remarks

POSTED
7 MAR 1958

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

FITNESS RPTS
1966 - 1969

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible], [illegible], Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 [illegible] 19[illegible]	3. SEX	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/[illegible]		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
X CAREER
RESERVE
TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
INITIAL
X ANNUAL
REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
16 March - [illegible] 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Headquarters desk officer responsible for the support of Miami Station CI/CE activities and operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Advisor to various components of the WH and WE Divisions on Cuban operations with specific reference to the Cuban Security Intelligence Service, organization, modus operandi and personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Briefing representatives of foreign liaison services and selected agents visiting in Washington on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services and his ~~own unique experience in the Communist Party.~~	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Translator/interpreter: Served as consultant to WH Division on Cuban Spanish.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

4 JAN 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo is an able intelligence officer, devoted to his profession and selfless in his desire to be of service to the Government. Although he has suffered ill health in recent years, he was insistent that he be among the first to be sent to the Dominican Republic when the crisis occurred.

An intense person, Mr. Hidalgo is industrious, works well under pressure and sets high standards for his performance. Because he is intent on getting things done, he is occasionally hasty in judgment and in written presentation of the results of his research and conclusions. He is perceptive, quickly accepts suggestions and offers counter-proposals with cogent argument. Mr. Hidalgo was not in a supervisory capacity. He was cost conscious; always endeavoring to be conservative where possible.

He is an effective and cooperative member of an office, ready to assume responsibility and to help his colleagues. Thanks to his unique experience on the Cuban target, he has wide knowledge of the Cuban problem and is, in fact, an expert on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 December 1965	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
8 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 December 1965	C/WH/C/MO/FI-CI	Susan L. Darling

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the supervisor's assessment of Mr. Hidalgo with [redacted] exception to the statement that Subject works well under pressure. He is indeed an intense person and, under great pressure, his involvement affects his performance; and even more important, it has a very bad effect on his health. With this consideration noted, the undersigned thinks very highly of Mr. Hidalgo and would be pleased to be associated with him again.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 December 1965	C/WH/C/MO	Walter T. Cini

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO, Balmes N.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SAS	8. CURRENT STATION Washington		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 9 April 1964--15 March 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Participated (with other WH/SA/CI officers) in the handling and debriefing of a defected intelligence officer housed in the Headquarters area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Served as Headquarters desk case officer for several counterintelligence operations--prepared cables, dispatches, and memoranda pertaining to these operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assisted in translations and preparation of operational documents in Spanish (s/w messages, cover letters, owvl messages, etc.).	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Served as case officer for a counterintelligence operation (the agent was located in New York City) which included the debriefing, assessing, training, and dispatching of the agent to a denied area (Cuba).	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 29 MAR 1965	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo's fluent knowledge of Cuban Spanish, his previous experience in DD/P Cuban operations, and his broad knowledge of Cuba (people, geography, customs, etc.) made him a particularly useful and versatile operations officer during his assignment in the WH/SA counterintelligence operations section. As indicated in Section B (specific duties) he performed a wide variety of duties.

Mr. Hidalgo approached and performed his assignments with enthusiasm, keeness, dedication, and promptness. He displayed a partioular talent for conducting debriefings, and it was in this type activity that he performed best. He also writes well which added to his debriefing capability as well as to his performance as a Headquarters desk operations officer in writing cables, dispatches, memoranda, etc. Mr. Hidalgo is cost conscious and effective in the use of space, equipment and funds. He does not hold a supervisory position.

Mr. Hidalgo performed most of his duties with a minimum of supervision. In a few instances, however, he had a tendency (in his eagerness and desire to get the job done well) to become impatient with the slow and deliberate pace of progress which is sometimes necessary in operational activities. In these few instances, Mr. Hidalgo's work required supervision by a senior operations officer.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 23 Mar 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 11 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 March 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR WH/SA/CI/COPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Richard Tansing
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Hidalgo is a sound operations officer with native fluency in Spanish. His impatience is with administrative delays rather than with operational problems which he understands fully and handles well. He has had problems with his health but these largely have been overcome and in the past 9 months have not impeded his operational usefulness. As of the date of this fitness report, he appears fully capable of handling any CI or FI operation assigned to him.

DATE 23 III 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C WH/SA CI (WH/C/SP)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harold F. Swenson

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 027630

SECTION A GENERAL

Hidalgo, [illegible]

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
	CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY		INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):	XX	SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.		12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 6 May 1963 to 5 September 1963	

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 To effect security screenings of PBRUMEN refugees arriving in the JMWAVE area from PBRUMEN in joint collaboration with ODENVY representatives.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 To interrogate PBRUMEN security suspects, surfaced by the above screenings and other means, in conjunction with representatives of the KUJUMP interrogation center [redacted] DC	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 To supervise the interrogation efforts of three KUJUMP interrogators connected with the JMWAVE/KUJUMP KUDESK debriefing program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 To prepare and present to his immediate supervisor completed interrogation reports.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 POSTED ON	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 27 SEP 1963	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

SEP 26 2 07 PM '63

MAIL ROOM

The person being rated is a conscientious devoted individual who has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to get along with his co-workers and other ODYOKE representatives with whom he is collaborating. He receives his assignments cheerfully and with enthusiasm and approaches all of his tasks with great zeal. He devotes an inordinate amount of his own personal time to his duties in an effort to achieve perfection and sets very high standards for his own performance The person being rated speaks native Spanish and is able to accomplish all of his interrogations in Spanish. This ability is a great asset to him in his work and redounds in benefits to the KUDESK effort of the Station.

The person being rated is an accomplished interrogator and thus receives very little guidance in his work. His ability to trap security suspects in contradictions is unique and is paying dividends in the WAVE KUDESK field of endeavor. He has shown mature judgment in the handling of complex security cases, balance in appraising the interrogation results and in recommending disposal action, and proficiency in the preparation of his interrogation reports. He is currently supervising the interrogation activities of three KUJUMP interrogators [redacted] and has shown an ability in establishing personal rapport with these interrogators and proficiency in drecting their activities. It is recommended from the standpoint of his career development that after the completion of his current assignment, the person being rated be moved into an assignment involving the handling of agents in the KUDESK field of effort.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
4 months	At time preparation this report employee was on TDY Hqs and leave. Will be shown him upon return.	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
4 September 1963	Chief, CI Branch, JMWAVE	/s/ Neil T. PICKWORTH (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject is a hard working, dedicated, productive intelligence officer who has completely mastered those basic tools of the trade which are needed in CI activities. Subject has and uses native Spanish language fluency. Subject's performance during the period covered by this fitness report warrants an overall evaluation of "Strong." As a result, it is believed that Subject is a well-qualified journeyman who has earned a promotion to the grade of GS-12. Subject is strongly recommended for promotion to the grade of GS-12. Subject has additional growth potential as an intelligence officer. Subject's activities come to the attention of the Reviewing Officer on a bi-weekly basis.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
18 September 1963	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	/s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SEP 1962

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO, BALMES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH P&O SEC A.	8. CURRENT STATION		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 October 1962

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
17 Jan 62 - 30 Sep 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for initiation and development of WH Division durable assets program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Collate and maintain files on espionage laws of LA countries.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Served as interpreter and translator for Division LA contacts.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinated with Branch 1 of WHD on FI and CI matters.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Gives lectures as guest instructor to students attending School of International Communism.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo joined WH/PO/A in November 1961 and took up those responsibilities listed above. However, Mr. Hidalgo's performance of duties was interrupted on two occasions by serious illness, 9-27 March and 15 April-31 May 1962. He was twice hospitalized. From 25 June-9 August 1962, Mr. Hidalgo was on TDY for WH/3 as escort officer for Latin American trainees. Although beset by health and other personal problems, Mr. Hidalgo seized upon each new assignment with his customary energy. He proved particularly adept in working as interpreter and escort officer for Latin American trainees, and demonstrated high interest and proven competence in counterintelligence work. His excellent memory and quick perception were distinct assets in these undertakings.

It is recommended, however, that Mr. Hidalgo's next assignment not carry responsibility for submission of finished papers or staff studies, but be one entailing duties commensurate with his ability to work effectively with indigenous personnel and to pursue CI leads through records investigation.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 18 Sept 62	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 18 September 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/PO/A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Clark Simmons CLARK [illegible]. SIMMONS
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have had insufficient personal contact with Subject to make any meaningful comments.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 September 1962	C/WH/OPS	VERNE L. GRESHAM

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) Hidalgo, Balmes

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
✓	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance). N/A
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employers' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
✓	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions). Medical Disability
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks). NO CHANGE
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee	Date Signed Feb 27, 1970
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) 403 Silver Rock Rd Rockville Md 20851	Correspondence ☑ Overt ☐ Covert

1R c/o Veronica Hidalgo
x6646

SECRET

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): HIDALGO JrBalmes Nieves

Employee Serial Number 27630

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): May 27 1919

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 123 05 9966

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

DATE: 13 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 20 3 30 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

SECRET

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED MARCH [illegible]
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F.P.M. CHAPTER A8

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—***Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee***

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY		WASHINGTON, D.C.
(Department or agency)	(Bureau or division)	(Place of employment)

I, BALMES HIDALGO JR., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic: that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

17 Mar 58
(Date of entrance on duty)

(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 13 th day of March A. D. 1958,

at Washington, (City) D.C. (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

Appointment Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*) % 4615 [illegible] Place NW - Wash 16, D. C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 19[illegible]

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city and State or city and foreign country*) Habana Cuba

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, PLEASE NOTIFY Louise Hidalgo

(B) RELATIONSHIP wife

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE

(D) TELEPHONE NO.

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blank below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE (*Check one*)
		1 2 3			
		1 2 3			
		1 2 3			

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*	✓	
7. DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*	HC	✓
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, CHARGED, OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 12 for each case, (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		✓
9. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for each debarment in Item 12.*		✓

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10. (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		✓
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		✓
11. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT:		
A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE:		✓
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT:		✓
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.*		✓

12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
			[illegible] ☑ ☐
			HAS LEAVE [illegible]?
			☑ ☐

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER.—You must determine that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, any record of recent discharge or arrest, age, citizenship, and members of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should particularly check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and/or other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

14-00000

LC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information, however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO. 027630	NAME (Last-First-Middle) Hidalgo, Balmes N. Jr.	DATE OF BIRTH 05/27/19

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED La Salle Academy	ADDRESS (City State Country) NYC NY	YEARS ATTENDED (From To) 1938-1940	GRADUATE ☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM-TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.	NY University	Comm Law	IMP-EXP	1943-45	NO		
2.	UNIV of MD	Fire engineering		1968	No Credit Course		
	Mont Jr College	Real Estate Procedures		1968	No Credit Course		

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
Suburban Hospital	Emergency Room procedures	~~XXXXXXXXX~~ 1968		3(?)

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.	Non-Com leadership school		1947		?
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single Married Widowed Separated Divorced Annulled Remarried) SPECIFY. MARRIED

2. NAME OF SPOUSE	(Last) HIDALGO	(First) Veronica	(Middle) Waylonis	(Maiden) Waylonis

3. DATE OF BIRTH 23 May 14	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City State Country) DuBois, Pa, USA
5. OCCUPATION Admin Asst	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER CIA

7. CITIZENSHIP US	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) N/A	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED Birth

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1	☐ ADD ☒ DELETE	Daughter	1945 NYC NY	US	Arlington, Va
2	☐ ADD ☒ DELETE	Daughter	1950 NYC NY	US	Alexandria Va
	ADD	Mother	1892 SPAIN	US	Rockville Md

FORM 444n
2-68

SECRET

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE			DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY: (CHECK (X)) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Havana Cuba	Languags, customs, people			1919-25		X			X
Rep of Panama	"	"	"	1952-58	Dec 20	X	X		X
El Salvador, Mexico	"	"	"	various		X	X		X
Guatemala, Puerto Rico		"	"	various		X	X		X
Hawaii	"	"				X	X		X

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

Extremely capable in First Aid (advanced) and teaching of same. Firefighting procedures. Elementary knoledge of Real Estate Procedures.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☒ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION N/A
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS N/A
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON N/A

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG NONE
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE N/A
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK N/A
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION N/A
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☒ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT N/A
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED N/A

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED
Non-Com leadership school	same	????	

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
American Red Cross	Silver Spring Md	1964	present
1. Rockville Fire Dept and OTHERS	(presently Rockville, Md)	1958	present
International Rescue & 1st Aid Assoc	worldwide	1956(?)	present
2. Montgomery Board of Realtors (ASSOCIATE member)(Permanency pending)		1958	present
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

I am a bit hazy on the dates.

DATE 19 Dec 68

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Cuba	Area and people/Lan.	1919-1924	Family	X		X	X
Panama	Area and people/Lan	1952-58	XXXX	X	X	X	X
Dom Rep	Area and People/Lan	1965			X		X
Salvador&Guat	" " " "	1961-2-3			X		X

SECTION VI & Mexi TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

Quite proficient in photography - Safety and Fire engineering - First Aid including the Instruction of First Aid& Hospital Coppsman duties. SOME Real Estate knowledge.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION See age.
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG NONE ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE N/A
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK N/A
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION N/A
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY(active) ☐ STANDBY(inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☒ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT N/A
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED N/A

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
Non-Com leadership school	Infantry	1943	RES N/A AGENCY SPONSORED N/A

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1. Rockville Fire Dept & others	Rockville Md & others	1958	present
2. Red Cross as Emeregncy transport and First Aid Instructor as well as Md Corpsman		1964	"
Associate member Mont Realtors		1968	"
3. Int Assoc Rescue & First Aid		1964	"

SECTION X REMARKS

Re Section IV: Both daughters now married.
Re Section III: This is second marraige.
Re Real Estate training: This still in active stage. Plans are to supplement my work and eventually change to it on full time basis.

DATE 25 Nov 68

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS.

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444i, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not. Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO. 027630	NAME (Last-First-Middle) Hidalgo, Balmes N.	DATE OF BIRTH 05/27/19

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
La Salle Acedemy	NYCity NY	1938-40	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.	New York Universtity	Comm Law	Import-Export procedures	1943/45	NO		
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
University of Md. College of Engineering	Fire Service extension	Jan 66	Aug66	8

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1	Montgomery Junior College Rockville Md Campus	Real Estate procedures	Oct 1968		1
2	Suburban Hospital Bethesda, Md	Emergency Medical Aid/ Maryland State Corpsman	Jan-May	1968	5

ALSO FIRST AID INSTRUCTORS course of more than 48 Hours.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY: Married

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) HIDALGO (First) Veronica (Middle) W. (Maiden) (WAYLONIS)

3. DATE OF BIRTH May 29 1914	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) DuBois, Pa., USA	
5. OCCUPATION Admin Asst	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER C.I.A.	
7. CITIZENSHIP US	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) N/A	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED Birth

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☒ DELETE	Daughter	NYC NY - Feb 23/50	US	Alexandria Va
2.	☐ ADD ☒ DELETE	Daughter	NYC NY - Jan 6/45	US	Arlington Va

FORM 2-69 444n

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

LLC

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until Filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 027530	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO B N JR	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 05/27/19	5. SCHEDULE GRADE/STEP GS -12-04
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WH	9. LOCATION (Country-City) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
~~[illegible]~~ PANAMA	PCS-VV	52/05/12	57/12/30
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	59/01/29	59/02/08
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	61/02/01	61/03/01
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	61/04/19	61/06/19
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY-CC	63/12/01	63/12/18
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	PCS-CC	~~[illegible]/04/01~~ 63/04/01	~~[illegible]/05/01~~ 64/04/01
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	65/7/11 Two weeks	~~65/7/11~~ [illegible]

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 25 APR 1968
INITIALS:

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		
NONE	Two years - Commercial Law Import Export Procedure	NYU	1943-45

FORM 1-67 444J

SECRET

(4-51)

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION III	EDUCATION (Cont'd)		
HIGH SCHOOL			
LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED From-To	GRADUATE
La Salle Academy	NYC NY	1938-40	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM./QTR. HRS. Specify
1	NYU - NYC NY	Commer. LAW	Export laws	Sept 43 to ? 45	No		???
2							
3							
4							

5 IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1	Full Ops course		During 1958		9
2	Management Course		1966	one week	
3					
4					
5					

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VII — **MILITARY SERVICE**

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1 ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2 SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION ???

3 LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS N/A

4 IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON N/A

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1 MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify) Army

2 BRANCH OR CORPS Infantry

3 DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty) FROM Oct 1940 TO Sept 1943

4 STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify) Federalized National Guard

5 RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation, if not in service) Cpl.

6 SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER 20249765

7 CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☒ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☒ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (Give the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

Infantryman; Crypographic section; driver.

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
None
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1 CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2 DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3 EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4 CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (Give the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

6 IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
1.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
2				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
3				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
4.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
5.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Cuba	Language-Area knowledge	1919-1924	——	X			
Panama	" " "	1952-58		X			X
Puerto Rico	" " "	various			X		X
Guatemala	" " "	various			X		X
El Salvador	" " "	various			X		X
Mexico	" " "	various			X		X
Dom Rep	" Limited area knowledge	1965					X
Germany	" " "	1963					X
Scotland	" " "	1963					X

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM): 40
2. SHORTHAND (WPM):
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

Various

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

First Aid Instructor. Very active currently.
Fire Fighting and safety practices. University of Maryland. Active cutrently.
Sky Diving - 10 jumps during 1962 - none since.

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

First Aid Instructor - National Red Cross - 1963

5. FIRST LICENSE, CERTIFICATE (year of issue): 1963

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue):

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	**MARITAL STATUS**		
1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, [✓ Remarried]) SPECIFY: MARRIED			
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) HIDALGO	(First) Veronica	(Middle)	(Maiden) WAYLONIS
3. DATE OF BIRTH May 23 1914	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) DuBois, Pa., USA.		
5. OCCUPATION Administrative Asst	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER CIA		
7. CITIZENSHIP US	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) None	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED N/A	

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Frances R. Hidalgo	daughter	Feb 23 1950 NYC NY	US	Alexandria, Va
Balmes N. Hidalgo Sr.	father	Dec 15 1890 Puerto Rico	US	NYC NY
Rose Hidalgo	mother	Jan 12 1892 Spain	US	NYC NY

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
American Red Cross Civil Defense team	Montgomery Cty, Md.	1964	present
Franconia Volunteer Fire Department	Franconia, Va	1958	1963
Rockville Volunteer Fire Department	Rockville, Md.	1964	present
International Rescue and First Aid Association		1967	present

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 Feb 1968	

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) [illegible]				2. I.D NO. [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) [illegible]		4. COMPONENT [illegible]	5. GRADE [illegible]	6. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]
7. LANGUAGE [illegible]	8. CODE (25-27) [illegible]	9. DATE OF TEST [illegible]		10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33) [illegible]

11. TEST PURPOSE	12. TEST SCORES					13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	
AWARD SKILL	READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)	AWARDABLE A M	NOT AWARDABLE

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD		15. TYPE OF AWARD				
SIGNATURE	DATE	A-M	E-I-N	C	R-W-S	D-V

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD	$	17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE OBLIGATION REF. NO.	SIGNATURE	
18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION	$			
19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION	$	20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.		DATE
21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD	$	22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.		
23. FORWARD CHECK TO		24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT		
		25. CHECK NO.		DATE

FORM 4-58 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-49) MRD COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) [illegible]				2. I.D NO. [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) [illegible]		4. COMPONENT [illegible]	5. GRADE [illegible]	6. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]
7. LANGUAGE [illegible]	8. CODE (25-27) [illegible]	9. DATE OF TEST [illegible]		10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33) [illegible]

11. TEST PURPOSE	12. TEST SCORES					13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	
AWARD SKILL	READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)	AWARDABLE A M	NOT AWARDABLE

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD		15. TYPE OF AWARD				
SIGNATURE	DATE	A-M	E-I-N	C	R-W-S	D-V

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD	$ [illegible]	17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE OBLIGATION REF. NO.	SIGNATURE	
18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION	$			
19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION	$	20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.		DATE
21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD	$	22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.		
23. FORWARD CHECK TO		24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT		
		25. CHECK NO.		DATE

FORM 4-58 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-49) MRD COPY

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6) 127 630

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24): Hidalgo, Balmes Nieves JR

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30): MONTH May DAY 27 YEAR 1912

3. LANGUAGE (31-33): Spanish 720

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39): MONTH May DAY 9 YEAR 1958

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

[✓ 1.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

[✓ 1.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

[✓ 1.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

[✓ 1.] I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

[✓ 1.] I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

[✓ 3.] BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE A', OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 9 May 1958	SIGNATURE
(46) C	(47) A

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
127630	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (*Last-First-Middle*) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Hidalgo, Balmes Nieves JR	May	27	1919

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
Portuguese 630	May	9	1958	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. [✓ I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.]
4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE; USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. [✓ I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.]

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. [✓ MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.] B
5. [✓ I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.]

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1 I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3 I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1 I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3 BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. (C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 9 May 1958	SIGNATURE
(46)	(47)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 17 April 1964

YOUR REFERENCE: 18658 DDP/SAS

CASE NO. : 65077

TO : Director of Personnel

ATTN :

SUBJECT : HIDALGO, Balmes Nieves, Jr.

1. This is to inform you that Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulations 10-3 and 20-5 including access to classified information through TOP SECRET as required in the performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐ Please advise Chief, Clearance Branch, extension 5620 when Subject enters on duty.

4. **This is a conversion case.**

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne

W. A. Osborne
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 10-63 1173 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(9)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

STAFF AGENT CLEARANCE

DATE : 22 April 1963

YOUR REFERENCE: Memorandum of 19 April 1963

CASE NO. : #65077

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN. : Staff Agents Branch

SUBJECT : [redacted] Hedrigo G.L. Jr.

1. This is to advise that a security clearance is granted for the employment of the Subject as a Staff Agent, GS-11, by DDP/SAS in the capacity of Operations Officer under Project JMWAVE.

2. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of the Subject, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

3. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

4. As a part of entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged by your office.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS
jms

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 10 March 1958

YOUR REFERENCE:

CASE NO. : 65077

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : HIDALGO, Balmes Nieves

1. This is to inform you of security approval of the subject person as follows:

☒ Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Regulations 10-210 and 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

☐ Subject has been approved for appointment under the authority of Paragraph 4(d) of Regulation 10-210, and under Regulation 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☒ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☐ A personal interview is not necessary.

☒ This clearance is issued in advance of receipt of a SF-377. Subject will be assigned to the WH Division.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W M Knott
W. M. Knott
Chief, Personnel Security Division

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Name:	Balmes N. HIDALGO, Jr.
Grade:	GS-11
Service Designation:	CI
Date and Place of Birth:	27 May 1919 Havana, Cuba
Marital Status:	Married
Education and Career Outside the Agency:	1945-46 New York University - No degree (2 yrs) Nov 45-Dec 49 FBI, Eastern part of United States - Undercover Agent
Languages:	Spanish - Fluent Portuguese & French - Fair
Military Duty:	27 Mar 39-27 Sep 1943 New York National Guard (Federalized Oct 40) U.S. Army
CIA Experience:	18 Feb 52 Ex Appt., Contract Employee, GS-9, DDP/WH/ HYPOTHESIS, Panama City, Panama 1 Feb 56 Promotion, Contract Employee, GS-11, DDP/WH, HYPOTHESIS, Panama City, Panama
CIA Training:	Covert training

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) HIDALGO JR (First) BALMES (Middle) NIEVES

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: D, C.

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: D.C.

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE: BELZONI MISS. USA

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 9 APR 1943

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE: -

DATE OF DECREE:

IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED: —

DATE SPOUSE DIED:

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S): —

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE LOUISE HIDALGO	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAMES OF CHILDREN LUZ MARIA FRANCES REBECCA	ADDRESS	SEX F F	AGE 13 9
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian) BALMES N HIDALGO	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian) ROSE HIDALGO	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES? WIFE

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, LOUISE

RELATIONSHIP: WIFE

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):

HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER:

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:

BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? ☑ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? ☑ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? ☑ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 7 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS: GREENWICH SAVINGS BANK

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JAN 57

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?
Balmes N. Hidalgo Sr +/or Luise Hidalgo

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Do NOT NOTIFY OTHER PERSONS IN ITEM 3 OF EMERGENCY UNLESS WIFE IS NOT AVAILABLE.

SIGNED AT

DATE

SIGNATURE
Balmes G. Hidalgo

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*)	2. DATE OF BIRTH
HIDALGO JR, BALMES NIEVES	27 MAY 1919

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service*).

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
US ARMY DEPT of DEFENSE QUARTERMASTER Corp	51	1	12	Present			

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
US ARMY INF	1939	MAR	27	43	SEPT	21	HONORABLE

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☑ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

_______________ (DATE)
Balmes N. Hidalgo (SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 13th day of Mar (MONTH) 1958 at Washington, D.C. (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

Betty A. Bussard

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
7	2	6
4	5	25

12. TOTAL SERVICE
11 8 1

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*).

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

PART III.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 12*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)			
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)	58	3	17
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)	11	8	1
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*Leave purposes*)	46	7	16

PART IV.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES

(To be completed only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes)

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 12*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 14*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)			
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*RIF purposes*) (*Enter as the "service computation date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SP-7*)			

REMARKS:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—00459-1

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "N.A." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES

Sec. I. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

1. FULL NAME [illegible] [illegible] Flores [illegible] N/A N/A [illegible]

PRESENT ADDRESS 20 Avenue D New York City 9, New York USA

PERMANENT ADDRESS 20 Avenue D New York City 9, New York USA

2. NICKNAME [illegible] WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED [illegible]

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES

See Attached sheet - marked Section I

HOW LONG? [illegible] years IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

N/A N/A

3. DATE OF BIRTH 27 [illegible] 1919 PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] Cuba

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP American BY [illegible]

4. IF NATURALIZED, CERTIFICATE NO. N/A DATE N/A PLACE N/A

N/A

[illegible] No [illegible] N/A

[illegible] N/A [illegible] N/A [illegible] No

[illegible] N/A

14-00000

SEC. [illegible] BROTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE N/A CAUSE N/A

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS Box 665 Leland Mississippi USA

DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible], Mississippi, USA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A

CITIZENSHIP American WHEN ACQUIRED Birth WHERE [illegible], Miss., USA

OCCUPATION [illegible] EMPLOYER Leland City [illegible]

SEC. [illegible] RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

See Attached Sheet Marked Sec. [illegible]

NAME RELATIONSHIP [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS [illegible]

NAME RELATIONSHIP [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS [illegible]

NAME RELATIONSHIP [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS [illegible]

SEC. [illegible] RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

[illegible]

ACTIVE U.S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

USA Army, Infantry Pvt. [illegible]/1945

Camp Hale, Colorado [illegible] Honorable

REMARKS: Could not pass physical to return overseas

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER N/A ADDRESS N/A

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON N/A

PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATION N/A

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (Each employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.) (See attached also)

From 14 Jan 1951 To Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE GS-7

EMPLOYER (FIRM OR AGENCY) [illegible]

ADDRESS 111 East [illegible] St., New York [illegible], USA

KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible] NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB [illegible] SALARY [illegible]

DUTIES [illegible]

[illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER [illegible] DISCHARGED [illegible]
[illegible] HAVE YOU [illegible]
[illegible] TO EXPLAIN [illegible] DETAILS

[illegible]

GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

[illegible]

[illegible] YOU [illegible] OR [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] ADDRESS [illegible] N/A

[illegible] (TYPE) N/A [illegible] N/A

GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN THIS APPLICATION, SUCH AS:
(1) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

N/A

HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN.

No [illegible]

DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," [illegible]

No

[illegible] FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY [illegible]

Bus. Add. [illegible]
Res. Add. [illegible] Brooklyn [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible]

NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES (NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS) [illegible]

Bus. Add. Unknown
Res. Add. [illegible] New York [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible]

[illegible]

National City Bank [illegible]

[illegible]

RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

From [illegible] to Present [illegible]

From [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

From [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

From [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

From [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

From [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

From [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

From to

From to

From to

From to

From to

CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

See Attached [illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP

[illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: [illegible]

[illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: [illegible]

[illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

MISCELLANEOUS

DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES?

[illegible]

DO YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? Yes [illegible]

EXTENT: [illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

[illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED [illegible] DETAILS BELOW:

[illegible]

[illegible] YOU HAVE APPLIED OR EMPLOYED [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 1964

[illegible]

36. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS [illegible] Ave. B [illegible] New York [illegible]

37. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO".

In 1964 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] FBI [illegible]

FBI [illegible] were notified.

38. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

[illegible] Ohio [illegible] 1971

[illegible] Jr. [illegible]

[illegible]

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

[illegible]

Section 10:

May be reached at or through Mariano Nieves Hidalgo at 1411 Paris St. San Juan, Puerto Rico	Mariano Nieves Hidalgo	Uncle	Puerto Rico
	Jorge Nieves Hidalgo	Uncle	Puerto Rico
	Elsa Nieves Hidalgo	Aunt	Puerto Rico
	[illegible] Nieves Hidalgo	Aunt	[illegible] married to [illegible] Nieves Hidalgo) Puerto Rico
	Joseph Nieves Hidalgo	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	Gilbert Nieves Hidalgo	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	Cousin	[illegible]
	[illegible]	Cousin	[illegible]
	[illegible]	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]		
[illegible]	[illegible] Villa	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible] Villa	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible] Villa	[illegible]	
	[illegible] Villa	[illegible]	

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

Continuation of Questions [illegible]

In 1946, October, I was approached by certain functionaries of the Communist Party. [illegible] These persons urged me time and again to join the Communist Party. Finally in November of 1946, I arranged an interview with Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

These happenings all took place in New York City, New York.

The FBI asked me if I would be willing to join the Communist Party and report all activities regularly. I thought the matter over and upon the next visit of the Party functionaries I allowed myself to be recruited into the Communist Party. I rose in the Party ranks to become Section Press Director, among other responsibilities held.

[illegible] friends, associates and relatives. This included my wife. [illegible] loyalty.

It was not until [illegible] 1949, [illegible] in the Communist Party, and [illegible] In May of 1949 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? ________ (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office NA
Ext. NA
Home NA

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) XXX Mr. XXX Balmes (First) Nieves (Middle) Hidalgo, Jr. (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS House number 60, 94th St. East, Panama, Republic of Panama (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME "Barney" "Bal" WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? See remarks

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? See remarks

HOW LONG? See remarks IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

No (Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919 PLACE OF BIRTH Havana, Cuba (City) (State) (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U. S. (Country) BY BIRTH? NA BY MARRIAGE? NA

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. NA ISSUED NA (Date) BY NA (Court)

AT See remarks (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? NA TO NA ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? NA (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NA

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS:

NA

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? March 1924

PORT OF ENTRY? NYC, NY ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? U. S.

LAST U. S. VISA None (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 38 SEX Male HEIGHT 5' 9½" WEIGHT 145

EYES Brown HAIR Dark Brown COMPLEXION Dark SCARS Appendix and under chin

BUILD slight OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES Mole. Upper left lip.

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE MARRIED X DIVORCED WIDOWED

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Annie (First) Louise (Middle) Beier (Maiden) Hidalgo (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE Belzoni, Mississippi - 9 April 1943

XXXXXX HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE Rt. 2, Box 76, (St. and Number) Belzoni, (City) Mississippi, (State) USA (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 15 May 1927 PLACE OF BIRTH Morgan City, (City) Mississippi, (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? USA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION File Clerk LAST EMPLOYER Classified

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS Classified (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME Luz Maria Hidalgo RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 12
   CITIZENSHIP U. S. ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME Frances Rebecca Hidalgo RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 7
   CITIZENSHIP U. S. ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (also dependent) (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Balmes (First) Nieves (Middle) Hidalgo (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH December 1890 PLACE OF BIRTH Aguadilla, Puerto Rico (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY 1923 (March) NYC, NY

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? Puerto Rico (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Retired LAST EMPLOYER Do not remember

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS None (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Frances (First) Rosario (Middle) Hidalgo (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan. 1892 PLACE OF BIRTH Oviedo, Spain

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Marriage 1917 WHERE? Havana, Cuba (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY March 1924, NYC, NY, USA

OCCUPATION Retired LAST EMPLOYER Leonid De Lesoinskis

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 48 St. NYC, NY (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA TO NA BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

NA

1. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Henry (First) B. (Middle) Peler (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 210 California Avenue, Leland, Mississippi, USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1895 PLACE OF BIRTH USA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? USA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Laborer LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Erma (First) Rebecca (Middle) Peior (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 210 California Avenue (St. and Number), Leland (City), Mississippi (State), USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH USA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? U.S.A. (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER NA

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

See remarks

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NONE

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______
2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______
3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR See covering dispatch reference

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 5390.00 P/A
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY Yes

FREQUENTLY ______, CONSTANTLY X

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. X

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES X, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES X

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL St. Thomas Apostle ADDRESS NYC (City) NY (State) USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1926-1934 GRADUATE? Yes

HIGH SCHOOL La Salle Academy ADDRESS 2nd St. and 2nd Avenue NYC, NY USA (City) (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1936-1940 GRADUATE? Yes

COLLEGE NY University ADDRESS Washington Square, NYC, NY, USA (City) (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Foreign Trade and Business Law YEARS COMPLETED Two (Night School)

DATES ATTENDED 1944-1945 DEGREE No

COLLEGE ______ ADDRESS ______ (City) (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY ______ YEARS COMPLETED ______

DATES ATTENDED ______ DEGREE ______

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ______

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ______

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

U. S. (Country) Army (Service) Cpl. (Rank) 1940-1943 (Dates of Service)

Camp Hale, Colorado (Last Station) 202 49766 (Serial Number) Honorable (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: None

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER Do not remember ADDRESS

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON NA

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS NA

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM Feb. 1952 TO Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS-11

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY See covering dispatch reference

ADDRESS See covering dispatch reference (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS U. S. Govt. NAME OF SUPERVISOR See covering dispatch

TITLE OF JOB See covering dispatch SALARY $ 6390.00 PER annum

YOUR DUTIES See covering dispatch reference

REASONS FOR LEAVING

FROM January 1951 TO February 1952 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS-7

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY NY QM Procurement Agency

ADDRESS 111 East 15th Street (St. and Number) NYC, NY, USA (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS U. S. Govt. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Inspector SALARY $ 3825.00 PER annum

YOUR DUTIES Inspecting material being purchased by U. S. Govt. specifically the U. S. Army.

REASONS FOR LEAVING To obtain present position.

FROM July 1950 TO January 1951 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY American Trust Company

ADDRESS Wall Street, New York City, NY, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Banking NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Collections clerk SALARY $50.00 PER week

YOUR DUTIES Export banking clerical work

REASONS FOR LEAVING Left for higher paying work

FROM January 1948 TO May 1950 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Colonial Trust Company

ADDRESS 6th Avenue and 45th Street, NYC, NY, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Banking NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Collections clerk SALARY $50.00 PER week

YOUR DUTIES Export banking clerical work.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Promised promotion failed to materialize.

FROM August 1945 TO September 1947 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Francis H. Leggett Inc.

ADDRESS 28th Street and 12th Avenue, NYC, NY, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Wholesale Grocery house. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Correspondence clerk SALARY $ 57.00 PER week

YOUR DUTIES Export correspondence clerical duties.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Dissatisfied with type of work.

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Spanish SPEAK Fluent READ Fluent WRITE Fluent

LANGUAGE Portuguese SPEAK Slight READ Fair WRITE Slight

LANGUAGE ____ SPEAK ____ READ ____ WRITE ____

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Judo - Have attained "yellow belt" rank
Photography - Very good degree of proficiency
Bowling - Fair degree of proficiency
Philately - Fair degree of proficiency
Fishing (no comment)

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Yes, See covering dispatch reference.

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

All photographic devices.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 30 SHORTHAND 0

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC.

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE No.

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ________ LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ________

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

NA

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

Yes. I must wear glasses continually.

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Edward Lee Anderson	BUS. ADD.	See Dispatch reference.		
	RES. ADD.			
2. Willard Galbraith	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
	RES. ADD.			
3. Homer Neal	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
	RES. ADD.			
4. Andres Rivera	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
	RES. ADD.			
5. Joseph Sancho	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
	RES. ADD.			

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

See remarks

		Street and Number	City	State
1.	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.			
2.	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.			
3.	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.			
4.	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.			
5.	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.			

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

See remarks

		Street and Number	City	State
1.	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.			
2.	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.			
3.	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.			

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS Greenwich Savings Bank. 36th St. and Broadway and 6th Avenue. NYC, NY.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No

GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.

1. NAME ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME None ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM April 1952 TO Present Panama Republic of Panama (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM 1949 TO 1952 20 Ave. D, NYC, NY, USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM 1944 TO 1948 200 West 82nd St., NYC, NY, USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM TO (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM TO (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM TO (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM TO (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM TO (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 23 RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM 1919 TO 1924 Havana, Cuba (City or section) Country of birth (Country) (Purpose)

FROM 1942 TO 1943 Pacific area (City or section) US Army (Country) (Purpose)

FROM 1952 TO Present Republic of Panama (City or section) (Country) Work (Purpose)

FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. None (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

2. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

3. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

4. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Numbr.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

5. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

6. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

7. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES," EXPLAIN: NO (See remarks)

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? Yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Beer with meals.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

Department of Defense

Present Organization

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

Federal Bureau of Investigation - 1946

This Organisation - 1951

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Annie Louise Hidalgo RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS Same as applicant.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Ft. Amador, Canal Zone DATE 19 July 1957
(City and State)

(Witness) (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

Section 1A - While an undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigations from 1946 to 1949 I used the name of Bernard Harris to members of the Communist Party of the United States. This information is already on file in this organization.

Section 1D - I became an American citizen at birth through the citizenship of my father. This information is already on file in this organization.

Section 3B - My wife is employed by this organization.

Section 10 - I have many relatives in Spain and Cuba but do not correspond with them and so do not know names, addresses or present status.

Section 18 - All persons mentioned in this section are employees of this organization.

Sections 19
and 20 - Not having lived in the USA for over five years I have lost all contact with old friends, neighbors, etc. I do not know their addresses, status, etc., at this time.

Section 25 - My past connections with any subversive groups and the reasons for such connections is already on file in the files of this organization.

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE July 1971

DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON LUMBARD & IRVINE
[illegible]
NEW YORK 5

[illegible]

[illegible]

Mr. Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator
Economic Cooperation Administration
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoffman:

I understand that you have accorded an interview to Mr. Howard Hunt with a view to considering his possible appointment to the staff of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

It may be of aid to you in considering Mr. Hunt's qualifications [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] of his duty. He subsequently served in China as a member of the staff of the Chief of OSS, China. In this capacity his duties consisted principally of establishing and maintaining the reports to Washington of the various operations and missions of OSS China. Colonel Richard P. Heppner, who [illegible] until the end of the war commanded the OSS in China [illegible] [illegible].

Sincerely yours,

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) HUNT E. HOWARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation). Received
✓	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance). Received
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
✓	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions). N/A
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks). NO CHANGE
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.

✓

Howard Hunt
Robert R. Mullen & Co.
1729 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
ME 8-2526

conflict of interests' policy of the Agency and
s-regard concerning my new employment.

Leave).

yment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed

10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee E. Howard Hunt	Date Signed [illegible]
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) 11170 River Rd., Potomac, Md. 20854	Correspondence ☑ Overt ☐ Covert

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 65

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HUNT, E. HOWARD

INCLUSIVE DATES: 17 May 1948 — 21 June 1922

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E 13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2/28/78	2/28/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
3/15/78	3/15/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

TERMINATED

STANDARD FORM 57 NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

APPROVAL EXPIRES NOV. 30, 1948

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR:

2. OPTION(S) *(if mentioned in examination announcement)*

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR *(City and State)*

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: 17 May 1948

5. ~~XX~~ *(First name)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden, if any)* *(Last)*
(Everette) Howard Hunt (Jr.)

6. (a) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER
30 Willett Street

(b) CITY OR POST OFFICE *(including postal zone)* AND STATE
Albany 6, New York

ANNOUNCEMENT

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): New York

8. (a) OFFICE PHONE: 4-2101

(b) HOME PHONE: 3-6218

9. DATE OF BIRTH *(month, day, year)*: Oct. 9, 1918

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH *(city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country)*
Hamburg, Erie County, New York

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (a) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 9 INCHES (b) WEIGHT: 165 POUNDS

14. (a) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(b) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR.
☐ NON APPOR.

MATERIAL
☐ SUBMITTED
☐ RETURNED

ENTERED REGISTER

NOTATIONS:

APP. REVIEW:

APPROVED:

OPTION.	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFER-ENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (a) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 4,500 PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary

(b) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED, FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment*

(c) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY.
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(d) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(e) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, accounting for the principal tasks which you performed and for periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the space below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in item 5, give [illegible] under "Description of your work" for each position [illegible].

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)*: FROM 1947 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Self-employed

CLASSIFICATION GRADE *(if in Federal Service)*

SALARY OR EARNINGS.
STARTING $ PER
PRESENT, $ 5000 PER year

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(city and State)*: Albany, N.Y.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization or person; if Federal name department, bureau or establishment, and division)*

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)*: writing

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT: Interest in ECA

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
authoring novels and magazine stories.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

15 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Jan. 1943 TO Oct. 1943
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: War Correspondent
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ FINAL $ 600 PER Month
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): New York, N.Y.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Dan Longwell - Editor
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): "LIFE"
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Publishing
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:
REASON FOR LEAVING: Enlisting in AAF.
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Travel with Naval combat groups in S. Pacific. Report results of actions.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Oct. 1942 TO Jan. 1943
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Script Writer
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ FINAL $ 600 PER Month
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): New York, N.Y.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Louis de Rochemont - Editor
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): The March of Time (Cinema)
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Newsreel producers
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:
REASON FOR LEAVING: go overseas w/ "Life"
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Developing screen narrative of a particular subject - writing of narration to footage. Writing + producing Naval Training Films.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM TO
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:
REASON FOR LEAVING:
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM TO
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
CLASSIFIED GRADE (If in Federal service)
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of bricks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
2/41	5/41	U.S.Naval Academy	USNR Midshipman's Course
1/44	6/44	Miami Beach	AAF/OCS
6/44	8/44	Orlando,Fla	AAF Combat Intelligence School
1/45	3/45	Catalina Island	Office of Strategic Services Clandestine School

18. EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF
☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED
Hamburg High School, N.Y.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Brown University Providence,R.I.	English	1936	1940	4		AB	June 1940	

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
English Literature			
Economics			
Sociology			

(E) OTHER TRAINING SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR IN-SERVICE TRAINING IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
Spanish		X				X			X

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

See list attached

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ..... SHORTHAND .....

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?
☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE.
FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)
LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(5) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

Covered in detail: "Who's Who in the East" VolII

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the [illegible] ed States or Territories of the United States who are [illegible] ated to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position you are applying. Do not repeat names of super[illegible] under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Maj. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan	2 Wall Street, New York 5, N.Y.	Attorney
2. John C. Farrar	53 East 34th Street, New York 16	Publisher
3. Raymond Rubicam	444 Madison Avenue, New York 18	Executive

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	Yes	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	Yes	
27. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?	No	
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?	No	
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?	No	
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*	No	
31. [illegible] *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*	No	
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*	No	
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*	No	
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*	No	

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENLISTING INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATIONS
July 1940	March 1942
Sept. 1943	March 1946
BRANCH OF SERVICE (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.)	SERIAL NO. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation)
6 Navy- Army	0-587241/97532

	YES	NO
38. (A) [illegible]	X	
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		X
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		X

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on 6-1 .... 19 48

Agency: .... Title: ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT E. Howard Hunt, Jr.

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (PART I)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED.
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R064

E. ..IC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATIO

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST) Mr. E. Howard Hunt, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10-9-18	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. 64	4. DATE 5-17-48

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Temporary Appointment, C.S. Reg. 2.114(a)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 5-17-48	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Information and Editorial Spec.
	9. SERVICE, GRADE SALARY	CAF-13, $6905.20 per annum CSC No. 103 - Series 1230
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Press Information Division
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

Subject to loyalty and security check.
Subject to satisfactory medical examination.
Affidavit "Striking Against the Federal Government" signed.
Not eligible for within grade salary advancements.
Entrance efficiency rating: Good

Acting Director of Personnel
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
	x				x		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL	
		x		CSC No. 103, 5/14/48

17. SEX M	18. RACE W	19. APPROPRIATION FROM: 118/95400(01) 100 01 TO:	20. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) No	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY) 5-17-48	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE New York	

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1947—722548

1. EM' E COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (9 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER, 1946

FORM APPROVED.
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R066.

Ec. ..ic COOPERATION ADMINISTRATIO.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST) Mr. E. Howard Hunt, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10-9-18	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. - 64	4. DATE 5-17-48

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Temporary Appointment, C.S. Reg. 2.114(a)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 5-17-48	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Information and Editorial Spec.
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	CAF-12, $6905.20 per annum CSC No. 103 - Series 1230
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Press Information Division
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

Subject to loyalty and security check.
Subject to satisfactory medical examination.
Affidavit "Striking Against the Federal Government" signed.
Not eligible for within grade salary advancements.
Entrance efficiency rating: Good

Acting Director of Personnel
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
	X				X		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
		X		CSC No. 103, 5/14/48

17. SEX	18. RACE	19. APPROPRIATION	20. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 118/95400(01) 100 01 TO:	No	5-17-48	New York

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1947—721549

1. EM' E COPY

AFFIDAVIT

STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Economic Cooperation Administration
(Dept. or Estab)

(Bureau or Office)

Washington, D. C.
(Place of Employment

I. I, ...**E. Howard Hunt, Jr.**............, do hereby swear (or affirm) that I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not while a Government employee become a member of such an organization.

II. I am loyal to the United States, its Constitution and form of Government, and I am not now a member of any organization advocating, to the best of my belief, contrary views, nor have I ever been a member of any organization advocating, to the best of my belief, contrary views during the period of my membership.

E. Howard Hunt Jr.
(Signature of Employee or Appointee)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this **17th** day of **May**, 19**48** at **Washington, D. C.**, State of

Mary T. Bakermus (Name) Appointment Clerk (Title)
Economic Cooperation Administration, Washington, D. C.

Act of June 26, 1943, Sec. 206

Standard Form No. 61
Approved January 24, 1941
U. S. Civil Service Commission
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 403

OATH OF OFFICE, AFFIDAVIT, AND DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

Economic Cooperation Administration .... Washington, D. C.
(Department or Establishment) (Bureau or Division) (Place of Employment)

A.
OATH OF OFFICE

I, E. Howard Hunt, Jr.,
Do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. SO HELP ME GOD.

B.
AFFIDAVIT

Do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence; and that during such time as I am an employee of the Federal Government, I will not advocate nor become a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence.

C.
DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

Do further certify that (1) I have not paid or offered or promised to pay any money or other thing of value to any person, firm, or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment; (2) I will inform myself of and observe the provisions of the Civil Service law and rules and Executive orders concerning political activity, political assessments, etc., as quoted on the attached Information for Appointee, and [strike out either (3) or (4)]

(3) ~~the answers given by~~ me in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this sheet ~~are true and correct;~~

(4) the answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. 57; dated 12 May .... 19[illegible], filed with the above-named department or establishment, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date, except for the following (if necessary, use additional sheet; if no exceptions write "none"; if (4) is executed, the reverse of this sheet need not be used):

E Howard Hunt Jr
(Signature of Appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 17th day of May A. D., 19 48

at Washington, D. C. (City), ... (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of Officer)

Appointment Clerk, Economic Cooperation Admin
Act of June 26, 1943, Section 206

NOTE.—If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown

16—42360-1

5-17-48 (Date of Entrance on Duty)

Information and Editorial Spec, CAF-12 (Position to which appointed)

10-9-18 (Date of Birth)

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form, if required, is to be completed before entrance on duty. Every question must be answered. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. False declaration is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. Present Address 38 Willett Street (Street and Number) Albany 6, N.Y. (City and State)

2. Who should be notified in case of emergency? Mrs. E. K. Hunt (Name) Mother (Relationship)

38 Willett St. (Street and Number) Albany 6, N.Y. (City and State) Telephone: 3-6218

3. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (either by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? Yes or No........ If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

Name	Post-office address (Give street number, if any)	(1) Position and (2) Temporary or not, and (3) Department or office in which employed	Relationship	Married or single	Age
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

4. Place of birth .... (Town) .... (State or Country)

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	Yes	No
5. Are you a citizen of the United States?		
6. If foreign born, have you furnished proof of naturalization or citizenship to (1) the U. S. Civil Service Commission?		
(2) this agency in connection with this appointment?		
7. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, has there been any change in the status of your citizenship, or of the persons through whom you gained your citizenship?		
8. (a) Do you hold any position or office under the United States or any State, Territory, County, or Municipality? If so, state the place, position, and salary under Item 12.		
(b) Are you willing to resign such position or office if it becomes necessary to do so in order to hold the Federal position?		
9. Do you receive any pension or other benefit for military or naval service or an annuity from the U.S. or D.C. Government under any Retirement Act? If so, give details under Item 12, stating whether you were retired for age, length of service, or disability, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rank, if retired from military or naval service.		
10. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been discharged for misconduct or unsatisfactory service, or forced to resign from any position? If so, give under Item 12 where employed, name and address of employer and the reason for discharge in each case.		
11. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been arrested, or summoned into any civil or military court as a defendant, or indicted for or convicted of any offense (felony or misdemeanor)? If so, for each case give under Item 12 (1) the date, (2) the name and location of the court, (3) the nature of the offense or violation, and (4) the penalty, if any, imposed, or other disposition.		

12. Space for detailed answers to other questions.

ITEM NO.	Write in left column numbers of items to which detailed answers apply

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that the appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable civil-service rules, the War Service Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

The form should be checked for holding of office, pension, purchase of office, [illegible] in connection with any [illegible] [illegible] to observe provisions regarding political activity, and particularly to the following:

(1) **Identity of appointee** with the applicant whose appointment was authorized. The [illegible] signature and handwriting are to be compared with [illegible] [illegible] and other pertinent papers. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] The [illegible] [illegible] questioned [illegible] on his previous history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) **Age.** [illegible] discrepancy exists between the date of birth and that on application, and [illegible] [illegible] have been established for the position, it should be determined that appointee is not outside the age range for appointment.

(3) **Citizenship.** — The responsibility for also [illegible] provisions of appointment [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] citizen. The Civil Service Commission indicates on applications showing foreign birth that citizenship has been verified. The appointing officer should verify citizenship [illegible] [illegible] letter of authority from the Commission [illegible] the appointment [illegible] proof of citizenship or if the application shows foreign birth but does not indicate on its face that citizenship has been proved. If the answer to question 4 of this form shows foreign birth and the application shows birth in the United States, the case should be referred to the Civil Service Commission.

(4) **Members of Family.** — Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family in the classified service, no other member of such family is eligible for appointment in that service. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] different family merely by living at an address different from that of the parents. Doubtful cases involving more than two members of a family, including all pertinent evidence, should be referred to the Civil Service Commission [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] be taken. Under [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the numbers [illegible] [illegible] provision does not apply to temporary appointments for one year [illegible]



Army of the United States

[illegible]

[illegible]

BUREAU OF NAVIGATION

[illegible]



Army of the United States

Honorable Discharge

[illegible]

Army of the United States

[illegible]

[illegible] RECORD OF

[illegible]

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 57- NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CATION FOR FEDERAL EMPL

APPROVAL EXPIRES
NO. 50-R-133

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type, write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR

2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State)

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION 17 May 1948

5. ~~MR~~ XX (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
(Everette) Howard Hunt (Jr.)

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER
30 Willett Street

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE
Albany 6, New York

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State) New York

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE 4-2101

(B) HOME PHONE 3-6218

9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) Oct.9,1918

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State, if born outside U. S., name city and country)
Hamburg, Erie County, New York

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES 5 FEET 9 INCHES (B) WEIGHT 165 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE

APPOINTMENT

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON APPOR.	MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED	ENTERED REGISTER

NOTATIONS:

APP. REVIEW:

APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 4,500. PER YEAR.
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED, FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY:
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS:

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the space below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below i.e. "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

①

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM 1947 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION Self-employed

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER
PRESENT $ 5000 PER year

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Albany, N.Y.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)
Writing

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT
Interest in ECA

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Authoring novels and magazine stories.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO | EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION | [illegible] (If in Federal service) | SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) | NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) | KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU | REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
2/41	5/41	U.S.Naval Academy	USNR Midshipman's Course
1/44	6/44	Miami Beach	AAF/OCS
6/44	8/44	Orlando,Fla	AAF Combat Intelligence School
1/45	3/45	Catalina Island	Office of Strategic Services Clandestine School

18. EDUCATION. (Circle highest grade completed).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF
☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED
Hamburg High School, N.Y.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Brown University Providence,R.I.	English	1936	1940	4		AB	June 1940	

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
English Literature			
Economics			
Sociology			

(E) OTHER TRAINING SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES | READING | SPEAKING | UNDERSTANDING
Spanish x x x

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?
☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE.
FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)
LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)
See list attached

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS (A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested) (B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS (C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE (D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC. (E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.
Covered in detail: "Who's Who in the
East" VolII

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS [illegible] COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING SHORTHAND

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Jan. 1943 TO Oct. 1943
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION War Correspondent
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 600 PER Month
FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) New York, N.Y.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Dan Longwell - Editor
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) "LIFE"
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Publishing
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
REASON FOR LEAVING Enlisting in AAF.
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Travel with Naval combat group in S. Pacific. Report results of actions.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Oct. 1942 TO Jan. 1943
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Script Writer
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 600 PER Month
FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) New York, N.Y.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Louis de Rochemont - Editor
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) The March of Time (Cinema)
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Newsreel producers
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
REASON FOR LEAVING go overseas w/"Life"
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Developing screen narrative of a particular subject - writing narration to footage. Writing + producing Naval Training Films

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM TO
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
REASON FOR LEAVING
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

24. REFERENCES: List three persons living in the States or Territories of the United States who to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Maj. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan	2 Wall Street, New York 5, N.Y.	Attorney
2. John C. Farrar	53 East 34th Street, New York 16	Publisher
3. Raymond Rubicam	444 Madison Avenue, New York 18	Executive

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	Yes	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	Yes	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?	No	
28. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?	No	
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?	No	
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*	No	
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*	No	
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*	No	
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*	No	
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*	No	

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (a) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(b) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(c) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(d) DATES OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE	DATES OF SEPARATIONS
July 1940	October March 1942
Sept. 1943 --------	-March 1946

BRANCH OF SERVICE (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.)	SERIAL NO. (if none, give grade or rating at time of separation)
6 Engr Navy- Army	0-587241/97532

	YES	NO
38. (a) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?	X	X
(b) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*	●	X
(c) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		X
(d) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on 6-1 .... 19 48

Agency: Title:

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (Indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT E Howard Hunt

(Sign your name in INK ... given name, initial or initials, and surname) If female, ... your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. ..."

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—

AFFIDAVIT
STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

______________________ (Place of Employment)

Economic Cooperation Administration (Office or Division)

I E. Howard Hunt, Jr., do hereby swear (or affirm) that I have not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States, that I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not while a Government employee become a member of such an organization.

E. Howard Hunt, Jr.
(Signature of Employee or Appointee)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3 day of June, 19 48

at Washington, State of DC

Marvin W Wolf
(Signature of Officer)

Notary Public
(Title)

NOTE: Any officer or employee of the Department of State who is designated in writing by the Secretary to administer oaths in connection with employment as required by law is authorized to administer the affidavit required incidental to the foregoing and such affidavit must be administered without charge or fee and has the same force and effect as affidavits administered by officers having seals.

STATUTORY PENALTY CLAUSE: "Any person who engages in a strike against the Government of the United States or who is a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States *** and accepts employment the salary or wages for which are paid from any appropriation contained in this Act shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both: Provided further, that the above penalty clause shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other provisions of existing law."

Standard Form No. 61
Approved January 28, 1943
U. S. Civil Service Commission
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 400

OATH OF OFFICE, AFFIDAVIT
AND
DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

Economic Cooperation Administration
(Department or Establishment) (Bureau or Division) (Place of Employment)

A.
OATH OF OFFICE

I, E. Howard Hunt, Jr.

Do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. SO HELP ME GOD.

B.
AFFIDAVIT

Do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence; and that during such time as I am an employee of the Federal Government, I will not advocate nor become a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence.

C.
DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

Do further certify that (1) I have not paid or offered or promised to pay any money or other thing of value to any person, firm, or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment; (2) I will inform myself of and observe the provisions of the Civil Service law and rules and Executive orders concerning political activity, political assessments, etc., as quoted on the attached Information for Appointee; and [strike out either (3) or (4)]

(3) the answers given by me in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this sheet are true and correct;

(4) the answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. ...., dated ...., 19......, filed with the above-named department or establishment, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date, except for the following (if necessary, use additional sheet; if no exceptions write "none"; if (4) is executed, the reverse of this sheet need not be used):

E Howard Hunt Jr.
(Signature of Appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 9 day of June A. D., 19 48

at Washington (City) DC (State)

Marvin W Will
(Signature of Officer)

[SEAL]

My commision expires 14 Dec., 1948

Notary Public
(Title)

NOTE.—If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown

14—33343-3

9 June, 1948
(Date of Entrance on Duty)

F3S-5; U.S. Media Specialist
(Position to which appointed)

Oct. 9, 1918
(Date of Birth)

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form, if required, is to be completed before entrance on duty. Every question must be answered. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancelation of application or dismissal after appointment. False personation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. Present Address 50 Willett St. (Street and Number) Albany 6, N.Y. (City and State)

2. Who should be notified in case of emergency? Mrs. E. W. Hunt (Name) mother (Relationship)
50 Willett St. (Street and Number) Albany 6, N.Y. (City and State)

3. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (either by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? Yes or No? NO. If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

Name	Post-office address (Give street number, if any)	(1) Position and (2) Temporary or not, and (3) Department or office in which employed	Relationship	Married or single	Age
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

4. Place of birth Hamburg, (Town) Erie County, N.Y. (State or Country)

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	Yes	No
5. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
6. If foreign born, have you furnished proof of naturalization or citizenship to (1) the U. S. Civil Service Commission?		
(2) this agency in connection with this appointment?		
7. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, has there been any change in the status of your citizenship, or of the persons through whom you gained your citizenship?		X
8. (a) Do you hold any position or office under the United States or any State, Territory, County, or Municipality? If so, state the place, position, and salary under Item 12.		X
(b) Are you willing to resign such position or office if it becomes necessary to do so in order to hold the Federal position?		X
9. Do you receive any pension or other benefit for military or naval service or an annuity from the U.S. or D.C. Government under any Retirement Act? If so, give details under Item 12, stating whether you were retired for age, length of service, or disability; amount of retirement pay and under what retirement act; and rank, if retired from military or naval service.		X
10. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been discharged for misconduct or unsatisfactory service, or forced to resign from any position? If so, give under Item 12 where employed, name and address of employer and the reason for discharge in each case.		X
11. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been arrested, or summoned into any civil or military court as a defendant, or indicted for or convicted of any offense (felony or misdemeanor)? If so, for each case give under Item 12 (1) the date, (2) the name and location of the court, (3) the nature of the offense or violation, and (4) the penalty, if any, imposed, or other disposition.		X

12. Space for detailed answers to other questions.

ITEM NO.	Write in left column numbers of items to which detailed answers apply
	ECA Information Specialist
	CAF 12 $5905.20

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable civil-service rules, the War Service Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, purchase of office, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, promise to observe provisions regarding political activity, and particularly for the following:

(1) **Identity** of appointee with the applicant whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) **Age.**—If discrepancy exists between the date of birth and that on application, and if definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment.

(3) **Citizenship.**—The responsibility for obe rovisions of appropriation acts prohibiting or restricting the employment of lies with the appointing officer. The Civil Service Commission indicates on applications showing foreign birth that citizenship has been verified. The appointing officer should verify citizenship if the list of eligibles or the letter of authority from the Commission makes the appointment subject to proof of citizenship, or if the application shows foreign birth but does not indicate on its face that citizenship has been proved. If the answer to question 4 of this form shows foreign birth and the application shows birth in the United States, the case should be referred to the Civil Service Commission.

(4) **Members of Family.**—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of the family in the classified service, no other member of such family is eligible for appointment in that service. Minors do not establish a different family merely by living at an address different from that of the parents. Doubtful cases involving more than two members of family, including all pertinent evidence, should be referred to the Civil Service Commission or its duly authorized representatives for decision. Under War Service Regulations, the members provision does not apply to temporary appointments for one year or less

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 57- NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

A CATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYME

APPROVAL EXPIRES NOV. 15, 1949

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR

2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State)

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: 17 May 1948

5. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
(Everette) Howard Hunt (Jr.)

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 30 Willett Street

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Albany 6, New York

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): New York

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: 4-2101 (B) HOME PHONE: 3-6218

9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): Oct.9,1918

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Hamburg, Erie County, New York

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 9 INCHES (B) WEIGHT: 165 POUNDS

ANNOUNCEMENT

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPVR. ☐ NON APPVR.
MATERIAL: ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED
ENTERED REGISTER:
NOTATIONS:
AUX. REVIEW:
APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 4,500. PER YEAR.
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED, FOR:
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY:
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① **PRESENT POSITION**

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year): FROM 1947 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Self-employed

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER; PRESENT $ 5000 PER year

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Albany, N.Y.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Writing

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT: Interest in ECA

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Authoring novels and magazine stories.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Jan. 1943 TO Oct. 1943

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: War Correspondent

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 600 PER Month FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): New York, N.Y.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Dan Longwell - Editor

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): "LIFE"

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Publishing

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR LEAVING: Enlisting in AAF.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Travel with Naval combat groups in S. Pacific. Report results of action.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Oct. 1942 TO Jan. 1943

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Script Writer

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 600 PER Month FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): New York, N.Y.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Louis de Rochemont - Editor

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): The March of Time (Cinema)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Newsreel producers

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR LEAVING: go overseas w/ "Life"

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Developing screen narrative of a particular subject - writing of narration to footage writing + producing Naval Training Films.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: TO:

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR LEAVING:

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM TO

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

CLASSIFIED GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (*firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division*)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (*e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.*)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
2/41	5/41	U.S.Naval Academy	USNR Midshipman's Course
1/44	6/44	Miami Beach	AAF/OCS
6/44	8/44	Orlando,Fla	AAF Combat Intelligence School
1/45	3/45	Catalina Island	Office of Strategic Services Clandestine School

18 EDUCATION. (*Circle highest grade completed*):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

MARK(X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF:
☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED
Hamburg High School, N.Y.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Brown University Providence,R.I.	English	1936	1940	4		AB	June 1940	

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
English Literature			
Economics			
Sociology			

(E) OTHER TRAINING SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (*show name and location of school*) OR "IN-SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19 INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
Spanish		x				x			x

22 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (*such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.*)?
☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:
FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)
LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20 IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES AND DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (2) REASON OR PURPOSE (*e. g., military service, business, education, recreation*)

See list attached

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ..... SHORTHAND .....

23 GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (*do not submit copies unless requested*)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

Covered in detail: "Who's Who in the East" VolII

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Maj. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan	2 Wall Street, New York 5, N.Y.	Attorney
2. John C. Farrar	53 East 34th Street, New York 16	Publisher
3. Raymond Rubicam	444 Madison Avenue, New York 18	Executive

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	Yes	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	Yes	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?	No	
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?	No	
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, OR SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?	No	
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*	No	
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*	No	
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*	No	
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*	No	
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*	No	

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment*		

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE(S) OF ENTRANCE INTO SERVICE	DATE(S) OF SEPARATIONS
July 1940	October ~~March~~ 1942
Sept. 1943	March 1946
(E) BRANCH OF SERVICE (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.)	SERIAL NO. (if none, give grade or rating at time of separation).
Ensign Navy- Army	0-587241/97532

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?	X	
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		X
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		X

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on 6-1, 19 48

Agency:

Title:

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

☞ SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN EUROPE

2 rue Saint Florentin
PARIS. January 13, 1949.

Dear Howard:

I am genuinely sorry to hear that you feel obliged to resign your post in our Information Division here at ECA in Europe owing to the pressure of personal matters in the States.

All who have worked with you have been impressed by your prompt and efficient handling of assignments - no matter how difficult - as well as by your quick and imaginative grasp of what ECA is attempting to do for the peoples of Europe.

Let me thank you for the splendid work you have done and wish you the best of health and good fortune in the future.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. Harriman

W. A. Harriman
U. S. Special Representative
in Europe.

I am personally sorry we aren't going to have any more trips together
Wally

Mr. Howard Hunt
Information Division
ECA 2 rue Saint Florentin
PARIS.

14-00000

FORM 50 (3 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

BUDGET BUREAU NO

IC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST) Mr. E. Howard Hunt, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10-9-18	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. 7	4. DATE 6-9-48

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Separation - Transfer (to Econ. Coop. Admin., Foreign Service)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 6-8-48 cob	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
Information and Editorial Spec.	8. POSITION TITLE	
CAF-12, $5905.20 per annum CSC No. 103 - Series 1020	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	
Press Information Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

Appointed to Foreign Service, effective 6-9-48.

Annual and sick leave, if any, to be transferred.

V. L. Couch
Director of Personnel
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
	X				X		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.	
		X		CSC No. 103 6-14-48

17. SEX	18. RACE	19. APPROPRIATION	20. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: TO: 118/95400(01) 100 01	No		New York

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1947—0

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

FORM FS-349 REVISED 4-15-47

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

DATE	6-9-48
JOURNAL NO.	48

NAME	(LAST) Hunt	(FIRST) E.	(MIDDLE) Howard Jr.	DATE OF BIRTH 10-9-18	LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 472, 80th

THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE FOLLOWING ACTION CONCERNING YOUR EMPLOYMENT:

NATURE OF ACTION	Appointment by Transfer	EFFECTIVE DATE 6-9-48	SERVICE ECA DATE OF OATH 6-9-48

	FROM	TO
POSITION TITLE		U. S. Media Specialist
CLASS AND TOTAL SALARY		FSS-5, $6120 per annum
POST		Office of Special Representative Information Division Paris, France
BASIC SALARY		
TEMPORARY INCREASE		
APPROPRIATION—ALLOTMENT		118/95400(01) 100 01
POSITION NUMBER		FSS-1230-5-SR-36, admin. allocated 6-9-48

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	FULL TIME	PART TIME	PERMANENT X	TEMPORARY	FULL TIME	PART TIME X

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS	YES X NO	AMERICAN X NON-AMERICAN	VETERAN PREFERENCE	5 POINTS X 10 POINTS

LEGAL RESIDENCE New York	SEX M	MARITAL STATUS AND CHILDREN UNDER 21 Single	

NATURE OF POSITION

NEW	REALLOCATION
ADDITIONAL IDENTICAL	VICE (NAME). Vacancy X

CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS: ABOVE ACTION AND CONTINUANCE OF STATUS EFFECTED THEREBY ARE SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS LISTED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE AS ARE CITED HEREWITH:

REMARKS: Subject to items a, b, e, j, i, g.

Not to exceed the duration of the Foreign Assistance Program.

Affidavit "Striking Against the Federal Government" signed.

Previously employed by Economic Cooperation Administration, Washington, D. C. Departmental Service.

pay card delivered to Mr. Hunt

3

Everett H. Bellows
(SIGNATURE)
Everett H. Bellows
TITLE: State Department Representative to ECA

GPO 1947-742351

RECEIVING POST

FORM FS 340, REVISED 4-15-47

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

DATE 6/9/48

JOURNAL NO. AB

NAME (LAST) Hunt	(FIRST) E.	(MIDDLE) Howard Jr.	DATE OF BIRTH 10/9/18	LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 472 - 80th
THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE FOLLOWING ACTION CONCERNING YOUR EMPLOYMENT:				SERVICE ECA
NATURE OF ACTION Appointment by transfer			EFFECTIVE DATE 6/9/48	DATE OF OATH 6/9/48

	FROM	TO
POSITION TITLE		U.S. Media Specialist
CLASS AND TOTAL SALARY		FSS-5, $6120 pa
POST		Office of Special Representative Information Division Paris France
BASIC SALARY		
TEMPORARY INCREASE		
APPROPRIATION—ALLOTMENT		118/95400(01) 100 01
POSITION NUMBER		FSS-1230-5-SR-36, admin alloc 6/9/48

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	FULL TIME	PART TIME	PERMANENT X	TEMPORARY	FULL TIME X	PART TIME

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS	YES X NO	AMERICAN X NON-AMERICAN	VETERAN PREFERENCE	5 POINTS 10 POINTS X

NATURE OF POSITION

NEW	REALLOCATION
ADDITIONAL IDENTICAL	VICE (NAME) X Vacancy

LEGAL RESIDENCE New York	SEX M	MARITAL STATUS AND CHILDREN UNDER 21 Single

CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS: ABOVE ACTION AND CONTINUANCE OF STATUS EFFECTED THEREBY ARE SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS LISTED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE AS ARE CITED HEREWITH:

REMARKS: Subject to items a b c e, j, i, g.

Not to exceed the duration of the Foreign Assistance Program.

Affidavit "Striking Against the Federal Government" signed.

Previously employed by ECA, Wash. D.C. Departmental Service.

2

Everett H. Bellos (SIGNATURE)
State Department
TITLE Representative to ECA

GPO 1947-

FOLDER

FORM FS-340, REVISED 6-1947

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

DATE 6/9/48			
JOURNAL NO. 48			
NAME (LAST) Hunt	(FIRST) E.	(MIDDLE) Howard Jr.	**DATE OF BIRTH** 10/9/18
LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 472 - 80th	**SERVICE** ECA		
NATURE OF ACTION Appointment by transfer	**EFFECTIVE DATE** 6/9/48	**DATE OF OATH** 6/9/48	

THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE FOLLOWING ACTION CONCERNING YOUR EMPLOYMENT:

	FROM	TO
POSITION TITLE		U.S. Media Specialist
CLASS AND TOTAL SALARY		FSS-5, $4120 pa
POST		Office of Special Representative, Information Division Paris France
BASIC SALARY		
TEMPORARY INCREASE		
APPROPRIATION—ALLOTMENT		11[illegible](01) 100 01
POSITION NUMBER		FSS-1230-5-SR-36, Admin Office 6/9/48

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT (FROM)	PERMANENT ☐	TEMPORARY ☐	FULL TIME ☐	PART TIME ☐
NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT (TO)	PERMANENT ☒	TEMPORARY ☐	FULL TIME ☒	PART TIME ☐
RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS	YES —	NO ☐		
	AMERICAN ☒	NON-AMERICAN ☐		
VETERAN PREFERENCE	5 POINTS ☒	10 POINTS ☐		
NATURE OF POSITION	NEW ☐	REALLOCATION ☐	ADDITIONAL IDENTICAL ☐	VICE (NAME): Vacancy ☒
LEGAL RESIDENCE New York	SEX M	MARITAL STATUS AND CHILDREN UNDER 21 Single		

CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS: ABOVE ACTION AND CONTINUANCE OF STATUS EFFECTED THEREBY ARE SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS LISTED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE AS ARE CITED HEREWITH:

Subject to items a b c e. j. i. g.

REMARKS:

Not to exceed the duration of the Foreign Assistance Program.

Affidavit "Striking Against the Federal Government" signed.

Previously employed by ECA, Wash, D.C. Departmental Service.

1

[illegible] (SIGNATURE)

TITLE: [illegible]

GPO: 1947-748351

EMPLOYEE'S COPY

FORM FS-140, REVISED 8-19-47

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

DATE 6-9-48

JOURNAL NO. 4E

NAME (LAST) Hunt (FIRST) E. (MIDDLE) Howard Jr.

DATE OF BIRTH 10-9-18

LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 472, 80th

THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE FOLLOWING ACTION CONCERNING YOUR EMPLOYMENT:

SERVICE ECA

NATURE OF ACTION Appointment by Transfer

EFFECTIVE DATE 6-9-48

DATE OF OATH 6-9-48

	FROM	TO
POSITION TITLE		U. S. Media Specialist
CLASS AND TOTAL SALARY		FSS-5, $6120 per annum
POST		Office of Special Representative Information Division Paris, France
BASIC SALARY		
TEMPORARY INCREASE		
APPROPRIATION—ALLOTMENT		118/95400(01) 100 01
POSITION NUMBER		FSS-1230-5-SR-36, admin. allocated 6-9-48

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT: PERMANENT ☐ TEMPORARY ☐ FULL TIME ☐ PART TIME ☐ | PERMANENT ☒ TEMPORARY ☐ FULL TIME ☒ PART TIME ☐

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS: YES ☒ NO ☐

AMERICAN ☒ NON-AMERICAN ☐

VETERAN PREFERENCE: 5 POINTS ☒ 10 POINTS ☐

NATURE OF POSITION: NEW ☐ REALLOCATION ☐ ADDITIONAL IDENTICAL ☐ VICE (NAME) Vacancy ☒

LEGAL RESIDENCE New York

SEX M

MARITAL STATUS AND CHILDREN UNDER 21 Single

CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS: ABOVE ACTION AND CONTINUANCE OF STATUS EFFECTED THEREBY ARE SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS LISTED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE AS ARE CITED HEREWITH:

REMARKS: Subject to items a, b, e, j, i, g.

Not to exceed the duration of the Foreign Assistance Program.

Affidavit "Striking Against the Federal Government" signed.

Previously employed by Economic Cooperation Administration, Washington, D. C. Departmental Service.

2

1011

Everett H. Bellows

TITLE State Department Representative to ECA

GPO 1947 74418

FOLDER

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

DATE: 7-7-48

JOURNAL NO.: 182

NAME (LAST) Hunt	(FIRST) E.	(MIDDLE) Howard	Jr.	DATE OF BIRTH 10-9-18	LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 472 - 80th

THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE FOLLOWING ACTION CONCERNING YOUR EMPLOYMENT:

SERVICE: ECA

NATURE OF ACTION	EFFECTIVE DATE	DATE OF OATH
Appointment by Transfer - Amendment	6-9-48	6-9-48

	FROM	TO
POSITION TITLE		U. S. Media Specialist
CLASS AND TOTAL SALARY		FSS-5, $6120 per annum
POST		Office of Special Representative Information Division Paris, France
BASIC SALARY		
TEMPORARY INCREASE		
APPROPRIATION-ALLOTMENT		118/95400(01) 100 01
POSITION NUMBER		FSS-1230-5-ER-36, admin. allocated 6-9-48

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT: FROM: PERMANENT ☐ TEMPORARY ☐ FULL TIME ☐ PART TIME ☐ — TO: PERMANENT ☒ TEMPORARY ☐ FULL TIME ☒ PART TIME ☐

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS: YES ☒ NO ☐

AMERICAN ☒ NON-AMERICAN ☐

VETERAN PREFERENCE: 5 POINTS ☒ 10 POINTS ☐

NATURE OF POSITION: NEW ☐ REALLOCATION ☐ ADDITIONAL IDENTICAL ☐ VICE (NAME) ☒ Vacancy

LEGAL RESIDENCE: New York

SEX: M

MARITAL STATUS AND CHILDREN UNDER 21: Single

CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS: ABOVE ACTION AND CONTINUANCE OF STATUS EFFECTED THEREBY ARE SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS LISTED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE AS ARE CITED HEREWITH:

Subject to items a, b, e, j, i, g, d.

REMARKS: In lieu of Appointment by Transfer on personnel action report dated 6-9-48 indicating "Not to exceed the duration of the Foreign Assistance Program" instead of the following statement., and omitting subject to item d.

Limited appointment. Duration limited to the period in which appointee's services are required by ECA and in any case limited to the duration of ECA.

Affidavit "Striking Against the Federal Government" signed.

Previously employed by Economic Cooperation Administration, Washington, D. C., Departmental Services.

Melbourne L. Spector

TITLE: Assistant State Department Representative to ECA

FOLDER

14-00000

FORM FS-349, REVISED 4-19-47

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

DATE: 7/7/48

JOURNAL NO.: 155

NAME (LAST): HUNT	(FIRST): E.	(MIDDLE): HOWARD Jr.	DATE OF BIRTH: 10-9-18	LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 472 80th

THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE FOLLOWING ACTION CONCERNING YOUR EMPLOYMENT:

SERVICE: ECA

NATURE OF ACTION	EFFECTIVE DATE	DATE OF OATH
Appointment by transfer - Amendment	6/9/48	6/9/48

	FROM	TO
POSITION TITLE		U.S. Media Specialist
CLASS AND TOTAL SALARY		FSS-9 $[illegible]
POST		Office of Special Representative Information Division Paris, France
BASIC SALARY		
TEMPORARY INCREASE		
APPROPRIATION—ALLOTMENT		11/9[illegible]00(01) 100 01
POSITION NUMBER		[illegible] Admin Alloc 6/9/48

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT								
FROM	PERMANENT ☐	TEMPORARY ☐	FULL TIME ☐	PART TIME ☐				
TO	PERMANENT ☒	TEMPORARY ☐	FULL TIME ☒	PART TIME ☐				

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS	YES ☒	AMERICAN ☒	VETERAN PREFERENCE	5 POINTS ☒	
	NO ☐	NON-AMERICAN ☐		10 POINTS ☐	

NATURE OF POSITION: NEW ☐ REALLOCATION ☐ ADDITIONAL IDENTICAL ☐ VICE (NAME): ☒ Vacancy

LEGAL RESIDENCE	SEX	MARITAL STATUS AND CHILDREN UNDER 21
New York	M	Single

CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS: ABOVE ACTION AND CONTINUANCE OF STATUS EFFECTED THEREBY ARE SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS LISTED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE AS ARE CITED HEREWITH:

Subject to items a. b. e. j i. g. d.

REMARKS:

In lieu of appointment by transfer on personnel action report dated 6/9/48 indicating "Not to exceed the duration of the Foreign Assistance Program" instead of the following statement and omitting subject to item d.

Limited appointment. Duration limited to the period in which appointee's services are required by ECA and in any case limited to the duration of ECA.

Previously employed by ECA Wash., D.C. Departmental Service.

Affidavit "Striking Against the Federal Government" signed.

Paris 7/28

Post 7/28

3

Melbourne L. [illegible] (SIGNATURE)

TITLE: Asst St to [illegible]
[illegible]

☆ GPO: 1947-748381

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

DATE 7-7-48

JOURNAL NO. 182

NAME (LAST)	(FIRST)	(MIDDLE)		DATE OF BIRTH	LEGAL AUTHORITY
Hunt	E.	Howard	Jr.	10-9-18	PL 472 - 80th

THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE FOLLOWING ACTION CONCERNING YOUR EMPLOYMENT

SERVICE ECA

NATURE OF ACTION	EFFECTIVE DATE	DATE OF OATH
Appointment by Transfer - Amendment	6-9-48	6-9-48

	FROM	TO
POSITION TITLE		U. S. Media Specialist
CLASS AND TOTAL SALARY		FSS-5, $6120 per annum
POST		Office of Special Representative Information Division Paris, France
BASIC SALARY		
TEMPORARY INCREASE		
APPROPRIATION—ALLOTMENT		118/99?00(01) 100 01
POSITION NUMBER		FSS-1790-5-CB-36, admin. allocated 6-9-48

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	FULL TIME	PART TIME	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	FULL TIME	PART TIME
						☒		☒

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS	YES ☒	AMERICAN ☒	VETERAN PREFERENCE	5 POINTS ☒	NATURE OF POSITION	
	NO	NON-AMERICAN		10 POINTS	NEW	REALLOCATION

LEGAL RESIDENCE	SEX	MARITAL STATUS AND CHILDREN UNDER 21	ADDITIONAL IDENTICAL	VICE (NAME)
New York	M	Single		Vacancy ☒

CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS. ABOVE ACTION AND CONTINUANCE OF STATUS EFFECTED THEREBY ARE SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS LISTED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE AS ARE CITED HEREWITH:

Subject to items a, b, c, j, i, g, d.

REMARKS: In lieu of Appointment by Transfer on personal action report dated 6-9-48 indicating "Not to exceed the duration of the Foreign Assistance Program" instead of the following statement, and omitting subject to item d.

Limited appointment. Duration limited to the period in which appointee's services are required by ECA and in any case limited to the duration of ECA.

Affidavit "Striking Against the Federal Government" signed.

Previously employed by Economic Cooperation Administration, Washington, D. C., Departmental Services.

7

Melbourne L. Spector

TITLE Assistant State Department

[illegible]

BUDGET .

14-00000

(Date) July 29, 1948

To: Director of Personnel

From: Director of Security

Subj: Notice of Loyalty and Security Certification of:

HUNT, E. Howard, Jr. ECA-48-189

This is to advise that the above named person has been certified by the Administrator as to loyalty and security in accordance with the requirements of Section 110(c), Public Law 472, 80th Congress, and appears on Certification Number 17, dated July 28, 1948.

J W Yeagley
Director of Security

Payroll copy attached.

Paris Mission

jwy:dy

ECA.72 (7.48)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION
SPECIAL MISSION TO AUSTRIA

November 19, 1948

Mr. Averell Harriman,
U. S. Special Representative,
Economic Cooperation Administration,
Hotel Talleyrand,
Paris, France.

Dear Averell:

On the point of departure from Vienna, I want to record with you my appreciation of the services rendered me in this Mission over the last few weeks by Mr. Howard Hunt, Information Officer, temporarily assigned here from your staff.

Hunt has not only carried the duties and responsibilities of Information Officer, pending appointment of Mr. Wilson to that post, but he has, additionally, carried a large load for me in connection with the Ross murder incident. He has acted as a personal aide, to all intents and purposes, at a time when, understaffed as this Mission is, we were faced with a concentration of vitally important work in connection with our normal Mission operations.

I think Hunt has shown a broad-gauged grasp of what ERP is, what ECA is, and what Information work in behalf of both should be. Besides this, he is the right kind of person to have in this great ECA undertaking. I hope you will be able to keep him and to give him opportunities to express his abilities fully.

Sincerely,

Westmore Willcox

Westmore Willcox
Chief of Special Mission

WW/ls

cc: Mr. Hoffman
Mr. Friendly

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

DATE: 3-17-49

JOURNAL NO.: 4 E

NAME	(LAST) HUNT	(FIRST) E.	HOWARD	(MIDDLE) Jr.	DATE OF BIRTH 10-9-18

LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 472 - 80th "ECA"

THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE FOLLOWING ACTION CONCERNING YOUR EMPLOYMENT

NATURE OF ACTION: Termination

EFFECTIVE DATE: cob 2-19-49

DATE OF OATH:

	FROM	TO
POSITION TITLE	Asst. Economic Commissioner * (U. S. Media Specialist)	
CLASS AND TOTAL SALARY	FSS-5 (ECA) $6120 per annum	
POST	Office of Special Representative Information Division Paris, France	
BASIC SALARY		
TEMPORARY INCREASE		
APPROPRIATION-ALLOTMENT	118/95400(01).008	
POSITION NUMBER	FSS-5-SR-36 admin. allocated 6-9-48	

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT	PERMANENT	X	TEMPORARY		FULL TIME	X	PART TIME		PERMANENT		TEMPORARY		FULL TIME		PART TIME	

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS: YES X / NO

AMERICAN X / NON-AMERICAN

VETERAN PREFERENCE: 5 POINTS X / 10 POINTS

NATURE OF POSITION: NEW / REALLOCATION / ADDITIONAL IDENTICAL / VICE (NAME)

LEGAL RESIDENCE: New York

SEX: M

MARITAL STATUS AND CHILDREN UNDER 21: Single

CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS: ABOVE ACTION AND CONTINUANCE OF STATUS EFFECTED THEREBY ARE SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS LISTED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE AS ARE CITED HEREWITH.

REMARKS:

* Equivalent to Attache.

Completion of Assignment

Mailing address: 30 Willett Street, Albany 6, New York

2

D. V. Stapleton
State Department

TITLE: Representative to ECA

FOLDER

FORM FS-349, REVISED 4-15-47

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

DATE 3-17-49

JOURNAL NO. 4 E

NAME (LAST) HUNT (FIRST) E. (MIDDLE) HOWARD Jr.

DATE OF BIRTH 10-9-18

LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 472 - 80th

"ECA"

THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE FOLLOWING ACTION CONCERNING YOUR EMPLOYMENT:

NATURE OF ACTION Termination

EFFECTIVE DATE cob 2-19-49

DATE OF OATH

	FROM	TO
POSITION TITLE	Asst. Economic Commissioner * (U. S. Media Specialist)	
CLASS AND TOTAL SALARY	FSS-5 (ECA) $6120 per annum	
POST	Office of Special Representative Information Division Paris, France	
BASIC SALARY		
TEMPORARY INCREASE		
APPROPRIATION—ALLOTMENT	113/92400(01).098	
POSITION NUMBER	FSS-5-SR-36 admin. allocated 6-9-48	

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT	PERMANENT	X	TEMPORARY		FULL TIME	X	PART TIME		PERMANENT		TEMPORARY		FULL TIME		PART TIME	

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS	YES	X	AMERICAN	X	VETERAN PREFERENCE	5 POINTS	X	NATURE OF POSITION	
	NO		NON-AMERICAN			10 POINTS		NEW	REALLOCATION
LEGAL RESIDENCE New York			SSS R		MARITAL STATUS AND CHILDREN UNDER 21 [illegible]			ADDITIONAL IDENTICAL	VICE (NAME)

CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS: ABOVE ACTION AND CONTINUANCE OF STATUS EFFECTED THEREBY ARE SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS LISTED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE AS ARE CITED HEREWITH:

REMARKS:

* Equivalent to Attache.

Completion of Assignment

Mailing address: 30 Willett Street, Albany 6, New York

D. V. Stapleton
State Department
TITLE Representative to ECA mm

10

GPO 1947-742151

PUBLICATIONS

STANDARD FORM 57—NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

PLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office *any other forms required by the announcement.* Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR
Intelligence Officer

2. OPTION(S) *(if mentioned in examination announcement)*

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR *(City and State)*
Washington, D.C.

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION
Mar 9, 1949

5. MR. ~~MRS.~~ ~~MISS~~ *(First name)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden, if any)* *(Last)*
Everette Howard Hunt, Jr.

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER
30 Willett Street

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE *(including postal zone)* AND STATE
Albany 6, New York

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE *(State)*
New York

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE

(B) HOME PHONE
3-6218

9. DATE OF BIRTH *(month, day, year)*
October 9, 1918

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH *(city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country)*
Hamburg, New York, USA

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 10 INCHES

(B) WEIGHT: 168 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE
FSS 5

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON APPOR.

MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED

ENTERED REGISTER:

NOTATIONS:

APP. REVIEW:

APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $8,000 PER YEAR.
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR:
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☒ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY:
☒ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS:

16. EXPERIENCE: It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

①

PRESENT POSITION Not presently employed

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)*
FROM: TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION

CLASSIFICATION GRADE *(if in Federal Service)*

SALARY OR EARNINGS:
STARTING, $ PER
PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(city and State)*

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)*

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)*

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM May, 1948 TO Feb., 1949
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: U.S. Media Specialist
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service): FSS 5
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $5010 PER yr; FINAL $5420 PER yr.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Washington, D.C.; Paris, France
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: J. M. Fleming, U.S. Media Officer
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):
Economic Cooperation Administration
2 rue St. Florentin, Paris 1, France
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
REASON FOR LEAVING: Deterioration of personal affairs while abroad.
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
General public relations work involving preparation of press releases, holding of press conferences; traveling with Ambassador Harriman as public relations aide; giving advice and guidance to journalists and American business men; liaison work with U.S. Embassy and U.S.I.S.; liaison work with French and Austrian governments; writing and production of documentary films. Press scrutiny; analysis of Communist propaganda

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Jan., 1945 TO Oct., 1945
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: War Correspondent
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $150 PER wk; FINAL $150 PER wk
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): New York, N.Y.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Dan Longwell, Editor of LIFE
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):
Rockefeller Plaza, N.Y.
TIME, Inc.
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Publishing
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: None
REASON FOR LEAVING: Re-enter military service
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Travel to South Pacific combat zone; report on campaign and unusual occurrences in South Pacific

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: Oct., 1942 TO: Jan., 1945
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Script Writer
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $150 PER wk; FINAL $150 PER wk
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): New York, N.Y.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Louis de Rochemont; Producer
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):
THE MARCH OF TIME
369 Lexington Avenue, New York 16
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Documentary films
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: None
REASON FOR LEAVING: Opportunity to revisit combat zones
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Creating from researched themes the framework of the monthly commercial release; writing to film footage; liaison with Navy Department over preparation of contract training films; writing of Navy training films.

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFIED GRADE (if in Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU		REASON FOR LEAVING	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
Feb'41	May'41	US Naval Academy	V-7 Midshipman's course
Feb'44	May'44	AAF OCS	Officer Candidate School
June'44	Aug'44	Orlando, Fla.	Air Combat Intelligence
Feb'45	March'45	Catalina I.	OSS Far East Training Course

18. EDUCATION. (Circle highest grade completed):

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF.

☒ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☒ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED

Hamburg (N.Y.) High

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

not applicable

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Brown University, Providence, R.I.	English	1936	1940	4		AB	June'40	

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
English literature	---		
Spanish	---		
Economics	---		

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN-SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
Spanish	x					x	x		
French		x				x			x

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

Europe, Melanesia, Mexico
1939-1949, pleasure and business

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ..... SHORTHAND .....

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR):

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

4 published novels; short stories

Guggenheim Fellowship 1946-1947

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Westmore Willcox, Jr.	40 William St., New York City	Investments
2. Robert G. North	5247 Fredonia Drive, Hollywood, Cal.	Textiles
3. Maj. J. K. Singlaub	"L" Bldg., Washington, D.C.	U. S. Army

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	--	--
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN ~~OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED~~ STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
see below	
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO. (*if none, give grade or rating at time of separation*)
	see below

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?	X	
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		X
		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		X

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19.....

....

Agency: Title:

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
37d	Navy: July, 1940 - Oct., 1942		File 97532
	Army: Oct., 1943 - Feb., 1946		Serial 0-587241

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT E. Howard Hunt, Jr.

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

STANDARD FORM 57—NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYM

INSTRUCTIONS: In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office *any other forms required* by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: Intelligence Officer
2. OPTION(S) *(if mentioned in examination announcement)*:
3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR *(City and State)*: Washington, D. C.
4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: May 9, 1949
5. MR. ~~MRS.~~ ~~MISS~~ *(First name)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden, if any)* *(Last)*: Everette Howard Hunt, Jr.
6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 30 Willett Street
(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE *(including postal zone)* AND STATE: Albany 6, New York
7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE *(State)*: New York
8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: ----
(B) HOME PHONE: 3-6218
9. DATE OF BIRTH *(month, day, year)*: October 9, 1918
10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE
11. PLACE OF BIRTH *(city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country)*: Hamburg, New York, USA
12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE
13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 10 INCHES
(B) WEIGHT: 168 POUNDS
14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO
(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE: FSS 5

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON APPOR.	MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED	ENTERED REGISTER:
NOTATIONS:	APP. REVIEW: APPROVED:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 3,000 PER YEAR.
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.
(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR: ☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☒ 6 TO 12 MONTHS
NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*
(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: ☒ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY
(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: ☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(*a*) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(*b*) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① **PRESENT POSITION** Not presently employed.

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)*: FROM TO PRESENT TIME
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION:
CLASSIFICATION GRADE *(if in Federal Service)*:
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING, $ PER PRESENT, $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(city and State)*:
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)*:
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)*:
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:
REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT:
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM May 1948 TO Feb. 1949
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION U.S. Media Specialist
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service) [illegible]
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 5940 PER yr. FINAL $8420 PER yr.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Washington, D. C.; Paris, France
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR J.F. Fleming, U.S. Media Officer
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
Economic Cooperation Administration
2 rue St. Florentin, Paris 1, France
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
REASON FOR LEAVING Deterioration of personal affair while abroad.
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
General public relations work involving preparation of press releases, holding of pres conferences; traveling with Ambassador Harriman as public relations aide; giving advic and guidance to journalists and American business men; liaison work with U.S. Embassy and U.S.I.S.; liaison work with French and Austrian governments; writing and productio of documentary films. Press scrutiny; analysis of Communist propaganda.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Jan. 1943 TO Oct. 1943
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION War Correspondent
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ 150 PER wk.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) New York, N.Y.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Dan Longwell, Editor of LIFE
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
Rockefeller Plaza, N.Y.
TIME, Inc.
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Publishing
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU None
REASON FOR LEAVING Re-enter military service
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Travel to South Pacific combat zone; report on campaign and unusual occurrences in South Pacific

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Oct. 1942 TO Jan. 1943
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Script Writer
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ 150 PER wk.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) New York, N.Y.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Louis de Rochemont; producer
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
THE MARCH OF TIME
369 Lexington Avenue, New York 16
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Documentary films.
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU None
REASON FOR LEAVING Opportunity to revisit combat zones.
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Creating from researched themes the framework of the monthly commercial release; writing to film footage; liaison with Navy Department over preparation of contract training films; writing of Navy training films.

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (*month, year*) FROM TO	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFIED GRADE (*if in Federal service*)	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (*city and State*)		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (*firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division*)		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (*e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.*)	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU		REASON FOR LEAVING	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full description.)

DATES		LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
FROM	TO		
Feb.'41	May'41	US Naval Academy	V-7 Midshipman's course
Feb.'44	May'44	AAF OCS	Officer Candidate School
June'44	Aug.'44	Orlando, Fla.	Air Combat Intelligence
Feb.'45	Mar.'45	Catalina I.	OSS Far East Training Course

18 EDUCATION (*Circle highest grade completed*):

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF

☒ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☒ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED

Hamburg (N.Y.) High

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

not applicable

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED		DEGREES CONFERRED		SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
		FROM	TO	DAY	NIGHT	TITLE	DATE	
Brown University, Providence, R.I.	English	1936	1940	4		AB	June '40	

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
English Literature			
Spanish			
Economics			

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (*show name and location of school*) OR "IN SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED	
		FROM	TO	DAY	NIGHT

19 INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR
Spanish	X					X		X	
French		X				X			X

22 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (*such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.*)?

☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20 IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (*e. g., military service, business, education, recreation*) Europe, Melanesia, Mexico, 1939-1949, pleasure and business

21 LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET-LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING SHORTHAND

23 GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (*do not submit copies unless requested*)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

2 published novels; short stories
Guggenheim Fellowship 1946-1947

14-00000

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. (Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 14 (EXPERIENCE).

	FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.	Westmore Willcox, Jr.	69 William St., New York City	Investments
2.	Robert G. North	3947 Fredonia Drive, Hollywood, Cal.	Textiles
3.	Maj. J.K. Singlaub	"L" Bldg., Washington, D. C.	U.S. Army

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	—	—
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for each debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified thereon.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
See below	
BRANCH OF SERVICE (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.)	**SERIAL NO.** (if none, give grade or rating at time of separation).
	See below

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?	X	
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		X
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		X

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19.....

Agency: .... Title ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (Indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
37d	Navy: July, 1940 - Oct. 1942 File 97332		
	Army: Oct.1942 - Feb.1946 Serial 0-867241		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT ....

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married, use own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

II 297

NAME: H. T. ~~[illegible]~~ Howard, Jr.

NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 8 Nov. 1949

CLASSIFICATION	**INITIAL** OJ	**DATE** 6/20/49
VICE		Auth# 297
IA	✓	CSC # 3112
VV		
NEW		6-2-49
QUALIFICATION & REVIEW ✓	**INITIAL**	**DATE** 6/17/49
210597		6/27/49
800-101		

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS
LAST WORKING DAY:

FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

APPROVED:

SIGNATURE EXECUTIVE 107

SIGNATURE EXECUTIVE FOR ADM

Kelly 6/23/49
SIGNATURE CHIEF, PERSONNEL BRANCH

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer P-6 (Editor) ~~[illegible]~~
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-12 7600.00 p.a. ~~[illegible]~~
OFFICE		OIC
BRANCH		Program & Planning Staff ~~Prog. Group 11~~
DIVISION		Editorial Prod Div ~~[illegible]~~
SECTION		
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
DEPT. OR FIELD		Departmental - 130.

REMARKS:

Searched 107 6/23/49

Attached are 2 Forms 57.
Security initiated 3 June 1949.

POSTED

RECOMMENDED: OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF, OR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

DATE 13 June 1949

FORM NO. 37-3
OCT 1946

(1514)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED.
BUDGET BUREAU NO. [illegible]

.ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

P.C. 9/30/49
(mmf) 130

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS. FIRST–MIDDLE INITIAL–LAST) Mr. Howard Hunt	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/9/18	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. #297	4. DATE 11/3/49

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Excepted Appointment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 11/8/49	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer, GS-13 (Editor)
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	GS-13, $7600.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC Program & Planning Staff Program Group II Editorial Prod. Division
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

Appointment is subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.

DOG 08/16/53
CSCOD } 11/08/49
LCO }

ROBERT B.J. HOPKINS
Chief, Employees Division
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE							
NONE	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
	X				X		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION				
NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL	
		X		Bu. #2971 CSC #3112 6/2/49

17. SEX	18. RACE	19. APPROPRIATION	20. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM TO 2105900 800-101	Yes	11/3/49	Va.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions:
1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office: ---
Ext. ---
Home: 3-8218

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) XXX Mr. XXX Everette Howard Hunt, Jr. (First, Middle, Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 30 Willett Street, Albany 6, New York, U.S.A. (St. & No., City, State, Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 30 Willett Street, Albany 6, New York, U.S.A. (St. & No., City, State, Country)

B. NICKNAME Howie WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? Howard Hunt

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? nom de plume

HOW LONG? 7 years IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS --------

(Where?) (By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 10/9/18 PLACE OF BIRTH Hamburg, N.Y., U.S.A. (City, State, Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? Yes BY MARRIAGE? ---

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # ____ ISSUED ____ (Date) BY ____ (Court)

AT ____ (City, State, Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) ____ (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ____ TO ____ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ____ (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS not applicable

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS:

not applicable

FORM NO. 50-1
SEP 1948

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ----

PORT OF ENTRY? ______ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ______

LAST U.S. VISA ______ Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 30 SEX Male HEIGHT 5' 10 1/2" WEIGHT 168

EYES Blue HAIR Brown COMPLEXION Fair SCARS right eyebrow

BUILD medium OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES None

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE X MARRIED ______ DIVORCED ______ WIDOWED ______

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ______

not applicable

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE — INCLUDE ANNULMENTS — USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE not applicable First Middle Maiden Last

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ______

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE ______ St. & No. City State Country

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______ City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______ City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ______ Date TO ______ Date BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

______

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents) None

1. NAME -------- RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. City State Country)

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. City State Country)

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. City State Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Everette (First) Howard (Middle) Hunt (Last)
LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______
PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS 30 Willett street, Albany 6, N.Y., USA (St. & No. City State Country)
DATE OF BIRTH 13 Dec '88 PLACE OF BIRTH Hamburg, New York, USA (City State Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______
CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? ______ (City State Country)
OCCUPATION Lawyer LAST EMPLOYER Self
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS ~~not applicable~~ 11 NORTH PEARL ST. ALBANY, 6, N.Y (St. & No. City State Country)
MILITARY SERVICE FROM 1916 (Date) TO 1918 (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE Air Service, SC
COUNTRY USA DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.
not applicable

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Ethel (First) Jean (Middle) Hunt (Last)
LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 30 Willett Street, Albany 6, New York, USA (St. & No. City State Country)
DATE OF BIRTH 15 March '91 PLACE OF BIRTH Canal Dover, Ohio
CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? ______ (City State Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER ----

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ______ TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

not applicable

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME not applicable First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
2. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
3. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
4. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
5. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME not applicable First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______ City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME not applicable
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________
City State Country

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME not applicable RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME not applicable RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

2. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

SEC. 12. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL Hamburg PS ADDRESS Hamburg, N.Y., USA (City State Country)
DATES ATTENDED 1924-1932 GRADUATE? Yes
HIGH SCHOOL Hamburg High School ADDRESS Hamburg, N.Y., USA (City State Country)
DATES ATTENDED 1932-1936 GRADUATE? Yes
COLLEGE Brown University ADDRESS Providence 12, R.I., USA (City State Country)
DATES ATTENDED 1936-1940 DEGREE A.B.
COLLEGE ______ ADDRESS ______ (City State Country)
DATES ATTENDED ______ DEGREE ______

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

Country	Service	Rank	Dates of Service
USA	USAAF	1st Lt.	1943-1946
USA	USNR	Ensign	1940-1942

HQ Det. 202, OSS China (Last Station) 0-587241 (Serial No.) Honorable (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: ______
SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER None ADDRESS ______
IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON ______
INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS ______
not applicable

SEC. 14. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

1. FROM May, 1948 TO February, 1949

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Economic Cooperation Administration
ADDRESS 2 rue St. Florentin, Paris 1, France (St. & No. City State Country)
KIND OF BUSINESS Public Relations NAME OF SUPERVISOR J. F. Fleming
TITLE OF JOB U.S. Media Specialist SALARY $ 8420. PER Year
YOUR DUTIES General PR work plus speech writing for Ambassador Harriman; film production.
REASONS FOR LEAVING My publishing affairs deteriorated to such an extent that my presence in America became imperative for financial reasons.

2. FROM January, 1943 TO October, 1943

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY TIME, Inc.

ADDRESS Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York, USA
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS Publishing NAME OF SUPERVISOR Dan Longwell

TITLE OF JOB War Correspondent SALARY $ 150. PER week

YOUR DUTIES Report on South Pacific campaign

REASONS FOR LEAVING To re-enter military service

3. FROM October, 1942 TO January, 1943

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY The March of Time (TIME, Inc.)

ADDRESS 369 Lexington Avenue, New York 16, New York, USA
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS documentary films NAME OF SUPERVISOR Louis de Rochemont

TITLE OF JOB Script writer SALARY $150. PER week

YOUR DUTIES Write Naval training films and assist on monthly release.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Opportunity to return to a combat zone for LIFE.

4. FROM ______ TO ______

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY ______

ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS ______ NAME OF SUPERVISOR ______

TITLE OF JOB ______ SALARY $______ PER ______

YOUR DUTIES ______

REASONS FOR LEAVING ______

5. FROM ______ TO ______

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY ______

ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS ______ NAME OF SUPERVISOR ______

TITLE OF JOB ______ SALARY $______ PER ______

YOUR DUTIES ______

REASONS FOR LEAVING ______

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

Street and Number City State

1. Mr. Murray Snouse BUS. ADD. State Bank of Albany, N.Y.
RES. ADD. 321 State Street, Albany, N.Y.
2. Mr. Chester T. Hubbell BUS. ADD. Hubbell Lumber Co., Albany, NY,
RES. ADD. Loudonville, New York
3. Hon. Westmore Willcox BUS. ADD. 63 William St., New York 5, NY
RES. ADD. East End Avenue, New York, N.Y.
4. Dr. Bruce Bigelow BUS. ADD. Brown University, Providence, R.I.
RES. ADD. Brown University, Providence, R.I.
5. Dr. R. G. Noyes BUS. ADD. Brown University, Providence, R.I.
RES. ADD. 164 Anthony St., E. Providence, R.I.

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. Hon. Archibald Douglas, Jr. BUS. ADD. 120 Broadway, New York, New York
RES. ADD. 455 E. 57th St., New York, N.Y.
2. Hon. MacNeill Mitchell BUS. ADD. 36 W. 44th Street, New York, NY
RES. ADD. 137 East 35th St., New York, N.Y.
3. Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay BUS. ADD. "L" Bldg., Washington, D. C.
RES. ADD. 3416 Que St., Washington, DC
4. Mr. Robert G. North BUS. ADD. 1719 North McCadden Place, Hollywood
RES. ADD. 3947 Fredonia Dr., Hollywood, Cal.
5. Maj. J. K. Singlaub BUS. ADD. "L" Bldg., Washington, D. C.
RES. ADD. 5509 Johnson Ave., Bethesda, Md.

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. Mr. J. Stanley Davis BUS. ADD. 3 Englewood Place, Albany, N.Y.
RES. ADD. 90 State St., Albany, N.Y.

2. Mr. Peter Kiernan, Jr. BUS. ADD. 5 Englewood Place, Albany, N.Y.
RES. ADD. 120 State Street, Albany, N.Y.

3. Bishop E. L. Barry BUS. ADD. ----
RES. ADD. 32 Willett Street, Albany, N.Y.

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? No IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME Royalties from book publishing

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
State Bank of Albany, N.Y.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: not applicable

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

1. NAME Brooks Brothers ADDRESS 346 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y.
St. & No. City State
2. NAME Abercrombie & Fitch ADDRESS Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y.
St. & No. City State
3. NAME Hotels Statler ADDRESS New York, New York
St. & No. City State

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM 1941 TO Present 30 Willett Street, Albany 6, N.Y., USA
St. No. City State Country
FROM 1937 TO 1941 125 Lancaster Ave., Buffalo, N.Y., USA
St. No. City State Country
FROM 1918 TO 1937 3 5 Maple Avenue, Hamburg, New York, USA
St. No. City State Country
FROM ______ TO ______
St. No. City State Country
FROM ______ TO ______
St. No. City State Country
FROM ______ TO ______
St. No. City State Country
FROM ______ TO ______
St. No. City State Country
FROM ______ TO ______

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM June '39 TO Sept., 1939 Europe Pleasure
City or Section Country Purpose
FROM March '47 TO July, '47 Mexico Guggenheim Fellowship
City or Section Country Purpose
FROM June '48 TO Feb. '49 Europe Business
City or Section Country Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT — NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE:

Diplomatic 4267, 10 June, 1948, Washington

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? Two GIVE APPROXIMATE

DATES: May, 1939 January, 1943

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: ________

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. Zeta Psi Fraternity, Epsilon; Providence, R.I., USA
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: February 1937 to present

2. Brown University Club; 86 Park Ave., New York, N.Y., USA
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1942 to present

3. Army & Navy Club, 1627 "I" St., Washington 6, D.C., USA
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: June, 1948 to present

4. Fort Orange Club, 110 Washington Ave., Albany 6, N.Y., USA
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: February, 1946 to present

5. Albany Country Club, Albany 3, N.Y., USA
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: May, 1947 to November, 1948

6. Authors League of America, 6 E. 39th St., New York, N.Y., USA
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1942 to present

7. Screen Writers Guild, 1655 North Cherokee, Hollywood, Cal., USA
Name and Chapter — St. & No. — City — State — Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1947 to present

8. American Legion, Fort Orange Post, Albany, N.Y., USA

1942 to present

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Spanish SPEAK slight READ fluent WRITE fair

LANGUAGE French SPEAK fair READ fluent WRITE slight

LANGUAGE German SPEAK ------ READ slight WRITE ------

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Swimming - excellent Music(piano) - fair

Tennis - fair

Trap shooting - good

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Wartime OSS service as CBI Reports Officer

Graduate AAF Combat Intelligence School

Lecturer on Psychological Warfare at Army-Navy Staff College

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

Economic Cooperation Administration

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

Office of Strategic Services - December, 1944

ECA - June, 1943

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: No

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? Yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Moderately

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Mrs. E. H. Hunt RELATIONSHIP Mother

ADDRESS 30 Willett Street, Albany 6, New York, USA
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Albany, New York City and State DATE May 11, 1949

John F. [illegible] Witness

61 [illegible] St. Albany NY

Everett Howard Hunt Jr. Signature of Applicant

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

14. Time unaccounted for in the Employment History was spent either in College, Military or Naval Service or in creative writing.

14. 1 Salary stated is inclusive of allowances.

19. A To date I have published 4 novels, one of which deals in part with OSS activities in Europe and the Far East during the war. In past years I have contributed to LIBERTY, THE NEW YORKER, and COSMOPOLITAN. My royalties yield me an average of $3,000 a year above my salary. A fifth novel is to be published in August, 1949, and this year an estimated 1 million copies of two books in pocket editions will be in circulation.

22. American War Correspondents Association, 13 West 54th Street, New York, New York

23. C At the request of the Allied High Commissioner for Austria, Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, I was placed on assignment in Vienna to the ECA Special Mission for the purpose of writing and producing an official U.S. documentary film directed at the Anti-communist elements of Austria, and specifically toward Austrian labor groups. The film has received wide distribution in all Allied zones except the Russian Zone, and its showing at the Vienna Fair, I have been informed, was the subject of an official Russian protest. I was solely responsible for the creation of this film, MIT VEREINTEN KRAEFTEN.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

To : xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Deputy Personnel Officer
Date: 30 September 1949

From : Chief of Inspection and Security
Number: 23600

Subject: HUNT, Everette Howard, Jr.

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

☒ Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Memorandum dated 3 June 1949 stated Subject is an applicant for OPC.

BERNAL P. GEISS
Chief, Personnel Security Division

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
MAY 1949

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office:
Ext.
Home:

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ EVERETTE (First) HOWARD (Middle) HUNT, JR. (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED?

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES?

HOW LONG? IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

(Where?) (By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH (City) (State) (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country) BY BIRTH? BY MARRIAGE?

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # ISSUED (Date) BY (Court)

AT (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? TO ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? GIVE PARTICULARS:

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ____

PORT OF ENTRY? ____ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ____

LAST U.S. VISA ____ Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE ____ SEX ____ HEIGHT ____ WEIGHT ____

EYES ____ HAIR ____ COMPLEXION ____ SCARS ____

BUILD ____ OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ____

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE ____ MARRIED x DIVORCED ____ WIDOWED ____

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NOT APPLICABLE

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE — INCLUDE ANNULMENTS — USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE DOROTHY (First) LOUISE (Middle) WETZEL (Maiden) HUNT (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE MILLBROOK NEW YORK SEPT 7-1949

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE C/O ECA (St. & No.) PARIS (City) (State) FRANCE (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 30 WILLETT ST (St. & No.) ALBANY (City) NY (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH APR 1-1920 PLACE OF BIRTH DAYTON (City) OHIO (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOT APPLICABLE

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? ____ City State Country

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER ECA PARIS FRANCE

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS NOT APPLICABLE (St. & No. City State Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NOT (Date) TO APPLICABLE (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ____

COUNTRY — DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

US DEPT OF STATE JULY 1944 - JAN 1946 - BERN S/W

US TREASURY DEPT APR 1946 - MAY 1947 - SHANGHAI, CHINA.

ECA APR 1948 - AUG 1949 - PARIS, FRANCE

NOTE WIFE'S F[illegible]ER MARRIED NA[illegible] 'GENTIERE'.

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents) NOT APPLICABLE

1. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________
CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ________
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________
City State Country

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ________ TO ________ BRANCH OF SERVICE ________
Date Date

COUNTRY ________ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.
____

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ________
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents) NOT APPLICABLE

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ______
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ______ TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______
Date Date

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.
______

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ______
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ________ TO ________ BRANCH OF SERVICE ________

COUNTRY ________ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

____

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME ________ First Middle Last AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
2. FULL NAME ________ First Middle Last AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
3. FULL NAME ________ First Middle Last AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
4. FULL NAME ________ First Middle Last AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
5. FULL NAME ________ First Middle Last AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

---

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME ALBERT (First) CHARLES (Middle) WETZEL (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — . CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS c/o NCR (St. & No.) DAYTON (City) OHIO (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH JUNE 17 1891 PLACE OF BIRTH DAYTON OHIO USA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

NOT APPLICABLE

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? ________ City State Country

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER NATIONAL CASH REGISTER DAYTON, OHIO

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME JEANNETTE (First) ELNER (Middle) DAVIS (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 183 HAWTHORNE (St. & No.) AVE (City) SARASOTA (State) FLA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH SEPT 4-1891 PLACE OF BIRTH DAYTON, OHIO USA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOT APPLICABLE

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION RECEPTIONIST LAST EMPLOYER SARASOTA HOSPITAL

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES: NOT APPLICABLE

1. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. NOT APPLICABLE

1. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

2. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT SARASOTA, FLA. (City and State) DATE 11 OCT. 1949

Jeannette Davis (Witness)

E Howard Hunt Jr. (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

J

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME [redacted] E. Howard Hunt		DATE 22 August 1950
NATURE OF ACTION Appointment		EFFECTIVE DATE 10 December 1950 ~~27 August 1950~~ 10 Dec. 1950
	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer II ~~Chief of Station~~
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-13 $7,600 p.a.
OFFICE		OPC
DIVISION		Latin America
BRANCH		Operations
OFFICIAL STATION		Mexico, Mexico City

QUALIFICATIONS Joseph S. Reff	APPROVAL FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 11 Sept 50 C. D. Hulick EAD/OPC	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION W-131 Austin J. Thomas	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 11 December 1950

SECURITY CLEARED ON 7 December 1950 7 December 1950

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 11 December 1950

ENTERED ON DUTY 10 December 1950

Chloie D. Hudson
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Charge to Mexico slot #1, JBEDICT
Budgetary allotment LA #3
~~Transfer~~ annual & ~~sick leave from [illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~

Transfer annual & sick leave
from unvouchered funds.

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH
DEO

✓ E. H. Farr

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

GPO CSO 50-284

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 19[illegible])
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Central Intelligence Agency (Department or agency) .... (Bureau or division) Washington, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, E. Howard Hunt, Jr., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

11 Dec. 1950 (Date of entrance on duty)

E. Howard Hunt Jr. (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 11th day of December, A. D. 1950,

at Washington (City) D. C. (State)

[illegible] (Signature of officer)

[SEAL]

Clerk (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—[illegible]

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*)

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY	(B) RELATIONSHIP	(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE	(D) TELEPHONE NO.
E. H. Hunt	Father	30 Willett St. Albany 6, N.Y.	3-6218

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?		
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

SECRET

MR file CR

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: E. Howard Hunt, Jr.

DATE: 13 December 1950

NATURE OF ACTION: Integration

EFFECTIVE DATE: 13 December 1950

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-13	Attache FSR-4
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-13 $7,600.00	FSR-4 $7,830.00
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	LA	LA
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION	Mexico City, Mexico	Mexico City, Mexico

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER Jcc 13dec50	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Subject is due a lump sum payment for annual leave to be paid up to 12 December 1950.

POSTED
16 Dec

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO DSC 50-284

SECRET

File

Agreement

AGREEMENT made this 13th day of December, 1950, effective the 13th day of December, 1950, by and between the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the Government), as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, and E. Howard Hunt, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as the Employee).

RECITALS

A. The Government desires the services of the Employee for CIA under circumstances requiring the Employee to receive a Foreign Service Staff Corps designation from the Department of State and proposes to send the Employee overseas to Mexico ________________ for operations in the general area of ____________________.

B. The Employee desires as an employee of the Government to serve CIA abroad under the supervision and control of the Assistant Director for Special Operations, CIA, (ADSO) and is willing to accept a designation in the Foreign Service Staff Corps with the obligations thereof.

In consideration of the premises, the mutual covenants and promises herein contained, and for other good and valuable considerations, the parties hereto agree as follows:

ARTICLE I. Relationship of Employee to the Department of State. The Employee, in so far as possible, shall abide by all the rules, regulations, and customs of the Foreign Service of the United States which affect personnel of the Foreign Service Staff Corps in order to appear as a normal member of the Foreign Service establishment.

1. The Employee shall rigidly comply with the provisions of Title X, Part A of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, prohibiting officers and employees of the Foreign Service from:

   - (a) Wearing uniforms;
   - (b) Accepting presents from foreign governments;
   - (c) Engaging in business abroad;
   - (d) Correspondence on affairs of foreign governments;
   - (e) Political, racial, religious, or color discrimination.

SECRET

2. The Chief of the Foreign Service establishment and certain other key members of his staff will know about the Employee's status and relationship under the terms of the TOP SECRET agreement between the Department of State and CIA. Other personnel may discover that there are certain irregularities in travel orders, position numbers, pay accounts, and other internal administrative procedures of the Foreign Service. Nevertheless, the Employee shall not divulge his relationship to CIA except with the expressed approval of the ADSO. While serving abroad, he shall for normal administration be under the control of the Chief of the Foreign Service establishment to which he is attached, but for operations, including travel as specified below, he shall be under the control of CIA.

3. The travel of the Employee shall be governed as follows:

(a) For temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States within or beyond the Employee's stipulated area, he shall perform CIA operational travel as directed by the ADSO or his designee with the consent of the Chiefs of the Foreign Service establishment involved. TD travel customary and necessary in the performance of routine Foreign Service Staff functions may be performed without clearance from the ADSO.DIC

(b) For any travel to the United States, either temporary duty or permanent change of station, the Employee shall travel only at the direction of the ADSO after clearance has been arranged through the State Department in Washington.

(c) All travel will be directed and performed in accordance with Foreign Service rules and regulations.

4. Although the Employee's Foreign Service Staff Corps title, location, appointment, Foreign Service class, and other pertinent information may be published in the Foreign Service list and other publications of the Department of State, such listings shall not affect his employment and the obligations and duties stipulated in this contract.

5. All payments to be made under this contract, including reimbursement for travel expenses, shall be made to the Employee by the Department of State except payments referred to in ARTICLE II, Section 4.

ARTICLE II. Relationship of Employee to CIA. Although for all intents and purposes it will appear as though the Employee is employed by the Department of State as indicated in ARTICLE I above, he shall in fact be employed by and under the operational control of CIA. In so far as possible, he will be expected to abide by the rules, regulations, customary practices, and courtesies of the Foreign Service, but his ultimate responsibility will be to CIA. In the event of any conflict of authority in the field between the Department of State and CIA, the matter shall be referred to the ADSO ADPC for resolution.

1. The line of authority for the Employee shall be as follows:

(a) Senior Representative of OSO OPC at Foreign Service establishment. OPC
(b) OSO Foreign Branch Chief in Washington.
(c) Chief of Operations, OSO OPC.
(d) ADSO. ADPC
(e) Director of CIA.

2. All travel shall be directed by the ADSO ADPC in accordance with ARTICLE I, Section 3. The Employee shall request appropriate Foreign Service clearance for travel through the Senior OPC OSO Representative at the Foreign Service establishment, who shall be responsible for arranging such clearance.

3. It is understood and agreed that the Employee's overseas assignment is to be for a minimum period of two years from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, unless terminated by the Government for its convenience. If the assignment is terminated in less than twenty-four months at the Employee's request, the following shall prevail:

(a) If the Employee resigns in less than twelve months from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, he shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses involved in the transportation of himself, his immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the foreign station, and pay all such expenses for return to the United States. Such expenses for return to the United States and amounts expended by the Government on account of such travel and transportation shall be considered a debt due by the Employee to the United States.

(b) If the Employee desires to terminate between the twelfth and twenty-fourth month from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, he shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of himself, his immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the United States.

4. If deemed necessary by CIA, the Employee may be reimbursed or advanced funds for operational expenses. Such amounts must be advanced or reimbursement made in accordance with CIA regulations, which require a full accounting of the amounts expended by the Employee. Therefore, the Employee will be required to account fully for any such funds advanced or reimbursed in accordance with CIA regulations.

ARTICLE III. Overseas Allowances and Transportation Expenses. When specifically authorized by the ADSO, the expenses of travel and transportation of the Employee, his immediate family, household goods and effects, including personally owned automobile and other allowances, will be paid the Employee in accordance with the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and regulations issued thereunder by the Department of State. When authorized by the ADSO, the Employee shall be paid a quarters allowance, cost of living allowance, or special foreign living allowance in accordance with the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and regulations issued thereunder. The amount of quarters and cost of living allowances and the special foreign living allowance is set forth in Bureau of the Budget Circular A-8, which is amended periodically to reflect adjustments in price indexes. Therefore, such allowances will be subject to change, and the amounts paid will vary according to Budget Circular A-8.

ARTICLE IV. Annual and Sick Leave. The Employee shall be permitted annual leave, sick leave, and leave of absence in accordance with Title IX, Part D of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Under such Act, the Employee may be granted not to exceed sixty calendar days annual leave of absence with pay in each year. Annual leave which the Employee may receive and which is not used in any one year shall be accumulated for succeeding years until it totals 180 days. Sick leave with pay may be granted to the Employee at the rate of fifteen calendar days each calendar year and may be accumulated for succeeding years until it totals 120 days.

1. If the Employee is transferred from another Government Agency to this position, any annual or sick leave standing to his credit in such Agency, may be transferred, if appropriate, in accordance with E. O. 9837, 27 March 1947, issued pursuant to Section 935 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

ARTICLE V. Return to the United States. The Employee shall be ordered to the United States on leave of absence or permanent change of station upon completion of two years continuous service abroad or as soon as possible thereafter.

ARTICLE VI. Retirement. The Employee occupies a position within the purview of the Civil Service Retirement Act. Accordingly, deductions shall be made at the rate provided by law (presently 5%) from the Employee's basic salary and placed in the Civil Service Retirement Fund. The Employee may not avail himself of the provisions of the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System, provided for in Title VIII of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

ARTICLE VII. Medical Care and Hospitalization. In the event of illness or injury to the Employee requiring hospitalization not the result of vicious habits, intemperance, or misconduct on his part, and incurred in the line of duty while assigned abroad, the expenses of treatment of such illness or injury at a suitable hospital or clinic, or transportation expenses to such hospital or clinic may be paid by the Government in accordance with Title IX, Part E of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Under appropriate regulations, a physical examination of the Employee will be made, together with necessary inoculations, or vaccinations, or the expense thereof will be paid to the Employee.

1. In the event of the death or disability of the Employee, the Employee or his dependents shall be afforded the benefits of the United States Employees' Compensation Act of 7 September 1916, as amended.

ARTICLE VIII. Equipment. The Employee may be furnished technical equipment and supplies to assist in the rendition of services hereunder, including an automobile where necessary. The Employee shall be responsible for such equipment and supplies issued to him by CIA in accordance with CIA Property Regulations. All such material shall remain the property of the Government regardless of any apparently conflicting ownership or the manner of registration.

ARTICLE IX. Salary. The Employee shall receive a basic salary of $[illegible] per year in accordance with Section 415 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. In-class promotions shall be granted to the Employee in accordance with regulations established in the Department of State pursuant to Title VI, Part E, Section 642 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Other changes in status will be made only as specifically authorized by the ADSO. ADFC

ARTICLE X. Continuance of Pay and Allowances. If the Employee is determined by CIA to be absent in a status of "Missing", "Missing in Action", "Interned in a Neutral Country", "Captured by an Enemy", "Beleaguered", or "Beseiged", he shall for the period he is determined to be in any such status be entitled to receive or to have credited to his account the same pay and allowances to which he was entitled at the beginning of such period of absence. Continuance of pay and allowances as specified above shall be as prescribed in the Missing Persons Act of 1942 (50 U.S.C.A. App 1001-1015, 7 March 1942).

ARTICLE XI. General. The Employee shall comply with the following provisions, and violation thereof by the Employee shall be deemed a breach of this contract.

1. In participating in the programs and activities of any private organization, the Employee shall make it clear that the Department of State has no official connection with such organization and that it does not sponsor or sanction the viewpoints which he may express. In general, his relations with private organizations shall be governed by applicable Foreign Service Regulations.

2. Neither the Employee nor the members of his family shall act as correspondents for American or foreign newspapers, press syndicates, or associations unless special authorization has been obtained in advance from the ADSO. He shall not write for publication any article or other manuscript on political or controversial subjects. Articles or manuscripts on nonpolitical or noncontroversial subjects shall be submitted to the ADSO for review and approval prior to their submission to a publisher.

3. Neither the Employee nor members of his family shall correspond privately on personnel or other official matters with members of Congress, or officers in the Department of State, CIA, or other Governmental agencies.

4. Members of the Employee's family shall not be employed in the same Foreign Service office except during grave emergencies or when special authorization has been obtained in advance of employment from both the Department of State and CIA.

5. Before contracting marriage with a person of foreign nationality, the Employee shall request and obtain permission from the appropriate officials in both the Department of State and CIA. Any such marriage with an alien without obtaining advance permission shall be deemed a breach of this contract and shall result in termination of service with the Government.

6. In the event the Employee desires to resign from the service overseas, he shall submit a written resignation addressed to the ADSO, who will take appropriate steps to clear the matter with the Department of State.

ARTICLE XII. Security. This contract contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act (50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as amended). Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Violation of this ARTICLE or any security agreement signed by the Employee with the Government shall result in immediate disciplinary action, which may include suspension, separation from Government service, and may subject the Employee to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act.

1. The termination of this contract will not release the Employee from the provisions of any security oaths which he may be required to take by CIA.

2. The Employee shall not publish, transmit, or divulge in any manner, information received by him as the result of his employment by the Government under this contract without specific written authority from the Director, CIA.

ARTICLE XIII. Orders and Directives. Orders and Directives received by the Employee from competent authority, including instructions received in briefing and training, shall be complied with by the Employee. No promises or commitments to the Employee of any nature whatsoever, beyond and in addition to the terms hereof, shall be binding on the Government unless and until such promise or commitment is reduced to writing and approved by an authorized official of CIA, and such writing placed with this contract thereby becoming an amendment hereto.

ARTICLE XIV. Amendments. The Government may at any time amend this contract and may terminate this contract upon thirty day prior notice to the Employee. If the Government proposes to amend this contract by reducing the salary provided for in ARTICLE IX (including class promotions, or other authorized increases, if any) and such reduction is unacceptable to the Employee, resignation by the Employee for such reason shall be considered as a termination of this contract for the convenience of the Government. Where the Employee is directed to proceed to a new post on a permanent change of station by the ADSO, this contract will be deemed to have been amended to the extent of such change.

ARTICLE XV. Special Provisions. The following special provisions shall apply to the Employee under this contract:

In the event any of the provisions in this Article are inconsistent with the provisions of any other Article in this contract, the provisions of this Article XV, shall govern and be determinative of the rights and obligations under this contract.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WITNESS:

Joseph S. Reil
(~~Foreign Branch Chief~~)
CHIEF, OVERSEAS BRANCH

~~APPROVED~~:

~~Chief of Operations~~

~~Assistant Director for Special Operations~~

BY: J. C.
~~Chief, Special Funds Division~~
CHIEF, EMPLOYEES DIVISION

E. Howard Hunt, Jr.
(Employee)

STANDARD FORM 50
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION (1ag)

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Howard Hunt	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct. 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. #4057	4. DATE 30 Dec. 1950

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Resignation*	6. EFFECTIVE DATE COB 9 Dec. 1950	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer GS-13 (Editor)	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-13-130-$7600.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
OPC Program & Planning Staff Program Group II Editorial Prod. Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
		X		Bu.#2971 CSC#3112 6/2/49

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2115900 TO: 801-101	Yes		☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

* To accept other employment.

LWD: 12/8/50
LSL: 155 hrs., 12/11/50 thru 11:30 am, 1/9/51.

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

H. C. Clinkscale

H. C. CLINKSCALE
Employees Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME E. Howard Hunt (Integree)		DATE 16 May 1951
NATURE OF ACTION Promotion		EFFECTIVE DATE 10 June 1951
	FROM	TO
TITLE	Attache (I.O.) FSR-4 (GS-13)	Attache (I.O.) FSR-4 (GS-14)
GRADE AND SALARY	FSR-4 $7830.00 (GS-13 $7800 per annum)	FSR-4 $7830.00 (GS-14 $8800 per annum)
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	LA	LA
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION	Mexico City, Mexico	Mexico City, Mexico

QUALIFICATIONS	APPROVAL FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION Audrey J Thoman	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____________

ENTERED ON DUTY ____________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Slot #1 - JBEDICT-Mexico
Semi-covert

Difference between $8800 and $7830 to be paid by CIA.

In grade since EOD 10 December 1950

FORM NO. 37-2
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 83-500339

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: E. Howard HUNT

DATE: 24 May 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Periodic Pay Increase

EFFECTIVE DATE: 13 May 51

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Attache Intelligence Officer	Attache Intelligence Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	FSR-4 $7830.00 GS-13 $7600.00	FSR-4 $7830.00 GS-13 $7800.00
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	LA	LA
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION	Mexico City, Mexico	Mexico City, Mexico

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER D V Mulcahy	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

PURSUANT TO DCI EFFECTIVE [illegible] 24 OCT 1951 SALARY ADJUSTED TO $ $560.00

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

L.S.I. 8 Nov. 1949

This is to certify that the conduct and services of the employee during this period were satisfactory in all respects.

Difference between Dept. of State salary and CIA salary to be paid by DIA.

Division Chief

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16—64306-1

(2)

14-00000

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 0R3498

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Pay period

3. Block No. UV

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) HUNT, E. Howard

6. Grade and salary GS - 14 $9600

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal					✓						
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks 14

11. Appropriation (s) HA/030

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
Dec 52	10 Jan 51	$9600	$9800	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status and
☐ LWOP status
Initials of Clerk

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126 - Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

Standard Form 52
Promulgated by the U. S. Civil Service Commission
Pamphlet No. Federal Personnel Manual, Chapter 51

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

5/11/53

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.— One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. E Howard ~~O.~~ HUNT
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct. 1918
3. REQUEST NO.: -
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 30 Apr. 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Conversion from FSR Status
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 7 Mar. 53 *
B. APPROVED: 7 Mar 53

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
ATTACHE, FSR-3	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	INTEL. OFF ~~[illegible]~~
48763 FSR-~~1~~ 4, ~~$8300.00~~ p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-14, $9300.00 p.a.
DDP WH III	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP WH III
Mexico City, Mexico	11. HEADQUARTERS	Mexico City, Mexico
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
~~[illegible]~~ S-1

* Subject resigned from State in the field effective this date.

COS WCPP

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): V. C. LYNCH, x-457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J. Keith Reed
Title: D/DP admin.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	x		x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO: 3522

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Virginia

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED
JM 11 May

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
5/11/53

16-67829-6

SECURITY INFORMATION

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

UNVOUCHERED PP

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. — Miss — Mrs. — One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. E. Howard HUNT

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 OCT 1918

3. REQUEST NO.: 174-53

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 18 MAY 1953

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): ~~Resignation~~ Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—

8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER: Intelligence Officer S-1

9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY: GS-132-14 $9800

10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH III

11. HEADQUARTERS: Mexico City, Mexico

12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL: ☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

TO— ☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Slot #1
Transfer leave to Vouchered Funds.

SW/B mc AP

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): C. R. [illegible] C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): V. C. LYNCH X-457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J. Keith Reed
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION 9522
FROM:
TO:

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED.
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY 6/15/53

SECRET

Security Information

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950 FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET

VOUCHERED

PP

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. E. Howard HUNT
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 OCT 1918
3. REQUEST NO.: 174A-53
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 18 May 1953

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): ~~Appointment~~ Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER			Operations Officer BD-22-14
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY			GS-132-14 $9800
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS			DDP/SE SE Political & PW Staff Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS			Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD	☐ DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer leave from Unvouchered Funds.

ENCL P
INCVP

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): JOSEPH BURK SE/ADMIN

for

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): ROBERT BURNS X-3965

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J. Keith Reid
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-PP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: 4- 3200-20
FROM
TO
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

7/23/53

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

6/18/53

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1952
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER ..., F.P.M.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
Security Information

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 23 Jul 53 bn

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. E. Howard Hunt
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct 1918
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 30 July 1953

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 2 Aug. 1953
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116 (b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer S-1	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer SD-22-14
GS-132-14 $9800.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-14 $9800.00 per annum
DDP/WH III	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/EE EE Political & PW Staff Office of the Chief
Mexico City, Mexico	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-PP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-3570-55-060
TO: 4-3200-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Transfer TO vouchered funds FROM unvouchered funds

Chief, Personnel Division
ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

SECRET
Security Information

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

8-3-53

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952 310794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. E. Howard Hunt
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct. 1918
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 4 Aug. 1953
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 11 Aug 53
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Operations Officer BD-22-14	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Operations Officer BD-22
GS-132-14 $9800 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-15 $10,800 p.a.
DDP/SE SE Political & PW Staff Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SE SE Political & PW Staff Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

APPROVED BY PP/CSB

Chairman
PP CAREER SERVICE BOARD

CONCURRED

Chief SE Division

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title):

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Edwin A. Willard, PP/CSO

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J. Keith Reid
Title: DD/P CAREER SERVICE BOARD

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB	OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

CD-PP
~~CD- PP UD~~

15. SEX:
16. RACE:
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY 14 Aug 53

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

[redacted]

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. E. Howard Hunt	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct. 18	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 14 Aug. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 16 Aug. 53	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Sch. A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Operations Officer HD-22-14	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer HD-22
GS-132-14 $9800.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-15 $10,800.00 per annum
DDP/SE SE Political & PW Staff Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CO-PP

[redacted]

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3200-20 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Acting Chief, Personnel Division [illegible]

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

(24/8/53)

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. E. Howard Hunt	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct. 18	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 16 Feb. 54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 28 Feb. 54	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Operations Officer BD 22	8. POSITION TITLE	Ops. Off (PP Staff Ch) BD-18
GS-132-15 $10,800.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.31-15 $10,800.00 per annum
SE Political & PW Staff Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SE Political & Psych. Warfare Staff
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.	
				CD-PP

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-3200-20 TO: same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD FORM 52
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible]

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. E. Howard HUNT	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 28 Feb 1954	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED:	

FROM—		TO—
Operations Officer . FD-22	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Off-(PP Staff CH) FD-18
GS-132-15 $10,800	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.31-15 10,800
~~DDP/SE~~ SE Political & PW Staff Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SE Political & Psychological Warfare Staff
~~Washington, D. C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) [illegible] H. CHAPIN SE/ADMIN	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Thomas M. Fisher
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) [illegible] 3965	Title: Personnel Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L A	REAL

CD - PP

15 SEX	16 RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19 DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 3200 - 20 TO: 4 - 3200 - 20			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JC	16 Feb	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

2-16-54 DM Gregg

16—87333-8

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 21 May 1954 jan

1. NAME (MR. – MISS – MRS. – ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. E. Howard Hunt	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 21 May 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE E.O.D. 23 May 1954	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Ops Officer (PP Staff Ch) BD-18	8. POSITION TITLE	Ops Officer (PP) BFF 1455
GS-0136.31-15 $10,800.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.31-15 $10,800.00 per annum
DDP/SE Political & Psych Warfare Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE SR/MA Political & Psych Warfare Staff
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD-PP

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3200-20 TO: 4-3700-55-121	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

5-25-54

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 – [illegible]

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION JANUARY 1951 — FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. E. Howard Hunt	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 18	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 7 April 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) REASSIGNMENT B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: [illegible] 23 May 54	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Ops Officer (PP Staff Ch) BD-1S	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer (PP) BFF #1455
GS-0136.31-15 $10,800.00 PA	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.31-15 $10,800 p/a
DDP/~~SE~~ Political & Psych Warfare Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/~~FE~~ SR/NA Political & Psych Warfare Staff
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Subject to ~~x~~ be temporaryly slotted with incumbent now occupying slot #1455 until the later transfers.

SE Concur:

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) H.C. Clinkscales FE/Personnel Officer	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Title: DD/P [illegible] 4/23/54
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) Herbert A. Hudson 2566	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD:PP

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3200-20 TO: 4-3700-5~~4~~5-121	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Effective date [illegible] 6E [illegible] FE [illegible] 24 May

Conc. (Osborne) 21 May 54.
24 May

Approved APR 20 1954
PP/Career Service

CPB notified 24 May.

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION	Apr	30 Apr 54
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	5/13 [illegible]	5/5/54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Ralph V. [illegible]

SECRET

1. Agency and organizational designations

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 997976

2. Pay roll no.

3. Block No. 07

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) [illegible], E. [illegible]ward

6. Grade and salary GS-15 $10,500

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE

[illegible] 1955

11,880

11. Appropriation(s) FZ-14

12. Prepared by gal 1.24/55

13. Audited by

☐ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date 2/13/55

15. Date last equivalent increase 3/15/53

16. Old salary rate $10,800

17. New salary rate $11,050

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ Pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.--Miss--Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. E. Howard Hunt	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 3 May 1956
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: MAY 1956	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer - PP BFF-1455
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.31-15 $11,880.00 p/a
DDP/FE SR/NA Political & Psychological Warfare Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE North Asia Station PP Staff
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL SD:DP

15

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

T/O Change

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
H. P. GILBERT, CFE/PT

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
HAZEL H. ACORD, x2205

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL

SD:DP

POSTED
23 MAY 1956

15. SEX

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM
TO

17. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

~~APPROVED~~ CONCUR
MAY 15 1956
PP Career Service

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	WHL	2 May
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	
E.		

REMARKS:

USED IN LIEU OF SF50
PERSONNEL
NOTICE

F. APPROVED BY

per [illegible] 16 May '56
for [illegible]

SECRET

10-07930-0

SECRET
Security Information

JBH

[illegible], JR. E. [illegible] HOWARD
Name: Last, First Middle

TO: All C. I. A. Personnel

FROM: Personnel Director

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The Agency is currently revising the system for machine coding employee qualifications, thereby permitting more complete and accurate data on all personnel. The new system will aid in implementing Agency policies on promotion from within by facilitating the selection of personnel with desired education and experience for vacancies which may occur. It is also expected that the new system will provide readily accessible statistics for planning and management purposes.

2. The attached questionnaire is designed to cover adequately those factors in which the Agency is interested. Although the information is, in a large measure, already reflected in previous forms submitted by you, it is felt that your time within the organization may enable you to emphasize those qualifications pertinent to its needs. The questionnaire also serves to bring your education and qualifications record up to date.

3. Your cooperation is requested in completing the questionnaire as thoroughly and accurately as possible and returning it to your Administrative Officer within the time allotted.

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 4 JUN 1956

George E. Meloon
George E. Meloon
Personnel Director

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry) 512942	2. NAME: (last) [illegible],Jr. (first) E. (middle) [illegible]		3. Office [illegible]
4. Date of Birth Oct. [illegible],19[illegible]	5. Sex: x male (1) ___ female (2)	Martial Status [illegible] Nr. Dependents 3	6. CIA Entry Date: Oct. [illegible]
7. Citizenship: x U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) x Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other (specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ______		

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
4. Two years college, or less
5. Over two years, no degree
[✓ 6. Bachelor degree]
7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
8. Masters degree
9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	
Brown University [illegible]	[illegible] Lit.		1935	[illegible]			AB	[illegible] 1940	

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
US Naval Academy	[illegible] 1941	[illegible] 1941	4	V-7 [illegible] Course leading to Commission as Ens

4. Military or Intelligence Training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, command & staff, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
[illegible], Air Combat Intell. School.	[illegible] 1944	[illegible] 1944	4	Air Combat Intelli [illegible] lecturer prior to [illegible] of course, but received diploma [illegible] incl class.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. CIA Experience: State the specific nature of duties performed with CIA and CIG, starting with your present position. Take position titles from your official personnel papers, if you have personal copies. Please do not request your Official Personnel Folder. Include geographic area and subject matter dealt with, if applicable. Position Title is your classification title such as Geographer, Intelligence Officer, etc. Duty Title indicates your organization position such as - Section Chief, Branch Chief, Administrative Assistant, etc., and is to be filled in only if different to the Position Title. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From 1/51 To 1/53 Tot. mos. [illegible] Grade [illegible] 15 Salary [illegible],600 Office [illegible], Mexico Position Title: Deputy Chief of Mission Duty Title: Deputy Chief of Mission	Description of Duties: [illegible] Mexico. Supervision [illegible] all [illegible] jects in Mexico; established and ran [illegible] continuing [illegible] with [illegible] Duty Station, if overseas: [illegible]
From 1950 To 1/51 Tot. mos. [illegible] Grade [illegible] 15 Salary 9,600 Office Station, Mexico Position Title: Chief of Station Duty Title: Chief of Station	Description of Duties: [illegible] activities in Mexico. [illegible] Duty Station, if overseas: Mexico
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mos. [illegible] Grade GS 13 Salary 7,[illegible] Office [illegible] Division Position Title: Plans Officer Duty Title:	Description of Duties: [illegible] activities [illegible] Duty Station, if overseas:
From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____ Grade ____ Salary ____ Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.)

From 1948 To 1949 Tot.mo's 9 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) FSS 5 Salary 6,900 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 3 Prof. 6 Steno. Employer ECA Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Information Officer, ECA Description of Duties: Production of propaganda films and radio programs in France and Austria Duty Station if overseas: Paris, France
From 1946 To 1949 Tot.mo's 27 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary $28,000 (av.) Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Professional Writer, self-employed Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From 1943 To 1943 Tot.mo's 9 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary $7,800 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer TIME, Inc. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Publishers	Exact Title of your position War Correspondent Description of Duties: accompany naval and air units in combat in SO Pacific Area. Write accounts and special stories of ensuing action Duty Station if overseas: South Pacific Area
From 1942 To 1942 Tot.mo's 5 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary $7,800 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 2 Prof.; 3 Steno. Employer TIME, Inc. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Publishers	Exact Title of your position Screen Writer Description of Duties: Prepare and write commentary for monthly newsreel THE MARCH OF TIME. Also prepare and write contract Naval Training Films. Duty Station if overseas:
From '41 June To '42 Tot.mo's 16 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Ens. Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 168 seamen Employer USN Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Officer (Destroyers) Description of Duties: Provide for air protection of USS MAYO, and merchant ships under escort Duty Station if overseas: North Atlantic

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 ___ Civil Police
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 ___ FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 X Office of Strategic Services
24 X Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 ___ Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 ___ Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
LANGUAGE	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study (Inc. CIA training)
Spanish		X						X		X
French				X				X		
German					X			X		

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ___

** Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ___

SE

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
Latin America	19[illegible], 1950-53	x		
France, Austria	19[illegible]-[illegible]			x
		x		x
UK and Scandinavia	1950			
China	19[illegible]		x	
		x		x

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specalized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained
France	Political	Study at [illegible], 19[illegible]-50
Poland	Political	" " " " "
Italy	Political	" " " " "
Mexico	Political	Chief of Station, 1950-51

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1. [illegible]	2. [illegible]	[illegible]0	1. Yes 2. x No
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No

Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc. ____________	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications. sailing, skiing, [illegible]
	[illegible], [illegible] xx fishing

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership. ____________

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

Under the names of [illegible] Hunt and "[illegible]" I am a professional writer of fiction. By the end of 1953 I will have published 13 books. Short stories have appeared in Cosmopolitan and the New Yorker. At one time I was a war correspondent [illegible], and my contributions appeared anonymously in [illegible] and [illegible].

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented	
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No

SEC. X. CIA TESTS

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken in CIA:

Type of Test	Date Taken

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour ___ (2) 4 year Tour X (3) Not interested ___

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment in CIA do you think you are best qualified?

[illegible] of Division or [illegible] Officer [illegible].

[illegible] - Staff work, or [illegible]

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status
Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ___ Yes x No.
If yes, indicate your present draft classification ________

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status
Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___ Yes x No.
If yes, complete the following.
1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service ________ Grade ________ Location ________

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated ________

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ________

Location of Service Records, if known ________

SEC. XV. CIA TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken while in the CIA.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Jan.'53	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] para-military work took place in Jan. [illegible] 1953 at [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

DATE 21 April,1953 SIGNATURE E. Howard Hunt

SECRET
Security Information

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-O-320090

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Payroll period	3. Block No. UV	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) HUNT, E. HOWARD	6. Grade and salary GS-15 $11,880.		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:	11. Appropriation(s) FE-2	12. Prepared by wlr 11Jun56 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 12Aug56	15. Date last equivalent increase 13Feb55	16. Old salary rate $11,880.	17. New salary rate $12,150.	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SERVICE & CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

JAR

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 – FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER P-

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.* If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname*) E. HOWARD Mr. Howard E. HUNT	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1916	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 16 Oct 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 13 Jan 57	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM–		TO–
Ops Officer (PP) BFF-1455	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Off (CCS) BAF-162
GS-0136.31-15 $12,150.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $12,150.00 p.a.
DDP/FE North Asia Station PP Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch II Montevideo, Uruguay Station
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Montevideo, Uruguay
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL (D)

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

2 copies to Security

DDP/FE
Concur FE/PP

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
J. KOBLANOVICH X8242

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: CS/DSP

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DP

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION 3555-005 FROM: 7-37~~90~~-~~55~~-121 TO: 7-3587-55-065	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible]
1/21/57
[illegible] 1/25/56

Concurred in by OCT
PP/Career Service

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL	SR	
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	RCB 10/22/56	
E.		

REMARKS:
[illegible]
1/25 WH

F. APPROVED BY
S. C. [illegible] 1/18/57

SECRET

11/5/49 QCB Wine G.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

573542

THIS DATE: January 6,1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT,Jr. E. Howard
2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):
3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 50 Willett Street, Albany 10, New York
4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 3-6218
5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: New York

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: Hunt, Mrs Everette H.
2. RELATIONSHIP: Mother
3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 50 Willett Street Albany 10, New York
4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:
5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 3-6218
6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER:
7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION:
8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Notification of Father not desired,due to cardiac condition.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED
2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS:

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME: (First) Dorothy (Middle) Louise (Maiden) Wetzel (Last) HUNT
4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: Sept 7, 1949
5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Millbrook, New York
6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): American Embassy, Paris
7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
8. DATE OF DEATH:
9. CAUSE OF DEATH:
10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 50 Willett Street, Albany 10, New York
11. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 April 1920
12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Dayton, Ohio
13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY:
14. PLACE OF ENTRY:
15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): USA
16. DATE ACQUIRED:
17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country):
18. OCCUPATION: housewife
19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers):
20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country):

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
USNR July 1940- Oct. 1942 USAAF Nov 1943- Feb. 1946

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE USNR USAAF	23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED USA

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
ECA, Paris April 1948 - Feb. 1949

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
2	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME
Book royalties

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Riggs Nat'l Bank, F&M Branch	Washington 7, DC

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country)
USA

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCY - IN ORDER LISTED															HOW ACQUIRED			
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
	R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK																		
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Spanish						X	X	X									X		X
French							X					X					X		
German													X				X		

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

3 years of College Spanish

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD

SECTION IX — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE", INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

SECTION X — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)

2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)

3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING *(Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)*

SECTION XI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION *(Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.)*, INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of issue)*

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of issue)*

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction*, X*scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE X

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

X

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) USA	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT X
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION X	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 8 11 39 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION XIII

CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 3

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING ▷ 1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Dorothy L. Hunt	wife	1920		X	USA	
Lisa T. Hunt	daughter	1951		X	"	
Kevan T. Hunt	"	1952		X	"	
Howard St.John Hunt	son	1954	X		"	

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED 6 Jan. 1957

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE E. Howard Hunt, Jr.

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr. – Miss – Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. HUNT, E. Howard 513842	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 October 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 24 Jan 1957

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
INTEGRATION - Department of State
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 25 January 1957

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops. Officer (COS) BAF 162	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Attache, Pol. Off. 1st Sec. & Consul (When confirmed)
GS-0136.01-15 $12,150	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	FSR-3 $12,100
DDP/WH Branch 2 Montevideo, Uruguay Station	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch 2 Montevideo, Uruguay Station
Montevideo, Uruguay	11. HEADQUARTERS	Montevideo, Uruguay
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Subject is to be paid the difference between CIA salary of $12,150 and FSR salary of $12,100, to be paid by the Department of State and allowances in accordance therewith

Sick and annual leave are to be held in escrow until subject reverts to GS status

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
FI/OPS/CCB/OCL

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
B. Eggleston x8104

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: B. Eggleston
Title: Cover Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX
M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM. 7-3587-56-065
TO-

per [illegible]

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

1/05 59

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	[illegible] 57
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS.

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

RCO

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. E. HOWARD HUNT 513842	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 25 Jan 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment 57	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 13 Jan 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Ops Officer (PP) BFF-1455	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Off (COS) BAF-162
GS-0136.31-15 $12,150.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $12,150.00 per annum
DDP/FE North Asia Station PP Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 465130	DDP/WH Branch II Montevideo, Uruguay Station
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS 5	Montevideo, Uruguay
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DP

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION W FROM: 7-3735-55-005 760-31 TO: 7-3587-55-065	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

20. REMARKS:

3 ECD 11/03/49

POSTED
25 JAN 1957

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director Of Personnel

GM Stewart

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

9:21 1/25/57

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

EOD

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME) MR. HOWARD E. HUNT 513842	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 31 Jan 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Integration - Department of State* 58	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 25 Jan 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Area Ops. Officer (COS) BAF-162	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops. Officer (COS) BAF-162 (Attache, Pol.Off. 1st Sec. & Consul) (When Confirmed)
GS-0136.01-15 $12,150.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $12,150.00 per annum (FSR-3 $12,100.00 per annum)
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 466130	DDP/WH Branch 2 Montevideo, Uruguay Station
	11. HEADQUARTERS 5	Montevideo, Uruguay
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT WIFE	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
				SD/DI

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
1 M W	FROM: 7-3537-55-065 760-31 TO: same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS

*Subject is to be paid the difference between CIA salary of $12,150 and FSR salary of $12,100, to be paid by the Department of State and allowances in accordance therewith

Sick and annual leave are to be held in escrow until subject reverts to GS status

3 EOD 11/08/49

POSTED
1957 FP

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Stewart

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

1/31/57

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER
HUNT, Howard		CAD 57-726-D

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on wife.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
4 Dec 57	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER
HUNT, Howard		[illegible]58-[illegible] D

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on [illegible].

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
4 Feb 58	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

(4-21-35)

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT, Howard E.	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER CAS 58-167D

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on dependent wife.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1 SEP 56 1076

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER
HUNT, Howard		CAB 58-68 D

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on dependent daughter.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
14 May '58	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1 SEP 56 1076

14-21

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT, Howard	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER 58-135 D

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on dependent daughter.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 21 May 1958	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE D. DeFelice m

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on [illegible]

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
18 A[illegible]	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER
HUNT, Howard	Unk	57-726D

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on wife.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
21 Aug 1958	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
HUNT, Howard	Dorothy	58-399 D

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on ________________.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
8 Dec. 1958	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 8-58 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT, E. Howard

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER:

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE:

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: Hunt, Ethel J.

2. RELATIONSHIP: Mother

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 75 Willett Street, Albany 10, NY

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: HObart 3-6218

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER:

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION:

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First): Dorothy (Middle): Louise (Maiden): Wetzel (Last): HUNT

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: Sept. 7 1949

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Millbrook, New York

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): Sarasota, Florida

7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH:

9. CAUSE OF DEATH:

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased):

11. DATE OF BIRTH: April 1 1920

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Dayton, Ohio

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY:

14. PLACE OF ENTRY:

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): USA

16. DATE ACQUIRED:

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country):

18. OCCUPATION: none

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers):

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country):

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III. CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.

publishing royalties

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Riggs Nat'l Bank	Wisconsin at M St.NW, Washington DC

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP: USA

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Brown University, Providence RI	Lit		1936	1940	AB	JUNE 1940	

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	
US NA, Annapolis	Reserve trng.	Feb 1941	May 1941	12
AAFTAC, Orlando,Fla.	Intelligence	June 1943	Dec 1943	28

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT (OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE). UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
France	political	1939, 1948-49			x	x
Spain	political, coasts	May 1960		x		
Mexico	political, terrain	Dec-June 1946	x			

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

France 1939 - study at the Sorbonne
" 1948-49 - spl. asst to Amb. Harriman at ECA (speechwriter)
Mexico 1946 - Residence at Acapulco as Guggenheim Fellow for that year

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING
Mexico	Pol, terrain	1950-53		xx	
Japan	Political	1954-56		xx	
Uruguay	Political terrain	1957-60		xx	
Balkans	Political	1953-54	xx		
Greece	Political	1953-54	xx		

SECTION IX — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.): 40
2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.):
3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

SECTION X — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

squash - good
equitation - good
hunting, shooting - good
fishing - fair
tennis - v.good

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4.

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) ~~Oct '49 - Dec. '50~~
2. GRADE ~~GS-13~~
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT ~~OPC/PP/PM~~
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION ~~6~~
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE ~~Operations Officer~~
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) Feb 1957 - March 1960
2. GRADE 15
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT WH-2
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 16
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station, Montevideo
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) ~~May~~ June 1960 —
2. GRADE 15
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT WH-4
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Political Action Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Field Chief in Mexico City of JMARC

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 3

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Dorothy L.	wife	1920		x	USA	
Lisa Tiffany	daughter	1951		x	USA	
Kevan Totterdale	"	1953		x	"	
Howard St. John	son	1954	x		"	

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
16 June 1960	Howard Hunt

SECRET

SECRET

5 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : E. Howard HUNT

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/or have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~reference~~ to deny ~~acknowledge~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of 1 July 1960 Richard J. Biladeau, 2-1005, T-4, x-8266.

HARRY A. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS

SECRET

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

FORM NO. 1580a (4-13-40)

27

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Hunt, Howard E.	daughter - Lisa	OC-1192

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on [illegible] '57.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
25 July 1960	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 October 1960

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 013842
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT, E. Howard
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT (TEMPORARY)*
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH ~~10 - 30 - 60~~ 11 25 60
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1535-5000-0021
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH Division Branch 4 JU17
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX OPERATIONS~~ OFFICER CI'S
12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~XXXXXX~~ 0000
12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 (5)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $15,030
18. REMARKS:

DDP/WH/2, Montevideo, BAF-162 Trez TA

*UPON TERMINATION OF THIS TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT YOU WILL BE REASSIGNED AS THE HEAD OF YOUR CAREER SERVICE DIRECTS.

POS; 08-16-53
PSI; 02-05-61

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Herbert V. Juul
HERBERT V. JUUL, C/WH/4/Pers.

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOYEE CODE CF VC	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 14452	ALPHABETIC with	22. STATION CODE 25213	23.	24. CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 09 18	26.

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 11/21/60

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A

SECRET

AES: 25 NOV 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT (TEMPORARY)*	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 11 DA 25 YR 60	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 1535 5000 0021	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH DIVISION BRANCH 4	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0000	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 15030

18. REMARKS
*UPON TERMINATION OF THIS TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT YOU WILL BE REASSIGNED AS THE HEAD OF YOUR CAREER SERVICE DIRECTS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Months Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	64450	WH	75013		1	10 09 18		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL SERV. CREDIT LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

12/31/60 WK

Form 60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

25 NOV

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
513842	HUNT E HOWARD	DDP/WH UNASS.	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA.	YR
GS 15	5	$15,030	08	09	59	GS 15	8	$15,290	02	05	61

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS
THIS CANCELS PSI EFFECTIVE 02/05/61.
ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR.

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

POSTED TO 2806

OBLIGATION
APPROVED

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
513842	HUNT E HOWARD	DDP/WH UV UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	5	$15,030	08/09/59	15	8	$15,290	02/05/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP ✓

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition SECRET (4-61)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	HUNT E HOWARD	513842	46 51	GS-15 5	$13,970	$15,030

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 November 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 0[illegible]

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT, ~~[illegible]~~ E. HOWARD

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 26 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2121-1000-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/CA Staff
Plans and Research Group
Evaluation Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer -CA

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0274

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 ~~[illegible]~~ 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 15030 ~~[illegible]~~

18. REMARKS:

FROM: DDP/WH/Br 4/Temporary

1cc - Payroll
1cc - Security

Called Security [illegible]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Roosevelt
[illegible] ROOSEVELT, Jr., C/CA Staff

DATE SIGNED: 16 Nov 1961

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 11 Nov 61

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

ACTION CODE	EMPLOYEE CODE	OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] CODE	DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.
57	10	44260	CA			1	10	09	18

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 2 = FICA 3 = NONE

FOD DATA

40. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA:
0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.)
3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 11-28-61

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 17 Nov 61

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

14-00000

PSC: 29 DEC 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 11 DA 26 YR 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF X		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2121 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP CA STAFF PLANS AND RESEARCH GROUP EVALUATION BRANCH		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH		12. POSITION NUMBER 0274	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 15030

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	44200	CA	75013		1	10 09 18		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 YES, 2 NO) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
01-04-62

Form 8-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-61)

[illegible] 12-29-61

14-00000

PSC: 26 JAN 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 01 29 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2121 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP . CA STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0454	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 15030

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 41100	ALPHABETIC CA	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 09 18	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 80	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1. CSC 3. FICA 5. NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	39. FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ECHOLS

POSTED
01-30-62

Form 8-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(4 91)

1-26-62

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 May 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 013842
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Hunt, E. Howard
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 01 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3129-1000-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DODS
Facilities Branch
Research and Publications Section
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops. Officer-(Ch) ~~D~~ 14
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0092
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0316.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $15,030.00
18. REMARKS

PRA Requested per R - 20-10, para 10C(2) for a period of 90 days.

DDP/CA Staff
Office of the Chief/454 - /

CONCUR: Helen Ingraham (By Phone)

CSID
Dm

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch, DODS/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: May
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: R. Eastman
DATE SIGNED: 6/4/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:
20. EMPLOY. CODE:
21. OFFICE CODE NO.: NUMERIC 400 ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 9 YR. 18
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXP RES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 80
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 4 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED: 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 = WAIVER 1 = YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LENGTHY CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Concur [illegible]
46. O.P. APPROVAL: R. Eastman
DATE APPROVED: 6/1/62

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

BWS: 21 JUNE 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

UCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 07 01 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3129 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DODS FACILITIES BRANCH RESEARCH & PUBLICATIONS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0092	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 15030

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 53400	ALPHABETIC DODS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 10 09 18	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 80	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD. 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

POSTED
6-29-62

Form 8-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-91)

Bac 6-22-62

ABM: 17 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 09 16 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO CF ☒	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3129 2000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DODS US FIELD FACILITIES BRANCH RESEARCH & PUBLICATIONS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS. OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0092	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 15030

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	53400	DODS	75013		2	10 09 18		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE, MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
	80						

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES), HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9-17-62

BAB 9/17/62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81)

(When Filled In)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 21 September 1962

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT - DODS

ESTABLISHED FOR: HUNT, E. Howard

ATTN: Miss Lynch

FILE NO.: 1088

REF: Form 1322 [illegible] dtd 29 Aug 62 requesting cover

ID CARD NO.:

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element, Composite Operations Group

☒ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____.

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD.

☒ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

[illegible]

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

45-136

ALR/pp CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(13-20-43)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HUNT E HOWARD	013842	43 400	CF	GS 15 6	$16,965	$18,240

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number		4 LWOP Hours
013842	HUNT, E. HOWARD	53 400	CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-15	5	$16,485	08/09/59	GS-15	6	$16,965	12/09/62			

8 Remarks and Authentication

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: R H Cunningham

DATE: 7 December 1962

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

MC

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
HUNT E HOWARD	013842	53400	CF	15 5	$15030	15 5	$16485

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1964

1 SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) HUNT, E. Howard		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 08 DAY YEAR 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	
6 FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5129-0253	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD U.S. Field C A Staff	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE Ops Officer - CH (15)	12 POSITION NUMBER 0280	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS-15	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0126.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15 06	17 SALARY OR RATE $18,240

18 REMARKS

[illegible]
CS?D

19A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Virginia C. Lynch VIRGINIA C. LYNCH, DO/Pers	DATE SIGNED 9 July 64	19B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Ronald Gage	DATE SIGNED 7/21/64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 12200	ALPHABETIC [illegible]	22 STATION CODE 75012	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE 2	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 09 18	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR. / 27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR. [illegible]	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA ⇨	33 SECURITY REQ. NO.	34 SEX
35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37 LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 30	46 O P APPROVAL Ronald Gage	DATE APPROVED 7/21/64						

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RZR: 31 JUL 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR) 08 03 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5129 0253 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD US FIELD CA STAFF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0280	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 18240

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR
37	10	43200	DOD	75013		2	10 03 18		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION-CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO. DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
XX XX XX							

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RES. PROV. TEMP. / CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES / HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

POSTED
12 AUG 1964

31 JUL 64

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 16 February 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 013242

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT, E. Howard

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: ~~REASSIGNMENT~~ TRANSFER and to Vouchered Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 28 YEAR 65

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5220-0001 ~~[illegible]~~

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
~~DDS~~ OFFICE OF THE /DDP
~~OPERATIONAL SERVICES~~
~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF~~ OPERATION GROUP

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: CPS ~~[illegible]~~ OFFICER (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~[illegible]~~ 0390

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: $19880

18. REMARKS

FROM: DOD/US FAD/C/OH STAFF

This employee is the only qualified person available for assignment to this position which must be filled immediately. He will be in PRA status for a period not to exceed 24 months.

PRA in accordance with Regulation HR 20-21 paragraphs c (3).

Verbal concurrence from DOD's per Bill Michael 2/19/65 2/18/65

CC: Payroll
Security

~~Security [illegible]~~ 2/23/65 HT

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPL. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGRITY CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
11	10	3 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	10 09 18	08 16 53	12 06 64

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 = CSC, 2 = FICA, 3 = NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
02 22 67	83						

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.):
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 = NO, 1 = YES) HEALTH INS. CODE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)):
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS:
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE:

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: from DODS 2-19-65 HT ②

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 1152 8-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) **Hunt, E. Howard**	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* **Self**	CLAIM NUMBER **65-607**

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 12 October 1964.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-58 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-?)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 April 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: C13342

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT, E. Howard

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: ~~7- Transfer to Vouchered~~ REASSIGNMENT-CORRECTION ~~Funds Conv~~

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5120-0001

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

-1
H

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
OFFICE OF THE DDP
OPERATIONS ~~[illegible]~~ Group

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER ⑮

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0390

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 19330

18 REMARKS

Correct action dated 2/28/65 to delete transfer to vouchered funds.

Correct Cost Center chargeable to 5120-0001 funds. Section 6 to read CF to CF.

Admin Error.

CC: Payroll
Security

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 5 Apr 65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE:

20 EMPLOY CODE:

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HOOTRS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 18

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO 02 DA 27 YR 67

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE: 83

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RSV PROV TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 4/5/65 Ht

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 5 April

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

12

1 Serial No.	2 Name				3 Cost Center Number				4 LWOP Hours		
013942	HUNT E HOWARD				43 200 CF						
5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION			
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ	
GS 15	6	$19,310	12/09/62	GS 15	7	$19,880	12/08/64				

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

4

000

m m

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: E.D.ECHOLS DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	Per Annum Rates and Steps									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

OLD: APR 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

GKF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 013842
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HUNT E HOWARD
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT (CORRECTION)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 02 28 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5120 0001 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP / OFFICE OF THE DDP / OPERATIONS GROUP
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0390
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: 13880
18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 02/28/65 AS FOLLOWS:
ITEM #3, NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION, TO DELETE TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS.
ITEM #6, FUNDS, WHICH READ CF TO V, TO READ CF TO CF.
ITEM #7, COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE, WHICH READ 5220 0001 0000, TO READ 5120 0001 0000.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 58
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 30100 / ALPHABETIC DDP
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 10 09 18
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 03
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC / 2 - FICA / 3 - NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 16; MO 02 DA 26 YR 65
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED / 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE / 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE / 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) / 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES / 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES / 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
4-7-65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 JUNE 1965 ✓

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 013842

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT, E. HOWARD

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 7 DAY 3 YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6120-0001

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
OFFICE OF THE DDP
OPERATIONS GROUP

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0390

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 19,880.

18 REMARKS

SUBJECT IS RE-EMPLOYABLE.

Recorded
UT

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 6/24/65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45

20 EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HDQTRS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 18

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 ... EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1, BF, 007, 1

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR-RESV PROV. TEMP

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; CODE 0-WAIVER 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:
6 22 65
ll

46. OP APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 7/13/65

1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PJH: 16 JUL 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 03 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ; V TO CF ; CF TO V ; X CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6120 0001 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/OFFICE OF THE DDP OPERATIONS GROUP	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0390	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 7
17. SALARY OR RATE 19880		

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 09 18	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE ; CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 1BF0071	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE ; MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP ; CODE	39. FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES ; HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO ; CODE ; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO ; CODE ; NO. TAX EXEMP ; STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7-19-65

1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 20 July 1965

TO: (Check)
- ☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
- ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) DDP

ESTABLISHED FOR: HUNT, E. Howard

FILE NO.: 1008

ID CARD NO.:

EMPLOYEE NO.:

ATTN: Admin Staff

REF: Resignee Backstop Debriefing

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element, Composite Operations Group

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ Block Records: (OPMEMO 20-800-11) Resignation effective 3 Jul 65

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______

b. Continuing, effective EOD Oct 49

NA Submit Form 642 to change limitation category. (HHB 20-7)

NA Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued. (HB 20-661-1)

NA Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover. (R 240-250)

NA Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility. (R 240-250)

☐ Remarks:

Continuing per Cecily Neil Mack 11/1/65

☒ Cover History

Dec50-Mar53	Mexico/State	Jun54-Oct56	Japan/DAC
Dec56-Jul60	Uraguay/State	Jul60-Jul65	Hdqs/DAC

Forwarding Address:
5029 Milwood La.
Washington, D.C.
Employment Address:
O/s with NOC background

James T. Franklin
RDD/al CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-CL/TELSVC, Copy 5-PSD/OS, Copy 6-File.

FORM 6-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 SEPTEMBER 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 013842
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT, E. HOWARD

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (Career)

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 18 YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS	XX	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7236-1184

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
50 DDP/WE
OPERATIONS STAFF
INTERNAL SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (15)
12 POSITION NUMBER: 0020
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 15-7
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 21192

18 REMARKS Subject terminated staff status July 1965. Picked-up as a Contract Employee, and the termination of Contract Status will be effective 17 September 1966.

~~[illegible] Contract Employee [illegible] 27th Staff~~

cc Security
cc Payroll

~~Reinstate [illegible]~~

* Former Contract Employee Reinstate with Career C-07/54

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Richard F. Westerman
Richard F. Westerman, C/E/Personnel
DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ronald Gage
DATE SIGNED: 19 Sept 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HDQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
11	10	56845	WE	75013		1	10 04 18	05 16 55	10 06 64

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE	30 CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32 MO DA. YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO	34 SEX
			1					48130	M1

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV/TEMP	38 CODE	39 FEGLI CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
1		05 24 45	11 28 49		C	1		136-05-4672

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
1		8		1	1185		1	6	19

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:
46 O P APPROVAL: Robert McConnell
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RUN: 28 SEPT 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXCEPTED APPT CAREER		4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 09 13 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7236 1184 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE OPERATIONS STAFF INTERNAL SECTION		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0020	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 21192

18. REMARKS
FORMER CONTRACT EMPLOYEE. REINSTATE SICK LEAVE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 11	20 Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 50045	ALPHABETIC WE	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 10 09 18	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) 08 16 53
27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR) 12 06 64	28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE 1	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO 48130	34 SEX M1
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT) 1	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR) 05 24 44	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) 11 08 49	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, PROV, RESV, TEMP) CODE C	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES) 1	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO 126054970		
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) 1	42 LEAVE CAT CODE 8	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE 1	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS M5	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE 1	NO TAX EXEMP C	STATE CODE 19	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 12 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

1158

14

1. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
013842	HUNT E HOWARD	44 050	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 15	7	$21.192	12/06/64	GS 15	8	$21.799	12/03/67		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Rufe Kuse DATE 29 Nov. 1967

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-31)

SECRET

3 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, TRB

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Service for Howard E. Hunt

1. The following is a record of subject's contract service with the Agency:

Date	Action	Compensation
4 July 1965	Contract Employee	$19,880 per annum
10 October 1965	Salary Increase	$20,595 per annum
3 July 1966	Salary Increase	$21,192 per annum
17 September 1966	Contract Terminated	$21,192 per annum

2. All of above service is creditable for both leave and Civil Service Retirement purposes.

Dow H. Luetscher
Dow H. Luetscher
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP	6 January 1967
TO: (Check) ☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) O/DDP	ESTABLISHED FOR HUNT, E. Howard
ATTN: DDP/Personnel	FILE NO. 1033
REF: Resignation Debriefing	ID CARD NO.
OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED Department of State	EMPLOYEE NO.

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ **Block Records:** (OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______________________.

b. Continuing, effective EOD.

☒ **Submit Form 642 to change limitation category.** (HHB 20-7)

☒ **Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued.** (HB 20-661-1)

☒ **Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover.** (R 240-250)

☒ **Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility.** (R 240-250)

☐ **Concurred in issuance**

AGE ☐
NACS ☐ **Hospitalization card.**

COVER HISTORY

Oct 49 - Dec 50 HQS/OVERT
Dec 50 - Mar 53 MEXICO/STATE
Mar 53 - Jun 54 HQS/OVERT
Jun 54 - Oct 56 JAPAN/DAC
Dec 56 - Jul 60 URUGUAY/STATE
Jul 60 - Jul 65 HQS/DAC
Jul 65 - Sep 66 contractual employment O/DDP as consultant

77

James H. Franklin
OCD/sac CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER CCS

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-D/OS, Copy 4-OL/TELSVC, Copy 5-OP/BSD/IB, Copy 6-OCS/OPS, Copy 7-File

FORM 6-65 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 January 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 013832

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT, E. HOWARD

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Assignment & TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 29 YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V	XX	V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7136-1184

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES STAFF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OF

12 POSITION NUMBER: 2006

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15-7

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 21,192

18 REMARKS:

cc payroll

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Richard F. Westerman, CI/Personnel

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 18 Jan 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 30

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 4330 ALPHABETIC EUR

22 STATION CODE: 2612

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 NOOTES CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA. 09 YR 18

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV, TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: AF 17 67 wh FROM WE

46 O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJT: 26 JAN 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 013842
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HUNT E HOWARD
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 01 DA 29 YR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V; CF TO V; X V TO CF; CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7136 1184 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR SPECIAL ACTIVITIES STAFF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0006
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: 21192
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 20
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 44050 ALPHABETIC EUR
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA 09 YR 18
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS; 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: WE

E.D. ECHOLS

POSTED 6-7

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

BJT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

111

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 April 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 013842

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT, E. HOWARD

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 | DAY 07 | YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 7136-1184

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/~~WE~~ EVR

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE:

20 EMPLOY CODE:

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HEQTRS CODE:

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. | DA. | YR.

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA | YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO | DA. | YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO | DA | YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE: 2

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA | YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE

- 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
- 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
- 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
- 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: OMN

46. OP APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 27 APR 19

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 8-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
0P-2

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJT: 17 MAY 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM		4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 05 07 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☒ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO CF ☐	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7136 1184 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE		12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP 15	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA YR)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE 2	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE / MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E. D. ECHOLS

POSTED
5-18-68

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BJ

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET

1 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Howard Hunt

Mr. Hunt, on instructions of the Deputy Director for Plans, and with approvals from the DCI and the DDCI, was converted to contract employment and assigned to Spain for a special undertaking in behalf of the DD/P. He left for Spain in July 1965 and returned to the U. S. in June 1966 having completed his assignment successfully. If an evaluative comment is needed to cover his work during this period of time he should be rated as "strong".

THKaram

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

Orig & 1 - Director of Personnel
via C/EUR
1 - ADD/P

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(Last)* HUNT	*(First)* E.	*(Middle)* Howard	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY Sarasota, Fla.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. *(If appointed abroad)*
~~PLACE IN~~ CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Potomac, Md.	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE 11120 River Rd. Potomac, Md. 20854

2. MARITAL STATUS *(Check one)*

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Millbrook, N.Y.	DATE OF MARRIAGE Sept. 7 1949
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)*	TELEPHONE NO.	
Dorothy L. Hunt	11120 River Rd. Potomac, Md. 20854	299 7366	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Lisa T.	11120 River Road, Potomac, Md.	F	~~22xxx~~ 3/11/51
Kevan T.	D	F	27/11/52
Howard St. John	I TTO	M	3/22/54
David A.		M	8/1/65
NAME OF YOUR FATHER *(Or male guardian)*	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER *(Or female guardian)*	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. Wife and 3 elder children

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME ~~Mr~~., Mrs., ~~Miss~~) *(Last-First-Middle)* ~~M~~ Hunt, Dorothy L.	RELATIONSHIP wife
HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)* 11120 River Rd. Potomac, Md. 20854	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER 299 7366
BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)* AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? *(If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)* Yes	YES	X
	NO	
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? *(If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)*	YES	X
	NO	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? *(If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)*	YES	X
	NO	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 3-67 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Riggs National Bank F&M Branch, Washington, DC

Howard and/or Dorothy L. Hunt

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

in wife's possession

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

Wm. F. Buckley, Jr. Stamford, Conn.

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Daughter Lisa T.Hunt is presently hospitalised. Notofication should not be made to her.

SIGNED AT: Langley, Va.

DATE: 25 June 1963

SIGNATURE: E. Howard Hunt

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 JULY 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HUNT, E. HOWARD

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 08 DAY 07 YEAR 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / CF TO CF XX	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 9136 1184	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR ~~[illegible]~~ OPERATIONS STAFF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER (15)	12. POSITION NUMBER 0012	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 ~~4~~ 8	17. SALARY OR RATE ~~$23,738~~ 24,393

18. REMARKS

VICE: W. DIETRICH

FROM EUR/SAS/#0006

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/PERS	DATE SIGNED 8/1/68	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Paul M. [illegible]	DATE SIGNED 5 Aug 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44100	ALPHABETIC EUR	22. STATION CODE 75213	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VOOTRS CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 09 18	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OREGN 3—FICA 5—NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP DATE MO DA. YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV. TEMP / CODE	39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES / HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 8-7-68	46. O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PLW: 13 AUG 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

-OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 03 07 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9136 1154 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR OPERATIONS STAFF	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0012	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15 8	17 SALARY OR RATE 24393

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44166	ALPHABETIC EUR	22 STATION CODE 73013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 09 1	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

WATTLES

POSTED
mpm 8/16/68

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET PLW

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

7 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: E. Howard Hunt, DDP/EUR/CA

SUBJECT : Service Computation Date

In your memo of 24 February 1969 to the Director of Personnel you requested a classification of your Service Computation Date, since various records had indicated three different dates. The date should be 7 September 1944.

This date reflects the following service:

Economic Cooperation Administration-

17 May 1948 - 08 June 1948 22 days

Foreign Service-

09 June 1948 - 19 February 1949 - 08 mo., 11 days

U.S. Naval Reserve-

19 August 1940 - 13 October 1942 · 02 yr., 1 mo., 25 days

U.S. Army-

06 October 1943 - 08 January 1946 02 yr., 3 mo., 3 days

Agency (Staff and Contract)-

08 November 1949 to Present

Total non-Agency time amounts to 5 years, 2 months and 1 day. When this time is subtracted from your Agency EOD date the result is 7 September 1944.

The confusion has resulted from conflicting dates arrived at in previous attempts at classification.

SECRET

This office is charged with arriving at SCD's for leave purposes. Prior to your retirement the Retirement Operations Branch will obtain records from the Civil Service Commission verifying that service which is creditable for retirement purposes.

In this regard let me point out that the date which we have just verified contains a period of service that is potentially creditable for retirement. Your military records show an enlistment in the Army as 6 October 1943. However the form later states active duty from 22 November 1943 to 8 January 1946. If you have any questions regarding the computation please call me on X7165. Questions regarding creditable service for retirement purposes can be referred to Murray Benthall on X3257.

John T. McCann
Chief, Transactions & Records Branch

Distribution:
Orig.&1-Addressee
1-TRB Chrono

30 April 1969.

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : Howard E. Hunt, GS-15, Employee Number 013842, DOB: October 1918; EUR/CA; Career; Service Designation: D.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW : 22 June 1968 - 31 March 1969

MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 7

OVER-ALL RATING : Strong

1. Mr. Hunt took on his present duties as EUR/CA in July 1968. His performance in this position has been consistently Strong.

2. From the period of his previous assignment to EUR's Special Activities Staff, Mr. Hunt has made a substantial contribution to the refinement and recasting of CA operational concepts which has been underway in the Division since the termination over the past two years of many long established projects. He has a fine political sense and a sound grasp of European realities and evolutions. While concerned with the role and methods of political action, his mind is essentially operational, imaginative, and perhaps at its happiest in the recognition of opportunities and the stimulation of specific action in the field. In both these areas he has shown a power of original thought, persuasiveness in presenting his views, and persistance and vigor in helping get action underway.

3. There are three primary areas in which Mr. Hunt has played an important role in the Division's business. The first is in providing consistent staff assistance to Branches and Stations in the conduct of on-going CA action, and the modification and relocation of certain activities of concern to the Senior Staff and other divisions. He has brought to this work a balanced view of Division and Senior Staff equities, an excellent awareness of realities in the field and of the practical limits imposed by the field priorities, manpower, and the requirements of security.

4. Secondly, Mr. Hunt has carried with him from SAS a continuing participation in the work of that staff in its two aspects: the countering of Soviet political action and a reawakened and redefined concern with Communist Party operations. He has contributed to the definition of these interests and worked closely with the Branches in identifying opportunities. Neither of these areas are of a nature that has made for prompt common understanding between Headquarters and the field. Mr. Hunt's TDY's have been of major assistance in furthering this understanding.

5. Thirdly, Mr. Hunt has assumed a particularly important role in responding to requirements for memoranda, studies and suggestions which the Division has been asked to produce since the beginning of a new national Administration in January. Intimately coupled with this is direct support to the Chief of the Division in the latter's participation in the Interdepartmental Group, and the analyses and studies which have derived from that participation.

6. In all these duties, Mr. Hunt's performance has reflected sagacity, balance, and imagination. He has had, to his credit, the advantage of excellent give and take with the Division's branches and a sound knowledge of branch people and capacities. He has drawn with equal effectiveness upon a broad range of personal associations in other divisions and senior staffs, and upon a deep experience of the mechanics, nuances and occasional delicacies of getting business done at Headquarters.

7. In summary, Mr. Hunt's has been the performance of a very competent, tough-minded senior professional in a period which has somewhat changed the nature of the CA officer's duties within the Division.

Edward Fenimore
Chief of Operations
European Division

I certify that I have seen the above fitness report.

Date: 5/5/69

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 14 January 1970

FILE NUMBER: 1088

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 013842

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)

☒	CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
☐	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
☒	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) EUR

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: FORM: 1413

OFFICIAL COVER:
- ☐ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
- ☒ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: HUNT, E. HOWARD

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS *(OPM 20-800-11)*	☒ CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS *(OPM 20-800-11)*
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF COB	DATE XXXXXXX FROM EOD
☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*	NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*
☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ______ W-2 BEING ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*	NA RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR-240-2e)*	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR-240-2e)*	
☐ SUBMIT FORM 2688 ☒ FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

COVER HISTORY:

NOV 49 - DEC 50	HQS/OVERT
DEC 50 - MAR 53	MEXICO/STATE INT
MAR 53 - JAN 54	HQS/OVERT
JAN 54 - OCT 56	JAPAN/DAC
OCT 56 - JAN 57	HQS/OVERT
JAN 57 - JUN 60	URUGUAY/STATE INT
JUL 60 - JUL 65	HQS/OVERT
JUL 65 - SEP 66	HQS/OVERT
SEP 66 - PRESENT	HQS/STATE NOM

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - RID
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - CCS - CHRONO
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

JC/sl

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (13-20-43)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 Jan 70

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 013842

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT, E. HOWARD

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 11 YEAR 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF (XX)

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0236 1184

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
OPERATIONS STAFF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0012

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 8

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 26,629

18 REMARKS

Effective date of 11 Jan 70 must remain in order for Subject to be eligible for Blue Cross Hospitalization.

CF: PAYROLL

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: MILFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers — DATE SIGNED: 1/19/70

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: — DATE SIGNED: 1-19-70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
16	10	41.60	[illegible]	V-T13		1	10 09 18		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA YR:
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—CIGRS 3—FICA 5—NONE) CODE:
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR:
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY RTQ NO:
34 SEX:
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT):
36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA YR.:
37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR:
38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV TEMP) CODE:
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED 1—YES) HEALTH INS CODE:
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)):
42 LEAVE CAT CODE:
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS:
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE:

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1-20-70 mw

46 OP APPROVAL: W Hart — DATE APPROVED: 1/20/70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] 21 JAN 7[illegible]

UCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 013142	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 01 DA 11 YR 70	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS	☐	V TO V	☐	V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 0233 1104 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	☒	CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR OPERATIONS STAFF	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0012	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15	17 SALARY OR RATE 28321

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 16	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44100	ALPHABETIC EUR	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 [illegible] 1[illegible]	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR
								27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1-22-70
DB

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

JBC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962".

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS		GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HUNT E HOWARD	013842	44 100	CF	GS 15 8	$25,629

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS		GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HUNT E HOWARD	013842	44 050	CF	GS 15 7	$21,192	$22,082

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 215 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

SEC: 29 APR 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DAY YR 04 30 70	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No Chargeable 0236 1184 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY P.L. 88-643 SECT. 233
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR OPERATIONS STAFF	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0012
	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15 8	17 SALARY OR RATE 28226

18. REMARKS

---

1. LAST NAME HUNT	FIRST NAME E	INITIAL(S) HOWARD	2 APPOINTMENT DATA Entered on duty 5/15/48	F.T X	P.T	3 TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
4 DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY CIARDS 4/30/70			Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act Yes ☐ No ☐ Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ______ Annual Leave Bal ______			Years 25 / Months 7 / Days 23 ☒ More than 15 years

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	Annual	Sick
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 19 70	300	745
6 Current leave year accrual through 4/18 19 70	56	28
7 Total	356	773
8 Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9 Total leave taken	44	36
10 Balance	312	~~737~~ -0-*

11 Total hours paid in lump sum 300 HRS + 1 HOL.

12 Salary rate(s) 28,226

13 Lump sum leave dates From 0830, 5/1/70 to 6/24/70 1230 (Hours)

26 Certified correct by ________ 5/18/70
(Signature) (Date)

for Chief Payroll 143-2585
(Title) (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14 Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______

15 Current balance as of ______ 19 ___

16 12 month accrual rate ______

17 Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______

18 Monthly accrual date ______

19 Calendar days credit for next accrual date ______

20 Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21 Dates during current calendar yr ______ to ______

22 Dates during preceding calendar yr ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or AWOL or Furlough Suspension (Hours)
23 During leave year in which separated	0
24 During step increase waiting period which began on 12/3/67	0
25 During 12 month HL accrual period (dates)	

REMARKS

SCD: 9/7/44

*S/L TRANS. TO CSC

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

(When Filled In)

SECRET

21 APR 1970 70-2034

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement
E. Howard Hunt

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. E. Howard Hunt, GS-15, Operations Officer, European Division, Clandestine Service, has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j, to be effective 30 April 1970.

3. Mr. Hunt has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for voluntary retirement under the System. He is 51 years old with over 25 years of Federal service. This service includes over 20 years with the Agency of which more than 10 years were in qualifying service overseas. The Head of the Clandestine Service Career Service has recommended that his application for voluntary retirement be approved. I endorse this recommendation.

4. It is recommended that you approve the voluntary retirement of Mr. E. Howard Hunt under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

/s/ Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

[illegible] APR 1970
Date

SEC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 APRIL 1970

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 013842

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HUNT, E. HOWARD

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 | COB 30 | YEAR 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0236-1184

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sect. 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR OPERATIONS STAFF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (15)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0012

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 8

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~26,629~~ 28226

18 REMARKS

cc: SECURITY
cc: PAYROLL

Recommended for Agency Reserve program [illegible]

CSPS 4/27/70

1152 delivered w/ D. Morris, RAB, 4/29/70.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 4/27/70

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 4-27

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45

20 EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 HOURS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 18

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-OTHER 3-FICA 5-NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: C, BJ, CC, C.O.

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO.

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT

36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.; CODE

39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVED 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 4-29-70

46 O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 4/29/70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: April 23, 1970

FILE NUMBER: 1088

EMPLOYEE NUMBER:

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- [✓ x] CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- x CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) EUR

ATTN: Chief Support Staff

REF: Retirement Debriefing

SUBJECT: HUNT, E. Howard

OFFICIAL COVER:
- ☐ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
- x DISCONTINUED

UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	x CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF COB	DATE ~~XXXXXXX~~ From EOD
☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ______ W-2 BEING ISSUED (HHB 20-11)	NA RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY (HR-240-2e)	
SUBMIT FORM 2688 ☒ FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Cover History:

NOV 49 - DEC 50	HQS/OVERT
DEC 50 - MAR 53	MEXICO/STATE INT
MAR 53 - JAN 54	HQS/OVERT
JAN 54 - OCT 56	JAPAN/DAC NOM
OCT 56 - JAN 57	HQS/OVERT
JAN 57 - JUN 60	URUGUAY/STATE INT
JUL 60 - JUL 65	(HQS/OVERT
JUL 65 - SEP 66	HQS/OVERT
SEP 66 - Present	HQS/STATE NOM

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - RCO
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - CCS - CHRONO
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

CD/sl

James H. Franklin
OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

JSC: 29 APR 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013842	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HUNT E HOWARD

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE COB 04 30 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 0236 1184 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY P.L. 88-643 SECT. 233
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0012	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 28226

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-60 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET

1 MAY 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. E. Howard Hunt

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Request for Voluntary Retirement

1. I am pleased to inform you that your request for voluntary retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System has been approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Your retirement will become effective 30 April 1970. Your annuity will commence as of 1 May 1970 and is payable on 1 June 1970. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative processing required to effect your retirement.

3. You will receive a lump-sum payment for your accrued annual leave up to 30 days or for whatever amount of leave credit you carried over from the last leave year if that amount is more than 30 days.

/s/ H. B. Fisher
Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
- 0 - Addressee
- 1 - D/Pers
- 1 - OPF
- 1 - ROB Reader
- 1 - ROB Soft File

OP/RAD/ROB/DEMorris:jat/3257 (30 April 1970)

SECRET

[illegible]

70-1825

Executive Registry
70-329[illegible]

Mr. E. Howard Hunt
11120 River Road
Potomac, Maryland 20854

6 MAY 1970

Dear Howard:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have every reason to feel great pride and satisfaction in your accomplishments. Your record of service is both example and goal for the young people who are now just beginning their careers in intelligence.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Dick

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Good luck and best wishes!

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: /s/ H. B Fisher 4 MAY 1970
Director of Personnel

Concur: SIGNED
C/EAB/OS
29 APR 1970

OP/RAD/ROB/DEMorris:jat/3257 (20 April 1970)

Mr. E. Howard Hunt
11120 River Road
Potomac, Maryland 20854

Dear Mr. Hunt:

It is the practice of the Organization to follow up with former employees six months after their retirement. We hope by such inquiry to obtain information on what our retirees are doing and where they are located, invite suggestions for improving the retirement program and to learn if the Organization might be of some assistance on any post-retirement matters.

We should like very much to hear from you on the above points and on any other topics you think would be useful to us.

For your convenience in replying, we have enclosed a sheet somewhat akin to a form on which we have listed those standard items of information we'd like to have on every retiree. The remainder of the sheet, including the reverse side, is for your comments and suggestions. We shall be most appreciative of your fullest response to this inquiry.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Carroll A. Duchay
Personnel Officer

Enclosures:
Questionnaire
Return Envelope

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - OPF
1 - RAD Subject's File

OP/RAD/EEAB/MLShober:alp (9 October 1970)

Howard Hunt
C/CA/EUR
4829

NO SECU[illegible]TIONS
11 Dec 69

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Career Profile

From 1949 to the present I have been a career official of the Central Intelligency Agency. My foreign assignments have been in Europe, Latin America and the Far East where my duties involved the collection, evaluation, and reporting of high priority intelligence in the national interest. This intelligence information related to the economic, political, social and military aspects of nations and regions where I was located. During two crisis periods I was a senior member of special task forces organized to confront the crises, and took part in White House conferences. At other times I have served as a regional trouble-shooter.

Abroad I have dealt and negotiated with senior officials including Presidents of foreign nations and members of their Cabinets.

In Washington I have represented CIA at high levels of our government including the Psychological Strategy Board, Operations Coordinating Board and Interdepartmental Groups chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State. I have had extensive responsibilities for the development and review of large-scale budgets, and for their successful presentation.

I have also had broad experience in dealing with key non-governmental figures in the United States and abroad, including major corporate and industrial personalities at the highest level.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
013[illegible]2	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
HUNT, E(verette) Howard	9 Oct 1918


HUNT, E. Howard Jr.

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appreciation 1953 from Chief, PP, for assistance rendered in the preparation of "PP Operational Aids."

Appreciation 1953 from P. T. Culbertson, American Embassy, Mexico City, for ability, discretion and judgment displayed while assigned to Mexico City.

Commendation 1954 from W. D. Playdon (P) for superior performance in connection with project PBSUCCESS.

Appreciation 1960 from Chief, US Secret Service, Treasury Dept, to the DCI, for excellent cooperation provided prior to and during President Eisenhower's visit to Uruguay.

Commendation 1961 from Ch,WH for performance of duties with distinction in support of the mission outlined in Project JMATE.

23 Mar 1973	rrd/cal

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) SECRET E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010025 PROFILE 2561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

SD: 7 Sep 1944

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 013842			
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HUNT, E(verette) Howard	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1918	5. CONSECUTIVE COMP. DATE 8 Nov 1949
6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee) NO. 5	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1920 1951 1952 1954 1963	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE NA
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. RPT. Feb 1967	QUAL. FOR TDY Standby EVAL. FOR TDY Standby
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1 / RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2 / TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3 / RETIRED
12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None	

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1940-42	Military Service, US Navy, Ensign
1942-43	"The March of Time," NYC - Script Writer
1943	"Time," Inc, NYC - War Correspondent (South Pacific, 9 mos)
1943-46	Military Service, USAAF, 1st Lt (1945-46, OSS in China)
1946-49	Free Lance Writer
1948-49	Economic Cooperation Administration, Paris, France - US Media Specialist

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1934	AAFSAT, Orlando, Fla - Air Combat Intelligence (4 mos)
1936-40	Brown Univ - AB, English, English Literature, Economics
1950	Berlitz School of Languages, DC - Spanish

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

Spanish - R,P Inter; W,S,U High (Apr 1967) Transl & Interpr -May 1957
German - R,W,S,U,Slight;P,inter; T,none - May 1957 (declined testing)
French - R,P Elem; W,S,U Slight; T None - Sep 1966 - disc prof Apr 1968

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1950 Admin Proc
1950 Secret Writing
1953 Ops Famil
1953 Flaps & Seals
1953 Photography

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Nov 1949	I.O. (Editor)	0130.00	13		OPC/P&P Stf/Program Cop II	Hq
Dec 1950	I.O.	0132.00	13		OPC/Latin America/Ops/COS	Mexico City
Jun 1951	"	0132.00	14		OPC/Latin America/COON	" "
Aug 1953	Ops Off	0132.00	15	PP	DDP/SE/Ch, PP Staff	Hq
Jun 1954	Ops Off (PP)	0136.31	15	DP	DDP/FE/SR-NA/Ch, PP Staff	Tokyo
Feb 1957	Area Ops Off	0136.01	15	DP	DDP/WH-II/Uruguay Station/COS	Montevideo
Nov 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	DDP/WH-4	Hq
	Jun-Nov 1961 Detailed to Office of the DCI					
Nov 1961	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	DDP/CAStf/PlanstResBr/Ch, EvalBr	"
Jan 1962	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/CA Staff/OC	"
Jul 1962	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/DODS/Facilities Br/Ch,WFSec	"
Aug 1964	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/DOD/U.S. Field Ch, CA Staff	"
Feb 1965	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/Off of the DDP/Ops Group	"
	Jul 1965-Sep 1966 Contract Employee					
Sep 1966	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	DDP/WE/Operations Stf	Hq
Jan 1967	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/Eur/Spec Act Stf	"
Aug 1968	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/EUR/OperationsStaff	"
Apr 1970	Retirement--Voluntary under CIARDS					

20. DATE REVIEWED 28 Mar 1973	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY E 2 IMPDET nrd/ cal CL BY 010026	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE No

FORM 8-67 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE

REVIEWING OFFICER'S COMMENTS:

Although I would not differ from the evaluative comment on this officer, I would be inclined to rate his over-all performance as highly PROFICIENT rather than Strong, in view of his broad experience and grade. This officer has had a series of personal and taxing problems, beyond his control, which have tended to dull his cutting edge just enough to be noticeable.

E.N. Korn-Patterson
Deputy Chief,
European Division

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 December 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
Hunt E. Howard	013642	44 100	CF	GS-15 8	25,225

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
513842	HUNT HOWARD E	DDP/WH	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO	DA	YR
GS 15	4	$13,670	02	09	59	GS 15	5	$13,970	08	09	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA	YR

13. REMARKS

5/11

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

CF

WCD

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

S E C R E T

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HUNT HOWARD E	513842	GS-15-4	$12,420	$13,670

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

S E C R E T

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
513842	HUNT HOWARD F	DDP/WH	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO	DA	YR
15	3	$12,150	08	12	56	15	4	$12,420	02	09	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA	YR

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 01[illegible]

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HUNT, E. Howard	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1918	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer (CA)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DODS/[illegible]		8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D.C	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 20 April 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): March 1962 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises all Division propaganda operations. (4 employees, 7 projects)	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Project Officer WUROMBOW.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Project Officer WUHUSTLER.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with USIA, Staffs and Area Divisions as required to coordinate DODS foreign and domestic propaganda operations.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P/S

17 APR 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
013842

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HUNT, E. HOWARD	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/09/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer (Ch)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DODS/R&P	8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D.C.			

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 March 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises all Division propaganda operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Project Officer WUHUSTLER, WUBONBON	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with USIA, Staffs and Area Divisions as required to coordinate DODS foreign & domestic propaganda operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

26 MAY 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

[illegible]

Subject has performed in a manner quite consistent with his long and broad experience in many aspects of the craft of intelligence. His senior grade, his special expertise in the field of propaganda and publication and his very high intellect have contributed to the division's operations in the public media field a sharp focus, an economical concentration of money and effort and a consequently heightened impact. In the WUHUSTLER project, Subject vindicated his faith in a moribund clandestine asset by demonstrating, after about a year and a half under his personal direction, that it is one of the most effective activities of its kind. Before Subject assumed direct responsibility for this project, it had suffered from visionary and diffuse direction and from poor case officer-agent rapport. Subject's personal handling of this operation is marked by excellent rapport and the project prospers on an entirely reoriented basis which the agent himself enthusiastically welcomes.

Subject's supervisory responsibility has extended over two secretaries, from one to two professional staffers under official cover and three professional career employees under unofficial cover. The fairness and precision of his management has patently won their respect and inspired their performance.

(Continued on additional sheet)

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 20 May 64
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: E. Howard Hunt

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 24 months
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 19 May 1964
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: DCOS
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Stanley H. Gaines

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Concur -

DATE: [illegible]
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: C. T. Davis -

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 013842

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Hunt, E. Howard	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/09/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer (CH)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DOD/CA	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 64 - 28 February 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises all DO Division propaganda operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Project officer for WUHUSTLER, WUBONBON, WUPUNDIT.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with USIA, Staffs and Area Divisions to coordinate DO propaganda operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises one CS staff officer and secretary under official and two career agents and several witting proprietary hires under project cover.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 13 APR 1965	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hunt continued to direct the propaganda activities of the DO Division in a superior professional manner until 12 October 1964, when he was incapacitated by illness. On his return from sick leave on 7 December, he was detailed to the Office of the DD/P and officially transferred to that office on 28 February 1965. DO Division can only view this transfer with considerable regret.

Mr. Hunt, by virtue of his personal background, has a unique flair and competence in the propaganda field. Over and above, but complementary to these special skills, his extensive experience in the CS, his sound judgment, high and creative intellect and other commendable personal qualities contributed significantly to the successful prosecution of DO's efforts in the media field. These same attributes attest, in my judgment, to his suitability for employment as a Station Chief or in any other position requiring broad knowledge of and skill in the CS business. He is very cost conscious and an effective supervisor. He enjoys the respect of all personnel under his supervision, official and non-official, as well as that of all his co-workers in the Division and Station.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 7 April '65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE E. Howard Hunt

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 16	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 8 APR 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DO/Executive Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Thos. P. Schreyer Thos. P. Schreyer

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur generally with the foregoing. I would, however, be less inclined to recommend him for a COS job. He could do it but I do not consider that details of management or handling of people his forte -

DATE 5 April 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, DO Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE C. Tracy Barnes Tracy Barnes

SECRET

30 April 1969.

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : Howard E. Hunt, GS-15, Employee Number 013842, DOB: October 1918; EUR/CA; Career; Service Designation: D.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW : 22 June 1968 - 31 March 19689

MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 7

OVER-ALL RATING : Strong

1. Mr. Hunt took on his present duties as EUR/CA in July 1968. His performance in this position has been consistently Strong.

2. From the period of his previous assignment to EUR's Special Activities Staff, Mr. Hunt has made a substantial contribution to the refinement and recasting of CA operational concepts which has been underway in the Division since the termination over the past two years of many long established projects. He has a fine political sense and a sound grasp of European realities and evolutions. While concerned with the role and methods of political action, his mind is essentially operational, imaginative, and perhaps at its happiest in the recognition of opportunities and the stimulation of specific action in the field. In both these areas he has shown a power of original thought, persuasiveness in presenting his views, and persistance and vigor in helping get action underway.

3. There are three primary areas in which Mr. Hunt has played an important role in the Division's business. The first is in providing consistent staff assistance to Branches and Stations in the conduct of on-going CA action, and the modification and relocation of certain activities of concern to the Senior Staff and other divisions. He has brought to this work a balanced view of Division and Senior Staff equities, an excellent awareness of realities in the field and of the practical limits imposed by the field priorities, manpower, and the requirements of security.

4. Secondly, Mr. Hunt has carried with him from SAS a continuing participation in the work of that staff in its two aspects: the countering of Soviet political action and a reawakened and redefined concern with Communist Party operations. He has contributed to the definition of these interests and worked ~~closely~~ with the Branches in identifying opportunities. Neither of these areas are of a nature that has made for prompt common understanding between Headquarters and the field. Mr. Hunt's TDY's have been of major assistance in furthering this understanding.

5. Thirdly, Mr. Hunt has assumed a particularly important role in responding to requirements for memoranda, studies and suggestions which the Division has been asked to produce since the beginning of a new national Administration in January. Intimately coupled with this is direct support to the Chief of the Division in the latter's participation in the Interdepartmental Group, and the analyses and studies which have derived from that participation.

6. In all these duties, Mr. Hunt's performance has reflected sagacity, balance, and imagination. He has had, to his credit, the advantage of excellent give and take with the Division's branches and a sound knowledge of branch people and capacities. He has drawn with equal effectiveness upon a broad range of personal associations in other divisions and senior staffs, and upon a deep experience of the mechanics, nuances and occasional delicacies of getting business done at Headquarters.

7. In summary, Mr. Hunt's has been the performance of a very competent, tough-minded senior professional in a period which has somewhat changed the nature of the CA officer's duties within the Division.

Ed Fenimore

Edward Fenimore
Chief of Operations
European Division

I certify that I have seen the above fitness report.

Edward Hunt Date: 4/5/69

REVIEWING OFFICER'S COMMENTS:

Although I would not differ from the evaluative comment on this officer, I would be inclined to rate his over-all performance as highly PROFICIENT rather than Strong, in view of his broad experience and grade. This officer has had a series of personal and taxing problems, beyond his control, which have tended to dull his cutting edge just enough to be noticeable.

E.N. Korn-Patterson
Deputy Chief,
European Division

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 21 September 1966

YOUR REFERENCE:

CASE NO. : 23500

TO : Director of Personnel

ATTN : John Stocks

SUBJECT : HUNT, Everette Howard Jr.

1. This is to inform you that Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulations 10-3 and 20-5 including access to classified information through TOP SECRET as required in the performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made for entrance on duty within 150 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐ Please advise Chief, Clearance Branch, extension 5620 when Subject enters on duty.

4. This is a Conversion Action. This is issued in advance of Form #577.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Steven L Kuhn

Steven L. Kuhn
Chief, Personnel Security Division

SECRET

1 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Howard Hunt

Mr. Hunt, on instructions of the Deputy Director for Plans, and with approvals from the DCI and the DDCI, was converted to contract employment and assigned to Spain for a special undertaking in behalf of the DD/P. He left for Spain in July 1965 and returned to the U. S. in June 1966 having completed his assignment successfully. If an evaluative comment is needed to cover his work during this period of time he should be rated as "strong".

THKaram

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

Orig & 1 - Director of Personnel
via C/EUR
1 - ADD/P

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
HUNT	E.	Howard 01342	10/9/18	126 05 1970

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY:

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): E. Howard Hunt

DATE: Feb. 13, 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
RECEIVING
FEB 19 10 19 AM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED JUNE [illegible]
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAP. 295
[illegible]

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Central	Intelligence	Agency
(Department or agency)	(Bureau or division)	(Place of employment)

I, [illegible] E. [illegible], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

13 Oct 66
(Date of entrance on duty)

(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 17 day of September A. D. 1966

at Langley (City) Virginia (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

[illegible]
(Title)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U.S.C. 16, or by a person designated to administer oaths under Section 206, Act of June 26, 1943, 5 U.S.C. 16a. If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)
[illegible] River Road Potomac, Md. 20854

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: Oct. 9, 1918
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city and State or city and foreign country*): Hamburg, N.Y.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, PLEASE NOTIFY: Dorothy L. Hunt
(B) RELATIONSHIP: wife
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 11120 River Rd. Potomac Md.
(D) TELEPHONE NO.: 299 7366

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blank below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MAR-RIED (*Check one*)	SIN-GLE (*Check one*)
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, CHARGED OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 12 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken*		X
9. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 12*		X

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10. (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		X
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		
11. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT: A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE: (1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT: (1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.*		X

12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER.—You must determine that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, any record of recent discharge or arrest, age, citizenship, and members of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should particularly check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and/or other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1963 O—[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) HUNT	(First) E.	(Middle) Howard	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 126 05 4970

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY Washington, D.C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Potomac, Maryland	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Millbrook, N.Y.	DATE OF MARRIAGE 6 Sept. '49
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Dorothy Louise Hunt	11120 River Rd. Potomac, Md	299 7366	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Lisa	"	f	9 March '50
Kevan		f	11 Nov. '52
Howard S.		m	22 March '54
David		m	1 Sept. '65
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
	deceased		
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
	"		

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
wife

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Mrs. E.Howard Hunt	RELATIONSHIP wife
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 11120 River Road Potomac 20854 Md.	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER 299 7366
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) yes	YES	X
	NO	
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) yes	YES	X
	NO	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	X
	NO	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 11-63 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Riggs National Bank of Washington (F&M Branch)
Washington 7, DC

Dorothy L. and/or
Howard Hunt

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

SD box, Riggs Bank

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

Mr. Wm. F. Buckley,Jr. Wallacks Point, Stamford, Conn .

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

wife

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
	[illegible]	[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 15 3 15 PM '63
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hunt is an officer with real ability, creative and managerial. During the period under review, he has done a great deal to tighten up the operation of his shop. The amorphous aspects of some projects he inherited have been eliminated or cut down to size. He has a pleasant and engaging personality and a broadly based background.

If there are any areas of weakness in his performance it is only because his potential is so considerable. For example, it is possible that the staff and planning aspects of his job could receive more attention although, admittedly, there is a large grey area between the responsibilities of the CA Staff and the responsibilities of DODS in this respect.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 8 March 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE E. Howard Hunt	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 13 APR 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DODS/EXO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE R. H. Cunningham
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 14 April 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief CA Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE C. Tracy Barnes

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO. 0135942	NAME (Last-First-Middle) Hunt, E. Howard	DATE OF BIRTH Oct 9, 1918

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED Hamburg High	ADDRESS (City, State, Country) Hamburg, N.Y. USA	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To) 1932 - 36	GRADUATE ☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1. Brown U. Providence R.I.	English Lit.		1936 - 40	A.B.	'40	
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1				
2				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1 PRESENT STATUS (Single [✓ Married] Widowed Separated Divorced Annulled Remarried) SPECIFY:

2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) Hunt (First) Dorothy (Middle) Louise (Maiden) WETZEL

3. DATE OF BIRTH 1 April 1920	4 PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Dayton, Ohio, USA	
5 OCCUPATION Housewife	6 PRESENT EMPLOYER —	
7 CITIZENSHIP USA	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) —	9 DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED —

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (✓)			
				RESI-DENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGN-MENT
1							
2							

OCT 23 3 10 PM '68

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (✓) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED?	2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
☐ YES ☐ NO	

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS	4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT	6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Oct. 7, 1968	E. Howard Hunt

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
< 2	6-DIGITS	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< 3										

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NON-LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST						
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< 5	013842	HUN	C	BK50	1	0	1	0	1	3	57

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST		
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR
BK50	2	1	2	1	1	4	66	07	19	66

DATA FOR ITEM 2 20 MAR 1967 EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME
< 4		3-LETTERS

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
A - ADDITION TO RECORD
C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-511

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF CLAIMED LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 013942	2. NAME (last-first-middle) Hunt, E. Howard	3. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]

4\.

LIST BELOW THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE OR LANGUAGES IN WHICH YOU POSSESS ANY DEGREE OF COMPETENCE. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH OF THE FIVE SKILL FACTORS SHOWN *(reading comprehension, writing ability, etc.)* BY NOTING THE NUMBER MOST INDICATIVE OF YOUR LEVEL OF SKILL UNDER THE FACTOR BEING CONSIDERED.

IF YOUR PROFICIENCY RELATES TO A PARTICULAR DIALECT OF A MAJOR LANGUAGE, IDENTIFY THIS DIALECT BY NOTING IT IN PARENTHESES AFTER THE LANGUAGE ON THE SAME LINE.

IF YOU HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE, CHECK (X) BOX AT RIGHT AND LEAVE OTHER ITEMS BLANK. → ☐

LEVEL OF SKILL

(Slight) 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 *(Native)*

0 = NO PROFICIENCY IN A SPECIFIC SKILL FACTOR

	SKILL FACTORS						HOW ACQUIRED *(Check (X) Box(es) which apply)*				
	READING COMPREHENSION	WRITING ABILITY	PRONUNCIATION	CONVERSATIONAL ABILITY	ORAL COMPREHENSION		NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY	
Spanish	4	3	4	4	4			X		X	
FRENCH	2	1	2	1	1			X			

5. IF YOU HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR, INTERPRETER OR INSTRUCTOR, EXPLAIN AND SPECIFY IN WHICH LANGUAGE(S) YOU HAVE HAD SUCH EXPERIENCE.

Spanish — translator + interpreter

[illegible]

[illegible]

DATE [illegible]

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that the information given above is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE [illegible] Hunt

FORM 4-66 444c OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-45)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
<• 2	6-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH			5. DATE CODED		
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR
•			•		

THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED			6. DATE OF BIRTH		
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR
•			•		

WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 5	• 013742	• HUN	• C	• BL18	H	H	H	H	H	3	62

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST		
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR
• BL18	I	H	I	H	H	3	67	• 04	18	67

DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA. 10 JUL 1967

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME
<• 4	•	3-LETTERS •

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
- A - ADDITION TO RECORD
- C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
- D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-21)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST
	HUNT, E. HOWARD	A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE CODE:	LAN. CODE / R / W / P / S / U / I/T / YEAR

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
LAN. CODE / R / W / P / S / U / I/T / YEAR	04/18/67	10/09/18	15	EUR

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

TO: ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN SPANISH (NEW WORLD) BL18
(NAME OF LANGUAGE)
AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
I	+	I	H	H

TEST RATINGS
0 = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE
S = SLIGHT H = HIGH
E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

CODED
FOR
C[illegible]ATIONS

12. SIGNATURE

13. LD NUMBER
13670

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE ~~PREVIOUS~~ EDITIONS (10-45) **SECRET** GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION I - OP/QAB

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE, GRADE, STEP
013842	HUNT E HOWARD		10/09/18	GS -15-07

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
D	OPS OFFICER	EUR	WASH., D.C.

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
MEXICO	PCS 64	50/12/31	53/04/01
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 64	54/01/31	54/03/01
JAPAN	PCS 64	54/05/01	56/10/01
URUGUAY	PCS 44	57/01/01	60/05/02
ASIA AREA	TDY 43	63/01/27	63/01/19 ✓
Mexico	TDY	66/2/10	66/10/03

New PHS made
Sept 67

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 22 Jun 67
INITIALS: [illegible]

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BAGH	ENGLISH LITERATURE	BROWN UNIV RI	40

SECRET

6 7 JUL END

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U. S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

6 May 1971

Mr. Howard Hunt
11120 River Road
Potomac, Maryland 20854

Dear Howard:

I have taken so long in answering your letter of April 5th because of the careful consideration given to your request by all concerned, particularly as we have not had this problem before.

I am sorry to tell you that our answer is in the negative, although we have taken every approach we can think of to comply with your wishes. Very simply, the problem is as follows:

> The statute states--
>
> > At the time of retirement, any married participant may elect to receive a reduced annuity and to provide for an annuity payable to his wife or her husband, commencing on the date following such participant's death . . . (emphasis added).
>
> Our regulation on the subject repeats the language of the statute above and in addition states--
>
> > A participant may not change his election under this provision . . . .

We considered the possibility of a waiver of the regulation but ran into another problem here. The act specifically provides that the Director may prescribe rules and regulations, but continues with the language that, "such rules and regulations /are/ to become effective after approval by the chairman and ranking minority members of the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate." The regulations as presently enacted were specifically reviewed by those Committees and approved in their present form.

Looking back into the legislative history of the act, we believe it is clear that the Committees desired our act to conform as closely as possible to Civil Service retirement, which definitely would not permit a change of election after retirement. There does not appear to have been any administrative error or misunderstanding at the time you retired and made your election, therefore, we have been unable to find any basis for making the change you request.

I think you know me well enough to agree that I like to stay as flexible in the law as I possibly can, but this seems to be one case where we are bound by specific provisions with no leeway to meet the requests of individual employees.

Sincerely,

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

cc: Executive Director
DDS
Director of Personnel
OGC chrono
✓subject Retirement
OGC:LRH:jeb

HOWARD HUNT

11120 River Road,
Potomac, Maryland 20854.,
May 12, 1971.

The Honorable
Lawrence R Houston,
General Counsel,
The Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D. C. 20505.

Dear Larry:

I thoroughly appreciate the thought and study you gave my problem, and while your findings are disappointing to me, I must regard them as definitive.

Reflecting on the statute, however, I find myself wondering whether such irrevocable limitation on personal choice is, first, in the public interest, and second in the interest of annuitants whose personal circumstances and civil status are subject to unanticipated change. This could be the subject of an interesting class action challenge in which, I imagine, more than a few annuitants would be eager to join.

All that aside, I'm most grateful for your efforts to help me once again.

Cordially,

Howard

SECRET

21 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. E. Howard Hunt

1. On 21 June 1972 Mr. Robert Tegethoff, INR, Department of State, informed Mr. James Franklin, Chief, CCS/OCB, that the Department of State had received press inquiries in regard to Mr. E. Howard Hunt's service with the Department of State. INR had arranged for withholding any Department of State replies until CIA had been consulted. Mr. Hunt's cover record showed that he was in integrated Department of State status in Mexico from 1950 until 1953 and in Montevideo from 1957 until 1960. He also had nominal domestic Department of State cover from 1966 until he retired in 1970. Upon retirement, Mr. Hunt was " opened up " as a CIA employee back to EOD in November 1949.

2. In the absence of both Messrs. Osborn, Director of Security, and Geiss, Deputy Director, I discussed the State Department request with Mr. Leo Dunn, Acting Deputy Director of Security for Personnel Security. He concluded that everything considered, the Department should say that Mr. Hunt was assigned to the Department while in integrated status but, when pressed, not deny his basic CIA status. While trying to clear this line with the ADDP, Mr. Geiss called and at the end of our discussion, cautioned that any guidance to the Department of State in regard to Mr. Hunt should be cleared with the DCI.

3. I then talked to Mr. Sam Halpern, EA/DDP, to determine the whereabouts of Mr. Meyer. He recommended that I talk to both Messrs. Meyer and Colby who were in the OPPB think tank.

SECRET

4. As I was leaving my office, Mr. Tegethoff called Mr. Franklin a second time to say that in the evening of 20 June 1972, Mr. John King, Department of State's Press Office, and Mr. John Unumb of CIA had discussed press inquiries in regard to Mr. Hunt which were made to the Department of State in the afternoon of 20 June 1972. These inquiries had particular reference to Mr. Hunt's biography in WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA showing him as Department of State employee since 1968 and listing his office at the Department of State. Messrs. Unumb and King agreed the press should be informed that he was not on the State Department's payroll during the period. Mr. Unumb confirmed this arrangement when I called him and said that he had added that Mr. Hunt retired in good standing from CIA in April 1970. I also cleared the proposed guidance with Mr. Ted Shackley, Chief, WH Division.

5. I then saw Messrs. Colby and Meyer, outlined the Department of State's request and our proposed reply that Mr. Hunt, during his integrated service in Mexico and Montevideo, was assigned to the Department of State. This information would not be volunteered by the Department of State, and Mr. Hunt's basic status as a CIA employee would not be denied if raised by members of the press. Messrs. Colby and Meyer agreed that this was the only feasible line to take. I then asked Mr. Colby whether additional clearance from the DCI was required. He replied that it was not, and that he would brief the DCI.

6. I informed Mr. Geiss of Messrs. Colby's and Meyer's decision and then called Mr. Tegethoff and provided him the agreed guidance.

/s/ ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
Chief, Central Cover Staff

Orig - C/OCB/CCS; File 1088 (Hunt)
EA/DDP; ADDP
DD/Security
Mr. Unumb, Deputy Asst to the DCI
Chrono

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Chief, TRB		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Janet: Please file the attached document in the Official Personnel Folder on E. Howard Hunt. The Hunt OPF was returned to you for retention on 6 May 1976. Thanks.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Bonnie, OD/Pers	21 May 76

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 (40)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/Security, 4E-60	6/22	
2	D/OS	22 JUN 1972	
3			
4	ADD/PS	6/26/72	
5	File		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

E. Howard Hunt

BY HAND

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/CCS (9164)	[illegible]

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: [illegible]

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible] ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible], E. [illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 01 / DAY [illegible] / YEAR 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE [illegible]	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS [illegible] Staff Office of the Chief	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE [illegible]	12. POSITION NUMBER [illegible]	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION [illegible]

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) [illegible]	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES [illegible]	16. GRADE AND STEP [illegible]	17. SALARY OR RATE $ [illegible]

18. REMARKS

FROM: Same as above/[illegible] Plans & Research Group

PTA in accordance with R 20-[illegible]

cc - Security
cc - Payroll

[illegible] CSIP

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Roosevelt [illegible], Jr., C/[illegible]	DATE SIGNED [illegible]	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 22 Jan 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC [illegible] ALPHABETIC [illegible]	22. STATION CODE	23. [illegible] CODE	24. [illegible] CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. [illegible] 18	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 30	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. [illegible] SERV. CREDITED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE 0 - [illegible] 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	[illegible]	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE [illegible] STATE CODE				

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 1-25	46. O.P. APPROVAL

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 23 JUNE 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
513842	HUNT E HOWARD	10	09	18		1	M	1	11	08	49			
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Aff. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code
05	24	44		1	50 USCA 403 J						11	08	49	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 2 MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY STATION		MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY	

16. Dept - Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	ATT POL OF 1stSEC CON CHIEF OF STATION	0162	~~FSR~~ GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
~~03~~ 15 5	$ ~~13640~~ 13970	D							0135 5870 3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	60	06	~~25~~ 808	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 2 MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY STATION	4651	MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY	76031

33. Dept - Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	CHIEF OF STATION	0162	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 5	$ 13970	D	08	16	53	XX	XX	XX	0135 5870 3000

44. Remarks

POSTED

06-24-60 WK

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) HUNT, E, HOWARD	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr. 10 09 18	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. Da. Yr.	
7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Aff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code

5 A

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 2 MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY STATION	Code	15. Location Of Official Station MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY	Station Code
16. Dept - Field Dept. - Usfld - Fgn - Code 5	17. Position Title ATTACHE POL OFC 1ST SEC CONSUL CHIEF OF STATION	18. Position No. BAF-162	19. Serv. FSR GS 20. Occup. Series 0136.01
21. Grade & Step 3 15 5	22. Salary Or Rate $ 13,640 13,970	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 26. Appropriation Number 0135 5870 3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	Code 60	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. ~~OCB~~ 25 BCB 06 ~~24~~ 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 2 MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY STATION	Code 1651	32. Location Of Official Station MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY	Station Code 76651
33. Dept - Field Dept. - Usfld - Fgn - Code 5	34. Position Title CHIEF OF STATION	35. Position No. BAF-162	36. Serv. GS 37. Occup. Series 0136.01
38. Grade & Step 15 5	39. Salary Or Rate $ 13,970	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 08 16 53 42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 02 05 61 43. Appropriation Number 0135 5870 3000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
F. E. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
JOHN WASHINZO X8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved B.		

Remarks Subject resigned from the Department of State effective COB 24 June 1960.

NO. 1152
57

SECRET

Attachment to Fitness Report of Howard Hunt 31 March 63 - 31 March 64

Section C (Continued)

Special mention should be made of Subject's objectivity and integrity in carrying out his responsibilities. These were best demonstrated when he promptly and swiftly terminated a large and effective radio broadcasting project, to establish which he and his subordinates had labored hard, immediately upon belated discovery that insuperable, practical obstacles precluded realization of the project's theoretical potential.

Subject's professional background has attuned his constant attention to FI operational opportunities arising in the course of his current CA activities, a practice consistent with his habit of seeking maximum benefit for every dollar spent in time, effort or cash.

CRABANAC, Terence S.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HUNT, E. HOWARD (CONTRACT

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 January 1965 - 3 Dec 1970

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: O/P

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2/28/78	2/28/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
3/15/78	3/15/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

TS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

Contract Service — Terence S Crahmac (P)

Date	Action	Comp —	GS Equivalent
4 July 65	Former Staff Employee Hired as a Contract Employee with Civil Service Retirement, LPIs and PSIs.	$ 19,550	GS-15/7
10 Oct 65	LPI	20,595	GS-15/7
3 July 66	LPI	21,192	GS-15/7
17 Sept 66	Contract Terminated	21,192	GS-15/7

Converted to Staff Employee Status

4-00000

SECRET

8 DEC 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Engagement of E. Howard Hunt as Independent Contractor Under Memorandum of Oral Contract

1. Effective 2 November 1970, subject was retained under oral contract to write a citation concerning an employee of CIA for a fee of $250.00. The completed citation was delivered to and accepted by CIA on 23 November 1970.

2. Subject is a former CIA Staff Employee who retired effective 30 April 1970.

3. Subject is to be paid his fee of $250.00 under Fin Account Number 1176-0041. At Mr. Hunt's request, payment is to be made in the form of two sterile checks, one in the amount of $200.00 payable to the Public Service Aid Society, and the second in the amount of $50.00 payable to the Educational Aid Fund. Please forward both checks to Mr. Ben DeFelice, 5E-67 Headquarters.

4. No other commitments have been made to subject.

Approving Officer
Office of Personnel

APPROVED:

/s/ [illegible]

Chief, Contract Personnel Division

8 DEC 1970

Date

The

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] Terence S. CRABANAC

[redacted] on instructions of the Deputy Director for Plans, and with approvals from the DCI and the DDCI, was converted to contract employment and assigned to Spain for a special undertaking in behalf of the DD/P. He left for Spain in July 1965 and returned to the U. S. in June 1966 having completed his assignment successfully. If an evaluative comment is needed to cover his work during this period of time he should be rated as "strong".

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

Orig & 1 - Director of Personnel
via C/EUR
1 - ADD/P

SECRET

3 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, TRB

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Service for [redacted] [illegible]
[illegible]

1. The following is a record of subject's contract service with the Agency:

Date	Action	Compensation
4 July 1965	Contract Employee	$19,880 per annum
10 October 1965	Salary Increase	$20,595 per annum
3 July 1966	Salary Increase	$21,192 per annum
17 September 1966	Contract Terminated	$21,192 per annum

2. All of above service is creditable for both leave and Civil Service Retirement purposes.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - CPD

SECRET

26 SEP 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION : Paul R. Wilson

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Service
[redacted] CRAGANAC, Lenne S.

In order to establish the salary, LCD and to compute the SCD for both leave and retirement purposes, it is necessary to verify the contract service and salary of [redacted], DOB 9 October 1918, who claims employment with this Agency in a contract status from 4 July 1965 to 17 September 1966.

Lowell P. Moore
Lowell P. Moore
Deputy Chief, Transactions & Records Branch

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

This is to advise that effective 17 September 1966 I will resign from employment with the United States Government as provided in the contractual agreement effective 4 July 1965. It is understood that my status as a Staff Employee will be effective 18 September 1966, the day following my resignation as a Contract Employee.

Terence S. CRABANAC

APPROVED:

European Contract Approving Officer

Date

APPROVED:
/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

REVIEWED:
~~/s/ Dow H. Luetscher~~
~~Special Contracting Officer~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Terence S. CRABANAC (P)

The ADDP requested the writer to personally bring CRABANAC's file to him for review this date. I was informed by Mr. Karamessines that Subject has now returned to headquarters for reassignment and will not be returning to Madrid, as his duties have been fulfilled there.

When the DDP decides CRABANAC's next assignment, ADDP will inform us of such and action desired. CRABANAC's travel accounting was given to C/E/B&F for preparation and processing of the voucher for Subject's return travel.

Charles J. Francis

Charles J. Francis
AC/E/SS

CFrancis/cls: 14 Jul 66

SECRET

SECRET

8 NOV 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT: Request for Exception to Provision of FR 45-10b — Terence S. CRABANAC (P)

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph 4 for the approval of the Deputy Director for Support.

2. Terence S. CRABANAC (P) is a Contract Employee assigned to the Madrid area in Spain in a sensitive assignment since his conversion from a Staff Employee on 4 July 1965. CRABANAC was a GS-15, step 7 ($19,850.00 per annum) and he is being paid at the same rate in his present contract status. His contract provides that he will be entitled to a living quarters allowance in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel.

3. The basic living quarters allowance for Class II officers in Madrid is $2,900 per annum. The house which CRABANAC has located, with a one year lease from 15 November 1965 to 14 November 1966, has an annual rent of $6,600.00 excluding utilities. Therefore, for rent alone, he will be $1,960.00 per year over the 160 percent maximum allowed under the provisions of FR 45-10b. On a 75/25 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent over the quarters allowance, he would be out of pocket $2,395.00.

4. Due to the operational sensitivity of CRABANAC's assignment, his request for relief on his housing costs was handled by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP. On 15 September 1965, Mr. Karamessines, ADDP, approved his being reimbursed on a 75/25 percent basis for the excess allowable costs up to, but not to exceed, 60 percent above his quarters allowance. This authorization was included in a letter to CRABANAC from Mr. Karamessines. It is requested that the Deputy Director

for Support authorize the 75/25 percent sharing of the excess allowable costs up to 60 percent above his quarters allowance.

/S/

Edward Ryan
Acting Chief
Western Europe Division

Recommendation in paragraph 4
is authorized:

Charles H. Davis
Deputy Director for Support

9 NOV 1965
Date

DDP/WE/SS:DavisB.Powell/aj/6189 (8Nov65)

Distribution:
Orig. - C/WE
2 - SSA-DD/S
1 - C/WE/SS
1 - WE/LO
1 - WE/PT
1 - WE/BF
1 - WE/S

SECRET

Chief, Western Europe Division 18 October 1965

ATT : Support Staff

Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

Duty Status Reports-Terence S. CRABANAC, Employee Number 179080

Reference : FHB 20-1000-1, paragraph 5.

1. To date there is no record of receipt of Forms 764, Duty Status Reports, for Terence S. CRABANAC since his EOD 4 July 1965. These reports are required in order to maintain his leave account in accordance with the terms of paragraph 6(e) of his contract and to preclude action to withhold pay in accordance with requirements of the referenced handbook.

2. It is requested that this office be advised as to the reason for the delay in the submission of these Duty Status Reports.

LUCILE F. TWOGOOD
Chief,
Contract Employees Accounts Section
Agent Payroll Branch

TO: Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

ATTENTION: Lucile F. Twogood

FROM: Chief of Support, WE Division

Per conversation with Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP, there will be no Duty Status Reports (Form 764) submitted on Terence S. CRABANAC. This should be used as the authority to continue his pay without these reports.

Davis B. Powell
Chief of Support
WE Division

5 NOV 1965

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

October 18, 1965

Dear Howard,

Your insurance representative has passed along some information concerning reimbursement to you by means of deposits to your bank account. So that you will understand the reason and the source of deposits which show up on your bank statement, here is the run-down for the present:

Amount of Deposit	Approx Date of Deposit	Reason for Payment
$ 5.00	Sep 9	Settlement of claim for son Howard (settlement sheet enclosed)
$216.06	Oct 7	Settlement of following claims: You..........$ 47.68 Lisa.......... 112.88 Kevan......... 24.50 Howard........ 31.00 $ 216.06 (Four settlement sheets are enclosed.)
$505.75	Oct 7	Settlement of following claims: Lisa..........$ 112.49 Kevan......... 63.75 Kevan......... 189.74 Lisa.......... 139.77 $ 505.75 (Four settlement sheets are enclosed.)
$ 60.00	To be made Nov 4	Refund of advance premium payments made on your life insurance policy which you cancelled.

I am also forwarding herewith some bills and receipts which your insurance representative has returned with appropriate notations on each. I believe you will want to retain these for possible future use.

Sincerely,

John

4 October 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division, Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : Terence S. CRABANAC (P), Contract Employee Request for Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that Subject's contract, which was effective 4 July 1965, be amended with respect to living quarters allowances so as to authorize reimbursement for 75% of the excess allowable costs up to, but not in excess of, 60% of the standardized quarters allowance.

2. The proposal for this 75%/25% sharing basis, in lieu of the standard 50%/50% basis, has been reviewed and approved by Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines.

Davis B. Powell

Davis B. Powell
Chief, WE Support Staff

SECRET

15 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines

SUBJECT : Madrid Housing

1. The following is a listing of the GS-13 and above staff employees and their quarters costs as of April 1965:

Grade & No. of Dependents	Allowance	Cost	Cost to Individual
(COS)GS-16 (3)	$2,900	$4,236	All cost paid
GS-15 (1)	2,900	3,132	$116
GS-15 (0)	2,000	1,800	0
GS-14 (5)	2,900	2,796	0
GS-14 (5)	2,900	3,840	450
GS-13 (3)	2,000	2,280	140
GS-13 (3)	2,000	2,472	236
GS-13 (5)	2,000	2,544	272

2. Mr. Hunt's quarters allowance is $2,900. Using the same formula as applied to the other staff employees at the Station, the following would be the figures:

$2,900 + 60% ($1,740) = $4,640

On a 50/50 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent, he would be out-of-pocket $870 if his costs were $4,640.

On a 75/25 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent, he would be out-of-pocket $435, if his costs were $4,640.

3. I would recommend he be authorized the 75/25 percent sharing basis of the allowable excess costs up to, but not to exceed, 60 percent above his quarters allowance.

Davis B. Powell

Davis B. Powell
Chief
WE Support

4640
-435
4205

SECRET

SECRET

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : General - Terrence S. CRABANAC - Supplement
Specific - Paragraph Entitled "Offset"

REFERENCE : A. OGC Opinion 65-2476a, dated 12 August 1965

B. Our Memo, dated 8 July 1965, Same Subject

1. This office herein recommends an ammendment to CRABANAC's Supplement dated 4 July 1965, to delete paragraph 7. entitled "Offset."

2. This office acknowledges the OGC opinion, Reference A, which determined CRABANAC may retain without Agency salary offset any future royalties earned as a result of his literary efforts based on the fact cover does not include role of a writer.

3. As Subject's cover "activities" have been officially clarified as being only a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer for which the Agency will be making all entitlement payments and actually he will receive no funds from any cover, this paragraph, which is misleading, has no meaning in Subject's contract and it is hereby recommended that it be deleted from CPABANAC's Supplement.

4. Further, in future cases when a cover is so light that Subject will not be receiving funds from cover it is reccommended that no "Offset" paragraph be included in Supplements or Contracts.

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

Attachment
Ref. A and B

no action taken on
this memo.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

OGC 65-2476a

12 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Terence S. CRABANAC - Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. You have requested the opinion of this Office in regard to the retention of future royalties which might be earned by Terence S. CRABANAC as a result of his literary efforts. We believe that he is entitled to retain such royalties without an offset against his Agency salary.

2. We have been advised by Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support, that CRABANAC's cover does not include the role of a writer; CRABANAC's cover for status will only be a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer. Therefore, paragraph 7 of his contract dated 4 July 1965 may remain as written. Royalties from the fictional works that he writes as a profitable hobby will not be emoluments received from or through his "cover activities."

Norman D. Block

NORMAN D. BLOCK
Office of General Counsel

cc: Chief, Covert Claims Branch
Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support

SECRET

3 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : Norman Block

SUBJECT : Terence S. Crabanac -- Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation of 26 July 1965 between yourself and Rogers C. Brooks of this Office wherein background information relating to the assignment of Terence S. Crabanac was discussed.

2. Subject will apparently develop a cover as a writer, a field wherein he has an already demonstrated talent based upon several publications. The objective of the cover is to provide a basis of attribution for some of his income. At the time of the preparation of Mr. Crabanac's contract, the specific detail of his cover was unknown.

3. Request your opinion in regard to the retention of possible royalties earned by Crabanac as a result of his literary efforts or whether such income should be properly offset.

Joseph B. Ragan
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Attachments.

OP/CPD: RCBrooks/cw: 2 August 1965

Distribution:
Orig & 1 -- Addressee
2 -- CPD

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIF... ION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WE/Support	15 July	[illegible]
2			
3	WE/PT - Stevens		
4	Re Seeing Mr. Coleman		
5	concerning P.O. Box		
6	[illegible] 9715		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY 925
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Assume you wish to add this to
your file. As previously stated
there is no reason for him to
have a Transportation allowance.
If you are in touch with [illegible],
pls have him see me. I want
him to get a postoffice box —
over

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/WE/3	14 Jul

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

(40)

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O—587281

from Security to which he can send his financial accounts. This will reduce contact with station.

WE [illegible] CRABANAC

SECRET

8 July 1965

FINANCIAL BRIEFING REPORT

DATE : 7 July 1965 STATUS: Contract Employee

SUBJECT : Terence CRABANAC COVER : Non-Official - Writer

DESTINATION: Madrid Spain

DEPENDENTS : Wife and four children
14 12, 11 and 21 mos.

Subject was advised that this briefing was being held to review with him the official financial business and personal aspects created as a result of his assignment. He was told that a report of the briefing would be prepared and that a copy would be forwarded to the KUBARK office responsible for his administration.

Subject is proceeding abroad as a retired CD CID officer who is now pursuing a career as a writer.

Subject had read his Contract. The persons present at the briefing were Subject and wife Division Budget and Fiscal Officer, payroll representative, and the undersigned Certifying Officer.

The payroll representative briefed Subject regarding his compensation, Headquarters payrolled allowances, tax withholding and deductions. proposed Foreign Duty Data Sheet was used and an official copy will be sent to the office administering Subject upon receipt of a notification Subject has arrived in place. The Tax Committee representative had briefed Subject as to the procedure by which he will fulfill his Federal tax reporting requirements - see below Section III entitled "Taxes." All questions raised by Subject during the briefing were answered to his apparent satisfaction. There were two points which were to reviewed further by WE, they were:

a. Review of Supplement relative to quarters allowance being payrolled and non-accountable.

Decided [illegible] T.A

b. Determination of authorization and amount of a Transportation Allowance.

Plans call for Subject to establish through Monetary Division an operational bank account. This fund will serve his operational needs while in Madrid as he is to have no (or limited) contact with the station. Highpoints of the briefing are discussed below:

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

I. Funding and Accounting

A. Headquarters

(1) Will payroll Subject's compensation (and allowances) authorized deductions. (Specify allowances as applicable)

(2) Will advance PCS travel funds and audit accounting which is to be submitted by Subject when accounting complete.

(3) Will advance funds and receive accountings fo operational fund. His first accounting will be upon moving into permanent quarters, and initially quarterly thereafter, unless activity warrants more frequent accounting period.

B. Station

Will provide only emergency support as needed.

C. Cover

(1) Subject has no ligitimate cover from which through agreement with KUBARK he would receive payments.

(2) Paragraph 7 entitled OFFSET is in question with contracting office as to what is intended as Subject's only income from cover activities appear to be income from his writings. Subject is under impression income from writings not to be refundable.

no problem. Subj will have no cover income from writing. In event he should at some future time receive cover income from other source, it would be offset.

II. Terms of Contract and Additional Items

(11) Allowances -

Subject was informed that allowances were subject to fluctuation as a result of Standardized or KUBARK regulations changes.

(11a.) Subject was advised to notify Headquarters of changes in his family status as such changes would effect allowances being payrolled where rates are determined by Subject's family status.

(12) Receipts

Subject was advised that a receipt is required where practicable or a certification in lieu of receipt should be submitted for all reimburseable expenses in the amount of $15.00 or more.

(20) Travel

Subject was briefed in general regarding reimburseable incidental expenses and travel entitlements in regard to his proposed itinerary. Among the points covered were the following:

A. Per Diem rates applicable to Subject's proposed itinerary

B. Excess baggage provisions when economy/tourist flights are used

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C. Use of less than first class air travel accomodations

D. Use of American airlines

(30) Effects Shipment
Subject was briefed in general regarding his KUBARK authorizations as follows:

A. The combined shipping and storage of household effects is limited to 13,500 pounds net for Subject.
B. Full shipment is authorized.
C. Subject was advised the total of the amount of the effects stored and shipped shall not exceed the limitations for shipment and storage set forth as 13,500 pounds net.

(31) Unaccompanied Baggage
300 pounds net per traveller which may be used as follows:
When entire journey is by surface transportation the 300 pound authorization is to be shipped by surface transportation, or can be included with household effects shipments.

(33) FOREIGN CUSTOM DUTIES
As Subject is under non-official cover he may be required to pay foreign import duty so this regulatory authorization was discussed.

(43) Transportation Allowance
Subject will be taking his personal car and reported he will be authorized a Transportation Allowance not yet determined by Division. The Allowance is to be paid monthly by Headquarters.

(51) Temporary Lodging Allowance
Subject was advised he would be entitled to this allowance and he was briefed as to its provisions as outlined in the Standardized Regulations.

(53) Permanent Personal Quarters
Subject was advised that his quarters would be administered in accordance with FR 45-10b, and then the provisions of this Regulation were explained to him. However, Division BAF Officer intends to review this point for possible contract amendment in providing a quarters allowance at maximum Standardized rate and to be non-accountable.

Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

(60) **Leave**

(61a) Subject was informed of his leave balances as of 3 July 1965: A/L 374 hours and S/L 633 hours.

(63) **Leave Benefits**
Subject was informed of accruals, use, and carry-over for annual (360 hours) and sick leave while overseas. Also, he was informed Headquarters forwards leave balances to the field annually.

(71) **Insurance**
Subject was informed that costs incurred for insurance protection of baggage, effects, car and their shipment are considered personal and are not reimburseable by KUBARK.

(74) **Education and Educational Travel Allowances**
These regulatory provisions were discussed as the ages of Subject's children indicate his elligibility. All official employees are required to send children to U. S. Military school, Subject's allowances will be equal to that authorized for other WE non-official personnel in area.

(81) **Operational Expenses**
Subject was briefed in general terms regarding advances, control, safekeeping, accounting, receipts, and other supporting authoritative documentation.

(82) **Operational Entertainment**
A thorough briefing was given Subject regarding this topic in accordance with current regulations.

(84) **Other Operational Considerations**
An operational bank account is being opened through the Monetary Division to house an operational advance - amount yet undetermined. Subject was advised not to co-mingle personal funds with operational funds. Subject will submit his first accounting upon occupying permanent quarters and initially quarterly thereafter. From this account TLA and Educational allowance payments will be made and reported.

III. **Taxes**
Subject was advised he should file overtly only. Subject's W-2 is to be forwarded by pouch and his tax return is to be returned by pouch for mailing to U. S.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

IV. Banking Arrangements

A. Subject has provided Headquarters with his bank account for use as his stateside allottee.

B. An operational bank account is to be established.

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - CCB
1 - C&L
1 - Registry
1 - Payroll
1 - WE/Division

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

8 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division, O/P

SUBJECT : general - Terence S. CRABANAC - Supplement
specific - Paragraph Entitled "OFFSET"

1. This office has a question as to the intent of including paragraph (7.) entitled "OFFSET" as appears in the Contract for Terence S. CRABANAC. The paragraph in question reads as follows:

> 7. OFFSET
> Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U.S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions.

2. Subject reportedly is proceeding abroad under the cover of a retired Foreign Service Officer and in pursuit of his ambitions as a writer, Subject will receive all his contractual benefits through the Agency, there is no cover company, so therefore the only apparent emoluments to be received from or through his cover activities would be earnings received from articles, stories, or books written by him. Please inform this office if its interpretation is correct. If not, we would appreciate your interpretation and reasoning relative to the statement "Emoluments received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U.S. Government."

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Mr. Terence S. Crabanac

Dear Mr. Crabanac:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a Contract Employee for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $19,880 per annum. In addition, you are herein authorized legislative salary adjustments, within-grade promotions and, if applicable, a post differential in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in an approved manner. Taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

2. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel. In the event you are furnished quarters by the Government you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost-of-living allowances in conformance with applicable regulations of this organization including, but not limited to, a post allowance, a transfer allowance and a home service transfer allowance.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped, in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick, annual and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives. All accrued but unused leave credited to your former account as an appointed employee of this organization will be transferred to the leave account established for you hereunder.

(d) As a Government employee under contract converted from staff status without a break in service, it is required that you continue to make contributions to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Such contributions (presently six and one/half per cent (6-1/2%)) will be deducted by the Government from the basic compensation due you hereunder, i.e., presently $19,880 per annum.

(e) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Contract Employees of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(f) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee in the line of duty while abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

7. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions.

8. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognise and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

10. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

11. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

12. Term. This contract is effective as of 4 July 1965, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon sixty (60) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY DHL
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/S/

WITNESS:

/S/

APPROVED:

/S/

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: Gene Stevens

DIVISION: SE/PI

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 7157

DATE: 24 June 1965

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See HR 20-44; HR 20-41, HR 20-7, HR 20-53, and HR 20-620-1, HR 20-1000-1 and or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)*

All Benefits Normally Applicable To Staff Personnel Except FEGLI.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)*: ☒ PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE *(Check)*: ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☒ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)*

☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ____ MONTHS ____ 2 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 4 July 1965

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*: 60 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATIO ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(CI, PI, PP, other)*

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Intel Officer

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE *(No degree)* ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
24 June 65			

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Use HR 20-33 and HR 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: Gene Stevens

DIVISION: WE/IT

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 7157

DATE: 2 June 1965

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Terence S. CRABANAC

2A. PROJECT

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Madrid, Spain

3. ALLOTMENT NO. 6136-1347

3A. FUNDS ☐ V ☒ VV

4. SLOT NO.

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES
#23-501

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.) Staff Employee November 1949 - July 1965
Terminal Salary GS-15 step 7, $1[illegible],[illegible]80 per annum

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Type A Granted 23 June 65

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE ☐ OBTAINED ☒ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Contract Employee

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 46

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): Oct. 9, 1918

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Largo, Florida

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Bethesda, Maryland

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate) ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:

Wife - 45
Dau - 14
Dau - 12
Son - 11
Son - 21 Mos.

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: No

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: -----

24. RANK OR GRADE: --------

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $19,880 per annum

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: none

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): none

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER	CIA
YES	☐	☒
NO	☐	☐

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: yes

32. POST: yes

33. OTHER: Cost-of-living, Education, TLA

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): none

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☐ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife - U. S. - 45 - April 1, 1920
Dau - U. S. - 14 - March 9, 1951
Dau - U. S. - 12 - November 27, 1952
Son - U.S. - 11 - March 22, 1954
Son - U.S. - 21 mos. - September 1, 1963

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: yes, when authorized

43. ENTERTAINMENT: yes, when authorized

44. OTHER

6 January 1965

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: Benefits & Services Division

SUBJECT : Cause of Illness - E. Howard Hunt

1. Having been requested to give an opinion regarding the origins of the duodenal ulcer for which I was hospitalized October 12-15, 1964, I believe it to have resulted from three years of work frustration and professional dissatisfactions occasioned by (a) Agency failure to assign me to an appropriate post abroad following my participation in Project JMATE, and (b) the passive, non-challenging nature of the domestic work I was given.

2. I should point out that before joining Project JMATE in May, 1960, I requested in writing, and was granted by responsible senior officials, commitment to return me to an appropriate assignment abroad upon the termination of JMATE. Despite continuing verbal assurances in the ensuing three years I was not sent abroad. Instead, I was retained in domestic duties which I felt were inconsistent with the heavier responsibilities discharged by me during a long and active operational career abroad.

3. The T/O position I have been occupying - Chief of Covert Action for DO Division - is the equivalent of my 1953-54 assignment as Chief of Covert Action for SE Division. Organisationally I am where I was 11-12 years ago, but with a smaller staff and many fewer responsibilities.

4. To me this represented a professional dead-end, without hope of promotion or foreign assignment, a situation which preoccupied my mind and in due course found physical reflection in duodenal hemorrhage.

5. For the record, the foregoing information is not volunteered, but provided in response to an official request.

HOWARD HUNT

SECRET

7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. Howard Hunt

SUBJECT : B&C Claim

1. Returned herewith is CA-1 (in duplicate) and CA-2 (in duplicate) which you completed in connection with your recent illness.

2. The Benefits and Services Division has requested the following information:

a. Statement of medical history - Form 89 attached for this purpose.

b. Full statement from physician, or physicians, including nature of illness, treatment, prognosis and statement as to what he thinks may be the cause.

c. Statement from you, describing in full, what you think the contributing cause may be.

Virginia C. Lynch
DD/Personnel

Attachments - A/S

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP	DATE
TO: (Check) ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)	ESTABLISHED FOR
ATTN: ✓	FILE NO.
REF:	ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED	EMPLOYEE NO.

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ **Block Records:**
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______________________.

b. Continuing, effective ______________________.

☐ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category.
(HHB 20-7)

☐ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover.
(R 240-250)

☐ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility.
(R 240-250)

☐ Remarks:

☐ Cover History

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-OL TELSVC, Copy 5-PSD/OS, Copy 6-File.

FORM 6-64 1551 [illegible] SECRET (13-20-43)

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTACHMENT TO GA-2 Filed by E. Howard Hunt

My first knowledge of Mr. Hunt's illness was on the morning of 12 October when his office informed me that he became ill and was taken to the hospital with a "bleeding ulcer". He has been on sick leave since that date.

Thos. P. Schreyer
Executive Officer

[illegible], M.D.
DIRECTOR

[illegible]
DEPARTMENT OF RADIOLOGY
[illegible]

PATIENT [illegible]
PHYSICIAN [illegible]
EXAMINATION [illegible]

AGE [illegible] DATE [illegible]

Upper [illegible] satisfactorily.

[illegible], M.D.

[illegible]/sv

CHART COPY

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Phillips, DAVID ATLEE

INCLUSIVE DATES: 28 MAY 1952 - 13 MAY 1975

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2/10/78	2/10/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
9:40 17 AUG 78	8/17/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

PHILLIPS, DAVID A. [illegible]45

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 February 1976

Mr. David A. Phillips
8224 Stone Trail Drive
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Dear Dave:

From time to time we receive letters and telephonic inquiries concerning the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers. In view of the restrictions of the Privacy Act, we hesitate to release your name and address without your prior knowledge and consent.

If you have no problem with our providing your name and address in response to such inquiries, please indicate to that effect by signing below and returning this letter to us for official filing. In the future, we would then be free to release this information concerning the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers without consulting you in each and every instance.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter, and best wishes.

Sincerely,

B. DeFelice
Acting Director of Personnel

I hereby authorize the Director of Personnel to release my name and address to individuals seeking contact with or information concerning the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers:

David Atlee Phillips

4 February 1976
Date

AND THANKS!
DAP

Mr. David A. Phillips
8224 Stone Trail Drive
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

WASHINGTON
PM
4 FEB
1976

GIVE
TO THE
MARCH OF D

Director of Personnel
P. O. Box 1925
Washington, D. C. 20013

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Addresses for former Agency employees organizations:

Association of Retired Intelligence Officers
Mr. David A. Phillips
8224 Stone Trail Drive
Bethesda, Maryland, 20034

~~Central Intelligence Retirees Association~~ (CIRA)
Box 1150
Fort Myer, Virginia, 22211

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Rd 5-9-75

3 JUL 1975

Mr. David A. Phillips
8224 Stone Trail Drive
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Dear Dave:

I am happy to send to you, under separate cover, your Agency Retirement Medallion. The Medallion is a tangible form of recognition and appreciation of your service to the Agency. It should serve as a lasting reminder of an honorable career, rewarding associations and the knowledge that you played your part in a vital activity.

Let me, therefore, add my congratulations and wish you the very best for the future.

Sincerely,

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - OPF

OP/RAD/ROB/MWBenthall:cl (1 July 75)

75-2172

10 June 1975

Mr. David A. Phillips
8224 Stone Trail Drive
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Dear Dave:

The ordinary retirement letter is in no way appropriate for you. In the first place, your retirement is no stepping out of the active world into a world of pleasure. Instead, you are launching off on even a tougher challenge because of your sense of dedication. Your retirement also will not be the termination of your interest in intelligence and in this Agency. Instead, you are going to be doing what you can to help it survive the current set of attacks upon it. But most of all, your retirement is the departure of one of our most exceptional officers, to whom I had the great pleasure to give the Distinguished Intelligence Medal and whose work I have admired these many years. The only thing ordinary about your retirement is the sincere and special personal and official good wishes we in the Agency send to you and your family for success and satisfaction in the years ahead. This we send to all our retirees, and we send it to you with special spirit.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby
Director

WEC:jlp (10 June 75)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - Dir/Personnel
1 - ER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 March 1975

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 024545

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Phillips, David A.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Cancellation of N.S.~~C.A and~~ Retirement (Voluntary) under CIARDS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 | DAY 09 COB | YEAR 75

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | x CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 5135 4523 0000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643, Section 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/LA Division
Office of the Chief

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Chief, LA Division

12 POSITION NUMBER: CN51

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYY

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0001.10

16 GRADE AND STEP: 18 1

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000.

18 REMARKS:

*supergrade blurb

Co-ordinated with Paul Seidel/ROB 11 April 1975.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: H.L. Berthold, C/LA/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 28 Mar 75

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 4/1/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 NOOTRS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 | DA 31 | YR 22

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA | YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO | DA | YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO | DA | YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIARDS 3—FICA 4—NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0,EJ,00

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 0,0 | MO | DA | YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAS RES PROV TEMP | CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPT | STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12 MAY 1975
OK 5/12/75

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 14 APR 1975

FORM 1152 8-72 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 Dec 73

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 024345
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PHILLIPS DAVID A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 23 YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	XX	CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 4135-4523 0001

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/WH DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

G
32

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF WH DIVISION (15)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0001.10

16. GRADE AND STEP: 18 1

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000

18. REMARKS:

Supg.

Approved By DCI on 21 Dec 1973
RSB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
L. Olmstead, C/MSB

DATE SIGNED: 27 Dec 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA	YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO	DA	YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO	DA	YR
22	1D	51050	WH	75213		/	10	31	22	12	23	73	12	23	73

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CSRDS 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO

34. SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR-RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-27-73 1973

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 27 Dec '73

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 01-0332

E2-2 IMPDET

(4)

7/12/73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 July 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER 024345	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PHILLIPS, DAVID A. ✓ C6B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 07 DAY 21 YEAR 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

G
32

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA 4135 4523 0001	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF, WH DIVISION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0001	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0001.10	16. GRADE AND STEP 17-4	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 36,000

18. REMARKS

WASh., D.C

1 - Security
1 - Finance

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 007034

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL HENRY L. BERTHOLD, C/WH/PERS	DATE SIGNED 10 Jul 73	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 7/11/73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. FOOTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
56	16	51050	WH	75013			10 31 22		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OASDI 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV/TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 16 JUL 1973	46. OP APPROVAL C. T. Beck	DATE APPROVED 16 Jul 73

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET CLASSIFIED BY 01-0332

E2-2 IMPDET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 June 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 024345

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT ~~AND DELEGATION OF N-910-A~~

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 | DAY 15 | YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF X

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135 0620 0001

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/WH DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: 1st Sec~~retary~~ In Rel Off
Chief, WH Division (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0001.10

16. GRADE AND STEP: 02 3 / 17 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~33057~~ 33,051 PRS
$ [redacted] 36,000

18. REMARKS
FROM: DDO/WH/FOR FOLD/BR 3/CARACAS, VENEZUELA/0093
VICE THEODORE G. SHACKLEY

Supergrade Blurb

77003
Caracas, Venezuela

1 - Security
1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: H.L. BERTHOLD, C/WH/PERS | DATE SIGNED: 15 Jun 73

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul B. Breitmaier | DATE SIGNED: 20 June 73

G
32

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HDQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51050	WH	75013	S	1	10 31 22		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR		33 SECURITY REQ. NO	34 SEX
XX XX XX							EOD DATA		

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY LAE RESV PROV, TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 6-21-73

46 OP APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher | DATE APPROVED: 28 June 73

G
54

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

7-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ABS	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	SRO
0	0	0	0	0	0

OMF

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 191830Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 411279

CONF: C/WH3 INFO: FILE DDO, "EYES ONLY",
DISSEM BY: 28
PER 4118 (EC)

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO ______
0 IP FILES

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS

RYBAT PLVUCADET

CHOADEN FROM PARDEE

REF: CARACAS 21988 [IN 921770]

1. I AM PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT YOU HAVE BEEN SELECTED AS CHIEF, WH DIVISION. YOUR APPOINTMENT WILL BE EFFECTIVE AT SUCH TIME AS YOU (AND YOUR FAMILY) CAN CONVENIENTLY RETURN TO THE WASHINGTON AREA. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ORDERS FOR YOUR MOVE WILL BE REQUESTED ON A PRIORITY BASIS ON ~~21~~ 21 MAY. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR TENTATIVE SCHEDULE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.

94F

2. YOUR SELECTION WILL BE ANNOUNCED EARLY THIS NEXT WEEK. THEREFORE, YOU SHOULD FEEL FREE TO INDICATE TO WHOMEVER YOU FEEL NECESSARY LOCALLY THE REASON FOR YOUR RETURN AND WHAT YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT WILL BE.

3. I WANT TO EXTEND MY PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR SELECTION. I AM SURE YOU WILL HANDLE THIS VERY IMPORTANT ASSIGNMENT WITH THE SAME KIND OF EXCELLENCE, DEDICATION AND LEADERSHIP THAT HAVE CHARACTERIZED YOUR PAST ASSIGNMENTS.H

DATE: 19 MAY 1973
ORIG: JAMES W. FLANNERY
UNIT: AC/WHD
EXT: 1366

CONCUR: Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

5/23/73
Date

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 August 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER 024345 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PHILLIPS DAVID A ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 08 DAY 14 YEAR 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 3135 8 1138	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3-CARACAS, VENEZUELA STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION CARACAS, VENEZUELA	
11. POSITION TITLE 1ST SECRETARY INT REL OFF CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0093	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP 03 7 17 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 28022 ✓ $ 36000 ✓

18. REMARKS

Vice Thomas J. Flores

Approved 259a attached.

This is a personal rank assignment in accordance with HR 20-17e (1)(b)

* Brasilia, Brazil

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY 5/2002
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY,
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

1-Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL H.L. Berthold C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 8/9/72	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER R D Phillips	DATE SIGNED 15/8/72

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. MINUTES CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
31	10	51745	WH	7700					

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CS 2—ORGN 3—FICA 4—NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG OPT 3—INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
		15 Aug 72

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) SS# 460-28-3930 Phillips, David A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 22	3. GRADE GS-17
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) State (Integrated) DDP/WH/Brasilia, BrazilXX	5. PRESENT POSITION COS	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 7431
7. PROPOSED STATION Caracas, Venezuela	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) COS/0093/GS-16	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State (Integrated)	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE August 1972	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY XXXX five

12. COMMENTS

Vice: Thomas Flores

Please schedule appointments for the week of 10 July.

Mr. Phillips will not be occupying a specific language position. However, his tested Spanish proficiency of High reading and Intermediate Speaking and Understanding will add to the overall language requirements of the Station.

13. DATE OF REQUEST 10 May 72	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Jean Ferguson	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3D 5309 Hqs	16. EXTENSION 7431

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

5 [illegible]
~~1 [illegible]~~ 1972

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS

Chairman, Overseas Candidate Review Panel

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 November 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 024345
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Phillips, David A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 28 | YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | XX CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2135-0694-0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 5
BRASILIA, BRAZIL STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BRASILIA, BRAZIL
11. POSITION TITLE: 1st Secretary Political Officer (1)
Chief of Station
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0186
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05
16. GRADE AND STEP: 03 7 / 17 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 26,563 / $ 34,716
18. REMARKS:
* Rio De Janeiro, Brazil

cc: Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert W. Sheay, C/CSPS
DATE SIGNED: 24 Nov 71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: [illegible]
20. EMPLOY CODE: [illegible]
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC [illegible] | ALPHABETIC [illegible]
22. STATION CODE: [illegible]
23. INTEGREE CODE: 5
24. HQDTRS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 | DA. 31 | YR. 22
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 11 | DA. 28 | YR. 71
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 11 | DA. 28 | YR. 71
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIARD 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV/TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11 26 71 [illegible]
46. OP APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher
DATE APPROVED: 1 Dec 71

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

72-0311

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips, as Chief of Station, Caracas, Venezuela

1. The appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips, GS-17, as Chief of Station, Caracas, Venezuela effective on or about 15 July 1972 is recommended. Mr. Phillips would replace Mr. Thomas J. Flores.

2. Mr. Phillips has been with the Agency since 1952, first in a contract capacity, and since April 1955 as a staff employee. He is currently serving as Chief of Station in Brazil. He previously served as COS, Santo Domingo and in Mexico City, Havana, Beirut, Guatemala, and Santiago. Mr. Phillips has a strong command of both Spanish and Portuguese. A biographic profile including information regarding his Agency experience and training is attached.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

1 Attachment
Biographic Profile (Parts 1 and 2)

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Deputy Director for Plans

13 Jan. 72
Date

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips, as
Chief of Station, Caracas, Venezuela

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

19 Jan 72
Date

SECRET

Eyes Only
Personal Matter

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 January 1970

G 57

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 024345	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PHILLIPS, DAVID A.
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 11 YEAR 70
	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 0135 0694
	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 5 RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL STATION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL
11 POSITION TITLE: 1st SECRETARY, POLITICAL OFFICER CHIEF OF STATION (OO)	12 POSITION NUMBER: 0186
	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05
16 GRADE AND STEP: 03 7 16 4	17 SALARY OR RATE: 23,646 $27,549

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/COG/OFF OF THE CH/POS #1105

+HOME BASE WH

APPROVED 259a attached

Wash. D.C

1 - Finance

2 - Security

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED: 1-2-70
18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED: 1-7-70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
57	[illegible]	51732	WH	[illegible]	S	3	10 31 22		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-CIARDS 3-FICA 5-NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVES 1-YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

G 40

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED: 5 Jan 70

01-D-70 GK

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Phillips, David A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/31/22	3. GRADE GS-16
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/WH/COG	5. PRESENT POSITION Branch Chief	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 7451
7. PROPOSED STATION Rio de Janeiro	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) COS, # 0186, GS-00	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE o/a 28 Dec. '69	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 7

12. COMMENTS

Vice Robert D. Gahagen
State Integree
Form DS-1686 to be forwarded

C/SPS

13. DATE OF REQUEST	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Ruth A. Sanford	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3D 5309	16. EXTENSION 6815

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

29 DEC [illegible]
[illegible]

7560

[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips as Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Secretary, PMC		DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chairman, PMC				COS, Rio de Janeiro is a GS-17 position. Mr. Phillips' current assignment as Chief, Cuban Operations Group plus previous overseas tours in WH Div. including a tour as Chief of Statio, Santo Domingo, qualify him for the proposed assignment as Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro. He will enter Portuguese language training this fall which should provide adequate exposure to make the transition from Spanish which he speaks with native fluency. Mr. Phillips has been highly effective as a senior member of WH Div., both at Headquarters and in the field. His relations with his co-workers and subordinates have alway been excellent and his liaison with State Department representatives ha been marked by good will and mutual respect. NOTE: Above statement prepared by WH Division. Mr. Gahagen has been recalled from the Station. The DCOS Mr. Stewart D. Burton, GS-15, will serve as Acting COS until the arrival of Mr. Phillips in January 1970.
2.				
3. ADDP				
4.				
5. DDP				
6.				
7. ~~XXXX~~ DCI				
8. 1				
9. Chairman, PMC				
10.				
11. Secretary, PMC GG10				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

No. 9-4209

8 AUG 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips as Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

1. The appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips, GS-16, as Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro, effective on or about 15 January 1970 is recommended. Mr. Phillips would replace Mr. Robert D. Gahagen.

2. Mr. Phillips has been an employee of the Agency since 1951 initially in a contract capacity. He has served in Santiago, Guatemala City, Havana, Beirut, Mexico City and most recently as Chief, Cuban Operations Group. Mr. Phillips is fluent in the Spanish language and is scheduled for two months of full-time Portuguese training immediately prior to his departure. A biographic profile including information regarding his Agency experience and training is attached.

Signed William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment
Biographic Profile (Parts 1 and 2)

SECRET

SUBJECT: Appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips as Chief of
Station, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

/s/ Thomas H. Karamessines [illegible]

Deputy Director for Plans — Date

The recommendation in paragraph one is APPROVED:

[illegible] 1 OCT 1969

Director of Central Intelligence — Date

Distribution:
- Original & 2 - Addressee
- 2 - DDP
- 1 - C/WHD
- 1 - C/CSPS
- 1 - C/WH/5
- 1 - C/WH/BB
- 1 - C/WH/Personnel

DDP/WH/PERS/PMcDOUGAL:ajr/6815 (5 August 1969)

[redacted]

23 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Clandestine Services
Career Service Board

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to GS-16: David A. Phillips

1. Mr. David A. Phillips is strongly recommended for promotion to GS-16 and is ranked Number 2 in WH Division's preference for promotion in that grade.

2. Mr. Phillips stands out among his peers as a true Clandestine Services operator. He has had a range of operational assignments enjoyed by few Clandestine Services officers. He served in Cuba, Guatemala, Beirut, Chile, Mexico and the Dominican Republic. His functional assignments have included Contract Agent, Operations Officer under both unofficial and official cover, Chief of Station, and he is currently assigned as Chief, Cuban Operations Group. In regard to his tour as Chief of Station, Santo Domingo, I cite the following quote made by Dr. Hector Garcia-Godoy, Provisional President of the Dominican Republic, concerning the turbulent events in his country during his tenure:

> "You know," he said, "looking back over those months when things seemed pretty bleak, two names come immediately to mind as able and effective representatives of the United States. They are Ellsworth Bunker and David Phillips."

[redacted]

[illegible]
[illegible] 1968

[redacted] [redacted]

3. Mr. Phillips has the intelligence, language capability, personality, management and operational ability to move forward steadily in this Agency and he is now ready for promotion to GS-16. I urge you to act affirmatively on this promotion recommendation.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

S-E-C-R-E-T.

27 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Briefing at DO Base Chiefs' Conference by Mr. David A. Phillips

I should like to express my thanks to you for having made available Mr. David A. Phillips to brief the DO Base Chiefs' Conference on 17 February 1969. His briefing was extremely lucid and helpful and expressly commended by all Conference participants. Please convey to him my personal appreciation of his efforts.

Gordon L. Jorgensen
Chief, DO Division

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 6 December 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)
024345	PHILLIPS, David A.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 15 YEAR 68

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 9135-0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

6.40

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
Office of the Chief

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Att Pol Officer
~~Ops Officer-Ch~~

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1105

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 03 5
16 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: ~~[illegible]~~ Rc 335
$25,118

18 REMARKS

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Secretary, CSCS Board

DATE SIGNED: 9 Dec 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE:
20 EMPLOY CODE:
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE:
23 INTEGREE CODE: 5
24 VET CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. [illegible] DA [illegible] YR 22
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA YR
27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28 LTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—CSCA 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO:
34 SEX:
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE:
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:
46 OP APPROVAL: H.B. Fisher
DATE APPROVED: 13 Dec. 68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

VOICE OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20547

CD/P 2167

April 15, 1968

Dear Dave:

I thought you would be pleased about a reference to you which came up in the course of a longish conversation last night with Dr. Hector Garcia-Godoy, former President of the Dominican Republic and now Ambassador here, about the turbulent events in his country three years ago.

"You know," he said, "looking back over those months when things seemed pretty bleak, two names come immediately to mind as able and effective representatives of the United States. They are Ellsworth Bunker and David Phillips."

I thought such a pleasant echo of a rough period would help heal your ulcers.

Cordially,

Dick

Richard G. Cushing
Deputy Director

Mr. David A. Phillips
8224 Stone Trail Drive
Carderock Springs
Bethesda, Md. 20034

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 August 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 024345

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PHILLIPS, David A.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 9 | DAY 10 | YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 8~~2~~35 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH.,D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: [illegible] OFFICER
OPS OFFICER-CH

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1105 ✓

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 03 5
15 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: ~~[illegible]~~ 18041
$ 19,978

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/DR STATION

K Santo Domingo, Dom Rep

[illegible] Created by Pers. SD/GS 8/31/67
Rec 9/11/67

1 - [illegible]
1 - [illegible]

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold
C/WH/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 9/1/67

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

6
54

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HDQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51500	WH	75013	5	1	1[illegible] 31 22		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV. TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 9/[illegible]

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 8 Sept 67

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

25 October 1966

David A Phillips

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

THROUGH :

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : Book Dispatch 5096 dated 12 August 1965

1. You have been found to be qualified as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System and have been so designated effective 23 October 1966.

2. Although such designation under present statutes is viewed favorably by most persons, the regulation governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interests. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, you are hereby notified of your right to appeal. An appeal with reasons therefore must be received in Headquarters within 60 days of the date of this memorandum or acceptance of designation will be assumed. Any questions that you may have in connection with your designation that cannot be answered by referring to referenced Book Dispatch should be forwarded to Headquarters.

3. We believe that the benefits of the Organization Retirement System are superior to the benefits of the Civil Service Retirement System. However, there are a few situations in which an employee *at the time of retirement* may have so many years of service (almost 37) that he would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service System. Because of this, the policy decision has been made that a participant in the Organization System who would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service System may, not later than one year prior to his retirement, apply to be removed from our system and transferred to the Civil Service System. Thus, you should not anticipate this contingency as a factor in deciding whether you regard your designation as a participant adverse to your best interests.

Richard B Egan

RICHARD B. EGAN

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

David A. Phillips

CONFIDENTIAL

24 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. The Dominican Republic Station has distinguished itself by especially meritorious service during the past year and has made a major contribution toward the advancement of the objectives of the United States Government in a critical situation. One year ago the people of the Dominican Republic were facing a dismal future. Today, while the future remains uncertain, the prospects for eventual stability have been immeasurably increased. Several Departments and Agencies of the United States Government engaged in an effort to bring this about. I believe that the role of the CIA in the Dominican Republic during the past year was a crucial one. The highly effective performance of the Santo Domingo Station and the Base at Santiago was the result of the combined efforts of each officer and employee stationed there. These men and women gave unsparingly of their time, energy and brain power. Their efforts were sustained over a long period under stressful circumstances. Now, while our long-term mission continues, a significant milestone has been reached and it is most appropriate at this time to grant this special recognition for a job well done to all members of the CIA team in the Dominican Republic during the year ending June 30, 1966.

2. I should like to commend each member of the Station who contributed to this noteworthy performance and request that a copy of this commendation be placed in individual personnel files as appropriate.

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
[illegible]
downgrading and
[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C-54

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 October 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 024345 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PHILLIPS, DAVID A. ✓

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 23 YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 7135-0875

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE:

20 EMPLOY CODE:

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HDQTRS CODE:

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO / DA / YR

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO / DA / YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO / DA / YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO / DA / YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—LSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE 2

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO / DA / YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO / DA / YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO / DA / YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 16-1366 N

46 O P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 10 OCT 1966

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 8-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
OP-4-7-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF CREDITABLE SERVICE
[FOR LEAVE PURPOSES]

☐ VOUCHERED
☒ UNVOUCHERED

NAME *(Last, First, Middle)*: PHILLIPS, David A.

SERIAL NO.: 024345

OFFICE *(and Division)*:
DDP/WH
Foreign Field
Branch 2

	ORIGINAL
X	CORRECTION

SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE *(Mo - da - yr)*: 01-15-53

THIS DATE: 7-01-66

SIGNATURE *(Office of Personnel)*:
Lowell P. Moore

FORM 5-63 171 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 JULY 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 024345

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH JUN | DAY 6 | YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135 0875

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 2
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
STATION

3
44

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
Dom Rep
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

11 POSITION TITLE
ATT POL OFF
[redacted] (CHIEF OF STATION)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0274

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05

16 GRADE AND STEP: 03 5 / 15 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: 16,920 ✓ / $ 18,170 ✓

18 REMARKS
FROM: DDP/WH/BRANCH 1/MEXICO CITY, MEXICO/STATION/0340/

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 7/23/65
Lee 8/1/65

MEMORANDUM SENT TO DDCI VIA DDP REQUESTED THE APPOINTMENT OF MR. PHILLIPS AS COS, SANTO DOMINGO, DOM. REP. STATION APPROVED ON 13 APRIL 1965. MR. PHILLIPS REPLACED MR. EDWIN M. TERRELL WHO HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO WH/BRANCH 2/HEADQUARTERS, EFFECTIVE 6 JUNE 1965.
FORM 259 HAS BEEN SUBMITTED

3
12

[illegible] CSTD

1-FINANCE
1-SECURITY

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert D. Cashman
ROBERT D. CASHMAN
C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 29 July 65

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 8/3/65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA	YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO	DA	YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO	DA	YR
37	10	51650	WH	19039		3	10	31	22						

28 NTE EXPIRES MO	DA	YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO	DA	YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
XX	XX	XX											

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO	DA	YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO	DA	YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI CODE	0—WAIVER 1—YES	HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-3-65 [illegible]

46 O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 8/3/65

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

TO : David A. Phillips

SUBJECT: TDY in the Dominican Republic

Most of you who went down to the Dominican Republic departed with so much speed and so little ceremony that there was no time to explain the importance and urgency of your assignments. Now that you have served there during the crisis, the importance of the task needs no embellishment from us, but you should know that the contribution of the augmented Station was decisive in shaping the policies and actions of the government and in avoiding several major mistakes. For weeks after the April revolution, our Station reporting was literally the only source of information that the United States had on the role of Communism among the rebel forces and on conditions outside the capital.

Many fine things were done in the Station and in the hinterland by all of you. Manning the check-points under fire, flying to remote and hostile villages, moving tons of supplies through the gauntlet of the communications line, toiling over midnight reports, and keeping open our country's only commo link -- all these things were commonplace. The dedication, discipline, and routine of our personnel placed them in a class apart.

To the sense of pride and accomplishment you must already feel, I want to add the gratitude and admiration of the DDP and of the Agency.

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

DD/P 5-1764

1 2 AUG 1965

65-1911

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips as Chief of Station, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

1. The appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips as Chief of Station, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, effective on or about 15 October 1965, is recommended. Mr. Phillips would replace Mr. Edwin M. Terrell.

2. Mr. Phillips was employed in a contract status from 1952 to 1955 and became a Staff Employee in April 1955. He resigned from the Agency in August 1958 to enter private business. In March 1960 he returned to the Agency as a staff employee and is presently assigned as Operations Officer, Mexico City, Mexico, GS-15. A biographic data sheet, giving more detailed information on Agency experience and training, is attached.

R. W. Herbert
Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

1 Attachment
Biographic Profile (Part 1)

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

___________________________ __________
Deputy Director for Plans (Date)

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

Lyman Kirkpatrick 20 Sep. 1965
for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Date)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 September 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 024345 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PHILLIPS, DAVID A ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 29 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 41355700 1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY
MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE:
ATT POL OFF
OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0340

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP:
03 0
15 ~~2~~ 3

17. SALARY OR RATE:
~~12,555~~ 13,440
~~15,045~~ 15,525

18. REMARKS

This is a PRA in accordance with HR 20-21c(1). for 2 years

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 9/27/63

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 27 Sep 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

20. ACTION CODE	21. EMPLOYEE CODE	22. OFFICE CODE NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	23. STATION CODE	24.	25.	26. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	28. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	51400	WH	15075		3	10 31 22	09 29 63	09 29 63

EOD DATA

63. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

64. C.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 27 Sep 63

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 August 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 0[illegible] ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PHILLIPS, David A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible]--Dept. of State

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 8 DAY 2[illegible] YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS

V TO V		V TO CF
CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 113[illegible]-5700-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS

7

DDP/WH
Branch 3
Mexico City
Mexico Station

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Mexico City, Mexico

11. POSITION TITLE: Attache, Political Officer
Ops. Officer

12. POSITION NUMBER: 340

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 1[illegible] 1 / 1[illegible] 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $12,535 / $12,730

18. REMARKS

No sick and No hours annual leave to be transferred to the Dept. of State

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: W M Kerr
M. Roney, Cover Officer, X3104

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

55	1C	64700	CCH	45015		3	10.31 22

EOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: E. Kearney 08/3 61

44. ... APPROVAL

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 June 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 024345

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: 08 15 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2135 5700 1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

7

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER D

12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]-340

12a. PCR CONTROL NO.

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LP, etc.): GS 14

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 12,730 ✓

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/WH/4/BA-624/Wash., D.C.

Subject scheduled to integrate o/a ~~21~~ 16 August 1961.

~~It is requested~~ that this action be made effective no later than 6 August 1961.

1 copy to Security.

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SO/OS 7/12/61
8/21/61

19a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

19b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ronald Gage

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

37	10	64700	WH	45075	3	10 31 22

FOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Kearney 8/15/61

46. APPROVAL: Ronald Gage

FORM 1152

SECRET

12443

SECRET

29 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: David A. Phillips

On 14 June 1961 the undersigned reviewed with Mr. David A. Phillips his career development prospects for the next five year period. We agreed that the following represented a desirable and fairly firm goal in this respect:

a. In general his future training and field experience should place sufficient stress on the CI and FI fields to avoid the career confinement of strict CA specialization.

b. His next assignment would be a normal field tour in Mexico City. Upon return from that assignment, he would receive up to six months training to be followed by an assignment to the CA Staff (or the organizational successor thereof). One of his primary undertakings in the CA Staff would be to develop what might best be termed "ideological warfare" (e.g., a search for basic ideas and concepts with wide appeal) as opposed to the normal propaganda approach (e.g., a running debate on current events).

[illegible]

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

cc: ASSA (Pers)
Attn Panel A
Mr. Phillips
Thru C/WH
OP/RSD

[illegible]

[illegible] 3 23 [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

1 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM : Chief, WH/4/Support

SUBJECT : Premium Pay

Due to the recent reduction in heavy workload requirements, the following employees are no longer entitled to Premium Pay. It is requested that this entitlement be discontinued effective c.o.b. 10 June 1961. The salaries are chargeable to Allotment #535-5000-8021.

BELSITO, Frank J.
BROWN, Fravel S.
CANN, Ruth E.
CARTWRIGHT, Cecil J.
CHELLINO, Samuel J.

KENT, William M.
MORALES, David S.
MURRAY, William J.
OVERJORDE, Robert W.
PATTON, Lee E.

PETERS, John D.
PHILIPS, David A.
PIEDMONTE, Robert P.
REYNOLDS, Robert

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
Chief, WH/4/Support

Distribution:
2 - Chief, Finance Division (ea. employee)
2 - Director of Personnel (ea. employee)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None 0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo. Da. Yr.

7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

DC

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations [illegible]	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate $	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 54	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. 07 11 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

3

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 4	Code 4211	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field Dept - X USfld - Frgn - Code 1	34. Position Title OPS OFFICER	35. Position No. 10-14 BA-624	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01

38. Grade & Step 14 3	39. Salary Or Rate $ 11835	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number 0135 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) C. C. Bowers
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
JOHN WASHINKO X8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		9-15-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved B.		9/16

Remarks Staffing Complement Change.

2 copies to Security.

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

9-13-60

(4)

SECRET

RE FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

60

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
52-4345	PHILLIPS, DAVID A.	10	31	22	1	M - W	03	14	60

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt (Yes-1, No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Code
~~[illegible]~~ 02	12	54	1	[illegible] CSCR 4C35	3	14	60	2	4	25	55	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
OFFICIAL [illegible] 3-14-60 WH	[illegible]	[illegible]	

16. Dept. - Field (Dept. - USfld - Frgn) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
	$				

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT*	11	03	14	60	REGULAR	~~[illegible]~~ 26	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

DC.

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT DDP WH DIVISION	4658	WASHINGTON, D. C.	

33. Dept. - Field (Dept. - USfld - Frgn) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	OPS OFFICER	C3116-C	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
14 3	$11,835	D	03 14 60	03 17 61	0320-1998

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) C/[illegible]
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
John Washinko X6242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[illegible]	1/27/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	3-9-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	

Remarks
*See DIR 10716 (OUT 83837) released by DDP on 16 January 1960. Proposed EOD date is 22 February 1960. This cable gives DDP's approval [illegible]
2 copies to Security Office. [illegible]

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

*Appointee [illegible] 3/22/60

SECRET

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 4 2 37 PM '60
MAIL ROOM

RESIGNATION

I Resign For The Following Reason:

My Last Working Day Will Be	This Date (Date Of Signature)	Signature

Forward Communications, Including Salary Checks And Bonds, To The Following Address (Number, Street, City, Zone, State):

[illegible] negotiation for permanency [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] for
[illegible] appointment [illegible] permanency [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : File

DATE: 18 March 1960

FROM :

SUBJECT: PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

Effective date of CA is 19 Aug 1958, per Mr. Toomey, x2823

This time is creditable for LCD only, per Mr. Stevens.

Mr. Phillips was same as independent contractor, per Lyle Miller, x3039.

David Phillips

Per Mr. Washenko x8242

Phillips is presently contract Agent. also (Ex Staff employee)

DDP. approval per Bissell via Cable. Will be here to EOD 1 March.

WH - has already contacted Security (Osborne) and they will grant clearance, subject to poly.

Kennedy (MC) has copies of 89 (on Phillips, wife and children). He says ok to enter on duty, but will be subject to medical when on duty.

Phillips will be in (8 Feb) now. for TDY and will have poly at that time (1:00 pm)

Poly ok [illegible] be in · W·60

2-8-6[illegible] ~~Current poly~~ will [illegible] 1st 14 March.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-8): CS/CS 1-3573 Dev Comp

REQUEST DATE (9-11): 8 Feb 1966

NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) (12-28): PHILLIPS, DAVID ATLEE

YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30): 1922

POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

POSITION NUMBER (31-36):

OCCUP. CODE (37-42): 0136.01

GRADE (43-44): GS-14

LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): Washington, DC

ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH): DDP/WH Division CS/CS Dev Comp

ORGN. CODE (45-48): 1600

TYPE OF APPLICANT: ☐ REGULAR ☐ CONTRACT ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ MILITARY

CONVERSION ACTION — IF OTHER, SPECIFY: CONTRACT to SE

TYPE OF APPL. (49): 7

NAME OF REQUESTER (OR OFFICIAL): G.M. Stewart/hc

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS: ☒ HQS ☐ USP ☐ FF ☐ V ☒ UV

HDQTRS & FUND (50): 1

CLEARANCE REQUIRED: PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP): ☐ SECRET ☒ FULL

CLEARANCE (51): 3

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ☐ PHOTOGRAPH(S) ☐ APPENDIX I ☐ APPENDIX II ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER ☐ REPORT OF INTERVIEW

RECRUIT. CODE (52-54): 004

VETERANS STATUS: ☒ MALE - VETERAN ☐ MALE - NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - NON-VETERAN

VET PREF. & SEX (55): 1

PLEASE EXPEDITE

Mr. Hashinko, WH Division, advises that Mr. Osborne (Office of Security) has indicated that subject would be granted immediate security clearance, subject to poly.

Former Staff Employee. Your Case #40696.

Presently Contract Agent.

HAND CARRY

0 SO
0 OTF

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 377 USE PREVIOUS
1 SEP. 58

SECRET

(9)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL SECRET ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WH/Personnel

NO.

DATE 22 January 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/Pers Ofcr	22 Jan		X/B	Service as CA with agency, is creditable toward RCD, but not SCD. - 3-14-60 per Gene Stevens
2.				
3. C/WH/Support	JAN 1960 25		Mr	
4.				
5. WH/Pers				
6. Paul A	JAN 1960 26	1/27	RG	
7. CS/PO 2120 I Bldg.	4 Feb 60		Vr	Please coordinate with Ron Gage per his conversation with Mr. Bowers, WH/Pers on 22 Jan 60.
8.				
9. MRS CARRIOTTI				
10. CURK				Send 259's to Mr Kennedy MO. stating 89's have been forwarded to MO on Phillips, wife and all children.
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. P/				Sent to MO 3-10-60
15.				Fod mailed - 15 Mar - 8:30

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 DEC 56

SECRET

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1959 O - 476731

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
NEA/ADM/Personnel
1103 I. Bldg. x8571

NO.

DATE
6 August 1958

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. NEA/B & F		8/6	LB
2.			
3. ~~NEA/TNG~~			
4.			
5. NEA/PERSONNEL		12 Aug 58	FDC
6.			
7. CS/CS PANEL (Section A) 2100L	13 AUG 1958	AUG 13	
8. CPD	Dsh	15 Aug 58	
9. ~~OFFICE OF PERSONNEL~~			
10. C/CPD			
11. 2102-L			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. 14-32-12-4			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Employee had following:

Security debriefing
CPD "
Finance "
Logistics "

L. Hewald Jr

1, 13, 00, 4, 1

For your Signature
Please - Three Resig.

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
NEA/ADM/Personnel
1103 I Bldg. x8671

NO.

DATE 16 May 1957

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. NEA/B & F				
2.				
3. NEA/TRG		20 May		
4.				
5. NEA/PERSONNEL		20 May		
6. C NEA	approved by DC/NEA			
7. WH DIVISION	22 May	22	JCB	7 - Please attach current fitness report.
8.				
9. CS/CS PANEL (Section A) 2309L	MAY 24 1957	17 June		Latest Fitness Report for period February-September 1956 is in file. Shortly after this period subject was returned for TDY with NEA. Baynes WH/PER
10. PED	20/6/57	6/21/57		
11. PI ~~OFFICE OF PERSONNEL~~	JUN 1957	25 JUN 1957		261 unif 20 Jun 57 cntrl # 542
12. CPD Room 801 16th 10/6	26 June	26 June		
13. Kerr ~~Shelf~~				
14. Chief/CPD	For your signature please			TO support PED list of needs submitted by you 19 June
15. CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION Room 807 ~~…L~~ Ext 55?5				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

REPORT OF SEPARATION

DATE 18 August 1958	SERVICE DESIGNATION DP		
1. NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) David Phillips [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/31/22	3. JOB TITLE Ops Officer(PP)	4. GRADE GS-14
5. OFFICE DDP/NEA	6. DIVISION DDP/NEA	7. BRANCH Egypt & Arab States Br.	
8. LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE 4/1/55	9. DATE OF RESIGNATION 13-Aug 58	10. SEPARATION CATEGORY 1,13,00,4,1	
11. DATE EXIT INTERVIEW	12. NAME OF EXIT INTERVIEWER		

13. REMARKS

To enter Private Business

This is for record only
No exit interview conducted

14. ☐ IS ☐ IS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR RE-EMPLOYMENT

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

15. ☐ IS ☐ IS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR RE-EMPLOYMENT

SIGNATURE OF PLACEMENT OFFICER

16. ☐ IS ☐ IS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR RE-EMPLOYMENT

SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL RELATIONS OFFICER

FORM NO. 971 REPLACES FORM 37-154
1 MAY 56 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The record

DATE: 15 Aug 58

FROM : Dorothy S. Kreinheder/CPD(Staff Agent Branch)

David Phillips

SUBJECT: [redacted]

1. This is certification that during the Personnel interview with Mr. [redacted] on 7 Aug 58 he specifically stated that he did not want an SF-8(Unemployment Compensation Program) sent to the DDP/NEA Division.

2. Subject coordinated with CCB 7 Aug 58 re: retirement(all services were being combined and sent to the CSC)

3. Subject had intention of checking B & C re: Hospitalization, Mutual Insurance & Conversion of FEGLI.

Dorothy S. Kreinheder

Dorothy S. Kreinheder

11 August 1958.

I resign from Central Intelligence Agency effective Close-of-business, Wednesday, 13th of August, 1958.

David A. Phillips

4534 WASHBURN ST.
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

Date Prepared: Mo 8 Da 6 Yr 58

V to V / V to UV / UV to V / UV to UV

1. Serial No.:

2. Name (Last-First-Middle): [illegible] [redacted]

3. Date of Birth: Mo 10 Da 31 Yr 22

4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt.-1, 10 Pt.-2) Code:

5. Sex: M

6. CS - EOD: Mo Da Yr

7. SCD: Mo Da Yr

8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code:

9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:

10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr

11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code:

12. LCD: Mo Da Yr

13. Mil. Serv. Credit, LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code:

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP/NEA
PROJECT ANNEX
EGYPT & ARAB STATES BRANCH
PROJECT PECTATE

Code:

15. Location Of Official Station: BEIRUT, LEBANON

Station Code:

16. Dept.-Field (Dept. - Usfld. - Fran. -) Code: 5

17. Position Title: OPS. OFFICER (PP)

18. Position No.: REP 8127

19. Serv.: GS

20. Occup. Series: 0136.31

21. Grade & Step: 14 3

22. Salary Or Rate: $ 11,835.00

23. SD: DP

24. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr

25. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr

26. Appropriation Number: 9-3[illegible]1-91-215

[illegible] L. Smith

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: RESIGNATION*

Code: [illegible]

28. Eff. Date: Mo 8 Da 13 Yr 58

29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR (SA)

Code:

30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:

Code:

32. Location Of Official Station:

Station Code:

33. Dept.-Field (Dept. - Usfld. - Fran. -) Code:

34. Position Title:

35. Position No.:

36. Serv.:

37. Occup. Series:

38. Grade & Step:

39. Salary Or Rate: $

40. SD:

41. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr

42. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr

43. Appropriation Number:

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Frank J. Dewald Jr.
FRANK J. DEWALD,Jr.,NEA/SS/PERSONNEL

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Shirley M. Ryan ext. [illegible]

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	Ronald Gage	8 13 1958	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	8/14/58

Remarks:

*See reverse side.

[illegible]

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDIT...)

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RESIGNATION

I Resign For The Following Reason:

ENTER PRIVATE BUSINESS

My Last Working Day Will Be: COB 13 Aug 58

This Date (Date Of Signature): 12 Aug 58

Signature: [redacted]

Forward Communications, Including Salary Checks And Bonds, To The Following Address (Number, Street, City, Zone, State):

4804 WASHBURN - FORT WORTH, TEXAS

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

U N V O U C H E R E D

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr – Miss – Mrs – One given name, initial(s), and surname): [redacted] (P) David Phillips

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 31 Oct.1922

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 16 May '57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment (Staff Agent)

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ~~30 April 1957~~ 16 June 57 Beg. Jrn. 17 June 57

B. APPROVED: 16 JUN 1957

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops. Off. (PP) BAF 125		Ops. Off.(PP) BEP-5127
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.31-14 $10,535.00 p.a. OK Dut		GS-0136.31-14 $10,535.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba - Station		DDP/NEA Near East Egypt and Arab States Branch Project PECTATE
11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana, Cuba		Beirut, Lebanon
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

7

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary): Concur: Cleared for WH/Pers. [illegible] 14 June 57

+ moved to NEA

T. J. Hester

11 July 57

Copies Security - 16 May 57 - Spd

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): T. J. Hester, NEA/ADM/PERSONNEL

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Shirley Matthews ext. 8671

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature:

Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	5WD	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

[illegible] 14 [illegible] 57

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL

SB 14 June 57

SD+DP

15. SEX: M

16. I certify funds available:

~~Oblig R56-8545-55-055~~

~~Charge A7-3361-91-215~~

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED

STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM REMARKS

Present Letter o.k Per Klw. 8 July 57

Fontana taking Care of Spcl. Allowances.

APPROVED

16 JUN 1957

21. CLEARANCES

	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	MS	25 JUN 1957	
C. CLASSIFICATION		21 Jun 57	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	SB	14 June 57	
E			

F. APPROVED BY: Louis W. McDowry

10 JUL 1957

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) [illegible] [redacted])	2. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 1922	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 7 May 1956
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment (Staff Agent) B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: JUN 3 1956	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Ops Officer (PP) BAF-125	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer (PP) BAF-125
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.31-14 $10320.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch III HAVANA - CUBA - STATION
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana, Cuba
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL (DP)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

New T/0

POSTED ON 31 May 56

USED IN LIEU OF SF50
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL
ACTION

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Philip C. Bowers for C/WH

~~D. REQUEST APPROVED BY~~
Signature:
Title:

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
J. KOSLANOVICH X-4457

13 VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER

14 POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

SD-DP

15 SEX	16 RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18 SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19 DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 6-3545-55-355 TO: Same			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

~~Approved~~ CONCOR
PP/Career Serv.

APPROVED
CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
1956

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	CEB 5/17/56	
E.		

REMARKS:

Effective:

F. APPROVED BY
Ralph A. [illegible]

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. - Miss - Mrs. - One given name, initial(s), and surname) David Phillips [redacted])	2. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 1922	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 16 Jan 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)

Excepted Appointment (Staff Agent)

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

A. PROPOSED:

B. APPROVED: FEB 7 1956

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer (PP) BAF-125
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.31-14 $10,320.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana, , Cuba
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL (PP)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) P. E. POWERS

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature:

Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				SD-DP

15 SEX	16 RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18 SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19 DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20 LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: TO 6-3545-55-055	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Approved JAN 1 3 1956

Service

APPROVED

CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A		
B CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		23 JAN 1956
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCP	1/18/56
E		

REMARKS

Effective: FEB 7 1956

F APPROVED BY

Ralph A.

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

BOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname*)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. David A. PHILLIPS	31 Oct 1922		16 January 1956

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Resignation
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: FEB 6 1956

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Ops Officer BW-229	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	
GS-0136.31-14 $10,320.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	
DDP/PP Operations Staff Information Coordination Division Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)
Concurrence with Mr Shafer Chief/ICD/PP by phone 3 Feb 1956. KLW.
To seek other employment.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) P. C. BOWERS X 4457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	T A	REAL

SD-DP

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 6-2105-20 TO			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Approved ... use
FP/Career Service

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		23 JAN 1956	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OED	1/31/56	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY per F. Bean, Jr 18 Jan '56

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) MR. DAVID A[redacted] PHILLIPS	2. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct '22	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 16 Sept '55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) REASSIGNMENT (CORRECTION) B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 1955	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Paramilitary Off. BW-156	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer BW-229
GS-0136.11-14 ~~$9600~~ p/a 10,320	9. SERVICE, GRADE AND SALARY	GS-0136.31-14 ~~$[illegible]~~ p/a 10,320
DDP/PP Operations Staff Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/PP Operations Staff Information Coordination Div. Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

To correct allotment number shown in action effective 14 Aug '55

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
Laura E. Keen, AC/PP/Admin

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Frances A. Taylor - x-8606

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL

SD:DP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-2101-20
TO: 6-2105-20

Correct

18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Texas

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Approved SEP 20 1955
D. M. Coelius
PP/Career Service

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	3	26 Sept 55	
C CLASSIFICATION			
D PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	gec 21 Sept 55		
E			

F. APPROVED ON

per i. Bear, jr 22 Sept 55

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. DAVID ~~[illegible]~~ A. PHILLIPS
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 31 Oct. 1922
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 1 July 1955

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 14 Aug 55

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Paramilitary Off. BW-156	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer / BW-229
GS-0136.11-14 ~~$9600~~ 10320 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.31-14 ~~$9600~~ 10320 p/a
DDP/PP Operations Staff Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/PP Operations Staff Information Coordination Div. Office of the Chief
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ XX DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ XX DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

For record purposes only

Approved JUL 14 1955
R. M. Coclan
PP/Career Service

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Jeanne K. Letellier
Jeanne K. Letellier, C/PP/Admin

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Frances A. Taylor, x 8606

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB	OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

SD-DP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-2101-20
TO: 6-2101-20
18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (325-380):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 7 Apr 55
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B CEIL OR POS CONTROL	SRD	27 Jul 55	
C CLASSIFICATION			
D PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	JAB	8-1	
E			

F. APPROVED BY
per ... Bear Jr 1 Aug 55

14-00000

SECRET

ENTRANCE ON DUTY NOTICE

1. DATE: 7 June 1955

TO: Frac Taylor

DDP/PP

[illegible]

NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE): Phillips, David A.

JOB TITLE AND GRADE: Paramilitary Off. GS-14

EFFECTIVE DATE OF ACTION: 1 April 1955

☒ E.O.D.
☐ REASSIGNMENT
OTHER:

TYPE CLEARANCE: Full

10. REMARKS: [illegible]

H. G. Reynolds eop

DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL AND COPY (WHITE) TO ITEM NO. 3. COPY (PINK) TO PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM NO. 37-118 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED
NOV 1952

(4)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST FOR PRE-EMPLOYMENT MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE: 4/7/55

2. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Phillips, David Atlee

3. SUSPENSE DATE (10 WORKING DAYS)

4. ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT: DDP/PP

5. POSITION TITLE (and grade): Paramilitary Officer, GS-14

6. PERSONNEL DIVISION ☒ Overt ☐ Covert

7. THE MEDICAL OFFICE IS REQUESTED TO CHECK THE DESIRED ACTION, RETURNING THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THIS FORM TO THE APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL DIVISION NO LATER THAN THE SUSPENSE DATE INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 3.

A ☒ Approve processing for E.O.D.
B ☐ Hold pending receipt of additional medical information (Form letters attached)
C ☐ Request pre-employment medical examination
D ☐ Rejected for medical reasons

8. Remarks:

This (approval ~~request~~) supersedes
the previous (h[illegible] ~~approval~~)

James M. Sanz J.
SIGNATURE FOR MEDICAL OFFICE

FORM NO. 37-163
FEB 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST FOR PRE-EMPLOYMENT MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE: ~~30~~ 31 March 1955

2. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Phillips, David Atlee

3. SUSPENSE DATE (10 WORKING DAYS)

4. ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT: DDP/PP

5. POSITION TITLE (and grade): Paramilitary Off. GS-14

6. PERSONNEL DIVISION ☒ Overt ☐ Covert

7. THE MEDICAL OFFICE IS REQUESTED TO CHECK THE DESIRED ACTION, RETURNING THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THIS FORM TO THE APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL DIVISION NO LATER THAN THE SUSPENSE DATE INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 3.

A ☐ Approve processing for E.O.D.
B ☒ Hold pending receipt of additional medical information (Form letters attached)
C ☐ Request pre-employment medical examination
D ☐ Rejected for medical reasons

8. Remarks: ADDITIONAL MEDICAL INFO ON: (4-6-55)

Trench mouth or pyorrhea
Bed wetting after 6 years of age.

OK

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. SR-6033-PP

DATE 31 ~~30~~ March 1955

FULL NAME (LAST) Phillips, (FIRST) David (MIDDLE) Atlee

YEAR OF BIRTH 1922

POSITION TITLE Paramilitary Off. PP DH-156-14

GRADE GS-14

CODE

LOCATION (OFFICE) DDP/PP

CODE

DIVISION Operations Staff

CODE

BRANCH Ofce of Chief

CODE

GEOGRAPHIC DESTINATION (CITY AND STATE OR COUNTRY, AS APPROPRIATE) Washington, D. C.

TYPE OF EMPLOYEE 1. ☒ REGULAR 2. ☐ CONTACT 3. ☐ CONSULTANT 4. ☐ MILITARY 5. ☐ OTHERS:

FUNDS ☒ VOUCHERED ☐ UNVOUCHERED

TYPE(S) OF SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUESTED

☐ PROVISIONAL FOR: (Show name of pool or group)

☐ SECRET

☒ FULL

☐ WAIVER

AVAILABILITY DATE (Da-Mo-Yr) ASAP

EST. CLEARANCE DATE (Mo-Yr)

RECRUITMENT SOURCE

CODE 06

SEX AND VETERAN STATUS 1. ☒ M-V 2. ☐ M-NV 3. ☐ F-V 4. ☐ F-NV

REMARKS:

NO RECORD

Attachments:

PHS 1 (SO) 1 (otf)

Append. I ~~A-II-~~ 1

Photos.

H. G. Reynolds

SIGNATURE ep

Director of Personnel

FORM NO. 37-104
JUN 1951

(8)

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry

FROM: PP/CS

TELEPHONE

NO.

DATE 3 March 55

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE
1. CS/CSP	2001 L4	3/3	3/3		
2. [illegible]		3 March	3 March		
3. Ledford		3/4	3/17	BW	
4. P&RD	Currie				
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

COMMENTS

1. I'd suggest we approve on behalf of the CS/CSP and circulate a brief sheet for the info of all members.

2 & 3 agree.

FORM 1 MAY 54 51-10 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

(40)

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.--Miss--Mrs.--One given name, initial(s), and surname*) MR. DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS	2. DATE OF BIRTH 31 October 1922	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 4 Feb. '55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 1 April 1955
B. APPROVED:

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER			Paramilitary Off. PM ~~EP~~ BW-156 -14
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY			GS-0136.11-14 $9600 p/a
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS			DDP/P&P ~~EP~~ Operations Staff Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS			Washington, D.C. ✓
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL 9

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)
For slotting purposes only pending approval of new T/O

John E. Baker, C/PP

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) Jeanne K. Letellier
Jeanne K. Letellier, C/PP/Admin

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) Frances A. Taylor, x 8606

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: ✓
Title: Career Service:PP

13 VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAIV	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14 POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

R. G. Sedgford, CS/Actg
SD:EP D

15 SEX	16 RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18 SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES--NO)	19 DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20 LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM. TO 5-2101-20			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Approved MAR 2 1955
PP/Career Service

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	EH	3/24
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	((	3/15/55
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Robert A. Stricklin by John J. Caldwell

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: PP/Admin

TELEPHONE:

NO.:

DATE: 7 February 1955

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
1. C/PP	2032 K	FEB 1955	21 Feb	JBM		Contract will be terminated effective 19 April '55
2. CS/PP				JMC		
3. OS/CS	2031 L	25 Feb				
~~[illegible]~~	~~[illegible]~~					
4. PP/CMO Mr. Cole	2405 K					
5.						
6.						
7.						
8.						
9.						
10.						
11.						
12.						
13.						
14.						
15.						

3 & 4.

Dwight,

Per our telephone conversation, I feel that our Career System should provide for the review of such cases from the point of view of:

(a) Bringing someone in at this grade level

(b) Whether the person's background & experience indicate that he should be picked up under the jurisdiction of a specialist panel or the CS Panel.

It seems to me ~~that~~ such review could be the responsibility of the CS Panel or of the functional Panel concerned. The latter seems to make most sense.

Could you review this one in PP from that point of view and let me know how you folks feel on the policy questions?

14-00000

SECRET 11 DEC 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

SUBJECT: Equalization Allowance Adjustment for [redacted]

David Phillips

1. Effective 15 December 1957, subject individual's equalization allowance is decreased from $950 to $565 per annum due to a decrease in the cost of living at subject's post as compared with Washington, D. C.

2. All other terms and conditions of the original authorization remain in full force and effect.

SIGNED

Louis W. Armstrong
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
- Orig. and 1 - Addressee
- 2 - NEA Division
- 2 - CPD

OP/CPD:HSurles:ahw (9 Dec 57)

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

27 JUN 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION :

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : [redacted])

David P. Phillips

1. Reference is made to the memorandum dated 18 June 1957 in which a covert security clearance was requested to permit the Subject's conversion from an Ops Officer (FP), GS-14, DDP/WH, Branch III, Havana, Cuba, to an Ops Officer (PP), GS-14, DDP/NEA, Egypt and Arab States Branch, Project PECTATE, Beirut, Lebanon.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949 entitled, "Security and Operational Clearances," a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above. For administrative purposes only, this clearance is effective as of 15 June 1957.

3. Subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

Robert H. Cunningham

S-E-C-R-E-T

S E C R E T

Date. 18 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Security Division

FROM : Chief, Special Contracting, Allowances & Processing Staff, Wing 2F Curie Hall

David Phillips

SUBJECT [redacted] (P); Your Number **40696**

1. In compliance with paragraph four (4), your memorandum dated ________, subject as above, clearance to cover the following proposed change in subject's status and/or use is hereby requested:

Ops Officer(PP)	Position Title	**Ops. Off(PP)**
GS-14	Grade & Salary	**GS-14**
DDP/WH **Branch III**	Orgn Designation Headquarters	**DDP/NEA** **Egypt & Arab States Branch** **Project PECTATE**
Havana, Cuba		**Beirut, Lebanon**
( ) Field ( ) Dept'l	Field or Hqtrs.	( ) Field ( ) Dept'l

2. Changes other than specified above:

Cover is Commercial

Case Officer: Robert S. Goralski X3548

3. The proposed effective date of this change is **16 June 1957(For Financial and Administrative reasons.**

Please phone verbal concurrence
to Dot Kreinheder X3585

LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Verbal Concurrence
Granted by Mr Godar
21 June 57

S E C R E T

SECRET

28 FEB 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

SUBJECT: Equalization Allowance Adjustment for
[redacted]
Phillips, Howard

1. Effective 13 January 1957, subject individual's equalization allowance is decreased from $3780 to $3145 per annum due to a reduced cost of living index for subject's post.

2. All other terms and conditions of the original authorization remain in full force and effect.

SIGNED

RALPH S. POLLOCK
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

elt-28 Feb 57
Distribution:
Original and 1: FD
2: WH Div
1: Subject File
1: Chrono File
1: Equal Allow File
1: my copy

SECRET

26 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Investigations & Operational Support

THROUGH : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : [redacted] - Change of Pseudonym

REFERENCE : Memorandum for Deputy Director for Investigations & Operational Support, through, Contract Personnel Division, from this office, dated 26 April 1957

Due to a compromise, the pseudonym of Paul D. LANGEVIN has been changed. Please refer to reference for new pseudonym.

/s/ J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution -
Sec
Finance
File
Chrono - Statistics
Allowance Staff
Selection "
Pcs

SECRET

SECRET

26 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Investigations
& Operational Support

THROUGH: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: [redacted] Phillips Havid
New Pseudonym

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Deputy Director for Investigations & Operational Support, through, Contract Personnel Division, from this office, dated 26 April 1957

The pseudonym of subject of reference has been changed to

[redacted]
Havid Phillips

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

SUBJECT: Equalization Allowance Adjustment for
[redacted]
Phillips, David

1. Effective 7 October 1956, subject individual's equalization allowance is increased from $3670 to $3780 per annum.

2. All other terms and conditions of the original authorization remain in full force and effect.

RALPH S. POLLOCK
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

3 JUL 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

SUBJECT: Equalization Allowance for
[redacted]
Phillips Dovel

1. Subject individual is authorized an equalization allowance at the rate of $950 per annum upon his arrival at Beirut, Lebanon.

2. All other terms and conditions of the original authorization remain in full force and effect.

SIGNED

Louis W. Armstrong
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - FD
2 - NEA
✓1 - Subject File
1 - Equal Allow File
1 - Chrono
1 - Extra

aih - 2 July 1957

SECRET

619

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : P. C. BOWERS
UNIT : WH/PERS
EXT : 4457
DATE : 8 FEBRUARY 1956

19

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : HAVANA, CUBA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : FI/ADMIN, FI/RI 2, OP 2, S/C 2

5 A

DIR 46833 (OUT 67172) 2146Z 8 FEB 56 ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: HAVA CITE: DIR

RE: DIR 30629 (OUT 86720)

David Phillips
[redacted] ARV HAVA 1440 HRS 9 FEB PAA 436 WITH FAMILY.

END OF MESSAGE

H. J. PRESTON
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J C King
J. C. KING
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

O. H. DOERFLINGER
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

~~STANDARD FORM NO. 64~~ SECRET

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

DATE: MAR 20 1956

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Phillips, David

1. Reference is made to your request dated 20 January 1956 for a Covert Security Clearance to permit appointment of Subject to Staff Agent/operations officer at Havana, Cuba.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949 entitled, "Security and Operational Clearances," a covert security clearance is granted for the covert use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above. This will confirm the Covert Security Clearance granted telephonically to Mr. Ken Wambold, CPD x-3585 on 26 January 1956.

3. Subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented, as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

Robert H. Cunningham

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-5):
REQUEST DATE (6-11): 20 Jan 1956

NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) (12-28): [redacted] David Phillips
YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30): 31 Oct 1922

POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer (PP)
POSITION NUMBER (31-36):
OCCUP. CODE (37-42):
GRADE (43-44): GS-14

LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): Havana, Cuba
ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH): DDP/WH
ORGN. CODE (45-48):

TYPE OF APPLICANT: ☐ REGULAR ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ CONTRACT ☐ MILITARY
CONVERSION ACTION: SP to SA
IF OTHER, SPECIFY:
TYPE OF APPL. (49):

NAME OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Ralph S. Pollock, C/CPD
TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS: ☐ HOS ☐ UST ☐ FF ☐ V ☐ UV
HOOTLERS & FUND (50):

CLEARANCE REQUIRED: PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP): COVERT SECURITY CLEARANCE ☐ SECRET ☐ FULL
CLEARANCE (51):

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ☐ APPENDIX I ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER ☐ PHOTOGRAPH(S) ☐ APPENDIX II ☐ REPORT OF INTERVIEW
RECRUIT. CODE (52-54):

VETERANS STATUS: ☐ MALE - VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - VETERAN ☐ MALE - NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - NON-VETERAN
VET. PREF. & SEX (55):

REMARKS.

Security #40696

Covert approval granted by [illegible]

[illegible] SSA [illegible] Jan 56 [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR SO USE ONLY

FORM NO. 377 REPLACES FORM 37-104 WHICH IS OBSOLETE

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 3 1231Z 57

ROUTINE

IN 39082

DATE : 001 08/MK/AJN
3 MAY 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BEIRUT

ACTION: NEA 6

INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, FD 3, OP 2, S/C 2

TO DIR INFO SA CITE BEIR 3537

PECTATE

Phillips

[redacted] AND FAMILY ARRIVED 30 APRIL.

END OF MESSAGE

File
KHW

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FC DEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS N GE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

200 HM/JM/BJ

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 30 APR 57 200

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, NEA 4, OP 2, S/C 2

APR 30 10 08 57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 37747

TO PRITY DIR INFO: BEIR CITE HAVA 900

ADMIN

David Phillips

[redacted] AND FAMILY DEPARTED HAVA CUBANA FLIGHT 998 0800 HOURS 29 APR ETA BEIRUT 2100 HOURS 30 APR BEIRUT TIME PAA FLIGHT 64.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

SCD: 15 Jan 19[illegible]

1. EMPL. SERIAL NO. 0[illegible]				
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PHILLIPS, David Atlee		3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 1922	5. [illegible] DATE 4 Oct 194[illegible]
6. MARITAL STATUS Remarried	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclude employee) 7	1960 1964 1970 1943 1951 1956 1959	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA	SPOUSE NA
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP Apr 1968	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST [illegible] Dec 1969	QUAL. FOR Prep PCS O/S — EVAL. FOR PCS O/S
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	
12. ASSESSMENT DATE None		13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None	

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1942-43 Self-employed, Actor
1943-45 Military Service, USAAF, S/Sgt
1949-54 "The South Pacific Mail" (News Paper), Santiago, Chile, - Owner-Editor-Publisher
Lecturer

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1940-41 College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, Va - Drama, English
1941-42 Texas Christian Univ, Ft Worth, Texas - Drama, English
1948 Univ of Chile, Santiago, Chile - Spanish

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French-R,Elem; W,Slight(Jun 1961); P,S,U,Slight; T,None-Oct '57(His est)
Spanish,New World - R High; W,P,S,U Inter (Sep 1969) Transl & Interpr
Portuguese (Brazilia) - R Inter (Dec 1969)

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1955 Reading Improvement
1965 COS Seminar
1969 Short Range Agt Cont Surv
1969 Portuguese
1969 COS Sem
1971 Wpns/ Defensive Driving

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
	1952-53 Contract Agent				WH/Santiago, Chile	Santiago
	1954-55 Contract Employee				WH	Guatemala
Apr 1955	Para Mil Off	0136.11	14	D	DDP/PAP Ops Stf	Hq
Aug 1955	Ops Officer	0136.31	14	DP	DDP/PP Ops/Info Coord Div	"
Feb 1956	Ops Off(PP)	0136.31	14	DP	DDP/WH III/Havana Cuba Sta	Havana
Apr 1957	" " "	0136.31	14	DP	DDP/NEA/EAS Br/Proj[illegible]	Beirut
	1958-60 Contract Agent (Independent)				DDP/WH	Havana
Mar 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	DDP/CS Dev Comp/WH	Hq
Apr 1960	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/WH-4	"
Sep 1961	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/WH-3/Mexico Sta	Mexico City
Sep 1963	" "	0136.01	15	D	" " " "	"
Jun 1965	Chief of Station	0136.05	15	D	DDP/WH-2/Dom Rep Sta/COS	Santo Domingo
Sep 1967	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	DDP/WH/Ch,Cuban Ops Group	Hq
Dec 1968	" "	0136.01	16	D	" " " " " "	"
Jan 1970	Chief of Sta	0136.05	16	D	DDP/WH/Br-5/COS	Rio de Janeiro
Jul 1971	" " "	0136.05	16	D	" " " " "	Brazilia
Nov 1971	" " "	0136.05	17	D	" " " "	"
Aug 1972	" " "	0136.05	17	D	DDP/WH-3/Venezuela Sta	Caracas

20. DATE REVISED 5 Jun 19[illegible]	21. PROFILE REQUESTED BY [illegible]	22. ITEMS [illegible] REVISED [illegible]	22 Jun 19[illegible]

FORM 1288 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. [illegible]	**BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (Continuation Sheet)**
NAME (Last-First-Middle) PHILLIPS, David Atlee	DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 1922

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT. 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details) (Cont'd.)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SC	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Jun 1973	Ch WH Div	0001.10	17	[illegible]	DDO/Chief, WH Division	Hq
Dec 1973	" " "	0001.10	18	D	" " " "	"

DATE REVISED [illegible] Jun 1974	PROFILE REVIEWED BY [illegible]

FORM 10-73 1200-1a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY: [illegible]

PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 024585	**BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)**
NAME (Last-First-Middle) PHILLIPS, David Atlee	DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 1922

23. PHOTOGRAPH



24. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

SEE COVER HISTORY ATTACHED.

25. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Award 1956 Intelligence Medal of Merit for his outstanding dedication and devotion to the cause of freedom, during the period Jan - Jul 1954.

Commendation 1961 from DCI for loyal and devoted performance while serving with JMATE

Awarded 1956 Intelligence Medal of Merit for outstanding dedication and devotion to the cause of freedom.

Appreciation 1962 from US Ambassador, Mexico City conveying President Kennedy's thanks to Embassy Staff who contributed to success of his Mexican visit.

Appreciation 1966 from CMDR, USFORDOMREP for outstanding contribution in the accomplishment of USFORDOMREP Intelligence missions 1 May 1965 - 17 Jan 1966.

Commendation 1966 from the DCI for especially meritorious service during the past year by members of the Dominican Republic Station.

Commendation from DDCI for services rendered during the crisis while TDY in the Dominican Republic Station.

Appreciation 1968 from former President of the Dominican Republic, to Deputy Director, Voice of America, USIA, for Subject's able and effective representation of the United States during turbulent events in the country three years ago.

Appreciation 1969 from Ch,DOD for briefing the DO Base Chiefs' Conference - 17 Feb 1969.

26. DATE REVIEWED 5 Jun 1974	27. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hms /cal

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 27 July 1973

FILE NO.: 2500

TO: (Check)
- x CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- x CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH

SS NUMBER: 391-24-4032

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 024345

ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: Chief Support Staff

REF: Form 1322 dated 7 Jun 73

OFFICIAL COVER: x ESTABLISHED
DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

x ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE EOD

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)

x SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY III (HHB 20-7)

x SUBMIT FORM 3254 State W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

x SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2a)

x SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)

x EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II x

x SUBMIT FORM 2698 FOR AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

SUBMIT FORM 2698 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

JAN 53-54-SANTIAGO/NOC
MAY 54-FEB 56-NEW YORK/NOC
FEB 56-APR 57-HAVANNA/NOC
APR 57-JUL 58-BEIRUT/NOC
AUG 58-MAR 60-HAVANNA/NOC
MAR 60-22 AUG 61-HQS/NOC
23 AUG 61-JUL 65-MEXICO/STATE INT
JUL 65-JUN 67-SANTO DOMINGO/STATE INT
JUN 67-JUN 70-HQS/STATEINT
JUN 70-14 JUN 73-BRAZIL/STATE INT
15 JUN 73-21 JUL 73-HQS/STATE INT
22 JUL 73-HQS/STATE NOM

DISTRIBUTION
COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SPBCD
COPY 4 - OL/STFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

EBP:ss

James ! Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 6-73 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL BY 007622

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 7 MAY 1975

FILE NO. 2500

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP	SS NUMBER 391-24-4032
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP	EMPLOYEE NUMBER 024345
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) LA	ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: RETIREMENT

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS		
	☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______		
	☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED. FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)		
	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)		
	SUBMIT FORM [illegible] TO BE ISSUED. (HHB. 20-11)		
	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR [illegible])		
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)		
	EAA. CATEGORY I ☐	CATEGORY II ☐	
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

X	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD		
X	SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 ~~TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)~~		
X	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)		
NA	EAA. CATEGORY I ☐	CATEGORY II ☐	
X	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS		
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD		
	[illegible] WRITTEN [illegible]		

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

SUBJECT WILL BE ACKNOWLEDGED AS CIA FOR ENTIRE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BUT WILL NOT REVEAL SPECIFIC PLACES OR LOCATIONS OF COVER ASSIGNMENTS.

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - CD OR CPD
2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
1 - OS/SRACD
1 - OC-DO/TFB
CCS-FILE

ebp
EP/mlr

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF

USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY 007622

(13-20-43)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 27 MARCH 1975
FILE NO.: 2500
SS NUMBER: 391-24-4032
EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 024345
ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) LA

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: VERBAL

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED XX DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ____

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ (HHB 20-7)

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ____ W-2 TO BE ISSUED (HHB 20-11).

SUBMIT FORM 1022 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)

SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HHB 240-2e)

ON TOP OF FILE

EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS

X EFFECTIVE DATE: 22 JULY 1973

X SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ (HHB 20-7)

NA EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

NOT[illegible] IN THIS [illegible]

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

15 JAN 53-54-CHILE/SANTIAGO/NOC
MAY 54-FEB 56-NEW YORK/NOC
FEB 56-APRIL 57-CUBA/HAVANA-NOC
APRIL 57-JULY 58-LEBANON/BEIRUT/NOC
AUG 58-MARCH 60-CUBA/HAVANA/NOC
MARCH 60-22 AUG 61-HQS/NOC
23 AUG 61-JULY 65-MEXICO/MEXICO CITY/STATE-INTEGRATED
JULY 65-JUNE 67-SANTO DOMINGO/STATE/INTEGRATED
JUNE 67-JAN 70-HQS-STATE/INTEGRATED
JAN 70-JULY 71-BRAZIL/RIO DE JANEIRO-STATE-INTEGRATED
JULY 71-JULY 72-BRAZIL/BRASILIA/STATE-INTEGRATED

(TO BE CONTINUED)

DISTRIBUTION
COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SRBCD
COPY 4 - OC-DD-TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF

FORM 1-74 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY 007622

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

D.	FILE NO. 2500
TO: (Check) ☐ CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP	SS NUMBER
☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP	EMPLOYEE NUMBER
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)	ID CARD NUMBER
ATTN:	OFFICIAL COVER ☐ ESTABLISHED
REF:	OFFICIAL COVER ☐ DISCONTINUED
SUBJECT DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS	UNIT

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:
☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*
☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER *(Specify)*	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ *(HHB 20-7)*
SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ *(HHB 20-7)*	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR 240-2e)*	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD
SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR 240-2e)*	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐	
SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY (CONTINUE)

AUG 72-14 JUNE 73-VENEZUELA/CARACAS-STATE-INTEGRATED
15 JUNE 73-21 JULY 73-HQS-STATE/INTEGRATED
22 JULY 73-24 MARCH 75-HQS-STATE/NOMINAL
25 MARCH 75-HQS/OVERT

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS-SPACO
COPY 4 - OC-CC TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

bp
EP:mlr

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF

FORM 1-74 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY 007622

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 27 July 1973

FILE NO.: 2500

TO: (Check)	x CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP	SS NUMBER 391-24-4032
	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP	EMPLOYEE NUMBER 024345
	x CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH	ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: Chief Support Staff

REF: Form 1322 dated 7 Jun 73

OFFICIAL COVER: x ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

x ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE EOD

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)

x SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY III (HHB 20-7)

x SUBMIT FORM 3254 State W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

x SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2a)

x SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)

x EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II x

x SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-14)

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

JAN 53-54-SANTIAGO/NOC
MAY 54-FEB 56-NEW YORK/NOC
FEB 56-APR 57-HAVANNA/NOC
APR 57-JUL 58-BEIRUT/NOC
AUG 58-MAR 60-HAVANNA/NOC
MAR 60-22 AUG 61-HQS/NOC
23 AUG 61-JUL 65-MEXICO/STATE INT
JUL 65-JUN 67-SANTO DOMINCO/STATE INT
JUN 67-JUN 70-HQS/STATEINT
JUN 70-14 JUN 73-BRAZIL/STATE INT
15 JUN 73-21 JUL 73-HQS/STATE INT
22 JUL 73-HQS/STATE NOM

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD OR CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SRBCO
COPY 4 - OL-TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

EBP:ss

James Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 6-73 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL BY 007622

(13-20-33)

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING	FILE
TO: Retirement Operations Branch Office of Personnel	DATE 17 April 197[illegible]
RETIREE [illegible]	CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Cover & Commercial Staff, the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT ☐ CIVIL SERVICE ☑ CIARDS — DATE [illegible] 197[illegible]

COVER ☐ OVERT ROUTINE ☐ COVERT (*OFFICIAL COVER*) LOCK-UP ☐ COVERT (NOC) SPECIAL

RETENTION OF AWARDS ☑ YES ☐ NO

CORRESPONDENCE ☑ OVERT ☐ COVERT ☐ THRU CCS

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE ☑ U.S. GOV'T. CHECK ☐ OTHER (*Payment instructions follow*)

TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE ☑ CIA ☐ CSC ☐ OTHER (*MEMO FOLLOWS*)

REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ☑ YES ☐ NO ☐ INTERNAL TRANSFER

INSURANCE

FEGLI ☑ OVERT ☐ COVERT ☐ MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD:

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE ☑ YES ☐ CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE ☐ YES ☐ NO ☑ OVERT ☐ COVERT

REMARKS

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH
COVER & COMMERCIAL STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

______________________ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FORM 12-73 3429 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

HMAB

7 - ~~OFF. PERS.~~ FILE ROOM

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	41354523

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	51 050	CF	GS 18 1	$36,000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLM: 12 MAY 75

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

0EF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 024345

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): PHILLIPS DAVID A

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO DA YR 05 09 75

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 5135 4523 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/LA DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: CHIEF LA DIVISION

12 POSITION NUMBER: CN51

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYY

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0001.10

16 GRADE AND STEP: 18 1

17 SALARY OR RATE: 36000

18 REMARKS: "IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

PHILLIPS DAVID A
040696 1922

E BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 Hdqtrs Code:

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR 10 31 22

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

MENT DATA: CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: FB.10000

32 Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

ONG COMP DATE: DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES PROV TEMP

CODE

39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JK 5/13/75

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74 Mfg 10-74

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

RCS: 28 DEC 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 024345	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PHILLIPS DAVID A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 12 23 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA 4135 4523 0001	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF WH DIVISION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0001	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0001.10	16. GRADE AND STEP 18 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 36000

18. REMARKS

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Health Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	51050	WH	75013		1	10 31 22	12 23 73	12 23 73

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT)
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
WQB 1-3-74

FORM 1150 4-72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 00 [illegible]

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	51 050	CF	GS 17 4	$36,000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EML: 17 JUL 73

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 024345
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): PHILLIPS DAVID A
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS
4 EFFECTIVE DATE: COB 07 21 73
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7 CAN AND FCCA: 4135 4523 0001
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/WH DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11 POSITION TITLE: CHIEF WH DIVISION
12 POSITION NUMBER: 0001
13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0001.10
16 GRADE AND STEP: 17 4
17 SALARY OR RATE: 36000
18 REMARKS:
WASH., D.C.
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING		22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Health Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
56	10	51050	WH	75013		1	10 31 22		

28 NTE EXPIRES
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 Correction/Cancellation Data
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE
36 SERV COMP DATE
37 LONG COMP DATE
38 CAREER CATEGORY
39 FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA
44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7 19 73

DMS: 18 JULY 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 024345	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PHILLIPS DAVID A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 06 15 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 4135 0620 0001	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE 1ST SEC IN REL OFF CHIEF WH DIVISION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0001	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0001.10	16. GRADE AND STEP 02 3 17 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 33051 36000

18. REMARKS
CARACAS, VENEZUELA
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED "

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING 51050 WH	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE S	24. Majority Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 10 31 22	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
28. LEI EXPIRES XX XX XX	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction Cancellation Data		EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE		42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA			44. STATE TAX DATA		

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

SECRET

RCS

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	51 745	CF	GS 17 4	$36,000

C 54

1. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
024345	PHILLIPS DAVID A.	51 745	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
[illegible]	[illegible]	$36,000	11/26/71	GS 17	4	$36,000	11/26/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 9/9/72

1/5/73

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK'S INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EOD: 26 AUG 72

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 024345	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PHILLIPS DAVID A		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 08 14 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF X	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 3135 1138 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3 - CARACAS, VENEZUELA STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION CARACAS, VENEZUELA		
11. POSITION TITLE 1ST SECRETARY INT REL OFF CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0093	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP 03 7 17 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 28022 36000

18. REMARKS ~~BRASILIA, BRAZIL~~
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH ~~HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK~~ FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Macing Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE
37	10	51745	WH	77003	S	3	10 31 22	

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	EOD DATA
10 13 74	82		

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible] 07/31/7[illegible]

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible]HILLIP[illegible] DA[illegible]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION [illegible]	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 [illegible] 74	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable [illegible]	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS [illegible] DIVISION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION CARACAS, VENEZUELA		
11. POSITION TITLE [illegible]	12. POSITION NUMBER [illegible]	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) S	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES [illegible]	16. GRADE AND STEP [illegible]	17. SALARY OR RATE
18. REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. Employ Code | 21. OFFICE CODING | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. Health Code | 25. DATE OF BIRTH | 26. DATE OF GRADE | 27. DATE OF LEI

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI | HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42. | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE
CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	51 925	CF	GS 17 3	$36,000

BBG: 30 NOV 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	024345
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	PHILLIPS DAVID A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	11 28 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V ☒ · CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	2135 0694 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 5 BRASILIA, BRAZIL STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	BRAZILIA, BRAZIL
11. POSITION TITLE	1ST SECRETARY POLITICAL OFFICER CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER	0186
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	FSR GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.05
16. GRADE AND STEP	03 7 17 3
17. SALARY OR RATE	26563 34716
18. REMARKS	RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

22	10	51825 WH	09026	S	3	10 31 22	11 28 71	11 28 71

IDD DATA

10

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	51 730	CF	GS 16 4	$29,232

637

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
024345	PHILLIPS DAVID A	51 730	CF	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 16	4	$29,292	12/19/69	GS 16	5	$30,087	12/13/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Joseph [illegible] - WH/Exo

DATE

1
5/5

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-64 560 Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4 31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	51 730	CF	GS 16 5	$31,[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JAN 7

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 24345	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) P ILLIPS DAVID A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 01 DA 11 YR 7	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 0135 0694	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 5 RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

11. POSITION TITLE 1ST SECRETARY POLITICAL OFFICER CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0186	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP 03 7 16 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 23646 27543

18. REMARKS

WAS., D.C.

BASE: W

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Handle Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	51730	W	09 37	5	3	10 31 22		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI | HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42. STATE CODE | FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

01 22 73

SECRET

JBC

"FROM ROLLS KEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 202 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024745	51 500 CF	GS 16 4	$27,549

PLW: 13 DEC 6[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 024545	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PHILLIPS DAVID A

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 12 15 [illegible]	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF		7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 0135 0520 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF			

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH WH/COG OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE ATT POL OFFICER OPS OFFICER CH	12 POSITION NUMBER 1100	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 03 3 16 4	17 SALARY OR RATE 26330 2011[illegible]

18 REMARKS
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employee Code	21 OFFICE CODING		22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
32	10	51600	W	50010	S	1	10 31 [illegible]	12 15 [illegible]	12 15 [illegible]

FOD DATA

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POST

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	51 500	CF	GS 15 5	$19,978	$20,856

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	51 500	CF	GS 15 5	$20,856	$22,416

EXO

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
024345	PHILLIPS DAVID A	51 500	CF	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 15	5	22416 $~~[illegible]~~	09/29/66	GS 15	6	23075 $~~[illegible]~~	09/22/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

Donald C. Marelius

DATE 12 July 1968

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SE: 12 SEPT. 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OOF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 021345	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) PHILLIPS DAVID A				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 09 | 10 | 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR		
6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V X	CF TO CF	
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 3135 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J				
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH WH/COG OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.				
11. POSITION TITLE ATT POL OFFICER OPS OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 1105	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D			
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 03 5 15-5	17. SALARY OR RATE 18041 19978		

18. REMARKS
SANTO DOMINGO, DOM REP

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51500	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE S	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 | 31 | 22	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9/13/67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

MAH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

G3-4

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
024345	PHILLIPS DAVID A	51 750 CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	4	~~[illegible]~~ 19371	09/27/64	GS 15	5	~~[illegible]~~ 19978	09/25/66			

8 Remarks and Authentication

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 15/7/66

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg 3-65 (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

~~BJT. 18 OCT 66~~

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 024345	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PHILLIPS DAVID A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 10 DA 23 YR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7135 0875 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SANTO DOMINGO, DOM REP

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE: 2	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO, DA, YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, REG, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

10-21-66

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	51 750	CF	GS 15 4	$18,825	$19,371

SECRET

30 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, TRB

SUBJECT : Record of Contract Service for
David A. Phillips

1. Per your request we are forwarding record of Subject's contract service:

Date	Action
4 March 1954	Hired as Contract Employee
31 July 1954	Terminated
1 August 1954	Hired as Contract Employee
31 March 1955	Terminated
19 August 1958	Hired as Contract Agent
13 March 1960	Terminated

2. Subject was employed on a full time basis with leave benefits from 4 March 1954 through 31 March 1955. Accordingly, this entire period is"creditable" for establishing his annual leave category. However, the period from 19 August 1958 through 13 March 1960, as an independent contractor, is not creditable for this purpose. Only the period from 4 March 1954 through 31 December 1954 is "creditable for Civil Service Retirement, since Contract Employee's were mandatorily covered by Social Security as of 1 January 1955. 1951-1953 Contract Agent time is not creditable.

3. Attached is OF record of Agency service with salary breakdown.

Rogers C. Brooks

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division
ATTN : Mary Kay Snink

DATE: 16 June 1966

FROM : Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

SUBJECT: Agency Service of David Atlee PHILLIPS

The records of the Office of Finance show the following Agency service for Subject:

Contract Agent:

EOD 1 February 1951 @ $600.00 P/M
Term 28 February 1951 @ $600.00 P/M

not creditable see memo 6-30-66

EOD 25 January 1952 @ $6000.00 P/A
Term 31 August 1953 @ $6000.00 P/A

not creditable see memo 6-30-66

Contract Employee:

ECD 4 March 1954 $7200.00 P/A
Pay Inc. 1 August 1954 @ $8360.00 P/A
Term. 31 March 1955 @ $8360.00 P/A

O.K

Staff Employee:

Ex. Appt. 1 April 1955 @ $9600.00 P/A
Res. 6 February 1956 @ $10,320.00 P/A

O.K.

Staff Agent:

Ex. Appt. 7 February 1956 @ $10,320.00 P/A
PSI 7 October 1956 $10,535.00 P/A
Pay Raise 12 January 1958 @ $11,595.00 P/A
PSI 6 April 1958 @ $11,835.00 P/A
Res. 13 August 1958 @ $11,835.00 P/A

O.K.

Contract Agent:

EOD 19 August 1958 @ $7,200.00 P/A
Term. 13 March 1960 @ $7,200.00 P/A

not creditable per memo from CPD dated 6-30-66

Staff Employee:

Ex. Appt. 14 March 1960 @ $11,835.00 P/A
Subject has been a Staff Employee since 14 March 1960.

O.K. as Staff Employee

JHudson
JOSEPH H. HUTSON
Chief
Agent Payroll Branch

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND AGENCY POLICY. EFFECTIVE DATE OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	51 650	CF	GS 15 -	$18,170	$18,625

---

5 AUG 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
024345	PHILLIPS DAVID A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	05 06 65	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		6135 0575 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 2 SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC STATION	SANTO DOMINGO, DOM REP

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
ATT POL OFF CHIEF OF STATION	0274	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.05	03 5 15 4	16920 18170

18. REMARKS
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA YR)
37	10	51650	WH	19039	1	3	10 31 22		

28. MTE EXPIRES (MO. DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
XX XXXX								

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 03/31/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 024345	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) PHILLIPS DAVID A

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION
CONV. TO CAREER EMPLOYEE STATUS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE

MO	DA	YR
04	01	56

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6 FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP/WH DIVISION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11 POSITION TITLE

12 POSITION NUMBER

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES

16 GRADE AND STEP

17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
04/02/65

Form 11508 1-63 MFG. 1-63
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

121

1. Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
024345	PHILLIPS DAVID A	51 700 CF 45G	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	3	17,600 ~~$16,665~~	09/29/63	GS 15	4	18,170 ~~$17,210~~	09/27/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

C1

557

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY EJH

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 5/7/64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	51 700	CF	GS 15 3	$15,525	$16,495

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MHC: 27 SEPT 63

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 024345

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): PHILLIPS DAVID A

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 09 29 63

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF [✓ X]

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4135 5700 1000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY
MEXICO STATION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11 POSITION TITLE:
ATT POL OFF
OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0340

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	03 0 15 3	13440 15525

18 REMARKS:
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employee Code	21 OFFICE CODING	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Category Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
22	10	51700 WH	45075	1	3	10 31 22	09 29 63	09 29 63

28 NTE EXPIRES	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO.	34 SEX
09 28 65	31					

EOD DATA

35 VET PREFERENCE | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

10

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI [illegible] DATED 1 AUGUST [illegible], SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
PHILLIPS DAVID A	024345	64700	CF	14 4	$12990	14 4	$14120

---

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
024345	PHILLIPS DAVID A	340 64 700 CF 8	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 14	4	$14,120	09/17/61	GS 14	5	$14,545	09/15/63		1	

559

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

Ab 9/1963

7/1/6

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 17 July

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9 61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4 51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2 Name	3. Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
24345	PHILLIPS DAVID A	DDP/WH 87 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 14	3	$12,730	03/14/60	14	4	$12,990	09/17/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
X / / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

AN

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BWS: 31 AUG 1961

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 024345	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) PHILLIPS DAVID A				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION INTEGRATION - DEPT. OF STATE		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 08 23 61		5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	V TO V CF TO V	X	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2135 5700 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY MEXICO STATION			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO		
11. POSITION TITLE ATT POL OFF OPS OFFICER			12. POSITION NUMBER 0340		13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16. GRADE AND STEP 03 3 14 3		17. SALARY OR RATE 12535 12730

18. REMARKS

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $12730 AND FSR SALARY OF $12535 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.

NO SICK AND NO ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPT. OF STATE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Nagov Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
5	10	64700	WH	45075	1	3	10 31 22		

NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

VET PREFERENCE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL SERV CREDIT 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

09/05/61 UK

1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-51)

14-00000

PSC: 23 AUG 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 024345	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PHILLIPS DAVID A	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 08 15 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO CF X	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2135 5700 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0340	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 3
17. SALARY OR RATE 12730		

18. REMARKS
TO BE INTEGRATED.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Mequm Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	10	64700	WH	45075		3	10 31 22		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 FICA, 3 NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO.	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT)	36 SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT LED (1 YES, 2 NO)	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE, CODE: 0 WAIVED, 1 YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 YES, 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 YES, 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

03/29/61 WK

L I

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	PHILLIPS DAVID A	524345	46 17	GS-14 3	$11,835	$12,730

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BWS: 15 APR 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 524345	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) PHILLIPS DAVID A	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 10 Da. 31 Yr. 22	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 03 Da. 14 Yr. 60
7. SCD Mo. 02 Da. 12 Yr. 54	8. CSC Rqmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 04 Da. 05 Yr. 55 13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Lcd Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT DDP WH DIVISION	Code 3688	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 1	17. Position Title OPS OFFICER	18. Position No. 031460	19. Serv. GS 20. Occup. Series 0136.01
21. Grade & Step 14 3	22. Salary Or Rate $11835 23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 14 Yr. 60 25. PSI Due Mo. 09 Da. 17 Yr. 61	26. Appropriation Number 0320 1998

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo. 04 Da. 17 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 4	Code 4617	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 1	34. Position Title OPS OFFICER	35. Position No. 0624	36. Serv. GS 37. Occup. Series 0136.01
38. Grade & Step 14 3	39. Salary Or Rate $11835 40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 14 Yr. 60 42. PSI Due Mo. 09 Da. 17 Yr. 61	43. Appropriation Number 0135 1000 1000

44. Remarks

[illegible]-26-60 WK

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 14 MARCH 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
524345	DAVID A PHILLIPS PHILLIPS DAVID A	10	31	22		1	M	1	03	14	60	

7. SCD Mo.	Da	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11 FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
02	12	54		1	50 USCA 403 J	03	14	60		1	04	05	55		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25 PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
	$								

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT	17	03	14	60	REGULAR	20	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT DDP WH DIVISION	4688	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	OPS OFFICER	031460	GS	0136.01

38 Grade & Step	39 Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
14 3	$ 11835	D	03	14	60	09	17	61	0320 1998

44. Remarks
APPOINTEE.

[illegible]
3-24-60

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a   3-23-60

SECRET

(4)

STANDARD FORM 50 (2 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
WHEN FILLED IN.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)
David A. Phillips
[redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 10/31/22

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 18 Aug 58

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): RESIGNATION(STAFF AGENT)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 13 Aug 58

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403j

FROM		TO
Ops Officer (FP) 8127	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-0136.31-14 $11,835.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
DDP/NEA Project Annex Egypt & Arab States Branch Project PECTATE	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Beirut, Lebanon	11. HEADQUARTERS	
XX FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD:DP

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 9-3361-91-216
TO:

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): YES

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. REMARKS:

Subj debriefed by Security(Frasee)
Subj debriefed by Finance(Shipley)
Subj debriefed by Personnel(Kreinheder)

POSTED ON
G-4D
15 Aug 58

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

FOR DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

Joseph B. Ragan

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. [redacted] COPY
File

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
WHEN FILLED IN

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) David P. Phillips [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 1922	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 15 Aug 57

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT (CORRECTION)* STAFF AGENT)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 30 Apr 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403J

FROM		TO
Ops. Off (PP) BAF-126	8. POSITION TITLE	Ops. Officer (PP) PSP-8127
GS-0136.31-14 $10,535.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.31-14 $10,535.00 p/a
DDP/WH Branch III Havana Cuba Station	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/NEA Project Annex Egypt and Arab States Branch Project FECTATE
Havana, Cuba	11. HEADQUARTERS	Beirut, Lebanon
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE						14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION				
NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER	NEW	VICE	I. A.	REA.	
										SD:DP

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-3545-55-055 TO: 7-3361-91-215	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

*Subject arrived PCS Beirut 30 Apr 57.
Project FECTATE was approved 15 Mar 57

POSTED ON
OF-40
Bd 15 Aug 57

FOR DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

Louis W. Armstrong

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. [redacted] COPY

716

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): [redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 31 Oct 1922

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 11 July 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): REASSIGNMENT (STAFF AGENT)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 16 June 57

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403j

FROM		TO
Ops Off (PP) BAF-126	8. POSITION TITLE	Ops Officer(PP) BEP-8127
GS-0136.31-14 $10,535.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	CS-0136.31-14 $10,535.00 p/a
DDP/WH BRANCH III Havana Cuba Station	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/NEA Project Annex Egypt and Arab States Branch Project PEETATE
Havana, Cuba	11. HEADQUARTERS	Beirut, Lebanon
☒ XX FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ XX FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE | WWII | OTHER | 5 PT | 10-POINT (WIFE | OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I. A. | REAL. — SD:DP

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3546-56-055
TO: 7-3361-91-215

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. REMARKS:

POSTED ON
OF-4b

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

FOR DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

Louis W. Armstrong

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. [redacted]EE COPY

File

(when filled in)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

organizational designation DDP/WH	2. Payr	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
[redacted] David Phillips	6. Grade and salary GS-14 $10,320.00		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY

POSTED ON
DF-40
8 Oct 56

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
dak 1 Aug 56

13. Audited by

Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

Effective	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. ~~Performance rating is satisfactory or better.~~ SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY
Oct 56	1 Apr 56	$10,320.00	$10,535.00	(Signature or other authentication)

LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP ________ Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
ber 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(when Filled In)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1955—O-37102

Agency and organizational designations DDP/WHA	2. Payroll	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) [redacted] David Phillips	6. Grade and salary GS-14 $10,535.00		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
Previous total													
total													
this period													

Remarks:
PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 12 JAN 1958
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: $11,835

POSTED ON

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
dak 3 Feb 58

13. Audited by

Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

Effective	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. ~~Performance rating is satisfactory or better.~~ SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY
58	7 Oct 56	$10,535.00	$10,750.00	(Signature or other authentication)

LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP ________ Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
ber 26, 1954 General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

:ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC

1v:

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. David A. Phillips	2. DATE OF BIRTH 21 Oct 1922	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 7 Feb 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Resignation*	6. EFFECTIVE DATE COD 6 Feb 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
Ops Officer BW-229	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-0136.31-14 $10,320.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
DDP/PP Operations Staff Information Coordination Division Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DP

15. SEX M W	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-2105-20 TO:	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Texas

20. REMARKS.

*To seek other employment.

Statement of accrued annual leave to your credit will be forwarded with your final salary check.

57,--,--,--,-,-

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

1. U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950 - 35-809

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

2/7/56

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R-1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

dah

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. David A. Phillips	2. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 1922	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 4 October 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment (Correction) *	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 14 Aug 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Paramilitary Off. BW-156	8. POSITION TITLE	Ops Officer 5W-229
GS-0136.11-14 $10,320.00 Per Annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.31-14 $10,320.00 Per Annum
Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/PP Operations Staff Information Coordination Division Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL XX

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT.	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			XX		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

N/A	VICE	C.A.	REAL

SD/DP

15. SEX M
16. RACE W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-2101-20 TO: 6-2105-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

* This Action Corrects Item No. 17 on the "to" Side of Notification dated 4 August 1955, to show the correct Allotment Number, Previously shown as 6-2101-20

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

H.G. REYNOLDS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Director of Personnel

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954—O-[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. DAVID A. PHILLIPS
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 31 Oct 1922
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 4 Aug 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 14 Aug 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE	Paramilitary Off. BW-156		Ops Officer BW-229
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.11-14 $10320.00 per annum		GS-0136.31-14 $10,320.00 per annum
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/PP Operations Staff Office of the Chief		DDP/PP Operations Staff Information Coordination Div. Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS			Washington D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE ☐ WAIV. ☐ OTHER ☐ 5-PT. ☒ 10-POINT: DISAB. ☐ OTHER ☐

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ I. A. ☐ REAL. ☐ SDMP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 5-2101-20 TO: 6-2101-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Texas

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

10,320

Director of Personnel

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

nj 8/11/55

STANDARD FORM 50 (5 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 01, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

FC 26 April 1955
SR 6033

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. David A. Phillips

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 31 October 1922

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 1 April 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Excepted Appointment

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 April 1955

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Paramilitary Off. PM BW-156-14
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.11-14 $9600.00 P/a
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/P&P Operations Staff Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE ☐ 5-POINT ☐ OTHER ☐ DISAB ☐ 10-POINT: DISAB ☐ OTHER ☐ — X

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ T.A. ☐ REAL. ☐

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: — TO: 5-2101-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 23 April 1955

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Texas

SD:G

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject to a satisfactory physical examination.

RC 06
DOG 04-01-55
CSECD 04-01-55
LCD 04-01-55

TAO
5/2/55

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950—

23 Apr 1955

SECRET

12 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION : Mary Kay Spink

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Service
PHILLIPS, David A.

In order to establish the salary, LCD and to compute the SCD for both leave and retirement purposes, it is necessary to verify the contract service and salary of David A. PHILLIPS, DOB 31 October 1922, who claims employment with this Agency in a contract status from 27 March 1952 to 1 April 1955 and from 19 August 1958 to 13 March 1960.

Signed

Lowell P. Moore
Deputy Chief, Transactions & Records Branch

Distribution:
- 0 & 1 - Addressee
- ~~1~~ - OPF - PHILLIPS
- 1 - TRB - Chrono

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

4 February 1971

David A. Phillips

30 June 1966

4 March 1954

31 March 1955

WH/Personnel

30 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, TRB

SUBJECT : Record of Contract Service for David A. Phillips

1. Per your request we are forwarding record of Subject's contract service:

Date	Action
4 March 1954	Hired as Contract Employee
31 July 1954	Terminated
1 August 1954	Hired as Contract Employee
31 March 1955	Terminated
19 August 1958	Hired as Contract Agent
13 March 1960	Terminated

2. Subject was employed on a full time basis with leave benefits from 4 March 1954 through 31 March 1955. Accordingly, this entire period is"creditable" for establishing his annual leave category. However, the period from 19 August 1958 through 13 March 1960, as an independent contractor, is not creditable for this purpose. Only the period from 4 March 1954 through 31 December 1954 is "creditable for Civil Service Retirement, since Contract Employee's were mandatorily covered by Social Security as of 1 January 1955. 1951-1953 Contract Agent time is not creditable

3. Attached is OF record of Agency service with salary breakdown.

Rogers C. Brooks
Acting Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
2 - CPD

Chief, Contract Personnel Division
ATTN : Mary Kay Spink

16 June 1966

Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

Agency Service of David Atlee PHILLIPS

The records of the Office of Finance show the following Agency service for Subject:

Contract Agent:

EOD 1 February 1951 @ $600.00 P/M
Term 28 February 1951 @ $600.00 P/M

EOD 25 January 1952 @ $6000.00 P/A
Term 31 August 1953 @ $6000.00 P/A

EOD 4 March 1954 @ $7200.00 P/A
Pay Inc. 1 August 1954 @ $8360.00 P/A
Term. 31 March 1955 @ $8360.00 P/A

Staff Employee:

Ex. Appt. 1 April 1955 @ $9600.00 P/A
Res. 6 February 1956 @ $10,320.00 P/A

Staff Agent:

Ex. Appt. 7 February 1956 @ $10,320.00 P/A
PSI 7 October 1956 @ $10, 535.00 P/A
Pay Raise 12 January 1958 @ $11,595.00 P/A
PSI 6 April 1958 @ $11,835.00 P/A
Res. 13 August 1958 @ $11,835.00 P/A

Contract Agent:

EOD 19 August 1958 @ $7,200.00 P/A
Term. 13 March 1960 @ $7,200.00 P/A

Staff Employee:

Ex. Appt. 14 March 1960 @ $11,835.00 P/A
Subject has been a Staff Employee since 14 March 1960.

JOSEPH H. HUDSON
Chief

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 024345	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Phillips, David A.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 10/31/22	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-18	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief, WH Division	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/WH/O-CH	9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	10. CODE (Check one) S HQS.		DF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: C CAREER | RESERVE | CONTRACT | OTHER (Spec.) | TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL | REASSIGNMENT | SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-): 1 May 1973 - 31 March 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1974

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT.

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Plans, organizes and implements the programs of the Operations Directorate in the Western Hemisphere area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises approximately 255 staff employees in Headquarters and 310 in 26 Stations and Bases abroad.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Represents the Agency in contacts with senior representatives of liaison services.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Represents the Directorate and/or the Agency in official contacts with other components of our government.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Implements the EEO policy of the Agency.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

054581

E2, IMPDET CL BY ____________

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This report covers Mr. Phillips' initial period as a Division Chief. It coincided with a period of unusually high stress and strain in the Western Hemisphere Division, particularly in relationships with the State Department and in the problems left over from our drastic measures designed to protect ourselves against a potential counterintelligence disaster. The most important fact to be recorded about Mr. Phillips' direction of his Division during this period is that he kept operations at the top of his priority list, and that as a result our operational achievements in the area during the past year have been on the whole better than in the year before.

Mr. Phillips is developing into a very competent manager, and has handled well the problems involved in adjusting to decreasing manpower ceilings. He is prudent in the use of official funds. He is a good supervisor and is providing excellent leadership to his subordinates, who have responded with a clear improvement in morale during the period since Mr. Phillips assumed charge.

(continued next page)

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 22 April 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Associate Deputy Director for Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE David H. Blee

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 23 April 1974	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur. An excellent operational leader who is learning rapidly the nuances of a Division Chief's job in Washington. He is an inspirational leader whose management techniques and abilities are still developing. All in all a first rate performance.

DATE 11 June 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Director for Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William E. Nelson

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE 6/21/74	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

SECRET

Fitness Report - David A. Phillips

Section D., Continued:

The most dramatic challenge to the capabilities of the WH Division in the past year flowed from the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. Overall, the intelligence reporting was timely and accurate, the adjustments to our political action programs skillfully made, and the responses to Congressional inquiry well handled.

It is as a senior operations officer that Mr. Phillips has had the greatest experience, and it is not surprising that he has made an excellent input into the improvement of operational matters throughout the many areas of this hemisphere for which he is responsible. He has also consistently handled the many and important senior liaison contacts which he has made during this year, both at Headquarters and during field visits, with great effectiveness.

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 024345	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Phillips, David A.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 10/31/22	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-18	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief, WH Division	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/WH/O-CH	9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	10. CODE (ck one) S HQS.		OF.

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

C	CAREER		RESERVE		CONTRACT		OTHER (Spec.)	TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
1 May 1973 - 31 March 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1974

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT.

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Plans, organizes and implements the programs of the Operations Directorate in the Western Hemisphere area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises approximately 255 staff employees in Headquarters and 310 in 26 Stations and Bases abroad.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Represents the Agency in contacts with senior representatives of liaison services.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Represents the Directorate and/or the Agency in official contacts with other components of our government.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Implements the EEO policy of the Agency.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

11 JUL 1974

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

054581

E2, IMPDET CL BY

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This report covers Mr. Phillips' initial period as a Division Chief. It coincided with a period of unusually high stress and strain in the Western Hemisphere Division, particularly in relationships with the State Department and in the problems left over from our drastic measures designed to protect ourselves against a potential counterintelligence disaster. The most important fact to be recorded about Mr. Phillips' direction of his Division during this period is that he kept operations at the top of his priority list, and that as a result our operational achievements in the area during the past year have been on the whole better than in the year before.

Mr. Phillips is developing into a very competent manager, and has handled well the problems involved in adjusting to decreasing manpower ceilings. He is prudent in the use of official funds. He is a good supervisor and is providing excellent leadership to his subordinates, who have responded with a clear improvement in morale during the period since Mr. Phillips assumed charge.

(continued next page)

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 9

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 22 April 1974

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Associate Deputy Director for Operations

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: David [illegible]. Blee

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE: ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED

DATE: 23 APRIL 1974

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur. An excellent operational leader who is learning rapidly the nuances of a Division Chief's job in Washington. He is an inspirational leader whose management techniques and abilities are still developing. All in all a first rate performance.

DATE: 11 June 1974

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Deputy Director for Operations

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: William E. Nelson William E. Nelson

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT

DATE: [illegible] 1, 1974

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

CLASSIFICATION

Fitness Report - David A. Phillips

Section D., Continued:

The most dramatic challenge to the capabilities of the WH Division in the past year flowed from the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. Overall, the intelligence reporting was timely and accurate, the adjustments to our political action programs skillfully made, and the responses to Congressional inquiry well handled.

It is as a senior operations officer that Mr. Phillips has had the greatest experience, and it is not surprising that he has made an excellent input into the improvement of operational matters throughout the many areas of this hemisphere for which he is responsible. He has also consistently handled the many and important senior liaison contacts which he has made during this year, both at Headquarters and during field visits, with great effectiveness.

14-00000

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 024345	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Phillips, David A.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 22	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-17	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3-Caracas	9. CURRENT STATION Venezuela			10. HQ CD 3

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.)

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ TEMPORARY ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) 1 February 1972 - 31 March 1973

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 May 1973

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER

Form 8-72 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY 061991

22 JAN 1974

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JAN 11 10 45 [illegible] '74

SEE ATTACHED

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, C AND D OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
7 January 1974	[illegible]	Theodore Shackley Theodore G. Shackley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Phillips is a highly experienced senior operations officer with outstanding leadership ability. In both the Chief of Station positions covered by this report his performance was superior in every important respect.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
8 Jan 1974	ADD/O	David H. Blee

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECTION D · NARRATIVE COMMENTS

1. In the period covered by this report Mr. Phillips was the Chief of Station Brazilia during the time frame February to August 1972. After that Mr. Phillips became the Chief of Station, Caracas and served in Venezuela during the period August 1972 to April 1973. At both of these posts Mr. Phillips was responsible for managing an average of 44 Agency employees. Additionally, Mr. Phillips supervised in this period an average FY budget of 1.8 million which was spent on FI, CA, CI, anti-narcotics and protected economic intelligence operations. American policy interests in Brazil and Venezuela are high in terms of the United States scale of values for Latin America. This means that Mr. Phillips was assigned to two prestige posts during a fifteen month time span.

2. As a manager Mr. Phillips is operations oriented. In view of this he places his time, attention and command emphasis on programs that are designed to acquire intelligence and agents. This approach has consistently produced results in terms of FI and CA operations which are targeted against the host country.

3. Mr. Phillips was also active at both posts as an operations manager who focused Station resources on the Soviet target, protected economic intelligence and the anti-narcotics effort. Unfortunately, as these programs moved into gear Mr. Phillips was also in motion between Stations, or had just been in place at his second Station for less than a year. As a result one can only say that Mr. Phillips made all the right moves in his managerial duties against these priority targets. The brevity of his program implementation at each of the two posts did not provide a solid basis, however, for measuring tangible success. In short Mr. Phillips deserves high marks for initiative, drive and imagination on programs that were receiving increased attention at Headquarters.

4. The myriad problems that are faced when a Station moves its location from one city to another were still challenging Mr. Phillips when he left Brasilia. In overview terms, however, the move from Rio de Janerio to Brasilia was well done. This does not mean that Mr. Phillips' successor at Brasilia did not have some gaps to fill or adjustments to make in the administrative field. The scope of these actions, however, was in the realm of the reasonable and attests to the fact that while his basic interests are in

operations, administration per se is not a totally alien field to Mr. Phillips.

5. In representational terms Mr. Phillips did a sound job in winning and maintaining the respect of the American Ambassadors in Brazil and Venezuela. This is due in large measure to Mr. Phillips' native charm, area knowledge, and language skills in Spanish and Portuguese. In addition, Mr. Phillips is people oriented, and this makes it possible for him to sell himself and CIA to senior American officials at the Ambassador level.

6. In personal terms Mr. Phillips is a hard-working, dedicated officer who is a good team player. This officer has the intent, capability and desire to fulfill the needs of the Organization. He is particularly well versed in CA skills and is politically oriented. As a result he likes the challenge of election operations and is well qualified in this area.

7. Mr. Phillips' total performance during the period covered by this report merits an evaluation of Strong.

8. In terms of future assignments Mr. Phillips is likely to be at his professional best in field activities. This officer is highly specialized in Latin American affairs, but he is perfectly capable of being a Station Chief at most Agency posts in Europe or Asia.

9. Mr. Phillips' activities come to the attention of the Rating Officer on a daily basis.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 024345

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Phillips, David A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 1922	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-17	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/5		8. CURRENT STATION Brasilia	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 July 1971 - 31 January 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

20 JAN 1972

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

HAS SEEN

Please see attached MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27 January 1972	/s/ David A. Phillips

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 January 1972	Chief, WH Division	William V. Broe

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Please see attached.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	AD[illegible]P	Cord [illegible]eyer, Jr.

SECRET

Mr. Phillips continues to show excellent growth potential and his breath of capabilities qualifies him for advancement to senior echelons.

I rate Mr. Phillips as very Strong as Chief of Station, Brasilia.

William V. Broe
William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

I certify that I have seen this memorandum:

/s/ David A. Phillips
David A. Phillips

This fitness report is being sent to David A. Phillips in Brasilia for his signature and to be returned to Headquarters for file.

27 January 1972
Date

Comments of Reviewing Official:

I completely agree with this high rating and should add that subject has handled a continuing Congressional interest in Brazil with a rare combination of diplomatic tact and sound judgment.

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

15 Jan '72
Date

10 January 1972

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: David A. Phillips
1 July - 31 December 1971

This memorandum is in lieu of a fitness report to cover Mr. Phillips' performance during the period 1 July to 31 December 1971. This rating is being prepared in view of the rater's imminent departure from the Division.

Last month Mr. Phillips was promoted from GS-16 to GS-17. There is no better evidence of the high esteem in which he is held by his superiors in the Agency.

During this rating period Mr. Phillips transferred the station from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia. This move, however, divorces the Chief of Station from the main area of operations, Rio de Janeiro. In spite of this Mr. Phillips, through much extra effort and time on his part, has been able to maintain a high operational tempo in the station.

Station relations with key people in the Brazilian government, especially the security agencies, have been highly productive but through recent efforts, these relations have been placed on a much higher plane with the decision of General Fontoura, chief of the SNI, to give the station copies of the briefings especially prepared for President Medici.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 024345

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Phillips, David A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 1922	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/5		8. CURRENT STATION Rio de Janeiro	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
XXX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					XXX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1971	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1970 - 30 June 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached memorandum.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 5 AUG 5 11 05 AM '71

MAIL ROOM

See attached memorandum.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
11 August 1971	/s/ David A. Phillips

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
	~~Copy of report has been sent to Mr. Phillips for acknowledgment.~~	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
30 June 1971	Chief, WH Division	/signed/ William V. Broe

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Assistant Deputy Director for Plans	/signed/ Cord Meyer, Jr.

SECRET

30 June 1971

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Mr. David A. Phillips
1 April 1970 - 30 June 1971

This memorandum is in lieu of the fitness report on Mr. Phillips as Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro, during the period 1 April 1970 to 30 June 1971.

Mr. Phillips is a highly capable, versatile and imaginative Operations Officer and manager who makes a substantial contribution to the Clandestine Service.

The above statement is borne out by the fact that faced with a highly difficult, sensitive operational problem of the utmost priority in the fall of 1970, the Rater immediately thought of Mr. Phillips as the man to head the Task Force and received immediate and enthusiastic endorsement from the Deputy Director for Plans and the Director for Mr. Phillips' assignment. He was recalled from Brazil, took over the Task Force, and handled it in an outstanding manner.

My first statement is further borne out by the fact that Ambassador Rountree, on a recent visit to Washington, made a special effort to express to the Rater his appreciation for Mr. Phillips' support to him and the Embassy and to express further his appreciation to the Agency for furnishing him a man of Mr. Phillips' caliber.

Mr. Phillips has a large, widely spread operation with Bases in Brasilia, Recife and Sao Paulo. However, he has succeeded in keeping them well coordinated and dead on the target.

I rate Mr. Phillips as Strong as Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

I certify that I have seen
this memorandum:

David A. Phillips
Date

Comments of Reviewing Official: I would have rated this performance as "very strong". Excellent political judgment and the ability to handle the most delicate situations with tact and dexterity characterize this performance.

Cord Meyer Jr.

22 July 71
Date

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Course # 3/71 Specialized Training in Weapons for Self-Defense and Countermeasures Against Vehicular Kidnapping

Date: 2-5 February 1971

Trainee: PHILLIPS, David A. **Office:** WH

Purpose and Scope of the Course:

The course provides basic proficiency training in the use of weapons for self-defense and in the techniques of evasive driving to counter vehicular kidnapping for Agency officers being assigned to hostile or unstable political and operational environments abroad.

Achievement Record:

This is to certify that Mr. Phillips has satisfactorily completed the prescribed course of instruction.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

CHIEF, SPECIAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH

10 February 1971
DATE

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
024345

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Phillips, David A	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/31/22	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE COS	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Br.5		8. CURRENT STATION Rio de Janeiro	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1969 - 31 March 70

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached memorandum.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 5 AUG 1970	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 4 3 48 PM '70

See Attached Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 July 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WH Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /signed/ William V. Broe

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 21 JUL 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Assistant Deputy Director for Plans	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Cord Meyer, Jr. Cord Meyer

SECRET

15 July 1970

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Mr. David A. Phillips
1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

This memorandum is in lieu of the fitness report on Mr. David A. Phillips as Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro, during the period 1 April 1969 to 31 March 1970.

During this period Mr. Phillips took over command of the Rio Station. It is typical of Mr. Phillips that he made excellent preparation for this assignment, including a full-time course in the Portuguese language.

Mr. Phillips has brought to his new position the operational zeal and enthusiasm that has characterized all of his previous positions. Brazil, by the very nature of its size but, more importantly, the type of "strait jacket" government in power, is a difficult place to operate on a broad plain. Mr. Phillips has the station moving and real effort and progress is seen on the more difficult targets, such as the Soviets.

He has excellent relations within the embassy and is recognized for his contribution to the Country Team. He, of course, handles his liaison contacts with mature style and is very actively developing a number of contacts in the local community.

Mr. Phillips is a good supervisor of men and the present high morale of the Rio de Janeiro Station and its Bases is a living proof of this. He furnishes good operational planning and guidance and exhibits a high degree of cost consciousness.

I rate Mr. Phillips as Strong as Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

I certify that I have seen
this memorandum:

26 Sept 1970

David A. Phillips
Date

Date of Report
15 January 1970

LANGUAGE TRAINING REPORT

Proficiency Level Before and After Training	Before	After
Speaking	--	1 *
Aural Comp.	--	3 *
Read Comp.	--	3 *

* Instructors Estimate vice Official Test

Student Name: PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

Office: WH

Course: PORTUGUESE FULL-TIME

Inclusive Dates: 11/03/69-12/18/69

Hours of Instruction
Scheduled 244 Actual 108
Absences 28

LANGUAGE TRAINING AIMS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

The general aim of this course of study was to provide the student with a command of a foreign language in a skill and at the level set by the sponsoring office. Speaking, aural comprehension and reading comprehension, as required, were emphasized. Fluency and accuracy were given equal importance in training and in evaluation of the student. Cultural matters were covered only incidentally.

This student evaluation is based on (1) Instructor and Linguist observations; (2) regularly administered oral and written achievement tests; (3) a final comprehensive achievement examination. The achievement rating reflects only performance and achievement in the course and is conditioned by the length of time the student spent in training, achievement potential based upon his or her aptitude for language study and upon motivation. This rating should not be confused with the Proficiency Rating which is submitted separately on Form 1273, Certification of Language Proficiency.

PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING COURSE AIMS

(Overall progress in the course is shown as unsatisfactory, marginal, satisfactory, above average, superior when compared against established standards for such training).

Speaking	Aural Comprehension	Reading Comprehension
SUPERIOR	SUPERIOR	N.A.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

In six weeks the student covered the entire DLI course of 75 lessons which usually takes 4 to 6 months to complete. His study habits and approach to language learning were excellent and he made maximum use of the time available.

The joint decision by instructor and student to rush through 75 lessons was based on:

(1) the student's determination to make as much of a conversion from Spanish to Portuguese as possible and

(2) on the instructor's faith and confidence in the student's ability to do so.

In cases where the principal objective is to convert a student's command of Spanish to an equivalent level in Portuguese, the point is often reached where the student is able to understand and make himself understood most adequately without,

See reverse side for additional comment

Instructor

For the Director of Training:

R W Williams
Department Chief
Language School/OTR

however, his having achieved a corresponding tested level because of the remaining influence of Spanish.

In the case of this student, I judge his command of the language to be already adequate for all situations he may encounter in the field. So that while he may not test quite elementary, in reality, and as far as ability to communicate effectively is concerned, he would have to be rated intermediate.

SECRET

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION -- TECHNICAL SCHOOL

SHORT RANGE AGENT CONTACT SURVEY (A-106)

Training Report

Name : PHILLIPS, David A.

Office: WH/COG

Date : 6 June 1969

I. OBJECTIVES:

To provide a general knowledge in:

a. Selected gear used for clandestine short range agent contacts. Included are representative samples of:

One way RF radio devices; two way RF radio devices; two way carrier current devices; optical communicators; and special telephone devices used for establishing agent contact.

b. The philosophy, purpose, considerations and manageability of short range agent contact systems; including message security, link security, reliability and feasibility of agent contact systems.

INSTRUCTOR
TSD/TECHNICAL SCHOOL

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
024345

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Phillips, David A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/31/22	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
04/69

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 68 - 31 March 6~~8~~9

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 7 JUL 1969	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

See attached Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report.

JUL 2 11 17 AM '69

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 9 June 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /signed/ David A. Phillips

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 6 June 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, WH Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /signed/ John R. Horton

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached.

DATE 27 June 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /signed/ William V. Broe

SECRET

6 June 1969

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Mr. David A. Phillips
1 April 1968 to 31 March 1969

Mr. Phillips continues to head the Division's program against the high-priority Cuban target, although he has also been selected to fill an unusually responsible job overseas in the coming year, both of which jobs testify to the high regard in which he is held by his superiors in the Agency. Mr. Phillips has had the difficult task of presiding over a show which is being cut back, in terms of money and people, and in which task he has played a major role. At the same time as doing a pruning job, he has had to try to maintain a vigorous program and to keep up enthusiasm. His own qualities of personal leadership and of magnetism have done a great deal to keep up enthusiasm among his people. He has a positive attitude toward operations and is determined; his day-to-day concern is for developing new operations, and he has put all of his own notable vigor and drive into operational directions.

Mr. Phillips knows his target and knows Latin America well and he brings a good feel and insight into his work, which is never pedestrian or unimaginative. He speaks well and convincingly and makes a very good impression both within the Agency and outside, where he serves the Agency well in his relations with other government elements. He also writes notably well.

His task this year has not been easy for he has had to deal with an experimental situation, to a considerable extent, with the new Miami station which he is responsible for supporting and guiding. He has had to exercise a good deal of tact and diplomacy in the doing of it and he has done a good job of reconciling often conflicting views. He has shown a good head for costs in all of this.

Mr. Phillips is a notably good supervisor, especially with younger officers, for whom he is an object of admiration and emulation. Mr. Phillips is a fast-moving, energetic person and he has some of the faults that often go with this virtue: he is impatient with details and "paper" with the consequence that if someone else does not do it for him, his work is sometimes marred by inaccuracies and imprecisions.

Without going into it, it should be noted that Mr. Phillips has had a very trying year personally and it is a proof of his strength of character that he has not only come through it but has hardly broken his stride in carrying out a demanding job, or being any less than his usual cheerful and charming self.

His performance has been very Strong.

John R. Horton
Deputy Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

I certify that I have seen
this memorandum:

David A. Phillips

7 June 1969
Date

Comments of Reviewing Official:

I concur in the above rating of Mr. Phillips. Dave Phillips is an operator in the solid professional sense of the word. I have great hopes for the Rio Station which he takes over early in 1970.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

27 June 1969
Date

S E C R E T
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ (When Completed)

[illegible]

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED DAVID A CHIEF, CAS	POST American Embassy, Caracas	
POSITION CHIEF, CAS	GRADE	AGENCY CAS
RATING PERIOD August 13, 1972 - October 31, 1972	DATE OF REPORT December 8, 1972	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER Robert McClintock Robert McClintock	TITLE AMBASSADOR	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☒ Yes ☐ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

The CAS Station Chief has been at the post only since August 13, 1972. Although this period may seem unusually short for the preparation of a performance evaluation, I would like to say that I have been enormously and favorably impressed by his performance during this initial period.

The CAS Station Chief comes to Venezuela from a series of highly responsible positions in which, I understand, he performed outstandingly. He has taken hold of his new position in a commanding manner and gives every indication of being thoroughly on top of his job. He is understanding of the Embassy's needs, professionally competent in his approach to his work, and highly articulate in explaining those facts and factors which are of importance to me and to other officers of the Embassy.

I am very favorably impressed by the initial performance of the CAS Station Chief and I consider myself fortunate to have him with me at this post.

FORM 4-65 FS-572

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ (When Completed)
S E C R E T

14-00000

ROGER CHANNEL XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX when Completed) **S E C R E T**

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED Chief CAS	POST American Embassy - BRASILIA
POSITION Chief of Station	GRADE FSR-2
	AGENCY DIA
RATING PERIOD 11/1/71 - 6/29/72	DATE OF REPORT October 16, 1972
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER William M. Rountree	TITLE Ambassador
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☑ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☑ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☐ Yes ☑ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

The previous incumbent completed his assignment at this post and departed on June 29, 1972. During the period under review he continued to perform in a highly creditable manner, working well with other members of the Embassy staff and handling the affairs of his agency in a most professional, efficient and effective manner.

In my last evaluation I stated that both the Agency and the Embassy were fortunate to have a man of the rated officer's abilities and qualities as CAS Chief at this important post. I am happy to say that his performance throughout his assignment here reinforced that view.

FORM 4-65 FS-572 ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ (When Completed) **S E C R E T**

SECRET XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (When Completed) (ROGER CHANNEL)

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED Chief CAS	POST American Embassy BRASILIA	
POSITION Chief of Station	GRADE FSR-2	AGENCY DIA
RATING PERIOD 11/1/70 - 10/31/71	DATE OF REPORT November 1, 1971	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER William M. Rountree	TITLE Ambassador	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☑ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☑ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☐ Yes ☑ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

Mr. Phillips is an able officer and a highly cooperative member of the Country Team. I have been impressed and pleased with the degree of cooperation which exists between him and other members of the Embassy staff. He has, to the extent that is possible considering the nature of his work, cooperated in our efforts to bring about maximum coordination of reporting. With rare exceptions he has, I believe, kept me appropriately advised on all matters relating to his functions, and the material which he provides on a regular basis has been extremely useful in the discharge of my mission.

Mr. Phillips works quietly and discreetly and is alert to any situation which might create problems for the Embassy and the United States. I fully share the view of the DCM, expressed in a previous evaluation, that both Mr. Phillips and his wife conduct themselves in a quiet, friendly and wholly creditable manner.

I feel that both the Agency and the Embassy are fortunate in having a man of Mr. Phillips' abilities and qualities as CAS Chief at this important post.

FORM 4-65 FS-572 SECRET XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (When Completed)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency; retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED David A. PHILLIPS	POST American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro	
POSITION Chief CAS, Chief of Station	GRADE FSR-02	AGENCY DIA
RATING PERIOD 7/1/70 - 10/31/70	DATE OF REPORT November 1, 1970	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER C. A. Boonstra	TITLE Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☐ Outstanding ☑ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☑ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☑ Yes ☐ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

Mr. Phillips' performance during the four months covered by this evaluation has been highly satisfactory. For some years previous to my arrival here, in June 1970, I had been acquainted with him, and from this I already had a favorable impression of his qualities. This impression has continued and has improved further. He has worked quietly and discreetly, has kept me informed of all important developments, and has coordinated as necessary with other offices in the Embassy. His interest in his work, and his dedication to the job, have been outstanding. His relations with others are very good. Because of wide previous experience in this hemisphere, he frequently is helpful to Embassy officers in areas outside his own specialization. He appears to manage his personnel well. In functions outside the Embassy, both he and his wife conduct themselves in a quiet, friendly, and wholly creditable manner.

FORM 4-65 FS-572

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)

SECRET XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (When Completed) SECRET

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED David A. PHILLIPS	POST American Embassy Rio de Janeiro	
POSITION Chief CAS, Chief of Station	GRADE FSR-03	AGENCY DIA
RATING PERIOD January 30 - June 30, 1970	DATE OF REPORT April 24, 1970	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER William Belton	TITLE Deputy Chief of Mission	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER CA Boonstra C. A. Boonstra	TITLE CM, Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.	

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☒ Yes ☐ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

Phillips has been here too short a time and there has been too little opportunity for us to work together for me to be able to discuss his performance in detail. I am able to say, however, that he has impressed me and other Embassy officers with whom he works, including Ambassador Elbrick, very favorably, indeed. He is a cool-headed, straightforward, intelligent man who seems professionally very capable. He has a clear understanding of the appropriate role for himself and his organization within the Embassy and is working to achieve a genuinely low profile. He has already demonstrated his interest in the best possible relations with the rest of the U.S. Government organization and he knows how to act in order to achieve such a relationship. He has come to me a number of times to volunteer detailed information which he did not feel important enough to bother the Ambassador about, but he has kept the Ambassador fully informed about all those subjects which were of sufficient interest to him. I see every reason to assume that he will be a positive, constructive and very dependable and reliable factor in the Embassy.

Mrs. Phillips is an attractive and personable young lady who has particularly impressed my wife and me with her attitude and intellect.

SECRET

FORM 4-65 FS-572 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (When Completed)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (When Completed)

SECRET

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED Chief CAS David A. Phillips	POST Santo Domingo	
POSITION Station Chief	GRADE	AGENCY
RATING PERIOD January 1966 to July 1967	DATE OF REPORT July 15, 1967	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER John Hugh Crimmins John Hugh Crimmins	TITLE Ambassador	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☒ Yes ☐ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

I have been associated with the CAS Station Chief since my arrival at this post on January 11, 1966, Inasmuch as I have kept in very close daily touch with him, I believe that I am in position to evaluate his performance.

Let me say at the outset that the Rated Officer has had to work under the most varied and difficult circumstances. His service at this post began, for example, in a revolutionary situation marked by great and continuing violence. The attention of a good part of the world was focused upon this situation, and some of the highest national interests of the United States were involved. The presence of the Inter-American Peace Force, of its major U.S. component, and of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in his unusual and unprecedented role added greatly to the dimensions of the work done by the Rated Officer. In the aftermath of revolution, he had unusual, delicate and complicated tasks to perform in connection with the establishment and maintenance in power of a most fragile Provisional Government. As the latter carried the nation toward the all-important election scheduled for June 1, 1966, the CAS Station Chief faced a changing and constantly challenging set of requirements. Finally, his tour of duty at this post has encompassed the transition from the Provisional Government to a constitutional government emerging from those elections and the gradual firming up of the position and institutions of the present democratically elected administration.

To this intricate complex of circumstances, the CAS Station Chief has brought a background knowledge of the Latin American area and its

SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (When Completed)

people as well as a proficiency in Spanish which has enabled him to deal readily and effectively with a heterogeneous range of contacts.

His performance can only be described as outstanding. He has provided a completely professional response to a most difficult and varied challenge. He has mounted an organization and provided a mechanism fully up to the tasks confronting it and the high-level requirements levied upon it. With the advantages afforded by hindsight, I suggest that the success which has been achieved speaks for itself.

It is pertinent to mention that the Rated Officer invariably places business ahead of pleasure and personal interests. He works long and irregular hours and is continuously available in time of need. He has evidenced the highest degree of cooperation with representatives of State, DOD, Legal Attaché, AID (in the Public Safety sector) and all other members of the Country Team. His quiet and professional approach inspires their confidence, and on innumerable occasions he has proven that he is an excellent team player who genuinely wants to be of assistance to all members of the official community. The harmonious, close relations among all the intelligence components of the Country Team are due in great part to the tactful, skillful and thoughtful leadership of the Station Chief.

There is probably little need for me to comment upon the Rated Officer's technical achievements at this post. Under his guidance, specialized security agencies of the Dominican Government have been brought to a state of high readiness. Penetration of subversive groups has reached impressive proportions. Subversive document seizures have been abundant. Counter-espionage work has been impressively successful.

no
The CAS Station Chief is in/sense a narrow technician or specialist. He keeps his eye on the broad picture, understands what he sees there and intelligently relates it to his own work. He is imaginative in his approach and does not hesitate to suggest innovations of various kinds. To mention only one of these, it was as a result of his initiative that "electoral police" appeared upon the scene during the Presidential election campaign in mid-1966 with a salutary calming effect upon the potential for political violence at the moment.

I wish to make special mention of, first, the scrupulousness with which the Rated Officer has consulted me and kept me informed about his activities, and, second, his strict adherence to the guidance I have given him. At no time have I had any doubts concerning the care and fidelity with which he has followed my instructions.

I have developed the highest personal and professional regard for the Rated Officer. I have valued greatly his advice and his support not only upon matters within his own special field of competence, but also over a considerably broader spectrum of U.S. Mission activities. I could not have asked for a better Chief of Station than the one whom I have had at this post. I very much regret his departure but am comforted by the knowledge that his successor, as his deputy, has been trained by him.

I earnestly hope that these comments of mine -- based on a very close and continuous working relationship -- will be given full consideration and will contribute significantly to his career advancement.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 024345

SECTION A — **GENERAL**

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Phillips, David A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/31/22	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer Ch	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT WH/COG	8. CURRENT STATION Hqts.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY	☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):	☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 04/68	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B — **PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsibility for overall management of Headquarters Branch activities.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Support and guidance of field operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Reporting to higher authority; implementing of policy level decisions.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervision and management of personnel.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Liaison with State Department and other agencies.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

Reviewed by OP/PD/EAB

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUN 7 8 53 AM '68
MAIL ROOM

The Rating Officer's last fitness report on Mr. Phillips dealt with his terminating an outstandingly successful and very complicated assignment as Chief of Station, Dominican Republic. This report deals with a completely different situation, i.e. coming into Headquarters as Chief, Cuban Operations Group at the time that drastic reduction had just become the order of the day. The same energy, imagination and zeal which has characterized Mr. Phillips over the years has characterized his performance in this difficult task since his assumption of the new responsibility. He has been a prime mover in reducing the Headquarters WH/COG component to realistic and managable proportions. By the same token he has been a prime mover, guider, cajoler and sometimes "patron saint" to JMWAVE management in its massive job of bringing JMWAVE down from its ponderous proportions to a viable Clandestine Services "instrument" compatible and consistent with the present day needs of Cuban operations. In this endeavor Mr. Phillips' accomplishments have been of the first order.

(See attached sheet)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 13 MAY 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 32	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 10 May 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, WHD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Jacob D. Esterline

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This is a very fine officer with one of the best potentials in WH Division. I believe the rater is somewhat carried away in his views. Mr. Phillips' career advancement has been closely observed in this Division and I do not believe he is falling behind in the promotion timetable. It is definitely expected he will be recommended next year (which is within the proper time frame,) if his current excellent performance continues.

DATE 20 May 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William V. Broe

SECRET

Fitness Report - David A. Phillips

SECTION C (Continued)

Most important however, and this is one of Mr. Phillips unique qualities, he has been able to bring about this drastic reduction and at the same time instill enthusiasm in his staff for new approaches to the ever more difficult Cuban target. His own infectious enthusiasm and his fine manner with co-workers and subordinates has made this possible. In short the Rating Officer believes he is the right man at the right time for the job he is in.

Mr. Phillips' relations with the Department of State and other agencies where it really counts are outstandingly good. He has in his short time back re-established his fine relationship with the manager of the Voice of America. This relationship will undoubtedly be of inestimable value in getting WH Division's new radio effort through the 303 Committee and into operation.

It is probably obvious to one reading this fitness report that the Rating Officer is well disposed towards Mr. Phillips. This is quite true. It in no way, however, affects the Rating Officer's opinion that Mr. Phillips is a man of considerable talent who for one reason or another has fallen at least one grade behind in the promotion timetable. The Rating Officer, therefore, trusts that this will be corrected in the near future. Mr. Phillips is a gentleman of breadth, drive, imagination and dedication. The Rating Officer considers Mr. Phillips to be one of the very best of the many fine officers he has known in his career in the Clandestine Services. In some ways he is unique in that he knows the business from the ground up, having started in unofficial cover (several assignments) and now having moved into the managerial area where he can speak with authority based on valid experience.

Reviewed by OP/PO/EAB

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Chiefs of Station Seminar No. 1-70
80 hours, full time 6 - 17 October 1969

Participant : Phillips, David A.
Office : WH
Year of Birth: 1922
Service Designation: D
Grade : 16
No. of Students : 8
EOD Date : Apr '55

COURSE OBJECTIVES, CONTENT AND METHODS

The COS Seminar is aimed to prepare prospective Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Station and Chiefs of Base for field assignments. Emphasis was upon the difficulties confronting Chiefs of small or medium-sized installations, since they must handle a peculiarly wide range of problems. Included were case studies serving to remind outgoing chiefs of various operational approaches and techniques, but more time was devoted to policy, coordination, management, reporting, and administrative responsibilities of the Chief of Station, both within CIA and in the government at large, at home and abroad.

The bulk of the course is given in lectures and question periods conducted by officials responsible for the missions, functions, programs, and services discussed. A few key items of suggested reading are included, and bibliographies of suggested reading tailored to the individual's assignment are offered for those who want them.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No further assessment of individual capacity or performance is made in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Anthony D. Holland
20 OCT 1969
Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
024345

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Phillips	(First) David	(Middle) A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/31/22	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/7	8. CURRENT STATION Santo Domingo

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
XX CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
May 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1966 to 31 March 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station management.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Direction of the operational program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other U. S. agencies.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

12 MAY 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

FORM 6-63 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

MAY 8 3 39 PM '67

Mr. Phillips is nearing completion of his tour of duty as Chief of Station, Santo Domingo. During the past several months he has had the difficult task of reorganizing his Station and redirecting its manpower following a major election operation. His task has been made more difficult by a series of almost weekly political or security crises which not only required intensive intelligence coverage but also frequently involved Station assets.

Mr. Phillips has done remarkably well in this difficult regearing process. It has in no way affected the volume or quality of Station reporting which remains very high. His critical analysis and in-depth interpretation of the rapidly changing political scene have been timely and useful.

The Station under his direction has aggressively undertaken the development of new FI and CI assets without losing momentum in existing operations. Also in a relatively short period of time effective security and countersubversion units within the host government internal security apparatus have been established. (Cont'd)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 20	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject in the field.	
DATE 5 April 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, WHD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Jacob D. Esterline Jacob D. Esterline

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the rating and statements made concerning Mr. Phillips. He is one of the best. He will take over as Chief, Cuban Operations Group this summer and we can expect new impetus in this difficult denied area program. We are carefully observing his promotional progress and are making every effort that he advances in accordance with his excellent capabilities and potential.

DATE 28 April 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WHD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William V. Broe William V. Broe

SECRET

Fitness Report -- David A. Phillips

SECTION C - (Cont'd)

His relationships with the Ambassador and with representatives of other agencies are excellent and the high regard they accord him are reflected in the great confidence placed in him and his staff.

The overall management of the Station reflects careful consideration of manpower and money commitments. Mr. Phillips has taken the initiative in effecting savings wherever possible. In short he has turned in an aggressively outstanding performance under the most difficult imaginable conditions during the period under review.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 024345

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PHILLIPS, David A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct 22	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer/Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/DR	8. CURRENT STATION Santo Domingo		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 65 - 31 March 66

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Direction of Station CA program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Direction of Station FI/CI efforts.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison responsibilities with Embassy and other U.S. Government representatives.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Managerial responsibilities as Chief of Station.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Cost consciousness.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

16 JUN 1966

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Phillips brings to this assignment (his first as Chief of Station) a wealth of CA experience gained through many years of operating in the Western Hemisphere and other areas. As a propagandist and general CA operator he must rank high among all Agency personne. Consequently, it was indeed fortunate that his assignment to the Dominican Republic came at a time when a person of his talent was badly needed. Arriving shortly after the American intervention he has had the difficult task of ferreting out information in great detail about an entirely new government, diplomatically handling the delicate coordinations with other U.S. Government agencies in a crisis and highly emotional situation, while administering a rapidly expanding station composed in large degree of young men long on initiative and intelligence but somewhat lacking in depth of experience. At present he is engaged in a fairly large and vastly important election operation which is of concern to the highest authorities of our government.

(Continued - See attached sheet)

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
9 months	Employee will see report upon his return to Headquarters	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 May 1966	Deputy Chief, WHD	Jacob D. Esterline Jacob D. Esterline

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I heartily endorse the rater's comments. The Santo Domingo Station, under the excellent leadership of Mr. Phillips, recently completed a most successful and significantly important political action operation. It was a well-done Station operation but great credit has to go to Mr. Phillips personally.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
14 June 1966	Chief, WHD	William V. Broe William V. Broe

SECRET

Fitness Report - David A. Phillips

SECTION C - Continued:

Perhaps the outstanding quality which Mr. Phillips has demonstrated is his ability to "fire up" his people to produce at their maximum capacity. Another outstanding characteristic is his diplomatic manner of dealing with other officials. Of particular note is the fact that Subject's relationship with Ambassador Bunker of the OAS (who, in effect, has been the President's principal representative in the Dominican Republic) are closer and more fruitful than the relationship of the Embassy with Ambassador Bunker. This has in no way damaged the close relationship Subject has with the Embassy and other government officials.

Subject had little managerial experience of the scope required by his present position prior to his arrival in the DR, nor had he had much experience in FI matters. He has adapted readily however, and he continued to broaden in these respects with the passage of time.

Cost consciousness is, of course, a relative thing. Mr. Phillips as a CA operator "thinks big." However, it is clear that he weighs heavily costs against anticipated results and expects to get a dollar return for each one spent. Overall Subject can be described as a very able person. His ability to maintain Station morale at a high level while producing at a very gruelling pace under difficult conditions is in itself an outstandin accomplishment. Mr. Phillips has been recommended for an Agency Award.

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

Chiefs of Station Seminar No. 3 — 19 April - 7 May 1965
60 hours, half days

Participant : PHILLIPS, David A.
Office : WH
Year of Birth : 1922
Service Designation : D
Grade : GS-15
No. of Students : 15
EOD Date : April 1955

COURSE OBJECTIVES, CONTENT AND METHODS

The COS Seminar aimed to prepare prospective Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Station, Chiefs of Base, and senior Chiefs of Support for field assignments. Emphasis was upon the difficulties confronting Chiefs of small or medium-sized installations, since they must handle a peculiarly wide range of problems. Included were case studies serving to remind outgoing chiefs of various operational approaches and techniques, but more time was devoted to policy, coordination, management, reporting, and administrative responsibilities of the Chief of Station, both within CIA and in the government at large, at home and abroad. Special attention was given to counterinsurgency.

The bulk of the course is given in lectures and question periods conducted by officials responsible for the missions, functions, programs, and services discussed, most of them being from within the Agency but several also from outside. A few key items of suggested reading are included, and bibliographies of suggested reading tailored to the individual's assignment are offered for those who want them.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance.

Mr. Phillips attended the first half of the seminar being withdrawn at that point due to an operational emergency.

No further assessment of individual capacity or performance is made in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

W.J. Rowland — 5/13/65
William Rowland — Date
Acting Chief Instructor

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. Phillips David GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted] [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 31 Oct. 1922	3. SEX Male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION [redacted] DP
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT [redacted] DDP/WH/Havana	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Staff agent [redacted] Ops Off (PP)		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORTED FOR DUTY IN OP August 9, 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 9 February 1956 - 14 September 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

X	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D A WARNING LETTER HAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify).
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 19 Sept. 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR CALDWELL William	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

POSTED ON
ajk 10/8/56

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos Control		5/22/66
Reviewed by PUD		

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 25 Sept '56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL JCKing	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WHD

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. [illegible] unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty [illegible] effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific [illegible] not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others [illegible] same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may [illegible] performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
CONT PERS DIV
SEP 27 3 10 PM '56
OCT 2 10 31 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
Supervises KUCAGE projects	4	Supervises staff agents	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5**	**RATING NUMBER**
Develops new KUCAGE programs	4	Spots and develops contacts	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6**	**RATING NUMBER**
Has and uses Area Knowledge	5	Prepares progress reports	4

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

This officer has ability, talent, area knowledge, understanding of the people and experience in his field. In the initial six months covered by this report he has adjusted remarkably well to a difficult cover situation with a minimum of station support and guidance.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE. BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "F" below.

SECTION E. David Phillips GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [redacted] [redacted]
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 31 Oct. 1922
3. SEX: Male
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [redacted] DP
5. OFFICE DIVISION, BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: [redacted] DDP/WH/Havana
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Staff agent - [redacted] Ops off (PP)
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 9 August 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 9 February 1956 - 14 September 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☒ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 19 Sept. 1956
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: CALDWELL William
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief of Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 25 Sept '56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: JCKing
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WH

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
2		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Six months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

This officer is a natural [illegible] his present assignment. He is qualified for future unofficial or staff assignment with more responsibi[illegible]

CONT PERS DIV
OCT 2 10 31 AM '56

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 27 3 16 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None at present.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

As senior KUCAGE officer, better knowledge of Station procedures and practices would be helpful.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL.
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	5	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14 ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10 CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	1	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

9 Sept due date 1 Jan 57 ff

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PHILLIPS, David A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH Oct '22	3. SEX M	4. CAREER DESIGNATION DP
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 1 April 1955	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO PP	7. DIVISION Information Coordination	8. BRANCH
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:		11. GRADE GS-14
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 1 January 1956	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 April 1955 - 1 January 1956 (Initial)		

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION OPS. OFF. (PP) Radio & ~~Television Officer~~, PP/ICD 0136.31	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 1 April 1955

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

Advising and assisting operating divisions in development, effective management and supervision of radio broadcasting facilities.

Maintaining liaison with Department of State and USIA on radio matters.

Collaboration with the Office of Communications in development of unconventional techniques for broadcasting and jamming evasion.

Preparation of staff study on proposed use of the television medium.

DATE 18 JAN 1956
BY
Posted Per [illegible]
by [illegible]

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ has ☐ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE 6 January 1956	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) John G. Shaffer, Chief, PP/ICD John G. Shaffer

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE 15 Jan 56	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority)

FORM NO. 45 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
1 JAN 55 THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words should be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale for each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at each statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 15 3 [illegible] PM '56
MAIL ROOM

STATEMENTS	NOT OB-SERVED	CATEGORIES												
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.							X							
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.										X				
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X				
5. UNEMOTIONAL.	X													
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.											X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.							X							
11. CALM.							X							
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X		
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.							X							
14 GETS THINGS DONE.										X				
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.							X							
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.										X				
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.								X						
18. HAS STAMINA. CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION										X				
20 SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X						
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.										X				
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.	X													
23 RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION										X				
24 EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25 ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.										X				

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.										X				
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.										X				
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".											X			
29. TOUGH MINDED.	X													
30. OBSERVANT.							X							
31. CAPABLE.											X			
32. CLEAR THINKING.										X				
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.							X							
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.							X							
36. DELIBERATE.	X													
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.								X						
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.										X				
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.							X							
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										X				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.							X							
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.							X							
45. VERSATILE.												X		
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.							X							
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.										X				
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.										X				
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.											X			
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.	X													

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Professional experience in several media plus field experience with CIA equip him to undertake a variety of assignments with excellent ~~pmo~~ppects of success; ability to outline own job, and then do it.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

none apparent to me

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Strengths indicated above easily outweigh the few characteristics in which the subject is average.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 16 3 47 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES,

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Operations Familiarization course.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

None

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☐ NO ☒ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

Better qualified for field assignment in WH area only because such assignment can utilize his language and area experience in addition to utilizing the characteristics that have made him a successful staff officer.

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

Jack
[illegible]
Feb. 56

MEMORANDUM FOR: PP/C/IOD

ATTENTION : Training Officer

SUBJECT : Attendance at PPS In-Service-Training Series 10 January to 20 March 1956

REFERENCE : Memorandum for Chiefs, Senior Staffs and Area Divisions, and Chief, IO Division from CPP, subject: "Seminar on Preparation and Processing of PP/PM Projects" dated 19 December 1955.

1. **David Phillips** attended the lectures in the subject series which [illegible] from [illegible] to [illegible] hours, **1 February** 1956. During this period, instruction in "Preparation and Processing of PP/PM Projects" was given as follows:

a. [illegible]

b. PROJECT DOCUMENTATION

Step-by-step explanation of items in project outline format.

c. PROJECT REVIEW AND COORDINATION

Steps case officers should take in determining extent of coordination of projects. Importance of discussion with Senior Staff in draft stage.

d. PROJECT APPROVAL SYSTEM

e. PROJECT [illegible]

f. [illegible]

g. [illegible]

2. Students were required to study the following references, prior to attending the lectures:

a. [illegible]

(1) [illegible] SUBMISSION OF PROJECTS TO THE PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE, dated 1 April 1955

(2) [illegible] PREPARATION AND PROCESSING OF [illegible] PROJECTS FOR APPROVAL, [illegible] 1 January 1955

(3) CSI 230-72 THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES REPORTING SYSTEM—AREA DIVISIONS, CHAPTER II. THE [illegible] STATUS REPORT, dated [illegible]

b. SECONDARY REFERENCES

(1) R [illegible] AGENCY ACTIVITIES APPROVAL SYSTEM, dated [illegible] March [illegible]

(2) R [illegible] PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE, dated [illegible] March [illegible]

(3) R [illegible] [illegible] TO THE [illegible], dated [illegible] April [illegible]

(4) CSI [illegible] THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES [illegible] SYSTEM, dated [illegible]

(5) CSI [illegible] [illegible] dated [illegible] March [illegible]

(6) CSI [illegible] OPERATIONAL [illegible], dated 7 December [illegible]

[illegible] information is provided to permit appropriate recording of the action received by the employee named in paragraph 1, above.

[illegible]

Chief

[illegible]

✓

TRAINING EVALUATION

READING IMPROVEMENT COURSE #26

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

Name	Sex	Dates of Course	No. of Students
Phillips, David A.	**M**	**24 October-9 December 1955**	**23**
Date of Birth	EOD Date	Grade or Rank	Office
31 October 1922	**2 April 1955**	**GS-14**	**IOD/PP**

Projected Assignment or Present Position

PP Officer

SECTION II: OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE

The Reading Improvement Course is designed to increase the reading efficiency of Agency employees by developing their speed and level of comprehension through (1) expanding the range of reading techniques, (2) adjusting rate of reading to comprehension requirements and (3) improving perceptual habits.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

The course consists of 30 class hours, one hour a day, 5 days a week. 9 hours are devoted to lectures and practice exercises, 12 hours to speed reading practice and 9 hours to specific perception techniques.

Each student's reading skills are analyzed at the beginning of the course and the student then concentrates on the development of those skills in which he is deficient or those which are most frequently demanded by the nature of his office reading.

SECTION IV: METHOD OF EVALUATION

Student achievement is measured by an initial and final test battery and class exercises. Two sets of norms have been developed on the test battery. Group I represents the scores of 400 Agency employees, 84% of whom had four or more years of college. Group II represents the scores of 94 Agency employees with two years or less of college training. Section V contains a description of the tests and exercises. Section VI indicates the student's skill level and Section VII includes the student's over-all achievement and the instructor's comments.

SECRET Phillips

SECTION V: TEST DESCRIPTION

1. READING COMPREHENSION TESTS: Measure speed and accuracy of basic comprehension skills. Complete and objective understanding, analysis, and interpretation are required in these tests.

2. EXTENSIVE (informational) READING TESTS: Measure the degree of proficiency in the application of extensive reading skills to acquire broader frames of reference.

3. INTENSIVE (technical) READING TESTS: Measure the ability to acquire the basic knowledge of a new subject.

4. SCANNING TESTS: Measure efficiency in the application of scanning skills for the selection of information, for identification of the main idea, and for organization.

SECTION VI: REPORT OF SKILL LEVEL

This student is being compared with the following norm group:
Group I - Four or more years of college
Group II - Two or less years of college

	Fail	Poor	Sat.	Exc.	Sup.
Basic Comprehension Skills					
Extensive Techniques					
Intensive Techniques					
Scanning Techniques					

SECTION VII: OVER-ALL ACHIEVEMENT

In consideration of all factors observed during the course and taking into account this student's experience, profession, age and education, an "X" in one of the boxes shows the student's over-all achievement in the course.

FAIL	POOR	MINUS	SATISFACTORY	PLUS	EXCELLENT	SUPERIOR
☐	☐ ☐	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ ☐ ☐ ☐	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ ☐ ☐	☐
Inadequate in performance	Barely adequate in performance. Demonstrated ability only in a limited range of skills	Performed acceptably but barely adequate in some skills	A typically effective student who performed in a competent manner.		Performed at a high level of competence	Performed at an extremely high level that only a few students have surpassed.

COMMENTS:

Incomplete - 5 hours Overseas assignment

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Francis Cook
Chief Instructor

SECRET

14-00000

Standard Form No. 54
January 1968
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 990-1
54-106

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INSURED:

NAME (Last) Phillips, (First) David (Middle) A.

DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)

PLACE AN "X" IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW TO SHOW WHETHER YOU ARE.

☐—AN EMPLOYEE ☒—RETIRED OR AN APPLICANT FOR RETIREMENT ☐—RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION BENEFITS OR AN APPLICANT FOR SUCH BENEFITS

IF YOU ARE RETIRED OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION GIVE YOUR "CSA," "CSL" "A," or "X" NUMBER

(CSA, CSL, A, or X number)

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH PRESENTLY EMPLOYED (If retired, former department or agency):

Central Intelligence Agency (Department or agency) (Bureau) (Division) Langley, Va. (Location—City, State, and ZIP Code)

I, the individual identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any amount of LIFE INSURANCE and ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE due and payable at my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, with respect to any amount payable, unless or until canceled by me in writing, or until such time as it is automatically canceled (see regulation "f" on reverse side of duplicate copy).

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES (SEE EXAMPLES OF DESIGNATIONS):

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address (including ZIP Code) of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
VIRGINIA S. PHILLIPS	8124 Stone Trail Dr. Bethesda, MD. 20034	WIFE	All
FOR DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING			
TO MY WILL. DP			

For each type of insurance (regular and optional): (1) I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. (2) I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change this Designation of Beneficiary at any time without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

(Date of execution—month, day, year) (Signature of insured)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE (*A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary*):

Phillip L. Devore (Signature of witness) 1218 Oronoco St. (Number and street) Alex. Va. 22314 (City, State, and ZIP Code)

Nancy B. Johnson (Signature of witness) 401 [illegible] (Number and street) Vienna, Va. 22180 (City, State, and ZIP Code)

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS (including ZIP Code) OF INSURED

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING AGENCY

PERSONAL AFFAIRS
BRANCH
MAY 6 4 28 PM '75
OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL

(Indicate date and by whom received)

SEE REVERSE SIDE OF DUPLICATE COPY FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON WHERE TO FILE THESE FORMS.
DO NOT FILE WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE.

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

S/E
FILE PUNCHED BY

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch.

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME: LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
024345	PHILLIPS	DAVID	A

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
11	03	74	11	15	74		2			EUR	801

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓ TRAVEL VOUCHER	DISPATCH
CABLE	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
OTHER (Specify)	
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		
DCO	✓ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
✓ C & L DIVISION, CTBR.	DATE 2/14/75	SIGNATURE Donald W Black
C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 2-74 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

(4-10)

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
024345	Phillips	David	[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58 REV SED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY	COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38 39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY	AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38 39		CODE 40-42
12	13	74	12	15	74		2		[illegible]	311

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 13-15 Dec '74

REMARKS

PREPARED BY				ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	DCO	☐	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	
☒	C & L DIVISION, CTBR.	DATE 6 Feb '75		SIGNATURE
☐	C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FILE COPY OF STANDARD FORM 56
"AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS—FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM"

on file with the Retirement Operations Branch,
Office of Personnel (x3257).

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Phillips	X David	Atlee	October 31 1922	460 28 3930
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	
Department of State			American Embassy, Rio de Janerio	

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED AN "ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE"? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one. (See Instructions for Employees on page 4) Not to the best of my memory, but I cannot remember positively.

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

DATE

20 March 1970

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

Received March 20, 1970

Mary E. Murphy

Mary E. Murphy
Personnel Officer
Amembassy Rio de Janeiro

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
Revised 1968
FPM Supplement 870-1
176-102

14-00000

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) 024345 Phillips David Atlee	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) 31 Oct 1922	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 460 28 3930
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

DATE

13 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

PERSONNEL

FEB 19 2 31 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

14-00000

DDF

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

Ext. [illegible]

DATE: 11 March 1975

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO. 024345	NAME (Last-First-Middle) PHILLIPS, David A.	BIRTHYEAR 1922	SEX M	TYPE EMPLOYEE Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/LA	SD D	SCHEDULE GS	GRADE 18	STATION

BE AWARDED

Distinguished Intelligence Medal

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD 1953 - Present

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. David A. Phillips is hereby awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal in recognition of his outstanding service to the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 22 years. Throughout his career Mr. Phillips has held a series of highly important positions in Headquarters and overseas, including four assignments as Chief of Station. In each instance his superior accomplishments were marked by his broad area knowledge, initiative, drive and imagination. His most recent assignment as Chief of a major division is further evidence of his exceptional capability. Mr. Phillips' efforts during his career constitute a major contribution to the mission of the Agency, reflecting great credit on him and the Federal service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by DD/O on 5 March 1975)

APPROVED

/s/ Vernon A. Walters

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

[illegible] MAR 1975

DATE

SIGNATURE: (Signed) F. W. M. Janney

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD: F. W. M. Janney

SIGNATURE:

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER: R. L. Austin, Jr.

FORM 9-73 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4)

14-00000

OPF

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A

1. EMPLOYEE NO. 024345	2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle) Phillips, David A.	3. POSITION TITLE Division Chief

4. GRADE GS-18	5. SD D	6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/LA	7. RECOMMENDED AWARD Distinguished Intelligence Medal

8. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED 1953 - May 1975	9. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT 9 May 1975	10. POSTHUMOUS	YES	XX NO

11. HOME ADDRESS 8224 Stone Trail Drive Bethesda, Maryland	12. HOME PHONE 365-0527

SECTION B

LIST ANY PERSONNEL GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD WHO ASSISTED IN THE ACT OR PARTICIPATED IN THE PERFORMANCE.

13. FULL NAME	14. TYPE OF AWARD

SECTION C

ATTACH NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PERFORMANCE OR SERVICE WARRANTING AWARD, ANY SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND A PROPOSED, UNCLASSIFIED CITATION.

SECTION D

15. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION William E. Nelson Deputy Director for Operations		DATE
16. HEAD OF D CAREER SERVICE (Career service of nominee)	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item #18	DATE
17. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item #18	DATE
18. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Deputy Director for Operations	DATE

FORM 11-73 600 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: ______ (4)

SECRET

OPF

Mr. David A. Phillips is retiring after a distinguished career with the Agency. He has been an employee of the Agency since 1951 when he initially joined as a Contract employee. He served with distinction in Santiago, Guatamala City, Havana, Beirut, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, and Caracas. His excellent command of both Spanish and Portuguese has enhanced each of his assignments in Latin America. A true DDOer, fifteen years of this glorious and active career were spent overseas. His outstanding dedication and devotion to the cause of freedom won for him in 1956, the Intelligence Medal of Merit. His file is replete with letters of commendation and appreciation from the DCI, DDCI, the former President of the Dominican Republic, Ambassadors, and military commanders, all of whom recognized the uniqueness of his outstanding service. Mr. Phillips has been highly effective as a senior member of the Latin American Division which has been under his immediate command since 1973. An excerpt from a late fitness report nicely characterizes the caliber of his work. "It is as a senior operations officer that Mr. Phillips has had the greatest experience, and it is not surprising that he has made an excellent input into the improvement of operational matters throughout the many areas of this hemisphere for which he is responsible." Mr. Phillips will be remembered for his initiative, drive and imagination, and for the excellence of his representational responsibilities which in large part is attributable to his native charm, area knowledgeability and superb language skills. He will be remembered for his intent capability and desire to fulfill the needs of the Organization. It is fitting and proper that upon his retirement, Mr. Phillips be recognized with the award of the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

David A. Phillips

5 JUN 1974

Dear Dave,

You have just finished an important albeit grueling GS-16 Evaluation Exercise at my direction. The recommendations for promotion and executive development you gave me were a major factor in my recommendations to the Director for the upward movement of officers who will be the top management cadre of the Directorate in the near future.

I believe you will find that the last several weeks will have sharpened your focus on one of our most important management responsibilities, our personnel. Many thanks for a job well done.

Bill

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

E2 IMPDET CL BY 056788

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY [illegible]

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
024345	Phillips	DAVID	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
11	11	73	11	26	73		2			WESTERN Hemisphere	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒ TRAVEL VOUCHER

☐ DISPATCH

☐ CABLE

☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT

☐ OTHER (*Specify*)

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. WH 870 1/74

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 11/11 - 12/4/73

REMARKS

PREPARED BY

☐ OCO

☒ C & L DIVISION, CTDR.

☐ C & T DIVISION

☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 1/23/74

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE Dave E. Kn[illegible]

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

FILE PUNCHED BY [illegible]

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) LAST 7-24	FIRST	MIDDLE
024345	Phillips	David	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
11	29	73	12	04	73		2			WESTERN Hemisphere	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

[illegible]

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: WH BTO #1/74

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: [illegible] - 12/4/73

REMARKS:

PREPARED BY		☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	DCO	DATE 1/23/74	SIGNATURE
☒	C & L DIVISION, CTRS.		
☐	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting B

FILE PUNCHED BY

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
034345	PHILLIPS	DAVID	A.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

FILE PUNCHED BY

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
						1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION					

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
02	11	74	03	09	74	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	2			South America	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. WH 1-74

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 11 Feb - 9 March 74

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
- ☐ OCO
- ✓ C & L DIVISION, CTBR.
- ☐ C & T DIVISION

✓ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 1 May 74

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE Tom Zacharias

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

PUNCHED
BY

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) LAST 7-24	FIRST	MIDDLE
027345	PHILLIPS	DAVID	A

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 38, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			06	29	72		1			GREECE	090

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☒ DISPATCH
☒ CABLE
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐ OTHER (Specify)

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 646685
DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 27 June 1972

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ DCOs
☐ C & L DIVISION, CTUR.
☒ C & T DIVISION

☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 25 SEPT '72

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SERVICE ABROAD AGREEMENT

I. GENERAL

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU AGREE TO SERVE THE PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION II BELOW AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS OBLIGATED TO RETURN YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS UPON THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF THIS PERIOD. YOUR ALLOWABLE EXPENSES WILL BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS.

IF YOU TERMINATE YOUR PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BEFORE YOU COMPLETE 12 MONTHS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE FOLLOWING THE DATE OF YOUR ARRIVAL ABROAD, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO REIMBURSE THE GOVERNMENT FOR ALL EXPENSES IT INCURS IN THE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS, YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO YOUR POST. IF YOU FAIL TO COMPLETE YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD YOU WILL NOT BE ENTITLED TO THE RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOURSELF, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO THE UNITED STATES. IF, HOWEVER, AGENCY OFFICIALS DETERMINE THAT YOUR EARLY DEPARTURE IS NECESSARY FOR OFFICIAL REASONS, OR FOR PERSONAL REASONS OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST TO THE GOVERNMENT, THEY MAY WAIVE THE REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES ALREADY INCURRED, OR AUTHORIZE YOUR RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION, WHICHEVER IS APPLICABLE.

IF ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF HR 20-30, YOU WILL BE GRANTED HOME LEAVE AS SOON AS IT CAN BE ARRANGED AT GOVERNMENT CONVENIENCE AFTER COMPLETION OF YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY, PROVIDED YOU HAVE SERVED AT LEAST 18 MONTHS OF CONTINUOUS CREDITABLE SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. HOME LEAVE AND HOME LEAVE TRAVEL ARE CONTINGENT UPON YOUR WILLINGNESS TO RETURN, AND CONTEMPLATION BY AGENCY OFFICIALS THAT YOU WILL RETURN TO SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY AFTER HOME LEAVE OR UPON COMPLETION OF AN ASSIGNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

YOU ARE ADVISED THAT ANY MONIES DUE YOU FROM THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE APPLIED IN LIQUIDATION OF ANY INDEBTEDNESS ARISING FROM VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT. YOU WILL BE AFFORDED ALL NORMAL RECOURSE IN APPEALING DECISIONS MADE PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEEMENT.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE David A. Phillips	SD D

II. TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD

1. NAME OF POST OF ASSIGNMENT
Caracas, Venezuela

2. PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD AS PRESCRIBED IN A, B, OR C BELOW

A. STANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF 24 MONTHS X	C. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ______ MONTHS FOR THIS TOUR ONLY FOR THE EMPLOYEE SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT. (See HR 20-18)
▨	REQUESTED (Memo attached) OPERATING OFFICIAL
B. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ______ MONTHS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PER HR 20-18.	CONCUR CAREER SERVICE / DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OPERATING OFFICIAL Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Pers	APPROVED DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

III. PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE

3. YOUR "PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE" IS A PLACE TO WHICH ALLOWABLE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES MAY BE AUTHORIZED IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES PURSUANT TO HR 22. ITS DESIGNATION WILL BE KEPT IN YOUR OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

4. IN REQUESTING YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN ITEM 5 ON THE REVERSE SIDE (OR RESIDENCE AS DEFINED in HR 22-3) NORMALLY INDICATE THE PLACE WHERE YOU PHYSICALLY DWELLED IN THE UNITED STATES, ITS POSSESSIONS OR THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO AT THE TIME OF YOUR PCS TRANSFER TO A POST ABROAD. YOU MAY REQUEST IN ITEM 6 THE DESIGNATION OF ANOTHER PLACE AS YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE IF YOU CAN ESTABLISH THAT YOUR PHYSICAL DWELLING PLACE IS (or was) TRANSITORY AND THAT SUCH OTHER PLACE IS YOUR DOMICILE OR HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN USED BY YOU AS A PHYSICAL DWELLING. INFORMATION THAT CAN BE PRESENTED IN AN ATTACHED STATEMENT AS EVIDENCE INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, STATE VOTING REGISTRATION, PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND PLACE WHERE INCOME OR PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID.

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
E2 IMPDET
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

FORM 6-70 3154 REPLACES FORM 311A (2-56) WHICH IS OBSOLETE

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(12-21-27)

CONTINUED ON THE REVERSE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

5. PHYSICAL DWELLING PLACE (Permanent Place of Residence unless address in item 6 is approved in lieu thereof)

FULL ADDRESS

8224 Stone Trail Drive
Bethesda, Md.

6. OTHER PLACE REQUESTED (Requested Permanent Place of Residence if different from item 5)

FULL ADDRESS

CONCUR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE

APPROVED

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE
for Jay R. [illegible]	7 Aug 1972

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	DATE

IV. HOME LEAVE POINT

7. AMONG THE PLACES YOU MAY REQUEST AS A HOME LEAVE POINT ARE: YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE SHOWN ABOVE, HEADQUARTERS AREA, AND WHERE YOUR CHILDREN, PARENTS, PARENTS-IN-LAW, BROTHERS, SISTERS, BROTHERS-IN-LAW, OR SISTERS-IN-LAW RESIDE.

8. YOU MAY REQUEST FOR APPROVAL SOME OTHER POINT SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-309(3)(C). THE REQUEST MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A MEMORANDUM EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 7 ABOVE

FULL ADDRESS

SAME AS 5 ABOVE.

RELATIONSHIP OF RELATIVE AT HOME LEAVE POINT

[illegible]

APPROVED

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE
for Jay R. [illegible]	7 Aug 1972

10. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 8 ABOVE.

FULL ADDRESS

CONCUR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	DATE

EMPLOYEE CERTIFICATION

I have read and understand my service obligations and travel entitlements as described in this agreement.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	DATE
	7/28/72

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6 024345	(Print) Phillips	7-24 David	A

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 88, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
2 7	1 6	7 1					3			Brazil	0 7 0

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☑	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 14177

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 13 July 1971

REMARKS Correction
BRASILIA — LATERAL

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCO	☑	
☐	C & L DIVISION, C BR.	DATE 7/19/71	SIGNATURE Marylin Burleson
☐	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME			
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	
1-6	(Print)	7-24		
024345	Phillips	David	A	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 5P, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
01	11	70	07	09	71		1			Brazil	090

*

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☑	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 13872

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 8 July 1971

REMARKS Rio de Janeiro - Lateral
NO Record - date claimed

PREPARED BY	☑ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED	
☐ OCO			
☐ C & L DIVISION, CTRR.	DATE 7/15/71	SIGNATURE M. Burleson	
☑ C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(4-10)

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: General - Administrative
Specific - Performance of TDY Personnel During Recent DR Crisis

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As Headquarters is well aware, a constant flow of TDY personnel was provided the Station by Headquarters during the crisis period of the recent revolution. Obviously, the Station would have found it most difficult, if not impossible, to perform in the fashion it did without this assistance. What deserves special comment, however, is the generally high quality of their performance under quite demanding, fluid, and, often, dangerous conditions. With few exceptions, already known to Headquarters, the TDY personnel did a magnificent job both collectively and as individuals. Considering the grade and experience of most of these officers, it can probably be assumed that this was to be expected. But, what clearly was not predictable was their willingness to accept any type of assignment regardless of grade or circumstances, their quick adaptability and initiative in an unfamiliar and confused situation, and their stamina under the stress of long and irregular work days seven days a week. Furthermore, in spite of the close working quarters, constant association, and strain inherent in this type of situation, "personality clashes" or other signs of incompatability were very few indeed.

2. Undoubtedly, Headquarters has sensed the foregoing from returnees. The purpose of sending this dispatch is to make it a matter of record and to suggest to Headquarters that their standard of performance under these conditions may merit consideration of some special recognition in the personnel files of the personnel concerned.

Continued...

Distribution:
3 - WHD

Attachment:
As stated - h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HDCT-1221	17 July 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	

3. Without detracting one whit from the performance of any of the other officers on TDY assignment, the present COS would like to single out [illegible] and [illegible] R. McLean as deserving special comment. Their performance has been exceptional. A special note is attached for [illegible] W. Wickert. Therefore, it is recommended that the attached memoranda be inserted into each of their personnel files.

4. Also, the COS would like to register the fact that the foregoing not only speaks highly of the TDY personnel assigned, but Headquarters as well in providing this type of support.

5. As a final comment, Headquarters may care to check this memorandum with Edwin M. [illegible], the COS for a good part of this period, to obtain any special comments he might wish to make in this regard -- either with respect to content or individuals whom he considered exceptional and who are not known to the present COS.

David Phillips

S-E-C-R-E-T

17 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Richard W. Rastetter

SUBJECT: TDY in Santo Domingo

1. Rastetter was assigned to Station Santo Domingo on a TDY basis for the period 2 June to 16 July 1965. During this assignment, Rastetter was placed in charge of the Station CA program with special emphasis on exploiting targets of opportunity in the very fluid crisis situation then prevalent and, simultaneously, generating new assets and new approaches to lay the groundwork for the altered situation which would be confronting the Station in the post-crisis era. In addition to supervising the CA program, he handled a number of existing agents, developed some new assets, and conducted numerous special CA operations, including some quite effective black activities. On this assignment, Rastetter worked some fourteen to sixteen hours a day throughout the entire period.

2. The undersigned is aware that CIA would expect a quite professional and dedicated performance from an officer of Rastetter's seniority, experience, and caliber; however, even taking this into consideration, his performance in every respect was exceptional, and should merit special recognition.

3. It is recommended that a copy of this memorandum be placed in Rastetter's personnel folder.

David Phillips.

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET

CC: 9 4209

6 AUG 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips as Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

1. The appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips, GS-16, as Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro, effective on or about 15 January 1970 is recommended. Mr. Phillips would replace Mr. Robert D. Gahagen.

2. Mr. Phillips has been an employee of the Agency since 1951 initially in a contract capacity. He has served in Santiago, Guatemala City, Havana, Beirut, Mexico City and most recently as Chief, Cuban Operations Group. Mr. Phillips is fluent in the Spanish language and is scheduled for two months of full-time Portuguese training immediately prior to his departure. A biographic profile including information regarding his Agency experience and training is attached.

William V. Broe
William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment
Biographic Profile (Parts 1 and 2)

SECRET

SUBJECT: Appointment of Mr. David A. Phillips as Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Deputy Director for Plans — 20 Sept 69
Date

The recommendation in paragraph one is APPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence — 1 Oct 69
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)*: Phillips David Atlee
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 460-28-3930

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY: Santiago, Chile
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. *(If appointed abroad)*: Washington, D.C.
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: Fort Worth, Texas
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: Bethesda, Md. (Please note this is a change!

2. MARITAL STATUS *(Check one)*

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Potomac, Maryland
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 28 March 1969
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED:
DATE SPOUSE DIED:
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

Joan Hildebrant, incompatibility, cerca September 1941
Helen Haasch, incompatibility, XX 22 November 1967.

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE: Virginia S. Phillips
ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)*: 8224 Stone Trail Drive, Bethesda Md 20034
TELEPHONE NO.: 469-6753

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Maria	Same as above	F	1949
David Jr	"	M	1951
Christopher	"	M	1956
(See Continuation)			

NAME OF YOUR FATHER *(Or male guardian)*: Deceased
ADDRESS:
TELEPHONE NO.:
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER *(Or female guardian)*: Deceased
ADDRESS:
TELEPHONE NO.:
WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
My brother, Edwin T. Phillips, Jr.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME *(Mr., Mrs., Miss)* *(Last-First-Middle)*: Mr. Phillips, Edwin Thomas
RELATIONSHIP: Brother
HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)*: Fort Worth National Bank, Bldg., Fort Worth, Texas
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Unknown.
BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)* AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: Same asa above.
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION: Unknown

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? *(If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)* ☒ YES ☐ NO
Yes

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? *(If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)* ☒ YES ☐ NO
Yes, he is my attorney-in-fact.

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? *(If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)* ☒ YES ☐ NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
3-67

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. **VOLUNTARY ENTRIES**

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Fort Worth National Bank, Foxrt Worth, Texas. Checking andSaving.
Potomac National Bank, Potomac, Md. Checking.
Columbia Federal (House mortgage).

All in name David A. Phillips

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

In possession of my brother and attorney, Edwin T. Phillips, Jr. (See above).

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

But ,My children would go their mother; my step-children to their father.

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

My brother, Edwin T. Phillips, Mr.

6. **ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS**

Continuation of chilren:

The following are my step children, who live with me/andx receive more than half their support from me: (All have common address of 8224 Stone Trail Drive):

Deborah Anne Ahern (f) 12-25-59
Bryan Moss Ahern (m) 12-31-60
Wynne Augherton Ahern (f) 9-12-64

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington Dc	19 November 1969	

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE
PUNCHED
Lig

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	*(Print)*	7-24	
024345	Phillips, David A.		

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
08	05	69	08	06	69		2			[redacted] WH	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
Wh 71-70	5 - 8 Aug 69

REMARKS

PREPARED BY				ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OCO	XX	REPORT ANNOTATED OR CONTROL DOCUMENT	
XX	C & L DIVISION, CTBR.	DATE		SIGNATURE
	C & T DIVISION	21 Nov 69		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-57 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

PUNCHED

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
024245	Phillips	David	A

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 38, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
07	08	69	07	12	69		2			South America	663

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. WH 4870

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 7-8 - 7/12/69

REMARKS

PREPARED BY			REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	BCO			
✓	C & L DIVISION, CTBS.	DATE 9/10/69		SIGNATURE
	C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 9-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PUNCHED
BY RT

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	*(Print)*	7-24	
024345	PHILLIPS	DAVID	A.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39	WH	40-42
05	19	69	05	21	69		2				120

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 5 thru 21 May 1969

REMARKS

PREPARED BY			REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	DCD			
X	C & L DIVISION, CTBR.	DATE 28 May 1969		SIGNATURE
	C & Y DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO: Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
024345	Phillips	David	A.	WH Division

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	ARRIVAL MONTH 28-29	ARRIVAL DAY 30-31	ARRIVAL YEAR 32-33	DEPARTURE MONTH 34-35	DEPARTURE DAY 36-37	DEPARTURE YEAR 38-39	COUNTRY	OMIT 40-42
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION									

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	DEPARTURE MONTH 28-29	DEPARTURE DAY 30-31	DEPARTURE YEAR 32-33	RETURN MONTH 34-35	RETURN DAY 36-37	RETURN YEAR 38-39	AREA(S)	OMIT 40-42
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	2	5	22	68	5	25	68	Mexico	450

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
WH-703-68	22-25 May 1968

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OSS		
X	C & L DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
	C & T DIVISION	5 August 1968	

FORM 4-66 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

Creditable Service —

Military 45-10-~~31~~ 32
43-02-13
02-08-19

Contract Employee — 54-03-04
TO
55-03-31

Staff Employee — 55-04-01
TO
56-02-06

STAFF AGENT — 56-02-07
TO
58-08-13

CON-TINUOUS SERVICE

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 58-08-19
TO
60-03-13

NOT CREDITABLE SERVICE

STAFF EMPLOYEE — 03-14-60
TO
PRESENT

02-08-19 MILITARY
04-05-10
06-13-29
07-01-29

58-08-13
54-03-04
04-05-10

60-03-~~[illegible]~~ 44
07-01-29

S.C.D. 53-01-15
L.C.D. 55-10-04

d.m. 7-01-66

Standard Form No. 1152
[illegible]
1152-102

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

UNPAID COMPENSATION OF DECEASED CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EMPLOYEE:

NAME— (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
Phillips	David	Atlee	October 31, 1922

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED

(Department or agency) (Bureau) (Division)

I, the employee identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any UNPAID COMPENSATION *due and payable under existing law after my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary relates solely to Unpaid Compensation as defined in section 2 of the act of August 3, 1950, Public Law 636, and in nowise will affect the disposition of any benefit which may become payable under the Retirement Act applicable to my Government service. I further understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, unless or until canceled by me in writing, so long as I am continuously employed in the above department or agency.*

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES:

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Maria I. Phillips	8224 Stone Trail Drive Bethesda, Maryland 20034	daughter	one-fourth
David A. Phillips, Jr.	8224 Stone Trail Drive Bethesda, Maryland 20034	son	one-fourth
Atlee Y. Phillips	8224 Stone Trail Drive Bethesda, Maryland 20034	daughter	one-fourth
Christopher C. Phillips	8224 Stone Trail Drive Bethesda, Maryland 20034	son	one-fourth

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change any designation of beneficiary at any time in the manner and form prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States, and without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

1 December 1967
(Date of execution—month, day, year)

(Signature of employee)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE:

(Signature of witness)	(Number and street)	(City, zone number, and State)
Margaret Joyce	2400 So. Glebe Rd	Arlington, Va 22206
Elizabeth Ann Reilly	8137 Prescott Dr	Vienna, Va 22180

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYEE

David A. Phillips
8224 Stone Trail Drive
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING DATA OF EMPLOYING AGENCY

05 DEC 1967

Recd. C/P

(Indicate date and by whom received)

DELIVER BOTH COPIES TO THE PROPER OFFICER OF YOUR AGENCY—DUPLICATE WILL BE NOTED AND RETURNED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME: LAST *(Print)*	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
024345	Phillips	David	A.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 38, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			08	02	67		1			Dominican Republic	190

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐ TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐ DISPATCH
☑ CABLE	☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐ OTHER *(Specify)*	
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. IN 24259	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD August 2 1967

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ DCO	☑	
☐ C & L DIVISION, CTBB.	DATE August 7 '67	SIGNATURE
☑ C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

SUBJECT
Letter of Appreciation from General Bruce Palmer, Jr.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See para two

1. Attached find an original and two copies of a letter of appreciation from Gen. Bruce Palmer, until 18 January, Commander of USFORDOMREP.

2. It is requested that the original be placed in the personnel file of Michael C. CHOADEN. The first copy, marked "A" should be placed in the personnel file of Stewart R. PATAKER. The second copy, marked "B", should be passed to Franklyn D. MALLEK for his information and disposition.

Michael C. CHOADEN

Attachment: Letter

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HDCT 1359

DATE
18 January 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

K. (C[illegible])
Congratulations although
this is only typical of
your unusually high
performance WS

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
APO New York 09478

USFDR-CG

17 January 1966

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

THRU: The Honorable W. Tapley Bennett
American Ambassador
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

TO: [redacted] DAVID A PHILLIPS
American Embassy
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

1. I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the outstanding contributions you and your staff have made in the accomplishment of USFORDOMREP Intelligence missions from 1 May 1965 through 17 January 1966. The first intelligence contact upon our arrival at San Isidro Air Base on 1 May was a representative from your office. From that day on a mutual respect, cordial relationship and a unity of effort prevailed throughout the many trying days in the Dominican Republic crisis. Without your assistance we would have realized a serious gap in the intelligence picture, a gap which would have made intelligence evaluations and the development of tactical estimates most difficult.

2. My J2 has frequently mentioned the close association and coordination he has had with you and the members of your organization and repeatedly expressed the high esteem and respect he has for the professionalism and competence displayed by you and your subordinates.

3. The intelligence unity of effort in the Dominican Republic has been exemplary and a prototype for future operations. This cohesive atmosphere is directly attributable to your efforts.

USFDR-CG 17 January 1966
SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

4. Again I wish to express my appreciation and congratulations on a job well done.

BRUCE PALMER, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
Commander

RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE (4)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. EOD ~~X~~24345

COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE ✓ YES ☐ NO

TELEPHONE EXT.

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE, SPINDLE, OR MUTILATE

INSTRUCTIONS

THIS FORM MUST BE RETURNED WHETHER YOU HAVE HAD OVERSEAS SERVICE OR NOT.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCOMPANYING CARD; THEN FILL OUT THIS FORM AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE.

DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 30-31	WHERE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED	PCS - 1 TDY - 2 (ENTER NO.) 32	DATES FROM MO 33-34	DATES FROM YR 35-36	DATES TO MO 37-38	DATES TO YR 39-40	SERVICE AS CIVILIAN - 1 MILITARY - 2 (ENTER NO.) 41	RESPONSIBLE U.S. GOVT DEPT OR AGENCY	DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 42-44
196	HAVANA, CUBA	1	04	56	?	57	1	CIA	100
400	BEIRUT, LEBANON	1	?	57	07	58	1	CIA	100
861	AFRICA, ITALY GERMANY	1	?	43	04 ~~APR~~	45	2	USAAF	330

IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED, CHECK HERE ☐ AND ASK YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CARDS.

SECRET

FORM 1451

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 29 August 1961.

Signature

2 October 1963
Date

DAVID A. PHILLIPS

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 3 DEC [illegible]

REPORT OF HONOR AWARDS BOARD

(CONVENED PURSUANT TO REGULATIONS AR 20-635 AND AFR 20-635)

The Honor Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

NAME: (Last) PHILLIPS (First) David (Middle) Atlee

POSITION TITLE: Covert Associate

PRESENT GRADE: $7200.00 p.a.

OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: WH Division

STATION: PBSUCCESS

BE AWARDED: Distinguished Intelligence Medal

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION, ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE DURING THE PERIOD January - July 1954

☐ APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION ☐ DISAPPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION

☒ APPROVES, BUT IN LIEU THEREOF, RECOMMENDS THE AWARD OF: Intelligence Medal of Merit

CITATION

DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS is hereby awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit for his outstanding dedication and devotion to the cause of freedom.

While assigned a position of responsibility in creating a psychological medium to further the efforts of removing a serious threat to the security and welfare of his government, he, personally, with superior talent and concentration of energy proceeded to develop a program which greatly contributed to the ultimate elimination of the threat which concurrently brought historical relief to the oppressed people of an entire population.

The psychological medium developed and sustained by Mr. PHILLIPS was directed and operated with such ingenuity, resourcefulness and forceful imagination that he was able to create and maintain a completely notional situation for an extended period thereby making it possible to achieve the objectives of his government. This achievement has no parallel in the history of psychological warfare.

REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF RECOMMENDED AWARD

APPROVED

SIGNED

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

8 SEP 1956

DATE

SIGNATURE: SIGNED

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AWARDS BOARD: [illegible]

SIGNATURE: SIGNED

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER: (Acting) [illegible]

FORM NO. 37-176
OCT 1953

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
24345	Phillips	David	A	35 64

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	09	25	61				Mexico	450

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
								WH	

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☒ DISPATCH
☐ CABLE
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
OTHER *(Specify)*

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: HMMT-2316
DOCUMENT DATE PERIOD: 13 October 1961

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
FISCAL DIVISION	DATE 11/20/61	SIGNATURE
FINANCE DIVISION x2		

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible] 1 3443

29 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: David A. Phillips

On 14 June 1961 the undersigned reviewed with Mr. David A. Phillips his career development prospects for the next five year period. We agreed that the following represented a desirable and fairly firm goal in this respect:

a. In general his future training and field experience should place sufficient stress on the CI and FI fields to avoid the career confinement of strict CA specialization.

b. His next assignment would be a normal field tour in Mexico City. Upon return from that assignment, he would receive up to six months training to be followed by an assignment to the CA Staff (or the organizational successor thereof). One of his primary undertakings in the CA Staff would be to develop what might best be termed "ideological warfare" (e.g., a search for basic ideas and concepts with wide appeal) as opposed to the normal propaganda approach (e.g., a running debate on current events).

Richard M. Bissell Jr.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

cc: ASSA (Pers)
Attn Panel A
Mr. Phillips
Thru C/WH
OP/RSD

SECRET

TR

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) PHILLIPS	(First) DAVID	(Middle) ATLEE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED FORT WORTH, TEXAS	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE FORT WORTH, TEXAS	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE FORT WORTH, TEXAS

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

SINGLE ☐	MARRIED ☑	SEPARATED ☐	DIVORCED ☐	WIDOWED ☐	ANNULLED ☐

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE FORT WORTH, TEXAS	DATE OF MARRIAGE
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
JEAN HINDEGARDT PHILLIPS INCOMPATIBILITY SEPT 15 1941

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
HELEN H PHILLIPS	6307 DAHLONEGA RD. WASH 16, DC	OL-2-5151	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
MARIA	" " "	F	21 FEB 1951
DAVID, JR		M	14 JAN 1952
ATLEE	" " "	F	APRIL 1953
CHRISTOPHER		M	25 [illegible] 1955
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
DECEASED			
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
DECEASED			

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. WIFE - BROTHER (EDWIN T. PHILLIPS, JR.)

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) PHILLIPS, EDWIN T.	RELATIONSHIP BROTHER
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 4408 WASHBURN ST. FORT WORTH, TEX	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER ?
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE FORT WORTH NATIONAL BANK BLDG.	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION ?

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)	YES	✓
	NO	
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)	YES	✓
	NO	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	✓
	NO	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

SECRET

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of David A. Phillips

Effective 23 August 1961

The purpose of this memorandum is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are integrated and to set forth certain rights and obligations which are incident to your status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS-14 $12,730 per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of 23 August 1961. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected at FSR-3 and salary of $12,535 per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of twenty-four months from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and (except as provided in paragraph three (3) above) allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they are less than or equal to the salary and allowance payments due on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due, the difference will be credited to your payroll account with this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due, the overage will be remitted to this organization at designated intervals, presently ________________________. Computations hereunder will be made on the basis of the aggregate gross due and received provided, however, that in computing remittances for overage Federal and, if applicable, District of Columbia income taxes withheld by your cover facility against the overage may be deducted. To assure timely accuracy in your payroll account with this organization you are expected to immediately report cover facility payroll changes.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integration into your cover facility, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and at your personal expense you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half per cent) on the basis of your cover salary or your salary from this organization, whichever is the greater.

b. If you receive taxable income from both your cover facility and this organization, necessary adjustments for Federal, and if applicable, District of Columbia income tax purposes will be made in conformance with instructions received from this organization.

c. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with the rules and regulations of this organization.

d. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with your cover facility of any status with your cover based on your services performed with that organization at the request of this organization.

e. All annual and sick leave which is accrued to your credit at the time of integration will be transferred to your cover facility. While integrated you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon completion of your integration your accrued annual and sick leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization including any income taxes withheld by your cover facility.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

SECRET

11 January 1961

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Additional Compensation in Lieu of Overtime Payment

REF: Memo dated 11 January 1961 from SSA/DDS to DD/S, approved by DD/S, Subject: "Employee Benefits for JMATE Personnel"; and Memo dated 22 December 1960 from ADD(P) to Deputy Director (Plans), Subject: "Employee Benefits for Personnel Assigned to JMATE".

In accordance with referenced memoranda, it is requested that the personnel listed below be authorized to receive additional compensation effective 8 January 1961, at the rate of 15% of their respective rates of basic annual compensation (but not to exceed the ~~maximum~~ rate for a Minimum GS-9) in lieu of payment of the regular overtime rates for irregular, unscheduled and frequent overtime.

NAME	EMPLOYEE Serial No.	TITLE	SALARY
~~ESTERLINE, Jacob D.~~	~~56793~~	~~OPS Officer~~	~~$14,055~~
WHEDBEE, Robert A.	509360	OPS Officer	12,990
DOUGLAS, Jesse S.	229350	OPS Officer	14,055
PHILLIPS, David A.	654600	OPS Officer	12,730
NAPOLI, Louis F.	012616	OPS Officer	12,210
KUZMUK, Walter P.	064738	OPS Officer	12,730
PETERS, John D.	56093	OPS Officer	11,675
WARNER, Thomas D.	59794	Instructor (OPS)	8,955
HICKS, Calvin W.	56361	Guerrilla Warfare Officer	9,475
RILEY, James	60471	OPS Officer	8,860
FILSO, Anthony L.	559127	OPS Officer	7,820
BLAIR, William E.	60218	Instructor (OPS)	8,955
KENDALL, Sidney S.	059517	OPS Officer	11,155
REYNOLDS, Robert	55407	OPS Officer	12,470
SPARKS, Ernest W.	62285	Instructor (OPS)	12,470
BROWN, Pravel S.	61901	OPS Officer	9,475
CARTWRIGHT, Cecil J.	57840	OPS Officer	9,215
CHELLINO, Samuel J.	55622	ADM Officer	7,820
MORALES, David S.	63385	OPS Officer	12,210
KENT, William F.	559198	OPS Officer	9,215

All the above employees are on Allotment #535-5000-3021.

J C King
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

APPROVED:
Emmett D. Echols
EMMETT D. ECHOLS

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED JUNE 1957
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A6

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON, D.C. (Place of employment)

I, DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

14 March 1960 (Date of entrance on duty)

David A Phillips (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 11th day of March A. D. 1960,

at WASHINGTON, D.C. (City) (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

PERSONNEL CLERK (Title)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U. S. C. 18, or by a person designated to administer oaths under Section 206, Act of June 26, 1943, 5 U. S. C. 16a. If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—[illegible]

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)
ALBAN TOWERS - 3500 MASS. AVE. WASHINGTON, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH
OCTOBER 31, 1922

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city and State or city and foreign country*)
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, PLEASE NOTIFY	(B) RELATIONSHIP	(C) STREET AND NUMBER CITY AND STATE	(D) TELEPHONE NO.
HELEN N. PHILLIPS	WIFE	ALBAN TOWERS 3500 MASS. AVE., WASH, D.C.	WO6-6400

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blank below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1 2. 3			

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*		✓
7. DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12*		✓
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED CHARGED OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 12 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		✓
9. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN BARRED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 12.*		✓

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10. (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		✓
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		
11. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT: A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE:		✓
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT:		✓
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case*		

12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER.—You must determine that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, any record of recent discharge or arrest, age, citizenship, and members of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should particularly check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and/or other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1954
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1, R1 AND S2

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*) PHILLIPS, DAVID ATLEE	2. DATE OF BIRTH October 31, [illegible]

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN	11. SERVICE		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY		YEAR	MONTH	DAY
CIA	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	1955	[illegible]	13	GS-14	3	4	13

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.*)			
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY				
ARMY AIR FORCE	1942	2	13	1945	10	31	HON.	3	8	19

12. TOTAL SERVICE [illegible]

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☑ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

14 MARCH 1960
(DATE)

David A. Phillips
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ____ day of ________ 1960 at WASHINGTON, D.C.
(MONTH) (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

Helen Capriotti

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

(OVER)

Part III.*—DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS.** ***(Complete for noncompetitive hires based on competitive status as required by instructions in FPM Chapter 52.) **Employee has a competitive status. This determination is based upon the following evidence:**

NAME OF AGENCY	SIGNATURE AND OFFICIAL TITLE	DATE

PART IV.—DETERMINATION OF CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	TOTAL SERVICE *(Item 12)*	NONCREDITABLE SERVICE *(Item 13)*	CREDITABLE SERVICE *(Leave Purposes)*	ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE *(Present Agency)*	LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE *(Leave Purposes)*	SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE *(Leave Purposes)*
Years				1960	5	[illegible]
Months				03	12	3
Days				14	6	1

PART V.—DETERMINATION OF CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES. ***(Complete only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes.)***

	TOTAL SERVICE *(Item 12)*	NONCREDITABLE SERVICE *(Item 14)*	CREDITABLE SERVICE *(RIF Purposes)*	ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE *(Present Agency)*	LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE *(RIF Purposes)*	SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE* *(RIF Purposes)*
Years						
Months						
Days						

* Enter as the "Service Computation Date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF 7

REMARKS:

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible] O [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
	PHILLIPS	DAVID	ATLEE

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
HAVANA, CUBA	476 ROSE LANE, ANNANDALE, VA.

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE
4504 WASHBURN, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE FORT WORTH, TEXAS	DATE OF MARRIAGE 3 JUNE 1948
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
JOAN HILDEBRANDT, DIVORCE DECREE FOR (INCOMPATIBILITY), FORT WORTH, TEXAS, — ? — 1943

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
HELEN N. PHILLIPS	ALBAN TOWERS, 3500 MASS AVE, (WASH), D.C.	WOODLEY 6-6400	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	AGE
MARIA LOUISE PHILLIPS	" " " "	F	10
DAVID A. PHILLIPS JR.	" " " "	M	8
ATLEE YOUNG PHILLIPS	" " " "	F	7
CHRISTOPHER [illegible] PHILLIPS	" " " "	M	3

NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER
EDWIN T. PHILLIPS (DECEASED)	— NA.	NA
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER
MARY LOUISE PHILLIPS (DECEASED)	NA	NA

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES?
WIFE, AND BROTHER (EDWIN T PHILLIPS JR. 4504 WASHBURN, FORT WORTH, TX

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle)	RELATIONSHIP
PHILLIPS HELEN FLORENCE	WIFE
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 3500 MASS. AVE (ALBAN TOWERS)	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER WO 6-6400
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE NONE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION NONE

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☑ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☑ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☑ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
FIRST WORTH NATIONAL BANK, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 1 JAN 57 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED) 6

IN WHOSE NAME~~(S)~~ ~~ARE~~ THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

DAVID A. PHILLIPS, SPECIAL ACCOUNT

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

LAW OFFICES OF EDWIN T PHILLIPS, JR, FORT WORTH NATIONAL BANK BUILDING, FORT WORTH, TEXAS, AND AMERICAN EMBASSY, HAVANA

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☑ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

EDWIN T. PHILLIPS, JR.
FORT WORTH NATIONAL BANK BUILDING, FORT WORTH, TEX

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON, DC	DATE 14 MARCH 60	SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Credit Reference

1. You are advised that the position for which you have been hired is of a sensitive nature and that YOU ARE NOT TO IDENTIFY YOURSELF WITH THIS AGENCY FOR credit reference or for any other purpose.

2. You are to disregard that portion of the Monday morning Personnel EOD Orientation and the Monday morning Security Introduction (which you will receive during your second or third week with the Agency) which authorizes certain personnel to identify themselves with this Agency, when necessary, for credit, rental agreement, and like purposes.

3. You will be advised by your Placement Officer as to the cover information necessary for proper job identification. If at any time cover difficulties are encountered you may arrange an appointment through your Placement Officer to see the Security Officer responsible for your activity.

G. M. STEWART
Director of Personnel

I have read the above and understand that I am not to associate myself with the Central Intelligence Agency for credit reference or for any other purpose.

14 March 1960
Date

Signature of Employee

SECRET

STAFF AGENT LETTER OF APPOINTMENT

Howard Phillips

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted] Phillips

1. Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 5.2 of the Confidential Fund Regulations, you are hereby appointed a Staff Agent of the Government at an initial salary of $10,320, grade GS-14, effective as of FEB 7 1956.

2. As a Staff Agent of the Government, you are an appointed employee of the Government and as such are entitled to all the emoluments of, and subject to the restrictions of, that status. As a Staff Agent, you will undertake certain cover employment or activities as directed by the Government. Your Federal income taxes will be reported and paid in conformance with AFN 20-660-4, dated 26 November 1954, and/or any subsequent Government issuances promulgated on this matter.

3. As an appointed employee of the Government, you are required to make certain contributions to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. In the event that you are paid through a cover facility, you will be required to return to the Government at such times and in such manner as it shall direct the required contributions (presently six per cent (6%) of your gross salary). If the conditions of your cover require that you make contributions to the Social Security Fund, such contributions will be at your expense.

4. (a) In addition to your basic salary, you will be entitled to any post differential, living-quarters allowances, cost-of-living allowances (except post allowance), or other allowances that are granted Government employees stationed at the same permanent post of duty abroad. You will account for such allowances in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

(b) In addition to the above payments, effective upon the arrival of you and your dependents at your initial permanent post of duty overseas you will be entitled to an equalization allowance calculated at the rate of $3,670 per annum. This allowance is in lieu of any present or future standardized post allowance established for your initial permanent post of duty overseas, but is subject to the entitlement provisions applicable to standardized post allowances. It is understood and agreed that this allowance is predicated upon the comparative cost of living between Washington, D. C., and your overseas post, your unofficial cover, family status and basic compensation. Consequently, this allowance may be unilaterally adjusted or discontinued by the Government whenever warranted by a change in any of these factors. No accounting will be required for this allowance.

SECRET

5. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses including travel and operational expenses which are authorized by the Government or your cover. Accountings for such expenses will be in compliance with applicable Government regulations unless such accounting is inconsistent with the practices of your cover facility. If the policies of your cover facility relating to payment of travel and transportation expenses differ from those of the Government, and if you are paid through your cover facility, you will receive and retain the amount paid by your cover without regard to Government regulations.

6. (a) It is specifically understood and agreed that as an appointed employee of the Government you are entitled to receive and retain only the salary, allowances, and other benefits which are commensurate with your appointed position and salary grade except as provided in paragraph five (5) above and paragraphs six (6), (b) and (c), below. Any compensation that you may receive from your cover facility will be offset against your salary from the Government, and you will return to the Government any salary, allowances and other pecuniary benefits which in the aggregate exceed your Government salary, allowances and other pecuniary benefits. You will report to the Government not less than semi-annually any sums received from your cover facility.

(b) It is understood and agreed that any fees derived from the remaining three (3) lectures on your current lecture tour will not be subject to the offset provisions of this agreement. It is further understood and agreed, however, that said lectures will be made by you while on annual leave and that you will be solely responsible for all expenses incidental thereto. Subsequent to the completion of said three (3) lectures, the income derived from any additional lectures will be presumed to be income derived from cover activities and will, therefore, be subject to offset unless specifically excluded by an amendment hereto.

(c) It is understood and agreed that should a specific manuscript, the title to which is set forth in your operational letter of instructions, be published during your tour of duty hereunder, the income derived therefrom will not be subject to offset as said manuscript was completed in its entirety prior to your appointment as a Staff Agent.

7. It is understood and agreed that your overseas assignment is to be for a minimum of two (2) years from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty unless such assignment shall be sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience. If, in violation of this letter, you terminate your overseas assignment for your convenience at any time prior to the expiration of two (2) years from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you shall not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents from such post of duty to the United States; and, further, if, in violation of this letter, you terminate your overseas assignment for your convenience prior to the expiration of one (1) year from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you shall reimburse the Government for all its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

8. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this letter and any contradiction in terms which may in any way appear to amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this letter which shall always be dominant.

SECRET

9. Upon termination of your cover employment or activity, you will revert to normal staff employee status, unless for good and sufficient cause, such as misconduct or demonstrated incompetence, such reversion would be opposed to the best interest of the Government.

10. If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to, property of any nature whatsoever situate which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

11. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing or training are a part of this letter and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

12. You will be required to keep forever secret this letter and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Office of Personnel

ACCEPTED:

[redacted]
[redacted]in.

Harold Phillips

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: Roy Malcolm
DIVISION: WH
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2056
DATE: 17 January 1956

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
[redacted]

2. PROJECT

3. ALLOTMENT NO. 6-3545-55-055

4. SLOT NO. BAF-125

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES
Paul D. Langevin

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)
Contract Agent, 1952 - 1954
Staff Employee as of 1 May 1955 - $10,320

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date)
Top Secret

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.)
Staff Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 33

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 31 October 1922

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): 4804 Washburn, Fort Worth, Texas, USA

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): 949 Rose Lane, Falls Church, Va.

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☒ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP:

Wife	: Helen H. Phillips
Daughter	: Maria Louise Phillips
Son	: David A. Phillips, Jr.
Daughter	: Atlee Young Phillips

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: No

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: -

24. RANK OR GRADE: -

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $10,320

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: Yes

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): No

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: Yes

32. POST

33. OTHER

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any)
Newspaperman

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Helen H. Phillips, Wife, U.S. 36, March 29, 1919

Maria Louise Phillips, Daughter, U.S. 6, August 9, 1949

David A. Phillips, Jr., Son, U.S. 4, January 14, 1952

Atlee Young Phillips, Daughter, U.S. 2, February 18, 1953

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION

43. ENTERTAINMENT

44. OTHER

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST
(CONTINUED)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: Ray Malcolm
DIVISION: WH
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2056
DATE: 17 January 1956

CTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

BENEFITS *(See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-335 or successor regulations.)*

Staff Agent benefits

ECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

7. STATUS *(Check)*	☐	PROPOSED	48. TYPE *(Check)*	☐	PROPRIETARY	☐	CULTURAL	☐	COMMERCIAL	☐	TOURIST
	☒	ESTABLISHED		☐	SUBSIDIZED	☐	EDUCATIONAL	☐	MILITARY	☒	OTHER

IB. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
NA ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

ECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

O. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)*
☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

ECTION XI — TERM

I. DURATION						52. EFFECTIVE DATE	53. RENEWABLE
	DAYS		MONTHS	2	YEARS	Upon Departure	☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION
☒ YES ☐ NO

ECTION XII — FUNCTION

6. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(FI, PP, other)*
PP

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

7. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

PP Officer, Cuba

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Contract Agent 1952-1954 in Chile
Contract Agent 1954 (PBSUCCESS & PBHISTORY)
Covert Associate 1954-1955

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐	GRADE SCHOOL	☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE				
☐	BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE			☐	COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE				
☒	COLLEGE (No degree)	☐	COLLEGE DEGREE	☐	POST GRADUATE	☐	MA	☐	PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	X			X			X		
French		X				X		X	

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
U.S.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Latin America, Europe

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

Self employed: Newspaper editor and publisher; lecturer.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF DIVISION OFFICER	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF SENIOR STAFF OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL

You will utilise your established cover as a newspaper publisher and lecturer on Latin American affairs resident in Santiago, Chile. You have chosen to live temporarily in Cuba because of unfulfilled lecture contracts in the United States. You have not returned to your business in Santiago because of the great expense of traveling between Chile and the United States. You will, in fact, return to the United States on two occasions to deliver lectures contracted before your employment as a Staff Employee of this Agency. (February 14 and 15 in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and Wichita, Kansas; and March 13 in Palm Beach, Florida). You are strictly enjoined against using any material relating to intelligence or other covert activities. You are advised that the income received from the three scheduled lectures shall not be subject to the offset provisions of (this letter of instruction). It is understood that the lectures will be made while on annual leave and that all expenses incidental thereto will be met by you. At some future date, should it be decided that you should renew your lecture activities, the decision as to whether or not the income will be subject to offset provisions will be made at Headquarters.

You are also informed that should the manuscript entitled "Popcorn in the Andes", now in the hands of your literary agent, be published during your tour of duty the income therefrom will not be subject to the offset provisions of this contract.

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: Robert S. Goralski

DIVISION: NEA

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 3548

DATE: 9 May 1957

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE [illegible] [redacted]

2. PROJECT Beirut, Lebanon PECTATE

3. ALLOTMENT NO.

4. SLOT NO.

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES [redacted]

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include salary) Staff Agent, WH $10,535.00

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date) Top Secret, 1 April 1955

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.) Staff Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP U.3.A

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE 34

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year) 31 Oct. 1922

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country) 4804 Washburn, Fort Worth, Texas

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country)

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate) ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP: Five: Wife and four children

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE N.A.

21. VETERAN World War II

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat) N.A.

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE N.A.

24. RANK OR GRADE N.A.

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY 535 GS-14 $10,320.00

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL $585.00

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS $3,000.00

32. POST $585.00

33. OTHER

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife: Helen H. Phillips, U.S., 38, 29 March 1919
Daughter: Maria Louise Phillips, U.S., 7, 9 Aug. 1949
Daughter: Atlee Young Phillips, U.S., 4, 18 Feb. 1953
Son: David A. Phillips, Jr., U.S. 5, 14 Jan. 1952
Child approx. 5 mos., U.S.

Present letter OK.

KLW - Jul 57

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION N.A.

43. ENTERTAINMENT N.A.

44. OTHER N.A.

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)	CASE OFFICER Robert S. Goralski	DIVISION NEA
NOTE: *SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET*	TELEPHONE EXTENSION 3548	DATE 9 May 1957

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-310 or successor regulations.)*

Usual staff employee benefits

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)* ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE *(Check)* ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)* ☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS — MONTHS 2 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: Upon departure

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(PI, PP, other)*

PP

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Ostensible Assistant to the Director of a Lebanese radio and television center, perform liaison functions between the Chief of Station, Beirut, and the Center; provide thematic guidance to the Center in its output in accordance with Agency needs in support of HEMANTLED projects.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

PP operations officer in the development, management and supervision of radio broadcasting facilities; professional experience in several media, particularly newspapers and radio.

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)* ☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE ☒ COLLEGE *(No degree)* ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	x			x			x		
French		x			x			x	
German		x			x			x	

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Central and South America; North Africa; Italy

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

Editor and publisher, lecturer, actor and free-lance writer.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

Assignment to Project PECTATE should be effective 30 April 1957

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF DIVISION OFFICER	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF SENIOR STAFF OFFICER
10 May 57			

14-00000

TR

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

1. NAME (Last) Phillips (First) David (Middle) A

2. THIS DATE 9 Dec 55

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME

☑ WAR AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA)
☑ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED (GHI)
☑ MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA - HOSPITALIZATION
☑ UNITED LIFE INSURANCE (UBLIC)
☑ AIR TRIP INSURANCE
☑ DREAD DISEASES *
☑ INCOME REPLACEMENT *

* CASH PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS AT THE TIME EMPLOYEE APPLIES FOR INSURANCE MUST COVER THE PERIOD OF TIME HE WILL BE AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS.

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance)

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INSURANCE PROGRAMS LISTED BELOW.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
Fed Empl Life		✓			
Mut of Omaha Health		✓		Pd thru Jun 56	

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY

CPB (Signature) C-T Chrisman

ICD (Signature)

8. REMARKS

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to TSRB for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPB files.

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

FORM NO. 797 REPLACES FORM 37-190
1 SEP 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

TR

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in duplicate when ordered overseas or whenever designated place of residence, marital or dependency status changes. This information is important in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or membe. of family.

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
	Phillips	David	Atlee

2. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (if appointed abroad)
949 Rose Lane, Falls Church, Va.	

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED PERMANENT OR LEGAL RESIDENCE
4804 Washburn, Fort Worth, Texas.

3. MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED	PLACE OF MARRIAGE Fort Worth, Texas	DATE OF MARRIAGE 5 June 1948
☐ DIVORCED	PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE
☐ WIDOWED	PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

4. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (Number)	(Street)	(City)	(State)	TELEPHONE	
Helen Haasch Phillips	949	Rose Lane	Falls Church	Va	JE-3-9579	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS (Number)**	**(Street)**	**(City)**	**(State)**	**SEX**	**AGE**
Maria Louise Phillips	"	"	"	"	Female	6
David Atlee Phillips, Jr.	"	"	"	"	Male	3
Atlee Young Phillips	"	"	"	"	Female	2
NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	**ADDRESS (Number)**	**(Street)**	**(City)**	**(State)**	**TELEPHONE**	
Deceased						
NAME OF MOTHER (or female guardian)	**ADDRESS (Number)**	**(Street)**	**(City)**	**(State)**	**TELEPHONE**	
Deceased						

5. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME				RELATIONSHIP
Edwin T. Phillips, Jr.				Brother
ADDRESS (Number)	**(Street)**	**(City)**	**(State)**	**TELEPHONE**
4804	Washburn	Fort Worth	Texas	—

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 4 ABOVE WILL ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, DUE TO HEALTH OR OTHER PERTINENT REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE UNDER "REMARKS."

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

THE FOLLOWING AGENCY ENDORSED LIFE AND HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE POLICIES ARE IN FORCE IN MY NAME: THE "POLICY NO." SHOULD BE ENTERED IF POSSIBLE, SINCE THIS INFORMATION WILL ASSIST IN EXPEDITING ACTION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD A CLAIM BECOME PAYABLE.

6. FULL NAME OF COMPANY	ADDRESS OF HOME OFFICE	POLICY NO.
U.S. Government Employee	Washington, D.C.	—
Mutual of Omaha Hospitalization	Omaha, Neb.	GMF 1514

7. I HAVE COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING: WILL ☐ YES ☒ NO POWER OF ATTORNEY ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. REMARKS:

Power of Attorney to:

Edwin T. Phillips, Jr
4804 Washburn, Fort Worth, Texas.

Edmond K. Fannon
Casilla 1250, Santiago, Chile

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington, D.C.	27 December 1955	

FORM NO. 61 REPLACES FORM 37-79
1 JUL 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on MAY 12 1955 (DATE) I have attended the Induction Course specified by Regulation 25-110.

Note:
Displayed unusual alertness at the Introduction Program on May 12

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
(NAME) - Please print

☐ CLERICAL ☐ STENOGRAPHIC ☑ OTHER

OFFICE DDP/FP/130

GS- 14 (Grade)

FORM NO. [illegible] REPLACES FORM 51-121
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(6)

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST [illegible])
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, DAVID A. PHILLIPS, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

1 April 1955
(Date of entrance on duty)

(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 23 day of April, A. D. 19 55,

at Washington, (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

5 USC 16 & 16a
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—84160-8

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

[illegible] [illegible] FORT WORTH TEXAS

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: OCTOBER [illegible], 192[illegible]

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*): FORT WORTH TEXAS

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: HELEN [illegible] PHILLIPS

(B) RELATIONSHIP: WIFE

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: [illegible]

(D) TELEPHONE NO.: [illegible]

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

(Check one)

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $5 OR LESS OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $5 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case, (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—88100-2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 29 Jan 75

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Phillips, David A.

3. POSITION TITLE: C/LAD

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDO/LA

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	
STATION	
TDY OR PCS	
TYPE OF COVER	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED	

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Kathy Hill

Kathy Hill, LA/Trng

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D5317 Hqs

EXT: 7431

10. COMMENTS

Subject has completed his Executive Annual.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified for ~~XXBXXXBXX~~ TDY Standby until 1 Ocoober 1975.

DATE: 4 February 1975

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: William T. Golder, OMS/Registrar

FORM 2-62 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 10 May 1972

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Phillips, David A. (Dependents Of)

3. POSITION TITLE: COS

4. GRADE: GS-17

5. OFFICE DIVISION, BRANCH: ~~Brasilia, Brazil~~

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 7431

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

~~10 July 0900~~
~~12 Jul 1300~~
~~13 July 0900~~
27 Jul 0900
28 Jul 1300
20 Jul 1300

☐ HDQS/TDY
☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: August 1972
STATION: Caracas, Venezuela
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: State (Integrated)
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: ~~four~~ five
NO. OF DEPENDENTS REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES
☐ NO

DEPENDENT

11 MAY 1972

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Joan Ferguson

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D 5309 Hqs

EXT: 7431

10. COMMENTS

Please schedule appointments for the week of 10 July.

Virginia S.	wife	26 Feb 43	Wynne [illegible] Augherton	~~son~~ dau	12 Sep 64
Deborah Anne [illegible]	dau	25 Dec 59	Todd	son	3 Aug 70
Bryan Moss [illegible]	son	31 Dec 60	[illegible]		25 Dec 56

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR OS PCS

SPERRY PRESTON

Daniel Jr. 7 31 72 Jan 52

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

15 MAY 1972

FORM 2-68 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(28)

2 [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 17 October 1969

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Phillips, David A. (dependents)

3. POSITION TITLE: Branch Chief

4. GRADE: GS-16

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/COG

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 7451

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQS/TDY

☒ XX OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: o/a 28 December 1969

STATION: Rio de Janeiro

TDY OR PCS: PCS

TYPE OF COVER: State

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 7

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED: To be forwarded

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ XX YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Ruth A. Sanford WH Personnel

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D5309 Hq

EXT.: 6815

10. COMMENTS

Virginia S. - wife - 26 Feb 43

[redacted] 12 31 69

Christopher Clark - son - 28 Dec 56 Bryan Moss - son - 31 Dec 60

De SPERRY PRESTON - 25 Dec 59 Wynn Augherton - ~~son~~ - 12 Setp 64.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION QUALIFIED OS PCS 12 31 69

SPERRY PRESTON

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-60 259. USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SPERRY PRESTON

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Phillips, David A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/31/22	3. GRADE GS-16
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/WH/COG	5. PRESENT POSITION Branch Chief	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 7451
7. PROPOSED STATION Rio de Janeiro	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) COS, # 0186, GS-00	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE o/a 28 Dec. '69	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 7

12. COMMENTS
Vice Robert D. Gahagen
State Integree
Form DS-1688 to be forwarded

13. DATE OF REQUEST	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Ruth A. Sanford	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING SD 3309	16. EXTENSION 6815

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

MEDICALLY QUALIFIED FOR
PROPOSED OS PCS.

DONALD FARLEY

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION
12 24 69

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): PHILLIPS, David A.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/COG

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 22 May - 5 June 1968
STATION: Mexico City
TDY OR PCS: TDY
TYPE OF COVER: Tourist
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEPTS:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Mary C. Wernig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D5309

EXT.: 1516

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED TDY

REX HART

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 5-21-68

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 6 September 1967

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Phillips, David

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE: GS-15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: WH

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL - Executive

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:
ROOM NO. & BUILDING:
EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT
DUTIES
REX HART

DATE:
SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): PHILLIPS, David A. (Deps of)

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Off

4. GRADE: GS-15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/3

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5909

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD

STATION

TDY OR PCS

TYPE OF COVER

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA

STATION: Santo Domingo

NO. OF DEP.'S: Five

MEDICALLY QUALIFI
RETURNED
BACK DATE

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

10 25 57

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

ROOM NO. & BUILDING

EXT.

10. COMMENTS

Wife: Helen F.
Dau: Maria L. DOB 9 Aug 49
Son: David A DOB 14 Jan 52
Son: Atlee L DOB 18 Feb 53
~~Son: Christopher DOB 28 Dec 56~~

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-50 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 31 October 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Phillips, David A.

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE: GS-

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: COB (WH)

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5903

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL - Executive

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

ROOM NO. & BUILDING:

EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

REX HART

DATE: 12 [illegible]

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 2 June 64

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): PHILLIPS, David A.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Ofcr

4. GRADE: 15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/3

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: x5909

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 3 July 64
STATION: Return to Mexico City
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: State Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 5
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED: -0

☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA: 30 June 64
STATION: Mexico City, Mexico
NO. OF DEP.'S: 5

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Murray Benthall
Murray Benthall WH/Pers Ofcr
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GH 4407 Hqs
EXT.: x5909

10. COMMENTS

Will be in Hqs beginning 30 June until 3 July for TDY. 1 & 2 July

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED O'S'D

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

PCS

JOE W. CLINE

DATE: [illegible] 64

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 27 JULY 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

3. POSITION TITLE: COS

4. GRADE: 15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/BRANCH 2

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6576

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: LATERAL TRANSFER
STATION: SANTO DOMINGO, D.R.
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 5
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED: 0

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA: LATERAL TRANSFER
STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
NO. OF DEP.'S: 5

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: FRANK LANE
WH/PERSONNEL

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GR-56

EXT.: 6576

10. COMMENTS

MR. PHILLIPS IS A DIRECT TRANSFER.

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED
PCS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

JOE W. CLINE

DATE: 7 30 65

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 22 June 1961

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): PHILLIPS, David A.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WHD

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 8242

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ ~~OVERSEAS RETURN~~
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ [illegible]/ICT
☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 16 August 1961
STATION: Mexico City
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: Dept of State
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: five
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

FORM 89 attached

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS
ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEPS:

Subject's last physical exam was more than a year ago.

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (*One block must be checked*)
☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: Henry Oosthoek, Jr.
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1404 Barton Hall
EXT.: 8242

10. ~~REPORT OF EVALUATION~~
COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 10 AUG 1961

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
12 April 1960

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) PHILLIPS, David Atlee	3. POSITION TITLE	4. GRADE GS-14
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH Washington, D. C.		6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT. 2960

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ OVERSEAS RETURN
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	15 April 1960
STATION	WH Area
TDY OR PCS	TDY
TYPE OF COVER	[redacted]
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	None
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE
S. J. CHILLINO

ROOM NO. & BUILDING
1014 Barton

EXT.
8717

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

[illegible]
[illegible]

DATE
21 APR 1960

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CS/

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST	
2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)	[illegible], DAVID A.
3. POSITION TITLE	OPS O[illegible]
4. GRADE	[illegible]-14
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH	DDP/TR [illegible] Development Complement
6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.	

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☒ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ OVERSEAS RETURN
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	
STATION	
TDY OR PCS	
TYPE OF COVER	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

[illegible]

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

[illegible] B. [illegible]

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: [illegible] Curie

EXT.: [illegible]

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

PLEASE [illegible]

[illegible]

qualified Conv from S.A.PSE

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

3. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

4. GRADE: [illegible]-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH CS/C Development Complement

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☒ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ OVERSEAS RETURN

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	
STATION	
TDY OR PCS	
TYPE OF COVER	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

[illegible] H. GA[illegible]

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1704 Curl

EXT.: 6371

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

PLEASE EXPEDITE

DEPARTMENTAL DUTIES

See Official Commission from St [illegible] SE

DATE: 24 MAR 1960

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

3. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/PR CS/CL Development Complement

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ OVERSEAS RETURN

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD

STATION

TDY OR PCS

TYPE OF COVER

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY *(SF 89)* ATTACHED

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

ROD H. CARIOTTI

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1504 Curtis

EXT.: 8372

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

PLEASE EXPEDITE

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
PHILLIPS, DAVID A. (DEPENDENTS)

3. POSITION TITLE
O S OFFICER

4. GRADE
14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH
DDP/WH CS/CS Development Complement

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ OVERSEAS RETURN
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	
STATION	
TDY OR PCS	
TYPE OF COVER	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)
☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER
SIGNATURE
POD H. Capriotti
ROOM NO. & BUILDING
1504 Curie
EXT.
8371

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

PLEASE EXPEDITE (DEPENDENTS)

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY Ralph S. Pollock, C/CPD

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): PHILLIPS, DAVID A.
2. DATE: 20 Jan 56
3. TO POSITION: Operations Officer (PP)
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH
5. GRADE: GS-14

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☒ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☒ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

Please notify Ken Wambold only, 2508 Curie Hall, x3585

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks:

Subject is qualified for proposed PCS O/S assignment. (1-16-56)

MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Phillips, David A.
2. DATE: 12 Dec., 1955
3. TO POSITION:
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: WH
5. GRADE: GS-12

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks:

Subject is qualified for proposed 7 days TDY assignment. (12/12/55)
Must have a physical examination on return form trip.
This memo supersedes previous qualification.

Tal

MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) PHILLIPS	(First) DAVID	(Middle) ATLEE	2. DATE 30 Dec 1955
3. TO POSITION Ops Officer	4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH W.H		5. GRADE GS-14

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas
Cuba

ETD 17 Feb 1956 PCS

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Subject is qualified for proposed PCS O/S assignment. (1/16/56)

MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) XXXXXXX	(First) PHILLIPS, DAVID A.	(Middle)	2. DATE 2 August 1954
3. TO POSITION	4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH WH		5. GRADE GS 12

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☒ Overseas
Guatemala

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☒ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☒ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks:
WH #I

Mr. GAHAGAN
x 3995

Full duty/General (8-9-54)

Joseph J. Mac

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
< ● 2	6-DIGITS ●	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS ●

4 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR ●	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR ●	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN ~~APPLICANT~~ FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2 EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4 LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< ● 3	●	●	●							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR ●	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR ●	> WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< ● 5	● 024345	● PHI	● A	● BL31	1	+	+	+	+	+	69

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST		
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR
● ++++	+	+	+	+	+	+	++	● 12	18	69

> DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273 LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

PLW

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3 NAME	ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
< ● 4	●	3-LETTERS ●	A - ADDITION TO RECORD C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-51)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PHILLIPS, DAVID A.	3. TYPE CHANGE ADD / CHANGE / DELETE — CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST LAN. CODE · R · W · P · S · U · I/T · YEAR
5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST LAN. CODE · R · W · P · S · U · I/T · YEAR	6. DATE TESTED 12/18/62	7. DATE OF BIRTH 10/31/22	8. GRADE 16
9. OFFICE OR DIVISION WH			

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN PORTUGUESE (BRAZILIAN) [illegible]
(NAME OF LANGUAGE)
AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
I	+	+	+	+

TEST RATINGS
0 = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE
S = SLIGHT H = HIGH
E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

12. SIGNATURE

13. LO NUMBER 17603

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45) **SECRET**

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1 - OP/CAB

SECRET
(When Filled In) Phillips, David A.

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
<• 2	8-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR	
•	•	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	
•	•	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. CODE C-A-D	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 5	• 024345	• PHI	• C	• BK50	E	S	I	I	I	4	61

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	7. DATE OF TEST MO	DA	YR	
• BK50	F	T	0	0	0	4	61	• 06	30	[illegible]	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273. LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

3 Jun [illegible]

The authorization to process this employee's disclaim of proficiency in the language factors indicated on this form is contained in a memorandum on file and designated "Language Proficiency Disclaim File", located in the Qualifications Analysis Branch, Office of Personnel.

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS

—DO NOT ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE THIS FORM UNTIL YOU HAVE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS—

1. Answer all questions completely or check (X) the box which applies. If the question is not applicable, write "NA". If you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records, write "Unknown". Use the blank space on pages 15 and 16 for extra details on any question for which you do not have enough space.
2. Type or print carefully—**USE BLACK TYPEWRITER RIBBON OR BLACK INK.**
3. Leave blank any boxes or columns which are marked "**FOR OFFICE USE ONLY**".
4. Consider each of your answers carefully, accurate completion of the form will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage. Your signature at the end of the form will certify to its correctness.
5. Page 17 entitled "Personal History Summary" must be completed. It is a brief abstract of information from other parts of the form and will *help to speed the processing* of your application.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

GENERAL

1. Full Name (Last-first-middle): Ahern, Virginia, Simmons
2. Age: 26
3. Sex: ☐ Male ☒ Female
4. Social security number: 579-54-5233
5. Nicknames: Gina
6. Other names you have used: N/A
7. Indicate circumstances (including length of time) under which you have used the names noted in item 6 above: N/A
8. If legal change of name, give particulars (Where and by what authority): N/A
9. Height: 5' 3
10. Weight: 105
11. Color of eyes: green
12. Color of hair: blond
13. Type of complexion: fair
14. Build: slight
15. Scars (Type and location): appendix, stomach
16. Other distinguishing physical features: N/A
17. Current address (No., Street, City, State & ZIP code—country if not U.S.): 9741 Corral Dr., Potomac, Maryland 20854
18. Current phone number: 299-5362
19. Long distance area code: 301
20. Permanent address (No., Street, City, State & ZIP code—country if not U.S.): 9741 Corral Dr., Potomac, Maryland 20854
21. Permanent phone number: 299-5362
22. Long distance area code: 301
23. Office phone number: 332-2730
24. Office extension: N/A
25. Legal residence (State, territory or country): Maryland

SECTION II POSITION DATA

POSITION DATA

1. Indicate the type of work or position for which you are applying
2. Indicate the lowest annual entrance salary you will accept $ ____________
3. Dates available for employment Earliest Latest
4. Indicate your willingness to travel

	Occasionally	Other (Specify)
	Frequently	
	Constantly	

5. Indicate your willingness to accept assignment in the following locations—check (X) each item applicable

	Washington, D.C.		Outside continental U.S.
	Anywhere in U.S.		Certain locations only (Specify)

6. Indicate any restrictions you would place on assignments outside the Washington, D.C. area

(For Office Use Only)

Date of this application

THIS SHEET MUST BE COMPLETED

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

CITIZENSHIP

1. Date of birth: 2-26-43
2. Place of birth (City, State, Country): Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
3. Present citizenship (Country): U.S.
4. Citizenship acquired by: ☒ Birth ☐ Marriage ☐ Other (Specify)
5. Date naturalized: N/A
6. Naturalization certificate number: N/A
7. Court issuing naturalization certificate: N/A
8. Issued at (City, State, Country): N/A
9. If alien, give alien registration number: N/A
10. Date and place of arrival in U.S.: N/A
11. Have you held previous nationality? ☐ Yes ☒ No
12. If yes, give name of country: N/A
13. Give particulars concerning previous nationalities: N/A
14. Last U.S. visa (Number, type, place of issue): N/A
15. Date visa issued: n/a

SECTION IV EDUCATION

EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. Name of elementary school	Address (City, State, Country)	Years attended (From – to –)	Graduate
			☐ Yes ☐ No

HIGH SCHOOLS

	Name of high school	Address (City, State, Country)	Years attended (From – to –)	Graduate
1.				☐ Yes ☐ No
2				☐ Yes ☐ No

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	Name and location of college or university	Subject		Years attended		Degree Received	Year Received	Grade or Point Average	Number of Sem./Qtr. Hours (Specify)
		Major	Minor	From –	to –				
1.									
2.									
3.									

4. If a graduate degree has been noted above which required submission of a written thesis, indicate the title of the thesis and briefly describe its content

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	Name and address of school	Study or specialization	From	To	No. of months
1.					
2					
3.					
4					

EDUCATION

EDUCATION (Continued)

MILITARY TRAINING IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Name and address of school	Study or specialization	From	To	No. of months
1.				
2.				
3				

Other education or training not indicated above

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITY

1 List below the foreign language or languages in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency in each of the five skill factors shown (reading comprehension, writing ability, etc.) by noting the number most indicative of your level of skill under the factor being considered.

If your proficiency relates to a particular dialect of a major language, identify this dialect by noting it in parentheses after the language on the same line.

If you have no proficiency in any foreign language, check (X) box at right and leave other items blank. → ☐

Level of Skill

(Slight) 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 (Native)

0 = No proficiency in a specific skill factor

	SKILL FACTORS					HOW ACQUIRED (Check (X) Box(es) which apply)			
	Reading comprehension	Writing ability	Pronunciation	Conversational ability	Oral comprehension	Native of country	Prolonged residence	Contact (with parents, etc.)	Academic study

2. If you have had experience as a translator, interpreter or instructor — explain and specify in which language(s) you have had such experience.

3 Describe your ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, military and other specialized fields

4 If you have noted a proficiency in language, would you be willing to use this ability in any position for which you might be selected? → ☐ Yes ☐ No

(For Office Use Only)

THIS SHEET MUST BE COMPLETED

SECTION XI MARITAL STATUS

MARITAL STATUS

1 Present status (Single, married, widowed, separated, divorced, annulled, remarried) specify ⟶ Divorced

2 State date, place, and reason for all separation, divorces or annulments
2-10-69, Juarez, Mexico, incompatibility

Wife, husband or fiance(e) — If you have been married more than once (including annulments) use separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance(e).

3 Name of spouse (Last) Phillips (First) David (Middle) Atlee (Maiden)

4. State any other names ever used by spouse
N/A

Indicate circumstances (including length of time) under which any names noted in item 4 above were used. If legal change, give particulars (where and by what authority). Use extra space provided on pages 15 and 16 of this form to record this information.

5 Date of birth
10-31-22

6. Place of birth (City, State, Country)
Fort Worth, Texas

7. Date of marriage

8 Place of marriage (City, State, Country)

9 Living
☒ Yes ☐ No

10 Citizenship
U.S.

11. Former citizenship(s) (country(ies))
N/A

12. If alien, give alien registration number
N/A

13 Date U S citizenship acquired
N/A

14. Where acquired
N/A

15 Date and place of arrival in U S.
N/A

16. Naturalization certificate number
N/A

17 Date of death
N/A

18 Cause of death
N/A

19 Current address (Give last address, if deceased)

20. Address of spouse before marriage

21. Occupation
Foreign Service Reserve Officer

22. Present employer (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed, give last two employers)
U.S. Dept of State

23 Employer's or business address (Number, Street, City, State, Country)
U.S. Dept. of State, Washington

24 Dates of military service (From — to — by month & year)

25 Branch of military service

26 Country with which military service affiliated
U.S

27. Details of other government service, U.S. or foreign

SECTION XII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

DEPENDENTS

1 Provide the following information for all children and dependents

Name	Relationship	Date & Place of Birth	Citizenship	Address

2 No. of children (include stepchildren & adopted children) who are unmarried, under 21 years of age, and are NOT self-supporting ▶

3 No. of other dependents (e.g., spouse, parents, stepparents, etc.) who depend on you for at least 50% of their support or children over 21 NOT self supporting ▶

SECTION XVII MOTHER-IN-LAW (If marriage contemplated, fill in information for future mother in law)

MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. Full name (Last – First – Middle – Maiden)

2. State other names she has used

Indicate circumstances (including length of time) under which any names noted in item 2 above were used. If legal change, give particulars (where and by what authority). Use extra space provided on pages 15 and 16 of this form to record this information.

3. Date of birth

4. Place of birth

5. Living ☐ Yes ☐ No

6. Date of death

7. Cause of death

8. Citizenship (Country)

9. Former citizenship(s) [country(ies)]

10. Date U.S. citizenship acquired

11. Where acquired (City, State, Country)

12. Naturalization certificate number

13. If alien, give alien registration number

14. Date and place of arrival in U.S.

15. Occupation

16. Present employer (Give last employer if mother-in law deceased or unemployed)

17. Current address (Give last address, if deceased)

SECTION XVIII RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

RELATIVES WITH FOREIGN CONNECTIONS

(1)

1. Name (Last – First – Middle) Simmons, George Stuart

2. Relationship Grandfather

3. Date of birth 3-17-84

4. Place of birth (City, State, Country) San Francisco, Calif

5. Citizenship (Country) U.S.

6. Address or country in which relative resides 4143 Unterer Zielweg 111, Dornach, Switzerland

7. Employed by N/A

8. Frequency of contact none

9. Date of last contact 1961

(2)

1. Name (Last – First – Middle)

2. Relationship

3. Date of birth

4. Place of birth (City, State, Country)

5. Citizenship (Country)

6. Address or country in which relative resides

7. Employed by

8. Frequency of contact

9. Date of last contact

(3)

1. Name (Last – First – Middle)

2. Relationship

3. Date of birth

4. Place of birth (City, State, Country)

5. Citizenship (Country)

6. Address or country in which relative resides

7. Employed by

8. Frequency of contact

9. Date of last contact

SECTION XIX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

RELATIVES IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

(1)

1. Name (Last – First – Middle)

2. Relationship

3. Date of birth

4. Place of birth (City, State, Country)

5. Citizenship (Country)

6. Address (Number, Street, City, State, Country)

7. Type and location of service (If known)

(2)

1. Name (Last – First – Middle)

2. Relationship

3. Date of birth

4. Place of birth (City, State, Country)

5. Citizenship (Country)

6. Address (Number, Street, City, State, Country)

7. Type and location of service (If known)

(3)

1. Name (Last – First – Middle)

2. Relationship

3. Date of birth

4. Place of birth (City, State, Country)

5. Citizenship (Country)

6. Address (Number, Street, City, State Country)

7. Type and location of service (If known)

(For Office Use Only)

THIS SHEET MUST BE COMPLETED

Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by the section and item number to which it relates and sign your name at the end of the material. If additional space is required beyond page 16, use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

SECTION XI MARITAL STATUS FORMER HUSBAND

3. Ahorn, Thomas Joseph
4. N/A
5. 4-12-40
6. Washington, D.C.
7. 4-6-59
8. Hyattsvillo, Maryland
9. yes
10. U.S.
11. N/A
12. N/A
13. N/A
14. N/A
15. N/A
16. N/A
17. N/A
18. N/A
19. U.S. Embassy, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
20. 4622 Hunt Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland
21. Foreign Service Reserve Officer
22. U.S. Dept. of State
23. U.S. Dept. of State, Santo Domingo, Washington, D.C.
24. N/A
25. N/A
26. N/A
27. N/A

(Signature)

Space for extra details continued on page 16

THIS SHEET MUST BE COMPLETED

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT — (Appendix I)

Listed below are names of organizations identified by the Attorney General, under his responsibility pursuant to Executive Order 10450, dated 27 April 1953, to list the names of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which he designates as Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or as having adopted or having shown a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Each applicant or employee and spouse (if any) must review the following list of organizations for certification purposes, and sign on the last page.

Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
Action Committee to Free Spain Now
Alabama People's Educational Association (see Communist Political Association)
American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
American Branch of the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions
American Christian Nationalist Party
American Committee for European Workers' Relief (see Socialist Workers Party)
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born
American Committee for Spanish Freedom
American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidjan, Inc
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
American Committee to Survey Labor Conditions in Europe
American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee for National Unity
American Council on Soviet Relations
American Croatian Congress
American Jewish Labor Council
American League Against War and Fascism
American League for Peace and Democracy
American National Labor Party
American National Socialist League
American National Socialist Party
American Nationalist Party
American Patriots, Inc.
American Peace Crusade
American Peace Mobilization
American Poles for Peace
American Polish Labor Council
American Polish League
American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the United American Spanish Aid Committee)
American-Russian Fraternal Society
American Russian Institute, New York, also known as the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union
American Russian Institute, Philadelphia
American Russian Institute of San Francisco
American Russian Institute of Southern California, Los Angeles
American Slav Congress
American Women for Peace
American Youth Congress
American Youth for Democracy
Armenian Progressive League of America
Associated Klans of America
Association of Georgia Klans
Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party

Baltimore Forum
Benjamin Davis Freedom Committee
Black Dragon Society
Boston School for Marxist Studies, Boston, Massachusetts
Bridges-Robertson-Schmidt Defense Committee
Bulgarian American People's League of the United States of America

California Emergency Defense Committee
California Labor School, Inc., 321 Divisadero Street, San Francisco, California
Carpatho-Russian People's Society
Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent, also known as Central Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian Women
Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai)
Central Japanese Association of Southern California
Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance (Deutsche-Amerikanische Einheitsfront)
Cervantes Fraternal Society
China Welfare Appeal, Inc.
Chopin Cultural Center
Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges
Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)
Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder
Citizens Emergency Defense Conference
Citizens Protective League
Civil Liberties Sponsoring Committee of Pittsburgh
Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations, including:
  Civil Rights Congress for Texas
  Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York
Civil Rights Congress for Texas (see Civil Rights Congress)
Columbians
Comite Coordinador Pro Republica Espanola
Comite Pro Derechos Civiles
(See Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles)
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
Committee for Constitutional and Political Freedom
Committee for Nationalist Action
Committee for Peace and Brotherhood Festival in Philadelphia
Committee for the Defense of the Pittsburgh Six
Committee for the Negro in the Arts
Committee for the Protection of the Bill of Rights
Committee for World Youth Friendship and Cultural Exchange
Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland
(See Congress Against Discrimination; Maryland Congress Against Discrimination; Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland)
Committee to Aid the Fighting South
Committee to Defend Marie Richardson
Committee to Defend the Rights and Freedom of Pittsburgh's Political Prisoners
Committee to Uphold the Bill of Rights
Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas
Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates

CERTIFICATION

I certify that I have read the names of the above listed organizations.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, I am not, nor have I been a member of, contributed to, received literature from, signed petitions of or in behalf of, or attended meetings of any organization listed above, or any organization outside the United States espousing Communist, Fascist, Totalitarian or Nazi causes, except as noted below.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, none of my close relatives are, nor have ever been members of, contributed to, received literature from, signed petitions of or in behalf of, or attended meetings of any such organizations, except as noted below.

INSTRUCTIONS

For the purpose of this certification, if an applicant or employee is completing this form, the term "close relative" will include spouse, children, parents, brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts. "Close relatives" of the spouse, for this purpose, will include children, parents, brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts.

If there are exceptions to this certification, set forth below under Remarks all pertinent information concerning the nature and extent of your activities or those of your close relatives in such organizations, including the names of the organizations, dates of membership, meetings attended, titles of positions held, amounts and dates of contributions, nature of petitions signed falling within the meaning of the above certification and circumstances thereof, titles and authors of literature received, and dates on which received.

In exceptions concerning relatives, include only such information presently known to you or available from your own records.

If necessary, use additional sheets and sign each sheet. Write none if there are no exceptions.

REMARKS: To be completed by Spouse	REMARKS: To be completed by Applicant or Employee
Date	Date March 12, 1969
Signature of Spouse	Signature of Applicant or Employee Virginia S. Ahern
Address — City and State	Address — City and State Potomac, Maryland
Witness	Witness
Address — City and State	Address — City and State

PHILLIPS DAVID A   1065 WH

[illegible] (1) [illegible]   (2)   (3) [illegible]   (4)

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF GRANTING OR OF REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE

THE ABOVE NAMED INDIVIDUAL (ITEM 1) HAS BEEN GRANTED A CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE (OR THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE HELD BY THIS INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN REVOKED) UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF HR 90-4. THE CLEARANCE (ITEM 2) OR REVOCATION (ITEM 4), IS EFFECTIVE AS OF THE MONTH AND YEAR SHOWN ABOVE. SUBJECT HAS BEEN BRIEFED OR DEBRIEFED, AS APPROPRIATE, CONCERNING CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND RELATED COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MATTERS AND HAS SIGNED A BRIEFING/DEBRIEFING STATEMENT, AS APPROPRIATE, ACKNOWLEDGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION. UPON REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE SUBJECT IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO HAVE CONTINUED CUSTODY OF, ACCESS TO, OR OTHERWISE GAIN FURTHER KNOWLEDGE OF STAFF CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL OR INFORMATION.

WHEN EMPLOYEE NO LONGER REQUIRES THE CLEARANCE IN ORDER TO PERFORM HIS/HER ASSIGNED DUTIES, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY STAFF, OC, BE NOTIFIED THAT THE CLEARANCE MAY BE REVOKED.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS.

CHIEF, [redacted] BRANCH, OC-S

DOCTRINES

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - EMPLOYEE'S COMPONENT (ITEM 3)
1 - OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

FORM 12-63 597b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) [illegible]	LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA		2. LD NO. [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE Phillips, David A.	4. OFFICE OR DIVISION WH	5. LANGUAGE Spanish	6. LANG. CODE (25-27) 720
7. DATE OF TEST (46-51) June 10, 1961	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE Mar. 16, 1962	9. GRADE 15	10. DATE OF BIRTH Oct. 31, 1922

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST
☐ APPLY FOR AWARD
☐ ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
[illegible]	[illegible]	-		-

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)
☐ A
☐ M
☒ NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)
level of proficiency not maintained

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ (40-45)
SIGNATURE
DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.
CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (10-45) MRD COPY

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) [illegible]			2. ID NO. [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE Phillips, David A.	4. OFFICE OR DIVISION [illegible]	5. LANGUAGE French	6. LANG. CODE (25-27) [illegible]
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51 June 20, [illegible]	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE Mar. 14, [illegible]	9. GRADE 14	10. DATE OF BIRTH Oct. 31, 1922

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST
- ☐ APPLY FOR AWARD
- ☐ ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
[illegible]	[illegible]	-	-	-

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)
- ☐ A
- ☐ M
- ☒ NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)
Did not achieve an awardable level.

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ (40-45)
SIGNATURE
DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.
CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (10-45) MRD COPY

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
524345

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24): PHILLIPS, DAVID A.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30): MONTH: October DAY: 31 YEAR: 1922

3. LANGUAGE (31-33): FRENCH 265

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39): MONTH: March DAY: 14 YEAR: 60

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC. USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

[✓ 4] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE..

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3 BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 14 MARCH 1900	SIGNATURE
(46) 5	(47) F

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
524345

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)
PHILLIPS, DAVID ATLEE

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
OCTOBER	31	1922

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)
SPANISH DO

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
MARCH	14	1960

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

[✓ 1.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

NTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

[✓ 2.] I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

[✓ 1] I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2 I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

[✓ 3] BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 14 MARCH 1960	SIGNATURE
(46)	(47)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
963003

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)
DAVID A Phillips
[redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)
MONTH: OCTOBER
DAY: 31
YEAR: 19~~[illegible]~~ 22

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)
FRENCH 265

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)
MONTH: OCTOBER
DAY: 22
YEAR: 1957

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

13

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c-1
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. **Speaking (43)**

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. **Understanding (44)**

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

[✓ 3.] I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE /S/ -
(46) C	(47) E

56
[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
413003

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)
David A. Phillips
[redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)
MONTH: OCTOBER DAY: 31 YEAR: 1922

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)
SPANISH 720

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)
MONTH: OCTOBER DAY: 22 YEAR: 1957

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

[✓ 1.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

[✓ 2.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c-1
1 MAR 5

SECRET

(4-55)

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. **Speaking (43)**

[✓ 1.] I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. **Understanding (44)**

[✓ 1.] I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE. I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE. I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING – CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

[✓ 3.] BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-119, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE
(46) C	(47) A

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SECURITY APPROVAL

[illegible]

DATE : 9 February 1960

YOUR REFERENCE: E-8573 CS/CS Dev. Comp.

CASE NO. : 40696

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : **PHILLIPS, David Atlee**

1. This is to inform you of security approval of the subject person as follows:

☒ Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Regulations 10-210 and 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

☐ Subject has been approved for appointment under the authority of Paragraph 4(d) of Regulation 10-210, and under Regulation 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☒ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☐ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne
Acting Chief, Personnel Security Division

Mr. [illegible] advised (WH.) 2-10-60

[illegible] ok per Mr. [illegible] - 2-24-60

FORM NO. 1173 1 MAR 57 REPLACES FORM 30-104 WHICH IS OBSOLETE

CONFIDENTIAL (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 26 April 1955

Your Reference: SR-6038-PP

Case Number: 10696

TO: Chief, Processing & Records Division
Personnel Office

FROM: Chief, Security Division
Personnel

SUBJECT: PHILLIPS, David Atlee

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of EOD procedures.

4. This clearance is retroactive to 1 April 1955 per Myers.

Ermal P. Geiss

Ermal P. Geiss

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "N/A." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? [illegible]

Sec. I - PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME Miss Mrs. Mr. [illegible] Telephone Office Ext. Home [illegible]

PRESENT ADDRESS [illegible]

PERMANENT ADDRESS [illegible]

B. NICKNAME [illegible] WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? [illegible]

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? [illegible]

HOW LONG? [illegible] IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS [illegible]

C. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

IF NATURALIZED, CERTIFICATE NO. [illegible]

[illegible]

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? [illegible]

[illegible]

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient space.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? [illegible]

SECTION I PERSONAL BACKGROUND

FULL NAME Mr. [illegible] (First) (Middle) (Last)

PERMANENT ADDRESS [illegible]

MAILING ADDRESS [illegible]

[illegible]

MARITAL STATUS

SINGLE [illegible] MARRIED [illegible] DIVORCED [illegible] WIDOWED [illegible]

[illegible]

WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE [illegible] Florence [illegible]

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE [illegible], 19[illegible]

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE [illegible], Dallas, Texas, USA

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS [illegible], Falls Church, Va. USA

DATE OF BIRTH Nov. [illegible], 1919 PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED WHERE

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYED [illegible]

EMPLOYER OR BUSINESS ADDRESS [illegible], Dallas, Texas USA

[illegible]

14. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME Maria Louise Phillips RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS 949 Rose Lane, Falls Church, Va. USA
(St and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME David Atlee Phillips, Jr. RELATIONSHIP Son AGE [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS 949 Rose Lane, Falls Church, Va. USA
(St and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME Atlee Young Phillips RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 8
CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS 949 Rose Lane, Falls Church, Va. USA
(St and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

15. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME [illegible] Thomas Phillips
(First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Deceased DATE OF DECEASE 1952 CAUSE [illegible]

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS 607 [illegible], Fort Worth, Texas USA
(St and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Approx. 1888 PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] Texas USA
(City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED WHERE

OCCUPATION Attorney PRESENT EMPLOYER Self

[illegible]

16. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

[illegible]

[illegible] MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Florence [illegible] [illegible]
(First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Deceased DATE OF DECEASE [illegible] CAUSE [illegible]

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS None [illegible] [illegible] USA
Approx. (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] [illegible]

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED WHERE

OCCUPATION Housewife EMPLOYER

10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES

NAME [illegible] Phillips RELATIONSHIP [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP US ADDRESS [illegible]

NAME RELATIONSHIP

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS

NAME RELATIONSHIP

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS

11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE EMPLOY OF [illegible] THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

NAME None

[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible] EDUCATION

[illegible] SCHOOL [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible], Texas [illegible]

DATES ATTENDED [illegible] GRADUATE? [illegible]

HIGH SCHOOL [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible], Texas [illegible]

DATES ATTENDED [illegible] GRADUATE? [illegible]

COLLEGE [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible], Va. [illegible]

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY [illegible] YEARS COMPLETED [illegible]

DATES ATTENDED [illegible] DEGREE [illegible]

[illegible] ADDRESS [illegible], Texas [illegible]

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY [illegible] YEARS COMPLETED [illegible]

DATES ATTENDED [illegible] DEGREE [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ACTIVE [illegible] OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

[illegible]

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NO. [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON — [illegible]

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS — [illegible]

[illegible] 21A. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible] CLASSIFICATION GRADE IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE [illegible]

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY [illegible]

ADDRESS [illegible]

KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible] NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB [illegible] SALARY [illegible]

[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION GRADE IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE [illegible]

[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION GRADE
IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE

EMPLOYER'S NAME (OR AGENCY)

ADDRESS

KIND OF BUSINESS
NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB
SALARY

YOUR DUTIES

[illegible]

REASONS FOR LEAVING

FROM
TO

CLASSIFICATION GRADE
IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE

EMPLOYER'S NAME (OR AGENCY)

ADDRESS

KIND OF BUSINESS
NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB
SALARY

YOUR DUTIES

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO [illegible] POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER [illegible] WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

FOREIGN LANGUAGES [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U.S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

[illegible]	Res. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Bus. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Res. Add. [illegible]	New York	N.Y.
	Bus. Add. [illegible]	New York	N.Y.
[illegible]	Res. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Bus. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Res. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Bus. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Res. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Bus. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible] NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

[illegible]	Res. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Bus. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Res. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Bus. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] Arthur D. Carter	Res. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Bus. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Res. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Bus. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Res. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Bus. Add. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible] GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST [illegible]

[illegible]

Sec. [illegible]. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST [illegible]

[illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

Sec. [illegible]. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

FROM 194[illegible] TO 19[illegible] [illegible]

FROM 19[illegible] TO 19[illegible] [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible] [illegible]

FROM TO

FROM TO

Sec. [illegible]. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

Actor's Equity [illegible] W. 46th St. New York N.Y.

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: [illegible]

American [illegible] Society [illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

[illegible]

MISCELLANEOUS

DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATE THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

[illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL [illegible] MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

[illegible]

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

[illegible] 19[illegible]

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS [illegible] ACCORDING TO THE [illegible] OF THE [illegible] YOUR NAME AT THE END OF [illegible] ADDITIONAL PAGES [illegible]

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Phillips, DAVID A.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 25-MARCH 1955 - 27 Feb 1976

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP Files

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2/10/78	2/10/78	DAN Hardway	Dan Hardway
17-APR-78	4/17/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

JOB # 73-154 BOX #
TO RECORD CENTER
ELY AFTER USE
54 BOX 3

022163

Contract Service — Michael M. CHOADEN (P) GS

Date	Action	Compensation	Expended
1 Feb 51	Independent contractor	$600 per mo	
28 Feb 51	~~Independent~~ contract terminated	600 " "	
25 Jan 52	Independent contractor	$6,000 p.a.	
31 Aug 53	Contract terminated	6,000	
4 Mar 54	Contract Employee	$7,200	
31 Jul 54	Contract terminated	7,200	
1 Aug 54	Contract Employee	8,360	
31 Mar 55	Contract terminated	8,360	
1 Apr 55 13 Aug 58	Agency Staff Agent service		
19 Aug 58	Independent contractor (Note: the base rate of pay of $7,200 is subject to increase on occasions wherein subject performs specialized assignments)	~~[illegible]~~ $7,200	
13 Mar 60	~~[illegible]~~ Contract terminated	7,200	
14 Mar 60	Entered on duty as an Agency Staff Employee at the rate of GS-14/3 ($11,835).		

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

13 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Earnings of David A. Phillips

In accordance with your telephone request, the following is a record of income earned by Mr. Phillips during the period 19 August 1958 through 13 March 1960. Mr. Phillips was paid at $7,200 P/A, with the exception of those periods of service performed outside of his country of permanent assignment and then he was paid at $13,000 P/A.

DATES	PAID AT $7200 P/A	DUE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN $7200 P/A & $13000 P/A	TOTAL
19-31 Aug 58	$ 240.00	-0-	$ 240.00
Sept 58	600.00	$ 32.22	632.22
Oct 58	600.00	434.97	1034.97
Nov 58-Jan 59	1800.00	-0-	1800.00
Feb 59	600.00	88.60	688.60
March 59	600.00	-0-	600.00
April 59	600.00	157.07	757.07
May 59	600.00	128.88	728.88
June-July 59	1200.00	-0-	1200.00
Aug 59	600.00	80.55	680.55
Sept 59-Feb 60	3600.00	-0-	3600.00
1-13 March 60	260.00	-0-	260.00
Totals	$11,300.00	$922.29	$12,222.29

JOSEPH H. HUDSON
Deputy Chief
Compensation and Tax Division

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

Out of Country 6 times

P.O. Jim Hudson

David Phillips

19 Aug 58 — $7200

19-31 Aug 58	—	$260	
Sep 58	—	600 + 32.22	$632.22
Oct 58	—	600 + 289.98	889.98
Nov 58	— Thru Jan 59	600	$1800.00
Feb 59	—	600 + 88.60	688.60
Mar 59	—		600.00
Apr 59	—	600 + 157.07	757.07
May 59	—	600 + 128.88	728.88
Jun. 59		600	600.00
Jul 59		600	600.00
Aug 59		600 + 80.55	680.55
Sept 59		600	600.00
Oct 59		600	600.00
Nov 59		600	600.00
Dec. 59		600	600.00
Jan 60		600	600.00
Feb 60		600	600.00
1-13 Mar 60		260	260.00

$11,320 paid at $7,200

also pay $777.30

Total Paid $12,097.30

4 March 1975

BACKGROUND ON REQUEST FOR CREDITABLE SERVICE: August 1950 Until 3 March 1954

1. A basic document in consideration of this request is HCSA-825, dated 4 February 1954.

Polygraph C
Commitment
Courses
Via
process
C

2. I was running an English-language newspaper in Santiago, Chile when asked to work with our Station there. My first pay was $50.00 per month. The file contains a project approval dated 31 May 1950; TCS-A-1064 asks that the first payment be made to the U.S. bank on 1 August 1950.

3. During this period I recall a number of activities undertaken for the Station, and I travelled to New York for clandestine training. The file indicates "He was originally approved operationally to handle the complex Soviet espionage case of FULMINATER-2. His conduct of this case was considered excellent...." Also, "It will be recalled that Headquarters was very pleased with the printing job...which he had done." The latter was indicative of a number of such chores, when I stayed behind in my plant after the employees had left for the night, printing leaflets, booklets, etc. I also handled agents and did a number of spotting and assessing jobs for the Station.

4. I signed a new contract on 25 January 1952 for $500.00 per month which ran until the termination date of 31 August 1953. (Actually this was in the form of a loan which was paid off at the rate of $500.00. The advance was used to purchase printing equipment which allowed me to do certain work for the Station, but which I retained.)"

5. After termination of the contract on 31 August I remained in Chile until 4 March 1954. During this period I recruited a CP agent who still works for the Station--and was a cabinet member under Allende. On 3 February 1954 Headquarters asked that I be made available for another assignment. The Station pointed out that I was working on the recruitment, and that I and my family were planning on a European vacation. Headquarters again requested my assignment. Thus I departed for the Guatemala project in early March, abandoning my free family trip to Europe (tickets paid for by advertising in my paper) and leaving my family behind to pack up. I accepted this assignment without knowing where it was, or for how long it would last. Indeed I did not even have a contract.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 024345

6. I worked for the Agency in Santiago, then, between 1 August 1950 until departure for PBSUCCESS on 4 March 1954. I was always available and when I finally did leave it was for Agency business rather than my own. Thus I request that all or part of this time be approved as creditable toward retirement."

David A. Phillips

Mr. DeFelice:

Information from Adele regarding Dave Phillips' creditable service:

As of 31 December 1974:

18 years, 11 months, 27 days
(Agency civilian service)

2 years, 8 months, 11 days
(military service)

Total creditable service:

21 years, 8 months, 8 days.

Sick leave will be added to that.

For your information, Paul Seidel has an appointment with Mr. Phillips on Wednesday afternoon. He is in the CIARDS system and with his birth date in 1922, he is eligible for voluntary retirement.

Bonnie

18 - 11 23

Mar 54 - July 54 - 4 mos -

1 Aug 54 - 31 Mar 55 8 mos [illegible]

April 55 - 15 Mar 56 3 [illegible]

Mar 56 - Mar [illegible] - 1 5

Staff Agent - 7 Feb 56 - 13 Aug 58

Payne's [illegible] - Show

Contract Agent - 1 Feb 51 - 28 Feb 51 -

Contract Agent 25 Jan 52 - 31 Aug 53

Contract Employee 4 March 54 - 31 Mar 55

Staff Employee 1 April 55 - 6 Feb 56

Staff Agent 7 Feb 56 - 13 Aug 58

Contract Agent 14 Aug 58 - 13 Mar 60

Staff Employee 14 Mar 60 - 6 [illegible]

David A. Phillips.

Excepted Appointment Staff Employee 1 Apr 55

Resignation Staff Employee 6 Feb 56

Excepted Appointment Staff Agent 7 Feb 56

Resignation Staff Agent 13 Aug 58

Contract Agent 19 Aug 58
Terminated 13 Mar 60

Excepted Appt Staff Employee 14 Mar 60
Staff Employee since 14 March 1960

SECRET

21 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance/C&TD

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Employee Service of David A. Phillips, current staff employee for period 19 August 1958 through 13 March 1960.

REFERENCE : Memorandum from Deputy Chief Comp & Tax Division subject earnings of David A. Phillips dated 13 May 1975

1. Based upon new information it has now been determined that subject served as an Agency contract employee during period 19 August 1958 through 13 March 1960, and that this period is creditable for both retirement and leave account category purposes. Civil Service Retirement deductions were not withheld during the period. Records of this office reflect subject was authorized compensation during referenced period at the rate of $7,200 per annum, except that when he was outside of the United States he was paid at the rate of $13,000 per annum. For times and amounts involved in change of rate see reference.

2. Action required:

(a) Office of Finance: Please post the above information to subjects retirement records.

(b) DDO/LA/Pers: Please advise subject of the contents of this memorandum.

(c) RAD/ROB: For your information and assistance in retirement processing.

Rogers C. Brooks
Deputy Chief
Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DDO/LA/Pers
1 - RAD/ROB

OGC Concurrence: [illegible] 75

SECRET

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

13 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Earnings of David A. Phillips

In accordance with your telephone request, the following is a record of income earned by Mr. Phillips during the period 19 August 1958 through 13 March 1960. Mr. Phillips was paid at $7,200 P/A, with the exception of those periods of service performed outside of his country of permanent assignment and then he was paid at $13,000 P/A.

DATES	PAID AT $7200 P/A	DUE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN $7200 P/A & $13000 P/A	TOTAL
19-31 Aug 58	$ 240.00	-0-	$ 240.00
Sept 58	600.00	$ 32.22	632.22
Oct 58	600.00	434.97	1034.97
Nov 58-Jan 59	1800.00	-0-	1800.00
Feb 59	600.00	88.60	688.60
March 59	600.00	-0-	600.00
April 59	600.00	157.07	757.07
May 59	600.00	128.88	728.88
June-July 59	1200.00	-0-	1200.00
Aug 59	600.00	80.55	680.55
Sept 59-Feb 60	3600.00	-0-	3600.00
1-13 March 60	260.00	-0-	260.00
Totals	$11,300.00	$922.29	$12,222.29

JHH

JOSEPH H. HUDSON
Deputy Chief
Compensation and Tax Division

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

21 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance/C&TD

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Employee Service of David A. Phillips, current staff employee for period 19 August 1958 through 13 March 1960.

REFERENCE : Memorandum from Deputy Chief Comp & Tax Division subject earnings of David A. Phillips dated 13 May 1975

1. Based upon new information it has now been determined that subject served as an Agency contract employee during period 19 August 1958 through 13 March 1960, and that this period is creditable for both retirement and leave account category purposes. Civil Service Retirement deductions were not withheld during the period. Records of this office reflect subject was authorized compensation during referenced period at the rate of $7,200 per annum, except that when he was outside of the United States he was paid at the rate of $13,000 per annum. For times and amounts involved in change of rate see reference.

2. Action required:

(a) Office of Finance: Please post the above information to subjects retirement records.

(b) DDO/LA/Pers: Please advise subject of the contents of this memorandum.

(c) RAD/ROB: For your information and assistance in retirement processing.

/s/ Rogers C. Brooks

Rogers C. Brooks
Deputy Chief
Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DDO/LA/Pers
1 - RAD/ROB

1 - Subjects CPD file
1 - CPD Chrono file
DDA/OP/CPD: RCB;sp (21 May 1975)

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

SECRET

SECRET

10 MAR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TRB

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Employee Service for Michael M. CHOADEN (P) Current Staff Employee

REFERENCE : CPD Memorandum of 30 June 1966 to Chief, TRB, Subject "Record of Contract Service for CHOADEN, Michael M.

1. Referent memorandum is revised in its entirety to reflect the following periods of full time contract employee service as being creditable service for both leave and Civil Service Retirement purposes.

DATE	ACTION	PER ANNUM COMPENSATION
4 March 1954	Contract employee	$7,200
31 July 1954	Contract terminated	7,200
1 August 1954	Contract employee	8,360
31 March 1955	Contract terminated	8,360

2. Period of service 4 March 1954 through 31 December 1954 had in previous memorandum been declared creditable service for both leave and retirement purposes. It denied creditable retirement service for the period 1 January 1955 through 31 March 1955 because of a Federal statutory provision relating to periods covered by Social Security. The foregoing position was removed by P. L. 91-630 of 31 December 1970, thereby having the effect of rendering said service as creditable.

3. Action required:

   a. Office of Personnel/TRB: Please file this memorandum in subject's official personnel file folder.

   b. Office of Personnel/ROB: For your information.

[illegible]

c. Office of Finance/C&TD: Please post the above information to subject's retirement records.

d. DDO/LA/Personnel: Please advise subject of the contents of this memorandum.

Rogers C. Brooks
Deputy Chief
Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - CP/ROB
1 - OF/C&TD
1 - DDO/LA/Personnel
1 - CPD Subject file
1 - CPD Chrono
OP/CPD/R.C.Brooks:jc (10 March 1975)

14-00000

SECRET

MEMO FOR: The File

SUBJECT : Michael M. CHOADEN (P), Verification of Contract Service

19 Oct 70

Subject, now a Staff Employee, asked Don DeFelice to see if any of his old contract time is creditable towards CIARDS retirement. Currently, subject is assigned PCS in WH field, but is currently in Hqtrs on TDY.

21 Oct 70:

Met with subject and discussed all aspects of his questions and his prior contractual service. Provided him with information concerning his service, that criteria CPD used in determining independent contractor service vs contract employee service, applicability of the "social Security rule" precluding the use of contract employee time under social security being creditable retirement time, etc. Also, provided subject with a sample of a memo which could be written to CPD requesting old independent contractor time be recatorized as contract employee time. Also indicated to subject we would help him draft an appropriate memo if he (subject) felt he had a good case. In general, from information provided by subject, it seemed that subject's old independent contractor time was not of a type that might lend itself to conversion to contract employee time.

3 Dec 70: As of this date, CPD had heard nothing more from subject and it was therefore assumed that subject had, at least for the immediate moment, decided not to pursue the matter further.

Paul Wilson
3 Dec 1970

Michael M. CHOADEN

[redacted]),

O/Personnel/Contract Personnel Div
5E-69 Hqtrs.
(Paul R. Wilson)

23 April 1970

OP/RAD - 205 Magazine Bldg.
Attn: Adele J.Sukowicz

1. Adele: Hope the following will help you:

(a) Attached is our CPD file on loan. In it find a chrono of all of subject's contract service.

(b) Information in our CPD memo of 30 June 66 is reaffirmed. However, note it did not cite subject's 1951/52/53 service, which service is cited in the O/Finance memo of 16 June 1966. This 1951/52/53 service is independent contractor service and not creditable for purposes of Civil Service Retirement.

(c) Our CPD memo of 30 Jun 66 indicates subject had a social security obligation for period 1 Jan 55 thru 31 Mar 55. Since this obligation came about retroactively in Mid 1955, possibility exists that neither subject or the Agency made contributions to the Social Security System. If they were not made, it is possible for such to be made at this late date and if subject or WH Division is interested in looking into this, they should contact Rod Brooks of CPD.

Paul R. Wilson

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) [redacted] CHOADEN

FROM: WH Personnel 3D3102

EXTENSION: 6815

NO.

DATE: 6 April 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CP/RAD 205 Magazine ATTN: Adele J. Sukowicz				CHOADEN Attached is Mr. [redacted]s official file and a dispatch from him in which he requests a computation of his time with the Agency for retirement purposes. It is a very complicated case. Good luck! Ruth Sanford WH Personnel
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6. Chief, Contract Personnel Div 5 E 69 HQS				1 to 6: On the basis of CPL's memo dated 30 June 1966 (copy attached) ruling on the creditability of Subject's contract service, ROB can reply to the attached dispatch. However, it is requested that CPL review HERT for its factual content and advise ROB if the memo of 30 Jun 66 is reaffirmed. Your attention is invited to a discrepancy in identifying 1951 contract service. In the dispatch (para 5) Subject refers to himself as a "covert associate"; the Office of Finance (see memo dtd 16 Jun 66) copy attached) lists the time as "contract agent" service; and your memo of 30 Jun 66 lists the time as "contract employee" service.
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Operational Services

FROM
Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

SUBJECT
Request for Review of Retirement Status---Michael C. CHOADEN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Paragraph 9 et all

1. During his RVROCK career Michael C. CHOADEN has served as Contract Agent, Covert Associate, Staff Agent and Contract Employee. On one occasion CHOADEN resigned from RVROCK, became a Contract Agent, then returned as a Staff Employee. The purpose of this dispatch is to request a review of exactly what CHOADEN's status has been over the years, what must be done to repay retirement funds for any periods of creditable service not now covered, and to study the possibility that some periods of tenure might be converted from uncreditable to creditable status.

2. CHOADEN served in the Air Force from February 1943 through October 1945, with total service of two years, eight months and 19 days.

3. The dates of CHOADEN's first RVROCK service in Santiago, Chile, are very hazy to CHOADEN. He does recall that he was first recruited by the COS, but cannot recall if this was on a formal, salaried basis. At some time during 1950 or 1951, probably the latter, CHOADEN signed an RVROCK contract, for at least two years, possibly longer. The salary is remembered as US$500 per month, and on one occasion this salary was paid in advance to allow CHOADEN to purchase printing equipment. Please check the contract covering this period and advise Rio (a) the duration of the contract and (b) if any provision for deductions (or future payment of) was made. If, as CHOADEN suspects, there were no deductions, even for Social Security, CHOADEN would appreciate Headquarters comment on the possibility that this period might be retroactively converted to creditable service status (after payments into retirement system, of course). In this connection it is suggested

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD
2 - Chief, OPSER

REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HBRT-7797	DATE 25 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

that a discussion might be held with James G. COLLETT, who was COS in Santiago during most of that time. CHOADEN believes that COLLETT will confirm that CHOADEN demonstrated his intense interest in his RVROCK work by performing not only the work called for in his contract (mostly clandestine printing) but other chores as well. Example: during this period, or perhaps just after the expiration of CHOADEN's contract, CHOADEN, under Station guidance and instruction, approached and recruited a Communist Party agent. (It is understood that the agent is still reporting.) Another example: in March 1954, COS COLLETT approached CHOADEN and asked him if he would accept the Headquarters' request that he leave Chile, board an airplane for the U.S. and assist in an unidentified operation which would last "some months." That was the extent of the offer. CHOADEN accepted. This was despite the fact that he had no contract, and that he had to leave his family behind and to abandon a trip which had been planned through Europe. It is believed that this indicates that CHOADEN was pretty much "under RVROCK control" during this period. (Perhaps training records can assist in finding information on this Chilean period, as CHOADEN went to New York on one occasion for a six-week training course).

4. The next period of contract employment is also hazy. The operation in which CHOADEN was asked to participate turned out to be PBSUCCESS. Some sort of contract was drawn up, but CHOADEN does not recall if any deduction for retirement was made, nor of the terms of the contract. It is requested that this contract be reviewed and, should there have been no retirement credit, that it too be reviewed for possible conversion to creditable service. There is no question of CHOADEN "responding to RVROCK control" during this period. It was full time work, and most of it performed away from family---some of it in the jungle. About sixty days, CHOADEN recalls, was spent [redacted], in Project PBHISTORY. CHOADEN was awarded an RVROCK decoration for his work during this period. ABROAD.

5. As the result of his participation in PBSUCCESS, CHOADEN was contracted as a Covert Associate from (about; this is a guess) October, 1954 until April of 1955. CHOADEN distinctly recalls that this contract called for retirement credit if chosen as a future option. (It is not impossible that this contract was made retroactive to cover CHOADEN's departure from Chile in March, 1954.) It would be appreciated if Rio would be advised of the exact duration and terms of this contract.

6. CHOADEN was a Staff Employee from 1 April 1955 until 13 July of 1958, when he resigned. Retirement payments for this period were returned to CHOADEN, and he understands that they must be repaid sometime before retirement to make the period creditable.

7. After resigning in 1958 CHOADEN went to Cuba and within a week signed a contract---as an independent operator and, to the best of CHOADEN's recollection, without any retirement benefits. Again, it is requested that this contract be reviewed with the view of possible conversion to creditable status.

8. On March 14, 1960 CHOADEN again became a Staff Employee, and has remained in that status.

9. Despite a rather long tenure with RVROCK CHOADEN now finds that much of his service is either not creditable, or is creditable and not paid. CHOADEN would like to set this house in order, and to begin having regular deductions from his salary begin building up his paid-up creditable retirement equities. Headquarters' assistance in arriving at this happy state would be appreciated. CHOADEN is especially interested in obtaining approval for conversion of the early contract days in Chile. It seems apparent that if repayment into the retirement system is to be initiated,

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HBRT-7797

it would be wiser to repay the early years first (so as to add more time more quickly with less payment). In any event, a Headquarters' review of the case would be appreciated.

Michael C. CHOADEN

30 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, TRB

SUBJECT : Record of Contract Service for
[redacted]
CHOADEN, MICHAEL M.

1. Per your request we are forwarding record of Subject's contract service:

Date	Action
4 March 1954	Hired as Contract Employee
31 July 1954	Terminated
1 August 1954	Hired as Contract Employee
31 March 1955	Terminated
19 August 1958	Hired as Contract Agent
13 March 1960	Terminated

2. Subject was employed on a full time basis with leave benefits from 4 March 1954 through 31 March 1955. Accordingly, this entire period is "creditable" for establishing his annual leave category. However, the period from 19 August 1958 through 13 March 1960, as an independent contractor, is not creditable for this purpose. Only the period from 4 March 1954 through 31 December 1954 is "creditable for Civil Service Retirement, since Contract Employee's were mandatorily covered by Social Security as of 1 January 1955.

3. Attached is OF record of Agency service with salary breakdown.

Rogers C. Brooks
Acting Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
2 - CPD

16 June 1966

Chief, Contract Personnel Division
ATTN : Mary Kay Spink

Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

Agency Service of [redacted]

The records of the Office of Finance show the following Agency service for Subject:

Contract Agent:

EOD 1 February 1951 @ $600.00 P/M
Term 28 February 1951 @ $600.00 P/M

EOD 29 January 1952 @ $6000.00 P/A
Term 31 August 1953 @ $6000.00 P/A

EOD 4 March 1954 @ $7200.00 P/A
Pay Inc. 1 August 1954 @ $8360.00 P/A
Term. 31 March 1955 @ $8360.00 P/A

Staff Employee:

Ex. Appt. 1 April 1955 @ $9600.00 P/A
Res. 6 February 1956 @ $10,320.00 P/A

Staff Agent:

Ex. Appt. 7 February 1956 @ $10,320.00 P/A
PSI 7 October 1956 @ $10, 535.00 P/A
Pay Raise 12 January 1958 @ $11,595.00 P/A
PSI 6 April 1958 @ $11,835.00 P/A
Res. 18 August 1958 @ $11,835.00 P/A

Contract Agent:

EOD 19 August 1958 @ $7,200.00 P/A
Term. 13 March 1960 @ $7,200.00 P/A

Staff Employee:

Ex. Appt. 14 March 1960 @ $11,835.00 P/A
Subject has been a Staff Employee since 14 March 1960.

JOSEPH H. [redacted]
Chief
Agent Payroll Branch

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1954
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS 51, 85 AND 58

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL C IAN AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): PHILLIPS, DAVID ATLEE

2. DATE OF BIRTH: October 31, 1922

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO

B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN	11. SERVICE		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY		YEAR	MONTH	DAY
CIA	1955	April	~~8~~ 1	1958	Aug	~~12~~ 13	GS-14	3	4	13

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)			
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY				
ARMY AIR FORCE	1942	2	? 12	1945	10	? 31	HON.	2	8	19

TAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE Y ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO

12. TOTAL SERVICE 6 2 2

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

NOTE:

This SF-144 was completed by subject on 14 March 1960 on occasion of entering on duty as ~~&&&~~ an Agency Staff Employee.

Note that he did not claim any of his prior contract service.

Original of this SF-144 on file in subject's Staff Employee file.

TO—		TOTAL		
MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

NT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?

ne status was acquired?)

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO.

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

... OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

14 MARCH 1960
(DATE)

David A. Phillips
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ 1960 at WASHINGTON, D.C.
(MONTH) (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

(OVER)

SECRET

14 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Termination of Michael CHOADEN Contract

It is requested that the contract of Michael M. Choaden be terminated as of close of business 13 March 1960 in view of his appointment to staff employee status effective 14 March 1960

J. C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

Mr. Michael M. Choaden

Dear Mr. Choaden:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 August 1958, as amended.

Effective 16 February 1960, said contract, as amended, is further amended by adding after paragraph seven (7), entitled "Travel and Operational Expenses," the following paragraph:

> "8. Return Travel. Upon the successful completion of your services under this agreement you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for authorized travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents and your household effects from Havana, Cuba to the Washington, D.C. area, including per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in conformance with applicable Government regulations."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY__________________________
Contracting Officer

Orig - cs - 16 Feb 60
WH/PP Amemrille
c.o. Robert Reynolds
C.A.

SECRET

16 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Amendment to Contract - Michael M. CHOADEN

It is requested that Subject's contract dated 19 August 1958, as amended, be further amended to authorize return travel from Havana, Cuba, to Washington, D. C., for Subject and his dependents at Government expense. It is also requested that the amendment authorize shipment of Mr. CHOADEN's household effects from Havana, Cuba, to Washington, D. C., at Government expense.

for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, Finance Division

FROM: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Extension for [redacted]

1. Effective 19 Aug 59 [illegible], the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 19 Aug 58 [illegible], is extended for 1 year a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ____________________
CONTRACTING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

18 August 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division
Attention: Mr. D. H. Letcher

FROM : Acting Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : Renewal of Contract of Michael M. CHOADEN

It is hereby requested that the contract of Michael M. CHOADEN, effective 19 August 1958 and amended, be renewed for one (1) year effective 19 August 1959.

for R. E. GOMEZ
Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Michael M. Choaden

Dear Mr. Choaden:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 August 1958.

Effective 19 August 1958, said contract is amended in the following manner:

(a) The first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," is deleted and in lieu thereof the following sentence is substituted:

> "In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $7200 per annum except that for those periods of time during which you are performing services necessitating certain specialized professional skills on a full time basis outside of the country of your present permanent assignment, you will be compensated at the rate of $13,000 per annum."

(b) The following paragraph is added after paragraph six (6), entitled "Term":

> "7. Travel and Operational Expenses. While performing those tasks for which you will be compensated at the rate of $13,000 per annum, as set forth in paragraph one (1) above, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government. This may include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel and while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment overseas. In addition, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by the Government. Payment and accounting for the items set forth herein will be in conformance with applicable Government regulations."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Michael M. Choaden

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

[illegible] 29 Sep 58
[illegible]

SECRET

17 September 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Contract Personnel Division
Attention: Mr. D.H. Letcher

FROM : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Amendment To Contract of Michael M. CHOADEN

1. It is hereby requested that the contract of Michael M. CHOADEN be amended to provide that he be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $13,000. per annum while travelling outside Cuba at the request of the United States Government and engaged full time in the work of the United States Government. It is further requested that while so travelling outside Cuba, CHOADEN be paid per diem at the standard United States Government rate for the area of travel or temporary residence.

2. CHOADEN possesses certain specialized professional skills which are in temporary, but urgent demand in a country (other than Cuba) within the jurisdiction of the Western Hemisphere Division. The contract amendment outlined in paragraph 1. (above) is being requested so as to provide a means by which CHOADEN's skills might be made available to meet this current need for them.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Mr. Michael M. Choaden

Dear Mr. Choaden:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $7200 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. No taxes will be withheld therefrom but it will be your responsibility to report such income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations. A Form No. 1099 prepared in a manner to conceal the true source of such income will be furnished you by the Government in order that said responsibility may be properly fulfilled. Income received pursuant to this contract is not subject to relief from Federal income taxes on the basis of foreign residence.

2. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

3. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

4. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

5. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

6. Term. This contract is effective as of 19 August 1958, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By fifteen (15) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by the Government in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Michael M. Choaden

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

LLM/ue/11 Sept 58

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: Robert Reynolds
DIVISION: WHD

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2056
DATE: 13 August 1958

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Michael M. Choaden

2A. PROJECT: Amourette-x (DETO)

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Habana

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 8-3545-91-500

4. SLOT NO.: N. A.

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: Paul D. Langevin

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)
Contact Agent, 1952-1954 Staff Agent, 1957-1958
Staff Employee, 1955-1957 ($10,320) GS-14

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Top Secret Clearance EOD/CIA 1 April 1955

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Contract Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U. S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 35

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 31 October 1922

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): 4804 Washburn, Fort Worth, Texas

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Habana, Cuba

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Five: Wife and four children.

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: N. A.

21. VETERAN: World War II

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat): N. A.

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: Air Force

24. RANK OR GRADE: S/Sgt.

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $7200 p. a.

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: N. A.

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): N. A.

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY
☐ COVER Issue 1099 in
☐ CIA name of notional
☐ NOT WITHHELD payor.

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: N. A.

32. POST: N. A.

33. OTHER: N. A.

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): N. A.

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL N. A.

36. WITH DEPENDENTS N. A. ☐ YES ☐ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☒ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
N. A. ☐ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PRACTICES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION

43. ENTERTAINMENT

44. OTHER

N. A.

[redacted] SECRET [redacted]

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED) NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET	CASE OFFICER Robert Reynolds	DIVISION WHD
	TELEPHONE EXTENSION 2056	DATE 13 August 1958

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested see R 15-210 or successor regulations.)

N. A.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☒ PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)

☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION DAYS: —— MONTHS: 12 YEARS: ——	52. EFFECTIVE DATE 15 August 1958	53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO
54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days) 15	55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION N. A. ☐ YES ☐ NO	

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (FI, PP, other)

PP

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

To be assigned by COS, Habana, according to Station requirements.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Contract Agent in Chile, 1952-1954
Contract Agent, PBSUCCESS and PBHISTORY, 1954
Covert Associate, 1954-1955
Staff Agent, Cuba, 1956-1957
Staff Agent, Beirut, Lebanon, 1957-1958

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☒ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	x			x			x		
French		x				x		x	

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Chile, Cuba, Lebanon

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

Editor and publisher, actor, lecturer, free-lance writer.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF DIVISION OFFICER	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF SENIOR STAFF OFFICER

7 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, SCAPS

VIA : Contract Approving Officer, PP Staff

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract.

It is requested that the contract on Paul E. LANGEVIN be terminated effective 1 April 1955.

SIGNED

JEANNE K. LETELLIER
Chief of Administration
Psychological and Paramilitary
Operations Staff

APPROVED

PP/CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

SECRET

19 October 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Psychological and Paramilitary Operations Staff

SUBJECT: Paul D. Langevin (P) - Covert Associate

REFERENCE: Memo to Special Contracting Officer, CIA, dated 12 October 1954, Same Subject

Pending publication of a regulation on Employee Services, the Office of Personnel issued N 20-660-19, dated 29 July 1954 to be effective 1 August 1954. This Notice announced the availability of two life insurance and two health insurance programs sponsored by the Agency under the name of "Government Employees Health Association, Inc." Eligibility for these life and health insurance programs has been limited to those categories of personnel expressly stipulated in the Notice. Nowhere are Covert Associates listed as an eligible group, although in fact a Covert Associate may be an employee of the U. S. Government. Until the notice or the proposed regulation is changed, this Staff is precluded from inserting in contracts similar to that of subject individual's any reference to health and life insurance programs normally available to staff employees.

JOHN L. BISCHOFF
Special Contracting Officer

DHL/pr
Orig & 1 Addressee
1 cc Employee Services Div.(attn. Joe Evans)
1 cc subject file
1 cc chrono
1 cc corres w/PPStaff file

SECRET

14-00000

12 OCT 1954

SECRET

12 Oct 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL CONTRACTING OFFICER, CIA

SUBJECT : Paul D. Langevin (P)--Covert Associate

It is requested that the subject's contract effective 1 August 1954 be amended to permit the subject to apply for Hospitalization and Life Insurance with the Agency.

Colwell E Beers
for [illegible] A. BAKER
Chief
Psychological and Paramilitary Operations Staff

APPROVED
[illegible]
PP CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kermit Roosevelt

ATTENTION : Mr. John Baker

SUBJECT : Mr. Paul D. Langevin; Employment as CIA Staff Officer

1. To those of us at Headquarters who have followed closely the work of Mr. Langevin in connection with PBSUCCESS, it is completely evident that he made one of the major and most outstanding contributions to this Operation and that he has demonstrated himself to be exceptionally qualified in the field of political and psychological operations (covert). I have just been informed by Messrs. Barnes and Langevin that the latter who has heretofore been employed in the capacity of a Contract Agent, desires to become more closely associated with the Agency and would like to be employed as a regular staff officer. I am very much in favor of following up on this opportunity, and I have good reason to believe that the Director likewise is specifically interested.

2. There are certain aspects of this case which appear to require special handling and tailoring -- none of which presents any difficulties as I see it -- but, on the contrary, would tie in very neatly with both the near term and longer range aspects of the employment of Mr. Langevin. These aspects are as follows:

(a) Mr. Langevin desires to begin his term of employment by the Agency with a period of service at Headquarters. (He has spent many years in Latin America, principally in Chile where he has owned and still owns a newspaper, and, in my judgment, it would be mutually advantageous to the Agency and to Mr. Langevin for him to spend not less than a year as a member of the Headquarters organization.)

(b) Mr. Langevin has for some years in the past been giving an annual series of lectures in various Latin American capitals. These lectures have been arranged by an agent of his in New York and his audiences have consisted of business and professional groups and women's organizations. The general subject matter of his lectures has included talks on the threat of international Communism to Latin America. Mr. Langevin would desire, if it can be worked out, to be permitted to continue to deliver lectures of this kind in the future and is at the present time

SECRET

contemplating a series of lectures on Latin America to be given in various cities within the United States.

(c) Mr. Langevin would be ready and able to accept a field assignment in South America following the conclusion of the period of Headquarters' duty referred to.

3. As already indicated, it seems to me that there are no serious problems involved in any of the foregoing and that the material can be readily cut to fit the pattern. It is the recommendation of Mr. Barnes in which I concur, that Mr. Langevin be assigned to the PP Staff during his tour of duty here. He could in this capacity work very closely with WH Division, but it seems to Tracy and myself that he can contribute importantly to the work of the PP Staff and in the process broaden himself. As regards the matter of the lectures, I would recommend that arrangements be made to permit and even encourage him to continue these since it seems to me that they would fit in very well with his general PP assignment -- assuming, of course, that his Headquarters and field cover are properly designed and maintained. The Headquarters cover problem is not a substantial one and as far as the field is concerned if Mr. Langevin were to go under non-official cover of the right kind this also should present no problem. There is a ready-made cover in the field and in a critically important country by virtue of his ownership -- for some six years -- of a newspaper in Santiago. It would not be incompatible with his resumption of his position as owner and editor of the Santiago newspapaer to work in an annual series of lectures either in Latin America or in the United States. There is only one further point involved in connection with the lectures: Because of Mr. Langevin's intimate association with many of the details of PBSUCCESS and also in light of the standing rules of the Agency, it would be desirable for him to submit at least in general outlines, and preferably textually to the extent feasible, the substance of his proposed lectures. He is anxious to do this in connection with the forthcoming lectures -- for his own piece of mind since he would like to be double-checked on the things which he should say and those which he should not say with respect to the Guatemalan development. He could and in the material to Mr. Holcomb or myself -- or to you -- and after it has been checked over by one of us, we could arrange to submit it to the Office of Security for such further checking as may be desirable.

4. Mr. Langevin proposes to take a leave of absence of a month or six weeks, starting within the next few days. I believe it would be desirable for Mr. Baker, to start the necessary personnel and other administrative actions, including any additional security clearances which may

which may be necessary, etc., looking toward having everything in line for Mr. Langevin to come aboard officially at the conclusion of this leave.

5. His home address is: 811 Hollywood Blvd.
Hollywood, Florida

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (PLANS)

cc: COPS -- DD/P
CWH

[illegible]

Date:

Mr. Paul D. Langevin

Dear Mr. Langevin:

Reference is made to your contract effective 4 March 1954 with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature.

Effective ~~14 September~~ 31 July 1954, said contract is terminated and in lieu thereof the following contract is substituted:

The United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, hereby contracts with you as a Covert Associate for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature, you will be compensated at the rate of $8360 per annum. In addition, you will be entitled to authorized overtime in excess of 40 working hours per week at the rate of $1.51 per hour. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to CIA. No taxes will be withheld from any sums paid to you hereunder directly by CIA, but it will be your responsibility to report such sums in accordance with applicable Federal income tax laws and regulations.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such travel as may be directed or authorized by CIA. This will include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel while away from Washington, D. C., and while on temporary duty overseas. You will be required to account for such expenses in accordance with applicable CIA regulations or those of your cover facility, whichever is directed by CIA.

3. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information as specifically approved by CIA. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with CIA regulations.

4. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by CIA in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to CIA employees. Such leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of CIA.

(c) Civil Service Retirement deductions will not be made from your wages since your employment hereunder is not a covered employment under the Civil Service Retirement Act. However, your status is that of an

[illegible]

employee of the United States Government paid from Government funds. Therefore, if in the future you are employed by the United States Government in a status covered by the Civil Service Retirement Act, periods of service under this contract will be available as creditable service for retirement purposes in conformance with Civil Service Regulations.

5. Cover. It is anticipated that you will undertake certain cover employment in the course of your performance under this agreement. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

6. Leave Without Pay. During the term of this contract it is anticipated that you will undertake contracted speaking engagements. For such periods of time necessary to fulfill these commitments you will be considered on leave without pay status under the terms of this agreement.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by CIA to evidence this relationship.

8. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by CIA from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

9. Instructions. Instructions received by you from CIA in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

10. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

11. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 August 1954, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year unless sooner terminated by CIA either:

(a) By fifteen (15) days' actual notice to you from CIA, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Rewrite of 2d page
(3 Aug 54)

employee of the United States Government paid from Government funds. Therefore, if in the future you are employed by the United States Government in a status covered by the Civil Service Retirement Act, periods of service under this contract will be available as creditable service for retirement purposes in conformance with Civil Service Regulations.

5. Cover. It is anticipated that you will undertake certain cover employment in the course of your performance under this agreement. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

6. Offset. Any sums or substantially similar benefits or allowances received from your cover facility will be used to offset those due under this contract by CIA. Sums, similar benefits or allowances thus received through your cover facility are acknowledged and agreed to be payment by CIA within the provisions of this contract. You will report all sums or substantially similar benefits received from your cover facility at least every four (4) months during the term of this contract.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by CIA to evidence this relationship.

8. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by CIA from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

9. Instructions. Instructions received by you from CIA in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

10. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

11. Term. This contract is effective as of 15 September 1954, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year unless sooner terminated by CIA either:

(a) By fifteen (15) days' actual notice to you from CIA, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

SECRET

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from CIA accepted by you. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY________________________
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Paul D. Langevin

WITNESS: __________________

APPROVED:

____

Dill: b/y
3 [illegible] 58

Cp. [illegible],

SECRET

Mr. Paul D. Langevin

Dear Mr. Langevin:

The United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, hereby contracts with you for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $7200.00 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to CIA. No taxes will be withheld from this amount, and it will be your responsibility to report such income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations.

2. Travel. (a) You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such travel as is directed or authorized by CIA. This will include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel and while on a temporary duty status away from your permanent station. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with CIA regulations.

(b) Upon the successful completion of your services under this contract or any renewal thereof, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for return travel and transportation expenses to your permanent residence in Santiago, Chile

3. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to entertainment and the purchase of information as specifically approved by CIA. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with CIA regulations.

4. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by CIA in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U. S. C. A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to fourteen (14) calendar days' leave per contract year. Such leave may be accrued during the term of this contract or any renewal hereof except that payment in lieu of unused leave will not be authorized. Such leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of CIA.

5. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either

express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by CIA to evidence this relationship.

6. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status, except as specifically enumerated herein.

7. Instructions. Instructions received by you from CIA in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

8. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by CIA from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

10. Term. This contract is effective as of 4 March 1954, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years, unless sooner terminated by CIA either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice to you from CIA, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from CIA accepted by you. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by CIA prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel and transportation expenses to Santiago, Chile. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

JW/PA 4 May 54
Con. Assessment

ACCEPTED:

____
Paul D. Langevin

APPROVED:

SECRET
Security Information

13 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Record

SUBJECT: PBCROVEL Amendment #1

1. This date copy number four of subject project has been forwarded to Mr. William Rowland for approval in view of the fact that the original and copies number two and three have been temporarily misplaced.

2. As amendment number one to PBCROVEL covers no substantive operations it has not been coordinated with Security and Cover.

3. It is requested that approval of subject project amendment be given as soon as possible in view of the urgency of action as stated in the project itself.

HOMER BRETT, Jr.
WH/Project Coordinator

WHD/HB/jo

Distribution
Orig: CO/CO
  cc: Special Contracting Officer (Mr. J.L. Bischoff)
      CM (Mr. Ernest W. Pittman)
      Chief, Branch I
      Project File PBCROVEL WHD/F&O
      Chrono F&O

SECRET
Security Information

28 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CD/CO

ATTENTION: Mr. William Rowland

SUBJECT: Project PBCROVEL, Amendment No. 1

1. Forwarded herewith are the original and two copies of subject amendment plus an extra copy of OPC Form 404a.

2. It is respectfully requested that approval of subject amendment be expedited as the Project Financial Data, Form 404a, indicates that payment of eight thousand ($8,000.00) dollars to PA L. D. LANGEVIN must be made on or about 20 June 1952.

3. Subparagraph six of the Proposal indicates that as a prerequisite to issuance of a loan to LANGEVIN the latter will be required to submit a complete nameplate inventory of all machinery and equipment involved in the loan transaction, its physical existence in his custody, his title to the property, and an approximate evaluation of its worth (as determined by WHD station personnel). WHD will be prepared to do this shortly after Amendment No. 1 is approved and the necessary funds are available for payment.

4. Subparagraph five of the Proposal indicates the details of the loan contract and selection of the appropriate legal instrument to secure a lien on the machinery and equipment will be arrived at through joint agreement of WHD, CCC and the Legal Division. These financial details will be arranged subsequent to approval of the amendment in question and will comprise the financial plan governing the expenditure of the funds requested.

J. C. KING
C/WH

WHD/JCK/[illegible]/VLC/RB/jc

Distribution
Orig: CD/CO
cc: Special Contracting Officer (Mr. J. [illegible] Bischoff)
CM (Mr. Ernest W. Pittman) ✓
Chief, Branch I
Project File PBCROVEL WHD/[illegible]
Chrono WHD/P&O

[illegible]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Personnel File:
Thomas B. CASASIN (J. Richardson)

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: [illegible]

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

CASASIN, Thomas B.

1R

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 0037033	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS E		PREPARED:08/23/74
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONTRACT TERMINATION (033MH71)	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 06 DA. 26 YR. 74	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER ASSOCIATE (F)	

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	4136-4292	

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO DIRECTORATE EUROPEAN DIVISION UNSAVANT	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE OPERATIONS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) . [illegible]	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15 0	17 SALARY OR RATE EOD: 020363 $ 36000 LEI: 052872

18 REMARKS - - - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 112049 FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA RET HOSPITALIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: [illegible] REFR ORG: EUR PHONE: 7503
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STATUS: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: [illegible] SPEC EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: [illegible] DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
SOCIAL SEC: Y PREMIUM PAY: N ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
QTR INCR: N [illegible] TAX PAID: N OTHER ALLOWNS: N SEPARATION:

[illegible] PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition
8-72 WG 9 72

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4 51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
CASASIN THOMAS B PREPARED:06/11/72

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION
INITIAL ENTRY

4 EFFECTIVE DATE
MO DA YR
05 15 72

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE
3136-1231

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP DIRECTORATE
EUROPEAN DIVISION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE
OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB etc.)
(FULL TIME) GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES
0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP
15 0

17 SALARY OR RATE
$ 33260 DOG: 020363
LEI: 052872

18 REMARKS

---------- STATUS INFORMATION ----------

BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 6 S/L IND: 4

---------- CONTRACT INFORMATION ----------

EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: EUR PERS REFR ORG: EUR PHONE: 6913

------- ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES ----------

TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : N ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 7-66 MFG 2 72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: CC[illegible]7623
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CASASIN THOMAS E

PREPARED: 10/15/73

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 10 DA 14 YR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER ASSOCIATE (S)

6. FUNDS

FUNDS		V TO V	X C TO V
		C TO V	C TO C

7. FAN AND NSCA: 4136-4294
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO DIRECTORATE
EUROPEAN DIVISION
UNSAVANT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 0
17. SALARY OR RATE: EOD: 020363 $ 36000 LEI: 0526

18. REMARKS

```
---------- STATUS INFORMATION -------------------
BIRTH DATE:    24  SEX: M     MARITAL ST: DIV    NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 112647  FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D               HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES             CREDIT. GOVT SERV: 4        SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A           A/L CAT: 6                  S/L IND: 4
------------- CONTRACT INFORMATION ---------------
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: EUR PERS       REFR ORG: EUR       PHONE: 7503
------- ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES --------
TAX STAFF: Y    FED EXMP:          STATE EXMP:        STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI     OPS EXPENSE: Y     HOUSING: A         POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: Y   DIFFERENTIAL: Y    OFFSET CLAUSE: Y   STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y   PREMIUM PAY: N     ALLOWANCE COMP: N  EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N   OTH TAX ENTL: N    OTHER ALLOWNS: N   SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B
8-72 MFG 9-72

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN, THOMAS [illegible]	PREPARED: 02/12/73
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 01 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER ASSOCIATE (3)
6 FUNDS V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA 4150-420[illegible]	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS *DDO DIRECTORATE EUROPEAN DIVISION *[illegible]SAVANT	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE	
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13 6
17 SALARY OR RATE 24971	BEG: 0[illegible]	END: 0[illegible]

18 REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - -

DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 112049 FED SERVICE COMP: [illegible]
TYP RETIREMENT: CIA [illegible] HOSPITALIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: A SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L CAT: 6 S/L CAT: 4

- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - -

EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: [illegible] DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REPORTING OFFICER: EUR [illegible] [illegible] PHONE: 7503

- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -

TAX STATUS: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHT OP EXPENSE: Y HOUSING: [illegible] POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y [illegible] SERV: Y
LANGUAGE PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY: N CLEARANCE COMP: N EDUCATION:
STEP BONUS: N FED TAX CREDIT: N OTHER ALLOWANCES: N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK [illegible] REFLECT CHANGES [illegible]

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 11508 Use Previous
8 72 MFG 9 72 Edition

SECRET

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

(4 5)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 0037833	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B	PREPARED: 01/15/73
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 01 12 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO O	7. FAN AND FISCA 131-4252	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		O TO V	X	O TO O		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO DIRECTORATE NON-OFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 0	17. SALARY OR RATE DOG: 020303 $ 34571 LEI: 052872

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - -  STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:      24  SEX: M       MARITAL ST: DIV     NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP:*112045  FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D              HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES                PREV. GOVT SERV: 4       SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A              A/L INC: 8               S/L INC: 4
- - - - - - - - - -  CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: NOCAD PERS       REFR ORG: NOCA     PHONE: 5050
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y    FED EXMP:            STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI     OPS EXPENSE: Y       HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4   DIFFERENTIAL: Y      OFFSET CLAUSE: Y  STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y   PREMIUM PAY : N      ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N   OTH TAX ENTL: N      OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:
```

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 8-72 MFG 9-72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 0037833	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B	PREP/REC:01/15/73

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 01 07 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)

					7 FAN AND NUCA	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
6 FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO O	3131-4292	
		O TO V	X	O TO O		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE OCA-OFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15 0	17 SALARY OR RATE DOG: 02036 $* 34971 EOD: 05287

18 REMARKS - - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4

- - - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: NCCAD PERS REFR ORG: NCCA PHONE: 5050

- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -

TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : N ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N OTH TAX ENTL: A OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition
8 72 MFG 9 72

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B	PREPARED: 11/03/72
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 11 DA. 01 YR. 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / V TO C / C TO V / X C TO C	7. FAN AND NSCA 3131-4292	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE NON-OFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 0
17. SALARY OR RATE $ 33260	DOG: 020363 LEI: 052872	

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:      24  SEX: M       MARITAL ST: DIV    NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP:          FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D                  HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES              PREV. GOVT SERV: 4       SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A            A/L IND: 5               S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EOD DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: N'CAD PERS       REFR ORG: NOCA      PHONE: 5050
- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y     FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:         STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI      OPS EXPNSE: Y          HOUSING: A          POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4    DIFFERENTIAL: Y        OFFSET CLAUSE: Y    STP GOVT: Y
LOGICL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : N        ALLOWANCE COMP: N   EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N    OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N   SEPARATION:



NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 8-72 MFG 9-72 | Use Previous Edition | SECRET | "E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622" | (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 0037833
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CASASIN THOMAS 8

PREPARED:09/29/72

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 09 DA. 20 YR. 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO Ø
		Ø TO V	X	Ø TO Ø

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: *3131-4292
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
*DDP DIRECTORATE
*NON-OFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 0
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 33260 DOG: 020363 LEI: 052872

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:      24   SEX: M       MARITAL ST: DIV    NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP:           FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D                   HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES                 PREV. GOVT SERV: 4         SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A               A/L IND: 8                 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER:*NOCAD PERS        REFR ORG:*NOCA      PHONE:*5050
- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y     FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:           STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI      OPS EXPNSE: Y          HOUSING: A            POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4    DIFFERENTIAL: Y        OFFSET CLAUSE: Y      STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : N        ALLOWANCE COMM: N     EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N    OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N     SEPARATION:
```

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 7-66 MFG 2 72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

78-02869R
Box [illegible]

/437

SECRET

FRP: . . . .

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-11 INFO: FILE, RF, (13/P)

78 0582111 PAGE 001
TOT: 190843Z APR 78 WASHINGT 208255

SECRET
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 190843Z WASHINGTON 208255
TO: PARIS.

FROM: E/F/S INFO E/D/PERS, E/D/HF, OP/CPD, CCS/CSB, OED/NOC

SUBJECT: ADMIN BCHAWK WOGAME - THOMAS B. CASASIN (P)

1. ACCORDING TO MOC ON THOMAS B. CASASIN, RTACTION OBLIGATION TO REIMBURSE CASASIN FOR COST OF SHIPPING UP TO ONE THOUSAND (1000) POUNDS OF HHE FROM FRANCE TO WODUAL, EXPIRED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1977. ALL OTHER COMMITMENTS, INCLUDING EXTENSION OF CASASIN'S SERVICES UNDER MOC, EXPIRED 31 DEC 77 ALSO.

2. FYI: UNSAVANT PROJECT FOR CASASIN WAS TERMINATED AT END OF FY 76 REPEAT FY 76. PROJECT FILE BEING CLOSED AS ALL ASPECTS OF THIS CASE TERMIN ATD.

3. FILE: 029-006-252/2; 201-0933259. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: E/F/S (SANDY DELONG X9487 14 APR 78); COORD: C/E/D/PERS (DUTER), E/D/BF (YOW), OP/CPD (BROOKS), CCS/CSB (FOR INFO), OED/NOC (FOR INFO); REL: C/E/F (HORNSTEIN). CL BY 061308.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

DATE [illegible] 1975

TO: OFFICE OF FINANCE

VIA: CHIEF, EUR AND CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION

FROM: CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER, PARIS

SUBJECT: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ENGAGEMENT OF [illegible]/2 ([illegible]) as (Independent Contractor) (Contract Employee)

1. TERM AND ACTIVITY CHARGE - Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Activity [illegible], effective 1 July 1975 XXXXXXXXXXXX until ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ obligation is ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ completed but not to exceed 31 December 1977. CMK

2. SECURITY APPROVAL - The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type (former Career Associate) dated ________.

3. CITIZENSHIP - Subject (is) (is not) a WODUAL Citizen.

4. COMPENSATION - Subject will be paid nothing per ____ in ____ currency. Describe any other compensation in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, loans, currency conversions or other ________.

5. TAXES - Explain method of collection when appropriate FLAT RATE.
(N/A, FR 20-18d applies, to be determined by Headquarters)

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE - Quarters Allowance N/A per ____.
Subsistence Allowance ____ per ____.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES - N/A

a. Travel expenses (will) (will not) be reimbursed. Fixed Payment ____.
Regular Accountings ____. Allowance of ____ per ____.

b. Other operational expenses (will) (will not) be reimbursed.
Type Expense ____; Method of Accounting ____.
Type Expense ____; Method of Accounting ____.
Type Expense ____; Method of Accounting ____.

8. OTHER COMMITMENTS - *Describe BEHERALD will reimburse CASASEN for costs of shipment of up to 1000 (one thousand) pounds of [illegible] at the conclusion of cover employment from Paris, France to [illegible]. (Scheduled for 31 May 1977)

9. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS - (Not promised Subject but may have to be met) *Describe ____

NO COMMITMENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DESCRIBED ABOVE HAVE BEEN MADE TO SUBJECT.

SIGNED: Edward [illegible]
Case Officer

REVIEWED: ________
Special Contracting Officer
1/3/76

APPROVED: ________
Field Contracting Officer

*Certain special benefits or commitments require prior Headquarters approval i.e., leave, retirement, death, disability, missing in action, resettlement, escrow accounts, citizenship assistance, emergency assistance, bonus payments, and other unusual items.

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - Headquarters
1 - Station Finance
1 - Subject File

S E C R E T

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/Pers/SP 23 FEB 1976		hy
2			
3	AD/Pers 1976	25 FE	1976
4	C/CPD		
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: Recommend AD/Pers approval (albeit retroactively) of the attached request from the Chief, EUR Division to extend the MOC for Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an independent contractor without compensation beginning 1 July 1975. The only benefit payable under the MOC will be a taxable payment for the shipment in 1977 of 1,000 lbs., of personal effects from Paris to the United States.

Subject, now age 52, retired under CIARDS 28 June 1974 as a GS-15 (Step 10) career associate. On 24 June 1974, D/Pers approved a request to engage him as an independent contractor for a one-year period beginning 1 July 1974 at an annual fee of $8,000.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/CPD, 5 E 67, Hqtrs 7841	23 Feb 76

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

GPO 1974 O - [illegible] (40)

SECRET

76-0561

76-376

29 JAN 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Chief, European Division

SUBJECT: Request for Extension of the Services of Thomas B. CASASIN (P), Retired Annuitant, under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. Action Requested: Your approval is requested to extend the services of Thomas B. CASASIN (P) under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment for the period 1 July 1975 to 31 December 1977. The only compensation to CASASIN would be money equivalent to shipment costs for a maximum of 1,000 pounds of personal effects from Paris, France, to the United States. Since CASASIN is an Independent Contractor, the amount of money given CASASIN will be considered taxable income for tax year 1977.

2. Basic Data and Background: CASASIN, born 20 January 1924, has been employed by the Agency since 1949. Twelve years of this period were spent as a Staff Employee, seven of which were at Headquarters and five years, 1955-1960, were spent in Tokyo. In 1962 CASASIN was assigned to Paris under nonofficial cover as a Staff Agent. In 1972 he was converted to Career Associate status to coincide with his cover employment with UNESCO, a position he attained on his own initiative. CASASIN retired as a GS-15, Step 10, on 30 June 1974 and with proper Headquarters approvals was utilized by Paris Station as an Independent Contractor, effective 1 July 1974. His compensation was in accordance with the 90 percent provision of HR 20-13 a(1) (c) (1).

3. Staff Position: Due to his growing employment involvement at UNESCO, CASASIN requested, and the Paris Station agreed, not to renew his written Independent Contract, due for renewal 1 July 1975. However, since CASASIN is willing to meet informally

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 057567

SECRET

SECRET

with the Station, the Station requests a Memorandum of Oral Commitment to be effective for the period CASASIN remains in UNESCO's employ, which is expected to terminate in 1977. CASASIN's experience as an Operations Officer and, specifically, experience and operational contacts derived through his present employment position in Paris are sufficiently valued by the Paris Station to request the continuation of CASASIN's services under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

4. Recommendation: Your approval is requested to continue CASASIN's services under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment for the period 1 July 1975 to 31 December 1977 with total compensation being money equivalent to the cost of shipping a maximum of 1,000 pounds of personal effects from Paris, France, to the United States.

William W. Wells
Chief, European Division

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Operations — Date: 17 Feb 1976

APPROVED:

A Director of Personnel — Date: 25 FEB

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Personnel — Date:

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : Career Management Group,
Contract Personnel Branch

SUBJECT : Thomas B. CASASIN (P)
Termination of contract

This is to advise you that Thomas B. CASASIN'S (P) contract expired 30 June 1975. It is requested that CASASIN'S contract be terminated effective that date.

Gerald K. Hughes, Jr.
Chief, Personnel Section
European Division

APPROVED:
/s/ [illegible] W. Sandman
Special Contracting Officer

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 027164

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

28 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement -
~~Mr. Jacques C. Richardson~~
Casasin, Thomas B.

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50h.

Grade: GS-15 Equiv. Position : Career Associate
Career Service : Operations
Office/Division : Europe Division
Date Requested for Retirement : 28 June 1974
Age at that Date : 50
Years of Creditable Service : 30
Years of Agency Service : 24
Years of Qualifying Service : 19

3. The applicant's Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommended that the request be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

B. DeFelice
for Director of Personnel

4. The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

/s/ Harold L. Brownman
Deputy Director for Management and Services

[illegible]
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

3585 (4-74)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 026653

Distribution:
0 - Return to Director of Personnel
2 - DD/M&S
1 - D/Pers
1 - Applicant
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/WFMadigan:cam/3257 (27 June 1974)

SECRET

CERTIFICATION BY THOMAS B. CASASIN CAREER ASSOCIATE, AS TO EXPENDITURES OF ADMINISTRATIVE ALLOWANCE

I certify that the Administrative Allowance payments made to me in accordance with the provisions of the Addendum to the Agency contract dated 5 August 1972 and any amendments and extensions thereto have, to the best of my knowledge and belief, been used substantially for the purpose for which provided and have not accrued to my personal advantage or enrichment.

[illegible]	SIGNED
Date	Thomas B. Casasin

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

OUTG NG MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY 12 - 1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 162304Z DIRECTOR 696231

CONF: EUR 4 INFO: FILE CMG/NOC 3 CMG/HS CCS 2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 83

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

OP

TO: PARIS.Y

WODEEP ADMIN Y

REFS: A. PARIS 56954 | IN 578647 |

B. OFAT-1377, 29 MAY 74 Y

NEED TO KNOW DATE WHEN CASASIN WILL CONCLUDE UNCAIRD EMPLOYMENT. SECTION I {C} NOC STATUS REPORT FORWARDED REF B STATES HE ON THREE-YEAR EXTENSION CONTRACT WITH UNCAIRD TO END JUNE 1977. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMPDET.A

C/EUR/PERS Stephen C. Ertz

CMG/NOC GEORGE MARLING {PHONE}

E/NOC E Sullivan

E/BF P. Yew

DATE: 16 MAY 75
ORIG: BARBARA GENTILE
UNIT: E/F/S
EXT: 9487

C/E/SS

AC/E/F

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

FORM [illegible]

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY U PER

TOTAL COPIES (16) RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT
EUR 4
ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR CCS 2 CMG/NEC 3.
OP 2. OF 2. CMG/MS

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 011629 EIA530 PAGE 01-01 IN 578647

TOR:1310432 MAY 75 PARI 56954

S E C R E T 1310032 MAY 75 STAFF

CITE PARIS 56954

TO: DIRECTOR,

WODEEP ADMIN

1. THOMAS B. CASASIN HAS GIVEN NOTICE THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO RENEW HIS CONTRACT WHICH TERMINATES 30 JUNE 1975. HE CITES HIS GROWING INVOLVEMENT AT UNCAIRD AS THE REASON.

2. HE HAS AGREED TO FUTURE MEETINGS WITH STATION OFFICERS ON AN INFORMAL BASIS. FOR HIS CONTINUING COOPERATION HE ASKS ONLY THAT HIS ENTITLEMENT FOR SHIPMENT OF HEE TO THE U.S. BE KEP OPEN UNTILHE CONCLUDES HIS UNCAIRD EMPLOYMENT. STATION WILL WRITE A MOC COVERING THIS CONTINGENCY. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR CONCURRENCE.

E-2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET

DATE: 20 May 1975

CTC NO. 210

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax Assessment for Thomas B. CASASIN

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Twenty-three and seven-tenths (23.7) per cent	1 May 1975	

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

GEORGE E. POWELL
Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:
/s/ Charles W. Sandman
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

22 MAY 1975
Date

DISTRIBUTION: Orig - Addressee; 1 Copy - CPD; 1 Copy - CCS/CSB; 1 Copy - CHRONO; 1 Copy - CCS/PR.

SECRET

(1-4-21)

E-2, IMPDET CL BY. 007622

2 - CPD Copy

SECRET

DATE: 15 December 1974

CTC NO. 210

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax Assessment for Thomas B. [illegible] (P)

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Twelve and nine-tenths (12.9)	1 December 1974	1975

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

[illegible]
Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Rogers C. Brooke
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

26 DEC 1974
Date

DISTRIBUTION: Orig - Addressee; 1 Copy - CPD; 1 Copy - CCS/CSB; 1 Copy - CHRCNO; 1 Copy - CCS/RR.

SECRET

FORM 11-73 2643 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(1-4-21)
E-2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622

2 - CPD Copy

OFAT-1492
6 Aug 74

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT	NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 128609	2. NAME (last, first, middle) CASASIN, Thomas B. (P)	3. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jun 24	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-1	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Career Associate - Ops Officer	8. OFF. DIV. BR. OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/EUR	9. CURRENT STATION Paris

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		CAREER PROVISIONAL		RESERVE
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

	ANNUAL		21-MONTH		30-MONTH	X	REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-)
1 January 74-30 June 74

13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM IN LIEU.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 3-73 45N

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2. IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : Thomas B. CASASIN

PERIOD COVERED: January - June 1974

Although I have been the Station case officer for Subject only since January 1974, I have been acquainted with his performance for the Station for the past 5 1/2 years through my assignment in the French Branch at Headquarters and, for the past 2 1/2 years, as the Station officer responsible for UNCAIRD operations. I have always considered CASASIN to be a highly skilled, experienced senior case officer thoroughly devoted to the work of BKHERALD. He is becoming increasingly effective in his present cover position at UNCAIRD, operating against both Soviet and PRC targets, and I am delighted that he has agreed to continue his cooperation with the Station as a field agent following his retirement from BKHERALD effective 30 June 1974. CASASIN can look back with pride over his years of service with BKHERALD but he can also look forward to additional years of highly useful, productive work for Paris Station.

CASASIN's attitude can best be summed up by a comment on my first operational meeting with him following his official retirement. He instinctively went immediately to a discussion of operations, not of retirement. I am confident that CASASIN will continue to be a highly motivated, effective asset of Paris Station, and I wish him well.

John H. Kenney
Operations Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION D

The attached Memorandum in Lieu of a Fitness Report should be read in conjunction with the NOC Status Report on Subject for the period ending 31 March 1974; these reports overlap somewhat in the period covered. As has been indicated by both Russell N. SKOGSBERG, who prepared Section I, and George T. HEMSLEY, who prepared Section III of the NOC Status Report, Subject is an impressive officer who has developed superb cover for himself but who has been only reasonably effective in identifying, developing and turning over useful access agents to the Station. While endorsing the general thrust of the Memorandum in Lieu of a Fitness Report, the undersigned also feels that Subject should bring a sharper focus to bear on developing in-depth relationships with those persons who have the potential of becoming quality access agents to priority targets. Subject meets and knows many people in his milieu, including Soviets; he reports in considerable volume on these contacts. We encourage him to concentrate on a few of these contacts and to plumb them to their depths. The undersigned joins SKOGSBERG in wishing Subject well and in paying recognition to his motivation and his attitude.

Subject's Specific Duties remained essentially as described in his previous Fitness Report (for the period 1 January - 31 December 1973). I would rate him on these Specific Duties as he was previously rated.

/s/ Oleg Selsky

Operations Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT - FIELD TRANSMITTAL

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel.

SECTION A, items 2, 3, 7, and 8.

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 (*Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature"*)

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT including Section D.	DATE 6 Aug 74	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (*in pseudonym*) Thomas B. Casasin Thomas B. CASASIN.

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS.

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (*in pseudonym*) Edwin E. [illegible] for Russell N. SKOGSBERG
DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (*in pseudonym*) Edward J. HEROSIAN Edward J. Herosian

FORM 3-73 45A OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622

(04-47)

SECRET

DATE: 23 July 1974

CTC NO. 310

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax Assessment for Thomas B. CASASIN

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Eighteen and seven-tenths (18.7)	23 June 1974	1974

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Charles R. Sandman
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

25 JUL 1974
Date

DISTRIBUTION: Orig - Addressee; 1 Copy - CPO; 1 Copy - CCS CSB; 1 Copy - CHRONO; 1 Copy - CCS/RR.

SECRET

FORM 11-73 2643 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(1-4-21)

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

2 - CPD Copy

14-00000

BLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER

TOTAL COPIES 17-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

RSON UNIT NOTIFIED

DVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT

TION UNIT VR 9

TION # 1

INFO RF FILE VR 0P2, OF 2

CMG/MJS

CTION COPY

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 431289 EIA505 PAGE 01-01 IN 365718

TOR:201235Z SEP 74 PARI 51247

S E C R E T 201107Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 51247 (HEMSLEY ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

ADMIN PERS

REF: DIRECTOR 599151

EDWIN E. HAURONIC WITNESSED SIGNING OF CASASIN'S CONTRACT. E2 IMPDET.

luth

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : CMG/CP

SUBJECT : Inclusion of HHE shipment in contract for Independent Contractor, Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

1. It is requested that the new contract for Thomas B. CASASIN (P) include shipment of HHE for him and his dependents and POV as well as storage of household effects.

2. CASASIN retired from the Agency 28 June 1974, and by regulation is entitled to movement of HHE up to one year. An extension of an additional six months can be requested, but beyond that CASASIN would not be covered.

3. EUR has been granted approval to hire CASASIN under a Paris Station project. His cover job contract has been approved until May 1977, at which time he plans to return to the United States.

4. Therefore, EUR recommends his contract include the benefits of shipment of HHE, POV, and storage of goods to his place of legal residence upon the successful completion of his services.

George W. Owens
Chief, Personnel Section
European Division

CONCUR:

CMG/CP

19 JUL 1974
Date

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 033769

CONFIDENTIAL

☒ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CCS/CSB GH-43 Hqs.	EXTENSION 5029	NO. CSB 74-254 DATE 27 June 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. OP/CPD 5E-69 Hqs.				This individual is being retained as an independent contractor after retirement. Geo. P.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

CSB 74-254

26 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

SUBJECT: Mr. Jacques G. Richardson

1. This is to advise you that Mr. Richardson will be placed under the covert annuity plan administered by the Cover and Commercial Staff effective upon his retirement in June 1974. He has also been placed under the Combined Group Investments (C.G.I.) plan for hospitalization insurance.

2. All future correspondence with Mr. Richardson will be handled through the Cover and Commercial Staff.

GEORGE S. POWELL
Chief
Cover Support Branch
Cover & Commercial Staff

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 063851

SECRET

Jacques Richardson

Sal. 36 000

90% 32 400

Annuit 22-24 K.

8000 is within 90% rule

Age 50

Thomas B. CASASIN GS-15^{10}

22,332 annuity per annum

36,000 current salary GS-15^{10}
3600 less 10%
32,400
22,332 less annuity
10,068

Annuity figure from Bill Madigan, ROB,
27 Jan 74
CNL

SECRET

[illegible]/C 74-3322

26 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Request for Approval to Utilize Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an Independent Contractor

REFERENCE : DD/P 6-1818, 2 May 1966

1. Action Requested: The European Division requests approval to utilize Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an Independent Contractor subject to the terms regarding employment of annuitants as set forth in the reference. CASASIN has just opted for retirement under the Agency Retirement Program effective 28 June 1974.

2. Basic Data or Background: CASASIN, born 20 January 1924, has been employed by the Agency since 1949. He held several positions in Headquarters and from February 1955 until October 1960 served in Tokyo. Until his departure for Paris he served as a Branch Chief in the then SR Division. In 1962 CASASIN was assigned to Paris under non-official cover as a Staff Agent to work on the Soviet target. He remained a Staff Agent until his conversion to Career Associate status in 1972.

3. Staff Position: In 1972, with Paris Station approval, CASASIN on his own initiative obtained an editorial position with IDENTITY. This cover job affords him the unique opportunity to establish and maintain contact and access to a variety of target personalities. Despite a heavy cover load, he has been able to make useful operational contributions

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055747

SECRET

to the overall Station effort against the Soviet Bloc and more recently, the PRC target. His current appointment with IDENTITY has recently been extended until 31 May 1977. We would like to continue to utilize CASASIN's professional talents and his natural sustained access to priority targets in IDENTITY. CASASIN will retire at the GS-15 step 10 level. In accordance with Agency regulations CASASIN's proposed gross annual contract salary of $8,000 plus his annuity will not exceed ninety percent of his salary at the time of retirement.

4. Recommendation: It is requested that approval be granted to employ Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an Independent Contractor.

ARoosevelt

Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr.
Chief, European Division

CONCUR:

William E Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

27 July 1974
Date

APPROVED:

FWM Janney
Director of Personnel

27 June 74
Date

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Personnel

Date

CONFIDENTIAL

7 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : CWG/CP

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract for Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

This is to inform you that Career Associate Thomas B. CASASIN (P) retired from the Agency on 28 June 1974. His contract is terminated effective as of that date.

George W. Owens
George W. Owens
Chief, Personnel Section
European Division

Distribution:
Original &①- Adse.

APPROVED:
/s/ Charles W. Sandman

Special Contracting [illegible]

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 033769

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Administrative Allowance Committee

SUBJECT : Fixed Allowance Amendment for

Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN

1. Effective 28 April 1974, to offset dollar appreciation, the fixed allowance for Subject is revised by substituting the figure $13,741 for the figure $14,981.

2. All other provisions of the current Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY

APPROVED:

for Allowance Committee

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL by: 063837

S E C R E T

AMENDMENT TO ALLOWANCE COMMITTEE ADDENDUM
For **Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN**

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Mr. Casasin

Effective the day following your departure from **Paris, France** for home leave, paragraph (A) entitled "Fixed Allowances" of your current Allowance Committee Addendum (as amended) is hereby (further) amended:

1) By substituting the figure **$6,877** for the figure **$13,741**; and

2) By extending the period covered through the day prior to your PCS return to **Paris, France** following home leave.

All other provisions of your Allowance Committee Addendum (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____
Allowance Committee

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

S E C R E T

SECRET

DATE: 14 November 1973

CTC NO. 210

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax assessment for Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. An acknowledged Letter of Tax Instruction ________ forwarded. The ________ advised of this assessment. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Twenty-eight and seven-tenths (28.7)	9 December 1973	1974

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

GEORGE S. POWELL
Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Charles W. Sandman
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

16 NOV 1973
Date

DISTRIBUTION: Orig - Addressee: 1 Copy - CPD: 1 Copy - CCS/CSB: 1 Copy - CHRONO: 1 Copy - CCS/RR.

FORM 11-72 2643 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(1-4-21)

E-2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622

2 - CPD Copy

14-00000

OUTGOI'`G MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE TIME GROUP: 112330Z
SITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 415807

CONF: EUR8 INFO: FILE OF2 cmb/Nocy CCS2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 47
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILED #

TO: PARIS.

ADMIN FINANCE WODEEP

1. REQUEST THOMAS B. CASASIN FORWARD HQS ASAP COPIES OF HIS COVER PAY STATEMENTS FOR FEB & MARCH 73.

2. LATEST COVER PAY STATEMENTS INDICATE INCREASE ALLOWANCE OF $260.67 PER MONTH MADE IN FEB OR MARCH 73. COVER PAY OFFSET 1 FEB 73 THRU 15 SEPT 73 WAS $12,631.28. ANALYSIS BASED ON COVER PAY STATEMENTS IN HAND HQS FOR APRIL, MAY & JUNE 73 EXTENDED THRU 15 SEPT 73 INDICATES OFFSET SHOULD HAVE BEEN $14,307.57, WHICH RESULTS IN REFUND DUE FROM CASASIN OF $1,676.29. NET PAY DUE NOW $787.87 PER PAY PERIOD. ALL NET PAY DUE CASASIN WILL BE WITHHELD UNTIL REFUND DUE - $1,676.29 IS LIQUIDATED.

3. IF PROPOSED METHOD OF REFUND REPAYMENT CITED PARA 2 ABOVE UNACCEPTABLE TO CASASIN, PLEASE ADVISE. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 11 OCT 73
ORIG: J. A. PAVLICK
UNIT: E/BF
EXT: 86657

OF/C&TD/D. LAUREY/TELECOORD

C/E/SS ______ RELEASING OFFICER   C/E/F ______ COORDINATING OFFICERS   E/BF ______ AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Administrative Allowance Committee

SUBJECT : Fixed Allowance Amendment for

Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN

1. Effective 1 July 1973, to offset dollar depreciation, the fixed allowance for Subject is revised by substituting the figure $14,981 for the figure $13,494.

2. All other provisions of the current Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Kenneth C. Rushworth
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

Heather W. Balivia
for Allowance Committee

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL by: 026715

SECRET

27 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : EUR/Contract Personnel

SUBJECT : Changes in Financial Analysis Number
Personal Services of Thomas B. CASASIN (P)
OBJECT CLASS: ____________________

It is requested that the cost of personal services for subject Career Agent be changed, effective the pay period beginning 1 July 1973 from Financial Analysis Number 3131-4292 to 4136-4292 (UNSAVANT)

EUR DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

APPROVED:

Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

SECRET

[redacted] D TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmittal to Headquarters:

SECTION A, Items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, Items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Thomas B. Casasin Thomas B. CASASIN

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Reginald M. GUNION Reginald M. Gunion
DATE 31 January 73	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Joseph H. Rilander Joseph H. RILANDER

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CASASIN, Thomas B.	20 Jan 24	M	CS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
		Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
28 February 1973	1 February - 31 December 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintenance of effective NOC status and functioning as a WOMACE officer in this situation	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains direct long-term contact with CKPOLAR personnel and exploits these contacts for operational objectives.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides spotting reports on wide range of contacts and follows up with additional meetings when individual is of special interest to Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responds to Station requirement for information on individuals or organizations	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Operational reporting	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period covered by this report, subject began a new job in an upper-level, executive capacity with an international organization. He obtained this job without BKHERALD assistance and the salary offsets approximately 60% of the total cost of this activity. This cover job was possible because of subject's extensive, solid background in scientific journalism and his French fluency. His cover is impeccable because he is capable of a first class, professional performance on this job and he was selected for the job solely on his professional qualifications in competition with other highly-qualified persons.

A solid cover situation is useful only to the extent that it serves as a base for BKHERALD activities. Despite a full time job and unwitting superiors and co-workers, Subject has done a full time job for BKHERALD. He has maintained an intensive dialogue with one Soviet official, frequent contact with others, and he is developing additional Soviet contacts in his cover organization. He has also established initial contacts with Chinese officials and has laid the foundation, through the cover organization, to develop and maintain direct and long-term contact with certain of these targets. He has been effective and ingenious in devising direct access to this difficult target and to others having access.

Subject devotes about 50% of his operational effort to the Soviet and Chinese targets. His operational reporting reflects these priorities and it is timely,

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Joseph I. Saltsman
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

During the period under review, this NOC moved into a highly sensitive but potentially very valuable new cover situation, in which he has infinitely greater access to Soviet and Chinese targets. The NOC is also superbly equipped to handle this new position, by virtue of previous experience, linguistic competence and substantive knowledge of the field of endeavor. He should, in our judgment, do a first-class job, both for the cover employer, and for the Organization as well.

With respect to the specific duties set forth in the first section of this report, this reviewer would not have rated specific duty number two at the "O"

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Hugh R. Montgomery

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

complete and literate. Despite his relative isolation as a NOC, he is well aware of priority objectives, concentrates his efforts in these areas and does not waste time on operationally marginal activities.

As is normal in a NOC situation, subject has no supervisory duties with BKHERALD personnel but his cover job provides supervisory responsibility. Subject is meticulous in presentation of financial accountings and his operational expenses are modest. There are no administrative problems related to this project.

SECTION D (cont'd) REVIEWING OFFICIAL

level; in point of fact, it would, in the writer's opinion, merit a solid "S", but no more. Recognizing that such ratings are perforce subjective, and that the rating officer has a closer, almost daily experience factor, nonetheless, the reviewer simply does not believe that the written record of the NOC's accomplishments on the specific targets will support an "O" rating at this time. Even accepting the limitations which the cover situation imposes upon the NOC, he has still not performed in a manner which would correspond to the literal definition of "O".

Other than this divergency, the reviewer shares the laudatory comments set forth in the narrative on this NOC. He is all the things the rater has stated and more: highly intelligent, versatile, linguistically extremely well qualified, and professionally experienced in his cover role. He has begun very well to utilize this new cover position on the Organization's behalf, and it is quite accurate to note that the NOC landed this particular plum (in terms of competition for the cover vacancy) solely on the basis of his own demonstrated talents in the cover context.

In sum, this is an experienced, effective NOC, whose new cover affords him an expanded natural access to a host of the Station's primary targets; he has begun to exploit this access in a sound, logical fashion, and the period ahead should further document the utility of his key situation to our operational programs. In fairness to all concerned, it is simply too early in this new position to attempt a definitive judgment of the depth of access which can be derived from it.

Comments by Chief, EUR France:

Although concurring with an overall rating of "S", I consider the "O" ratings for specific duties numbers one and two to be somewhat high and I recommend an "S" for both. Casasin certainly has maintained his cover and we anticipate he will be able to preserve it in his new job. He has just begun to initiate contacts with Soviet personnel of operational interest and it remains to be seen how effectively Casasin can exploit this situation.

Frederick A. Allner, Jr.

Frederick A. Allner, Jr.
C/E/F

ATTACHMENT - FITNESS REPORT - Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

NOCAD/MB REVIEWING OFFICER COMMENTS:

Whether Specific Duty No. 1 is rated "O" (as by the Station rater and reviewer) or "S" (as by the EUR Division reviewer), the fact remains that CASASIN is melding his overt life and operational activity against a primary Station target with a degree of success not often achieved by Agency officers.

CASASIN's response to requirements based in NOCAD administrative and managerial responsibilities has been prompt and efficient; in this additional specific duty we rate his performance "Strong".

In view of his initiative and competence in a demanding and sensitive NOC assignment, NOCAD agrees with CASASIN's overall performance rating of "Strong".

/s/ Charles J. Beckman

Charles J. Beckman
Chief, NOCAD/Management Branch

10 APR 1973
Date

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Administrative Allowance Committee

SUBJECT : Fixed Allowance Amendment for

~~Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN~~

1. Effective 14 February 1973, to offset dollar depreciation, the fixed allowance for Subject is revised by substituting the figure $13,694 for the figure $12,234. (   )

2. All other provisions of the current Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

Allowance Committee

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CLby 026715

[illegible] ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Official Personnel File

SUBJECT : Richardson, Jacques F.

CASASIN, T. B.

1. Studies in Intelligence is the Agency's quarterly professional journal. It publishes a wide variety of unique material—historical, analytical, technical, etc.—on all aspects of intelligence both as a profession and as a function of national security and foreign policy. Employees whose writings are accepted for publication make a valuable contribution to the Agency's work which ought to be reflected in their official files.

2. Accordingly, the Board of Editors wishes to record the fact that Studies in Intelligence has published the following material submitted by Mr. Richardson:

Article: "What to Do with Defectors" - Vol. V, No. 4 (Fall 1961)

Letter to the Editor - Vol. IX, No. 4 (Fall 1965)

Hugh T. Cunningham

HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
Chairman, Board of Editors
Studies in Intelligence

Distribution:
0 - Subject's Official File
1 - NOCAD/Pers

[illegible] ONLY

Thomas B. Casasin

Date	Action	Compensation	Grade
15 MAY 72	Career Agent	33,260	GS-15/
7 JAN 73	LPI	34,971	GS-15

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO ALLOWANCE COMMITTEE ADDENDUM
For Career Agent, Thomas B. CASASIN

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

Effective 7 September 1972, paragraph (A) entitled "Fixed Allowance" of your Allowance Committee Addendum dated 18 April 1972, is amended by substituting the figure $12,234 for the figure $11,769 to reflect your total HHE storage cost.

All other provisions of your Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
SIG...

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

18 DEC

____
Allowance Committee

Note: CASASIN was converted from Staff Agent to Career Agent status, effective 15 May 1972. The conversion does not affect any provisions of his Allowance Committee Addendum dated 18 April 1972.

E2IMPDET
CLby 027015

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Thomas B. Casasin	DATE (from item 5-1) 26 Sept 73	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) David E. Murphy	DATE (from item 5-2) 3 Oct 73
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 20 Oct 73	DISPATCH NUMBER: OPAT4785	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	2. SERVICE DESIGN CS	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION; TITLE AND GRADE ACC, Car Assoc, GS15	4. STATION OR BASE Paris	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER UNCAI.D

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 10 Sep 62 3 Apr 72	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE o/a 15 May 1974	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ o/a 25 May 1974	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE same

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

1 daughter, aged 20 (already actually back at her university)

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

My two-year contract with UNCAIPD ends officially 14 May 1974; it is, theoretically, renewable.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Have continued my spotting and assessment functions, mainly of [illegible] and [illegible] individuals on a selected basis but of third and fourth nationals as well. Have concentrated on two particular [illegible] targets, while assuming new cover responsibilities and managing a fairly large-scale, authentic cover property in the field of mass communication. Have also responded to Station investigative needs in fields other than my own, and have maintained a continuing relationship with a high-level, well placed [illegible] political-technical management personality. Have also developed a minor, yet well-placed [illegible] personality in the field of technical innovation and management.

Have arranged to travel to various venues of technical and scientific meetings for appropriate coverages of personalities or substance, as the case required.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

I believe that there is none indicated at the present time, especially in view of the time and schedule demanded by my cover functions.

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I think that in view of the difficulty of obtaining, through legitimate means, the kind of cover assignment I have at the present time, I should stay where I am.

Having said that, Headquarters may wish to give consideration to my moving to a position analogous to the one I have in another organization which is comparable in access and movement to what we know to be the case in UNCAIRD.

I would like, at any rate, to be able to continue to use the French language operationally.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

2 EXTEND TOUR 6 to 12 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO Oct 74 - Apr 75 (DATE)

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE. 1ST CHOICE [illegible] 2ND CHOICE [illegible] 3RD CHOICE [illegible]

3 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION; INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIAL STATION. 1ST CHOICE Geneva 2ND CHOICE Brussels 3RD CHOICE Black Africa

1 RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Station recommends approval of extension. If CASASIN retains present, excellent cover with international organization, it is a natural for coverage of primary targets.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Hqs approves home leave in April 1974 and new tour.

DATE 13 April 74 TITLE Personnel Off SIGNATURE Marjorie Galey

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

Home leave in April 1974 followed by a new tour.

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. [illegible] DATED: 13 [illegible] 197[illegible]

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

OFAT-1110
19 Feb 74

FITNESS REPORT	NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
128609	CASASIN, Thomas B.	20 Jan 24	M	GS-15	D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF. DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION
Career Associate	DDO/EUR	Paris

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		CAREER PROVISIONAL		RESERVE
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

X	ANNUAL		21-MONTH		30-MONTH		REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-)	13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
1 Jan 73-31 Dec 73	28 February 1974

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintenance of effective NOC status and functioning as a WOMACE officer in this situation.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Exploits his natural access to Soviet personnel for operational needs.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Exploits his wide range of contacts inside and outside his cover organization for operational purposes.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Makes imaginative use of cover position to meet Chinese officials at international conferences.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Operational reporting.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 3-73 45N

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period covered by this report, Subject has settled into his new cover job as an upper-level executive in an international organization. This salary offsets approximately 40% of the cost of maintaining this NOC in Paris. His cover is, however, excellent for other than financial reasons: Subject's experience and skills are such that he is admirably qualified to perform the job and is doing outstanding work in the eyes of his peers and supervisors, all of whom are unwitting. More importantly, it places him in a situation where he has normal, daily contact with numerous Soviet officials and by skillful use of his cover job he concocts logical reasons for contacting Chinese officials to whom he does not have natural access. In addition to direct contact to target individuals, Subject uses his position to spot and assess co-workers having access to Station targets.

The area of Subject's performance most in need of strengthening is follow-up development of operational targets. His cover situation is somewhat unique for an NOC in that it puts him in daily contact with his priority target group: Soviet officials and other potential agents having direct access to Soviet officials. This access is not fully exploited. He should make a concerted effort to expand social and/or business contacts with the four or five Soviet officials who work in close proximity to him and to seek out and assess eight or ten third

//continued//

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 Feb 74	/s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Operations Officer	/s/ Oleg N. Selsky for Joe Irl Saltsman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the supervisor's letter ratings and with the substance of his narrative comments. Put as simply as possible, Subject has done an outstanding job in establishing superb access cover; it now remains for him and the Station to exploit it operationally. On the basis of his ability during the reporting period to establish meaningful relationships with target Soviets or to spot and assess leads to potential agents who can, Subject's retention is this assignment would not be justified in terms of costs. The 40% rebate does make this effort entirely defensible, however, but Subject should understand that we expect more concrete results now that his cover position has been solidified.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 Feb 74	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ John W. Berg

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C - Narrative Comments (continued)

country nationals who work in the same offices as these Soviet officials. The objective is more first hand reporting by Subject on Soviet officials and assessment reports on several of his co-workers who can be selected and recruited (based on his assessment reports) by other case officers to serve as access agents to Soviet officials.

Despite long service as an NOC, Subject's knowledge of and responsiveness to Organization priorities and requirements has not weakened. He concentrates on priority targets and his operational reporting is complete, on target and highly literate.

As is normal in an NOC position, Subject has no supervisory duties over Organization personnel although his cover job does include supervisory responsibilities. Subject is meticulous in his presentation of financial accountings and his operational expenses are modest. There are no administrative problems related to this project.

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT - FIELD TRANSMITTAL

20 Jan 74

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel.

SECTION A, items 2, 3, 7, and 8

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 (*Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature"*)

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 15 II 74	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (in pseudonym) Thomas B. Casasin Thomas B. CASASIN

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS.

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (in pseudonym) Reginald M. GUNION for
DATE 12 Feb 74	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (in pseudonym) George T. HEMSLEY

FORM 3-73 45A OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

(04-47)

SECRET

1 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : [redacted] CASASIN, T B.

Contact C/CPD prior to servicing any request for verification of Agency service.

/s/ Don H. Luetscher

Don H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

NOTE: Subject converted from Staff Agent status to Career Agent status effective 15 May 1972; this should be placed in his terminated Staff Agent file.

SECRET

GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

14-00000

SECRET

1 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/OP

This is to advise that Thomas B. CASASIN (P), has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 15 May 1972. The contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/EUR.

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

Former Staffer (Stf Agnt)

SECRET
GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN Thomas B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/F	8. CURRENT STATION Paris			

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 March 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 71 - 31 March 1972

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintenance of effective NOC status and functioning as a WOMACE officer in this situation.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains direct contact with MHHARSH personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides spotting reports on wide range of contacts and follows up with additional meetings when individual is of special interest to Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responds to Station requirement for information on individuals or organizations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Operational reporting.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

10 APR 1972

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds must be commented on if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period covered by this report subject's job with a scientific publication was terminated for economy reasons. He has now, by his own efforts and with no BKTRUST help, obtained a similar position (as of mid-March the contract has not been signed but it is almost certain that he has the job) with an international organization. The job is at a professional level with a salary that will offset approximately 40% of the total cost of this activity. His French fluency and background in scientific journalism were instrumental in obtaining this job. Subject's operational security is good and all indications are that his cover security is superb.

Despite a full time cover job, and completely unwitting employer, subject has maintained a high output for BKTRUST. He has maintained frequent and meaningful contact with two MHHARSH nationals in Paris and with an MHHARSH couple in another European city. The flow of spotting reports is equal in number and quality to those produced when his cover work was less demanding. One person spotted and assessed by subject was successfully recruited by an "inside" case officer. Subject's cover situation precludes the possibility of his recruiting.

/continued/

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 24 March 1972

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Ops Officer

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Joe IRL Saltzman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

See Attached Sheet.

DATE: 27 March 1972

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: DCOS

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE (continued)

It has been noted in past fitness reports that subject was weak in long-range, operational development of a target. The ease and probable success of an extended development is a function of the personalities involved. During this reporting period subject has conducted a sustained development of an MHHARSHER despite their different ages and divergent personalities thus demonstrating improvement in this area.

It some times appears that subject's reporting could be more precise and more closely attuned to BKTRUST objectives. This is probably the result of time limitations, and the NOC officer's knowledge of BKTRUST needs is lessened by his relative isolation.

As is normal in a NOC situation, subject has no supervisory duties with BKTRUST personnel. His cover job provided supervisory responsibility. Subject is meticulous in presentation of financial accountings and his operational expenses are modest.

Section 3 - Comments by Reviewing Official

The career of this NOC officer has reached a crucial juncture; if, as we currently anticipate, he succeeds in landing the position for which he appears to have the inside track, he will gain access to an institution and its employees which could prove to be invaluable. His new function will permit the widest possible access to a variety of targets, and with careful guidance, his utility as a spotter and assessor should improve very substantially.

The report notes that this officer has conducted a lengthy dialogue with an MHHARSH target; it is quite accurate that our NOC has handled himself well in a situation where disparity in age and background renders the relationship somewhat incongruous. Nonetheless, accuracy requires that we record that the NOC's interlocutor has obviously not maintained this ongoing relationship solely for altruistic motives, and has, in point of fact, on one occasion suggested that the NOC might wish to "help" him in the preparation of restricted distribution reports on the local situation, even though the particular topic was in itself totally innocuous. For these reasons we continue to monitor this relationship with great care, particularly since we simply cannot assess its longer range viability and the direction it is likely to take.

In sum, the NOC has done the best he could under somewhat trying circumstances, exacerbated by the severe economic problems of his erstwhile employer, which led to the NOC's being separated from that position at the end of last year. Through his own efforts, the NOC learned of the vacancy for which he has applied, and by assiduous and discriminating manipulation of his extensive connections on the local scene, has managed to maneuver himself into becoming the leading candidate for the post. If he is accepted for this position, his value to the Organization will unquestionably increase by a quantum leap, and we are consequently optimistic concerning his future ability to make an impressive contribution to Organizational goals on the local scene.

ORIG: Tom Roberts
UNIT: 9235
EXT: E/F/X
DATE: 1 June 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 13-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 43 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: C/EUR 5 INFO FILE VR: NOP C/CCS 2 C/NOCAD 2 CSPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 5 JUN 72 23 10z CITE DIRECTOR 274972

TO PARIS

RYBAT ADMIN PERS TOPSY WODEEP WOGAME

REF: DIRECTOR 271979

1. HQ INSTRUCTED CASASIN THAT IF UNCAIRD RAISES WITH HIM QUESTION OF FRC "NO RECORD" RESPONSE TO UNCAIRD QUERY RE HIS FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD REFER UNCAIRD TO IDEN. CASASIN SHOULD SAY HE CONSULTED IDEN ON RECENT VISIT RE HIS ACCRUED SERVICE CREDITS WITH VIEW TO WITHDRAWING THEIR CASH VALUE SINCE HE DOES NOT INTEND REENTER U.S. GOVT SERVICE. CASASIN SHOULD SAY IDEN CHECKED AND ACKNOWLEDGED CASASIN'S PREVIOUS SERVICE AND CAN VERIFY SAME TO UNCAIRD. ADVISE HDQ IF CASSASIN USES ABOVE AND IDEN WILL BE ALERTED.

2. [illegible]

3. NO FILE.

END OF MESSAGE

E/COV ____
NOC/CS ____
CCS/CSB ____

J Keith Reid
C/EUR/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AC/E/F
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO

TOM ROBERTS
E/F/X
5295
26 MAY 1972

SECRET

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

FILE VR.

(classification) (date and time filed)

SECRET

26 MAY 72 23 03z

CITE DIRECTOR 271978

PARIS

RYBAT ADMIN PERS TOPSY WODEEP WOGAME

REF: PARIS 27951 (IN 597183)

1. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION CASASIN HAS BEEN CANCELLED.

2. ALSO TAKING MEASURES BACKSTOP PRIOR EMPLOYMENT. BUT REGRET IT NOT POSSIBLE BACKSTOP WITH FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER. IF UNCAIRD QUERIES FRC ITS RESPONSE WILL BE "NO RECORD."

3. IF UNCAIRD QUERIES SKOGSBERG DELEGATION RE FRC RESPONSE, PRESUME SKOGSBERG CAN ARRANGE REPLY THAT "FRC IN ERROR" BECAUSE CSC INVESTIGATION CONSISTENT CASASIN'S CURRICULUM VITAE.

4. NO FILE.

END OF MESSAGE

E/COV ED WILT (IN DRAFT)
OS/OSD/SAB LARRY MILLS (TELECORD)
NOC/CS BILL BROWN (TELECORD)
CCS/

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/E/F
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16-2

SECRET

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: ROBERT JARMAN
UNIT: [illegible]/E/S

DATE: 5 APRIL 1972

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 48 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: EUR6 INFO: FILE, VR, NCAD3, OP2, CCS2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

[illegible]

CITE DIRECTOR

252752

TO PARIS

ADMIN TOPSY WODEEP

1. FOLLOWING IS STATUS REPORT ON TALKS WITH CASASIN RE CONVERSION TO CAREER AGENT:

A. PROCESSING FOR CONVERSION DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH CASASIN AND HE AGREEABLE TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT, WHICH NOW IN PROCESS. CONTRACT WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED.

B. IN ORDER CONVERT CASASIN TO CAREER AGENT IT NECESSARY ~~TO~~ ALLOW HIM RETAIN PORTION OF COVER SALARY IN LIEU OF 10% LOSS OF STAFF STATUS PAY AND TO MOVE HIM FROM GS-15/8 TO 15/10 LEVEL. ABOVE WILL BE SPELLED OUT FULLY IN CONTRACT.

C. CASASIN WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO WODEEP ~~[illegible]~~ UPON DATE OF HIS ACCEPTANCE BY UNCAIRD.

2. SHOULD CASASIN NOT BE ACCEPTED BY UNCAIRD, HQS RECOMMENDATION, SUBJECT TO STATION CONCURRENCE, WOULD BE FOR CASASIN TO REMAIN PARIS AS STAFF AGENT FOR RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD TO COMPLETE CURRENT OPS ASSIGNMENTS. FOLLOWING THIS PERIOD CASASIN WOULD BE [illegible] ~~RETURNED HQS FOR REASSIGNMENT~~. REQUEST STATION COMMENT.

-CONT-

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ROBERT JARMAN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 252755

3. IF CASASIN ACCEPTED BY UNCAIRD, WODCCP ~~[illegible]~~ WOULD LIKE CASASIN TDY HQS AREA FOR ADDITIONAL TWO OR THREE DAYS TRAINING. CASASIN PLANS RETURN WOCORK FOR DAUGHTER'S GRADUATION FIRST WEEK JUNE. THIS WOULD ~~[illegible]~~ PRESENT BEST OPPORTUNITY COVER-WISE FOR CASASIN TDY HQS AREA.

END OF MESSAGE

E/F/X
E/PERS
E/COV
NOCAD/CADRE J. KINSCHI (TELECOORD)
DC/NOCAD
C/E/SS
J Keith Reid
E/COPS
C/E/F

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

Attachment #1

Item 44. Operational Expenses

Reimbursement for payment of fringe benefit programs of cover organization (including retirement, health, and life insurance) when it is determined by the Agency that membership therein is necessary for cover and/or security.

SECRET

Attachment #2

Item 50. Offset of Income

In accordance with HN 20-129(2b), CASASIN will initially be permitted to retain $1449 of his cover income without offset. Upon successful completion of three years service under this contract, the offset will be further reduced by $551, which totals $2000.

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible] PROFILE (PART [illegible]) [illegible]

[illegible] B (P)		Jan [illegible]		[illegible] 19[illegible]
Married		[illegible] 1950 [illegible]		
	[illegible] 1954		[illegible] 1962	FCS C/S | FCS C/S
	X			
12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None		

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT
1943-48 Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt. - Civil Censorship Officer, Japanese Translator & Instructor, Liaison Officer
1949 [illegible] Publishing Co, [illegible] - County Editor of weekly paper
1949 [illegible] Housing Authority, [illegible] - Administrative Officer

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION
19[illegible] [illegible] College, [illegible] - French
[illegible] Sir George Williams College, Montreal, [illegible] - French
19[illegible] Univ of [illegible] [illegible] (19[illegible]), Oriental Civilization, Japanese
1951-52 Georgetown Univ Graduate School - International Relations

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)
French - R, P, S, U, [illegible] W, Inter(Feb 1962), Trans & Interp Aug 1957
Japanese - P, S, U, Inter([illegible] 1962); R, W, Elem; Trans & Interp Aug 1957

18. AGENCY-SPONSORED TRAINING

19[illegible]-50	[illegible]	19[illegible]	[illegible] Ops	19[illegible]	[illegible]
1950	Intel Orient	19[illegible]	[illegible] Surv [illegible]	1962	Tech Writer's Inst
1950	Ops	19[illegible]	Oper Audio Surv Equip	1962	French
1950	Ops [illegible]	19[illegible]	[illegible]		
		19[illegible]	[illegible] Serv Review		

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE [illegible] (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE	OCCUPAT. SERIES	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (if any)	LOCATION
Nov 19[illegible]	I.O.	[illegible]	7		[illegible]/[illegible] [illegible]/[illegible]LICT	HQ
Oct 1950	" "	[illegible]	9		[illegible]	"
[illegible]	" "	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible] Ch, FE [illegible]	"
[illegible]	Ops Off	[illegible]	[illegible]		" " " "	"
[illegible]	"	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible] Ch, FE [illegible]	"
[illegible]	Area Ops Off	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
Jan 195[illegible]	" " "	[illegible]	[illegible]	DI	[illegible] Area	[illegible]
Oct 19[illegible]	Ops Off	[illegible]	[illegible]	D	[illegible]/Ch, [illegible] 6	HQ
Sep 1962	" "	[illegible]	[illegible]	D	DDP/[illegible] Area	Paris
Feb 1963	" "	[illegible]	15	D	" " " "	"
Oct 1963	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/[illegible]/Internal Ops	"
Mar 1964	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/[illegible]/Internal Ops	"
Feb 1967	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/EUR/FF/CenReg	"

20. DATE [illegible] 20 Apr 19[illegible]	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY [illegible]	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE No

FORM 1200 [illegible] SECRET PROFILE

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

DATE 29 MAY 72

TO : James Jones | 4B-1 | Hqs

FROM: Office of Medical Services

SUBJ: Interim Medical Disposition

This is to advise that the medical processing of Jacques VOLTAIRE is incomplete awaiting receipt of supplemental medical information or completion of corrective medical action. Final medical disposition will be issued when this matter is resolved.

Glenn V6322

FORM 7-69 2997 CONFIDENTIAL GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION (4-26)

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: (See HR 20-33 and HR 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.)

CASE OFFICER: Robert F. Jarman
DIVISION: EUR/F
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 9269
DATE: 27 March 1972

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Thomas B. CASASIN

2A. PROJECT: NOCAD/~~Cadre~~
2B. PERMANENT STATION: ~~Paris~~
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 2131-0115
3A. FUNDS ☐ V. ☒ VV
4. SLOT NO.:
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES:
6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Bio attached

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): In process
7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE ☐ OBTAINED ☒ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Career agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: USA
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. AGE: 48
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): January 20, 1924
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Alexandria, Va.
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Paris, France
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate) ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☒ DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Daughter - 18
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: No
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED AS AN OFFICER CHECK ONE. ☐ RETIRED REGULAR ☐ RETIRED RESERVIST
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U.S. Army
24. RANK OR GRADE: 1st Lt.
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT TO BE OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: GS-15/10 $33,260
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: NA
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): UNESCO
30. FEDERAL TAXES
☐ GOV'T TAX DOCUMENTATION - BY AGENCY
☐ TAX DOCUMENTATION BY ESTABLISHED COVER
☒ AGENCY TAX COMMITTEE CASE

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO U S CITIZENS AND RESIDENT ALIENS)

31. QUARTERS: Yes
32. POST: Yes
33. OTHER: all standard allowances
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any):
To be determined

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☒ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO
37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO
37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☒ YES ☐ NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
DAUGHTER - USA - 18 - 5 September 1953

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes
43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes
44. OTHER: See Att. #1
45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☐ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED) NOTE SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.	CASE OFFICER Robert E. Jarman	DIVISION EUR/F
	TELEPHONE EXTENSION 9269	DATE 27 March 1972

SECTION VIII OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See HR 20-44, HR 20-41, HR 20-7, HR 20-53, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

All normal benefits for career agent. Reimbursement for foreign taxes.

SECTION IX COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check)	XX PROPOSED	48. TYPE (Check)	☐ PROPRIETARY	X CULTURAL	☐ COMMERCIAL	☐ TOURIST
	☐ ESTABLISHED		☐ SUBSIDIZED	X EDUCATIONAL	☐ OFFICIAL	☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

☐ YES ☒ XX NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)

☐ TOTAL ☒ XX PARTIAL ☐ NONE See Att. #2

SECTION XI TERM

51. DURATION Indef. DAYS MONTHS YEARS	52. EFFECTIVE DATE	53. RENEWABLE ☒ XX YES ☐ NO
54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days) 90	55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☒ XX YES ☐ NO	

SECTION XII FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION

Operations Officer

SECTION XIII DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Spotting, assessment and recruitment of potential operational assets for the Paris Station.

SECTION XIV QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Subject has been associated with CIA for over 20 years as an operations officer.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐ GRADE SCHOOL	☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE			
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE				
☐ COLLEGE (No degree)	☐ COLLEGE DEGREE	X POST GRADUATE	☐ MA	☐ PHD	

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ			61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	
French	XX			XX			XXX			
Japanese		XX			XX			XX		U.S.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Japan, Canada, France

SECTION XV EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Guide Publishing Company, Baltimore, Md. - County Editor - 1949
Baltimore Housing Authority, Md. - Admin Officer - 1949

SECTION XVI ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

Authorize advance shipment of HHE presently stored in Paris to U.S.A. for combining with present HHE in U.S. storage.

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
March 27, 1972	Frederick A. Cilner, Jr.	[illegible] 1972	

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an Independent Contractor to render professional services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Fee. For professional services rendered hereunder, you will be paid a fee calculated at the rate of $8,000 per annum. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government.

2. Taxes. As an Independent Contractor, monies paid you under paragraph one (1) above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational and security considerations, the Tax Board or this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you and your dependents to and from your permanent post of assignment and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped in conformance with applicable organization policies and procedures. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and when authorized for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. Upon your satisfactory completion of services hereunder, you will be authorized transportation expenses for you, your dependents and your household and personal effects to your recorded permanent place of legal residence in the United States. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized and expenses incurred herewith are subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with Government regulations or your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Execution of Documents. If, during your utilization hereunder, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by this organization to evidence this relationship.

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

7. Status. Your legal status under this agreement is that of an Independent Contractor. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as implying the creation of an employee-employer relationship.

8. Requirements. Requirements levied upon you by this organization hereunder are a part of this contract provided they are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

9. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or negotiated benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

10. Secrecy. By virtue of personal knowledge acquired during this and any previous association, you will become privy to employees, associates, plans, programs, methods and the like of this organization, in particular, and the U. S. Intelligence Community, in general. As a direct consequence of this knowledge, you agree to keep forever secret all classified information so obtained; to refrain from presenting a paper, writing for publication; making a speech through any media or forum, or other public statement on the subject of intelligence, factual or fictional, without prior authorization by the Government. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws of the U. S. and other applicable laws and regulations.

11. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 July 1974, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year unless sooner terminated upon fifteen (15) days' actual notice by either party hereto. Termination or expiration of this agreement will not release you from the provisions of paragraph ten (10) above and any secrecy oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /s/ Charles W. Sandman
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Thomas B. Casasin
Thomas E. Casasin

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

RCB/jff
28 June 74

SECRET

15 May 72

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. Your status is that of a Government employee under contract and, as such, your rights and benefits are governed by the provisions of this agreement. It is specifically understood that you are not entitled to rights and benefits pertaining to appointed staff status, except as provided herein.

2. Cover. In the performance of your services hereunder, you will act under cover suitable to conceal your relationship with the Government. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction of terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

3. Compensation. In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, and subject to the provisions set forth in paragraph four (4) below, you are guaranteed payment of a basic salary of $33,260 per annum, the equivalent of a GS-15/10. In addition, you are herein authorized legislative salary adjustments and a post differential in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed personnel. Your Federal Tax liability, benefits, retirement and the like shall be based upon said basic salary.

4. Disposition of Cover Emoluments.

(a) Earned Cover Income.

(1) Earned cover income is herein defined as income (including benefits in kind) received by you from your cover activities, which income does not have as its source the Government (this organization) or for which reimbursement from the Government has not nor will be sought by the cover activity.

(2) Earned cover income in an amount initially computed at the rate of $1449 per annum may be retained by you in addition to your basic contractual salary for the first three consecutive years of successful service hereunder; thereafter, at the rate of $2000 per annum.

(3) Earned cover income in excess of that set out in subparagraph two (2) above will be offset and thereby reduce your basic contractual salary by a like amount.

(4) You will initially report to this organization, upon assumption of cover status and thereafter on an annual basis, your rate of cover compensation. Any changes during the year will also be reported. This organization will pay your basic contractual salary (initially $33,260) until such time as reports indicate cover income in excess of that set out in sub-paragraph two (2) above. You will thereafter be paid at your full rate of compensation less anticipated earned cover income based on the last report. Adjustments, if any, will be made following receipt of the yearend report. Failure to timely submit reports may result in a delay or suspension of contractual payments due you hereunder.

(b) Other Cover Emoluments. With the exception of earned cover income, emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the Government and will be disposed of at such times and in such a manner as the Government may prescribe.

5. Taxes. (a) As an employee of the Government, you must satisfy your Federal tax liability on the taxable income paid to you under paragraph three (3) above. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational and security considerations, the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income tax liability on said income. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference.

(b) You will not be required to bear the expense of foreign taxes on income paid or guaranteed you by the Government under paragraph three (3) above. You will be reimbursed for such foreign taxes paid by you, consistent with your cover.

6. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel. In the event you are furnished quarters by your cover facility or the Government you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost-of-living allowances in conformance with applicable regulations of this organization including, but not limited to, a post allowance or, if applicable, an equalization allowance in lieu thereof, a supplementary post allowance, a transfer allowance, a home service transfer allowance and a separation allowance.

7. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You will also be authorized shipment of household effects, presently stored in Paris, France, for combination with such household effects as are presently in storage within continental United States. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

8. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including but not limited to payment of fringe benefit program costs, of your cover organization (including retirement, health and life insurance) when it is determined by this organization that membership therein is necessary for cover and/or security, also entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

9. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government or your cover facility to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

10. Benefits. (a) By virtue of your employment relationship with the Government hereunder, you are entitled to coverage under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to sick, annual, and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government-appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government or cover officials. All accrued but unused leave credited to your account under previous employment with the United States Government will be transferred to the leave account established for you under this agreement.

(c) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act.

(d) Your participation in the Retirement and Disability System of this Organization is preserved by virtue of your transfer without a break in service from a position of employment wherein qualification for such status was achieved. Contributions into the Retirement and Disability Fund will be deducted from the basic compensation due you hereunder.

(e) You are herein authorized continued coverage under the Federal Employees' Health Benefits Act. This organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(f) You are herein authorized continued coverage under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act unless you have previously executed a written waiver of said coverage. This organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(g) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee in the line of duty while abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations, and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

(h) You will be entitled to claim reimbursement for loss of personal property pursuant to applicable Government regulations.

11. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with governmental instructions.

12. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existance of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

13. Secrecy. (a) You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all classified information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws of the United States and other applicable laws and regulations.

(b) In the event you marry or remarry during the term of this contract, you agree to advise this organization at least one hundred twenty (120) days in advance of such contemplated marriage, or otherwise as soon as known, and to furnish such personal history data on your prospective spouse as may be required by this organization. You understand and agree that should this organization determine that your marriage would limit or otherwise impair your usefulness to the Government, this contract may be terminated.

14. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

15. Reassignments. During your period of service under this agreement, it may be necessary for this organization to terminate an assignment for reasons beyond your control. In such event, you will be given every consideration for other assignments appropriate to Career Agents.

16. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government. Specifically, you herein acknowledge that this organization makes no commitment, either express or implied, that appointed employment status will be offered you at the conclusion of or during your period of contractual service.

17. Term. This contract is effective as of 15 May 1972 and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon ninety (90) days' actual notice by either party hereto,

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

SECRET

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

/s/ [illegible]

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Thomas B. Casasin
Thomas B. Casasin

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

RCB/dhc
4/5/72

CCRP

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B	PREPARED: 05/11/72

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION INITIAL ENTRY	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 05 15 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 5136-1231	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE EUROPEAN DIVISION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 0	17. SALARY OR RATE DOG: 02036 $ 33260 LEI: 05267

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:      24  SEX: M       MARITAL ST: DIV     NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP:            FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D                   HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES                 PREV. GOVT SERV: 4          SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A               A/L IND: 6                  S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: EUR PERS          REFR ORG: EUR       PHONE: 6913
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y     FED EXMP:             STATE EXMP:         STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI      OPS EXPNSE: Y         HOUSING: A          POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4    DIFFERENTIAL: Y       OFFSET CLAUSE: Y    STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : N       ALLOWANCE COMM: N   EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N    OTH TAX ENTL: N       OTHER ALLOWNS : N   SEPARATION:
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

fil

Form 1150B
7-66 MFG 2 72

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BBG: 01 JUN 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 008102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1973	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 23 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1136 1231 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD FRENCH AREA PARIS STATION PARIS ANNEX	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0668	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 29099

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

50 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EOD: 17 AUG 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 008102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1971	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 20 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1136 1231 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD FRENCH AREA PARIS STATION PARIS ANNEX	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0688	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 27463

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

10 MAR 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

B

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEB. 1970	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 25 69	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	0136 1231 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP EUR FOREIGN FIELD CENTRAL REGION PARIS STATION ANNEX, PARIS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0668	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 23734

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 26 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	7136 1231 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD CENTRAL REGION PARIS STATION ANNEX, PARIS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0FF3	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 20585

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-91)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1 7 APR 66

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

0CB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 10 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR		
6. FUNDS V TO V CF TO V ☒ V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 8136 1231 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY SECTION 203 P.L. 88-643		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE FOREIGN FIELD PARIS STATION INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE			
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0885	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D		
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 19415	

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81)

(When Filled In)

we

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO
SUPPLEMENT TO STAFF AGENT PERSONNEL ACTION
FOR THOMAS B. CASASIN

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

Reference is made to your Staff Agent Supplement, effective 5 August 1962.

Effective 27 September 1965, all reference to income is deleted from that supplement and the following provision is substituted:

Taxes. As an appointed employee of the Government you must satisfy your Federal income tax liability on taxable income paid to you. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income tax liability on income directly received as a result of your Federal employment. Such determinations and procedures constitute an integral part of your Staff Agent administration.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Personnel Officer

Copy Pouched to field
TM# Y52637
1 Mar 66
p.t

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, EUROPEAN Division		file
INFO.		
FROM Chief of Station, PARIS		
SUBJECT O ADMIN PERS TOPSY WODEEP Thomas B. CASASIN		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: PARIS 27?ol, 27 April 1972

As reported in reference, CASASIN begins his UNCAIRD job on 5 June 1972. Forwarded USC are a Curriculum Vitae which he prepared for UNCAIRD and a completed form required for an LNLUTE security clearance.

Reginald M. Gunion

Reginald M. GUNION

Attachment:
1. As stated, USC

[illegible] att'd by [illegible] 15 May 72

Distribution:
~~3~~ 2 - C/EUR w/att USC
1 - [illegible]/RCG

CS COPY

201-

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFPA-95019	MAY 8 1972 4 May 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER [illegible]

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION — ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ÉDUCATION, LA SCIENCE ET LA CULTURE

CURRICULUM VITAE

Please complete this form in English or French. It is in your own interest that your answers are complete, accurate, and clearly presented. They should be typed or printed on the form; only if additional space is required for certain items should separate sheets of the same size be used, with clear reference to relevant numbers.

Veuillez remplir ce formulaire en anglais ou en français. Il est de votre propre intérêt que vos réponses soient complètes, précises et claires. Elles doivent être tapées à la machine ou libellées très lisiblement; autant que possible, n'employez que cette formule pour donner les renseignements demandés; en cas d'absolue nécessité, utilisez des feuilles supplémentaires de même format, avec indication précise du paragraphe.

1. Family name (Surname) - Nom de famille	First names - Prénoms	Maiden name - Nom de jeune fille
RICHARDSON	Jacques Gabriel	

2. Permanent address - Domicile permanent	Telephone
5 villa Madrid, 92 Neuilly, France	722 99-90

3. Mailing address - Adresse postale (If different from above) (Si elle diffère de la précédente)	Telephone

4. A) Date of birth - Date de naissance: day / jour	month / mois	year / année	B) Country and place of birth - Pays et lieu de naissance	C) Sex - Sexe	D) Marital status - État civil
20	I	1924	USA, Baltimore, Maryland	M	Divorced

5. A) Citizenship at birth / Nationalité à la naissance	B) Present citizenship (since) / Nationalité actuelle (depuis)
USA	USA

C) Have you taken any official steps towards changing your present nationality?
Avez-vous entrepris des démarches officielles aux fins de changer votre nationalité actuelle?
No

6. Give the following information about persons fully dependent upon you for financial support.
Donnez les renseignements suivants sur les personnes qui sont, financièrement, entièrement à votre charge.

Name of dependant / Nom de la personne à charge	Date of birth / Date de naissance	Relationship / Degré de parenté	Name of dependant / Nom de la personne à charge	Date of birth / Date de naissance	Relationship / Degré de parenté
Pamela A. Richardson	19 IX 5[illegible]	Daughter			
Michelle Richardson	5 IX 5[illegible]	Daughter			

7. List any of your relatives employed by the United Nations or its Specialized Agencies.
Donnez les noms de ceux de vos parents qui sont employés par les Nations Unies ou une des Institutions spécialisées.

Name - Nom	Relationship / Degré de parenté	Name of international organization / Nom de l'organisation internationale

8. Would you object to serving in any regions of the world? If so, indicate which
Avez-vous des objections à [illegible] dans certaines parties du monde? Dans l'affirmative indiquez lesquelles
No

9. Would you accept employment for [illegible]
Accepteriez-vous un emploi d'une durée de [illegible]

Up to 6 months / moins de 6 mois	No
6 months to 1 year / 6 mois à un an	No
more than 1 year / plus d'un an	Yes

10. How much notice would you require to report for work?
Dans quel délai pourriez-vous entrer en fonctions?
One month

11. If employed, you will be required to pass a medical examination. Have you any disabilities which might limit your prospective field of work or preclude your undertaking any necessary travel by air?
En cas d'engagement un examen médical est nécessaire. Avez-vous une infirmité quelconque susceptible de restreindre vos activités professionnelles ou de vous interdire tout voyage par avion que vous pourriez être appelé à effectuer?
No

12. For what type of work or for which specific post do you wish to be considered? - Quel genre d'emploi ou quel poste précis vous intéresse?
Scientific-technical publications

[illegible]

13. EDUCATION - ETUDES - List in chronological order the educational establishments you have attended from the age of 14, including in service training courses having lead to the granting of diplomas.

Enumérez, en suivant l'ordre chronologique, les établissements d'enseignement que vous avez fréquentés depuis l'âge de 14 ans. Mentionnez également les stages de perfectionnement ayant abouti à l'obtention d'un diplôme.

Name, place and country *Nom, adresse et pays*	Years attended *Années d'études* From - *de*	 To - *à*	Degrees, diplomas, etc. (in original language) state main subjects *Diplômes, titres (titre original) indiquer matières principales*	Date obtained *Date d'obtention*
A) Secondary, Technical, Professional, etc. *Secondaire, Technique, Apprentissage etc.*				
High School of Montreal, Canada		Jun 40	Diploma	1940
B) College or equivalent University establishment				
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor USA		Feb 47	BA	1947
Georgetown University, Washington USA	1951-2		None	
Rensselaer Polytechnic, Troy, NY USA (Technical Writers Institute)		Jun 62	Certificate	1962

14. List professional societies to which you belong and your activities in public or international affairs.

Enumérez les associations professionnelles dont vous êtes membre; vos activités publiques et internationales

International Council for the Advancement of Science [illegible], Founding Member; British Interplanetary Society, Fellow; Society of Technical Publishers and Writers, Senior member; International Science Writers Association, Member; The Glaciological Society, Member; Association des Journalistes Scientifiques, Membre Associé; and others

15. List, but do not attach, your significant publications. Include publisher and date and place of publication.

Enumérez, sans les joindre, tous travaux importants que vous avez publiés. Indiquez le nom de l'éditeur, le lieu et la date de publication.

Numerous articles, Science and Technology, Space/Aeronautics, Electro-Technology, 1963-9; numerous articles, Science Journal, 1969-70; numerous articles, book reviews, Atomes and La Recherche, 1969-present; numerous articles, Innovation and Search, 1969-present; Journal of Medical Engineering & Electronics, 1969; numerous articles in Nature 'News and Views,' 1970-present; articles in Purchasing and Heating Industry, 1963-9; editorial work for Unesco Impact, 1970; planned June 1971 issue on chemistry of Unesco Courier; article on American oceanology in Sciences & Avenir, August 1970, and others

16. LANGUAGES
LANGUES

A) Mother tongue :
Langue maternelle : English

B) Other languages
Autres langues

	Ability to - *Aptitude à*															
	Speak - *Parler*				Write - *Rédiger*				Read - *Lire*				Understand - *Comprendre*			
	Excellent *Excellente*	Good *Bonne*	Fair *Passable*	Slight *Faible*	Excellent *Excellente*	Good *Bonne*	Fair *Passable*	Slight *Faible*	Excellent *Excellente*	Good *Bonne*	Fair *Passable*	Slight *Faible*	Excellent *Excellente*	Good *Bonne*	Fair *Passable*	Slight *Faible*
French	☒		☐	☐	☒		☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
Japanese	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
Spanish	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
Italian	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐

C) In which languages are you able to teach ? *Dans quelles langues pouvez-vous enseigner ?*

English and French

17. CLERICAL SKILLS - STÉNO-DACTYLOGRAPHIE

Indicate speech in words per minute, after verification on non-commercial texts.
Indiquez les vitesses en mots-minute après vérification des vitesses sur textes non-commerciaux.

Languages - *Langues*		Shorthand *Sténo*	Typing *Dactylo*
English	*anglais*		
French	*français*		
Spanish	*espagnol*		
(Other - *autre*)			

18. MECHANICAL SKILLS - MÉCANOGRAPHIE

List any special skills you possess and office machines you can use
Enumérez vos compétences techniques et les machines de bureau que vous avez appris à manier.

Can use all office equipment, including some IBM and ICL computers (2, 2.5, and 3d generations)

19. EMPLOYMENT RECORD.
ANTÉCÉDENTS PROFESSIONNELS

Starting with your present position list in reverse order every employment during at least the past ten years.

Énumérez, en commençant par le plus récent, tous les emplois que vous avez exercés au cours des dix dernières années au moins.

A. PRESENT POSITION - POSTE ACTUEL

Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi
From: October 1 1970 To: Present
De: A: Ce jour

Annual salary - Traitement annuel
Starting: 78,000F Present: 85,150F
De début: Actuel:

Exact title of your position and place of work
Titre exact de votre poste et lieux d'activité
Directeur Adjoint, Paris

Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur
Société d'Editions Scientifiques; Science-Information

Type of work
Genre d'activité Scientific publishers, consultants

Name and title of your immediate supervisor M. Cheukiewicz,
Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct Président

Reason for wishing to leave - Pourquoi desirez-vous changer d'emploi?
Would like to have my week-ends free

Description of your duties (underline the main points); include number and type of subordinates.

Décrivez vos fonctions, en soulignant les principales; indiquez également le nombre et les fonctions des personnes sous vos ordres.

Directeur-adjoint of firm publishing monthly scientific magazine and providing scientific and technical consulting services; deputy to president, helping him manage two enterprises specializing in the processing of specialized information and the talent which handles it.

Directly responsible for sales, sales promotion, advertising, and public relations functions; supervise accountancy and purchasing functions, and relations with other publishers.

Handle the inception of all foreign relations, and deal directly with international organizations (OECD, Unesco, [illegible]

B. PREVIOUS POSITION - POSTE ANTÉRIEUR

Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi
From: January 1 1969 To: Present (concurr'
De: A:

Annual salary - Traitement annuel
Starting $5,000 plus comm. Final $9,000 plus comm.
De début: A la fin:

Exact title of your position and place of work
Titre exact de votre poste et lieux d'activité
European Director — Paris

Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur
Technology Communication, Inc

Type of work
Genre d'activité Managing overseas publishing co.

Name and title of your immediate supervisor F. Park,
Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct Executive Director

Reason for leaving
Cause de départ Would prefer to remain as consultant.

Description of your duties (underline the main points); include number and type of subordinates.

Décrivez vos fonctions, en soulignant les principales, indiquez également le nombre et les fonctions des personnes sous vos ordres.

Responsible from the outset for creating editorial and promotional resources and services outside North America, mainly in Europe, of ucs firm specializing in continuing education for technical management. This includes the publishing and editing (based in New York) of three periodicals: Innovation, Search, and a monthly newsletter. All are concerned with the art of management in a continually changing social environment.

Find authors; write my own article material; work with firms and individuals as well as government units desiring the

C. PREVIOUS POSITION - POSTE ANTÉRIEUR

Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi
From: February 1968 To: June 1969
De: A:

Annual salary - Traitement annuel
Starting $19,500 + profits Final $21,000 + prof
De début: A la fin:

Exact title of your position and place of work
Titre exact de votre poste et lieux d'activité
Chief Correspondent, Europe

Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur
Conover-Mast Publications, Inc

Type of work
Genre d'activité Applied technology periodical press

Name and title of your immediate supervisor H. Conover,
Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct President

Reason for leaving
Cause de départ Tired of routine; wanted new challenges

Describe your duties (underline the main points); include number and type of subordinates

Décrivez vos fonctions, en soulignant les principales; indiquez également le nombre et les fonctions des personnes sous vos ordres.

As head of correspondents, planned, directed and supervised work assignments of a dozen correspondents reporting to the overseas editorial bureau of a major trade press organization, which during this period was merged by purchase with the Cahners Publishing Company

14-00000

C. PREVIOUS POSITION - POSTE ANTÉRIEUR

Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi
From / De: May 1962 To / A: February 1968

Annual salary - Traitement annuel
Starting / De début: $10,000 + profits Final / A la fin: $19,000 + profits

Exact title of your position and place of work / Titre exact de votre poste et lieu d'activité (London, Paris)
European Editorial Representative

Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur
Conover-Mast Publications, Inc

Type of work / Genre d'activité: Specialized periodical press

Name and title of your immediate supervisor / Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct: L. Harrerty, Exec Vice Pres (deceased)

Reason for leaving / Cause de départ: Promotion

Description of your duties (describe the main points) [illegible] and type of work done
Décrivez vos fonctions, [illegible] les principales, indiquez également le nombre et les fonctions des personnes sous vos ordres

Established, planned, directed and managed activities of overseas editorial bureau of medium-sized publishing firm specializing in the applied sciences, industrial management methods and technology, and marketing methods magazines.

E. If applicable, give here a brief resumé of employment(s) held before those covered above.
Si vous le jugez utile, résumez ici vos divers emplois antérieurs.

1960-2 Free-lance technical editor, various publishing houses, New York
1960-2 Supervising Technical Editor, Scientific Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army
1955-60 Supervising Foreign Affairs Specialist, Mutual Defense Assistance Program, at Tokyo, Japan
1950-4 Regional Editor, International Press Section, US Information Agency
1949 Reporter, then associate editor, weekly newspaper chain, Baltimore.

20. REFERENCES: List three persons not related to you by blood or marriage, who are familiar with your character and qualifications. Do not repeat names listed in item 19.

RÉFÉRENCES: Indiquez trois personnes (parents et alliés exclus) pouvant donner sur vous des renseignements d'ordre moral et professionnel. Ne répétez pas de noms déjà cités dans la case 19.

Name - *Nom*	Full address - *Adresse complète*	Profession
Prof AIGRAIN Pierre	DGRST, Ministère de la Recherche Industrielle et Scientifique, Paris	Civil Servant
Mr VICHNEY Nicholas	Science Editor, LE MONDE, rue des Italiens Paris	Journalist
Prof THUILLIER Pierre	University of Paris, Nanterre Campus, Paris	Educator

21. Have you any objection to our making enquiries of your present employer?
Voyez-vous quelque inconvénient à ce que nous prenions des renseignements auprès de votre employeur actuel?
☐ yes / oui ☒ no / non

22. State briefly any other relevant facts. Include information regarding any residence or travel outside the country of which you are a citizen.
Donnez brièvement tout autre renseignement afférent à votre candidature. Donnez également des précisions sur la période de résidence ou voyages hors du pays dont vous êtes ressortissant.

Foreign residence: Canada 1937-42; UK, France, Belgium, Germany, 1944-5 (military service); Japan, 1946-8 (military service), 1955-60; France, 1962-present

23. I certify that the statements made by me in answer to the foregoing questions are true and complete. I understand that wilful misrepresentation renders me liable to dismissal, if employed.

Je certifie que les réponses que j'ai faites aux questions ci-dessus sont complètes et exactes. Je reconnais qu'en donnant sciemment une indication inexacte, je me rendrais passible de renvoi immédiat, au cas où je serais engagé.

Signature

Date November 30, 1971

N.B.

You may be requested to supply documentary evidence in support of the above statements. Do not, however, send any such evidence unless asked to do so by Unesco.

Receipt of this form is not ordinarily acknowledged but your application will be carefully examined and Unesco will, if need be, get into touch with you.

Applications for employment are not normally retained by Unesco for more than two years after receipt.

Il pourra vous être demandé de fournir des pièces justificatives à l'appui des déclarations faites ci-dessus. Ces pièces ne devront être envoyées qu'à la demande expresse de l'Unesco.

Il n'est pas coutume d'accuser réception de ce formulaire, votre demande sera néanmoins examinée attentivement et, le cas échéant, l'Unesco se mettra en rapport avec vous.

En règle générale, l'Unesco ne conserve pas les demandes d'emploi plus de deux ans après réception.

[illegible]

IDENTIFICATION AND PERSONNEL DATA FOR EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN

[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS.—Prepare in quadruplicate. All sections must be completed. Write "None" when applicable. *Type or print answers.* If space not adequate for complete answers continue under item 23, and attach a supplemental sheet to this form if necessary. All addresses must show street number, street, city, and State.

1. NAME (Last, first, middle)
RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

2. OTHER NAMES USED (Maiden name, names by former marriages, former names changed legally or otherwise, aliases, nicknames, etc. Specify which, and show dates used)

5. DESCRIPTION (Check which) ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COLOR EYES	COLOR HAIR
178 cm	72 kg	Brown	Black

6. MARITAL STATUS (Check which)
☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☒ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOW(ER)

7. BIRTH DATE

DAY	MONTH	YEAR
20	Jan	24

3. PRESENT ADDRESS AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE THERE
5 villa Madrid
92 Neuilly, France
3 years

8. BIRTHPLACE (City, county, State, and country)
Baltimore, Maryland

4. DATES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE (Go back 15 years. Continue under item 23 on other side if necessary.)

FROM	TO	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY	STATE
June 1969	Present	5 villa Madrid	92 Neuilly	France
Sept 1962	June 1969	9 villa Madrid	92 Neuilly	France
Sept 1960	Aug 1962	312 Lamond Place	Alexandria Va 22314	
[illegible] 1958	June [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible], Tokyo, Japan	
Feb 1955	June 19[illegible]	2-chome [illegible]	Setagaya-ku, Tokyo, Japan	

9. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP.
INDICATE WHETHER:

(A) BY BIRTH ☐	(C) NATURALIZATION ☐
(B) DERIVATIVE ☐	PETITION NO.
DATE	DATE
CERTIFICATE NO	CERTIFICATE NO
PLACE	PLACE

10. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 042 20 5339

11. MILITARY SERVICE (Past or present)

SERIAL NO.	BRANCH	FROM (Yr.)	TO (Yr.)	TYPE OF DISCH.
31316265	Army	1943	1946	Hon
0 937200	Army	1946	1948	Hon

12. EDUCATION (All schools above elementary)

NAME OF SCHOOL	ADDRESS	FROM (Year)	TO (Year)	DEGREES
High School of Montreal	University St, Montreal		1940	Dipl
University of Michigan	Ann Arbor		1947-X	BA
Georgetown University	Washington DC	1951	1952	---
Rensselaer Polytechnic	Troy NY.		1962	Certif

S/C att. 2 to OFPA-98019

CS COPY

DEFERRED

15. EMPLOYMENT (List ALL employment dates starting with your present employment. Show ALL dates and addresses when unemployed. Give name under which employed if different from name now used)

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER (Firm or agency) AND NAME OF YOUR SUPERVISOR	TYPE OF WORK	ADDRESS (City and country)	REASON FOR LEAVING
1970	Present	Sté d'Editions Scient Mr H. Chodkiewicz	Publishing	Paris France	To accept Unesco appt
1960	Present	Technology Communic'n Mr F. P. Park	Publishing	New York NY	ditto
1962	1969	Conover-Mast Public'ns Mr H. Conover, Jr	Publishing	New York NY	To join Technology Comm'n
1960	1962	Army Office of Ch of Staff; Col H. P. Garrity	R&D reports	Washington DC	To re-enter priv industry
1955	1960	Tokyo CM Center Col J. H. Stewart	Industrial surveys	Tokyo Japan	Contract expiration
1950	1954	USIA (IPS) Mr Hundy	Govt info services	Washington DC	To accept o'seas assgmt
1949	1949	Housing Authority, Baltimore; Mr Kilburn	Public housing authority	Baltimore Md	To accept better job
1948	1949	Guide Publications Inc Dr Kobre	Publishing	Baltimore Md	To accept better job

16. FOREIGN COUNTRIES VISITED (SINCE 1930) (Exclusive of military service)

COUNTRY	DATE LEFT USA	DATE RETURNED USA	PURPOSE
Western Europe	1944	1945	Military service
Japan	1946	1948	ditto
Japan-Korea	1950	1953	USIA activities
Japan	1955	1960	Civil service
Western Europe	1960	1960	Tourism
France, western Europe	1962	1972	Business, tourism

15. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., OR ANY COMMUNIST OR FASCIST ORGANIZATION?

(ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

16. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH IS TOTALITARIAN, FASCIST, COMMUNIST, OR SUBVERSIVE, OR WHICH HAS ADOPTED OR SHOWS A POLICY ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR WHICH SEEKS TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?

No

(ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

17. IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 15 OR 16 ABOVE IS "YES," STATE THE NAMES OF ALL SUCH ORGANIZATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS, MOVEMENTS, GROUPS, OR COMBINATIONS OF PERSONS, DATES OF MEMBERSHIP, AND OFFICES HELD. IN QUESTION 21 OR ON A SEPARATE SHEET TO BE ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART OF THIS FORM, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON YOUR ACTIVITIES THEREIN AND MAKE ANY EXPLANATION YOU DESIRE REGARDING YOUR MEMBERSHIP OR ACTIVITIES.

NAME	ADDRESS	FROM	TO	OFFICE HELD

18. MEMBERSHIP IN OTHER ORGANIZATIONS (*List all organizations in which you are now a member or have been a member, except those which show religious or political affiliations.*)

NAME	ADDRESS	TYPE	FROM	TO	OFFICE HELD
British Interplanetary Soc	London	Professional	1955	present	Fellow
Soc of Tech Communication	Washington	"	1968	present	Sen Member
Intl Science Writers Assn	London	"	1955	present	Member
American Club	Paris	Social	1962	present	Member

19. RELATIVES (*Parents, spouse, divorced spouse, children, brothers, and sisters, living or dead. Name of spouse should include maiden name and any other names by previous marriage. If person is dead, so state under "address" and enter other information as of time of death.*)

RELATION	NAME IN FULL	YEAR OF BIRTH	ADDRESS	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Daughter	Pamela A. Richardson	1950	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	USA	USA
Daughter	Michelle D. Richardson	1953	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	USA	USA

20. REFERENCES. (Name three persons, not relatives or employers, who are well acquainted with you.)

NAME	ADDRESS	YEARS KNOWN
[illegible], Jr	[illegible] Road [illegible]	6
[illegible]	420 East 23 Street (6C) New York NY 10010	29
Col Gordon W[illegible]	340 Moreland Circle Prescott AZ 86301	29

21. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, TAKEN INTO CUSTODY, HELD FOR INVESTIGATION OR QUESTIONING, OR CHARGED BY ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY? *(You may omit: (1) Traffic violations for which you paid a fine of $30 or less, and (2) anything that happened before your 16th birthday. All other incidents must be included, even though they were dismissed or you merely forfeited collateral.)*

(ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

22. WHILE IN THE MILITARY SERVICE WERE YOU EVER ARRESTED FOR AN OFFENSE WHICH RESULTED IN A TRIAL BY DECK COURT OR BY SUMMARY, SPECIAL, OR GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL?

(ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

IF YOUR ANSWER TO 21 OR 22 IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS IN ITEM 23, SHOWING FOR EACH INCIDENT: (1) DATE, (2) CHARGE, (3) PLACE, (4) LAW ENFORCING AUTHORITY OR TYPE OF COURT OR COURT-MARTIAL, AND (5) ACTION TAKEN.

23. SPACE FOR CONTINUING ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS *(Show item numbers to which answers apply. Attach a separate sheet if there is not enough space here.)*

CERTIFICATION

NOTE: *The original copy must be signed by the person named in item 1 on this form.*

I certify that the above information is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

May 1 1972
(DATE)

SIGNATURE (Sign original only)

DELETED

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 196[illegible]—O—[illegible]
GPO [illegible]

Ot 9m

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN, Thomas B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Off	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR	8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1970 to 31 March 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M–Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P–Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S–Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O–Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Gained full-time employment as a senior executive of a foreign scientific publication for the purpose of further developing access to station targets and appreciably lowering the overall cost of the operations in which he is involved.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to gain access to MHHARSH personnel and spot leads on eventual access and support-type assets directed against the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and assesses MHHARSH officials with whom he has made contact as well as access prospects to the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reports on the above activities.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review, Subject managed to gain full-time employment as a senior executive of an HBSPRITE government subsidized scientific publication at a time of economic slowdown when jobs were not easy to get. He did this without help from Headquarters or the Station. Such an achievement is a tribute to Subject's fluency in French, his ability to write, his general scientific know-how and his good buisness sense. Over half of his salary therefore is now paid by this company. In converting to full-time employment, a major adjustment, Subject's contribution to the Station operations in the MHHARSH and TPFAST fields against which he is targetted temporarily decreased somewhat. Subject continued, however, to maintain contact with three local MHHARSH officials and initiated contact with three others. He also continued to search for new leads to personalities in the priority areas assigned to him. Subject has the capability to call **on local scientists or technicians of just about any nationality with the possible exception of TPFAST citizens. He has used this near-unique potential well.**

Subject has had occasional difficulty switching from "professional" or intellectual subjects in his development of MHHARSH personalities or access prospects to more down-to-earth interests necessary —con't—

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 June 1971	/s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
18 months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Handling Officer	/s/ Francis S. Sherry

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Station submitted comments on Subject officer recently in OFPT-16549 (8 April 1971), to which we should add that Subject has, largely on his own merits, acquired a solid and potentially highly useful cover employment. However, this new employment will demand a very substantial amount of time and energy from Subject, and the unanswerable question at the moment relates to his availability for Organizational tasks. We shall need additional time and careful working with this officer to determine the answer, since the fiscal outlay from the Organization to support his continued stay in Paris is still quite

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 May 1971	DCOS	/s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

Section C (continued)

to the development of human relations. His forte is therefore more in the field of spotting and making operational contacts than in that of more than short-range operational development. Subject's operational situation makes it impossible for him to attempt recruitments. Thus, his very real achievements are not by essence of the spectacular variety.

Subject's reporting has been satisfactory and continue to be copious. He could, however, further improve the selectivity of the leads provided the Station and make more of an effort to "digest" the information contained in his reports.

Although Subject has, at present, no supervisory function, he has repeatedly requested such a responsibility. He is careful with operational expenses and has exercised good security.

During the period under review, additional efforts have been made to make full use of Subject's potential and integrate him further in the work of the station component with which he works. He is a particularly valuable asset for the Station programs directed against the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.

Section D (continued)

substantial. In a word, is it worth it? We do not yet know, although our initial impressions are favorable.

On the fitness report itself, this rater would have preferred an "S" rating for specific duty number one; Subject may ultimately deserve an "O", but it does not seem warranted at the present time. Moreover, I believe the overall rating would more properly have been in the higher range of the "P" category, rather than "S", but it is of course a subjective judgment of the rating officer, who is more intimately and directly involved with Subject on a frequent basis.

In sum, the cover is superb, and only time will reveal to what extent the cover requirements permit a full measure on behalf of the Organization. We are following this aspect closely and will be commenting upon it subsequently as we gain experience and knowledge.

FITNESS REPORT

[illegible]

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible]	8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER RESERVE TEMPORARY

CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

INITIAL REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

X ANNUAL REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Established and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to develop leads on eventual access or support type assets to be used by the Station against the local MHHARSH target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates contact with selected local MHHARSH targets and undertakes to develop sufficient rapport with them to provide operational assessments.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	-
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

14-00000

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The comments of the rating officer are limited to the period from October 1969 to March 1970 during which he worked with Subject. The previous rating officer has added his comments to allow coverage of the total indicated period from April 1969 to March 1970. During this period Subject was integrated in a new team assigned to the local S&T and Commercial MHMARSH target. Subject's recent activity has been very productive indeed. Subject used the excellent potential given to him by his cover to skillfully spot and assess access agent candidates. As Subject's operational situation in Paris precludes making recruitment, the most promising of these candidates was placed in contact with a Station officer during social events Subject organized. At the same time, Subject continued his efforts to develop personal relationship with several MHMARSHers. The beginning of personal, as opposed to purely professional, relations with a major MHMARSH target enabled him to obtain insight into the target's beliefs and personality which was the best the Station had to date. Subject also managed to establish contact with two other MHMARSH representatives of interest. This, in one case, required almost six months to accomplish via a combination of patience, skill and determination. Subject is an experienced officer. He is cost conscious and practices good security. The Station has no other asset with the necessary scientific and editorial know-how, fluent French and local knowledge to replace Subject. In view of this and the recent progress made by Subject in response to very specific requirements and his willingness to try to establish personal and, hopefully, social relations with access prospects and MHMARSH targets, the Station recently recommended that he be extended in Paris. At the same time, the Station recommended that Subject's cover be reinforced by full-time employment with Subject's current [illegible] part-time employer.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	[illegible] Officer	/s/ Francis Cherry

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As previous Station correspondence and fitness reports will reflect, this officer has been the subject of varying evaluations and projections in recent years. In fairness to him, however, it is equally true that an officer under non-official cover reflects, in the level and quality of his performance, the amount and type of guidance, direction and push he receives from the responsible inside case officer. Making allowances for these variables, this officer's past record has not been impressive; however, it is also correct to note that he has improved substantially during the latter part of the period under review, and that if the Station can work out some fiscal arrangement which will reduce the heavy financial input

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
19 May 1970	[illegible]	Hugh Montgomery

Section D3 continued

from the Organization, his continued presence at this Station definitely appears to be warranted for a sufficient period to reach more definite conclusions concerning the level of sustained performance over a somewhat longer period than that reflected by this report.

On balance, we are pleased that this officer has responded so well to greater case officer direction and that he has undertaken somewhat more aggressive efforts to expand his range of contacts in immediate proximity to the primary Station targets. This officer does bring many talents to bear on his operational activity: he has absolutely fluent French, a solid and exploitable cover, and a vast range of contacts in the local community. Nonetheless, it will require additional time to explore these contacts in depth, select those which appear to be operationally viable, and pursue them actively either to the point of recruitment by another officer or elimination from further development, for whatever reason.

In sum, in spite of the recognized and commendable improvement in this officer's performance during the period under review, the reviewer submits that the letter grade for specific duties 2 and 4 would more properly have been a "P", and that the overall rating, at this point, would more accurately be set at a level between "P" and "S", probably closer to the former than the latter.

This reviewing comment has been read by the officers who prepared the Fitness Report.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): CASASIN, Thomas B
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-15
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/EUR/France
8. CURRENT STATION: Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1968 - 31 March 1969

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet WOLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

During this reporting period subject had very markedly increased the tempo of his activities and contacts. Many agent prospects have been screened and contacts were established with people of interest to several elements of the Station. Subject is particularly thorough and outstanding on specific investigations where he utilized cover in a skillful and imaginative way. He has improved in terms of people development but in this respect he is still best with people in a professionally related context rather than a contrived social context. As mentioned in the previous report subject's cover assignment does not allow him to make recruitments. Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness and does not exercise any supervisory responsibilities.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 11 June 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 5 June 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Murat Natirboff

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I do not concur in this rating. I would have given the employee STRONG in the performance of his cover responsibilities, that is to say in the manner in which he has created and expanded his cover. I would have restricted myself to PROFICIENT, however, in assessing his exploitation of that cover for operational purposes. For a fuller treatment of this staff agent's performance, suggest that reference be made to the NOC Status Report, submitted 26 May 1969, via OFPA-89925.

DATE 23 JUNE 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David E. Murphy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 00G102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN, Thomas B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D!
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/France		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XXXX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1967 - ~~31 March~~ 1968 [illegible]

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet WOLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Since the last reporting period Subject's efforts were directed by the Station toward the spotting, developing and assessing WOLADY S&T agent candidates in terms of recruitment and inclusion in the Station's S&T spotting network.

Subject has done thorough and at times imaginative spade work in this field despite the fact that the mission was not as successful as anticipated. Recent progress however would indicate that the next reporting period would be more productive.

Subject continues to respond to ad-hoc specific assignments in an exemplary manner.

Because of the nature of his cover assignment Subject is not authorized to make recruitments.

Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness. He does not exercise any supervisory responsibilities under his cover assignment.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
24 Oct. 1968	/s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 Oct. 1968	Ops Officer	/s/ Murat Natirboff

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Chief ofStation	/s/ David E. Murphy

3. It is difficult to place in the proper perspective the contribution of this senior staff agent to Paris Station operations. On the one hand, Subject has established superb cover in the scientific and technical field which should have afforded him virtually unlimited access to persons of interest to us, both Soviet and potential access agents. In evaluating the manner in which the employee set up and managed this cover, I would tend to agree with his comments to the fitness report on the [illegible] demands on him although these comments are somewhat overdrawn.

The principal difficulty has been the time it has taken to relate the cover potential to the specific operational requirements of the Station. We have not received from CASASIN as [illegible] leads and assessment reports to persons of operational interest in the S&T field as we think he could have produced. It may be that the earlier listing of the project (viewed as a regional undertaking) contributed to this.

Recently we have noted significant improvement in that we have received responses to requests we have made for assessment and development of potential access agents within a cover context. We hope, therefore, that this last year of CASASIN's stay will be the most productive ever. It is unfortunate that the cover must end because of the cover company's decisions over which we had no control.

/s/ David E. Murphy

ADDENDUM, Form 45 (Fitness Report), for period March 67-March 68.

Section D

As the individual being rated, I would like to add some remarks to those prepared by the rating officer.

The assignment I have includes managerial responsibilities which (a) are essential to the continued existence and security of the cover mechanism as a vehicle for operational exploitation, and (b) are not necessarily visible to those "on the inside."

In the case of (a), I must engage in a constant orchestration of the cover and the facilities it offers. This means maintaining a managerial equilibrium to insure that cover work will not become, of itself, so demanding that it negates the cover's utility to the CS. In effect, the top officers and middle managers of the cover corporation [who are not cleared and witting] have to be satisfied that their demands are met (or cannot be), or else manipulated in order to neutralize or reject their demands. After all, the cover position is to them a legitimate, normal, workaday post in their firm. What work is done at their bidding, it follows, must be accomplished according to the high standards of thoroughness and accuracy which they have set.

In the case of (b) -- which derives from (a) -- and can prove to be so demanding that the needs of the CS could no longer be served, the incumbent is required to manage a span of human contacts at several levels in order to preserve his cover position and enhance its value to the CS. This means planning, directing and managing the work of multinational, multicultural teams of technical correspondents, as well as meetings and negotiations to improve the [cover firm's] relations with similarly widespread individuals at the levels of editor-in-chief, publisher, corporate vice-president, president, and chairman of the board. These levels are scattered not only through industry, but have their analogs as well in government, higher education, and professional societies.

Having previously managed both a CS base and the principal denied-areas operating component of a major field Station, I can report quite honestly that my present managerial responsibilities exceed the former -- despite the apparent lack of "supervisory responsibilities" in my present position.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 00G102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN, Thomas B. (SA)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/France	8. CURRENT STATION Paris			

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					XXX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Soviet S&T personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet, assess, and recommend as agent candidates WOLADY and Third Nationals in the HEPAIRY S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Contacts and develops local Soviet Bloc personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops cover pretexts to attend selected scientific conferences.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Responds to local Station adhoc operational requirements.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to maintain a secure effective cover mechanism. In this reporting period the whole thrust and objectives of this cover facility have been changed from pursuit of targets designated by Headquarters at international conferences to pursuit of the local Soviet presence. This has caused a major readjustment and Subject is now beginning to produce the type of leads that help the Station achieve its local operational objectives.

Subject continues to show a well organised methodical approach to his cover and operational tasks.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 2 August 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/[illegible]
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I rarely see the written product of this employee's efforts and know little of his work except as I am informed of it by his supervisor in the Station. I have the impression, however, that the employee is responding to his supervisor's guidance and is not by any means simply drifting along paths indicated by his cover work, which can be a temptation when an employee has, as is true in this case, rather limited contact with his colleagues who work under official cover on the same target. I thus concur in the evaluation on the basis of limited knowledge.

DATE 9 August 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Robert E. Owen

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN Thomas B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 15	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/French	8. CURRENT STATION Paris			

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)					X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1964 - 2 June 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counselling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Contact, cultivation and assessment of, and collection of biographic and operational intelligence on Soviet scientific and technical targets, and on other Soviets and other nationalities to whom he has access through his cover.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting and assessment of potential operational assets to be used against the targets specified under Specific Duty No. 1.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Execution of operational assignments as directed by Hqs and field stations concerned, whether of a KUTUBE, KUWOLF or KUDESK nature.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation or acquisition of cover firm written material as operational information to increase his access and flexibility in furtherance of Specific Duties Nos. 1 through 3.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Planning, directing and managing overseas bureau of cover firm, with emphasis on exploitation of the cover to meet operational requirements.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable. During the reporting period this employee as a staff agent has continued the solidification of his cover and the expansion of his operational activity within his cover to a point where he represents as deeply buried a staff officer as can be found in anyone with his past organizational background. From the point of view of the host country authorities he appears to be completely legitimate. From the more important point of view of his targets, he also apparently has been accepted, and not through a lack of opportunity for scrutiny, for what he claims to be. He thus represents for KUBARK an asset who has not only solid status and access cover, but also the demonstrated capability for exploiting his cover for specific and aggressive operational undertakings.

As has been stated in past fitness reports, his present capability directly and openly to approach operational targets through the vehicle of his cover is the result of his own efforts, in which he has devoted a tremendous amount of work not only to establish and enhance the foundations of the cover, which requires a considerable amount of work for the cover company, but to devise and exploit ways and means by which the cover activity may be applied directly to operational tasks and programs. In addition to operational activity in his country of assignment, he has also been used in Hqs-directed activity in other countries, usually involving direct contact with target individuals, and in addition he has contributed greatly to the acquisition of operational information for the use of Hqs components in their overall approach to Soviet scientific and technical targets.

It would be difficult to fault this employee with respect to energy, professional skills, and mental capacity. He is a keen student of his operational environment and very skillful in analyzing the possibilities it offers for application toward operational objectives. He shows considerable resourcefulness in devising logical and credible

(continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 1 June 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Thomas B. Casasin

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 1 June 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James M. Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Since the Reviewing Officer in the field has not indicated his views on this Fitness Report, I would like to make a comment of my own. Without wishing to detract from anything the Supervisor has said about Subject's performance, I feel obliged to note that the ratings given him in this report are higher than those given, for example, to any Branch Chief in this Division, and, as such, are inconsistent with the grading pattern of the Division as a whole.

2 June 1965 Chief, External Ops /s/ Robert E. Owen Reviewing Officer

DATE 24 June 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward Ryan

SECRET

SECTION C continued Thomas B. CASASIN

approaches to operational problems and personalities, and expends considerable effort in maintaining a level of specialized knowledge sufficient to backstop his cover and to ensure the maximum exploitation of his contacts with target organizations and individuals. His command of spoken, written, and technical French is excellent.

From the point of view of supervision, this employee in his present position requires guidance only insofar as to identify specific targets and for him to protect himself in situations where he does not have, by virtue of his not having access to official files, specialized information~~. Otherwise~~, he requires no supervision other than the periodic provision of policy and operational directives.

This employee has always been conscious and punctilious in his preparation of operational and administrative reports, including financial accountings, and his reporting in general, despite the burdens imposed by the necessity for minimizing the risks inherent in the lack of access to classified storage, leaves nothing to be desired.

Other than the funds for operational activities, this employee currently has no responsibility for the programming and use of personnel, space, equipment, and funds.

With respect to dedication to his job, this employee has practically speaking single-handedly built his present cover/operational position despite a number of negative factors inherent to his situation such as relative isolation, meager opportunity for contact with his professional group, and expensive area of assignment, and an exposed cover situation where the necessity for living cover is compounded by the necessity of avoiding mistakes which might jeopardize cover. His dedication to and enthusiasm for accepting the challenge ofthis assignment, and his willingness to continue on in it, deserve particular mention, particularly since he would perhaps justifiably feel that his present assignment may leave him outside the mainstream of competitive organization progression.

This employee's health and family situations leave nothing to be desired, as his proven mobility in the execution of operational assignments attests.

It should further be noted that with respect to the problem endemic to deep-cover assignments of allocation of time between cover work and operational activity, this employee comes very close to the happy norm of making cover work complement operational work, and making operational work contribute where possible to the enhancement of cover.

While this employee's assignment to date has essentially been a one-man show, it is recommended that serious consideration be given to expanding the operational complex which he has created in order to capitalize on his experience, the work he has put in to date, and his own management capabilities.

---

*(Section B) - No special recognition of Subject's "Outstanding" overall performance is being requested at this time.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN Thomas B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/France	8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Finding, cultivating unwittingly and assessing new target personalities among Soviet scientists, engineers and other technical specialists.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Continuing the assessment and unwitting development of established targets in the same category.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Development of similar leads on target personalities from other denied areas; making recruitments outside base country.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Development and assessment of technical personalities of interest to Station's internal (domestic) programs.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Managing and directing cover company's foreign bureau and its assets to strengthen own cover and diversify access for KUTUBE, KUWOLF and KUDESK purposes.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Researching, writing and editing own and others' material published by cover company to strengthen cover and diversify access for KUDOVE operational purposes.	O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-52 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This employee combines the relatively rare combination of a senior and broadly experienced intelligence officer under working cover providing both long-term status in his country of residence (and in Europe in general) and access for a variety of operational functions, including spotting, assessing, contact with Soviet bloc nationals of specific interest, investigative measures, assessment in depth of ostensibly cover-company hired persons, and attendance at a broad range of national and international specialized meetings. Development of the capability operationally to exploit his cover has been the achievement of the employee himself. In so doing he has at the same time achieved genuine acceptance by his cover company associates (most of whom are unwitting) and his colleagues in his cover profession and related professions.

In undertaking operational tasks this employee has consistently shown initiative imagination, security consciousness, and application of both operational and substantive background to the problem at hand. He has put a conscious effort into improving his already excellent command of the French language, and his grasp of a variety of specialized scientific and technical fields has been achieved basically as a result of his own efforts.

His management of operational reporting, finances, and the administrative problems connected with his cover status has been exemplary.

It should be noted that during the reporting period, this employee has not had the benefit at all times of specific pinpointed operational direction. As of the end of the reporting period, Headquarters assumed control of his activities against specific Soviet targets on a Europe-wide basis.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 May 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Eighteen	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops. Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 25 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops. Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert E. Owen

SECRET

SECRET

21

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true) Thomas B. CASASIN	DATE (from item 5-1) 9 Dec 1963	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Jason Flint	DATE (from item 5-2) 27 Dec 1963
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:			DATE

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 2[illegible] Jan 1924	2. GRADE GS-15	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE Operations Officer, GS-15	7a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD OR BASE 10 September 1962
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (If known)		5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE	7b. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD September 1965
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR Paris Rome			7c. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

Staff agent assigned to a major overseas station, exploiting the cover provided by a major firm of technical periodical publishers. I take my instructions from a section chief within the station, and report in writing on the progress of my cover development and its operational application.

For operational reasons, I develop and assess operational leads in the FI, CI and CA areas, principally against denied area targets. I also handle local investigations and such cases as the station determines will fit into my cover, or which I can otherwise handle in alias. I travel to other field stations to handle such tasks as they request or Hq directs. I handle all cover tasks as they appear.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

I would like to continue to serve essentially in the same scapacity as described above, although I would like eventually to add more supervisory and managerial functions to my responsibilities. I would like to expand the operating base provided by the cover organization by taking on several journeyman case officers to work with me against both denied area and host country targets, and to make the cover facility and the access it provides of more versatile use to both the station and to KUDOVE as a whole.

My second choice would be to return to Hq, and use the knowledge and experience I have gained in my present job to (1) select staff personnel who will be placed in non-official cover, (2) select the cover mechanisms proper, (3) train our personnel for the proper discharge of their total responsibilities while serving under such cover.

9. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*:

The completion of work toward a master's or doctor's degree in the physical or life sciences, or in the management/administration of the sciences and their personnel.

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT *(continued)*

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 *(for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice)* IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION, after a one-year extension of my present tour

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE OTR 2ND. CHOICE Cover Group 3RD. CHOICE Office/Personnel

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:

1ST. CHOICE Geneva 2ND. CHOICE Brussels 3RD. CHOICE New Zealand/Canada

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 25

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife, will be 37 in 1965; two daughters, 15 and 12 in 1965

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Next post should have high school facilities teaching in French or in English.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Chief, External concurs in subject's wish for one year extension and return for second tour after home leave in the fall of 1965. However, subject's wish as expressed in 9.A. of having case officers working under him is not feasible at this time.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Recommend Home Leave and return for another tour.

SR Concurs.

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER DATE 6 February 1964	SIGNATURE G.K. Nogannam (SCD) G.K.Nogannam

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. CFPS-7775 CABLE NO.
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME Dwight M. [illegible]	20. SIGNATURE /s/
21. TITLE Secy, CS [illegible] Panel	22. DATE 26 Feb 64

23. COMMENTS Approved extension of present tour to Sep 1965, home leave and second tour.

SECRET

CII 21

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

CASASIN

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 037367

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
10 September 1962 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishment and maintenance of cover as a genuine working member of his profession.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting and assessing persons of operational interest to Paris Station and to other stations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Investigating of organizations and phenomena of operational interest to the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Collection of positive and operational information using his cover for entree.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

See attached sheet.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 May 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6½ months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR [illegible] Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached sheet

DATE 20 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL OPS Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Edward Ryan

SECRET

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

The assignment of this employee to the field under non-official cover was designed to compensate for the loss of an employee in an official cover slot which was cut from the Station's ODACID allotment of personnel positions.

During the reporting period this employee has accomplished with success the convincing establishment of his cover in a complex milieu, and has been accepted as legitimate by his professional colleagues, the persons whom he meets under cover, and the French authorities. It should be noted that his ability to assume his cover has been largely the result of his own efforts over a period of years to acquire and maintain a familiarity with the general scientific field.

During the reporting period he has developed a wide circle of contacts in the scientific and journalistic fields and applies a long background in a variety of assignments in KUDOVE to the determination and assessment of operational potential among these contacts. At the same time his cover organization, in which only four persons are witting of his actual status, has shown itself to be more than satisfied with his performance of his cover duties.

This employee requires a minimum of detailed operational supervision; it is necessary in specific cases only to indicate the operational or informational objectives.

From the point of view of administrative support, his attention to detail and meticulousness reduce the problems of his support by the Station to a minimum.

This employee uses the French language continuously, and his facility is such as to permit him to handle himself excellently in a broad range of complex technical subjects. He has in addition undertaken specialized French language training to develop this capability further. His operational reporting is excellent both with regard to clarity and pertinence.

In the immediate future he will be assigned case work, for the most part in fields where it will complement, and be complemented by, his independent operational activities and cover work.

6 August 1962

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

Subject: [redacted]
[illegible]

My last statements concerning the performance of [redacted] should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

signed
HOWARD J. OSBORN

CONCUR:
HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

14-00000

Recorded by [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER ✓

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Branch Chief		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OC/SR/6

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From July 1960 To October 61

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises large functional branch of thirty-seven staff and fifteen contract personnel.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with various components of the Agency and with other agencies.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and programs for operations support, including initiation of new support activities.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares and presents briefings.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises preparation of, and sometimes personally prepares, special studies both on own initiative and on request.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises maintenance of SR Division records on Soviet defectors, supports exploitation of defectors and participates in their resettlement.	5

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAIL ROOM '61

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. [redacted] a good knowledge of Soviet matters and generally is very well informed. He continually demonstrates much initiative and a high degree of productivity. He is stimulating to his associates, businesslike and delegates work easily. He appears very self-confident and he is dynamic.

Mr [redacted] supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 9 November 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Twelve	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 9 November 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR SR/Chief of Plans and Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE QUENTIN C. JOHNSON

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 21 NOV 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, SR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOHN M. MAURY

SECRET

SECRET [illegible]

[illegible]

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true) [redacted]	DATE (from item 8-1) 9/15/55	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) John Baker	DATE (from item 8-2)
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:		Andrew L. Busby	DATE 6/30/60

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	2. GRADE GS-14	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Operations Officer
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known) DI	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Tokyo, Japan	
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR		7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 15 June 1960

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

Chief of Major External Geographic Branch (USSR-European Satellites) of large overseas station (Tokyo). As such, am responsible to Station Deputy for Operations.

Direct, manage, supervise and train 25 persons, including operations and project personnel under non-official cover, under State, Army, and Air Force cover. Personnel are divided functionally within FI, PP, and CI sections.

Initiate and launch new FI, PP and CI operations using best available independent assets as well as assets available through foreign (Japanese) liaison. Manage and exploit perennial operations; observe progress or deterioration of activities to insure that marginal and non-productive activities are terminated. Am case officer on my own operations, too.

Maintain liaison with other US agencies. Provide operational support to other Far East stations needing specialized aid as USSR-East European operations emerge and develop.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

I would like a challenging assignment overseas, again, as my first preference: I am especially interested in developing across-the-board FI-PP-CI programs "from scratch," with particular reference to building up long-term FI-CI programs and assets. I am not unduly particular as to area, but of course would prefer an area in which English or French is the lingua franca.

My next choice would be to go to an area whose language I do not know — but could learn — and which meets the requirements of the challenge stated in the first paragraph, above.

My next choice would be to return to Japan, where I could use my Japanese knowledge.

My next choice would be an assignment to a special training course at the national intelligence level.

My last choice would be reassignment directly to Headquarters.

* * *

I would especially enjoy an assignment in which I can combine on-the-job training of other personnel with the direction and management of their operational programs.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

Clandestine Services Review
State Senior Officers' Course
Appropriate additional language training
Outside advanced graduate work in international relations.

FORM NO. 202
1 SEP 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT *(continued)*

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 *(for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice)* IN THE BOXES BELOW:

2 RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

3 BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

1 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION:

1ST CHOICE: Western Europe

2ND CHOICE: Eastern Europe, Africa, or Near East

3RD CHOICE: Latin America, Southeast Asia

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

10 weeks, including possible TDY

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 60

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife:	Harriette, 32
Daughters:	Pamela, 10; Michelle, 7

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

To be assigned as Chief, SR/6

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Andrew L. Busby	SIGNATURE:
TITLE: Chief, SR/Personnel	DATE: 30 June 1960

17. REMARKS *(additional comment)*

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

Cressin

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/Tokyo Sta/SR

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 Apr 59 To 24 June 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Soviet Branch, responsible for activities of 24 staff and 8 contract employees	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	RATING NO. 5/6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for station SR planning, budgeting, and operating activities	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Representing the station at varied levels in all SR matters	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his "host" country; an excellent and proven degree of operational "know-how"; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty. He can be expected to continue his dynamic and imaginative pursuit of a most difficult target. It is my opinion that this officer has great potential and is ready for increased responsibilities which would involve the promotion for which he has been recommended. As for training, a good managerial course might help to bring into even sharper focus his many talents.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 23 June 1960	[redacted] on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	☐	REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐	OTHER *(Specify):*		

DATE 23 June 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE signed on [redacted] transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS, Tokyo	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John Baker/s/ on transmittal

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT Vacarin	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT SR, Tokyo, Japan	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS						9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED	☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED	☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 May 1959	11. REPORTING PERIOD 10 Apr 58 - 31 Mar 59	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and directs operational branch of some 17 persons	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local intelligence and security services.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with U.S. military and civilian intelligence services	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the Station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 27 April 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE signed on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC Tokyo Statirn	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William Nelson signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/Tokyo Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John E. Baker signed on transmittal

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON JACQUES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
☐	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

THIS [illegible] HAS BEEN PREPARED UNDER CRITERIA
[illegible] AT THIS STATION AND IN CONSONANCE
WITH [illegible] STANDARDS IN ORDER TO MAKE FITNESS
REPORTS AS [illegible] AND [illegible]UL AS POSSIBLE

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John F. Baker	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

5/6
INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SP IC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only)*.
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As branch chief directs and plans operations of denied area branch.	RATING NUMBER 5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with other U.S. agencies	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local security services.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and handles agents	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is an exceedingly well-equipped operations officer. He is mature, intelligent, has a thorough background in operations in his area and the ability to grow in his job. His operational planning and execution is usually impeccable. He has the loyalty of his subordinates and the respect of his equals and supervisors. He is particularly effective in dealing in the liaison field where his good sense and disinterest in "fighting the problem" produces a maximum of cooperation and good will. If he has any minor fault as a supervisor, it is not in impatience with his subordinates, as reflected in previous evaluations, but in an occasional unwillingness to say no to them.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON JACQUES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FS, TOKYO, JAPAN	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John E. Baker	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATE IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NU OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN YOUR SUPERVISION
10 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

His potential for advancement is excellent. He has the right blend of operational know-how and supervisory talent to undertake positions of wider scope than he now holds. Although his advancement has been rapid for his age, his maturity, poise and common sense almost completely eliminate age as a factor in his potential for a more senior job.

SECTION N. **FUTURE PLANS**

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject deserves at sometime within the next year or two the opportunity to broaden his experience either by command of a small station or advancement to a more responsible job in a large one.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. **DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL**

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS		30 DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SR 5/E

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organisation policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organisation policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON Jacques
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Tokyo Station REDWOOD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one):
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Completed at Headquarters; subject not available

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 16 Oct 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Edward Marelius
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the Supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 23 OCT 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Lloyd GEORGE
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: COS, Tokyo

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB.
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO.		RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO.		RATING NUMBER
1	Deputy to Branch Chief	5	4	Supervising	4
2	Conducts Foreign Liaison	6	5	Prepares correspondence and reports and handles administrative routine	5
3	Prepares and Manages Projects	4	6	Developes and handles Agents	5

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has excellent natural equipment for employment in this organization in terms of his intelligence and natural apptitudes. Additionally, he brings a great deal of area knowledge and language ability to his present assignment. During the period covered by this report he has displayed great industry and devotion to duty in a variety of circumstances and achieved notable results in production and in the creation of both short and long-term assets for his unit. On the debit side I would say that he is somewhat too businesslike in many personal situations to the point of being almost humourless. This, however, is a quality which he does not permit to intrude upon the necessities of his operational work although it often shows in office relationships.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON Jacques
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Tokyo Station [illegible]:OCD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one):
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 23 OCT 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Lloyd GEORGE
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: COS., Tokyo

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 16 Oct 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Edward [illegible]
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief SOV Branch Japan

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Spec ·)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMB MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UN YOUR SUPERVISION

15

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is well suited for this business and the business for him. He should progress steadily to positions of great responsibility.

SECTION H. **FUTURE PLANS**

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Normal refresher a/o preparatory training as required.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

No limiting factors or personal circumstances known to the rater

SECTION I. **DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL**

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGE S	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON JACQUES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Japan Station (REDWOOD)	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)	
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify)
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 15 November 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR EDWARD MARELIUS	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 21 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL W. LLOYD GEORGE	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPE C DUTIES

DIRECTIONS.

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy to Branch Chief	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervising	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts Foreign Liaison	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares correspondence and reports	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares and manages projects	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Handles admin routine	RATING NUMBER 4

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has really superb natural equipment for work in this Organisation in terms of mental capacity, psychological bent and affinity for the things and people he comes against. He tops this off with industry and language ability among other natural aptitudes. On the debit side and measured against the best, he is a bit shy of humor and personal understanding in some situations, qualities which mitigate more against acceptability than job competence.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE.. BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Subject is an all around performer capable of a primary, in place of his present secondary, responsibility.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* RICHARDSON JACQUES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Japan Station (REDWOOD)	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*: ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 15 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR EDWARD MARELIUS	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE CHIEF, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 21 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL W. LLOYD GEORGE	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Operations

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NO. OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Six

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has a high all around potential. With respect to supervision, below, he tends to support subordinates from his own energy rather more than to bring them along the hard way, and a normal tendency to avoid the categorical "no" - both tendencies easily correctable.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Routine refresher training as appropriate.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

All normal. No limiting factors.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY Jacques Richardson	1. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI

4. GRADE GS-14	5. STATION DESIGNATION *(Current)* USSR Base, Tokyo
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 September 1955	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* 17 February - 30 September 1955

SECTION II *(To be completed by field supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION Chief, USSR Base, Tokyo	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 19 February 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*

A. As Chief of Operating Base:
  1. Manage and direct all operations against target area, and monitor products.
  2. Supervise system of development and exploitation of operational leads.
  3. Supervise proper administration and support of operations, including finances.
  4. Conduct or supervise effective liaison with other CIA elements, with other Government agencies abroad and, when appropriate, with representative of other governments.

B. As Senior SR Division Officer in Area:
  1. Consult with or advise other CIA and non-CIA units on target area, government, and IS characteristics.
  2. Make available to other CIA and non-CIA units area specialists, as required.

SECTION III *(To be completed at headquarters only)*

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER *(True)* Carleton B. Swift	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD *(True)* W. Lloyd George

3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 7 Nov. 1955	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES Phyllis M. Landrum

DO COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTE USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 SEP 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS		CATEGORIES													
		NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.	SAMPLES			X											
B. PRACTICAL.											X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.														X	
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.												X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.													X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.															X
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.														X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.												X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.													X		
11. CALM.														X	
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.														X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.															X
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.													X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.														X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.													X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.														X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.													X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.														X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.													X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.														X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.													X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.														X	

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.														☒
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											☒			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES, A "SPARK PLUG".												☒		
29. TOUGH MINDED.												☒		
30. OBSERVANT.												☒		
31. CAPABLE.													☒	
32. CLEAR THINKING.														☒
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												☒		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												☒		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.													☒	
36. DELIBERATE.													☒	
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												☒		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											☒			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													☒	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												☒		
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.														☒
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													☒	
43. HAS DRIVE.												☒		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												☒		
45. VERSATILE.													☒	
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.													☒	
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											☒			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												☒		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													☒	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												☒		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Capable operations officer with broad understanding of Soviet problems.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT A NGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL ER CONSIDERATIONS:

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

F. OTHER COMMENTS *(Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person)*:

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. ***DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.***

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. ***DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.***

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. ***DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.***

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION...WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. ***DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.***

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Richardson Jacques 150.

2. GRADE: GS-13

3. POSITION TITLE: Area Ops. Officer CE-FI

4. OFFICE: DDP

STAFF OR DIVISION: SR

BRANCH: SR/5

☐ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD

IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 18 July 1953 To 17 July 1954

6. TYPE OF REPORT: ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

18 July 53 - 31 Jan 54

a. Manage and direct the activities of an overseas operating branch.
b. Assist the division chief of operations in the planning of new and continued oper'ns.
c. Assist the division chief in personnel programming in support of branch and field station activities.

1 Feb 54 - 17 Jul 54

a. Establish new domestic activities branch.
b. Develop and manage operational program of this branch, insuring (1) continuity of treatment by qualified personnel, (2) processing of intelligence requirements, and (3) expeditious movement of finished intelligence.
c. Multilateral liaison with other elements of CIA, the Government, and foreign IS.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD:

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Counterespionage (OTR)	Washington	3 weeks	22 January 1954

(In addition to the duties indicated in §7 above, I also give a 3-hour lecture at the CE course (advanced phase) approximately every six weeks.)

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am primarily interested in a foreign assignment where I could apply the various espionage and CE techniques it has been my responsibility to manage and plan for in recent years.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

My work at headquarters has become somewhat narrowing in that I am losing language abilities and opportunity for direct contact with foreigners.

10.

9 July 1954
DATE

SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Richardson is a superior officer in the performance of his duties. He is efficient, precise, and energetic, and brings considerable imagination and foresight to the operational problems confronting him. His concept of staff organization and responsibility is of a high caliber. In handling personnel, he is perceptive and serious, and his judgment and motivation are of the highest quality.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

This officer has been outstanding as a staff officer. He is unusually talented in his balancing of jurisdictional equities. This ability reflects a broad competence, however, and should not be construed so as to limit his future duties.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

This officer's devotion to his duties and professional convictions sometimes inclines him toward inflexible declarations of position. This fault, a minor one in officers of considerable potential, will be corrected by increased responsibility and experience.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

This officer is prepared for promotion and for increased responsibilities in command or staff duties.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Richardson is presently well placed. See below.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Tradecraft training and a field assignment. Both are planned in the next six months.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

29 July 54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

21 July '54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON (First) Jacques (Middle) D X U.
2. GRADE GS-15
3. POSITION TITLE Exe. Intell. Off. (Chief)
4. OFFICE DDP STAFF OR DIVISION SR BRANCH SR 5 PS Br. ☐ DEPT'L ☒ FIELD IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From -13-53 To 9-14-53
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☐ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☒ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES.

a. Supervise and manage a foreign geographic branch; this includes a total of 51 authorised personnel at HQ and in the field stations. b. Direct and coordinate all project development. c. Detect and explore potential operational leads. d. Coordinate intra-division activities with appropriate branches, inter-division activities with appropriate divisions, senior staffs, and elements outside DD/P and CIA. e. Determine the suitability of new personnel, continued employment and rotation of incumbent personnel, and make available incumbent personnel on loan basis to other divisions etc. f. Apportion the operational and administrative workloads within the branch sections and desks, and their personnel. g. Adapt changing field situations and problems to the organisation and operation of the branch, making the branch best serve the needs of the field stations. h. Review continuously all requirements imposed on the branch, and transmit them clearly to the field.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
None (I was overseas part of the time covered by this report).			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am principally interested in the building and successful operation of American intelligence abroad, both in theory and in practice.

I

The only remark I can make here is the one I stated in the previous report: the administrative responsibilities of a branch chief do not enable him to be a purely operational individual. If it were possible to carry less of an administrative load, I would enjoy devoting all of my time to the refinement of the intelligence process and its techniques in my area of concern.

10. 22 October 1953

DATE SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

During this period Mr. Richardson was promoted from Deputy Branch Chief to Branch Chief, in recognition of his extremely good performance. Not enough time has elapsed to be able to evaluate him fully on all aspects of his new position. However, his handling of the branch has been unusually good from a management point of view and there is every reason to believe that in the planning and direction of operational activities the same high standard will prevail.

FORM NO. 37-151 MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

He is a good organizer and a good leader. He is methodical and thorough in his planning and supervision of substantive activities, while at the same time he maintains close and sympathetic relations with his subordinates. His knowledge of them and of their personalities and problems is outstanding.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

He should continue to develop his knowledge of operations and operational procedures.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He is well equipped to advance through increasing levels of responsibility.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Well placed at present.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Assignment to a field position in the not-too-distant future.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

26 October 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

26 October 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON, Jacques G.
2. GRADE: GS-12
3. POSITION TITLE: I.O. (Dep. Chief)
4. OFFICE: DDP
STAFF OR DIVISION: SR
BRANCH: SR-5 Far East
☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 2-18-52 To 2-18-53
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.
Assist the Branch Chief in management of the Branch and its overseas stations (3); at present, I act as Branch Chief about 25%-30% of the year. Supervise the planning and preparation for approval of all basic plans, programs, and projects. This involves thorough discussion with each of seven (7) desk chiefs of the purposes and procedures for accomplishing any single mission under any given project, including target analysis (whether FI or PP), preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements, specific personnel needs, etc. Am responsible for working directly with the Division's Intelligence Branch for control of requirements, ops intelligence, and reports. Am responsible for maintaining liaison with appropriate staffs and other Divisions who must coordinate any action or document. Assist or direct, as required, specific mission planning at overseas stations on TDY. Supervise preparation of all periodic reports; interview candidate empl's.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
International Politics, 102	Graduate School Georgetown University, Washington.	4 months: 3 hours' credit	5 June 1952

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?
I am primarily interested in the conception, planning, and operational management of FI and PP activities, and ops policy and control.
IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).
This differs from my present assignment essentially in that a Branch Chief or his Deputy becomes so involved in administrative detail that he cannot always give his undivided attention to project management and agent handling problems. Otherwise, I feel that my background and experience qualify me for the functions I aspire to perform.

10.
7 February 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE. As Deputy Branch Chief, Mr. Richardson has performed his duties, taken as a whole, in a superior manner. His timely and efficient preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements and reports has been particularly outstanding. During three to four months of the past year, Mr. Richardson has acted as Branch Chief. The review of Branch operations under Mr. Richardson's direction, during the writer's absence, indicated his complete competence in supervising Branch activities. His supervision of the planning and preparation for approval of basic plans and projects of the seven (7) desk chiefs has been superior. Mr. Richardson also participated in the planning and dispatch of a difficult operational mission, acting in the capacity of Senior Case Officer. On this mission his liaison with representatives of one of the Military Services was conducted in a manner which enhanced cooperation between that S ice and this Agency.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Richardson's performance was noticeably outstanding with respect to his thorough knowledge of every activity of the Branch. He was in position to assume direction of Branch activities at any time. He also kept himself thoroughly briefed on Division policies and planning in order to give timely instruction and guidance to the Branch overseas stations.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Mr. Richardson has a very thorough background in two (2) languages, French and Japanese. He would benefit substantially by learning the Russian language. He is meticulous with respect to his attention to details, sometimes to the point of concealing the broader picture from his view. It would be well for Mr. Richardson to direct his attention to the broad scope of Branch activities rather than to concentrate on its details.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Richardson is fully qualified to assume the duties of the chief SR Division representative at a field station. In order to assume this responsibility in the most efficient manner, it is recommended that Mr. Richardson serve a minimum period of time of approximately six (6) months as the assistant to the present chief of the field station.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. Richardson could serve effectively in a staff function for either FI or PP activities. This does not mean, however, that his present duties are not better suited to his qualifications.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Mr. Richardson has already been recommended for overseas assignment in the Far East during the past year. He has area knowledge and command of the Japanese language, having served in Japan previously with the United States Army. His duties at Headquarters have been so pressing that his departure for overseas assignment is being delayed until an adequate replacement may be trained.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

March 31 1953
DATE

George Kisevalter
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

March 30 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

GS-15
WE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

20 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas B. CASASIN (SA)

THROUGH : Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : Book Dispatch 5096, dated 12 August 1965

Recent correspondence on the above subject informed you that I had determined that you met the criteria specified in the applicable regulation for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System. On the basis of this determination and your recently executed election to remain in the System, your designation as a participant was made effective 10 April 1966.

Richard B Egan
RICHARD B. EGAN

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

6E
1.5

28 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Thomas B. CASASIN** (SA)

THROUGH : **Chief of Station, Paris**

SUBJECT : Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : Book Dispatch 5096 dated 12 August 1965

1. Based on a review of your record and the recommendations of the Head of your Career Service and of the Organization Retirement Board, I have determined that you meet the criteria for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System.

2. The regulation governing this retirement system provides that "Any participant who has completed fifteen years of service with the Organization and whose career at that time is adjudged by the Director of Personnel to be qualifying for the system may elect to remain a participant in the system for the duration of his employment by the Organization and such election shall not be subject to review or approval by the Director." Since you have already completed fifteen years of service with the Organization, your right to this election vests upon your designation as a participant and must be exercised immediately.

3. If you should elect not to remain a participant in the system, you will be continued under the Civil Service Retirement System. Once your election has been made, you do not have the privilege of changing it at some later date.

4. It is requested that you indicate your election by checking in the appropriate box and signing below. The original of this memorandum should be returned to Headquarters as soon as possible.

Richard B. Egan

RICHARD B. EGAN

Exercise of option of participant with fifteen years of service:

☐ I elect to remain in the Organization Retirement and Disability System for the duration of my employment by the Organization.

☐ I elect NOT to remain a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System for the duration of my employment by the Organization.

Signature

Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO (1-6): [illegible]

2. ID NO.: 8707

3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE: Richardson, Jacques G.

4. OFFICE OR DIVISION: SR

5. LANGUAGE: French

6. LANG. CODE (23-27): [illegible]

7. DATE OF TEST 46-51: Feb. 14, 1962

8. ANNIVERSARY DATE: Feb. 14, 1963

9. GRADE: 14

10. DATE OF BIRTH: Jan. 20, 1924

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST

X	APPLY FOR AWARD
	ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
H	I	H	H	H

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)

X	A
	M
	NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
A	I-H	C	V

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ 100.00 (40-45)

SIGNATURE

DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

TLO COPY

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) 08102				2. ID NO. 8787
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE Richardson, Jacques G.		4 OFFICE OR DIVISION CA	5 LANGUAGE Japanese	6. LANG. CODE (25-27) 370
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51 Mar. 6, 1962	8 ANNIVERSARY DATE Apr. 6, 1962	9. GRADE 14	10. DATE OF BIRTH Jan. 30, 1925	

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST		12. TEST SCORES				
☐	APPLY FOR AWARD	READING (24)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
☐	ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL	-	-	1	1	1

13 ELIGIBILITY (39)		14 TYPE OF AWARD			
☐	A	ACHIEVEMENT (A)	ELEMENTARY (E)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS
☐	M	MAINTENANCE (M)	INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	COMPREHENSIVE (C)	DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
☒	NA				

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)
Award disapproved by CS Board

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ (40-45)
SIGNATURE
DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.
CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

TLO COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

French Basic Reading, Speaking, Writing--II
100 hours, part-time, 9 Apr 62 - 15 Jun 62 — 4 students

Student : Harriette D. Richardson (Dependent) (wife of Jacques Richardson - SR) — Year of Birth: 1928

EOD Date: — Grade: — Office : —

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS - Instructor: W. Ray Rackley

This is the second phase in a three-phase basic sequence of 30 weeks, each phase lasting 10 weeks.

The general aim of this course is to provide a thorough grounding for the student who has previously had either a reading course in French or an insufficient introduction to the language. The major objectives of this phase of the course are to develop an ability: (1) to distinguish and pronounce satisfactorily all the sounds of the language; (2) to use effectively a modest stock of French sentences and expressions; (3) to comprehend normal-speed spoken French in a variety of everyday non-technical situations; (4) to begin to read and write basic French, applying the spoken vocabulary and grammatical material previously learned.

Classes are held 2 hours per day, 5 days a week, requiring a minimum of 10 hours of preparation per week. To receive the maximum benefit from this course each student should plan to devote at least two-thirds of the class preparation time doing drill in the language laboratory.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student progress is evaluated primarily on oral recitation in the form of drills and free conversation based on memorized material. In addition, several tests are given during the course. This student's rating is indicated by the asterisk.

Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Excellent	Incomplete
	3	1*	

Mrs. Richardson was definitely a superior student. Her pronunciation was excellent and she had a solid command of the structure of French. She was somewhat hesitant in new language situations, but she more than made up for this through diligent and profitable laboratory and home preparation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: /s/ W. RAY RACKLEY — 26 July 1962
Chief Instructor — Date

[illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RS-4c-4

REPORT OF TRAINING AT NON-CIA FACILITY
(Forward original and 2)

DATE

TO : Director of Training
ATTN: Registrar
THRU: Training Officer, SR Division

FROM:
J. G. Richardson
CSR 6 (DD/P)
5218
X-5098

1. INSTITUTION ATTENDED
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

2. DATES OF TRAINING
10-16 June 1962

3. DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM (Include list of courses and a copy of grades received)

Technical Writers' Institute; certificate awarded

Purpose: to provide a forum where technical writers from industry and government can meet to discuss and practice writing techniques under the supervision of experienced teachers. Many of the instructors have worked closely with industry as consultants on special writing problems and training courses for technical writing. All of them have published in the field of technical writing.

4. YOUR OPINION OF THE PROGRAM (Explain strengths and weaknesses)

This was an excellent combination of classroom presentations and writing laboratories. Almost all guest speakers had a useful message to deliver. The writing encouraged is of the tight-language, pure English variety, in the three categories of informative, directive, and persuasive writing. The schedule was full, although I believe it could have been fuller. The five 2-hour workshops should be expanded to three-hour sessions. The contact with representatives of industry was especially useful for cross-fertilisation purposes.

5. EXPLAIN TRAINING OBJECTIVES AND WHETHER THEY WERE MET

Four our purposes, the training objectives were (a) to see that our writing techniques in the reporting field compare favorably with those in industry, (b) to meet and become known by persons throughout the nation in the technical writing field, and (c) to learn new techniques in the field of communicating technical, scientific and engineering concepts, processes, and general information. All three objectives were met. I recommend that officers from SR/Reports and SR/Requirements-Targets, as well as analysts from SR 6, be permitted the opportunity to attend this same institute in future years. It is well worth the effort.

6. I CERTIFY THAT I ATTENDED THE TRAINING PROGRAM DESCRIBED ABOVE.

18 JUN [illegible]

J. G. [illegible]
Jacques G. SIGNATURE **Richardson**

NOTE: The original will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in your official f er, 2 copies will be for OTR us

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6): [illegible]
2. I.D. NO.: [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE: Richardson, Jacques G.
4. OFFICE OR DIVISION: [illegible]
5. LANGUAGE: French
6. LANG. CODE (25-27): [illegible]
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51: Dec. [illegible], 1960
8. ANNIVERSARY DATE: Aug. 6, 1961
9. GRADE: 14
10. DATE OF BIRTH: Jan. 20, 1924

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST
☐ APPLY FOR AWARD
☐ ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
I	I	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)
☐ A
☒ M
☐ NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
M*	H		

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ [illegible] (40-45)
SIGNATURE
DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.
CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
SIGNATURE

REMARKS
*3 yrs. Main. (2 yrs. @ old scale, 1 yr. @ new scale)

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET (10-45) TLO COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6): [illegible]
2. I.D. NO.: [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE: Richardson, Jacques G.
4. OFFICE OR DIVISION: [illegible]
5. LANGUAGE: Japanese
6. LANG. CODE (25-27): [illegible]
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51: Dec. [illegible], 1960
8. ANNIVERSARY DATE: Aug. 6, 1961
9. GRADE: 14
10. DATE OF BIRTH: Jan. 20, 1924

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST
☐ APPLY FOR AWARD
☐ ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
-	-	I	I	I

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)
☐ A
☒ M
☐ NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
M*	I	[illegible]	

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ [illegible] (40-45)
SIGNATURE
DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.
CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
SIGNATURE

REMARKS
*3 yrs. Main. (2 yrs. @ old scale, 1 yr. @ new scale)

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET (10-45) TLO COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

MANAGEMENT COURSE NO. 64

40 hours, part-time | 18 students

Student: **Jacques Richardson** | Year of birth: **1924**

EOD Date: **September 1956** | Grade: **14** | Office: **SR**

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The Management Course is designed to familiarize senior line and staff managers with both the theory and the practical problems of management in CIA. The underlying assumption of the course is that management development is a process of growth on the job. The course, however, enables the participants to examine their job activities in an environment where, guided by the instructors, they can critically examine their own actions, exchange ideas with managers from other components, and develop an understanding of the complex relationships that exist among the people, the pattern of organization, and the purposes of the Agency. The course approaches the problems of management in the Agency by discussing the formal and informal structures, concepts of leadership and communication, the problems of personnel management, and theories of planning and controlling. These subjects are related as closely as possible to the activities of the class members.

The content of the course is developed through lectures, case and group discussions, filmed presentations, and problem-solving exercises.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: ______________ **20 February 1961**
Chief Instructor | Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Clandestine Services Review No. 31
60 hours, full-time 28 November - 9 December 1960 43 students

Student: **Jacques G. Richardson** Year of birth: **1924**

EOD Date: **November 1949** Grade: **GS-14** Office: **DDP/SR/6**

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

This course aims to develop in the Clandestine Services officers, and others, recently returned from the field an up-to-date awareness of the role of CIA in the United States intelligence community, the relations of the DD/I area with the CS and the support available from the offices of the DD/S. Recently this course has been designated as an alternate prerequisite for CIA officers nominated for certain external training.

The course is presented by lectures given by CIA officials who are directly responsible for the missions, functions, programs, and services discussed. Each lecture is usually followed by a short question period. Approximately 10 per cent of the students' time is scheduled for reading pertinent up-to-date regulations and background summaries.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD.

This is a certificate of attendance only; no attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the course. This student was conscientious and regular in attendance.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Mayo S. Stuntz
Chief Instructor

21 December 1960
Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

TSS EVALUATION

NAME RICHARDSON, James O. Div. SR/5

SUBJECT Flaps & Seals - Basic Familiarization

DATES TRAINED FROM 2 TO 3 December 1954

EVALUATION:

Did good work. Appears to have a good understanding of the basic principles involved. His attitude inclass reflected his interest in the work.

Note: This course is only for familiarization. It does not qualify student to engage in the opening of mail.

Please return three copies of this form to TSS/TD.

Distribution:
1 - TLO ✓
1 - OTR/Registrar
1 - TSS/TD files

SECRET

SECRET

TSS EVALUATION

NAME Jack Richardson **Div.** SR

SUBJECT Audio

DATES TRAINED **FROM** 29 Nov. 1954 **TO** 3 Dec. 1954

EVALUATION: Although lacking a background in electronics, Mr. Richardson was able to grasp the instructions given and correctly interpret it. I feel that Mr. Richardson would be able to correctly evaluate audio opportunities and to equip and direct such an operation with the exception of the telephone tap. Mr. Richardson is not qualified to perform maintenance on the equipment.

CS Moorfield
CARL S. MOOREFIELD

Please return three copies of this form to TSS/TD.

Distribution:
1 - TLO ✓
1 - OTR/Registrar
1 - TSS/TD files

SECRET

CSR/AD
T.A. Parrott
O. de Silva
J. Smith
April 15. 1954

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

Counterespionage Course No. 20

RICHARDSON, Jacques G.	Male	4-22 January 1954
Name	Sex	Dates of Course

20 Jan. 1924	10 June 1949	GS-13	DD/P/SR-5 /FI
Date of Birth	EOD	Grade or Rank	Office

Chief of geographic branch.
Projected Assignment or Present Position

The Counterespionage Course is a specialized course of three weeks' duration designed to expose the student to CE principles and practices and to indoctrinate him therein. The course is conducted on a seminar, round-table basis. Emphasis is placed on student participation during staff and guest lectures. Ample time is allotted for reading the extensive material provided.

Each student is required, starting mid-way in the second week, to give a presentation before the class. This hour-long presentation is based on a problem assignment given the student by the staff. Exception is made where students have the field or headquarters experience in CE or a related field; such a student is permitted to give a one-hour lecture based on specific experience. The "canned" problems are selected to test students' ability to do CE research, collate, make logical analyses, and present ideas effectively to a seminar group.

This evaluation is based primarily on the student presentation, and to a lesser degree on participation in seminar discussions when conducted by the staff.

S-E-C-R-E-T

RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

1. Mr. Richardson ranked first in a strong group. He applied himself effectively throughout the course. His seminar contributions aided materially. He drew freely on a sound operational background and was by all odds the top student.

2. Student Presentation: Mr. Richardson presented a case with which he was familiar from his own experience. It was a first-rate performance. The material was very well organized and crisply presented. So effective in fact, that Mr. Richardson will be called upon to give the same discussion in subsequent CE courses.

3. In my opinion Mr. Richardson is fully qualified to act as senior CE officer.

Chief Instructor, CE Course

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may within his discretion show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations, and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

RICHARDSON

STUDENT'S NAME [redacted]

DATE OF REPORT 2 May 1950

TRAINING COURSE Advanced Operations V

DIVISION OPC/FED GRADE 08-7

TRAINING PERIOD 27 March - 21 April 1950

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Ass't Pol. Warfare Officer.

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

			Possible Score	Achieved Score
FACTS	(1)	Comprehension of mission of OSO	(40)	30
	(2)	Comprehension of mission of OPC	(40)	30
	(3)	Comprehension of operational procedures	(25)	16
	(4)	Comprehension of operational policy	(25)	16
	(5)	USSR and Communism (clandestine aspects)	(20)	15
SKILLS	(6)	Evaluation of operational data	(30)	24
	(7)	Operational planning	(30)	24
	(8)	Operational mechanics	(30)	23
	(9)	Personality analysis	(30)	21
	(10)	Personality manipulation	(30)	16
		TOTAL	(300)	215

Overall adjectival rating . . . . Satisfactory (72%)

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait has not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, and the higher indicating above average.

		Rating
(1)	Ability to get along and work with people	5
(2)	Ability to grasp instructions	6
(3)	Enthusiasm and interest in work	6
(4)	Industriousness	7
(5)	Practical intelligence	5
(6)	Astuteness	5
(7)	Adaptability	5
(8)	Effectiveness	5
(9)	Stability	5
(10)	Initiative	5
(11)	Imagination	5
(12)	Ability to handle and direct people	4

3. COMMENT. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths or weaknesses)

CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED. ______________________
CHIEF, STS

REVIEWED. ______________________
CHIEF, TRD

Dist: COS
COP
CAU
Files

FORM NO. 31-38
JAN 1950

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

STUDENT'S NAME Richardson [redacted]

DATE OF REPORT 10 April 1950

TRAINING COURSE Operations

DIVISION OPC/FBD GRADE 7

TRAINING PERIOD 20 February - 17 March 1950

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Ass't Pol. Warfare Officer

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

	Possible Score	Achieved Score
(1) Comprehension of basic principles of clandestine operations	(40)	28
(2) Use of tradecraft (ability to apply principles of clandestine operations)	(50)	32
(3) Ability to evaluate operational data	(20)	15
(4) Ability to use operational data	(20)	14
(5) Planning	(30)	19
(6) Personality analysis	(20)	17
(7) Personality manipulation	(50)	42
(8) Adaptability to operational emergencies	(30)	21
(9) Attention to detail	(20)	14
(10) Organization and presentation of written operational material	(20)	16
TOTAL	(300)	218

Overall adjectival rating Satisfactory (73%) . . . .

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait has not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, and the higher indicating above average.

	Rating
(1) Ability to get along and work with people	7
(2) Ability to grasp instructions	6
(3) Enthusiasm and interest in work	6
(4) Industriousness	5
(5) Practical intelligence	6
(6) Astuteness	5
(7) Adaptability	6
(8) Effectiveness	6
(9) Stability	6
(10) Initiative	5
(11) Imagination	6
(12) Ability to handle and direct people	7

3. COMMENTS. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths or weaknesses)

CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED. ____________________
CHIEF, STS

REVIEWED. ____________________
CHIEF, TRD

FORM NO. 51-66
JAN 1950

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may within his discretion show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations, and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

Richardson

STUDENT'S NAME [redacted]

DATE OF REPORT 10 February 1950

TRAINING COURSE Staff Orientation V

DIVISION OPC/FBD

GRADE GS-7

TRAINING PERIOD 9 January - 3 February 1950

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Assistant Political Warfare Officer

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

Problems	Possible Score	Achieved Score
(1) Reporting of Information	(30)	20
(2) Message Writing	(5)	4
(3) Interviews: Procurement of Information	(25)	14
(4) Interviews: Personality Handling	(25)	16
(5) Mapping and Sketching	(30)	26
(6) Observation and Description	(30)	25
Objective Tests		
(7) Intelligence Tools and Objectives	(25)	18
(8) Reporting Mechanics	(20)	15
(9) CIA Security Regulations	(10)	9
(10) USSR and Communism	(50)	31
TOTAL	(250)	178

Overall adjectival rating.................................... Satisfactory

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait has not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, the higher indicating above average.

	Rating
(1) Ability to get along and work with people	6
(2) Ability to grasp instructions	5
(3) Enthusiasm and interest in work	7
(4) Industriousness	7
(5) Practical intelligence	7
(6) Astuteness	7
(7) Adaptability	5
(8) Effectiveness	7
(9) Stability	8
(10) Initiative	6
(11) Imagination	0
(12) Ability to handle and direct people	6

3. COMMENT. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths and weaknesses.)

RBShaffer
CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED. ____________
CHIEF, STS

REVIEWED. ____________
CHIEF, TRD

FORM NO. 51-87
JAN 1950

SECRET

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO ALLOWANCE COMMITTEE ADDENDUM
For Staff Agent, Thomas B. CASASIN

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

Effective 25 May 1970, your current Allowance Committee Addendum, as amended, is further amended by substituting the following for sub-paragraph (B) entitled "Other Allowance Entitlements":

> (B) One-Time Payment. You are herein authorized a one-time, non-taxable Agency payment of $235 in lieu of your entitlement to reimbursement for the round-trip educational travel of your daughter from Paris to Norton, Massachusetts, and return to Paris. Payment of this amount will be by deposit to your bank account. This payment and the fixed allowances as set out in sub-paragraph (A) above are in lieu of your Agency overseas allowance entitlements except that upon your return to a domestic permanent post of assignment you will be entitled to a home service transfer allowance in conformance with applicable Agency regulations.

All other provisions of your Allowance Addendum, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____
Allowance Committee

SECRET

ADDENDUM TO STAFF AGENT SUPPLEMENT
For Thomas B. CASASIN, Effective 5 August 1962

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

The Agency Allowance Committee is authorized to modify the entitlements of a Staff Agent for cover, operational or security reasons. Based upon that authority, on 7 June 1966, the Committee made the following determinations which will apply to your Agency overseas assignment in Paris, France under non-official cover. These determinations supersede and modify any provisions of your present Staff Agent Supplement which conflict therewith:

(a) Fixed Allowance. Effective the day of your return to Paris you are herein authorized a non-accountable, non-taxable fixed allowance calculated at the rate of $7,580 for the following year, i.e., for a one year period. If required, advances may be granted by an Agency authorizing official. This fixed allowance is in lieu of your Agency overseas allowance entitlements except that upon your return to a domestic permanent post of assignment you will be entitled to a home service transfer allowance in conformance with applicable Agency regulations. Agency fixed allowances are also in lieu of entitlements to (1) reimbursement for the overseas operational use of your POV and common carriers in and around Paris and (2) storage of your HHE. Quarters will not be furnished you by the Government or by your cover facility during the period covered by these fixed allowances.

(b) Exemption from Offset. During this one year period of your overseas assignment, you are herein authorized to retain, without offset, the housing and cost-of-living allowances of your cover facility.

(c) Requirement of Certification. You agree to certify, when requested, that payments made to you as set forth herein have been expended for the purpose for which made and have not accrued to your personal advantage or enrichment. You will repay any amount for which you cannot provide such a certification. You understand that you are not required to make financial accountings for amounts received under (a) above.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________

APPROVED:

____
Allowance Committee

ACKNOWLEDGED:

____
Thomas B. Casasin

Supplement to Staff Agent Personnel Action

For **Thomas B. Casasin** Effective 5 AUG [illegible]

Mr. **Thomas B. Casasin**

Dear Mr. **Casasin**.

In view of your contemplated cover assignment, you have been designated a Staff Agent. The purpose of this Supplement is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are so designated and to set forth certain rights and obligations incident to your status as an appointed employee.

1. Payroll Administration. As indicated in your Staff Agent Personnel Action, your present salary and grade are **$13,510** and GS-**14** 6, respectively, and you are entitled to receive the salary, allowances and other benefits applicable thereto, however, certain procedural variations will be followed to preserve the security of your cover position.

(a) The gross emoluments that you receive from your cover activities will be retained by you as an offset against the gross emoluments due you from this organization. If, except as provided in paragraph 4 below, your cover emoluments ever exceed those due you as a Staff Agent, the overage is to be remitted to this organization on a monthly basis, unless a different period is specified.

(b) Your Federal income taxes will be withheld and reported in conformance with HR 20-33 or any subsequent regulations or procedures promulgated by this organization. For your information, this organization shall withhold from the gross payments due you Federal income taxes in an amount which, when added to the income taxes withheld by your cover facility, will equal the tax withholdings normally made from your gross taxable compensation with this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make tax remittances in conformance with HB 20-661-1. Also, that issuance together with R 30-720 covers the procedures to be followed in order to receive reimbursement for foreign income taxes imposed upon you.

(c) This organization will deduct from the gross payments due you an amount equivalent to six and one half per cent (6 1/2%) of your gross salary for contribution to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. This amount will be deducted from the differential due you by this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make direct remittances to this organization in satisfaction of the required contributions.

(d) If permanent quarters are not furnished, your quarters allowance will be granted at the maximum rate established for your post of assignment, family status and grade. No accounting for this allowance will be required.

If your position requires that you make contribution to the Social Security Fund, such contributions will be at your expense. However, involuntary contributions for cover facility programs, such as insurance and retirement, may be considered items of expense to this organization, and in such case any monies you receive as a result of your participation in such programs must be returned to this organization. Whether participation in a particular cover facility program is involuntary will be determined by this organization.

2. Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay. You are hereby authorized Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay in conformance with applicable organizational issuances. For your information currently this premium pay is ten percent of your base salary, represents additional taxable compensation to you and is applicable for that period of time you are assigned under nonofficial cover.

3. Equalization Allowance. You are hereby authorized an equalization allowance in accordance with applicable organization issuances.

4. Travel Expenses. You will be entitled to travel, transportation and storage in conformance with the regulations of this organization. HR 20-2c provides that travel expenses of integrated personnel will be allowed in accordance with the regulations of their cover organizations or HR 22, whichever allows the greater amount.

5. Travel Penalties. You herein agree that your assignment abroad will be for a minimum of ________________ from the date of your arrival at your permanent post of duty, unless such assignment shall be sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience. Your violation of such agreement may result in regulatory travel penalties. HR 22-6 provides that if the agreement is violated during the first year of duty abroad, expenditures for travel and transportation to the post, including per diem while at headquarters and storage of effects, shall be reimbursed by the employee. If the agreement is violated after the first year of duty, but before the completion of the minimum tour agreed to above, return travel at Government expense shall not be allowed.

AGREED: ________________

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this Supplement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Personnel Officer

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: [illegible] L. Paul

DIVISION: SR

INSTRUCTIONS: Use R 20-1000 and RR 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: For contract info

DATE: 9 July 1962

SECTION I — GENERAL [illegible]

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Thomas B. CALASIS

2A. PROJECT: NA

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Paris, France

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 3234-[illegible]-1000

3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☒ UV

4. SLOT NO.: 2[illegible]0

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES:
James H. Kamicott (P)
John F. Reynolds John B. Williams, John F. Martin (A)

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO *(If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)*
Staff Employee since 1949

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE *(Type and date)*: SI

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: OBTAINED ☒ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D. ☐

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY *(Contract agent, contract employee, etc.)*: Staff Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 38

14. DATE OF BIRTH *(Month, day, year)*: January 20, 1924

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE *(City and state or country)*: Alexandria, Virginia

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE *(City and state or country)*: Alexandria, Virginia

17. MARITAL STATUS *(Check as appropriate)*: ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS *(Not including individual)* RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Three - Wife, age 34
Daughter, age 8
Daughter, Age 11

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY. ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: NA

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY *(Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)*:

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U. S. Army

24. RANK OR GRADE:

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA: NA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY / 28. POST DIFFERENTIAL / 29. COVER *(Breakdown, if any)*:
Pay entitlements equating to GS-14 (step 5) including premium pay

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER		CIA
X	YES	X	YES
	NO		NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES *(NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)*

31. QUARTERS / 32. POST: In accordance with regulations

33. OTHER:

34. COVER *(Breakdown, if any)*:

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
Wife, U. S. Citizen, age 34, DOB 13 June 1928
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 8, DOB 5 September 1953
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 11, DOB September 1950

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☒ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: As authorized

43. ENTERTAINMENT: As authorized

44. OTHER: As authorized

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
☒ CIA REGUL[illegible] ☐ [illegible]

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED) NOTE: *SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.*	CASE OFFICER [illegible]	DIVISION [illegible]
	TELEPHONE EXTENSION For [illegible] call [illegible] 1932)	DATE 9 July 1962

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)*

All Staff Employee benefits

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)* ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE *(Check)* ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

NA ☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)* ☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION ___ DAYS ___ MONTHS ___ YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(CI, FI, PP, other)*

FI and CA

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Handling and supervision of field agents already recruited.
Spotting, assessment and development of agent candidates or projects.
Recruitment of agent candidates outside France when necessary.
Clandestine support of own and other station operations.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Photographic equipment salesman
Newspaper assistant ~~XXXXX~~ editor
Assistant to planning division of housing authority of a major city
Operations Officer for past 12 years

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE *(No degree)* ☒ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
French		X			X			X	
Japanese		X				X		X	
Russian									X

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Canada, Japan, Western Europe thru residence, study and travel

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Newspaper assistant editor - $2,100
Assistant to planning division of housing authority $3,100

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
	JOHN CLTHY		[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 3 April 1968

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): RICHARDSON, Jacques G. (Dependents)

3. POSITION TITLE: Staff Agent

4. GRADE: GS-15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/EUR

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6913

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT Home leave & return to Station
ETD: October 1967
STATION: Paris, France
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: Non-official
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: three
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 93) ATTACHED: 3

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS
ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)
☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: George W. Owens E/PERS
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4-B-01
EXT.: 6913

10. COMMENTS

Medical statements from a private physician is attached.

MEDICALLY QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED OS PCS

SPERRY PRESTON

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 89 21 74

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, European Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT
Admin/Personnel/Medical
Dependents of Thomas B. CASASIN Staff Agent

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Reference: OFPS-10932

CASASIN's dependents took physical examinations at the American Hospital in Paris on 20 February. Since, because of his cover there could be no LNHARP connection, CASASIN's dependents made arrangements for their physicals as private citizens, on the pretense that they required statements that they were in good health in order to obtain insurance. Obviously, forms 88 were not prepared; the attached certificates of good health and freedom from contagious disease are all that is normally given to private individuals in France. We hope they suffice.

DENISE H. ZEHNGRAFF

Attachment - U/S/C via TNP
As Stated Above

Distribution:
3-Chief, Eur-Div w/att usc-tnp

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPT-13839

DATE
MAR 14 1968
11 March 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Paris

Chief, EUR
Administrative/Personnel/Medical
Dependents of Thomas B. CASASIN

The Office of Medical Services has advised that Thomas B. CASASIN's dependents did not take physical examinations prior to their PCS return to Paris. So that CASASIN's dependents may be fully covered under the Overseas Medical Program, it is essential that arrangements be made for their physicals to be taken in the field and the results forwarded to Headquarters as soon as possible.

Daniel J. LEURIGAN

DISTRIBUTION:
3-COS, Paris

20 OCT 1967

OFPS-10932

S E C R E T

1-E/REG
1-E/PERS
1-OMS
1-E/F

E/Pers GWOWENS mm 6913

OMS

C/E/F

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO 006102	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) CASASIN THOMAS B (P)	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/24	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS -15-06
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE CPS OFFICER	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WE	9. LOCATION (Country, City) PARIS, FRANCE	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
JAPAN	TDY-60	50/07/01	50/09/01
US PACIFIC POSSESSIONS	TDY-60	52/07/01	52/10/01
ASIA AREA	TDY-60	53/06/01	53/07/01
JAPAN	PCS-VV	55/02/17	60/06/24

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	LINGUISTICS, GENERAL	MICH UNIV.	45

FORM 1.67 444J
Mfg. 2-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(4 51)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) RICHARDSON, (First) JACQUES (Middle) G. | SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 042-20-5339

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED: ESSEX, MARYLAND

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad): ALEXANDRIA, VA

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: ALEXANDRIA, VA.

HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: ALEXANDRIA, VA

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

SINGLE ☐ [✓ MARRIED] SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: ALEXANDRIA, VA. | DATE OF MARRIAGE: 25 JUN 49

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE: — | DATE OF DECREE: —

IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED: — | DATE SPOUSE DIED: —

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S): —

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
HARRIETTE D.	312 LAMOND PL, ALEX, VA.	KI 9 1037	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
PAMELA A.	SAME	F	19 SEP 50
MICHELLE D.	"	F	5 SEP 53
NAME OF FATHER ~~(Or male guardian)~~	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
JOHN B. RICHARDSON	2948 WYMAN PKY, BALTO, MD	BE 5-5240	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
DECEASED			

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. NONE

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME ~~(Mr., Mrs., Miss)~~ (Last-First-Middle): THEODORE G. DRISCOLL | RELATIONSHIP: BROTHER-IN-LAW

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 722 S. ROYAL ST., ALEX, VA. | HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: TE 6 8506

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: WHARTON-POTTER, N. FAIRFAX ST, ALEX., VA. | BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION: KI 9-4330

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) CONOVER-MAST PUBL'NS INC. 205 E. 42 ST, NEW YORK 17, N.Y. YES ☐ [✓ NO]

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) [✓ YES] NO ☐

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) YES ☐ [✓ NO]

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

CLARENDON TRUST CO., ARLINGTON 10, VA.

JACQUES G. RICHARDSON }
HARRIETTE D. RICHARDSON } JOINT

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

WIFE HAS IN POSSESSION

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT Washington, D.C.	DATE 31 July 62	SIGNATURE Jacques G. Richardson

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

RYBAT **SEPARATE COVER ATT:**

BIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

NAME: RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel **DOB:** 20 January 1924

GRADE: GS-14 Date of Grade 16 January 1955

MARITAL STATUS: Married **DEPENDENTS:** Wife
Daug - age 11
Daug - age 8

CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

EDUCATION:

1940-42 Sir George Williams College, Canada - French
1942 Trinity College, Conn. - French (½ year)
1945 Univ of Michigan - BA (1947), Oriental Civilization, Japanese
1951-52 Georgetown Univ. - International Relations

PRIOR ORGANIZATIONAL EMPLOYMENT:

1940-41 Jacoby Photographers, Montreal, Canada - Photo Tech (part-time).
1941-42 T. Eaton Co., Ltd (dept store), Montreal, Canada - Salesman (part-time).
1943-48 Military Service, U. S. Army, 1st Lt. (1946-48, G-2 Japan).
1949 Guide Publishing Co., Baltimore, Md., County Editor of weekly newspaper (4 months).
1949 Housing Authority of Baltimore City, Md., - Planning Admin. officer (6 months).
1955-56 Seikei Univ., Tokyo, Japan - Current Affairs English Seminar Leader (part-time).

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:

French - Reading and Writing - Elementary; Speaking - Native (Oct 1960).
Japanese - Reading andSpeaking - Elementary; Writing - Intermediate.

MILITARY RESERVE STATUS: NONE

ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING:

1950	Basic Intel
1950	Staff Orient
1950	Ops
1950	Adv Ops
1950	Intel Orient
1950	Ops Famil
1950	UTGA
1951	Documentation
1954	Counterespionage
1954	Audio Surv Mgmt
1954	Ops Audio Surv Eq
1954	Flaps and Seals
1960	Intel Rptg Tech
1960	Cland Serv Review
1961	Mgmt Course
1961	IBM Program. Orient. Course

RYBAT

SECRET

RYBAT

SEPARATE COVER ATT:

BIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel

ORGANIZATIONAL EMPLOYMENT:

Nov 1949	I.O., GS-7, OPC/OPS St/FBD Area III, Hqs
Oct 1950	I.O., GS-9, OPC/FE-3/Ch, Soviet Desk, Hqs
Apr 1951	I.O., GS-11, OPC/FE/Dep Ch, FE-3, Hqs
Jan 1952	Ops Off, GS-12, OSO/SR/Dep Ch, SR-5, Hqs
	June - Oct 1952, TDY Hawaii, Alaska & Pearl Harbor
	June - Jul 1953, TDY Japan and Korea
Jul 1953	I.O., GS-13, KUDOVE/SR/Ch, SR-5, Hqs
Jan 1954	Area Ops Off, GS-13, KUDOVE/SR/COPs/Ch, Spec Def Rec Proj, Hqs
Feb 1955	Area Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/FE/Japan/Ch, USSR Base, Tokyo
	Oct - Nov 1955, TDY Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaya and Burma
Mar 1956	Area Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/Tokyo Sta/Dep Ch, Sov Br, Tokyo
	Nov - Dec 1956, TDY Hong Kong and Australia
Oct 1957	Area Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/Tokyo Sta/Ch, Ops Br, Tokyo
Oct 1960	Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/Ch, Branch 6, Hqs

PERSONNEL EVALUATION:

Fitness Report, 10 April 1958 - 31 March 1959 "Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position." Fitness Report, 1 April 1959 - 24 June 1960 "In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his 'host country'; an excellent and proven degree of operational 'know-how'; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty." Fitness Report, July 1960 - October 1961 "Subject supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well."

RYBAT

SECRET

C/SS

1 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Group/Non-official Cover

VIA : SR/SS

SUBJECT : Cover requirements for Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

1. Information keyed to your format "Nonofficial Cover Request for Individual" is transmitted herewith.

2. SR would like to have a durable, permanent cover established for Thomas B. CASASIN as quickly as possible. CASASIN is presently a staff employee in Headquarters. He will be available to develop and undertake cover preparations as soon as Cover Group has completed the necessary arrangements.

3. It will be convenient for CASASIN to discuss cover plans and preparations with you whenever you wish. Miss Ruth Paul (ext. 3839) will serve as Headquarters case officer and will be pleased to provide any supplementary information you may require.

John Gerry
Chief, SR/2

Attachment:
As stated in Para 1, 2 cy

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) [illegible]

2. I.D. NO. [illegible]

3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE Richardson, Jacques G.

4. OFFICE OR DIVISION SR

5. LANGUAGE Japanese

6. LANG. CODE (25-27) 379

7. DATE OF TEST 46-51 Mar. 5, 1960

8. ANNIVERSARY DATE Mar. 5, 1963

9. GRADE 15

10. DATE OF BIRTH Jan. 20, 1924

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST

X	APPLY FOR AWARD
	ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
-	-	-	I	I

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)

	A
X	M
	NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
M	I		

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ 100.00 (40-45)

SIGNATURE

DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

TLO COPY

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mary
E/Pers.

DATE: 3 October 1967

FROM : Registrar/OMS

SUBJECT: Richardson, Jacques G.

Subject has been evaluated by OMS and found to be qualified for proposed assignment.

DONALD W. FARLEY
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mary
E/Pers.

DATE: 3 October 1967

FROM : Registrar/OMS

SUBJECT: Dependents of Richardson, Jacques

No medical disposition. Dependents will be evaluated when physicals are received.

DONALD W. FARLEY
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

SECRET

13 September 1960
File No. [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [illegible]

ATTENTION : Security Officer

SUBJECT : [illegible]
Establishment of Official Cover Backstop

REFERENCE : Form 1322, dated 9 September 1960.

1. In compliance with above reference, official cover backstopping which utilizes the U. S. Army Scientific Liaison and Advisory Group has been established for the above-named individual. All information concerning this cover arrangement is available in the Official Cover and Liaison Section, CCD.

2. It is requested that OCL/CCD be notified when this cover arrangement is no longer required. Any changes in the Subject's Headquarters status should be coordinated with this office for the determination of need for continued documentation and cover.

3. Subject has been issued Unit ID Card No. [illegible] for domestic use only. In accordance with arrangements made with Offices of Security and Personnel, the above documentation will be picked up by a CPB representative for any individual making a PCS move from Headquarters or an overseas TDY trip. In the case of the PCS traveler, CPB will return this documentation to OCL/CCD for disposition. For the TDY traveler, this documentation will be retained by CPB and returned to the TDY traveler upon completion of the trip. In the event of a resignation from the Agency, OCL/CCD will obtain the documentation from the employee at the time of the employee's debriefing conference.

/S/ PAUL P. STEWART

JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCD

cc: Personnel Security Division,
Office of Security

FORM 9-60 1554

SECRET

(9-11)

A. General Information

(1) Thomas B. CASASIN (P). Aliases: John F. Reynolds, John R. Williams, John F. Martin, Mr. Black, John J. Kennedy, Lt. Col. Williams, Mr. Robbins, John Rainey, Mr. Richards, Mr. Roberts. Cover development has not been previously requested.

(2) Staff employee, GS-14, Step 5; total compensation under cover should be publicly within range of current actual compensation.

(3) Employee: fully cleared; wife previously had CSA for contract work in Japan, not overtly affiliated with CIA (cover was Army). Spouse is aware of employee's status.

(4) Medical status OK

(5) Employee has had psychological assessment and technical interviews. Results presumably satisfactory.

(6) Current cover: industrial liaison officer, Army Scientific Liaison and Advisory Group. Previous cover (Nov 1954-Sep 1960): supervising foreign affairs specialist, Detachment 1, Army Property Disposal Sales Agency, APO 94, San Francisco. Earlier cover (Nov 1949-Nov 1954): editor, International Press Section, USIA, in Washington. All were backstopped.

(7) New cover can be assumed at any time.

(8) Proposed departure date overseas is roughly summer 1962, but is flexible.

(9) SR/Support and SR/COA funds will be available to support any operational expenses and financial commitments made to the cover organization.

B. Biographic Information

(1) DPOB: 20 January 1924, Baltimore, Maryland. Male, caucasian. Married, two children (girls, 8 and 11). Current address is 312 Lamond Place, Alexandria, Virginia. Previous address was 344-C 3 chome Harajuku, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, Japan.

(2) Adult dependent to accompany is wife, who resides with employee, and on whom bio data is available in the Office of Security. Both minor daughters would accompany overseas.

(3) Education: BA, U of Michigan; graduate work in international relations at Georgetown University.

(4) Professional experience: part-time work during college years as apprentice and journeyman photo technician; part-time work as photo equipment salesman; newspaper assistant editor, about $2,100 per annum; assistant to chief, planning division of housing authority of major city, $3,100 per annum; employed since then by CIA, pay range of $3,800 to $13,250 per annum.

(5) Outside interests: photography, including own processing; writing, editing non-fiction and some fiction; gardening and do-it-yourself wood and metal working; interest in mechanics and electricity; interest in organization, management, and administrative planning; member, British Interplanetary Society; former associate member, American Astronautical Society; former member, Japan Rocket Society. Interested in sports cars and other high quality automobiles and trucks. Skiing, swimming, horseback riding, hiking, camping, alpinism.

(6) Objective personality evaluation: An exceedingly well-equipped operations officer, combining an excellent knowledge of the target area and of the base country with proven operational know-how and a mature, dynamic, self-confident personality. Has a great facility to express himself in writing and orally. Very effective in dealing with people on various levels, poised and businesslike.

(7) Financial status: almost wholly dependent upon job income. Outstanding debt is mortgage on house (about $20,500).

(8) Previous foreign residence: Canada, 5 years; Japan, 8 years. Tourism and official travel (including war service) for shorter periods to the UK, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, West Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Hong Kong, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, British North Borneo, Australia, and the Philippines.

(9) Speaks French and Japanese (tested in both).

C. Security Considerations

(1) Employed by CIA 12 years and two months. Security approval is TOP SECRET dated 10 June 1949.

(2) Employee will know specifically of CIA interest.

(3) Employee has had normal staff employee access to CIA buildings.

(4) Identification of CIA connection to others: a few close friends and neighbors are aware that employee has worked for CIA since spring 1961 on detailed basis from Pentagon. Employee has been exposed to foreign intelligence services, but always under alias, and in all cases but one for short, one-time purposes. Exception: the Japanese, who know employee as John Reynolds. Turned up once in a Japanese police report as a

possible intelligence-connected person after having been accosted by a Japanese policeman in a CIA safehouse which had evidently been compromised without Station's knowledge. Government claimed no knowledge of employee's intelligence connections. Employee has one close acquaintance in proposed area of assignment who knows of employee's true connections. Acquaintance is former staffer, discreet, and who wants to protect his own reputation and status locally.

(6) There are no other known problems bearing on security.

(7) Employee has used overseas cover designations and Headquarters' "Army Scientific Liaison and Advisory Group" and USIA for cover backstopping for non-operational purposes.

(8) After the forthcoming tour, it is hoped that the employee will be able to continue in a non-official cover capacity, or convert to the most appropriate official cover dictated by operational and administrative planning needs.

(9) This is a request for permanent cover.

(10) Theodore G. Driscoll, 722 S. Royal Street, Alexandria, Virginia. Father-in-law of employee. He is not witting of Subject's CIA employment.

(11) Insurance: WAEPA and "Eisenhower" payroll-deducted insurance. Have personal policy with Massachusetts Mutual, taken out while under Army cover. Wife is beneficiary in all cases.

(12) No Selective Service or reserve status or responsibility.

D. Operational Information

(1) Type of Operation

FI-CA management of large group of agents earlier recruited by others for REDWOOD purposes, including termination of marginal assets.

Spotting, assessment, and reporting potential new recruits.

Recruitment of agent-candidates outside the country of assignment when necessary.

Clandestine support and communications of own and others' operations.

Other tasks set out by Station, within cover and time-available capability.

(2) Location

Paris, France. Alternates: Brussels, Belgium; Luxembourg; Geneva, Switzerland.

(3) Employee should be relatively free to travel on short trips to nearby countries of Western and Middle Europe. Times and intervals will probably be dictated by the Paris Station.

(4) Special groups the employee should be able to contact

Although it is not essential, it would be desirable if the employee's cover permitted him to initiate and maintain contacts in the scientific, technological, commercial and engineering fields.

(5) Income directly attributable to cover should be in the range of $10,000 per annum, with supplementary income attributable to commissions, retainers, piece work fees, personal resources, etc.

(6) Employee should be able to devote upward of 30 hours per week to operational duties.

(7) Communications channels desired

Communications will be (a) directly with Station; (b) indirectly with Station via dead-drop, S/W, accommodation addresses, cut-outs, or any combination of these, or (c) in unusual circumstances via Headquarters or third country points. It is not desired that the cover facility provide an operational communication channel.

(8) Cover Suggestions

Suitable covers might include: technical publication representative, correspondent, or editor; book or manuscript agent or publisher's representative; corporation, service, or management consultant's representative; prestige or representational agent for large firm, service, institute, or association. The cover vis-a-vis the target is less important than the status afforded by the cover to the eyes of the host government, i.e., a reason for being there.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT C[illegible]TTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF [illegible]ERS
SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WILCOTT, James B.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 29 APRIL 1956 - 15 APRIL 1966

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3-9-78	3-9-78	HAROLD D. LEAP	Harold D Leap

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

SECRET

WILCOTT, JAMES B.

TERMINATED 25798

[redacted]

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 Apr 66

1 SERIAL NUMBER	025798
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	WILCOTT JAMES B. JR
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	RESIGNATION *
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 04 / C.O.B. 15 / YEAR 66
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6 FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF
7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	6135 1164
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH USFIELD WH/C JMWAVE DEP CHIEF OF STATION FOR OPS SUPPORT FINANCE BRANCH
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	JMWAVE
11 POSITION TITLE	FISCAL ACCT ASST
12 POSITION NUMBER	1369
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	SF
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0501.03
16 GRADE AND STEP	07 4
17 SALARY OR RATE	$ 6890.

18 REMARKS

* Staff Employee Special

Subject is re-employable

Resignation Memo Attached

CSPS/BA

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	Robert D. Gishman, C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED	22 April
18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	Head, SF Career Service
DATE SIGNED	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	45
20 EMPLOY CODE	10
21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	
22 STATION CODE	
23 INTEGREE CODE	
24 VOUCHERS CODE	2
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	09 27 31
26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28 NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	1 60 66 45
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA	
33 SECURITY REQ NO.	
34 SEX	
35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT)	
36 SERV COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37 LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV, PROV. TEMP) CODE	
39 FEGLI-HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER, 1—YES) / HEALTH INS CODE	
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE)	
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	
46 C.P. APPROVAL	L. G. Zingler
DATE APPROVED	5/16/66

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 9 10 20 AM '66
MAIL ROOM

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE 15 Apr. 66 (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

[illegible]

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE—	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)*

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a — The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains *only* to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 — "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular
Part Time
Temporary
Temporary-Part-Time

Summer
Detail Out
Detail In

WAE
Consultant
Military

Item 9 — "Organizational Designations" should show *all* levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE: Major Component *(Director, Deputy Director, etc.)*
Office, Major Staff, etc.
Foreign Field or U.S. Field *(if pertinent)*
Division or Staff *(subordinate to first line)*
Branch
Section
Unit

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAR 10 10 01 AM '66

Items 11 and 15 — "Position Title" and "Occupational Series" should be the standard abbreviated title and corresponding occupational series in Handbook of Official Occupational Titles and Codes for the duties actually to be performed by the employee. If different from the title and series of the position occupied as shown on the most current edition of the Position Control Register or Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization, explain under Item 18—Remarks.

Item 18b — Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, *the gaining Career Service should approve* and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING— The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel *through* the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

CIF

DATE PREPARED: 9 November 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025793
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WILCOTT, James B., Jr.
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT * [illegible]
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 21 YEAR 65
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135-1164
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): ✓

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH U.S.Field
WH/C JMWAVE
Deputy Chief of Station for Operational Support
Finance Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE

11 POSITION TITLE: FISCAL ACCT. ASST. (SF)
12 POSITION NUMBER: 1369
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SF
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (07)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0501.03
16 GRADE AND STEP: 07 (4)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 6890

18 REMARKS:

*Staff Employee Special. — e-03-60 —

#109301

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: 9 Nov 65
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Shirley Johnson
DATE SIGNED: 16 Nov 65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. NOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.
13	10	51550	wh	99999		—	09 29 31

26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.: 09 15 63
27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.: 09 13 64
28. LWE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.:
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE) CODE: 1
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.:
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO.: [illegible]
34 SEX: M

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT): 1
36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.: 06 26 53
37 LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.: 03 04 57
38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV TEMP) CODE: C
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER 1—YES): 1 HEALTH INS. CODE: —
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO: —

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)): 1
42 LEAVE CAT CODE: 6
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO): CODE 0 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO): — CODE — NO TAX EXEMP — STATE CODE —

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-[illegible]
46 OP APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 11/17/65

FORM 1152 8-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 November 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025798
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Wilcott, James B. Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 28 YEAR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135-1164
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH U.S.Field
WH/C JMWAVE
Deputy Chief of Station for Operational Support
Finance Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE
11. POSITION TITLE: FISCAL ACCT. ASST.
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1369
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SF
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0501.03
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 (4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 6390
18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 9 Nov 65
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 10 Nov 65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. VOUTRS CODE: 2
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 09 DA 27 YR 31
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1R0009
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA. YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV./TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-20-65 TN
46. O P APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 11 Nov 65

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

ULB

DATE PREPARED: 15 April 1965 ✓

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025793

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Wilcott, James B

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT Cs

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 25 YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF X

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5135-1164

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/Special Affairs Staff
U. S. Field
Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE
Deputy for Support
Finance Branch

42
F

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE

11 POSITION TITLE: FISCAL ACCT. ASST. (7)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1030

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SF

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0501.03

16 GRADE AND STEP: 07 (4)

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 6650

18 REMARKS

Subject replacing Edna C. JUCHENTHAL, rotating to Headquarters latter part of May 1965.

C-03-60

Recorded
40

OVERLAP

Validated
SR/18PW
22 April 65

Concur: CS/DA 4/27/65

1 cy Payroll

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 15 Apr 65

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Bradley
Head, Sr Career Service
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HQDTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
13	10	4960	SAS	99999		2	09 27 31	09 15 63	09 13 64

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION-CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO.	34 SEX
		1					00000	M

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT)	36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37 LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV, PROV./TEMP) CODE	39 FEGLI CODE (0—WAIVER, 1—YES)	HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
1	06 26 53	03 04 57	C	1	—	—

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE
1	6		0	0	—	—	—	—

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 4-26-65 HT

46 OP APPROVAL: Joseph B. Fagan

DATE APPROVED: 22 APR 1965

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 April 1965 ✓

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025796
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WILCOTT, James B., Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Resignation
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 24 YEAR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5271-0003
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS OFFICE OF FINANCE
Confidential Funds Division
Compensation and Tax Accounts Branch
Contract Agents Accounts Section

15
E

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Finance Assistant (7)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0470
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SF
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0510.16
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 6650
18. REMARKS:

1cc - Security
1cc - Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Act. Chief C&T Division
DATE SIGNED: 19 APR 65
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Act. Director of Finance
DATE SIGNED: 19 APR 65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPL. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HQTRS. CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 09 DA. 27 YR. 31
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1BDCC9
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 1; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 4-26-65 HT
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 22 APR 65

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DLB: 27 APR 65

0EF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025798	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) WILCOTT JAMES B JR		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 24 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5277 0003 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
11. POSITION TITLE FINANCE ASSISTANT	12. POSITION NUMBER 0470	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION SF	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0510.18	16. GRADE AND STEP 07 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 6850

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition
11-62

(4-61)

14-00000

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 September 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025798

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WILCOTT, James ~~Bernard~~, Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment & Transfer to Vouchered Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 11 YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5277-0003

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS OFFICE OF FINANCE
Confidential Funds Division
Compensation and Tax Accounts Branch
Contract Agents Accounts Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Finance Assistant

12. POSITION NUMBER: C 470

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SF

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0510.16

16. GRADE AND STEP: 07/4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 6650

18. REMARKS

From: FE/Tokyo

CONCUR: Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 9/21/64

Oly 10/1/64

FE/Personnel

25 Sept

1cc - Sec
1cc - Payroll w/
Forms W-4 and

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Acting Chief, C&T Division

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Adm. Officer-O/Finance

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 1200 ALPHABETIC F

22. STATION CODE: 2-CB

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOOTPS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 09 DA. 27 YR. 31

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPEC. ACC. REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERV. OF LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERV. OF MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. CAREER CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: from FE

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Michael

DATE APPROVED: 1 Oct 64

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a. (4)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED 3 SEPTEMBER 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025798	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) WILCOTT, JAMES B., JR.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 09 DAY 15 YEAR 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4137-7351-1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
		CF TO V	XXXXX	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP FE ~~[illegible]~~ FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION SUPPORT STAFF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO, JAPAN

12

11. POSITION TITLE FISCAL ACCT ASST	12. POSITION NUMBER 3167	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION SF

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES ~~851~~ 0501.03	16. GRADE AND STEP 0 7 03	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 5,910

18. REMARKS

FROM: GS- 6 step 4

FOR FURTHER INFO, CALL X5271

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL LEE AUSTIN, CFE/PERSONNEL	DATE SIGNED 05 SEP 1963	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Admin. Officer, O/Comptroller	DATE SIGNED 9/11/63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 45370 ALPHABETIC FE	22. STATION CODE 38837	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VOUCHERS CODE 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. 09 DA. 27 YR. 31	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 09/13/63	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 13 SEP 63

FORM 4.62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 October 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER ✓ 025798	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Wilcott, James B., Jr.		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Promotion		4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 11 DAY 12 YEAR 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2137-7351-1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 14 DDP/FE FE/JAO - Tokyo Station Support Staff- TOKYO		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Tokyo, Japan	
11. POSITION TITLE Fiscal Acct Asst D-07		12. POSITION NUMBER 3167-[illegible]	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION SF
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0501.03	16. GRADE AND STEP 6 [illegible] 4	17. SALARY OR RATE $ ~~4,830~~ 5,325

18. REMARKS

Promotion from GS-5, Step [illegible] 5 to GS-6, Step [illegible] 4

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL ~~M.L. Shobe, [illegible]~~	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER E. R. Saunders E. R. SAUNDERS, Comptroller	DATE SIGNED [illegible] 1961

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFF. CODING NUMERIC 56[illegible]	ALPHABETIC FE	22. STATION CODE 27597	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 09 27 31	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR. 11 12 61
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR. 11 12 61	28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX	35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT 2 = 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION R. K. Kearney 11/02/61	46. O.P. APPROVAL DV Mulcahy	DATE APPROVED 11/3/61

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

[illegible]

SECRET

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP in the CAREER STAFF of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

To the Director of Central Intelligence

Sir:

I submit herewith my application for membership in the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency as defined below:

> "The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency is a group of carefully selected and trained individuals who accept an obligation to devote themselves to the needs of the Agency, and who intend to make a career with the Agency."

In accordance with this definition, I desire to devote myself to the faithful performance of duty in the Central Intelligence Agency, and I accept the obligations and conditions of that service which are determined to be essential to the furtherance of its mission.

I am aware of the many restrictions necessarily placed upon me by virtue of the security requirements inherent in my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency. I am also aware that as a member of the Career Staff, it will be my obligation to serve anywhere and at any time and for any kind of duty as determined by the needs of the Agency, and I have been assured that in order to carry out this policy, full consideration will be given to my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances. By virtue of this application for membership and upon my acceptance in the Career Staff, I am assured that, with continuing satisfactory work performance and conduct on my part, just and equitable attention will be accorded my personal progress during my tenure in the Career Staff. I am also assured that, on my satisfactory completion of any assignments, I will be offered reassignments which are compatible insofar as possible with my abilities and career interests, and that I shall be entitled to the benefits now available or to be made available in the future to members of the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(Signature)

12/11/59
(Date)

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CAREER STAFF OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
APPROVED, TO TAKE EFFECT 4 MAR 1960
FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
THE CIA SELECTION BOARD

David C. Knapp

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): Wilcott, James B., Jr.
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 09 Da. 27 Yr. 31
4. Vet Pref (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code: 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS - EOD: Mo. Da. Yr.
7. SCD: Mo. Da. Yr.
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code:
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Apmt Affidav.: Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code: 1
12. LCD: Mo. Da. Yr.
13. (Yes-1, No-2) Code:

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

8

14. Organizational Designations: DDS/Office of the Comptroller
Finance Div. Accounts Branch
Accounting Control Section
Accts Receivable and Payable Unit

Code:

15. Location Of Official Station: Wash., D.C.

Station Code:

16. Dept. - Field: ~~Dept~~ USHJ - Fgn - Code: 2
17. Position Title: Fiscal Acct Clk
18. Position No.: 0506
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0501.04
21. Grade & Step: 05 3
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 4340
23. SD: SF
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. 9 Da. 22 Yr. 57
25. PSI Due: Mo. 9 Da. 18 Yr. 60
26. Appropriation Number: 0263 1040

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: Reassignment + T to CF — Code: 16
28. Eff. Date: Mo. 05 Da. 15 Yr. 60
29. Type Of Employee: Regular — Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

14

31. Organizational Designations: DDP/FE
FE/JAO - Tokyo Station
Support Staff - Tokyo

Code: 6171

32. Location Of Official Station: Tokyo, Japan

Station Code: 37587

33. Dept. - Field: Dept - USHJ - ~~Fgn~~ Code: 5
34. Position Title: Fiscal Acct Asst
35. Position No.: 3167
36. Serv.:
37. Occup. Series: 0501.03
38. Grade & Step:
39. Salary Or Rate: $
40. SD:
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. Da. Yr.
42. PSI Due: Mo. Da. Yr.
43. Appropriation Number: 0137 7351 3000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): [illegible] Y. Kennig, CFE/JAO for

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Roselle Little, X2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): Robert D. Cashman, CFE/Personnel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		2-23-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

2 copies to Security.

2/24/60

Please transfer from vouchered to unvouchered funds as of 15 May 1960.
Subject to replace Robert Weber, who is returning to ZI June 1960.

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth			4. Vet Pref		5. Sex	6. [illegible]			
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
125798	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	09	27	31		1	M 1	03	04	57	

7. SCD			8. CSC Retmt		9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav			11. FEGLI		12. LCD			13. [illegible]	
Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes-1 No-2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes-1 No-2	Code	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes-1 No-2	Code
06	26	53		1	50 USCA 403 J						03	04	57		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER FINANCE DIVISION COMPENSATION AND TAX ACCTS BR CONTRACT AGENTS ACCTS SECT.	3803	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn -	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	FINANCE ASST	0470	GS	0510.14

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade			25. PSI Due			26. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
05 ~~XX~~ 3	$ ~~XXXX~~ 4340	SF	03	22	57	~~[illegible]~~			9 6300 20 004
						9	18	60	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date			29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
Reassignment	56	10	ASAP	57	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS/Office of the Comptroller Finance Division, Accounts Branch Accounting Control Section Accts Receivable and Payable Unit	↑	Wash., DC	

33. Dept. - Field Dept - XX USfld - Frgn -	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	Fiscal Acct Clk	506		0501.04

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade			42. PSI Due			43. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
5/3	$ 4340	SF							0263-1040

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
R. E. WOMAC, Deputy Chief, Finance Division

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
Comptroller

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	fg	10-2-57	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 125798	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WILCOTT JAMES B JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 09 Da. 27 Yr. 31	4. Vet Pref (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1	5. Sex M 1
6. CS - EOD Mo. 03 Da. 04 Yr. 57	7. SCD Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 53	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. 03 Da. 04 Yr. 57	13. Mil. Serv. Credit, Etc. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER FINANCE DIV COMPENSATION & TAX ACCTS BR STAFF EMPLOYEES ACCTS SECTION	Code 3803	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code 2	17. Position Title TIME LV PAY CLK	18. Position No. 0305 ~~XX~~	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0544.01	21. Grade & Step 05 1/[illegible]	22. Salary Or Rate $ ~~3610~~ 4190	23. SD SF
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 09 Da. 22 Yr. 57	25. PSI Due Mo. 09 Da. 21 Yr. 58	26. Appropriation Number ~~[illegible]~~ 9-6300-20-004	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. ASAP [illegible]	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS/Office of the Comptroller Finance Division Compensation and Tax Accounts Branch Contract Agents Accounts Section	Code [illegible]	32. Location Of Official Station Wash., DC	Station Code [illegible]
33. Dept. - Field (Dept - X, USfld -, Frgn -) Code 2	34. Position Title Finance Assistant	35. Position No. ~~X~~470	36. Serv
37. Occup Series 0510.14	38. Grade & Step 5/2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 4190.00	40. SD SF
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 7 Da. 22 Yr. 57	42. PSI Due Mo. 9 Da. 20 Yr. 58	43. Appropriation Number 9-6300-20-004	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
R. E. WOMAC, Acting Chief, Finance Division

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
Comptroller

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		20 [illegible] 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

For slotting purposes only

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2 Name (Last-First-Middle)	3 Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4 Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
125748	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	[illegible]	07	31		1	M 1	03	04	57	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8 CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo. / Da. / Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code
05	26	53		1	50 USCA 403 J						03 / 04 / 57	12

(11)

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER FINANCE DIVISION COMPENSATION AND TAX ACCTS BR CONTRACT AGENTS ACCTS SECTION	3803	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn -	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	FINANCE ASST	0521.03	GS	0510.15

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
05 1	$ 3670	SP	09 22 57	09 21 58	8 6304 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30 Separation Date
Reassignment	56	**ASAP**	**Regular**	01	

(21)

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS/Office of the Comptroller **Finance Division** **Compensation and Tax Accounts Branch** **Staff Employees Accounts Section**	3803	**Wash., DC**	

33 Dept. - Field Dept - XX USfld - Frgn -	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
		Time Leave Pay Clk	**N305.02**		**0544.01**

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42 PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
5/1	**$3670.00**	**SP**			**8-6304-20**

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) **R. E. WOMAC, Deputy Chief, Finance Division**	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) **Acting Comptroller**
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		16 APR 1958	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	R W Shay by tell Dell	4/16/58

Remarks

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo	Da	Yr	
	WILCOTT, James B., Jr.	9	27	31			M				

7. SCD Mo	Da	Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo	Da	Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo	Da	Yr	13. Mil Serv. Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS/Office of the Comptroller Fiscal Division Accounts Branch Allotment Ledger Section		Wash., DC	

7

16. Dept. Field Dept - XX Usfld. Fran -	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
		Fiscal Acct Clk	30.01		0501.04

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	25. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	26. Appropriation Number
5/1	$ 3670.00	SF							8-6303-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo	Da	Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date	
Reassignment	56	ASAP 2	23	58	Regular	01		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS/Office of the Comptroller Finance Division Compensation and Tax Accounts Branch Contract Agents Accounts Section	3805	Wash., DC	75013

33. Dept. Field Dept - XX Usfld. Fran -	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
		Finance Assistant	521.03		0510.14

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	42. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	43. Appropriation Number
5/1	$ 3670.00	SF	09	22	57	09	21	58	8-6304-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) R. E. WOMAC, Deputy Chief, Finance Division	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) Comptroller
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		2/14/58	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		2/17/58

Remarks

Subject will replace Mr. Robert U. LaRoss who is processing for an o/s assignment.

FORM 1152a
5-57

14-00000

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED
12 September 1957

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WILCOTT, James B.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 9 Da 27 Yr 31	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code /
5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 Code
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2 Code /	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. Mil Serv Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS/Office of Comptroller Fiscal Division Accounts Branch Allotment Ledger Section	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code
16. Dept.- Field Dept - X Unfld- Fran - Code M	17. Position Title Fiscal Acct. Clk	18. Position No. [illegible] 30.01-[illegible]	19. Serv.
20. Occup. Series GS-0501.04-4	21. Grade & Step [illegible]-4 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 3415	23. SD SF
24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 8-6303-20	

7

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr 29 SEP 1957	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS/Office of Comptroller Fiscal Division Accounts Branch Allotment Ledger Section	Code	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code
33. Dept.- Field Dept - X Unfld- Fran - Code M	34. Position Title Fiscal Acct Clk	35. Position No. [illegible] 30.01	36. Serv.
37. Occup. Series GS-0501.04-5	38. Grade & Step [illegible]-5 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 3670	40. SD SF
41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr [illegible] 57	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr 9 21 58	43. Appropriation Number 8-6303-20	

7

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
D.W. Corrick, Chief, Fiscal Division Dwc

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Ruby Johnson x 4445

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
Comptroller

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		9/19/57	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		9/20/57

Remarks

FORM 5-57 1152a

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

FC · 9 Nov. 1956

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. James B. Wilcott, Jr. 125738

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 27 Sept. 1931

3. REQUEST NO.: C-5481 RC-135

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 28 June 1956

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Excepted Appointment 13
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: 4 March 1957

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403j

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Fiscal Acct Clk M 30.01-4
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0501.04-4 $3415 pa
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Comptroller Fiscal Division Accounts Branch Allotment Ledger Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL 7

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

This action cancels Recruitment Request submitted under date of 25 June 1956

Personnel Folder is attached

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): D. W. Corrick, Chief, Fiscal Division

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Ruby Johnson x 4445

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY:
Signature: R. H. Fuchs
Title: Acting Comptroller

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/SF

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO 7-6303-20

18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 4 March 57

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

OFFICE/DIVISION WITHIN CEILING
[illegible] Date
BAB Position Con. Clk.

① subj. to med.
② subj to trial period
RC-135

DOG: 03/04/57

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		9 JUL 19[illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	EH	7/11
E.		

REMARKS:
CSEOD: 03/04/57
LCD: 03/04/57
SCD: 06/26/53
PSI Due: 03/09/58

F. APPROVED BY

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

1. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 10 April 1956
2. PLACE: Syracuse, New York
3. PREVIOUS APPLICATION: ☐ YES ☒ NO
4. INTERVIEWER: Neil F. Doherty
5. REFERRED BY: --
6. TYPE OR PRINT IN CAPS — LAST NAME: WILCOTT, FIRST NAME: JAMES MIDDLE NAME: B.
7. PERMANENT ADDRESS: 400 James Street, Syracuse, New York — TELEPHONE: none
8. BUSINESS ADDRESS: -- — TELEPHONE:
9. TEMPORARY ADDRESS: -- — TELEPHONE:
10. DATE OF BIRTH: 27 Sept. 1931
11. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cleveland, Ohio
12. CITIZENSHIP: ☒ U.S. ☐ OTHER (Specify country)
U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☒ BIRTH ☐ NATURALIZATION — IF NATURALIZED INDICATE DATE:
13. ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOW(ER) ☐ DIVORCED
14. NO. OF DEPEND. (Excluding wife): 0
15. FOREIGN RELATIVES, INCLUDING WIFE (Reg. 10-9)

N A

16. EDUCATION (Schools, degrees, dates, majors, thesis title, grade average or class standing, extra-curricular activities, etc.)

Poland Central High - left at end of first year (1948)
GED (Army) Equivalency diploma 1951
Feb. '53 - May '54 - Utica College of Syracuse University, Utica, N.Y. - Physics major- left when his marks were getting too low -working also.
Feb. '55 - Present - Central Business School, Syracuse, New York - Accounting course- all A's and B's except 2 C's. (Can end course in Fall or continue)

17. MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Employers, positions, duties, salaries, reasons for leaving)

August '52 - Dec. '52 - Esso Tower Station, Genesee St., Utica. N.Y. - Gas attendant- $45 per wk - laid off due to slow business.
De.c '52 - Fe b. '53 - Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., Utica, N.Y. - Engine lathe operator $50 per wk. was an unskilled job with no future.
May '54 - Sept. '54 - Tobbogan Inn, Eagle Bay, N.Y. - Handyman $60 wk, plus room and board - summer job.
Sept. '54 - Dec. '54 - Century Metal Craft Cork, Syracuse, N.Y., Cookware salesman - $60 wk.-did not make out as a salesman.

18. MILITARY EXPERIENCE (Branch, serial no., stations, training duties, command responsibilities, rank held, reserve status, current proficiency and interest). INCLUDE ALSO DRAFT, ACTIVE MILITARY OR RETIRED STATUS.

Dec. '48 - August. '52 - U.S. Army
Electrician and generator operator (MOS 3166 - Cpl.
liked the work and was considered fairly good at it.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

19. AREA KNOWLEDGE (Areas, type of knowledge, how acquired, etc.)

Okinawa July '49 - March '51

20. LANGUAGE FACILITY (Give tests when skill warrants and rate below)

LANGUAGE	NATIVE FLUENCY	FLUENT BUT FOREIGN	ADEQUATE FOR TRANSLATOR	ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH	ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL	LIMITED	ACQUIRED BY
N A							

21. SALARY REQUESTED $3200

22. POOL INTEREST ☐ YES ☐ NO

23. ACCEPTABLE STATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. ☒ YES ☐ NO
ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☒ YES ☐ NO
OVERSEAS ☒ YES ☐ NO

PREFERENCE LIMITATIONS
Prefers O/S and the sooner the better- anywhere.

24. HEALTH
Good

25. FORMS GIVEN ☒ PHS ☒ APP. I ☒ MED. ☐ SEC. AGREE. ☒ L/A (If required)

26. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION (Appearance, manners, personality, maturity, motivation, flexibility, intelligence, emotional stability, qualifications for intelligence work, career planning, over-all impression, pertinent unfavorable factors)

The first thing of note is the scattered work and educational history of this fellow. On paper the case is all against him but in talking to him I conclude that it is the case of a guy who failed to get the proper job and school guidance when it would have been most effective (immediately after discharge). The guy has intelligence (LA/5 61-81) but perhaps not the final grasp of things to make a go of a technical degree in College. He probably would have done O.K. with the Liberal Arts course. At any rate he has decided on accounting as a career (finds he likes it and can do it well). He's had a tough life to say the least (how much bearing this has had on his career I'm not trained to evaluate.) My final impression is that he's neat, clean cut, sincere, reliable, capable if given the proper supervision. Types about 40 wpm and is learning shorthand from his wife (who's applying as steno). I think he'd do a competent job and perhaps with experience and training do a very good one. Wants O/S at earliest opportunity for financial reasons.

27. RECOMMENDED FOR
GS 4 Admin/ Accounting

28. SERIAL NUMBERS

29. TESTS LA/5 61-81

30.
Neil F. Doherty
SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

May 13, 1956
DATE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. [illegible]	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 26 Jun 1953				
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible], James Bernard, Jr.		3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH Sep 1931	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 4 Mar 1957	
6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee)	NO. 2	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1934, 1959	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA	SPOUSE NA
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. RPT. Mar 1960	QUAL. FOR PCS O/S	EVAL. FOR O/S PCS
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2 / TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3 / RETIRED
12. ASSESSMENT DATE None		13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None		14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE Jan 1960	

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1948-52	Military Service, US Army - Cpl, Electrician & Generator Operator
1952	Esso Tower Station, Utica, NY - Attendant
1952-53	Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co, Utica, NY - Engine Lathe Operator
	Various Summer & Part-time positions while attending college

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1953-54	Utica College, Utica, NY - Physics
1955-57	Central City Business Institute, Syracuse, NY - Ctf, Exec Business Admin&Acctg
1957-59	USDA Graduate School, DC - Federal Govt Acctg; Mathematics of Acctg&Investment

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): German - R,P,S,U, Slight(Nov 1959); W, Elem; T, None - Mar 1958

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1957	Clerical Induct	1960	Intro to Communism
1957	Clerical Orient		
1960	Intel Orient		
1960	Ops Spt		

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SC	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Mar 1957	Fisc Acct Clerk	0501.04	4	SF	Compt/Fiscal Div/Accts Br	Hq
Sep 1957	" "	0501.04	5	SF	" " "	"
Feb 1958	Finance Asst	0510.14	5	SF	Compt/Fin Div/Comp&Tax Accts Br	"
Mar 1958	Time,Lv,Pay Clerk	0544.01	5	SF	" " " " " "	"
Mar 1959	Finance Asst	0510.14	5	SF	" " " " " "	"
Oct 1959	Fisc Acct Clerk	0501.04	5	SF	Compt/Finance Div/Accts Br	"
May 1960	Fisc Acct Asst	0501.03	5	SF	DDP/FE/Jao-TokyoSta/Spt Stf	Tokyo
Nov 1961	" " "	0501.03	6	SF	" " " " " "	"
Sep 1963	" " "	0501.03	7	SF	" " " " " "	"
Oct 1964	Finance Asst	0510.16	7	SF	DDS/Finance/CF Div/Comp&TaxAccts	Hq

20. DATE REVIEWED 23 Nov 1964	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY nrd	22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE No

FORM 8-59 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET jlk PROFILE (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 25798	**BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)**

NAME (Last-First-Middle) WILCOTT, James Bernard, Jr.	DATE OF BIRTH Sep 1931

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

27. DATE REVIEWED 23 Nov 1964	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY mrd

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1060 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET jlk

PROFILE

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025798

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wilcott, James B. Jr	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sep 31	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-07	5. SD SP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Acct Asst	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO	8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 Aug 64

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July 1963 - 30 June 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As Station Cashier, responsible for the daily receipt and disbursement of cash (Japanese yen, U.S. dollars, MPC).	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consolidates all Station cash transactions to one voucher and verifies balance daily.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Summarizes all Station transactions for off-base housing and vehicle expenditures into monthly accountings and maintains appropriate subsidiary records.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Polices individual housing and vehicle advance accounts and audits related accountings.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains statistical records on private rentals by individual house and cost center.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Advises TDY travelers of their entitlements, audits the travel vouchers, and performs other related duties as assigned by the Finance Officer.	RATING LETTER P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

15 JUL 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 9 9 44 AM '64
MAIL ROOM

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has performed his duties in a competent manner. He handles huge sums of money with few errors, and maintains the necessary statistical records.

Cost consciousness and management of organization assets does not apply to this position.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 9 Jun 64	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James Wilcott

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 23	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 9 Jun 64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Finance Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Frank Wells

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject has held the position of Finance Disbursing Officer since his arrival at Tokyo Station in May 1960. He has performed well in a function for which he had no previous experience or training. With a realignment of the office workload in December he was given the additional responsibility of processing TDY travel. Due to his specialized work, he has not had the opportunity to be trained in other facets of finance work. He has been scheduled for Finance training upon his return to Headquarters in July 1964.

DATE 7 Jun 64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Finance Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Jack Randall

SECRET

FJTT 10,374, 31 May 63

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025798

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WILCOTT, JAMES B. JR.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 27 Sept 31
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-6
5. SD: SF
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: FISCAL ACCT ASST
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/JKO
8. CURRENT STATION: Tokyo

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Jul 62 - 30 Jun 63

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As Station Cashier, responsible for the daily receipt and disbursement of cash (Japanese yen, U. S. dollars, MPC).	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consolidates all Station cash transactions to one voucher and verifies balance daily.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Summarizes all Station transactions for off-base housing and vehicle expenditures into monthly accountings and maintains appropriate subsidiary records.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Polices individual housing and vehicle advance accounts and audits related accountings.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains statistical records on all private rentals by individual house and cost center.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Performs other related duties as assigned by the Finance Officer.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

20 JUN 1963

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign-language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OCT 17 3 38 PM '63
MAIL ROOM

Subject is conscientious, industrious, and willing to accept all responsibility assigned him. He has performed his duties in a competent manner and has shown a marked interest in learning all facets of his job. Subject at times gives the impression (whether warranted or not) of being uncertain in his thinking, and he does not always seem to exercise his best judgment in reaching decisions, but he is striving to eradicate this impression.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
21 May 1963	/S/ James B. Wilcott

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
33	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 May 1963	Finance Officer	/S/ Clerence Norment III

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur in the evaluation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 May 1963	Adm Officer	/S/ Douglas S. Trabue

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

(When Filled In)

1. EMPL. SERIAL NO. 25268

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) EOD: 26 Jun 1953

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) WILCOTT, James Bernard, Jr.	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH Sep 1931	5. CONTINUITY COMP. DATE 4 Mar 1957

6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee)	NO. 2	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1954, 1959	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA	Spouse: NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. RPT. Mar 1960	QUAL. FOR PCS O/S	EVAL. FOR O/S PCS

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3 / RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE Jan 1960

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1948-52 Military Service, US Army - Cpl, Electrician & Generator Operator
1952 Esso Tower Station, Utica, NY - Attendant
1952-53 Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co, Utica, NY - Engine Lathe Operator
Various Summer & Part-time positions while attending college

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1953-54 Utica College, Utica, NY - Physics
1955-57 Central City Business Institute, Syracuse, NY - Ctf, Exec Business Admin&Acctg
1957-59 USDA Graduate School, DC - Federal Govt Acctg; Mathematics of Acctg&Investment

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

German - R,P,S,U, Slight(Nov 1959); W, Elem; T, None - Mar 1958

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1957 Clerical Induct
1957 Clerical Orient
1960 Intel Orient
1960 Ops Spt
1960 Intro to Communism

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Mar 1957	Fisc Acct Clerk	0501.04	4	SF	Compt/Fiscal Div/Accts Br	Hq
Sep 1957	" "	0501.04	5	SF	" " " "	"
Feb 1958	Finance Asst	0510.14	5	SF	Compt/Fin Div/Comp&Tax Accts Br	"
Mar 1958	Time,Lv,Pay Clerk	0544.01	5	SF	" " " " " " "	"
Mar 1959	Finance Asst	0510.14	5	SF	" " " " " " "	"
Oct 1959	Fisc Acct Clerk	0501.04	5	SF	Compt/Finance Div/Accts Br	"
May 1960	Fisc Acct Asst	0501.03	5	SF	DDP/FE/Jap-TokyoSta/Spt Stf	Tokyo
Nov 1961	" " "	0501.03	6	SF	" " " " " "	"
Sep 1963	" " "	0501.03	7	SF	" " " " " "	"
Oct 1964	Finance Asst	0510.16	7	SF	DDS/Finance/CF Div/Comp&TaxAccts	Hq

20. DATE REVIEWED 23 [illegible]	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY [illegible]	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE No

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.
25798

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle): WILCOTT, James Barnard, Jr.

DATE OF BIRTH: Sep 1931

23.


WILCOTT, Jas.

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

27. DATE REVIEWED: 23 Nov 1964

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: mrd

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET jlk

PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 025798

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wilcott, James B., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sep 31	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-07	5. SD SF
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Acct Asst	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify): Resignation

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 26 Apr 65 - 15 Apr 66

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Lists, computes and verifies four cover companies commercial payrolls involving approximately 200 persons. Prepares and verifies all salary checks. An accounting machine is used for payrolling	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains both overt commercial and covert pay records, files, etc. for staff employees, staff agents, contract employees and agents. Maintains leave records for WAE contract employees and all staff personnel	W
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for timely payment of monthly tax deposits and preparation of the quarterly Federal Withholding and Social Security tax returns of the cover companies	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates dispatches and cables to Headquarters and Field Stations on all matters pertaining to pay, leave and payroll deductions of staff employees, staff agents and contract employees and agents	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	A

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 15 10 37 AM '66

During the period Subject was in charge of the Payroll Section at JMWAVE his performance was, in the rater's opinion, not more than adequate. He apparently was of the opinion that being in charge of a section relieved him of the onerous tasks of filing and other related duties of like nature. As far as meeting the payroll deadlines Subject was proficient ~~in this~~ duty, but he normally required considerable amount of overtime work to meet these deadlines. He had many ideas which he presented to Chief, Finance Branch for betterment of the payrolling system, but unfortunately after due consideration the majority of these ideas were found to be impractical and/or in violation of either good accepted commercial practice or Agency regulations. Suggestions made to him were outwardly accepted but upon follow-up it was determined that he had failed to implement these suggestions. Overall it is the rater's opinion that the Subject was barely adequate in performing his assigned tasks.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject departed the Station without seeing this Report.	
DATE 17 Jun 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Finance Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ H. Robert Graham

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject resigned and departed the Station rather suddenly and before there was an opportunity to observe his performance. The supervisor has made a careful evaluation with which I concur.

DATE 6 July 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief for Support	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ William A. Jewett

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 025798

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILCOTT, James B, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sep 1931	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-07	5. SD SP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Finance Assistant	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Fin/CFD/CSTAB	8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D. C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: ASAP

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 11 Oct. 1964 - 25 April 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analyzing Payroll Accounts	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reconciling Tax and Retirement Accounts	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Computing Staff and Career Agents' Pay and Allowances	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducting Liaison with our Division regarding Payroll matters.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Preparing Correspondence	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Maintaining Leave records and Agents' Pay Files	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

MAY 1965

FORM 45 4-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF [illegible]

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

In the six months that Mr. Wilcott was assigned to the Staff Agents Accounts Section, he demonstrated the ability to accept responsibilities and responded well to all work assignments. Mr. Wilcott was a great help in reconciling and analyzing Payroll, Tax, and Retirement accounts. He worked well with his associates and had a good disposition. Mr. Wilcott is very cooperative and dependable.

This employee did not have any supervisory responsibilities and, therefore, is not being rated on Cost Consciousness.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
30 April 1965	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
6	Employee had departed for PCS prior to this date.	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
30 April 1965	Chief, Staff Agents Accts. Sec.	JOSEPH H. [illegible]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
30 April 1965	Chief, Compensation and Tax Div.	[illegible] F. Strickland

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025793

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wilcott, James B. Jr	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sep 31	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-07	5. SD SF
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Acct Asst	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JMO		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		~~REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR~~
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 Aug 64

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July 1963 - 30 June 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - *Weak*	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - *Adequate*	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - *Proficient*	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - *Strong*	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - *Outstanding*	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As Station Cashier, responsible for the daily receipt and disbursement of cash (Japanese yen, U.S. dollars, MPC).	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consolidates all Station cash transactions to one voucher and verifies balance daily.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Summarizes all Station transactions for off-base housing and vehicle expenditures into monthly accountings and maintains appropriate subsidiary records.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Polices individual housing and vehicle advance accounts and audits related accountings.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains statistical records on private rentals by individual house and cost center.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Advises TDY travelers of their entitlements, audits the travel vouchers, and performs other related duties as assigned by the Finance Officer.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	[illegible]

15 JUL 1964

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(when filled in)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has performed his duties in a competent manner. Handling huge sums of money with few errors, and maintains the necessary statistical records.

Cost consciousness and management of organization assets does not apply to this position.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT		
DATE 9 Jun 64	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James Wilcott	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 23	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 9 Jun 64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Finance Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Frank Wells
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject has held the position of Finance Disbursing Officer since his arrival at Tokyo Station in May 1960. He has performed well in a function for which he had no previous experience or training. With a realignment of the office workload in December he was given the additional responsibility of processing TDY travel. Due to his specialized work, he has not had the opportunity to be trained in other facets of finance work. He has been scheduled for finance training upon his return to Headquarters in July 1964.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
7 Jun 64	Finance Officer	/s/ Jack Randall

SECRET

14-00000

FJTT 10,374, 31 May 63

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 025793

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILCOTT, JAMES B. JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sept 31	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-6	5. SD SF
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE FISCAL ACCT ASST	7. OFF/DIV OR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Jul 62 - 30 Jun 63

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As Station Cashier, responsible for the daily receipt and disbursement of cash (Japanese yen, U. S. dollars, MPC).	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consolidates all Station cash transactions to one voucher and verifies balance daily.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Summarizes all Station transactions for off-base housing and vehicle expenditures into monthly accountings and maintains appropriate subsidiary records.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Polices individual housing and vehicle advance accounts and audits related accountings.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains statistical records on all private rentals by individual house and cost center.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Performs other related duties as assigned by the Finance Officer.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

20 JUN [illegible]

FORM 4-63 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OCT 17 3 38 PM '63
MAIL ROOM

Subject is conscientious, industrious, and willing to accept all responsibility assigned him. He has performed his duties in a competent manner and has shown a marked interest in learning all facets of his job. Subject at times gives the impression (whether warranted or not) of being uncertain in his thinking, and he does not always seem to exercise his best judgment in reaching decisions, but he is striving to eradicate this impression.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
21 May 1963	/S/ James B. Wilcott

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
33		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 May 1963	Finance Officer	/S/ Clarence Norment III

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur in the evaluation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 May 1963	Adm Officer	/S/ Douglas S. Trabue

SECRET

or Career Service Board

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
035778

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILCOTT, James B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sept 31	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-6	5. SD SF
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Acct Asst.	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/Tokyo		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 Apr 61 - 30 June 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station cashier responsible for the day to day receipt and disbursement of cash.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consolidates all station cash transactions to one voucher and verifies balance daily.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Summarizes all station transactions for off-base housing and vehicle expenditures into monthly accountings and maintains appropriate subsidiary records.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Polices individual housing and vehicle advance accounts and audits related accountings.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains statistical records on all private rentals by individual house and cost center.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Performs other related duties as assigned by the Finance Officer.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject is conscientious, industrious, and willing to accept all responsibility given him. He has performed capably in a function for which he had no previous experience or training, and has shown a marked interest in learning all facets of his job. He has handled large sums of money with few errors, and maintains the necessary statistical records in a competent manner.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 19 July 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James B. Wilcott /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 25	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 17 July 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Finance Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Elwood Martin

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 17 July 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Finance Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Clarence F. Norment

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	52579?

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILCOTT, James B	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sept 1931	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-05
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SF	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Acct. Asst.		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Tokyo Station

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS					
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)			

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 27 May 60 To 31 Mar 61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station cashier responsible for the day to day receipt and disbursement of cash.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Polices individual housing and vehicle advance accounts and audits related accountings.	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consolidates all station cash transactions to one voucher and verifies balance daily.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains statistical records on all private rentals by individual house and cost center.	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Summarizes all station transactions for off-base housing and vehicle expenditures into monthly accountings and maintains appropriate subsidiary records.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Performs other related duties as assigned by the Finance Officer.	RATING NO. 4

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					X		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE	X						
WRITES EFFECTIVELY	X						
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is conscientious, industrious, and willing to accept all responsibility given him. He has performed capably in a function for which he had no previous experience or training, and has shown a marked interest in learning all facets of his job. He has handled large sums of money with few errors, and maintains the necessary statistical records in a competent manner.

MAIL RUSH

Subject should strive to develop more confidence in himself and in his ability to perform the duties assigned him. His lack of assurance and his naiveté are sometimes disconcerting to those with whom he deals.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
3 May 1961	James B. Wilcott (Signed)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
8	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 May 1961		Elwood Martin

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 May 1961		Clarence Torment

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible] [illegible] B. Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 September 1931	3. SEX M	4. GRADE [illegible]
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SF	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Accountant Clerk	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Compt/Finance/[illegible]	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

X	NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1960

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 MAR 59 To 31 MAR 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for numbering, removing attachments, batching and totaling confidential funds posting vouchers to be processed by Machine	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY ~~NO. 4~~ NO. 1 (continued) Records Division	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for verifying the daily expenditure listing totals with the expended general ledger accounts.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for matching the attachments to the vouchers and filing when vouchers are returned from Machine Records Division.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	X						
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY	X						
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS	X						
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-59 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject has accepted a field assignment effective in June.

The position to which subject has been assigned is very repetitious and not at all conducive to disclosing his full potential. However, by the way in which he adapted to Duty No. 2, it is felt that he will be able to perform more responsible duties with a minimum of additional training.

He has an extremely good attitude toward his work and responds well to supervision.

This report has been prepared in accordance with the criteria set forth in Comptroller Instruction No. 77 which are designed to reflect realistic and [illegible] ratings and fair comparisons between [illegible] and his fellow workers of [illegible] or responsibility. An [illegible] reflects an entirely satisf[illegible].

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 18 April 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	☐	REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE 18 April 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/Voucher Review Unit	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Louise H. Simpson Louise H. Simpson

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 4/19/60	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/Accounts Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE H. P. [illegible]

SECRET

REVIEWED BY:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 125798

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wilcott, Jr. James B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sept. 1931	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-5
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SP	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Time Leave Pay Clerk	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Compt/ Finance Division	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS					
X	NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT			
	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1959	11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 Apr 58 - To 31 Mar 59	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Fundamental of Payroll	RATING NO. 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducting liaison with Area division on payroll problems	RATING NO. 3
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of all payroll documents considering base and premium pay and allowances	RATING NO. 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Application of Agency pay regulations	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintaining of leave records	RATING NO. 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Processing of checks	RATING NO. 4

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 3

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					X		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 1-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Wilcott is a genial and cooperative person. He is well liked and gets along with people. He does get his work out in the required time but more stress should be put on accuracy. He is capable of more efficient work than he is doing at the present time. He does require strong supervision.

He does not abuse his leave privileges and as a whole, has a favorable attitude toward his work and the Agency.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE March 10, 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James B. Wilcott Jr.

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE March 10, 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Time, Leave, Pay Supv.	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ann C. Robbins

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE March 10, 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL A/C, Staff Employees Accts. Sect.	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Addie B. Lewi

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wilcott, James B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sept. 1921	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SP

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Comptroller - Fiscal Division	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fisc. Acct. Clerk

7. GRADE GS-5	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 4 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 4 March 1957 - 4 December 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)
☑	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 5 Dec. 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Ben H. Marion Ben H. Marion	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief, Accounting Br.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	[illegible]	[illegible]
Reviewed by P...	[illegible]	12/4/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 5 Dec. 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL R. M. Gronlund [illegible]	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Accounting Branch

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: Mr. Wilcott is very industrious and accepts his assignments without hesitat

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Records obligating instruments, supplements and adjustments relating to allotment accounting.	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assists in the closing and reopening of the allotment ledger accounts at close of each fiscal year.	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Prepares current analysis of allotment ledger accounts of unliquidated obligations.	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records liquidations or cancellations of obligations to individual allotment accounts.	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Checks and reconciles returns of expenditures with those in the allotment ledger accounting records.	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepares summaries required for reconciliations and duplicate allotment records (copies) for forwarding to the various allottees.	RATING NUMBER 4

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Wilcott is very anxious to prove his capabilities. Accordingly, he frequently assumes additional duties other than those assigned to him. He is very attentive to his work, is diligent in applying himself to the job, he is very quiet by nature and it is only on rare occasions that he indulges in conversation unrelated to his duties. He is attempting to become better acquainted with government accounting as has been evidenced by his enrollment in an accounting course with the Department of Agriculture School. He has made great progress in his assigned position in the Accounting Branch.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER [illegible]SITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

He is well suited for his pres[illegible]sition, but has expressed a desire for an opportunity to serve in an overse[illegible]signment, as this was a part of his ambition in seeking employment with the [illegible]. It is believed that he could readily adapt himself to other duties in the fi[illegible] accountancy.

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 19 April 1965

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH

ESTABLISHED FOR: WILCOTT, James B., Jr.

ATTN: Mr. Mullane

FILE NO.: K-9524

REF: Continuation of backstopping cover

ID CARD NO.: Returned

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element, Composite Operations Group

EMPLOYEE NO.:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ Block Records: *(OPMEMO 20-800-11)*

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______________.

b. Continuing, effective EOD.

☒ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category. *(HHB 20-7)*

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued. *(HB 20-661-1)*

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover. *(R 240-250)*

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility. *(R 240-250)*

THIS [illegible]

☒ Remarks: Subject is going on PCS out of D.C. area.

NA Cover History

James H. Franklin

XX CD/al IEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-OL/TELSVC, Copy 5-PSD/OS, Copy 6-File.

FORM 6-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 10 September 64

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

ESTABLISHED FOR: OFF FIN WILCOTT, James B. Jr.

ATTN: Ruby Johnson

FILE NO.: K-9524

REF: Form 1322 8 September 64 Requesting cover

ID CARD NO.:

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element Composite Operations Group

EMPLOYEE NO.:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ Block Records:
(OFMEMO 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______

b. Continuing, effective May 60

☒ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category.
(HHB 20-7)

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued.
(HB 20-681-1)

[illegible]

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover.
(R 240-250)

9/14/64

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility.
(R 240-250)

☐ Remarks:

☒ Cover History
Mar 57-May 60 Hdqs/overt
May 60-Jul 64 DAC & DAFC/Japan

James H. Franklin

ALR/al CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD. Copy 2-Operating Component. Copy 3-OS D/OS. Copy 4-OL/TSLSVC. Copy 5-PSD OS. Copy 6-File.

FORM 6-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

R.M. 17 MAY 66

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CEF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025798
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WILCOTT JAMES B JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION*
4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR): 04 15 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF
7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE: 6135 1164 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH/US FIELD
WH/C JMWAVE
DEP CHIEF OF STATION FOR OPS SUPPORT
FINANCE BRANCH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE: FISCAL ACCT ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1369
13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: SF

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0501.03
16 GRADE AND STEP: 07 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 6890

18. REMARKS
*STAFF EMPLOYEE SPECIAL

WILCOTT
259
SEPT 61

LOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

2 STATION CODE:
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 Hdqtrs Code:
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 09 27 31
26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):

T DATA CODE:
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1BD0043
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO.:
34 SEX:

COMP DATE (DA YR):
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP / CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE / 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES / HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

057866N

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

FJH. 21 DEC 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025798
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WILCOTT JAMES B JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPT* CAREER
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 11 DA. 21 YR. 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135 1134 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH U.S. FIELD
WH/C JMWAVE
DEP CHIEF OF STATION FOR OPS SUPPORT
FINANCE BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE
11. POSITION TITLE: FISCAL ACCT ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1369
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SF
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0501.03
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 6890
18. REMARKS: *STAFF EMPLOYEE - SPECIAL

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Reqmt. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
13	10	51550	WH	99999		2	09 27 31	09 15 63	09 13 64

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
		1					00000	M1

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
1	06 26 53	03 04 57	C	1		

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
1	6		0	0				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12-22-65-11

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

PJH: 21 DEC 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025798	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) [redacted] Wilcott, James B Jr		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 24 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ / CF TO CF ☒	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6135 1104 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH US FIELD WH/C JMWAVE DEP CHIEF OF STATION FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FINANCE BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION JMWAVE		
11. POSITION TITLE FISCAL ACCT ASST	12. POSITION NUMBER 1303	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION SF	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0501.03	16. GRADE AND STEP 07 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 6830
18. REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR [illegible] 4 31	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 6 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 1EDOO91	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

[illegible]

FORM 11 62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED N OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Walcott, James B	025798	51 550	CF	GS 07 4	$ 6,650	$ 6,890

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 09/27/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 029798	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Wilcott, James B [redacted]

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 05 DA 31 YR 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE 5135 1164 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION US FLD D CH STA OP SUP	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION JMWAVE

11 POSITION TITLE FISCAL ACCT ASST	12 POSITION NUMBER 1369	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION SF

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0501.03	16 GRADE AND STEP 07	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

POSTED
6-3-65 HT

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

J.D. ECHOLS

Form 1-63 1150a MFG 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLB: 27 APR 65

0A3

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025798
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] Wilcott, James B
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CAREER EXCEPTED APPT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. DA. YR. 04 25 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5135 1164 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SAS
U.S. FIELD
FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION-JMWAVE
DEPUTY FOR SUPPORT
FINANCE BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE
11. POSITION TITLE: FISCAL ACCT ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1080
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SF
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0501.03
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 6650
18. REMARKS: REPLACEMENT FOR EDNA C. JECENTHAL.

POSTED ON OF-4b
BK 28 APR 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUM. 49760 ALPHABETIC SAS
22. STATION CODE: 99999
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 2
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 09 DA 27 YR 31
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO 09 DA 15 YR 63
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 09 DA 13 YR 64
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE): CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE NO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO: 00000
34. SEX: M
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT): CODE 1
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO 06 DA 26 YR 53
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO 03 DA 04 YR 57
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RES., PROV, TEMP): CODE C
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES): CODE 1 HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)): CODE 1
42. LEAVE CAT CODE: 6
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE 0 NO TAX EXEMPTIONS 0
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
04/28/65 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET jgd

[illegible]

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLB: 27 APR 65

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025798	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WILCOTT JAMES B JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 24 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5277 0003 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY				

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS/OFFICE OF FINANCE CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS DIVISION COMPENSATION AND TAX ACCOUNTS BRANCH CONTRACT AGENTS ACCOUNTS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE FINANCE ASSISTANT	12. POSITION NUMBER 0470	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION SF

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0510.16	16. GRADE AND STEP 07 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 6650

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 09 27 31	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 15D0091	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JRJ 4/28/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLB: 9 OCT 64

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035798
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WILCOTT JAMES JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 10 DA 11 YR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5277 0003 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS OFFICE OF FINANCE
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS DIVISION
COMPENSATION & TAX ACCOUNTS BRANCH
CONTRACT AGENTS ACCOUNTS SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: FINANCE ASSISTANT
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0470
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SF
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0510.16
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 6650
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
16	10	13500	FIN	75013		1	09 27 31		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR:
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT.):
36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR:
37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR:
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 WAIVER, 1 YES) HEALTH INS CODE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)):
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS:
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: FE
B

POSTED
9 Oct 64
JDS

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 79a

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81)

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WILCOTT JAMES B JR	025798	45 380	CF	GS 07 3	$ 5,910	$ 6,185

//

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
025798	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	45 380 CF 11F	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 07	3	$ ~~6,185~~ 6450	09/15/63	GS 07	4	$ ~~6,380~~ 6550	09/13/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP 04
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 742
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY
○ ○ 8B

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE DATE 1/1/64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 961 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLS: 13 SEPT 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025798	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WILCOTT JAMES B JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 15 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4137 7351 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD FE/JKO-TOKYO STATION SUPPORT STAFF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE FISCAL ACCT ASST	12. POSITION NUMBER 3167	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION SF

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0501.03	16. GRADE AND STEP 07 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 5910

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	45380	FE	37587		3	09 27 31	09 15 63	09 15 63

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAN RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

POSTED
09/25/63 DK

FORM 1 62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

19 SEP 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1962, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
WILCOTT JAMES B JR	025798	56380	CF	06 4	$ 5325	06 4	$ 5545

ARE:9 NOV 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025798	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WILCOTT JAMES B JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 11 12 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V. TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	2137 7351 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION SUPPORT STAFF TOKYO	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE FISCAL ACCT ASST	12. POSITION NUMBER 3167	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION SF

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0501.03	16. GRADE AND STEP 06 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 5325

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 56380	ALPHABETIC FE	22. STATION CODE 37587	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 09 27 31	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR. 11 12 61

27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR. 11 12 61

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA. YR	EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SF	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	525798	51 71	GS-05 3	$ 4,340	$ 4,675

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5.
525798	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	DDP/FE /f	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR				MO	DA	YR.
GS 05	3	$ 4,675	09	20	59	GS 05	4	$ 4,840	09	18	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

9-20-60

WK

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-58 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
25798	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	DDP/FE 14 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last LII Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 05	4	$ 4,840	09/18/60	05	5	$ 5,005	09/17/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E. D. ECHOLS JK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-61)

SECRET

(When Filled In)

AES: 6 MAY 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth	4. Vet. Pref.	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD
525798	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	Mo. 09 Da. 27 Yr. 31	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	M 1	Mo. 03 Da. 04 Yr. 57

7. SCD	8. CSC Retmt.	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav.	11. FEGLI	12. LCD	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD
Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 53	Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	50 USCA 403 J	Mo. Da. Yr.	Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	Mo. 03 Da. 04 Yr. 57	Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER FINANCE DIV, ACCOUNTS BR ACCOUNTING CONTROL SEC ACCTS RECEIVABLE AND PAYABLE UNIT	3803	WASH., D.C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 2	FISCAL ACCT CLK	0506	GS	0501.04

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
05 3	$ 4340	SF	Mo. 09 Da. 22 Yr. 57	Mo. 09 Da. 18 Yr. 60	0263 1040

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT & TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS*	06	Mo. 05 Da. 15 Yr. 60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO - TOKYO STATION SUPPORT STAFF - TOKYO	5171	TOKYO, JAPAN	37587

33. Dept. - Field	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 5	FISCAL ACCT ASST	3167	GS	0501.03

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
05 3	$ 4340	SF	Mo. 09 Da. 23 Yr. 57	Mo. 09 Da. 18 Yr. 60	0137 7351 3000

44. Remarks

*SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

POSTED

07-16-60 JK

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 2 OCT 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
125798	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	09	27	31		1	M 1	03	04	57	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Yes-1 No-2 Code
06	26	53		1	50 USCA 403 J						03	04	57	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER FINANCE DIVISION COMPENSATION AND TAX ACCTS BR CONTRACT AGENTS ACCTS SECT.	3803	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	FINANCE ASST	0470	GS	0510.14

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
05 3	$ 4340	SF	09	22	57	09	20	59	9 6300 20 004

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	10	04	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER FINANCE DIV, ACCOUNTS BR ACCOUNTING CONTROL SEC ACCTS RECEIVABLE AND PAYABLE UNIT	3803	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	FISCAL ACCT CLK	0506	GS	0501.04

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
05 3	$ 4340	SF	09	22	57	09	10	60	0263 1040

44. Remarks

POSTED
fa 10-6-59

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
125798	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	DDS/COMPT //	V-20	263.46

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA.	YR
GS 5	2	$ 4,190	09	21	58	GS 5	3	$ 4,340	09	20	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

SEP 14 4 17 PM '59
REC. PAYROLL BRANCH

G.M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 25 MAR 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
125798	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	09	27	31		1	M 1	03	04	57

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit Yes-1 No-2	Code
06	26	53		1	50 USCA 403 J						03	04	57		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER FINANCE DIV COMPENSATION & TAX ACCTS BR STAFF EMPLOYEES ACCTS SECTION	3803	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv	20. Occup Series
	2	TIME LV PAY CLK.	0305.02	GS	0544.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
05 2	$ 4190	SF	09	22	57	09	21	58	8 6304 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	03	25	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER FINANCE DIVISION COMPENSATION AND TAX ACCTS BR CONTRACT AGENTS ACCTS SECT.	3803	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	FINANCE ASST	0470	GS	0510.14

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
05 2	$ 4190	SF	09	22	57	09	20	59	9 6300 20 004

44. Remarks

POSTED
27 MAR

```
                         SECRET

   [illegible] SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE
   [illegible] JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND [illegible]
   EFFECTIVE SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

 NAME               SERIAL    GRADE-STEP    OLD SALARY    NEW SALARY

WILCOTT JAMES B JR    125798    GS-05-1       $ 3,670       $ 4,040
                                            GORDON M. STEWART
                                       /S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

                         SECRET
```

```
 IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 THIS NOTIFICATION EFFECTS RESLOTTING RESULTING
                          FROM R-20-250

 SER #          NAME            SD   OLD SLOT   NEW SLOT       DATE

125798  WILCOTT JAMES B JR   SF   0305.02       305        01/12/59
```

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
125798	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	DDS/COMPT	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO.	DA	YR.
GS 5	1	$ 4,040	09	22	57	GS 5	2	$ 4,190	09	21	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
H. A. CHANDIER	13 August 1958	

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

30202

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM28 APRIL 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
125798	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	09	27	31		1	M	1	03	04	57		

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13 Mil. Serv. Credit Ltd. Yes-1 No-2	Code
06	26	53		1	50 USCA 403 J						03	04	57		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER FINANCE DIVISION COMPENSATION AND TAX ACCTS BR CONTRACT AGENTS ACCTS SECTION	3803	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	FINANCE ASST	0521.03	GS	0510.14

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
05 1	$ 3670	SF	09	22	57	09	21	58	8 6304 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	04	21	58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER FINANCE DIV COMPENSATION & TAX ACCTS BR STAFF EMPLOYEES ACCTS SECTION	3803	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34 Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	TIME LV PAY CLK	0305.02	GS	0544.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
05 1	$ 3670	SF	09	22	57	09	21	58	8 6304 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
5/1/58

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

[illegible]

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 21 FEB 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
125798	WILCOTT JAMES B JR	09	27	31		1	M 1	03	04	57

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Yes-1 No-2	Code
06	26	53		1	50 USCA 403 J						03	04	57		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER FISCAL DIVISION ACCOUNTS BRANCH ALLOTMENT LEDGER SECTION	3802	WASH, D. C.	75013

16. Dept - Field Dept.-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	FISCAL ACCT CLK	30.01	GS	0501.04

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
05 1	$ 3670	SF	09	22	57	09	21	58	8 6303 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	02	23	58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER FINANCE DIVISION COMPENSATION AND TAX ACCTS BR CONTRACT AGENTS ACCTS SECTION	3803	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	FINANCE ASST	0521.03	GS	0510.14

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
05 1	$ 3670	SF	09	22	57	09	21	58	8 6304 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
9u
4 MAR 1958

X7 3Mar59

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.: 1257 [illegible]
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): WILCOTT, JAMES [illegible] JR
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. [illegible] Da. [illegible] Yr. [illegible]
4. Vet Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M 1
6. CS-EOD: Mo. 03 Da. 04 Yr. 57
7. SCD: Mo. 05 Da. 2[illegible] Yr. [illegible]
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA 403 J
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code
12. LCD: Mo. 03 Da. 04 Yr. 57
13. [illegible] (Yes-1, No-2): Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations: DDS OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER / FISCAL DIVISION / ACCOUNTS BRANCH / ALLOTMENT LEDGER SECTION
Code:
15. Location Of Official Station: WASH. D. C.
Station Code:
16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6): Code 2
17. Position Title: FISCAL ACCT CLK
18. Position No.: 30.01
19. Serv: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0501.04
21. Grade & Step: 04 1
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 3415
23. SD: SF
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. Da. Yr.
25. PSI Due: Mo. Da. Yr.
26. Appropriation Number: 8-202-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: PROMOTION
Code: 20
28. Eff. Date: Mo. 0[illegible] Da. 22 Yr. 57
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR
Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations: DDS OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER / FISCAL DIVISION / ACCOUNTS BRANCH / ALLOTMENT LEDGER SECTION
Code: 2502
32. Location Of Official Station: WASH. D. C.
Station Code: 75013
33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6): Code 2
34. Position Title: FISCAL ACCT CLK
35. Position No.: 30.01
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 0501.04
38. Grade & Step: 05 1
39. Salary Or Rate: $ [illegible]
40. SD: SF
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. 0[illegible] Da. 2[illegible] Yr. 57
42. PSI Due: Mo. [illegible] Da. 21 Yr. 5[illegible]
43. Appropriation Number: [illegible] 202 20
44. Remarks:

30 SEP
JW

FORM NO. 1150
MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

F.C. 9 Nov 56
0-5481 mjw

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. JAMES B. WILCOTT, JR. 125798
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 27 Sep 1931
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 4 Mar 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Excepted Appointment 13
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 4 Mar 1957
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Fiscal Acct Clerk 3-30.01-4
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0501.04-4 $3415.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 380273	DDS/Office of Comptroller Fiscal Division Accounts Branch Allotment Ledger Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD/SP

1

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION FROM / TO: W 7-6303-20 750-13
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 4 Mar 1957
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

20. REMARKS:

Subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.
Subject to the satisfactory completion of a medical examination.
RC-135

DOG 03/04/57
CSEOD 03/04/57
LCD 03/04/57
SCD 06/26/53

2 EOD 03/04/57

PSI due 03/03/58

POSTED
6 MAR 1957

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Director of Personnel

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956 - 380509

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

773 3/4/57

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025798

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wilcott, James B., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sep 31	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-07	5. SD SF
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Acct Asst	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify): Resignation

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
26 Apr 65 - 15 Apr 66

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Lists, computes and verifies four cover companies commercial payrolls involving approximately 200 persons. Prepares and verifies all salary checks. An accounting machine is used for payrolling	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains both overt commercial and covert pay records, files, etc. for staff employees, staff agents, contract employees and agents. Maintains leave records for WAE contract employees and all staff personnel	W
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for timely payment of monthly tax deposits and preparation of the quarterly Federal Withholding and Social Security tax returns of the cover companies	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates dispatches and cables to Headquarters and Field Stations on all matters pertaining to pay, leave and payroll deductions of staff employees, staff agents and contract employees and agents	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	A

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 15 10 37 AM '66
MAIL ROOM

During the period Subject was in charge of the Payroll Section at JMWAVE his performance was, in the rater's opinion, not more than adequate. He apparently was of the opinion that being in charge of a section relieved him of the onerous tasks of filing and other related duties of like nature. As far as meeting the payroll deadlines Subject was proficient in this duty, but he normally required considerable amount of overtime work to meet these deadlines. He had many ideas which he presented to Chief, Finance Branch for betterment of the payrolling system, but unfortunately after due consideration the majority of these ideas were found to be impractical and/or in violation of either good accepted commercial practice or Agency regulations. Suggestions made to him were outwardly accepted but upon follow-up it was determined that he had failed to implement these suggestions. Overall it is the rater's opinion that the Subject was barely adequate in performing his assigned tasks.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
12 months	Subject departed the Station without seeing this Report.	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 Jun 1966	Chief, Finance Branch	/s/ H. Robert Graham

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject resigned and departed the Station rather suddenly and before there was an opportunity to observe his performance. The supervisor has made a careful evaluation with which I concur.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
6 July 1966	Deputy Chief for Support	/s/ William A. Jewett

SECRET

REVIEWED BY:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025798

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILCOTT, James B, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sep 1931	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-07	5. SD SF
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Finance Assistant	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Fin/CFD/C&TAB		8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
ASAP

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
11 Oct. 1964 - 25 April 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analyzing Payroll Accounts	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reconciling Tax and Retirement Accounts	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Computing Staff and Career Agents' Pay and Allowances	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducting Liaison with our Division regarding Payroll matters.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Preparing Correspondence	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Maintaining Leave records and Agents' Pay Files	RATING LETTER P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

5 MAY 1965

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

In the six months that Mr. Wilcott was assigned to the Staff Agents Accounts Section, he demonstrated the ability to accept responsibilities and responded well to all work assignments. Mr. Wilcott was a great help in reconciling and analyzing Payroll, Tax, and Retirement accounts. He worked well with his associates and had a good disposition. Mr. Wilcott is very cooperative and dependable.

This employee did not have any supervisory responsibilities and, therefore, is not being rated on Cost Consciousness.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 30 April 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Employee had departed for PCS prior to this date.	
DATE 30 April 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Staff Agents Accts. Sec.	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Hudson JOSEPH H. HUDSON

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur.

DATE 30 April 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Compensation and Tax Div.	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Murray F. Strickland Murray F. Strickland

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025798

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wilcott, James B. Jr		2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sep 31	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-07	5. SD SF
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Acct Asst		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
X	CAREER	☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY		INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		X	ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):	
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 Aug 64			12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 July 1963 - 30 June 1964		

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As Station Cashier, responsible for the daily receipt and disbursement of cash (Japanese yen, U.S. dollars, MPC).	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consolidates all Station cash transactions to one voucher and verifies balance daily.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Summarizes all Station transactions for off-base housing and vehicle expenditures into monthly accountings and maintains appropriate subsidiary records.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Polices individual housing and vehicle advance accounts and audits related accountings.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains statistical records on private rentals by individual house and cost center.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Advises TDY travelers of their entitlements, audits the travel vouchers, and performs other related duties as assigned by the Finance Officer.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

15 JUL 1964

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 9 9 44 AM 64
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has performed his duties in a competent manner. Handling huge sums of money with few errors, and maintains the necessary statistical records.

Cost consciousness and management of organization assets does not apply to this position.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 Jun 64	/s/ James Wilcott

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
23	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 Jun 64	Finance Officer	/s/ Frank Wells

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject has held the position of Finance Disbursing Officer since his arrival at Tokyo Station in May 1960. He has performed well in a function for which he had no previous experience or training. With a realignment of the office workload in December he was given the additional responsibility of processing TDY travel. Due to his specialized work, he has not had the opportunity to be trained in other facets of finance work. He has been scheduled for Finance training upon his return to Headquarters in July 1964.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
7 Jun 64	Finance Officer	/s/ Jack Randall

14-00000

FJTT 10,374, 31 May 63

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025798

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILCOTT, JAMES B. JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sept 31	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-6	5. SD SF
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE FISCAL ACCT ASST	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO	8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)					X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 Jul 62 - 30 Jun 63

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As Station Cashier, responsible for the daily receipt and disbursement of cash (Japanese yen, U. S. dollars, MPC).	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consolidates all Station cash transactions to one voucher and verifies balance daily.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Summarizes all Station transactions for off-base housing and vehicle expenditures into monthly accountings and maintains appropriate subsidiary records.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Polices individual housing and vehicle advance accounts and audits related accountings.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains statistical records on all private rentals by individual house and cost center.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Performs other related duties as assigned by the Finance Officer.	RATING LETTER P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

20 JUN 1963

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUN 17 3 38 PM '63
MAIL ROOM

Subject is conscientious, industrious, and willing to accept all responsibility assigned him. He has performed his duties in a competent manner and has shown a marked interest in learning all facets of his job. Subject at times gives the impression (whether warranted or not) of being uncertain in his thinking, and he does not always seem to exercise his best judgment in reaching decisions, but he is striving to eradicate this impression.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 21 May 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ James B. Wilcott	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 33	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 21 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Finance Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Clarence Norment III
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Concur in the evaluation.		
DATE 21 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Adm Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Douglas S. Trabue

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEWED BY:
of Career Service Board

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025778

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILCOTT, James B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sept 31	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-6	5. SD SF
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Acct Asst.	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/Tokyo		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)					X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 Apr 61 - 30 June 62

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station cashier responsible for the day to day receipt and disbursement of cash.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consolidates all station cash transactions to one voucher and verifies balance daily.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Summarizes all station transactions for off-base housing and vehicle expenditures into monthly accountings and maintains appropriate subsidiary records.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Polices individual housing and vehicle advance accounts and audits related accountings.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains statistical records on all private rentals by individual house and cost center.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Performs other related duties as assigned by the Finance Officer.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

05 PM '62

Subject is conscientious, industrious, and willing to accept all responsibility given him. He has performed capably in a function for which he had no previous experience or training, and has shown a marked interest in learning all facets of his job. He has handled large sums of money with few errors, and maintains the necessary statistical records in a competent manner.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 19 July 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James B. Wilcott /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 25	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 17 July 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Finance Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Elwood Martin

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 17 July 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Finance Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Clarence F. Norment

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	525798

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILCOTT, James B	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sept 1931	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-05
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SF	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Acct. Asst.		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Tokyo Station

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. x 31 May 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 27 May 60 To 31 Mar 61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station cashier responsible for the day to day receipt and disbursement of cash.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Polices individual housing and vehicle advance accounts and audits related accountings.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Consolidates all station cash transactions to one voucher and verifies balance daily.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains statistical records on all private rentals by individual house and cost center.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Summarizes all station transactions for off-base housing and vehicle expenditures into monthly accountings and maintains appropriate subsidiary records.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Performs other related duties as assigned by the Finance Officer.	4

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					X		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE	X						
WRITES EFFECTIVELY	X						
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is conscientious, industrious, and willing to accept all responsibility given him. He has performed capably in a function for which he had no previous experience or training, and has shown a marked interest in learning all facets of his job. He has handled large sums of money with few errors, and maintains the necessary statistical records in a competent manner.

JUN 26 11 20 AM '61
MAIL ROOM

Subject should strive to develop more confidence in himself and in his ability to perform the duties assigned him. His lack of assurance and his naiveté are sometimes disconcerting to those with whom he deals.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 3 May 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James B. Wilcott (oSigned)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 3 May 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Elwood Martin

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 3 May 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Clarence Norment

SECRET

REVIEWED BY:
SF CAREER SERVICE BOARD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wilcott, James B. Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 September 1931	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 5-3
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SF	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Accountant Clerk		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Compt/Finance/Accts

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

X	NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1960	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 1 APR 59 - 31 MAR 60	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for numbering, removing attachments, batching and totaling confidential funds posting vouchers to be processed by Machine	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY ~~NO. 4~~ No. 1 (continued) Records Division	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for verifying the daily expenditure listing totals with the expended general ledger accounts.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for matching the attachments to the vouchers and filing when vouchers are returned from Machine Records Division.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	X						
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY	X						
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS	X						
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject has accepted a field assignment effective in June.

The position to which subject has been assigned is very repetitious and not at all conducive to disclosing his full potential. However, by the way in which he adapted to Duty No. 2, it is felt that he will be able to perform more responsible duties with a minimum of additional training.

He has an extremely good attitude toward his work and responds well to supervision.

Apr 21 12 60

This report has been prepared in accordance with the criteria set forth in Comptroller Instruction No. 77 which are designed to reflect realistic and meaningful ratings and fair comparisons between [illegible] and his fellow workers of equal [illegible] or responsibility. An "average" rating reflects an entirely satisf[illegible]

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 18 April 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James E. Willett Jr

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE 18 April 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/Voucher Review Unit	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Louise H. Simpson Louise H. Simpson

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 4/18/60	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/Accounts Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE M. P. Strickland

SECRET

REVIEWED BY:

RW

OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD

8/1/59

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
125798

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wilcott, Jr. James B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sept. 1931	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-5
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SP	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Time Leave Pay Clerk	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Compt/ Finance Division	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

X	NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
1 Apr 58 - 31 Mar 59

SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Fundamental of Payroll	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducting liaison with Area divisions on payroll problems	3
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of all payroll documents considering base and premium pay and allowances	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Application of Agency pay regulations	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintaining of leave records	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Processing of checks	4

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - *performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents.* Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
3

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					X		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAR 16 2 19 PM '59
MAIL ROOM

Mr. Wilcott is a genial and cooperative [illegible] liked and gets along with people. He does get his work out in the required time but more stress should be put on accuracy. He is capable of more efficient work than he is doing at the present time. He does req[illegible]ng supervision.

He does not abuse his leave privileges and as a whole, has a favorable attitude toward his work and the Agency.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE March 10, 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James B. Wilcott Jr. James B. Wilcott Jr

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 3	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION [redacted]

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE March 10, 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Time, Leave, Pay Supv.	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ann C. Robbins Robbins

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE March [illegible], 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL A/C, Staff Employees Accts. Sect.	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Addie B. Lewis Addie B. Lewis

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) - PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wilcott, James B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sept. 1931	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SP
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Comptroller - Fiscal Division	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Fiscal Acct. Clerk		
7. GRADE GS-5	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 4 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 4 March 1957 - 4 December 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☒ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 5 Dec. 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Ben H. Marion Ben H Marion	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief, Accounting Br.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	LJH	10 Jan 58
Reviewed by PCD	WND	12/11/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 5 Dec. 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL R. W. Grandstaff R W Grandstaff	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Accounting Branch

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: Mr. Wilcott is very industrious and accepts his assignments without hesitation.

FORM NO. 1 NOV 55 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE ... DEC 6 4 27 PM '57 MAIL R...

DIRECTIONS:
- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

	RATING NUMBER		RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Records obligating instruments, supplements and adjustments relating to allotment accounting.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assists in the closing and reopening of the allotment ledger accounts at close of each fiscal year.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Prepares current analysis of allotment ledger accounts of unliquidated obligations.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records liquidations and cancellations of obligations to individual allotment accounts.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Checks and reconciles IBM runs of expenditures with those in the allotment ledger accounting records.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepares summaries required for reconciliations and duplicate allotment records (copies) for forwarding to the various allottees.	4

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Wilcott is very anxious to prove his capabilities. Accordingly, he frequently assumes additional duties other than those assigned to him. He is very attentive to his work, is diligent in applying himself to the job, he is very quiet by nature and it is only on rare occasions that he indulges in conversation unrelated to his duties. He is attempting to become better aquainted with government accounting as has been evidenced by his enrollment in an accounting course with the Department of Agriculture School. He has made great progress in his assigned position in the Accounting Branch.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

He is well suited for his present position, but has expressed a desire for an opportunity to serve in an overseas assignment, as this was a part of his ambition in seeking employment with the Agency. It is believed that he could readily adapt himself to other duties in the field of accountancy.

SECRET

Standard Form No. 2810 FPM Supplement 890-1 MAY 1964	FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRA **NOTICE OF CHANGE IN HEALTH BENEFITS ENROLLMENT**	GAO 3000 2810-104

Part A —IDENTIFYING DATA

1 NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL) Wilcott, James E., Jr.	2 DATE OF BIRTH 9/27/31	3 CARRIER CONTRACT NO. 078128
4 ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) 16620 S.W. 102 Avenue	5 PAYROLL OFFICE NO. 11239901	6 ENROLLMENT CODE NO. 425
(CITY) (STATE) (ZIP CODE) Perrine, Florida	7 DATE THIS ACTION BECOMES EFFECTIVE 23 April 1966	

ONLY THE ITEM WHICH IS CHECKED BELOW AFFECTS YOUR ENROLLMENT. READ THAT ITEM CAREFULLY AND FOLLOW ANY PERTINENT INSTRUCTIONS. KEEP THIS FORM UNLESS YOUR ENROLLMENT IS TERMINATED AND YOU APPLY FOR CONVERSION.

[illegible]

Part B.—TERMINATION

☒ YOUR ENROLLMENT TERMINATES ON THE DATE IN PART A, ITEM 7, ABOVE

Part C.—CHANGE IN PLAN

☐ YOUR ENROLLMENT SHOWN IN PART A, ITEM 6, ABOVE HAS BEEN TERMINATED BECAUSE OF YOUR ENROLLMENT IN ANOTHER PLAN

Part D.—TRANSFER OUT

☐ YOUR ENROLLMENT CONTINUES BUT IS TRANSFERRED TO YOUR NEW PAYROLL OFFICE (OR RETIREMENT SYSTEM)

Part E.—TRANSFER IN

YOUR NEW PAYROLL OFFICE (OR RETIREMENT SYSTEM) SHOWN IN PART K BELOW HAS ACCEPTED TRANSFER OF YOUR ENROLLMENT AND WILL CONTINUE IT ☐

Part F.—SUSPENSION

☐ YOUR ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN SUSPENDED, EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE IN PART A, ITEM 7, ABOVE

Part G.—REINSTATEMENT

YOUR ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN REINSTATED, EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE IN PART A, ITEM 7, ABOVE. ☐

Part H.—CHANGE IN NAME OF ENROLLEE

THE NAME IN WHICH THIS ENROLLMENT IS CARRIED HAS BEEN CHANGED TO. ☐

NAME ADDRESS IF DIFFERENT FROM PART A, ITEM 4, ABOVE DATE OF BIRTH

Part I.—CHANGE IN ENROLLMENT—SURVIVOR ANNUITANT

YOUR ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN CHANGED FROM FAMILY COVERAGE TO SELF ONLY. YOUR PLAN WILL SEND YOU A NEW IDENTIFICATION CARD ☐

YOUR NEW ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER

(NOTE. THIS ITEM TO BE COMPLETED BY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS ONLY)

Part J.—REMARKS

[illegible]

Part K.—DATE OF NOTICE

HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER
(ALTERNATE)

Central Intelligence Agency
NAME OF AGENCY

Washington 25, D. C.
ADDRESS

5/20/66
DATE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1964 [illegible] **QUADRUPLICATE—To Employing Office**

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Use HR 20-33 and HR 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "N.A." when items are not applicable. Forward original and two copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: Robert D. CASH JR

DIVISION: DDP/WH

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 6576

DATE: 26 April 1965

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
[redacted]
Wilcott, James B

2A. PROJECT: WH/Cuba

2B. PERMANENT STATION: [illegible]

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 5135-1104

3A. FUNDS ☐ V ☒ UV

4. SLOT NO.: 1030

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: None

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Staff Employee converting to Staff Agent

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Top Secret

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE ☒ OBTAINED ☐ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Staff Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 33

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): ~~XX~~ September 27, 1931

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Cold Brook, N. Y.

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Forest~~vi~~ville, Md.

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate) ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:

Wife	30
Son	6

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: N.A.

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U. S. Army

24. RANK OR GRADE: Corporal

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: GS-07(4)

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: N.A.

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): The gross cover compensation will be approximately the equivalent of Subject's net Agency salary. The exact amount to be determined at Finance briefing.

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER	CIA
YES	X	X
NO		

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: None

32. POST: None

33. OTHER: None

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☒ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED: X YES X NO (Temp)

37A. HHE TO BE STORED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED: ☐ YES X NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL: ☐ YES X NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife	U.S.A.	30	9 Sept. 1934
Son	U.S.A.	6	16 Feb. 1959

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES N.A.

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION

43. ENTERTAINMENT

44. OTHER

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED) NOTE: *SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.*	CASE OFFICER Robert D. CASHLAN	DIVISION DDP/WH
	TELEPHONE EXTENSION 6576	DATE 26 April 1965

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See HR 20-44, HR 20-41, HR 20-7, HR 20-53, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)*

Entitled to all benefits of a Staff Employee

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)*: ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE *(Check)*: ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)*
☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS MONTHS YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE

53. RENEWABLE ☐ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(CI, FI, PP, other)*
Support - Finance

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Fiscal Accounting Assistant

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

EOD CIA as Staff Employee 4 March 1957

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*
☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☒ COLLEGE *(No degree)* ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
German			x			x			x
Japanese			x			x			x

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Okinawa, Japan

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Dec. 1948 - March 1957 - U. S. Army

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

Social Security No. 103-24-6095

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER 1-5 F.P.M.
6 GAO 5000

ALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FC 1

6784

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read Instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ballpoint pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO
078128

PART A ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): Wilcott James B., Jr.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers): MONTH 9 DAY 27 YEAR 31

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE) ☐

5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by an enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☐ NO ☒

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1
$4,000 TO $5,999 ☒ 2
$6,000 TO $9,999 ☐ 3
$10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN: Association Benefit
OPTION (HIGH OR LOW): Low
ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER: 1 4 5

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception: List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband Elsie Louise	9 9 31	1			6
Steven James (son)	2 16 59	2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3.

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐
2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐
3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
   - (a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
   - (b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
   - (c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan.
2. Number of event which permits change. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)
3. Date of event which permits change: MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART

(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 1/4/
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 7/1/60
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.

4-17-64

585778

Triplicate—to Employing Office

APRIL 1960

11367

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED MARCH 1956
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A6

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, JAMES BERNARD WILCOTT, JR., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

4 March 1957 (Date of entrance on duty)

James B. Wilcott Jr. (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 4th day of March A. D. 19 57,

at Washington, (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer) 5 CS: 15 & 16

Appointment Clerk (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—68160-6

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)
1436 21st Street N.W. Washington, D.C.

2. (1) DATE OF BIRTH: 9/07/31
(2) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city and State or city and foreign country*): Cleveland, Ohio

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, PLEASE NOTIFY: Mrs Geraldine Misher
(B) RELATIONSHIP: Sister
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 1510 Brinkerhoff Ave Utica, N.Y.
(D) TELEPHONE NO.:

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blank below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, CHARGED OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $30 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 12 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		X
9. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN BARRED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 12*		X

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10. (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		X
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		
11. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT: A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE:		
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT:		
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.*		X

12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER.—You must determine that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, any record of recent discharge or arrest, age, citizenship, and members of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should particularly check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and/or other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—58160-5

12 March 1959

To: Personnel Division
From: James B. Wilcott, Jr.
Subject: Supplements to personnel records

Please add to my personnel records the attached information concerning my education and recently born child.

When I submitted my Personnel History Statement with my application for employment I was still attending business school. Therefore, my final transcript and graduation certificate were not included.

The attached auto-stat copies are attached as instructed by Personnel Division.

Also attached is a copy of my grade report for the 1st and 2nd semesters at the U. S. Department of Agriculture Graduate school for Elementary Federal Government Accounting.

James B Wilcott Jr.
JAMES B WILCOTT JR

Central City Business Institute

Syracuse New York

Be it Known That

James B. Wilcott

has completed the curriculum prescribed by the Faculty and Board of Directors of this Institute and after examinations in all the required subjects is therefore adjudged worthy of Graduation from the Course of

Executive Business Administration and Accountancy

and is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and honors of the Institute, by which these presents are conferred.

In Testimony Whereof, witness the seal of the Institute and the signatures of its officers are affixed at Syracuse, New York.

February 22, 1957

[illegible]

[illegible]

Attitude toward Work Good

Attitude toward Others Good

Personal Appearance Good

Attendance Average I.Q.

Subject	Grade	Class Sessions per Week	Credit Hours
[illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	6	6
[illegible]	B	3	3
[illegible]	B+	3	3
[illegible]	A	3	3
[illegible]	A	3	3
[illegible] Geog.	C-	3	3
[illegible]	B-	5	3
[illegible]			
[illegible]	A-	5	3
[illegible]	B	5	3
[illegible]	C	2	2
[illegible]			
[illegible]			
[illegible] Contracts	C	2½	1½
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1½
[illegible]	B		
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]			
[illegible]	B	2½	B
[illegible] I	B	1½	1½
[illegible] II	C	1½	1½
[illegible]			
[illegible] I	B-	5	3
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]			
[illegible]			

Subject	Grade	Class Sessions per Week	Credit Hours
FINANCE:			
Advertising	C	2½	1½
Bus. Organization	A-		1½
Budgeting	A-	-	1
Corp. Finance I	A-	-	1½
Corp. Finance II	A-	-	1½
Credit & Collections	A	-	1½
Economics I	B	-	1½
Economics II			
Insurance	A	-	1½
Investments	A	-	1½
Marketing	C+	-	1½
Money & Banking	A-	-	1½
[illegible]	A-	-	1½
[illegible]	A-	-	[illegible]
Statistics			
CLERICAL SKILLS:			
Filing	A	5	3
Office Machines	A		
[illegible]	—		
Shorthand Theory	—		
Shorthand Speed	—		
Typing Theory	B	5	3
Typing Speed	[illegible] wpm	—	—
MEDICAL STUDIES:			
Anatomy			
First Aid			
Office Procedures			
Med. Terminology			
Personality Development			

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Eisenschlag and Gorena Documents [illegible]

JAMES B. W[illegible]

[illegible]

B

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE (*First*) (*Middle*) (*Nee*) (*Last*)

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE

6. DATE OF BIRTH

7. PLACE OF BIRTH

8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH

9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Last residence, if deceased*)

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
STEVEN JAMES WILCOTT	X		1959	Washington, D. C.	U.S. citizen

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (*Identify child and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XI — FATHER

1. FULL NAME

2. YEAR OF BIRTH

3. PLACE OF BIRTH

4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH

5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

6. OCCUPATION

7. PRESENT RESIDENCE

SECTION XII — MOTHER

1. FULL NAME

2. YEAR OF BIRTH

3. PLACE OF BIRTH

4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH

5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

6. OCCUPATION

7. PRESENT RESIDENCE

SECTION II	CITIZENSHIP
1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP	2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1.)*

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 3.)*

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

SECTION III	OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA	
1. PRESENT OCCUPATION	2. TITLE	3. SALARY *(Per annum)*

4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
US Dept. of Agriculture Graduate School Wash D. C.	Elementary Federal Gov. Accounting 1st semester	Sept 1957	Feb 1958	Grade - B
US Dept. of Agriculture Graduate School Wash D. C.	Elementary Federal Gov. Accounting 2nd semester	Feb 1958	May 1958	Grade - A

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete *__Sections I through VI in their entirety__*. *You need complete* *__Sections VII__* *through* *__XII__* *__only__* *if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.*

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*)
Wilcott, James Bernard Jr.

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State*)
Governor Shephard Apts Apt 103
2121 Virginia Ave NW Washington, 7 D.C.

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State*)
same

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
NA-8-3771 Ex 103

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
Washington, D.C.

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (*Last-First-Middle*) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
Mrs. Elsie L. Wilcott

2. RELATIONSHIP
Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*)
2121 Virginia Ave NW Washington 7, D.C.

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*)- INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
2430 E St. Washington, D.C.

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
NA 8-3771 EX 103

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
EX 3-6115

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
Ex 3229

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (*Spouse, Mother, Father*) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
NA

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (*First*) Elsie (*Middle*) Louise (*Maiden*) Paul (*Last*) Wilcott

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
9/9/55

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (*City, State, Country*)
Eagle Bay, New York USA

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (*No., Street, City, State, Country*)
Cold Brook, New York USA

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 15 AUG 1958

7. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH
NA

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (*Give last address, if deceased*)
2121 Virginia Ave NW, Washington 7, D.C.

11. DATE OF BIRTH
9/9/34

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (*City, State, Country*)
Cold Brook, New York

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY
NA

14. PLACE OF ENTRY

15. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*)
USA

16. DATE ACQUIRED

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (*City, State, Country*)

18. OCCUPATION
Govern. clerk steno

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (*Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers*)

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, State, Country*)
2430 E St. Washington, D.C.

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE *(From- and To-)* BY MONTH AND YEAR
None

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE	23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
NA	

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
None

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* None	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
2	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.
My wife also receives a salary.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
None

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
The National Bank of Washington	Washington, D. C.

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
USA

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE:
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)
NA

SECTION VII. EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☒	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Utica College of Syracuse Univ. Utica, NY	Physics	Math	Feb. 53	June 55	None		

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	
Central City Business Institute	Accounting (2 years)	Feb. 1955	Feb. 1957	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	
Ft. Belvoir Engineer School	electrician	April 1949	June 1949	8

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE At present taking a course at US Dept of Agr. Title - Elementary Federal Government Accounting

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Okinawa		6/49 to 3/51	X			

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HDQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING

SECTION IX — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.) 40

2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)

3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING *(Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)* National Bookkeeping

SECTION X — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Chess - Fair, Football - fair

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

US Dept of Agr. Graduate School - Elementary Federal Government Accounting

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

National Bookkeeping machines, comptometer, calculator

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION *(Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.)*, INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE: NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

None

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of issue)*

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of issue)*

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

None

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

None

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

None

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

None

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) 3/20/57 to 2/15/58
2. GRADE 5
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Fiscal Div. Accounts Branch
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION None
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Accounting Clerk
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Posting of financial transactions to Allotment Ledgers

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) 2/15/58 to Present
2. GRADE 5
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Finance Div. Tax and Compensation Branch
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION None
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Payroll Clerk
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Preparation of payroll documents considering base and premium pay and allowances. Maintaining of leave records. Conduct liaison with area division on payroll problems Application of Agency pay regulations.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE, WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	M	F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
None						

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

I feel that my instruction at the Dept. of Agr. Graduate School is giving me a good foundation in governmental accounting and I sincerely hope it will be considered in future assignments.

[illegible]IVED
APR 14 10 23 AM '58

DATE COMPLETED 4/12/58

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

1124

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) Wilcott (First) James (Middle) Bernard Jr.
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 103-24-6095

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED Syracuse, N.Y.
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Cold Brook, N.Y
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Eagle Bay, N.Y.
DATE OF MARRIAGE 9/4/54
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE
DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED
DATE SPOUSE DIED
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Elsie Louise	Cold Brook, N.Y.		
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**DATE OF BIRTH**
Steven James	Cold Brook, N.Y.	M.	2/16/59
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
James Bernard Wilcott	unknown		
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
Esther Maud Wilcott	1510 Brinkerhoff Ave Utica N.Y		

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Geraldine Francis Mosher
RELATIONSHIP Sister
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 1510 Brinkerhoff Ave. Utica N.Y.
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) US Army
YES ☐ NO ☑

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)
YES ☐ NO ☑

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) Yes
YES ☑ NO ☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

6. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

CITIZEN'S BANK OF MARYLAND
RIVERDALE, MD # 460-1-596

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

James B Wilcott Jr

SIGNED AT Washington, D. C.	DATE 15 April 1765	SIGNATURE James B Wilcott Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1954
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1, R3, AND S2

›TATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CI‘ ‸N AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF CU‸PETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*) WILCOTT, JAMES BERNARD, JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Sept. 1931

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
None							

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U. S. Army	1948	Dec	13	1952	Aug.	30	Hon.

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☐ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☐ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
03	08	08

12. TOTAL SERVICE 03-08-08

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*).

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

4 March 1957
(DATE)

James B. Wilcott Jr.
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 4th day of March 1957 (MONTH) at Washington, D. C. (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

Appointment Clerk

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

(OVER)

10—60483-8

Part III.—DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS. *(Complete for noncompetitive hires based on competitive status as required by instructions in FPM Chapter S3.)* Employee has a competitive status. This determination is based upon the following evidence:

NAME OF AGENCY	SIGNATURE AND OFFICIAL TITLE	DATE

verified 6/4/57

PART IV.—DETERMINATION OF CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	TOTAL SERVICE *(Item 12)*	NONCREDITABLE SERVICE *(Item 13)*	CREDITABLE SERVICE *(Leave Purposes)*	ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE *(Present Agency)*	LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE *(Leave Purposes)*	SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE *(Leave Purposes)*
Years	03		03	57	03	53
Months	08		08	03	08	06
Days	08		08	04	08	26

PART V.—DETERMINATION OF CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES. *(Complete only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes.)*

	TOTAL SERVICE *(Item 12)*	NONCREDITABLE SERVICE *(Item 14)*	CREDITABLE SERVICE *(RIF Purposes)*	ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE *(Present Agency)*	LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE *(RIF Purposes)*	SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE* *(RIF Purposes)*
Years						
Months						
Days						

* Enter as the "Service Computation Date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF 7

REMARKS:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—60689-8

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 20 November 1965

YOUR REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 18 November 1965

CASE NO. : 109301

TO : Director of Personnel

ATTN :

SUBJECT : WILCOTT, James B., Jr.

1. This is to inform you that Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulations 10-3 and 20-5 including access to classified information through TOP SECRET as required in the performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐ Please advise Chief, Clearance Branch, extension 5620 when Subject enters on duty.

4. This is a conversion case.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Steven L Kuhn

Steven L. Kuhn
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 10-63 1173 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(3)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

STAFF AGENT CLEARANCE

DATE : 19 April 1965

YOUR REFERENCE: 32273

CASE NO. : #109301

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN. : Staff Agents Branch

SUBJECT : [redacted] Hilcott, James B

1. This is to advise that a security clearance is granted for the employment of the Subject as a Staff Agent, GS-07, by DDP/WH in the capacity of

Fiscal Acct. Asst., at JMWAVE.

2. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of the Subject, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

3. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

4. As a part of entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged by your office.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

W. A. Osborne

W. A. Osborne
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

FORM 10-61 1989 CONFIDENTIAL (9-40)

JAMES B. WILCOTT JR
MAR 67



NEIL F. DOHERTY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

[illegible]

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes

I. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible] MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME [illegible] [illegible] Ethel [illegible]

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING STATE OF HEALTH [illegible]

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS [illegible] Gold Brook [illegible]

DATE OF BIRTH 9-1-1906 PLACE OF BIRTH Newport [illegible]

[illegible]

CITIZENSHIP American [illegible]

[illegible]

RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO RESIDE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES NONE

[illegible]

[illegible] ACTIVE DUTY OR COMMISSIONED MILITARY SERVICE

[illegible]

Camp Roberts, California [illegible] HONORABLE

REMARKS: NONE

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER [illegible] New York

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON [illegible]

[illegible]

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED [illegible]
TION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER [illegible]
DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:
NO

GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

[illegible]

JAMES B WILCOTT JR
MAR 57

[illegible]

JAMES B WILCOTT JR
MAR 67

[illegible]

14-00000

DATE OF [illegible]

DATE OF [illegible]

[illegible]

DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF OR HAVE YOU EVER [illegible] POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OV[illegible]

[illegible]

JAMES B WILCOTT JR
MAR 57

[illegible]

[illegible] WILL BE INVESTIGATED

[illegible]

NO

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

[illegible]

However, [illegible] the City of Utica, New York [illegible] business with his brother, Charles Koehler, operating [illegible] The [illegible] Shop, located at [illegible] Park Ave. Utica, New York.

[illegible] employment record is as follows:

FROM [illegible] to 8-56
EMPLOYER: [illegible]
ADDRESS: 316 Summit Ave. Utica, N.Y.
KIND OF BUSINESS: [illegible]
TYPE OF JOB: radio repairman
REASON FOR LEAVING: [illegible] College

FROM [illegible]
EMPLOYER: [illegible]
ADDRESS: [illegible] New York
KIND OF BUSINESS: [illegible]
TYPE OF JOB: [illegible]
REASON FOR LEAVING: [illegible]

FROM [illegible]
EMPLOYER: [illegible]
ADDRESS: Utica, New York
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

JAMES B WILCOTT JR
MAR 57

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: **9 November 1956**

Your Reference: **C-5841 Compt.**

Case Number: **109301**

TO: **Chief, Records & Services Division**
Personnel Office

FROM: Chief, **Personnel** Security Division

SUBJECT: **WILCOTT, James Bernard, Jr.**

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. **Subject is to be polygraphed as part of EOD procedures.**

W. M. Knott
W. M. Knott

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

(8)

DISPATCH

SECRET

OSMA-12,641

TO: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO: Chief, WE
Chief, WH

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-6145

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Madrid

DATE: 25 August 1961

SUBJECT: Counter Espionage
Luis TEDESCHI, aka Luis TEDECHI

RE "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCES: OIEN-13463, 29 May 1961

On receipt of reference, Madrid Station traces were run on the Subject with negative results. Traces were also requested of the QUANTUM service and on 21 August 1961 they informed us that they had no record of the Subject in their files. In this case the QUANTUM service also carried out traces in the QUOTA files for KUBARK.

ANTHONY B. FELDRAKE

24 August 1961

Distribution:
2 - Buenos Aires
2 - C/WE
2 - C/WH

CS COPY

6145
201-289247

FORM 10-57 (40) 53 ABM/rat USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

DISPATCH

	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OIRA-28890
TO Chief of Station, Buenos Aires INFO Chief, WE Attn: Chief, WE/4 Chief, WH		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 201-6145
FROM Chief of Station, Rome		DATE 13 July 1961
SUBJECT Counter Espionage Luis T[illegible] (Possibly Luis T[illegible])		RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		
REFERENCE(S)		

OIRA-18463, 29 May 1961

File checks conducted on Subject through Police Liaison are negative.

FRANCIS K. [illegible]

Distribution:
- 2-Buenos Aires
- ✓ 1-WE/4
- 1-WH

201-289247
~~201-6145~~

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO

CS COPY

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OSBA-1924

TO: Chief, WE (Attention KUDESK).

INFO: Chief of Station, Madrid

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-6145

FROM: Chief of Base, Barcelona ccs.

DATE: 13 June 1961

SUBJECT: Counter Espionage
Luis TEDESCHI, possibly Luis TEDECHI

RE. "43-3" -- (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

REFERENCE(S): OIRW-18463

There are no base file or QUOTA traces on Subject in Barcelona.

Elaine B Friedwald
Elaine B. Friedwald

13 June 1961

Distribution:
- 3 - Headquarters
- 2 - Madrid
- 2 - Files

CS COPY

21-289247
~~201-6145~~

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

ASSIFICAT

[illegible]

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chiefs of Station, Rome, Madrid; COB, Barcelona

INFO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

FROM
Chief, WE

SUBJECT Counter Espionage
Luis TEDESCHI, possibly Luis TEDECHI

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
See paragraph 3

1. A source who has given highly reliable information in the past, and whom we have no reason to question, has stated that during 1943 one Luis TEDESCHI was either being considered for recruitment by/or was actually working for the RIS. According to the source, he was known to have been active as a member of the Spanish Communist Party. The address used by TEDESCHI during early 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

2. The Buenos Aires Station has determined that a Luis TEDESCHI, born 2 February 1918, is listed in local police files as living at El Dorador 3150, telephone 58-3717. Further investigation is being conducted there. Unfortunately, Headquarters does not have the date and place of birth of Subject of paragraph 1. The source has indicated that Subject was probably born in Italy and may have been active in the Spanish Civil War 1936-39. This, of course, could explain his involvement in the Spanish Communist Party.

3. It is requested that Rome, Barcelona, and Madrid check Station and Base files for any traces of Subject. Liaison and police contacts may be approached for any information available in their files.

4. Please address replies in this matter "Attention KUDESK."

GERALD B. NUTTARD

Distribution:
- 2 - Rome
- 1 - Barcelona
- 1 - Madrid
- 1 - Buenos Aires

RECLASSIFIED
~~[illegible]~~
RI/
RI/Files

DATE TYPED
29 May 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
12 JUN 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OIRW-18463

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
~~201-6145~~ 201-289247

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/WE/P WE/4	
WE/5 WE/X	
RI/FI	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WE/X	John D. Walker	sjs	2528

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WE/4	31/5	
C/WE/5	31/May	Thomas H. Thiele
C/CI/SID	1 Jun	Oscar H. Sells

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WE/X		John D. Walker

FORM 6-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

DRAFT

7 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/Project

SUBJECT: Luis TEDESCHI

1. This office is extremely interested in obtaining all available information on one Luis TEDESCHI, who was reported to be residing at Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina in the early part of 1943, at which time he allegedly was of interest to the RIS. The attached document refers to a Luis TEDESCHI residing at this address in 1942 and to an individual by the name of TEDESCHI who had resided at Estados Unidos 6366 in 1942. Apparently the information as shown on the attached document was obtained through mail intercepts.

2. We would appreciate having you tell us if you know of any way we might locate the intercepts referred to and possibly any other intercepts directed to TEDESCHI while the U.S. Office of Censorship was in operation.

BIRCH D. O'NEAL
Chief, CI/SIG

Attachment: 1

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
2 - CI/SIG

CI/SIG/EAGEgerter:jm

DRAFT

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH

SUBJECT
Counter Intelligence/Luis TEDEDCHI (Correct spelling believed to be TEDESCHI)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
See Paras. 3 and 4
HABA-9016 of 4 November 1960

1. Headquarters regrets that it has been unable to learn the date and place of birth of the Luis TEDESCHI who, according to a usually reliable source, was being considered for recruitment in 1943 by the RIS, or was actually working for the RIS. As stated in HABW-6515, our source reported that the address used by TEDESCHI during the early part of 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires.

2. Collateral information on Luis TEDESCHI of Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, has been found in a 1942 document which appears to have been based on censorship reports. This document indicates that TEDESCHI's address, as given above, was a cover address for a UDE (Union Democratica Espanola) manifesto sent from Cuba. Also one TEDESCHI, Estados Unido 3366, Buenos Aires, was given as a cover address in a secret writing message. A copy of the pertinent portions of this document is attached.

3. It is hoped that a unilateral surveillance on the Luis TEDEDCHI living at El Domador 3150, Buenos Aires, if instituted as the station planned, will be fruitful. Headquarters will be extremely interested in any further information on this individual you may be able to develop, as it is possible that he may be linked with Communist and/or RIS activities in Cuba as well as being used locally by the RIS.

4. As KUDESK is currently handling this case, it is requested that the slug REDWOOD not be used.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

Attachment: 1

DATE TYPED
6 February 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
10 FEB 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABW-6669

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-289247

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee, with one attachment

1 - WH/2, no att.
1 - RID for 201-289247, 1 att.
3 - CI/SIG, 1 att.

ROUTING
RI/
RI/
CI/SIG

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
CI/SIG	AEGEgerter	jm	2621

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C.CI/SIG	7 Feb 61	Birch D. O'Neal
C.WH/2		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH		Chief, WH/J. C. KING

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

Att to #ABW-6669

S/4612

MOST SECRET

FROM : No name, HAVANA, CUBA.

TO : SR. LUIS TEDESCHI, PICHINCHA 959, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINE.

28th July to 14th August 1942 : Spanish

c/34

OPINIONS AND CONDITIONS IN SPAIN : REPORTS COMPILED BY COMMUNISTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONS FROM SPAIN.

This cover contains Reports Nos. 550 - 3, 555 - 8 and 571, compiled from interviews with persons who have recently left Spain, and describe the attitude of the Spanish people to the war and to their Government, the extent of German penetration in Spain and of Spanish aid to the Axis, the activities and standing of political parties of the Right and Left in Spain, and general living conditions in the country. This group of reports contains opinions of both Communist and Falangist sympathisers.

PREVIOUS RECORDS:

560

TRI.10001/42, TRI.11003/42, TRL.24567, and TRI.14201/42 cover groups of reports on the same subject.

S/4555 covers a group of reports on the Spanish political scene, possibly from the same source as the above, which may be VICENTE URIBE, the Communist leader, whose headquarters are in CUBA. See also BER.14567/42, BER.14974/42, BER.19252/42.

Addressee, LUIS TEDESCHI, is shown by TRI.15328/42 to be a cover address for a U.D.E. (UNION DEMOCRATICA ESPAÑOLA) Manifesto sent from Cuba. He may also be the TEDESCHI, ESTADOS UNIDOS 3566, who is given as a cover address in the s.w message in TRI.14725/42 (secret).

Att to HABW-6669

201-

DISPATCH

MICROFILMED
SECRET
FEB 23 1961

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HABA-9016

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-6145

TO Chief, WHD
INFO Chief, SRD

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

DATE
4 November 1960

RE 433 — (CHECK "X" ONE)
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LIPROVE
Luis *TEDEDCHI 201-6145

ACTION REQUIRED
See Paragraph 2

REFERENCES
HABW-6515

1. In view of the fact that Subject dispatch presented a possible lead to an RIS agent, it was decided to do a unilateral check on TEDEDCHI rather than refer the matter to liaison. As a result of investigations undertaken by BIPALA-1, the Station learned that:

Luis TEDEDCHI

Is listed in the Buenos Aires police files as living at El Domador 3150, with telephone number 58-3717, and has no record of police offences. This individual was born on 2 February 1918.

[illegible]

2. If possible, it is requested that Headquarters attempt to confirm the above date of birth with the source of reference. The Station plans to institute a unilateral surveillance on Subject, and will keep Headquarters informed of pertinent developments.

Carlton G. Recart
Carlton G. RECART

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD
1 - Chief, SRD
1 - Chrono
1 - File: 201-6145

BCHeighan/okb

Zee to WHD

INDEX F
Index-F
201-289247
~~201-6145~~

CS COPY

End-1

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.
1 of 1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT General-Counter Espionage
Specific-Luis TEDEDCHI*

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
See Para. 2

1. A source who has given extremely reliable information in the past, has stated that, during 1943, one Luis TEDESCHI was either being considered for recruitment by the RIS or was actually working for the RIS. TEDESCHI was known to have been an active member of the Spanish Communist Party. The address used by TEDESCHI during the early part of 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

2. Our source was unable to provide further information on TEDESCHI and Headquarters' files contain no pertinent identifiable information on him. It is requested that you check all available records including any appropriate local services for any information on TEDESCHI that may be available.

Oliver G. Galbond
OLIVER G. GALBOND

MICROFILMED
JAN 6 1961
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

DATE TYPED
12 Oct. '60

DATE DISPATCHED
17 OCT 1960

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA - 6515

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
~~200-6-145~~ 201-289247

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

(3)

ROUTING	INITIAL
Distribution:	
~~Buenos Aires - 2~~	
WH/2 - 1	f
CI/SIG. - 2	f
~~RID for 200-6-145 - 1~~	
RI/FI	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
CI/SI	AEGEgerter	jrm	2356

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C, CI/SIG	13 Oct 60	Birch D. O'Neal
	14 Oct	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH	12 Oct. '60	Chief, WH/J. C. KING

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

5 October 1960

SUBJECT: Luis TEDESCHI

1. A Source, who has given extremely reliable information in the past, stated that, during 1943, Subject was either being considered for recruitment by the RIS or was actually working for the RIS.

2. Subject is known to have been an active member of the Spanish Communist Party. The address used by Subject during the early part of 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires.

3. It is requested that Latin American, as well as Spanish and Portuguese stations be asked to check available local services for any possible traces on Subject.

#75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION ROUTING SHEET

TO	BRANCH	ROOM & BLDG.	PHONE
Anne Egerter	CI/SIG	1408 J	2621

REQUEST NO.	REQUEST DATE	SUBJECT
21	12 Jan 61	Fedidchi

THESE REPRODUCTIONS ARE OF A PERMANENT QUALITY AND ANY INDIVIDUAL DOCUMENT, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, MAY BE INCLUDED IN A 201, SUBJECT OR PROJECT FILE. REMAINING MATERIAL MUST BE DESTROYED AS SOON AS THE IMMEDIATE PURPOSE HAS BEEN SATISFIED. PR ②

FORM 1-57 1259 SECRET (40)

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

ACCESSION NO

DATE RECEIVED IN S A.

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1					
2					[illegible] still pending. [illegible] retain till receipt of further info.
3 Riner					
4 Olsen					
5					
6 Spain FBW		21/4	22 Apr.		
7					
8					
9 Leddy	2211				
10.					
11.					
12.					Index - file
13. FBI RLG	2212	26/4	28/4		
14.					

-53

MAR 25 194[illegible]

SECRET

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE
MICROFILMED: 1P

SECRET

OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON, DC			SERIES NO THH-344 FILE NO. 30-33
REPORT MADE AT HABANA, CUBA	DATE 16 Mar 48	PERIOD COVERED 15 Jan-15 Mar 1948	MADE BY Clarence D. Lloyd

SUBJECT STATUS P

GENERAL : Communist Matters

SPECIFIC : Spanish Communist Party

REFERENCE : THH-W-258, THH-377, THH-330

SOURCE : A - LA files; B-AUTOCRATIC.

SYNOPSIS

Addresses used by Spanish Communist Party in 1943, as reported in Source A files, set forth. References in Source A files to persons who might be identical with some of those listed, or investigations of whom might lead to identification of individuals listed, in THH-W-258 also submitted as background material that is being used as a basis for investigations of Spanish Communist Party in Cuba.

ADMINISTRATIVE ADDENDUM:

To date no definite information has been received that would link any of the individuals reported herein to those named in reference THH-W-258. It is realized that this information is quite vague and is not conclusive in any way, but it is hoped that, by using it as a basis for our investigations, more concrete details regarding the Party's present activities in Cuba, as well as identification of individuals named in reference, can be obtained. Copies of this report are being furnished to our field stations in Mexico and Buenos Aires inasmuch as addresses used by the Party in 1943 include several in those countries.

REGISTRY COPY

EVALUATION : C-3

DISTRIBUTION :
Wash (3)✓
Mexico (1)
Buenos Aires (1)
Files (2)
No other distr.

SECRET

APPROVED BY
Geo. M. Granville
WDS

[illegible] 1-5-83

SECRET Series No. TMM-344
16 March 1948

SUBJECT: Spanish Communist Party

1. Investigations are being conducted in attempts to identify individuals named in material concerning Spanish Communist Party transmitted to us in [illegible]-252. Review of Source A files has revealed only scattered information which is being used as a basis for the investigations and this preliminary data is set forth below:

2. In March 1947 Source A outlined in some detail the Spanish Communist reporting system in the Western Hemisphere. The addresses known to be used by the Party at that time were stated to be as follows:

a. Buenos Aires

José [illegible]
Costa Rica 4559
Buenos Aires

Emilio [illegible]
Calle Cordoba 2244
Tercero D
Buenos Aires

Juan [illegible]
Calle Alsina 1954
Buenos Aires

Roberto CANINI
Inclan 4235
Buenos Aires

Jaime [illegible]
Rivadavia 5704 (7° piso)
Buenos Aires

Luis T[illegible]SCHI
Pichincha 969
Buenos Aires

Luis [illegible]
Estados Unidos 2369
Buenos Aires.

b. Mexico

Ana SAIS
Calle Pino 32 Depto 9
Mexico, D.F.

A. SANCHEZ
Morales 77
Mexico, D.F.

Antonio [illegible] GARCIA
Avenida Egidos 37
Mexico, D.F.

Antonio COLLANTES
Zaragosa 67, Apt. 27
Mexico, D.F.

E. RODRIGUEZ
Morales 77
Mexico, D.F.

Series No. TKH-344
March 16, 1948

c. Cuba

Caridad DIAZ
Calle Nueva del Pilar 2
altos del café
Habana, Cuba

Manuel [illegible]
San Lázaro [illegible] altos
Habana, Cuba

Juan José [illegible]
Casa de la Cultura
Paseo del Prado 210 altos
Habana, Cuba

Cesareo FERNANDEZ
Luis Estevez y Parraga
Santos Suarez (bodega)
Habana, Cuba

Alexandro [illegible]
Calle Lawton, entre Tejar y Pocito
Habana, Cuba.

d. Jack STRONG
c/o W.L.P.
232 Broadway, 9th flr.
NewYork, New York

Benigno RODRIGUEZ
c/o Francisco Canivet
51 Cleveland Square
London W. 2, England.

Dolores IBARRURI
Moscow, Russia.

3. Enclosure to TKH-W-253, report on expenses, cites payments to:

a. "Daughter of Eduardo" - $7 in Mar and Apr; $17 in May.

Source A reported that:

(1) On 21 Sep 45 one EDUARDO ORTEGA Y GASSET, a Spanish political exile, spoke at a meeting at the Casa de la Cultura, Cuban Communist front organization, lauding the success of a convention held 14-16 Sep 45 by the COMITE [illegible] PRO REPUBLICA ESPAÑOLA.

(2) On 1 Mar 46 EDUARDO MARTINEZ CENTELLES, representing the Association of Cuban ex-combatants of the Spanish Republic, spoke at a demonstration in front of the Spanish Legation in Cuba held as a result of the execution of ten leftist underground workers in Spain.

b. "Son of Esteban" - $11 each month. From Source A it is learned that:

201-4-5-88

Series No. T[illegible]-344
-3- March 16, 194[illegible]

(1) ESTEBAN VEGA (nationality not given) was named Secretary General of the [illegible] HISPANO CUBANA PRO [illegible], Spanish Communist Group.

(2) RITA [illegible] (nationality not given) was the representative in Cuba of the [illegible] GENERAL DE TRA-[illegible] ([illegible]) of Spain.

c. "[illegible]" - 175 in Mar: 1 in Apr. There is only one reference which might vaguely be considered to have any bearing on this item.

(1) SANTIAGO [illegible] (aka Santiago [illegible]) a Spanish [illegible], arrived in Cuba in 1940. From that time until 19[illegible] he lived in Santiago de Cuba when he came to Habana to assist Francisco (Pancho) GARCIA GONZALEZ in work "of an intelligence nature" for the Spanish Front group, Casa de la Cultura.

d. "JOAQUIN" - 179 in Mar: 180 in Apr. Source A reported:

(1) JOAQUIN [illegible] was acting in 1946 as first Vice President of COMITE HISPANO CUBANO PRO REPUBLICANO ESPAÑOLA in Ciego de Avila, Cuba.

(2) JOAQUIN LORENZO was a sailor on the vessel RIO NEUQUEN in 1942 and was acting as a courier to Habana for the Spanish Communist Party. This information, it was stated, was obtained from secret writings between one "PALACIOS" in Buenos Aires and one "GUILLERMO" in Habana.

Source B advises that according to official Cuban records, the vessel RIO NEUQUEN of Argentine Registry has arrived at Cuba only once since 1942. That was 19 April 1943. There is no record of the vessel having been here any time in 1942. The crew list of the RIO NEUQUEN does not carry the name of Joaquin LORENZO nor any name similar thereto.

e. "[illegible]A" - a seaman, who usually makes trips to Cuba, and two comrades who are anti-com.
"PANCHO" - Summary Jan-Mar 47. "To PANCHO Jan-Feb $315.55.

(1) In March 1947 it was reported by source A that Francisco (PANCHO) GARCIA GONZALEZ (see 3c(1)) had traveled in 1942 and 1943 from Cuba to Portugal

20-4-5-88

and returned; that he was an intelligence agent working for the Spanish Communists in Cuba and was in liaison contact with the Soviet Legation here. He was at that time reported to be utilizing the services of a courier named [illegible] between Cuba and France.

One [illegible], Cuban who fought with the Republican army in the Spanish war and was with the American merchant marine during World War II was reported as possibly the same. However, it was pointed out that this individual is supposed to be anti-communist. In March 1947 he was employed on a vessel (unnamed) between Philadelphia and Colombia but he also came to Habana often. There is no further report in Source A files concerning identification of this individual.

(2) See also 3d(2) above.

f. "Expenses for Documentation of [illegible] - [illegible]17.04 in May. [illegible]" Source A reports:

(1) FELICITA [illegible] (probably Cuban though nationality not given) attended the national PSP training school. Was president of Socialist Committee of the first district of Camagüey Cuba.

(2) LUIS [illegible] (nationality not given) represented JUVENTUD [illegible] UNIFICADA DE ESPAÑA in 1945 and was a member of the JUVENTUD SECCION of Casa de la Cultura.

g. "What They Send Us From Cuba On the Organization There". One of the family members is the daughter of a mourned member...Engineer [illegible] who died here"

(1) María GARCIA IZQUIERDO was elected in January 1945 Secretary of Feminine Section of the JUVENTUD COMBATIENTES ESPAÑOLA DE CUBA.

4. Others mentioned in reference THH-W-258 - MARIA ANGELES, ANGELITA, CONCHITA, EULALIO, VICTOR, HUERTA - cannot be identified in any way with persons named in Source A files.

20-4-5-55

5. In addition to the information outlined above, there have been gleaned some details regarding lesser known Spanish Communist groups and individuals. These are not included herein since the meager information available on them--which dates back two-four years--or the mere submission of the names can serve little or no purpose at this time. In view of Mexico reports THM-377 and THM-336 concerning Carlos DIAZ FERNANDEZ no inquiry regarding him is being made here.

200-1-5-58

14-00000

15 1954

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. OITA-38

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WE ✓

DATE: 12 March 1954

FROM : Acting Chief, Trieste Substation

INFO: Senior Rep., Rome

SUBJECT: GENERAL— INTEL

SPECIFIC— Summary of Reports Submitted by Lt. Col William Washington

REF: TRIE 2175

Attached hereto is a summary of reports relative to possible disturbances in Trieste which was prepared by G2/TRUST for the meeting described in reference.

James B. Blevins

Enclosure: 1 G2 report

6 March 1954

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters w/encl
2 - Rome w/encl

INDEX

ENCL

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

77-7-12-265

14-00000

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. OITA-38

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: ~~12 March 1954~~

FROM : Acting Chief, Trieste Substation

INFO: Senior Rep., Rome

SUBJECT: GENERAL— [illegible]

SPECIFIC— Summary of Reports Submitted by Lt. Col. William Washington

REF: [illegible] 2175

Attached hereto is a summary of reports relative to possible disturbances in Trieste which was prepared by G2/TRUST for the meeting described in reference.

James B. Blevins

Enclosure: 1 G2 report

6 March 1954

Distribution:
  3 - Headquarters w/encl
  2 - Rome w/encl

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28 A

CLASSIFICATION

COPY

77-7-12-265

Encl to 01TA-38
12 Mar 57

[illegible]

1. [illegible] Rept No. [illegible] dtd 2[illegible] Dec 53. Eval [illegible]

In late Jan 54 the action squads of the [illegible] will be [illegible] on a new system [illegible] in any eventual demonstration [illegible] in [illegible] 54. Not more than 6[illegible] [illegible] will come from the northern provinces of Italy particularly from the [illegible] and [illegible]. These youths will be trained to be [illegible] travelers and representatives. They will live in private homes. [illegible] of contact with the [illegible] will be [illegible], who does not believe that the police are acquainted with his activities in the [illegible] incidents.

2. [illegible] (1) dtd 2 Jan 54. Eval [illegible]

[illegible], [illegible] is presently [illegible] anti-allied propaganda activity in Trieste. [illegible] is believed to have been [illegible] on this new anti-allied propaganda [illegible] of [illegible] office in [illegible], (presumably [illegible], one of [illegible] "pigment" [illegible]). The propaganda material will be collected in Italy by one of the [illegible] to a friend of [illegible]. [illegible] are being made with [illegible] director [illegible], for the use of his warehouse in the [illegible] area, in which to store the material for distribution.

3. CIC Rept No. [illegible] dtd 12 Jan 54. Eval [illegible]

The [illegible] is making plans to have thousands of leaflets printed for the [illegible]th and 20th of [illegible]. The leaflets will be nationalistic in nature and will appeal to the population to [illegible] the two dates. The leaflets will be printed by the [illegible] Printing [illegible], [illegible], Trieste, and are to be distributed throughout the streets of Trieste a few [illegible] hours before the two mentioned dates.

4. CIC Rept No. [illegible] dtd 15 Jan 54. Eval [illegible]

[illegible], Salvatore, recently returned from [illegible], was [illegible] safe passage to [illegible] if necessary to evade police arrest. [illegible] was also promised financial assistance from a [illegible] businessman, whose identity is presently unknown. [illegible] has avowed to avenge the deaths of the six Trieste residents killed during the November riots. He has notified his group that they must strike a decisive blow on [illegible] by dynamiting the Yugoslav Delegation Building in Trieste and also the British and American Headquarters in Trieste. [illegible] is presently approaching Trieste merchants and businessmen in the hope of obtaining financial assistance for his venture. It is known that a certain member of his group is in possession of arms and explosives intended to be used by [illegible].

[illegible] 1 to 01TP-38 CONFIDENTIAL

77-7-12 265

CONFIDENTIAL

5. [illegible] (4) dtd 19 Jan. [illegible]

A [illegible] of [illegible] met on [illegible] Jan to discuss [illegible] trip to [illegible] on 26 Jan. [illegible] would [illegible] ordered for [illegible] on 23 Jan. It was decided to [illegible] in small [illegible] and in limited quantities, [illegible] against the police. [illegible] of the [illegible] Hall in the [illegible] Theater building, [illegible] stored there. [illegible] reports 4 and 5 do not coincide, although they apparently concern the same subject.

6. [illegible] (5) dtd 22 Jan. [illegible]

At a [illegible] meeting of the [illegible] said that it was [illegible] to [illegible] demonstrations [illegible] school students to concentrate their efforts on 23 Jan. [illegible] that he would authorize such demonstrations on that day.

According to the source, [illegible] of [illegible] and those of [illegible] being formed under the [illegible] considered [illegible] group, consists of action squads of 20-25 persons and will eventually [illegible] under one leader. The source also stated that this group is [illegible] formed with [illegible] knowledge, although he [illegible] to evade as much responsibility as possible.

The source also added that the following action squad leaders meet daily in bars and buffets to discuss their program. They are quoted to have said that 23 Jan will be their day of revenge against the police.

[illegible], [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible], [illegible]
[illegible], Cresto
[illegible]
[illegible], [illegible]

7. [illegible] dtd 23 Jan. [illegible]

The [illegible] intends to use violence in an attempt to [illegible] all local Yugoslav [illegible]. A prominent member of the [illegible] is stated to have said that the future policy of the party is to be one of violence.

8. [illegible] dtd 3 Feb. [illegible]

[illegible], noted Italian nationalist, stated that to the best of his knowledge there were no plans on the part of Italian groups or parties [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

Trieste to run a demonstrations on 2[illegible] Mar. It stated that certain groups would, no doubt, plan to place wreaths of flowers at the various spots where the Nov riot victims were killed. [illegible] predicted that the ceremonies would [illegible] peaceful and probably only of [illegible] hours duration, unless the police attempted to interfere.

[illegible]. CIC [illegible] dtd [illegible] Mar, Eval [illegible]-3

[illegible], Carlo [illegible], [illegible] of the Trieste [illegible] are the persons who have [illegible] demonstrations on [illegible] Mar. They are planning to have [illegible] printed in the near future for distribution throughout the city. [illegible] has stated that the [illegible] would participate in future manifestations only in conjunction with the other Italian political parties in Trieste.

[illegible], Davide [illegible], [illegible] Communist in the Italian parliament, who were injured in the [illegible] at [illegible] Trieste, have written to several Trieste [illegible] friends stating that they intend to visit Trieste sometime in March. [illegible] stated that he will oppose their coming to Trieste because their appearance would [illegible].

10. CIC [illegible] dtd 11 Mar, Eval [illegible]-3

[illegible], Salvatore, who is active in forming the "[illegible] Shirts" action squads, has requested permission to use the [illegible] in Trieste as a meeting place for the members of the squads. The [illegible] will discuss his request at their next meeting. It is believed that permission will be granted to [illegible].

11. [illegible] 6/32 (15) dtd 13 Mar, Eval [illegible]

In a conversation with Lt Col [illegible], the following information was supplied:

a. Leading members of the Committee for the Defense of Italianity in Trieste and Istria are discussing the possibility of patriotic processions to be organized in Trieste on 20 Mar.

b. No definite plans have been made as yet to stage demonstrations on that date, but the "Committee" is in favor of supporting student processions.

c. It was not excluded, during these discussions, that the presence of civilian police may be taken as a challenge and will turn eventual processions into disturbances.

d. [illegible] informed source that he intends to leave Trieste on 16 Mar to avoid a repetition of the unfortunate [illegible] of last November.

12. [illegible] Feb. [illegible]

[illegible] stated that there is no danger of the [illegible] or other Italian [illegible] during a demonstration on 2[illegible]. [illegible] that it had been brought to his attention that [illegible], [illegible] to organize the criminal elements of [illegible] to prepare demonstrations on 2[illegible]. [illegible] advised the authorities to [illegible] that [illegible] was not a member of the [illegible] had to have nothing to do with him.

[illegible] also [illegible] that another person who should be closely watched [illegible], [illegible]. He said that the [illegible] will have nothing to do with [illegible].

13. [illegible] 22 [illegible]

[illegible] to [illegible], an [illegible] of [illegible] members [illegible] this [illegible] organized to [illegible] activities, to [illegible] of Italy, to [illegible] and to [illegible] the [illegible] occurred on [illegible].

This group was founded by [illegible], [illegible]. A certain [illegible], [illegible] is a very active member with [illegible]. At present this group is discussing:

a. [illegible] on 2[illegible].
b. [illegible] attack on the Yugoslav [illegible] Headquarters.

17-7-19 -265

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

Security Information

Secret Control
US Officials Only
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. STTA-3769

TO : Chief, EE

FROM : Chief of Mission, Trieste

DATE: 5 February 1954

INFO: Senior Representative, Rome

SUBJECT: GENERAL— MSI/INTEL

SPECIFIC— MSI Activities and Plans for 20 March 1954

REF: TRIE 2069; STTA-3697, dated 14 January 1954

1. The following information was obtained from SSO/C/309(5), dated 22 January 1954, a report of the Trieste Security Office (British Field Security Service) made available by CEOFAL. Source is PILSEN (Evaluation is F). Date of information is 19 January 1954.

2. Riccardo GEFTER-WONDRICH presided at an MSI meeting held on Via Rismondo. Approximately thirty persons were present. GEFTER-WONDRICH told the students of "Giovane Italia" that it was inadvisable to demonstrate against the sentences imposed on students who participated in the November riots. Instead, he invited them to concentrate their efforts and attention on preparations for 20 March, promising that he would authorize student demonstrations on that date.

3. It is rumored that a new clandestine organization, composed of approximately 260 youths who are members of the MSI and other parties, is being formed under Bruno MARSETTI (TSO Comment: Bruno MARSETTI is possibly identical with Salvatore MARSETTI.) This organization consists of action squads of twenty to twenty-five men, each squad being under one leader. MARSETTI was expected to return from Rome during the weekend of 23-24 January with arms and funds for this organization. In the opinion of source, these arms and funds are supplied by prominent Masons in Rome and Milan. Source stated that the organization is being formed with the knowledge of GEFTER-WONDRICH, although the latter attempts to evade any responsibility therefor.

4. The action squad leaders meet daily in different locations to discuss progress. At the present time they have no headquarters. Their principal task appears to be the formation of plans for demonstrations on 20 March. They state that 20 March will be their day of revenge against police. The following persons are leaders of action squads:

Constantino DE MARCO
Aurelio D'ALESSIO
Pasquale BUONAIUTO
Orazio BOCCOLO
SANNA (fnu), brother of Duilio SANNA
Natale FERA

Secret Control
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

12-240

Security Information
Secret Control
US Officials Only

STTA-3769
5 February 1954
page 2

5. The following data is from TSO/O/309(4), dated 19 January 1954. Source is PILSEN. Date of information is 18 January 1954. The following MSI members met in the Buffet Gallopin, in Piazza Goldoni:

Constantino DE MARCO
Aurelio D'ALESSIO
Pasquale BUONAIUTO
Orazio BOSCOLO (armed with pistol)
SANNA (fnu) (armed with pistol)
Natale ERA

Subjects discussed MARSETTI's trip to Rome. MARSETTI had left for Rome on 16 January, arriving on 18 January, and had telephoned Trieste that he would "bring back the goods." The meeting also discussed plans for demonstrations on 20 March. It was decided to use acid in small bottles in limited quantities against the police.

6. Dr. TEDESCHI (fnu), manager of the Ridotto in the Rossetti Theater, keeps MSI arms stored there.

Michael L. Rosemont
Michael L. Rosemont

30 January 1954

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
2 - Rome

Security Information
Secret Control
US Officials Only

77-7-12-240

14-00000

SECRET CONTROL
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

FROM:	London, England	REPORT NO.: WRL-28265	LOCAL FILE NO.:
NUMBER OF PAGES:	1	NUMBER OF ENCLOSURES:	
REPORT MADE BY:	David P. Keck	APPROVED BY:	Roger S. Barnes

DISTRIBUTION BY COPY TO: CREDIT TO:

Washington (1)
Registry (1)

ORIGINATING BROADWAY SECTION: R-6

SOURCE CRYPTONYM: REFERENCES:

Source Operational Data and Comments:

Attention: DYCLAMOR

SECRET CONTROL
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

INDEX

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S.OFFICIALS ONLY
"SECURITY INFORMATION"

43-7-24-1170

Wc L-28265
29 Aug 52
2492

Date of Information July 1952.

E/ 2272

Country: ITALY

Subject: The S.T.I.M. Machine Tool Factory, MILAN.

Remarks:

Source: Believed reliable, based on documentary evidence.

43-7-24-410

ITALY

Economic

The S.[illegible] Machine Tool Factory, MILAN.

Location.

1. The firm, which designs machinery for construction in other factories, has its technical offices in Viale Monza 66 and its sales department in Via T. Prisco. 3, MILAN.

Personalities.

2. The manager is Dr. GOSSE[illegible]G, a German and former manager of a German machine tool factory. He is assisted by Ing. TEDESCHI and by other technicians.

Production.

3. The firm designs and/or produces on a sub-contracting basis the following types of machines :-

Machine tools for the manufacture of micron bearing balls, steel bearing balls, cylindrical roller bearings, conical roller bearings, cages for ball bearings, external and internal rings for ball bearings, sewing needles, bicycle accessories, fount for typewriters, eccentric presses for hot and cold stamping, sandpapering machines, special grinders, oscillating grinders, selectors, rotary rolling mills, control instruments, pneumatic hammers, splining machines, rectifiers, presses, drilling machines, and polishing machines.

Patents.

4. With the exception of some very small items, the machines designed by the firm are not covered by patents.

Destination of Output.

5. The firm's products are sold on the home market.

EF Gr[illegible]

43-7-24-11/70

N.Y.-Si Op. 38

S/4612

NOT SECRET

FROM : No name, HAVANA, CUBA.

TO : SR. LUIS TEDESCHI, PICHINCHA 969, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINE.

6734

28th July to 14th August 1942 : Spanish

OPINION AND CONDITIONS IN SPAIN : REPORTS COMPILED BY COMMUNISTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH PASSENGERS FROM SPAIN.

This cover contains Reports Nos. 350 - 3, 355 - 8 and 371, compiled from interviews with persons who have recently left Spain, and describe the attitude of the Spanish people to the war and to their Government, the extent of German penetration in Spain and of Spanish aid to the Axis, the activities and standing of political parties of the Right and Left in Spain, and general living conditions in the country. This group of reports contains opinions of both Communist and Falanjist sympathisers.

PREVIOUS RECORDS:

556

TRI.10901/42, TRI.11663/42, TRI.24567, and TRI.14201/42	cover groups of reports on the same subject.
S/4555	covers a group of reports on the Spanish political scene, possibly from the same source as the above, which may be VICENTE URIBE, the Communist leader, whose headquarters are in CUBA. See also BER.14367/42, BER.14974/42, BER.19252/42.

Addressee, LUIS TEDESCHI, is shown by TRI.13528/42 to be a cover address for a U.D.E. (UNION DEMOCRATICA ESPANOLA) Manifesto sent from Cuba. He may also be the TEDESCHI, ESTADOS UNIDOS 8366, who is given as a cover address in the s.w message in TRI.14725/42 (secret).

REPORT No.350

Results of our first conversation with a young man from TORREL VEGA, SANTANDER, about 28 years old. At the beginning of the war he was in the army in MOROCCO and spent the whole war in Franco's army. He comes from a family of small garage-owners. Neither he nor any of his family have belonged to any political party or syndicate although his sympathies have always been on the left.

SPANISH ATTITUDE TO THE REGIME AND THE WAR. — He says that the immense majority of the Spanish people is against Franco and the Falange, workers, peasants, employees, bourgeois, big and small and a large proportion of the soldiers and the Requetes. He says that everyone hopes for the victory of the Allies. In it there is a blind trust, especially when the U.S. entered the war as the U.S. and England are the most powerful countries in the world, especially with the assistance of Russia. Only the Falangists desire and plan for the victory of Hitler, even though "there are many Falangists too who take a very black view of him". He says the majority of people sympathise with England. They have complete faith in the victory of the Democracies. There are supporters of the USSR, but the immense majority, according to our informant, do not like "communism" and prefer Democracy. He is obviously rather muddled by the Falangist propaganda against the U.S.S.R. He says that the entrance of the U.S.S.R. into the war gave rise to happiness all over the world, although there had been a great deal of confusion before, through the "Treaty of Aid between Russia and Germany." But this confusion disappeared with German aggression against the U.S.S.R. He says that the German defeats on the Russian front raised morale and renewed everyone's confidence in victory. Hitler's admission in his speech of how much they had suffered in Russia in winter, and that they were on the edge of catastrophe, produced great joy among the people. He says that the entry of the U.S. into the war caused a very good impression, and increased people's confidence in victory although Pearl Harbour caused some demoralisation. He says that no one wishes Spain to enter the war, except the Falangists. Franco does not wish it himself, and desires neutrality but since those who command are Serrano Sunar and the Falangists, Franco has no choice but to do what Hitler orders him, and there is serious danger of war for Spain. He says that the Anglo-Soviet and the Soviet-American pact are known through the Falangist press which has spoken of them. They made a very good impression on the people. Asked if he knew that the said pact stipulated that after the victory nations would have freedom to decide their destinies without foreign interference, he says yes, the press published it. About the Second Front he says that everyone thinks of it, and is hoping for it to open if possible through Spain. That the day they disembark, all the people will rise. Asked what the people would do in case of a landing in France, he said that his opinion was that if that happened the Spanish people would rise, even though the invasion was not on their coasts. The agreement about the Second Front is also known. He says the people who are most fervent supporters of the Nazis are Serrano Suner, Primero de Rivera, and a certain Count whose name he does not know. He often says that he knows nothing of politics, because he only read the sports news in the papers and did not want to know anything about the Falange. He says that there are many preparations for war; they are making fortifications on the coasts of Galicia and placing a considerable amount of artillery there. He says that the political force of the Falange and the syndicates is "artificial"; everyone hates them. The people belong to the syndicate because they can't help it, but they do not pay their dues or take them seriously. Discontent has even reached the ranks of the Falange. Many clerks, students, and people who joined it thinking they "were going to steal the music" are now very discontented, and do not pay their dues, and when they are threatened with being expelled they say that is what they are waiting for, for the Falange to play at "fisticuffs". There are many officers in the army who are not in agreement with the Falange or the idea that Spain is to go to war. The most violent opposition comes from Queipo de Llano and Yague. No one knows where Queipo is going and Yague is thought to be in exile in the Prov. of Pontevedra. Both were cashiered, Queipo for protesting against food leaving for Germany and Yague because in a speech at Zaragoza, he said - "we do desire a great and free Spain, but without any Blue Shirts, Red Shirts, or prisoners."

All the sergeants say that they are very discontented, because they earn 5 pts. which keeps them very short and of the soldiers he says-"in a word they are hungry, many years in barracks, and then the danger that they might be sent to war". He says that they are well-uniformed, just as well as before the war. They have dismissed the 1941 Draft. He thinks that there was very little sympathy for the Division Azul and the people laughed at those who volunteered. 40% were forced to go, others went because they were hungry, and there were a few volunteers. He says that survivors came back in a state of panic, there was a lack of food and equipment, several of them mutilated themselves in order to escape from this inferno. All say that the Russians are very well-armed and fight with great courage.

HELP TO THE NAZIS. — He says that his opinion is that a great deal of food is taken to Germany, although he can give no details, but if there is no food and olive oil in Spain where is it? He says that in Torrelavega the "Fabrica Continental" is working at high pressure, making tyre covers, while in Spain transport is held up for want of them.

THE CHURCH. — He says that it is not true that in the Church there are anti-German and Anti-Falangist groups. The supporteres of the Regime are the Falange, the Germans and the Clergy, in that order. The Church wishes for the triumph of Germany, in spite of her anti-Catholic policy because they believe that in that case they will be able to preserve their position of influence. He says that English and Russian news can be heard although it is very difficult and is forbidden although there is no watch or inspection. He says that everybody is against the Falange and submissione to Germany, including the monarchists and the rich on whom the Falangists impose large fines for racketeering. Many of the monarchists, bourgeois etc. are on the side of England. Democracy is considered as a possible substitute for the Regime. A democratic Republic like there was before the war. A Regime of peace and work. Speaking of the solution of the present situation, he says that they want a regime of peace and not a revolution. Then he contradicts himself by saying that it will not be achieved by peaceful means. He says that this would be the best but that the deaths, the betrayals, the crimes must be avenged.

The people are very united and there are not the old differences between the parties of the Frente Popular. The policy of National Union is unknown, he has heard no one speak of it.

DETAILS OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE — He says that he thinks that secret organisations function, especially in Bilbao and he says particularly "It is a city of brave men". He says that notices painted on the walls are aften seen there. He only remembers one "Less Franco, more white bread". Asked if the notices were signed by any party he says no, because it would give away the people who had done it. He says that he knows, because he was told, that in Bilbao there were illegal pamphlets and even a newspaper in circulation, but he does not know their content. He thinks that there must have been a clandestine press, but as he was never an idealist the people who did those things would not trust him, and as he is out of everything he does not know any details". He says he thinks that the people working in Bilbao are nationalists and communists, especially the latter. That a few months ago two Italian submarines, badly damaged by English planes, came into Santander. Two hundred persons were arrested for discussing this, and many people thought that the second front had already begun. He gives no more details. He says that Serrano Suner was the object of an attack in Madrid when he met Arrese, and when the latter tried to protect Suner he was seriously wounded and had to undergo a critical operation. Asked if he thought there was sabotage etc., he says no - the disorganisation of the train services is due to all the employees being new and not knowing their business.

GUERILLEROS -- He says that "El Carinoso" was working in Santander and "The Railwaymen" too; that "El Carinoso" came from Lierganes and had his headquarters in Santander. That he was recently killed through quarrels and imbroglios caused by his girlfriend who was from the J.C. and had another lover, and it was he who was arrested at the same time as El Carinoso. It was he who informed against them all. Many people love the Guerilleros, although there are many people who help them through fear, as for example a relation of his from whom they took his only pig, but in general the Guerilleros behave excellently. "El Carinoso" was once in Barcelona, where he went in a cab to get his teeth fixed. El Carinoso was not a politician but took to the mountains in order to avenge the death of his cousin who was assassinated by the Falange. That they often, like the guerilleros of Asturias, disguised themselves as Civil Guard, went down to the villages, and arrested the Falangists. But where there are most Guerilleros, and the most active, is in Asturias. Six months ago, about three hundred guerilleros were ready to embark on the coast in order to leave Spain. But there was a quarrel and a terrific fight between these guerilleros and the forces of authority, with many dead, and after that they retreated to the mountains. He says that the politicians who are most popular are Prieto and Azana. Some speeches of Prieto's have been circulated through Bilbao, but he does not know what they say. There is also in circulation an article, reproduced from an English paper, reprinted by an employee in the Real Comp. Asturiana, de Inz. Republicana. The article refers to the powers and resources of the Allies and their chances of victory. He says he does not know of any activity of the communists, that this is obviously the activity of other people who are not communists; that for example the man who reprinted the article and those who read it were all on the Republican Left, and if there is any communist activity it is so camouflaged that no one knows who is the author. He says that during the crossing they were detained by the English in Bermuda and in Baltimore by the Americans. That the English made a short examination, they did not interrogate them in front of everybody and left them the letters they carried. In Baltimore they were interrogated one by one and were asked about fortifications, food, if they sent it to Germany, etc. When our informant said he had been in Franco's army up to the war they asked him why he did not desert to the Republican army.

SOLIDARITY. — He says there is no organisation for solidarity, that this only exists between groups of friends who have a relation or acquaintance in prison. They are not allowed to visit the prisoners more than once a week. He says that the killing still goes on, and that in Veg, a few days before he left, a lieutenant of the Civil Guard was shot for having gone for a walk along "at his own risk".

REPORT No.351

MARIA RODRIGUEZ, about 29 years old. Comes from a comfortably-off peasant family in the Province of Orense. She is very sluggish and at every question repeats that she does not know and that women do not understand many things. She had only a little more than an hour to spare as she was busy in the evening and had to leave for the interior in the morning.

WAR — She says that she was surprised when she arrived in Havana as she thinks there is more enthusiasm in Spain than here and more confidence in an American victory. The peasants "like everyone else" would like the "American" to win, even those on the Right are sure the Germans will lose. She cannot explain the nature of Franco's assistance to Hitler, she says only that "as it was the Germans who won, Spain owes them more than it has". She cannot be explicit, either, about the dangers of war, but she says that Franco's soldiers, the young men in general, and as a concrete instance a brother of hers who served five years in Franco's army, says that they will go up into the mountain and shoot before going again to the war. About the Division Azul she knows only that when it was first formed a volunteer left from her district. He was an outlaw who had committed crimes and she says that he went through fear of the consequences. The people do not like the Blue Division. They were not asked for anything for the "volunteers".

FUTURE PROSPECTS — She insists that there is great confidence that it will soon change. So much so that a Republican who was hidden for years and afterwards discovered told her to tell her husband "Do not leave beacuse things will soon change" The village has a hundred inhabitants, and she says that they all hope it will change; but from what we can gather this confidence is based entirely on an Allied victory. She says that if the English opened a second front in Spain the people would revolt, but she says she has heard no opinions on this point. The people speak without fear. She relates that the Falangists tried to take a pistol from her father and that he hid it. They threatened him, they took him in a car telling him that they were going to knock his head off, but the old man remained firm, telling them to do what they liked. They did not do anything to him nor did they get the pistol. As an example of solidarity against the Falange the old man said he had sold the pistol to a man who was going to America. They told him to prove it, the old brought as witnesses two peasants who lived more than a league away, without having agreed on a story first, but being quite convinced that the peasants when they saw the Falangists, if only for the sake of contradicting them, would say that what he said was true. A little later they sent him a notice for a Falangist meeting and he refused to go. She does not know if the other peasants did.

ARMY — She knows that a short time ago they dismissed the 36 (1936) Draft. Her husband was on service in Orense and deserted and went to Cuba. Immediately the Captain of the Company and a lieutenant went to his house to make inquiries. His brother told them "In his circumstances I do not know what I would have done", and the captain and the lieutenant went away saying - "He is right".

PEASANTS. — As we have already said, she belongs to a family which is comfortably off, they have several labourers in their employ. She says that the day labourers, and the farmer are equally against the Government and the Germans. To illustrate the situation she says that the daily wage is 20 pts. without food, and 5 with food. They all prefer the 5 and food, because otherwise they have nothing to eat. The peasants are very discontented, and show it openly to the Falangist officials when they come to inspect the harvest and when they fix the prices, saying - "They have no right to do it, it is an abuse", but it appears that it goes no further then this. They have not requisitioned anything but they force them to sell to the official buyers who issue permits to authorised buyers. These individuals take the produce to large shops and amass reeal fortunes. A quintal of potatoes, they have to sell at 30 pts. and they are sold afterwards by the dealers at the standard rate of four or five ptas the kilo, that is to say at a 800% profit, to private people who require them. And if the peasants take their produce to the market they have to sell it at the standard rate to the dealers. No peasant takes any rye to the market, they prefer to run the risk of selling it to private people. This is the only way in which they can get other products. They have imposed a new tax; they have to pay 15 centimes for each vinestock. They have given up the "one-dish meal" and they are not forced to contribute to Auxilio Social. She says that the Government does not know what is going on in the country. They distribute the sulphate, not according to the number of vineyards, not even according to the number of inhabitants, so that her district which is wine country, gets less sulphate than the next one and produces very little wine, although it has more inhabitants. A kilo of sulphate is worth 39 ptas. - before it was worth 50 centimes. She says that they were taking a few things to America and they made them pay in Pielato, in Orense, and in Vigo, and if they had passed through more provinces they would have had to pay again.

REPORT No.352

Information volunteered by three Galician peasants, not members of political parties. They remained throughout the war in Franquist territory, although only one of them fought in the army. Very backward politically, anti-Franquist, and more anti-Falangist. With the exception of one who was in Asturias as a soldier, the others never left their village which is a hamlet in Galicia.

SPANISH ATTITUDE TO THE WAR AGAINST HITLER. — The majority of the Spanish people with the exception of the very rich and the Falangists are against Franco and the Falange. They explain that Falangists see what is coming to them through the crimes they have committed, and they are the people who really wish for a German victory, with the object of saving their skins, and the money they have stolen from the people. In Spain, in general, no one wants the war, since they are exhausted, according to our informants, except for the Falangists. It is said that Franco is a partisan of neutrality, and daily visits the British Ambassador at his private residence and has interviews with him. In spite of this they say there is a danger of Spain being pushed into the war against her will, because in Spain the Germans are the masters. All the world believes that the Allies will be the victors except the Falange. Before the attack on Russia many people were demoralised by the German advances and began to "think them invincible". When Russia entered the war, enthusiasm and confidence in Hitler's defeat increased enormously, but that was especially when the Russian victories began.

They say: - I do not know what would have happeded to us but for Russia; the Nazis would be masters of the world. They also say that the Nazi army will not stand another winter of war, that they have suffered such losses that the next Russian winter offensive will defeat them although there is no talk of a Second Front. They are sure that the Democracies will win the war. They admire the resistance of the U.S.S.R. They say that Germany has already lost the war as a consequence of the losses suffered in Russia. The entrance of the U.S. into the war contributed to increase the already existing confidence in victory. They do not know of the Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American agreements, nor the agreement about the second front. One of our informants asked us what "O Hitler 1942"* meant and when we told him he said that they also said it in Spain, because in order to achieve it it was necessary to open a second front. They think that if there was a landing in France the people would rise. They also say that there are rumours that they land in Galicia and in this case the whole of Galicia would revolt to help the Allies. The same thing would happen in any part of Spain.

The "DIVISION AZUL" is hated by the majority of the people. They say that the majority have been forced to volunteer, and explain how the recruiting is done. Anyone who does not want to go and fight Communism, take a step forward. Some enlisted because of the desperate situation they were in. Some enlisted, too, bec because they were stalwart Falangists. When the recruits left the province a great many people went to see them off, calling them "sons of bitches" and insulting their mothers. When one contingent of "Volunteers" came back from the Russian front at Irun they had to leave the train because the people were stoning them. Many people xxxxxxx came back maimed and with frostbite. They tell terrible stories about the Germans and the horrors of the war. They say the Russians are very brave and fight with great courage. That they have large supplies of ammunition, and that things on the Russian front are not like the papers said they were. They said that the food on the Russian front was very scarce and bad. It was sent to them from Spain and they suffered many hardships. They all wished to return to Spain as soon as possible; they repented of having enlisted.

*"Sore hour for Hitler in 1942".

HELP GIVEN BY THE FRANQUIST REGIME AND THE FALANGE TO HITLER. — Now and then they send reinforcements to the Division Azul, in groups of a thousand or one thousand five hundred. They say that/in order to replace the casualties and tho those who return crippled. Even the Falangists themselves say - "the Russian front is a very serious matter". Those who are recruited to replace losses in Russia are recruited by force, by the process already mentioned. All airmen have to serve some months on the Eastern Front as "training". They say that lately they were training about 150 pilots to send them to Russia. The war factories are working at high pressure. The Germans are directing the erection of an aerodrome in the province of Lugo. In Galicia very few Germans are to be seen. Military instruction is obligatory for boys and youths in the "Frente de la Juventud". They also train youths from 15 onwards to serve in aviation. A friend of the informants told them that there passed daily through a city in the North fifty cars loaded with war material in the direction of the French frontier. German submarines refuel at Redondela and Vigo. He says that English aeroplanes often make reconnaissance flights over the harbours of Galicia. They describe Serrano Suner as the most subservient to the Nazis and in general to the Falangists who have crimes behind them or who have become rich through robbing the people.

Those who go to work in Germany are those workers who have nowork, or even if they have any live in the greatest poverty. They believe that by going to Germany they will be able to solve their economic situation and that of their families. The groups sent are not very large, according to our informants, at least in Galicia. This is understandable because the Germans prefer specialists. According to our informants, three workmen came back from Germany who say that in Germany the situation is terrible. They hardly eat, there is great poverty. They have the impression that Germany will not resist long in consequence of the situation there is in the country. They also say that a group of Spanish workmen were thrown out of the country because "they caused trouble".

FRICTION BETWEEN THE RULING CLASSES — He does not know of any dissension in the army except the case of Yague and Queipo, and gives data which is already known. The soldiers in general are against the entry of Spain into the war....They live in very bad conditions, badly fed, badly clothed and ill-treated by the officers, especially by the recently recruited Falangists. They all wish to be demobilised as soon as possible. They have demobilised the '39 draft. By their conversation we observe that the soldiers from the "national" and the "Red" zones receive different treatment. In Galicia there are many soldiers from Cataluna who have already spent several years in the army. They do not make it difficult for youths of military age to leave Spain; they cited their own cases. One of them is 18, the other 24 years old.

THE PEOPLE'S RESISTANCE TO THE WAR AND THE FRANQUIST REGIME — They say that there is no resistance there at all, because no one can act, and passivity is the opinion and state of mind of the people. When we insist they say there have been various train smashes and some derailments which they think were due to sabotage as well as to the defective material. Everybody knows the British and Soviet war communiques and they are discussed in private conversation. Some people take them down in shorthand and later circulate them. He says that in Vigo there is a secret transmitting station, but it was discovered by the police and all those connected with it shot. They were said to belong to the republican Left ("Izquierda Republicana") and among those shot there was one doctor and other intellectuals. He does not know any more details. Women complain loudly in queues of the shortage of foodstuffs. He knows because the rumour went round there that Prieto made a speech in the White House before Roosevelt, and that Roosevelt embraced him saying that the Americas were behind the Spaniards. This speech too is circulating in clandestine copies, but he never could see one. He says that there is no organised political activity because this is impossible. He tells several jokes which are going the rounds, and quotes this one: - "Recently they made a film called "We Thieves are Honest Men". Beneath the announcement of this film in Vigo, someone wrote "The Caudillo's Own Words". He says the press give most space to the English War communiques and the U.S. war news bulletins.

WHAT IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWARDS NATIONAL UNION. — Talking of Unity they say textually "There, there are no parties, there are only anti-franquists, and all the differences between sections of the Popular Front have disappeared.

Lister is known and has a following in Galicia. The politicians with most prestige are Prieto and Asana and Negrin, although Negrin is the most hated by the Falangists".

FUTURE PROSPECTS. — He thinks of the Republic as the Regime to substitute for Fascism, but without a revolution, and he immediately adds that the Republic will come because when the Germans are at their weakest the whole people will revolt and avenge the crimes of the Falangists. The people's blood rises when they see those who assassinated their relations dressed up in blue shirts. The Falange consists only of professional assassins and robbers. Those who wear the shirt can be recognised by their faces. Those who joined the Falange at first now do not want to know anything about it, and do not want anyone to wear the shirt. There is friction between Requetes and Falangists. The people hate the Requetes less than the Falangists. They say that the schools teach only militarism and religion. There are many little boys who can hardly read, but who can speak of military operations with maps, artillery and aviation. A teacher who was dismissed and came back to his post, told our informants that the Ministry constantly sent them books of military tactics, so that they could teach them to the children. The summer camps for children consist of sending boys to camp and teaching them drill.

GENERAL SITUATION OF THE PEOPLE. — They spoke of the terrible poverty endured by t the people, and the high price of food; wages have hardly been raised in comparison with those paid under the Republic. The Committees of Supply get hold of agricultural products and only leave a small quantity per person for the whole year's supply. Already in their village the Falange had listed the crop although they had not yet requisitioned it, which they had already done in other parts of Galicia. Falangists speculate in foodstuffs, selling them at high prices and so get rich. He says that in Vigo a large quantity of rice went bad and had to be thrown into the sea because they would not sell it to the people at lower prices. The rationing is quite inadequate. They were a whole year without seeing olive oil. Naturally on the Black Market it could be bought at 50 pts and more. In a year they only had bread twice. A very small meal in a restaurant costs 16 pts. Two courses and dessert 25 pts. One of them was charged 75 pts. for eating and sleeping in a pension in Vigo one day. A pair of shoes costs 25 pts., a poor suit 500, a dozen eggs 18 or more pts. The people hate the Committees of Supply used by the Falangists to make themselves rich. They say that there is the greatest immorality in all official organisations and everyone steals.

In the prisons there are still many people. They treat the prisoners very badly. In the prison of Oviedo, which has a capacity for 600 there are more than 5.500 prisoners. There are batallions of forced labour (workers they call them); they grant some people conditional liberty but they send them to districts where they know no one and where they die of hunger.

Generally these three young men have great confidence in the victory over Hitler, and say Germany may break up this very year.

REPORT No. 353

Information volunteered by an ex-Consular official of the Cuban Government in Spain, who arrived on the "Marques de Comillas" on the 25 th of July 1942. The subject is a person of quite good economic position. He is the son of Spaniards and owns some properties in Asturias. He went as Consul to ——— after Franco's troops had taken possession of it. A man of moderate views, politically of the persuasion that was regnant there at the moment, he honestly believed, doubtless as a result of Falangist propaganda in America, that "Franquist Spain was a paradise". Later he had the opportunity of experiencing what Franquism represented, and still represents for Spain, and owing to his honourable behaviour as Consul he was often insulted and was even threatened with expulsion. He was closely connected with officials of the Fascist Regime and with Falangists in high positions. His term of office, to use his own expression, was more successful through his friends than owing to his position.

SITUATION OF THE FRANQUIST REGIME — 90% of the Spanish people are against the Franquist regime. He says that to assess accurately the solution desired by this ninety percent is very difficult. Some wish, specifically, for the restoration of the Republic, but he maintains that what everyone is longing for is a change in the Regime, something to relieve the really chaotic situation in which the Spanish people find themselves. (He did not know life under the Republic, and therefore when he talked with people they always underlined the enormous difference there was between that life and life under the present regime). The Falangist unity they boast of is a myth. Division in the Franquist Camp grows daily. The Falangists write lampoons in the streets and so do the Requetes, but their slogans are contradictory. The Falangists accuse the rest — of being curs and traitors to the doctrine of the Falange. For example, he talked to a Falangist lieutenant - the man came from Cuba to fight at Franco's side - in the cafe "El Gato Negro" in Madrid, a few days before embarking. He seemed to be ashamed of the present situation in Spain. He excused himself by repeating the Falangist tag that the Falange had been betrayed. (This must refer to the Monarchists, Requetes, and other reactionaries). The Falangists are aware of the present situation in Spain. Perhaps that is the reason why they are seeking a solution which will preserve their class privileges. In his own phrase - the Franquist regime hangs from a very thin thread, which must snap very soon. (Perhaps this is not only the view of our informant, but also of some military and civil leaders with whom he was closely connected). For this reason, he says, they have tried to give the impression of a change, taking advantage of the "Camara Corporativa", and, if it is true, with the restoration of a Falangist-Monarchy.

ON THE MONARCHY. — There is, he says, no public activity with this goal. There does not exist what we might call psychological receptivity for this measure; but undoubtedly negotiations in this direction are being carried on by high officials of the Franquist Regime. He was in Madrid on the 22 - 23 June 1942, at the time of the visit of Don Juan. His visit was not given any publicity, but there were widespread police precautions. The streets nearest to the palace were closed to the public and a strict watch was kept. There were also arrests of suspicious persons, those who had been in prison etc. But the press gave no sign. The presence of Don Juan was public property. The people seemed completely indifferent. The monarchists displayed no activity either. Perhaps, he added, they took precautionary measures with some people characterised by their adhesion to the Monarchy. His impression is that if the monarchy were restored in Spain it would be in alliance with the Falangists, but the people would still have the impression that the situation had changed. He maintained that there would be the semblance of a coup d'etat, apparently directed against the Falange, but Franco would remain head of the army. If so, things would, fundamentally, remain as they are; that is, the Spanish State would still be entirely subordinated to Hitler, and without changing the policy of "partiality" they now maintain, to one of "neutrality" in the war. They would take this step, in his opinion, only in the last resort, if faced with a second front in Europe, and on the approach of Hitler's defeat, which would, naturally have an immediate repercussion on the countries subject to the Nazis in Europe.

ON THE COMPLETE SUBSERVIENCY OF THE FRANQUIST REGIME TO HITLER. — In Spain the Falangists do not speak of their position of "Neutrality" in the war but of "partiality". This is their attempt to justify the help they give to the Axis. There are German submarine refuelling stations in Vigo, Redondela, and on the Galician coast. This is public property, but every now and then the press publishes a complete denial that Axis submarines refuel in Spain. These denials are very frequent but they do not give much proof. Those who can see tanker-launches carrying on this work laugh at these ridiculous denials. Also on more than one occasion German submarines have been repaired in Spanish dockyards. In Galicia it is quite impossible to get a pot of jam. All the production, which is enormous, goes to the Germans. There are places on the frontier, through which trains pass with produce for Hitler. There are fortifications and artillery on the coasts of Galicia, where the Germans are in command. There are also new aerodromes, some already finished and some under construction by German technicians. They fear an Allied invasion in Galicia. Hitler is assisted not only with food and primary materials, but also with men.

There is continuous propaganda for the sending of volunteers as workers to Germany. Unwilling contingents of soldiers have left for the Blue Division.

THE DIVISION AZUL was a Falangist manoeuvre to give political importance to some Falangist leaders. The manoeuvre turned out very badly. This Division is the most unpopular innovation of the Falange. Our informant talked with 11 survivors of the division, who had returned from the Russian front on account of their wounds. One of them was 18 when he left as a volunteer, without the consent of his family. He asked if he would return to the front again and he answered categorically "My eyes have been opened. I will never return". They all speak of the bad food they are given - mainly vitamin pills and pots of jam. They speak of the courage and fighting spirit of the Russian army, but above all of the contempt with which the Germans treated them. They regarded them as inferior beings and they also said that when they paid compliments to the German women, a Spanish custom, they answered them disdainfully as if they despised them. There were cases of self-mutilation in the ranks of the Blue Division. At any rate their panic was obvious, and they refused to return. Everybody speaks ill of the Division Azul.

Its commander Munos Grande, is the most despised of soldiers. Countless jokes about this division circulate in Spain. Our informant knows several, but cites the following as an example which came from the Club Benevente-Arniches etc. "El Gato Negro" in Madrid. Munoz Grande sent a telegram to the political address of the Blue Division at the front - this was the address; F.E.T. URSS M.G. The telegram arrived and no one could decipher it, but finally a soldier said - "This is quite clear", and read the following words - "We were all deceived. Serrano Suner is the only one responsible. Many thanks". ("Fuimos enganados todos. Unico responsable S.Suner. Muchas gracias").

ON THE DANGER OF WAR FOR SPAIN AT HITLER'S SIDE. — His impression is that Spain wi will continue to assist Hitler as she is doing now but that she will not enter the war. Some of the Generals are in disagreement with the present policy - among them Varela, Aranda, Yague, Queipo etc. Among the soldiers the feeling against the Fascist Regime is very marked. They complain of bad food, treatment, clothes.... too much time spent on marches etc. Queipo, on his return from Italy was rude to Serrano Suner and struck him for which he was sent back to Italy. General Aranda spent a month at Gijon and talked to our informant. They had an interview. Our informant has a real admiration for Aranda, who, he says, is a gentleman. He says that Aranda appeared to be Leftist. Among his remarks he remembers the following words. "We Spaniards are robbers. We are, and we have been for some time. If you walk through the Castellana of Madrid you will see the sumptuous palaces owned by Wexler(?) and Primo de Rivera, etc. built wi with the blood of the Cuban people and the poor Spaniards who went to defend the Spanish colonies. The colonies were lost but the military leaders, whose duty it was to defend them, enriched themselves. Now it is the same thing over again. We made a revolution in order to bring progress to Spain but we have spilt blood in torrents uselessly. The result was not worth the expense of so much blood and so much repression".

In his conversation, although he said nothing against the Germans, he showed contempt for the Falangists who are enriching themselves; he showed particular fear of the treatment meted out to the soldiers in barracks. His impression is that it was a result of the seriousness of the situation through which the Franquist regime was passing and fear of what the outcome might be. He said nothing about the state of the war, and whether he was a partisan of England. In the conversation he had with the General it is possible that there was another aspect, which through discretion he did not repeat.

HUNGER SITUATION. — The situation has become noticeably worse during the last months. For several months already the rationing has been practically nil. The rich buy everything on the Black Market. Our informant, with his wife and five children spent from 9.600 to 10.000 a month on food alone. He says that during the year his expenditure on food - he does not drink nor smoke - was 120.000 pesetas. Of course he had a special clothes budget - 600 pesetas for a suit and 180 to 200 for a pair of shoes. When asked how the workers live who earn 10 to 15 pts. salary or perhaps less, he says very badly. They do not eat, and adds that besides they cannot earn more. If the workers and the people in general had a greater purchasing power, life would be impossible in Spain as they would also buy on the Black Market and no one would eat. Therefore the privileged classes can eat, and they can only do it if they have a fortune. They accuse the Falangist leaders and the Government of racketeering on the Black Market. Immense fortunes have been made in a night. "They go to bed poor and wake up millionaires" This is the only explanation of the fact that one is allowed two packets of tobacco at 0.90 per person per week, and in the Companía Arrenditaria de Tobacos, which is a state monopoly, one person can buy from 100 to 10.000 packets of the 0.90 at 7.50 a packet. He also relates the following instance. Petrol is scarce in Spain. A litre costs 15. pts. Cars frequently stop in the streets for lack of it. He cites a case which happened in the street of Gijon. A distinguished military personage had no petrol He saw a tank-convoy of Campsa pass and asked the chauffeur for a few litres, and when he refused, he ordered them to give it to him, as a superior officer. The chauffeur refused again, and in a panic explained that he could not do it because he was not carrying petrol but olive oil, without being able to explain which military leader or leaders it was destined for, although he knew it was to be sold as contraband.

SITUATION OF THE PRISONERS. — He cannot calculate the number of prisoners there are actually at the moment although he asserts that it is at any rate enormous. By reason of his position he has visited prisons and fortresses, and is terrified at the terrible treatment in the "Comisarias" Civil Guard barracks etc. On more than one occasion he says he has saved more than one Republican from certain death. The prison that he knows is the Coto at Gijon. It is at the moment completely full. The treatment is inhuman. They do not give the prisoners a cell number but allocate them only a square meter for sleeping, standing etc. That is to say that when a prisoner arrives he is given a metre of ground. Nor do they give them a mess. Lately they agreed to give them a peseta daily for maintenance. He does not understand why there are not more deaths, as with one peseta a day in the prison canteen one can only buy bread. They took the miners who were prisoners to camps so that they could work in the mines. They gave them 50 cts. day wages for bachelors and a peseta for a wife and 50 cts. for each child, to the married ones. They keep them working ten and twelve hours daily in the mine. The number of shootings has diminished. It is imputed to the fact that "almost all must have been tried".

THE CLERGY — He says that the clergy have never intervened in politics from the pulpit as much as they do now, sometimes inveighing against the Franquist Government, and at other times, naturally, defending the policy of the Falange. Numbers of the priests and monks continually expound their view on the political regime and the points on which they differ from it. As a characteristic example he relates that about two months ago in Gijon there was a house used provisionally as the Church of San Jose, which was destroyed during the war. A priest, professor at Salamanca, gave five lectures. In these lectures he spoke almost exclusively on political questions, and attacked the Franquist Government for their method of supply and distributing the foodstuffs among the people, saying that what was wanted was more rationing and less Franquist regulations. He also advocated the necessity of a pardon for all condemned people and other things that our informant does not remember. 500 people went to the first lecture, but the second one, when they heard what the subject was, was attended by literally all Gijon.

RECONSTRUCTION. — Reconstruction is only done as a matter of private enterprise by proprietors and churches. In Madrid, the Montana barracks, the prison, the workers districts, damaged by the bombardments, remain as they are. Nothing has been rebuilt. The Arguellos district has been partly rebuilt. Every owner ~~has taken in hand his own property.~~ The Franquist reconstruction policy is a myth. The people mock at it and make jokes, among them the following - In Gijon they erected a building marked "Reconstruction Office"; in the hallway there were two doors, one marked "for partial destruction" and the other "for total destruction" So a well-known Asturian who was visiting the office about his house which had been partially destroyed went into that department. Once inside, there were two more doors - "for those who have some resources, and for those who have not". He went through the first door, there was another room with two doors - "for those who are Falangists, and for those who are not". He went through the second door and found himself in the street.

FACTS ABOUT RESISTANCE. — In Spain acts of sabotage are carried out on the railways, factories, etc., although he cannot decide whether these are organised actions decreed by illegal organisations of Spanish Republicans or are spontaneous acts of workers who are enemies of the Falangist regime. He does not know any concrete instance of the activity of the workers organisations, C.P.S. etc., but when he was in Madrid on the 22nd and 23rd of last June, there was a film on called "We Thieves are Honest Men". There were thousands of lampoons done on that, some very clever and suggestive which were scattered throughout Madrid. According to our informant, one day the lampoons appeared printed in the same type lettering as the poster, with the following - "words of the Caudillo, from a recent speech". For this reason there were arrests and a number of beatings in Madrid. He also saw how the people had lost their fear. In the Gran Via in Madrid a man cried out that he was not only red but communist, and he could not endure this any more. Apparently the people told him to be silent but he did not take any notice. The R.A.F. bombardment of Cologne, which was known in Spain from the English broadcasts, was celebrated almost all over Spain by the people who stayed up much later than the usual time in the streets, drinking in bars, etc. He says that even the police took part as they are largely Anglophile.

GUERILLEROS — He says that there are many in Asturias; there is a state of war. There are Moors and the 'Tercio'. The guerilleros appear occasionally in the villages and avenge the deaths of anti-Fascists who have been murdered by the Falange. They take food and clothes. Once his car was stopped by a group of them in the street of Llanes. They were dressed as Falangists. When he showed his papers as Consul of Cuba and proved he was not the previous consul Pena, a known Falangist, they saluted him and said - "Long live the people of Cuba". He says that although they behaved correctly he was rather afraid. He knows that a short time ago the guerilleros of Campocaso had a fight with the Civil Guard and killed several people, among them some well known Falangists in the district. It appears that the Guerilleros are magnificently armed.

FUTURE PROSPECTS. — He believes firmly that Hitler will be defeated this year. He has great faith in the people of Spain and France, etc. Nazi-dominated Europe will arise, since this life cannot continue "even one winter more". He is confident that the U.S.S.R. will not be defeated; on the contrary the Soviet battlefronts will be the end of Hitlerism. He believes that England and the U.S., in opening a second front, will count on the help of peoples oppressed by the Nazis, in France or in Spain, and things will move rapidly. The Spanish people are waiting for the invasion of the Allies in order to take arms in the streets against their rulers. The Spaniards trust in the Allies and hope that the Second Front will not be long delayed. Soviet and English broadcasts are listened to; they follow the progress of the war. They hate the Germans and the Italians. Those who before supported Franco are now his enemies and partisans of the defeat of Hitler. The Spanish people hope to escape from this situation by the defeat of Hitler and trust in the Restoration of the Republic.

Cuba. — 28.7.42.

REPORT No.355

ANGEL MARTINEZ, 26 years old, is a student from Bilbao. He is not a consistent Fascist or anti-Fascist either, as his opinions are rather confused.

SPANISH [illegible] TOWARDS THE WAR. — He says that no one speaks of the war ~~because they take the view that~~ Spain will not enter it. All the world thinks that Germany will lose the war because her enemies are very strong. He says that nothing is said about the second front. About the Blue Division he says that the people are against those who went to Russia, chiefly because they think them mad. He talked to a friend of his who came back from Russia, who was thoroughly glad to be back. He said that our entire war was child's play compared with this one and the way the Russians fight. He says that some Leftists were in the Division through hunger, and some were Falangist adventurers, and in spite of its being said that all are volunteers it is obvious that many were forced into it. He says that in the Gibraltar demonstration, there were only four Falangists, "who do not know what war means".

In general he pretends to be slow and tries to get out of the questions with trifling answers. We think it is because he feels constrained by a Falangist who is with him. He declares that he is against Serrano Suner, but he says he is quite favourable to Franco because he promulgates laws which favour the people and is a partisan of neutrality besides. When we give him examples, especially that of the Blue Divison, to show him what Franco's neutrality amounts to, he maintains that they are all volunteers. He says they are always speaking in favour both of Germany and the Allies, because Franco wishes to stand well with both sides. He says that when the state of "non-belligerence" was established the people were content because before that they were afraid of being involved in the war. This fear, he says , is not so strong now. When asked what he would do if he were in Spain and the Spanish people were involved in the war he answered - "I would go to the mountains or spend a bullet on the first officer who tried to force me". He says that many Spaniards would do the same if Spain were forced into the war, because it would be so terrible.

SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE FRANQUIST REGIME TO HITLER. — He does not know the proporations of this assistance but he says that volunteers continue to leave for the front. In the same way he thinks that if the Germans did not take provisions from Spain all the needs of the country would be supplied. With this idea he complains against the Germans and against Serrano Suner above all. Falangists in uniform are now only seen in parades.

WORKERS FOR GERMANY — He says that a few months ago they sent a great quantity of workers to Germany. They were almost all Galicians, and very few from Bilbao. A little later they were returned because "they were being deceived", "getting into difficulties". When he was asked to be more precise he said that when they got to Germany they asked to be returned to Spain, and so they did with almost all of them.

TERROR — He says there are no persecutions or executions. When the execution of Larranaga was mentioned he said that the people had no knowledge of these crimes. About the refugees he says that the people talk of their returning to Spain when the war is over.

FRICTION — On this point, without being questioned, he says that the Requetes and Falangists cannot meet, because when the two parties were amalgamated the Requetes were pushed into the background, and that is the reason they prefer the monarchy. On this point he says that he has heard nothing about the restoration nor about the differences between certain leading factions in the army.

RESISTANCE. — At first he said that no one speaks about the war or any other problems because the people are afraid. But afterwards he said that people remember the Republic and how well they lived then. He does not report any example of resistance to the war. He says that the Nationalists have a lot of influence, but not so other parties, among them ours. Prieto has no influence either. In general it is obvious that he is ignorant of many things or does not dare to speak of them.

UNITY — All the anti-Fascists are united, but he gives no details.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — When the war ends with the victory of the Allies Franco will fall, and he thinks that the Republic will return. He thinks it will happen soon because the situation is unbearable, although "there is no need to think of Revolution" He says that if the Germans invaded Spain the people would rise. As we said, he is studying for his bachelors degree. His matriculation costs, including the price of books, about 500 pts; before it used to cost 200. He says that studying has become very difficult. He says that all students belong to the S.E.U. although it is not obligatory, but they are coerced, and they join in order to be in a good position.

ON CONDITIONS OF LIFE — He explains that in the rationing they allow a K. of potatoes per person a week, a quarter litre of olive oil, 200 gr. of vegetables etc. No one can live on that except those who have a lot of money; the rest go hungry. The workers, who are paid the same salary as before, cannot afford to deal on the Black Market and he says that there have been cases at Altos Hornos where workers have fallen dead from hunger at work. This causes discontent although it is not openly expressed. Now they have appointed wardens in the factories in Bilbao, and the workers receive larger rations. Here he is contradicting himself, because sometimes he says that these wardens were demanded by the workmen (which would be a demonstration of resistance) and sometimes he says that the directors asked for them. He says that in spite of everything he cannot understand why when food production is on the increase the workers are so badly fed. Later he says that they watch them closely and force them to work without ceasing. He relates (although we know no details) that the middle class does not feel the pinch like the workers.

POPULAR ORGANISATIONS. — They exist just as they did before. He cites the Club Andauchu which organises excursions. These organisations are not controlled by the Falange. Young people are as gay as before, and dance and go to the mountains.

ARMY — He refers above all the discontent of the families because their sons have to spend four years in the army. He says that they demonstrate their discontent and that they all want to be demobilised. But this open discontent is confined, he says later, to private conversation.

REPORT No.356.

Card

LUIS FERNANDEZ - a Mexican student, who has always lived in Gijon, Spain. His family is comfortably off and he is going to Mexico to join his father as he lived on what his father sent him in dollars and when this was forbidden he decided to leave Spain. He is an ardent Falangist. He is ignorant of all problems of the working and middle class. He only associated with people who were very well off, and especially with Falangist students. He is very cultured.

He says that he was in Gijon at the beginning of the war and remained there till now; as he was a Mexican he was molested by neither party.

HUNGER — He roundly asserts that there is no hunger, only a scarcity of certain articles. That with rationing "there is not enough for one mouthful" but that he never felt the want of food. That the olive oil ration is 1/8 of a litre every 15 days, and so on for all other commodities. That the rationing of bread (black bread, since white can only be got on the Black Market) is arranged in three categories, and for that there are three classes of cards - poor, middleclass, and rich. That the ration of the poor is larger, as they have less money for buying on the Black Market. That at Belmonte, Asturias, the rations are double what they are in Gijon. That rationing is different in each province, and even in different places in the same province. He says that no one is interested in politics, that everyone's daily preoccupation is food. He says that "it used to make him laugh to see well-to-do old people who in all their conversations spoke of nothing but the price of beans and bread etc." When he was asked for facts he says that it is obvious that the poor (by which he means the workers) who earn 10 or 12 pts. cannot buy anything contraband and live on their rations, which causes them to suffer somewhat from hunger and be very discontented. He says that the hunger is caused by the war and the blockade, because as soon as the Spanish war was over there was abundance of everything and free exchange, and as soon as the European war began there was scarcity and rationing. He also says at the same time that the cause of the scarcity is that the Government has bought thousands and thousands of tons of food in case the situation gets any worse. That this is good policy of the "Generalissimo's" and that the Falange is doing a lot of propaganda, saying that it is much better to keep the food now, when a lot is coming from Argentine and the U.S., than to eat it now and then if the situation gets worse, have nothing. That the people who are "good stuff" accept it, but most people protest and complain. He says that another cause of hunger are the Provisions Committees, which, like those of Gijon, are composed of bandits who sell as contraband the articles they are supposed to divide among the population.

ENTRANCE INTO THE WAR — He says that Spain will not enter the war, that this is the opinion of everybody. That all approve the foreign policy of the Government, which is very intelligent, as it knows how to maintain a balance in the situation and remain neutral. He says that the Spaniards are very favourable to Germany because they could have penetrated into Spain and taken Gibraltar, thus closing the Mediterranean to the English, but that it is "a German idea that one must be pleasant". After arguing a little with him I said that Germany might not have invaded Spain because she was not interested in dispersing her troops, considering that she needs them all for fighting against Russia. Later he confessed that all the Spaniards would fight against the Germans in case ~~they~~ invade Spain because the Spaniards are very fond of their independence, and would fight anyone who wished to enter Spain. The Spanish Government is a partisan of neutrality and the immense majority of the Falange think that Spain should send volunteers to Russia but "not enter the war" because they do not know that many thousands of Spaniards would be killed.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR. — He says that in Spain much petrol has been stored and that new tanks are under construction. He says that this too "is ~~the~~ being kept for the bad times", and in case anyone tries to invade Spain the '39, '40 and '42 drafts are mobilised. The '41 draft has been sent home. The '42 draft was called up with a three months' delay. They spend two years in military service. There is also a pre-military service for Youth Organisations. This is not obligatory but it is counted as time spent in the service and for that reason every one does it.

INVASION — He says that there are no Germans in Spain. He has seen none and so on. If there are any they are disguised as peasants. He is not certain that they are making fortifications in the north of Spain. Gijon is in fact defended by two ships, one of them a "sulta-tacos" and if there was an English invasion there "they would be the masters".

HELP TO THE NAZIS. — He says that it is not a fact there are more factories in the north of Spain which were not there before, and they do not work for the Germans. That the Germans say in their propaganda that they mean to suspend armament manufacture, because they have enough. That Germany is selling a quantity of war material to Turkey, which is a proof that they have no need of it, therefore armaments are not manufactured in Spain nor exported. But he takes the opposite view, that Spain receives material from Germany; there are frequent consignments, mostly tanks. What Spain does send, not, "as some say because the Germans take it", but because the Government gives it very willingly, is food. Every day many loaded open cars leave Spain and the people talk of it and are discontented, but those are only those who "think with their stomachs".

DESPATCH OF WORKERS. — He cannot be accurate about the quantity but many thousands have gone, all volunteers. He says it is quite natural for a man with no food or job to go there where they eat well and can send money home and because all the "poor" are like that. That is the reason they "go as volunteers and are glad to better their position".

DIVISION AZUL — 40,000 went, all volunteers, among them some quite well-known people and distinguished Falangists. The number of volunteers was so great that they had to close the lists and there are many thousands still waiting for their turn to go when they send reinforcements. In April 3,000 who had been r relieved came home, that they were all very happy. He had many friends who had gone and others who were ready to leave Our informant asked them if they had had many losses but the legionaries said that this was a lie, they had had very few deaths. There had been many wounded, to the point that not one of them had not ~~been wounded at least once.~~ All those who come home have been wounded. They say that it is very cold but they stand it very well and are much congratulated by the Germans. They wear the German uniform and the red cap. They say they behaved marvellously in Russia and gave the Russians a beating. That the Russians are brave, that is why they attack them from behind, but that they do not know how to fight and do not have good officers, although they have an abundance of material. "They attack in mass formation and do not care about their losses, so that very few reach the trenches." That men of the division always fought in a numerical superiority of ten to one and caused the Russians many losses. They were congratulated by the Nazis and often appeared in the German war communiques. That on occasions they established a salient on a river and resisted for more than ten days, that as they fought they sang and sang and that many Spaniards had been decorated with the iron cross. Our informant thinks that they have more losses than they confess to (all those he spoke with were Falangist students), and that in the casualty lists published only the names of the most important are given. In Spain everyone admires the courage of the Legionaries and praises them twice as much as the Germans do. He insists that they are all volunteers, and says in his own words - "a few idealists and the rest, the immense majority, because they were in a bad position in Spain and could get not work or food. They went into the Div. Azul in order to earn a good living because they are paid at the German rate and a war bonus, plus an allowance and large indemnity in case of death". Besides, if they are brave they can desert, when they go on leave they have millions of pts. in their pockets and can "put on airs and pose as heroes in their uniforms and their iron crosses in Spain". He says that although the lists are closed, there are thousands who are ready to leave at a day's notice, and that he "knows several." They said they celebrated Christmas very happily in February as they sent them tobacco and food from Spain.

He says that in Spain there is a lot of talk about the war, although no one bothers about politics at all now, and only about food. There are all sorts of parties, partisans of the Allies and the Germans, and among his friends the people are mostly partisans of the Germans; he also thinks the majority of Spaniards are on the side of the Germans and among the 150 in his university hall only two were partisans of Democracy and they had fierce arguments in loud voices until the director came. The partisans of the Nazis maintained that anyone who wanted England to win was not a Spaniard because if the Democracies win Prieto will come back and all the Reds of the Republic, and there will be a government of Leftists and in this fashion they attack the defenders of England. The students say - "we are very fond of Germany, because she helps us to be free of communism and is now defending us against it." He says that this appeals to many people who also hate communism.

SECOND FRONT. — He says that no one believes it will be established. The Germans cannot invade England, nor can the English invade Europe. All Spaniards would unite to defend themselves from the English. They would do the same if the Germans invaded Spain.

ON THE WAR.— He said that the Spanish idea was that it would last five or six years and that when they were all exhausted there would be an armistice or negotiated peace. This is the opinion of the people on the Right and the Falangists; he does not know the views of the rest. Franco said in a speech - "If the Russians make a breach and arrive at Berlin, he will send two million men to fight communism". They do not attack the Republicans much, but blame the Russian agents and the Communists for all that is happening in Spain. He says that in Hendaye there are hundreds of aeroplanes and many fields full of tanks. The Germans have war material on the frontier in fantastic quantities. He thinks that is in order to be in a position to assist either France or Spain if it were necessary.

FRICTION — He says that there are no disagreements between the Requetes, Falangists or Catholics; they are all united, and if there were any friction there are no scenes or quarrels because the "Generalissimo" would shoot them.

FRENTE DE LA JUVENTUD. — He says that it was a failure, that at the beginning many people were excited by the propaganda, then they got tired and practically the Youth Front does not exist.

STUDENTS. — ~~These are all xxxx~~ very happy to be members of the S.E.U. because they avoid military service. The S.E.U. is obligatory . The only corps they have to belong to is the University Militia. In summer they go to camps where they have military instruction and are commanded by students who are officers with some officers from the Army.

RESISTANCE OF THE PEOPLE — There is none at all. In Spain there is a totalitarian Government favourable to the Germans. In totalitarian countries there are no protests or any resistance because anyone who resisted would be shot. There are discontented people but they are silent, they do not speak because they cannot. I have seen no inscription on the walls of Gijon, the only thing there are a few robbers, the so-called Guerilleros, who rob, kill and assassinate. Three months ago at the Puerto de Somiedo, they machine-gunned a bus with travellers in it and the Civil Guard retreated. They are assisted by the discontented peasants and their families. If they came to Franco, with their hands free of blood, he would pardon them".

TERROR — At the beginning they shot many people, especially to pay off personal scores. Now it is done through the tribunals. It is a fact that shooting continues, but only for those condemned to death.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — Perhaps the end of the war will solve all these problems. The Governments of Spain will impose peace, law and order as soon as the war is over.

RESTORATION OF THE MONARCHY. — All a lie; all respectable people support Franco and the disagreements there are between the parties do not constitute a problem.

DISAGREEMENTS IN THE ARMY — He says there are none. Queipo was sent outside Spain diplomatically, as a drunkard and a rascal, as all the army is with Franco and Hitler, who have saved Spain and Europe from Communism.

RECONSTRUCTION — He says there is a lot being done in the way of reconstruction. In Gijon they have built hundreds of new houses and the town is very much changed. The people who have money are afraid it will lose its value, daily, and either build or use the money for business. 4.8.42.

REPORT No.357

JOSE PAGOS, a peasant, resident in Cuba for 11 years, returned to Spain in 1940. At that time he was a Franquist. He is very backward and extremely suspicious. At first he refused to speak, especially when he was told that he must talk to a journalist. He knows very little, since he lived in a small village in the district of Estrado and only left it to embark. He often says that he knows nothing, and can only give information about his village that is not political. Is a moderate anti-Falangist, and continues to defend Franco, of whom he has a high opinion, in many instances. The first thing he asserts is that in Spain there is not so much hunger as they say here. There is a scarcity caused by the war but it is just the same as it is everywhere, those with money eat and those without go hungry. It is not true that they requisition the peasants' crops, at least in the part of Spain he knows. He says that everyone says in Spain that they control the crops, and even if they force them to sell at the standard rate they leave the peasants enough to eat. It is obvious that everyone makes fun of the order and hides the produce "but it is not that they requisition them, but that the Government controls produce and they have to sell it at fixed rates." He says that he has a brother in the army and the soldiers are very well fed. The food is well prepared but rather scarce. In Estrada they get the ~~xxxxx~~ two regulation loaves just as before the war, but in Coruna bread is scarcer in the barracks. What everybody wants is for the war to end, anyhow, what is wanted is peace and tranquillity. When asked about the second front he says everyone is hoping for the English to*come and give orders in his house but when the people are so anxious they want something to happen to change the situation and see if it improves". On further questioning he confesses that 90% of the population are against Franco - not on his own account but on account of the hunger and misery there is.

There is no repression. People are only executed legally, through the tribunals.

He says that no one wishes Spain to enter the war, and Franco, "if he could, would have been on the other side already, but as he has the Germans on the frontier he cannot do it". The rich and the monarchists are discontented, and there are many people who were deceived and do not like the present regime.

Asked whether the people support the Germans or the Allies, he says - some on each side. A little later he says everybody hates the Germans and is afraid of their encroachments except the Falangists.

* arrive, which is natural. He says he "does not want the English to

THE DIVISION AZUL, he says was voluntary, at least "the papers say so although I do not know". (His most frequent phrase is "the papers say so but nobody knows"). He asserts that there were many volunteers and one went from the municipal government of Estrada, his village; he was the assistant to a high official. He does not know anything about the survivors. He gives the address of a Cuban who arrived in the "Comillas" with an amputated foot, a volunteer in the Blue Division. (The father of the legionary, when questioned at the port, said he was lame through an accident). He confirms the stories about Queipo and Yague. In Vigo he heard the following story - The Governor of Burgos was imprisoned for black marketeering and a son of his, a lieutenant in the army, went to Madrid to see Serrano Suner, who refused to see him and told him to see his secretary; the lieutenant refused and was referred to the Aide-de-Camp. The Aide-de-Camp unfortunately asked him what he wanted and the Governor's son said - "I wanted to put two bullets in S. Suner, but as I can't I'll put them in you instead"; he shot him and left him dead.

In Vigo a bad meal cost him 20 pts. He does not know anything about it, but the people say the Germans take everything. When we ask his opinion about the scarcity of rice, olive oil, etc. he ends by saying that he thinks too that the Nazis take it.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — He says that any regime will do as long as it is not this one. No blood to be spilt and "those in the wrong" to be pardoned. There are many people in the wrong who joined Franco, but have now repented. He says that those people fear the fall of Franco because there would be retribution, and many people would be killed, but if the Republic could come without bloodshed everyone would be delighted.

A cow is worth 3.000 pts. The Civil Guard turn a blind eye to the contraband sales of the peasants because it suits them.

REPORT No.358

Report from a youth of 17, a Cuban, born of Spanish parents, who was living in Santander for about ten years with his grandmother. He has no political convictions and in some respects is rather influenced by Nazis and reactionary propaganda. He is quite a wide-awake intelligent boy. He talks with no reservations and seems to be telling everything he knows.

ATTITUDE OF THE SPANIARDS TO THE WAR AGAINST HITLER. — He says that in Spain there are two parties, one which supports the Germans and wishes for their triumph and the other which sympathises and hopes for the victory of the Allies. In the first class S. Suner stands out, it includes all the Falange, some generals, and the middle class, government employees etc. The other class includes the majority of Requêtes, the rich whose money is in London, the workers, and all the poor in general. He says that in Spain it is only permitted to speak in favour of the Germans, and that the partisans of the Allies speak only in ~~secret and among~~ trusted friends. With the passage of time, owing to the German campaign in Russia, which the Falangists said would end in a week, there is growing a loss of confidence in the German triumph, both among the partisans of the Allies, who were dispirited at the beginning of the Russian campaign, and among the supporters of Germany themselves. He says that in Spain, except for a couple of Falangist fools, no one wants the war, not even the army chiefs, much less the soldiers. He really thinks that if they gave the order to march, no one would protest, but he does not insist on what would definitely happen. The German defeats in Russia, which are considered very important in Spain, have greatly contributed to raise the morale of the enemies of the Falange, who are now resisting it openly. (He refers to the Requetes and in ~~gxxxx~~ general to the partisans of England who are very numerous). The entry of the U.S. into the war was not considered very important, because German propaganda, which is very widespread, says that the submarines sank all the ships which came to Europe and that there was very little use in producing a quantity of war material if it never reaches Europe. He adds that the people realised that the Germans were and assassinate. Three months ago at the Puerto de Somiedo, they machine-gunned a bus with travellers in it and the Civil Guard retreated. They are assisted by the discontented peasants and their families. If they came to Franco, with their hands free of blood, he would pardon them".

TERROR — At the beginning they shot many people, especially to pay off personal scores. Now it is done through the tribunals. It is a fact that shooting continues, but only for those condemned to death.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — Perhaps the end of the war will solve all these problems, The Governments of Spain will impose peace, law and order as soon as the war is over.

RESTORATION OF THE MONARCHY. — All a lie; all respectable people support Franco and the disagreements there are between the parties do not constitute a problem.

DISAGREEMENTS IN THE ARMY — He says there are none. Queipo was sent outside Spain diplomatically, as a drunkard and a rascal, as all the army is with Franco and Hitler, who have saved Spain and Europe from Communism.

RECONSTRUCTION — He says there is a lot being done in the way of reconstruction. In Gijon they have built hundreds of new houses and the town is very much changed. The people who have money are afraid it will lose its value, daily, and either build or use the money for business. 4.8.42.

REPORT No.357

JOSE PAGOS, a peasant, resident in Cuba for 11 years, returned to Spain in 1940. At that time he was a Franquist. He is very backward and extremely suspicious. At first he refused to speak, especially when he was told that he must talk to a journalist. He knows very little, since he lived in a small village in the district of Estrado and only left it to embark. He often says that he knows nothing, and can only give information about his village that is not political. Is a moderate anti-Falangist, and continues to defend Franco, of whom he has a high opinion, in many instances. The first thing he asserts is that in Spain there is not so much hunger as they say here. There is a scarcity caused by the war but it is just the same as it is everywhere, those with money eat and those without go hungry. It is not true that they requisition the peasants' crops, at least in the part of Spain he knows. He says that everyone says in Spain that they control the crops, and even if they force them to sell at the standard rate they leave the peasants enough to eat. It is obvious that everyone makes fun of the order and hides the produce "but it is not that they requisition them, but that the Government controls produce and they have to sell it at fixed rates." He says that he has a brother in the army and the soldiers are very well fed. The food is well prepared but rather scarce. In Estrada they get the two regulation loaves just as before the war, but in Coruna bread is scarcer in the barracks. What everybody wants is for the war to end, anyhow, what is wanted is peace and tranquillity. When asked about the second front he says everyone is hoping for the English to* come and give orders in his house but when the people are so anxious they want something to happen to change the situation and see if it improves". On further questioning he confesses that 90% of the population are against Franco - not on his own account but on account of the hunger and misery there is.

There is no repression. People are only executed legally, through the tribunals.

He says that no one wishes Spain to enter the war, and Franco, "if he could, wou would have been on the other side already, but as he has the Germans on the frontier he cannot do it". The rich and the monarchists are discontented, and there are many people who were deceived and do not like the present regime.

Asked whether the people support the Germans of the Allies, he says - some on each side. A little later he says everybody hates the Germans and is afraid of their encroachments except the Falangists.

* arrive, which is natural. He says He "does not want the English to

THE DIVISION AZUL, he says was voluntary, at least "the papers say so although I do not know". (His most frequent phrase is "the papers say so but nobody knows"). He asserts that there were many volunteers and one went from the municipal government of Estrada, his village; he was the assistant to a high official. He does not know anything about the survivors. He gives the address of a Cuban who arrived in the "Comillas" with an amputated foot, a volunteer in the Blue Division. (The father of the legionary, when questioned at the port, said he was lame through an accident). He confirms the stories about Queipo and Yague, In Vigo he heard the following story - The Governor of Burgos was imprisoned for black marketeering and a son of his, a lieutenant in the army, went to Madrid to see Serrano Sunar, who refused to see him and told him to see his secretary; the lieutenant refused and was referred to the Aide-de-Camp. The Aide-de-Camp unfortunately asked him what he wanted and the Governor's son said - "I wanted to put two bullets in S. Suner, but as I can't I'll put them in you instead"; he shot him and left him dead.

In Vigo a bad meal cost him 20 pts. He does not know anything about it, but the people say the Germans take everything. When we ask his opinion about the scarcity of rice, olive oil, etc. he ends by saying that he thinks too that the Nazis take it.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — He says that any regime will do as long as it is not this one. No blood to be spilt and "those in the wrong" to be pardoned. There are many people in the wrong who joined Franco, but have now repented. He says that those people fear the fall of Franco because there would be retribution, and many people would be killed, but if the Republic could come without bloodshed everyone would be delighted.

A cow is worth 3.000 pts. The Civil Guard turn a blind eye to the contraband sales of the peasants because it suits them.

REPORT No.358

Report from a youth of 17, a Cuban, born of Spanish parents, who was living in Santander for about ten years with his grandmother. He has no political convictions and in some respects is rather influenced by Nazis and reactionary propaganda. He is quite a wide-awake intelligent boy. He talks with no reservations and seems to be telling everything he knows.

ATTITUDE OF THE SPANIARDS TO THE WAR AGAINST HITLER. — He says that in Spain there are two parties, one which supports the Germans and wishes for their triumph and the other which sympathises and hopes for the victory of the Allies. In the first class S. Suner stands out, it includes all the Falange, some generals, and the middle class, government employees etc. The other class includes the majority of Requêtes, the rich whose money is in London, the workers, and all the poor in general. He says that in Spain it is only permitted to speak in favour of the Germans, and that the partisans of the Allies speak only in secret and among trusted friends. With the passage of time, owing to the German campaign in Russia, which the Falangists said would end in a week, there is growing a loss of confidence in the German triumph, both among the partisans of the Allies, who were dispirited at the beginning of the Russian campaign, and among the supporters of Germany themselves. He says that in Spain, except for a couple of Falangist fools, no one wants the war, not even the army chiefs, much less the soldiers. He really thinks that if they gave the order to march, no one would protest, but he does not insist on what would definitely happen. The German defeats in Russia, which are considered very important in Spain, have greatly contributed to raise the morale of the enemies of the Falange, who are now resisting it openly. (He refers to the Requetes and in general to the partisans of England who are very numerous). The entry of the U.S. into the war was not considered very important, because German propaganda, which is very widespread, says that the submarines sank all the ships which came to Europe and that there was very little use in producing a quantity of war material if it never reaches Europe. He adds that the people realised that the Germans were exaggerating, since in the Russian Campaign they said that the Russians were defeated already and nevertheless months passed and the war went on. Our informant did not know the existence of the Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American pacts, although he heard some agreement spoken of, but he never knew exactly what it was. There was a lot of talk about the second front, and it is thought it will be in France. When asked what, in the event of the English landing in Spain, the attitude of the people would be, he says he thinks the Requetes would unite with them. When I told him I thought they had sent a brother of mine to the Div. Asul. he made a face as if they had sent him to the devil. "I am sorry, because those who go to Russia in general do not return, and those who do come back are crippled for life". He says that the Div. Asul was joined by the unfortunates who are, with their families, dying of hunger, and adventurers and robbers; some too because they were soldiers already and did not dare say no because they would have cut their throats if they had. He says that in the beginning a group of 40 left Santander and a few months ago ten came home, armless, legless or tubercular, the rest died of it. One of them, a captain, and tubercular, told some of his family and friends that all the German propaganda on the Russian war was an absolute lie. That the Russians never retreated until they were killed or received an order to retreat. That it is a lie to say that they have no leaders, and similarly that they have no material. He knew better than anybody what the war in Russia had already cost the Germans.

During the winter they had lost millions of men and a great deal of material. It was terifying what went on there. He says that those who come back from Russia are forbidden to speak of what they see there and therefore it is impossible to get more details. However they tell their friends in confidence.

ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY THE FRANCO-FALANGIST REGIME TO HITLER. — The reinforcements they send to the Div. Asul grow less each time. No one wants to go because the stories of the survivors are gradually passed round. He adds that the Germans pay them very highly. They give them 3.000 pts. just for crossing the frontier. A few months ago a few left Santander to concentrate in San Sebastian. It is there that they train. While before, they made propaganda out of those who were going to Russia, and saw them off at the Station, now it is done secretly.

All foodstuffs are sent to Germany, that is why there is famine in Spain. "I wish you could see all the things they send. Imagine that one can't get olive oil, which used to be so abundant in Spain". They say that in Bilbao and in Reinosa (?) and other places the factories work for the Germans. According to him there are no German soldiers in Spain, only technicians. Germans in civilian clothes are particularly common. He added that the Germans spend millions on propaganda and there are many newspapers, reviews, pamphlets etc. which are distributed gratis. The people, as a result of so much propaganda, do not know what to think on some points. They say - "If what the Germans say of Russia is true that country is doomed to disappear; there is nothing but savagery there". He says that some German propaganda postcards show Roosevelt and Churchill dressed as prostitutes, and Stalin in the middle embracing them. The people do not like this kind of propaganda. As for the German infiltration into the country, he limits himself to saying that they are the masters in Spain. He gives no data. He says that the Falange is very much weakened, that only timeservers and those who do business, thanks to the positions they occupy in it, are its supporters. Whereas, when it began, everybody wished to be Falangists, now no one takes any notice, and some people are careful to conceal the fact that they are Falangists. They say that the Requetes appear very upset. They were the ones who fought hardest in the war and now the Falangists are taking advantage of the victory. He says they do not give positions to the Requetes, and when the Falangists control the syndicates they do not give them work either. There is a great deal of discontent among the Requetes, and they have already begun to speak openly against the Falangists and those whom they blame for the present situation in Spain. They accuse them of being robbers. He says that they have printed broadsheets about the Falange, which they scatter on the streets and stick on walls at night. He adds that the syndicates have many members, because membership is obligatory, but if it were not so no one would belong. They oblige the young men to enter the "Frente [illegible] de la Juventud", although many are already losing their fear, and do not join, or, if they make them members against their will, do not pay the dues. Referring to the despatch of workers to Germany, he says the numbers were high because they offered them a good salary and food as well, but he has the impression that they were deceived, like the members of the Div. Azul. He does not know any more details.

FRICTION BETWEEN THE RULING CLASS IN SPAIN. — In the army there is a group headed by Yague and Queipo, who are opposed to Spain entering the war, and the Germans and Italians controlling Spain. He says that in conjunction with the Requetes and other individuals in the army, they were preparing a coup against Franco, and principally against S. Suner, who is the worst hated of all, but it was found out and no one knows what happened to Yague and Queipo. General Espinosa de los Monteros also had something to do with it, but he does not know exactly what his part was. Referring to Yague, he says that he was dismissed from the Air Ministry when he made a speech in favour of releasing the prisoners. Queipo refused to allow the Italians to have any olive oil. The situation of the soldiers is very bad. They hardly eat at all, and are very badly clothed. It is pitiful to see them. They all wish to be demobilised as soon as possible. The '39 draft has been demobilised and he thinks the first reserve of the '40 draft as well. He thinks it is because they cannot keep them in barracks for want of food.

THE PEOPLE'S RESISTANCE TO THE WAR AND THE REGIME — According to our informant the state of mind of the people is one of extreme hostility towards the present state of affairs, although it is not obviously shown. The Reds are in hiding. He says that the only people who are openly fighting against the Falange and the Regime in power are the Requetes. That besides the pamphlets we have referred to above, there often appear on the walls, lampoons and posters against the Falange. He remembers one which said more or less - "Famine and Theft, that is the Falange". There appeared another very like it, but he does not know what it said because they rubbed it out at once. He says the Requetes also accused the Falangists of being cowardly assassins who are only useful for doing mass assassinations ("dar Paseos").

The people take a sympathetic view of these actions of the Requetes. In the queues people xxxxxxxxx speak against the Government and the Falange. There are many prisoners. When the "nationalists" first entered Santander they killed people in thousands. The Falangists held many "paseos". They went on killing, only less than at first. The prisoners died of their harsh treatment, many were tubercular. He does not know if they give them organised assistance. Probably relations and friends. He does not know of any activity of the party, or the J.S.U. The Reds are very carefully watched. The only ones who do anything are the Requetes. In general our informant does not know any of our organisations because he was very young when the war began. The only thing he says is "the Falangists are like those they used to call the F.A.I. They go to a house, steal, take a man, take him and shoot him, and then it is finished". We could not get any information about the Union Nacional, although he gives the impression that he does not know anything about it.

He has no ideas on the future prospects. He thinks that this depends on England; there is talk that the Requetes wish to set up a King who is not a Bourbon. He does not know anything of the restoration of Don Juan. The Falangists are enemies of the Monarchy and the people do not worry much about this problem. Referring to the attack on S. Suner; Espinosa de los Monteros, Ambassador in Berlin, had on one of his visits to Madrid, a violent quarrel with Suner and in consequence resigned. He reports that then he was appointed Captain General of the Sixth Region, Burgos, and on taking over the post he made a speech in which he attacked the Falange. He reports that as a consequence he was violently dismissed. A few days later a son of the general who is a lieutenant in the army, shot at S. Suner several times, he thinks in Madrid. Arrese was wounded in consequence. The press said nothing about it. They published a notice that the Secretary of the Party was undergoing an abdominal operation.

The Italian submarine which entered Santander was damaged in the Caribbean. A few miles from Santander, and in full view of everybody, it was attacked very near the coast by two English aeroplanes which all but sank it. He says it entered harbour, listing over on one side. The English aeroplanes were not able to finish the sinking because German pursuit planes forced them to retire. When asked where the (German) planes came from he said Irun. (He gives the impression that he does not know really where their base was).

30.7.42.

REPORT 371

A young Basque 24 or 25 years old. By profession a metal-worker. Up to the beginning of the war he was working with an uncle in Zaragoza. He remained in the battle zone throughout the whole war and was mobilised in Franco's army. Is a Basque nationalist, like almost all his family. Although a workman by profession he always worked with his relations, almost always as foreman, or at least as manager. He has no political point of view nor are his class feelings very developed. He has never belonged to any syndicate. After the war was over he worked in Bilbao in a wire factory where there were about a thousand workmen. He finally left work in order to devote himself to the Black Market because, acording to him, it was impossible to live on what he was paid at the factory. He lived in Nationalist circles, they were the only ones with which he was connected. For this reason his report is rather incomplete, and in some cases lacks objectivity. He is rather reserved.

ATTITUDE OF THE SPANIARDS TOWARDS THE ANTI-HITLER WAR. — In the graphic words of the informant, 90% of Spaniards are partisans of England. The workers, peasants, petit-bourgeois, capitalists, and some of the clergy, (later he told us the majority of the Basque cures) are on the side of England, although in a passive way, and against Germany and the Falange.

The general opinion which is expressed in conversations between groups of friends, and lately also in the street, is that the defeat of Germany is inevitable, due, according to our informant, to the fact that the Allies have more economic resources and more primary materials. It is thought that the United States will be a very important factor in the realisation of victory. Also the defeats suffered by Germany on the Eastern front contribute to stressing this opinion.

In Spain everyone is tired of the war, and no one wishes Spain to take part in it. There people are in a real panic on this score. Our informant thinks that if Franco should decide to fight, in view of the terrorist nature of the Regime, the people would have to obey. Later in another conversation he said that there were people who, in that case, would hide in the mountains.

The defeats suffered by Germany on the Eastern front were well known there and contributed to increase the people's confidence. He says that they said there that, in spite of their resistance, it was obvious that the Russians were not sufficiently prepared to face a power like Germany.

The entry of the United States into the war was received with joy by the people who interpreted it as an event destined to shorten the war, of which they are all very tired over there.

The Ratification of the Anglo-Russian Pact and the American-Russian agreement is known there, although the range and content of the pact and the agreement were not known. He says that the Falangist press; only said that these nations had promised not to make a separate peace.

He does not know the agreement about the second front, although this subject is very often spoken of, with the idea that it would be the final blow to Germany. Over there they think that the opening of the Second Front will result in the rising of the French people, perhaps the Spanish people too. With this idea in mind the people often discuss possible landing places. It is thought that ~~this will take place in France,~~ although some say it might also happen in Spain. The opening of the second front would be received with joy by all.

The attitude of the people to the "Division Asul" is frankly hostile. It has no sympathy from the people, even from the very moment the recruiting was begun. He says that in the beginning a few volunteers gave their names, mainly Falangists who wished to earn merit in order to improve their position in Spain. Others went because their position in Spain was desperate and they thought it might improve if they left it. Some, who were in the army, found themselves in the position of not being able to refuse, because if they had they would have got into trouble. But they all went in the belief that they would see the war from a distance, and that they were really being sent as a symbolic deputation for the Moscow parade. He says the press made propaganda, asserting that the Spanish soldier could fight in all climates, as they had shown at Teruel. He says that when the names of the first casualties arrived, the people were glad and said "that will teach them to interfere in what does not concern them". The survivors came back disillusioned. They repent of having gone. The majority of them come back ill or crippled. He adds that the war in Russia is worse than the Press reports.it; the Spanish war was child's play compared with it. The Falangists are more reserved and make no public criticisms like the others but among their friends they also say that it was terrible. They went into action in fact just before the Russian counter-offensive began, and received the full brunt. They had many losses through bullets and the cold. Some of those who came back crippled have German iron crosses for which they get a pension, our informant does not know the amount, from the German government.

SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE FRANQUIST REGIME AND THE FALANGE TO HITLER. — Our informant does not know in what quantity they send reinforcements to the Blue Division. He thinks that there is some exaggeration on this point on the part of the Falangist Press which tries in this way to encourage enthusiasm among the young men. He knows that the place they report to and train is San Sebastian, and that from there they leave for the front. He thinks that they are still sending people, but they are only "reliefs" for those who come home. He adds that those who go to the Division Azul today, with very few exceptions, do it against their will. They get the majority of those who go from the barracks. He says that many workmen went to Germany on account of the lack of food and work. He does not know how many but he thinks a fair quantity. He says that the people take these things calmly generally, because they cannot do anything against them. He only heard that in Irun there had been some scene with the Blue Division or with the workers who were going to Germany but he gives not actual details, saying that it is dangerous to try and know too much.

In Spain the most fervent supporters of the Nazis are - Suner, Munos Grande, Moscardo and other generals, and especially the "idealist" Falangists, or those who committed injustices or profiteered and are afraid of "the tables being turned".

He says that the Falange is only the shadow of what it was during the war. That at the beginning many people joined it for safety's sake, but now it is a dead thing that no one takes any notice of. The same happened with the "Flechas", "Frente de la Juventud" etc. The syndicates have many members, because membership is obligatory in order to get work. The workers would not join them if they could help it. He says that all the directors are Falangist bureaucrats who take advantage of their position to steal all they can. He cites as an example the fact that employers are obliged to pay something as a contribution to the subsidy allocated to workmen with large families, but he says that the Falangists do not pay it to anybody, but spend it themselves. For these and other similar reasons there is a lot of discontent among the employers.

Our informant says that they are still sending large quantities of food to Germany, also iron and other materials. The people know that if there is famine in Spain it is because of the Germans and the "Black Marketeers"

Asked about the production of the metal factories in Bilbao, he says that they are working at pressure, but he does not know if it is war material. He knows that pig-iron is being sent to France, he imagines it is intended for Germany. Iron ore is also sent to France by sea.

FRICTION AMONG THE RULING CLASSES. — He knows that in the army there is a surge of feeling against the Falange, but he says that it has no outside repercussions. The only incident known there was the case of Yague and Queipo de Llano. In general there is a great feeling against the Falange among the soldiers. The consequence is that they make life impossible for Falangists in the army.

He says that the majority of the Basque Priests are enemies of Germany, of the Falange and of Franco. They are very indignant about the executions of nationalist priests carried out by France. Even today there are many of them in prisons. He says that the priests devote voluntary masses to praying that Spain may not enter the war.

He says that other members of the clergy, although they are opposed to the Catholic persecutions in Germany and Poland, support Franco because they believe that only with his help can they preserve their positions.

He adds that the richest and most influential people there do not wish to hold official posts because they feel that there will be a change in Spain and they do not wish to have the responsibility of the crimes committed by others. Official posts are occupied by a series of bandits.

Hatred for the Falange is general in the majority of social classes. He says that even those who belonged to the Falange before, young students, employees or just rich people, do not wish to have anything to do with it now, and say that the Falange is going to the dogs.

He adds that in general everybody hopes that the triumph of England will cause a change of government in Spain and so they confine themselves to waiting although there is talk of a possible coup d'etat by the soldiers.

RESISTANCE OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST ENTERING THE WAR AND AGAINST THE FRANQUIST REGIME — The people wish to see the situation change as soon as possible, but they believe that the solution must come from outside. According to our informant, there is no thought of fighting against ~~the~~ regime. He says that the workers in the factory in which he worked spoke openly against the regime but he does not know that there was any activity. (Given the character of the informant we may suppose that even if there was he would take pains to ignore it). From time to time the women rioted in the queues; at first they shut them up, now they say nothing. He asserts that every day the people speak more openly against the regime. The contribution to "Auxilio Social" was obligatory before but now no one pays. When the young ladies of "Auxilio Social" beg for subscriptions in the streets and ask the reason for refusal, some people answer - "because I do not wish to".

He says that when Franco was at Bilbao the people remained in their houses and he was received only by four "chats bottes" in the offices of the Falange. At the end of Franco's speech not a soul applauded. Then some Falangist young ladies said, half in tears, "what we must do is buy a machine gun and shoot them all".

Assistance to the prisoners, according to our informant is given by relations and friends. There is no organised assistance, but he proceeds to tell us that certainly there have been collections sometimes in the factory in favour of the prisoners, but "by groups of friends". He does not know of the activity of any organisation, as such. The nationalists, according to him (he is a nationalist) are the ones who have some organisation.

They distributed there a speech made by Aguirre in America. One of ~~the~~ Prieto's was also in circulation. He has no news of the other organisations although he admits that if they have any organisation they would not go and tell him about it.

When he is asked about the activity of the different organisations of which the Frente Popular is composed, and the attitude of the militant party members of these organisations, he asserts categorically that there the people are completely united, and there is now no talk of socialists, anarchists, communists, republicans etc. All treat each other as comrades, and help each other as far as they can. In Spain, according to our informant, there are only now enemies of Franco and the Falange, who maintain a strict unity among themselves; they discuss the progress of the war together, comment on the situation etc. He says that the people wish for unity, regret the disunion there was before in Spain and the quarrels between different parties and anti-fascist organisations.

He did not know of the shooting of Larra or Diegues. The execution of Larra impressed him very much and he said that in order to do what Larra had done one would need plenty of guts.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — He repeats again that they believe in Spain that the triumph of England will cause a change in the situation. (We must point out that for some time there have been currents in the Basque nationalism which have been seeking for a "solution" of their national problem with the assistance of England, transforming the "Pais Basque" into an English protectorate or Dominion or something like that, and even during the Spanish war there were individuals who thought that at the critical moment the Basques would receive help from the English)

Our informant told us at the beginning that there people spoke only in favour of England, but after considerable circumlocution he confessed that the workers also sympathised very much with the Soviet Union, although conversations in this direction were much more restrained. He added that the people were quite well informed about the course of events as they listen daily to the bulletins of Radio London, and some also listen to those of Radio Moscow.

The people in general are in favour of a solution on the basis of the Republic. Others are afraid that the fall of Franco will result in a revolution "worse than the other" and for this reason they are more hesitant. Those individuals are specially the rich. If they believed that the Republic would be established without bloodshed they would be in complete agreement with it.

In Spain they believe that Hitler may be defeated in 1942, especially if the Second Front is started. They also say that Russia is bearing the brunt of the fight.

Speculation about a monarchist restoration has neither delighted or depressed the people. The possibility does not arouse much interest.

The people, who, according to our informant, have most prestige in Euskadi (Basque national territory) are Aguirre and Prieto, especially the former.

As regards conditions of material life he assures us that they are terrible and that is the fundamental reason why all the people have turned against Franco. There is much talk of "no home without bread or a roof", but that does not improve the situation.

All business is controlled by the "Black Marketeers" of the Falange who, sheltered behind the Committees of Supply, requisition the crops from the peasants at the standard rate, and instead of selling them to the people at the standard rate they reduce rationing to almost nothing in order to compel the people to buy articles on the Black Market, at a price which will give them the profits. He says that those who have no money to buy things contraband (and they are the majority since salaries have hardly been increased at all in comparison with pre-war standards) die of hunger. He gives prices which correspond with those for other regions of Spain".

NOTE: the military and naval information contained in these reports has been extracted and supplied to the S.O.I. Trinidad, and the Military Adviser, Imperial Censorship, Trinidad, under the reference numbers S.E./S.O.I.1, and S.E./M.A.1 respectively.

T/9.9.42.
Copies to London, New York, Bermuda & Jamaica.

[illegible]

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

TEDESCHI, LUIS	
201-0289247	379-001-002
SEX M	DBD-76473
	04 SEP 44
CIT ARGE	FBI
	P8

LETTER DROP
CONNECTED W/OR MENTIONED IN PALACIOS-NUNEZ CASE /INVOLVING SPAN COMMUNIST NETWORK, PRINCIPALLY IN LATIN AMER/ SEE PALACIOS-NUNEZ CASE INDEX FOR VOLUME /S/ AND PAGE /S/

DATE 15 OCT 74 09190912

201-289247

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

For Betty

Bob Tarr

1943 addresses.
Under same name

① Estados Unidos 2366
Buenos Aires

② Pichincha 969
Buenos Aires.

Collateral information —

On original no additional —

29 AUG 1975

See if field can furnish any additional
background info —

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 05-979

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: HEADQUARTERS, RI

DATE: 9 December 1960

FROM: ANN EGERTER, CI/SIG, 1408J

ACTION: ☑ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters. (X2621)

SECTION I: All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: Cryptonym or pseudonym will be entered in Headquarters.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☑ NON-SENSITIVE

201 NO. 1. 289247

SOURCE DOCUMENT: HABW-6515-12 oct 60

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): TEDESCHI, Luis

SEX 3: ☑ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

PHOTO 4.: ☐ YES ☑ NO

BIRTH DATE 5: D ? M ? Y ?

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.: ?

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.: ?

OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.: 1 CM 2 58 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION:

OCC/POS. CODE 8.:

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM:

PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.: Arg~~entina~~ 004

ACTION DESK 11.: ~~CI/SIG~~ 731

2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.: ~~[illegible]~~

3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.:

COMMENTS: cit: ?

. c 1943 was an active member of the Spanish Communist Party.

. Address 1943: Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

. Suspected Soviet agent Info rptd. 1943

CS Copy

201- 289247

PERMANENT CHARGE: ☑ YES ☐ NO

RESTRICTED FILE: ☐ YES ☑ NO

SIGNATURE: Ann Egerter

FORM 10-57 831a SECRET RECORD COPY (38)

FBI doc.
27 Jan 69 (NY)
RE: Carl Winter, Helen Winter
DBC 41305

FBI doc.
1 Feb. 1972 (NY)
RE: Jim Beynon
Bufile: NY 100-175210
DBD 31051

FBI doc.
26 [illegible]:Dec. 1968 (Seatlle)
RE: Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov
DBC 39101

FBI doc.
22 [illegible] April 1963 (Detroit)
RE: The United States Festival Committee, Inc.
Bufile: 100-436225
DBA 39107

FBI doc.
24 Jan. 1969 (NY)
RE: Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov, Galina Sergeyevna Orekhova
DBC-41307

FBI doc.
24 June 1966 (Wash.)
RE: Communist Party, United STates of America; International Relations
Bufile: 100-3-81
DBB 51452

FBI doc.
28 Feb. 1974 (NY)
RE: World Peace Council
DBD 69841

FBI cable
11 Oct 1974 (NY)
RE: Communist Party, USA, International Relations
DBD 81515

FBI doc. 18
18 Oct. 1974 (Chicago)
RE: World Peace Council
Bufile: 100-41972
DBD 82108

FBI doc.
27 Jan 69 (NY)
RE: Carl Winter, Helen Winter
DBC 41305

FBI doc.
1 Feb. 1972 (NY)
RE: Jim Beynon
Bufile: NY 100-175210
DBD 31051

FBI doc.
26 16:Dec. 1968 (Seatlle)
RE: Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov
DBC 39101

FBI doc.
22 29 April 1963 (Detroit)
RE: The United States Festival Committee, Inc.
Bufile: 100-436225
DBA 39107

FBI doc.
24 Jan. 1969 (NY)
RE: Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov, Galina Sergeyevna Orekhova
DBC-41307

FBI doc.
24 June 1966 (Wash.)
RE; Communist Party, United STates of America; International Relations
Bufile: 100-3-81
DBB 51452

FBI doc.
28 Feb. 1974 (NY)
RE: World Peace Council
DBD 69841

FBI cable
11 Oct 1974 (NY)
RE: Communist Party, USA, International Relations
DBD 81515

FBI doc. 18
18 Oct. 1974 (Chicago)
RE: World Peace Council
Bufile: 100-41972
DBD 82108

FBI doc.
20 Aug. 1975 (NY)

RE: International Conference of Solidarity with the Independence of Puerto Rico, Havana, Cuba, September, 1975
DBD 90674

FBI doc.
26 April 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Michele Allison Winter
Field office file: 100-21782
DBA 1530

FBI doc.
16 Feb. 1971 (NY)
RE: Communist Party, USA, International Relations
Bufile: 100-3-81
DBD 5593

FBI doc.
2 Feb. 1971 (NY)
RE: Communist Party, USA, INternational Relations
Bufile: 100-3-81
DBD 4464

Winter

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/DBD-97891	06 JUL 76	201-0289246			

DOC. SUBJECT

HELEN MARY WINTER

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

THIS REFER TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED [illegible] CONTROL
SECTION BY TS#768033

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)* WINTER, HELEN MARY	201- 0289246

FORM 12-72 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/DBD-97886	15 JUN 76	201-0289246			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem No., etc - if applicable)*

THIS REFER TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED I[illegible]
SECTION [illegible] TS#210307

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)* WINTER, HELEN MARY	201- 0289246

FORM 12-72 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622

(7)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/DBD-91238	08 September 1975	201-289246			

DOC. SUBJECT
HELEN MARY WINTER

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

THIS REFER TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY TS# 208557

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	
WINTER, HELEN MARY	201- 289246

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/000-07429	16 Apr. 76	201-289246			

DOC. SUBJECT

HELEN MARY WINTER

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
[illegible]
[illegible] TS#_207016 [illegible]

DRD

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)*	
WINTER, HELEN MARY	201- 289246

FORM 12-72 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622 (7-48)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION					
DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/000-07430	27 Apr. 75	201-289246			

DOC. SUBJECT

HELEN MARY WINTER

SOURCE INFORMATION		
SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

THIS REFER TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY TS-207826

=135

Also
DBD-87447 TS-207886 DRD'd
DBD-90319 TS-208391 DRD'd

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)* WINTER, HELEN MARY	201- 289246			

FORM 12-72 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET E-2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622 (7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/DBD-95432	03 MAR 76	201-0289246			

DOC. SUBJECT
HELEN MARY WINTER

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

THIS REFER TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL SECTION BY TS# 208998

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last. First. Middle) WINTER, HELEN MARY	201- 0289246

FORM 12-72 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/DBD-93305	13 February 1976	201-289246			

DOC. SUBJECT

HELEN MARY WINTER

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

THIS REFER TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY ____TS# 208972____

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)*

WINTER, HELEN MARY

201- 289246

FORM 12-72 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622

(7-46)

14-00000

D'sh

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT: HENRY WINSTON

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 201-006887

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. FBI/DHQ-80203

4. DATE 26 Sep 74

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFER TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY ---TS-206249----------------

Cross reference
deleted from
Star

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201- 289 246

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN
201-0289246
SEX F

200-004-208/04
DPD-69841
28 FEB 74
FBI
PR

MBR U.S. DELEGATION TO WORLD CONGRESS OF PEACE FORCES, MOSCOW, USSR, 25-31 OCT 73, SPONSORED BY WPC.

DATE 27 MAR 74   09086070

201-289246

SECRET   E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN	
201-0289246	100-009-022
SEX M	DBD-90674
	20 AUG 75
	FBI
	P2

FROM THE POLITICAL COMMISSION OF THE CP-USA MBR DELEGATION U.S. SUPPORT COMM. FOR THE INDEPENDENCE CONF IN SOLIDARITY W/THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO RICO

DATE 12 SEP 75 09327216

201-0289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN	
201-0289246	201-0850469
SEX F	DBD-75231
	31 MAY 74
	FBI

SECY OF INTERNATL AFFAIRS CPUSA INQUIRES RE SONDRA SANDY PATRINOS IF SHE INTERESTED IN THE TRIP TO MONGOLIA

DATE 27 JUN 74 09136546

201-289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN	
201-0289246	100-004-123
SEX F	DBD-74602
	13 JUN 74
	FBI

MBR OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CPUSA.
MBR OF A DELEGATION FROM CP USA WHO VISITED MOSCOW TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION W/LEADERSHIP CPSU DURING PERIOD 4-10 MAY 74

DATE 23 JUL 74 09144083

201 - 0289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN	
201-0289246	200-004-208/04
SEX F	DBD-32108
	18 OCT 74
	FBI
	P2

DISCUSSED QUESTION OF CHIL AND USA GOVM INVOLVEMENT

DATE 22 NOV 74 09210285

201- 289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN	
201-0289246	201-0006887
SEX F	DBD-78208
	06 SEP 74
CIT USA	FBI

SCHEDULED TO DEPART FR NY 01 MAY 74 DESTINED FOR MOSCOW VIA AEROFLOT TOGETHER WITH FERN AND HENRY WINSTON /201-0006887/ AND JAMES JACKSON /201-0011793/

DATE 04 NOV 74 09199669

201-289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN	
201-0289246	201-0133419
SEX F	DBD-81515
	10 OCT 74
	FBI

OBSERVED ENTERING PREMISES OF POLD UN MISSION NYC. MBRS OF CPUSA

DATE 24 OCT 74 09195351

201-289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

X-REF. SHEET   S-E-C-R-E-T   DATE 26/10/74

X-REF.	SYMB. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-0289246	DBD -80203	26 SEP 74	201-0006887

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT(S) ARE CROSS REFERENCED TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN. FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF THE FILE CONTAINING THE RECORD COPY DOCUMENT, CALL FILES SECTION, EXTENSION 4127.

S-E-C-R-E-T   E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FILE IN 201-0289246

FBI document
10 May 1974 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
18 July 1974 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
15 May 1974 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
19 Nov. 1973 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
22 Aug. 1973 (NY)
Subject: Tour of Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics by Representatives of Central Committee, Communist Party, USA, July 13 - Aug. 12, 1973

FBI document
30 March 1973 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
23 March 1973 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
10 January 1973 (NY)
Subject: Gus Hall, aka/ Helen Mary Winter, aka
Bufiles: 61-8077 and 100-423449

FBI document
20 December 1972
Subject: Gus Hall, aka; Helen Mary Winter, aka
Bufile: 61-8077 and 100-0423499

FBI document
15 June 1972 (NY)
Subject: Helen Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX F DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
MET WITH JIM BEYNON, CANADA, NOV 71

100-004-124
DBD -31051
01 FEB 72
FBI

R 7202281340

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)*	201- 289246			

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN	
201-289246	200-004-324
SEX M DOB ?	DBD -04464
	02 FEB 71
CIT ?	FBI
OCC ?	

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LITERATURE COMMISSION VENEZUELA TO ATTENDED THE IV PARTY CONGRESS

R 7102160350

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN 201-289246 SEX F DOB ?	200-004-324 DBD -05593 16 FEB 71 FBI

CIT ?
OCC ?
HAD DEPARTED USA 21 JAN 71 FOR VENEZUELA TO ATTEND THE IV PARTY CONGRESS AS DELEGATES OF CP USA

R 7103030740

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
SECRET
(7-46)

FBI Doc.
17 Sept. 1970 (Wash.)
RE;Communist Party, USA Contacts with Communist Parties of Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru
(NOFORN, NO DISSEM ABROAD)
DBC-93754

FBI Doc.
14 May 1970 (Wash.)
RE: Contacts Between Communist Party, USA and Communist Party of Venezuela
DBC 82704

FBI Doc.
24 June 19~~8~~669 (NY)
RE: Helen Winter
Bufile: 100-423449)
DBC 54933

FBI doc.
20 May 1969 (NY)
RE: Helen Winter
Bufile : 100-423449
DBC 52075

~~FBI doc.~~

FBI doc.
10 Jan. 69 (NY)
RE: Carl Winter, Helen Winter
DBC 39844

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

```
WINTER, HELEN
201-289246                             201-760835
SEX F DOB ?                            DBC -41305
                                       27 JAN 69
CIT ?                                  FBI
OCC ?
HAD RETURNED FROM A TRIP AND ARRIVED FOR
WORK AT COMMUNIST PARTY, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA /CP, USA/ HEADQUARTERS ON JAN 27,
69



                                 R 6902051315
```

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

01150

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

```
WINTER, HELEN
201-289246                          201-752914
SEX F DOB ?                         DBC -41307
                                    24 JAN 69
CIT ?                               FBI
OCC ?                               P4
SEC ORGANIZATION COMMISSION, CP, USA.
MBR NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CP USA ON TRIP
7 DEC 68 TO CONNECTICUT W/HUSBAND CARL
WINTER /201-760835/, B. M. OREKHOV
/201-752914/ AND WIFE GALINA SERGEYEVNA

                              R 6902061627
```

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

C/55

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX M DOB ?

201-752914
DBC -39101
26 DEC 68
FBI

CIT USA
OCC ?
SECRETARY OF THE ORGANIZATION COMMISSION, CPUSA, ALSO A MBR OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CPUSA
IN CONTACT WITH BORIS M. OREKHOV, 201-752914

R 5901141020

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

FBI doc.
18 April 1967 (Wash.)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
BUfile: (SC) 100-423449
DBB 77957

FBI doc.
8 Nov. 1960
RE: Helen Mary Winter
DBF 62099

FBI doc.
26 July 1967 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 88376

FBI doc.
2 June 1967 (NY)
RE; Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 81991

FBI doc.
D 23 May 1967 (Seattle)
RE: Helen Mary Winter

Bufile: &Ellad Field Office 100-17363
DBB 81995

FBI doc.
27 April 1967 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 78966

FBI doc.
18 April 1967 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 78724

FBI doc
18 Jan. 1967 (NY)

RE? Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77690

KENT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX F DOB ?

CIT USA
OCC ?
< USA, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
COMMUNIST PARTY FUNCTIONARY WHO WORKS IN
NATIONAL OFFICE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK.

100-004-121
DBB -51452
24 JUN 66
FBI

R 6607180197

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX F DOB ?

CIT USA
OCC CP OFFICIAL
< USA
ELECTED TO NATL COMM CPUSA DEC 59 IN
CHARGE OF CP SCHOOL IN MARXIST TRAINING
IN NEW YORK CITY, MAR 66.

201-762338
DBB -51958
20 JUN 66
FBI
P2

R 6607122280

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI doc.
6 July 1966 (Seattle)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Field office file: SE 100-17363
DBB 77913

FBI doc
21 Jan. 1966 (NY)
RE; Helen Mary Winter

Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77914

FBI doc.
26 Oct. 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77915

FBI doc.
30 July 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77916

FBI doc.
5 May 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77917

FBI doc.
12 Feb. 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77918

FBI doc.
20 Nov. 1964 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter, nee Wagenknecht
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77919

FBI doc.
20 August 1964 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77920

FBI doc.
25 Feb. 1964 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77921

FBI doc.
17 May 1962 (Detroit)
RE: Comgress of Canadian Women, Information Concerning
DBA 10048

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

THE UNITED STATES FESTIVAL COMMITTEE, INCORPORATED (EIGHTH WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.	200	004	236	01

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DBA -39107

4. DATE 22 APR 63

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-289246

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN (201-289246)
DE T-2 ADVISED DURING SEPTEMBER, 1962, THAT ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1962, CARL AND HELEN WINTER HELD A BUFFET SUPPER OPENHOUSE AT THEIR RESIDENCE, 9556 BURNETT, DETROIT, IN HONOR OF THEIR DAUGHTER, MICHELE WINTER, UPON HER RETURN FROM THE EIGHTH WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL.
DE T-3 ADVISED ON MARCH 18, 1963, THAT CARL WINTER WAS THE STATE CHAIRMAN OF THE MDCP
DE T-1, ON MARCH 20, 1963, ADVISED THAT HELEN WINTER WAS CURRENT MEMBER OF THE YOUTH CLUB OF THE MDCP.
DE T-2 STATED THAT AT THE OPENHOUSE MICHELE WINTER GAVE A TALK AND TOLD OF VISITING SOCIALIST CITIES, SCHOOLS, FACTORIES, HOUSING, AND TRANSPORTATION. SHE TOLD OF VISITING LENINGRAD, VOLGAGRAD, MOSCOW, AND EAST GERMANY.
MICHELE EXHIBITED SOUVENIRS WHICH SHE BROUGHT BACK, AMONG THEM THE RED FLAG AND THE EAST GERMAN FLAG. MICHELE SAID SHE HAD MOST OF HER SOUVENIRS SENT BACK FROM THE COUNTRIES FROM WHERE SHE ACQUIRED THEM AND CARRIED HER LITERATURE IN THE BOTTOM OF HER BAG, WHICH HAD A SHOULDER STRAP. SHE SAID THIS WAY SHE HAD NO TROUBLE WITH CUSTOMS AND IMPORT AUTHORITIES IN THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-289246

FBI doc.
30 Nov. 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBF 96370

FBI doc.
24 Aug. 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77922

FBI doc.
21 June 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBF 81488

FBI doc.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT MICHELE ALLISON WINTER	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 100 004 134
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DBA -01530 4. DATE 26 APR 61
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
201-289246

13. TRANSFERRED TO
RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN (201-289246)
SUBJ. WAS BORN 6/25/24. AT LOS ANGELES, CALIF., RESIDES AT 9556 BURNETTE, DETROIT. SUBJ.'S PARENTS ARE CARL AND HELEN WINTER, BOTH MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE. CP, USA. INFORMANT ADVISED DURING 4/61, THAT SUBJ. IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE CP. SUBJ. WAS REPORTED AS AN ASSOCIATE EDITOR OF "NEW HORIZONS". SUBJ. ATTENDED CLASSES IN MARXISM INSTRUCTED BY CP MEMBERS. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES SET FORTH. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS CONTACTED DURING 4/61, COULD FURNISH NO ADDITIONAL SUBVERSIVE INFORMATION. SUBJ. IS A FRESHMAN AT WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, DETROIT.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-289246

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI doc.
24 Jan. 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter, nee Wagenknecht, et al.
DBF 67557

FBI doc.
6 Sept. 1960 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77923

FBI doc.
3 June 1960 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-0423449
[illegible] DBB 77924

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO : RID/201 Section

DATE [illegible]

FROM: [illegible]

1. ACTION: OPEN ☑ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

ROOM NO. [illegible]

PHONE [illegible]

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☑ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO. [illegible]

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

7. NAME (Last) [illegible] (First) [illegible] (Middle) [illegible]

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

NAME VARIANT

10. TYPE	(Last) (First) (Middle)
[illegible]	[illegible]
H	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]

VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D [illegible] M [illegible] Y [illegible]

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH [illegible]

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible]

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION [illegible]

CODE [illegible]

15. CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

16. AFFILIATION CODE P B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

63	64	65		66	67	68	69	70	71		72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION (Clear text)

19. ORG/GROUP CODE [illegible]

20. OCCUPATION/POSITION (Clear text) [illegible] National Committee, [illegible] Party, USA, Michigan [illegible]

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION [illegible]

22. ACTION DESK [illegible]

23. CODE 93[illegible]

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

26. CRYPTONYM

27. PSEUDONYM

28. COMMENTS

Wife of Carl Winter, head of the Michigan District of the Communist Party, USA, [illegible] N.Y. CO.

29. SIGNATURE

30. IDN-

201-[illegible]

FORM 8-60 831 TEST OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 201-289249
Vol II

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
8 Dec. 78	8 Dec. 78	Betsy Wolf	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

FBI Doc.
29 Sept. 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
DBA-23746

SECRET

To: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

From: Deputy Director (Plans)

Subject: Semen Spiridon [illegible], also known as
Semen [illegible]
Internal Security - Russia

1. Reference is made to your letter dated 12 July 1962, entitled as above, to our CSCI-3/772,735, dated 25 September 1962, and to your file number 105-93295.

2. Information from our representative in Paris indicates that one Joseph [illegible], born 10 May [illegible], [illegible], USSR, possibly a Soviet citizen, living at [illegible], France, and a Russian refugee, was listed by the French Ministry of Interior as potentially dangerous during the visit of Nikita Khrushchev to France from 15-30 March 1960. Approximately two thousand other individuals were also listed.

3. An official French liaison service reported on 9 November 1962, that Josef [illegible] (sic) had not attracted their attention. Our representative advises that this is tantamount to a "no trace" reply.

CSCI 3/773,830

SR/CI/RED - L. Lyon 4 Dec 1962
Distribution:
Orig and 1 addressee
1 C/CI
1 CI/Liaison
1 CI/R&A
1 SR/CI/P/dl
~~1 RID (201-257249)~~
1 WE/3
1 CI/OG/SS
1 Comeback
1 SR/CI/RED

Based on OFPA-65186, 20 Nov 1962

SECRET

CS COPY

201-257249

FBI doc.
29 Nov. 1962 (PHiladelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBA 28575

FBI doc.
02 20 November 1962
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
DBA 28182

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSED	PROCESSING ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SR

INFO
Chief, WE
Chief, EE
Chief of Station, Vienna

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris WM

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE,
Jozef KOZAK [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: None; for information only.

REFERENCES: A. OFPW-34223, 25 September 1962
B. OFPA-67615, 16 October 1962 (not sent Vienna.)

In their Memorandum No. D-5054 dated 9 November 1962, UNBOUND informed us that Subject had not attracted UNBOUND's attention. This is tantamount to a "no trace" reply.

Robert G. Lamprell
Robert G. LAMPRELL

Distribution:
- 2 - SR - [illegible]
- 2 - WE
- 2 - EE
- 2 - Vienna

201-289249
~~[illegible]~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED 16 Nov 62	DATE DISPATCHED 20 Nov 1962
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFPA- 68186	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-289249	

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
XXXXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SR

INFO.
Chief, WE
Chief, EE

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Josef *KOZAK

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
ACTION: None; FYI only.

REFERENCE: OFPW-34223 of 25 September 1962

201-289249

1. According to Paris Station files:

Joseph KOSAK AKA KOZAK
DPOB: 10 May 1901, Szrdoriben, USSR
Possibly a Soviet citizen
ADDRESS: La Seine, France
Russian Refugee

was listed by French Ministry of Interior as potentially dangerous during the visit of Nikita KHRUSHCHEV to France, 15 - 30 March 1960. Approximately two thousand other individuals were also listed (SOURCE: OFP-8178 of 27 April 1960, page 35).

2. Since Paris Station has terminated AEDOGMA/1, it will not be possible to obtain further information on Subject from him.

3. We are querying UNBOUND for information on Subject.

Robert G. Lamprell
Robert G. LAMPRELL

Distribution:
~~3~~ - SR
2 - WE
2 - EE

INDEX X

CS COPY

201-289249

DATE TYPED 10 Oct 62	DATE DISPATCHED OCT 1 5 1962
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFPA-67615	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-289249	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Paris , COS, Vienna

INFO

FROM
Chief SR, via Chief, WE and Chief, EE

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ aka Semen POHORILIW (201-289249) and Jozef KOZAK aka Osyp KOZAK

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: See below

1. Attached for your information is an FBI report on an interview with Andrij DIDKOWSKYJ, contact of Semen POHORILYJ and correspondent of Antin NYKYPORUK.

2. The FBI has requested any information available in our files or through KUBARK sources concerning KOZAK's current activities and contacts with the Soviets. The information on KOZAK in the last paragraph on page 3 and the top of page 4 of the attachment, is the latest information we have on KOZAK. This same information was received from Paris in CFPA-55817 of 7 December 1960 and gave KOZAK's address as 26 rue Caston Jaillon, Vesines Chalette, Loiret.

3. To Paris: We would appreciate any information available on KOZAK's current activities and contacts. You may query liaison.

4. To Vienna: The interview with DIDKOWSKYJ contains a statement that KOZAK left the camp in Salzburg for France with NYKYPORUK in 1948 or 1949. Other information indicates that KOZAK came to France in 1946 from Munich. We would appreciate your checking Station and liaison files for any information on KOZAK, including biographic data and the date of his departure for France (or Munich). Please send a copy of your reply to Paris.

Doris M. Killgo

Paul K. Stockwood

201-289249

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Paris w/a
2 - Vienna w/a

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
10 Sept. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
25 SEP 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPW-34223

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-2892

CLASSIFICATION
CS COPY

ROUTING INITIAL
1 - SR/CI/RED
RID/ 1 - EE/A
2 - WE/3
RID/
~~RID/RC~~
~~RID/FI~~
SR/C/Ba 5027
DESTROY

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SR/CI/RED	L. Lyon	tb	6991

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/CI/RED	13 Sept 62	
SR/2		
EE/A	18 Sept	
CI/OPS/SS	20	J. Evans
WE/3		R. Ow

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WE/3	24 Sept	Robert E. Owen

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

CS COPY

DISPATCH

SECRET

25 SEP 1962

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon [illegible], also known as
Semen [illegible]
Internal Security - Russia

1. Reference is made to your letter dated 12 July 1962, entitled as above, and to your file number [illegible].

2. The files of this Agency contain no additional information on Josef [illegible], also known as Osyp [illegible]. We are querying our sources abroad for any information available on [illegible] and his current activities and contacts with the Soviets. You will be advised of the results of our inquiries.

CSCI-3/772,723

SR/CI/RED/L.Lynn 13 September 1962

Distribution:
Addressee - Orig. & 1
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/R&A
1 - SR/CI/P/A1
1 - RID (201-289249)
1 - WE/3
1 - EE/A
1 - CI/OO/SS
1 - Comeback
1 - SR/CI/RED

Coord. with

CS COPY

201-289249
ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE 13 Sep 62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FBI doc.
24 Aug. 1962 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBA 20582

EAB FBI64066

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

1 cc w/o ATT to [illegible]/A
1 cc w/o ATT to [illegible]/3

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SR/CI/RED	5C45	[illegible]		
2. ~~Trudy~~ Layon				fa
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.	8 AUG 62	13 44		
17. RID/FI				

The report provides bio data on Krivenko & Burchart. The investigation indicates there is no point of contact between these persons and Pokarelin —

See DBA-23746, 11-10-62 for some info

9 AUG 62 10 41

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-289249

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

3 Aug 62

DOCUMENT NUMBER

EAVA 30210

FORM 12-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
EAVA-30210

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO
Chief, SR; Chief, EE; Chief, WE

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
201-289249
29-6-106/3

FROM
Chief of Station, Austria

DATE
3 August 1962

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA/1
Semen POROHILIY -

RE: "43" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☒ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information.

REFERENCE(S)

A. EGMW-10664, 23 May 1961
B. EASA-5566, 24 November 1961

In accordance with a recent request from ODENVY, we queried our liaison in regard to Subject and his contacts in Austria. A copy of their reply, which has been passed directly to ODENVY in Bern, is attached for your information.

Christine R. Kerbe

ATTACHMENT: h/w
Liaison Reply dated 24 July 1962 (in German)

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris w/Att.
2 - Chief, EE w/o Att.
1 - Chief, SR w/Att.
1 - Chief, WE w/o Att.

31 July 1962

CS COPY

1 Encl. H/W

201-289249

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

ATTACHMENT TO EAVA-30210

Subject

Betr.: POHORILYI Semen Spiridow,
BURCHART Vera,
Dr. KRIWENKO Gregor

Bezug: Do. Anfrage

Reply to Question.

Dr. Gregor KRIWENKO (Arzt, 3.12.1900 in Kiew/UdSSR geb., seit 1955 durch Einbürgerung österr. StA., Kremsmünster 80, Oberösterr., wh.) war seinerzeit in der Ukraine als Arzt tätig und kam im Jahre 1943 mit seiner Gattin Maria geb. Kurotschina und seinen beiden Kindern als Flüchtling nach Österreich. Von 1943 bis 1945 war er als Arzt im Krankenhaus Ried i. I., später im Allgemeinen Krankenhaus in Linz und dann bis 1952 als Flüchtlingsarzt im ehemaligen Flüchtlingslager Ried i. I. angestellt. Seit 1952 geht er keiner geregelten Arbeit mehr nach. Als Befürsorgter übt er noch fallweise stillschweigend geduldet die Heilpraxis aus. Im übrigen betätigt er sich als Organist und Chordirigent in der griechisch-orthod. Kirche in Salzburg. Seine Gattin, die seinerzeit in der Ukraine angeblich Sängerin war, ist gleichfalls musikalisch tätig. Der Sohn Dr. KRIWENKOS studiert Sprachen, die Tochter ist kränklich und steht in keinem Arbeitsverhältnis. Ein Bruder Dr. KRIWENKOS ist angeblich noch in der UdSSR als Arzt angestellt.

Dr. KRIWENKO lebt mit seiner Familie in sehr bescheidenen Verhältnissen, ist sehr religiös eingestellt und als Antikommunist bekannt. Die ganze Familie genießt einen guten Ruf.

Veronika (Vera) BURCHART geb. Chermilewski (17.2.1901 in BAR/Ukraine geb., seit 1957 durch Einbürgerung österr.StA., Untereitzing 32, Bez. Ried i.I./Oberösterr., wh.) kam mit ihrem Gatten Wilhelm BURCHART (26.4.1887 in Jedenier/Ukr. geb.)

3 Aug 62 SECRET CS COPY

encl #1 TO EAVA 30210

201-28924

gleichfalls im Jahre 1943 als Flüchtling von der Ukraine nach Österreich. Wilhelm BURCHART war in der Ukraine Fabriksdirektor. 1961 verstarb er in Ried i.I. Veronika BURCHART erhält eine Rente. Sie tritt in keiner Weise nachteilig in Erscheinung.

Die bisherigen Erhebungen erbrachten keine Anhaltspunkte dafür, daß die Vorgenannten Verbindung zu dem in Philadelphia lebenden Semen Spiridow POHORILYI haben. Sollten die weiteren Erhebungen in dieser Hinsicht Positives erbringen, wird der do. Stelle davon Mitteilung gemacht werden.

24.7.1962

FBI doc.
12 July 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: (E) 105-93295
DBA 13988

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO

FROM
Chief SR, via Chief WE

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION: None, FYI

Attached for your information is a copy of an ODENVY report dated 20 April 1962, on an interview with Subject on 13 April 1962.

Doris M. Killgo

PKS
Mortimer F. Bingham

Distribution:
3 COS Pairs w/att

201-289249

DATE TYPED
16 May 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
25 MAY 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPW-33472

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-289249

[illegible]
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN 1 - RID	CKS
RID/MIS 1 - SR/CI/RED 2 - WE/3	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
SR/CI/RED	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/CI/RED	LLyon	aes	6991

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SR/CI/RED	16/5	
C/SR/2		
FI/SPOG	22 May	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WE/3	24 May	Robert E. Owen

FORM 9-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

CS COPY

DISPATCH

SECRET

62

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ also known as Semen POHORILIW
Internal Security - Russia

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 5 February 1962 regarding the Subject and to your file number 105-93295 (E).

2. An interview of Subject by your Bureau, under the conditions outlined in the reference, would not adversely affect any of this Agency's sources or operations. We would appreciate any information you may obtain from Subject on his contacts and associates abroad.

CSCI-3/769,591

SR/CI/RED/LLyon:aoh - 23 February 1962

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/R&A
1 - SR/CI/P/dl
1 - SR/CI/RED
1 - Comeback
1 - RI/Files (201-289249

Reference: DBA-396, 5 February 1962

SECRET

CS COPY

201-289249

FBI doc.
20 April 1962 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBA 7408

FBI doc.
5 Feb. 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295 (E)

14-00000

SECRET

19 JAN 1962

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ also known as Semen POHORILEW
and Andrij DIDKOWSKYJ also known as DIALKAWSKY (fnu)
Internal Security - Russia

8/6-631 - type

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence from this office regarding the Subjects and to your file number 105-93295.

2. The files of this Agency contain no identifiable information on Andrij DIDKOWSKYJ of 731 North Seventh Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. We have not checked our sources abroad and will not do so unless this action is specifically requested by you.

3. A sensitive Austrian source provided the following information on Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ on 31 October 1961:

> "Semen POHORILYI - born 2 February 1910 in Czerkassy/Kiev, married, teacher, Ukrainian citizen, resided at the refugee camp in Siezenheim, Salzburg, from 13 July 1950 to 23 August 1950. Prior to 13 July 1950 he lived at the Hellbrunn refugee camp in Salzburg. According to police records Subject left Salzburg for the United States on 23 August 1950."

4. Additional information from the same sensitive source, in the form of a photographic copy of the official police registration card and a negative of an identification photograph of Subject, both dated 7 November 1947, reveals that

> "Semen PHORILYJ - born 2 February 1910 in Przemysl, is a Polish citizen, married, teacher, 178 cm tall, gray eyes, blond hair, oval face, no prominent or identifying features."

SECRET

CS COPY

201-289249

A copy of the photograph is attached for your information. The date on the registration card presumably indicates the date on which Subject was first officially registered by the Salzburg police.

CSCI-3/769,019

Attachment - As stated

SR/CI/RED/LLyon:afo - 15 January 1962

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee, w/att.
1 - C/CI, w/o att.
1 - CI/LSN, w/o att.
1 - CI/R&A, w/o att.
1 - SR/CI/P/dl, w/o att.
1 - SR/CI/RED, w/o att.
1 - EE/A, w/o att.
1 - Comeback, w/o att.
1 - RI/Files, w/o att. (201-289249)

Reference - DBF-96946, 21 December 1961

Based on EASA-05566, 24 November 1961

14-00000

THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED: SECRET

1. SUBJECT (NAME, IN ROMAN LETTERS AND IN NORMAL ORDER)

DIDKOWSKYJ , Andrij

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

DIALNAWSKY

3. BIRTH DATE

30 Nov 1890,

4. BIRTH PLACE

Didkowitsche, Ukraine

5. CITIZENSHIP

U.S. in 1958

6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Retired - lives at 631 North 7th St. Philadelphia
Pa.

7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

Laborer

RESPONSE TO GREEN LIST
REQUEST Nº 100092

DATE OF REQUEST 5 Jan 62

REQUEST FROM

NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER L. Lyon

OFFICE DESIGNATOR SR/CI/RED

ROOM, BUILDING 15C1 J

EXTENSION 8251

14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED?

X YES ___ NO

15. TYPE OF REQUEST

X FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
___ ADDITIONAL DATA
___ OTHER

16. INTEREST IN SUBJECT

X ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
___ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
___ OTHER

17. INFORMATION REQUIRED

All information

8. MILITARY SERVICE

SERVICE ARM, COUNTRY	SPECIALTY	LOCATION	DATES

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
1904 to 1920 resided in Russia. 1920 to 1943 " in Poland 1943 to 1951 Salzburg, Austria 1951 to Sept. 1958 - Philadelphia		

10. DESCRIPTION	(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
	6'1"	170	Brown	Black-grey	White	

11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

Wira Sergel, born 1897 in the Ukraine. Resides at Kostppol, Ukraine.

12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND ASSOCIATES

13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC) ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI-10-7

FORM 11-58 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9)

SECRET

L. Lyon

11 January 1962
DATE

4: FI/D

filed

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO XXXXXXX INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF A CONTINUING SEARCH WAS REQUESTED IN SECTION 14, INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

TE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

N THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION ICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

IEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO GER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S ILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

FI/D

DATE

4:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 201-289249
Vol. I

INCLUSIVE DATES: ______

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: ______

ROOM: ______

DELETIONS, IF ANY: ______

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
8 Dec 78	8 Dec 78	Betsy Wolf	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

201-2892

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

23 Jan 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on KOHCRILLI (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ Should be closed. (If this category applies, affix Records Officer stamp.)

☐ Unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7.
Explanation:__________

☐ Witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ Potential witting collaborator; date opened:__________
OI Code A2.

☐ Former witting collaborator (relationship terminated).
OI Code A3.

☐ Potential witting collaborator never contacted. OI Code A4.

☒ Counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ All others. OI Code A6.

Signed [illegible] Lassiter (name) IA (title) SE/X/AF (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed (initials) 30 JAN 1975 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file. 201- 289249 Vol I & II

201 to files

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061475

FBI doc
21 Dec 61 (Wash)
Re – Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile – 105-93295
DBF -96946

FBI doc.
30 Nov. 1961 (Buffalo)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF-95895

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: EASA-5566

TO: Chief of Station, Austria

INFO: C/EE, C/SR, C/WE, COS/Paris, CAMOG, COS/Germany

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-289249
2y-6-106/3

FROM: Chief of Base, Salzburg

DATE: 24 November 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDICTA-1
Semen POHORILLIW

RE 433 - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐	MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
XX	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Vienna, please make appropriate number of prints from attached negative.

REFERENCES:

a. EGMA-10664, 23 May 1961
b. EAVA-20253, 19 July 1961 (not to Germany or Paris)
c. EASA-5385, 7 August 1961 "
d. EAVA-20594, 4 October 1961 "

1. References b., c. and d. contain Vienna's instructions to Salzburg regarding identifying Subject; our initial reply stating there was no information in ODIP files; and Vienna's permission to run unilateral police traces through GREYFIGY-1, respectively.

2. GREYFIGY-1's initial report (received on 31 October 1961) states that

> Semen POHORILYI - born 2 February 1910 in Czerkassy/Kiev, married, teacher, Ukrainian citizen, resided at the refugee camp in Siezenheim, Salzburg, from 13 July 1950 to 23 August 1950. Prior to 13 July 1950 he lived at the Hellbrunn refugee camp in Salzburg. According to police records Subject left Salzburg for the United States on 23 August 1950.

3. Additional information in the form of a photographic copy of the official police registration card and a negative of an identification photograph of Subject, both dated 7 November 1947 reveals that

> Semen POHORILYJ - born 2 February 1910 in Przemysl, is a Polish citizen, married, teacher, 178 cm tall, gray eyes, blond hair, oval face, no prominent or identifying features.

The date on the registration card presumably indicates the date on which Subject was first officially registered by the Salzburg police.

4. We are returning to Vienna the photograph sent us under reference b. for their retention. We have also attached the identification negative noted in the preceding paragraph. Would Vienna please make prints for SR and Paris and attach them to their copies of this dispatch.

MAXWELL E. UTTERIDGE

Attachments: H/W

Distribution:
2 - Vienna w/photo & negative
2 - EE w/o Att.
2 - SR w/photo
~~2 - WE w/o Att.~~ - , c destroyed
2 - Paris w/photo
2 - CAMOG w/o Att.
2 - COS/G " "

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1.

201-289249





att to EASA 5566
To: Chief SR
from Chief, ob Base, Salzburg

201-289249
24 Nov 61

FBI doc.
24 Oct. 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295

DBF-92203

FBI doc.
18 Oct. 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295

DBF 92487

SECRET

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ also known as Semen POHORILIW
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence from this office regarding the Subject and to your file number 105-93295.

2. An official French liaison source reported in early September 1961 that Antin HYCZPORUK received a letter with the return address: (fnu) DIALHAWSKY, 63/N. 7 SA. (sic) Philadelphia 23, Pa. The address was also received from an official U.S. source as 13/N 7 SA. but this is believed to be a typographical error. It has not been possible to verify the address as the envelcpe was not photographed but was passed routinely from the post office to HYCZPORUK. The letter was not tested for secret writing.

3. The files of this Agency contain no identifiable information on DIALHAWSKY. It is possible the address should be 631 North Seventh Street, Philadelphia, which is the one used by POHORILIW. According to information from your Bureau, this is the home of Dymto WASYLASZUK, Secretary of the Ukrainian Workingmen's Association and the residence may be used for meetings of that organization.

4. We would appreciate any information in your files on DIALHAWSKY.

CSCI-3/767,673

SR/CI/RED:LLyons:CH - 11 Oct 61

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/liaison
1 - SR/CI/P/DL
~~1~~ - RI/files (201-289249)
1 - Comeback
1 - SR/CI/RED

SECRET

CS COPY

201-289249

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EAVA-28594

TO Chief of Base, Salzburg

INFO Chief, EE; Chief, SR

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 201-289249
29-6-106/3

FROM Chief of Station, Austria

DATE 4 October 1961

SUBJECT REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA-1
Semen POHORILIY

RE. "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

EASA-5495 dated 7 August 1961

1. The IRO files, we understand, have been moved to Germany (International Tracing Service) or are in the process of moving. This makes such a check inadvisable, if not impossible.

2. A GREPPIGY-1 check would not be objectionable even though he, in turn, makes a police check.

MATTHEW H. CHUBB

2 October 1961

Distribution:
- 2 - COB, Salzburg
- 1 - Chief, EE
- 1 - Chief, SR
- 1 - 201-289249
- 1 - Registry

ccd EE/H r fo.

201-289249

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

201-289249

ROUTING			
1	SR/Rec	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3		6	

407

DATE : 27 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, WE 4, S/C 2, CI/IC 2

RE Filing (check one):
- No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
- RI file this copy as indicated ☒
- Branch copy filed as indicated ☐ — 74-6-63/3

RE Indexing (check one).
Marked ☐ None required ☒

Signature:

SEP 27 1818Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 36157

DIR CITE PARI 7037

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF DIR 11988 (OUT 97023)*

ADDRESS GIVEN IN PARI 6667 (IN 26002) AS RECD FROM UNBOUND. BELIEVE HQS ASSUMPTION REF CORRECT. ADDRESS ALSO RECD FROM ODOPAL AS 13/N 7 SA BUT THIS BELIEVED TYPO ERROR. IMPOSSIBLE VERIFY AS UNBOUND DID NOT PHOTO ENVELOPE WHICH PASSED ROUTINELY FROM P.O. TO NYCZPORUK.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *NO TRACES DIALNAWSKY.

RI COPY

ROUTING [illegible]	
[illegible]	JTH
[illegible]	
[illegible]	
RI/FI	

FORM 4-58 1389a

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

25 SEP

Copy No. (35)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: EGMA-56218

TO: Chief, SR

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany
Chief, EE

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-289249
29-6-106/3
FP: CE-1643

FROM: Chief, Munich Operations Group

DATE: 21 September 1961

SUBJECT: CAMOG/REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/Operations
Identification of Picture

RE "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE(S):

EGMW-10664, 23 May 1961

Both AETRAPEZE and AEMERCURY-2 were shown the picture forwarded with the reference. Neither recognized the picture as being of anyone they had ever seen.

Hadley B Allensworth
HADLEY B. ALLENSWORTH

APPROVED Hadley B Allensworth for
HOWARD E. TAPHORN

Distribution:
2 - SR
1 - EE
2 - COS/G

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO 1

CS COPY

201-289249

14-00000

201-289249

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : LOUISE LYON
UNIT : SR/CI/RED 1534
EXT : 8251
DATE : 14 SEPTEMBER 1961

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : PARIS
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SR 6
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, WE 4, S/C 2

RI Filing (check one): ☐
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☒
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated
RI Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ Name required ☑
Signature:

5 SEP 61 17 38 z

74-6-63/3

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT97023

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 11988

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF: PARI 6667 (IN 26002)*

1. NO HQS TRACES. ASSUME ADDRESS IS 631 NORTH SEVENTH STREET, PHILADELPHIA ALSO USED BY POHORILIN. ADVISE. ACCORDING ODENVY THIS HOME OF DYMTRO WASYLASZUK, SECRETARY UKRAINIAN WORKINGMENS ASSOCIATION AND MAY BE USED FOR MEETINGS THIS FRATERNAL ORG. HQS OPINION ADDRESS MAY ALSO BE USED BY UKRAINIAN MEMBERS UWA.

2. WILL ADVISE ODENVY WHEN CORRECT ADDRESS RECEIVED FROM PARI.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *Requested traces on DIALNAWSKY, Philadelphia, correspondent of Antin NYCZPORUK, Suspect RIS.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	✓
~~DESTROY~~	
ENFF	

CSR/2

William D. [illegible]
D C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SR/CI/RED S. [illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-289249

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	S/R/Red	4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 008 8 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, S/C 2, ~~WE 4~~

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
File this copy as indicated ☒ 74-6-63/3
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ Name required ☒
Signature: L. Kyne

SEP 9 0256Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 26002

DIR CITE PARI 6667

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF PARI 2329 (IN 40964)*

UNBOUND SURVEILLANCE ANTIN NYCZPORUK REVEALED RECEIPT LETTER WITH RETURN ADDRESS: DIALNAWSKY, 63/N.7 SA. PHILADELPHIA 23 PA.

63 1 N 7

REQUEST TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CABLE PRE-DATES CS FILES. COPY MAY BE SEEN IN SIGNAL CENTER ARCHIVES.

RI

Reply sent 15 Sep 61.
Out 97023 (~~Dir~~ 11988)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TV	
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

FORM 1329 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FBI doc.
21 Aug. 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 86583

DISPATCH

	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EASA-5495
TO	Chief of Station, Austria	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-289249 29-6-156/3
INFO	Chief, EE Chief, SR	
FROM	Chief of Base, Salzburg	DATE 7 August 1961
SUBJECT	REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEKAZMA-1 Semen P[illegible]RILIN	RE[illegible] 43 3 — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED	Pls indicate what further action we may take.	
REFERENCE(S)	EAVA-28253, 19 July 1961	

We passed on your request concerning Subject to the local chief of USEP. He checked his files and found no traces. He suggested that the old IRO files might have something. Checks of these files are normally done by a local investigator of USEP. We request permission to bury Subject's name in a short list of names which the local investigator would then be asked to check in the old IRO files. Also, please indicate whether we should try to check this out through [illegible]-1, who presumably would check with the Salzburg police.

Sladen E. Wilsong

Distribution:
- 2 - Vienna
- 2 - EE
- 2 - SR

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1.

201-289249

SECRET

2 August 1961

C-61-1144

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/2/CE
Attention: R. I. Perkins

SUBJECT: Photo Identification
Semen POHORILYJ

The photograph of Semen POHORILYJ was shown to Reino HAYHANEN,* who stated he did not recognize the subject. The photograph is attached.

J. M. Evans
J. M. EVANS
C/CI/OPS/SCVSAT

Enclosure:
Photograph

* on 31 July 1961

SECRET

610511



201-289249

FBI doc.
22 June 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 80925

FBI 6066

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EAVA-23253

TO: Chief of Base, Salzburg

INFO: Chief, SR
Chief, EE

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-289249
29-5-106/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Vienna

DATE: 19 July 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA/1

RE 433 — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See below

REFERENCE(S): EGMW-10664, dated 23 May 1961 201-289249

Chief of Base, Salzburg is requested to check USFP and any other appropriate files on Subject of reference (a copy of which is herewith attached for Salzburg). The principal object of this exercise is to determine whether the person shown in the attached photograph is identical with Subject. As a minimum please ascertain the addresses at which Subject lived in Salzburg from 1945 to 1950. Depending on what you find, we can then devise some unilateral method of confirming the identity of the attached photo.

Lee J. Farmer

18 July 1961

Attachments:
  A) Copy EGMW-10664, h/w
  B) Photo USC

Distribution:
  2 - Salzburg, w/atts.
  ✓2 - SR, wo/atts.
  2 - EE, wo/atts.
  1 - Reg., wo/atts.
  1 - File

LJF/ejn

201-289249

[redacted]

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

SECRET

COPY

LIAISON UNBOUND

CPFA 59215
13 June 1961

contact reports

UNBOUND 11and JENTONS - weekly meeting 9 June 1961

Antin NYCZFORUK

4. Gave him poop on Antin NYCZYFORUK, It wastoo late in the AM to get hold of UNBOUND 27 oranyone who would be in on the working level and hesaid he would take it up with them in the afternoon and that we could then get together and discuss means of action.

SECRET

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Saman POHORILLW

1. Representatives of the FBI Laboratory have been previously briefed on the KEMFOTE TEST which we believed had been used when working on the POHORILLW letter and which established the presence of SW on the letter.

2. We have now been advised by a field representative that a modified version of this process was actually used and it is possible that the SW is detectable by this version of the test, but not by the regular test of which your Bureau has the details.

3. It should be noted that our work on known systems revealed two cases exhibiting the same type of fleeting detection as was noted on the POHORILLW letter. This, of course, does not mean that the POHORILLW letter is written in one of these systems, but merely that fleeting detections can occasionally be expected with this variation of the KEMFOTE TEST.

4. Agency headquarters laboratory has not completed a comparison of the original and modified KEMFOTE procedures so as to confirm the finding of our field laboratory that the modified test is more sensitive. It is being provided to your Bureau at this time, however, since it is a technique which has been used successfully in a current case.

CSCI-3/765,739

Attachment: KEMFOTE TEST (Modified)

cc: TSD - Dr. Colin Reid (w/o attachment)

CI/Liaison/JARoman/nfr (2 June 61)
Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - TSD
1 - SR/Rita Perkins
1 - RI
1 - CI
1 - CI/R&A

14-00000

1961

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Comma FORMALIN

201-289249

1. Representatives of the FBI Laboratory have been previously briefed on the KEYFUZE TEST which we believed had been used when working on the FORMALIN letter and which established the presence of SW on the letter.

2. We have now been advised by a field representative that a modified version of this process was actually used and it is possible that the SW is detectable by this version of the test, but not by the regular test of which your Bureau has the details.

3. It should be noted that our work on known systems revealed two cases exhibiting the same type of fleeting detection as was noted on the FORMALIN letter. This, of course, does not mean that the FORMALIN letter is written in one of these systems, but merely that fleeting detections can occasionally be expected with this variation of the KEYFUZE TEST.

4. Agency headquarters laboratory has not completed a comparison of the original and modified KEYFUZE procedures so as to confirm the finding of our field laboratory that the modified test is more sensitive. It is being provided to your Bureau at this time, however, since it is a technique which has been used successfully in a current case.

CSCI-3/765,739

Attachment: KEYFUZE TEST (Modified)

cc: TSD - Dr. Colin Reid (w/o attachment)

CI/Liaison/JARoman/mfr (2 June 61)
Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - TSD
1 - SR/Rita Perkins
1 - RI
1 - CI
1 - CI/SAA

SECRET

CS COPY

201-289249

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OFPA- 58988

TO: Chief, WE

INFO: Attention: Chief, SR

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-289129
29-6-106/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

DATE: 2 JUN 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

RE: "43-3" – (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCES: OFPW 30647, 19 May 1961

1. AEDOGMA was shown the photograph attached to Reference and said he did not recognize the face.

2. AEDOGMA stated that he knew no one other than NYCZPORUK in contact with POHORILIN, when the subject was raised later, in another context.

WALLACE H. HAVEDON

1 June 1961
Distribution:
3-SR
2-WE

[illegible]

file 201

when [illegible] + [illegible] reply – notify Bureau of results

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

201-289249
CC 29-6-104/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : RITA PERKINS
UNIT : SR/2/CE
EXT : 2080
DATE : 23 MAY 1961 1672

ROUTING			
1	SR/2	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : PARIS
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SR 6
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one)
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
File this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one)
Marked ☐ Not required ☑
Signature:

29 MAY 61 22 54z

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT 60803

OUT 60803

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 42528 42528

REDWOOD AEDOGMA UNBOUND

RE: PARI 4365 (IN 34016)*

1. ODENVY HAS NO OBJECTION STA INFORMING UNBOUND POHORILIW CASE PROVIDING POHORILIW NOT IDEN BY NAME.

2. PLS FORWARD FOR HQS PASSAGE ODENVY ANY UNBOUND INFO PBPRIME ASPECTS CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: POHORILIW US RESIDENT WHO SENT LETTER CONTAINING S/W TO ANTIN NYCZYPORUK IN PARIS.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/	MK
RI/	
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

SR/SI
CI/OG/SS
WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CWE/X
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

SECRET

[illegible]-10664

TO: Chief, Munich Operations Base; COS, Vienna

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany; Chief of Station, Paris

201-289249
29-6-106/3

FROM: Chief, SR

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA/1

ACTION REQUIRED: Show photograph to appropriate sources

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

1. Attached is a photograph of Semen POHORILYW, which we would like shown, without name, to appropriate unilateral sources for possible identification.

2. FYI: POHORILYW's name appears as the sender of a letter containing secret writing to Antin MYCZYPORUK in Paris, France. The letter was sent in care of Dmytro GNYP, another Ukrainian resident of Paris. GNYP, in November 1960, asked AEDOGMA/1 to deliver the letter to MYCZYPORUK who was confined to a mental sanitarium near Paris. GNYP told AEDOGMA/1 that he (GNYP) and MYCZYPORUK had been involved with Vasiliy KHARCHENKO (Soviet assigned to UNESCO and the case officer of the arrested emigre Grigoriy DEMYANCHUK), and therefore GNYP feared coming to the attention of the French police by delivering the letters to MYCZYPORUK. MKTOPAZ analysis revealed the presence of the s/w in the letter from POHORILYW, but failed in attempts to develop the s/w. ODENVY and Paris Station are now investigating this case; therefore, in your reply please send an information copy to Paris.

3. The following is biographic information on Semen POHORILYW.

a. dob: 2 February 1910
b. pob: Czerkasy, Ukraine
c. parents: Spiridon and Alexandra nee IWCZENKO POHORLYJ
d. education: seven years elementary school and one year teachers' school
e. residence: USSR 1924 to 1943
Poland 1943 and 1944
Czechoslovakia 1944 and 1945
Salzburg, Austria 1945 to July 1950
United States July 1950 to present
f. physical description: c. 1951, 5'10", 175 pounds, gray eyes and fair complexion.

23 MAY 1961

Attachment:
Photo herewith

Pamela D. Chalifoux
PAMELA D. CHALIFOUX

16 May 1961

Distribution:
2 - MOB, w/att.
2 - COS, Vienna, w/ATT
2 - COS, Paris
2 - COS, Germany

1 - SR/3
1 - EE/G
1 - WE/3
1 - EE/A
2 - SR/2/CE
~~1~~ - 201-289249
1 - 29-6-106/3

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ aka POHORILIW
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to memorandum from this office, CSCI-3/764,636 of 24 April 1961, and to your memorandum of 3 May 1961, file number 105-93295.

2. As reported in referenced CSCI memorandum, a letter purportedly from Subject was tested for secret writing. Secret writing was seen by one technician and its presence confirmed by another technician. However, the message had disappeared before a third technician could observe it. The technician who tested the letter has said that only one line of hand-printed secret writing was distinctly visible. There were traces of S/W on other parts of the letter but this was very indistinct. The cover letter was in longhand. The disappearance of the writing did not permit photography or recording of any part of the S/W message.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

Signed: James R. Hunt, Jr.

JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-3/765,321

Distribution:
Orig &1 - Addressee
2 - SR/2/CE
1 - CI/OG/SS
~~1~~ 201-289249
1 - C/CI
1 - SR/RISB/DL (dummy copy)
1 - CI/Liaison (dummy copy)
1 - CI/R&A (dummy copy)

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins:bbh 19 May 1961

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING

	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief of Station, Paris

INFO

FROM

Chief, SR via Chief, WE

SUBJECT

REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: Show attached photo to AEDOGMA/1

Reference: OFPW-30103, 17 March 1961

1. In answer to our request of ODENVY to compare the handwriting of Semen POHORILIW with that attributed to him in the letter to Antin HYCZYPORUK, ODENVY has informed us that at this time they do not have sufficient specimens of POHORILIW's handwriting to reach any conclusion.

2. ODENVY has furnished us with the attached photograph of Semen POHORILIW. We suggest that this photograph, unidentified, be shown to AEDOGMA/1 for possible recognition. We are sending this photograph to MOB, also, for showing to appropriate sources.

MHZ

SHELBY K. LIPNOTT

MORTIMER F. BINGHAM

Attachment: h/w
Photograph

Distribution:
3 - COS, Paris (w/att.)

CC [illegible] FILE IN 29-6-106/3

DATE TYPED: 12 May 61

DATE DISPATCHED: 19 MAY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFPW-30647

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-289129
~~29-6-106/3~~

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

2 - WE/3
2 - SR/2/CE
~~1~~ - 201-289129
1 - 29-6-106/3

[illegible] Km
[illegible]
SR/2/CE
[illegible]

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/2/CE	Rita Perkins	bbh	2080

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CSR/2	15/5/61	JOHN ~~GERRY~~
WE/3		M. Hiller

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER
CWE/3		Hiller

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

POKORNIEV, Semen Photo [illegible]

AEDIPPE TO shown c. 11 May 61 - [illegible] negative



FBI doc.
11 May 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 76343

FBI doc.
3 May 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 75098

FBI doc.
21 April 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 75201

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen POHORILIW
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 28 February 1961 on Subject.

2. We plan to discuss with French liaison the receipt by Dmytro GNYP and Antin NYCZYPORUK of the letter containing secret writing from Subject, who will be identified to the French only as a resident of the United States. We believe such a discussion is desirable in view of its pertinence to the current investigation of the intelligence activities of Vasiliy MYAKUSHKO (member of the Soviet delegation to UNESCO from April 1957 to August 1960). If such a discussion would adversely affect your interest in POHORILIW, please advise us as soon as possible.

CSCI-3/765,058

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins:bbh 20 April 1961

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/OG/SOV
~~1~~ - 201-289249
1 - 29-6-106/3
1 - SR/RISB/DL
2 - SR/2/CE

CS COPY

14-00000

FILE No 201-284249

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	S/C 2	4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 255
11 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WE 4, S/C 2, CI/OA

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature R. C. Fitz

APR 11 1329Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 34016

DIR CITE PARI 4355

IN34016

REDWOOD AEDOGMA UNBOUND

REF: DIR 33187 (OUT 91903)*

1. STA WISHED EXPLORE TELLING UNBOUND THAT GNYP AND NYCZYPORUK HAD RECEIVED S/W MAIL FROM UNNAMED SOURCE IN PBPRIME. SINCE UNBOUND STILL INTERESTED MYAKUSHKO CONTACTS, MIGHT PROFITABLY PUT MAIL COVER ON G AND N

2. STA THEREFORE ASKED ODENVY REP OPINION WHETHER ODENVY HQS INVESTIGATION OF POHORILIW WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED IF ABOVE INFO RE G AND N GIVEN TO UNBOUND.

3. ODENVY REP STATES HE CABLED QUERY TO HIS HQS RE ABOVE.

RE REF:

A. "PBPRIME ANGLE REFERS TO INVESTIGATION OF POHORILIW WHICH IS ASPECT OF CASE MOST DIRECTLY TOUCHING ODYOKE INTEREST.

FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

RE Filing (check one).
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

PAGE 2

IN 34016 PARI 4365

B. MADE NO REF "LIVE LETTER DROP".

C. LOOSELY REFERRED TO KUBARK'S "PENETRATION OF CORRESPONDENCE CHANNEL". THIS INACCURATE AND MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN MEAN WE INTERCEPTED MORE THAN ONE LETTER IN POHORILIW-NYCZYPORUK CORRESPONDENCE. ODENVY REP AWARE OF SECOND LETTER (FROM USSR TO N WHICH NOT FOUND CONTAIN S/W) INTERCEPTED BY AEDOGMA, BUT DID NOT MENTION IN HIS CABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ODENVY REQUESTED CLARIFICATION FOLL POINTS.

A. WHAT MEANT BY WORD ANGLE IN STA QUERY WHETHER DISCUSSION CASE UNBOUND WOULD INTERFERE WITH PBPRIME ANGLE.

B. STA ALLUSION LIVE LETTER DROP PBPRIME.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: RPerkins
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 8757 1565
DATE: 3 April 1961

TO: PARIS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 4 APR 61 19 59z
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY SIG CEN
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT91903
~~OUT 91903~~

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 33187
33187

REDWOOD AEDOGMA

RE DIR 26906 (OUT 77202) *
OFPW 30103

1. ODENVY ASKS FOR CLARIFICATION FOLL POINTS CONFUSION ARISING FROM ODENVY PARI REPORT MEETING WITH STA ON POHORILIW CASE:

A. WHAT MEANT BY WORD ANGLE IN STA QUERY WHETHER DISCUSSION CASE WITH UNBOUND WOULD INTERFERE WITH FBPRIME ANGLE;

B. STA ALLUSION LIVE LETTER DROP FBPRIME;

C. REF TO MORE THAN ONE LETTER.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RECOMMEND NO ACTION PARI THIS TIME. (RE POSSIBLE REPATRIATION NYCYPORUK).

SR/SI
CI/OG/SOV (Smith in draft)
WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WE/1
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

CSR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 25 APR 1961

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Semen POHORILIW - Internal Security R

FROM:

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins x 8757

NO. CSCI-3/764,636

DATE 29 March 1961

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CSR/2/CE		29/3	[illegible]
2. CSR/2		29/3 /61	BH
3.			
4. SR/RISB/DL	MAR 1961	30/3	[illegible]
5. SR/COP/SI	MAR 1961	MAR 1961	[illegible]
6.			
7. CI/OG/SOV		3	e
8. C/CI/OG		4 apr	✓
9. DC/CI	4 APR 1961	10 APR 1961	[illegible]
CI/Liaison	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
10. C/CI/Sov		11	e
DC/CI	11 APR 1961	21 APR 1961	[illegible]
11. RID/[redacted] AN		24 APR 1961	[illegible]
12. ~~RID/MIS~~			D
13. RI/FI			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

7 to 9A — In view of FBI investigation of Subject believe FBI should have this info. This is case on which I sent you memo re [illegible] S/W handling.
JE

Evans
Let me see info on this.

enclosed 14
[illegible]

201-285445
ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX
DXP
DATE 24 APR 1961

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 476732

14-00000

24 APR 1961

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen POHORILIW 201-289249
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to the following correspondence:

   a. Bureau report of 14 February 1961, made at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Subject as above;

   b. Memorandum from Deputy Director (Plans), Subject as above, dated 9 January 1961, and numbered CSCI - 3/763,211;

   c. CIA Teletype, Subject as above, dated 16 November 1960;

   d. CIA Teletype, Subject as above, dated 17 February 1961.

2. We would appreciate being informed whether or not you have had an opportunity to compare the hand writing of Semen POHORILIW and that of the letter bearing his name and address, which we sent to you with reference 1.b..

3. In a review of our files we note that the lack of elaboration in our earlier correspondence might cause your Bureau some difficulty. Our statement in reference 1.c. that the POHORILIW letter bore indications of secret writing was based on the findings of our technical staff. One of our technicians applied a test that permitted him to see writing which, although it was not legible, could be seen to be other than that of the overt text. This writing remained visible long enough for another technician

CS COPY

201-289249

to confirm its presence. There have been reports that our source is considered by the Soviets to be American controlled. Thus it was considered that, if this letter were a Soviet intelligence communication, it was likely the Soviets would consider the operation compromised when our source's possession of the letter was reported. For this reason, we decided it was best to forge a copy of the POHORILIW letter and make every attempt to develop any secret writing it contained. Unfortunately, we were unable to do so, and the original letter was destroyed in the process. As we reported in reference 1.d. on 8 or 9 January 1961 our source delivered to Antin HYCZYPORUK the forged copy of the POHORILIW letter. To date there has been no report of any reaction to HYCZYPORUK's receipt of the forgery.

CSCI-3/764,636

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins:bbh   29 March 1961

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - C/CI
1 - RID/FI
1 - SR/RISB/DL
2 - SR/2/CE

14-00000

DISPATCH

S-E-C-R-E-T-

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief of Station, Paris

INFO

FROM

Chief, SR via Chief, WE

SUBJECT

REDWOOD/AEDOGMA - Semen POHORILIW

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: DIR 26906

1. ODENVY has informed us that neither the release of Antin NYCZYPORUK from the mental sanitarium nor his repatriation would affect their investigation of Semen POHORILIW.

2. ODURGE files contained following information on Subject: He was born 2 February 1910 at Czerkasy, Ukraine. His parents, now deceased, were Spiridon and Aleksandra nee IWCZLEKO. Subject attended elementary school for seven years and teachers' school for one year. He resided in the USSR 1924 to 1943; in Poland, 1943 and 1944; in Czechoslovakia, 1944 and 1945; and in Salzburg, Austria, from March 1945 to July 1950. His last residence in Salzburg was at Camp Hellbrunn. In July 1950 he was granted a visa to the United States as a displaced person. At that time he stated his destination in the United States was the home of Pawlo KLYMENKO in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He entered the United States in September, 1960. In July 1951 he filed a Declaration of Intention to become a United States citizen. At that time he was residing at 933 North 7th Street, Philadelphia, and was employed as a polisher. His physical description in 1951 was 5'10", 175 pounds, blond hair, gray eyes and fair complexion.

3. According to ODENVY in January 1961 Subject was residing at 931 North 7th Street, Philadelphia, in a home owned by Daytro WASYLASZUK and Paraska OLEKSIUK. WASYLASZUK is a member of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Workers Association.

SB/63

SHELBY K. LIPSCOTT

MORTIMER F. BINGHAM

Distribution:
3 - COS, Paris

✓2 - RI
2 - WE/3
2 - SR/2/CE

DATE TYPED
13 March 61

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPW-30103

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
29-6-106/3
201-289249

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/2/CE	Rita Perkins	bbh	8757

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CSR/2		JOHN GERRY
WE/3		
CI/OG/SOV		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
CWE/3		201-~~[illegible]~~ 289249

CS 19-29-6-106/3

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

COPY

FBI doc.
28 Feb. 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
DBF 69970

FBI doc.

749

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO. 201-[illegible]

ORIG : RITA PERKINS
UNIT : SR/2/CE
EXT : 8757
DATE : 21 ~~E~~ FEBRUARY 1961

TO : PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, WE 4, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED 24 FEB 61 · 23 24z

X ROUTINE

PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

~~SIG CEN~~

INITIALS

OUT 77202
OUT77202

TO INFO CITE DIR 26903
26903

PARI

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA 1

RE: PARI 3664 (IN 46263)*

~~ODENVY SENT REF INFO AND ASKED IF RELEASE AND OR REPATRIATION NYCZYPORUK WOULD AFFECT POSERILIV CASE.~~ ODENVY INTERIM REPLY NON COMMITTAL BECAUSE DELAY THEIR INVESTIGATION. THUS RECOMMEND NO ACTION PARI THIS TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

* CS COMMENT: REF ASKED IF HQS DESIRED ANY PARI ACTION RE POSSIBLE REPATRIATION NYCZYPORUK.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	MK
RI/T	
RI/FI	

CI/OG/SW

SR/SI

WE/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WE

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

~~C/SR/2~~

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

FORM 4-58 1389a

G: RITA PERKINS 633
T: SR/2/CE
: 8757 633
E: 17 FEBRUARY 1961

: FBI

M: DIRECTOR

NF: SR 6

O: CI, CI/OPS, WE 4, S/C 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO. ~~201-~~ 201-117577

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value Destroy
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None needed
Signature: [illegible]

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED 17 FEB 61 22 11z
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

~~SIG CEN~~
INITIALS

OUT 74849

INFO

CITE DIR

FBI

[illegible] POHORILIN

REF: CSCI 3/763,811

1. LETTER DELIVERED NYCZYPORUK 8 OR 9 JAN. NYCZYPORUK READ LETTER IMMEDIATELY AND GAVE NO INDICATION HE SAW ANYTHING WRONG.

2. NYCZYPORUK TOLD OUR SOURCE DOCTORS CONSIDER HIM COMPLETELY CURED AND ALL HE NEEDS IS AN ASSURED DOMICILE IN PARIS TO BE RELEASED. ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED GNYP AVERS NYCZYPORUK WILL REPATRIATE FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE.

3. WE DO NOT PLAN INTERFERE IN RELEASE AND OR REPATRIATION OF NYCZYPORUK UNLESS IT AFFECTS YOUR INVESTIGATION POHORILIW. PLS ADVISE SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

ROUTING
RI/AN MK

CI/OG/SOV/SAT J. C[illegible]
SR/SI [illegible]
WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~201-106613~~

CI J. [illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/2 201-285249
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FORM 1389 (35)

14-00000

xref 99-6 70/13
201-259.949

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

269
DATE : 16 FEB 61 SR 12

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, WE 4, S/C 2

RID: [illegible] (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy.
RID file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated
RID: [illegible]
None required
Signature:

ROUTING			
1	SR 12	4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 16 1533Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 46263

DIR CITE PARI 3664

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA 1

REF DIR 15201 (out 50208)*

1. AEDOGMA/1 DELIVERED LETTER 8-9 JANUARY. NYCZYPORUK OPENED AND READ IMMEDIATELY, GAVE NO INDICATION HE ~~P~~SAW ANYTHING WRONG.

2. N'S DOCTORS CONSIDER HIM COMPLETELY CURED. N TOLD DOGMA HE ONLY NEEDS ASSURED DOMICILE PARI FOR RELEASE. HOWEVER SNYP INFORMED BYDNIK THAT N WILL REPATRIATE WHEN RELEASED.

3. IN LIGHT POSSIBLE N REMOVAL, ANY ACTION DESIRED PARI?

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED DETAILS RE THE DELIVERY OF A LETTER TO NYCZYPORUK WHICH DEFINETLY CONTAINED S/W.

cit: ? / Deb - c 1916 / Pub - Ukrainec / Ukr Congress Paris, PSA

* Andy

contact of subject ? (201-29756)

[illegible]

cit: ? Dmytro / Deb 1915 / Ukr Congress Paris, PSA / [illegible] contact of [illegible] Nyczyporuk contact ?

subject of 201-27656

RI

POHORILIW SEMEN

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/FI	MK
RI/[illegible]	✓
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

SECRET

1389c REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FBI doc.
14 Feb. 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj,aka
DBF 69574

FBI doc.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OFPA- 56927

TO
Chief, WE
INFO
Attention: Chief, SR

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
29-6-106/3

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris

DATE
8 FEB 1961

SUBJECT
REDWOOD LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA
Transmittal of UMWEAVE TRACES

(CHECK "X" ONE)
☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
For Your Information

REFERENCE(S)
DIR 15201, 7 December 1961

Transmitted herewith are the UMWEAVE traces for Dmitrio *CHYP and Antin *NYKYPORUK as requested in reference.

Leona N. Costerman

7 February 1961

Attached Herewith:
2 UMWEAVE traces
Distribution:
3-SR with 2 copies each attachment
2-WE with 1 copy each attachment

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET

7 February 1961

Dmitrio GNYP, born 13 October 1898 at WASNICZU, Hungary - child of Wassile and JAZWINSKA Paraska, Ukrainian refugee, has lived for about the past twenty years at 211 rue de Beroy, Paris 12eme.

He has been employed, since 1945, as night watchman for the "Societe de Transports de Vehicules Automobiles", 60 rue St. Ferdinand, Paris 17eme.

His monthly salary is about 60,000 old francs.

From his first marriage, he had two sons, Baseli (36 years old) who lives in Poland and Lvitomir (34 years old) who lives in the USA.

Liubomir

From his second marriage with Martha MASLY, born 9 September 1903 in LWOW Poland, he had a third son Jean, born 22 May 1940 in Paris (12th arrondiesment) who chose a French nationality.

During the German occupation, GNYP who has been in France since 1925 went to work in Germany as a volunteer for the organization TODT. Returning to France in 1943 he worked until the Liberation as a chauffeur for the "Legion SPEER" at Enghien Les Bains.

In 1944, with the liberation, he was arrested and interned at Fresnes for collaboration, but this detention was not followed by condemnation.

In the milieux of Ukrainian refugees he is considered as an opportunist.

[illegible]
CONTINUED CONTROL
SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

7 February 1961

Antin *NYKYPORUK, born the first of January 1912 in Karkow (Ukraine), bachelor, has most recently lived at 86 rue de Montreuil-arrived in France in 1950.

He first of all was a manual laborer, and then an electrician.

Bothered with mental troubles, he has been interned since 1954 in various psychiatric hospitals.

His last stay was in 1959 at Villejuif.

Since his departure, his activity and sources of income have not been known because his unemployment payment has been refused by the "Bureau de la Main d'Oeuvre".

His ordinary resident's card has lapsed since 16 August 1960 and he is ~~actually~~ at present violating the law for Foreigners.

It is a question of a violent individual when he has his mental crises.

On several occasions the police have intervened to control him before interment.

CONTINUED CONTROL
SECRET

SECRET

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen POHORILYJ
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 22 November 1960 on Subject.

2. There have been no new developments in France on this matter. Our source has been given a facsimile of the POHORILIW letter, but there has been no report on its delivery to Antin NYCZPORUK (see attachment).

3. We have received the following biographic information:

a. Dmytro GNYP was born on 13 October 1898 at Wasyczyn Rohatyn, Western Ukraine. He is married and the father of two sons, one of whom repatriated to the Ukraine in 1948 and the other of whom lives in France and is a member of the Ukrainian nationalist organization - Spilka Ukrainskoji Molodi (The Union of Ukrainian Youth in France). GNYP's education consists of four years of elementary schooling in the Ukraine. In 1918 he served as a non-commissioned officer in the Ukrainian Army in a formation called the Sitschowi Strilci. GNYP emigrated to France in 1925. He has been a member of two Ukrainian communist organizations in France; in 1927 he joined the Soyuz Ukrainskych Hromadian u Francji (Union of Ukrainian Citizens in France), and from 1945 to 1947 he was a member of the Batkiwtschyna (Homeland). His address for the past two years has been 211 Rue de Bercy, Paris XIIeme.

CS COPY

copies filed in
29-6-106/3
201-277417

201-289249

b. Antin NYCZYPORUK (according to GHYP his true name is NYKYPORETZ) was born about 1910. He is married and had a wife and two children in Noginsk. Prior to 1944 he was a professor of Ukrainian and West European Literature at a pedagogical institute in Kiev. NYCZYPORUK left the USSR in 1944; from 1945 to 1948 he was in an International Refugee Organization camp in Salzburg, Austria; he has resided in France since 1948.

4. The following details on GHYP's and NYCZYPORUK's involvement with Soviet intelligence were obtained by our source from GHYP and other Ukrainian emigres in France. During the period 1958 to 1960 GHYP and Vasiliy MYAKUSHO, Third Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to UNESCO, frequently visited with each other at the Soviet Embassy and at GHYP's apartment on 211 Rue de Bercy. At the end of 1959 GHYP introduced NYCZYPORUK to MYAKUSHKO. MYAKUSHKO asked NYCZYPORUK to contribute literary articles to Soviet publications; it is not known whether NYCZYPORUK wrote any such articles. Early in 1960 NYCZYPORUK developed a persecution complex and was confined to a sanitarium for a short period. GHYP, fearing that NYCZYPORUK might expose the GHYP-MYAKUSHKO relationship, provided NYCZYPORUK with free board and lodging in his apartment and with spending money. MYAKUSHKO dropped NYCZYPORUK as soon as the latter's mental condition became obvious. In May 1960 the Soviet Embassy advised NYCZYPORUK to repatriate to the USSR as soon as possible, and offered to help locate his family in the USSR. (As you already know, in October 1960 the Soviets sent NYCZYPORUK a letter reporting his family was not in Noginsk. See attachment.)

5. There is a rumor in the Ukrainian emigre colony in Paris that NYCZYPORUK has been a Soviet agent since about 1949. This is based on his close relationship with Josef (aka Osyp) KOZAK since 1949. KOZAK moved to France from Munich in 1946. Until his expulsion in 1950 he was quite active in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationals/Bandera (OUN/B) in France. He was ousted from the OUN/B because of his excessive curiosity about OUN/B members and their relatives in the USSR. Subsequently it was learned that KOZAK was in contact with the Soviet Embassy in France. KOZAK is presently residing at 26 rue Gaston Jaillon, Vesines Chalette, Loiret.

CSCI-3/763,211

Attachment - Copy of two letters

SR/2/CE/RPerkins:bbh 27 December 1960

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/OG/SOV
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/R&A
1 - 29-6-106/3
1 - 201-289249
1 - 201-277417
1 - SR/2/CE

Based on: OFPA-55524
OFPA-55817

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OFPA- 55817

TO: Chief, WE Attention: Chief, SR

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 2[illegible]-6-10[illegible]/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

DATE: 7 DEC [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]
Jozef (aka Osyp) *KOZAK

RE [illegible] 43 3 — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: For information

REFERENCE(S)

1. KOZAK, a friend of Antin *[illegible] (see OFPA-55524, 23 November 1960), is a West Ukrainian of about 50 years of age. He arrived in Paris just after World War II and was engaged as the A[illegible]/S operative in France, since he had been involved in this activity in Munich until 1946. As an intelligent man, gymnasium graduate, and student of political economy at the University of Nancy, KOZAK was able to learn all A[illegible] secrets.

2. KOZAK came into contact with Antin [illegible] in 1949 and they became fast friends. Ivan *[illegible] is convinced that [illegible] was already then a Soviet agent and made contact with KOZAK on HIS instructions. When [illegible] and others noticed that KOZAK frequently made critical remarks about A[illegible] activity, displayed excessive curiosity about various A[illegible] members and their relations in the USSR, they became suspicious of him. He was removed from his job and strictly isolated from A[illegible] activity in 1950. Then the suspicions were borne out when it was learned that KOZAK had contact with the Soviet Embassy. He has subsequently maintained his contact with [illegible].

3. KOZAK is now living at 26 rue Gaston Jaillon, Vesines Chalette, Loiret, where there is a rather large Ukrainian colony.

Wallace N. HAVEDON

6 December 1960

Distribution:

- 3 - SR
- 2 - WE

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

94-6-106/3

705

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: RITA PERKINS
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 8757
DATE: 5 DECEMBER 1960

TO: PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	2	4	
2	2	5	3
3		6	

6 DEC 60 23 39z

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY — INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

OUT50208
OUT 50208

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 15201

15201

LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

RE: PARI 2579 (IN 49970)*

1. ODENVY REPORTS NO FILE INFO GNYP NYCZYPORUK AND POHORILIW. ODENVY INVESTIGATING POHORILIW AND REQUESTS ANY DETAILS WE CAN DEVELOP.

2. ONLY ACTION FOR PARI NOW REPORT DETAILS DELIVERY LETTER TO NYCZYPORUK AND UNWEAVE NAME TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *SINCE EGTA 15927 REPORTS SW DEFINITELY PRESENT PHILADELPHIA LETTER, REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS FURTHER PARI ACTION IF ANY.

C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

WE/3
SR/COP/CE
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/SR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

498

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 30 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : ~~TSD 4~~, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	2	4	
2	2	5	3
3		6	

DEC 2 1958Z 60
ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

IN 49970A PARI 2579

TO **INFO** **CITE**

LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

CS COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM TSD TO SR BY DR REID TSD EXT 2922 IN COORDINATION WITH RITA PERKINS, SR DIV EXT 8757.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. **Copy No.**

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	2	4	
2	3	5	
3		6	

DATE : 349
30 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : TSD 4*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

Perkins
Kali

NOV 30 1750Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 49970

DIR CITE PARI 2579

LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REF A. EGTA 15927

B. PARI 2453 (IN 45709)**

C. FRAN 7388 (IN 45202)

1. FACSIMILE PASSED TO DOGMA FOR DELIVERY ADDRESSEE.

2. SINCE REF A REPORTS SW DEFINITELY PRESENT PHILADELPHIA LETTER, REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS FURTHER PARI ACTION IF ANY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR AQUATIC USED.

**STATED NO FURTHER TESTING REQUIRED. REQUESTED POUCH ALL LETTERS PARI.

SINGLE COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FBI doc.
22 Nov. 1960 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Pohoriliw
DBF 63039

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
EGTA 15927

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
Chief of Station, Paris
Attn: James B. WINTERHALTER

INFO
Chief, EE Chief, WE, Chief, SR
Chief, EURIOT

FROM
Chief of Station, Germany

DATE
22 Nov 60

SUBJECT
AQUATIC / REDWOOD / Operational
Transmittal of SW examination Report

ACTION REQUIRED

MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCES

A. OFPA 55220, 4 Nov 60
B. EGTA 15911, 8 Nov 60
C. PARI 2329, 10 Nov 60
D. DIR 11442, 15 Nov 60
E. OFPA 55359, 16 Nov 60
F. PARI 2426, 18 Nov 60

Transmitted herewith as EAPCK attachment number one is a report on the laboratory work done on letters mentioned in the references above.

Elmer E. Hukeed
Elmer E. HUKEED

Attachment: 1
EAPCK Report

Approved: Joseph Q. Klemack
Joseph Q. KLEMACK

Distribution:
3 - Chief of Station, Paris, w/att
~~1~~ - Chief, SR, w/att
1 - Chief, WE, w/att
1 - Chief, EE, wo/att
2 - Chief, EURIOT, w/att

COPY

FORM 1957 53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

Attachment to EGTA-15927
dated 22 November 1960

SUBJECT: Report on Testing of Letters for SW

REFS: (1) OFPA-55220, 4 November 1960
(2) EGTA-15911, 8 November 1960
(3) FRAN 7328

1. The purpose of this report is summarize the laboratory work done on two letters transmitted to us originally as attachments to Reference #1. For identification purposes in this report we shall refer to the letter postmarked in Philadelphia as Letter #1 and the one postmarked in the USSR as Letter #2.

2. In order to facilitate a better understanding of the results some interpretative data on the tests performed is included.

3. Because of the requirement that the letters be left in good condition to permit their delivery to the addressee, the initial examination consisted of the customary visual and U.V. inspection (including long wave and short wave), and the so-called KEMPOTE test. This latter test has only recently been introduced and constitutes the most formidable test known to us against SW. It was by means of this test that the presence of SW in Letter #1 became apparent. In the application of this test a portion of the SW is actually physically lifted from the item being tested and subsequently through a process involving both chemical and physical reactions, the SW is made visible. The degree of visibility varies from completely negative results to completely legible ones. According to the technician who performed this test the results obtained with Letter #1 were not quite legible, but definite enough to permit checking to establish that they were not due to the visible ink of the letter. The time interval during which this particular detection is observable lasts but a few minutes which the technician used to verify that he was detecting SW and not visible text. By the time he called in his two colleagues the reaction had progressed to the point that only one of these technicians was able to observe the SW. Thus the operator and one other technician saw the SW.

4. At this point the letters were returned to Paris with Reference #2 which reported "definite traces of SW" in Letter #1.

5. Before giving an account of the work done during the second phase of the investigation (i.e., after the letters were returned to the laboratory for development) it should be pointed out that the KEMPOTE test, though an extremely effective test for the detection of SW, does not identify the system involved. Complete development of the secret message under these circumstances would have been almost impossible. The only alternative available to the chemist, and the one he followed in this particular case, is to proceed with a series of chemical tests applied directly to the document under investigation. These tests are applied in sequence, one after the other, each requiring for its execution that a portion of the page be sacrificed. It is therefore important that those tests affording the greatest probability of developing the SW be applied first; thus if and when, a test is found capable of developing the ink, the remainder of the page (i.e., the portion not affected by previous chemical applications) is treated with it.

SECRET
KAPOK

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

14-00000

Page 2 of Attachment to
[illegible]-15927 dated
22 [illegible] 1960

SUBJECT: Report on Testing of Letters for SW

Carlos [illegible]

6. In testing Letter #1, the chemist chose to apply first those tests known to be effective in developing known RIS inks. (There are, however, RIS inks for which we have no known developer.) After such tests were exhausted without yielding any detection the chemist proceeded with the application of other tests. In all a total of 30 different chemical tests were applied. No additional ones were used because no more area was left on the letter to apply them.

7. None of these tests yielded even a trace of SW. These results appear to contradict the report initially sent with Reference #2. They should not be so interpreted. We still believe that Letter #1 contained SW, our failure to develop it notwithstanding.

8. As previously reported, Letter #2 was not treated, for reasons given in Reference #3. A facsimile of Letter #1 was made before undertaking its chemical treatment. The facsimile was check by a competent linguist and authentication specialist and found satisfactory.

9. FYI: Any information concerning the KENFOLD test, including its existence, is considered extremely sensitive and should be so treated.

Elmer E. Hukeed

Elmer E. HUKEED

DESENSITIZED
per CSN [illegible]

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO	: Chief of Station, PARIS	29-6-106/3
INFO	: Chief, KURIOT; Chief, EE; Chief, WE; Chief, SR	
FROM	: Chief of Station, GERMANY	20 November 1960
SUBJECT	: /AQUATIC/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA Transmittal of Letters	[illegible]
ACTION REQUIRED		[illegible]

REFERENCES:

A. DIR 11442	D. OFPA-55369	G. PARI 2330
B. FRAN 7364	E. PARI 2426	H. EGTA-15911
C. FRAN 7388	F. PARI 2329	I. OFPA-55220

Enclosed herewith as Attachment #1 is an envelope containing the two letters of reference "1". A full report on the examination of these letters will follow.

Elmer E. Hukeed
Elmer E. HUKEED

ATTACHMENT:
1 - Envelope Containing
Two Letters

APPROVED: Joseph Q. Klemack
Joseph Q. KLEMACK

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - COS, Paris, w/attachment
1 - Chief, KURIOT, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, EE, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, WE, w/o attachment
~~1~~ - Chief, SR, w/o attachment

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

FORM 10-57 53b (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 339
19 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : TSD 4*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 19 2226Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 45202

PRITY PARI INFO DIR CITE FRAN 7368

REF A. PARI 2426 (IN 44558)**

B. OFPA 55369

C. EGTA 15911

1. ALL ATTEMPTS DEVELOP SW UNSUCCESSFUL ON PHILDELPHIA POSTMARKED LETTER. FACSIMILE MADE.

2. LETTER POSTMARKED USSR NOT TREATED AS NO TRACE SW FOUND PER REF C. ALSO WOULD INVOLVE REPRODUCING LETTER HEAD. ADVISE IF DESIRE FURTHER SW TESTING.

3. WILL RETURN FACSIMILE PHILDELPHIA ORIGINAL USSR NEXT POUCH.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR AQUATIC USED.

**REFERENCE RYBAT.

SINGLE COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

273

SECRET

DATE : 18 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : TSD 4

INFO : EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI

CE

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 18 1844Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 44579

OPIM PARI INFO DIR CITE FRAN 7364

AQUATIC REDWOOD

RE OFPA 55369

LETTERS WILL BE DESTROYED IN DEVELOPMENT. WITHHOLDING ACTION PENDING YOUR ADVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

SINGLE COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

266

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 18 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : C/TSD 2 (TSD ISSUED TEMPO COPY AT 1345 18 NOV 60)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/SR 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	2	4	
2	3	5	
3		6	

NOV 18 1821Z 60

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 44558

OPIM FRAN INFO OPIM DIR CITE PARI 2426

SENSITIZED

RYBAT AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

Perkins

REF A. FRAN 7364*

B. DIR 11442 (OUT 92118)

1. REQUEST MKTOPAZ ATTEMPT MAKE FACSMILE OF OVERT TEXT OF LETTER FOR DELIVERY TO ADDRESSEE. PROCEED DEVELOP ORIGINAL EVEN IF FACSIMILE NOT POSSIBLE OR NOT FULLY SATISFACTORY. CABLE ALL RESULTS OPIM BEFORE POUCHING FACSIMILE.

2. DIR: AGREE COMMENTS REF B. IF NO SW, BELIEVE GOOD CHANCE REASONABLE FACSIMILE WILL PASS CURSORY INSPECTION ADDRESSEE AND PROTECT AEDOGMA. IF SW PRESENT WILL HOLD OFF DELIVERY PENDING HQS ADVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 1400 18 NOV 60.

SINGLE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET OFPA- 55369

COS, Germany MKTOPAZ
Chief, SR
Chief, WE
Chief, EE

29-6-106/3

16 NOV 1960

Chief of Station, Paris

AQUATIC REDWOOD Operational

XX

See Below

A. DIR 11442, 15 November 1960
B. EGTA 15911, 8 November 1960

Forwarded herewith are reference B letters for development as per reference A. It is requested that every effort be made to expedite this matter and to have letters back to Paris by return pouch if possible. Please cable progress.

Wallace H. Havedon

15 November 1960

Attached herewith:
2 letters as attached in reference B
Distribution:
2-C/MKTOPAZ Germany
2-C/SR
2-C/WE
2-C/EE

502

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : RITA PERKINS
UNIT : SR/2/CE
EXT : 8757
DATE : 15 NOVEMBER 1960

ROUTING			
1	2	4	6
2	2	5	
3		6	

TO : FBI
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, WE 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE		
☐	DEFERRED	15 14 16Z 60
X	ROUTINE	CABLE SEC
☐	PRIORITY	INITIALS
☐	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 92770
OUT 92770

TO FBI INFO CITE DIR

SEMEN POBORILIW

1. USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE IN PARIS, FRANCE, REPORTED EARLY NOV 60 THAT DMYTRO GNYP ASKED SOURCE TO DELIVER TWO LETTERS TO ANTIN NYCZYPORUK, WAS NYKYPRZUK AND NYKPORETS, WHO CONFINED MENTAL SANITARIUM NEAR PARIS. GNYP TOLD SOURCE MADE REQUEST BECAUSE BOTH GNYP AND NYCZYPORUK HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH VASILIY MYAKUSHKO, RIS OFFICER WITH UNESCO, WHO WAS CASE OFFICER GRIGORIY DEMYDCZUK UKRAINIAN EMIGRE ARRESTED BY FRENCH AUG 60, SEE YOUR MEMO 12 SEP 60.

2. OUR FIELD OFFICE EXAMINED LETTERS AND FOUND ONE LETTER FROM NOGINSK USSR ADVISING NYCZYPORUK HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER NOT IN NOGINSK, NO EVIDENCE SECRET WRITING. OTHER LETTER FROM SEMEN POBORILIW OF 613 N 7TH ST. PHILADELPHIA 25 BORE INDICATIONS SECRET WRITING. IF SOURCE ABLE RETAIN LETTER FIELD OFFICE WILL REPRODUCE AND ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP SECRET WRITING.

CONTINUED

S/c 631

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

Page 2

DIR
OUT 92770

TO FBI INFO CITE DIR

3. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION IN OUR FILES ON SEMEN POHORILIW AND ANTIN HYCZYPORUK. DMYTRO GNYP REPORTED IN 1958 MEMBER UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX PARISH COUNCIL IN PARIS. OUR SOURCE MET HYCZYPORUK IN REFUGEE CAMP CA 1945, AND CHARACTERIZES HIM AS BRILLIANT BUT MENTALLY UNBALANCED PROFESSOR UKRAINIAN LITERATURE. SOURCE HEARD RUMORS HYCZYPORUK NEVER HELD REGULAR JOB BUT RECEIVED MONEY FROM SOVIET EMBASSY PARIS, ALSO HAD AGREED MYAKUSHKO ORDER TO RETURN TO USSR ON CONDITION SOVIETS LOCATE HIS FAMILY IN NOGINSK.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING ABOVE PERSONS.

END OF MESSAGE

SR/COP/CE
WE/3
CI/OG/SOV/SAT - draft S.MILER
CI/LG
TSD - by phone Dr. REID
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CI J. Roman
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

RITA PERKINS
SR/2/CE 706
8757
DATE: 14 November 1960

TO: PARIS FRANKFURT
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/SR 4
INFO: COP, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI, C/TSD 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	2	4	
2	3/2	5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	23 05z
X	ROUTINE	CABLE
✓	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT92118
92118

TO PRITY PARI FRAN INFO CITE DIR 11442
11442

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT IMMEDIATE HANDLING

REDWOOD AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REFS: A. PARI 2329 (IN 40?964)*
B. PARI 2330 (IN 40?966)

HQS OPINION PRIME CONCERN DETERMINING WHETHER IDEN 1 REF B INVOLVED RIS. RECOMMEND MKTOPAZ DEVELOP IF THEY CAN, IF NOT PLS STATE DEGREE CERTAINTY
DEPENDING RESULTS, INCLINED BUY TIME WITH REF A PARA 4C, ALTHOUGH
PRESENCE SW. ~~XXX [illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~ BELIEVE RIS WILL CONSIDER OP COMPROMISED WHEN AND IF REPORTED LETTERS WERE IN AEDOGMA/1 POSSESSION. WILL ALERT ODENVY HERE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *STATED (EGTA 15911) LETTER IN WHICH MKTOPAZ SUSPECTS SW CONTENT POSTMARKED PHILADELPHIA 6 SEPT FROM IDEN 1 TO IDEN 2 IN CARE OF IDEN 3.

CI/OPS

SINGLE COPY

SR/COP/CE
WE/3
TSD
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

421·

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 10 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : C/SR 4

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI, C/TSD 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	2	4	B
2	3/2	5	
3		6	

NOV 10 213:Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 40966

DESENSITIZED

DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE PARI 2333

RYBAT IMMEDIATE HANDLING

REDWOOD AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REF PARI 2329 (IN 40964)

IDEN 1: PROF SEMEN POHORILIW 613 N. 7TH ST PHILADELPHIA 25

IDEN 2: ANTIN NYCZYPORUK, AKA NYKYPORCZUK AKA NYKYPORETS

IDEN 3: DMYTRO GNYP 211 RUE DE BERCY PARI XII

NO STA TRACES FOR ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

5/10 631

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

419

DATE : 10 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : C/SR 4

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI, C/TSD 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	2	4	3
2	3/2	5	
3	C	6	

NOV 10 2131Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 40964

DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE PARI 2329

BAT IMMEDIATE HANDLING

REDWOOD AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REF A. OFPA 55223 not [illegible]

B. EGTA 15911 not [illegible]

1. REF B LETTER IN WHICH MKTOPAZ SUSPECTS SW CONTENT POSTMARKED

Semen Pohorilew — Antin Nyczyporuk

PHILADELPHIA 6 SEPT FROM IDEN 1 TO IDEN 2 CARE OF IDEN 3. OVERT

Dmytro Mnyr

CONTENT IN UKRANIAN APPARENTLY INNOCUOUS.

Nyczyporuk

2. FYI: IDEN 2 BRILLIANT BUT MENTALLY UNBALANCED PROFESSOR UKRANIAN LITERATURE. AEDOGMA/1 MET IN REFUGEE CAMPS CA 1945. FREQUENTLY HEARD RUMORS HE NEVER HELD REGULAR JOB BUT HAD MONEY ALEGEDLY PROVIDED BY SOV EMB. IN PARI PUT IN CONTACT WITH VISILIY

Mnyr — Nyczyporuk

MYAKUSHKO BY IDEN 3. IN MAY, IDEN 2 ADVISED BY MYAKUSHKO REPATRIATE

Nyczyporuk

USSR IMMEDIATELY. IDEN 2 AGREED ON CONDITION SOV EMB LOCATE HIS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FAMILY IN NOGINSK, USSR. OTHER REF B LETTER FROM NOGINSK GORSOVET

Nyczyporuk

ADVISING IDEN 2 HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER NOT IN NOGINSK.

Nyczyporuk

3. IDEN 2 CURRENTLY IN UNKNOWN MENTAL SANATORIUM NEAR PARI.

Uswyp Nyczyporuk

IDEN 3 RELUCTANT PERSONALLY DELIVER TWO LETTERS TO IDEN 2 SINCE BOTH

RIS off'l

HAD HAD CONTACT WITH NYAKUSHKO, WHO DISAPPEARED AFTER DEMYDCZUK ARREST, REQUESTED AEDOGMA/1 TO VISIT IDEN 3, LEARN ADDRESS SANATORIUM, THEN DELIVER. AEDOGMA/1 CAN DELAY AS LONG AS NECESSARY UNDER PRETEXT LETTERS ALREADY OLD, HE BUSY SETTLING IN NEW APARTMENT.

4. STA SEES FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES:

A. AEDOGMA/1 DELIVER LETTERS NOW, TRUST RIS NOT LEARN HE COVERTLY OPENED.

INFORM?

B. DEVELOP FOR SW AT HQS OR FRAN, THEN HAVE AEDOGMA/1 INFER

Pohoriliw Nyczyporuk

IDENS 1 AND 2 HE HAD NO TIME MAKE TRIP TO SANATORIUM, SIMPLY DROPPED IN MAIL BOX. RIS THEN MIGHT ASSUME UNBOUND INTERCEPTED BECAUSE OF KNOWN INTEREST IN NYAKUSHKO CONTACTS.

C. POSSIBLY REPRODUCE LETTER WITH OR WITHOUT SW.

5. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
PRIORITY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
EGTA-15911

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO

TO : Chief of Station, PARIS Attn: James B. WINTERHALTER

INFO : Chief, EE; Chief, WE; Chief, SR; Chief, KURIOT

FROM : Chief of Station, GERMANY

DATE
8 November 1960

SUBJECT : AQUATIC/REDWOOD/Operational
Examination of Letters for Secret Writing

RE. "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

OFPA-55220 dated 4 November 1960

1. The letters transmitted with the above reference have been covertly tested for the presence of secret writing.

2. The letter postmarked from USSR revealed no evidence of secret writing. The letter postmarked Philadelphia had definite traces of secret writing, however, because of the nature of the requirements no attempt was made to develop or identify the secret writing.

3. The letters are herewith returned, sealed, for integration in the mails for sending to the addressee.

Elmer G. Hukeed, jr

Jacob R. OVERBURY

Attachment:

1 - Envelope
Containing Letters

APPROVED: Feaster
for Joseph Q. KLEMACK

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - Chief of Station, PARIS, w/attachment
1 - Chief, EE, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, WE, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, SR, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, KURIOT, w/o attachment

201-289249

FORM 10-57 (40) 53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
priority
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OFPA- 55220
TO Chief MKTOPAZ Germany INFO Chief, WE and Chief, SR		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. None
FROM Chief of Station, Paris		DATE
SUBJECT General: AQUATIC/REDWOOD/Operational Specific: Testing letters for possible secret writing		RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED See below		
REFERENCE(S)		

1. KURIOT/Paris requests that the attached letters be examined for secret writing. These letters have been opened by a REDWOOD agent and photographed by the Paris Station. It is possible that these letters contain SW and SW traps.

2. MKTOPAZ technicians should keep in mind that these letters have to be [illegible] returned in the 9 [illegible] November pouch. a [illegible]se letters have to be integrated in the mail system and sent to the addressee without his knowledge that these letters have been tampered with on the eleventh or twelfth November. If the work cannot possibly be done the letters should be sealed and returned untested.

James B. Winterhalter

4 November 1960

Attached Herewith:
 2-letters for Frankfurt only

Distribution:
 3-Germany
 2-SR
 2-WE

3960 TSD

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.



Сочи. Домик Н. А. Островского

Куда France/ Франция

Poris XII

211 rue de Bergy

Кому M-r Cnyp Dmytro

Pon. Nykyporчuk Anti

Адрес отправителя: СССР

г. Ногинск Московской обл.

Горисполком исх 823

23 Sept 60

Encl #2 to OFPA 55524

201-277417

Р. С. Ф. С. Р.
ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ
НОГИНСКОГО ГОРОДСКОГО СОВЕТА ДЕПУТАТОВ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ
Адрес: г. Ногинск, улица III Интернационала, дом 57, тел. 2-20

исх - 825

«8» сентября 1960

Исполком Ногинского городского Совета депутатов трудящихся сообщает, что НИКИПОРЕЦ Агриппина Семеновна в городе Ногинске не проживает.

ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЬ ИСПОЛКОМА ГОРСОВЕТА

/В.ПЛЕШЕВ/



S.Po.
631 N. 7th St
phila. 23, pa.
u. S. A.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
SEP 6
530PM
1960 CC

VIA AIR MAIL

Mr Gnyp Dmytro (Pour Antin)
211, Rue de Bersy
paris XIIe

FRANCE.

F

[illegible].IX.60

Дорогий Антоне!

Занурив ти мене своїм станом. Що сталося, що ти знову попав на той чортячий курорт? Чи знову хтось поміг у тому ділі, чи ти з кимсь посварився, чи що воно там сталося?

Зрозуміла річ, що нема що питати як там є у тому будинку. А все ж, як ти себе, будучи здоровою людиною, почуваєш, як там жартують, поводяться; які є можливості та надії на вихід з чортополоху? В якому стані є тепер твоє здоров'я? Хто та як може тобі помогти?

В цей лист укладаю тобі один зелений на потреби цигарети.

Оце знову мене нога дуже турбує. Хоч уже є трохи краще, але рани, що були появились, ще не погоїлись. Операцій уже багато мав, але біди цілком ніяк не можу позбутися. Як буде далі.

Напишу мені. Літо тут цього року для Філадельфії було добре, холодновато [illegible] [illegible] раз на 20-30 років. Вже й осінь надійшла. Тут вона холодна не буває. Холодніше в Сієні на морі, т.з. [illegible] [illegible] мені.

Як будеш мати можливість напиши пару слів.

З найкращими побажан-
нями твій Сем



14-00000

Secret

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OO/SOV/SAT

From: SR/2/CE/Rita L. Perkins

Subject: Outline Communication re POHORILIW Case

1. OFPA 55220, 4 November 1960
Request to MKTOPAZ to analyze letters

2. EGTA 15911, 8 November 1960
MKTOPAZ reply that POHORILIW letter bore definite traces of S/w.

3. PARI 2339, 10 November 1960
PARI STA informed Hqs of AEDOGMA/1 receipt of letters, relay to MKTOPAZ, latter's reply, and asked for guidance

4. OUT 92770, 16 November 1960
INFO PARI 2339 relayed to FBI; long delay in informing FBI because cable came in on Thurs evening and not given to c/o until 14 Nov. Dr. REED consulted 14 Nov re the wording "definite traces" and advised could not elaborate until MKTOPAZ report came in.

5. OUT 92118, 14 November 1960 To Pari
Stated HQS opinion prime concern was to determine if POHORILIW involved RIS and directed PARI to return letters to MKTOPAZ and that the latter attempt to develop the S/W.

6. OFPA 55369, 16 November 1960
PARI returned letters to MKTOPAZ per para 5 above.

8. ~~7~~. PARI 2426, 18 November 1960
Refed 6 above; directed MKTOPAZ to make foreged copy of POHORILIW letter and then attempt develop S/W

7. ~~8~~. FRAN 7364, 18 November 1960
MKTOPAZ reminds PARI letters will be destroyed in development attempts Holding action till Pari advises.

9. FRAN 7388, 19 Nobember 1960
MKTOPAZ reports efforts to develop S/W failed.

10. EGTA 15915, 20 November 1960
MKTOPAZ returned letters to PARI; full report on examination will follow.

11. EGTA 15927, 22 November 1960
MKTOPAZ report in full. My copy does not indicate date arrived in HQS, but believe c. 1 December; at this time in telephone communication with DR. REED who advised S/W detection made by new sensitive method, that FBI lab aware of this method, and he would be responsible for relaying this info to FBI.

12. DBF 63039, 22 November 1960
Made reference to our teletype; said had no info persons involved; investigating POHORILIW, desired any further info we cld develop.

13. PARI 2579, 30 November 1960
Letters given to AEDOGMA/1 to deliver to NYCZYPORUK; and since POHORILIW letter bore definite S/W trace asked for further guidance

14. OUT 50208, 6 December 1960
Relayed para 12 ODENVY reply; and advised only PARI action for time to report delivery letters to NYCZYPORUK and UNWEAVE traces.

15. OFPA 55817, 7 December 1960
Relayed additional info on NYCZYPORUK - his relationship with Jozef KOZAK.

16. OFPA 55524, December 1960
Transmitted to HQS facsimiles of letters involved, and bio on GNYP and NYCZYPORUK.

17. CSCI 3/763,211, 9 January 1961
relayed info and letters cited para 15 and 16 to FBI

18. PARI 3664, 16 February 1961
Informed HQS letters delivered to NYCZYPORUK 8 or 9 January 61; and that N evidenced no reaction when opened letters; N said considered cured by Doctors and only needs assured domicile to be released; aldo GNYP rumor that N intends to repatriate when released. PARI Sta aksed for guidance.

19. OUT 74849, 17 February 1961
relayed para 18 to FBI and asked if any action PARI would abet their investigation POHORILIW.

20. Mrs. ROMAN telephoned interim reply to Perkins 20 or 21 February that FBI investigation delayed by incorrect address; unfortunately para 3 cable gave address as 613 N 7th whereas letter stated 631 N 7th, cf. para 16 and 17.

21. Mrs. ROMAN telephoned Perkins 27 February 1961 and reported FBI did not have report on S/w aspects. Perkins called Dr. REED and was told that this info had been passed to William Magee, Chief of FBI lab about 1 December 1960 and that Dr. REED in speaking to Mr. Magee had cited our teletype OUT 92770 and the name POHORILIW; further he would call Mr. Magee and remind him of same.

22. I believe Mr. Magee and Dr. REED spoke on the matter 28 February (I was absent from office on 28 Feb and 1 Mar) but I spoke to Dr. Reed on 2 March 1961 and he assured me now remembered matter.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO : RID/201 Section

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

FROM:

ROOM NO.

PHONE

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO.

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

NAME VARIANT

TO TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

16. AFFILIATION CODE P B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION (Clear text)

19. ORG/GROUP CODE

20. OCCUPATION/POSITION (Clear text)

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION

22. ACTION DESK

23. CODE

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

26. CRYPTONYM

27. PSEUDONYM

28. COMMENTS

[illegible] Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Possibly [illegible]

29. SIGNATURE

30. IDN-

201-

FORM 6-60 831 TEST OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: DE GOLYER CO.

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
DEC. 18, '78		SORRELL BRADY	Sorrell Brady

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

ESV 09

R 231920Z

GR125

BT

078 VA

CONFIDENTIAL

VA CITE SFCO 8443

GMP STAFF (YOUNG) FROM CUTLER

REUR TWENTY MARCH 61 TELEMEMO - SUBJECT: PHOTOGEOLOGICAL MAPPING OF SPANISH SAHARA

OIL COMPANIES DENVER SOURCES HAVE DONE WORK FOR IN SPANISH SAHARA ARE: A 14691 ~~S-[illegible]~~ A 9680

GEOPHOTO SERVICES, INC: CHAMPLIN OIL AND REFINING CO, 5331 CAMP BOWIE AVE, FORT WORTH 7, TEXAS ✓ use S-14691

PAN AMERICAN HISPANO OIL CO, 555 FIFTH AVE, NEW YORK 17 NY. A-[illegible]

DE GOLYER & MAC NAUGHTON INC, 5625 DANIELS AVE, DALLAS, TEXAS (FOR WORK DONE FOR VALDERRO COMMISSION). A 609 A 3440

A 69237

KNOX-BERGMAN-SHEARER: COMBINED OPERATION OF TIDEWATER & SOHIO OIL COMPANIES AND PAN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL.

CONFIDENTIAL A 12650

CFN 8443 YOUNG CUTLER 28 MAR 61 PHOTOGEOLOGICAL MAPPING SPANISH SAHARA GEOPHOTO SERVICES CHAMPLIN OIL AND REFINING CO 5331 CAMP BOWIE AVE FORT WORTH 7 TEXAS PAN AMERICAN HISPANO OIL CO 555 FIFTH AVE NEW YORK 17 DE GOLYER AND MAC NAUGHTON INC 5625 DANIELS AVE DALLAS TEXAS VALDERRO COMMISSION KNOX BERGMAN SHEARER TIDEWATER AND SOHIO OIL COS PAN AM INTL

copies filed in all jackets

BT

TOR: [illegible] TOT. 0312 1552Z

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

S E C R E T

FIELD DISTRIBUTION - [illegible]

AF DIVISION

Johannesburg
Lagos
Nairobi
Pretoria
Rabat
Salisbury

EUR DIVISION

Barcelona
Berlin
Bern
Bonn
Brussels
Copenhagen
Geneva
The Hague
Hamburg
Helsinki
Lisbon
London
Madrid
Milan
Munich Liaison Base
Munich Ops. Base (Laurion)
Oslo
Ottawa
Paris
LCPIPIT
Rome
Salzburg
Stockholm
Vienna
Zurich

NE DIVISION

Ankara
Athens
Beirut
Calcutta
Colombo
Istanbul
New Delhi
Rawalpindi
Teheran

FE DIVISION

Bangkok
Djakarta
Hong Kong
Honolulu
Kuala Lumpur
Kuching
Manila
Medan
Melbourne
Okinawa
Rangoon
Saigon
Seoul
Singapore
Taipei
Tokyo
Vientiane
Surabaya
Wellington

WH DIVISION

Asuncion
Bogota
Brasilia
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Georgetown
Guatemala City
Guayaquil
JMWAVE
Kingston
La Paz
Lima
Managua
Mexico City
Monterrey
Montevideo
Norfolk (REPLANT)
Panama City
Port au Prince
Porto Alegre
Quito
Recife
Rio de Janerio
San Jose
San Salvador
Santiago
Santiago de los Caballeros
Santo Domingo
Sao Paulo
Tegucigalpa

S E C R E T

CA [illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
CA/3
CA/4
CA/5

[illegible] COPS/CA
AF/1
AF/2
AF/3
AF/4
AF/5
AF/6

FE/CA 14
C/CO/CA

SB/CA

DO/CA 3

CI/R&A 10

EUR DIVISION

E/CA
E/SC
E/BNL
E/F
E/I
E/IB
E/G
E/AS
E/BC

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

WH DIVISION

WH/CA
WH/C
WH/C/CA
WH/1
WH/1/Mexico
WH/2
WH/2/G
WH/2/P
WH/2/S
WH/2/CR/N
WH/3
WH/3/B
WH/3/CO
WH/3/E
WH/3/P
WH/3/V
WH/4
WH/4/AR
WH/4/CH
WH/4/P/U
WH/5
WH/5/Brazil
WH/6
WH/7
WH/7/HT
WH/7/GU
WH/7/DR
WH/7/JTS

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]

Files 29 January 1964

M. D. Stevens

THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel [illegible], Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a 'Blanket' request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to 'rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies.' The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Dup
1271-1029

~~SECRET~~

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., 77-574, ID & SR, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. [The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352967, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 13 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.]

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 25 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MURRELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MURRELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MURRELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MURRELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyalty. In November 1954, MURRELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizens Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MURRELL.

M. D. Stevens

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

MBER/VOLUME: CIA STUDY "CONCLUSIONS & COMMENTS IN THE CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO," (COPY #9)

ATES: 1 OCT. 68

NIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

IF ANY: INFO BEARING ON SECURITY OF ONGOING CIA OPS

DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
	Kenneth Klein	Kenneth Klein
	G. Robert Blakey	G. Robert Blakey
	Kenneth Klein	Kenneth Klein
	THOMAS SMITH	Thomas Smith
	G. ROBERT BLAKEY	G. Robert Blakey
	Thomas Smith	Thomas Smith
	Mary E. Jackson	Mary Jackson
	Thomas Smith	Thomas Smith
	Thomas Smith	Thomas Smith
	Thomas Smith	[illegible] COC1CC1

NTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

1 October 1968

CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
IN THE CASE OF
YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

SECRET

1 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff

SUBJECT : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich

1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclusions concerning the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Subconclusions are contained in the summary concerning several major areas which were given primary consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO.

2. Included in this summary are comments concerning conclusions in the previous summary and an annex containing remarks on three separate subjects related to the NOSENKO case.

3. In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO is the person he claims to be, that he held his claimed positions in the KGB during 1953 - January 1964, that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB, and that his previous lies and exaggerations are not actually of material significance at this time.

Bruce L. Solie

Attachment:
Summary

BLS:ko

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction

II. Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since 30 October 1967

III. Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

- A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims to be?
- B. Is the Claimed KGB Career of NOSENKO Plausible?
- C. Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation of His Motivation in Contacting CIA in 1962 and For His Defection in 1964?
- D. Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CIA Concerning KGB Operations, Personalities, and Organization Reasonably Commensurate With His Claimed KGB Career?
- E. Can the Information Furnished by NOSENKO be Considered in Toto as Having Resulted in Material Damage to the KGB and/or Has the Information Furnished by NOSENKO Been of Significant Benefit to Western Intelligence?
- F. Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away" in Information Furnished by NOSENKO Which Would Warrant a Conclusion that NOSENKO was Dispatched by the KGB?

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

G. Is There Evidence of a Political or Any Other Type Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions?

H. Is There Any Evidence That the Contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 With CIA Were Known to the KGB Prior to His Defection or That NOSENKO Was Ever Briefed by the KGB Relative to His Behavior or KGB Objectives During These Contacts or After His Defection?

IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regard to NOSENKO

A. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval RU in Any of the Capacities or at the Places and Times He Claimed

B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the Time He Claimed

C. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy Section Throughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He Claimed

D. During the Period 1955 - 1960, He Was Neither a Senior Case Officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section

E. NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a Senior Officer or Supervisor in the Section During the Period 1961 - 1962 (sic)

F. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and Was Thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, Are Not Credible

G. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim to Certainty That the KGB Recruited No American Embassy Personnel Between 1953 and His Defection in 1964

V. Annex

Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text

Annex C - The Cherepanov Papers

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

I. INTRODUCTION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

INTRODUCTION

The following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organizational, operational, personality and case type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do so would be repetitious and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of primary concern.

This summary will not contain a detailed psychological assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational or policy nature.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily on whether he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide" defector.

There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer. For purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to whether this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate.

The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omissions and unsupported conclusions in the previous summary in regard to specific cases or sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this summary will not include a point-by-point comparison of all areas of agreement or disagreement with information contained in the previous summary.

A positive decision in regard to NOSENKO based on all available information should be made in the immediate future. There are no known sources currently available to provide new positive information concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. It is recognized that there is always a possibility in the future a new source or sources will be able to furnish additional information in regard to NOSENKO. However, this possibility is exceedingly tenuous and it is felt there is sufficient information available on which to base a conclusion in the NOSENKO matter.

II. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962.

Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been covered during previous interview or interviews.

NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the first few interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

interviewer would not dispute or disparage his statements without adequate reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the interviewer, totally disappeared.

During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six months, NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for defection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an example of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included remarks concerning approximately 875 KGB officers, 100 KGB agents, 35 GRU officers, and 400 other Soviet nationals. These lists were alphabetically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information furnished by him during current interviews.

Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related memoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the CI Staff. Special Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has interviewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information.

In addition, three professionals from the SB Division have reviewed the current information and assisted in the retrieval of previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current information with previous information. The latter is a tremendous task because of the volume of material; the number of individual cases involved; and the extensive information in regard to KGB personalities, procedures, organizational structure and activities.

The SB Division also provided the services of an expert translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOSENKO by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioned three professionals completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly pertinent previous interviews of NOSENKO have been completed by the Office of Security.

Approximately 7000 pages of transcripts and related material have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Comments concerning the value of the information contained in the above material are contained in another section of this summary. As of the present time, a complete analysis is not possible since a considerable portion of the material has not been fully processed. In the preparation of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined. Because of the voluminous information, all analytical and collation work has not been completed; but it is not considered that, based on all available information, the remaining work will materially affect the conclusions drawn in this summary.

The polygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on 2 August and concluded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixty questions of a pertinent nature were included in the polygraph interview. No problems were encountered during the polygraph interview and no additional testing of NOSENKO is anticipated. Attached is a copy of the self-explanatory report on the results of the polygraph interview.

Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph interview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permit a review of previous information and preparation of this summary. There is no doubt that future interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information of intelligence value, but information developed thus far will permit a decision in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Attachment:
12 Aug 68 Polygraph Rpt

TO : Chief, Security Research Staff 12 August 1968

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO IRD # 67491

IDENTIFYING DATA

Subject is a 40 year old former KGB Staffer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 in Geneva.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been debriefing and interrogating Subject since October 1967 in order to resolve the issue whether Subject was a dispatched agent of the KGB. He has conducted a vast amount of research and checking with sources in an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements.

PURPOSE

The primary purpose of the polygraph test was to determine:

1. Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB;
2. Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie any false information.

PROCEDURE

Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was conducted in the English language. Subject's comprehension and the ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative in all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information on a topic.

The following relevant questions were asked during the first test:

Is your true name Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes.

Were you born in the year 1927? Yes.

Besides the Americans, did you tell anyone else about your intention to defect? No.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Did you ever tell anyone in the KGB about your contact with American Intelligence? No.

Were you given instructions by the KGB to get in contact with American Intelligence? No.

Were you told by the KGB to defect in order to carry out an Intelligence mission? No.

The following relevant questions were asked during the second test:

Did the KGB actually send a communication for your recall to the USSR on the day of your defection? No.

Were you acquainted with CHEREPANOV? Yes.

Did you actually travel to Gorkiy in November 1963 to hunt for CHEREPANOV? Yes.

Are you deliberately withholding from us any information about the KGB recruitment of Americans? No.

Does the KGB have METKA and NEPTUNE 80? Yes.

Were you the responsible Case Officer for John Abidian in 1960-61? Yes.

Do you know the true name of ANDREY or SASHA? No.

Did you ever have tuberculosis? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test three:

Did you serve in Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yes.

06

Was SHUBIN in the USSR during the period 1957 to 1959? Yes.

To the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh Department at this time? Yes.

06

Did you telephone the GRU about SHUBIN at this time? Yes.

To the best of your knowledge, was POPOV compromised because of the letter Mr. Winters mailed? Yes.

2/8R

To the best of your knowledge, was PENKOVSKIY exposed to the KGB because of the mass surveillance on the British Embassy? Yes.

Was there any misleading information in the notes you brought out from the Soviet Union? No.

Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal association with GRIBANOV? No.

Are you hiding any adverse information about your background? No.

Subject's polygraph test reflected no significant responses indicative of deception regarding the relevant questions asked. No further polygraph tests were administered on this date because the examiner did not want to run the risk of fatigue setting in and thus possibly causing adrenalin exhaustion.

Polygraph testing was resumed on 6 August 1968. The following relevant questions were asked on test four:

Did you join the KGB in March 1953? Yes.

Were you a KGB officer from 1953 to 1964? Yes.

Were you a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department? Yes.

Were you only a Captain at this time? Yes.

Were you an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section from March 1953 to May 1955? Yes.

In 1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section in the Seventh Department? Yes.

From January 1960 to December 1961 were you the Deputy to the Chief of the First Section of the First Department? Yes.

From January to July 1962 were you the Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department? Yes.

Were you an officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD, at the time of the Stalingrad operation against Benson, Mule and Stroud? Yes.

06 06, 06

SECRET

21BR

IRD # 67-91
Page 4

The following relevant questions were asked on test five:

Since 1953 do you know of any other KGB recruitments in the American Embassy besides ANDREY and HOWARD? No.
06

Did the KGB know about the notes you brought out? No.

Have you told us the complete truth about your KGB career? Yes.

Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal involvement in cases in 1962 and 1964 in order to mislead us? No.

Did you intentionally give us any false operational information? No.

Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chief of the First Department? Yes.

Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the Chief of the First Department? Yes.

In early 1960 did GRIBANOV tell you that your primary responsibility was to work against American Code Clerks? Yes.

Other than you mentioned, are you hiding any other reasons for your defection? No.

Are you deliberately withholding any information on any foreigners recruited by the KGB? No.

The following relevant questions were asked on test six:

Did you enter the KGB through the influence of General BOGDAN KOBULOV? Yes.

Did you succeed BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.

Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.

Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB knowledge? No.

11BR

IND # 67[illegible]
Page 5

To your knowledge was there any misleading information in the CHEREPANOV papers? No.

Did you ever personally meet GOLITSYN? No.

Was there a cable sent to Geneva for you to assist ARTEMEV in the BELITSKIY case? Yes.

06
Did you personally make an approach to KEYSERS at the Moscow Airport? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test seven:

Did you actually review the KGB file on OSWALD? Yes.

Did LEE HARVEY OSWALD receive any KGB training or assignments? No.

Were there any microphones installed in the North Wing of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow? No.

Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in 1960-61? Yes.

Are you withholding any information known to you concerning KGB microphones or electronic activity against the U.S. Embassy? No.

Before your official transfer to the Seventh Department did you read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to PUSHKIN street? Yes.

Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKOV in 1962 in Geneva? Yes.

Was the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document to GORKIY only a mistake by KASHPEROV? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test eight:

While in the U.S. Embassy Section did you obtain a typewriter for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter to Edward Ellis SMITH? Yes.

118R

IRD # 67491
Page 6

Did you read the official report of KOSOLAPOV on his contact with JENNER on a train from Helsinki to Moscow? Yes.
06

Are you intentionally withholding any information concerning KGB knowledge of CIA personnel in Moscow? No.

Is there any possibility that the KGB would dispatch an officer to defect to the Americans? No.

Subject's polygraph test of 6 August likewise reflected no indications of deception.

CONCLUSION

Based solely on the overall analysis of Subject's polygraph tests, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the Subject has been substantially truthful in answering the relevant questions asked.

0001020

1/BR

SECRET

III. ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbitrary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent to the question of whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB.

It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects would also be considered but that his admitted previous lies and exaggerations would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide defector."

The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which are being given specific consideration. Attached is a separate section containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A - H.

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964?

D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB career?

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence?

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?

G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions?

H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection?

A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE?

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

During interviews NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard to his family, his activities as a youth, the schools he attended, associates of his father and mother, and his own associates. The period under consideration in this section is the period preceding his entry into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953.

Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and mother and his early life, together with other information such as a comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he is Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satisfactorily supported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other associates of his father and mother.

Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

little or no value in assessing the bona fides or non-bona fides of NOSENKO. An expose of his youthful indiscretions, of which he has admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. Obtaining any collateral first-hand information in regard to NOSENKO before 1945 would be of negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from Nikolay ARTAMONOV, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory school in Leningrad.

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had attended the Institute since 1945. He has explained that he should have graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the final examination in Marxism and therefore was required to attend the Institute for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations.

Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co-students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he "completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950." NOSENKO has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950 instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952.

The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has characterized as his "stupid blunders." The latter is a rather apt characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence of a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which he had knowledge but did not personally participate.

The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of time are contained in a separate section of this summary, but it is considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily substantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953.

Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum completed by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement concerning his life and KGB career. No effort has been made to correct grammatical errors or spelling since to do so would be in conflict with the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give NOSENKO an opportunity to recount his life and activities to permit a re-examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time.

Interviews of and memoranda prepared by NOSENKO since 31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the statements of NOSENKO in the attached memorandum. One change that has been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization" (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature. An effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by NOSENKO.

Attachment:
31 Oct 67 Memo

SECRET

Operational Memo # N-2

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on 30 October 1967:

I, NOSENKO, George, was born 30 October 1927 in the city Nicolaev, Ukraine.

My family: the father - NOSENKO, Ivan, b. 1902, was working at the shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI), b. 1908, a housewife; the brother - NOSENKO, Vladimir, b. 1944, a student.

In September 1934 I began to study in the school (0 class) but studied a short period of time because in October with the mother went in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant, "Sudsmech" from summer 1934. In Nicolaev I was living at the Street Nicolski 7. All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev.

In Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938: at the Street Stachek (1934 - summer 1935), St. Canal of Griboedov, 154 (1935-1938), St. M. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living. In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon I with the mother went to live in Moscow in the end of this year.

In Moscow we were living at the St. Serafimovich, 2. Here I was continuing to study at the school 585 (St. B. Polianka). In 1941 I finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the south (Sochi) but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow.

In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I finished 7th class in spring 1942. In Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, being there I tried to run to the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned home. In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorki and in July-August we returned in Moscow.

In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finished 8th class in summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow. This school must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I did not want to go there. With the help of father I was accepted in the Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku, where I was studying at the second course (9th class). In this school I twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to the front but failed. Soon after that I run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Moscow (January 1944). In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished 9th class and was accepted again in the military-navy preparatory school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in Leningrad.

All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km. from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was put in the navy hospital. When I was in the hospital I decided not to return in the school but to finish 10th class in Leningrad about what I have written a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with such my decision. With the help of the father's friends I quited with the school and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January 1945 and studied there till the end of May. The WWII finished and I decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second course and finished this course (though I was not passing exams). In Leningrad I was living in the hostel of this college (St. Tolmachev).

In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parents (St. Granovski, 3).

In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the international relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institute.

In July my father went in Germany with the group of engineers and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant, documents and a uniform).

In 1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 I acquainted with a girl - Shishkov FLAVIA, student of the medicine institute. I was in close relations with this girl, because of the pregnancy I married her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and we did not live together and we soon divorced. In the end of 1946 I was acquainted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, received a flat in 1947 (St. Mira - former 1st Uecyehckad, 162/174). In November her father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married her. The marriage was not successful. I foundout about her close relations with the brother, and the child-girl was born with pathological changes. I was not the father of this child. After that I broke with her and we were living separately (end of 1948 - beginning 1949).

In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working the commission, which was dealing with future works of the students of my 5th course. I expressed a wish to work in any military organization and soon I was invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry of State Security). But MGB did not accept me. After that with the help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my future work.

Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a group of fails I was passing state exams once more. In October 1950 I finished the institute and received a diploma.

I was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951 and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th Fleet, as an interpreter of the information department). Before going to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife.

At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Moscow. Immediately after returning in Moscow I had a blood cough out. In the middle of May I went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow. In July I finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health I could not return back to the Far East and the personnel department of the navy intelligence sent me to Baltic Sea (as a senior interpreter of the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet - in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district).

When I studied at the institute I as all the students received a rank of junior lieutenant of administrative service after finishing the second course in 1947. In 1951 the ministry of navy had given me also the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence. In September-October 1952 I received a rank of lieutenant.

In Sovietsk the work was not interested and for me it was nothing to do. Besides this the climate was not good for my health and I decided to change the job. With this purpose before new year at the end of 1952 I took a leave and went to Moscow. January 1 I was with my parents at the evening party at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom I did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili - a former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I was thinking about change of the job. KOBULOV was speaking with me on this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nothing more definite was said about my work. This month I reported to the head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN about my decision and that I will be working in MGB.

In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium, where I was in 1952. In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There I have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said that he would settle my question concerning my job. After several days in the middle of March I have received a telephone call from MVD to come to KOBULOV. There I have spent about two hours in the reception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory SHUBNIAKOV, who told me that there was signed an order and I was accepted in the 1 department of 2 chief directory as a case officer. SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1 department GORBATENKO (who was acting as the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department of extraordinarily affairs (investigation)). SHUBNIAKOV and GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the 1 section of the department. Then I with GORBATENKO went to the 1 department, was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV told me that I will be working against the American correspondents, showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were working in this room: KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV. The last officer must give files on the correspondents and agents. I was said to come next day and began to work.

When I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium I acquainted with KOJEVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University, and in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents at St. Gorky, 9, but after marriage was living with the wife at

St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents). In 1955 I received a flat at St. Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family.

In 1954 I contracted a disease (gonorrhea) and on the advice of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctors asked to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an operative passport and showed them the passport. Doctors had given me a treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to come once more, but I did not come. They wanted to see once more and sent a letter to the place of work, which was written in the passport. The plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAKOV, was speaking with me. I had written my explanation, and punished by the chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV - 15 days of arrest. The komsomol's organization also punished me. I received a strict reprimand and was freed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director.

I was a member of komsomol's organization from October 1943. In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of age) the komsomol organization of KGB took off this strict reprimand.

In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that I did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory. In June-July I was appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory as a case officer of 2 section. This section was new created (the work against tourists). The chief of 7 department - PERFILIEV, the chief of the 2 section - GUSKOV.

In 1956 I was accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party, soon received a rank of a senior lieutenant and got a promotion - a senior case officer.

In 1957 I was accepted in the Party as a member.

In August 1956 my father died.

In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section. In 7th department I was working till 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to work as a deputy chief of the 1 section in the 1 department 2 chief directory (chief of the 1 department, KLIPIN, Vlad., chief of the 1 section - KOVSHUK).

My family was consist of the wife and two daughters: Oksana, born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958. Oksana was ill (bronchial asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in hospitals. In 1960 I was thinking about change (temporary) place of living and there was a possibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB in Lvov and Odessa. But there was another question if I go from Moscow I would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the chief of the section of 2 department, PIATROVSKI, proposed to me to go to work in Ethiopia (counter-intelligence work among Soviet specialists in Ethiopia). The chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agree. The reasons were the case of 1954 (illness and use of the passport for "cover) and a checking in the place of my living (some of agents report that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife).

I was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962 I was appointed again in the 7 department as the chief of the 1 section (work against tourists from the USA and Canada).

In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain.

When I began to work in the 7 department I knew that soon I must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free a place - the deputy chief of department BALDIN was preparing to go to work in eastern Germany.

In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department (the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here I was working till January 18, 1964.

During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school, only in 1953-1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD-KGB at St. Kiselni.

Five times I was sent abroad: In 1957 I was in England with a sport delegation; in 1958 was again in England with a sport delegation; in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industry; in 1961 I was sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to 1 department 2 directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzerland - the conference of disarmament.

Working in MVD-KGB every year I had leaves for rest. In 1953 with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium. In 1954 I was with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage. In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia. In 1957 I was in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at the cottage. In 1958 I was resting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife rested in Sochi. In January-February 1960 I rested with the wife in Kislovodsk. In 1961 - August - I rested with the wife and daughters in Nicolaev. In October 1962 I rested with the wife in Sochi. In July 1963 I rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa.

B. IS THE CLAIMED KGB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE?

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer in the KGB. Information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concerning the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has been so extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer.

It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed positions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 as date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given in 1962). There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature, as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day of transfer from one Department to another and not considered critical or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning his KGB career today is not significantly different from the fragmentary version he gave in June 1962.

Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB career of NOSENKO:

Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, First Section, First Department, SCD

Late May 1955 - December 1959 (1958 - December 1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh Department, SCD

January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of Section, First Section, First Department, SCD

January 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section, Seventh Department, SCD

July 1962 - January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh Department, SCD

(NOTE: The term Deputy Chief is being used throughout this summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief." The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance, including CIA, is not synonymous with the term "Deputy Chief" as used in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example, a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the title of First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief of Department and in general has supervisory functions over all the Department sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider the most important section. Other deputies have supervisory functions only over designated sections or organizational components.)

During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, NOSENKO has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates his claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remarks on these topics are contained in separate sections of this summary.

It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960. It is impossible to correlate this information with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available at this time. On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO would lay claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 - 1961 and of his conferences with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time.

NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD or former officers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN. A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware of certain activities including Vladislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. GUK, Vladimir A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV.

The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950's. The description of GOLITSYN of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it. There is no reason to attach significance to this lapse of memory.

The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 has had the most merit in the controversy over his statements relative to his KGB career. This particular aspect will be covered in detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961 on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the First Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch.

Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment as to whether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis of a comparison of his activities and responsibilities with that inherent in a somewhat similar position in CIA.

One of the most important differences between United States agencies or organizations, including CIA, and the bureaucratic structure of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the salary structure. Pay of a KGB officer is based on military rank and on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity and language qualification. Actual position held is important from a monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increase in military rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a major who holds the position of Chief of Section.

During current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at this time.

C. HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OF HIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CIA IN 1962 AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and although motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in 1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision. Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit unfavorable information which they consider of a personal nature.

On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnished a handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct, is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memorandum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.

[illegible] 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at best usually a gradual process in which many factors, some recognized and some not recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying degrees.

NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibly until the death of his father in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The influence of his father and the name of his father undoubtedly was an important if not the most important factor in NOSENKO even being permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENKO is particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was the primary reason.

The above should not be construed as any reflection on the actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His performance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding.

If a certain amount of speculation is permitted, the disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may have actually started soon after the death of his father. That NOSENKO is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time after his defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through influence.

A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money and would sell "two pieces of information." NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he was not emotionally ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could no longer retreat.

NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the Americans stating he was a "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted to give information," he would not have been believed and would have been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally decided to do it through 06 David MARK whom the KGB considered was with American Intelligence.

The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the record. NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces of information," almost immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated, as he first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the Americans.

11BR

NOSENKO has stated that the night before his departure from Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but was not emotionally adapted to defect at that time. Following his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a period of time, made his final decision to defect at the first opportunity, realizing that it meant leaving his wife, children, and other members of his family in the USSR.

Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and will probably so remain. It would be preferable if an exact detailed chronology of all the factors involved could be prepared or if even certain obvious factors could be accurately delineated. These are both impossible at this time and probably at any time in the future. What is important at this time is a decision as to whether the motivation of NOSENKO was based on personal reasons with no implications of KGB dispatch. It is considered that the explanation of NOSENKO concerning his motivation is acceptable and that his statement that no one except the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americans in 1962 or his intent to defect in 1964 is supported by other information of a collateral nature. (See Section III, H.)

Attachment:
Typed cpy Memo from NOSENKO

Operational Memo # N-4

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on 31 October 1967:

What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of the methods of the communist regime, the knowledge of the real foreign and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the rightness of the free world.

It was not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing in me. I think that the beginning was in the studentship.

Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent's and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in the Far East and later being in trips in different regions and cities of Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the people of the Soviet Russia.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

When I worked 11 years in MVD-KGB I understood and found out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime, about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings, about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was (and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB.

At the same time when I was several times abroad I have seen personally the so-called "decay" at the West. I have seen in reality how is living people.

Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying at the West and not returning in Russia, but only one thing was keeping me -- my family.

In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the Americans. From my part "the sell of the information" was a real show. I was thinking that they would not believe me otherwise. In that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even when I was returning home in Vienna.

In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done all my best to go as soon as possible abroad.

It was not easy to make this decision, it was very difficult to leave the family for ever.

And now in spite of everything I do not regret.

D. IS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO TO CIA CONCERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND ORGANIZATION REASONABLY COMMENSURATE WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the information furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with his claimed career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February 1964.

In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given to his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in each department. Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logically be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, of course, no accurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive determination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events or could be attributed to willful deception.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall specific matters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely from recollection. In addition, there has been no material reluctance on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topics of interest.

NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire KGB career. He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently added certain details which he recalled at a later date.

Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This information is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Consideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held.

It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed positions. Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an applicable description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957. As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four primary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 - 1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagrams and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily prepared the material in such detail. This type of information is peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another defector and could, if not relatively correct, permit a rather positive conclusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information.

NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is less for the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently substantiated even though his actual job performance undoubtedly deserved a low rating.

The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cases, KGB operations, and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of other departments of the SCD from the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is also a further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions during this period of time.

E. CAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE CONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence? The conclusion in regard to both of the above questions is affirmative, even though it is realized that ultimate loss to the KGB and ultimate benefit to Western Intelligence are both partly of an intangible nature and not susceptible to accurate measurement.

NOSENKO has, as previously indicated, furnished voluminous information during current and previous interviews. An accurate total of specific cases is not possible at this time and would at best be only an interesting figure, the actual significance of which would be marginal. Practically every interview with NOSENKO, even at present, reveals information of counterintelligence interest and it is expected that this production can continue for a considerable period of time. This should not be construed as an indication that NOSENKO is intentionally withholding information, but rather that stimulation of his memory through normal questions and discussions has been and can continue to be productive.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning perhaps 08 2,000 KGB officers and 08 300 KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms agents or operative contacts are used to refer to Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately 08 250 former or current First Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the number of KGB officers identified by NOSENKO who have been outside the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in the future.

There has been very little attempted exploitation of information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other KGB officers and, therefore, the possible value of this information to United States Intelligence cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be estimated.

Disclosure of information concerning certain KGB officers would be a necessary part of any dispatch of a KGB agent or officer to the West either for purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a

SECRET

3/BR

limited period of time or for the placing of the individual in a defector status. However, identification of KGB officers or agents to Western Intelligence is necessarily a matter of concern to the KGB and the exposure of the identities of approximately 08 [2,000] KGB officers and [several 08 hundred] KGB agents could not be considered of negligible importance.

Obtaining specific information in regard to KGB officers or KGB assets is important to United States Intelligence and a considerable amount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even acknowledging that it is much more difficult for CIA to obtain this type of information about the KGB, which operates in a closed society, than it is for the KGB to obtain the identity of CIA employees, it is believed doubtful any reader of this summary would consider that the identification of 08 [2,000] CIA employees and 08 [several hundred] agent assets to the KGB would be any less than a very serious compromise of valuable information.

Prior to the defection of NOSENKO, little was known of the organization of the SCD or other internal KGB organizations. The information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been detailed and extensive. That this information is of value to the United States Intelligence community is hardly subject to dispute, although analysts

418R

can differ as to the weight which should be given to the value of this type of information.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning SCD, KGB, recruitments of United States citizens and foreign nationals covering the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not be interpreted as a statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all SCD recruitments, even of Americans, during this period. His information based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the First Department and Seventh Department. He has furnished information concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some FCD cases, but this information was in general acquired indirectly from social or business conversations with other KGB officers.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of cases which were previously known to United States Intelligence. While the value of such information cannot be considered high, the additional details which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be dismissed as being of no value to Western Intelligence, even if the information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his having provided such information.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of recruitments by the KGB of non-Bloc nationals who were known by Western Intelligence to be pro-Communist or even connected with Communist organizations. The identification as a recruited KGB agent of an individual previously known to be pro-Communist is of considerable value to Western Intelligence and may be considered to have resulted in some damage to the KGB. Admittedly, the potential to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than that of a "politically clean" individual. However, "pro-Communist" or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent."

NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in which there was some previous but limited information. In a number of these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has permitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing of an "Unknown Subject" case. In such instances the information from NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest. This category of cases must be considered as having resulted in damage to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of individuals, both American and non-Bloc foreign, who were recruited by the KGB and concerning whom Western Intelligence had no significant information. It is recognized that certain of these cases mentioned by NOSENKO, particularly in the tourist category, would probably never have actually materialized as productive KGB agents. This could be for various reasons including later refusal to cooperate, later geographical inaccessibility to the KGB, or not being either at the time of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish information of interest to the KGB. In this regard, NOSENKO has stated that at least until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Department to make a "recruitment" as a statistic for the end-of-year report even though it was apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that it was highly unlikely there would be a potential in the future.

NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a number of cases, primarily third nationals but some American, in which he has been unable to furnish sufficient details to permit identification at this time. In certain instances it is believed that an identification will be possible after additional research and investigation. Until an identification is made, the value of any particular lead to Western Intelligence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential value cannot be ignored. As an example of this category, NOSENKO has furnished a lead, still under investigation, to an unidentified agent, probably not an American, who in 1962 was in a position to remove the "NATO Emergency Codes," deliver the codes to the KGB for photographing, and then successfully replace the codes. Because the agent is as yet unidentified, his current access to information affecting the security of the United States cannot be gauged.

In all, the information from NOSENKO in the category of cases where Western Intelligence did not previously have significant information must be considered on balance as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and of significant benefit to Western Intelligence.

Quantity alone of CI or FI information from a KGB defector is not a standard on which to judge bona fides. The question is whether the amount of his information is reasonably commensurate with his claimed positions in the KGB. This question as regards NOSENKO has been examined, with affirmative findings, in another section of this paper.

A few examples from the above cited categories of information furnished by NOSENKO are listed below. These cases are given as illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance.

The case of Robert Lee JOHNSON and the related case of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH have been covered in the previous summary. It can be considered that both were exposed as a result of a lead from NOSENKO which led to suspicions of JOHNSON.

Another American case is that of Herbert HOWARD, a USIA 06, 08 employee who spent considerable time in the USSR in 1962 - 1963. NOSENKO identified 06 Herbert HOWARD as having been recruited by the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1962 and was positive that 06 HOWARD furnished valuable information to the KGB. When interviewed in 1964, 06 HOWARD did not admit he had been recruited, but suspicion of 06 HOWARD was great enough so that his contract with 29 USIA was not renewed.

If indeed 06 HOWARD was recruited by the KGB, it is impossible to determine how much information would have been compromised by 06 HOWARD; while in the USSR, he did have certain access to the United States Embassy. There is good reason to believe that if 06 HOWARD was recruited, it was he who was responsible for the compromise of a potentially valuable Soviet walk-in with whom CIA was attempting to establish contact using 06 HOWARD as intermediary.

NOSENKO in 1964 furnished information in regard to a "ZHARI" (apparently a KGB code name, although NOSENKO thought it was a true

10/BR

name). He identified "ZHARI" (phonetic) as an American code clerk who defected to the USSR in 1961. An internal assumption was made based on the original lead information from NOSENKO that "ZHARI" was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Fouad Mitri HINDALY, a former NSA employee who defected to the USSR in 1962, and the information from NOSENKO was never disseminated or investigated.

Prior to the surfacing of John Discoe SMITH by the Soviets in the fall of 1967, [redacted] information concerning KGB knowledge of American code clerks was being investigated; and John Discoe SMITH was a leading suspect. After the surfacing of SMITH by the Soviets, it became apparent that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, was identical to "ZHARI." Investigation disclosed that no definite information could be established in regard to the actual whereabouts of SMITH after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively stated that appropriate investigation in 1964 of the "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identification of John Discoe SMITH as "ZHARI." However, such identification would have been of considerable interest to the Department of State and CIA, and could very well have permitted certain action which would have at least lessened the propaganda effect of the surprise announcement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967.

NOSENKO, in June 1962, furnished information from which William VASSALL could be quickly identified. GOLITSYN, in late 1960 - early 1961, had furnished information concerning a Soviet penetration of the British Government on the basis of which the British

Services had compiled a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. Even though it may be presumed that investigation of the twenty suspects would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL was the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the information from NOSENKO in June 1962 resulted in the earlier termination by the British Services of a still valuable productive KGB agent.

Although not the case of a KGB agent, the matter of the microphones in the United States Embassy should also be mentioned. GOLITSYN, following his defection in December 1961, furnished certain information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones were connected to central cables, location of one microphone would logically have led to the exposure of the entire set of microphones. However, appropriate action was not taken on this information and the KGB would have been aware that no action was taken prior to June 1962 when NOSENKO first contacted CIA.

If NOSENKO is a dispatched KGB agent, it is not clear why the KGB would attract specific attention to a system of microphones which must have still had some value as of June 1962. A presumption may be made that if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence of such an advanced system is available and it should be noted that it was not until circa April 1964 that any effective action was taken to locate and remove the microphone system on which GOLITSYN had given a lead in late December 1961 - early January 1962.

A few general comments in regard to the CI information furnished by NOSENKO would be appropriate in this particular section. As regards leads furnished by NOSENKO to American cases, most of these leads have been mentioned in the previous summary. Current interviews with NOSENKO have resulted in approximately seventeen new American leads which are being examined by the FBI. The interviews have also resulted in more specific information in regard to a number of cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO, thus permitting additional development of these cases by the FBI.

NOSENKO has provided leads to over 100 third-country KGB agents. Geographically these leads are wide in scope, including nationals of such countries as Indonesia, Austria, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Japan, Mexico, Italy, and a number of other countries.

Included in the more important of these agent or other leads are leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks, to access agents for American targets, to actual or possible illegal support assets. Also included are foreign correspondents, representatives of foreign tourist firms, and foreign tourists.

A summary of the foreign leads arbitrarily defined as of major significance shows nineteen leads highly placed or formerly highly placed in their own government, four code clerks, eight cases involving definite American interest, and four access agents to Americans. It also shows nine instances of clandestine KGB activity against foreign missions in Moscow, including actual KGB clandestine access into certain Western Embassies (but not the British or American Embassies).

NOSENKO has also furnished leads to certain FCD foreign national agents, his information on several being derived during his three months in Geneva in 1962.

It is impossible to give an exact evaluation of the significance of the foreign leads furnished by NOSENKO. That they are of significant value to Western Intelligence and damaging to the KGB is hardly subject to dispute. This evaluation must be given even though there are numerous foreign leads which have not been adequately exploited at this time.

As a final note, the implied conclusion in the previous summary is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive

0001076/a

intelligence information is not a significant factor in a determination of his bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intelligence interest.

F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGB DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY" IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENKO WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB. In reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above question has been both a necessary and integral part.

It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration in arriving at a conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have surely been willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be unknown.

An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.

[illegible]

NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter-intelligence officer who wanted to give information," he very possibly would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information" and began to talk quite freely on other matters.

If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead, a current review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva.

NOSENKO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which in retrospect were impossible, and the investigation of which could only have raised certain questions concerning NOSENKO. The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO made gross exaggerations or made incorrect or impossible statements.

(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the recruitment pitch to [James STORSBERG.] 06 (This was a lie and an interview with [STORSBERG] 06 with display of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO did not participate.)

(b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and LANGELLE was available for interview.)

(c) NOSENKO said he recruited [LUNT (Horace LUNT)] 06 in Bulgaria. (Actually NOSENKO never met [LUNT.]) 06

41BR

(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with [Edmund 06 STEVENS] who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally met 06 [STEVENS] and only had seen 06 [STEVENS] once at a distance.)

(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY" in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnished information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to Moscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in Moscow 1952-1954.

(f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he did not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreign typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH operation.)

(g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the first person, saying "We did this," or "We did that," in reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits

3/SR

he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he and the KGB should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.)

In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were quite striking and gave rise to certain suspicions of NOSENKO because he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of NOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of the similarities noted.

(a) Both furnished information in regard to [Johan PREISFREUND]. 06

(b) Both furnished information in regard to a [military code clerk case (James STORSBERG)]. 08, 06

(c) Both furnished information in regard to a trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name, to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in

Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerly with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the assumed name which KOVSHUK used.)

(d) Both furnished information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.

(e) Both furnished information in regard to

06 06
[Edmund STEVENS] and [Isaac Henry SHAPIRO].

The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the actual differences in the amount of information furnished on any particular topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in this summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases, or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.

The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during current interviews satisfactorily sourced his information in almost every instance. In a few instances he has said he did not recall how he learned of a particular piece of information but these apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are considered to be in no way suspicious.

The general area in which there was a similarity between information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early 1962 and information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering around or in the First Department, SCD.

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955 and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961. Therefore, the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN knew and was in contact with other officers of the First Section and GOLITSYN has attributed his knowledge of certain cases or activities of the First Department, SCD, primarily to his association with certain officers in the First Department, SCD.

It is recognized that there are certain conflicts in information furnished by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO and at this time it is not possible to satisfactorily correlate certain information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO. Pages 162 - 163 of the previous summary refer to information from GOLITSYN which is characterized as "Information about KGB Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in 1960 - 1961." The references are to information from GOLITSYN based on remarks by Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV and Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Department, SCD, and an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD.

NOSENKO has stated that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1960 - 1961, that his primary responsibility was work against code clerks at the United States Embassy in Moscow, and that both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV were engaged in the same work and under his supervision. The statement by GOLITSYN that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary.

GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he received from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part of NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain instances, more apparent than real.

In certain instances it has now been possible to correlate fragmentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO, making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be construed as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this time, (d):

(a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an

American female employee of the American Embassy in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that the attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return to Moscow so that further work could be undertaken to effect her recruitment. He did not recall the name of the secretary, but did recall that it was a long and "German sounding" name. 08

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a recruitment attempt against Collette SCHWARZENBACH, 06 who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary" referred to by GOLITSYN. However SCHWARZENBACH was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow. 06, 08 The recruitment attempt against SCHWARZENBACH according to 06 NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First Section, First Department, SCD.

41BR

(b) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNOV had developed an operation against an American Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited. This is believed to undoubtedly be a reference to the case of 06 [James STORSBERG] who was actually the subject of a recruitment approach in 1961.

There is considered to be a good possibility that GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January 1961 from Vladislav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section) that 06 [Johan PREISFREUND] had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American employee of the Embassy. 06 [Johan PREISFREUND] was used in the 06 [STORSBERG] operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also

4/89

aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about 06 PREISFREUND since GOLITSYN wanted to use 06 PREISFREUND in Helsinki. NOSENKO has stated he was not present during the above conversation. It is very possible that KOVSHUK exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the matter of why GOLITSYN could not use 06 PREISFREUND as an agent.

NOSENKO has furnished extensive information in regard to the 06 James STORSBERG case and with due consideration to the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the reporting by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV concerning what is considered to have been the James 06 STORSBERG case and detailed information furnished by NOSENKO concerning the 06 James STORSBERG case. The exact date of the recruitment attempt against STORSBERG 06 has not been positively established, but it is considered to have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the March-April 1961 period. The statement by James 06

8/88

06
STORSBERG that it occurred in October 1961 is completely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other statements by 06 STORSBERG himself.

(c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960. The previous summary also states that according to GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN did not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB would hold in reserve.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the homosexual compromise of 06 Robert BARRETT, who was a guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and with whom "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted. Work against the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of the Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departments were participating under the direction of the Ninth Department.

One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in involving 06 BARRETT in homosexual activities which were photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO, although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because of a general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO also stated that the compromising material and information on 06 BARRETT was later given to the First Department and that 06 BARRETT was recruited by the Second Section, First Department when he returned with another Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in the recruitment operation. BARRETT 06, following his return to the United States in January 1962, confessed to the FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of compromising photographs which had been taken during his 1959 trip to Moscow.

Although it cannot be established at this time, it is possible that the information furnished by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV actually refers to the 06 [Robert BARRETT] case. It should be noted that 06 [Robert BARRETT] could not actually be characterized as an "American employee of the Embassy in Moscow."

(d) Page 162 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki. GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had already furnished the KGB with some information, that he was

21BR

considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki to accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train to Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow.

The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was undoubtedly 06 [John GARLAND] and the train manifest lists 06 [John GARLAND] and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the same train from Helsinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the identity of 06 [John GARLAND] but claims no knowledge of the above trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip.

NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki. His lack of knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities such as his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it cannot be interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.

318R

A theory which has previously been given consideration and warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence and/or to denigrate the value of information furnished by GOLITSYN. In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during current interviews has not made any remarks which could in any way be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently, when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been broached with NOSENKO, his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD," or "You should ask GOLITSYN about that."

In connection with any consideration of whether the contact of NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing of certain events should be noted. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerland, where he remained until 15 June 1962.

It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN, select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counteract the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for this would have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN aspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.

The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have been dispatched to confuse and divert American Intelligence and thus to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United States Government, particularly CIA. This is a theory which should and has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.

Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts of American counter-intelligence to determine the identity of and take appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United States Government. The only answer to this question seems to be that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelligence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.

The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even considered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow. In this area his statements could be construed as assurance that there were no recruitments of American personnel in the United States Embassy in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" 06 (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD. The basis for this expressed opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the expressed opinion of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any particular knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he does not claim to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. As an

UBR

example, he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activities against members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students, and individuals in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best mainly of a collateral nature.

NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD, nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code name. These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases.

14-00000

SECRET

G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH OF NOSENKO BY THE KGB WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION OR MISSIONS?

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions? The above possibility has been given consideration even though the ultimate ramifications are practically incalculable. The conclusion is that as regards NOSENKO, with the single exception detailed below, there is no evidence of a political or other type objective which could be considered of sufficient importance by the KGB to warrant the dispatch of a KGB officer with the knowledge of NOSENKO to speak freely with CIA without his being given a specific mission or missions by the KGB.

It is accepted that the Soviet leadership would be entirely capable of instructing the KGB to dispatch a staff officer for permanent defection to United States authorities with no specific intelligence mission and no limitations on the KGB intelligence information he might reveal providing that such act would, in the estimate of the leadership, result in a net political gain for the USSR. For such a possibility to be seriously entertained by the Soviets, however, it would have to involve an issue of major importance to the Soviet leadership and presumably would have to be considered by them as the only or at least the best means of achieving the desired end and of having a very high probability of success.

The only area touched upon in any way by NOSENKO which might meet the above requirements is the assassination of President Kennedy: the involvement of Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination and his association with the Soviet Union. Given (a) speculation obtaining at the time that there was Soviet involvement in the assassination, (b) the premise that in fact there was no Soviet involvement, and (c) a hypothesis that the Soviet leadership was deeply concerned lest erroneous conclusions be drawn which could lead to irreversable actions, it is conceivable that the Soviet leadership might have been prepared to take extreme steps to convince United States authorities of their non-involvement in the assassination. (The passage to the United States Government of the allegedly complete Soviet consular file on OSWALD was, in itself, an unprecedented act.)

The NOSENKO case warrants examination in the above regard in light of the fact that among the information NOSENKO provided was "inside" KGB information on OSWALD: information which purportedly revealed the substance of the content of the KGB files on OSWALD. This information clearly indicated that there was no KGB relationship with OSWALD, that the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD, and that as a matter of fact OSWALD had presented the KGB with a continuing series of problems.

Upon examination, however, NOSENKO does not meet the requirements premised above for serious Soviet consideration of a free KGB defection. The following reasons render this unacceptable:

✓ a. The chronology, in itself, presents virtually impossible problems for such a theses, viz. NOSENKO's initial approach to CIA in June 1962, 17 months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.

b. While the information from NOSENKO on OSWALD is interesting and pertinent, it is not, in nature, scope, and content, sufficiently convincing for United States authorities to reasonably be expected to conclude that it represented unequivocal proof of Soviet non-involvement.

c. It is implausible not to assume that the Soviets would assume that United States authorities, in any examination of the possibility of a Soviet (KGB) hand in the assassination, would presume extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation -- a compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB officer other than very senior persons and an individual or group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of this nature. The KGB career of NOSENKO would not permit even serious consideration that NOSENKO could have logically been fitted into the above very limited category.

It is accordingly concluded that the possibility of a politically motivated free dispatch can in the case of NOSENKO be satisfactorily eliminated.

The possibility has also been considered that the KGB might have theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an officer, with numerous leads to non-valuable or non-current KGB agents or cases, the facilities of the United States Intelligence community would be practically neutralized for an extended period of time. This could only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence community would involve a major portion of its personnel and efforts in the investigation and resolution of cases which had little or no current or potential value to the KGB. The above possibility cannot be arbitrarily eliminated without full consideration. It is not believed that

NOSENKO in the absence of any evidence that he had any KGB mission or missions to fulfill comes within the above category, particularly since an overall assessment of his information leads to the conclusion that full exploitation of his information would be quite damaging to the KGB.

Consideration of the above possibility must also include an evaluation of the deterrent effect on the prospects of future recruitments by the KGB caused by legal action taken against individuals exposed by information from the dispatched agent or officer. The deterrent effect on others of the conviction and sentencing of persons who have committed a crime or crimes has long been a part of the legal theory of why persons who commit a crime should be imprisoned or punished.

The deterrent effect on others of the trials and convictions of William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH should not be underestimated. The KGB also could not have known that information furnished by NOSENKO would not result in the trial and conviction of other KGB agents or recruitments concerning whom NOSENKO had some knowledge.

H. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTACTS OF NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1964 WITH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE KGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR OR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFECTION?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection? The conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.

The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in previous sections. It is being treated here as a separate area of interest since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration.

It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO, collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of each item of available information.

The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962 and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB control at that time.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962 contacts with CIA were not known to the KGB, but became known to the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It was concluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitor in KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free to defect.

Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO, during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the

United States Embassy in Moscow concerning his contact with CIA and that he did not wish to be contacted and would not recognize any attempted contact within the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also furnished information as to the reason for his concern that no information regarding his contact with CIA become known in the United States Embassy in Moscow and the dangers to NOSENKO in any contact of attempted contact with NOSENKO in the USSR.

It is recognized that the above indicated concern of NOSENKO about his personal security is not substantial evidence that NOSENKO was not under KGB control; however, it is evidence that NOSENKO was not in any way encouraging clandestine contact of NOSENKO within the USSR, which very likely would have been an aim of the KGB if NOSENKO was under KGB control.

The material which NOSENKO furnished to CIA in 1964 has been carefully reviewed to determine if there is any evidence that the KGB participated in any way in the assembling of this rather unique collection of material. None of the material appears to have been of an accountable type and, on the contrary, it appears that NOSENKO could have furnished all of the material to CIA and returned to the Soviet Union without the KGB ever at a later date becoming aware that the material was actually missing. The latter statement even includes the travel document which authorized the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963.

The trip in December 1963, according to NOSENKO, was to participate in the search for Aleksandr CHEREPANOV. According to NOSENKO, this particular document was not accountable in that it was only necessary to turn it in when requesting reimbursement for travel expenses. NOSENKO stated that he had not claimed the rather small amount of money to which he was entitled and has also admitted that he really brought the document along because it gave him the indicated rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

NOSENKO has completely retracted his claim to having had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, stating that even as a Deputy Chief of Department he was only a Captain although he was entitled to and expected to receive the rank of Major in early 1964. NOSENKO has stated that giving him the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the above document was the error of KASHPEROV, the officer on duty in the SCD on Sunday, and that practically all Deputy Chiefs of Department in the SCD had at least the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

The above explanation by NOSENKO may well be considered by readers with at least a degree of skepticism. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would seem that he could have been provided with something a little more substantial to document his claim of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In addition, it would seem that the KGB could have provided NOSENKO with some type of document which would support at least one of his claimed positions in the SCD, KGB. Even the Cherepanov Papers do not in any way support the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1960 - 1961, nor do they even support the claim of NOSENKO that there was such a position in the First Section in 1960 - 1961 or even in 1958 or 1959.

ons of

IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS
IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 - 360 of the "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" which contains seven (A - G) primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence) and KGB career of NOSENKO. These conclusions or findings are independently treated in separate attachments.

With the exception of "G," the conclusions in this summary are in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that NOSENKO served in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964, and held his claimed positions in the *KGB during the March 1953 - February 1964 period.

* For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations unless otherwise indicated.

Attachment:
Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination
of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"

The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with other sections of this summary.)

"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES"

"NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, 'the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence', paralyzed the work of [redacted] KGB [redacted] Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assassinate him."

"The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?"

"This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently:

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed.

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed.

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.

D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.

E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic)

F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964.

These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance."

"The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector."

"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made."

"Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB agent."

"The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself."

"Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind."

"It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources."

"Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable."

"In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his information should be assessed accordingly."

SECRET

A. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NAVAL RU IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES AND TIMES HE CLAIMED

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation from the Institute of International Relations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class. However, previous efforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962 statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time.

It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his "stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully acceptable. It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will, for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope.

The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits to Geneva."

Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by NOSENKO regarding approximately 08 875 KGB officers, 08 100 KGB agents, 35 GRU officers and 08 400 other Soviet nationals.

It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENKO relates to the early 1950's period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelligence personnel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period.

Page 52 of the above summary and other related pages question whether NOSENKO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area. The memorandum was completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.

NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled that the former name of the place, an almost deserted fishermen's village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENKO for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non-existent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen.

The previous summary also stated that despite his claimed active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures. It should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States Navy.

Attachments:
List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO
Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO

ekrenev Leonid - till 1952 or 1953 a deputy of chief of navy intelligence (on agents), then a chief of navy intelligence, later he was a deputy of chief of GRU (Serov Ivan and Ivashutin). I heard he was a navy attache in the USA.

~~or Bolshakov~~

2. Bespalov - a major, code-clerk of the navy intelligence of 7 fleet in Soviet Harbour's region in 1951-1952.

3. Bogdanovskiy - a deputy of chief of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet (on agents) in 1951-1952.

4. Bulakh - an officer of the navy intelligence point of intelligence of the 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.

5. Chikin - in 1950's a colonel, worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

6. Churil'skiy - a colonel, in 1950's worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

7. Demchenko Petr - an officer of navy intelligence point of intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district.

8. Denisenko - in 1962-1964 a military attache of soviet embassy in Bern.

9. Bol'shakov Yuri - an officer of GRU (colonel), was in the USA, works under cover of press-agency "Novos".

10. Bulganin Lev N. - in 1950's worked in GRU.

11. Ioliyev - an officer of GRU in 1950's. (or Iyevlev).

12. Kaloshin - a colonel, in 1950-1953 a chief of personnel department of the navy intelligence.

C001125

13. Kononyuk - in 1950 finished the institute of international relations, in 1951 taken in the navy intelligence and sent to work in Berlin (knows

14. Kopalkin - a general, in 1940s was a deputy of chief the Military diplomatic academy. He has two sons: Kopalkin Sergey - finished this academy in 1950, works in GRU, worked in Italy and in France, his wife - a daughter of Marshal Timoshenko - Olga (finished the institute of foreign trade); Kopalkin Victor - in 1940s studied as a student in the USA, also works in GRU.

15. Kabalinov Vladimir - a major, a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

16. Khabarov - in 1950-52 a deputy of chief of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

17. Khaytor S.S. - a deputy of chief (on information) of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

18. Kon'kov - a deputy of chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1951-52.

19. Kozlovskiy - in 1950s an officer of department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

20. Molchanov - an officer of GRU (in 1950s)

21. Orekhov Gennadi - in 1951-52 an administrative officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

22. Pogodin Boris - a chief of the secretariate of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-1952, knows a japanese language.

23. Rezantsev - a commander of navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.

24. Shalin - a general, in 1940s was a chief of the Military diplomatic academy; later was a chief of GRU.

001126

25. Shaposhnikov Igor' - a general, works in GRU; his father was a marshal USSR.

26. Mel'nikov Sergey - a chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

27. Namgaladze - a general, a chief of navy intelligence at Black sea, 1950-52

28. Sergeyev - an engineer-[illegible] colonel, a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52 (earlier he worked in Turkey).

29. Iuslovich - in 1950-52 a commander of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

30. Grishchunov - an officer of GRU, worked in the USA, last years in India, from where was recalled.

31. Tishkin (or-ov) - a rear-admiral, in 1950-52 a deputy chief of the navy intelligence of the ministry of military navy.

32. Vasilevskiy Yuri - works in GRU, son of a marshal of USSR.

33. Voronkov Al'bert - an officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1952.

34. Vorontsov Michael - a vice-admiral, a former chief of navy intelligence (1950-51)
~~[illegible] F. a doctor of [illegible] fleet, works in port Leningrad, an archives agent of [illegible]~~.

35. Yershov - an officer of personnel of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52, knows a chinese language.

The 15 of March, 1951 was signed an order about my appointment as an interpreter of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in Soviet harbour, Primorskiy district, where I have gone by a train and arrived in the place of my appointment in the end of March. (I went from Moscow to Khabarovsk, where changed a train to Komsomolsk-on-Amur, then crossed the river and from station Pivan' went to Soviet harbour (station Pyatisotka).



The intelligence of 7 Fleet was located in bay Postovaya, here were also Political directory of 7 Fleet, submarine's and destroyer's bases. The headquarters of 7 Fleet was located in settlement Zhildorbat. The commander-in-chief of 7 Fleet was admiral Baykov Ivan I., a chief of staff - vice-admiral Kasatonov.

The chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet was captain of 1 rank Mel'nikov Sergey K., his deputies - captain of 2 rank Bogdanovskiy (agents department), captain of 1 rank Khaytov-Simon S. (information department), captain of 1 rank Kontor (navy intelligence), colonel Burchenko (a commissar).

I was working in the information department. Officers Kabalinov, Efimov were working in this department. Other officers of the intelligence were lieutenant-colonel Sergeyev, lieutenant-Vorontsov Albert, major Ershov, captains Orekhov, Rodionov, Pogodin, Bespalov and 3-4 more officers. There were also sergeants and privates.

In the end of April, 1952 I flew in Moscow (stopping for 1-2 days in Khabarovsk) for a leave.

In June-July 1952 a personal department of the chief directory of navy intelligence (a chief - colonel Kaloshin) was deciding a question about my transference because of illness. And I was appointed in the navy intelligence point of navy intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk (located before a peninsula to Baltiysk - former Pillau), where I arrived in August, 1952. (Kaliningrad's district - former Prussia).

Soviet is a little sity-village, a former german village of fishermen, it seems had a name Fishhausen.



Sovietsk - a demolished little town, here there were a navy intelligence point and 1-2 others military detachments (building battalion).

Baltiysk was a base and headquarters of 4 Fleet.

The commander-in-chief of 4 Fleet was admiral Golovko A. G.
The chief of my navy intelligence point was captain of 2 rank Ryzgantsev.
There were officers: Vinogradov, Bulakh, Demchenko and others with sergeants and privates.

Before my arrival (2 days) this navy intelligence point was transferred from east Germany in Sovetsk. If in Germany the work of the point was connected with agent's work, now there was another task - a preparation of agent-observation post in a case of new war (3-4 persons each post). - an absolutely monkey business.

In the end of December I took a leave reasoning it with my illness, but having in mind a transference in another place.

In mid of March, 1953 I began to work in 2 chief directory of KGB (former MGB).

B. NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER THE KGB IN THE MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.

Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary and will not be repeated here. His statements during current interviews that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are considered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in 1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

In 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into the KGB in an effort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the Institute of International Relations in 1949.

The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding, and the influence of General KOBULOV. An analyst can either accept or reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB procedures should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet Intelligence organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official. General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy to BERIYA, the Minister of the then MVD.

The previous summary raises several points concerning the eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67 that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not controvertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO was not sponsored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953 with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy to BERIYA.

The previous summary also states that according to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statement which it is doubtful any defector or series of defectors could fully substantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it is medically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it is accepted that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium -- rest place in Kubinka. It is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGB after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.

The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB (MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that

NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his processing for KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate. This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).

The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also had a dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN era.

The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office. It would seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he completed the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD).

Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While NOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN has stated this reversal of designations occurred in March 1953.

STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June 1953. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less than a year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning the date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and places it as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated that the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of the MVD in April 1953." In the light of our inability to fix the effective date of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it is unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).

There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who was responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD. NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is in conflict with the statements of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for the changes. As for the issue of who was responsible for the reversal of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. However, the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in this issue.

NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased to exist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicates the KI continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but care should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certain position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations were organized or ceased to exist.

The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the brother of General KOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection was discussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.

SECRET

C. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION THROUGHOUT THE 1953 - 1955 PERIOD AS HE CLAIMED

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953 - 1955 period as he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department, SCD.

This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work during this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his personal behavior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether he would be fired from the KGB or transferred to some other component.

The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB.

The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.

NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews that following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was responsible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with newspaper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers. NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer," indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officers and his information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American correspondents was his assignment from mid-March 1953 to mid-1954.

From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Department in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the Military Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members of the Office of the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work undoubtedly left much to be desired.

In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances, NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if not undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of the Military Attache supports the claim of NOSENKO that he was an officer of the First Section with the indicated assignment as related by him.

NOSENKO has stated that the work against the Military Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB would appear to be completely plausible and NOSENKO noted as exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Walter MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches to Soviets in the United States in that period.

NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the details concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time. It is submitted that this may be evidence of his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his assigned functions, but makes no allowance for the uncertain personal status of NOSENKO whose actual future in the KGB was in jeopardy after mid-1954.

NOSENKO has previously indicated and still indicates a definite lack of knowledge concerning his assigned targets during approximately March - May 1955. This, according to NOSENKO, was when an unsatisfactory "characterization" was being prepared on NOSENKO, a decision was being made on his case, and a period of time in which he went on a "big drunk" which culminated in his spending about 40 days under hospital care because of the possibility of recurrence of his previous tuberculosis.

Pages 84 - 87 of the previous summary suggest that NOSENKO had not furnished sufficient details about his alleged agent network for use against the Military Attaches. It is considered that NOSENKO in current interviews has furnished adequate acceptable details, and as an example furnished specific information concerning "[illegible]LODINA" and "RANETA" (page 85). It would appear that there was no intent by NOSENKO to withhold information concerning these individuals, but rather that he was never asked to amplify his previous casual reference to these individuals.

The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an officer in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that information furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.

SECRET

D. DURING THE PERIOD 1955 - 1960, HE WAS NEITHER A SENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF, THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

D. During the period of 1955 - 1960, NOSENKO was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, American-British Commonwealth Section. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department from 1958 to December 1959.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally involved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959. These activities include among others the recruitment of Richard BURGI 06 in June 1956, contact with Sir Allen LANE 06 and Arthur BIRSE 06 in the summer of 1957, the recruitment of Gisella HARRIS 06 in 1958, the recruitment of George DREW 06 in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

5/BR

06 William Stanley WILBY in June 1959, the recruitment of 06 David TAYLOR in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of 06 Gerard MERTENS in July - August 1959, and the recruitment of 06 Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959. The foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO claims personal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who was the KGB target.

06, 06, 06 Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY, and 06 David TAYLOR were 08 British citizens and the other above-named individuals were 08 United States citizens. This would seem to substantiate the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Commonwealth tourists in the USSR.

In addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about an operation against 06 Martin MALIA, an American tourist who was in the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955. 06 MALIA has not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, so at this time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the individual involved.

10/BR

NOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certain United States Government officials, including Congressional representatives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when considered with the previously mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his claimed service in the Seventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealth tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period.

NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent network was not available for operations against American and British tourists. This seems quite logical since the influx of tourists into the USSR was just in a formative stage.

NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he developed after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB code names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual compromise operations.

The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It is considered that even if the statements were accepted in toto, there would still not be an adequate basis for a conclusion that NOSENKO was not an officer in the claimed positions in the Seventh Department during the period of late May 1955 - December 1959. Nor is it conceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various areas of information were accepted without qualification, there is any evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. However, there are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and which are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.

On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter-intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruitment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Department, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB officer. When considered with the detailed information NOSENKO has provided on Seventh Department personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of a similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact.

Page 145 of the above summary lists eleven operations which were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations were those against Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06 Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (fnu) KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William 06, 06 TARASKA. The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cases was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Department in 1962 following his return from the First Department.

The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in another section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently available indicates that his statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approximately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes.

218R

During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific information on certain of the above eleven cases, including [William TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUFE]. 06, 06, 06, 06, 06 It should also be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR and [William TARASKA] 06 were cases in which the tourist was visiting relatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactory explanation of how he learned of the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in discussing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended to visit relatives in the USSR, the case automatically was assigned to a group of officers in the Section who reported directly to the Chief of Section and were not under the supervision of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual

2/5R

was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual returned to the USSR.

06

NOSENKO has also explained how he learned of the [Patrick PRESSMAN] and [Gerald SEVERN] cases; and, the listing of the [Sofia SHATTAUER] case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in complete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.

06 06

The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual. An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents were used in two of the four cited cases.

The summary also noted that there was a question concerning whether [Gisella HARRIS] was necessarily a Seventh Department case.

06

418R

06

This question seems quite superfluous since [redacted] was in the USSR on a tourist visa and "real" tourists are the responsibility of the Seventh Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an individual traveling in the USSR is decided on the basis of how the individual is traveling; i. e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member of a delegation, as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a former diplomat stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow, as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors which affect the determination of which Department or organizational component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman. In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the FCD.

On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at least some of the substance of the information furnished by George BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents in the USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information

1/BR

although he did then and still suspects that William VASSALL was the source. The references by NOSENKO to the KGB having such information were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was not until current interviews that it was established that NOSENKO had actually seen excerpts of information passed by George BLAKE. According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could only have come from an agent.

The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his defection in December 1961). It was noted that the summary contained references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counterintelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents during this period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967.

NOSENKO has never claimed to know all activities against American travelers in the Soviet Union during 1958 - 1959. Many of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in the Seventh Department, other than the American-British Commonwealth Section, or another Department in the SCD. NOSENKO was quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 - 1959 were acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view.

NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effort to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not review the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and following advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained additional information not in the document which he was aware had been prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD.

NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the description of NOSENKO concerning the distribution of responsibilities within the SCD for various categories of foreign visitors to the USSR provides a logical explanation for his unfamiliarity. Previous problems in this regard appear to have stemmed from a misconception of the meaning of the term "tourist" as used by the KGB. This general term has a specific meaning in the Second Chief Directorate; namely, a "tourist" is a foreigner travelling to the USSR on a tourist visa. Such a person was the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department. A large number of travelers to the USSR, including businessmen, persons travelling on invitation of a Soviet organization, students attending a university, etc., are not tourists in the KGB concept and would not be the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department.

The only unresolved problem considered of any significance in regard to the 1955 - 1959 period is the account by NOSENKO of the presence of American citizen 06 John SHUBIN in the USSR as a tourist in the late 1950's. The previous summary pointed out that, since 06 John SHUBIN did not have a valid United States passport between 1940 * and June 1961, it was impossible for him to have been a tourist under true name in the USSR and, therefore, a target of the Seventh Department, as NOSENKO claims. Although several avenues of possibly fruitful investigation have not yet been fully explored, there is no

2/8R

assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch, or for that matter as indicative that he was not Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959; neither would such an inaccuracy reflect on his claimed service in 1962 - 1963 in the Seventh Department.

E. NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR OFFICER OR SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE PERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period of 1961 - 1962 (sic). (Previous conclusion)

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO held the position of Deputy Chief, First Section (American Embassy Section), SCD, from January 1960 - December 1961.

The claim of NOSENKO that he held the above position in 1960 - 1961 has been the most difficult claimed position of NOSENKO to satisfactorily resolve and accept. Acceptance or nonacceptance of his claim to have held this particular position is a critical factor in a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career is valid. It is believed reasonable to presume that if NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indication that he was demoted, he should have been at least a Deputy Chief of Section during 1960 - 1961.

Position in the SCD, KGB, and throughout the KGB is important from a monetary point of view as well as a prestige point of view. If

NOSENKO was only in the First Section as a Senior Case Officer in 1960 - 1961, this would have been a demotion in position with resultant loss of both money and prestige. For this reason alone, his failure to have held the position of Deputy Chief in 1960 - 1961 would raise considerable doubt as to whether he held his claimed position prior to 1960, as well as whether he held his claimed positions in 1962 - 1963.

It is apparent that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning all aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 is incomplete when judged by what are considered the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA. During current interviews, an effort was made to determine what the responsibilities of NOSENKO actually were in 1960 - 1961 and whether his statements in this area were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section.

According to NOSENKO, in the early 1960's there were only approximately fifteen Deputy Chiefs of Section in the entire SCD and in certain departments none of the sections had a Deputy Chief of Section. In addition, transfer of a Deputy Chief of Section was not always followed by a replacement in kind, according to NOSENKO who stated that he was not replaced by another Deputy Chief when he transferred to the First Section, First Department.

According to NOSENKO, there was not a job description for a Deputy Chief of Section and the duties of the particular Deputy Chief were in actuality what the Chief of Department and Chief of Section decided would be his assigned duties.

The previous summary drew attention to an apparent conflict between early statements of NOSENKO that he replaced no one when he entered on duty in the First Section, First Department, and his subsequent claim that he replaced Mikhail BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief in the First Section. Along with this he had first credited KOVSHUK and various other officers in the Section with previous responsibility for certain matters which were assigned to him upon his arrival there, then later stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsible for these matters. The previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these contradictions.

In the light of the present clearer picture of the nature of a Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not contradictory. There is no reason to question that BAKHVALOV, with whom NOSENKO, incidentally, did not overlap, was a Deputy Chief of Section in the First Section before NOSENKO, and that he was responsible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO. On the other hand, according to NOSENKO, the principal reason for his being assigned to the First Section was to concentrate on a new area of emphasis (code clerks). There could of course have been no specific predecessor for a substantively new area. Therefore, in one sense BAKHVALOV was the predecessor of NOSENKO and in another sense he was not. The interpretation of the various statements of NOSENKO on this issue as being in conflict appears to be the result of confusion on this point by all concerned.

According to NOSENKO, at the time of his transfer to the First Section, First Department, in early 1960, he had not been told and for a short period thereafter was not told what his actual duties would be. KOVSHUK, Chief of the First Section, wanted to assign NOSENKO to supervise the work against Service Attaches at the United States Embassy. NOSENKO felt that the proposed assignment by KOVSHUK was intended to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive work since KGB policy for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of control on trips and not active work towards possible recruitment.

After a short period of time, NOSENKO was informed by GRIBANOV that he, NOSENKO, had been transferred to supervise the work against code clerks (also code machine mechanics) at the United States Embassy. GRIBANOV defined this work as being of the greatest importance, and the recruitment of code clerks as a priority aim of the KGB. KLYPIN, who was Chief of the First Department, later repeated the above and a group consisting of NOSENKO, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV was formed with NOSENKO responsible for supervision of the work. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV were not new KGB officers, but instead were experienced officers although both as Senior Case Officers were of lesser rank than NOSENKO. NOSENKO does not claim that he had to train either officer or to minutely scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO does claim he was responsible for supervision over their work.

According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV emphasized that work against code clerks was to be his primary work in the First Section and that it would take precedence over any other activity. Other than work against code clerks, NOSENKO has generally defined his responsibilities as follows:

(a) Responsibility for file of (work against) John ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States Embassy.

(b) Responsibility for preliminary review of reports from OTU (KGB technical unit) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.

(c) Responsibility for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy.

(d) Acting in place of Vladislav KOVSHUK, Chief, First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent.

As can be seen from the above, the responsibilities of NOSENKO, by his definition, which are borne out by specific information furnished by NOSENKO, would not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CIA. An analyst can either accept or reject the theory that there is necessarily an equation between the responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA and the KGB, but if the analyst accepts the theory, he must offer some supporting evidence on this point.

Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments and conclusions and sub-conclusions in regard to the claimed service of NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy Chief of the First (American Embassy) Section nor a supervisor in that section. The conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks. The matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later. Comments will first be made on the responsibilities listed in (a) - (d) above.

Pages 205 - 222 of the previous summary contain a detailed basis for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the KGB case officer for John ABIDIAN. The current conclusion is that he was the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN. Whether or not his work against ABIDIAN compared favorably with what is considered to be the MO of a responsible CIA case officer is immaterial; what is material is whether NOSENKO reasonably fulfilled the requirements of the KGB for work against the particular target, John ABIDIAN. It is felt that the answer to this is that NOSENKO did.

According to NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the direction of determining if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his description of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered only within that framework.

Admittedly NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the KGB was to see if coverage of ABIDIAN would lead to "another POPOV," it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had little material value for the SCD. The FCD had advised the SCD prior to the arrival of ABIDIAN in the USSR that ABIDIAN was considered to be "American Intelligence," and in addition ABIDIAN assumed the Security Officer position formerly held by Russell A. LANGELLE, who was known by the KGB to be CIA. No investigation by the SCD was necessary to determine if ABIDIAN was "American Intelligence" or not.

The previous summary, pages 213 - 216, contains some quite specific statements relative to ABIDIAN and a Soviet maid, a KGB operational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erroneous. This invalidates one of the bases for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO had previously stated that in circa October 1960 he prepared an operational plan on ABIDIAN which included continuation of the placing of Metka on the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN by his maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH. The statement is made in the summary that this could not be true because FEDOROVICH did not work part time for ABIDIAN until at least July 1961. ABIDIAN has recently been reinterviewed concerning the above and the results invalidate the previous conclusion that FEDOROVICH could not have treated the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN with Metka prior to July 1961.

ABIDIAN has now stated that he arrived in Moscow in March 1960 with the intention that he would not employ a Soviet maid. Approximately three months later his close association began with Myra KEMMER, a Department of State employee; this association continued until she left Moscow in mid-1961. KEMMER had Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid and through mutual agreement with KEMMER, FEDOROVICH became the part-time maid for ABIDIAN beginning sometime in the fall of 1960. From that time on FEDOROVICH, according to ABIDIAN, had uncontrolled access to his living quarters since she had a key to permit entry for cleaning purposes.

ABIDIAN did not mail any operational letters within the Soviet Union until after March 1961 and therefore in view of the above, there is no reason to contradict the statement of NOSENKO that the three operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN all showed evidence of Metka. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO in June 1962 warned CIA about the KGB use of Metka for spotting internal letter mailings by United States Embassy personnel.

when mailed?

ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was the subject of a 24-hour surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance brigade to cover ABIDIAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was the responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the

First Section, First Department. NOSENKO, as the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN, was expected to review these reports and give any appropriate guidance or direction to the Seventh Directorate, but under the KGB organization he would not participate in the surveillance activities of the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO stated that had surveillance or agent information disclosed any personal weaknesses of ABIDIAN, the KGB would have attempted to exploit them. No personal weaknesses were disclosed, according to NOSENKO, and the pattern of coverage to see if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV" remained unchanged.

Pages 210 - 212 of the previous summary notes that NOSENKO was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN during trips outside the USSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the FCD to find out such information. According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that the FCD "would not accept" such a request for "operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow." The surveillance which would have been required on the part of the FCD to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad would certainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKO contends that the results which might reasonably be expected would be of little or no practical value to the SCD.

Pages 216 - 221 of the previous summary contain a summary on the matter of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site which John ABIDIAN visited on 30 December 1961. It should be noted that a current review of the 1964 - 1966 interrogations of NOSENKO on this matter indicates they were unable to clarify the matter and did much to confuse the issue.

Current interviews, as indicated above, have not fully resolved the problems, but have assisted in at least minimizing the areas of conflict or confusion. It is apparent that NOSENKO was not in the First Section, First Department, for any material period of time after 30 December 1961. It is also clear that he either read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or was fully briefed on the details of the visit. NOSENKO insists that he read the surveillance report at the time or shortly after the event. There is no reason to question his assertion that he read the report since his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN and his actions in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relate it to his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually read the report.

NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop area led to the KGB setting up a stationary surveillance post near the site which was maintained for three months and that he was informed on a daily basis of the results of this stake out (always negative). To take this statement literally would raise a further problem since, in addition to his transfer from the First Department to the Seventh Department as of early January 1962, NOSENKO went to Geneva in mid-March 1962.

It is conceivable that, as he himself now maintains, he was kept advised of developments or nondevelopments following the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street building by Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chief of Department in the Seventh Directorate who had been known to NOSENKO since 1953, or Vladislav KOVSHUK or Gennadiy GRYAZNOV, Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Department. Even so, however, his failure to call our attention to this matter in June 1962 would seem to require explanation, especially in view of the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letter mailings by ABIDIAN -- a warning which would appear clearly to have been derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the spring-summer of 1961.

It is to be noted that during the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO was not specifically asked for any additional information regarding any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyond this, NOSENKO himself has stated that it did not occur to him to tell us because the stake out had long since been dropped, it had revealed nothing suspicious on the part of ABIDIAN or anyone else, and therefore he had regarded it as insignificant.

This is not implausible. Another possible explanation, however, derived from the already noted inability of NOSENKO to pin down a date for the visit, is that he learned of the stationary surveillance post if not of the visit itself after his meetings with us in June 1962. It should be noted in this context that with the public exposure of the PENKOVSKIY case in the fall of 1962, the Pushkin Street deaddrop undoubtedly became the subject of widespread interest within the KGB.

That NOSENKO is at a minimum still confused about the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop and its consequences is clear from the record. While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has consciously exaggerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermath, it is also possible that the evident distortions of his accounts of the affair derive from honest confusion.

Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous interviews leave no doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961. These visits by ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operational letter mailing. NOSENKO consistently relates, and has furnished drawings which substantiate, that visits of ABIDIAN to a commission shop, a next-door art shop, and a local post office in the area were known to and considered suspicious by the KGB. The entrance to the art shop, according to NOSENKO, was so situated as to be an ideal place for picking up or placing a deaddrop, and a mobile surveillance was placed on the art shop for a period of time following the visit of ABIDIAN. Official records confirm the visits of ABIDIAN at the time and to the buildings described by NOSENKO.

Pages 216 - 220 of the previous summary contain no reference to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area. It is also clear from a review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations that no differentiation was made concerning his statements relative to KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his knowledge of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site after the visit of ABIDIAN to that site (30 December 1961).

It is impossible at this time to state that a detailed debriefing of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would have permitted the clarification of all issues including the above, but there is no doubt that the hostile interrogation has confused matters to the point where complete clarification appears impossible. In any event, one thing is clear -- since he may well have transferred out of the First Section, First Department, by 31 December 1961 and most certainly had transferred by early January 1962, the fact that NOSENKO has supplied confused information regarding the Pushkin Street affair cannot be used to impugn his claim to having been case officer for ABIDIAN from early 1960 until late 1961. Furthermore, the fact that NOSENKO is not able to properly date the visit of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, is in no way indicative of KGB dispatch. If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have had the date right.

In regard to (b), the responsibility of NOSENKO for preliminary review of reports from OTU (Technical Unit of KGB) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy, the previous conclusion was that his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB monitoring reports was not sustained.

It is not felt that the previous conclusion made sufficient allowance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually entailed. Information from microphones in the United States Embassy, according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially. Telephone intercepts were given to a designated officer for distribution to the appropriate case officer, but microphone reports, to prevent wide dissemination even within the First Section, were brought daily to the Deputy Chief or in his absence to the Chief and then were distributed to the individual responsible case officer. In this way, according to NOSENKO, no one below the rank of Deputy Chief was aware of the total microphone "take" from the United States Embassy as received by the section.

As regards political type information, and according to NOSENKO this was considered the most important by the KGB and OTU, NOSENKO had no responsibility for review or ultimate dissemination of the information to the Chief, SCD, the Chairman, KGB, or the Central Committee since this was the responsibility of a unit in the office of the Chief, SCD.

NOSENKO has also stated that the output from certain of the working microphones was "dying" and that OTU in addition to having reception difficulties was also having difficulty obtaining a sufficient number of qualified monitor-translators. As a result, according to NOSENKO, OTU was not providing complete verbatim transcripts from most microphones, but actually was reporting only those portions which OTU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts of all conversations in areas covered by active microphones would have been of interest to responsible officers of the First Section, OTU, according to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more personnel." According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of the

First Section could listen to a particular tape but he had to go to OTU to do so and as a result this was done very infrequently.

It is believed that any presumption that the KGB recovered or transcribed all conversations even in the thirteen areas listed by NOSENKO as having active microphones is not reasonable or even realistic. It is also unrealistic to presume that any conversation conducted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was not compromised to the KGB. The latter is a factor to be considered in any damage assessment; it is not an appropriate basis for a presumption that NOSENKO had to have been aware of this or this just because someone had a conversation in one of the rooms in which there was an active microphone and NOSENKO has claimed he reviewed the "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.

It is apparent that there are a number of imponderable factors to be considered such as whether the conversation could be picked up by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover sufficient portions of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being said, and even if he did, whether he would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form.

In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy, it is not considered that there is an adequate basis for questioning this claim.

The previous summary contained a conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was custodian of the Embassy security file was an invention. The basis for this conclusion was not then adequate and current interviews with NOSENKO have further indicated that his claim on this point should be accepted.

In regard to (d), the claim of NOSENKO that he acted in place of KOVSHUK, the Chief of First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent, it is considered that this claim is acceptable providing it is not converted into a presumption that therefore NOSENKO knew everything that KOVSHUK knew.

NOSENKO claims that he was not responsible for the direct supervision of approximately two-thirds of the officers in the First Section. These officers normally reported directly to KOVSHUK and would only report to NOSENKO when KOVSHUK was absent. As an example of this, NOSENKO has shown a lack of detailed knowledge of the work against diplomatic personnel in the United States Embassy. He has stated he is sure he would have known of anything "important" such as a recruitment or attempted recruitment, but he does not claim to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First

Section. His recognition of the names of individuals at the United States Embassy in 1960 - 1961 and even their assignments seems adequate.

The previous criticism that NOSENKO knew only the names of most agents or operative contacts who were part of the KGB network among the indigenous employees of the American Embassy, did not recognize their photographs, and did not give sufficient details concerning their specific activities is considered to be an unwarranted criticism. NOSENKO indicates that in general the handling of agents in the First Section was the responsibility of individual case officers.

It is also apparent that the philosophy in the KGB was to maintain a single handler-agent relationship as much as possible, and that responsibility for an agent would not be transferred merely because the agent had access to a target who was the responsibility of a case officer other than the handler of the agent. This apparent philosophy is of particular interest in connection with NOSENKO, who even though he was the case officer responsible for ABIDIAN and together with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agent network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent for reporting on or a specific activity against a particular target was normally not an adequate reason to transfer responsibility for the agent and it appears the KGB considers that the continuation of an established handler-agent relationship has considerable merit.

NOSENKO, as previously indicated, has stated that he had the responsibility for work against code clerks at the United States Embassy during 1960 - 1961. Except for the period of time that he claims responsibility for supervision of work against the Service Attaches in early 1960, he was, according to NOSENKO, responsible for supervision of the work of Vadim A. KOSOLAPOV, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir DEMKIN and Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY.

GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV worked only against code clerks and therefore were supervised solely by NOSENKO, whereas DEMKIN and GROMAKOVSKIY, who handled indigenous agents in American House, came under the supervision of NOSENKO only in those cases where these agents were directed against code clerks.

It is quite clear that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning the code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouch clerks who, according to NOSENKO, were included in his targets in 1960 - 1961, was much greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees at the United States Embassy during this period except for ABIDIAN.

The following comments are concerned with several specific cases in which, according to NOSENKO, there was an approach by the KGB, interesting information was developed, or in which at least a considerable amount of specific work was carried out by NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.

06

The first case, James STORSBERG, is covered on pages 166 - 177 of the previous summary. Little additional comment is considered necessary on this case since there does not appear to be any adequate reason to question the general story of NOSENKO in regard to the KGB effort against STORSBERG. 06

It is recognized and mentioned elsewhere that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal involvement in the case, particularly in placing himself as present with GRIBANOV when the recruitment pitch was made to 06 STORSBERG. NOSENKO has retracted this particular claim, but there is no reason to doubt that he was engaged for approximately a year in the planning and activities which preceded the unsuccessful approach to 06 STORSBERG.

An issue was previously made over the timing of the approach to 06 STORSBERG since 06 STORSBERG dated this as October 1961, NOSENKO has indicated about June 1961, and information from GOLITSYN, based on remarks by KOVSHUK to him, had been interpreted as indicating the

61BR

approach occurred at the "end of 1960."

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has given an acceptable account of the 06 STORSBERG case. He has stated that he cannot precisely date the approach to 06 STORSBERG but that it occurred before the approach at the Moscow airport to 06 James KEYSERS (June 16, 1961) because otherwise no action would have been taken against 06 KEYSERS.

When recently reinterviewed, 06 STORSBERG continued to maintain that the approach occurred in October 1961, but the internal evidence in his description of collateral events makes it clear that the approach had to have taken place considerably earlier.

06 Joseph MORONE another code clerk at the United States Embassy, who will be the subject of further discussion below, has been interviewed on the basis of statements by 06 STORSBERG that 06 MORONE was present in American House the night of the approach. Analysis of the statements of 06 MORONE clearly indicates that the events 06 STORSBERG describes could not have taken place later than the period February to early May 1961.

The best estimate possible at this time is that the approach to 06 STORSBERG occurred in March - April 1961, which is quite compatible with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSENKO. In the face of this approximation of the date of the approach to 06 STORSBERG it is

12/BR

believed reasonable to assume that the remarks of KOVSHUK to GOLITSYN in January 1961, as related by GOLITSYN concerning a successful operation against a 08 military code clerk in Moscow at the end of 1960, referred to 06 STORSBERG and that KOVSHUK either was referring to a compromise phase of the operation rather than the actual approach, or was prematurely claiming anticipated success.

Pages 178 - 181 of the previous summary contain information in regard to the attempted defection operation against 06 James KEYSERS. As of this time, it is considered that there are no discrepancies between record information and information from NOSENKO which in any way reflect against NOSENKO. 06 KEYSERS did not recognize a photograph of NOSENKO as the Soviet who made a fast approach to him at the airport, but this does not provide a valid reason to disbelieve the statement of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk to 06 KEYSERS.

There are certain statements relative to the 06 KEYSERS case as set forth in the previous summary which require specific comment.

(a) The statement is made that no KGB officer directly connected with the case could regard 06 KEYSERS as the replacement for 06 STORSBERG. In fact, KEYSERS 06 actually was being trained by 06 STORSBERG as a substitute, not a replacement, even though his primary assignment

10/BR

was not that of a code clerk. NOSENKO has during current interviews related how he received the impression from the OTU reports of conversations picked up by the microphone in the Military code room at the United States Embassy that 06 KEYSERS either was not a code clerk or had been away from code work for a considerable period of time. In any event, the impression of NOSENKO was that 06 STORSBERG was having a difficult time explaining the particular work to 06 KEYSERS. The observations of NOSENKO are of interest since 06 KEYSERS actually had not been a code clerk but, as noted, was being trained by 06 STORSBERG so that he could act as a substitute. Under the circumstances, it is considered quite logical that the KGB would assume at the time that 06 KEYSERS was to be the eventual replacement of 06 STORSBERG.

(b) The previous summary stated that, "prior to his departure from Moscow, 06 KEYSERS acknowledged to his supervisors 06 (Colonel URBAN) his homosexual tendencies and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents, all at the American House" (page 179).

918R

Contrary to this assertion, a review of the official memorandum, dated 16 June 1961, of [Colonel 06 URBAN] reflects that 06 [KEYSERS] was not informed by 06 [URBAN] of the "allegations of homosexuality in order not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him while within the Soviet Union."

(c) On page 236 of the previous summary, the statement is made that, "In the single case in which he /NOSENKO/ asserted that he relied on information procured from microphones 06 ([KEYSERS] failure to report receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error."

While the official record shows that [KEYSERS] 06 did indeed report receipt of the defection letter to [Colonel 06 URBAN] in the office of 06 [Colonel URBAN], it should be noted that this occurred less than one hour before 06 [KEYSERS] left the Embassy for the airport. NOSENKO has stated that in the absence of information to the contrary from microphone and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded that 06 [KEYSERS] had not reported receipt of the defection letter and therefore had decided to approach 06 [KEYSERS] at the airport. In view of the short time between [KEYSERS] 06 report of receipt

111/BR

of the letter and his departure from Moscow, it would have been remarkable if the KGB had learned this information in time to call off the airport approach. The account of NOSENKO in the 06 KEYSERS matter therefore is considered completely credible.

Pages 181 - 184 of the previous summary contain information in regard to 06 Matthew ZUJUS, who succeeded 06 James STORSBERG having arrived in Moscow in September 1961. GRYAZNOV was the responsible case officer for 06 ZUJUS, according to NOSENKO.

The previous summary states (page 183) that 06 ZUJUS, during a routine debriefing, confirmed an Embassy report that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN," who visited the American House with someone from the United Arab Republic. "LILLIAN" was interviewed by the American House manager and she claimed to be from Vienna but traveling with her employer, a Czech. Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport had been issued to "LILLIAN," and she was later asked for her passport. "LILLIAN" replied that she had forgotten it, then left, and did not return.

The previous summary stated that the above incident had been described by NOSENKO but in connection with attempts to entrap Joseph 06 MORONE in 1960, not 06 ZUJUS in 1962.

C001186

718R

Page 194 of the previous summary relates information from NOSENKO that GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin in early 1960 to obtain two German women who could be used against the residents of American House. During current interviews, this matter has been again covered with NOSENKO. According to NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV arranged for these two women, agents of the Berlin KGB Residentura, to visit Moscow under false documentation, one as a West German and the other as an Austrian. NOSENKO further identified the "West German" agent, "HANNA," as having the cover of a journalist, and stated he believed "HANNA" had met 06 MORONE at American House. In a recent interview, 06 MORONE confirmed that in early 1961 he had met a West German girl at American House who claimed to be a journalist. The statements of 06 MORONE therefore appear to substantiate the report of NOSENKO.

Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO reported that she was queried about her passport at American House and as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further attempts to use her at American House. NOSENKO places this incident in the same time period as the "HANNA" case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He has never suggested any connection with 06 ZUJUS, nor is there reason to assume that he could be referring to the experience of 06 ZUJUS since this took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had left the American Embassy Section.

51BR

It was the conclusion of the previous summary that NOSENKO did not know enough about 06 ZUJUS or his background to have exercised any supervision in the development of 06 ZUJUS. Granted that NOSENKO did not know many details regarding 06 ZUJUS the fact is that NOSENKO left the First Section, First Department, at the end of 1961 at which time any supervisory functions of NOSENKO terminated. 06 ZUJUS, who did not arrive in Moscow until September 1961, remained in Moscow until January 1963. NOSENKO could hardly be held responsible for knowing anything about 06 ZUJUS after 1 January 1962.

Pages 165 - 169 of the previous summary contain a synopsis of previous information from NOSENKO in regard to 06 Paul JENNER. Basically, NOSENKO had reported that when the KGB learned that 06 Paul JENNER, who was thought to be a code clerk, was coming to Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki to travel on the same train as 06 JENNER to Moscow. A female agent of GRYAZNOV was to be placed on this train at Vyborg after the train entered the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainted with 06 JENNER as a part of a future operation against 06 JENNER in Moscow, and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with JENNER. 06

NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successful, that both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acquaintance of JENNER. 06

12/BR

and that he, NOSENKO, read the report submitted by KOSOLAPOV on the trip from Helsinki to Moscow.

06 JENNER after arriving in Moscow, reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students," who struck up a conversation. According to 06 JENNER they both said that they might see 06 JENNER in Moscow. About three months later 06 JENNER reported being approached again by the same girl, this time at the Moscow airport where he had gone on courier business. There was a short conversation and she gave 06 JENNER a phone number, insisting that he call her. The woman also advised 06 JENNER not to mention the conversation to anyone. NOSENKO has stated that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance, the KGB had arranged for the female agent to encounter 06 JENNER at the Moscow railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet couriers.

Insofar as is known, 06 JENNER has never been shown a photograph of KOSOLAPOV. Although KOSOLAPOV was approximately 34 years of age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicate that in appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed as a university student.

SECRET

8/BR

During current interviews, NOSENKO has repeated the same general story as regards 06 Paul JENNER; he still insists that KOSOLAPOV was on the same train with 06 JENNER from Helsinki. Collateral information raises difficulties here, however: Finnish train manifests indicate that 06 JENNER was the only Moscow-bound passenger on the 08 31 March 1960 train from Finland to Moscow, and that one Viktor KOLOSSOV (a name NOSENKO has identified as an alias used by KOSOLAPOV) was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow.

The above obvious discrepancy has not been and cannot be clarified with available information. KOSOLAPOV (KOLOSSOV) was either on the same train as 06 JENNER or he was not. Train manifests indicate that KOSOLAPOV was not. Nevertheless, the "boy and girl, probably university students" who, according to 06 JENNER, struck up a conversation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the operational effort described by NOSENKO, particularly in view of the later approach of this same girl to 06 JENNER at the airport. There is no reason to question that this girl was the female agent of GRYAZNOV. In view of the conflict between the train manifest and statements by NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the "boy student" was: whether this somehow was KOSOLAPOV, or whether it may have been some other person entirely.

71BR

It is not accepted that the train manifests are incontrovertible evidence that KOSOLAPOV could not have been on the same train as 06 JENNER. Neither is it accepted that the train manifests are in error. There is just not a satisfactory answer for the indicated discrepancy between the train manifests and the statement of NOSENKO that KOSOLAPOV and 06 JENNER were on the same train. If indeed KOSOLAPOV did not travel with 06 JENNER, this does not establish anything more than that NOSENKO is wrong; it is evidence that he does not know something he, as the supervisor of KOSOLAPOV, should have known according to his own statements.

Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in regard to the 06 John GARLAND case. 06 GARLAND was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk whom the KGB was studying, but on whom no derogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practically no details in regard to 06 GARLAND other than to identify him as a code clerk.

GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered relates to the trip of 06 GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsinki KGB Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that the responsible SCD case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki under alias to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which the SCD hoped to continue in Moscow. GOLITSYN talked to KOSOLAPOV in Helsinki at that time, and the Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in the compartment of the American on the train from Helsinki to Moscow.

The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN had advised that later in Helsinki he inquired of another SCD officer "from the Embassy Section" (First Section, SCD) about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, the officer refused to discuss the case and he, GOLITSYN, concluded from this reaction that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment.

It has been determined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the FBI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD officer from the Embassy Section" as (fnu) ZENKIN of the American Department. GOLITSYN also stated that the officer was in Helsinki under the alias of SERGEEV (SERGEYEV), but was unable to furnish a first name and patronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN referred to (fnu) ZENKIN as being from the American Department, SCD.

It is considered that there is no doubt that the (fnu) ZENKIN referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name

SECRET

concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished information. NOSENKO has identified ZENKIN (whose first name he does not recall but possibly is Yuriy) as an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD. According to NOSENKO, one group of the Second Section both before and after 1960 - 1961 was engaged in "operative games" against American Intelligence and that ZENKIN was a member of this group. NOSENKO has advised that ZENKIN traveled abroad in connection with activities of the Second Section, but that he had no specific knowledge regarding the activities of ZENKIN on these trips. NOSENKO has furnished some fragmentary information which he learned in regard to ZENKIN and when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) together with his photograph is obtained, this fragmentary information from NOSENKO may prove quite useful.

As regards the KOSOLAPOV-06 GARLAND matter and the opinion expressed by GOLITSYN based on the refusal of ZENKIN to discuss the case (06 GARLAND) that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment, there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presumption. According to NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSENKO on this point, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not the First Section, in 1960 - 1961. He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case

Officer. Since KOSOLAPOV was an officer of the First Section and the work against GARLAND was the responsibility of the First Section, it does not appear that ZENKIN would necessarily have known of any developments in the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND matter.

The Finnish train manifest of 16 November 1960 for the Helsinki to Moscow train lists John GARLAND and Viktor KOLOSSOV (alias of KOSOLAPOV) as passengers. GARLAND, when interviewed in 1962 following the lead from GOLITSYN, denied having met any Soviet with the physical description of KOSOLAPOV on the Helsinki-to-Moscow trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet Intelligence. Later interviews by the FBI and a polygraph interview did not indicate that he had ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had ever knowingly been contacted by any foreign intelligence agent.

It is accepted that KOSOLAPOV went from Moscow to Helsinki in November 1960, that he talked with GOLITSYN there, and that he was on the same train as GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow. It is also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960.

Travel for an SCD officer outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not matter that the individual has previously traveled on a similar mission, each trip must have specific high-level approval. The red tape which thus must inevitably have been involved in preparation for such a trip further supports the assumption that NOSENKO should have known about the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND trip.

The position taken by NOSENKO on this point is that he accepts the statement by the interviewer that KOSOLAPOV made such a trip, but he says that he, NOSENKO, simply does not know anything about it. He adds only that had anything significant developed in the study of GARLAND, he would have been aware of it.

NOSENKO, as supervisor of the group working against code clerks, should have known of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba from 15 November 1960 to circa 17 December 1960. The possibility exists that this could have accounted for his lack of knowledge of the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki and return to Moscow on 16 November 1960. However, NOSENKO has not attempted to use his Cuban trip as a possible explanation for not knowing of the November KOSOLAPOV trip.

As with the JENNER-KOSOLAPOV case, it is not possible at this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the GARLAND-KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledge of

4/BR

this operational activity of KOSOLAPOV is another apparent instance, as in the 06 JENNER case, of his not knowing something he, by his own statements, should have known.

Viewed in the context of the total knowledge of NOSENKO of operations against code clerks, however, neither the problems in the 06 JENNER case nor those in the 06 GARLAND case, singly or combined, in any way represent conclusive evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of KOSOLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk operations described by NOSENKO. This statement, however, was not substantiated in the previous summary.

Pages 193 - 199 of the previous summary contain an account of KGB activity against code clerk 06 Joseph MORONE from various sources, including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962.

According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work against 06 MORONE was KOSOLAPOV. When it was learned that MORONE 06 and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the name of 06 BEGGS were planning a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrangements were made with the UB (the Polish Security Service) for a female Polish agent to come to Moscow and travel from there to Warsaw on the same train as 06 MORONE and 06 BEGGS. The intent was for the agent, either on the train or subsequently in Warsaw, to meet and compromise 06 MORONE sexually. She

101BR

successfully accomplished this, but due to certain problems in KGB-UB liaison relations, it was not possible for the KGB to exploit this directly.

The previous summary stated that with respect to the female UB agent, there was persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV played the roles in the 06 [MORONE] case described by NOSENKO. That summary cited the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba and of KOSOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the same time as the 06 [MORONE] trip to Warsaw as evidence of the impossibility of NOSENKO and KOSOLAPOV being involved personally in this part of the [MORONE] 06 case.

NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish female agent and made the arrangements to place her on the train to Warsaw. 06 [MORONE] and 06 [BEGGS] departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. It is not known when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the 16 November 1960 train manifest as departing Helsinki for Moscow. NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 for Cuba. The activities described by NOSENKO are therefore possible within the known time frame.

It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role in the 06 [MORONE] case, particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO, placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that

6188

KOSOLAPOV was the only KGB officer in contact with the Polish agent. NOSENKO previously stated that a KGB technician who was on the train from Moscow to Warsaw reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw. Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician after he returned from Cuba.

The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matter are accordingly possible within the known time frame. It is not considered that the retractions NOSENKO has made from his original statements on this operation are of sufficient significance to materially discredit him.

Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that 06 MORONE when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House. NOSENKO had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw or heard concerning 06 MORONE (page 194). The summary, however, cited a number of reports that 06 MORONE had been intimate with IVANOVA and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware of the sexual involvement of 06 MORONE with "IVANOVA's friends."

41BR

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has indicated awareness of at least some involvement of IVANOVA with MORONE. He has furnished information on a developing operation against Marine guard GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCIA) based on the involvement of GARCIA with IVANOVA. He has also stated that the possibility was considered of using IVANOVA against MORONE to obtain compromising photographs. This plan was seriously affected when it was learned from the militiaman/KGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA, her girl friend, MORONE and a Marine guard, possibly GARCIA, had been "in the city," then returned to the "flat" of one of the Marines where the girls spent the night. This apparently placed the reliability of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section.

According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Pietro CECCHI, Italian cook at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOV, reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE. The summary also states that MORONE was said by other American Embassy employees to be a close friend of CECCHI and that MORONE had admitted black market money exchanges with CECCHI.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has stated that CECCHI furnished "pieces" of information concerning MORONE, but he, NOSENKO,

10/8R

knew of no black market involvement of 06 [MORONE] with CECCHI. NOSENKO has also indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected, and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not fully report everything of interest to the KGB. The KGB of course was aware that CECCHI was involved in the black market. However, whether he reported to the KGB everything he did and with whom is open to question; viz., the 06 [Maurice ZWANG] case below.

The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENKO was unaware that 06 [MORONE] met some Soviet females in the spring of 1961 at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, an Egyptian-national KGB agent of the Sixth Department who was also reporting on Americans, and was intimate with one in this apartment.

A review of official records indicates that 06 [MORONE] did report having met some Soviet girls at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is no indication that he admitted or that anyone else has reported that he was intimate with any of them. The conclusion of the previous summary in this regard was based on a misinterpretation. Accordingly, since there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is considered completely acceptable.

4/BR

A few comments are appropriate concerning remarks in the previous summary on pages 199 - 204. Comments were made there concerning five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY and Joseph GAFFEY, and although it is not specifically stated, the suggestion is apparent that the reporting of NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of all KGB operations against code clerks. The following observations may assist in placing these cases in their proper perspective:

08, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06

06

(a) Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on" during 1960 - 1961. The previous summary suggested that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity against 06 ZWANG was inadequate. First, reporting of NOSENKO on 06 ZWANG contained no reference to the relationship of 06 ZWANG with his maid, whom NOSENKO in another case has identified as a KGB agent. Although 06 ZWANG denied sexual relations with his maid, he did admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment. During polygraph examination 06 ZWANG reacted when he

SECRET

7/BR

responded in the negative to a question regarding sexual relations with his maid. The failure of NOSENKO to report on this relationship can be ascribed to ignorance, but also can be plausibly explained by faulty memory on his part or failure on the part of the maid to report details of this relationship to the KGB.

Second, NOSENKO had not reported that 06 ZWANG was involved in the currency operations of Pietro CECCHI. (A fact that previous summary implied he should have known from KGB agent CECCHI.) From the record, however, it appears that the dealings of 06 ZWANG were not directly with CECCHI, but rather through other Embassy employees, making it plausible that CECCHI was either unaware of the involvement of 06 ZWANG or, as NOSENKO himself stated he suspected, CECCHI did not report all details of his currency operations to his KGB handler.

(b) 06 John TAYLOR - NOSENKO identified TAYLOR 06 as 08 a State Department code clerk and target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was aware of the involvement of 06 TAYLOR with his Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit 06 TAYLOR before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might endanger the plans for a recruitment approach to 06 James STORSBERG who had been under development for almost a year and was considered more valuable.

The implication of the previous summary that the explanation given by NOSENKO was subject to question failed to take into account the fact that although STORSBERG 06 was not approached until after the departure of TAYLOR. 06 the operation against 06 STORSBERG was underway before 06 TAYLOR became involved with his maid. Further, it is apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in TAYLOR 06 since he was approached at a later date outside the USSR on the basis of his previous affair with his maid in Moscow.

(c) 06 Frank DAY - NOSENKO identified 06 Frank DAY as 08 a State Department code clerk who was the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO, nothing "interesting" was learned about 06 DAY and no operational measures were taken against 06 DAY. The previous summary noted that in July 1961, 06 DAY traveled to the Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA employee, 08, 06 Agricultural Attache G. Stanley BROWN. It was also stated that the two were under surveillance by five persons

13/3R

at all times on the above trip, that they found a "repairman" in their hotel room when they unexpectedly returned, and that on another occasion an "attractive and available Soviet female" was believed to have been planted in their train compartment.

According to NOSENKO, surveillance and any other local coverage of any employee at the United States Embassy who travels in the USSR is the responsibility of the local KGB organization, not the SCD. It would appear that the local organization was trying to do a thorough job on DAY 06 and 06 BROWN but it apparently was nonproductive. It does not seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should have recalled a trip which produced no results.

(d) 06 Robert DWELLY - NOSENKO has related in considerable detail the efforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV to involve 06, 08 Robert DWELLY, a code clerk in Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in a homosexual compromise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion 06 DWELLY was a homosexual.

G00012C4

SECRET

5/8Q

There is no reason to doubt the statement of NOSENKO concerning KGB efforts to determine when and where 06 DWELLY was going "into the city" (Moscow) so that a homosexual compromise situation could be arranged. There were no specific developments from their efforts, according to NOSENKO.

06 DWELLY has categorically denied being a homosexual; NOSENKO has not said he was, but only that the homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed 06 DWELLY as a homosexual. There does not appear to be any reason to consider the statements of NOSENKO about DWELLY 06 as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO.

(e) 06 Joseph GAFFEY - NOSENKO has identified 06 Joseph GAFFEY as a 08 code clerk. The previous summary noted that NOSENKO had stated the KGB had tried to lure 06 GAFFEY into downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA, an agent of DEMKIN in the American House.

By way of comment, the previous summary stated that 06 GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 1961 and that 06 Fred KADERA had reported that 06 GAFFEY had told him he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the Ame C00012C5

11/8R

House. It was further noted that 06 GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962 because of drunkenness and during interview had admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apartment and that she had claimed pregnancy.

As to whether the above information raises a question concerning NOSENKO, the following factors should be considered:

(1) NOSENKO has stated that during the latter part of December 1961 he was part time in the First Department and part time in the Seventh Department, and that he reported full time to the Seventh Department after New Years Day 1962.

(2) In addition to the information previously mentioned as furnished by 06 GAFFEY during interview, 06 GAFFEY also stated that he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December 1961 and was also intimate with her later on three occasions at her apartment. According to 06 GAFFEY, IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about 1 May

418R

1962, which is approximately four months after NOSENKO has stated he transferred to the Seventh Department.

The matter of review by NOSENKO of OTU reports from microphone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been mentioned in this summary. Pages 226 - 236 of the previous summary contained a detailed account of information from NOSENKO on the matter of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and damage estimates prepared by the Americans. The previous conclusion was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports. Comments have been made in this summary in regard to this previous conclusion.

A few remarks, it is believed, will assist in a fuller understanding of the microphone matter. In the material brought out by NOSENKO in 1964, there was a single sheet of paper containing on one side handwritten notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active microphones (those which were being monitored) in the United States Embassy. This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not be repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was characterized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated that NOSENKO has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.

During current interviews, the matter of the above list has been covered in considerably greater detail with NOSENKO than had been done before. His explanation, both of the circumstances which led to his acquiring the list as well as of his still having it in his possession at the time of his defection, is considered plausible, contrary to the judgment of the previous summary.

NOSENKO has stated that in 1960 - 1961 Vladimir I. PETROV, Chief of the Second Section, First Department, desired some "points" for use against targets of his section. NOSENKO uses the term "point" not as meaning just a microphone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors and translators to cover the microphone and translate the "take." The targets of PETROV were primarily Americans and, therefore, there was a transcription-translation problem.

According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points" were assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the United States Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Vladimir A. KLYPIN, held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section Vladislav KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, and NOSENKO, the purpose of which was to discuss the possibility of temporarily discontinuing certain Embassy "points" controlled by the First Section, and permitting PETROV to use these "points" against targets of his section.

According to NOSENKO, PETROV brought to the meeting a list of names of certain targets to which he wished to give technical coverage. During the meeting, KOVSHUK apparently took a piece of paper which PETROV had and wrote on it a list of active microphones in the United States Embassy and residences. When the meeting ended, NOSENKO had this paper and he took it back to his office.

Contained on the reverse side of the paper were the following names in Russian: 06,06,06 LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN, and 06 Sipe BURTIN. The name A. A. MIKHAYLOV was listed next to the name of LUBIN 06 and the name of Y. E. CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of 06 SMITH. NOSENKO has explained that LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN 06,06,06 and 06 Sipe BURTIN were among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOV and CHERNETSEV were officers of the Second Section.

NOSENKO stated he knew nothing more about the four non-Soviet names except that they were targets of PETROV. NOSENKO stated that he could not be positive of the date of the meeting other than that it occurred while KLYPIN was Chief of the First Department. (According to NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FEDOSEYEV as

6/BR

Chief of the First Department in circa mid-1961.) Research in regard to the four non-Soviet names leaves no doubt that 06 LUBIN is George LUBIN and that 06,06 Will BURTIN and Sipe BURTIN are correct names, with 06,08 Sipe being the wife of Will BURTIN. All three are American citizens who were in the USSR circa June 1961. 06 SMITH, at this time, has still not been identified.

In view of the above, it has been possible to deduce the date of the meeting called by KLYPIN as circa June 1961.

According to NOSENKO, the piece of paper described above was placed by NOSENKO with other notes he kept between the pages of a bound volume which NOSENKO calls a "working copy." This, according to NOSENKO, was an accountable, registered notebook issued to all officers in which they were supposed to write all their notes, destroying any other notes.

According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers, did not completely follow regulations and the tendency was to frequently put loose notes in the notebook so that the notebook often acted as a file rather than being used in the way required by regulations. NOSENKO has stated that when he left the First Section he took various notes with him to the Seventh Department; these included notes he had drafted concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSEYEV

4188

when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLYPIN, and notes he had prepared for lectures to the Seventh Directorate. According to NOSENKO, he did not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones; it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went to the Seventh Department.

In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKO, it should be noted that he also brought with him in 1964 his notes for the briefing of FEDOSEYEV and certain notes he obviously had also prepared while in the First Section; e.g., his notes for a lecture to the Seventh Directorate in regard to a "mass surveillance" on the American Embassy.

By including a section (pages 236 - 239) on the knowledge of NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on United States Embassy communications, the previous summary implies that there is some reason to question his information on this subject.

NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however, he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KGB responsible for communications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading some United States Embassy traffic. While it is open to question to what extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known to anyone in the First Section of the First Department, within the scope plausibly available to NOSENKO in his claimed position, there is no reason to question his statement.

In the previous summary (pages 240 - 246), the failures or successes of NOSENKO in identifying CIA officers are noted. With the exception of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO does not claim to have been the responsible case officer for any of the listed CIA officers. According to his claim, NOSENKO should have been aware that William N. MORELL was CIA, but he has never identified MORELL as CIA. Surely KOVSHUK knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was CIA is not known. It has already been established, however, that NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of all of the activities of KOVSHUK.

As regards some of the other listed individuals, a few remarks are appropriate.

(a) NOSENKO has never indicated any knowledge Paul GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely known to the FCD as a CIA employee before going to Moscow. It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was "American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not arrive in Moscow until November 1961, only a month before NOSENKO left the First Section for the Seventh Department.

(b) The previous summary stated that according to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect that Eugene 03 MAHONEY was a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA officer. It was also stated that 03 MAHONEY reported the presence of intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow from October 1960 to September 1961. The "intensive KGB surveillance" is based on statements of 03 MAHONEY and may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern over surveillance rather than what was actually happening.

(c) 03 Steve WASHENKO was correctly identified by NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA and identified by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CIA officer or cooptee.

(d) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according to NOSENKO, suspected of being a CIA officer.

George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate

4/BR

that the KGB had reasons to consider the activities of BOWDEN with suspicion.

It is not believed that the listed failures of NOSENKO to identify CIA officers are of particular significance in establishing that he was or was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. There are too many unknown factors which would need to be considered. Despite our assumptions as to what the KGB knows, it is possible that (a) the KGB did not know of the CIA affiliation of these people, (b) the information known to the KGB was not available at the First Section, First Department, level, or (c) information available to the Chief of the First Section or to a specific case officer was of no official concern to NOSENKO and was not made available to him. The last of these possibilities is suggested in spite of claims by NOSENKO that he had to have known whatever was known in the Section regarding CIA identifications; a propensity on the part of NOSENKO to exaggerate the area of his own knowledgeability has been seen elsewhere in this case.

Pages 252 - 258 of the previous summary contain a report of the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With regard to the Cuba trip, there is collateral evidence of his travel as described by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason to doubt his account of his activities on this trip. The statement was made in the previous summary that the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba in 1960 damaged his claim that he was supervising operations against Embassy code clerks at the time. To accept the validity of this judgment is to say that no supervisor in the SCD would be permitted to make a trip abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for which there is no supporting evidence.

As regards the trip of NOSENKO to Bulgaria in 1961, for which there is no collateral information, the previous summary concluded that his account of the trip was untrue and argued that such a trip to Bulgaria, if it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operation against 06 [STORSBERG] was reaching a climax and his subordinates were "apparently planning to exploit 06 [KEYSERS]' newly-discovered vulnerability," it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dispensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO did not travel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reasoning as to why his account of the purpose of the trip was untrue.

As to the 06 [STORSBERG] case, while it cannot at present be proved that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria, it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from 06 [MORONE], that it had to have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria. Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning the presence

C001215

41SR

of NOSENKO in Moscow at the time this pitch was made, it would appear that NOSENKO was comparatively free to go to Bulgaria because this phase of the 06 STORSBERG operation had been completed.

As to the 06 KEYSERS case, there is no apparent problem since it is clear that the approach to 06 KEYSERS took place after NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably did not become aware that 06 KEYSERS was a homosexual, and therefore potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was made.

In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true, or that if they are true they necessarily reflect on his claim to having been supervisor of code clerk operations.

F. NOSENKO's CLAIMS, THAT IN 1962 HE WAS CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department thereafter.

NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the position of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position.

According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK, then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section. However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUK as a Deputy.

Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indicates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.

This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section, and July 1962 - January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having detailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January - July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarks in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of Wallace Everett JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst BRAUNS. Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO and information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial evidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. That there were KGB operations against JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and BRAUNS has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four individuals.

06, 06, 06, 06

06, 06, 06, 06

A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clarification.

06

06

In the Wallace Everett JOHNSON case, it was previously noted that JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary suggested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tendencies of JOHNSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary to the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during current interviews

06

5/BR

has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of 06 JOHNSON "by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a room at the Metropol Hotel where 06 JOHNSON stayed. They met 06 JOHNSON there and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies.

In regard to the 06 William Carroll JONES case, NOSENKO during current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation against 06 JONES, including the woman Ludmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited as an agent to work against 06 JONES and was used in another case. The other details furnished by NOSENKO concerning the 06 JONES case are compatible with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department.

In regard to the 06 Natalie BIENSTOCK case, NOSENKO did not claim to have been the responsible case officer but was able to provide enough specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when she was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the details concerning the 06 BIENSTOCK case could be explained by his claim to have been Chief of Section and not the case officer directly involved with the case.

In regard to the 06 Horst BRAUNS case, in the previous summary the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why 06 BRAUNS visited the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom 06 BRAUNS met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that

1218R

the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, according to the previous summary, was aware that 06 BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives was information available to the KGB through his visa application.

In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from NOSENKO.* Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the responsibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were involved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher authority to another department or component, it was and remained the responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that 06 BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen could very well have made 06 BRAUNS of interest to the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of the SCD. However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher authority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Department since 06 BRAUNS was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The previous summary also indicated that 06 BRAUNS listed on his visa application that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. 06 BRAUNS had a

---

* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the Seventh Department. The situation was not the same as in 1959.

0001222

6/BR

06

relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although BRAUNS, when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concerning his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose in visiting the USSR.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary reviews remarks by NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role in the case was not plausible. There are several specific points made in the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of the case. There is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV.

The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and information from the actual CIA record of the case. There are major differences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved, an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case.

NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the

VBR

KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary stated that NOSENKO did not know when the BELITSKIY operation started (Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or Geneva.

NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruitment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR. The latter was considered completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.

There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent discrepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO. On the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. There is a distinct possibility the KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium. As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in 1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.

The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the developments in his case prior to 1961:

(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to

George BLAKE. (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence.)

(b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, after he went to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961, BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore would not have told the KGB how he actually made contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962, but very well could have told the KGB he had seen a particular woman whom he had previously known, he was sure she worked for American Intelligence and it was through this woman American Intelligence became aware BELITSKIY was in Geneva.)

(c) BELITSKIY in 1962 in Geneva agreed to meet within the USSR an individual representing CIA. However, his agreement was only under certain stipulated conditions, the most interesting of which was that the individual must be unwitting of the true nature of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. In addition, any message to BELITSKIY or any individual who met BELITSKIY must make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITSKIY with CIA.

The above conditions are quite explainable if BELITSKIY had not been under KGB control between 1958 and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGB only a partial story of the 1961 events in London.

As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrepancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reflection against NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not know the true facts of the BELITSKIY case.

The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA." The previous summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY."

There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA," is a reasonably accurate description of what actually happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva. The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence while previously in Paris, France.

It was determined there was no collateral information which would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behalf of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "forcibly recruited by American Intelligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV. It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of American tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959. The summary noted this was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section, First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approximately 1957.

A closer examination of the cases described in the previous summary as "CIA American tourist agents," reveals there is no conflict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Department. As an example, one of the cases is the case of Edward McGOWAN. 06 NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department.

Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with a CIA officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland, 08,24,14-1 and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. Such an individual would under no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of the Seventh Department, particularly since apparently the individual was even traveling under a diplomatic passport. It is assumed the individual was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely unlikely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance in a case involving an American diplomat.

2|BR

Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate information. During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964.

An example in support of the statement that the previous conclusion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the written notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964. The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews, an effort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explanation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed information concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960 - 1961.

Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as follows:

(a) Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 - 1963 responsible for supervision over these Sections and that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, who supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives. NOSENKO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also expanded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not excluding previous cases or cases which had already been given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included handwritten reports from the Chief or Acting Chief of each Section on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to agent and even including some human errors.

Many of the above cases had previously been transferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about their inclusion support his statement that he had expanded the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have some "pieces of information to give CIA."

(b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned of during the 1962 - 1963 period. Certain of the notes were made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before his defection.

(c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962 - 1963.

(d) Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1961.

(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report prepared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs, including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh

Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a formal document.

The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination of this material suggests that NOSENKO was using extreme care in collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a considerable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his departure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None of the material was registered and all could have previously been destroyed by NOSENKO.

The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to:

(a) The draft report for the briefing of the Collegium which has been mentioned previously.

(b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of submitting in handwriting as the others did.

(c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one. Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usual information as to number of copies typed.

G. NOSENKO HAS NO VALID CLAIM TO CERTAINTY THAT THE KGB RECRUITED NO AMERICAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL BETWEEN 1953 AND HIS DEFECTION IN 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the opinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and 06 Herbert HOWARD who actually was a 29 USIA employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy.

The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any way of the recruitment. This should in no way be interpreted as a suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area.

The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should be examined and can be cited as follows.

0001237

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/BR

(a) During March 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKO was a case officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD. NOSENKO does not claim that he would have known the details concerning any recruitments (other than "ANDREY") in this period, but states if there had been he would have heard "something."

(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department, but continued to have contact with certain officers in the First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United States Embassy during this period he would have heard "something" even though he would probably have learned few details.

(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, and he has made the categorical statement that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United States Embassy personnel during this period of time. He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during 1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of the case or cases. There is merit to this contention by

NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Department since 1953, actually working in the First Section except for the periods of time that he was in the United States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First Department.

(d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain contact with certain officers of the First Section, First Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department.

According to NOSENKO his relationship with GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO some information in regard to any successful recruitments of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed out that he learned of the existence of the [Herbert HOWARD] 06 case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually

1/BR

learned of the name when the First Section, First Department, needed the services of the Seventh Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room in a certain hotel for the Soviet girl friend of 06 HOWARD.

In general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and 06 Herbert HOWARD were the only successful KGB recruitments during 1953 - December 1963. It should be noted that there are no other identified KGB recruitments during this period of time which would specifically refute the opinion of NOSENKO. However, in view of the cited actual basis for the opinion of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being an honest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it is absolute proof that another recruitment could not have occurred. NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, but since NOSENKO was only in the First Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961 his opinion that he would have heard "something" about a recruitment in 1955 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 cannot be accepted as infallible.

2158

SECRET

V. ANNEX

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ANNEX

The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex "B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex "A," Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B," Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition, there is an Annex "C" to this summary which is entitled, "The Cherepanov Papers."

Attachments:
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

ANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT

C001243

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ANNEX B

SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT

Pages 399 - 435 of the previous summary contain summaries on the cases of 49 08 Americans who, according to information from NOSENKO, were of KGB interest, were approached by the KGB, or were actually recruited by the KGB. It was stated that these cases did not clearly relate to the specific KGB positions held at particular times by NOSENKO and thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The sourcing of these cases has been explored in detail during the current interviews with NOSENKO, and it is now possible to establish a certain relationship between these cases and certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB.

It is the conclusion of this summary that any group of 49 08 cases, as well as all other cases concerning which NOSENKO has furnished information, must be fully considered, not necessarily for the importance or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENKO claimed to have learned of the case and whether his statements concerning each identified case are supported by collateral information. These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of information from NOSENKO as well as being supporting evidence of his claimed positions in the KGB.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current interviews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO in approximately 40 of the 49 cases. Of even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has logically sourced his information in all except perhaps four cases. The indicated inability of NOSENKO to completely source all 49 of the cases is not considered significant, particularly since his having knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSENKO for not being able to source all of his information would be unreasonable since it makes no allowance for normal lapses of memory or failure to recall something which was insignificant at the time it occurred.

Without citing in detail any of the 49 cases, the ways in which NOSENKO learned of a number of the cases are considered important since there is a direct relationship to his claimed positions in the KGB during 1960 - January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961; Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, January - July 1962; and as Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, July 1962 - January 1964. Certain examples of the above are as follows:

6/BR

(a) NOSENKO learned of a number of the Seventh Department cases which had occurred in 1960 - 1961, as well as several 1956 - 1959 cases from notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section in 1963. These notes were prepared at the request of NOSENKO who as a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, was responsible for supervision of these three sections; and the request was actually an expansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chief of the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO brought with him in 1964 the notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section and his knowledge of many of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly 1960 - 1961, was limited to information contained in the notes. From these notes, NOSENKO had prepared his report to BOBKOV eliminating those which were not applicable to the request.

(b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 - 1963 cases of the First Section, First Department, from Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department. This information was furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENKO learned of certain of the cases or was furnished additional details as a result of a request from the Seventh Department to the First Section, First Department, for assistance or vice versa.

08

Certain of the 49 cases listed were cases of the Seventh Department prior to 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 when NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. Certain of the cases were cases in which the First Section, First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or 1960 - 1961. The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these two groups of cases does not materially support his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to the Seventh Department prior to 1960 and in 1962 - 1963, and his claimed assignment to the First Department in 1960 - 1961.

08

It is difficult to specifically comment concerning these 49 cases since they do not fall into one or two specific categories. Instead, they constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of the detailed sections of the previous summary. Included are First Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approximately five and one-half years. It should be noted, however, that the

21BR

08

explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of the [49] cases is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department during 1960 - January 1964.

1/BR

ANNEX C - THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ANNEX C

THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

Pages 309 - 316 of the previous summary contain a description of the Cherepanov Papers, and how Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV passed a package of documents to an American tourist in Moscow in early November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, in late 1963.

The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored and must be given specific consideration. If CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception information," the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious question.

NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Department,

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

during 1960 - mid-1961 when he was forced into retirement from the KGB. During the above period of time, NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, although he does not claim to have had a direct supervisory responsibility over CHEREPANOV except in the absence of the Chief of Section, Vladislav KOVSHUK. NOSENKO also claims to have participated in the hunt for CHEREPANOV in December 1963.

Consideration has previously been given to the theory that the Cherepanov Papers were passed to Americans by the KGB through CHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. This theory seems to have little credibility since the papers contain no information which would even support the claim of NOSENKO that he was in the First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The papers also contain no information which would indicate there was even a Deputy Chief of the First Section during 1958 - 1960.

Statements by NOSENKO are emphatic that CHEREPANOV was not under KGB control, that he passed the papers which it later developed he had taken from the First Section prior to his retirement because he was disgruntled with his treatment by the KGB, and that the action by CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.

There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any of the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is nothing in either the form or substance of the papers which provides a basis for suspicion as to their authenticity. In addition, the form and substance of the papers are in keeping with the description by NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Section, First Department.

During current interviews, the CHEREPANOV case has been covered in detail with NOSENKO. The Cherepanov Papers, which were originally shown to NOSENKO in 1964 after his defection, have also been covered in detail on a separate item-by-item basis. Although NOSENKO does not claim to have specifically seen any particular item prior to 1964, his statements in regard to the various handwritings, types of notes, and draft memoranda leave no doubt that NOSENKO was very familiar with personnel in the First Section, First Department, and with First Department procedures.

Certain additional research has been conducted in regard to the papers and a detailed analysis will be prepared at a later date. It should be noted that a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary in making an assessment of the Cherepanov Papers since there are no exemplars with which to compare any of the material. However, based on information developed thus far, and there is no reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is not an adequate basis for an opinion that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive information," or that the papers were other than the collection of material by a disgruntled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulated, the removal of which would only have constituted a minimal risk to CHEREPANOV.

The entire Cherepanov Papers have been reviewed to determine if there is any information which could be considered "deceptive information" either by direct statement or implication. Two possible areas have been noted and given full consideration. These areas are:

(a) There is no specific information that there were any recruitments by the KGB of American personnel in the United States Embassy during 1958 - 1960, nor is there any information suggesting the KGB had an American source or American agent in the Embassy during that period of time.

(b) Petr S. POPOV, a GRU officer who had been an extremely valuable CIA source from 1953 on, was, according to the papers, exposed to the KGB in January 1959 as a result of a letter mailing by George Payne WINTERS, Jr. WINTERS was a CIA employee under 32 [Department of State cover] assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. The letter, which was to POPOV, was obtained by the KGB after mailing by WINTERS and was a direct result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS.

1/BR

In regard to (a), the papers are only a rather minute part of the total papers prepared in the First Section during 1958 - 1960. The lack of any information in these papers which directly or indirectly indicates that the KGB made a recruitment of an American in the Embassy or had an American source in the Embassy during the 1958 - 1960 period is only a matter for consideration. It is not conclusive proof that a recruitment was not made or that an American source did not exist. The papers do not contain a positive statement on either matter.

In regard to (b), the quite specific information in the papers that Petr S. POPOV was uncovered by the KGB as a result of KGB surveillance on George Payne WINTERS, Jr., who mailed a letter to POPOV in January 1959, this information should be considered as possibly information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalled to Moscow from East Germany in November 1958 ostensibly for TDY. The circumstances under which he was recalled and collateral information have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November 1958 POPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had been cooperating with United States Intelligence.

It may be presumed that any lead to the KGB in regard to POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more specifically

CIA, had a source in the GRU would have come from an agent or source of the FCD, KGB, not the SCD. It can also be presumed that a source or agent of the FCD in a position to furnish a lead to a penetration of the GRU by Western Intelligence would be carefully protected even within the KGB. The possibility of course exists that a lead from George BLAKE, an FCD agent, resulted in the exposure of POPOV to the KGB, but it is not established that it did nor is there any reason to believe the FCD could not or did not have another agent or agents who furnished information to the KGB pertinent to development of the case against POPOV.

The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov Papers is whether, even if it is presumed the KGB obtained information from an FCD source or agent which led to suspicion of POPOV or identification of POPOV, this would be incompatible with information in the papers and could only lead to the conclusion that the papers contain "deceptive information."

The conclusion in regard to the above is that the fact the papers attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained information from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV.

If information was received from an important FCD agent such as George BLAKE or through another valuable FCD agent which led to KGB suspicion of POPOV prior to his return to Moscow in November 1958, it is highly unlikely such information would receive wide distribution within the KGB, either in the FCD or the SCD. It is also possible the limited group within the KGB who would be aware that the KGB had received information leading to suspicion of POPOV from a valuable agent would be very interested in attributing the exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPOV by WINTERS. The possibility should be considered that prior to the retrieval by the KGB of the letter to POPOV there was only a deep suspicion of POPOV but that the letter completely solidified the case against POPOV.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist and that it was done by the KGB with the hope of involving CIA in a KGB-controlled operation within the USSR. In that event, the papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likely be genuine since this would have been the initial step in what the KGB hoped would become a successful operation.

The above theory has been rejected since there are a number of factors which militate against it. These factors include the fact that the latest information in the papers was at least three years old, which would indicate CHEREPANOV had no current access and there was no indication CHEREPANOV was interested in a future contact.

SECRET

INDEX

ABIDIAN, John - IV, E, 5, 7-15, 19, 20, 52

"ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) - IV, G, 1-4

ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - III, A, 2

ARTEMOV, Vladimir Lvovich - IV, F, 6, 12, 13

BAKHVALOV, Mikhail - IV, E, 3, 4

BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich - IV, F, 2

06 [BARRETT, Robert] - III, F, 14, 15

06 [BEGGS, Frank] - IV, E, 36, 37

BEL-TSKIY, Boris - IV, F, 6-12

BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich - IV, B, 2, 3, 5-7

06 [BIENSTOCK, Natalie] - IV, F, 3, 4

06 [BIRSE, Arthur] - IV, D, 1, 2

BLAKE, George - IV, D, 9; IV, F, 9; V, C, 6, 7

BOBKOV, Filip Denisovich - IV, F, 15, 16; V, B, 3

BOHLEN, Ambassador - III, F, 10

[redacted]

BOWDEN, Lewis - IV, E, 53, 54

06 [BRAUNS, Horst] - IV, F, 3-6

06 [BROWN, G. Stanley] - IV, E, 43

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

61BR

BUGAYEVA, Ludmila - IV, F, 4

06 [BURGI, Richard] - IV, D, 1

06 [BURTIN, Sipe] - IV, E, 49, 50

06 [BURTIN, Will] - IV, E, 49, 50

CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E, 39, 40, 42

CHELNOKOV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich - IV, F, 2, 16

CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr N. - III, H, 4; V, C, 1-4, 6-8

CHERNETSEV, Y. E. - IV, E, 49

CHURANOV, Vladimir A. - III, B, 4

06 [DAY, Frank] - IV, F, 41, 42

DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, E, 20, 45

DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich - IV, B, 5, 6

DOUGLAS, William O. - IV, D, 3

06 [DREW, George] - IV, D, 1

06 [DWELLY, Robert] - IV, E, 41, 44, 45

FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. - V, A, 1

FEDOROVICH, Tatyana - IV, E, 8, 9

FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M. - IV, E, 49-51; IV, F, 1

06 [FISK, Norman] - IV, D, 5

06 [FRIPPEL, Arsene] - IV, D, 2

06 [GAFFEY, Joseph] - IV, E, 41, 45, 46

9/8R

GARBLER, Paul - IV, E, 52

06 GARCIA, Anthony A. - IV, E, 39

06 GARLAND, John - III, F, 17; IV, E, 31, 33-36

06 GINSBURG, Michael - IV, D, 5, 6

GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich - III, B, 3, 4; III, E, 9-11; III, F, 5-13, 15-19; IV, B, 5, 6; IV, D, 9, 10; IV, E, 21, 23, 31-34; V, A, 1

GRIBANOV, Oleg M. - III, F, 3, 4; IV, 6; IV, 6; IV, E, 4, 5, 21; IV, F, 1, 2

"GRIGORIY" - III, F, 13; IV, D, 3, 6; IV, F, 4

GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - III, B, 4; IV, E, 20

GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. - III, B, 4; III, F, 8-13, 15; IV, E, 5, 12, 19-21, 26-28, 30, 43-45; IV, G, 3; V, B, 3, 4

GUK, Yuriy I. - III, B, 4

HAMILTON, Victor Norris - III, E, 9
(aka: HINDAL, Fouzi Mitri)

"HANNA" - IV, E, 27

06 HARRIS, Gisella - IV, D, 1, 7, 8

HORBALY, William - IV, E, 53

06 HOWARD, Herbert - III, E, 8; III, F, 20; IV, G, 1, 3, 4

IVANOVA, Svetlana - IV, E, 38, 39, 45, 46

06 JENNER, Paul - IV, E, 28-31, 35-36

JOHNSON, Robert Lee - III, E, 8; III, G, 5

06 JOHNSON, Wallace Everett - IV, F, 3, 4

06 JONES, William Carroll - IV, F, 3, 4

8/6R

SECRET

06 [KADERA, Fred] - IV, E, 45

KANTOR, Marvin - IV, D, 5, 6

06 [KARLOV, fnu] - IV, D, 5

KASHPEROV, Mikhail - III, H, 4

KEMMER, Myra - IV, E, 9

06 [KEYSERS, James] - IV, E, 22-26, 55, 56

KLYPIN, Vladimir Alekseyevich - IV, E, 5, 48-51

KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) - IV, B, 1-4, 7

KOLOSSOV, Viktor - IV, E, 30, 34
(Alias used by KOSOLAPOV)

KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V. - III, B, 4; III, F, 8, 16, 17; IV, E, 5, 19-21, 28-32, 34-39, 42-44

KOSYGINA, Madame - III, A, 1

KOVSHUK, Vladislav M. - III, B, 4; III, F, 5, 11, 12; IV, E, 3, 4, 6, 12, 18, 21, 23, 49, 52, 53; IV, F, 1, 2; IV, G, 3; V, C, 2

KOZLOV, Veniamin - IV, E, 12

KRUGLOV, Sergey Nikiforovich - IV, B, 5

06 [LANE, Allen] - IV, D, 1, 2

LANGELLE, Russell - III, F, 3; IV, E, 8

"LILLIAN" - IV, E, 26

06 [LUBIN, George] - IV, E, 49, 50

06 [LUNT, Horace] - III, F, 3

06 [MAHONEY, Eugene] - IV, E, 53

06 [MALIA, Martin] - IV, D, 2

SECRET

8/BR

06
[MARK, David] - III, C, 4

06
[MATLAW, Ralph] - IV, D, 5

06
[MERTENS, Gerard] - IV, D, 2

MIKHAYLOV, A. A. - IV, E, 49

MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen - III, E, 8; III, G, 5

MORELL, William N. - IV, E, 52

06
[MORONE, Joseph] - IV, E, 22, 27, 36, 37, 39, 40, 55

MULE, Walter (Capt.) - IV, C, 4

06
[MC GOWAN, Edward] - IV, F, 13

06 [PECHTER, Bernard] - IV, D, 5, 6

PENKOVSKIY, Oleg Vasilyevich - IV, E, 13

PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich - III, B, 4; IV, E, 48, 49

POPOV, Petr S. - IV, E, 7, 10; V, C/4-7

06 [PREISFREUND, Johan] - III, F, 5, 11, 12

06 [PRESSMAN, Patrick] - IV, D, 5, 7

"RAKETA" - IV, C, 5

RASTVOROV, Yuriy - IV, B, 5, 6

RHODES, Roy - III, F, 4

06 [RUFE, John] - IV, D, 5, 6

06 [SCHWARZENBACH, Collette] - III, F, 10

[redacted]

104BR

SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FNU - IV, E, 32, 33
(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)

[redacted]

06 SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry - III, F, 6

06 SHATTAUER, Sofia - IV, D, 5, 7

SHAZLY, Sarwat el - IV, E, 40

SHELEPIN, Aleksandr Nikolayevich - III, F, 13

"SHMELEV" - III, F, 13; IV, D, 3, 6; IV, F, 4

06 SHUBIN, John - IV, D, 11

SHULGINA, Nataliya - IV, F, 11, 12

SMITH, Dayle Wallis - III, F, 4, 20; IV, G, 1

SMITH, Edward Ellis - III, F, 4

06 SMITH, John Discoe - III, E, 9; IV, E, 49, 50

STALIN - IV, B, 5

06 STEVENS, Edmund - III, F, 4, 6

06 STORSBERG, James - III, F, 3, 5, 11-13; IV, E, 21-24, 26, 43, 55, 56

06 TARASKA, William - IV, D, 5, 6

06 TAYLOR, David - IV, D, 2

06 TAYLOR, John - IV, E, 42, 43

UMANETS, Ella - IV, E, 38

918R

06 [URBAN, (Colonel)] - IV, E, 24, 25

VASSALL, William - III, E, 9; III, G, 5; IV, D, 9

06 [WASHENKO, Steve] - IV, E, 53

06 [WILBY, William Stanley] - IV, D, 2

WINTERS, George Payne, Jr. - IV, E, 53; V, C, 4-7

ZENKIN, FNU - IV, E, 32-34
(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)

06 [ZUJUS, Matthew] - IV, E, 26-28

06 [ZWANG, Maurice] - IV, E, 40-42

TOP SECRET

1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278
281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and
357

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

TOP SECRET

CONTENTS

PAGE

VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964) (Cont.)

Deputy Chief of Seventh Department (July 1962-January 1964) 291
  KGB Operations 292
    Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY 292
    Investigation of SLESINGER 293
    Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN 295
    GRU Agent SHUBIN 296
    Arrest of BARGHOORN 298
    Investigation of OSWALD 303
      Residence in USSR 303
      Request to Return to USSR 305
      Post-Assassination Review of KGB File 307
    The CHEREPANOV Papers 309
      Contents 314
      NOSENKO's Travel Document 315
  Return to Geneva (January-February 1964) 316
    Purpose of Trip 317
    Visits to KGB Legal Residency 318
    Availability for Meetings with CIA 318
    NOSENKO's Written Notes 319
    NOSENKO's Defection 320
    The Recall Telegram 324
  Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations 325
  Operational Activities (July 1962-January 1964) 326
KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists 326
  Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE 327
  KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations 327
  NOSENKO's Information 330
  Summary 331
Summary and Conclusion 331

CONTENTS

PAGE

IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE 335

Relationship with General GRIBANOV 335
Communist Party Status 338
Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures 342
Awards and Decorations 345
Sourcing 349
Ranks 350

X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT 355

XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES 357

Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO 361

Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text 399

Index of Personalities 437

Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in Annex A.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by a jealous naval officer whom he then protected by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, and that he actually did accidently shoot himself. a sensitive source [redacted] quoted [redacted] a KGB officer to the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a naval college in 1942.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued)
After NOSENKO's defection was publicized, Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered to CIA that he had known the son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV. A sensitive source [redacted] is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO served in the RU. According to [redacted], NOSENKO attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU Information Department for about a year before securing a transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports) Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held Reports assignments.

this source

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

A sensitive source [redacted] has quoted two KGB officers [redacted] respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947 or 1949.

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in

FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the FRIPPEL case.)

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter. a sensitive source According to [redacted], FRIPPEL, who is now in New York City, is a current target of the [redacted] Soviet intelligence service,

Johannes PREISFREUND

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961) and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.

Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175) and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.

who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961, but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and 'not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad'. "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow, a sensitive source [redacted] identified him as "an employee of the KGB": and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still "under suspicion", according to [redacted] a sensitive source,

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Yu.I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Resident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A), because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUK was dismissed from the KGB.

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Headquarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.

Comment: A sensitive source [redacted] had reported to the FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer [redacted] "might be trying to develop SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some other agent capacity."

NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether SLESINGER had "ever been bothered by the FBI."

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

Comment: (Continued)
In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case.

KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent [redacted]

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, but from the description he provided he is believed identical with [redacted] a KGB S&T agent [redacted] identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report from [redacted] a sensitive source.

NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN.

Comment: Earlier, a sensitive source [redacted] identified an [redacted] agent apparently identical with SHUBIN and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel to the USSR in summer 1961 and in September 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHEREPANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.

Comment: Other sources, including sensitive sources, [redacted] have also reported various aspects of the CHEREPANOV incident.

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's Information

On 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of 4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived, instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to participate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thenceforth in CIA custody.

Comment: Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's assertion regarding the existence of the recall telegram. According to Special Intelligence, there were enciphered communications from Moscow to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and later, but there was none from 1815 on 3 February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

[redacted]

NOSENKO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram

NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he signed the following statement:

> "On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY, the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held. [redacted]

KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists
1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

Other Sources - 1964 and 1965

As indicated in Annex A, a sensitive source [redacted] reported several items of information he stated he obtained from various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO's defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired because he had been NOSENKO's friend and patron, that GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO's father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief despite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence, and that GRIBANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence", paralyzed the work of [redacted] KGB [redacted]

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?

TOP SECRET

1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

TOP SECRET

Annex A

Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

4 February 1964

NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

6 February 1964

The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February. They speculated privately between themselves that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an automobile accident.

8 February 1964

An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four days.

9 February 1964

Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February 1964

The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

A U.S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted]. Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

Comment: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in Geneva; he asserted that some others, known by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

According to a sensitive source [redacted] NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine.

Comment: NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until 1953, when he entered the KGB.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] several KGB It appeared quite certain to [redacted] officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been a KGB lieutenant colonel.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] from KGB officers [redacted] The photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO. One KGB officer [redacted] worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: [redacted]. The photograph accompanying American and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection was by error not that of NOSENKO but of Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom [redacted] and NOSENKO both identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

a sensitive source

Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working against American citizens.

Comment: Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962 (before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.

11 February 1964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release, and to demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February 1964

S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

(Annex A)

12 February 1964 (continued)

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.

NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.

12-13 February 1964

[redacted]

14 February 1964

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

(Annex A)

14 February 1964 (continued)

"gross provocation by American Intelligence organs". GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

18 February 1964

Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of International Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV, NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TS No. 197124
Copy ______

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate. [redacted] NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books. [redacted] A KGB officer expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. [redacted] a KGB officer [redacted] said that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."

Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB telephone book referred [redacted] to above.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

([redacted])

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] in a response to a question whether NOSENKO actually defected or whether [redacted] the defection might be a KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

22 February 1964

According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the Embassy. [redacted]

Comment: Although NOSENKO knew that there were microphones in three general locations in the Embassy, his specific information regarding the number and location of microphones was limited to that contained in a written list brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he claimed no one in the KGB knew he had. [redacted]

24 February 1964

Women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time, expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his family and country and requesting a personal meeting with him. [redacted]

24 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife and mother on the basis of physical descriptions. On only one previous occasion have members of a defector's family called on a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him.

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] KUROCHKIN (fnu), a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor referred to the name.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

February 1964

Nikolay ARTAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO's defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO in 1944-1946.

Comment: ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved differs from those claimed by NOSENKO.

KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a CIA double agent in Vienna. TULAYEV said that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV later said on another occasion that he had friends who knew NOSENKO well.)

Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied knowing him.

[redacted]

February-March 1964

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source:

[redacted]: A KGB commission was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was very large, formed from different departments of the KGB. The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many details about life of the leaders of the country, in the government...that he knew very much about internal relations between the people working in the KGB, that he had many close friends among them and [spent] days and nights together with them. The whole history of his life was studied step by step very carefully."

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6 March 19[illegible] [redacted]

According to a sensitive [redacted] source, [redacted] (from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers [redacted]: NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms until the January-March 1965 interrogations, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room".

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

23 March 1964

The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

(Annex A)

27 March 1964

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted] certain [redacted]: There seems to be unanimous opinion among [redacted] KGB chiefs [redacted] that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some [redacted] KGB "chiefs" [redacted] that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.

Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB directories described.

31 March 1964

KGB officers I.I. PETUKHOV nad P.P. BORISOV in Canada told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intelligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be prepared for himself and his family. SPRECHER asked whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recently publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it, asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".

(Annex A)

31 March 1964 (continued)

Comment: When PETUKHOV recontacted SPRECHER in February 1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENKO had in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he had had some connection with NOSENKO, and NOSENKO may have known something of what the KGB was doing in Canada.

NOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name was unknown to him, who apparently is identical to SPRECHER.

March 1964

According to a sensitive source who [redacted], was briefed in his office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief Directorate officer of the American Department: Personnel of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served until his defection, were so shocked at the event that they would not mention it at all.

Comment: In this and other contexts a sensitive source [redacted] has stated or implied that NOSENKO served in the American Department in 1963-1964. NOSENKO asserts he left the American Department in January 1962 and served in the Seventh Department until his defection.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

April-May 1964

KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See p 24 for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

May 1964: According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB officers [redacted]): Two commissions have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

(Annex A)

20 May 1964
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.

[redacted]

[redacted]

12 June 1964

Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a profligate with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow to be someone they are well rid of.

22 June 1964
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted]: The consensus among some KGB employees [redacted] is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to

22 June 1964 (continued)

the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

29 June 1964

GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959. When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department. NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during 1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsibilities or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or 1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the Section during this period.

(Annex A)

29 June 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in 1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not identify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied since defection that he has ever met or even seen him.

June 1964

According to a sensitive source [redacted] "Just after" NOSENKO's defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some sixty Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return to Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known [redacted] to [redacted] Source had been discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. According to one rumor, the chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed, would also lose his job.

by a sensitive source

Comment: MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly stationed in New York City, was said by [redacted] to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conducted interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. [redacted] identified MEDVEDEV,

Another sensitive source

(Annex A)

June 1964 (continued)

Comment: (Continued)

[redacted] a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.

29 July 1964

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] (from unnamed sources, presumably KGB officers [redacted] [redacted]): An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK [BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB

(Annex A)

29 July 1964 (continued)

Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.

Comment: NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identified by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO said he had never worked with him at KGB Headquarters since GOLUBEV had always been in the First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the USSR on 28 August 1964.

July-August 1964

According to a sensitive source: [redacted]: The first information [redacted] about NOSENKO was [redacted] from KGB Headquarters which reported the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The letter, which was very brief, said that "the loss was very great and some new forms of work should be created to be efficient in the future". The Legal Residency had not before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's escape".

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

November 1964

Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American acquaintance that they had not been told officially but they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. It was in this way, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance. According to the "grapevine", the defection was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States.

(Annex A)

November 1964 (continued)

Comment: GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements, actions, and unusual freedom of solitary movement while on visits to the United States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he had met with their American counterparts". During that 1964 meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country".

[redacted]

[redacted]

December 1964

a [redacted] source

Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's/roommate in Geneva at the time of his defection, told [redacted] that he had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection, and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK reported to [redacted] the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what RESHETNYAK said, [redacted] thought the KGB might go so far

source
source

(Annex A)

December 1964 (continued)

as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. ([redacted] Source later identified RESHETNYAK as a KGB officer.)

Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation.

29 January 1965

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers [redacted]): It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.

Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV was responsible for sending him to Geneva in 1964, but after retracting his claim that GRIBANOV had played any special role in his assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father and GRIBANOV were acquainted.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, [redacted] the KGB officer on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these. Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the KGB. [redacted] the KGB officer attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified the KGB officer [redacted]. NOSENKO always claimed that he had been a lieutenant colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when he retracted that claim and asserted that he had been only a captain.

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965 (continued)

Comment: GRIBANOV was reported in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat until late autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's defection), when he turned over that contact to another KGB officer.

9 February 1965

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Early June 1965

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from conversations with KGB officers [redacted]: Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing".

(Annex A)

15 July 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted] who attended the Moscow meeting described): A meeting of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second (British) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A. TARABRIN, about three and a half months earlier. I.A. BELOV and other officers also attended the meeting. According to official statements made at the meeting, after the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there. [redacted] described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.

a sensitive source

Comment: NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met GRIBANOV socially only three times during his KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or November 1963 in circumstances similar to those referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source [redacted]): As a result of NOSENKO's defection, many KGB officers were punished, expelled from the Party, and from the KGB. These included KGB Chairman SEROV, and Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and they were "buddies and night buddies".

Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.

Winter 1965-1966 Source, a [redacted] self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962. [redacted] Source said that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations against the American Embassy in Moscow):

NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.

(Annex A)

Winter 1965-1966 (continued)

Source's
Comment: [redacted] allegation is the single report from any source describing NOSENKO as other than a KGB officer.

[redacted]

[redacted]

March 1966

According to a sensitive source,

[redacted] (from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO, who was not personally known to [redacted], was an important boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and "not very good". He was to have been discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion of persons to whom [redacted] talked that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the microphones.

Source

Source

March 1966 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he, like [redacted], called the GRU Military Academy), by choice accepting assignment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in 1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO did attend the school, he could not have served as he claimed in the GRU. [redacted] is the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged NOSENKO served in the GRU.

Source

Source

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

14-00000

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Mid-1966

Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

Comment: KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International Moscow correspondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. KOROLEV has travelled previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik, and to Japan and the United States as a correspondent for Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by an official Soviet press representative of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent.

October 1966

Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors to provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their

(Annex A)

October 1966 (continued)

life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement KOROLEV provided *Paris Match* editors stated: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.: it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident [the defection]. Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family could be obtained and that interviews with them and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a *Paris Match* correspondent.

Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request.

28 January 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from personal knowledge): Referring to his own knowledge of KGB organization, [redacted] said if NOSENKO heard his explanation, he would call [redacted] a child, since NOSENKO knew these matters better than [redacted] because he had served at KGB Headquarters longer.

Source

(Annex A)

February 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow): NOSENKO worked only in KU Information Department of the GRU, and only for about five or six months, after which he went to the KGB.

May 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted] The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.

According to a sensitive source [redacted]: When NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked only in the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went to the KGB.

5 June 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted]: There had been some KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of SHAKHOV.

Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

OF CONTENTS, ERRATA SHEET
III IV PGS 1-84

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO: (835 PAGE STUDY · (VOL. I): PAGES 1-84 (PARTS I, II, III & IV)

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: SE

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: ONGOING OPERATIONS MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
11 MAY 1978		KEN KLEIN	
11 May [illegible]		[illegible]	
5 Sept 78		Johanna Smith	Johanna Smith

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

TOP SECRET

The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

February 1967

TOP SECRET

The Bona Fides of NOSENKO

Page

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 3

  A. Introduction 3

  B. First Geneva Phase (June 1962) 3

  C. Second Geneva Phase (January-February 1964) 4

  D. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964 to Present) 4

III. OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 8

  A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Geneva 8

  B. Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva 11

    1. TDY in 1962 11

    2. The 1964 TDY 15

  C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO 16

    1. Introduction 16

    2. Collaboration in 1962 16

      a. Readiness to Report to CIA 16

      b. Attitude Toward Defection 20

      c. Motivation 20

    3. Decision to Defect (January 1964) 22

    4. The Letter of July 1964 24

  D. Pattern of Activity in Geneva 30

    1. Introduction 30

    2. Official Duties in Geneva 30

    3. Visits to the KGB Legal Residency 30

    4. Association with TSYMBAL 31

    5. Association with Other Soviets 32

    6. Availability for Meetings with CIA 33

  E. Timing of Defection 34

  F. The Recall Telegram 38

TOP SECRET

Page

G. Soviet Official Reactions 40

H.. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family 42

I. Repercussions Within the KGB 44

  1. [redacted] SENSITIVE SOURCE 44

  2. [redacted] SENSITIVE SOURCE 46

  3. [redacted] SOURCE 46

  4. KGB Handlers of Agents 47

IV. NON-KGB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO's LIFE 48

A. Introduction 48

B. NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography 48

C. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB 79

  1. Family Life 79

  2. Venereal Disease 80

  3. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs 81

  4. Statements to Others by NOSENKO 82

D. Soviets' Statements About NOSENKO 83 - 84

V. NOSENKO's KGB CAREER 85

A. Introduction 85

B. Entry into the KGB 86

  1. Date of Entry 86

  2. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry 89

C. To June 1955 (American Department) 93

  1. Introduction 93

  2. Operations Against Correspondents 93

    a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY, and WHITNEY 93

    b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents 94

    c. Information from Other Sources 95

  3. Operations Against Military Attache Personnel 96

    a. Agents Reporting on Military Attaches 98

Page

b. NOSENKO's Targets 99
    (i) MICKELSON 100
    (ii) MEARNS 100
    (iii) RICHARDS 100
    (iv) FELCHLIN 101
    (v) BENSON 103
    (vi) STROUD 103
    (vii) MULE 104
    (viii) PNG of BENSON, STROUD and MULE 104
    (ix) CARDELLA 106
    (x) VAN LAETHEM 106

D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department) 107
  1. Introduction 107
  2. Soviet Homosexual Agents 107
  3. Other Soviet Agents 109
  4. Operations with Foreign Visitors 112
    a. Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955) 112
    b. Recruitment of BURGI (1956) 113
    c. Approach to [redacted] (1957) 120
    d. Contact with [redacted] and [redacted] (1957) 121
    e. Recruitment of [redacted] (1957) 121
    f. Recruitment of HARRIS (1958) 122
    g. Compromise of KRAFT (1958) 123
    h. Recruitment of DREW (1959) 123
    i. Recruitment of [redacted] (1959) 124
    j. Recruitment of [redacted] (1959) 124
    k. Recruitment of [redacted] (1959) 124
    l. Recruitment of [redacted] (1959) 125
    m. Compromise of BARRETT (1959) 126
    n. Compromise of WILLERFORD (1959) 127

Page

5. The FRIPPEL Case (1959-63) 129
    a. NOSENKO's Information 129
    b. FRIPPEL's Information 133
6. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963) 136
    a. Statements to the FBI 137
    b. Statements to CIA 141
        (i) KGB Interest in OSWALD 141
        (ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD 142
        (iii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure from the USSR 142
        (iv) OSWALD's Visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico 143
        (v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible KGB Involvement in the Assassination 144
7. Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge of Tourist Operations 145
    a. Information from NOSENKO 145
    b. KGB Knowledge from George BLAKE 146
    c. GOLITSYN's Tourist Document 147
8. TDY's to London (1957 and 1958) 150

E. January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department) 152
1. Introduction 152
2. NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy Section 153
3. Duties and Knowledgeability 157
    a. Introduction 157
    b. Functions as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of Section 158
        (i) Access 158
        (ii) Duties 159
        (iii) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's Absence 163

Page

c. Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations 164
    (i) Introduction 164
    (ii) Approach to STORSBERG 166
        (a) NOSENKO's Information 168
        (b) Information from STORSBERG 177
        (c) Information from PREISFREUND 179
        (d) Information from GOLITSYN 182
        (e) Information from Other Sources 184
    (iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk Cases 186
        (a) Introduction 186
        (b) False Identity for Travel 186
        (c) The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER Case) 187
        (d) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND Case) 196
    (iv) KGB-Polish UB Activities Against MORONE 201
        (a) Introduction 201
        (b) NOSENKO's Information 201
        (c) Information from Other Sources 206
    (v) Developmental Operation Against ZUJUS 209
        (a) Introduction 209
        (b) Information from NOSENKO 209
        (c) Information from Other Sources 211
    (vi) Approach to KEYSERS 213
        (a) Introduction 213
        (b) Information from NOSENKO 213
        (c) Information from Other Sources 216

d. NOSENKO's Responsibilities for Coverage of ABIDIAN 220
    (i) Introduction 220

Page

    (ii) Duties as Case Officer 220
    (iii) ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings 227
    (iv) ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Dead Drop 231
  e. Supervisor of Activities Against American Service Attaches 236
  f. Knowledge of the Target 240
    (i) Introduction 240
    (ii) Physical Premises 240
    (iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy Cover 242
  g. Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Embassy 248
    (i) Introduction 248
    (ii) Microphones in the Chancery 248
      (a) NOSENKO's Sources 249
      (b) Number and Locations of Microphones 252
      (c) Receptivity and Audibility of Microphones 257
      (d) Amount, Type, and Value of Production 260
    (iii) Microphones in the North Wing 267
    (iv) Monitoring/Jamming Beam 270
  h. Handler of KGB Agents 272
4. Overseas Assignments 274
  a. Attempt to Obtain Assignment to Ethiopia (1960) 274
  b. U.S. Visa Application (1960) 274
  c. The Cuba TDY (1960) 276
  d. The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case 279
5. Transfer to the Tourist Department 284
F. January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department) 285
1. Date of Transfer 285
2. Functions and Activities 285

Page

3. NOSENKO's Agents 287
    a. Arsene FRIPPEL 287
    b. Johan PREISFREUND 288
    c. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV 288
    d. [redacted] 288
    e. Marina RYTOVA 289
4. Approach to W. E. JOHNSON 289
    a. NOSENKO's Information 289
    b. Information from JOHNSON 292
5. Attempt to Recruit BRAUNS 293
    a. Information from NOSENKO 293
    b. Information from BRAUNS 294
6. The SVENCHANSKIY Case 295
    a. Information from NOSENKO 295
    b. Information from Other Sources 296
7. KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent [redacted] 298
    a. Information from NOSENKO 298
    b. Information from Other Sources Concerning KOTEN 300
    c. SENSITIVE SOURCE [redacted] Reporting on [redacted] 302
8. Arrest of BARGHOORN 304
    a. Information from NOSENKO 304
    b. Information from BARGHOORN 308
9. GRU Agent: John Andrew SHUBIN 310
    a. Introduction 310
    b. NOSENKO's Information 310
    c. Information from [redacted] Sensitive Source 311
    d. Information from Other Sources 312
10. BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis 313
    a. Introduction 313

Page

b. Soviet Sources During the Crisis 315
c. NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV 316
d. Information from [redacted] Sensitive Source 318
G. NOSENKO's KGB Promotions and Awards 319
1. Rank 319
2. Awards and Decorations 322
H. NOSENKO's Relationship with GRIBANOV 327
1. Information from NOSENKO 327
a. Summary 327
b. Details 327
2. Information from [redacted] SENSITIVE SOURCE 336
I. Confirmation from Other Sources 338
1. Introduction 338
2. [redacted] SENSITIVE SOURCE 338
3. [redacted] sensitive source 340
4. [redacted] sensitive source 341
5. [redacted] Source 342
6. GAMKRELIDZE 342
7. GOLITSYN 343
8. [redacted] Source 345
9. Case Officer for Robert Lee JOHNSON 347
10. Case Officer for [redacted] 347
11. Soviet Journalist KOROLEV 347
VI. PRODUCTION 349
A. Positive Intelligence Information 349
B. Soviet Intelligence Personalities 350
C. KGB Headquarters 352
1. Structure and Functions 352
2. Modus Operandi 359
3. Staff Procedures 360

Page

D. KGB Activities 361
- 1. Operations Against Americans 361
- 2. Tabulation of American Leads 363
  - a. Successful Recruitment Approaches 363
  - b. Development Operations 379
  - c. Unsuccessful Approaches 398
  - d. Investigations 402
- 3. Selected Cases of Recruited Americans 411
  - a. "SASHA" 411
    - (i) NOSENKO's Information on the Agent 411
    - (ii) NOSENKO's Sourcing 412
    - (iii) GOLITSYN's Lead to "SASHA" 412b
  - b. "ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH) 413
    - (i) Introduction 413
    - (ii) NOSENKO's Information - 1962 413
    - (iii) NOSENKO's Information - 1964 416
    - (iv) NOSENKO's Sourcing 419
    - (v) Results of Investigations 419
  - c. KGB Agent in Paris (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON) 427
    - (i) Introduction 427
    - (ii) The Lead from NOSENKO 428
    - (iii) NOSENKO's Sourcing 433
    - (iv) JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH 436
    - (v) Information from Other Sources 437
      - (a) JOHNSON's Statements 440
      - (b) MINTKENBAUGH's Statements 450
      - (c) Hedwig JOHNSON's Statements 457
      - (d) Mental Condition of Hedwig JOHNSON 459
      - (e) Soviet Concern about Mrs. JOHNSON's Illness 460

Page

- (vi) Damage by JOHNSON to U.S. Interests 461
- 4. Unsuccessful Approaches to U.S. Citizens 463
  - a. The HARMSTONE Case 463
    - (i) Introduction 463
    - (ii) Information from NOSENKO 464
    - (iii) Information from Other Sources 465
  - b. Edward Ellis SMITH 468
    - (i) Information from NOSENKO 468
    - (ii) Information from GOLITSYN 463
    - (iii) Information from SMITH 469
  - c. The BINDER Case 470
    - (i) Information from NOSENKO 470
    - (ii) Information from BINDER 470
- 5. Operations Involving Other Westerners 474
  - a. Tabulation 474
    - (i) Introduction 474
    - (ii) Agent Leads 475
      - (a) Afghanistan (1) 475
      - (b) Argentina (2) 475
      - (c) Australia (1) 476
      - (d) Austria (3) 476
      - (e) Belgium (6) 477
      - (f) Brazil (2) 479
      - (g) Canada (5) 479
      - (h) Egypt (1) 481
      - (i) Finland (9) 481
      - (j) France (9) 483
      - (k) Germany (9) 486
      - (l) Greece (1) 487

Page

(m) India (2) 488
(n) Indonesia (1) 488
(o) Iran (1) 488
(p) Israel (2) 489
(q) Italy (6) 490
(r) Japan (8) 491
(s) Mexico (2) 493
(t) The Netherlands (2) 494
(u) Norway (1) 494
(v) Peru (1) 495
(w) Sweden (3) 495
(x) Switzerland (2) 496
(y) Tunisia (1) 496
(z) United Kingdom (7) 496
(aa) Uruguay (1) 498
(bb) Venezuela (1) 498
(iii) Investigations and Development Cases 499
b. The VASSALL Case 503
(i) Information from NOSENKO 503
(ii) Information from GOLITSYN 505
(iii) Information from VASSALL 507
c. The Illegal [redacted] 509
(i) Introduction 509
(ii) Information from NOSENKO 510
(iii) Activities in Germany 510
(iv) Operation in Canada 512
6. The BELITSKIY Operation 517
a. Introduction 517
b. Information from NOSENKO 517
(i) Statements in 1962 517

Page

    (ii) Statements in 1964 520
    (iii) BELITSKIY Photograph 521
  c. Information from Other Sources 522
7. KGB Investigations 530
  a. Compromise of POPOV 530
    (i) Introduction 530
    (ii) CIA Operation with POPOV 530
    (iii) Cause and Date of Compromise 532
      (a) Information from NOSENKO 532
      (b) Information from [redacted] SENSITIVE SOURCE 532
      (c) Infromation from the CHEREPANOV Papers 533
      (d) Information from GOLITSYN 533
  b. Compromise of PENKOVSKIY 535
    (i) Introduction 535
    (ii) Resume of the PENKOVSKIY Case 535
    (iii) Statements by NOSENKO 536
      (a) [redacted] 536
      (b) Reports on the Compromise 538
    (iv) Information from [redacted] SENSITIVE 544 SOURCE
    (v) Information from [redacted] SENSITIVE 544 SOURCE
    (vi) Information from [redacted] 545 Source
    (vii) Information from [redacted] SOURCE 545
    (viii) Information from [redacted] 546
    (ix) Information from Official KGB Report 546
    (x) Information from WYNNE 546
  c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV 548
    (i) Introduction 548
    (ii) Earlier Information on CHEREPANOV 548
    (iii) Reports by Americans 553

Page

(iv) Information from NOSENKO 554

(v) Information from [redacted] SOURCE 557

(vi) Information from [redacted] sensitive [redacted] source 559 source

(vii) Information from [redacted] 561

(viii) Information from [redacted] sensitive 561 source

(ix) Contents of CHEREPANOV Package 561

(x) NOSENKO's Comments on the CHEREPANOV Papers 565

d. Reports on KAZAN-KOMAREK 569

(i) Introduction 569

(ii) Statement by NOSENKO 569

(iii) Statement by [redacted] 569

e. Alfred SLESINGER: Suspected Source of the FBI 571

(i) Introduction 571

(ii) NOSENKO's Information 571

(iii) SENSITIVE SOURCE [redacted] Information 572

(iv) SLESINGER's Information 573

8. Technical Penetrations of the West German Embassy 574

a. Introduction 574

b. Information from NOSENKO 576

c. The [redacted] 578

d. Evidence of Technical Penetration 580

9. Cryptologic Successes Against the U.S. Embassy 583

a. Introduction 583

b. Information from NOSENKO 585

(i) Breaking U.S. Ciphers 585

(ii) Handling Deciphered Cables 587

(iii) Methods of Cryptologic Attack 588

c. U.S. Evaluations 591

(i) NSA Report 591

Page

(ii) USIB Security Committee Report 593

E. NOSENKO and GOLITSYN 594

1. Introduction 594

2. Background Information on GOLITSYN 594

3. GOLITSYN Leads and Information from NOSENKO 595

a. Microphones in the U.S. Embassy 595

b. Other Leads Corroborated by NOSENKO 595

c. Leads Conflicting with NOSENKO Reports 597

d. Leads to Operations Against U.S. Embassy Not Covered by NOSENKO 597

4. NOSENKO's Information on GOLITSYN 599

F. Surveillance of Soviets in the United States 600

1. Information from NOSENKO 600

2. Information from Other Sources 601

a. GOLITSYN 601

b. [redacted] sensitive source 602

c. CHEREPANOV Document 602

VII. SPECIALISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF NOSENKO 603

A. Opinions on Intelligence and Personality 603

1. Graphological Analysis 603

2. Reports by Psychologist 605

a. Psychological Testing Results 605

b. Alternative Psychological Explanations 609

c. Psychological Interrogation 611

3. Report by Psychiatrist 613

B. Views of Intelligence Personnel 615

1. Statement by DERYABIN 615

a. Introduction 615

b. DERYABIN's Comments 616

2. Remarks by CIA Handlers 625

a. Introduction 625

Page

b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings 626

c. NOSENKO's Behavior Under Interrogation 627

(i) Introduction 627

(ii) Manner of Recounting Events 627

(iii) Evasion, Improvisation, and Other Defenses 628

d. Additional Observations 630

(i) Inquisitiveness about CIA 630

(ii) Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other Sources 631

e. Discussions with NOSENKO about his own Performance 631

C. Polygraph Testing 632

1. Test in April 1964 632

2. Test in October 1966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD 638

a. Introduction 638

b. Results 638

VIII. NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 642

A. Introduction 642

B. Evaluation of Production 643

1. Introduction 643
2. KGB Organization, Personalities, Methods 644
3. Operational Leads 645
    a. Introduction 645
    b. Operations Involving Americans 646
        (i) Completeness, Accurary, Detail and Consistency of Reporting 647
        (ii) Damage to the Soviets 650
        (iii) Importance or Usefulness 652
    c. Operations Involving Other Westerners 654
        (i) Introduction 654
        (ii) Discussion 654
4. Technical Operations Against the U.S. Embassy 657
    a. Introduction 657
    b. Discussion 657
    c. Remarks 659
5. The BELITSKIY Case 660
    a. Introduction 660
    b. Discussion 660
    c. Remarks 661
6. KGB Investigations 663
    a. Compromise of POPOV 663
        (i) Introduction 663
        (ii) Discussion 663
        (iii) Remarks 665
    b. Compromise of PENKOVSKIY 666
        (i) Introduction 666
        (ii) Discussion 666
        (iii) Remarks 669
    c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV 570
        (i) Introduction 670
        (ii) The Operational Plan in Draft 670
        (iii) The Summary on LANGELLE 672
        (iv) Remarks 674

C. Evaluation of Sourcing 675
  1. Introduction 675
  2. Discussion 675
  3. Remarks 677

D. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career 678
  1. Introduction 678
  2. Naval GRU Service 679
    a. Introduction 679
    b. Discussion 679
    c. Remarks 681
  3. Entry into the KGB 683
    a. Eligibility 683
    b. Date of Entry 683
    c. Circumstances of Entry 684
    d. Remarks 685
  4. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section 686
    a. Introduction 686
    b. Work Against American Correspondents 686
    c. Work Against Army Attaches 686
    d. Additional Reporting 690
    e. Remarks 690
  5. Tourist Department (June 1955 to January 1960) 692
    a. Introduction 692
    b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958) 692
      (i) General 692
      (ii) The BURGI Case 693
    c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section 695
    d. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent Personnel 695
    e. Knowledge of Section's Activities 695
      (i) BLAKE 695
      (ii) GOLITSYN Document 696
      (iii) Tourist Agents 696
    f. NOSENKO's Tourist Paper 697
    g. The OSWALD Case 697

h. NOSENKO's Operational Activities (1958-1959) 698

  (i) General 698

  (ii) The Homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV 698

  (iii) Homosexual Entrapment Operations 699

  (iv) The Agent FRIPPEL 700

i. Remarks 702

6. U.S. Embassy Section (1960-1961) 705

a. Introduction 705

b. Entry into the Section 705

c. Functions as Deputy Chief 706

d. Knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief 707

e. Knowledgeability of U.S. Embassy Physical Security 709

f. Knowledgeability about American Intelligence Personnel 709

g. Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Operations 709

  (i) The STORSBERG Case 711

  (ii) The JENNER Case 713

  (iii) The GARLAND Case 714

  (iv) The MORONE Case 715

  (v) The KEYSERS Case 717

  (vi) Other Code Clerk Cases 718

h. Responsibility for and Knowledge of ABIDIAN 720

i. Reporting on ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin Street Dead Drop 722

j. Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache Operations 725

k. TDY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case 726

  The U.S. Visa and the Cuba TDY 727

l. Personal Handling of Agents 729

  (i) YEFREMOV and VOLKOV 729

  (ii) FRIPPEL 729

  (iii) DMITRIYEV 729

  (iv) RYTOVA 729

  (v) LEVINA 729

  (vi) Johan PREISFREUND 730

  (vii) [redacted]

m. Transfer to the Tourist Department 731

7. Tourist Department (1962-1964) 73

    a. Introduction 733

    b. Absences from Moscow 733

    c. Personal Participation in Operations 734

        (i) The W.E. JOHNSON Provocation 734

        (ii) The BARGHOORN Provocation-Arrest 735

        (iii) The Approach to BRAUNS 736

        (iv) The Arrest of KOTEN 737

    d. Agents Handled by NOSENKO 738

        (i) FRIPPEL 739

        (ii) SVENCHANSKIY 739

    e. The OSWALD Investigation 740

    f. The CHEREPANOV Investigation 740

    g. Remarks 741

E. Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography 742

1. KGB Awards and Ranks 742

    a. Awards 742

    b. Ranks 742

    c. Remarks 743

2. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs 744

    a. Introduction 744

    b. Discussion 744

    c. Remarks 744

3. Schooling 746

    a. Introduction 746

    b. Discussion 746

    c. Remarks 748

F. Appraisals of NOSENKO, His Motivation, and Other Operational Circumstances 749

1. Introduction 749

2. NOSENKO 749

3. Motivation 750

4. Operational Circumstances 751

    a. Presence in Geneva (1962) 751

    b. Presence in Geneva (1964) 751

c. Access to KGB Residency and Availability to CIA

d. Timing of 1962 Contact 752

e. Willingness to Meet CIA 753

f. The Recall Telegram 753

g. Remarks 753

G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO 756

1. Introduction 756

2. Corroboration of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career 756

3. Remarks 757

H. Alternative Explanations 759

1. Introduction 759

2. First Alternative 759

a. Faulty Memory 759

b. Selective Memory 759

c. Embellishment 761

d. Combination of Above 762

e. Insanity 763

3. Second Alternative 763

4. Third Alternative 763

5. Remarks 764

I. Summary of Conclusions 765

ILLUSTRATIONS

Photograph of NOSENKO and his father, the Minister of Shipbuilding Facing Page 11
Photograph of NOSENKO and NOSENKO's Family Facing Page 43
Finnish Travel Manifests: March-April 1960 Facing Page 194
Finnish Travel Manifest: November 1960 Facing Page 197
TDY Authorization Facing Page 319
Translation of TDY Authorization Facing Page 320

TOP SECRET

I. INTRODUCTION

This review presents the facts and observations which bear on the *bona fides* of the Soviet defector Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

The highlights of NOSENKO's biography, as he has given it to CIA, are as follows: He was born 30 October 1927, the first son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, shipyard worker who in 1939 was to become Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. After graduating in 1951 from the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, where he specialized in international law and the English language, NOSENKO entered the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet Navy, serving first as a translator assigned to the intelligence staff of the Seventh (Far Eastern) Fleet and then as a senior translator and political officer at an intelligence unit of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. In mid-March 1953, immediately following STALIN's death, NOSENKO left the Naval GRU to become a junior case officer in the KGB. He was assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from 1953 to mid-1955. During this period he was initially responsible for operational activity surrounding American journalists in Moscow and later for operations against U.S. Army Attaches at the Embassy. When transferred to the newly organized Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1955, NOSENKO had as his targets visitors to the Soviet Union from the United States and the countries of the British Commonwealth. Having handled a number of successful tourist operations, NOSENKO in 1958 was promoted to Deputy Chief of the section responsible for operations against American, British, and Canadian nationals. Eighteen months later NOSENKO returned to the U.S. Embassy Section as its Deputy Chief. Between January 1960 and January 1962 he was second-in-charge of all KGB activities against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and personally supervised operations against the Embassy Security Officer, the Second Chief Directorate's most important counterintelligence target at the time, and against American code clerks, collectively the Directorate's most important recruitment targets. At the ~~end of~~ December 1961 NOSENKO again was transferred to the Tourist Department, this time as Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section. Six months later he was made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, and in mid-1963 he became its First Deputy Chief.

From the time he first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO's status has been under examination. Only now, three years following his defection in February 1964, is a definitive study of the *bona fides* question possible: the voluminous and diverse reports by NOSENKO, coupled with collateral information, required that much time for assimilation, correlation, investigation, and evaluation. NOSENKO's own testimony, interspersed with representative subsidiary cases stemming from or related to his reports, constitutes a large part of the evidence. This review also draws upon statements and actions by other Soviets, collations with materials from other sources, and opinions by specialists of various kinds. These factual elements are presented without comment or interpretation, except in the penultimate section of the review where the evidence on the *bona fides* of NOSENKO is evaluated and analyzed.

TOP SECRET

This review is presented in the following format:

Part II: A summary of developments in the NOSENKO case from 1962 to the present, including his clandestine meetings with CIA, his defection, and the subsequent debriefings and interrogations.

Part III: A discussion of the operational circumstances of NOSENKO's 1962 contact with CIA and his defection two years later. Included is discussion of CIA's information concerning NOSENKO prior to his first contact in Geneva, NOSENKO's explanation of the reasons for his presence in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, NOSENKO's motivations first for establishing clandestine contact with American Intelligence and later for defecting to the United States, NOSENKO's pattern of activity in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, and the reactions of the Soviets, both official and unofficial, to the defection.

Part IV: The non-KGB aspects of NOSENKO's life, both before and after he joined Soviet State Security Service, as he described them and as others have reported them.

Part V: The positions and responsibilities of NOSENKO in the KGB, the operations with which he was associated, his travels abroad, the awards and promotions which he received, and other Soviet sources' statements on these points.

Part VI: NOSENKO's production, especially in counterintelligence matters not discussed in the preceding section. Key cases are discussed in detail and other leads are summarized.

Part VII: Specialists' assessments of NOSENKO: by the CIA graphologist who studied his handwriting; by the CIA psychologist and psychiatrist who examined him; by the former KGB officer Peter DERYABIN; by the CIA case officers who handled him; and by the CIA polygraph operator who tested him.

Part VIII: Interpretation of the evidence and conclusions about the bona fides of NOSENKO.

Part IX: The implications of the conclusions in Part VIII for certain other sources.

There are several sources currently or formerly associated with the Soviet Intelligence services who are repeatedly referred to in this review. They include the following:

- Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who defected in Helsinki to U.S. authorities on 15 December 1961.

sensitive source

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

sensitive source

[redacted]

- Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a KGB officer whose case is reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.

[redacted]

[redacted]

source

- [redacted] former [redacted] agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. [redacted]

All pertinent material received by CIA prior to 15 January 1967 has been taken into account in this review of NOSENKO's bona fides.

TOP SECRET

II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Introduction

From the CIA side, the NOSENKO case can be divided into three periods: the first Geneva phase of June 1962, the second Geneva phase of January-February 1964, and the post-defection handling of NOSENKO from February 1964 to date. The rest of Part II is separated into these three periods accordingly.

B. First Geneva Phase (June 1962)

The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Disarmament Conference. A then-unidentified Soviet, known to him by sight from conference meetings, approached U.S. Foreign Service Officer David MARK with the suggestion that they get together for a talk the following day. In the late afternoon of 6 June, the same Soviet motioned MARK aside and said that he would like to talk to him privately as soon as possible. He told MARK that he was "not going to pump him for information, but simply wanted to tell him some things." A luncheon meeting was arranged for 9 June, although the Soviet clearly preferred an earlier date. MARK advised CIA of the appointment, explaining that he thought the approach so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection. He said he believed the Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet delegation to the arms talks.

At the 9 June luncheon with MARK, NOSENKO told MARK that he, NOSENKO, was a KGB counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that MARK had previously served in Moscow and believed he was connected with American Intelligence.* He needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva, and he offered for this amount to sell two pieces of information to American Intelligence. The first of these was the identity of a former U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent and, as of 1962, was "near ciphers" in the Washington area; the second was the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually planted on American Intelligence. Although NOSENKO at first told MARK that he would stop at the sale of these two items, he later stated: "I know you won't let me alone now." At another point NOSENKO said: "I will not work in Moscow, but I come out about once a year." NOSENKO also gave MARK a brief chronological account of his personal and professional past. MARK explained that although he was not an intelligence officer, he could place NOSENKO in contact with the Intelligence Chief in Geneva later that same day.

MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer at 2000 hours that evening, and a three-hour meeting followed at a CIA safehouse in Geneva. Describing himself as a KGB Major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA officer of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell two items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he said also that he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized, nevertheless, that he had no intention of becoming an American agent--this was to be a one-time transaction, and after that he would have no further contact with CIA.

---

* Another Soviet source, [redacted] has also reported that the KGB suspected MARK to be an American Intelligence officer; although he has never served in CIA, MARK did engage in a number of operational support activities on behalf of CIA while stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Despite this original reticence, NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic information on himself and also discussed in general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had told MARK earlier in the day, that CIA would want more information than the two items which he originally offered, and he agreed to meet again two days later.

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva in June 1962, always in the same safehouse. With the second meeting on 11 June, his initial reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most of his information being concerned with the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for counterintelligence and security within the USSR. NOSENKO seemed to be what he claimed to be: a KGB officer in a sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations.

NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to do everything within the limits imposed by personal security considerations to collect information of interest; the areas of CIA interest had been outlined to him. The only restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be made in correspondence to Moscow. He promised to notify CIA, via an address he was given, when he came to the West again.

C. Second Geneva Phase (January-February 1964)

NOSENKO accompanied the Soviet delegation to a later session of the Disarmament Conference (one having gone by in the interim without his participation), arriving in Geneva on 19 January 1964. The next day he sent a cable to his CIA accommodation address announcing his presence. At the first of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United States citing as reasons his continuing disaffection with the Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would not have further opportunities to travel to the West in the foreseeable future. Although he implied that he wanted to defect as soon as possible, he agreed to remain in place in Geneva for at least two or three weeks while arrangements for his reception were being made in Washington. NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB operational activity collected in the 18 months since his last meeting with CIA. Twelve more meetings were held in a Geneva safehouse over the next twelve days, varying in length from one and a half to six hours.

D. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964-Present)

On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively selected for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that a cable had been received from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate return to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to the Soviet Union.* Exfiltration plans were then implemented, and NOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany that same night. Debriefings resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The decision was reached on 11 February to bring NOSENKO to the United States, and in the early evening of 12 February he and his CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft, thence to a safehouse in the Washington area.

At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO met on 14 February with representatives of their respective Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and rights as a citizen of the USSR.

CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 February, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of the FBI for questioning. At about the same time, there was a marked decline in NOSENKO's discipline: He became evasive and uncooperative, refusing to answer some of the questions of his debriefers, both CIA and FBI; his nightlife in Washington and nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior, and disputes with his security escort. He explained these actions by saying that he was under great tension as a result of his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the disgrace that he had brought to his family name. It was against this background that CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vacation. On 12 March, therefore, NOSENKO left Washington with a CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week vacation in Hawaii. There his behavior deterioriated still further: He drank heavily and almost constantly; he engaged in sexual acts with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude in public places; and he spent money extravagently ($800 on one prostitute) and conspicuously (a $100 bill for a restaurant tip).

During NOSENKO's absence, consultations were held with the FBI concerning steps to be taken to restrict his movements and activities. Both agencies feared that his behavior would bring about unwanted attention and publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were becoming known to a widening group of people in the U.S. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The FBI on 1 April said it would "not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement. The Acting Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House were also notified of the CIA plan at this time.

In the morning of 4 April NOSENKO was driven to another safehouse in a Washington suburb, ostensibly only for a polygraph examination. At the safehouse NOSENKO was given a routine polygraph examination, lasting over three hours; he

---

* See Parts III E and III F for further discussions of this cable.

"reacted significantly" to questions concerning his intentions in defecting to the United States and other related matters.* He was then told that he would remain at this safehouse, which thenceforward was his regular place of residence. Since this time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to news media.

Detailed interrogation of NOSENKO was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to give in debriefings, and to clarify contradictions in what he had already reported. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964.

Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicit and explicit doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO proved himself willing to answer, or to try to answer, questions put to him. Because much more information pertinent to the question of his bona fides had to be obtained, a new phase of interrogation was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964.

After further consultations with the FBI, a new round of hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. NOSENKO was questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interrogators and by interrogation teams consisting of two or three men, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous reports. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had been basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States solely for the reasons he had originally given. This interrogation was broken off on 5 March 1965.

Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964 and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from January 1960 to January 1962. Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were the comparatively large amount of collateral information available against which NOSENKO's statements could be checked; the importance of the U.S. Embassy and its personnel as the outstanding KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from the standpoint of American security; and the extent of NOSENKO's knowledge about the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section, in his capacity as its Deputy Chief.

In keeping with Soviet practice, CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-called "protocols," most of which concern the period of his claimed service in the American Department. These were written by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to incorporate

---

* See Part VII.C. for a further discussion of the polygraph tests.

NOSENKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific subjects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom to indicate that he understood and agreed with its contents; he was allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any questions and make any changes that he wished. (Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were initialed by NOSENKO.) NOSENKO was asked, after reading each page and after completing the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there and whether there were any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to sign and date the statement, "I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct," at the end of the final page. With one exception, which will be noted later, he did so calmly and without objections, although on one or two of them he remarked that his statements were presented in such a manner as to make them look foolish; although invited to do so, he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presentation which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct. Anytning I have signed is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing when I am signing any paper. This is an official document, and I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being absolutely correct."

In May 1965 a CIA psychologist questioned NOSENKO in detail on his life from birth until 1953, when he said he entered the KGB, in an attempt to gain additional insights into his character and personality.

Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 1~~4~~3 August 1965 with the participation of Peter DERYABIN, a former KGB officer. These interrogations, the first to be held in Russian, were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's first-hand experience in the KGB to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's personal and professional background.

There were no further debriefings or interrogations until 18 October 1966. On this date NOSENKO was polygraphed on the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB operations. Questioning was in both Russian and English.

III. OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Geneva

NOSENKO's name first came to the attention of CIA in October 1960 when he applied at the American Embassy in Moscow for a visa to enter the United States as a member of an automotive delegation. The following month CIA obtained copies of his passport photograph at two separate points on his TDY route to Cuba. There was no indication of intelligence affiliation, and when NOSENKO arrived under true name with the Soviet delegation in Geneva in March 1962, he was accorded no more than the interest routinely given by Western intelligence services to Soviets travelling abroad.* After arriving in Switzerland, however, but before establishing contact with CIA, NOSENKO was involved in at least two incidents which brought him to the special notice of the British, Swiss, American, and possibly the West German services.

The first of these occurred in April 1962. At a cocktail party in Geneva, NOSENKO met a female secretary employed by the British Foreign Office. He saw her several days later in the corridors of the Palais des Nations and asked her to have dinner with him, and a date was made for several evenings later. According to the secretary's later account as reported by her superiors: "They talked about Marxism, the Chinese, Yugoslavia, and love; NOSENKO was obviously smitten with her, became verbally amorous, and told her that he would like to take her off to a desert island." The girl felt that NOSENKO probably was not interested in her for intelligence purposes, but seemed to be genuinely attracted by her. From her conversations with NOSENKO she was able to report that "he had been in submarines during the war and, according to himself, had risen to the rank of Commander. He was a member of the Communist Party. His father was in the Ministry of Shipping. He himself had served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 and 1949 and had apparently visited England but had not been stationed there." NOSENKO also told her that he was acquainted with [redacted] of the [redacted] publishing house in London.** When NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions, the secretary reported the contact to her superiors, was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland, and later resigned from the Foreign Office.

This same incident also brought NOSENKO to the attention of the Swiss service, which later reported it to CIA, without details, as an attempt on NOSENKO's part to recruit the girl.

---

*Although NOSENKO was described in reports (held by CIA) concerning recruitment approaches to Americans in Moscow prior to his first arrival in Geneva, there was no basis in these reports to identify the Soviet described as NOSENKO. The name NOSENKO did not appear in these earlier reports.

**[redacted] was one of NOSENKO's targets during a 1957 trip to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO used the alias NIKOLAYEV in his contacts with [redacted] and, in CIA debriefings, gave this as the reason he was forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV in the two trips he made to London in 1957 and 1959. The secretary knew NOSENKO by true name. (See Parts V.D.3.d. and V.E.8. for discussion of [redacted])

According to this report, "after a time it became evident that NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but also in information to which she had access in the course of her duties." A [redacted] official in Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her.

At his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO described the same incident, in the context of reporting a possible KGB penetration of British counterintelligence: "I decided to try to take this English girl to bed. And this had nothing to do with work. No, it was simply (sex)...And Yurka [Yuriy GUK, First Chief Directorate officer in Geneva] said to me: 'Listen, Yura. Be careful, because we have people even in British counterintelligence.'" NOSENKO described the incident as follows:

> "After I had been here a week or two there was a reception for members of the delegation and at it I saw a certain English girl. Then RUSK gave a reception and she was there again. I came to the reception, she saw me, and I went up to her. She said that it was very nice to make my acquaintance, and that's all. M.S. ROGOV (TSYMBAL) was there. He said to me: 'Yura, it looks to me like you are going to bed with that girl.' I answered: 'What do you mean, Mikhail Stepanovich? She just interests me.' I had already decided to try to get her in bed...But, listen further. After this she used to go to the Disarmament Conferences. Well, to make it short, I asked this girl for a date. She is Scottish, Scottish, not English, and works in an office here. We agreed to meet at a restaurant. I asked my friends which restaurant here is the best, where there isn't a crowd. We went to the restaurant and sat there all evening--all alone. There were just the two of us. The restaurant is under the ground and is called 'Day and Night' in Russian, 'Jour et Nuit.' We sat there and then she asked me where we could meet again. A day later we met again. Again in the restaurant and then we took a walk. She got me bothered and then gave me the brush-off. I called her once. She wasn't at home. I called again. Again she was out. I called a third time. She wasn't there. She thought that I was an intelligence officer and that I was interested in her for this reason. This, honestly, wasn't so. I had only one thing in mind. She was quite a woman...But the English girl felt that she was being developed. I met three times with her. Three times we were at the restaurant and she told them [her superiors] this. She knew that I am Russian. She told them this and they [NOSENKO whistled, apparently signifying that they terminated the relationship] at once. She knew from the very beginning that I am Russian, from the very beginning. In short, I told her a lot of things--well, you know--so to get her into bed. Well, we were walking on the quay and I said to her: 'How about going up to your place?' she answered: 'I can't.' 'Why?' I said, 'I'll take off my shoes and come on tiptoe.' She answered: 'Is it possible for me to come to you?' I said: 'You can't come to my place. There would be a knock on the door at once. The Swiss would tell the Americans and that would be the end. I can't do this.' So all I could do was have her next to the parapet. But the English felt--and nothing was heard about this, but

> she is no longer here. She got into trouble and I fee sorry for her because maybe they have fired her. Because they--the Foreign Office--keep only... Speaking honestly, as a human being, I am concerned that they might fire her. Because there was nothing more to it than this one thing."

The second event bringing NOSENKO to special notice occurred at about the same time that NOSENKO established contact with CIA and may, in fact, have been the incident which he said drove him to contact David MARK. On 15 June 1962 (ten days after NOSENKO approached MARK) [redacted] the permanent representative o[redacted] in Geneva, told his host at luncheon, American Ambassador TUBBY, that two girls from the Ba-Ta-Clan Club, a strip-tease bar in Geneva, had come to the [redacted] consulate apparently seeking visas. The girls had told of two Soviets, one about 30 and the other about 40, who had visited the club recently (no date was provided by [redacted]. According to the girls, [redacted] said, the two Soviets had attempted to pass themselves off as Americans and had spent "hundreds" of francs drinking at the club. The name which [redacted] gave Ambassador TUBBY for one of these Soviets "sounded like TISENKOV." From their descriptions, the two Soviets were almost certainly NOSENKO and his friend A.K. KISLOV.* At his first meeting with CIA NOSENKO said that a week and a half earlier he spent 1500 Swiss francs in a single night of drinking and women with KISLOV. The necessity of repaying this money, taken from KGB operational funds, was the immediate cause of his contact with CIA, according to NOSENKO.

---

*See Part III.D. for further information on KISLOV.

TOP SECRET

B. Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva (1962 and 1964)

1. TDY in 1962

When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva for the first time on 10 March 1962, he was listed officially as a Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs "expert" with the Delegation to the disarmament talks. Early during his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO was asked to explain precisely why he had been sent out to Geneva. He replied as follows: "Right now, I came to provide counterintelligence support to the Disarmament Delegation... There is a special [KGB] department for delegations, a special one, recently created. And the chief of this department is simultaneously a deputy chief of the [Second Chief] Directorate. He is both chief of the department and deputy chief of the directorate so that there will be a person who can be held responsible if anything happens. Understand? The chief of the directorate [O.M. GRIBANOV] hated to sign all sorts of recommendations and so on, when someone can run off in Belgium or wherever he may be. This happened more than once, and he was summoned before the [CPSU] Central Committee. Therefore, he decided to create a new position. The person holding it is simultaneously chief of the department and deputy chief of the directorate and personally signs off on all matters concerning exits [from the USSR]. This was in order to avoid being called on the carpet...so that blame would fall not on the chief of the directorate, but on his deputy, who is in charge of this department and who signed off...

"This department," NOSENKO continued, "is concerned with departures abroad, that is, it checks all Soviet citizens who intend to travel abroad, both alone and as members of delegations. Since GOLITSYN [defected] in Finland, we have an order that no delegation is to be let out without an operational worker, not a single delegation... With me it happened as follows: I was not planning to go. They told me: 'You are going.' I said: 'I can't. I have a section. I have 15 people there, all operating people. Am I supposed to dump them? What can I do?' 'No, you are going,' was the reply. 'And what did the chief order?' I asked. The chief [NOSENKO was referring to GRIBANOV when he spoke of the "chief".] said: 'GROMYKO is going this time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is going, and somebody on an appropriate level must go with him. Not a case officer, not a senior case officer, not a deputy, but the chief of a section, or the deputy chief of a department, or a department chief.' Well, I was the most junior section chief. I was called in to my chief, my immediate chief, who is concerned with the Seventh Department. They had told him that it would be for a month and on this basis he gave me permission. And I have been here since 10 March."

Later during this second meeting NOSENKO volunteered that in addition to his security officer functions in Geneva, he had a special assignment to check on P.F. SHAKHOV, a senior advisor to the Soviet Delegation.* SHAKHOV had been noted in contact with David MARK, believed by the KGB to be a CIA officer, NOSENKO reported, and on this basis the KGB suspected that SHAKHOV might be an American agent. NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested these suspicions in Geneva. He first gave SHAKHOV disinformation and looked for indications that he passed it on to American contacts. Next, SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally, NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB "dead drop" and checked back five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials which had been placed in it had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion from all this, he told CIA, was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters.

---

*CIA records show that SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States on numerous occasions since 1942, when he was assigned at the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He

On later occasions NOSENKO reported that SHAKHOV had previously served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during this period he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. In 1966 NOSENKO named one person whom SHAKHOV had spotted and developed in the United States, [redacted] SHAKHOV, according to NOSENKO, was not and never had been a KGB officer. Asked why SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad when he was suspected of being an American agent, NOSENKO explained that since SHAKHOV belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad. "There was no proof, only suspicions," and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet Delegation, S.K. TSARAPKIN.

NOSENKO was questioned again about his 1962 assignment to Geneva during the February 1965 interrogations. His answers were incorporated in a "protocol" which NOSENKO certified as being correct on 26 February 1965. The protocol states: "GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I think that the fitness report written about me for this trip was signed by [F.D.] BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the Seventh [Tourist] Department. I did not personally discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow. My candidacy for this assignment was supported by [S.G.] BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, who supervised the work of the Eleventh [Soviet Delegations] Department which had the investigative file on SHAKHOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who should go as case officer on

---

attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, the 1955 Paris Summit Conference, and many disarmament conferences over the years, and he has attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV arrived in New York as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN in 1963. The Soviet defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that SHAKHOV's face is familiar to them; RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow; and [redacted] identified him as an "employee of the KGB." [redacted], however, [redacted] said that SHAKHOV is "clean, a 'pure diplomat'" and that, to his knowledge, SHAKHOV was not engaged in any Soviet intelligence activity at that time.

sens
so

sensitive source

*For further particulars on [redacted] see Part VI.D.6.

this trip because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. When the Eleventh Department was looking for a case officer to make this trip they wanted to have a chief of section because of the seriousness of the SHAKHOV case. When they asked in the Seventh Department [V.D.] CHELNOKOV agreed that I should take the assignment. There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this trip.* My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the CPSU."

NOSENKO was asked why he had been selected to make this trip immediately after assuming the duties of the Chief of the American Tourist Section, on the eve of the tourist season, and at a time when he had no deputy. He explained that it was not thought that the assignment would last so long, and CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, had decided to let him go as a "treat."

During interrogations of October 1966 NOSENKO was questioned further about his 1962 assignment to Geneva as a security officer. He said that in this capacity he would necessarily know the identity of all other KGB officers serving with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva. There were only, besides himself, the KGB First Chief Directorate officers M.S. TSYMBAL and I.S. MAYOROV. (CIA, however, has tentatively identified three other delegation members as KGB staff officers: A.K. KISLOV, observed in Washington and in Moscow in what appears to have been KGB operational activity; V.G. FILATOV, who served as an alternate handler in the KGB operation with the NATO officer Georges PAQUES; and Oleg GRINEVSKIY, a member of the permanent Soviet Delegation who handled a [redacted] double agent during this same conference.) NOSENKO included GRINEVSKIY in the list of his own agents in Geneva in 1962 and said that, in Moscow, GRINEVSKIY was handled by an officer of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate. KISLOV, according to NOSENKO, was an operational contact in Moscow of the Austria-Germany-Scandanavia Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and was used in operations against the West German Embassy there. NOSENKO also said that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact during his earlier tour in the United States but was neither then nor later a KGB officer. He characterized FILATOV as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and stated that he is "definitely not an intelligence officer."

NOSENKO was also requestioned during these interrogations on his investigation of SHAKHOV. After saying on the morning of 19 October 1966 that he had been personally told by the

---

* NOSENKO has said that in 1960 he was turned down for a permanent assignment to Ethiopia because of his excessive drinking. (See Part V.E.4.a)

Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate that the SHAKHOV investigation was the main reason for his assignment to Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO later in the day stated: "My main task was to check the security of the delegation, plus SHAKHOV. You can't separate these tasks."

In this questioning NOSENKO described the basis for the suspicions of SHAKHOV, the lack of results from earlier investigations, and his own preparation for this assignment. He said that as a representative of the Soviet Delegations Department of the Second Chief Directorate, M.G. SITNIKOV had conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but SITNIKOV was unable to resolve the questions concerning him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send "a senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up." Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO therefore discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with one (fnu) LYALIN, the Soviet Delegations Department officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case; he also read various materials on the case, including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN. NOSENKO's description of these preparations provided the basis for the questioning which followed:

Question: Why was SHAKHOV under suspicion in June 1962?

NOSENKO: He was working with different delegations at different conferences and, being in Geneva, it was noticed that there was something which can be described as a connection with David MARK, who was considered a CIA officer.* Also, little, little, little things before.

Question: When did SHAKHOV and MARK first meet? How did it begin?

NOSENKO: In '60 or '61 there was a contact with MARK. I don't remember who reported it. The report was maybe from SITNIKOV in Geneva. MARK was known to the Second Chief Directorate as the Rezident [CIA Chief of Station] in Moscow. After Moscow he went to Geneva, and it was considered he must be the Rezident in Geneva. All the KGB officers going there were told to pay attention to him.

Question: What about the report?

NOSENKO: Maybe the officers saw the two going to the toilet. Maybe there was a contact. The file said "maybe." I was sent to Geneva to carry out measures to check... There were many little, little things. MARK maybe turned his head a certain way when SHAKHOV was talking. [S.M.] GOLUBEV, formerly of the Fourteenth [Counterintelligence] Department, was in the Soviet Delegation with SHAKHOV.* He noticed little details. When the officers in the United States decided to terminate SHAKHOV [as an agent], they wrote a report on him which said he was liking life in the U.S.--American products, money. He was pictured as not good and, in addition, he was not wanting to work as an agent.

---

*As stated earlier, MARK was not a CIA officer in Moscow, although he did perform certain clandestine tasks for CIA. He had no CIA missions in Geneva in 1962. Within the context of discussion of NOSENKO's security officer duties during October 1966, NOSENKO was asked to name any CIA officers he knew to be present in Geneva during the 1962 disarmament talks. MARK was the only one he cited.

2. The 1964 TDY

NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, commencing on 19 January, was also in the capacity of security officer with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. He said he was the only security officer for the group, which consisted of about 25 persons, and again he was officially listed as an "expert." NOSENKO reported that he had three or four agents within the delegation and an equal number of operational contacts. The only person whom he was instructed to watch in particular was A.A. TKACHEV, an interpreter, who had travelled to Austria in 1960 and 1961 and who, the KGB had noted, was in the habit of going about by himself. Other than this, according to NOSENKO, his responsibilities were general in nature.

NOSENKO explained during the February 1965 interrogations how he was selected for this TDY. The protocol he signed on 26 February 1965 states: "GRIBANOV had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. The fitness report on me for this trip was signed by [F.D.] BOBKOV. For the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU was required for me or for any other members of the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. It was my own personal wish to make this trip in 1964 and I had discussed the question with [V.D.] CHELNOKOV even in 1963 and had received his agreement. I had also talked about this with [M.V.] KHLOBUSTOV, and [G.] PANCHENKO [both of the Soviet Delegations Department]. After it had been decided that I would go, in about the beginning of January 1964, [N.T.] ZHARIKOV, the Chief of the Department, suggested that a case officer might not be required with this delegation. KHLOBUSTROV, PANCHENKO, and [A.G.] KOVALENKO [Chief of the Tourist Department and NOSENKO's immediate supervisor] supported me for the assignment as a personal favor to me." With regard to GRIBANOV's knowledge of his assignment to Geneva this second time, NOSENKO said that he feared that if GRIBANOV learned about the TDY he would have said, "What, again?" and would not have permitted him to go. It was for this reason that NOSENKO did not discuss the trip with GRIBANOV, he said, and he did not believe that GRIBANOV, in fact, knew anything about it.

---

*GOLUBEV was also identified by [redacted] sensitive source as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer. According to [redacted] he was one of several KGB officers forced to leave the United States in 1964 because he was well known to NOSENKO. There is no record in CIA files that GOLUBEV has ever been to Switzerland.

C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO

1. Introduction

NOSENKO has not indicated that his professional status in the KGB, his standard of living in the Soviet Union, or his family life prompted him to volunteer to American Intelligence in 1962 and to defect to the United States in 1964. He initially told CIA that he had been unusually successful during his ten-year career as a KGB counterintelligence officer; his closest friends and the people whom he admired most were members of the KGB; he enjoyed his work. The NOSENKO family held a high social position, and their economic situation was "luxurious by Soviet standards." NOSENKO described his family life as close and harmonious. He spoke with fondness and pride about his two daughters, of his wife's tolerance and understanding, of the companionship she gave him. He expressed love and a sense of responsibility for his widowed mother, who heavily depended upon him after the death of his father in 1956. The elder NOSENKO won his son's admiration for having worked his way up from an apprentice pipefitter in a shipyard to the position of Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. The NOSENKO name is honored in the home town of Nikolayevsk, where the shipyard has been renamed for the former minister and where a statue of him has been erected in the town square. By his own account, NOSENKO thus had had a rewarding home life and a successful and enjoyable career in the KGB.

2. Collaboration in 1962

At the outset in 1962, NOSENKO said he wanted to limit his reports to two items of information. Before the first meeting with CIA was over, he went beyond these two items to give details on the KGB Second Chief Directorate and other operations, and he offered to meet again. (Four more meetings ensued in 1962, with NOSENKO providing additional information on the KGB.) He would not defect, NOSENKO said, unless his personal safety was endangered by the KGB. Motivations in coming to American Intelligence, according to NOSENKO, were his financial emergency in Geneva and his disaffection for the Soviet regime.

a. Readiness to Report to CIA

During his 9 June meeting with David MARK, NOSENKO said he realized, even before talking to representatives of American Intelligence, that they would not be satisfied with the two items of information alone--he expected them to insist on more. He was introduced by MARK to a CIA case officer later the same day, and at the start of the meeting, the following dialogue took place:

NOSENKO: You see, I am not planning to be your agent... and don't think that I am going to work with you in Moscow. No. No...

Case Officer: As you have said, I am an intelligence officer as are you. And I think that we will understand one another.

NOSENKO: You want to place our relationship on an agent basis.

Case Officer: Of course.

NOSENKO: Never in my life I will go in contact [with CIA] in Moscow or the USSR, never in my life. I also know about Langelle and POPOV;* I know this matter. When it was abroad it was fine, but when you decided to meet him in Moscow... You want more than I came with the intention of saying. You want to change this to a long-term relationship. Understand me. I am now the chief of a section. Before my departure [from Moscow] a decision was being reached--and I have just spoken with my wife in Moscow--I am supposed to become the deputy chief of a department. Do you understand what this is?

Case Officer: Why are you telling me this?

NOSENKO: Because I wanted to come [to CIA] only for a business deal, to give you these two cases, to receive money for this, and that's all. Goodbye. Perhaps, sometime, when I come abroad, we will meet one another and perhaps I will give you something. God knows. But I don't want to do this now. I don't want to and I am not prepared within myself for this... I am giving two interesting cases. The most interesting ones. I say to you honestly, the two most interesting ones. In the first of them ["ANDREY"**], I took no part. In the second [BELITSKIY***] I took part, even here.

Case Officer: I want you to understand that these two matters that you spoke to Mr. MARK about are of great importance to us. But I don't have to tell you that. You know that. But we are not going to play like children. You know perfectly well that it is worth every franc... What I want to tell you is this: of course I will ask you more, and of course I want to know as much as you know. If you refuse to answer, that's your business.

NOSENKO: I will tell what I am able to tell. What I know, I will tell. Of course, you yourself understand that there are things concerning our internal system that I cannot report to you. You yourself understand this.

---

*The compromise of the CIA source in the GRU, P.S. POPOV, is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.

**The case of "ANDREY," the KGB cryptonym for the agent Dayle SMITH, is discussed in Part VI.D.3.b.

***BELITSKIY, a KGB-controlled double agent, is discussed in Part VI.D.6

When the CIA officer said that he understood NOSENKO had been in the KGB since shortly after the war, NOSENKO, without further prompting, gave a detailed statement of his own personal past and his professional career. In this statement he described his education, his service in the GRU, his entry into the KGB and generally the functions and operating techniques of the various components of the KGB Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along with the inclusive dates of his service in each. This account was very similar to that given MARK earlier in the day. Still without prompting, he discussed several specific KGB operations against Americans inside the Soviet Union, one involving the recruitment of a Yale University professor on the basis of homosexual compromise and the other an unsuccessful attempt to recruit an American code clerk. NOSENKO said he was personally involved in both cases.*

The question of his further assistance was then raised again: The CIA officer asked NOSENKO to tell more about the Yale professor, but NOSENKO demurred, stressing that the agreement involved only two pieces of information and ignoring the fact that he had already given considerably more:

NOSENKO: I have told you enough for this day, and I will tell you only these two cases which I wanted to tell you, and it is enough for this day.

Case Officer: How do you imagine that this is enough? You know that we work much the same way.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Case Officer: You know what interests us, of course.

NOSENKO: I know it. Today I gave only two things. Let's meet one another [again].

Case Officer: Good. But let me say this: What you tell me is your business. I am not going to try to bring any pressure at all...There is no argument about it. I am not going to say: 'Please see us in Moscow.' I don't want to see you in Moscow because it's too difficult. It is completely impossible. That's it. No more on that subject.

NOSENKO: I said to David [MARK] before meeting you that I don't want to meet anyone anymore, not anyone.

Case Officer: All right. Agreed.

NOSENKO: In another place. I don't know whether I will come back here in a month or not...I personally don't want to, either, because my wife will be moaning at home. But I am afraid they will make me come, because I know the delegation. I know the circumstances. They may make me come In that case we can meet.

---

*Richard BURGI and Joseph MORONE; see Parts V.D.4.b. and V.E.3.c., respectively. NOSENKO did not supply the names at this time.

Case Officer: You know that I would not bring any pressure. That's something we understand because we are both in this business. You and I are in the same business, so you can't--

NOSENKO: Let me interrupt. Why are we bargaining so now? So that I will say something more to you. I said: 'Let's meet again.' Maybe I will tell [more]. Now I will give you only these two items because we have made a deal. I will tell you about these two cases. Let's meet again, if you insist. I understand that you want more. Well, I will think a bit about what I know.

Case Officer: That's all right.

NOSENKO: We can meet when I am abroad perhaps...You must understand me. This has not come to me simply. I had time to think for a long time. I thought for a long time. You see, it's very difficult for me, very difficult for me. And after I go it will also be very difficult for me.

Case Officer: But you knew that when you came. Why did you come to us? Why to the American rezidentura [CIA Station] and not to the British?

NOSENKO: I came here because you are strong, strong... You don't have to explain to me. I know what makes me go. I told you it is hard for me. I still need to think. That's all. But I can no longer take a step back because the step forward has already been taken. I won't refuse if we meet before my departure. If you like, on Monday, on Tuesday, any day. Monday is better for me. Not Sunday, because I have to be there with my own [people].

This exchange was followed by a lengthy description of the two leads which NOSENKO had come to sell, the BELITSKIY and the "ANDREY" cases.

As NOSENKO was about to leave this first meeting, his case officer asked when they might meet again. NOSENKO suggested that they meet two days later, on Monday, around noontime as it would be easier for him to get away unnoticed at lunchtime. He then said that the case officer was probably trying to get everything down on tape and asked that this be stopped because of the risk to his security resulting from such a permanent record of their conversations. NOSENKO said: "I will not tell you anything particularly interesting. But I can tell you something. But not today. I can tell how LANGELLE blew POPOV--not LANGELLE, but because of whom and why we found him--for your future use, so that you will know how to operate. But LANGELLE was not guilty. It was not LANGELLE who was guilty. Another person was responsible for the compromise. Next time."

TOP SECRET

or of the degree of this cooperation was never raised again. At the very start of the second meeting, on 11 June, he said: "I am tortured all the time by a single thought. Everything now depends upon you, only on you. The slightest careless move by your people and it will be the end of me." Although he sometimes voiced moral compunctions, from this point on NOSENKO expressed his primary personal concern as being his own security vis-a-vis the KGB.

b. Attitude Toward Defection

While willing to meet with CIA representatives during future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once a year, NOSENKO in 1962 refused to consider defection except in circumstances where his personal security would be endangered. His devotion to his wife and children and the probability that the KGB would take reprisals against them if he fled were, he said, the primary considerations behind this refusal. (Without elaborating on the reasons, NOSENKO said on another occasion that he would not want to leave the USSR even on a permanent KGB assignment and accompanied by his family.) Other considerations included his widowed mother's dependence on him and his love of Russia and the Russian people, as opposed to the regime. For these reasons, NOSENKO said, he could not defect as PETROV, GOLITSYN, and KHOKLOV had done.

c. Motivation

NOSENKO told David MARK on 9 June 1962 that he wanted to contact American Intelligence because he was in trouble over the loss of KGB operational funds, for which he had to account prior to his imminent departure for the Soviet Union. His KGB career would be ruined if he was caught misusing this money, NOSENKO added, and because he had nowhere else to turn, he was willing to sell two items of information to MARK. The amount needed to cover the loss was 900 Swiss francs, or about $210, and this was the price asked for the information.

NOSENKO's statements of motivation to his CIA case officers during subsequent meetings are given below:

9 June 1962: In his first meeting with a CIA officer NOSENKO asked whether MARK had relayed the reasons why he wanted to meet with American Intelligence. He then very briefly repeated what he had told MARK concerning the loss of his operational funds. The case officer remarked that there must be something more to it, upon which NOSENKO said that this was not, in fact, his main motivation: "I have been working in this business for a long time and I know what I am doing. I have heard more than is written [in the newspapers]. A reorganization has been started in the USSR. In short, they have begun to do away with the ministries and the sovnarkhozy. But this is premature. Right now our agriculture is falling apart at the seams and our industry is at the point of collapse because this reorganization, this innovation, is too early. And this is not just me, a young man, talking. I mingle with ministers, with my father's friends, and I hear what they are saying. And how much does a worker earn? 600-800 rubles in old money, now 60-80. And he doesn't sense any improvement [in his position] within the total population. These are empty words only. We have exceeded the United States in per capita production of butter and milk. But how can it be said that we have surpassed you when they are

now raising the prices for butter? You know, you feel this internal resentment (nadlom), and you feel that some big mistakes have been permitted, that management as a whole is somehow off on the wrong track. Also, look at the serious situation in Czechoslovakia now, in Germany--in the GDR. It is very serious. In Poland they have just had a poor harvest. Everywhere there they have had floods. These rains are also very serious. It means that the system, the whole socialist system cannot [cope?--one word on the tape cannot be distinguished here]. Do you understand what is wrong? Faith in the future is being lost. Why have I told you this? Because under other circumstances perhaps I would not have come to this. So this is the reason for what has happened to me. This is perhaps the incident that drove me into contact with you. It all somehow grew within me. God knows."

11 June 1962: During the second meeting, NOSENKO himself raised the issue of motivation. His case officer had just said that CIA would respect his wishes in connection with a particular request when NOSENKO said: "Speaking of respect, how can there be respect? I don't even respect myself for what I have done. But, but, take the press bulletin, the communique of the Summit Conference in Moscow on various questions. Again lies, lies, lies, to show that we have had great successes. I can't see them [the successes]. No, excuse me, I know somewhat more than the rank and file Soviet man because I work under this system. I can see what is being done and what is not being done. Lies, more lies. This was my mood. I say, 'How much is it possible to deceive the people, the Soviet people? How far can you go?' Our people are very poor. It is somewhat difficult to arouse a people such as this. If we stir ourselves up we will know how to stand up for ourselves. But I feel for my people. How often can you say that things will be good; how often can you say that we have achieved big successes? Where are they? Show me them. I can see no trace of them. This is what I say...that there is resentment in my soul. Do you understand? A terrible resentment. I love my country. You may say that this is nothing. But I tell you that I cannot act like GOLITSYN, like KHOKLOV, like PETROV, because I want to be there. I want to be with my family. That's all. But I feel that not only the government is making mistakes. I feel that there are faults throughout the entire system of socialism. What I mean is that things are bad in Czechoslovakia, things are bad in Poland, things are bad with KADAR [in Hungary], they are starving in China. This means that there are great mistakes. Well, that's all. What did you want to ask me, please?"

At the close of this meeting, NOSENKO stressed that money was unimportant as a motive for a continuing relationship: "My name must not be used anywhere, even in your offices. Understand? It would be the end of me. I am not afraid of this. The devil with them. Because I have had such a life. I lost my father, everything. Why do I say this? I did not come to you simply because I needed money. I don't need it. I came because I am resentful inside. Do you understand this internal resentment? I do not believe in what is being done. I do not believe in this. Listen to me. Let me speak honestly. Have I not had the chance to live as a person should? My father was a big man. He had a dacha and a state-owned automobile. I have my own Volga [automobile]. My mother was given a dacha for life. It's luxurious. Her apartment is enormous--150 square meters. For America this is nothing, but for Moscow this is enormous. We always had a lot of money, especially during the war. A salary of 15,000 or 20,000-plus--25,000. There was much money. She is a rich woman. She has paintings by Ayvazovskiy, Makovskiy. Even if she had insufficient money, she could always sell her possessions. What do I want to say? That I've never wanted for money. Never...As I said, perhaps the thing which drove me to you was not money, but this great, great resentment."

14 June 1962: The subject of motivation was not discussed during the third and fourth meetings with NOSENKO. As he was about to leave the Geneva safehouse after the fifth and final session, however, NOSENKO again touched on the economic inequities existing inside the Soviet Union and raised a new reason for cooperating with CIA, his basic sympathy for the American people. NOSENKO said that he realized that the reason he had given for coming to us, his need for money, was "not good." Before he and his case officers parted, NOSENKO said, he wanted to emphasize "without attempting to justify himself" that he had "always felt a certain sympathy toward the American people." He explained that it was not the technical progress of the United States which attracted him, nor was it the high standard of living of the American people. It was rather the openness and directness with which the Americans whom he had met and seen handled themselves. As examples he cited his American targets in Moscow and Secretary of State Dean RUSK, whom he had seen in Geneva.

Although NOSENKO did mention the difficult economic situation in the USSR on a few other occasions, he did not relate these remarks specifically to his motives for volunteering to CIA. The above excerpts are representative of his total statement on motivation during the 1962 meetings.

3. Decision to Defect (January 1964)

On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had decided to defect. He once again criticized the Communist regime along the same lines as during earlier meetings, but his immediate motivation seemed to have nothing to do with this. NOSENKO explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh (Tourist) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and that because of the stature and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few opportunities, if any, for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family behind. He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the USSR for the "next twenty years." NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is to part with my family." He had, however, carefully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector, and he knew that, because of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm would come to them.

Whereas NOSENKO declared his intent to defect immediately, the CIA case officers at this first meeting in 1964 persuaded him to remain in place for at least two or three weeks on the grounds that, first, CIA would benefit much from this, and second, arrangements for his transfer to and reception in the United States would have to be coordinated in advance with CIA Headquarters.

During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintelligence matters because he was a specialist in this field; he would be able to give CIA leads and assistance in spotting and recruiting other Soviets.

The next five meetings with NOSENKO were devoted exclusively to debriefings on the activities of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. Although his impending defection was mentioned, his reasons for taking this step were not discussed. In the meantime, NOSENKO's first CIA handler flew to Washington for discussions regarding the defection and, on his return, told NOSENKO that the CIA leadership had asked why, specifically, NOSENKO had decided to come to the United States at that time. The answer was that NOSENKO, "after coming back and seeing that there was no more chance to come to the West, or little more chance," felt that this was his one opportunity to come and make his life with the Americans. Therefore, he was going to seize the opportunity while he had it. Asked about this, NOSENKO confirmed that this was his reason, and added: "I may never have another chance, and in addition, I've had sufficient time since our last meeting here in Geneva [1962] to weigh everything and to consider everything." Later in this same meeting, NOSENKO again mentioned his lack of interest in money and his feelings about deserting his family: "I understand [that it will be difficult to adjust to a new life in America] and know that for some time I will be sick within. And I know that a certain period of time must elapse before this can heal. I even spoke to you bluntly about my [financial] security. I am absolutely unmercenary and have never had any appreciation for money or wealth...My most difficult and sorest spot of all is my family. This is the most basic and most difficult spot of all. And I know perfectly well that I must go through an illness over this. For this the only and the best doctor is time. I don't expect to have a new family there. Of course, I don't know--but at least I'm speaking from the way I feel now. I have a strong liking for children--not only for my own, but for all children and, losing my own, I am fully conscious how I must suffer through this. In time I will get used to it. I know one can get used to almost anything."

At this meeting, NOSENKO agreed to remain in place for approximately another week, and the tentative date of 8 February was selected for the defection.

NOSENKO's motives for the defection were not mentioned for five more meetings. Then, on 4 February 1964, he telephoned the Geneva safehouse to say he wanted to defect at once. Arriving shortly thereafter, he announced that he had been ordered to return to Moscow the following day and, therefore, had to leave Switzerland before morning. He stated his reasons formally in an asylum request, written at the time:

> "This decision was made by me, not now, at the moment I write this request, but several years ago. Having worked for many years in the KGB and knowing more than the average Soviet citizen about the policy of the Soviet government, about the direction which this government has chosen to take, and about the law and order in the USSR, I have come to the decision that

live in this country and work for the welfare of this government."

4. The Letter of July 1964

The most complete explanation given by NOSENKO of his motives for first contacting CIA and later defecting to the United States is contained in a letter to his CIA case officer in July 1964. He described this letter as "an exposition of all those reasons and root causes which led to the decision to leave the Soviet Union" and further explained that "everything put down here is lacking in a whole series of lesser details which to a greater or lesser degree played their role." Nevertheless, he said, he had tried in this letter "to set down the main things to show how, when, and why the decision was born, grew, and hardened within me to completely alter the course of my life." This letter is presented below in its entirety. Most of the biographical and operational details mentioned in the letter are covered separately in other parts of this paper.

> "1. My life, my childhood and youth passed in very comfortable circumstances since the position of my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking for anything. And the only difficult periods of my life (before the death of my father) were: study in the naval schools in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad; and the beginning of my working life, the period in the Far East (1950-1952). The opportunity to be always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the car given me by my family and also my father's car, the opportunity to travel to the South and to vacation in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth; all this unquestionably left its mark on me and became something of a habit. After the death of my father, my successful progress in my work gave me a higher salary, and although I did not have all that which I had while my father was alive, still I did not experience any serious difficulties. But already I wanted to live still better.
>
> "2. Up to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the family--it was always pounded into my head that STALIN was a great genius, that he was good, keen, etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question his words or his deeds because everything that he said, and everything he did, were completely axiomatic. The arrests and trials only involved traitors and it was considered and explained that the people who suffered innocently, especially in 1937 and 1938, suffered only because at the head of the NKVD in 1937, 1938, was the betrayor of the people YEZHOV. Not even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of STALIN. Soon after STALIN's death in 1953 I read a certain document given me by my father. This was a secret letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 'case of the doctors;' it was not addressed to all communists but only to members and candidate members of the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this letter which described in detail how these people,

important specialists in the field of medicine, were brought to such a condition that they condemned themselves; that is, they confessed to things which had never happened, to things which they had never done. They were simply forced to give the evidence which was needed by the investigators. The secret letters on the cult of STALIN and much that I heard in the KGB about the reign of STALIN, all this left its mark and forced me to think deeply about the real truth and to look at everything more critically. Already I no longer had faith in all those ideas which for years had been pressed into my head.

"3. The new leaders (KHRUSHCHEV and Company) used the same methods but already diluted with the water of democracy, with playing up to the people and attempts to convince them that a new era would arise, a new and better life, and that now the Party was always going to concern itself with the welfare of the people. In fact, it was a struggle for power and the use of all means in this struggle, even microphones (they listened to the conversations of BERIYA and his friends; later they listened to the conversations of MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, KAGANOVICH, and others). KHRUSHCHEV's endless blabbing about successes, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures about how the USSR had passed the USA in the production of butter and milk, when in the stores they were available only infrequently. The endless promises of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is taking place. All this similarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the events which were taking place in the country, but already the entire ideology of the Party, its external and internal course.

"4. The events in Novocherkassk where about 20,000 to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this popular indignation was suppressed by troops with many casualties. This also made a deep impression on me. When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood well the real relation of the workers both to the leadership and to the Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat, what they have and what they can buy with their wages.

"5. I heard a great deal from my father about the domestic policies of KHRUSHCHEV in regard to the development and the course of construction in industry, about his complete illiteracy in engineering technology and industrial economics, about incorrect decisions in regard to many industries, and this was not only the opinion of my father, but also of other important leaders in various fields of industry (MALYSHEV, VANNIKOV, AKOPOV, and others). But no one dared to open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain decision would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff from KHRUSHCHEV that he was profoundly shaken and in the opinion of my mother this brought him to his illness in 1956 and his death in August 1956.

6. The events in Germany and especially in Hungary showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of communist ideology. What was especially important for me was the fact that in these countries it was a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the entire people who could no longer endure a regime imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to emphasize that the life of the people in these countries was much better than that of the people in the USSR (I saw for myself how people live in Czechoslovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live better than the entire people of the Soviet Union).

"7. The split of the international communist movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed my opinion that the theory of communism is a theory built on sand and that it is practiced according to the needs of the leadership of the Party at a given stage of life and that in reality full material welfare would never be enjoyed by the people but only by the leadership and the Party and the government.

"8. Working in the KGB I came to understand much and became conscious of the contradiction between the internal and external course of the USSR. Such questions as disarmament, the ban on atomic weapons, the position of the USSR in the United Nations--all these are used only in the interest of propaganda and as a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by the communist party. (I was myself present at the negotiations in Geneva and saw the 'politics' of the Soviet delegation.)

"9. My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people live, how much they earn, how they can dress and live on their wages, and I paid special attention to the life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists, engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of the West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and the 'unbelievably difficult life' flew immediately out of my head. And that which I met with in my work, the sending of Soviet citizens abroad--who gets sent where and how, etc.--this finally debunked this propaganda. Many of my acquaintances--GUK, CHURANOV and others--think back with great pleasure about life abroad.

"10. I entered the KOMSOMOL completely without thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and I became a Komsomolnik like all the others. It was different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party in 1956 after the death of STALIN and while I was working in the KGB and already at that time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father continually insisted on this, saying that without the Party I would never move ahead and would not have success in life. But I myself understood and saw that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the Party. And if I worked somewhere else, I would truly never move ahead in my career

TOP SECRET

unless I entered the Party. But from the very beginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism and dogmatism. All the Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially when I became the deputy chief of the section, the chief of the section, and the deputy chief of the department, because then I had to speak at these meetings. Because this meant to lie, to twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedicated to the Party and its course.

"11. In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became worse. The question of a change of climate was raised. At that time the SCD needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally talk GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work references had been confirmed, all the questionnaries were already filled out, the photos had been submitted; that is, all the formalities had been accomplished. But at the very last moment the Central Personnel of the KGB began to protest against my going with my family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from the house check made at my place of residence they received information that I sometimes came home in a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was necessary because of the health of my daughter (since 1963 the illness has become better) and also it would have been advantageous from the financial point of view. From this time on I understood that Personnel would not let me go abroad with my family.

"12. Knowing many officers in the FCD, I began to understand that being sent abroad is entirely determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and success, but only by the absolute 'cleanliness' of the person's autobiography and complete assurance as to his limitless dedication to the Party and the government. But not only being sent abroad but the assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons indicated by me and also on good relations with the leadership and good connections with workers in Central Personnel.

"13. I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life was not a hell. It is true that there were quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude towards my delays at work and also when I would be delayed with some of my friends and acquaintances after work and would come home with a few drinks under my belt. Of course, I loved and love my children and only the fact that they are taken care of financially until they grow up and have received an education to some extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial security? After the death of my father, the family received a large monetary allowance, plus the money that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc. My mother many times offered to divide all this in three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I suggested that we not do this before her death. And, of course, my mother will not leave my children without attention, and my share of the property and the money will be given to my children.

"14. If the defections of PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also great strength of will. And already I put to myself the question, will I be able to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me?

"15. Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my departure I myself of my own desire entered into contact with you. The reason for this was the loss of money received by me for operational expenses. I would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of money before my departure and there was nobody to borrow from (at this time GUK was himself in financial difficulty and at the same time he was already preparing for his return home). To tell the truth about the loss of the money would have meant that it would be necessary to explain where and in what circumstances it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they might think that I had appropriated the money, that is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst of all and I would, of course, in such event have told the truth.

"16. To tell the truth, it was only after my return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not immediately, began fully to realize all the seriousness of my contact with you and its full meaning. And although I did not give you any promises or assurances about our continued contact in the future, I understood that you sooner or later would set yourself the task of continuing our contact. And here it was that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip abroad.

"17. Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some sort of 'baggage', that is, with materials which could be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment to the position of deputy chief of the Seventh Department in July 1962 gave me a greater opportunity than before. But at the same time this assignment almost excluded the possibility of a trip abroad and it was only with great difficulty that I was able to get away for the trip in January 1964. It was necessary to convince CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince BOBKOV and in 1963 to convince KOVALENKO. In this I advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the money (in foreign currency); that the medicine which I bought for my daughter had proven very successful and that I needed to buy some more medicine to carry out one more series of treatments; that this trip would not be a long one and that since I was already the deputy chief of the Department I would not be able to travel abroad any more and so, therefore, this trip would probably be my last. Of course, all this was said at convenient moments and outside of work. Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms with PENCHENKO who covered Switzerland, besides which when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him a number of presents.

"18. The publication in 1963 by the foreign press of the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the newspaper Times it said outright that the English learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the leadership of the FCD, as I learned from GUK, CHURANOV, and TARABRIN, came to the conclusion that here the Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the same time the FCD was not completely sure of this. But the publication in the American press of Alsop's articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely. This article in one spot said plainly that as far as is known the KGB does not have any sources in the CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB.

"19. During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a pass in the Second Department and went in order to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his appearance and I understood that everything which had been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater confidence in the correctness of the decision taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.

26 July 1964 Signed: Yu. NOSENKO"

D. NOSENKO's Activities in Geneva

1. Introduction

The extent to which NOSENKO made himself available for meetings with CIA in Geneva in 1962 and 1964 is reviewed here in connection with his statements about the KGB duties assigned to him for these trips, his visits to the KGB Legal Residency, and his personal association with other Soviets. Although NOSENKO was not precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, he did indicate that he was his own boss, disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. At the first meeting with CIA in 1962 he accounted for his freedom of movement by saying: "I can come and go as I please at any time. (Ambassador) ZORIN knows who I am, almost the entire delegation knows who I am, because I don't need to pretend. Nobody pays any attention to me. They know that I am not a Ministry of Foreign Affairs man (at the conference sessions). I sit, listen, leaf through some papers. For this reason I can leave the conference at any time, or I do not come at all, and no one will say a word to me." CIA made no attempt to place NOSENKO under surveillance in 1962 and 1964, and there is no evidence from other sources confirming or disproving NOSENKO's statements about his activities while away from the CIA safehouse.

2. Official Duties in Geneva

In 1962 NOSENKO said he was the sole KGB officer in the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation.* To assist him in carrying out these security officer functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. In addition, NOSENKO had the specific mission of checking on suspicions attached to one of the delegation members, P. F. SHAKHOV,** but by the time he established contact with CIA, he said, this assignment had already been completed.

In 1964, NOSENKO said his only operational task then was to handle the general security responsibilities for the Soviet delegation, as he had done in 1962. There was no specific mission such as the one concerning SHAKHOV in 1962.

NOSENKO has described his investigations of SHAKHOV, but he has never indicated either that he conducted security checks of other delegation members in 1962 and 1964, or that he received any security-type information (except on SHAKHOV) from the KGB cooptees who were supposed to be reporting to him. Likewise, NOSENKO has not said that he prepared communications for KGB Headquarters regarding his clandestine assignments in Geneva.

3. Visits to the KGB Legal Residency

Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for more than a day or two, the Legal Resident, S. I. GAVRICHEV, would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself.

---

* I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL also arrived with the delegation in March 1962 but had left Geneva by the time NOSENKO contacted CIA.

** SHAKHOV is discussed further in Part III.3.1.

GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962, NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesitation on the part of the Legal Resident that all of his subordinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO. (In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform counter-surveillance on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry out other private errands.)

Similarly, in 1964, NOSENKO said he was making nearly daily visits to the Legal Residency. During the 1964 meetings NOSENKO stated that it was his close relationship with M.S. TSYMBAL* which made it possible for him to have visited the Geneva Legal Residency so frequently, both in 1962 and 1964. "According to the strict rules," NOSENKO told CIA, "an officer in a status such as mine should not even go to the Residency. In this case it is only because I am deputy chief of a department and GAVRICHEV knows my position perfectly well (it is not lower than his), and because I have such a sympathetic personal relationship with TSYMBAL." He then went on to say that TSYMBAL "sort of escorted me to the Residency. They could have simply said: 'You are here on a mission, we have our own mission, and we have nothing in common.'" But, NOSENKO indicated, this was not the case, thanks to TSYMBAL's intervention.

4. Association with TSYMBAL

At the second meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO volunteered information on TSYMBAL's KGB background and his current missions in Geneva, then alluded to his having spoken with TSYMBAL in Geneva but without placing any particular emphasis on this relationship.

In 1964, however, NOSENKO claimed that their relationship was close, explained that it was TSYMBAL (again in Geneva at the same time) who gained NOSENKO's admission to the Legal Residency, and said that he had twice gone to see TSYMBAL off on train trips, once on 24 January when TSYMBAL went to Bern and again on 28 January when TSYMBAL left Lausanne for Rome. NOSENKO told CIA he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961. At that time "We were looking over some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals) Directorate...Then when we came (here) in 1962 for the Disarmament Conference, I got to know him a little better - more from the human side. He seemed to take a liking to me for some reason. We had met in Moscow before, of course, but just in the hall or in the dining room. He used to say: 'Stop in and see me,' and I would answer: 'Well, it's kind of awkward for me to hang around the Special Directorate - what am I supposed to be doing here?' He would say: 'Oh, comeon, stop in.' But I didn't." NOSENKO also said that TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and had suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In fact, NOSENKO added, he had got into some difficulty with O. M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, by virtue of TSYMBAL's efforts in 1962 to have NOSENKO transferred and his leaving the impression with GRIBANOV that NOSENKO (who was still in Geneva) had agreed to this action.

---

* TSYMBAL appeared in Geneva under the last-name alias "ROGOV" and was identified by NOSENKO as Chief of the Illegals Directorate, KGB First Chief Directorate. Since 1956, TSYMBAL was known by CIA to be the true name for ROGOV, and GOLITSYN reported in 1961 that TSYMBAL was Chief of the European Department, KGB First Chief Directorate.

Questioned in April 1964 about his association with TSYMBAL, NOSENKO stated that he met TSYMBAL for the first time several days before their departure for Geneva. Besides saying again that he saw TSYMBAL almost daily at the Legal Residency and that TSYMBAL's assistance enabled him to enter the Legal Residency, NOSENKO reported that in 1962 he went out with TSYMBAL several times a week to eat lunch or dinner; sometimes they were joined by I. S. MAYOROV,* sometimes by A. K. KISLOV (see next section), and sometimes the two ate alone. During the 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO said that, while he had seen TSYMBAL on a daily basis in 1962, he saw him only twice in 1964: once when TSYMBAL travelled to Geneva from Bern for one or two days and later when NOSENKO saw TSYMBAL off for Rome from Lausanne.

5. Association with Other Soviets

NOSENKO said in 1962 that the other Soviets he saw most often were A. K. KISLOV and Yu. I. GUK.** KISLOV, with NOSENKO was one of the four members of the Soviet delegation staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva, and was said to be head of the American Section of TASS and a genuine correspondent.*** During the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV was not a KGB officer and made no reference of his having any affiliation with the KGB. NOSENKO did say, however, that he had arranged for KISLOV's name to be given the KGB double agent B. Ye. BELITSKIY**** to use as a notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy; BELITSKIY was to pass this information to his CIA contacts. NOSENKO made numerous references to drinking and carousing with KISLOV, specifically with regard to a night in early June - when NOSENKO was robbed of or squandered his operational funds, which brought him to CIA - and on the night of 10 June 1962 when NOSENKO squandered 2000 Swiss francs (the money CIA had given him) on wine and women.***** In giving NOSENKO the money to defray these personal expenses, the CIA handlers expressed to him their concern over the dangers to his security arising from KISLOV's knowledge of this inexplicable source of income. NOSENKO replied that there was no need to be concerned since KISLOV was "too drunk to know what is going on," and in any event he constituted no threat.

---

* MAYOROV, according to NOSENKO, was visiting Geneva in order to have operational meetings with agents.

** Both KISLOV and GUK are mentioned in the discussion of the "ANDREY" case (see Part VI.D.3.b.). GUK was also a friend of GOLITSYN, who reported extensively on GUK's career in the KGB including his service in the United States.

*** In October 1966 NOSENKO named all the Soviets living at the Ariane, without mentioning KISLOV.

**** The BELITSKIY case is discussed in greater length in Part VI.D.6.

*****See Parts II.B. and II.C.2.c.

In 1964 NOSENKO confirmed that he had spent much time with KISLOV in Geneva two years before and that they had become very friendly. For the first time, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while in the United States, that he had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to his departure for Geneva in 1962 in order to be able to exploit him during the Geneva Conference, and that after returning from Geneva KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on the basis of a favorable report NOSENKO had prepared.

Often during the 1962 meetings NOSENKO spoke of his "big, big friend" GUK, whom he described as the Deputy Legal Resident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the KGB Legal Residency. He implied that his friendship with GUK, a former member of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, was of longstanding. NOSENKO related that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva. They often went out together to chat and have a few drinks, and as a consequence, NOSENKO was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations there. In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA he found it difficult to obtain information on the activities of the Geneva Legal Residency because he no longer had a good friend there like GUK, who had been reassigned to KGB Headquarters. When questioned later in 1964 about his relationship with GUK, NOSENKO said he had come to know GUK well only during his 1962 TDY in Geneva.

6. Availability for Meetings with CIA

In speaking to David MARK on 6 June 1962, NOSENKO expressed displeasure over MARK's insistence on deferring their luncheon (at which NOSENKO sought contact with American Intelligence) until three days later. When the first meeting with CIA did take place on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO stayed for three hours, and it was at his suggestion that another meeting was scheduled for 11 June. This second meeting in 1962 lasted seven hours. NOSENKO remained in Geneva until 15 June, and in the interim he met CIA officers three more times for over seven hours altogether. He offered to meet again on the day of his departure, but this proposal was rejected as needlessly endangering his security.

From the first 1964 meeting on 23 January to his defection on 4 February, NOSENKO was met a total of 13 times, the sessions lasting for five or six hours. He was able to come to the CIA safehouse every day but one, and this opportunity was skipped at the request of the CIA handlers. By mutual consent, most of the meetings started in the afternoon, but on two occasions NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours; several meetings went on until past midnight. NOSENKO appeared to be totally at the disposal of CIA, to be the master of his time, and to have no other demands for his attention except for the visits to the KGB Legal Residency, "looking in" on an occasional session of the Disarmament Conference, and attendance at a reception.

E. Timing of Defection

After telling CIA on 24 January 1964 of his decision to defect, NOSENKO at the same meeting concurred when CIA gave operational and administrative reasons for him to stay in place until the middle of February. During the week that followed, the date of the defection was moved up to 8 February in accordance with NOSENKO's wishes and with his reports indicating that less information of value would be forthcoming than CIA had at first thought. On 4 February, however, NOSENKO reported that he was being recalled to Moscow for a conference on foreign tourism in the USSR, and he therefore placed himself in CIA custody on that date.* Details on the timing of NOSENKO's defection are given in the following paragraphs.

At the 24 January meeting the CIA case officers agreed in principle with NOSENKO's decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA could exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States. He wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the CIA officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this request were:

- The desire to get information on the local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference while he still had access to this information;
- The value of having NOSENKO present when O.M. GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February a visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;**
- The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's in place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the Soviet representation in Geneva;
- The necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.

The events which followed NOSENKO's agreement to remain in place for a short time longer are chronicled below:

---

* The report of NOSENKO's recall to Moscow for the conference on tourism is discussed further in Part III.F.

** GRIBANOV was in 1964 the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and, according to NOSENKO and other sources, the sponsor of NOSENKO's rapid rise in State Security. Several [redacted] sources, have reported that GRIBANOV was fired from the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's defection (Part III.I.). NOSENKO's relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed in Part V.H.

26 January 1964: In a three-and-a-half hour meeting, NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was necessary and useful for him to remain in place until the GRIBANOV visit to Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as possible thereafter.

28 January 1964: NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.

30 January 1964: At the seventh meeting of the series, NOSENKO said that there now appeared to be little likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.* Therefore, he wanted to defect right away. As reasons he cited the emotional strain of any further delay and the fact that he and his case officers were wasting their time working against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or promising targets. He also felt that nothing of value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because "TSARAPKIN himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by Moscow the day before." The CIA handlers, however, delayed the defection for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for the defection, he suggested Saturday morning, 8 February, because he probably would not be missed until the following Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a trace." He also asked about exfiltration plans.

31 January 1964: NOSENKO reported the results of his reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in connection with the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers**, which he was told were enroute from Washington. He explained that he had felt pressure at the previous meeting because of an imminent move by the delegation from its hotel to the Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would be noticed more quickly. This move, he had now learned, had been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer from Moscow.

---

* From 3 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer. There is no evidence that he visited Switzerland.

** See Part VI.D.7.c for further details on CHEREPANOV.

[redacted]

1 February 1964: At NOSENKO's request, it was firmly agreed that the defection would take place in the morning of 8 February. NOSENKO said that he assumed that exfiltration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States.* His case officers confirmed that this was correct.

3 February 1964: NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV materials. The defection was still scheduled for Saturday, 8 February.

4 February 1964: NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel room in the early afternoon and said: "I want to come now and not go back." After arriving he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the Soviet Union.** The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day, and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties as security officer for the Soviet Delegation in Geneva; he was not told who the replacement would be. Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a number of new cities and tourist itineraries in this connection. SEMICHASTNYY had now decided that it was time to call a conference to discuss new "tactics and strategies" for handling the increased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the report would be read to the conference either by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO explained that he was the only one who could do this job as Lt. Col. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new man in this line of operations, having been there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the morning of 5 February. He had arranged for a Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the next morning for the move. His absence would be noted at that time, and therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss border before morning." NOSENKO felt, however, that there would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for a time following his disappearance, and that there would be no real concern until the evening. To foster Soviet uncertainty he had left his clothing lying around his hotel room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safehouse. NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss

---

* [redacted]

** See Part III.F.

authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or early on the 6th.

NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immediate interview with NOSENKO prompted the Director of Central Intelligence to order that he be brought to Washington as soon as possible. He arrived in the evening of 12 February.

F. The Recall Telegram

On arriving at the safehouse at 1515 on 4 February 1964 NOSENKO related that on the preceding day, 3 February, he had been to the KGB Legal Residency during the day and again in the evening. (He had met with CIA from 1200 to 1800 hours on 3 February.) He related that as of that time "everything was quiet and peaceful," and he received four personal letters from Moscow. NOSENKO said that on the morning of 4 February he had again stopped in at the Residency, but "nothing was going on." Later in the morning, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, NOSENKO learned that the coded telegram described above had arrived from Moscow ordering him to return immediately to Moscow to participate in the KGB conference on tourism.

[redacted]

Special intelligence indicates, however, that no cable traffic at all was sent from Moscow to Geneva from the late afternoon of 3 February 1964 until the morning of 5 February, the day after the defection. (Two priority cables of unusual length, 247 and 207 groups, were transmitted to Geneva at 1901 and 1915 hours Greenwich time on 3 February; there was no traffic on 4 February; and the next message passed was a routine cable originated by Moscow at 0755 hours on 5 February.)

On 26 October 1966, while being questioned about the circumstances of his defection, NOSENKO was asked about this telegram which recalled him to Moscow. NOSENKO said that there was no such telegram, and that he had invented it in order to defect as soon as possible because he was nervous and afraid his contacts with American Intelligence in Geneva might be noticed by Soviet authorities. After detailed questioning on this point, NOSENKO voluntarily signed a statement with the following wording.

"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from KGB Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

G. Soviet Official Reactions

The Chief of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon on 6 February 1964 that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February; they speculated that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in a car accident.* Two more days passed without Soviet authorities making any additional public or private statements on the subject. Later events showing Soviet official reactions to NOSENKO's defection are presented below in chronological order:

8 February: A Soviet spokesman in Geneva reported to Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert" temporarily assigned to Geneva, had been missing for four days.

9 February: Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February: Unidentified Soviet sources were quoted in the press as having said it was presumed that he had defected.

A U. S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as a KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

11 February: The Department of State was advised informally by Ambassador DOBRYNIN in Washington that a Soviet note to be delivered later would ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, request his release, and demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February: S. K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note predicted by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department, and a noncommittal reply was given to

---

* Apparently no effort was made to notify Moscow immediately. Special intelligence shows that no cable traffic was passed from Geneva to Moscow from 1630 hours on 3 February until 1900 hours on 7 February: at 1915 hours on the 7th, the Geneva Residency transmitted a short top priority cable to Moscow. Likewise, after one routine cable on 4 February, the Bern Residency sent no traffic to Moscow on 5 February. Seven cables, at least four of which were of routine precedence, were sent to Moscow on 6 February; thereafter there was no traffic from Bern to Moscow until the early morning of 10 February.

Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.

(NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours this same evening.)

13 February: NOSENKO said he had no objection to talking to the Swiss, but he would see the Soviets only if necessary.

14 February: In Moscow, Ambassador KOHLER was summoned to the office of Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO, who read him a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a "gross provocation by American Intelligance organs." GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy, Jean-Louis NATURAL, interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service late in the afternoon. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G. M. KORNIENKO, second to Ambassador DOBRYNIN at the Soviet Embassy, and Third Secretary V. F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. (ISAKOV had been a member of the Soviet Delegation to the 1962 Disarmament Conference in Geneva, where NOSENKO said he had first met him.) NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

H. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family

Two women who said they were the mother and wife of NOSENKO called at the American Embassy in Moscow on five occasions between 24 February and 23 March 1964,* and NOSENKO, who on the basis of physical descriptions confirmed their identities, said he had no doubt that the KGB had directed them to do this in order to pressure him to return. The women expressed disbelief that NOSENKO had voluntarily betrayed his family and his country. They sought a personal meeting with him in the United States or anywhere else, submitted letters for him, and returned to the Embassy to ask whether he had replied; the younger Mrs. NOSENKO explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

NOSENKO proposed to respond to his family's letters by writing two of his own, one which would be intended for KGB consumption and the other for his wife alone. The first of these would state NOSENKO's irrevocable decision to remain in the United States and to sever all ties with his family and homeland. The second letter would be read by Mrs. NOSENKO in the Embassy, left there, and not reported to the KGB; in it he would express hope for a reunion, ask her to wait for him, and tell her to indicate her willingness to join him in the West by writing either "yes" or "no" on the letter itself. Although NOSNEKO prepared both letters, only the first was sent to his wife; it was mailed from Washington to the NOSENKO home in Moscow on 7 April 1964.

From March 1964 nothing was heard from NOSENKO's relatives until mid-1966, when Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV,** a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent." As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

---

* Only once before had members of a defector's family called at a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in September 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him. KROTKOV, an admitted agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, is believed by MI-5 and CIA to remain under KGB control.

** CIA records show that KOROLEV was employed at the Soviet Pavilion of the Brussels World's Fair in 1958 as a photo-correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik. He visited Japan in 1963 and the United States in February-March 1965, at the invitation of Life magazine, as a photographer for Novosti, a Soviet news agency. On the latter trip he was to be accompanied by Feliks Avramovich ROSENTAL, an interpreter but no record of ROSENTAL's arrival is available. KOROLEV is believed to be identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International correspondent in Moscow, Henry SHAPIRO. Both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified SHAPIRO as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (see Part V.C.).

On 10 October 1966, however, KOROLEV again appeared at the Paris Match offices, this time with one Feliks ROSENTAL who acted as his interpreter. He displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and he submitted a one-page document in English which gave a short account of NOSENKO's background. The document said in part: "NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident (the defection). Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." The document, which was in no way represented as coming from a Soviet Government source, also said that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family in Moscow could be obtained and that an interview with the family and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent.*

---

* According to information available to CIA, a divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request. There is no known precedent for either Soviet-inspired publicity or divorce difficulties in any previous Soviet defection.

Photographs submitted to PARIS MATCH (See Part III.H.)



Subject (circa 1963)



Subject's wife, elder daughter and younger daughter (circa 1965)



Photograph of Subject from passport used for temporary assignments to England in 1957 and 1958 (see Part V.D.8)



Photograph of Subject from passport used on assignment to Geneva in 1964 (see Part III.B.2)



Subject (February 1964)

Subject's father, the Minister of Shipbuilding (1953)

I. Repercussions Within the KGB

1. [redacted] sensitive source

sensitive source

According to [redacted], it was the "unanimous opinion" of the KGB leadership and of KGB officers [redacted] that "NOSENKO could do a tremendous amount of harm to the KGB," and that this damage would be severe for "several years to come." As a direct result, [redacted], new regulations were promulgated to increase KGB operational security in Moscow and abroad.

In addition, the defection brought about the dismissal from the KGB of persons close to NOSENKO and the recall of many officers abroad -- [redacted] -- known to and presumably compromised by NOSENKO.*

Five months after NOSENKO disappeared from Geneva, in July 1964, [redacted] said that 15 KGB officers had already been fired. Among them were GRIBANOV** and a number of his deputies

sensitive source

---

* [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

** See Part V.H. regarding NOSENKO's relationship with GRIBANOV.

including one General BANNIK.* Since NOSENKO was GRIBANOV's personal friend and protege, [redacted] stated it had been decided that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans and was therefore ultimately responsible. [redacted] reported further [redacted] that GRIBANOV had been dismissed from the KGB and the Communist Party immediately after the defection, adding that GRIBANOV had personally authorized NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, despite the fact that he had received a summary statement of NOSENKO's capabilities and activities which contained enough "compromising material" to prevent such a trip under normal conditions.** [redacted] reported having learned that GRIBANOV was the chief of security at a military plant outside Moscow and is considered a "nothing."*** Others dismissed from the KGB included GUK and Ye.A. TARABRIN, Chief of the British Department, First Chief Directorate.****

sensitive source

---

* [redacted]

** According to NOSENKO in 1965, it was BANNIKOV who supported his candidacy for the 1964 trip to Geneva; as far as he knew, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV was not involved. Earlier, however, NOSENKO stated that his 1964 trip had been approved by GRIBANOV.

*** Reportedly GRIBANOV continued an operational contact with a Western Ambassador in Moscow until as recently as the autumn of 1964. This is a type of activity in which GRIBANOV was often engaged while serving as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate.

**** In 1962 NOSENKO told CIA: "GRIBANOV and I are very friendly socially and we have often caroused together unofficially... He is very friendly and we often go out drinking together." Under interrogation in April 1964 NOSENKO was asked specifically whether he had ever gone out socially with GRIBANOV after working hours. He replied that he had done so on one occasion and that TARABRIN was present at the time. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked the same question and this time answered that he had seen GRIBANOV three times socially, most recently in October or November 1963; TARABRIN, he said, was the only other person present on these three occasions; all three outings began as drinking parties in Moscow restaurants and the latter two ended at the homes of girls NOSENKO had been asked to procure. Although [redacted] indicated that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department at the time he was fired, NOSENKO said he had held this position only until 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of the newly established Service No. 2 (Counterintelligence) of the First Chief Directorate.

[redacted]

[redacted]

2. [redacted] source

At the time of NOSENKO's defection, [redacted] told CIA in 1964, he was in training for an illegals assignment in the West, but these plans were cancelled partly because of the NOSENKO case and partly for other reasons not specified to [redacted] One of his handlers informed [redacted] that the NOSENKO matter was very serious, that the KGB was on a "major alert" as a result, and that all missions had been halted to make readjustments.

3. [redacted] source

In Geneva at the time of NOSENKO's defection, [redacted] reported to CIA that just afterwards V.S.MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee* travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. [redacted] also reported that the defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEFREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva, and among the Soviets there it was rumored that some 60 Soviet officials then stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignments in consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet representation in Geneva, speculated to [redacted] that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and therefore would have to return to Moscow. Y.I. GUK , said [redacted], who had known and reported on GUK for years, was discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva, and according to one rumor, the chief of the department where NOSENKO had been employed would lose his job. (This would be A.G.KOVALENKO who, according to NOSENKO, was Chief of the Tourist Department at the time of the defection.)

---

* MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly stationed in New York City, was said [redacted] to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conduct interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. [redacted] identified MEDVEDEV, then a Counselor at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, "but his role is not important and he works mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

4. KGB Handlers of Agents

A reflection of NOSENKO's defection was seen in KGB's handling of [redacted], the subject of a lead received from NOSENKO and [redacted] double agent.* [redacted] on 31 March 1964, was questioned by two of the KGB officers about possible surveillance and was asked to provide passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be supplied to him and his family. At this same meeting, the KGB officers announced that [redacted] was being put on reserve status for an unspecified period and told him that this decision had been made about two months earlier (i.e., about the time of NOSENKO's defection). At the next meeting in November 1964, the Soviet handlers admitted to [redacted] that they had "some connection" with NOSENKO. Although NOSENKO probably could not identify [redacted] as a KGB agent, they said, there was a possibility that he knew "what we [the KGB] are doing in Canada."

Also, in Paris, Sergeant Robert JOHNSON was told of NOSENKO's defection by his KGB case officer and was instructed to destroy anything which could identify him with Soviet Intelligence. Although the Soviet told JOHNSON that there was nothing to worry about, he was evidently disturbed by the defection, JOHNSON said.**

---

* See Part VI.D.5.c. for full details of the [redacted]

** See Part VI.D.3.c. for a discussion of the JOHNSON case.

IV. NON-KGB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S LIFE

A. Introduction

The biography of NOSENKO is built largely upon his own statements to CIA, but certain portions of it have been substantiated (as well as contradicted) by other Soviet sources. Given first below is the NOSENKO autobiography for the period preceeding his entry into the KGB, then follows a summary of his statements about his non-professional life since becoming a KGB officer, and finally there is presented a review of what other sources have said on these subjects. A separate section of this paper, Part V, discusses NOSENKO's career in the KGB.

B. NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography

Although several other sources have since NOSENKO's defection furnished fragmentary information concerning NOSENKO's early personal history, NOSENKO himself has, of course, been the principal source on this topic. He volunteered information during the 1962 meetings, during debriefings in early 1964, and under interrogation in April 1964, in 1965, and in 1966. These various accounts are arranged in separate columns in the following table, and they are organized chronologically from NOSENKO's birth to his alleged entry into the KGB. The first column in the table contains statements which NOSENKO made during the June 1962 meetings in Geneva; these were taken from the transcripts of the meetings and, for the most part, are in NOSENKO's own words. The column headed "1964," derived from the April 1964 interrogation, reflects a number of changes in his story before and during that interrogation. Most of the information given in the "1965" column was taken from discussions with NOSENKO, mainly on his early years, by a CIA psychologist in May of that year; however, material from the February 1965 interrogation and from DERYABIN's interrogation in July and August has also been included when it was not covered in the psychologist's questioning and when NOSENKO signed protocols certifying his statements to be correct. The "April 1966" column is comprised of remarks by NOSENKO in a signed autobiography submitted to CIA at that time. The final column presents the results of the October 1966 interrogation as they pertain to NOSENKO's early life. From column to column appear inconsistencies and contradictions with regard to dates and locations furnished by NOSENKO, although in 1964, again in 1965, and most recently in October 1966 NOSENKO has said that he was "now" telling the truth. The table shows where he has admitted having previously lied about certain events and where he seems to have forgotten his earlier statements to CIA about the occurrence of other events affecting his life.

This tabulation of NOSENKO's autobiography concludes in Part V.A., in which are quoted the various dates and circumstances concerning his entry into the KGB which NOSENKO has given in 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1966.

	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
4	"I was born in Nikolayev, my father worked as a senior mechanic at a plant and took evening courses. Then he graduated from the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute."	Born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, Ukraine, USSR, where he lived with family until 1934.	Born 1927 in Nikolayev where father was a student at the Shipbuilding Institute. Father from simple peasant background, while mother's parents were nobility. (May)	"I, NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, was born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, an oblast center in the Ukrainian Republic of Soviet Russia."	Born 1927 in Nikolayev, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO and Tamara Georgievna NOSENKO.
		In 1934, at age six, entered the "zero" (nulevoy) class, equivalent to kindergarten, in Nikolayev.	Entered the "zero" class in Nikolayev in September 1934, two months before his seventh birthday. (May)	"In September 1934, in Nikolayev, I entered the 'zero' class. My father was already in Leningrad, where he was working at the Sudomekh Shipyard."	
8	"My father was sent to Leningrad, to the Sudomekh plant, a small plant in Leningrad. He was at the plant for half a year and then became director. This was 1936-1937. Then he was sent to the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad as Chief Engineer. He was there less than a year."	Moved to Leningrad in 1935, where father was first appointed chief engineer and later director of Sudomekh. Lived at several addresses and attended several schools. [Note: Soviet press stated elder NOSENKO was chief engineer of "several enterprises" in Leningrad during	Moved to Leningrad, probably in spring of 1935. Attended three years of school there, completing First Class in 1935-36, Second Class in 1936-37, and Third Class in 1937-38. (May)	"Shortly thereafter he [father] found an apartment and, interrupting my studies, I travelled to Leningrad with my mother. I did not begin studies in the First Class until September 1935 as there were no 'zero' classes in the Leningrad schools. I finished the Third Class in Leningrad in 1938."	Lived in Leningrad from 1935 to 1938.

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	1935-1937; became director of Baltic Shipyard in 1938.]			
"In 1938 my father was assigned to Moscow as Deputy Peoples' Commissar. I was only a little boy. In 1939 he was appointed Peoples' Commissar, later Minister, of the Shipbuilding Industry and remained such until his death in 1956."	NOSENKO's father was appointed First Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and then became Commissar. Family returned to Moscow and NOSENKO entered 10-year school located on Ulitsa Bol'shaya Polyanka. [Note: Soviet press reported that I.I. NOSENKO became Deputy Commissar in 1939 and Commissar in 1940.]	In 1938 the elder NOSENKO was named First Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar of Shipbuilding and the family returned to Moscow. NOSENKO entered a school on Bol'shaya Polyanka. He completed the Fourth Class in 1938-1939 and the fifth class in 1939-1940. (May)	"In 1938 my father was summoned to Moscow and he began to work in the Peoples' Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry. Having finished the Third Class, I moved to Moscow with my mother at the end of the summer."	
	Completed the Sixth Class at School No. 585. Went to Sochi with parents for vacation and was there when war broke out. Returned to Moscow the next day.	NOSENKO finished the Sixth Class at the 10-year school on Bol'shaya Polyanka during the 1940-1941 academic year. Then he travelled on vacation to Sochi, where the family stayed at a "rest home" of the Council Ministers. Learned of war's outbreak on the radio while there	"In 1941 I completed the Sixth Class at the 585th middle school and went to Sochi for a vacation with my father and mother. On 21 June, during our vacation in the south, the war began and for this reason my parents and I returned to Moscow the next day."	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		and returned to Moscow the next day by train. (May)		
	Enrolled in Moscow Special Naval School, but studies did not begin in Moscow because of the war and immediate plans to evacuate the school. In September 1941 NOSENKO spent one week digging trenches with a group from the school, and on 10 October he travelled with the rest of the school to Kuybyshev. There he began his studies in the Seventh Class.	Enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev, attended the 1941-42 school year in Kuybyshev. (May)	"In October 1941 my mother and I were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where I completed the Seventh Class in June 1942." [Note: NOSENKO here added a year to his life which he had not mentioned earlier. To accommodate this change he subtracted a year from the time he spent at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku. See below.]	**Went to Chelyabinsk from Moscow in 1941, after the start of the war.**
"I studied first in a school of the Navy. There I sailed aboard boats and cutters." [No date given.]	In June 1942 completed the Seventh Class at the Moscow Special Naval School in Kuybyshev. Returned to Moscow in July with about three other boys from the school. Prevailed on father to allow transfer to "real military school" and enrolled in the Leningrad	In summer 1942 returned from Kuybyshev to Moscow on leave. While there somehow learned that Special Naval School to be moved from Kuybyshev to Achinsk, Siberia. Did not want to go so far away from home, so enrolled in Leningrad Naval Prep School, Baku. Spent	"I completed the Seventh Class in Chelyabinsk. In the beginning of the summer of 1942 I moved from Chelyabinsk to Gor'kiy and soon after this returned to Moscow. In Moscow I was accepted in the Special Naval School which in August 1942 was evacuated to Kuybyshev. There	**Was in Gor'kiy for a time in the summer of 1942.**

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Naval Preparatory School which had been evacuated from Leningrad to Baku. Spent summer vacation at home in Moscow with parents.	summer with parents in Moscow. (May)	I entered the Eighth Class."	
	After 3 1/2 months in Moscow, left by train for Baku with a group of about 30 other students in October. The trip lasted 14 days. Route not recalled. Arriving in Baku joined Prep School and spent about a month in "quarantine." Then assigned to the Ninth Training Company, in the Third Course, equivalent to the Eighth Class. [Note: The Moscow-Rostov railroad line was cut by the Germans by this time. The only possible route at this time would have been a long and circuitous one via Tashkent]	Went to Baku by train in October. Trip took two weeks. Spent first four to six months in Baku in "quarantine," which was similar to American bootcamp. Enrolled in the First Course, equivalent to the Eighth Class. (May)	[In Kuybyshev; see above entry.]	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Took military oath. [Note: NOSENKO was 15 years old at this time, by law too young to take oath. This point stressed in April 1964 interrogations.]	Took military oath at end of "quarantine" period. Oath administered to make boys feel a part of service although too young. Oath taken between 15th and 16th birthdays, i.e., after October 1942 and before November 1943. NOSENKO certain he celebrated 15th birthday in Baku in 1942. (May)	[Studying in Kuybyshev. See above entries.]	
	Completed Third Course (Eighth Class) in June 1943. Took no vacation but spent summer working at the school in Baku. In September 1943 began new school year in the Second Course, equivalent to Ninth Class.	Completed First Course in June and spent summer of 1943 at school. Entered Second Course at the Naval Prep School in Baku in September 1943. (May)	[Completed Eighth Class in Kuybyshev.] "During the summer of 1943 I returned to Moscow on vacation. The Special Naval School was to be evacuated from Kuybyshev to Achinsk and therefore, not wanting to go to Achinsk, I enrolled in the Naval Preparatory School in Baku.	"I took the military oath in Baku. I was 15 years old at the time. This was in 1943." [No month given.]
	Along with 15 or 20 classmates, NOSENKO submitted a collective letter asking to be sent	Since 1942 NOSENKO had had an "obsession" about getting into the war. Students from	"While at the Naval Prep School in Baku, in October 1943, I joined the KOMSOMOL."	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	to the front because they had heard that students at the Frunze Higher Naval School had gone. Request caused an uproar and investigations. Permission denied.	the Frunze Higher School had gone to the front in 1942 and some of the older boys at the Prep School went in early 1943. Fired up, NOSENKO and about eight others filed a petition to be allowed to fight. (May)		
	Joined KOMSOMOL.		[See above entry.]	
inning of 1944)				
	In January, together with classmate Yura RADCHENKO, NOSENKO went to the city military commissariat in Baku to inquire about joining a Marine detachment. They were turned down and thereupon ran away from the Naval Prep School. Travelling by boxcar, the two went to Stantsiya Lazarevskaya via Tbilisi and from there walked to Tuapse in search of the mili-	After receiving a scolding from school authorities for having submitted the petition, NOSENKO and several other boys began to plot to run away to the front. When the time came in early 1944 only one other boy, RADCHENKO, would accompany him. The two slipped out of school, made their way to the railway station, and found a freight train heading toward Tuapse. On arriving in Tuapse they were arrested almost immediately	"I studied in Baku only for half the school year because I ran away from school, home to Moscow, in the beginning of 1944!"	The story about going to or toward the front was a lie, NOSENKO said.

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		tary front. Arriving in Tuapse, they were arrested and were then returned to Baku under guard. In Baku, they managed to escape again before being returned to the Prep School. After hiding a few days at the home of a girlfriend, NOSENKO and RADCHENKO travelled to Moscow by train, using forged documentation obtained by a friend in the Naval Prep School. They were arrested at the Moscow Railroad Station by military police who had been alerted by authorities in Baku. NOSENKO's father bailed him out. [Note: Previous accounts varied widely. NOSENKO originally said he had participated in the battle for Novorossiysk with his entire class from the "Frunze Higher Naval School." This battle actually took place in September 1942. On a later occasion, NOSENKO	at the station, several days later they were returned to Baku where they managed to escape. They then travelled to Moscow using false documents and were arrested at the train station on arrival. (May)		

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1965	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	said that he and RADCHENKO saw combat near Tuapse.]			
	Took Ninth Class exams after studying as an "external student" at the Gorniy Institute in Moscow. Passed these and through father's influence was transferred back to the Naval Prep School, which had just moved back to Leningrad from Baku. Travelled to Leningrad to join his class in September.	Did not want to return to Baku as ashamed to face classmates after failure to get to front. Remained at home and attended adult education courses at Gorniy Institute and had special tutors in math and Russian grammar. Finished Ninth Class in spring or summer and travelled in fall to Leningrad to rejoin class in Prep School. (May)	"In Moscow I finished the Ninth Class as an external student at Gorniy Institute and at the end of the summer of 1944... was enrolled in the Naval School in Leningrad and travelled there in the month of August."	
	Studies did not start at once. NOSENKO and others lived in Narva and worked in the woods.	Arriving in Leningrad NOSENKO was assigned to a group made up of stragglers and was sent to the forest near Leningrad to cut wood for the winter supply at the school. Conditions were terrible--the work was hard and the weather was cold, damp, and miserable. (May)		

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Studies in Tenth Class of Naval Preparatory School commenced in November 1944.	About three or four days before the boys were to return to Leningrad a car was sent for NOSENKO. He returned to Leningrad to stay in the Hotel Astoria with his father who was visiting with a delegation. After this he went back to school, sometime in November. (May)		
	At the end of April 1945, NOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party by a jealous young officer and was hospitalized. In the ensuing investigation he protected the real culprit by pretending that he had shot himself accidentally while cleaning a gun. He never saw the officer again.	Sometime in February or March, a female acquaintance of an unknown Navy officer began to flirt with NOSENKO. The officer became angry, drew his gun and shot NOSENKO through the hand. The officer was apologetic, and NOSENKO promised not to report the incident. The wound grew worse, however, and NOSENKO was forced to enter the hospital. He told the doctor that he had accidentally shot himself with a souvenir gun. He was hospitalized for about three weeks. (May)	"In the beginning of 1945 I accidentally shot myself through the hand and spent about a month recuperating in the Navy hospital."	NOSENKO shot himself through the hand. This was absolutely accidental and was not an attempt to avoid military duty. [Note: NOSENKO made this statement in response to a direct question. The question was based on a report from [redacted] source [redacted] that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a "naval college in Leningrad in 1942."]

TOP SECRET

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
May-June 1944	"I finished the Naval School, then was in the Navy. I fought," (boyeval--presumably in World War II). "In 1945 I was demobilized."	While in the hospital, NOSENKO applied for release from military service. This was assisted by father's friends. After release from the hospital he did not want to return to school. He called his father and then spent a week with friends of the family in Leningrad before getting a room in a dormitory at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum. Despite failure to return to the Naval Prep School, NOSENKO was credited with satisfactory completion of the school year (Tenth Class). In June he passed the exams for the Second Course at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum. He then went to the District Military Commissariat and was demobilized. He received his military reserve registration and a certificate of satisfactory completion of	In the hospital NOSENKO decided he could not return to school as he was ashamed of the type of girls he had been with the night of the accident and could not stand the thought of being made an example of by the school KOMSOMOL organization. He left the hospital in civilian clothes and stayed with a friend of his father. He obtained a statement that he had attended the Naval Prep School, which was just a report of his courses and an average of his marks up to that time. As the son of a minister it was then easy for him to enter the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum where, with special tutoring, he was able to complete the Tenth Class in the summer. (May)	"After this [hand shooting] incident I did not want to go back to the school and began to study at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in Leningrad, in the Second Course, in order to complete the Tenth Class. In May or June 1945, with the help of the Director of the Tekhnikum, I received documentation certifying that I had completed the Second Course which made it possible for me to enter the Institute [of International Relations] and I returned to my parents in Moscow."	

TOP SECRET

TE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		ten year's schooling. [Note: A biographical statement was drawn up on the basis of NOSENKO's statements in January-February 1964 and approved by NOSENKO as correct in February 1964. This statement said that he completed his 10-year education at the Baku school in the spring of 1943 and thereby became eligible to enter a higher educational institution. From 1943 to 1945, the statement continued, NOSENKO attended the Frunze Higher Naval School (a counterpart of Annapolis). After three years there, he decided to leave the Navy, was demobilized and entered the Institute of International Relations. In October 1966, NOSENKO said he had lied about attending Frunze Academy.]			
ly 94	"After the war I went to study at the Institute of International Relations...In 1945 I was demobilized.	NOSENKO decided he did not want to study further at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum and returned to Moscow where he	NOSENKO decided he would like a career in the foreign service and returned to Moscow, where he passed the entrance	"In July 1945 I entered the Institute of International Relations."	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	passed the entrance examinations for the Institute of International Relations (IIR). The exam consisted only of a composition, dictation, and an interview.	exams for the IIR. (May)		
	Travelled to Germany with his father who was leading a delegation. For the purpose of the trip only, NOSENKO was issued a uniform and documents showing him to be a senior lieutenant. When he returned to Moscow he continued to pass himself off as an officer who had seen combat in the war and eventually got into trouble at the institute because of this. Began studies in Faculty of International Law and English language in September.	Travelled to East Germany in August 1945 with father's delegation. Given temporary commission as senior lieutenant for the trip. Continued to wear uniform on return, even to classes at the institute. Entered institute on return from Germany and chose to specialize in English language and U.S. area studies for reasons he could not recall. (May)		

TOP SECRET

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
June 1946		Completed first year at Institute of International Relations.			
eptember 1946		Began second year at IIR.			
June 1947		Completed second year at IIR. Commissioned junior lieutenant in Reserves.	With help of temporary documents used for the trip to Germany, NOSENKO managed to exempt himself from compulsory military training during his first two years at IIR. When it was found that his claims of active duty were false, he was commissioned a junior lieutenant in the Reserves along with his classmates. (May)		In 1947 commissioned a junior lieutenant in the reserves. Did not undergo any military training. After completing second year at the Institute, began to do military translations to avoid military service.
eptember 1947		Began third year at IIR.	In third year at IIR NOSENKO began to specialize in International law. (May)		
Late 1947	[NOSENKO was talk-about his present wife.] "This is my second wife. I was married before... I cannot say that I	While studying at the IIR NOSENKO was dating Augustina Konstantinovna TELEGINA, the daughter of a lieutenant general.	"I was a friend and companion of TELEGINA for some months before her father was arrested in connection with STALIN's campaign	"While I was studying at the Institute, at the end of 1947, I married Augustina Konstantinovna TELEGINA, who was born in 1929"	

	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	loved her a great deal...The war had just ended. I wanted peace. I wanted a quiet corner. I wanted someone to look after me...and so we became acquainted. We saw each other for about two weeks. Let's get married. I married her. That's all." [Note: NOSENKO did not date this marriage other than to imply it was right after the war; it is included here to place it in the context of later statements.]	TELEGIN was arrested by STALIN, and NOSENKO married Augustina soon afterwards, in about November 1947.	against associates of Marshall ZHUKOV. However, we never planned to marry. After the arrest, however, I decided to marry her in order to show my strength of character. I cannot remember the date of the marriage, which was my first. I think that it happened in 1947, but do not know what season or how long after the arrest of TELEGIN." (Interrogation Protocol signed in February 1965.)		
18	"One Monday...at 10 o'clock [I came home early from work]. Suddenly I heard--I approached on tietoe--What is this? In my bed, who is lying with my wife? Her older brother. Well, I slammed the door, left, and did not go back. Never went back. That was all.	Broke off marriage after several months when he found his wife in flagrante delicto with her brother. The two were separated, but not divorced, at this time. [Note: As with other dates connected with the TELEGINA marriage, NOSENKO has been imprecise here: in	"One morning--I cannot remember the date or season, but it was in the first half of 1948--I came early and unexpected from my studies at the Institute of Internation Relations t to the apartment of my wife's mother, where I sometimes met my wife, and surprised her in sexual inter-	"I lived with my first wife until 1949."	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
Bye bye...Well, you can imagine my horror." [Note: Portions of the tape of this conversation are unreadable. It is clearly implied that this scene took place at NOSENKO's own home.]	April 1964 he said on another occasion that he found his wife with her brother sometime prior to June 1947.]	course with her brother. I walked out without comment. The next day I returned to our apartment where my wife and I continued to live together, although our relationship was strained. I stayed with her because she was pregnant at the time." (Protocol signed February 1965.)		
	Completed third year at IIR.			
"A child was born who might have been mine and who might not have been mine. God knows. There was still no child when I left. Well, I helped out. I sent money. That's all. But I didn't see either her or the child." [Note: NOSENKO provided no date for the above.]		Girl with hare lip and cleft palate born to TELEGINA. NOSENKO decided deformity was due to her incestuous relationship with her brother. Subsequently gave his wife a little money to help support the child, but never considered it his. Marriage cooled still further, but NOSNEKO continued to live in the apartment. (May)		

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Began fourth year at IIR.			
	Completed fourth year at IIR.			
	Successfully defended his thesis on the subject of "Diplomatic Immunity."			
	Completed English language studies.	NOSENKO was through with courses at the Institute in January 1950 and had already defended his thesis on "Diplomatic Immunity." The last half-year at the Institute was relatively free because the students were given time to prepare for the state exams which were required for graduation. (May)		
	In March or April 1950 NOSENKO was interviewed by the assignments commission of the IIR and was tentatively assigned to the GRU. In May 1950 he went to the	Before taking his final state exams, NOSENKO went before the placement board. Here they talked about his possible assignments and although no definite decision was reached	"In the spring of 1950 before the beginning of the state examinations a personnel placement commission was created at the Institute and I declared to it my	The Placement Commission sent NOSENKO to the MGB where he was told he was not a suitable candidate. The reason was for "little things. I was drunk several times, only an average student, etc."

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	GRU Personnel Department for an interview with Colonel KALOSHIN on the instructions of the chief of the "secret unit" at the IIR.	it was suggested he go into the Navy. After this, but before the state exams, NOSENKO visited a special section of the Navy Ministry to give them special documents for a security check. Although it was not stated, NOSENKO believed he was slated for Navy Intelligence. (May)	wish to work in some sort of military organization. Soon thereafter the chief of the Institute's special section gave me a telephone number and told me to call it. The number was K-6...and I realized that the MGB was interested in me since these numbers belonged to the MGB. I called the number and was told to come to the MGB... the conversation [at the MGB] concerned my biography and my knowledge of the English language.. Nothing was said about where it was intended for me to work....Later the chief of the Institute's special section told me my qualifications were not suitable for the MGB."	**NOSENKO said he did not mention this earlier because his interrogators would not have believed that the MGB first turned him down and they later accepted him in 1953.**

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Took state exams for completion of the Institute. Passed three of them but flunked Marxism-Leninism. Advised GRU and was told to call back when he had his IIR diploma. He was allowed to take the Navy physical exam, which lasted three days.	After failing the state exam NOSENKO had someone in his father's office call the GRU to see what he should do. It turned out that the security check would take a long time and NOSENKO was told to check back after he had passed the exam. (May)	"During the summer of 1950, while the state exams were underway, I began to process for entry into the Navy GRU. My processing took place through Colonel KALOSHIN, the Chief of the GRU Personnel Department. Up until March 1951 I repeatedly visited the Ministry of the Navy... I filled out questionaires in duplicate, wrote two autobiographies and submitted copies of my diploma." [Note: NOSENKO in his 1966 autobiography did not mention having failed the exam in Marxism-Leninism.]	
"I finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950, after this I worked in the GRU of the Navy."	Passed exams on second try and received diploma of completion of IIR. Contacted Colonel KALOSHIN of GRU Personnel. Submitted	NOSENKO checked back with GRU Personnel after passing his exams. (May)	"I submitted copies of my diploma to GRU Personnel." [See above entry.] NOSENKO processing for GRU entry.	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	diploma, transcript of grades, and other necessary papers. [Note: Previously in 1964 NOSENKO stated that he graduated from the IIR, which at that time was a four-year course, in mid-1949 and "just loafed around" for a year. He later changed the completion date to late 1949 or early 1950. Then he changed this to say that he failed exams in 1949 and had been forced to wait an entire year before he could retake them in 1950. Finally he gave the version above.]			
"When they offered me [assignments in] Moscow, Leningrad and the Far East I took the Far East so that nobody could say that Yuriy NOSENKO took advan-	Entered on active duty with the Navy on 17-19 September 1950, when he received orders transferring him from a junior lieutenant in the Reserves to a junior	In the autumn of 1950 received orders transferring him from the Reserve to active duty. Offered a choice of duty posts, NOSENKO chose to go to the Far East "in order to prove he	[See above entries.] Still processing for GRU entry.	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
tage of his father's position."	lieutenant on active duty. Received orders to the Intelligence Staff of the Seventh Far East Fleet. [Note: In an earlier version, NOSENKO said he entered the GRU in 1949, having finished the Institute of International Relations the same year.]	was now ready to make a man of himself...in the country God forgot." (May)		
"I worked in the field of information in the Far East, in the city of Sovetskaya Gavan...in the field of information--radio intercept, etc. All your movements, when you moved vessels to Chemul'po, Korea, the Korean operation...we knew all the ships there because you talked on the air. You transmitted. We knew each division, its name, its number, everything...	On approximately 1 October 1950 NOSENKO left Moscow by train for the Far East. The trip to Bukhta Postovaya (near Sovetskaya Gavan), where his unit was stationed, took nine or ten days. Assigned to work in the Information Section under Captain Second Rank KHAYTOV. Duties included translations from American Naval literature and making summaries of American Navy OB in	Arriving at his duty station NOSENKO was assigned to the Information Section. He liked the work and did a good job despite the rigorous conditions. During his service here he received special mention as an outstanding officer. There were 300 to 350 intercept operators there. NOSENKO and other officers analyzed the take as well as information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok. (May)	[See above entries] Still processing for GRU entry.	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
and we reported this to Moscow. I don't know what was done with this information after this. So, we were concerned with information."	Far East. There was a unit involved in radio intercept of American Naval targets in Korean area, but NOSENKO was not personally concerned with this work.			
	Promoted to the rank of lieutenant.	After about seven months in the Far East, NOSENKO was promoted to lieutenant. This was April 1951. Normally one is promoted from junior lieutenant to lieutenant only after a year's service in grade. This can be reduced to six months in the Far East. (May)	"On 12 March 1951 two orders were issued by the Naval Ministry; one concerning my enlistment in the Navy and the other assigning me as a translator to the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet (Military Unit 70176). The following day at KALOSHIN's instructions I reported to the Moscow City Military Commission where I was issued my passport and my voyenyy bilet. The Commission also issued me temporary duty orders and travel documents. On 16 or 17 March I left Moscow for my duty post. I arrived at Bukhta Postovaya at the end of March and	"I lied when I said I started in the GRU in 1950. It was really March 1951." [Note: No effort was made to obtain a reason for this lie or to question NOSENKO on its implications for his earlier statements about promotions, etc.] "I was on active duty in Sovetskaya Gavan--Bukhta Postovaya from 1951 to 1953."

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
				began work in the Information Department of the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet.	
End of 1951		NOSENKO involved in apprentice work in the Agent-Intelligence Section at Bukhta Postovaya. This involved going out to sea on subchasers to pick up and drop off, and conducting meetings with agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin. NOSENKO did not actually meet agents, but was merely along to learn how they were picked up at sea.			
January-February 1952		Filed action by mail to divorce TELEGINA in Moscow court and published intention notice in a local Sovetskaya Gavan newspaper in January or February.	NOSENKO was planning to divorce his wife before he left Moscow but did not start proceedings because he was afraid she would bring charges against him in the KOMSOMOL. Sometime in late 1951 or early 1952 he published his notice		

TOP SECRET

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
			of intent in a local newspaper and forwarded the necessary papers to Moscow. (May)		
April 1952		Left Bukhta Postovaya and returned to Moscow on leave. Arrived at the end of April and reported to KALOSHIN. Requested transfer from the Far East.	On 1 May 1952 NOSENKO's father was to observe his 50th birthday. NOSENKO's two-year tour in the Far East would not be up until October or November 1952, and he was not entitled to any leave until it was ended. However, his section chief was very understanding and arranged for him to leave in April so that he could be in Moscow for the birthday celebration. NOSENKO flew to Khabarovsk where he had a "two-day drunken orgy" with another Naval officer. He then continued on to Moscow in time for the May Day and birthday celebrations. The next day he reported to the Navy Ministry and was told to re-	"At the end of April 1952 I left Sovetskaya Gavan on leave, arriving in Moscow on 28 April."	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
"I worked in the ar East until 1952, hen suddenly I fell ill. In the Far East. It was this way. Then I arrived in Moscow, I went to the doctor. They began to x-ray me. Clear lungs, absolutely. They examined me one day, two days, three days. Clear, absolutely clear. Then by accident, right under my collarbone, a small, small, little spot was found and it turned out to be on a blood vessel. It turned out to be at a very early stage. At that time they had just discovered streptomycin and I was confined at the Hertzen Sanitorium near Moscow. I was there for two months. I felt fine but they	NOSENKO was on leave during May and June 1952 and lived during this time at the home of his parents at No. 4 Ulitsa Gor'kogo in Moscow. He received one month leave for his 1951 service in the Far East and the other for his 1952 service there. [Note: NOSENKO did not mention having had tuberculosis during any interrogations or statements in 1964. According to his 1966 statements, he spent only one year, March 1951 to April 1952, in the Far East.]	turn at the end of his leave for reassignment. (May) NOSENKO was on leave during May and June. No decision had been reached with regard to whether he would return to Sovetskaya Gavan or not and he was "at the disposal" of the Naval Ministry during this period. After the leave, NOSENKO waited another month until his assignment was decided upon. (May) [Note: NOSENKO did not mention having been hospitalized in this period.]	"While on leave I became ill with tuberculosis and spent almost two months in a sanitorium near Moscow." [Note: In another statement, written a week earlier, NOSENKO said that in Sovetskaya Gavan "drunkeness and the severe conditions had their effect on my health and led to an outbreak of tuberculosis in May 1952."]	NOSENKO confirmed that he was at the Herzen Sanitorium during this period and said that as a result of his illness he was "coughing up a half a glass of blood at a time." His treatment consisted of shots of streptomycin.

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	gave me shots of streptomycin every hour for two months and stopped this disease at once. After this I had check-ups for five years, was carried on their books until 1957. It was nothing."				
Mid-1952	"They offered me the opportunity to study in the Military-Diplomatic Academy. I went and took a look at the courses they had to offer--Marxism, Philosophy, History, and so on. Well, what did I need this for? I already knew this. I said: 'No, I won't go.'"		During the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to the Military-Diplomatic Academy, to a special Navy espionage school, and to Germany, but turned all of them down for various reasons. He rejected the opportunity to attend the Military-Diplomatic Academy because he had already had 96 per cent of the courses in the Institute. (May)		NOSENKO was offered an opportunity to attend the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but did not want to go. Besides, he failed the physical examinations for entrance when sugar was discovered in his faeces. NOSENKO drank too much.
July-August 1952	"After my illness and after the Far East I received orders to the Baltic. On the Baltic there is a city which was formerly	Following his regular leave NOSENKO was ordered by the Navy to proceed to Berlin and Rostok, but refused to go	NOSENKO received orders to Sovetsk and arrived there in late August or early September 1952. In Sovetsk NOSENKO was assigned a political	"During the month of July the Personnel Department of the GRU reached a decision concerning the place of my	NOSENKO was shown a map of Kaliningradskaya Oblast showing Primorsk to be where he said Sovetsk should be located. NOSENKO continued to

①

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
the German city of Pillau and is now called Primorsk." There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of "agent-observation posts." Suitable candidates were selected from among the crews of ships. They were then formed into groups of three men each and were trained in radio-operation, demolition, etc. After this the groups split up and their members went their separate ways. In case of war the groups were to be reformed and sent behind enemy lines on sabotage and intelligence missions. [Note: The former German city of Pillau is now called Baltiysk, not Primorsk; the latter is a small village nearby.]	when he learned that the Naval Intelligence Points (MRP's) in Germany were closing down and that his final assignment was not definite. He then took more leave (unauthorized) until about 29 July when he left for Baltiysk and reported for duty to the Intelligence Staff of the Fourth Baltic Fleet. He was assigned to a Naval Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk, a small town near Baltiysk. There he prepared area training materials for and carried supplies to agents, but did not actually deal with or train them directly. [Note: Previously during the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO said that he had received training near Moscow and was then sent to Rostok and Sassnitz before	officer's job and helped train sailors for wartime agent missions. His main task was to prepare the training plan for the sailors, to instruct them in subjects such as "The Foreign Policy of the USSR," and generally to see to their needs. (May)	further assignment and I was ordered to the Naval Intelligence Point of the Fourth Baltic Fleet Intelligence Unit in Sovetsk, Kaliningradskaya Oblast. Sovetsk is located before you go out on the spit of land where Baltiysk (Pillau) stands. I arrived in Sovetsk in August 1952 and began to work in the Naval Intelligence Unit as a senior translator. Shortly before my arrival the Intelligence Point had been moved from Rostok, in Germany, to Sovetsk. [Note: It was clear from NOSENKO's earlier descriptions that the "Sovetsk" which NOSENKO described is, in fact, Primorsk, a small village on the coast. The only place called Sovetsk in Kaliningradskaya Oblast	say that he was assigned to Sovetsk in the summer of 1952. He was asked why, as a son of a minister and as a patient under treatment for tuberculosis, he was not assigned to the Black Sea or somewhere else with a healthy climate. NOSENKO explained that there were no positions available "elsewhere."

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	going to Baltiysk/Sovetsk. He then said this was a lie and gave the version above. The reason for the lie, NOSENKO said, was that he knew we "wouldn't believe the truth"--that he had successfully refused the assignment to Germany.]		is about 40 kilometers inland, and NOSENKO himself had said in 1962 that he served in Primorsk.] [redacted]	
No date given for divorce.	In mid-August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to Moscow from the Baltic for 7 to 10 days to complete divorce proceedings he had initiated in the Far East. This was not counted as leave, but as official business. He then returned to Sovetsk.	"Sometime after my return to Moscow from Sovetskaya Gavan, I carried through with my intention to divorce. My divorce was noted in my Officer's Booklet and nowhere else. I turned this document in to the KGB Personnel office when I began my KGB service and since then have had no record of the divorce. I continued to pay alimony to Augustina TELEGINA (one quarter of my salary) until I left the USSR in		

2

	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
			1964. She kept the name NOSENKO even after she remarried." [Note: This is placed here for comparison with his 1964 statement.]*		
	[See next entry.]	NOSENKO did not like his work in Sovetsk [sic] and wanted to return to Moscow to arrange for a transfer. He asked for annual leave which the unit commander refused to give him as he had none due. NOSENKO thereupon went to Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk and with his help obtained leave because of the elder NOSENKO's influential position. NOSENKO then returned to Moscow shortly before New Year's.	NOSENKO disliked his job as a political officer and was disdainful of the low educational level of those he was called upon to train, as well as of the "whole stupid" program. He remained in Sovetsk only until December 1952, when he obtained leave to spend the holidays with his parents in Moscow. (May)	"I remained in Sovetsk a short time and returned to Moscow at the end of the year [1952] with the aim of changing my place of work... While in Sovetsk I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service." [Note: See 1965 entry for the spring of 1951.]	
ry- 953	"In the beginning of 1953 I came to Moscow [from Primorsk]. This was '53, in the beginning.	"I arrived back in Moscow in December 1952, just before New Year's. I had vacation for the month of Janu-	In January NOSENKO and his parents went to visit the family of General KOBULOV at KOBULOV's dacha in Usov. NO-	"On 1 January 1953 my parents and I were guests at the dacha of KOBULOV who at that time was working in GUSIMZ in East Ber-	

TOP SECRET

65: NOSENKO was divorced from TELEGINA during his leave before going to Sovetsk (May and June 1952).

June 1962	-964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
in January. Well I came on leave to Moscow. I was there at my father's dacha, near Moscow. KOBULOV came to visit us at the dacha...a conversation started. He asked: 'What are you doing?' I answered: 'I am working in the GRU...I came home on leave.' KOBULOV asked: 'How do you like your work?' I said: 'Speaking frankly, I don't." 'Well,' he said, 'you better come work with us....Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' KOBULOV was First Deputy to BERIA and a great friend of my father's."	ary. At the end of January, at the end of my vacation I went back to GRU Personnel and saw KALOSHIN...I told him I did not like my job, all that typing, and he said: 'Well, wait a while. Look around.' I was at the disposal of the Personnel Department all of February. I had no work at all. And since I was not working, I did not get any pay for this month. During this vacation I was living with my father and mother on Gor'kiy Street."	SENKO and KOBULOV discussed NOSENKO's dissatisfaction with his Sovetsk assignment and KOBULOV suggested the possibility of NOSENKO getting into State Security work. (May)	lin with the WISMUTH company. This was the first time I met KOBULOV; I don't remember how the conversation came around to me, but I told KOBULOV about my work in the Naval GRU and my desire to change my place of work. He promised to find me a place in the MGB, but this promise was empty conversation."	
y- 53 ed	"After the New Year I went to this sanitorium, Kubinka, 75 or 78 kilometers from Moscow, and I was there January	"I met my [second] wife [Lyudmila KOZHEVNIKOVA] for the first time at the Herzen "House of Rest," one of the	"From the end of January to the middle of March I was under treatment at the sanitorium near Moscow where I had been	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	and part of February. After that I was home." [Note: This statement was made on 8 April. As no attempt was made to reconcile it with the previous entry, made on 6 April, and because NOSENKO offered no explanation, both are included here.]	"Houses of Rest" of the Council of Ministers. I was resting there for several days. She was there too. It's about 65-70 kilometers from Moscow, not far from Kubinka. I was waiting for my status to be resolved...I didn't want to stay alone at the dacha [his father's]. She was studying philology in the third course at Moscow State University. She had been seriously ill with tuberculosis when she was 17 and still required treatments." (Interrogation, 12 February 1965) [Note: NOSENKO's explanation of his presence at the "House of Rest" was given in response to the specific question: "What were you doing there?"]*	during the summer of 1952. Here I became acquainted with my second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA.	

---

ay 1965 NOSENKO said: "I met my wife in a House of Rest. I had been at Sosno in January but didn't like it. I tried Dyatkino and met her.

See June 1942 entry: Red Star, on 14 January 1967, reported that seven "special naval schools" were established in 1940 in Leningrad, Moscow, Vladivostok, Gorkiy, Kiev, Odessa, and Baku. There is no indication that any of

TOP SECRET

C. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB

1. Family Life

The Soviet internal passport which NOSENKO carried to Geneva in 1964 confirms his claim that he married Lyudmila KOZHEVNIKOVA on 27 June 1953. (They married approximately six months after he says he first met her at a sanatorium or "rest home" outside Moscow and about three months after he says he joined the KGB.) Immediately after their marriage the couple moved into the home of NOSENKO's new in-laws at Ulitsa Serafimovich 2, Moscow, where they lived until obtaining their own apartment on Narodnaya Ulitsa in January 1955.* KOZHEVNIKOVA's father is Yulian Nikolayevich KOZHEVNIKOV, a metallurgical engineer by training, who held the position of First Deputy Chairman of the State Scientific Research Committee (GKKNIR) of the RSFSR at the time of NOSENKO's defection.**

NOSENKO said that he has two daughters by this second marriage. According to his passport, the eldest of these, Oksana, was born on 21 August 1954 and the other, Tamara, on 13 July 1958.*** NOSENKO in 1962 displayed to his CIA handlers a photograph of the two girls and their mother and made a particular point of noting the close physical resemblance between

---

* On 23 April 1964 NOSENKO was questioned on the various apartments he occupied in Moscow. He said that, from the time of his marriage to TELEGINA until his departure for his first GRU post in the Far East, he lived in an apartment on Meshchanskaya Ulitsa. He gave up this apartment, he said, in 1950, when his Navy orders came through. Having made this statement, NOSENKO was then asked why the 1951 Moscow telephone directory still listed him at the Meshchanskaya Ulitsa address. He replied that he could not explain but that he was considered to have vacated the house in 1950. (He later said he moved to the Far East in 1951 - see Section IV.B.) NOSENKO then said that the previous tenant at Narodnaya Ulitsa 13 had been one Nikita ISHCHENKO. Although the phone then in the apartment was switched to NOSENKO's name for billing purposes, NOSENKO never bothered to have the change entered in the Moscow phone book; he said that this would have required a visit to a downtown office, the filling out of numerous forms, etc.; besides he added, he did not use the telephone anyway. Therefore, NOSENKO said, from 1955 until his defection in 1964, the telephone in his apartment was listed under the name of ISHCHENKO. He has repeated this story during subsequent questionings. The 1961 Moscow phone directory carries no listing for NOSENKO; it does list ISHCHENKO but gives his address as Krasnokholmskaya Naberezhnaya, not Narodnaya Ulitsa.

** The GKKNIR of the RSFSR is now the GNTK. PENKOVSKIY worked under cover in the GKKNIR of the USSR.

*** NOSENKO has also given his second daughter's year of birth as 1957. In 1962 he told CIA that the older daughter was then studying in the first class at school; in 1965, however, he said she began school in the fall of 1962.

Oksana and himself. He said that he and his wife refer to her as his "double" (kopiya). His wife, in a letter after the defection, referred to Oksana as NOSENKO's kopiya.

NOSENKO's father, the Shipbuilding Minister, died of stomach cancer in August 1956, three years after NOSENKO says he entered the KGB Second Chief Directorate. The period of time surrounding his father's death was, according to NOSENKO, a turning point in his personal and professional life. It was then that he "found himself" after an irresponsible past, drinking and wenching, and indifference to his work.

2. Venereal Disease

The incident which NOSENKO has most often cited as an example of his irresponsibility in the period prior to 1956 involved his illegal use of KGB alias documents to cover treatment for a case of gonorrhea he contracted in 1954, at the time his wife was pregnant with their first child. The CIA psychologist who questioned NOSENKO in May 1966 submitted the following summary of NOSENKO's statements about this incident, which are about as given earlier (during the April 1964 interrogation):

"A girl friend he had known in Leningrad since 1945 came to visit relatives in Moscow in 1954. She called him, and he spent some time with her. She was not a prostitute, and he had slept with her before, so he thought nothing of it. Later he developed what he feared was a venereal disease. Since his wife was pregnant, he was safe both from discovery and the danger of infecting her. He searched frantically around Moscow for a private doctor who treated such diseases, but could not find one. Some of his friends at the office suggested a central clinic that would require no documents. He went here but when confronted with a request for documents, had the choice of showing his KGB certificate or using a false passport he had for business. He tried to talk the doctor into letting him go home to get his documents, but the doctor said he would have to be accompanied by a member of the militia; otherwise he might not come back. He was required to take treatment of a communicable disease. He was forced to give the false document. He came back for treatment about three times and was ordered to report back in two weeks for a final check. They also demanded the name of the girl, but he claimed he had only just met her and did not know who she was. He forgot to go back and a nurse visited the safehouse about two times and left a note for him to report. However, he did not go to the safehouse so knew nothing of the note. In the false passport was a listing of where the named person worked, a fictitious factory. As the result of the clinic inquiries, the request for information got into the hands of the section which made the documents. NOSENKO was called before the deputy chief of the Directorate and severely criticized. He explained what had happened and was given five days of house arrest. However, the chief of his section had also gotten word of the infraction and sentenced him to fifteen days of house arrest without even talking to him. He told his wife he was going on a trip and moved into the administrative room near the office to serve his term. In the meantime, the Secretary of the KGB Party

Committee called NOSENKO's father on the phone and told him the whole story. NOSENKO's father never told either NOSENKO's wife or mother of the incident, but did chide NOSENKO about it. The incident was brought before the Komsomol and discussed. A written reprimand for immoral conduct-unauthorized use of official documents was placed in his record. This was also a final warning meaning that any other infraction would result in expulsion. He made the statement that he had been punished for this incident many times. He could not immediately apply for party membership; the incident was brought up repeatedly in Komsomol meetings and even in party meetings (after he was accepted) as a horrible example; and it kept him from being promoted from Senior Lieutenant to Captain. (The Deputy-Director who gave him five days was a member of the promotion commission.)"

Although there have been slight changes and contradictions in NOSENKO's numerous accounts of this story (the house arrest was variously reported as 5, 10, and 15 days) it remained basically consistent until the October 1966 interrogations when he said for the first time that he contracted gonorrhea from the girl in Leningrad in 1945 rather than 1954. In 1954, he said, he again was infected, this time by a prostitute whom he picked up in the vicinity of the Leningrad Railroad Station in Moscow. When the KGB required that he reveal the source, NOSENKO said, he ascribed the latter case to the original girl from Leningrad. During the October 1966 interrogations NOSENKO also told CIA for the first time that he had had venereal disease on two other occasions while studying at the Institute of International Affairs.

He later began to "feel more a part of the KGB," and as a junior KGB case officer, he personally recruited Richard BURGI in the first successful recruitment operation carried out by the newly-created Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate.* "And in 1956," NOSENKO said in 1964, "before my father's death, I was made a candidate for membership in the Communist Party and, exactly 15 days later, was assigned the rank of Senior Case Officer. I developed a pride in myself, (a feeling) that I can do things. You know how it is. When a person feels that he can, that he has some support, then he works much better. He has more initiative and so forth."

3. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs

NOSENKO said that his formal participation in Communist Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku. This step was a casual one, and he has said that he took it without much thought, mainly because all his friends were joining. When NOSENKO entered the KGB in the spring of 1953, he transferred routinely to the Komsomol organization there and became Secretary of the Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate. This was a small organization consisting, NOSENKO thought, of about 17 KGB employees; he remained its secretary until June or July 1954, when he got into the trouble over illegal use of operational documents. According to NOSENKO, "Immediately after this incident the Bureau of the Komsomol was gathered, and I was immediately removed from the position of Secretary." A week later, a "strict reprimand" was entered in NOSENKO's Komsomol records.

---

* See Part V.D.4.b. for a description of the BURGI recruitment operation. Until 1966 NOSENKO claimed to CIA that he had received an award for his participation in this operation. In the October 1966 interrogations he retracted this and said that he never received any KGB award for the BURGI or any other operation.

In October 1954, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol for over-age.* At that time, the "strict reprimand" he had received several months earlier was remitted on NOSENKO's petition, and he was permitted to leave the organization with a clean record. He was not permitted to join the Communist Party immediately, however. NOSENKO described the situation on 15 April 1964 as follows: "Now I had to prove myself. Not being a candidate for Party membership, I asked them for assignments to show my eagerness, to prove myself. I also asked the Party Organization of the Second Chief Directorate for some 'public service' (obshchestvenniy) assignments. I collected newspapers." For a year, NOSENKO "made good" by running errands and performing other such tasks, until it was decided that he was suitable for Party membership. He applied in January 1956 and was accepted as a candidate member of the Party in June the same year; full membership was granted in 1957. For over a year, from October 1954 until January 1956, NOSENKO said, he had the distinction of being the only employee of the KGB who was neither a Komsomol nor a Party member or applicant.

4. Statements to Others by NOSENKO

Before giving CIA the foregoing details, NOSENKO had talked about himself to several non-Soviets, including persons involved in cases which are reviewed in other portions of this paper. NOSENKO informed the recruitment target Horst BRAUNS that he had two daughters.** He advised Ivan Ivanovich PREISFREUND, a Finnish citizen used in the recruitment approach to a U.S. Army sergeant in Moscow, that he was married, his father was dead but his mother was living, he had served in the Navy, and he had two children. PREISFREUND met the "little girls" and later reported to CIA that, although NOSENKO was a "woman-chaser," he loved his daughters very much.*** With one KGB agent in particular, Arsene FRIPPEL, NOSENKO was especially forthcoming: he told FRIPPEL of his service in the Soviet Navy; he dwelt at length on his father's work in the Soviet shipbuilding industry; and while using the alias "NIKOLAYEV" with FRIPPEL, he mentioned that his father had been employed in the town of Nikolayev. On one occasion NOSENKO and his wife dined at FRIPPEL's home.* NOSENKO told his recruitment target George DREW in April 1959 that he had two daughters.

---

* According to the Statutes (Ustav) of the Komsomol in effect in 1954, the maximum age for a Komsomol member at that time was 25. On this basis, NOSENKO should have been excluded in October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. When this was explained to NOSENKO by DERYABIN in July 1965, NOSENKO replied that he was certain he left the Komsomol in 1954 upon reaching the age of 27, that he was sure the maximum age was 26 at that time, and that no special exceptions were made in his case.

** See Part V.F.9.

***PREISFREUND is discussed in detail in Part V.E.4.a.

D. Soviets' Statements About NOSENKO

Portions of the NOSENKO autobiography have been supported and other portions contradicted by the statements of several Soviets following the defection. The Soviets' remarks dealing with NOSENKO's KGB career are reviewed in Part V.I., but with reference to other aspects of the background of NOSENKO:

- Letters to NOSENKO in Geneva from his wife (who later went to the U.S. Embassy after his defection) include a reference to one of the daughters as his "double" and two other personal letters in his possession at the time of his defection, Yu. I. GUK and G. I. DUCHKOV, referred to visits to NOSENKO's wife and children.

- A KGB officer in Vienna, Vladimir TULAYEV, told a CIA double agent that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. TULAYEV later told the agent that he had "friends who knew NOSENKO well."**

- A Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, Feliks KOVALEV, said to a CIA agent that NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and was "famous for his character."

- The Soviet Navy defector Nikolay ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval preparatory school with NOSENKO in 1944 to 1946. (ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved, however, differs from NOSENKO's.) sensitive source

- [redacted] reported NOSENKO is the son of a former Soviet Government Minister, attended naval college, shot himself to avoid going to the front with the rest of his class, was graduated from the Institute in 1950, and contracted venereal disease in 1950 but through his father's influence avoided damage to his career. [redacted] sensitive source [redacted] from conversations with fellow officers [redacted] He has indicated that he does not know NOSENKO.

---

* FRIPPEL is discussed more fully in Part V.D.5.

** In October 1966 NOSENKO failed to identify TULAYEV either by name or photograph and said he didn't know him.

sensitive source
- [redacted] said that when NOSENKO was a young man, he attended the GRU Military-Diplomatic Academy and then spent a short time, perhaps a year, in the Information Department at GRU Headquarters. NOSENKO had been a "very undisciplined person" while in the GRU and "not very good," [redacted] continued, and he was discharged from the GRU. However, his father, an "influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding," was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. [redacted] said he did not know NOSENKO personally, but learned this information from "various persons" (unnamed) in Moscow.

- The thumbnail biography of NOSENKO which KOROLEV and ROSENTAL submitted to the editors of Paris Match in October 1966 (see Part III.H.) stated that NOSENKO was "closely acquainted with the country's leaders, families, and homes" and that his "father who died several years ago was an important official in the Party and state organs." The document went on to say that "NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, mother and a brother (younger)." KOROLEV and ROSENTAL also provided photographs purporting to be of NOSENKO's wife and daughters.

source
- [redacted] said she heard from her KGB friend V. G. SVIRIN that NOSENKO's father was a Minister or a General of Ukrainian origin and that his mother was Jewish and "was always involved in some blackmarketeering." She also said that she heard NOSENKO was a "civilian," not a KGB officer, but was connected somehow with the KGB. (She could not explain this connection other than to say that all Soviets permitted to meet foreigners are either officers or "relatives" of the KGB.)

14-00000
104-10210-10068 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO (835 PAGE STUDY) VOL. II PAGES 85 THRU 348 (PART V)

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: SE

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: ONGOING OPERATIONS MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
11 MAY 1978		KEN KLEIN	
15 May 78		Ken Klein	Kenneth K
5 Sept 78		Johanna Smith	Johanna Smith

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER

A. Introduction

During his 11 or 12 years' service in the KGB Second Chief Directorate, NOSENKO said, he rose from case officer to deputy chief of a department and from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel (or, as he has stated more recently, only to the rank of captain). An English speaker, he had specialized in operations against American targets in the USSR as he steadily advanced to higher positions in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department (from entry on duty with the KGB in 1952 or 1953 until 1955, and from January 1960 to January 1962) and in the Tourist Department (from June 1955 to January 1960, and from January 1962 until the defection). His duties took him to England in 1957 and 1958, Cuba in 1960, and Bulgaria in 1961 as well as to Switzerland in 1962 and 1964; also, NOSENKO made numerous trips within the USSR in connection with operations, inspections, and conferences. Commendations, twice accompanied by bonuses, were awarded to him by the KGB Chairman in 1956, 1959, and 1961 and by the head of the Second Chief Directorate in 1957 and 1958; he was one of 70 Second Chief Directorate officers awarded the Order of the Red Star in 1962; and in the same year he received a medal for completing ten years of "irreproachable service."* Thus, according to NOSENKO, his defection ended a promising career marked by promotions, responsible positions, extensive travel, and many honors.

NOSENKO has discussed a large number of KGB operations, including some in which he had a personal role, either as a participant or as a supervisor, and others conducted by other KGB personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorate about which he learned through his professional and personal contacts. Those in which he played a personal role are covered in this part of the paper. All are included in Part VI. The text of the paper distinguishes the information from collateral sources and investigations from the details which NOSENKO has provided on the same topics.

---

* NOSENKO has admitted recently, however, that he never got any awards at all in the KGB.

B. Entry into the KGB

NOSENKO has provided a wide range of dates for his entry on duty with the KGB and has offered disparate descriptions of the circumstances and procedures involved in his becoming a KGB staff officer. His statements on these two topics are presented under separate headings below.

1. Date of Entry

A range of dates between early 1952 and 2 April 1953 has been given by NOSENKO as the time when he entered on duty with the KGB, but he has been most consistent in placing his entry in the month of March 1953.* In summary, he has said the beginning of 1952 (statement of 31 January 1964), May 1952 with no day (statement of February 1964), 5 or 7 September 1952 (statement of 6 April 1964), March 1953 with no day (statements of 9 June 1962, 24 April 1966 and 27 October 1966), 12 or 15 or 17 March 1953 (statement of 8 April 1964), 13 or 15 March 1953 (statement of 26 July 1965), and 2 April 1953 (statement of 17 April 1966). When last questioned about this subject, on 27 October 1966, NOSENKO acknowledged that he had lied when he had earlier reported his entry as occurring in 1952. His statements about the entry date are arranged in chronological order below.

9 June 1962 (first CIA meeting with NOSENKO): "In the beginning of 1953 I came to Moscow /from duty with the GRU in Primorsk/. This was 1953, in the beginning in January. Well, I came on leave to Moscow. I was staying at my father's dacha there... I was then in the Navy GRU. So I came to Moscow on leave and, while I was home near Moscow at my father's dacha, /General Bogdan Zakharovich/ KOBULOV** dropped in on us. A conversation simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?' I said: 'I'm working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm working in the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: 'How do you like the work?' I replied: 'Well, speaking honestly, I don't like the work.' 'Well,' he said, 'You better come to work with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counterintelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I

---

* Several of NOSENKO's remarks about his date of entry into the KGB were made during CIA questioning about how and when he first learned of the KGB agent "ANDREY"; the lead to "ANDREY" was one of the two pieces of information which NOSENKO offered to sell when he approached CIA in 1962 (see Part II.B.); the "ANDREY" case is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.3.b.

** Other sources have reported that KOBULOV was expelled from the State Security apparatus in 1946 and that he did not return to a position of authority until a few days after Lavrentiy BERIYA became MGB-MVD Minister on 9 or 10 March 1953. As of 1952, KOBULOV was working in East Germany for both Wismut A.G., a uranium ore-mining concern, and for the Soviet contingent to the Allied Control Commission. KOBULOV was arrested at the same time as BERIYA, along with others in the KGB. See Part V.B.2. for further references to KOBULOV.

consider that only people who have seven, even ten years' experience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelligence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence. Then they know how counterintelligence operates... Well, when KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: 'It is better, of course, to go into counterintelligence.' 'Well,' he said, 'Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' This was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later I got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and told me to stop by. I went. 'Come into this room,' /they told me/, 'it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa). We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go directly to the central entrance. A pass has already been issued for you; the pass is already there. Go to the Secretariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.' Well, I went. KOBULOV had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his assistant received me. 'How about working in the American Department?' he /the assistant/ asked. 'Well, good. Go there right now.' Well, I went to the Second Directorate... His /KOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directorate, the American Department, the First Section, working with American correspondents...in '53, in March, in March '53. STALIN had just died."*

---

*STALIN died on 5 March 1953.

31 January 1964: Yuriy Ivanovich GUK was reassigned from the KGB Second Chief Directorate "in something like 1952," NOSENKO said, "exactly just about the time when I came from the GRU to the KGB. He was already gone by that time."*

February 1964: After his defection on 4 February 1964, NOSENKO prepared an official statement about his biography. He said that he had entered the KGB in 1952, and he shifted the dates of most of the events during the 1945-1955 period one year backwards from the version given in 1962. This was discussed with NOSENKO, and he repeated the new dates; he then studied and approved an official statement on his biography (for the Intelligence Community) which contained the new dates, including his claim that he entered on duty with the KGB in about May 1952.

6 April 1964: Confronted with the above inconsistencies, NOSENKO said that he returned to Moscow in August 1952 and during the same month had a conversation with KGB personnel about getting a job. The interview continued with the following dialogue:

Question: You came (to Moscow) in January?

NOSENKO: No, it wasn't January, it was the second part of 1952. Yes, before that I was in the GRU... Maybe - if I tell you 7 - 7 September - maybe it was 5, I don't know.

Question: ...What date did you enter on duty with KGB?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: Early September 1952?

NOSENKO: Early September 1952, yes... I came and the first few days was sitting in a room with KUTYREV, RAKOVSKIY, and GROBOV, in Room 615. Yes, it was 7 September when I had joined... 7 or 5... And so the first few weeks I had been reading cases, studying forms; I worked like that (during) December, January, February... No, it was March, yes, after STALIN's death, after the reorganization. And at the end of March I was transferred to the attaches cases...**

---

* This would place the entry date some time at the beginning of 1952, for the KGB defector GOLITSYN has reported that GUK was transferred from the Second Chief Directorate in January 1952.

** NOSENKO later settled on June or July 1954 as the time of this transfer. Part V.C. covers the period when, according to NOSENKO, he was engaged in operations against the U.S. military attaches in Moscow.

8 April 1964: The interrogator pointed out to NOSENKO that he had on different occasions dated his entry into the KGB as January 1952, March 1953, and in September 1952. The questioning continued:

Question:	Which is the truth?
NOSENKO:	After the death of STALIN, in March 1953. Why did I say it /the other dates/? You see, I finished the Institute in 1949. Then I defended my diploma, and then came the State exams. I passed all the exams except one - "Foundations of Marxism-Leninism," the philosophy. And I had to take all the examinations over again. All of them. I took four, passed three, flunked one. Just the same, all four had to be taken over again. For that reason I graduated, or I received the diploma from the Institute in 1950, although officially I graduated in 1949. This is an unpleasant thing and I did not want to mention it. And right after that I was sent to the GRU.* The rest is just as I told you, word-for-word. This was the only thing. And then, after I said it, I did not want to correct it. To twist around again. And the mistake I made was about my work in the KGB. It was not 1952, of course, but 1953... It was 12 or 17 or 15 March. KOBULOV accepted me right away. STALIN was still not dead and I was already accepted. March 1953, about the 15th, about 15 March 1953.

26 July 1965: "At the end of 1952 I came to Moscow from Sovetsk in Primorskiy Kray, near Baltiysk. I had worked in the Naval Intelligence Point (MRP) there. My aim in coming to Moscow was to get out of this work in the MRP. I couldn't stand that work. I couldn't stand that work... I arrived in Moscow at the end of 1952, December... I don't remember exactly the date of the order appointing me an officer in the KGB. It was 13 or 15 March 1953."

17 April 1966 (letter to CIA case officer): "From August 1952 until 1953 I worked at the Intelligence Point of the Naval Intelligence of the 4th Fleet in Sovetsk, where I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service. From 2 April 1953 until 4 February 1964 I worked in the Second Chief Directorate of the MGB-KGB."

24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement): "In the middle of March /1953/ KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY called me at home and told me to come to see KOBULOV... I worked in the First Section, First /American/ Department from the middle of March 1953 until July 1955."

27 October 1966: NOSENKO reaffirmed that he entered the KGB in mid-March 1953. He said that he had lied when he earlier said that he had joined the KGB in 1952, and that he knew he was lying at the times he made these statements. Asked why he had lied, he replied: "There was no sense." NOSENKO then went on to explain that because he was only an average student and because he was a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable

---

* Since April 1966, NOSENKO has said he joined the GRU in 1951, a year later.

by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 1950. Therefore, NOSENKO continued, he had been trying to conceal this fact from CIA by moving events back a year, for he thought CIA would not have believed him if he reported that he was first rejected by the KGB and was later accepted.

2. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry

Although NOSENKO has consistently associated his entry into the KGB with his discussions with General KOBULOV,* he has been inconsistent concerning the content of their conversation, when it occurred, its relationship in time to other events (see Part IV.B.), and where it took place, at his father's dacha or at KOBULOV's dacha. Also, whereas NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were virtually no administrative formalities prerequisite to his entry, he recalled in 1964 that he had had conversations with various KGB personnel officers and (at home) had completed a KGB questionnaire and a biographic form. NOSENKO was questioned at length on these points during 1964 and 1965. As a result, he provided lengthy descriptions of his various interviews at KGB Headquarters and of the questionnaire and other documents he completed. In April 1966, however, NOSENKO reverted to his original statement of 1962: There were no interviews with KGB personnel officers, and he implied that he had filled out no official forms. His various statements are presented in chronological order below.

9 June 1962: "KOBULOV was at our dacha. Well, he is a great friend of my father. He was First Deputy to BERIYA, and my father was Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry... A conversation simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?' I said: 'I'm working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm working on the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: 'How do you like the work?' I replied: 'Well, speaking honestly, I don't like the work.' 'Well,' he said, 'You better come to work with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counterintelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I consider that only people who have seven, even ten years' experience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelligence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence. Then they know how counterintelligence operates...Well, when KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: 'It is better, of course, to go into counterintelligence.' 'Well,' he said, 'Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' This was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later I got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and told me to stop by. I went. 'Come into this room,' [they told me], 'it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa). We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go directly to the central entrance. A pass has already been issued for you; the pass is already there. Go to the Secretariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.' Well, I went. KOBULOV had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his assistant received me. 'How about working in the American Department?' he [the assistant] asked. 'Well, good. Go there right now.' Well, I went to the Second Directorate... His [KOBULOV's] assistant sent me directly to the Second Directorate, the American Department, the First Section, working with American correspondents."

---

* See Part V.B.1. for further references to KOBULOV.

8 April 1964: "It was February [1953]. KOBULOV was in February - in Moscow. He was our friend. He said: 'O.K., George. I'll help you if you want, with the KGB.' I remember exactly. Yes. It was in February. I saw him at the cottage... By this time I had been in Moscow six weeks... KOBULOV was in February. He went to see my father at the Ministry. It was the end of the day. It was late and my father invited him to come along to the summer home. It happened to be a Saturday. KOBULOV's wife stayed in Germany. He was just here for a short TDY.* My father invited him to spend Saturday night and Sunday at the dacha... On Sunday we were playing billiards and KOBULOV asked me what I was doing. I told him 'nothing,' that I was at the disposal of the [GRU] Personnel Department. I said: 'I don't want to go back to Baltiysk, to the Baltic Sea, because I don't like the work there. I'm not doing anything there. I get no satisfaction from the work.' He said: 'Well, you should be utilized somehow... Do you want me to call the KGB Personnel - them look you over?' I told him: 'All right.' He called, and he must have given our number to them, our home phone. I was called subsequently by the Personnel Department of the KGB. In February. They told me to come see them at House No. 12. They had a pass for me... So I went. Picked up my pass and went... [NOSENKO next gives a description of his route to the KGB building, his receipt of a pass, and his visit to the Central KGB Personnel Office.] They talked to me. This man - I don't know who or what he was - asked where I worked before and all that. He said: 'O.K. We'll request your file from GRU. We will check you out and will let you know whether or not we will take you.' That's all." NOSENKO was asked whether he completed any forms or questionnaires. "No. Not there. They gave me three copies of forms to take home. There were so many questions. About my parents, my education, my residences, addresses. I filled all this out... Finally I completed all three copies and called them. I was told that this time I would not need a pass, that I should just go to the entrance, and the person [the personnel officer] would come down and take the papers from me. I went, brought the papers, and he took them from me, and also three copies of my handwritten autobiography... Then I was called by the personnel people once more. And at that time another officer talked to me, and this time I knew who was talking to me, because I was told to go to talk to ROZHENKO [first name unknown, later identified as a Section Chief in the Personnel Department]. This was in March... Just as soon as STALIN died, KOBULOV came back from Germany immediately. He must have been summoned by BERIYA or someone. And so, in just a few days - evidently he did not forget - I got a call. It was Bogdan Zakharovich's assistant. He told me to go to the central entrance, that I didn't need a pass. I remember it as if it just happened. I went in the uniform of a lieutenant, but with a civilian overcoat. This was, maybe, the 10th of March... I sat down [in KOBULOV's office]. I thought it would be for five minutes. I waited there almost two hours. The assistant came out a few times and told me that Bogdan Zakharovich is very, very busy, but that he would give me an escort. Some senior lieutenant came up to me and told me to follow him... We went up to the sixth floor of the old building. I remember it as though it just happened. I sat there about five or seven minutes. Then I was told to go in. I announced myself. He said: 'Yes, I know. Sit down. My name is SHUBNYAKOV, Fedor Grigoryevich.' He told me he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate and that they had talked things over and decided. He said that they wanted to offer me a position in counterintelligence, in the First Department, the American

---

* NOSENKO had been told by his interrogator shortly before that KOBULOV had been stationed in Germany and not in Moscow.

Department... Then he asked /A. M./ GORBATENKO to come in. He was filling in for the Chief of the First Department... He took me to his office... Well, they decided to put me in the First /U. S. Embassy/ Section and called Yevgeniy KOZLOV, the Chief of the Section. He came in and said: 'Well, hello, Yuriy Ivanovich. I heard of you. Well, if you're finished with him, I'll take him along with me and show him around.' He took me and talked to me for a while and then told me to report... Either the 12th or the 17th. I don't remember."

15 April 1964: NOSENKO again described the KGB questionnaire and autobiographic forms he had filled out at home and recalled that he had also signed a secrecy agreement in the personnel office. He also remembered that he had made several additional phone calls to the KGB personnel office and described his second visit there to talk to ROZHENKO: "At the end of February I was told again to stop in the Pass Office and pick up a pass and go to the same floor, but another room. They told me I would have to talk to ROZHENKO today. He was a Chief of Section, of the Personnel Section. So we had a talk. It was the same thing again. He said: 'Tell me about yourself.' But he just wanted to look me over. And after that they said: 'All right, we have not gotten all your documents yet from your /military/ district. So wait.'"

26 April 1965: NOSENKO recounted his conversation with KOBULOV, saying that it took place at KOBULOV's dacha in Usov, where he and his parents were visiting in January 1953. NOSENKO continued: "I was called at my family's dacha in February. They said it was State Security calling and that I was to report. I did this on the next day. Probably I then reported to House No. 12. As officer talked to me about my education, service, and so on. Biographic questions. Then he gave me a blank for my autobiography and a four to six-page anketa (biographic form). I filled these out at home. The next day I called in and was told to come to the Eighth Entry. The officer came down, and I gave him the forms and photographs of myself. They said they would call me. I did nothing from January to March. January was leave. In February and March I was at GRU Personnel's disposal." After STALIN's funeral NOSENKO was summoned to KOBULOV's office. His assistant, SAVITSKIY, told NOSENKO to wait. After more than an hour had passed, SAVITSKIY sent him to SHUBNYAKOV's office. There he learned that he would be assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section and was introduced to the Chief of the American Department, GORBATENKO. The official order appointing NOSENKO was issued the same day, the 13th or 15th of March 1953.

24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement: Again NOSENKO said that he had spoken with KOBULOV at the KOBULOV dacha and set the date at 1 January 1953. The document continued as follows: "I saw KOBULOV for the second and last time on the day of STALIN's funeral in my father's office in the Ministry of Shipbuilding in March 1953. I had come from the sanitorium to Moscow and dropped in to see my father at work. In his office I ran into KOBULOV as they were gathering to go to the Dom Soyuzov for the funeral. KOBULOV said he would concern himself with the question of my entry into the KGB. The same day I returned to the sanitorium, and several days later, having completed my treatment, I returned to Moscow. In the middle of March, KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY,

called me at home and told me to come see KOBULOV. KOBULOV didn't see me and SAVITSKIY directed me to the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, Colonel SHUBNYAKOV... SHUBNYAKOV told me that an order had been signed appointing me a case officer in the First Section of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate. SHUBNYAKOV called the Chief of the First Department, Lieutenant Colonel GORBATENKO, and introduced me. Then I went to the First Department and was introduced to the Deputy Chief of the First Department and the Chief of the First Section, KOZLOV. KOZLOV said I would take over the cases of Senior Case Officer, Captain /Anatoliy/ TORMOZOV and suggested that I begin work the same day. I was accepted for work in the MVD in precisely this way. It is necessary to note that none of the workers of the MVD Personnel Administration spoke to me, either before or after the signing of the order assigning me to the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD."

C. To June 1955 (American Department)

1. Introduction

Depending upon which date he has given for entering the KGB, NOSENKO's first assignment in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, working on American correspondents living in Moscow, lasted for about six to eighteen months. From that job, he said, he moved in 1954 to operations against U.S. Military Attaches assigned to the Moscow Embassy, remaining in the same section until being transferred in June 1955. His activities, as NOSENKO described them, and pertinent collateral information on his targets while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section are reviewed below.

2. Operations Against Correspondents

On the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO was taken directly to the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section. There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO that he would take over the work of the departing case officer, Captain Anatoliy TORMOZOV, in operations against American correspondents in Moscow.

a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY

When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, according to statements made on 8 April 1964, he found a desk in Room 615. "There were three other guys sitting there. At first I was running traces, and at the same time I was reading the files on journalists... I think there were seven files in all, and I didn't see any other." NOSENKO listed these files as those on Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy GILMORE (as well as one on GILMORE's wife SEREBRYAKOVA and her sister CHERNYSHEVA), Harrison SALISBURY and Thomas WHITNEY.*

During the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO identified SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours." He said that WHITNEY "worked for us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he refused to work for us when he left the country and would not contact us in the United States." GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did not know the status of SALISBURY as of 1953.

NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read during the early period of his KGB service were developmental files (delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents. The developmental files were less sensitive, and from them "you would never be able to figure out whether he [the subject of the file] is an agent or not." NOSENKO explained that, once a person becomes an agent, another file is set up, and these agent files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO stated that he read the files on these seven persons "slowly and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things as notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remember." He was also given the files on the agents surrounding these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and cooks.

---

* NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsible for the more important correspondents: "KOZLOV himself was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with SHAPIRO, with SHAPIRO's wife. I also know that KOZLOV was working with WHITNEY and with [Andrew J.] STEIGER... For each of these persons there was an operational file which I did not see." According to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved with STEIGER and Edmund STEVENS, both of whom were American correspondents recruited as agents by the KGB.

b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents

NOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents who were reporting on SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, SALISBURY and the GILMOREs and met with them regularly to learn whether "anything was new, who did SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting in his behavior, what might be suspicious in his behavior, who he is contacting, etc." He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare a written report of his conversations with the agents. Asked to describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied: "Let us take the same case of SHAPIRO. I would meet drivers about three times a month or even two times. At the meeting I would ask the driver what was new in SHAPIRO's behavior since our last meeting, whether SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with foreigners, about his meetings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was SHAPIRO walking behind the person he met. And then the man [agent] would begin his report. Of course, if he spots anything suspicious he calls immediately, and I would see him the next morning. Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I would see him again in about ten days or in two weeks, but if there was something interesting he should call immediately. It was the same with the maid and the cook. Upon returning to the office I would have to report to KOZLOV about my meetings, either orally or in writing. If, for example, [V.M.] KOVSHUK [also of the U.S. Embassy Section] had a meeting with his agents, he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV or as soon as convenient to both. If the meetings were taking place late in the day and lasted until midnight or later and there were no written materials submitted at the meeting, I could go home and then report the next morning."

KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was teaching me. Then he would go in cases when something interesting would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case officer."

NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their families. Asked to describe them, he said on 15 April 1964: "My first agent was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at GILMORE's place. She also worked at the Associated Press later. Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one. My second agent was a chauffeur whose codename, I think, was 'SERGEY'. I think he was driving WHITNEY. Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a funny little fellow. In other words, charwomen, chauffeurs, this was my agentura [agent network]." Although NOSENKO was able to give a breakdown of this network in terms of the number and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he had forgotten their true names and could not provide detailed personality information on any of them. He explained: "I don't remember now. They all passed by like a river because they were turned over often." NOSENKO did recall that it was he who selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's office as a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of Moscow News, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.

He first identified GILMORE's cook, "AGLODINA," as Yelena S. KOSIENKO in the fall of 1965, while reviewing a list of Soviets employed by Americans in Moscow. He told CIA at that time that he had taken over KOSIENKO from TORMOZOV upon entering the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked for and reported on GILMORE's successor, Richard KASISCHKE. NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never provided any interesting information."

NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling 10 to 12 agents in operations against the correspondents. This, he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case officers might have as many as 15. In April 1964 NOSENKO broke his agentura down as follows:

Target	Agents
Eddie GILMORE	Two agents, the cook and the driver; one operational contact, a part-time cleaning girl; and a girlfriend of GILMORE's sister-in-law, who reported on the sister-in-law and GILMORE's wife.
Thomas WHITNEY	One agent, his driver.
Henry SHAPIRO	Three agents, SHAPIRO's secretary and his cahuffeur, plus an old woman who was a relative of SHAPIRO's wife and lived with the SHAPIROs in Moscow. (The secretary and chauffeur later worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and reported on him to NOSENKO; BRODNEY temporarily took SHAPIRO's place in Moscow.)
Harrison SALISBURY	Two agents, SALISBURY's driver, "SERGEY" and a part-time cleaning girl.

NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral," in that they did not have specific targets on whom to report. The first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language training program for foreigners in Moscow. His cryptonym was "RAKETA," but NOSENKO could not recall his true name. The second, "VOLODINK," was a female teacher in this same program who instructed some of the correspondents, including BRODNEY, and Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true name of "VOLODINK." When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his agents to other case officers in the U.S. Embassy Section with the exception of "RAKETA" and "VOLODINK," whom he continued to handle in his work with military attaches.

c. Information from Other Sources

SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by GOLITSYN in 1961, before the lead was received from NOSENKO, and he had previously been suspected as such on the basis of his long stay in Moscow, his unusually good access to Soviet information sources, and his marriage to a Soviet national. SHAPIRO was mentioned as a KGB agent by a cryptonym (known to NOSENKO and confirmed by GOLITSYN) appearing in the CHEREPANOV papers.*

The KGB defector Nikolay KHOKLOV had earlier identified the Polish-born wife of WHITNEY as a KGB agent, an allegation which she denied, and it had been long assumed that WHITNEY too had reached some sort of accommodation with the KGB because of this fact and because of the long duration of his tour as a correspondent in Moscow.

GILMORE also had been suspected by CIA before NOSENKO's information was received. He served in Moscow for 12 years, from 1941 to 1953, and is married to a Soviet national.

SALISBURY served two short tours, of about one year each, in Moscow during the 1950's. During the second of these, he became enamored with the Pole who was to become WHITNEY's wife (see above) and was during this period a subject of criticism by other American correspondents in Moscow for his pro-Soviet articles. When WHITNEY married the Pole shortly after STALIN's death, SALISBURY returned to the United States and his articles took on an anti-Soviet tone.

NOSENKO claimed no involvement with the other two American correspondents whom he identified as KGB agents, STEVENS and STEIGER, both the subjects of a considerable amount of derogatory information in CIA files. They are discussed in Part VI.D.2. under the heading of NOSENKO's American leads.

3. Operations Against Military Attache Personnel

Some time in the first half of 1954 NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then until his transfer from the American Department he handled KGB Second Chief Directorate operations against the officer personnel of the U.S. Military Attache's office. NOSENKO's account of the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of the acceptance of the attache files is presented below.

- 8 April 1964: "I took over the Military Attache cases from Nikolay KHRENOV... When I was leaving in 1955, I turned the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."

- 10 April 1964: "I made a mistake... I said I accepted the cases from KHRENOV when I was taking on the Military Attache work. This is not right. KHRENOV was not working in the First (U.S. Embassy) Section; he was working in the First (American) Department. I took over the cases from--let's see, there was ZHUKOV and Vladimir Aleksandrovich CHURANOV, and here was my table (desk), and I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954."

- 15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned to the USSR from Australia in May 1954). NOSENKO asked when the PETROV's defected in Australia; he explained that he was not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them to another officer. "If KISLITSYN came [back from Australia] in 1953, then it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was someone else."

---

* See Part V.D.7.c. for a detailed discussion of the CHEREPANOV Papers.

- 18 June 1964: "KISLITSYN came into the First Section in 1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents. BUDYLDIN also joined the section this year and took the files on the Army Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV. BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over to me... Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files on the Army Attache and his assistants."

NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed responsibilities for the attaches. As noted above, he said on 10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of 1954. He had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents "only about six months." If the date of March 1953, which he most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is correct this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he has said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases and began work against the attaches in January 1954, on still others that this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.

a. Agents Reporting on Military Attaches

Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network (agentura) at his disposal in operations against U.S. Military Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers*... about ten persons, plus the agent 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the code name 'DMITRIYEV'... These additional two agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one exception, this network remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the street. According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the main source of information on the Military Attaches being the microphones in their offices.**

Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache Earl L. MICKELSON and his successor, Fillmore K. MEARNS. Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of English in order to overhear conversations or read letters without taking them outside."

Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, code name "SHVEDOVA," and she was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, Ira RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin woman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest. They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.

Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO identified Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various of the attaches. "He reported where they went, what they said, whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages with them, and so on."

When viewing photographs in September 1964, NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as the agent "SERVIZNIY." He had been working in the Embassy since its establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connection with the Military Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in 1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the Embassy, issued monthly.

"DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV: NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but was not sure, that this was his agent. An electrician who worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and elevator, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires and other wires he had observed in the Embassy as well as on the security measures on the top floors. Like VOROBYEV, "DMITRIYEV" had no direct connection with the Military Attaches.

---

* The Military Attaches used a pool of five drivers at random, NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior attache, none were targetted against individual members of the attache office.

** See Part V.E.3.g. on electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy.

In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260 biographic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American Embassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the person involved and short biographic notes, including his name and job in the Embassy. The first time he went through these cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photographs; NOSENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV but said that the face of VOROBYEV was familiar, adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV. When shown the biographic information on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American Department and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the biographic information, which listed SHNYRYEV as "chauffeur for the Military Attache," NOSENKO exclaimed: "Oh my God, this is my own agent." He later said it was a good photograph of SHNYRYEV.

b. NOSENKO's Targets

As the Second Chief Directorate case officer responsible for operations against American Military (Army) Attaches stationed in Moscow,* his main task was not to recruit them but rather was to prevent the attaches from collecting intelligence. He has used this statement about his main task (identical with that of other U.S. Embassy Section officers working against the Army and Navy Attaches) to support his claim that no U.S. Armed Forces Attaches were recruited by the KGB from 1953 until his defection in 1964. He has also said that this is one reason he knows relatively little about the personal backgrounds of his various targets during this period--the emphasis was on surveillance instead of development for recruitment purposes. Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache personnel for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and 1955, NOSENKO gave the following names: "MICKELSON, MEARNS, RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."** His knowledge of the activities of these targets and of KGB action against them, coupled with information from other sources, is discussed in the following paragraphs.

---

*Naval Attaches were handled by ZHUKOV during this period, NOSENKO said, while Air Attaches were initially handled by CHURANOV. When CHURANOV left the section in early 1954, he turned over the Air Attache files to PANKRATOV, who turned them over later in the year to KHRENOV.

**This is the order given by NOSENKO. The list comprises two generations of Army Attaches in Moscow and is neither in alphabetical order nor in terms of date of service in Moscow. It is, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKELSON through Captain MULE to Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA. Questioned about these officers in a different context, NOSENKO indicated knowledge of their ranks. Not mentioned by NOSENKO was George VAN LAETHEM, Assistant Army Attache in Moscow from August 1951 to August 1953 (prior to the time when NOSENKO said he was responsible for work against the military attache office). VAN LAETHEM returned to Moscow in 1955, however, and was attached to the Army Attache staff again from 19 March to 19 May 1955, during which time NOSENKO claimed he was still responsible for this group.

(i) MICKELSON

NOSENKO has identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a colonel and the Military Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955. PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKELSON, and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When asked about agents who might have been working against MICKELSON, NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON's maid, whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA; the cook and NOVIKOVA went to work for MICKELSON after NOSENKO had left the U.S. Embassy Section. In addition to these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was his chauffeur, whose name NOSENKO also did not remember. NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruitment was attempted. There was, in fact, no interesting or derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source.

According to information in CIA files, MICKELSON was involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed a bridge, but he persuaded the Militia not to press charges. In August 1954 MICKELSON was arrested again for illegal photographs south of KHARKOV; on this occasion he was held for two hours before being released.

(ii) MEARNS

NOSENKO identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as MICKELSON's replacement and said that he was the responsible case officer. There were two agents and one operational contact working against MEARNS. Of these, NOSENKO could recall the name only of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on MICKELSON. Besides being told to attempt to overhear MICKELSON's conversations NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find, but she never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the United States, and that all his service records had been discovered and photographed.* NOSENKO described MEARNS as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had been and said that information from concealed microphones showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest concerning him was received from these microphones or from telephone taps.

CIA has no derogatory or otherwise significant information on MEARNS, who replaced MICKELSON.

(iii) RICHARDS

NOSENKO identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a lieutenant colonel who served as the Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he was the case officer working against

---

*NOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON.

RICHARDS. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym "SHVEDOVA," but she had never provided any worthwhile information about RICHARDS. In addition, some Soviet drivers reported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from them.

According to CIA records, RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 to July 1956. There was a microphone in the office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with MEARNS. RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart attack during the period she was employed by him. (This incident was not recalled by NOSENKO.) For about four months of his Moscow tour, RICHARDS took Russian-language lessons from Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During these lessons, RICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her record her speech on his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was pregnant and unmarried at the time. (NOSENKO has named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent in another context but has not mentioned her contacts with RICHARDS.)* RICHARDS identified one "Volodya" (i.e., first name Vladimir) as his principal driver. About 62 years old in 1954, Volodya was the son of a rich jeweler in Moscow during the Revolution. Volodya himself was well educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with RICHARDS about the Revolution, propaganda, and news media. (NOSENKO did not know of Volodya.) Further details from RICHARDS are given in the following section on FELCHLIN.

(iv) FELCHLIN

NOSENKO identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in Moscow and stated that he was FELCHLIN's case officer. FELCHLIN was in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being declared persona non grata. NOSENKO did not recall the names of any agents specifically targetted against FELCHLIN, although he thought FELCHLIN must have had a maid and she would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO said, the Assistant Military Attaches shared a pool of cars and drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind. NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel FELCHLIN, but said the action was based on information which had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents. For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photographs and a report had been written; along with other similar indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of agents in contact with FELCHLIN, the report was filed away for possible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on FELCHLIN during the February 1965 interrogations. He said then that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata, and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO explained his having but few details concerning this action by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had transferred from the American Department to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN's background.

---

* See Part V.E.3.d., which discusses coverage of John ABIDIAN, to whom she also taught Russian.

Other sources have reported that FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before arriving in July 1953 as Army Attache. He served in the latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was asked to leave the country. (He had previously served in Austria and West Germany and had been in official contact with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the United States.) During his entire tour in Moscow he was the subject of intensive KGB interest. Shortly after his arrival, in September 1953, FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF, and two Air Force attaches took a train trip to Siberia, the first such trip permitted American attaches in many years. Six months later, on 25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article saying that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some of their "spy documents" on the train. FELCHLIN said this charge was false. On another occasion, while travelling with a British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to his train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in his bunk. (NOSENKO recalls neither of these incidents.) In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was the Air Force Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia station where they were ordered to sign a confession. They were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the American ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. FELCHLIN was told on 3 July 1954 that he had 48 hours to get out of the Soviet Union. No specific charges were mentioned. Major Walter A. McKINNEY, the U.S. Air Attache and one of FELCHLIN's travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata at the same time.*

Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the general chauffeurs assigned to the Office of the Military Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either "Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to distinguish him from the other chauffeur with the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV drove primarily for the Military Attache himself, but sometimes drove for the Assistant Military Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had continuing chest or lung trouble. (Asked whether SHNYRYEV had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of any.)

---

* Ambassador BOHLEN successfully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the USSR to fly FELCHLIN and McKINNEY out. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN left. NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch as he was no longer in the American Department at the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.

FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOROVA (not specifically named by NOSENKO) was in her 50's. When she spoke with FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN offered 80. FEDOROVA refused and left. Two days later she returned and accepted. She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back door of FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with her, and suspecting that they were reporting to FEDOROVA, FELCHLIN teased her about it. FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew PEARSON with a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the local "boss" of the Embassy network. PEARSON printed the allegation. In the summer of 1953 or 1954, according to FELCHLIN, the maid approached FELCHLIN with the article, waved it in his face, and accused him of being PEARSON's source. (NOSENKO did not recognize FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or reading of this incident.)

(v) BENSON

NOSENKO identified his target John S. BENSON as a major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not recall the names of any agents working against BENSON but said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared persona non grata. The KGB had no other derogatory information on BENSON from any other source.

(vi) STROUD

NOSENKO identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an Assistant Army Attache. The only agents working against him were the Military Attaches' drivers. From concealed microphones, the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned before STROUD's arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of electronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any source.

CIA files show that STROUD was, with BENSON and MULE, the victim of the Soviets' seizure of technical equipment in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata on 7 May 1955. On 31 January 1955 he travelled to Kharkov from Moscow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an American defector living there. (According to NOSENKO, SISCOE was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer; SISCOE was, in fact, a CIA cooptee.)

(vii) MULE

NOSENKO identified Walter MULE as an Assistant Army Attache and said that he was the case officer responsible for him. NOSENKO described an operational approach to MULE, in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there had been several defection approaches to Soviets in the United States on the basis of money and the promise of a new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to try the same measures, MULE was selected because he was only a captain despite his lengthy service in the Army and because material from concealed microphones indicated that he was often disparaged by the other attaches. When MULE received letters from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned these over to the KGB; from this mail it was understood that MULE did not have a house in the United States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Germeny for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the KGB appointed N.M. BORODIN, a recruiter of the American Department, to attempt to defect MULE. Together with BORODIN, KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's special technical section) NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE's hotel room, and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return. When MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK closed the door from the hall and prevented his escape.* BORODIN reviewed for MULE the facts the KGB had accumulated about his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his fellow attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered him a job as a "consultant." BORODIN had either $5,000 or $10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. According to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN to get out, that he would not talk to him, and that he was a captain in the American Army.

CIA files show that MULE reported this incident. He said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000 for "work" on a long-range basis.. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required to procure documents from the Embassy, and according to MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts concerning MULE's personal life that could have been obtained only from listening devices in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about 20 minutes, having warned MULE not to report the incident. MULE was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph.

(viii) PNG of BENSON, MULE, and STROUD

After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Tourist Department in 1955, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being

---

***Precisely the same role was played by NOSENKO in the recruitment approach to James STORSBERG, according to NOSENKO. (See Part V.E.3.c.ii.)**

declared persona non grata. NOSENKO gave the following account of this incident: For some time the Second Chief Directorate had been trying to acquire a small, convenient piece of electronic equipment which American Intelligence officers were known to be using during their travels inside the Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the American Department had been given authorization from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to steal this equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of such an operation was assured. Before his transfer to the Tourist Department in 1955, NOSENKO himself had helped to develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an abortive attempt to steal the equipment from an attache at a railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE, and STROUD were on one of their trips (after NOSENKO's transfer) it was learned that they had the equipment with them, and the KGB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad. To carry out the operation, Lieutenant General P.V. FEDOTOV, then Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and A.M. GORBATENKO, Chief of the American Department, flew with other personnel from the American Department to Stalingrad. The hotel rooms of BENSON, STROUD and MULE were watched constantly from a visual observation post, and it was noted that they never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms. It was also noted that the apparatus was placed under a pillow before they began to eat. While they were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment. In order to partially cover the illegality of this act, it was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, MULE and STROUD from the Soviet Union, and this was done via the persona non grata action.

According to information from other sources, the equipment was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD on 5 May 1955, and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May (a month before NOSENKO claimed to have transferred to the Tourist Department).* When the 7 May date was given to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he did not directly participate in it, but that he had been involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment. It was pointed out to him that he had always said he was in the Tourist Department at the time of this operation, and that he had consistently said that he transferred from the American to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO shrugged, but offered no comment.

---

*The [redacted] source Kaarlo R. TUOMI, who served in the United States as a GRU Illegal from 1958 to 1963, reported to CIA in 1964 that while working as a KGB informant in Kirov in the early 1950's, he was targetted against three U.S. Military Attaches travelling on a train. TUOMI believed that he might have contributed information leading to the three Americans (as he later read in the Soviet press) being declared persona non grata. It would appear that TUOMI's targets were BENSON, MULE, and STROUD.

(ix) CARDELLA

NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was an administrative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA. The KGB had no interesting or unusual information concerning CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO could say nothing more about him.

CIA files show that Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955. Other than the fact that a microphone was discovered in CARDELLA's Moscow Embassy office in 1964, no significant collateral information concerning him is available.

(x) VAN LAETHEM

NOSENKO identified George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant Air Attache at the U.S. Embassy against whom an operation was attempted in 1953 or 1954. He said that during this period a Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquaintance with VAN LAETHEM which could be followed up in Moscow. She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number. Although she was certain that she would hear from him, he never did call her in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he had heard about this from P.F. PANKRATOV, the case officer handling LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOV was the case officer responsible for VAN LAETHEM, as he was for all members of the Air Attache's office at that time. NOSENKO knew of no other interest or activity concerning VAN LAETHEM.

CIA records show that VAN LAETHEM was not an Assistant Air Attache but an Assistant Army Attache, serving in Moscow from March 1951 to March 1953.* As cryptographic security officer and officer in charge of the Embassy code room, he had supervisory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics, including Dayle SMITH, and he was on fairly close personal terms with Sergeant Roy RHODES until the latter's departure from Moscow in January 1953; VAN LAETHEM's duties also carried responsibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy.** He was again in Moscow from 19 March to 19 May 1955 (at a time when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for U.S. Army Attaches). Although this trip was always intended to be only a TDY, it was represented to the Soviets as a PCS Assistant Army Attache assignment because of the extremely sensitive nature of his business there. He was project officer for the entire electronics program at the Embassy, and went to Moscow to review the operations including the planned use of the new electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (see above).

---

* Although VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in March 1953, just at the time NOSENKO said he entered the KGB, he was succeeded in his post by Walter MULE, for whom NOSENKO has claimed full responsibility. Thus, the fact of his position as Assistant Army Attache and MULE's predecessor would presumably be available to NOSENKO.

** Each time NOSENKO gave CIA the story of the recruitment of "ANDREY" in the June 1962 meetings, he related it to Roy RHODES. Each reference to Roy RHODES was followed by a statement that it was through RHODES that the KGB learned of the existence of special electronic equipment in the U.S. Embassy. RHODES had no access to such information.

D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)

1. Introduction

By his account NOSENKO served in the American-Canadian-British Section of the Tourist Department,* KGB Second Chief Directorate, from June 1955 (shortly after the department was created to operate with and against foreign travellers in the USSR) until his transfer to another department in that directorate in January 1960. He was a case officer until appointed Deputy Chief of the Section about June 1958. In statements made prior to April 1966, NOSENKO claimed to have been twice promoted during this four and one-half year period--to captain in July 1956 and to major in August or September 1959--but in a signed statement of April 1966 he said he remained a captain from 1956 until his defection.

NOSENKO has described his personal and direct participation in the section's activities as consisting of:

-Recruitment of two Soviet nationals as homosexual agents,** with NOSENKO their handler from the outset until they were dropped in 1962 or 1963.

-Recruitment and handling of Soviets as agents targetted against American tourists; their number varied from eight to 14 and many were employed by Inturist.

-Operations involving 14 foreigners who visited the USSR for various lengths of time.

-Recruitment and handling of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, whom NOSENKO continued to meet following his reassignment in January 1960.

-Decision in October 1959 that Lee Harvey OSWALD was of no operational interest to the KGB, and subsequent participation in the KGB investigation of OSWALD's activities in the USSR.

Each of these categories is discussed separately below.

2. Soviet Homosexual Agents

Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a public lavatory in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some operational value. The KGB therefore mounted an operation which verified this possibility in 1957: A homosexual agent of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked VOLKOV into a compromising situation. Then VOLKOV, who had previously been a KGB agent but was at this time deactivated, was called to KGB Headquarters where, after NOSENKO interrogated him, he admitted his homosexuality and agreed to

---

*These components are also known as the First Section and Seventh Department, respectively.

**This term refers to agents whose homosexuality is exploited by the KGB against certain male targets.

NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB among homosexuals. VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to recruit a homosexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not recalled) YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in addition to specific targets, they had the general assignment of associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the purpose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents: "Although I am a chief of section there I have all sorts of agents. I have a good agent apparatus. I have beautiful girls, beautiful girls, whom I can use as I like--anything you want. I have homosexuals, pederasts, and, in particular, I have one special pair. I am afraid they are known to both you and the British. I permitted this pair to work in general [without specific assignments]. I send them out to look on their own. I give them money and tell them to go out. 'Stroll about. Here are theater tickets. Look around, but only Americans. Look for American pederasts.' They are a couple, that is, they love each other. They are able to do anything desired, either active or passive, anything. They call me at night: 'Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister so-and-so here. He wants to go to bed with us.'' I say: 'Well, let him. We'll talk about it tomorrow.' So the next day they go to a special hotel room. We make photographs. Then we think about what he represents. Is he worth it? Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not--depending on his position, what he can give, what he can tell. If he can give something, I say: 'Well, let's have a go [igrat']. After this, I speak to these boys: 'Well, go to bed with him again, one or both of you, as you wish. Do whatever is wanted.' All this is seen [observed by the KGB]. The [hotel] administrator enters. 'What are you doing?' The administrator calls the Militia. An akt is drawn up. 'Well, you are a foreigner. This is not our business. We don't know what to do with you.' Then the Chief arrives: 'What's up. Aha, I see.' Well, then a conversation begins: 'Listen, what shall we do? Pederasty is punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand, if your friends find out that you are a pederast--and how can they help but find out?..."

When NOSENKO moved from the Tourist Department to the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in January 1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him. They were never used against targets in the U.S. Embassy, but, NOSENKO said, the Tourist Department "used to call me on homosexual prospects." VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB agents until some time in 1960 or 1961, after which they could not be used further since they had become too well known, and NOSENKO finally retired their files to KGB archives in 1962 or 1963. The last operation in which these two agents participated was during January 1962.

During interrogation on these agents, NOSENKO has been unable to tell where they lived in Moscow, their family situation, or other such details. He said that he never met either in a safehouse (always on the street) and never met either of them alone, without the other being present.

NOSENKO has described eleven KGB approaches to Americans based on compromising evidence obtained with the assistance of VOLKOV and/or YEFREMOV and several other cases in which Americans were suspected of being homosexuals on the basis of the evaluation of these two. Additionally, CIA records indicate that at least six Americans, not reported on by NOSENKO, have had contacts with one or both of these agents in Moscow. Of these six, three were CIA agents, one a U.S. graduate student, another a psychiatrist visiting Soviet institutions, and the last Charles W. THAYER, the well-known diplomat and author. With one or possibly two exceptions, all the contacts of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported by NOSENKO or other sources took place during the period from April to November 1959. The known exception was the KGB approach to W.E. JOHNSON in January 1962;* the possible exception was the contact with the American psychiatrist, which took place in 1959 or early 1960 but cannot be dated precisely. Finally, NOSENKO has described the contacts between VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, and the American Robert BARRETT in the summer of 1959 but does not know of their contacts in the summer of 1961, shortly before BARRETT was approached on the basis of compromising information obtained in 1959.**

3. Other Soviet Agents

The Tourist Department, just established when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent network for operations against American and British tourists. Consequently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case officers had to "start from the beginning."

As a first step, NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist; these were not agents, he explained, but "just persons known to the KGB so that a KGB man could approach one of them with questions about somebody or something." NOSENKO began to collect information on these individuals and others with the aim of formalizing their recruitment; by the end of 1955, he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all of them Inturist interpreters. During the following four years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied: Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another, some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing all the time, back and forth." In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had about ten agents, in 1957 there were about 12, in 1958 about eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return to the American Department) he had approximately 12 to 14. NOSENKO has provided information on five of these agents, all of whom he says he recruited from within Inturist during 1955. These were:

-Larissa SOBOROVA: An Inturist interpreter and one of the first Inturist agents recruited by NOSENKO. SOBOROVA was NOSENKO's agent until 1959 (when she married and retired) and reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as an interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO in the operation against [redacted]n the summer of 1957.* NOSENKO reported specifically on her possible sexual involvement with two other tourists, one American and the other British, during 1957-1959. NOSENKO mentioned at one point that he "even told Larissa about his last name."

---

*See Part V.F.4

**See Part V.D.4.m.

- Vladimir MUROMTSEV: KGB cryptonym "LEBEDEV," recruited in 1955. (NOSENKO has also said that MUROMTSEV had been a Second Chief Directorate agent "since 1958.") MUROMTSEV was called into the Army in about 1959 and was sent to some Soviet Air Force academy in Central Asia, where he worked as an interpreter for Syrian students studying there. During this period, his file was held by the local KGB in Central Asia. Later he returned to Moscow and was reactivated by the Second Chief Directorate.

- Nikolay ROGOV: KGB cryptonym "Ozero," recruited in 1955. ROGOV had formerly been a "confidential contact" of the KGB. He worked in the central office of Inturist which assigned interpreters to British and American citizens visiting the Soviet Union.

- Natalya SHULGINA: Recruited by NOSENKO in 1955, an Inturist interpreter. Shown SHULGINA's photograph on 6 February 1964, NOSENKO failed to recognize it; when he was given her name, however, he said that this was a Second Chief Directorate agent, on whom Boris BELITSKIY had reported to CIA.** NOSENKO's only other statement on SHULGINA was made on 17 April 1964, when discussing the agents he acquired in 1955. He said: "So, for example, I had this SOBOROVA, then I had MUROMTSEV. I recruited him. Who else? Natalya SHULGINA, KUNGAROVA. Well, anyway, during this short period, during 1955 until the end of '55, I had about eight people, all of them translators from Inturist." NOSENKO therefore said he handled SHULGINA and implied that he recruited her. (Information from other sources indicates that SHULGINA worked for two years as secretary/interpreter for the NBC correspondent in Moscow, Irving R. LEVINE, who arrived in the Soviet Union in July 1955. Although there is no evidence that SHULGINA was directly involved, the KGB attempted to recruit LEVINE in November 1955. She has travelled abroad twice, the first time to Paris in 1956 and the second time as an interpreter at the Brussels Fair in the summer of 1958. As NOSENKO indicated, BELITSKIY reported on SHULGINA, who he said was a close friend. BELITSKIY said that she was directly involved, probably as the principal, in a sexual entrapment operation, in the recruitment of a member of the British Parliament. BELITSKIY reported to CIA on SHULGINA in October 1962; NOSENKO said his last connection with the BELITSKIY case was in Geneva in the spring of 1962.)

- Tamara KUNGAROVA: Inturist interpreter recruited in 1955 (according to NOSENKO's statement in April 1964 - see above on SHULGINA). In October 1964, NOSENKO said she was transferred as an agent to the Tourist Department by the British

---

* [redacted] are discussed in Part V.D.4.d.

**NOSENKO reported in 1962 that the KGB controlled BELITSKIY, a source of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.).

Commonwealth Department in 1957 or the beginning of 1958. In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a sexual compromise operation against an American professor, which did not reach the point of a recruitment approach. Between 1957 or 1958 and 1960 she was working against an American tourist named Philip NIELSEN who was suspected of connection with CIA and who was under study for recruitment by the KGB.* KUNGAROVA later married NIELSEN and the two lived in England. The KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at the time NOSENKO left the Tourist Department, but NOSENKO believed there was no recruitment. Mrs. NIELSEN died in 1965.

Besides those in Inturist, NOSENKO has named several other agents whom he ~~recruited~~ or was given while in the Tourist Department. These included the following:

-Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV: KGB cryptonym "TOMO," a candidate member of the Academy of Sciences USSR and a specialist on Japan and Thailand. DMITRIYEV speaks Japanese and English and worked at the Japanese exhibition in Moscow. NOSENKO did not indicate how DMITRIYEV was used operationally or how he was connected with the American-Canadian-British target.

-(fnu) IVANOV: A lawyer employed by the Institute of Foreign Trade in Moscow. NOSENKO did not personally recruit this agent. IVANOV moved to Moscow from the Baltic area and his previous handlers there notified the Center, suggesting that the agent might be of use in the capital. NOSENKO contacted IVANOV and later turned him over to the British Commonwealth Department of the Second Chief Directorate which, NOSENKO believed, "planted him in the British Trade Mission or something like that."

-Marina RYTOVA: KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA," born about 1923 or 1924 and educated at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, a special school which also had Communist students from foreign countries. There she studied military subjects as well as foreign languages. She speaks English and Greek well. NOSENKO could not recall who recruited her, but she was turned over to him by I.A. KONSTANTINOV, a Tourist Department case officer, in 1956 or 1957. At that time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow and continued in this job until about 1960, when she became an instructor in the Greek language school of the Institute of International Relations. She reported to NOSENKO any information which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the Exhibit in Moscow. As she was often invited by the Ministry of Agriculture to interpret during meetings between Soviet officials and delegates from America, England,,and Greece, she also reported this information to NOSENKO. RYTOVA served several times as an interpreter for KHRUSHCHEV and once participated in a conversation he had with Iowa farmer GARST. In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as interpreter with a small delegation which visited GARST's farm in the United States and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington,

---

*NIELSEN was, in fact, in contact with CIA at the time (see Part VI.D.2.).

D.C., to report on observations enroute and while there. RYTOVA is married to a man who works in one of the military offices in Moscow and is a captain or a major. They have one daughter, approximately 14 years old.

-Yevgeniya ("Jane") DANKO: KGB cryptonym "OKSANA." She worked in the American Express Company office in Moscow for Arsens FRIPPEL and later for FRIPPEL's successor, Michael JELISAVCIC.* DANKO was handled by I.A. KONSTANTINOV from about 1955 to 1957 and was then turned over to NOSENKO. She reported on JELISAVCIC, who was not approached, according to NOSENKO.

4. Operations with Foreign Visitors

NOSENKO said he participated in 14 operations with foreign visitors to the USSR while a member of the American-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department. Nine of these operations resulted in recruitments (excluding one who later was recruited by another element of the KGB, but including another whom NOSENKO classified as a borderline case). Of the remaining five operations which did not end with a recruitment, no approach was contemplated by the KGB in one case, one target rejected NOSENKO's proposal, the KGB was unable to obtain compromising material for an approach to a third, and for political reasons the KGB decided against approaching the final two.

Although the information from NOSENKO on the timing of these operations does not always agree with that from other sources, these cases can be grouped chronologically as follows: 1955 - one; 1956 - one; 1957 - three; 1958 - two; and 1959 - seven. The operations in 1955, 1956 and, with one exception, 1959 were homosexual provocations. The recruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959 was based on heterosexual compromise.

These fourteen operations are summarized briefly below in the approximate order in which the cases began. For each case, NOSENKO's information is followed by a summary of the results of CIA investigations. The description of the BURGI case is more detailed than the others, for reasons indicated in the text.

a. Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)

NOSENKO's Information: Martin MALIA, a graduate student, spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was suspected of having connections with American Intelligence. Toward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA was observed in contact with a Soviet citizen believed to be a homosexual. The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and NOSENKO eventually obtained a confession that he had had homosexual relations with MALIA. After NOSENKO had arranged for the Soviet to introduce MALIA to a KGB homosexual agent, the latter enticed MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow; NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in touch with MALIA) when the introductions were made in a

---

*See Part V.D.5. for further details on FRIPPEL and JELISAVCIC.

Moscow restaurant, and from an observation point in a neighboring hotel room he watched the KGB agent and MALIA having relations. With MALIA insisting on the lights being turned off, however, it was impossible to obtain compromising photographs (the KGB did not yet have infra-red photographic equipment, NOSENKO said) and therefore no recruitment approach was made to MALIA. During this and a later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "very cautious," and the KGB never again succeeded in exploiting MALIA's homosexuality for a recruitment approach.

Investigation Results: MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence officer during World War II, has visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and twice in 1962. While buying books for the Library of Congress and several universities in 1955, MALIA travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, which was sufficiently unusual at the time to attract press publicity. In 1955 and 1962 he had contacts with dissident Soviet citizens and clandestinely brought to the West literature for publishing abroad. In December 1963 MALIA was the subject of an attack in the Soviet press which charged that during 1962 he had "spent his time in Moscow looking for dissension in the ranks of young intellectuals at drunken debauches." MALIA had been in periodic contact with CIA in recent years; in the spring of 1963 he claimed to have had no involvements with blackmarketeers, homosexuals, or females inside the Soviet Union at any time. He made a similar statement to [redacted] in October 1963. MALIA has not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's information about him.

b. Recruitment of BURGI (1956)

NOSENKO's Information: At the first meeting in 1962 and despite his stated fear for his own security and his determination to discuss only the two leads he wished to sell CIA, NOSENKO described his recruitment of Yale Professor Richard BURGI on the basis of a homosexual provocation operation which began in Moscow and culminated with an approach in Kiev in June 1956. NOSENKO reported that he received a letter of commendation (blagodarnost') and a bonus of one month's pay for this recruitment, but in 1966 he retracted this claim. The BURGI case was the first operation in which NOSENKO had direct contact with a foreign target of the KGB, and NOSENKO said he counted it as a turning point in his personal and professional life: It was with this successful operation, NOSENKO stated, that he "began to grow" from a spoiled playboy into a responsible and effective counterintelligence officer. The BURGI operation was the first recruitment carried out by the Tourist Department after it was created in 1955, according to NOSENKO. In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, had also taken part in this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was the responsible case officer. In August 1965, when asked who had recruited BURGI, NOSENKO replied: "KOZLOV and NOSENKO." Asked who recruited him first, NOSENKO said: "KOZLOV, naturally. He was the Deputy Chief of the Department. The collection of the materials [in preparation for the approach] was in the hands of Case Officer NOSENKO." Because of the personal and general significance ascribed to this operation by NOSENKO, it is discussed in detail here:

In August 1965 NOSENKO reported that at the time of BURGI's arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application (anketa), "maybe" an excerpt from a cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying that a visa had been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving BURGI's anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary inside the Soviet Union, and the results of traces of the general KGB Archives and of the First Chief Directorate Archives. NOSENKO himself ran the traces, which proved to be negative; there was no information on record concerning BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the material available on BURGI, no other traces were made. The KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact that he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefore had contact with students who might some day work for the U.S. State Department, American Intelligence, and other target organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested an attempt to recruit him.

When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in contact with a number of KGB agents, and their reports were placed in the unofficial file maintained by NOSENKO.* NOSENKO could not recall in 1965 how many such agents there may have been, their names, or what they might have reported concerning BURGI. (BURGI had an Inturist interpreter but NOSENKO did not know whether he was a KGB agent.) From some source, name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB obtained indications that BURGI was a homosexual, and it was decided to try to obtain the grounds for recruitment by homosexual compromise. NOSENKO therefore approached Yu.A. LOPUKHOV, an officer of the British Department who handled the homosexual agent Viktor BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use his agent in setting up the compromise. After permission had been received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV and NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met BURGI, the fact of mutual homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the adjoining room and directed the compromise. He did not meet BURGI at this point, however.

As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the compromising photographs were ready by the following day. A report of the compromise and a request for permission to attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors. The request came back with the approving signatures of O.M. GRIBANOV and A.S. FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Department of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed interest in using BURGI in the United States. BURGI's itinerary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there the day before to prepare the operation. BURGI arrived the next morning and was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist cover. NOSENKO was unable to recall how the car was acquired, whether it was a KGB or Inturist vehicle, who the driver was, whether he was in the employ of the local KGB, or other details.

---

*NOSENKO explained that no official files were kept on tourists until 1960--only "collections of materials."

In accordance with the operational plan, the local KGB officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels in Kiev were full at the moment because of various conferences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about a day in a private apartment in the center of town; he would be moved to a hotel as soon as possible. When the car arrived at the apartment building on Kreshchatik Ulitsa in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer, and (fnu) KASTYKAITE, a woman housekeeper, were waiting for them. NOSENKO could not remember how or whether he introduced himself to BURGI. The recruitment conversation, he said, was handled by "KOZLOV-NOSENKO," but NOSENKO had forgotten by 1965 who said what: "I don't remember what I talked about and I don't remember what KOZLOV talked about. Many things were discussed. It started with how he liked his stay in the Soviet Union... Then we slowly proceeded to say how unfortunate it was that information had been received about his conduct in Moscow. We told him that his homosexual activities were known, that this was punishable under Soviet law according to article so-and-so of the criminal code, etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court according to the Soviet law... Well, he was scared, confused, upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly proceeded to say that all that could be smoothed out, but, you understand, the basis was prepared for the man to say: 'All right, I agree to help.'... We showed him the pictures. He was embarrassed of course--he was naked. Then we prepared the basis: 'You have a noble task. You teach; you have students; the students might become future specialists on Russia or might work as diplomats, etc., but many of these students could be used by intelligence. They might be sent somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will tell us who among the students is preparing for government service, how they are distributed, etc.'... During the first conversation everything was made completely clear... He was not at all willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence. He was told that he must understand that in this case 'helping Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term. I remember that I told him: 'Understand, nobody is going to ask you that you help our friends over there, or me, if I should be there, or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subversive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.' After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to Italy, to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this school. He told us a bit about the Russicum and we asked him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the professors who teach Russian subjects..." According to NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five hours; at its end BURGI signed a short statement that he agreed "to assist the organs of Soviet Intelligence." NOSENKO first said that it was he who took this statement from BURGI but later said he could not remember whether he or KOZLOV did this. BURGI was then taken to a hotel.

This was the first time NOSENKO met BURGI. Following the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor above BURGI, and for the remainder of BURGI's stay in Kiev became his constant companion and guide. An attempt was made"to smooth out all the dirty business that had been brought up during the recruitment talk." NOSENKO took BURGI to an old cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in nearby Kaniv. The subject of homosexuality was not raised again. From Kiev, BURGI went directly to the West, without returning to Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had visited the American Department of the First Chief Directorate and had arranged with its chief, FEKLISOV, for a recontact plan in New York City should BURGI be recruited. Before he left BURGI was briefed on these arrangements, which called for a first meeting in the New York Public Library. BURGI was given a recognition signal and a KGB cryptonym, but the latter was not discussed with him.

About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO turned over all his materials on the BURGI operation to the First Chief Directorate. Somewhat later Sergey GUSKOV, Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, KOZLOV, and NOSENKO visited FEKLISOV in the First Chief Directorate and expressed an interest in further developments in the case. FEKLISOV told them that BURGI had arrived for his first meeting, but the KGB had not established contact; the first meeting in New York City took place the second or third time BURGI appeared and the New York Legal Residency continued to meet with him until the Revolution in Hungary in late 1956. NOSENKO later heard from someone in the American Department, First Chief Directorate that the case was closed. For their roles in this first recruitment of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said in 1965, he and KOZLOV received letters of commendation and bonuses of one month's pay by order of KGB Chairman SEROV; PETRENKO was given a letter of commendation and half a month's salary; and even RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation. In October 1966, however, NOSENKO said his only KGB award was for his longevity of service.

Investigation Results: BURGI was first interviewed on 22 November 1957 concerning his recruitment by the KGB. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

---

* In August 1965, NOSENKO denied meeting BURKE in Moscow.

BURGI then continued to describe the remainder of his stay in Kiev (generally agreeing with NOSENKO's account).

[redacted]

c. Approach to [redacted] (1957)

NOSENKO's information: NOSENKO made an unsuccessful recruitment approach in 1957 to [redacted], [redacted] on the basis of [redacted]nterest in continuing his commercial activities in the USSR. Originally the responsible case officer had been A.I. VERENIKIN of the Sixth Section of the Tourist Department; this section was then responsible for operations against foreign seamen. Since VERENIKIN spoke no German and [redacted] was known to speak English, NOSENKO was selected to make the approach because he "knew English a little." When asked why a German-speaking KGB case officer was not used, NOSENKO answered: "The higher-ups said 'go work on this case,' and that was all." After being rebuffed by [redacted] NOSENKO saw him several more times during the 1957 visit to Moscow, but when NOSENKO attempted to renew contact upon [redacted] return to the Soviet Union in 1958, the latter refused to see him.

Investigation Results: [redacted] was interviewed by CIA on 19 July 1965, and, while generally uncooperative, described a "mild approach" in Moscow during 1956 or 1957 which may be the one described by NOSENKO. (He was not questioned on the identities of the Soviets involved.)

[redacted] continues to have extensive business contacts with Soviet commercial representatives in West Germany and was recently reported to have negotiated a sizable shipping contract with the Soviet Union shortly after a visit to the USSR. His principal contact at [redacted]

d. [redacted]

c. Recruitment of (fnu) [redacted])

NOSENKO's Information: In 1957 or 1958 [redacted] visited the Soviet Union and an attempt was made to recruit him. A Second Chief Directorate officer, N.A. ARKHIPOV, made [redacted] acquaintance and handled the entire operation against him, but NOSENKO himself played a role. It had somehow been determined that [redacted] had a fondness for girls. NOSENKO therefore presented himself to him, using the name "SMIRNOV" or "SERGEYEV" and posing as a painter, and told [redacted] that he could find women for him. A party was arranged, with a KGB agent as [redacted]

***See Part V.D.8 for more discussion of this point.**

****This incident is described more fully in Part III.A.**

date and a Second Chief Directorate secretary as NOSENKO's. Late in the evening NOSENKO and his date excused themselves, and [redacted] had sexual relations with the female agent. Photographs of the scene were taken by the KGB. When NOSENKO and [redacted] saw one another the next day, [redacted] announced that he had some articles, cameras and the like, that he want to sell on the black market. NOSENKO offered to arrange the sale and took [redacted] to a dingy section of Moscow. As they arrived before a small house, NOSENKO asked [redacted] to give him the things to be sold. At this moment a KGB officer posing as a militiaman approached and arrested the two for blackmarketeering. At the Militia station, [redacted] was recruited by K.N. DUBAS, then Chief of the Tourist Department, under threat of imprisonment. (It was DUBAS who had had the photographs taken the previous evening.) There was no further contact with [redacted] after he left the USSR, however, because on his return to Oslo he published an article in which he described his experiences, "but not all of them."

Investigation Results: [redacted]

f. Recruitment of HARRIS (1958)

NOSENKO's Information: NOSENKO in 1959 recruited Gisella HARRIS, an employee of the American Express Company in Salt Lake City, based on her romantic and sexual involvement with a Soviet citizen. The Soviet told HARRIS that he was in trouble with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to accompany him to the police. HARRIS agreed to meet and cooperate with the Soviets if they established contact with her in Salt Lake City, but the case was turned over to the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any further contact with her.

[redacted]

g. Compromise of KRAFT (1958)

NOSENKO's Information: Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the Chicago area, visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in 1957 or 1958, and NOSENKO was assigned to be the responsible case officer. During an earlier trip to the USSR, the KGB had learned, KRAFT had been intimate with a Soviet woman. NOSENKO arranged for her to come to Moscow from Kiev, where she was living in 1957 or 1958, in order to compromise KRAFT. Although his wife was accompanying him in Moscow, KRAFT and the Soviet woman were intimate in the latter's room in the Grand Hotel. NOSENKO was present at the time supervising the operation. Photographs were taken. Then militiamen broke into the room, finding KRAFT and the woman in the nude; a recruitment approach was then made by DUBAS, the Chief of the Tourist Department. (NOSENKO had been the case officer and had handled the operation thus far, but he took no part in the confrontation or recruitment approach "because DUBAS wanted it for himself.") Although the recruitment was not firm, KRAFT and DUBAS "had an agreement" that nothing would be done about the compromise if KRAFT did not criticize the Soviet Union in lectures about his trip there which he was to give in the United States. DUBAS again contacted KRAFT when he came to Moscow in 1963, and after this his file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO recalled that the First Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was not in a good region of the United States. And also it smelled like he had spoken of the approach made to him." Therefore, NOSENKO concluded, he probably had not been contacted in the United States.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

h. Recruitment of DREW (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: George DREW, an American who visited the Soviet Union in the spring of 1959, had originally been the responsibility of V.M. IVANOV, a case officer of the section dealing with American and Canadian tourists. By chance, however, DREW became involved with NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2), and they reported this to NOSENKO, then the deputy chief of the section. NOSENKO and IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the section chief, and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad to make the approach. (IVANOV was not considered to be sufficiently experienced and his English was not good.) NOSENKO arranged for DREW to be compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homosexual agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer, (fnu) PERELETOV. Using the name "Mr. SERGEYEV," NOSENKO alone recruited DREW in an office of the hotel. The KGB First Chief Directorate was interested in DREW's recruitment because he might be able to spot other homosexuals, possibly some in the U.S. Government.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

i. Recruitment of [redacted] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: In June or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited a [redacted] subject*, [redacted], in a room of the Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after [redacted] had been compromised by NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2.). The case was then turned over to Ye. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief of the British Department of the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did not know its current status, but he believed the KGB has not been in contact with [redacted] subsequently.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

j. Recruitment of [redacted] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: By himself NOSENKO recruited [redacted] in the Nova Moskovskaya (now the Bucharest) Hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after [redacted] had been compromised by either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, his homosexual agents (see Part V.D.2.). [redacted] is a [redacted] citizen and his case was also turned over to TARABRIN.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

k. Recruitment of [redacted] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: NOSENKO personally and alone recruited the Moscow representative of [redacted]

---

* NOSENKO explained his involvement with British nationals by saying that, after 1958, the Tourist Department had two geographic sections, one dealing with U.S. and UK citizens and the other with tourists from other countries. NOSENKO was involved in the first of these, "so they assigned them to me."

[redacted]

[redacted] whose name NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow during the summer of 1959, possibly in August. The approach was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2.).

Investigation Results: [redacted]

1. Recruitment of MERTENS (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: When Gerard MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or August 1959, NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, as part of their general assignment to become acquainted with homosexuals (see Part V.D.2.), accidentally met MERTENS in Moscow and reported their suspicions to NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and requested authority to take compromising photographs in preparation for a recruitment approach, and DUBAS, his chief, then assigned the case to him. (MERTENS had previously been the responsibility of A.A. VELITSKIY, another case officer.) Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between VOLKOV and MERTENS on two separate occasions in Moscow. When MERTENS later travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested" by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged in relations with a homosexual agent of operational contact from Odessa. NOSENKO arranged by phone to bring this homosexual to Uzhgorod; he did not recall his name, but supplied CIA with a physical description. (NOSENKO could give no background on the agent and when asked why not, said he "wasn't interested.") MERTENS was then brought before NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with MERTENS when he visited Lvov and Minsk before leaving the USSR. NOSENKO said that he had used the name "George" with MERTENS, but he could not recall what last name he had given him.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

---

* NOSENKO explained that the Tourist Department in 1959 had a section dealing with commercial representatives, which was responsible for the [redacted] man, but had asked NOSENKO's section for help. "They said they didn't have any agents or anything and didn't know what to do. So somebody said, 'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the section? He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange everything for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report to him." In this passage NOSENKO seemed to be referring to himself, although he said he was deputy chief of the section; the chief of the section at that time, M.A. LEONOV, is not known to have participated in operations stemming from the homosexuality of the prospective agents.

[redacted]

m. Compromise of BARRETT (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: Robert BARRETT, a guide at the U.S. Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, had become friendly with the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2.), whom he met at the fairground. Although BARRETT was not a homosexual, VOLKOV succeeded--after a long period of development--in involving him in homosexual acts, which were photographed by KGB personnel from an adjoining hotel room. As case officer for VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise, was present when the photographs were taken, and has described the occasion in detail. There had been much complaining among the photographic technicians because of the amount of time they were forced to spend waiting for VOLKOV to succeed in his mission, and NOSENKO recalled that he "had to provide them with drinks and treat them well" because "they were a big help" to him in this operation. The photographs were good, but the KGB was unable to use them in 1959 because of a general ban placed by SHELEPIN on the recruitment of U.S. Exhibition guides due to the possible repercussions on KHRUSHCHEV's planned visit to the United States.* (NOSENKO reported, however, that BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 photography when he returned with another exhibition in 1961. This recruitment was carried out by another component of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO had nothing to do with it.**)

Investigation Results: [redacted]

---

* See the discussion of the WILLERFORD case, below, for additional information on SHELEPIN's prohibition.

** In 1961, shortly before his recruitment, BARRETT had ostensibly accidental contact with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in Moscow. NOSENKO has not mentioned this.

n. Compromise of WILLERFORD

NOSENKO's Information: Frederick WILLERFORD was BARRETT's roommate during the 1959 exhibition in Moscow. Initially he was a target of the local KGB organization for the city of Moscow, which believed WILLERFORD to be an FBI agent and had been collecting materials on him. At the same time and, without knowing of the interest of the local organization, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had made WILLERFORD's acquaintance, and NOSENKO had arranged for compromising photographs of WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV in a Moscow hotel room. NOSENKO watched WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV through a two-way mirror and was able to describe the scene in detail. It was only after this compromising material had been obtained that NOSENKO learned of the local KGB's interest in WILLERFORD. NOSENKO's department and the local KGB unit then made a joint request for operational approval to approach WILLERFORD, but permission was refused because of the general ban on recruitment approaches at this time. The case file was retained by the Moscow KGB organization, and NOSENKO did not know whether WILLERFORD has been approached subsequently.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

Note: There is a similarity between NOSENKO's description of the ban on recruitment approaches in 1959, which prevented the Tourist Department from taking advantage of its compromising photography of BARRETT and WILLERFORD, and information provided by the earlier defector, GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN reported that an American employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual compromise during 1959 and 1960. According to information he said he learned from U.S. Embassy Section case officer, G.I. GRYAZNOV, the KGB had photographs of the American in various stages of a homosexual act, and there was no question about the recruitment being achieved: "The only question was to where." At the time, however, SHELEPIN had just become Chairman of the KGB and was stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. He was shown these particular photographs but decided that an approach on their basis would be too crude and that another way should be found. Although SHELEPIN did not exclude the use of these photographs some time in the future, according to GOLITSYN, he had reservations against using them at that time for fear of the propaganda repercussions if the attempt should fail and be exposed publicly. GOLITSYN did not know whether the recruitment was subsequently carried out. The essential differences between this account and that of NOSENKO are that GOLITSYN implied the ban was in effect at least into 1960 and that GOLITSYN appeared to be speaking of a general prohibition, whereas NOSENKO related the ban specifically and only to the U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park which ended on 4 September 1959.*

---

* In speaking of the 1959 U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park, Moscow, [redacted] told [redacted] that both the KGB and the GRU launched an all-out effort to recruit Americans employed at the Exhibition. All officers at GRU Headquarters were assigned to this task, and some were used by the KGB in an attempt to compromise the Americans; V.A. GRUSHA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer specializing in American operations of the First Chief Directorate) directed many of these KGB activities in which GRU personnel were involved. As a result of this endeavor, "more than one American" was recruited, and [redacted] indicated that the technique of compromise--such as "bed pictures"--was employed. When questioned on this subject [redacted] [redacted] reported that to handle the Exhibition, the CPSU Central Committee issued a special directive to form a committee headed by the KGB (GRUSHA was in charge of one section of this committee) and to which the GRU [redacted] contributed personnel. Its purposes were two-fold: protective, that is, to prevent propaganda, to disrupt presentations, and to conduct counterintelligence; and to recruit. [redacted] and that the GRU did not recruit any Americans at the Exhibition. [redacted]

5. The FRIPPEL Case (1959-1963)

As a member of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO in 1959 personally took part in the recruitment of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL. He continued to be one of this agent's two KGB handlers after transferring to the American Department in 1960, and FRIPPEL was asked to report on the U.S. Embassy as well as on two Embassy officials in particular. FRIPPEL left the Moscow job in 1961 but returned on trips to the USSR in 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO met him. The only recruited American whom NOSENKO ever handled as a reporting source, FRIPPEL [redacted] The accounts of this operation by NOSENKO and FRIPPEL differ in several details, but both agree that FRIPPEL provided the KGB with no significant information. These two versions are presented separately below.

a. NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO first mentioned FRIPPEL during the third meeting in Geneva in 1962 while discussing KGB successes in Moscow: "There was another agent [KGB cryptonym] 'ARTUR.' He was not a correspondent. He knew me as George, Yuriy Ivanovich, and my last name as NIKOLAYEV. He was a permanent representative, not in the Embassy, but of the American Express Company in Moscow. FRIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPEL. But he also has the cryptonym 'ARTUR.' He liked drinking, always drank. He was also strongly attracted to women. I provided him with beautiful women... Well, we decided to have a talk with him. Why? What could he give? He now works in the American Express Company [main office in New York City]. A new department has now been organized for the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. And he is chief of the department... He is no longer in Moscow, but he was here two and a half or three years. We hope that he will return. We are waiting for him to come back. We know that the company wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian language very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this FRIPPEL. And he also did a good and intelligent job of establishing relations with Inturist. He had very good relationships with ANKUDINOV, the Chairman of Inturist, and with other people, both the chiefs and the low-level workers... But, why was FRIPPEL recruited? I was interested in knowing precisely by whom, by name, and how approaches were being made to our delegations [in the United States], i.e., I was interested in him from the point of view of counterintelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of approaches are taking place to our people in America and by whom? This is what interested us. But he didn't know anything. He couldn't say anything. He provided only superficial information, nothing more."

NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEL would not have been useful for coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union. He replied that the KGB had already had great success in this by other means and launched into a long description of the methods of covering foreign tourists in the USSR.

NOSENKO was present in the adjoining room when FRIPPEL was compromised by a Soviet female agent, Klara Konstantinovna GORBACHEVA. NOSENKO described the compromising scene in detail as well as the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion pictures of these activities through a two-way mirror, and the confrontation with the militiamen who broke into the room.

After returning to Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made the following additional statements concerning the FRIPPEL case:

- Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he did not do so alone; Col. V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later Chief) of the Tourist Department, was present; he and NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in early September 1959. NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL's case officer.

- NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the FRIPPEL recruitment to the following: "In 1958, after 1958, when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area of activity was narrowed down. I didn't handle all the tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of the section and I had my own little area--for example, the permanent representative of the American Express Company, and besides that I began to collect all the material on all American tourist firms which have anything to do with Inturist and who send tourists to the USSR."

- FRIPPEL never provided any information of value to Soviet tourist operations.

- When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960, he took FRIPPEL with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Americans at the Embassy. NOSENKO was asked to question FRIPPEL about the U.S. Embassy and such Embassy officers as George WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO anything along this line.*

- FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.

- NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL during the period to January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at FRIPPEL's home, where they met Mrs. FRIPPEL. Odette FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent, and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with FRIPPEL. Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that he went because he "was invited," and CHELNOKOV went "because he was also involved in the recruitment."

- First as Deputy Chief of a section of the Tourist Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels and restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time I met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with

---

* See Part V.E.3. regarding NOSENKO's duties in the U.S. Embassy Section.

CHELNOKOV." Usually NOSENKO would arrange these meetings with FRIPPEL at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continued to meet with FRIPPEL, despite his lack of production, because they "kept hoping he would give something." In a different context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO explained: "You see, never mind if you are a chief or a deputy chief of a department, you must have one, two, or three agents. GRIBANOV insists, so that you don't forget how to work. The Chiefs of the [Second Chief] Directorate do not demand that they have 12 or 13 agents, but they must have two or three. They will have important agents or those in leading positions."

- NOSENKO continued to act as FRIPPEL's case officer after FRIPPEL had left the Soviet Union and NOSENKO had been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. He met twice with FRIPPEL during this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as a guide with groups of foreign visitors. Both of these meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, without CHELNOKOV.

- The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had returned to Moscow from Geneva. FRIPPEL had arrived in the Soviet Union as a guide for some American journalists. (NOSENKO was unable to give the composition of the journalist group or to recall where they stayed in Moscow and where else they travelled in the Soviet Union.) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what questions the newsmen intended to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a scheduled interview; subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice required visiting journalists to submit their intended questions for KHRUSHCHEV in writing to Soviet authorities prior to interviews. After the interview, he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader. NOSENKO could not recall their specific reaction to the KHRUSHCHEV interview but did remember that they were "satisfied." Another reason for contacting FRIPPEL, NOSENKO added in a later discussion, was to learn whether any of the journalists might have joined the group at the last moment in the United States, which might suggest intelligence connections on their part.*

- NOSENKO met FRIPPEL alone for the second and last time during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for tourists aboard the ship "Olympia," which stopped for a day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Moscow and accosted FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get away from his group, FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's hotel room, and the two drank and talked. NOSENKO had given FRIPPEL a bottle of vodka as a gift, and FRIPPEL said he wanted to give NOSENKO some whiskey in return. They drove in NOSENKO's car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while FRIPPEL went aboard for the whiskey. (He had invited NOSENKO to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.) When FRIPPEL returned. he brought another American, so NOSENKO had to invent for himself a suitable cover (Inturist) on the spot. The three returned to the hotel and drank some more, everyone getting drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL reported "nothing of importance," and his most interesting news was that he might again be reassigned to Moscow in December 1963 as the American Express Company representative.*

---

* NOSENKO had earlier said on several occasions that one of the things KGB sources in foreign tourist companies abroad were instructed to report to the KGB was any last-minute additions to a tour group to the USSR; this might signify intelligence affiliation.

- On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV papers** in Geneva, NOSENKO was asked about the following passage which appeared in the KGB operational plan against BOWDEN, dated February 1960 and signed by V.A. KUSKOV of the U.S. Embassy Section: "He [BOWDEN] showed himself to be an indiscreet person... Ironically, one day as though by chance, he [BOWDEN] blurted out to our agent SHMEPOVA [the fact of] "ARTUR's" affiliation with American Intelligence."*** NOSENKO confirmed that the "ARTUR" of the CHEREPANOV papers was FRIPPEL, but he said he "could not say" whether FRIPPEL had any affiliation with American Intelligence.

---

* NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been reassigned, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent would return to Moscow; this report was submitted by V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City, who was a former Second Chief Directorate colleague of NOSENKO.

** The CHEREPANOV Papers are discussed in detail in Part VI.D.7.c.

*** There is no other report of BOWDEN making such a remark and no basis for it. Although never contacted by or associated with CIA in any way, FRIPPEL during 1960 was under consideration for operational use in Moscow, and in this connection background inquiries about him were submitted to the FBI. [redacted]

While in the Soviet Union in August 1962 and shortly before his recruitment on homosexual grounds (see Part VI.D.2.), the American Spencer ROBERTS was approached on the beach at Sochi by a young Soviet male. ROBERTS and the Soviet, who spoke French, soon became friends, and the Soviet told ROBERTS that he had been used as an agent in several operations against French-speaking foreigners in the USSR. One of these was FRIPPEL, the Soviet said, adding that FRIPPEL was suspected by the KGB of being an American Intelligence agent. NOSENKO, who has provided much detail on the ROBERTS case, did not mention the unidentified Soviet in this context or while discussing FRIPPEL.

- under interrogation in [illegible] referring to his [illegible] refusal [illegible] contacts with CIA inside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO suggested for the first time that "if you had been [illegible] FRIPPEL, you could have made me work in Moscow. You could [illegible] and sent him to my apartment. It was possible, even with tourists."*

b. FRIPPEL's Information

FRIPPEL, who uses the nickname "Arthur," was the American Express Company representative in Moscow from 7 April 1959 to 3 January 1961. [redacted]

---

* See Part III.[illegible]., which describes NOSENKO's emphatic refusal during the 1962 meetings to have any contacts with CIA inside the Soviet Union. During the October 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO said that in 1962 he had "absolutely no idea" concerning the possibility of CIA using FRIPPEL as an intermediary for contact inside the Soviet Union.

[redacted]

[redacted]

---

* FRIPPEL also had social contact with NOSENKO's target John ABIDIAN (see Part V.B.3.d.). NOSENKO said they did not know one another. There is no indication that FRIPPEL was questioned on these contacts by NOSENKO and/or CHELNOKOV.

** In February 1965 NOSENKO denied that this meeting took place. Department of State records show that in November 1961 FRIPPEL applied for a new passport indicating that he intended to depart the United States in February 1962 aboard the "Olympia" for a cruise which would visit the Soviet Union.

[redacted]

---

* NOSENKO said it was "impossible" that he should have to request permission to board the vessel.

** In February 1965, NOSENKO did not recall having told FRIPPEL these details of his life and said that, if he had done so, it was while he was drunk.

6. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963)

As in the FRIPPEL case, NOSENKO was involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD during both periods of his assignment to the Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate (1955-1960 and 1962-1964).* While Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Tourist Section, NOSENKO had a direct hand in the decision in October 1959 that OSWALD was of no operational interest to the KGB and should be returned immediately to the United States. Before President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, when NOSENKO was again in the Tourist Department as its Deputy Chief, he was present at the time the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned of OSWALD's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to re-enter the USSR. After the assassination, he also played a role in the KGB investigations of OSWALD's activities during residence in the Soviet Union from October 1959 until June 1962.

Collateral information relating to OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union, and particularly concerning any connections he may have had with Soviet Intelligence, is meager and indirect. It derives almost entirely from indications of primary interest by the KGB (among all Soviet Government organs) in every defector to the USSR, and from inferences which may be drawn from certain entries in OSWALD's "Historical Diary" and certain statements made by his wife, Marina, during interviews on behalf of the Warren Commission. After President Kennedy's death, the Soviet Government provided the United States with official documents and letters pertaining to OSWALD's defection to the USSR, his suicide attempt, his marriage, and other events inside the Soviet Union. This information from the Soviet Government generally agrees with the information from NOSENKO. The materials furnished by the Soviet Government make no mention of any Soviet Intelligence interest, or lack thereof, in OSWALD.

In this sense NOSENKO's information is unique: It was and remains the only such information available on the 32 months of OSWALD's life in the USSR.** NOSENKO's access to information on KGB involvement with OSWALD in 1959, at the time of OSWALD's request to remain in the USSR, derives exclusively from the claimed fact that he, NOSENKO, was Deputy Chief of the KGB Section" dealing with American tourists at that time. He said he knew of later developments because of his position as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from mid-1962 until 1964. The central theme of NOSENKO's information, as given to CIA and the FBI, is that the KGB determined as early as 16 October 1959, when OSWALD made his first declaration of intent to remain in the USSR, that he was "not normal" and thereupon "washed its hands" of him entirely. According to NOSENKO, the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD and made no attempt to recruit or even to debrief him during the time he spent in Moscow and Minsk or during his trip to Mexico shortly before killing the President.

---

* For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement, 1959-1960 and 1963, are discussed in this part of the paper.

** Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 3 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Tourist Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Headquarters from the KGB legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR and that he had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.

a. Statements to the FBI

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

** OSWALD attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship at the American Embassy on 31 October, three days after leaving the hospital. From his diary, the Warren Commission concluded he received permission to reside in the Soviet Union on a year-to-year basis about 4 January 1960, approximately the time he moved to Minsk.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

---

* NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally.

** In October 1965 NOSENKO said he learned that OSWALD was a poor shot from V.V.KRIVOSHEY, a fellow KGB officer who had been told this while visiting Minsk.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. Statements to CIA

On the basis of the FBI interviews of NOSENKO and the similar information which he had previously provided CIA, further debriefings were conducted by CIA on 3 and 27 July 1964. New and explanatory information received during these debriefings is presented below.

(i) KGB Interest in OSWALD

Until OSWALD mentioned to the Inturist guide his desire to remain in the Soviet Union, he was treated routinely by the KGB. When OSWALD made his request, this was reported immediately to the Tourist Department, and it was from this moment that the KGB began to pay attention to him. All available materials on him were thereupon collected and examined--the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check of KGB Archives. KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his desire. Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility as "this would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an interesting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.** From the materials and reports immediately available it was decided that something was not quite normal about OSWALD, and the KGB therefore had Inturist tell him that he would have to leave the USSR when his visa expired. OSWALD's suicide attempt supported the Tourist Department's feeling that it had been right in deciding to refuse OSWALD's request for citizenship, particularly as the hospital also reported that he was not normal, and the Tourist Department decided: "We will do nothing; we don't want to know him." Inturist was subsequently told: "'There is no KGB interest in him. Do what you want'... The KGB thought that he was of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he was not normal, and that he should leave the country." The Tourist Department and the KGB in general thereupon "washed their hands" of this matter.

---

* NOSENKO provided details on this point to CIA (see below) and made a similar statement when asked in 1964 why KGB agent Tamara KUNGAROVA had been permitted to marry an American (her own developmental target) and then emigrate to England; See Part V.D.3.

** When he appeared at the U.S. Embassy to renounce his citizenship on 31 October 1959, OSWALD told the counsellor officer that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and had told a Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information concerning the Marines and radar which he possessed.

There was never any operational use of OSWALD nor was there anything in OSWALD's file to indicate that the KGB attempted to debrief him on his past service in the U.S. Marine Corps or other matters; this was because "he is a very little person and also it is felt that he is not normal, so the KGB is afraid to do this with him."* The GRU was not informed of OSWALD's defection. Neither was any attempt made to exploit OSWALD for propaganda purposes in Moscow or in Minsk. In short, there was no intelligence interest or contact with OSWALD after the initial assessment of abnormality.

(ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD

The KGB had no knowledge or interest in Marina (nee PRUSAKOVA) until she and OSWALD applied for permission to register marriage. In fact the KGB did not know that she was a friend of OSWALD until this point, for there was no surveillance on OSWALD to show that he knew her. When the KGB learned of their relationship, checks were made of the Archives of the Minsk KGB as well as neighborhood checks and checks at her place of employment. The people where she lived and worked and went to school considered her a simple girl, not very clever, only fair in her studies, not an active member of the KOMSOMOL. She was a simple "philistine," an uncultured girl more interested in gossip than in anything important. The KGB never considered recruiting her as an informant on OSWALD "because it was considered dangerous to recruit a wife to report on her husband." Nor was it considered to recruit her for use after she arrived in the United States, "because she would tell him and also she would probably tell the Americans, based on the assessment of the type of person she was."

(iii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure from the USSR

NOSENKO was asked why there were so few difficulties in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her departure from the Soviet Union. He replied: "The Soviet law allows any Soviet citizen to marry a foreigner. It was easy in this case because OSWALD was already living and working in the Soviet Union. It would be more difficult, of course, with tourists or others who are in the Soviet Union only for a short period and want to marry Soviet citizens."* Asked whether it is not unusually difficult for Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union, NOSENKO explained: "In this case it was easier because Marina was already married to a foreigner." NOSENKO was next asked what office or level of the Government or Party must make the final decision regarding Marina's marriage to OSWALD. He described the procedure as follows: "They would come to the Regional Registration Office to apply to register their marriage. [There] they will be told that they will have to wait a week or two while they think it over to be sure they want to get married. During this period the necessary checks are conducted. The Regional Office would call the Militia, and the Militia would call the Minsk KGB. The Minsk KGB said that it is all right for them to get married--that the KGB has no objection. But it is the law that allows them to be married. There are no formal approvals necessary."

---

* NOSENKO subsequently defined this KGB reservation about OSWALD as fear of becoming involved with an unstable person.

Concerning the decision to permit the couple to leave the USSR, NOSENKO said on 3 July 1964 that the decision would be made on the local level, in Minsk, and that there is no need to check in Moscow. On 27 July 1964 he corrected this statement to say that, while local authorities make the decision, it must be approved in Moscow by, he thought, the MInistry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP).

(iv) OSWALD's Visit to Soviet Embassy in Mexico

Asked whether he had any information on OSWALD's visit to Mexico in September 1963, NOSENKO said that he knew only that OSWALD had applied at the Soviet Embassy there to come to the Soviet Union. The Mexico City Legal Residency of the KGB reported his visit to Headquarters by cable, requesting information; this was the first that the KGB First Chief Directorate had heard of OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of Service Number Two (KGB counterintelligence abroad), thereupon phoned V.K. ALEKSEYEV, Chief of the Sixth Section of the Tourist Department, whom TURALIN knew personally, to learn whether any information was available. NOSENKO believed that ALEKSEYEV then came to V.D. CHELNOKOV or A.G. KOVALENKO to ask about OSWALD, and NOSENKO thought that he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given the background on OSWALD, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to re-enter the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV then telephoned TURALIN to relay this message. NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere.

---

* By the time OSWALD applied for permission to marry, he had already written the American Embassy in Moscow, through Soviet mails, of his desire to return to the United States. The letter, dated 5 February 1961, was mailed from Minsk and was received by the Embassy in Moscow on 13 February. The OSWALDs were married on 30 April 1961.

(v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible KGB Involvement in the Assassination

When first discussing the OSWALD case with NOSENKO on 23 January 1964, a CIA case officer commented: "It is a very unfortunate thing that these prior events occurred in the Soviet Union." (NOSENKO apparently misunderstood the case officer's intent, which was not to imply that the KGB was behind the assassination, but only that the fact of OSWALD's "defection" placed the USSR under probably unfounded suspicion.) NOSENKO's immediate response to this remark was: "That is not correct. This is putting a false color to it. I am your friend. I am completely with you, and I will continue to work with you and against the Soviet Union in all respects. But the truth should always remain the truth. No matter how I may hate anyone, I cannot speak against my convictions, and since I know this case I could unhesitantly sign off to the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be tied into this in any way. I say this because I know they were frightened of this man [OSWALD] and that everything should have been said to him or that he should have been in any way worked on, in any was [by the KGB] --God forbid!... I know this because I sat on this matter for several days after the tragic matter occurred to the President. To investigate in detail if anything had been done, particularly by the local authorities, that is, by the local KGB in Belorussia..., I had to make a complete investigation and even sent several workers down there to investigate--not trusting official papers. Even without specific orders I had to make a complete investigation on my end of things because this is a serious matter when the head of a government is assassinated... If you want to know, it would be a greater advantage to the Soviet Union if the President were still Kennedy because he was a personage who was a realist and looked at many things in the eye boldly... In the history of any intelligence service there have been assassinations of one kind or another. I can say this: That in our organization, not even speaking of myself, many persons were shocked by the assassination--to think that this should happen in the twentieth century and in, of all places, the most powerful government in the world."

7. Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge of Tourist Operations

a. Information from NOSENKO

In June 1958 there was a reorganization within the Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate. The Second Section, which had theretofore concerned itself with operational activity against foreign tourists from all countries, was broken down into separate sections; one section dealt with tourists from the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, the other with tourists from Europe, Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO said that he was promoted at this time to the position of Deputy Chief of the first of these new sections.

NOSENKO's involvement in at least one major case, Lee Harvey OSWALD, stems entirely from his having held this position. It is also on this basis that he was able to claim awareness of all recruitments from among American tourists from mid-1958 until he returned to the American Department at the beginning of 1960. His knowledge about recruitments is based additionally, he said, on the fact that some time between May and October 1959, during the tourist season, he was ordered by Ye. S. KIRPICHNIKOV, GRIBANOV's secretary, to gather facts for GRIBANOV concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations during the period from 1955 through 1958. NOSENKO gathered this material from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talking with various case officers in the department.*

On the basis of his general and supervisory experience in the Tourist Department as well as his research for this paper, NOSENKO had the following to say about Tourist Department operations prior to 1960 (taken from the protocol he signed on this subject on 25 February 1965):

> "Operations against tourists were developing slowly during this period and very little was known by the KGB about the use of tourism by American Intelligence at the time I wrote the report in 1959. No agents were definitely uncovered among American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959 and, until 1960, no tourists were 'caught in the act' of mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting agents, except one whose name I remember as McGUIRE. I do

---

* Questioned on this paper in February 1965, NOSENKO said he did not remember whether he discussed it with GRIBANOV, nor could he recall any examples of the material he included in it, what the paper said about CIA tourist operations, or what other U.S. Intelligence organizations were using tourism as an operational cover in this period. He did remember, however, that it incorporated statistical data on the growth of foreign tourism.

not know any details concerning the operational activity which led to the discovery of McGUIRE's letter mailing.*

"I know of no case in which an American tourist was definitely uncovered as an agent of American Intelligence and thereafter approached for recruitment by the KGB during this period.

"I do not know of any such American tourists who were CIA agents, and who were recruited by the KGB during this period.

"In addition to McGUIRE, the Seventh Department developed suspicions concerning a number of tourists, but didn't learn of any specific intelligence connections. Some were taking pictures, others were disseminating literature. Although various operational measures were taken against them, including vyemka (covert baggage search) and the use of KGB agents, none of these tourists received real operational development."

b. KGB Knowledge from George BLAKE

During the first week of June 1959, a three-day meeting was held in London, England, between representatives of CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, commonly referred to as MI-6) on the subject of "legal-travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. At the conclusion of this meeting there was drawn up a 19 page document summarizing what had been discussed at the meetings. This summary spelled out CIA operational doctrine pertaining to tourist operations, including agent-spotting techniques, criteria for agent selection, agent assessment, agent training, and tasks to be carried out by tourist agents during the coming (1959) tourist season. It stressed CIA's reliance on tourists for the spotting, recontacting, assessing, and communicating with clandestine assets in the Soviet Union. A copy of the document as well, presumably, as other British documents relating to the joint meetings was given to George BLAKE, who has admitted having made a photographic copy which he passed to the KGB. He gave the KGB this information in the summer of 1959.

---

* One Robert Alan McGUIRE, a former staff employee of CIA, travelled to the Soviet Union as a tourist during April and May 1958. Although he was debriefed on his return, he had no connection with CIA in preparation for this trip and mailed no letters for CIA inside the USSR. While in the Soviet Union, McGUIRE was approached on numerous occasions by Soviets seeking blackmarket deals, American girls, and assistance in defecting to the Americans. While en route to Leningrad, his brief case was overtly searched by a customs employee, who confiscated a Radio Liberation script. McGUIRE reported that he was compelled to sign a document which stated that the script had been confiscated, but the reasons for the action were left blank. NOSENKO, who has reported none of these details, appears to have confused McGUIRE with Edward McGOWAN, a CIA agent who mailed a letter in Minsk in August 1958 and was detected doing so by the KGB; NOSENKO said McGUIRE mailed a letter in Minsk in 1959.

A second joint meeting on this same subject took place in Washington, D.C., from 20 to 23 April 1960, and BLAKE mitted providing the KGB with a copy of the 21-page summary of the sessions.*

c. GOLITSYN's Tourist Document

When he defected to CIA in December 1961, GOLITSYN brought with him a top secret KGB document dealing with the use by American Intelligence of tourists for espionage inside the Soviet Union and with KGB countermeasures.** This study relied heavily upon the two documents supplied to the KGB by BLAKE, and although it purports to be a study of American tourist operations during 1960, it cites as examples many cases which occurred in earlier years. In these examples, the American agents detected by the KGB are named and their operational roles accurately described. (As noted above, NOSENKO said that McGUIRE/McGOWAN was the only American definitely determined to have intelligence connections prior to 1960.) Cited below are excerpts from the GOLITSYN document, along with additional information from CIA records and investigations.

The document states: "McGOWAN, Edward, born 1935, passing himself off as a post-graduate student of Harvard University, in Moscow, after a thorough check [for surveillance] sent an espionage letter containing secret writing. Further investigation of McGOWAN showed that he specialized for a long period of time on Russian and Polish questions at the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, which is a branch of CIA. He came to the USSR at the expense of ROCKEFELLER and MORGAN, who are financing the so-called 'Research' work on Russia."

---

* This occurred at a time that NOSENKO claims to have been in the American Department. During the 1962 meetings in Geneva, when NOSENKO said he was Chief of the American Tourist Section, he was asked about BLAKE. He replied only that BLAKE had been "an agent of the British Department of the Second Chief Directorate" and that he was not nearly as valuable as the Canadian Ambassador [redacted] or "the other Englishman" (VASSALL). At the time of his defection, NOSENKO said he was First Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department. Asked about BLAKE after his defection, NOSENKO replied: "Who's BLAKE?" During the February 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO was first asked whether the KGB had received any significant information concerning the use of tourism as operational cover by CIA during 1960 and 1961, when he was in the American Department, and was then asked specifically whether the KGB obtained documentary information on this subject from an agent source. He replied "no" to both questions.

** This document was transmitted from KGB Headquarters in Moscow to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 7 April 1961. In content it is similar to the general description of the document which NOSENKO said he himself wrote. NOSENKO said in 1964 that he knew GOLITSYN had passed CIA this report and that it had been written in the Tourist Department.

[redacted]

During his trip to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1958, McGOWAN mailed in Minsk an operational letter containing secret writing. In the CIA debriefing upon his return to the United States, McGOWAN described a number of incidents in the USSR. On 20 August 1958, for example, while staying at the Metropol Hotel in Moscow, McGOWAN met Alan BALLARD* and Gertrude SAMUALS, fellow Americans, and the three of them were photographed by a surveillance team when leaving the hotel. Within several days of his arrival in Moscow, McGOWAN found he was incompatible with his female Inturist interpreter/guide and succeeded in having her replaced. His new guide was V.L. ARTEMOV, who assured that McGOWAN had female companionship for the remainder of his visit.**

The document from GOLITSYN also states: "SIMARD, Lionel, born in 1939, a college instructor, expressed an abnormal interest towards military literature of the USSR; he made contact with Soviet citizens and attempted to slip into the area of shipbuilding factories in Leningrad. Later it was recorded that this 'pedagogue', while in Moscow, sent espionage letters containing secret writing. The letter contained the coordinates of a deaddrop for an American agent."

SIMARD went to the USSR as a CIA agent in August 1959, and he believed that he was under complete KGB coverage while there. He was in and out of Moscow four times during his trip, and each time he was assigned hotel rooms known to contain various KGB observation equipment. On one occasion SIMARD was introduced to and went out to dinner with Svetlana N. IVANOVA, who attempted to cultivate him.*** The characterization of his activities in the GOLITSYN document is correct. NOSENKO has not mentioned SIMARD.

Another part of the document supplied by GOLITSYN says: "An American, Whitmore GRAY, born 1932, an assistant professor at Michigan University, sent three espionage letters containing secret writing, while in Kiev. In Stalingrad he was detained while he was photographing a military factory."

GRAY arrived in Kiev on 3 November 1959 after having been trained by CIA in countersurveillance and briefed on his letter-mailing mission and other assignments in the Soviet Union. Between midnight that night and one o'clock the next morning he mailed four operational letters. No surveillance was noted during the mailings, but GRAY detected surveillance daily thereafter until he left Kiev and later in Yalta. He was approached on 17 November in Baku by an attractive woman who persistently offered her services despite his refusal, and on 18 November by a girl in Tbilisi who occupied a seat next to his in a theater and made similar overtures. GRAY was also approached by blackmarketeers and by purportedly disaffected young men. On 13 November he was arrested in Stalingrad while photographing industrial installations and was released after interrogation and confiscation of his film. NOSENKO made no references to GRAY.

---

* NOSENKO reported on a 1959 trip to the Soviet Union by BALLARD, but said he was not aware of earlier ones.

** This is the same ARTEMOV identified by NOSENKO as a fellow case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department and as the man with whom he worked on the BELITSKIY case in Geneva in 1962. ARTEMOV appeared again in operations against American tourists in 1959 when he was assigned as Inturist guide/interpreter for a group of Americans which included a CIA officer. On one occasion, when this officer returned unexpectedly to his hotel from the theater to which ARTEMOV had escorted him, he caught ARTEMOV searching his hotel room. NOSENKO has not mentioned these contacts of ARTEMOV, which took place at the time he said he was Deputy Chief of the section dealing with American tourists. In October 1966, in answer to a specific question, NOSENKO stated that ARTEMOV never had any connection with the American Section of the Tourist Department.

*** NOSENKO has identified IVANOVA as an agent of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, but has not described her earlier activities against tourists.

The KGB document elsewhere states: "A guide of a tourist group, John Milton FRANCIS, born 1934, an instructor of Russian at a college of Yale University, when in Odessa with a group of tourists--American students--separated himself from the group and travelled through the city alone. In a notebook which was lost by him, notes and sketches were found which pointed to the fact that he utilized his trip for the purpose of selecting suitable places for the placing of deaddrops, or for checking those deaddrops which were earlier selected by American agents. In Moscow he selected routes which were used to check and disdiscover the existence of surveillance, utilizing passable backyards and following skillful methods. At the present time FRANCIS is the chief interpreter of the State Department, servicing Soviet delegations in the USA."

FRANCIS did have such a mission in 1958 and brought back a notebook with sketches of the sites he selected. He did not mention losing his notebook. In 1954 and 1955 FRANCIS was in frequent contact with V.V. KRIVOSHEY in Berlin; KRIVOSHEY, who served there until the late 1950's, has been identified as a KGB First Chief Directorate officer who later became an officer in the Correspondents Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate.* FRANCIS was also a student of Richard BURGI at Yale in 1956, the year that NOSENKO was involved in BURGI's recruitment (see Part V.D.4.b.). NOSENKO has not mentioned the FRANCIS case and did not recognize his name.

Besides these and other examples in the document GOLITSYN gave CIA, there are indications of KGB awareness of the clandestine activities of many other CIA contacts who travelled to the Soviet Union as tourists during the period from 1955 to 1960.

---

* KRIVOSHEY was a participant in the Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON case to which NOSENKO provided the lead (see Part VI.D.3.c.).

[redacted]

8. TDY's to London (1957 and 1958)

NOSENKO reported that his first official travel outside the Soviet Union occurred in the fall of 1957 when he was selected to accompany a group of athletes who had been invited to visit London. As he explained on 6 April 1964, it is necessary for a security officer to accompany any such delegation, and the Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for recruiting Second Chief Directorate officers for this purpose, telephoned [illegible] DUBAS, Chief of the Tourist Department, to request an officer who spoke English. DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether he wanted to make the trip. NOSENKO replied: "Why not? I have never been abroad yet." NOSENKO consequently travelled to London, using the alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as "the deputy chief" of the delegation. He was specifically instructed to observe one member of the delegation, a woman named MYARIMYAYE, whose father had been killed in a Soviet prison and whose political reliability was uncertain. Additionally, he had the general task of watching all members of the delegation for possibly suspicious contacts with foreigners. The delegation consisted of approximately 50 persons and to help him in carrying out these duties, NOSENKO was assigned three or four agents and several operational contacts among the delegation members. He was the only staff security officer making this trip.

The second trip to London took place a year later, in the fall of 1958, again as a security watchdog. This time he accompanied a delegation of 11 or 12 boxers, and again he used the alias NIKOLAYEV and the cover position of deputy chief of the delegation. NOSENKO was the only security officer with the delegation, and he had two agents and two operational contacts among the boxers. His assignment was general; nobody in particular was kept under observation, and the KGB had no derogatory information concerning any members of the delegation.

NOSENKO has associated his use of the NIKOLAYEV alias in London with the use of the same name with the British subjects [redacted] and [redacted] (see Part V.D.4.d.) shortly before the first of these two trips. On 17 April 1964 NOSENKO explained this situation as follows: "With [redacted] I used the name NIKOLAYEV, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative of the Ministry of Culture. And then when the question was raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to England, I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEV. I was forced to. And again under the cover of the Ministry of Culture. Because [of this] I went as the assistant head of the delegation, representing the Ministry of Culture. I didn't go under my own name because it was decided that when these people [redacted] came back to England, they would tell who they were with [report their contacts in the USSR]. They would probably question [redacted] especially as one who used to work in intelligence. [redacted] would say: 'There was this man from the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV. He was with us all the time, even went to Leningrad with us.' So they would say: 'How does he look [what does he look like]?' He would say: 'He looked so-and-so.' So, of course, I would go there the same year. I'd go there, and they would look at me and say: 'How come this man--his name is NOSENKO, and yet he is very similar to the one described by [redacted]' That was why it was decided I have to go again under the name NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable."

[redacted]

of course, I would go there the same year. I'd go there, and they would look at me and say: 'How come this man--his name is NOSENKO, and yet he is very similar to the one described by [redacted].' That was why it was decided I have to go again under the name NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable."

[redacted]

E. January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department)

1. Introduction

NOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first days of January 1962.* This section, in his words, was working against "the most important counterintelligence target in the Soviet Union," the permanent American representation in Moscow. It regarded every American stationed there as a possible spy and, simultaneously, as a target for eventual compromise and recruitment.

The functions of the U.S. Embassy Section were described by NOSENKO as being, first, to control all contacts by Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens; second, to evaluate information collected from all possible sources on American Embassy employees; and third, to use this information as a basis for planning and carrying out recruitment approaches. The Americans' personalities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines, security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the major and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers directed and debriefed large numbers of agents and informants, including the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with American contacts; the officers also assigned tasks to and assimilated the reports from the numerous surveillance teams at their disposal, and they read and tried to exploit materials from telephone taps and microphones placed in the offices and homes of the Americans. Each officer had a limited number of American targets and attempted to become thoroughly familiar with each; annually, they submitted detailed operational plans to exploit the knowledge they had gained of their target. During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, special emphasis was placed within the section on "identifying intelligence officers at the Embassy and active development of them, the acquisition of ciphers, and the detailed and painstaking study of code clerks, creating the conditions on the basis of which they can be recruited."

As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO has said, he had access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing was hidden" from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB did not recruit any Americans associated with the Embassy, that no Americans assigned to the Embassy were being handled in Moscow as KGB agents in this period, and that, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American Embassy personnel since "ANDREY."** From continuing friendships with his fellow-officers of 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO has also claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the time he left the section in January 1962 until the January 1964 trip to Geneva.

---

* In debriefing and interrogating NOSENKO, CIA placed particular emphasis on his activities during the period January 1960 to January 1962, since this information was of special importance to U.S. Government security.

** See Part VI.D.3.b. for a discussion of the case of the KGB agent "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), whose recruitment has been variously dated by NOSENKO between the years 1949 and 1953.

Meanwhile, no one replaced NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department's American Section because (as he explained on 29 January 1965) the Tourist Department, which had earlier operated against members of delegations and various other categories of foreign visitors, was being reorganized in January 1960 for work against tourists alone and the Deputy Chief slot was eliminated.* With the exception of A. A. DMITRIYEV, Marina RYTOVA, and the homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, NOSENKO turned over all of his agents to another officer in the section named TIMOFEYEV. NOSENKO said on 29 January 1965 that he had two separate files on his agent Arsene FRIPPEL, a developmental file and an operational file, and that he turned the former over to TIMOFEYEV and the latter to V. D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. During later interrogations, however, NOSENKO has said that he continued to handle FRIPPEL while in the U.S. Embassy Section and was the case officer during FRIPPEL's visits to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963.**

2. NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy Section

In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO learned from K. N. DUBAS, the department Chief, of plans to transfer him to the U.S. Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move and wanted to remain in the Tourist Department: "I was used to it there and wanted to continue. I wanted to stay in the Tourist Department. This /the transfer/ was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief of section and would be the same there. But, of course, its more important there. The American Department is, of course, the most important. But here I was working against American tourists. This is also important. Furthermore, I showed /had proven/ myself there in '55, '56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to be not a bad case officer. And here, in the American Department, I must show /prove/ myself with new people." NOSENKO therefore asked DUBAS in December 1959 to "please fight for me to stay." DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring NOSENKO were issued.

On the day NOSENKO reported to V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report to GRIBANOV's office. To GRIBANOV NOSENKO again expressed misgivings about the change of assignment. GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him about this but that he, GRIBANOV, "had his own plans and that was all." GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that he thought NOSENKO could bring "fresh air" to the U.S. Embassy Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention to operations against American code clerks, the "number one target."* Neither GRIBANOV nor KLYPIN told NOSENKO why he had been selected for this position or who had recommended him for it.

---

* There was no change in the functions of NOSENKO's section, however; as before, it continued to be responsible for operations against tourists from the United States, England, and Canada.

** FRIPPEL has reported that NOSENKO continued to meet him until he left the Soviet Union in January 1961 and again when he returned as a guide to tourist groups twice in 1962 and once again in 1963; see Part V.D.5.

NOSENKO was asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section. He replied: "Nobody." He was then asked to identify the persons from whom he had assumed certain of his duties as Deputy Chief of the section (these are discussed in detail below). NOSENKO said that he took the responsibility for maintaining the section file on the security of the U.S. Embassy from the Chief of the section, V. M. KOVSHUK.** Regarding his responsibility as case officer for the Security Officer of the Embassy, NOSENKO explained that because former Security Officer Russell LANGELLE had been declared persona non grata in October 1959 and because his successor John ABIDIAN was not to arrive until March 1960, no one in the section had this responsibility when he, NOSENKO, arrived in January 1960. Asked who had been LANGELLE's case officer, NOSENKO replied: "LANGELLE was handled by several people - by /A.S./ MALYUGIN, then after that by /V.A./ KUSKOV, then by KOVSHUK, then

---

* In late December 1961, GOLITSYN also commented on this subject to his CIA handling officer: "The task of strengthening of work against the Americans has been a standing requirement, both in the past and most particularly at this time. This work was particularly intensified after the appointment of SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the Americans at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other countries... This question of intensifying work against the Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB. Thereafter, there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensification of work against the American cipher-clerks."

**There is an apparent contradiction between NOSENKO's designation of KOVSHUK as Chief of the First (U.S. Embassy) Section in 1960 and information earlier supplied by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN told CIA of a conversation he had with KOVSHUK in January 1961 in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.c.2. concerning a recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORSBERG) but at that time described KOVSHUK only as an American Department officer, without indicating his position. The only time that GOLITSYN has given a position for KOVSHUK was in the context of questioning concerning KHRUSHCHEV's "Secret Speech" denouncing STALIN in 1956; GOLITSYN said that at this time KOVSHUK was Chief of the American Department (sic) of the Second Chief Directorate. On 16 February 1962 GOLITSYN identified Vladimir PETROV as Chief of the "section concerned with the American Embassy of the American Department of the Second Directorate" in 1960. NOSENKO had identified PETROV as Chief of the Second Section of the American Department, which was concerned with the penetration of U.S. intelligence operations inside the Soviet Union.

PIN. Yes. LANGELLE was before my time." Two months later, on 24 June 1964, NOSENKO stated: "In 1959 and possibly in 1958, Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. I replaced him in this position in 1960 and he went to the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department as Deputy Chief."* On 8 September 1964 NOSENKO volunteered for the first time that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief of the section, had been the case officer for LANGELLE. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO added that BAKHVALOV had also been responsible for maintaining the file on the security of the U.S. Embassy. At this time he explained his earlier statement by saying that BAKHVALOV had left the section before his arrival and had given the file to KOVSHUK to hold for his successor. The file continued to be charged officially to BAKHVALOV, however, even though he was no longer in the section, and NOSENKO arranged for the official change of custody shortly after reporting for duty (see Part V.E. 3.f.). NOSENKO said further, in January 1965, that BAKHVALOV had shared responsibility for supervising code clerk operations with KOVSHUK before NOSENKO arrived to assume these duties himself. NOSENKO had been given a number of opportunities prior to 24 June 1964 to identify BAKHVALOV as his predecessor, but he did not do so. These are summarized below:

25 January 1964: In a discussion of the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said: "The Chief of this department is Colonel Artem DAVIDYAN. He is an Armenian. His Deputy is Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV."

27 February 1964: NOSENKO was shown a photograph of V.A. ALEKSEYEV, a Soviet who was in Japan from July to September 1961 as a member of a trade delegation. NOSENKO immediately recognized the face as that of the Deputy Chief of the Fifth Department of the Second Chief Directorate. He said that he did not know this person's last name, but that his first name and patronymic were Mikhail Fedorovich. When shown the last name ALEKSEYEV, NOSENKO recognized it as an alias, but provided no further information concerning his true identity or earlier service in the American Department.

10 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list in writing the names of KGB officers who had received various awards for their service. He wrote: "The following got either the Order of the Military Red Banner or the Order of the Red Star, I'm not sure which: Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of a section in an unremembered department of the Second Chief Directorate."

18 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list all the officers who had been assigned to the American Department for each year since he joined the KGB. He named the chiefs and deputies of the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 through 1956. When he came to 1957, however, he said that he could not provide accurate information as to which officers were assigned to the section for that year through 1959 (he was

---

* With reference to the Fifth Department, NOSENKO has furnished only one other item of information: he reported that in 1958, or as late as the fall of 1959, the Israeli Section was transferred to this department after having been a component of the American Department.

allegedly in the Tourist Department in this period) and could not describe their functions. On this basis NOSENKO was then asked to list the officers who had joined the section between 1956 and January 1960, when NOSENKO said he had returned. He provided 14 names, but BAKHVALOV's was not among them. Asked to name the officers who had left the section in the same period, he named five, again omitting BAKHVALOV.

3. Duties and Knowledgeability

a. Introduction

Shortly after reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section and following his short discussion with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO met with Department Chief KLYPIN and Section Chief KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in the section. Repeating what GRIBANOV had already said, KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single responsibility in the section would be supervision of all KGB operational activity against American military and State Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for the other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN suggested a division of labor under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for supervising operations against State Department personnel and NOSENKO would supervise work against the Army, Air Force, and Naval attaches and their assistants.* NOSENKO was also made responsible for maintaining certain files in the section. On 19 February 1965 NOSENKO signed an interrogation protocol which he agreed contained a listing of his principal responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It read in part:

> "During the entire period in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section, First [American] Department in 1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section. My responsibilities were the following:
>
> -General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of Section in his absence.
>
> -Immediate supervisor for the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity I closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV.
>
> -Case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer, John ABIDIAN.
>
> -For about the first six months of 1960, supervisor of the work against the offices of the U.S. Military, Naval, and Air Attaches.
>
> -I maintained the file on American Embassy security.
>
> -I maintained the log books for the reports sent to the First [U.S. Embassy] Section by the Operational Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information obtained from all the microphones installed in the American Embassy. I read all the reports and gave the pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in the Section. In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV.**

---

*NOSENKO mentioned his responsibility for supervising attache operations for the first time in 1965. These functions are discussed below.

**The final sentence was added at NOSENKO's request at the time the protocol was signed.

-During this period I was the agent handler for agents 'SHMELEV', 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', 'ARTUR' and 'SARDAR'.*

"Throughout this entire period I sat in room 618 of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzhershinskiy Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this office with me throughout most of this period."

b. Functions as General Deputy and Acting Chief of Section

(1) Access

Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under repeated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSHUK, with the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he had access to all information on the section's activities and was obliged to keep current on this information. On this basis he has been able to assure his questioners that the KGB was completely unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit Americans assigned to the Embassy in these two years. NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to section files and his discussions with section officers made it certain that there were also no successes from 1953 to 1960 and from January 1962 to January 1964. His statements on this subject during the February 1965 were distilled in a protocol which NOSENKO signed on 20 February (quoted in full):

> "1. As the only Deputy to the Chief of the American Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my functions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In order to perform this function I had the right and the obligation of knowing the details about every important activity of the section against the American Embassy and its personnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from me.
>
> "2. As Deputy Chief of the Section I know definitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy were agents of the KGB or reporting unofficially in any way to the KGB during my service in the Section. There were no approaches or recruitments made by the Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962 against personnel of the American Embassy, including personnel of the State Department, the offices of the Military Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department of Agriculture and USIA, including Marine guards, Army sergeants, State Department code clerks and Army code clerks except against STORSBERG and KEYSERS, both unsuccessful approaches.

---

*VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, Johan PREISFREUND, FRIPPEL, and [redacted] [redacted] respectively, who are discussed in other parts of this paper. At other times NOSENKO has named additional agents he handled in this period; they are discussed below.

"3. There were no approaches or recruitments made against any employees of the United States Government who were assigned to the American Embassy on temporary duty during this period. I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct."

(ii) Duties

On 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was questioned concerning his supervisory duties as Deputy Chief of the section, particularly his function of supervising activity against code clerks. The transcript of this discussion is quoted here:

Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have mentioned did you have to devote the most time?

Answer: I don't know.

Q: What was the most important?

A: Everything was important.

Q: Whom did you supervise in the American Embassy Section?

A: GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, [Vladimir] DEMKIN, and later [Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY who worked with DEMKIN. Then there was [N.A.] GAVRILENKO, [I.Ya.] KURILENKO, and BELOGLAZOV working with the Attaches.

Q: They were all in the First Section?

A: Yes.

Q: What were their responsibilities?

A: GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had all the code clerks. DEMKIN was charged with all persons living in America House, except code clerks. GROMAKOVSKIY helped him. GAVRILENKO had the Air Force Attaches and [their] assistants, and also he had the plane of the Ambassador. He must think about watching the pilots who were living in a hotel. KURILENKO--Army Attache and assistants; BELOGLAZOV--Navy Attache, assistants, and Marines.

Q: What is your understanding of the meaning of the word "supervisor"?

A: Personally to be at the head, to direct.

Q: So, in your responsibilities of supervising all the work against all the code clerks, this meant that you were the head of this work, that you were directing this work, that you were participating in discussions concerning this work, and in these discussions you were talking about what measures were necessary.

(Interrupting.) When necessary, because there are little questions which the case officer must decide himself. When it was necessary.

Q: And participating personally when necessary?

A: Yes.

Q: What sort of case officer questions were you answering?

A: All kinds. If I couldn't answer them, if my authority isn't enough for this, it is necessary to discuss them with KOVSHUK. I was discussing with KOVSHUK, with KLYPIN, with [KLYPIN's successor as Chief of the American Department, S.M.] FEDOSEYEV. Several times, not once, we were discussing questions with GRIBANOV. Also, concerning measures, concerning future steps. When it was necessary.

Q: What other duties did you have as a supervisor?

A: I told you. When it was necessary I was going to agent meetings with case officers. When it was necessary. Or, besides, I met personally with "PROKHOR" [PREISFREUND] or [redacted] "PROKHOR" was working against STORSBERG, "SARDAR" against ZUJUS. I was working myself with them.

Q: You personally worked agents "PROKHOR" and "SARDAR"?

A: Yes.

Q: When did you find it necessary to go to an agent meeting with a case officer?

A: Well, for example, DEMKIN would come to me and say: "You know Ella [UMANETS, an agent in America House]. Ella said that MORONE had looked at her and was smiling." This is just an [hypothetical] example....Okay, I am going with him, hearing Ella myself, [to learn] what happened, [whether] it is possible to make something or not.

Q: You met Ella and talked with her?

A: Yes, with DEMKIN. Very, very difficult to say, why and how we are going. When it was necessary to go.

Q: As a rule did you try to make it a practice to visit the agents of the section who were working against the American target?

A: Yes, I am telling you. There was such an agent, Inga [VARLAMOVA]. GRYAZNOV was meeting with her. It might be necessary to go to meet her. But, we knew how Inga was afraid of intelligence. And, you see, they don't like it when a new case officer appears. But, maybe, for the sake of the file,

[redacted]

it was necessary to go, to hear her. Not because you do not believe GRYAZNOV. No. But, you see, to hear from the source [emphasized], directly, what is going on, and how it is going on, to get a feeling. Because the source will tell the case officer, then the case officer will tell you. Maybe sometimes he will not give you every detail, every intonation. But in some cases, it is necessary to feel this. But, of course, it depends on the agent, on the target, whether you will go or not go. It's very difficult, again, to say.

Q: Could you say that you met 50 per cent of the section's agents?

A: No, I can't say.

Q: Fifty per cent or 75 per cent?

A: I can't answer you.

Q: What about your functions as a supervisor in regard to safehouses, to "K.K.'s" and "Ya.K.'s".*

A: Oh. I myself had a file on my flat, a yavochnaya kvartira, which I brought from the Seventh [Tourist Department]. It was my own. GRYAZNOV had his own yavochnaya kvartira. KOSOLAPOV had also his own yavochnaya kvartira. And not one of us had a conspirative apartment.

Q: And you took the "Ya.K." from...

A: (Interrupting.) Which I had from the Seventh. And, by the way, when I was leaving the First [American] Department, I took this file again to the Seventh.

Q: And not one of you had a conspirative flat.

A: No, because the section had only--how many?--[P.I.] MASSYA had one conspirative. [V.P.] FEDYANIN had one conspirative, and then there was one conspirative flat, where, in fact, an agent was living. In the First Section there were three or four conspirative flats.

Q: But among you, GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV there was none?

A: Only "Ya.K.'s".

---

*A "K.K." (konspirativnaya kvartira--conspiratorial apartment) is defined by NOSENKO as a safehouse or apartment owned and maintained by the KGB. A "Ya.K." (yavochnaya kvartira--meeting apartment) is an apartment occupied by a tenant who is perhaps subsidized by the KGB and absents himself when there is a need to use the apartment for meetings or other activities. The "K.K." is used for more sensitive operational purposes, he said.

Q: Who kept a record of these three?

A: The case officers.

Q: Where was your "Ya.K."?

A: Vorovskogo Street.

Q: And where was GRYAZNOV's?

A: GRYAZNOV's was on Kachalogo Street.

Q: And KOSOLAPOV's?

A: Don't remember. Don't remember. (Pause.) It was in the vicinity of the Suvorovskiy Boulevard. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. In the region of Arbat Square. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. KOSOLAPOV's. DEMKIN's I don't remember.

Q: And you didn't have any responsibility for supervising the activity that went on at these flats?

A: I don't understand.

Q: Was there some central control of the use of the "Ya.K.'s"?

A: What kind of control?

Q: Who would be using them, when they would be using them, under what conditions?

A: No. The case officer who was working with it decides how to use this flat or how not to use it, et cetera, et cetera. Besides that, very often we were using rooms in hotels.

Q: So GRYAZNOV would take any of his operational activity to his "Ya.K."?

A: He would also meet with his agents, with his operational contacts in hotel rooms. KOSOLAPOV was meeting his agents in his own "Ya.K."; NOSENKO was meeting his agents or operational contacts in his own "Ya.K.".

Q: Could GRYAZNOV or KOSOLAPOV ever use these "Ya.K.'s" without your knowing about it?

A: Of course. It's their own flat.

Q: But you're supervising their work?

A: Must I keep them like a little, little child? No, no. They don't have to report to me: "Today I go to meet my agent at my flat."

Q: They can use them whenever they like without checking with you as supervisor?

A: Of course, of course. They are meeting their own agents.

Q: You have no idea who they are meeting, or when they are meeting them?

A: When they are meeting an active development agent, they tell me afterwards. They are telling "this, this, this, this" and I am answering "this, this, this." But usually they are going to meet maids or they don't have to report. There is nothing active and there is....The file is going on.

Q: What about operational vehicles? Automobiles?

A: You see, we had one automobile for the whole department. Besides this, we could apply, when necessary, to the officer on duty for the Second Chief Directorate and he would give a car, because he has a number of cars at his disposal.

Q: Approximately how much of your time did you spend supervising GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV?

A: I can't say.

Q: Was it the most important function?

A: Yes, it was important. All work in the First Section was important. This was the most important. But one day I could devote the whole day to code clerks, the next day maybe half the day, maybe two hours in the day. The rest of the day I will be absent. I will be meeting with KLYPIN, or I will be having a meeting with surveillance, or I will be at another place. The third day, again, maybe the whole day, maybe part of it. No, I can't tell you. It depends on the situation.

(iii) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's Absence

As Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, one of NOSENKO's responsibilities was to serve as Acting Chief when KOVSHUK was absent from the office. NOSENKO recalled that he fulfilled this function during KOVSHUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and 1961, but he did not remember when this leave occurred in those years. He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961 when KOVSHUK was ill again. NOSENKO was unable to recall any operational or inspection trips that KOVSHUK made in 1960 or 1961, and the only other specific time that he could remember KOVSHUK being absent was for several days in connection with preparations for President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in 1960.

NOSENKO's description of his duties in KOVSHUK's absence was summarized in a protocol which he signed on 3 March 1965:

"I do not remember any particularly important operational decisions I made as Acting Chief of Section, nor any unusual things that happened during these times. The only specific responsibility KOVSHUK had which I handled in his absence was to report to the Chief of the First Department about all mail going out of the First Section. I did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences because there was no necessity to do so. His only Russian agent whom I remember was Ilya GLAZUNOV [KGB cryptonym "VRUBEL"], whom he transferred to FEDYANIN in 1960, I think. The only other agent of KOVSHUK's whom I remember was the correspondent Edmund STEVENS.* The only thing that was different for me as Acting Chief of the Section was that I had to go every day to see the Chief of the Department.

c. Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations

(i) Introduction

Among the numerous KGB activities against American code clerks in Moscow which NOSENKO has discussed are five operations wherein the KGB intended or effected approaches for recruitment/defection purposes. According to NOSENKO, none was successful. The five major cases are reviewed separately below, one of them in the context of duty trips abroad by NOSENKO's subordinate KOSOLAPOV.**

NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for supervising operations against American code clerks, he found a very "difficult situation." Prior to the assignment of KOSOLAPOV to the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959, all operations against code clerks had been handled by A.S. MALYUGIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort there had been no operational approaches and no successes. When

---

*The Edmund STEVENS case is discussed in Part V.C.2.

**GOLITSYN on 20 March 1962 identified KOSOLAPOV's photograph as that of a veteran KGB officer with whom he was personally acquainted. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had entered the KGB in about 1952 and had served for two or three years as a member of the First [American] Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate under United Nations cover in New York City; subsequently he had worked for two or three years in the First Chief Directorate at KGB Headquarters. According to GOLITSYN, the bachelor KOSOLAPOV was transferred to the KGB Second Chief Directorate some time prior to 1960 in line with a KGB policy for only married men to be sent abroad. As of 1960, GOLITSYN said, KOSOLAPOV was working against code clerks stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow. He added that KOSOLAPOV speaks excellent English. Prior to GOLITSYN's identification, CIA had no indication of intelligence activity on KOSOLAPOV's part. Between February 1953 and April 1955 he was assigned to the United Nations Secretariat Translation Unit as a translator; in August 1958 he had been an interpreter at the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Detection; in September 1959 he accompanied KHRUSHCHEV on his trip to the United States (see Part V.E.3.d. which describes the role of NOSENKO's target John ABIDIAN in connection with the KHRUSHCHEV trip). KOSOLAPOV's English is flawless.

NOSENKO took over there were no active developmental operations against code clerks underway, and the only agents or operational contacts being used against them were poorly educated maids and waitresses, none of whom had accomplished anything of importance. No foreign agents were being used in operations against coderoom personnel, and at the time NOSENKO had no agents of his own in America House, or in the Embassy, who could be used in these operations.

In January or February of 1960 GRYAZNOV* was assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section as a second assistant to NOSENKO in his code clerk activities. From this point on, NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV shared the same KGB Headquarters office (Room 614). There all KGB files on American code clerks, as well as the files on agents available for work against them, were stored in one large safe, accessible to all three officers. NOSENKO supervised all of the section's work along these lines, and no provocations, compromises, recruitment attempts, or recruitments could have been planned or carried out without his prior knowledge and agreement when he was in Moscow. If NOSENKO went away on a trip, he said, he would have been told about any such activity upon his return.

---

*GOLITSYN first named GRYAZNOV as a case officer of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, on 31 December 1961. He said at that time that he had been personally acquainted with GRYAZNOV since 1945 and that, as of the spring of 1960, GRYAZNOV was "working only against code clerks of the American Embassy in Moscow." GRYAZNOV had travelled to the United States at some time in the past, GOLITSYN added. [redacted] On 5 June 1962 GOLITSYN told CIA that he had been a classmate of GRYAZNOV during 1945 and 1946 at the "SMERSH" counterintelligence school in Moscow; he described GRYAZNOV as a specialist in operations against American code clerks, saying that GRYAZNOV was "very experienced" and had had "some successes." As an example, he told of having spoken to GRYAZNOV in the spring of 1960 while he, GOLITSYN, was visiting the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in connection with his forthcoming assignment as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer in Helsinki. GOLITSYN had complained to GRYAZNOV that the KGB had no U.S. assets in Helsinki at the time, and to CIA he quoted GRYAZNOV as replying: "Maybe we will help you." According to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV went on to explain that he was handling an agent, a code clerk in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, who was about to be transferred, perhaps to Helsinki; he told GOLITSYN that the KGB had received information from this American code clerk and classified him as a "real agent." NOSENKO has not mentioned such an agent (who has yet to be identified) and has denied that the KGB had any agents in the U.S. Embassy at this time. GOLITSYN identified a photograph of G.I. LAPIN, who travelled with the Moiseyev Dance troup to the United States and Canada in 1958, as being identical with GRYAZNOV. CIA had no prior indication of intelligence activities by GRYAZNOV, under the alias LAPIN, and had no traces on GRYAZNOV in true name.

When NOSENKO took over responsibility for operations against code clerks, he read available files on targets and agents, discussed the situation with MALYUGIN, DEMKIN (the U.S. Embassy Section case officer responsible for the residents of America House), GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV, and reported his findings and recommendations to his superiors, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result. In introducing a new program for the work of the section, NOSENKO suggested the use of third-country nationals (not American and not Soviet) for agent work against code clerks; in line with this suggestion, he personally recruited a [redacted] military officer, [redacted] (cryptonym "SARDAR"), and directed him against the America House. (After his first few visits, [redacted] was specifically targetted against military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS.) Another such agent directly handled by NOSENKO was the Finnish businessman Johan PREISFREUND, who figured in the case of the military code clerk James STORSBERG. NOSENKO also suggested initiating activity against code clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and specifically proposed that operational measures be undertaken or that operational possibilities be studied in Helsinki, the city through which most of the code clerks passed on their way to Moscow.

Finally, according to NOSENKO, none of the operations against code clerks was successful during the two years he spent as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, nor did the KGB have any success between January 1962 and January 1964, when NOSENKO left Moscow for Geneva. He stated that GRYAZNOV would have told him if any successful approaches had taken place during this latter period.

(ii) Approach to STORSBERG

From the start of his association with CIA, NOSENKO has emphasized that the primary mission of the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961, during his incumbency as Deputy Chief of Section, was the recruitment of an American military cryptographer. He has explained the special stress placed on this requirement (vis-a-vis the recruitment of State Department code clerks) by saying that, while the KGB had broken certain U.S. State Department cipher systems and could read enciphered messages up to and including those classified "secret," there had been no such success with American military ciphers, which remained secure in this period. NOSENKO also has asserted repeatedly that the KGB had not been able to recruit any American code clerk, either State Department or military, during the years since the recruitment of "ANDREY" in 1953.*

---

*See Part VI.D.3.b., which discusses the "ANDREY" case.

On the several operations against military code clerks which NOSENKO has described and in which he has claimed a personal role, his greatest detail and emphasis has been given to the case of James Harry STORSBERG. In 1962 NOSENKO said that, in line with GRIBANOV's instructions that he pay particular attention to code clerk operations, he devoted most of his time for almost a year to the STORSBERG operation, and played a personal role in the unsuccessful KGB approach; he described in the first person his conversation with STORSBERG. During the 1964 to 1966 period, NOSENKO denied not only that he had personally participated in this way but also that he had ever claimed to have done; he continued to say, however, that he supervised the operation from beginning to end. According to NOSENKO, this operation got under way with the recruitment of a third-national agent (Johan PREISFREUND, a Finn) some time in the first half of 1960. The specific aim in using this agent was to involve STORSBERG in compromising activities, which would then form the basis for the approach. The operation dragged on through 1960 and until the spring, summer, or autumn of 1961; at this time N.S. SKVORTSOV, a KGB officer, was introduced in the guise of a wealthy French businessman to continue the development of compromising information. PREISFREUND was then withdrawn from the operation. Several weeks later STORSBERG was approached, principally on the basis of his financial need, but he rejected the KGB bid and the operation was over. NOSENKO was certain that STORSBERG had not reported the approach and said that the KGB would use this fact as an additional element of pressure should STORSBERG again be posted outside the United States. NOSENKO also knew that GOLITSYN had reported to CIA concerning KGB modus operandi in this case as well as PREISFREUND's part in it.

GOLITSYN in early 1962 had, in fact, told CIA about PREISFREUND having been used by the KGB in an operation against an American stationed in Moscow. Contrary to NOSENKO's information, he said that this American had been approached--and recruited--by the KGB at the end of 1960.

A second item from GOLITSYN may also relate to the STORSBERG operation: GOLITSYN told of learning in the spring of 1960 that the KGB had developed a military code clerk in Moscow to the point that recruitment was virtually assured. According to U.S. Army records, only two military code clerks were stationed there at that time, STORSBERG and his superior William S. HURLEY, the military communications officer who additionally performed cryptographic duties. NOSENKO has said that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY, and HURLEY has reported no approach.

In addition to the detailed information given by NOSENKO on this case, the FBI and Army Intelligence have interviewed STORSBERG (who confirmed NOSENKO's account and denied recruitment) and CIA has talked to the KGB agent PREISFREUND (who also generally confirmed the information given by NOSENKO but did not know the outcome of the case). The results of these interviews, together with information from GOLITSYN and from other sources, are summarized in this order below.

January 1960:	STORSBERG arrived in Moscow (this date was supplied by the interrogator and was accepted by NOSENKO as accurate, which it is).
Early 1960:	PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK. (This was consistent with earlier statements, and NOSENKO had always said he first met PREISFREUND a week or so after his recruitment. On 21 October 1966, however, NOSENKO said that he and PREISFREUND first met "in the middle of 1960, in the summer of 1960." He subsequently stayed with the general date "mid-1960.")
Summer 1960:	PREISFREUND first supplied a woman to STORSBERG.
Early 1961:	Compromising photographs of STORSBERG and a Soviet female were first obtained at the Hotel Peking in Moscow.
About May 1961:	PREISFREUND was withdrawn from the operation and SKVORTSOV, alias MICHAUD, was introduced. (NOSENKO dated this by saying it was about three weeks before the approach to STORSBERG.)
June 1961:	Unsuccessful KGB approach to STORSBERG in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow. (Earlier on 20 October 1966 NOSENKO had said that the approach was made "a month or a month and a half before STORSBERG left Moscow." Told that STORSBERG was reassigned in November 1961, NOSENKO said that the approach was in "June 1961, i.e., five months before STORSBERG's departure date. STORSBERG has reported that the approach was in October 1961; see below.)

NOSENKO was questioned further on the STORSBERG case later in the October 1966 interrogations. He asserted on 21 October that he had first met PREISFREUND in the summer of 1960 and that he continued to meet with him in his case officer capacity after the unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG. He saw PREISFREUND most recently, he said, in Moscow during 1963. NOSENKO also explained how PREISFREUND first came to know his true name: Initially NOSENKO was introduced to PREISFREUND only by first name and patronymic, Yuriy Ivanovich; on one occasion, however, NOSENKO was visiting PREISFREUND's hotel room in Moscow and "lost his KGB certificate" there. Thereafter PREISFREUND knew him as NOSENKO. On 25 October 1966, NOSENKO repeated his earlier statements that the STORSBERG case was the only one in which PREISFREUND participated, although he may have reported casually on other Americans he met during his visits to America House. For the first time he specifically named GRYAZNOV as the case officer holding the operational file on STORSBERG. He continued to maintain that he, NOSENKO, supervised the operation against STORSBERG.

(C) Information [illegible]

STOPSBERG did not report [illegible] approach until he was interviewed by the FBI [illegible] [redacted]

STOPSBERG was interviewed by the FBI on 14 and 18 September 1964 in connection with the [illegible] (He had not been identified on the basis of [illegible] information.) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

** Official records indicate that MORONE was transferred from Moscow to Lisbon, Portugal, in August 1961. If these records are correct, STOPSBERG could not have seen MORONE with MICHAUD on this night in October 1961.

[redacted]

---

* This is in reference to NOSENKO's statement that PREISFREUND involved STORSBERG in speculation which PREISFREUND also claimed; see also GOLITSYN's second lead, discussed below.

(c) Information from PREISFREUND

CIA initially interviewed PREISFREUND on 8 July 1965 in Helsinki. (NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND would confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.) During this first meeting with him, PREISFREUND correctly identified photographs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and STORSBERG. He maintained, however, that his relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO was strictly on a business level, that he had never had anything to do with the KGB, and that he did not know what the initials "KGB" stand for. Toward the end of this meeting, PREISFREUND allowed that he may have been unwittingly involved in some activity against STORSBERG and agreed to tell the "entire truth" the following day.

On 9 July 1965 PREISFREUND described how he had been caught in a blackmarket operation in Moscow and was, on this basis, recruited by KOVSHUK "either at the end of 1959 or early 1960." Several weeks later, he said, he was approached by NOSENKO who explained that KOVSHUK was unavailable and that the KGB wanted him, PREISFREUND, to arrange an introduction between STORSBERG and a Soviet female, Irina, the daughter of a Soviet general.* PREISFREUND then left Moscow, and when he returned about two months later, he took STORSBERG to the Peking Restaurant, where the introduction was effected. PREISFREUND, STORSBERG, Irina, and another girl then went to PREISFREUND's hotel, where STORSBERG and Irina were intimate.

PREISFREUND said on 10 July 1965 that he was fairly certain his recruitment took place in early 1960, probably in March or April. At the time KOVSHUK had refused to explain what the KGB wanted him to do; he said only that they would talk about it later but assured PREISFREUND that he would not be asked to undertake anything detrimental to Finnish interests; nor did KOVSHUK establish any means of communications with PREISFREUND, telling him only that the KGB would know where to find him. PREISFREUND subsequently visited the USSR on several occasions, but no contacts were made. Just as he was beginning to believe that the affair had been forgotten, NOSENKO contacted him at his room in the Berlin Hotel in Moscow. Asked to explain his earlier statement that NOSENKO first met with him two weeks after the recruitment, PREISFREUND said he could not remember exactly how long it was, but that it was definitely on another trip to Moscow and that it was probably several months later.

PREISFREUND was asked how he had first met STORSBERG. He first replied that it had been at America House and recalled that NOSENKO had simply told him to go there and "find Jim;" it was only with some difficulty that he finally managed to strike up an acquaintance at the bar. On second thought, PREISFREUND said, he may have first met STORSBERG at the sauna in the Finnish Embassy in Moscow through a mutual Finnish acquaintance. Throughout this initial period, NOSENKO and KOVSHUK made repeated promises that once the introduction of STORSBERG to the Soviet female had been accomplished, there would be no more demands made of PREISFREUND by the KGB. PREISFREUND added:

---

* According to NOSENKO, this was Irina LEBEDOVSKAYA, an agent of the U.S. Embassy Section who was handled by A.V. SUNTSOV.

"Both NOSENKO and KOVSHUK used to make all sorts of promises to me about helping me out in my business and so on, but they never did a damn thing for me. On the contrary. The only promise they kept was that I would not be asked to do anything except the STORSBERG job. But, as for the rest of it, they didn't help me at all."

PREISFREUND was eventually successful, he said, in introducing STORSBERG to Irina as NOSENKO wished and the three of them returned to PREISFREUND's hotel room on a summer evening. PREISFREUND slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and Irina shared his bed. He told his CIA interviewers on 10 July 1965 that at one point during the evening he caught a glimpse of NOSENKO in the corridor wearing a rubber apron and from this deduced that NOSENKO had been taking surreptitious photographs of STORSBERG and Irina together.* On orders from NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, it was the last time he saw STORSBERG.**

Toward the end of the 10 July 1965 meeting PREISFREUND said that about six months elapsed between his recruitment and the beginning of his involvement with STORSBERG. "The job," he said, "dragged out a long time." He reaffirmed that this was the only operation in which he participated and that he had told to the best of his ability all he knew of it. He admitted that he was a heavy drinker and said that for this reason he could not be sure about his dates. PREISFREUND added that he would not have forgotten, however, if he had performed other services for the KGB.

PREISFREUND was shown GOLITSYN's photograph and remarked: "Was he here [in Finland]? I don't know him." Shown the photograph during a later meeting, he said that he had once invited a large group of Soviets to go fishing with him in Finland and that this person may have been among them. When given the name KLIMOV, which GOLITSYN used in Finland in 1960 and 1961, and told that it was an alias, PREISFREUND asked whether KLIMOV had signed visas. He was told this was correct and was asked for the true name. PREISFREUND replied: "GOLUB? Yes?"

At the close of the 10 July 1965 meeting, PREISFREUND mentioned to his interviewers that he was planning to travel to Leningrad by automobile with his family for about five days, beginning on or about 23 July. He said that he had learned from his business contacts in Moscow and from hotel personnel there that the Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in NOSENKO's defection and was therefore apprehensive of the forthcoming trip.*** He said that he was particularly concerned about what his response should be if the KGB accused him of confessing to American Intelligence and asked his interviewers to brief him in this regard. During the final CIA meeting on 13 July 1965 PREISFREUND said that he had decided that the situation was too dangerous; he would not be going to the USSR after all. Reliable information shows, however, that he did go to the Soviet Union several days later, returning to Helsinki on 24 July 1965.

---

* NOSENKO has not mentioned this.

** PREISFREUND could not date this occasion precisely; he said it was probably before the time he accidentally caused a fire in a Moscow hotel, which was in 1961. [redacted]

*** An official [redacted] liaison service has advised CIA that in discussions with V. Ya. CHEKALOV, the Chief of the KGB Ninth (Guards) Directorate [redacted], a representative of that service was asked by CHEKALOV for whom PREISFREUND was working during his frequent visits to the Soviet Union. CHEKALOV told the representative of the [redacted] liaison [redacted] service that PREISFREUND is considered to be an agent of American Intelligence.

(d) Information from GOLITSYN

GOLITSYN, who had served the KGB most recently as a counterintelligence officer in Helsinki during 1960 and 1961, reported separately two possibly related leads to operations against American personnel assigned to the United States Embassy in Moscow. One of these was a developmental operation against a military code clerk which the KGB felt was almost certain of success, the other a recruitment approach to an Embassy employee which GOLITSYN was told had been successful. GOLITSYN learned these two items of information from different KGB Second Chief Directorate officers at different times.

GOLITSYN provided the first of these leads on 23 December 1961, when he reported information he said he learned during conversations with his personal friend GRYAZNOV at KGB Headquarters in Moscow some time between April and July 1960.* At that time GOLITSYN was visiting the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in connection with his preparations for assignment in Helsinki as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer. GRYAZNOV told GOLITSYN that he, GRYAZNOV, had personally prepared an operation involving an American military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the recruitment approach to this code clerk would be successful. GOLITSYN subsequently narrowed the time of his conversation with GRYAZNOV down to "April or May 1960" and quoted GRYAZNOV as saying that the KGB "is certain that the recruitment is prepared and will be successful." GOLITSYN also said that the recruitment plan for this operation "evidently involved a woman," but could provide no further details. During these same talks, according to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV said that although the KGB had earlier recruited U.S. Department of State code clerks in Moscow, this would be the first recruitment of a code clerk in the office of the American Military Attache since the establishment of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department (in the 1940's).

GOLITSYN reported on the second operation on 26 February 1962, while discussing the KGB agent PREISFREUND. GOLITSYN said that he first met PREISFREUND when the latter went to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in connection with an application for travel to the USSR. On several later occasions, GOLITSYN said, the two men had drinks together in Helsinki cafes. According to GOLITSYN, PREISFREUND had been used in the recruitment in Moscow of at least one American who "could have been a code clerk or a diplomat." He also knew that the recruitment had been accomplished "in 1960, at the end of 1960" and that PREISFREUND, having met the target at America House in Moscow, had helped to set up the target for the recruitment approach by involving him in speculatory activities and by arranging his introduction to various KGB female agents. GOLITSYN thought that PREISFREUND had dropped out of the case after "he had helped to create the circumstances" and had not taken a direct part in the approach, which was made by KGB officers. During an interview by the FBI on 18 June 1962, GOLITSYN [redacted]

---

* According to NOSENKO, he himself was GRYAZNOV's superior at this time. NOSENKO did not recall visits by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960.

This second lead, GOLITSYN said, stemmed from his conversations with KOVSHUK whom he said was the "assistant" (chief) of the American Department,* while GOLITSYN was temporarily in Moscow during "December 1960."** GOLITSYN related that he had visited the American Department to request permission to use PREISFREUND operationally in Helsinki. This request was refused with the explanation: "You see, he (PREISFREUND) helped us in one recruitment now, and it is necessary to be careful for about six months

---

* GOLITSYN could mean either Pomoshchik (assistant) or Zamestitel' (deputy). The CHEREPANOV papers show that KOVSHUK was Deputy Chief of the Department as late as 1959. NOSENKO said that, as a result of a drinking incident, KOVSHUK was demoted from Deputy Chief of the American Department to Chief of its American Embassy Section in 1959 and held this position until early 1962. GOLITSYN said he had known KOVSHUK for about ten years and characterized him as a capable officer with about 15 years of KGB experience, at least ten of them in the American Department, Second Chief Directorate. In about 1956, according to GOLITSYN, KOVSHUK was handling KGB agent Henry SHAPIRO. CIA records show that in addition, KOVSHUK was involved in the Moscow and Washington phases of the "ANDREY" case (he was identified by Dayle SMITH; see Part VI.D.3.b.) and in the development in Moscow of CIA officer George WINTERS (who identified his photograph; see Part VI.D.7.c.). According to NOSENKO, KOVSHUK took personal part in the recruitments of Roy RHODES and Dayle SMITH, in the approach to Army Attache Walter MULE, code clerk Louis MANNHEIM, State Department Officer Richard HARMSTONE, and code clerk James STORSBERG, and in the interrogations of CIA officers Russell LANGELLE and Richard JACOB.

**GOLITSYN's passport and travel records held by CIA confirm that GOLITSYN travelled only twice to the Soviet Union after his arrival in Helsinki on 20 July 1960. The first of these trips was on 19 January 1961, when he flew directly from Helsinki to Moscow; he returned to Helsinki by rail a week later, on 28 January. GOLITSYN's second trip to the Soviet Union was from 9 to 15 April 1961, when he appears to have spent all or most of this period in Leningrad. A Finnish national, whom GOLITSYN had been developing in Helsinki, has reported that he met with GOLITSYN in Leningrad on a daily basis from 10 through 13 April 1961. Moreover, GOLITSYN has never mentioned being in Moscow during this time. Since GOLITSYN remained in Helsinki from April until December 1961, when he defected, it appears that he erred by one month in reporting the date of his conversations in the American Department and that he learned of the second lead some time during the week of 19 January 1961. This is the same conversation of which NOSENKO spoke several times in 1962 and subsequently (see above). NOSENKO has always maintained that he was out of Moscow on leave at the time of GOLITSYN's visit and that this was in the summer of 1961. When he was told in February 1965 that GOLITSYN was in Moscow in January 1961, NOSENKO replied that CIA was either wrong or was attempting to deceive him. NOSENKO declined to change his story of the summer leave.

(e) Information from other Sources

Information available to CIA indicates that the Attaches of the three U.S. military services represented in Moscow shared a single cryptographic center as of 1960 and 1961 and that, except for overlapping assignments during periods of turnover, there was normally only one military code clerk assigned to the Embassy at any particular time. This military code clerk was responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all three military services. In practice, at least one other member of the Attache staff in Moscow has held a cryptographic clearance and has been trained and has performed the function of back-up for the military code clerk during periods of the latter's absence from the Moscow Embassy or inability to perform his functions for other reasons.

STORSBERG was the only military code clerk assigned to the Moscow Embassy from February 1960, when his predecessor, Everett HOBSON, was reassigned, until September 1961, when his successor, Mathew ZUJUS, arrived. STORSBERG himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and departed in November 1961.

During the period of STORSBERG's tour in Moscow, back-up cryptographic duties were performed by the Military Communications Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY. HURLEY performed these duties on a number of occasions, including the night of the approach to STORSBERG, and he could be loosely termed a code clerk.* Additionally, he performed repair work on the cryptographic machines and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy. HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly before STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.

The only other person performing official functions in the military code room during the 1960-1961 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer. As a concurrent secondary assignment, KEYSERS worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the Air Attache. From February until mid-April 1961, as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in the joint military code room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer. He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of low aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.*

---

* Although NOSENKO has distinguished between STORSBERG's function as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's duties as "military code machine mechanic," he said on one occasion that he considered both to be within the general category of "military code clerks." NOSENKO reported that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY.

---

* NOSENKO has described an operation against KEYSERS (see below), but because of the date of KEYSERS' arrival in Moscow, he must be ruled out as a candidate for the first of GOLITSYN's two leads discussed above. On the basis of available information, it appears that the subject of this lead must have been either STORSBERG or HURLEY, the only two "military code clerks" in Moscow in the spring of 1960. The subject of GOLITSYN's second lead could have been STORSBERG, HURLEY, or, in fact, anyone else at the Embassy, although GOLITSYN suggested that he might be a code clerk and might be a military man. By his statement that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY, together with his description of the operation against STORSBERG beginning in the spring of 1960 and his (and PREISFREUND's) assertion that PREISFREUND took part in only one operation for the KGB--that against STORSBERG--NOSENKO has said in effect that both of GOLITSYN's leads were to the STORSBERG operation, which ended in failure. This conflicts with GOLITSYN's report that PREISFREUND was involved in a successful recruitment operation in late 1960. There are also inconsistencies between the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN leads as regards the progress of the operation. GOLITSYN reported that recruitment of a code clerk was "99 per cent" assured in May-June 1960, whereas NOSENKO and PREISFREUND describe an operation which, at best, was just becoming active at that time. GOLITSYN, in reporting his second lead, said that the operation in which PREISFREUND participated culminated "in late 1960;" NOSENKO reported that the only operation in which PREISFREUND took part ended in an unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG in "mid-1961" or, on other occasions, in "autumn 1961."

(iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk Cases

(a) Introduction

According to NOSENKO, the U.S. Embassy Section officer KOSOLAPOV travelled only once to Helsinki, and KOSOLAPOV at that time succeeded in his mission of accompanying--together with a KGB female agent--a suspected American code clerk, Paul Francis JENNER, by train to Moscow. (The KGB later learned that JENNER was not a code clerk but a pouch clerk who also met couriers at the Moscow airport, NOSENKO said, and this KGB identification of JENNER's specialty is confirmed by U.S. Department of State files.) The report by NOSENKO on KOSOLAPOV is contradicted by two sources, travel records available to CIA and the KGB defector GOLITSYN.

Statements made by JENNER in 1960 and 1962 parallel those of NOSENKO in 1964 and 1965 to the extent that two young Soviets, a man and a woman, did converse with him on the train, and later JENNER did encounter the same woman at a Moscow airport. Nevertheless, travel records contradict NOSENKO's statement that KOSOLAPOV was the Soviet male aboard the train with JENNER on the 24-hour journey.

Although NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV was on a single TDY to Finland, in early 1960, travel records show that KOSOLAPOV (under a different identity) went to Helsinki in both the spring and fall of 1960. Travel records on the second Helsinki TDY by KOSOLAPOV, on which NOSENKO has not reported, are borne out by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV, in order to lay the groundwork for a future relationship in Moscow, accompanied a U.S. Embassy code clerk by train from Helsinki about November 1960, or perhaps as late as the beginning of 1961. Again on the basis of travel records, it has been determined that on 16 November 1960 KOSOLAPOV was a fellow passenger of an American code clerk named John W. GARLAND on the daily train from Helsinki to Moscow.

The following discussion of the TDY's of KOSOLAPOV is divided into three parts: KOSOLAPOV's false identity for travel, the early 1960 TDY, and the November 1960 TDY. Each part incorporates the information from all sources, including NOSENKO.

(b) False Identity for Travel

Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV was born in Perm' on 19 February 1928. According to travel records, one Viktor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, born in Perm' on 19 March 1927, was in Finland from 31 March to 2 April 1960, in Finland from 12 to 16 November 1960, and in Denmark from 25 October to 1 November 1961.* In July 1965, Johan PREISFREUND (see Part V.E.3.c.ii. on STORSBERG operation) identified for CIA a photograph of KOLOSOV as that of a KGB officer named Vadim (last name unknown) who approached him in Moscow in the fall of 1964 to ask whether he knew anything about NOSENKO's defection. Shown KOLOSOV's photograph in October 1966, NOSENKO immediately identified him as KOSOLAPOV.

---

* NOSENKO reported that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen in 1961 to recontact the YOUNGERs, an American man and wife who were arrested for espionage and recruited by the KGB while touring the USSR in 1961 (see Part VI.D.2.).

NOSENKO told the [redacted] Subsequently CIA prepared a protocol, which NOSENKO read and signed, corroborating its accuracy. This protocol reads:

> "I do not know about this trip of KOSOLAPOV's to Helsinki in November 1960. I do not know that he accompanied a code clerk back to Moscow at that time.
>
> "I was KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January 1960 to January 1962 and would have to know and approve any operational travel by KOSOLAPOV outside the USSR. In the case of his trip in March 1960 to Helsinki to accompany Paul JENNER, I talked with him about it, and then approved after he wrote it, the cable to the Helsinki residentura (Legal Residency) informing them of his mission, and of course received his report after the trip.
>
> "Normally, I would know about and approve this trip in advance. If I were away at the time, normally I would have heard about the trip upon my return. However, I don't remember anything about this trip either before or after KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki. If there were further developments in this case, I certainly would have known about them."*

(c) The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER Case)

NOSENKO first mentioned a TDY by KOSOLAPOV in an interview by the FBI. [redacted]

---

* NOSENKO reminded his interviewer that he had travelled to Cuba in November 1960. He was told that CIA travel records show that he transitted Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba from Moscow on 15 November 1960, three days after KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki. NOSENKO was then asked if he would have learned of the trip in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow, and he stated that he would have.

** [redacted]

[redacted]

NOSENKO was interrogated by CIA on the JENNER case on 15 February 1965. On the basis of this interrogation, a protocol was drawn up in question-and-answer form, incorporating NOSENKO's responses, and on 19 February 1965, NOSENKO signed the protocol, attesting to its accuracy. The following is taken from this signed statement:

Question: Did you supervise the work against JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you read the file on JENNER?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: Did you read reports on JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes, I read materials on JENNER, everything which came into the section on JENNER and the other code clerks.

Question: Did you ever see JENNER personally?

NOSENKO: Yes. We had his anketa [visa application].

Question: What was the operational plan on JENNER?

NOSENKO: Before his arrival we had only the anketa, nothing more. He was listed as secretary/archivist,* and there was a date on this anketa which was the date he was due to cross the Finnish border--the middle of the month, the 15th. It was the beginning of 1960, not long after I had arrived in the First Department. We decided to create an active operation. We knew the date, and we thought he was to be a code clerk. We wanted to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki with the mission of returning with JENNER on the same train, during which time KOSOLAPOV was to study his behavior. JENNER was young and so was KOSOLAPOV.

---

* The position of secretary/archivist at the U.S. Embassy in in Moscow was usually occupied by a code clerk, but as previously stated, this was not true in JENNER's case.

Question: How old was JENNER at the time?

NOSENKO: I don't know. We sent GRYAZNOV's agent, a ballerina, to Vyborg as part of this operation. I think her first name is Yeva, but I don't remember her last name; her code name was "SOLISTKA"... She was placed on the train in Vyborg as if she had been visiting someone there and was returning to Moscow. The main idea was to place an agent near JENNER before he even arrived in Moscow. We wrote a proposal to the Chairman of the KGB giving the reasons for doing this. We explained that we had usually only one year in which to work. The agent "SOLISTKA" met JENNER and spoke with him. KOSOLAPOV also became acquainted with JENNER and spoke with him, but I can't say that they were all speaking together at one time. She gave JENNER a telephone number.

Question: A KGB telephone number?

NOSENKO: Of course not; it was her own telephone number, but he didn't call her. We then noticed that he wasn't working in the code room but in the mail room. O.K., that was interesting too. We waited one or two months for the call to come, but nothing happened. When JENNER once went to the railroad station or airport alone to meet the couriers, we sent her with GRYAZNOV by car in an attempt to have them meet again. JENNER saw her but did not approach [her]. Instead, he turned in the other direction. Only later did we learn that he is a very quiet person. There was nothing else on JENNER at all except a suspicion that he may have been a homosexual, but there was no proof. He was like a child.

Question: How much time did you have between the time of the anketa's arrival and the time of JENNER's arrival?

NOSENKO: A month, plenty of time to prepare.

Question: A month?

NOSENKO: Well, approximately a month. The usual approval from the Central Committee was necessary so that KOSOLAPOV could go abroad.

Question: Who wrote this?

NOSENKO: I prepared the kharakteristika [official form] on KOSOLAPOV for this TDY and gave it to the Personnel Office.

Question: Whose idea was it for this Helsinki operation against JENNER?

NOSENKO: It was the idea of the group.

Question: Did you advise KOSOLAPOV on what his role was to be before he left--what he was to do?

NOSENKO: I was discussing this case with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV, and maybe we discussed it with KOVSHUK on the day before KOSOLAPOV left.

Question: Was "SOLISTKA" an experienced agent?

NOSENKO: She had been working before 1960, but I don't know for how long.

Question: Who handled her before GRYAZNOV?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: How did you coordinate this trip of KOSOLAPOV's with other units, for example, with the [KGB] First Chief Directorate (FCD)?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable saying that he was coming for two or three days.

Question: Did you approve this cable?

NOSENKO: I didn't sign it, but I read it, and then we took it to KLYPIN for his signature. Once it was signed, KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second [European] Department, FCD.

Question: What cover did KOSOLAPOV use for this trip?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: What name did KOSOLAPOV use?

NOSENKO: I don't remember if he used his own name or another.

Question: What other correspondence was there?

NOSENKO: Correspondence?

Question: What other cables or letters were sent to or received from the Helsinki Rezidentura [Legal Residency of the KGB] concerning this operation, KOSOLAPOV's trip?

NOSENKO: Only this cable, nothing else. KOSOLAPOV was to discuss with the Rezidentura the possibility of obtaining their help in Helsinki with the work against code clerks, to see what agents they had, or to study the situation, the possibilities. We wanted to use agents against the code clerks in hotels and restaurants, to use girls...

Question: With whom was KOSOLAPOV to speak in Helsinki?

NOSENKO: He spoke with the Resident and the Deputy Resident. He discussed this question with them and they said they would see about it, but we were told that the Residency has more important questions.

Question: What was more important than the work against code clerks?

NOSENKO: They didn't tell us.

Question: Well, wasn't there some sign, some hint as to what was so important?

NOSENKO: Code clerks in Helsinki would be more important for them; this is the work of the FCD.

Question: How did KOSOLAPOV know how to find JENNER, to recognize him and make contact?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV had his photograph, knew his name, and with the help of the Residency, I think, they found out at the railroad station who was going on the train. Then they bought a ticket on the same train for KOSOLAPOV. We knew JENNER must cross on the 15th.

Question: When did KOSOLAPOV leave for his trip to Helsinki?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: When did he return?

NOSENKO: I don't know, don't remember.

Question: How long was KOSOLAPOV gone in all?

NOSENKO: About one week, not more than one week counting travel time.

Question: How did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki?

NOSENKO: By train, both ways.

Question: Was he alone on the way down or did someone go with him?

NOSENKO: He was alone.

Question: How did you arrange for "SOLISTKA" to board the right train?

NOSENKO: GRYAZNOV sent "SOLISTKA" alone to Vyborg and had the local KGB officers there meet her and place her on the correct train. They knew the date and would establish the fact that KOSOLAPOV was on that train before placing her aboard...

Also on 15 February 1965 NOSENKO made the following additional statement not included in the protocol: "The agent was 'SOLISTKA.' She was GRYAZNOV's agent even before 1960. GRYAZNOV briefed her for the mission... KOSOLAPOV wrote a report on his trip. Nothing unusual or interesting in it. 'SOLISTKA' also gave a report to GRYAZNOV, but there was nothing there, either."

NOSENKO was questioned on 20 October 1966 about his responsibility for and knowledgeability of KGB operations against American code clerks. He was required to give only brief answers, without discussion, to specific questions. The CIA questions and his answers were as follows:

Question: Did you supervise all code clerk operations in 1960 and 1961?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV your subordinates during this period?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: How many times did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki in order to travel to Moscow on the train with American code clerks?

NOSENKO: I know of one.

Question: When was that? Which one?

NOSENKO: Don't remember. 15 March or April 1960.

Question: Which code clerk?

NOSENKO: It wasn't a code clerk. When he arrived it was found that he worked with the mail. He came as a secretary/archivist and the First [U.S. Embassy] Section thought he is a code clerk. Found out later that he worked on the mail.

Question: JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Do you know of any others?

NOSENKO: No. What do you mean?

Question: Only one?

NOSENKO: Only one--JENNER.

Question: Was the operation successful?

NOSENKO: No it wasn't successful. But it was interesting. It was the first try to send an officer to Helsinki.

Question: When did it happen?

NOSENKO: First part of 1960. I think approximately 15 March or April.

Question: Other than the trip to meet JENNER, did KOSOLAPOV make other trips abroad?

NOSENKO: He went to Copenhagen to meet this couple [the YOUNGERs] and was in the United States at one of the General Assemblies. That's all. That was in the '50's. No others.

Question: Did KOSOLAPOV personally meet JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you read his report of this meeting?

NOSENKO: Yes.

When on 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was shown the KOLOSOV photograph for the first time, the following discussion ensued:

Question: Do you know the person in this photograph, number 17 [Viktor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, employee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927 in Perm, USSR]?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV, Vadim KOSOLAPOV, the former case officer of First Chief Directorate, First Department. From '59, the end of '59, case officer of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate.

Question: We have information that a Viktor--

NOSENKO: (interrupts) Vadim Viktorovich.

Question: Anything else you want to say about the name?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV.

Question: Concerning his travel to Helsinki by train in March of 1960 under cover of Vneshtorg, does that mean anything to you?

NOSENKO: I was telling you that there was trip when he was returning with Paul JENNER.

Question: JENNER, the code clerk?

NOSENKO: He was secretary/archivist, but he wasn't working as a code clerk. He was working with mail.

Question: Well, according to official records he arrived in Helsinki by train from Moscow.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: On the 31st of March 1960.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: And he went to meet JENNER, to come back on the train with him. Right?

NOSENKO: I was thinking and I'm not sure. '60 or '61. I'm not sure. '60 or '61. I'm not sure. I'm not sure '60 or '61. I was telling '60, but I'm not sure. Anyway, I cannot tell exactly. I know he was in Helsinki, that he was going to Helsinki.

SECRET

Finnish Travel Manifests for 31 March and 2 April 1960 (See Part V.E.3.c.iii)



[illegible]	Junalla		Vainikkalan		
1 Jenner, Paul Francis	arkist.[illegible]	[illegible].07.23	U S A	U S A - Mosk. /P	

Passintarkastaja:
V.t.ylikonst. E. Saukkonen

31 March 1960



[illegible]	Junalla		Vainikkalan		
1 [illegible], Klaus Vilhelm	[illegible]	19.04.23	Tanskan	Tanska-Afganistan/P	
2 [illegible], Sofia	konttoristi	[illegible]	Kreikan	[illegible]-Mosk./P	[illegible]
3 Kolesnov, Viktor	[illegible]	19.03.27	N:liiton	Hki. - Mosk.	[illegible]/Mosk.
4 Suomen kansalaiset:			Kotipaikka:		
5 [illegible], Jouko Aarre [illegible] ✓	työmies	26.11.24	Joensuu	Joensuu-Mosk. alue	([illegible]
6 [illegible], Kirsti Hellin Irene ✓	kansl.apul.	24.07.23	Jyväskylä	Jyväskylä-Gorki	(15pv.viis.)
7 [illegible], Tyyne Kyllikki ✓	rouva	03.09.21	"	"	"
8 [illegible], [illegible] Helena ✓ Vak	"	23.07.22	Lahti		
9 [illegible], Aarre Viljam ✓ Vak	opettaja	12.07.28	"	Lahti-Zaporoje	(15pv.viis.)
10 [illegible], Toivo Erkki ✓ Vak	var.hoit.	27.03.22	"		
11 Utriainen, Erkki Olavi ✓ Vak	kirv.mies	09.08.20	"		
12 [illegible], Otto Allan ✓	toimittaja	08.12.17	Helsinki		
13 [illegible], Antti ✓	liitt.siht.	12.04.28	"		
14 [illegible], Unto Mattias ✓	[illegible].siht.	13.12.16	[illegible]	Hki. - Mosk.	([illegible]pv.viis.)
15 Järvinen, Aarne Juhani ✓	varastomies	[illegible].01.34	Toijala		
16 [illegible], Judith Josefina ✓	[illegible].apul.	03.03.15	Helsinki		

Passintarkastaja:
V.t.ylikonst. E. Saukkonen

2 April 1960

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Question: It's 1960. He made a trip in 1960, in March, to Helsinki by train using this name, KOLOSOV, and using this cover, Vneshtorg, and we also have a report from official Finnish sources that he left Helsinki by train on 2 April 1960 and went to Moscow.

NOSENKO: I don't remember the dates. Don't remember. Must be 15 March or 1 April, 15 March or 1 April.

Question: No, he didn't arrive until 31 March. We have the official record on his travel. We have his photo here, which you just saw.

NOSENKO: On the visa certificate, anketa, with this picture of Paul JENNER, it was said that he must come; we knew that he must come 1 April or 15 March, or something of this kind.

Question: But we have the official records showing KOLOSOV's, or KOSOLAPOV's, arrival on 31 March.

NOSENKO: I cannot give you any details. All I have said, everything what I knew. If you need something on KOSOLAPOV, I will try to remember.

Question: The interesting thing is KOLOSOV, or KOSOLAPOV, left Helsinki on 2 April. JENNER, Paul JENNER, according to the same official sources, left Helsinki by train to go to Moscow on the 31st. Two days before.

NOSENKO: They were going in one train.

Question: They weren't even on the same train.

NOSENKO: Here, please, they were going in one train.

Question: KOSOLAPOV remained in Helsinki.

NOSENKO: (interrupts) KOSOLAPOV in one even carriage, in one even carriage with Paul JENNER. Then...

Question: (interrupts) How do you know this for sure?

NOSENKO: I was reading his report after his coming. I was reading also the agent's report of the female agent who was put in this carriage, in this carriage in this train, and at the station Vyborg, the first Soviet station, Vyborg, where she was taken by GRYAZNOV, and was put in the same carriage, and she was acquainted with JENNER. And later, it was a try, as I was telling, to show her to JENNER, but JENNER didn't want to have a contact with her. That's all. It was finished... And she was acquainted with him and was speaking with JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV himself was speaking with JENNER... I was reading KOSOLAPOV's otchet [official account] about his [trip].

Question: That's quite possible. It's quite possible that they gave you a report to read concerning this. But it is a fact that official records show that the two men were not on the same train. They were two days apart.

NOSENKO: No (whispered).

Question: JENNER left on the 31st.

NOSENKO: I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. Maybe this is a mistake of Finnish officials. I don't know, but he was on the same train and he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER. The same train, the same carriage.

The remaining information on KOSOLAPOV's TDY in early 1960 comes from other sources:

- After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960, JENNER reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students."* The two Russians struck up a conversation and were soon baiting him on the question of racial discrimination in the United States. They said that they might see JENNER in Moscow. About three months later, on 29 June, JENNER was performing his normal duty of escorting Embassy couriers to Sheremetevo Airport when he was again approached by the Russian girl, Yuli, who acted surprised to see him and asked him to go outside to talk. Yuli explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend who was leaving on a flight to Irkutsk (JENNER had seen the Irkutsk flight depart a half hour earlier) and told JENNER that her male companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with Yuli's questions concerning JENNER's impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy. When JENNER said he must leave, she gave him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted that he call her.** She advised JENNER that "it would be better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone."

- Besides information about his Soviet companions on the Moscow journey, JENNER also told U.S. Department of State security officials about sexual advances made by his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his second maid. (NOSENKO has not indicated that either of these two women was a KGB agent, but has said in another context that all maids of American code clerks were KGB agents or informants.)

- CIA investigations showed that I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in Helsinki, contacted the police chief there on 31 March 1960 to ask his assistance in locating an American named Paul F. JENNER who was due to arrive in Helsinki the day before.*** SERGEYEV explained that he had some "business" with JENNER, but he did not specify its nature. Reportedly this was the first time that SERGEYEV had made such a request of the police chief.[°]

---

* KOSOLAPOV was 32 years of age at the time.

** NOSENKO has mentioned several times that GRYAZNOV's agent "SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number.

***GOLITSYN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet Intelligence agent from "about 1945 on."

- CIA travel records show that JENNER arrived in Helsinki en route to Moscow on 30 March 1960 and departed by train the following day. KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki the same day that JENNER left, 31 March 1960, and remained there until 2 April 1960 when he too departed for Moscow by train. The Finnish train manifest for 31 March 1960 indicates that there was only one passenger aboard the daily train leaving Helsinki for Moscow on this date, Paul JENNER, listed as a U.S. citizen and secretary/archivist. The manifest for 2 April 1960 carries the name Viktor KOLOSSOV (KOSOLAPOV) and shows that no American citizens were aboard.

(d) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND Case)

Apart from denying that it ever took place, NOSENKO has said nothing about a trip to Helsinki by KOSOLAPOV in November 1960, but GOLITSYN said such a trip occurred and related it to an incipient KGB operation against an American code clerk.

GOLITSYN was not posted to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki until July 1960, i.e., after KOSOLAPOV's first trip to Helsinki, under the KOLOSOV alias. He has reported that at "about the end of 1960, about November or possibly by the beginning of 1961," the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residency. The telegram advised that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki in transit to Moscow; the responsible case officer would be KOSOLAPOV, who was being sent to Helsinki under an alias and under Vneshtorg cover; KOSOLAPOV was to strike up an acquaintance to be continued with the American in Moscow.

The following extracts are from the transcript of GOLITSYN's further remarks on this subject in early 1962:

Question: You say that around November 1960 KOSOLAPOV came to Finland?

GOLITSYN: Came to Finland.

Question: He came under cover?

GOLITSYN: Yes.

Question: Under a new identity? With an alias?

GOLITSYN: Yes, as an employee of Trade Union (Vneshtorg). But, of course, there may be some different dates. Maybe November. I suppose [believe] it was the end of 1960 or it can be the beginning of 1961. And he waiting for some days, a week or so.

Question: In Helsinki?

[°] A similar request to the police chief was made by SERGEYEV with regard to GARLAND (see below).

14-00000

SECRET

Finnish Travel Manifest for 16 November 1960
(See Part V.E.3.c.iii)

TOP SECRET

Luettelo matkustajista, jotka Junalla (kulkuneuvo) *saapuivat Suomeen / lähtivät Suomesta* Vainikkalan (paikkakunta) *kautta* / 196

	Suku- ja etunimet	Ammatti tai arvo	Syntymäaika	Kansalaisuus	Määrämaa	Osoite Suomessa
1	Mouravieva, Nonna ✓	sos.min.	dipl.	N:liiton	N:liitto	Lähetystö, Hki.
2	Parve, Ralf	kirjailija	1919	"	Eesti	"
3	Morosov, Alexandre	dipl.kur.	dipl.	"	N:liitto/N-S-F	Kauttakulku
4	Otchagovski, Alexandre	"	"	"	"	"
5	Gavrilova, Maria	rouva	1922	"	N:liitto	-
6	Kolesov, Viktor	virkailija	19.03.27	"	"	-
7	Amedjanov, Kamil	"	1922	"	"	-
8	Akulnine, Petr	sirkustait.	1913	"	"	-
9	Lair, Jean Baptiste	dipl.kur.	17.08.07	Ranskan	"	Kauttakulku.
10	Garland, John Jr.	sihteeri	22.03.33	USA:n	"	"
11	Brubaker, Henry Charles	tato siht.	dipl.	Suomen	"	Ulkoasiainministeriö.
12	Rantalainen, Aatu Ilmari	kirvesmies	14.11.19	"	"	Kulmak. 2.H.65, Hki.
13	Oksanen, Frans Oskar	sähk.asent	25.05.00	"	"	4.Linja.20.B.39, Hki.
14	Immonen, Heikki Juhani Fin ✓	lainop.kand	21.01.30	"	"	Kivaltorink.23.C, Hki.
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						

Passintarkastaja:
V.t.ylikonst. E. Saukkonen
E. Saukkonen

SECRET

GOLITSYN: Yes. Maybe four days. Then we knew that the American Embassy took a ticket for him [the American target] for the train... And KOSOLAPOV took a ticket in the same compartment. And before the departure we knew exactly from the guide [conductor] of that train that it's the same person--[I'm not certain whether he was a] code clerk or not a code clerk*--but his name, his real name. It was listed. And I was at the railroad station at that time. I went to see off the delegation, the Soviet delegation.**

Question: See them off?

GOLITSYN: Yes, the delegation. And I asked him, KOSOLAPOV: "Who is this person? I suppose [he is an] American?" I suppose [believe] he said: "He's a fat man, a young fat man."

Question: The American?

GOLITSYN: Yes. And I suppose [believe KOSOLAPOV said] bespectacled.*** And KOSOLAPOV and these persons were smiling and looked through the window before departure.

Question: In the compartment? The train compartment?

GOLITSYN: Yes, and then this other person visited Helsinki from KOSOLAPOV's division [the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, Second Chief Directorate].****

Question: When was this?

GOLITSYN: It was in summer or maybe September or so of 1961. And I asked him. I reminded him about his case...

Question: Who was this? Do you remember?

GOLITSYN: I don't remember because he changed his name. I know him but I... And I asked him how is that case that I helped KOSOLAPOV with? And he did not want to discuss it. That's why I came to the conclusion that this case was a success. Otherwise he would have told [me]. And I am not sure but I can try to recognize this person in pictures.

Question: You think that you could?

---

* When he first gave this lead, GOLITSYN identified the American as a code clerk.

** GOLITSYN was not asked details of this delegation. There were eight Soviets, including KOSOLAPOV, on this train.

*** KOSOLAPOV's description does not fit John GARLAND; it is, however, a fairly accurate characterization of Paul JENNER.

**** NOSENKO has not mentioned this TDY, and the KGB officer remains unidentified.

GOLITSYN: Yes, probably. He reminds me a little of one of my friends.

Question: He looks a little like your friend?

GOLITSYN: Yes.

Question: Which one? KOSOLAPOV?

GOLITSYN: No, no. This American

The Finnish railroad manifest lists the passengers travelling from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. KOSOLAPOV was one of eight Soviets aboard the train, and John W. GARLAND was the only American. GARLAND, by his own statement, arrived in Helsinki on 14 November 1960; he was travelling to Moscow to assume the duties of supervisor of the State Department code room in the U.S. Embassy.

As he had with regard to JENNER (see above), SERGEYEV of the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to GOLITSYN) on 11 November 1960 for help in locating GARLAND, an American who would arrive there on 14 November.

GARLAND was first interviewed by John ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security Officer in Moscow in connection with the GOLITSYN lead on 17 June 1962. In this interview GARLAND denied having met any Soviet of KOSOLAPOV's physical description during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied having ever been approached by Soviet Intelligence. On 30 July 1963 GARLAND was interviewed by the FBI [redacted]

NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified 20 Americans employed by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow who were of interest to the KGB because they were suspect intelligence officers or agents, or because they fell into some other category of interest to the KGB. He gave a short statement concerning each of these 20 persons. One of them was GARLAND, about whom NOSENKO said: "code clerk, but nothing doing." NOSENKO was asked on 2 September 1964 to review this list for the purpose of supplying any additional information he might have concerning the individuals named. NOSENKO stated: "As with all code clerks, they were studying him (GARLAND) in order to gather enough material to make a recruitment. The case officer was KOSOLAPOV. I don't remember the names or descriptions of any agents, and I didn't hear of any derogatory information. As far as I know, there was no operational approach and no recruitment." Although he could not recall whether he had read the KGB file on GARLAND or not, NOSENKO on 15 February 1965 said he thought that he must have read current materials concerning GARLAND as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO also said that there was no operational plan drawn up for GARLAND because the KGB had no derogatory information whatsoever concerning him. NOSENKO has not provided additional information concerning GARLAND, whom he had presumably never seen, and was unable to recall any background information concerning GARLAND or any details on his travels and acquaintances while stationed in Moscow.

In the context of discussion of KOLOSOV/KOSOLAPOV's travels to Helsinki, NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out on 26 October 1966 that CIA was aware of a second trip there which NOSENKO had not reported. The following is a transcript of this portion of the discussion on that date:

Question: Well, we started to look for other trips by KOSOLAPOV, or KOLOSOV, and we did run across another trip, again by KOLOSOV, using the same alias.

NOSENKO: To Copenhagen?

Question: No. This was a trip to Helsinki.

NOSENKO: Oh. I don't know. Maybe after, after '61 maybe. I don't know--'62, '63, I don't know.

Question: No, this was in 1960. When you say you were in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section, First [American] Department, Second Chief Directorate. He was on the train, according to official records, on 16 November 1960, going from Helsinki to Moscow.

NOSENKO: I know about one, he has took trip, when he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER.

Question: We looked at everybody else, all the other records concerning this train trip to see who was on the train with KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV. KOLOSOV was the name he used.

NOSENKO: Yes?

Question: We found there was one American on that train with KOLOSOV going from Helsinki to Moscow.

NOSENKO: Yes? And his name? If it is not secret, if you can say, of course?

Question: One of your targets, an American code clerk.

NOSENKO: He was, I know, going from Helsinki, only with Paul JENNER.

Question: You don't know this man's name?

NOSENKO: (silence)

Question: Well, we checked further and we found out that GOLITSYN had told us about a trip.

NOSENKO: When he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER? GOLITSYN was then out, yes?*

---

* GOLITSYN arrived in Helsinki in July 1960, over four months after JENNER passed through Finland en route to Moscow.

Question: GOLITSYN told us that KOSOLAPOV was travelling to Helsinki to meet a code clerk in November 1960. You understand what I'm telling you?

NOSENKO: Yes, I understand. And KOSOLAPOV must tell him about the code clerk, but we found out that Paul JENNER is not a code clerk when he began to work at the Embassy.

Question: This is not Paul JENNER. This is a different time of year--

NOSENKO: (interrupts) When he began to work in Embassy.

Question: This is not March 1960. This is November 1960. A different time. It's the same year, but a different time.

NOSENKO: I know only about his trip when he was returning with Paul JENNER.

Question: Well, how do you explain that this man, who's supposed to be under your supervision in the Embassy Section, is aboard this train with this American code clerk, one of your targets, in November 1960?

NOSENKO: I know only about one trip [by] KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, when he was returning with Paul JENNER, about whom he was thinking also that he was a code clerk. Yes.

Question: KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV was not on the same train with JENNER. We have the names; we have the facts; we have the official records. We also have GOLITSYN's information about November 1960. GOLITSYN went with KOSOLAPOV to the train station to see him off.

NOSENKO: He must. He was working as a case officer of counterintelligence, of the Fourteenth Department. Of course he must, of course he must. And KOSOLAPOV must speak with him.

Question: KOSOLAPOV spoke with GOLITSYN, and KOSOLAPOV rode with this American code clerk from Helsinki on the train back to Moscow. But GOLITSYN was not in Helsinki when JENNER was there. It wasn't JENNER.

NOSENKO: With Paul JENNER I know, but I don't know of anybody else... You are giving me such a big bluff. I don't know, I don't know, I don't know.

Question: It's no bluff. Do you have any idea who this other code clerk was?

NOSENKO: No. There wasn't such a one.

Question: Well, I'll tell you who it was... Did you ever hear the name GARLAND?

NOSENKO: Yes, I heard GARLAND. And there wasn't any approach made to GARLAND. There wasn't any attempt to recruit him. There was a study of him, yes, but there wasn't recruitment or something else...

(iv) KGB-Polish UB Activities Against MORONE

(a) Introduction

In 1961 CIA learned from a Polish source who furnished much reliable and sensitive information that, with the assistance of its Polish counterpart, the Office of Security (UB), the KGB in November 1960 began using a female agent against Joseph MORONE, a U.S. Department of State code clerk assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow in August 1960. The woman accompanied MORONE on a train trip from Moscow, became intimate with him in Warsaw, returned to Moscow twice in February 1961, and there had sexual relations with him. The compromising scenes of MORONE and the Polish UB agent were photographed. This information on the KGB operation was received by CIA soon after the woman's second visit to Moscow. On the basis of this report, MORONE was interviewed and polygraphed in Oslo in May 1961, and he was transferred to Lisbon from Moscow in August 1961.

NOSENKO gave a few details on the same case, without mentioning the name of the KGB target, during the 1962 meetings in Geneva. In 1964 and 1965 he furnished more particulars on the MORONE case, identifying three KGB agents (besides the Polish female) who participated in the operation. NOSENKO, however, said that two of them added no information of use to the KGB against MORONE, and that he was unable to remember what the third agent reported: statements by other sources indicate that regarding MORONE all three agents could have acquired information of operational potential for the KGB. NOSENKO has not reported, as have other sources, that a fourth KGB agent named Ella UMANETS was in contact with MORONE, or that the KGB officer SKVORTSOV--posing as MICHAUD--was with MORONE at America House on at least one occasion, the night when STORSBERG says he was approached by the KGB (see above). NOSENKO has confused the MORONE case with another by saying that a fifth KGB agent was directed against MORONE, whereas she was apparently directed against the American code clerk ZUJUS (see below). The sensitive source of the original report on MORONE stated that a KGB officer "VOLODYA" (Vladimir, last name unknown) personally met the Polish female agent when she arrived in Moscow, and NOSENKO said that the KGB officer was his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO at first claimed a KGB photographic technician supporting the case reported to him, but he retracted this remark after CIA showed him that travel records on NOSENKO made it impossible for the technician to have spoken to him as he described. According to NOSENKO, MORONE was reassigned from Moscow before the KGB could take further steps against the code clerk, and he speculates MORONE's transfer was prompted by American authorities' concern over his relationship with one of the KGB female agents.

(b) NOSENKO's Information

At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a female agent of the Polish service in contact with an American from the Moscow Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw. Later, NOSENKO said, he brought the same female to Moscow in order to obtain further compromising materials on this American.

Asked on 11 June 1962 whether he had had foreign agents working against the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO described his having introduced the idea of using such agents to develop Americans afraid of contacts with Russian girls. He said that he himself had several of these third-national agents, that he sometimes would ask the German and Polish services to supply him with agents, and that it was unnecessary for him to explain their intended use in operations against Americans. NOSENKO then gave an example: "Listen, the sergeants [enlisted men] who lived in America House had a custom--it was too far to go to America, so where did they go to rest [on leave]? To Finland or Poland. Why Poland? Because they can find women there, the rate of exchange is good, and so on. What do we do? We planted a female Polish agent [on an American] in Poland. Then she comes to Moscow. We arranged a chance meeting, and things developed. Once two guys, a Marine guard and a code clerk went to Warsaw. They were on leave for a week and a half. We knew when they would be going. I made an immediate phone call to Warsaw. 'Give me a woman,' I said. 'Get a good whore for me there, a pretty one but not one who strikes the eye particularly.' Well, they sent me such a girl. And I placed this Polish agent on the same train, in the same car, even in the same compartment. The train left. One of the Americans, the one in whom we were particularly interested, the code clerk, wanted the girl and there, in the compartment, they went to bed together while the other American slept. I told the Poles in Warsaw to give the girl an apartment and to get photographs. They arranged an apartment and he came there. Everything was O.K. After a week and a half he returned to Moscow. We did not rush things. A month passed. Two months. Let's not rush, I said. A half a year went by. I insisted that nothing further may be done any earlier. Then I said, 'All right, let's give him this girl, this Pole.' She arrived [in Moscow] and they met one another. I created the conditions: we created the conditions. They slept with one another once, twice. A [Soviet] girlfriend showed up. The same thing. And he also began to sleep with the girlfriend. The Pole left and he was with this Russian, and she was our agent. You see, first the boys are afraid of Russians. But [we gave him] a Pole and then transferred him to a Russian."

NOSENKO stated on 1 February 1964: "I remember we were working on one of the members of the guard of the American Embassy, who was going to Warsaw for a good time, for a few days' relaxation.* We wrote to our advisors [KGB officers attached to the Polish UB] to do everything possible--to get a pretty Polish girl for the fellow and to photograph any intimate scenes. The Poles introduced the guard to the girl, they did have intimate relations, but they gave us photographs without any intimate scenes. Just how they are sitting together, how he is kissing her--that's all. Well, we got these photographs and some time went by and then we asked that the Poles send us this Polish girl so that she could meet him in Moscow. They sent her. [illegible] and [illegible] asked her, during the conversation [illegible] reached the ultimate in intimacy. [illegible] They said they were surprised [illegible] she had reported that this relationship [illegible] You see, the Poles had not told [illegible] the film which they gave us had been cut [illegible] I remember we called the Poles a few [illegible] names [illegible] friends! They were doing this under instructions [illegible] withhold things. ... At any rate [illegible] developed any further."

---

* The guard referred to is Frank BEGGS, a marine enlisted man who accompanied MORONE to Warsaw. The facts, however, seem to relate to MORONE, who has described his encounter with the Polish girl and her subsequent recontact in Moscow. BEGGS has also reported (see below) that MORONE met a Polish girl on the train to Warsaw and that she later contacted him in Moscow; BEGGS has denied that he, himself, was contacted by any such girl in the Soviet Union after the trip to Warsaw with MORONE.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

---

* NOSENKO has also mentioned a prohibition on recruitment attempts during the 1959 Sokolniki exhibition because of the need to avoid incidents affecting U.S.-Soviet relationships. GOLITSYN told CIA of such a prohibition placed on the use of homosexual compromise material against a U.S. Embassy employee in 1960 because of the impending visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union. As a result of the U-2 incident on 1 May 1960, this visit never took place, and U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated. Throughout the rest of 1960 and most of 1961 they remained very strained, and Soviet pressures and hard lines culminated in the Berlin crisis and wall-building in Berlin in August of 1961.

NOSENKO further reported to CIA that the KGB case officer working against MORONE was NOSENKO's subordinate and specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO read the file on MORONE and saw his visa photograph, but he never saw him in person and so could not provide a physical description. NOSENKO had discussed the MORONE case with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occasions.

NOSENKO said that the KGB agents working on MORONE were:

- Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid or waitress at America House who reported to DEMKIN, the case officer responsible for Americans living there, on everything she saw or heard concerning MORONE. KOSOLAPOV visited her several times with DEMKIN to discuss MORONE, and NOSENKO himself met her once or twice in one of the two safe apartments that DEMKIN had at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall any specific information on MORONE which was interesting or useful from this source.

- [redacted] an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian Embassy who was an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. [redacted] visited America House and met MORONE, but he did not report anything of value that NOSENKO remembered.

- One of two East German females imported for use against the inhabitants of America House. In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two German women who could be used for this purpose. The first of these was Hanna, blonde, documented as a West German travelling to Moscow. NOSENKO never met her but instructed PREISFREUND (see the STORSBERG case) to take her to America House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times to America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that she may have reported on MORONE. The other East German girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENKO never met her but recalled that she was asked for her documents at America House on her first or second visit there. She replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America House, and never returned. NOSENKO did not remember the time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the Embassy security officer at the time.*

- [redacted], an Italian [redacted] at the American Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that [redacted] had said about MORONE.

---

* CIA has no information concerning such an incident in 1960-1961, but the circumstances described by NOSENKO seem to apply to those surrounding a relationship between a woman named Lillian (last name not known) and the military code clerk ZUJUS. These details are given in Part V.E.3.c.(v). In any event, the incident involving Lillian occurred after the date when NOSENKO says he was transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section. At the time, Hugh MONTGOMERY rather than ABIDIAN was the Embassy Security Officer.

From one of these agents, or possibly in some other manner, the KGB learned that MORONE was planning to go on leave to Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to compromise him. KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational plan for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after some editing by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, chief of the section. KOSOLAPOV next met with a Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Headquarters to discuss the plan. The Pole was told that the target was a U.S. Embassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk; this fact was deliberately kept from the Poles.

As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow by train. Upon her arrival she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her to a Moscow hotel, where he gave her instructions concerning her role in the operation. The girl was told to meet MORONE on the train, flirt with him, have him fall in love with her, continue the association, and study him. She was to tell him that she had been in Moscow as a guest of her uncle, a member of the Polish Trade Representation in Moscow, and that she could meet him again on her next visit.

Arrangements were made with the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for a technician to be placed on the train in the compartment next to that of MORONE and BEGGS and for audio and visual (but not photographic) coverage.

NOSENKO did not recall when MORONE and BEGGS left Moscow. The Polish agent did, however, succeed in making MORONE's acquaintance, and the technician from the Operational Technical Directorate reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train reached Warsaw.* The technician told NOSENKO the girl had engaged in sexual intercourse during the trip. The technician also reported that the tape recordings obtained were of poor quality.

Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials, KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising photography during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room. The girl called MORONE at America House, and MORONE subsequently visited her in the hotel room two or three times, during which photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on MORONE. He did not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she had no further contacts with him.

---

* CIA travel records show that NOSENKO transitted Amsterdam on 15 November 1960 on a through flight from Moscow to Cuba. [redacted] NOSENKO returned from Cuba approximately 14 December 1960. When told this, NOSENKO stated that instead of talking to the technician himself, he may have read the report and seen the film strips after his return.

Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it was felt that there were insufficient materials for a recruitment approach to MORONE. The KGB wanted to trap him in the apartment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something that is definitely prohibited. For this purpose, Svetlana IVANOVA (see above) was supposed to lure MORONE into the city, but before anything further could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE out of Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore, NOSENKO said, the KGB made no operational approach to MORONE and no recruitment of him.

(c) Information from Other Sources

A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 November 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where she was met by a KGB case officer named "VOLODYA." She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The KGB case officer, apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November 1960 pointed MORONE out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Polish female met MORONE on the train to Warsaw, where intimacies began. In Warsaw on 12 November 1960 she was quite friendly with MORONE, but pursuant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a Polish UB safehouse suitably prepared for clandestine photography, and revealing photographs of an intimate nature were taken of MORONE and herself. The female agent again travelled to Moscow on 5 February 1961 and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further compromising photographs were taken of her and MORONE on this trip. The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her and MORONE.

GOLITSYN was questioned on the basis of this lead on 16 February 1962:

Question: Do you know anyone in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate who worked against the American Embassy and used the name "VOLODYA?"

GOLITSYN: Yes, I know CHURANOV. He worked at one time against the U.S. Embassy. Later he worked against the British Embassy and later he was sent to Denmark.

Question: When was he sent? Do you know?

GOLITSYN: It was in '57 until probably '60... I suppose that he will continue to work now in the First Chief Directorate. He transferred there from the Second...

Question: Do you know anyone who used the name "VOLODYA" in the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow in the fall of 1960?

GOLITSYN: There is another person. It is [Vladimir Ivanovich] PETROV. He is the employee of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate who works against the American Embassy. He evidently knows English. ...and he worked in the American Department. I know him and I met him in 1960. He was Chief of the American Section, the Embassy Section...

Question: Well, in VOLODYA, I'm interested in a KGB case officer who would be working against American code clerks in the fall of 1960.

GOLITSYN: Yes he [PETROV] is the Chief of this section. That is why. He is the Chief of this section where GRYAZNOV works. [GOLITSYN had earlier identified GRYAZNOV as a code clerk specialist in the U.S. Embassy Section.]

Question: And GRYAZNOV is under him?

GOLITSYN: Yes, he was an assistant at one time, but is not [now], and then there was the reorganization and he became a little "liquidated" [downgraded in position].

In an October 1962 interview, following his withdrawal from Moscow, MORONE stated that he had travelled with Frank BEGGS to Warsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her what languages she spoke. Later she entered his compartment, and when he tried to engage in sexual relations with her, she slapped his face. A day or two after they arrived in Warsaw, the girl contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room where they had sexual relations. According to MORONE, he had sexual relations with at least two other women while in Warsaw. He and BEGGS returned to Moscow without incident. On 6 February 1961 the Polish girl from the train called him at America House, and the following day he visited her in her room at the Peking Hotel, where they had several drinks and sexual relations. On this occasion or earlier the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow. MORONE had denied being approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence, a statement which was supported by a polygraph examination administered in 1961. (Further details on this interview of MORONE are inserted in a later paragraph containing information from MORONE's associates in Moscow.)

The Marine guard BEGGS has confirmed MORONE's account in general, with the exception that he has stated that the two travelled to Warsaw on 13 November 1960 and that, after meeting the Polish girl on the train, MORONE and she got into the lower bunk in their train compartment. They arrived in Warsaw on 14 November and returned the 20th. BEGGS had heard from MORONE that the latter had been recontacted by the Polish girl in Moscow in February 1961.

The U.S. military code clerk STORSBERG has reported that MORONE was acquainted with "Michel MICHAUD" (SKVORTSOV), who laid some groundwork for the KGB approach to STORSBERG in the fall of 1961. When interviewed by the FBI [redacted]

*** In February 1965 NOSENKO said that SKVORTSOV undoubtedly met other Americans on his visits to America House, but he did not remember who they were. He added that the KGB would not be interested in SKVORTSOV's contacts with other code clerks because "we told him not to squander his forces, to concentrate on Jim [STORSBERG]. Jim was his target."**

[redacted]

MORONE's fellow code clerks and residents of America House have described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and a ladies' man. Various reports indicate that MORONE was involved in a currency-speculation ring operated by [redacted] the KGB agent mentioned by NOSENKO, and MORONE has confirmed that, on at least one occasion, [redacted] arranged the introduction of MORONE and other code clerks to Soviet females. MORONE had relations with one of them in [redacted]'s apartment in the spring of 1961. MORONE was also said to be a close friend of the Embassy [redacted] identified by NOSENKO as an agent of KOSOLAPOV, but not mentioned by him in connection with the MORONE operation. (MORONE admitted that along with other Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles illegally from [redacted] One report states that [redacted] asked a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to MORONE in the State Department code room, a restricted area to which [redacted] had no access. A number of reports indicate that MORONE was sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO but not mentioned by him in connection with MORONE. (MORONE denies having had relations with IVANOVA but said that he told his friends that he had been intimate with her. He said, however, that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued. MORONE has also admitted sexual relations with a number of women from various Western embassies in Moscow.)

(v) Developmental Operation Against ZUJUS

(a) Introduction

NOSENKO reported that he personally recruited and handled [redacted] the "main agent" in the KGB developmental operation against U.S. Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS, although GRYAZNOV was the officer responsible for the ZUJUS case. [redacted] military officer posted to Moscow for training, was used only in this operation, but NOSENKO continued to meet him even after transferring from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department. While being interrogated in February 1965, NOSENKO said that [redacted] could vouch for his bona fides, and he suggested that CIA approach [redacted] for this purpose.*

ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in September 1961 to assume the military code clerk duties of STORSBERG (see above), and he remained there until January 1963. After initially confusing ZUJUS with James KEYSERS**, NOSENKO first described the KGB operation against him in February 1964. According to NOSENKO, neither [redacted] nor any other source supplied significant information to the KGB, and the KGB therefore did not attempt to recruit ZUJUS. Claiming not to know the names of KGB agents besides [redacted] who participated in the operation, NOSENKO nevertheless in other contexts has mentioned two female agents who reportedly associated with ZUJUS. One is Ella UMANETS, the other an East German woman posing as an Austrian. NOSENKO indicated the latter was in contact with MORONE (see above), whereas it is clear that ZUJUS was the American code clerk who met this woman. The date that she and ZUJUS were together, however, falls during the summer of 1962 when, NOSENKO said, he was no longer engaged in operations against the U.S. Embassy.

(b) Information from NOSENKO

The first reference by NOSENKO to the ZUJUS case was made on 2 February 1964:

NOSENKO: With respect to ZUJUS, I'll tell you exactly what we tried to do with him because I spotted this in some notes. This mistake [confusion of KEYSERS and ZUJUS] made me so mad. I completely forgot about ZUJUS until I saw my little note. In 1961 I recruited a Syrian who was from Damascus. [redacted], and he became acquainted with ZUJUS. The reason why they had something in common was that sometime earlier ZUJUS had been stationed in Lebanon and the Syrian himself was from Damascus, which is a relatively short distance away... Here is his name. He wrote it out himself. It is [redacted], and he wrote out his own address

---

[redacted]

** The KEYSERS case is discussed in the next part of this paper.

here [on one of the notes NOSENKO brought with him to the meeting]. We did not work with him, and we retired the case to Archives, and did not turn him over to anyone. Here is his address. The street is [redacted].. I worked with him myself at the end of 1961 and the beginning of 1962. And when I was leaving Moscow to come here for the Disarmament Conference in 1962 I turned him over for contact to GRYAZNOV. I said goodbye to him and he was scheduled to leave the USSR permanently in April, back to Syria.

Question: What did you do against ZUJUS?

NOSENKO: Nothing at all. He [redacted] was merely studying and devloping him. During the conversation [at American House] they even spoke of how nice it would be to have some Lebanese vodka, and we specially had some shippped in from the [KGB Legal] Residency [in Beirut], and the Syrian brought it to ZUJUS saying it had come from his friends. ZUJUS by character is a very quiet, unexcitable, calm person... Nothing disturbs him.

Question: Why didn't you turn [redacted] over to the First Chief Directorate?

NOSENKO: There was no reason for this because he was a [redacted]. If we were to turn him over to anyone it would have been to the GRU. But we decided to hell with it and put the case into our Archives.

Question: Did [redacted] know ZUJUS when you recruited him?

NOSENKO: No, he didn't hardly know anyone--even by name. So we showed him photographs, and when he said that he had met ZUJUS, then we directed him to develop ZUJUS and not to pay attention to anyone else... If you want to approach him you can use my name, simply Yuriy Ivanovich.

NOSENKO then proposed a false-flag recruitment of [redacted] whereby a CIA representative would approach [redacted] saying that he was from the KGB. A year later NOSENKO told CIA that if CIA talked to [redacted] the latter would be able to vouch for NOSENKO's bona fides.

Speaking of his own agents on 20 April 1964, NOSENKO said: [redacted]...I took with me, even though I had transferred to the Seventh [Tourist] Department [in January 1962]. But it had been decided that no one else knew him from the First [American] Department; it would have taken some time before anyone would get used to him. But he was already working in the development of ZUJUS. So they [the First Department] said that they were asking me to continue meeting with him, and they were counting on my cooperation. They also promised to speak to CHELNOKOV [Chief of the Seventh Department] so that I would not have to stop [redacted] meetings with ZUJUS."

When reviewing lists of employees of the U.S. Embassy between 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO on 19 September 1964 identified ZUJUS as STORSBERG's replacement and said that the case officer working against him was GRYAZNOV. He said that his (NOSENKO's) agent [redacted] was working against ZUJUS, but that he did not know the names of other agents involved, nor of any unusual or interesting information concerning him, although he had read the Second Chief Directorate file on ZUJUS. There was no information on ZUJUS from KGB microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance. The KGB, NOSENKO stated, did not make an operational approach to ZUJUS and did not recruit him.

NOSENKO reported on 2 February 1965 that he himself had supervised GRYAZNOV's handling of the operation and personally handled the main agent, [redacted] NOSENKO read all current reports on ZUJUS as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section, and he discussed the case with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible for the America House) and his superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote the operational plan on ZUJUS, which called for thorough development by [redacted] in order to learn everything possible about him, and eventually to introduce an agent to ZUJUS through [redacted] [redacted] was to invite ZUJUS to a restaurant in March or April 1962, and a "friend" was to be introduced to ZUJUS at that time. This had not been accomplished as of NOSENKO's departure for Geneva in 1962.

Progress was slow because ZUJUS was quiet and reserved and often stayed alone, even in America House, plus the fact that although [redacted] and ZUJUS were acquainted, they did not become good friends. On the days [redacted] was to visit America House, NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants (never in safehouses). This was once every week or two, depending on [redacted] They would meet again the following day; [redacted] would report on which Americans were drinking heavily and which were caressing the girls from foreign embassies in Moscow. Although [redacted] went to America House once or twice a month and drank there with ZUJUS, he reported little of interest. The KGB learned something about ZUJUS's family in the United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall; NOSENKO was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or interesting about ZUJUS's family background. NOSENKO stated that the KGB was not aware of any vices or vulnerabilities that ZUJUS may have had. There was no recruitment and no approach by the KGB--if there had been, even after NOSENKO left the U.S. Embassy Section, his friend GRYAZNOV would have told him about it.

(c) Information from Other Sources

In connection with a security investigation at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, ZUJUS prepared a statement in January 1963 which acknowledged his having had sexual relations with only one woman in Moscow, an employee of the Finnish Embassy. During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities later in 1963, however, ZUJUS said that he had once had sexual relations with a girl who said she was an Austrian. The U.S. Embassy Security Officer reported in the summer of 1962 that ZUJUS had been intimate with an Austrian woman, Lillian (last name unknown), who had gone to America House with someone from the United Arab Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when she was picked up by ZUJUS. Since ZUJUS was a cryptographer, the manager of America House decided to interview the woman. She told him that she was from Vienna and was travelling with her employer, a Czech. The manager then reported to the Security Officer, who learned from the Austrian Embassy that no passport had been issued to this woman. The Security Officer went to America House, and asked Lillian for her passport; she replied that she had forgotten it, and she then left saying she was going to her hotel for the passport. She never returned to America House.*

The U.S. Army report of its debriefing of ZUJUS states [redacted]

ZUJUS was interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1965. Asked whether he had met any nationals of Near Eastern countries while in Moscow, ZUJUS named among others a person from Beirut who had been in Damascus or a person from Damascus who had been in Beirut--he could not remember which. ZUJUS said that he had been acting as doorman at America House when this person entered, and that the two "shot the breeze" for about 15 minutes. ZUJUS could not recall what they had talked about, but their conversation apparently did not interest the visitor, because he left after a short while and went to the bar. ZUJUS may have seen the man on several other occasions, but he could supply no additional information. ZUJUS did not recall that this person gave him Lebanese vodka, but did say he favored this beverage. ZUJUS said that he did not know this man's name or why he was in Moscow, and he could provide no physical description.

ZUJUS said that, as manager of the America club, he had frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS (a long-time agent named by NOSENKO). ZUJUS often used her as an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was able to provide a considerable amount of background information concerning her. He repeated his earlier statements that he had never been approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence.

FBI investigations indicate [redacted]

---

* See also NOSENKO's account of the KGB using one of two East German women, who represented themselves as Austrians, at America House in an operation against MORONE.

(vi) Approach to KEYSERS

(a) Introduction

U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS began his tour in Moscow on 20 December 1960 as an assistant to the Embassy Medical Officer, Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force captain; as an additional duty he was assigned administrative functions in the office of the Air Attache. For a short period in early 1961 KEYSERS was trained to perform back-up cryptographic duties under James STORSBERG in the military code room, but he was relieved of this in April 1961 because of low aptitude, laziness, and lack of interest. Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies, coupled with his attitude and behavior, KEYSERS was removed from Moscow by his American superiors in June 1961. The decision to transfer him was made on 13 June, and KEYSERS was informed of it the following day; approximately two hours before leaving America House for the airport on 16 June, KEYSERS received a letter from the KGB suggesting that he defect. This was followed by an approach to him at the Moscow airport.

NOSENKO has claimed that he was the KGB officer who spoke to KEYSERS on this occasion and has said that this incident was his only face-to-face contact with an American target during his 1960-1961 period of service in the U.S. Embassy Section (excepting the alleged brief encounter with STORSBERG--See above). NOSENKO has confused the KEYSERS and ZUJUS cases, but corrected this error prior to defecting. In most particulars NOSENKO s account of the case matches the details from KEYSERS and other sources. However, whereas NOSENKO stated (without indicating how the KGB obtained its information) that the KGB knew KEYSERS had not told American authorities of having received the letter, KEYSERS did so before leaving Moscow; this conversation took place in an Embassy room where a KGB microphone was then located.

(b) Information from NOSENKO

NOSENKO first spoke of the case, without naming KEYSERS, on 12 June 1962: "Now I remember. He came to Moscow, to the Embassy. He was to replace the military cipher clerk [STORSBERG].[a] We sensed at once [that he was a homosexual]. Well, everything was thrown at him. I stayed with this case constantly. I didn't spend time on anything else. We chased him all over Moscow but were late. We were in an operational car. It happened like this. When there was traffic, you couldn't get through. Whether we went up the left side or on the sidewalk where people were walking, in the opposite direction, no matter. Therefore we were late, late [i.e., could not catch him at anything]. But such things happen. But we were not mistaken about this fellow. He proved to be a homosexual. He sold himself, so to say. The American ice ballet (Ice Capades tour) arrived. There were many such fellows (homosexuals) with it, and he was extremely drunk, and was embracing and kissing a man. The Americans also saw this. And decided not to... I thought, what to do? Let's write him a letter, in real English, on an English typewriter. We'll send this letter to his room. We knew that he was supposed to leave today, today. And we wrote it: 'Listen, they know about you. You have been caught. It will go very badly for you back there. Come on. Stay here. We are waiting for your answer.' Well, as is customary, you had someone accompany him. The Assistant Military Attache escorted him. I don't remember who right now. Perhaps it was NIXON, NIELSON, a lieutenant colonel. What was his name?* He accompanied him to Finland and then returned by plane. Well, there was no answer from him to this letter. And it was already the last moment, and suddenly--'Listen, they are taking you away, wait, they know who you are, what you are, it's all over. If that's the way it is, stay here.' No answer. What to do? Here's what happened: We got into a car. They (KGB surveillance) had reported that he and the Assistant Military Attache had pulled out from Kropotkinskaya Naberezhnaya (America House) for the airport to take the plane. So we put on all speed to get there first. We got there first, in order to have got to him. No. It was WILSON." The interview then continued: NOSENKO was asked who had accompanied KEYSERS to the airport. He replied:

---

[a] Although KEYSERS trained in Moscow to assume back-up cryptographic duties, he was not STORSBERG's replacement; Mathew ZUJUS, who arrived in September 1961, was. KEYSERS was assigned to Moscow as a replacement for Staff Sergeant J.C. BRADLEY, who had earlier been returned from Moscow for reasons of homosexuality.

"Yes, Lt. Col. WILSON, I believe. He didn't leave him for a moment at the airport. I am turning around here, walking there. There is coffee there and cognac. He didn't leave him. I must separate them. O.K. So I said 'What about their documents? Make some pretext to separate them.' They were separated for two minutes. I approached him and said: 'Hello, hello, what about the letter? You think about it?' He said something to the Assistant Military Attache, that 'they tried to approach me.' So he was in Moscow in all only three or four months. He gave himself away you see. If this ice ballet had not come we would have worked on him. At the start we did not know who he was or what he was, i.e., we knew that he came to replace the military code clerk, on whom we had spent much time." NOSENKO then moved on to a description of the STORSBERG operation without naming KEYSERS.

After describing the recruitment approach to STORSBERG, NOSENKO reported on 24 January 1964: "Then his replacement came. It was ZUJUS.** We began to study him carefully and it appears that both ourselves and the Americans, primarily in the person of the Security Officer, discovered that he was a homosexual. It appears that there was some visiting ballet troupe in which some of the male members were homosexuals. He met them in the America House and his behavior towards them was reported to the American Security Officer and at the same time our agent had reported him to us. We wanted to mount an operation against him but the Americans had already decided to give him up. All we could do was to have a letter delivered to him; the letter warned him that he was being sent out because he was a homosexual and that he would get into consequent trouble, and an offer was made to him to stay in the USSR. He did not answer the letter and it was just prior to his actual departure. He was escorted to the airport by two officers of the Military Attache's office. At the airport--I even went there with a group of assistants to see if we could get a few words to him to change his mind. He left his group for a moment to get a drink of water. When I made this offer to him that he would not regret it if he stayed, that he would receive great benefits, he panicked and ran back to his group and shortly thereafter he flew off. If he were not spotted by you possibly we would have been able to get at him."

---

* This officer's name is MASON.

** See NOSENKO's statements on 28 January and 2 February 1964 (below). ZUJUS did in fact replace STORSBERG, who completed his Moscow tour in November 1961, five months after KEYSERS was removed from Moscow.

While reviewing a list of personnel assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow in 1963, NOSENKO said on 28 January 1964: "Matthew ZUJUS--how come? That man can't be in Moscow. That's the homosexual code clerk I told you about, [the] homosexual who was urgently sent back to the States with military guards. How come he is back in 1963? In August 1963? He couldn't be there. It is impossible" He was asked whether he was sure of his facts, and NOSENKO answered: "Yes, this must be the same man, but this must be an error in your document. He just cannot be in Moscow."

NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse on 2 February 1964 and said that he wanted to come right over as he had something important to say. The meeting with CIA opened as follows: "I was thinking last night and I realized that I have made a mistake and it bothered me, so I wanted to be sure to call it to your attention today. Remember when I told you we were working on Jim STORSBERG, the code clerk, and after that a replacement came for him? And I said that we wanted to get a hold of him because he was a homosexual? It was not ZUJUS, but it was KEYSERS. In other words, everything I said about ZUJUS applies to KEYSERS."

"I don't remember having any face-to-face encounters [with Americans] except when KEYSERS was leaving," NOSENKO stated on 17 April 1964. "When he was being taken to the airport we decided, 'Why not try, in case he's alone; why not approach him and ask him if he wants to stay?' And sure enough he stood there with these two officers and then he walked into the restaurant alone... So I immediately approached him right there in the restaurant. "I don't remember what his name was--I think it was Jim.) So I said" 'Jim, did you think about staying perhaps? Because you know what will happen to you when you return. Say, please.' He looked at me and turned around and without saying a word he went into the waiting room and started talking rapidly with the officers."

When questioned on the KEYSERS approach in February 1965, NOSENKO added no new details except that, at the time of the approach, he understood KEYSERS had not reported the KGB letter to his superiors at the American Embassy; he said that there was no information to this effect from the microphones or telephone taps in the U.S. Embassy.

(c) Information from Other Sources

In Moscow prior to his removal and in subsequent debriefings, KEYSERS admitted homosexual tendencies and his involvement in three homosexual incidents during his tour in Moscow, all at America House; one of these was an approach to a Marine security guard in March 1961, which was rebuffed, and the two others were homosexual acts with members of the Ice Capades troupe visiting Moscow in May 1961. He denied that he ever made any public display of his homosexuality but said he could not be sure that someone had not entered his room at America House while he and a homosexual partner may have been asleep following [illegible] homosexual relations.

During a detailed debriefing in West Germany on 26 June 1961 KEYSERS related the incidents leading up to the approach made at Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow as he was leaving the Soviet Union. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Microphones were subsequently found in Colonel [illegible]'s office and in the office of the Minister Counsellor. NOSENKO has reported that both were being monitored on a simultaneous basis in 1961.

** This is not an accurate description of NOSENKO who was 34 years old at the time, is several inches taller, and is not rotund.

A memorandum sent by [illegible], the Embassy Security Officer, to Colonel URBAN, the Army Attache, on [illegible], indicates that KEYSERS' behavior had been a subject of concern for some months prior to his removal from Moscow:

[redacted]

In a report to U.S. Army authorities on the date of KEYSERS' removal, Colonel URBAN stated as follows:

[redacted]

---

[*] See Part V.E.3.g., referring to Colonel [illegible]'s statement on security losses as a result of KGB microphones in this office.

[redacted]

[redacted]

NOTE: Part VI.D.2., a tabulation of NOSENKO's leads involving American cases, includes several operations against U.S. code clerks for which he was the supervisor; their names are Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY, Joseph GAFFEY, John TAYLOR, and Maurice ZWANG.

TOP SECRET

d. NOSENKO's Responsibility for Coverage of ABIDIAN

(i) Introduction

John V. ABIDIAN served as the U.S. Embassy Security Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately the same period as NOSENKO's claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate. During his Moscow tour, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a number of operational tasks, including clandestine letter mailings to several CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing a dead drop to be used only for receiving two special types of communications* from the source in the GRU, Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY.

During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN on several occasions, identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as a CIA officer. In 1962 he described ABIDIAN's letter-mailing activities, and he said he was himself concerned (zanimat'sya) with ABIDIAN. After recontacting CIA in Geneva in January 1964 NOSENKO divulged that he had been the KGB case officer responsible for coverage of ABIDIAN in Moscow; for the first time he described then a visit made by ABIDIAN to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site.

The discussion below is divided into three parts: NOSENKO's case officer responsibilities and the information he learned about ABIDIAN, NOSENKO's knowledge of clandestine letter mailings by ABIDIAN, and NOSENKO's statements on ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street dead drop.

(ii) Duties as Case Officer

On 17 April 1964 when asked to describe his transfer from the Tourist Department to the American Department in January 1960, NOSENKO said that when he reported for duty and was interviewed by V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was told that as one of his duties he would be the case officer in charge of ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was expected in the near future. NOSENKO was the only KGB officer responsible for coverage of and activities against ABIDIAN and, NOSENKO said, ABIDIAN was the only American target for whom he, personally, was officially accountable while in the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO was questioned in detail concerning ABIDIAN for six days in January and February 1965. He produced the information in the following paragraphs at that time.

When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section, ABIDIAN had not yet arrived in Moscow. The section, however, already had received some information on him, and this was given to NOSENKO by KOVSHUK. Among this material was ABIDIAN's visa application, the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate. According to this report, based on correspondence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN had served as a Department of State Security Officer concerned with the personal safety of Premier KHRUSHCHEV when he visited the United States in 1959; from the way ABIDIAN had acted at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer, probably with CIA.* NOSENKO remarked that the report, combined with the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security Officer, made ABIDIAN one of the most important counterintelligence targets of the U.S. Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Chief Directorate.

---

* One type was early-warning information, the other notification of his forthcoming absence from Moscow. Otherwise, as of this time, PENKOVSKIY submitted information in Moscow via contacts with the British Embassy and the British businessman Greville WYNNE. The PENKOVSKIY case is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.b.

NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later assigned him the cryptonym "ARSEN," since this cryptonym had been used by personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, KGB Second Chief Directorate, who were working against him.

NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, but this unit had no information in addition to that already included in the original information report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States be asked for further details, but they were never received. For these reasons, NOSENKO said that he did not know and never obtained details about ABIDIAN's education and study abroad, date of entry into the Department of State, promotions, personal rank, previous foreign assignments, military service, or status as Foreign Service Reserve, Staff or Officer (FSR, FSS, FSO).**

---

* CIA records indicate that ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 and then secured employment with the Department of State as a clerk/typist. He remained in Paris until 1954. After special training at the CIC school at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service School, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Department's Office of Security. A large part of his work in this period was arranging the security of and accompanying foreign dignitaries visiting the United States. These included the visits of Soviet Foreign Minister SHEPILOV in November 1956, MIKOYAN in the spring of 1959, and KHRUSHCHEV at the end of 1959. These duties undoubtedly brought ABIDIAN into contact with a large number of KGB officers stationed in New York and Washington. One of the members of the KHRUSHCHEV entourage was KOSOLAPOV who, according to NOSENKO, joined the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959 and, as of January 1960, became NOSENKO's subordinate in operations against American code clerks.

**NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the Department of State Biographic Register for information on ABIDIAN's background, he replied that this publication is not available in the U.S. Embassy Section. He subsequently recalled that the Chief of the Section, KOVSHUK, did have a copy dated about 1956, which was of no use in gathering information on ABIDIAN.

Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of his arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveillance by at least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour a team was available to cover him if he left the U.S. Embassy. The only time this intensity of coverage might have been reduced, NOSENKO said, was during a period of about one and one-half months in 1961, when surveillance of the Embassy was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage of British targets.* As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by pertinent information in the surveillance reports.

Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the decision was reached not to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal vulnerability, NOSENKO stated. It was considered better to concentrate on surveillance coverage in the hope that, as LANGELLE's successor, he might lead to another POPOV.** Therefore, no operational plan was written on ABIDIAN until about October 1960. This plan, which NOSENKO wrote, called for no direct action but did specify that:

- ABIDIAN's maid, Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an operational contact of the U.S. Embassy Section, was to continue to apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and NEPTUNE-80 to his shoes.*** (She put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing approximately every 14 to 21 days throughout the time she was employed by ABIDIAN.) The only item of operational interest from her during this period was evidence that ABIDIAN was having intimate relations with a female employee at the embassy. FEDOROVICH was unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's apartment.

- [redacted] KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever he learned concerning him. [redacted] never obtained significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life. ABIDIAN, NOSENKO said, was developing [redacted] as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy, but NOSENKO did not recall any specific report of his to ABIDIAN that would have been of interest to the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO told CIA in 1962 that ABIDIAN had recruited [redacted] for an unspecified intelligence mission in France shortly before [redacted] left the Soviet Union in December 1960 and that the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section thereupon turned the case over to the KGB First Chief Directorate.*

---

* In another context NOSENKO said that KGB surveillance of British targets in 1961 led to the discovery of PENKOVSKIY.

** The POPOV case is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.

*** Metka and NEPTUNE-80 are surveillance techniques described by NOSENKO. The former, a "thief powder" applied to clothing, leaves a trace on anything with which it comes into contact; its use in detecting clandestine letter mailings is described in greater detail below. NEPTUNE-80, a substance applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on the ground wherever he walks and permits the KGB to carry out surveillance long after the target has travelled a particular route. Dogs are used to follow the target's trail.

- Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if necessary.

- All other agents and operational contacts of the section were to be instructed to report every detail about ABIDIAN (see below).

- Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters.

- Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be continued.

Apart from those specified by the operational plan, the only two KGB agents or operational contacts who met ABIDIAN were Lyudmila GROMOKOVA and "KAMO" (KGB cryptonym, name not remembered by NOSENKO). GROMOKOVA, a language instructor for U.S. Embassy personnel, was a KGB agent handled by the U.S. Embassy Section officer N.A. GAVRILENKO. ABIDIAN took "only several" Russian language lessons from GROMOKOVA and NOSENKO did not know whether these were private or class lessons. He did not learn anything of operational significance from GROMOKOVA's contacts with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular reporting from her.** "KAMO" was an agent of the Moscow City KGB organization who accidentally met ABIDIAN at the

---

* [redacted] claimed he concocted this story for the KGB in order to extricate himself when the KGB attempted to recruit him shortly before his departure from Moscow.

** NOSENKO first identified GROMOKOVA as a KGB agent when viewing Embassy employee lists on 28 August 1964. The list on which her name appeared indicated she was a Russian language teacher, and NOSENKO said she was handled by N.A. GAVRILENKO during 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO was later shown GROMOKOVA's photograph and failed to recognize it; when told her name, however, he again said she was GAVRILENKO's agent and that she was valuable because she had a good education and was able to provide personality sketches on her students. He did not associate her with ABIDIAN until he was told by his interrogators in February 1965 that ABIDIAN had been one of her students. NOSENKO then made the above statement concerning these lessons. ABIDIAN reported that he took regular language lessons from GROMOKOVA, normally three one-half hour lessons a week, beginning shortly after his arrival in Moscow and continuing until his departure. The first few lessons were with a group of other Embassy personnel, and then ABIDIAN switched to private lessons for the remainder of his tour in the Soviet Union. In reporting his contacts with GROMOKOVA, ABIDIAN said he refused to be drawn into talking about his Embassy responsibilities during Russian language conversation but kept the topic limited to his past personal life, travel, education, his fiancee, and his trips on which he saw his fiancee. ABIDIAN also reported that on 23 June 1960 GROMOKOVA attempted to persuade him to pass a letter to departing personnel officer Mary GORINHA for forwarding to Jean LIEBERMAN, a former student. When ABIDIAN refused, saying that this is against Soviet law, GROMOKOVA tore up the letter.

Baku Restaurant. When informed that ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that "KAMO" try to develop a relationship with ABIDIAN. After arguing that this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finally agreed, and "KAMO" phoned ABIDIAN twice on KGB instructions. ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet him, and no further action was taken.*

NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but said that he could check the room number if necessary since he had a copy of the Embassy telephone list published monthly with the office room number of each American employee. ABIDIAN's office was in the "Zone of Security" (i.e., secure office areas). A report from some agent, whose name NOSENKO did not recall, indicated that there was a sign on ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security Office." NOSENKO did not know and said he was unable to determine whether ABIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation or conversation was heard from ABIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone was there, and NOSENKO said that he did not remember any specific interesting or important information about ABIDIAN from other microphones in the Embassy.**

NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished. He said that he did not consider data of this nature to be operationally significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was under active development.

Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries he went or the time of year when the trips were made.*** Such information, he stated, would have been of interest to him as ABIDIAN's case officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier trips abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed to be for operational purposes. There was, however, no possibility for the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone;**** even if the U.S. Embassy Section did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First Chief Directorate would not accept a request for operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow.

---

* See below for ABIDIAN's account of a similar incident involving a Soviet he met while on a trip to Armenia.

** In 1960-61 the Security Officer occupied a room where an inoperative microphone was discovered in 1964.

*** ABIDIAN made at least three trips abroad during his two years in Moscow. In August 1960 he took personal leave to visit his fiancee, a French girl, in the south of France and met with a CIA officer while there. In February 1961 he flew on the Ambassador's plane to Paris for meetings with CIA and then took personal leave to visit his fiancee. In September 1961, at CIA request, ABIDIAN again flew to France and to New York City and Washington for briefings connected with the handling of PENKOVSKIY in Moscow.

**** When CIA interrogators suggested that the KGB could have photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow, NOSENKO replied that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union. While this procedure would not be impossible, NOSENKO added, it was not considered so important as to justify the special effort involved.

In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked a number of times whether he knew of any occasions on which ABIDIAN took trips in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow. He replied each time that he knew of no such trips and that if ABIDIAN had made such a trip or trips he would have known of them and would remember them as it would have been his responsibility as case officer to take certain actions. Among the latter he listed:

- Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel from the UPDK (the Soviet Government organization which provides services to the diplomatic community in Moscow).

- Notifying the UPDK of KGB approval for the trip.

- Notifying appropriate local KGB offices on ABIDIAN's itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and other operational activity if desired.

- Receiving, reading, and filing all surveillance reports and reports of other operational activity carried out by local KGB units.

NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. He stated further that even if he were absent when such a request for travel was made, he would have seen all documents upon his return and that he did not remember seeing such documents in ABIDIAN's file.

NOSENKO's interrogators then told NOSENKO that ABIDIAN travelled out of Moscow from 5 to 9 October 1960.* Thereupon NOSENKO stated that he specifically recalled having been on leave in October 1960. He said that he could not recall exactly the dates of this leave (which he had not mentioned before), but he did remember that he was away exactly 30 days since he stayed at a dacha near Moscow and therefore was not allowed any travel time. NOSENKO said further that he also remembered that he had left the Soviet Union for Cuba two or three, but not more than five, days after his return from leave; he could not recall the date of his departure for Cuba.[*]

---

* ABIDIAN made a trip with Paul A. SMITH, the Embassy's Publications Procurement Officer, to Armenia between 5 and 9 October 1960. (ABIDIAN is of Armenian origin, and speaks the Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency.) While there ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen and their parishioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece in 1946. They attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and ABIDIAN also visited some relatives of his in or near the city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow, an Armenian whom ABIDIAN had met on this trip tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but ABIDIAN refused to see him. When NOSENKO was told that on 7 October 1960 ABIDIAN attended a service celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk, and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said that this was his sole recollection concerning ABIDIAN's trip, and that he remembered no other details.

Except for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was thought to have been intimate, NOSENKO could not name ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow or his close friends and professional contacts with foreigners there.

NOSENKO received and read transcripts of all telephone calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and apartment via the Moscow city telephone system. He did not remember the names or nationalities of people whom ABIDIAN called or who called ABIDIAN because there was nothing of interest in these conversations. NOSENKO did not learn anything from telephone transcripts about ABIDIAN's relationship with any foreigner in Moscow.

---

[*] NOSENKO departed Moscow for Cuba on 15 November 1960 and therefore, by his own statement, would have been back from leave by 10 November at the earliest (five days before departure). It was pointed out to NOSENKO that, in this case, his 30 days of leave could have begun no earlier than 10 October and that he must therefore have been on duty on 5 October 1960 when ABIDIAN left Moscow. In October 1966, however, when the subject of his leaves again came up in interrogation, he volunteered that he had lied in February 1965 when he said he had taken this leave. He said he had no reason for this lie other than he had claimed to be on leave "in conditions of interrogation when lies and truths were all a porridge." He told CIA again for the first time that his 1960 leave was taken in January of that year, immediately after joining the U.S. Embassy Section. Additional details on this January leave period are given below, in discussion of NOSENKO's claimed responsibility for operations against U.S. military attaches in 1960.

(iii) ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings

During the 1962 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO reported KGB knowledge of one type of operational task performed by ABIDIAN in Moscow in addition to his recruitment of [redacted] (see above). This task, NOSENKO said, involved mailing at least three clandestine letters, in each case to KGB double agents.

According to NOSENKO on 11 June 1962, the KGB detected all the letters mailed by ABIDIAN; he said that this was achieved through the use of *metka*: "Stop mailing letters from the Embassy, by Embassy employees. After LANGELLE you didn't mail letters for a year and a half, and then you began again. ABIDIAN mailed several.* ABIDIAN, John ABIDIAN the Embassy Security Officer. Listen, *we* have this cold /i.e. complete coverage of clandestine mailings/. We have a machine, and the machine finds the letters which are mailed. Without surveillance. The machine itself. This is a big, big secret. Here's how it works. They enter your room - you live in Moscow, work and even live in the Embassy. They /Soviet maids/ clean up the room and simply pour a powder or apply it with a rag /to your clothes/. A rag, even like a handkerchief. There is no smell. They put it in the pockets where you might put a letter. And there is a special little machine at a station in Moscow... All letters which are mailed in Moscow pass through this machine, under a *fotoapparat* /literally a camera; NOSENKO probably means some sort of light-sensitive device/. We now have 12 /machines/ and hope to have 100 in Moscow. And all the letters pass through the apparatus and the machine itself selects the letter which was mailed by you or him. Do you understand? The machine itself finds it... This is how it was with the letters that ABIDIAN mailed. We had them all because this machine gave them /to us/. I even would phone surveillance and say: 'He's out walking around. ABIDIAN is out walking around, checking, checking.' I would say: 'Drop him. But give me all the letters today.' The machine determines whether there is a special letter there."

Three days later, at NOSENKO's fifth and final meeting with CIA in 1962, he was asked whether he knew to whom these letters were addressed. NOSENKO replied: "To whom did ABIDIAN mail letters? First he mailed a letter to a guy in Odessa. Then ABIDIAN mailed one to still someone else. He mailed two or three letters. One letter was to the Baltic area. The same kind, that is we had planted this man on you. I think it was to Riga, to our double agent. And still, I think, two or three other letters, also to double agents.** But we didn't uncover any agents on the basis of letters he mailed. There weren't any. I was concerned with ABIDIAN; therefore I know. I can't tell you anything about the agent in the Baltic area because he was handled by the Second Section of the American Department, the 'Active Line' - penetration."*

---

* NOSENKO's information is substantially correct. LANGELLE was declared *persona non grata* in connection with the arrest of CIA agent POPOV in October 1959. Two letters were mailed, one on 9 December 1959 and the other on 22 February 1960 (one of which was to an agent now known to have been under KGB control at the time); no more letters were mailed until 1 April 1961, when John ABIDIAN mailed one, again to a KGB-controlled agent. LANGELLE's arrest, however, was not the cause of this break in letter-mailings; the suspension resulted from other considerations.

**In 1961 ABIDIAN mailed three operational letters for CIA, one to an agent in [redacted] on 1 April, the second to an agent in [redacted] on 2 July, and the third to a [redacted] agent on 1 September.

NOSENKO has described in greater detail how ABIDIAN was detected mailing the letter to Odessa. While discussing personnel assigned to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate, he said on 24 June 1964: "I first saw Aleksey Konstantinovich SUMIN in the Second Section in 1960, although I heard that he was there in 1959... He is considered a specialist on working against letters containing secret writing... SUMIN sees all the letters mailed by Americans, even the American tourists. The letters are caught either by surveillance or by use of metka. There are several types of metka with different colors, and one type will be used on American Embassy personnel, another type on British Embassy personnel, and another type for tourists.** The same type is not always used against the same group. They are switched around. An example is in 1961 when ABIDIAN mailed a letter to an agent in Odessa. This was a 'game' /igra - double agent operation/. The agent was 'ARKHANGELSKIY' /KGB cryptonym/ I think. ABIDIAN used to park his car and walk around, visiting many shops on Gorkiy Street. He went to one commission shop where there was a large mirror in the shop window, and he would check for surveillance. He was even followed to a post office and one of the surveillance men got in there ahead of him, but he didn't do anything. Then he walked by a post box on the street and was checking it. Two or three times he was followed by this post box but the surveillance never saw him mail a letter. Still the KGB would remove the contents of the letter box and send it in. On the second or third time SUMIN found the letter he mailed with metka. He had also mailed a cover letter to his parents. Of course, SUMIN also knew the address of the agent since it was a 'game'."

---

* NOSENKO has explained that the so-called "Active Line" Section of the American Department was concerned with the penetration of U.S. Intelligence, primarily by serving up KGB-controlled agents for recruitment.

** CIA has conducted a series of tests designed to determine whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB control device. For the purpose of these tests, articles of clothing worn by members of the U.S. Embassy and those of other selected Western embassies were sent back to CIA Headquarters. The clothing in each case had been sent to Soviet dry-cleaning establishments or had been permitted to hang unattended in unrestricted areas of the Embassy or in the apartments of Embassy employees. Special filter paper was applied to these articles of clothing. The same paper was applied in Moscow to desk tops, safe drawers, and the like. The paper was then subjected to ultra-violet, chemical, and microscopic analysis as well as to examination for traces of radioactivity. Results have been consistently negative with a single exception. One test, on one item of clothing, produced a sharply positive reaction. This article of clothing belonged to a third national diplomat who was a CIA operational support agent in Moscow; he was also the only person known to CIA to have been a victim of radioactive isotope tagging in connection with an operational task (not letter-mailing) which he had performed for CIA. There were no positive reactions for this agent's clothing in subsequent tests.

Under interrogation in January 1965 NOSENKO described how metka had been applied to ABIDIAN's clothing by his maid and how, in particular this led to the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed to the agent ARKHANGELSKIY in Odessa and to his parents in the United States. The following is taken from the protocol of these interrogations which NOSENKO signed as being accurate on 4 March 1965:

> "ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH. She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV. She started to work for ABIDIAN a few months after his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than six months after his arrival. I met her shortly after she began to work for ABIDIAN in order to get acquainted with her, in order to evaluate her and give her general instructions about her work for ABIDIAN. I do not know the exact date of this meeting but it was before the fall of 1960. I wrote the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN. This operational plan stated that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly on ABIDIAN's clothing.
>
> "FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing during the entire period that she worked for him. She did this every two or three weeks except for a few times when she was sick or on leave. No one else had access to ABIDIAN's apartment and therefore no other person had the possibility of putting metka on his clothing.
>
> "I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational letter to the KGB double agent 'ARKHANGELSKIY'. He mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier. Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to 'ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these letters had metka on them, as I was told by SUMIN. I cannot remember the date that ABIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was sometime in 1961."*

---

* In a CIA interview on 8 December 1964, ABIDIAN identified a photograph of Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid who worked for Marion ALBAMONTE and Myra KEMMER, Embassy secretaries, until KEMMER departed Moscow in approximately July 1961. Thereafter FEDOROVICH worked part-time for ALBAMONTE and part-time for ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN explained that he had no maid at all for the "first year or so" of his Moscow tour and that FEDOROVICH was the only maid he employed there. When ABIDIAN left Moscow, she began to work for the Embassy

(continuation of footnote from preceding page)

code clerk John GARLAND (Part V.E.3.c.i.). CIA records show that ABIDIAN mailed the first of his clandestine letters on 1 April 1961 and his second, the one to "ARKHANGELSKIY", on 2 July 1961. If ABIDIAN's recollection is correct (a review of Embassy phone lists shows that KEMMER was in Moscow in June 1961, but was not there in August of that year), it appears that FEDOROVICH could not have been responsible for the metka which, NOSENKO said, led to discovery of the first of these letters; also, it is possible that she was not employed by ABIDIAN at the time the letter to "ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed. ABIDIAN's third clandestine letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, apparently after FEDOROVICH came to work for him. When NOSENKO was told in January 1965 that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the time of the "ARKHANGELSKIY" letter-mailing, he repeated that no one but FEDOROVICH had the possibility of doing so and that he was sure she had. When his interrogators suggested that FEDOROVICH may have occasionally cleaned ABIDIAN's apartment on an informal basis before being formerly hired as his maid, NOSENKO said that this was possibly the case. (CIA does not know whether this was so or not, but ABIDIAN gave his interviewer the impression in December 1964 that he did his own housekeeping until hiring FEDOROVICH.)

v) ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Dead Drop

In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA for the first time that KGB surveillance had observed a visit by ABIDIAN to a probable dead drop on Pushkin Street in Moscow at the end of 1960. This dead drop figured prominently in the PENKOVSKIY case.

NOSENKO's first remarks on this subject were made on 20 April 1964: "I left /the U.S. Embassy Section/ in 1962. There was an interesting move. This address where JACOBS* was caught in the PENKOVSKIY case - the same address was visited by ABIDIAN in 1960, or at the beginning of 1961. And at that time I went there together with /V. A./ KOZLOV, the Chief of the Surveillance Directorate. /M. G./ MATVEYEV /Deputy Chief of the American Department/ also went there with us. We went to that address several times, at Pushkin Street. It was very interesting, this radiator and everything, but the only thing we did there was to place an observation post there, and that post was there for about three months after ABIDIAN's visit... That was in 1960, 1961... They watched for three months. The surveillance teams had to be occupied there for 24 hours every day. I was there then /in the U.S. Embassy Section for the entire time that surveillance was watching the Pushkin Street site/... At the beginning I came there two or three times. I came there with MATVEYEV once, twice with KOVSHUK; we came there with Venyamin KOZLOV... But no one appeared here and so they were not writing anything /meaning that the Surveillance Directorate was not submitting written reports/. No one appeared. That's why, only orally, KOZLOV was saying 'nothing.' A week passed - 'nothing.' the next week passed - 'nothing'... I shall tell you why /I didn't mention this to you in June 1962/. Because I had occasions where there were many such places, and they were watched for nothing. And it would just pass away and in a month it would be forgotten... So we waited a month, two, three. Nothing. So they let it go at that and had forgotten. Of course, the surveillance team had it all recorded, but we had forgotten about that in the First /American/ Department... In 1962, I was in the Seventh /Tourist/ Department. I transferred in January 1962."

On the basis of information supplied by NOSENKO during April 1964, he was questioned during January and February 1965 on ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. The following, which is consistent with and somewhat more detailed than earlier statements not recorded here, is taken from these 1965 interrogations:

> - In 1961, while NOSENKO was the responsible case officer, the KGB followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally used. The surveillance team assigned specifically to ABIDIAN thereupon followed the car to a bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but

---

* Richard JACOB, a CIA officer, was apprehended while servicing the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962.

shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone. He walked around the corner and entered a residential building next to a meat market on Pushkin Street. ABIDIAN emerged after a few seconds. The surveillance team saw him go in but did not follow him. This unusual incident was reported by the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, and the building was inspected that same day by the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV, together with the Deputy Chief of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, MATVEYEV. Taking into account the character of the building and its inhabitants, the duration and circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the suitability of the hallway - particularly the radiator in it - for use as a dead drop site, it was decided by the leadership of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover this location. Because of the short time available, it was not possible to place this post inside the building, so it was set up across the street. In addition, the radiator was checked daily to see if anything, such as a magnetic container, had been concealed behind it. This stationary post was maintained around the clock for 30 days, after which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another two months. If a package or magnetic container had been found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning, it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger a signal should someone remove the package. At the same time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of sight from the hallway below. During the three months that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the building. The post was then discontinued, but the address was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Directorate. The true significance of this location became known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.

- NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the suspected dead drop site on the day it occurred. He was sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone call from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, the decision to place the stationary surveillance post on this location was made at a higher level; neither of them was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO himself visited the building on Pushkin Street the following day or the day after, but he remained only a few minutes and did not recall any details of the hallway, except that there was a radiator there.

- As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled receiving the surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street building and placing this report in ABIDIAN's file. (This is the case file which NOSENKO turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about 28-28 December 1961, just before he transferred to the Tourist Department.)

- NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month of surveillance, periodically after that. These discussions took place either by telephone, or when KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred during the period of the stationary surveillance.

- NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section during all the period that the stationary surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections.

- NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on the Pushkin Street dead drop site to his CIA contacts in Geneva in June 1962 because the post had already been discontinued by this time without anything unusual or suspicious having been noted. Therefore he thought that this incident would not be particularly interesting to the CIA.

CIA records show that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street dead drop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a year later than NOSENKO says, in response to an apparent signal from PENKOVSKIY. The sequence of events was as follows: On 27 December 1961, following receipt of what seemed to be the prearranged signal from PENKOVSKIY that the drop had been loaded, Air Force Captain Alexis DAVISON drove from his apartment to the U.S. Embassy to alert ABIDIAN. At about 2100 hours the same night, ABIDIAN left in his own car for Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence where a dance was in progress, to tell the CIA Chief of Station, Paul GARBLER, about the signal. ABIDIAN and GARBLER left Spasso House with the other guests at about 0200 on 28 December in ABIDIAN's car and drove past the telephone pole where, as part of his "drop loaded" signal, PENKOVSKIY was to leave a mark. Later in the morning of 28 December, ABIDIAN, again in his own car drove from the Embassy to DAVIDSON's apartment, where he first checked the telephone pole visually from the window and then walked by it for a closer examination. Although it was not certain that the telephone calls received on 27 December had, in fact, been a signal from PENKOVSKIY and although no supplementary mark was found on the telephone pole, a decision was reached to check the drop. Therefore, at 1115 on 30 December 1961, ABIDIAN with Julian F. MacDONALD, an Embassy Economics Officer, left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet driver and proceeded to a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin Street. At 1130 ABIDIAN entered the building where the drop site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and left one minute later. The pair then returned to the Embassy.

These facts were outlined to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations. It was pointed out that, by his own most recent account, NOSENKO had transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department about 28 December 1961 and that his participation in a Tourist Department approach to American citizen W. E. JOHNSON on 5 January 1962 had been confirmed by JOHNSON himself. Therefore, NOSENKO was told, much of what he had told CIA about his own role in the Pushkin Street affair became untenable. NOSENKO's response to this observation is described in Part V.F.3., which discusses NOSENKO's approach to JOHNSON.

Also during the February 1965 interrogations NOSENKO refused to sign the page of a protocol which read as follows:

> "I have been told by my interrogators that ABIDIAN's only visit to the Pushkin Street site took place on 30 December 1961. Therefore, I was told that:
>
> a. I could not have placed the surveillance report in ABIDIAN's case file because I had already turned over the file to GRYAZNOV.
>
> b. I could not have received reports about the stationary surveillance while still ABIDIAN's case officer, since I was already in the Seventh Department in January 1962.
>
> c. The three month period in which the surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site did not expire until 30 March 1962 - more than two weeks after I left for Geneva.
>
> Thus I could not have known in June 1962 that the surveillance of the dead drop site had failed to produce results or that it had been discontinued."

Although he acknowledged having reported to CIA on his involvement with ABIDIAN as summarized in the protocol, NOSENKO said the way in which the protocol was prepared made him "look silly." On no other occasion has NOSENKO refused to sign protocols dealing with other subjects.

NOSENKO was questioned further during October 1966 concerning ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO reaffirmed that ABIDIAN was under special surveillance coverage throughout his Moscow tour and that this surveillance detected his travel from the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street and back; he would date this only as "sometime in 1961." NOSENKO was asked whether KGB surveillance had detected any unusual movements by ABIDIAN during the period just preceeding his visit to the PENKOVSKIY drop site (a reference to his movements on 27 and 28 December 1961 as described above). He replied that he knew definitely that surveillance had reported nothing unusual and added that ABIDIAN had not succeeded in losing the KGB surveillance at any time during this period.

On 20 October 1966 NOSENKO was asked why, in his opinion, ABIDIAN had gone to Pushkin Street at the time he did. In response, he told CIA for the first time that in about 1960 an

American tourist or delegation member had gone to the Pushkin Street address and that it was the "opinion of the Second Chief Directorate" that this American had selected it as a dead drop site,* it was thought that ABIDIAN went there merely to check the suitability of the proposed site.

When he was asked on 20 October 1966 whether he had visited the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied: "I don't remember. I do not want to say that I visited the dead drop. I don't remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say 'yes,' and I cannot say 'no.'"

As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that on the same day ABIDIAN was observed on Pushkin Street (i.e., on 30 December 1961) the Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV, inspected the Pushkin Street building. The FBI had reported, however, that KOZLOV was on TDY in the United States from 15 November 1961 until leaving New York City on 30 December 1961, travelling via France. The timing of ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street, at 0330 hours New York City (Eastern Standard) time, would appear to preclude the possibility of KOZLOV's having gone to the dead drop site on the day NOSENKO said he did.

---

* The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 letter by which he initially contacted CIA. The only known visits by Americans to this address and the only ones connected with its use as a dead drop location occurred on 12 November and 4 December 1960, when CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY checked the address from the outside, and on 21 January 1961, when MAHONEY returned and entered the building to check the precise dead drop location. See Part V.E.3.f. for a discussion of NOSENKO's knowledge of MAHONEY.

e. Supervisor of Activities Against American Service Attaches

At the beginning of the interrogation session on 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was asked to list the duties he assumed upon reporting to the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1960. As he had on a number of earlier occasions, NOSENKO replied that he was given responsibility for the supervision of code clerk operations, was made the KGB case officer for American Security Officer John ABIDIAN who was to arrive in the near future, and was charged with the Second Chief Directorate file on the security of the U.S. Embassy and his section's file on the materials from microphones in various Embassy offices. Later in this same session NOSENKO recalled--and told CIA for the first time--that he was also given the duty of supervising activities against officers assigned to the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force Attache offices. The pertinent portion of the 29 January 1965 interrogation was as follows:

Question: Who briefed you or gave you instructions on what was expected of you in the Section?

NOSENKO: I was speaking with GRIBANOV and KLYPIN.

Question: What did KLYPIN say?

NOSENKO: That "you are Deputy Chief of Section, but I consider that you must also pay special attention to code clerks. We must study them and make an approach to one of them. It's necessary to work on this." KOVSHUK was in KLYPIN's office and I remember also that he raised the question: "O.K. He will supervise this kind of work, but maybe he can also take the military. All three attaches." Well, KLYPIN did not say yes and did not say no. I couldn't say anything because I had not begun; I didn't know how much work this would involve. I couldn't say. And, you see, KLYPIN said: "Let's try it a short period of time." It was that way. It was decided that I will supervise the code clerks and then the three attaches. And KOVSHUK took the diplomats and a whole pile of work. But, of course, in the absence of KOVSHUK I must take everything and in my absence, KOVSHUK must take everything. But later, 1,2,3 -- I don't remember dates -- later I was not supervising the military attaches but concentrated only on code clerks.

Question: Later you were not supervising military attaches, but only code clerks?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: What do you mean you were supervising military attaches?

NOSENKO: What does it mean? If the case officers of the three attaches have any questions or any papers to report to the Chief of Section, they go to me, not to KOVSHUK. They were deciding all questions with me. This is what supervising the work on these three attaches means. They were deciding all questions with me. For example, the case officers who were working against diplomats -- KUSKOV, ARTEMOV, FEDYANIN, CHEREPANOV -- they were reporting any questions, any papers, to KOVSHUK. You see, there was such a division [of labor].

Question: Am I correct that by military attaches you mean Army, Navy, and Air Force?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Attaches and their assistants?

NOSENKO: Yes, yes, yes.

Question: And enlisted personnel?

NOSENKO: DEMKIN was handling enlisted personnel, and he was also coming in to me for advice.

Question: Roughly how long did you have the responsibilities for the attaches?

NOSENKO: (pause) I don't remember. Several months.

Question: By several, you mean...?

NOSENKO: Five or six.

Question: And why was this responsibility removed from you?

NOSENKO: I didn't have time. No time. No time. You see, besides this, which is simple to explain, there were too many other questions which...

Question: What occupied most of your time?

NOSENKO: Day-to-day matters. An order from the Chief of Department to study and develop this question, then this question, then this question. Then something to prepare for GRIBANOV, then something to prepare for KLYPIN, for his report, then something to prepare for myself...

Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have mentioned did you devote the most time?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: What was most important?

NOSENKO: They were all important.

Question: Can you tell me where you were spending most of your time to cause the removal of your responsibility for military attaches?

NOSENKO: No. I can't tell you.

Question: Who was given the responsibility for military attaches?

NOSENKO: Just a moment. I think he was... I don't remember how, or what date, when there appeared in the First [American] Department a Deputy Chief of Department. It was either before I came, or it was in January, or it was a little bit later.

Question: Who was this?

NOSENKO: ALESHIN.* And his job was such -- it was a new one -- supervision of work against military intelligence officers, not only Americans, but of other departments also, the First, the Second, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth. Coordination of the whole work against all military intelligence officers. And that's why, later, KLYPIN and KOVSHUK said: "Well, why are you supervising this? Let ALESHIN do it. You are the Deputy of the Chief." It was not only because of the lack of time. Also it wasn't convenient to the case officers. They were reporting to me. Then ALESHIN would invite them in and they would have to report the same thing to him.

Question: Who were you supervising?

NOSENKO: ...GAVRILENKO had the Air Force attaches and assistants; KURILENKO had the Army Attache and assistants; and BELOGLAZOV the Naval Attache, assistants and marines.**

During interrogations on 20 October 1966, NOSENKO changed his earlier statement that the only operational file he held in the U.S. Embassy Section was that on ABIDIAN. At the same time, he described a leave period that he had not mentioned earlier. NOSENKO said: "When I began to work [in the U.S. Embassy Section], after a month or so, I took the files on the Naval Attaches. And then after two months I gave them to BELOGLAZOV. I immediately went on vacation after I came.* After two weeks I went on leave for a month. I took over the files either before or after the leave."** NOSENKO was asked why he had assumed responsibility only for the Naval Attaches and replied: It was decided by KOVSHUK. I should take only the Navy while I was getting acquainted with the section. At the same time, the case officer DRANOV was retiring and he handled only Naval officers. I didn't take the Army or Air Force."

---

* NOSENKO had mentioned this earlier. On 18 June 1964 he was asked to list the names and functions of U.S. Embassy Section officers in 1960. He said: "In 1960 the Chief of the First Department was KLYPIN. MATVEYEV was still there as First Deputy. The Second Deputy was Yevgeniy Nikolayevich ALESHIN. He was given the special assignment of coordinating the activities of the Second Chief Directorate against all foreign military intelligence activity but was assigned to the First Department... In the First Section, KOVSHUK was the Chief and I was the Deputy Chief. In addition to general functions, I had the responsibility for supervising the work against code clerks and the Embassy Security Officer."

** In June 1964 NOSENKO explained that Nikolay DRANOV was responsible for the Naval Attache's office in January when NOSENKO arrived, but he was transferred and his duties were taken over by BELOGLAZOV who had been working with him against this target.

NOSENKO was asked again on 25 October 1966 why he was responsible only for the Naval Attaches during early 1960. He answered: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working on all of them."

---

* In other contexts NOSENKO has always equated custody of a file with case officer responsibilities. Therefore, he seems to have indicated here that for the approximately two months when these files were in his name, he was officially the KGB case officer charged with the American Naval Attaches.

** During a subsequent interrogation session, NOSENKO was asked to describe the leaves he took during 1960 and 1961. He repeated that he took a month's leave immediately upon joining the U.S. Embassy Section, "part of January and part of February" 1960; He had gone, he said, to the Caucasus with his wife and mother. He then added: "You want me to say I was not telling the truth in February [1965] when I said I was on leave before I went to Cuba [in November 1960]. I know this." (See Part V.E.3.d., which describes this November 1960 leave and its relationship to NOSENKO's responsibilities as case officer for John ABIDIAN.)

f. Knowledge of the Target

(i) Introduction

His position and duties as Deputy Chief and sometimes Acting Chief gave NOSENKO access to, and required him to know, the extent of the U.S. Embassy Section's knowledge of its target. He has therefore been questioned at length by CIA about the locations and occupants of the Embassy offices as well as about the Embassy personnel whom the KGB had identified as CIA officers. The information from NOSENKO on these two topics is presented below.

(ii) Physical Premises

NOSENKO has said that his knowledge of the physical layout of the Embassy derives both from his general supervisory function during 1960 and 1961 and from his responsibilities as the officially registered custodian of the KGB's file on the security of the Embassy. According to NOSENKO, he received the latter from his chief, KOVSHUK, when he arrived in the section in January 1960; shortly thereafter he arranged by a phone call to the Secretariat of the Second Chief Directorate to have custody transferred officially to his name from that of M.F. BAKHVALOV, his predecessor as Deputy Chief of Section. NOSENKO explained that BAKHVALOV had already left the section by this time but that, under KGB procedures, it was permissible for an officer to remain official custodian of a file belonging to the U.S. Embassy Section, even after leaving the American Department, so long as he remained in the Second Chief Directorate. Until he turned this file over to GRYAZNOV approximately during the period 25 to 28 December 1961, no one else had access to it other than KOVSHUK, Chief of the section, and GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV, who shared the office and safe where this file was kept.

NOSENKO stated in February 1965 that he had never studied the contents, nor had he paid any special attention to this file. Since he would necessarily have been in a position to know, NOSENKO also said he is certain that no operational analysis or planning by himself or others was done on the basis of this file during his two years in the section. The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old building on Mokhovaya Street and the second--about one inch thick--concerning the new Embassy building on Chaykovskiy Street, which was occupied in 1953. It was used only for reference purposes, for the KGB had concluded that it was impossible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate the secure areas of the Embassy because of the security precautions in effect. Apart from these file-custodial duties, NOSENKO was generally interested in the floor plans of the Embassy by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of the section. NOSENKO's knowledge of the Embassy premises is reflected in the CIA debriefing of February 1965, and these statements are given in the next paragraphs.

All KGB employees who went into the secure areas ("Zone of Security") of the Embassy on the seventh through tenth floors* were carefully questioned on what they saw, because these areas were of special interest to the KGB. NOSENKO knew no KGB employees who entered the secure areas during 1960 or 1961 and had no personal contact with any of them. He did not remember any information that such KGB employees ever reported to the KGB, except that Dmitriy I. KUKOLEV, an electrician whom he personally handled in 1954-1955, had observed antenna wiring in the attic; the details or significance of the wiring were unknown to NOSENKO as of 1965.

---

* The seventh floor is not one of the secure areas; the eighth, ninth, and tenth are.

NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in the Embassy security file while he had custody of it. None of the information, he said, was interesting, important, or useful enough for him to remember, and he could not name the agent sources of the KGB. In another context and at another time, however, NOSENKO said he had received a report from some agent (name unknown) that there was a sign "Security Office" on the office door of John V. ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security Officer.*

NOSENKO did not study the Embassy security procedures in detail and did not remember where the classified trash was burned. He said that nothing could be done with this information operationally, because the trash was always burned by a U.S. sergeant or a Marine guard accompanied by an officer.**

The Embassy office or floor where any section was located or any individual worked during the years 1960 and 1961 was not remembered by NOSENKO. This reply was also given when he was asked about the rooms and floors for the offices of the ambassador, the political officers, ABIDIAN, and the code clerks.*** NOSENKO said that he either knew these locations at the time he was Deputy Chief of the section or could have found them in the in the monthly Embassy phone lists; the KGB received these regularly from agent sources, and the lists gave office numbers and phone numbers.****

---

* There never has been such a sign; NOSENKO's responsibility for the KGB coverage of ABIDIAN is discussed in Part V.E.3.d. All Soviets who enter the top three floors of the Embassy have a marine escort.

** A check with two former Embassy security officers indicates that there has never been such a regulation. The trash is burned by the marine on duty who "invariably does it alone." One of the security officers questioned said: "I can think of no reason why the Soviets would think this to be the case, since whatever collateral information they have on it would point to the truth."

*** Part V.E.3.c. reviews NOSENKO's knowledge of and participation in KGB operations against U.S. code clerks.

**** The telephone lists give only phone numbers, not office numbers. They do, however, provide apartment numbers.

In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret conversations. NOSENKO was not certain where it was located or whether it was ever used, but he heard from an unknown source that in 1960-1961 meetings were held in a secure room in the "Zone of Security." He did not know any of the technical details of this room.

The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material in any form from the U.S. Embassy during 1960 and 1961. A charwoman (name or cryptonym not recalled), who worked as an agent for the KGB officer Viktor BELOGLAZOV, stole a bag of papers from the office of the Naval Attaches. Most of the papers were torn or crumpled. They included a draft of a report of the Naval Attaches' sighting of ships and factories while on a trip to Leningrad. Since this report was of only routine interest to the KGB, NOSENKO said, he was unable to recall any other details of the theft, including the date, except that the charwoman was granted a cash award.

(iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy Cover

According to NOSENKO, the Americans at the U.S. Embassy of greatest counterintelligence interest to the KGB section were the identified CIA officers. When questioned on 2 September 1964 concerning his knowledge of intelligence personnel assigned to the Embassy in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO stated that the KGB immediately listed any officer associated with the offices of U.S. Armed Forces Attaches as a member of American Military Intelligence and any diplomat as "suspect American Intelligence," the latter notation always meaning CIA. One of the tasks of the section was to determine which of these diplomats was the CIA "Resident" (KGB nomenclature for Chief of Station), which were CIA case officers, and which were the CIA agents or cooptees. The KGB knew that code clerks would not be used to fulfill intelligence missions and that the same probably held true for the Ambassador and the Marine guards. NOSENKO on 25 February 1965 signed a protocol which included his statement that, as Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the section, he would "necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer in the Embassy."

NOSENKO has been shown lists of the names of all American personnel assigned to the embassy during 1960 and 1961 and on a number of occasions has been asked to select those known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers. The persons he so identified, together with his comments concerning them were:

-Boris KLOSSON: Considered to be the CIA "Resident" in Moscow during this period. NOSENKO did not know why KLOSSON was considered as such but said: "Every officer in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section thought he was the Resident." KLOSSON may have taken David MARK's job, NOSENKO said, and MARK had been suspected of being the CIA Resident on the basis of his behavior under KGB surveillance and of his letter mailing.* NOSENKO did not recall the names of KGB agents working specifically against KLOSSON and never read any agent or surveillance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in clandestine activity. NOSENKO did not know KLOSSON's position in the Embassy, where he had been previously stationed, what trips he took inside the Soviet Union, where he lived in Moscow, about KLOSSON's wife or whether he had children with him in Moscow, anything about his personal life, the names of close American friends and his Soviet contacts. "I didn't read the file" on KLOSSON, NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965. The responsible KGB officer, A.M. MIKHAYLOV, "was reading [the file]. I can't tell you why [we believed KLOSSON was the CIA Resident]. There was opinion--his previous position, attitude. Little, little details. I don't remember."*

---

* MARK was a CIA cooptee while in Moscow, not a CIA officer; see Part II.B.

-John ABIDIAN: Considered to be a CIA officer on the basis of his conduct as a U.S. Department of State security officer in connection with Premier KHRUSHCHEV's 1959 visit to the United States and because he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE in Moscow. Surveillance established the fact that he mailed operational letters and visited a possible dead drop site in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.d.).

-George WINTERS: Known to be a CIA officer and was given special attention because of his operational activity in the POPOV case.** WINTERS was in personal contact with KOVSHUK, who used the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as cover. The KGB case officer responsible for covering WINTERS was V.A. KUSKOV.

-Steve WASHENKO: Known to be a CIA officer. As far as NOSENKO was aware, the KGB identified WASHENKO as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing one or two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area. In addition, from a KGB microphone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a trip in the USSR.

Lewis BOWDEN: Suspected of being a CIA officer, but NOSENKO could not recall the reasons why.*** KOVSHUK, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was in contact with BOWDEN.

---

* See below; William MORELL was identified by KLOSSON to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs as a CIA officer before MORELL arrived in Moscow.

** The case of GRU Lieutenant Colonel POPOV is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.; further KGB information on WINTERS is reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.

*** The CHEREPANOV document, which sets forth a KGB plan for operations against BOWDEN, lists several reasons why he was believed to be an FBI representative in the Embassy. NOSENKO, when reading this document in Geneva in February 1964, concurred in this opinion; he referred to BOWDEN as FBI on later occasions also. See Part VI.D.7.c. on CHEREPANOV.

- Richard FUNKHOUSER: Suspected of being a CIA officer because he is a specialist on the Soviet Union, particularly economics. NOSENKO did not remember the names of any agents working against FUNKHOUSER nor any derogatory information concerning him.

- William HORBALY: Suspected of being a CIA case officer* because the KGB heard him, by means of microphones in the Embassy, discussing a report he had written, or dictating it, about his observations on a trip he had taken in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO said that he did not know the names of agents working against HORBALY or whether the agents obtained derogatory information concerning him. As far as NOSENKO knew, there had been no operational approach to or recruitment of HORBALY.

Of the seven U.S. Embassy officers designated by NOSENKO as known or suspected CIA personnel, three--WINTERS, WASHENKO, and HORBALY--were in fact CIA officers. When HORBALY was first assigned to Moscow, however, he was detached from overt employment as an economic analyst in CIA. In January 1962 he severed his connections with CIA to become a full member of the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture. When HORBALY first arrived in Moscow he openly discussed the fact that he had come to the Embassy from CIA. While in Moscow he had no connection with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities. WASHENKO was similarly detached from overt employment as an economic analyst with CIA when he was assigned to Moscow, but was coopted by CIA for limited operational support activity, chiefly mailing agent letters. After his return from Moscow he reverted to his overt CIA employment. John ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted by CIA; although not a CIA staff employee, he was for all intents the CIA "Resident" in Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961. The remaining three--KLOSSON, BOWDEN and FUNKHOUSER--had no affiliation with CIA.

During the time NOSENKO said he belonged to the American Embassy Section there were stationed in Moscow two CIA officers, Eugene P. MAHONEY and Paul GARBLER, whose status as such was subsequently found to have been known to the KGB before their arrival in the Soviet Union. In addition, one officer (William MORELL) was openly identified as a CIA employee to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs before arriving in Moscow. Furthermore, Francis STEVENS (see Page 374) reported having been asked by one of the two KGB officers trying to recruit him whether MORELL was a CIA employee; when STEVENS replied that he did not know, the KGB officer stated: "He openly says he does." Another officer (G. Stanley BROWN), an overt CIA employee, had transferred to the U.S. Department of Agriculture shortly before being assigned to the Embassy. The latter two were not engaged in clandestine activities in Moscow on behalf of CIA, but the first two CIA officers were.

NOSENKO indicated that he did not know about the intelligence affiliation of any of these four persons:

- NOSENKO was shown a photograph of MAHONEY, whom he did not recognize. He was then given MAHONEY's name, which he recognized as being that of an employee of the Administrative Section of the Embassy. NOSENKO said that, other than this, he did not know anything about MAHONEY--his previous career, his knowledge of the Russian language, when he arrived in Moscow, when he departed, where he lived, his activities there, or evidence that he was an intelligence officer. "It wasn't known he was a CIA officer," NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965. "If there was evidence I would have known. But there was none." NOSENKO was told that MAHONEY's CIA status had been revealed to the KGB by a KGB penetration of British intelligence [George BLAKE]. He replied that he was certain that the U.S. Embassy Section's file on MAHONEY contained no information from such a source concerning MAHONEY, and that had there been such information available, he would have been a special target and would have been handled by one of the best officers in the section. NOSENKO added that he could not understand why this information about MAHONEY was not given to the section by the KGB First Chief Directorate.

---

* Earlier NOSENKO had said the KGB classified HORBALY as a CIA cooptee.

- NOSENKO identified Paul GARBLER as a naval officer who worked in the office of the Naval Attache and the case officer working against him as BELOGLAZOV. He said that he could provide no other details on GARBLER. NOSENKO specifically said that he did not know the names of any agents working against GARBLER, that he knew of no unusual or interesting information concerning GARBLER contained from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that he did not know whether he had read GARBLER's file or other "materials" concerning him.

- NOSENKO did not identify William MORELL as a CIA officer.* Nor did he know that while MORELL was in the Soviet Union, he was under direct cultivation by NOSENKO's superior, KOVSHUK, and by K.N. SMIRNOV, a case officer of the KGB First Chief Directorate.

- NOSENKO did not recognize the name of G. Stanley BROWN. As shown on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA, BROWN shared an office with HORBALY, whom NOSENKO said was a suspected CIA officer; in this office was a KGB microphone with good reception but insignificant production, according to NOSENKO.** Reportedly BROWN and another member of the Embassy staff were under constant surveillance during a trip within the USSR during 1961, and in the same year he travelled to Leningrad with WINTERS, correctly identified by NOSENKO as a CIA officer.

CIA records show that, as a staff officer, MAHONEY served in Frankfurt during 1955 and 1956 and was connected with a joint CIA/MI-6 project which handled the NTS, a Russian emigre organization. His work brought him into liaison in true name with both MI-6 and the French Service; he was known to NTS personnel by his true first name only.

---

* See first footnote, Page 243.

** An operative microphone was found in this office in 1964. In discussing the microphones in the Embassy, NOSENKO said that in late 1960 or early 1961 the U.S. Embassy Section had decided to withdraw the requirement for continuous monitoring of the microphones in HORBALY's and BROWN's office so that this monitoring point could be used on targets of higher priority. See also Part V.E.4.g.

MAHONEY arrived in Moscow on 4 October 1960 as the Assistant General Services Officer at the U.S. Embassy. His specific CIA mission there was to support the handling of PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union. MAHONEY lived in America House. From the start of his tour he was active in his attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow and he frequently toured various areas of the city on foot. In checking locations connected with the PENKOVSKIY case, MAHONEY went to the Pushkin Street dead drop location on two occasions during November and December 1960, and he made a thorough examination of the dead drop itself as well as of its related signal site on 21 January 1961. Throughout, MAHONEY was subjected to intensive KGB surveillance. In a report dated 25 October 1960, ABIDIAN commented on this as follows: "I find this type of coverage (five surveillants on a recent trip to the barber shop) completely out of character with that which is usually given a new arrival of similar rank. My only inference is that the KGB has at least strong suspicions of MAHONEY's primary role [CIA officer]. As for surveillance on myself, it continues to be occasional and extremely discreet."

George BLAKE, the KGB penetration of MI-6, was arrested in London on 14 April 1961. In his confession he said that he had passed the KGB a master list of the names of persons connected with the joint U.S.-British project with which MAHONEY had been connnected in Frankfurt, as well as other materials on this project. On this basis, MAHONEY was relieved shortly thereafter of further duties connected with support of the PENKOVSKIY operation; he was withdrawn from Moscow in September 1961, less than a year after his arrival.

CIA records indicate that GARBLER was detailed to CIA by the Navy in April 1952 and served CIA under Naval cover in Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955. In the fall of 1955, he resigned his naval commission, and in May 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm. GARBLER served there until August 1959 in the cover position of Second Secretary and Political Officer (FSR). On 3 June 1961, he returned to active duty with the Navy, and on 31 August 1961 his appointment was announced as Assistant Naval Attache to Moscow, with the rank of Commander. In September 1961 his official biographic data was forwarded to the office of the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington, who had requested this information, and the same month GARBLER made an official call at the Soviet Embassy. GARBLER arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961. He was the CIA Chief of Station there.

Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER served in Korea and there was acquainted with George BLAKE. In April 1960 GARBLER was a participant in joint CIA-MI-6 discussions in Washington on the question of tourist operations into the Soviet Union (see Part V.D.8); BLAKE, who had access to information on the agenda and participants for these talks, admitted after his arrest in 1961 that he had photographed the minutes of this meeting and had passed them to his Soviet handlers. On this basis CIA presumed that GARBLER was identified to the KGB prior to arriving in Moscow at the end of 1961. (BLAKE was arrested the previous April.) He was definitely identified as such in an article carried in the Soviet Government newspaper Izvestiya in October 1963. This article, entitled "A Cruel Lesson," was allegedly written by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian who defected to the West in 1955 and returned to the Soviet Union in 1963; in it HAMAN attempted to expose how "the U.S. Secret Service, riding roughshod over Swedish sovereignty, recruits agents for subversion and espionage against the Soviet Union and other countries...making active use of the official U.S. missions in Stockholm, newsmen, tourists..." HAMAN named GARBLER as having been involved in this work. This article, which appeared at about the same time as the arrest of WENNERSTROM, described a number of fabricated activities of CIA in Sweden and, in fact, GARBLER had no connection with HAMAN or with anything which HAMAN describes.*

GARBLER's part in ABIDIAN's visit to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site on Pushkin Street is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.

---

* See Page 394 for other KGB operational use of HAMAN.

g. Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Embassy

(i) Introduction

NOSENKO had three basic pieces of information on KGB audio and other electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow: The presence of microphones in the chancery building, the absence of audio-technical devices in the north wing of the Embassy, and the existence of a beam which monitors and jams transmissions from the Embassy. These are discussed separately below. Except for knowing that a resonant cavity (wireless) microphone had been found in the American Ambassador's residence in 1953, NOSENKO said he was unaware of audio surveillance devices and techniques (other than the chancery microphones) in use against the Embassy, nor did he know of any material produced by such measures. NOSENKO told CIA on 14 May 1964 that, to the best of his knowledge, there were no wireless microphones (i.e., carrier transmitters and radio transmitters) in the Embassy.* His information on KGB electronic operations against this target dated mainly from the period when he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and derives from his special responsibilities in this period; from his 1953-1955 service in the American Department, NOSENKO said, he learned only that audio installations existed.

(ii) Microphones in the Chancery

Frequently described by NOSENKO as his most important information, the microphones in the chancery building were first mentioned by him during the 1962 meetings in Geneva. In these and subsequent debriefings NOSENKO reported in detail on the ways in which he acquired this information, on the number and locations of the microphones, the quality of reception, and the value of production. He has not given the date when the microphones became operative, but presumed (in agreement with the KGB defector GOLITSYN) that they were installed prior to 1953, when the chancery was occupied by U.S. Government representatives.** Of the 16 microphones listed by NOSENKO, he has stressed the importance of the one in the office of the Minister Counsellor, the existence of which was earlier reported by GOLITSYN and subsequently confirmed by technical investigations. In 1962 NOSENKO said that the audibility of the nine-year-old system varied from very clear to zero; he said in 1964 that the quality was deteriorating and that "in a year or two they [the microphones] will be completely inoperative."* Although the microphones produced a great deal of political intelligence, NOSENKO said, he found nothing worthwhile for use against U.S. code clerks or others of operational interest to him.** All pertinent details from NOSENKO and other sources on the microphone system in the chancery building is presented in the following portions of this paper.

---

*NOSENKO stated that the KGB knew the identity of American counter-audio technicians and therefore turned off the microphones whenever any of them arrived at the Embassy. Since a microphone-and-wire system cannot be turned off, this remark suggests either that there was an external power source for the microphones, which NOSENKO has not mentioned, or that NOSENKO himself did not have rudimentary knowledge of such matters.

**The investigations by American technicians leave no doubt that the microphone-and-wire system would have had to be in place at the time of occupancy.

(a) NOSENKO's Sources

Nearly all of NOSENKO's knowledge about the microphone system in the chancery building was, he said, derived from two circumstances: First, his responsibility as Deputy Chief of the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section, for receiving and disseminating transcripts of conversations there; and second, a special meeting which he attended in his dual capacity as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section and custodian of the microphone information. Additional information was obtained by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1963 from G.I. GRYAZNOV, his former subordinate and his successor as Deputy Chief of the Section. In several discussions with GRYAZNOV during this period NOSENKO learned that some of the microphones were dead while others had become less efficient since NOSENKO's reassignment to the Tourist Department in January 1962. NOSENKO's statements concerning his major sources of information on the microphones are presented in chronological order below.

"We are listening to everything the military attaches say in Moscow, the Military, Navy and Air Force Attaches," NOSENKO said on 11 June 1962. "All the reports go through me. I read them....Only a limited group of people read these reports. They are all in the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate. Who are they? The Chief of the Department (we don't give them to his deputies), the Chief of the [U.S. Embassy] Section, and I--altogether three people. Sometimes we report to GRIBANOV things we consider important. We conceal the fact that we are listening to the Americans from our workers in other departments, from the English Department, from the French Department....We are listening to the three attaches and the Minister Counsellor. Don't even send coded cables about me (to Moscow). If you do it will be the end of me....Only three people know that we are listening to you. Even within the Second Chief Directorate it is a tremendous secret that we are listening to you."

NOSENKO was asked on 12 June 1962 about the form in which he received the audio intercept reports and whether these reports were delivered to his office. He answered: "No. Here's how it is done. We have a special unit concerned with this function which is called the Second Special Department. It is a part of the Operational Technical Directorate [OTU]. The Special Department has several sections within it. Take, for example, the section under Colonel [N.Ya.] KUZMIN. He has the entire English line, everything. He has young girls and boys there who have an excellent command of English. They all sit in a room with special equipment and listen continuously. Besides this, everything goes on tape and later they transcribe it. They listen to it two or three times so as to get every word.... [They prepare the materials.] The materials from the American Embassy used to come to me...and I decided what to keep and what not to keep. Why? A summary report would come to me with the notation that the information in it was Top Secret or Confidential. This was all nonsense, but I was required to return the report within two days' time. So, I would read through the materials to see what was useful and what was not. It's not all suitable. And I would underline this [the significant items] with a pencil. No, [I was wrong]. The report first went to the Chief of department and then I underlined with a pencil what was necessary and gave it back to them [the Second Special Department, OTU]. They collected it. I signed a receipt that I had received it from them and they gave me a receipt when I returned it. And then they gave me extracts. From these extracts alone one cannot tell where the material came from, but from the report one realizes that the Americans are being listened to. It is necessary to have these extracts to place in the files. We have a file on each person working in the Embassy, the so-called delo-formulyar [developmental file]. We keep one on every Embassy employee."

---

*Tests of the KGB equipment by the American technicians later in 1964 resulted in recordings of high intelligibility in certain instances.

**Vulnerability data on Americans in Moscow could be obtained from the microphone system, according to the damage report by the Security Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) and according to the views of the U.S. Army Attache whose office in the Embassy was the site of a microphone.

During the second of the 1964 series of meetings in Geneva, on 24 January, NOSENKO took a number of notes from his wallet. Pointing to one of them, he said: "This piece of paper was kept in my operational file and it represents the statistics for the years 1960-1961, listing those microphones which are actively used in monitoring conversations in the U.S. Embassy." This list named eleven offices and apartments in the chancery which contained microphones. When asked whether he had copied the list from records or had drawn it up from memory, NOSENKO explained that it came from an operational review of what "listening points we had in the U.S. Embassy."

A detailed explanation of his acquisition of the written list was supplied by NOSENKO on 14 May 1964:

Question: How did this list come into your hands? What caused you to write it?

NOSENKO: I came to KLYPIN [Chief of the American Department] with my working notebook. KOVSHUK [Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in the Department] was writing and he put the list on my book. KOVSHUK said this one [microphone] is working well, this one badly, and so on.

Question: What was the date of this? What year and month?

NOSENKO: Oh, I don't remember, 1960...maybe the beginning of 1961.

Question: At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 you and KOVSHUK met in KLYPIN's office?

NOSENKO: Yes. Or maybe it was at a meeting. It is difficult to say. Maybe we went to report to KOVSHUK in his room or maybe KOVSHUK was writing in KLYPIN's study room. I don't remember.

NOSENKO then described the purpose of the meeting: To discuss the possibility of releasing monitor positions from some of the chancery microphones and of assigning these released positions to Vladimir [patronymic unknown] PETROV, Chief of the American Department's section for work against American tourists and delegates suspected of being connected with American Intelligence; PETROV had earlier requested English-language monitoring positions from the Chief of the English-Language Section of the OTU's Second Special Department but had been told that all such interpreters were already engaged on priority targets. At the meeting KOVSHUK and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little value and which monitoring positions could be released to PETROV. KOVSHUK drew up a list of the Embassy offices and apartments then being covered on a full-time basis and indicated those of lesser importance. At the end of the meeting, KOVSHUK gave the list to NOSENKO, who retained it in his safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964. NOSENKO has added nothing further on the locations of microphones in the chancery building, and much of his information concerning the quality and value of the production by these microphones came from this meeting.

Since his defection, NOSENKO has spoken further on his responsibilities in connection with the daily transcripts received from the Second Special Department. He said on 14 May 1964: "All the materials after they were read and signed were returned to the Second [Special] Department of the Operational Technical Directorate. Some of the material from this was put in the individual file, but anyone who read it would never know where it came from. He wouldn't know that it came from mikes....KOVSHUK and I read all of this. From this we gave information to those who needed it, depending on their interest. If there was something interesting, it was given to KLYPIN to read. If KLYPIN saw something interesting he could take it and give it to GRIBANOV. Tatyana GRISHNYAT [from the Second Special Department] came by car with this material. She went to KLYPIN. Sometimes she left them with me."

A protocol signed by NOSENKO in 1965 states: "One of my duties as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, was to receive, review, and give to appropriate case officers the production from microphones in the American Embassy on a daily basis. I also maintained the control book (journal) for these transcripts. These transcripts were prepared by the Operational Technical Directorate of the KGB. Every day a female worker of the OTU brought me the transcripts of conversations in the Embassy from the previous day. I regularly returned all of the original transcripts to this female worker; they were usually in my possession for one day. In my absence this duty was performed by [my superior] KOVSHUK or [my subordinate] GRYAZNOV."

(b) Number and Locations of Microphones

The information from NOSENKO on the number and locations of the KGB microphones in the chancery building in the U.S. Embassy is separated from that furnished by other sources.

NOSENKO's Information

11 June 1962: [NOSENKO has just been assured that none of the information he had given CIA would be used without first consulting with him.] "Well, because you are such good guys, I will give you even more. Have the Minister Counsellor stop dictating to himself in his office.... Listen, move the Minister Counsellor from his present office to the north wing of the Embassy [where NOSENKO said there were no listening devices; see below]. We are not listening to the Ambassador. But move the Minister Counsellor.... And we are listening to all your military attaches there. All of them--the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Air Force Attache....We have four or five points [from which we are getting intercepts]. We hear the Minister Counsellor, all three attaches--that's four points--and the fifth is where one of the State Department employees sits. And yes, there's another, a sixth point. We are listening to the Agricultural Attache. [C. Stanley] BROWN is working there now and someone else, a young man [William HORBALY]. So, we are listening to these six points. This is our biggest secret. Only a few people know this. I was Deputy Chief of the section and received this information. I decided what to give the Chief of Department and what not to give him. Do you understand? This is to say nothing about the other departments and the [U.S.] Embassy Section itself."

12 June 1962: "We lost the microphone in the private residence of the Ambassador. This was not THOMPSON, but the one before him. BOHLEN was there then. We once had something there, but you found the [Great] Seal where it was located. But in the Embassy itself, in the Ambassador's office, we have nothing. The one we hear now is [Minister Counsellor] FREERS. Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this is important material."

14 June 1962: "When I was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section I received reports on the microphone material daily. If there was something important in it, I reported to the Chief of the department. The rest KOVSHUK and I read and then distributed to the workers the parts that concerned them. Well, the workers who were operating against the three attaches knew about this [microphone] equipment.... Nothing was received from the code room. These machines were working and there were no conversations. He was sitting alone and there was nothing. [NOSENKO is evidently describing the military code room.]....There is a point there from which we hear the Agricultural Attache. But there is nothing there. They talk about what interests them in the field of agriculture. Nothing interesting."

24 January 1964: The late 1960/early 1961 list which NOSENKO brought to CIA (see above) showed that the following offices and apartments in the chancery contained microphones:

"Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;
"Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;
"Office of the Military Attache, URBAN;
"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO and SACHANEN;
"Office of the Assistant Military Attaches MASON, REITZ and WILSON;
"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;
"Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;
"Military Code Room;
"State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;
"Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;
"Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"

Altogether, sixteen spaces are listed, but of these NOSENKO said that the microphone in one (the Marine bar) had never worked and that nothing of importance was learned from the microphones in the four Embassy apartments. This leaves eleven; when presenting the list to CIA, NOSENKO said that while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section, "there were a total of eleven listening posts." (In discussing the late 1960 or early 1961 meeting at which KOVSHUK and KLYPIN received the microphone coverage, NOSENKO said on 14 May 1964 that it was decided to release the microphone positions in the GLEYSTEEN office, the HORBALY-BROWN office, the State Department code room and the teletype office. This would leave a total of eight 'listening posts.'")

14 May 1964: Questioned on the total number of microphones in the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO said that "many" were installed in the chancery building before the Americans moved in, but that he did not know how many were installed in all, how many were in any one of the rooms included in KOVSHUK's list, or where they were located in specific rooms. He did recall that most of the microphones were placed in the outside wall, the wall nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced this street and the placement of the microphones near the outer wall would make it more difficult for American technicians to find them if they examined only the inner walls.

January 1965: NOSENKO volunteered that there were no fixed microphones in America House, the residence of enlisted men at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there was discussion during 1960 and 1961 of using the KGB agents employed there to place temporary audio devices for one or two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans as well as in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, because such devices are too easily found. For the same reason, NOSENKO said, there was no attempt made in this period to place temporary devices in Spasso House (the Ambassador's residence) or in the apartments of such Embassy officers as John ABIDIAN. The KGB was "afraid that they will be detected and that there will be a scandal."

Information from Other Sources

In 1956 a sensitive source holding a senior position in the KGB submitted a written report to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow with the cautionary remark: "Do not speak about this information in the rooms of the American Embassy." The report itself contains a portion reading as follows: "Because all rooms in the American Embassy in Moscow are being monitored by the KGB, I strongly ask that there be no conversations and discussions concerning this information in the American Embassy. The flap involving the American direction-finding specialists* in Stalingrad during the summer of 1955 was organized by the KGB because conversations were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valuable direction-finding equipment from the American intelligence officers. The KGB did not possess this type of valuable equipment, and it would have been necessary for Soviet technicians to work and experiment for a long time in order to acquire such valuable equipment. The listening devices are so skillfully installed in the walls, floors, and ceilings of the rooms of the American Embassy that it is impossible to find them, even with special-purpose instruments."

GOLITSYN, who defected in late 1961, reported the existence of a microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor and said that many more had been installed in the chancery prior to 1953. (GOLITSYN was debriefed in early 1962 and his information on this subject was disseminated within the U.S. Government approximately two weeks before NOSENKO's initial contact with CIA.) GOLITSYN said he had learned of the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office when by chance he happened to see a particular document in an office at KGB Headquarters. According to GOLITSYN, during one of his visits to the American Department in 1960** he heard and saw that a report or reports concerning the results of audio-surveillance in the U.S. Embassy had been misplaced. While GOLITSYN was in the office, the Chief of the American Department ordered all personnel present to search for these papers, and all the KGB officers searched again through their files, without success. GOLITSYN noted a large number of reports with red stripes across their covers, indicating that they were the property of the Operational Technical Directorate. The only office in the U.S. Embassy that GOLITSYN recalled being mentioned in connection with this search was that of the Minister Counsellor.*

---

*This is a reference to the arrest of U.S. Military Attaches BENSON, MULE, and STROLD and the seizure of sensitive electronic equipment they had with them in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955. NOSENKO reported that the KGB seizure of this equipment was based on information obtained from microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. See Part V.C.3.b.(viii).

**GOLITSYN has reported that he visited the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department on a number of occasions in the spring of 1960 as part of his preparation for assignment to Helsinki in July of that year; he has also said that he returned on temporary assignment to Moscow and again consulted with U.S. Embassy Section officers in December 1960. With regard to the latter visits, however, GOLITSYN's passport and CIA travel records indicate that he was in Moscow on temporary duty for two weeks in January 1961 and that he is therefore a month off in his estimate of when these visits took place. On this basis it appears that by his statement that this incident occurred in 1960 (he has not been more specific), he could have been referring to either his visits to the American Department in the spring of 1960 or his visits in January 1961.

No technical investigations were undertaken as a result of GOLITSYN's information, and so it was largely on the basis of NOSENKO's reports that American technicians inspected the chancery building for the presence of microphones in the spring of 1964. The results have been described in the damage report submitted by the USIB Security Committee on 7 October 1964: "On 23 April 1964, a low-impedance dynamic microphone and associated seven-inch probe tube were discovered in the wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the Chancery of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The cable to this microphone was traced to a major cable run which lay several inches under the outside surface of the east face of the Chancery. This major cable run consisted of a single twenty (20) pair and a single thirty (30) pair, lead-sheathed audio cable which ran along the east face of the Chancery to the roof area of the North Annex of the Embassy. At this point, these cables were spliced into a one hundred and one (101) pair cable along with two ten (10) pair cables.... A number of vertical cables were found to run from the ten, twenty, and thirty pair cables to the various microphone installations. Fifty (50) microphones have been positively identified.** Two (2) microphones not physically located can reasonably be presumed to be in apartment 6J based on the symmetry of the known installations. The microphones located were situated so that all microphones and probes were behind radiators. The microphone system discovered covered every outside room on floors six through ten, with the exception of those offices with doors entering onto balconies and when exterior building constructions were adjacent to outside wall sections bearing radiators."

---

*On 28 January 1965 NOSENKO volunteered an account of the loss of one of the intercept reports which the U.S. Embassy Section had received from the Second Special Department of the Operational Technical Directorate "in 1960 or 1961." This document, according to NOSENKO, was "one of the reports with [Minister Counsellor] FREERS dictating"; as a result of its loss, "the month of December, the whole month, the U.S. Embassy Section was in a turmoil" searching for the document. The month-long search and investigation was unsuccessful, however, and, in the end, the case was closed with the conclusion that the document had probably been burned inadvertently, without a record of destruction having been drawn up. In this account NOSENKO appears to date the incident in December 1960, which approximates GOLITSYN's second series of visits to the U.S. Embassy Section (and duplicated GOLITSYN's erroneous estimate of when these visits took place). NOSENKO has never reported that GOLITSYN was present in the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section during the search for this document and, in fact, has denied that GOLITSYN visited the section either in the spring of 1960 or in late 1960 or January 1961. The only visit by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section reported by NOSENKO was one in the spring or summer of 1961, at which time NOSENKO claims to have been on leave; GOLITSYN was not in Moscow at the time.

**Four more were subsequently located, for a total of 54.

The first microphone found was in Room 1008, in what is now the Army Finance office and which in 1960-1961 was the office of the Military Attache, where NOSENKO reported a microphone to be. All other microphones were ultimately traced from this discovery. There were microphones in all rooms identified by NOSENKO, and in others besides. Two of the latter were inoperative when found--one in the Ambassador's office where NOSENKO said no conversations were being heard in 1960-1961 and the other in the Security Office where NOSENKO said there was none. The damage report concluded that all the microphones were installed before the U.S. Government took possession of the chancery building in 1953.

(c) Receptivity and Audibility of Microphones

NOSENKO made the following evaluations of the quality of intercept received from the chancery microphone installations:

11 June 1962: "They are dying, the microphones, and we cannot do anything about it, because we can't get into the Embassy [to make new installations]. In that respect your Embassy and the British Embassy are the only ones we can't get into."

14 June 1962: "The most interesting materials, of course, are from the...[Note: one or two words on the tape are unintelligible here; from earlier and subsequent remarks, particularly one on 24 January 1964 (see below), it is clear that NOSENKO is speaking of the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office.] And I tell you honestly that it is becoming increasingly difficult to work with this. The shayba [microphone], as we call them, is fading and only two or three people are able to make out what is being said. That is, the tape sounds as if somewhere far, far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaking in a whisper. It is very difficult to hear, very difficult when it is fading. But, what can you do? They tell us categorically and directly--KUZMIN, the Chief of the section of the Second Special Department responsible for this, tells us that soon we will not have anything there. There are a great number of microphones there, but they don't work. I know that there are about 20 microphones there that don't work. They have all gone deaf."

24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of interference [probably speaking of machine noise]. From this point [pointing at the list, but not stating which microphone he was speaking about] the reception became progressively weaker until it finally stopped: evidently it wore out. Yes, there was another point in the bar on the 8th floor. This one never worked even though it was installed. Thus, out of the eleven points, nine were working...[NOSENKO then referred to information he learned in 1962 and 1963, after leaving the U.S. Embassy Section.] GRYAZNOV said that the equipment is deteriorating and they are only getting snatches of conversation and that in a year or two they will be completely inoperative. GRIBANOV is insisting on getting to [recruiting] code clerks at all costs."

31 January 1964: "Here in HORBALY's and BROWN's room [office of the Agricultural Attaches], there is no acoustical [sic] and nothing comes from here. I'll come back to this, but they complained that they're not getting anything. [These microphones were installed] when this building was being built. It wasn't later after you had moved into the building, but when the building was under construction...[NOSENKO was asked whether more or fewer than nine microphones are now currently active.] It couldn't be more, anyhow."

14 May 1964: Very interesting information was heard from Minister Counsellor FREERS' office, NOSENKO said, "but for the last years, even in 1960 and 1961, it was very

difficult to hear. I was sitting with [S.G.] DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of the Second Special Department] and they told me how difficult it was. The mike was dying. Only very experienced interpreters were sitting on this. They listened 10, 15, even 20 times to the same place [on the tape]....[After 1961] GRYAZNOV was telling me that they were getting almost nothing from this point. [He said this] in 1962, 1963. I was thinking you had given a command [had cautioned FREERS]. We were getting almost nothing. I heard this from GRYAZNOV several times in 1963. The mikes were working not bad at all in 1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Navy, Air Force.... I don't know [how reception was in 1962]. I know only that GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting little, little, and almost nothing. He said we are losing everything. We have no materials. We have little, little pieces, but nothing...in general [from all of the microphones]." NOSENKO then speculated that one reason for this was the fact that the Americans in the Embassy were not saying anything significant, but he said he did not know this to be the case. Speaking of the microphone in GLEYSTEEN's office, he said: "There was something heard. In 1960 and 1961 it was working I remember. Reception was good but there was no secret information. The mike in HORBALY's room was good in 1960 and 1961....1960 and 1961--good reception." According to NOSENKO, reception was good from the State Department code and teletype room "only always the sounds of [teletype] machines. In 1960 and 1961--machines only....Reception was good when conversation came through. I don't know [about reception in 1962 and 1963]....Reception was good [from the military code room] in 1960 and 1961."

On-site tests made by American technicians after the 1964 discoveries determined that the following microphones in the chancery (the occupants listed are those as of December 1960) were inoperative or unintelligible, but the USIB damage report emphasized that it had not been possible to determine how long these microphones had been inoperative:

- -one microphone in the apartment of the senior Naval Attache;
- -three microphones in the apartment of the senior Air Attache;
- -one microphone in the apartment of the Economic Counsellor;
- -the microphone in the office of the Publications Procurement Officer;
- -the microphone in the Marine bar;
- -the microphone in the Internal Affairs office
- -the microphone in the Ambassador's office;
- -the microphone in the office of the Security Officer;
- -the microphone in the office of the Chief of Chancery;
- -the microphone in the office of the Air Attache;
- -the microphone in the office of the Assistant Air Attache;
- -the microphone in the office of the Assistant Naval Attaches;
- -the microphone in the Navy administrative office;
- -the microphone in the Air Force administrative office.

This list includes the office of the Ambassador (from which NOSENKO said no intercepts were being received in 1960 and

1961) and the office of the Security Officer (where NOSENKO has said no microphone was installed).* On-site recordings made from twelve selected microphones in 1964 indicate that the microphone in the office occupied by the Minister Counsellor in 1960 was capable of producing tapes of "high intelligibility" as of 1964. The 1964 tests of the microphones in the military and State Department code rooms in the office of the Naval Attache also produced recordings of high intelligibility. As pointed out below, however, the possible production by the code room microphones would have been sharply reduced by the installation of acoustical rooms during 1962.

---

*As noted in Part VI.D.3.e., NOSENKO reported that the U.S. Embassy officer Richard HARMSTONE did not report his having been approached by the KGB for recruitment in May 1959. HARMSTONE did, in fact, report the approach, and the report was made in the office of the Security Officer.

(d) Amount, Type, and Value of Production

Evaluations of the quality of production have been given by NOSENKO as well as U.S. authorities concerned with the microphones in the chancery building.

NOSENKO's Statements

11 June 1962: "Well, perhaps, there would be some kind of fitness report [kharakteristika]. Sometimes there the Counsellor, FREERS, who was there before McSWEENEY, dictated something; he said that so-and-so has such-and-such weaknesses. We had not known that. We are listening to your military attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machinery and what targets interest them--always....They chatter sometimes. Some of the things they say are surprising [from the point of view of security]. They discuss, among other things, where to go, what to see, what to take with them--electronic equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely certain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take it, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955, but now you have better apparatus....What do we do [when we know the attaches are taking special equipment]? Well, they are getting ready to go and we hear that such-and-such data interests them. We give them disinformation; we make them think, for example, that there are rockets there. And there's absolutely nothing there, understand? Absolutely nothing. We make it appear on the radio [by spurious transmissions] that there are rockets there; we even have patrols standing there and everything....They talk about interesting things, but never in my life have I heard a conversation about agent operations, not once."

12 June 1962: [Speaking again about coverage of the U.S. Service Attaches] "They say: 'Today, let's go to such-and-such a place.' They go to the military attache, the two assistants, and say: 'This region is interesting. They have something there.' We know it at once. I personally telephone surveillance at once and tell the Chief of the department to come at once. He arrives and I say: 'Throw in three, four, five brigades [surveillance teams].' We work almost openly against the attaches....FREERS, Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around in his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this is very important material. We do not know the cipher, but he dictates Top Secret and Confidential cables [in the clear]. We receive the clear text and decide at once whether there is anything serious there or not. If we decide that this must be reported to the [KGB] Chairman immediately, GRIBANOV may call him right away."

24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything because of interference [teletype machine noise]....We didn't get much out of the [military] code room; we could hear [the code clerk James] STORSBERG swearing on occasion, and then he would mention a group of numbers.* This was, of course,

---

*See Part V.E.3.c. on the STORSBERG case.

all recorded, and we turned it over at once to the Eighth Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding."

14 May 1964: Discussing the list drawn up by KOVSHUK and ~~the decision~~ to withdraw U.S. Embassy Section requirements for full-time monitoring of certain microphones, NOSENKO quoted KOVSHUK: "We are getting information from the rooms of the attaches, the Counsellor, and the Agricultural Attache. The flats [Embassy apartments]--no; the bar--nothing. Of course, I know it is necessary to keep the room of the code clerks in spite of the fact that there is seldom anything received except several numbers. The code clerk is saying aloud several numbers. But the flats you can take, not permanently, but temporarily." NOSENKO then continued: "KOVSHUK said to give them these flats....But you see, nothing was going on in these flats. They weren't speaking or were talking about steak and eggs. There was nothing of interest from an operating standpoint. Sometimes we heard there would be guests. Okay. There is a possibility to hear something. In this case we would call DMITRIYEV [English-language Section of Second Special Department] and say: 'This evening, this day, this flat. Maybe we will get something.' The mikes were working not bad at all in 1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Naval, Air Force. When the man was alone we heard nothing. But when two or three men were sitting in the rooms, the assistants, we heard. For example, when they returned from a trip and discussed what they had seen or when they were preparing for a trip.... But we heard nothing about agents."

Later on this occasion the following diagogue took place:

NOSENKO: GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting little, little, almost nothing. He said we are losing everything. We have no materials. We have little, little pieces, but nothing.

Question: Was he talking about the Military Attaches?

NOSENKO: In general. I think they were speaking very little. God knows. Then, you see, we were thinking they were taking new measures. GRYAZNOV, FEDOSEYEV, and KOVSHUK considered that there was a room-in-a-room--a room [acoustic] for the meeting.

Question: When did you first hear about the room-inside-the-room?

NOSENKO: First it was known when, I think, Eisenhower was going to come.* In 1960 or 1961 we had information that the Embassy had such a chamber made out of steel....In 1960 and 1961 the mike in GLEYSTEEN's office was working, I remember. Reception was good, but there was no secret information. I don't know [about reception from this mike in 1962].

---

*President Eisenhower's trip to the USSR was scheduled for the summer of 1960 but was cancelled over the U-2 incident on 2 May 1960.

Question: What about GRYAZNOV's statement [concerning diminishing production of the Embassy microphones]?

NOSENKO: This was only one common phrase. He didn't tell which room. I think he was speaking about the group...

Question: How was production from the mikes in HORBALY's office?

NOSENKO: Not good, but we did get something which made us suspect he was connected with intelligence. HORBALY.

Question: What about the code room and teletype office?

NOSENKO: At State, yes. Only always the sounds of machines in 1960 and 1961. Machines only. Three times during these two years maybe somebody said one phrase or one of the guys said several numbers.

Question: What about the military [code] area?

NOSENKO: The reception was good. He [STORSBERG] seldom spoke. Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself. And sometimes a mechanic of code machines came to him, a military guy, a sergeant [William HURLEY, an Army Warrant Officer]. They said two or three phrases. "Did you check this?" "Yes." "This side good." Et cetera.

Question: In all this time that you read all this material, there must have been something that impressed you as extremely valuable.

NOSENKO: Extremely valuable--nothing. A little was interesting from FREERS' room. It was given to the special group of GRIBANOV. They were writing special information to the [KGB] Chairman to the [CPSU] Central Committee. There were political questions, for example.

26 January 1965: The following is taken from an interrogation protocol signed by NOSENKO: "I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from January 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only information which I can remember as being important, interesting or operationally useful to the KGB:

a. From the microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government and advised the State Department on positions for negotiations with the USSR. This information was of such importance that special reports were written to the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, I cannot remember any specific incidents or events which these cables reported nor any specific evaluations or recommendations made in these cables.

b. Also from the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve officers in the Embassy. I cannot remember who any of these officers were or any details from the reports. There was nothing in these reports which was interesting or useful to the KGB.

c. From the microphone in the Military Attache's office I remember that the Military Attaches regularly discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the targets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed the results of these trips after their return. However, I cannot remember any information about specific trips planned by specific Military Attache personnel or any specific targets that they planned to cover or any specific results from any trip. I do not remember any specific operational activity taken by the organs of the KGB against Military Attaches on trips within the USSR which was based on information obtained from this microphone. There was no interesting, important, or useful information about the personal or professional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone in the Military Attache's office (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this microphone.

d. I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally a code clerk would read numbers. These numbers were only of interest to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryptology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations from this microphone. There was no information from this microphone on any of the code clerks which was interesting, important, or useful to the U.S. Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB.

During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed the production from all the microphones in the American Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points noted in the above paragraphs."

28 January 1965: "In 1960 and 1961 I don't remember any report from the mikes about agents. Never. Nothing about work with agents or work with contacts. But FREERS or WALMSLEY [Minister Counsellor 1954-1956] were dictating interesting opinions of the Embassy concerning the political situation and this material was looked at by the information group and then they were preparing special reports for KHRUSHCHEV."

Evaluation by Others

Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961, has been interviewed concerning the microphone discoveries. (In the spring of 1961, Colonel HOFFMAN was succeeded by Colonel URBAN as Army Attache.) While in Moscow, Colonel HOFFMAN occupied room 1008, where the first microphone was found and his statements below relate to matters presumed to be of general and specific interest to the U.S. Embassy Section during the period when NOSENKO claims to have been its Deputy Chief.*

> "James H. STORSBERG [military code clerk] was dating a foreign national, I believe a secretary in the British Embassy, name not recalled. On one or two occasions, he was needed either to decode or to encode for dispatching a message and was not available. He would be off with his girl friends, and we couldn't find him. He was verbally reprimanded in my office in regard to the two incidents of absenteeism.
>
> "M/Sgt. Peter BINDER [manager of America House] and I discussed frequently the administrative problems encountered in his operation of the America House. We also discussed the importance of his keeping me informed of the conditions, personality problems, drinking habits, and any other incident of importance that might occur in the America House or the America House club. All discussions were conducted in my office.
>
> "In May or June 1961, James C. KEYSERS [military code clerk] was found to have allowed one or more male members of...a U.S. ice review entertainment group touring the Bloc countries to spend the night in his room at America House. He was suspected of homosexual activities, and he admitted to me being a participant in homosexual activities. I believe these admissions and my entire discussion with KEYSERS took place in room 9, identified now as the shielded code room, located on the ninth floor of the Embassy. I gave SAVAGE [his enlisted administrative assistant] verbal instructions in my office to immediately prepare the necessary paper work for removing KEYSERS from the station and instructed him to inform ACSI by cable as to the details of the incident.
>
> "I remember...a discussion I held with the U.S. Air Attache in his office [where a KGB microphone was located] concerning homosexual activities on the part of two of the Air Force enlisted personnel on station... The discussion in his office concerned the administrative procedures necessary in removing the individuals from Station.

---

*Apart from his general duties as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO bore special responsibilities for each of the persons mentioned by Colonel HOFFMAN: He supervised the KGB officers operating against code clerks and the residents of America House, and he personally participated in approaches to the two code clerks named, STORSBERG and KEYSERS. The STORSBERG and KEYSERS cases are discussed in Part V.B.3.c.

> [Summing up] "To be perfectly frank, I would assume that...some of our modus operandi, some of our targets, some of the results, and all of our personal weaknesses were compromised. This is not a very definite answer; however, it is the best estimate I can make."

In its general introduction, the USIB damage report states: "Although there has been no observable indication that the Soviets have acted in any manner to the detriment of the United States based upon information considered possibly compromised, it must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetration, the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to the United States. The Soviets have gained considerable knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache collection program. Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority intelligence and probable Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions. The Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable information concerning the personal habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future."

The following extract from the USIB damage report concerns the declining value of the production from the microphones in 1962 and 1963.*

> "The security practices and procedures appear to have followed a pattern from April 1953 to May 1960, at which time the first plastic room was installed. A change occurred in the work habits in that the more senior State Department officers utilized the plastic room for sensitive discussions and dictation. The room could accommodate only a limited portion of the Embassy classified discussions and accordingly, a number of classified discussions were held outside this secure area. In the April 1953-May 1960 period it was an accepted practice for the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to discuss openly in their offices routine classified operations of the Embassy and to dictate classified documents and telegrams....In September 1962, the second acoustic room was erected for the typing section for the handling of sensitive classified material. From December 1963 to date it was indicated that no classified telegrams have been dictated

---

*As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that in 1962 and 1963 he learned there was almost no production from the Embassy microphones. One reason was the natural decline in efficiency of equipment installed ten years previously; the KGB believed that other reasons were the installation of acoustic rooms in the Embassy and tightened security procedures.

outside of the acoustic rooms....The military attaches reported that most cables were drafted in longhand or typed by the originator and then turned over to the code clerks for transmission. In certain instances cables were dictated in the offices. There were many discussions in the offices relating to official duties, office routine, proposed travel, personal observations and normal office talk not specifically in themselves considered classified. From 1953 to 1959, sensitive classified matters were discussed in whispers or to the accompaniment of external noises, such as radios and street noises....In 1959 a secure inner room was constructed in the attache section and has since been utilized for classified discussions and debriefings...."

(iii) Microphones in the North Wing

According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio devices were installed in the north wing (as distinct from the chancery) of the U.S. Embassy prior to its occupancy in 1962. (For this reason, NOSENKO advised CIA in 1962 to transfer its sensitive offices gradually--to protect NOSENKO's security--from the chancery to the north wing at the Embassy.) He has commented several times on this subject, and these remarks are presented below.

11 June 1962: "The Embassy is now located on Chaykovskiy Street. When they decided to give the north wing to the Embassy, I wrote an entire report about it. SHELEPIN was still there then [as KGB Chairman. I proposed that] equipment be installed in the walls, gave the justification for this, etc. SHELEPIN wrote: 'Is it worth it?' At the time there was an improvement in mutual relations (between the Soviet Union and the United States). SHELEPIN was a good lad, but feared that...and before this you found 18 or 20 microphones in the new building in Warsaw.* SHELEPIN wrote: 'Is it worth it? We now have good relations with America. It isn't worth it.' He didn't want complications. And then time was lost. Two or three months passed and we again wanted to try it. SHELEPIN also wanted to, but it was already too late. ABIDIAN was going there all the time, the Security Officer. It was already too late because this can be done only while the building is being built. When the windows and doors have been begun it is already too late... The north wing was almost ready. We don't have anything there. So, you should move the Minister Counsellor there. Move him to the north wing from his present office... Don't do it at once. Do it slowly. Don't hurry; don't be in a hurry. Have him say that he doesn't like this room and wants to move there... We hear all the military attaches--the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, and the Air Force Attache--in Moscow. Everything is recorded. But again, don't do anything at once. Don't make any (sudden) changes. Quietly transfer one and then another there (to the north wing), the attache himself and his assistants... You must be very, very clever and very, very foxy... Gradually, gradually move them to the north wing of the building, to the north wing, in which we have absolutely nothing and won't have anything."

31 January 1964: "When the construction of this right (north) wing had begun, when you started the right wing, the new addition to the building, there was a plan to install as many (microphones) as possible--thirty, forty--stick them everywhere. It really wasn't important how many of them would really work. The Committee (KGB) Chairman at that time was SHELEPIN. He didn't go for this. Whether it was the flap with the Poles that happened just before that* or whether it was something else or whether it was the international situation, they were afraid that this may be uncovered. But then, later, when the building was finished, and when you were finishing or putting up the addition yourself, at that point it was too late to put these things in. It was impossible to do it."

---

* NOSENKO is referring to the discovery in June of 1960 of 19 microphones in the new U.S. Embassy in Warsaw.

After being told by CIA on 31 January 1965 that a lead cable had been found in the north wing, NOSENKO said: "I personally can assure you that nothing was done in that right wing. Nothing, absolutely nothing. There was nothing done there, so it must have been something else."

No extensive counter-audio checks have yet been carried out in the north wing of the U.S. Embassy, and no wired microphones have been found there. Investigation of the microphones in the main section of the Embassy led, however, to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing. The USIB damage report stated: "Three coaxial cables were discovered running parallel to the one-hundred-and-one pair audio cable from the North Annex roof area to the basement of the North Annex...[All three cables were severed by American technicians in 1964.] The cable runs were as follows:

> "1. The first coaxial cable...terminated under six inches of reinforced concrete in the North Annex attic. The center conductor was connected to the lead sheath of the 20-pair and of the 30 pair cable which in turn come from the east face of the chancery. The shield of the coaxial cable was unconnected.
>
> "2. The second coaxial cable...followed the same path as the first coaxial cable. The shield was unterminated. The center conductor was terminated in an insulated metal grill. The grill is located in the upper crust of the North Annex attic floor with the long dimension in juxtaposition to the old common wall between the Chancery and the North Annex. The long dimension is normal to the street in front of the Embassy. The grill is made of one centimeter steel reinforcing rods spot welded into a mesh of 15 cm. (5.9 inches). The overall dimensions of the grill are 14'4" by 4'7". The coaxial cable was connected to one corner of the grill....The grill is located as close as possible to the old common wall and is about thirty feet below the State Department code room. The grill 'points' in the general direction of the code room as the plane of the grill is parallel to the plane of the ground.
>
> "3. The third coaxial cable ran along the approximate path of the other coaxial cables to the block of reinforced concrete that contains the grill mentioned above. This coaxial cable terminated in a four-inch piece of fine Lits wire. The shield of the coaxial cable was unterminated...".

The damage report added: "The coaxial cables appear to be of recent installation probably prior to Russian evacuation of the North Annex. The outer shields of all the coaxial cables were carefully insulated."

The coaxial cables and their terminations were evaluated as follows in the damage report: "All tests that have been performed indicate that the grill work and the lead sheaths [of] the cables 20 and 30 pairs were used as antennas.... No function has been determined for the third coaxial cable which terminated in a short piece of Lits wire....The location of the grill in such close proximity to the State Department Code Room indicated that an operation was directed against that area....The lead sheath may have had other uses. The possible uses that have been suggested are listed below. The most likely use is as an antenna although the other possibilities have not been completely discarded.

"a. Antenna for collection effort directed against code room.

"b. Antenna for use in connection with some other surveillance device or technique.

"c. An alarm system to 'protect' the microphone system.

"d. Part of a hum removal system connected with the microphone installation.

"e. Not in use."

(iv) Monitoring/Jamming Beam

NOSENKO was questioned on 31 January 1964 about the so-called "Moscow Signal." (This is an "S" band signal that has been directed against the top floors--the "secure area"--of the U.S. Embassy since the early 1950's from an apartment building located about 200 feet away. Detailed investigation of the signal has been underway since October 1962, but its exact nature and purpose have not yet been established. Although there is some speculation that the signal is meant for harassment purposes only, the view now generally accepted by U.S. technicians is that it has some intelligence-collection function. No change in the signal has been noted since the discovery and the cutting of the cables referred to in the preceding section.) The interview went as follows:

NOSENKO: There is a beam, there is a ray which works against the Embassy. I know.

Question: Do you know what it is?

NOSENKO: No, I don't. But I know that they work and they put things in, and they listen and they do something, and they...

Question: (Interrupting.) Is it successful, is it working?

NOSENKO: Yes, they keep working all the time. Perhaps periodically, but it's working. Yes, there is something in the back of the Embassy on this Chaykovskiy Street, and there is something in front of the Embassy, too.

Question: And it is for listening in?

NOSENKO: No, it's in order to deprive you of working with stationary equipment.

Question: What do you mean--so that our receivers wouldn't operate properly?

NOSENKO: Look, I'm not a specialist. I don't know the details. I know only that the work is being done in this particular area, in this particular direction. But what they do, I don't really know.

Question: But this is not for the purpose of obtaining information?

NOSENKO: Let's say you go on the air. So we find out whether you're listening in on some of our communications or something like this.

Question: To what extent would you in your [American] Department, in your [U.S. Embassy] Section, know about these technical aspects? Would you have to know it? Would you know the details of these things?

NOSENKO: No. No. This is something that the members of the [KGB] Eighth Directorate [responsible for communications and ciphers] should concern themselves with, the ones who work in OTU. This doesn't concern us in the American Department, in the U.S. Embassy Section.

Questioned again later, NOSENKO said that the signal was used to jam U.S. equipment working in the Embassy building. It was this system, he said, which had determined that the Americans had intercepted some GRU agent radio communications. The beam was designed "both to monitor and to jam" transmissions from the Embassy. NOSENKO repeated that "not being a specialist" he was ignorant of the technical nature of the job, or any further details.

Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request, NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his true name for all travel abroad.

c. The Cuba TDY (1960)

In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first mentioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the question of whether he had ever visited Germany: "I have been in Germany. Yes, yes. I was in Cuba in '61. Well, as NIKOLAYEV. I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it over to see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me to prepare, so to speak, an accounting on how things were going. I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just on you. Everyone there is working for you. One, two, three, five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amount. I could go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me. The fellows reported: 'He [an American] is there.' My mission was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days, but for a month or two, to provide an opinion... I worked pretty cleverly on them. He [the American] would go to a restaurant. They would say to me: 'He is at such-and-such a restaurant and can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in the mirror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc., etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an intelligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences with them [the Cubans]. They didn't know a thing... They had turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The Communist Party complicates it."

In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in 1962 the subject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO recalled that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba and that his function there was that of security officer.

Question: When did you travel to Cuba?

NOSENKO: 1960, November and December 1960.

Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV?

NOSENKO: No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain how this happened. I was supposed to go to America, sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan, automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been submitted for coordination and, in particular, my name had been given to the American Embassy there [Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that this delegation could be accepted, but a little later. And my passport had already been issued. My passport had already been signed authorizing travel abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to

---

* The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January 1961.

Her job was simply to inform us in case something interesting happens and somebody interesting comes to the library, but practically nobody ever went to the library. Then, what could she tell us about these sergeants that were taking Russian lessons, that she was supposed to be reporting on? In the first place, they were lazy bums. They would go to a lesson once and then miss the next two and then perhaps go again, and again miss one or two." In September 1964 NOSENKO added that LEVINA had never been targetted against any particular individual and had never provided any interesting reports on her American contacts. At the end of 1960 or in the beginning of 1961, NOSENKO said, she was released from the Embassy by Paul SMITH, possibly because she was a little deaf and one had to speak loudly to her to be understood.* NOSENKO turned LEVINA over to another officer before he returned to the Tourist Department, and later the British Department was planning to use her in either the British or Canadian Embassies.

---

* CIA records show that LEVINA was employed at the Embassy as a librarian from January 1958 through January 1962, when she was released. Paul SMITH was Second Secretary of the Embassy in charge of the Cultural Affairs Section and Publications Procurement Officer from May 1959 until approximately September 1961, when he left Moscow.

4. Overseas Assignments

a. Attempt to Obtain Assignment in Ethiopia (1960)

During the first half of 1960, NOSENKO said, he applied for a permanent overseas assignment to Ethiopia because doctors had prescribed a change of climate for his daughter Oksana's asthma. O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, approved his request, but then the KGB Personnel Department turned it down when a file review revealed potentially dangerous character weaknesses.

NOSENKO described this matter on 14 April 1964 as follows: "Gennadiy GRYAZNOV came to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1958. Before 1956 he was studying in the Higher School of the KGB and when he finished the school in 1956 he was assigned to the KGB Personnel Department, and then he came to the American Department in 1958. So GRYAZNOV had very good connections in the Personnel Department. So in 1960, when I wanted to leave, to go abroad on permanent assignment I said to GRIBANOV: 'Let me go for two years to Ethiopia.' When the Personnel Department refused to let me go, I decided I'd just have to know what was there in my personal file. I had to learn what it was that was causing all this. By that time GRYAZNOV was in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate and happened to be the head of the Party Organization of the entire directorate, and he at one time had worked in the Personnel Office himself. He said: 'Give me this thing and I'll see what I can find out about it.' So he went to the Personnel Department and through his friend there got my personal file. Then he gave me a call and said to come over. I went to his office and he locked the door. Of course, he couldn't give me this file, couldn't let me hold it in my hands so to speak. So he read this case to me, this 1954 case to me, about the woman and so forth,* and then said that at that time they made an investigation of my previous residence. And they found out that while I was studying at the Institute [of International Affairs] and was living on Pervaya Meschanskaya Street, all sorts of girls visited me; different girls, a new girl would visit me almost every week. This was in my file. Then this case that took place in 1954. And then in 1960--and, incidentally, GRIBANOV mentioned this to me also--the file said that I was drinking quite a bit, and for this reason I had many fights with my wife. And that was all that appeared in my file. Nothing else, whatsoever, besides these things that I just mentioned."

b. U.S. Visa Application (1960)

NOSENKO's true name appeared with 11 others on a 20 October 1960 request to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for visas for members of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled to visit the United States in mid-November 1960.* NOSENKO was listed as an engineer employed by the State Scientific-Technical Committee (GNTK). After defecting, NOSENKO told CIA that he had been scheduled to accompany this delegation as a security officer but that the delegation's visit to the United States had been postponed at the last moment. He therefore did not travel to this country.

---

* NOSENKO is referring to the incident he says took place in 1954 when he used KGB alias documentation to conceal his true identity while seeking treatment for venereal disease. See Part IV.B.

He further explained, on 17 April 1964, why his visa application had been submitted in true name and under a different cover: "In 1957 and 1958 I went to London as NIKOLAYEV representing the Ministry of Culture. Then in 1959 I didn't go anywhere. Then when this question came up of my going to the States in 1960, I said: 'I'm not going. I've been going under the Ministry of Culture [cover] and with sports delegations. This has to be changed somehow at this point.' So we thought about it and finally somebody said: 'Look, how about this? Perhaps [you can use] this committee of RUDNEV's [GNTK].' So I said: 'Well, it's up to you. You decide.' By that time my passport was ready, but the Americans and the Soviets hadn't come to an agreement yet. It was decided that this delegation would go to the U.S. in 1961." NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have used the NIKOLAYEV name for his trip to the United States. He replied: "Sure, I could have gone as NIKOLAYEV, but I just didn't want to. Because, look, it was known to us that the British and American Intelligence exchange information on people they suspect of being KGB, and that the British, of course, had probably watched me when I was in England [in 1957 and 1958] and probably there it was noticed that here's this man under the cover of Ministry of Culture. He's not a sportsman. It kind of looks suspicious. Then he goes to the Soviet Embassy. Also suspicious. So then I have to go to the States. And if I go as NIKOLAYEV I couldn't use--in that case I couldn't use the same cover of Ministry of Culture because of the type of the delegation. I'd have to use a different cover. So I'd go there and they'd say: 'Aha, here's NIKOLAYEV under different cover now.' But if I go as NOSENKO, the British never heard the name. Nobody knows the name. Everything would be O.K." NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have travelled under some other alias. He answered: "That's the way it was decided. I guess so as not to get all mixed up they decided to send me as NOSENKO anyway. It's up to the people who are in charge of these operations. They are the ones who decide."**

---

* This visa application was submitted approximately six months after the KGB rejected his request for PCS assignment to Ethiopia.

** With regard to his trips to England in 1957 and 1958, NOSENKO said that he had been forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV because this was the name he had used with British citizens [redacted] when they visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1957; he could not, he said, have shown up in England with another name as [redacted] upon their return from the USSR (see Part V.D.4.d.). This apparently was not a consideration when selecting a name for the U.S. visa application, for NOSENKO had used the name SERGEYEV in his approach to American George DREW in 1959 (Part V.D.4.h.) and the name PETERSON when he recruited Professor Gerard MERTENS, also in 1959 (Part V.D.4.1.). NOSENKO was in contact with Arsene FRIPPEL under the name NIKOLAYEV during this period. NOSENKO and other sources have said that the KGB suspected that FRIPPEL was an American agent (see Part V.D.5.).

Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request, NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his true name for all travel abroad.

c. The Cuba TDY (1960)

In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first mentioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the question of whether he had ever visited Germany: "I have been in Germany. Yes, yes. I was in Cuba in '61. Well, as NIKOLAYEV. I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it over to see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me to prepare, so to speak, an accounting on how things were going. I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just on you. Everyone there is working for you. One, two, three, five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amount. I could go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me. The fellows reported: 'He [an American] is there.' My mission was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days, but for a month or two, to provide an opinion... I worked pretty cleverly on them. He [the American] would go to a restaurant. They would say to me: 'He is at such-and-such a restaurant and can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in the mirror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc., etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an intelligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences with them [the Cubans]. They didn't know a thing... They had turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The Communist Party complicates it."

In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in 1962 the subject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO recalled that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba and that his function there was that of security officer.

Question:	When did you travel to Cuba?
NOSENKO:	1960, November and December 1960.
Question:	Under the name NIKOLAYEV?
NOSENKO:	No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain how this happened. I was supposed to go to America, sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan, automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been submitted for coordination and, in particular, my name had been given to the American Embassy there [Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that this delegation could be accepted, but a little later. And my passport had already been issued. My passport had already been signed authorizing travel abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to

---

* The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January 1961.

go to Cuba. GRIBANOV's deputy [S.G.] BANNIKOV, said that a worker [KGB officer] should be sent. But they decided not to send a worker to Cuba. "Why bother?" [they said]. "Is Cuba worth it?" Suddenly there was a phone call from the Central Committee [of the Communist Party]. Someone from the Central Committee said: "No, there is a directive that one of our workers must go nevertheless." And only two days remained before the departure of the delegation. Who could they send?

Question: The first person they come across.

NOSENKO: Those who have passports. I had a passport. I was ready. And they decided: "Get going immediately." We flew through Amsterdam, through Geneva. We spent a night in Amsterdam and then made a short stop in Geneva, then the Azores, Santa Maria Island, then we were supposed to fly to Curacao. But we had a headwind and the pilots were evidently afraid that we wouldn't have enough fuel. So the plane went out of its way and made a landing on the island of Barbados. This was not a Soviet plane, but KLM. We flew to Amsterdam on a TU-104 and then went by KLM. Then from Curacao we flew to Aruba. We also spent a night in Aruba, an interesting island; the water and natural surroundings are beautiful. From Aruba we flew through Kingston, through Jamaica, and then to Cuba. And we flew the same route back, but we did not spend the night in Curacao. From Curacao we landed in Caracas for about 40 minutes, and through Paramaribo--Dutch Guiana--across the ocean, some island or another there, and from there again Lisbon, Geneva, and Amsterdam. But here the entire delegation flew [to Moscow] after a day or two and I took a train through West Germany [to East Berlin].

All of NOSENKO's accounts since contacting CIA in 1964 have been generally consistent with that given on 14 June 1962. His story has been as follows: In the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan, the Soviet State Planning Commission, was preparing for departure to Cuba. The delegation was a routine one, consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the Soviet Union, and since there was no one under any sort of suspicion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of the Second Chief Directorate had decided that it would not be necessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided that a Second Chief Directorate case officer must go along. Because of the short time remaining before the scheduled departure of the delegation, the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suitable person and get all the necessary papers ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department said: "Just a minute. We have a man who has his passport all ready. His passport has been formalized. NOSENKO. He was supposed to go to the States... and his foreign passport has been issued and signed. Why don't you take him?" NOSENKO's statement continued: "So somebody said: 'How about a visa?' And KUZNETSOV says 'Never mind. The Cubans will give him an entry visa.' And then I had to get a transit visa because we were flying through Amsterdam. And this whole thing was taken care of in two days. The Cubans gave their visa immediately and The Netherlands issued their visa also right away."

NOSENKO has reported that his functions with this delegation were purely of a security nature. He flew with the delegation to Cuba in October or November and spent about a month and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delegation everywhere it went: "I was with the delegation. They go to a plant--I go with them to the plant. I was with them all the time. They went to different plants, to watch the production. They met with some representatives of the so-called Institute of Agrarian Reform. They would meet with these people and they would have many discussions about how to increase production." NOSENKO's cover assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly before departing Moscow he was introduced to the other members as such. He had one agent within the delegation and developed several "confidential contacts" during the trip, which turned out to be entirely uneventful and, for NOSENKO, somewhat long and dull. He explained that he would not have accepted the assignment had he known how long the trip was to be, and that he had really wanted to go only to the United States.

On his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB Legal Resident in Cuba, A.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package with instructions to deliver it to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know the contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route home. There the wrappings became loose (it was bound only by thin string) and NOSENKO took the opportunity to determine that it contained copies of "letters between MIKOYAN and KHRUSHCHEV concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Arriving with his delegation at the airport in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that a message had been received from the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructing that the package was to be delivered "urgently" to Che GUEVARA, who was touring the Satellite countries and was then in Berlin. While the delegation continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO therefore was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train for East Berlin. When he arrived, however, he found that GUEVARA had left Berlin for Hungary. NOSENKO refused to go any further. The package was delivered to GUEVARA's deputy in Berlin, and NOSENKO then returned to Moscow.

CIA travel records show that NOSENKO, listed as a mineral engineer, transitted Amsterdam en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960; and that he transitted Caracas from Amsterdam on 17 November 1960; and that on 19 November 1960 he went through Caracas en route to Havana.* Our records also show that NOSENKO again arrived in Amsterdam en route to Moscow from Havana on 13 December 1960 and that he left for Moscow on 15 December. There is no record that he travelled to Berlin.**

---

* CIA obtained a photocopy of NOSENKO's passport while he was passing through Amsterdam and again through Caracas.

** It appears possible that his name was not removed from the original passenger manifest for the 15 December flight to Moscow and that his train trip to East Berlin went unnoticed.

d. The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case

In the spring of 1961, four months after returning from Cuba, NOSENKO was sent on temporary assignment for about a month to Sofia, the only trip he took in other than a security "watchdog" capacity. According to NOSENKO, it happened this way: "I think I first heard that I was going to Bulgaria, a week or so before I left, from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the section having contact with the counterintelligence representatives of the Countries of the Peoples' Democracies in Moscow... He said: 'You must go to Bulgaria. GRIBANOV has decided.' He asked, 'Do you know about this?' and I said 'No.' He said: 'KLYPIN [Chief of the American Department] must tell you.' But this was the first I had heard about it. YEGOROV said that the Minister of the Bulgarian MVR had requested the Chairman of the KGB to send an officer from the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate to Bulgaria for consultation with the American Department, Second Directorate of the MVR of Bulgaria. After one or two days KLYPIN told me about it. He repeated the same thing and after about one and a half weeks I flew to Sofia." The discussion continued as follows:

Question:	What plans were made for this trip in Moscow before you left? What briefings or discussions were held concerning what you were to do in Sofia?
NOSENKO:	I was told: "You are going for consultations. There are KGB advisors there. They will discuss it with you." No one was speaking with me about my trip.
Question:	What discussions did you have with your department chief, KLYPIN, about what you were to do on this trip?
NOSENKO:	Nothing. He told me: "You will go. You will see what they are doing. You will tell them how to work."
Question:	Did you have any meetings or discussions with the representatives of the Bulgarian MVR in Moscow before you left?
NOSENKO:	No.
Question:	What discussions did you have with YEGOROV or his section about what you were going to do in Sofia?
NOSENKO:	YEGOROV said: "You will go. You will tell us what they are doing."
Question:	Before you left Moscow for Sofia did you know anything about the size of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?
NOSENKO:	No. Nothing.
Question:	Did you know the names of any of the officers of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?
NOSENKO:	No.

Question: Did you know what any of their particular problems were?

NOSENKO: No. Nothing.

Question: Did you know just what was the area of responsibility of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?

NOSENKO: No. Nothing.

NOSENKO flew from Moscow in early April 1961 and was met at the airport in Sofia by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second Chief Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow.* The following morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian MVR building, not far away. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was told that "they want to know about how to work against the American Legation. He said he wanted me to tell them everything about how to work, right from letter 'A.'" NOSENKO was then introduced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he was assigned an office in the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks he discussed both general matters and particular cases with individual Bulgarian officers working against the American target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers on the principles of operations against foreign military personnel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR surveillance post opposite the American Legation. He discussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists. He also addressed the entire American Department for about five hours and told them "what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work." At the end of his visit, some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First Deputy Minister of the MVR about what had been accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations against Americans.

As an outgrowth of his TDY to Bulgaria, NOSENKO has provided one lead to a case in which he said he took personal part. About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of April 1961, NOSENKO was going over lists of foreigners who were scheduled to visit Bulgaria in the near future, and he came across the name Horace G. LUNT. NOSENKO recalled that a man named LUNT who was a Slavic linguist had been reported to him in 1958 or 1959 by one of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, as a possible homosexual. He asked the Bulgarians whether this man was a specialist in Slavic languages. When the Bulgarian officers replied in the affirmative, NOSENKO decided to check his recollection against KGB records and an immediate phone call was placed to Moscow, asking for traces.

---

* NOSENKO had earlier reported that KOZLOV had served as the Chief of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, until 1953 and that, until about two years before going to Bulgaria as a counterintelligence advisor, he had been Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. For the two years immediately prior to his Bulgarian assignment, he had been Secretary of the Party Organization of the Second Chief Directorate and was relieved of all other duties. Asked why KOZLOV was unable to "advise" the Bulgarians in this instance, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on higher levels and that he had been away from the work for a number of years.

A reply was received almost at once: "Yes. This is the same LUNT who was in Moscow. Homosexual." NOSENKO told CIA that the KGB had never done anything with its knowledge of LUNT's homosexual proclivities and that the Bulgarian MVR had not previously known of them.

NOSENKO's description of what happened next is as follows: "KOZLOV and the Chief of the American Department were very interested. KOZLOV said: 'George [NOSENKO], you must help them. They never recruited an American.' I said that I would do what I could. The three of us went to see General DUMKOV, the Chief of the Second Directorate, Bulgarian MVR. I asked them if they had a homosexual agent. They checked and said they had one who is an operational contact. O.K., I said, acquaint them, prepare a flat, make the pictures. This is the first stage. I also told them, of course, to find out how long he had been there, why, who his acquaintances were, etc. Then we went to YEGOROV, the senior Soviet advisor, and KOZLOV called GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV, I later found out, was in a meeting with the department chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and was not in a good mood. Why, I don't know. He didn't understand what KOZLOV was saying. GRIBANOV thought that I, myself, wanted to make the approach to LUNT. KOZLOV got confused on the phone. GRIBANOV asked to speak to me. I took the phone. 'What are you doing?' he said. 'You are not at home, you are abroad. You were sent only for consultations, but you are living as if you were at home.' I said: 'O.K., O.K. I wasn't going to do anything.' He hung up. I told KOZLOV that even if the Bulgarians were to ask me, I could not do it myself. YEGOROV became upset. He thought our position was bad because the Bulgarians were asking. 'What they ask, I will tell,' I said, 'but I am not leaving the office to go any place or do anything. I can only advise them on how to make the record entries after he is caught. I can dictate the questions to be asked. But the approach and recruitment I cannot do myself.'

"The Bulgarians never said anything to me about active participation, but they didn't know what to do. I told them to get two agents. Maybe LUNT wouldn't like the first one. The Bulgarians reported that LUNT wouldn't be there long. I told them that if they wanted to take pictures and make a pitch later, that's one thing. But if they wanted to do it all in one step, that is another. I told them they should consider the time element... The Chief of the American Department, KOVACHEV, and the chief of the section dealing with tourists and American delegations were to make the recruitment. The approach was made at the end of April, I think."

NOSENKO went on to say: "I was in the office during the approach. I told them I would not leave. 'If you need my advice,' I said, 'come to me.' KOZLOV and I were sitting in his office. It was the end of April, I think, and the next day I went on holiday. I don't know where or how they approached LUNT. I only advised them that after the first conversation with him they would know if he would be willing to cooperate. I said they should have an apartment ready... not far from Sofia. I told them that if he agreed, they should change the place right away. Take him some place nice to finish the conversation. That's what I suggested."

The outcome was not known to NOSENKO, for he said: "I didn't read any report of the results, and I didn't ask to see one. I took a neutral position. They said everything was O.K. The next day LUNT was to meet KOVACHEV and the section chief. I went on a little trip, the May holidays, part of 30 April, 1, 2, and 3 May. When I returned they said everything was O.K. and that he [LUNT] had left. I asked them what they had decided for the future, a contact in the United States or not. They said they decided against it because he was to come to Bulgaria in 1962 or 1963 for a Slavic conference."

This account, which NOSENKO gave on 6 October 1964, differs somewhat from what he had said earlier, on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. NOSENKO claimed then that he personally participated in the recruitment of LUNT against GRIBANOV's wishes: "They sent me in '61 to Bulgaria. The Minister of Internal Affairs there asked for a specialist to help them. I went to help. An [American] professor arrived, a very prominent specialist on the Slavic countries... They [the Bulgarians] had never tried [to recruit] an American. 'Let's try,' I said. The Soviet advisor in Bulgaria telephoned GRIBANOV and reported that NOSENKO had decided that it is possible to get this American. GRIBANOV was in a conference at the time. GRIBANOV said: "Where the hell's NOSENKO? Let me talk to him... What the hell are you doing? I sent you only as an advisor.' Then he hung up. What could I do? The Bulgarians had already made all preparations... I was embarrassed, but what could I do? I left the office of the advisor and they were waiting for me... I decided to go ahead. I was sure that it would work. I felt that it could be done, that this American could be firmly recruited... I spit on everything and went ahead with the Bulgarians. I told them to grab him. If it will be difficult for you, tell me and I myself can recruit him. Well, they began and I came there. He [NOSENKO is speaking of himself] was under the guise of a Bulgarian and spoke in English, although my English was poor... I said: 'You are a pederast.' He also proved himself to be a homosexual there [in Bulgaria]... 'Well, what will society think of you, those whose know you?' Well, what did this person decide? He agreed."

The first time NOSENKO said that he had not participated directly in this operation was on 2 February 1964, while still in Geneva. He volunteered the following: "In Bulgaria in April and May 1961, although I did not personally participate in this, I went there, and I helped them there with the whole process of recruitment of this professor. I helped the Bulgarians with what to do and how. He was the professor of philology, LUNT."

NOSENKO has also varied on the timing of the operation against LUNT. In the account quoted above, he said that the approach was made the day before he left on his May Day holiday. On 24 April 1964 he said: "I remember that it was at the very beginning of May that this name came up. And we got the information from Moscow the same day, telling us it was the same LUNT. I went on a trip the 1st, 2nd, 3rd of May. That is the 30th of April, 1st and 2nd of May, and the 3rd of May in the morning I was back. So it was in the very beginning after the night of the trip. And Moscow was called right away, given all the data, and they called back right away and said: 'Yes, this is the same LUNT who was in Moscow...' As soon as this was established, the next day the Bulgarians planted this homosexual on him. They planted this man either next to him or in the restaurant and, well, he met LUNT and they got together and decided to meet with each other the same day or the next day. This was all done very rapidly."

According to Professor LUNT, the approach actually took place on 5 May 1961, following a visit to Moscow where he had contacted an official in the U.S. Embassy. He travelled on 9 May directly from Sofia to Yugoslavia, where he at once reported the incident to U.S. Ambassador George KENNAN, an academic acquaintance. LUNT told the Ambassador, and later CIA, that he had visited Sofia on one earlier occasion, from 8 to 28 November 1960. During this first trip he became involved with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on at least five separate occasions and to whom he gave U.S. travellers checks, which ALEKSIEV intended to sell on the black market. On one occasion during the first visit ALEKSIEV was recognized and stopped by the Bulgarian civil police while walking on the street with LUNT. After leaving Bulgaria in November 1960, LUNT received two letters from ALEKSIEV and prior to his next visit, on 25 April 1961, LUNT wrote ALEKSIEV saying he would be returning.

5. Transfer to the Tourist Department in January 1962

In the autumn of 1961 a decision was reached, on the basis of NOSENKO's own request, to return him to the Tourist Department. GRIBANOV had originally wanted to promote NOSENKO from the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section to the post of Deputy Chief of the American Department; NOSENKO's superior and friend KOVSHUK had long had his eye on this job, however, and was the personal choice of the Chief of the American Department for it. (In fact, NOSENKO said, KOVSHUK had once held the job, losing it in 1959 because of some misbehavior.) NOSENKO did not want to be placed in the difficult situation which his own promotion to this post would have created. NOSENKO described his transfer in the February 1965 interrogations. The following is from a protocol signed on 26 February 1965:

> "The decision for me to return to the Seventh [Tourist] Department in January 1962 was actually made in about September or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First [American] Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of FEDOSEYEV, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had already spoken to [V.D.] CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the Seventh Department, about this matter and he had suggested that I go to GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Department as Chief of the First [American-British-Canadian] Section with the understanding that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this position would be vacated by [B.A.] BALDIN [who was retiring in July 1962]. ...GRIBANOV did not tell me his reasons... for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961 or for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He did not discuss with me my personal qualifications for each of these positions."

Aware of his impending transfer NOSENKO took the opportunity during December 1961 to spend several hours each day in the Tourist Department. There he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist Section, and discussed current operations and operational possibilities with the officers assigned to this section. The formal order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 December 1961 and NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file and the U.S. Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, G.I. GRYAZNOV, within the next few days.* As he had when he transferred from the Tourist to the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said, he took his active agents and his safehouse on Vorovskiy Street with him when he returned to the Tourist Department in 1962.

---

* These specific dates were arrived at under interrogation in February 1965. On all earlier occasions NOSENKO had said that he was transferred in January 1962 (or some later date); he said in February 1965 that he was "officially" transferred at the end of December and reported to his new position at the beginning of January (see below).

F. January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department)

1. Date of Transfer

NOSENKO has given different dates for the time when he left the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department to become Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department. During the Geneva meetings of 1962 he said on different occasions that this occurred in January 1962 and in February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 NOSENKO gave the date as 2 or 3 January 1962. He has also reported that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section for three months after John ABIDIAN serviced the Pushkin Street dead drop (on 30 December 1961, thus placing NOSENKO in the U.S. Embassy Section until late March 1962) and that he had transferred to the Tourist Department by the time GOLITSYN defected (which NOSENKO placed in mid-January 1962 but which actually occurred in mid-December 1961).* W.E. JOHNSON, the target of a Tourist Department operation** confirmed that NOSENKO approached him in Moscow on 5 January 1962.

In February 1965 NOSENKO said he recalled that the correct date of his approach to JOHNSON was on 5 January 1962. The CIA interviewer then reminded NOSENKO that he had earlier described on several occasions his visit to the dead drop site on Pushkin Street and his receipt of reports from the surveillance post for three months afterwards; during all of this period, NOSENKO had said, he was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the First Department. NOSENKO was told that CIA records show that ABIDIAN made only one visit to this dead drop site, on 30 December 1961, six days before the approach to JOHNSON. He answered only that he might have been confused, but despite any contradictions the "facts" (his emphasis) were the important thing, not any correlation of dates.

2. Functions and Activities

As Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department (hereafter in Part V.F. referred to as the American Tourist Section) from January to July 1962, NOSENKO said, he was responsible for planning and coordinating all KGB activities against such tourists in the USSR as well as for supervising the operational work of 15 subordinate case officers. He had no deputy. NOSENKO told CIA that he required several months at the beginning of 1962 "to get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the initial period on this new job, and plans for handling the influx of American tourists during the forthcoming 1962 season consisted of studying files and continuing to work against the tourists as in the past. NOSENKO was asked in February 1965 whether, in his first several months in the Tourist Department, he had originated any new methods for operations against American tourists. He replied that during this period he had proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist firms in Moscow with an eye toward the KGB attempting to recruit them.[*] This suggestion, NOSENKO said, had been accepted.

---

* Statements by NOSENKO about GOLITSYN are reviewed in Part VI.E., and ABIDIAN's servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.

** See Part V.F.4. for details on this operation.

In March 1965, NOSENKO was asked what new knowledge concerning the use of tourism for espionage purposes by foreign intelligence organizations had been acquired by the KGB during his two-year absence from the Tourist Department. He replied that the KGB had noted an increase in automobile tourism and that American Intelligence had increased its use of multinational tourist groups. NOSENKO was then asked what new information concerning the use of tourism as a cover for espionage activity had been obtained by the KGB from any agent source during this period. NOSENKO answered that he neither knew of any such new information nor had he heard of such an agent.[**]

NOSENKO has said that, in line with the wishes of the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, O.M. GRIBANOV, he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department in July 1962, immediately after his return from Geneva. A year later he was made First Deputy Chief of the Department, a promotion which involved only a change in title as there was no Second Deputy Chief at the time. Apart from saying he was V.D. CHELNOKOV's second-in-command from July 1962 to January 1964 and as such general supervisor of all KGB tourist operations, NOSENKO has not detailed the functions attached to this position; NOSENKO has not been questioned specifically concerning these duties.

NOSENKO's first operational activity after transferring to the American Tourist Section was supervision of a homosexual approach to W.E. JOHNSON on 5 January 1962. Additionally, during the 1962-64 period in the Tourist Department NOSENKO took part in the recruitment approach to Horst BRAUNS, in the interrogation of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN, and in the arrest of the American tour guide Bernard KOTEN. For a short time in 1963 he handled the KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, owner of a tourist agency in New York City[***] and a Russian language bookstore in Chicago, Illinois. By virtue of his supervisory position in the Tourist Department NOSENKO also became involved with John SHUBIN, a GRU agent. (These six cases - JOHNSON, BRAUNS, BARGHOORN, KOTEN, SVENCHANSKIY, and SHUBIN - are discussed below.) NOSENKO reported that his planned role in the approach to Natalie BIENSTOCK (see Part VI.D.2.) was prevented by his preparations to leave for Geneva in March 1962. Finally, NOSENKO said he participated in the KGB investigation of Lee Harvey OSWALD after President KENNEDY's assassination in November 1963 (see Part V.D.6.).

---

[*] NOSENKO said at another time that he made the same proposal in 1958-59, forming the basis of the FRIPPEL operation (see Part V.D.5.).

[**] See Part V.D.7.b., which discusses the KGB agent George BLAKE, a staff officer of MI-6, who confessed after his arrest in April 1961 that he had passed to his Soviet handlers the complete minutes of joint meetings held by CIA and MI-6 in London in June 1959 and in Washington during April 1960. These meetings were held to coordinate the American and British programs for legal travel operations, mainly with tourists, into the Soviet Union. Part V.D.7.c. describes a top secret KGB document on Western tourist operations in the Soviet Union which was prepared in 1961 in the Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. This document, which the defector GOLITSYN gave CIA, quoted verbatim certain portions of the minutes given to the KGB by BLAKE.

[***] KOTEN was frequently employed as a tour guide to the USSR by this tourist agency.

NOSENKO has indicated that his own operational work in 1962 to 1964 was limited to those cases cited above because of the considerable amount of time spent on temporary duty assignments outside Moscow during these two years. In mid-February 1962, soon after assuming the duties of Chief of the American Tourist Section, he began to prepare for his first trip to Geneva, which lasted from 14 March until 15 June 1962 (see Part III.B.). NOSENKO estimated that he had spent a total of six months outside Moscow in 1963 on temporary assignments. These included a two-day trip to Odessa to meet FRIPPEL, an inspection tour of the Leningrad KGB organization, a five-day trip to Leningrad for a conference on border control, a week-long trip to Alma-Ata for a conference on tourist travel with KGB representatives from the Soviet Central Asian republics, and an eight- or ten-day inspection trip to the Caucasus as a member of a team headed by GRIBANOV. NOSENKO said he travelled to Gorkiy Oblast on 16-17 December 1963 to assist in the search for CHEREPANOV, who had passed top secret documents to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (see Part VI.D.7.c.).

3. NOSENKO's Agents

When NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department in the first days of 1962, he took with him the agents whom he had been handling as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. These agents are listed below with a summary of NOSENKO's comments concerning their use in 1962 and 1963.*

a. Arsene FRIPPEL:

FRIPPEL had been reassigned from Moscow in early 1961, but NOSENKO continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case officer in charge of any future KGB contacts with him. (FRIPPEL had no KGB contacts in New York City.) Describing FRIPPEL's past service for the KGB on 15 June 1962, five months after he said he transferred to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said: "FRIPPEL was afraid and gave practically nothing... He was a weak agent... I recruited him but, speaking honestly, he was not an agent." Nevertheless, NOSENKO said, the KGB hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to the USSR at some future date. When FRIPPEL returned twice to the Soviet Union in 1963, NOSENKO met with him, once in Odessa and once in Moscow, but FRIPPEL provided nothing useful on these occasions.* Whereas NOSENKO had normally met FRIPPEL in the company of CHELNOKOV during FRIPPEL's Moscow tour, he went alone to the two 1963 meetings.

---

* The only other agent whom NOSENKO handled during this period was the American Alexander SVENCHANSKIY. (See Part V.F.6.).

b. Johan PREISFREUND:

After GOLITSYN's defection, NOSENKO said, the KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence and therefore ineligible for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason NOSENKO was told by the U.S. Embassy Section to continue to handle PREISFREUND while serving in the Tourist Department, but as PREISFREUND spoke only Finnish and Russian, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. Although NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962 and 1963, this agent was not used operationally.

c. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV:

NOSENKO's two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV took part in the entrapment approach to W.E. JOHNSON several days after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department. This was their first operational activity since 1959, for they had not been used in any homosexual operations while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section. It was, according to NOSENKO, the last time they were engaged in KGB activity. At the end of 1962 or the beginning of 1963 they were terminated, and their files were sent by NOSENKO to KGB archives. NOSENKO explained that VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had become too well known for their operational activities to be of further use to the Second Chief Directorate.

d. [redacted]

When NOSENKO was transferred to the Tourist Department, he was instructed by the American Department Chief, S.M. FEDOSEYEV, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, to continue to handle [redacted] studying in Moscow. NOSENKO had personally recruited [redacted] and had used him in the development of U.S. military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS (see Part V.E.3.c.) in 1961, an operation which was still underway at the time of NOSENKO's transfer. NOSENKO continued to meet [redacted] during the first months of 1962, and he recalled that in February or March of that year he instructed [redacted] to attempt to arrange a social meeting with ZUJUS in a Moscow restaurant so that another KGB agent could be introduced to the KGB target. This meeting had not taken place by March 1962, when NOSENKO left for Geneva. Just before leaving Moscow, around 12 March 1962, NOSENKO turned [redacted] over to G.I. GRYAZNOV, according to NOSENKO, then the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. [redacted] was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, and NOSENKO believed he left at that time to return to Syria.

---

* FRIPPEL reported a meeting with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV in Odessa in early 1962, and the records of the State Department Passport Office indicate that FRIPPEL intended to visit the USSR at that time. NOSENKO said there was no such meeting. See Part V.D.5.

e. Marina RYTOVA:

Marina RYTOVA was turned over to NOSENKO by I.A. KONSTANTINOV of the Tourist Department in 1956 or 1957. At that time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibition in Moscow. In 1960 or 1961 she became an instructor of the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations, and some time in 1962 she got a job at the school of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thereafter she ceased all agent work. NOSENKO was officially registered as her case officer until his defection in 1964. He did not indicate that RYTOVA took part in any operations from January 1962 until she began work for the Central Committee.

4. Approach to W.E. JOHNSON

a. NOSENKO's Information:

NOSENKO first referred to his approach to the American tourist Wallace Everett JOHNSON on 11 June 1962. He did not name JOHNSON at this time: "In January of this year I recruited [an American]. I cannot remember his name. He is from California, a Baptist, a young guy, healthy, somewhat fat, and he turned out to be a homosexual.* He loved men. I have an agent network capable of anything and, in particular, although I head a section there, I have a good agent apparatus, i.e., I have beautiful girls... and I have young pederasts, homosexuals. In particular, I have one special pair [VOLKOV and YEFREMOV] - I'm afraid that they are known to you and the English... Here is what happened. He gave me a signature. I told him: 'Write it yourself.' So he typed it on a typewriter. I said: 'No, I don't want it typed. Write it out longhand.'... He had a very reactionary attitude toward the Soviet Union. His attitude was such that he insulted us terribly. He visited Baptist groups, churches and... insulted us, Russia, and the government horribly. He sent letters, and we read them all - awful letters, i.e., the government is lousy and everything here is poor. I said to him: 'Write, damn it, that the best country [in the world] is the Soviet Union, that the best government is the Soviet Government. Write, write.' In general he did everything [I asked] but then, right away, he ran to the Embassy and told everything. This was in January of this year [1962]. He told everything. I know that he told. But he gave me his signature that he would help the Soviet security organs, etc. I know this. I was there. I decided to go to the hotel where he was staying. I sat down and waited. Surveillance was on the job. 'Tell me when he comes,' [I ordered]. I sat down. 'He has come,' [the surveillance team reported]. 'Where is he?' [I asked]. 'In his room,' [they said]. 'We'll wait,' [I replied]. They reported that he had gone to eat in the restaurant and I went there at once. He was sitting alone. I approached him: 'Hello, how are you?' I didn't say anything to him. I knew that he had told everything in the Embassy. [I said:] 'How are you? How about our connection in the States? And our work in the States? What do you think about it?' I said to him: 'Will you work? Can you give us something important or not?' He answered: 'I have nothing.' I said: 'And if I make it public that you are a pederast, what will happen then?' 'No,' he said, 'I will do anything you want.' But I couldn't tell him that I knew that he had reported everything. I said: 'Listen, brother, I don't believe you. You are a bad person.' We decided that we couldn't do anything with him. 'Go home, damn you,' I said. 'But if you write one insulting article about Russia I will find you, even in the U.S.' He is a Baptist and writes articles, a bright guy. And I left. He pushed aside his food and ran to a pay telephone and called /the Embassy/: 'This afternoon in a restaurant George was frightening me.' We know he called the Embassy. We heard everything."

---

* Other sources, personal acquaintances of JOHNSON, have reported JOHNSON's having homosexual tendencies.

NOSENKO's first reference to JOHNSON in 1964 was at a meeting on 2 February, when he produced a note bearing that name and the date 5 January 1962. "Here I have a name jotted down, Everett Wallace /sic/ JOHNSON," NOSENKO said. "The date was 5 January 1962, but what took place I have absolutely no recollection. I don't think it was a recruitment, but it was some sort of contact, or he was being studied or worked on, or something like that. But I remember nothing."

NOSENKO next mentioned his approach to JOHNSON on 17 April 1964. Although not immediately recalling JOHNSON's name, he eventually remembered that "it was something like JOHNSON, JOHNSTON, or something that starts with a 'J'" and that he was a Baptist from the California coast. NOSENKO placed the operation sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered wearing "just a coat, no overcoat at the time." JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist, was known to be a socialist, and on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a recruitment target. When the Second Chief Directorate checked whether the KGB First Chief Directorate would have any use for JOHNSON as an agent, however, it learned there was no interest in JOHNSON: He had no access to important information, and he lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient contact.

Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they were found to be "so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical, that they /the KGB/ decided something had to be done" to stop him from writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on his return to the United States. At about the same time there was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to halt JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR - no recruitment was attempted, because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorates had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had determined that he probably would not accept a recruitment proposal anyway. NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach to JOHNSON, except that "BOBKOV said I should go." (F. D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, supervised the activities of the Tourist Department.) NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to compromise JOHNSON.*

---

* In 1962 NOSENKO implied that the KGB received its first indication of JOHNSON's homosexuality from one or both these agents.

JOHNSON became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the Metropol Hotel. They told JOHNSON that they had recently arrived in Moscow and invited JOHNSON to visit their hotel room. JOHNSON agreed because "they understood each other right away. They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals) and so he came, and when they were engaged in their business, our people walked in on them under the disguise of the hotel administrator and one militiaman." Photographs of the incident had been taken, but these had not been developed at the time of this, the first confrontation of JOHNSON. A report describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared, and JOHNSON was then transferred to another room. By this time, NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his office, and he went into the room where JOHNSON was waiting in accordance with KGB orders. NOSENKO discussed the situation with JOHNSON, then asked him to type and sign a statement that he would "not say anything derogatory about the Soviet Union." JOHNSON did as he was told.

The following day, after the incriminating photographs had been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his promise. When JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photographs and said that they would be leaked to the foreign press if JOHNSON were to break his promise. The KGB later learned that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a later version) the U.S. Embassy and assumed that he had reported the approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had used during this operation.

Questioned further on 24 April 1964, NOSENKO said that, upon his arrival at the hotel immediately after the compromise, the militiaman described the incident to him in JOHNSON's presence. Addressing JOHNSON, NOSENKO had said: "How come? How could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and... people are given from five to eitht years for such relations. It used to be three to five, not it's from five to eight." Frightened by this, JOHNSON had written and signed his promise not to denigrate the Soviet Union in the future.

NOSENKO was asked whether the KGB would mount such an operation against any foreigner who wrote uncomplimentary letters and articles about the USSR. He replied: "They don't jump on everyone, and not everyone writes this way. And not everything that is written this way gets into their hands. In this case there was a coincidence. There was something we could hit him on. For instance, if the fact that he is a homosexual didn't come to our attention, they would probably just say: 'All right, to hell with him. We have to get rid of him. Let's see that his trip is cut off.'"

While discussing the approach to JOHNSON on 30 January 1965, the following dialogue took place:

NOSENKO: This (the approach) took place in the summertime of '62 or '63.

Question: In your notes, you have the date 5 January 1962.

NOSENKO: No, it doesn't concern JOHNSON at all. I remember it was summer; I think it was '63.

course, because we haven't seen him yet. But even that first signal is very helpful. So if he goes on a Soviet plane, they will start watching him from the time the flight starts. Now, as soon as he crosses the border, he will be watched by the border guards; he will be watched the entire route of his travel. This is a very important business, because the main task in regard to tourists is to uncover within the general flow of tourists those persons who are of interest from the operational point of view... Let's just say that this person is processing a group of American tourists who are going to the Soviet Union, and, when the processing is almost finished, another person is added to the group. Nobody knows this person in the group... but he was added at the last minute. So this is an indication. This is what he /the agent/ was taught to pay attention to when he was being trained in Moscow... Now, if some official government agency makes a request that a man be sent to the Soviet Union as a tourist, this immediately arouses suspicion, of course... In such things he has been trained... He comes to Moscow once or twice a year. You know, such a little Jewish fellow - an emigre from Russia - in the past, you know, scared of everything. The last time he came he told us: 'You know, I'm thinking about it all the time,' he says. So they asked him: 'Are you afraid? Why are you shaking?' He says, 'Well, I'm not afraid; I'm not shaking. But why should I be caught like an idiot...' His pseudonym is 'ANOD' and his last name is SVENCHANSKIY. Well, I'll give you all this later."

NOSENKO told CIA on 14 February 1964 that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 and that in 1963 he, NOSENKO, had taken over the handling of this agent from Tourist Department case officer Ye. N. NOSKOV.* SVENCHANSKIY had sent the KGB many open code messages such as those described above, and a number of these messages have been considered to have been of definite operational interest. NOSENKO identified SVENCHANSKIY as the president of "Afton Tours" in New York City and the owner of a Russian-language bookstore in Chicago.

There was some concern on the part of the KGB at the time of the recruitment in 1960 or 1961, NOSENKO reported on 1 March 1965, because SVENCHANSKIY had had contacts with AMTORG in New York City. The KGB suspected he was an FBI agent, but in contacting SVENCHANSKIY in 1960 or 1961, NOSKOV decided that this was not so and therefore recruited him. (Asked how it was determined that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI agent, NOSENKO replied: "NOSKOV felt it;" he had no further explanation.) The recruitment was based mainly on an agreement that Inturist would send more business to SVENCHANSKIY if he cooperated. NOSENKO also said SVENCHANSKIY had been arrested for blackmarketeering, but he did not elaborate on this statement. NOSENKO took over the case from NOSKOV in September 1963, and his name was entered in the single-volume file of SVENCHANSKIY as the handling officer as of that date. Together with NOSKOV, NOSENKO subsequently had two meetings with SVENCHANSKIY when the latter travelled to the Soviet Union, one in September and one towards the end of 1963.

b. **Information from Other Sources:**

CIA records reflect that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY was born on 6 March 1909 in Theodosia, Russia. He immigrated to the United States in 1923 and became a naturalized citizen on his father's papers in 1929. His earliest employers were the "All-Russian Textile Syndicate" from February 1928 to March 1931, by AMTORG in New York City from April 1932 to May 1942, and by the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington from May 1942 until December 1942. During the Second World War, SVENCHANSKIY served in the U.S. Army Air Force as "official translator" at the White Horse Air Base in Alaska, where he had frequent contacts with members of Soviet aircraft crews. From October 1946 until December 1952, when he was dismissed for refusing to answer questions by the McCarran Committee concerning alleged subversive activity, SVENCHANSKIY was employed at United Nations Headquarters as a radio officer, broadcasting to the USSR. As of early 1965, SVENCHANSKIY was listed as president of Afton Tours, Inc., New York City, and president of Cross World Books and Periodicals, Chicago. Afton Tours is a branch of the Package Express and Travel Agency, which is a registered agent of Inturist. Cross World Books and Periodicals was registered in 1961 as an agent of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, the Soviet Foreign Trade Administration dealing with the distribution and sale of Russian-language books, periodicals, films, and visual aids. SVENCHANSKIY has made numerous trips to the USSR, including one in August and September 1963.

---

* At this time, NOSENKO has stated, he (NOSENKO) was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espionage activities date back to his U.S. Air Force service in Alaska, [redacted] of his strong pro-Soviet bias and suspiciously close contacts with Soviets. In August 1950 Harry GOLD, then in prison as an admitted Soviet agent, linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage network in the United States.* GOLD stated that in March 1942 SVENCHANSKIY, under the name of SWAN, had been instrumental in introducing his "co-conspirator" Abraham BROTHMAN to "another AMTORG man to engage in industrial espionage." A CIA report of 14 November 1950 cites a "tested source" (a Czech national employed at the United Nations) as stating: "I believe that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, employed in the Radio Section of the Russian Division of the United Nations, is a Communist and possibly a Communist agent." [redacted] Identified as a Soviet agent by Elizabeth BENTLEY, KAZAKEVICH has since emigrated to the Soviet Union; he was identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate by GOLITSYN and by NOSENKO. Virtually all the individuals with whom SVENCHANSKIY has entered into business arrangements since leaving the United Nations have or had connections with the U.S. Communist Party or with the Soviet Intelligence Services. His business dealings have also brought him into frequent contact with Soviet officials in this country, including a number of identified intelligence officers (two of them reported on by NOSENKO).

---

* The 21 October 1953 edition of the New York Times carried the story of GOLD's testimony under the headline "Ex-U.N. Aide Linked to Spy Ring by Gold;" the Times reported that GOLD had executed an affidavit to this effect the week before.

An FBI report [redacted]64 [redacted] SVENCHANSKIY [redacted]

7. KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent [redacted]

a. Information from NOSENKO

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva on 26 January 1964 whether he had been involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO recognized this as the case of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY - see below) who had been apprehended on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO explained that, while he had not personally participated in the arrest and had never met KOTEN, he had supervised the case from KGB Headquarters and "the case was reported to me."

NOSENKO said that KOTEN had long been a member of the American Communist Party and was a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union after World War II. On these trips he had a large number of contacts with dissident literary figures and with Soviet citizens in general, particularly among Russian Jews.** Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and the Second Chief Directorates had come to the conclusion that KOTEN might well be a provocation agent planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party of the United States. Moreover, on the eve of KOTEN's 1963 trip, the Tourist Department learned from V.B. BARKOVSKIY of the First Chief Directorate's Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate that KOTEN was carrying with him the address of relatives of an important [redacted] agent of the KGB's [redacted] Legal Residency, and that KOTEN intended to visit them while in the USSR. NOSENKO said he did not know the name of this agent [redacted]

This agent was a naturalized American citizen, about 40 to 45 years old, an engineer born in Russia, who was employed in an "interesting industrial company or technical organization in the New York City area." For some time he had been working actively for th[redacted] Legal Residency and had provided the KGB with "good, solid information" with "very valuable material for technical intelligence;" at the same time the agent had been asking to be repatriated to the USSR, to become a Soviet citizen, but the KGB had been putting him off in order to continue to exploit his access. Since the amount and quality of the agent's production had recently deteriorated, the KGB decided to accede to his request for repatriation. Now, however, the agent declined, saying that "he was not ready to go just yet. First he was practically begging to come to the Soviet Union and now he was balking." This by itself appeared suspicious to the KGB, but in addition, it was about this time that the agent came into contact with KOTEN. NOSENKO learned from BARKOVSKIY that KOTEN "used to go to some bookstore that sells Soviet literature and through a saleslady in this story whom KOTEN knows, he became acquainted with the agent who also used to go to this store. After that, he used to meet with the agent without the saleslady."

---

* CIA told NOSENKO of this information about SOKOLOW in March 1965. He recalled that a woman named Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY but said that "we considered that he (SVENCHANSKIY) was doing it (spotting the tourists)." NOSENKO did not know of any Soviet Intelligence ties to SOKOLOW.

** NOSENKO has explained in another context that the Second Chief Directorate is wary of foreign contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently sponsored such contacts.

On the basis of these incidents the First Chief Directorate suspected that KOTEN had been directed specifically to this store in order to meet and "work on" the agent and that, having learned that the agent had relatives "in Stantsiya Loo, about 17 kilometers from Sochi..., he had evidently received the assignment (to visit the relatives) from American Intelligence. Evidently they had gotten on the trail of this agent and were checking on him." The KGB also had suspicions concerning the relatives, former kulaks who were still well-off financially. It was known to the KGB, for example, that the agent had written his sister in Stantsiya Loo that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union, and she had replied: "Is there any sense in your coming here?"

KOTEN arrived in Moscow and then travelled to Sochi. From there he sent a telegram to the agent's sister and her husband in Stantsiya Loo, asking them to come to Sochi to see him. When they arrived at KOTEN's hotel, however, the hotel administrator told them that KOTEN was on an excursion and refused to allow a meeting. KOTEN then took it upon himself to travel to Stantsiya Loo where he eventually contacted and spoke to the relatives. In the course of this meeting KOTEN took photographs of the sister and her husband and recorded a message from the sister to the agent on a tape recorder he had brought along. From this the KGB deduced that "U.S. Intelligence wants to get documentary data" and it therefore decided to "try to get hold of KOTEN."

There had already been some indication during KOTEN's earlier trips to the USSR that he was a homosexual, but the KGB had taken no action because KOTEN was believed to be a loyal Communist Party member. With these recent developments, the situation had now changed. Although NOSENKO's superiors were absent from KGB Headquarters at the time, immediate action was required. NOSENKO consequently "took the whole thing on myself because everybody got excited. Everybody said: 'Let's go. American Intelligence is active, none of our bosses are here, the situation is right, the decision must be made right now.'" By this time KOTEN had travelled to Tbilisi, and there a homosexual KGB agent managed to entice him into relations in a public park. These were suitably documented, and he was then picked up by the local Militia. (In the absence of his superiors and fearing the possible repercussions, NOSENKO had insisted that the illegal acts take place in a public place, and that the KGB not participate in KOTEN's apprehension.) After questioning by the Militia, KOTEN was permitted to continue his itinerary to Kiev, where he was scheduled to stay for two days before leaving the USSR

Meanwhile, the First Chief Directorate, which was growing increasingly concerned that the [redacted] agent of the [redacted] Residency would be apprehended by the FBI, wanted to get him out of the United States before this happened. To "establish the true purpose" of KOTEN's presence in the USSR and whether he was an American agent, as well as to hold him until the [redacted] agent had arrived safely in the USSR (as NOSENKO told the FBI on 24 February 1964), it was requested that KOTEN be detained in the Soviet Union. The decision was made to arrest him at once on the basis of the compromising materials obtained in Tbilisi. Following the arrest by the Kiev Militia, KOTEN was turned over to the KGB for interrogation; the purpose, NOSENKO said, was to "break him," to secure the admission that he was an American Intelligence agent. At the same time [redacted] the [redacted] agent had failed to keep a number of scheduled meetings with his KGB case officer, and the Legal Residency feared that something had gone wrong. He did eventually appear, however, and NOSENKO has described the subsequent meetings as follows: "They asked him: 'Are you going to leave the States?' He said: 'Well, I don't know. I have to think about it some more.' So we said: 'No, you have to leave or else we will wash our hands of the whole affair.' So he said: 'You know I was thinking of leaving with my wife, but my wife does not want to leave.' To make a long story short, they spent three meetings trying to talk him into leaving, and he kept hesitating. He didn't seem to want to leave, so then they told him: 'Look, we are breaking off contact with you. If you decide to go, you know how to do it. You are to go from the United States to some place in Europe and go to the Soviet Embassy there. They will give us a signal and the visa will be issued to you. But as far as we're concerned, we're breaking contact with you.'"

After this, according to NOSENKO, the KGB released KOTEN when the American Communist Party and other organizations strongly protested his arrest and imprisonment.

b. Information from Other Sources Concerning KOTEN

At the time of his arrest KOTEN was an instructor of Russian at New York University, director of the Library for Intercultural Studies, and a regular contributor to the New World Review and the magazine Jewish Life. Both the Library for Intercultural Studies and Jewish Life have been designated "Communist fronts" by the House Committee on Un-American Activities; the New World Review has been cited as a propaganda organ of the Soviet Government. KOTEN has said that, despite his arrest and imprisonment in the USSR, he hopes to return there in the future and that he "still loved the Russian people and believed in the basic humanitarianism of the Soviet Government."

Regarding the arrest, the New York Times on 29 August 1963 carried an article under the headline "U.S. Guide Missing

After Soviet Trip;" the article stated that "an American tour of the Soviet Union ended today (28 August) at Kiev with the apparent arrest of the New York guide identified as Bernard L. Koten of Afton Tours." A second article datelined 29 August, Moscow, reported that "an official of the Soviet Intourist travel organization said today that Bernard L. Koten... had been arrested on charges of homosexual activities with a Soviet citizen. He said that Mr. Koten... was arrested in Kiev Tuesday night (27 August) and was being held in Tiflis (Tbilisi)... where the alleged offense took place." A third Times article, filed in Moscow on 28 September 1963, stated that KOTEN, who had been arrested on 26 August, had been released on 28 September and was enroute to Vienna; the article also noted that "officials of Intourist reported Mr. Koten's release, but declined to comment on the reasons and circumstances of his arrest."

Several of KOTEN's friends have also commented on his arrest:

- Isadore Gibby NEEDLEMAN, a New York lawyer, self-avowed Marxist, and allegedly a Soviet espionage agent in the past, was reported by an FBI source [redacted]

- Eda GLASER, a "close associate of KOTEN" and the office manager of the Four Continents Book Store, a Soviet book outlet in New York, termed the entire incident as "fantastic" and a "fabrication." [redacted]

- SVENCHANSKIY, who returned to the United States from Moscow while KOTEN was still being held, stated that the morals charge against him was true but he (SVENCHANSKIY) had been assured that the matter would be cleared up and that KOTEN would be released.

FBI sources reported that KOTEN later made the following remarks concerning his arrest and imprisonment:

[redacted]

[illegible] After his release, [illegible] told that he could return to the Soviet [illegible] In fact, he could have returned [illegible] if he wished to do so. The arrest by the [illegible] and the mistake had been corrected.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible]

TOP SECRET

8. Arrest of BARGHOORN

a. Information from NOSENKO

At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO described the provocation and arrest of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963; he was questioned further on this case on 3 February 1964 and again while waiting in Frankfurt to leave for the United States. NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the following paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964.* On this last occasion NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona non grata action taken against three Soviets in New York City in the case of John W. BUTENKO and to secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet in the BUTENKO case who was jailed. In Geneva, however, NOSENKO maintained that the operation against BARGHOORN "was to discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV [the jailed Soviet], not because of any special importance of IVANOV himself."

NOSENKO said that in 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in operational activity in the United States. Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauffeur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity.**

GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed by KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY to take "necessary measures." GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Tourist Department; and G.I. GRYAZNOV and Ye.M. RASHCHEPOV, both Deputy Chiefs from the American Department. After explaining the arrest, GRIBANOV asked what information the Second Chief Directorate had on any American--U.S. Embassy employee or tourist--that could serve as material for an arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said that at that very moment there were three or four American military attaches in Rostov and that, in the opinion of the American Department, these officers might be carrying electronic apparatus. It was known that they had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and that they had been observed taking notes. If permitted, they could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to Moscow. GRIBANOV wanted to know what other possibilities existed and instructed the two representatives of the American Department to write a report on this. He also told them to request permission to arrest and search the military attaches.

---

*The detail of NOSENKO's information on the BARGHOORN case reflects both the extent of the CIA debriefings and the depth of his knowledge of this case. He did, in fact, furnish much of this information during his first 1964 meeting with CIA. NOSENKO was also able to describe at length BARGHOORN's professional background, which gave rise to KGB suspicions of intelligence affiliation, and he provided the general outlines of other operational activity centering around BARGHOORN during his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union.

**Three Soviets were arrested in Englewood, N.J., on 30 October 1963 during a clandestine meeting with the KGB agent, BUTENKO, an American engineer. Two of the Soviets, G.A. PAVLOV and Yu.A. ROMASHIN, were members of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations; they claimed diplomatic immunity and were released; a few days later they were declared persona non grata along with a third Soviet, V.I. OLENEV, who was named in the charges by the U.S. Government, but was not arrested. Another Soviet citizen, I.A. IVANOV, a driver for AMTORG, did not have diplomatic immunity and was jailed. All have been identified as KGB officers [redacted]

GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held by the Tourist Department. He was told that there were relatively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that time;* these included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not recalled). NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no "strong" materials against them. They were ordered to make an immediate study of the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon as possible.

Returning to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that BARGHOORN was the only American on whom the KGB had anything worth consideration. All the materials on BARGHOORN were gathered together, and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took them to GRIBANOV, explaining that he was the only possibility. GRIBANOV read all the materials and was pleased with them; he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi and that, in fact, Ye.N. NOSKOV (case officer, American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose of working against BARGHOORN; the doctor had some special item which had been used to make BARGHOORN so violently sick to his stomach that he had to be hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful search had been made of his belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN "materials," but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait. At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.

It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving "materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow. NOSENKO said that this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made no difference to him. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO to locate an agent who could be used to pass the damaging materials to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materials which are of interest to American Intelligence." This was to be sent in letter form to SEMICHASTNYY over GRIBANOV's signature; the letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive the materials (i.e., the fact of provocation was not to be mentioned).

---

*On another occasion, NOSENKO estimated their number at "about 60."

GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV concerning the military attaches, to SEMICHASTNYY. While the four--NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOVALENKO-- were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the local KGB organization in Rostov informing him that the military attaches were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the military attaches as well as BARGHOORN. (KHRUSHCHEV was absent from Moscow at the time, but SEMICHASTNYY had called BREZHNEV and secured his approval.*)

When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the military attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he became furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die." Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department D" (the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate) to provide some materials on rockets which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While these were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the provocation.

BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN had gone to the U.S. Embassy, and it was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of the British Embassy at 1900 hours, but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN had left the U.S. Embassy in the American Ambassador's car. He was alone but for the Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was in the moving car. A check on ORCHARD established that he was in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was therefore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at the hotel.

---

*NOSENKO placed these events on the day before BARGHOORN returned to Moscow from Tbilisi and on the day before BARGHOORN was arrested. As indicated below, BARGHOORN returned from Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October 1963 and was arrested on 31 October 1963, six days later. CIA records show that on 30 October, the day before the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV greeted Laotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma on his arrival in Moscow and later in the day attended a luncheon in his honor. On 31 October, the day of the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV and SOUVANNA attended a performance of Swan Lake in Moscow. BREZHNEV was not seen in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.

No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car than the agent approached. "You are an American?" the agent asked. "Yes." "Please take it," the agent said. The agent put the packet containing the materials on rocketry in BARGHOORN's inside coat pocket and then ran off.

BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he was seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest. A surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in the United States had received similar treatment) and driven to the 50th Section of the Militia, where a room had been prepared.

L.I. YEFREMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and a resolution was prepared requesting permission to hold him 48 hours. Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the Tourist Department case officers were released with instructions to report for duty at 0930 hours. NOSENKO and the others went home.

KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000 hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian, YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several times during these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained the damaging materials.) The first sessions concentrated on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.*

After one and one half hours of questioning, BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had been placed on his person. He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something," that he did not know what they were. The closed package was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages of information on missiles. "BARGHOORN was not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.

---

*In October 1966, NOSENKO stated his certainty that he had been present on the day after the arrest. At this interrogation NOSENKO said KRUPNOV questioned BARGHOORN "concerning personal background, employment, etc." Then NOSENKO asked BARGHOORN whether he had had the incriminating materials on his person at the time of his arrest. When BARGHOORN admitted this, NOSENKO left. As noted below, BARGHOORN reported that the materials were not discussed at this particular interrogation.

The CIA interviewer then read to him the report which fixed the date of the approach as 5 January 1962, the date contained in NOSENKO's notes, and indicated that NOSENKO used the name NIKOLAYEV (see below). Acknowledging that "maybe" he had used the name Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV with JOHNSON, NOSENKO said: "I don't know why I made this mistake with the dates. I think it (the approach) was the first or second day that I was in the Seventh (Tourist) Department. I saw myself that he had (homosexual) intercourse... Your date is absolutely right, but this reminded me that it was soon after I had come in the Seventh (Tourist) Department. Is this important?"

Question: How long had you been in the Seventh Department?

NOSENKO: Now I remember that it was immediately - one or two days. I know I returned in January 1962. I knew I would be going to the Seventh (Department) already in December. I was visiting the Seventh already then. I had not too many papers to turn over to the First (American Department), and now I remember that I moved to the Seventh immediately (NOSENKO's emphasis) after 1 January 1962.

b. Information from JOHNSON:

JOHNSON reported to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 5 January 1962 that he experienced an "incident with Soviet plainclothesmen in the Hotel Metropol earlier that day." JOHNSON, who arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, told the consular officer that "he was dining alone in the Hotel Metropol restaurant the evening of 4 January when he was joined at his table by a Soviet citizen who identified himself as a doctor from Riga. (This was NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV.) According to JOHNSON, little conversation transpired because the Riga 'doctor' spoke English poorly. Before JOHNSON left, however, the 'doctor' said he would like to chat with him and knew a student who spoke English well. JOHNSON then agreed to come by the 'doctor's' room at the Metropol at 10:00 a.m. the next day. JOHNSON said that he dropped by the 'doctor's' room about 10:00 the morning of January 5. Soon after he entered, the 'doctor' and his 'student' friend (NOSENKO's homosexual agent YEFREMOV) began to make homosexual advances to him. He stated that he protested and was rising to leave when two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under arrest. JOHNSON was then taken to another room where he was asked to sign a statement in Russian... He signed this statement and was taken to a man in a third room who identified himself as the Chief of Police, Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV.* The police chief first told him that Soviet law had been violated and that he, JOHNSON, could be imprisoned for three, five, or perhaps even eight years. After proceeding in this vein for a few minutes, the police chief remarked that it was in his power to dismiss the whole affair, provided JOHNSON would do him a favor. The favor turned out to be a signed commitment that he would not speak ill of the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States."

---

* NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV. He has said that he was normally called Georgiy, a variation of Yuriy, by family and friends in Moscow.

In the afternoon of 8 January, JOHNSON called the Embassy to say that he had been recontacted by the Chief of Police, who reminded him of his pledge and showed him four pictures. JOHNSON said: "I don't know where they got them, but they were dillies." During the interviews by the FBI [redacted] 1965, JOHNSON repeated substantially the same story, continuing to deny that he had actually been compromised. In addition to letters to his parents, JOHNSON said he wrote to about 20 other people, mostly "minister friends" abroad; apparently he did not tell the FBI of their content. Shown pictures of VOLKOV and NOSENKO on 13 May 1965, JOHNSON said he had seen VOLKOV "somewhere" and suggested that the photograph of NOSENKO was that of a younger man whom he had seen in Djakarta in 1962-1963.

5. Attempt to Recruit BRAUNS

a. Information from NOSENKO:

NOSENKO made the following statement on 2 February 1964: "In 1962 some U.S. citizen by the name of Horst BRAUNS came to the Soviet Union. I mentioned him to you in 1962 but at that time could not recall his name.* We tried to recruit him but did not succeed. He lived somewhere in Leningrad, and in 1942 he went back with the German troops to Germany. And he served in the German Army, and after the war he changed his name and went to the USA and became a U.S. citizen. He is either a skilled mechanic or a worker. His real name is different - it is Russian - because he changed his name when he was in Germany."

NOSENKO went into the operation against BRAUNS in greater detail on 17 April 1964: "This was /K.G./ KRUPNOV's case. This fellow was a Russian and lived prior to the war in Leningrad. In 1942 he was in Tikhvin, near Leningrad, when the Germans came, and when the Germans were retreating they took him along and some other people, local people, and so he found himself in Germany. Now, in Germany, as he told his story, he was kept in various prison camps and when the war was over he worked in West Germany and then, in 1956 or 1957 or 1958 - I don't remember /which year/ - he came to the United States and settled down. Why we became interested in this fellow... /NOSENKO thought his name was something like 'BRUNKS' or 'BRONX'/ is because he came from Russia. So, according to Soviet law, he never lost his Soviet citizenship... Leaving with the Germans is interpreted as treason, as being a traitor of your country. So there was something to talk to him about. Besides, KRUPNOV found out either in the Information Section or some other section /of the KGB First Chief Directorate/ that the man is working in some very interesting company that makes computers or adding machines or some other instruments. But when I talked to him he already left the company. He wasn't working with this company any more.

---

* BRAUNS did not arrive in Moscow until after NOSENKO had returned to the Soviet Union from Geneva in 1962, according to travel records.

"They called him to Inturist. They gave him a room in the Inturist /Hotel/. Then KRUPNOV transferred him from the Inturist to another hotel, put him in a room in the hotel, and started talking to him. Then he left him in his room and called us up - said that he needed help, that he can't do anything with the man. I thought that he would be able to handle him all by himself, so I said to KOVSHUK:* 'I'm sorry. I thought he'd be able to handle it. He tells me that he doesn't seem to get anywhere, so I guess I'd have to go help him.' I got there and I see that the man is scared stiff. He doesn't talk about anything, doesn't want to listen to any of these reasons. He was told that, after all, he is a traitor to his country, that he went with the Germans... This fellow was a coward, a real coward, so he gave his consent, he agreed to help us.

"The next day he went to Leningrad. So I felt that this agreement wasn't very firm, reliable. So the next day KRUPNOV and I went to see CHELNOKOV /Chief of the Tourist Department/. And I told him: 'I feel that this agreement of his is quite shaky. I'm not sure about it. So are we to follow through? If we decide to do so, then we'll have to go to Leningrad. So KRUPNOV went and called the man, and the man refused to talk to him. So then I was told to go. So I went /to Leningrad/ and... I went to his hotel room. He locked the door, and he wouldn't let me in. The only thing, fortunately for us, the lock in the door wasn't a very good one, so we called a locksmith, and he found a key that opened the door. So we entered the room, and we started talking to him. The fellow was terribly scared, he was shaking, so it was quite obvious that he would never work for us. So we finally decided: 'Look, it's okay. We don't want anything from you. Go ahead, leave. Goodbye.' And that was all; that was the end of it. I don't know whether it was BROOKS or BRONX or some name like that which he used in the States, but his true name was IVANOV."

In February 1965 NOSENKO said he had forgotten how he came to be involved in the BRAUNS case. He also said that he did not know why BRAUNS had visited the Soviet Union, and that he could not name any Soviet citizens with whom BRAUNS was in contact in Moscow.

b. Information from BRAUNS

Interviewed by the FBI [redacted]

---

* NOSENKO is apparently in error. At this time, he has reported, V.M. KOVSHUK was not in the Tourist Department but in the American Department. He may mean V.D. CHELNOKOV, Chief of the Tourist Department.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6. The SVECHANSKIY Case

a. Information from NOSENKO:

NOSENKO provided the lead to Alexander SVECHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "ANOD," on 26 January 1964 in the course of discussions of KGB use of foreign travel bureau personnel to spot tourists of possible operational interest. "Well, here's an example! One of our agents is the director of a small tourist agency," NOSENKO said, "He takes the tourist's application form which has a photograph, and if he suspects the tourist of having ties to American Intelligence, he will move the photo slightly, for example. Further, on the fifth line, where it says 'nationality,' he can make a small pinprick. And at the end, where the stamp of the tourist agency is placed, he can make a check-mark with a pencil. That's all. He indicates an agent to us... but why he/the tourist/ is suspected we don't know yet, of

Following BARGHOORN's admission, another resolution was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first interrogation, and the first and second resolutions were reported to (fnu) MISHUTIN (or MISHUSTIN), the First Deputy to the Chief Prosecutor. GRIBANOV further directed that all materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB Archives, be given to the Department of Prosecution of the KGB so that they could begin the legal proceedings against BARGHOORN. After this, all interrogations were conducted by this department; KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, but YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.

b. Information from BARGHOORN

BARGHOORN, who had made five earlier trips to the Soviet Union since 1956, arrived there on 2 October 1963. The purpose of his visit, as stated in his visa application, was to gather information for a book on how effectively the Soviet Union was operating as a result of its political education and political system. His itinerary took him to Leningrad from 2 to 7 October, to Moscow from 7 to 10 October, Tbilisi from 10 to 17 October, and short visits to Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Alma-Ata from 17 to 25 October. He flew from Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October and was scheduled to leave for Warsaw on 31 October. On the latter date he was arrested and held by the KGB until 16 November when, at President Kennedy's intervention, he was released and left the Soviet Union. BARGHOORN had no intelligence mission.

Upon his return to the United States, BARGHOORN was debriefed by the U.S. Department of State and by CIA. His information indicated a high degree of KGB operational interest in him throughout the trip, including encounters with at least five probable KGB agents during his first week there: an attractive waitress who invited him to "do the town," a disenchanted intellectual in Leningrad, an attractive unattached girl who sat next to him on the flight from Moscow to Tbilisi, and two young Armenians whom he met his first day in Tbilisi.* The two Armenians were instrumental in the drugging described by NOSENKO. At dinner in his hotel on the day he arrived in Tbilisi, BARGHOORN met a young man claiming to be a student at the Leningrad Music Conservatory. They left the hotel for a walk and ran into a friend of the student, a second young Armenian, and the three of them went to a cafe for coffee. None was available, but the young student went to the kitchen "to arrange things," and shortly thereafter "three foul-tasting coffees" appeared. Within an hour, BARGHOORN was in the hospital, acutely ill. He was assigned to a room where there was another patient, and a woman doctor took care of his case. He was in the hospital for four days. During this period his clothes, notes, and other possessions were held by hospital authorities.

---

*Questioned about this in February 1965, NOSENKO said that BARGHOORN, as a suspected American Intelligence agent, was of operational interest throughout the trip. He vaguely recalled the girl on the plane but either did not know or had forgotten details of any other specific activity. NOSENKO said that none of this activity was directly related to the provocation operation, which was based on a last-minute decision.

Upon his return to Moscow by air on 25 October, BARGHOORN checked into the Metropol Hotel. The next six days were occupied by sightseeing and appointments connected with his research. In the late afternoon of 31 October he called on friends at the U.S. Embassy for cocktails, and at 1910, already 10 minutes late, he left in the Ambassador's car for a dinner appointment (prearranged by telephone) at the Metropol with Theodore ORCHARD, a British diplomat.

BARGHOORN's account of the subsequent events closely parallels NOSENKO's. Having been handed the incriminating materials, he was arrested, handcuffed, and taken to Militia Station No. 58, where he was questioned briefly by a uniformed Militia officer. The KGB was called. Within 30 minutes a KGB captain (BARGHOORN thought his name might have been GORBUNSKIY) arrived and began to question him, assisted by an interpreter named YEFREMOV.* All question were asked in Russian, and BARGHOORN answered most of them in English. The package of materials was opened and contained, according to BARGHOORN, 13 or 14 photographs of rockets. This session lasted until about midnight and centered around BARGHOORN's possession of the photographs and his "intelligence mission." He was then taken to the Lyubyanka prison.

Interrogations were conducted the next morning by the original KGB officer together with his "chief," whom BARGHOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. The questioning concerned BARGHOORN's biography, and nothing was asked about the compromising materials. The following day the case was turned over to a KGB colonel identified as (fnu) PETRENKO, and BARGHOORN did not see NOSENKO or the other KGB officer again. At this and subsequent sessions, BARGHOORN was questioned further concerning the circumstances of his arrest. BARGHOORN described NOSENKO as "clever and quick-witted" and as giving "the impression that he was not a dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive; he seemed not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."

---

*Asked why YEFREMOV used his true name during the interrogations, NOSENKO said this was necessary for legal reasons, that he had to sign documents connected with the interrogations. BARGHOORN confirmed that YEFREMOV had participated throughout the entire series of interrogations and had signed interrogation reports attesting to the accuracy of translation.

310.

hn Andres SHUBIN

ohn Andres SHUBIN and his year of birth
es which NOSENKO brought to the 1964
in Geneva. NOSENKO identified SHUBIN as a
of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker,
rofessor in New York City. According to
rsonally involved in SHUBIN's fourth trip
62 or 1963. SHUBIN had become known to
gent during his third visit to the Soviet

fessor of economics at New York Univer-
eviously known to the FBI [redacted] The following paragraphs
rmation from NOSENKO and other sources on

rmation

been imprecise in dating SHUBIN's third
t Union.* He said on 25 January 1964 that
cow some time during the period 1959 to
1 1964 NOSENKO said he was unsure of the
t by SHUBIN but thought it occurred in
any event, prior to 1960 and while he was
tour of duty (June 1955 to January 1960)
t Department. NOSENKO indicated on 26 June
LITSKIY was the case officer in the Tourist
sible for SHUBIN, and since at another time
VELITSKIY transferred from the department
would appear that he was placing the date
trip as some time before the transfer.

rted that SHUBIN was placed under surveil-
during the third trip. He has offered
as to why: On 25 January 1964 NOSENKO
as that SHUBIN had visited the Soviet
e;** on 2 February 1964 he explained the
illance as having been founded on the KGB's

ng for this trip, as variously given by
nflict with the fact that SHUBIN had no
rt between 1940 and 12 June 1961, according
xplanation for this discrepancy, however,
BIN went to the USSR without valid docu-

IN's own admission about having gone to
, there is no other evidence of his travel
ion prior to 1961.

[redacted]

d. Information from Other Sources

The GRU defector in Canada, Igor GOUZENKO, supplied the lead which enabled the FBI [redacted]

SHUBIN, whose father was a native of Russia, was born in Los Angeles on 20 February 1915. [redacted] After receiving [redacted] the NOSENKO information of 1964, the FBI interviewed SHUBIN [redacted]

[redacted]

10. BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

a. Introduction

NOSENKO volunteered at his second meeting with CIA in January 1964 that G.N. BOLSHAKOV was his "old friend" and that he was a colonel in the GRU. On 26 January, 1 February, and 19 August 1964 he again raised BOLSHAKOV's name, emphasizing that he was a GRU officer and a "good friend." In the 1 February interview, after displaying an initial reluctance to discuss with CIA such a "sensitive" subject, he provided a number of details on BOLSHAKOV's alleged relationship in 1962 with the then Attorney General, Robert Kennedy. His information on this subject, he said, derived from his friendship with BOLSHAKOV in Moscow, where BOLSHAKOV was reassigned (in December 1962 following a tour in Washington as Novosti correspondent and editor of the magazine USSR). NOSENKO claimed a personal role in this affair, in that he personally proposed to the KGB leadership that the KGB take over BOLSHAKOV's former (GRU) contact with Robert Kennedy.

NOSENKO claimed that an information channel of communication between BOLSHAKOV and the Attorney General had developed at Kennedy's initiative. He described in detail the circumstances of their introduction at a social function by a journalist (whom he did not name). He said that he "thought" that the Kennedys knew that BOLSHAKOV was a "military intelligence officer," and he implied that they regarded these private conversations with BOLSHAKOV as a useful instrument of diplomacy. According to NOSENKO, the KGB knew that CIA was not aware of this relationship--it was "obvious" that Robert Kennedy wanted it that way. NOSENKO claimed that after BOLSHAKOV left the United States "during the Cuban missile crisis,"* no one took over his role as a confidential channel to the White House. After the assassination of the President, NOSENKO continued, the Kennedy family tried to reestablish the relationship through their close friend, the artist William WALTON, during the latter's visit to Moscow in December 1963. NOSENKO reported that he had urged that the KGB try to take over the Robert Kennedy operation from the GRU and that he had proposed two plans which would have enabled this to take place, the second involving WALTON. Neither came to fruition, however. Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, NOSENKO said that the GRU had "played dirty" with BOLSHAKOV by forcing him to "tell Robert" that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba whereas there actually were such weapons there.

According to other sources, BOLSHAKOV left Washington for Moscow on 3 August 1962 and returned on 2 October 1962. On 23 August, about the time that CIA was reporting urgently to the President that "something new and different" was going on with respect to Soviet aid to Cuba, Ambassador DOBRYNIN assured Theodore SORENSEN (Special Counsel to the President) that the United States had no need to fear Soviet activity in Cuba. On 4 September DOBRYNIN gave Robert Kennedy "an unusual personal message from KHRUSHCHEV for the President": KHRUSHCHEV pledged that he would not stir up any incidents before the upcoming U.S. elections. On the same day, the President stated publicly that the United States had no proof of a Soviet offensive missile capability in Cuba. Also on the same day, the Soviet Union sent a harsh note to the U.S. Government concerning the (unintentional) violation of Soviet airspace by an American U-2 plane on 30 August; the note threatened "appropriate retaliatory measures" against U-2 bases should such incidents be repeated. The following day (5 September) U-2 flights over Cuba were temporarily suspended, and they did not resume until 14 October. On 6 September DOBRYNIN again told SORENSEN that the Soviets had "done nothing new" in Cuba and gave his assurances that all their steps "were defensive in nature and did not represent any threat to...the United States." On 13 October DOBRYNIN informed Chester BOWLES (a Special Representative and Advisor to the President) that the USSR would never send offensive weapons to Cuba. Similar assurances were given by KHRUSHCHEV to U.S. Ambassador KOHLER in Moscow on 16 October (the same day that the President was shown the U-2 photographs which revealed the presence of offensive missiles) and by Foreign Minister GROMYKO to President Kennedy in person on 18 October.

---

*The Cuban missile crisis occurred during October 1962, and as indicated above, BOLSHAKOV was not reassigned from Washington until two months afterward.

Also on 18 October, the FBI reported, [redacted] Two days later BOLSHAKOV told Washington correspondents Joseph ALSOP and Charles BARTLETT that the Soviets had no offensive weapons in Cuba, and said he had been instructed by KHRUSHCHEV and MIKOYAN on 1 October (the day before his departure from Moscow) to inform President Kennedy of this fact. CIA has no indication that BOLSHAKOV delivered this message to the President, or even directly to the Attorney General, or that, prior to his meeting with BEGLOV in New York City, he made any remarks about Soviet weapons in Cuba. [redacted] There is no report of BOLSHAKOV's having played any role in the Cuban missile crisis beyond making these remarks to ALSOP and BARTLETT. Discussions at the White House, State Department, and Defense Department about the crisis culminated in the decision to impose a blockade on Cuba; this decision was announced by President Kennedy over nationwide television and radio on 22 October 1962. Soviet overtures for a peaceful settlement of the situation were initiated on 26 October by the KGB Legal Resident in Washington, A.S. FEKLISOV,** in contacts with the American journalist John SCALI. FEKLISOV's proposals were along the same lines as those received at the White House late that night in a secret letter from KHRUSHCHEV. At a farewell party for BOLSHAKOV in December 1962, Presidential Press Secretary Pierre SALINGER asked BOLSHAKOV who would "do his work." BOLSHAKOV replied that no one would do precisely the same job, but that if SALINGER had "anything special to say," he might contact A.I. ZINCHUK.*

---

*BEGLOV came to the United States to attend the "Third Unofficial US-USSR Conference of Public Figures," held at Andover, Massachusetts, from 21 to 27 October 1962. Also present at this conference was Boris BELITSKIY, identified by NOSENKO four months earlier as a KGB-controlled source of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.). BELITSKIY indicated at that time that BEGLOV might be affiliated with the KGB.

**FEKLISOV, who served in Washington under the alias FOMIN, was the author of one of the documents among the CHEREPANOV papers (see Part VI.D.7.c.).

b. Soviet Sources During the Crisis

NOSENKO has not indicated that BOLSHAKOV had an information-collection role during the Cuban missile crisis. As for Soviet sources at this time, NOSENKO stated on several occasions in 1964, in different contexts, that the KGB "had not had luck in getting intelligence from high places in the U.S. Government" in October 1962. On more than one occasion he said that the KGB agent "SASHA"** was unable to furnish any information of value in this regard. He said this on 25 February 1964 and again while being questioned about "SASHA" on 4 August 1964. On the latter date NOSENKO said: "During the Cuban missile crisis the [KGB] First Chief Directorate, the Intelligence, couldn't tell what the U.S. will do. KHRUSHCHEV*** was not satisfied with the work of the Intelligence. No agents were producing information on this." NOSENKO continued by saying that "SASHA" reported nothing to the KGB during the Cuban missile crisis. In fact, "he couldn't know anything. I heard that this was very tightly held information. There were just a few people around President Kennedy who knew the plans, and they were sworn to keep it secret."

[redacted]

---

*ZINCHUK was identified by DERYABIN by name and photograph in October 1954 as a KGB staff officer. NOSENKO has said that ZINCHUK was a KGB cooptee rather than a staff officer.

**For a discussion of the "SASHA" case, see Part VI.D.3.d.

***Speaking before the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962, KHRUSHCHEV said that the decision to negotiate with the United States for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban situation had been influenced by "information from our Cuban comrades and other [unspecified] sources." This information had been received, KHRUSHCHEV stated, on the morning of 27 October 1962 (Moscow time). As previously indicated, however, KHRUSHCHEV's secret and conciliatory letter to the President was received at the White House on the night of 26 October 1962.

c. NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV

NOSENKO repeatedly emphasized BOLSHAKOV's GRU affiliation and the fact that the KGB was in no way involved in this channel to the U.S. Government via Robert Kennedy. He first volunteered BOLSHAKOV's name during a discussion of the use of Novosti as a cover organization for Soviet Intelligence officers. "Yuriy BOLSHAKOV of the GRU also sits there," he said. "He is a colonel and a friend of mine." Two days later, out of context with the preceding discussion, he introduced the name again: "Then there is this BOLSHAKOV. He is from GRU who was in the United States." NOSENKO then commented that this was "a very interesting case" and added: "We shall talk about it later." When his case officer thereupon turned to another topic, NOSENKO immediately interrupted to say: "I know BOLSHAKOV very well. He is my old friend...I met him through Yuriy GUK...[who]was with him in the United States...and we are now very good friends. He calls me up and consults me for advice..." On 1 February 1964 NOSENKO said he thought the Kennedy family knew BOLSHAKOV to be a military intelligence officer; "yet for some reason they chose him" as a channel between the U.S. and Soviet Governments. BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO added, "reported directly" to the Chief of the GRU concerning his exchanges with Robert Kennedy.

NOSENKO said BOLSHAKOV was introduced to Robert Kennedy by an American journalist (unnamed) at a reception in the United States. The journalist invited BOLSHAKOV to go for a walk, and as they strolled "down an alley," there was a man sitting on a bench directly ahead of them. "The journalist said: 'Listen, George [BOLSHAKOV], are you acquainted with Robert Kennedy, the brother of the President and the Chief of the Department of Justice?' BOLSHAKOV said: 'No. Of course, I have heard of him.' 'Would you like me to introduce you?' 'Of course,' BOLSHAKOV said, 'please do.' He led him to the man on the bench. There was this feeling that all this had been pre-arranged."

This contact "was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy... BOLSHAKOV was called in for this. As you know, the whole idea of this contact was to pass information to Kennedy from KHRUSHCHEV and from Kennedy to KHRUSHCHEV....It happened to be BOLSHAKOV, but it was not BOLSHAKOV who sought to have the meeting....Then the relationship grew. BOLSHAKOV was a visitor in Robert Kennedy's house. They would first talk about ordinary things, and then the conversation turned to other matters...Robert Kennedy did not say: 'Please tell KHRUSHCHEV so-and-so.' He would say: 'You know, some of these problems seem insolvable.' And BOLSHAKOV would say: 'And you know, at home they think this and that way...' without actually saying that this was coming from KHRUSHCHEV. But, of course, this was clear without explanations. It was an exchange of views on important political questions of the moment. He was like an intermediate point..." NOSENKO commented that he personally thought that it was a "case of mutual 'feelers' being sent out by both sides--exploring some given current political situation."

After BOLSHAKOV left Washington, NOSENKO stated, no one replaced him as a channel to the U.S. Government. Asked whether ZINCHUK could have taken over upon BOLSHAKOV's departure, NOSENKO said: "Oh, no. There is no contact like there was before. It was broken at the time BOLSHAKOV left. ZINCHUK was an agent or a cooptee....No, there is no such contact since BOLSHAKOV left. He passes no more messages."

Referring to the Kennedy-BOLSHAKOV contacts, NOSENKO told CIA on 26 January 1964: "You have shown considerable interest in him [BOLSHAKOV], even after his return to the Soviet Union...because all this was done by by-passing CIA." He said on 1 February 1964: "It was pretty obvious that this relationship between BOLSHAKOV and Robert Kennedy had nothing to do with CIA, and CIA was not witting of it. It was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy." The KGB determined that CIA was unaware of the exchange between Kennedy and BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO reported, because when BOLSHAKOV was subsequently invited to a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, two CIA officers--Kenneth A. KERST and Malcolm A. TOON*--tried to elicit information from him about his relationship with President Kennedy. "The most important thing" they had tried to find out, according to NOSENKO, was whether the President and BOLSHAKOV had met personally. Although BOLSHAKOV did not admit the fact to them, he did have one meeting with President Kennedy--"he was brought in a car...and was taken through a back door into the White House," NOSENKO said.

NOSENKO reported that William WALTON visited Moscow in December 1963 and at that time went to BOLSHAKOV, whom he had previously met at the home of Robert Kennedy. Part of their conversations, he continued, related to Robert Kennedy's future political plans: "WALTON said that Bobby...did not expect at present to become a candidate for the vice presidency. He was, perhaps, according to WALTON, thinking of running for Governor of Massachusetts..." NOSENKO said he felt that there were "some feelers sent out on the part of WALTON--not exactly questions, but just a passing of opinion. WALTON was trying to sound them out, but I think that everything was left without an answer....My personal opinion was that these things were told to WALTON so that he could pass them on as, so to speak, Bobby's plans for the future." Another topic covered in the WALTON-BOLSHAKOV discussions, NOSENKO added, was the assassination of President Kennedy.** "As I remember, it was WALTON's opinion--and his opinion reflected the opinion of the Kennedy family--that there was no Russian involvement in the murder of the President. No suspicion at all."

NOSENKO proposed two plans whereby the KGB could take over the GRU's channel to President Kennedy. Under the first of these plans, the Soviet Minister of Justice would personally invite the Attorney General to come to the Soviet Union. There the KGB would "set him up in private living quarters, give him everything he wants...so that he would be pleased....Not to make an agent or cooptee out of him, but just to promote a rapprochement." In addition, on the basis of what BOLSHAKOV had told NOSENKO about Robert Kennedy's interest in a Soviet ballerina, this plan called for the two to be brought together, and the ballerina, who "is quite free in her behavior with the opposite sex," would do "everything necessary for the State." Before NOSENKO's superiors could make a decision on this plan, the President was assassinated and the matter was dropped. NOSENKO conceived his second plan during WALTON's trip to Moscow in December 1963: "BOLSHAKOV told me that he was going to meet WALTON, and asked me whether we had an interest in it....I told the chiefs about it and said: 'Let's utilize WALTON ourselves. Why should we let the GRU use him?'" NOSENKO suggested that the KGB "tell BOLSHAKOV that we are working on WALTON--that this is a Number One target as far as we are concerned. BOLSHAKOV will do anything we ask him." However, "the boss said: 'Well, you know, it will worsen relations between the KGB and the GRU. As long as they are working on it, let them do it.'"

---

*Neither KERST, who NOSENKO said was suspected by the KGB of being the CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, nor TOON was affiliated with CIA in any way.

**See also Part V.D.6. on NOSENKO's information concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD.

NOSENKO indicated that if the KGB had actually assumed authority for the operation in Moscow from the GRU, as he had proposed, the KGB Legal Residency in Washington would have then taken over, and "someone new" probably would have been sent from KGB Headquarters to develop the association. This KGB officer would have been "someone with a broader outlook who could carry himself well in social contacts."

d. Information from [redacted]

In addition to NOSENKO, one other Soviet source had identified BOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer. [redacted] reported that another member of the GRU Legal Residency [redacted] had "recently" turned over to BOLSHAKOV an informant who was an American correspondent based in Washington. This journalist, [redacted] had accompanied Vice President Nixon to the USSR in July 1959 and while there had agreed to cooperate by "furnishing political information." BOLSHAKOV was to "concentrate all of his efforts on this one contact."*

---

* FBI [redacted]

SECRET



СССР

КОМИТЕТ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

"15" декабря 1963 г.

Командировочное удостоверение № 11933

Выдано подполковнику Носенко Юрию Ивановичу

Командированному в УКГБ Горьковской области

Срок командировки "15" дней

по "30" декабря 1963 г.

Основание: распоряжение нач. Главного Управления

Действительно только по предъявлении удостоверения личности № НК-251[illegible]

Начальник [illegible] Управления / отдела

Комитета Государственной Безопасности при Совете Министров СССР

ОТМЕТКИ О ПРЕБЫВАНИИ В ПУНКТАХ КОМАНДИРОВКИ

Прибыл в г. Горький 18 декабря 1963 г.

Прибыл в г. Ша[illegible] [illegible]-1963

бесплатной квартирой не пользовался

[illegible]

Убыл из г. Ша[illegible] 17 [illegible]

бесплатной квартирой не пользовался

[illegible]

Убыл из г. Горького 17 дек. 1963 г.

ОТМЕТКИ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ, ОТДЕЛА КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Бесплатной квартирой не пользовался [illegible]

Убыл из Москвы "__" ______ 196_ г.

Прибыл в Москву "__" ______ 196_ г.

Нач. [illegible]

Печать

ФИНО

КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Выдано:

Аванс на расходы по командировке в сумме

Руб. ______

Перевозочные требования №№ 005864, 005870

Талоны на плацкарту №№ ______

Ст. бухгалтер

Front

Reverse

Temporary Duty Authorization
December 1963

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Committee for State Security
Under the Council of Ministers
USSR

15 December 1963

Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel
NOSENKO,
Yuriy Ivanovich
For duty to: UKGB of Gor'kaya
Oblast'
Length of temporary assignment: 15 days
through: 30 December 1963
Authorization: directive of
Chief of a Chief Directorate

Effective on presentation of
identity document No.: NK-2513

Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorate
of Department

Committee for State Security
under the Council of Ministers, USSR

Front

NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES
OF TEMPORARY DUTY

"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy 16 December 1963"

"Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye 17 XII 1963
Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief Militia
Section, Militia Major ____(illegible)

"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63
Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief Militia
Section, Militia Major ____(Illegible)

"Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963
Did not use free quarters"

s./____(illegible)

Reverse (endorsements only)

TDY authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV

G. NOSENKO's KGB Promotions and Awards

1. Rank

NOSENKO has been questioned at length concerning his progress through the KGB ranks, from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. He has volunteered additional information on this subject himself. His various statements follow in chronological order.

11 June 1962: "As a Chief of Section, I now receive 2,500 [rubles per month], plus 700 for my rank, for major, plus pay for longevity. I receive more than 4000, i.e., 450-470-480 [rubles per month] in new money. This is enough for me...I am now a major but I should receive lieutenant colonel soon. I have already completed my time in grade. We have a system of time in grade. From major to lieutenant colonel it is necessary to have four years... My time in grade was up in December, in December of last year [1961]."

23 January 1964: At the first of his 1964 meetings with CIA in Geneva NOSENKO had in his possession the temporary duty authorization which he said he had been issued in December 1963 to travel from Moscow to Gorkiy Oblast in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV.* This official KGB paper had been signed by O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, and authorized "Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO to visit the local KGB organization in Gorkiy Oblast on official business between 15 and 30 December 1963." It bore official stamps of arrival and departure in December 1963, as attested by officials in the town of Shakhunya.

10 February 1964: In Frankfurt, while awaiting exfiltration to the United States, NOSENKO was asked to review a biographic statement which had been prepared by his case officers on the basis of statements he had made during the 1962 and 1964 meetings in Geneva. NOSENKO went over the biography carefully, noted several changes, and then stated that it was correct. The biography included the information that NOSENKO had served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department as a senior lieutenant from 1952 [sic] to 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963, shortly before leaving Moscow for Geneva.

8 April 1964: NOSENKO was questioned about the date when he became a senior lieutenant, and he replied: "I think in the end of '53 or the beginning of '54 I got the senior lieutenant."

Question: That's less than a year after you entered the service [KGB].

---

*See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search and of NOSENKO's claimed part in it.

NOSENKO:	Well, I had the GRU service. That counts two years, as military service, of course. It was considered as a continuance of military service.
Question:	So you got it when? At the end of 1953?
NOSENKO:	At the end of '53 or beginning of '54. Then I got captain in 1956.
Question:	When in 1956?
NOSENKO:	I don't remember. You see, they are not given exactly in February or in March. Sometimes the scheduled time passes before they give it. So, '56--Captain, '59--Major, and '63--...

16 June 1964: Asked to list in chronological order the date of his promotions within the KGB from the date of entry, NOSENKO stated: "I began in the GRU as a junior lieutenant. While in the GRU I became a lieutenant, and I entered the KGB with this rank in 1953. Not long after I entered the KGB I became a senior lieutenant, but I don't know the month. It was still 1953. In 1956 I was promoted to the rank of captain. I don't know the month. I became a major in 1959. I don't know the month. In October 1963 I was made a lieutenant colonel....Personnel called me on the telephone and said I had been promoted. Later I was told that GRIBANOV wanted to see me. I went to his office, but, of course, I didn't let him know that I already knew that I had been promoted. He gave me his congratulations. You never see the attestation. It goes into your official file."

26 January 1965: While discussing his role as case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never officially been a major. He explained this situation as follows: Having been promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in April 1953, he became eligible for the rank of captain in 1956. When this time came, however, he was not promoted because a senior KGB official held against him his illegal use of KGB documents to cover treatment for gonorrhea in 1954. NOSENKO therefore remained a senior lieutenant until 1959, when he would have been eligible for promotion to the rank of major had he received his captaincy on schedule. Although GRIBANOV had promised NOSENKO that he would be promoted directly from senior lieutenant to major, skipping the rank of captain, an administrative error was made by the KGB Personnel Office, and NOSENKO found when the orders were issued that he had instead been promoted only to captain. Instead of rectifying this mistake, GRIBANOV persuaded NOSENKO that it would be to his advantage to remain a captain until he became eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1963. NOSENKO therefore was a captain from September or October 1959 until October 1963 when, as promised by GRIBANOV, he was promoted

directly to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In this manner it turned out that he never officially held the rank of major.*

10 August 1965: Under questioning by DERYABIN, NOSENKO repeated the chronology of his promotions given on 26 January 1965. He again explained that he was put up for captain in 1956, but this time said that the promotion had been blocked on the grounds that he should be made to wait because of shortcomings in his work. Asked why he had told CIA that he had been a major during the 1962 meetings and again in the biography prepared in Frankfurt, NOSENKO replied that he thought the true story would not be believed.

17 April 1966: In a voluntary statement, NOSENKO wrote the following: "In March 1951, with the rank of junior lieutenant, I started service in Naval Intelligence of the Seventh Fleet in Sovetskaya Gavan....From August 1952 until 1953, I worked at the intelligence base of the Naval Intelligence of the Fourth Fleet in Sovetsk, where I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service....In 1956 I received the rank of senior lieutenant [in the KGB], in December 1959 the rank of captain, and at the end of 1963 I was recommended for the rank of major. I have never held the rank of lieutenant colonel and the travel order which you know of, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, was filled out erroneously.**

19 April 1966: In a new version of his autobiography, NOSENKO included the following statement: "in July 1956 I became a candidate member of the CPSU, soon after which I received a promotion at work: I became a senior case officer and was given the rank of senior lieutenant. In August 1957 I was accepted into the CPSU, and during the second half of 1958 was appointed Deputy Chief of the Second Section, Seventh Department. On 29 December 1959 I was promoted to the rank of captain.

26 October 1966: "I lied when I said I was a lieutenant colonel in 1964. I was only a captain." Asked why he had said in 1962 that he was then a major, NOSENKO replied: "There was no conversation about rank in 1962. About my position, I said I was in the Tourist Department. That's all."

To summarize what NOSENKO has said about his ranks while serving in the KGB: He became a senior lieutenant in 1952, April 1953, 1954, or 1956; a captain in 1956 or September/October/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963. (The latter claim was verified by the official KGB document listing him as a lieutenant colonel as of December 1963.) On the other hand, NOSENKO has indicated that his highest rank in the KGB was captain, and that he never advanced to a majority or a lieutenant colonelcy.

---

*At about this time, in early 1965, [redacted] NOSENKO was only a captain and had advanced to his senior KGB position because of his close relationship with GRIBANOV. [redacted] shortly after NOSENKO's defection, [redacted] reported having received information from fellow KGB officers which made it "appear quite certain" that NOSENKO was a lieutenant colonel.

**See above; NOSENKO was referring to the TDY authorization issued for the CHEREPANOV search in December 1963.

2. Awards and Decorations

Not long after reestablishing contact with CIA in January 1964, NOSENKO mentioned that he had received the Order of Lenin "shortly after the 1962 meetings" in Geneva as a reward for the ideas which he had developed to "enlarge the experience and improve the quality" of KGB Second Chief Directorate staff personnel in Moscow.* During the first series of interrogations, NOSENKO on 6 April 1964 claimed that he was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1963 for his work in the Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, after receiving the Order of the Red Banner in 1962 for his performances while in the American Department.

The following discussion of the subject took place on 6 April 1964:

NOSENKO: Yes, I received a big gold medal.

Question: It was the Order of Lenin?

NOSENKO: It was at first the Order of the Red Banner--the Red Star, I mean. In '63 I received the Order of Lenin. In '63.

Question: What for?

NOSENKO: GRIBANOV decided that whoever is working a long period in the Second Chief Directorate--[V.D.] CHELNOKOV got one, [A.G.] KOVALENKO got one--many, many [received the Order of Lenin].**

Question: You received the Order of Lenin for this brilliant service?

NOSENKO: No. For working in the Seventh [Tourist] Department, which is considered good.

Question: What is good? Were there recruitments? What recruitments?

NOSENKO: You must know that the main task of the Seventh Department is not recruitments. The main task is countering the intelligence activities of the opposition.

Question: So, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department got the Order of Lenin?

NOSENKO: Yes.

---

*NOSENKO has described the Order of Lenin as the highest decoration for which a KGB officer can be eligible.

**In June 1964 NOSENKO said that the only Second Chief Directorate officer whom he knew to have received this award was V.A. CHURANOV, Chief of the British Embassy Section, who recruited William John VASSALL (see PART VI.D.5.b.). On the same general topic, NOSENKO asked his CIA case officer whether he, the CIA officer, had received a medal for his part in the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO. He asked this in January 1964 in Geneva.

Question: CHELNOKOV and KOVALENKO?

NOSENKO: Yes. And CHURANOV got and I got and--who else? [S.M.] FEDOSEYEV got and [V.M.] KOVSHUK also got the Order, the second time. The first time he got it several years ago, and this was the second time.

Question: When did you get the Order of the Red Star?

NOSENKO: Red Star I got--I don't know for what.

Question: But then one year later they gave you another one, because this [Order of the Red Star] wasn't enough?

NOSENKO: Because the awards are given out--now, wait one moment; up until 1961, if there were any awards for the Chekists [KGB personnel] it was very rare, and they were only awarded for a specific thing. Such as CHURANOV, for instance. He was rewarded for a specific deed [the recruitment of VASSALL]. But in 1962, 1963--these first years--whether it was the idea of the Party to encourage the workers, they decided to let SAKHAROVSKIY [Chief of the KGB First Chief Directorate] declare his medals and GRIBANOV to declare his medals. They get together with their deputies and decide to whom they will give them. They don't say to whom--they say, for instance: 'One order to your department; you decide who should have it.' Like that. Then we would get together, I CHELNOKOV, KOVALENKO, and we decided [who would get one]. In our department, [V.I.] YAKOVLEV got a medal. Who else got a medal? In 1962, I got one, and then LEONOV who was Chief of the Second Section--he got the Order of the Red Star. We decided on these individuals. As far as we ourselves were concerned, that decision was made by GRIBANOV and his deputy.

Question: Did the Seventh Department catch any spies?

NOSENKO: Well, as I have already told you, there was this Italian fellow [redacted]. This was considered a good case because the First Department later--the Seventh Department was only involved at the time of the arrest--began meeting with him.

Question: So you got the Order [of the Red Banner] in 1962 because of your work in the Tourist Department?

NOSENKO: I think in 1962 GRIBANOV gave it to me not for the Seventh Department, but for my work in the First [American] Department in 1960, 1961.

Question: You think so?

NOSENKO: I think so.

Question: The Order just came, without any explanation?

NOSENKO: It was just done at the order of the Chairman.

Question: And the Order of Lenin was the same?

NOSENKO: The same. Well, the way it says, "For work well done for the organs of the KGB" there is no indication exactly what it is for.

NOSENKO admitted on 8 April 1964: "In 1964 [in Geneva] I told a lie about the Order of Lenin. Why? It was a boast." NOSENKO then explained what he said to be the true circumstances and gave the reason for which he was to have received this decoration. GRIBANOV, NOSENKO stated, had promised in 1963 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and KOVALENKO would get the Order of Lenin: "He said: 'I am submitting your names for the Order of Lenin for creating the TsOPS [Central Operational Communications System of the Second Chief Directorate], for this new thing you have tried to create in tourist work.' But December [1963] had gone by. I left [for Geneva] and nothing happened."*

NOSENKO was asked on 15 April 1964 to list the dates, reasons, and types of awards, decorations, and bonuses he had received during his KGB career, as well as to indicate from whom he had received each of these. His reply was as follows: "I received nothing in 1953, 1954, and 1955. In 1956 I received a commendation and one month's pay. SEROV, the Chairman of the KGB, awarded me this for the recruitment of Richard BURGI [see Part V.D.4.b.] while I was working in the Seventh [Tourist] Department of the Second Chief Directorate. It was signed by the Chairman, and GRIBANOV told me about it. As usual, this Order of the Chairman of the KGB was circulated, and I and all case officers saw my name listed. There is no certificate or anything. Personnel just makes a note in your official file that on a certain date you received the commendation from the Chairman of the KGB.

"From 1956 on, I received something almost every year, but it was nothing special. Perhaps it was the KGB anniversary or May Day or Army Day. In 1957 or 1958, I got something from GRIBANOV. Maybe it was the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Army. I don't remember. It was given to me and a group of people in the hall [auditorium] between the third and fourth floors [of the KGB Headquarters building]. PERFILYEV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, made the presentation.

"In 1959 I received a commendation and one month's pay from SHELEPIN, Chairman of the KGB, for several recruitments, among them the professor from Tennessee [MERTENS], DREW, FRIPPEL, and three British people. There were six in all; three Americans and three British. I can't remember the British names just now.*

---

*NOSENKO later reverted to his original statement, which related the award to his efforts to "inspire" the work of the Tourist Department.

"In 1960 I got a commendation from GRIBANOV for good work in general. A lot of officers got this. In 1961 I received the Order of the Red Star. With a group of case officers I got this for general good work in the Second Chief Directorate. KOVALENKO and KOVSHUK got this too. IVASHUTIN gave it to me (made the presentation). Personnel makes a note in your official file, but you can take the medal and the little certificate that goes with it and either keep it at home or in your study room (office).**

"In 1962 I got a commendation from GRIBANOV for general good work. I also received the Unblemished Service Award for ten years' service. They counted this from October 1950, when I joined the GRU, and they were late by two years in giving it to me. This is not unusual. SHCHERBAK, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, gave it to me in the hall along with a certificate.* In 1963 I received a commendation from GRIBANOV for general good work. Also, GRIBANOV told me that I, along with some others, was to receive the Order of Lenin on 20 December 1963, the KGB anniversary date, but I left for Geneva.**I was to receive it for arousing [inspiring] the Seventh Department."

---

* See Parts V.D.4.1.and h., Part V.D.5., and Parts V.D.4.i., j., and k., respectively, for descriptions of these recruitment operations and NOSENKO's role in them. NOSENKO also said during interrogation by DERYABIN on 10 August 1965 that, in 1959, his name was submitted for the Order of the Red Banner in connection with these recruitments, but that he did not get it, probably because he was transferred to the First Department at that time (January 1960). NOSENKO has described the Order of the Red Banner as the third highest award a KGB officer may receive. Asked what KGB officers had received this award, NOSENKO said on 10 June 1964 that GRIBANOV, SAKHAROVSKIY, and several other high-ranking KGB officers were awarded it for the important role they played in smashing the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.

** On 15 April 1964 NOSENKO had said that he received the Order of the Red Star, along with a group of other Second Chief Directorate officers, at the end of December 1962. He recalled this because they were planning the presentation for the anniversary of the KGB on 20 December, but the presentation was delayed and was not made until the end of the month. NOSENKO and about 70 other officers of the Second Chief Directorate, including KOVSHUK and G.I. GRYAZNOV, received the award "simply for achievements, for good results in work." NOSENKO told DERYABIN in August 1965 that the order accompanying his award had read: "For exceptional performance of mission." When asked what mission was involved, NOSENKO replied that the award was just for good work in general.

NOSENKO said on 26 October 1966 that he never received any KGB award or decoration for his operational work. The only awards he received during his KGB career, he said, were a Red Army anniversary medal and the award for satisfactory completion of ten years of service.

---

*NOSENKO's wording here reflects earlier intensive questioning concerning the ten-year service medal. NOSENKO said on 15 April 1964: "In 1962 I had ten years of service in the KGB and got a medal for unblemished service. It is usually given for ten years and to KGB men only....That was in 1962. I had ten years of service then." When it was pointed out that, according to his most recent statement, he had joined the KGB in March 1953 and therefore would have had only nine years of service in 1962, NOSENKO said he did not understand why but that he was certain that he had been given the medal after his return from Geneva in 1962. (The 1962 date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier statements that he joined the KGB in 1952.) The following day, 17 April 1964, NOSENKO said that he remembered why he had received the medal in 1962 rather than 1963; this medal, he recalled, is awarded to servicemen as well as KGB officers, and prior military service is taken into account in computing the service time for the latter. NOSENKO had entered the GRU in 1950 and therefore should have received the ten-year medal in 1960. Because of a mix-up in the KGB Personnel Department he did not receive it until 1962.

**NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 19 January 1964.

H. NOSENKO's Relationship with GRIBANOV

1. Information from NOSENKO

a. Summary

From the time of his first meetings with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO maintained that he had a close personal and professional relationship with Major General O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO has described recruitment approaches in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his rank promotions and receipt of various awards, and his afterhours carousing with GRIBANOV and First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer Ye.A. TARABRIN. NOSENKO has also frequently mentioned the role which GRIBANOV played in his, NOSENKO's, professional advancement within the KGB: GRIBANOV was wholly responsible, against NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in January 1960; later, when NOSENKO rejected his offer to make him Deputy Chief of the entire American Department, GRIBANOV arranged his return to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American Tourist Section and his later appointment as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

NOSENKO's remarks concerning his direct involvement with GRIBANOV in operations against Americans are included in other parts of this paper. Among them are his early statements on the approach to code clerk James STORSBERG (Part V.E.3.c.), his 1962 account of the arrest and attempt to recruit CIA officer Russell LANGELLE (Part VI.D.7.a.), and his early reports on the attempt to recruit CIA officer Edward Ellis SMITH (Part VI.D.2.). In all three cases NOSENKO subsequently denied having played the role he originally attributed to himself and denied having had personal contact with the Americans involved. NOSENKO has also altered his original accounts to say that he received no awards or decoration for operational activity and that he had not received the promotions he claimed.

b. Details

The statements of NOSENKO given below concern primarily his personal relationship with GRIBANOV and how GRIBANOV assisted his rapid rise within the organization of the Second Chief Directorate.

12 June 1962: "Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV is a great guy. A real pal. We, so to say, used to meet one another illegally and had women together... GRIBANOV wrote a fitness report on me. It was the very best that can be given, brilliant. GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on me. He had an excellent regard for me, excellent... I am supposed to become Deputy Chief of [the Tourist] Department. I believe that GRIBANOV is promoting young people, new people, who already have experience, good experience, who have made recruitments. I know two or three [of the people he is moving ahead]. I personally have about 12 recruitments, four or five of them were British and the rest Americans. He [GRIBANOV] has his eye on me in particular, and the question of my advancement is right now under consideration... I will be Deputy Chief of Department. You must give thought to the

fact that I have been talking with you. You can ruin everything. I have a career. I have bright prospects. My boss GRIBANOV, my highest boss, has a very high degree of respect for me. He sometimes bawls me out and I-- Well, I make it look like this is unpleasant for me. But, in fact, it is a pleasant thing because, inside, I am glad he is bawling me out and not someone else. I know that if he bawls me out he has a high regard for me. He sometimes calls me personally [to his office] and says: 'You come with me. I have to meet an ambassador.' I go with him. We arrive and have the conversation. He is there all night. He comes out and says: 'Well, where shall we go for a drink?' I know beforehand [that he will say this] and everything is ready at the Aragvi Restaurant. We go there. 'Well, what shall we drink!' [GRIBANOV says]. I answer: 'Well, Oleg Mikhailovich, cognac, of course! He is the highest chief. 'I don't drink cognac. I'll have vodka,' I say. 'Well, we'll have vodka then,' [GRIBANOV says]..." One of NOSENKO's CIA handlers suggested at this point that GRIBANOV seemed to treat NOSENKO as an older brother would. NOSENKO replied: "That's his attituce toward me."

23 April 1964

Question:	Did you ever go to GRIBANOV's house?
NOSENKO:	I never went in the house. I have driven to it.
Question:	Did he ever come to your house?
NOSENKO:	No.
Question:	Were you ever out at night with him, after work? If so, how, under what circumstances?
NOSENKO:	After work? Yes, once.
Question:	Who else was there?
NOSENKO:	TARABRIN.
Question:	What was the occasion?
NOSENKO:	No specific reason. GRIBANOV called me at midnight. I could hear that he was already drinking; he asked me how long it would take me to get dressed and come down to the Praga Restaurant, first private room. Afterwards we wanted to go somewhere else to finish the evening... GRIBANOV was sloppy drunk, lay down to rest, he needed a couple of hours of sleep. I drove him and TARABRIN home, got him there at 6:00 a.m., gave him some pills to help him.
Question:	When did you first personally meet GRIBANOV?
NOSENKO:	I might have seen him in 1953 or 1954, but I did not have a chance to speak to him then. Once I was in two group operational discussions (about 15 people present) about work against Military Attaches in 1954; that was the first time I ever spoke to him.

Question: When did you first have any personal conversation with him?

NOSENKO: I don't remember. He gathered groups of people. Maybe I was with him with KOZLOV and others in Tourist Department [i.e., between 1955 and 1960].

Question: When did you develop a personal relationship with him?

NOSENKO: It is difficult to say how it got started. I was still working in the Seventh Department. It was in 1958, or maybe 1957. KOZLOV suddenly called me and said I should immediately report to GRIBANOV. I did, and GRIBANOV said I should quickly be ready to go to a reception with him at the Indian Embassy, with him and Vera [Ivanovna] ANDREYEVA.

Question: Why you?

NOSENKO: I don't know... (pause) Oh, yes, this is the story. this is it, this is why he started favoring me. Earlier, some time in 1953, I knew some girls, Nina on Pokrovskiy Boulevard and her girlfriend, Rina GUDKOVA, friends of [Yu.I.] GUK and [V.M.] KOVSHUK and [V.A.] CHURANOV. CHURANOV was a friend of TARABRIN, who was a friend of GRIBANOV. Through TARABRIN he got acquainted with these girls, and TARABRIN brought them to GRIBANOV's dacha one night. The girls were talkative and told me all about it, and said they'd told CHURANOV. I told CHURANOV who warned me not to mention it. I never did, and GRIBANOV learned about this and liked it; he remarked once: "You are not a gossiper..."

Question: How did he find out that you knew and didn't tell anyone?

NOSENKO: I don't know, but he did.

Question: Who wrote your fitness reports?

NOSENKO: My last one was written by [V.D.] CHELNOKOV. The one before that by [V.A.] KLYPIN, in the First Department. Before that in the Seventh Department it was written by [K.N.] DUBAS, before him by [V.A.] KOZLOV, then [S.V.] PERFILYEV and before then, in the First Department, by [A.M.] GORBATENKO.

Question: Did GRIBANOV ever write a fitness report on you?

NOSENKO: He may not have actually written them, but he signed them, those reports written in connection with promotions to higher jobs or for trips abroad, or general reviews of personnel.

15 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 20 February 1965): "Before I joined the KGB in 1953 I had never heard the name of Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV and knew nothing about him. As [F.G.] SHUBNYAKOV, rather than GRIBANOV, was the Deputy Director of the Second Chief Directorate responsible for supervising the activities of the First Department of the Directorate, where I worked,

it may have been several months after I began my KGB service that GRIBANOV first came to my attention. I don't know when I first saw GRIBANOV but it may have been approximately 1953 at a meeting before May Day or the 7 November holiday. I would not necessarily remember this as I frequently met much more important people, who were friends of my father, and seeing GRIBANOV wouldn't have been particularly important to me. Sometimes during 1954 and 1955, it was necessary to obtain the signature of a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate on a cable that I had written and, if SHUBNYAKOV was absent at the time, I would take it to GRIBANOV for approval. Though I was only a junior case officer at the time, I would take the cable, after it had been approved by the Chief of Section and the Chief of Department, directly to GRIBANOV, who would simply sign it with no discussion. I do not remember how many times I took cables to GRIBANOV nor do I remember the contents of any specific one of them. The first meeting with GRIBANOV that I specifically remember was in the summer of 1956. I think it was in June. I had returned from Kiev with KOZLOV and, after writing a spravka on BURGI, PERFILYEV, KOZLOV, and I went to see GRIBANOV. KOZLOV didn't introduce me to GRIBANOV at that time, but GRIBANOV knew that I was NOSENKO because the plan for the BURGI operation said that I would participate and because PERFILYEV had made an appointment for the three of us to speak to GRIBANOV at this time. The meeting lasted about 30 or 40 minutes. GRIBANOV read the report on BURGI's recruitment and asked some questions. KOZLOV answered some of these and I answered others. Other than asking what Ukrainians took part in the operation, I can recall none of GRIBANOV's questions nor do I remember any of the conversation which took place at this meeting. When we were through, KOZLOV and I left while PERFILYEV remained with GRIBANOV. Perhaps the first time I was alone with GRIBANOV was in 1958 when I attended a reception given by the Indian Embassy at the Sovetskaya Hotel in Moscow. Usually [A.V.] SUNTSOV accompanied GRIBANOV on such occasions, but he was sick at the time. I don't know why SUNTSOV usually went with GRIBANOV, why I was selected to go, or what I was supposed to do at the reception. I think GRIBANOV called the Seventh Department and asked whom he could use, but I don't know why he picked me. GRIBANOV told me that, at the reception, I was to refer to him as Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBUNOV. I was to introduce myself as Yuriy Ivanovich and if anybody asked, would use the last name NIKOLAYEV. Vera ANDREYEVA, who went with us, used the name Vera Ivanovna. After work, I went home to change my clothes and we went in GRIBANOV's car from the KGB to the Hotel Sovetskaya. GRIBANOV sat in front with the driver and I sat in back with Vera ANDREYEVA. I cannot say how many times I have seen GRIBANOV altogether. From 1959 on I saw him more frequently. Sometimes, GRIBANOV would call meetings of chiefs of sections and their deputies and I would take part in these. I had begun to call GRIBANOV by his first name and patronymic in 1958, when I was Deputy Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department, but at these meetings I called him 'Comrade General.' In 1959 I also went to GRIBANOV's office alone in connection with the FRIPPEL case and, sometime between May and October 1959, took him a report that I had prepared concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations."

23-24 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 26 February): "GRIBANOV was never in my own office, my home, my parents home or my parent's dacha. My father never knew him. I was never in GRIBANOV's home or his dacha. I was never in any KGB operational apartment with GRIBANOV. I never introduced any of my own agents to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV knew about agents [redacted] [redacted] and 'ARTUR' (FRIPPEL), but I never specifically discussed them with GRIBANOV. I did discuss with GRIBANOV the agent 'PROKHOR' (PREISFREUND). On three occasions I have been with GRIBANOV in social circumstances. On all three occasions TARABRIN was also present. After two of these occasions, we had parties with girls. I don't remember when the first time was, but the last time was in September or October 1963. On this occasion they called me at home late at night and asked me to join them at the Prague Restaurant. I arranged for female companionship and this party lasted until early morning.* It was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV some pills I had for hangovers. I had brought a supply of these back from Geneva in 1962. A few days after this party [GRIBANOV's secretary Ye.S.] KIRPICHNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking me for some more of these pills. This is the note I gave to my CIA case officers in 1964.** I have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an Indian Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three times to meetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRIBANOV played absolutely no part in my entry into the KGB. I think he could not have played any personal part in my assignment to the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since at that time GRIBANOV was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate supervising the Second Department and not the First Department. I do not know who made the decision to transfer me from the First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but I did not have any personal contact or conversation with GRIBANOV concerning this decision. I do not know if GRIBANOV played any personal part in my appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in the Seventh Department in 1958. I do not remember just who was responsible for my appointment to this position. I did not personally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV decided at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, and this appointment took place sometime in January 1960. DUBAS, the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told me that GRIBANOV planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself about this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had recommended me for this new position and did not tell me any reason for my having been selected. GRIBANOV did tell me that my appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return to the Seventh Department in January 1962 was actually made in about September or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not

---

* See below for a more detailed version of this affair.

** When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva in 1964 he was carrying a note addressed: "Personal to NOSENKO, Yu.I." In translation the note read in full: "Yu.I., get me please some more tablets like the one you gave me once. [signed] GRIBANOV."

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

own agents to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV knew about agents [redacted] [redacted] and 'ARTUR' (PRIPPEL), but I never specifically discussed them with GRIBANOV. I did discuss with GRIBANOV the agent 'PROKHOR' (PREISFREUND). On three occasions I have been with GRIBANOV in social circumstances. On all three occasions TARABRIN was also present. After two of these occasions, we had parties with girls. I don't remember when the first time was, but the last time was in September or October 1963. On this occasion they called me at home late at night and asked me to join them at the Prague Restaurant. I arranged for female companionship and this party lasted until early morning.* It was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV some pills I had for hangovers. I had brought a supply of these back from Geneva in 1962. A few days after this party [GRIBANOV's secretary Ye.S.] KIRPICHNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking me for some more of these pills. This is the note I gave to my CIA case officers in 1964.** I have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an Indian Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three times to meetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRIBANOV played absolutely no part in my entry into the KGB. I think he could not have played any personal part in my assignment to the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since at that time GRIBANOV was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate supervising the Second Department and not the First Department. I do not know who made the decision to transfer me from the First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but I did not have any personal contact or conversation with GRIBANOV concerning this decision. I do not know if GRIBANOV played any personal part in my appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in the Seventh Department in 1958. I do not remember just who was responsible for my appointment to this position. I did not personally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV decided at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, and this appointment took place sometime in January 1960. DUBAS, the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told me that GRIBANOV planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself about this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had recommended me for this new position and did not tell me any reason for my having been selected. GRIBANOV did tell me that my appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return to the Seventh Department in January 1962 was actually made in about September or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of FEDOSEYEV, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had already spoken to CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the Seventh Department, about this matter, and he had suggested that I go to GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Department. GRIBANOV finally agreed that I should return to the Seventh Department as Chief of the First Section with the understanding that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this position would be vacated by [B.A.] BALDIN. In July 1962 I was appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. This decision was made by CHELNOKOV and GRIBANOV in accordance with the intention stated by GRIBANOV at the end of 1961 that I should be appointed to this position as soon as possible. I had no further personal discussions with GRIBANOV about this appointment at this time. In 1963 CHELNOKOV [GRIBANOV's Deputy, F.D.] BOBKOV, and GRIBANOV decided that I should be named First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. They did not discuss this with me beforehand and no order was issued about this appointment. I was simply told that from that time I would be considered as First Deputy Chief of the Department. At this time I was, in fact, the only Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, since KOROBOV did not come to the Seventh Department until about November or December 1963. GRIBANOV did not tell me his reasons for appointing me Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department in January 1960, for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961, or for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He did not discuss with me my personal qualifications for each of these positions. GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I think that the kharakteristika written about me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the Seventh Department. I did not personally discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow. My candidacy for this assignment was supported by BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the work of the Eleventh Department which had the investigative file on SHAKOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who would go as case officer on this trip because SHAKOV, who was suspected of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this trip. My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the CPSU. GRIBANOV had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. The kharakteristika on me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV. For the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU was required for me or for any of the other members of the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. KHLOBUSTOV, PANCHENKO, and KOVALENKO supported me for the assignment as a personal favor to me. I did not discuss my 1964 trip to Geneva with GRIBANOV prior to my departure. In fact, I was even afraid that GRIBANOV would find out that I was going and would object to my making this second trip."

---

* See below for a more detailed version of this affair.

** When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva in 1964 he was carrying a note addressed: "Personal to NOSENKO, Yu.I." In translation the note read in full: "Yu.I., get me please some more tablets like the one you gave me once. [signed] GRIBANOV."

23 February 1965: NOSENKO commented further on his social encounters with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. The following, which was not included in the protocol quoted above, is taken from case officer notes.

Question:	Tell me about the occasions when you were with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN.
NOSENKO:	Three times--drinking in cafes. Twice afterwards there were girls. The most recent time was in September or October 1963. I don't remember the first time. In 1963 I received a call from TARABRIN at home. Then GRIBANOV got on the phone and told me to take his car and come join them at the Praga Restaurant. I didn't take his car because I didn't want to call the duty officer. I took a cab and went to the Praga. They were sitting there and drinking in a private room. I joined them. They were drinking champagne, but I took cognac. TARABRIN suggested girls about 1230 and GRIBANOV made me go to the office to get my notebook. I called one girl I knew--her and her sister. When I got back to the restaurant it was closed with only GRIBANOV and TARABRIN still there. We went to the girls' (apartment). They weren't prostitutes exactly. I knew her before.
Question:	Is this why GRIBANOV called you to the restaurant (i.e., to provide girls)?
NOSENKO:	I think so. It was the second time I had participated in this. This last time GRIBANOV told the girl his name. The girl works in the Archives of the First Chief Directorate. At that time of night I wasn't able to reach anyone else. Her name is Galina Mikhaylovna. Her mother works in the Central Committee. I don't remember her last name. GRIBANOV was drinking and she told him that she had quarreled with ZAYTSEV, the Chief of the First Chief Directorate Archives. GRIBANOV told her that he would give her a job and told me to arrange for a job in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for her. Galina's flat is in the building inhabited by Central Committee workers on Kutuzovskiy Prospekt. GRIBANOV's driver drove him home at 0600 and he was in the office by 0830.

3 March 1965: Speaking of the damage his disclosures must have caused the KGB, NOSENKO said: "I believe they will punish people in the Second Chief Directorate [SCD]... Even GRIBANOV... He was personally responsible, as head of the SCD, for pushing me ahead."

Question:	What sort of punishment?
NOSENKO:	Even firing.
Question:	Do you think any others would be punished, or even fired?
NOSENKO:	Maybe KOVALENKO, BOBKOV, and people in the Eleventh Department. Many others, too.

Later in the same session the interrogator returned to this subject. The following is a transcript of the discussion:

Question: You said you think GRIBANOV might be fired. Yet, there is nothing in the protocol you signed [see above] about your relations with GRIBANOV which would seem to make him personally responsible for you. Is there something else, something you haven't told me?

NOSENKO: No.

Question: Why then do you think GRIBANOV would be fired?

NOSENKO: (no answer)

Question: (repeats)

NOSENKO: Don't know.

Question: Well, what is your opinion at least?

NOSENKO: Nothing, nothing. Let's not discuss this.

Question: Why not?

NOSENKO: It's simply my opinion, that's all. I don't know why.

Question: Well, what is your opinion?

NOSENKO: He was responsible for my becoming Deputy Chief of Department.

Question: But you had already gotten ahead before; you said he didn't help you become Deputy Chief of Section in 1958.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you ever hear any gossip about his help to you?

NOSENKO: It was said in the SCD that he helped me become Chief of Section and Deputy Chief of Department.

Question: Why would BOBKOV be punished?

NOSENKO: He was my supervisor, and in '61 he was Secretary of the KGB Party Organization.

Question: Would others in the Party Organization be punished?

NOSENKO: Yes, also in the Party Organization of the Seventh Department and of the SCD.

Question: Would BANNIKOV be punished?

NOSENKO: No. He did nothing, just supported my candidature for Geneva.

Question: Would KOVSHUK be punished?

NOSENKO: Of course they would speak with KOVSHUK, GUK, GRYAZNOV, who talked to me.

Question: How about the First Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate?

NOSENKO: No. I wasn't close to them, except GUK.

Question: How about First Chief Directorate residencies abroad?

NOSENKO: [S.I.] GAVRICHEV might be recalled from Geneva.

Question: You must be withholding something about your relationship with GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO: No, I was telling you I visited his office. He told me: 'I found out you're drinking too much.' I said no, not especially. He said: 'Stop this drinking with KOVSHUK. It's not good for you.'

Question: But this couldn't harm GRIBANOV's position now.

NOSENKO: They would review my file, and find that it contained the report about the woman in '54,* the fact that I was turned down for assignment to Ethiopia, drinking, scandals--GRIBANOV knew about this, but he approved my appointment (to Deputy Chief of Department) anyway.

Question: Why did he promote you?

NOSENKO GRIBANOV thought I was a young, active guy. Six recruitments--oh, they weren't much, but it sounds great for the First Department, which was having no success with Americans in the Embassy.

Question: But why make you Deputy Chief of Department?

NOSENKO: He thought I was a tough guy, good case officer. In '59 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of operations which were reported to him.

Question: But it was not then, but in 1961, when he made you Deputy Chief of Department.

NOSENKO: (shrugs)

Question: Who would officially approve a Deputy Chief of Department?

NOSENKO: Must be higher than a Department Chief--because GRIBANOV signed. They could get him for this, especially those who are against GRIBANOV.

Question: Who?

NOSENKO: Well, IVANOV, who wanted to get promoted to Deputy Chief of Department in 59-60 but didn't. He was in an inspection group of the Collegium, checking the Seventh Department.

---

* Presumably this is a reference to NOSENKO's contracting venereal disease (see Part IV.C.2.).

Question: But GRIBANOV must have approved all the other Deputy Department Chiefs, too. Would the same happen if one of them defected?

NOSENKO: Well, if it was from the Second Department, for example, no, because GRIBANOV wasn't personally supervising it. It would be someone else's proposal. In my case it was his own initiative.

Question: Was anyone in the First Chief Directorate punished as a result of GOLITSYN's defection?

NOSENKO: No, absolutely not.

2. Information from [redacted]

As indicated in Part III.I., a number of sources have reported that GRIBANOV and other KGB officers were discharged from the KGB in the wake of NOSENKO's defection.* [redacted]

[redacted]

According to sensitive source, [redacted] 15 KGB officers had already been dismissed from the KGB because of the defection, and that GRIBANOV and three of his deputies were included in this number. One of the deputies was named "BANNIK" (BANNIKOV). GRIBANOV's guilt was said to rest in the facts that, as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, he had been ultimately responsible for NOSENKO's flight; that NOSENKO was his personal friend and protege; and that, therefore, he should have been aware of NOSENKO's intention to defect.

According to sensitive source, [redacted] when NOSENKO was being considered for inclusion in the Soviet delegation to go to Geneva, a summary statement of NOSENKO's activities and capabilities was prepared by employees of the Second Chief Directorate and was sent to GRIBANOV... [redacted] said he understood this summary contained considerable 'compromising' information regarding NOSENKO and, if acted on properly, would have removed NOSENKO from future consideration for the trip to Geneva. [redacted] Sensiti source stated, however, that he understood from conversations with other KGB employees, whom he could not recall specifically by name, that GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and put the notation on the summary, 'Send him to Geneva.' [redacted] the general feeling among KGB personnel that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of deficiencies about NOSENKO because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father."

---

* In addition, a Western Ambassador with whom GRIBANOV was in operational contact in Moscow has stated that GRIBANOV disappeared from the scene sometime in mid-1965 and was replaced by another KGB handler. (He has also indicated that GRIBANOV disappeared about the time of KHRUSHCHEV's downfall in October 1964.)

According to sensitive source,

[redacted] GRIBANOV's dismissal took place immediately after NOSENKO's defection in February 1964 and no less than 50 other officers, most of them from the Second Chief Directorate and many of them close friends of GRIBANOV, had been fired subsequently. [redacted] prior to NOSENKO's defection, NOSENKO had been the deputy to a Department Chief in the Second Chief Directorate but that he held only the rank of captain in the KGB. [redacted] attributed NOSENKO's high position to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on his behalf. [redacted] rather than being fired, Major General "BANNIK" (BANNIKOV) had been appointed Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate in GRIBANOV's stead.*

[redacted] after the defection of NOSENKO, the KGB conducted an extensive investigation of personnel in KGB Headquarters to find out which KGB officers knew him. One of these questioned was TARABRIN, who said he was acquainted with NOSENKO, but that their relationship was only casual and was limited to occasional official contacts within the KGB. Subsequent investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN and GRIBANOV were close friends socially and had attended several parties which NOSENKO had arranged and attended. Girls provided by NOSENKO were at these parties.** As a result of his willful concealment of this information, TARABRIN, like GRIBANOV, was discharged from the KGB and dismissed from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

* [redacted] BANNIKOV was the Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO, as noted above, said that BANNIKOV would not be punished as a result of his defection. NOSENKO also said that it was BANNIKOV who sponsored NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva and that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with it or the 1962 trip.

** These evidently were the parties described by NOSENKO (see above). [redacted] at the time of his removal from the KGB, TARABRIN was the Chief of the British Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN held this post until 1963, at which time he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the newly established "Service Number Two" (counterintelligence) of the First Chief Directorate.

I. Confirmation from Other Sources

1. Introduction

Since NOSENKO's defection several Soviet sources and defectors have provided information supporting NOSENKO's claims of having held certain positions in the KGB at certain times. [redacted] a Soviet scientist with suspected intelligence connections who was approached by CIA, Soviet case officers for an [redacted] double agent (a NOSENKO lead), and the KGB officer handling Robert Lee JOHNSON (also a NOSENKO lead), a Soviet journalist who contacted the magazine Paris Match with a proposal to write an article on NOSENKO, and two defectors. Some of these sources had supported NOSENKO directly by reporting that he was a Second Chief Directorate officer in the various positions he says he was. Others have offered indirect support by confirming NOSENKO's knowledge of particular pieces of information or confirming the validity of information which NOSENKO said he learned while in particular KGB jobs. As will be noted, the information from one source sometimes contradicts that learned from another or from NOSENKO himself.

2. [redacted]

[redacted] has corroborated NOSENKO's story indirectly by his descriptions of the repercussions of the defection within the KGB (particularly the firing of GRIBANOV) [redacted] and by his statements concerning the probable effect that the defection would have on KGB operations. [redacted] reported at various times that NOSENKO is "more valuable than PENKOVSKIY," that he is "vastly more important than DERYABIN or GOLITSYN," that the KGB "will not be able to operate normally for two years," that it is the "unanimous opinion" of [redacted] "NOSENKO could do tremendous harm to the KGB," and that this damage would be severe "for several years to come".

[redacted] has also given indirect support to NOSENKO's statement that he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.* [redacted] NOSENKO as a "chief" had access to details on KGB activities against the U.S. Embassy, and [redacted] the loss suffered by the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's knowledge of the microphones installed in the Embassy. (NOSENKO has said that this information was available to him only because he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section. [redacted] reported that NOSENKO's position as a "chief" in the Second Chief Directorate gave him access to the names and backgrounds of many KGB officers in the USSR and abroad (see Part III.I.) and to sensitive information on KGB organization, operations, and methods. This status [redacted] made available to NOSENKO a "30-page personnel [illegible] and a 200-page phone list from Moscow Headquarters of the KGB."*

---

* [redacted] however, is not known to have stated specifically that NOSENKO was a senior official in the American Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960 and 1961.

[redacted] supported certain of the operational leads supplied by NOSENKO. [redacted] The agent was John RUFE, named by NOSENKO as a person recruited in Leningrad in January 1962 on homosexual grounds; this information NOSENKO said he learned as Chief of the American Tourist Section of the Tourist Department. [redacted] Further examples of [redacted] supporting NOSENKO in this way are reviewed elsewhere in this paper [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV incident in Part VI.D.7.c).

[redacted]

[redacted] also offered specific although [illegible] confirmation of NOSENKO's claimed positions in the [redacted] that from the very beginning of his employment by the KGB NOSENKO worked in the Second Directorate. [redacted] he once worked against personnel of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow; later he was assigned to work against U.S. journalists in Moscow. During his last years with the KGB, he was assigned to the task of working against American and

---

* NOSENKO has never mentioned these documents.

[redacted]

[redacted]

European tourists in Moscow. His last position, [redacted], was that of Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate (Tourists). [redacted] NOSENKO secured this relatively high position because of help he received from Lieutenant General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Directorate. [redacted] throughout NOSENKO's career GRIBANOV had always helped him and saw that he was promoted..."

With regard to NOSENKO's KGB rank, [redacted] "it appeared quite certain that NOSENKO had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the KGB." [redacted] reported having learned from [redacted] KGB officer, [redacted] that NOSENKO was in fact only a captain.**

[redacted] was asked if he feels that NOSENKO has actually defected or whether he feels that this might be a 'trick' by the KGB. He [redacted] replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he is convinced that NOSENKO's defection is not a 'trick' by the KGB."

3. [redacted] sensitive source

[redacted] said that "he had heard about NOSENKO from various persons in Moscow. He said he had never known NOSENKO personally. He said NOSENKO was an important boss in the KGB. He said he did not know what directorate or department NOSENKO had been in. [redacted] continued that when NOSENKO was a young man he was in the GRU Military Academy*** and then [was] sent to the Information Department of the GRU for a short time; in all,

[redacted]

** Until January 1965 NOSENKO maintained that he had progressed through the KGB ranks in normal sequence, from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. On 26 January 1965, however, he said that because of administrative confusion and GRIBANOV's advice he had skipped the rank of major and had moved directly from captain to lieutenant colonel in late 1963. In April 1966 NOSENKO told CIA that he had never held the rank of lieutenant colonel and was really only a captain (see Part V.G.1.).

*** The Military-Diplomatic Academy is the strategic intelligence school of the GRU. Although NOSENKO said he attended various naval-type schools before joining the GRU, he insisted that he was never enrolled in a formal intelligence course of any training establishment of the Soviet Navy. He claimed to have turned down an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he called the GRU Military Academy) because it offered too many political courses that he had already taken. See Part IV.B.

perhaps a year. [redacted] NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and 'not very good.' He was to have been discharged from the GRU, however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. [redacted] it was the opinion of the persons from whom he heard the information about NOSENKO that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. [redacted] the U.S. Embassy had found many of the microphones based on NOSENKO information."*

[redacted] confirmed operational information which NOSENKO has reported [redacted]. SHUBIN was the only GRU agent named by NOSENKO, who sourced his knowledge of SHUBIN to an incident which occurred about 1959, while NOSENKO said he was in the Tourist Department.**

4. [redacted]

[redacted]

---

*As indicated in Part V.E.3.g., the final sentence is largely but not entirel correct.

**See Part V.F.8.

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. [redacted]

[redacted] at the time of the defection, NOSENKO was rooming in Geneva with Nikolay RESHETNYAK, a representative of the International Organizations Branch of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. RESHETNYAK told [redacted] that NOSENKO often left his quarters without saying where he was going, but it was assumed that NOSENKO was "Intelligence" and had some mission to accomplish.** [redacted] RESHETNYAK had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with the NOSENKO defection. RESHETNYAK also told [redacted] that he had attended the Moscow trial of NOSENKO, held in absentia, at which NOSENKO was found guilty of treason and was sentenced to death. [redacted] thought the KGB might go so far as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. Finally, he has reported on the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and Yuriy GUK, and other repercussions within the KGB of NOSENKO's defection (see Part III.I.4.)

6. GAMKRELIDZE

NOSENKO's service in the American Department was confirmed in the fall of 1964 by the Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE.*** At that time an American scientist brought up with GAMKRELIDZE the subject of the ABEL-POWERS exchange**** and asked whether the Russian people had been told about it. GAMKRELIDZE replied that they had not been told officially but knew it had taken place since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. As an example, he said that it was in this way that he had heard about the NOSENKO defection and its significance. Expanding, GAMKRELIDZE stated that the "grapevine" indicated that the defection "was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States."

---

* See Part VI.D.7.c.

** NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation. Asked on 24 January 1964 whether RESHETNYAK might be suspicious of his absences for meetings with CIA, NOSENKO replied: "He thinks I'm KGB...so of course there's no problem if I come back late." [redacted] reported that RESHETNYAK had been dismissed from the KGB as a result of the defection of NOSENKO. CIA has no other reports of RESHETNYAK having served in the KGB.

*** GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements and actions, as well as his unusual freedom of movement, often alone, while on visits to the United States. When approached by a CIA representative with a recruitment proposal in 1964, GAMKRELIDZE declined but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer... since this enabled him to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he has met with their American counterparts." During this meeting, GAMKRELIDZE raised the subject of NOSENKO again, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country."

**** The exchange of the KGB Illegal Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL for Francis Gary POWERS, the U-2 pilot, took place in February 1962.

7. GOLITSYN

The defector GOLITSYN is the only source of information on NOSENKO's KGB career who claims to have been personally acquainted with him. GOLITSYN said that he met NOSENKO for the first time in 1953 when visiting the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate on business, and that he saw and spoke with NOSENKO on a number of occasions subsequently, most recently in 1959. This first-hand information from GOLITSYN, however, is not always consistent either internally or in comparison with that supplied by NOSENKO.

CIA has no record that GOLITSYN, prior to the publicity attending NOSENKO's defection, ever mentioned him by name or in connection with the KGB Second Chief Directorate. On 19 March 1962, prior to NOSENKO's first contact with CIA, GOLITSYN was shown NOSENKO's name among those of other Soviets in Geneva fo the Disarmament Conference. He failed to comment on it.

On 26 June 1962, after CIA's initial meetings with NOSENKO and because of the large overlap of NOSENKO's information and contacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CIA case officers who had met NOSENKO in Geneva met with GOLITSYN to obtain his comments on some of the NOSENKO material. GOLITSYN was told that CIA had received in Switzerland an anonymous letter which reported certain information from within the KGB; the CIA official stated to GOLITSYN that the information so closely overlapped his own reporting, including prominent mention of GOLITSYN's friends GUK, KOVSHUK, and CHURANOV, that the possibility of disinformation was suspected, perhaps in relation to GOLITSYN's own defection. Ten major items from NOSENKO were discussed with GOLITSYN, all pertaining to Second Chief Directorate operations, and a list of 15 names was shown him, identified as names of Second Chief Directorate personnel whom the letter writer had named. Among these names was (fnu) NOSENKO, and GOLITSYN indicated he had previously reported on him; CIA records, however, show that GOLITSYN had reported only on one Aleksandr Fedoseyevich NOSENKO, who had been a KGB officer in Japan when RASTVOROV defected to the U.S. in 1954. GOLITSYN made no further comments on these names, except to say that one identified as KGB had left that organization in 1961 for the MVD. GOLITSYN said that in general, lacking the full details necessary for an assessment, he could say that there were serious signs of disinformation in what he had seen; he wanted to see the full information on the case. Subsequently GOLITSYN made numerous demands for this information, complaining to Attorney General Robert KENNEDY and senior CIA officials because his request had not been granted.

On 10 February 1964 NOSENKO's defection from the Soviet Disarmament delegation in Geneva, Switzerland, was publicized, including his KGB affiliation. When GOLITSYN heard this news he immediately recalled the June 1962 "letter" in Switzerland and linked NOSENKO to it; he thereupon stated that he recalled NOSENKO as a member of the Second Chief Directorate working against American citizens.

GOLITSYN on 11 February 1964 raised the possibility of his participation in efforts to "break" NOSENKO, and at this time he was given some background on the case and an indication of CIA's reservations about NOSENKO's *bona fides*. Over the next several months GOLITSYN was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, and at his request was supplied with all the available biographic data to assist him in analyzing the KGB operation. On 29 June 1964, GOLITSYN was interviewed in detail on the subject of NOSENKO. He confirmed NOSENKO's identity as the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding and said that he was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Tourist Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate. He was shown a photograph of NOSENKO (not buried in a photo spread, but singly) and he said that the photograph depicted NOSENKO. GOLITSYN said he knew this because he was personally acquainted with NOSENKO, having met him two or three times in the U.S. Embassy Section while there on KGB First Chief Directorate business in 1953. He had also seen NOSENKO occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959, and when GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO told him that he was in the Tourist Department. Finally, GOLITSYN said, he and NOSENKO knew one another through their mutual friendships with Yu. I. GUK, V.A. CHURANOV, and Ye.G. KASHCHEYEV.* According to GOLITSYN, NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958 and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during the first year of this period. For the remainder of his service in the U.S. Embassy Section, until 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO may have had these same responsibilities or he may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents. He was definitely in the American Department during this entire period. In 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO transferred to the Tourist Department and was a senior case officer there as of 1959.** GOLITSYN was certain that NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate at any time during 1960. This he said he knew because he had visited the U.S. Embassy Section on at least three occasions during the early part of 1960 and again in about December 1960 (sic, actually January 1961).*** GOLITSYN said that he knew in detail who was in the section, and that he would have known if NOSENKO had been there, particularly if he were the Deputy Chief.****

---

* NOSENKO, on the other hand, failed to identify GOLITSYN's photograph and has consistently denied ever seeing or meeting him. After the defection, NOSENKO was asked what he knew of GOLITSYN. He immediately gave a detailed account of an incident which GOLITSYN himself had previously reported to CIA: GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV in 1951 or 1952 had written a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party proposing a reorganization and redirection of First Chief Directorate intelligence activities; as a result of this letter GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV had been received by MALENKOV and STALIN, and their proposals were accepted. This was NOSENKO's first mention of KASHCHEYEV, but he added at this time that he was personally acquainted with him, had seen him periodically at KGB Headquarters, sometimes had a drink with him after work, and had once entertained KASHCHEYEV at his dacha in 1953 or 1954. GOLITSYN saw NOSENKO's reply to his question prior to making the above statement, and NOSENKO's claims of friendships with Yu.I. GUK and V.A. CHURANOV were included in the file GOLITSYN studied.

(Footnotes continued on next page.)

(Continuation of footnotes from preceding page.)

** This chronology differs from that provided by NOSENKO and described previously: According to NOSENKO, he served in the American Department to mid-1955, in the Tourist Department from 1955 until January 1960, in the American Department during 1960 and 1961, and again in the Tourist Department from 1962 until his defection. NOSENKO's confirmed 1956 operation against BURGI and his 1957 operations against [redacted] and Gisella HARRIS tend to confirm his connection with tourist operations in 1956 and 1957.

*** GOLITSYN had spoken as early as December 1961 of these visits to the U.S. Embassy Section.

****GOLITSYN had earlier reported that G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as the assistant of the chief of section at this time. He has never identified the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section nor indicated that such a position was on the table of organization.

8. [redacted]

[redacted], a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent, told U.S. authorities [redacted], that she did not think NOSENKO was a KGB officer. At the same time, however, [redacted] said she knew that NOSENKO had told the Americans about the microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The following is from the transcript of her remarks:

Question: Do you know anything about NOSENKO, the one who defected in Geneva?

[redacted]: I didn't have any real information. I heard some gossip, and the gossip was that he is the son of a general, that his mother is Jewish, and that his mother was always involved in some blackmarketing, that his father had great concern over the family. This is, you know, idle talk. I don't really know--it was just gossip.

Question: Would you say that this idle talk was among KGB people or--

[redacted]: You know, I didn't know many KGB people. It was only Mr. SVIRIN.*

Question: But he told you about this?

[redacted]: He didn't tell me, he told [redacted] husband], ah--you know, they like to think they are all-powerful, that this man of course will be exterminated one day. They always repeat it. Well, somebody committed suicide. The old defector, that GUZENKO, I think. Yes--I read in the paper.

Question: But what were you saying about this Geneva NOSENKO? His mother is Jewish, his father was a general. What was his father in?

[redacted]: I really don't know.

Question: Were there others who suffered as a result of this?

[redacted]: I really don't know. I never heard. I never knew that defector. I never knew. He wasn't a KGB person.

Question: I beg your pardon?

[redacted]: He wasn't a KGB person, NOSENKO.

---

* V.G. SVIRIN was said by [redacted] to have been a KGB officer under cover of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) during the period of her husband's employment (1960-1962) there and later head of a unit conducting operations against the U.S. Embassy. He maintained a friendly association with [redacted] and her husband to the date of her defection. According to NOSENKO, SVIRIN was a KGB officer who participated in the PENKOVSKIY investigation (see Part VI.D.7.b.).

Question: The fellow from Geneva?

[redacted] No. He wasn't a KGB person.

Question: No? What was he?

[redacted]: He was a civilian, I think.

Question: You never heard anything about his family, his friends?

[redacted] No.

Question: But you say he was not a KGB person?

[redacted] I say I will tell you one thing: They don't have much gossip on these things. It is never safe. So gossip isn't popular. Besides, each of them have their own grudge, sort of department, and he knows very little except gossip, very little gossip from outside. And so, for instance, maybe Mr. SVIRIN wasn't in a position to know about this person straight, so he repeated the tiny scraps he heard.

Question: And that was only that he had a Jewish mother and a general for a father, but nothing about him.

[redacted]: Nothing... I don't know. Everybody was saying that he was detestable, when he ran away. He tipped Americans... He tipped the Americans about the microphones and things in the Embassy.

Question: In the Embassy in Moscow?

[redacted] In Moscow, yes.

Question; But yet, he was not a KGB person?

[redacted] But you know every Russian who is allowed to see foreigners is connected [in some way with the KGB]. You know, a KGB person is considered to be a person who works at this place, as an officer, and everybody else involved is somehow related to the KGB but not KGB persons themselves.

During a later debriefing by CIA, [redacted] clarified her sourcing of this information. All of it except that concerning the microphones in the U.S. Embassy came from SVIRIN when he visited the [redacted]. The information that NOSENKO had compromised the KGB microphone system to the Americans was also received from SVIRIN during another social visit [redacted] On this occasion SVIRIN remarked to [redacted] that NOSENKO had done considerable damage to the Soviets by revealing the fact of the microphones to U.S. authorities.

9. Case Officer for Robert Lee JOHNSON*

In an FBI debriefing [redacted]

10. Case Officers for [redacted]

[redacted] double agent [redacted]

11. Soviet Journalist KOROLEV

In October 1966, Yu.D. KOROLEV, who said he was a Soviet journalist, offered to write a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent" for the French magazine Paris Match.*** The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement on NOSENKO which KOROLEV handed Paris Match editors stated in part: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.; it was granted to him. That was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes."

---

* The JOHNSON lead from NOSENKO is discussed in detail in Part VI.D.3.c.

[redacted] NOSENKO provided information on [redacted] (see Part VI.D.5.c.).

*** See Part III.H. for more details concerning KOROLEV's offer to Paris Match.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO (835 PAGE STUDY) VOL. III PAGES ~~[illegible]~~ 603 - 835

INCLUSIVE DATES: (PART VII, VIII, IX)

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: SE

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: CONTAINS OPERATIONAL MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
11 MAY 1978		[illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
[illegible] HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

VII. SPECIALISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF NOSENKO

A. Opinions on Intelligence and Personality

1. Graphological Analysis

Three pages of penciled notes and jottings in Russian made by NOSENKO during an early debriefing session were submitted on 25 March 1964 to CIA handwriting analysts, together with a number of questions posed by the CIA officers handling NOSENKO. The graphologists were told only that the writer was a Russian male aged 36, that he had a university-level education, and that he was an intelligence officer by profession. Their report, which was qualified due to limitations on the amount of NOSENKO's handwriting specimens submitted to them, is quoted below.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~



[redacted]

2. Reports by Psychologist

a. Psychological Testing Results

A CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964. The psychologist's report, including answers to questions raised by the CIA handlers of NOSENKO is quoted in the following paragraphs.

[redacted]

"Emotional Balance and General Stability: NOSENKO appears to

[redacted]

"Social Relations and Inter-Personal Effectiveness: NOSENKO

[redacted]

[redacted]

"Relations and Loyalty to His Parents: It is apparent

[redacted]

[redacted]

"Ideological Makeup and Loyalty to His Country: To a

[redacted]

*Psychopathic Personality Structure: Many volumes have been

[redacted]

b. Alternative Psychological Explanations

[redacted]



[redacted]

c. Psychological Interrogation:

For fourteen days between 3 and 21 May 1965, the same CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO on his entire early history, from birth until about 1953, when he said he entered the KGB. The main purposes were to collect additional information on this period,* to gain further psychological insights into NOSENKO's personality, and to find possible ways of obtaining a truthful account. Although conducted under the physical conditions of interrogation, the questioning was relaxed and followed no rigid outline. There were relatively few changes of story from previous versions; at the same time, however, NOSENKO described in detail some incidents which he has subsequently admitted to be untrue. An extract from the psychologist's report of these interrogations is given below.

---

* A comparison of information obtained during this series of interrogations with information given earlier and later by NOSENKO can be found in Part IV.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. Report by Psychiatrist

During the year April 1964-April 1965 NOSENKO was under the medical care of a CIA psychiatrist who visited NOSENKO at regular intervals, usually weekly, to examine him physically and to listen to any comments NOSENKO might have about himself and his situation. The psychiatrist familiarized himself with available materials on NOSENKO, particularly with reports of his behavior in the months immediately following the defection. A report which he submitted on 20 December 1964 is given below.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~



B. Views of Intelligence Personnel

1. Statement by DERYABIN

a. Introduction

Former KGB officer Peter Sergeyevich DERYABIN has followed closely the entire course of CIA's investigation of NOSENKO and his information. He took part in the interrogations of NOSENKO in April 1964, January-February 1965, and October 1966 as an observer and consultant, and he personally questioned NOSENKO during July and August 1965 concerning certain aspects of his personal past and early KGB career. On the basis of his direct, personal knowledge of conditions within the Soviet Union and of KGB organization and procedures prior to his defection in February 1954, supplemented by continuing study of later information from a variety of sources, DERYABIN is of the opinion that much of what NOSENKO has said about himself and the KGB is purposefully false or distorted. Although DERYABIN has been able to offer authoritative comment on many aspects of NOSENKO's story, the following section of this paper is limited to his remarks concerning NOSENKO's entry into the KGB (then MVD) and his Communist Party affiliation, both of which fall into the period when DERYABIN was active as a KGB (then MVD) staff officer. DERYABIN personally interrogated NOSENKO on these topics in the summer of 1965. Since DERYABIN was a personnel officer of the KGB (then MGB and MVD) in Moscow, with long experience in Communist Party activities, at the time NOSENKO claims to have entered the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, he is particularly qualified to comment on these aspects of NOSENKO's story.

DERYABIN, as a Soviet Army officer, was graduated in 1945 from the higher counterintelligence school of Smersh (counterintelligence with the Soviet Armed Forces). Following this he worked in Naval Smersh in Moscow and in March 1947 began to work in the MGB as a case officer in the Central Personnel Directorate. Shortly afterwards, when his superior was appointed Deputy Chief of the Chief Guards Directorate for Personnel, DERYABIN transferred with him to the Guards Directorate. He served as a Guards Directorate personnel officer until May 1952, rising through the ranks from case officer to the position of Chief of Section. One of his responsibilities was the approval of personnel for service in various units of the Guards Directorate, and he was also in charge of supervising personnel and security matters concerning one of the Directorate's surveillance sub-sections.

After requesting a change from personnel to operational duties, DERYABIN was transferred in May 1952 to the Austro-German Department of the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Until December 1952 he served as the Deputy Chief of a sub-section in the Counterintelligence Sektor (desk) of the Austro-German Department. He was then appointed Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Sektor of the same department, a position he held until March 1953. From March until September 1953, DERYABIN was the Deputy Chief of the section in MGB Headquarters which was responsible for the security of Soviets stationed in Austria and Germany. In September 1953 he was transferred to Vienna, where he became Deputy Chief of the section in the MVD Legal Residency responsible for the security of Soviets in Austria. He defected to American authorities on 15 February 1954.

[illegible]

DERYABIN joined the Komsomol in 1936 and remained a member until 1940, when he became a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; he became a full Party member in August 1941. During his Party career he held a number of responsible posts. Before the war, when DERYABIN was a teacher in Altay Kray, he was the secretary of a local Komsomol unit and simultaneously served as a member of the Komsomol Plenum in the rayon where he lived. From October 1940 until November 1941 he was Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the 107th Engineer Battalion of the Red Army and from June 1945 until April 1946 held the same position in the Komsomol Committee of the Naval Smersh. This was the unit which had particular responsibility for counterintelligence work within the Naval GRU, which NOSENKO said he joined in 1951. In the MGB DERYABIN was a member of the Party Committee of the Personnel Section of the Guards Directorate and, after his transfer, was elected Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Austro-German Department of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. He held this post from January 1953 until his transfer to Austria in September 1953.

b. DERYABIN's Comments

The following statements by DERYABIN are based on his questioning of NOSENKO between 26 July and 13 August 1965. The questions asked and the statements attributed to NOSENKO (referred to as Subject) were during this period. Although the Soviet State Security Service did not become known as the KGB until March 1954, this term is used for convenience sake, except where the specific organization of the MGB or MVD is under discussion. DERYABIN's comments follow:

"NOSENKO's Acceptance into State Security*

"Taking NOSENKO's own statements at face value, it is highly improbable that a person such as he has described himself to be would be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State Security. The following factors are important in this regard:

a. It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring the children of high government officials.

b. Until STALIN's death in March 1953, KOBULOV, the man who supposedly helped NOSENKO gain entrance into the service, had no influence inside the MGB apparatus. From about 1948 until 9 or 10 March 1953, KOBULOV had no office inside the MGB or the MVD buildings. I know personally that in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad)** which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and later under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The office was located on Chkalova Street, near the Kurskiy Railroad Station (three blocks from my former apartment).

---

* See also Part V.B.

** WISMUT A.G. in Germany was subordinate to GUSIMZ; for a further discussion of KOBULOV's role in helping NOSENKO join the KGB, see Part V.B.

c. It was physically impossible at the time for NOSENKO to be recommended for and accepted into State Security, as he has told us, all in one month, March 1953. (If one accepts his earlier version that he had his talk with KOBULOV in January or February, his account is similarly impossible because KOBULOV was not then in State Security.) It would normally have taken a much longer time, but in addition to this it was a period of reorganization and the personnel staff was not actively conducting their work at that time, and permanent staff officers were not sure that they would retain their positions.

d. In March 1953 NOSENKO was already twenty-five and a half years old and only a member of the Komsomol. He had no recommendation for Party membership and could not become a member for a full year because of his transfer from one service (GRU) to another. It is impossible that State Security would accept him knowing in advance that on his birthday he would be twenty-six years old and without either Komsomol or Party membership. Even for the son of a Minister, the Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the KGB would have to talk with the Personnel Office and would not give a recommendation for his acceptance, especially for the Internal Counterintelligence (Second Chief) Directorate. In the case of a son of a Minister and one who is recommended by KOBULOV, the secretary would request from NOSENKO a recommendation for Party membership from the members of the Communist Party where NOSENKO used to work, in this case the GRU. In this way the secretary of the Komsomol would be sure himself that NOSENKO would become a candidate member of the Communist Party during the next year.

"However, even accepting that despite these obstacles and contradictions the KGB would have accepted him, one must also remember (according to NOSENKO's own statements) that NOSENKO's file contained the following negative points.* They are serious factors and certain of them alone would be enough to cause the rejection; the totality makes it difficult to believe that at a time of crisis in the State Security organs anyone would take the responsibility of accepting him:

a. Subject was already married and divorced before entry into State Security.

b. He had been married to General TELEGIN's daughter and TELEGIN had been arrested by State Security and was in jail the day that Subject entered State Security.

c. NOSENKO said that there was a file on NOSENKO's father in which compromising material was collected on Subject's family. NOSENKO agreed that one piece of information that would have been in this file was the fact that his maternal grandfather died in a Soviet prison while under sentence as a counter-revolutionary.

d. The social status background in the life of Subject's mother was nobility.

---

* See also Part IV.B.

e. The shooting incident in Leningrad during World War II and his desertion from the Naval School in Baku would have played a very negative role in any consideration of his acceptance into State Security.

f. Subject never completed high school in the normal fashion.

g. Subject was a poor student at the Institute of International Relations.

h. It should be added that the KGB would definitely know that NOSENKO was involved in an automobile accident in 1947 and was interrogated by the Militia (traffic court), found guilty, and fined. This would definitely play a negative role in NOSENKO's admission to the KGB.

i. NOSENKO would never be allowed to enter the KGB having just recovered from tuberculosis.* In fact, there was a rule at that time that no person who ever had tuberculosis (even twenty years earlier) would be permitted to work in the KGB.

"In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KOBULOV was a personal friend of Subject's father, as he has told us, would have been noted in the file and would have played a negative role in permitting Subject to continue to work in State Security after KOBULOV's arrest in June 1953.

"I asked Subject how he answered some of the questions in the anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questions on his former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry.** I then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's aristocratic ancestry, the fact that her father died in jail, the Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that Subject's former father-in-law (TELEGIN) was still in jail, and the fact that Subject was present when TELEGIN's apartment was searched--that he had been accepted into the KGB, particularly in 1953 during the confusion and changes after the death of STALIN. Subject admitted that the question was logical, and said that he could only assume that the influence of KOBULOV and the important and influential position of his own father outweighed these negative factors. He also cited his GRU experience in this connection.

"I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage to the KGB. He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned it briefly to GORBATENKO, and that he had unofficially run a name check on his prospective bride (which was 'clean'), and that after the marriage he had filled out another anketa in which he included all the required data on his wife and her relatives. After considerable prompting, Subject said that he had indicated that she and her parents had been in France, but that he had concealed the fact that her grandmother had been in German-occupied territory during the war. (He admitted that the KGB would have learned this in a routine check, however.) I then reviewed for Subject the negative security factors mentioned above, adding the arrest of KOBULOV, the fact that his new wife and her parents had been abroad, the fact that her grandmother was in German-occupied territory, the fact that Subject was now over-age for the Komsomol but not yet a Party member or candidate, and the fact that Subject received a 15-day sentence for misuse of cover documents and incurring venereal disease, and asked if he didn't think that his personnel file had been reviewed in 1954, and if so, what grounds there could have been for retaining him in the KGB. Subject said that he thought that his file probably was reviewed but that again the influence of his father had saved him. Subject added that another important factor was probably his language qualification and particularly his higher education. I pointed out to Subject that if his second wife and her parents had been abroad it was impossible that her name check could have been negative. He admitted it was illogical, but insisted that this was so.

---

* NOSENKO first mentioned having had tuberculosis during the June 1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he was under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mentioned his illness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a "glass of blood" at a time. Although DERYABIN's questioning covered this part of NOSENKO's life in detail, there was no mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1965. DERYABIN's comment is based on the 1966 information but is included here for purposes of context.

**The anketa and DERYABIN's questioning on this subject are discussed further below.

"NOSENKO's Knowledge of KGB, 1953-54

"Entry Date into KGB: NOSENKO was reminded that he had previously given varying dates for his entry on duty in the KGB. He replied that he did not remember the exact date, but he was sure that it was in the middle of March 1953 - perhaps 13 or 15 March (15 March 1953 was a Sunday). He would give no explanation for why he previously claimed to have entered the KGB in 1952.* In fact it would be very unusual for a KGB officer to forget his exact entry-on-duty date to the very day because it is used to compute length of service and must be entered on various forms from time to time.

"Numerical Designation of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Directorates in 1953: Asked to describe what directorates existed in the MVD while BERIYA was Minister (March-June 1953), NOSENKO named the First Chief Directorate (FCD) and the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) which he said were the intelligence and counterintelligence directorates respectively. Asked if he were sure, NOSENKO said he was positive, and that the only change that took place was that later, under KRUGLOV, for a few months only, the FCD became the SCD, and vice versa. NOSENKO stuck to this even when told he was wrong; he did not say he did not know or did not remember, perhaps realizing that he could not claim not to remember what directorate he served in. (Actually, the change in numerical designations was instituted by BERIYA right after STALIN's death in March 1953 and persisted until the KGB was organized in March 1954. Thus, NOSENKO does not know what the correct designation of his own directorate was at the time that he allegedly entered on duty with Soviet State Security and for the entire first year of his alleged service there.

---

* NOSENKO on other occasions has given various reasons why he told CIA that he joined the KGB in 1952. See Part V.B.

"MVD Leadership, 1953-54: Asked to name the chiefs of the directorates and separate departments of the MVD under BERIYA and KRUGLOV, NOSENKO named nine out of 28. He was unable to name the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, saying that he remembered only SAKHAROVSKIY (PANYUSHKIN was chief until 1955). Asked to name KRUGLOV's deputies, NOSENKO named only ROMASHKOV and SEROV, and was ignorant of such prominent deputies as LUNEV and SHATALIN. Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was one of KRUGLOV's deputies at this time (SHATALIN), NOSENKO flatly denied that this was possible.

"Organization of KGB: NOSENKO did not know when the KGB was organized (March 1954). He said that it was in early 1955 or late 1954. Told that he was a year off and asked to think it over, NOSENKO insisted that he was right.

"Processing Procedures for Employment with KGB: NOSENKO's story about how he was processed for employment with the KGB in 1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used at that time. He does not know many of the things that he should know about entrance procedures; he is wrong about many of the things that he claims to remember. The disparities are so great that they cannot be explained (as NOSENKO attempts to do) by the claim that KOBULOV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance procedure for NOSENKO.

"The most important document filled out by prospective employees of Soviet State Security is a detailed personal history questionnaire, called in Russian Anketa spetsialnogo naznacheniya sotrudnika KGB. This exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long, and filling it out is an experience that one is not likely to forget. A background investigation is run on the basis of this questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent feature of the employee's personnel file. NOSENKO remembers filling out a questionnaire, but does not know its designation. He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long. He asserts that he filled it out at home, and submitted it in two copies shortly before entering on duty. Actually, this questionnaire was required in one copy only, and was never permitted to be taken home since it was a classified document (even when not filled in).*

"NOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical examination prior to entering the KGB. This is not possible. Such an examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing. I cannot think of any instance in which it would be waived.**

---

* DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements in August 1965. In his original biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO said that no anketa was required. He implied as much in his most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned by DERYABIN. This statement is given in Part V.B.

**See remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for tuberculosis from 1952 to 1958.

"NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreement that he signed when entering on duty with the KGB is completely unlike the agreement that was in use at that time for staff employees. It may be significant that NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreement he recalls signing resembles the secrecy agreements that were taken from agents.

"NOSENKO insists that he did not fill out any other forms, questionnaires, or papers when entering the KGB. Actually, there were a number of other routine forms that had to be filled out by applicants and new employees.

"Location of ROZHENKO's Office: NOSENKO says that all his entry processing was handled by a personnel officer named ROZHENKO and his staff. He asserts that ROZHENKO's office, which NOSENKO visited several times in early 1953, was located on the 6th floor, 8th entry, Building No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Street. In fact, neither ROZHENKO nor any officers or units of the Personnel Department were located in the 8th entry. They were all (including ROZHENKO) located on the 6th and 7th floors of the 7th entry of Building No. 12.*

"Rank Pay: Asked about his salary when he first started to work in the KGB, NOSENKO said he got a basic salary of 1700 rubles as a case officer, 500 rubles for his rank of lieutenant, plus secrecy, language, and longevity pay. He insisted that this was correct, even when told that KGB officers were no longer being paid for rank in March 1953, and said that although he remembered that there was one year--1954--when they were not paid for rank, he was sure that when he first entered on duty he received this pay. Salary for rank was taken away from State Security officers in September 1952 and was not restored until April 1954.

"Promotion to Senior Lieutenant: In giving the chronology of his promotion to various military ranks, NOSENKO claimed to have been promoted to senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB. Told that this was impossible, and that no one in the KGB was promoted at this time, NOSENKO replied that he couldn't say about anyone else but he was sure that he had received his promotion at that time. In fact, this is impossible: all promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time BERIYA took over as minister (March 1953) until late 1953.

"Visitor's Pass Procedures: In talking about his first visit to the KGB to process for employment, NOSENKO was unable to recall the procedures employed by the KGB Pass Office in issuing visitor's passes. Specifically, he maintained that the name of the interviewer was not indicated on the pass. In fact, the name of the interviewer did appear on the pass and the interviewer had full responsibility for the visitor while he was on KGB premises. While it is understandable that NOSENKO might have forgotten the details involved if he had only visited there a few times more than ten years ago, if he worked at KGB Headquarters for over ten years as a staff officer and particularly as a supervisor he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors, and thus should know visitor's pass procedures quite well.

---

*NOSENKO has since said that he spoke to no personnel officers prior to acceptance by the KGB or afterwards, thereby indicating that his statements to DERYABIN were untrue. See Part V.B.

"Unescorted Entry into KGB Building with Visitor's Pass: In describing his first day at work, NOSENKO said that he went from the Pass Office, where he obtained a visitor's pass, to the 4th entry of the Building No. 2, where his pass was checked by the guards, and then went unescorted to KOBULOV's office on the third floor. Challenged on this point, he said he was sure that it was possible to enter without an escort. In fact, it was absolutely impossible to go through any entry of Building No. 2 without escort if you did not have a properly stamped KGB (MVD) identity document (see below).

"KGB Identity Document: NOSENKO was asked to describe the KGB identity document that he received when he first entered the KGB. He was then asked if there was anything unusual in connection with this document at that time. He replied that he knew of nothing unusual. He was then reminded that after STALIN's death and again after BERIYA's arrest it was necessary to have special stamps placed in the identity documents to validate them. Without the right stamp it was impossible to enter the KGB building. NOSENKO was ignorant of this and was unable to recall anything about it despite a number of hints and leading questions. Actually, during the period of upheaval following STALIN's death and again after BERIYA's arrest, all KGB identity documents were temporarily withdrawn in order to have special validation stamps placed in them, and it was literally impossible to get in the KGB buildings if one did not have the right stamp. This was the subject of numerous anecdotes at the time and is hard to believe that an officer who served in the KGB at the time could have forgotten it completely.

"Gastronom: Asked to describe the sign in front of the KGB Club, NOSENKO said that he did not remember any sign (there was one in 1953) but mentioned that there was a Gastronom (food store) next to the KGB Club. Asked when the Gastronom was opened, he said firmly that it was already there when he started to work in the KGB. In fact, this Gastronom was definitely not there as of 1954. It was opened sometime between 1955 and 1957, as Moscow directories show. The KGB Club is in entry No. 1 of Building No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Square, and NOSENKO would have had to pass it every day he went to work.

"Chief Directorate of Militia: Asked where the Chief Directorate of Militia of the USSR was located in 1953-54, NOSENKO replied that he did not know, and knew only that later it was located on Ulitsa Ogareva. Actually, in 1953-54 it was located next to the main KGB building at Dzerzhinskiy No. 2. A staff officer in the counterintelligence directorate would have frequent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of Militia.

"K.I. (Committee of Information): Asked where the Intelligence Directorate of the MVD was located in 1953, NOSENKO replied that it was scattered between Dzerzhinskiy No. 2, the Agricultural Exhibition, the K.I. building, and Kiselniy Pereulok. This is a confused and incorrect answer. Asked for clarification, NOSENKO said that he had never visited either the K.I. or the First Chief Directorate building at the Agricultural Exhibition. Thus, NOSENKO seems to be unaware that the K.I. has not existed since 1951, and that the K.I. building and the building at the Agricultural Exhibition were one and the same place.

"NOSENKO's Claim to Have Been a Komsomol Secretary in the Second Chief Directorate, KGB

"NOSENKO claimed to have become a member of the Komsomol Organization (K/O) of the KGB when he entered on duty in March 1953, to have been elected as Secretary of Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate in the fall of 1953, and to have served in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was removed because he used operational-alias documents in obtaining treatment for a venereal disease he had incurred. He claims to have been excluded from the Komsomol, without prejudice, when he attained his 27th birthday in October 1954.

"Asked to describe how he transferred from the Komsomol Organization of the Naval Intelligence Post in the Baltic to the Komsomol Organization of the KGB, NOSENKO gave an entirely incorrect description of this procedure, both as regards deregistration from the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the K/O in the KGB. He stated that he was issued a new Komsomol registration card by the KGB K/O, without reference to the previous K/O in the Baltic; this is impossible.

"NOSENKO gave an incorrect account of how a K/O secretary is elected, stating that he was elected at a meeting of the K/O. In fact, the K/O meeting can only select the K/O committee, which will convene separately to elect the Secretary.

"NOSENKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary in a specific manner.

"NOSENKO did not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB K/O. The secretary of the SCD K/O would be directly subordinate to him and would deal with him frequently.

"NOSENKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/O or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he dealt there.

"NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-54, the maximum age for a Komsomol member was 27. In actual fact, the maximum age was 26 (it was raised later). This point is important, both because NOSENKO should know exactly if he had served as a K/O secretary, and also because it refutes his story that he was excluded from the Komsomol for over-age in 1954.

"NOSENKO maintained that all the members of his K/O paid dues in the amount of 2 percent of their monthly salaries. This is incorrect, as monthly Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding scale determined by wage group: at that time, Komsomol members earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percent; those earning 500 to 1500 rubles paid 1 percent, and those earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent. The K/O secretary collects the dues, and must know the right amount.

"NOSENKO did not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress took place while he was K/O secretary, saying that they took place every year. In actual fact, the 12th Komsomol Congress which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948; at this 12th Congress a number of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules (Ustav). As secretary of a K/O NOSENKO would have been involved in a good deal of preparatory work for this Congress, which was a big event in the life of every Komsomol worker at the time, and could not be forgotten."

Although DERYABIN's direct knowledge of the KGB ended in 1954, his detailed information of KGB procedures has been updated by his more recent examination of reports from other sources. With regard to what NOSENKO has said about KGB procedures, DERYABIN stated: "Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a Soviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embassy in 1953-54, NOSENKO gave a superficial description of how such checks were done. However, he resisted every attempt to get him to describe this process in detail, and he made several blunders which show that he never actually ran such a check himself. For example, he did not know where the records of all Soviet citizens who have been tried are kept, and he attempted to improvise an answer (completely wrong) that they would check with the Militia about this. NOSENKO correctly said that Archives were located on Kirov Street, but he was completely unable to stretch his limited knowledge to provide a description of how these various repositories were actually checked. NOSENKO was also asked to describe in detail how he ran such a check on a Soviet citizen in the 1956-59 period. Here again he was in difficulty and refused even to try. He did not even know the everyday term Spetsproverka, which means a check for clearance.

"It was particularly interesting that he did not feel able to dispute my challenges of his information, even though he undoubtedly knows that I do not have first-hand knowledge of procedures in this period. I even tested this on one occasion by asking NOSENKO the difference between the 1st Spets Otdel (Special Department - KGB cards and files) and the Operativno-Uchetniy Otdel (Operational Reports Department - the functional name for the 1st Special Department). He answered that the 1st Special Department holds the files on Soviet criminal cases while the Operational Reports Department is for political and espionage cases. It seems he invented this answer on the spot. In addition, it is wrong that political and security cards are separate from criminal ones in the 1st Special Department. They were in my time and must still be combined in one card file.

"NOSENKO states that he knows nothing about the files of the First Chief Directorate. It is unbelievable that in ten years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never saw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able to check information on foreigners, especially on American Embassy personnel? The first stage in such a check is an inquiry to the First Chief Directorate and a check of any files they may have on the subject. According to his own account, NOSENKO should have been doing this type of thing the whole of his ten years of service, without regard to whether he was assigned to the American Department or the Tourist Department."

2. Remarks by CIA Handlers

a. Introduction

Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have recorded their personal observations on his behavior and actions. The principal case officer, the first CIA representative to meet NOSENKO in 1962, participated in all of the meetings and interrogations (either personally or monitoring from off-stage) since then; he is a senior officer with 17 years of operational experience, including extensive agent handling and dealings with more than 10 officers of Soviet and Satellite Intelligence and Security Services who were defectors or agents in place; he has also had desk or supervisory responsibilities connected with at least 20 other such sources. A second case officer, who participated in the meetings in Geneva in 1964 and in all subsequent phases of the operation, has spent the 16 years of his career solely in Soviet operations and has handled several Soviet sources in place, as well as defectors. Three other officers, who began to work with NOSENKO after his arrival in the United States and conducted the bulk of both the debriefing and the hostile interrogations, have spent most of their careers in Soviet counterintelligence operations; among them, they command an extensive knowledge of the Soviet Intelligence Services, and they have had a variety of agent- and defector-handling experience.

NOSENKO was talked to and questioned in several types of circumstances:

- In five tightly organized meetings in 1962 in Geneva with limited time available for each of a wide range of topics, none of which could be ignored but none of which could be covered in detail.
- In concentrated but somewhat longer meetings in place in Geneva in January-February 1964, with the knowledge by all participants that items not adequately covered then could be dealt with after the defection.
- In routine debriefing sessions after his defection, first in a Frankfurt safehouse, then in a safehouse in the Washington area, where a special effort was made not to put pressure on NOSENKO or express doubts about his statements.
- Under detailed hostile interrogation (especially April 1964 and January-March 1965).
- In extended, detailed debriefing sessions which NOSENKO could not evade (May-November 1964, May 1965, July-August 1965, and October 1966).

Thus there were opportunities to note his performance and reactions under varied degrees of stress and control.

The features of NOSENKO's conduct, manner, and techniques discussed below are confined to those which were clearly and consistently observed by all of the officers involved.

b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings

NOSENKO in brief, superficial, uncritical debriefings (of the sort which characterized the 1962 and 1964 Geneva meetings and the debriefings prior to 4 April 1964) was reasonably convincing in his manner. For example, on the basis of the hurried sessions of June 1962 in Geneva, which did not allow time for systematic or detailed questioning, the CIA case officer in commenting on NOSENKO's conduct mentioned "the ease of his manner, the sureness of his knowledge of matters which he should have known, and the amount of checkable information he provided." NOSENKO seemed to that case officer to be "under little or no restraint as to the amount and nature of what he told us" and "made a convincing and good personal impression: a vigorous, temperamental and vital man." Similarly, nothing in NOSENKO's manner caused doubts on the part of the FBI representatives who took NOSENKO's reports in February, March, and early April 1964.

It became apparent, however, when the cases NOSENKO had mentioned briefly in early meetings were taken up in detail in leisurely debriefings after the defection, that he could not add facts consistent with what he had said before. He was unable to recall related incidents or additional circumstances which did not come to mind in the first telling, despite being aided by questioning from different angles or in different contexts. The same results were obtained in exhausting his store of operational leads (with a half dozen exceptions) and his information on KGB procedures, installations, and operational methods: Having once reported on these general topics, NOSENKO could offer nothing more when debriefed again, regardless of the method of questioning tried. Repeatedly he used the same stories to illustrate his points; new stories did not emerge. In a period of nine months, NOSENKO was drained of information on his personal and professional experiences and knowledge. Never before had the CIA case officers encountered a defector who was totally debriefed.

A technique NOSENKO has frequently used to explain his inability to supply details and to forestall further questioning has been to claim poor memory. "Different people have different types of memories," he has said on many occasions, or on others: "I have told what I remember." The case officers who have handled NOSENKO agree, on the other hand, that he has an excellent memory, although perhaps a peculiar one: NOSENKO did not always recall most easily those events which had occurred most recently, or those incidents which were most closely related to him. He was able, for example, to remember detailed information on the penetration of the Courier Transfer Station in Paris and to give a long, detailed, and ordered account of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, in neither of which he claimed any personal role; he has been able to name hundreds of KGB officers, to give the dates on which many of them transferred from one component of the Second Chief Directorate to another, and to describe their responsibilities at particular times. Yet NOSENKO forgot where he himself served in the GRU; he could not consistently discribe the circumstances of his divorce; he failed to provide a consistent date for his entry into the KGB and for his transfer from the American Department to the Tourist Department in 1962. Likewise, NOSENKO remembered details of KGB operations which, like the "ANDREY" case in 1953, took place in the relatively distant past, but he could not recall the travels, friends, and activities of his own target John V. ABIDIAN or details of operations against many American code clerks in 1960 and 1961.

These limitations of knowledge and quirks of memory were evident not only during meetings when NOSENKO was being debriefed. They were also apparent in the interrogations which supplanted the debriefings.

c. NOSENKO's Behavior Under Interrogation

(i) Introduction

In the many and long interrogation sessions there emerged habits of behavior noticeable to each of the CIA officers present. These characteristics of NOSENKO were his manner of recounting events and his evasiveness, improvisations, and other defensive techniques. They are reviewed below.

(ii) Manner of Recounting Events

Typical of NOSENKO's performance in the interrogations were the following points:

- Talking about operations he supervised and about his personal role in the KGB Headquarters aspects of other operations, NOSENKO habitually used the passive voice ("it was decided") or indicated that he was not alone in these activities ("there was no accounting on who was working on any code clerk case--it was GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO, and also working was KLYPIN, GRIBANOV," or "We made the decision--I and KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV," or "I and GRYAZNOV discussed this with him.") When asked where a particular conversation took place, he rarely located it in his own office ("I was in KOVSHUK's office when KOSLOV called him about the trip" or "I was in KLYPIN's office and he was talking to KOVSHUK").

- At the other extreme from being impersonal, NOSENKO sometimes quoted conversations in which he took part ("I then said," "he said to me," etc.), but it was in just such matters that NOSENKO most often contradicted himself (e.g., his relationship with GRIBANOV and his part in the recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORSBERG).

- In repeating certain stories (the CHEREPANOV case and the provocation against Professor Frederick BARGHOORN are examples) NOSENKO gave them in precisely the same order, without addition or omission. In relating the PENKOVSKIY story, which he stressed he learned "little by little" from several different sources, he presented the facts each time in nearly identical order. Asked for more details on these cases, he invariably insisted--often with irritation--that he knew nothing more and if he did, he would have reported it. Other factors contributed to the impression that in such instances NOSENKO had delivered his information by rote: Statements like "I don't remember what I told you before" when queried again on a particular case; detachment and a lack of emotion when describing the compromise of Soviets who, like himself, had cooperated with American Intelligence: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV; an inability to correlate dates and events in different operations which he said he was handling (such as conflicts in the timing of his approach to W.E. JOHNSON and in the date he gave for John V. ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, and conflict between the dates of his participation in the MORONE case and his travel to Cuba).

- NOSENKO, with a few exceptions (notably the compromise of PENKOVSKIY and the ABIDIAN visit to the dead drop site), could not supply specific or approximate dates for operational activities during the period of his service in the U.S. Embassy Section. Beyond recourse to the phrase "1960, 1961," he refused to estimate the dates or to associate these activities with the time of the year or events in his personal life.

(iii) Evasion, Improvisation, and Other Defenses

In the debriefings before the interrogations, NOSENKO avoided questions and topics not of his own choosing, saying that he would give full details "later," when systematic debriefing began. When the question or topic came up anew in a later debriefing, he would plead fatigue or boredom and propose: "This morning we drink; tomorrow we work." Prior to 4 April 1964 he provided only accounts of operations selected by himself; it was only after 4 April 1964 that he could be constrained to reply to detailed questioning on other matters.

From that point on, other evasive tactics became familiar to his interrogators. He would try to change the subject or to shift from the specific event to a generalized account of how such things were done in principle. He would claim bad memory on grounds that, for example, operations against U.S. Embassy personnel were hopeless and useless anyway. He would dismiss the details or the entire operation as unimportant (for example, the microphones in the U.S. Embassy). He would set out reasons for his ignorance of things he admittedly should have known (his own "poor performance," preoccupation with other matters, inattention to duty, absence from the KGB while on vacation, lack of time to master details because he was a supervisor). Unable to name or talk about KGB indigenous agents working against Americans, including those in operations under his supervision, NOSENKO disparaged the quality of such agents ("they never reported anything of interest on anyone"); he cited their low educational level and their inferior status as servants and employees as one reason none of them could give the KGB operationally useful information. In fact, the record of many indicated previous employment which would demand at least the equivalent of a college degree or certificate from a technical institute. Numerous maids were former school teachers, one was formerly a chemist.

When evasion failed, it seemed to the interrogators that NOSENKO improvised his answers. Some of these evident improvisations led him into unacceptable statements or positions. To use his responses to the questioning on John V. ABIDIAN as an example: Not knowing about ABIDIAN's car, he said the KGB could not get at it. (In fact, the car was held by Soviet customs for two weeks, and later NOSENKO himself spoke about the way the KGB used Embassy chauffeurs for access to cars.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN's trips out of the USSR, he claimed that the KGB had no way to find out where Embassy officers went when they made trips out of the country. (In fact, ABIDIAN had told his language teacher each time and she, as NOSENKO said, was a KGB agent; also, ABIDIAN arranged his trips by long-distance phone from Moscow to his destination abroad, and the KGB can cover such calls.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN's trip within the USSR, he spoke of a vacation which he latter admitted to be false. Asked why he did not know personal data on ABIDIAN from the State Department Biographic Register, he said "only the First Chief Directorate" uses it; when the interrogator pursued the point, NOSENKO said he remembered that KOVSHUK did have a copy in his office, "but an old one, 1956, which didn't list ABIDIAN." Under pressure about ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street, NOSENKO said the KGB thought that ABIDIAN may not have entered the building on Pushkin Street; yet he had earlier given extensive details about how the KGB had analyzed the precise number of seconds ABIDIAN had been inside, to determine where the drop, if any, might be. As another example, when he was initially asked about George BLAKE, the KGB agent in MI-6, the context of the question was a discussion of Second Chief Directorate operations. NOSENKO labeled it as such and said it "was not as important as VASSALL." Later, when the name was mentioned again, he asked: "Who's BLAKE?"

On other occasions, when his self-contradictions were pointed out or when he admitted ignorance of matters he acknowledge he should have known, NOSENKO would fall back upon one of the following lines of defense:

- "What I know I tell you; what I remember I tell you," or "I don't know," "I can't explain," -- or a shrug.

- The details, even if confused or contradictory, are not important. What is important is the "whole" or entirety of the facts, their importance and their "reality." It is this that American Intelligence should evaluate, not details.

- He must be genuine because otherwise "how could I have been working with 'SARDAR' and 'PROKHOR'?" (Johan PREISFREUND whose KGB cryptonym was "PROKHOR," did confirm NOSENKO's role.) "How else could I tell you about STORSBERG?" "The KGB would not use a staffer as a provocateur," nor would the KGB supply information on "live cases" such as the Paris case (JOHNSON) and VASSALL, and reveal the names of its officers abroad.

[redacted]

- If American Intelligence checked his story "fully," it would learn that despite all this confusion, he was genuine. He repeatedly urged that his interrogators check via an independent penetration of the KGB--there it would verify that his name is registered as the case officer who opened, held and turned over the ABIDIAN file and thus that he was a KGB officer.*

NOSENKO referred to this method of corroborating him at least 20 times during the interrogations of January-March 1965. He said on 1 February 1965 that "maybe the day will come when you have a source to check and you will find out" (that he was ABIDIAN's case officer). Later in the same interrogation session, he added: "I see how poor and miserable I'm looking with regard to ABIDIAN's file, but anyone who can check in [KGB] Archives will see." On 9 February he said, "I greatly wish that you will have as soon as possible an agent in the KGB. It is simple to look at the file on ABIDIAN. On the first page is written that 'I, NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, opened this file'." On 16 February he said: "Time will show I am what I say." On 3 March he referred nine times within one hour to a check via such a source. He repeatedly stated that "time will show" that he is not a provocateur. At one point he engaged in the following dialogue with his interrogators:

---

* [redacted] was the only such source at the time.

NOSENKO: I'm telling you that, if you check, you'll find that I'm right.

INTERROGATOR: We're not disputing that you worked for the KGB. We're disputing that you held the positions you say you held in the KGB.

NOSENKO: That's what I'm saying. If you could check you would find that I was only in these two departments and only in these positions...

(later in the session)

NOSENKO: I can't tell you anything more. I can't prove anything. Maybe the future will show.

INTERROGATOR: What can the future show?

NOSENKO: I don't know. But from what I understand the checking has not gone very far. Maybe you can check further... I mean, if you have any possibility now, I mean by chance, have anyone in the KGB or out of the KGB, with any of my acquaintances, friends.

INTERROGATOR: You mean our acquaintances, don't you?

NOSENKO: Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check with someone, because anyone in the KGB should know that, yes, there was a NOSENKO.

INTERROGATOR: Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV or SUSLOV?

NOSENKO: No, of course not, because I gave you their names. Check someone else, not known to me, so you can be sure.

d. Additional Observations

(i) Inquisitiveness About CIA

NOSENKO's questions about CIA and its activities seemed to his interrogators to be beyond the interest or curiosity expected of Soviet Intelligence defectors. Frequently he asked, even while discussing his own KGB responsibilities: "You tell me about a case, and I will remember details." Other examples of NOSENKO's inquisitiveness include the following:

- When shown the CIA publication "Checklist of Soviet Officials Abroad" during the 1964 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO made inquiries about what organization prepared it and to what part of the U.S. Government that organization is subordinate.

- In January 1964, entirely out of context, he asked whether GOLITSYN had reported to CIA that Finnish President KEKKONEN was a KGB agent. (He was not able to explain in later questioning why he had not informed CIA about the case before he made the foregoing inquiry.)

- NOSENKO asked precisely how American Intelligence collection in the USSR is directed and coordinated. The CIA case officer responded: "What was that question?" NOSENKO thereupon said: "It was not a question--just general interest." When the case officer urged him to repeat the question, he refused to talk about it and diverted the conversation to other matters.

- He asked where CIA secretaries resided in the Washington area.

- NOSENKO tried to find out the grades of the CIA officers in contact with him.

- NOSENKO inquired in early 1964 whether the CIA officer who met him in Geneva two years earlier had received a medal for that phase of the operation.

(ii) Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other Sources

Under interrogation, even when accused of lying, NOSENKO rarely challenged the validity of CIA's information nor claimed superior knowledge. The only facts he challenged strongly were incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN's defection, the date of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSOLAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960 trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all times that he accepted that CIA knew more than he did on topics including conditions in the USSR and cases and people for whom he claimed direct responsibility. He never challenged DERYABIN's statements about KGB procedures, although aware that his own information was more recent.

(e) Discussions with NOSENKO on His Own Performance

After admitting his inability to respond to questions about operations in which he said he participated, NOSENKO sometimes gave a general appraisal of his own performance. He would admit that it was "impossible to have such memory breaks" and agree that his response was neither reasonable nor acceptable ("In your place I wouldn't believe it either," or on another occasion, "It will look bad to your boss"). Admitting that the questions were fair, logical, and clearly put, he acknowledged at least a dozen times during the January-March 1965 interrogation that his performance under questioning was bad and unacceptable.

He also admitted that most of the leads he had passed were largely useless. Out of the 150 or so he said he had provided, he stated that the great majority were "no good," unimportant, or people with whom the KGB had not worked ("Maybe 'ANDREY' became not interesting to KGB, changed jobs, and was not so important any more"; "some of the agents recruited by the Seventh Department weren't meeting the KGB"; etc.) He consistently estimated, however, that there were about 20 to 25 "good" leads.

C. Polygraph Testing

1. Test in April 1964

Shortly after his defection, NOSENKO agreed to undergo a polygraph examination which the CIA handlers had told him was a routine part of his defector processing. He was informed on 3 April 1964 that the test would be administered the following morning, and that it was therefore advisable for him to get a good night's rest and to refrain from alcoholic beverages. NOSENKO drank heavily on the night of 3 April, did not enter his bedroom until 0300 hours on 4 April, and following breakfast at 0730 hours on 4 April consumed several gin-and-tonics. Subsequently, when NOSENKO thought he was not being observed, he was seen to remove his hand from his lips hurriedly.*

Following a medical examination by a physician who noted that NOSENKO had been drinking, he was introduced to the CIA polygraph operator. An experienced interrogator, fluent in the Russian language, this polygraph operator conducted the test in Russian from 1045 to 1515 hours on 4 April. His report is quoted below.

"The question of Subject's (NOSENKO's) willingness to participate in the polygraph test was one of minor consideration, since he had, on previous occasions, agreed that he would take the test. However, whether Subject would continue with the polygraph testing if confronted with attempted deception after an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Consequently, in order to preclude the possibility of Subject's terminating the test prior to its completion, it was decided that a minor deviation from the accepted polygraph technique would be used during the polygraph testing; specifically, to insure that a polygraphic record of Subject's reactions to all the pertinent questions be obtained prior to challenging him on any significant polygraphic deception indications his charts might reflect... This plan was followed throughout the polygraph interview...

---

* On 18 May 1964 a report was received on the chemical analysis of six types of tablets which had been taken from NOSENKO's personal effects. In this report, a CIA chemical expert made the following remarks based on chemical, microscopic, and instrumental analysis including the use of X-ray: "Sample No. 4238 consisted of three (3) gray tablets wrapped in a piece of paper with the name 'Phenomin' written in Russian. Microscopic analysis of these tablets established the presence of a small amount of dl-amphetamine sulfate, a large amount of lactose, and a small amount of corn starch; dl-amphetamine is a sympathomimetic agent employed mainly as a central nervous system stimulant. The effect of taking amphetamine as a drug in conjunction with a polygraph test could exaggerate deception responses especially for a weak reactor. No phenothiazine (a tranquilizer) which is the active ingredient in 'Phenomin' was present in these tablets. The tablets do not appear to be of U.S. manufacture. ...As a result of the above examinations it was established that none of the items submitted are of the barbiturate family. Although either sulfaguanidine (Sample No. 4242) or aspirin (Sample No. 4240) could be used (and indeed have been used) as secret ink, they are also normal medicinals which a traveler might carry, and there is nothing in the formulation of the tablets to suggest

"Although the Subject had used both alcohol and some unknown drug prior to testing, there is no question, based both on analysis of Subject's polygraph charts as well as personal observation during the interview, that Subject has attempted deliberate deception in the specific pertinent areas which are mentioned below in this report.

"It is [my] conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific mission or missions.

"According to the plan, the different phases involving various pertinent areas were covered with Subject polygraphically. Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect and 'soft.' On no occasion did Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the possible causes for his polygraph reactions. He continually denied and refused to admit that there was anything to any of the questions which were asked of him. When the final test questions were completed and a record was obtained of all of Subject's polygraphic responses, the nature of the challenge and probing was changed.

"Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent questions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation to [my] direct accusation was that he could not be a dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volunteered to American Intelligence.

"Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected complete self-control and composure, now exhibited a completely different picture. His composure was non-existent, his eyes watered, and his hands trembled. Prior to being confronted with [my] opinion that Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject was asked on one of the last test runs (a) if he were sent to penetrate American Intelligence and (b) if Subject received instructions from KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given in a voice that actually trembled...

"Listed below are all of the questions asked of Subject.

"Series #1:

Were you born in the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you born in the city of Nikolayev? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you born on 30 October 1927? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you deliberately give any kind of misinformation when you told us your autobiography? No. (Reaction)

Is NOSENKO the surname which you had at time of birth? Yes. (Reaction)

Are you concerned about the fact that the polygraph test may discover that you are hiding the truth from me? No. (No reaction)

Was your father the Minister of Shipbuidling? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you a member of the Communist Party before 1956? No. (No reaction)
(Subject stated that he applied for candidacy to the Communist Party in 1956, and in mid-1957 was accepted as a member.)

Did you deliberately give any misinformation about your work and service in the KGB? No. (No reaction)

Besides your children, is there anything in your life on the basis of which someone may blackmail you? No. (No reaction)
(Subject stated that his love for his children was the only thing that is of any consequence which the Soviets might use for blackmail purposes. However, Subject said he was not worried, because regardless of threats against the welfare of his children, he would not allow himself to be blackmailed or controlled.)

Have you ever engaged in any homosexual activity? No. (Reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your education? No. (No reaction)

Did you ever commit a major crime? No. (No reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your military service? No. (No reaction)

"Series #2:

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in January 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you voluntarily defect to the Americans? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you ask for the right of political asylum from the Americans? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you sent to the Americans by the organs of Soviet Intelligence (with a special mission)? No. (Reaction)

Do you have a sincere desire to fight against the KGB and all other punitive organs of the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence on orders of the KGB? No. (Reaction)

Did anyone know of your intention to defect to the Americans? No. (No reaction)

Does the KGB have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact with you in America? No. (Reaction)

Do you have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact with Soviet Intelligence? No. (No reaction)

Do you have a concrete plan to return to the Soviet Union sometime in the future? No. (Reaction)

Are you performing a special mission for Soviet Intelligence in connection with your defection? No. (Reaction)

Are you deliberately hiding penetrations made by Soviet agents into American Intelligence about which you are aware? No. (Reaction)

Are you witting of other recruitments made by Soviet Intelligence of American Embassy personnel which occurred after RHODES and 'ANDREY'? No. (No reaction)

Are you an agent of the KGB or other Soviet Intelligence organs? No. (No reaction)

Was there any pre-arranged signal included in the letters you wrote to your wife (since your defection)? No. (No reaction)

Series #3:

Did you defect to the Americans in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans in Geneva? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment of uncovering plans of American Intelligence against USSR? No. (Reaction)

● Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment to find out more about the structure and methods of operation of American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of penetrating American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans because you were dissatisfied with the Soviet system? Yes. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of discrediting Soviet officers of the KGB who defected earlier? No. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of giving misinformation about Soviet agents' penetration of American Intelligence? No. (No reaction)

Series #4:

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Geneva in 1962? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Geneva in 1964? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Cuba in 1960? No. (Reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1957? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1958? No. (No reaction)

Did you personally participate in the search for CHEREPANOV in December 1963? Yes. (Reaction)

Is it true that KOVSHUK visited the United States in 1957? Yes. (Reaction)

Did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1962? No. (No reaction)

To your knowledge, did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1964? No. (No reaction)

Was GUK in Switzerland in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

"Series #5:

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey OSWALD? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you tell us the truth about Yuri KROTKOV? Yes. (Reaction)

Were the CHEREPANOV papers especially prepared and passed to the Americans by the KGB? No. (Reaction)

Is it true that Soviet Intelligence has an agent, whose name is unknown to you, among the American representatives in Paris? Yes. (Reaction)

Did you bring with you personal identity documents which were fabricated by KGB? No. (Reaction)

Did you give truthful information about the structure of the First and Second Chief Directorates of the KGB? Yes. (No reaction)

Are you misinforming American Intelligence according to a specially developed KGB plan? No. (No reaction)

Is it true that AGAYANTS is the Chief of Department D (Disinformation)? Yes. (Reaction)

To your knowledge, was FEDOSEYEV the Chief of the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1963 and 1964? Yes. (Reaction)

"Series #6:

Did you drink more than you told me? No. (Reaction) (Subject admitted to having only one gin and tonic prior to testing.)

Did you know that American Intelligence uses the polygraph? Yes. (No reaction)

Did anyone in the Soviet Union explain to you anything about American Intelligence's use of the polygraph. No. (No reaction)

Did anyone in the KGB explain anything about the polygraph to you? No. (No reaction)

During the last twenty-four hours, did you take any medicine or pills? No. (Reaction)

Did you receive instructions from the KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph? No. (Reaction)

Were you ever hypnotized by anyone? No. (No reaction)

Did you bring any types of medicine or pills with you (from abroad or from the Soviet Union)? No. (Reaction)

Do you have any pills or medicine about which you have not told me? No. (Reaction)

"Although Subject later admitted that he had two types of pills with him which he brought from Moscow and which [were] in his portfolio, he declined to admit that he had had more liquor than he told [me], that he had received specific instructions about the polygraph from the KGB, or that he had taken any type of pills during the last twenty-four hours."

2. Test in October 1966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD

a. Introduction

CIA conducted a polygraph examination of NOSENKO on 18 October 1966 on the subject of Lee Harvey OSWALD.*

Since the previous polygraph test in April 1964, NOSENKO had been under close security guard, his movements restricted, and in the interim had been interrogated in detail and accused of bad faith in dealing with U.S. Government authorities. NOSENKO had not been interviewed by CIA during the six months prior to October 1966. He had had no access to alcohol or drugs, his food consumption had been normal, and his sleep had been adequate.

NOSENKO was given no advance notice of the polygraph examination. Upon entering the room where it was to take place, he immediately recognized the officer present as the person who administered the first CIA polygraph test two and one-half years earlier. NOSENKO correctly said that they had first met on 4 April 1964.

In the pre-test interview, questions on the OSWALD case were put to NOSENKO in Russian, his answers (also in Russian) were recorded, the operation of the machine was explained, and clarifications of the questions and his answers were made. The three series of questions pertaining to the OSWALD case are given below in their entirety, and they are followed by the conclusions of the polygraph expert.

b. Results

"Series No. 1

1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD ever in the Soviet Union?

   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

2. Was OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961?

   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

3. Did you receive special instructions about what to tell the Americans about the OSWALD case?

   Answer: No. (Reaction)

4. Did you personally meet OSWALD?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

5. Was OSWALD recruited by KGB as an agent?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

6. Were you glad that President Kennedy was killed?

   Answer: No. (Reaction)

7. Other than what you told me, did you actively participate in the OSWALD case prior to 1963?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

---

* See Part V.D.6. for details on OSWALD

8. Did you see a photograph of OSWALD in 1963?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

9. Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

9a. Before her marriage to OSWALD?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

9b. After her marriage to OSWALD?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

10. Did you personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

11. Did OSWALD have any kind of contact with the 13th Otdel of the First Chief Directorate?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

12. Did KGB prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

13. Was OSWALD prepared (trained) by KGB to kill President Kennedy?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

24.* Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

"Subject's (NOSENKO's) most significant reactions on this test series were to questions 3 and 24--other reactions of a lesser significance were evident to questions 6, 8, 9a, and 10.

"Series No. 2

20. Is the name OSWALD familiar to you?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

21. Did you ever read the OSWALD case?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

22. Was this the full and official KGB case on OSWALD?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

23. Did you give us any kind of information about OSWALD?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

*Before the beginning of the examination, the polygraph operator

24. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?

    Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

24a. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) only after President Kennedy's death?

    Answer: Instead of the usual yes or no answer, Subject answered: 'Before and after.' When the question was repeated, he again answered: 'Before and after.' Only when the question was asked a third time on a subsequent test did he answer 'No.' (Reaction) (Subject reacted when he answered 'Before and after,' and when he answered 'No."

25. Did the KGB consider OSWALD abnormal?

    Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

26. As far as you know, did Marina OSWALD know about her husband's plan to kill President Kennedy?

    Answer: No. (No reaction)

27. To your knowledge did OSWALD talk with a KGB officer in Mexico?

    Answer: No. (No reaction)

28. Did OSWALD return to the United States in 1961?

    Answer: Yes. (No reaction) Subject's reaction to this question was inconsistent when he answered 'Yes.' hence the (No reaction) notation. However, it is noteworthy that Subject did not attempt to correct the date of OSWALD's departure to the U.S.; OSWALD returned to the U.S. in June 1962 and not in 1961.

29. Is your contact with the OSWALD case part of your legend (cover story)?

    Answer: No. (Reaction)

30. Did you really take part in the OSWALD case in 1959?

    Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

"Subject's most significant reactions were to questions 22, 24, 24a, 29 and 30.

"Series No. 3

16. Did you personally order RASTRUSIN, in 1959, to collect material on OSWALD?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

13. Did you personally talk on the V. Ch. with Minsk about the OSWALD case in 1963?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

17. Were you instructed on the OSWALD case by one of the KGB operational officers?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

17a. Did the KGB instruct you to tell us OSWALD was a bad shot?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

18. Do you know definitely that OSWALD was not of operational interest to KGB?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

18c. Did KGB give the OSWALDs any kind of help in their departure from the Soviet Union?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

3a. Did you receive special instructions from the KGB about what to tell the Americans about OSWALD?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

"Subject's reactions to the questions so indicated were about equal in consistency and significance.

"On the basis of an analysis of the polygraph charts obtained during Subject's polygraph interrogation and testing during the 18 October 1966 session, it is [my] opinion that:

a. Subject was not personally or actually involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 to 1961 while OSWALD was in the Soviet Union.

b. Subject heard of OSWALD only after Kennedy's assassination; however, he was not an active participant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably briefed on the case by a KGB officer.

c. Subject received special instructions (from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to tell American authorities about it."

VIII. NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Introduction

It is standard procedure to assess the bona fides of each intelligence and counterintelligence source, and special care is required in assessing sources of information relevant to the security of the United States.

One difficulty in doing so with a Soviet source is that Soviet realities, particularly in the KGB, are imperfectly known: Except where independent information is available, it is risky to say and impossible to prove what the Soviets--most notably the KGB--would or would not do in any given situation, or what any given KGB officer should or should not know. Independent information, voluminous in quantity although never comprehensive and entirely current, nevertheless has been assimilated from the reports of the several KGB staff officers who have defected, from the KGB agents who have confessed, and from the Western services which have investigated KGB activities. There is, therefore, a base of reliable knowledge upon which to predicate an assessment of a source reporting on the KGB, even one who principally covers a KGB component (in this instance the Second Chief Directorate) upon which there previously had been relatively little inside information. Moreover, in the absence of direct evidence from other sources, it would be arbitrarily confining if an assumption were not made that certain KGB standards are at least comparable to those of Western services. Such prior knowledge and, to a limited extent, such an assumption are factors in the assessment of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO that is submitted here.

A much more prominent factor in this assessment, however, is NOSENKO's own testimony. CIA has exhaustively debriefed and interrogated NOSENKO, his leads were checked, his information was studied, and a large body of facts pertinent to his bona fides was thus assembled. These details, as well as direct evidence from other sources and the views of specialists affiliated with CIA, have been presented in Part III. through Part VII. of this paper.

The basic questions with regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO are the following:

- Is there reason to question the general accuracy and completeness of NOSENKO's accounts of his situation and motivations in contacting CIA and later defecting, his personal life, military service, positions in the KGB, personal participation in KGB operations, knowledgeability about KGB activities and the way he learned of them, and his associations with KGB personnel?

- If there are grounds for doubting the general accuracy and completeness of these accounts, then what are the explanations for NOSENKO's actions, for the nature of the information he has provided, and for other Soviet sources having authenticated his personal life and KGB career?

In assessing the bona fides of NOSENKO, the classic method has been used: evaluating his production and sourcing, examining his autobiography, and appraising him and the circumstances of this operation. These points, with the conclusions drawn from each, are reviewed below. The discussion continues with a survey of the sources who have corroborated NOSENKO's background and status, and this is followed by argumentations on the various hypotheses which could explain NOSENKO as a source. The final portion is a summary of conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides.

B. Evaluation of Production

1. Introduction

What a Soviet source reports is one factor in assessing his good faith. Rarely, however, can it be conclusive: Even a genuine and conscientious source may be poorly informed or misinformed; he may be hampered by forgetfulness, mental shortcomings, or lack of education; his reporting may be incomplete because he is not available long enough to permit amplification and clarification of his information. On the other hand, a Soviet-controlled agent who is planted on the opposition may be supplied with useful, voluminous, and accurate information.

There are several standards which may be applied to the assessment of a source's production. Each of them is qualified; none is likely to be conclusive by itself; and all of them together may not permit a definite conclusion, although they do contribute to a broader assessment of bona fides. The standards are:

First, how does the information equate, in terms of completeness, accuracy, and detail, with the source's claimed or proven position and access to information? (In this, one judges the internal consistency of the source's reporting and also compares it with information from other sources and from investigations.)

Second, does the information harm the opposition? (This point is risky to judge, for a genuine source may simply not know anything harmful to his country. Also, information which seems harmful to the USSR may not actually be such in Soviet eyes; for example, the loss of an apparently valuable agent could be mitigated by the KGB's possession of better or comparable assets still unexposed.)

Third, is the information important or useful to us? (This point may in some cases be irrelevant, for information useful to us may not harm the opposition, and the apparent usefulness of information may not balance against the time and effort required to process and investigate it.)

These standards have been applied in evaluating the production of NOSENKO on the topics discussed below.

NOSENKO's production is exclusively in the field of counterintelligence information. As described in Part VI.A., he did not have any useful positive intelligence. This does not necessarily affect the question of his bona fides, however, for NOSENKO claims to have been a KGB internal counterintelligence officer. From a comparative standpoint, not one of the previous KGB officers who defected to Western services has produced significant military, economic, or scientific information on the USSR, and only a few have supplied political information (usually concerned with the personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the Communist Party). Therefore, nothing of positive intelligence consequence is expected of NOSENKO, although some question might be raised about his inability to report on the leadership of the Soviet regime in view of his father's position and NOSENKO's continuing contacts with the leadership after his father's death. The failure of NOSENKO to respond to questionnaires along positive intelligence lines is not considered unusual.

NOSENKO's counterintelligence production includes all of his information on the Soviet intelligence and security organs:

- their structure, functions, methods, and procedures;
- their officers and their agents of Soviet citizenship;
- their operational activities inside and outside the USSR.

For the most part this portion of the paper (as in Part VIII.C. through Part VIII.F.) follows a format in which the evidence is summarized, the facts interpreted, and conclusions presented.

2. KGB Organization, Personalities, Methods

Ability to discuss the structure of his service in general and at least some of its components in particular is an absolutely minimal requirement for anyone who claims to have been employed within that service. At the same time, current information on the organization of an intelligence service is of classic interest to opposing intelligence and security services. Organizational changes are indicators of policy and planning trends in the service; short of a penetration of the service's leadership, such changes are perhaps the most reliable reflection of changes in operational emphasis and tactics.

Had NOSENKO's information on the organization of the KGB been novel in this sense, it would have been of considerable value, while the exposure of this information--although perhaps not a major loss to the Soviets--would nonetheless have been against the KGB's best interests. NOSENKO's reports on the organization of the KGB in 1964 (Pages 352-358) agree with and are a logical extension of that framework of KGB organization newly revealed by the 1961 sources, but this weighs neither for nor against him as the source: In the absence of contradictory information, he cannot be subject to criticism or to suspicion because his reports show no redirection of the thrust of the KGB. Furthermore, NOSENKO's statements indicating that there have been no major changes in the years between the 1959 reorganization and 1964 are acceptable in the light of available information from other sources. The information which NOSENKO provided on the KGB's organization therefore neither supports nor discredits his bona fides.

NOSENKO's information on some 1,000 Soviets connected with intelligence and security activities is an impressive achievement of memory. These identifications, however, must be evaluated according to the damage inflicted upon the Soviets by his exposure of these personalities. In this respect, the discussion must concern new identifications, for intelligence personalities previously exposed could not be damaged any further by a repetition of their compromise. This discussion must be further restricted to new identifications of staff personnel, because the entire Soviet population is available to the KGB for occasional use as it sees fit, with the loyalty and discretion of the individual as the only limiting factors; to learn that a Soviet employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is an agent reporting to the KGB is to learn nothing that has not already been taken for granted, and besides, no action on such information can be taken. Finally, the new identifications also must be among persons who are identifiable and accessible, or the information is useless to Western services and is no loss to the Soviets. On this basis, only KGB First Chief Directorate as well as GRU identifications merit inclusion in this evaluation, since these are the officers who normally appear abroad and participate in agent operations. Although KGB Second Chief Directorate personnel have in the past transferred to the First Chief Directorate, this is not a predictable event and cannot be considered in discussion of current damage.

NOSENKO identified 165 First Chief Directorate personnel, but only 149 could be located in CIA files (i.e., were identifiable by name); the remaining 16 names from NOSENKO were valueless as they were untraceable. Of the 149, there were 37 who were not known or suspected as intelligence officers prior to the receipt of NOSENKO's information. Of 37, there were 24 who either resided abroad at the time of NOSENKO's defection or were sent abroad since that time.* Assuming that NOSENKO was correct in his identifications of all 24 members of the KGB who were accessible,** it cannot be said that the number is so large that the damage to KGB agent operations was substantial. None of NOSENKO's unique GRU identifications were abroad at the time of his defection or have been since. These personality identifications hence do not serve as evidence of NOSENKO's _bona fides_. At the same time, his inability to do further measurable harm to the KGB in this regard cannot be held against him, either, for he has claimed service only in the Second Chief Directorate throughout his career and so cannot be expected to know a high percentage of the First Chief Directorate complement. Therefore, NOSENKO's intelligence personality identifications do not constitute a factor in finding for or against his _bona fides_.

NOSENKO has been the source of many interesting details and examples of KGB _modus operandi_ (Pages 359-360), but while useful for illustrative purposes and valuable because of the fact that the material was easily collatable for study purposes, none of the methods described could be considered new and revealing, and their exposure in any event would not prevent their continued use in the future. NOSENKO's discussion of the only double agent case in which he claimed to have played a role, however, demonstrates his lack of knowledge of the principles and purposes of such an operation. This case, BELITSKIY, is a subject of separate

sensitive sources

---

* Of these 24, ten were identified by [redacted] as KGB [redacted] and thereafter, and two became prominently active in insecure KGB operations shortly after NOSENKO identified them.

[redacted]

**Other evidence has contradicted statements by NOSENKO to the effect that certain Soviets were not affiliated with the KGB; in Geneva, for example, where he had daily access to the KGB Legal Residency for months and claimed nearly complete knowledge of KGB personnel, he named 15 of a KGB staff which he said totalled at the most 18; CIA identifications of KGB officers in Geneva on the basis of other sources, investigations and analysis totalled at least double this number and probably triple, as many as 55 of the approximately 120 Soviets stationed there (a proportion which is consistent with other areas and defectors' estimates). NOSENKO was not entirely accurate concerning even KGB officers on his own delegation in Geneva, as noted on Pages 12 and 13. Therefore, the accuracy of NOSENKO's original identifications, positive or negative, cannot be accepted without question.

discussion below. This subject, too, must be considered neutral evidence in the bona fides assessment.

NOSENKO has shown himself to be both uninformed and inaccurate in his answers to questions on KGB Headquarters staff procedures (Page 360 and Pages 619-624). He has been unable to contribute any new information, although there has been no detailed reporting on the subject since 1954. (GOLITSYN in 1962 provided some new material on procedures but was never comprehensively debriefed on the topic.) Thus, information on the more up-to-date forms, coordination requirements, mechanization of records and tracing mechanisms, etc., could have been a singular contribution to our knowledge; NOSENKO could not describe anything of this sort. When he replied to questions about such matters for the period covering his entry into the KGB, on which previous reporting is available in detail, he answered incorrectly on numerous points. NOSENKO's tendency to improvise when he did not know the correct answer or when he had forgotten has been characterized by a CIA psychologist as the behavior of a pathological liar saving face in a tight psychological situation. When he could not produce a correct answer in this area of reporting, NOSENKO may have improvised because he is a liar or because he is concealing an ignorance based on not having been a KGB Headquarters officer.

3. Operational Leads

a. Introduction

Consideration of NOSENKO's operational leads must take into account the KGB positions and personal associations (with attendant access to information) which NOSENKO has claimed for himself. He indicated that the breadth of his knowledge about KGB agent operations and development cases increased as he rose from case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955 and in the American Tourist Section in 1955-1958 to become Deputy Chief of the latter section in 1958-1959, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960-1961, and finally Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from 1962 until his defection. Simultaneously he established lasting contacts with his KGB colleagues so that, for example, even after leaving the U.S. Embassy Section for the second time, in December 1961, NOSENKO kept abreast of its most important activities. On these grounds NOSENKO presented himself as an authoritative source, one who could detail the successes and failures of the KGB in recruiting Westerners--especially Americans--in the USSR over the years from 1953 through 1963. Repeatedly NOSENKO asserted that his leads to KGB agents constituted proof of his bona fides.

b. Operations Involving Americans

NOSENKO drew a picture of the recruitment scene in Moscow showing that:

- Since the "ANDREY" case of the early 1950's* the KGB recruited no Americans on the U.S. Embassy staff, succeeding only in recruiting one contract employee who was in Moscow on TDY. NOSENKO reported on recruitment approaches to six American officials stationed in Moscow, all of whom refused to collaborate with the KGB. He discussed 14 development cases which never culminated in recruitment approaches to these U.S. Government employees in Moscow, and he named 11 officials at the Moscow Embassy who were investigated by the KGB. These operations, NOSENKO asserted, comprised the total KGB activity against Embassy personnel with the exception of the technical penetrations (see Part VIII.B.4.).

---

* NOSENKO placed the recruitment date prior to his entry into the KGB in early 1953, but Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY") said he became a KGB agent in November or December 1953.

- Seven American correspondents in Moscow had been recruited by the KGB, four of them known to NOSENKO from the years 1953-1954 when he was working against U.S. newspapermen. Another two were under development by the KGB during that period.

- The American Express Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL, had become a KGB agent in 1959; NOSENKO was the case officer.

- The number of American visitors recruited by the KGB in 1962-1963 was 14, and if there had been others, NOSENKO would have known about them in light of his senior position in the Tourist Department during that period. Moreover, for the years before 1962, NOSENKO provided leads to 19 other American tourists whom the KGB recruited, plus one who was serving the GRU when he came to Moscow. NOSENKO also described 18 development cases and nine investigations in which the targets were American tourists.

As for KGB operations outside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO gave leads to four recruited Americans about whom he learned through conversations with KGB associates: a U.S. intelligence officer having the KGB cryptonym "SASHA" (still unidentified), a penetration of Orly Courier Transfer Station (identified as Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON), and two agents in Geneva (names not given and as yet not positively identified). NOSENKO learned of the KGB agent status of Horace G. LUNT, an American professor, because he took part in LUNT's recruitment while on TDY in Sofia, and of the [redacted] Legal Residency agent [redacted] because of the connection between [redacted] and Bernard KOTEN, an American tourist with whose case NOSENKO was personally involved. In addition, NOSENKO described two development cases with U.S. citizens. From his knowledge of the "SASHA" operation, NOSENKO also knew that the KGB had no agent sources able to supply information concerning the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

(i) Completeness, Accuracy, Detail and Consistency of Reporting

If he occupied the various KGB positions as claimed, if his access were as broad as he said it was, NOSENKO has provided a comprehensive review of KGB operations involving Americans in the USSR.

Other information, however, contradicts NOSENKO's assurances that he reported on all major cases involving Americans working at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow:

- GOLITSYN's reports indicate that a U.S. military code clerk was recruited in 1960, and other factors point toward this person being James STORSBERG or possibly William HURLEY (Pages 166-182). NOSENKO, the supervisor of operations against Embassy code clerks in 1960-1961, stated that

STORSBERG rejected the recruitment approach, and when interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, STORSBERG confirmed this. Both agree the approach was made in the latter part of 1961.

- GOLITSYN's reports cover six other operations (Pages 595-598) which NOSENKO has not mentioned: The KGB's recruitment of a female employee at the Embassy in 1957, the presence of a code clerk in the Embassy in 1960 who was a KGB agent, an unsuccessful recruitment approach to a female secretary at the Embassy prior to July 1960, the KGB plan to complete the recruitment of an American diplomat following his reassignment from Moscow in 1959, the KGB's recruitment of or planned recruitment approach to a U.S. Embassy employee (possibly a code clerk) prior to April/May 1960, and a KGB officer's trip to Helsinki to accompany an Embassy code clerk travelling by train to Moscow. (There is documentary evidence to support the accuracy of GOLITSYN's statements about the last of these cases; see below.)

On the basis of available information, NOSENKO cannot be faulted on the completeness of his reporting about American tourists recruited, approached, and under development by the KGB, but he could cite only one instance of KGB investigations uncovering tourists dispatched to the USSR by American Intelligence (Pages 145-150).* He knew nothing concerning two documents of CIA origin which described "legal travel" operations, one discussing forthcoming tasks of American agents in the tourist season of 1959, a year in which NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. These documents were placed in the hands of the KGB by George BLAKE of MI-6 in July 1959 (before the end of the tourist season) and in 1960; NOSENKO was not familiar with any aspects of the KGB operation with BLAKE. That the Tourist Department was aware of U.S. Intelligence sending agents under tourist cover to the Soviet Union in the years when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section is demonstrable by four cases of 1958 and 1959 cited in a KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO, although having no information on KGB countermeasures against American tourists in 1958 and 1959, knew that the document had been passed to CIA by GOLITSYN and that it had been written in the Tourist Department. Where NOSENKO's reporting on American tourist cases is checkable, therefore, it has been found to be incomplete.

---

* NOSENKO reported that of nine other tourists investigated by the KGB, eight were suspected of having current connections with American Intelligence. The KGB was correct with regard to Thomas BARTHELEMY and Robert CHRISTNER, who were on CIA missions, and Alfred SLESINGER, an FBI informant who nevertheless had no American Intelligence mission when he visited the USSR in 1961 and 1962. Frederick BARGHOORN, arrested in the USSR in 1963, had been affiliated with U.S. military intelligence many years before, and Ray GARTHOFF had severed his association with CIA as an overt employee before he went to Moscow in 1963. Concerning the rest reportedly suspected by the KGB--Donald ALBINGER, Bernard KOTEN, and Gabriel REINER--none was associated with American Intelligence in any way.

TOP SECRET

NOSENKO's reporting on individual cases wherein he was a personal participant or supervisor is not, with few exceptions, contradicted by information available from other sources. Nearly all of his statements have proven accurate when they could be compared with collateral information: In fact, the Americans whom he cited did visit or live in the Soviet Union, and many of them are known to have been of operational interest to the KGB, as NOSENKO said. The exceptions to his general accuracy of reporting, however, are of major importance in themselves and in reference to his claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy Section during 1960-1961:*

NOSENKO	Collateral
U.S. Embassy Security Officer John V. ABIDIAN, for whom NOSENKO was the responsible KGB officer, visited the Pushkin Street dead drop site in 1960 or at the beginning of 1961. Later that same day KOZLOV, Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate went to the scene. or 1st [illegible]	CIA records on the PENKOVSKIY case, in which the Pushkin Street dead drop was used, show that ABIDIAN visited the site only once, on 30 December 1961 at 1130 hours. KOZLOV left New York City on the same day, travelling via France, at the completion of a TDY in the United States. (Pages 231-235; this subject is discussed at greater length in Part VIII.B.6.)
KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's direct subordinate, made but one TDY to Helsinki in the 1960-1961 period; NOSENKO would have known about if not approved other TDY's in these years when he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.	Travel records show that KOSOLAPOV was twice in Helsinki during 1960, in March-April and again in November. (Pages 186-200).
Returning from his single TDY to Helsinki, KOSOLAPOV was abroad the same train as his target, the American military code clerk Paul JENNER; as supervisor of all operations against code clerks at the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO was familiar with the details of all such major activities.	Travel records show that JENNER and KOSOLAPOV travelled on separate days. (Pages 186-200)
The KGB knew that the U.S. military code clerk James KEYSERS, whom NOSENKO personally contacted in an effort to persuade him to defect, did not report the earlier recruitment approach by the KGB.	KEYSERS reported the recruitment approach immediately after it occurred, and the report was submitted in an Embassy room later found to have a concealed microphone. (NOSENKO stated that he was a customer for microphone intercepts at the time and that this microphone was monitored on a continuous basis by KGB personnel.) (Pages 213-219)

---

* An example of NOSENKO's inaccuracy on events during his later service in the Tourist Department related to his accounts on the arrest of American Professor Frederick BARGHOORN: According to NOSENKO, the approval for this KGB action in which he had a personal part was obtained from BREZHNEV in KHRUSHCHEV's absence from Moscow, and the arrest was made a few hours later; BARGHOORN was arrested on 31 October 1963, and on that day and the day before KHRUSHCHEV made public appearances in Moscow. (BREZHNEV was not seen in Moscow between 29 October and 2 November

In addition, a number of Americans--e.g., Walter RASK, Adam BROCHES, Henry APISSON, Herbert HOWARD, Vasiliy VOLKOV, William WALLACE, Thomas Whitney, and Stanley ZIRING--denied having been recruited by the KGB, as NOSENKO said they had been.

The only noteworthy internal inconsistencies in NOSENKO's reporting on KGB operations involving Americans appear in the HARMSTONE case, where he has given conflicting information on the KGB's ability to obtain photographic evidence of his homosexuality, and in his advice on how to identify "ANDREY"--that he was the only witness to testify in Roy RHODES' trial and that he did not testify at Roy RHODES' trial but was only interviewed in the pre-trial investigation once. Part VIII.D. covers the extent of his knowledge about American cases in which he took part personally or as a supervisor. Regarding others to which his official positions did not give him access, NOSENKO has indicated that it was his personal contact with KGB colleagues which enabled him to report on nine recruitments (Herbert HOWARD, Sam JAFFE, the KGB agent in France, the YOUNGER couple, "SASHA", and two unnamed agents in Geneva); three development cases (George VAN LAETHEM, Attorney General Robert KENNEDY, and Stephen HOFFMAN); three unsuccessful recruitment approaches (Richard HARMSTONE, Peter BINDER, and Collette SCHWARZENBACH); and three investigations (Thomas BARTHELEMY, Lewis BOWDEN, and George WINTERS). NOSENKO's alleged associates in the KGB thus gave him the names of four recruited agents and sufficient details for one more to be identified by subsequent investigation, JOHNSON. All of the NOSENKO leads to developmental operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and investigations have been identified.

(ii) Damage to the Soviets

Three criteria can be used in assessing the harm to Soviet interests caused by NOSENKO's operational leads to Americans:

First, the originality of his information on recruited agents and unsuccessful recruitment approaches;

Second, the agents' access to classified information at the time he reported on them; and

Third, the possibility of identifying them on the basis of the details provided or in combination with details received from other sources.

There is no reason to believe that NOSENKO's information on 22 Americans under investigation while in the USSR could have damaged the KGB, especially since all of them had left the Soviet Union before the NOSENKO leads were received (Pages 402-410). In another category, NOSENKO's leads to 35 Americans under development (Pages 379-397), there is no means for evaluating their importance to the KGB because it is impossible to estimate with confidence the likelihood of the KGB recruiting some or any of these targets; vulnerability and assessment data, when coupled with spasmodic or even continuing KGB access to the target, would be no guarantee that he is recruitable. Nevertheless, following the criteria listed above, NOSENKO's statements on KGB operational interest stemming from their homosexuality did bring about the recall of Robert ARMSTRONG and Stephen HOFFMAN from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

NOSENKO was the first source to report on the KGB recruitments of 22 tourists (none with access to classified materials and on 11 of whom there was previous derogatory information); four correspondents (one said by NOSENKO to have become inactive and on two of whom there was previous derogatory information); the American Express Company representative in Moscow; a contract employee of USIA who had earlier declared his intent to marry a Soviet national; and two agents whose names were not known to NOSENKO but who were identifiable. The latter two agents were:

- Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY"), a cipher machine mechanic at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow recruited in 1953. Despite NOSENKO's statement that "ANDREY" was currently supplying valuable information in June 1962, SMITH lost his access to classified information through retirement from the U.S. Army on 30 November 1961, or about six months before NOSENKO first reported on him (Pages 413-426).

- U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, who with his wife Hedwig began collaborating with the KGB in 1952 and who made James MINTKENBAUGH an agent of the KGB in 1953 (Pages 427-462). Hedwig JOHNSON discontinued her role in the operation in 1953, although thereafter remaining knowledgeable of the KGB activities of her husband and MINTKENBAUGH; according to MINTKENBAUGH, who lost access to classified information in 1954, he had no direct contact with the KGB after the late summer or early autumn of 1963 (about three to five months before NOSENKO first gave the lead on JOHNSON); JOHNSON was still on active duty with the U.S. Army and in contact with the KGB when NOSENKO reported in January 1964 about the existence of this agent.

Thus from a total of 30 original and identifiable leads, only one agent had access to classified information as of the date when NOSENKO's reporting on him began. By the criteria given in the preceeding paragraph, the single operational lead from NOSENKO which could have damaged Soviet interests was that which uncovered JOHNSON.

It is debatable, however, whether the JOHNSON lead constituted a serious loss to the KGB. In the first place, if JOHNSON can be believed, he gave the Soviets but one classified document while in charge of the "Classified Control Center" at Camp Des Loges between August 1963 and May 1964. His KGB case officer later told him, JOHNSON said, that the information he could provide was not worth the risk involved and that no future attempts of this sort should be made. JOHNSON also stated that he felt his espionage work at Camp Des Loges had not been very profitable for the Soviets, adding that his case officer had shown disinterest in his proposal to obtain for the KGB a top secret document he (JOHNSON) thought of greater importance than any other to which he had access. (NOSENKO indicated that JOHNSON lost his access in the spring of 1963, while at the Orly Courier Transfer Station.) In the second place, as the KGB knew, the behavior of Hedwig JOHNSON, a mental case, was unpredictable. Finally, the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH repeatedly disregarded the KGB's instructions to compartment their activities and to observe other routine security precautions. The KGB seems to have avoided full exploitation of JOHNSON in the latter stages of the operation, to have been concerned over Hedwig's mental condition as early as 1962, and to have regarded the threesome as difficult handling problems. Given these apparent factors, the NOSENKO lead may have been considered expendable by the KGB, without long-lasting adverse effect on the fulfillment of its overall intelligence requirements.

NOSENKO was the first source to identify James STORSBERG, a U.S. military code clerk stationed at the Moscow Embassy, as a target who had rejected the KGB's recruitment offer (Pages 165-185). The information was received from NOSENKO after STORSBERG was discharged from the U.S. Army, and when interviewed on the basis of this information, STORSBERG generally confirmed NOSENKO's reporting on the case. GOLITSYN had earlier reported on what may have been the same KGB operation, but GOLITSYN believed the military code clerk had been recruited; from what GOLITSYN had previously told CIA and from later investigations, it seems possible that the KGB recruited either STORSBERG or William HURLEY (who NOSENKO said was not recruited or approached by the KGB). If it is assumed that STORSBERG was not recruited in the approach described by NOSENKO and in the operation discussed by GOLITSYN, the KGB suffered no loss in the American services learning of this case. If it is assumed on the other hand that STORSBERG or HURLEY was recruited, the reporting by NOSENKO assisted the KGB--not the American services--by deflecting security investigations from a recruited agent of the KGB.

(iii) Importance or Usefulness

The American leads from NOSENKO enabled U.S. security authorities to:

- Confirm previous information on the recruitments of 13 tourists and three correspondents;
- Verify previous derogatory information on 11 tourists, two correspondents, and perhaps one military code clerk, STORSBERG;
- Remove two homosexuals from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow; and
- Identify 32 KGB agents including Hedwig JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH.*

One or possibly two of these 32 agents (SMITH and possibly HOWARD) in the past had been in a position to pass classified information to the KGB, and a third (JOHNSON) had current access to classified information and current contact with the KGB; the two homosexuals at the Moscow Embassy (ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN) presumably also had access to classified information. From the standpoint of protecting the security of the U.S. Government, NOSENKO brought to an end the JOHNSON operation and the KGB's potential for recruiting ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN.

Against this product of NOSENKO's reporting must be balanced the amounts of money and manpower that were needed for U.S. security authorities to exhaust and investigate NOSENKO's information on 49 recruitments, 35 developmental targets, seven unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and 33 investigations by the KGB--a total of 113 operational leads. CIA carried the burden of the debriefing and interrogation of NOSENKO on these cases, but the investigative work in the United States was accomplished mostly by other agencies. It would seem, however, that the JOHNSON operation was the only NOSENKO lead to be important or useful.

---

* Among these 32 agents were many whom the KGB had not recontacted after their return to the United States from the Soviet Union, others who had broken contact with the KGB, some who were known

(iv) Remarks

Judged by his major inaccuracies and by the demonstrable incompleteness in some of his reporting, NOSENKO is not an authoritative or reliable source of information on operations against Americans by the U.S. Embassy Section and the American Tourist Section. Proven untrustworthy in other categories of operational leads, there is no reason to accept at face value NOSENKO's statement that SMITH was the only Moscow Embassy employee working with the KGB from 1953 through 1963; indeed, evidence to the contrary exists. The same may be true regarding American tourists and correspondents in Moscow, i.e., other recruitments not mentioned by NOSENKO could have occurred. Furthermore, with the questionable exception of the JOHNSON case, the KGB lost nothing of great value in consequence of NOSENKO's leads but gained an advantage by occupying the attention and facilities of American security authorities.

It is therefore concluded that NOSENKO has withhold information on recruitments of Americans in Moscow, or he is unable to provide a comprehensive review of such activities because he did not hold the claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy and American Tourist Sections. Either explanation forces strong reservations about the bona fides of NOSENKO as a genuine source, and these reservations are reinforced by the relative costs to the KGB and U.S. security authorities of the NOSENKO leads. By itself, this evaluation of his production on American cases suggests the possibility that the KGB dispatched NOSENKO to report to CIA, and that the KGB did so for the purpose of misleading the U.S. security services.

c. Operations Involving Other Westerners

(i) Introduction

As already indicated, NOSENKO's principal knowledgeability of KGB operations is related to Americans in the Soviet Union. With the exception of one German and one Norwegian tourist case, his only other personal participation in third-national (i.e., non-American) operations stems from his association with the section of the Tourist Department concerned with United Kingdom and Canadian, as well as American, tourists. Where he has commented on sources for the rest of his third-national leads, he indicated his knowledge was acquired either through conversations with other officers or through his position as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department in 1962-1963. Thus he made no claim for completeness of his coverage, nor necessarily for absolute accuracy and full details on any one case. No attempt will be made here, therefore, to compare his information with other sources, except in terms of whether NOSENKO's reporting harmed the Soviets and assisted American security.

(ii) Discussion

Of the 90 third-national recruitment leads (Pages 474-502), 22 have not yet been positively identified. These cannot be evaluated at all except to point out that only two of them are potentially significant, the NATO penetration in Belgium in 1962 (which may be the same as a lead from another source) and a code clerk in the West German Embassy in Moscow in 1961. Without knowing the status of these two operations at the time NOSENKO told CIA about them, it is not possible to measure the value to us or the damage to the Soviet Union through the compromise of these cases.

Of the remaining 68 known or possible agents who have been identified, 35 were unique leads when NOSENKO provided them. No conclusive investigation results have yet been obtained on 30 of these, but the majority were said by NOSENKO to be travel agency employees (guides, bus drivers, etc.). Five of the 30 held positions of trust in their respective governments; these five leads are discussed below in terms of potential value to U.S. security and potential damage to the KGB. Of the five who have been interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO information, four denied being recruited by the KGB, including [redacted] (the only one of those interviewed holding a government position), discussed below. Reporting on the one remaining lead, a Dutch woman, is unclear and inconclusive--she admitted only to having been questioned while in the USSR.

Among the 35 new leads from NOSENKO, a total of five had positions of trust, with known or presumed access to sensitive information, in their respective governments:

- [redacted]: NOSENKO said in 1962 that the KGB was working on him when he was [redacted] in Moscow, but he did not know whether [redacted] was recruited or not. [redacted] in 1963 he told CIA of his contacts in Moscow with Soviets whom he suspected of being intelligence officers, and in 1964 he reported a social visit in Vienna by General GORBUNOV (an operational alias of GRIBANOV), whom he had known in Moscow. He has not been interviewed directly on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, nor has he reported a recruitment approach.

- [redacted]: French [redacted]

- [redacted] NOSENKO reported that [redacted], is either an agent or a "solid contact" of the KGB. [redacted] Indian [redacted]

- [redacted] NOSENKO has identified him as a KGB agent, with no further information. Stationed at the Indian Embassy in Moscow from 1957 to 1961, [redacted] there is no derogatory information on him in CIA files.

- Indonesian [redacted] in Moscow: In 1962 NOSENKO reported that prior to 1960 or 1961 the KGB recruited the Indonesian [redacted] Although NOSENKO had spelled out the name in 1962, in 1964 he could recall no such case but thought this must have been a mistake for the case of [redacted] who had been the [redacted] that time. Aside from the fact that conditions in Indonesia precluded CIA's passing this lead to the Indonesian service for investigation, Indonesia's position until 1966 was that of a semi-satellite of the Communist Bloc, and revelation of such a recruitment in the prevailing situation would have been of no value to the United States nor harm to the Soviet Union.

Thus of the third-national leads originating with NOSENKO, five might be considered to be important because of their position in government. In two cases [redacted] he was not able to say whether there was a recruitment, however, while a third (assuming that there was no further confusion on NOSENKO's part) cannot be considered an important lead because of the Communist bias of the Indonesian Government. [redacted] position as an agent or contact loses significance in view of his previously reported support of a powerful leftist political figure. The possible importance of the [redacted] lead cannot be assessed without investigation results.

The William VASSALL case (Pages 503-507) was the one third-national lead which NOSENKO himself considered most important. He invariably included this lead when talking about the importance of his reporting. The British security services nevertheless were well on their way to identifying the source of the Admiralty documents identified by GOLITSYN, having narrowed their list of suspects to 20 (including VASSALL) by 11 June 1962. When they received the fragment of NOSENKO information which focused on the British Embassy in Moscow, the number was reduced to VASSALL and one other. Although the NOSENKO information apparently confirmed the already solid suspicions of VASSALL, there is reason to believe that the identification would have been accomplished without this information. The lead was therefore not new or exclusive information, and NOSENKO himself admitted in 1964 that he knew that GOLITSYN had known of the case from the latter's work in the Information (Reports) Department.

Of the identified third-nationals whom NOSENKO said were being targetted or investigated by the KGB, none held positions of significance, with the sole exception of the then member of the British Parliament, [redacted] whose personal life and career the Soviets subsequently attempted--with considerable success--to destroy through a campaign of scandal.

(iii) Remarks

On the basis of the above examination, NOSENKO's information on KGB operations against third-nationals cannot be considered a positive factor in the assessment of his *bona fides*. As a possible negative factor in consideration of his *bona fides*, the insignificance of NOSENKO's reporting on third-national leads must be measured against the criteria of his claimed access and contrary evidence. In the case of foreign tourists his leads show--and he himself has commented--that such recruitments were of no particular value; assuming that NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, he should be able to make such a statement without challenge. To date no independent evidence of foreign tourist recruitments has emerged which contradicts him. Operations against other Western embassies in Moscow are a slightly different matter. NOSENKO's information, or lack thereof, cannot be evaluated on the basis of completeness because he has made no claim to full access to such information or to positions which would have given him better access. Except for those he said he was informed of in connection with possible use against U.S. Embassy targets, he has usually sourced such third-national leads as he did have to particularly close relations with the responsible case officer. It would not be valid to argue that a source of one lead should have told him of others, or that he should have had more close friends in the KGB. Thus on all applicable criteria, the NOSENKO leads to operations against third-nationals must be excluded as a factor weighing for or against his *bona fides*.

4. Technical Operations Against the U.S. Embassy

a. Discussion

In reporting on KGB microphones in the U.S. Embassy (Pages 248-269), NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were at that time "four or five points," later adding a sixth, from which conversations were heard. They included the offices of the Minister Counselor, the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Air Attache, one (unidentified) "State Department employee," and the Agricultural Attache. He also referred to a non-productive microphone in the code room but did not count this as one of the points. NOSENKO did not supply details of the information which the KGB obtained from any of these microphones except to make general allusions to the importance of the materials from those in the offices of the Minister Counselor and the Military Attache. He stressed that the existence of these microphones was the KGB's "biggest secret" and that only a very few people knew of them. In 1964 NOSENKO gave more details and provided a written list of the offices where microphones were actively monitored in 1960 and 1961.

NOSENKO's information on the microphones would appear, on the basis of the findings of the sweep team in 1964, to be generally accurate. Where NOSENKO reported there was no production but microphones were found audible, the discrepancy could be explained by KGB technical failure to receive the intercepts after they left the point at which the sweepers tested; where NOSENKO reported materials were obtained (such as from the Air Attache's office) and the sweepers found the microphone inaudible, it could be conjectured that the microphone died between early 1962 and the date of the sweep in 1964. However, NOSENKO's reporting did not harm the Soviets, because GOLITSYN knew and had reported on one specific microphone, and another earlier (and probably compromised) source had also reported that the microphones were there. The microphone known to GOLITSYN, when located and traced back to the point where its wires left the building, would lead to the uncovering of all the other microphones, as in fact happened with the find in Room 1008 (Page 256).

NOSENKO was unable to expand on his microphone information after his defection. Questioned repeatedly for details of the operation or examples of the product of these microphones, he gave almost no operational details* and could supply only the same three generalized examples of their product which he had already given in 1962: the unproductivity of the code room microphone;

---

* One of the few concrete incidents which NOSENKO recounted connected to the microphone operation (with the exception of the North Wing planning, see below) was the loss of a document reporting the product from one of the microphones; GOLITSYN had already told the same story (Page 255). GOLITSYN said he was present during the search for this document and it was under these circumstances that he learned specifically that there was a microphone in the office of the Minister Counselor. NOSENKO in 1962 stressed that this microphone was the most important in the Embassy.

the Minister Counselor's dictation, including fitness reports which NOSENKO said were of operational interest to the KGB but could not say how many of them there were or whom they concerned; and the Military Attache's planning of trips which permitted the KGB to seize equipment in Stalingrad in 1955. Of these three examples given by an officer who said he culled all the microphone materials for two years, one concerned a non-operating and therefore useless microphone, the second concerned a microphone (in the Minister Counselor's office) already reported by a previous defector, and the third concerned a well known incident which took place years earlier (and which NOSENKO should have planned and helped conduct, according to his claimed position in 1955; NOSENKO said he played no such role).*

In 1964 NOSENKO brought to CIA a sheet of paper which he said was in KOVSHUK's handwriting and which had been obtained in 1960 or 1961 during a conference (Pages 250-251). This, he said then, was how he knew of the exact locations of all the actively monitored and productive "points" in 1960-1961. NOSENKO was not able to explain why he would need this list to know the locations of the microphones when he had been daily receiving, selecting, and distributing the product of all of them for two years. Similarly, it was never clear why NOSENKO did not remember in 1962 that there were eleven points--as the list showed--rather than the four-to-six NOSENKO reported on in 1962.

---

* A comparison between NOSENKO's third example and a 1956 message from a sensitive source who is believed to have been compromised to the KGB after that message (but before 1962) reveals similarities which may not be coincidental.

- NOSENKO (11 June 1962; see Page 260): "We are listening to your Military Attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machinery and what targets interest them... Some of the things they say are surprising. They discuss, among other things, where to go, what to see, what to take with them - electric equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely certain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955..."

- Sensitive source, 1956 (see Page 254): "... All rooms are being monitored by the KGB... The 'flap' involving the American direction - finding specialists in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955 was organized by the KGB because conversations were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valuable direction-finding equipment from the American Intelligence officers..."

It is possible that both NOSENKO and the sensitive source were reporting a well-known event, because GOLITSYN reported in 1962 that the 1955 Stalingrad incident was written up in KGB training materials as an example of Second Chief Directorate work. The training version may have included the role of the microphone information (although GOLITSYN did not report that it did), which may thus have come naturally to the attention of NOSENKO and the sensitive source. However, this would call into question NOSENKO's allegation of direct access to all of the microphone product.

NOSENKO's account of how the product from the microphones was distributed and exploited would inevitably mean that all KGB case officers who had served in the U.S. Embassy Section since the microphones were installed would know of their existence--despite any effort to paraphrase and disguise the product as "agent reports." NOSENKO nonetheless maintained in 1962 that "it is a tremendous secret that we are listening to you," and that the microphones were known to so few that any countermeasures the Americans might take on the basis of NOSENKO's statements could reflect dangerously on him as the source.*

Accepting at face value NOSENKO's claimed lack of aptitude and interest in technical matters, and therefore his inability to provide specific technical details concerning electronic operations against the American Embassy, it is still noteworthy that:

- NOSENKO did not know the purpose of the so-called "Moscow beam," sometimes saying it was to jam Embassy communications and at other times that it was used to monitor them.
- Although he claimed to have personally participated in the planning for the installation of audio devices in the North Wing of the Embassy, he did not know of the existence or the purpose of the coaxial cables and grill found there by American technicians in 1964. (NOSENKO insisted that there were no audio devices installed in the North Wing at the time of its renovation for occupancy by Americans.)
- NOSENKO knew nothing of the general lines of research and development to substitute for or improve the fading microphone coverage of the U.S. Embassy.

These three points relate to aspects of the KGB's audio-technical attack on the U.S. Embassy in which the reporting of a source in NOSENKO's claimed position, no matter what his technical aptitude, could have been detrimental to Soviet interests.

---

* Both GOLITSYN and the 1956 source cited on Page 254 were First Chief Directorate officers. That they both knew of the microphones suggests that NOSENKO exaggerated the sensitivity of the microphone operation, which had moreover always been assumed by the Embassy to be active.

b. Remarks

NOSENKO's sourcing of his information on electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was unclear and unlikely. His knowledge of the location and production of these microphones, as well as the existence, nature, and purpose of other electronic operations directed against the Embassy, was not commensurate with his alleged position in the U.S. Embassy Section and his particular responsibility for audio operations. Significantly, the essential element of the information which NOSENKO did report, the existence of the microphone in the Minister Counselor's office, would presumably have been considered by the KGB to have been compromised six months earlier, with the defection of GOLITSYN. Discovery of this microphone, as an outgrowth of action on GOLITSYN's information, would have led to all the others. Thus the Embassy microphones must have been considered by the KGB to have been compromised before NOSENKO first spoke of them in 1962. Added to this is the fact (supported by NOSENKO himself) that the efficiency of the Embassy microphone installation as a whole had seriously diminished by late 1961 or early 1962 due to, first, normal deterioration of equipment and wiring and, second, the installation of secure rooms and the implementation of more stringent security precautions at the Embassy. For these reasons and in the absence of any information concerning other forms of electronic attack against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, it cannot be considered that the information provided by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1964 was harmful to the interests of the KGB nor helpful to American authorities. NOSENKO's denial of any installations in the north wing, in the light of the later discovery there of coaxial cables, the purpose of which appears serious and is as yet unclarified, and in the light of NOSENKO's specific claim to have been responsible for the operational planning for the north wing at the time it was being prepared for American occupancy, would appear to be purposeful deception.

5. The BELITSKIY Case

a. Introduction

NOSENKO reported to CIA in June 1962 (as one of the two items he wanted to sell) that one of its agents, the Soviet interpreter BELITSKIY, was in fact a KGB double agent who had been planted on CIA (Pages 517-529). NOSENKO said that this was a case run by the Second ("Active Line") Section, but that he personally had a role in the management of the case in May 1962 in Geneva. NOSENKO was able to give certain inside information on this case; for example, he knew the nicknames used by the CIA case officers with the agent.

b. Discussion

NOSENKO's information, at least in its general outlines, was correct. CIA had been running BELITSKIY as an agent, and the CIA case officers (alias "Bob" and "Henry," the latter from Washington as NOSENKO said) had just completed a series of meetings with BELITSKIY in Geneva. Important aspects of his information were inaccurate: BELITSKIY had been recruited a year before NOSENKO's date of 1959, and in Brussels, not London. Also, NOSENKO's claim that this was a Second Chief Directorate operation aimed at enticing CIA into meetings in the USSR was not borne out by the history of the case or by BELITSKIY's conduct, although it cannot be excluded that this was a long-term objective which the KGB still sought without appearing to. NOSENKO's account of the case thus is not as accurate as could be expected if his own role in it had been as claimed.

NOSENKO's description of his own involvement is not consistent with observed Soviet practice or with operational logic. NOSENKO said in both 1962 and 1964 that he had had orders to supervise the handling of this case in Geneva in the spring of 1962. The reason was that the case officer for BELITSKIY in Geneva (ARTEMEV) was young and inexperienced and had not even worked on the BELITSKIY case before. NOSENKO was saying in effect--with the authority of direct knowledge and official responsibility--that BELITSKIY, a prominent Soviet citizen having personal contacts with well placed members of the Soviet Government, a man who had been under the ostensible control of a hostile intelligence service (CIA) for four years, was sent by the KGB to Geneva for the purpose of recontacting CIA, with prepared information, but that the KGB did not send with him the responsible case officer or any member of the section responsible for the operation. Instead, the KGB turned over the responsibility to a young and inexperienced KGB officer who happened to be in Geneva to protect the security of a delegation and who had had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even local knowledge of Geneva conditions; then, after BELITSKIY was already in Geneva, the KGB had cabled instructions that NOSENKO, who had no need to know of the case and had learned of it only unofficially from conversations in 1960-1961 with the Section Chief responsible, who had no experience or training in handling double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva by chance with delegation security functions, should guide the other "less experienced" case officer.* As NOSENKO showed under questioning, he did not know the contents of any of the positive intelligence BELITSKIY was to pass to CIA as disinformation; he did not know BELITSKIY's Moscow or Geneva pattern of movement or contacts; he did not know in detail how or when the operation started; he did not know the nature of degree of British involvement, nor the operational details and contact arrangements. NOSENKO said that BELITSKIY had been placed on a Geneva delegation in the hope that CIA might be able to "find" and recontact him.**

c. Remarks

The circumstances above not only cast doubt on NOSENKO's version of the case and his own access but also suggest that NOSENKO did not have a theoretical appreciation of how double agents are handled. The examples he gave of his "guidance" to ARTEMEV are few in number. NOSENKO also stated in 1964 that he had arranged the actual introduction to BELITSKIY of KISLOV, the TASS man, to provide for BELITSKIY's need of a notional subsource for some of his disinformation; NOSENKO by October 1966 had apparently forgotten this event, for he stated unequivocally that KISLOV had had no connection whatever with the BELITSKIY case. NOSENKO claimed to have met BELITSKIY, but did not recognize his photo when shown it in 1966.

Did NOSENKO's report to CIA on the BELITSKIY case harm the KGB? It was useful to CIA, since despite frequently expressed doubts of BELITSKIY's bona fides, CIA was handling the operation as if it were genuine (but not intending to go to the extent of exposing to BELITSKIY CIA assets inside the USSR). (The KGB is aware, as Soviet Bloc counterintelligence guidance demonstrates, of the dangers inherent in having disinformation recognized as such.) The meetings in Geneva in May 1962 would have made it clear to the KGB that CIA had no intentions of meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR, and, in KGB eyes, the case may have reached the point of diminishing returns. It is perhaps significant that NOSENKO did not contact CIA and report on the BELITSKIY case until 10 days after BELITSKIY's series of meetings with CIA in Geneva had been completed, which would have given the KGB time for final appraisal of the operation's potential.

---

* NOSENKO has reported that he handled only one American agent (FRIPPEL); he had practically no knowledge of CIA nor even vicarious exposure to the substance of any other double agent operations. ARTEMEV had had extended contact with a CIA tourist agent as early as August 1958, a role in other operations against American tourists in 1959--including clandestine search (see Page 146), and continuous American Department service since then. NOSENKO did not know of the 1958-1959 operational activities of ARTEMEV, although they fell in the operational area NOSENKO claimed to have supervised at the time as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section.

** NOSENKO was seemingly unaware that BELITSKIY had contact arrangements which would presumably guarantee recontact.

NOSENKO's account of his own role in this operation appears to have been false, and nothing in the available evidence would preclude Soviet sacrifice of this already tired operation. Since NOSENKO provided some inside details of a sensitive KGB operation which could have been known to only a few, it is difficult to find any other explanation of NOSENKO's access to this information except that the KGB briefed him about it.

6. KGB Investigations*

a. Compromise of POPOV

(i) Introduction

Fixing the date and cause of the compromise of POPOV, the CIA penetration source in the GRU (Pages 530-534) could affect the evaluation of NOSENKO's production. If what NOSENKO has said is basically true, his story of POPOV's compromise (which has also been reported by other sources) is not particularly important and has not harmed the KGB nor measurably assisted CIA: The KGB assumes an awareness by CIA that it conducts surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel, especially those having known or suspected American intelligence connections (as with LANGELLE and WINTERS). If NOSENKO on the other hand has been incomplete or inaccurate in his statements about the compromise of POPOV, then his claims to knowledgeability on this subject must be questioned.

(ii) Discussion

The information from NOSENKO and other sources on the POPOV compromise may be collated and summarized in tabular form:

Cause	Date Implied	Source
KGB surveillance of WINTERS	21 January 1959	NOSENKO**
KGB surveillance of WINTERS	21 January 1959	CHEREPANOV document
KGB intercept of WINTERS letter	21 January 1959	POPOV message of 18 September 1959***
KGB surveillance of U.S. Embassy officer	none	[redacted] sensitive source
KGB surveillance of LANGELLE	4 January 1959	GOLITSYN, from the KGB orientation paper on the POPOV case *****
KGB agent	prior to 23 November 1957	GOLITSYN******

---

* Under this heading, only the compromises of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV are considered; there is insufficient collateral material available for an evaluation of NOSENKO's information on Vladimir KAZAN-KOMAREK (pages 569-570) and Alfred SLESINGER (Pages 571-575).

** NOSENKO reported that the KGB observed WINTERS mailing a letter which, upon being checked, was found to be addressed to POPOV; he has contradicted himself about whether the KGB applied metka to this letter.

***POPOV is believed to have been under KGB control in composing this letter.

[redacted]

(Footnotes continued on next page.)

The only other evidence available is analytical. POPOV was transferred to the Illegals handling unit in Berlin on 28 June 1957, an assignment of high sensitivity. Until mid-August he handled five Illegals, thereafter only one, TAIROVA, in October 1957. Following home leave from 12 December 1957 to 19 January 1958, he was again transferred, this time to a position where Illegals and productive GRU sources of intelligence were not exposed to him. Between March and November 1958 there were signs of a KGB investigation of the Illegals handling unit where POPOV formerly served, and he was recalled to Moscow in November of that year. These facts can be interpreted as follows:

- POPOV's status as a CIA source was not compromised before his transfer to the Illegals handling unit.

- POPOV's status was compromised before his recall to Moscow in November 1958, probably before his reassignment from the Illegals handling unit in January 1958, and possibly some time earlier. The latter possibility is apparent from the Soviets' knowledge that the TAIROVA couple was under surveillance in December 1957 (and until March 1958); it is also noteworthy that, after having met five Illegals in less than one and one-half months prior to 13 August 1957, POPOV subsequently was involved personally with only one other, TAIROVA, in October 1957.

- The KGB, realizing that POPOV was a CIA source, chose to keep him in Berlin until November 1958 in order to investigate the possibility of his operating in conjunction with other CIA sources.

This line of reasoning, if accepted, would confirm GOLITSYN's information that a KGB agent compromised POPOV prior to the arrival of ZHUKOV in Berlin, an arrival date falling some time before 23 November 1957.

(Footnotes from preceeding page.)

*****Since such orientation papers are written for general circulation within the KGB, it is doubtful that KGB security practices would permit their contents to reveal sensitive information; other sources have indicated that orientation papers sometimes are sanitized; this particular paper, however, reportedly did state that the KGB learned from an agent in about 1957 (GOLITSYN's estimate) that American Intelligence had a source which had provided GRU information.

******This date, which is consistent with that cited in the final sentence of the preceeding footnote, was derived from the time when POPOV reported the presence of the KGB officer ZHUKOV in Berlin; according to GOLITSYN, ZHUKOV was sent to Berlin after POPOV had been identified by a KGB agent as being a source of CIA.

(iii) Remarks

[redacted] The completeness and accuracy of NOSENKO's information on the compromise of POPOV, supported as it is by [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV document and POPOV's message but contradicted by GOLITSYN and analytical evidence, cannot be finally evaluated. Only with resolution of the bona fides of NOSENKO can a judgment be made on this part of his production.

b. Compromise of PENKOVSKIY*

(i) Introduction

Because his direct responsibility for coverage of ABIDIAN is an essential element in NOSENKO's story of his 1960-1961 career, because he insists that the KGB had no idea of U.S. involvement in the PENKOVSKIY case until Richard JACOB went to the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962, and because he is adamant on the point that the KGB until almost the end of the PENKOVSKIY case knew of no connection between PENKOVSKIY and the Pushkin Street site which ABIDIAN visited, NOSENKO's story of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY appears to bear directly on the question of NOSENKO's bona fides. Each of the various versions of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY must be examined and compared with NOSENKO's story and with the established facts.**

(ii) Discussion

[redacted] sources agree on the cause, and two on the timing. NOSENKO, [redacted] and the "official KGB report" attribute the compromise to the fact that surveillance detected a meeting between Mrs. CHISHOLM and the Soviet whom the KGB later identified as PENKOVSKIY. NOSENKO dated this as around November or December 1961, the official report stated this occurred on 30 December 1961, and [redacted] did not give a date.

[redacted] gave the cause as surveillance, but of Greville WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY rather than Mrs. CHISHOLM, and stated that the compromise dated from May 1962. [redacted] gave two different accounts, one that PENKOVSKIY was investigated for reasons unrelated to any suspicions of espionage and was thereby found out as a spy, the other that his excessive spending and sale of foreign merchandise led to an investigation which resulted in detection of his espionage activities. She placed the timing of the first version in 1961, without citing the time of year; in the second, she associated the timing with a warning against association with PENKOVSKIY which she and her husband received in about November 1961. [redacted] Since

---

* See Pages 535-547 for discussion of this case.

**It does not seem unusual for several sources to have reported on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY: Presumably this was the subject of widespread discussion within the two Soviet services, for it was covered in the Soviet press and in at least one "official report" disseminated by the KGB. Although their differing situations within the Soviet services could partially explain the differing versions that these sources have given, some of them nevertheless have claimed either direct knowledge of the compromise or specially informed sub-sources. Therefore the discrepancies among the reporting of NOSENKO on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, the accounts by other sources, and the facts on the handling of the case by CIA and MI-6 are pertinent to the question of NOSENKO's bona fides.

[redacted]

14-00000

DATE 4/12/94

LOST/MISSING MATERIAL

THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.

DOCUMENT NO. ____________ DATED: ____________

OR

PAGE~~(S)~~ 667

FROM:

CIA JOB NO. ________

BOX NO. JFK Reel 46

FOLDER NO. 2

PENKOVSKIY that he had visited the site after he chose it in 1960, although it is possible, especially as he had not been informed of ABIDIAN having been sent to check on a possible signal from him about the dead drop.

sensitive source

[redacted] however, makes it clear that the ABIDIAN visit was not the first observed activity at Pushkin Street to stir KGB investigative interest in the site. As the report states, when massive surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected an American visiting this address the first time, he was not followed inside by surveillants, but on the second occasion he was followed closely and the surveillant observed that he was kneeling down apparently tying his shoe.* [redacted] went on to say that, although this was not very unusual, it was sufficient to arouse suspicion in view of the fact that this American had been observed visiting the same address on two occasions for no apparent reason. There is no question about the fact that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street drop site on one occasion only, and that was on 30 December 1961. The reference to this as a second visit to this address by an American from the Embassy is a clear indication that the KGB had surveilled the first such visit, which was made by the CIA officer MAHONEY** in January 1961, and not by ABIDIAN. Thus where [redacted] erred by indicating one American went to Pushkin Street twice, the KGB must have known that MAHONEY went there first, in January 1961, and ABIDIAN went there next, on 30 December 1961. [redacted] said that the 24-hour fixed surveillance resulted from the second visit, and because of it PENKOVSKIY was subsequently observed to enter the vestibule of this address but did not visit anyone there. It was determined that no one living at that address knew PENKOVSKIY and he became a target of KGB suspicion and investigation.

[redacted]

The rest of the [redacted] story is completely in disagreement with the facts of the case and does not warrant discussion here. It must be noted, nonetheless, that this is the only instance among all the versions which places the compromise on the American side of the case, and the only one which makes a direct connection between the Pushkin Street dead drop and the KGB detection of PENKOVSKIY. (All others attribute the compromise to surveillance of British Embassy personnel, and NOSENKO claimed that the KGB was unaware of American Intelligence participation until the operation was terminated.) It is also in direct conflict with NOSENKO, who had no knowledge of any U.S. Embassy official visiting the Pushkin Street site prior to ABIDIAN. In this regard, NOSENKO insisted that the date of ABIDIAN's visit was the end of 1960 or the very beginning of 1961, whereas in fact MAHONEY's visit was in January 1961. Despite the errors relating to loadings and unloadings of deaddrops at the Pushkin Street location after the second (ABIDIAN) visit there, this story from [redacted] establishes KGB knowledge of MAHONEY's casing of Pushkin Street.

---

* ABIDIAN reported that a woman entered the vestibule behind him while he was in there, and he knelt down pretending to tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and on up the stairs.

**NOSENKO was not aware that MAHONEY had been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer well before MAHONEY's October 1960 arrival in Moscow.

Greville WYNNE's testimony concerning his interrogations by the KGB also introduced elements contradicting the versions of NOSENKO, [redacted] and [redacted] As indicated in discussion of NOSENKO's story of the [redacted] conversation with DULACKI (Pages 536-538), the KGB was convinced that PENKOVSKIY's question about his girlfriend "ZEP" was an important allusion and they demanded that WYNNE explain it. WYNNE either had forgotten the name or had never known it, and he was unable to tell the KGB who "ZEP" was. The fact that the KGB had a recording of this 27 May 1961 conversation shows also that the KGB was at least suspicious of the relationship before that conversation took place and must have then become aware of the conspiratorial aspect of the PENKOVSKIY-WYNNE relationship by virtue of the cryptic nature of that conversation. The additional fact that the KGB surveilled WYNNE to the apartment of an unidentified officer of British Intelligence on the same day the "ZEP" conversation between WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY was monitored is evidence that both WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY were under strong suspicion of espionage as of that day, if not earlier. Nor could those suspicions have been explained away by the fact that PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE had legitimate cover reasons for contact, in view of the content of their conversation--there was nothing in their overt relationship which required secrecy or even caution in conversation.

The indication from [redacted] that the KGB was aware of MAHONEY's visit to the inside vestibule of the Pushkin Street site in January 1961 is not only missing from all other versions, but conspicuously so from NOSENKO's story; he claimed to know everything the KGB knew about this American dead drop site, because of ABIDIAN's visit there. NOSENKO on one occasion said that he thought an American tourist (not a U.S. Embassy officer) might have visited the site a year or two earlier than ABIDIAN.

(iii) Remarks

NOSENKO did not know or did not report to CIA that the only other American who had visited the Pushkin Street dead drop area was MAHONEY. This fact suggests that either NOSENKO was deliberately withholding from CIA information of vital importance in the PENKOVSKIY compromise, or he was unaware of the KGB's possession of this information, despite his claimed position in the U.S. Embassy Section and responsibility for coverage of ABIDIAN. The fact that his story on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, like the "official report" of the KGB, does not show the seriousness of the evidence in the KGB's possession as of 27 May 1961 additionally points to his withholding of information on the subject of the timing of PENKOVSKIY's compromise, which was definitely no later than this date. If NOSENKO was deliberately withholding information on this subject and lying about the PENKOVSKIY compromise, then he is not a bona fide defector. If he is unaware of the information which the KGB has in its possession, then he was not in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 or 1961 as claimed, and hence his bona fides would be disproven.

c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV

(i) Introduction

NOSENKO's stories on the compromises of POPOV and PENKOVSKIY were examined for their accuracy as to timing and cause. In the case of CHEREPANOV (Pages 548-568), there is no question about when the so-called CHEREPANOV papers were passed, nor how the KGB openly learned of the U.S. Embassy's possession of the papers. The chief question is the authenticity of the documents themselves, with the subsidiary implications, if they are not authentic, that the passage of the papers was instigated by the KGB, and that there could have been neither a compromise of nor a search for CHEREPANOV, as described by NOSENKO and attested to by his travel authorization (see also Part VIII.D.8.).

(ii) The Operational Plan in Draft

Examination of one draft document--the operational plan against the CIA officer WINTERS--reveals the following points related to form:

- Although only a draft, the title of the case officer, the designation of his office, the title of his supervisor as approving authority, and the designation of his office component as well as the title of the confirming authority (the head of the department) are spelled out in full, even including the subordination of the KGB to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. KGB practice, as reported by other sources and as logic would dictate, does not require that this be done, cumbersome as these designations are, and the typist routinely fills them in as the official copy is typed from the draft.

- Although only a draft, this document has been signed by KOVSHUK as being approved, which is against common sense and KGB practice. NOSENKO himself noted this discrepancy, asking himself aloud why KOVSHUK had done this.

- Although only a draft, the name of the target of the plan appears several times, but earlier KGB defectors have stated and NOSENKO himself has confirmed that the name is left out of drafts so the typist in the typing pool will not know the identity of the subject of the report; a blank line is used wherever the name is to appear to be filled in by hand by the case officer after the document comes back from the typist.

- On the basis of references to LANGELLE and POPOV, this plan (which is not dated) would have to have been drafted sometime after October 1959. WINTERS by this time had been in Moscow since August 1958, had been detected in operational letter-mailing, and had been associating with KGB officers, etc. Neither this operational plan nor any other of the drafts included in the CHEREPANOV package cited a KGB cryptonym for him, and he is always referred to in true name, but this is contrary to the usage in the other operational plans in the package. It is also contrary to KGB practice, as described by NOSENKO and other sources.

- The draft cited several technical aids to be used in the clandestine study of WINTERS. It not only gives the KGB cryptonym of metka and "Neptun-80" for two of these techniques, but immediately thereafter explains for what purpose each one of them is used. In the other operational plans from CHEREPANOV, and in conformance with the established KGB practice of inserting cryptonyms for such devices, these preparations are not only not described, but the blank line typed by the typist has been filled in by hand after typing.

In addition to the above points of form, this same document contains statements which run counter to rigid KGB practice and which are internally contradictory, especially noteworthy in an approved draft. One of the objectives announced in the plan is to investigate two Soviet citizens who were detected in contact with WINTERS in Moscow; one of the two is identified parenthetically as having gone abroad. This document, if genuine, would be an admission on the part of the case officer, and an approval thereof by his supervisor, that a Soviet citizen who had been observed in contact with an identified officer of American Intelligence had been cleared by the KGB for travel abroad before the nature of that contact had been satisfactorily determined by the KGB. This is in contradiction to all available information concerning KGB travel clearances, which are denied on the basis of unauthorized contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in the Soviet Union, not to mention Western Intelligence officers. The draft, which consists of only three paragraphs, can be summarized briefly by paragraph to demonstrate the internal contradictions:

- To establish the nature of WINTERS' intelligence activities in the USSR, six special tasks will be carried out, including round-the-clock surveillance, metka, "Neptun-80," hidden microphones, other audio-devices, and investigation of already identified Soviet citizens.

- Because he already been identified as an intelligence operator, and he has a hostile attitude toward the USSR, there is no basis for recruitment; therefore the actions outlined in the first paragraph will not be carried out because they might alarm him and cause him to leave the USSR prematurely.

- Despite the statements of the second paragraph, which indicate that recruitment is out of the question and which precludes putting into effect the measures outlined in the first paragraph, this third paragraph sets forth the expectation that just before WINTERS' scheduled departure and depending on further accumulation of materials on WINTERS and the prevailing political climate at the time, an opportunity is likely to arise which will permit testing the possibility of recruiting him.

If the WINTERS operation plan were a draft like the others in this collection, the above conflicting and confusing paragraphs might be explained as variations jotted down as possible approaches to presenting a plan for the future, as yet undecided in direction. This document, however, is the one which--to NOSENKO's puzzlement--had been approved and signed in draft by KOVSHUK, as Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate. The preparing case officer, KUSKOV, had furthermore indicated to the typing pool that it was to be typed in one copy, which gives the document the appearance of a draft which had been or was about to be made a matter of official KGB record.

The foregoing review of errors, contradictions, and disregard for security considerations in preparation constitutes evidence that this is not a genuine KGB draft document.

(iii) The Summary on LANGELLE

A second document, a handwritten note in what NOSENKO identified as CHEREPANOV's own handwriting, also is pertinent to the authenticity of the papers and of NOSENKO's account on CHEREPANOV. This is a short summary of the operational activity of the CIA officer LANGELLE, covering the compromise of POPOV. The document says in part: "In January 1959 a letter with secret writing mailed by a co-worker of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow, WINTERS, was intercepted and was addressed to a Soviet citizen, POPOV, a worker of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. According to the contents of the letter, it was clearly established that POPOV was an American agent..."

This coincides precisely with NOSENKO's account of POPOV's compromise (see Pages 532 and 663). Unlike GOLITSYN's recollection of the official report which he read, there is no reference in this document to the report of about 1957 from an agent source that there was a leak of GRU information; nor is there reference to the indication that the KGB knew that LANGELLE had been posted to Moscow in order to handle a special agent, for this reason placing LANGELLE under heavy surveillance. If both of these items were in the official report which GOLITSYN read, their omission from the summary report in what purports to be CHEREPANOV's handwriting is noteworthy, particularly since CHEREPANOV was supposed to have been in the same office (room) as the case officer working against LANGELLE during the time the LANGELLE/POPOV operation was investigated by the KGB. The latter position should lend authority to CHEREPANOV's version of the compromise and termination of the case; yet GOLITSYN--informed only from the official, and presumably sanitized, account--had more detail, as well as conflicting information, on the same case. While it is reasonable that a sanitized case summary would conceal an agent source of a lead by imputing the discovery to surveillance, it seems less likely, and indeed unnecessary, to conceal a detection via surveillance by imputing it to an agent source. In thus supporting NOSENKO and others as to the cause of POPOV's compromise, and contradicting GOLITSYN (who is supported by other evidence accumulated independently), this document too appears to be a KGB fabrication.

The authenticity of another passage in the same document is likewise open to question. This is the description of LANGELLE's two visits to Lenin Hills, which the documents stated were for the purposes of casing a drop site and putting down the dead drop, respectively. The document further stated that the dead drop had been put down for REPNIKOV, an agent of American Intelligence who had recently been arrested by the Moscow KGB. Two errors of fact in this passage belie KGB practice as known from many sources:

- There is no reason to doubt that the KGB observed LANGELLE on the two occasions of his visits to Lenin Hills, both times to case a proposed dead drop site. Both sites involved staircases, but they were two different staircases in the same general area of the Lenin Hills park. Since it is a fact that LANGELLE did not put down a dead drop on either occasion, KGB surveillance could not have seen him do so. If the KGB had reason to suspect that he had done so, but could not locate it (since it was not there), the KGB would feel the necessity--even more than in the case of ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street drop--to put 24-hour surveillance on the area for a reasonable length of time, in order to apprehend the agent for whom it was intended. The dead drop was not actually put down until 7 June 1958 (during twilight), ten days after the second casing. Assuming the KGB had not stopped its coverage of the area after only ten days, the CIA agent who did put down the dead drop must have been observed doing this. CHEREPANOV's note thus erred by attributing to LANGELLE an action which the KGB knew he had not taken and which the KGB almost certainly knew someone else had taken.

- At the time the dead drop was put down, it had not been designated for any agent, REPNIKOV included. It was a contingency dead drop, to be activated at some time in the future as necessary; the agent for whom it might have been designated could conceivably not even be recruited until long after the dead drop was loaded. REPNIKOV, identified in the document as the person intended to unload it, was not a recruited agent of American Intelligence either at the time of the drop-loading or at any time thereafter; neither was any dead drop contemplated for him in the event that he might be recruited. Nothing that was in the drop could have suggested REPNIKOV as the intended recipient. Again, CHEREPANOV's note erroneously and groundlessly assigned the dead drop to REPNIKOV whereas in fact this dead drop was unassigned by CIA.

If this document were or purported to be the official version of the activities of LANGELLE, in typed or printed form, these errors in fact could be interpreted as intentional and part of the sanitization, or part of an effort to make the KGB investigative work look better than it was. As it is a handwritten copy, supposedly in the writing of the person who intended to give the document to the U.S. Government and harm the KGB, and since CHEREPANOV supposedly would have had access to the true facts, the absence of some comment further indicates that the document was intentionally inaccurate and incomplete.

(iv) Remarks

That at least two of the documents were not authentic is evidence that the CHEREPANOV papers were designed by the KGB for American Intelligence consumption.

There is no sensitive information contained in any of the documents; that is, they are not worth the risk of stealing either in helping the West or damaging the KGB. It is further questionable how CHEREPANOV was able to steal drafts destined for destruction which are dated August 1958, March 1959, and so on, if he had not acquired his motivation of bitterness against the KGB until 1961, as indicated by NOSENKO and other sources. It is also possible to question numerous other aspects of the CHEREPANOV case, some dating from the earliest known history of the man and others more recent. This seems unnecessary in view of the analysis of the WINTERS document and the LANGELLE summary.

It follows that the CHEREPANOV incident was a provocative plan of the KGB. NOSENKO's story about CHEREPANOV, a mutually confirming source on KGB affairs, must be interpreted as an indication that he has deliberately lied in reporting on the CHEREPANOV case and his part in the investigation, now shown to have been spurious. He has also lied in attesting to the validity of the CHEREPANOV documents and thereby to the validity of his own information on the same topics which those documents also covered.

C. Evaluation of Sourcing

1. Introduction

NOSENKO was able to provide logical and plausible sourcing for most of his American leads, through his claimed professional assignments. Among his foreign leads, those to which he had no plausible direct access have been variously sourced to hearsay from case officer friends (as with VASSALL, from his friend CHURANOV) and involvement in peripheral activities (such as his TDY to the city of Vladimir after the [redacted] had been spotted as a homosexual during a visit there). Questionable sourcing by NOSENKO has occurred in his statements on his one double agent case, four American cases and three involving foreigners. They are reviewed below because they include the most important leads NOSENKO has provided.

2. Discussion

There are two KGB Second Chief Directorate operations involving Americans which NOSENKO has sourced inconsistently or falsely.

He demonstrated uncertainty in his knowledge of the facts of the "ANDREY" case (Pages 413-426) by making vague allusions to having heard of it in "bits and pieces" from a number of case officers involved in the case at different times; his first knowledge of it, he said, was due to his own employment in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955, "although I worked there quite a bit later. But it was known." (In 1962 he repeatedly dated the recruitment as "1949-50.") Dayle SMITH, identified as "ANDREY", fixed his recruitment date around December 1953, and he did not leave Moscow until April 1954. Since SMITH was directly subordinate to the office of the Army Attache, which was responsible for the Embassy's code room, NOSENKO as case officer for the Army Attaches had a logical reason for knowing more than he claimed about the case, including the agent's name. MULE, who succeeded VAN LAETHEM as cryptographic security officer and SMITH's supervisor, was supposed to be one of NOSENKO's more active cases at this time. It is clear from NOSENKO's inability to claim direct knowledge of the case that he was not aware of these facts.

In the case of Edward Ellis SMITH (Pages 468-469), the U.S. Embassy Security Officer from 1954 to 1956, NOSENKO's ignorance of the objective facts of the case led him into statements concerning his own knowledge of the case which cannot be true. In 1962 he claimed to have played a significant role in the attempt to recruit SMITH, but he admitted after the defection that these claims were exaggerations designed to make him look better than he was at the time. He said the case officer was KOVSHUK, and GRIBANOV was personally running the operation, but that in a sense he did play a role: he was assigned to a phone watch in support of surveillance during the final phase of the case. Once again it is clear that he did not know the dates of SMITH's assignment to Moscow (1954 to 1956) nor did he know that the operation he has described took place between 1 and 5 June 1956, and that SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June 1956. This is a full year after NOSENKO said he transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO claimed to have had a direct role as the supervising case officer in the BELITSKIY case in its 1962 Geneva phase. As a first-hand source, however, he was wrong about the origins of the operation and ignorant of the content and the operational planning of the 1962 meetings he was supposedly supervising. In this instance, as in the Edward SMITH case, NOSENKO's information is inadequate for his sourcing.

NOSENKO provided leads to nine KGB operations which had originated with the First Chief Directorate. Six of these he claimed to have learned about through his friend in that Directorate, GUK, who was personally involved in most of these operations.* Of the other three, two--the Paris agent (JOHNSON) and the Brussels/NATO case--he said he picked up in bits and pieces from technicians of the Second Chief Directorate's Special Section who had assisted in them. For both of the latter operations, numerous coincidences were alleged by NOSENKO to have enabled him to obtain the fragmentary information from his sub-sources, and he was never able to clarify what parts he learned from which of the four technicians he named as sub-sources.

In describing his acquisition of information on the ninth case, "SASHA," NOSENKO has contradicted himself: He first said he had learned about "SASHA" from SHALYAPIN, providing lengthy and involved explanations of how he became acquainted with SHALYAPIN at the time of the latter's retirement from the KGB in 1962. Later, under interrogation, NOSENKO did not recall his statements that SHALYAPIN was the original source of the "SASHA" story, first attributing it to others and later saying that he could not remember when and from whom he first heard it, but SHALYAPIN and others had talked about it. This was despite the fact that by the time he heard of "SASHA" he had already met and agreed to cooperate with CIA; furthermore, when asked if "SASHA" was an important lead, he agreed that it was a serious matter. Except for this one occasion he had consistently failed to appreciate the significance of such a lead, indicating that it was not considered important in the KGB.

Also casting doubt on his sourcing of "SASHA" is the fact that, in his first reference to "SASHA" and the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, NOSENKO said he had learned of this item from SHALYAPIN, whereas later he said it was not from SHALYAPIN (but he could not identify another source from whom he had heard this detail).

Regarding NOSENKO's leads to other Westerners, the case of the [redacted] "illegal" in Canada--[redacted] the RCMP's [redacted]--is paradoxical as to sourcing. NOSENKO first said his friend GUK had told him of the case unofficially, GUK having been involved in the operation in Moscow. When asked why GUK should be involved in a Canadian case in 1963 when he was supposedly working in the First Chief Directorate's American Department against American targets, NOSENKO retracted his initial statement and said that GUK somehow got in contact with him, not as a KGB officer but simply as an acquaintance. Despite the non-official nature of GUK's relationship as thus implied by NOSENKO, GUK was able to tell him all the operational details concerning [redacted] except his name. This case has an odd aspect which NOSENKO failed to see: He said that this man had come to Moscow on a Soviet visa issued on a separate piece of paper, rather than entered in the man's passport, so that there would not be a permanent record of his travel to the USSR. This implies, and [redacted] confirmed, that he travelled under his true name to Moscow. [redacted] furthermore confirmed that he had gone as a tourist, entering the USSR on a Soviet tourist ship. In view of the First Chief Directorate's operational jurisdiction in this otherwise normal tourist, there was an obvious necessity for coordination between the First Chief Directorate's American Department and the Second Chief Directorate's Tourist Department, to prevent any slippage (such as NOSENKO described in the SHUBIN case, when the GRU failed to coordinate with the KGB). Yes despite logical professional need-to-know on NOSENKO's part, he first made his own knowledge unofficial, and then his subsource's knowledge unofficial as well.

---

*Although he had met GUK many years before, NOSENKO indicated that they did not become friends until his visit to Geneva in 1962, and only then did GUK begin to reveal operational details to him.

NOSENKO was unable to explain how he had learned of the case of [redacted] French [redacted] When pressed for a subsource, he claimed that he had attended a reception at the Indian Embassy in 1958 or 1959 with GRIBANOV, and when GRIBANOV told him to take a glass of wine to [redacted] he understood somehow that [redacted] was an agent of GRIBANOV's.

His sourcing for the case of the French businessman, [redacted] (Page 484), is not unlike that of [redacted] He said he had known that there was a French businessman who was an agent. On one occasion when NOSENKO was duty officer for the Second Chief Directorate a call for GRIBANOV came in and he asked who was calling. When he was told it was [redacted] then he knew somehow that this was GRIBANOV's agent.

3. Remarks

NOSENKO's errors concerning "ANDREY" (particularly his early insistence that "ANDREY" had left Moscow years before NOSENKO entered the KGB) make it impossible that NOSENKO could have learned of the case in the way he later said he did.

NOSENKO's accounts of how he learned of the "Paris agent" are vague and vary with each telling; they also depend heavily on coincidence. It is noteworthy too that he claimed to have been told of this one operation by no less than four individuals, whereas the rest of what he learned of First Chief Directorate operations in eleven years of KGB service came from only two other individuals. Furthermore, his knowledge of "SASHA" stemmed from elaborate and apparently contrived sourcing which he himself was unable to reconstruct when pressed for exact details. NOSENKO's inability to give any clear and consistent account of how he heard of either the "Paris agent" or "SASHA" must be judged in the light of the fact that he first heard of both cases only just after promising to collect such information for CIA. Because these were among the most important and the most fortuitous items he ever picked up, it could reasonably be expected that he would remember how he did so, especially since only a little over a year elapsed until his next meeting with CIA.

NOSENKO's sourcing for the [redacted] and [redacted] leads seems illogical and fabricated. It also appears that NOSENKO has given an inaccurate version of the way in which he would have learned of [redacted] (not an Illegal as NOSENKO indicated, but an agent).

TOP SECRET

D. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career

1. Introduction

What follows is an examination of NOSENKO's accounts of his Soviet Intelligence career, beginning with the years 1951 and 1952, in the naval GRU and continuing with his 11 years in the U.S. Embassy Section and the Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO's naval service opens the discussion primarily because, according to his story, it provided a springboard for his entrance into the KGB in 1953 with the rank of lieutenant.

The discussion of each period in his career has two central topics: First, NOSENKO's own description of his positions, responsibilities, and access: and second, an assessment of this description from the point of view of internal consistency, accuracy, and the commensurability of his knowledge, operational activities, and performance with his claimed senior and responsible posts with the KGB and his rise to these posts. This assessment is based on a comparison of the information supplied by NOSENKO with collateral information from a variety of overt, official, defector, and clandestine sources.

NOSENKO's accounts of the various periods in his career are, of course, cumulative in that his claimed positions and activities during one stage necessarily affect those of succeeding periods. Insofar as possible, each period is evaluated within itself and independently of conclusions earlier reached.

2. Naval GRU Service

a. Introduction

NOSENKO's accounts* of his naval GRU service (Pages 64-77) have been reviewed for their internal consistency and credibility, and examined for accuracy against information from other sources.

b. Discussion

Briefly, the outlines of NOSENKO's account of his military service are about as follows:

- He studied for the equivalent of 7th, 8th, 9th and part of 10th school years in naval schools in Kuibyshev, Baku and Leningrad. This would normally have nothing to do with military service, except that NOSENKO says he took the military oath at the Baku School in the fall of 1943, at the age of 16. (According to available collateral information, the oath--formal entry into the military forces--was at no time given before the age of 17, and never for purposes of "show" or "morale" as NOSENKO claimed it was here.) He claims to have deserted this school after taking the oath. Also, he shot himself in the hand only about two months after starting anew later the same year in the naval school in Leningrad and never finished school properly.

- He was commissioned in the "reserves" in 1947 after completing his second year at the Institute of International Relations in Moscow. However, he cannot remember what branch of the service he was in, except that it was not the navy. He avoided active military duty thereafter by voluntarily doing military translations at the Institute. While at the Institute he contracted venereal disease at least twice and this went on his record.

- In the spring of 1950, he was assigned to the Navy by a mandate commission at the Institute. However, he failed one of his examinations ("Marxism-Leninism") upon completion of the Institute of International Relations later in 1950 which delayed his diploma--and hence entry into the service--until successful re-examination later that year. (At about the same time, he was considered and turned down by the KGB [then MGB] because of his school record, drunkenness, and other bad marks in his record.)

- He was processed for entry into the naval GRU in 1950. He said he visited the GRU personnel office several times for interviews and to fill out questionnaires and write his personal history in connection with the required security check. He was accepted into naval GRU despite a record which showed desertion, self-inflicted wound in wartime, drunkenness, venereal disease, still-valid marriage to a State criminal's daughter, rejection for MGB employment, and a bad academic record including failure of a course in Marxism-Leninism just at this time.

---

* There is no single account of this period of NOSENKO's life which can be examined because NOSENKO has altered the circumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next.

- He was called to active duty as a senior lieutenant on 12 March 1951, and without any indoctrination or training, he departed four or five days later in civilian clothes for his first duty station, Sovietskaya Gavan' in the Soviet Far East. NOSENKO claims to have chosen this post, considered generally to be the least desirable of all naval assignments, on his own initiative, to prove to his father that he was a man. (The above was his account in 1966, in all earlier accounts he said he went to the Soviet Far East in the fall of 1950, and in fact said that he had two months' leave in 1952, one for each of two years there. However, according to the 1966 account, his service there lasted only one year.)

- In Sovetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO's job was to extract information from American publications reporting naval developments. Asked in April 1964 for any personal account of his own work, NOSENKO was able to think of only "four or five trips" on small ships to the coast of Sakhalin,* and three to Hokkaido, to drop or pick up agents. His own role, he said, was as a trainee; he was taken along only "to learn how it was done;" he himself never trained or dispatched any agents, nor did he know the identities or missions of any others. He also could not describe the ships he had travelled on. Questioned on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan' in 1965, NOSENKO insisted that this city is located in Primorskiy Kray, although it is actually located in Khabarovskiy Kray.**

- NOSENKO said he returned on routine leave (or, according to other accounts, because of having contracted tuberculosis) in April 1952. He then spent two months either in his parents' Moscow home or, according to other accounts, in a sanitorium near Moscow under treatment for tuberculosis. He said he was coughing up "half a glass of blood at a time." (X-rays and medical examinations from February 1964 have detected no indications that NOSENKO ever suffered from tuberculosis.)

- At this time, the summer of 1952, NOSENKO said he was offered in Moscow an opportunity to attend the GRU strategic intelligence school, the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but turned it down because he had already studied most of the course matter in the Institute of International Affairs; besides, NOSENKO said in October 1966, he failed the physical examination when sugar was discovered in his faeces.

- NOSENKO was then transferred--without returning to the Far East--to the Intelligence Staff of the Baltic Fleet at Baltiysk. He invented a story in 1964 about going there via Naval Intelligence Points in Berlin, Rostock, and Sassnitz, but then said this was a lie he told because he felt his interrogators would not believe him if he had said he successfully turned down an assignment to these points, then closing down, and had travelled directly to Baltiysk. (As pointed out to NOSENKO, the assignment to the cold, damp Baltic climate of a recent TB-sufferer appears unthinkable, particularly when that person is a Government Minister's son; he acknowledged this but said, "There were no other positions available.")

---

* In October 1966 NOSENKO was asked whether he had ever been to Sakhalin; his answer was no.

** This is the equivalent of being stationed for a year in Portland, Oregon and thinking oneself in California.

- He could not remember the name of the place he served near Baltiysk. He had named it as Primorsk in 1962 (which fitted his description of its size and location) but from 1964 on insisted it was Sovetsk. There is no such village in the area, but there is in the region a well-known city by that name (the former Tilsit) far inland and far away. He did not know (as contemporary Soviet maps show) that a rail line went to Baltiysk from Primorsk.

- In the Baltiysk area, he claimed in 1962, he had trained agent teams to be sent behind enemy lines in time of war. Under interrogation in 1964 he changed his description of his functions, saying he merely prepared training materials and delivered supplies, never having direct contact with or knowledge of the agent work. His service there was limited to about six months, since he said he left there at the beginning of 1953. He either had had one or two leaves from there, depending on which telling is accepted: In 1964 NOSENKO said that in August or September 1952 he was given a special leave from his duties in Sovetsk to travel to Moscow in order to formalize his divorce from his first wife; in April 1966 he wrote that he was divorced during his leave before going to Sovetsk.

- NOSENKO said he returned to Moscow on his own initiative and against the wishes of his commanding officer at the end of 1952 and began steps to get out of the GRU. He has told conflicting stories of where he stayed and in what leave status. It was during this period, he said, that his conversation with KOBULOV led him to shift to the KGB.

- In April 1966 NOSENKO wrote that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Services while stationed in Sovetsk. In earlier accounts he said that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while stationed in the Soviet Far East.

c. Remarks

The notes above on NOSENKO's career do not treat most of the changes of story, contradictions, corrections, or inaccuracies in NOSENKO's accounts: Variations of dates may be attributable to faulty memory, changes in the story might have resulted from his own elaborations and exaggerations, and inaccuracies might be explained by his inattention or indifference to detail. If all the details were to be considered, the story would become even more confused.

Certain general aspects stand out, however:

(1) If his story of his personal life is true [redacted], NOSENKO would, according to all available information, not have been accepted into the naval GRU, one of the particularly sensitive parts of the navy. Either the life history is false, or the GRU officer service is, or both.

(2) The story is vague, unsubstantial, and contradictory; no substance has been added to the base outlines of the story despite frequent questioning. One might expec of an educated or reasonably intelligent person some recollection of military service completed 10 years earlier--the locations where he served, whether he did or did not have TB, how and when he entered or transferred from one place to another, and what he did or what he experienced.

(3) NOSENKO's knowledge of military procedures, of the navy, and of the units with which he served is practically non-existent. He has provided no reason whatever to make one believe that he actually was a naval officer.

(4) The functions he claims to have fulfilled involved no direct involvement or personal responsibilities: They sound like the bare outlines of a legend, not like real life or personal experience.

That this period is fictitious is supported by the findings of the psychologist (Pages 605-611).

NOSENKO's description of his naval GRU service cannot be accepted as true. On the basis of his statements, it appears moreover that he was never a naval officer, nor an officer of any other regular military service.

Since NOSENKO claims that his GRU status and service provided him the platform for a transfer into the KGB (without such formalities as medical examination, personnel interviews or questionnaires), this conclusion is relevant to his claim of KGB staff status from 1952 or 1953.

3. Entry into the KGB

a. Eligibility

The previous section discussed NOSENKO's eligibility for admission to the naval GRU and concluded with the remark that, on the basis of what NOSENKO has told CIA about his earlier life, he could not have been accepted for service in Naval Intelligence. According to information available to CIA from several knowledgeable sources, the KGB has more stringent entry requirements than any other Soviet organization. The candidate's family background, personal conduct, and Party or Komsomol record must be impeccable. NOSENKO would have American Intelligence believe that in his case the KGB--specifically the officers responsible for signing their names to the approval--accepted a person whose record showed (as noted on pages 679-680 above) desertion from the armed forces, self-inflicted wound in wartime, drunkenness, venereal disease, previous marriage to the daughter of a state criminal, a bad academic record including failure of a course in Marxism-Leninism, and a prior rejection by the KGB itself. The only change since the earlier rejection had been, according to NOSENKO, two years of undistinguished military service in the Naval GRU.

Moreover, during this naval duty NOSENKO said he had contracted tuberculosis, for which he was still under treatment at the time he entered the State Security Service. NOSENKO has indicated on separate occasions that his illness was a matter of record with the GRU, and that the reason he did not have to take a physical examination for entry into the KGB was the availability of GRU records. According to DERYABIN, however, KGB regulations at that time would have precluded admission to KGB ranks if there was a recent history of tuberculosis even though already arrested.

b. Date of Entry

NOSENKO has given a variety of dates for his entry on duty with the KGB and has provided several reasons for his changes of story (Pages 86-89). During his first meeting with CIA, when NOSENKO gave a brief personal and professional autobiography, he said that he had joined the KGB in February or March 1953. In 1964, however, first while still attached to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation and later when reviewing and signing a biographic history prepared by CIA on the basis of his own account, NOSENKO set this date back a year, to early 1952. During the interrogations of April 1964, after naming several other dates, NOSENKO returned to the original one, March 1953, and has remained with this version since that time. NOSENKO has given two different reasons for this change of dates (which, he said in October 1966, was conscious deception). In the April 1964 interrogations, he explained that he had failed his examination in Marxism-Leninism at the Institute of International Affairs, which forced him to take all his exams over again and delayed his career: This was "unpleasant," NOSENKO said, and he was attempting to conceal it from CIA. In the October 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO gave a new and different reason. He described how he had been rejected for employment by State Security while at the Institute and was trying to cover up for this because he thought CIA would not believe that he had first been rejected and then, later, accepted by the KGB.

NOSENKO's change of story took place in 1964 while still in the relatively relaxed circumstances of an operational meeting in Geneva; he came back to his original account only during the April 1964 interrogations. NOSENKO's explanations of why he revised the story have been inconsistent and have forced him into further inconsistencies. Because of this and, in the absence of any pressure of any kind (including any apparent psychological pressure) to lie about his date of entry, the most logical explanation for this change is that NOSENKO forgot in early 1964 either when he joined the KGB and/or what he had told CIA in 1962. DERYABIN has commented on the significance which the date of entry holds for a KGB officer. He expressed the opinion that it would be unusual for a KGB officer to forget this date.

NOSENKO was questioned at length by DERYABIN (Pages 616-619) concerning the timing of his entry on duty with the KGB. As a result of this interrogation it was determined that NOSENKO was unaware that at the time he said he joined the KGB, the present First Chief Directorate was designated the Second Chief Directorate and vice versa. Therefore, NOSENKO would have joined a component entitled the First Chief Directorate in March 1953, not the Second Chief Directorate as he says. NOSENKO did not know or had forgotten various other facts, including the date that the MVD was redesignated the KGB, and misstated the locations and existence of various buildings and offices in the vicinity of the KGB Headquarters building in early 1953.

In June 1962 NOSENKO said several times, in different meetings, that the KGB agent "ANDREY" (Pages 413-414) had been recruited and had left Moscow before he, NOSENKO, entered the KGB. He estimated the date as 1949-1950. NOSENKO knew that "ANDREY" was associated in Moscow with RHODES and when told that RHODES was there from 1951 to 1953, admitted that the date he gave might be wrong. NOSENKO continued to say, however, that "ANDREY" was recruited before he (NOSENKO) became a KGB officer, and later reverted again to his estimate that "ANDREY" was recruited in 1949-1950. When he returned to Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO changed this story and said that during his 1953-1955 tour in the U.S. Embassy Section he saw cipher specialist SELEZNOV, who had come there to consult on the then-active "ANDREY" case. NOSENKO was unable to explain how he could have been sure in 1962 that the "ANDREY" case was before his time, when he said in 1964 that this was not so. Dayle SMITH confessed that he was recruited by the KGB in late 1953, and records show that he left Moscow in early 1954.

c. Circumstances of Entry

NOSENKO has consistently related his entrance into the KGB to discussions he had with General KOBULOV in early 1953 in Moscow, after returning from the Baltic. However, he has changed the date of these discussions with KOBULOV virtually every time he has told this story. In June 1962, NOSENKO said he talked with KOBULOV at the NOSENKO dacha while on leave in March 1953; during the April 1964 interrogations he changed the date to February 1953; in April 1965 NOSENKO said he spoke to KOBULOV at the KOBULOV dacha in January 1953 while on leave and that he lived at home and was at the "disposal of GRU personnel" during February and March. Finally, in April 1966, NOSENKO said he first spoke to KOBULOV at KOBULOV's dacha on New Years Day 1953, that he was subsequently "resting" at a sanitorium connected with his tuberculosis of the year before, and that he spoke again to KOBULOV on the day of STALIN's funeral, while home for a few days from the sanitorium. It was at this second encounter with KOBULOV that the latter promised to concern himself with NOSENKO's entry into the KGB.

In 1962 NOSENKO described the simple procedure by which he entered the KGB, volunteering that there was no need to fill out a questionnaire (anketa) as the KGB already had his files from the GRU. In April 1964 when asked if he had not been required to fill out any questionnaires or other documents, NOSENKO described the anketa and other forms he completed (saying he took them home to do so) and his various interviews with KGB personnel officers. He was interrogated in detail on these claims by DERYABIN in 1965, to whom he gave descriptions, albeit inaccurate, of the various forms and of his visits to KGB Personnel. In 1966 NOSENKO wrote in his autobiography that there were no talks with KGB Personnel before or after his acceptance and implied that there were no forms to fill out.

d. Remarks

According to all of NOSENKO's stories, his GRU service was the springboard for his acceptance into the KGB. He met KOBULOV while home in Moscow from Primorsk/Sovetsk, he entered the KGB as a lieutenant since this was his naval rank, his admission according to the early version was facilitated by the availability of his GRU personnel file; yet CIA has concluded that NOSENKO was never a GRU officer and it appears highly improbable that he was ever in Primorsk under any circumstances.

On the basis of generally available information concerning Soviet realities at the time of NOSENKO's claimed entry into the KGB, supported by the expert testimony of DERYABIN (who was in the KGB, then MVD, in Moscow at the time and had been himself a KGB personnel officer until less than a year earlier), a person with the background NOSENKO has given could not be accepted into the KGB in the manner he claims. His health alone would seem to have precluded this, but in addition, NOSENKO described a series of incidents in his life equally likely to cause rejection. NOSENKO's mistakes, changes of story, and apparent fabrications add to the unlikelihood of his account.

It is concluded that, as in the case of NOSENKO's GRU service, either NOSENKO and those who have supported aspects of his story have seriously distorted his past life, or he did not enter the KGB.

4. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section

a. Introduction

NOSENKO claims to have served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, during the period from his entry on duty with the KGB until June 1955. His targets during these two years were at first American correspondents in Moscow and later American Army Attaches at the Embassy.

NOSENKO sought to avoid discussion of his own or other KGB activity during this period and on occasion he has tried to dismiss the whole period as "not relevant" and "of no consequence." NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he "found himself" only after his initial service in the U.S. Embassy Section. (He variously dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955, when he transferred to the Tourist Department; in June 1956, in connection with his participation in and award for the BURGI case; and after August 1956, when the death of his father forced him to pull himself together.) Before this, NOSENKO said, he was a wastrel and "did not pay attention to the work."

b. Work Against American Correspondents

NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-1954 (Pages 93-96) by saying that, as a new, very junior employee he had no access to operational files and did not participate personally in the handling of any of the correspondents. Although able to identify four correspondents in Moscow who were then recruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in conversations with his superior KOZLOV or at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer was working against these targets. NOSENKO's early months in the job were spent reading personality (not operational) files on a number of the correspondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's developmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the "agent network" of drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four of the correspondents (two of whom were recruited KGB agents at the time); he met with them periodically to determine whether they had developed any important information. Even here, however, NOSENKO appears to have been given very little responsibility: His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NOSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward whenever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents even when there was a "hint" that something of interest might develop. NOSENKO has been able to identify some of these agents, but for all but a few he recalled neither their names nor personalia concerning them.

c. Work Against Army Attaches

Regarding NOSENKO's work against American Army Attaches, he claimed a specific area of KGB responsibility, one for which he alone was accountable and one about which something was previously known from U.S. records. Only 20 months at the longest, it is the last period in which NOSENKO had no supervisory responsibility to divert his attention from personal operational duties.

NOSENKO could not remember when he took over responsibility for the Army Attaches, and he named two other KGB officers before settling upon BUDYLDIN as the person from whom he received the Attaches' files. When belittling his earlier responsibilities for correspondents, he has said several times that he had been in that job "only about six months." Assuming that NOSENKO entered the KGB in the middle of March 1953, this would date his transfer to work against the Attaches in the fall of that year. In discussing this transfer itself, however, NOSENKO has consistently said that it took place in 1954. Asked when in 1954, NOSENKO has variously replied "at the beginning of 1954," January 1954, and May 1954. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO refused to estimate when he took over this responsibility. He has always said that he turned over these duties and transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in June 1955, when the Tourist Department was established within the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American Department case officer responsible for operations against the U.S. Army Attaches he received and was responsible for assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned information received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; microphones which were emplaced about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department*; a network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and other agents in the Embassy who together provided little useful information; permanent and roving surveillance patrols outside the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by the Attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military. The point of collecting and assimilating this information, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the Attaches were doing in Moscow and thereby to control their intelligence collection activities. Far less important was the goal of recruiting Military Attaches; NOSENKO knew of only several instances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts failed.

The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the backgrounds and personal lives of his targets--such information, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of control.* He has also used this explanation to support his claim that there were no recruitments of military attaches during this period.

---

*On some occasions NOSENKO has said that the microphones in the Army Attache offices were his most valuable source of information on his targets of 1954-1955; at other times he has said that he knew nothing of these microphones until he reentered the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960; and at still other times he claimed to have known only of their existence during 1953-1955 but not where any were located.

An exception, wherein the KGB did carefully compile a great deal of vulnerability data on an Army Attache, was described by NOSENKO in connection with the approach to Walter MULE (Page 104). On the basis of these explanations, NOSENKO's knowledge of the official and unofficial activities of his alleged targets in this period deserves attention.

NOSENKO knew almost nothing about the personal backgrounds and families of the eight members of the Army Attache Office whom he identified as his targets (Pages 99-106). Although he was able to identify each by rank and position in the Embassy--sometimes inaccurately--and in a few cases to describe certain of their operational activities, he was unaware of or had forgotten such facts as:

- Colonel Earl L. MICKELSON, the Army Attache in 1954 and 1955, was arrested twice by the Militia outside of Moscow in 1954.

- Assistant Army Attache Ira RICHARDS was a language student of GROMOKOVA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent); by RICHARDS' account she sought to elicit biographic data from him during the lessons.

- William STROUD, the Assistant Army Attache, travelled to Kharkov in May 1955 to interivew an American defector. (NOSENKO has identified Frank SISCOE, who accompanied STROUD, as a suspected CIA officer; he was coopted by CIA.)

NOSENKO, furthermore, was ignorant of important events, known independently to CIA, which were within the sphere of what he claimed was his direct, personal responsibility:

- NOSENKO claimed direct personal responsibility for the file of and operational activity against Lieutenant Colonel Howard FELCHLIN (Pages 101-103). He claimed to be receiving agent information on him but could not recall the names or cryptonyms of any such agents. (He said, for example: "I think FELCHLIN must have had a maid, and she would have been a KGB agent.") NOSENKO described FELCHLIN as by far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the object of special interest; yet he did not know or remember anything about FELCHLIN's background, presumably well documented by the KGB because FELCHLIN had been to the USSR in two different capacities, merchant seaman and diplomatic courier, prior to arriving in Moscow as the Assistant Army Attache: also FELCHLIN had had prior official association with GRU officers in Austria, Germany, and the United States, and he continued to be in liaison with one of them in Moscow. NOSENKO could recall nothing about FELCHLIN's intelligence activities in the USSR or his trips about the country, or what had been done about them by the KGB. In speaking of FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, NOSENKO reported the KGB file noted that FELCHLIN had been caught taking photographs on some occasion, but he did not know that FELCHLIN in June 1954 was arrested in Kiev with another Assistant Army Attache, F.J. YEAGER. (Erroneously identified by NOSENKO as an Air Force Attache, YEAGER likewise should have been NOSENKO's target.) NOSENKO also did not know that FELCHLIN, with another Army Attache and two Air Force Attaches, in September 1953 had made an unprecedented train trip throughout Siberia and that six months later, at the end of March 1954, had been the subject of a newspaper article which charged that they had lost "spy documents" on the train. NOSENKO was unable to provide a date for FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, and he knew nothing of the unusual circumstances of FELCHLIN's departure from Moscow; he insisted that nobody else was declared persona non grata along with FELCHLIN. In fact, FELCHLIN was expelled along with Air Force Major Walter McKINNEY, and the Soviets refused to permit the two to leave Moscow aboard the Ambassador's personal plane until Ambassador BOHLEN himself protested. Confronted by his lack of knowledge of the persona non grata action, NOSENKO said that he could not be expected to know the details because this incident occurred after he transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO was then told the recorded date of the expulsion, 3 July 1954, and he replied that this was not true.

---

* NOSENKO himself, when giving the reason why he did not know more details about the U.S. Embassy Section's targets while he was its Deputy Chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy overseeing subordinates; hence, NOSENKO continued, he could not be expected to remember as many such details as would be possible had he been a case officer working daily with only four or five files. In another context, NOSENKO explained why he was unable to supply the details of planning and organizing operations against tourists in the period 1955-1959; he contrasted operations against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a few days, to the work against the Military Attaches and diplomats stationed in Moscow on permanent assignments, who could be studied systematically and slowly.

- Discrepancies appeared in NOSENKO's account of one of the best known incidents in the history of KGB operations against the American officials in the Soviet Union, the subject of reports by GOLITSYN and other CIA sources and the subject of training materials. This was the seizure of sensitive technical collection equipment on 5 May 1955 in Stalingrad from three Assistant Military Attaches from the U.S. Embassy--Major John S. BENSON, Captain STROUD, and Captain MULE--and their expulsion from the Soviet Union two days later. NOSENKO claimed direct responsibility for KGB work against these officers (Pages 103-105); he described an earlier attempt to defect MULE, his own plans for seizing this equipment at a railroad station outside Moscow, and his role in developing plans for the successful operation in Stalingrad. When NOSENKO was pressed under interrogation to give the entire story of the equipment seizure and the persona non grata action, he said that the operation was carried out after he was in the Tourist Department and therefore he knew no more about it. When told that the operation took place at least a month before his alleged transfer, NOSENKO could offer no explanation for his lack of knowledge.

- NOSENKO identified George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant Air Attache in 1953 or 1954; he was a target of another U.S. Embassy Section officer, and an unsuccessful KGB development operation was carried out against him. NOSENKO did not know that VAN LAETHEM was actually an Assistant Army Attache, who left Moscow in March 1953 and was succeeded by NOSENKO's own target Walter MULE (see above). What NOSENKO additionally did not know is that in Moscow VAN LAETHEM was the Attache cryptographic security officer, the superior of Dayle SMITH (the subject of NOSENKO's "ANDREY" lead--see below) and a friend of the motor pool sergeant Roy RHODES, a KGB agent. NOSENKO furthermore did not know that on 19 March 1955, again as an Army Attache, and only two years after being transferred from Moscow, VAN LAETHEM was again sent to Moscow, ostensibly on a PCS assignment but actually on temporary duty. During this latter assignment, when NOSENKO by his own account should have been responsible for him, VAN LAETHEM was in Moscow to review the entire electronics program at the Embassy. (VAN LAETHEM's second tour in Moscow involved the planned use of the electronic equipment which was seized in Stalingrad while VAN LAETHEM was still in Moscow.)

d. Additional Reporting

His information on two other operations involving Americans was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the U.S. Embassy Section. One was the recruitment of the military cipher machine mechanic having the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see Pages 413-426 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C.). NOSENKO in 1962 was sure not only that this recruitment took place before he joined the KGB but that "ANDREY" had left the USSR by then as well; he repeatedly estimated "ANDREY's" recruitment date as "1949-1950." At all times he has claimed certainty that "ANDREY" was the last KGB recruitment in the Embassy until the time of NOSENKO's defection in January 1964. In 1964, however, NOSENKO changed his story and said "ANDREY" was active while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1954-1955. The other operation was an unsuccessful recruitment approach to the U.S. Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see Pages 468-469 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C. above) at a meeting with the KGB arranged through letters which had been sent to SMITH. This occurred in 1954 or 1955, NOSENKO said, and in support of the recruitment approach, he handled the surveillance phone-watch. SMITH admitted to U.S. authorities having received four letters from the KGB between 2 and 5 June 1956 (a year after NOSENKO dated his departure from the U.S. Embassy Section), but he denied having had any personal meetings with KGB officers.

e. Remarks

NOSENKO's accounts of the 1953-1955 period are confused, contradictory, and, when compared with collateral information, incomplete and inaccurate. He has been inconsistent in dating his shift of responsibilities within the U.S. Embassy Section, in dating his departure from the Section (viz., the timing of the Stalingrad incident and the approach to SMITH), and in dating his first knowledge of the microphones in the Embassy. Having few new details of importance on the American correspondents, NOSENKO has proven unreliable regarding his work against Army Attaches: He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and activities of the others; and he lacked even the most important details on security affairs involving the majority of his eight alleged targets. In addition, NOSENKO has told CIA almost nothing about the work of his colleagues in the U.S. Embassy Section.

The statements by NOSENKO about this period therefore hold so little substance and the manner of his reporting was so unconvincing, that his claim to have been an officer of the U.S. Embassy Section in the years 1953-1955 cannot be true.

5. Tourist Department (June 1955 to January 1960)

a. Introduction

NOSENKO's activities from June 1955 to January 1960, his first period of alleged service with the American-British-Canadian Section of Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, are described in Pages 107-151. For the purposes of the following discussion, it is convenient to divide this period into two parts. The first of these covers the years from June 1955 to June 1958, when NOSENKO said he was a staff case officer, handling and recruiting agents and planning and managing operational activity. The second part covers NOSENKO's service from June 1958 to the beginning of 1960 as Deputy Chief of this section. Apart from his personal involvement in a number of recruitment operations in the latter period, it is this service which provides a basis for NOSENKO to claim awareness of all important arrests of spies and recruitments from among American tourists visiting the Soviet Union; it is also this service as Deputy Chief of Section which NOSENKO cites as a basis for his involvement in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD inside the Soviet Union.

b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958)

(i) General

According to NOSENKO's story, he was among the first case officers in the Tourist Department. He arrived there just as the Department was being formed and took part with other officers assigned in the acquisition of an agent network from within Inturist, in the establishment of facilities and methods, and in generally "getting things going." Several months later he participated in what he says was his first operation against an American tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-the-scenes (and hence unconfirmed) organization of an unseccussful attempt to compromise Martin MALIA (Pages 112-113). NOSENKO's next case (the first operation in which his participation is confirmed) took place a year later, in June 1956, when he assisted in the homosexual entrapment and recruitment of Richard BURGI (Pages 113-120). This recruitment, which occurred close in time to the Minister NOSENKO's death, was by NOSENKO's account a turning point in his personal and professional life. With it, NOSENKO began to acquire a sense of self-confidence and responsibility and began to "grow" from a wastrel into an effective and successful KGB officer. As a result of this operation, the first successful recruitment in the then short history of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO first came into personal contact with General GRIBANOV. According to all accounts prior to October 1966, when he retracted the claim, NOSENKO received the first of a series of KGB awards for operational performance because of the BURGI case--a letter of commendation. Within a month of this operation, NOSENKO said, he was promoted from the rank of lieutenant to captain, his last promotion prior to defecting eight years later.

NOSENKO's direct operational activity in the next two years, before his appointment as Deputy Chief of the Section, was described by NOSENKO as follows: Sometime in 1957 he was involved in the attempted recruitment of the German businessman [redacted] (Pages 120-121); after surrounding him with agents, NOSENKO personally spoke to him. NOSENKO explained his (unconfirmed) participation in this case, which was not among the responsibilities of his section, by saying there was no KGB officer available who spoke German but [redacted] was known to speak "a little English," a language in which NOSENKO had fair fluency. In 1957 NOSENKO was also involved in the sexual and blackmarket entrapment of [redacted] Norwegian journalist (again, not a target of NOSENKO's section, being neither American, British or Canadian); NOSENKO has not explained how he came to be involved in this operation, but he said his role was that of involving [redacted] with women and blackmarketeers so that another officer, ARKHIPOV, could recruit him. [redacted] has not identified NOSENKO, but reported on an individual whose role corresponds to the one NOSENKO claimed as his own (Pages 121-122). NOSENKO's third operation in 1957 was really not an operation at all. He was assigned to accompany the British [redacted] and the latter's interpreter [redacted] on a tour of Soviet publishing houses (Page 121). NOSENKO said his purpose was only to watch [redacted] a suspected intelligence agent or officer. His presence was confirmed by [redacted] who recognized NOSENKO's photograph.

This is the sum of NOSENKO's reported, sometimes verified, operational role during the three years preceding his promotion in June 1958 to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, hereafter referred to as the American Tourist Section.

The only case of the June 1955-June 1958 period resulting in agent contacts abroad, and the one to which NOSENKO ascribed the greatest importance, was the recruitment of BURGI. For this reason, the BURGI operation is discussed in detail below, with particular attention being given to those aspects of the case which reflect upon NOSENKO's own personal role.

(ii) The BURGI Case

NOSENKO's statements of this operation generally agreed with that BURGI provided to the FBI in 1957. The part NOSENKO played in the case, both in his brief initial presence with the two homosexuals in the Moscow restaurant on the evening of BURGI's compromise (20 June 1956) and in the Kiev events (23-28 June 1956) would appear to be one normally taken by a KGB staff officer. The identities of the other two KGB participants in the Kiev recruitment, KOZLOV and PETRENKO, seem clearly established. There were discrepancies between NOSENKO's and BURGI's versions, but most of these could stem from NOSENKO's faulty memory nine years after the events. (Such discrepancies include NOSENKO's failure to remember his first Moscow meetings with BURGI; the identity, role, or even existence of the person "Anatoliy" whom BURGI says introduced him to NOSENKO and participated in the homosexual compromise; whether NOSENKO was at the Kiev airport to meet BURGI; the location of NOSENKO's bedroom in the Kiev Hotel as compared to BURGI's; NOSENKO's reference to BURGI's "interpreter" when in fact BURGI neither had nor needed one; and NOSENKO's failure to remember the unusual circumstances of BURGI's departure from Kiev.) Other contradictions and omissions in NOSENKO's reporting relate to matters of greater operational consequence:

- NOSENKO was unable to say when or how the KGB first learned that BURGI was a homosexual, nor could he remember who first proposed an operation against him.

- NOSENKO gave a confused and evasive account of his dealings with the First Chief Directorate on this case.

- NOSENKO insisted that there was no official file on BURGI, and that none was opened as a result of this operation. The initiative for the operation came, he said, from the Second Chief Directorate, and when NOSENKO traced BURGI in the First Chief Directorate, there was no information on him there.* The KGB's only information on BURGI at the time of the compromise came from BURGI's visa application (which showed him to be a professor of Russian) and a few agent reports from the preceding days in Moscow. BURGI, on the other hand, reported that during the recruitment KOZLOV, the senior Soviet present, showed knowledge of the names of BURGI's sister, mother and father and knew the sister's occupation; details of BURGI's background, work, and military service, BURGI's relations with the Russicum in Rome, which BURGI said he had never mentioned in the USSR; and BURGI's acquaintance in the U.S. with Alexander KERENSKY.

NOSENKO cited "his" recruitment of BURGI in Kiev in 1956 as one of the main reasons for his rapid rise in the KGB. BURGI's story of the recruitment, as reported to the FBI, definitely establishes NOSENKO's role as having been subordinate to that of KOZLOV--it was KOZLOV, not NOSENKO, who made the recruitment.

---

* DERYABIN interrogated NOSENKO on this case. NOSENKO's answers to such detailed questions as how the traces were done, how the travel to Kiev was arranged, details concerning the personnel involved, the contents of the file, and other mechanics of the case, betrayed an almost total lack of memory.

c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section

NOSENKO said that in June 1958, when the unit that had formerly handled tourists from all countries was reorganized into two sections, he was promoted from the rank of senior case officer to that of Deputy Chief of the newly created American Tourist Section. NOSENKO said that this section was the most important in the Tourist Department, and that he did not know why he, in particular, had been chosen its Deputy Chief but was certain that GRIBANOV had no voice in the decision.

d. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent Personnel

NOSENKO has named with clarity and consistency the other officers of the American Tourist Section during this period. The Soviet agents of his section whom NOSENKO has identified were mostly his own; he said that the agents were constantly shifted from case officer to case officer and hence it was "difficult to say just who handled which agents." NOSENKO said he had approximately eight Soviet agents in 1958 and about 12 or 14 in 1959, most of them employed by Inturist (Pages 109-112). With the exception of the two homosexuals, YEFREMOV and VOLKOV discussed separately below, NOSENKO cannot supply personal data on his own agents or remember specific jobs they did for the KGB.

e. Knowledge of Section's Activities

As of June 1958, according to NOSENKO, the work of the section of which he was deputy chief was "just getting going." Its mission was, first of all, to detect Western Intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the Soviet Union; only secondarily was the section directed toward the recruitment of KGB agents from among these tourists. In his new position NOSENKO was responsible for supervising other officers in the section in efforts along these lines. Because of this and because at GRIBANOV's request he personally reviewed KGB information on the use of tourist cover by Western intelligence services and KGB counteraction through 1958 (Pages 145-146), NOSENKO made a number of statements concerning these subjects during the 1955-1959 period.

CIA started its so-called "legal traveller" program in 1955 and by 1958 was deeply committed to such operations. Now there is firm collateral information on what the KGB knew of this operational program. In view of NOSENKO's duties in the American Tourist Section and the section's prime mission, he should have knowledge of agent compromises during 1958 and 1959. Moreover, thanks to collateral holdings, what NOSENKO did and did not know can be compared with information from other sources. These facts are reviewed below.

(i) BLAKE

A valuable source of information for the KGB in its planning for the operational activity of its Tourist Department in the late 1950's and early 1960's was the Englishman, George BLAKE (Pages 146-147). BLAKE has confessed that in the summer of 1959 he passed the KGB a 19-page summary of the results of a three-day meeting during the first week of June 1959, between representatives of CIA and MI-6; these sessions were on the subject of "legal travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. This summary spelled out in detail the complete CIA operational doctrine pertaining to tourist-type operations and stressed CIA's reliance on tourist agents for the spotting, recontacting, assessment, and communications support of internal assets.

While NOSENKO has displayed some familiarity with CIA modus operandi in the field of tourist operations, he has never mentioned that the KGB was in possession of documentary reporting which described these methods in full detail. NOSENKO does not appear to be aware of who BLAKE was, much less of his importance to the KGB. NOSENKO never volunteered the name of BLAKE in his debriefings, and when specifically asked in 1962 about BLAKE, the KGB agent in British Intelligence, he said that he had read the dossier and that BLAKE had been "an agent of the Second (British) Department (of the Second Chief Directorate) who was not nearly as valuable as the [redacted] or the other Englishman" (VASSALL). By 1964 he could not recall any such agent of the British Department. When the name BLAKE was mentioned, he asked: "Who's BLAKE?"

BLAKE had, in addition, passed to the KGB a photocopy of a 21-page summary report of a second, follow-up conference between CIA and MI-6 on "legal travel" operations which was held in Washington from 20 to 25 April 1960. NOSENKO, although not in the Tourist Department at the time the latter report was received by the KGB, said that he reviewed all important materials of the American Tourist Section when he became its Chief in January 1962. Asked whether the Tourist Department had received documentary information from any agent source while NOSENKO was away from the department in the years 1960-1961, he replied that none had and that he knew of no agent who could have provided such documentary information.

(ii) GOLITSYN Document

NOSENKO in 1964 reported knowing that GOLITSYN at the time of his defection in December 1961 took with him an official top secret KGB document concerning Western Intelligence operational activity in the field of tourism (Pages 147-149). He did not mention this fact in the June 1962 meetings. Although NOSENKO also stated that this document had been prepared by the Tourist Department, he has not been able to describe the document in detail and specifically did not mention that this particular document was in large part based, as subsequent analysis has shown, upon the above-mentioned reports submitted to the KGB by George BLAKE.

(iii) Tourist Agents

NOSENKO asserted that the KGB detected no agents among American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959, and that no tourists had been caught in the act of mailing letters, servicing dead drops, or contacting agents, except one in 1959 whose name, NOSENKO said, was MacGUIRE (actually McGOWAN in 1958). NOSENKO signed a statement attesting to these facts.

The KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN, however, refers to a number of cases of American tourists who were found by the KGB to be engaged in intelligence collection or intelligence support activities. In addition to McGOWAN, the GOLITSYN document cited the cases of SIMARD, GRAY and FRANCIS, all of them CIA agents detected by the KGB in 1958 and 1959. These years coincide with the time when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the section which was responsible for monitoring and uncovering activities of this sort, but NOSENKO has never mentioned them. Furthermore, the annual reports of the section which NOSENKO would have helped to write, by virtue of his claimed position as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section, presumably included all of these cases.

f. NOSENKO's Tourist Paper

NOSENKO was questioned at length on the review of Western tourist operations which he claimed to have written for GRIBANOV. He said he gathered the material for this study from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talking with various case officers, then took the study to GRIBANOV's office. NOSENKO could not remember whether he discussed his findings with GRIBANOV, could not give any examples of the information which he included in the report (other than statistical information on the increase in foreign tourism), could not recall what the report said about CIA tourist operations (other than there appeared to be increased use of tourists travelling by automobile), and did not know what other American Intelligence services were sending agents into the Soviet Union under tourist cover during these years. On the basis of his research for this report and his own experience, NOSENKO said he knew that KGB operations against tourists had been developing slowly and that, at the time the report was written during the tourist season of 1959, the KGB knew little about the use of tourism by the American services.

BLAKE's confession that he passed documentary information on this subject to the KGB, but more particularly the intensity of KGB operations against tourists at this time as reflected in the GOLITSYN document and other reports indicate, that this statement by NOSENKO must be erroneous.

g. The OSWALD Case

According to NOSENKO's account of his direct involvement in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD (Pages 136-144), his participation seemed to stem solely from his supervisory role as Deputy Chief of the American Section. In this capacity, NOSENKO said, he was the one who made the decision that OSWALD was "not normal" and of no interest to the KGB. On other occasions NOSENKO has reported that he made this decision together with his subordinate KRUPNOV, or that "they decided," or "it was decided." NOSENKO's information on the handling of OSWALD in 1959 is unique, and there is no collateral information against which it can be reliably measured. The results of the polygraph examination in October 1966, however, indicated that NOSENKO lied in having said that he was personally connected with any aspect of the OSWALD case and that he had heard of OSWALD before the assassination of President Kennedy. The polygraph results also indicated that the KGB gave NOSENKO special instructions on the OSWALD case and what he should tell U.S. authorities about it.

h. NOSENKO's Operational Activities (1958-1959)

(i) General

NOSENKO appeared in one operation shortly after being promoted to the position of Deputy Chief, the recruitment of the American woman HARRIS in September 1958 on the basis of her romantic involvement with a Soviet male. HARRIS tentatively identified NOSENKO's photograph as that of one of two Soviets who approached her in Moscow and said that, of the two, he was "definitely the man in charge." She denied having had further contacts with the KGB after leaving the Soviet Union. In 1959, NOSENKO said, he also supervised the sexual entrapment of [redacted] but did not become personally involved in the approach, which was made by his superior DUBAS. Some time during this year, NOSENKO said, he recruited the second of his pair of homosexual agents, YEFREMOV. Beginning in the srping of 1959 he used the two in a series of successful recruitment approaches to [redacted] [redacted], [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted]. (In the case of [redacted], who as a commercial representative [redacted] in Moscow, was not the responsibility of NOSENKO's section, NOSENKO was asked to make the approach because he was a "specialist" in this type of operation.) In 1959 NOSENKO also used these agents in operations against two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLERFORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, in 1959 he accomplished the recruitment of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL, on the basis of sexual compromise.

(ii) The Homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

There is a preponderance of homosexual recruitment operations in NOSENKO's account of his KGB career. He has referred to several homosexual agents with whom he has worked on specific recruitment-entrapment operations, but said that he himself was never their official case officer. They include "LUCH," "STROYEV," "NIKOLAYEV," "SIBIRYAK" and KOSHKIN. He has remembered only a few of their names and has supplied no personality information about them. He identified only VOLKOV and YEFREMOV as his own agents.

NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former agent (cryptonym "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMOV (cryptonym "GRIGORIY") and to have been their sole case officer from the beginning of their KGB careers in 1957-1958 until they were deactivated in 1963 because they became too well known. He met them frequently, directing them in at least a dozen entrapment operations or other homosexual encounters. NOSENKO took them with him when he transferred to the American Department in 1960 (but used them in no operations during 1960 and 1961) and back again in early 1962 to the Tourist Department (where they were used only once, immediately after his return). He gave a relatively clear account of the recruitment (Pages 107-108), but:

- He has never been able to remember YEFREMOV's patronym.
- He does not know the home address, general area of Moscow residence, family circumstances, job details, or other basic information about either of them.

- He said that during the five or six years he handled them, he never was at their homes, never met them in a safehouse (only on the street), and never met either of them alone without the other's presence.

- He did not know about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's encounters with and development of one Dutch and five other Americans, independently known to CIA. Of the Americans, three were CIA agents and a fourth was the well-known American diplomat and author Charles W. THAYER.

- He told about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's compromise of Robert BARRETT in 1959 (Page 126) but did not know that they had met BARRETT again in 1961, shortly before BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 compromise.

- He did not know details of why or how VOLKOV and YEFREMOV first came into contact with their most recent target, W.E. JOHNSON, nor how they set up the compromise which led to NOSENKO's entry as a "police official" under the name Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV (Pages 289-293).

(iii) Homosexual Entrapment Operations

During 1959 NOSENKO said he made recruitment approaches to five U.S. and British citizens on the basis of homosexual entrapment operations involving the agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV. All five approaches were successful, and the four Westerners who have now been identified have, in turn, identified NOSENKO in one way or another as the recruiting officer. With the exception of the FRIPPEL case and the homosexual compromise of BARRETT and WILLERFORD (which did not result in approaches during NOSENKO's tour in the American Tourist Section), these were the only operations in which NOSENKO took part in 1959 and they represented, in fact, the only recruitments by the section during this year, NOSENKO said. He claimed repeatedly in 1962, 1964, and 1965 that at the end of 1959 he received a commendation from the KGB Chairman for his recruitment of the five homosexuals and FRIPPEL (discussed separately below). In October 1966, he admitted that this claim was untrue.

In discussing the [redacted] case (Pages 123-124) NOSENKO had forgotten details which, from his confirmed participation, he certainly once knew. He said that (as with the [redacted] case--see below) another case officer (IVANOV) had the file materials on the target before he did. NOSENKO stated that his agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported to NOSENKO in Moscow on [redacted] homosexuality and then "IVANOV and I and possibly GUSKOV, the Section Chief, reported this to DUBAS," Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO could not remember the arrangements for taking the pictures, nor in what Moscow hotel the photography took place. When [redacted]ent to Leningrad, NOSENKO was sent there to approach him, flying alone (as in the [redacted] case). All Leningrad arrangements were made by the local KGB. Asked why he was assigned to the case, NOSENKO replied: "I was told to go." Asked why IVANOV could not handle it, he answered: "He was not considered capable," his English was "not bad but he didn't have enough operational experience." NOSENKO did not remember who wrote the request for permission to make the approach ("Maybe I did, or maybe I dictated it to IVANOV") or whether [redacted] was staying in the hotel where the Leningrad compromise and approach took place. He named the Leningrad case officer, PERELETOV, but said that he, NOSENKO, made the recruitment [redacted] said another man was present.

NOSENKO's account in general matches [redacted] statements on this approach (Pages 125-126). The discrepancies, as well as the omissions in the former's statements and his uncertainty of the facts, may be attributable to faulty memory on the part of NOSENKO. Although NOSENKO was at this time Deputy Section Chief, when asked to explain his own selection as recruiting officer, he said that he did not know why "they" chose him and, when pressed as to who selected him, said "DUBAS, I think." When asked why the case officer VETLITSKIY, who originally had the materials on [redacted] could not do the job, he answered: "I don't know." NOSENKO claims that he himself arranged the transfer of a KGB "agent or operational contact" (he did not remember which) to Uzhgorod from Odessa for this case, and said he did this only by phone calls, with nothing written. He gave a physical description but had no other knowledge of this agent, neither name nor code name nor job nor background nor KGB status ("I wasn't interested"). The agent, he said, travelled alone; NOSENKO did not arrange to receive him in Uzhgorod because the local KGB took care of everything. NOSENKO met him only once, and then in the company of a case officer of the Uzhgorod KGB, whose name or other data he has also forgotten. NOSENKO said he did not report to Moscow about progress and plans on the case from Uzhgorod or other stops in this operation, nor obtain permission to travel alone with the agent to Lvov and Minsk after the recruitment; the local KGB's in Uzhgorod, Lvov, and Minsk did that, he said. NOSENKO could not describe KGB arrangements and support in Lvov and Minsk, where he said "the only thing I needed was a car from the airport to the city." [redacted] said they travelled by train.) Likewise, NOSENKO was unable to describe the KGB procedures for clearance, tracing, reporting and other management of this operation.

(iv) The Agent FRIPPEL

FRIPPEL (Pages 129-135) is the only American citizen with whom NOSENKO ever had more than fleeting operational contact in his whole KGB career and is the only foreign agent he claims to have run for more than two meetings at any time in his career (with the exception of [redacted] Pages 201-212, and "PROKHOR," Pages 173-181). The American Express Company representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL was not recruited so that he could report on American tourists visiting the Soviet Union, or on official and unofficial Americans living there, but in hopes of learning about approaches being made to members of Soviet delegations visiting the United States. With a wealth of reporting assets in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB did not need him there. When FRIPPEL was reassigned to New York City, however, there were no plans to contact him through the local KGB Legal Residency. FRIPPEL is identified by KGB cryptonym in the CHEREPANOV papers as a suspected American Intelligence agent. That FRIPPEL was considered such by the KGB is confirmed by statements of a self-admitted KGB agent in contact with the American tourist ROBERTS in 1962.

NOSENKO said FRIPPEL was his agent and said, repeatedly: "I recruited him myself." In 1962 no other KGB officer was mentioned by NOSENKO, who quoted from a number of his conversations with FRIPPEL. In 1964 NOSENKO said he and CHELNOKOV "had carried out the recruitment together," but NOSENKO was the case officer. According to FRIPPEL's account, CHELNOKOV was the senior officer in the recruitment and in the later meetings.

NOSENKO never met FRIPPEL alone while FRIPPEL was stationed in Moscow. The only times he ever did so were later, he said, when FRIPPEL returned to the USSR, and these consisted of a brief visit to FRIPPEL's hotel room during FRIPPEL's visit to Moscow in the summer of 1962 and a short meeting in Odessa where FRIPPEL was on a cruise in February 1963. (Both of these meetings took place after NOSENKO, in his 1962 contacts with CIA, had exposed FRIPPEL as a KGB agent.) According to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting. NOSENKO phoned someone to ask whether he could accept FRIPPEL's invitation to board the ship; the answer was evidently no. NOSENKO denied this, insisting that there was no one in Odessa superior to him, and as a Deputy Department Chief, he would not have to ask anyone anyway.

NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and their wives dined at FRIPPEL's house in Moscow some time after FRIPPEL's recruitment. NOSENKO acknowledged this to have been a most unusual procedure and could name no parallel in KGB agent handling. Asked why it happened, he said: "Because he invited me," and when asked why CHELNOKOV and his wife went along, NOSENKO said: "Because he was also involved in the recruitment."

NOSENKO said he retained operational control of FRIPPEL, then still Moscow representative of a tourist firm, when NOSENKO shifted in June 1960 from the Tourist Department to the American Department. Later NOSENKO also maintained responsibility for contact during FRIPPEL's visits to the USSR after FRIPPEL's PCS departure from Moscow in January 1961 and after his own return to the Tourist Department. According to FRIPPEL, who saw no sign of change in NOSENKO's reponsibilities during his relationship with him, he recalled meeting CHELNOKOV (who had stayed in the Tourist Department) alone, without NOSENKO, probably in 1960.

FRIPPEL said he was queried by NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV only once concerning U.S. Embassy personalities, specifically on BOWDEN and WINTERS. NOSENKO, who claimed case officer responsibility for Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN in 1960-1961 as well as for FRIPPEL said the two did not know each other; in fact, they met socially several times. NOSENKO could recall nothing which FRIPPEL ever reported to or did for the KGB, dismissing the subject on several occasions with: "He never gave anything of value." The only question NOSENKO posed when he came to FRIPPEL in August 1962, FRIPPEL said, was whether the agent knew what the newspaper editors he was escorting were going to ask KHRUSHCHEV in an interview. According to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting NOSENKO posed no questions and merely made polite conversation until FRIPPEL excused himself.

During the early 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO volunteered: "If you had been clever you could have made me work inside the USSR; you could have contacted me through FRIPPEL..." NOSENKO was asked in October 1966 whether he had expected or hoped CIA would attempt to establish contact with him inside the USSR through FRIPPEL. He strongly denied this.

i. Remarks

NOSENKO claims to have participated directly or indirectly in every recruitment operation with American tourists in the years 1955-1959. His presence in KGB operations during this period has sometimes been confirmed, but not always did these cases involve tourists of the three nationalities--American, British, and Canadian--for which NOSENKO said his section was responsible:

Years	Name	Nationality	Status in USSR	Confirmed
1955	MALIA	American	Tourist	No
1956	BURGI	American	Tourist	Yes
1957	[redacted]	German	Commercial/Tourist	No
	[redacted]	British	Tourists (under investigation)	Yes
	[redacted]	Norwegian	Quasi-official visitor	No
1958	HARRIS	American	Tourist	Yes
	KRAFT	American	Tourist	No
1959	DREW	American	Tourist	Yes
	[redacted]	British	Tourist	No
	[redacted]	British	Tourist	No
	[redacted]	British	Resident	Yes
	MERTENS	American	Tourist	Yes
	BARRETT	American	Temporary Resident	No
	WILLERFORD	American	Temporary Resident	No
	FRIPPEL (to 1963)	American	Resident, later tourist	Yes

This tabulation of 15 cases shows a higher number of operations involving American (six) and British (three) tourists than any other category, but it nevertheless intermingles citizens of other nationalities and having different status in the USSR. FRIPPEL and [redacted] were neither tourists nor (according to them and NOSENKO) used against tourists; [redacted] were from continental Europe; BARRETT and WILLERFORD worked in Moscow for several months. The tabulation also shows that, according to NOSENKO, his operational work was considerably more intensive in the time after he became Deputy Chief of the section than before, when as a senior case officer his administrative responsibilities presumably would have been far less demanding.

Although NOSENKO's participation in five cases of the American Tourist Section is confirmed, his acknowledged role in five others of different varieties--with corroboration by other sources in two of them--raises doubts about whether he belonged to that section as a senior officer. The doubts are strengthened by the nature of his information about the four individual cases reviewed at length above:

- In the BURGI case NOSENKO did not have knowledge of the extensive background information on the recruitment target which the KGB possessed at the time of the approach; or of other significant details in what NOSENKO described as an operation of greatest importance to the American Tourist Section and to himself personally. In addition, NOSENKO has admitted lying about his having received an award for his role in the recruitment of BURGI.

- Regarding the DREW case, NOSENKO said he was chosen for the approach (made on the basis of homosexuality) because the regular case officer lacked operational experience. By April 1959, however, the KGB had arranged "hundreds" of homosexual compromises in the USSR, NOSENKO reported in another context. His earlier personal experience with Western targets had been limited to a secondary role in the BURGI case and a principal role in the HARRIS case, the latter not an approach on homosexual grounds. It is difficult to comprehend how NOSENKO would have qualified for the task whereas the case officer IVANOV would not.

- There are gaps in NOSENKO's information about a number of significant aspects in the [redacted] case, including staff planning and management of the operation, operational support arrangements, and on personnel of the outlying KGB units involved. NOSENKO was unable to explain why he was selected to make the approach to [redacted]

- CHELNOKOV was the senior case officer for FRIPPEL. NOSENKO never met this agent alone while he resided in Moscow as the American Express Company representative, and NOSENKO reportedly acted on a supervisor's instructions at their later meeting in Odessa. Despite his occupation and his entree into the American community in Moscow, FRIPPEL reportedly was not exploited by the KGB against tourists or U.S. Government employees but was targetted to report on matters to which he had no access; hence there seems to have been no logical reason for the FRIPPEL case to have been transferred from the American Tourist Section to the U.S. Embassy Section and back again. Although available information verifies the continuity of NOSENKO as FRIPPEL's handler, it cannot be considered firm evidence of NOSENKO having been an officer in either of these sections and in fact might be interpreted as evidence that he was not.

Similarly, while familiar with some but not all of the operational activities of the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO failed to support his claim to being their American Tourist Section case officer; he has been unable to provide rudimentary background information of these two individuals, who allegedly were prominent in operations of the section. NOSENKO's statement that he retired the files of VOLKOV and

YEFREMOV because they were too well known is incompatible with his other reporting to the effect that neither took part in an operation between 1959 and early 1962.

In further reference to NOSENKO's claims to having been the case officer in these various operations, he has been unable to recount in any detail KGB staff procedures involved in these operations, such as name-tracing, coordinating with other components, obtaining approvals for action, etc. Finally, of his alleged 54 months of service in the American Tourist Section, NOSENKO's described activity against foreigners accounts for only about three months; if the bulk of his time was spent with recruiting or handling Soviet-citizen agents, he might be expected to remember something about some of them. He can barely remember names (and only a few), has given confused accounts of their recruitment, remembers nothing about any of their specific operations or activities for the KGB, and knew no personality background data on any of them.

Even if it were assumed that NOSENKO was a case officer of the American Tourist Section, his claim to the position of Deputy Chief cannot be substantiated. He himself could not explain his appointment to the job. He did not know about the CIA "legal travel" operations compromised to the KGB in 1958 and 1959 when he was allegedly in a supervisory capacity. NOSENKO knew nothing about the documents on such operations which BLAKE gave the KGB and which can be presumed to have been of the utmost interest to the American Tourist Section, among all KGB Headquarters elements. These documents offered material that could have proven valuable to the preparation of NOSENKO's own paper on Western tourist operations; they were used in the genuine KGB paper written by the Tourist Department and passed to CIA by GOLITSYN. As with his status as a case officer in the American Tourist Section, NOSENKO the Deputy Chief could not describe how data on tourists was received, general and specific plans laid, events discussed, decisions made, and leads channeled.

The foregoing paragraphs suggest the conclusion that NOSENKO was not a senior case officer or the Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. While the methods of the Tourist Department are not independently known in detail, it is conceivable that what NOSENKO did on behalf of the KGB (not necessarily the American Tourist Section) could have been accomplished by a principal agent. These conclusions do not cast doubt about the facts presented by NOSENKO on the KGB investigations in the OSWALD case but merely rule out the possibility of NOSENKO's having been involved with this case in any way prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.

6. U.S. Embassy Section (1960-1961)

a. Introduction

From January 1960 until January 1962 NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, under KOVSHUK. This period (described in Pages 152-285) is the most significant in NOSENKO's account of his KGB career for a number of reasons:

- The section is the specific unit working against the U.S. Embassy, by NOSENKO's own statements the KGB's most important counterintelligence target in the USSR. Its operations (characterized on Page 152) directly affect American security. The section has the twofold purpose of knowing of and controlling all access of Embassy personnel to Soviet citizens and of collecting, assimilating, evaluating, and using information from all possible sources to recruit Americans stationed in Moscow.

- NOSENKO's position as Deputy Chief of this section provided him his access to most of the major counterintelligence information he has reported, including recruitments of foreign embassy officials and microphone operations against the U.S. Embassy. Most important, it provided NOSENKO with his authority for stating that there were no successful recruitments of or agents among official Americans in Moscow for this two-year period, or for a time both before and after. (This is the same point made by indirection in the CHEREPANOV papers; yet this view is contradicted by information from GOLITSYN. Although the latter did not serve in the U.S. Embassy Section, he knew members of it and gave leads to KGB operational interest in and possible recruitments of official Americans in the Moscow Embassy during this period. Some of these appear to be related to information items NOSENKO has provided.)

- The apparent importance of NOSENKO's information on this period contrasts sharply with that from other periods. His accounts of recruitments in the tourist field covering the five years prior to this assignment and the two years following have been checked thoroughly and not one of them represents a penetration of any government; none has access to classified information; most were inactive, suspect, or already known to Western counterintelligence organs.

sensitive source

- NOSENKO's work against the U.S. Embassy is confirmed by [redacted] and less directly by other Soviet sourced reporting to CIA and the FBI. It is denied by GOLITSYN. (GOLITSYN has said that NOSENKO was not in the section during these years.)

b. Entry into the Section

NOSENKO has given a detailed account of how he came to be transferred into the U.S. Embassy Section, but he has never given a precise date, usually saying "January 1960" or "at the beginning of 1960."

As described on Pages 153-154, the shift was made at GRIBANOV's insistence and against NOSENKO's own personal wishes. GRIBANOV told NOSENKO during a personal interview, at which NOSENKO voiced his objections, that the transfer was part of his (GRIBANOV's) plans and was primarily to put new life into operations against American code clerks, the primary target of the Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV did not tell him why he, instead of another, had been selected for this job, although NOSENKO had the impression it was because of his achievements in the Tourist Department. (see Part VIII.D.5.). NOSENKO's transfer could not have been a result of his close personal relationship with GRIBANOV or because his father was a friend of GRIBANOV's: NOSENKO has admitted that he exaggerated the closeness of his relationship with the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate and most recently (February 1965) said that he had few personal contacts with him outside of work; NOSENKO has also said that his father never met GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO initially said that he relieved nobody on coming into the section. He eventually recalled, however, that BAKHVALOV was his predecessor but left the section before he (NOSENKO) arrived. NOSENKO's confusion on this point, his description of how he assumed custody of certain files from BAKHVALOV although the latter had transferred to another department, and the opportunities NOSENKO had to name BAKHVALOV as his predecessor before he eventually did so are described on Pages 154-156.

c. Functions as Deputy Chief

In NOSENKO's view the transfer to become Deputy Chief of the section from the same position in another section was definitely an important promotion: He now became second-in-charge of the most important operational section of the entire Second Chief Directorate. As KOVSHUK's deputy, NOSENKO had the right and obligation to be aware of all activities in order to exercise his general supervisory functions and so as to be prepared to become the Acting Chief of the section when necessary.

NOSENKO said that consequently nothing was hidden from him for the two years 1960 and 1961. He claimed to have had complete knowledge of the U.S. Embassy Section's activities during the relatively recent years of 1960 and 1961 and to know of all significant operational successes achieved in the years before and after this period. He has also said he has told CIA all he knows of these activities. It was on this basis that he was able to say in 1965: "Tell Mr. McCone that there were no recruitments. I was there."

When NOSENKO reported for duty, he and KOVSHUK agreed on a division of supervisory duties within the section. KOVSHUK was, in addition to his over-all responsibility for the section's operations, to supervise in particular operational activity against American diplomatic personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy. NOSENKO had been specifically instructed by GRIBANOV and American Department Chief KLYPIN to concentrate his efforts on the supervision of operations against the most important American recruitment target, the code clerks at the Embassy, with the aim of revitalizing these activities and making recruitments. (NOSENKO said there had been none since the early 1950's.) According to the agreed-upon division of labor, NOSENKO also assumed case officer responsibility for John ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security officer (identified by NOSENKO as a CIA officer, but actually a CIA cooptee). Additionally, he was responsible for maintaining the section's file on factors pertaining to the physical security of the Embassy and for receiving and disseminating materials from the microphones concealed in various U.S. Embassy offices. These were functions held, NOSENKO said, by his predecessor BAKHVALOV and were turned over by NOSENKO at the end of 1961 to his successor GRYAZNOV: Apart from these duties, which apparently were routinely assumed by the Deputy Chief, NOSENKO supervised, during the early part of 1960 (as NOSENKO first said in 1965), the work of the officers responsible for operations against the American Armed Forces Attaches in Moscow; in October 1966, NOSENKO reported that he was personally responsible during this period for the operational activity against Naval and Marine officers in the Naval Attache's office.

d. Knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief

As deputy to KOVSHUK, NOSENKO said, he was aware of all the operations being conducted by the section during this two-year period; by his own statement, nothing was kept from him. There were in these two years a total of over three months when KOVSHUK was ill or on leave, and at these times NOSENKO was acting chief of the section. In the latter capacity, NOSENKO was responsible for supervising the administrative work and operational activity of the entire section and, in particular, assumed KOVSHUK's work in directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Therefore, pertinent to his claims are the facts presented in the following paragraphs.

NOSENKO could not remember any operational decisions that he made as acting chief, or any specific or unusual occurrences during these times. In answer to a question, NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSHUK's which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going out of the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences. He could not remember any of KOVSHUK's agents, except GLAZUNOV (whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own agent and later said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's") and the American correspondent STEVENS (about whom NOSENKO had reported in connection with his responsibilities in 1953-55). NOSENKO also said that in 1960 KOVSHUK recruited PREISFREUND, although earlier he had reported that he (NOSENKO) had done this. (Regardless of who the recruiter might have been, KOVSHUK attended NOSENKO's meetings with PREISFREUND.)

NOSENKO knew that his immediate supervisor KOVSHUK had personal contact, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, with some U.S. Embassy officers and was aware that one of these had been WINTERS. He knew no details of KOVSHUK's contacts with WINTERS, nor that his own friend KISLOV, as well as his friend and frequent source of operational information LOPUKHOV, were also in touch with WINTERS. He could not remember who else KOVSHUK knew, or what KOVSHUK was doing with them, or why. NOSENKO knew neither that William MORRELL (declared to the Soviet Government as a CIA officer) belonged to CIA nor that KOVSHUK, who was aware of this fact, was in personal contact with MORELL.

Unlike KOVSHUK, ARTEMEV, KOSOLAPOV, BORODIN, BIRYUKOV, KRIVOSHEY and many other Second Chief Directorate officers, NOSENKO never had any direct contact, even for cultivation or assessment, with any American officials, either stationed in the Embassy or visiting the USSR. However, his English had been proven good enough to qualify him particularly for tourist recruitments and his operational flair had been tested. (It was this which caused him to be picked for the DREW, [redacted] and other approaches and the only reason why he, an English speaker, would have been specially selected to work on the German [redacted] who spoke "some English.")

DERYABIN and other defectors from the KGB have stated that the deputy chief of a section working against a foreign embassy in Moscow would be responsible for approving and retaining monthly schedules for the planned use of safehouses by the section; that he would discuss agent meeting schedules with individual case officers and approve and retain a list of planned agent meetings for each case officer on an individual basis; and that he would approve the acquisition of new agents and new safehouses and their transfer from one operation to another. By contrast, NOSENKO first did not list these functions among his responsibilities and later denied that he had them. NOSENKO did not understand the question when asked whether he had any responsibility for supervising the use of safehouses in Moscow (Page 162) and said that as the agents and the safehouses belonged to the case officers, they could use them when and how they liked without informing anyone; only when they were meeting an active development agent was it necessary to report to NOSENKO and this only after the meeting. NOSENKO said that, while he was Deputy Chief of the section, three or four subordinate officers had safe apartments, but he did not remember the location of any of them. Neither NOSENKO nor his subordinates GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had such apartments, instead using less secure "meeting apartments" (which are used in the absence of the full-time occupant). NOSENKO was able to locate his own "meeting apartment" (which he said he brought with him when he transferred from the Tourist Department and later took back with him to the Tourist Department) by street and could do the same for GRYAZNOV's. He was not sure of the location of the apartment used by KOSOLAPOV.

e. Knowledgeability of U.S. Embassy Physical Security

According to NOSENKO, he maintained the file on physical security at the U.S. Embassy, and it contained detailed floor plans and photographs of the installation. NOSENKO was unable to give the location or the floor of the office of any single individual or component of the Embassy, including those of the Ambassador, or his own targets (ABIDIAN, the military code room, and the State Department communications room). NOSENKO said that all important Embassy offices were located in the "zone of security," which he has variously reported as the "seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth floors," or "seventh and up," or the "top four floors." NOSENKO did not remember how many floors there are in the Embassy, nor was he even sure how many floors were included in the restricted area. (The restricted area in fact consists of the top three floors, the eighth, ninth, and tenth.)

f. Knowledgeability about American Intelligence Personnel

NOSENKO said that not only the deputy chief but every officer in the section could identify the known and suspected American Intelligence personnel in the Embassy. Nevertheless, he himself did not know about three CIA officers (MAHONEY, MORELL, and GARBLER) whom the KGB had definitely identified as such before their assignments to Moscow in 1960-1961. For example, MORELL, whose overt CIA affiliation was officially announced by the Embassy to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, was under direct and active cultivation by KOVSHUK and the KGB First Directorate officer K.N. SMIRNOV in 1960-1961; NOSENKO knew nothing about this (although asked leading questions and given hints) and did not identify MORELL as a CIA officer. Four of the seven officers whom he said the KGB suspected to be CIA had never had any such affiliation. He could not give any information at all on the person he said the KGB considered to be the CIA chief in Moscow, KLOSSON, either on his Moscow activity and contacts or on the extent and results of KGB coverage, or on his personal situation and background. He could not explain why KLOSSON was considered to be the CIA chief, but said that "every officer thought he was."

g. Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Operations

As his main task, the prime reason he was moved into the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO alleged, was to supervise the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity he closely guided the work of case officers GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV.* NOSENKO shared an office with his two subordinates, and the three were within sight and hearing of one another and used a single safe, which contained files on the American code clerks and the agents involved with them. NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases with them, taking part in operational planning, and approving or disapproving all operational measures. NOSENKO originally asserted that he had also read and studied all the files kept on the American code clerks; under questioning on individual cases, however, he retracted these statements and said that he may have skimmed some of the files, that he did not study any of them, but that in any event he read all the current incoming materials on the code clerks from microphones, agents, and the like and then routed them to the case officer concerned.

---

*According to GOLITSYN, who knew both men well, GRYAZNOV was "a very experienced" case officer with some success; he had spent about the last five years of his 16 years in the KGB in the American Department and was a specialist in code clerk operations. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had about ten years' KGB experience and, like GRYAZNOV, was specializing against code clerks in 1960.

CIA has two types of information against which the reports from NOSENKO can be compared. The first consists of the detailed debriefings of code clerks returning from Moscow, administered routinely by the Department of State and the military services; it also includes the special debriefings and interrogations of the Department of State, the FBI, and CIA as a follow-up to KGB operational activity which has become known from various sources. On this basis, CIA has accumulated a considerable amount of collateral information on the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section involving United States code clerks during the period NOSENKO said he was its Deputy Chief. The second type of information is the reporting on KGB operations by GOLITSYN who, from contacts with U.S. Embassy Section officers in Moscow and Helsinki, was able to provide several leads to what he said were recruited American code clerks. GOLITSYN's information thereby directly contradicts NOSENKO's statement that the KGB had no successes in its code clerk recruitment operations from the early 1950's to the end of 1963, and none of the subjects of GOLITSYN's leads have been positively identified. Some of GOLITSYN's information has been generally substantiated by other sources. In one case, this confirmation has come from NOSENKO himself, whose information on the STORSBERG operation, on the agent PREISFREUND's role in it, and on GOLITSYN's knowledge of KGB use of PREISFREUND presents an explanation of one and possibly two of GOLITSYN's leads.* Another of GOLITSYN's leads, that concerning an operational trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in order to establish contact with a code clerk, is confirmed by documentary evidence that KOSOLAPOV did in fact travel on the Helsinki-Moscow train with an American code clerk at the time and under the cover GOLITSYN reported. NOSENKO denied that such a trip was made by KOSOLAPOV.

NOSENKO has been questioned in detail about each of the code clerks serving in Moscow during 1960 and 1961. His information concerning KGB activities involving five of these Americans (STORSBERG, JENNER, MORONE, ZUJUS, and KEYSERS) and his lack of information concerning a sixth (GARLAND) is discussed in detail in Pages 166 through 219. NOSENKO's information on a number of other cases, less important in his opinion, is described in the tabulation of American case leads given on Pages 364-410. Certain of these cases are further examined below to determine whether NOSENKO's knowledge equates with details which the deputy and acting chief of the U.S. Embassy Section could reasonably be expected to know and retain.

---

*As discussed below, there are important differences in the accounts of GOLITSYN and NOSENKO, particularly regarding the outcome of this operation.

(i) The STORSBERG Case

The operation against STORSBERG (Pages 166-185) was, NOSENKO said, the most important case he had as supervisor of code clerk operations. The KGB, while able to break certain State Department ciphers, had had no success with military cryptographic systems, and therefore NOSENKO "dropped everything for a year" to involve himself with the development of James STORSBERG, the military code clerk at the U.S. Embassy. The following facts are pertinent to an evaluation of NOSENKO's story of this case.

NOSENKO originally raised the STORSBERG case indirectly at his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962. He told how GOLITSYN, during a visit to the American Department in 1960, at a time NOSENKO was on leave, had requested permission to use a U.S. Embassy Section agent, a Finn, in his own operations in Helsinki. During his discussions in the American Department, GOLITSYN learned that this Finnish agent was being used in operations against Embassy employees living in America House. NOSENKO said that the KGB realized that GOLITSYN had passed this information on to the Americans following his defection, for the regulations governing visits to America House by third nationals had been tightened. At this meeting NOSENKO did not name the Finnish agent or specify his involvement in any particular operational activity nor did he date the visit by GOLITSYN.

Later in the 1962 meetings NOSENKO gave a detailed summary of the Finnish agent's involvement in the unsuccessful recruitment attempt against an American military code clerk. NOSENKO, without naming the Finn or the American, said that he personally conducted the recruitment confrontation with GRIBANOV present. These early accounts were full of quotes of what NOSENKO said to the American and vice versa, descriptions of the American's reaction to the confrontation, and statements of NOSENKO's admiration for the American despite his refusal to work. Following his defection, NOSENKO recounted the case in even greater detail, in fact, in more detail than he gave for any other case. He identified the Finn as PREISFREUND and the American as STORSBERG and described and referred to the case whenever possible (over 50 times). When asked for details of other code clerk cases, for example, he repeatedly diverted to discussion of the STORSBERG case to illustrate how the KGB operated against code clerks in general.

After defecting NOSENKO denied that he personally confronted STORSBERG. He said that his personal role was limited to directing STORSBERG into the hotel room where the approach was made; after first saying that he had never claimed any other role, he admitted that he may have been "painting" himself (exaggerating) in his descriptions of 1962. This admission came only after the tape of NOSENKO's 1962 statements had been played to him and he had successively said that (a) it was not his voice, (b) he was drunk in 1962, (c) the CIA case officer in Geneva had made him nervous, and (d) CIA probably spliced various pieces of tape together to make this false one. Still, NOSENKO said, he directed the entire operation from beginning to end, and it was his most important case. Interrogated further concerning his role in the STORSBERG operation in October 1966, NOSENKO said that he had never read the KGB file on STORSBERG, which was held by GRYAZNOV.

GOLITSYN, as NOSENKO reported, didvisit the American Department, did request permission to use PREISFREUND operationally in Helsinki, and did report this to CIA in late 1961 following his defection. GOLITSYN also reported that, in denying his request, KOVSHUK told him that PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American Embassy employee, possibly a military man and possibly a code clerk or diplomat; therefore, KOVSHUK said, PREISFREUND could not be used for six months or so in other operations, for otherwise the Americans might become suspicious. NOSENKO has not reported these details, but has said only that GOLITSYN was instructed to drop interest in PREISFREUND because PREISFREUND belonged to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO volunteered at his first meeting with CIA that he was on leave outside of Moscow on the occasion of GOLITSYN's visit to the American Department. Since defecting he has insisted with absolute certainty that this visit took place in the late spring or early summer of 1961 and has described his leave, where he went and with whom. GOLITSYN's passport and CIA travel data show that GOLITSYN was on TDY in Moscow in January 1961.* Told this, NOSENKO said that it is untrue, that he recalled being told of GOLITSYN's visit after his return from leave in July 1961, and that he was certain that he (NOSENKO) was in Moscow in January 1961.

NOSENKO has indirectly confirmed that the operation of which GOLITSYN learned during this visit to the American Department was the operation against STORSBERG. He did so by his assertion that PREISFREUND, his own agent, was used in only one operation, that against STORSBERG. Thus, as to the outcome of this operation, there is a conflict between NOSENKO's information and that earlier provided by GOLITSYN. There is also a conflict between NOSENKO's statements that the recruitment approach took place some time after May 1961 (NOSENKO's dates have varied from June to October 1961, STORSBERG said it was in October 1961) and GOLITSYN's statement that this approach had already been made in January 1961 when he learned of it.

GOLITSYN provided a second lead which NOSENKO appears to confirm and which may be related to the STORSBERG case. GOLITSYN said that during a visit to the American Department in the spring of 1960,* he learned from GRYAZNOV that he (GRYAZNOV) had developed an operation against an American military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent" certain that a recruitment approach to this code clerk would be successful. GOLITSYN said that GRYAZNOV told him that this would be the first recruitment of a military code clerk (as contrasted to a State Department code clerk) in the history of the American Department. There were only two persons meeting this criterion who were in Moscow at the time GOLITSYN placed this visit, STORSBERG and HURLEY; the superior of STORSBERG, HURLEY performed back-up cryptographic duties in STORSBERG's absence. If NOSENKO's report that there was no development of or approach to HURLEY can be accepted, this lead from GOLITSYN would apply to STORSBERG rather than HURLEY. There is a conflict between NOSENKO's information on the STORSBERG case and this second GOLITSYN lead in that GOLITSYN described an operation which was in its final stages in the spring of 1960, whereas NOSENKO (as well as STORSBERG) asserted that the STORSBERG operation was just under way at this time and was long and drawn-out.

---

*GOLITSYN has based his assertion that NOSENKO was not in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961 partly on this visit.

(ii) The JENNER Case

Apart from the STORSBERG operation, NOSENKO has been able to supply the greatest amount of detail concerning the operation (also unsuccessful) against the State Department pouch clerk Paul JENNER (Pages 186-196). This case developed as a result of an idea originated by NOSENKO himself shortly after he arrived in the U.S. Embassy Section. Because of the inaccessibility of American code clerks to the KGB in Moscow, it was NOSENKO's plan to send a KGB officer to Helsinki in order to strike up an acquaintance with a code clerk entering the Soviet Union aboard the Helsinki-Moscow train. The first (and last) time this was attempted, NOSENKO related, was in March 1960, when the KGB learned that JENNER, listed as a "secretary-archivist" and thus assumed by the KGB to be a code clerk, was scheduled to transit Helsinki en route to his assignment at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Under NOSENKO's supervision KOSOLAPOV therefore travelled to Helsinki and boarded the same train as JENNER. Additionally, GRYAZNOV took a KGB female agent to the town of Vyborg, on the Finno-Soviet border, and placed her on the same train. Both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent met and spoke with JENNER en route to Moscow, and the girl gave him her telephone number, asking him to call her. After JENNER's arrival in Moscow, both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV submitted written reports to NOSENKO describing the contacts on the train. Although the KGB later found out that JENNER was only a pouch clerk, not a cryptographer, he was considered of interest and when JENNER failed to telephone the female agent, the two were brought together in a "chance meeting" at the Moscow airport. JENNER would have no part of the agent's invitations, however, and the operation therefore went no further.

---

*When NOSENKO was told of the GOLITSYN visit in May or June 1960, he denied that it took place, saying that he necessarily would know if it had.

JENNER reported to the Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy upon his arrival that he had been contacted by two Soviet students from Vyborg, a young man and a woman, on the Helsinki-Moscow train. He also reported having been given a telephone number by the girl and later reported having been recontacted by her at the Moscow airport.

CIA has documentary evidence, in the form of official Finnish train manifests, that JENNER travelled from Helsinki to Moscow by train on 31 March 1960. This document shows that JENNER travelled alone and no Soviets were aboard when the train left Helsinki. CIA also has an official travel manifest showing that KOSOLAPOV, using the name KOLOSOV, travelled from Helsinki to Moscow by rail on 2 April 1960, two days later, and that no Americans travelled on this train with him. NOSENKO identified KOLOSOV's photograph as that of his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. (NOSENKO earlier said that he did not know whether KOSOLAPOV used an alias for this trip, what that alias might have been, or whether KOSOLAPOV had an alias passport; he agreed that he would have had to authorize such a passport.) When he was told of CIA evidence that KOSOLAPOV did not travel on the same train as JENNER and therefore could not have met and talked with him as NOSENKO had reported, NOSENKO refused to believe it; he insisted that he had read the reports of both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV, and that the events were exactly as he described them.

(iii) The GARLAND Case

GOLITSYN told CIA after his defection that while he was stationed in Helsinki, probably in November--not March--1960, KOSOLAPOV travelled to Finland under alias and commercial cover in order to make the acquaintance of an American code clerk on the Helsinki-Moscow train. KOSOLAPOV's arrival had been announced by a cable from KGB Headquarters to the Helsinki Legal Residency. According to GOLITSYN, the Legal Residency learned which train this American was to board and succeeded in placing KOSOLAPOV in the same compartment with him. GOLITSYN saw KOSOLAPOV board the train with this American. Later, when another American Department officer visited Helsinki, GOLITSYN asked him how KOSOLAPOV's operation with the code clerk had gone; from the officer's refusal to answer, GOLITSYN assumed that it had been a success.

CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPOV made a second trip to Helsinki in November 1960, again under the KOLOSOV alias. Finnish railroad manifests show that KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki by train on 16 November 1960 and that one of his travelling companions on this train was GARLAND, who was en route to Moscow to assume his duties as chief of the State Department code room at the American Embassy (Page 198). There were no other Americans on this train.

Told that KOSOLAPOV had made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960 and had travelled to Moscow on the same train as an American code clerk, one of his own targets, NOSENKO said that this could not be. He agreed that, as in the case of KOSOLAPOV's trip to meet JENNER, he would necessarily have been involved in the planning of such a second trip and would have had to approve arrangements and correspondence in connection with it. Even if such a trip took place when NOSENKO was out of Moscow, he said, the details of it would have been known to him upon his return, and he would not have forgotten about the trip. (In fact, CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki on 12 November 1960 and that NOSENKO left Moscow for Amsterdam, en route to Cuba, on 15 November.) NOSENKO has not changed his position that there was no such trip.

(iv) The MORONE Case

Like the STORSBERG operation, the MORONE case was mentioned at NOSENKO's first meeting with CIA; he cited it as an example of a technique which NOSENKO introduced for using third nationals to obtain access to American code clerks who were reluctant to establish contacts with Soviet citizens. According to NOSENKO's most recent version, given in early 1965, the KGB learned that MORONE and a Marine Guard (BEGGS) planned to travel to Warsaw on leave. KOSOLAPOV thereupon drew up an operational plan, edited by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK and approved by GRIBANOV, proposing that a female agent of the Polish UB be introduced to MORONE on the Moscow to Warsaw train for the purpose of obtaining compromising materials. KOSOLAPOV arranged with Polish liaison officials in Moscow to have such an agent sent to Moscow, met her when she arrived, and briefed her on the operation. She was then placed on MORONE's train together with a KGB technician whose task it was to obtain tape recordings of the compromise. Events went according to plan: MORONE met the girl and was intimate with her on the train, but when the technician reported to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw, he said that the tape recordings were of low quality and unsuitable for their intended purpose. In a further attempt to acquire compromising material on MORONE, KOSOLAPOV later brought the UB agent to Moscow, and on this occasion photographs were obtained of their intimacies in a Moscow hotel room. Still, the KGB felt, there was not enough blackmail material to ensure recruitment, and it was further planned to have the America House maid IVANOVA attempt to lure MORONE to a room in Moscow where truly compromising photographs of intimacies with a Soviet citizen could be obtained. Possibly because they noticed MORONE's interest in IVANOVA, NOSENKO said, the Americans ordered MORONE out of Moscow before further steps could be taken.

Although NOSENKO provided a considerable amount of detail on MORONE's trip to Warsaw, there were numerous variations in his different accounts. In 1962 he said that he had handled the entire operation himself, including telephoning Warsaw with the request for the girl; he also said that the UB obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw and that several months later the female agent was brought to Moscow expressly for the purpose of introducing MORONE to a Soviet girlfriend. This, NOSENKO said, was successful and MORONE was soon having intercourse with a KGB agent. While still in place in Geneva on 1 February 1964 NOSENKO gave a different version: "We," he said, arranged for the girl by a dispatch pouched to the KGB advisor in Warsaw; moreover, the Poles, who had obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw, sent the KGB only pictures of the two kissing, keeping the best ones for themselves, and this is why she had to be brought to Moscow. NOSENKO told the FBI later in February 1964 that compromising photographs had been obtained in Warsaw but no recruitment was attempted because KHRUSHCHEV had given instructions that no actions were to be taken which might embarrass then existing good relations with the United States. When in February 1965 it was pointed out that MORONE arrived in Warsaw on 14 December 1960 and that NOSENKO left for Cuba on 15 November 1960, NOSENKO revised his story of receiving the personal report of the technician to say that he had perhaps read the technician's report after returning from Cuba in December 1960.

CIA learned of the MORONE train trip and subsequent involvement with the UB agent in 1961 from a Polish source who had provided much sensitive and reliable information previously. The Polish source submitted a considerable amount of detail including the date of the operation (which NOSENKO did not recall) and the fact that the Polish agent was handled in Moscow by a KGB officer named "Volodya." It was on the basis of this report that MORONE was withdrawn from Moscow in May 1961.

In accounts given since his defection, NOSENKO has consistently named KOSOLAPOV as MORONE's case officer. KOSOLAPOV drafted the plan for the operation on the train, discussed it with NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, met with a UB official in Moscow to arrange for the agent, met the agent on her arrival, and briefed her on her assignment. NOSENKO has not been asked and has not volunteered who specifically placed the agent on the train. Records show, however, that MORONE left Moscow on 13 November 1960, arriving in Warsaw on the 14th; from 12 to 16 November 1960, KOSOLAPOV is confirmed to have been in Helsinki, apparently in connection with an operation involving the American code clerk GARLAND (see above). It is also noted that travel records show that NOSENKO, the officer supervising this (as well, presumably, as KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki), left Moscow on 15 November 1960 with a delegation going to Cuba.

NOSENKO has been questioned concerning the KGB agents in contact with MORONE and what was learned from them. He reported that an Egyptian agent visited America House, met MORONE there, but did not report anything of interest concerning him. NOSENKO also mentioned IVANOVA, a maid at America House, who knew MORONE and whom the KGB wanted to use to lure MORONE into a compromising situation (see above). NOSENKO said that he, himself, had met with IVANOVA several times to discuss MORONE, but that he could not recall anything specific of interest or use that she reported concerning him. Another agent who may have reported on MORONE, NOSENKO said, was an East German girl sent to America House to pose as an Austrian; NOSENKO was not sure what she might have reported or when this was, other than it occurred when he was working against MORONE and that it was during ABIDIAN's tour in Moscow, for he had come to America House to question the girl.

Various reports indicate that MORONE was involved in illegal currency speculation with the Egyptian agent and that on at least one occasion the Egyptian introduced MORONE to a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate. NOSENKO did not know that MORONE was also involved in illegal currency dealings with [redacted] whom NOSENKO has identified as KOSOLAPOV's agent and who, he said, was involved with and reporting on NOSENKO's target ABIDIAN. NOSENKO did not know that IVANOVA once introduced MORONE to a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate; additionally MORONE was reported by a number of his co-residents at America House to have been intimate with IVANOVA herself (which MORONE denied). Some of these same Americans reported also that MORONE was intimate with UMANETS, another KGB agent identified by NOSENKO; MORONE himself said he knew UMANETS "well." Finally, the incident involving the East German girl posing as an Austrian involved the code clerk ZUJUS, not MORONE, and took place after NOSENKO claims to have been transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section; she was interviewed by ABIDIAN's successor, MONTGOMERY.

(v) The KEYSERS Case

The approach to KEYSERS is the only time during his service in the U.S. Embassy Section that NOSENKO claims to have had direct contact with an American stationed in Moscow. (NOSENKO said on one occasion that this was the only face-to-face encounter he could recall; and, on another, that it was possible that STORSBERG--the only other possibility--may not have seen him on the night he was approached in the Moscow hotel.) KEYSERS therefore is the only independent American source who could confirm that NOSENKO was involved in operations against American Embassy personnel in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself pointed out, however, that this contact was of very short duration, and that it was possible that KEYSERS would not recognize him. This was the case: KEYSERS failed to identify NOSENKO's photograph and described the officer who approached him as a man considerably older, shorter, and probably of a much heavier build than NOSENKO was. Although NOSENKO was able to provide a description of this incident, he did not know much about the overall KGB case against KEYSERS and a number of discrepancies have been noted.

In 1962 NOSENKO first reported the approach to KEYSERS, without naming him, but saying he was the successor to STORSBERG. Since defecting in 1964, NOSENKO has continued to identify him as STORSBERG's replacement. In fact, KEYSERS was sent to Moscow as an assistant to the Embassy medical officer; he also worked in the office of the Air Attache as a collateral duty and for a short while in 1961 was under training in the military code room as a "back-up" cryptographer for STORSBERG. STORSBERG's replacement in Moscow was ZUJUS.

On 24 and 28 January 1964, before the defection, NOSENKO incorrectly named ZUJUS, who he said was STORSBERG's replacement, as the target of this operation. On 2 February 1964 NOSENKO called a special meeting with his CIA handlers to correct this mistake. He said that, in fact, KEYSERS was STORSBERG's replacement, and the approach had been made to him. (Thus NOSENKO had forgotten the name of the one American Embassy official he ever approached.)

In February 1965 NOSENKO said that the KGB believed that KEYSERS did not report the receipt of the defection letter and that there was no indication that he had from microphones or telephone coverage of the U.S. Embassy. In fact, KEYSERS reported the letter at once in the office of the Military Attache, where a microphone was discovered in 1964. NOSENKO had earlier said that this particular microphone was being monitored around the clock by the KGB. (KEYSERS' homosexuality and drinking problems had also been discussed widely in Embassy offices. NOSENKO was unaware of these discussions.)

NOSENKO did not know correctly where or how the KGB delivered to KEYSERS the letter which preceded the airport approach which NOSENKO claimed to have made.

(vi) Other Code Clerk Cases

Frank DAY: NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Department code clerk and the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. As with all other code clerks, NOSENKO was asked whether he knew of any interesting information about DAY, whether he knew of any of DAY's friends in Moscow, or of his travels inside and outside the Soviet Union, etc. NOSENKO answered "no" to all these questions. He said that the KGB had no derogatory information on DAY, was unaware of any vulnerabilities he might have had, and that no operational measures were taken against him. Records show that DAY was in Moscow from May 1960 to October 1961. In July 1961 he travelled to the Caucasus with his friend, the U.S. Agricultural Attache BROWN, formerly an overt CIA employee. DAY later reported that the two were under surveillance by five persons at all times on this trip, that on one occasion they found four "repairmen" in their hotel room upon returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and that another time during this trip an "attractive and available Soviet female" was placed in their train compartment.

John TAYLOR: NOSENKO said TAYLOR was a State Department code clerk and the target of KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not know of TAYLOR's previous service abroad or of any background information the KGB might have had about him. He described an operation against TAYLOR which centered around his intimacy with a Russian maid (a KGB agent) and his sympathy towards the Soviet Union and its people. No compromising photographs were obtained of TAYLOR and the maid, however, and no approach was made to him, possibly because the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important STORSBERG case by creating a "flap." According to TAYLOR, he was intimate with his maid from about September 1960 until the beginning of 1961. On one occasion they were intimate in a "friend's apartment" in Moscow. NOSENKO did not know that the maid told TAYLOR she was pregnant or that TAYLOR offered her money for an abortion. TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961, whereas the approach to STORSBERG was reported by NOSENKO and STORSBERG to have occurred four to eight months afterward.

Maurice ZWANG: NOSENKO identified ZWANG as a State Department code clerk who was "actively worked on" during the 1960-1961 period. An Egyptian agent, whose name NOSENKO did not recall, introduced ZWANG to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain compromising photographs, but the agent did not like ZWANG and refused to have intercourse with him. At the time NOSENKO left the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1962, there was no further activity surrounding ZWANG. The KGB had no agents in contact with him, and there was no vulnerability data concerning him. When ZWANG was interviewed by the State Department after returning from his Moscow assignment, a polygraph examination indicated that ZWANG had had intercourse with his Russian maid, elsewhere identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent; ZWANG admitted visiting the maid's apartment several times but denied intimacies. In March or April 1961, an Egyptian introduced ZWANG to another Soviet female; ZWANG also admitted visiting her apartment on several occasions, but again denied having had intercourse with her. ZWANG was reported by various other Americans stationed in Moscow to have been active in currency speculation and blackmarketeering with the Egyptian and [redacted] and agent of KOSOLAPOV according to NOSENKO. NOSENKO was unaware of this.

h. Responsibility for and Knowledge of ABIDIAN

NOSENKO said that, as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was directly responsible, as case officer, for all coverage of the Embassy Security Officer John V. ABIDIAN. This was NOSENKO's only individual target responsibility, and no KGB officer shared it with him. NOSENKO said that he opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN before ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow in early 1960, and that he turned this file over officially to his successor, GRYAZNOV, when transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section at the end of 1961. It was NOSENKO who wrote the KGB plan for operations against ABIDIAN in about October 1960. ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was considered by the KGB to be a CIA officer and, as LANGELLE's successor, was also considered to be the most important counterintelligence target in the Embassy. ABIDIAN was thus made a special target of surveillance from the day of his arrival in the USSR; this meant he was always under surveillance by several teams of the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate. The intensive coverage of ABIDIAN included mail censorship, telephone taps, and agent reporting; it was instituted, NOSENKO said, "in the hope that he might lead the KGB to another POPOV." ABIDIAN was detected, NOSENKO continued, in three letter-mailings--all to agents already under KGB control. He was seen to enter a suspected dead drop site on Pushkin Street, the significance of which did not become known to the KGB until later, when it was learned that this site was to be used by PENKOVSKIY. In the hostile interrogations of early 1965, NOSENKO agreed that he was the single person in the KGB responsible for knowing everything possible about ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO said he knew nothing about ABIDIAN's personal background, his education, his studies in France, his military service, his date of entry into the State Department, his State Department rank, his previous foreign assignments with the State Department, or his status as a Foreign Service Reserve, Staff, or Officer status (FSR, FSS, FSO). NOSENKO said he tried to learn these things, but the information was unavailable in the Second Chief Directorate or in KGB Central files, and although he requested information from the First Chief Directorate, nothing was received. The only information the KGB had on ABIDIAN, insofar as NOSENKO knew, was that contained in ABIDIAN's visa request and in a report from one of the Legal Residencies in the United States; the report provided a basis for believing him to be a CIA officer.

NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the Department of State Biographic Register for information on ABIDIAN's background, he replied that this document was not available to the U.S. Embassy Section; he subsequently recalled that there was an old copy of the Biographic Register "from about 1956" in KOVSHUK's office, but that it contained no information on ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO reported that one of the reasons ABIDIAN was considered a CIA officer was his behavior while serving as a Department of State Security Officer with KHRUSHCHEV's delegation when the latter visited the United States in

1959. NOSENKO never mentioned that KOSOLAPOV, who he said was his immediate subordinate and shared NOSENKO's office in KGB Headquarters, was a member of this same delegation.

NOSENKO did not know where ABIDIAN's office was located in the U.S. Embassy. He said he did not know and was unable to find out who ABIDIAN's secretary was. He reported that some agent told the KGB that ABIDIAN had a sign on the door of his office which said "Security Officer." There was no such sign.

NOSENKO did not know where ABIDIAN's apartment was located. He did not know its contents and said that the KGB was not interested in this. He did not know whether ABIDIAN changed apartments in Moscow, which he did.

NOSENKO identified GROMAKOVA, an Embassy language teacher, as a KGB agent who was valuable because she was intelligent and was able to provide personality sketches on her students based on classroom discussions. He never associated ABIDIAN with GROMAKOVA. When told that ABIDIAN had taken language lessons from her, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN took "several" lessons from GROMAKOVA at the beginning of his tour but discontinued; she reported nothing of significance and there was no regular reporting from her on ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN, however, reported that he took regular, private Russian lessons from GROMAKOVA throughout his tour in Moscow and that they discussed in class his past personal life, travel, education, fiancee, and his trips abroad to see his fiancee.

NOSENKO knew that ABIDIAN travelled out of the USSR two or three times, but had no idea when these trips took place or what countries ABIDIAN visited. NOSENKO said that, as ABIDIAN's predecessor LANGELLE was known to have travelled outside the USSR for operational reasons in connection with the POPOV case, it would have been of interest to learn where ABIDIAN had gone, but the KGB had no way of finding this out. (Note in the previous paragraph that GROMAKOVA knew.) When NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out the possibility of photographing ABIDIAN's passport upon his return to the USSR, NOSENKO replied that the KGB does not photograph the passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO said that ABIDIAN made no trips outside Moscow within the USSR and explained that, as case officer, he would necessarily have been aware of any such trip as he would have had to handle all arrangements for surveillance during it. When NOSENKO was told that ABIDIAN travelled to Soviet Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO said for the first time that he was on leave in that month. NOSENKO admitted in October 1966 that he knew nothing of ABIDIAN's trip.

NOSENKO said that he did not know who were ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow or his friends and professional contacts among foreigners there.

NOSENKO said at the end of the January-February 1965 interrogations concerning ABIDIAN that the reason he knew so little about ABIDIAN was because he was "working badly" as ABIDIAN's case officer. The reason for his poor work, he said, was that he had to concentrate on supervising the work against code clerks and therefore had very little time left for ABIDIAN (see above concerning code clerks).

In 1962 NOSENKO correctly described all of the three clandestine letter mailings carried out by ABIDIAN in Moscow at CIA request (Pages 226-230). He also provided accurate information on CIA letter-mailings in general, pointing out that none at all were mailed for a year and a half after the arrest of LANGELLE in October 1959. (No letters were mailed from 22 February 1960 until 1 April 1961, when ABIDIAN mailed his first one.) NOSENKO explained that the KGB completely controlled this activity through the use of metka, a thief powder applied to the clothing of foreigners in the USSR; a trace is left on anything coming into contact with treated areas, and this can be detected by special machines through which all mail passes. Despite the fact that all of ABIDIAN's letters were mailed to KGB double agents and would therefore have been detected anyway, it was metka, NOSENKO said, which in each case led to their initial identification. After his defection NOSENKO described how the metka had been applied to ABIDIAN's clothing (and hence to the letters) by the agent FEDOROVICH, who began working as ABIDIAN's maid several months after ABIDIAN arrived in Moscow in March 1960. NOSENKO insisted under interrogation that FEDOROVICH was the only agent who had access to ABIDIAN's apartment, that he, NOSENKO, had personally briefed her on the application of metka, and that he was sure that ABIDIAN's letters were detected by means of metka. From a CIA debriefing of ABIDIAN, however, it appears that FEDOROVICH did not begin working as ABIDIAN's maid until some time in July 1961, whereas ABIDIAN mailed his first letter in Moscow on 1 April 1961 and his second letter on 2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, after FEDOROVICH began to work for him.

i. Reporting on ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin Street Dead Drop

NOSENKO's account of the visit by ABIDIAN to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site on Pushkin Street in Moscow is described in detail on Pages 231-235. In summary, NOSENKO reported that at the end of 1960 or early 1961 KGB surveillance followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street, where ABIDIAN was noted to enter a residential building. Upon examination it was decided that this was a likely dead drop site, and a stationary surveillance post was assigned to watch it. After three months, since nothing suspicious had been noted, this post was removed. The true significance of the location did not become known to the KGB until after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962. NOSENKO said he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and was ABIDIAN's case officer when this event took place. He heard of it while sitting in KOVSHUK's office on the day it happened. visited the site the following day with V. KOZLOV (Chief of the American Department of the KGB Surveillance Directorate), placed the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file, and discussed the results of the stationary post with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month and periodically thereafter until the post was removed. It was KOZLOV who told NOSENKO that after three months the stationary surveillance had been discontinued. NOSENKO did not tell CIA about this incident in 1962, he said, because he knew that the watch had been discontinued and that nothing suspicious had been noted; therefore, he thought the incident would not have been of interest to American Intelligence.

NOSENKO has stressed that ABIDIAN was under special surveillance by at least two surveillance teams at all times and that, on the day he visited Pushkin Street, ABIDIAN was under continuous watch from the moment he left the Embassy. NOSENKO has been able to give a detailed description of ABIDIAN's movement to the dead drop site.

Despite the special surveillance coverage of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO said, he was unaware of any unusual movements by ABIDIAN during the days immediately preceding his visit to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO said that he knew definitely that surveillance had reported nothing unusual during this period and that he was sure ABIDIAN had not eluded the surveillance at any time during it. According to CIA records, three days before ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street in response to indications that the dead drop had been loaded, ABIDIAN left the U.S. Embassy in his private car for Spaso House at about nine o'clock in the evening: at about two o'clock the next morning he and [GARBLER] (CIA Chief of Station) went in ABIDIAN's car to check the telephone pole for the signal PENKOVSKIY was to leave as part of his signal that the drop had been loaded. Two days before ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street he drove his car to the apartment of Air Force Captain DAVISON; he again checked the telephone pole from a window in the apartment and then walked by it on foot. NOSENKO identified GARBLER as a U.S. naval officer but not as a CIA employee (see above).

Asked why, in his opinion, ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street at the time he did, NOSENKO replied that in about 1960 an American tourist or delegation member had gone to this address. It was the "opinion of the Second Chief Directorate" that this American had selected the site as a dead drop location, and that ABIDIAN went there merely to check the suitability of the site for this purpose. In fact, ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street in response to what appeared to be a prearranged telephone signal from PENKOVSKIY signalling that he had loaded the dead drop there. It has been confirmed that PENKOVSKIY did not give this signal and, because of the circumstances and type of signal given, the possibility of coincidence has been ruled out. CIA has therefore concluded that the signal came from the KGB.

The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 letter through which he initially contacted CIA. There is no record that a "tourist or delegation member" visited this address. The only known visits by Americans to the building on Pushkin Street--the only ones having any connection with its use as a dead drop location--occurred on 12 November and 4 December 1960 when the CIA officer MAHONEY checked the address from outside, and on 21 January 1961 when MAHONEY entered the building and checked the specific location of the dead drop. MAHONEY is known to have been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer before arriving in Moscow and was the target of heavy surveillance throughout his tour. (NOSENKO did not know about MAHONEY or his CIA status.)

NOSENKO's date of "late 1960 or early 1961" is incorrect, almost exactly by a year. NOSENKO said he turned ABIDIAN's file over to GRYAZNOV about 28 December 1961. ABIDIAN checked the Pushkin Street dead drop on 30 December 1961. NOSENKO has described his participation in an approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON as happening "right after returning to the Tourist Department in 1962." Because NOSENKO's participation in this case was confirmed by JOHNSON, and because the approach to JOHNSON took place on 5 January 1962 (he reported it to the U.S. Embassy at once), it can be said with certainty that NOSENKO's entire story of his own participation in the surveillance of the Pushkin Street dead drop site is false. NOSENKO: (a) could not have visited the dead drop site with KOZLOV (who in any event was not in Moscow at the time); (b) could not have placed the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file, which GRYAZNOV held as of 28 December 1961; (c) could not have received almost daily reports from KOZLOV for about a month and periodic reports thereafter; and (d) could not have neglected to tell CIA of ABIDIAN's visit to the drop in 1962 on grounds that the surveillance of Pushkin Street had been discontinued after three months without anything suspicious being noted. (NOSENKO was in Geneva on 15 March 1962, only two and a half months after ABIDIAN checked the dead drop.)

NOSENKO has refused to admit that he lied about his part in this incident. The page containing the contradictions listed in the preceding paragraph was the only page of a "protocol" which NOSENKO refused to sign during the hostile interrogations of early 1965. In October 1966, when he was again asked whether he went to the Pushkin Street dead drop site with KOZLOV, NOSENKO said that he could not remember whether he had gone there at all.

j. Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache Operations

On 29 January 1965 NOSENKO told his interrogator that for the first five or six months of 1960, immediately after transferring to the U.S. Embassy Section and as part of his responsibilities as its Deputy Chief, he supervised Second Chief Directorate activities against American service attaches in Moscow. By this he meant, NOSENKO said, that when GAVRILENKO (the case officer for Air Force Attaches), KURILENKO (Army Attaches), or BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attaches and Marines) had any questions or reports to submit, they would come to him rather than to KOVSHUK, the Chief of the section, After about six months he was relieved of this duty because his other duties did not allow sufficient time for this function and because it was considered more suitable that ALESHIN, recently assigned to the American Department as Deputy Chief, be given this responsibility.

NOSENKO had previously been questioned in detail on his responsibilities in the U.S. Embassy Section, and had never before mentioned this one. NOSENKO told CIA in June 1964 that when he reported for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1960, DRANOV was the responsible case officer for the Naval Attaches and Marines. Soon after his own arrival, NOSENKO said, DRANOV was transferred from the section and his responsibilities were taken over by BELOGLAZOV, who had earlier been assisting DRANOV against these targets.

NOSENKO said on 20 October 1966 that immediately upon, or at the latest a few weeks after, arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section, he went on leave for a month. Either immediately before or right after this leave KOVSHUK told him that he would be responsible for activities against the Naval Attaches. DRANOV was retiring and gave NOSENKO the files on Naval and Marine personnel. This was NOSENKO's first mention either of the leave period in early 1960 or of having had case officer responsibilities for personnel of the Naval Attache's office in Moscow. (At the same time he said that he had lied about going on leave in November 1960.)

NOSENKO was reminded on 25 October 1966 that he had said in 1965 that in 1960 he was supervisor of operations against all U.S. service attache personnel. NOSENKO replied: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working on [supervising] all of them."

NOSENKO has never volunteered details of specific operational activity he handled as the case officer for U.S. Naval Attaches or supervisor of operations against all attaches in early 1960. He said that Marine Colonel DULACKI's contact with (or attempt to recruit) the Indonesian KGB agent [redacted] which he has described in detail (see Page 488) took place after he was relieved of these functions.

k. TDY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case

In the spring of 1961, NOSENKO said, four months after returning from Cuba, he was told unexpectedly that in about a week's time he would leave for Bulgaria to consult with the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR concerning operations against the American Legation in Sofia (Pages 279-283). NOSENKO flew to Sofia in early April 1961, where he was met by A.S. KOZLOV, an advisor there and a former employee of the Second Chief Directorate whom NOSENKO had known at KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO remained in Bulgaria until about the middle of May. While there he discussed both general matters and particular cases with the Bulgarians, gave several lectures on operations against American installations and personnel as well as against tourists, and finally directed the successful homosexual operation against the American Professor LUNT.

Aside from being told that he would be advising the Bulgarian service on operations against Americans at the Legation in Sofia, NOSENKO apparently received no preparation for this trip. He said in answer to specific questions that nobody told him what he was supposed to discuss with the Bulgarians, that he did not meet with the Bulgarian liaison representatives in Moscow before leaving, and that he knew nothing of the organization, personnel, area of responsibility, or problems of the American Department of the Bulgarian service before arriving in Sofia.

NOSENKO was selected for this mission despite the fact that he was extremely busy with his duties in the U.S. Embassy Section (see above discussion of his responsibilities for code clerks, ABIDIAN, and the military attaches) and despite the fact that KOZLOV was permanently assigned as an advisor in Sofia. NOSENKO described KOZLOV in another context as a "very experienced officer" and has said that KOZLOV was Chief of the American Department until 1953 and then from June 1955 until sometime in 1958 was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, Second Chief Directorate. (KOZLOV, assisted by NOSENKO, had recruited BURGI in June 1956.) Asked why KOZLOV could not have advised the Bulgarians, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on higher levels and had been away from active operations in Moscow too long.

NOSENKO gave only a general description of his duties as an advisor on operations against the American Legation. On the other hand, he accidentally became involved in a homosexual entrapment operation against an American tourist who was visiting Bulgaria, and he has described this operation in considerable detail. (NOSENKO's previous speciality was tourist operations, particularly those involving homosexual compromise.)

NOSENKO's story about his role in the LUNT case changed greatly between 1962 and 1964. During the first meeting series he described in detail how he set the operation up and what he said to LUNT when he personally confronted the American with the evidence. Since defecting in 1964, however, NOSENKO has said that he took no personal part in the approach itself, that he remained in his office, and that he merely advised how to set it up. (A comparison of his account and that of LUNT indicates that he was not on the scene at the time.)

NOSENKO said that the Bulgarian service became aware of LUNT's homosexual tendencies only after he saw LUNT's name or heard it mentioned; he recognized the name as that of a professor who had been assessed as a homosexual when earlier visiting Moscow, and traces with the KGB Second Chief Directorate confirmed that this was the same man. In statements made to U.S. authorities after the approach, LUNT said he had had homosexual relations at least five different times with a Bulgarian during an earlier trip to Sofia. LUNT gave this Bulgarian travellers' checks, which the latter planned to sell on the blackmarket, was on one occasion stopped on the street with him by a Bulgarian civil policeman, and corresponded with him in the interim between his first visit and the one during which the approach took place. LUNT had written the Bulgarian homosexual that he was returning to Sofia before arriving on the second occasion.

The U.S. Visa and the Cuba TDY

NOSENKO said that in October 1960 he was assigned to accompany a delegation of automotive specialists on a visit to the United States but that when this trip was cancelled, he went on TDY to Cuba (Pages 274-278). After he had completed arrangements for his passport and had submitted his true name to the U.S. Embassy for a visa, the Soviets were informed by U.S. authorities that the delegation could not then be accepted in the United States. At about the same time, a delegation of nickel industry experts was being readied for departure to Cuba. At first, NOSENKO explained, it was not considered necessary for a security officer to accompany this delegation to a friendly country, but at the last moment, two days before the delegation was scheduled to leave Moscow, the Central Committee of the Communist Party demanded that such an officer go along. Because there was no time to do otherwise, NOSENKO was chosen for this job since he already had a valid passport and authorization to travel abroad. Visa arrangements were made for the transit countries and NOSENKO left with the delegation, returning to Moscow in mid- or late December 1960.

NOSENKO's U.S. visa request submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 29 October 1960 was his first use of this name in connection with travel abroad. (He travelled to England in 1957 and 1958 as NIKOLAYEV, NOSENKO said, because he had used this name with British citizens [redacted] in the Soviet Union; as [redacted] was suspected of being an intelligence officer, NOSENKO was exposed under this identity. He applied for U.S. entry under true name, however, despite the fact that he had also used the NIKOLAYEV name with Americans; one of them was FRIPPEL who, according to the CHEREPANOV papers and one other source, was suspected by the KGB to be an American intelligence agent. NOSENKO further explained that he could not use the name NIKOLAYEV because the automotive delegation cover he planned to use in the United States conflicted with the sports/cultural cover he had used in Great Britain, and the KGB feared that this would be noticed when the American and British services exchanged notes. The proposed automotive cover, however, conflicts in the same way with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover NOSENKO used, again under true name, in Geneva in 1962.

NOSENKO said that the decision to send him to Cuba was made two days before the delegation left Moscow because a security officer was required and he happened to have a passport and authorization to travel. The delegation left Moscow on 15 November 1960, and therefore this decision was reached on 13 November or thereabouts. NOSENKO, who had been transferred to the U.S. Embassy Section in order to supervise and revitalize operations against code clerks, the Section's most important recruitment target, consequently left Moscow on the day that MORONE also departed by train for Warsaw and at a time that his subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16 November 1960), apparently in connection with an operation against John GARLAND.

NOSENKO has given widely divergent accounts of the purpose of his assignment to Cuba. In 1962 he related in detail how he had been sent to investigate how the Cuban intelligence service was operating against Americans stationed in Havana, particularly intelligence officers, and described what he did to fulfill this mission. Since 1964, however, NOSENKO has claimed merely to have been the security officer with the delegation.

1. Personal Handling of Agents

When NOSENKO transferred from the Tourist Department to the American Department, he took along a number of the agents he had used in tourist operations with him: YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, FRIPPEL, DMITRIYEV, and RYTOVA. During this period he also handled LEVINA, a librarian and language teacher at the U.S. Embassy who was turned over to him by U.S. Embassy Section case officer MASSYA in 1960; and PREISFREUND and [redacted] who were used in code clerk operations. These agents and NOSENKO's handling of them are discussed below.

(i) YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

NOSENKO continued to meet with these two homosexual agents during his two years as Deputy Chief of the section. He did not use them in any way, however, according to his account. The only contact of the two known to CIA was a meeting in 1961 with BARRETT. In 1959, while in Moscow and a CIA agent, BARRETT was compromised by YEFREMOV and VOLKOV; in 1961, shortly after an apparently chance meeting with them, BARRETT was recruited by the KGB on the basis of the materials obtained in 1959. NOSENKO described the compromise of BARRETT in 1959 and knew that he had been recruited in 1961. He did not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in 1961.

(ii) FRIPPEL

NOSENKO said he continued to handle FRIPPEL during the 1960-1961 period, despite the fact that he never provided anything of value, because he and CHELNOKOV (the Chief of the Tourist Department who was always present at these meetings) "kept hoping he would give something." FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union in January 1961, but NOSENKO continued to be registered as his case officer.

(iii) DMITRIYEV

DMITRIYEV, a specialist on Japan and Thailand who spoke Japanese and English, had been NOSENKO's agent during the 1955-1960 period. DMITRIYEV was then employed by the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow, and NOSENKO did not indicate how he was used in tourist operations. NOSENKO did not describe any operational use of him in 1960 or 1961.

(iv) RYTOVA

RYTOVA was NOSENKO's agent in the Tourist Department after 1956 or 1957, at which time she was employed at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow. An English speaker, she reported any interesting information concerning visitors to the exhibition. NOSENKO has not referred to any KGB operations in Moscow in which she participated during his service there.

(v) LEVINA

LEVINA worked as a language teacher and librarian at the American Embassy and NOSENKO handled her because she had a number of code clerks in her language classes. He met with LEVINA a number of times, but she never reported anything interesting and was never used directly in operations involving the Americans. She was fired from the Embassy at the end of 1960 or early 1961.

(vi) Johan PREISFREUND

As described in Pages 173-181 and discussed above, PREISFREUND was, NOSENKO said, recruited by KOVSHUK in 1960 and was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against James STORSBERG. Both NOSENKO and PREISFREUND said that this was the only operation in which he took part. NOSENKO suggested to CIA that PREISFREUND would be able to attest to his description of this case, and CIA interviewed PREISFREUND in Helsinki and Stockholm during the summer of 1965. PREISFREUND's account generally agreed with NOSENKO's and he was able to supply a considerable amount of personality and background information concerning his former case officer. From PREISFREUND's manner during these interviews, the nature of his responses and statements, and his actions after the interviews were completed, there was no reasonable doubt that he remained under KGB control while meeting the CIA representatives.

(vii) [redacted]

[redacted] (KGB cryptonym "SARDAR") was recruited by NOSENKO in 1961. A Syrian [redacted] in Moscow, [redacted] was first targetted against America House in General, but was then used only in the development operation against ZUJUS, the successor to James STORSBERG as military code clerk in Moscow. [redacted] met and developed ZUJUS, but nothing had come of the operation at the time NOSENKO transferred from the American Department. No other use was made of this agent and there was no approach to ZUJUS. NOSENKO first suggested that CIA attempt a "false flag" recruitment of [redacted] using his (NOSENKO's) name for this purpose; he provided CIA with [redacted] in Damascus so that contact could be established. Later NOSENKO said that [redacted] like PREISFREUND, could verify NOSENKO's position as his handler in the ZUJUS operation (Pages 209-212). CIA interviewed ZUJUS, who vaguely recalled having met [redacted] did not recall his name and denied that his relationship with [redacted] was as close as NOSENKO reported.

m. Transfer to the Tourist Department

Some time in the fall of 1961, NOSENKO said, he heard of GRIBANOV's decision to promote him to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire American Department. NOSENKO, however, knew that his chief and friend KOVSHUK wanted the job and that FEDOSEYEV (Chief of the Department) also favored KOVSHUK for this position. Realizing that his own appointment would therefore place him in a difficult position and wishing to avoid this, NOSENKO spoke to the Chief of the Tourist Department, CHELNOKOV, about returning there. At CHELNOKOV's suggestion, NOSENKO went to GRIBANOV with the request to be returned to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American Tourist Section, with the understanding that he would be made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department upon the retirement of the incumbent, BALDIN, in July 1962. To this GRIBANOV agreed. NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV did not discuss with him his reasons for wanting to appoint him Deputy Chief of the American Department or for appointing him Chief of the American Tourist Section, nor did he discuss with NOSENKO his personal requirements for these positions. On one occasion, in early 1965, NOSENKO said that it was because GRIBANOV "thought I was a tough guy, a good case officer. In 1959 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of questions which were reported to him." According to his most recent version, NOSENKO was officially transferred from the American Department at the end of December 1961 and reported for duty in the Tourist Department on about 3 January 1962.

KOVSHUK, who was also a candidate for the job as Deputy Chief of the American Department, had earlier held this position, according to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN. He had been personally involved in many of the more significant American Department operations during the previous decade. These included the recruitments of RHODES and SMITH (the latter one of NOSENKO's most important leads, according to NOSENKO); the handling of SHAPIRO; the attempts to recruit STORSBERG, HARMSTONE, and MANNHEIM; the development of the CIA officer WINTERS; and the interrogation of LANGELLE in connection with the POPOV arrest.

By contrast, GRIBANOV's original candidate for the job, NOSENKO, was present when KOZLOV recruited BURGI, and himself recruited HARRIS and five homosexual tourists who visited the Soviet Union in 1959. Furthermore, NOSENKO's performance as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, as he admitted under interrogation, was "not good."

NOSENKO has given many contradictory dates for his transfer to the Tourist Department. In 1962 NOSENKO said at various times that this took place in January 1962 and in February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling some time between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 he arrived at the date of 2 or 3 January 1962, after it was pointed out that he appeared in the approach to W.E. JOHNSON on 5 January. (On this basis, he said that the official order was issued about 25 December 1961 and that he turned over his files to his successor GRYAZNOV several days later.) NOSENKO contradicted this latter estimate, however, by saying that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section for the entire period of the three-month surveillance of the Pushkin Street dead drop, i.e., until late March 1962, and by his insistence that he had returned to the Tourist Department by the time GOLITSYN defected; he placed this on 15 January 1962 and refused to believe the correct date of 15 December 1961.

D. Remarks

For no single responsibility has NOSENKO substantiated his alleged service as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in the years 1960-1961. His statements about the appointment to and transfer from this position have been inconsistent; his comparatively narrow experience and his acknowledged falsehoods about a personal relationship with the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV, dispel the likelihood that these personnel assignments were made in the way he claims. Repeatedly he has been contradictory about his activities during this two-year period, shifting his story to suit the occasion and ignoring how each succeeding version made all of his claims increasingly incredible. The limited extent of NOSENKO's information betrays a lack of familiarity with details on the duties, targets, and most of the operations which he has ascribed to himself; in a certain few instances, however, such as his description of ABIDIAN's route to the Pushkin Street dead drop, he has recounted events just as they are known from other sources to have occurred. Nevertheless, where collateral information has covered the few subjects on which he provided details, it has almost invariably contradicted him and showed him to be ignorant of significant facts. The reporting by NOSENKO thus was so superficial, so incomplete, and so demonstrably erroneous as to suggest without reservation that he never served as an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section, much less as its Deputy Chief. All available evidence, excluding that from certain Soviets who were CIA and FBI sources (see Parts VIII.H. and VII.I. below), combines to formulate this conclusion.

7. Tourist Department (1962-1964)

a. Introduction

NOSENKO agreed during the interrogations at the beginning of 1965 that he must have reported for duty as Chief of the American Tourist Section on about 3 January 1962.* In this job he was responsible for planning and supervising KGB activities against all tourists of American, British, and Canadian nationalities arriving in the USSR, and his duties also encompassed preparations for the coming tourist season (Pages 285-287).

In July 1962, in conformity with GRIBANOV's intentions, NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department; it had a table of organization of close to 100 staff officers, was responsible for handling operations against all tourists to the Soviet Union, and maintained the facilities used in these operations. A year later NOSENKO received the title of First Deputy Chief of the Department, a "paper" promotion as there was no other deputy. During this period in the Tourist Department, in addition to his supervisory duties (concerning which he has not been questioned in detail), NOSENKO took personal part in approaches to several tourists, organized and directed the arrest of an American tourist on homosexual charges, and met with a number of agents. It was his senior supervisory position that involved him in two of the most widely publicized cases of this period, the arrest of BARGHOORN and the case of OSWALD.

b. Absences from Moscow

During his two years in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO was available to perform his assigned duties only part of the time. After arriving in the American Tourist Section and after the approach to JOHNSON on 5 January 1962, NOSENKO spent several weeks "getting the feel" of things by talking to case officers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the previous two years, and discussing plans for the up-coming tourist season. In mid-February he began preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO has said that this involved discussions with the Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for arranging for security coverage of Soviet delegations going abroad, as well as with the case officers responsible for the investigation of suspected American agent SHAKHOV. NOSENKO said that he did this on a part-time basis in addition to his regular duties, but has noted in another context that these preparations required sufficient time to make it impossible for him to take a personal part in the recruitment of BIENSTOCK in February 1962. On 15 March 1962, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, remaining there with the delegation until 15 June, when he left Geneva by train to return to Moscow to reassume his duties as Chief of Section. (He said that he had no deputy chief in this position, and it is unclear who performed these functions in his absence.) Thus, according to NOSENKO's account, of the six months he was Chief of the American Tourist Section, he was in Moscow only three months and for much of this time was involved in breaking in on his new job or in preparing for his temporary assignment abroad. NOSENKO said he had "no accomplishments" in this period.

---

* This date was settled upon after he acknowledged that his approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON must have occurred on 5 January, as CIA records show.

In the fall of 1962, NOSENKO went on leave for a month in Sochi with his wife and mother. NOSENKO has estimated that six months of 1963 were spent on various temporary assignments in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow, plus a one-month's vacation in 1963. From 15 June 1962 to his arrival in Geneva on 19 January 1964, a period of 18 months, NOSENKO was absent from KGB Headquarters for eight months. Thus in the period 1962-63, holding supervisory positions, NOSENKO was absent or "reading in" for about 13 months, or about 50 percent of the time.

c. Personal Participation in Operations

NOSENKO had direct operational contact with three Americans during 1962 and 1963. Two of these (the approach to JOHNSON and the interrogation of BARGHOORN) were unusual in that they were provocations without any attempt to recruit the target; NOSENKO could name no other examples of such operations. In both cases, the victim of the provocation has verified NOSENKO's presence. The third case, the recruitment approach to BRAUNS, was unsuccessful. Additionally, NOSENKO supervised the homosexual compromise of KOTEN, who was closely tied in with [redacted] sensitive source and related.

(i) The W.E. JOHNSON Provocation

JOHNSON (Pages 289-293), NOSENKO said, was in Moscow as a tourist in early January 1962 and was considered for recruitment, but a decision was made that he was not worth the effort as he had no access to classified materials and lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in Washington and New York City. (JOHNSON's home was in Texas.) Several days after this decision was made, postal intercepts showed that JOHNSON was writing abusive letters concerning the Soviet Union. They were "so bitter" and critical that the KGB decided that something had to be done to stop him. At about the same time the KGB received an indication that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis and force him to promise not to write any more letters or criticize the USSR in articles when he returned to the United States. The compromise was effected by use of NOSENKO's homosexual agents, and NOSENKO was able to describe the confrontation scene, his second meeting with JOHNSON, and JOHNSON's frightened telephone call to the U.S. Embassy reporting that NOSENKO had recontacted him.

NOSENKO told CIA in June 1962 that he had taken part in this operation "in January." When he contacted CIA in Geneva in 1964 he had a scrap of paper on which was noted JOHNSON's name and the date "5 January 1962." This was the actual date of the approach, but NOSENKO insisted that the date bore no relationship to the name, and that the approach to JOHNSON took place in the summer of 1962, a fact he recalled distinctly because he wore no overcoat. It was only when confronted with official U.S. records that NOSENKO agreed in early 1965 that the approach was in January and recalled that it was made immediately after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department.*

NOSENKO said that when JOHNSON first arrived in Moscow there was consideration of recruiting him, but that there was a decision against this as he was of little intelligence value. Then JOHNSON mailed insulting letters which were picked up through postal intecept. About the same time there were indications of homosexuality. Then the operation was mounted against him. This implies a very tight time schedule. JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961; NOSENKO said he reported for duty as Section Chief on 3 January 1962; JOHNSON reported his first contact with NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV the evening of 4 January; and the approach by NOSENKO was on 5 January.

Although NOSENKO implied in 1962 that his homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were the ones who originally determined JOHNSON's homosexuality, he said in 1964 only that there were "signs." NOSENKO did not know what these indications were or where they came from. JOHNSON reported that he first met the agent VOLKOV on the evening of 4 January when the latter sat down at his restaurant table; on this same occasion VOLKOV invited JOHNSON to his hotel room the next day. The fact that VOLKOV joined JOHNSON uninvited and set him up for the approach without leaving the table suggests that there had, in fact, been signs of his homosexuality beforehand and that operational plans had been laid by this time.

NOSENKO has described the caution taken in other homosexual entrapment cases and has named several which were called off because of a risk of scandal. It is, therefore, unusual that the KGB would take this risk merely to force JOHNSON, an American and a Baptist minister, to stop writing insulting letters and articles.

NOSENKO did not know why he became involved in this operation the day after he reported for duty in the senior position of Section Chief. He said only that BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, told him to do it. During his talks with JOHNSON, NOSENKO introduced himself to JOHNSON as "Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV," (rendered by JOHNSON as NIKOLOV) the "Chief of Police."

(ii) The BARGHOORN Provocation-Arrest

The arrest of Professor BARGHOORN (Pages 304-309) took place at the end of October 1963, at the time NOSENKO said he was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO has described in detail the selection of BARGHOORN as a hostage for IVANOV (the KGB officer arrested shortly before in New York City as a result of [redacted] the planning of the provocation, other KGB activities surrounding BARGHOORN which were not related to the provocation, BARGHOORN's arrest in Moscow, and the early stages of his interrogation. Except for some variation in dates, NOSENKO's accounts of BARGHOORN's movements and of the sequence of events in the provocation-arrest matched that of BARGHOORN. This case is in two ways similar to the approach to W.E. JOHNSON: It was an operation in which there was no thought of recruitment, and BARGHOORN was able to identify NOSENKO as a participant.

---

* How NOSENKO's self-stated and confirmed participation in a Tourist Department operation on 5 January 1962 carries implications for his account of ABIDIAN's visit to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop is discussed above.

BARGHOORN reported that the day after his arrest he was questioned by the same officer who had interrogated him the evening before about the "compromising materials" which had been planted on him. With this officer on this one occasion was his "chief," whom BARGHOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. NOSENKO has said that he was told by the Chief of the Tourist Department that GRIBANOV wanted him (NOSENKO) present in the interrogation room at the time when BARGHOORN admitted that he had the compromising information in his possession at the time of arrest. NOSENKO did not know why his particular presence was needed or desired, but he complied despite the fact that he did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN as he knew BARGHOORN would be released. NOSENKO said that he stayed in the interrogation room only until the interrogating officer secured this admission and then he left. BARGHOORN has reported that NOSENKO attended one of the interrogation sessions, that this session covered only biographic and background matters, and that the compromising documents and his possession of them had been discussed the previous evening, right after his arrest.

In describing the planning of this provocation, NOSENKO told CIA that the suggestion to provide BARGHOORN came from GRIBANOV, who took the idea of arresting BARGHOORN to KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY, but did not divulge to him that it would be based on provocation. This was on the day before the arrest. SEMICHASTNYY agreed with the idea of the arrest and secured permission to carry it out from BREZHNEV, as KHRUSHCHEV was out of Moscow at the time. Reliable sources show, however, that KHRUSHCHEV was in Moscow on 30 October, the day when SEMICHASTNYY allegedly called BREZHNEV, and was also there on 31 October, the day of the arrest. BREZHNEV was not seen by Westerners in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.

(iii) The Approach to BRAUNS

NOSENKO said he personally approached the American tourist BRAUNS (Pages 293-295) shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962. BRAUNS had lived in Leningrad until World War II, had left with the fleeing Germans, and had eventually settled in the United States, where he was a technician working at an "interesting company making computers, adding machines, or other instruments." NOSENKO had originally instructed his subordinate KRUPNOV to handle the case, but KRUPNOV was not able to get anywhere with BRAUNS and in the middle of the approach called NOSENKO for help. NOSENKO went to the Moscow Hotel where KRUPNOV and BRAUNS were talking, and he eventually secured BRAUNS' agreement to cooperate, against threat of imprisonment for treason on the basis of his wartime flight from the Soviet Union. BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Leningrad, and because NOSENKO felt the recruitment was "shaky," KRUPNOV was sent after him to consolidate the agreement. BRAUNS refused to see KRUPNOV however, so again NOSENKO went to help him. It was clear to NOSENKO, however, that BRAUNS was so frightened that he would never work for the KGB; NOSENKO thereupon decided to terminate the case, and BRAUNS was sent on his way.

NOSENKO could not recall his position at the time he approached BRAUNS, he did not know why BRAUNS had visited the Soviet Union, and he was unable to name any Soviet citizens with whom BRAUNS came into contact while in the USSR. BRAUNS, in fact, had spent almost a week in Moscow before the approach was made. During this time he spent his days with an Inturist tour and his evenings with an old girlfriend he had known before the war. She had been writing to BRAUNS in the United States for about a year, telling him of her unhappy marriage and impending divorce. BRAUNS had written her of his intention to visit the USSR, and she travelled specially from her home in Leningrad to Moscow to spend this time with him.

According to the account given by BRAUNS, the man (NOSENKO, according to NOSENKO) who joined him and his original interrogator in Moscow was the person who first approached him in Leningrad. This suggests, if correct, that it was NOSENKO who was sent there to consolidate the recruitment, not KRUPNOV. BRAUNS was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph but explained that he was so frightened that he probably could not recognize anyone involved. Other aspects of his story therefore may be confused.

(iv) The Arrest of KOTEN

NOSENKO said he supervised the homosexual provocation and arrest of American tour guide KOTEN in 1963 and the developments in the case were reported to him (Pages 298-303); he was not in face-to-face contact with KOTEN. NOSENKO explained that KOTEN, a member of the CPUSA, had frequently visited the USSR since the war, had numerous suspicious contacts there, and was considered possibly to be a "plant" (presumably of the FBI) in the Communist Party. Prior to his arrival in 1963, [redacted] Legal Residency reported that KOTEN was in contact with an important [redacted] agent in [redacted] that he was carrying the address of relatives of this agent with him on his trip, and that he intended to visit them. On this basis, it was considered that he might have the mission of investigating the [redacted] agent inside the USSR. [redacted] As it was suspected from earlier trips that KOTEN was a homosexual, the KGB planned to compromise him, arrest him, break him, and provide time for the [redacted] agent to make his escape from the United States. KOTEN was arrested, but the [redacted] agent refused to leave the United States, and when the CPUSA protested the arrest of one of its members, KOTEN was released.

KOTEN was a long-time Communist, and there are no apparent reasons why the KGB should doubt his loyalty. His homosexuality was well-known to his acquaintances within the CPUSA, and at the time of his trip to the Soviet Union he was acting as a tour guide for the New York firm "Afton Tours," which is owned by SVENCHANSKIY. (NOSENKO said that SVENCHANSKIY, also a Communist, was his own agent at the time of KOTEN's arrest.)

NOSENKO was able to give a considerable amount of identifying data on the "important [redacted] agent" [redacted] This agent had been identified [redacted] a year before KOTEN's trip. [redacted]

The fact that KOTEN had been arrested on charges of homosexuality was leaked by Inturist to press services two days after the reported date of the arrest, resulting in wide publicity in Western newspapers. (The U.S. Embassy was not notified officially until two days later.) There was no apparent reason for this extremely unusual step by the KGB, which can be assumed to manipulate Inturist for operational support purposes.

After the CPUSA had protested the action, KOTEN was released from prison. He was told that the incident was a mistake which had been corrected, that he was free to go anywhere he wanted in the Soviet Union, and that he could return anytime. [redacted] the [redacted] agent, has since repatriated to the Soviet Union.

d. Agents Handled by NOSENKO

When NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department, he took with him the two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, PREISFREUND, [redacted] and RYTOVA (Pages 287-289). The homosexuals he used the day after his return, in the operation against W.E. JOHNSON. This was their first operational use since the fall of 1959; they were never used again before being terminated at the end of 1962 or early 1963, NOSENKO said, because they were "too well known." PREISFREUND was considered compromised to American Intelligence following the defection of GOLITSYN, so he also was never used again, although NOSENKO met him socially when PREISFREUND returned to Moscow on business trips as recently as 1963. During the first part of 1962, on instructions from KOVSHUK and the Chief of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with [redacted], who was still involved in the development of ZUJUS, the American code clerk. NOSENKO last saw [redacted] before going to Geneva in March 1962; WEISS left the Soviet Union to return to Syria while NOSENKO was away. RYTOVA, NOSENKO said, had been his agent since 1956 or 1957. Some time in 1962 she moved from her position as an instructor of Greek at the Institute of International Relations to a position in the school of the CPSU Central Committee and ceased agent work. Although she was inactive, NOSENKO continued to be registered as her case officer until 1964, when he defected.

(i) FRIPPEL

Having left his assignment in Moscow in early 1961, FRIPPEL (Pages 129-133 and Part VIII.D.5.) returned several times to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO, who remained his case officer although FRIPPEL now lived and worked in New York City, met him each time. FRIPPEL said there were three such occasions, in February 1962 when he met once with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV in Odessa, and two later times in Moscow and Odessa, when NOSENKO came alone. NOSENKO denied that he met FRIPPEL in Odessa in February 1962 with CHELNOKOV, but said that he met twice with him alone after returning to Moscow from Geneva. The first of these meetings was in the summer of 1962 when FRIPPEL was accompanying a group of American newspaper editors touring the Soviet Union. FRIPPEL said NOSENKO called briefly at his hotel room to enquire what questions the editors planned to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a planned interview. When FRIPPEL said he did not know, NOSENKO departed and FRIPPEL later reported that he did not see NOSENKO again on this trip. (NOSENKO said he called again after the interview to learn the "reactions" of the editors.) The second meeting was in Odessa, when FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as a guide on a tour ship. According to FRIPPEL, it was on this occasion that NOSENKO apparently made a phone call to ask permission to go aboard FRIPPEL's ship, and it might have been at this meeting or the earlier one that NOSENKO told him something of his personal background. (FRIPPEL knew a considerable amount of information about NOSENKO's father and family.) NOSENKO denied the possibility that he would have to request permission to board the vessel and said that if he had told FRIPPEL anything about himself, it was when he was drunk. Both FRIPPEL and NOSENKO agreed that FRIPPEL provided no information of value during any of these meetings.

(ii) SVENCHANSKIY

NOSENKO has cited SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "ANOD," as an example of the Second Chief Directorate's use of foreign travel agents to signal the KGB when an interesting tourist is about to visit the Soviet Union (Pages 295-298). SVENCHANSKIY was recruited for this purpose, NOSENKO said, in 1961 and used to send open-code signals to the Tourist Department by marking visa applications whenever he spotted anything significant. Some of SVENCHANSKIY's signals had been considered, NOSENKO said, "of definite operational interest." In September 1963, NOSENKO took the case over from the previous handling officer, NOSKOV, and his name was listed in SVENCHANSKIY's file as the responsible officer.

NOSENKO first said that he had read SVENCHANSKIY's file and then changed this to say that he had only skimmed it. He met twice with his new agent, once in September 1963 and once later in the year. On both occasions, NOSKOV was present.

NOSENKO said that at the time SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 that, because SVENCHANSKIY was known to have had contacts with AMTORG in New York, there was some suspicion that he might be an FBI agent. NOSENKO was unable to be more precise as to the basis for these suspicions and, when asked how NOSKOV had resolved them, was able to say only that NOSKOV "felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an American agent.

NOSENKO knew little about SVENCHANSKIY's background from the one-volume file kept on him in the Tourist Department: He did know that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 on the promise of commercial favors, that he had at one time been detected in blackmarket transactions in the USSR, and that in addition to his travel agency, SVENCHANSKIY ran a Russian-language bookstore in Chicago. FBI and CIA records show that SVENCHANSKIY has been employed by a series of registered Soviet Government organizations in the United States since the early 1930's, that he was released from his position as a United Nations radio officer broadcasting to the Soviet Union in 1952 when he failed to answer questions of the Senate Internal Security Committee concerning alleged subversive activity, and that both his travel agency and his book store are affiliated with registered Soviet agencies, Inturist and Mezhkniga. Allegations on file of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espionage activities date back to the Second World War. In August 1950, Harry GOLD linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage network in the United States during the war. The FBI has reported [redacted] one time been the confidential secretary of GOLOS, the "director of Soviet espionage in the United States." (NOSENKO knew that someone called Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY in New York, but said that she is not a KGB agent and was not the one who marked the visa applications.)

e. The OSWALD Investigation

As First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said, he was directly involved in the investigation of OSWALD's activities in Minsk which was ordered after the assassination of President KENNEDY (Pages 136-144 and Part VIII.D.5.). It is from his role at this time and his reading of the Minsk KGB file on OSWALD that NOSENKO derived his authority to state that the KGB "washed its hands of OSWALD" after his attempted suicide in the USSR, that there was no attempt to recruit either OSWALD or his wife, and that KGB interest in OSWALD while he lived in Minsk was restricted to passive observation.

f. The CHEREPANOV Investigation

Part VIII.B.6.c. contains a discussion of the CHEREPANOV case, in which NOSENKO claims to have been involved in November 1962 while Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

g. Remarks

Leaving aside NOSENKO's unsubstantiated claims to supervisory jobs in the Tourist Department in 1962-1963, when he indicated he was absent from KGB Headquarters nearly half of the time, his personal role in operations and investigations of the period appears artificial in some instances and implausible in others. NOSENKO's knowledge of the origins of the JOHNSON case is incomplete, the timing conflicts with other activities attributed to himself, the expressed purpose of the compromise in unique, and the outcome seems to have little consequence beyond enabling JOHNSON to confirm that NOSENKO appeared in it. Although BRAUNS may have been in a position to corroborate NOSENKO's appearance in that operation, he has not done so and his statements contradict NOSENKO on the part the latter played. So too do the statements of BARGHOORN, who recognized NOSENKO as a person who was seen briefly during the interrogation sessions; certain facts from other sources contradict NOSENKO on one important detail (KHRUSHCHEV's presence in Moscow) of the BARGHOORN arrest, explained as a retaliation-hostage action for events in [redacted] [redacted] NOSENKO's information on the Soviet arrest of the American Communist KOTEN seems simply to have confirmed [redacted]. NOSENKO's earlier information [redacted] information on the background of the SVENCHANSKIY operation is fragmentary, lacking even the most important facts known from several, mainly overt, sources; his attendance at meetings with SVENCHANSKIY was confined to the two times when the original handler was also present. The position of NOSENKO in the FRIPPEL and OSWALD cases is discussed in Part VIII.D.5. In summary, NOSENKO's operational work was not commensurate with that of a Section Chief and Deputy Department Chief, nor with that of a case officer, regardless of rank. Where the participation of NOSENKO in Tourist Department activities has been or might be confirmed by other sources, it is therefore unproven that he was in a supervisory position in the KGB or that he was even a case officer.

E. Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography

1. KGB Awards and Ranks

a. Awards

At various times since contacting CIA in 1962, NOSENKO described a series of awards and decorations which he received over the years for his performance of duties in the Second Chief Directorate (Pages 319-321). He claimed to have received the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, and the Order of the Red Banner; he said he received a special commendation from KGB Chairman SEROV for his role in the BURGI recruitment and the same award in 1959 for his recruitment of all of the American or British tourists recruited that year by the KGB (three British and three American homosexuals). NOSENKO told of a number of other commendations which he received--almost one a year--for his "general good work." In October 1966 NOSENKO said that he never received any awards for his KGB operational performance, only a medal for satisfactory completion of 10 years of KGB service and a Red Army anniversary medal.

b. Ranks

NOSENKO's descriptions of his various rank promotions follow a similar but more complicated pattern (Pages 322-326). He has given two separate sets of circumstances for his first promotion, from junior lieutenant to lieutenant. According to the first of these, the one NOSENKO adhered to during 1964 and 1965, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while serving in the Far East with the naval GRU at the beginning of 1951. NOSENKO explained that the required time in grade is sometimes cut in half for officers serving at this undesirable post, and that this is why he was promoted after only six months of active duty. In 1966 NOSENKO said for the first time that he did not enter on active duty until March 1951 and that his promotion to lieutenant was in mid-1952, while stationed in Sovetsk, on the Baltic. In all his accounts, NOSENKO has said that he entered the KGB with the rank of lieutenant as this had been his rank in the naval GRU.*

During his first meetings with CIA in Geneva during 1962 NOSENKO claimed then to be a KGB major and said that he had already completed the necessary time in grade for a lieutenant colonelcy. NOSENKO gave an apparently accurate description of the structure of his salary as a major (so much for rank, so much for longevity, etc.) and pointed out that he was filling a position (Chief of Section) normally held by a lieutenant colonel. On contacting CIA again in 1964, NOSENKO claimed the rank of lieutenant colonel. He supported this claim with the TDY authorization issued for the CHEREPANOV search,** which gave NOSENKO's rank as lieutenant colonel and was signed by GRIBANOV himself and testified to it by his signature on the "official biographical statement" prepared in Frankfurt.

---

* See Part VIII.D.2. for a discussion of the likelihood that NOSENKO served in the naval GRU.

** See Part VIII.B.7.c. for an analysis of the CHEREPANOV case.

The first major change in NOSENKO's story of his promotions came during the interrogations of January 1965 when he volunteered out of context and for no clear reason that he had never held the rank of major but rather, because of a series of administrative slip-ups and GRIBANOV's advice and help, had jumped directly from the rank of captain, which he received in 1956, to the rank of lieutenant colonel in late 1963. NOSENKO was later to claim that he had never said in 1962 that he was a major.*

In an unsolicited statement given to CIA in April 1966, NOSENKO wrote that he was only a captain and that the TDY authorization for the CHEREPANOV search had been filled out in error.

c. Remarks

NOSENKO's admissions regarding his awards and promotions directly affect his self-portraiture as a successful and rapidly rising KGB officer. They also have a bearing on one of the alleged reasons for this rise [redacted]; it was GRIBANOV's favoritism. NOSENKO almost invariably linked GRIBANOV's name to each of the awards he earlier claimed to have received. In most cases it was GRIBANOV who decided that NOSENKO should get a particular award; in the rest, it was GRIBANOV who physically presented the award to NOSENKO. The same is true of NOSENKO's account of his rank promotions: GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said, had promised him that he would be promoted directly from senior lieutenant to major in 1959; when the Personnel Department made a mistake and only promoted NOSENKO to captain, GRIBANOV advised him to accept this rank and promised that when he had completed sufficient time in grade for promotion to major, GRIBANOV would see to it that he was promoted directly to lieutenant colonel. This is what happened, NOSENKO said in 1965, and after he received his rank of lieutenant colonel, GRIBANOV called him in and congratulated him. On the basis of NOSENKO's admissions, there is additional reason to question his relationship with GRIBANOV.**

NOSENKO carried with him to Geneva, against KGB regulation and for no reason he could explain, an official KGB document listing him as a lieutenant colonel and signed by GRIBANOV himself as well as by two provincial authorities. This suggests strongly that the lie concerning NOSENKO's rank was not NOSENKO's alone. (If, in fact, as pointed out above, the CHEREPANOV papers were fabricated by the KGB, then there was no genuine search for CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO's document is also fabricated and not a mistake as NOSENKO claims.)

---

* This change of story coincided closely in time with a change in the information reported by [redacted]. Shortly after NOSENKO's defection [redacted] had said that remarks by his KGB associates made it appear that NOSENKO was a lieutenant colonel. [redacted] that NOSENKO was only a captain.

** NOSENKO's retractions and changes of story concerning his personal and operational relationship with GRIBANOV are discussed elsewhere (Pages 327-336).

2. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs

a. Introduction

NOSENKO drifted into the Komsomol, he said, in 1943 or 1944 without giving the step any thought whatsoever. All of his friends at the Baku school were joining, so NOSENKO did too. He remained an indifferent member of this Communist youth organization throughout his school and university years, in the GRU, and during his first year as a KGB officer. On arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1953, NOSENKO told CIA, he was appointed Secretary of the small Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate, a group of about 17 members.

b. Discussion

NOSENKO was questioned by DERYABIN on his duties as Komsomol Secretary (Pages 623) and, although able to give a superficial account of these functions, was found to be unaware of certain basic information which DERYABIN felt a person in this position should have. Thus, for example, NOSENKO provided a description of the system of levying dues on Komsomol members which was substantially incorrect and was unaware that a Komsomol Congress (the first in many years and therefore a major event) had been held during his claimed tenure as Secretary.

NOSENKO said that he held the position of Komosmol Organization Secretary until the late spring or early summer of 1954, when he got into trouble for having used official KGB alias documentation to conceal the fact that he received treatment for venereal disease contracted from a prostitute. Immediately after this incident, said NOSENKO, he was removed from his position and a "strict reprimand" was placed in his Komsomol file. Several months thereafter, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol because he was too old. For over a year, until January 1956 when NOSENKO was admitted as a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he was the only officer in the KGB who was neither a Komsomol nor a Party member. NOSENKO's account of his expulsion from the Komsomol on reaching his 27th birthday is contradicted by the official Statutes of the Komsomol in effect at that time. These regulations stipulate a maximum age of 25 years and NOSENKO should therefore have been forced out at the end of October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. This was explained to NOSENKO, who insisted that he remained a member until he became 27 years old and that no special exceptions were made in his case.

c. Remarks

The fact that NOSENKO is incorrect regarding the age limitation makes it doubtful that his account of the venereal disease incident and his removal from the Komsomol Secretaryship is true. The date which he gives to this incident is after that on which he should have been expelled from the Komsomol. (Additionally, NOSENKO's descriptions of the veneral disease incident, his use of false documents, and his subsequent punishment by the KGB and the Komsomol have been inconsistent; see Pages 80-81).

The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.).

3. Schooling

a. Introduction

There is relatively little reliable collateral information concerning NOSENKO's schooling up until 1950. Other than what he himself has reported, available information consists of overt press releases pertaining to the Minister NOSENKO's career (and giving his location at various times) and comments by one KGB officer and one defector. NOSENKO's own account, together with references to these other sources, is summarized below.

With the exception of minor variations in dates, attributable to memory, NOSENKO's story of his early years until the beginning of World War II, when he had just completed the sixth grade in Moscow, has been generally consistent in its various tellings. Moreover, his accounts of having studied in Leningrad and Moscow agree with information concerning the positions and movements of the elder NOSENKO during these years. In contrast, the period immediately following, during which NOSENKO allegedly received his early training in naval matters is characterized with frequent changes of story, contradictions, and admitted falsehood.

b. Discussion

In 1964 and 1965 NOSENKO recalled that he enrolled in the Moscow special naval school in the summer of 1941, immediately after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, and was evacuated with the entire school from Moscow to Kuybyshev in September to begin studies in the seventh grade. (An article in the Soviet Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on 14 January 1967 confirmed that seven special naval schools were established in the Soviet Union in April 1940. One of these was in Moscow. However, to be eligible for admission, one had to have completed the seventh grade. The article did not indicate that the Moscow school was evacuated.) In April 1966, NOSENKO remembered that he did not go to Kuybyshev at this time but rather had been evacuated to Chelyabinsk with his mother and entered the seventh grade of a regular school.

In keeping with his respective accounts, NOSENKO said in 1964 and 1965 that he returned from Kuybyshev in the summer of 1942 and secured admission to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School, along with which he was evacuated by train to Baku in the fall of that year. In April 1966, after inserting the year spent at Chelyabinsk with his mother, NOSENKO moved all events up a year and wrote in his autobiography that he entered the Kuybyshev school in the fall of 1942 rather than the fall of 1941. NOSENKO also wrote at this time that he transferred to the Leningrad preparatory school and travelled to Baku in the fall of 1943, not 1942.*

---

* Describing the reasons for his transfer to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School, NOSENKO explained that the Moscow special naval school was evacuated further to Achinsk in Siberia and that this was farther from home than he wished to go. The Red Star article mentioned above said that the special naval schools were all closed in 1943, however. The special school apparently therefore was not transferred further to Achinsk, but was shut down.

Again to accommodate the added year in Chelyabinsk, NOSENKO said in 1966 that he spent half a year (actually, according to the rest of the story, about three months) in Baku before running away from school back to Moscow in January 1944. In earlier accounts he said he was at the preparatory school there from October 1942 until January 1944. Earlier he had also given expansive and changing accounts of his escape from school to join the Soviet front against the Germans at Tuapse; now he admitted that this was a lie. By cutting the time he was in Baku from 15 months to about three, NOSENKO also admitted implicitly that his accounts of the basic training he received in the preparatory school, of the summer he spent working at the school rather than returning to Moscow on vacation, and of his "certainty" that he celebrated his 15th birthday in Baku were also false.

NOSENKO has been relatively consistent in recounting the events of 1944. In 1964, 1965 and again in 1966 he told of studying as an "external" student in Moscow to complete his ninth year of schooling and of rejoining his classmates from Baku when the naval preparatory school returned to Leningrad in the autumn of 1944. On several occasions during 1964 and 1965, NOSENKO described how he and his classmates spent October and November 1944 working in the woods near Leningrad before beginning their tenth grade studies late in the year; he omitted this account from his April 1966 autobiography.

NOSENKO's account of the next years is similarly marked with a number of inconsistencies and falsehoods. (In the latter category he has claimed and later admitted as untrue that he attended the Frunze Naval Academy from 1943 to 1944, that he was on active military duty until being demobilized in 1945, and that he was shot in the hand by a jealous young naval officer in 1945.) According to the account given under interrogation in April 1964, NOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party in the end of April 1945, was hospitalized, resigned from the preparatory school, and received a certificate of satisfactory completion of the tenth grade, although he had been in school only since November 1944. In 1965 and 1966 NOSENKO said, respectively, that he was shot by a naval officer in February or March 1945 and that he shot himself in "early" 1945; since the 1964 interrogations he has claimed only that he received a statement of the courses he had attended at the preparatory school and that he completed the tenth grade at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in Leningrad.

The earliest collateral information specifically concerning NOSENKO's educational background appears to relate to the general period described above. [redacted] the Soviet Navy defector ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval preparatory school with NOSENKO during the period 1944 to 1946. ARTAMONOV, after NOSENKO's defection was publicized, said he had known a son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946. He was then shown a picture of NOSENKO and confirmed this was the man. However, according to NOSENKO's statements, NOSENKO would have been about two classes behind ARTAMONOV, and would have been at the school for only about two months. It is conceivable that the presence of the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding would be widely known in the school and later remembered, but so would that son's self-inflicted wound and disappearance, which ARTAMONOV has not mentioned. It is unlikely, moreover, that ARTAMONOV could (20 years later) reliably recognize a photo of a person who had been there such a short time and not in ARTAMONOV's class. (NOSENKO claims not to have known ARTAMONOV nor to recognize the name.)

In all accounts, including his 1962 statements, NOSENKO has said that he entered the Institute of International Relations in Moscow in 1945. His descriptions of courses, events and friends are as vague and unsubstantial as his accounts of his earlier schooling. He has given various dates for his graduation and has explained that he did so to cover up the fact that he failed his final examination in the subject of "Marxism-Leninism," of which he was ashamed. NOSENKO most recently claimed that he received his diploma in the end of the summer of 1950. [redacted]

c. Remarks

NOSENKO's own admissions, as well as the small amount of collateral information available, make it clear that much of his account of his education has been false. The reasons for this are not at all clear and perhaps, in fact, there is no logical explanation. The CIA psychologist who tested and questioned NOSENKO about his youth suggested that, under conditions of interrogation, he may lie for no other reason other than his need to save face. This view is an accurate description of NOSENKO's behavior when questioned in detail on this and other aspects of his pre-KGB life; it is not so with regard to questioning on his intelligence career. Nor does the psychologist's view appear to explain why NOSENKO forgot or was unwilling to tell CIA about an entire year of his life, particularly such a significant one, after consistently and apparently accurately (judging from the Soviet press accounts of the Minister's activities) describing the years preceding it. It is not apparent why NOSENKO originally volunteered the story of his travel to Baku in the fall of 1942, when this was untrue, or why he said that the Moscow Special Naval School was evacuated to Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that the school was closed, if he was there.*

---

* The possibility that NOSENKO is not the person he claims to be (and with a completely false life history, or one lived by someone else) has been examined carefully, but no clear conclusion can be drawn on the basis of available evidence.

F. Appraisals of NOSENKO, his Motivation, and Other Operational Circumstances

1. Introduction

Appraisals of NOSENKO the man and of his motivations must be founded, as with any source, on factors which are often immeasureable, but fewer reservations need be attached to an appraisal of the other circumstances affecting the course of events in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. These operational circumstances can be analyzed and evaluated in much the same manner as were NOSENKO's production, sourcing, and biography for they are tangible pieces of evidence. In the next portions of this paper are presented these appraisals, which draw chiefly upon Pages 603-641 (for NOSENKO the man), Pages 20-29 (for his motivations), and Pages 11-19 and 30-43 (for the operational circumstances).

2. NOSENKO

The CIA specialists who assessed NOSENKO fouhd him to be of above-average intelligence, one of them saying that "his effective intelligence is more cleverness than intellectuality, more shrewdness than efficiency." He is capable of good memory and, as illustrated by his repeating certain facts in the same sequence, capable of what appears to be good memorization of details. On the other hand, there were numerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountings of various events, he himself claimed an odd or poor memory, and he was the exceptional defector by having been totally debriefed within a relatively short period.

Parts VIII.D. and VIII.E. discuss NOSENKO's truthfulness with reference to his Soviet Intelligence and personal backgrounds. Here may be added other observations by the CIA specialists: NOSENKO can exercise deception cleverly, he improvised and was evasive under interrogation, and he has a "remarkable" disregard for the truth where it serves his purposes. The results of the polygraph examination were that NOSENKO "attempted deliberate deception."

The gaps and errors in NOSENKO's testimony therefore do not seem attributable to low intelligence or to consistently poor memory, but to a conscious attempt to mislead American Intelligence. Independently, then, this conclusion raises the questions of whether NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB and if so, why he was chosen. Regarding the latter point, it is noted that a CIA psychiatrist observed: "This man is capable of playing a role and playing it effectively," and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NOSENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors] as a possible penetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired." It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations, that NOSENKO displayed an inability to explain the gaps and errors in his reporting.

3. Motivation

Part of one's motivation for such a drastic act as treason or defection may not be wholly conscious, and there may be underlying causes which any source might not want or be able to admit even to himself. Thus, what NOSENKO said about motivation need not be taken at face value, and for this reason the whole question of his motivation must remain a minor weight in the overall assessment of bona fides.

NOSENKO has tried to present a meaningful explanation and has changed or adjusted his story to this end. He initially insisted that he had no ideological motives but simply wanted to "make a deal" in order to get out of trouble; yet this claim is open to question: The amount of operational money which NOSENKO needed to replace was hardly enough to have driven him to treason, especially since there were friends in Geneva like GUK and KISLOV who might have helped him make up his loss. Furthermore, only two days after CIA had rescued him with the funds, NOSENKO spent the CIA money in another drunken debauchery (with the same companion) and came back needing more. The discrepancy between the degree of the need and the seriousness of of the act was so evident that the CIA case officer commented to NOSENKO at the outset that there must be some deeper explanation for his act. Thereupon NOSENKO added new reasons: His distaste for certain aspects of the regime, his resentment of KHRUSHCHEV, and his liking for Americans.

By his defection in 1964 NOSENKO changed the course of his life, although he had said in 1962, forcefully and unequivocally, that he would never do so unless in acute danger. In 1964 he could give no coherent explanation for the change of heart and in October 1966 he denied, for the first time, that he had said in 1962 that he would not defect. His only motivation was that, having risen to the level of Deputy Department Chief, he would not get to travel abroad any more. (This contradicts NOSENKO's 1962 statements: anticipating imminent promotion to Deputy Department Chief, he said that he would leave the USSR at least once a year in the future.) For no visible reason NOSENKO seems to have abandoned a purportedly successful and promising career, an undisturbed family life and children of whom he was fond, cast shame on his father's memory and his remaining relatives, and departed forever from his own country.

His own unease concerning his motivation evidently continued until, in 1965, he wrote one cohesive explanation. No part of this statement was ever borne out by his conduct, attitudes, remarks or reactions. He appeared, whenever his reactions seemed spontaneous, to dislike the United States, to have no interest in it politically, culturally, or scenically, and to preserve a preference for the USSR. A CIA graphologist commented on NOSENKO's "strong emotional ties to his traditional background," while a CIA psychologist reported: "Emotionally he has not defected in spite of his attempt to intellectually rationalize that he has." The psychologist also said that it is "almost impossible to determine his true loyalties and true beliefs."

4. Operational Circumstances

a. Presence in Geneva (1962)

When he came to Geneva in mid-March 1962, NOSENKO was a newly appointed Section Chief in the KGB Second Chief Directorate, having held this position for two months. He himself acknowledged to CIA that it appeared strange for the KGB to send a new Section Chief on an extended trip abroad unconnected with his own work. His reasons for being in Geneva have varied and to some degree contradict one another: The Disarmament Conference was not expected to last more than "a few weeks," but NOSENKO did not begin his work against SHAKHOV (one of the main reasons for his being there) until six weeks after arrival; GRIBANOV played a role in his TDY, but NOSENKO later denied this; there were in 1962 "new rules" requiring a staff officer to accompany a Soviet delegation, but in 1965 NOSENKO said he did not remember such regulations. He was permitted to go to Geneva in 1962 and 1964, as well as to Cuba in 1960 and England in 1957 and 1958, under no supervision or restraint despite his claim to a record so bad that he was not cleared by the KGB for permanent posting to Ethiopia in 1960.

b. Presence in Geneva (1964)

NOSENKO said on one occasion that GRIBANOV was one of those who allowed him to come to Geneva in January 1964, as a personal favor;* he later not only denied this but said in 1965 that GRIBANOV knew nothing about the TDY. He reported the 1964 TDY might, because of his new position, be his last trip to the West, hence the "favor" of his superiors to permit him this last trip; in 1962 NOSENKO said he had the assurance that as Deputy Department Chief (which he knew he was about to become) he would in the future come to the West at least once a year. Also, NOSENKO could not explain why a First Deputy Department Chief, if allowed out of the USSR as a "treat," would go abroad for a conference which could be expected to last many weeks, probably months. This question is compounded by the fact that NOSENKO would be needed in Moscow: He said that a KGB conference to plan the handling of the tourist season was to be held at about this time, and he stuck to this story even after admitting that the telegram recalling him for this Moscow conference was an invention (see below).

c. Access to KGB Residency and Availability to CIA

NOSENKO in 1962 routinely visited the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva every weekday morning, although he claimed that he had no reason and that it is normally forbidden (as other sources have confirmed).** When asked how and why he

sensitive source

---

*[redacted] cited GRIBANOV's personal authorization of NOSENKO's trip in the face of derogatory information as one cause of GRIBANOV's dismissal.

**NOSENKO said he did not visit the KGB Legal Residency in London more than once during his visits there in a similar capacity in 1957 and 1958, nor during his trip to Cuba in 1960.

did so in Geneva, NOSENKO has given different answers at different times. His stories of simply "dropping in and hanging around" for lack of anything better to do are unacceptable in terms of known or likely Soviet practice. His explanation that it was due to TSYMBAL's auspices or or intervention were contradicted by: First, his own confused accounts of his relationship with TSYMBAL; and second, his own statements at other times that it was GUK who was primarily responsible for NOSENKO's visits to the Residency.

NOSENKO had a full day free for meetings on 11 June 1962, although thereafter he limited meeting times to shorter and shorter periods until his departure. This seemed natural at the time since he would presumably have his own responsibilities and would need to be seen by his Soviet colleagues in his proper surroundings. However, in 1964 he seemed not to have any official responsibilities or any calls on his time: He was willing to spend all his time in meetings with CIA. Although this could be explained by the fact that he planned to defect anyway, it nevertheless would have involved unnecessary risks to a genuine source about to become a defector. He showed no concern at the time, but later (in 1966), he said that he had been in fact afraid; it was for this reason that he invented the Moscow recall telegram, in order to hasten his defection and put an end to his fears of getting caught. It is, of course, impossible to make conclusive judgments on Soviet practice, but one would expect, if NOSENKO were not engaged in security duties, that he would be required to participate for cover reasons in more of the Soviet delegation's official activity. He said that any absence could be explained as "security duties," since everyone on the Soviet Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer. This unconcern for the suspicions of other Soviets conforms neither with observed Soviet practice nor with reports from other sources that Soviet intelligence and security officers under cover go to some pains to hide their true affiliation.

NOSENKO explained the contrast between his freedom and availability in 1964 and his limited free time in 1962 by the fact that in 1964 he had no personal friends in Geneva; in 1962 both GUK and KISLOV expected to see him in his free time. (This story does not explain his ability in 1964 to get away during conference working hours; neither GUK nor KISLOV affected this in 1962.)

d. Timing of 1962 Contact

NOSENKO had been in Geneva for three months in 1962 when the incident which brought him to CIA occurred; it was only two weeks before his departure. He came to David MARK only 10 days before leaving. This had the effect of limiting CIA's time with him. NOSENKO's contact came only about 10 days after CIA had completed, in the same city, a series of meetings with BELITSKIY, a Soviet interpreter who had been recruited and handled as an agent by CIA during earlier visits to the West. NOSENKO, as one of the two primary items he wanted to "sell" revealed that BELITSKIY had been under KGB control from the outset (Page 517).

e. Willingness to Meet CIA

Although in 1962 NOSENKO claimed that he wanted to sell only two specific items for the money he had lost, and then disappear, there were indications from the outset that he expected and planned to come back for further meetings with CIA. At this first meeting he called attention to certain information in his possession about POPOV, hinting that he would tell it later; even as he protested his unwillingness to continue meeting with CIA, he was giving ample details about himself which would inevitably have compromised him to CIA and forced his future collaboration. Before he finally agreed to return for more meetings, he said: "Maybe I'll meet you again Monday" (two days after the first meeting). NOSENKO refused, despite repeated inducements, to meet on the intervening Sunday. In fact, when he did return on Monday, he said that he had spent Sunday with friends, drinking and "discussing recent USSR foreign policy moves and speeches by KHRUSHCHEV."

f. The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's confession that he fabricated the story of his having been urgently recalled to Moscow by a telegram [redacted] leaves only two possible interpretations:

- There was a telegram, but NOSENKO's mind has slipped and he is no longer able to distinguish between fact and fancy. This, however, is not borne out by his general conduct nor his performance under interrogation in 1966.

- There was, in fact, no telegram. (This is borne out by Special Intelligence.) Thus, the invention was [redacted] not NOSENKO's but the KGB's; the KGB briefed NOSENKO to report to CIA that a telegram was sent; and NOSENKO made an error in later admitting that it was not.

g. Remarks

The operational circumstances so far reviewed point out the facts that:

- NOSENKO was inconsistent if not contradictory in stating his reasons for being in Geneva in 1962 and 1964;

- He had unusual access to the KGB Legal Residency and an availability for meeting CIA that seemed to impinge upon his security;

- He was willing to return to meetings with CIA although having at first said that there were but two items of information for sale;

- He was "in place" as a CIA source for the last six of his 100 or so days in Geneva in 1962, thus restricting the amount of time he could provide continuing reporting on the local Legal Residency; and

- After 12 days in the same status in 1964, he forced the defection by the KGB recall telegram, which appears to have been a fabrication.

Taken together, these facts suggest the possibilities that the KGB sent NOSENKO to Geneva on both occasions for the purpose of contacting CIA, that the KGB wanted the opportunity to gauge CIA's reactions to the walk-in in 1962 and to the defection plans in 1964, and that the KGB guided NOSENKO after contact was established in both years.

A further examination of the operational circumstances in Geneva lends credence to these possibilities. During the 1962 meetings, NOSENKO would frequently answer CIA questions by saying: "I will have to think about that tonight," or "I will have some time tonight to jot down and prepare a good answer for you," or "I don't want to give you an answer to that right off--I am afraid to mislead you." He would return to a later meeting with the information, after having visited the Legal Residency. In 1964 there were other examples of what may have been backstage guidance by the KGB:

-He called for an urgent special meeting to correct something he had said in an earlier meeting. Initially NOSENKO had named ZUJUS instead of KEYSERS as the U.S. Embassy code clerk whom he had personally approached in 1961. This seemed remarkably urgent and important to him at the time, and in retrospect this case gains special importance: It was the only time he claimed to have had direct contact with a U.S. Embassy staff employee during his alleged tour in the American Department in 1960-1961. If he could not remember this one name, it might call his entire story into question. It is hard to find another explanation; had he simply made a careless mistake, with his customary indifference to names and dates, NOSENKO would be unlikely to mull over what he had said at the meeting nor to bother about correcting a minor misstatement. Much less would he feel compelled to call an emergency meeting to do so.

-He came to meetings with "chance" items picked up at the Legal Residency, each of which would require quick action and the commitment of assets on the part of CIA in Geneva. Also, NOSENKO originally said in January 1964 that he wanted to defect right away, but various steps taken or planned by his CIA handlers kept him in place for a time. Each step, however, was quickly negated--usually at the next meeting--by some information NOSENKO had picked up by chance.

-He asked, out of context and without any explanation, whether GOLITSYN had told CIA that the President of Finland was a Soviet agent, and later could not coherently explain where he had heard this, why he had not told CIA about it in 1962, and why he had asked.

In addition, the Soviet reactions to the defection were unprecedented and contrasted sharply with, for example, the Soviets' avoidance of publicity concerning GOLITSYN's defection in 1961. The post-defection actions by the Soviet Government created publicity which had the superficial effect of underlining NOSENKO's authenticity, establishing him as a public figure, confirming that he had a family, and verifying that his defection was of alarming consequence. These reactions seem purposeful in light of the approach in Paris in 1966 of a Soviet photographer to Paris Match; the photographer passed photographs of NOSENKO's wife and children as part of a proposed story to dramatize the abandoned family of a "top Soviet intelligence officer" whose defection had caused the "biggest blow ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence." There is no independent press in the USSR, no Soviet journalist is allowed to publish as he pleases, and the Soviet Government in the past has shown no predisposition to dramatize defections from its most secret agency. The photographer can only be presumed to have been acting on KGB instructions.

G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO

1. Introduction

The preceding portions of Part VIII. present an analysis of the NOSENKO case without giving detailed consideration to information about him from [redacted] Soviets reporting to CIA and the FBI. Because their evidence generally runs counter to the results of the foregoing analysis, it is reviewed here separately so that the concentrated examination of NOSENKO would not be diverted by asides as to the authenticity and reliability of these Soviets. As indicated below, the CIA and FBI sources who have directly supported NOSENKO's intelligence background are [redacted] sensitive sources [redacted] and the defectors [redacted] and GOLITSYN. None except GOLITSYN claimed to know NOSENKO personally or to have worked with him, and NOSENKO contradicted GOLITSYN by saying they had never met. Some of them, as well as CHEREPANOV, supported NOSENKO indirectly through overlapping information on specific KGB operations, but this aspect of their reporting is reviewed in Part IX.

2. Corroboration of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career

The statements of [redacted] the sources confirm that NOSENKO was a KGB officer with access to sensitive information:

sensitive source

[redacted]

- [redacted] said NOSENKO was a KGB lieutenant colonel (later changed to captain), a friend and protege of the head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV, who approved NOSENKO's (1964) TDY to Geneva. [redacted] NOSENKO was a KGB "chief," with access to details on KGB operations against the U.S. Embassy, and was most recently Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. He also stated that NOSENKO, with his information on U.S. Embassy microphones and KGB operations involving correspondents and tourists, was "more valuable [to American Intelligence] than PENKOVSKIY." NOSENKO "could do tremendous harm to the KGB," [redacted] and moreover, the KGB "will not be able to operate normally for two years" (i.e., until 1966). He described the repercussions in the KGB caused by NOSENKO's defection: new KGB regulations to increase security, the dismissal of many KGB officers including GRIBANOV and the recall of many others [redacted] Asked [redacted] whether NOSENKO could be a "trick," i.e., a KGB provocateur, [redacted] expressed the conviction that NOSENKO was not. [redacted]

[redacted] sensitive source

[redacted]

- [redacted] stated that NOSENKO had attended the GRU's Military-Diplomatic Academy (NOSENKO has indicated he declined the opportunity to enroll in this strategic intelligence school in the early 1950's.) Afterwards, [redacted] NOSENKO served in the GRU and then entered

[redacted]

[redacted]

source

- According to [redacted] NOSENKO was in "Intelligence." His defection brought about the recall of a KGB secretary from Geneva, the rumored transfer of some 60 Soviet officials from assignments abroad, and the dismissal of KGB personnel including NOSENKO's friend GUK, who had recommended the TDY to Geneva. In addition, [redacted] reported, immediately after the defection a representative of the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee went to Geneva to speak to the Soviet Government employees there. [redacted] said that NOSENKO had been tried in absentia in Moscow for treason and sentenced to death (see Pages 46 and 342).

- GOLITSYN failed to comment when shown NOSENKO's name in 1962, and there is no record of his ever having mentioned NOSENKO prior to the Western press announcement of the defection in 1964, even though he had named people known to him in the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. (Shortly after defecting GOLITSYN said that he had visited this Department in 1960 and at the turn of the year 1960-1961.) After NOSENKO defected, GOLITSYN was given a summary of NOSENKO's biography. Thereupon GOLITSYN reported that NOSENKO was a KGB officer whom he first met in 1953 and last saw in 1959. From 1953 to 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN stated, NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, responsible for coverage of U.S. military personnel and later either for others in the Moscow Embassy or for correspondents. As of 1959, GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO was a senior officer in the Tourist Department; as of 1960, he was definitely not in the American Department. GOLITSYN added that GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV were friends in the KGB whom he shared with NOSENKO (see Pages 343-344).

Source

[redacted] Soviet source, [redacted], indicated she had been told by her KGB friend SVIRIN that NOSENKO was a "civilian"; he had nevertheless provided information on microphones in the U.S. Embassy and had caused "considerable damage." [redacted] also have corroborated certain non-Intelligence aspects of NOSENKO's background. [redacted]

3. Remarks

Source,

[redacted] aside, the Soviet sources have certified that NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer, and all asserted or implied that he had access to information valuable to American Intelligence--the microphones in the U.S. Embassy being one item in common. [redacted]

TOP SECRET

[redacted]. Most of them have described the serious repercussions of NOSENKO's defection. The possibilities with regard to the accuracy of these sources' reporting are:

> First, they are correct. If so, the foregoing analysis is in error, they are valid sources, and NOSENKO is what he claims to be: a genuine defector whose previous positions in the KGB enabled him to divulge all important details on operations against Westerners, mainly Americans.
>
> Second, they are misinformed. If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, they may be valid sources, and NOSENKO has always been under KGB control. For this to be true, it would have been necessary for the KGB to dispatch NOSENKO with only a highly restricted number of KGB personnel (including GRIBANOV) aware of the actual circumstances of the operation. The KGB, at the same time, would have propagated within and outside of the Soviet Intelligence Services the fiction that NOSENKO was an actual but disloyal KGB officer and would have supported this fabrication in various ways [redacted] the rumor spreadin about the severity of the loss of NOSENKO, etc.).
>
> Third, they have been purposefully misleading American Intelligence for their own or KGB purposes. If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, and some or all of them have participated in a KGB conspiracy to support the *bona fides* of NOSENKO, a KGB-controlled source.

These possibilities are discussed further in Part IX.

H. Alternative Explanations

1. Introduction

Parts VIII.B. through VIII.F. have discussed the inaccuracies, self-admitted contradictions, inconsistencies, and incompleteness of NOSENKO's reporting about himself and the KGB. Collectively, these important flaws in the story of and by NOSENKO make it necessary to choose an explanation for his actions and the nature of his information. There are three alternatives:

> First, NOSENKO was a KGB officer but (a) has a faulty or selective memory, has embellished or boasted, or his reporting has been influenced by a combination thereof; or (b) he is insane.
>
> Second, NOSENKO lied about himself in order to save face.
>
> Third, NOSENKO has misrepresented himself, either on his own or at the instigation of the KGB.

Each of these mutually exclusive alternatives is discussed below.

2. First Alternative

According to one postulate, NOSENKO was an officer in the KGB but has a faulty memory, has a selective memory, and/or has embellished or boasted:

a. Faulty Memory

NOSENKO himself has repeatedly appealed for understanding that "different people have different memories" and that his own is "funny," and this is supported by his forgetfulness and errors concerning events he is known independently to have lived through, such as the BURGI and [redacted] cases. But it cannot be said that he is, in general, "very bad with names," because he has almost total recall of names and positions of hundreds of KGB officers in the American and Tourist Departments. He has a good memory for faces and rarely failed to recognize photographs of people he claimed to know. He remembered consistently details about certain operations (the compromise and investigation of PENKOVSKIY, the surveillance of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, the JENNER case, the arrest of BARGHOORN, and the search for CHEREPANOV, to cite a few examples). NOSENKO was precisely accurate in his recollection of most of his dealings with CIA personnel from June 1962 onward.

b. Selective Memory

Although having a selective memory is probably true of nearly everyone, a CIA psychologist has described NOSENKO as a psychopath who would register each passing event only in relation to its effect on himself at that moment. This would inevitably make him indifferent to the characteristics of other people, for example, and to the sequence in which events transpired; the aspects important to him might not appear so to a more objective observer. Such a person would suppress unpleasant memories and would have no real appreciation of or respect for an "objective truth." His reporting, like his perception and his memory, might therefore seem distorted. He might recount events according to his mood of the moment. Thus, for example, if real attachments to family or friends is impossible for a psychopath, there would be an explanation as to why NOSENKO cannot easily remember his childrens' birthdays, why in 1962 (or 1965) he appears to have lied--or been indifferent to the truth--about his older daughter's schooling, and why he cannot recall when he first married. In theory this hypothesis can explain any aberration, since it involves the unknowable. In its most extreme form, by describing NOSENKO as one unable to discriminate between fact and fancy, it would encompass and explain away the facts that his story is obviously untrue and contradictory in major ways; that his account of his personal and professional life and his rendition of the information he knows are so vague and unsubstantial; that he cannot (and/or does not care to) remember or recount how he did the things he did. Most important, it would dismiss any conclusions based on NOSENKO's testimony since nothing NOSENKO said could be taken seriously. This hypothesis, however, is unsupportable because of several factors.

First, NOSENKO claims--and other sources confirm--that he quickly rose to high supervisory responsibility in a counterintelligence organization which is known to require attention to detail. He would have risen in the KGB while overcoming the black marks in his file: scandal, indiscipline, negative background factors, and bad Party record. NOSENKO admits that his performance was not good; he was inattentive and inactive and almost none of his operational activity was carried out unaccompanied. That his rise resulted from his father's influence or GRIBANOV's is untenable, for his father died in 1956 and GRIBANOV's patronage (itself open to the strongest doubt) would not and could not be dispensed upon such a mental case. Mental aberration to the degree which would explain his poor performance under CIA interrogation would necessarily have hindered his performance of KGB duties, denied him special privileges, and and hence cost him the career which NOSENKO has claimed for himself.

A second factor negating this hypothesis of a psychopathic personality is that such a person could be induced to recall certain details with the help of discussion, questioning, and reminders, whereas NOSENKO's vague and hazy reports seem to represent the absolute limits of his memory or knowledge. Years of questioning have not succeeded in dredging up any new details or incidents. Even when reminded, he could not recall, for example, one of KOSOLAPOV's TDYs to Helsinki, the details of the seizure of electronic equipment from the U.S. Army Attaches at Stalingrad, the correct date of GOLITSYN's defection, or the presence of KHRUSHCHEV in Moscow at the time of the decision to arrest BARGHOORN.

Another factor is the impossibility of applying this hypothesis to the totality of NOSENKO's reporting. If the hypothesis holds that some things are important to him and others are not, and that he therefore remembers the former and forgets the latter, it is refuted by the inability to find a category of information about himself which he consistently remembered nor any that he consistently forgot. If what is important is his own direct experiences, for example, it is odd that he recalled the operations of others better than his own; he remembered the names of hundreds of KGB officers, but could not recall names of his own agents and people involved in his own career; he could recount details of the PENKOVSKIY investigation, in which he did not participate, but not of the discovery of American spies among tourists, such as McGOWAN, for which he was responsible; he remembered details of the 1955 MALIA case in which he did not meet the target personally but forgot details of the 1961 KEYSERS case in which he did. If it is the importance to him of recruitment operations against U.S. Embassy employees which permitted him to recall some details of the STORSBERG and MULE operations, it is not important enough to help him recall some of the other details which were equally pertinent to him personally; and it is not selective memory which made him forget almost every detail about CIA personnel in Moscow and KGB action against them. If it is said that his parental family is important to him (hence his memory of his father's funeral and the names of his uncles and aunts), it is odd that he cannot recall details about his childhood. If drinking with important people is meaningful to him, it would explain why he remembers one GRIBANOV evening with sharp clarity, but it does not explain why he cannot remember the other two times, not even in what season of the year or in what restaurant they took place.

Finally, with reference to the "selective memory" hypothesis, it is precisely in matters NOSENKO said he remembers best and which he told most confidently that the majority of inexplicable contradictions arise. Nothing could shake him from his claim to have been directly responsible for ABIDIAN or on his story of the Pushkin Street dead drop, among numerous examples.

c. Embellishment

The third possibility is that he has simply embellished and boasted, while underlying his story is a core of truth somewhere near what he has reported. NOSENKO has, after all, admitted many "white lies" and boasts ("painting" himself, as he called it). Also, in the interrogations there were repeated signs that he was fabricating and improvising, often in ways which led him into more contradictions and further admissions of white lies. Perhaps then, according to this hypothesis, he simply invented, on his own, various aspects of his career. Perhaps he dated his entry into the KGB earlier to make himself seem more experienced, and invented his service in the American Department to make himself more interesting to American Intelligence. Perhaps he was only a principal agent, not a staff officer, but learned enough from his operations and from his handlers to think he could pose as one. This hypothesis would certainly explain many of the dubious aspects: the story of his career, his lack of information on KGB staff procedures, his ignorance of major KGB events and sources, the degree of his relationship with GRIBANOV, etc. This theory, however, founders on a number of points:

-The validity of the information he has provided. To get such information he would have to be a KGB staff officer, must have worked in both the American and Tourist Departments as he says he did, and must have been a fairly senior officer with broad responsibilities (in view of the number of Tourist Department operations revealed by name in his 1964 notes). To name a few other examples from among hundreds possible:

(a) NOSENKO not only knew the identity of a KGB double agent against CIA, BELITSKIY, but gave checkable details from inside the case, including the names by which the CIA case officers identified themselves to the double agent;

(b) NOSENKO was able to report, with almost complete accuracy, that CIA ceased clandestine letter-mailings inside the Soviet Union for over a year after the arrest of Russell LANGELLE in late 1959;

(c) He identified several Americans recruited or approached by the KGB in operations in which he said he did not directly participate, including "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), Sergeant Robert JOHNSON, and Henry SHAPIRO;

(d) NOSENKO knew inside information on Americans at the Embassy in Moscow, including operational activities of John ABIDIAN, (WINTERS) mailing of a letter to POPOV, the homosexuality of two diplomatic officers, etc; and

(e) He knew certain details of the story of Aleksandr CHEREPANOV which would not have been available outside the KGB staff.

Thus there would not be any great need nor much room for embellishment.

-The confirmations of others. He appeared before BARGHOORN and other KGB targets as a "chief," and sensitive source's [redacted] subsources confirmed NOSENKO's unusual importance: that he was a Deputy Department Chief in the KGB, that his defection was a severe blow to Soviet Intelligence, that he was more important than PENKOVSKIY, and so on. A Soviet journalist told Paris Match that NOSENKO's defection was the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence. [redacted]

Two sources reported the recall to Moscow of many KGB staffers as a result of the defection, and these officers did indeed return to the Soviet Union.

Thus any embellishment must concern only minor details such as his rank, which he has already admitted.

d. Combination of Above

Another possibility might be that NOSENKO's poor performance was due to a combination of bad memory, psychopathologically selective memory, and embellishment. While this theory is intrinsically more logical and might correct and round off some obvious weaknesses in any one of the individual theories, it cannot explain the counterarguments discussed under component parts above.

e. Insanity

It might be postulated that NOSENKO went insane and that this was the cause not only of his seemingly unmotivated contact with CIA in 1962 but of shortcomings in his story. However, NOSENKO thereafter handled senior KGB functions well enough to be promoted and to be permitted abroad in 1964; he has been examined periodically by a CIA psychologist and a CIA psychiatrist; he has been in contact over considerable periods of time and under varying degrees of stress with experienced CIA and FBI personnel; he has maintained his equilibrium under difficult circumstances. None of the foregoing results in an indication of insanity and there are countless other arguments which would invalidate this hypothesis.

3. Second Alternative

It has also been postulated that NOSENKO is a psychopath, is what he says he is, but that for psychological reasons and while under interrogation, he did not want to tell what he knew. By this line of reasoning, NOSENKO has lied for no other reason than to save face; by dwelling on the inconsistencies in NOSENKO's statements, the interrogator merely caused more inconsistencies or else received the false answers that NOSENKO did not know or did not remember the facts. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO recalled and repeated what he had previously said in the less inhibiting atmosphere of the relaxed debriefings prior to 4 April 1964. This alternative explanation thus does not account for the factual contradictions in NOSENKO's reporting before the interrogations, such as the errors in dates, in sourcing on the "ANDREY" case, in details about the Pushkin Street dead drop, etc. It also fails to account for NOSENKO's retractions about his rank as lieutenant colonel, in the face of the KGB TDY travel authorization which shows him to be a lieutenant colonel, and about the telegram recalling him to KGB Headquarters in January 1964. [redacted] The suggestion that NOSENKO lied to save face consequently can be dismissed.

4. Third Alternative

The only other postulate is that NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, in which case his misrepresentation was done either on his own or as part of a KGB operation.

If he is misrepresenting himself on his own, there are (even in theory) only two possibilities: He is merely exaggerating (discussed above, under the "First Alternative") or he is a fabricator. He cannot be a fabricator, however, since the Soviets have certified him in many ways; including his diplomatic status at the Geneva Conference, Soviet official protests and Soviet Embassy confrontation in Washington, Soviet officials' remarks in various areas of the world, and reports from [redacted] other sources on his KGB status and importance.

sensitive source and

There remains the possibility that NOSENKO has misrepresented himself and is a witting part of a KGB operation. This hypothesis could accommodate the argument that the KGB would not dispatch a KGB staff officer as a double agent against a hostile service because, whether or not the argument is valid, NOSENKO (as indicated in Part VIII.D. above) has not proven his claim to having served as an officer of the KGB. If he has been and is now under KGB control, it would appear that he was being built up for years to look like an officer and was shown to Westerners in certain recruitment operations.* This could explain NOSENKO's revelations to FRIPPEL and others about his family and background; the otherwise pointless W.E. JOHNSON case, and NOSENKO's appearance in the BARGHOORN interrogation. It could explain NOSENKO's uneven memory and performance under detailed questioning: Much of what he should have known by personal experience could have been merely memorized as part of his KGB briefing. Nothing in NOSENKO's production (see Part VIII.B. above) would preclude his being a KGB-dispatched agent. That he was a KGB-dispatched agent was the conclusion independently arrived at by the CIA specialist who administered a polygraph examination to NOSENKO in April 1964.

4. Remarks

The first alternative above has been rejected while the possibility that NOSENKO on his own misrepresented himself is unacceptable. The remaining possibility is that NOSENKO has been manipulated by the KGB in an operation directed against American Intelligence.

---

* His American Department service in 1960-1961 was not supported by any such "show" appearances--he did not insist on the truth of his claim to participation in the KEYSERS case, which, moreover KEYSERS could not confirm; PREISFREUND is an unreliable witness; and [redacted] is not accessible to interview.

I. Summary of Conclusions

CIA has considered every major aspect of the NOSENKO case for the purpose of reaching a definitive conclusion about the bona fides of this man who says he is a KGB officer-defector collaborating with American Intelligence.

As this point-by-point analysis has demonstrated, there is no reason to accept any of NOSENKO's claims to a career as an officer in Soviet Intelligence, to authority concerning the range and degree of KGB operational successes in the USSR (particularly with U.S. officials and private citizens), to accurate knowledge regarding major security cases in that country, or to cooperation with American Intelligence.

It would be sufficient proof of his mala fides to verify that NOSENKO lied about a single segment of his career in the KGB. He cannot have been truthful in saying that he was the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and a Deputy Chief in the Tourist Department of the same directorate from 1962 until his defection. Numerous indications make it doubtful that NOSENKO, as he contended, belonged to the naval GRU in 1951-1952, to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and to the American Tourist Section in 1955-1959. He was unable to support his alleged staff officer status in the KGB, providing incomplete and inaccurate information on his sub-sources and on such topics as Headquarters staff procedures while making illogical statements on modus operandi. Neither a supervisor nor, probably, a case officer, it remains dubious but possible that he was a KGB principal agent whose speciality in the past was compromising Western homosexuals. Whatever the capacity in which NOSENKO served, it was not in the KGB ranks, holding the KGB titles, or with the KGB honors he has ascribed to himself, and this fact is enough to prove the falsity of his claims to being a genuine defector.

There is no question, however, that NOSENKO has had the benefit of inside information from the KGB. He has said so, other sources have said so, the Soviet Government's reactions to the defection implied as much, and his reports contain details which could have come only from the KGB. He was introduced into several operations, the first as early as 1953, in a position appearing "senior" to known KGB staff officers. He has provided data on organization, personnel, and methods complementing and supplementing that from others affiliated with the KGB. Purposefully misleading about himself, NOSENKO has also been deceitful in discussing the compromises of CHEREPANOV, PENKOVSKIY, and perhaps POPOV, although here his reporting often correlates with that from several [redacted] Analysis shows that -- NOSENKO and others to the contrary -- CHEREPANOV was a KGB provocateur, PENKOVSKIY was detected at the latest in early 1961 not 1962, and POPOV was probably uncovered earlier than January 1959 because of a KGB agent rather than surveillance. NOSENKO thus has not merely misrepresented himself but has practiced deception under KGB guidance. Appraisals of NOSENKO's performance under interrogation, his alleged motivation, and the operational circumstances support this view.

sitive
sources

14-00000

Furthermore, it is the only acceptable explanation, among the alternatives, for what has transpired since contact with CIA began in 1962.

CIA's conclusion about the bona fides of NOSENKO is unequivocal: He is a dispatched agent controlled by the KGB.

Part IX contains a discussion of the implications of the foregoing conclusion for the Soviet sources who, [redacted] have corroborated the bona fides of NOSENKO.

IX. EXPLANATIONS FOR OTHER SOURCES

1. Introduction

sensitive sources

The conclusion that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed contradicts information reported to CIA and the FBI by two categories of Soviet Intelligence sources: (1), the defector GOLITSYN and (2) [redacted] These sources, all of whom have claimed to be collaborating honestly with American Intelligence, stated or implied that NOSENKO held senior positions in the KGB Second Chief Directorate.** If the conclusion of this study of NOSENKO's bona fides is accurate, none of the [redacted] sources can be correct, and they must therefore be either misinformed about NOSENKO or purposefully misleading.

In assessing whether and how [redacted] sensitive sources could have been innocently misinformed about NOSENKO after he defected, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the KGB might have created and supported a legend for a counterfeit KGB officer-defector like NOSENKO. The KGB might have accomplished this by the following means:

- NOSENKO's legend would have required the KGB to brief him in depth on numerous cases and various targets which he would be free to discuss with CIA. The KGB would also have to familiarize him with KGB staff organizational structure and procedures,*** and KGB officers prominent in his story (e.g., GUK, KOVSHUK, TSYMBAL, GRIBANOV) so that he could not only recognize their photographs but also lend reality to his remarks about them. NOSENKO would also have to visit KGB installations and other areas which appeared in his legend.

---

* Sources whose reporting tended to support NOSENKO but who have not been members of the Soviet Intelligence Services are eliminated from detailed consideration here because their connections with NOSENKO are less direct than the sources with service in the KGB and GRU. [redacted] has never been a Soviet Intelligence officer, and his support for NOSENKO has been relatively limited. However, he reported on repercussions in Geneva caused by NOSENKO's defection and like NOSENKO, he said that the KGB suspected the U.S. State Department official David MARK of belonging to CIA. He has also reported on certain personalities prominent in NOSENKO's reporting, including Yu. I. GUK and V.V. VAKRUSHEV. Source

** Although all of them supported NOSENKO by confirming his KGB status, there is nevertheless a distinct difference between GOLITSYN's opinion about him and the statements by the other sources. GOLITSYN believed NOSENKO to be a KGB-dispatched agent, while the rest indicated that he was a genuine defector.

***That these preparations were imperfect, or at least that NOSENKO imperfectly mastered his briefing, was shown in his performance under interrogation.

TOP SECRET

- Another phase of the preparations would have been NOSENKO's actual and demonstrable participation in operations, seemingly as a KGB officer. Presumably this would be done so that Westerners (e.g., BARGHOORN, TRIPPEL, and W.E. JOHNSON) could certify that they had seen NOSENKO in some such role.*

- The KGB presumably would have restricted the number of its officers aware of some or all of the operational plan; it would nonetheless be faced with the problem of how public knowledge of NOSENKO's defection might affect others in the service. KGB officers abroad uninformed of the operational plan might be indiscreet with foreigners, in meeting Western double agents, or before microphones in their homes and offices, making such remarks as "I never heard of this man NOSENKO" or speculating close to the mark. Thus the KGB might have tried to support the bona fides of NOSENKO [redacted] by the spreading of false rumors about his authenticity (this on the part of the limited few aware of the facts of the case), by recalling KGB officers from the posts in the West (ostensibly because they were known to NOSENKO), by announcing the wholesale dismissal of those responsible including GRIBANOV (although in fact they may have routinely retired or may have been removed from the main stream of KGB Headquarters activities), and by making general announcements within the KGB about the "loss" incurred by the defection [redacted] Furthermore, since it is common Soviet practice to make a bad example of defectors, such announcements might be expected to denigrate NOSENKO as a "bad character" with venereal disease, an odd Party record, self-inflicted wound, etc., in his background. The KGB might also have taken pains to support NOSENKO further by having Western Intelligence sources, notably double agents recognized by the KGB to be such, told of the seriousness of the defection.

sensitive sources

It is within this possible framework that one might judge whether the reports of [redacted] concerning NOSENKO were unwitting repetitions of widely disseminated misinformation, or whether their reports constituted purposeful passage of KGB disinformation.

Their direct and indirect support of NOSENKO's bona fides, as well as the statements by GOLITSYN, are presented and evaluated in the next sections below, together with presentations and appraisals of their information on topics of reporting in common with NOSENKO's. Certain reports by [redacted]

Source

---

* It is noteworthy that such participation was limited to Tourist Department operations. NOSENKO did not claim physical participation in any contacts with American Embassy officials during the periods 1953-55 or 1960-61, except for MULE and STORSBERG (where his claimed role was uncheckable since it involved only holding a door) and KEYZERS (which KEYZERS did not confirm and on which NOSENKO did not insist, admitting that he doubted KEYZERS would remember or recognize him.

source

[redacted] are also considered because they overlap NOSENKO's to some extent, although by saying he was a civilian, [redacted] contradicted his claim to KGB staff officer status. A number of general correlations between the NOSENKO case and the [redacted] sensiti sources operations are then reviewed. The final section of Part IX is a summary of conclusions about the relationship between the NOSENKO case and the reporting about him by GOLITSYN, [redacted]

[redacted] sensitive sources

C.

B. [illegible]

1. [illegible]

[illegible] At [illegible] 1962 and 1963 [illegible] GOLITSYN was shown a list of names of Soviet delegates to the 1962 session of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. N[illegible]'s name was on the list but GOLITSYN gave no indication that he recognized the name.

On 26 June 1962, after CIA's initial meetings with NOSENKO and because of the large overlap of NOSENKO's information and contacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CIA case officers who had met NOSENKO in Geneva met with GOLITSYN to obtain his comments on some of the NOSENKO material. GOLITSYN was told that CIA had received in Switzerland an anonymous letter which reported certain information from within the KGB. The CIA officer stated to GOLITSYN that [illegible] closely overlapped his own [illegible], including [illegible] GOLITSYN's friends G[illegible], [illegible], and [illegible], [illegible] perhaps in [illegible] of [illegible] items from NOSENKO [illegible] Second Chief [illegible] was shown him, [illegible] personnel whom the [illegible] NOSENKO, and [illegible] CIA records, [illegible] one Aleksandr [illegible] Japan when [illegible] further [illegible] identified as KGB [illegible] GOLITSYN said [illegible] that organization in 1961 for the [illegible]. [illegible] in general, lacking the full details necessary for an assessment, he could say that there were [illegible] of disinformation in what he had seen; he wanted to see the full information on the case. It was not given to him.

On 10 February 1964 NOSENKO's defection from the Soviet Disarmament delegation in Geneva, Switzerland was publicized, including his KGB affiliation. When GOLITSYN heard this news he immediately recalled the June 1962 "letter" from Switzerland and linked NOSENKO to it; he thereupon stated that he recalled NOSENKO as a member of the Second Chief Directorate working against American citizens.

On 11 February 1964 GOLITSYN raised the possibility of his participation in interrogations of NOSENKO, and at this time he was given some background on the case and an indication of CIA's reservations about NOSENKO's *bona fides*. Over the next several months GOLITSYN was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, and at his request was supplied with all the available biographic data on NOSENKO to assist him in analyzing the operation. On 29 June 1964, GOLITSYN was interviewed in detail on the subject of NOSENKO. He confirmed NOSENKO's identity as the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding and said that he was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Tourist Department at the KGB's Second Chief Directorate. He was shown a photograph of NOSENKO (not buried in a photo spread, but singly) and he identified it as a photograph of the man he knew. At this time he gave the information about NOSENKO which is summarized below.

The NOSENKO case has not been discussed with GOLITSYN since the 29 June 1964 interview; thus he has not been questioned further on the circumstances which led to the encounters with NOSENKO described by him, nor have the results of subsequent detailed reinterrogations of NOSENKO - discussed at length in the foregoing sections of this paper - been made available to him for review, analysis, or comment.

2. Resume and Discussion of Information*

American Department - 1953

NOSENKO has said that he entered the KGB in March 1953** and was first assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department of what is now the Second Chief Directorate, KGB. He stated that his duties from his entry until sometime in 1954, perhaps about June, were to work on files of American correspondents on permanent assignment to Moscow and to meet with the Soviet citizens who were agents or informants reporting on the correspondents to the KGB.

GOLITSYN stated that he met NOSENKO in the American Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate*** a couple of times in 1953 when he, GOLITSYN, was there on other matters. GOLITSYN had earlier identified his own job between December 1952 and April 1953 as Chief of the American Sector, Counterintelligence (Ninth) Department, Foreign Directorate, under the Chief Intelligence Directorate (formed in December 1952 and reorganized in April 1953). From April 1953 until his departure for Vienna in October 1953 GOLITSYN was Deputy Chief of the Emigre Sector, Counterintelligence Department, Foreign Intelligence Department, Foreign Intelligence Directorate. GOLITSYN has not indicated the nature of his responsibilities in either of these positions which would have necessitated his visiting the American Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate, although certain activities of common interest with the latter would appear logical. NOSENKO's description of his alleged duties with correspondents, however, did not encompass his having official contacts with representatives of any component of the Counterintelligence Department of the Foreign Directorate. According to NOSENKO's description of the location of his claimed office in the American Department, and his description of the duties of the co-workers he said shared it with him, chance contacts there with such a representative would have been precluded. Even by NOSENKO's account, then, an encounter between GOLITSYN and himself could not have been in the course of interdepartmental liaison between their respective units, nor could it have occurred in NOSENKO's office. GOLITSYN's lack of reporting on KGB operations against American correspondents (other than his conversation with KOVSHUK in 1956 or 1957 about Henry SHAPIRO) is further evidence that his business in the American Department was unrelated to NOSENKO's claimed activities at that time, and GOLITSYN's own statement on the 1953 encounters implied that his meetings with NOSENKO were accidental. Fleeting as their contacts would therefore have been, it could have led GOLITSYN to make the unfounded assumption that NOSENKO was a member of the staff within the American Department.

---

* The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595, with comments thereon appearing on Pages 647-659, while in this section are a discussion and an evaluation of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate (see Pages 343-344).

** Among the various dates given by NOSENKO for this entry, March 1953 has been given more often than others and is more consistent with the rest of NOSENKO's story.

***This is now designated the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

American Department/Tourist Department - 1955-1960

NOSENKO stated that he transferred from the American Department to the Tourist Department in June 1955, and remained in the Tourist Department until 1960, becoming a deputy chief of section there in 1958.

GOLITSYN, however, insisted that NOSENKO remained in the American Department until at least 1957, or possibly as late as 1958. GOLITSYN added that the KGB would not be aware that he knew

NOSENKO's true position in the American Department in 1957 or 1958. GOLITSYN did not indicate how he acquired his knowledge on this nor why the KGB subsequently would have been unable to determine that he had. If his access to this information was indeed that remote (as GOLITSYN's assignment in 1957 and 1958 would indicate - see below), it is readily apparent that it could likewise be somewhat garbled. GOLITSYN was unable to explain the fact that NOSENKO's physical presence in exclusively Tourist Department cases had been positively established through photo identifications made by several of the individuals involved, who met NOSENKO as early as 1956.

From 1955 to 1959 (the same years when NOSENKO claimed to have been in the Tourist Department) GOLITSYN was enrolled in the KGB Higher School. He was detached from the school, in the period January-March 1959, in order to gather material for his thesis. At that time GOLITSYN spent just under two months in the Tourist Department,* but GOLITSYN's work did not involve him in any day-to-day operational activities of this department. He has reported having "occasionally" met NOSENKO in 1959; although he did not specify that it was at precisely this time, it seems probable that it would have been. GOLITSYN said that he asked NOSENKO in 1959 where he was working and NOSENKO told him the Tourist Department. Again it appears from this that his encounters must have been brief, superficial, and not work-related, hence insufficient for GOLITSYN to arrive independently at a well-founded conclusion as to NOSENKO's actual status and function with the Tourist Department.

---

*In describing his own and others' responsibilities in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO has made no reference to this unit having a formal or regular relationship with the KGB school or to students from the school having been detached to the department.

Information Not Available to GOLITSYN

The detailed interrogations of NOSENKO concerning his claims to KGB positions between 1953 and 1964, did not take place until many months after GOLITSYN made his statements, and they were based upon all collateral information known relating to each phase. None of the results of these interrogations was made available to GOLITSYN, so he was not aware of the countless points on which NOSENKO contradicted known facts and revealed his ignorance of activities which were carried out by the KGB during his alleged tenure in these departments.

3. Comments on GOLITSYN

Several factors influence the evaluation of GOLITSYN's statements on NOSENKO:

- First, as stated in Part VIII.I., it is concluded that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed. GOLITSYN's testimony verified this conclusion insofar as NOSENKO's claims about service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960-1961 are concerned. Moreover, in 1962 GOLITSYN concluded that the KGB "letter-writer" (actually NOSENKO) was under KGB control in submitting information to American Intelligence. At issue, therefore, is the evidence from GOLITSYN to the effect that NOSENKO was an officer in the American Department (until 1957 or 1958, whereas NOSENKO said he was reassigned from the department in 1955) and in the Tourist Department subsequently.

- Second, GOLITSYN made no comment about or identification of NOSENKO prior to the public announcement of the latter's defection, despite many previous opportunities to do so (e.g., in discussions of GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV) and despite GOLITSYN's proven excellence of memory for names and tasks of KGB personnel. GOLITSYN gave little detail on the circumstances of his encounters with NOSENKO, and he has not been questioned further about them. Nevertheless, as indicated in the foregoing remarks on the circumstances in which the two men could have met, it seems apparent that any contact would have been brief, infrequent, casual, extra-official, and probably as [illegible]

The following discussion considers GOLITSYN's information about NOSENKO in conjunction with NOSENKO's denial about having been in contact with GOLITSYN.* Possible explanations for GOLITSYN's having referred to their encounters but having misidentified NOSENKO's positions in the KGB are: First, GOLITSYN could have erred; second, GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons; and third, GOLITSYN could have lied at the direction of the KGB because he (like NOSENKO) is under KGB control. To examine each of these points separately:

- GOLITSYN could have erred. Apart from the denial by NOSENKO, who is an unreliable source, there is no evidence to refute GOLITSYN's statement that he and NOSENKO met in the American Department in 1953 and in the Tourist Department in 1958 or 1959. (The conclusions in Part VIII.I. about NOSENKO's bona fides do not rule out the possibility that he was physically present on occasion on the premises of the two departments in these years, although not in the capacities that he has claimed.) The nature of their encounters, however, could have been such that GOLITSYN erred in assuming - because NOSENKO was seen on or near the premises of the two departments, and because NOSENKO told GOLITSYN in 1958 or 1959 that he was in the Tourist Department - that NOSENKO was therefore an officer of these specific elements of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. Thus, if GOLITSYN met NOSENKO as he said, he mistakenly identified NOSENKO as being a member of the staffs of the American and Tourist Departments at these times.

- GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons. He may have believed that to say he met NOSENKO or to say he knew

---

* There is insufficient information available to reach a conclusion about, or even speculate on, why NOSENKO was so certain GOLITSYN's defection occurred in January 1962, as contrasted with the fact that it took place on 15 December 1961.

NOSENKO's positions in the KGB would add authenticity to his earlier evaluation of the NOSENKO information of 1962, to his contradictions of NOSENKO's statements concerning service in the U.S. Embassy Section and the operations of that section, and to his contention that the KGB would try to counteract his (GOLITSYN's) information by spreading purportedly authoritative but purposefully misleading reports on the same subject matter. In summary, GOLITSYN's intention in lying about NOSENKO could simply have been to add greater credibility to his expressed opinion that NOSENKO was a KGB provocateur.

- GOLITSYN could have lied at the direction of the KGB, an explanation that is examined here for the sake of completeness and not because CIA has any reason to believe GOLITSYN is under KGB control. This explanation would mean that GOLITSYN, although offering partial confirmation for NOSENKO's claims, directly attacked the bona fides of another KGB-dispatched agent of allegedly comparable rank and knowledgeability. Acting under KGB instructions, GOLITSYN would have sought to undermine NOSENKO's acceptability, regardless of the fact that NOSENKO said he was providing reliable and comprehensive information about KGB operations against American officials and tourists in the USSR. At the same time, NOSENKO was not giving an account of their relationship that was consistent with GOLITSYN's, by implication NOSENKO was distorting or diluting the earlier reports of GOLITSYN on KGB operations in the Soviet Union, and NOSENKO was seeking to gain acceptance by CIA equal to that experienced by GOLITSYN. According to this hypothesis, two sources under KGB control - each striving for acceptance - deliberately gave conflicting stories of their relationship, and each tried to undermine the bona fides of the other, GOLITSYN explictly and NOSENKO by implication. This explanation is so illogical, as well as so detrimental to the KGB, that it must be rejected from serious consideration.

The choice thus seems to lie between the first two explanations for GOLITSYN's misidentification of NOSENKO, one an understandable error of assumption drawn from their few chance encounters, the other a misguided attempt that had no sinister goals. In either case, GOLITSYN's testimony does not contribute to a determination of the status of NOSENKO within the KGB as of the years prior to 1960.

There are two explanations for NOSENKO's denial about having met GOLITSYN. One explanation is that they were never in personal contact, the KGB was aware of this fact, and - unprepared for GOLITSYN's statements to the contrary - the KGB briefed NOSENKO accordingly. If in this particular instance NOSENKO told the truth and (as discussed above) GOLITSYN did not, no additional or different conclusion can be drawn about the bona fides of NOSENKO and his claims of service in the KGB. The second explanation is that, as GOLITSYN said, these encounters did take place in 1953 and again in 1958 or 1959, but because of their casual and fleeting nature, NOSENKO (unlike GOLITSYN) has not remembered them.

2. Resume of Information*

According to GOLITSYN, he personally met NOSENKO two or three times in 1953, while visiting the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, a component of the internal security directorate, and again in 1958 and 1959. On the other hand, NOSENKO was unable to identify GOLITSYN's photograph and he denied ever having seen him. GOLITSYN said that GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV were friends of NOSENKO as well as of GOLITSYN. (NOSENKO claimed to be on friendly terms with each of these three KGB officers; he acknowledged, however, that his acquaintance with GUK had been merely casual until NOSENKO's three-month TDY to Geneva in 1962, which made them the best of friends.) From 1953 to 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO was a case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section, then transferred to the Tourist Department, where he was a senior case officer in 1959. GOLITSYN stated unequivocally that NOSENKO was not a Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section or otherwise serving in that section or in the American Department as of the time he (GOLITSYN) consulted with various officers there in April-June 1960 and January 1961.** GOLITSYN spoke there with officers whom NOSENKO claims as close colleagues, including KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV, and would doubtless have known if NOSENKO were supervising or otherwise involved in code clerk operations. In summary, GOLITSYN corroborated some of NOSENKO's alleged assignment in the KGB Second Chief Directorate but not all of them, while NOSENKO contradicted GOLITSYN by saying that the two men had never met.

3. Comments on GOLITSYN

From December 1952 until April 1953 GOLITSYN was Chief of the American Desk, Counterintelligence Department, Foreign Directorate, KGB (then MGB), and for most of the period from January to March 1959 he was on TDY training assignments to the Second Chief Directorate. In the first job at least GOLITSYN presumably would have had regular dealings with the U.S. Embassy Section, and perhaps also in the second he would have been in contact with the Tourist Department, in which NOSENKO claimed to have been then serving. Despite this, and despite his proven excellence of memory for the names and tasks of KGB personnel, GOLITSYN never mentioned NOSENKO in debriefings during the years 1962 and 1963, nor commented on his name on the two occasions when it was shown to him, although he had numerous opportunities to mention him in connection with the names of CHURANOV, KASHCHEYEV, and GUK.

---

* The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595, with comments thereon appearing on Pages 647-659, while in the section which follows below are a discussion and an evaluation of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate, as described on Pages 343-344.

**As stated in Part VIII.1., however, it is not credible that NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-55 or in 1960-1962.

[redacted]

[redacted]

There would appear to be no reason why NOSENKO, if he had ever met GOLITSYN, should not have said so to American Intelligence representatives.* To have done so would have given NOSENKO concrete support for his claims of KGB staff service, which he knew to be in question. On the contrary, however, NOSENKO consistently denied any contact and manufactured a demonstrably false story to explain his own absence during GOLITSYN's admitted visit to the section in which NOSENKO claims to have served in January 1961. (See Page 183, second footnote.)

On the other hand, GOLITSYN's claim must be measured against the background and circumstances of his statements. In the absence of any comments about or identification of NOSENKO by GOLITSYN prior to the public announcement of his defection from the KGB, and in view of the amount of information made available to him from NOSENKO materials prior to his making any statements about his alleged acquaintance with him, GOLITSYN's "identification" of NOSENKO as a KGB staff officer known to him personally cannot be considered as spontaneous or uncontaminated information.

The weight of independent evidence against NOSENKO's alleged service in those positions which GOLITSYN corroborated, combined with the conflict between GOLITSYN's and NOSENKO's testimony about their personal acquaintanceship, makes it impossible to accept GOLITSYN's verification of NOSENKO's claimed KGB status during any stage of the latter's career.

---

*It is not likely that he would forget it. Direct relationship with or knowledge of a defector would be interesting and important to remaining KGB officers; even if temporarily forgotten, post-defection reminiscences would almost certainly bring back memories of such recent and direct contacts as GOLITSYN relates.

2. NOSENKO's Background and Career

Date of Information	Source	Information Reported by [redacted]
10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)	[redacted]	NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately 16 years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine. [redacted]
10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)	[redacted]	The photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO.** [redacted] worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.
10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)		[redacted] "It appeared quite certain [redacted] that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB."
19 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 20 February 1964)	[redacted]	[redacted]

TOP SECRET

[redacted]

** [illegible] photograph of Vladimir [illegible], identified by [redacted] as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at

[redacted]

(Reported to the FBI on 20 February 1964)

(Reported to the FBI on 22 February 1964)

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 8 February 1965)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was asked [redacted] whether he felt NOSENKO actually defected or whether he felt the defection might be a "trick" by the KGB. [redacted] [redacted] replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the U.S. Embassy.

Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow [redacted] on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these. [redacted] Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the KGB, [redacted] attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

DATE 4/12/94

LOST/MISSING MATERIAL

THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.

DOCUMENT NO. ____________ DATED: ____________

OR

PAGE(S) 777

FROM:

CIA JOB NO. ________

BOX NO. Reel 46

FOLDER NO. 2A

10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)

[redacted]

[redacted]

10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)

[redacted]

10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 25 February)

[redacted]

Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

[redacted]

The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva* and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

TOP SECRET

[redacted] NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate. [redacted] NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Tourist Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books.** [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO

[redacted]

[redacted]

is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. [redacted] that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."

(Reported to the FBI on 9 March 1964)

[redacted]

NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.*

~~21 March 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 23 March 1964)~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

---

* NOSENKO volunteered for the first time during the January-March 1965 interrogations that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room." He had not mentioned this dining room earlier.

(Reported to the FBI on 27 March 1964)

[redacted]

20 May 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 21 May 1964)

[redacted]

Reported to CIA by the FBI on 11 June 1964)

[redacted]

There seems to be unanimous opinion among the [redacted] KGB chiefs [redacted] that NOSENKO... could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm." NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting forth the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some [redacted] KGB "chiefs" [redacted] [redacted] that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.

The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. [redacted] feels quite sure that NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. It was his opinion that NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

---

* See above; NOSENKO did not mention these directories.

(Reported to the FBI on 22 June 1964)

[redacted]

The general consensus among [redacted] KGB employees [redacted] [redacted] is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to the U.S. Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. [redacted] these comments cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but [redacted] no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 8 February 1965)

[redacted]

The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable." NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

TOP SECRET

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

4. Repercussions of NOSENKO's Defection

19 ~~February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 20 February 1964)~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

~~[illegible] February 1964 [illegible]~~

~~[illegible] February 1964 (Ro- [illegible]~~

~~[illegible] and [illegible] February 1964 (reported to the FBI on 2[illegible] February 1964)~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible] KUROCHKIN, a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be [illegible] as "well known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted" with him.***

[redacted]

[redacted]

**NOSENKO provided no information concerning KUROCHKIN [illegible]

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(Reported to FBI on 28 February 1964)

[redacted]

(Reported to the FBI [illegible] March 196[illegible]

[redacted]

(Reported to the FBI on [illegible] March 1964)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible] Depart[illegible] [illegible]ions

TOP SECRET

20 March 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 23 March 1964)

[redacted]

[redacted]

...orted to ... 9 June

2[illegible] March 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 23 March 1964)

[redacted]

[illegible] April 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 14 April 1964)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

~~(Reported to the FBI on 5 May 1964)~~

[redacted]

~~(Reported to the FBI on 18 ...)~~

[redacted]

~~(Reported to the FBI on 1... 1964)~~

[redacted]

~~(FBI Report ... 29 July 1...)~~

[redacted]

Two commissions have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad; and (b) to attempt to eliminate "weak" KGB employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

[redacted]

An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at

TOP SECRET

the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB.* It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. [redacted] Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK[redacted] Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. [redacted] S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.[redacted]

TOP SECRET

---

* See Pages 327-336 in which NOSENKO's description of his relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed.

[redacted]

*** NOSENKO identified GOLUBEV by name and photograph as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer, who had served in New York City under United Nations cover in 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO said that he first met GOLUBEV in 1959 and knew nothing of his earlier career. Because GOLUBEV had at one point been assigned to Geneva with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO went to him in 1962 for a briefing on Foreign Ministry personnel in the delegation before his own assignment to Geneva. NOSENKO said he last saw GOLUBEV in KGB Headquarters in 1963. At that time GOLUBEV was assigned to the New York Direction of the Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO said that GOLUBEV had been in this Department as long as he had known him.

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 29 January 1965)

[redacted]

It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.* [redacted]

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 8 February 1965)

[redacted]

GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection.** In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

---

* NOSENKO said that his father and GRIBANOV were not acquainted.

** GRIBANOV was reportedly in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat in Moscow as recently as late autumn of 1964. At that time he turned his contact over to another KGB officer.

Early June 1965 (Reported to CIA by the FBI on 29 June 1965)

[redacted]

Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career.* GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an important military plant and is now a "nothing."

[redacted]

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 30 September 1965)

[redacted]

After the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TAPABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN and GRIBANOV were friends socially and that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there. [redacted] described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accused on willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.***

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

---

* NOSENKO said that it was BANNIKOV who authorized his 1964 trip to Geneva, during which he defected, and that to the best of his knowledge, GRIBANOV did not know that he (NOSENKO) was making this trip. Nevertheless, NOSENKO said that he thought that GRIBANOV might be fired from the KGB as a result of his defection because "he was responsible for pushing me ahead." NOSENKO said that BANNIKOV would not be punished because he had done nothing other than support him as a candidate for the 1964 Geneva assignment (see Pages 333-334).

** NOSENKO reported that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, at which time he became Deputy Chief of "Service No. 2," the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.

*** NOSENKO said he saw GRIBANOV three times socially during his KGB career; on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO reported that he provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN at parties in 1962 and 1963, but not in 1961. He could not recall any details of the 1962 party (e.g., who the girls were, where they went, what they did, etc.). He was, however, able to describe the 1963 party, which took place in October or November, in considerable detail [redacted]

23 April 1946

790.

[illegible]

[illegible]

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

[redacted]

According to CIA records, the sequence of events leading up to NOSENKO's confrontation with the Soviets was as follows:

- On the morning of 11 February 1964 the Soviet Embassy delivered a note to the U.S. State Department requesting an immediate interview with NOSENKO, but no reply was given.

- In the early morning of 12 February NOSENKO arrived in the United States.

- On 13 February NOSENKO's agreement to meet the Soviets was obtained, and initial arrangements as to the timing and place of the confrontation were discussed with him and within the U.S. Government.

- Final arrangements were agreed upon during the morning of 14 February, the Soviets were then notified, and the confrontation took place late in the afternoon of the same day.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6. [illegible]

a. [illegible]

(1) [illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

(i) Introduction

[redacted] and NOSENKO agree on only one aspect of the PENKOVSKIY compromise (see Part VIII.B.6.b.): They both attribute the initial compromise to KGB surveillance. Although [redacted] report agrees with NOSENKO that the KGB learned of American participation in the operation only after PENKOVSKIY was arrested, [redacted] subsequent reports contradict this by tying the compromise directly to surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel visiting the Pushkin Street dead drop site. [redacted] story of the events stemming from the compromise of the dead drop site is at odds both with the facts of the case and with all other reporting by Soviet sources of CIA and the FBI. [redacted]

(ii) Discussion

[redacted]). [redacted] report of [redacted] 1962--the month after the KGB terminated the operation--indicated that the KGB had been aware of PENKOVSKIY's involvement with Americans, and specifically with the CIA officer JACOB, for about two and one half months prior to the arrests. This statement is inaccurate concerning JACOB, who was a last-minute substitute for the servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962 and who never before had personally participated in the operation. [redacted] statements otherwise agree with NOSENKO's subsequent report and the "official report" regarding KGB ignorance of the role of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY case. [redacted]

[redacted] report on the case, however, is contradictory to his first report and to the other sources: He said in [redacted] 1963 that surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected a visit to the Pushkin Street site by an American, and that the resulting 24-hour surveillance of the site caught PENKOVSKIY visiting the same location, whereupon he was arrested and confessed. CIA, however, has no evidence besides the statements by [redacted] that PENKOVSKIY ever went to the Pushkin Street site after it was visited by CIA personnel. [redacted]

In [redacted] 1963 [redacted] reported at greater length about the role of Pushkin Street in PENKOVSKIY's compromise. At this time he explained that the American had visited Pushkin Street not once but twice; surveillance had observed him on both occasions when he went inside the entrance, but followed him inside only on the second visit. The surveillant who entered the building reported that the American appeared to be tying his shoe; although this was not unusual in itself, [redacted] continued, the fact that it was the second visit to the same address for no visible purpose caused suspicion, and as a result the KGB installed a closed circuit TV camera to provide 24-hour coverage of the site. PENKOVSKIY was observed checking it (see preceding paragraph): an American was observed loading a dead drop behind a lobby heating unit (radiator); the KGB tagged the dead drop material with a radioactive substance; PENKOVSKIY was observed unloading the dead drop and proceeding to his office where he secreted the material in a concealment area in his desk; the KGB also continued in surveillance of the dead drop site, observed PENKOVSKIY load the dead drop, and seized an American (JACOB) who came to unload it. PENKOVSKIY was then confronted with photographic evidence of the loadings and unloadings and could offer no defense. This report is the only indication from a Soviet source that the KGB had surveilled the two visits to the Pushkin Street site made by U.S. Embassy officers; while [redacted] report stated that one American visited the site twice, in fact two different Americans visited the site once each, MAHONEY on 21 January 1961 and ABIDIAN on 30 December 1961.

[redacted]

(iii) [redacted]

[redacted]

(iv) Remarks

The Pushkin Street dead drop was never used for communication to PENKOVSKIY. and in fact was loaded only once, when the KGB did so and activated it on 2 November 1962, thereby apprehending JACOB. Moreover, the first visit to Pushkin Street, in January 1961, predated any personal contact between PENKOVSKIY and Western Intelligence, either American or British. Thus, [redacted] report on Americans visiting there is only partially accurate. and the use of these "surveilled" visits as an explanation for how the KGB detected PENKOVSKIY is unsupportable. In reporting incorrectly on this matter, [redacted] could have erred merely because his sub-sources (one unnamed, the other apparently [redacted] despite the conflict in reporting about his position) repeated erroneous information in his presence.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] nevertheless is the only source to reveal that the KGB was aware of the Pushkin Street dead drop as early as 21 January 1961, when MAHONEY went to the site. [redacted] therefore has detracted from the bona fides of NOSENKO by showing KGB awareness of a CIA officer having gone to the dead drop site 11 months before ABIDIAN's visit there, and even before PENKOVSKIY finally succeeded in establishing personal contact with Western intelligence services. It was the ABIDIAN visit, NOSENKO said, which first aroused KGB interest in the site at Pushkin Street.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(ii) [redacted]

600
831.

[redacted]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SEC[illegible]

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

D. [redacted]

1. Introduction

While in general terms corroborating NOSENKO's claims to service in both the GRU and the KGB, [redacted] has supplied some details which are incompatible with the statements by NOSENKO on his intelligence career. Although not as prolific a reporter on NOSENKO as [redacted] has had several topics in common with NOSENKO: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, CHEREPANOV, SHUBIN, SLESINGER, and the contacts between the GRU officer BOLSHAKOV and Attorney General Robert KENNEDY in 1962. When compared with NOSENKO's information, the reports by [redacted] on the case of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV are interlocking:

- [redacted] and NOSENKO agree that POPOV was compromised after his return to Moscow from East Berlin in November 1958 and in consequence of KGB surveillance.

- CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO likewise agree about POPOV's compromise.

[redacted] concurred with NOSENKO by indicating that CHEREPANOV was a genuine source of American Intelligence, and this statement by [redacted]

- [redacted] learned some of his details on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, and [redacted] and NOSENKO have indicated that this compromise resulted from KGB surveillance of PENKOVSKIY's British contacts in Moscow.

Presented below are [redacted]s remarks about NOSENKO, followed by a review of the topics common to these two sources.

2. Statements on NOSENKO

When discussing NOSENKO for the first time, [redacted] said on [redacted] that they were not personally acquainted, but that "various persons" in Moscow (whom he did not identify) had spoken to him about NOSENKO. The statements by [redacted] and NOSENKO on the latter's background are compared in the following tabulation:

[redacted]	NOSENKO
As a young man, NOSENKO attended the GRU's Military-Diplomatic Academy (MDA) and then was in the GRU Information Department--in all, perhaps a year of service in the GRU.*	NOSENKO said his entire service in the GRU, in the years 1950-1953, consisted of duty in the Naval GRU, first in the Far East and then in the Baltic.**

---

* Until the late 1950's, the course at the MDA, the strategic intelligence school of the GRU, lasted for four years; more recently, the course has been of three years' duration.

**During the 1950-1953 period and before, the Naval GRU was separate from the rest of the GRU.

[redacted]	NOSENKO
A "very undisciplined person" while in the GRU and "not very good," NOSENKO was to have been discharged from the GRU.	NOSENKO's statements about himself during the 1950-1953 period appear to agree with the evaluation, but he has said nothing about facing discharge by the Naval GRU.
NOSENKO's father, "a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding," was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB.	His transfer from the Naval GRU to the KGB in 1953, NOSENKO said, was at the initiative of KGB General KOBULOV, a friend of his father; the elder NOSENKO was Minister of Shipbuilding.
NOSENKO was "an important boss" in the KGB (directorate or department unknown).	According to NOSENKO, his most recent KGB title prior to defecting was Deputy Chief, Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate.

[redacted] stated that NOSENKO gave "very, very good information" to the United States, having had "great access" to KGB information which included "all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc." The U.S. Embassy, [redacted] continued, had found microphones on the basis of information that NOSENKO had provided.

3. Parallels with NOSENKO's Reporting

a. The CHEREPANOV Case

(i) Summary

One of the two ways in which [redacted] has corroborated NOSENKO on the authenticity of CHEREPANOV as a genuine source of American Intelligence was to cite information he had learned from [redacted] CHEREPANOV had formerly served in the KGB; CHEREPANOV gave some papers to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, which returned them to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); the MFA turned the papers over to the KGB, which traced them by analysis to CHEREPANOV; meanwhile, CHEREPANOV had tried to flee the USSR, but he was captured near the Turkish border and executed. In every major respect, therefore [redacted] agrees with NOSENKO's version of the case. When asked whether the CHEREPANOV incident might have been "a trick" by the KGB to embarrass the U.S. Embassy, [redacted] replied that it was definitely not.

The second way in which [redacted] has certified that CHEREPANOV was a genuine source is indirect. Like NOSENKO ~~and one~~ of the CHEREPANOV documents, [redacted] had indicated that KGB surveillance of a U.S. Embassy officer brought about the compromise of POPOV.

(ii) Remarks

As stated in Part VIII.B.6., the CHEREPANOV incident was a KGB provocation against the U.S. Embassy, but it is conceivable that statements suggesting the contrary could have been made [redacted]

[redacted] agreement with both CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO on the cause of POPOV's compromise, however, appears to be based on [redacted] direct involvement, and does not appear to be attributable to sub-sources having provided him with erroneous information; this is discussed further below.

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

[redacted] dates on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY are at variance with NOSENKO's and they disagree on whether the KGB knew American Intelligence to be involved in this operation before JACOB of CIA was apprehended at the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962. Both sources stated, however, that surveillance led to the detection of PENKOVSKIY, although again they differ on the person with whom PENKOVSKIY was first seen by the KGB; [redacted] said this individual was the British businessman WYNNE, while NOSENKO said it was the Englishwoman Mrs. CHISHOLM.

According to [redacted] PENKOVSKIY had been working openly with WYNNE, explaining that he was trying to develop WYNNE, and the KGB learned of their meetings through surveillance.* CIA records show that WYNNE met PENKOVSKIY in Moscow during April-May 1961, May-June 1961, August 1961, and June-July 1962. [redacted] report that PENKOVSKIY came under suspicion in May 1962 therefore is not consistent with his statement about KGB surveillance of the WYNNE-PENKOVSKIY meetings, nor does this report coincide with the evidence from WYNNE himself that the KGB was sufficiently suspicious of their meetings to record a conversation they had had [redacted] 1961 (one year earlier than in the [redacted] version). NOSENKO dated the PENKOVSKIY compromise at a month or two after he was first seen, but at the time not identified, in contact with Mrs. CHISHOLM in November or December 1961.

Whereas NOSENKO said the KGB was unaware of the participation of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY operation until JACOB was detained, [redacted] reported that while PENKOVSKIY was at a reception in Moscow, he was observed making contact with an American in a lavatory. [redacted] did not date this event, but CIA records show that it was on 27 August 1962. [redacted] added that the KGB "invented" the incident at Pushkin Street on 2 November 1962, the month after PENKOVSKIY's arrest, in order to catch the American unloading the dead drop.**

PENKOVSKIY was not personally known to him, [redacted] stated. [redacted] no other sub-sources were named.

---

* The same statement was made by NOSENKO and in the official KGB document on PENKOVSKIY's compromise.

**This is obviously true, although the date of PENKOVSKIY's arrest may have been more than a month before.

c. The Compromise of POPOV

(i) Introduction

Of all the sources available to American Intelligence, [redacted] is the best placed to report on the compromise of POPOV: [redacted] information agrees with that provided by NOSENKO and CHEREPANOV, as well as that in the 18 September 1959 message from POPOV to CIA (believed to have been dictated by the KGB). These four sources have indicated that the compromise resulted from KGB surveillance of a U.S. Embassy official following the recall of POPOV in November 1958. [redacted] however, has not precisely dated the incident (dated by inference by the others at 21 January 1959), has associated it with an American Intelligence dead drop for POPOV (whereas the others have said it was CIA's mailing of a letter to POPOV), and has not named the CIA officer involved (George WINTERS).* The evidence from [redacted] like that from NOSENKO, CHEREPANOV, and the POPOV message, conflicts with that from GOLITSYN whose statements on the compromise of POPOV are supported by analysis of events in 1957 and 1958 on which POPOV reported (see Pages 663-665).

(ii) Details

[redacted] reported [redacted] on the POPOV compromise. POPOV's correspondence with his Austrian girlfriend [redacted] appears to have been the prelude to the POPOV compromise; POPOV, said [redacted] had made a "very serious mistake" by using an accommodation address supplied by American Intelligence to receive mail from a girlfriend in Austria.** "In some fashion" this came to the attention of the Austrian police, [redacted] and it was determined that she had been sending mail to a Soviet officer in Berlin. The Austrian police notified the Soviets, and eventually POPOV was confronted by the chief of his GRU component in Berlin.*** GRU Headquarters was notified, POPOV was recalled to Moscow to explain the situation, and when he was unable to do so, the facts were turned over to the KGB for full-scale investigation. [redacted]it not been for POPOV's correspondence with an Austrian woman, "they would never have caught him," and that POPOV was "arrested because of a connection with a girl;" also, [redacted] at the end of 1959 POPOV [redacted] was recalled to Moscow "for something" -[redacted] While the foregoing KGB investigation was in progress, the KGB routinely placed under surveillance a U.S. Embassy official in Moscow. This person was observed renting a boat in Gorkiy Park, going to the vicinity of a new bridge near the Moscow Stadium, and there taking photographs of the bridge and surrounding area. Its suspicions aroused, the KGB covered this area and observed POPOV unloading a dead drop. He was arrested, doubled, and "operated" against American Intelligence for a year and one-half.* Eventually, the KGB put in motion a plan to attempt to compromise the American official who was meeting POPOV. The KGB photographed a meeting in a Moscow restaurant, then arrested the official and showed him pictures of his meeting with POPOV and of POPOV unloading the dead drop at the bridge. After the American refused to work for the KGB, he was released and declared persona non grata.**

---

* In his first reference to POPOV's compromise [redacted] that POPOV made the mistake of providing information traceable to himself. No sub-source for this remark was given [redacted] and since then [redacted] has not resolved the discrepancy between this version and the other one treated at length here.

** CIA did not supply POPOV with an accommodation address, but he did secretly correspond with KOCHANEK.

*** [redacted] went to the Austrian police on 25 August 1958 with information that included the identification of POPOV as a Soviet Intelligence officer. POPOV's superior confronted him on 4 November 1958 about KOCHANEK and received from him an admission to having had some correspondence with her concerning his search for operational leads; the superior told POPOV that the Soviets believed "she was working for someone" and that "possibly she is the cause" of the Berlin unit's operational difficulties. POPOV was recalled to Moscow on 17 November 1958 ostensibly for a week's TDY to discuss the case of an American whom he was developing under CIA aegis. He did not return to Berlin.

[redacted] CIA questioned [redacted] on POPOV's compromise. He said at this time that he had heard POPOV was apprehended through a dead drop. POPOV "apparently was under suspicion there in Berlin, and when they (presumably the GRU) recalled him to Moscow, they wondered who his future contacts would be, and they were told the following: 'KGB workers place American Embassy employees under surveillance.' They observed an American at the staircase... and they found a dead drop under the staircase. So they established coverage of the dead drop and observed POPOV come and unload the drop. They made a report, and after this POPOV was under surveillance... Then he was called in and told thus-and-so. They showed him photographs. They told him he was going to work for them to expose his contacts. He agreed to it..."***

---

* Since POPOV returned to Moscow in November 1958 and LANGELLE was arrested the following October, he could not have been doubled against CIA for more than eleven months.

** Starting on 4 January 1959, POPOV had a series of six brush contacts in Moscow with the CIA officer Russell LANGELLE of the U.S. Embassy, culminating in the detention and interview of LANGELLE by the KGB on 16 October 1959.

***As previously stated, no Moscow dead drops were used by CIA in the POPOV operation, but LANGELLE did survey the possibilities for dead drops to be used in other operations. One of these was located in Lenin Hills, an area of Moscow not far from the new bridge near Moscow Stadium, and it was situated beneath a staircase; [redacted] LANGELLE visited the area of the dead drop site on 24 and 28 May 1958, but the dead drop was loaded by a CIA legal travel agent (on 7 June 1958) rather than by LANGELLE. The CHEREPANOV document, discussed on Pages 563-564, stated, in the course of reviewing LANGELLE's operational activities in Moscow, that this dead drop was for use with an agent named REPNIKOV; in fact, it was not intended for the REPNIKOV case.

(iii) Sub-sourcing by [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

In [redacted] that he had learned these details about the compromise of POPOV from a conversation [redacted] who conducted some of the investigation of POPOV because at the time he was a [redacted] The same sub-source was cited by [redacted] information he supplied CIA in [redacted]

[redacted]

(iv) Remarks

[redacted] reported, inaccurately, that American Intelligence gave POPOV an accommodation address in Berlin, that a dead drop was used in the Moscow phase of the operation, and that the KGB doubled POPOV for a year and one-half before terminating the case. Each of these incorrect items came to [redacted] since [redacted] participated in the investigation of POPOV, presumably he would have recognized them to be untrue. One explanation for the inaccuracies might be that [redacted] precisely what he had been told, but [redacted] deliberately misinformed him. There is, however, no evident reason why [redacted] would have done this. Another explanation might be that [redacted] misunderstood his sub-source, or in relaying the information to [redacted] garbled the details. This would mean that [redacted] was less than fully attentive to details on a personal acquaintance who had gained notoriety, details which he was told at a time when he was in a position comparable to POPOV's: in contact with [redacted] Intelligence. [redacted] None of these explanations seems entirely satisfactory, and the answer may lie elsewhere.

[redacted] has been inconsistent about the degree of suspicion surrounding POPOV when he was recalled to Moscow in November 1958 in connection with his correspondence with [redacted] On one hand, in 1962 [redacted] indicated that the KGB surveillance of the U.S. Embassy officer was coincidental with the separate investigation of POPOV's relationship with this Austrian woman. On the other hand, in [redacted] implied that as a result of the suspicion of POPOV in Berlin, there was interest in POPOV's future contacts in Moscow, an interest which would be covered by the KGB's surveillance of U.S. Embassy employees.

---

*However, in another version [redacted] said that as soon as the Illegals reported their compromise in January 1958, POPOV immediately fell under suspicion. The conflict between [redacted] [redacted] statements has not been resolved.

d. SHUBIN, SLESINGER, and BOLSHAKOV

In three instanc[redacted]964 NOSENKO confirmed reports made by [redacted] the identification of SHUBIN as a GRU agent, the Soviets' suspicions that SLESINGER was in contact with the FBI, and the status of BOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer.*

SHUBIN was previously known to have been associated with two GRU Illegals in the United States during the 1940's, but independent of NOSENKO and [redacted] there is no verification of his having more recently been an agent of the GRU. [redacted] FBI.

BOLSHAKOV, the only claimed mutual acquaintance of [redacted] and NOSENKO, has not been named as a GRU officer by any other source, nor has he been observed in meetings with GRU agents. Both [redacted] and NOSENKO spoke of BOLSHAKOV's having met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY in 1962. NOSENKO added that, in initiating the contact, the Attorney General knew BOLSHAKOV to be a "military intelligence officer," but this report has not been corroborated.**

4. Comments on [redacted]

[redacted] confirmation that NOSENKO is a genuine KGB officer-defector is comprised of hearsay evidence. and hence the conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB would not necessarily bring [redacted] *bona fides* into question: much would depend upon [redacted] sub-sources, as yet unidentified.

[redacted] and NOSENKO are mutually supporting on the compromise of POPOV, a man [redacted], and both have authenticated [redacted] the validity of a CHEREPANOV document which concerned the POPOV compromise and which was prepared by the KGB for transmittal to American Intelligence. In addition, [redacted] and NOSENKO support one another about the PENKOVSKIY compromise, about the contact between BOLSHAKOV [redacted] and Robert KENNEDY, and about SHUBIN and [redacted] Their information on BOLSHAKOV and SHUBIN is unique; on SLESINGER it is corroborated by actions taken by the KGB, as reported by SLESINGER; on POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV it is confirmed by KGB controlled sources.

With the exception of his details on POPOV, [redacted]s reporting on NOSENKO and on common topics can be explained, individually, by misinformation [redacted] received and innocently passed along. These items taken together, however, in the light [redacted] statements on the compromise of POPOV (which conflict with GOLITSYN's reporting and analytical evidence) are indications that [redacted] is controlled by the KGB.

[redacted]

**If Robert KENNEDY indeed knew BOLSHAKOV to be a GRU officer, the question remains as to how NOSENKO was aware of the fact, since [redacted] was the only source to have made this identification before the time when KENNEDY and BOLSHAKOV met.

TOP SECRET

TOP S

sensitive source

14-00000

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

F. [redacted]

1. Introduction

[redacted] counterintelligence production has been extremely limited. For the most part she has provided only superficial reports, generally only in response to questioning and frequently citing her own lack of access to information of value. Her professed personal involvement in, and dramatic accounts of, certain situations on which NOSENKO's reporting is demonstrably false is therefore noteworthy in the context of her total performance. [redacted]'s reporting on NOSENKO, despite vagueness and contradictions, has the net effect of supporting his *bona fides* and affirming the importance of the information he has reported. Her accounts of the CHEREPANOV case emphasized the depth of his treason and the retribution of the KGB--themes which dominate the NOSENKO account [redacted] Her reports on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, while differing markedly from NOSENKO's in basis, scope, and detail, confirmed almost to the month NOSENKO's dating of the compromise. Her confessed participation as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, despite her repeated claims to know nothing of importance concerning its operations, has placed her in NOSENKO's milieu, and the KGB officers who figured in her reporting are (with two exceptions) personalities who have previously been identified as KGB officers only by NOSENKO.

2. NOSENKO's Background and Career

[redacted] has claimed no first-hand or authoritative knowledge of NOSENKO, reporting at various times that she had heard gossip, had heard about him from her KGB friend SVIRIN (who she believed only "knew about" NOSENKO, i.e. did not know him personally), or had heard about him from "someone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not SVIRIN." She has reported fragments on NOSENKO's background: his father's position, his mother's ethnic background, and NOSENKO's non-KGB status. She initially said that NOSENKO's father was a general, later said she was not sure of that, and still later amended her description to "general or minister," adding that he was Ukrainian - thus approaching an accurate statement only after several conversations about him. Her consistent statement that NOSENKO's mother was Jewish and involved in black market activities has not been elsewhere reported, and her statement that NOSENKO was a civilian, rather than a KGB officer, contradicts his own account and that of other sources who have confirmed his KGB status. [redacted] sourcing of her limited information on NOSENKO to her KGB friend SVIRIN nevertheless demonstrates at least potential access to some information about NOSENKO. (SVIRIN was identified by NOSENKO as an officer of the Third Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, since 1963, and before that of the Third Department of the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, where he participated in and received an award for his part in the investigation of PENKOVSKIY.)

3. NOSENKO's Knowledge - Damage to the KGB

[redacted] has mentioned NOSENKO's disclosures to the Americans concerning the microphones in the U.S. Embassy - her only reference to information he might have provided - on each occasion when she has discussed NOSENKO. She once attributed to SVIRIN the remark in October 1966 that NOSENKO had done considerable harm to the Soviet Union by revealing this information, thus (and specifically only in this context) underscoring the importance of NOSENKO's information. (NOSENKO himself has characterized this information as the most important he has provided.) The context in which she has discussed NOSENKO has been the general one of defectors from the Soviet Union: she has repeatedly emphasized that the Soviets attempt to convince all Soviet citizens that "anybody who defects will find his grave by the hand of KGB people" [redacted] with reference to NOSENKO, she once quoted SVIRIN as having said that NOSENKO, too, would one day be exterminated, thus clearly implying that NOSENKO was a genuine defector.

4. Parallels with NOSENKO's Reporting

a. The CHEREPANOV Case

[redacted]s account of CHEREPANOV's disaffection, treason, arrest, and execution confirms in general outline and in emphasis that of NOSENKO. [redacted] claims direct knowledge of the case through her own and her husband's personal friendship with CHEREPANOV and his wife. [redacted] described her husband, in fact, as the only friend of CHEREPANOV who remained faithful enough after CHEREPANOV's downfall to call on CHEREPANOV's widow, whose address [redacted] knew. This direct knowledge is comparable to that of NOSENKO and [redacted] [redacted]

She introduced her account of the CHEREPANOV case, as in her discussions of NOSENKO, by references to the determination and effectiveness of the KGB in apprehending and executing those who were "running away"; she offered CHEREPANOV as an example of a Soviet traitor who had been caught and executed. Her account of the details, however, differs sharply from that of NOSENKO (and others). Her identification of CHEREPANOV as a classmate of her husband at the GRU's Military Diplomatic Academy (MDA) from 1956 to 1959 is unique among the sources who have reported on CHEREPANOV. For the period during which [redacted] said CHEREPANOV attended the MDA, NOSENKO has made no specific statements concerning CHEREPANOV's career; he has said only that at some unspecified date after CHEREPANOV's return from Belgrade (elsewhere reported as mid-1956) and before early 1960 CHEREPANOV had been assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate. [redacted] also stated, however, that after his graduation from the MDA in 1959, CHEREPANOV "finally" obtained a job in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, suggesting that he had no intervening assignment. Where NOSENKO has failed to establish a clear motive for CHEREPANOV's having collected KGB documents during his assignment to the U.S. Embassy Section for later transmittal to the Americans, [redacted] has described his increasing bitterness from the date of his entering the MDA in 1956. She was not sure that he had been a KGB officer; she neither mentioned nor did her account allow for his assignment to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960-1961 (as stated by by NOSENKO); and she described the documents which he turned over to the Americans as having come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. She stated, therefore, rather than demonstrated, the point that "these were such important documents, important enough that...he was shot."

During her second account of the CHEREPANOV affair, [redacted] sourced her information differently and added first-hand details which she had previously disclaimed having. She said that "In two days this man was arrested...In two months he was shot." This is also at variance with NOSENKO's account of a KGB investigation of up to 20 or 25 days, followed by the KGB officer's visit to CHEREPANOV on 8 December 1963, CHEREPANOV's flight, and a seven-day search for him before his arrest.

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

Closely conforming in this respect to NOSENKO's account of PENKOVSKIY's compromise, [redacted] placed the date of initial suspicion of PENKOVSKIY at about October or November 1961. Her statements of the basis for this suspicion, however, differ completely from the reasons advanced by NOSENKO (and other sources). Her account is vague, in consonance with her claimed lack of any first-hand contemporary knowledge of the investigation leading to his arrest, and is colored by her expressed personal dislike for PENKOVSKIY the man and by the professional misfortunes of her husband which resulted from PENKOVSKIY's arrest. [redacted] cited her KGB friend SVIRIN as the source of some of her information, as the source of the indirect warning to her husband to stay away from PENKOVSKIY, and as someone who knew about PENKOVSKIY's trial and had been somehow associated with the investigation - thus confirming NOSENKO on SVIRIN's participation in the PENKOVSKIY investigation.

c. Reports on KGB Personnel

[redacted] has named relatively few KGB officers who have figured in her career as a KGB agent or about whom she could report any substance. Of her KGB handlers:

- CIA has been unable to identify one, Gennadiy Fedorovich, whose last name she did not know, her handler while she worked at the Embassy of Nepal in 1964. NOSENKO has not referred to operations against this Embassy.

- Two KGB handlers were assigned to [redacted] in Leningrad - V. I. DEMIDOV and Georgiy PCHELIN. Both of these officers had previously been identified by NOSENKO as officers of the Leningrad KGB and have not been identified by any other source. They were two of the total of four Leningrad KGB officers named by NOSENKO.

- Her KGB handler while she was employed by a Canadian correspondent in Moscow was Vladimir Ivanovich KOSTYRYA. Only NOSENKO has identified KOSTYRYA as the KGB officer who had been in the United States under the name Vladimir Viktorovich VLADIMIROV; NOSENKO considered this, as he said in 1965, his most important identification among KGB personnel. [redacted] KOSTYRYA was in the U.S. under Intourist cover; [redacted] relationship with him was not related to her earlier Intourist work, however, but her connection with a foreign correspondent, which was KOSTYRYA's responsibility after his return to Moscow.

Of the four other KGB officers on whom [redacted] has reported in any depth, three were previously identified by NOSENKO and only by NOSENKO:

- V.G. SVIRIN, her KGB friend, is an ubiquitous figure in much of her reporting on other subjects and in her account of her personal life, as well as her primary candidate for a Western recruitment approach. SVIRIN had previously been identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, previously involved in the PENKOVSKIY investigation (both of which assignments [redacted] has confirmed).

- In connection with SVIRIN, [redacted] recounted an incident in which a KGB officer whom she described in derogatory terms, Valentin MUZEYNIK, had narrowly escaped dismissal as a result of a drunken brawl with a militiaman. MUZEYNIK had not only survived, however, but continued to bear a higher KGB rank than his former friend, colleague, and subordinate, SVIRIN. NOSENKO said MUZEYNIK was an officer of the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

- Vadim BIRYUKOV was identified by [redacted] as the KGB officer under *Novosti* cover assigned to report on the interview in August 1966 of [redacted] NOSENKO had previously given information concerning BIRYUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, targetted against foreign correspondents.

5. Remarks

There is confusion in [redacted]'s sub-sourcing for her information on NOSENKO and inconsistency in her statements that, on one hand, he was a civilian but on the other, he was aware of microphones in the U.S. Embassy. These facts indicate that if she was briefed by the KGB to report to American Intelligence on NOSENKO, [redacted] was inadequately prepared. Otherwise, however, [redacted] has personally supported the *bona fides* of NOSENKO by offering direct confirmation of the *bona fides* of CHEREPANOV, by corroborating NOSENKO's details on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, and by verifying his identification of KGB Second Chief Directorate personalities.

Note: Aside from her support of NOSENKO and CHEREPANOV, there are many aspects of the [redacted] case which independently led CIA and other Western services to conclude that she is a KGB-dispatched agent. Some of these aspects are as follows:

- The circumstances of her claimed relationship with the KGB contradict KGB practice as known from other sources.

- [redacted] description of her husband's recall from Stockholm and his punishment for having previously worked as a GRU colleague of PENKOVSKIY in the GKNNR fit neither the treatment of other GRU officers whom PENKOVSKIY also identified nor the logic of the situation: Her husband was sent to Stockholm after PENKOVSKIY was uncovered and even after he was arrested. (That the brief assignment in Stockholm may have been a KGB-organized prelude to the defection of [redacted] is also suggested by the fact that the one operational contact her husband is known to have had there was a Western double agent, and [redacted] was able to provide identifying data on this agent.)

- Nearly all of [redacted]'s identifications of Soviet Intelligence personalities were previously known.

- She has given conflicting accounts of her motivation for defecting, of her relationship with her husband, and of her associations with KGB personnel.

- Against the background of the claimed difficulties in which she and her husband found themselves, it seems unlikely that [redacted] would have been permitted to leave the USSR.

- There are oddities in her relationship with the Canadian correspondent who employed her in the USSR and who was her alleged KGB target, as well as in her conduct in the West and in her husband's situation and behavior since the defection.

G. General Correlation[illegible]

1. Quality of [illegible]

a. Introduction

In examining the bona fides of [illegible] intelligence source, it is necessary to evaluate the [illegible] to Soviet illegals and to [illegible] NOSENKO's identifiable and original leads [illegible] in Part VIII.B., should that with one exception--the [illegible] complex--he did not identify current penetrations of the U.S. Government. Considering the conclusion that the bona fides of NOSENKO, the assumption can be made that the KGB found it feasible to sacrifice the JOHNSON-[illegible] operation. The reasons may have lain in the circumstances that the operation was under threat of compromise because of various security factors, the agents posed difficult handling problems, [illegible] had no current access, and JOHNSON had not been exploited for some time before the NOSENKO lead was received. The rest of NOSENKO's identifiable leads to recruited Americans involved agents who had been previously compromised, who were inactive, or who had already lost their access to classified information.

[redacted]

b. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

TOP SE 827

sensitive sources

TOP SE

sensitive sources....

sensitive sources

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] CIA with [illegible] intelligence activities inside the [illegible] and G[illegible]TSYN in 19[illegible] operations of this kind. What information was available came mainly from the reports [illegible] who became involved with the KGB during visits to the Soviet Union. [illegible] detailed information on [illegible] counterintelligence methods, particularly surveillance techniques, and his less detailed information on the organization and operations of the [illegible] Directorate were unique [illegible] early 1961. This information was [illegible] following his defection at the end of 19[illegible] organizational [illegible] identified a sizeable number of internal [illegible] and provided leads to specific [illegible] and [illegible] activities.

[illegible] and other Western Intelligence Services [illegible] and agent sources with connections [illegible] with KGB internal counterintelligence. [illegible] the most important of these [illegible]

[redacted]

---

* A Polish [illegible] staff officer trained by [illegible] GOLENIEWSKI was also a KGB agent within the UB.

[redacted]

Other techniques on which various sources have confirmed one another include the following:

- [redacted] reported [redacted] that the surveillance equipment used by the KGB Surveillance Directorate includes special paint invisible to the naked eye but visible through use of a special device. It is used in conjunction with helicopters, closed circuit television at bridges, tunnels, etc. A similar technique was described by GOLENIEWSKI.

[redacted]

- NOSENKO [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV papers have described a special chemical compound sensitive to dogs but not to humans (NEPTUNE 80) which is used in surveillance.*

[redacted]

- [redacted] reported [redacted] that microphones and transmitters are installed in American automobiles in the Soviet Union by personnel of the KGB Surveillance Directorate. GOLENIEWSKI earlier provided many details on this technique.

[redacted]

- [redacted] the KGB had developed a transmitter using paper-thin batteries so shaped that they can fit in the shoulder pads of a man's suit. They also can be concealed in the inside covers of menus. Thus concealed, they are used in Moscow by the KGB to listen to conversations between foreign diplomats, particularly at the Hotel Metropol and the Hotel National. Such miniaturized devices have also been described by GOLENIEWSKI, GOLITSYN, NOSENKO, [redacted] [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV papers. Inter alia, NOSENKO and the CHEREPANOV papers gave the KGB cryptonym as "[illegible]".

[redacted]

[redacted]

- NOSENKO and [redacted] have reported the KGB technique of switching telephone calls intended for the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to a KGB installation, where they are intercepted by a Soviet posing as an American.

Where the bulk of NOSENKO's reporting on KGB operations was concerned with those of the Second Chief Directorate, this has been true with only two of the other sources named here. [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted], however, have also given details on specific KGB internal counterintelligence activities in addition to their statements on the compromise of CIA assets within the USSR (a topic of reporting by [redacted] and CHEREPANOV as well). The information from [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] is summarized below.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] - has been able to provide details of KGB Second Chief Directorate activity. He reported the KGB's discovery of an American employed at the Sokolniki Exhibition in Moscow in clandestine contact with an unidentified Soviet female. (This contact is not identified with any CIA operation at the Exhibition in 1959.) He spoke of the KGB's knowledge of an American Intelligence deaddrop under a bench in the area of the Agricultural Exhibition. He said that the KGB controlled all U.S. agent contacts in Moscow, including one with an old man in his 60's (NOSENKO reported on an individual who may be identical with this agent).

---

* The existence and feasibility of such a substance has not been verified.

[redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] claimed to have fulfilled functions which NOSENKO and others have described as standard procedure in operations against foreigners and Soviets inside the Soviet Union. [redacted] said she was a Second Chief Directorate agent targetted against the Nepalese Embassy in Moscow and later against the Canadian correspondent who employed her [redacted]

c. Remarks

As previously indicated, it was only after the defections of the genuine sources GOLITSYN and GOLENIEWSKI in 1961 that American Intelligence began to receive voluminous and mutually corroborative information from others on the activities of the KGB Second Chief and Surveillance Directorates. The timing of this information therefore appears to be significant in addition to the overlap of specific details. The fact that so many of these sources, even [redacted] including [redacted] provided KGB Second Chief Directorate information may reflect a centralized KGB decision to emphasize or sacrifice it.

sensitive source(s)

H. Evaluation

The conclusion that NOSENKO is on a KGB mission could carry damaging implications for the American Intelligence sources who have supported his *bona fides*. Unless their statements on NOSENKO can be convincingly explained as innocent repetition of misinformation spread by the KGB within the Soviet services, these sources might be concluded to have been deliberately misleading either as promotors of their own personal interests or as parties to a KGB conspiracy.

[redacted] Regarding GOLITSYN, the opinion of CIA is that he purposefully gave false support for NOSENKO in an attempt to make his opinions more authoritative. This is not a satisfactory explanation for the remarks on NOSENKO by [redacted] however, there seem to be no personal interests which their support of NOSENKO's *bona fides* might have served. The choice thus seems to lie between these three officers being genuine sources of American intelligence but unwitting channels of KGB misinformation and, on the other hand, one or more of them being in league with the KGB.

[redacted] The possibility that [redacted] are under KGB control was tested further in the context of the NOSENKO operation by reviewing parallels in their reporting and his, and general correlations that appear from one case to another. At the same time, the NOSENKO-[redacted] connections were shown for comparative purposes. [redacted] Here nothing was found that would eliminate [redacted] from consideration as possibly being KGB provocation agents.

[redacted] This examination against the conclusion that NOSENKO is under KGB control, has brought the *bona fides* of [redacted] into serious question. If NOSENKO is a dispatched agent of the KGB, these other sources seem also to be.

SECRET/[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PRQ Part I - Alfonso Dibildox Torres

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith is PRQ Part I on Subject. Provisional Operational Approval is requested, along with 201 number. Subject's cryptonym, assigned 15 October 1963 by the Station, follows under separate cover.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att. h/w and u/s/c
2 - Files

SECRET/[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-22488	13 November 1963
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM : Chief, WH Division			MICROFILM
SUBJECT : LIENVOY-8			

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As a result of the recent review done of the LIFEAT and LIENVOY Project, it came to Headquarters attention that LIENVOY-8, who was believed to have been terminated, was still covered by the LIENVOY Project.

2. According to HMMA-14676, LIENVOY-8 was the cause of a security problem for LIENVOY in February 1960 when he requested release from LIENVOY and a transfer to his parent organization, the General Staff of the Presidency. LIENVOY-8 was described as a "sour" nationalist who disapproved of ODYOKE's sharing of the LIENVOY take.

3. Headquarters now notes that LIENVOY-8's clearance has never been cancelled and there is no Agent Service Record or termination report in his file. LIENVOY-8 was included in the LIENVOY Project renewal request for the 1961/62 project year, but not for the 1962/63 year. The field project renewal request for the 1963/64 year included him again.

4. It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters of the present status of LIENVOY-8 (201-118406). If he has been terminated, please forward an Agent Service Record. If he is still being used, please provide a current analysis of his reliability and comments on any security probelms present in light of his actions and reputation in 1960.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

31 Oct 63

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-12027	23 October 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-118406
	ORIGINATING	

DDP 1-122

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Related Mission Directive for Mexico

1. Attached is the revised Related Mission Directive for Mexico.

2. Your approval is requested.

J. C. King
J. C. King
Chief, WH Division

CONCUR:

[illegible]
Chief, DDP/PG

Lloyd George
Chief, FI

J. F. Collins
Chief, CA

Chief, CI

24 January 1961
Distribution:
Orig & 2 - WHD
1 - PG
1 - CA
1 - CI
1 - SR
1 - FI/Plans
1 - FI/INT
1 - RI

APPROVED:

Richard Helms
/Deputy Director (Plans)
3 JUN 1961
Date Approved

3 COPY

RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. National Policy. The long-range national policy objectives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce to an ineffectual level the influence of international Communism, to encourage democratic government, and to keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably inclined toward U. S. policies. Further guidance is given in the current OCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America.

B. Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis will continue to be placed on clandestine collection operations and covert action operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico.

C. Changes in the RMD. This basic policy instruction for activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capabilities and direction. In view of the importance and threat presented by Communist Cuba to U. S. interests in Latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The former task for production of motion pictures and their distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid requirement; two former tasks pertaining to the possible use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to develop young potential political leaders (ZREAGER) has been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelligence service, and the Station regularly reports on activities of the security services. Coverage of Chinese Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with the elimination of the former Priority C section.

D. Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy Intelligenc

Guides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected that these requirements be satisfied utilizing existing assets. Of particular interest on a continuing basis is information on: (a) any indications that Mexico may be used as a base for clandestine activity directed against the U. S. (CI Book Messages 83 and 115); (b) activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially those that are potentially harmful to U. S. interests; (c) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to their current importance in attempts to overthrow the regimes of their respective Latin American countries; (d) the current alignment and activities of political forces with the potential for assuming control of the Mexican Government; (e) U. S. Communists residing in Mexico; and (f) the Spanish Communist group.

It will be noted that certain previous contingency reporting requirements have been amended as follows: The former levy for reporting on the stability of the Mexican Government has been changed to a more realistic and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above. This modification is appropriate, as political changes in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework of constitutionality. The previous charge for reporting on secret shipments of strategic materials from Mexico to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and has been deleted.

II. OBJECTIVES

PRIORITY A

1. Obtain information on Sino-Soviet bloc plans and activities in Mexico, including those of bloc intelligence services.

    a. Continue and, where possible, increase physical and technical surveillance of bloc installations and residences.

    b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitor the activities of bloc personnel; if conditions warrant, attempt recruitment or defection of bloc personnel.

e. Continue CI operations against bloc intelligence personnel.

2. Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Communist and leftist control or influence in key governmental and non-governmental organizations, political parties, mass media outlets, and other elements that influence public or official opinion and policies.

   a. Develop political action penetration agents in key functional groups, such as students, teachers and organized labor, in order to disrupt and reduce their capacity for carrying out action harmful to U. S. objectives and interests.

   b. Expose and discredit illegal or subversive Sino-Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico, as well as the activities and personnel of international and local Communist front organizations.

   c. Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminate Communists and pro-Communists from strategic positions in government, educational institutions, state-controlled industrial and agricultural enterprises, labor unions, and student organizations.

   d. Provide support and give guidance to individuals and organizations that can be induced to produce and disseminate anti-Communist, pro-Free World propaganda via radio, television, newspapers, or other media, and carry out political action operations against Communist or other anti-U. S. elements.

   e. Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communist political, business or civic leaders to carry out propaganda, economic or political actions against Communist influence and induce them to support views coinciding with U. S. Government policy interests.

   f. Continue to support and guide anti-Communist youth and student organizations, publications or agents, and when necessary, develop additional assets in key schools in Mexico City and selected provinces.

g. Develop and support covert press assets on the staffs of influential newspapers.

h. Develop access to individuals and organizations in the labor field and support non-Communist leaders and groups in key unions.

3. Obtain information on the organizational structure, key personnel, financing, covert plans and activities of the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM), Communist front organizations and groups, especially the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), and non-Communist and/or anti-U. S. groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by International Communism.

   a. Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the PCM and the PPS.

   b. Maintain penetrations of the PCM and seek to penetrate the anti-ENCINA wing of the PCM.

   c. Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key source in the Workers' University capable of monitoring cultural contacts between the University and bloc diplomatic installations.

   d. Continue to monitor the activities of selected Communist-influenced labor unions and front groups through the penetration in the PPS; if conditions warrant, make selected recruitments in the unions or groups.

4. Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U. S. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime.

   a. Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats.

   b. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in Cuba.

   c. Secure support of high Mexican Government officials for the conduct of operations against Cuba.

   d. Continue to provide operational support for activities directed against the CASTRO regime in Cuba.

e. Utilize propaganda media, political action assets, and other covert means to combat the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico.

PRIORITY B

1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U. S. activities in Mexico, and propagandize the dangers of Communism.

   a. Utilize existing media and political action assets to combat anti-U. S. propaganda or activities.

   b. Utilize existing media and political action assets to prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalists and Communists.

   c. Utilize media and political action assets to prevent or negate the socio-economic and cultural penetration plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

   d. Spot and develop for future covert collaboration young local figures who show potential for political leadership and who may be influenced to become generally favorable to U. S. interests.

2. Obtain information on the secret intentions and activities of the Mexican Government in foreign affairs, particularly toward the U. S., the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba.

   a. Continue to develop and influence high level contacts in the Mexican Government, particularly the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry.

3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc.

   a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers.

   b. Recruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected travellers to bloc countries, especially those who will remain in bloc countries for an extended period and who may be on scientific missions.

   c. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries.

   d. Obtain communications intelligence on bloc diplomatic traffic.

4. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico.

   a. Spot, assess and recruit or develop sources in the Chinese community.

   b. Exploit the Gobernacion files on Chinese living in Mexico and effect penetration of the SHACP.

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

AH

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
SEX M DOB 12 APR 26
CIT GERM
REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH 29 OCTOBER.

POB GERM, BERLIN
OCC PHARMACIST
OCC CODE CHEM

201-0032671*
TYPE NAME T
OI CODES AA XX
RCD DATE 53

30 NOV 70

00833555

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

14-00000

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

15 November 1974

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

1. IP/Files GC-52				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)

Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s)

of 201-______________.

☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)

☐ Non-Restricted Dossier

For Split Charge Dossiers:

All documents prior to ________ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ________ (date) retained at ____________ desk.

610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REG. NO.

FORM 8-73 2377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL. BY: [illegible]

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE BT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______
(name)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2021 CONFIDENTIAL

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*
   - a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.
   - b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.
   - c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*
   - a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.
   - b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).
   - c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.
   - d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*
   - a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.
   - b. Military attaches.
   - c. Assistant military attaches.
   - d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Res by
Annex B to Chp III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dat
1 Aug 6

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

a

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970

1. GENERAL

a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In general, it is DDO policy to select agent assets with primary regard to the agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following:

(1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to restrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of individuals.

(2) The Agency has entered into a special restrictive agreement with an organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a category of individuals.

(3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently pertain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where appropriate, reference has been made to another publication which provides more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI and DOI-F 10-5.

E-2 IMPDET

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*

Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*

Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*

Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):

(a) Members and trainees of ACTION;

(b) Fulbright grantees;

- (c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom;
- (d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations;
- (e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies.

(2) *Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence* (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.

- (a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
- (b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
- (c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;
- (d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand;
- (e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
- (f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) *Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO* (see paragraph 7):

- (a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;
- (b) CARE employees;
- (c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
- (d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;
- (e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned;
- (f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
- (g) Officials of the Vatican State;
- (h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
- (i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
- (j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
- (k) Volunteers to America.

(4) *Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division* (see paragraph 8):

- (a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
- (b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.;
- (c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION*

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION.

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. *Fulbright Grantees*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

e. *Employees of U.S Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations.

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies*
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions.

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI.

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*

The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.

for Germans
citizens
only [illegible]

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.

b. *CARE Employees*

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.

d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United ~~States~~* NATIONS
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations*

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute*
Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America*
Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)

The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.*

The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community.

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is

operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad. DDO Approval

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

2 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR : General Counsel
Director of Security

FROM : S.D. Breckinridge

SUBJECT : HSCA Request of 20 July 1978 -
OLC-78-2728

1. Attached is correspondence from the DDO focal point on the HSCA investigation, responding to Question #2 of reference. It states that there are and have been no agreements (at least not as described in the HSCA request) between CIA and the FBI, or other government agencies, that pertain to the Agency's responsibilities to report on U.S. citizens abroad who contact Communist embassies or officials. It also states that current legislation forbids such reporting.

2. Attached are copies of papers collected by O/IG during the Rockefeller Commission's inquiry; I recall that there was a 1966 agreement, which is not in these papers. In any event they do not seem to contain a specific provision such as is envisioned in the report. It is possible that interpretations of NSCID and DCID provisions resulted in routine reporting of such contacts, although there were no agreements, per se, for such action. Since the promulgation of Executive Orders 11905 and 12036 there have been limitations on reporting on U.S. persons, which may affect past practice. However, this office is not in a position to provide an Agency position on this issue.

3. It is requested that you coordinate with the DDO in preparing an answer to an Agency response to the HSCA question.

S.D. Breckinridge

Distribution:
1 - General Counsel
1 - D/Security
1 - OLC/Subj.
1 - OLC/Chron
1 - Mr. Gregg w/o/ATT
1 - Mr. Shepanck

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

This document may be downgraded to AIUO when detached from attachment

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI ATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Breckinridge		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Expansion of DCD-FBI Relationship
Book Dispatch 9335 of 18 Feb 1975

Two sanitized copies ready for Mr. Knoche.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Walter F. Little	3/18/75

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

2 copies each of the attached sent to Mr. Knoche via IG
3/18/75

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

AM

OUTGOING TELEPOUCH

SIGNAL CENTER USE

TEL 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE - TIME GROUP | DISPATCH NUMBER

TELEPOUCH BOOK DISPATCH 9335

0 MORE 0 NO MORE
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 02361870

TO: FR/ATLANTA, FR/CHICAGO, FR/CLEVELAND, FR/BOSTON, FR/SAN FRANCISC
FR/LOS ANGELES, FR/NEW YORK, FR/WASHINGTON.

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO: BD 9335 22 12 52z FEB74

DATE: 18 FEBRUARY 1974

ISOLOG

TO: CHIEF OF BASE, ATLANTA; CHIEF OF BASE, BOSTON; CHIEF OF BASE, LOS ANGELES; CHIEF OF BASE, CHICAGO; CHIEF OF BASE, CLEVELAND; CHIEF OF BASE, SAN FRANCISCO; CHIEF OF BASE, NEW YORK; CHIEF OF BASE, WASHINGTO

FROM: CHIEF, FOREIGN RESOURCES DIVISION

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH THE FBI

1. ATTACHED HEREWITH IS THE SUBSTANCE OF A LETTER FROM FBI HQS TO ITS EIGHT FIELD OFFICES IN CITIES WHERE FR BASES ARE LOCATED. THIS LETTER IS AIMED AT CLARIFYING A NUMBER OF BASIC FACTS REGARDING THE MISSIONS OF DDO IN GENERAL AND FR DIVISION ACTIVITIES IN THE USA IN PARTICULAR, AND IT SPELLS OUT IN SOME DETAIL OUR AGREED INTERPRETATION OF SOME OF THE HISTORICALLY MORE TROUBLESOME ASPECTS OF THE 1966 AGREEMENT.

DATE: 15 FEB 74
ORIG:
UNIT: FR/COPS
EXT: 5885

COORDINATING OFFICERS
C/FR/B1
C/FR/B2
C/FR/B3

IP USE ONLY

FR/CO

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

FILE NUMBER

TEL E 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
TELEPOUCH

DATE - TIME GROUP

DISPATCH NUMBER
BD 9335

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO
☐ IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

2. WE WERE ESPECIALLY GRATIFIED WITH THE OPENING PARAGRAPHS OF THE LETTER WHICH EMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT FR IS CARRYING OUT A U.S. GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENT IN ITS RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, AND THAT THIS ACTIVITY IS BEING CONDUCTED IN THE USA WITH FULL BUREAU CONCURRENCE. ANOTHER BASIC POINT WHICH THE LETTER MAKES IS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE GUIEDELINES (1966 AGREEMENT) IS TO PROTECT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE U.S.GOVERNMENT, NOT ENABLE THE BUREAU TO MONITOR OUR OPERATIONS.

3. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION INVOLVED IN DRAFTING THIS LETTER, BUT NO REAL STICKY DIFFERENCES AROSE. WE BELIEVE IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO GIVE ADDRESSEES SOME OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS AS BACKGROUND FOR ANY TALKS YOU MAY HAVE ON THESE SUBJECTS WITH YOUR FIELD OFFICE CONTACTS. THESE ARE SET OUT BELOW:

A. PAGE 2, LAST PARAGRAPH: ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT FOREIGN OFFICIALS ARE OF "PRESUMED INTEREST" TO THE BUREAU; WE AGREED THAT THIS CATEGORY CHANGED WITH WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AND THAT FR WOULD SIMPLY USE A COMMON SENSE JUDGMENT TO MAKE ITS CASE BY CASE DETERMINATION. WE AGREED THAT TRYING TO BROADEN OR LIMIT THE CATEGORY BY

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

IP USE ONLY

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

CROSS REFERENCE

FILE NUMBER

SIGNAL CENTER USE

PAGE OF PAGES
3

TEL 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
TELEPOUCH

DATE - TIME GROUP

DISPATCH NUMBER
BD-9335

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO
☐ IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

FURTHER DEFINITION WAS NOT PRACTICAL.

B. PAGE 3, TOP PARAGRAPH: PLEASE NOTE THAT THE CRITERION OF OVERLAP AND/OR CONFLICT IS USED THERE THE SAME AS IN THE '66 AGR MENT PARAGRAPH TWO CONCERNING BUREAU CONCURRENCE FOR RECRUITMENT APPROACHES.

C. PAGE 3, BOTTOM PARAGRAPH: ALTHOUGH WE ARE REQUIRED ON TO KEEP FBI APPRISED OF INFORMATION RELATING TO ITS COUNTERINTELLIG AND INTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES, WE CONCURRED IN THIS REQUES FOR MORE DETAILED AND TIMELY REPORTING ON CERTAIN CASES SINCE WE CONSIDERED THE DETAIL ASKED FOR TO BE OF DEMONSTRABLE CI VALUE AND TIME LIMITS TO BE REASONABLE. THE BUREAU WAS COMPLETELY AMENABLE 1 LIMITING SUCH REQUIREMENTS TO CASES WHEREIN THEIR STATUTORY RESPO: SIBILITIES WERE CLEARLY INVOLVED, AND WE WERE PARTICULARLY PLEASED THE ADDITIONAL AGREEMENT ALLOWING THE FIELD OFFICES AND THE FR BASI TO WORK OUT THE LOCAL HANDLING OF ALL OTHER CASES, INCLUDING [illegible] SPECIFICALLY THE "PRIOR NOTICE" REQUIREMENT OF PARAGRAPH THREE OF '66 AGREEMENT. (NOTE THAT THIS ENTIRE PORTION OF THE LETTER INVOL TARGETS WHICH ARE HISTORICALLY AS WELL AS PRACTICALLY, IN THE BURE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

COORDINATING OFFICERS

IP USE ONLY

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

CROSS REFERENCE

FILE NUMBER

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES
4

TEL 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
TELEPOUCH

DATE-TIME GROUP

DISPATCH NUMBER
BD-9335

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO:
0 IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

"COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ETERRITORY".) IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE BUREAU HAS ALREADY AGREED TO PROVIDE US WITH CERTAIN TYPES OF OPERATIONAL INFORMATION IN EXCESS OF ANY EXISTING AGREEMENT, AND WE HAVE RECEIVED INITIALLY FAVORABLE REACTION TO PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONAL ITEMS IN THE FUTURE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS REPORTING AGREEMENT WILL CAUSE YOU ANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS, BUT IF IT SHOULD BE BROADENED OR INTERPRETED IN A WAY THAT YOU CONSIDER UNREASONABLE OR BURDENSOME, PLEASE ADVISE AND WE WILL TRY TO HAVE THE CRITERIA DEFINED MORE EEEEEE CLEERUBEOSELY.

D. PAGE 4, BOTTOM PARAGRAPH: WE HAD CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT. THE EBUREAU FELT THAT IN SOME INSTANCES WE WERE "STRETCHING" THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS INTO THE FIRST STAGES OF RECRUITMENT, AND IN SOME OTHERS WE WERE MOVING INTO RECRUITMENT WITHOUT FORMALLY SEEKING BUREAU CONCURRENCE AND COORDINATION. GOOD FAITH BEING PRESUMED, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT OUR PROBLEM WAS BOTH SEMANTIC AND ONE OF DEFINITION. THE BUREAU INSISTS, AND WE RECOGNIZE, THAT CONCURRENCE IN OUR PROCEEDING WITH ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE INTERPRETEED AS CONCURRENCE TO MOVE BEYOND ASSESSMENT. THEY EXPLAIN THAT THEY

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

COORDINATING OFFICERS

IP USE ONLY

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CROSS REFERENCE

FILE NUMBER

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

TEL 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP DISPATCH NUMBER

TELEPOUCH BD-9335

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO
☐ IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OFTEN CONCUR IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF TARGETS IN WHOM THEY HAVE A VE ACTIVE "RECRUITMENT INTEREST" WITH BUREAU SOURCES IN TOUCH, ETC. HENCE, BEFORE THE AGENCY MOVES INTO THE ACTUAL RECRUITMENT OPERA THE BUREAU NEEDS SPECIFIC NOTICE IN ORDER TO ASSESS ITS OWN COUN INTELLIGENCE OR INTERNAL SECURITY EQUITIES AND MAKE A DECISION.

THE DEFINITIONS OF "ASSESSMENT" AND "RECRUITMENT" IN THE LE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER; THE ONLY POSSIBLE AREA OF CONFUSI WOULD SEEM TO BE IN THE "PROCESS" OF RECRUITMENT. A SIMPLIFIED COMMON SENSE BREAKDOWN WOULD BE THAT ASSESSMENT IS THE OBTAINING AND ANALYZING OF INFORMATION CONCERNING A TARGET INDIVIDUAL TO E US TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT IS DESIRABLE AND/OR FEASIBLE T MOUNT A RECRUITMENT APPROACH; IF OUR ASSESSMENT IS AFFIRMATIVE, THEN MOVE INTO THE RECRUITMENT PHASE - PRIOR TO WHICH MOVE WE MU SEEK BUREAU CONCURRENCE AND COORDINATION.

WE INTERPRET MANIPULATION OF A TARGET VIA SOCIAL CONTACTS, MANY CASES BY OVERT, LEGAL, DJNONCOMPROMISING BUSINESS ARRANGEME TO BE PART OF THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS; THAT IS, AN ATTEMPT TO OBT DINFORMATION REGARDING HIS VULNERABILITY, STRENGTH, IDEOLOGY,

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:	COORDINATING OFFICERS	IP USE ONLY
RELEASING OFFICER		
CLASSIFICATION SECRET		
CROSS REFERENCE	FILE NUMBER	

TEL ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ PAGE OF PAGES 6

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP DISPATCH NUMBER

TELEPOUCH BD-9335

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO:
☐ IP FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

ASPIRATIONS, ETC., ALL OF WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO OUR DECISION TO OR NOT GO" FOR A RECRUITMENT APPROACH. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE IN PRET A COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH IS IN ANY WAY COVERT OR QUAS LEGAL OR IS A PLANNED STEPEPING STONE TO THE PLANNED INTRODUCTIO U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST, TO BE PART OF THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS TO REQUIRE PRIOR BUREAU CONCURRENCE.

E. PAGE 4, BOTTOM PARAGRAPH: BASES WILL NOTE THAT WE AGREED TO CONSIDER AGENTS RECRUITED IN THE U.S. WHO EREMAIN HERE SAME AS AGENTS RECRUITED ABROAD WHO COME HERE FOR TOURS OR VISIT ALTHOUGH ONLY THE LATTER ARE SPECIFIGED IN THE AGREEMENT, WE FEL IMPLICITLY IT INCLUDED THE FORMER. WE FEEL THAT OUR EQUITIES AR ADEQUATELY PROTECTED BY THE VERY SPECIFIC TERMINOLOGY OF PARAGRA
1
FIVE AND SIX OF THE E966 AGREEMENT. NOTE ALSO THAT ALTHOUGH THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS FOUR, FIVE AND SIX OF THE 01966 AGREEME ARE ALL-ENCOMPASSING, WE ARE IN PRACTICE CONCERNED ONLY WITH THOS AGENTS, OPERATIONS AND SOURCES WHO HAVE REAL OR POTENTIAL CONTAC OR CAPABILITY IN THE FIELDS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND/OR INTERN SECURITY; THAT IS, WHO ARE OF KNOWN OR PRESUMED INTEREST TO THE

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:	COORDINATING OFFICERS	IP USE ONLY
RELEASING OFFICER		
CLASSIFICATION SECRET		
CROSS REFERENCE	FILE NUMBER	

OUTGOING TELEPOUCH

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

TEL 0 0 0 0 0 0	PAGE 7	OF PAGES 37

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE - TIME GROUP	DISPATCH NUMBER
TELEPOUCH		BD-9335

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 FILES

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

BUREAU. IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US, HOWEVER, TO BE METICULOUS IN
DETERMINATION OF "PRESUMED" INTEREST AND TO LEAN TOWARDS THAT P
SUMPTION WHEREVER THERE IS ANY DOUBT

4. FILE: 100-002-090.

ATTACHMENT - FBI LETTER, AS STATED ABOVE - H/W

E2 IMPDET.d

DIST:

1 - FR/REG, W/ATT
1 - FR/COPS W/ATT
1 - 100-002-090

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:	COORDINATING OFFICERS	IP USE ONLY
RELEASING OFFICER		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) House Select Committee on Assassinations Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S

FEB 28 4 50 PM '78

FROM: C/ISS
1D4124

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 28 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. O/SA/DO/O				1 to 3: attached is the response to OLC 78-0070/19, 23 Feb 1978. The attached regulations answer all of the questions posed. Please note the classification SECRET. We assume that HSCA Staff will review here.
2.				
3. OLC attn: Pat. Carpenter			31	
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

14-00000

SECRET

OLC 78-0070/20

DO/ISS 78-098

28 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O
Attention: Mr. Shepanek

FROM: William F. Donnelly
Chief, Information Services Staff

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S)

REFERENCE: OLC 78-0070/19, 23 February 1978

1. (S) With reference to the conversation of 27 February between Mr. Shepanek and Mr. Cleffi of ISS, attached are copies of DOHB 70-1-1, 15 November 1974, and an earlier version, CSHB 43-1-1 dated 15 February 1960. A close study of the list of questions submitted by the HSCA Staff has led us to conclude that the most complete and effective way to respond would be by inviting the Staff to review our regulation governing the criteria for opening, maintaining, controlling and closing 201 files by the Operations Directorate. A careful reading of the regulation provides an answer to every question posed by the Staff.

2. (S) The earlier version of the regulation is included to reflect the situation as it existed in the period of their primary concern (1958-1964). The later version provides an expansion, clarification and refinement of the earlier versions.

William F. Donnelly
William F. Donnelly

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 015866

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                                          201-0032671
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26            POB GERM, BERLIN                   TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                       OCC PHARMACIST                     OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53      OCC CODE CHEM                      RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                              30 NOV 70             00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISG Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

15 November 1974

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

7

14-00000

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records systèm and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

? l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

1. IP/Files GC-52	(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.	
3.	Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-______________.
4.	
5.	
6.	☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.	
8.	☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.	
10.	For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.	All documents prior to ________ (date)
12.	forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.	documents after ________ (date)
14.	retained at ____________ desk.
15.	

610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	GRADE	COMPONENT	ROOM	BLDG	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ____ GRADE ____ COMPONENT ____ EXT. ____

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	[illegible]	[illegible]

FORM 2977 [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: [illegible]

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE ET-A			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______________________________
(Name)
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______________ R.O. No. ________
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________

FORM 2021

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

15 November 1974

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

?

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

✓

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Resc by
Annex B to Chapt III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dtd
1 Oct 62

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

SECRET-EYES ONLY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

The assassination 1
Overt knowledge of U.S. Government involvement 2
Recollections of CIA officials 3
The organization of the coup group 6
Why a coup failed to follow the assassination 8
International activity in opposition to Trujillo 11
The cast 13
The first Farland memorandum 16
Level of CIA activity prior to 1960 17
Approach to Trujillo by General Clark 17
Operation Lancet 19
State asks Farland if he could engineer a coup 20
Farland replies that he could 21
Farland says the dissidents need guns 22
The U.S. is prepared to assist in overthrowing Trujillo 24
Rubottom asks that sniper rifles be supplied the dissidents 25
Acting DCI approves air drop of 12 Springfield rifles 26
Special Group approves small arms for dissidents 29
COS asks that one weapon be sent in each pouch 30
Dearborn learns of plan to assassinate by intercepting auto 33
Wimpy Berry asks for submachine guns for plotters 34
Dearborn asks for three 38-caliber pistols for dissidents 35
The plot to kill Trujillo at his mistress' apartment 36
COS protests restriction on pouching weapons 36
Hqs guidance cable on policy and objectives 37
Station asks permission to pass three carbines to dissidents 38
Hqs approves passing carbines 40
The carbines are passed to the dissidents 40
Request for pouch waiver ref pouching submachine guns 41
Submachine guns pouched 42
Pleas from dissidents that submachine guns be passed to them 42
Hqs informs the station not repeat not to pass submachine guns 43
Post-Bay of Pigs standdown cable 44
Station acknowledges receipt of submachine guns 44
Draft cable (not sent) approving release of submachine guns 47
State Department disapproves passing submachine guns 48
The whereabouts of the three carbines 49
Special Group confirms not passing submachine guns to dissidents 50
The dissidents' assassination plans are firm 51
U.S. policy does not condone assassination 51
Dearborn and the COS protest 52
Critic No. 1 on the assassination 53
Vice President Johnson asks about arms delivery 54
Discovery of U.S. involvement with assassination group 55
Recapitulation of arms passed or considered for passing 59
The motivations of the assassins 61

SECRET-EYES ONLY

Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, was assassinated at about ten p.m. on the night of 30 May 1961. It was Trujillo's custom to visit one of his mistresses at his ranch at San Cristobal about once a week. On most of his travels he rode in a Chrysler with bullet-proof glass and with security guards riding in accompanying cars. He departed from this practice on his periodic trips to San Cristobal and substituted a highly stereotyped pattern of action: after his nightly walk, he dismissed his companions; changed into a khaki uniform; and set out for San Cristobal in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet, always driven by the same chauffeur.

On the night of the slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on a four-lane highway on the outskirts of Ciudad Trujillo by eight armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo was killed by gunfire, and his body was removed from the scene by the assassins. Trujillo's chauffeur was seriously wounded, was left behind by the assassins, and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scene. One was never caught and was eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed while resisting arrest. The others were arrested, confessed, and were later executed before coming to trial. About eight or nine others, who were in on or knew of the plot but did not participate in the actual assassination, were killed while in custody, while resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture.

(Note: We use the term "plotters" to refer to all of those involved in this attempt to overthrow Trujillo. "Assassins" refers to the small group that actually did the killing.)

There were reports in Ciudad Trujillo at the time that the U.S. Consulate had been in some way involved with the plotters. Eventually, after the surviving plotters were granted amnesty, many of the details came out. Norman Gall, a reporter with the San Juan Star, wrote an article that appeared in The New Republic issue of 13 April 1963. Excerpts follow:

> The assassination of the Dominican Republic's Rafael L. Trujillo was carried out with assistance from the US Central Intelligence Agency. Arms for the May 30, 1961 slaying of the 69-year-old dictator on a lonely stretch of highway near his capital were smuggled by the CIA into the country at the request of the assassins.
>
> The CIA began shipping arms to the Dominican Republic in late 1960, following a series of talks between US Consul Henry Dearborn, Chief Political Officer John Barfield of the US Consulate, and Luis Amiama Tio. Also involved in the plot was Antonio Imbert, who had been Governor of Porto Plata province.
>
> As Trujillo's political and financial problems deepened, talks continued between Dearbon, Barfield and leaders of the anti-Trujillo conspiracy. Toward the end of 1960, contact was established between Amiama and a CIA agent who . . . was named Plato Cox.
>
> The key link between the assassins and the CIA in the arms shipments was a long-time American civilian resident of Ciudad Trujillo, Lorenzo Berry, otherwise known as "Wimpy," who operated a supermarket in a fashionable neighborhood where Trujillo also lived. "Wimpy" was put under brief arrest after the killing but was later allowed to leave the country.
>
> The weapons were imported in small parts, to be assembled later by the plotters, among the routine grocery shipments for the supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The

gun parts entered the Republic in specially-marked food cans, which were later turned over to the conspirators.

Plans for the intended assassination were worked out during the same period in which the abortive assault on Cuba was being prepared. However, when the CIA-organized April 17, 1961, invasion at the Bay of Pigs failed and world attention was focused on Washington's complicity in that operation, a postponement of the attempt on Trujillo's life was ordered because of the embarrassment another such failure might cause the United States. But the order to hold up came too late. The needed weapons were already in the hands of the conspirators, who refused appeals by Dearborn and Barfield to delay the assassination. They insisted on moving at the first opportunity. This came on May 30, when Trujillo and his chauffeur drove out into the country in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet for a rendezvous at a San Cristobal estate, La Fundacion, with Trujillo's 20-year-old mistress, Mona Sanchez.

It can be reported on excellent authority that close associates of the slain dictator knew of the US role within a few days following the killing.

Dearborn, Barfield and Berry had meanwhile been rushed out of the Dominican Republic by US officials. . . . . . Since the ouster of the Trujillos, Berry ("Wimpy") has returned to operate his handsomely appointed supermarket, where he greets customers with calm and courtesy, as if Trujillo had never lived.

We interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. C. King (then Chief, WH Division), and J. D. Esterline (then Chief of Operations, WH Division). King recalls the Agency's role as being limited to monitoring internal plotting against the Trujillo regime "but not pushing or instigating." Esterline, like King, recalls that the Agency was not directly involved in coup plotting. He described the furnishing of weapons as a symbol--something that would constitute tangible evidence of U.S. support. Bissell remembers the Agency role as being somewhat more positive than that described by King and Esterline. He viewed the Agency's role as one of giving support to an indigenous group whose intended actions were in the U.S. interest. He described the affair as "a fairly normal operation involving meetings, discussions, and formal approvals." We do not have firm information as to whether or not any of the weapons supplied by CIA were actually used in the assassination of Trujillo. Both Esterline and King believe they were not. Bissell, however, has a vague impression that one of them was.

The Agency officers most immediately involved with the plotters are now widely scattered. Lear Reed, who was chief of station until October 1960, is now retired. Robert Owen, who was chief of station at the time of the assassination, is in Paris. Charles Cookson, the station's operations officer, is in Brazil. Isabel Cintron, the station's administrative assistant who was used as a communications link and in the passing of the arms, resigned in 1964 and is believed to be living in Puerto Rico. Ned Holman, the headquarters branch chief, is in Guatemala City. We elected not to call back any of these people for interviews. While they might be able to furnish minor details that are missing from the written records, we think it unlikely that they would be able to add significantly to the quite complete record that appears in the EMDEED operational files.

Agency activities aimed at replacing the Trujillo regime were assigned the cryptonym EMDEED. One segment of EMDEED was known as EMSLEW, the cryptonym for the operation to remove Trujillo by violent action. We have reviewed the voluminous EMDEED files. Most of this account is drawn from them. Many of the more significant documents were not put into the EMDEED files but were kept in a private file by J. C. King. He made that file available to us. We also have studied another particularly useful document. The Dominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) officer put in charge of the investigation of the Trujillo assassination was a navy lieutenant named Ortiz. The Dominican Republic assigned him to its embassy in Ottawa in November 1961 when the Trujillo family's attempt to regain power failed. The New York field office of the FBI held extensive interviews with him from 6 April through 10 May 1962. The result was a massively-detailed, 182-page report on the plot and on the assassination as reconstructed by the SIM from its interrogations of the persons it apprehended.

From the records (the [illegible] operational files), we can trace the origins and the course of U.S. policy with respect to the overthrow of Trujillo. We also can ascertain from the files the nature and the extent of U.S. support of the plotters, including the passing to them of weapons out of the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo. What we cannot discover from the files, despite quite massive documentation, is how the coup group was organized. The best single account we find, and it is not wholly accurate, is in a book by Robert Crassweller.* The main flaw in the story is its failure to identify the individuals with whom the U.S. Government was actually working. Excerpts follow:

> The plot was organized on the basis of two groups of conspirators linked together by a liaison that later proved too fragile to bear the stresses laid upon it. Each group had its purpose and its separate personnel.
>
> The function of the Action Group was to assassinate Trujillo and immediately present proof of its succes, in the form of Trujillo's corpse, to the second group, the Political Group. The latter would then launch a coup, taking over the machinery of the government and the Armed Forces.
>
> The Action Group consisted of eight men. It appears to have been organized originally by General Antonio Imbert Barreras and Salvador Estrella. . . . . . They were joined by Lieut. Amado Garcia Guerrero, a member of the military corps attached to Trujillo in the National Palace; Antonio de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, who had been killed by the government because of his involvement in the

---

* Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: MacMillan Co., 1966)

Galindez case; Huascar Tejeda; Roberto Pastoriza; and Pedro Livio Cedeno. The eighth member, Manuel Caceres Tunti, was in Moca on the night of the 30th and saw none of the action.

The Political Group had a less distinct membership. It included Luis Amiama Tio, Modesto Diaz, General Juan Tomas Diaz, and several others. At the very top it had the support of General Roman Fernandez, Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, and his brother Bibin. . . . . .

The over-all authority appears to have centered principally in General Diaz, probably the only one who had sufficient prestige to command authority. . . . . .

The Action Group would remain in daily readiness. When information in the Palace indicated that Trujillo was going to drive to Estancia Fundacion . . . Garcia Guerrero in the Palace would inform the others by personal message. . . . . .

The expected message from Garcia Guerrero in the Palace came to the patient plotters at seven o'clock on the evening of May 30. They were not fully prepared and coordinated at this moment, but the emotional and impetuous de la Maza threatened to act by himself if the others lagged. In any event, the plan went into execution. . . . . . Each of them had his revolver or pistol, and de la Maza also had his own sawed-off shotgun and two M-1 semiautomatic rifles. . . . . .

The conspiracy began to come apart within an hour. Never very professionally contrived, the plot was hastened prematurely to its culmination by the impatience of de la Maza, and it was now afflicted with bad luck and ineptitude. Immediately after the assassination, the men of the Action Group were unable to reach General Roman. . . . . .

The Political Group of the conspiracy never took up its planned role. The Action Group scattered, leaving a trail as wide as a boulevard. Trujillo's body was left in the trunk of de la Maza's car, parked in the garage of General Tomas Diaz, where the police found it in a few hours. The conspirators were all hunted down very quickly, except for Amiama and Imbert, who managed to conceal themselves for months until the danger had passed.

The FBI report of its interviews of Ortiz, the SIM investigator, gives an excellent account of why the plot fell apart after the assassination took place. One of the assassins, Pedro Livio Cedeno, was seriously wounded (probably by fire from his own companions). All of the assassins assembled at General Diaz' house after the killing. One of them called a friend, Dr. Robert Reid Cabral, to treat Livio. Dr. Reid found him so badly injured that surgery would be required. Reid and two of the assassins took Livio to a hospital. While in delirium he mumbled the names "de la Maza" and "Juan Tomas." The police immediately picked up two brothers of Antonio de la Maza. Neither was personally involved in the plot, but both knew the details and the names of most of the assassins. General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lieut. Garcia Guerrero were killed resisting arrest. Amiama and Imbert went into hiding and survived. The rest were caught and interrogated followingtorture. All confessed.

The confessions led to identification of persons who were in or on the fringes of the Political Group: General Roman and his brother, Amiama Tio, General Garcia Urbaez, General Guarionex Estrella, Tomas Baez Diaz, Modesto Diaz, and Miguel Angel Baez Diaz. Lorenzo Berry (Wimpy) was identified as a communications link between the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. However, the SIM did not discover the identities of the political plotters with whom the Consulate was actually working, because neither of the men who might have known the identities were available for interrogation. Amiami Tio escaped and General Diaz was killed.

Although the identities and the intention of the Action Group were fairly widely known to persons not actually members of it, there appears to have been excellent compartmentation between the Political and the Action Groups--perhaps too much compartmentation. The assassination itself was well planned. General Diaz was in over-all charge of the operation, but de la Maza was the one who did all of the work. He took three cars to a local garage and had the engines rebuilt so that the cars could reach speeds of 120 mph. He had possession of the weapons from the U.S. Consulate, plus several of his own. He and the other participants took the cars to the site selected for the killing and conducted dry runs each night. Everything was ready and the assassins were lying in wait for Trujillo on the night of 23 May. At the last minute he decided not to go to San Cristobal because he wasn't feeling too well. The assassins continued their dry runs each evening. After the assassination was carried out, essentially as it had been planned, the coup that was to follow failed--in part because of bad luck, in part because of poor planning, and in part because of too much compartmentation.

General Roman, who was to take over the government after Trujillo's death, was not told that the assassination was to be attempted on May 30th. After the slaying, General Diaz tried to telephone General Roman but could not reach him. Diaz then took the car with Trujillo's body still in its trunk and drove to Roman's house. He saw so many soldiers in the vicinity that he gave up and returned home, leaving the car in the driveway with the body still in the trunk, where it was later found by the police.

What had happened was this: Former general and former head of the SIM, Arturo Espaillat, happened to chance upon the scene while the assassination was taking place. He was out for a drive with his wife and was passed by a car that he recognized as Trujillo's. He stopped at a drive-in restaurant and almost immediately heard shooting ahead, which he suspected involved Trujillo. He drove to the scene, saw what was happening, turned around, and sped back into town. He stopped at a military installation and gave the alarm and then drove to the home of General Roman to alert him. He and Roman then returned to the scene of the assassination, arriving simultaneously with the police. The police found Trujillo's chauffeur, who was wounded but still alive. Roman and Espaillat then went to the hospital to try to question the chauffeur. Thus, General Diaz could not reach General Roman to inform Roman that

Trujillo had been killed and that it was time for Roman to make his move to take over the government. Roman knew only that there had been a shooting involving Trujillo and that Trujillo was missing. He did not know whether General Diaz' group was involved in it or not. He was reluctant to move until he was sure that Trujillo was dead. By the time Roman concluded that Trujillo must be dead, it was too late for him to act; Hector Trujillo and Johnny Abbes had already taken charge. Roman did make a couple of feeble tries at engineering a take over, but it is apparent that he had no real advance plan nor any appreciable chances of succeeding.

The assassination itself and the plotting preceding it took place against a background of international activity in opposition to the Trujillo regime, with both the OAS and the U.S. taking clear-cut stands. These are some of the highlights:

a. A briefing paper prepared in WH Division for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1960 states that a revolt was planned for December 1959 in the Dominican Republic but was delayed pending receipt of arms from Venezuela. The plot was discovered and was rolled up in January. Venezuela brought charges in the OAS that the Dominican Republic was "in flagrant violation of human rights, freedom, and democracy" following the mass arrests in the Dominican Republic in January 1960. A committee of the

OAS assigned to investigate the charges reported on 8 June 1960 that the Dominican government was guilty as charged.

b. A near-miss assassination attempt against President Betancourt on 24 June 1960 killed two in his entourage and injured him and several others. The Venezuelan government announced after capture of most of the assassins that the Dominican government was responsible for the attempt on Betancourt's life and took its case to the OAS. On 20 August, the OAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Under Secretary of State Dillon, testifying before the House Agriculture Committee on 24 August in support of a request by President Eisenhower for a cut in the Dominican Republic's sugar quota, is reported as having said that it was hoped that economic sanctions would result in the downfall of Trujillo's dictatorship and its replacement by a moderate and free regime. The United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic on 26 August 1960, although consular relations were continued.

As a further prelude to a chronological review of operation EMDEED/EMSLEW, we think it would be useful to identify the people involved, especially since officers of the Department of State played a very prominent role.

Washington - Department of State

Roy R. Rubottom	Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Frank Devine	Special Assistant to Rubottom
John C. Hill	Special Assistant to Rubottom

Washington - CIA

J. C. King	Chief, WH Division
Ned Holman	Chief, Branch III, WH Division

Ciudad Trujillo - Department of State

Joseph S. Farland	Ambassador until 28 June 1960. It is pertinent to note that King and Esterline attribute U.S. and CIA involvement

	with the plotters in the Dominican Republic to Ambassador Farland. They describe him as a former FBI employee who considered himself quite a clandestine operator. Esterline, who later served under him in Panama, called him "a wild man who bugged the Agency to support a move to assassinate Trujillo." He had direct dealings with a number of the key plotters.
Henry Dearborn	Counsellor of Embassy until 26 August 1960 and Consul General thereafter. He used the code name DELTA in correspondence with the plotters.
John D. Barfield	Second Secretary until 26 August 1960 and a consular officer thereafter. CIA cryptonym: EMDAZE-1

Ciudad Trujillo - CIA

Lear Reed	Chief of Station until October 1960
Robert Owen	Chief of Station from 20 January until 4 June 1961. Code name used with the plotters: GALGO
Charles Cookson	Operations Officer
Isabel Cintron	Administrative Assistant

Key Dominican Plotters

Dr. Jordi Brossa	Code names: SWORD and EL CHICO
Juan Vicini	Code Names: Mr. X, ABC, and YAGUATE
Luis Baquero	Code name: SOCRATES

S. Thomas Stocker	An American in the Dominican Republic with whom the station had had an earlier unhappy experience. The consulate preferred to have nothing to do with him, but the Dominican plotters brought him in as a cutout to the consulate. He took delivery from Lorenzo Berry of three carbines passed to Berry from the U.S. Consulate for use by the plotters. He held them for a few days and then gave them back when Berry insisted they be returned. Berry then passed them to one of the assassins.
Dr. Severo Cabral	Code names: HECTOR and PLUTARCO
Jose Francisco Tapia	
Aulio Brea	
Andres Freitas	Code name: ANDY
Luis Amiama Tio	
Jose Rene Roman	
Juan Tomas Diaz	Code name: CRISTOBAL
Donald Reid Cabral	Code name: CIBAO
Lorenzo D. Berry	"Wimpy" - Berry is a U.S. citizen who owned Wimpy's Supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo. He was the main communications link between the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. The weapons furnished the plotters were actually passed to Berry.
Flerida Berry	Wimpy's wife - a Dominican citizen of Syrian extraction. She appears to have been even more active in the plot than her husband. It was she who had the contacts with the Dominicans involved.

Most communications between the Dominican plotters and the U.S. Consulate were by means of written notes. Mrs. Berry received the notes from or passed them to either the Consul General's secretary or the CIA Station's administrative assistant.

Two documents provide a useful point of departure, from an historical point of view. One is a semi-official letter from Ambassador Farland in the Dominican Republic to Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom. The other document is an internal CIA staff paper revealing the relatively passive role that had been played by CIA prior to 1960.

16 November 1959

Ambassador Farland wrote an "Official-Informal" memorandum to Rubottom reporting that "the underground is more active today than ever in the history of the Trujillo regime." He described the principal opposition group as being about 2,000 strong. He said:

> ". . . within this group there is growing militant anti-American feeling based on the premise that the United States should actively aid the Dominican revolutionary (sic) for the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Discussions I have heard on this subject show an appalling lack of understanding of the position of the United States and its adopted doctrine of non-intervention. . . . . . This group is in possession of clandestine broadcasting equipment which will go into operation when the strike is made. CAS has been informed and joins with me in suggesting that you pass this information to J. C. King."

15 February 1960

A CIA staff paper, addressed to Chief, WH Division, discusses a plan for improving intelligence coverage of the Dominican Republic in the event of Trujillo's removal from power. The objectives stated in the paper were to ensure orderly transition in the event Trujillo abdicated or was deposed and to prevent a takeover by Castro-type forces. The following excerpt reveals the level of CIA activity in the Dominican Republic prior to that time:

> "The COS Ciudad Trujillo conducts no covert operations; however, his official contacts with Generalissimo Trujillo and with the Chief of the Dominican Security Services has enabled him on occasion to assess the attitudes and reactions of the Trujillo government to internal opposition activities and to criticisms of and activities directed against the Dominican government by exiles and other American governments unfriendly to the Dominican regime."

10 March 1960

This is the date of the first draft that appears in Agency files of a plan to persuade Trujillo to retire. The originator of the draft is not shown, but it was to be forwarded to President Eisenhower from General Edwin Clark, a friend of the President from their years of military service. The plan was for Clark to approach Trujillo, with whom he had been on good terms in the past, and attempt to persuade Trujillo to retire. It was to be pointed out that there was no one who could succeed him, and that to protect his family and to preserve his image as El Benefactor, he should step down and allow asylum to be arranged for him. His family would have the wealth already outside the Dominican Republic, and the fortune inside would be placed in trust, to be administered by internationally-known personages for the benefit of the Dominican people.

This proposition received high-level attention in Washington, including that of President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Herter, and Allen Dulles. In approving Clark's approach to Trujillo, the President specified that Clark should travel as a representative of the State Department, rather than as a personal emissary of the President. General Clark traveled to the Dominican Republic and met with Trujillo on 27 March. By the time of the meeting it appears that it had been decided that the plan would be presented as merely that of private citizen Clark, and that was what was done. The station thought it likely that Trujillo recognized the official U.S. Government hand in the proposal. Of course, nothing came of the meeting.

22 March 1960

Ambassador Farland, in a TOP SECRET memorandum to Rubottom, forwarded a plan of a Dominican group plotting Trujillo's overthrow bearing the code name "Operation Lancet." It was basically a proposal for a course of political action reinforced by the threat of being backed by muscle. The operation was to begin with the arrival of a "special U.S. confidential envoy" who would tell Trujillo to leave the country. "He tells it plainly and decisively; he will give him 12 or 18 hours to do it." It would be made clear that if Trujillo refused, a border incident would be contrived, which would be followed by "collective intervention." Assuming Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatum, the plan then outlined steps for transition to an operating representative government. The army would be reduced in size. A caretaker government would prepare for free elections. Ambassador Farland forwarded the plan with these comments of his own to Rubottom:

> " . . . this segment of the dissidents is psychologically conditioned to a point where it will take any step except the ultimate, and for the execution of the latter they expect United States assistance. . . . . .
>
> "Dick, I think the time has come for certain agencies of our Government, without attribution, to establish and implement a definite constructive program to influence the course of events in the Dominican Republic. My conversations with the Secretary and Allen Dulles emphasized the problems and the possibilities of this type of approach. . . . . . "

30 March & 7 April 1960

The Special Group considered actions that might be taken in the event of a flare-up in the Dominican Republic. On 30 March, fearing that Cuba might be involved, there was talk of evacuating U.S. civilians from Guantanamo. There was also discussion of the possibility of sealing off the land entrance to the Dominican Republic from Haiti and of the problem of providing asylum for Trujillo. On 7 April, there was further talk of sealing off the country if Trujillo fell, and an appraisal was made of the chances of his leaving willingly:

> " . . . it is evident that Trujillo will not consider making any arrangements for orderly succession to himself, but that he will either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice, a la Batista."

9 April 1960

State sent a cable to Farland through CIA channels, from which the following is an extract:

> "Could you, if so instructed, make appropriate arrangements within next few weeks with appropriate civil and military dissident elements to take over the GODR? You would be authorized to indicate to them that as soon as they had seized power they should immediately request United States recognition, and ask for United States military assistance under Article Three of the Rio Treaty in the event of actual or threatened Castro-sponsored invasions or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-Castro or pro-Communist elements within or outside Dominican Republic . . .
>
> "What, if any, aid would be essential to dissident elements prior to takeover . . . . . "

"FYI wish to emphasize strongly that above is for contingency planning purposes only and in no way indicates higher authority at present contemplates such action. . . . . ."

11 April 1960

Farland cabled his reply through CIA channels, in part as follows:

"Under instruction, it would be possible for me to make arrangements with appropriate civilian dissidents whose leaders are known to me including names their selectees for top governmental positions, and with one military dissident, a general, who is expecting an exchange of passwords for purpose secret discussions. . . . .

"Regardless of . . . seething unrest which exists, indications reflect Dominican dissidents, who are admittedly poorly armed, loosely organized and lack working liaison with military dissidents, will find it difficult to effect take-over of GODR without existence one or more or combination of following developments (which we summarize below):

(1) Clandestine arms shipments, with sabotage materiel.

(2) An invasion to serve as a signal to the populace.

(3) Implementation of the dissidents' "Operation Lancet."

(4) Advance psychological conditioning by radio.

(5) "Incapacitation or assassination of Trujillo."

(6) A careful step-by-step plan for the period preceding the coup and for the period following it.

Farland stated a need for "minimum but key cooperation" from Dominican military dissidents. He added:

"One of the greatest contributions U.S. could make to dissidents would be to let them know we are prepared to assist

> them; transmission of armament and sabotage material . . . could fully substantiate this cooperation. . . . . . "

9 May 1960

A memorandum addressed to Chief, WH Division, and signed by P.E.Oberst, Chief, WH/CA, reports steps taken or recommended for improving CIA's capabilities in the Dominican Republic. The paper refers to the need for covert action assets, principally to obstruct infiltration of Communists or Fidelistas. Among things recommended were: placement of a junior officer in the embassy; assignment of a full-time officer to the headquarters desk for the covert action program; authorization to use Jose Figueres in third country operations; development of a contingency PM plan in the event Trujillo fell and hostile forces attempted to seize power, and establishment of a "U.S. Committee for Democracy in the Dominican Republic."

A memorandum written of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads, in part, as follows:

> "The dissidents need guns and ammunition from the United States. In particular they need a small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic lenses. The Ambassador said that he saw no problem in the purchase and delivery clandestinely of the arms to the dissidents. But he said, of course, this raises the question of whether the U.S. Government wants to engage in this activity.
>
> "Col. King said that this of course is a policy decision. He said that CIA could deliver the arms if this is the group we want to support.

(Comment: Farland was in Washington for consultations. Although he is listed as having served as Ambassador until 28 June 1960, it appears that he did not actually return to duty in Ciudad Trujillo. His successor, Vinton Chapin, was nominated 13 June, but he never took the post.)

3 June 1960

Farland met with Nelson H. Smith, the Dominican desk officer in WH Division. They compared lists of dissidents to see if the names CIA had were those with whom Farland had been dealing. Farland said, "Those are the boys all right." Smith's memorandum of the meeting includes this comment:

> "Farland then told me that the underground opposition are planning to assassinate Trujillo. He said that it is planned to use a powerful bomb which could be planted along the route of Trujillo's nightly walk and could be detonated by a remote-control firing device. He intimated that this plan is pretty well along and could be executed at any time."

Undated Working Paper (filed between papers dated 25 May and 13 June)

The author is not identified nor is there any indication that the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus: "To precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regime by 1 August or as soon as possible thereafter." It proposed that the U.S. become a prime motive force against the Trujillo regime. "In the event Trujillo refused to abdicate, consideration should be given to other covert or overt actions designed to effect his removal from the scene." A deadline of 1 July was proposed for completing arrangements.

17 June 1960

Henry Dearborn, who was in charge in the Ambassador's absence, queried State through CIA channels, asking for confirmation on certain points for a meeting he was having with a dissident leader, Dr. Jordi Brossa. He stated his understanding of the U.S. position as follows:

a. The U.S. is not prepared to take overt action against the Trujillo government while it is in full control.

b. The U.S. is prepared to assist the opposition clandestinely to develop effective forces to accomplish Trujillo's overthrow.

c. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertly until such time as the dissidents establish a provisional government which controls a substantial section of the Dominican Republic.

20 June 1960

Dearborn, again through CIA channels, asked Rubottom and Farland if he could make the same statements concerning U.S. policy in a meeting with Juan Vicini, another dissident leader. Farland replied in the affirmative.

28 June 1960

Dearborn cabled the results of his first meeting with Juan Vicini. He said that Vicini felt that the time to concentrate on, for planning purposes, was the period extending through the "incapacitation" of Trujillo; too much planning for what would follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he agreed.

Also on 28 June (although the first written record we find is a summary memorandum prepared on 18 October), Rubottom told J.C. King that the Government of the United States was prepared to participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the following extent: "to provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene. . . . . . " Rubottom added that the U.S. Government was not prepared, at this time, to send arms, equipment, or paramilitary experts to assist the undergound to accomplish a revolt.

29 June 1960

Dearborn cabled the results of his meeting with Dr. Brossa. He said that Brossa had recommended a temporary standdown on "action toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while determining Venezuela's reaction to the Trujillo assassination plot against Betancourt.

Dearborn reported that the dissidents had a capability for picking up arms at sea and for caching in nearby caves. He also described an airdrop site.

1 July 1960

A memorandum addressed to the Acting DCI recommended approval for the delivering of weapons to the Dominican dissidents.

> "It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground opposition forces in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile U.S. rifles, Model 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, together with five hundred rounds of ammunition for same. . . . . . It is planned to deliver these weapons by air through DPD facilities provided arrangements can be worked out with the opposition for their reception. If they cannot be delivered by air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for delivery by sea.
>
> "Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in the hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment.

The memorandum was signed by Rudy Gomez for Chief, WH Division; was concurred in by Richard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was approved by C. P. Cabell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI.

Dearborn was informed by cable of plans to airdrop twelve 30.03 Springfields, with ammunition, and with sights "fixed and sighted." The cable asked for the coordinates of a suitable drop site and for a four-man reception team with flashlights. The cable added that, "If air drop delivery not possible, Hqs now studying means of effecting delivery by sea if deemed more practicable."

8 July 1960

Headquarters cabled Dearborn, in part:

> " . . . imperative learn from [Juan Vicini] and/or [Dr. Jordi Brossa] what plans and capabilities are to be employed simultaneously with action to incapacitate Trujillo and what is needed in way of material support for implementation of plan of action. Of particular importance is info re extent of military participation in preparations. In spite of [Vicini] apparent lack of knowledge of opposition organization, most logical that he is actively collaborating with a group that must have some plan and capability for action which will assure stable interim government after removal of Trujillo. . . . . . In your opinion are [Vicini] and [Brossa] members of same group or if not could the two groups be merged? . . . . . "

8 September 1960

The Special Group discussed a letter drafted by the Department of State for delivery to Trujillo (copy in CIA files dated 6 September) proposing that he step down. The DCI (Mr. Dulles) doubted the wisdom of putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personal approach. The Group concluded that a personal approach would be best and discussed William Pawley as a candidate for the job.

18 October 1960

Chief, WH Division, prepared a memorandum summarizing approvals obtained for action in support of the Dominican internal opposition. The text states that the summary was "provided in response to your verbal request on 13 October 1960 . . . " This is the memorandum to which reference is made earlier under the entry for 28 June 1960.

29 December 1960

The minutes of the Special Group meeting of this date read, in part:

> "Bissel gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given to the Figueres group there is no intention of establishing a paramilitary force as such . . . . . He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
>
> " . . . . . It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operations. . . . . . it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be."

(Comment: We find nothing in the files identifiable with such a "plan." We found no other reference to any specific plan of about this date.)

12 January 1961

The following is an excerpt from the minutes of a meeting of the

Special Group on this date:

> "Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the group being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project."

19 January 1961

Cable from headquarters:

> "For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable, authority has been given Hqs for delivery to internal front of limited supply of small arms and other material on condition that introduction of material into DomRep be effected by Doms. . . . . . Above coordinated with State."

24 January 1961

Memorandum for the record of a discussion of Project EMDEED by members of the CA Staff and of WH Division:

> "It was confirmed (from Mr. Parrott by phone) that the Special Group now has approved that a 'limited supply' of small arms and related equipment may be provided covertly to the Dominican resistance elements with whom we have been dealing. This was additional to the Special Group's approval on 29 December 1960 of our Operational Proposal."

(Comment: As noted in the entry for 29 December, we know none of the specifics of this Operational Proposal.)

31 January 1961

"Official-Informal" letter from Dearborn to Devine in State Department:

> "With regard to the delivery of exotic equipment, my friends were of course delighted that such a decision had been made. I hope that it will not be necessary to play down too long the question of actual delivery since they are eager and expectant and too great tardiness on our part would only lead them to question our sincerity."

6 February 1961

Cable from headquarters:

> "1. Realize details not now available but Hqs would appreciate [dissidents'] reaction to offer of armed assistance to include [dissidents'] current plan . . .
>
> "2. Also request [Robert Owen's] initial assessment [dissidents'] capability carry out plan of action once limited armed assistance provided."

10 February 1961

The station cabled its reply:

> "No solid reaction except joy as of 9 Feb.
>
> "Initial assessment is [Brossa and Vicini] could not carry out plan. But with access [Dr. Severo Cabral] he now approaching point when will better be able evaluate group potential for action. We some weeks away from being able make solid preliminary assessment.
>
> "Suggest KUBARK consider sending in each pouch one small

size high fire power weapon so at least gesture in right direction can be made if we all thrown out. Ammo could come later."

14 February 1961

At the Special Group meeting of this date, Mr. Bundy:

" . . . asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo."

(Comment: We did not find a copy of such a memorandum in CIA files.)

15 February 1961

Ned Holman, the headquarters branch chief, met with Juan Vicini and Donald Reid Cabral in New York City. Excerpts from his memorandum record of the meeting follow:

" . . . . . Vicini played down somewhat the necessity for delivery of arms, although he did say that it is desireable and should be a part of the planning. He said that members of the opposition could, if they wanted to, obtain small quanitities of arms from Army contacts . . . but that any arms so obtained would have to be used very quickly before their loss is discovered. For this reason, he said it would be desireable to have arms delivered by us that could be stored for use at any moment desired.

"Vicini said that the object of obtaining this kind of help anyway is the elimination of Trujillo and instead of using arms or grenades he began to speak of more exotic materiels and methods . . . a powerful bomb that could be planted along the route of Trujillo's evening walk and could be detonated from a nearby electronic device . . . (or) . . . the possibility of poisoning the dictator's food or of putting poison capsules in bottles of certain medicines that the dictator is known to take regularly. . . . . .

"A less exotic and more practical plan that they put forward was one that they said had already been planned at one time before. They said that when the dictator leaves his office for his home there are three automobiles in his procession with the dictator himself in the first automobile and the bodyguards in the following two. The idea that has been discussed internally is for several trucks to block the progress of these cars at a given intersection at which time young men who belong to the action groups would leap out of the trucks with fire arms and grenades to finish off the dictator."

4 March 1961

Headquarters pouched to the station a copy of Holman's memorandum of his meeting with Vicini and Reid. On 4 March, the chief of station cabled his assessment of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage and kill him with guns and grenades:

"Vicini idea . . . almost certain fail if applied. That type attack is precisely what bodyguards appear best qualified cope with. Their defense pattern and displacement vehicles plus police practice detour traffic blocks away from entourage make Vicini idea fatally childish in Owen's view."

(Comment: The assassination was actually carried out through a variation of this scheme. The assassins detected and took advantage of a stereotyped pattern in Trujillo's movements in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled highways.)

The station cabled headquarters on 4 March:

> " . . . if opportunity support pro-US group not to be lost, believe . . . imperative make sure arms with ammo ready for immediate entry DomRep . . . if necessary at air drop sites . . . "

5 March 1961

As a follow-up to that cable, the station cabled a communication from Dr. Severo Cabral: "We have in our hands chance to speedup events. Everything is being planned perfectly. Results may be assured as much as human fallibility permits. . . . . . "

7 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the field, in part:

> "Existing authorization precludes introduction arms into Dom Rep by U.S. personnel. Order prepare contingency plans for possible alternate delivery method, request station determine additional drop zones and confirm those mentioned . . . . . Request type and quantity arms desired. . . . . . "

8 March 1961

Cable from the station:

> "Brossa told Dearborn on 7 March that Dr. Severo Cabral and group plan try kill Trujillo by /intercepting his car/ at point near /Wimpy's Supermarket/. Date not set and obviously depends on Trujillo travel . . . Severo Cabral not aware Brossa has told us but interesting that Charge' Papal Nunciatura also aware plot exists but possibly not of personnel involved."

8 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Hqs deeply interested plan . . . and request urgently additional details in order make plans timely assistance. Uncertainty of plans, timing and chances of success precludes Hqs seeking commitment for such speicific assistance as that requested . . . . ."

13 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Following elicited from EMOTH-8 (Andres Freitas): Freitas speaks for Amiama Tio group which includes military members . . . in six brigade Hqs and which have capability, at appropriate time, of taking over military garrisons with arms already at hand, and appointing military/civilian junta in control provisional govt. . . . . . Reqst following station action with respect Amiama Tio group: A. Identify military membership; B. Assess capabilities as claimed; C. Indicate if assets can be coordinated with overall effort. Hqs places special emphasis on identifying military membership Amiama Tio group. This important for vetting as well as enable assess realistically chances successful takeover."

15 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"Lorenzo (Wimpy) Berry asked [a consulate employee] for small supply fragmentation grenades 'for use in next week or so.' By note, the chief of station checked back with Wimpy and learned the dissident group must do EMSLEW [kill Trujillo] this month or drop it as number of fringe persons with loose mouths are apparently aware renewal plan . . . . . Wimpy asked for five 45 mm (sic) rapid fire weapons or similar, 1,500 rounds ammo for same, . . . 50 fragmentation grenades, . . . ten 64mm tank rockets. . . . ."

16 March 1961

Headquarters cabled its reply:

"Hqs exploring possibilities for arms delivery and will advise ASAP. Meanwhile, request you clarify soonest: Is Berry making request on own initiative or is he speaking for Dr. Severo Cabral? . . . . . "

17 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"For issue to several [of the dissident group] Consul General Dearborn requests three 38 caliber Smith and Wesson Special pistols or similar and three small boxes cartridges. If sending ammo complicates problem, advise and we will try get from Marines.

"Chief of Station reiterates suggestion [to send in each pouch one small size high fire power weapon] as Dearborn increasingly concerned lest momentum which group has now for [assassination] decline result lack tangible or too slow action on arms by the U.S. Government. Also security these people increasingly of direct interest US Government which each day more involved in [the operation]. Loss of one of key people thru capture could lead revelation details ODYOKE/EMBEED activity. Thus preferable we give them some chance defend themselves against SIM."

18 March 1961

Chief of Station Robert Owen met for the first time with Dr. Severo Cabral. He cabled the results:

"His group [assassination] plan now this: Group knows identity Trujillo's mistress in capital. He visits her once week or once in two weeks. Goes her apartment incognito and lightly guarded. Group apprently has someone in building who can alert them to visit. Dressed as army officers, small group will go to entrance, distract guard with pretext, dispatch him or them in silence, enter apartment and try do [assassination], possibly including mistress, in silence.

"To do they need five M-3 or comparable machine guns and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event firefight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job. . . . . . Severo Cabral's final position was U.S. Government get items here soonest via pouch or similar means. Evident he actually worried that delivery by other means would compromise entire project. Obvious he can count on only one group both receive arms and do [assassination].

"Dr. Severo Cabral expects and willing risk chaos for period of undetermined length after [assassination] mainly because for security reasons his group cannot approach military and hope to get decisive agreement support before [assassination].

20 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms . . . Will deliver to the group's representatives outside the Dominican Republic if this feasible. Coordinated with State Department."

22 March 1961

The station replied, in part:

" . . . we realize permission does not now exist but Chief of Station knows that he at last two posts received pistols via pouch for worthy purposes, so it can be done. Judging from ref, WH not prepared take this step. If this unalterably so then

> please continue try get authorization for air drop of . . . arms . . . or import arms by [other] means. Completely negative plea for arms, whatever delivery method, will end cooperation Severo Cabral and probably by [Wimpy and Mrs. Berry].*

25 March 1961

The above excerpt is the most significant point in the cable, but the excerpt does not fully reveal the contentious tone of the cable. On 25 March, Headquarters, in a cable released by the DD/P (Bissell) undertook to set Owen straight. The cable gives a fairly complete statement of U.S. policy and objectives and of Owen's responsibilities. It is summarized here. We support a program to replace the Trujillo regime; we wish to avoid precipitate action if planning is not well organized, as appears to be the case; machine guns and ammunition will be supplied to demonstrate good will to the dissidents; the requested revolvers are being pouched. Headquarters is planning with State against the eventuality of sudden action by the dissidents that might result in the forming of a new government. "If above clarifies Hqs position, Owen should proceed accordingly. In event major points remain unclear, State Department preparing orders permit return for consultations."

(Comment: We do not know whether Owen replied to this cable or not. We do not find a reply in the files. Owen did go to headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we cannot

---

* It is apparent from the EMDEED operational files that no arms were ever air-dropped or delivered by sea.

establish that the trip was a direct result of this cable. There is some evidence that suggests that the trip may have been in connection with a request from the dissidents for submachine guns.)

26 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"For Dr. Severo Cabral request permission pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines 30 caliber and supply ammo which available consulate from departed naval personnel. Would need from Hqs nine 30 cartridge magazines for weapons. Request prompted by Severo Cabral note 25 March which says he cannot hold group together beyond April 15 without arms delivery. . . . . ."

(Comment: It may be helpful to interrupt the chronology at this point. As we will later explain, these carbines were actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hands of Antonio de la Maza, who worked out the details of the assassination and was the lead figure in carrying it out. They almost certainly were taken to the scene of the slaying by the assassins. We have no evidence that any of them were actually fired during the shooting. The little evidence we have suggests that they were not actually used. These three carbines are the weapons referred to by various sources as having been passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no evidence of any other weapons having been passed.)

27 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"FYI, ref hardware [the three pistols the station asked be pouched] makes fairly sizeable package if lumped single shipment. Request soonest COS estimate of risk involved sending one package; or whether split shipment preferable."

(Comment: We find no indication in the files that these revolvers were ever actually pouched. We suspect they were not, because the request for them was overtaken by subsequent events.)

29 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

" . . . Hqs inclined to favor passing Severo Cabral ref carbines and ammo. Are carbines carried on local installation inventory, thus requiring paper work which may blow CIA's ultimate use? How does station propose to pass weapons in secure manner order avoid other ODACID installation employees becoming witting they being made available to Dominicans? Require Consul General Dearborn's concurrence. . Advise. . . . . . Pouching . . . nine magazines . . . "

31 March 1961

The station replied:

"No inventory problem. No paper work to show CIA in act in anyway. Plan file off serial numbers. Will handle packaging after hours. Only consulate person who knows disposition is Dearborn. Delivery to Wimpy Berry by the station's female administrative assistant or other CIA officer depending on what steps seems best here. Dearborn concurred in request and in this message. We cannot emphasize enough that we must make gesture of good will to Severo Cabral now. These items are not what he asked for but they are an investment in operational continuity. The security risk in his having these items is no greater than his having similar items delivery which done by more complicated and less secure cache or drop."

Headquarters cable to the station:

"/Passing the three carbines/ approved. Advise Hqs when passing of this equipment completed.

(Comment: This cable was released by the DD/P (Bissell).)

7 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"/The pouch forwarding magazines for the three carbines/ contained 15-bullet magazines rather than 30-bullet magazines as requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type M-1 carbine magazines."

9 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"/The station's female administrative assistant/ passed /the three carbines/ to /Wimpy Berry/ April 7. No complications."

(Comment:. The files do not contain an account of how the carbines were actually passed. As we will later see, headquarters subsequently pouched submachine guns for passing to the dissidents. Headquarters asked for the station's plan for securely passing the submachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied: "Propose use essentially same technique as that for /the three carbines/.

[The station's female administrative assistant] driving own car will go to local supermarket [Wimpy Berry's] for usual Saturday morning purchases. Then to consulate to get mail. Will get assist from Chief of Station in loading package or packages into car trunk with groceries. [Station operations officer] will then accompany to administrative assistant's apartment, help take groceries in. If no danger signal given by operations officer, [Wimpy Berry] will arrive in personal car, pick up items from operations officer at partially concealed entrance to administrative assistant's apartment and promptly leave. Cover for his visit will be commercial delivery.")

7 April 1961

Chief, WH Division, submitted to Chief, RI, a memorandum requesting waiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons. "The above request is submitted for the following reason: Station Ciudad Trujillo has requested that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection."

(Comment: The entry for 18 March 1961 refers to a request for submachine guns, but there was no follow-up on it from the station. This pouch waiver request was submitted while the chief of station was at headquarters for consultations. It is probable that he made the plea in person. As will be seen later, the submachine guns (the so-called "grease guns" of World War II) were pouched but approval was never given the station to pass them to the plotters.)

12 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

> "Equipment for Severo Cabral /submachine guns/ which subject of Chief of Station conversations Hqs being pouched . . . 14 April. Prior to passing equipment, advise Hqs what scheme of delivery proposed."

(Comment: The delivery scheme is explained in comment on the 9 April entry.)

13 April 1961

An extract from a note sent to Consul General Dearborn from Juan Vicini:

> "The three Leica cameras, model M-1 /the three carbines/, with their accessories, should be in the proper hands in a day or two. . . . . . With the small amount of equipment which they are receiving they can only take action at a few specific places and therefore the probabilities are considerably reduced and the time factor considerably extended accordingly. With the rest of the equipment (four Leicas, model M-3) /the submachine guns/ the possible places of action are multiplied and the lost time greatly reduced."

14 April 1961

Extract from a note from SOCRATES /Luis Baquero/ to DELTA

[Consul General Dearborn]:

> "The three Leica cameras and accessories are in the hands of the ones that will take the pictures. They need more cameras in order to do a better and faster job. We hope that the memo we sent two days ago might help in Wash. in this regard."

17 April 1961

Note from YAGUATE [Juan Vicini] and SOCRATES [Luis Baquero] to DELTA [Dearborn]:

> "The last word, up to the minute in the matter of cameras: CRISTOBAL [General Juan Tomas Diaz] says that with the 3 Leica cameras already delivered it is impossible to do the photographic job. He needs to have the rest of the equipment (the 4 M-3 Leicas) before he undertakes the job. The ones already delivered he sees them as good complementary equipment (defensive) but he needs the others for the aggressive part of the job. It is my belief that the ones already delivered have served a psychological purpose also: the men involved have always been in doubt the good faith of your people in Wash. Their feeling was that in several months all they have obtained were promises. Now they see that you actually mean business. So, now, all they are doing is waiting for the heavy cameras."

17 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

> " . . . . . most important [the submachine guns] not repeat not be passed to Severo Cabral without additional Hqs approval. Please advise when equipment received and proposed scheme and timing of delivery."

20 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"[Submachine guns] should be held in station custody till further notice and not repeat not be passed to [Wimpy Berry]. This Hqs decision based on judgment that filling vacuum created by [assassination] now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions in Caribbean area.

"Request station provide foll info soonest: (a) Have [the three carbines] been delivered to Severo Cabral? (b) Details on an alternate plan to deliver [submachine guns] which would involve ground caching."

(Comment: It might be noted that this cable was sent just three days after the failure of the landing at the Bay of Pigs.)

20 April 1961

Note to DELTA [Dearborn] from YAGUATE and SOCRATES:

"The officers that were to do the photographic job are not only disappointed but really angry at the refusal of the delivery of the other Leicas. They have decided to give up the plan and disperse, because they cannot take any more risks for nothing."

20 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"[Submachine guns] here 19 April with no entry problems whatsoever. Excellent basic wrapping means station's plan can be simplified even more. The administrative assistant, the operations officer, and the chief of station can share delivery direct to drop. Request Hqs advise when we may begin."

(Comment: The precise nature of this "excellent basic wrapping" is not further clarified in the file. Norman Gall, writing in The New Republic, said that the weapons were shipped to Wimpy Berry in food cans. This sounds to us as if the submachine guns were packed in food containers for pouching. If so, we wonder how Gall learned of this. We can state with fair confidence that these submachine guns were never passed out of the consulate. As late as the very day of the assassination, Bob Owen sent a cable protesting the policy that forbade his passing them. This sounds as if there must have been a leak from the consulate--from one of the very few who knew of the submachine guns. We cannot confirm that the submachine guns were actually packaged in food containers for pouching. TSD has no record of having done so. Jake Esterline has a faint recollection of food containers, but not in connection with pouching.)

21 April 1961

Cable from headquarters to the station:

> "[Submachine guns] should be held in station custody till further notice and not repeat not be passed to [Wimpy Berry].

22 April 1961

The station replied to headquarters' query of 20 April regarding disposition of the three carbines:

> " . . . . . [Wimpy Berry] has given [the three carbines] to intermediary who holding until Severo Cabral picks up . . . . . "

(Comment: This "intermediary" appears to have been Thomas Stocker. The significance of this and the security problem it posed will become apparent from one of the later entries for 31 May.)

25 April 1961

Cable from the station:

> "Foll from Dearborn: 'I believe political consequence of not delivering [submachine guns] so serious I plan go Washington within next few days for discussion with Department and CAS Hqs!"

26 April 1961

Cable from the station:

> "[Wimpy Berry] told Chief of Station . . . Antonio de la Maza plans try assassination between 29 April and 2 May. Severo Cabral possibly not yet aware plan. No solid info other members assassination effort but General Juan Tomas Diaz probably will aid. Will use the three carbines plus whatever else can get. De la Maza asks Berry add the submachine guns if possible . . . . ."

30 April 1961

Cable from the station:

> "Following from Dearborn: April 28 Lorenzo Berry as emissary Juan Vicini and Severo Cabral called on me with foll info: . . . main mission Berry was plead with me release submachine guns they believe in Dom Rep and under my control. Action group has 3 carbines, 4 to 6 12-gauge shotguns with 120 rounds and some small arms. . . . . . Action entails roadside ambush near San Cristobal

and few additional weapons could be important. . . . . . I replied I had no submachine guns under my control and that any U.S. controlled items which might be in Dom Rep could only be released on specific authorization from Washington. I pointed out that since the three carbines were made available Cuban incident had occurred and hoped group could understand this is period of study and assessment. . . . . . "

2 May 1961

Cable from the station:

" . . . . . suggest Hqs review decision not pass submachine guns. Determination of group to go ahead with possibly inadequate means could spell end best pro-US force now working toward the overthrow of the Trujillo regime."

2 May 1961

Draft cable prepared at headquarters:

" . . . . . Since it appears that EMOTH group has committed itself to action with or without additional support, coupled with fact that the carbines already made available to them for personal defense; station authorized pass submachine guns to Berry for their additional protection on their proposed endeavor. . . . . . "

(Comment: This cable was never sent. It was authenticated by Ray Herbert for J. C. King, and Richard Bissell coordinated on it. It was forwarded to the DDCI for release. General Cabell attached a handwritten buck-slip: "Return to: Chief, W.H. Div., unacted upon.")

4 May 1961

The Director, at a meeting of the Special Group, reported a new anti-Trujillo plot, saying that we never knew if one of these would work or not.

5 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Regret delay but release /of the submachine guns/ awaits high level State Department decision."

8 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"State Department has disapproved passing /submachine guns/.

16 May 1961

Cable from the station:

"For Achilles and Coerr from Dearborn: Thomas Stocker called on me night May 15. Stated he emissary from action group which plans execute action against Trujillo night May 16. Stocker's mission was urgently request me to furnish group with few machine guns which it understood US agents have in Dom Rep . . . . . "

(Comment: There is an unsigned and almost incomprehensible memorandum in the EMDEED files. It is dated 17 May 1961 and concerns a meeting with Mrs. Flerida Berry. The transmittal dispatch makes it clear that the author was Isabel Cintron, the station's administrative assistant. This is our interpretation of what Miss Cintron was trying to say: Sometime during the second week of May, Wimpy Berry asked Thomas Stocker to return the three carbines Berry had given Stocker for the plotters. Stocker at first refused but finally agreed. [Presumably Berry then passed them to Antonio de la Maza.] On 15 May, Stocker again saw Berry at the supermarket, said he had the carbines back in his possession, and his group planned to carry out the assassination the following night. The group that was to do the job was not the group that Berry had been working with on behalf of the consulate. SOCRATES (Luis Baquero) arrived at the supermarket while Stocker was still with Wimpy. After Stocker left, Mrs. Berry asked Baquero if he had given the Carbines back to Stocker. Baquero said he was certain not, although he and the man who had the carbines and was to do the job did not know each other's identities. While Mrs. Berry was talking with Baquero, the man to whom Berry had last given the weapons [presumably Antonio de la Maza] arrived at the supermarket. Mrs. Berry asked him if he had returned the carbines to Stocker. He replied that he had not that that, if she wanted confirmation, she could look in the trunk of his car where he always carried them.)

18 May 1961

There was discussion at a Special Group meeting of planning with respect to the Dominican Republic. Chester Bowles said he thought that an internal State planning paper outlining an ambitious paramilitary plan (and alleging Special Group approval) exceeded the Special Group's action. Mr. Parrott's notes supported that impression. The following is an excerpt from the minutes:

> "General Cabell noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the Group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary position at this time." *

25 May 1961

The agenda of the Special Group meeting for this date proposed discussion of "further guidance to Dearborn re contacts with dissidents." The minutes of the meeting, however, make no mention of the subject.

27 May 1961

The station cabled:

> "Department from Dearborn: 'May 26 I had long talk with Andreas Freitas. . . . . . Freitas made no request for arms which indicates group has accepted fact it must do with what it has.

* The small arms to which General Cabell referred were the submachine guns, which were pouched to the station but were never passed to the dissidents.

His only statement on this subject was that group has arms but is somewhat concerned whether enough.

"He stated action group planning overthrow Trujillo for past 3 weeks and representing anti-communist pro-democratic elements of which he member remains on brink final performance and determined as ever. Said he could give me no date because action depends when Trujillo follows awaited pattern which not known in advance. Group has arrangement for being informed sufficiently in advance to get into assigned positions once signal given. He asked if United States prepared assist pro-United States Dominicans quickly if they succeed overthrow Trujillo.

"I replied . . . speed with which assistance could be given would be increased considerably if we could have prior info on such subjects as timing, plans for action, personalities involved and identity of proposed junta. . . . . . He replied participants were not prepared give their names until afterward and could not give time for reasons stated earlier. . . . . .

"Re timing Freitas stressed event could happen any day and could in fact have happened 3 times in last 2 weeks except that necessary juxtaposition of forces did not materialize."

29 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"For Dearborn from State . . . . . We must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. Thi last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. . . . . . You must request and receive further specific instruction for any specific covert activity. At the present time we are unable to transfer arms to dissidents. . . . ."

(Comment: Both Dearborn and the chief of station sent cables commenting on this guidance cable. Their cables were filed in Ciudad Trujillo on 30 May but were not received in Washington until the early morning hours of 31 May--about eight hours after the assassination took place. Excerpts follow.)

31 May 1961

Cable from the station:

"State from Dearborn . . . . . If attempt is made by U.S. friends assassinate Trujillo there will be accusations against us and best we can do is see there is no proof. Greatest danger point is Thomas Stocker. He was given small number arms by dissident agent to hold several days and has told several persons dissidents obtained these items from consulate. Stocker told me same and I have informed him this cannot be true or I would know and when he requested me supply arms through him for dissidents I told him this impossible. . . . . . "

Cable from chief of station:

"Assume [the 29 May policy cable from State to Dearborn] is final word on present policy on which CIA work here must be based. This for practical purposes retreat from previous policy. However Hqs aware extent to which U.S. Government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least try 'cover up tracks,' CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn now. . . . . . If assassination tried and not successful, immediate evacuation of the chief of station, the operations officer, and the administrative assistant mandatory. . . . . . "

31 May 1961

Received in Headquarters Signal Center at 0341 hours, Washington time:

FLASH SECRET CRITIC CIA CIUDAD TRUJILLO NUMBER 1. APPR 2. SOURCE DISSIDENT IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH DISSIDENT ACTION GROUP (C). SOURCE AT 2330 HOURS LOCAL TIME 30 MAY RECEIVED PREARRANGED SIGNAL WHICH MEANT TRUJILLO KILLED BY ASSASSINATION SAME NIGHT. AMERICAN CONSULATE PERSONNEL ENCOUNTERED ROADBLOCKS ON CIUDAD TRUJILLO RIO HAINA SUPER HIGHWAY AT ABOUT 0030 HOURS LOCAL TIME 31 MAY. INDIVIDUALS FORMING BLOCKS APPEARED HASTILY ORGANIZED MILITIA ONLY FEW OF WHOM ARMED WITH FIREARMS OTHERS WITH MACHETES. NO CONFIRMATION TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION AS OF 0100 MAY 31. FILED 0600Z. [0200 Washington time]

(Comment: The station's follow-up operational cable identified the source of Critic No. 1 as Lorenzo (Wimpy) Berry, who gave the information in person to Consul General Dearborn and Chief of Station Owen at the consulate. At about 0100 hours, Dominican time, Andres Freitas telephoned Dearborn "to ask cryptically whether we had the news." Freitas said he would add details when he had them.)

3 June 1961

Memorandum for the record signed by J. D. Esterline, in part:

"The evening of 2 June, it was decided to immediately move out of the Dominican Republic the Station Chief Owen, and Case Officer Cookson. It was also decided that Administrative Assistant Isabel Cintron should not return to Trujillo. Accordingly, an operational immediate cable was sent to the station the afternoon of 2 June issuing appropriate instructions."

9 June 1961

Memorandum for the record signed by J. C. King, subject: "High-Level Meeting on Dominican Crisis"--in part:

"The meeting was held at 1800 hours on 5 June 1961 in Room 7514 of the Department of State. Among those present were Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer, Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary Alexis Johnson, Mr. Ed Murrow, Chief, USIA, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Mr. Richard Goodwin, Mr. Ted Achilles, Mr. Wim Coerr, Mr. Morales Carrion and Mr. Jameson.

"Vice President Lyndon Johnson referred to another message from Consul General Dearborn which was in an alarmist tone as to the possibility of implicating the United States in the delivery of arms to the dissidents. The Vice President then asked what was the timing and authority on the delivery of arms."

(Comment: The message to which Vice President Johnson referred is not in the EMDEED operational files. We did not find a copy in a search of Cable Secretariat archives. Jake Esterline, who appears to have ridden herd on post-assassination planning, does not recall having heard of Vice President Johnson's query. The record suggests that he knew of it but does not now remember. There is an unsigned memorandum in the EMDEED file dated 6 June 1961 (the day after the meeting at State), subject: "ODACID Views on Passage of Arms to Dominican Dissidents." The memorandum summarizes State Department-Consulate involvement in having weapons furnished to the dissidents. The routing and record sheet attached to the memorandum shows it was originated by John Poulter, WH3/DR&H, and was forwarded to C/OPS/WH (Esterline). Esterline initialed the routing and record sheet and returned the memorandum to Poulter. This suggests to us that J. C. King, upon returning from the meeting at State, asked Esterline to have a summary pulled together.

J. C. King remembers the meeting at which the Vice President asked about the delivery of arms. He does not now recall the specific query. Re-reading his memorandum record of the meeting leads him to believe that the Vice President's question was directed to one of the State representatives. He feels that, if it had been directed to CIA, he would have made mention of that fact in his record of the meeting.

A memorandum for the record prepared by J. C. King of a White House meeting on the Dominican crisis on 7 June 1961 makes no mention of U.S. involvement in passing weapons to the assassins. The meeting was chaired by the President, and Vice President Johnson was present.

The preceding, quite detailed, and almost wholly documentary account of U.S. Government involvement with persons plotting the overthrow of Trujillo carries through the actual assassination. Early in the report we explained why the coup that was to follow the assassination never took place. Another essential part of the story is the roll-up of the assassination group and the discovery of U.S. involvement with them. The consulate cabled through CIA channels on 9 December 1961 that the 7 December issue of the Dominican newspaper La Nacion carried a story

> " . . . based on Huascar Tejeda Pimentel's statement to Judge of Instruction that Wimpy (Lorenzo A. Berry) provided the caliber 30 M-1 Garand automatic carbines used to kill Trujillo."

Wimpy's involvement with the plotters, including passing weapons from the U.S. consulate to them, became known to the Dominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) as early as 3 June from its interrogations of the captured assassins. The following summary is drawn from the FBI's report of its interviews of Ortiz, the SIM officer who headed the investigation of the assassination.

Immediately after the slaying, all of the assassins assembled at the house of General Juan Tomas Diaz. Dr. Robert Reid Cabral was called to treat the most seriously wounded assassin. Dr. Reid was the cousin of Donald Reid Cabral, one of the key political plotters, but appears not to have been in on the plot himself. Since Dr. Reid in being called as a physician learned the identities of the assassins, General Diaz said he could not allow Dr. Reid to go free. General Diaz forced Dr. Reid to furnish refuge in Reid's house for four of the assassins (General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, Salvador Estrella, and Roberto Pastoriza). The other assassins went their separate ways.

Within hours after entering Dr. Reid's house, General Diaz and his three companions began to panic. (It might be noted here that the assassins were so sure that the coup would follow and they would all be national heroes that they had made absolutely know plans for hiding or escape.) De la Maza called for Mrs. Reid and ordered Dr. Reid out of the room. De la Maza thereupon raped Mrs. Reid in the presence of his companions. Pastoriza and Estrella were highly incensed over the rape. Pastoriza left the house soon after a near-fight and a drawn-weapons confrontation. Estrella left after a few hours. Diaz and de la Maza left later and were killed in a gunfight while resisting arrest. Both Pastoriza and Estrella were captured, tortured, and confessed. The following are excerpts from the FBI's report of its interviews with Ortiz, the SIM investigator.

> ". . . after Pastoriza left General Juan Tomas Diaz composed a telegram addressed to President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, which said, 'We who have killed Trujillo urgently need your help in order to flee the country. Signed General Juan Tomas Diaz.'

Diaz requested Dr. Reid to take this telegram to 'Wimpy,' an American who owned a supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo, and to tell 'Wimpy' to take the telegram immediately to the American Consul and to ask the Consul to code the telegram and send it through the proper channels to Betancourt.

"Reid refused to take the telegram on the basis that he had already implicated himself greatly in the plot through no fault of his own and stated that he thought Diaz was trying to have him killed by asking him to take this telegram to 'Wimpy.' With that de la Maza became so incensed that he punched Reid and pushed him around and even went so far as to hold his revolver against the head of Reid's young son. Reid then said that the plotters could kill the entire Reid family if they wished but that he would not deliver the telegram to 'Wimpy.'

"Estrella was asked to furnish what he knew concerning 'Wimpy's' alleged connection with the conspiracy. Estrella related that 'Wimpy' is the one who facilitated the obtaining of the shotgun and the automatic rifle for de la Maza and General Diaz. He was asked if 'Wimpy' knew the purpose for which these weapons were secured and Estrella replied that 'Wimpy' was aware of the purpose. Estrella further related that 'Wimpy' works for the FBI, the State Department, or some other agency of the U.S. Government.

"Estrella was asked to explain how he knew 'Wimpy' was connected with the Americans and he replied that he had heard from the other conspirators that 'Wimpy' was the intermediary between the American Consulate and the conspirators. Estrella stated that 'Wimpy' was a friend of General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza and Luis Amiama Tio, and that 'Wimpy' had been the intermediary through the American Consulate when these three discussed their proposed coup with American authorities.

" . . . the source mentioned that during the interrogation of the conspirators who mentioned that United States officials were involved, they were all asked to identify the United States officials, but none of the conspirators were able to identify these officials by name and mentioned only that they were high functionaries of the United States Department of State. The only name of any American official which was disclosed during these interrogations was the name of American Consul Hill in connection with the telegram that General Diaz wanted to send to Betancourt.

". . . the source noted that the telegram never reached Consul Hill because Diaz tore it up after the incident in Dr. Reid's house.

"(. . . the source commented that the interrogators themselves did not believe at this time that the U.S. Department of State was in any way involved with the plot. They thought the disclosures concerning the alleged involvement . . . was simply a method by which Amiama induced General Roman to give his approval to the plot. . . . . . it was the interrogators opinion at that time that if the North Americans had been involved in this plot, the plot would have been much better organized and the coup would have succeeded.)

" . . . by the latter part of June 1961, the investigation had pretty well established the identities of all the individuals involved in the plot, many of whom had been arrested and interrogated. The only ones not accounted for were Luis Amiama Tio and Antonio Imbert Barreras. As previously related, General Juan Tomas Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lieutenant Amado Garcia Guerrero were killed when resisting arrest. (At this point the source related that if General Diaz, Lieut. Garcia, de la Maza, Amiama, and Imbert had been captured, and made to talk, it is certain that many many more prisoners would have been taken.)

"As far as the source is aware, the only individuals who were arrested as a result of the assassination of Trujillo, who were brought before the courts were Tavares and General Roman. As far as the source is aware, no other individual arrested in connection with this plot was brought before any Dominican court. 'Wimpy,' the North American, was to have been brought before a court to be deported; however, Ramfis ordered that he was not to be molested in any way and as far as the source is aware, no action was taken against 'Wimpy.'"

"Wimpy" Berry, his wife, and their children were allowed to leave the Dominican Republic. They went to Florida and subsequently visited Washington. While in Washington, Berry was given $2,000 for "expenses" by CIA. After amnesty was granted the plotters in December 1961, the Berrys returned to Santo Domingo and resumed operating their supermarket. They, especially Mrs. Berry, continued to involve themselves in political intrigues. They were staunch supporters of the conservative Antonio Imbert/Wessin y Wessin faction and were involved in the actions that led to the overthrows of the governments headed by Juan Bosch and later by Donald Reid Cabral.

To recap:

a. Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom told J. C. King on 28 June 1960 that the U.S. Government was prepared to participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the extent of providing a small number of sniper rifles for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene. General Cabell, as Acting DCI, on 1 July 1960 approved delivering 12 Springfield rifles to the Dominican dissidents by air drop or by sea. The rifles were never delivered.

b. On 10 February 1961 the chief of station cabled a suggestion that one small-size, high-fire-power weapon be forwarded in each pouch. This suggestion was not acted upon.

c. On 17 March 1961, the chief of station cabled a request of Consul General Dearbon for the pouching of three 38 caliber Smith and Wesson Special pistols for delivery to key members of the dissident group. Headquarters was preparing to pouch the pistols but apparently did not do so. There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsquent request for submachine guns.

d. On 26 March 1961 the station cabled a request for permission to pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines plus ammunition to Dr. Severo Cabral. The carbines and ammunition were in the consulate, having been left by departed naval personnel. The station requested that headquarters pouch magazines. Headquarters approved passing the carbines and ammunition and pouched the magazines. The cable authorizing passing the carbines was released by the DD/P (Bissell). The station said it would file off the carbines' serial numbers. The station cabled that the carbines were passed to "Wimpy" Berry by the station's female administrative assistant on 7 April 1961. Berry, at the request of the dissidents, gave the carbines to S. Thomas Stocker for temporary safekeeping. Berry later recovered the carbines from Stocker and gave them to Antonio de la Maza, who reportedly kept them in the trunk of his automobile. It is probable that at least one of the carbines was taken to the scene of the assassination by de la Maza, but we have no evidence that it was actually used in the shooting. Ortiz, the SIM investigator, told the FBI that the assassins who were apprehended and interrogated spoke only of the firing of a sawed-off shotgun, revolvers, and pistols.

e. While at headquarters for consultations in early April 1961, Chief of Station Robert Owen evidently prevailed upon headquarters to pouch four M-3 submachine guns and ammunition to the station. The submachine guns were pouched and arrived at the station on 19 April 1961. Headquarters cabled the station on 17 April that the submachine guns were not to be passed to the dissidents without additional headquarters approval. Despite repeated pleas from the Chief of Station and from the Consul General, Washington continued to refuse authorization to pass them. We think it is safe to conclude that the submachine guns were never passed to the dissidents.

A final, and rather sorry, footnote: We do not know the motivations of men such as Jordi Brossa, Juan Vicini, Severo Cabral, Amiama Tio, and Antonio Imbert. The SIM interrogations of the plotters it captured revealed that they were not greatly motivated by a desire to live in a free and democratic republic. Most of them were seeking vengeance or personal gain. General Roman, who was to have taken over and form an interim government, admitted that he had had no intention of permitting free elections. He had planned to establish himself as the new Dominican "strongman" replacing Trujillo. General Juan Tomas Diaz was bitter over having been publicly disgraced by Trujillo and then cashiered from the army. Antonio de la Maza also had a personal grudge. His brother, Octavio, had been killed by the Trujillos to conceal his and their participation in the slaying of Gerald Murphy in the Galindez case. Most of the others also had personal reasons for wishing Trujillo dead.

A I R
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRET KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-1025
(201-16881)
(23-88/2-139)Local

Dahlgren

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE: 7 November 1957

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative
SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Attached herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Subject, dated 29 October 1957, calling the attention of Headquarters to the fact that his assignment in Habana terminates in June 1958 and setting out his wishes as to reassignment thereafter.

2. While Vaivada did not include it in his memorandum, in recent conversations with the case officer he has expressed considerable interest in the possibility of being assigned under unofficial cover to Spain, saying that both he and his wife would welcome such an assignment. The Subject has also said in those conversations that he would not take it amiss if an opportunity for reassignment outside of the Central America-Caribbean area were to become open to him at any time prior to June 1958.

3. In the opinion of the Station, Vaivada has done a very good job here, having been confronted with and overcome a number of difficult problems and situations during his tour of over three years in Habana. The Station is happy to recommend that his request for reassignment be given every consideration.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Attachments:
Memorandum of Reassignment (4 copies)

Distribution:
4 - Washington w/att.
2 - Files w/att.

4 November 1957

JRP/mfm

DESENSITIZED
[illegible] 43-23

201-168881

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET ~~KAPOK~~
CLASSIFICATION

Havana, Cuba
29 October 1957

SUBJECT: Reassignment - Arthur G. Vaivada

TO : Headquarters Desk

THROUGH: Chief of Station, Havana, Cuba

1. While at Headquarters in the early part of May 1957, it was verbally agreed that I return to Cuba for about one year, security permitting.

2. While my operational work in Cuba from August 1954 until February 1957 was concentrated on communist targets in the University of Habana, it should be pointed out that my duties during that period also involved many contacts with subversive oppositionist elements. When governmental persecution increased during February 1957, two of my key agents were lost, one of them by governmental assassination, so that I was obliged to leave Cuba temporarily pending clarification of the security factors involved. During my three months' absence in PEPRIME the local situation deteriorated; and after my return my position was less favorable than it had been as a newcomer since I had lost assets but had retained the cumulative security hazards of three years of cultivation and recruitment efforts. The University was, and still is, closed. Our communist penetration efforts are continuously harrassed by official persecution of the target group.

3. Since by June 1958 I shall have spent four years in Cuba, I believe it appropriate to submit this letter at this time requesting that Headquarters begin to study the possibilities for reassignment about June 1958, or prior to that date if necessary. As to future assignments, I have no reservations or special requests. I am willing and prepared to travel to any area consistent with my qualifications. Generally speaking, and for obvious security reasons, I am interested in getting out of the Central America-Caribbean area if possible. It may be recalled that I was denied an Argentine visa in 1953, for purely technical reasons. This situation may be changed, and I would not be opposed to a tour in Argentina, Chile, or any of the South American republics. In this matter, the nature of the new project or assignment would take precedence with me over personal preferences as to particular area of assignment.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

Att to HKHA 4025
7 NOV 57

201-168881

4. Regarding my cover status: I entered Cuba in 1954 under student cover (Pan American Foundation Scholarship), and as it became increasingly more difficult to maintain owing to student disturbances, I completed a course in the writing of free-lance fiction and am thrice published. This writing has been used as a realistic, stop-gap cover, even after I was provided with a notional business cover (Public Surveys Institute) by Headquarters. I understand that journalism is considered a weak and time-worn cover; yet if it is worked at, and financially managed through a PBPRIME checking account, it not only satisfies local SS probes but it does not have the inherent disadvantages involved in setting up a full-fledged business cover. I set this out as a possible suggestion to Headquarters, but have no insistence as to journalistic over business cover. The notional business cover provided me has proved satisfactory in a limited sense thus far, and even utilized as cover for action occasionally, but I would be uncertain about introducing it in a less "Americanized" country than Cuba.

Arthur G. Vaivada
Arthur G. Vaivada

201-168881

SECRET

25 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Staff

ATTENTION : Charlie Danish

SUBJECT : Ross CROZIER

REFERENCE : SAS Memorandum Dated 14 May 1963

1. Referenced memorandum requested the Subject be provided with military cover while assigned in the Headquarters area for operational and credit purposes in the performance of his duties with SAS. It is understood that your office was reluctant to issue the Subject the necessary military cover because he was physically located in a DODS office which was under commercial cover.

2. As indicated verbally on 24 June 1963, SAS will move the Subject out of the DODS area on 26 June. SAS has also requested suitable office or apartment space through the Office of Logistics from which the Subject will operate in the future. Until this property is acquired, the Subject will perform his duties from his home. Consequently, it is requested that immediate attention be given to providing the Subject with the necessary military cover. Refer any questions to G. A. LADNER, Jr., SAS/Security, ext. 5909.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, SAS

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SAS/Security

SAS/Security:GALadner:ftk - 25 June 1963

SECRET [illegible]

201-168881

19 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff
Room 1-B-24 Headquarters Building

SUBJECT : Request for Domestic Cover
Mr. Ross Lester Crozier

REFERENCE : Form 1322, forwarded to your Office,
14 May 1963

1. It is requested that this Office be advised as to the disposition of our request dated 14 May 1963 for providing Mr. Ross Lester Crozier appropriate Domestic Cover.

2. Since security requirements prohibit Mr. Crozier from being located in the Headquarters Building, he has been provided an office in the DODS Area. Subject needs "Cover" as soon as possible, for credit purposes, employment, etc.

3. Your prompt attention to this matter would be appreicated.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

cc: DODS

DDP/SAS/PERSONNEL/J. ALBERT HOESER/kct (19 June 63)

Distribution:
Orig + 1 - Addressee
1 - DODS
1 - SAS/Personnel

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

REQUEST FOR DOMESTIC COVER LIST ENTRY OR CHANGE

SUBMIT THIS FORM IN TRIPLICATE. ENCLOSED IN SEALED ENVELOPE

TO : **Central Cover Staff**
THROUGH:
SUBJECT: **Mr. Ross Lester Crozier** (True Nm.)
DATE: **14 May 1963**

ENTRY	CHANGE
Inclusion of subject on the Domestic Cover List is requested for the reason noted below. When notified that cover has been established, subject will be specifically authorized and instructed to conceal his Agency affiliation.	Subject is currently included on the Domestic Cover List. For the reason noted below, it is requested that ☐ this employee be removed from the Domestic Cover List. ☐ the following change be made:

REASON

Request subject be provided Military Cover (Army) while assigned in Headquarters Area for operational and credit purposes in performance of his duties with SAS.

Note: Subject was formerly under commercial cover at JMWAVE prior to January 1963.

COVER *(Complete only for new entries)*

TYPE COVER IN USE		
IF NO COVER IN USE	TYPE SUGGESTED *(Specify whether official or non-official)*	
	JUSTIFICATION, IF NON-OFFICIAL COVER SUGGESTED	

APPROVED BY CENTRAL COVER DIVISION	REQUESTING OFFICIAL
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE **ORVILLE C. DAWSON**
DATE	TITLE **Chief, SAS/Personnel**

201-168881

FORM 7-58 1322 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/P PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: CROZIER, Ross

AGE:
DOB: 20 June 1922

3 April 1963

STATION HQS.
AND DUTIES:

DD/P UNIT:

PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: CAREER AGENT

PRESENT GRADE: GS-12
PROPOSED GRADE: NA
CIA TRAINING:

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: NA
NA

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: NA
NA

EDUCATION:

Wife: Costa Rican citizen, DOB: 15 Mar 1913
Son : DOB: 4 Sept 1949 - U.S. Citizen
DAU : DOB: 24 June 1951 - U.S. Citizen

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Spanish (Fluent - writing/reading/speaking)

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, Tech Sgt. (1940-1945: Intelligence NCO) & (April 46 - Apr 49)
Leading man labor, $12.36 per day, US Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone; (Jan. 1946 - April 1946).

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
Contract and career agent since June 1949 - Intelligence assignments in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba; (Foreign Intelligence with some Psychological Warfare and Paramilitary) FI mission with Castro's forces in Sierr Maestra (April 58). Mexico City Jan 59 to May 1960; assigned to WH/4 PA-PROP from June 60 to Oct 61; Assigned PCS JMWAVE Oct 61 to Jan 1963. (Case Officer on student project involving propaganda and area intelligence collection & network operation; CO on press placement and press collection project).

RECOMMENDED BY:

CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

201-168851

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

X	TDY	☐ RECD	OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. SAS-473-63
	PCS		
	INVITATIONAL		

NAME: Mr. Ross L. Crozier

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.:

OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

OFFICE PHONE: 6576

GRADE: Career Agent

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

From Washington, D. C. to NYC for approximately three (3) days TDY and return.

MODE: Air tourist/ce
PURPOSE: Operational contacts

TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE			AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE	
BEGIN c/a	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN			
			MAXIMUM	OTHER (See below)	CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
19 Mar 63	22 Mar 63	$ 16.00				

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

☐ ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
☐ FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
☐ ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
☐ TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
☐ CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
☐ SHIPMENT ☐ NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
☐ SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED

ACCOMPANIED	UNACCOMPANIED
LBS. AND MODE	LBS. AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
X YES $100.00 ACCOUNTING DUE DATE
☐ NO

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: $100.00

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.: 473-63

CHARGE COST CENTER NO.: 3132-1000-1000

DATE: SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER:

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: VINCENT J. HEYMAN, Chief
COMPONENT: SAS/Support
SIGNATURE:
DATE:

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: DESMOND FITZGERALD, Chief
COMPONENT: SAS
SIGNATURE:
DATE:

FORM 8-59 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
MFG. 8-62

SECRET

March '63
201-168881

(20-40)

13 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division
Chief, Staff Agent Accounts Section

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Reassignment of Career Agent - Harold R. NOEMAYR

This is to advise you that Career Agent Harold R. NOEMAYR was reassigned PCS from JMWAVE to the Washington, D. C. area on 21 January 1963.

Howard J. Heyman
HOWARD J. [illegible]
Chief, SAS/Support

DDP/SAS/Personnel/John H. Martin/kct (13 Mar 63)

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - C/CPD
- 1 - SAS/Pers

201-168851

X

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	NRO	OCI
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

8-2

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF *

DATE-TIME GROUP
2100222

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
795395

CONF: LA 1,
INFO: FILE IP/AN

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 49
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SP
0 IP FILES # 111

TO: SANTO DOMINGO INFO LA/MIAMI.Y

EMUISE Y

* CS SUGGESTS ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO OPS/ITC.

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17047 (IN 793956)* Y

1. FOLLOWING ARE HQS TRACES ON SUBSOURCES REF INFO:

A. COL. ORLANDO PIEDRA NEGUERUELA {201-247879} DPOB: 18 DEC 17, SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BANOS, CUBA. WAS VERY CLOSE TO FULGENCIO BATISTA AND WAS CHIEF OF CUBAN NATIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION. ARRIVED IN U.S. 1959 FROM CUBA VIA THE DOM REP AFTER BATISTA OVERTHROWN. OVER YEARS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN WORKING FOR RETURN OF BATISTA TO POWER IN CUBA. LATEST INFO DATED APRIL 1970 REPORTED THAT HE WAS SOLICITING PRICES OF ARMAMENTS FOR NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT. PRESUME THAT HE MAY KNOW EMGARNET-1 BECAUSE OF THEIR SIMILAR PRE-CASTRO BACKGROUNDS.

B. FNU ALPIZAR POSSIBLY IDEN WITH EVELIO ALPIZAR PEREZ {201-264344} DPOB: 27 NOV 31, ARROYO ARENAS, HABANA, CUBA. EVELIO ALPIZAR WAS CUBAN AIR FORCE PILOT AND POSSIBLY A MEMBER OF THE SERVICIO DE INTELIGENCIA MILITAR {SIM} UNDER BATISTA. HE FLEW TO FLORIDA 1 JAN 59 AFTER BATISTA'S OVERTHROW AND WHILE IN U.S. HE WAS APPARENT

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-264344
DO NOT DESTROY

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012913

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

195395

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TARGET OF CUBAN DGI ATTEMPTS TO LURE HIM BACK TO CUBA. UFGW-371, 5 APRIL 61 REQUESTED ■■■■THAT HE BE WITHDRAWN FROM "PROGRAM" BASED ON CONTINUOUS TREATMENTS FOR NERVOUS DISORDER AND RECOGNIZED EMOTIONAL INSTABILITY. "PROGRAM" PROBABLY REFERS TO BKHERALD-ASSISTED FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO (FRD) WHICH HAD RECRUITED HIM. IN 1963 ALPIZAR REPORTED ON PLANS TO BOMB CUBAN OIL REFINERY TO FBI AND CUSTOMS. IN 1972 HE REPORTEDLY OWNER OF MIAMI AIR LEASING CORP. Y

2. BOTH PIEDRA AND ALPIZAR PEREZ ARE SUBJECTS OF EXTENSIVE FBI REPORTS AND INTERVIEWS AND BIT POSSIBLE THAT ALPIZAR MAY BE BUREAU CONTACT. REQUEST STATION APPROVAL FOR PASSAGE OF NAMES OF PIEDRA AND ALPIZAR TO FBI, NAMING THEM AS SOURCES OF REF INFO IN ORDER TO ASSIST FBI IN ANY INVESTIGATION THAT THEY MIGHT MAKE INTO ALLEGATIONS. Y

3. FILE: 22-4-120; 22-2-21/3; 200-9-35; 201-247879; 201-264344; 201-64137. E2, IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: INFORMATION PASSED BY EMFETCH-9 RE DOMINICAN AND PUERTO RICAN EXTREMISTS TRAINING IN PUERTO RICO.

FEB 4 76

DATE: 19 JANUARY 1976
ORIG: R. SPRAGUE/JP
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 1497

COORD: OPS/ITG
LA/COG

RICHARD S. SAMPSON
C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

FISHER AMES
C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2, IMPDET
CL BY: 012913

INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☒
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-241813
X-REF TO FILE NO. ______
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
~~DESTROY~~ ☐ ~~SIG.~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

46 SECRET

201-261813

ROUTING			
1	SR/CI(A)	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: SR 6
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, RI/AN, WH 7, RF 2

INDEXED AND CONTROL COPIES MATCHED

20 July 63

S E C R E T 200017Z

IN 83496

DIR CITE MEXI 5444

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

C/S COMMENT: *DID NOT DESIRE COLD STREET APPROACH TO BAKULIN

REF DIR 45798

SPOT

1. SINCE REF STATION HAS TRIED SPOT CANDIDATES FOR PLAUSIBLE ACCESS VALENTIN VASILYEVICH BAKULIN WHOSE OVERT ACTIVITY IS PRINCIPALLY THAT OF SUPPLYING PROPAGANDA FILMS TO INTERESTED LOCAL GROUPS.

2. SOURCE SEYMOUR D. TRINNICH, POSSIBLE ACCESS ASSET IS ARTURO CARRILLO ESPARZA DPOB 3 JULY 1940 MEXICO CITY. CARRILLO IS GRADUATE STUDENT UNAM FACULTY SCIENCES, COMPLETING DOCTORATE THEORETICAL PHYSICS, IS MEMBER OF COMMITTEE WHICH OPERATES CINE CLUB, APPEARS SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY RE FINANCING AND FILM PROCUREMENT. CLUB HAS GOTTEN FILMS IN PAST FROM SOVEMB. (REQUEST HQS TRACES AND INITIATION POA. HAVE NO LOCAL TRACES.)

3. REQUEST TRACES ALSO ON CARRILLO'S GIRL FRIEND CYNTHIA CHLEBICKI, U.S. NATIONAL, UNAM MASTER'S DEGREE STUDENT, GRADUATE OF UNIV ILLINOIS, HOME ADDRESS 11 EAST 151 ST, HARVEY, ILL. (NO MEXI TRACES.)

4. INDEX.

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPORT COVER SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

UFG-[illegible]

JMWAVE

23 January 1963

[illegible] KENNEDY [redacted]

[redacted]: [redacted]

[redacted] C/dar [redacted]

[redacted]

agency staff employee

COPY

[redacted]

ASSET

Source: Paras. 1-4: [redacted] from [redacted], former Panamanian Charge in Habana, presently in Miami who was approached by [redacted] of the Inter-American Affairs Commission. [redacted] works with [redacted], Panama employee; and it is said that the [redacted] [illegible] have been quite successful in shipping medicines to Cuba including shipments to prisoners in Cuban jails.

ASSET ASSET

Paras. 5 and 6: [redacted] on or about 20 September, [redacted] obtained the information because it was addressed to [redacted] of Miami, who is related to [redacted] who is a very good friend of [redacted].

ASSET

Also attached under cover of this report are the following items of information of potential interest:

a. Bulletin No. 2 of the National Medical Association in the Frente Interna Anti-Comunista fr [redacted] ASSET It is not known how [redacted] received this information. It is believed that this information dates to about June or July 1962.

asset

Attachments: H/W
Misc. Medical Info.

1 - Headquarters [illegible] & atts. h/w
1 - OO/C
1 - File

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

b. Copy of a letter signed by Cmdte Rene VALLEJO for the Executive Council of the National Institute of Surgery of the Ministry of Health, dated 6 June addressed to Regino BOTTI, President of JUCEPLAN requesting an approval for the expenditure of $20,000.00 for the purchase of raw color film from Czechoslovakia. This film to be used at the national Universities and in Cuban scientific institutions. Received from [redacted] ASSET about mid-July from an unidentified correspondent.

c. ASSET [redacted] debriefing of Antonio TOLEDO Zamora (A12 829 419) who was in the third year at the Medical School, University of Habana. Report dated 21 August.

d. Translation of a commentary by Virgilio PEAJO Nunez, leader of the Cuban medical class Habana on 18 August 1962. It was submitted in translated form by [redacted] ASSET on 26 August. Though this appears to be an interesting commentary there does not appear to be anything new or startling in the information.

e. Listing of medical and professional personnel in Habana which was received through the CRYPT [redacted] diplomatic pouch. Pouch turned over to CRYPT [redacted] for duplication. [redacted] ASSET provided translations. Envelope had return address Colegio Teresiano Calle 17 No. 1054 Vedado, Habana. Addressed to Eduardo ROCO, PO Box 1495. No WAVE traces ROCO. Source of this information is not known. It is believed that the names under this attachment should be indexed for the Field. No indication of meaning of A, C and B, but believe they stand for A- Anti-Communist, B- Neutral and C- Communist.

CROZIER, Ross L. 201-168881

SECRET

Vol. IV of V

OFFICIAL CS FILE

(June 1958 - Dec. 1960)

FORM 3-68 1505B

SECRET

130 ES/OBS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FILE No ~~201-32723~~ 201-168881

DATE : 02 JAN 59

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, COP, A/DD/P/P, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, PP 2, PP/PRD, PP/PYD 2, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ Not ☑
Signature: TCK

PRIORITY

IN 43348

TO DIR INFO MEXI SACU CITE HAVA 0796

AMUTTER

STATION TAKING ADVANTAGE OPPORTUNITY SEND NOEMAYR ON PLANE CHARTERED BY BOHEMIA AND TIME MAG TO CARRY JAY MALLIN AND CARLOS CASTANEDA TO SACU TO INTERVIEW FIDEL CASTRO AND POSSIBLY ACCOMPANY CASTRO PARTY WHEN IT COMES TO HAVANA. PLANE ETD HAVA 0600 JAN 2.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

UNCLASSIFIED
Z
RI/Files

ROUTING
R/FI

CS COPY

2 Jan 59
201-168881

FORM 4-55 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE ~~201-32725~~
201-168881

10) ER/DLD

DATE 01 JAN 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTIAGO DE CUBA

ACTION: WH 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING

1	✓	4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible]
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 43223

TO PRITY HAVA INFO DIR CITE SACU 317

RE: HAVA 0766 (IN 42971)*

AFFIRMATIVE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED IF SACU WAS IN POSITION TO ARRANGE VAIVADA ENTRY INTO REBEL TERRITORY AS IN PREVIOUS CASES. HQS WISHED TO SEND HIM ON MISSION SIMILAR TO THAT TAKEN LAST MARCH.

RI COPY

CS COPY

UNCLASSIFIED	
RI/	2
RI/	
RI/Files	

WG	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

2 Jan 59
201-168881

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 6-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. (35)

14-00000

201-168,881
~~201-[illegible]~~
[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

104/LB/JJW/LL/D
DATE : 01 JAN 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 6 MR. GRUNWELL, WH DIV. NOTIFIED 1730 1 JAN 59

INFO : S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature:

ROUTING

1	WH/[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 1 23 57 '59
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 43216

TO OPIM SACU INFO PRITY MEXI PRITY DIR CITE HAVA 0784

VIEW STRONG RUMORS FIDEL CASTRO COMING HAVA, CANCELLING NOEMAY DEPARTURE FOR SACU.

FOR HQS, MEXI: MEANTIME PLAN USE HIM LOCAL INTEL COLLECTION.

RELEASED 011850Z

END OF MSG

RI COPY

UNCLASSIFIED	
RI/AN	2
RI/[illegible]	
RI/Files	

[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	9
RI/TY	
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

CS COPY WH/3M

1 Jan 59
201-168,881

SECRET

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
4-58
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

FILE 201-3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 007 DB/DLD 01 JAN 59 Butler CU7

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 6 (MR. EVANS, WH ISSUED TO ~~CO~~ COPY 2330, 1 JAN)

INFO : S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature: Thomas A Cole

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 2 05 13:59

REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 43240

TO PRITY MEXI INFO DIR CITE HAVA 0790

PLS ADVISE WIFE NOEMAYR HE SAFE AND NO NEED WORRY. HE CONCERNED EXAGGERATED STORIES SUBMITTED BY WIRE SERVICES MAY UNDULY UPSET HER.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

DECLASSIFIED

Z

RI/Files

INITIAL

RI/TY

DESTROY

RI/FI

CS COPY

WH/3M

2 Jan 59

201-168881

SECRET

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-7302
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-32723
FROM : Chief, WHD	CS COPY	DATE 13 FEB 1959
SUBJECT O : Harold R. NOEMAYR/Cover Device		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED : See below		
REFERENCE(S)		

Cover Division has requested that the Station make a thorough assessment of Subject's notional cover in relation to its operational suitability and report to Headquarters on the strength or weakness of the arrangement, giving any recommendations deemed advisable to strengthen it. For guidance the Station may consider such factors as the security consideration involved and the ability of Subject to live his cover.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

6 February 1959

Distribution:
  3 - Mexico City
  1 - WH/Mailroom
  1 - WH/3/Mexico
  1 - RI

WH/3/Mexico/B.MERRELL:ngs

AB
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BZ~~
~~[illegible]~~ HZD
FI

~~201-32723~~
201-168881

CS COPY

201-168 881
X
HMMW 7302
DATE 13 FEB 59

RECEIVED
FEB 22 11 38 AM '59

201-168 881

~~201-32723~~

14-00000

201-168851
~~201-~~ [illegible]
[illegible]

407 DMCL/WS WS 3/DS 20.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3

SECRET

DATE : 31 DEC 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2 [illegible]

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑

ROUTING

1	WH/III/FIEX	4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 1 03 11:59
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 42971

TO PRITY SACU INFO DIR CITE HAVA 0766

RE: DIR 06245 (OUT 57838)*

1. SUBJECT REF ARRIVED HAVA EVENING 30 DEC.

2. FOR SACU: SUBJ IS VAIVADA. HQS WISHES SEND HIM TO FIDEL CASTRO TERRITORY ON MISSION SIMILAR TO THAT UNDERTAKEN LAST MARCH. IS SACU IN POSITION ARRANGE HIS ENTRY INTO REBEL TERRITORY AS IN PREVIOUS CASES? IF NOT HAVA PROBABLY CAN ARRANGE THROUGH 26 JULY CONTACTS HERE BUT PREFERS IT BE DONE THROUGH ESTABLISHED CHANNELS SACU IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

3. CABLE REPLY PRIORITY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ADVISED NOEMAYR ENROUTE HAVA CMA FLT 565 ETA 30 DEC.

RI

1 Jan 59

Z

RI/Filed

RI/AN
RI/TY
~~DESTROY~~
RI/FI

CS C[illegible]

WH/3M

S E C R E T

201-168881

FORM 4-58 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/~~RYBAT~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-7933
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. ~~201-32723~~
FROM : Chief, WHD		DATE AUG 4 1959
SUBJECT - Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED - Reply reference.		

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-7790, 19 June 1959

Please reply to referenced dispatch at your earliest convenience so WH Division can start making plans for Subject's future assignment.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

3 August 1959

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mexico/Rybat Chrono
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/E. I. SCALETTI:mpm

AN	97
AB	X
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~IX~~	
PRE	NFD
FD	

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-23

RECEIVED
11 AM '59

201-168 881
X
HMMW 7933
DATE 4 AUG 59

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29

CLASSIFICATION [illegible]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

Sent to RID/AN

23 Dec. 70

✓ HMMW-6430	10 June 58	201-168881
✓ HMMW-6481	19 June 58	201-168881
✓ HMMW-6448	17 June 58	201-168881
✓ DIR 29606	1 July 58	201-168881
✓ HMMW-6748	22 Aug. 58	201-168881
✓ HAVA-766	31 Dec. 58	201-168881
✓ HAVA-784	1 Jan. 59	201-168881
✓ HAVA-790	1 Jan. 59	201-168881
✓ HAVA-796	2 Jan. 59	201-168881
✓ SACU-317	1 Jan. 59	201-168881
✓ HMMW-7302	13 Feb. 59	201-168881
✓ HPSW-1730	15 June 59	201-168881
✓ HMMW-7790	19 June 59	201-168881
✓ HMMW-7933	4 Aug. 59	201-168881
✓ HMMA-13726	14 Sept. 59	201-168881
✓ HMMA-14169	27 Nov. 59	201-168881
✓ HMMA-14463	5 Feb. 60	201-168881
✓ HMMW-8499	16 Feb. 60	201-168881
✓ HMMA-14701	22 Mar. 60	201-168881
✓ HMMA-14661	8 April 60	201-168881

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief of Base, JMASH

INFO.

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT J[illegible]/Admin.
Administrative Matters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As Indicated

REFERENCES: (A) UFGT-135, dtd 29Oct60
(B) UFGT-150, dtd 4Nov60

1. Please advise Harold R. KOFFAIR that the hospitalization application forwarded via reference (A) is being processed, and the effective date of coverage is 27 November 1960.

2. Please advise Charles E. PARZON that his U. S. Savings Bonds will be retained in Headquarters pending his return. The Payroll Office handling PARZON's accounts has determined that this is a more secure method of making sure he receives them in person, rather than sending the bonds in care of the party indicated in reference (B).

3. Please advise IDEN A that as a result of the Proficiency Test he took while assigned locally, he obtained a Proficiency Score of 87. As the Minimum Proficiency Score for award of Proficiency Pay is 94, he is not eligible for the award of Proficiency Pay.

4. Forwarded under separate cover is another envelope containing copies of Travel Orders for personnel currently assigned JMASH and JMRIM.

5. Please advise Oliver H. CORBUSTON that the annual premium on his Specified Diseases policy is due 30 November 1960. The Family Plan for this policy is $10.00. Inasmuch as a grace period of one (1) month is granted, you may advise CORBUSTON to submit a check for the premium amount to Headquarters as soon as possible.

END OF MESSAGE

ENCLOSURES:
(A) IDEN A, u/s/c
(B) T/Os a/s par.4, u/s/c

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. + 2 - COB, JMASH, w/encls. a/s

1 - WH/4/Registry
1 - WH/4/Personnel

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 25 Nov. 1960

DATE DISPATCHED 1 DEC 1960

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGS - 127

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE WH/4/[illegible] OFFICER TYPIST EXT.

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL C/[illegible] Ops. DATE OFFICER'S NAME

201-167881

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL WH/4/Sup. DATE 25 Nov.60 OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. [illegible] (40)

WH

S-E-C-R-E-T

Mr. Harold R. Noemayr

Dear Mr. Noemayr:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, effective 1 June 1957.

Effective 26 November 1960, said contract is amended by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"Health Insurance. You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected ([redacted] (career agents) of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

S-E-C-R-E-T

26 Nov. 60
201-168881

file
201
Contracts

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 12 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MASH

ACTION : [illegible]

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

ROUTING

NOV 12 17[illegible]Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 41651

DIR CITE MASH 1597

1. MASH KUCAGE FACED WITH INCREASING ACTIVITIES IN STUDENT AND LABOR FIELDS; CONTINUATION AND PROGRESS AMRASP PROPCON ACTIVITIES AND INDEPENDENT OPS SUCH AS AMHOSE, AMPACA, TODD NEWSLETTER, CRUZADA FEMENINA CUBANA, PRENSA LIBRE, ETC; TRAINING, INFILT AND SUPPORT PROP TEAMS CUBA; DEVELOPMENT PROP ACTIVITIES WITH NEW POLITICAL ENTITIES E. G. ALIANZA, MRP PLUS ACTIVITIES IN LAWYER FIELD, BLACK OPS, PROP AIRDROPS CUBA, ETC.

2. IN ORDER BETTER EXPLOIT OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL EXTANT CURRENT OPS AND IN DEVELOPMENT NEW OPS PARA 1 ABOVE, MASH HAS NEED FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL. MASH KUCAGE SECTION COMPOSED GOUDEAUX, [illegible], CORBUSTON. THEIR DUTIES IN ADDITION HANDLING KUCAGE MATTERS INCLUDE LARGE VOLUME INTERNAL PAPERWORK AND ACCOUNTING, PLUS ASSISTANCE OTHER MASH OPS REQUIRING SPANISH LANGUAGE CAPABILITY.

NOEMAYR, HAROLD

3. REQUEST HQS CONSIDER IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT MASH MINIMUM ONE CASE OFFICER, WITH SOME EXPERIENCE AND WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF SPANISH. EXPECT HAVE SUBSEQUENT NEED FOR SECOND JUNIOR CASE OFFICER.

4. PM CASE OFFICER REQUIREMENTS TO BE SUBJECT SEPARATE CABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

12 Nov. 60
201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

☐ TDY
☐ PCS
☐ INVITATIONAL

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. WH-A-353-61
Amend No. 1

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.

NAME Harold R. Noemayr (P)

OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.

OFFICE PHONE

GRADE Contract

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Amended to authorize reimbursement $.10 per mile for auto allowance as more advantageous to the government.

Balance of order remains the same.

TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE			AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE	
BEGIN	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN		CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
		$	☐ MAXIMUM	☐ OTHER *(See below)*		$.10

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

☐ ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
☐ FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
☐ ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
☐ TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
☐ CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
☐ SHIPMENT ☐ NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
☐ SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED
ACCOMPANIED — LBS AND MODE
UNACCOMPANIED — LBS AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
☐ YES
☐ NO
ACCOUNTING DUE DATE

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO. WH-A-353-61
CHARGE COST CENTER NO. 1535-5000-0021
DATE 9 Nov
SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER Joseph F Baker
Joseph F. Baker

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
		14 Nov

REQUESTING OFFICIAL
TYPED NAME AND TITLE William E. Eisemann
COMPONENT C/WH/4/Support
SIGNATURE for
DATE 9 Nov

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL
TYPED NAME AND TITLE for Jacob D. Esterline
COMPONENT C/WH/4
SIGNATURE Jesse S. Douglas
DATE 9 Nov 60

FORM 8-60 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-167881

TRAVEL ORDER WORK ..EET

☐ TDY ☐ PCS ☐ INVITATIONAL		OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. Amend. 353
NAME Harold B Noemayr (P)		SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.
OFFICIAL STATION Wash.	OFFICE PHONE	GRADE Contract

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Amend to auth. reimbursement 10¢ per mile for auto. allowance as more advantageous to government.

Balance of order remains the same.

TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE			AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE	
BEGIN	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN		CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
		$	☐ MAXIMUM	☐ OTHER (See below)		

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED		
NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

☐ ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
☐ FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
☐ ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
☐ TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
☐ CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
☐ SHIPMENT ☐ NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
☐ SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED

ACCOMPANIED	UNACCOMPANIED
LBS AND MODE	LBS AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
☐ YES
☐ NO
ACCOUNTING DUE DATE

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.
CHARGE COST CENTER NO.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
	WH/4/Sec	11/3/6

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	COMPONENT
SIGNATURE	DATE 3 Nov 60

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	COMPONENT
SIGNATURE	DATE

FORM 3-60 540a

SECRET

PERFORMANCE REPORT
FOR CONTRACT PERSONNEL

TO : FD/C&TAB/SAAS
THROUGH: WH/B&F
FROM : WH/3/Mexico

INDIVIDUAL *(Pseudonym)*	PROJECT	PERIOD
Harold R. NOEMAYR	LIEDGE	30 Oct. - 27 Nov. 1960

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING METHOD OF PAYMENT

Deposit to bank account
on file in Finance Division

FACTORS AFFECTING AMOUNT DUE

LEAVE TAKEN DURING PERIOD *(If contract provides leave entitlement)*

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT FOR THE PERIOD INDICATED THIS INDIVIDUAL HAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT AND IS ENTITLED TO PAYMENT.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL
	Ned P. Holman, AC/WH/3

FORM 8-58 433 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (30)

201-168581

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E CR ET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. UFGT 135
TO Chief, WHD INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM Chief of Base, JMASH		DATE OCT 2 9 1960
SUBJECT JMNET/Admin/WSLUGGAGE Hospitalization Insurance, Harold R. NOEMAYR		RE: "43-3" – (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		
REFERENCE(S) UFGS-66		

Attached herewith is the hospitalization application on Harold R. NOEMAYR. Subject requests that premiums for this insurance be automatically deducted from his salary. We would appreciate being advised of subject's policy number and the effective date of the coverage.

Stanley M. Westrall

Attachment: Hospitalization Appl. ASA

27 October 1960

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters w/att
2 - Files w/o att.

Appl. to Ins
Br. 11/3/60 – po
Asked for policy
& date of coverage
advised per
UFGS-127

201-168591

UFGT 135

FORM 10-57 (40) 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

WH/3/MEXI

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Base, JMASH

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. It is requested that the attached application for Health Insurance be given to Harold R. NOEMAYR for completion. NOEMAYR may retain the covering memorandum which outlines his coverage. The completed forms should be returned to Headquarters for processing. The premiums will be deducted from NOEMAYR's salary. Headquarters will notify NOEMAYR when his policy is in effect.

2. Please explain to NOEMAYR that this plan covers basically two types of health insurance. 1: the normal hospitalization explained in paragraph 3 of the attachment which includes in- and out-patient care, surgery and maternity. The allowable expenses covered under this section are immediately reimbursable within the limits of the plan. 2: the major medical benefit plan described in paragraph 4 covers miscellaneous medical expenses not normally connected with hospitalization such as doctors' office visits, doctors' home visits, prescriptions, injections and medications given by doctors, X-rays and other laboratory work done in connection with diagnosis or treatment, etc. The insured pays up to $100 of such allowable expenses under this category for each member of his family. If expenses exceed this $100 for any person during the calendar year, then the policy will pay for 80% of their additional expenses. In connection with this phase of the plan, it is suggested that NOEMAYR be advised to have his family keep a detailed record of all medical expenses incurred by each member of the family.

3. NOEMAYR should be advised that under the hospitalization section of the plan, up to $75.00 can be reimbursed for surgical fees in connection with a tonsilectomy, whether the tonsilectomy is performed in a hospital or in the surgeon's offices.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - JMASH

DATE TYPED
Oct. 1960

DATE DISPATCHED
12 OCT 1960

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGS-66

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-168881

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 - Subj. 201
1 - WH/3/Mexi Chrono
1 - WH/4/Registry

ORIGINATING

OFFICE		TYPIST		EXT.
WH Mexico	CZehrung	nra	C/WH/3/Mexi	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/4/S		~~[illegible]~~ Thorpe

201-168881

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		for J. C. King

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-6481

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-32723

19 JUN 1958

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Harold R. HOSMAYR

ACTION REQUESTED: Sign and Return Contract

Forwarded herewith is an original and three copies of an amendment to Subject's contract. Please have Subject sign these copies and have them properly witnessed and signed by the Chief of Station as contracting officer. Please return all but one copy to Headquarters.

COPY

R N Dahlgren
J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

16 June 1958

Attachment:
As described above.

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono
~~1~~ - RI

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mpm

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

for J. C. KING, C/WHD

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

19 JUN 58

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881
~~201-32723~~

FORM NO. JUN 1949 51-29

14-00000

SECRET

PERFORMANCE REPORT
FOR CONTRACT PERSONNEL

TO : FB/CA.TAB/SAAS

THROUGH: WH/B&F

FROM : WH/3/Mexico

INDIVIDUAL (Pseudonym)	PROJECT	PERIOD
Harold R. NOEMAYR	LIEDGE	2 Oct. - 29 Oct. 1960

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING METHOD OF PAYMENT

Deposit to bank account
on file in Finance Division

FACTORS AFFECTING AMOUNT DUE

LEAVE TAKEN DURING PERIOD (If contract provides leave entitlement)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT FOR THE PERIOD INDICATED THIS INDIVIDUAL HAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT AND IS ENTITLED TO PAYMENT.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL
	Ned P. Holman, AC/WH/3

FORM 8-58 433 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

201-168881

(30)

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER WORK SHEET

☐ TDY
☐ PCS
☐ INVITATIONAL
EOD

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. 353

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.

NAME Harold B R ~~N~~ Noemayer (P)

GRADE Career Agent

OFFICIAL STATION

OFFICE PHONE

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Wash. to Area II A for TDY and return.
Travel: POV
Purpose: to assist Kent in Propaganda workshop.

TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE					AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE	
BEGIN	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN				CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
			☐	MAXIMUM	☐	OTHER (See below)		
1 Sept.	31 Jan 61	$					10¢	

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

Auth. reimbursement auto expense for operational use.

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED		
NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

☐ ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
☐ FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
☐ ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
☐ TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
☐ CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
☐ SHIPMENT
☐ NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
☐ SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED
ACCOMPANIED LBS AND MODE
UNACCOMPANIED LBS AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
[✓ YES] $500
☐ NO
ACCOUNTING DUE DATE

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL FY 61 — $750

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.
CHARGE COST CENTER NO.
DATE
SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
Hinkle, XO (Phone)		
D F Miller	SO/WH/4	9/2/60

REQUESTING OFFICIAL
TYPED NAME AND TITLE
COMPONENT
SIGNATURE Phillips (Phone)
DATE

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL
TYPED NAME AND TITLE
COMPONENT
SIGNATURE
DATE

FORM 540a
(10-60)

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

☒ TDY
☐ PCS
☐ INVITATIONAL

EOD

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. WH-A-353-61

NAME: Harold R. Noemayer (P)

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.

OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

OFFICE PHONE:

GRADE: Career Agent

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Washington, D. C. to Area IIa for TDY and return.

MODE: POV
PURPOSE: Operational Mission

TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE			AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE			
BEGIN	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN					
			MAXIMUM	OTHER *(See below)*		CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER		CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOVT.
1 Sept.	31 Jan 61	$			10¢			

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

Authorized reimbursement auto expense for operational use.

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

☐ ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
☐ FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
☐ ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
☐ TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
☐ CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
☐ SHIPMENT ☐ NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
☐ SHIPMENT PCA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED

ACCOMPANIED	UNACCOMPANIED
LBS AND MODE	LBS AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
☒ YES $500
☐ NO
ACCOUNTING DUE DATE

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: FY 61 - $750

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO. WH-A-353-61

CHARGE COST CENTER NO. 1535-5000-0021

DATE: 7 Sept.
SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER: Michael J. King

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
	OCS	20 Sept

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: William E. Eisemann
COMPONENT: C/WH/4/Support
SIGNATURE: E. E. Schmidt for
DATE: 8 Sept

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Jacob D. Esterline
COMPONENT: C/WH/4
SIGNATURE: Jacob D. Esterline
DATE: 7 Sept. 60

FORM 3-59 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-168881 (20-40)

642

ORIG : JAMES A. PEARSON
UNIT : WH/4/PERSONNEL
EXT : 8717
DATE : 1 SEPTEMBER 1960

642

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

P 1 22 31 '60
C/S CABLE SEC'

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	
	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO : JMASH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 7

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

OUT65049
OUT 65049

TO MASH PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 48514

48514

JMHET ADMIN

Noemayer

[redacted], CAREER AGENT, TO ASSIST MR. KENT DEPARTING VIA POT 1 SEPTEMBER TDY. ETA 3 OR 4 SEPTEMBER. WILL PHONE MR. KENT OR MR. CHELLINO.

END OF MESSAGE

Believe Subj. file should be kept in Pseudo Herb

DC/WH/4 E. Hinkle (Phone)
C/WH/3 J. Hync (Phone)
C/WH/4/PROP M. Maney (Phone)

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
C/WH/4/SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Herbert V. Juul
HERBERT V. JUUL
C/WH/4/PERSONNEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

4

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

From CCD:

[illegible]

NAME:	[redacted]
AGE:	38
ADDRESS:	Route #1 Longmont, Colorado
EMPLOYED:	Clarence A. DePew & Sons since September 6, 1960
SALARY:	$600 per month
OCCUPATION:	Research Specialist

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

20 JUL 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division
ATTENTION : Miss Charlotte Zehrung
FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : S-8760
#215483

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 22 April 1960 wherein you requested a covert security approval to cover the possibility that Subject may learn of details of her brother-in-law's work for this Agency. It is understood the Subject resides with her brother-in-law and his wife, and although she is aware he does confidential work for the U.S. Government, she is not witting of his Agency connections. It is also understood that no direct revelation of the Subject's brother-in-law's work for this Agency is intended.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. A memorandum containing pertinent information regarding Subject is being forwarded to CI/OA this date. CI/OA should be contacted and this information reviewed prior to any utilization of Subject.

4. Subjects of covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

6. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Louis W. Vasaly
for Fred H. Hall

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH Division
ATT'N : Miss Charlotte Zehrung

DATE: 20 JUL 1960

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT: S-9546
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 12 April 1960 wherein an amended covert security approval was requested to permit the PCS of Subject, a career agent, from Mexico to Headquarters and specifically, to permit his utilization in translating documents pertaining to Cuban matters from Spanish to English and English to Spanish. The Subject will also assist the Division by making suggestions for PP and FI purposes. It is understood that Subject will work under a cover established for him by CSD/HC and that he will have no access to official Agency buildings or installations. It is further understood that he will not engage in clandestine operational activities in the USA.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. A memorandum containing pertinent information regarding Subject is being forwarded to CI/OA this date. CI/OA should be contacted and this information reviewed prior to any utilization of Subject.

4. Subjects of covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

6. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Louis V. Vasaly
for Fred H. Hall

SECRET

201-168771

14-00000

C-82713 (S-8644) Arge ina Cordero de CROZIER

RI Trace, non-derog.

CL #100169, 22 April 1960.

CSA req'd 22 April 1960. Acknowledged by CI/OA 27 April 1960.

Acknowledged by OS/SSD, 6 May 1960. (S # 8644)

CSA granted 20 July 1960

201-168881

C-82712 (S-8760) Consuelo Felicia CORDERO-Calderon

RI Trace, No record.

GL #100170, 22 April 1960.

CSA req'd 22 April 1960. Acknowledged by CI/OA 27 April 1960.

Acknowledged by OS/SSD, 13 May 1960. (S #8760)

CSA granted 20 July 1960

201-168881

13 July 1960

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Harold R. Noemayr Assistance
to WH/4/CA Effort

1. Harold R. Noemayr has been working full time for WH/4/Prop and WH/4/PA since early June 1960. He has translated important propaganda or political action manuscripts into Spanish and from Spanish into English. He has proofread materials to be sent to the station. He has offered suggestions on operational possibilities and reviewed critically a great deal of propaganda material under preparation by WH/4.

2. Mr. Noemayr's work has been of the highest quality and has been of inestimable value to WH/4.

3. It is hoped that he will be able to continue in his advisory and support capacity, especially to our propaganda effort.

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/4/Prop

Noemayr 201

13 July 60

201-168881

SECRET

Secret

Finance Division

WH/B&F

WH/3/Mexico

Harold R. HOFMAYR

LIEDGE
Mexico

10 Jul - 6 Aug 1960

Cash

file:
NOEMHYR
201

N. P. Holman, AC/WH/3

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 22 April 1969

TO:
☐ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: WHD

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Argentina CORDERO de CROZIER

PROJECT: LIEDGE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
X	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE:

FULL DETAILS OF USE:

Subject will not be used operationally. She is the wife of Harold R. NOEMAYR (C-25507), a Career Agent. By virtue of this relationship she necessarily becomes exposed to some operational activity of her husband. She knows he is engaged in intelligence work for KUBARK. She knows he meets agents and has spoken to them on the phone, but does not know their names. She knows his activities are targeted against Communists.

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☐ YES	☐ NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X YES	☐ NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION:

Any investigation of Subject should reveal in no way Government interest. Subject's husband is under sensitive deep cover.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I. OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL not BE FORWARDED unless requested
☐	PRQ II. OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED. NO: 100169

FIELD TRACES Costa Rica

☐	NO RECORD	X	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)* no traces former husband

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

X	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
C.Zehrung, WH/3/Mexico	3162	H.P.Holman, AC/WH/3

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-166871

(9)

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* Argentina	*(Middle)* I.	*(Last)* CROZIER	*(Nee)* Cordero-Calderon

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)* Argentina Iris de Los Angeles Cordero-Calderon

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

5. DATE OF BIRTH 15 March 1918 (also reported 1915)

6. PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)*

None known

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

9a. SEX M ☐ ☒ F	9b. AGE 42	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT FT. 5 IN. 1	9e. WEIGHT 127	9f. COMPLEXION olive	9g. FACE *(Shape)*
9h. COLOR OF HAIR dark brown (dyed blond)	9i. COLOR OF EYES brown	9j. TEETH		9k. BUILD med heavy	9l. POSTURE	

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Scar on left cheek and jaw visible only on examination.

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE Good

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES None

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

SECTION II

CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Costa Rican

2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1.)*

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*
Presidential Gardens, Alexandria, Virginia

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 3.)*
San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*
Has traveled with husband throughout Latin America. Prior to marriage she had traveled in Panama where she worked.

SECTION III

OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION
Housewife

2. TITLE

3. SALARY *(Per annum)*

4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V

EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE RECEIVED
Vernice Coiffure Design Inst. Havana, Cuba	Beauty Operator	August 1957	February 1958	

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE *(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)*	COMPETENCE: READ YES	READ NO	WRITE YES	WRITE NO	SPEAK YES	SPEAK NO	UNDERSTAND YES	UNDERSTAND NO
Spanish - native	X		X		X		X	
English	X		X		X		X	

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES. ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

None

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
1	December 1945-present	housewife					
2	Early 1945-December 1945	Cafe & Bar	Colon, Rep de Panama	Cashier	129	mo	marriage
3	1944	Post Exchange	Fort Gulick, Canal Zone	Soda Fountain	75	mo	higher salary
4	1944	Post Exchange	Fort Sherman, Canal Zone	Soda Fountain	75	mo	Labor problems
5	1942	U.S. Army	Fort Randolph, Canal Zone	Soda Fountain	75	mo	

SECTION IX

MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☒ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

Pedro CAMPO-Marzal, married sometime in 1935 in San Jose, Costa Rica. Date and Place of birth are unknown, believe Spain; has held Spanish and German passports. Now residing in Mexico City. Divorced in 1940 in San Jose, Costa Rica for incompatibility.

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE	(First) Ross	(Middle) Lester	(Nee)	(Last) CROZIER

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE 17 December 1945	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE Cristobal, Canal Zone
6. DATE OF BIRTH 20 June 1922	7. PLACE OF BIRTH De Kalb, Illinois
8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH U.S.A.	9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS None

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)
Presidential Gardens, Alexandria, Virginia

SECTION X

CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Ross Arnulfo	X		1949		U.S.
Lillian Caridad		X	1951		U.S.

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI

FATHER

1. FULL NAME Alberto CORDERO-LOAIZA	2. YEAR OF BIRTH 1897	3. PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Costa Rican
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION shoemaker	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE deceased - 1942	

SECTION XII

MOTHER

1. FULL NAME Dora CALDERON-MARTINEZ	2. YEAR OF BIRTH 1899	3. PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Costa Rican
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION housewife	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE deceased - 1956	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Federico CORDERO-CALDERON	X		1914	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rican
Franklin CORDERO-CALDERON	X		1916	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rican (deceased
Antonio CORDERO-CALDERON	X		1919	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rican (XXXXXXX)
Gladys CORDERO-de CAMPO		X	1921	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rican (deceased)
Mario CORDERO-CALDERON	X		1923	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rican

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

Consuelo CORDERO-CALDERON		X	1925	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rican
Isabel de NARANJO		X	1929	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rican
Azdruval CORDERO-CALDERON	X		1932	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rican
Norma CORDERO-CALDERON		X	1932	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rican

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Husband - Ross L. CROZIER - CIA (Career Agent)

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

2 sisters - Consuelo CORDERO-CALDERON - sister (live together)
Norma CORDERO-CALDERON (husband's name unknown) - sister (residing
at 160 Main Street, Quincy Pt., Mass.

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

Norma may have U.S. citizenship.- She has applied.

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION *(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)*	DATE 22 April 1962
TO: ☐ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division ☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security	FROM: WHD
SUBJECT: *(True name)* Consuelo Felicia CORDERO-Calderon	PROJECT LIBDGE
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES	CI/OA FILE NO. RI 201 FILE NO. SO FILE NO.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
X	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

FULL DETAILS OF USE

Subject is residing with Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps), Career Agent, her brother-in-law. Because of this she might find out some details of NOEMAYR's real job. She does not know he is working for KUBARK, but she does know he works for ODYOKE in a confidential capacity. NOEMAYR said she has neither an awareness nor an interest in politics. No RI traces on her husband Arthur Burgett. Without more bio-data, it was impossible to trace Bill Parker.

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☐	YES	X	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☐	YES	X	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION

No investigation should indicate U.S. Government interest. NOEMAYR is under sensitive deep cover.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

PRO AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRO I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	X	PRO II WILL ~~BE FORWARDED~~ not be forwarded
☐	PRO II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED. NO: 100170

FIELD TRACES Costa Rica

X	NO RECORD	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

X	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

X	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
C. Zehrung, WH/3/Mexico	3162	N. P. Holman, AC/WH/3

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-161171

(9)

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRO NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First)	(Middle)	(Last)	(Nee)
Consuelo	Felicia		CORDERO-CALDERON

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 July 1925

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: San Jose, Costa Rica

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

None

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)

None

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

9a. SEX	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION	9g. FACE (Shape)
M ☐ F ☒	35	30	FT. 5 IN. 5	130	light	oval

9h. COLOR OF HAIR	9i. COLOR OF EYES	9j. TEETH	9k. BUILD	9l. POSTURE
brown	blue		slender	good

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE: attractive and neat

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES: none

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES: none

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS IF OBTAINABLE

14-00000

SECTION II	CITIZENSHIP
1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican	2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (*If different than Item 1.*) Costa Rican - no subsequent

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant*)
Presidential Gardens, Alexandria, Virginia

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*If different than Item 3.*)
San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Countries, dates and purposes*)
Panama in 1943 to visit sister Argentina and again in 1944 and 1945. To the U.S. (Port of Entry Norfolk, Virginia) in 1947 with husband Arthur Burgett to live in Ohio and Wisconsin. To Guatemala in February 1954 to visit Argentina for two months. To Cuba in 1955 and 1958 (July) to visit sister Argentina to U.S. on 14 April 1958 to visit

SECTION III	OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA	
1. PRESENT OCCUPATION Beautician	2. TITLE	3. SALARY (*Per annum*)

4. FINANCIAL STATUS (*Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property*)
Not known - not believed to have any assets

SECTION IV	ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Catholic

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
None

SECTION V	EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Gregg Shorthand School San Jose, Costa Rica		1950	1952	Graduated

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(*List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.*)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish (native)								
English	X		X		X		X	

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

None

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

None

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
NA					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
1	1957-present (see attached)						
2	1953 - 1957	Bordallo Beauty Parlor	San Jose, Costa Rica	beautician	65	mo	came to U.S.A.
3	1947 - 1949	Gina's Cocktail Lounge	Panama City	cashier	85	mo	departed for Costa Rica
4	1945 - 1946	Kresch Cafe & Bar	Colon, Republic of Panama	cashier	110	mo	married and departed for U.S.
5	1942 - 1944	Post Exchange	Fort Randolph, Fort Sherman, Canal Zone	Soda fountain	75	mo	left with sister

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☒ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

Married Arthur Burgett, U.S. citizen, U.S. Navy, at Cristobal, Canal Zone, in March 1946. Divorced in 1947.

Married William Parker, U.S. citizen, Canal Zone employee, early 1950 in Panama City. Divorced early 1951.

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*
see above

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE see above	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE see above
6. DATE OF BIRTH not known	7. PLACE OF BIRTH not known
8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH U.S.A.	9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS none

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*
not known

SECTION X CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
none					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI FATHER

1. FULL NAME Alberto CORDERO Loaiza	2. YEAR OF BIRTH 1897	3. PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Costa Rican
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS none	6. OCCUPATION shoemaker	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE deceased 10 October 1942	

SECTION XII MOTHER

1. FULL NAME Dora CALDERON-Martinez	2. YEAR OF BIRTH 1899	3. PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Costa Rican
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS none	6. OCCUPATION housewife	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE deceased 29 September 1956	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Federico CORDERO Calderon	X		1914	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rica
Franklin CORDERO-Calderon	X		1916	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rica (deceased)
Antonio CORDERO-Calderon	X		1919	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rica
Gladys DORDERO-de CAMPO		X	1921	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rica (deceased)
Argentina CORDERO-Calderon		X	1918	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rica

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

Mario CORDERO-Calderon	X		1923	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rica
Isabel CORDERO de NARANJO		X	1929	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rica
Azdruval CORDERO-Calderon	X		1931	San Jose, Costa Rica	CostaRRica
* Norma CORDERO de GREGOR		X	1932	San Jose, Costa Rica	Costa Rica

*may be naturalized U.S. citizen - residing at 160 Main St., Quincy Pt. Mass.

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

None

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

sisters - see Section XIII

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

see Section XIII

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE
April 1960	

SECRET

CONTINUATION SHEET

Section II

#6 - sister Argentina. (B-2 visa issued at San Jose, Costa Rica, No. V 2056 500 issued on 3 April 1957, Port of Entry, Miami, Florida).

Section VIII

Dates	Employer	Address
1957	Manicurist Salon BORDALLO	San Jose, Costa Rica
1957	Unemployed	Havana, Cuba
1957-1958	Salon BORDALLO	San Jose, Costa Rica
1958	Unemployed	160 Main St., Quincy, Mass.
1958	Salon MODERNO	Mexico City, Mexico
1958-1959	Unemployed	180 Main St., Quincy, Mass.
1959-1960	Student at Wilfred Academy; Glamour Cut; Ciro's Coffiure; Jacques Beauty Salon.	New York, New York Bronx, New York New York City New York City
1960-present	Temporarily unemployed	226 Burgess Ave., Alexandria, Virginia

* The dates were taken from passport travel.

SECRET

14-00000

April 15, 1960

TO: Central Cover Division, Notional Cover

Attention: Mr. Dick Biladeau

Subject: Harold R. NOEMAYR (p)

Attached is a review made by NOEMAYR of the notional cover provided by your office in 1957. You will note that NOEMAYR included some operational information in the report so you will be better able to assess his cover. In view of the sensitive information contained in the attachment it is requested that it receive special handling.

John G. Heyn
Chief, WH/3/Mexico

201-168881

A RESUME OF THE USE OF A "NOTIONAL COVER" EMPLOYMENT

Harold R. Noemayr

10 April 1960

1. The following "notional cover firm" was established in April 1957 and backstopped mail-cable-telephone checks:

    Public Surveys Institute
    General Polling Service
    RIverside 1-3674

    532 Fidelity Union Life Bldg
    1511 Bryan Street
    Dallas, Texas

    A few hundred business cards were printed up both in Washington and locally in Havana, Cuba for my use. It was agreed that stationary would be printed up and some correspondence should be initiated from Havana. The business cards were first used in May 1957 in Havana; renting an apartment, purchasing furniture, automobile, and among friends and acquaintances. It was later used as a developmental recruitment approach with known communists in Havana - details set forth with each case reviewed here.

2. Generally, it is believed that this cover held up well with Latinamerican in Cuba, Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama. It was received with some curiousity by some Americans living abroad in these countries, and was often questio "Well, what do you do?" Actually, university background in economics made it possible for me to answer and converse professionally, and only difficulties ever encountered with with two persons who were in a position to appeal to my firm for services. This, of course, made it obvious that I had to be prepared at all times to actually render some service or presen a valid technical reason for not being able to do so. To my knowledge, this cover firm has never been compromised as such, and it has only been seriously challenged on one occasion. This was a newsman in the Sierra Maestra in Cuba and will be set forth in detail.

3. It would be impossible, of course, to remember and record every"brushing" acquantance that has been given this business card. But the well known and more important ones are listed for Cuba as follows:

Bernardo ALAEZ : Calle 64 No. 908 Ap. 2 Almendares, La Habana, Cuba	Spanish Cuban, about 50 years old, a former "Prio man" (Carlos PRIO Socarras). Was a police Lieutenant and anti-communist strongarm man. Also worked for the Military Attache (US) in Havana. Was recommended for recruitment as a spotter in 1955, but not favorably received because "new blood" was sought.
Angel BOAN Acosta: Present address unk.	Met in Guatemala in February 1954. Cuban exile. BOAN was a news and radio announcer in Guatemala not a communist, but enjoying entre`e with them Was later encountered in Havana in 1956 and in 1957, employed by our station as one the AMPHODARCH project. He was later terminated and now believed to have been re-activated in Havana

4. On 11 March 1958 I went into the Sierra Maestra mountain range of Santiago, Oriente Province, on an assignment as observer with the Fidel CASTRO Ruz revolutionary movement. CASTRO "cleared" me for this assignment and was given my business card. It was also considered operationally advantageous to "drop a hint" to CASTRO from another direction as to my true mission. During the period 11 March - 1 April 1958, the following persons were either given a business card or informed of the cover firm:

Fidel CASTRO Ruz	Commander, 26 July Revolutionary
Ernesto (Che) GUEVARA S.	2nd in Command, Commander 4th Supply Column.
Rene RODRIGUEZ Cruz	Adjutant and Chief of Sabotage in Havana
Celia SANCHEZ Manduley	Staff Secretary
Haydee SANTAMARIA Cuadrado	Staff Liaison
Ramiro VALDEZ Menendez	2nd in Command, 4th Column

Civilian Components:

Sra. Herminia de GRECO Tel. Santiago 2424	Civilian Coordinator and Secretary of Finances in Santiggo
Felipe CORRALES	Owner of the estate and sanatorium "San Juan Bautista" located about 10 to 15 miles SSE of Manzanillo, Oriente. CORRALES was high-level official in Manzanillo sector and managed a clandestine supply-personnel route to Sierra Maestra.
Ramon FAJARDO	Owner of the Finca, La Candelaria and the bodega El Toro, camino de Estrada Palma. About 30 miles SE of Manzanillo.

Newspapermen:

Andrew St. George 104 Pearsall Drive, Mt Vernon, N.Y.	Time-Life photographer and free-lancer. St. George made several trips of considerable duration into the Sierra and in addition to his journalism, was debriefed by our organisation and the State Department. He was a very shrewd photographer and an observing person. We became very close during those weeks and he eventually drew me aside and told me that he wanted to bring me in contact with some friends of his in Washington who would like to talk to me concerning the military and intelligence aspects of CASTRO's movement. While I do not think that he strongly doubted my cover firm, he seemed to recognise my approach as more for military intelligence than journalism or economics.

Charles SCHUMAN 348 East 19th St., New York City Tel. Oregon 4-7360	United Press International. This was his trip into the Sierra and he was very green for camp life and had no knowledge of Spanish or their history. It was a simple matter to give him a hand in everything and become his interpreter during the entire assignment. This gave me a lot of access persons and information that I would normally have to struggle for - but eventually, him being a veteran newsman - he recognised my approach as something more than journalism. He put it in a few words, saying that I was entirely too thorough - too many field trips, too many technical photographs, etc. He came out and asked if I did belong to my true organization. It became necessary to become very convincing here; and I think that I did eventually allay his susicions.

5. On December 29, 1958, I returned to Havana for a second assignment in the Sierra Maestra which was interrupted by the fall of the BATISTA regime. During a period of three weeks, the following persons were given the business card:

George KAPPES George Michael KAPPES (Micky) Calle k, No 58 Ap 5, Vedado La Habana, Cuba Home Address: 2530 Woodhull Ave. Bronx 69, N.Y.	KAPPES is now employed with Harry Wassel & Associates in Havana - he was then in Havana in the employ of Fidel CASTRO as an Underwater demolition expert and was in the process of sabotaging the Cuban destroyer "Jose Marti". He had lost his contact with the movement and did not speak Spanish - I helped him make contact and remove the explosives - he remained in Havana. (This has been reported complete with photographs.)
Don Soldini 120 Laconia Ave, Statten Is., N Y.	U.S. volunteer rifleman with Fidel CASTRO. Present whereabouts unknown
Jay Mallen Life Magazine, Havana Tel. F- 6579	

Charles Schuman and Andrew St. George were also met again on this trip.

6. In Mexico City, from 7 June 1958 to 12 March 1960, the cover employment was used from renting houses and apartment, schools, purchase of automobile, and with general acquaintances:

Agustin RIVERA Torres, 703 Martin Mendalde, Colonia del Valle, Mexico 12, D.F.	Owner and rentor of the addressgiven.

Arrow Apartments, Inc. 157 Chihuahua St. Mexico 7, D.F.	Apartment hotel.
Modern American School, 1141 Nicolas San Juan, Mexico 12, D.F.	Tel. 23-99-34
Rodolfo FARIAS Ferrer Cerrado Monico Neck No. 12 2nd Colonia del Periodista, Mexico 13, D.F.	Acquaintances.
Alfredo LEDESMA Gabriel Mancera No. 1234 Ap 403 Colonia del Valle, Mexico 12, D.F.	Acquaintances.
(Fnu) LOPEZ Autos Reforma, S.A. Ramon Guzman No. 58 Home Tel. 11-53-18	Acquaintance & "coyote" - processed my first drivers license for me.

7. In connection with my automobile accident on 13 December 1959, the business card was given to a (Fnu) DURAN, legal inspector for the Union de Seguros (Insurance company) and Angel GANDARA, owner of the other vehicle involved. (Addr: Sitio Bolivar, Calle de las Casas, Cuernavaca, Mexico.) The card was also given to the garage, Taller de Mecanico Versalles, on Calle Versalles 46, Mexico City.

8. In Alexandria, Virginia, since arrival on 12 March 1960, the business card was used for identification with the following persons or institutions:

Presidential Gardens, Inc. Mt. Vernon Ave., Alexandria, Va.	Temporary quarters.
Patman W. Byers, 226 Burgess Ave.	Rentor of the address cited.
Old Dominion Bank, Lee Highway Branch No. 4707 Jackson 7-9200	Bank officer Julian E. Keck For opening check account and credit references.
Bob Andrews Repr. AAA 312 S. Washington St. Alexandria, Va.	For joining AAA and insuring car.
Mr. L.R. Porter Buckington Furniture Co. 315 North Glebe Rd.	For purchasing furniture.

9. Finally, the following persons are friends and relatives that at different times have been given a business card or informed of it:

Mr. & Mrs. L.E. Crosier Longmont RR #1 Box 243 Colorado. Tel: Meade 2424	Parents
Alicia C. de Cruz 3321 Roland Drive, Santa Cruz, Calif.	Friend of the family
Jose A. Chacon P.O. Box 469, San Jose, Costa Rica	Friend of the family
Arthur Gregor, 160 Main Street, Quincy 69, Mass.	Brother-in-law
Mrs. Norma Gregor, 160 Main Street, Quincy 69, MAss	Sister-in-law
Grant Heitsig Calle 3a No. 9609 Miramar, La Habana, Cuba	Acquaintance.
Guillermo Loaiza, 550 Riverside Drive, New York 27, N.Y.	Wife's cousin
Fernando NARANJO A. P.O. Box 3881, San Jose, Costa Rica	Brother-in-law
Isabel NARANJO P.O. Box 3881, San Jose, Costa Rica	Sister-in-law
Tony Portilla, 3907 Bruce St. (Formerly) Alexandria, VA.	Acquaintance
Bernardo Wolf P.O. Box 1656 San Jose, Costa Rica	Acquaintance
Mr. Francis Williams, 16 Kendig Rd, Hickory Hills RR #1 New Carlisle, Ohio	Old Friend

Guy Shirflet: 1001 Coleman St., Charlottesville, Va. Tel. 2-4302	U.S., Virginian, worked as a loom technician in Cuba from 1954 to 1958. Guy is a fishing and family friend. No political interests in Cuba or U S.
Orestes PADILLA Miramar. B-5440 Office M-9721	Cuban, Lawyer. Active leader of the 26 July Revolutionary Movement in Havana. Was given to me as useful contact and potential spotter. Worked about 4 months in 1957 and assisted in setting up escape route for him - rather, one of his leaders - thru the Costa Rican Ambassador and the Brazilian embassy.
Roberto PUENTE Blanco Tel. U-3857 and U-3231 Federacion Estudiantil Universitario (FEU). And mother, Pilar BLANCO, Tel. I-9366.	Both are AMPHODARCHS and are currently leaders in the Directorio Revolucionario (DR). I also met the brother Pedro PUENTE Blanco in Miami - he is currently an official in the FEU.
Alberto RUBIERA Translator on Bohemia magazine.	Cuban, about 28-30 years old, was secretary of organization (?) in the Juventud Popular Socialista (JSP) in Havana. The cover firm was utilised during a lengthy developmental approach. He originally engaged as my translator for a short story of mine which was published 9 Sept 1957 issue of Bohemia. He was eventually approached on the possibility of working for a local survey on "economic" aspects of "labor supply" in Cuba. He resisted all approaches. He was later arrested by the Buro de Repression de Actividades Comunistas (BRAC) and interrogated. During body search, my PSI business card turned up - he told the simple truth about our relationship and to our knowledge nothing ever came of the incident. (This was learned through our liaison contacts with Cuban BRAC.)
Juan BRADMAN CMQ - TV, Havana	White, Cuban, originally from Guantanamo, Cuba. Employed as small parts actor on CMQ TV and was strongly indicated as high level intellectual crypto-communist. Travelled behind curtain once. I cultivated BRADMAN over long period and eventually used the "survey" pitch. He refused because the Cuban Buro de Investigacion had his residence under surveillance and were questioning or searching his quarters regularly.

15 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: FD/HAAS

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOZMAYR (ps)
Career Agent

1. Harold R. NOZMAYR left Mexico City on 12 March 1960 for PCS assignment at Headquarters. He arrived in Washington, D.C. on 12 March.

2. It is requested that NOZMAYR's complete salary be deposited to his bank account.

R.M. Dahlgren, C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Addressee
1 - WH/B&F
1 - Mexi chrono
1 - Subject

Lidge

201-168881

14-00000

449 DMCL/SE/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 10 MAR 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2 (MR HEYN, WH DIV NOTIFIED 2150 10 MAR 60)

INFO : COP, C/CCD 2, C/CI, S/C 2

MAR 11 0209Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 11770

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 5269

EV 323435 9:15

RE MEXI 5261 (IN 10787)**

1. NOEMAYR AND FAMILY ETA WASH 12 MARCH VIA AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 380 WILL CALL BYNAM AT HOME ON ARRIVAL. NO RESERVATIONS NECESSARY.

2. ASSUME COVER BACKSTOPPED PER REF REQUEST. SUGGEST BE COVERED FOR EITHER CABLE OR TELEPHONE REQUEST SINCE FLIGHT FROM MEXI DIRECT TO DALLAS WHERE CONNECTS 380. QUESTION SOLVENCY MAY ARISE DALLAS SITE OF COVER COMPANY.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

**STATED NEED ASSURANCE COVER WILL BE BACKSTOPPED IF NOEMAYR REQUIRED CABLE COVER ADDRESS TO VERIFY EMPLOYMENT AND SOLVENCY.

Noemayr 201

10 March 63

201-168181

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

5/7/DMCL/HP/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: J. HEYN
UNIT: WH/3/MEXICO
EXT: 2555
DATE: 10 MARCH 1960

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 2
INFO: COP, C/CCD 2, C/CI, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☒ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

[illegible] 17 00Z

OUT 52435

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 18827

DESENSITIZED

REF: MEXI 5261 (IN 10787) *

1. NOEMAYR AND FAMILY TO PROCEED DIRECTLY WASH. TRAVORD 262-60. COVER ALERTED TO BACKSTOP EMPLOYMENT AND SOLVENCY.

2. ARE RESERVATIONS DESIRED? UPON ARRIVAL WASH CALL MR. HEYN EL 65243.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *STATED NEED ASSURANCE COVER WILL BE BACKSTOPPED IF NOEMAYR REQUIRED CABLE COVER ADDRESS TO VERIFY EMPLOYMENT AND SOLVENCY.

Koemayr 201
10 March 63
201-168871 ✓

COORDINATIONS:

CCD/NC/MR. BILADEAU (BY PHONE)

WH/B&F ____

Robert N Dahlgren
for J.C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R. N. Dahlgren
R.N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

097 CWT/SW/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 9 MAR 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2

INFO : COP, C/CI, S/C 2 *

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 9 0653Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 10787

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 5261

RE MEXI 5206 (IN 46565) **

1. NOEMAYR CAR SOLD 2 MARCH FOR 680 DOLLARS HIGHEST PRICE FINALLY OBTAINABLE. POUCHING FULL REPORT. -WH 202-60

2. TENTATIVE ETD NOEMAYR AND FAMILY NOW 11 TO 13 MARCH. ADVISE PRIORITY DESTINATION DESIRED. ASSUME WASH BUT WISH CONFIRM.

2. ALSO NEED ASSURANCE COVER WILL BE BACKSTOPPED IF NOEMAYR REQUIRED CABLE COVER ADDRESS TO VERIFY EMPLOYMENT AND SOLVENCY. ODACID REP MEXI SUGGESTED HE BE PREPARED SUPPLY SUCH PROOF IF CALLED FOR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION SAME AS REFERENCED CABLE.

**STATED THAT NOEMAYR'S ETD WAS DEPENDENT ON SALE OF CAR.

Noemayr
201

9 March 60
201-168881 ✓

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

459 DMCL/MCB/2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 17 FEB 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 2

INFO : COP, C/CCD 2, C/CI, DD/S, SSA, D/OP, OS 2, S/C 2

FEB 18 0112Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 43086

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 5153

REFS: A. DIR 14001 (OUT 91470)*

B. HMMA 14463

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-28

DESENSITIZED ~~RYBAT~~

1. NOEMAYR LOST PASSPORT SOMETIME DURING WEEK ENDING 13 FEB. AFTER THOROUGH SEARCH FAILED DISCLOSE REPORTED LOSS EMB AND ON EMB ADVICE TO MEXI SECRET SERVICE SIGNED AFFADAVIT RE LOSS AT EMB AND EMB REQUESTING DUPLICATE URGENT BASIS. ESTIMATE DUPLICATE WILL BE APPROVED APPROX THREE WEEKS. REQUEST HANDLED NOEMAYR WITHOUT INVOLVING STATION.

2. DUR DELAY ARRIVAL NOEMAYR REPLACEMENT AND STATION STRONG FEELING NOEMAYR DEPARTURE SHOULD NOT BE POSTPONED FURTHER STATION PLANNING USE OLIVER Q. WIMPEN AS CUTOUT CP OPS PENDING ARRIVAL REPLACEMENT. REQUEST WIMPEN CLEARANCE BE AMENDED IF NECESSARY TO ALLOW USE AS INDICATED. ADVISE PRIORITY. WIMPEN TO BE MOVED EVENTUALLY FROM LIERST AND USED SOLELY CP OPS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS STATED NOEMAYR NEW ASSIGNMENT NOT YET FIRM.

Noemayr 201

17 Feb. 60

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

Mr. Harold R. Noemayr

Dear Mr. Noemayr:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957, as amended.

Effective 15 February 1960 said contract, as amended, is further amended by adding after subparagraph (c) of paragraph four (4) entitled "Allowances" the following:

> "(d) You will be entitled to a home service transfer allowance in conformance with applicable Government regulations."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /s/
Contracting Officer

15 Feb. 60.
501-168781

SECRET

SECRET

file: NOEMAYR

15 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)

It is requested that the contract for Harold R. NOEMAYR, Career Agent, be amended to include a "Home Service Transfer Allowance."

J. C. King
Chief, WHD

WH/3/Mexico/CZehrung:gm

Distribution:
- 2 - Addressee
- 1 - WH/3/Mexico
- 1 - Subject

LIEDGE

SECRET

201-168881

10 February 1960

Subj File

NOTE FOR THE RECORD:

NOEMAYR is a Career Agent in Mexico City on Project LIEDGE. According to Charlotte Zehrung he is to depart Mexico City for Hqs upon the arrival of HEGARTY. HEGARTY is scheduled for a medical release about 29 Feb 60 and should arrive in Mexico about 20 March. After a few weeks overlap, NOEMAYR should depart for Hqs about 1 April 60, ready to go to work. According to Charlotte he prefers to take no home leave.

Apparently Mr. Gomez has been working with the Covert Training people in an attempt to place him in that type of activity in a cover status. Per Col. King on 10 Feb Covert Training indicated that they had no interest in subject and Col. King requested the above information for use in his contact with Col. Baird in a further attempt to place NOEMAYR with OTR.

Bowers

arrived 8 July 60

201-165881

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OTR

FROM : Chief, WHD

Feb 1960

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)

1. Reference is made to our telephone conversation on 10 February 1960 regarding the possible use by your office of Subject. Attached for your information are some facts concerning his personal and operational background.

2. NOEMAYR has successfully worked for KUBARK under deep cover for eleven consecutive years. All operations officers handling subject and his training officers at Headquarters have commended his operational capability and achievements. He received an official commendation from the agency for his work in Cuba.

3. WH Division has several motives for wishing to bring NOEMAYR to Headquarters for a tour of duty.

a) After having lived and worked for so long under deep cover without being able to mingle freely with Americans he needs to return to the United States for mental and physical readjustments for himself and his family. The fact that his wife has not been able to become an American citizen and that his children have not had an opportunity to live in the States has been of understandable increasing concern to NOEMAYR. This, combined with the stress of his double life required by his deep cover position and his non-association with anyone except his Case Officer with whom he can discuss his work and problems has been making him increasingly more tense during the last year or two. NOEMAYR is an extremely capable Operations Officer and WH Division earnestly believes that it is KUBARK's responsibility to bring this man and his family to the United States for two years. Your cooperation in this effort is being sought.

b) NOEMAYR, even though he has received Headquarters covert training, still needs to be closely associated with Headquarters for a tour to acquire additional background on operational techniques and approaches and to be exposed to Headquarters' activity and thinking. This experience is requisite to making a well-rounded intelligence operator out of NOEMAYR and will certainly affect his future usefulness to KUBARK.

c) A Headquarters tour will enable NOEMAYR's wife to become a United States citizen and permit his children to receive, at least, a part of their education in the States.

SECRET

file
LIEDGE

201-168881

4. WH Division plans to bring NOEMAYR to the States the end of March 1960 in his capacity of a Career Agent. At that time a cover will be arranged for him which will be consistent with his Headquarters assignment. Appropriate cover will be decided upon only after consultation with your office if you decide to use NOEMAYR.

5. As a Career Agent, NOEMAYR will continue to be funded under LIEDGE, his present project. All funds required to support NOEMAYR and his activity will be charged to this project against the WH Division allotment. In addition, WH Division will handle all administrative problems connected with NOEMAYR, such as renewal of the project, covert income tax returns, cover, etc. after coordinating such action with your office.

6. WH Division has confidence in NOEMAYR and believes he can be of value to OTR in its training program. The Mexican desk will be glad to work closely with you in the handling of NOEMAYR if you so desire. NOEMAYR is enthusiastic about his impending Headquarters assignment and is anxious to start work immediately upon return to the United States.

7. If you desire any additional information on NOEMAYR, I will be happy to make it available on request.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

SECRET

I. PERSONAL

NOEMAYR was born on 20 June 1922 in De Kalb, Illinois. He had five years experience in General Air Force intelligence work. He was discharged from the Air Force on 18 February 1949. He attended the University of Costa Rica for three yearsthen transferred to the University of Habana. NOEMAYR speaks fluent Spanish.

He was married to Argentina CORDERO of San Jose, Costa Rica, on 17 December 1945. His wife hopes to obtain her U. S. citizenship when NOEMAYR is transferred PCS to the United States. They have two children.

II. PHOTOGRAPH

SECRET

III. CONTRACT

NOEMAYR was first placed under contract by KUBARK on 1 June 1949. He is now under contract as a Career Agent. He is a GS-12.

IV. COVER

NOEMAYR is operating under a notional cover. He supposedly was sent by the "Public Surveys Institute" of Dallas, Texas, into Mexico to investigate the prospects of establishing a Mexican affiliate. He supplements his income by free-lance writing. He actually has had articles published in Bohemia and Boys Life. Subject can show these articles to support his cover. On one operational trip he took photographs which appeared in the New York Times and the New York Daily Mirror. To further cover his sources of income NOEMAYR has let it be known that he owns property in Costa Rica and in Cuba and that rentals provide him with monthly income. When Subject returns to the U. S., WH Division will request Cover Division to assist NOEMAYR in establishing a new, back-stopped cover which can be used during his tour here.

V. TRAINING

NOEMAYR received covert training at Headquarters during October and December 1953 in all phases of basic tradecraft. He was rated above average by all three of his instructors.

NOEMAYR was given additional covert training in May 1958.

VI. OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND

NOEMAYR was first recruited in Panama in November 1948 and transferred to Costa Rica under the HUMANOID PROJECT. He successfully directed and exploited a high-level penetration of the Costa Rican Communist Party. Among other accomplishments he recruited two mail intercept agents, processing the take himself, and recruited three additional agents. He also set up safe houses and was in charge of the monitoring post in a technical surveillance.

In early 1953 he was transferred to the PBSUCCESS Project with additional duties as cutout under Project ESCROW.

In 1954 he transferred to Cuba under Project AMPHODARCH. He went under cover as a student since he had one more year of academic work to finish in order to receive a B.A. in Economics. In Cuba he worked on penetration of the Communist targets at the University of Habana. During the same period he was also in contact with subversive oppositionist elements.

In May, 1957, Chief CI/ICD recommended that NOEMAYR be considered for spot assignments of making recruitment pitches throughout Latin America to CP targets. This recommendation was made after Mr. Paul Burke, Deputy Chief CI/ICD, had an informal discussion with NOEMAYR on 9 May on this subject. Mr. Burke believed NOEMAYR would be an effective recruiter and NOEMAYR expressed an interest in such assignments.

In May, 1958, he volunteered to go to the rebel mountain headquarters of Castro, in Cuba, to obtain information for KUBARK. He received a commendation for his work during this special assignment.

NOEMAYR was transferred to Mexico on 7 June 1958 where he has been handling Communist Party penetration agents and informants.

He spent January 1959 in Cuba on a TDY assignment similar to that he undertook in March of 1958, and for which he received his commendation.

VII. OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE AND COMMENDATIONS

On 1 May 1953, NOEMAYR was in charge of an attempt to physically penetrate the home of Manuel MORA Valverde, President of the Costa Rican Communist Party for the purpose of obtaining documents which could be used to prove the Communist Party's control over the Partido Progresista Independiente, a front which had been organized to participate in the 1953 elections. When the sub-agent who was to actually perform the penetration failed to appear, NOEMAYR, realizing the urgency of the operation, voluntarily and on his own initiative made a successful surreptitious entry, removing approximately 85% of the PPI documentation plus Communist Party documents. On 24 July 1953 the President of Costa Rica signed a bill outlawing the PPI. The participation of NOEMAYR in the campaign to prevent the PPI from becoming a legal party is considered to have been instrumental in its success.

In May 1959 NOEMAYR was awarded a monetary bonus of $300.00 in recognition of his outstanding services on behalf of KUBARK in the Sierra Maestra area during the early part of 1958. For his outstanding performance on this assignment and his great devotion to duty, NOEMAYR received a personal commendation from General Cabell. In early January 1958 NOEMAYR volunteered to undertake a mission to contact Cuban rebel leader Fidal Castro in the Sierra Maestra mountains in Southeastern Cuba. He spent approximately three weeks in the mountain hideout of Castro's headquarters during which time he even joined them in an actual attack on the town of Manzanillo.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

352 BD/MCB/JLP
DATE : 20 JAN 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 20 2233Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 31564

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 4995

REF: MEXI 4883 (IN 26097)*

1. NOEMAYR WISHES BEGIN WORK NEW ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL. NO LEAVE PLANS.

2. REQUEST INFO RE NEXT ASSIGNMENT SINCE HE HAS CHILDRENS SCHOOLING TO CONSIDER.

3. TWO WEEK MINIMUM OVERLAP WITH HEGARTY REQUIRED MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *MEXI CONCURRED PROPOSAL HEGARTY AS NOEMAYR REPLACEMENTS. WOULD ADVISE LEAVE PLANS NOYMAYR ON HIS RETURN 7 JAN FROM PERSONAL BUSINESS TRIP SANJ TO SELL HOUSE. DEPARTED MEXI FOR SANU 1 JAN.

Replacement (HEGARTY) ETA 15 FEB
which would make NOEMAYR ETA HQS
O/A 1 MARCH 60.

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

40A/DD/HP/HP

[illegible] 7 JAN 60

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CCD 2, OP 2, S/C 2 , DD/S, SSA

JAN 6 0259Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 26097

TO DIR INFO SANJ CITE MEXI 4883

RE: DIR 08383 (OUT 78527)* (NOT SENT SANJ)

1. CONCUR PROPOSAL HEGARTY AS NOEMAYR REPLACEMENT.

2. WILL ADVISE LEAVE PLANS NOEMAYR ON HIS RETURN 7 JANUARY FROM PERSONAL BUSINESS TRIP SANJ TO SELL HOUSE. DEPARTED MEXI FOR SANJ 1 JANUARY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS PROPOSED HEGARTY AS NOEMAYR REPLACEMENT.

File: Noemayr
201
LIEDGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-165881

622/SE/HP/HP

ORIG : J. [illegible]
UNIT : WH/III/MEXICO
EXT : 2555
DATE : 29 DECEMBER 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

DEC 29 23 12 55
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : CCD 2, OP 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
INITIALS

OUT 78527
OUT 78527

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 08382

RE: HMMA 14169*

1. HQS PROPOSES FRANCIS R. HEGARTY AS HOHMAYR REPLACEMENT. VIEW RECENT SURGERY PERFORMED ON HEGARTY HIS EARLIEST ETA ABOUT 15 FEB. REQUEST STATION CONCURRENCE.

2. ADVISE LEAVE PLANS OF HOHMAYR.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT:

STATION REQUESTED HOHMAYR ETD AND ETA OF REPLACEMENT. STATION'S TENTATIVE ETD FOR HOHMAYR WAS 1 JAN 1960.

29 Dec 59
201-168881

COORDINATION:
WH/PERS

J.C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R.E. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

4

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HRS-A-4026
TO Chief, WHD INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-32723
FROM Chief of Station, San José		DATE 21 August 1959
SUBJECT Operational/Field Traces CORDERO Calderon Family		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED None; for information only		
REFERENCE(S) HRS-W-1730		

1. Field traces reveal the following on the CORDERO Calderon family:

    a) Federico was born on 29 March 1912, has been living in Panama for several years, and is currently employed at the Union Club in Panama City;

    b) Antonio had been living for several years in the Pacific Banana Zone city of Quepos, Costa Rica. Recently, he was placed in jail in San Juan de Tibas (a suburb of San Jose) on a charge of robbery;

    c) Mario was born in San José on 7 February 1920 and was a militant communist prior to and during the 1948 Costa Rican Revolution. After the revolution, he left the Party voluntarily, but was reported to have been actively sympathetic towards communism for the past ten years. Another source reported this month that Mario is visited regularly by communists, who leave printed propaganda with him;

    d) Asdrubal was born in San José on 12 November 1928 and is currently living in San José, employed as a shoemaker in a shop owned by a communist. He is reported to be sympathetic to communism;

    e) Angela Argentina was born in San Jose on 15 March 1915, now living in Mexico with her husband who is a PBPRIME citizen. They own a house in San José, in which Mario (see c. above) now lives;

    f) Gladys was born in San José on 27 February 1923, is married (common law) to a Spaniard, and has resided in Spain for many years;

    g) Consuelo is living in New York City, working in a beauty parlor; There are no available traces on Norma or Isabel.

2. Discrepancies will be noted on the vital statistics as opposed to those in reference; Costa Rican Civil Registry files are the Station's source. The Registry had no file on either Norma or Isabel. Station files, inquiries to Station assets, and an investigation conducted by HUBURBOT accounted for the narrative portions of the traces. The above traces include all of the information available to the Station.

Floyd E. Aimonet

Distribution
3-Washington
2-Files

FEA:tef

18 August 1959

201-168881

FORM 10-57 53
(40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T
☐ CONTINUED
PAGE NO.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HKSA-4063
TO Chief, WH INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-251074
FROM Chief of Station, San Jose		DATE 17 July 1959
SUBJECT Operational Mario CORDERO Calderon		RE: "X" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED None, information only		

REFERENCE(S)

1. At an operational meeting on 8 July 1959, HUMAROID/3 told HUSKANAW that he was aware of the efforts of Mario CORDERO Calderon to re-enter the PVP, presumably on ODYOKE behalf. Without waiting for a reply, HUMAROID/3 then pleaded with HUSKANAW to stop these efforts for the following reasons:

   a) while handled by HUTHAYR several years ago, HUMAROID/3 often had operational meetings in HUTHAYR's house. On occasion, HUMAROID/3 would be entertained by HUTHAYR's wife and mother-in-law until HUTHAYR's arrival for the meeting. HUMAROID/3 has harbored a deep fear for years that Subject (HUTHAYR's brother-in-law) might have seen HUMAROID/3 enter or leave the meeting site, or that HUTHAYR's wife, a Costa Rican national, might have (wittingly or otherwise) exposed HUMAROID/3 to her brother.

   b) HUMAROID/3 who knows CORDERO personally, claims that CORDERO was probably a poor choice for a party penetration, since he was known to be actively sympathetic to the PVP for the past ten years. In addition, HUMAROID/3 doubted that CORDERO had the necessary qualifications of intelligence and discretion to perform in the capacity of a penetration agent.

2. HUSKANAW denied any knowledge of a penetration attempt, and assured HUMAROID/3 that no action would ever be taken to endanger HUMAROID/3's position. At an operational meeting with the project case officer later the same evening, HUSKANAW expressed deep concern over HUMAROID/3's state of mind concerning CORDERO, and tactfully advised against CORDERO's entry, if it were within the Station's ability.

3. Regardless of the validity of HUMAROID/3's allegations, it is quite apparent to the extent and the Station that HUMAROID/3 is upset and worried about the possibility a CORDERO entering the PVP and discussing with other party members, details of HUMAROID/3's past activities and contacts. As a supplementary factor, it was also felt that CORDERO's extremely limited ability, potential, and access would not be worth the security risks involved. In the interest of security and agent morale, the Station decided to stop CORDERO's penetration attempt, diverting him temporarily, to provide a fuller coverage on communist labor (CGTC) activities, and to perform spotting tasks for the Station.

4. At a contact on 13 July 1959, HUTHAYR set up a contact plan, and instructed CORDERO in the Station's wishes. CORDERO accepted without question, and a meeting with the Station has been scheduled for 5 August 1959.

5. An investigation of the CORDERO family is being conducted by the Station.

Floyd H. [illegible]

17 July 1959

Distribution
3-Wash
2-Files

201-168181

035/ER/CWT/CWT/CWT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 9

SECRET

DATE : 14 JULY 1959

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 14 08 11:59

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 40409

TO PRITY MEXI INFO DIR CITE SANJ 3428

RE: MEXI 4103 (IN 37896)*

NOEMAYR AND FAMILY RETURNING MEXI 14 JULY VIA LACSA.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED ETA NOEMAYR.

File Noemayr 201

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

190 ERB/SW/SW/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 9 JULY 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : COP, CCD 2, DD/S, SSA, C/MS 2, MS, OP 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 10 14 53 '59

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 38892

TO MEXI INFO DIR CITE SANJ 3427

REF MEXI 4103 (IN 37896)* SANJ 3425 (IN 38658) **

NOEMAYR RETURNED SANJ 8 JULY. ENTIRE FAMILY CONFINED BED SERIOUSLY ILL WITH FLU. EPIDEMIC SPREADING THRU CR. WILL ADVISE WHEN SUBJ PLANS RETURN MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED NOEMAYR'S ETA.

**NOEMAYR AND FAMILY WERE IN PACY, BUT EXPECTED TO ARRIVE SANJ VERY SOON.

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

372/KM/HP/HP/

DATE : 7 JUL 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 9 0129Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 37896

TO SANJ INFO DIR CITE MEXI 4103

REQUEST ETA NOEMAYR.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

COLITHO - MFD. BY MOORE BUSINESS FORMS, INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

SECRET

30 June 1959 par

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Mexico - Larry Sulc

SUBJECT: Ross Lester CROZIER

1. Reference is made to your request to this office dated 17 April 1958.

2. The reply to your request is contained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security dated 29 June 1959.

Chief, CI/OA

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

29 JUN 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to a memorandum dated 17 April 1958 from WH Division through CI/OA requesting that the Covert Security Approval granted on 3 July 1957 be amended to permit Subject's utilization as a career agent in Mexico City under Project LIEDGE.

This will confirm the verbal Covert Security Approval granted to Mr. Larry Sulc, WH Division on 3 June 1958 for the use described above!

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

David E. Hanlon
for Robert H. Cunningham

S-E-C-R-E-T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 019 ER/JLS/ 15 JUN 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : S/C 2

[illegible] COPY

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUN 16 0341Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 29447

TO (PRIORITY) SANJ INFO DIR CITE MEXI 4017

1. NOEMAYR AND FAMILY DEPARTED MEXI FOR SANJ 14 JUNE BY LACSA.

2. WILL PHONE COS SANJ USING NAME ROGER.

END OF MESSAGE

file K
NOEMAYR 201

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

COLITHO - PRTD. BY MOORE BUSINESS FORMS, INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

182/SE/CG/CG/N

DATE 29 MAY 59

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

NO. ~~201-32723~~ 201-168881

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature

WH/34

MAY 30 17 41 Z

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 23195

TO DIR INFO MEXI

CITE SANJ 3375

REF MEXI 3931 (IN21594 *)

CLOSED
SEE 201-168881

SANJ CONCURS WITH REF PLAN.

C/S COMMENT: * REQUESTED HQS APPROVAL NOEMAYR AND FAMILY GO SANJ SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

N.F.

RI COPY

FILE CLASSIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	L
RI/TY	m
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

29 May 59
201-168881

SECRET

FORM 4-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

663 ES/JLS/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : S. D. BURTON
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 27 MAY 1959

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	MAY 27 20 49 Z 59	
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.	
	PRIORITY		INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		INITIALS

OUT 58618
OUT 58618

TO MEXI INFO SANJ CITE DIR 28397
28397

REF: MEXI-3931 (IN 21594)*

HQS CONCURS PROPOSED RECRUITMENT PITCH AND TRAVEL REF.

END OF MESSAGE

*WHD COMMENT: SUGGEST NOEMAYR BE AUTHORIZED ATTEMPT RECRUITMENT OF BROTHER-IN-LAW, INACTIVE COSTA RICAN CP MEMBER, NOW CARETAKER OF NOEMAYR HOUSE IN SAN JOSE. NOEMAYR AND FAMILY DESIRE TRAVEL TO SANJ FOR PERSONAL REASONS ON 14 JUNE.

COORDINATE WITH:

WH/CA/S________

CI/ICD/MR. WILLIAMSON

201-168881

(BY PHONE)

R Gomez
for
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

555 ES/OBS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

No. 201-168881 ~~201-37773~~

DATE : 26 MAY 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature: J Kaulen

ROUTING

2		4	
3		5	
		6	

MAY 27 0333Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 21594

TO DIR SANJ INFO CITE MEXI 3931

(WARE ACTING)

CLOSED
SEE 201-168881

RE A. HMMA 12436
B. HRSW 1705
C. HRSA 3915

1. RE PARA 2 REF C, MEXI BELIEVES NO SECURITY PROBLEM. REQUEST HQS CONCURRENCE.

2. DUE LEGAL ACTION REQUIRED FOR NOEMAYR OWNED HOUSE SANJ, HIS PRESENCE NECESSARY SANJ DURING NEXT MONTH. HE AND FAMILY WILL ALSO UTILIZE TRIP THERE TO RENEW TOURIST STATUS WHICH ABOUT TO EXPIRE AND TAKE TWO OR THREE WEEKS LEAVE. IF RECRUITMENT PITCH AGREED TRIP WOULD PROVIDE EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY IMPLEMENT OPN UNDER DESIRABLE COVER CONDITIONS.

3. NOEMAYR AND FAMILY ETD FOR SANJ 14 JUNE. REQUEST APPROVAL HQS SANJ SOONEST. TRAVEL FUNDS AVAILABLE IN PROJECT LIEDGE.

END OF MESSAGE

FILE CLASSIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	L
RI/TY	Jch
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

26 May 59
201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORM 4-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

697 CWT/CBS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 29 APRIL 1959

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	APR 29 22 17 z59	
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT 99003
OUT99003

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 24246
24246

REF: MEXI 3786*

REF QUARTERS BENEFITS NEED NOT BE INCLUDED CONTRACT. CONTRACT STATES QUARTERS IN ACCORDANCE GOVT REGS. COS HAS AUTHORITY GRANT FOR CAREER AGENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT:
REQUEST HQS AMEND PARA 4 NOEMAYR CONTRACT.

*(IN 10582)

201-168581
File NOEMAYR

R. Gomez
for J.C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R.N. Dahlgren
R.N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

016 ES/OBS/cwT/cw7

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	MFX	4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 29 APR 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

APR 29 0341Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 10582

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 3786

(WARE ACTING)

RE HMMS 726

REQUEST HQS AMEND PARA 4 HAROLD R. NOEMAYR CONTRACT PERMIT FR 45-1050 BENEFITS RETROACTIVE TO 1 AUGUST 1958.

END OF MESSAGE

CC: NOEMAYR
201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMM-A-12611 - KAPCM-1595
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 50-6-67/1
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 10 April 1959
SUBJECT Project LIEDGE (General)		RE: "43-2" -- (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED See para 3		

REFERENCE(S)

1. HMM-W-6420, dated 11 June 1958
2. HMM-W-7302, dated 13 February 1959
3. HMM-W-7407, dated 6 March 1959

1. Attached is a cover review of the notional cover under which Harold R. NOEMAYR, the principal component for Project LIEDGE, has been operating. This analysis was mainly written by NOEMAYR, himself, with additions made by the Station. It is requested that this review be sent to Cover Division for their study.

2. The following constitute the basis for which the Station is requesting that Project LIEDGE be renewed for the period 1 May 1959 through 30 April 1960:

a. As this is a support project for the maintenance of Harold R. NOEMAYR, an outside case officer whose responsibilities comprise the running of operations currently in progress against the Communist movement in Mexico, there is no direct product derived other than that obtained from projects LIONHEART, LIMAD and LIFEAT.

b. As of 1 January 1959, Project LIGHOUSE was transferred to a case officer under official cover at the Station, and must, therefore, not be included as one of the operations under the direction of NOEMAYR.

c. NOEMAYR has continued to manage operations under his control very satisfactorily and fully justifies the expenditure of KUBARK personnel, time, funds and the security risk involved. (For production specifics, consult reviews for projects LIONHEART, LIFEAT and LIMAD.)

d. Operations under jurisdiction of this Project are the primary projects possessed by the Station against the Communist movement and are based on Priority A requirements of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

e. This Project has continued to satisfy those requirements necessary to maintain an outside case officer under the Communist penetration program.

f. There is no change anticipated in operational planning for the future of this Project, nor are there any changes believed necessary in line with altered political or operational conditions or any other changing situations.

g. During the period under review (1 May 1958 - 30 April 1959) funds obligated total U. S. $22,270. It is requested that the same obligation be made for the period 1 May 1959 - 30 April 1960.

h. All commitments are contained in the contract for Harold R. NOEMAYR and in the oral agreements with subagents LIJERSEY-1 and LIJOINT-1.

i. LIJERSEY-1 continues to serve as cutout for LIMOLD-1, a high-level penetration of the Partido Popular (PP) and the Union General de Obreros-Campesinos Mexicanos (UGOCM), but changes are anticipated in this status. Since LIMOLD-1's recruitment by LIJERSEY-1 on 15 August 1957, LIMOLD-1 has been handled by LIJERSEY-1 in a loosely-controlled manner. LIMOLD-1 still does not submit sensitive info on his organizations nor does he know that he is receiving funds monthly from an agency of ODYOKE. NOEMAYR is currently attempting to obtain a direct interview with LIMOLD-1 - as arranged with LIJERSEY-1 - in order to either establish direct control of the agent or, on the negative side, to determine if LIMOLD-1 should be terminated Thus far, LIMOLD-1 has not appeared, for apparently valid reasons, at any of the scheduled meetings with NOEMAYR. When contact is finally established it maybe that

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-12611 - KAPOK-1595

LIMOID-1 will react negatively upon learning that he is and has been working for ODYOKE, but this risk is considered by the Station to be worth while because of the lack of production of LIMOID-1 during the past 18 months. If LIMOID-1 accepts direct control by KUBARK, then LIJERSEY-1 may be separated from his present function and placed on a stand-by status for conducting new penetration approaches to members of the Communist movement in Mexico.

j. LIQUIET-1 has been placed on an inactive status until such time as her services may be required in new penetration operations. As such she does not receive a monthly salary, but merely spot payments and a Christmas bonus for occasional assignments performed by her.

3. It is therefore requested the Project LIEDIE be renewed for the period and amount of funds as stated in subparagraph g, paragraph 2 above.

Willard C. CURTIS

FCH/cys

Attachment - as stated in paragraph 1

8 April 1959

Distribution:
3 - Hqs w/att
2 - Files

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

DESENSITIZED

SUBJECT: Cover Review for Harold R. NOEMAYR

1. The leading factor that has been responsible for the maintenance of a suitable cover arrangement for NOEMAYR has been the flexibility and adaptability of NOEMAYR himself. Without this person's fundamental ability to mold his cover around his personal qualifications, the notional cover story would not have been adequate in Mexico. However, to date, this cover has provided the added backstopping needed to permit NOEMAYR to give a convincing appearance of being gainfully employed and with no apparent inference to ODYOKE connections.

2. When NOEMAYR originally was assigned to Mexico City, he stopped in Dallas, Texas en route here in order to visit the cover address of his supposed cover concern so that he could be aware first hand of the details surrounding this company. In November-December 1958 he became acquainted with several Texans who were considering business opportunities in Mexico and - although they were not from Dallas - was able to successfully convince them of the legitimacy of his business. In this case, as is usual with his general cover story, he also showed them published articles in Bohemia and Boys Life, written under his true name, to further illustrate his varied means of financial support.

3. As stated above, the notional cover firm alone would probably not satisfy NOEMAYR's cover requirements, but when combined with his actual writing activities, it furnishes a fairly well-rounded background story. Thus emerges the basic necessity for this type of cover: some large grains of truth mixed tastefully with the nebulous aspects of a notional story.

4. The exact manner by which NOEMAYR achieves this impression is as follows:

a. He mentions that his cover firm has sent him into Mexico to investigate the prospects of establishing a Mexican affiliate. NOEMAYR's absences from Mexico (once in July 1958 for consultation in Washington and again in January 1959 on TDY to Cuba) are thus explained as added surveys of this nature outside of Mexico - thus providing the pattern of flexibility in movement.

b. To implement his income, NOEMAYR has taken up free-lance writing and can prove his accomplishments by exhibiting his published articles. His home has office space that is surrounded by popular literature, manuscripts and other aids that a writer would normally possess.

c. To further cover for his source of income, NOEMAYR has let it be known that he owns property in Costa Rica and in Cuba (places where he was previously assigned - the Costa Rican property is actual) and that rentals provide him with monthly income.

d. NOEMAYR does not attempt, however, to mix with the American community in Mexico, but prefers to lend the general impression thathe wishes to get "down to grass roots" in dealing with the native environment. His residence is situated in a middle to upper class neighborhood largely settled by Mexican families. He thus creates the impression of a slightly "bohemian" American writer who has adapted his life during long experience in Latin America, to local conditions.

DESENSITIZED DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED

5. For the remainder of his tour in Mexico (his first year will expire in June 1959), HOEMAYR believes that his present cover will be entirely suitable. However, should KUBARK desire to continue the same cover arrangement for his successor - at the end of his normal tour - it is suggested that thought be given to the establishment of a registered affiliate of an American concern, with the accompanying requirement of securing the costly working papers necessary for regular employment in Mexico. This would be particularly of value if his successor should happen not to possess the type of back ground that would permit independent activity in support of his cover, as is writing in HOEMAYR's case.

SECRET / DESENSITIZED

file
HOEMAYR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.	HMM-A-12432
HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.	
TO	Chief, WH Division
INFO	Chief of Station, San Jose
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City
DATE	18 March 1959
SUBJECT	Proposed Costa Rican CP Penetration
ACTION REQUIRED	
REFERENCE(S)	

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED.
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

1. As recorded in Headquarters files, HOEMAYR's brother-in-law, Mario CORDERO Calderon, Costa Rican, residing in San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica, was once a member of the Costa Rican CP. Mario's first loyalty had been to the CALDERONISTA party, but since the latter was allied with the CP, a great deal of recruitment had taken place within the allegiance. Mario drifted from CP militancy shortly after the 1948 revolution.

2. If the organization so desires, all the factors are present for the recruitment of Mario and return to CP militancy with a low to medium level penetration as the objective. These factors are as follows:

a. Mario CORDERO has been caretaker and therefore living in HOEMAYR's house in Costa Rica for the past two years. On two occasions during visits in 1956 and 1957, HOEMAYR conversed at some length with Mario concerning the Costa Rican CP. Mario indicated very emphatically that he was disgusted with them (party leaders) because of the corruption.

b. Letters received from Mario during the past year have indicated no change in this attitude. Mario is extremely grateful to HOEMAYR for this period of residence without paying rent. (Mario is a shoemaker of humble means).

3. HOEMAYR is reasonably certain that Mario CORDERO would accept such an offer and could return to CP militancy without security problems. It is believed that with a little guidance and manipulation, Mario could become a medium level penetration with a relatively short time. While not having more than an elementary school education, Mario is a stolid type, sincere and determined in his own way. Once satisfied that he could improve his lot by this service, he would lend a steady and reliable service.

Willard C. CURTIS

HEM/cpa

16 March 1959

Distribution:
3 - Hdqs
1 - San Jose
2 - Files

201-168881

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMM-T-719
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 11 March 1959
SUBJECT Harold R. NOEMAYR		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		
REFERENCE(S)		

It is requested that the Station be sent a copy of the original contract for Harold R. NOEMAYR and a copy of each amendment thereto.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

PCK
PCK/cps

8 March 1959

Distribution:
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

Quid- HMMS-726

201-166851

[illegible] file

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-T-723

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.:

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 11 March 1959

SUBJECT: Medical Reimbursement for Harold R. NOEMAYR

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED:

REFERENCES:

A. HMM-T-595

B. HMM-S-555 → [illegible] 16 [illegible] 57

1. Attached, per Headquarters instructions in reference B., are the required documents from Harold R. NOEMAYR applying for reimbursement for medical treatment required by his dependent daughter. These include Form 1126, receipts for payments made and a statement from the attending physician as to the treatment given. The physician's statement merely indicates that he provided medical care and a biopsy, without delving into the nature of the illness, his diagnosis or specific treatment. Mrs. NOEMAYR was unable to obtain any further declaration from the physician and security considerations prevented her from becoming more demanding on this point.

2. If Headquarters requires a more elaborate statement, would it be permissable for NOEMAYR to certify as to the missing aspects from the physician's statement? Otherwise, no other document of this nature is available.

Willard C. CURTIS

RCE/dps

Attachment - as stated above - receipts U/S/C

10 March 1959

Distribution:
- 3 - Hqs w/att
- 2 - Files

201-168881

14-00000

/LSB/LSB/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : R. REYNOLDS
UNIT : WH/III/CARIB
EXT : 2056
DATE : 25 FEBRUARY 1959

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, PP 2, PP/PRD, PP/PROP 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE

	DEFERRED	FEB 25 19 13 z59
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT75968

TO MEXI INFO HAVA CITE DIR 14183

RE MEXI 3392 (IN 22960)*

1. ON BASIS HAVA AND ODENVY REPORTS ON HOGAN HQS PREFERS NOT IMPROVE HIS CHANCES SECURING CUBAN ACCOUNT. ACCORDING AIRMAIL, CUBAN OFFICIAL IN HQS AREA 20 FEBRUARY, AN ACCOUNT MAY GO TO EITHER OF TWO FIRMS IN PBPRIME WITH WHICH KUBARK HAS CONTACT AND EITHER OF WHICH WOULD SERVE ODYOKE INTERESTS BETTER THAN HOGAN.

2. HOWEVER, IN EVENT HOGAN BEATS OUT OTHER CONTENDERS IT COULD BECOME ADVANTAGEOUS HAVE KUBARKER IN HIS GROUP, DEPENDING ON NATURE OF ACCOUNT. THEREFORE/REQUEST NOEMAYR ATTEMPT KEEP JOB OFFER OPEN WITHOUT COMMITTING HIMSELF TO HOGAN AND THEREBY STRENGTHENING LATTER'S HAND WITH CUBANS. USE CAUTION IN TOUCHING ON WEAK ASPECTS NOEMAYR COVER STORY WHICH COULD BE CHECKED ON BY HOGAN.

3. MICKEY IS GEORGE MICHAEL KAPPES, ABOUT 24, U.S. CITIZEN WHO HAS WORKED WITH HOGAN SINCE LATE 1958

(END OF MESSAGE)

File NOEMAYR 201 CS [illegible]

WH Comment: *Noemayr received letter dated 1 Feb from "Mickey" sounding out Noemayr for job with Don Hogan, who hopes to get major public relations contracts with Cubans.

R. E. GOMEZ, AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/III/Mexico
COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

SECRET

10 Jan 59

C-1243

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION : WH/III/Mexico Att Ogden

SUBJECT : Cover Review - Harold Noemayr (P)

1. In compliance with the regulative responsibility placed upon Central Cover Branch for the review of nonofficial cover arrangements, it is requested that the action herein prescribed be taken in the subject case.

2. The interested Area Branch and the field station, if applicable, should make a thorough assessment of this notional cover in relation to its operational suitability and report to you on the strength or weakness of the arrangement, and any recommendation they deem advisable to strengthen it. For guidance, the field station should consider such factors as the security consideration involved and the ability of the individual to live his cover. The report from the field station, along with the Area Branch comments should be forwarded to CCB.

3. The Area Branch Desk should also advise CCB of future plans for the Agent with particular regard to termination, change of operations, change of station, extension of the Agent's tour of duty, etc., in order that Central Cover Branch may take measures to ensure cover continuity and to protect the security of the arrangement.

4. After the above-requested review has been completed, action will be taken to solve any existing problems.

5. This case will be reviewed again six months after the completion of this review, or if the Agent is being rotated or terminated, 90 days prior to his termination or departure

per HMMW-7302
tickled for
2 April 1959

SECRET

201-168881

from his present post. Therefore, it is requested that Central Cover Branch be notified of pending termination or change of station as soon as such determination has been made.

6. For matters concerning this case, please contact Mr. Richard J. Bialdeau Extension 8264.

for
JOHN G. SOUTHARD
CHIEF, CCB/NC

CCB REMARKS:

Your attention is invited to the fact that Noemayr has never communicated with either of his cover firms, even to advise them of his address.

File: NOEMAYR (201)

Crozier, Ross, Lester (SA) [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMM-S-558

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM: Chief, WH

DATE: 16 January '59

SUBJECT: Harold R. NOEMAYR

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See below

REFERENCE(S): HMMW-585

1. In answer to your queries of reference, we wish to direct your attention to FHB 20-620-1, dated 28 November 1958, which provides information on overseas medical benefits available from KUBARK. This new handbook should be of great help in the future on questions of this nature as it sets forth in one place KUBARK provisions for employee and dependent medical benefits, together with the procedures required.

2. Section 2a of the handbook specifically states that Career Agents, if they are full-time employees and citizens of PBPRIME, may receive all medical benefits available to Staff Employees. Section 3a also specifically states that Career Agents, if they are full-time employees and citizens of PBPRIME, are eligible to receive the benefits of the KUBARK dependent medical program.

3. We suggest that Subject forward to Headquarters receipts for his dependent medical expenses, together with a statement from his physician attesting to the nature of the illness, his diagnosis and treatment. Subject should also execute Form No. 1126 as requested in Section 5a of the handbook. We will submit the claim to the Office of Personnel for their review and determination of any allowable reimbursement.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

29 December 1958
Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Pers
1 - WH/Mailroom
WHD/RB/bm

201-168881

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO.

14-00000

472 ER/WS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 9

DATE : 13 JAN 59

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 14 04 11 59

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 47110

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : S/C 2

TO PRITY MEXI INFO DIR CITE HAVA 0893

NOEMAYR ETD HAVA 13 JAN 1715 CMA 300. ETA MEXI 2040.

END OF MESSAGE

301-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

524 RLG/R/R/

ORIG : RUDOLPH E. GOMEZ
UNIT : WH
EXT : 8081
DATE : 10 JANUARY 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : HAVANA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 5

INFO : S/C 2

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	JAN 10 16 39z 59
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

60979

TO HAVA INFO MEXI CITE DIR 07614

REF: HAVA 0872 (IN 45998) *

APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *STATED STA FELT NOEMAYR JOB COMPLETED. WOULD HAVE HIM RETURN MEXI IF HQS. APPROVED.

R Gomez

RUDOLPH E. GOMEZ/DCWH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

File Noemayr 201

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168551

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

003 HM/DLD

ATE : 09 JAN 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5 (MR. COBB WH DIV. NOTIFIED 0100, 10 JAN 59)

INFO : S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 10 06 31 z59
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 45998

TO DIR INFO MEXI CITE HAVA 0872

FEEL NOEMAYR JOB COMPLETED. WILL TELL HIM RETURN MEXI IF HQS APPROVES.

END OF MESSAGE

File Noemayr 201

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

034 HM/DLD

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

NOEMAYR

DATE : 2 JANUARY 1959

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5 (ROBERT REYNOLDS WH ISSUED TEMPO COPY 0215 3 JAN 59.)

INFO : COP, S/C 2

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 3 07 30 59

REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 43650

TO DIR SACU INFO MEXI CITE HAVA 0805

RE: HAVA 796 (IN 43348)*

REBELS CANCELLED AUTHORITY FOR FLIGHT ON WHICH NOEMAYR SCHEDULED GO SACU.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 4

061 ER/WS/

DATE : 01 JANUARY 1959

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 6

INFO : S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 1 17 50z59

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 43176

TO OPIM SACU INFO DIR MEXI CITE HAVA 0778

NOEMAYR ETD HAVA FOR SACU 1 JAN 1530 CUBANA VISCOUNT.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168887

File: Noemayr 201

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

172 ES/BJ [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 30 DECEMBER 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 6

INFO : S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 30 18 03 58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 42435

TO OPIM HAVA INFO PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 3027

REF: MEXI 3025 (IN 42393)*

CORRECTION REF: FLIGHT 565 ARRIVING 1645.HAVA TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *NOEMAYR TO LEAVE MEXI 30 DEC.

201-168887

Noemayr 201

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : R.REYNOLDS
UNIT : WH/III
EXT : 2508
DATE : 30 DEC 58

TO : HAVANA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DEC 30 17 22:58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE				INITIALS
☐	DEFERRED	☐	PRIORITY	
☐	ROUTINE	☒	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	RG

OUT 57838
OUT 57838

TO HAVA INFO MEXI CITE DIR 06245
06245

REF HAVA 0746 (IN 42224) *

AMUTTER

NOEMAYR EN ROUTE HAVA CMA FLIGHT 565 WITH ETA 1645 HOURS 30 DEC. MAY HAVE MISSED REF. IF SO, WILL DEVISE CONTACT ARRANGEMENT. CABLE HQS AND MEXI CONFIRMATION HIS ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONTAINED CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FOR NOEMAYER.

Noemayr
201

J.C.KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

R.N.DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7

SECRET

152 WCJ/BJ

DATE : 30 DECEMBER 1958

53

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

Dec 30 16 31:58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 6

INFO : S/C 2

FILE COPY

PRIORITY

IN 42393

TO OPIM HAVA INFO PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 3025 (WARE ACTING)

NOEMAYR LEAVING MEXI 30 DECEMBER VIA CMA FLIGHT 566 ARRIVING HAVA 1515 HOURS. WILL PHONE COS AT OFFICE.

END OF MESSAGE

Noemayr 201

K

SECRET

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

286 BD/LR/LR 22

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 10

SECRET

DATE : 29 DEC 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 6 (MR BRADY, WH DIV, NOTIFIED AT 1800 29 DEC)

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 29 23 18:58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 42092

TO PRITY DIR INFO HAVA CITE MEXI 3019

RE: DIR 06062 (OUT 57143)*

AMUTTER

1. NOEMAYR SUGGESTS FOLL PLAN:
   - A. AVOID HAVA DUE SECURITY RISK.
   - B. ARRANGE U.S. NAVAL AIR TRANSPORTATION TO GUANTANAMO.
   - C. HAVE REQUIRED SUPPLIES FOR TRIP ISSUED FROM NAVAL BASE AND WHATEVER BRIEFING DONE HELD ON BASE.

2. NOEMAYR ALSO CONSIDERING POSSIBLE NEED THIS TRIP CARRY SIDEARM.

3. ALTERNATE PLAN FOR SUPPLIES COULD BE PURCHASE LOCALLY MEXI AND CARRY TO JUMP OFF POINT NAVAL AIR IN U.S.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *HQS REQUESTED HAVA ADVISE MEXI SUGGESTED ITINERARY AND CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS.

File - Noemayr 201

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

640 RLG/RLG// /Eh

ORIG : J. B. BRADY
UNIT : WH/III
EXT : 3997
DATE : 24 DECEMBER 1958 640

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 6

INFO CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	DEC 24 23 16 Z 58	
	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.	
	PRIORITY		INITIALS
X	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		INITIALS JBB

OUT 57143

TO MEXI INFO HAVA CITE DIR 06062

AMUTTER

REF: A. MEXI 3006 (IN 40908)
B. DIR 05525 (OUT 56079)

1. POSTANY AND MARCHMAN NOT AVAILABLE TDY AS TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT NOEMAYR. MR. BALMES HIDALGO WILL ETA MEXI OA 30 DEC THIS ASSIGNMENT. NOEMAYR SHOULD PROCEED HAVA OA 1 JAN AND INFORM WIFE.

2. FOR HAVA: ADVISE MEXI SUGGESTED ITINERARY AND CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

File Noemayr 201

for R S Gomez
J. C. KING, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/PERS P.C. Bowers
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. B. Brady
J. B. BRADY, AC/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

14-00000

350 BD/LR/LR DM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 23 DEC 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5 (MR REYNOLDS, WH DIV, NOTIFIED AT 1725 23 DEC)

INFO : CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DEC 23 22 34 '58

RECD CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 40908

TO DIR INFO HAVA CITE MEXI 3006

AMUTTER

REF: DIR 05525 (IN 56079)*

1. NOEMAYR WILLING ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT PROVIDED:

   A. WIFE BE INFORMED.

   B. SUITABLE TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT SENT MEXI.

2. STATION CONCURS NOEMAYRS OPINION. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS NOEMAYRS AGENTS MEXI REQUIRE OUTSIDE CASE OFFICER THOROUGHLY ACQUAINTED LOCAL SITUATION. SUGGEST POSTANY OR MARCHMAN TDY.

3. REQUEST CABLE REPLY SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN NOEMAYR RETURN FIDEL CASTRO AREA. DURATION AND NATURE MISSION SAME AS NOEMAYR'S TRIP LAST MARCH. QUERIED WHETHER MEXI COULD RELEASE HIM FOR APPROX SIX WEEKS BEGINNING EARLY JAN.

SECRET

301-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : R. Reynolds
UNIT : WH/III/Carib
EXT : 2056
DATE : 20 December 1958

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE		
☐	DEFERRED	DEC 20 18 21 '58
☒	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

56079
OUT56079

TO MEXI INFO HAVA CITE DIR 05525

05525

AMUTTER

[illegible] CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN NOEMAYR RETURN FIDEL CASTRO AREA. DURATION AND NATURE MISSION SAME AS NOEMAYR'S TRIP LAST MARCH. AFTER CONSULTATION NOEMAYR ADVISE FEASIBILITY THIS OP AND WHETHER STATION CAN RELEASE HIM FOR APPROX SIX WEEKS BEGINNING EARLY JANUARY

END OF MESSAGE

File Noemayer 201-

201-168881

Robert N. Dahlgren
for J.C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

440 ER/DLD

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 19 DECEMBER 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 20 04 31 '58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 39959

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2988

REF: HAVA 0666 (IN 36388)

DIR 04579 (OUT 54018)*

1. NOEMAYR DID NOT GO HAVA. ONLY WIFE AND CHILDREN FOR PURPOSE RENEWING THEIR TOURIST VISAS, DISPOSING BULK OF HOUSE HOLD ITEMS AND CARRYING BACK REMAINING SMALL ITEMS MEXI.

2. NOEMAYR PLANS GO TEXAS EARLY JANUARY FOR VISA RENEWAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED REASON FOR NOEMAYR TRAVEL TO CUBA, LENGTH OF STAY AND WHERE HE CAN BE CONTACTED.

File Noemayr 201

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

556 WH/DLD/

ORIG : Robert N. Dahlgren
UNIT : C/WH/III
EXT : 3997
DATE : 14 Dec '58

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY, HAVANA
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : S/C 2

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	DEC 14 19 21 58	
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT 54018

TO MEXI INFO HAVA CITE DIR 04579

04579

ADVISE REASON NOEMYER TRAVEL CUBA, LENGTH STAY AND WHERE CAN BE CONTACTED.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

File: Noemyer 201 (Personal)

R. N. DAHLGREN

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

418 BD/LR/LR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 10 DECEMBER 1958 [illegible]

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: C/WH 2

INFO : *COP, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 11 01 52 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 36388

TO MEXI INFO DIR CITE HAVA 0666

RE: HAVA 482 (IN 41535)
DIR 40487 (OUT 71918)

FYI: HAROLD B NOEMAYR AND FAMILY ARRIVED HAVA FROM MEXI 5 DEC 58 VIA CUBANA 465.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

File Noemayr

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMT-585
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 10 December 1958
SUBJECT Hospitalization Benefits for Dependents of Harold R. NOEMAYR		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED See paragraph 2 below.		

REFERENCE(S)

FR 20-1000, paragraph 2, c.

1. Harold R. NOEMAYR, a Career Agent, is incurring medical expenses from the required hospitalization and medical/surgical treatment of one of his minor dependents. He wishes to know if he is covered by insurance that includes the above type of expenses for his dependents.

2. It is noted that reference regulation mentions in general terms that Career Agents are usually entitled to the same benefits as Staff Employees. However, since the Station does not have a copy of NOEMAYR's contract, it is requested that Headquarters check his personnel file to determine if he and his dependents are all covered by some manner of hospitalization plan and, if so, what the exact terms are that this plan covers.

Willard C. CURTIS

PCK/vps
8 December 1958

Distribution
3 Hqs

201-168851

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : MERVIN JENNINGS: SS
UNIT : FINANCE DIVISION 538
EXT : 4677
DATE : 7 AUGUST 1958

TO : MEXICO
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : FD 2
INFO : WH 4, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

AUG 13 16 56 '58
CABLE SECT

☐	DEFERRED	☐ PRIORITY	INITIALS
☒	ROUTINE	☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

CS COPY

OUT61565
OUT 61565

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 36120
FINAN

36120

PAY NOEMAYE 328.73 FOR SUMS DUE FROM HQS THRU 12 JULY. EFFECTIVE PERIOD ENDING 9 AUGUST, DEPOSITS OF 43.70 WILL BE MADE TO HIS BANK.

END OF MESSAGE.

Noemaye Support

Eldridson
C/WH/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

715
WH/BF
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

FD/CATAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

SECRET

4-1335

Executive Registry
10-6438/

12 August 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Commendation for Mr. Ross L. Crosier

The signature of the Deputy Director on the enclosed commendation is requested. It will be recalled that Mr. Crosier made an outstanding contribution to the intelligence mission of the Western Hemisphere Division in March 1958.

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

1 Attachment

DD/P/WH:RReynolds:fem 12 August 1958

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Signer
1 - WH/III

201-168881

SECRET

SECRET

24 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

VIA : FI/OPS/Projects (Miss Paxton)

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR
Amendment of Contract

Forwarded herewith are the signed original and one copy of an amendment to Subject's contract. This amendment was prepared at Headquarters and forwarded to the field for signature. Subject is a career agent in Project LIEDGE.

R. W. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

WH/3/Mexico/LSulc:ngs

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Mexico Chrono
1 - Subject

201-168881

SECRET

509 SE/SE/SE/ 1/ N

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : ROBERT N. DAHLGREN
UNIT : WH
EXT : 2287
DATE : 12 JULY 1958

509

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

JUL 12 16 1[illegible]
CABLE SEC

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT99445
OUT 99445

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 31306

REF: DIR 31132 (OUT 99075) *

NOEMAYR ARRIVING FLIGHT 69 AMERICAN 13 JULY.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *NOEMAYR RETURNING 12 JULY.

File: Noemayr

201-168881

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R N Dahlgren
J.C. KING/CWH
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

R N Dahlgren
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

512 ERB/SW/

ORIG : J. B. BRADY
UNIT : WH/III/MEXICO
EXT : 2555
DATE : 11 JULY 1958

512

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 11 15 52Z '58
DIR CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				INITIALS
	DEFERRED	X	~~PRIORITY~~	
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 99075

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 31132

NOEMAYR RETURNING 12 JULY.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168981

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

R. H. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-T-294

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 9 July 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO: Finance Division

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative

SPECIFIC— Contract Amendment - Harold R. NOEMAYR

ACTION REQUIRED: For your files

REFERENCE : HMM-W-6481, 19 Jun 58

Per referenced dispatch, we are forwarding herewith subject's contract amendment, signed as requested. We have retained a copy for our files.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

GPO/jpw

Attachment:
1 & 2 cc's contract

7 July 1958

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/atts a/s
1 - Finance Division, w/o att

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

301-168881

SECRET

Mr. Harold R. Noemayr

Dear Mr. Noemayr:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957, as amended.

Effective 1 May 1958, said contract, as amended, is further amended in the following manner:

a. The first sentence of sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph four (4), entitled "Allowances," is revised to read as follows:

> "In addition to the above payments, you will be entitled to an equalization allowance computed in conformance with applicable Government regulations and policies. (For your information, the equalization allowance for Mexico City is presently $000.00)"

b. The following sub-paragraph is added after sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph five (5), entitled "Travel":

> "(d) For you, your dependents, your personal automobile and your household effects between permanent posts of assignment."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY Willard C. Curtis
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Harold R. Noemayr
Harold R. Noemayr

WITNESS: Walter B. Marchman

APPROVED:

SECRET

X

FILE NO. 201-168881

2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

*S E C R E T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JUL 2 19 00Z58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 49957

295 ERB/SW/RFL/

DATE : 02 JULY 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ✓
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated ✓
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ______ None required ✓
Signature: Hugh C. MacCaul

TO OPIM DIR INFO HAVA CITE MEXI 1892

RE: DIR 29606 (OUT 95479)*

NOEMAYR LEFT MEXI AMERICAN AIRLINES FLT 158 1115 HRS 2 JULY. ARR WASH AMERICAN AIRLINES FLT 114 2345 HRS 2 JULY. PLANS STAY DUPONT PLAZA HOTEL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED HAROLD R NOEMAYR REPORT HQS IMMED FOR CONSULT PRIOR TDY CUBA TO REESTABLISH CONTACT FIDEL CASTRO.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

* CLASSIFICATION ASSIGNED BY WASH SIG CEN.

2 July 58
201-168881 ✓

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

094 ERB/RG
DATE '10 JUN 1958 -94

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

JUN 11 12 02 '58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

TO 'DIRECTOR
FROM 'MEXICO CITY
ACTION : FD 3
INFO : FI/OPS 2, WH 4, S/C 2 , OP 2

IN: 40330

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1746

DTEARN

HAROLD R. NOEMAYR AND DEPENDENTS ARRIVED MEXI 7 JUNE. PLS ADVISE FIELD ALLOTMENT AND EFFECTIVE PERIOD.

END OF MESSAGE

file
noemayr
201

CONFIDENTIAL

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

551 MJ/DUB/ [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : V. SOLC
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 2 JUNE 1958

551

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUN 3 10 18 Z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE					
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 34452
OUT 34452

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 24927
24927

RE MEXI 1608 (IN 32413)*

NOEMAYR ETA 1730 HRS 7 JUNE. WILL CALL POSTANY HOME USING TRUE FIRST NAME. WILL CALL MARCHMAN OFFICE IF UNABLE REACH POSTANY.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED NOEMAYR ETA.

DCA/DAL AAL 15 0935-1145 6 JUN 58
DAL/MEX AAL 159 1350-1730 7 JUN 58

Travel Order # WH-318-58
Allot # 8-3570-83-599
Obligation ref. #734, 7 Apr 58

x 247571

file NOEMAYR/201

R. Dahlgren
for J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~ C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

14-00000

PERSONAL DOCUMENTS FROM

VOL IV of V

CROZIER

SUBJECT [illegible]	MFG.—11-69 **DOC. NO. & SYMBOL** [illegible]
	DOC. DATE / **DATE REC'D**
	SUSPENSE DATE
COMMENTS [illegible]	**FILE NUMBER**

ROUTING	DATE OUT

FORM NO. 779
1 MAY 56
USE PREVIOUS EDITION

LOCATOR AND CONTROL RECORD (13) 3

NOTI

1.

2.

3. ~~DATE OF~~

4. Do you contemplate dissemination of information reviewed:

☐ to field

☐ to another US Government Agency (if so, to whom)______________

The dissemination of any Office of Security investigative information, including FBI reports, must be coordinated with CI/R&A and the Office of Security.
CB

5. Comments:

DO NOT REMOVE THE ATTACHED FOLDER FROM CI/R&A/CB

FORM 3230
8-70

SECRET

(13-21-40)

SECRET

THIS FOLDER IS NOT TO BE RELEASED OUTSIDE OF CI/STAFF. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH THIS FOLDER MUST NOTIFY CI/OA(5077) IMMEDIATELY IF IT IS TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER GROUP WITHIN CI/STAFF SO THAT IT MAY BE RECHARGED TO THE

14-00000

08/74/13 — C-101080

ORIG: MICHAEL OLEJAR[illegible]
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 5668 [illegible] 1463
DATE: 24 MAY 1968

SECRET

201-335555

SECRET [illegible] CITE DIRECTOR -0324[illegible]

[illegible] INFO: [illegible], [illegible] FRANKFURT

TYPIC [illegible]

REF: MADRID 4958 (IN 17725)

1. AMFAUNA/19 (201-335555) HAD NO CONTACT WITH WOFIRM. HE [illegible] BY AMFAUNA/1 AS [illegible] FOR AMFAUNA INTEL NET. NO HQS RECORD OF ESCROW OR OTHER COMMITMENTS. AMFAUNA/19 ATTEMPTED RE-ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH AMFAUNA/1 VIA AN INNOCUOUS LETTER IN 1964 AND WAS SENT AN S/W SCORCH CARBON. NO OTHER CORRESPONDENCE FOLLOWED. AN OA WAS GRANTED [illegible] 1962.

2. FILE INDICATES AMFAUNA/19 WAS ONE SEVERAL HUNDRED EMPLOYEES DISMISSED BY CUBANA [illegible] FOLLOWING THE TRIALS OF AMFAUNA/1 AND AMTRUNK/10 APRIL 1966. THERE IS NO INDICATION GOC AWARE OF HIS INTEL CONNECTION IN AMFAUNA NET; HOWEVER, HIS ROLE WAS KNOWN TO AMFAUNA/[illegible].

3. CONCUR [illegible]. WILL PROVIDE OPS AND INTEL REQUIREMENTS WHEN INITIAL DEBRIEFING REPORT IS RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: PER

☐ NO COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO.

703947

WH/COG/COMMENTS: [illegible] that [illegible] 19 arrived Spain as refugee and requested guidance re any Committments or ESCROW account established.

C/WH/COG/OPS

C/WH/COG

WH/1/MEXICO C.E. [illegible]danos (by phone)

E/G Bob Wood (by phone)

EUR/CUBA

R/[illegible]

JOHN L. HART
C/EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

C-101080

CABLE SEC DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

DISSEM BY: 25 PER ____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION
WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE. VR. WH 8, EUR 8, CI, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T Ø32232Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2290

3 May 68 IN 03837

M

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC AMICARUS

REF: BOOK DISPATCH 6372 (NOT SENT MEXICO)

1. REF REQUESTS CERTAIN STATIONS LOCATE CONTACTS AND POSSIBLE ACCESS AGENTS TO OBTAIN ASSESSMENT AMICARUS/1 (IDEN TO MEXICO ONLY).

PR

2. WHILE VISITING MEXICO CITY MARCH 68, AMCONCERT/1 MET ORLANDO DE JESUS (VENTURA) REYES, CUBAN EXILE DOCTOR AND FORMER MEMBER 13 MARZO DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO. VENTURA, DPOB 15 JULY 31, SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR, CAMAGUEY, ARRIVED MEXICO CITY 17 NOV 57, RESIDES APT 1, CALLE ZAMORA 112, COLONIA CONDESA. VENTURA WAS CLOSE FRIEND JOSE ANTONIO (ECHEVERRIA) BIANCHI, CONSIDERED MARTYR BY DIRECTORIO, AND WAS CLOSE FRIEND AMICARUS/1 AND OTHER DIRECTORIO LEADERS. VENTURA ARRESTED DURING AMLASH/1 TRIAL AND SENTENCED TWO YEARS FOR ANTI REGIME ACTIVITIES.

C-77112 /20

C-101080 /20

3. AMCONCERT/1 BELIEVES VENTURA WILLING COOPERATE WITH WOFIRM BUT NOT WITH CUBAN EXILE GROUPS. IN ORDER

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE, VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 2298 S E C R E T

SATISFY HQS REQUIREMENTS OBTAIN INFO DIRECTORIO LEADERS, MEXICO MAY WISH ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACT FOR DEBRIEFING.

4. JMWAVE TRACES SHOW VENTURA ANTI COMMUNIST DOCTOR WHO PLANNED DEFECT 1964, WORKED FOR CUBAN GOVT AS MEDICAL DOCTOR, WAS IN EXILE MEXICO CITY 1958 WHERE ARRESTED FOR ANTI BATISTA ACTIVITIES AND WORKED WITH GUSTAVO (ARCOS) BERGNES IN 26TH JULY MOVT MEXICO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION: WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH-8, EUR-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/IC-2

SECRET 032232Z MAY 69 CITE JMWAVE 2291

3 MAY 69 IN 03842

M

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMICARUS

REF: JMWAVE 2290 (IN 03837)

IDENTITY: JULIO (GARCIA) OLIVERA, CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO NORTH VIET NAM AND MEMBER 13 MARZO DIRECTORIO.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

[illegible]

Cuban Asks to Be Shot For Plot to Kill Castro

HAVANA (AP) — A former Cuban army major has asked a revolutionary tribunal to sentence him to death because he agreed to shoot Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

"To the wall. To be executed, that is what I want," Rolando Cubelas told the tribunal yesterday.

He and six other Cubans are on trial, accused of plotting to assassinate Castro with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Cuban exile leader Manuel Artime.

"I was the victim of my weaknesses and contradictions," Cubelas said. "I simply fell into the hands of the enemy.

"If I have to die, I will do it yelling, 'Viva la revolucion, fatherland or death, we will win.' "

Death Asked for Three

At the opening of the trial in La Cabana prison fortress, prosecutor Jorge Segura asked the death penalty for Cubelas, former Maj. Ramon Guin, Jose Gonzalez Gallaretta and Alberto Blanco Romariz.

He asked 30-year prison terms for Juan Alsina Navarro, Guillermo Cunil Alvarez and Angel Herrero Veliz.

Guin is charged with knowing about the plot, concealing it and spying for the CIA.

Cubelas testified that Artime persuaded him to join the plot during a meeting in Madrid on Christmas Day, 1964. He said that in February, 1965, Artime gave him a high-powered telescope and a silencer for his rifle, and he agreed to shoot Castro from a distance of about 800 yards.

'In Hands of Enemy'

"This was a cowardly act," he said. "I fell in the hands of the enemy."

Cubelas said the meeting was arranged by a Cuban resident of Madrid and by Odon Alvarez de la Campa, a former counselor to the Cuban embassy in the Spanish capital who defected in March, 1965.

About 500 persons, including Cuban and foreign newsmen, attended the session of the trial.

Schirra Ponders Settling in Perth

PERTH, Australia (AP)—American astronaut Walter M. Schirra Jr. says he is seriously considering settling in Perth when he is through with outer space.

Navy Capt. Schirra and Air Force Col. Frank Borman orbited around the capital of western Australia today, meeting political and civic leaders and other residents of the "City of Lights."

Perth is the site of a tracking station for U.S. space flights and puts on its lights when American astronauts fly over the area at night. Schirra during his six-orbit flight Oct. 3, 1962, radioed the station that he had spotted the lights during his second orbit.

The Evening Star—The Sunda

Published by THE EVENING STAR NEWSPAPER CO
MAIN OFFICE: 225 Virginia Ave. S.E., Washington, D. C. 20003—Tele

The Associated Press is entitled exclusively to the use for rep
the local news printed in this newspaper as well as all A. P. n

EUROPEAN BUREAU—
London SW 7, England, 122 Old Brompton Rd.
ASIAN BUREAU—
Hong Kong, Repulse Bay Hotel
ADVERTISING REPRESENTATION BY
MILLION MARKET NEWSPAPERS, INC.
NEW YORK, N. Y.
CHICAGO, ILL.
DETROIT, MICH.
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.
THE LEONARD COMPANY
MIAMI BEACH, FLA.

DELI
Evening and Sunday
Monthly —— 2.60
Weekly —— .60

RATES BY MA
Anywhere
Evening and Sunday
1 year —— 32.00
6 months —— 16.50
3 months —— 8.50
1 month —— 3.00

Entered at Post Office, Washington, D. C., Second-Class Post

14-00000

negotiate peace, and let war stand aside while the people of

Two Ex-Majors Arrested in Cuba As CIA Agents

HAVANA (AP)—Two former Cuban Army men, one of whom played a key role in Fidel Castro's rise to power, have been arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary activities for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The Interior Ministry announced last night that Dr. Rolando Cubela and Ramon Guin, both former majors, had been arrested for "actions which seriously involve them in counter-revolutionary activities" with the CIA.

Cubela, a physician, has been director of Havana's Fajardo Hospital. Before the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista's regime, he was a commander of Castro's guerrilla forces in the Escambray Mountains.

After Castro took over, he became first president of the Federation of University Students at Havana University.

No information was given on Guin.

EARLY MARCH 1964

(C-10108)

201-142291

J.U ORLANDO CUBELAS C-101080

[illegible]

Memo for the File

[illegible] In connection with [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] to kill Castro, [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible] information [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible].

(1) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] FELIAFEL Canahan ([illegible] = [illegible]). He has been a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] infil missions. [illegible] from [illegible] to the [illegible] of [illegible] CUBELAS, JUAN FELIAFEL [illegible] overboard, presumably [illegible], ~~[illegible]~~ off the Cuban coast while on an infil mission which aborted. ~~[illegible]~~

During the [illegible] he corroborated the [illegible] story of the plot, stating he [illegible] a [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] plot or (in its [illegible]) [illegible] —

(2) His brother, [illegible] FELIAFEL Canahan, [illegible] in Miami, has been picked up by Agency, has left to join MRR ([illegible] FI [illegible] & works with Manuel ARTIME) & [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] of WAVE.

SECRET

C/OA

HAVANA (AP) [illegible] in a televised [illegible] Spain [illegible] U.S. C[illegible] cy.

[illegible]

Cubelas was a [illegible] Castro [illegible] President [illegible]

Castro 'Advised'

The communique [illegible] that Castro himself and other officials helped in uncovering the alleged plot.

It said that after Cuba's security agency reported that Cubelas was making [illegible] trips to Spain, Castro called him to his office.

CIA Official Named

At the same time [illegible] Alvarez de la Campa [illegible] Cuban Embassy official, [illegible] linked [illegible] with CIA agents in the Spanish capital.

[illegible] was arranged for Alvarez de la Campa [illegible] who was an official of the American Embassy in Spain. Noel gave the [illegible]

U.S. State Department directories list a James A. Noel as being attached to the U.S. Embassy in Madrid since Sept. 17, 1961. The State Department's biographic register lists Noel as serving in the U.S. Embassy in Havana from [illegible] to [illegible]

Alvarez de la Campa defected in March [illegible], and contacted a group of Cuban exiles in Madrid who eventually arranged meetings between Cubelas and Artime in [illegible]

It was during these meetings that the assassination and counterrevolutionary plots were drawn up.

Cubelas was to be the head of the counterrevolution and Artime served the technical means with support from the CIA, "various Central American governments and the Organization of American States," [illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY dP

ACTION
WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CA2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, C/FI, FI

SECRET 252214Z CITE JMWAVE 4286

DIRECTOR

25 NOV 65 IN 46546

TYPIC

REF DIRECTOR 53681

1. DEBRIEFING JUAN A. ORTEGA HERRERA AND JULIAN PEREZ PARRADO AS WELL AS INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN OF SHIP "CHIRICANO" WHICH PICKED UP ESCAPEES ESTABLISHED BONA FIDES. LOW KEY EXPLOITATION OF ESCAPE STORIES ARRANGED THRU AMHIM FACILITIES.

201 C-101080

2. AMLASH-1 REPORTED BY ESCAPEES TO BE WORKING AS [redacted] PRISONER-MEDICAL ASSISTANT ON ISLE OF PINES. SOME AMERICANS IN PRISON BUT NAMES NOT KNOWN. NO KNOWLEDGE AMSOUR-1. OTHER NAMES RESULTING FROM DEBRIEFING WILL BE REPORTED BY SEPARATE CABLE.

201 C-100068

3. ESCAPEES MADE AVAILABLE TO QKFLOWAGE AND LNYUMA 25 NOVEMBER. LNYUMA HOPES TO USE EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM PEREZ PARRADO AGAINST OSMANI NODARSE, ALLEGED CUIS AGENT RESIDENT JMWAVE AREA.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 28 SEP 1964	CASE NO. 201- 101080

☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA	

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES	☐ FILE
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐ TICKLE
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐ OTHER

☐ POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

Proc -

cancel tickle and retire file.

Leonard W. Tate

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

SECRET

6 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMLASH-1 C-101080

1. Reference is made to your "Request for Information" dated 31 July 1964 concerning Subject.

2. The PRQ Part II on AMTRUNK-10 (201-142291) contains certain errors which are being struck: AMLASH-1 is not a Headquarters internal asset, nor is he running any internal group. The relationship between AMTRUNK-10 and AMLASH-1 is a personal one - they have been friends for many years. AMLASH-1 is not doing anything whatsoever at the present time inside Cuba which has anything to do with any KUBARK operation, plan, activity; in addition, he is not furnishing any Political or Foreign Intelligence. A POA was requested on him in June of 1962 for recruitment as a possible defector. He returned to Cuba and has resumed his career as a surgeón. He is working with the cardiology department of the Manuel Fajardo Hospital.

3. Station JMWAVE is being advised of the above.

Samuel Halpern
ADC/WH/SA

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee

File 201 < 101080
142291 thermofax copy

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
31 July 1964 dlr

TO:
WH/SA/IOS - Joe Moughan

C NO.
C - 101080

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

SUBJECT:
AMLASH/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL.

REMARKS:

1. Statements in the PRQ Part II for AMTRUNK-10 (201-142291) indicate that Subject is being used, although POA expired and was cancelled on 4 November 1963, as the leader of a group including AMTRUNK-10.

2. It is requested that a Division representative discuss this case at CI/OA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 31 JUL 1964	CASE NO. 201- 101 080
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LEFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below or see remarks)	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	X	TICKLE 30 Aug 64 Discuss
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	X	OTHER
☐	POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
☐	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

Note for file: OA granting for AMTRUNK-10 is pending resolution of Subject's status. [initials]

REMARKS

WH/SA/105

1. Statements in the PRQ-II for AMTRUNK-10 (201-142291) indicate that Subject is ~~[illegible]~~ being used, although POA expired and was cancelled on 4 Nov 63, as the leader of a group including AMTRUNK-10.

2. It is requested that a Division representative discuss this case at CI/OA.

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

FROM: CABLE

ACTION

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 48405
Date Received SA

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Dr 3		16 SEP		RB	
Mr MacAuley WH/CUBA				MCQ	Verbal approval from Mr. Oden, CI/OA on 11 Sept. 1957 - Written request for OA amendment submitted to CI/OA same date MCQ.
3. WH BB				Mr Rastetter read this	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					

Paul:

Please draft cable to station and coordinate with Dick Rastetter :

"Hqs. has no objection use subject to contact Amourette B. ~~Due present situation Amourette-A,~~ ~~suggest station use [illegible] discretion in contacting Amourette-10 if such is felt necessary to maintain latter's interest.~~ AGL ~~Suggest~~ contacts be kept [illegible] minimum during "cooling off period" until replacement arrives.

Rastetter edited above MCQ
12 Sept

Each comment should be number
A line should be drawn across she
Officer designations should be use
Each officer should initial (check
Action desired or action taken sho
Routing sheet should always be re
For officer designations see separa

SECRET

201-168881

FROM: CABLE

ACTION

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 48405
Date Received SA

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Dr 3		10 SEP			
2. Mr MacAuley WH/CUBA				MCQ	Verbal approval from Mr. Oden, CI/OA on 11 Sept. 1957 - Written request for OA amendment submitted to CI/OA same date MCQ.
3. WH BB				Mr Rathstetter read this	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					

Paul:

Please draft cable to station and coordinate with Dick Rastetter :

"Hqs. has no objection use subject to contact Amourette B. ~~Due present situation Amourette-A, suggest station use [illegible] discretion in contacting Amourette-10 if~~ such is felt ~~necessary to maintain latter's interest.~~ AGL ~~Suggest~~ contacts be kept [illegible] minimum during "cooling off period" until replacement arrives.

Rathstetter edited above 12 Sept MCQ

Each comment should be number
A line should be drawn across she
Officer designations should be use
Each officer should initial (check
Action desired or action taken sh
Routing sheet should always be re
For officer designations see separa

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-19 JAN 1947

201-168881

116

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 116 BD/MK/BM
10 SEPT 1957

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

VAIVADA, ARTHUR G.

SEP 10 15 40 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 48405

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 016

RE: HAVA 014 (IN 48222)*

RE PARA 3 REF REQUEST APPROVAL USE ARTHUR G. VAIVADA AS CONTACT AMOURETTE B, AMOURETTE 10 IF NECESSARY, AND OTHER KUCAGE ASSETS AT STATION DISCRETION PENDING REPLACEMENT GALLEGOS. WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH HIS KUTUBE DUTIES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: STATION COULD PROVIDE CONTACT FOR AMOURETTE-B AND POSSIBLY A ON INTERIM BASIS.

CS COPY

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 10 SEPT	

03

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

10 SEP 57

201-168881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch) DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2362

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana 29 JUL 57 09 12

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational
{ SPECIFIC C Arthur G. VAIVADA

References: HKH-W-2268, 22 May 1957

Action Required: For Subject's Information

Subject's contract dated 1 August 1954 was recently amended to read as follows:

"Effective 14 May 1957, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting in its entirety Paragraph 1 (b) and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

'1 (b) Additional compensation calculated at the rate of $5,135 per annum.'

All other terms and conditions of the original contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect."

COPY

17 July 1957

Charles E. Apple
for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
- 3 - Habana
- 1 - RI
- 1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs

Charles E. Apple
for J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-347

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T
DATE: 20 May 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- OPERATIONS
SPECIFIC- Request for Project Authorization

REFERENCE: TZP-W-411

1. Authorization is hereby requested for the project described below, which we plan to initiate on 1 June 1949. In view of the comment contained in paragraph 2 of referenced communication, we are assuming that commencement of this project on a simple exploratory basis has already been approved by headquarters. No further commitments, other than those described below, will be made.

A. Objectives

(1) Cutout services, as suggested by headquarters, in an effort to test Subject's abilities.

(2) As a basic and continuing assignment to permit and encourage development of Subject's best local contacts as well as in the hope of filling a long-felt need in our operational pattern, he will be assigned to the general topic of labor; specifically, communist penetration of local non-communist labor groups and theoretical developments which are of interest regardless of group designation.

(3) Subject appears to be genuinely interested and to possess an unusual appreciation for operational ways and means, which is seldom encountered. For this reason, none of his assignments will be exclusive, and he will be encouraged to follow up such leads and opportunities as arise in the course of his daily occupations regardless of any objective and target assignments.

INDEX

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED

23 may 1949 43-25
201-168881

B. Targets

(1) Subject will commence by serving as cutout for Hugger, who has always held out great promise but never been properly developed or directed.

(2) In the labor field, the principal and only target at the moment is the only labor federation, the Rerum Novarum.

(3) Subject will represent our only contact among the student groups and certain allied "intellectual" societies. Any activity in this category showing promise may subsequently become an assigned target.

C. Cryptonym and Essential Data on Personnel

The designation "Hydropathic", heretofore applied to subject individual, is hereby discarded. He will hereafter be designated by San Jose Station Symbol No. 26. For essential data on personnel, see TZP-A-365, Part I and II.

D. Control and Contact

Judging by Subject's background data and his already demonstrated cooperative attitude, we do not feel that control and direction of his activities will be any problem. Contact, owing to the nature of this project, will be frequent and carried out in any convenient manner, generally in one or the other of our respective homes.

E. Cover

Subject had planned to and has established himself in Costa Rica for entirely personal reasons, prior to any contact with this office. He has a Costa Rican wife, attends the university, and lives a perfectly normal life which any assignments from us will not disrupt. Our only anticipated problem is that of routine contacts between Subject and the Chief of Station. That matter will be handled with care and discretion.

DESENSITIZED
PER CSI 43-23

F. Cost

Subject has agreed to serve for a salary equivalent to $50.00 per month, to be paid in colones. To offset this expense we plan to dispense with the services of Hucklebone who is presently receiving $400.00 per month.

KAPOK

DESENSITIZED

G. Timing and other Factors

Our preliminary interviews with Subject lead us to believe that he will be the interested and reliable American cutout for which this station has long felt a need. His greatest virtue in this respect appears to be an understanding of operational methods and an appreciation of relative values with respect to information. It is hoped to make this a permanent project, but our plans and our arrangements with Subject are considered to be probationary, dependent entirely upon his development and future usefulness.

Elmer C. Mercer

Elmer C. Mercer

DESENSITIZED

SECRET KAPOK DESENSITIZED

20 May 1949
201-168 881

14-00000

TZPA 365/01

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR POUCH
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TZP-A-365/ ~~Part II~~ /01

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FBT

DATE: 4 November 1948

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama.

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations.
SPECIFIC- Operational Data - HYDROPATHIC PART II

1. The subject of TZP-A-365 Part I is HYDROPATHIC.

2. Subject is best qualified to serve as a cutout in handling informants. He has had experience along these lines in cultivating and collecting information from the following individuals:

Government Oppositionists:

Dr. José PEZET
Lic. Angel VEGA Mendez
Eng. Luis A. CRUZ
Prof. Luis FARIAS

Government Supporters:

Lic. Demetrio MARTINEZ
Lic. Alberto [illegible]SALLO
Lic. Generoso SILCOS

As a result of the recent meeting between Elmer C. MERCER and Grover J. WARING, Subject has been recruited for the specific task of acting as a cutout in handling HYDROCYST I, who can be handled more profitably if trasferred to the control of MERCER's station. Subject to Home Office approval, no definite commitments have been made in this case.

3. Subject has a working knowledge of the following subjects:

a. Protocol
b. Liaison methods pertaining to intelligence in Latin American countries and inter-departmental liaison within our own government.
c. Communications systems. Subject transmits and receives about 12 - 16 words per minute in Morse code.
d. The political structure of Latin American governments.

Index D X

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

e. Subversive potential and leading subversive personalities of most Latin American countries.

f. Subject is trained in the use of firearms, jungle warfare, and has studied and worked with maps and charts, and is acquainted with surveillance and evasion procedures.

g. His primary activity after his arrival in the new area may of itself be useful. However, it is doubtful if this man will be able to devote any large portion of his time to our work until such time as he is thoroughly oriented.

4. Subject is best qualified to procure information in Latin American countries, particularly Panama and Costa Rica.

MANNER OF OPERATION

5. After he has established himself, Subject is interested in traveling in Argentina, Chile and Brazil.

6. He is willing to travel for us and subject to Home Office approval, it is planned to introduce HYDROPATHIC to HYDROCYST who will, in turn, introduce HYDROPATHIC to HYDROCYST I and, if approved, to HYDROCYST II. For the sake of cover, this is to be done on the basis that HYDROCYST and HYDROPATHIC are lodge brothers. HYDROPATHIC will join that organization in order to build up the cover. (Paragraph 8, TZP-A-365 Part I).

7. The number of people that will work for Subject is undetermined. Tentatively we have in mind HYDROCYST I and HYDROCYST II and, if he recruits them, the subjects underlined in red in Paragraph 16 of TZP-A-365 Part I. It might be well to start collecting biographic data on the latter three individuals at this time.

8. Subject is employed by another agency, but that employment will be terminated in the near future.

9. Subject has been recruited on an Embassy Intelligence Officer basis. It is possible that he knows the ultimate destination of any information he may submit.

10. As presently planned, HYDROCYST and HYDROPATHIC will be acquainted with each other. The turnover could be effected without these agents meeting, but then it would be more difficult to build up the lodge cover story. It would even be possible for HYDROPATHIC to communicate with HYDROCYST since both have a knowledge of Morse Code. However, it is believed that future information from HYDROCYST I will not have its primary value in this area.

11. Subject will be briefed to communicate by letter-drop. Here again, a lodge connection might be used as this is the present system which HYDROCYST I employs in forwarding communications to HYDROCYST.

12. Subject will be briefed to report in writing and to require his sub-agents to do so wherever possible.

SENSITIZED

SECRET

13. Subject cannot be expected to devote any major portion of his time to our work until he has built up his cover and is oriented in his new surroundings. Although fluent in the language, he will probably encounter a good deal of new terminology.

14. Subject has entered into a tentative oral contract to perform services for us for a salary of $50.00 per month. This can be made into a written contract at any time.

15. Subject's tentative continuing project is outlined in paragraph 2 above.

16. Subject should be capable of initiating his own projects.

PAYMENT

17. Starting in February 1949, it will be necessary to pay subject $50.00 U.S. dollars per month as indicated in paragraph 14 above.

18. Subject has been told that if his services prove satisfactory, he can expect an increase in salary. No specific amount was discussed.

19. It is contemplated that this station may be required to pay certain travel expenses for Subject. If done, this will be charged against Project Development.

20. No cost of purchase of information is involved at this time.

21. Subject's superiors regard this man as highly dependable. He has had considerable experience in writing reports and has remarked that his two principal criticisms of intelligence reporting as he has observed it in this area is that the reporting is inclined to be sensational rather than factual and that most people have nothing to report other than that which the opposition is willing that they receive. He should have a fair concept of security. However, general security in this area is very lax and he may have subconscious bad habits.

22. In view of his background, Subject should only be good in semi-covert work.

23. If this man is kept under cover he might eventually effect a penetration of scholastic or parlor-pink circles. It is presumed that this would be on a low level.

24. This individual could easily be recruited for a full-time job with our organization. However, it is believed that more is to be gained by starting him off in this manner, perhaps giving him periodic schooling and gradually increasing his activities and responsibilities.

CS COPY

Grover J. Waring

Grover J. Waring

Distribution:
Wash - 2
Sanj - 1
Files - 1

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~ SANITIZED

201-168881

14-00000

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

24 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CI

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 1610 BY

INFO FILE VR, DCI, DDCI, DCI(MIN), DIR, DDP, EX-DIR, CS/DO, CS/RF, C/CA2, C/CI, C/FI2, C/CPSER, C/DO4, C/DO/H3

S E C R E T 291900Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 4885

RYBAT

REF MEXI 4865 (IN 61382)*

*In the station's judgement, neither GOM nor VLT will wish to push this further.

29 Sep 65 IN 62264

1. NIGHT 28 SEPTEMBER LIFTER-3[1] SAID VLT CALLED MEETING NATIONAL DIRECTORATE SEPT 21, AT WHICH LIMOLD-1[2] PRESENT, AND TOLD GROUP PLANNED CALL PRESS CONFERENCE SEPT 23 TO MAKE EXPOSURE RE ODYOKE[3] INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES MEXI.

2. SEPT 25 VLT SPOKE BRIEFLY TO NUMBER OFFICIALS AT GOM ABOUT PRESS RELEASE AND SAID THAT TO GAIN MAXIMUM IMPACT HE ADDED CHARGE THAT L-1[2] AND RACIEL HERNANDEZ WERE THREATENED. ON QUESTIONING BY L-8[1], VLT SAID NO NEW ATTEMPTS MADE AGAINST PPS PEOPLE BUT BELIEVES SOME ODYOKE[3] AGENCY HAS POSSIBLY ONE MEMBER NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OR PROBABLY ONE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER WORKING FOR IT, BUT ADDED THIS TYPE OF THING DIFFICULT UNCOVER AND PROVE.

3. L-8[1] HAS TALKED TO ADRIANA SEVERAL TIMES SINCE EXPOSURE AND SHE SAYS PPS HAS NO PROOF OF CHARGES, AND NO EVIDENCE, DOCUMENTARY OR OTHERWISE, WHICH NOT PUBLISHED IN PRESS. THERE STILL NO EVIDENCE L-1[2] HAS REPORTED MOST RECENT APPROACH, AND NO EVIDENCE

SECRET

File
Lombardo T
201
201-161881

IN 62264

PAGE 2

HERNANDEZ HAS REPORTED MORE THAN FIRST MEETING AND FIRST TELEPHONE CALL TO PPS.

4. L-8 HAS TALKED TO HERNANDEZ SEVERAL TIMES SINCE PRESS RELEASE, AND LATTER ANGRY WITH VLT WHO FAILED CONSULT HIM BEFORE PRESS CONFERENCE. HERNANDEZ SAID VLT HAD PROMISED MATTER WOULD BE DROPPED AND NO PUBLICITY WOULD BE GIVEN APPROACH. HERNANDEZ NOW FEARS ODYOKE AGENCY WHICH APPROACHED HIM WILL HAVE HIM FIRED FROM HIS TWO JOBS, AND REALIZES PPS IN NO POSITION HELP HIM.

5. L-8 BELIEVES VLT MADE EXPOSURE THIS TIME IN EFFORT MAKE SOME FAVORABLE PROPAGANDA AT EXPENSE PBPRIME, KNOWING THAT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF LATTER HAVE BEEN "EXPOSED" IN NUMBER PLACES RECENTLY. ALSO, VLT VERY POSSIBLY TRYING OFFSET EXPECTED ADVERSE CRITICISM AS RESULT CHIHUAHUA INCIDENT 23 SEPT IN WHICH SOME UGOCM (PPS) PEOPLE INVOLVED. ACCORDING L-8, PPS AND VLT FEEL GOM NOT INTERESTED PPS CHARGES AND WILL NOT SERIOUSLY INVESTIGATE IF IN FACT ANY EFFORT MADE AT ALL. VLT PLANS SPEECH IN CONGRESS ON 5 OCT, AND ALTHOUGH ADRIANA SAID SPEECH WILL DEAL PRIMARILY WITH ECONOMIC MATTERS, L-8 FEELS CERTAIN VLT WILL DISCUSS ODYOKE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES MEXI.

6. PRESS MORNING 29 SEPT CARRIED ARTICLE ON INTERVIEW LUIS

SECRET

IN 61264 PAGE 3

ECHEVARRIA MINISTER OF GOBERNACION HAD WITH NUMBER REPORTERS 28 SEPT. ECHEVARRIA SAID VLT GAVE HIM DECLARATION 25 SEPT REGARDING SUPPOSED ACTS EXPIONAGE AND BRIBERY INVOLVING TWO OFFICIALS PPS. ECHEVARRIA SAID IN VIEW FACT ONE OF TWO PERSONS ACCUSED BY PPS IS FOREIGNER (TORELLI), GOBERNACION HAD INITIATED AN INVESTIGATION, BUT THAT FACTS PRESENTED BY PPS DO NOT CONSTITUTE EXPIONAGE, SINCE NEITHER PPS OFFICIAL INVOLVED IS PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR FUNCTIONARY. ADDED THAT IF FACTS CAN BE PROVEN IT MAY BE THAT THEY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THREATENING PHYSICAL HARM TO PPS OFFICIALS[5] AND THEIR FAMILIES[6].

[6] 7. BENADUM TALKED TO LITEMPO-1 28 SEPT RE VLT CHARGES. LITEMPO-1 APPEARED NOT AT ALL CONCERNED, SAID VLT HAS MAKE SOME KIND OF SPECTULAR CHARGES PERIODICALLY IN ORDER PROVE TO PPS RANK AND FILE HE HAS NOT JOINED PRI, AND INDICATED[7] GOM PLANS DO NOTHING ABOUT CHARGES. BENADUM[5] PLANS MENTION TO LITEMPO-4 AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY[8]

8. LIJERSEY-5 TOLD GERENDE[9] 28 SEPT HE HAD NOT SEEN LIJERSEY-1[10] SINCE TURN OVER TO CASE OFFICER IN 1957. L-5[8] DOES NOT KNOW LIHOLD-1[2] AND BELIEVES LIJERSEY-1[10], IF QUESTIONED, WOULD DENY ANY INTEL CONNECTIONS AND NOT REVEAL NAMES OTHER KUBARK PEOPLE THEN KNOWN TO HIM.

SECRET

SECRET

8 2

VIEW ABOVE DO NOT PLAN HAVE L/5 SEE L/1.

SECRET

IN 62264

PAGE 4

CFN 4385 4865 28 LIFTER-8 VLT 21 LIMOLD-1 23 RE ODYOKE 25 VLT UOM L-1 RACIEL HERNANDEZ L-8 VLT NO NEW PPS ODYOKE L-8 ADRIANA PPS NO PROOF NO EVIDENCE NOT PUBLISHED NO EVIDENCE L-1 NO EVIDENCE HERNANDEZ PPS L-8 HERNANDEZ VLT HERNANDEZ VLT NO PUBLICITY HERNANDEZ ODYOKE PPS NO POSITION L-8 VLT VLT CHIHUAHUA 23 UGOCM PPS L-8 PPS VLT GOM NOT INTERESTED PPS NOT SERIOUSLY VLT 5 OCT ADRIANA L-8 VLT ODYOKE 29 LUIS ECHEVARRIA GOBERNACION 28 ECHEVARRIA VLT 25 SEPT PPS ECHEVARRIA PPS TORELLI GOBERNACION PPS NOT CONSTITUTE PPS PPS BENADUM LITEMPO-1 28 RE VLT LITEMPO-1 NOT AT VLT PPS NOT JOINED PRI GOM BENADUM LITEMPO-4 LIJERSEY-5 GERENDE 28 NOT SEEN LIJERSEY-1 1957 L-5 NOT KNOW LIMOLD-1 LIJERSEY-1 NOT REVEAL KUBARK NOT PLAN L/5 L/1

B

SECRET

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

3/30

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, P/AII, CA2, CA/PROP, 5/Ops, CI/IC2

SECRET 2122052 [illegible]

DIR CITE MEXI 4852

REF A MEXI 4830 (IN 59248) ✱

B DIR 38518

1. NOTE STATE TELEGRAM 693 OF 24 SEPT INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES MENTIONED IN APPARENT FOLLOW UP EL DIA ARTICLE REF B. FULL TEXT VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO PRESS CONFERENCE BEING POUCHED.

2. INDEX.

SECRET

✱ RE MORNING PRESS CARRIED PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO

CFN 4852 4830 38518 693 24 SEP REF B VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO BEING POUCHED.

BT

RI 201-168881

File Ross CROZIER 201-168881

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	ROLL	NUMBER	PAY PERIOD DATE	ALLOTMENT	STA. NO.
NOEMAYR HAROLD R	15	857575	10/27 - 11/23	13220011000	000

	EARNINGS	DESCRIPTION
4*	961.92	REG SALARY
5*	1883.76	LSL

	DEDUCTIONS	DESCRIPTION
30*	62.52	RETMT
1*	1778.86	FED TAX 1
2*	1294.72-	FED TAX 2
69*	9.27	936HOSP 9

LEGEND of ACTION CODES

1. Promotions
2. Periodic Step Increase
3. Field Allotment
4. Salary Differential
5. Leave Without Pay
6. Hospital, Insurance, Credit Union
7. Overpayment
8. Tax Deduction Change
9. Allowances

RESIGN. EFF. 11/25/63
HEREWITH PJ THRU 11/25/63 + 376 hrs T/L @ 5.01 PER HR

EMPLOYEE NAME:
NOEMAYR HAROLD R

SECRET

EFFECTIVE DATE			CO. DE	EFFECTIVE DATE			CO. DE	ADDL. COMP.				
DAY	MO.	Y		DAY	MO.	Y		P/P	P/P	O/T	S/D	SOL.

FROM EMPLOYEE

than Normal Salary

2845.68	555.93	2289.75	2289.75	TOTALS
		NET PAY	PD. at HDQTS.	

FORM 11-58 1315 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(30)

201-168881

4 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract - Ross L. Crozier

201-168881

1. Attached is the original of Form 1689, Clearance Sheet for Termination of Contract Personnel, for retention in your file. A copy has been forwarded to the Office of Security for their records.

2. Also attached is Mr. Crozier's letter of resignation. In accordance with the provision of his contract providing for a ninety day notice, the resignation becomes effective close of business 28 November 1963.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Attachments:
Form 1689 h/w
Letter of Resignation

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 Addressee w/att
1 - Comp Tax Accts Br
1 - CCS
1 - Outplacement Branch

[illegible]

201-168881

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE

TO: (Check)
☐ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT

ATTN:

REF:

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED

ESTABLISHED FOR

FILE NO.

ID CARD NO.

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: (OPMEMO 20-800-11) [illegible] DATE: [illegible] November 19[illegible]

a. TEMPORARILY FOR _____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________________.

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ____________________.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3. (HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS: Cover History: 1953 - Jul 54 - NOC, CONUS; Aug 54 - Feb 57 - NOC, overseas; May 57 - Sept 60 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 60 - Aug 61 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 61 - Jan 63 - NOC, CONUS; Jan 63 - Jul 63 - DAC, Hdqs.

Subject will use above information for backstopping and use for commercial use only. Should he ever have need to apply for a governmental position, he will contact this office and will ignore above information and use CIA from Nex 1953 on.

Fwdg address not known.

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

27 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Charles Danish

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract Personnel - Ross L. Crozier

1. Mr. Ross L. Crozier, a Career Agent assigned to Special Affairs Staff, has tendered his resignation from the Agency. In accordance with the terms of his contract, he gave 90 days notice making his termination effective close of business 28 November 1963.

2. Subject's employment history was established by Mr. Biladeau of the Central Cover Staff in conjunction with the Outplacement Branch of the Personnel Operations Division. Mr. Crozier was advised that he should indicate employment by CIA from his EOD date (1 June 1949) through the above termination date when applying for a position with another Government Agency. If seeking employment with private business, however, he was to utilize the employment history provided him by the Outplacement Branch.

3. It is requested that Central Cover Staff's records be noted accordingly. Contract Personnel Division should be requested to refer all inquiries concerning Crozier's employment to the Outplacement Branch of the Personnel Operations Division, effective immediately. The Outplacement Branch will acknowledge Agency employment when the inquiry comes from a Government source, and will deny Agency affiliation to all other inquirers

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, **Ross L. Crozier**, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of our country. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of our government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims I may have against the Organization or our government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of the Organization concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

30 Aug. 63

201-168881

5. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to our government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of our government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and our government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 30th day of August 1963.

Ross L. Crozier (SEAL)
Signature

Witnessed by me this 30th ~~Aug~~ day of Aug. 1963
at Wash DC

George A. Ladner
Signature

14-00000

30 August 1963

Washington 25, D.C.

DIRECTOR,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington 25, D.C.

I hereby tender my resignation from the Central Intelligence Agency as a Career Agent. In accordance with the termination clause in my contract, request that all salary be continued for a period of 90 days from this date. I understand that my services are to be available to the Agency during the period of 90 days.

Ross L. Crozier
Ross L. Crozier

1607 S. 26th St
Arlington 6, Va.

201-168881

SECRET

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN DUPLICATE

DATE

PERSONAL DATA

NAME (Last, First, Middle - true or pseudonym) Crozier, Ross L.	OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Special Affairs Staff
LOCAL ADDRESS Apt. 8 1607 So 28th St Arlington Va	PERMANENT ADDRESS Same
PERMANENT STATION OR BASE Washington D.C.	POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE Ops Officer

CONTRACT DATA

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE 1 June 1957	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED original contract indefinite term	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES contract for indefinite term	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION 28 November 1963

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

RESIGNATION

INTERNAL STAFF OR DIVISION CLEARANCES (Add or delete as applicable)

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE		8/30/63	
LOGISTICS			
PERSONNEL		8/30/63	

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER	CLEARED BY (Signature) Charles Francis	DATE 30 Aug 63

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES

(OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE)

OFFICE	SCHEDULE			INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL
	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	
CENTRAL COVER DIVISION			Already briefed No interview nec.	CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE 23 Sep '63
OFFICE OF SECURITY SSD				CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CPD				CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE Aug 30, 1963

REMARKS (Please initial)

201-168881.

STAFF OR DIVISION AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT SAS/EOB	SIGNATURE OF STAFF OR DIVISION RESPONSIBLE OFFICER SAS/CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER	DATE

FORM 8-60 1669

SECRET

(8)

Ross L. Crozier
Resume

Al: 12 July 1963

On qualifications - there just aren't any in the civilian or industrial category - The university work in Economic Sciences was real, not cover, but interrupted before I got the degree (5 years). However, I specialized in Economic Theory, which when considered that I studied in three Latin American Universities (Costa Rica, Guatemala and Cuba) does give me some qualification as a "Latin American Consultant".

The classification as "Research Analyst" is cover except for that part of which the "Latin American" background could be utilized.

Although I have had no business experience in an administrative or executive capacity, I am sure that I could qualify in that work, especially if it were in connection with Latin America or utilizing my Spanish language ability.

As you can see by the above, unfortunately there is no commercial "counterpart" for the type of work I have been doing for 15 years or more. My feeling is that we should consult the "local outplacement" man first, on the possibility that there is a local opportunity, but the opportunities in the Latin American field whill be greater.

(In addition to the above, I might add that I have performed best in "operations" work"- which involves planning, direction and coordination.)

R

201-168851

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY - Ross L. Crozier
331-12-9652

10 July 1963

Organization/Location	Dates	Title/Position
60th FA Bn., Ft. Bragg, N.C.	29 Aug 40-8 Sep 41	Survey Operator
USAF, C.Z. and IBT	9 Sep 41-6 Jul 45	Intelligence NCO
USAF, Canal Zone	18 Apr 46-18 Apr 49	Intelligence NCO
University of Costa Rica Economic & Social Sciences	15 May 49-15 July 53	Student/G.I. Bill
University of Costa Rica Department of Geology	1 Aug 52-1 Nov 52	Adm Asst/Photography
Studio Indiana (Photography) San Jose, Costa Rica	1 Nov 52-1 Jul 53	Owner/Mngr.
Commercial Photography - Guatemala City, Guatemala	1 Jan 54-1 May 54	Photographer/Indep.
Pan American Foundation, University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. Scholarship Grant to Cuba. (Director: Curt Wilgus)	1 Sep 54-1 Sep 56	Student/School of Economic Sciences, University of Havana.
Public Surveys Institute, 1511 Bryant St., Dallas, Texas In Havana: Feb 57 - Apr 58 In Mexico: June 58 - Apr 60	1 Feb 57-31 Aug 60	Research Analyst & Latin American Consultant.
Clarence A. DePew & Sons, 230 Park Ave., N.Y.C. Branch Office, Coral Gables, Fla.	1 Sep 60-1Sep 61	Research Analyst & Latin American Consultant.
Zenith Technical Enterprises, Inc Bldg 25, Coral Reef Drive, Miami 56, Fla. Empl Id No. 59-0938096	1 Sep 61-15 Jan 63	Research Analyst & Latin American Consultant.
U.S. Army Element, Joint Operations Group 7753 The Pentagon, Wash 25, D.C. Tel. OXford 7-7510 (Code 11)	15 Jan 63-To date.	Latin American Consultant.

Employment History:

Organization	From	To	Title/Position
60th FA Bn, Ft. Bragg, NC	29 Aug 40	8 Sep 41	Survey Operator
USAF, Canal Zone-Burma IBT	9 Sep 41	6 Jul 45	Intelligence NCO
USAF, Canal Zone	18 Apr 46	18 Apr 49	Intelligence NCO
Central Intelligence Agency 2430 E Street, Washington 25, D.C.	1 June 49	1 June 57	Contract Agent
Central Intelligence Agency 2430 E Street, Washington 25, D.C.	1 June 57	To Present	Career Agent.

14-00000

PERSONAL INFORMATION

VOL. V of V

14-00000

PERSONAL INFORMATION

VOL. V of V

14-00000

429 SE/DJB/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RI / FILE 201-52514

S E C R E T

ROUTING

	4
2	5
3	6

DATE 8 APRIL 1958

429

TO 'DIRECTOR

FROM 'MEXICO

ACTION , WH 5

INFO , FI, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one)
No CS Record Value. Destroy ✓
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated 201-32723
RE Indexing (check one)
Marked ✓
Signature: LKPuckett

APR 18 58 22 58
RECD CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 14180

IP

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1364

O SUBJ: 201-52514

1. RE VAIVADA COVER, ROBERT S BENJAMIN WILLING IN PRINCIPLE ASSIST IN PROCURING WORK PAPERS AND COVERING ANY FRIEND NAUMAN. AS HQS INFORMED, EXPECT BENJAMIN WILL BE SATISFIED NOMINAL SUM COMPENSATE ADDITIONAL EXPENSES.

2. BENJAMIN TOLD NOTHING EXCEPT WOULD APPRECIATE HIS MAKING PLACE FOR A FRIEND. NO COMMITMENT OR OBLIGATION OF ANY KIND.

3. LEAVE DECISION TO HQS. IN EVENT ANY INTEREST WOULD PERHAPS BE WISE HAVE VAIVADA COME MEET AND TALK WITH BENJAMIN. 201-32723

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

AN	22
AB	X
~~TI~~	
FS	MR
RX	4
DESENSED	
~~FI~~	
~~[illegible]~~	

AN	~~[illegible]~~
AB	~~[illegible]~~
~~TI~~	
~~FS~~	
~~RX~~	
~~DESENSED~~	
FI	

MICROFILMED
[illegible]
DOC MICRO SER.

CS COPY

10 April 58

~~201-168881~~ ~~201-032723~~

~~CO-80044~~

S E C R E T

B-201-52514

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

[redacted]

FORM 2-58 1389 (35)

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-6430

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 11 JUN 1958

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Harold R. NOEMAYER

ORoss L. CROZIER

REFERENCE: HMMW-6420, June 1958 (50-6-67/1)

ACTION REQUESTED: None. For Your Information.

Forwarded herewith is a copy of Subject's PRQ, Part II. Subject's Covert Security Approval was amended on 3 June 1958 to permit Subject's use in Mexico.

COPY

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

4 June 1958

Attachment:
As described above. (MAPOK)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City (w/attachment)
1 - WH/Mailroom (w/o attachment)
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono (w/o attachment)
1 - RI " "
1 - Subject " "

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mpm

AN RR
AB
IH
PS
BX
DES NFD

AN RR
AB
IH
PS
BX
DES NFD
FI

201-168881
X
HMMW 6430
11 JUN 58

COORDINATED BY PHONE:

S.O./MR. WEHKING

CS COPY

(Releasing officer)
for J. C. KING, C/WHD

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
AUG 1949

201-168881
~~201-32723~~

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMMA-14169

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-32723

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 27 November 1959

SUBJECT: Operational/Harold P. NOEMAYR

RE: (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Advise ETA of NOEMAYR's replacement so that NOEMAYR can make departure plans.

REFERENCES:

HMMA-13726, 11 September 1959

1. The Station would appreciate any information which Headquarters can provide concerning an ETD for Harold R. NOEMAYR and his family and an ETA for NOEMAYR's replacement. NOEMAYR's tentative ETD of 1 January 1960 is only slightly more than one month away and he has visas to obtain in addition to other departure preparations.

2. NOEMAYR was instructed by the Station to proceed with the necessary correspondence with Mexican, Costa Rican, Cuban, and Panamanian authorities for the required police certificates for his wife since she is not a citizen of PBPRIME and is applying for an Immigrant Visa. He has already received the necessary documents from Costa Rica and Cuba and expects to obtain the Mexican certificate within the next two days. No reply from Panama has been received as yet although it should arrive shortly. As soon as the Panamanian clearance and that from Mexico is obtained, NOEMAYR will submit all papers to the local ODACID installation and request the necessary documentation for the travel of himself and his family. As Headquarters is aware, the Immigrant Visa for NOEMAYR's wife will be valid only so long as she travels within four months of the date issued.

3. An early reply to this dispatch would be appreciated.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

LJS/mvr

25 November 1959

Distribution:
  3 - Hqs
  2 - Files

CS COPY

201-168881

~~201-32723~~

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-0118

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 17 JUN 1958

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Harold R. HOCHMAYER

O ROSS L. CROZIER

Action Requested: Please Notify Subject

Reference is made to Subject's contract effective 1 June 1957.

Effective 1 June 1957, said contract is amended by adding after sub-paragraph (b) of Paragraph four (4), entitled "Allowances," the following:

> "(c) You will be entitled to an educational allowance in conformance with and at the rates prescribed in applicable Government regulations."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

COPY

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

AN RL
~~AB~~
~~FB~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DES~~ RFD
PI

9 June 1958

WH/3/Mexico/[illegible]

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI

~~201+168881~~
~~X~~
~~6448~~
~~17 JUN 58~~

CS COPY

(Releasing officer)
for J. C. KING, C/WHD

(Coordinating officer)

J B Bra
(Authenticating officer)
[illegible], WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
AUG 1949

201-168881
~~201-32723~~

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TRSA-974

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 10 July 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative

SPECIFIC— Ross Lester CROZIER

Ref: TRSA-925 - 18-6-3-66

Attached herewith are the fingerprints and samples of handwriting of subject to be attached to the reference.

Eugene T. Roday

Encl: 2

AN
AB
~~IN~~ D
~~FS~~
~~EX~~
RI/FI

CS COPY CS COPY

IR COPY

201-168881
X ×D
TRSA 974
10 JUL 51

201-168881
~~18-6-3-66~~

2 Encl.

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

ALIEN

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Name Xxxxxxx Crozier (Surname) Ross (First) Lester (Middle) Classification

(PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT PLAINLY)

Nationality USA Color White Sex M Reference

RIGHT HAND

1. Thumb	2. Index finger	3. Middle finger	4. Ring finger	5. Little finger
				

LEFT HAND

6. Thumb	7. Index finger	8. Middle finger	9. Ring finger	10. Little finger
				

Impressions taken by: Eugene T. Perry
(Signature of official taking prints)

Date impressions taken July 2, 1951

Note amputations

Ross L. Crozier
[redacted]'s signature.

FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

Left hand



Left thumb	Right thumb

FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

Right hand



PLEASE DO NOT FOLD THIS CARD

10—16300

Encl 1 to 7RSA 9-74

CS COPY

201-165881

This is a sample of my handwriting.

Este es un ensayo de mi letra.

Ross L. Crozier

[illegible]

CS COPY

Encl 2 to TRSA 974

201-168881

18-6-3-68

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: ~~AIR~~
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-W-275

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED

TO : Chief of Station, San Jose

DATE: 21 December 1948

FROM : Acting Chief, Foreign Branch T

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic

REF: TZP-A-365, Part I

The attached document is forwarded to your station for examination in connection with the development of Project Hydropathic. You are directed to forward this document to Panama City when it has served its purpose.

A. Rodriguez
A Rodriguez

Attach.

R.
BR:jcr

COPY

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-23

201-168881
X
TRS W 275
DATE 21 DEC 48

R. A. MacMillan
RELEASING OFFICER
OP-BA

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICER

HARRY A. REAL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-29
APR 1947

(709)

OFFICIAL - DISPATCH

VIA: ________
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. 643

CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED

MAY 25 1951

TO :

DATE:

FROM : Chief of Station, San Jose

DESENSITIZED

SUBJECT: GENERAL. Chief, Foreign Division T

SPECIFIC: Operational

HUMANOID - HUMANIST

Gen. cps

REF: TRS-633

1. A review of the compromise of the technical surveillance and the part played in it by HUMANIST indicates that HUMANOID may have been compromised by the former's confession. While you indicate that HUMANIST did not know HUMANOID's name, and could not have given it to the police, it is quite probable that he may have told them that an American other than yourself took part in the operation.

2. It would be natural for HUMANIST to attempt to minimize the extent of his confession in his report to you, and he may possibly have given the police identifying data and a description of HUMANOID. Because of these factors, headquarters feels that HUMANOID should be isolated from all operations for a period of approximately six months, in order to avoid the possibility that the authorities may suspect him of taking part in intelligence activities. It is believed that this period of inactivity will protect HUMANOID and assist him in the preservation of his cover.

3. You are authorised to continue his salary for the period during which he will perform no work for you.

4. It is requested that you turn over all operations which HUMANOID is currently handling to another agent (or agents) as soon as practicable. If you are unable to do this, you may suspend the operations in which HUMANOID has been active, until such time as HUMANOID can again resume his work for us. You are also authorized to pay the agent (or agents) whose work is suspended during this period.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET CS COPY
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

DESENSITIZED

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

DESENSITIZED

5. If the opportunity should present itself, it would be appreciated if you would question [illegible] as to the nature of the interrogation which he underwent at the hands of the police, with the object of finding out whether he told them at any time that there was a third individual involved in the technical surveillance.

Wm M Wheeler Jr

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

T J Flores

By T. J. Flores

797

TJF:jr

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-28

201-168881

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-3314

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE 17 January 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana SPR

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Administrative
SPECIFIC 2 - Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HAVA 755

1. Discussions of the whole problem of VAIVADA's early TDY to Headquarters were held between the agent, the field case officer, and the Chief of Station on 13 and 14 January, as a result of which it became clear that, unless Headquarters has a compelling reason to the contrary, it would be advisable that the contemplated TDY be postponed until about the end of VAIVADA's current contract year, i.e., the period of July-August 1957.

2. A number of important personal problems dispose VIAVADA to accept the delay in acquiring staff status that would accrue from such a postponement. His wife is sufficiently ill at this time from a form of nervous colitis as to recommend that she not travel now. His children would have to lose a semester of their schooling since the current semester began on 7 January. Moreover as he and family have resided in tropical areas for a number of years, VAIVADA would have to make a rather large financial outlay to purchase needed winter clothing for himself and his family which does not seem justified for a period as short as two months. Owing to several routine but time-consuming inquiries being made by the local ODACID in connection with his wife's visa application, there is no guarantee that VAIVADA would be able to depart Cuba before February 1957.

3. On the operational side, in spite of the original Station request that VAIVADA's travel be expedited, advantages now of delaying his TDY outweigh the disadvantages, from the Station's point of view. Most important of these is that two promising sources currently under development by the Station, namely AMPHODARCH-6 and AMPHODARCH-10, were originally contacted by VAIVADA and he has since been the person working most closely with them. To substitute him with a relatively untrained cut-out at this point in their development is not desirable. On the basis of the original proposed timing of his trip the Station has however proceeded with firm plans to transfer handling of two other sources, AMPHODARCH-1 and AMBIVALENT-5, to a reliable PBPRIME cut-out. This plan can be initiated whether VAIVADA departs now or later, and provides the ideal opportunity to take two low-level sources off VAIVADA's hands thereby freeing the latter to undertake new

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

2917

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

RI COPY

development of specific student Communist and Youth targets the Station has already lined up. Both these sources have passed through an initial period of training and have fully demonstrated their reliability and ability to continue to perform effectively via a cut-out. In handling a half-dozen sources, as VAIVADA has been doing, he reached the limits of reasonable span of control and has not had the time to give to such new developmental work which is his forte and upon which it would be most desirable to have him concentrate rather than upon the mere routine handling of relatively tested sources.

4. Delaying VAIVADA's TDY as proposed herein would place VAIVADA at Headquarters at or about the end of his current contract year, where he would be immediately available for personal consultation regarding his future assignment whether or not it is decided that he return to Habana or sent to a new post. In this connection the Station wishes parenthetically to point out its definite interest in having VAIVADA reassigned to Habana for at least one additional year if possible, and to note that VAIVADA has expressed a personal desire to that effect.

5. Regardless of the decision as to timing of his travel, VAIVADA is proceeding to change his residence. He will try to obtain a suitable house possessing a telephone, something he has lacked heretofore, thereby carrying through plans previously reported to Headquarters in paragraph 6 of HKH-A-3144.

6. Therefore, unless there exist truly urgent reasons for VAIVADA's travel to Headquarters prior to about July 1957, it is recommended that his trip be postponed until that time.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Distribution:
3 - Washington
2 - Files

16 January 1957

JRP/dnt

201-168881

2817

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-2726

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE 7 June 1956

FROM: Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT GENERAL - Administrative
SPECIFIC - Arthur G. VAIVADA - Contract Amendment

REF: HKH-W-1710, 28 May 1956.

Forwarded is the original of the Contract Amendment transmitted under reference dispatch, signed by Arthur G. Vaivada. One copy of this Amendment is being retained in Station files.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Attachment:
1-Amendment

Distribution:
3 Wash w/att.
2 Files w/att.

5 June 1956

JRP/rrd

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

28 Jan
30 Jan

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST		
2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) CROZIER, ROSS L.	3. POSITION TITLE	4. GRADE
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH TFW/		6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	
STATION	
TDY OR PCS	
TYPE OF COVER	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

☒ XXX RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	WH
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE L. Armstrong C/~~TFF~~ TFW/PER	
ROOM NO. & BUILDING GH 5608 Hdqts.	EXT. 6577

10. COMMENTS

#26513
6 Mar. 63
201-168881

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES
Hqs only

DATE 6 MAR 1963	SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF S. H. Duston

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

2-259. to PS 23 Jan 63

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF $500.00 (CASH) FROM Louis W. ARMSTRONG. REPRESENTING AN ADVANCE AGAINST SALARY DUE FOR THE PAY PERIOD 1/20-2/16/63.

PAYEE: HAROLD R. NOEMAYR

/S/
Signature

15 FEB 63

File

201-168551

SECRET

14 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

SUBJECT : Harold R. HOEMAYR, Career Agent - Request for Advance Against Earned Salary

REFERENCE : HR 30-410, dated 20 May 1955

1. Subject has recently transferred to Headquarters PCS from JMWAVE. He is presently arranging to move into new quarters on 1 March 1963 and is short of funds to effect this transaction.

2. It is therefore requested that HOEMAYR be advanced $500.00 against earned salary totalling approximately $895.00 due him for the pay period ending 16 February 1963.

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief,
Special Affairs Staff/Support

cc: SAS/Pers

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-161881

SECRET

FI D TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPOR

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, Items 1, 6, and 7
SECTION D, Items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 15 January 1963	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Harold R. NOEMAYR

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 15 January 1963	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Robert K. TROUCHARD
DATE FEB 12 1963 [redacted]	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Andrew K. Reuteman Andrew K. REUTEMAN

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

201-168881

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SAS

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
GYROSE/FINAN - 1962 Covert Earning Statement - Harold R. NOEMAYR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REFERENCE: UFGS-2585, dated 18 January 1963

Forwarded herewith is 1962 Covert Earning Statement for Harold R. NOEMAYR. Subject departed JMWAVE 16 January and arrived at Headquarters 21 January 1963.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Earning Statement, H/W

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SAS, w/att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
29 Jan. 196

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 31 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-3987

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-165551

SECRET 22 Jan 63

TRAVEL ORDER

TDY	~~PCS~~ X
INVITATIONAL	
OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.	17W-325-63
NAME	Harold R. [illegible] (P)
SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.	
OFFICIAL STATION	Miami, Florida
OFFICE PHONE	[illegible]
GRADE	Career Agent

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Miami, Fla. to Washington, D. C.

PURPOSE: PCS per DIR 05[illegible]17
MODE: Air tourist/POT/CC

TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE			AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE	
BEGIN	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN MAXIMUM	FOREIGN OTHER (See below)	CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
26 Jan 63	Arr. Hqrs	$1[illegible].00			.12	

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

Authorized 3½ days travel time with full per diem for subject only. Travel and costs in excess of direct route chargeable to traveler.

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP
~~Argentina de los Angeles Cordero~~	15/3/[illegible]	Wife
~~Rene Arnulfo~~	13	Son
~~Lillian Caridad~~	11	Dau

☐ ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
☐ FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
☐ ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
☐ TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
☐ CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
☐ SHIPMENT ☐ NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED

ACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE	UNACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
☐ YES
☐ NO
ACCOUNTING DUE DATE

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: $600.00

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.: 325-63

CHARGE COST CENTER NO.: 3132-2001-1000

DATE

SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER: [illegible]

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	RICHARD J. PRESTON
COMPONENT	C/TFW/SUPPORT
SIGNATURE	
DATE	

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	WILLIAM K. HARVEY
COMPONENT	CHIEF/TFW
SIGNATURE	
DATE	

FORM 8-60 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
MFG. 8-62

SECRET

(20-40)

22 Jan. 63
201-168881

1

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	ROLL	NUMBER	PAY PERIOD DATE	ALLOTMENT	STA. NO.
NOEMAYR HAROLD R	15	857575	01/20 - 2/16	13220011000	000

	EARNINGS	DESCRIPTION
04	801.60	REG SALARY
18*	324.77	OT - HOL

	DEDUCTIONS	DESCRIPTION
30	52.10	RETMT
42*	24.94	FED TAX 2
42*	58.46	FED TAX 2
42	116.20	FED TAX 2
69	6.18	624HOSP 9

LEGEND of ACTION CODES

1. Promotions
2. Periodic Step Increase
3. Field Allotment
4. Salary Differential
5. Leave Without Pay
6. Hospital, Insurance, Credit Union
7. Overpayment
8. Tax Deduction Change

Ret to Hq 1/21/63 Cover term 1/15/63
Due Refund of 138.54 for Civil offset
Accrual for P/P 1&2-1963 10808 plus 11360 Paid by Voucher 1/25/63

Prem. Pay Paid From 9/16/62 - 1/15/63

EMPLOYEE NAME:
NOEMAYR HAROLD R

SECRET

EFFECTIVE DATE (DAY MO. Y)	CODE	EFFECTIVE DATE (DAY MO. Y)	CODE	ADDL. COMP. P/P	P/P	O/T	S/D	BAL.		REFUNDS DUE FROM EMPLOYEE	* ASTERISK Denotes other than Normal Salary

1126.37	257.88	24.94-	893.43	893.43	TOTALS
			NET PAY	PD. at HDQTS.	

Less 500.00 Advance
$393.43

FORM 11-58 1315 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(30)

201-165881

18 JAN 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

VIA : Chief, Contract Personnel Division/OP

SUBJECT : Qualification for Premium Pay

REFERENCES : (A) Memorandum to ADCI from General Counsel, dated 29 May 1962. Subject: Delegation of Authority (OGC 62-1131)

(B) Memorandum to DD/S from Chief, Task Force W, dated 17 August 1962. Subject: Application of Housing Allowance and Premium Pay to Certain JMWAVE Contract Personnel

1. This is to certify that Harold R. NOEMAYR, a Career Agent, assigned PCS to the geographic area of JMWAVE and JMBAR, qualifies for premium payment according to the authorization contained in the referenced memorandums. This certification is based upon the following conditions of subject's employment during his PCS assignment.

(a) Subject's hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively.

(b) In order to satisfactorily discharge his duties, subject is required to perform substantial amounts of irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty, and duty at night and on holidays.

(1) A substantial amount of irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty means an average of at least six hours of such over-time duty a week.

(2) The irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty is a continual requirement, generally averaging more than once a week.

201-168881

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(3) Night and holiday duty will be performed from time to time.

(e) Subject is responsible for recognizing, without supervision, circumstances which require him to remain on duty.

2. The effective date for this premium payment will be the beginning of the first pay period following 4 September 1962.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel　　　　Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE X

Chief, Task Force W
GYROSE/Personnel
Premium Pay for Certain Contract Employees

1. Headquarters has, or is now in the process of, amending the contracts for the following personnel to provide for Premium Pay in lieu of overtime:

BLAIHAUSE, Russell J.
CONNER, Richard E.
DELLAROCCO, Peter V.
GLAVASCO, Philip D.
HEARD, Bruce E.
LAURENKUS, Marvin A.
STARKWOOD, Kenneth A.
STUART, Jennifer A.
TARTARILLO, John K.
TAAFDIRA, Jacob C.
YERKES, Leonard E.
CADICK, Irving G.
MOEZAYS, Harold R.
DEVOCHO, Irving G.
SLOBAR, Henry J.

2. When Peter J. DIGERVENO is converted from a contract agent to a contract employee status, his contract will also provide Premium Pay.

3. It is requested that JMWAVE review the above list to determine its completeness as it pertains to headquarters type contracts and advise if there are any discrepancies and/or omissions.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

13 Nov. 1962 15 NOV 1962

UFGS - 2255

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

TFW/Personnel James Durham [illegible] 6576

1 - TFW/Personnel
1 - TFW/Registry
1 - Chief, TFW

C/TFW/Pers. Louis W. Armstrong

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Nov 14 00 22 62

ORIG : JAMES DURHAM:amm
UNIT : TFW/PERSONNEL
EXT : 6576
DATE : 13 NOVEMBER 1962

1672

LOGS

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, OP 2, S/C 2

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT97865

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 48601

GYROSE

REF: WAVE 1148 (IN 15729)

ALL CONTRACTS NOW BEING AMENDED WITH EXCEPTION PETER J. DIGERVENO. WILL AUTHORIZE PREMIUM PAY DIGERVENO UPON CONVERSION CONTRACT EMPLOYEE STATUS.

END OF MESSAGE

TFW COMMENT: Request advise.

201-168871

Howard J. Preston
HOWARD J. PRESTON
C/TFW/SUPPORT

Louis W. Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG
C/TFW/PERSONNEL

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

13-11

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

13 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Application of Premium Pay for Certain Contract Personnel

It is requested that the contracts for the following named Contract Employees and Career Agents be amended to include, in the applicable paragraph, the following provision:

> "You are herein authorized Premium Pay in lieu of overtime in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization."

BLAIMAUSS, Russell J.
DELLAROCCO, Peter V.
GLAVASCO, Phillip D.
BEARD, Bruce R.
STUART, Jennifer A.
TARTARILLO, John K.
TABYDINA, Jacob C.
CADICK, Irving G.
GOLMAYR, Harold B.
DEVOGNO, Irving C.
SLOMAN, Henry J.
LAURENKUS, Marvin A.
STACKROOD, Kenneth A.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel

Date

DDP/TFW/Personnel/JDurban/kct (5575)

201-168181

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/TFW
1 - TFW/Person

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

X

23 Oct. 62
201-165881

CONFIDENTIAL

☆U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-552848

1. Agency and organizational designations
DDP/TFW

2. Payroll period

3. Block No.

4. Slip No.
JM

3. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
NOEMAYER, Harold R. (F) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary
$10,105

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX___	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:
I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
jlv 23 Oct 62

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date
14Oct62

15. Date last equivalent increase
16 Apr 61

16. Old salary rate
$10,105

17 New salary rate
$10,420

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
(Signature or other authentication) Date:

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods). Period(s).
☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.
Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126b
6 GAO 8000 1126-308

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP—DISBURSING OFFICER'S COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

TO

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
[illegible]/Personnel
Assessment Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PROCESSING		
PROC.	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

References: A. UFGT-1813, dtd 18 April 1962
B. UFGS-1711, dtd 17 August 1962

1. Attached is the material forwarded by Reference B on IRVIN C. CADICK, IRVING C. DEVUONO, and HAROLD R. NOEMAYR.

2. Biographic information on the three individuals has been reviewed and, as far as is known, is correct. It is assumed that another assessment would not be required on CADICK and DEVUONO inasmuch as fitness reports were forwarded by Reference A. Assessments of NOEMAYR is attached.

END OF DISPATCH

Forms to
Mrs Dwight
Collins

15 OCT 1962

Enclosures: Biographic info h/w

Distribution
3 - Chief., TFW w/encls.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
4 Oct 62

DATE DISPATCHED
8 Oct '62

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT - 2956

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-168881

SECRET

25 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Application of Housing Allowance for Certain Contract Personnel

It is requested that the contracts for the following named Contract Employees and Career Agents be amended to include, in the applicable paragraph, the provision: -> effective 1 September 1962

"You are herein authorized housing assistance in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization."

CADICK, Irving G. (Career Agent)
DEYUOSO, Irving C. (Career Agent)
HORWATH, Harold R. (Career Agent)
GLAVASCO, Philip D. (Contract Employee)
HEARD, Bruce R. (Contract Employee)

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief, TFW/Support

DDP/TFW/Personnel:JEMARTIN:jtr (25 September 1962)

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - TFW/Personnel

Memo approved by C.P.D., Mr. Sutcliffe, 1 Sep. 62.

201-168881

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ORIG : LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG
UNIT : TFW/PERSONNEL
EXT : 6576
DATE : 12 SEPTEMBER 1962 1548

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

12 SEP 62 18 19z

TO : JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, OP, S/C 2

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT75621

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 35588

GYROSE

REF: WAVE 8436 (IN 19838)

1. POLICY TO APPLY STAFF HOUSING ALLOWANCE TO CERTAIN CONTRACT PERSONNEL APPROVED. NECESSARY CONTRACT AMENDMENTS BEING PREPARED HQS FOR HOEMAYER, CADICK, GLAVASCO, DEVUONO, ~~[illegible]~~ AND HEARD. NO RETROACTIVE PROVISIONS IN APPROVAL. WILL REQUEST 1 SEPT EFFECTIVE DATED. POLICY DOES NOT APPLY TO CONTRACT AGENTS. DIGERVENO AND SLOMAN IN LATTER CATEGORY.

2. HQS WILL PROCEED CHANGE DIGERVENO TO CONTRACT EMPLOYEE. CAREER AGENT STATUS FOR SLOMAN WILL BE REQUESTED UPON RECEIPT WAVE RECOMMENDATION. BOTH NEW CONTRACTS TO INCLUDE HOUSING PROVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

TFW COMMENT: Pls advise.

Howard J. Preston
HOWARD J. PRESTON
C/TFW/SUPPORT

Louis W. Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG
C/TFW/PERSONNEL

201-165788

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

12-9

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: ~~AIR~~
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO ~~TZP-W-~~ 411

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED

TO : Chief of Station, Panama City and San Jose
FROM : Acting Chief, Foreign Branch T
DATE: ~~21 December 1948~~
SUBJECT: GENERAL- 0 Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic

REF: TZP-A-365, Parts I and II

1. The proposal that the Panama Station activate an agent project in conjunction with San Jose has been studied by this headquarters and elicits the following comment. It is felt that nothing can be gained from a cumbersome joint operation of this project that cannot be obtained from a simple agent project controlled exclusively by the San Jose Station. If San Jose wishes to avail itself of these two men as an independent project, that station is authorized to proceed with its preliminary planning for submission to this headquarters for final approval.

2. In the event San Jose decides to use Hydropathic, that station is directed to become more familiar with his capabilities before entering into a formal agreement re tasks and salary. His practical experience and educational background are not outstanding and the mere fact that he has had duty with the U. S. Army in an intelligence capacity in no sense automatically qualifies him for our work. It is suggested that the San Jose Station initiate its relations with Hydropathic by using him as a cutout in an endeavor to test his abilities. If his value is proved and his Costa Rican associations appear to be in a position to give him high-level intelligence information, then come to a formal agreement with regard to his future work in an intelligence gathering capacity. The San Jose Station is directed to give him no encouragement at this time with respect to a later full-time position with this organization.

3. In summary Hydrocyst is to sever his formal connection with Hydrocyst I and is to have no knowledge of Hydropathic with regard to the latter's work for Mercer. Details on the procedure to be followed in Hydropathic's relation with Hydrocyst I are the responsibility of the San Jose Station and are to be submitted to this headquarters for final approval before any formal commitments are made. The Panama Station is directed to forward to San Jose all the documents in its files that are considered pertinent to the development of this project.

AN NHF
AB X
~~I4~~
~~IC~~
~~IE~~
~~DR~~
~~FI~~
RID/FIP

RELEASING OFFICER

DESENSITIZED

COORDINATING OFFICER

US COPY
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

21-Dec 48

201-168881

FORM NO Per. CSIL 43-23
APR 1947

(700)

DESENSITIZED TZP W-411

4. Attachment to TZP-A-365, Part I, is being forwarded to San Jose in order to provide Mercer with a sample of Hydropathic's work. The San Jose Station is directed to return this document to Panama City when the content of the report has served its purpose.

A. Rodriguez
ARodriguez

PP:jcr

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER
OPERA

HARRY A. REAL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-168881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-1905

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE: 16 OCT 56 15 38 z

FROM : Chief, WHD

RI COPY

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative
SPECIFIC- Arthur O. VAIVADA; Proposal to Grant Staff Status

Reference: HKH-A-2577 201-32723

Action Required: Pouch Views on Proposal Contained Herein

1. Headquarters looks favorably upon referenced proposal to grant staff status to Arthur O. VAIVADA. It has been determined however that such status is virtually out of the question for subject so long as his wife remains an alien. It has been further determined that the wife can acquire U.S. citizenship within a span of 45 days if she so desires and is willing to come to the U.S. for that period of time, most of which would have to be spent in the Headquarters area. There are certain other basic requirements such as a fair knowledge of English and an ability to pass routine citizenship exams. None is believed to pose any problem in this case however.

2. Headquarters recognizes that the proposed travel and related expenses might work certain hardships on VAIVADA and his family. In order to partially offset these, we are prepared to bring VAIVADA to Headquarters for TDY-training to coincide with his wife's stay in the U.S.

3. If the foregoing proposal meets with the approval of the Station, VAIVADA, and the latter's wife, Headquarters should be advised as to preferable dates for implementation of same. We would also like to have recommendations re: further training of VAIVADA at Headquarters. Any objections to the plan, as outlined above, should likewise be communicated to Headquarters at an early date.

JCKing
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

19 October 1956

Distribution: 3 - Habana, 1 - RI/D&P,
1 - WH/III/Cuba, 1 - WH/Mailroom,

201-168881

WH/III/Cuba/JBBoland:gp
JBBoland

RELEASING OFFICER

JCKing
J. C. KING, C/WH

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

J. BRADY, AC/WH/III

RI COPY

~~201-32723~~

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

X

Chief, Task Force W

[illegible]/Personnel

Information about Career Agents

ACTION REQUIRED: As Indicated

Transmitted herewith are sets of forms concerning the biographic data and request for assessment in the cases of the three Career Agents stationed in JMWAVE, Irving G. CADICK, Irving C. DEVUONO and Harold R. NOEMAYR. Please have those forms reviewed for accuracy in the biographic section and have the appropriate supervisor complete the assessment portion. Stanley R. ZAMKA should prepare the assessment for CADICK and DEVUONO and Robert K. TROUCHARD should prepare the one for NOEMAYR. It is requested that these forms be returned to Headquarters as soon as possible.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Career Agent Forms, herewith

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE, w/encl. a/s

17 August 1962

HYCS-171

201-168881

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

TFW/Personnel John Martin 6575

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/TFW/Pers.		Louis V. Armstrong

1 - TFW/Personnel
1 - TFW/Registry
1 - Chief, TFW

RELEASING

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT GYROSE
Housing Allowance for Contract Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

1. JMWAVE has reviewed the status of contract personnel assigned to this station and has related the circumstances of their assignment to that of staff agents with respect to the application of the station housing allowance. Certain of these contract personnel are not indigenous to this area, have been transferred or assigned to JMWAVE from other areas on the same indefinite basis as staff agents, and suffer the same inconvenences and uncertainties as staff agents which were recognized in the Headquarters approved housing policy. The rationale for granting some degree of financial relief under these circumstances, in the form of a housing allowance, is considered equally applicable to these individuals. Based on JMWAVE initial survey of the status of contract personnel the station requests that Headquarters approve extension of the housing allowance to the following individuals:

HAROLD R. HOEMAYER
PETER J. DIGERVENO
HENRY J. SLOMAN
IRVING G. CADICK

PHILIP D. GLAVASCO
IRVING C. DEVUONO
ALICE P. JENRETTE

2. Upon approval JMWAVE will forward to Headquarters copies of the proposed amended contracts and will pay and administer the allowance in the same manner as is now applicable to staff agents.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3- Chief, TFW

Att USC

DATE TYPED 30 June 1962	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGT-2270	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-168881	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman, CS Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Career Agents of TFW

REFERENCE : Memorandum to Chief, Task Force W from Chairman, CS Agent Panel, dated 6 June 1962, Subject: Information About Career Agents

Per your request contained in reference memorandum the following information is supplied on career agents assigned to Task Force W:

a. NOEMAYR, Harold R., GS-12, $9,475 (JMWAVE)

b. CADICK, Irving O., GS-15, $13,750 (JMWAVE)

c. DEVUONO, Irving C., GS-13, $11,155 (JMWAVE)

William K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - Personnel
3 - Subject Files

201-168551

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIEDCK

TYPE OF ACTION		
☐	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION WH
☐	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Mexico City
☐	RENEWAL FY 196	BRANCH 3 — DESK Mexico
☐	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER John G. Heyn
☒	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 1009 — BUILDING Barton Hall — EXTENSION 2555/3162

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
C/WH/3/Mexico	John G. Heyn					
C/WH/3	Ned P. Holman					
WH/BAF	Robert D. Carter					
WH/PO/A	Clarke W. Simmons					

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
		$	196	$
			196	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
J. C. King, Chief, WH Division		10 Jan. 62

FORM 8-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

1. It is requested that the LIEDGE Project be terminated effective 1 January 1962. The present project will not expire until 30 April 1962.

2. Effective 1 January 1962 all expenses and obligations under this Project will be picked up by WH/4, allotment #2335-5452-1000. This has been coordinated with WH/4/Personnel, Mr. Juul.

3. Harold R. NOEMAYR (p), Career Agent, was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961. WH/4 anticipates an indefinite need for his services and his transfer has been cleared with Mr. Armstrong of the Agent Service Panel.

4. This Project was merely a support mechanism for NOEMAYR and did not provide positive or CE information. NOEMAYR has performed valuable services for KUBARK with WH Division since 1948.

5. There are no cover or security problems involved in this project termination action since this is only an administrative measure transferring NOEMAYR from Project LIEDGE to WH/4. The Office of Security and CCG have been notified by WH/3 of this action. WH/4 is notifying the Agent Service Panel.

Distribution:
1 - LIEDGE/Dev & Plans
1 - VMP
1 - WH/4/Juul
1 - NOEMAYR/201

SECRET

19 Jan. 62

SECRET

21 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
4-E-60 Headquarters Building

ATTN : Chief, PSD, Clearance Branch
3-E-44 Headquarters Building

VIA : WH/4/Security

SUBJECT : Assignment of Harold NOEMAYR to JMWAVE

1. This is to advise you that Harold R. NOEMAYR, Career Agent, was assigned PCS to JMWAVE, a domestic base on 20 October 1961. Subject will be utilized as an Ops Officer in PA-Prop activities in support of Project JMATE.

2. Your concurrence in the assignment of NOEMAYR to JMWAVE is requested.

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCURRENCE:

Director of Security

Note: This information was supplied to SA Panel per memorandum dated 15 September 1961 to the Career Agent Panel.

DDP/WH/4/Personnel:JAHOESEE:jtr (21 December 1961)

201-168881

SECRET

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/SS
1 - WH/4/Exec
1 - C/WH/4/SS
1 - C/WH/4/Security
1 - SA Panel
1 - WH/4/Personnel

SECRET

1 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Investigative Division
Attn: Chief, SED, Office of Security

SUBJECT : S-8644
#215482

Effective 1 January 1962 the file on Subject will be transferred to WH/4/Personnel, ext. 8350.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - Subject
1 - Chrono

SECRET

201-161881

SECRET

1 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Investigative Division
Attn: Chief, SRD, Office of Security

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR
S-9546
#112569

1. Effective 1 January 1962, Harold R. NOEMAYR, Career Agent, will be transferred to WH/4/Personnel, ext. 8350. He was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961.

2. He will be paid out of their funds. The LIEDGE Project is being terminated.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - NOEMAYR 201/Clearances
1 - Outgoing memo chrono

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

30 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Cover Division

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR

1. Harold R. NOEMAYR, Career Agent, was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961. WH/3 is terminating the LIEDGE Project which has been supporting him.

2. Effective 1 January 1962, any questions concerning NOEMAYR should be directed to Mr. Juul, WH/4/Personnel, 1905 Quarters Eye, ext. 8350.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - Subject - NOEMAYR 201/Cover
1 - Chrono

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

30 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)

1. Effective 1 January 1962 Harold R. NOEMAYR is being transferred to WH/4/Personnel, Mr. Juul, 1905 Quarters Eye, ext. 8350. He was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961.

2. The LIEDGE Project is being terminated and starting on 1 January 1962 he will be paid from allotment #2335-5452-1000.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - NOEMAYR/201 - Contract
1 - Outgoing memo chrono

SECRET 201-168851

Noemayr

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Base, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
JMZIP ADMIN/FINANCE
Transportation and Temporary Storage of HHE (Domestic PCS Move)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Ref: UFGT 910, dated 28 October 1961

1. Reimbursement for the temporary storage of effects applicable to a domestic PCS movement is authorized from the date of the employee's departure. The maximum storage period is sixty (60) days. Harold R. NOEMAYR and William D. WENMEAD were assigned PCS to JMWAVE on 20 August 1961. Therefore, the initial reimbursement date for storage of effects is 20 August 1961. Unfortunately charges prior to 20 August will have to be borne by the individuals since regulations do not permit storage of effects during periods when an employee is absent from his domestic post of assignment.

2. Paragraph two (2) of the reference requested advice regarding reimbursement for shipment of effects between domestic PCS points using the following instruments:

a. POA - Upon evidence of a proper weight certificate, reimbursement for the transportation of 543 pounds from Washington to Miami (1104 miles) is the product of the applicable commuted rate, i.e., $19.40 (999 pounds or less) multiplied by the net hundred weight transported which is 5.43, giving a total of $105.33.

b. Rental of Trailer - If a proper weight certificate was not obtained at the time the effects were hauled between domestic PCS points, three (3) estimates must be obtained as to the weight of the effects. Reimbursement will be at the commuted rate and this includes the trailer rent (receipt is submitted).

c. Employee Rents and Drives a Truck - The same formula as given in the rental of a trailer is applicable. A weight certificate (or three estimates) along with the rental receipt must be submitted. Reimbursement is at the commuted rate.

(Continued on Page 2)

DATE TYPED 6 Nov. 1961	DATE DISPATCHED 15 NOV 1961
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGS - 681	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-168811	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Base, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
PAGE 2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

3. Interpretation of the "Commuted Rate Table" citing examples was requested in paragraph three of the reference:

a. Shipment of 4,000 lbs. of HHE from Washington, D. C. to Miami (1,111 miles) — $12.00 rate is used. In this instance the mileage is more than 1100 miles (Column "A" of Table No. 3); therefore, any mileage in excess of 1100 miles up to and including 1150 miles, the rate in Column H ($12.00) is used for shipment of 4,000 lbs. and up.

b. Minimum rates—(1) Three hundred fifty pounds billed at 500 pounds: reimbursement at the applicable rate for shipment of 500 pounds is authorized. If billing is less than for 500 pounds, reimbursement is applicable thereto.

(2) Shipment of 850 pounds HHE from Rockville, Maryland, to Miami and billed for 1,000 pounds: reimbursement - since the net weight (850 lbs.) exceeds the number of pounds shown in Column E (774 lbs. - breakpoint in lbs. for 1150 miles), the applicable rate is that shown in Column D ($15.00 for 1150 miles), and the applicable rate is the minimum hundredweight of that Column (D), instead of the actual weight (850 lbs.) of the HHE transported.

(3) The 1,000 pound minimum weight allowance for shipment to or from Fishers Island, New York is for additional allowance only and does not apply to shipment of effects from Rockville, Maryland to Miami.

4. We hope that the above has helped to clarify the transportation and storage of HHE in connection with a domestic PCS movement.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - COB, JMWAVE

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
6 Nov 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
15 NOV 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGS - 681

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

TRAVEL ORD...

TDY	
PCS	X
INVITATIONAL	

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. WH-A-1024-62

NAME
Harold R. KOEMAYER (P)

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.

OFFICIAL STATION
Washington, D. C.

OFFICE PHONE

GRADE
Contract Employee

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Travel from Washington, D. C. to Miami for PCS.

Mode: None,

TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE			AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE	
BEGIN	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN		CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
			MAXIMUM	OTHER *(See below)*		
20 Aug.	20 Aug. 61	$				

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

Note: Subject picked up in the field from TDY status for PCS.

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
SHIPMENT | NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED
EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED
ACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE | UNACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
YES | ACCOUNTING DUE DATE
NO

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL
None

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO. 2535-5000-8021
CHARGE COST CENTER NO. 7-1024

DATE	SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER
1 Nov.	P. J. Maggi P. J. Maggi

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
R J Bilodeau	CCG	13 Nov

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	COMPONENT
Fred F. Cyrus	C/WH/4/SS
SIGNATURE	**DATE**
Fred F. Cyrus	6 Nov 1961

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	COMPONENT
Raford W. Herbert	DC/WHD
SIGNATURE	**DATE**
J C King	11-7-61

FORM 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
3-60
MFG. 3-60

SECRET

(28-40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
JMATE/ADMIN - Transportation and Temporary Storage of HHE

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: As stated

Reference: HR 22-11e(1)

1. Please advise for what period reimbursement is allowable in each of the following instances of temporary storage of HHE which preceded the individual's actual PCS assignments to JMWAVE on 20 August 1961:

Harold R. NOEMAYR - In anticipation of being assigned PCS to JMWAVE NOEMAYR placed his HHE in temporary storage in Alexandria, Virginia on approximately 1 July 1961 from whence they were shipped to Miami on 22 September 1961. The date of the personnel action assigning NOEMAYR PCS JMWAVE is unknown. The date of his PCS travel order is unknown.

William D. WENHEAD - In anticipation of being assigned PCS JMWAVE WENHEAD placed his HHE in transit storage in Washington, D. C. on 27 July 1961 from whence they were shipped to Miami on 24 August 1961. The date of the personnel action assigning WENHEAD PCS JMWAVE is unknown. His PCS travel order approval date is illegible.

2. Cases have arisen which are not specifically covered by regulation. Please advise what reimbursement is allowable under HR 22-11a(3)b and attachment 2 in each of the following circumstances:

A. Employee on PCS transfer from Washington, D. C. to Miami carried 543 pounds of effects in his POV. A proper weight certificate was obtained. There was no cost to employee.

B. Employee rents a trailer on which his HHE are hauled between domestic PCS points incident to his PCS transfer. Cost to employee was only for trailer rent.

C. Employee rents and drives a truck containing his HHE between domestic PCS points incident to his PCS transfer. Cost to employee is truck rental only.

Continued

Distribution:
3 - WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
25 Oct 61

DATE DISPATCHED
OCT 28 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-910

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-168881

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

TO: Chief, WHD SUBJ: Transportation and Temporary Storage of HHE UFGT-910

3. A question has been raised on how to interpret the rate tables in attachment 2 to HR 22-11. For example, the mileage from Washington, D. C. to Miami, Florida is 1,111 miles. In shipping 4,000 pounds of effects between these points is the employee entitled to reimbursement at the rate of $11.70 or $12.00 per hundred weight? In addition, reimbursements where minimum weight allowances occur are not clear. We assume that in the case where 350 pounds is billed as 500 the employee is entitled to payment for 50 hundredweight at the applicable rate. However, in the case of a shipment from Rockville, Maryland to Miami where 850 pounds shipped is billed as 1,000 pounds what reimbursement is in order? HR 22-11, attachment 2, mentions a 1,000 pound minimum only in regard to Fishers Island, New York.

4. Your early reply will be appreciated.

END OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2	~~SUPPORT~~	5	
3		6	

DATE : 396
20 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 10

INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

Pers Fin

SEP 20 1619Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 32174

DIR CITE WAVE 7985

JMZIP ADMIN

REF A DIR 87859 (out 87489)

B DIR 87791 (out 88844)

C WAVE 7658 (IN 17386) *

IN VIEW FACT MESSRS DEAN, CROZIER IN TEMPORARY QUARTERS W/O HHE AT TIME DESIGNATION PCS 20 AUGUST, REQUEST AUTHORITY TERMINATE PER DIEM ABOVE INDIVIDUALS ON DATE ARRIVAL HHE BUT NOT BEYOND 20 SEPTEMBER 1961.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE EXTENT PER DIEM REDUCTIONS.

subj / WAVE
file
~~[illegible]~~
aw. by dept

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

15 September 1961

MEMORANDUM TO: Career Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Assignment of Harold R. Noemayr

Approval is requested for the PCS assignment of Noemayr to JMWAVE, a domestic base. Subject will be utilized as an Ops Officer in PA/Propaganda activities in support of Project JMATE. It is anticipated that Noemayr will receive a cover salary (offset) during the period of this assignment. Such offset would not exceed his net Agency compensation.

/S/ Raford W. Herbert

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/Ops
1 - C/WH/4
1 - WH/4/PA/Prop
✓1 - WH/4/Personnel

WH/4/Personnel:RFGILLS:jtr (15 September 1961)

201-161881

SECRET

1524 F

ORIG : RICHARD F. GILLS:jtr
UNIT : WH/4/PERSONNEL
EXT : 4031
DATE : 8 SEPTEMBER 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: BELL 10
INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

11 SEP 61 15 43z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
XX ROUTINE

OUT95185

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 10966

JMZIP ADMIN

Ross G. Crozier

[redacted] WILL BE ASSIGNED WAVE PCS. IF NECESSARY RETURN HQS FOR PROCESSING HE SHOULD BE SCHEDULED WITH STAFFERS.

END OF MESSAGE

Pauly | WAVE

C/WH/4/SUPPORT
WH/4/PA-PROP
C/WH/SUPPORT

201-168881

For J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R. K. DAVIS
C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

4-8

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

28 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Amendment of Contract, case of Harold R. HUEMAYER

It is requested that the Contract for Subject, as amended, be further amended to discontinue that portion of the "Compensation" section which states "You will receive additional compensation, amounting to $80.00 per month, effective 8 January 1961, in lieu of payment of the regular overtime rates for irregular, unscheduled and frequent overtime, for the duration of this assignment". It is requested that this discontinuance be effected C.O.B. 10 June 1961.

HERBERT V. JUUL
Chief, WH/4/Personnel

APPROVED:

FRED F. CYRUS
Chief, WH/4/Support

201-168881

X

SECRET

File — Cy w/Attach Fin. 7/x/61

Mr. Harold R. Noemayr

Dear Mr. Noemayr:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957, as amended.

Effective close of business 10 June 1961, that portion of Paragraph two (2) entitled "Compensation" which pertains to the authorization of additional compensation in the amount of $80 per month is deleted in its entirety.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY____________________________
Contracting Officer

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : JOHN H. MARTIN
UNIT : WH/4/PERSONNEL
EXT : 8350
DATE : 6 JUNE 1961 1594

ROUTING 06-07

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : ~~DIRECTOR~~ BELL
CONF: BELL 15
INFO : WH 4, BELL S/C

NOEMAYR

JUN 6 1704Z 61

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 9792
OUT 9792

TO WAVE INFO CITE ~~DIR~~ BELL 0891
0891

JMZIP ADMIN

REF: WAVE 6491 (IN 2592) *

PREMIUM PAY FOR SUBJ REF WILL BE DEPOSITED HIS BANK BETWEEN 23 - 27 JUNE IN AMOUNT $343.36 NET, COVERING PERIOD 8 JAN THRU 10 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * REQUESTED ADVISE MR. ROSS CROZIER RE PREMIUM PAY.

C/WH/4/FIN

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
C/WH/4/SUPPORT

HERBERT V. JUUL
C/WH/4/PERSONNEL

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

14-00000

579

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	SUPPORT	4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 1 JUN 61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 4, BELL S/C

JUN 1 2128Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 2592

NOEMAYR

[illegible]

Breaux — did you put in for it?

TO BELL INFO CITE WAVE 6491

JMZIP ADMIN FINANCE

RE WAVE 5287 (IN 1907)*

ADVISED DATE PREMIUM PAY TO BE PAID MR ROSS CROZIER.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* REQUESTED CONTRACT BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE FOR PREMIUM PAY.

6 Jun 61: Per conversation with Joe Hudson, SAAS, he had recd. the Amendment to C's contract for Premium Pay and the check should be deposited in C's bank around 23-27 June (or between) — total is for $343.36 net.

John — Maybe he wants to know which payday will bring the windfall?

Herb

John — the ans.!

Subj / Wave

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

4 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Amendment of Contract, case of Harold R. NOEMAYER

It is requested that the Contract for Subject, as amended, be further amended to reflect the following addition: "Compensation". "You will receive additional compensation, amounting to $80.00 per month, effective 8 January 1961, in lieu of payment of the regular overtime rates for irregular, unscheduled and frequent overtime, for the duration of this assignment."

HERBERT V. JUUL
Chief, WH/4/Personnel

APPROVED

Chief, WH/4/Support

201-168581

X

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

SUPPORT

ROUTING			
1	RM	4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 2 1433Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 1136

322
DATE : 2 MAY 61 RLG
TO : BELL
FROM : WAVE
ACTION : BELL 15
INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH, BELL S/C

BELL CITE WAVE 5979

JMZIP

HAROLD R. NOEMAYR ARRIVING HQS 2 MAY ON EAL 648 FOR CONSULTATION. WILL CALL CHOADEN ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

Subj | Wave Hq

201-161881

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

192

06-45

ORIG: ERVIN W. SCHMIDT
UNIT: DC/WH/4/SUPPORT
EXT: 8712
DATE: 6 APRIL 1961

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO: JMWAVE
FROM: [illegible] JMBELL
CONF: BELL 15
INFO: COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

CJT 5112
5112

TO WAVE INFO CITE [illegible] BELL 3963
3968

JMZIP ADMIN

REF: WAVE 5287 (IN 1907)*

PER REF REQUEST CONTRACT WILL BE AMENDED TO ADD $80 MONTHLY EFFECTIVE 8 JANUARY FOR DURATION THIS ASSIGNMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Request Normayer's contract be amended effective 8 January 1961 to provide for premium pay.

301-168851

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
CHIEF, WH/4/SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/4/PERSONNEL
COORDINATING OFFICERS

ERVIN W. SCHMIDT
DC/WH/4/Support
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 866
06APR61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

Pers

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3		6	

6APR61 0112Z

ROUTINE

IN 1907

BELL CITE WAVE 5287

JMZIP ADMIN

REF A WAVE ~~4968~~ 4698 (IN 0324)*

B UFGS 0284

C UFGS 0285

1. IN REPLY PARA 3 REF B:

3A. YES

3B. YES

3C. WAVE HAS NO OTHER CONTRACT TYPES THIS GRADE RANGE

~~3E.~~ 3D. YES

2. [redacted] Ross L. Crozier's UNSCHEDULED, IRREGULAR DUTY FAR EXCEEDS MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS STATED REF C. HE HAS BEEN SO QUALIFIED SINCE BEFORE INCEPTION PREMIUM PAY ARRANGEMENT AND WILL SO CONTINUE THROUGH OPS CLIMAX SAME AS WAVE STAFF EMPLOYEES.

3. REQUEST HIS CONTRACT BE AMENDED EFFECTIVE 8 JAN 1961 TO PROVIDE FOR PREMIUM PAY.

END OF MESSAGE

*C/S COMMENT: ~~(MONEY, OIL ADDITIVE, AND LOADED CLAMS INFILTRATED VIA OPN CAROL.~~ wrong ref in

301-168891

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

No. SD 38055 B

DATE 3 April 1961

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY ~~RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.~~ OP CONTACTS ONLY I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) Roger T. Fox

Noemayer

Roger T. FOX
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS: Oliver H. Corlenton

SECRET

201-168551

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 38055 A **DATE** 3 April 1961

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE) Ross L. Crozier

Ross L. CROZIER
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS: Oliver H. Carlton

SECRET

201-168851

→ Personnel

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACTUAL PLACED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Base, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
CROZIER, Ross (Premium Pay)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF WAVE 4698 (IN 4338) dated 21 March 1961.

1. The contract of Ross Crozier with amendments has been reviewed. It is noted that the terms set forth a rate of GS-12 as full compensation and no provision is indicated permitting additional pay. Overtime does not apply above GS-10 and premium pay has not to date been applied to contract types.

2. The approval of premium pay is based on CSC Regulations, Section 25.261 which permits such pay to full-time employees subjected to substantial amounts of irregular, unscheduled overtime, night and holiday duty. Consequently certifications were received from supervisors at Headquarters attesting to those eligible and in the field all staffers were processed for this in GS-11 and above (not to exceed the top of a GS-15) on the knowledge of the various assignments subjecting our employees to these qualified conditions.

3. Since processing is an administrative exercise of effecting a personnel action to add to his salary and thereafter assure that he is taken off this entitlement as soon as he is no longer entitled to it, it is not intended to do this for short periods. Except in the initial cases effective 1 February 1961, this pay becomes effective the beginning of the first pay period after he enters this type duty and is taken off the end of the pay period when he is no longer subjected to such duty. On contract types, it is suggested, therefore, that overall aspects be considered such as:

a. Is his duty and salary similar to a staffer receiving this entitlement?

b. Is the period of time proposed for the duty 30 days or longer?

CONTINUED

External Distribution:
2 - Addressee

DATE TYPED
23 March 61

DATE DISPATCHED
29 MAR 61

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible] - [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-168891

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Internal Distribution:
1 - WH/4/Support
1 / WH/4/Registry

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/4/Support	E.W.Schmidt	vlm	6712

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/4/PERS	3/27/61	
C/WH/4/PERS		
C/WH/4/OPS		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. UFGS - 284

c. Does augmenting application to this case indicate that this should be done on all other contract types in this grade area and

d. Does the current and proposed duty entitle him to this additional pay?

Upon review of this additional information, if you feel an equivalent compensation should be effected, the case will be considered for possible amendment for approval by the contract officer of our organization. Additional details concerning personnel entitlements are being forwarded under separate cover.

END OF MESSAGE

22 March 61
201-168881

X

CONFIDENTIAL

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-520030

1. Agency and organizational designations: D. /WH
2. Payroll period
3. Block No.
4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): NOEMAYER, HAROLD R. (P) CAREER AGENT
6. Grade and salary: $9,215

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks
11. Appropriation(s)
12. Prepared by: jlv 22 March 61
13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
[illegible]pr61	18Oct59	$9,215	$9,475	Joseph B. B[illegible] (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Part-d(ih

✓ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126b—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — DISBURSING OFFICER'S COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

620

DATE : 21 MAR 61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

Memo Pers

Info: Finance

ROUTING

1		4	
2	SUPPORT	5	
3		6	

MAR 21 2004Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 4338

TO BELL INFO CITE WAVE 4698

JMZIP ADMIN

REQUEST MR ROSS CROZIER'S CONTRACT BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE PAYMENT FOR PROJECT PREMIUM ALLOWANCE. ADVISE WHEN PAYMENTS TO BEGIN.

END OF MESSAGE

John

Ans. by dispatch 3/23/61

Ely

John —

Pls see me! (Mr Schmitt is preparing a reply!)

Herb

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

463
DATE : 17 MAR 61

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : BELL

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

FROM : WAVE

ACTION : TSD 2

#112569

WH/3/M

MAR 17 1610Z 61

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, BELL 15, WH 3, BELL S/C

ROUTINE

IN 3826

BELL CITE WAVE 4534

JMZIP AQUATIC

1. PLS REGISTER ALIAS ROGER T. FOX FOR PSEUDO HAROLD R. NOYMAYR.

2. SUBJ KNOWN AS FOX TO OPS CONTACTS. DOCS BEING ISSUED IN NAME FOX.

END OF MESSAGE

File

[illegible] C-59713

[illegible]

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

4-00000

A-4

File

Mr. Harold R. Noemayr

Dear Mr. Noemayr:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957, as amended.

Effective 8 January 1961, and to continue for the duration of your current assignment, paragraph two (2) of subject contract, entitled "Compensation" is amended to authorize additional compensation in the amount of $80.00 per month in recognition and compensation of the irregular, unscheduled and frequent requirement of hours of duty over and above the regular and daily schedule.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /S/
Contracting Officer

SECRET 201-168871 X

SECRET

3 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract - Harold R. NOEMAYR

It is requested that the contract for Career Agent Harold R. NORMAYR, as amended, effective 1 June 1957, be terminated upon close of business 30 September 1963. Subject was advised of this termination on 1 July 1963, and the 90 days actual notice required by para. 15 (a) of the contract expires on 30 September 1963.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

DDP/SAS/PERSONNEL/John H. Martin/kct (3 July 63)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SAS/Personnel

SECRET [illegible]

201-168551

4-00000

Roemeyer

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE [illegible]

TO: (Check)
☐ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT WSAS

ATTN: [illegible]

REF: [illegible]

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
[illegible]

ESTABLISHED FOR
[illegible]

FILE NO.
[illegible]

ID CARD NO.

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR _____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ______________________________.

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ______________________.

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

201-168851

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO FOR THE STUDENT FILE

11 February 1958

FROM: Rufus A. Horn, Jr.

This folder contains information on the 41 American students that went from the Moscow Youth Festival to China. The information was prepared for FE-2 CE working purposes. The material has not been carded, ~~and the material~~ is non-record, and should be destroyed sometime before 1 January 1959.

Rufus A. Horn, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION:
1- for student file

CONFIDENTIAL

CS COPY

200-8-14

SECRET

22 OCT 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE-2 CE

SUBJECT: File-check Results of the American Students in China

1. Cursory file-checks have been conducted on the American students that went from the Moscow Youth Festival to China and the results are attached hereto.

2. The file-checks are by no means complete, for they were conducted only for the purpose of determining the subject's political doctrines.

Rufus A. Horn

Attachment: As stated above

Distribution:
1 - ~~Chief, FE-2 CE w/attachment~~ student file
1 - IO Div. w/attachment
~~2 - Originator w/attachment~~

SECRET

American Student in China

ALHANOTE, Louis — File Check Results

54: USA.

Residence - Brooklyn, New York — Photo Attached

Passport No. 618189 issued 3/5/57

MS-CARD to All NAMES: → One of 41 American students that went from the Moscow Youth Festival to China late 1957 [redacted]

1. Louis Alhanote, in 1954, visited the Soviet and Polish United Nations Delegation, in New York City. As of 1950, the subject was a subscriber to the "Daily Worker". In August 1952, the subject was a signer of the Nominating Petition that was circulated in behalf of Communist leader Simon W. Gerson, Representative in Congress, Thirteenth Congressional District, New York City. In 1949, the subject made application for membership into the Young Progressives of America. In 1951, a play "Longitude 49" was put on by the New Playwrighters, Inc., at the Czechoslovak House, New York City, the subject was a participant in this play. The subject, in 1955, was a member of the Labor Youth League of New York City. (DFB-88463, 20 August 1957.)



(over)

ALHONOTE, Louis

2. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Louis Alhonote:

"Louis ALHONOTE, from Brooklyn, was mentally ill and had been told by a doctor that he was paranoic. Once in a meeting of the American group when one of the other members disagreed with him, he dashed a glass cup against the wall. On a second such occasion, he threw a glass cup at Jake ROSEN, which caused Rosen to have three stitches in his chin and five in his biceps.. This second incident was hushed up only with difficulty because the Chinese authorities learned of it when a doctor was called."

SECRET

American Student in China

AVEDISIAN, Sahag

File Check Results

ed: USA Photo ATTACHED

Residence - Pawtucket, R.I.

Passport No. 472013 issued 4/24/57

~~[illegible] went from the Moscow Youth Festival!~~

~~[illegible] 1957 - photo attached~~

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow).

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.

3. OO-B-3093654 (FLEETWOOD folder) comes from Avedisian. It is almost worthless. (Recd from O.O. Baker)

4. DFB-95178, 6 Dec 57, is a report on Sahag Avedisian ([illegible]). He refused to answer most some of the FBI questions, said he was not a communist, and explained his going to Moscow as largely chance.

5. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "... not well educated; not intelligent enough to form own opinions but at end of trip did stick up for the Communist system; not believed to have had much association with Communist movement before this trip." DFB-97144, 23 January 1958.

(over)

AVEDISIAN, Sahag

SECRET

6 Sahay Avidisian said he was not a Communist and never had been, when questioned by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)



AVEDISIAN, Sahag

American Student in China

BELFRAGE, Sally D.O.B - 4 Oct. 1936 **File Check Results**
ex. USA , Photo Attached
Residence - London/New York, New York
Passport No. 9728 issued 1/20/56
[illegible]

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Sally M. Belfrage, born on 4 October 1936, is the daughter of Cedric Hinning Belfrage. Cedric was or is the editor of the publication, "National Guardian," with offices located at 17 Murray Street, New York City. He was reported to be a Communist Party member in England; served as a Soviet spy in 1942 or 1943, while he was attached to British Intelligence in New York City; he and his wife admitted being Communists in 1937 or 1938; he held a Communist Party membership card in Hollywood, California, in 1937 or 1938; he has been a close associate of Soviet agents and known Communists and Communist sympathizers in the United States and in Europe, since 1937; he has attended and spoken at numerous Communist Party front organization functions; he has made pro-Russian statements and disparaging remarks about the United States. (DFB-26627, 11 May 1953)

3. Sally Belfrage's father, Cedric Belfrage, is a British subject who was deported from the United States and now resides at 16 Talbot Square, London, England. (DFB-90733, 27 September 1957)

4. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88476.

(over)

5. Sally Belfrage's father, Cedric Belfrage, is a British-born magazine writer who was deported from the United States in 1955, and is now writing from Communist China. Komsomol Pravda on 10 September 1957 reprinted part of an article by Belfrage from the magazine Chinese Youth. The article echoed the Peiping line by charging the United States with holding dozens of Chinese students and refusing them visas except for Formosa.



SECRET

BELFRAGE, Sally

American Student in China

BLOCK, Morris D.O.B - 30 March. 1920
P.O.B. New York, New York
CIT - U.S.A. Photo Attached
Residence - New York
Passport No. 921617 issued 4/12/56

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. A report dated 29 October 1956, indicated that M. BLOCK, 1718 Grand Avenue, New York City, had indicated a desire to travel to Czechoslovakia. It was not known whether or not he had actually filed for a satellite visa. (DFB-73259, 19 November 1956, p. 4.)

3. Morris BLOCK, residing at 421 7th Avenue, New York, New York, was listed as a reference by Grigory Lvovich SCHIFRIN on his visa application in 1954. SCHIFRIN was reported to have been linked with narcotic and diamond smuggling in 1946. (FJYA-5693, 22 March 1954.)

4. Morris S. BLOCH of 421 Seventh Avenue, New York City had known Rachel BEILIN since 1935 according to a report dated 11 August 1953. Rachel BEILIN was believed to have formerly engaged in trafficking drugs in Shanghai and been involved in Russian espionage. As of August 1953, Rachel BEILIN was residing with her husband Alexander, at 1566 Macombs Road, Bronx, New York. (DFB-29039, 20 August 1953.)

5. Morris BLOCK, born 30 March 1920, New York, New York, was among those on a list of persons denied security clearances pursuant to Executive Order 10173 as amended, dated 12 October 1953.

6. It has been reported that a certain Morris BLOCK, born 30 March 1920 at New York, and his wife, Mollie BLOCK, aged 37, United States Nationals, arrived on 16 April 1949 at Southampton from New York en route to Gdynia in the Polish S. S. Batory. Their destination was believed to be Warsaw. According to a reliable informant, who travelled

with them from New York, BLOCK and his wife endeavoured to get permission to hold a public meeting on board during the crossing, but when this was refused they contented themselves by holding a small meeting in the Tourist lounge on the morning of 9 April. In the course of this meeting both BLOCK and his wife spoke very disparagingly of the Atlantic Pact and from the tone of their remarks, the informant gained the impression that they were Communists. (WELA-2326, 9 May 1949 and OSDB-16157.)



MORRIS BLOCK
3-26-56

(over)

BLOCK, Morris

7. Morris Block invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination when he was asked if he was a Communist by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)

SECRET

American Student in China

BLOKSBERG, Harry D.O.B - 6 June 1937 OCC. - APPRENTICE tool MAKER File Check Results

CIT - USA.
Residence - Trenton, New Jersey Photo Attached
Passport No. 454479 issued 4/15/57

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was instrumental in applying pressure to make the Americans, that did not give up their passports at the Chinese frontier, give their passports to the Chinese in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Harry Irving Bloksberg, born 6 June 1937, resides in Newark, New Jersey and is employed as an apprentice tool maker. His parents, Gabriel and Bertha Bloksberg, were described as Communist Party members. The subject is a member of the Labor Youth League (LYL) which is a Communist organization. He attended Camp Midvale, which is owned and operated by the Metropolitan Recreation Association (MRA), on occasions during 1955. In 1956, the subject was named to a committee that was organized to make plans for the Communist MRA Youth Group. (DFB-86649, 16 July 1957.)

(over)

BLOKSBERG, Harry

SECRET

4. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Harry Bloksberg:

"Harry BLOKSBERG's father pleaded the 5th Amendment in 1954 and was subsequently thrown out of a hearing for causing a disturbance. Harry apparently took some pride in this, as he carried with him a clipping about the incident which he read to members of the group." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

[illegible] JENSWOLD



(over)

BLOKSBERG, Harry

5. Harry Bloksberg invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination when he was asked if he was a Communist by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)

SECRET

American Student in China

H **BRONSTEIN, Eugene**
CIT-USA
Residence - New York   Photo Attached
Passport No. A-757784 issued 6/28/56

File Check Results

1. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.

2. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; came to Moscow by himself; not believed to have had previous Communist affiliation; at end of trip appeared to be sympathetic toward the Communist movement." DFB-97144, 23 January 1958.



BRONSTEIN, Eugene

American Student in China

CARAWAN, Guy Hughes, Jr. **File Check Results**
CIT- U.S.A. Photo Attached
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 43499 issued 5/8/56

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. The AP correspondent in Moscow reported that the subject and Peggy Suger would return to the U.S.S.R. for an estensive folk-singing tour. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Guy Carawan, Jr. was the sponsor of a program entitled "Call to National Student Conference for Academic Freedom of Equality and Peace, University of Wisconsin, April 25, 26, and 27, 1952". The subject and his wife, Noel attended camp festivals that were sponsored by the Jewish Young Fraternalists in 1954. The camp festivals were held on property that belongs to the International Workers Order. The subject attended an affair that was given by Peoples Songs in Los Angeles, on 18 February 1950. Peoples Songs is an organization that was organized and directed by the Los Angeles County Communist Party. On 8 November 1954, Peoples Artists, Inc. a Communist front organization, gave a farewell party for the subject. Guy Carawan signed a petition that was addressed to Chief Justice Vinson requesting that the U.S. Supreme Court consider the cases concerning the "Hollywood 10". (DFB-88500, 20 August 1957.)

4. **Guy Carawan attended a party at the home of Bart and Edna Van der Schelling on the night of 28 August 1953. The persons in attendance were members of the American Communist group in Mexico City. Carawan was described as the son of wealthy parents who has been working at a Quaker encampment some place near Mexico City. Carawan has now decided to dedicate his life to "singing the folk songs of the common people". (DFB-88501, 20 August 1957.)**

(over)

CARAWAN, Guy Hughes, Jr.

SECRET

SECRET



GUY HUGHES CARAWAN, Jr
4/17/56

SECRET

CARAWAN, Guy Hughes, Jr.

American Student in China

CARAWAN, Noel Oliver
CIT - U.S.A.
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 43500 issued 5/8/56

Photo Attached File Check Results

1. Subject's full name was reported to be Noel Oliver CARAWAN. (DFB-88814, 21 August 1957.)

2. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

3. For derogatory information on the subject and her husband Guy Hughes Carawan, Jr., see the report entitled "CARAWAN, Guy Hughes, Jr.".

[illegible] Interviewed [illegible]



CARAWAN, Noel

SECRET

9

FJZW - 2233/1
10 Mar. 58

American Student in China

COHEN, Robert Carl,
CIT-U.S.A
Residence - Los Angeles

D.O.B - 24 Sept. 1930
P.O.B - Philadelphia, PENN.

Photo Attached

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender his passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Robert Carl Cohen was born 24 September 1930, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In 1947, the subject was reported to be residing in Los Angeles, California. In 1946, the subject was assigned to the Walt Whitman Club of the American Youth for Democracy. The subject's father is Isadore Cohen. An Isadore Cohen, not otherwise identified, was in April 1951, a member of the Los Angeles County Communist Party and the President of Lodge 251 of the International Workers Order. (DFB-89875, 12 September 1957.)

4. The IO Division, in a cable to Tokyo and Hong Kong, stated that Robert Cohen and Orville Schmidt were probably the most reliable members of the students that were visiting China. (DIR-35428, OUT-89863, 13 September 1957.)

CASIC DOCUMENT FILED IN 200-8-14

(over)

201				
AN		~~PS~~		
		FI		~~DESTROY~~
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX		

CS COPY

COHEN, Robert Carl
201 - 197821
10 Mar. 58

SECRET

5. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Robert Cohen:

"Robert COHEN was sending reports of the group's travels to NBC; O'Connell said that he planned to write NBC a letter telling them what a poor choice they had made. O'Connell described Cohen as intelligent but overbearing, and probably the most unpopular member of the group. He admitted that he had been a pimp in San Francisco, and was rather proud of the fact that in 1939 -- at the age of 9 -- he had been stoned while marching in a May Day parade. Steve Tyler told O'Connell that Cohen had been residing in Paris and that he known there as a "violent left-winger". O'Connell could not understand the fact that Cohen at some previous time had been in the Army in security work for the Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

6. Robert Cohen departed Pari Air France midnight 1 Dec for Idlewild arriving morning 2 Dec. Concerned about procedure at Idlewild re passports. Attempting to arrange to be met by sufficient people to forestall a passport incident. (Pari 0169, IN 40350), 28 Nov '57)



ROBERT CARL COHEN
11/1/55

COHEN, Robert Carl

201-197821

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT COHEN, Robert Carl	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO. 201-197821
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. FJZW-2233
	4. DATE 10 Mar 58
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 8 - JUN 1965	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO. 201-197821

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Doc. removed and reprocessed for 201-197821 (COHEN, Robert Carl).

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 8-57

SECRET

(7-46)

American Student in China

COLLINS, Judy
CIT-U.S.A.
Residence - San Francisco
Passport No. 270636 issued 1/9/57

Photo Attached

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-86248.

3. Ron O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; didn't appear to be very familiar with Communism; associated with the pro-Communist element on the trip; very naive and not a good thinker; seemed very impressed by the trip and by the Communist system." DFB-97144, 23 Jan 58.



(over)

COLLINS, Judy

SECRET

American Student in China

DANIELS, Ben Photo Attached **File Check Results**
CIT - U.S.A
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 518654 issued 6/12/57

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.



(over)

DANIELS, Ben

3. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Ben Daniels:

"Ben DANIELS, who exited China through Burma, took many photographs on the tour (see ALUSLO Hong Kong telegram to DNI, 11 October 1957)." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957)

4. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "... at the end of the trip (he) was sticking up for the Communist system; physically weak and does not have a strong will power." OFB-97144, 23 Jan 58.

SECRET

American Student in China

FIDERER, Jerry — DOB - 4 April 1933 — POB - New York, New York — File Check Results

CIT - U.S.A.

Residence - Brooklyn, New York — Photo Attached

Passport No. 20123 issued 4/26/56

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Macao Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is far left. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. The meeting of the Young Progressives of America that was scheduled to meet on 5 March 1953, did not take place due to the fact that only a few people attended; of the few that attended was one Gerald L. Fiderer. (DFB-65050, 19 June 1956.)

4. Gerald Lionel Fiderer, who resided at Brooklyn, New York, was not inducted into the United States Army on 27 November 1956, because he had a schizophrenic personality. (DFB-75071, 26 December 1956.)

5. Gerald Lionel Fiderer was born 4 April 1933 at New York, New York. In 1953, he was reported to have had "recurring emotional difficulties". He has been registered and publicly known as the General Secretary of the Labor Youth League (LYL) Chapter at the University of Wisconsin since 1955, and has been present at all public meetings of the LYL Chapter that has been held in Madison since September 1955. He was also reported as being present at an organizing committee meeting of the Young Progressives of America that was held in Madison in March 1953. The subject, (apparently as of 1956), was the vice-president of the LYL at the University of Wisconsin, participated in a public debate on behalf of the LYL on 19 April 1956, in Madison, in which he defended Marxism, criticized the "War Economy" of the United States, claimed that the elections in East Germany "are free", and claimed that reports on the recent Communist Party Congress in the U.S.S.R. were distorted in the United States newspapers. (DFB-70056, 20 September 1956.)

FIDERER, Jerry

SECRET

6. Gerald Lionel Federer was dropped from the rolls of the University of Wisconsin because of poor grades in his classes. The subject was in contact with Sigmund Eisenscher the State Chairman of the Communist Party in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The subject apparently returned to New York on 1 July 1956. (DFB-71805, 24 October 1956.)

(over)



GERALD L[illegible]DERER

FIDERER, Jerry

7. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Jerry Fiderer:

"Jerry FIDERER, a chemist, is definitely a Marxist thinker, but possibly not a Communist Party member." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

American Student in China

GOLDSTEIN, Ninel　　**File Check Results**

CIT - U.S.A.
Residence - Brooklyn, New York
Passport No. 69190 issued 5/23/56　　Photo Attached

Ninel E. Goldstein visited the Tass News Agency, New York City on 20 March 1955. The subject resided at 2670 Colby Court, Brooklyn, New York. She allegedly belongs to a Communist Party Youth Group in New York City. Her father, Alfredo Henley, was identified as a Communist Party member; her stepmother, Lillian Henley, was employed at the Soviet Embassy in 1954; her aunt and uncle, Ruth and Harry Fisher, ~~was~~ were employed with the Tass News Agency, in New York City, and her uncle, Zol Tan Deak, was described as a recognized Communist. (DFB-88449, 15 August 1957.)



GOLDSTEIN, Ninel

American Student in China

H **GOODMAN, Faye** — **File Check Results**

CIT-USA.

Residence - New York — Photo Attached

Passport No. 473652 issued 4/23/57

1. No pertinent information was available on the subject.

2. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "... pro-Communist; appeared to come from a poor working family and indicated her parents believed Communism was the answer for the working class." OFB-97144, 23 January 1958.



GOODMAN, Faye

SECRET

American Student in China

GRAB, Fred Photo Attached **File Check Results**

CIT-U.S.A.
~~Residence - Vienna~~ (formerly) now Alexandria, Virginia
Passport No. 73458 issued 5/24/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88472.

3. Don O'Connell, a member of the groups, had the following to say about the subject: "...; possibly a socialist; don't think he [illegible] believed in Communism but did believe socialism would be the answer to all problems;..." DFB-9714



GRAB, Fred

SECRET

American Student in China

GRANT, Joanne
CIT- U.S.A.
Residence - New York
Passport No. 473761 issued 4/24/57

File Check Results

Photo Attached

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender her passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The Peking CHINA YOUTH NEWS carried in its 5 October 1957, issue an article by Joanne Grant, giving her impression of her visit to China. She had the following to say in her article:

> "You can see the future through the Chinese people. You can obtain a firm conviction that China will continuously advance forward. As a western visitor, nothing impressed me more than the great power of this country. Every person in New China is very modest but has great pride; they are united, have self-respect, and respect each other. No one can overlook China's advance; it is to be regretted that many people do not have the opportunity to observe it personally. I like Shanghai very much, because from the way Shanghai has changed I can really understand New China. In the old Shanghai, except for the Chinese, everyone had special privileges. However, everything has changed greatly. I am of the opinion that from this, one can see the miracles which have begun in this great country."

3. **The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.**

SECRET

- 2 -

4. Joanne Grant has written for "Rights," a pamphlet sponsored by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (ECLC). The subject was among those invited to the ECLC "Bill of Rights" dinner that was given on 15 December 1954. In October 1953, she contacted the American Committee For Protection of Foreign Born and in October 1956, the subject's name and address was in possession of the Socialist Workers Party. (DFB-92684, 23 October 1957)

5. [illegible]



GRANT, JOANNE A.

SECRET

GRANT, Joanne

SECRET

American Student in China

GREENBERG, Sheila

File Check Results

CIT - U.S.A.

Residence - New York

Photo Attached

Passport No. 98843 issued 6/11/56

1. RI has a 201 file on the subject, however, there is no material in the file.

(over)



GREENBERG, Sheila

SECRET

2. Sheila Greenberg invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination when she was asked if she was a Communist by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)

3. Dee O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; definitely pro-Communist." OFB-97144, 23 January 1958.

SECRET

American Student in China

HAMILTON, Betty **File Check Results**

CIT-O.S.A

Residence - ~~New~~ York

Passport No. 184522 issued 9/11/56 Photo AHached.

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender her passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-886031.

3. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; described as a liberal; sold on the Communist system during the trip; believed most of the things she heard; however, appeared that she would never actively work for ~~the~~ Communism in the U.S." DFB 57144, 23 January 1958.



BETTY ANN HAM

8/24/56

HAMILTON, Betty

SECRET

American Student in China

HOCKMAN, Sam

CIT- U.S.A.

Residence - New York

Passport No. 746706 issued 1/30/57

File Check Results

Photo Attached

1. Shelby TUCKER, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was the most effective anti-Communist in the group and that he had also refused to surrender his passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957 from Moscow.)

2. The FBI in answer to a file check request, from the State Department regarding some of the individuals that attended the Moscow Youth Festival, replied that their records failed to disclose any indentifiable data of a subversive nature concerning Samuel E. Hockman of Trenton, New Jersey. (DFB-88829, 21 August 1957.)

3. S. Hockman was an assistant to the director of the Jewish Legion, of 21 Hyde Park Street, London, W. Z. The Jewish Legion was reported to be a subversive organization. (WEL-3908, 26 Feb 48.)

4. S. Hochman departed Pari Air France midnight 1 Dec. for Idlewild arriving morning 2 Dec. Concerned about procedure at Idlewild re passports. Attempting arrangements to be met by sufficient people to forestall a passport incident. Fears contempt Congress charge, says he will not plead fifth amendment but will refuse to give information on other China travelers. (Pari 0169, (IN 40350), 28 Nov '57)



SAMUEL EDWARD HOCHMAN

8/1/55

HOCKMAN, Sam

American Student in China

HOLLISTER, David — **File Check Results**

CIT-U.S.A.
~~Residence - New York.~~
Passport No. 211858 issued 5/2/56 — Photo AHAchGD

1. David Manship Hollister, residing in New York City, was rejected from military service on 18 September 1951, because of a schizoid personality. Records dated September 1951, indicated that the subject had received professional care for dementia praecox in 1950 and 1951, and that the subject had admitted heterosexual and homosexual experiences until about March 1951. In 1952, the subject was registered with the American Labor Party. The subject's mother, Ruth Manship Hollyster, reportedly was a member of the Los Angeles Communist Party. In 1947 and 1948, the subject was a member of the Harvard Youth for Democracy. The subject was also believed to be a secret member of the Communist Party in 1947. (DFB-86787, 18 July 1957.)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-86248.



HOLLISTER, David

SECRET

American Student in China

H **HOXSEY, Dean Cornelius** **File Check Results**

CIT- U.S.A

Residence - Los Angeles

Passport No. 619885 issued 7/19/57 Photo Attached

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Dean Hoxsey who originally applied for permission to remain in the U.S.S.R. now states that he is eager to remain in China after his interview with the American expatriates WILLS and WHITE in Peking. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that WILLS was thinking of returning to the US and that WHITE was completely brainwashed. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Dean Hoxsey was recruited into the Communist Party in May 1944, and was assigned to the East Los Angeles Communist Party Club. In August 1949, the subject advised a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in Los Angeles, California, that he had been reared in a home which was one of Communist influence, as his father, Lowell Hoxsey, had for many years been a member of the Socialist Party and in the 1930's had joined the Communist Party. (DFB-88557, 21 August 1957.)



HOXSEY,
DEAN CORNELIUS
JULY, 1957

HOXSEY, Dean Cornelius

SECRET

American Student in China

A **HYMAN, Elaine** File Check Results

CIT-USA

Residence - Brooklyn Photo Attached

Passport No. 136094 issued 7/12/56

Elaine Hyman, of 1240 Union Street, Brooklyn, New York, was believed to be on the Teenage Labor Youth League State Board, in August 1953. In 1944, Fay Hyman and William Hyman, parents of the subject, were members of the Communist Party, Thomas Jefferson Group, 11th A. D., Kings County, Brooklyn, New York. William Hyman, father of the subject, was a delegate for the Communist Party, 11th A. D., to the United Labor and People's Conference for May Day, that was held in New York City, on 26 March 1949. (DFB-88471, 20 August 1957.)



HYMAN, Elaine

American Student in China

A

KIDDER, Noel Arthur — File Check Results

CIT-U.S.A. — Photo Attached

Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 113046 issued 6/30/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. Noel Arthur Kidder, during an interview with a representative of the Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army, in April 1956, stated that he would refuse to sign a Loyalty Oath if he were inducted into the armed services. Kidder attended functions that were sponsored by the Los Angeles Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born in 1956. He attended meetings of the Los Angeles County Labor Youth League (LYL) in 1956 and 1957. He was elected Vice President of the Los Angeles County LYL in January 1957. He attended the California State LYL Conference that was held in February 1957. In December 1956 he was reported to have stated that a violent class struggle and a revolution were certain to occur. A subscription to the "Daily People's World" was maintained in the name of Kidder in November 1956. (DFB-81948, 24 April 57)

3. Noel Arthur Kidder is married to Susan Toya Pollock. (DFB-83271, 15 May 57)



KIDDER, Noel Arthur

American Student in China

H **KIDDER, Susan Pollock** **File Check Results**

CIT-U.S.A. Photo Attached

Residence - Los Angeles

Passport No. 126723 issued 7/3/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. Sue Pollock, of 1700 Abermarle Road, Brooklyn, N. Y., was mentioned as being one of Gustave Gilbert's contacts. (No further information was given as to who Gilbert was or what was meant by Sue being a contact). (DFB-14187, 13 Dec 51)

3. For derogatory information on the subject and her husband, Noel Arthur Kidder, see the report entitled "KIDDER Noel Arthur."



SUSAN POLLOCK KIDDER
6/13/56

KIDDER, Susan Pollock

American Student in China

KUZNITZ, Elaine
CIT- U.S.A.
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 135646 issued 7/12/56

Photo Attached

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Division)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a probable Communist. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: IFB-86248.



ELAINE KUSNITZ
6-21-56

KUZNITZ, Elaine

American Student in China

LANDAU, Nina
CIT.-U.S.A
Residence - New York
Passport No. 488104 issued 6/7/57

Photo Attached

File Check Results

As of October 1956, Nina Serrano Landau and her husband, Saul Landau, were students at the University of Wisconsin. Mr. and Mrs. Landau have been active in the Student Peace Center at the University of Wisconsin. This organization was registered at the University as being a social-action type of organization which was affiliated with the American Friends Service Committee. In its 1957 registration, the Student Peace Center listed Nina Landau as secretary. In 1955, Saul Landau attended two public meetings that were sponsored by the Labor Youth League at the University of Wisconsin. Saul Landau was identified as having visited the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., in March 1956. (DFB-88459, 20 August 1957.)



NINA LANDAU
6/6/57

LANDAU, Nina

SECRET

American Student in China

LANE, Dick
CIT-USA
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 908260 issued 4/6/56

Photo AHAchED

File Check Results

1. The SR Division briefed the subject prior to his attendance at the Moscow Festival. (DFB-89325, 30 August 1957.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. The following documents pertain to the subject, however, efforts to locate the documents have been unsuccessful: 201-193201, DFB-86248, and DFB-88603.



RICHARD RENO LANE
3/26/56

LANE, Dick

SECRET

SECRET

American Student in China

MARCH, William James D.O.B - 8 May 1939 P.O.B - Chicago, Illinois File Check Results
CIT - U.S.A
Residence - Los Angeles Photo Attached
Passport No. 218671 issued 10/8/56

1. William James MARCH was born on 8 May 1939 in Chicago, Illinois. His parents are Herbert MARCH and Jane V. MARCH. The subject attended a meeting of the Labor Youth League (LYL) in 1955, as a prospective member. In February and March 1957, he attended a meeting of the Los Angeles County LYL, and was also in attendance at a California State LYL Conference. Subject's mother was a member of the Central Section, Moranda Smith Division, Los Angeles County Communist Party in October 1955. (DFB-88466, 20 Aug. 1957)

2. Information has been received that William James March left New York 8 June 1957, for Europe to attend the Youth Festival in Moscow during July and August, 1957. March's parents were listed as father Herbert MARCH, with aliases Herbert Fink and Harry Martin; and mother Jane V. March. (DFB-86867, 19 July 1957)

3. William James March was issued Los Angeles Series Passport #218671 on 10/8/56. In his application for this passport, the subject stated he intended to depart from the United States on 12/5/56 for a proposed length of stay abroad of two months in order to visit France, Italy and West Germany for the purpose of visiting relatives and seeing Italy. Subject answered "no" to questions "Are you now a member of the Communist Party?" and "Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?" (DFB-87370, 27 July 1957)



WILLIAM J. MARCH
10-4-56

MARCH, William James

SECRET

American Student in China

MATTOX, Virginia Lee (Ginger)

CIT - U.S.A.

File Check Results

Residence - San Francisco

Photo Attached

Passport No. A-758615 issued 7/12/56

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. Virginia Lee Mattox was born on 10 October 1937, at Los Angeles, California. On the subject's application for a passport she stated that she was not a member of the Communist Party and she had never been member of the Party. (DFB-85650, 28 June 57)

4. In November 1955, Virginia Mattox attended a meeting of the California Labor Youth League (LYL) State Board meeting that was held in Los Angeles, California. In 1955, Ginger Mattox was the chairman of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Teen-Age Club of the San Francisco County LYL. On 16 April 1956, Virginia Mattox attended a lecture on the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that was given by William Schneiderman the Chairman of the 13th District Communist Party of the U. S. A. (DFB-82103, 26 April 1957)



MATTOX, Virginia Lee

SECRET

American Student in China

McKENNA, (Rev.) Warren occ. - Theologian **File Check Results**

C.I.T. - U.S.A.

Residence - Boston Photo Attached

Passport No. 11791, issued 5/27/57

1. The IO Division's informants that attended the Moscow Festival were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was instrumental in applying pressure to make the Americans (that did not give up their passports at the Chinese frontier) give their passports to the Chinese in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513, 10 Sept. 57, from Moscow)

3. The Reverend Warren H. McKENNA of St. John's Church, Roxbury, Mass., was identified as an active participant in a picket line sponsored by the Communist Party during the strike at the Bethlehem Steel Company, Boston, in Oct. 1947. (DFB-28536, 30 July 53)

4. The name of Rev. Warren H. McKENNA was among those on a list contained in an article entitled "Penalties for Thinking Alarm U. S. Liberals." in the Daily Worker for 30 Oct. 1949. This article set forth that since the eleven Communist leaders had been found guilty, a great number of American church leaders had spoken out against the verdict of guilty. (DFB-889, 19 Jan. 1950, page 126)

5. Subject reportedly accepted position as Assistant at a Church in Dalston, London, England and is expected to remain there two years. Informants advised that one Warren McKENNA, was a sponsor of the National Conference of American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, December 1954 and December 1955; name appeared on card at Pittsburgh Civil Rights Congress, February, 1956; subject attended the meeting of the Civil Liberties Committee of Massachusetts in May 1955; the subject's name appeared on the mailing list of the Southern Conference Educational Fund in August 1954. Informants reported no current activity on the part of the subject. (DFB-63999, 30 April 1956.)

SECRET

McKENNA, Rev. Warren

6. One Warren McKENNA was on a list of delegates to the Second World Peace Congress that was held in Warsaw from 16 to 23 November 1950. (WDCA-890, 80-54896, 11 Jan. 1951)

7. A reliable informant in the Boston area furnished a copy of the first issue of a new publication entitled "Our Common Concern," dated October 1950, published by Workers of the Common Life, at Roxbury, Massachusetts. The editors and publishers of this publication are Reverend Warren H. McKENNA and Reverend Robert MUIR, both associated with the Massachusetts Action Committee for Peace. The instant issue of this publication features the Stockholm Peace Pledge and the address which Reverend Joseph FLETCHER of Cambridge, Massachusetts, gave at the Winter Stadium at Ostrava, Czechoslovakia, on 18 August 1950, this speech also favored the Stockholm Peace Pledge. (DFB-6285, 22 Nov. 1950)

8. The Boston Globe, a Boston newspaper, on 5 November 1948, carried an article entitled "Boston Group Plans Welcome for 'Red Dean'". This article furnished information that a group of prominent Bostonians had joined into a special "Committee of Welcome" for the Very Reverend Hewlett JOHNSON, British Dean of Canterbury Cathedral, who was to visit at Boston after being refused a visa to enter the country the previous year.

The article continues, "Known as the 'Red Dean,' Dr. HEWLETT will speak at Jordan Hall, Gainsborough St., November 16 at 8 p.m." The article quoted Reverend Warren H. McKENNA, the Minister of St. John's Episcopal Church, at Roxbury, Massachusetts, as saying, "Dean HEWLETT was refused a visa by the State Department in 1947, because his invitation came from the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. The State Department later recanted and permitted the visa." (DFB-14689, 5 Jan. 1952, enc. 2)

9. Reverend Warren McKENNA, a delegate to the 2nd World Peace Congress in Warsaw, Poland, in November 1950, testified that Irma C. OTTO attended that Congress, presumably a delegate from some other groups, and that he and Mrs. OTTO had the same committee participation, which he described as "the commission to define aggression." This same witness testified that upon their return from Warsaw, Poland, both he and Mrs. OTTO spoke at a meeting sponsored by the Minute Women for Peace.

As of April 1955, Irma C. OTTO resided at 140 Huron Ave., Cambridge, Mass. c/o Flo LUSCOMB who has been identified by informant as a "Concealed Communist". Subject appeared before the N. H. Commission Investigating

Communism and Subversive Activities in N.H. and testified on 1/6/54 and 2/1/54 that she was not and had not been a member of the Communist Party. She refused to give further information on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination. Informant identified subject as a former member of the Mass. Minute Women for Peace. Another informant reported subject spoke as the New England Representative of the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born at the National Legislative Conference of this organization that was held in Washington, D. C. on 27-28 March 1955. Another informant identified subject as being in attendance at a meeting of the Chicago Women for Peace that was held on 12/6/54. (IFB-55296, 29 July 1955)

10. See 16 Jan 57 memo to Chief, Contact Division, O.O. from Boston office, on the Kennas lecture on interviews with Downey & Fecteau.

11. Interviews secured

McKENNA,
WARREN HENRY
(OCT 1950)

MCKENNA, Rev. Warren

(over)

12 Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American Youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about McKenna:

"Reverend Warren McKENNA, a 39-year-old Anglican minister, has spent the last year or so in London. He has a socialist viewpoint, but is neither a clear nor a fast thinker. O'Connell commented that he sometimes had too much to drink and may have said some things he otherwise might not have." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

SECRET

American Student in China

H **MESCOLI, Sandra** Florence

C. IT - U.S.A.

Residence - Los Angeles

File Check Results

Photo Attached

1. No Record in RI.

2. Mescoli, as of December, 1957, was traveling in Europe after attending the Youth Festival in Moscow and the trip to China. She attended Labor Youth League meetings in 1956 and 1957. She attended the May Day rally that was held in Los Angeles, California, on 1 May 1957. (OFB-96419, 3 January 1958, in RI 201-146407)

3. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "... not too well informed on Communism but did support the Communist system." OFB-97144, 23 Jan 58.



MESCOLLI, Sandra

American Student in China

MOYER, Larry (Eli Larry) **File Check Results**

C.I.T.-U.S.A Photo Attached

Residence - New York
Passport No. 922674 issued 4/13/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. Larry Moyer, a reported Communist Party member, attended a meeting on 6 January 1950, at the Independent Progressive Party (IPP) Headquarters at San Diego. The meeting was held by the members of the IPP Housing Committee for the purpose of making plans for their participation in the public Rent De-Control Meeting that was to be sponsored by the City of San Diego on 25 January 1950. (DFB-23641, 9 January 1953)

3. The regular meeting of the Communist Party Morgan Hull Club was held at the home of Eli Larry Moyer on the evening of 14 March 1948. (This meeting was probably held in San Diego, California.) Eli Larry Moyer, a Communist Party member was among the members of the Independent Progressive Party that maintained a picket line at the entrance to the Chamber of Commerce Auditorium, in September 1948, when the California Un-American Activities Committee Hearings were being held. (DFB-19758, 22 July 52)

(over)

4. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Larry Moyer:

"Larry MOYER, age 32, was reporting on the trip for United Press. O'Connell was Moyer's roommate in Moscow, and had learned of many of Moyer's past experiences before O'Connell had indicated where he stood politically. Moyer had been a pimp in Hawaii in 1941, working through the photograph shops where a serviceman could get his picture taken with a hula girl. He had also been afriend of Ada B. Jackson, whom O'Connell described as "a well-known pink in New York"; Moyer had known her through American Labor Party meetings there. O'Connell said that Moyer was crude, but by no means stupid." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

S. [illegible] SCHWALD



MOYER, Larry (Eli Larry)

American Student in China

Nowicki H **NOWICKI, Lorraine (Genevieve)** D.O.B - 7 Oct. 1932 **File Check Results**

CIT - U.S.A P.O.B - Poland

Residence - Detroit
Passport No. 117018 issued 6/22/56

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. Genevive Loraine Nowacki was residing at Hamtramck, Michigan and was employed by the "Glos Ludowy" (People's Voice) a Communist-line Polish-English language weekly newspaper. She attended meetings sponsored by the Civil Rights Congress in 1951, and the Convention of the Progressive Party at Chicago in 1952. She attended local and national functions of the "Glos Ludowy" in 1952. She served as Recording Secretary of the Youth Committee to Elect Peace Candidates in 1952, and was campaign manager for Ben Kocel who was an active member of the Communist Party in 1951, and the Progressive Party candidate for Michigan State Senator in the November 1952 elections. The subject represented the American Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born at the "Glos Ludowy" National Press Conference in Cleveland, Ohio in 1952. She was a member of the Civil Liberties Committee at the University of Michigan in 1952, and the International Workers Order in 1950. The subject was elected to the temporary Executive Committee of the newly formed Youth Club, Communist Party, U. S. A. District 7, on 4 December 1956, and was described that date as a member of the East Side Section of the Communist Party, District 7. Subject was the Chairman of the meeting of the Youth Club, Communist Party, District 7, on 11 December 1956. The subject has or is also connected with the Michigan Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case, Michigan Artists Bureau, Civil Liberties Committee, Michigan Youth Committee for Peace, Freedom of Press Association of Michigan, American Slav Congress, and the National Negro Labor Council. (DFB-79256, 14 March 1957)

3. Genevive Loraine Nowacki was born on 7 October 1932, in Poland and in 1956, she was residing in Detroit, Michigan with her father and

SECRET

mother. Genevive's mother Stella who was born in Poland and naturalized at Detroit, Michigan travelled to Poland in 1956, and returned to the United States in that same year. Stella was a member of the International Workers Order, Lodge No. 3503, and was in good standing. Stella was also reported to have attended many receptions with the representatives of the Polish Embassy. (DFB-67777, 13 August 1956)

4. Miss Lorraine Nowacki was the Campaign Manager for Ben Kocel, the candidate for membership in the State Legislative representation of Michigan. Lorraine and Ben obtained over 1,800 signatures within less than 5 hours under the Progressive Party's petition demanding that the City Council in Detroit extend the rent control. (DFB-27456, 15 June 53)

5. [illegible]

¶ DFB-95643, 14 Dec 57, contains info on Nowacki's Communist connections, with her visits to USSR and China. Nothing of use for our interest in Americans imprisoned in China



GENEVIEVE NOWACKI
May 1956

NOWICKI, Lorraine (Genevieve

American Student in China

O'CONNELL, Dan (Daniel Myles)
CIT- U.S.A
Residence - Chicago, Illinois
Passport No. 594311 issued 6/25/57

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender his passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957 from Moscow.)

3. Dan O'Connell was listed as the Publicity Director of the United States Youth Festival Committee, as of May 1957. (DFB-84120, 16 May 1957.)

4. American HK telegram No. 604, 7 Oct 57, says O'Connell says he is last member Youth Festival group departing Communist China.

(over)

O'CONNELL, Dan (Daniel Myles)

5. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. O'Connell said he saw Father Wagner in prison in Shanghai; he did not provide the Consulate General with more information about Father Wagner than appeared in the press. He was quite cooperative with the Consulate General (he turned over his passport) and was most anti-Communist in public and private statements. He described the greater part of the American group which attended the October 1 celebrations in Peiping as being politically and morally corrupt, and stated that only three members of the group, including himself, made any effort to defend the U.S. against Chinese Communist critics. The shortness of O'Connell's stay in Hong Kong prevented spending much time with him, but he stated that he would be happy to answer further questions after he returns to Chicago. (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

6. O'Connell is a KUJUMP informant. (See 10 January 58 item from KUJUMP, filed in CIA-connected Americans jailed in China)

7. WFB-95135, 9 Dec 57, is a report on Daniel Myles O'Connell. O'Connell said that John Rosen & Bob Williamson were the leaders of the American delegation, that the Reverend Warren McKenna was the leader of the group that went to China, that he (O'Connell) & Steve Tyler were the only members of the China group that praised the U.S.

SECRET

42

American Student in China

H **ROSEN, Jake**

CIT- USA.

Residence - New York

Photo ATTACHED

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was instrumental in applying pressure to make the Americans, that did not give up their passports at the Chinese frontier, give their passports to the Chinese in Peking. Tucker also feels that the subject is a most dangerous leftist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. On 15 November 1951, it was reported that Jack and Mildred Rosen, indicated to be members of the Chicago Branch of the Socialist Workers Party, resided at 1839 Touhy Avenue, Chicago. (DFB-16666, 24 March 1952)

4. In March 1948, it was reported that Jack Rosen, who was residing at 314 Harbor Road, Hunters Point Housing Project, San Francisco, and a part-time employee at Sonotone, Inc., 450 Sutter Street, San Francisco, and a student at Stanford University, was a member of the Theodore Dreiser Club of the Communist Party. At a meeting of the Professional Section functionaries on 19 March 1948, and in a discussion by those present on the responsibility of a Communist Party member in the event of war between the United States and Soviet Russia, Rosen, a member of the club, stated, "I would be drafted like any other individual and then do what I could." This same Jack Rosen was on a list of Communist Party members or reported sympathizers known to possess or who have been issued licenses for the operation of radiotelegraph, radiotelephone or amateur "ham" apparatus; who have received radio training; or who have been or now are employed in allied fields where their employment, talent, or knowledge could be utilized for clandestine radio communications. (DFB-5016, 14 August 1950)

(over)

SECRET

ROSEN, Jake

SECRET

5. Jacob Rosen was a member of "The Campus" and the "Marxist Discussion Club," both organizations are student groups at the City College of New York, where Rosen was in attendance as a student. (DFB-90299, 19 Sept 57)

6. The "New York Times" issue of 30 July 1957, contained an article by "Max Frankel," regarding the World Youth Festival then in session at Moscow, USSR, which stated in part - "Jacob Rosen, 636 West 174th Street, Manhattan, a junior at City College went without sleep to keep things moving. He carried the United States flag at yesterday's opening, dipping it in salute to Nikita S. Khrushchev and other Soviet dignitaries, at the Lenin Stadium."



JACOB ROSEN
5/11/56

SECRET

ROSEN, Jake

7. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Jake Rosen:

"Jake ROSEN, one of the organizers of the group is "solidly leftist". His father had been a labor leader in New York." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)



CHINA VISITOR APPLIES

Passport Seized, Youth Moves to Re-enter City College

One of the forty-two young Americans who ignored a State Department ban to travel in Communist China will seek to re-enter City College next semester.

The student, Jacob Rosen, returned to New York last week and his passport was seized by immigration officials. He said yesterday that he had taken a six-month leave of absence from City College to attend a youth festival in Moscow and to travel in Europe. Mr. Rosen, a 19-year-old junior, went to China following the festival and visited relatives in Israel before returning home.

Dr. Buell G. Gallagher, president of the college, said he expected Mr. Rosen to have "no difficulty" in being readmitted.

8. Interviews SECKUALD.

9. DFB-95661, 26 NOV 57, contains info on Rosen's Communist connections and visits to the USSR and China. He was the organizer of the group. He helped prepare the report that said Democracy & Freedom looked well (Moyer objected to this). Several members of the group considered Rosen as a Communist & acting for the Russians (those who did are Moyer, O'Connell, Tucker, Coppedge, & Mumford).

SECRET

American Student in China

H

SCHMIDT, Orville | **File Check Results**

CIT-USA

Residence - Marion, South D.

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.

American Student in China

SCHWARTZ, Larry **File Check Results**

CIT-U.S.A
Residence - Utica, Michigan
Passport No. 920030 issued 4/12/56. Photo Attached

The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)



Over

SECRET

SCHWARTZ, Larry

SECRET

2. Lawrence Schwartz, who recently arrived in Hong Kong, from his tour in Communist China, had the following to say about his observations of Communist China: "Communism is run by fanatics. What they are trying to do cannot be done. People cannot submit to long periods of regimentation. Regimentation is frightening. In the states I visited, it was entirely out of hand." (New York Times, 21 Nov. 57)

SCHWARTZ, Larry

SECRET

Cy Loclaud

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

UNCLASSIFIED

32
Action

P
Info

RMR

INR
EUR
FE
IES
SCA
PPT
IRC

CIA

Control: 12435
Rec'd: November 21, 1957
8:30 p.m.

FROM: Hong Kong

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 865, November 21

SENT DEPARTMENT 865, REPEATED INFORMATION KOBE 2, YOKOHAMA 3.

Lawrence Schwartz, member Youth Festival group, aboard PRESIDENT CLEVELAND due Honolulu December 3. Presence Hong Kong unknown until after departure.

DRUMRIGHT

UMT/1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED.

SCHWARTZ, Lawrence

SECRET

American Student in China

SEEGER, Peggy (Margaret) **File Check Results**

CIT - U.S.A

Residence - Los Angeles, California Photo Attached

Passport No. 729373 issued 7/11/55

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. The AP correspondent in Moscow reported that the subject and Guy CARAWAN would return to the U.S.S.R. for an extensive folk-singing tour. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. There is no pertinent file information concerning Margaret SEEBER however, the following information is furnished for your information.

Charles Louis SEEGER, Jr. and Ruth Crawford SEEGER, parents of subject reside at 7 West Kirke Street, Chevy Chase 15, Maryland.

A report dated May 1952 states that Charles SEEGER was a member of the Communist Party in approximately 1936 and 1937. Ruth Crawford SEEGER was reported to have been friendly or acquainted with serious individuals during the 1940's who were Communist Party members, some of whom were also identified as being involved in a Soviet espionage ring which operated in Washington, D. C. and New York during the early 1940's.

Charles SEEGER admitted Communist Party membership from 1936 to 1939 in a discussion group of the Communist Party. He stated that the group payed no dues and had no membership cards. He also admitted that he joined a similar Communist Party discussion group consisting of three people in the latter part of 1941 and early 1942. This group, according to SEEGER met very irregularly and he ceased association with the Communist Party about 1943. He denied membership in the Communist Party at the time he was interviewed in August 1953.

SEEGER, Peggy (Margaret)

SECRET

SECRET

Margaret SEEGER's half brother Peter SEEGER is reported to have been a member of the Communist Party in 1945.

Peter SEEGER is reported to have been one of the organizers of People's Songs, Inc. in 1946. He served as editor, executive chairman, and national director prior to the dissolution of the company in 1949. People's Songs, Inc. was cited as a Communist front which was incorporated January 31, 1946, by the California Committee on Un-American Activities in its 1948 report.

Peter SEEGER is also reported to have been a member of the WEAVERS, a musical quartet who entertained at "Closed meetings" of Communist Party functionaries and have appeared before numerous pro-Communist and Communist-front groups. (ONHW-4402, 20 February 1956 from various FBI reports.)

Peggy Seeger [illegible]



MARGARET SEEGER
12/13/55

SEEGER, Peggy (Margaret)

SECRET

SECRET

American Student in China

TUCKER, Shelby Jr. (James) **File Check Results**

CIT-U.S.A

Residence - ~~Pass Christian, Miss.~~ Photo Attached

Passport No. 615485 issued 3/29/57

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow, on 9 September 1957, and was interviewed in regards to his trip to China. (Interviewers name not given) The interviewer stated that he was convinced from his talk with Tucker, both before the festival and now, that he was a sincere and loyal if misguided American and that his refusal to give up his passport to the Chinese was not a trick. (State Dept. Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. The FBI in answer to a file-check request, from the State Department regarding some of the individuals that attended the Moscow Youth Festival, replied that their records failed to disclose any identifiable data of a subversive nature concerning James T. Tucker, Jr. (DFB-88829, 21 August 57)



TUCKER, Shelby, Jr. (James)

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
[illegible]
015

FROM : American Embassy LONDON — 808 DESP. NO.
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. — October 5, 1957 DATE
REF : Embtel 1887

7

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION SCA-2	INFO	DEPT. RMR-2 EUR-5 OLI-8 FE-4 P/T-2
	REC'D 10/9		OTHER CIA-12 USIA-10

SUBJECT: Embassy De-briefing of Shelby Tucker, American Student Who Visited Communist China

Mr. Shelby Tucker, an American student at Oxford University, visited Communist China in company with several other students at the conclusion of the Moscow Youth Festival. After his arrival in Peking he was requested by the Chinese Communist authorities to surrender his passport. Mr. Tucker refused to do this and as a result was deported from China into the Soviet Union. He returned to London on September 12 and during his discussions with the Embassy volunteered to prepare a statement of his impressions of Communist China based on his notes. This statement is transmitted as enclosure one.

Shortly after Mr. Tucker arrived in London he was approached by Life magazine for his story, which it is understood he sold to the editors for a sum of $500.00. A copy of this story, which was written by a Life staff writer based on Mr. Tucker's remarks is transmitted as enclosure two. The Embassy understands that Life magazine is not now planning to publish this story.

There is transmitted as enclosure three a copy of Mr. Tucker's affidavit regarding the use of his passport in Communist China. This affidavit has already been transmitted to the Department under separate cover in connection with Mr. Tucker's passport difficulties but is included here for the Department's convenience.

It was the impression of the de-briefing officers that Mr. Tucker was sincere in his desire to furnish information which might be of use to the United States Government. Unfortunately, however, Mr. Tucker seems to have very little background in Chinese affairs and his observations, both written and oral, appear to contain little significant political or economic information.

/Mr. Tucker

POL/F-RHFostorick
REPORTER

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION COPY
Retain in divisional files or destroy in accordance with security regulations.
THE ABOVE INSTRUCTION APPLIES TO THE DEPARTMENT ONLY.

TUCKER, Shelby

Mr. Tucker took a number of photographs during his stay in China. One print of each will be forwarded to the Department under separate cover when they have been received by the Embassy.

For the Ambassador:

Rockwood H. Foster
Second Secretary of Embassy

Approved:

Edwin W. Martin
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures:

1. Statement of impressions of Communist China
2. *Life* magazine story
3. Mr. Tucker's affidavit

cc: Taipei, Hong Kong

SECRET

American Student in China

H **TYLER, Patty (Patricia)** **File Check Results**

CIT-USA

Residence - New York

Passport No. 1 issued 6/12/56

Photo Attached

1. No Record RI.

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. See Steve Tyler.

4. McConnell told O.O. that Mrs. Tyler interviewed Richmond & said he had recently had all of his teeth removed & didn't look well, & that he was too outspoken against the Chinese. (By phone 14 January 58)



PATRICIA GROLL TYLER
6/12/56

TYLER, Patty (Patricia)

SECRET

39

American Student in China

H

TYLER, Steve

CIT-USA

Residence - New York

Passport No. 17 issued 10/22/56 Photo ATTACHED

File Check Results

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow.)

(over)



SECRET

TYLER, Steve

2. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about the Tylers:

"Steve and Patty TYLER (ref. Consulate General telegram to Department 560, repeated Moscow 8, Prague 1, of September 27, 1957) have been traveling in Europe for about a year and a half. Steve is 23. Neither are college graduates. O'Connell felt that Patty was the smarter of the two, but that both were quite sound in their thinking, and he was convinced of their anti-Communist sentiments. O'Connell said that both of Steve's parents had been in some sort of trouble for leftist or Communist activity in the U.S., and that Steve feared that this would unwarrantably be held against him in spite of his violent reaction against his upbringing. O'Connell said that he had never known a case where the views of father and son were father apart." (Foreign Service Dispatch Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

3. Stephen Tyler's father, Leonard, of 263 Parkside Ave., was a member of the Parkside Club, Communist Party, and in the Parkside Club, he was Press Director and member of the Executive Committee. Stephen's mother, Evelyn, was in April 1949 a member of the State Committee of the American Labor Party. (DFO-94348, 19 Nov 57)

SECRET

American Student in China

H WILLIAMSON, Bob (Robert Dawson) D.O.B - 14 MAY 1938
P.O.B - CLEVELAND OHIO File Check Results
CIT - USA
Residence - New York
Photo Attached
Passport No. 502806 issued 5/9/57

1. The IO Division's informants that attended the Moscow Festival were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. On 11 Oct. 1955, Confidential Informant T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, reported he had received information that Robert WILLIAMSON, born 14 May 1938, a student from Cleveland, Ohio had arrived in Paris, France on 2 Sept. 1955 from Prague, Czechoslovakia. Informant said his information indicated this individual had been in Poland. He stated he was not sure, but in all probability this person was a member of a youth club that had met in Warsaw, Poland. (DFB-59303, 11 Jan. 1956, RI 200-4-25201-8) (possibly subject's father)

3. WILLIAMSON, Bob - Represented the Communist League of Great Britain at the UBJF Congress at Lyon in April 1948. (French press, RI 20-4-10-100y8)

ROBERT DAWSON WILLIAMSON
5/1/57

(over)

WILLIAMSON, Bob (Robert Dawson)

SECRET

4. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Williamson:

"Earl (I believe O'Connell called him Bob) WILLIAMSON's father was deported from the U.S. for Communist activities and is now in London. (See Consulate General despatch No. 199 of September 17, 1957)." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

5. Interviewed SCHWALD

6. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "... very pro-Communist; definitely familiar with Communism; argued very convincingly for the Communist system and appeared sincere in his beliefs." DFB-97144, 23 January 1958.

American Student in China

WILLIAMSON, Earl **File Check Results**

201-054.

Residence - Pleasant Hill, Calif./London

Passport No. 577624 issued 6/10/57

Photo attached

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a most dangerous leftist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-86248.

4. Interviews Jenswold.

5. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say [illegible] subject: "...very naive; definitely for the [illegible]p." DFB-97144, 23 Jun 1958.



FBI doc
25 Nov. 57 (Boston)
Re: Richard James Medalie
Bufile - 100-426846
Boston Field Office - 100-32145

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENT

BLOCK, MORRIS

Information on Vehicle Consigned to Soviet National

GSMusulin/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff 2268
900 Key Bldg.

Case 51,605

19 August 1968

DO/DCSL

SOD/Maritime
Mike Evans
1 E 4846 Hq.

Attached in furtherance to previous communication sent you on subject is copy of Bill of Lading and Dock Receipt, which correlates to this case.

MOORE-McCORMACK LINES. INCORPORATED

American Republics Line — American Scantic Line — Robin Line

DELIVERING CARRIER

CAR NUMBER · REFERENCE

FORWARDING AGENT · SHIPPER'S REFERENCES
LUIGI SERRA, INC. FMC 232
~~21 WEST ST., NEW YORK, N. Y.~~ E-32896 CBC

FMC NO. 282

EXPORT DEC. NO.

BILL OF LADING

SHIPPER: LUIGI SERRA INC., 21 WEST STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 2 AS AGENTS DE LA EMBAJADA DE U.R.S

00-0282

CONSIGNED TO ORDER OF: IVAN GABRGLOVICH ALFERIEV SECUNDO SECRETARIO BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA

ADDRESS ARRIVAL NOTICE TO (Without liability to Carrier, see Clause 9): SAME AS 4

NONE

SHIP: MORMACPRIDE

USA FLAG

PIER: FT 23 STREET, BKLYN.

PORT OF LOADING: NEW YORK.

PORT OF DISCHARGE: BUENOS AIRES

DESTINATION (if Transshipped)

O
D

PARTICULARS FURNISHED BY SHIPPER OF GOODS

MARKS AND NUMBERS	NO. OF PKGS.	SHIPPERS DESCRIPTION OF PACKAGES AND GOODS	GROSS WEIGHT KILOS	GROSS WEIGHT POUNDS
IVAN GAPRILOVICH ALFERIEV SECUNDO SECRETARIO DE LA EMBAJADA DE LA U.R.S.S BUENOS AIRES XCO 189'9? S#13659E1125849	1	FREIGHT COLLECT 461.6 455.0 UNBOXED: CHEVROLET CHEVELLE 1968	1596 ~~1628~~Kg.	3518 #

COPY

NON-NEGOTIABLE

FOR ARGENTINE CUSTOMS ONLY
LUIGI SERRA INC.

FREIGHT COLLECT IN ARGENTINA

FREIGHT CHARGES MUST BE PAID PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF VESSEL AT PORT OF DISCHARGE OTHERWISE CARGO WILL BE EMBARGOED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARGENTINE LAWS AT RISK AND EXPENSE OF THE GOODS.

462

Supplier GENERAL MOTORS CORP.

LUIGI SERRA INC
By

FREIGHT TO BE PREPAID IN U.S.A. COLLECTED IN ARGENTINA

These Commodities ... to ... Destination ARGENTINA

Notice: All rates apply from ships tackle at port of loading to end of ships tackle at port of discharge, unless otherwise mentioned.

ITEM	WEIGHT (2)	CU. FEET (3)	RATE	FREIGHT CHARGES	TYPE RATE	TYPE BRKGE	TYPE CARGO	COMMODITY NO.	P.P. or COLL.	COLLECT PORT	ACCOUNT CODE
		462	455	525 53	2	1		7320140	2		
				$							
				$							
				$							
				$							
				$							
				$							
				$							

Freight to be COLLECTED $ 525.53

Freight to be PREPAID $

RECEIVED from the shipper herein named, the goods or packages said to contain goods mentioned herein, in apparent good order and condition unless (Terms of this Bill of Lading Continued on Reverse Side Hereof)

In witness whereof, the Carrier by its Agent has signed THREE (3) BILLS OF LADING, all of the same tenor and date, one of which accomplished, the others to stand void.

MOORE-McCORMACK LINES, Incorporated

By ______ FOR THE MASTER

MONTH ______ DAY ______ YEAR ______
DATED AT NEW YORK

B/L NO.

CHECKER MUST VERIFY MARKS NU

Benny

DELIVERING CARRIER	M & G CONVOY
PLEASE DELIVER TO:	[illegible]
PLEASE DELIVER THE UNBOXED MOTOR VEHICLES DESCRIBED BELOW:	
S/S	[illegible]
NOW AT	BUFFALO, NEW YORK
PIER	[illegible]
EXPORT LICENSE NO.	
DELIVER ON	8/1
DOCK RECEIPT ATTACHED ON DOCK	
LOAD NO.	1/1
EXPORT DEC. NO.	

T&E NO.	DATE	XCO	NO. UNITS	MODEL DESCRIPTION	GROSS POUNDS	CUBE
1672	7/15 7/26	189471	1	CHEV-13639-SEDAN.	3512	461
				Serial # 81125849	468.535	
				P/c-LUIGI SERRA INC.		

SIGNED DOCK RECEIPT must be returned IMMEDIATELY to undersigned

TO BE REMARKED

IN BOND

D/L DESTINATION

WHEEL WRENCH	1
INSIDE MIRROR	1
EXTRA WHEELS & TIRES	1
RADIO & ANTENNA	1
SEALED CARTONS OF PARTS	1
HEATERS & DEFROSTERS	1
JACK & JACK BASE	1
½ PINT CAN OF PAINT	2
ASH TRAYS	3
W/S WIPER ARMS & BLADES	2
RADIO FUSE	2
[illegible]	1

MARKS

IVAN GABRILOVICH ALFERIEV.
SEGUNDO SECRETARIO DE LA
EMBAJADA DE U.R.S.S.
BUENOS AIRES - ARGENTINA

GENERAL MOTORS OVERSEAS OPERATION
DIVISION OF GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
BY W. TRAINOR JUL 17 1968 P.M.

Received the within merchandise for shipments indicated hereon subject to all conditions of undersigned's usual form of dock receipt or bill of lading.

Carrier ______

Receiving Clerk ______ Date ______ 157

DOCK RECEIPT
QUADRUPLICATE
NON-NEGOTIABLE

14-00000

Moore Mc Cormack Lines

GSMusulin/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff 2268
900 Key Bldg.

Case 51,605

16 August1968

DO/DCSL
SOD/Maritime
Mike Evans
1 E 4648 Hq.

Copy of NYOR 0225 is for your information and records. Additional information will be forwarded when received. Please let me know if there is something further we can do.

Process Sheet typed in CSS. 19 Aug 68

CO. A(S) 29007-68

SECRET

S E C R E T 161544Z AUG 68 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 0225

PRIORITY CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL DIVISION (MUSULIN) FROM BROOKS

INTEL REPORT: 00A(S) 322- 29007-68

CONTACT AND SOURCE: MR. BUSER
VP, SOUTH AMERICAN OPNS
MOORE MCCORMACK LINES
NEW YORK CITY

SOURCE: SAME

FILED: 16 AUG 1968

FIELD REMARKS: COPIES OF THE DOCK RECEIPT AND BILL OF LADING ARE BEING FORWARDED UNDER COVER OF A PROCESS SHEET.

AUG 16 12 21 PM '68

OSMusulin/bm

2268

ROUTINE

S E C R E T

80533

15 AUG 68 1100 1 1

CONTACTS NEW YORK

FROM OSS (MUSULIN)

NEW CASE 51,605 - REQUEST TO IDENTIFY VEHICLE CONSIGNED TO SOVIET EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

1. THIS IS NEW CASE OPENED TO YOUR OFFICE

2. SOD/MARITIME REQUESTS INFORMATION ON MAKE AND MODEL OF CAR CONSIGNED TO IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEZ AND REPORTEDLY DESTINED TO SOVIET EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA. CAR WAS PLACED ABOARD SS MORMACPRIDE, MOORE MC CORMACK LINES, MERCHANTMAN, 4 AUGUST 1968, DUE TO ARRIVE BUENOS AIRES, 18 AUGUST 1968. SHIPPING RECORDS SHOULD PROVIDE THE DESIRED IDENTIFICATION AND OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION. PLEASE EXPEDITE REPLY ASAP.

AUG 15 [illegible]

S E C R E T

14-00000

SECRET

COUNTRY: USSR/ARGENTINA/USA

CASE 5:605 RE WASHINGTON 80933

DATE OF INFO 16 AUG 68

SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON VEHICLE CONSIGNED TO SOVIET NATIONAL

PLACE AND DATE ACQUIRED: ---/16 AUGUST 1968

THIS IS NEW YORK REPORT OOA(S) 2405468

SOURCE DESCRIPTION: NONE

1. THE VEHICLE SHIPPED ABOARD THE MORMACPRIDE ON 4 AUGUST AND CONSIGNED TO IVAN GABRILOVICH ALFERIEV IS MANIFESTED AS A 1968 CHEVELLE SEDAN, SERIAL 136398I129849 RPT 136398I129849. ALFERIEV IS REFLECTED AS THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE USSR EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES. A SECOND IDENTIFYING SERIAL NUMBER SHOWN ON THE BILL OF LADING IS XCO-18949:. THE VEHICLE WAS CONSIGNED BY LUIGI SERRA INC, 21 WEST ST, NYC AS AGENTS FOR THE USSR EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES.

2. THERE IS NO INFORMATION RECORDED SHOWING THE COLOR OF THE AUTOMOBILE OR WHETHER IT IS TWO OR FOUR DOORS. THE VEHICLE IS STOWED IN NUMBER FOUR UPPER TWEEN DECK WING AND IS ONE OF FOURTEEN ASSEMBLED VEHICLES TO BE OFFLOADED AT BA. THERE IS AT LEAST ONE OTHER 1968 CHEVELLE ABOARD.

3. THE MORMACPRIDE IS SKED INTO BA ON 18 AUG, BUT HER PORT POSITION IS NOT YET KNOWN. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT SHE WILL BE ASSIGNED A BERTH ON THE 18TH AND THAT CARGO WILL BE WORKED IMMEDIATELY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SUNDAY. IF THIS IS THE CASE, THE VEHICLES IN THE TWEEN DECKS SPACES WILL BE THE FIRST CARGO OFF-LOADED.

-END-

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: BARNES, WINIFRED C.
DCD FILE 08 97 44

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFI
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSC

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

F-8-97-44

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Miami Office

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE : 28 February 1967

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT: BARNES, Winfred Clark

FILE NO: 496 289 A-89744

1. Reference is made to your request for security checks on the subject person as a source of intelligence information.

2. This is to inform you that the necessary checks have been completed with the following results:

a. ☒ No additional information has been obtained, except for such biographic information as indicated below or in the attachment.

b. ☐ Information has been received that Subject was investigated with favorable results in

c. ☐ Certain information has been received and appears in the attachment which your Division will wish to consider in determining the extent and level of your use of Subject.

3. It is to be noted that our checks were made on the basis of the identifying information you furnished or in an attachment to this memorandum. Should it be disclosed that this information is erroneous or that Subject is known by a different name, this Division should be notified immediately.

Steven L Kuhn

STEVEN L. KUHN
Chief, Personnel Security Division

Attachment:
State Passport Report

APPROVED

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

BARNES, Winfred Clark
#496 289

11 January 1967

On 4 January 1967 a passport file of Winfred Clark BARNES was reviewed at the Passport Office, Department of State. The following is a summary of the information contained therein:

Date of Birth: 1 May 1912 at Gatesville, Texas; verified by birth certificate

Father: Shaw Andrew BARNES; Date of Birth: 8 May 1882 at Kennedy, Texas; current residence not given.

Mother: Velma Elizabeth HARRIS; Date of Birth: 8 March 1888 at Thelma, Texas; current residence not given.

PASSPORT ISSUED: At Miami, Florida on 27 January 1966, #G755310, for a period of four weeks to visit Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Peru, Columbia, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil for the purpose of tourism.

Permanent address: 5350 Southwest 76th Street
Miami, Florida

Mailing address: International Petroleum Company, Ltd
396 Alhambra Circle
Coral Gables, Florida

Occupation: Director

Spouse: Lois Enquist BARNES; Date of Birth: 8 Marcy 1915 at New Haven, Connecticut; current residence not given; Wed: 17 February 1945; no information on whether or not marriage has been terminated.

PASSPORT ISSUED: At Miami, Florida on 27 February 1961, #B10831, for a period of varying from one day to three weeks to visit Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamica, Trinidad, British Guiana, Guadeloupe, Barbados and Suriname for the purpose of business.

RENEWED: At Miami, Florida on 12 May 1964, for a period of ten days to visit Peru, Columbia, and other South American countries for the purpose of business

SUBJECT's first passport was issued at Washington, D. C. on 21 February 1957, #328617, for a period of indefinite time, to visit Bermuda, Bahamas, Haiti, Trinidad, Jamica, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

#496 289

and Guatemala for the purpose of business

RENEWED: At Havana, Cuba on 2 separate occasions: 13 February 1959 and 5 June 1959, for a period of approximately two on both renewal forms, countries to visit and purpose of visit not given.

EAG/mch

APPROVED

CONFIDENTIAL

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DATE 6 December 1966

MEMORANDUM TO : Chief, **MIAMI FIELD OFFICE**

ATTENTION : **GLEICHAUF**

SUBJECT : Ad Hoc Clearance

REFERENCE :

A 89744

Re **WINFRED CLARK BARNES**, Security Division has granted ad hoc clearance thru "**SECRET**."

Security checks will be completed.

Virginia L. Thorne

VIRGINIA L. THORNE
Security Liaison Officer

SECURITY

cc:

VThorne:pat

SECURITY MESSAGE # **1150**

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

Miami (Gleichauf)

16 NOV 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 November 1966

BIOGRAPHIC DATA A-89744 NO.

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME — FIRST NAME — MIDDLE NAME
BARNES, Winfred Clark

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
1 May 1912, Gatesville, Texas

2. ALIASES
A# ~~136283~~ REVISED

4. SEX
M

5. CITIZENSHIP
US

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No., and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	5350 Southwest 76th Street Miami, Florida

A# 136284

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
1964	1966	Esso Inter-America Inc. ✓	Coral Gables, Florida
1961	1964	International Petroleum Co.	Coral Gables, Florida
	1960	Esso Standard Oil S.A., Ltd	Coral Gables, Florida
	1959	Esso Standard Oil (Cuba Div)	
	1957	Esso Standard Oil, S.A.	Havana, Cuba
1927	1955	Humble Oil Company	

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR
1925	1929	Pearsall High School Pearsall, Texas	
1930	1933	University of Texas Austin, Texas	
1955		University of Pittsburg (15 session)	

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

16 NOV 1966

☐ CONTINUED

FORM 150 USE PREVIOUS
8-65 EDITIONS
MFG. 4-64

(4-43)

A08974

MR. W.INFRED C.LARK BARNES

5350 Southwest 76th Street
Miami, Florida

BUSINESS:

Subject is General Manager and in Cuba Division at:

S000049 - Esso Standard Oil SA, Havana, Cuba

Subject is now with:
DIRECTOR:
A136284 - Esso Inter-America Inc., Coral Gables, Florida

INACTIVE
DATE 14 AUG 1963
INITIALS BCS

ACTIVATED
DATE 12-13-66
INITIALS RL

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

CF-8-97-44 Contol

1 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, **Miami Office**

SUBJECT: Executive Leadership Conferences on Public Affairs

1. On Friday, 28 April 1967, the business executives attending the Conferences for Business Executives on Federal Government Operations, conducted by The Brookings Institution, were briefed by ranking Agency officials.

2. I have attached for your information biographic information on the executives from your area who were present.

James R Murphy
JAMES R. MURPHY
Director, Domestic Contact Service

Attachments: a/s

cc: Control w/atts

JRM:mg

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

A89744 winifred clark

WINFRED C. BARNES

Director
Esso Inter-America Inc.

Mr. Barnes attended the University of Texas.

He began his career with Humble Oil & Refining Company, where he held various marketing positions before serving in the U. S. Army from 1942 to 1946. He rejoined Humble as a District Sales Supervisor at Corpus Christi, Texas, and later held the positions of District Manager, Assistant Division Manager, and Marketing Manager in several of Humble's marketing areas. He transferred to Esso Standard Oil, S.A. in Havana as Marketing Manager in 1957, and was General Manager - Cuba Division at the time of the loss of that operation in 1960. Upon his relocation in Coral Gables, Florida in 1960, he became Eastern Region Manager for Esso Standard Oil, S.A. Limited. Mr. Barnes joined International Petroleum Company, Ltd. as Marketing Coordinator in 1961 and was elected a Director of that company in 1964. Today he is a Director of Esso Inter-America Inc., with responsibility for petroleum marketing, public relations, government relations, and operations in the Caribbean and Chile.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. 00- B-3,168,138

SUBJECT Attitude of Segundo Cevallos, Key Official of National Bank

DATE DISTR. 6 Oct 60

NO. PAGES One

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Sep 60 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana/Sep 60

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. In Sep 60 I talked to an old friend who was president of one of the US-owned tire companies recently intervened by the Castro regime. My friend stated that he had recently contacted Segundo Cevallos, one of the top officials of the National Bank, in connection with obtaining approval for some of the company's US technicians to take their furniture and appliances out of Cuba. Cevallos said, "I don't want those technicians to leave. We need them." At this, the rubber company official stated that it was too late and that the technicians had already gone.

2. Cevallos then made the statement that he was very much concerned about the flight of technicians of all kinds from Cuba. He said that the revolution had been fought to give Cuba a more highly developed industry, but that the technicians were leaving and industry was being seriously effected.

3. Cevallos then said, "Something is wrong. The revolution has gotten off the track somewhere." He then added, "I have got to talk to 'Che' about this."

4. Cevallos is a man of about 60-63 years, and has a very important position, in that he is in charge of granting foreign exchange. My friend said that Cevallos is a very pleasant individual but seems to be a theorist, a professorial type who obviously has had little or no business experience. He has a background as a writer and philosopher, and apparently is extremely naive as evidenced by his comment that he would talk to "Che" Guevara about how the revolution had gotten off the track.

-end-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC		[illegible]		

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN NO DISSEM ABROAD LIMITED

LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echlons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA.

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. 00-B-3,168,139

SUBJECT Anti-Castro Attitude of ICP Personnel

DATE DISTR. 6 Oct 60

NO. PAGES Two

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Sep 60 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana/Sep 60 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. As of Sep 60 there appear to be some significant developments occurring among personnel of the staff of the Cuban Petroleum Institute. The Institute has commandeered a building of Esso Standard Oil SA for use as headquarters, and is currently engaged in mixing the personnel of all three intervened oil companies in the new headquarters.

2. The shuffling around of personnel has further lowered the morale of the petroleum industry employees, and I have been told that 95% are strongly in favor of the companies and against the Castro regime.

3. Since ICP established its new offices, indoctrination sessions of employees have been scheduled on a twice-a-week basis. The first session was held recently and was concerned with the "Colored Problem of the World". The gist of the remarks of the conference leader was that Cubans were of Spanish ethnic origin, and because of the close ties of Spaniards and the Moors for so many hundreds of years it had to be realized that all Cubans had colored blood, and should not make a distinction and should have no prejudices concerning people with colored blood.

4. The second indoctrination session was headed by an overt Communist from the Texas Company. He delivered the straight Party Line, anti-US, anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly, "The Soviet Union is the great hope of the world for peace", and only Communist ideology will survive, etc.

5. He also stated that, "The Declaration of Havana of Fidel Castro will be our doctrine," and said that it was desired to obtain the signatures of the whole population of Cuba to show that everyone was behind this doctrine. He then said in response to a question regarding what would happen to those who did not sign, "You are either for us or against us."

6. At this, one of the office girls who had been a strong Fidelista got up and remarked that such comments reminded her of the Batista days, and she strongly disapproved of any pressure tactics.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC		07	

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN NO DISSEM ABROAD LIMITED

LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echlons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA.

7. One of the male office employees then stood and stated that he agreed heartily with her, and added that it was not the intent of the revolution to "get into this sort of business." He then asked, "Why are we getting all this Communist propaganda and why do we not hear anything about José Martí?" His comments were greeted with applause.

8. A third employee stood up and talked for 45 minutes. He really laid it on the line concerning the way the revolution had failed the people of Cuba, and had leaned far too much toward Communism. The conference leader did not interrupt and following the conclusion of the employee's remarks did not even answer. He merely said, "That is all", got up and walked out. However, the next scheduled indoctrination session was cancelled.

9. Although mixing the employees of the three companies was done deliberately to break up a feeling of trust among employees who knew each other, and to introduce a feeling of fear concerning strangers, there has been close cooperation on the technical level between employees of at least two refineries. For example, technicians at Esso and Shell recently collaborated in shutting down the refineries without real justification, allegedly because of Hurricane Donna. When the word got out that the refineries were shutting down, ICP officials rushed in and protested vigorously that there was no danger, and that the action should not be taken. The technicians then said, "Well, it is too late now," and they kept the refineries shut down for three full days. Both Shell and Esso technicians concerned enjoyed this minor act of sabotage hugely.

10. They also cooperated in dealying action when they were ordered to start the cat plant. LPG is needed badly, so the technicians decided to keep the unit shut down. ICP officials screamed that it was unnecessary and ordered them to start, but the technicians said that it was not practical because it was too difficult, and possibly dangerous, to stop and start the unit. They said that the shortage of catalysts made it impossible to figure on keeping the unit going, and so it was not the right thing to do to start it at all. Consequently they have been able to keep the cat units shut down completely since the storm.

11. One of the top Shell engineers who has participated in such actions is going to attempt to skip the country as a test, because many other technicians of the oil companies are desperate to flee Cuba and are trying to arrange ways and means to do so.

-end-

language - 547

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. 00-A-3,168,137

SUBJECT Desire of Oil Industry Technicians to Flee Cuba/Effect on Production

DATE DISTR. 29 Sept 60

NO. PAGES Two

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Sep 60 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana/Sep 60 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. A real body-blow could be given the Castro regime if a few selected technicians in the oil refineries skipped the country. As an example, at the Esso refinery there are four technicians whose loss would have a very severe effect on the production of the refinery. These men are all young, extremely intelligent, well trained, and are completely loyal to the company. They have served immediately below the superintendent and the assistant superintendent. These four would be given immediate jobs in the US, because of their outstanding backgrounds, if they were able to get out of Cuba.

2. The top figure of the four is Leon Hequin Maya, who is a specialist in the Processing Department, one of the most important functions in the plant. This department's responsibilities deal with the physical processing of the product from crude to the finished material.

3. Hequin is 32 years old, married, no children, but expecting a child in Dec 60. He is a graduate of Auburn University, with a degree in chemical or mechanical engineering. He is a Cuban national, I believe of the Jewish faith. He is about 5'10", weighs about 160 lbs, has close cropped black hair, and is a very personable, intelligent young man. He is a very good leader, and was definitely one of the men on their way up in the company.

4. Hequin already has been branded a counterrevolutionary in an official Acta, and has been taken out of the plant and put into the office. Apparently the regime wanted to get him away from the production line for fear of possible sabotage, and also wanted to utilize his undoubted talent and knowledge of the industry in headquarters.

5. Hequin is extremely eager to get out of Cuba, but he does not have a police exit permit, and since he has been branded counterrevolutionary he is afraid he would not get his passport back if he presented it for a police permit.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

27 OCT 1960

STATE		ARMY			NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN

NO DISSEM ABROAD

LIMITED

LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echlons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or

6. Another outstanding young man is Zequin's assistant, Jose Ramon Alvarez, about 31. He is a graduate of Auburn University and is a top flight engineer. Since Alvarez is single, he says that he will wait until the others get out of Cuba. He also wants to hang back to be able to do some sabotage before he makes his departure. He believes that he will be able to get out on his own.

7. A third top flight mechanical engineer, who is extremely eager to leave Cuba, is Santiago Pardo Suarez del Villar. He is about 35, a graduate of the University of Havana. Pardo is head of Maintenance and Construction, and is an extremely intelligent and capable engineer. He is about 5'8", weighs about 170 lbs, and has dark black ahair and a moustache.

8. The fourth is Raul Capote Ortiz, a graduate of Louisiana State University with the degree in chemical engineering. Capote is one of the top technicians in the Processing Department. He is married, but I do not know if he has any children.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. 00-B-3,164,609

SUBJECT Operations of Refineries/Effect of Use of Soviet Crude Oil/Jet Fuel Production

DATE DISTR. 23 Aug 60

NO. PAGES Two

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Aug 60 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana/Aug 60 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. As of Aug 60 the three major refineries confiscated by the Castro regime are operating in fairly good shape. Their principal problem is that the Soviet crude being supplied is very light and they cannot run as much volume because gas pressure builds up. The Esso refinery, for example, has a capacity of 36 thousand bbls per day on heavy crude, but 26 thousand bbls per day is the best they have been able to do on the Soviet crude, and it has been running at a rate of only 20 thousand bbls per day since 20 Jul 60.

2. The Soviet crude available to date has been compatible with the refineries and will not damage them, but in addition to not being able to get as much volume, the refineries cannot get as much fuel oil because of light ends. This is true of all three major refineries.

3. The refineries were designed for 26 gravity crude which is fairly heavy. The Soviet crude is 33 gravity, and has caused an imbalance in that they are now producing more gasoline than is needed. As a consequence, Cuba is searching desperately for fuel oil. The USSR has said that it is not in a position to supply fuel oil and so Cuba has turned toward Mexico, even to the extent of attempting to arrange deals whereby they will trade gasoline for fuel oil.

4. The imbalance of gasoline is indicated by the fact that the Cabaiguán refinery was shut down recently because its gasoline storage was completely filled.

5. Cuba will reach a critical point about 1 Sep 60. The Esso refinery slowed down from 26 thousand bbls per day to 20 thousand bbls per day because it had only a 10-day supply of crude. The supply on hand was sufficient to last only until 14 Aug, but around 11 Aug the refinery was supposed to receive a shipment of 80 thousand barrels of crude. However, this is only enough to operate four days.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

19 SEP 1960

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN

NO DISSEM ABROAD

LIMITED

LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echlons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. 00-B-3,164,652

SUBJECT Shortage of Lubricating Oil/
Operating Supplies for Refineries/
Ship Bunkerage

DATE DISTR. 23 Aug 60

NO. PAGES Two

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Aug 60

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana/Aug 60

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. As of Aug 60 there is a shortage of lubricating oil in Cuba which will become critical in a fairly short time. Great efforts have been made by the Castro regime to obtain lubricating oil from US suppliers, and a vessel, the Mar Caribe, has visited a number of US ports attempting to obtain the oil. However, it has been refused everywhere and had to return to Cuba in ballast. As of 10 Aug 60 it is loading molasses for delivery to Boston, and will then proceed to Montreal in an attempt to obtain lubricating oil.

2. A former Esso employee, Frank García, left Cuba on 2 Aug 60 for Mexico to try to obtain lubricating oil. He is going to visit the Mobile blending plant, PEMEX, and several others.

Robt. Wallace, Tulsa, Okla.

3. A US national recently employed by ICP to attempt to arrange for the purchase of necessary supplies and spare parts for the oil industry has been traveling throughout the SW part of the US, also attempting to arrange for lubricating oil, but with no success. This individual is such an unsavory character that it is not beyond the bounds of probability that he might "go south" with the funds entrusted to him, which are considerable.

4. There are 20 principal types of lubricating oil needed for the total economy, and the actual status of supply of each is not known. They may be completely out of some and have six months supply of others. However, the general story is that there is a "one month supply" of lubricating oil available.

5. Lubricants for power plants, transportation, and communications are the primary concern. They are in critically short supply in diesel lubricants for engines and heavy equipment, and turbine oil for power plants.

6. There is no lubricating oil manufactured on the island although the Castro regime is trying to set up a plant. However, this is a long range project and takes a lot of time and money.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

7 SEP 1960

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN NO DISSEM ABROAD LIMITED

LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echelons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT Friction in New Management of Esso Refinery

REPORT NO. 00-B-3,164,653

DATE DISTR. 23 Aug 60

NO. PAGES One

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Aug 60 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana/Aug 60 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. On 1 Jul 60 the Castro regime intervened the Esso refinery in Cuba. The interventor appointed was Commander Olivio Pino, a career officer in the Cuban Navy. The number two man is (fnu) Guardia, about 35, a former marketing analyst in the office of the company. As of Aug 60 there is evidence of definite friction between Pino and Guardia.

2. Commander Pino is an intelligent, affable, and hospitable personality. He wears a business suit, and to the best of my knowledge has never worn a "barbudo" beard.

3. Guardia, on the other hand, is a real hard-core Communist, who feels that Pino is too soft and not revolutionary enough. Guardia wants to take a hard line toward the employees. He wants to cut salaries and "get things in line." Pino knows that such abrupt changes would result in a drastic drop in efficiency, and would alienate employees who are at least neutral at present.

4. There are indications that Pino recently told Guardia in effect to stay in the office and keep his mouth shut.

5. Pino is directly under Alfredo Gutiérrez of ICP, and both are friends and associates of Fidel Castro, not Raúl, or "Che" Guevara. If something happens to Fidel, both Pino and Gutiérrez would definitely be replaced quickly, because they are not the hard-boiled Party line type.

-end-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 7 SEP 1960

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN NO DISSEM ABROAD LIMITED

LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echlons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	00-A-3164654
SUBJECT	Leonel de Paula Arias, Oil Industry Procurement Agent (Biographic)	DATE DISTR.	17 Aug 60
		NO. PAGES	One
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Aug 60 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Havana/Aug 60 and earlier		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. In Aug 60 the Castro regime sent two representatives to the US to attempt to obtain replacement parts and machinery for the oil industry. One of these men is Julio Caunedo, on the staff of ICP, and the second is Leonel de Paula Arias, a former employee of Esso Standard Oil SA.

2. De Paula is about 28-29 years old, 6'1", 180 lbs. He has black curly hair and fair skin. He is married and I believe has one child. He is a Roman Catholic; and has never been considered as having any left-wing inclinations.

3. De Paul speaks excellent English, and I believe studied in the US. He has a degree in engineering and worked three years with the Esso refinery, mainly in maintenance and construction. As of Jul 60 he was section head of the Refining Department, Purchasing and Warehousing.

4. The choice of de Paula to go to the US to obtain necessary supplies is sound because he is the man which the company would have chosen to do such a job if required. He has a reputation of being a good hard worker, intelligent and dependable. He has a pleasant personality and handles himself very well.

5. De Paula was considered one of the better men of the plant and could be classed as a key technician because of his knowledge, background, and ability, and it would definitely hurt the Castro regime if he fled Cuba. However, the opportunities for employment in the oil industry in Latin America are not good because there is considerable prejudice against Cubans on the part of other countries in which there are refining operations.

-end-

5
4
3
2
1

6 SEP 1960

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

5
4
3
2
1

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN

NO DISSEM ABROAD

LIMITED

LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echlons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CROZIER, ROSS LESTER
C-25507

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/OA

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

PERSONAL INFORMATION IN
25507 (CROZIER)

PERSONAL INFORMATION IN

25507 (CROZIER)

C-82712 sister-in-law of Subject
C-82713 wife of Subject

These two cases are requests for CSA.

We are forwarding the original of this request to the office of Security, but since the husband of one of the subject's is under such DEEP COVER, we are setting up files and cards on those attached.

Files set up per Mr. Brewer's instructions to me on 26 Apr 60.

pat

Copy for husbands
file C-25507
made

14-00000

S E C R E T

DATE: 15 April 1960
mc

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C# 25507
OS# 112569

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
Chief, CI/CA

ATTACHMENTS (if any): Copy of WHD memo
and PRQ part II.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 15 Apr 60

CASE NO. C-25507

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR: ☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RI TRACES
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST FIELD TRACES
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES	REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
✓ original FORWARD ~~ATTACHMENT~~ TO SECURITY OFFICE w/PRQ II	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM (See "Remarks" for Reason)	REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES	PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW	PREPARE —— COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
✓ FILE Copy WHD memo w/PRQ II	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
TICKLE FOR:	OTHER

REMARKS:

SIGNATURE

FORM 7-58 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

12 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA : Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)
C-25507
#112569

1. It is requested that the CSA granted Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps), formerly called Arthur G. VAIVADA (ps), on 3 July 1957 for use in Cuba under Project AMPHODARCH and later amended to cover his use in Mexico under Project LIEDGE, be further amended to cover his PCS to Headquarters. His activity in or around the Washington, D.C. area will also be covered under the LIEDGE Project.

2. Attached is a new PRQ, Part II to cover his activity in the United States. NOEMAYR will continue to live under cover and will probably be reassigned overseas after a two year tour at Headquarters.

3. CSA's are being requested under separate cover on his wife and sister-in-law who are also living with him.

J. C. King
Chief, WHD

Note: Additional thermofax copy sent to S.O. per request of Evan Highley 8 July 60

SECRET

SECRET

30 June 1959 par

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Mexico - Larry Sule

SUBJECT: Ross Lester CROZIER

1. Reference is made to your request to this office dated 17 April 1958.

2. The reply to your request is contained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security dated 29 June 1959.

Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE. 30 June 59	CASE NO. C-25507

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR:
☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RI TRACES
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST FIELD TRACES
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES	REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
✓ FORWARD ~~ATTACHMENT~~ copy of S.O. memo TO DIVISION (WH Div/Mexico)	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM *(See "Remarks" for Reason)*	REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES	PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW	PREPARE —— COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
✓ FILE Orig S.O. memo dtd 29 June 59	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
TICKLE FOR:	✓ OTHER

REMARKS:

T - 30 July 59
(Supplementary S.O. memo)

SIGNATURE

FORM 7-58 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (21)

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

29 JUN 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to a memorandum dated 17 April 1958 from WH Division through CI/OA requesting that the Covert Security Approval granted on 3 July 1957 be amended to permit Subject's utilization as a career agent in Mexico City under Project LIEDGE.

This will confirm the verbal Covert Security Approval granted to Mr. Larry Sulc, WH Division on 3 June 1958 for the use described above.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

David E. Hanlon
for Robert H. Cunningham

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

29 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMPHODARCH/2
C-25507

1. On 23 April 1958 Mr. Lou Hamby of the Office of Security called in connection with the above designated case, specifically regarding the contingencies upon which the CSA dated 3 July 1957 was granted.

2. Mr. Hamby advised that the investigation of Subject has been completed and he has been given an LCFLUTTER, both with favorable results.

3. In view of the foregoing the restrictions (contingencies) in the 3 July 1957 approval are now removed. WH Division has been notified.

4. Jim Burton, Project Branch CI/OA, was given the above information also. He advised FI/Projects in order that further action could be taken in connection with the Project renewal.

John B. Brewer
CI/OA

CI/OA/JBB:rc

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 14 May 1958	CASE NO. C-25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
	INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM		FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
	FILE		SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
	EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ________	✓	OTHER *(See Remarks)*

REMARKS:

Please prepare tickler for 5 June 1958.

James R. Burton
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 56

SECRET

(21)

SECRET
CI/OA

COMMENTS:

14 May 1958

RE: Project LIEOGE
C-25507

1. Miss Emily Brockenbraw, FI/Projects, telephoned the writer to report that FI intends to hold up final processing of the subject project until a determination is reached by the Office of Security concerning the request for a Covert Security Approval authorizing the agent's assignment in Mexico City.

2. The writer agreed to advise FI/Projects when CI/OA receives a report from the Office of Security.

FI/Projects advised per above on 23 May 1958.
JPB

DATE: 14 May 1958 BY: James P. Burton

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

CI/OA PROJECT REVIEW FORM

Cryptonym.......LIEDGE..................Division.....WH......Station..Mexico

Type of Project.Provide Mexico City Station with career agent to be used as C/O handling CP operations.

Case Officer...Louis Puckett..........Room.2121 RH..........Ext..2555.....

New Project...X.......;Renewal of.......year-old project...........;

Amendment............;Extension for.......months; termination.......

Project approval period from....1 May 1958.............to......30 April 1959.........

Recommendations:

1. CI/OA recommends approval on condition the agent Harold R. NOEMAYR receives, from the Office of Security, a Covert Security Approval for his new assignment in Mexico City and the results of his LCFLUTTER are satisfactorily resolved. Also, on condition that should the Office of Security request~~s~~ a clearance and LCFLUTTER on this agent's wife, a clearance is issued and LCFLUTTER results are satisfactorily resolved.

2. A new request for CSA for Subject's use in Mexico City was submitted to the Office of Security on 24 April 1958. When the Office of Security issued Subject's last CSA on 3 July 1957, they recommended that Subject be afforded a polygraph as soon as possible. Subject was given an LCFLUTTER a few days ago and although Subject ran clean the polygraph operator began getting some reaction, or hits, regarding the Subject's wife. There is some derogatory information in the Office of Security on what is believed to be the Subject's wife and sister-in-law.

3. The Office of Security has not reached a final decision regarding CSA and LCFLUTTER for Subject's wife. They have stated, however, that unless the wife can be cleared and LCFLUTTER results are clean, it is doubtful whether a new clearance would be issued for the career agent.

Date of Evaluation......29 April 1958..........

...Maurice S. Brady...........
CI/OA Reviewing Officer

Distribution:
1 - FI/Projects
1 - CI/OA Project file
1 - C 25507 ✓

....
Chief, CI/OA

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 4/29/58	CASE NO. 25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
	INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
✓	FORWARD copy of ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM		FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
✓	FILE copy Attach Memo.		SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
	EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ________		OTHER *(See Remarks)*

REMARKS:

orig of WH/III memo forwarded to Security 24 April 1958. JD

(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 56

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

17 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA : Chief, CI/OA

FROM : C/WHD

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)
C-25507
#112565

It is requested that the POA granted Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps), formerly called Arthur O. VAIVADA (ps), on 3 July 1957 for use in Cuba under Project AMPHODARCH, be amended to permit his use in Mexico City. NOEMAYR will be transferred PCS to Mexico City in May 1958 where he will be carried under Project LIFIRE which is being prepared for submission to FI/Projects for approval. Attached is a new PRQ Part II which covers our proposed use of NOEMAYR in Mexico.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

APR 23 3 27 PM '58

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

/PRQ/

PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (items 35 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym Harold R. NOEMAYER (p) - (formerly Arthur G. VAIVADA)

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?
Subject was first recruited in Panama as HYDROPATHIC in November 1948 and transferred to Costa Rica in approved HUMANOID project. Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL project, PBSUCCESS and in 1954 to AMPHODARCH project (Cuba) with which he is currently identified. His transfer to and activity in Mexico will be covered by Project LIEDGE.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Yes **To whom?** Record over the past years shows that subject has easily been turned over to different projects and case officers.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation
Subject is motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, its remuneration and as loyal U. S. citizen.

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-65B
MAY 1950

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?

Checked upon recruitment in Panama in 1949 and subsequently upon transfer to other projects.

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?

Subject is controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty because of American heritage, past Army and Agency service, and a desire for a career in intelligence work.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?

KUBARK

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.

While in the US Army and U.S.A.F. from 1940 - 1945 and again from 1946 - 1949, Subject was concerned with intelligence.

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.

None except through agents which he handles.

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

It is anticipated Subject will be an outside case officer for the Mexico City Station, handling Communist and Marxist party operations. Subject will also act as a spotter and recruiter.

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

Subject received intelligence training by the Army. He was given covert training by KUBARK from 5 October through 25 November 1953, and again from 25 March 1957 through 7 May 1957. Additional training will be given him at Headquarters from 21 April through 23 May 1958.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

His principal function will be that of handling and spotting agents.

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.

As per his contract, Subject receives the regular salary of a GS-12, plus allowances, with provisions for normal step increases.

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

No. See contract signed by Subject as a Career Agent.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

He has native fluency in Spanish. For this reason he might pass as a long-time resident and possibly even as a national of certain Central American-Caribbean countries, although he has obvious foreign physical characteristics.

51. **What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.?**

Middle class

52. **What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers?**

Believed to be normal in all respects.

53. **Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.**

All noted excellent

54. **With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.**

None.

55. **What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?**

Subject can send and receive morse code.

56. **Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.**

Previously submitted.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

From Subject personally.

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

Case officer

SECRET
(When Filled In)

APPROVAL REQUEST

DATE 11 April 1958

PROJECT

TO : Deputy Director of Security
ATT. : Mr. Rice 2613 I bldg
FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT :
C C-25507
NO. 112569

1. TYPE OF REQUEST
☐ POA ☐ OA ☒ CSA ☐ PROP. A. ☐ CSC

2. METHOD OF HANDLING
☐ EXPEDITE ☐ ROUTINE

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY

4. FBI CHECK REQUESTED
BY (Date)

5. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT
For briefing by CI/ICD and WH/III/Mexico representatives in safehouse.

6. USE OF SUBJECT

7. INVESTIGATION NOT TO REVEAL INTEREST OF
☐ U. S. GOVERNMENT ☐ CIA ☐ SEE REMARKS

8. COVER SUGGESTED FOR INVESTIGATION
☐ OFFICIAL ☐ COMMERCIAL
☐ OTHER:

9. RESULTS OF TRACES
FIELD TRACES
RI TRACES

GREEN LIST INITIATED
☐ YES ☐ NO

10. ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ-PART I ☐ OTHER: memo

12. REMARKS

Thomas Carroll Jr.

INITIALS

FORM NO. 693 REPLACES FORM 59-60
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 11 Apr 58

CASE NO. C-25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☑ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY
NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES
FILE
EXTEND POA FOR ______ DAYS UNTIL ____________

REQUEST RI TRACES
REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
REQUEST FIELD TRACES
REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
REQUEST GREEN LIST
FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
✓ OTHER *(See Remarks)*

REMARKS:

Use: For briefing by CI/ICD and WH/III Mexico representatives in safehouse.

GWNoble
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 58

SECRET

(21)

11 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics

THROUGH : Chief, Central Cover Branch, DD/P

REQUESTING OFFICE: WH/III/Mexico

CASE OFFICER : Louis D. Puckett, Ext. 2555, 3162

PROJECT : OCA, Mexico City Station Allotment No. 8-3570-83-599

REFERENCE : R 45-1025, 25 June 1956

Type of safehouse requested: Office

Location and Environment: Washington, D. C. - Business area

Maximum Price Range: $50/week

Occupancy from: 21 April 1958 To: 23 May 1958

Intended Use: Safehouse will be occupied by one (1) career agent and personnel from the CI Staff and WH/III/Mexico. The agent will live elsewhere, not in the safehouse. The agent is a U. S. citizen, 36 years old. Sensitive material will be in the safehouse during the day. None will be left overnight. A tape recorder for play back will be used there during the day and will be stored overnight.

Cover Arrangement: Subject is a U. S. citizen - his cover is that of employee of Public Surveys Institute, (a notional polling firm) in Dallas, Texas. During a recent operational trip he took photographs which have appeared in the New York Times and the New York Daily Mirror. He has in the past sold news stories and fiction. His family will live at Presidential Gardens Apartments, Alexandria, Virginia, during the agent's stay in the Washington area.

R. E. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

Funds are available: ______________________

OBLIGATION REFERENCE No 733

CHARGE TO ALLOTMENT No 8/3570-83-599

AUTHORIZING OFFICER

SECRET
CI/OA

COMMENTS:

A meeting in Security office was held with the following present.

C. Rice - Security SSD
B. Pearson - Security SSD
C. Phelan - Polygraph group
M. Reynolds - WH Div
H. MacAuly - WH Div -
W. Odum - CI Staff

Purpose of the meeting to discuss polygraph program for subject

S.O. will work out details for WH and subject will probably be brought to Miami for the poly-

questions re subject
1) I&R has a file on subject
2) questions re wife

DATE: 9 Dec 1959 BY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III - Willard Galbraith, Chief 15 Jul 57

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 26 Feb 56 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

Attachment:
so memo 3 Jul 57. ac

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

MICROFILMED
DEC 6 1957

SECRET

FORM NO. 388 REPLACES FORM 38-46
JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

(47)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 11 July 57	CASE NO. C- 25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
	INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
✓	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION 1 Cy death S.O. [illegible]		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM.		FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
	FILE		SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
	EXTEND POA FOR ______ DAYS UNTIL ____________	✓	OTHER *(See Remarks)*

REMARKS:

Send to Chief WH/III
(Eyes only)

(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 56

SECRET

(21)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 3 JUL 1957

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957 wherein a covert security approval was requested to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent status for use as principal agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba under non-official cover. Reference is also made to our memorandum of 2 April 1957 in which a provisional covert security clearance was granted for the above use.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949 entitled, "Security and Operational Clearances," a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. This clearance is contingent upon the following:

a. The receipt by this office of full overseas traces and such actual overseas investigation as is possible on Subject and on his wife and her family.

b. that Subject be afforded a polygraph interrogation as soon as possible and that the verbatum results be promptly furnished to this office. The Office of Security will be happy to assist in arranging this interrogation.

4. Subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

SECRET

3 JUL 1957

6. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Fred Hall
for
Robert H. Cunningham

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 3 JUL 1957

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C-25507 Crozier, Ross Lester
#112569

1. Concurrent with this memorandum a covert security clearance is being issued to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent for use as principal agent for Project AMPHOMARCH in Cuba under non-official cover.

2. This is to advise that information has been received from a confidential source of the Office of Security concerning Argentina CORDERO Calderon and her sister, Counsuelo, who are believed to be the Subject's wife and sister-in-law respectively. According to a December 1944 report, the above individuals were described as Costa Rican citizens then in Panama under suspicion and members of the Russian Ballet team of Pedro and Lidia CHUPRINE. Argentina is known to speak and understand German. She was formerly married to Pedro MARZAL, reportedly a German national and formerly on both British and U. S. Proclaimed List. She is reliably reported to have made pro-German remarks and is pro-German in her sympathies. It was further reported that both of the above individuals have at times attempted to secure information from members of the American Armed Forces.

3. In view of the above information, it is requested that current overseas traces and investigation be conducted on the Subject as well as on his wife and sister-in-law, Counsuelo, and other members of his wife's immediate family and that the results thereof be furnished this office.

4. The covert security clearance which is being issued in this case is made contingent upon the faovrable results of the requested overseas traces and investigation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

This data is the property of the Security Office and should be returned when it has served its purpose. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned. This material shall not be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the prior approval of the Security Office.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1[illegible] April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Cuba/McAuley

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 20 February 1957 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Attachment:

so memo 2 April 1957/par

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

SECRET

FORM NO. 388 REPLACES FORM 39-46
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

(47)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 2 APR 1957

FROM : Acting Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957, wherein a provisional covert security approval and a covert security approval were requested to enable the Subject's conversion to career agent status for use as Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba, under non-official cover.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Field Regulation 10-215, a provisional covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph #1, above.

3. It should be noted that the provisional covert security approval herein granted is based on limited investigative coverage and should not be in any way construed as a final security determination relative to a full covert security approval. Upon completion of additional investigation now pending, you will be appropriately advised as to our decision with regard to the issuance of a full covert security approval.

4. Subjects of provisional covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a provisional covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

6. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Fred H. Hall
Fred H. Hall

SECRET

SECRET

8 March 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (sp.)
C-25507

1. Reference is made to OS's verbal request of 7 March 1957, for additional information on Subject in connection with our request for a Provisional Covert Security Approval dated 26 February 1957.

2. Subject was born in De Kalb, Illinois, on 20 June 1922. He received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U. S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U. S. Air Force. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-Burma theater and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945 with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge, he worked for a brief period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Gel Corporation and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to marry a Costa Rican girl in December 1945. For about four months he worked as a stevedore and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone and was discharged three years later, in 1949.

3. Late in 1948 he was recruited by the Agency, and on 1 June 1949 became a CIA contract agent. Since that date, he has served as a contract agent with continuing high level performance, first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba where he is utilized as Principal Agent of Project AMPHODARCH. Subject has worked principally and successfully so, on Communist Party penetration operations since his engagement with CIA, and his current work involves the handling of a net of agents providing coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities at the University of Habana, and the student-youth circles in general in Cuba.

4. Subject has always proven to be loyal and trustworthy. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status. He was promoted recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating.

to SO
3/18/57

SECRET

SECRET

5. Subject's spouse, a Costa Rican citizen, has expressed desire to acquire U. S. citizenship, and has now made the necessary arrangements to accompany her husband to the U. S. for this purpose, when Subject returns for Covert training at Headquarters in the very near future.

6. Covert Security Approval, with an expedite Provisional Covert Security Approval, has been requested in connection with the recommendation to convert Subject from contract to staff status.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 28 February 1957

PROJECT:

PCSA requested by
15 March 1957.

TO : Deputy Director of Security
ATT: Mr. Rice 2613 I

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT : C: C-25507
NO. #112569

1. TYPE OF REQUEST: PCSA & ☐ POA ☐ OA ☒ CSA ☐ PROP. A. ☐ CNC

2. METHOD OF HANDLING: ☐ EXPEDITE ☐ ROUTINE

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY

4. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY (Date)

5. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT
(WH/III/Cuba)

6. USE OF SUBJECT
see remarks

7. INVESTIGATION NOT TO REVEAL INTEREST OF ☐ U. S. GOVERNMENT ☐ CIA ☐ SEE REMARKS

8. COVER SUGGESTED FOR INVESTIGATION ☐ OFFICIAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ OTHER:

9. RESULTS OF TRACES

FIELD TRACES
NDI

RI TRACES
NDI

GREEN LIST INITIATED ☐ YES ☐ NO

10. ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ-PART I ☒ OTHER: PHS

12. REMARKS

6. Subject has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance. He is currently assigned to Cuba, where he is being utilized a the Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH. Project AMPHODARCH is an FI operation designed to provide information on political activities (including Communist) in university circles in Havana, Cuba. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status.

Thomas Carroll, Jr.
lms INITIALS

FORM NO. 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 APR 56

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 27 Feb '57	CASE NO. 25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
	INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
✓	FORWARD ~~ATTACHMENT T~~O SECURITY originals PHS + ~~[illegible]~~ DOC: 27 Feb '57		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM		FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
~~✓~~	~~FILE carbon copies of PHS + 772~~		SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
	EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ~~dtd 27 Feb~~ '57		OTHER (See Remarks)

REMARKS:

~~Proc. Branch~~

~~[illegible]~~

BRM
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 56

SECRET

(21)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL

DATE: 26 February 1957
PROJECT:

TO: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
FROM: (Division) WH/III/CUBA

SUBJECT
TRUE NAME: Ross Lester CORZIER
CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM: Arthur G. VAIVADA
TYPE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE:

CI/OA FILE NO.: C-25507
SO FILE NO.:

USE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE (Full details)

Subject has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance. He is currently assigned to Cuba, where he is being utilized as the Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH. Project AMPHODARCH is an FI operation designed to provide information on political activities (including Communist) in university circles in Havana, Cuba. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐ PROVISIONAL APPROVAL
☐ OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ GOVERNMENT NAME CHECK
☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☒ PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL 15 March
☒ COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐ PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐ OTHER:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒ PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IS ATTACHED IN TWO COPIES
☒ PRQ II IS ATTACHED, IF OBTAINABLE
☐ PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐ GREEN LIST CHECK HAS BEEN INITIATED

FIELD TRACES

☒ REVEAL NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐ REVEAL INFORMATION AS ATTACHED
☐ WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐ NOT INITIATED. NOT EXPECTED TO POSSESS RELEVANT INFO.

SUGGESTED INVESTIGATIVE COVER

☐ GOVERNMENT
☐ COMMERCIAL
☐ ACADEMIC
☐ OTHER:

RI TRACES
☒ RECORD (Not derogatory) ☐ NO RECORD

DIVISION TRACES
☒ RECORD (Not derogatory) ☐ NO RECORD

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION OR SPECIAL COVERAGE DESIRED

SUBJECT	IS	☒	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF CIA INTEREST
		☐	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST
		☐	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF IMPENDING INVESTIGATION
	HAS	☐	BEEN	☐	NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON A "COVER STORY"

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Hugh [illegible] MacAuley	2056 1021 Barton	W. Galbraith

FORM NO. 772
1 SEP 55

SECRET

(9)

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) XXX Miss Mrs. Ross (First) Lester (Middle) Crozier (Last)

Telephone None
Office
Ext. None
Home

PRESENT ADDRESS 5th Street 655, (St. and Number) Havana (City) (Vedado) (State) Cuba (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS San Juan Tibas, (St. and Number) San Jose, (City) Costa Rica (State) None (Country)

B. NICKNAME None WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED?

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NA

HOW LONG? NA IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS NA

NA (When) NA (By whom)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 20 June 1922 PLACE OF BIRTH DeKalb, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP US (Country) BY BIRTH? Yes BY MARRIAGE? NA

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. NA ISSUED NA (Date) BY NA (Court)

AT NA (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? NA TO NA ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? NA (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NA

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NA GIVE PARTICULARS: NA

(1)

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? NA ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? NA

LAST U. S. VISA NA (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 34 SEX M HEIGHT 6'2" WEIGHT 175

EYES Blue HAIR Brown COMPLEXION Ruddy SCARS None

BUILD Slender OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES Nose broken-to left

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE No MARRIED Yes DIVORCED No WIDOWED No

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Argentina de los Angeles Cordero de Crozier (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE 17 Dec. 1945, Cristobal, Canal Zone

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 5th St., No. 655 Vedado, Habana, Cuba (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 15/3/18 PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? San Jose, C.R. (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER None

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME Ross Arnulfo Crozier RELATIONSHIP Son AGE 6½
CITIZENSHIP US ADDRESS 5th St., No. 655, Habana, Cuba
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME Lillian Caridad Crozier RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP US ADDRESS 5th St., No. 655, Habana, Cuba
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE
CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Lester Earl Crozier
(First) (Middle) (Last)
LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS RR No. 1 Tampico Illinois USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATE OF BIRTH Mar. 15 1900 PLACE OF BIRTH Palestine Illinois USA
(City) (State) (Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA
CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? above
(City) (State) (Country)
OCCUPATION Truckdriver LAST EMPLOYER Self-employed
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS RR No. 1 Tampico Illinois USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
MILITARY SERVICE FROM 1917 TO 1919 BRANCH OF SERVICE US Army
(Date) (Date)
Theatre: [illegible] France-Belgium DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN
NA

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Elisabeth Lorene McKibben
(First) (Middle) (Last)
LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS RR No. 1 Tampico Illinois USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATE OF BIRTH Sept. 1903 PLACE OF BIRTH La Moille, Illinois USA
(City) (State) (Country)
CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? above
(City) (State) (Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS Unknown (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA TO NA BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

None

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME James (First) Earl (Middle) Crozier (Last) AGE 27
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) Tampico, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME Irma (First) Lilly (Middle) Crozier (Last) AGE 32
   PRESENT ADDRESS RR No. 1 (St. and Number) Tampico, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME Blanche (First) Elaine (Middle) Crozier (Last) AGE 30
   PRESENT ADDRESS 1900 Canal St., (St. and Number) Rock Falls, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME Morris (First) Edwin (Middle) Crozier (Last) AGE 24
   PRESENT ADDRESS 804½ 1st Ave., (St. and Number) Sterling, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME NA (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Alberto (First) (Middle) Cordero Loizia (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Dec. DATE OF DECEASE Oct. 26, '43 CAUSE Cerebral Hem.

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS (St. and Number) San Jose, (City) (State) Costa Rica (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1894 PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

NA

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? Above (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Musician LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Dora (First) (Middle) Cordero Calderon (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Sept. 7, 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? Above (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME Norma Cordero de Gregor RELATIONSHIP sister-in-law AGE 24
CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican ADDRESS Box 2655, Cristobal, C. Z. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME Isabel Cordero de Naranjo RELATIONSHIP sister-in-law AGE 27
CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican ADDRESS Plaza Viquez, San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME Consuelo Cordero Calderon RELATIONSHIP sister-in-law AGE 29
CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican ADDRESS San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT: NONE

1. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

2. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR NA

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ NA
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY Yes and also

FREQUENTLY when necessary., CONSTANTLY No

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. Yes

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES Yes, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES Yes

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

Preference for Latin America and Spain

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL Elwood ADDRESS DeKalb, Illinois, USA
(City) (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1926-1934 GRADUATE? Yes

HIGH SCHOOL DeKalb Township ADDRESS DeKalb, Illinois USA
(City) (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1935-1939 GRADUATE? Yes

COLLEGE University of Costa Rica ADDRESS San Jose, Costa Rica
(City) (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Economics Economic Theory YEARS COMPLETED four

DATES ATTENDED 1949-1953 DEGREE Not yet

COLLEGE Univ. of San Carlos ADDRESS Guatemala City, Guatemala
(City) (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Economics YEARS COMPLETED studies interrupted.

DATES ATTENDED 1954 Jan-May 1 DEGREE No

University of Habana--one year, 1954-55, Habana, Cuba

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS

Political Economy, Principles of Administration, Sociology, General Mathematics, Economic History, Psychology, Statistics, Financial Math, Economic Doctrines, Labor Law, Credit-Money & Banking, Public Treasury, ~~CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS~~ Prices, Public Administration, Advanced Algebra, Biodemographic Statistics, Accounting I, Theory of Occupation (Employment) and Labor Unions and Coops.

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

(Country) (Service) (Rank) (Dates of Service)

Albrook Field, C. Z. 16001390, Honorable

REMARKS: None

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER None ADDRESS NA

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON NA

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS None

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM 1940 TO 1945 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) T/Sgt.

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY USA, USAF

ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB NA SALARY $ NA PER NA

YOUR DUTIES Intelligence NCO—Assists in collection, evaluation, interpretation and distribution of information of enemy and counterintelligence activities and the safeguarding of military information.

REASONS FOR LEAVING ETS and termination of WW II.

FROM Jan 45-Aprl 46 TO CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) unknown

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY United States Naval Air Station

ADDRESS Coco Solo, Canal Zone (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Supply Station NAME OF SUPERVISOR Unknown

TITLE OF JOB Leadingman Labor SALARY $ 12.88 PER day

YOUR DUTIES Loading and unloading naval supply ships with native labor maintaining existent stocks in order, handling salvage and/or destruction of equipment.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Resigned to re-enlist in the USAF

FROM April 18, 1946 Apr. 18, 1949 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) T/Sgt.

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY USAF

ADDRESS Albrook Field, Canal Zone
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB Intelligence NCO SALARY $ NA PER NA

YOUR DUTIES Chief of Section, Political Analysis, Caribbean Air Command. Organize and maintain files, study and prepare timely political analysis of Caribbean and South American republics.

REASONS FOR LEAVING ETS and to study Political Economy at the University of Costa Rica.

FROM Apr. 18, 1949 TO Mar. 1953 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Free-lance photography and student.

ADDRESS San Jose, Costa Rica
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS part-time Photo. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Self-employed

TITLE OF JOB none SALARY $ Variable PER

YOUR DUTIES NA

REASONS FOR LEAVING Employed by following agency.....

FROM March 1953 TO June 1953 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) unknown

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Section of Geology, Ministry Agriculture, Costa Rican Government.

ADDRESS San Jose, Costa Rica
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR Dr. Cesar Dondoli

TITLE OF JOB Photographer SALARY $ part time PER

YOUR DUTIES Design and direct a photographic laboratory for technical work in geology, both for the Costa Rican Government and the University of Costa Rica.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Termination of work—atemporary position

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE English SPEAK Fluent READ Fluent WRITE Fluent

LANGUAGE Spanish SPEAK Fluent READ Fluent WRITE Fair

LANGUAGE ______ SPEAK ______ READ ______ WRITE ______

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Fishing, fresh water and sea. Sailboating, Hunting, Archery. Football in HS and USAF. Track, HS and USAF; High jump, broad jump and Discus; National record in Guatemala 1954 in Discus. Pistol (Expert). Chess. Jungle lore. Photography—freelance and commercial.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Particular position, no. In general, my study and experience has been almost entirely in Latin American areas, in their universities and government. In military service, I would naturally qualify for a position in political-economic intelligence. In civil service, this must be convertible to one or more departments, of which I have no knowledge as to particular positions. In conclusion, any position that entails political-economic analysis in Latin American areas.

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

Some experience in radio; send and receive 15-20 wpm Morse International, key and blinker. Operated motion picture projectors—Simplex 35mm and about all 16mm makes. Photo reproduction equipment, including laboratory microphotography.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 40 SHORTHAND No

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC. NO

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE NA

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) NA LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) NA

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

(1) All written work in political-economy was classified.

(2) None

(3) None

(4) None

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

None

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

None

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number / City / State

1. W/O Francis Williams
BUS. ADD. Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio
RES. ADD. 584 Access Rd., Dayton Ohio

2. Howard Mck Couse
BUS. ADD. Prospect at Little Neck Rd., Box 245
RES. ADD. Centerport, LI, N. Y.

3. Donald Page
BUS. ADD. Elgin Watch Co., Elgin, Illinois
RES. ADD. 525 S. Edison Elgin Illinois

4. Col. C. J. Stattler
BUS. ADD. Pentagon Bldg.
RES. ADD. 4550 Conn. Ave., Washington 8, D. C.

5. Edward A. Marelius
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 3333 Toronto St., Falls Church, Va.

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number / City / State

1. Wilford A. Pyle
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 12119 S. Hastings Dr., Norwalk, Cal.

2. Tom Oakland
BUS. ADD. Hopewell Junction, New York
RES. ADD.

3. Milo Edwards
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. Box 63 Kingston Illinois

4. Joseph Perkovich
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 532 Grove St. DeKalb Illinois

5. Guy Shifflet
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. RFD No. 3 Staunton Va.

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number / City / State

1. Helen Buchanan
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 5008 7th St., NW, Washington 11, D.C.

2. Maria Fama
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 5010 7th St., NW, Washington 11, D.C.

3. Others not recalled.
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD.

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME NA

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NY, BRANCH — Av. 23, No. 152, Havana, Cuba

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No

GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: NA

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S. All credit references are foreign since I have not lived in the US since 1940.

1. NAME ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME NA ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME NA ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM Nov. 1955 TO Present Calle 5 No. 655 Vedado Habana, Cuba (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM Apr. 1955 TO Nov. 1955 Calle 11 No. 1013 Vedado Habana, Cuba (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM Nov. 1954 TO Apr. 1955 Calle 16, No. 511 Vedado Habana, Cuba (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM Aug. 1954 TO Nov. 1954 Calle 3, No. 6A, Miramar, Habana, Cuba (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM May 1954 TO Aug. 1954 San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM Jan. 1954 TO May 1954 7th Ave. N. 9-04, Jocotanango, Guat. City. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM Jul. 1953 TO Jan. 1954 5008 7th St. NW, Washington 11, D. C. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM Apr. 1949 TO Jul. 1953 San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica (Country)
(All prior residence was military service—back to 1941.)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM Aug 40 TO Nov 41 Fort Bragg, N. C. (City or section) (Country) 60th Field Art. (Purpose)
FROM Dec 41 TO Mar 44 Canal Zone, Panama (City or section) (Country) USAF (Purpose)
FROM Nov 44 TO June 45 India-Burma-China theatre. (City or section) (Country) USAF (Purpose)
FROM Dec 45 TO Apr 49 Albrook Field, C. Z. (City or section) (Country) USAF (Purpose)
FROM Apr 49 TO July 53 San Jose, Costa Rica (City or section) (Country) Student (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. Club Universitario, Av 3ra, Miramar, Habana, Cuba (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1954-55 academic year

2. Club Nautico de Marianao (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) Habana (State) Cuba (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: January 1956—current

3. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

4. NA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

5. NA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

6. NA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

7. NA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? No

IF "YES," EXPLAIN: NA

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? Yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Social--moderate

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

None

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

Investigation (Loyalty check for security) in USAF 1944.

Again for USAF in 1946.

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Mrs. Argentina Crozier RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS Calle 5 No 655 Vedado, Habana, Cuba
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No.

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Habana, Cuba DATE 24 July 1956
(City and State)

ROSS L. CROZIER
(Witness) (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

Section 15 (Cont)

From June 53 to Dec. 53

Student. University of ____________, Washington, D. C.

Reasons for leaving: Termination of course.

From Jan 54 to May 54.

Student. University of San Carlos, Guatemala City, Guat.

Reasons for leaving: political disturbances.

From Jul 54 to present.

Student. University of Habana, School of Economic Sciences.

Section 23 (Cont)

From Jan 54 to May 54.	Guatemala City, Guatemala.	Student
From July 54 to present.	Habana, Cuba	Student.

S/ Ross L. Crozier

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

ATTENTION: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT: Covert Training Request for Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: Project AMPHODARCH

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 4 December 1956 requesting covert training for Arthur G. VAIVADA.

2. The CI Staff approves the training request subject to the comments and recommendations set forth in the attached memorandum prepared by CI/ICD under date of 20 December 1956.

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachment:
C/CI/ICD memo dtd 20 Dec. 56 - Subject; Comments and Recommendations on Proposed Covert Training of Arthur G. VAIVADA

CI/OA/JHBurton:re (27/12/56)

Distribution:
- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - FI/Training
- 1 - D/Training
- 1 - C/CI
- 1 - CI/R&A
- 2 - CI/OA

SECRET

SECRET

Date: 13 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/R&A
CI/OPS

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Training
Project: AMPHODARCH (PI)
Pseudonym: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Attached are separate comments sheets for each CI Division listed above. Any comments you may have after reviewing the attached request for training, which was submitted by WH/III/Cuba, should be recorded on the comment sheet provided.

2. When you have indicated your comments on the sheet provided, send this by hand to the next person on the routing sheet.

3. Your comments will be consolidated into a memorandum to the WH Division over the signature of the Chief, CI Staff. This memorandum will be prepared by CI/OA. When this consolidated memorandum omits or contradicts one of your comments, CI/OA will so inform you.

4. If you feel that this request should receive further coordination within CI Staff, simply add the person's name or symbol to the routing sheet and forward, by hand. Routing outside of CI Staff can only be made by CI/OA.

Thomas Carroll Jr.

THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
Chief, CI/OA

Attachments:

CI/R&A

Re: AMPHODARCH/Arthur G. VAIVADA

CI Staff notes that training for VAIVADA is scheduled to commence on the same date in the same city as the training scheduled for Colonel PEREZ and Lt. CASTANO of the Cuban BRAC. This situation seems inherently dangerous and unwarranted by the circumstances as known to CI Staff. Pending further justification CI Staff cannot concur in the training as requested, but would of course concur in the training for VAIVADA if the locale were shifted to another city such as New York.

(This is basically an operational or an operational security matter. CI/R&A/TRB therefore urges that CI/OPS/WH and CI/OA discuss the problem with the desk, and resolve it if possible. CI/R&A/TRB will of course defer to CI/OPS AND CI/OA in this matter.)

DATE: 14 Dec. 56

COMMENTS:

CI/OPS

CI/OPS/WH does not concur with the CI/R & A recommendations as set forth for the following reasons:

1. The security compromise would only stem from the two BRAC officers identifying the VAIVADA affiliation and training on behalf of this Agency. This appears extremely remote as the desk advised there is no indication that the BRAC officers know VAIVADA either by name or sight.

2. While VAIVADA is being trained, his wife will be attending citizenship classes in D.C. preparing for her citizenship examination before returning to Cuba. Consequently, it would be a financial drain for VAIVADA to stay in New York City and his wife in D.C. In addition, certain per diem costs would be incurred by the Case Officer traveling to New York City to monitor some of the OTR training.

3. The desk will instruct OTR of this joint training aspect and as a precautionary measure, request that training sites, hours, etc. do not overlap.

DATE: 12 Dec 1976

Robert L. Brown

SECRET

CI/OA

AN OPERATIONAL APPROVAL WAS ISSUED FOR ARTHUR G. VAIVADA ON 19 JULY 1949; A NEW OPERATIONAL APPROVAL WAS ISSUED ON 22 JULY 1954. CI/OA CONCURS IN THE APPROVAL OF THE WH DIVISION TRAINING REQUEST DATED 4-DEC-1956.

DATE: 27 DEC. -56 BY: James R. Burton

SECRET

SECR

20 December 1956

TO : C/CI/OA

FROM : C/CI/ICD

SUBJECT: : Comments and Recommendations on Proposed Covert Training of Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: Covert Training Request for Arthur G. VAIVADA of 4 December 1956

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA has worked principally, and successfuly so, on CP penetration operations since employment by the Agency. His current work involves the handling of a net of CP penetration agents and informants. ICD concurs in general with the projected training scheduled for subject but recommends that considerable emphasis specifically be placed on anti-CP penetration operations (i.e., principles and practices of penetration of the international Communist movement).

2. In addition, subject should also be given materials and briefings on Communism in his area of operations. It is suggested that he be given the following materials to study and discuss during the phase of training recommended above: "The Operational Pattern of International Communism in Latin America" (a paper prepared by CI/ICD) and "The Communist Movement of Cuba" (a paper prepared by Miss Anne Kendall). These materials may be borrowed either from CI/ICD/WH (Hein) or from WH/III/Cuba (Roland).

3. Should OTR contemplate presenting in any form any of the CP penetration case studies contained in FHB 52-865-4 ("The CP Penetration Program" - Issue No. 4) to subject during the training sessions, CI/ICD (Hein - extension 3919) should be consulted. Some of the material in FHB 52-865-4 directly concerns VAIVADA's previous operational work.

CI/ICD/CHein:gmh
(20 December 1956)

Distribution: Original & 1 - addressee
1 - Hein
1 - Chrono
1 - ICD/WH

SECRET

4 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Assistant Chief for Covert Training, OS/TR

FROM : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training

Project: AMPHODARCH (FI)
Pseudonym: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Request initiated by WH/III/Cuba

2. Project Approval - Agent Clearance

   a. Project AMPHODARCH last approved for renewal on 5 October 1956.

   b. P/A VAIVADA has operational clearance dated 19 July 1949.

3. Agent Status

   Contract (contemplate change to staff status in near future).

4. Agent Nationality

   United States citizen (by birth).

5. Operations Officer

   James B. Noland, known to student by true name. Office: 1021 Barton Hall, Extension 2056.

   Alternate Operations Officer

   Hugh O. MacAuley, known to student by true name. Office: 1021 Barton Hall, Extension 2056.

6. Training Date

   Training to commence on 14 January for period of approximately six weeks.

7. Biographic Information

Subject was born in De Kalb, Illinois, on 20 June 1922. He received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U.S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U.S. Air Force. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-Burma theatre and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945 with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge he worked for a brief period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Gel corporation and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to marry Argentina CORDERO C., a Costa Rican girl, in December 1945. For about four months he worked as a stevedore and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he reenlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone and was discharged three years later, in 1949.

Late in 1948 he had been recruited by the Agency, and on 1 June 1949 he became a CIA contract agent. It was originally planned that he be used in Panama, but he was assigned instead to the HUMANOID Project in Costa Rica. While there, he successfully handled a high-level penetration of the Communist Party. In 1953 he was sent to Headquarters for training, and in 1954 he was assigned to PBSUCCESS for a brief period. In July 1954 he signed a new contract in Washington whereby he became the new principal agent of Project AMPHODARCH. He has been under student cover and has worked for his B.A. degree at the University of Habana.

Subject is happily married and is the father of two children. He is fluent in Spanish and is well qualified to continue work in his area of operations as shown by his past performance. He is also very versatile and has a wide range of outside interests, including sports, photography, outdoor life, and many others.

8. Previous Training

VAIVADA previously received covert training at Headquarters during the period 5 October through 25 November 1953, under the training alias of "VICKS." The training was of a comprehensive nature.

9. Project Objective - Area of Assignment

Objective of Project AMPHODARCH is to provide coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities at the University of Habana, and the student-youth circles in general in Cuba.

10. Cover - Operational Duties

VAIVADA's present cover consists of being a graduate student at the University of Habana. Efforts are currently underway to obtain a new cover as representative in Habana of a well-known U.S. polling agency. Subject's duties are those of a P/A handling a rather large net of sub-agent informants in Cuban University-youth circles with emphasis on Communist and revolutionary matters. He reports directly to the Habana Station.

11. Training Cover

Consultation in connection with proposed new polling cover (see above) combined with vacation and acquisition of citizenship for wife (would explain time spent in Washington).

12. Availability for Training

Student will be available for training on a full-time basis.

13. Special Problems

No particular problems anticipated.

14. Subjects to be Covered

Refresher course in Clandestine Intelligence Operations.

15. Technical Training Requirements

Only those falling within prescribed Operations Course, if any.

16. Visits to Overt CIA Installations

None, past or present.

17. Special Attributes to be Evaluated

General suitability only. Subject's performance has been outstanding.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

13 Dec Approval ______________________

____
Senior Staff Training Officer

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FI/STC/SPB

DATE: 15 OCT 1954

FROM : Chief, Special Security Division

SUBJECT: C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your request dated 21 July 1954 for a recommendation as to whether an Operational Clearance should be granted to permit the Subject's use as an Agent in Costa Rica under unindicated cover.

2. The attached information is furnished as an aid in determining whether or not the Subject should be used in the requested capacity.

3. In view of the fact that Subject has resided outside the United States since, at least, 1945 no field investigation was scheduled in this case.

4. This memorandum pertains only to this proposed assignment. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision in this case. The attached material should be returned to the writer in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only" when it has served its purpose.

OCT 15 9 12 AM '54

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham
Robert H. Cunningham

Attachment:
NCD dtd 28 September 1954

This data is property of the Security Office and should be returned when it has served its purpose. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned.

File

OC already issued

SECRET

SECRET

FI/STC/SPB

15 OCT 1954

Chief, Special Security Division

C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your request dated 21 July 1954 for a recommendation as to whether an Operational Clearance should be granted to permit the Subject's use as an Agent in Costa Rica under unindicated cover.

2. The attached information is furnished as an aid in determining whether or not the Subject should be used in the requested capacity.

3. In view of the fact that Subject has resided outside the United States since, at least, 1945 no field investigation was scheduled in this case.

4. This memorandum pertains only to this proposed assignment. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision in this case. The attached material should be returned to the writer in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only" when it has served its purpose.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

Attachment:
MCD dtd 28 September 1954

SECRET

S E SECRET

COVERT NAME CHECK REPORT

OOC

DATE: 28 September 1954

SUBJECT: R. L. G. 112569 OC

In accordance with your request, a covert name check was conducted on Subject with results as indicated below:

AGENCY	RETURN	DATE
G-2	NR	8/28
ONI	NR	9/27
STATE (less Passport)	NR	8/24
FBI	NIC	8/27
CSC		
HCUA		
OSI		
PASSPORT	NA	9/21
I&N		

This data is property of the Security Office and should be returned when it has served its purpose. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned.

SECRET

FORM NO. 30-66
JUL 1950

SECRET

PASSPORT FILE CHECK

DATE CHECKED 21 September 1954

INITIALS AND CASE NUMBER: P. L. ~~O.~~ #112569

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH : 29 June 1922 in Dekalb, Illinois
(Photostatic copy of birth certificate appears in the file)

PASSPORTS RECEIVED

DATE ISSUED	COUNTRIES	PURPOSE OF TRAVEL	POSITION AND ORGANIZATION
27 September 1945 #14394	Clon, Panama	Personal Business	Student

Amended 19 November 1946 to show occupation as S/Sgt. United States Air Force in Panama.

Renewed and amended the above passport at Panama City, Panama 29 January 1949 under orders from the United States Air Force (T Sgt. AF16001300) authorizing him 10 days leave of absence with permission to visit Republic of Panama and San Juan, Costa Rica. Subject registered at San Juan Tibas, Costa Rica on 3 March 1949 where he was for the purpose of study under the GI Bill of Rights.

14 August 1950 #180FS119	San Jose, Costa Rica (passport included son, Ross A. ________, born Costa Rica 4 September 49		Student

Amended the above passport 9 October 1951 at San Jose to include minor child Lillian CARIDAD, born Costa Rica 24 June 1951.

Renewed the above passport at San Jose, Costa Rica 17 August 1953.

~~ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:~~

2 July 1954 #98FS11099	San Jose, Costa Rica	Leaving for United States for visit	Student

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Address: (1945) 612 West 7th Street, Sterling Illinois.

SPOUSE: Married 17 December 1945 to Argentina CORDERO at Cristobal, CZ, who was born on 15 March 1919, who is not an American citizen.

PARENTS: Lester Earl ________, born Palestine, Illinois 15 March 1900 and Elizabeth Loraine McKIBBEN, born La Moille, Illinois, both of whom currently reside at Tampico, Illinois.

Subject's file indicated that he resided in Dekalb, Illinois from birth until 1940. From 1945 to 1949 he resided in Panama, from 1949 to date he had resided in Costa Rica.

WITNESS: (1945) Rose PERKOVICH, not related, 1322 Pleasant Street, Dekalb, Illinois.

LFM:ph

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. C-25507

TO: Chief, WH

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of Arthur G. VAIVADA as follows:

As requested in memorandum dated 19 July 1954

This clearance is for the specific use set forth above, and is based upon an appraisal of information currently available to this office. It must be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that derogatory information, if any, has been considered and evaluated for the instant purpose only.

Date JUL 22 1954

FI/STC/SPB
cr

SECRET

FORM NO. 59-47 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED
1 MAR 54

(8)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CLEARANCE REQUEST

DATE 21 July 1954

TO : Chief, Special Security Division, I&SO
FROM : Chief, Staff C/SPB

SUBJECT: NO._____C ~~30984~~ 25507

Called Jean Coultre this date & advised her to disregard this request. New O.C. granted 22 July 54 on basis of previous record.

1. Character of Case: OC XXX CSC_____ PROJ._____
2. CIA indices check required in advance------------Yes--No---X
3. Project name: XXX AMPHODARCH
4. Proposed country of assignment: Costa Rica
5. Contemplated type of contract or employment agreement (see C.F.R. 14.1)_____
6. Scope and nature of use or activity: Agent
7. Subject's cover: Not cited.
8. Present whereabouts and occupation of Subject: SA
9. Suggested guide of I&S investigation: U.S. Govt.:_____ Commercial_____ Other: Credit checks.
10. Special coverage desired in investigation: Not cited.
11. Limitation, if any, on investigation: Not cited.
12. Subject aware of Agency interest------------Yes--No-X
13. Subject aware of pending investigation------------Yes--No-X
14. Subject briefed on "cover" story to be used in investigation----Yes--No--X
15. Probable investigative contacts informed of "cover" story subject will use: Yes----No----. If not, state reason.
16. Return attached PRQ Part I----------57's-------Biog. Data XXX with results of your action.
17. Certification having been made by the Chief of the interested Division that operational files and documents contain no pertinent information of an investigative or security nature other than that furnished to Staff C/SPB, such information forwarded to your office------------Yes--X No---
18. Remarks: STC/SPB (has) ~~(has not)~~ been advised if Green List initiated

____
INITIALS

SC

FORM NO. 59-60
FEB 1953

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

SECRET

14 July, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

SUBJECT : OCR-________-A/WHD/Branch III, Forwarding Part II, PRQ, on Arthur G. Vaixada (pseudonym)

REFERENCE : OCR-________-B/WHD/Branch III, dated 14 July 1954, Forwarding Part I, PRQ.

No record of this in STC/SPB.

Previous OC obtained in No. 68, dated 19 July 1949, for project HUMANOID.

1. Forwarded herewith is Part II, PRQ, on Arthur G. Vaixada

2. Operational....Security....Clearance is requested in order to employ Arthur G. Vaixada as (indicate: US, ~~or indigenous~~; witting ~~or unwitting~~; form and value of emoluments; FI ~~or PP~~ and ~~oral or~~ written contract.)

To receive a salary of $5060.00 annually, plus allowances.
To replace RIKON in project AMPHODARCH.

Robert D. Gahagan
for J. C. KING, Chief, WHD

SECRET

SECRET

14 July, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

SUBJECT : OCR-________-B/WHD/Branch III, Forwarding Part I, PRQ, on Ross L. Crozier

1. Forwarded herewith is Part I, PRQ, on Ross L. Crozier

2. a. A Green List name check (Form 51-125) has been requested.

b. The Registry and WHD operational files have been checked and no information of investigative value or security interest was found on the subject.

c. Local Field Traces contain no derogatory information.

3. Part II, PRQ, is being forwarded under memorandum for STC/SPB OCR-________-A/WHD/Branch III, dated 14 July 1954

4. Additional comments (if any):

Robert D. Gahagan

for J. C. KING, Chief, WHD

SECRET

TRS/PRQ/26

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Instruction: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable"
3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. Full Name Ross (First) Lester (Middle) Crozier (Last)

2. Name in native script Ross L. Crozier

3. Name at birth (if different from 1.) Lester Ross Crozier

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.) Not applicable

5. a. Date of birth 20 June 1922 b. Place of birth DeKalb, Illinois

6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate U/S/ by birth

7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.) U.S. and no subsequent nationalities

8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) Owner of house and lot at Colima de Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica.

9. Permanent address (if different from 8.)

10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.) Matriculated as Student of Economic Sciences at University of Costa Rica, third year, under G/I/ bill Right
Also practicing photography and planning to open small studio.

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate granted.)
Not applicable

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship) Lester Earl Crozier, Elizabeth Lorene Crozier, Father and Mother.
M/sgt Francis WILLIAMS, Friend. Colonel C/J/ Stattler, friend.
F. Arthur Greger, friend.

18-6-3-60

14-00000

TRS/PRQ/26

13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

Lester Earl Crozier, Trucking business, Sterling Illinois, born 1900 in Palestine Illinois, U/S/ citizen with no subsequent nationalities.

14. Mother - same information as 13.

Elizabth Lorene Crozier (Maiden name; McKibben) housewife, Sterling Illinois, 1903 at LaMoille, Illinois, U/S/ at birth with no subsequent nationality.

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

Argentina de Crozier (Argentina Cordero Calderon) born 1918 at San Jose Costa Rica, married at Cristobal Canal Zone on 17 Dec 1945; Costa Rican at birth with no subsequent nationality, presently resides at Colima Tibas San Jose, Costa Rica; no previous marriages.

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Ross Arnulfo Crozier, male, born 4 sept 1949 at San Jose, C/R/ and registered as a U/S/ citizen with no subsequent nationality; residing at Colima de Tibas, San Jose.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Norris Edwin Crozier, Male, 1933 DeKalb, Ill., U/S/, Sterling, Ill.
James R. Crozier, Male, 1930 Malta, Ill. U/S/ Somewhere in Corea with U/S/ Army.
rma Lily Crozier, Female , 1924 Elgin, Ill. U.S. Sterling, Ill.
ancho Elaine Crozier, Female, 1927 DeKalb Ill. U/S/. Sterling, Ill.

TRS/PRQ/ 26

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

James Earl Crozier, Corporal, U/S/ Army in Corea.

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

U/S/ Passport, Issued San José, Costa Rica, Aug 14, 1950, # 180 (FS)119
Cedula de Residencia, 100-37712, issued 6 April 1949. San Jose Costa Rica indefinite with annual renewal.

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

Catholic , Roman, practiced occasionally.

21. Present and past political affiliations **: Not applicable.**

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited **: With U/S/ Army, departed US in Nov 1941 and covered Panama, Puerto Rico, Ecuador, Costa Rica, then departed US in Nov 1944 and covered Australia, India, Burma, China, Iraque, Iran, Egypt, Morocco, Bermuda. Dep US in Nov 1945 to Panama as civilian to work US Navy at Coco Solo, then Dep C/Z/ in April 1949 for enrollment at U of CR, San Jose Costa Rica.**

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

Graduated Grammer School at Five-points District School, Sycamore, Ill. 1937
Graduated High school DeKalb Illinois by virtue of recognition of credits attained thr ugh AF educational work and graduated actually in 1949.
Currently attending University of Costa Rica, third year, Economic Sciences.

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language **English** Speak **Good** Read **Good** Understand **Good**

Language **Spanish** Speak **Good** Read **Good** Understand **Good**

Language ________ Speak ______ Read ________ Understand ________

TRS/PRQ/26

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war : U/S/ Army 1940 - 1941, Artillery, Private, North Carolina, dischged for entry in Air Forces. US Air Forces. 1941 - 1945, Intelligence Specialist, Panama, India-Burma theater. Dischgd termination of War. US Air Forces, 1946-1949, Technical Sergeant, Intelligence Specialist, Political analysis, dischgd - exp term of service.

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

None.

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Photography.

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property

Compensation from G/I/ bill of Rights: $120.00
Approx earnings from Photography : $ 40.00
Owner of house and lot valued at : $ 3,500.00
No current bank deposits.

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

Summer vacation 1939-40 - Stapling machine op. -$50 week - California packing Corporation, DeKalb, Ill. Left for service with US army.
August 1940-45 - US Army and AF, Operations and Intelligence Specialist - Technical Sergeant, 135 dollars month, dchgd exp term of service. -
August 1945 - Oct 45 - Laboratory Technician - Sterling Silica Gel Corp - $60 weekly - left due to strike complications.
Jan 1946 - April 1946 - Stevedore and Labor foreman - US Navy Coco Solo, CZ. approx 65 dollars weekly - left for entrance US Air Forces.
April 1946-April 1949 -US Air Forces, Albrook Air Base, CZ. Tech Sergeant, Intelligence Specialist, dischgd due to exp term of service.

29. (Continued)

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates. **None.**

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

Argentina de Crozier,

Correspondents:

Mrs Jeannie Williams
m/sgt Francis Williams
Hq 2nd Air Force
Barksdale Air Force Base.

Sra Miguel Aguila
Panama City, R de P.

32. List five character references.

Lt. Col. C/J/ STATTLER , Washington, D/C/
T/Sgt. Francis J. Wiliams, Hq 2nd AF, Barksdale AFB, La.
Major Paul H. Harrison, Howard Field, C/Z/
Lt. Col. William R. Forbes, Howard Field, C/Z/
Mr. Edward Marelius, Washington, D.C.

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

Not applicable.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age	29	Posture	erect - good
Apparent age	30	Weight	165
Height	6' 1"	Teeth	perfect
Eyes	blue	Hair	brown
Face - shape		Scars	Appendectomy, varicose viens right leg.
Complexion	ruddy	Build	Slender
Sex	Male		

General appearance

Prominent features

Other identifying features

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

Part II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

____/PRQ/____

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the case officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym Arthur G. VAIVADA

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?
Subject was first recruited in Panama as HYDROPATH; in November 1948 and transferred to Costa Rica in approved HUMANOID project. Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL project and PBSUCCESS.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Yes four years shows that subject has different projects and case officers.

To whom? Above record over the past easily been turned over to

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation
Subject is motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, and its remuneration.

FORM NO. 51-95B
MAY 1950

SECRET

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?

Checked upon recruitment in Panama in 1949.
Has subsequently been check upon employment in other projects.

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?

Subject is controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty because of American heritage, past Army and Agency service, and a desire for a career in intelligence work.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?

Subject if cognizant of the identity of this organization.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.

Subject previously in U.S. Army and Air Force Intelligence.

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.

Subject has furnished information received from sub-agents on Communist Party activities and Central American revolutionary matters.

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

None.

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

U. S. Army Intelligence Training and Agency covert training from 5 October through 25 "ovember 1953.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

Previously worked a Principal Agent handling various sub-agents.

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.

Subject is to receive $5060.00 annually, plus allowances.

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

No.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

No.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.? Upper middle class.

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers? Social drinker but very moderately. No gambling or mistresses.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.
All noted excellent.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?

Subject can send and receive Morse code.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Previously submitted.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

From subject personally.

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

Excellent work done in previous projects should ably qualify subject for use in project AMPHODARCH.

____
Case officer

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : STC/SPB **DATE:** 19 July 1954

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Request for Operational Clearance for use of Arthur G. VAIVADA in Project AMPHODARCH

1. Reference is made to Operational Clearance No. C-25507, dated 28 April 1954, wherein the Subject was cleared for use in Project PBSUCCESS.

2. It is requested that Subject now be cleared for use in Project AMPHODARCH.

3. PRQ, Parts I & II have been submitted to your office, Green List Check No. 9467 was submitted to STD and this office was informed by phone on 16 July 1954 that no derogatory information on Subject was on record with STD.

for C. KING
C/WH

SECRET

DATE: 9 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

ATTENTION : Mr. Maurice Brady

SUBJECT : Cancellation of ~~[illegible] and~~ OC on
(NAME) Ross Lester CROZIER
Project PBSUCCESS

It is requested that ~~[illegible] and~~ OC, # C-25507, dated 28 Apr 1954, and granted to (Name) Ross Lester CROZIER for purpose of utilization on project PBSUCCESS be cancelled.

F. P. HOLCOMB
Special Deputy, DD/P

Carbon returned to WH noting completion
~~action completed by STC/SPB~~

JUL 20 1954

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : STC/SPB
Attention: Mr. Ogden
DATE: 25 May 1954
FROM : Chief, WHD
SUBJECT: Request for Amendment of OPC - BIRADIAL C-25507

1. This division has been advised by the Guatemala City station that BIRADIAL (formerly HUMANOID) is currently being used as cutout in the ESCROW project.

2. BIRADIAL, whose pseudonym is Anthony G. VAIVADA, holds OPC for PBSUCCESS.

3. In accordance with the recommendation contained in Para. 6 (b), Memorandum of the Chief, Plans, FI, dated 7 May 1954, subject: Project Renewal ESCROW, it is requested that the OPC for this agent be amended to authorize his additional use as stated in Para. 1 above

Robert D. Gahagan
for J. C. KING

Copy of IOC dated 28 Apr 54 was forwarded to Col Dreeflinger in response to this memo. A. Salerno aware of this.
CWL 9 Jun 54

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. C-25507

TO: Chief, WH

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of Arthur G. VAIVADA as follows:

This clearance amends Subject's first name (Ps) from Anthony To Arthur.
Use however, remains as stated in clearance dated 28 April 1954.

As requested in memorandum dated 27 April 1954

This clearance is for the specific use set forth above, and is based upon an appraisal of information currently available to this office. It must be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that derogatory information, if any, has been considered and evaluated for the instant purpose only.

Date MAY 5 1954

FI/STC/SPB
TC/er

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. C-25507

TO: Chief, WH

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of ~~[illegible]~~ ARthuR G. VAIVADA as follows:

As requested in memo of 27 April 1954 this clearance supersedes that of 19 July 1949 and permits Subject's use under Project PBSUCCESS. Further, this clearance is so amended to allow for Subject's additional duties as cutout under Project ESCROW.

As requested in memorandum dated 27 April 1954

This clearance is for the specific use set forth above, and is based upon an appraisal of information currently available to this office. It must be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that derogatory information, if any, has been considered and evaluated for the instant purpose only.

Date APR 28 1954

FI/SIC/SPB
TC/cr

SECRET

SECRET

27 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

ATTENTION : Mr. Maurice Brady

SUBJECT : Clearance for Arthur G. VAIVADA (Ps) - PBSUCCESS

Confirming conversation on 26 April 1954 between Mr. Brady and Mr. Salerno, PBSUCCESS, it is requested that Operational Clearance No. 68, dated 19 July 1949, granted to Subject under Project BIRADIAL, now be amended and brought up to date for Subject's use on Project PBSUCCESS. In addition, it is further requested that the clearance issued be so amended as to also reflect Subject's additional duties as cutout on Project ESCROW.

for J. C. KING
CWH

SECRET

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: WH/III

NO.

DATE 12 April 1954

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. RASBERRY		12 Apr 54			
2. DOERFLINGER		Apr 20	Apr 20	D	
3. ESTERLINE		20 Apr 54		E	3. There is no conflict of interest here. PSBUCCESS is the primary interest and ESCROW is supporting PBSUCCESS. EDC
4. DAHLGREN			20 Apr	RnD	
5. FI/STC/SPB	2607 L				
6. ATT: MR. BURTON	✓				
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10 1 NOV 53 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED SECRET CONFIDENTIAL 16—61150-3 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE UNCLASSIFIED (40)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FI/STC/SPB
ATT : Mr. Burton
FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE: 12 April 1954

SUBJECT: Use of Contract Agent Anthony G. VAIVADA (P) as Cut-Out in ESCROW Project

1. The Guatemala Station has advised Headquarters that subject contract agent, who holds Provisional Operational Clearance for PBSUCCESS, is currently also being used as cut-out in the ESCROW Project.

2. Pursuant to telephone conversation this date between Mr. Burton and the WH desk officer concerned, it is requested that above reference Provisional Operational Clearance be amended to authorize the use of VAIVADA in the ESCROW project as indicated in paragraph 1 above.

J C King
J. C. KING
CWH

File

Hold for new request from Mr Salerno for use in PBSUCCESS work only

(This memo brought to attention of Mr. Burton & Mr. Brady - 26 Apr. 54)
CMH

SECRET

[illegible]

1. Mitchell Rosbery, WH Case Officer handling project ESCROW, was advised on this date that he should submit a request to STC/SPB to amend the operational clearance for agent BIRADIAL to provide for his use in project ESCROW. It should be noted that BIRADIAL is currently being used as a cut-out in this operation.

DATE: April 9, 1954 James R. Burton

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

9 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: STAFF C

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Ogden

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (pseudo)

It is requested that the proper clearance be granted for the use of subject, now on Project BIRADIAL, on Project SUCCESS. This will confirm telephone conversation between your office and WH/Personnel on 9 December 1953.

for J. C. KING
C/WH

Note: I talked to 14 Dec.
Virginia Lynch on
this and per [illegible]
that she would have John
Caroline get in touch w/ me
on this. I requested a PRQII
& that I would know
what the price was. [illegible] 16 Dec.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SECURITY INFORMATION

6 August 1953

MEMORANDUM TO: FILE

FROM: James R. Burton

SUBJECT: Project BIRADIAL

1. BIRADIAL (formerly HUMANOID) is the only agent involved in this operation at the present time. Additional agents are expected to be added at a later date.

2. The Case Officer reported that the agents other than BIRADIAL formerly used in the HUMANOID operation would be picked up by other operations in the Costa Rica area in the near future.

3. The Case Officer was instructed to report the change in BIRADIAL's cryptonym and use to STC/SPB and also the changes for the other agents when their transfer to new projects has been accomplished.

4. STC/SPB concurrence is subject to further review of operation after six months when Commo details will be known.

SECRET
SECURITY I[illegible]

SECRET

File in ~~Humanist~~ Humanoid Folder

24 September 1951

3623

Chief, WHD

THRU: Chief, STC

STC/SPB

Project HUMANOID

1. From information made available to this office it appears that details concerning the exposure of the technical surveillance of Juan Bosch and subsequent arrests were not fully determined. It is believed probable that HUMANOID has been compromised with the Costa Rican authorities.

2. It is understood that, with the exception of the HUMANIST Project, HUMANOID is to continue inactive for an undetermined period. Any further contemplated use of HUMANOID should be coordinated with STC/SPB.

3. In view of his wife's and mother-in-law's Costa Rican background and apparent connections and associations with politically significant personalities, it is recommended HUMANOID discontinue using his home to reproduce material obtained in the HUMANIST Project.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : STC/OCO

DATE: 23 February 1951

FROM : Chief, FDT

SUBJECT: HUMANOID

The following answers are keyed to your questionnaire dated 5 February 1951 concerning HUMANOID:

a. Subject is an active agent.

b. He is used substantially the same as when clearance was issued.

c. Subject has not been used in connection with projects other than originally contemplated.

d. All information on subject's personal and operational security has been submitted.

e. The operation has been considered excellent. The only test of HUMANOID's security has been the test of evaluating his information, and the evaluation of his reliability by the Chief of Station.

f. There have been no operational or other changes in the status of this agent which have affected our evaluation of this agent.

W M Wheeler Jr

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

SECRET

D

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
DISSEM BY 28 PER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT OT TIME 2140Z BY B

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, OT, C/IOA, OPSER, WH/C 8

S E C R E T 072354Z CITE JMWAVE 1869 7 Jul 66 IN 52218

PRIORITY ISOLATION INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, EGLIN

PBRUMEN KUROAR CHAPPIE RAMROD

REF A WAVE 0818 (IN 42001)

B WAVE 0746 NOT SENT EGLIN (IN 14906)

1. REQUEST TRAINING FOR SIX MAN LEADER GROUP SCHEDULED ARRIVE ISOLATION 11 JULY AS FOLLOWS: ISOTROPIC SAME GIVEN AMANCHORS LESS EMPHAIS UDT. ISOLATION STRESS LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND ROTATE LEADERSHIP ASSIGNMENTS IN FIELD EXERCISES ENCOMPASSING TRADECRAFT, CACHING, OBSERVATION AND REPORTING.ALL TRAINEES

O
CPMPLETED JMWAVE TRAINING AND HAVE OA'S AND RECENT LCFLUTTERS.

2. TRAINEES: dR 728520

AMLILAC/29 TA IGNACIO (TRAINED AT ISO/ISOT JULY 63)
AMLILAC/33 TA MANUEL (TRAINED AT ISO FEB 64) 741331
AMSKIRT/1 TA PABLO (TRAINED AT ISO JAN 65) 753409
AMHINT/56 TA FRANK (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 332676
AMTRUNK/21 TA LUIS (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) ~~3[illegible]63~~ 3[illegible]
AMLUNT/2 TA FILIPE (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 334081
AMPOLISH/1 TA SIMON (ISO/ISOT AUG 65) INTERPRETER C/O TO 285159

File 201 each

SECRET

BE ASSIGNED.

3. REQUEST AIRLIFT LEADER TEAM TO ISO NIGHT 11 JULY AND RETURN AMANCHOR GROUP ISO VAVE NIGHT 12 JULY.

SECRET

BT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE IWK/COS

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/AMLILAC
Termination of AMHINT-56

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Cancel OA and MOC

Transmitted herewith are copies of Form 2457, Agent Service Record, and Damage Report on AMHINT-56. Subject was terminated 31 December 1967 due to reduction in Special Operations assets resulting from budgetary considerations.

Irving C. Devuono
Irving C. DEVUONO

APPROVED:
WH CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
Feb. 21, 1968

Attachments:
1 - Form 2457, 2cys h/w
2 - Agent Service Record, 2cys h/w
3 - Damage Report, 2cys h/w

REVIEWED:
Special Contracting Officer

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/atts 1, 2, and 3 h/w

3 att

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
22 Jan 68

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 26 1968

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-29367

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201 - 332676
201-332676

SECRET

ATTACHMENT #1 to
UFGA- 29367

NO.

INVENTORY - NON STAFF PERSONNEL

	1	2	3	4
A	ARBITRARY NO.	SUBJECT'S 201 201-332676	OTHER FILE NO.	
B	SURNAME AMHINT-56	1ST NAME — PERSONALIA	OTHER GIVEN NAME/TELECODE	TYPE OF NAME
C	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	NATURALIZED-US *(yes or pending)*
D	COUNTRY CURRENTLY RESIDES	CITY CURRENTLY RESIDES-YEAR	MARITAL STATUS *(most recent)*	SEX *(M or F)*
E	OVERT OCCUPATION	LANGUAGE	LANGUAGE	LANGUAGE
F	MILITARY SERVICE-COUNTRY	BRANCH OF SERVICE	INCLUSIVE DATES	
G	COUNTRY AREA KNOWLEDGE	COUNTRY	COUNTRY	
H	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY *(limit to 62 spaces)*			CODE
I	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY *(limit to 62 spaces)*			CODE
J	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	TYPE EMPLOYEE TYPE A OR B	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE WIFE	FULL, PART TIME OR WAE
K	MAINTENANCE/SERVICE	CONSULTANT	PROPRIETARY OR SUBSIDY	CAREER AGENT
L	FIELD AGENT	HQS. FF OR USF	INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR	MOC/MOA
M	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	POA — STATUS	STAFF CLEARANCE	CSA/PCSA
N	HQS COMPONENT RESPONSIBLE	FIELD STATION RESPONSIBLE	PROJECT	COVER
O	ENTRY ON DUTY DATE	YEARLY SALARY	DATE LAST PAY CHANGE	
P	PART OF A RETIREMENT PLAN - SPECIFY *(limit to 62 spaces)*			
Q	DATE TERMINATED 31 December 1967	REEMPLOYABLE Yes	STAFF CEILING SPACE	
R	REMARKS *(re: termination, etc.) (limit to 62 spaces)* Terminated due to budgetary considerations			ATTITUDE Good

FORM 4-65 2457

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(9-51)

Att 1 UFGA- 29367

CS COPY

201-332676

SECRET

ATTACHMENT #2 to
UFGA-29367

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. Agent's cryptonym or pseudonym: AMHINT-56
2. Project identification: AMLILAC Group
3. Agent recruited by: AMLITAINT-1
4. Capacity in which agent served: Small boat operator
5. Rate of pay: Monthly--$300—
6. Other Commitments: None
7. Agent dismissed by: AMLITAINT-1
8. Reason for dismissal: Reduction of assets/Subject was on INACTIVE STATUS/AMLILAC Reserve Force since 1 September 1966
9. Security risks: None
10. Is agent recommended for re-use: Yes
11. Manner of dismissal: Verbal friendly
12. Letter of termination signed: No

SECRET

CS COPY

Att 2 UFGA-29367

201-332676

SECRET

ATTACHMENT #3 to
UFGA- 29367

DAMAGE REPORT

NAME: AMHINT-56

Last date SGSWIRLED 31 March 1966

Safehouse and Training Areas Exposed and Cover Companies Exposed

Safe Sites 177, 255, 342, 206, 259, 164, 343
Maritime 181, 276
Training 184, 211, 313

The unknown location and identification of ISOLATION, ISOTROPIC
Ft. Stewart, Camp McCall, and AMDOT

Indigenous Agent Personnel Exposed

AMLILAC Group Members
AMANCHOR Group Members
HERMES Team Members
AMNUBA-1, 2, 3, and 4

WOFIRM Personnel Exposed

Stanley R. ZAMKA/Dr. Miranda
Emory D. PREMSELAR/Bill
Aubrey K. PAUKERT/Jerry
Paul D. DECRUCCIO/Ed
Hugh R. DENDY/George
Ronald C. HIRSCHTICK/Jeff
Clayton B. FARSHTY/Frank
Reuben A. HANNULA/Fred
Paul V. MENDICINO/Ted
Aubrey R. PARANT/Randy
Alton T. PIRNACK/Larry
Stewart V. KAPRIDNO/Dewey
Irving N. PEGGINS/Joe
John K. TARTARILLO/John
Irving C. DEVUONO/Lee
Paul H. KUBIAK/Rene
Kurt C. MAKRICKAS/Ed
Ewan K. SCHWAMBORN/Bob
Philip D. GLAVASCO/Rudy
Peter V. BOAROTTI/John
Oliver D. CIMOCK/Ralph
Henry W. DORISTOOK/Frank
ISOLATION Staff by Nicknames
AMDOT Staff by Nicknames
Louis F. THURLAND/John
John K. GARZYNSKI/Roy
Clayton D. HEIPPERT/Don
Grover P. LYTHCOTT/Chip
Felix R. TITTLEY/Jack
Bernard F. KARPOVICH/Tom
Keith N. PATTAKOS/Juan
Maurice A. POYNTZ/Ted
Harold V. KARABLY/Jack
Nigel P. YASUINAS/Marty
John H. HEMMING/George

Indigenous Instructors Exposed

AMSHAM-1/Joe
AMSHRUG-1/true name
AMHINT-18/Jorge
AMHINT-19/true name
AMTERRY-1/true name
AMSKILL-1/Jose
AMSWING-1/Charlie
AMJILT-1/Jose

SECRET

Operational Areas Exposed

YUMA
CUSPIDOR
ROOT
CUDGEL
ALICE
ENOCH
JEANINE
ESSAYONS
IDA
ZORRO
BOWSER
CAUTION
CLOAK
CANE
GLADYS
PYRO
CUBIC
DINGLE
JASON
PRY
HUBBARD
SNOOP

Loading Sites and Vessels Exposed

Naples
Safesite 184

M/V PETREL
M/V EXPLORER II
M/V ROINA
O/V GULL
O/V SPRAY
O/V SATURN

And Crews

AIRCRAFT: PBY

Internal Assets Exposed

None.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ATTACHMENT #2

TRAINING REPORT

TEAM/GROUP: PBRUMEN II
(211 hours, full-time)

11 July - 13 August 1966
(Date)

Student: FRANK

Rit/56

COURSE OBJECTIVE AND CONTENT

This course is designed to train indigenous personnel in paramilitary resistance activities and intelligence collection operations in denied areas. Approximately 70% of the student's time is devoted to practical work and field exercises and 30% to the theoretical aspects essential for a logical understanding and application of training covered during the course.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

* U - Unsatisfactory	Performance is so low in relation to requirements of the work as to be unequivocally below minimum standards.
W - Weak	Achieved minimum standards, but less than adequate (in terms of indigenous personnel participating in the program).
A - Adequate	Has achieved the basic level required. Satisfactory, characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	More than satisfactory. Has acquired a solid beginner's proficiency. This rating may be interpreted as representing "average" on our rating scale.
S - Strong	Exceptional proficiency, characterized by thoroughness, initiative, originality, and an exceptional student understanding and application of paramilitary resistance activities.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of other students doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

* Modification of the Office of Training standard rating scale at the specific request of JMWAVE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

FRANK

S-E-C-R-E-T

		HOURS	RATING
1.	MAP READING (ABILITY TO REPORT LOCATIONS USING GRID COORDINATES)	12	P
2.	NAUTICAL CHARTS	8	P
3.	WEAPONRY (U.S. & FOREIGN)	31	P
4.	CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT	-	-
5.	RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS	20	P
6.	AMBUSH TACTICS AND OPERATIONS	24	S
7.	RAID TACTICS AND OPERATIONS	24	P
8.	CACHING	20	P
9.	CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT LINES (E&E)	-	-
10.	OBSERVATION AND REPORTING TECHNIQUES	40	S
11.	LEADERSHIP TRAITS AND CAPABILITY	See Comments	
12.	OPERATIONAL PLANNING ABILITY	See Comments	
13.	SKETCHING	12	A
14.	SABOTAGE (SEE ATTACHED STB REPORT)	-	-
15.	TARGET PHOTOGRAPHY	-	-
16.	AIR RECEPTION ACTIVITIES	20	P
17.	WEAPONS QUALIFICATION (TEST RESULTS ATTACHED) Pistol	Non-Applicable	
	Rifle	Sharpshooter	
	SMG	Sharpshooter	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE

RATING LETTER

P

Rating takes into account trainee's effectiveness, such as performance in operational skills, tactics, techniques, leadership, planning, teamwork, motivation and limitations.

S-E-C-R-E-T

The ratings above, and narrative comments hereunder, are derived from a synthesis of all evaluations submitted on each respective trainee by the instructor staff.

Overall performance ratings of all students in this class were as follows:

WEAK 0 ADEQUATE 0 PROFICIENT 6 STRONG 0 OUTSTANDING 0

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Over-all, FRANK was the most conscientious and hardest working student in his class. His serious attitude and fine performance warranted a highly proficient rating.

In preparation of plans, completion of written exercises, and execution of field problems, he demonstrated a high level of achievement.

During the Ambush Exercise, FRANK had a leadership role during which he adhered to a detailed plan, exerted good control over the team, and produced a very successful ambush operation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

PREPARED BY:

Jerome W. Greiner
JEROME W. GREINER
Project Officer

APPROVED AND FORWARDED:

Joseph M Hudacek
JOSEPH M. HUDACEK
Chief Instructor

8/30/66
Date

FRANK - Frank was the hardest working student of the group. He consistently applied himself to all phases of the training with equal and great diligence. However, his practical work, which took him a great deal of time to perform, was always a little sloppy. When Frank crimped detonators or threw improvised grenades, he was very shaky. However, he did not seem at all nervous about working with other hazardous material. He asked many pertinent questions which contributed to the group's training and always answered test questions correctly and in detail. He was cooperative and reacted well to correction. Some supervision was required since the staff instructors were concerned about his nervousness with detonators. His overall performance was rated as proficient.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational/AMLILAC
O Amended MOC for Subject 201-332676

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : A. UFGA 18946, 9 December 1964
B. UFGA 17818, 25 September 1964

Transmitted herewith for Headquarters information and files are three copies of an amended Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Subject 201-332676. This amendment is submitted due to a raise in Subject's salary.

Hilda K.
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachments:
A. 3 cys, MOC H/W
B. 3 cys, IDEN U/S/C

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee w/atts

[illegible]

201-332676

CS COPY

2 attch

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED 14 Jan 65

DATE DISPATCHED JAN 18 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-19442

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER ♦ 201-332676

TO : Chief, Special Affairs Staff

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Engagement of IDENTITY A 201-332676

1. Term and Project Charge. The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under TYPIC and is to be charged against PM cost center. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 January 1965 and it shall continue until termination by either party upon fifteen days actual notice.

2. Security Approval. The appropriate security approval, to utilize subject as requested, has been obtained. OA requested per UFGA-17555, 3 September 1964.

3. Citizenship. The Subject is a foreign national and, was born on 6 May 1939 at Pinar del Rio, Cuba and resides at IDENTITY B.

4. Compensation. Commencing on the effective date of this agreement, Subject will be paid compensation at the rate of $ 244.67 per month. Such payments to be made following completion of satisfactory service.

5. Taxes. Subject will/~~will not~~ be obligated to pay U.S. income tax. Taxes will/~~will not~~ be deducted from the above stated paid compensation. Subject is/~~is not~~ eligible for Social Security. # IDENTITY C. Subject is married and has a total of 3 dependents other than himself. Subject's dependents are/~~are not~~ residing in the U.S., U.S. possessions, Canada, Mexico, the Canal Zone, or the Republic of Panama.

6. Quarters and/or Subsistence. The Subject ~~will~~/will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence.

7. Operational Expenses. When properly authorized, Subject will be reimbursed for:

a. Operational travel including mileage claims for official use of his personal automobile.

b. Operational hotel expenses, meals, telephone calls, etc.

8. Other Commitments.

a. In case of capture, 50% salary until released or for two years, whichever is less.

b. In case of death, four months salary to dependents.

c. In case of wounds, medical care.

d. With prior approval of CCS, a bonus may be authorized for outstanding performance in the line of duty. The amount of the bonus will be commensurate with the risks taken and results which were achieved but will not exceed $100 per single bonus payment.

9. Contingent Obligations. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

JAN 15 1965

SIGNED: Frederick J. Ingham
Field Contracting Officer

REVIEWED: Charles J. Francis
Contract Approving Officer

REVIEWED:
Special Contracting Officer

S E C R E T

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:
UFGA-19442, 14 JANUARY 1965

IDENTITY A: Juan F. BLANCO Fernandez

IDENTITY B: 6831 SW 6 Street, Miami, Florida

IDENTITY C: 265-74-1626

FEB 16 13 49 '65

SECRET

S/C attach #2
UFGA-19442

201-332676

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational
MOC Amendment for Subject of 201-332676

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Please Record Amendment

References : A. UFGA-17702, dtd 11 Sept 1964
(AMLILAC Progress Report)

B. UFGA-17558, dtd 2 Sept 1964
(MOC)

1. Transmitted herewith are three (3) copies of an amended MOC for Subject. This amendment has been written to provide Subject a raise in salary from $150.00 net per month to $200.00 net.

2. Subject now has a total of three dependents other than himself as is stated in the attached MOC amendment.

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN AC 29Sep64

Attachments:
Amended MOC - H/W
IDEN Sheet - USC

Distribution:
3 - Addressee w/atts.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

DATE TYPED
21 Sept 64

DATE DISPATCHED
SEP 25 1964

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-17818

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-332676
201-332676

GROUP
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

LCCC

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

TO : Chief, Special Affairs Staff

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Engagement of IDEN A 201-332676

1. Term and Project Charge. The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under TYPIC and is to be charged against FM cost center. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 September 1964 and it shall continue until terminated by either party upon fifteen days actual notice.

2. Security Approval. The appropriate security approval to utilize Subject as requested has been obtained. POA reinstated 26 June 1964 per UFGW-3997 dtd 8 July 1964.

3. Citizenship. The Subject is a foreign national and was born on 6 May 1939 at Pinar del Rio, Cuba and resides at IDEN B.

4. Compensation. Commencing on the effective date of this agreement, Subject will be paid compensation at the rate of $ 207.52 per month. Such payments to be made following completion of satisfactory service.

5. Taxes. Subject will/xxxxxxxx be obligated to pay U.S. income tax. Taxes will/xxxxxxxx be deducted from the above stated paid compensation. Subject is/xxxxxx eligible for Social Security. # IDEN C. Subject is married and has a total of 3 dependents other than himself. Subject's dependents are/are xxx residing in the U.S., U.S. possessions, Canada, Mexico, the Canal Zone, or the Republic of Panama.

6. Quarters and/or Subsistence. The Subject xxxx/will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence.

7. Operational Expenses. When properly authorized, Subject will be reimbursed for:

a. Operational travel including mileage claims for official use of his personal automobile.

b. Operational hotel expenses, meals, telephone calls, etc.

8. Other Commitments. Bonus. With prior approval of the Chief of Station a bonus may be authorized for outstanding performance in the line of duty. The amount of the bonus will be commensurate with the risks taken and the results which were achieved; amount not to exceed $100.00 per any single bonus payment In the event of Subject's death in the line of duty, an amount not to exceed $5,000.00 will be paid to Subject's estate.

9. Contingent Obligations. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

SIGNED: Frederick J.
Field Contracting Officer

REVIEWED: Joseph L Durand
Contract Approving Officer

REVIEWED: Joseph
Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

CS COPY

att to UFGA 17818

01-33266

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
TO UFGA-17818

IDEN Sheet

IDEN A - Juan Francisco BLANCO Fernandez

IDEN B - 6831 SW 6th Street
Miami - Florida

IDEN C - SS# 265 - 74 - 1626

CS COPY

SECRET

SCA to UFGA 17818

201-332676

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE H

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational/AMLILAC
Transmittal of Memorandum of Oral Commitment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : None.

Transmitted herewith for Headquarters information and files are three copies of a Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Subject, 201-332676. H-5C

Andrew K. Reuteman for
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachment:
3 cys, MOC H/W
3 cys, IDENS U/~~S/C~~
SCA att'd

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee w/att A

201-332676

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2 atts

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
RS COPY

DATE TYPED 25 Aug 64	DATE DISPATCHED SEP 2 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-17558	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-332676	

TO : Chief, Special Affairs Staff

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Engagement of Identity A 201-332676

1. Term and Project Charge. The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under TYPIC and is to be charged against EH cost center. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 August 1964 and it shall continue until termination by either party upon fifteen days actual notice.

2. Security Approval. The appropriate security approval, to utilize subject as requested, has been obtained. POA reinstated 26 June 1964 per UFGW 3997.

3. Citizenship. The Subject is a foreign national and was born on 6 May 1939 at Pinar del Rio, Cuba and resides at Identity B.

4. Compensation. Commencing on the effective date of this agreement, Subject will be paid compensation at the rate of $ 163.01 per month. Such payments to be made following completion of satisfactory service.

5. Taxes. Subject will/xxxxxxxx be obligated to pay U.S. income tax. Taxes will/xxxxxxxx be deducted from the above stated paid compensation. Subject is/xxxxxx eligible for Social Security. # Identity C . Subject is single and has a total of 2 dependents other than himself. Subject's dependents are/xxxxxxx residing in the U.S., U.S. possessions, Canada, Mexico, the Canal Zone, or the Republic of Panama.

6. Quarters and/or Subsistence. The Subject xxxx/will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence.

7. Operational Expenses. When properly authorized, Subject will be reimbursed for:

a. Operational travel including mileage claims for official use of his personal automobile.

b. Operational hotel expenses, meals, telephone calls, etc.

8. Other Commitments.

a. In case of capture, 50% salary until released or for two years, whichever is less.

b. In case of death, four months salary to dependents.

c. In case of wounds, medical care.

d. With prior approval of COS, a bonus may be authorized for outstanding performance in the line of duty. The amount of the bonus will be commensurate with the risks taken and results which were achieved but will not exceed $100 per single bonus payment.

9. Contingent Obligations. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

SIGNED: Field Contracting Officer

REVIEWED: Contract Approving Officer

REVIEWED:

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

att #1 to UFGA.17558

201-332

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:
UFGA-17558, 25 August 1964

IDENTITY A: Juan F. BLANCO Hernandez

IDENTITY B: 6831 SW 6 Street, Miami, Florida

IDENTITY C: SS #265-74-1626

SECRET

SCA
att#2 to UFGA 17558

CS COPY

201-332676

WW

ORIG : W. WAINWRIGHT:tw
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 18 JUNE 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

MMCASH

12-62

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : ROME

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, S/C

19 JUN 63 15 57z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 48198

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: DIR 44488 (IN 55801)

1. REQUEST SMITHAM ASK AMWHIP FOR DATE HE SENT LETTER TO "THOMPSON'S FRIEND" IN PBRUMEN. ALSO REMIND HIM TO SAVE COPY OF LETTER FOR THOMPSON. IF AMWHIP AGREEABLE, OFFER SEND COPY TO THOMPSON VIA "SECURE CHANNELS". WW

2. FYI, LETTER IS ACTIVATION EFFORT TO RELUCTANT DRAGON AGENT NOW PBRUMEN, WHO MET PARIS BY THOMPSON AND WALLACE A. GROWERY LAST SUMMER. AGENT IS GOOD FRIEND AMWHIP WHO WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN ARRANGING CONTACT.

END OF MESSAGE

WE/4/S. Munger SM

WE/5

Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

18-14

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM TYNG
AC/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-252234

SECRET

DATE 21 January 1963

PREPARATION OF OUTGOING SW MESSAGES

TO: Bill Wainwright TFW/FI
(Field Units Use Pseudo) (Div. or Branch)

FROM: TSD/SWB
(Field Units Use Pseudo)

Transmitted herewith is an Outgoing SW Message prepared for:

AMLASH/1
(Cryptonym of Agent)

Message No.: #1

This message is located:

On the side of the paper that has the penciled "X" mark.

It is suggested that the cover letter be placed:

On the reverse side and at right angles to the penciled "X" side.

Make sure the penciled "X" is removed before mailing

William J. Murphy
(Field Units sign in Pseudo)

Form 60-1 (OUT) SECRET

MSJ 1. QUERIDO AMIGO. TU MSJ 1 CLARO PERO NO INCLUISTE DIRECCION SEGURA DE REMITENTE COMO PROMETISTE A JAIME EN PARIS. NO TE PREOCUPES DEL REMITENTE DE ESTA CARTA YA QUE NO ES CUBANO Y SE TRAJO LA CARTA A CUBA DE DONDE LA ENVIO DE UNA MANERA SEGURA. NECESITAS ALGO O TE PUEDO SERVIR EN ALGO? AVISAME ACERCA TU PRESENTE POSICION Y POSIBILIDAD DE REGRESAR AL SERVICIO MILITAR. SI NO REGRESARAS CUALES SON TUS FUTUROS PLANES? TODAVIA ESTAS EN HOSPITAL FAJARDO? POR FAVOR DAME INFORMACION CON MAS AMPLIOS DETALLES INCLUYENDO CUANDO OCURRIO, DONDE, CUANTO Y COMO Y DE QUIEN FUE OBTENIDA INFORMACION ETC. POR EJEMPLO EN MSJ 1 EN INFORME SOBRE CAMPO ENTRENAMIENTO DE GUERRILLAS DEBIAS HABER DADO NOMBRE, LOCALIDAD DE LA FINCA, POR EJEMPLO TERMINO MUNICIPAL, CAMINO O CAMINOS DONDE ESTA SITUADA, DISTANCIA DEL CAMINO Y PUEBLO MAS CERCANO, DE QUIEN Y COMO SE OBTUVO ESTA INFORMACION. PUEDES VENIR A MEXICO PARA UNA REUNION EN LOS PROXIMOS MESES? SI NO, QUIZAS OTRO PAIS QUE TU DESEES? TAMBIEN SELECCIONA E INFORMA EN DETALLE SOBRE LOS TRES ESCONDITES DISCUTIDOS EN PARIS. DOS PARA CARTAS Y UNO PARA PAQUETES PEQUENOS. POR FAVOR INFORMAME SOBRE LO SIGUIENTE LO ANTES POSIBLE: TIENEN LOS SOVIETICOS SUS PROPIAS CLINICAS MEDICAS EN CUBA? PUEDES CONFIRMAR RECIENTES INFORMES QUE GRAN NUMERO DE SOVIETICOS SE HAN ENFERMADO EN PROPORCIONES EPIDEMICAS? QUE FUE LA ENFERMEDAD? DONDE FUERON HOSPITALIZADOS? CUANTAS PERSONAS ESTUVIERON ENFERMAS? ERAN CIVILES, MILITARES O AMBOS? DONDE OCURRIO EPIDEMIA? PUEDES CONFIRMAR LLEGADA DE ENVIOS DE CARNE MALA PROCEDENTE DE LA UNION SOVIETICA? SI ESTO ES VERDAD QUE CAUSO QUE SE ECHARA A PERDER? CUANTA CARNE MALA HABIA? SOBRE ESTO TAMBIEN HAY INFORMES QUE MUCHO GANADO EN CUBA ESTA INFECTADO EN PROPORCIONES EPIDEMICAS CON FIEBRE AFTOSA REQUIRIENDO SU DESTRUCCION. SI ES VERDAD, DAME DETALLES INCLUYENDO EL NUMERO DE GANADO INFECTADO, ORIGEN DE ENFERMEDAD, AREAS DONDE SE HAN REGISTRADO INFECCIONES, MEDIDAS TOMADAS PARA CONTROLAR ENFERMEDAD. SE ESTA CONTROLANDO

ENFERMEDAD EFECTIVAMENTE? HAY ALGUNA INDICACION QUE CARNE INFECTADA SE ESTA VENDIENDO AL PUBLICO? POR FAVOR RECUERDA CONTESTAR ESTA CARTA LO ANTES POSIBLE, INCLUYE CONTESTACIONES A TANTAS PREGUNTAS COMO SEA POSIBLE. MAS IMPORTANTE QUE ESTO ES TENER UNA DIRECCION A LA QUE PODAMOS ESCRIBIRTE Y DETALLES SOBRE ESCONDITES Y TUS FUTUROS PLANES. SI POR CUALQUIER RAZON NO DESEAS O NO PUEDES MANTENER CONTACTO REGULAR CONMIGO PARA AYUDAR EN NUESTROS ESFUERZOS PARA UNA LIBRE CUBA, O SI NO DESEAS TRABAJAR MAS CONMIGO, POR FAVOR AVISAME DE ESTO TAMBIEN Y YO CONSIDERARE NUESTRO ENLACE POR TERMINADO. ME GUSTARIA CONTINUAR TRABAJANDO CONTIGO PERO TENGO QUE RECORDARTE QUE SE REQUIERE REPORTAJE Y CORRESPONDENCIA FRECUENTE Y CONTINUA EN ORDEN DE OBTENER LA MAXIMA VENTAJA PARA LLEGAR A CUMPLIR NUESTROS OBJETIVOS MUTUOS. SALUDES Y UN ABRAZO DE TU AMIGO. JAIME. FIN.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid PCK

SUBJECT
[redacted] debriefing Center
Cuban Medical Personalities, Pro and Anti-Castro

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
JUN 3 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

References: A. MADRID 0937 IN 68562
B. WH/MIAMI 7277 IN 68752
C. DIRECTOR 029809

1. The following was prepared by [redacted] staff employee

2. The information below was acquired through interrogation of CC-4276, Mario Enrique Eugenio MARTINEZ Delgado, M.D., a Cuban refugee and former resident of Havana City who left Cuba on 22 December 1969. Subsource is a medical doctor who was employed at Havana Psychiatric Hospital (Mazorra) from 1959 to December 1969.

201-022396

a. /Dr/ Jose Angel *BUSTAMANTE O'Leary (201-022396), Psychiatrist, studied medicine at Havana University in the same class as subsource's father-in-law, Dr. Enrique CASUSO Casuso, M.D., employed as an orthopedic surgeon at the Havana Psychiatric Hospital. According to subsource's father-in-law, Subject was very active politically during his university studies; he belonged to the Student Left Wing (Ala Izquierda Estudiantil) at Havana University, which organization followed PSP directives. When Subject had completed his medical studies, he directed his political activities at the National Medical College and controlled the College for several years prior to 1959, during which years he was able to select the presidents of the College.

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WHD
- 2 - C/EUR
- 2 - COS, WH/Miami

....continued

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA - 26227	20 May 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-
201-022396	S E C R E T	65-6-38/4

b. Subject is President or Director of the Neurophysiology Institute (formerly Higher Nervous Activity Institute), Academy of Sciences; subsource thinks that Subject is also Professor of Medical Psychology at Havana University. Subject is a very well trained psychiatrist and has always enjoyed great prestige as such; nevertheless, he has always been reputed to have very low morals, and in medical circles is "famous" as a woman chaser. He is widely reputed to attempt to seduce his female patients and his colleagues' wives. Major Bernabe ORDAZ, Director of Havana Psychiatric Hospital, considers Subject to be a vulgar political schemer utterly lacking in personal prestige among Cuban "new" Communists; Ordaz has stated that he considers that Subject wants to control Cuban psychiatric practice for his own personal benefit.

c. When Castro took power, Subject surprisingly abandoned the Immediate Action medical doctors' party and joined the recently organized Revolutionary Medical Party; Ordaz did not join this party until 1960. In medical circles, Subject is reputed to collaborate with the DSE in brain-washing activities, but subsource had never seen any direct indications of such collaboration.

F ccc:

d. Dr. Armando *DE CORDOVA, Psychiatrist, employed as a professor at Havana University, is a good psychiatrist about 70 years old who has always been a leftist but is not the type of immoral person that Bustamante is. De Cordoba and Bustamante travel together to almost all the psychiatric congresses held abroad; according to Major Bernabe Ordaz, the two of them would like to take over the Havana Psychiatric Hospital, and base their desire on the fact that Ordaz is not a psychiatrist. In subsource's opinion, they will never be successful in replacing Ordaz, because Ordaz enjoys the backing of both Fidel Castro and Celia Sanchez, who are good friends of his.

e. Subsource has known a Dr. Edmundo GUTIERREZ Agramonte, Psychiatrist, since 1959; Gutierrez is Director of the magazine of Havana Psychiatric Hospital and attends psychiatric congresses held abroad. He is a competent psychiatrist and has an office located on Calle 23, corner of Calle 18, Vedado, Havana City. In subsource's opinion, he is antiregime although he speaks in favor of the regime when with proregime persons, and against the regime when with antiregime persons. He does not belong to the PCC cell at the hospital and is not a militiaman. In an assembly held at the hospital in 1969 with the express purpose of increasing the number of members of the PCC cell, no one proposed Gutierrez as a possible aspirant. Gutierrez is about 50 years old and was married about February 1969

f. Dr. MIGNAGARAY, whose first name subsource thinks is Ruben, worked at Havana Psychiatric Hospital (formerly Mazorra) prior to 1959. He is proregime but not an extremist, and does not appear to be "willing to die for the regime". Mignagaray was proposed as an aspirant to the PCC cell at the Hospital, in an assembly held in 1969, but stated that he had a defect consisting in the fact that he was in love. Subsource did not know whether he was accepted as an aspirant. In mid-December 1969, Dr. Cristino Cabello, employed as a psychiatrist at Havana Psychiatric Hospital, told subsource that Mignagaray had told him that he (Cabello) would have to take over Mignagaray's ward because he was going abroad to attend a psychiatric congress; subsource could give no further information on the congress or Mignagaray's date of departure. Mignagaray is described as a light-skinned mulatto, about 5'9" tall, weight about 160 pounds, 60-65 years old, brown eyes, greying hair, married; subsource thought he had three children.

g. Dr. Lino Bernabe FERNANDEZ Martinez, Psychiatrist, joined the anti-Castro counterrevolutionary forces in the Escambray mountains a few months before the Playa Giron invasion; he was arrested shortly before said invasion and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Subsource had met him when both were students at Belen High School; their friendship continued at Havana University, when both were members of the Havana University Catholic Group, and later as members of the Movement for the Recuperation of the Revolution (MRR). Subsource took leave of Fernandez the day that the latter joined the anti-Castro counterrevolutionaries, and never saw him again. When subsource visited his brother-in-law, Enrique Casuso, held first on the Isle of Pines, then at La Cabana and later at the Guanajay Jail, he habitually asked for news of Dr. Fernandez; the information he received made him believe that Fernandez is one of the most respected prisoners because of his bravery and equilibrium. Fernandez was mentioned as an example of integrity. Other prisoners such as Dr. Andres CAO, Juan BUSTAMANTE, and Antonio GARCIA told subsource that Fernandez' attitude had not varied. Fernandez' wife, Emilia LUZARRAGA, who frequently visited subsource professionally (subsource was her psychiatrist), also told subsource that Fernandez' attitude was firmly antiregime; Luzarraga is also antiregime.

h. Vicky ANDRIAL, a friend of Emilia Luzarraga's who sometimes accompanied her on her visits to subsource, is married to Dr. Armando ZALDIVAR Pita, M.D., aka "Manduco", who is incarcerated at the Guanajay Jail. Subsource thought that he had been in jail since before the Playa Giron invasion; he had belonged to both the Havana University Catholic Group and the MRR. Subsource's brother-in-law, Enrique Casuso, and Vicky Andrial both told subsource that Dr. Zaldivar continued to be unyielding in his antiregime attitude.

i. Vicky Andrial lives in Miramar, Havana, with Iliana ARANGO, the wife of Rino PUIG, imprisoned at La Cabana since 1961; subsource did not know the length of Puig's sentence but did know that he had refused to accept "rehabilitation". Andrial works at the Canadian Embassy in Havana. Arango also works at an embassy in Havana, but subsource did not know which. Both Andrial and Arango are anti-regime and teach the catechism to children at Reina Church, Havana City.

3. Further questions on members of MARTINEZ' wife's family, per References B and C, are being asked and answers will be forwarded when available.

[redacted]

staff employee

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID
[redacted] VAL
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

EH-129
GA 50
TUBE GT-7

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION I ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

D [illegible]

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. C/WH C/SA		30 MAR 1970			1-2 [illegible]
2.					
3. [illegible]/COG			3 APR 1970		1-3: Interesting! [illegible] many [illegible] involved [illegible] ?
4.					
5.					
6. [illegible]/IB/S				[redacted]	
7.					
8. [redacted]					
9.					
10.					
11.					[illegible]
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					
16.					
17. RID/FI					

FILE TITLE

SPACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT X INDEX	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)	201-0?2376
		DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief of Station, WH/Miami
DO Base/Chicago; Chief, DO

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: [redacted] (Briefing Center) Cuban Doctor Possibly Involved with Ransom Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Debriefing Center

1. For your information and possible investigation, [redacted] debriefing of Jose Francisco BOTET Carrion, DPOB: 14 April 1938, Havana, Cuba, engineering technician who arrived as a refugee in Spain on 30 January 1970, produced the following story:

> During the first two weeks of January 1970, Source's father, Jose F. BOTET who still is in Cuba, told him that he had met in Havana a Dr. MOLINA who was a physician who has been residing in Chicago, Illinois for the past 20 years. MOLINA told Source's father that he had come to Cuba to see the psychiatrist BUSTAMANTE (Jose BUSTAMANTE O'Leary, 201-022396 ?) who Havana rumors said has been involved in helping, some way or other, Cuban political prisoners in La Cabana. BOTET's father recalled that MOLINA had a brother who was just finishing a prison term (he supposed for counterrevolutionary activities) and guessed that MOLINA's visit was related to this fact. MOLINA would not confirm this, nor did he reveal what means he used to enter Cuba. At the time of Source's departure, 29 April 1970, MOLINA was still in Havana. Unfortunately, Source could not recall MOLINA's full name, but remembers having seen him briefly in New York in 1961. MOLINA is age 63/64, white, 5'8" tall, 170 lbs.

2. In view of the growing number of cases involving attempts to ransom Cuban political prisoners, it may be that MOLINA is playing an active role in the release of his brother and possibly others. If the BUSTAMANTE concerned is BUSTAMANTE O'Leary, the trusted headshrinker of the regime, then this report may indicate that he is cooperating, with or without regime knowledge, in obtaining the release of certain political prisoners.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - COS, WH/Miami
2 - DO/Base, Chicago
2 - C/DO

[redacted]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
OSMA - 26188	24 April 1970
CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
SECRET	19-6-136/3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 35/21 PER ______ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

[redacted]

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 066

S E C R E T 211957Z OCT 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5551 [redacted] ACTING)

WIKLIN

MADRID, MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR
TYPIC

REF: OSMA-2559 (NOT FORWARDED MEXICO CITY)

21 Oct 69 IN 70170

1. REF BACKGROUND INFO ON AND ASSESSMENT OF SUBJ OF 201-22396 MOST INTERESTING. SINCE THIS, COUPLED WITH PAST INFO DEVELOPED ON SUBJ, WOULD APPEAR MAKE HIM INTERESTING RECRUITMENT CANDIDATE, SUGGEST HE BE WATCHLISTED BY ADDRESSEES. NOTICE FROM MADRID-9144 (IN 13730) SUBJ TRAVELLED TO MADRID AS LATE AS JULY 1969.

2. FOR MEXICO: REF ASSESSMENT OF SUBJ, PROVIDED BY COLLEAGUE WHO LEFT CUBA MARCH 1969, SAID SUBJ "WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT OFFER AND WOULD TAKE BAIT IF GIVEN HALF CHANCE." DOES [redacted] STILL ACT AS MAIL CHANNEL FOR SUBJ AS PER MEXICO CITY-3806? (IN 12763) (DEC. '67)

3. FILE: 201-22396.

S E C R E T

CS COPY

SECRET

21 Oct 69

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

VRW

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

1/196[illegible]

MICROFILMED
OCT 17 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Don't [illegible] have a [illegible] voice [illegible] rue.

— All yours [redacted]

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1 C/WH/C	[illegible]	[illegible]		S
2 [redacted]				[illegible]
3 [redacted]		21 Oct		[illegible]
4. [redacted]				P
6.				
7 WH/SAO	[redacted]		31/10/58	
8.				
9				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13				
14.				
15				
16.				
17 RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201 - [illegible]2396

DOCUMENT NUMBER

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO: Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami UFA

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid VW

SUBJECT: [redacted]/Operational - Information on Dr. ~~Jose BUSTAMENTE~~ O'Leary, Psychiatrist (201-022396)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
OCT 17 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Reference: DIRECTOR 27502

1. The following was prepared by [redacted]

2. The information below was acquired through [redacted] interrogation of CC-4033, Dr. Hector WILTZ Lancis, a Cuban refugee and former resident of Nuevo Vedado, Habana, who left Cuba on 19 March 1969 and has been a professional colleague of Subject for many years.

a. Dr. Jose *BUSTAMENTE O'Leary, psychiatrist, was brought up by his aunts; he does not know the identity of his mother. He, together with Raul Roa, Justo Carrillo, and others, comes from the ranks of the left wing of the student movement: he joined the Communist Party of Cuba in 1938 and, in 1944, supported presidential candidate Dr. Carlos Saladrigas in the presidential elections held that year. When Dr. Grau was elected President, Subject concentrated on his professional activities, earning considerable prestige and acquiring a good practice, while maintaining his political relationships with senators, colonos, etc. In 1952, the year of the coup d'etat, Dr. Bustamente had such friendly relations with both presidential candidates that, if the general elections scheduled for June 1952 had been held, Subject would have been made (a) Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations if Dr. Agramonte had been elected, and (b) Minister without cartera (portfolio) if Dr. Hevia had been elected.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
P 17-1-134	OSMA 25559	13 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
65-6-38/4	S E C R E T	201-022396

b. After the 10 March 1952 coup d'etat, Subject opposed the de facto government in spite of his close relations with Dr. MORALES del Castillo, who offered Subject the post of Consulting Counsellor (Consejero Consultivo) which post Subject rejected. Subject began to conspire against the regime with Justo Carrillo and Dr. Araujo, constituting the organization called the Montecristi Group. Subject continues to maintain a close relationship with Dr. Araujo, now President of the Cuban Medical College, Professor of the School of Medical Sciences of Havana University, and functionary of the Higher Nervous Activity Research Institute.

c. After the 1 January 1959 Revolution, Subject hastened to exploit the Communist content of the Revolution and participated directly in the denunciation of Dr. Urrutia. One of Urrutia's assistants was Subject's patient and informed Subject of events occurring within the Presidential Palace. Subject then consulted with Raul Castro and denounced Dr. Urrutia as anti-Communist.

d. Subject is very intelligent, very competent, and an extraordinarily hard worker. He is Professor of Psychology at the Havana University Medical School, and Director of the Higher Nervous Activity Research Institute. During the decade 1950-60, he held a high post within the Cuban Medical College and was President of the World Medical Group; during this decade he made many visits to the USA on matters related to his professional activities.

e. It has been commented that Subject performed "brain washing" activities for the Havana DSE. During the period in 1966 that subsource was held prisoner at Villa Marista, he did not see Subject; subsource has never heard anyone state that he actually saw Subject at Villa Marista. In subsource's opinion, if Subject has ever worked for the MININT, it was probably as professor of psychology in classes given to MININT personnel; subsource presumes that the classes would have been similar to those that Subject gave to Cuban artists.

f. In 1956, Subject acquired an extraordinarily beautiful mistress that he still continues to visit and support. This mistress, Manolita Canto, was divorced by her husband, Salup (fnu), after a private detective hired by the husband surprised Subject and Canto in a hotel room in Miami, Florida; subsequently, U.S. immigration authorities prohibited Subject from entering the U.S.A. Canto had had one son by her husband; when her husband died, the son inherited the father's wealth, which was considerable. The laws against private property promulgated by the Castro regime undermined Canto's economic position to the point that she has had to go to work; she now works at the INIT (National Tourist Industry Institute), located at 23 and L Streets, Vedado, Havana City.

Subject surrendered his private practice to the Cuban Government, and receives only his salary as Director of the Higher Nervous Activity Research Institute, which salary amounts to 800 Cuban pesos; this salary is insufficient to permit Subject to maintain his own home and his mistress's separate home and to lead the type of life to which he was accustomed.

g. Subject is described as lacking in normal affections, cold and calculating, a typical schizoid interested only in himself, never makes a friendly gesture, has almost no friends. Subject is generally disliked and has many enemies who feel real hate towards him. The young Revolutionary medical doctors refuse to have anything to do with him. Fidel Castro does not know who Subject is and has certainly never been treated by Subject or received psychiatric treatment from any other psychiatrist. Subject must be very unhappy and downcast at his present situation: His income is insufficient forhis normal mode of life; he no longer travels extensively abroad (formerly, he traveled abroad every three months); he holds no representative office; he is not politically or socially prominent and, indeed, no one pays him the slightest attention. Subsource states categorically that he believes that "Dr. Bustamente would be willing to accept any offer. He would take the bait if given half a chance."

h. The trip that Subject made to the USSR in the early 1960's was a "pleasure trip." So far as subsource knows, Subject received no training in the USSR.

i. Subject is not known to have any relations with SovBloc officials in Havana. He does maintain close relations with (Dr J) *LOPEZ Sanchez (fnu), an old-guard Communist of the so-called microfaction who holds the post of Secretary of the Cuban Academy of Sciences. Contact of Subject of [illegible]-C22 [illegible] CIT-CUBA

j. Fidel Castro is a pathological schizo-paranoid reform-type personality, which personality type is characterized by latent homosexuality.

k. Raul Castro is just the opposite of what he appears to be and is more "human" than Fidel Castro; he has founded a home, takes an interest in his family, etc. He suffers from a homosexual complex, as denoted by his hoarse voice.

l. Armando Hart is a hysterical type who believes that his wife dominates him. His wife suffers from a complex based on the fact that she is much older than he.

[redacted]

staff employee

14-00000

O: [redacted]dm
NIT: WH/SAO
XT: 9061
ATE: 6 August 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 29

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 21 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☒ RETURN TO WH/SAO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH-8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR-6, SB-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

06 22 56z AUG 69

CITE DIRECTOR 27502

MADRID
[redacted]

REFERENCE: MADRID 9173 (IN 14866)

1. PLEASE COVER FOLLOWING IN DEBRIEFING DR. WILTZ RE DR. BUSTAMANTE (SUBJECT).

A. EXTENT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT, PERSONAL, FAMILY AND PROFESSIONAL.

B. HIS KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT'S TRAINING IN SOVIET UNION IN EARLY 1960'S. FYI, SUBJECT WAS ALLEGEDLY TRAINED IN BRAINWASHING TECHNIQUES.

C. SUBJECT'S FRIENDS AND CONTACTS AMONG SOVIET BLOC OFFICIALS IN HAVANA.

D. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBJECT AND FIDEL CASTRO; ANY TREATMENTS OF CASTRO BY SUBJECT; SUBJECT'S PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT OF CASTRO, OTHER OFFICIALS.

AF	ß
AC	X
PR	/
PS	/
BX	✓
DEF	NFD
FI	
WH/SAO	

(CONTINUED)

201-23396
06 AUG (6-)

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY No.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION SEP 9 4 42 PM '69
PER RECEIVED RID/EDI

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF:
FILE, VR.

(classification) SECRET (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 27502

PAGE TWO

E. PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES PERFORMED BY SUBJECT FOR CUBAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

2. FILE: 201-22396.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/SAO [redacted]
C/WH/COG/RR [redacted]
EUR/Cuba [redacted]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[redacted]
C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted]
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

SSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, CI, FI 2

ACTION NO. 684

S E C R E T 011413Z AUG 69 CITE MADRID 9173 (ROPARD ACTING)

MADR

DIRECTOR

Director

[redacted]

1 Aug 69 IN 14866

REF: DIRECTOR 25064

1. SOURCE OF OSMA 25247 DOES NOT KNOW BUSTAMANTE.

2. TWO OTHER PSYCHIATRISTS QUESTIONED SAME BASIS BY DR. HECTOR (WILTZ) LANCIS HAD HAD CONTACT WITH BUSTAMANTE. WILTZ BORN HABANA 24 OCT 26, ARR MADRID 19 MAR 69. IN CUBA LIVED AT CALLE 32, NO 863, NUEVO VEDADO, HABANA. WAS DOCTOR AT CENTRO DEPENDIENTES 1957-67; IN PRISON 67-68; WORKED HOSPITAL MAZORRA 68 TO MAR 69.

3. IF PROVIDE REQUIREMENTS CAN DEBRIEF WILTZ ON BUSTAMANTE.

4. FILE 201-22396.

S E C R E T

AN
AB X
~~IH~~
~~PS~~
~~EX~~
DES ~~NFD~~
PI
C/WH/C

CS COPY

201-22396

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT
WH 8
FILE, VR [illegible], EUR 6, CI/OPS, FI 2

646

S E C R E T [illegible] AUG 69 CITE MADR[illegible] ARD ACTING

MADR

1 Aug 69 [illegible]

DIRECTOR
Indicator
[redacted]

REF: [illegible] 25054, PARA 2

1. SUBJ AMANTE O'LEARY ARRIVED MADRID 24 JULY AND WENT [illegible] PARIS [illegible]. STATION HAS NO INFO REASON SUBJ AMANTE TRAVEL NOR FURTHER ITINERARY.

2. [illegible] THRU [illegible]. WILL ADVISE.

3. [illegible]

S E C R E T

AN
AB X
IN
PS
BX
DES
EI

CS COPY

SECRET

201-22376

(11 Dec [illegible])

SEC: Staff officer

RIG: [redacted]
NIT: AC/WH/SAO
T: 9061
ATE: 22 July 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 57

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ✓ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☒ RETURN TO WH/SAO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

INFO: WH8
FILE, VR. EUR6, RI/AN, SB8, CI, CI/IC2, CI/OPS, FI2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

23 20 54 z JUL 69

CITE DIRECTOR 231130

LONDON
Director Crypto
[redacted]

1. ACCORDING SENSITIVE SOURCE DR. JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY IS SLATED ARRIVE LONDON 25 JULY VIA AIR FRANCE TO ATTEND 19TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY 27 JULY-2 AUGUST, AND FIRST CONGRESS ON SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 4-9 AUGUST.

2. DR. BUSTAMANTE IS PRO-SOVIET CUBAN COMMIE, PSYCHIATRIST TRAINED IN BRAINWASHING TECHNIQUES IN SOVIET UNION AND REPORTEDLY HAS TREATED FIDEL CASTRO. ABOVE MAY BE PASSED JAGUAR, SMOTH.

3. PLEASE CABLE CONFIRMATION HIS ARRIVAL.

4. FILE: 201-22396.

END OF MESSAGE

AH	JB
AB	X
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~BK~~	
DES	~~HPD~~
~~FI~~	
WH	SAO

[redacted]

C/WH/COG/
C/WH/COG/OPS
EUR/C
Staff officer

EUR/BC [redacted]

Staff officer
[redacted]
HC/EUR/BC

CS COPY

Staff officer
[redacted]
C/SID

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 12 PAGE

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

REPORT NO. CS-311/07069-68

DATE DISTR. 8 August 1968

COUNTRY Cuba

DOI 1967, except as indicated

SUBJECT a. National Center for Scientific Research (CNIC)

b. National Research Institute

See Page 10

ACQ Spain, Madrid (19 February 1968) FIELD NO. OSM-9009

SOURCE A member of a group of Cuban emigres who have been trained in the techniques of information collection and who have provided useful reports since early 1962, from CC-3524, Ramon Alberto Mendoza Gandarilla, a Cuban refugee and former resident of Havana City who left Cuba on 22 January 1968. Source studied medicine at Havana University until September 1966, when he completed his fifth year before abandoning his studies; from Sept 1967 to January 1968, he worked as a translator of medical texts at the National Information Center for Medical Licenses, 23 and N Streets, Vedado, Havana City. He visited twice the main building of the National Center for Scientific Research (CNIC), the second time in mid-July 1966. Paragraphs 8, 11 and 14 from Elizado Maso Marcoleta, who had worked with Dr. Mora and was familiar with "all of the research projects of the CNIC." Paragraph 9 from Carlos J. Finlay's brother, Miguel Finlay, with whom source spoke in mid-January 1968. Paragraph 36 from Dr. Jesus Perea, professor of endoctrinology, from whom source acquired the information in July 1966, and from Elizalde Maso Marcoleta. Source visited the Gastroenterology Institute in mid-August 1966 and Dr. Llanio accompanied him on a tour of the installations (Paragraph 40). Source visited the Psychology and Neurophysiology Institute in mid-May 1966 and Dr. Leonel Valles, who was employed at this institute, accompanied him on a tour of the installations. Paragraph 45, and most of paragraph 44, from Dr. Valles. Paragraph 47 from Dr. Cosme Ordonez, a former professor of sources's and Director of the Hygiene and Epidemiology Institute.

Bostamante

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA EV	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	FBI	(For Field Distribution see final para)
DCS	OS and SD EV				S [illegible]			[illegible]

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WHC/RR	3	WH/SAO	1	E/IB/R	3
WHC/OPS	2	-		E/MADR	1
WHC/EW	1	CI/OPS/WH	2	E/R	1
WHC/PP	1				
WHC/COBRA	1				

TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO 1, WH/C 7 (1), EUR 4 (1) (WH 1)

LIAISON

OSM-9009

[redacted] Delchiefiera

CS-311/07

COORDINATING

1. (Summary: The National Center for Scientific Research (CNIC) is an autonomous organization controlled by the Office of the Prime Minister, who appointed the Director, Dr. Wilfredo Torres, M.D., and other important executives. The CNIC exists basically to perform scientific research and to train personnel for employment as (a) CNIC researchers, (b) researchers for the National Research Institutes that collaborate with the CNIC, (c) medical school faculty members, (d) industrial scientists, (e) and researchers and workers in the pure sciences. The CNIC has departments of Biochemistry, Ultracentrifugation, Electronic Microscopy, Medical Botany, Microbiology and Virology, and Biomechanics and Biomedical Studies. The CNIC graduate training program for medical doctors confers the degree of Doctor of Basic Sciences upon completion of the three-year program; in the future, the CNIC will also graduate Doctors of Pure Science The National Research Institutes, of which there are at least 1 are organized by medical specialties and work in coordination with the CNIC but are subordinate to the MINSAP. All are clinical research institutes that work primarily with patients. These institutes include the Institutes of Endocrinology, Nephrology, Hematology, Gastroenterology, Neurology and Neurosurgery, Physiopathology, Psychology and Neurophysiology, Hygiene and Epidemiology, Cardiology and Cardiovascular Surgery, Microbiology and Virology, Angiology, and Parasitology.)

2. The National Center for Scientific Research (Centro Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas, CNIC) is located in Reparto Siboney (formerly Country Club), Marianao, Havana Province, next to the Victoria de Giron premedical school (formerly Colegio Sagrado Corazon), and occupies several impressive new buildings; in addition, large private homes in the area have been equipped as laboratories and residences for CNIC personnel. As of mid-November 1967, some of the residences were occupied by foreign scientists.

3. The CNIC is an autonomous organization controlled by the Office of the Prime Minister, through which its funds are budgeted. Important matters concerning the CNIC are handled personally by Fidel Castro, whose approval is required for foreign exchange expenditures such as the purchase of equipment. contracting of foreign personnel, trips abroad by CNIC personnel, and recruiting campaigns aimed at foreign scientists. Fidel Castro, rather than ex-Minister Machado Ventura, appointed the director and other important CNIC executives. Dr. Wilfredo Torres, M.D., hematologist, is CNIC director. The Public Health Ministry (MINSAP) plays no part in the supervision of the CNIC and cannot influence the decisions of its executives.

4. The organization and functions of the CNIC are confidential although not secret, and any person who has contact with medical professors can acquire some information on the CNIC. Since about June 1967, an ID card issued by the CNIC to its employees is required to enter the CNIC buildings and the private homes that have been equipped as laboratories and residences.

5. CNIC activities are oriented towards three fundamental objectives, namely:

a. Scientific research related to the medical sciences.

b. The preparation of highly qualified research and professorial personnel for employment, after graduation, as (1) CNIC researchers, (2) researchers of The National Research Institutes (see below),

5
4
3
2

(3) members of the faculty of the three Cuban medical schools (referred to as schools of medical sciences) located in Havana City, Santa Clara, and Santiago de Cuba, and (4) biochemists and microbiologists in industries related to the medical sciences, such as the pharmaceutical industry.

c. The preparation of personnel for work in the pure sciences; this third objective constitutes a more ambitious but long-range goal that was still in the organizational and planning stage in January 68. Part of the personnel so trained would remain at the Center as CNIC researchers; part would join the faculties of the university schools of pure sciences, and part would enter Cuban industry to work on the applications of technology to production.

Scientific Research

6. Scientific research related to the medical sciences is done at both the CNIC and at the National Research Institutes. The general directives for such research are oriented towards:

a. The experimental verification of conclusions arrived at, or discoveries made, by foreign scientists. This work of verification is effected (1) principally in order to train Cuban personnel in the methods of higher research, but also (2) as an attempt to contribute information complementary to the discovery.

b. Original research work done by Cuban personnel advised by foreign scientists. This work is directed towards (1) the attainment of results of international importance to be used in propaganda praising Castro's education system, and (2) the achievement of discoveries in applied science that would serve either as an economic saving or to earn foreign exchange. As of mid-January 68, CNIC research projects had produced nothing of scientific importance. During the first half of 67, Fidel Castro ordered the CNIC to orient all its research projects towards production technology so that the foreign exchange invested in the projects could be partially recovered through improved production.

7. Department of Biochemistry. The most important of the CNIC departments is the Department of Biochemistry; it occupies several new buildings and former private homes. It is headed by Dr. Mora (fnu), a Chilean microbiologist. This department was conducting research on polarimetry, enzymology, spectography, and the synthesis of a steroid hormone from stigmasterol, a sugar-cane by product.

8. As of mid-January 1968, all attempts to synthesize a steroid hormone from stigmasterol had failed and will almost surely continue to fail because stigmasterol is an inert steroid lacking in biological activity.

9. Dr. Carlos J. Finlay, M.D., was preparing a research thesis for the degree of Doctor of Basic Sciences; his research project, the biochemistry of lipides in cardiovascular diseases, is of scientific interest although not of international importance.

10. Department of Ultracentrifugation. Although nominally a separate department, the Department of Ultracentrifugation in fact functions as a subdivision of the Department of Biochemistry. As of mid-November 1967 it contained the most modern

5
4
3
2
1

centrifuges then available. Its basic function is the analysis or separation of the diverse elements that constitute a biological substance.

11. Department of Electronic Microscopy. This department was functioning in November 1967 and contained two electron microscopes of the highest quality, one Polish-made and the other believed to be Japanese. It was performing research in cytology, ultrastructure (the ultramicroscopic structure of tissues of living beings), crystallography, and the three-dimensional spatial structure of certain biological substances.

12. DEpartment of Medical Botany. This department is headed by a very intelligent and cultured Spanish agronomist named Guillermo Cid who has been in Cuba since 1940. It is effecting a systematic study of Cuban flora in order to determine the pharmacological and therapeutical properties of Cuban plants. The department works in coordination with the experimental station in Santiago de las Vegas that is directed by the eminent 92-year old Dr. Juan Tomas Roig Mesa, who is the greatest Cuban expert on Cuban and tropical flora and one of the greatest authorities in the world on medicinal plants. In addition, the department has the cooperation of all the experimental agronomical stations in Cuba, which send the department samples of any plant considered worth investigation; the department conducts an exhaustive analysis of such samples. The research has two objectives:

a. The utilization of the curative properties of the plants, which constitute a cheap supply of national raw materials and can replace many imported products.

b. The launching on the world market of competitive pharmaceutical products, following the example of Red China and Bulgaria.

13. The work of the Department of Medical Botony will probably be successful because of (a) the qualifications and competence of its director, Guillermo Cid, (b) the extraordinary impulse that has been imparted to its research program, and (c) the extraordinary richness of Cuban flora in medicinal plants.

14. Department of Microbiology and Virology. This department is very well equipped and manned. It has ultracentrifuges and isolated installations for virus cultures, and installations for experimental animals.

15. Biomechanics and Biomedical Studies. Biomechanics is the study of the biological activity of living organisms from the point of view of the physicochemical laws that govern them. As of September 1966, a department that would do research on biomechanics was being organized within the CNIC. The Cuban Government is aware of the enormous medical importance of the application of cybernetics (problem solving by electronic computers) to the analysis, organization, and resolution of the very complex physicochemical problems that the biology of living beings presents; the Government is attempting to organize this department, which will train highly qualified personnel and import electronic computers (a) for the study of the complex physicochemical problems related principally to hematology, neurophysiology, and cardiology and cardiovascular surgery, and (b) for the computation for public health purposes of the vast amounts of public health data of different types that the MINSAP regional organizations would provide.

16. The research projects of this department were to be directed fundamentally towards the study and electronic computation of the modification in both healthy and sick persons of such biological parameters as hemodynamic curves, concentration and saturation of gases and alterations in the basic acid equilibrium of the blood, and were to include the study of the variations in the biological parameters from the biochemical and hemodynamic point of view during cardiovascular surgery and in physiological research related to the cardiovascular apparatus. In neurophysiology and neuropharmacology, the research projects would be oriented towards research on higher nervous activity including electrical modifications produced in higher nervous activity; in hematology, the projects would be oriented towards the study of isoimmunization and pathological alterations of the different blood cells. The electronic computers would be needed to process the immense quantities of data such research would produce.

17. Dr. Fernando J. Toro, a medical doctor who is also an electrical engineer, was to head this department. Toro is reputed to be very intelligent, a gifted organizer, highly motivated, and by far the best man available in Cuba for the type of research described; he has more than 20 years experience in electromedical instruments.

18. Reduced Number of Research Projects. The scarcity of research projects can easily be explained by the fact that Cuba, which has no considerable scientific tradition, must first train personnel in the higher methods of scientific research, and such training requires years of effort. The few persons prepared to do important research are at the present time occupied in the administrative and pedagogical organization of the CNIC and cannot work full-time as researchers.

19. Research in Antibiotics. In 1960, Dr. Jose Antonio Padron, an eminent research scientist, began work on the isolation and culture of antibiotic substances, the study of their properties, and experimentation with said substances; he initiated this work at the Oncological Hospital but is now a CNIC collaborator. As of December 1967, he had isolated and exhaustively studied 89 new antibiotics, many of which are too toxic for human use. His work demonstrates his great ability and perserverance, and with the material resources of the CNIC at his disposal, should result in discoveries of scientific importance.

CNIC Training Program

20. Doctor of Basic Sciences. The CNIC offers a three-year training program leading to the degree of Doctor of Basic Sciences for which program fifth-year medical students with exceptional academic standing can qualify if (a) during their college career they have shown special aptitudes for teaching and research, (b) the UJC gives them an "A" grade in political standing or reliability, and (c) they are cleared by a DSE investigation. In 1966, of the students then in the fifth year of medical school, only six were accepted by this training program; all were excellent students and UJC members and are now medical doctors: Ramon Ortiz, Rosa Elena Simeon, Ismael Clark Arce, Hilda Donderis, Julio Rodriguez Docal, and his wife Maira (lnu). As of April 1968, probably no more than 30 students were studying in this training program, chiefly because of the rigorous entrance requirements.

21. During the first year of the three-year program, the students, all of whom are medical doctors, study (a) mathematics: mathematical analysis (higher algebra), analytical geometry, and trigonometry; (b) physics: mechanics (kinematics, statics, and dynamics), mechanics of liquids and gases, and heat; (c) chemistry; inorganic and organic; (d) languages (Russian, English, French, or German); dialectical and historical materialism; and logic of science. The classes occupy both mornings and afternoons and include seminars given by the professors; under a rotation system, the students also give seminars in which each by turn first lectures then presides over the ensuing debate. In addition, the students review the bibliography of subjects related to medicine, such as studies on biochemistry, pharmacology, etc.

22. During the second year of the three-year program, the students continue to study the pure sciences: mathematics (infinitesimal analysis), physics (optics and electromagnetism), and organic chemistry, plus dialectical and historical materialism, languages, and a specific medical speciality selected by the individual student. In addition, the students serve as instructors of biochemistry, physiology, etc., at the Victoria de Giron premedical school.

23. During the third year, each student (a) continues to serve as an instructor at the Victoria de Giron premedical school, (b) continues to study in his own specialty, such as biochemistry, neurophysiology, electronic microscopy, genetics, virology, etc., (c) undertakes an original research project under the guidance of a professor who is usually a foreigner, (d) writes a thesis based on the research project, presents it, and defends it before a tribunal, and (e) completes an examination in the specialty he has chosen. If the thesis is approved and the student passes the examination in his specialty, he receives the title of Doctor of Basic Sciences and either becomes a member of the faculty of one of the three Cuban medical schools (Paragraph 5.b.above) or stays on at the CNIC as a research assistant.

24. During the first year, students receive 225 Cuban pesos monthly. During the second year they receive 250 pesos monthly, and during the third year they receive 300 pesos monthly. In addition, the students receive a free lunch and supper daily.

25. In late 1968, the CNIC will graduate its first two Doctors of Basic Sciences: Dr. Carlos J. Finlay, M.D., who studied in France, and Morlan (fnu), who studied in Rumania; both will remain at the CNIC after graduation and do research in biochemistry.

26. Doctor of Pure Sciences. Candidates for the CNIC training program leading to the degree of Doctor of Pure Sciences must satisfy requirements similar to those described in paragraph 20 above; candidates must be outstanding students in one of the pure sciences (chemical, physical, mathematical, or biological sciences) who, throughout their entire college career have demonstrated special aptitudes for teaching and scientific research, and who are Communist sympathizers approved by the UJC.

Victoria de Giron Institute of Basic Sciences

27. The Victoria de Giron Institute, located next to the CNIC, is the only school of its type in Cuba. Rather than a

medical school, it is an organism attached to Havana University Medical School. Students wishing to study medicine or stomatology at Havana University must study first two years as boarding students at the Victoria de Giron Institute. Neither Santiago de Cuba nor Santa Clara has a similar institute.

28. As of September 1967, students from Las Villas, Camaguey, and Oriente Provinces who desire to enter medical school as first-year students must matriculate at either Santa Clara or Santiago de Cuba University; this measure was put into effect in order to reduce congestion at Havana University.

National Research Institutes

29. The following National Research Institutes, organized by medical specialties, work in coordination with the CNIC but are subordinate to the MINSAP. All were organized as "institutes" during the first three months of 1967, although some had been functioning for years under different names. All are clinical research institutes that work primarily with patients. Each institute controls all the hospital departments throughout Cuba that correspond to the specialty of the institute. For example: The Endocrinology Institute controls all the hospital departments of endocrinology in Cuba.

30. Endocrinology Institute. The Endocrinology Institute replaced the former Institute for Endocrinological Research that was founded and directed by Dr. Yamil Kouri. The institute is located at the same site as the former institute: the ground floor of the left wing of the Fajardo Hospital, Havana City. It is headed by Dr. Oscar Mateo de Acosta, M.D., Cuba's most eminent endocrinologist. Dr. Mateo is extraordinarily intelligent, a university professor and PCC member, and is one of the scientific bulwarks of the Castro Regime. Mateo's assistants include Dr. Catalina Eibenschuz, who is married to Dr. Mora, head of the CNIC Department of Biochemistry, and was studying endocrincology in France in early 68; Dr. Bartolome Arce, who studied in Rumania and was studying in France in early 68; and a young medical doctor named Oviedo (fnu), who was probably to be sent to Sweden to study.

31. The Endocrinology Institute enjoys a large budget because of Dr. Mateo's scientific eminence and political "virtues". It has excellent equipment for electrophoresis, ultracentrifuges, and photocolorimeters.

32. Nephrology Institute. The Nephrology Institute is located on the fifth floor of the Joaquin Albarran Clinical-Surgical Hospital, Avenida 26 at Avenida Rancho Boyeros, Havana. It is headed by Dr. Abelardo Buch, M.D., an extraordinarily able researcher who was working on:

a. acute, chronic renal insufficiency,

b. microdeterminations of certain normal quantities of the renal apparatus, and

c. the experimental verification of modern theories that explain the physiopathology of shock and its treatment; his experiments were based on the research hypothesis of Dr. Richard Lillehei, chief of the Department of Surgery, Minnesota University.

33. The institute has two artificial kidneys: one imported from the United States in 1959, and one imported from Czechoslovakia and installed in November or December 1966. An attempt has been made to organize the institute like the Cleveland Clinic. Dr. Roberto Mañalich and Dr. Villalba (fnu) work with Dr. Buch.

34. In January 1968, the MINSAP created a three-year residency in nephrology and appointed Dr. Frankie Dorticos as the first resident; Dorticos is the son of the Dean of the Havana University Medical School and nephew of President Dorticos. Artifical kidneys were installed at both the Santa Clara Civil Hospital and the Santiago de Cuba Hospital in late 1967; these artificial kidneys are for use in treating kidney disease rather than for medical research.

35. Hematology Institute. The Hematology Institute has departments at the William Soler Hospital, the Fajardo Hospital, and the National Hospital, all located in Havana City. The institute has no building of its own and its activities are located at the three best hematological clinics in Cuba, as enumerated above. The Director of the Hematology Institute is Dr. Eduardo de la Torre, who is also chief of the Department of Hematology, William Soler Hospital. Dr. Ulacia (fnu), who is probably Cuba's best hematologist, is chief of the Department of Hematology of the Fajardo Hospital.

36. The most important research project of the Hematology Institute was initiated about July 66 and consisted of the study of the "utilization of isoniazida in the treatment of Werholf's (as received) disease o purpura trombopenica idiopatica." The value of isoniazida in the treatment of Werholf's disease was discovered by chance under the following circumstances: A child hospitalized in the hematological department of the William Soler hospital for treatment of Werholf's disease contracted a primary tuberculosis infection; when this infection was treated with isoniazida, the symptom-complex of Werholf's disease disappeared completely and no relapse occurred. As of January 1968, 22 such cases had been studied and the conclusions were being prepared for presentation at a Hematological Congress; the biological mechanism of the treatment had not yet been determined, but it was considered that the experimental stage had been completed.

37. Dr. Eduardo de la Torre was performing research - principally of a statistical nature - on leucemias. Infantile leucemia was being studied at the William Soler Hospital and at the Angel Arturo Aballi Children's Hospital, located in Arroyo Naranjo, Havana; this research followed the treatment scheme of Swelzer and the University of California scheme known internationally as V.A.M.P.

38. Gastroenterology Institute. The Gastroenterology Institute occupies the two-story building at the Calixto Garcia Hospital which was formerly occupied by the hospital library. Its Director is Dr. Raimundo Llanio Navarro, who was brought to world-wide eminence when he presented his study "Colangiografia Laparoscopica en la Lactante" at the Brussels Congress in 1965. When the Gastroenterology Institute was officially established in early 1967, it had been functioning for about two years. In January 1967, Dr. Humberto Rodriguez Hidalgo and Dr. Mirna Quintero were admitted as residents; their admission as residents coincided with the establishment at the institute of a training program for specialists in gastroenterology.

39. As of mid-1966, Dr. Llanio was conducting a study of thousands of his own cases of laparoscopy in general, gynecologic laparoscopy, and laparoscopy in pediatrics. His assistants were Dr. Oscar Garcias, and Dr. Arcadio Soto Escobar, also employed as instructor of the Department of Internal Medicine, Havana University Medical School.

40. In August 1966, the ground floor of the institute contained the most modern radiological equipment in Cuba, including X-ray machines and fluoroscopes; each of the machines had a seriografo and occupied a square room measuring about four meters square. There were two rooms for laparoscopic examinations and four or five wards with a total of approximately 50 beds. On the ground floor there were also eight small rooms (4 x 2 meters) for biliary drainages and gastroquimogramas, the Department of Electrophoresis, a conference hall, a laboratory of pathological anatomy, a clinical laboratory, three or four bedrooms for resident physicians, two waiting rooms for out-patients, and the Department of Coloprotologia (Proctology ?), headed by Dr. Oscar Garcia, Cuba's best proctologist, who is also Vice Rector of Havana University and Vice President of the MINSAP Scientific Council. The second floor contained a library for which volumes were beginning to be received, and several rooms still unequipped that would be used for research to be conducted by Dr. Llanio in person.

41. Neurology and Neurosurgery Institute. The Neurology and Neurosurgery Institute functions at two separate installations. Its headquarters is located in the former building of the Governing Board of the Calixto Garcia Hospital, which also contains the Department of Psychiatry of the Calixto Garcia Hospital. This building contains the neurosurgical installations of the institute, consisting in three splendidly equipped operating rooms, two or three rooms containing radiological equipment, a laboratory of pathological anatomy, out patient examination rooms, conference room, library, filing room , about 70 beds, and bed rooms for residents and interns. The building was totally rebuilt in 1965 and equipped with U.S. $100,000 worth of new instruments and equipment.

42. The Hospital of Neurology and Neurosurgery (formerly the Medical-Surgical Center), located on 29th and D Streets, Vedado, Havana City, also belongs to the institute. Dr. Ramon Estrada, Director of the Hospital of Neurology and Neurosurgery, is Professor of Neuroanatomy, was trained in the United States and is described as extraordinarily able; he maintains a degree of medical rivalry with the Director of the Neurology and Neurosurgery Institute, Dr. Filiberto Ramirez Corria, that makes the hospital an autonomous organization although it functions in coordination with the institute. The hospital has about 275 beds and is a modern class "A" hospital; residents in internal medicine must spend three months in intensive study at this hospital.

43. Physiopathology Institute. The Institute of Physiopathology was in the process of organization. It will probably be headed by Chilean biochemist Dr. Mora (fnu) who, until about October 67, held thepost of director of post-graduate scientific training (responsable de superacion cientifica) of the CNIC, and who is now head of the Department of Biochemistry, CNIC. Dr. Mora and Dr. Ruth Urba, another Chilean microbiologist, introduced into Cuba the modern concepts of medical biochemistry and created a model Department of Medical Biochemistry at the Victoria de Giron Institute of Basic Sciences. Urba, who left Cuba some time ago, Mora, and Yamil Kouri were the brains behind

Dorita - B) J. Bustamante

the organization of the CNIC. The date upon which the Institute of Physiopathology will begin to function cannot be established inasmuch as Mora, who has the degree of Doctor of Biochemistry, must first receive his degree as a medical doctor.

44. Psychology and Neurophysiology Institute. The Psychology and Neurophysiology Institute (formerly the Higher Nervous Activity Institute) occupies the building formerly occupied by the Banco de Piedad, in Reparto Alturas del Vedado, Havana City. The institute is headed by Dr. Jose Angel Bustamante, M.D., who is very intelligent and very well organized. As of mid-May 1966, the ground floor contained the lobby, three rooms used for psychiatric care, a sicofarmaco storeroom, the Department of Neuropharmacology, two small rooms for experimental surgery, about 20 cages for experimental animals, three rooms containing electromedical instruments used by Dr. Toro (see paragraph 17) in his research work, including three electroencephalographs, two electrocardiographs, electromiografos, ammeters, voltmeters, etc., two or three rooms for animals in which scientific instruments have been imbedded for the experimental verification of certain physiological data, two rooms used to study conditioned reflexes in rats, a long corridor (about 30 meters long) equipped with bells, lights, and gates, in which Dr. Diego Gonzalez was studying sintesis aferente de Anoyshen, two rooms in which Dr. Jose Aquino was conducting experiments on the effects of ouabaina on the central nervous system, and other undescribed experiments. The second floor contained the files, library, conference hall, and rooms for which no specific function had yet been determined.

45. As of May 1966, Dr. Bustamante was doing research on social psychology (the psychological characteristics of individuals belonging to a specific socioeconomic group) and had very ambitious plans to use electronic data processing machines to study the electrochemical processes and the servomechanisms of higher nervous activity; these ambitious plans were to be put into effect in 1967. The land located behind the institute was to serve for the construction of other departments of the institute.

46. Hygiene and Epidemiology Institute. The Hygiene and Epidemiology Institute functions at two separate installations. Institute headquarters and its hygiene section occupy a building on Calle Infanta, Havana City. Dr. Cosme Ordoñez, M.D., is director of the institute; he is described as very intelligent and very well-organized. During the first six months of 1967 he took a course in hygiene and epidemiology at the University of London. Dr. Plasencia (fnu) is another of the principal figures at the institute.

47. Public health data received from all parts of Cuba are processed at the institute headquarters on Calle Infanta (DOI: September 1966). In addition to the hygiene section institute headquarters contains a well-equipped Virology Department, which has an electron microscope, a well-equipped Serums and Vaccines Department, a school for public-health workers, and a school of medical statisticians.

48. The epidemiological section of the institute is located at Las Animas Anti-infectious Hospital, Havana, at which medical care is provided and research work done. Las Animas Hospital was totally rebuilt during the period 1962-65 and is a model hospital that compares favorably with any other

hospital in the world; its medical training program is excellent. The hospital consists of a main two-story building that is connected by passageways and corridors to a number of one-story clinics that are isolated from each other. The ground floor of the main building contains the vestibule, receiving section, duty rooms, classrooms, operating room, and library. The second floor contains living quarters for the resident physicians. Hospital Director is Dr. Julio Capote Perez.

49. The clinics that are connected to the main building are:

a. Tetanus and Diphtheria Clinic, with two wards with a total of about 35 beds for diphtheria patients and two wards with about 15 beds for tetanus patients. Near the entrance to the clinic are three rooms containing five iron lungs for polio patients.

b. Viral Hepatitis Clinic,headed by Dr. Martinez (fnu), has about 50 beds.

c. Clinic for Typhoid Fever and High-Fever Producing Diseases (Enfermedades Febriles Agudas), with about 35 beds.

d. Clinic for Mumps and Severe Exanthematic Diseases, headed by Dr. Julio Capote, who is also Director of the hospital. This clinic has about 30 beds.

50. The Clinic for Infectious Diseases of the Central Nervous System is unconnected to the main hospital building. The hospital also has a pathalogical anatomy laboratory, a clinical analysis laboratory, and a two-story building for experimental animals. Plans existed to build three more clinics (DOI: 1967).

51. As of September 1966, the following research work was being performed at Las Animas Hospital:

a. Hospital Director Capote was doing research on (1) the treatment of encefalitis sarampioniosa, and (2) an antimeasles vaccine provided by the USSR.

b. Dr. Julio Romulo Calvet was completing his research studies on (1) tetanus and had achieved original contributions concerning the etiopatogenia of tetanus, (2) the prognosis of patients with exotoxins circulating in the blood, (3)a screening test for diverse therapeutical procedures to combat tetanus, and (4) the elaboration of a hyperimmune human vaccine for use with persons already suffering from tetanus, or for use as a prophylactic medicine. Dr. Romulo has 28 years experience in infectious-contagious diseases and is one of the world's greatest authorities on diphtheria and tetanus.

52. Cardiology and Cardiovascular Surger Institute. This institute is headed by Dr. Noel Gonzalez and is located at the Fajardo Hospital, where it has the following installations:

a. Second and third floor: two operating rooms for the exclusive use of the institute. The rooms contain machines for extracorporeal circulation, instruments for the determination of hemodynamic curves, multi-cardiographs, vectocardiografos, balistocardiografos, equipment for cardiovascular "radiology" (X-rays ?), equipment for intracardiac catheterism, electronic defibrillators, automatic respirators, and extrathoracic pacing devices. Either the second or third floor contains a storeroom with the most modern medicines known for use in cardiovascular diseases. The third floor also contains a Department of Cardiology and Hemodynamic Research that is splendidly equipped and is directed by Dr. Hernandez Cañero (fnu), one of Cuba-s best cardiologists; the surgical research that was being done included mitral commissurotomies, valvuloplastias, correction of septal defects, surgical correction of the ductus arteriosus, the implantation of intrathoracic pace makers, and heart transplants in animals. Institute Director Gonzalez is assisted in cardiovascular surgery by Dr. Roberto Menchaca, Dr. Roberto Guerra, Dr. Llaca, Dr. Arango, and Dr. Kiljian.

b. Sixth floor: a ward with approximately 40 beds.

53. Because of Director Noel Gonzalez's executive capacity, professional ability, and political relations, this institute has received strong economic support since mid-1966. In December 67, Dr. Roberto Guerra and Dr. Roberto Menchaca were preparing to leave for Europe where they would spend approximately one year studying and purchasing surgical equipment for the institute.

54. Microbiology and Virology Institute. This institute is in the process of organization. It will have departments in the CNIC and in the headquarters building of the Hygiene and Epidemiology Institute, Calle Infanta, Havana City.

55. Angiology Institute. The Angiology Institute is located on the second floor of the Luaces Clinic, Calixto Garcia Hospital, and is directed by Dr. Jorge MacCook, one of Cuba's best angiologists. The activities of this institute are oriented basically towards the treatment of patients and the instruction of medical students. The chief Cuban angiologists are Dr. MacCook, Dr. Francisco Bidart Labourdette, Director of Angiology at the Clinical-Surgical Hospital, and Dr. Huguet (fnu), Director of Angiology, National Hospital.

56. Parasitology Institute. This institute occupies the former Parasitology Clinic of the Calixto Garcia Hospital. Dr. Pedro Kouri was to have been named Director but died before the institute was formally organized. The institute's activities are oriented principally towards the treatment of patients and the instruction of medical students.

57. Oncology Institute. As of late 1967, the official creation of an institute to be named the Oncology Institute was under consideration; said institute would be headed by Dr. Zoilo Marinello Vidaurreta, who presides the Scientific Council of the MINSAP and is the director of the Oncological Hospital, 29th and C Streets, Vedado, Havana City. An organization similar to the projected Oncology Institute has been functioning at the Oncological Hospital for about two years.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET 3
(When Filled In)

TOTAL COPIES 10

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	✓
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 4 PER WH 9.

ACTION C WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, CI/CI

S E C R E T 121544Z JUL 68 CITE MADRID 5476

12 JUL 68 IN 43225

ACTION

DIRECTOR
Federation Crypt. (Debriefing Center)
[redacted]

REF: DIRECTOR 15233

1. MITRANI KNEW DR. JOSE ANGEL (BUSTAMANTE) AS HEAD PSYCHIATRIC DEPT OF NATIONAL CENTER FOR SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS. HIS DEPUTY WAS DR. DIEGO (GONZALEZ) MARTIN. MITRANI HAS NO KNOWLEDGE THAT BUSTAMANTE WAS PROVIDING PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT TO FIEDEL CASTRO. ALSO DOES NOT KNOW OTHER DOCTORS TREATING CASTRO WHO HAVE CLOSE SOVIET CONNECTIONS.

2. DESCRIBES BUSTAMANTE AS HAVING ALWAYS BEEN LEFTIST BUT NEVER IDENTIFIED AS MEMBER CUBAN CP. HAS HEARD INFO TO EFFECT BUSTAMANTE HAS USED DRUGS TO HELP EXTRACT INFO FROM PRISONERS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

[redacted]ddm
WH/SAO
9061
10 July 1968

33 MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET 36

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 24 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO WH/SAO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-162/3 x-ref-201-22396 + B. Bustamante

WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH/COG-8, EUR-6, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 05233

MADRID
Cuba
[redacted]

10 22 21 z JUL 68

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 97491*

ANY INFO OBTAINED FROM DR. MITRAMI ON REF REQUIREMENTS?

END OF MESSAGE

*Asked Madrid Station crypt [redacted] to debrief Cuban refugee, one-time doctor of Fidel Castro, re Dr. Jose Bustamante.

C/WH/SAO [redacted]
WH/COG/RR [redacted]
E/IB/S [redacted]

staff officer

staff officer

staff officer

[redacted]
EUR/COPS

[redacted]
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

[redacted]

UNIT: WH/SAO staff employee

EXT: 7208

DATE: 6 May 1968

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

28 PER WH 9

\WH6

☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY XX RETURN TO WH/SAO BRANCH ☐ FILE

☐ NO INDEX XXX FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-162[illegible]3

INFO: FILE, VR DDP, C/CI

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) MAY 7 1940 Z

(elite) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MADRID

Inlicator

[redacted]

CHRONO DETAIL

97491

REFERENCE: MADRID 4825 (IN 02436)

PLEASE INQUIRE IF DR. MITRANI KNOWS CUBAN COMMIE DR. JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY. IF SO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE INFO ON DR. BUSTAMANTE'S SERVICES AS FIDEL CASTRO'S PSYCHIATRIST. DOES MITRANI KNOW ANY OTHER CUBAN DOCTOR WITH CLOSE SOVIET CONNECTIONS TREATING CASTRO.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/SA[redacted] staff employee

C/WH/COG/OPS[redacted]

C/WH/COG/RR[redacted]

C/EUR/IB[redacted]

staff employee

[redacted]

EUR/COPS

staff employee

[redacted]

C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: 7 PER #

ACTION

WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO. FILE. VR. WH 8 EUR 8 CI CI/...

FI FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 021125Z MAY 68 CITE MADRID 4825 2MAY68 IN0[illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC [redacted] Debriefing Center

REF: JMWAVE 3925, 3 NOV 66 - IN 31494

1. DR. SALOMON (MITRANI) RUSO PP 267543 BORN HAVANA 23 JAN 1921 ARRIVED MADRID 28 APRIL. WIFE AND SON IN U.S. REPUTED TO HAVE HAD ONE OF FINEST CLINICS IN CUBA AND WAS AT ONE TIME DOCTOR FIDEL CASTRO. ALTHOUGH HAS NOT TREATED CASTRO SINCE ABOUT 1961 WILL BE INTERVIEWED BY QUWEDS THIS AND OTHER RELATED SUBJECTS. IF HQS OR JMWAVE HAVE SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS PLS FORWARD SOONEST.

2. MITRANI UNABLE EXIT VIA VARADERO AIRLIFT AND HE VERY NERVOUS ABOUT POSSIBLE REFUSAL U.S. VISA. HE WILL SUBMIT TO ANY INTERVIEWS AND COOPERATE TO MAXIMUM TO PROVE HIS CURRENT AND PAST PRO U.S. POSITION.

3. ONLY INFO STATION FILES IS THAT IN REF.

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

[illegible] ☐ [illegible] ☐ NO

[illegible]ASSIFY TO FILE NO.

[illegible]REF TO FILE NO

[illegible]LE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

[illegible]ESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

IN 11,547

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

[illegible]ISSEM BY 2Y PER #

NOTIFICATION TO ☐

ADV. COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

[illegible]CTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR. FILE. ADDP. CA 5 CA/PEG. CA/PROP. CI/OPS. CI/IC 2.

[illegible]S/DO. FI/D .. FI/INT, IW, DDP, CI, RI/AN, SB 8, WH 8.

Copy marked for microfiche, f.i.

FE[illegible] 71

SECRET 080055Z FEB 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4414

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, REP/LANT, PANAMA CITY

INTEL ZRWAHOO

SUPDATA: SOURCE ASSET [redacted] FROM FORMER ASSET [redacted] AND DR. JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE. NO LIAISON. RI INDEX.

FILED: 08/0055Z

SECRET

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE [illegible]
IN [illegible]
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services before being released outside the Agency. · Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

Distribution for BACKGROUND USE ONLY to: SDO 2, D/[illegible]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COUNTRY: CUBA/USSR

DOI: LATE JANUARY 1968

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY CUBAN OFFICIALS ON THE RECENT DENUNCIATIONS AND PURGES IN CUBA OF ANIBAL ESCALANTE AND OTHER OLD-GUARD COMMUNISTS

ACQ: 30-31 JANUARY 1968 (FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-11,547)

SOURCE: ESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESS EXECUTIVE OF PROVEN RELIABILITY. HE TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO CUBA, AND HAS OBTAINED INFORMATION FROM HIGH-LEVEL ECONOMIC OFFICIALS OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT. HE ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION FROM A CUBAN OFFICIAL WHO IS INTIMATELY ACQUAINTED WITH BOTH JOAQUIN ALVAREZ REMENTOL AND DR. JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: WITH RESPECT TO THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH TWO, BELOW, WHILE IT MIGHT BE ASSUMED THAT JOAQUIN ALVAREZ REMENTOL WOULD NORMALLY FOLLOW THE OFFICIAL CUBAN LINE, THE RELATIONSHIPS THAT ARE KNOWN TO EXIST BETWEEN HIM AND THE

SECRET

CUBAN OFFICIAL, AND BETWEEN THAT OFFICIAL AND THE SOURCE, ARE SUCH AS TO PERMIT THE BELIEF THAT HE WAS SPEAKING FRANKLY.)

2. ACCORDING TO JOAQUIN ALVAREZ REMENTOL, CUBAN VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE IN CHARGE OF NORTH AMERICAN AND WESTERN EUROPENAN AFFAIRS, THE RECENT PURGE BY FIDEL CASTRO OF A NUMBER OF OLD-GUARD COMMUNISTS, INCLUDING ANIBAL ESCALANTE, WILL NOT HAVE MAJOR CONSEQUENCES. FROM THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW, THE PURGE AND THE CONDEMNATION OF ESCALANTE ARE ESSENTIALLY A DEMONSTRATION OF FORCE ON THE PART OF CASTRO AND A WARNING TO THE USSR AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTIRIES, AS WELL AS TO THE CUBANS, THAT THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT IN WHOSE HANDS POWER LIES IN CUBA. THE PURGE AND ARRESTS CSHOULD HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE USSR. FROM A BRIEF TALK WITH GERMAN AMADO BLANCO, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE OFFICIAL WHO RECENLTY RETURNED FROM MOSCOW AFTER HAVING SPENT MONTHS NEGOTIATING A COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT, ALVAREZ REMENTOL CONCLUDED THAT THERE WILL NOT BE ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN CUBAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS OR SOVIET ASSISTANCE, AND THERE MAY EVEN BE A FEW IMPROVEMENTS. THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL ECONOMIC AID TO CUBA. THE RECENT PURGE AND ARRESTS SHOULD

SECRET

FORM 3007 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN

TDCS

PAGE OF PAGES

(classification) (dissem controls)

NOT HAVE FAR-REACHING RPERCUSSIONS ON THE POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE USSR, AS NUMEROUS DIFFERENCES OF VIEWS HAVE EXISTED FOR SOME TIME AND ARE WELL KNOWN. THESE DIFFERENCES WILL PROBABLY NOT AFFECT THE ESSENCE OF CURRENT POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. CASTRO KNOWS THAT THE USSR CANNOT GO BEYOND A CERTAIN POINT IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEASURES DESIGNED TO PRESSURE HIM TO FOLLOW A POLICY MORE IN AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET INTEREST. HE CONTINUES TO GIVE OPEN SUPPORT TO ARMED STRUGGLES IN LATIN AMERICA, SUCH AS VENEZUELA, AND ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, IN COMPLETE OPPOSITION TO SOVIET POLICY. THIS POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE HAS WON CASTRO SYMPATHIES IN AND OUTSIDE CUBA. THE CUBANS, WHO LIKE OTHER LATIN AMERICANS HAVE A CERTAIN VANITY, LIKE TO THINK THAT THEY LIVE IN A SMALL BUT BRAVE COUNTRY WHICH IS "NOT GOING TO LET ANYONE PUT ANYTHING OVER ON IT."

3. ACCORDING TO DR. JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE, HEAD OF THE FACULTY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT ANIBAL ESCALANTE WAS AN AGENT OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. (FIELD COMMENT: BUSTAMANTE HAS OFTEN BEEN ACCUSED OF, AND HAS DENIED, CLANDESTINE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.)

(classification) (dissem controls)

BUSTAMANTE POINTED OUT THAT ESCALANTE HAS LONG BEEN CONNECTED WITH A SOVIET ADVISER OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IN CUBA, EVIDENTLY A KGB AGENT, WHO INTRODUCED HIM TO HIS SUCCESSOR. THE OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS MADE AGAINST ESCALANTE AND HIS GROUP, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF RAUL CASTRO, PLACED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF ANIBAL ESCALANTE ON THE USSR. BUSTAMANTE NOTED THAT UNTIL VERY RECENTLY THERE WAS IN THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR A FRENCH ADVISER AND FORMER MEMBER OF THE FRENCH SURETE, WHO APPARENTLY WAS AT ODDS WITH SOVIET ADVISERS OVER THE ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE STATE SECURITY. BUSTAMANTE HEARD ABOUT THIS FRENCHMAN VIA SEVERAL OF HIS FRENCH PATIENTS OR CONTACTS, WHO TOLD HIM OF HAVING MET THE FRENCH ADVISER ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. THE EXISTENCE OF THE FRENCH ADVISER WAS CONFIRMED TO BUSTAMANTE BY A CUBAN DOCTOR-FRIEND WHO ALSO WORKED IN THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. BUSTAMANTE IMPLIED THAT THE FRENCH ADVISER HAD RECENLTY RETURNED TO FRANCE.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS THE OPINION OF A NUMBER OF KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS IN HAVANA THAT ESCALANTE WAS A SOVIET AGENT.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT CINCSO

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE
INFO: Chief, WH Division ASSET
FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT: PBRUMEN [redacted]
Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMENTE 2[illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References : A. HMMA-32515
B. UFGA-28239

Forwarded attached is a list of the addresses to which ASSET [redacted] recently mailed letters prepared by Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMENTE, Director of the Institute of Neuropsychology and Psychology in Havana. ASSET [redacted] was given the letters by BUSTAMENTE during a recent visit to Cuba. He did not bother making photocopies of the letters as they simply contained a pamphlet on Dr. BUSTAMENTE's work with a request for comments.

STAFF employee
for [redacted]

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
2 - COS, JMWAVE w/att — To out Pouch
② - C/WHD w/att

1 ATT

CS COPY

201-[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-33169	28 September 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER

Dr.H.Collomb
Psychopathologie Africaine
Centre Hospitalier de Fann
DAKAR (Senegal)

Prof.Dr.Guillermo Davila
Liverpool 62
MEXICO 6, D.F.

E.D.Wittkower, M.D.
McGill University
Section of Transcultural Psychiatric Studies
MONTREAL,P.Q. (Canada)

Dr.Carl F.Hereford
Secretary General
2104 Meadowbrook Drive
Austin, Texas 78703
U.S.A.

Prof. Carlos A.Seguin
Jiron Huancavelica 470
LIMA (Perú)

E.B.Brody, M.D.
Professor of Psychiatry
Director of the Psychiatric Institute
University of Maryland
School of Medicine
BALTIMORE, Mariland
U.S.A.

Stanley Lesse, M.D.
American Journal of Psychotherapy
15 West 81st Street
NEW YORK, N.Y.

Prof.Dr.Rodolfo G.A.Ferrero
Vice-Presidente
Liga Argentina de Higiene Mental
Vieytes 489, Piso 11
BUENOS AIRES (Argentina)

Dr.Rogelio Diaz Guerrero
Presidente Electo
Sociedad Interamericana de Psicologia
Georgia 123
MEXICO 18 D.F.

CS COPY

ATT TO HMMA [illegible]

201-[illegible]

[illegible] 201 23396 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[redacted]

25 [illegible]

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

FILE VR WH/COG 8, EUR 8, FI, FI/INT 2, FI/SIG, FI/D 4, CA 2, CA/CI, CA/REG, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, WH/PROG, ADDP, DDP

S E C R E T 150045Z CITE MEXICO CITY (MEXI) 3806

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

AN/13	FI	
~~PB~~	~~DEBT~~	
ABSTRACT ~~X~~	~~INDEX~~	

15 DEC [illegible] 17 30

REF A HMMA 32515

B UFGA 28239

C HMMWK33442

1. DR JOSE ANGEL (BUSTAMANTE) O LEARY, DIRECTOR HAVANA INSTITUTE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY ARRIVED MEXICO ELEVEN DECEMBER TO ATTEND INTERAMERICAN CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY 17 TO 4 DECEMBER. ASSET [redacted] WHO ON SAG PLANE FROM CUBA HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH HIM AND LEARNED ADDITIONAL INFO:

ZZ

A. BUSTAMANTE WAS PART "GRUPO MONTECRISTI" WHICH OPPOSED BATISTA. OTHER MEMBERS THIS GROUP WERE MIRO CARDONA, RUFO LOPEZ FRESQUET AND MANOLO RAY. HE ACCUSED THESE MEMBERS OF GIVING HIM REPUTATION OF UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTER CASTRO REGIME AND PERSON DOING BRAIN WASHING FOR CUBAN SECURITY SERVICES. ALTHOUGH HE WORKING FOR REGIME BUSTAMANTE DENIED OTHER CHARGES TRUE.

ZZ PROCESS [illegible]

B. AT WORLD PSYCHIATRIC CONGRESS IN MOSCOW 1966, HE ENTRUSTED BY CUBAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES WITH NEGOTIATION SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL AID FROM RUSSIANS INCLUDING ACQUISITION OF PROMISED

SECRET

201-23396

Dec 67

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 3806 SECRET

ATOMIC RESEARCH REACTOR. BUSTAMANTE SAID HE TURNED DOWN ON ALL POINTS BY SOVIETS. LATTER HOWEVER CHANGED THEIR MIND AND RECENTLY ASSURED NUNEZ JIMENEZ, PRESIDENT HAVANA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES THAT REACTOR SOON TO BE GIVEN CUBANS (DETAILS BY SEPARATE INTEL REPORT).

C. BUSTAMANTE RECENTLY COMPLETED STUDY REQUESTED BY CUBAN GOVT OF REASONS PUSHING DOCTORS TO LEAVE CUBA. PROMISED COPY FOR Asset [redacted] NEXT TIME LATTER VISITS CUBA Asset [redacted] NOW SCHEDULED MAKE ONE LAST TRIP IN JAN).

2. STATION PER REF A SUGGESTED EFFORTS BE MADE OBTAIN ASSESSMENT ON BUSTAMANTE FROM ONE OR MORE U.S. SCIENTISTS ATTENDXING MEXICO CITY CONGRESS. WHILE JMWAVE CONCURRED THIS PROPOSAL, STATION HAS RECEIVED NO INDICATION TO DATE THAT HQS HAS MADE EFFORT BRIEF SCIENTIFIC SOURCES IT MAY HAVE AT CONGRESS ON BUSTAMANTE. Staff employee [redacted] HAS PUSHED HIS DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICAN NEUROLOGIST CARMEN LOZADA (SEE REF C) TO POINT WHERE LATTER COULD PROBABLY BE USED TO OBTAIN ASSESSMENT BUSTAMANTE.

3. PLS ADVISE WHAT STEPS TAKEN BY ADDRESSEES OBTAIN ASSESSMENT BUSTAMANTE AND DESIRABILITY SEPARATE ASSESSMENT FROM LOZADA. LATTER CURRENTLY CONDUCTING RESEARCH WITH FNU CHASE WHOM

PAGE THREE MEXICO CITY 3806 SECRET

SHE REFERS TO AS NOTED U.S. NEUROLOGIST.

SECRET

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

X

MICROFILM

SUBJECT

TYPIC/[redacted]/Operational
Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE (201-22396)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: a. HMMA - 32515, 14 July 1967

b. HMMA - 31953, 4 May 1967

1. JMWAVE has reviewed all available file data on Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE and concurs with the proposal in paragraph 2 of reference a.

2. JMWAVE would appreciate continuing information concerning this, as well as other activities of Dr. BUSTAMANTE.

Staff employee
[redacted]

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City
2 - C/WH [illegible]
2 - WH/COG

CS COPY

201-22396

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[illegible]	UFGA-28239	11 August 67
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-022396

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
XXX & ATTS MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO Chief, WH/COG and Chief of Station, JMWAVE [redacted]

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City [redacted]

SUBJECT PBRUMEN [redacted] Dr. Jose Angel *BUSTAMANTE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES See paragraph two

Former Asset

Reference: HMMA-31953

1. Forwarded under separate cover attachment are eleven letters sent or received by Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE, Director of the Institute of Neuropsychology and Psychology in Havana, via [redacted] who acts as a postman receiving and mailing these letters in Mexico City. We would like to make the following observations in connection with these letters:

A. The Cubans are planning to hold a symposium in psychology in Havana from 24 to 30 November 1967. Two of BUSTAMANTE's letters include invitations to American psychiatrists to attend the symposium.

B. Dr. BUSTAMANTE is planning to attend the XI Interamerican Congress of Psychology to be held in Mexico City from 17 to 22 December 1967.

C. Dr. E. Roy *JOHN from the New York Medical College spent a month at the Institute directed by Dr. BUSTAMANTE in Havana.

CONTINUED...

MICROFILMED
AUG 1 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
Letters a/s para 1 USC

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 26 JUL 67

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att usc
1 - C/WH/COG w/o att
1 - COS/JMWAVE w/att
2 - FILES

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-32515

DATE
14 July 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-327753

14-00000

ANEXO 1

15P

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS DE CUBA

INSTITUTO DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA
Y PSICOLOGIA
Loma y 37, Alt. del Vedado
Habana

DR. JOSE A. BUSTAMANTE
DIRECTOR

March 27, 1967

Stanley Lesse, M.D.
American Journal of Psychotherapy
15 West 81st. Street
New York, N.Y.
United States of America

Dear Dr. Lesse:

I have just received your letter acknowledging receipt of my work for which I thank you.

Since the mailing situation between our countries is so terrible I have made arrangements to keep in touch with you via Mexico, so I enclose a visiting card of the Assistant to the Director, Sr. Enrico Varisco, who works for Laboratories Erba in Mexico City. This will be a liaison between us since I will send my correspondence to you through him and I beg of you to do the same.

Hoping you will excuse the inconvenience, and with best wishes, I remain,

MICROFILMED
MAY 17 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Sincerely,

Prof. Dr. J. A. Bustamante
Director

JAB/el
enc.

S/C
ATT TO HMMA 31953

CS COPY

211-22396

14-00000

Anexo 2

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS DE CUBA

INSTITUTO DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA
Y PSICOLOGIA.
Loma y 37, Alt. del Vedado.
Habana

DR. JOSE A. BUSTAMANTE
DIRECTOR

La Habana, 27 de marzo de 1967

Profesor
Dr. Guillermo Dávila
Liverpool 62
Mexico 6, D.F.
Mexico

Querido Compañero:

En noviembre 8 le escribí; al no recibir respuesta suya también le escribí el 17 de febrero aprovechando el paso por esa ciudad del compañero Holmgren quién debía ponerla en correos allí.

Acabo de enterarme por la visita del amigo Enrico Varisco de que ha estado Ud. enfermo y que apenas hace unos días es que comienza a desarrollar sus actividades. Nada sabía en relación con la misma por las dificultades de comunicación que existen entre nosotros y me alegro enormemente de que el informe de Varisco incluya ya su restablecimiento.

Me informa Varisco que la Revista de la APAL, por razones de su enfermedad, no ha salido aún, lo que explica no haber llegado a mi poder pero que espera esté en la calle en los primeros días de Abril.

Me informa de que Ud. hubo de recibir mi foto y el Curriculum Vitae. Añado ahora a lo enviado en esa ocasión la elección de que he sido objeto como miembro de la IBRO (International Brain Research Organization) así como miembro de la Interamerican Journal of Psychology, en calidad de Director Consultante.

En la carta del 17 de Febrero le hablaba del libro de Psicología Médica cuyo 1er tomo ha sido publicado ya y le adjunto un ejemplar, así como también el Indice del 2o tomo que saldrá para el mes de Junio fecha en que le enviaré un ejemplar.

En cuanto al libro "Psicología Médica y su Enseñanza en Latinoamérica" del que le hablé en la antes citada carta ya está en la imprenta y saldrá para el mes de Julio.

Le adjunto también un libro publicado por la Editora del Hospital Psiquiátrico que recoge las opiniones del Prof. [illegible] que nos visitó. En este momento estamos traduciendo el libro que acaba de llegarnos.

S/C
ATT To HMMA 31953

CS COPY

201-22396

Dr. Guillermo Dávila

[illegible]

de los Profesores [illegible] y [illegible], que se denomina "Introducción a la Psicología" [illegible] y que cuando esté traducida completa le enviaré.

Le adjunto los trabajos "Aprendizaje y [illegible]", leído en el Congreso de Moscú para su uso personal y asimismo la ponencia [illegible] "Factores Culturales en Histeria con Cuadro Clínico Esquizofrénico", leído en el Congreso de Madrid para su publicación en la Revista de la APAL.

El Dr. Holtzman hubo de hablarme del Congreso de la SIP en Mexico en diciembre a donde pienso asistir y le mando un trabajo experimental que estamos haciendo en el Instituto. Todo ello se lo he escrito al Dr. Díaz Guerrero y a los miembros de la SIP, pero al mismo tiempo les he aclarado la necesidad de que a tiempo se hagan las gestiones para que se me otorgue la visa y así evitar lo que ocurrió aquella vez cuando se reunió la APAL.

Creo que las condiciones han variado mucho de entonces a acá como pone de manifiesto la serie de delegaciones cubanas que visitan a Mexico y Mexicanas que visitan a Cuba así como la estancia en Mexico durante algunos meses para post graduados en algunas materias de gran número de médicos cubanos integrados al regimen actual. Por otra parte, espero que mi condición de miembro de la Sociedad de Amistad Cubano-Mexicana haga que el Embajador de Mexico en la Habana también ayude, pero de todos modos estoy desde ahora rogando para que en su tiempo oportuno haga que se realicen las gestiones necesarias.

Voy a empezar a publicar para el mes de Junio una Revista que se denominará Psiquiatría Transcultural y que será órgano oficial de la Comisión de Psiquiatría Transcultural de la Sociedad Cubana de Psiquiatría en la que vamos a comenzar comentando en español y resumiendo los trabajos que sobre la materia se publican en el mundo para después incluir los trabajos que vayamos realizando. Vamos a hacer una tirada que comprende no solo Cuba, sino los países Latinoamericanos, España y Portugal. Estamos parando el primer número y como ve será la primera Revista en español pues en estos momentos hay dos en Inglés, la "Transcultural Psychiatry Research Review and Newsletter" de Wittkower, la "Social Psychiatry", de Joshua Bierer, y la nueva en Francés, "Psychopathologie Africaine", de Collomb, de Dakar, Senegal.

Le agradecería que si tiene trabajos sobre Psiquiatría Transcultural me los envíe para comentarlos en mi Revista. También me agradaría recibir datos sobre la APAL y sobre su cátedra.

El amigo Varlaco y yo hemos llegado a la conclusión de [illegible] vía Erbo para nuestra comunicación tanto en los viajes que él hace periódicamente como en el intermedio a través de la correspondencia entre su oficina central en Mexico y la oficina de la Habana.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para enviarle también un ejemplar de mi libro, de mis trabajos así como de la carta que hube de enviarle a nuestro común amigo y compañero, Alfonso Millán, por correo. Le ruego se lo haga llegar.

Sin más por el momento, y deseándole de nuevo que se encuentre bien, quedo de Ud.,

Afectuosamente,

Prof. Dr. J. A. Bustamante

JAB/el
adj.

Anexo 3

La Habana, 17 de Febrero de 1967

Dr. Guillermo Dávila
Liverpool 52
Mexico 6, D.F.
Mexico

Estimado Compañero:

En noviembre 2 le escribí dándole a conocer mis actividades y adjuntándole el trabajo leído en Moscú para su publicación en la Revista de la APAL; no he recibido respuesta suya y por lo tanto no sé si la carta se habrá extraviado por esa razón vuelvo a escribirle y en este momento utilizo el paso por esa ciudad del compañero [illegible] el cual ha de ponerla en correos allí y por tanto tengo la seguridad que ahora la reciba.

Le ruego me conteste entregándole su respuesta al Gerente de la Compañía Cubana de Aviación que me la envía con el piloto en turno, pues quisiera saber si va a publicar el trabajo.

Por otra parte espero a partir de ahora escribirle usando el piloto de la Cubana por lo que más cartas le llegarán.

Espero enviarle un libro de Psiquiatría Infantil que acaba de publicarse en La Habana escrito por un autor soviético.

Le adjunto también el trabajo que leí en Moscú, "Aprendizaje y Drogas".

Si ha recibido el número 2 de la Revista de la APAL, le ruego me haga saber también este dato.

Acabo de terminar un texto de Psicología Médica en tres tomos del cual ya salió el primero, el segundo está siendo impreso, debiendo salir en los primeros meses del año en curso, y ya casi he terminado el tercero.

Creo es un trabajo muy general ya que lo he escrito [illegible] para trabajo de consulta. Un índice previo en [illegible] y el programa del curriculum aparece al final. Todos los capítulos tienen [illegible]; aquellos títulos que aparecen en el programa del curriculum son parte del curso, el resto no es más que una expansión del tema [illegible] igualmente a los estudiantes y a los médicos.

S/C
ATT. TO HMMA 31953

CS COPY

201-22396

Dr. Guillermo Dávila

Creo que se trata de un trabajo que enfoca el problema de manera adecuada de acuerdo con nuestro gusto de lo que es la Psicología Médica y después de revisar toda la bibliografía mundial sobre este tema he verificado que los trabajos de Psicología Médica ya publicados no son más que Psicología Generales o Manuales de Patología Psicosomática.

Yo llamo Psicología Médica a mi libro. El primer tomo tiene 226 páginas, y cada uno de los otros dos tendrán un número similar de páginas.

El 1er. tomo es sobre Psicología General (para los estudiantes del 2do. año) y el 2do tomo se llama Psicología y la Medicina, y es la verdadera Psicología Médica la que es propia para los estudiantes de Propedéutica en el 3er. año, y también para aquellos que estén estudiando Cirugía, Obstetricia y Pediatría en el 4o. y 5o. años. El tercer tomo reune todas las escuelas psicológicas que se usan en Medicina así como toda la orientación de Psicoterapia que se usa para los post graduados.

También le estoy enviando una copia del Indice del segundo tomo. Yo considero que este constituye una originalidad en todo el trabajo ya que el primer tomo es sobre Psicología General (de la cual hay trabajos publicados) y el tercero contiene todas las escuelas (de las cuales hay trabajos publicados también). En Madrid, hube de mostrar el Indice a Seguín y estuvo muy de acuerdo con el mismo. Se lo estoy enviando solicitando su opinión crítica.

He escrito y me encuentro en el proceso de revisarlo y casi he terminado, un libro de unas 200 páginas para el cual he seleccionado el título de "Psicología Médica y su enseñanza en Medicina", un libro en el que expongo de manera detallada mi opinión sobre esta materia. Como es natural, recojo en el mismo todas las opiniones expresadas por diferentes autores, también las orientaciones de Congresos y Conferencias, lo que hay en el mundo en estos momentos sobre este tema, y después de todo eso desarrollo lo que estamos haciendo en nuestro Departamento de Psicología Médica, y finalmente nuestra opinión sobre todo esto.

El Dr. Holtzman me dijo que en diciembre se celebrará en Mexico el Congreso de la SIP y me invita a que no falte. Pienso ir, pero desde ahora me encuentro escribiendo a Ud., a Díaz Guerrero y a los miembros de la SIP para que me hagan las gestiones porque se me de la visa. Espero que mi condición de miembro de la Sociedad de Amistad Cubano-Mexicana haga que el Embajador de Mexico en La Habana también ayude.

Ud. sabe bien que tengo gran deseo de estar con Ud., Seguín y los otros compañeros así que le ruego haga lo posible para que tal cosa se logre.

Le estoy adjuntando los trabajos pues creo que no le llegó la carta anterior.

Con un saludo afectuoso me despido de Ud., fraternalmente,

JAB/el
adj.

Dr. J. A. Bustamante
Director

14-00000

Anexo 4

La Habana, 20 de Febrero de 1967

Profesor
Dr. Alfonso Millán
Cátedra de Psicología Médica
Universidad Autónoma de Mexico
Mexico, D.F.
Mexico

Querido Amigo:

Hace tiempo no te escribo pues las ocupaciones me han embargado en forma insuperable.

En Madrid pude saber de ti por los compañeros asistentes al Congreso de Psiquiatría y asimismo pude tener la satisfacción de recibir el homenaje ofrecido por los compañeros Latinoamericanos en magnífico almuerzo. En el mismo me informaron del acuerdo del Congreso con relación a dicho homenaje y a mi futura nominación en el Consejo Asesor.

Espero asistir al Congreso de la SIP en Mexico en diciembre de esta año y supongo habré de encontrarme allí contigo, Dávila, Matta de Gregorio, Seguín y otros compañeros.

Aprovecho la oportunidad ahora para informarte de nuestras actividades y te ruego me hagas saber de las tuyas por correo para estar mutuamente enterados.

Nuestro Instituto, que empezó sus actividades en 1962, tiene tres Departamentos: Neurofisiología, Psicología y Psicología Social, y fue fundado por la Escuela de Medicina llegando a formar parte de la Academia de Ciencias en 1965.

El Departamento de Neurofisiología está actualmente trabajando en las investigaciones siguientes:

a) Condición y Potenciales Evocados en la Vía Auditiva.
b) Influencia de Cardiotónicos y otras Drogas sobre el Reflejo Condicionado de Evitación.
c) Estudio de la Actividad Eléctrica del Sistema Nervioso de la Zachrisia Guanensis.

s/c
ATT. TO HMMA 31953

CS COPY

201-22396

Dr. [illegible]

d) Irradiación de Ondas Epilépticas. Influencias de diversas estructuras cerebrales sobre las mismas.

El Departamento de Psicología está trabajando en estas investigaciones:

a) Estudio de las variables participantes en la relación Médico-Paciente en Psicoterapia individual y en Psicoterapia de grupo.

b) Estabilidad manual y motivación.
c) Factores de la personalidad del médico en perturbaciones Iatrogénicas.
d) Motivación y actividad motriz.
e) Hipnosis y aprendizaje.

El Departamento de Psicología Social está realizando las siguientes investigaciones:

a) Encuesta de la actitud de los estudiantes de Medicina.
b) Comportamiento de inadaptados sociales en la Provincia de Camagüey
c) Estudio sobre la burocracia.

El Departamento de Psicología Social no es un laboratorio de Ciencias Sociales; no es un Departamento de Sociología, y si se quiere, no se rige por un concepto psicologizante de la sociología. Es un laboratorio donde algunos aspectos sociales de nuestro medio son estudiados.

Por lo tanto, las investigaciones para estudiar las actitudes y opiniones de los jóvenes estudiantes cubanos así como el estudio de las aspiraciones del hombre en los campos, en sus propias tierras o en las granjas colectivas, se efectúan en este Departamento de Psicología Social.

Por primera vez en Cuba tenemos esta oportunidad ya que la Nación es, al fin, un gran laboratorio social donde profundos cambios se están ofreciendo a la mente investigadora, grandes posibilidades que si no se toman en consideración se perderían lamentablemente.

Como puede observarse, el estudio social se limita a aquellos aspectos peculiares no solo de nuestra tradición sino de los cambios ocurridos en nuestro país, así como las consecuentes modificaciones psicológicas que quedarán evidenciadas en nuestros Simposios.

Además de estos tres Departamentos, el Instituto tiene cuatro Secciones: Electrónica, Estadística, Bibliografía y Publicaciones. En estos momentos, el personal que trabaja en el Instituto es como sigue: 8 profesores, 6 auxiliares, 3 psicólogos, 6 técnicos, 6 alumnos en Psicología y 6 en Psicología Social.

Como una aspiración final, trabajamos por la posible unificación de nuestros esfuerzos llevados a cabo por nuestros tres Departamentos para así poder alcanzar nuestra meta, esto es, los estudios interdisciplinarios realizados en campos hasta ahora desconocidos por nosotros, una aspiración deseada por aquéllos que están interesados en estas materias. Así, estamos trabajando en dos líneas de investigación: "Estímulos materiales y morales en la productividad" y "Motivación en un grupo religioso de Cuba".

Para resumir, el objetivo de nuestro Instituto es el estudio de los niveles neurofisiológicos y psicológicos así como los aspectos sociales que puedan ser de interés a nuestro país, tratando de alcanzar dentro de los límites de nuestros métodos de investigaciones la integración interdisciplinaria de nuestras disciplinas.

En estos momentos nos encontramos en el proceso de organizar un laboratorio de actividades Córtico-Viscerales o Psicosomático en conexión con una Clínica Psiquiátrica. Otro Laboratorio de Psicofármacos y Conducta pero manteniendo el de Psicología Aplicada en el que yo continuaré con mis estudios de variables participantes en la relación Médico-Paciente en Psicoterapia.

El Instituto ha organizado y convocado un Simposio Internacional de Neurofisiología el cual se celebró en febrero de 1965 en La Habana al cual asistieron muchos neurofisiólogos de fama internacional (como Asratyán, Purpura, Roy John, Grastyán, Bures, Kogan, Lifschits, Lissak, Mancic, etc.) y está organizando un Simposio Internacional de Psicología para 1968 con el siguiente tema: "Motivación: sus aspectos psicológicos, sociales y neurofisiológicos. Perspectiva de su integración".

Hemos inaugurado una nueva sección llamada Estudio Transculturales la que trabaja en conexión con la Comisión Psiquiátrica Transcultural de la Sociedad Cubana de Psiquiatría.

Para junio yo empezaré a publicar una Revista que se llamará Psiquiatría Transcultural y la cual será el órgano oficial de la Comisión de Psiquiatría y la Sección de Estudios Transculturales del Instituto, en la que aparecerá un resumen y comentarios en español de todos los trabajos publicados sobre esta materia en el mundo y más tarde incluiremos nuestros propios trabajos.

En relación al Departamento de Psicología Médica de la Facultad de Medicina en la Universidad de La Habana, nosotros empezamos a trabajar en 1961 después de operarse algunos cambios en la Universidad entre los cuales surgió este Departamento.

Empezamos con un curso práctico teórico en el 3er. año de Medicina pero mientras tanto se estaban realizando negociaciones con las autoridades Académicas para llevar a cabo esa transformación.

Nuestra opinión es que la Psicología Médica debe enseñarse de modo paralelo a las disciplinas a lo largo de la carrera hasta que el absurdo dualismo que hoy ofrece adecuada preparación somática pero muy débil preparación psicológica sea superado.

El año pasado, el Departamento de Psicología Médica realizó un estudio de la personalidad y vocación de todos los estudiantes que se inscriben haciendo entrevistas y pruebas que se repiten más tarde

En el 5to.

En el 2do. año explicaremos la Psicología General para dar la necesaria preparación a una aplicación adecuada de la Psicología Médica.

En el 3er. año invadimos el campo de la Propedéutica y participamos con los maestros añadiendo los factores psicológicos y sociales a la historia clínica, el estudio de los factores psicológicos en la entrevista, la relación Médico-Paciente, la reacción psicológica del paciente somático y las repercusiones somáticas de los trastornos emocionales.

En el 4to. año tenemos una tarea similar, pero como es natural, en una forma más especializada en Cirugía y Obstetricia, y en el 5to. año en Pediatría, añadimos los elementos necesarios de Psicología Social para realizar una competente campaña sanitaria.

El 6to. año se dedica al sistema de internado rotativo.

El Departamento de Psiquiatría explica Propedéutica Psiquiátrica en 3ro. y 4to. años, y la Psiquiatría Clínica en el 5to.

Nuestro Departamento junto con el Departamento de Psiquiatría para los residentes de Psiquiatría explica los aspectos neurofisiológicos y psicológicos y en curso de post graduado dedica tres años a que se desarrollen como especialistas.

Un curso de Psicoterapia se está organizando para los post graduados para así crear psicoterapeutas.

Por el momento tenemos el siguiente personal, el cual se divide el trabajo entre sí: 6 profesores, 4 auxiliares, 4 psicólogos, 3 instructores graduados, 6 no graduados y 40 estudiantes ayudantes.

Como que no tenemos técnicos suficientes ya que el nuestro es un país subdesarrollado, nosotros trabajamos en una doble capacidad por el momento (enseñanza e investigación) usando un tercio de nuestro tiempo en la enseñanza y dos tercios en la investigación.

Acabo de terminar un texto de Psicología Médica en tres tomos del cual ya salió el primero, el segundo está siendo impreso debiendo salir en los primeros meses del año en curso, y ya casi he terminado el 3ro.

Este es un trabajo sui generis ya que lo he escrito no solo como texto sino como trabajo de consulta. Un índice previo da todo el contenido y el programa del curriculum aparece al final. Todos los capítulos tienen los títulos en negritas; aquellos títulos que aparecen en el programa del curriculum son parte del curso, el resto no es más que una expansión del mismo. De este modo, sirve igualmente a los estudiantes y a los médicos.

Creo que se trata de un trabajo que enfoca el problema de manera adecuada de acuerdo con nuestra tesis de lo que es la Psicología Médica y después de revisar toda la bibliografía mundial sobre este tema he verificado que los trabajos de Psicología Médica ya publicados no son más que Psicologías Generales o Capítulos de Patología Psicosomática.

Yo llamo Psicología Médica a mi libro. El primer tomo tiene 396 páginas, y cada uno de los otros dos tendrán un número similar de páginas.

El 1er. tomo es sobre Psicología General (para los estudiantes del 2do. año y el 2do tomo se llama Psicología y la Medicina, y es la verdadera Psicología Médica la que es propia para los estudiantes de Propedéutica en el 3er. año, y también para aquellos que estén estudiando Cirugía, Obstetricia y Pediatría en el 4to. y 5to. años. El tercer tomo reune todas las escuelas psicológicas que se usan en Medicina así como toda la orientación de Psicoterapia que se usa para los post graduados.

Adjunto encontrará mi trabajo sobre "Aprendizaje y Drogas". Este trabajo que hube de presentar en el XVIII Congreso Internacional de Psicología de Moscú en el Simposio de Psicofármacos y Regulación de la Conducta lo hemos continuado posteriormente modificando el diseño realizando en lugar de tres sesiones un número de ellas que se extenderán hasta unas veinte con idéntico ritmo. Con ello, pretendemos superar una duda que quedó consignada en sus conclusiones sobre la posible insuficiencia de tres sesiones en relación con la normal curva del olvido.

Muy bien podría ser este trabajo el que llevara al próximo Congreso de la SIP o por el contrario algunos de los que realizamos en el campo de la Psicología Transcultural.

También te estoy enviando "Factores Culturales en Histerias con Cuadro Clínico Esquizofrénico". Este trabajo fue leído en el mes de Septiembre pasado en el IV Congreso Mundial de Psiquiatría, en Madrid.

Además te envío una copia del Indice del segundo tomo. Yo considero que éste constituye una originalidad en todo el trabajo ya que el primer tomo es sobre Psicología General (de la cual hay trabajos publicados) y el tercero contiene todas las escuelas (de las cuales hay trabajos publicados también). En Madrid, hube de mostrar el Indice a Seguín y estuvo muy de acuerdo con el mismo. Te lo estoy enviando solicitando tu opinión crítica.

He escrito y me encuentro en el proceso de revisarlo y casi he terminado un libro de unas 200 páginas para el cual he seleccionado el título de "Psicología Médica y su enseñanza en Medicina", un libro en el que expongo de manera detallada mi opinión sobre esta materia. Como es natural, recojo en el mismo todas las opiniones expresadas por diferentes autores, también las orientaciones de Con-

[illegible] A. Millán

Personas, [illegible] [illegible] al mundo en [illegible] momentos sobre este tema, y después de todo ese desarrollo lo que estamos haciendo en nuestro Departamento de Psicología [illegible] y finalmente quisiera opinión sobre todo esto. Ya estoy escribiendo también el Índice de este libro.

Cuando este libro salga con mucho gusto te enviaré una copia.

Esperando tener noticias tuyas pronto, y con un abrazo se despide de ti,

Fraternalmente,

Prof. Dr. José A. Bustamante
Director

JAB/el
adj.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOTHERAPY
OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHOTHERAPY, INC.

STANLEY LESSE, M. D. • EDITOR
15 WEST 81ST STREET • NEW YORK 24, N. Y.

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
SILVANO ARIETI, M. D.
LEOPOLD BELLAK, M. D.
JEROME FRANK, M. D.
LAWRENCE C. KOLB, M. D.
FREDERIC WERTHAM, M. D.
JOSEPH WILDER, M. D.
LEWIS R. WOLBERG, M. D.
WILLIAM WOLF, M. D.

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
RUTH NORDEN LOWE

April 21, 1967

Mr. Enrico Varisco
Assistant Director
Lab. Carlo Erba De Mexico, S.A.
M.A. Quevado 555
Mexico 21, D.F.
Mexico

Dear Mr. Varisco:

Enclosed you will find a letter written to Dr. Jose Bustamante. Dr. Bustamante informed me that I could maintain contact with him by forwarding letters to you and that these letters in turn, would be sent to him. I appreciate your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Stanley Lesse

Stanley Lesse, M.D.
Editor-in-Chief

SL:al
Enc.

s/c
ATT TO HMMA 31953

CS COPY

201-22396

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOTHERAPY

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHOTHERAPY, INC.

STANLEY LESSE, M. D. ● EDITOR

15 WEST 81ST STREET ● NEW YORK 24, N. Y.

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
SILVANO ARIETI, M. D.
LEOPOLD BELLAK, M. D.
JEROME FRANK, M. D.
LAWRENCE C. KOLB, M. D.
FREDERIC WERTHAM, M. D.
JOSEPH WILDER, M. D.
LEWIS R. WOLBERG, M. D.
WILLIAM WOLF, M. D.

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
RUTH NORDEN LOWE

April 21, 1967

Dr. Jose A. Bustamante
Instituto de Neurofisiologia
Y Psicologia
Loma y 37, Alt. Del Vedado
Havana, Cuba

Dear Dr. Bustamante:

I have recently completed a reading of your paper entitled "Cultural Factors in Hysterias with Schizophrenic Clinical Pictures." I found it to be of great interest and I appreciate your sending it to me. I have been working with Dr. William Wolf on the projection of medical education and psychiatry as they are likely to be in the next century. The first of a series of articles and of a monograph, was published in the April 1966 issue of the American Journal of Psychotherapy. This takes in a great deal of analysis that would be included under transcultural psychiatry. Indeed, we are using the systems analysis approach which, of course, must take into account the broad psychosocial and socioeconomic forces that influence the psychodynamics matrices in individuals. I am interested in the particular securities that are precipitated in the ego structure of individuals by the very nature of the socioeconomic, sociopolitical and sociophilosophic system in which the individual lives. In an opposite vein, we are interested in the stresses that are placed upon the individual by various social systems from individual and practical standpoints. Awarenesses such as these should be of help in the planning of social systems for underdeveloped nations. While this seems like a very ambitious conceptualization, I do not believe that it is an unlikely possibility in the coming generations.

I look forward to receive the copy of your book "Psicologia Medica", Volume I. I believe that the outline as you presented it to me seems very inclusive.

Your note concerning a meeting dealing with

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN

FROM:

RID/FI

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

ZZ

17 MAY 1967 copy detached, [illegible]

3-4 - please review for any exploitation desired.

There may be some info on [illegible] here."

MICROFILMED
MAY 17 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

4-7 Letter to [redacted] STAFF employee
[illegible] in one-time CSLB
to OS/[illegible], CSAB-ED

16 MAY 1967

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICERS INITIALS
1 [illegible]				[redacted]
2				
3 [redacted] STAFF employee				[redacted]
4 WH/COG Cuba/Reports/ [redacted] staff employee				[redacted]
5				
6				
7 WH/1 [redacted] STAFF employee				[redacted]
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17 RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

"motivation" to take place in February, 1968 is of some interest to me. I would like to know more about it with the possibility that I might attend if there are circumstances permitting my coming to Havana.

I plan to publish a modified form of your letter in the July issue of the American Journal of Psychotherapy. This will enable our readers to be more aware of your activities in Cuba.

I look forward to the maintenance of a very close correspondence.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely,

Stan Lesse

SL:al

Stanley Lesse, M.D.
Editor-in-Chief

Note! I just received the book. It is well organized and represents a definite contribution

14-00000

26

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: [redacted] ASSET

Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: Director 83396

Action Required: For your information

MICROFILMED
MAY 17 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Before leaving on his last trip to Cuba in March 1967, [redacted] ASSET was asked to obtain information on Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE, reported to be one of Fidel CASTRO's physicians. [redacted] was warned that BUSTAMANTE is considered to be a pro-Soviet Communist. ASSET

2. [redacted] ASSET had previously met Dr. BUSTAMANTE via a common friend, Dr. Guillermo DAVILA, a Mexican physician who occasionally gives L-1 ASSET messages and publications for delivery in Havana. DAVILA asked [redacted] to say hello to his Cuban friend, which L-1 did on 27 March. During the ensuing conversation, BUSTAMANTE mentioned that he attended the World Congress of Psychology in the Soviet Union in August 1966. He had previously visited the USSR in 1961, and found great changes in that country. He felt that a definite evolution had taken place between 1961 and 1966, bringing life in the Soviet Union several steps closer to that in the Western countries. He also found radical changes in the field of his professional specialty. Psychiatric and psychological trends in the USSR, he felt, had broken away from the rigid doctrines that limited their development until a few years ago and had grown more liberal. Several specialists who had been ostracized for psychiatric and psychological theories contrary to those officially accepted in the USSR had been rehabilitated.

3. [redacted] ASSET offered the services of his firm with branches in Mexico and Cuba to help BUSTAMANTE send and receive letters to and from foreign countries, pointing out that his firm quite frequently made use of Cubana pilots, a much faster transmittal method than normal mail channels.

(Continued)

Attachment:
Letters (5) Under Separate Cover

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated [illegible]

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/atts.
1 - C/JMWAVE w/atts.

CS COPY

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-31953

DATE: 4 May 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-31953

BUSTAMANTE appeared grateful for this offer and gave [redacted] ASSET four letters when he had lunch with him on 30 April. Photocopies of these letters are forwarded under separate cover. We leave any exploitation of the information contained in these letters to Headquarters. Of some interest is the fact that BUSTAMANTE hopes to attend a medical congress in Mexico in December 1967. Also interesting are the details which the doctor gives on his work in Cuba. BUSTAMANTE mentions, for example in his letter to Dr. Alfonso MILLAN in Mexico, that he is currently making two separate investigations: "Material and moral enducements for productivity" and "Motivation of a religious group in Cuba." A reply to one of BUSTAMANTE's letters received by [redacted] on 26 April is also attached under separate cover. Information provided by BUSTAMANTE on the rise and fall of Drs. MACHADO Ventura and Rene VALLEJO as Fidel Castro's private physicians and confidants was disseminated in a separate intelligence report.

ASSET

[redacted]

for [redacted]

STAFF employee

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

CPH

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/1				JCP
2. [redacted]		1 Aug		
3. [redacted]		3 Aug		[redacted]
4. WH/COG/FI		4 Aug		
5. [redacted] WH/SAO [redacted]				
6. STAFF OFFICERS				
7.				
8. C/[illegible]/NG [redacted] 7 AUG 1967 STAFF OFFICER				
9. WH/SAO 22 AUG 1967				
10. CU			8/22-DS	
11.				
12. WH/1 - JS				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

1 AUG 1967 Copy Detached

1 3 Al - you [illegible] this guy from Cuba [illegible] be wrong but I [illegible] recollect that he [illegible] as [illegible] as he [illegible] Will you check [illegible]

MICROFILMED
AUG 1 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

with Cuba [illegible] his formerly traces and comments - No objection if Cuba takes action ~~[illegible]~~ our only [illegible] is 42(SOZT-1). [redacted] check with [redacted] ~~re Cuba ago~~ for possible [illegible] Hopefully be [illegible] State [illegible]

4 TO [illegible]

I think this should be passed on to [illegible] for action. Maybe Dr. [redacted] in medical can be of [illegible] assistance in this [illegible]

note error in dispatch - should be 1968 not 1967.

[illegible] employee

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	☒
		INDEX	☒

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

[illegible] 223418

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

[illegible]

DOCUMENT NUMBER

[illegible]

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

71

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	XXX	PROCESSING ACTION & ATTS MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO: Chief, WH/COG and Chief of Station, JMWAVE (UFG		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City [redacted]		MICROFILM
SUBJECT: PERUMEN[redacted]Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: See paragraph two		

Reference: HMMA-31953

FORMER ASSET

1. Forwarded under separate cover attachment are eleven letters sent or received by Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE, Director of the Institute of Neuropsychology and Psychology in Havana, via [redacted] who acts as a postman receiving and mailing these letters in Mexico City. We would like to make the following observations in connection with these letters:

A. The Cubans are planning to hold a symposium in psychology in Havana from 24 to 30 November 1967. Two of BUSTAMANTE's letters include invitations to American psychiatrists to attend the symposium.

B. Dr. BUSTAMANTE is planning to attend the XI Interamerican Congress of Psycology to be held in Mexico City from 17 to 22 December 1967.

C. Dr. E. Roy *JOHN from the New York Medical College spent a month at the Institute directed by Dr. BUSTAMANTE in Havana.

CONTINUED...

MICROFILMED
AUG 1 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
Letters a/s para 1 USC

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 28 Jul 67

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att usc
1 - C/WH/COG w/o att
1 - COS/JMWAVE w/att
2 - FILES

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-32515	14 July 1967
	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	HQS FILE NUMBER 1753

Asset

2. This Station believes that an effort should made to obtain assessments of Dr. BUSTAMANTE from one or more American doctors attending the Havana symposium and/or the Mexico City congress. While BUSTAMANTE is openly critical of various aspects of United States foreign policy, including U.S. relations with Cuba, he apparently likes Americans. He recently told [redacted] in Havana that the World Congress of Psychology held in Madrid in September 1966 gave him the opportunity to again meet, after a number of years, a number of colleagues from various countries including the United States. He said that he took this opportunity to deny allegations that he was a doctor belonging to the state security emphasizing that these allegations were calomnies as he had always limited his activities in Cuba to strictly scientific fields.

3. We would like to have Headquarters' and JMWAVEs' reactions to our suggestion.

[redacted]

for [redacted]

Staff employee

9P

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS DE CUBA

INSTITUTO DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA
Y PSICOLOGIA
Loma y 37, Alt. del Vedado
Habana

Prof. Dr. José A. Bustamante
Director

June 12, 1967

MICROFILMED
AUG 1 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

F. C. Redlich, (M.D.)
occ Professor of Psychiatry
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut USA

Dear Dr. Redlich:

In December 14, 1966, I wrote you a long letter giving you all the information about our activities at the Institute. I have not heard from you ever since, and I am afraid this letter did not reach you at all, therefore, I am enclosing a copy and following are a few more news about this year's activities so far.

I wish to let you know that in July our new Review called Transcultural Psychiatry will be published here. As soon as it is out, I will mail you a copy. We are editing it and it will be the first of its kind in our language.

We have an Anthropologist working with us at the Institute now, Dr. Antonio Santa Cruz, a Yale graduate, and we are planning a joint book on Transcultural Psychiatry since there is not a treatise in Spanish on this subject. I will let you know as to its development.

In reference to the Reviews that you so kindly offered to send us, we are for the time being overcoming the shortage we were experiencing. Instead, and if at all possible, I would like to receive Vol. III of the American Handbook of Psychiatry, edited by Silvano Arieti. I have Vols. I and II, and would be obliged to you if you could send it to me.

Although I know your interest is in Psychiatry, I wish to inform you that we are organizing a Symposium of Psychology which will take place in Havana, the 24-30 of November, 1968, convened by the Institute and the Academy of Sciences. Its subject will be: "Motivation: neurophysiologic, psychologic and social factors. Perspective of an integration". The paper could be on motivation: it can be an interdisciplinary subject, as well as neurophysiologic, psychologic or a social one.

I do not know whether you are interested or not, but in case you are, please let me know and I will send you an invitation. The guests' stay will be borne by the Academy of Sciences, and we have

s/c
ATT #1 TO HMMA 32515

201-22396

made arrangements that will assure tickets for all via Mexico, Praga or Madrid.

Three of the scientists that have already accepted to come to the Symposium visited the Institute this year. One of them was Dr. Vladimir D. Nebylitsyn, Vice-Director of the Institute of Psychology from Moscow, who stayed two months with us. He helped us to create a typology laboratory in our Psychology Department. At the same time, he offered a course on typology variables according to Teplov and himself.

He works principally studying personality. His conception is primarily based in the human brain properties that were discovered by Pavlov and later on were developed by Teplov and his collaborators.

De Nebylitsyn, as well as other investigators, have developed some scientific methods on the investigation of such properties of the nervous system and their studies nowadays can very well be correlated with certain personality dimensions. It has been thus proven by some investigators abroad and today, in Cuba, we need to begin developing such scientific methods.

We also had Dr. E. Roy John, from the New York Medical College, who spent a month here. Following is a brief resumé of his activities at the Institute.

In the mornings, Dr. John gave a lecture on physiology of learning, having memory as a basic theme, explained every possible way, psychological, physiological, biochemical and anatomically. The lecture was discussed by those attending, and experimental solutions were proposed for various problems not yet resolved. The text book used in this course was written by Dr. John himself and will be out of print by now.

In the afternoons, four different experiments were carried out. The first one on evoked potentials in humans, correlations of same facing luminous stimulations of different colors. Influence of expectancy situations. The second experiment was on learning, observing cats with alimentary reflex. The third one was in influence of specific and unspecific structures of the Central Nervous System on learning. Stimulations of different specific structures and of reticular watching the importance of the facilitation of this mechanism. The fourth experiment was a study with microelectrodes of neuronal activity changes during the learning stage in cronic animals.

Both Dr. Nebylitsyn and Dr. John dictated very interesting conferences at the Academy of Sciences' Conference Hall and at the Scientific Council of the Ministry of Public Health.

At the moment, we have Dr. E. Grastyán, from the University of Pecs, Hungary, who will leave soon after collaborating with the Department of Psychology for two months. He has been working on motivation and cooperating in a joint work for our coming Symposium.

I think I should let you know that I have written to Dr. D. Leigh, Secretary to the World Psychiatric Association and among other things I indicated the convenience to create one Committee or Section of Transcultural Psychiatry within the World Psychiatric Association because this is a rather new and multi-disciplinary field (comprising psychologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists, etc.) requiring more than any other one the cooperation and help to facilitate the efforts to keep producing and offering contributions in the development of this field.

I have secured a better way to get our mail and it consists of the following: address your envelope to Laboratorios Erba, Apartado 21909, Mexico 21, D.F., Mexico, and the letter to me. Once they open the letter and see it is addressed to me, a member of the laboratory will bring it personally to me as they travel back and forth between our countries. I will address my letters to you and they will mail them in Mexico to you. In this way, we are both sure our mail will not get lost since I have absolute confidence in them.

I think I have covered everything of interest to you.

Hoping to hear from you soon, and with best wishes, I remain,

Cordially yours,

Prof. Dr. J. A. Bustamante
Director

JAB/cl
enc.

SECRET

VOLUME II OF II

JANUARY 1966 Thru

OFFICI CS FILE

SECRET

[redacted]
WH [illegible]
EXT. 5910 7144
2? JANUARY 1972

S-E-C-R-E-T

[illegible] DISSEMINATION
3? PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

[illegible] FILE, VR. c/WH/FAN, CS/DO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 23JAN72 CO 53z CITE DIRECTOR 224205

IMMEDIATE BOGOTA INFO ROUTINE WH/MIAMI

[redacted]

REF A. BOGOTA 18310 (IN 519768)

B. WH/MIAMI 13648 (IN 519786)

1. HEADQUARTERS TRACES REVEAL NO SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL INFO.

2. FILE: DEFER. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG

FILE IN 201- 022396

Released by—phone:
[redacted]

staff employee

staff employee
[redacted]
C/WH/3/C

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

CSDO

D 1820 Z

3

c/will8

865

FILE, VR c/WH/N CSDO ADP ADDP c/CI c/ c/

S E C R E T 221724Z JAN 72 CITE BOGOTA 18310

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI, DIRECTOR

22 JAN 72 IN 519768

[redacted] Indecatore

REF: BOGOTA 18289 (IN 518523)

1. REQUEST IMMEDIATE TRACES COMPLETE PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PRESENT WHEREABOUTS, IF KNOWN, CAPTIAN JOSE ABRAHANTES FERNANDEZ. Former Asset [redacted] PICKED PHOTO NUMBER 169 CUBAN MUG BOOK (JUAN ABRAHANTES) AS POSSIBLY CUBAN WHO USES ALIAS "FIDEL" AND WHO IN CHARGE CUBAN GROUP ALLEGEDLY BOGOTA AT PRESENT. COULD JUAN LOOK LIKE JOSE IF LATTER WEARING BEARD?

2. ALSO REQUEST IMMEDIATE TRACES INCLUDING PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PRESENT WHEREABOUTS ROLANDO CUBLEA SECANDES, NUMBER 170 MUG BOOK, JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY, NUMBER 311 MUG BOOK, AND JACINTO VASQUEZ DE LA GARZA, NUMBER 623 MUG BOOK.

3. FILE: DEFER. GP-1

SECRET

FILE IN 201-022396

[redacted] staff employee

100

2310

30

FILE, VR, C/WH/OA, CS/DO, C/CI, DDI, [illegible], C/[illegible] 3, C/[illegible]

SECRET 222200Z JAN 72 CITE WH/MIAMI 13648

IMMEDIATE BOGOTA INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

22 JAN IN 519786

[redacted] Indicators

REF BOGOTA 18310 (IN 519768)

1. PRECISE WHEREABOUTS OF CAPTAIN JOSE ABRAHANTES IS NOT KNOWN TO US, BUT WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS OUTSIDE OF CUBA. GIVEN HIS RANK (VICE MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND HEAD OF THE DSE), IT SEEMS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD BE ENGAGED IN A MISSION WITH SUCH PATENTLY HIGH FLAP POTENTIAL. OUR FILE ON JOSE DOES NOT INDICATE THAT HE HAS EVER USED WAR NAME "FIDEL." COMPARISON OF OUR MOST RECENT (CIRCA 1965) PHOTOGRAPH OF JOSE WITH PHOTO 169 (OF JUAN) IN MUG BOOK LEADS US TO CONCLUDE THAT JOSE AND JUAN ARE NOT IDENTICAL. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF JOSE AS FOLLOWS:

THIRTY NINE YEAR OLD CAUCASIAN WITH BLACK HAIR AND EYES. DARK COMPLECTED, MEDIUM BUILD, ROUND FACE AND GENERALLY REGARDED AS HANDSOME. DIFFERENT SOURCES ESTIMATE HIS HEIGHT AND WEIGHT AS RANGING FROM FIVE FOOT SEVEN TO FIVE FOOT NINE AND FROM 110 LBS TO 175 LBS.

2. WE HAVE NO PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF JUAN ABRAHANTES AND CAN PROVIDE NO INFORMATION ON HIS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS.

FILE IN 201- 022396

FILE, VR

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 13648 S E C R E T

3. MAJOR ROLANDO CUBELA SECADES (201-2[illegible]34) WAS ARRESTED IN EARLY 1966 FOR CONSPIRING WITH CIA AGAINST THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT GENERALLY AND FIDEL CASTRO SPECIFICALLY. HIS SENTENCE WAS FOR 25 YEARS. IN THE INTERIM WE HAVE RECEIVED SEVERAL REFUGEE REPORTS TO THE EFFECT THAT CUBELA IS STILL (AS OF AUGUST 1971) IN THE LA CABANA PRISON WHERE IS WORKING AS A MEDICAL DOCTOR. WE HAVE NO PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF CUBELA AND HAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS WHEREABOUTS. HOWEVER, UNLESS THE ENTIRE ARREST AND TRIAL IN 1966 AND SUBSEQUENT IMPRISONMENT OF CUBELA WERE A TOTAL FARSE, WE INCLINED TO DOUBT THAT CUBELA WOULD BE ENTRUSTED WITH THIS SORT OF MISSION.

4. JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY (201-022395) WAS BORN IN JANUARY 1911 AND IS CURRENTLY A PROFESSOR PHYCHOLOGY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA MEDICAL SCHOOL. IN NOVEMBER 1971, ALONG WITH FIDEL CASTRO, HE MADE CONTACT WITH CHILEAN DRUG TRAFFICERS (DIRECTOR 2011[illegible]). WE HAVE NO PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS TO BUSTAMANTE'S WHEREABOUTS, BUT ARE INCLINED TO THINK THAT HIS AGE WOULD RULE HIM OUT OF THIS SORT OF EXERCISE.

5. JACINTO VASQUEZ DE LA GARZA (201 [illegible]) IS [illegible]

[illegible]

FILE, VR

PAGE 3 WH/MIAMI 1648 S E C R E T

AMBASSADOR TO THE UAR. CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN TO US. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AS FOLLOWS: BORN SOMETIME BETWEEN 1927 AND 1932. CAUCASIAN WITH LIGHT BROWN HAIR WHO WEARS PRESCRIPTION GLASSES. DESCRIPTIONS OF HIS HEIGHT AND WEIGHT VARY FROM 5 FEET 6 INCHES TO 5 FEET 8 INCHES AND FROM 125 LBS TO 145 LBS.

6. FILE: DEFER. GP1.

SECRET

December 14, 1966

F. C. Redlich, M.D.
Professor of Psychiatry
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut
United States of America

Dear Dr. Redlich:

According to our conversation I am writing to you in order to let you know all about the Institute of Neurophysiology and Psychology of the Academy of Sciences of Cuba, and the Department of Medical Psychology of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Havana.

Our Institute, which began its activities in 1962, has three Departments: Neurophysiology, Psychology and Social Psychology, and was founded by the School of Medicine, becoming one of the Institutes of the Academy of Sciences in 1965.

The Department of Neurophysiology is working on the following investigations: *

a) Influences of some drugs or chemical substances which favor and inhibit Leao's spreading depression on convulsive crisis.
b) Cardiotonic influences on avoidance reflex.
c) Study on the electrical activity of Zachrisia Guanensis' nervous system.
d) Drug-dependence learning on cat and rat.

The Psychology Department is working on these investigations: *

a) Study on the participant variables in the Physician-Patient relationship in individual psychotherapy and in group psychotherapy.
b) Hand-steadiness and Motivation.
c) Personality factors of the physician in Iatrogenic disturbances.
d) Motivation and motor activity.
e) Hypnosis and learning.

The Department of Social Psychology is doing the next researches: *

a) Attitude survey on medical school students.
b) Social Maladjusted behavior in Camagüey Province.
c) Study on bureaucracy.

---

* At the time this was written.

The Social Psychology Department is not a laboratory on Social Sciences; it is not a Sociology Department, and if you will, it is not ruled by a Psychologised concept of Sociology.

It is a laboratory where modest social aspects of our medium are studied with the purpose to know the values and stereotypes offered in our medium in connection with the psychological activity.

Thus, the investigations to study the attitudes and opinions of the young Cuban students as wellas the study of the ambitions of the man in the fields, in his own lands or in collective farms, are carried out in this Social Psychology Department.

For the first time in Cuba we have this opportunity since our Nation is, at last, a big social laboratory where profound changes are being offered to the investigative mind, great possibilities that if not taken in consideration would be hopelessly lost.

As it can be observed, the social study is limited to those peculiar aspects not only of our tradition but of the changes occurring in our country, as well as the consequent psychological modifications that will be evidenced in our Symposia.

Besides the three Departments, the Institute has four Sections: Electronics, Statistics, Bibliography and Publications.

At this moment, the personnel working at the Institute is as follows: 8 Professors, 6 auxiliaries, 3 psychologists, 6 technicians, 2 statisticians, 1 anthropologist, 6 students in Neurophysiology, 6 in Psychology, and 6 in Social Psychology.

As a final aspiration, there is the possible unification of the efforts carried out by our three Departments so we can reach our goal, i.e., the inter-disciplinary studies made in fields unknown up to now, an aspiration maintained by those interested in these subjects. Thus, we are working in two lines of investigation: "Material and moral incentives in productivity", and "Motivation in a Cuban religious group".*

To sum it up, the objective of our Institute is the study of the neurophysiologic and psychological levels as well as that of the social aspects that might be of interest in our country, trying within the limits of our methods of investigations to attain the inter-disciplinary integration of these disciplines.

We are now in the process of organising a Cortico-Visceral Activities or Psychosomatic Laboratory in connection with a Psychiatric Clinic. Another Laboratory on Psychopharmacals and Behavior keeping the Applied Psychology one in which I will continue with my studies of participant variables in the Physician-Patient relationship in Psychotherapy. In reference to this last work, I wish to state that I have finished its first stage.

---

* As of this date, June, 1967, the latter was dropped.

The Institute has organised and convened an International Neurophysiology Symposium which took place in February, 1965, in Havana which was attended by many Neurophysiologists of international fame (like Asratyán, Purpura, Rey John, Grastyán, Bures, Kogan, Lifschitz, Lissak, Mancia, etc.) and is organising an International Psychology Symposium for February, 1968 with the following theme: "Motivation: its neurophysiological, psychological and social aspects. Perspective of its integration". *

We have inaugurated a new section called Transcultural Studies which works in connection with the Transcultural Psychiatric Commission of the Cuban Society of Psychiatry.

For the beginning of next year I will begin to publish a Review called Transcultural Psychiatry and which will be the official organ of the Transcultural Psychiatry Commission of the Cuban Society of Psychiatry and the Transcultural Studies Section of the Institute, where we will have a resumé and comments in Spanish of all the papers published in this subject in the world and later on we will include our own works.

Enclosed please find my paper on "Learning and Drugs" which I read at the XVIII International Congress of Psychology in Moscow, and the one you heard at the IV World Congress of Psychiatry, in Madrid, "Cultural Factors in Hysterias with Schizophrenic Clinical Picture", and also one of our Bulletins. I will send you the next number now in press.

In relation to the Department of Medical Psychology of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Havana, we started to work in 1961 after making some changes at the University which, among other things, created this Department.

We began with a theoretic practical course in the 3rd year of Medicine but we undertook all the opportune negotiations with the academic authorities to carry out such a transformation.

Our opinion is that Medical Psychology must be taught in parallel manner to the disciplines all along the career until the absurd dualism that today offers adequate somatic preparation but very weak psychological preparation is overcome.

Last year in agreement with the Faculty and after constant efforts we obtained and put in practice the following activity:

In the 1st. year, our Department carries out a study of the personality and inclinations of all the students who are registered making interviews and tests which are repeated later in the 5th year.

---

* The date of the Symposium has been moved to 24-30 of November, 1968.

In the 2nd. year, we explain General Psychology in order to give the necessary preparation for an adequate application of Medical Psychology.

In the 3rd. year, we invade the field of Propedeutics and participate with these teachers adding the psychological and social factors in the clinical hystory, the study of Psychological factors in the interview, the physician-patient relationship, the psychological reaction of the somatic patient and the somatic repercussions of the emotional disturbances.

In the 4th year, we realize a similar task, but as it is natural, in a more specialized manner in Surgery and Obstetrics, and in 5th year in Pediatrics, adding the necessary Social Psychology elements in Preventive Medicine to carry out a competent sanitary campaign.

The sixth year is dedicated to the rotating internship system.

The Department of Psychiatry explains Psychiatric Propedeutics in 3rd. and 4th years, and Clinical Psychiatry in 5th.

Our Department together with the Psychiatric Department for residents in Psychiatry explains the Neurophysiologic and Psychological aspects and in the post-graduate term dedicates three years for them to become specialists.

A course on Psychotherapy is being organised for the post-graduates so as to create psychotherapeutists.

At the present we have the following staff which divides the work among themselves:

6 Professors
4 auxiliaries
4 Psychologists
3 graduated instructors
6 under-graduated instructors and
40 student-helpers

As we do not have many technicians since ours is an underdeveloped country, we have to work in a dual capacity for the moment (teaching and investigating) using a third of our time in teaching and two thirds for investigation.

I just finished a text on Medical Psychology in three volumes of which the first is already out, the second is in press, coming out during the first months of the coming year, and I am almost finished with the third.

This is a "sui-generis" work as I have written it both as a text and as a work of consultation. A previous index gives all the contents and the curriculum program appears at the end. All chapters have all the headings in blacker type; those headings that appear in the curriculum program are part of the course, the rest are merely an expansion of the same. This way, it fits both the students and the physicians.

I think it is a work that approaches the problem in an adequate manner according to our thesis of what Medical Psychology is and this is why I am writing to you because after revising all the world bibliography on this subject I verified that the Medical Psychology works already published are nothing but General Psychology or Handbooks of Psychosomatic Pathology.

I call it Medical Psychology. The first volume, just out, has 396 pages, and each of the other two volumes will have similar number of pages.

The first volume is about General Psychology (for the students in the 2nd year) and the second volume is called Psychology and Medicine and it is the true Medical Psychology which is suitable for the students of Propedeutics in the 3rd year, and also for those taking Surgery, Obstetrics and Pediatrics in the 4th and 5th years. The third volume gathers all Psychological schools being used in Medicine as well as all the orientations in Psychotherapy which are in use for the post-graduates.

Also enclosed please find the Index of the second volume. I consider this one constitutes an originality in the whole work since the first volume is on General Psychology (of which there are published works) and the third one contains all the schools (of which there are published works too).

In Madrid, I showed Seguín the program of the second book and he was greatly in favor of it. I am sending it to you asking for your critical opinion.

I had written, now in the process of revising and almost finished, a book of about 200 pages for which I have chosen the title of "Medical Psychology and its teaching in Medicine", a book in which I expose in detail my opinion about this matter. As it is understandable, I gather in it the opinions expressed by different authors, Congresses' and Conferences' orientations, what is available in the world on this subject at this moment, and after all that I develop what we are doing in our Medical Psychology Department and, finally, our opinion about all this.

When this book is out of print, I will send you one copy.

Dr. Redlich, we have some knowledge of your Psychiatric Department and your investigations but we would like to know more in detail about them. Would you please correspond with a similar letter telling me the most important information of your activities.

As for the Reviews we are interested in, I want you to know that at the moment we are conducting a survey in our Library to see what we have and what we need, and for the first days of the next year I will let you know about this.

Hoping to hear from you soon, and with best wishes for the Holiday Season just ahead, I am,

Cordially yours,

Prof. Dr. J. A. Bustamante
Director

JAB/el
enc.

NOTE: This is an exact copy of the letter except for the footnotes that will bring you up to date.

14-00000

16P

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS DE CUBA

INSTITUTO DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA
Y PSICOLOGIA
Loma y 37. Alt. del Vedado
Habana

Prof. DR. JOSE A. BUSTAMANTE
DIRECTOR

La Habana, 23 de junio de 1967

Prof. Dr. Alfonso Millán
Cátedra de Psicología Médica
Universidad Autónoma de México
México, D.F.
México.

MICROFILMED
AUG 1 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Querido Amigo:

Aprovechando un nuevo viaje del amigo Varisco te escribo otra vez para saludarte y darte unos informes que creo de importancia.

También le estoy escribiendo a Seguín y Dávila. Les hago saber a todos que en el mes de Julio saldrá el primer número de nuestra Revista Psiquiatría Transcultural de la cual les enviaré un ejemplar tan pronto salga.

En el mes de Noviembre se ha de celebrar una reunión de la Organización Sanitaria Panamericana sobre la "Enseñanza de la Psicología Médica y la Psiquiatría en América," a la que pienso asistir pues ha sido invitada la Facultad de Medicina de la Universidad de la Habana por la organización y la Facultad casi con toda seguridad me ha de designar, en ese caso no tendría problemas pues ellos se ocupan de conseguir la visa y de todos los demás detalles relacionados con la reunión.

En el mes de Enero le escribí una extensa carta a Pichot que en el Congreso de Madrid estuvo tratando de producir una reunión de los asistentes al mismo que se dedican a la Psicología Médica.

Yo recibí su citación con gran entusiasmo pues creo que es necesario cambien impresiones los norteamericanos, europeos y latinoamericanos ya que cada uno de dicho grupo tenemos nuestra propia opinión como son sin duda las tres opiniones que rigen en el mundo en esta materia. Él por su parte nos defraudó tanto a mí como a Seguín pues realizó una reunión intrascendente y se puso en contacto con gente que no representa la Psicología Médica en el mundo y por ejemplo, concretamente en relación al Perú, entró en contacto, no con Seguín que estaba allí, sino con un muchacho que no se dedica a esta disciplina.

Esa es la razón por la cual le escribí esa carta haciéndole esas críticas y sugiriéndole que para tratar de esos problemas con nosotros latinoamericanos tenían fundamentalmente que entrar en contacto contigo, con Seguín y conmigo pues creo fuera de toda falsa modestia que somos la más alta experiencia de la Psicología Médica en América Lati-

s/c

CS COPY

ATT #2 TO HMMA 32515

201-22396

na y de hecho una corriente de importancia en el mundo.

No he tenido respuesta a esta carta todavía, pero sí recibí una nota de él donde me decía que había estado varios meses fuera de Francia.

Ahora bien yo creo que lo mejor es que cambiemos impresiones los tres por correo antes de llegar a la reunión en Noviembre en Lima pues allí nos vamos a poner de acuerdo los latinoamericanos sobre dicho problema. Seguín estará allí, tú no debes faltar y yo voy a hacer todo lo posible por ir.

Claro que hay cátedras de Psicología Médica en Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia y tal vez otras más, pero el desarrollo que hemos logrado en Perú, México y Cuba por nuestros respectivos esfuerzos todo el mundo reconoce y de no saberlo lo acepta en cuanto se le informa.

Por ello es que creo que es importante que cambiemos impresiones los tres antes de llegar a Noviembre, para llegar a Lima con perspectivas de una línea adecuada.

Luego debemos demandar de los norteamericanos y de Pichot y los Europeos un cambio de impresiones o indicárselo a la OMS como acuerdo de nuestra reunión en Lima.

Con los mejores deseos para ti y un fuerte abrazo, se despide tu amigo,

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS DE CUBA

INSTITUTO DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA
Y PSICOLOGIA
Loma y 37. Alt. del Vedado
Habana

Prof. DR. JOSE A. BUSTAMANTE
DIRECTOR

23 de junio de 1967

Prof. Dr. Carlos Alberto Seguín
Jirón Huancavélica 470
Lima, Perú

Querido Amigo y Compañero:

Aprovechando la oportunidad que me brinda los Laboratorios Erba de escribir a los amigos de Latino América a través de ellos es que te hago estas líneas. A partir de ahora dirige el sobre a ellos a la dirección siguiente: Apartado 21909, Mexico 21, D.F., Mexico, y la carta a mí. Una vez que ellos abren el sobre y ven que está dirigida a mí, me la trae personalmente un representante de la casa en sus viajes entre nuestro país y Mexico. Así podemos estar seguros de una vía que no crea problemas pues tú escribes a Mexico y te llegan las mías de Mexico. Gracias a esto es que te estoy enviando el Tomo I de mi libro "Psicología Médica".

Te hago saber que en el mes de Julio saldrá el primer número de nuestra Revista Psiquiatría Transcultural de la cual te enviaré un ejemplar por la misma vía.

Te estoy enviando un ejemplar de los trabajos que a continuación relaciono: "Aprendizaje y Drogas", trabajo que leí en el Simposio "Psicofarmacología y Regulación de la Conducta" en el XVIII Congreso Internacional de Psicología, Moscú; el trabajo que oiste en Madrid, "Factores Culturales con Cuadro Clínico Esquizofrénico"; "Importancia de la Psicología Médica en la Formación del Nuevo Médico", trabajo que ha sido traducido al Alemán y será publicado por la Universidad de Halle-Wittemberg, Alemania; "La Enseñanza de la Psicología Médica en Cuba", que ha sido traducido al Búlgaro y será publicado en la Revista "Savremena Medicina" en Sofía, Bulgaria; así como el último número del Boletín del Instituto. El Boletín a partir del próximo número saldrá cada tres meses, y estando ya en imprenta el número de Julio tan pronto salga te enviaré un ejemplar.

Deseo hacerte saber que le envié a Stanley Lesse mi trabajo "Psiquiatría en Cuba", igual al que tu enviaste correspondiente al Perú, el cual debe estar al salir en el American Journal of Psychotherapy.

Está al salir también mi libro "La Enseñanza de la Psicología Médica en la Carrera de Medicina". Recibirás un ejemplar cuando esté listo. Asimismo, recordarás haber visto el Indice del Tomo II de la "Psicolo-

Prof. Seguín

gía Médica" el cual saldrá el mes de julio próximo y del cual también te enviaré un ejemplar.

Voy a México en Diciembre de este año, al Congreso de la Sociedad Interamericana de Psicología y espero verte allí. Es casi seguro que vaya también, a fines de Noviembre a Lima, a la reunión de la Organización Sanitaria Panamericana sobre la "Enseñanza de la Psicología Médica y la Psiquiatría en América". He sido invitado por la organización y ellos se encargan de conseguirme la visa y demás detalles relacionados con el viaje. Es casi seguro que vaya.

Estoy usando la misma vía para comunicarme con Dávila, y le envié un retrato mio así como el trabajo que llevé a Madrid. El retrato saldrá en la Revista de la Asociación con un comentario similar al que se hizo sobre González Enríquez y sobre tí, y el trabajo lo publicarán en este o el próximo número.

En mi carta del mes de Febrero te informaba sobre mi carta a Pichot.

Yo creo que lo mejor es esperar a la reunión de Noviembre en Lima pues allí nos vamos a poner de acuerdo los latinoamericanos sobre el problema. Tú estarás presente, Millán irá con toda seguridad y yo voy a hacer todo lo posible por ir. Además creo que tú, Millán y yo, fuera de toda falsa modestia, somos la más alta experiencia de la Psicología Médica en América Latina y de hecho, como señalo en mis trabajos y en el libro que te reseño, una corriente de importancia en el mundo.

Claro que hay cátedras de Psicología Médica en Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia y tal vez otras más, pero el desarrollo que hemos logrado en Perú, México y Cuba por nuestros respectivos esfuerzos todo el mundo reconoce y de no saberlo lo acepta en cuanto se le informa.

Por ello es que creo que es importante que cambiemos impresiones los tres, antes de llegar a Noviembre.

Esta vía que ahora poseemos y que se debe a una gran amistad del Sr. Varisco, Representante de la casa Erba de Milán en México y en Cuba, con Dávila y ahora conmigo lo garantiza, ya que él personalmente viaja Cuba-México todos los meses. El me dice que sin pena alguna podemos escribirnos y enviarnos lo que deseemos y como siempre antes y ahora hemos mantenido correspondencia ajena a todo problema político y nos interesamos en los problemas científicos cuya responsabilidad nos incumbe puedes pues escribirme y enviarme folletos, libros, todo lo que desees y yo igual a tí pues el Sr. Varisco es el que lo recibe y quien me lo envía a mí o a tí. Tu recibes correspondencia de México, no de Cuba, y escribes a México. Por tal razón espero que ahora nuestra correspondencia se restablezca.

No solo lo usarás tú sino los amigos (6 u 8) de América Latina y también un grupo de norteamericanos que ya me estan escribiendo.

Pues bien, debemos escribirnos los tres (lo estoy haciendo también a Millán) para llegar a Lima con perspectivas de una línea adecuada.

Luego debemos demandar de los norteamericanos y de Pichot y los Europeos un cambio de impresiones o indicárselo a la OMS como acuerdo de nuestra reunión en Lima.

Espero de todos modos la respuesta de Pichot, pues estuvo fuera de París y ahora recibí nota de él.

Por otra parte, creo que nosotros tres (tú, Dávila y yo) tenemos la responsabilidad de llevar adelante la comisión de Estudios Transculturales de la Asociación Psiquiátrica de la América Latina en unión de Kelly y Marconi.

Voy a confeccionar un proyecto de actividades y se lo voy a enviar a Dávila y a tí te enviaré una copia.

De todos modos le escribí a Leigh, el Secretario de la Asociación Mundial de Psiquiatría pidiéndole se creara una Comisión o sección de Psiquiatría Transcultural en la Asociación Mundial de Psiquiatría.

Espero que ahora me podrás escribir sin problemas e infórmame de tus actividades.

Deseando te encuentres bien al recibo de ésta y en espera de tus noticia, y con un abrazo se despide tu amigo,

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS
DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA - PSIQUIATRICA
DR JOSE A. BUSTAMANTE
DIRECTOR

P.D. En mi última carta con fecha 17 de febrero envié los dos primeros trabajos de los señalados en la página 1, como no he recibido respuesta alguna pienso que no llegaron a tus manos, y por eso los envío de nuevo.

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS DE CUBA

INSTITUTO DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA
Y PSICOLOGIA
LOMA Y 37. ALT. DEL VEDADO
HABANA

Prof. DR. JOSE A. BUSTAMANTE
DIRECTOR

June 9, 1967

Stanley Lesse, (M.D.)
American Journal of Psychotherapy
15 West 81st Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Dr. Lesse:

I have received your letter of April 21 for which I thank you.

As of now I am inviting you in the name of the Institute and the Academy of Sciences of Cuba to our next International Symposium of Psychology which will take place on 24-30 of November in 1968.

So far we have received acceptance letters from the following scientists: two from Italy, Dr. Ancona and Dr. Marzi; one from Hungary, Dr. Grastyán; one from the G.D.R., Dr. Hiebsch; one from Belgium, Dr. Nuttin, one from Checoslovaquia, Dr. Buresova; one from France, Dr. Gastaut; four so far from your country, Doctors Roy John, Littig, Mansonn and Klausner; we also have four from the Soviet Union at this moment, Doctors Roitbak, Zotowa, Oshanin and Nebylitsyn.

The guests' stay will be borne by the Academy of Sciences, and we have made arrangements to cover your trip Mexico-Havana-Mexico. Unfortunately, we won't be able to pay for the New York-Mexico trip due to the dollar situation, something I regret very much.

If you can arrange to be with us then, I wish you would send me the title of your work. The Symposium will accept papers in three languages, English, French and Spanish. Your work could be on motivation in psychotherapy, or any other subject you may have in mind as long as it deals with motivation. It can either be a neurophysiologic, social or a psychological theme. Once your paper has been accepted, it should be in our hands by May 31, 1968, and its length should be about 30 minutes. After your paper has been read, there will be a discussion on your work by all concerned. As you can see, you have a year from the moment this Symposium is convened up to the time of presentation of your paper which we believe is sufficient.

It would give me a great pleasure if you could come a week earlier or stayed a week after the Symposium to give a course at the Institute, or a month if it is possible. The Academy will take care of the expenses.

We would appreciate an early answer from you about this so we can begin the necessary arrangements.

As for your information about publishing a version of my letter to you on activities at the Institute is all right with me. In fact, I consider it a great honor to tell your readers about us.

I am happy to know that you have received and read my paper on "Cultural Factors in Hysterias with Schizophrenic Clinical Pictures." For my part, I will let you know that I have read your monography published in the April 1966 number of the American Journal of Psychotherapy. I found it extremely interesting and was glad to know that there is more to come on this subject.

Thank you for your kind words about my book on Medical Psychology. The one you received is Vol. I; Vol. II will be out in August, and I am working on Vol. III. As soon as Vol. II is out, I will mail you a copy.

Three of the scientists that have already accepted to come to the Symposium visited the Institute this year. One of them was Dr. Vladimir D. Nebylitsyn, Vice-Director of the Institute of Psychology from Moscow, who stayed two months with us. He helped us to create a typology laboratory in our Psychology Department. At the same time he offered a course on topology variables according to Teplov and himself.

He works principally studying personality. His conception is primarily based in the human brain properties that were discovered by Pavlov and later on were developed by Teplov and his collaborators.

Dr. Nebylitsyn, as well as other investigators, have developed some scientific methods on the investigation of such properties of the nervous system and their studies nowadays can very well be correlated with certain personality dimensions. It has been thus proven by some investigators abroad and today, in Cuba, we need to begin developing such scientific methods.

We also had Dr. E. Roy John, from the New York Medical College, who spent a month here. Following is a brief resumé of his activities at the Institute.

In the mornings, Dr. John gave a lecture on physiology of learning, having memory as a basic theme, explained every possible way, psychological, physiological, biochemical and anatomically. The lecture was discussed by those attending, and experimental solutions were proposed for various problems not yet resolved. The text book used in this course was written by Dr. John himself and will be out of print by now.

Stanley Lesse, M.D.

In the afternoons, four different experiments were carried out. The first one on evoked potentials in humans, correlations of same facing luminous stimulations of different colors. Influence of expectancy situations. The second experiment was on learning, observing cats with alimentary reflex. The third one was in influence of specific and unspecific structures of the Central Nervous System on learning. Stimulations of different specific structures and of reticular watching the importance of the facilitation of this mechanism. The fourth experiment was a study with microelectrodes of neuronal activity changes during the learning stage in cronic animals.

Both Dr. Nebylitsyn and Dr. John dictated very interesting conferences at the Academy of Sciences' Conference Hall and at the Scientific Council of the Ministry of Public Health.

At the moment, we have Dr. E. Grastyan, from the University of Pecs, Hungary, who will leave soon after collaborating with the Department of Psychology for two months. He has been working on motivation and cooperating in a joint work for our coming Symposium.

I told you in my previous letter that I was receiving your Journal because the dues had been paid, but I just found out that because of the dollar situation my subscription was not renewed, something I am unable to help. If at all possible I would like you to do the following:

We are publishing a Bulletin for the Institute, and as of next July, the first number of a Review called Transcultural Psychiatry, the first of its kind in Spanish, will be out. I beg of you that, apart from sending you news about Cuba from time to time to be published in your Journal, to please accept as an exchange these two Reviews for your Journal, otherwise, I could not guarantee to receive it periodically. Thus, I am proposing an official exchange of both Reviews until this abnormal situation can be remedied, because the Journal is very important to me.

Please refer to my letter of March 27 as th the fastest way of communication between us. This will reach you via the same person. However, please address the Journal to the Institute address: Loma y 37, Alturas del Vedado, Havana, Cuba.

I will be waiting for your news. With best wishes, I am,

Cordially yours,

PROF. DR. JOSE A. BUSTAMANTE
DIRECTOR

(JAB/el

If you agree the official invitation will be send by the Academy of Sciences — answer as soon as possible.

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS DE CUBA

INSTITUTO DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA
Y PSICOLOGIA
Loma y 37, Alt. del Vedado
Habana

Prof. Dr. José A. Bustamante
Director

June 22, 1967

Ari Kiev, (M.D.)
The New York Hospital
Cornell Medical Center
525 East 68th Street
New York N.Y., 10021

Dear Dr. Kiev:

I received yours of May 17 a few days ago and I thank you for the information.

First of all, I wish to acknowledge receipt of your book, "Magic, Faith and Healing - Studies in Primitive Psychiatry Today", for which I am grateful. It is most interesting and I am reading it with great pleasure.

I want you to know that in July a new Review called Transcultural Psychiatry will be published here. We are editing it and it will be the first of its kind in our language. As soon as it is out, I will mail you a copy. This Review will be the official organ of the Transcultural Psychiatry Commission of the Cuban Society of Psychiatry and the Cuban Group of Transcultural Studies in which a resumé, translation or comments in Spanish of all the works written the world over will be published. Later on, it will become the publication media for the Cuban Society of Psychiatry works, as well as those written by the Transcultural Psychiatry Section of the Institute, gathering in it all Cuban publications and giving opportunity too to some Latin American scientists' papers, but always keeping comments, translation or resumé of other Reviews. At the beginning, the Review will appear every 6 months, but later on it will be a quarterly.

We have an Anthropologist working with us at the Institute now, Dr. Antonio Santa Cruz, a Yale graduate, and we are planning a joint book on Transcultural Psychiatry, since there is not a treatise in Spanish on this subject that I know of. I will let you know as to its development.

We have had three scientists visiting the Institute this year. One of them was Dr. Vladimir D. Nebylitsyn, Vice- Director of the Institute of Psychology from Moscow, who stayed two months with us. He helped us to create a typology laboratory in our Psychology Department. At the same time, he offered a course on typology variables according to Teplov and himself.

He works principally studying personality. His conception is primarily based in the human brain properties that were discovered by Pavlov and later on were developed by Teplov and his collaborators.

Dr Nebylitsyn, as well as other investigators, have developed some scientific methods on the investigation of such properties of the nervous system and their studies nowadays can very well be correlated with certain personality dimensions. It has been thus proven by some investigators abroad and today, in Cuba, we need to begin developing such scientific methods.

We also had Dr. E. Roy John, from the New York Medical College, who spent a month here. Following is a brief resumé of his activities at the Institute.

In the mornings, Dr. John gave a lecture on physiology of learning, having memory as a basic theme, explained every possible way, psychological, physiological, biochemical and anatomically. The lecture was discussed by those attending, and experimental solutions were proposed for various problems not yet resolved. The text book used in this course was written by Dr. John himself and will be out of print by now.

In the afternoons, four different experiments were carried out. The first one on evoked potentials in humans, correlations of same facing luminous stimulations of different colors. Influence of expectancy situations. The second experiment was on learning, observing cats with alimentary reflex. The third one was in influence of specific and unspecific structures of the Central Nervous System on learning. Stimulations of different specific structures and of reticular watching the importance of the facilitation of this mechanism. The fourth experiment was a study with microelectrodes of neuronal activity changes during the learning stage in cronic animals.

Both Dr. Nebylitsyn and Dr. John dictated very interesting conferences at the Academy of Sciences' Conference Hall and at the Scientific Council of the Ministry of Public Health.

At the moment, we have Dr. E. Grastyán, from the University of Pecs, Hungary, who will leave soon after collaborating with the Department of Psychology for two months. He has been working on motivation and cooperating in a joint work for our coming Symposium.

Just today I received the 1966 Report on Activities of the International Committee Against Mental Illness, also, I got the picture taken during the luncheon in Madrid, for which I thank you.

Reading the Report I noticed there is a Bulletin de Centre de Psychiatrie et de Neurologie in Haiti. I would like to receive copy or copies of numbers that have already appeared. I do not know exactly where to write, or to whom address the letter, so will you kindly take care of this for me.

Also, I am interested in the International Journal of Psychiatry published in Boston, which I would like to receive too. You could give them my name with the Institute address so they can send me the copies. To both these Reviews you can tell them that since I am Director of both the bulletin of the Institute and the new Review of Transcultural Psychiatry I am officially proposing an exchange for their Review, or else they can tell me what they want me to do.

Incidentally, I wish to call your attention to the fact that the Institute's name now is Instituto de Neurofisiología y Psicología, not Instituto de Investigaziones de la Actividad Nerviosa Superior, as the aforementioned Report was addressed. The address was correct, Loma y 37, Alturas del Vedado, Havana, Cuba.

I think I should let you know that I have written to Dr. D. Leigh, Secretary to the World Psychiatric Association and among other things I indicated the convenience to create one Committee or Section of Transcultural Psychiatry within the World Psychiatric Association because this is a rather new and multi-disciplinary field (comprising psychiatrists, psychologists, anthropologists, etc.) requiring more than any other one the cooperation and help to facilitate the efforts to keep producing and offering contributions in the development of this field.

I have secured a better way to get our mail and it consists of the following: address your envelope to Laboratorios Erba, Apartado 21909, Mexico 21, D.F., Mexico, and the letter to me. Once they open the letter and see it is addressed to me, a member of the laboratory will bring it personally to me as they travel back and forth between our countries. I will address my letters to you and they will mail them in Mexico to you. In this way, we are both sure our mail will not get lost since I have absolute confidence in them.

I am taking this opportunity to send you my book, "Medical Psychology", in three volumes of which this is Vol. I.

I think I have covered everything of interest to you.

Hoping to hear from you soon, and with best wishes, I am,

Cordially yours,

Prof. Dr. J. A. Bustamante
Director

JAB/el
enc.

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS DE CUBA
INSTITUTO DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA Y PSICOLOGIA
LOMA Y 37, ALTURAS DEL VEDADO
LA HABANA

Junio 23 de 1967

(Dr.) Rogelio Díaz Guerrero
~~Presidente Electo~~
Sociedad Interamericana de
Psicología
Georgia 123
Mexico 18, D.F. Mexico

Estimado Dr. Díaz Guerrero:

Acuso recibo de su última de fecha 20 de mayo y le doy las gracias por lo que me envía.

Aprovecho el viaje del compañero Varisco para suplicarle me envíe la invitación para asistir al Congreso y así iniciar las gestiones necesarias. También quisiera tener una idea del programa del Congreso para saber en qué sección debo tomar parte, el nombre de la misma, etc., y entonces podré enviarle el título de mi trabajo.

Sírvase enviármelo con Varisco así llegará pronto a mis manos.

Con gracias anticipadas, quedo de Ud.,

Fraternalmente,

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS
DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA Y PSICOLOGIA
DR. JOSE A. BUSTAMANTE
DIRECTOR

JAB/el

Georgia 123
Mexico 18, D.F.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

8 de junio de 1967.

DR. JOSE A. BUSTAMANTE
ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS DE CUBA
INSTITUTO DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA Y
PSICOLOGIA
LOMA Y 37, ALT. DEL VEDADO
HABANA, CUBA

Muy estimado Dr. Bustamante:

Muchas gracias por su atenta misiva del 12 de mayo de 1967. Ya estamos tramitando el registro de la lista de científicos que Ud. tuvo a bien enviarnos.

Le acompaño copia al carbón de la carta enviada a Embajada de Cuba en México.

Los trabajos principales como el que estamos solicitando de Ud., tendrán una duración de 40 minutos. [illegible] le agradeceré me envíe a la mayor brevedad posible, el título de su colaboración tal y como Ud. desea que aparezca en el Programa del Onceavo Congreso.

Todo parece indicar que tendremos un magnífico Congreso y que, posiblemente, la inscripción al mismo, sobrepase a mil psicólogos y científicos en las ciencias afines. Me dá mucho gusto enterarme de la intensa actividad que se realiza en el Instituto que Ud. acertadamente dirige.

Reciba Ud. mis cordiales saludos.

Dr. Rogelio Díaz-Guerrero
Presidente-Electo
Sociedad Interamericana de
Psicología

Adj.

EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MEXICO D.F.

NUM. 157

Junio 18 de 1967

Sr. Dr. Rogelio Díaz-Guerrero
Director del Programa Científico
XI Congreso Interamericano de Psicología
[illegible]

Estimado Señor Doctor:

Tengo sumo gusto en referirme a su atta. de 8 del corriente, por la cual ha tenido la amabilidad de comunicarnos que el Comité Ejecutivo de la Sociedad Interamericana de Psicología extendió una invitación a favor del Dr. José Angel Bustamante, especialista cubana de aquella disciplina, a fin de que sea uno de los conferencistas en el XI Congreso de la Institución.-

Procedemos a cursar la oportuna comunicación con el especial pedido de que se nos dé la respuesta en fecha que podamos llevarla a su conocimiento dentro del plazo que se ha fijado para ello.

Agradeciendo a Ud. la amabilidad de su comunicación, aprovecho para reiterarle las seguridades de mi distinguida consideración y estima,

Dr. Joaquín Hernández Armas
Embajador de Cuba

Georgia 123
México 18, D.F.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

México, D. F., 8 de junio de 1967.

SR. JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS
EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA
F. MARQUEZ NO. 160
COLONIA CONDESA
MEXICO, D. F.

Excelentisimo Señor Embajador:

Del 17 al 22 de diciembre del presente año, se realizará en la Ciudad de México, en la Unidad de Congresos del Centro Médico del Seguro Social, el XI Congreso Interamericano de Psicología.

En reciente reunión realizada en Austin, Texas, del Comité Ejecutivo de la Sociedad Interamericana, se votó unanimemente para invitar al Dr. José Angel Bustamante, distinguido psicólogo cubano, para ser uno de los conferencistas principales de este evento, en consideración a su reconocida capacidad y su contribución a la ciencia psicológica.

En mis funciones de Director del Programa, me estoy dirigiendo a Ud. para solicitar - a través de sus buenos oficios - del Gobierno que Ud. dignamente representa, el patrocinio del viaje y de la estancia en esta capital del citado científico.

El día primero de julio del presente año, es la fecha límite que nos hemos fijado para iniciar la última fase de elaboración del programa final de este importante evento. Así pues, mucho le agradeceríamos el que nos pudiese informar para tal fecha, o antes, acerca de nuestra solicitud.

El tema fundamental del Congreso es el de "La Contribución de las Ciencias Psicológicas y del Comportamiento al Desarrollo Social y Económico de los Pueblos". Y si juzgamos por los trabajos hasta ahora propuestos o los remitidos, este Décimo Primer Congreso Interamericano de Psicología deberá resultar un evento de singular importancia.

Muy atentamente.

Dr. Rogelio Díaz-Guerrero
Director del Programa Científic
XI Congreso Interamericano Ps

c.c. Dr. José A. Bustamante

[redacted]

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS DE CUBA

INSTITUTO DE NEUROFISIOLOGIA
Y PSICOLOGIA
Loma y 37 Av. del Vedado
Habana

Prof. Dr. JOSE A. BUSTAMANTE
DIRECTOR

La Habana, 25 de junio de 1967

Prof. Dr. Guillermo Dávila
Liverpool 62
México 6, D.F.
México.

Querido Compañero:

Aprovechando un nuevo viaje del amigo Varisco le escribo otra vez para saludarlo y darle una pequeña información, pero primeramente deseo que al recibo de ésta se encuentre Ud. bien de salud.

También le estoy escribiendo a Seguín y Millán. Les hago saber a todos que en el mes de Julio saldrá el primer número de nuestra Revista Psiquiatría Transcultural de la cual les enviaré un ejemplar tan pronto salga.

Yo creo que nosotros tres, (Seguín, Ud. y yo) tenemos la responsabilidad de llevar adelante la Comisión de Estudios Transculturales de la Asociación Psiquiátrica de la América Latina en unión de Kelly y Marconi.

Meditando sobre este asunto he pensado que sería bueno escribir un proyecto de actividades y se lo enviaré para que Ud. lo estudie y me dé su opinión. Le escribiré a Seguín dándole un esquema del mismo.

De todos modos, deseo informarle que le escribí a Leigh, el Secretario de la Asociación Mundial de Psiquiatría pidiéndole se creara una comisión o sección de Psiquiatría Transcultural dentro de la misma Asociación.

Sin más por el momento, y con un afectuoso saludo quedo de Ud.,

Afectuosamente,

ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS
NEUROFISIOLOGIA · PSICOLOGIA
JOSE A. BUSTAMANTE

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21 [illegible]
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-22356
X-REF TO FILE NO. ______
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION BY 7
WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR, EUR 8, OA 2, CA/PROP

ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 291252Z CITE MADRID 9267

29 SEP 66 IN 06003

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF A DIRECTOR 34907

B DIRECTOR 37503

C DIRECTOR 37504

COPY DR. BUSTAMANTE SIGNATURE AIRMAILED TO REF C

ADDRESS 29 SEPT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

OCI
201-22356

29 Sept 66

Dr. Bustamante
201-22396



I V/1

ENTRADA DE EXTRANJEROS

Apellidos BUSTAMANTE Nombre Jose Angel.
Fecha nacimiento ______ Nacionalidad actual Cuba.
Lugar de nacimiento ______
Pasaporte n.º D-62/637. exp. en Habana el 2-11-62
o
Autorización residencia n.º ______ exp. en ______ el ______
4 de 9 de 1966
EL VIAJERO.
Establecimiento ______
Domicilio ______

Nº 573696

Document showing signature of Dr. Jose Angel Bustamante (Cuban Doctor who traveled to Madrid Sept. 66). Sent to Hqs via HPO air ~~mail~~ at request of Hqs, per DIR 37503, 21 Sept 66.

[redacted]
WH/C/CA/PA

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES [illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO. [illegible]
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [redacted]
STAFF OFFICIAL

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 33 / 7

ACTION
WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR8, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/04, CI/IC2, FI

AN [illegible] FI
PS
ABSTRACT X INDEX

[redacted]

S E C R E T 092343Z CITE JMWAVE 2940

MICROFILMED
SEP 22 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

10 SEP 66 IN 93132

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF MADRID 9083 (IN 92840)*

1. WHILE VIEW END OF WORLD CONGRESS OF PSYCHIATRISTS IN MADRID ON 11 SEPTEMBER DOES NOT APPEAR FEASIBLE TO UNDERTAKE ANY IMMEDIATE EXPLOITATION, SUGGEST IT MIGHT BE OF USE TO START FLOATING FURTHER RUMORS RE CASTRO MENTAL STATE, INTIMATING THAT INFO ORIGINATED WITH SEVERAL CUBAN PSYCHIATRISTS WHO ATTENDED WORLD CONGRESS. SUGGEST INITIAL ACTION MIGHT BE PLACEMENT OF SMALL ITEM OF TYPE WHICH APPEARS IN NEWSWEEK PERISCOPE OR U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT WASHINGTON WHISPERS, WITH FOLLOWUP FROM VARIOUS HQS, JMWAVE, MADRID, POSSIBLY PARIS ASSETS.

2. NOT AWARE OF CURRENT STATUS OF HQS ACTION TO SURFACE PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT OF CASTRO. POSSIBLY PARA 1 ACTION WOULD CONSTITUTE USEFUL PRELIMINARY TO SUCH SURFACING.

3. ADVISE ANY ACTION DESIRED.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

* CUBAN PSYCHIATRISTS AT CONVENTION IN MADRID FOR TRAVELS

[illegible]

19-120-32

201-022396

[illegible]

14-00000

STAFF OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 29

ORIG: [redacted]
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TD
EXT:
DATE: 9 Sept. 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-022396

1	TC	5	RR-[illegible]
2		6	CA-IA
3	FI	7	FIO
4	OS	8	CI

DISSEM BY 3 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO IP BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8

INFO: VR, FILE, RID COPY EUR 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/D 4, CDC

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 9 22 38 Z CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 34227

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 9 Sept 66

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO JMWAVE, FRANKFURT, GERMANY,

CRYPTO (RECRUITMENT TARGETS)

TYPIC [redacted]

REF MADRID 9088 (IN 92840)

AN	PI	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX X

MICROFILMED
SEP 27 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

3P

1. TYPIC DESK TRACES SUBJS REF:

A. DR. JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMENTE O'LEARY HARD CORE COMMIE AT LEAST TWENTY YEARS AND DO NOT BELIEVE HE VULNERABLE ANY PITCH.

B. DR LEOPOLDO ZR ARAUJO (201-771754) WAS ONE OF DIRECTORS MEDICAL COLLEGE IN HAVANA AND ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL MEDICAL MEN CUBA. ROSE TO THIS POSITION OUT OF COMPARATIVE OBSCURITY. HE COMMIE OF LONG STANDING AND CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF TOP COMMIE PARTY MEMBERS IN LATIN AMERICA.

C. DR. LUIS YODU PREVEZ: ONLY TRACES SHOW HE TRAVELED CZECHOSLOVAKIA '61 AND '62.

D. DR. RAFAEL J. LARRAGOITI, BORN 9/8/12, MATANZAS, CUBA. GRADUATE UNIVERSITY HAVANA '40. '40 - '43 INTERNED CALIXTO GARCIA HOSPITAL. '43 - '46 RESIDENT IN DEPT NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASES UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL. TOOK POST GRADUATE TRAINING IN ILLINOIS AT

201-022-396

9 Sept 66

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

TO SECRET

Page 2

CITE DIRECTOR 34227

TO

PSYCHIATRIC AND NEUROLOGICAL INSITITUTE WHERE ALSO STUDIED ELECTRO-ENCEPHALOGRAM. LICENSED PRACTICE CUBA. PSYCHIATRIST AT CASA DE SALUD, COVEDANGA FROM '48 TO DATE. WAS IN PRIVATE PRACTICE TEACHING UNIVERSITY HAVANA FROM 1943 TO 1946, PROFESSOR EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY AT MAZORRA HOSPITAL DE MENTES DE CUBA FROM 1945 TO AT LEAST 1963. MEMBER CUBAN PSYCHIATRIC SOCIETY. PUBLISHED ARTICLES IN THERAPEUTICAL DIA 1943 AND IN REVIEW MEDICAL CIRCULATION FOR CUBA 1945. ADDRESS-CALLE 22 NUMBER 273 ALTO VEDADO, HAVANA.

E. DR JORGE LOPEZ* VALDES PSYCHIATRIC SPECIALIST IN DEPENDIENTES DEL COMERCIO HOSPITAL. ONE TRACE LISTS JOSE LOPEZ VALDES SCHEDULED ATTEND SPECIAL TRAINING IN ORGANIC FUNCTIONS IN PSYCHIATRIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN USSR FOR TWO YEARS. INFO DTD OCT '63.

F. DR. GERARDO NOGUEIRA* RIVERO BORN HAVANA 27 JAN '18. GRADUATED IN MEDICINE FROM UNIV HAVANA. DIRECTOR SANITARY UNIT MARIANAO '44 TO '47. WORKS IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY. WAS ASSISTANT CLINIC ANGEL ABELLI FOR CHILDREN. PODIATRIST. ALSO INVOLVED IN TROPICAL AND PARASITIC MEDICINE. BROTHER ELEPT [redacted], TERMINATED JAN '64 FOR NON PRODUCTIVITY.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET Page 3. CITE DIRECTOR 34227

TO

G. NO, OR INSIGNIFICANT, TRACES ON REMAINING DRS.

2. UNLESS THERE IS INDICATION THAT ANY SPECIFIC MEMBERS SUSCEPTIBLE, DESIRE THAT APPROACHES BE LIMITED TO ONE MEMBER OF DELEGATION, PREFERABLY LARRAGOITI SINCE HE HAS AT LEAST BEEN EXPOSED TO THE U.S. PURPOSE OF PITCHING ONE DELEGATE, EVEN THOUGH COLD, IS TO HAVE OTHERS BECOME AWARE THAT RECRUITMENT AND/OR DEFECTION POSSIBLE.

SECRET

NOT:

ORIGINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/C/FI/IC

COORDINATING OFFICER [redacted] C/WH/C/FI

[redacted]) E/IB/C

STAFF OFFICERS

[redacted] (PHONE E/G

RELEASING OFFICER [redacted] BY PHONE FOR C/EUR

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
Dissem BY 24

ACTION
WH/C-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, EUR-8, D/MS-2, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA/O-4, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC-2

SECRET 100013Z CITE JMWAVE 2946

10 SEP 66 IN 93148

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO DIRECTOR, FRANKFURT

OP. CRYPT
TYPIC [redacted]

CS COPY FILED IN 201-332674

REF: MADRID 9288 (IN 92970) *

1. ASSET [redacted] IN CONTACT WITH DR. JULIO FEIJOO, CUBAN PSYCHIATRIST WHO ARRIVED MIAMI FROM CUBA ABOUT FIVE MONTHS AGO. FEIJOO TOLD ASSET [redacted] ON 10 AUGUST THAT HE KNEW JORGE (LOPEZ) VALDEZ, GERARDO (NOGUEIRA) RIVERO, RENE (YODUZ) PREVEZ, AND CLAUDIO (PALACIOS) MESA, ALL OF WHOM HE EXPECTED TO ATTEND CONFERENCE. FEIJOO DID NOT THINK FIRST THREE NAMED SUSCEPTIBLE RECRUITMENT BUT NOTED PALACIOS WHO WORKED US 1956-59 POSSIBLY APPROACHABLE.

2. ASSET [redacted] WILL TRY CONTACT FEIJOO 9 SEPTEMBER TO SEE IF HE KNOWS ANY OTHER DELEGATES NAMED IN REF. ASSET [redacted] WILL ALSO ASCERTAIN IF FEIJOO WILLING TRAVEL SPAIN IMMEDIATELY TO MAKE APPROACH ANY LIKELY TARGETS. DEPENDING ON RESULTS ASSET [redacted] MEET WITH FEIJOO, WAVE WILL PREPARE FEIJOO GO SPAIN SOONEST IF MADRID DESIRES. WILL ADVISE.

3. NO STATION TRACES LARRAGOITI, RAFELO, GUIA, HERNANDEZ, SOLER AND PORTELA.

201-022396

4. DEFER TO HQS VOLUMINOUS INFO ON JOSE ANGEL (BUSTAMANTE) OLEARY (201-22396).

5. FOLLOWING ARE JMWAVE TRACES FROM LOCAL SOURCES ON SUBJS OF REF:

A. LEOPOLDO (ARAUJO) BERNAL, BORN CA 1920, PRES CUBAN NATIONAL MEDICAL ASSOCIATION. GRADUATE HAVANA UNIV. SUPPORTER CASTRO AND COMMIE SYMPATHIZER. PHYS DESCRIPTION, WHITE, DARK COMPLEXION, SLENDER, FIVE FT NINE, BROWN HAIR AND EYES. JULY 66 WAS TO TRAVEL PARIS VIA PRAGUE.

B. RENE (YODUZ) PEREZ. SUBJ DIRECTOR MENTAL HYGIENE, HOSPITAL CALIXTO GARCIA. HE AND WIFE, ELENA ARIAS, HEAD OF HOSPITAL PHARMACY, ARE ACTIVE "FIDELOCOMMUNISTAS". IN 64 ALSO CHIEF, PSYCHIATRY HALL, PROFESSOR OF SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, U OF HAVANA. LIVES AVE 11 NO. 6616, MARIANAO, HAVANA. FOLLOWING ON (YODUZ) FROM FEIJOO. YODUZ IS MULATTO, WAS APPOINTED DIRECTOR MENTAL HEALTH ORGANIZATION BY CASTRO REGIME, RELEASED AFTER ONE YEAR AS A FAILURE. YODUZ TOLD SOURCE IN AUG 59 HE WISHED BE INTEGRATED GOC TO GET 'GOOD' JOBS. SUBJ NOW OWNS CAR, IS WELL DRESSED, WOMAN CHASER. SOURCE DID NOT EXPECT HIM BETRAY REVOLUTION AT PRESENT TIME. YODUZ HAS

SECRET

LAWYER BROTHER WHO TRAVELS ABROAD REPRESENTING AN UNIDENT INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMITTEE.

C. JORGE (LOPEZ) VALDES, REPORTED BE MEMBER COMMUNIST PARTY IN HAVANA. FEIJOO REPORTS HIM BORN CA 1918. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION, FAT, ROUND FACE, BLOND HAIR, NO GLASSES. FORMER DIRECTOR OF CLINICA DE DEPENDIENTES, NOW CHIEF PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC, REGIONAL 1-2, WITH OFFICES CLINICA LA BONDAD, HAVANA. WAS MEMBER ORTHODOX PARTY AND NOW INTEGRATED IN CUBAN REVOLUTION. WIFE, TELMA, ARTIST, REGIME SYMPATHIZER. VALDES RAN FOR COUNCIL IN HAVANA ELECTIONS 1958. WEARS MILITIA UNIFORM, ALTHOUGH HE BOTHERS NO ONE, IS NOT TRUSTED.

D. GERARDO (NOGUEIRA) RIVERA, ENTERED MEXICO ON 12 JUNE 61. FEIJOO REPORTS NOGUEIRA GOOD FRIEND. SUBJ IS DISTRUSTFUL, DOES NOT ACT LIKE COMMUNIST BUT IF WAS APPROACHED SPAIN WOULD INFORM CUBAN AUTHORITIES UPON RETURN CUBA. NOGUEIRA HAS A BROTHER PEDRO, FORMER DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN HEALTH DEPT, WHO SENTENCED TO FIVE YEAR PRISON TERM ACCUSED OF DEALING IN DOLLARS WITH MEMBERS FOREIGN MEDICAL DELEGATIONS, ALSO BOUGHT AUTO SPARE PARTS IN US AND SOLD THEM CUBA. BROTHER NOW RELEASED AND HAS PRO-

SECRET

PAGE 4 JMWAVE 2946 SECRET

MISED COOPERATE GOC, BROTHER ALSO HAS SON LIVING US.

E. POSSIBLE TRACE E. LOPEZ ONE DR. EDUMNDO (LOPEZ) HIDALGO, BORN CA 1912 OR 1915, WHITE, ABOUT FIVE FT FIVE IN TALL, 145 LBS, BLACK HAIR AND EYES. REPORTED TO BE BOTH PRO AND ANTI REGIME IN EXILE DEBRIEFINGS. AS OF 30 JULY 65 WAS DIRECTOR OF HYGIENE AND EPIDEMIOLOGY CENTER OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH REGION PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

Request Traces Doctors Attending World Congress of Psychiatrists

NNNN

14-00000

[illegible] employee

[redacted]

WH/COG/CA/PA

2975

16 NOVEMBER 66

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

☒ FILE RID

☐ INDEX

☐ NO INDEX

☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-22396

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BY 17 PER WH/COG # 2

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DIRECTOR

C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE C/WH2, C/CI.

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 18 16 25 Z

(REFERENCE NUMBER) CITE DIRECTOR 52983

MADRID

TYPIC [redacted] CRUP

REFS: A. MADRID 9664 (IN 35507)

B. MADRID 9267 (IN 06003)

AUT	FI
~~RS~~	~~DEST~~
ABSTRACT X	

DR BUSTAMANTE MENTIONED PARA 4D REF A PROBABLY REFERS TO DR. JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE. PLS ADVISE ARRIVAL MADRID BUSTAMANTE AND IDENTITY OF "COMPANION." ALSO INTERESTED IN ANOTHER SAMPLE BUSTAMANTE SIGNATURE IF CAN BE OBTAINED WITHOUT UNDUE EFFORT.

END OF MESSAGE

all staff employee

C/WH/COG/CA/PA [redacted]

C/WH/COG/CA [redacted]

C/WH/COG/E [redacted]

EUR/IB/C [redacted]

[redacted]

201-22396

16 Nov, 1966

[redacted]

G/WHD

C/EUR/IB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

17-4

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
	2. RI FILE NO.		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

BUSTAMANTE, JOSE ANGEL
201-022396
SEX M DOB 16

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
FULL PROFESSOR AND HEAD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA
MEDICAL SCHOOL. HE IS FULLY INTEGRATED
WITH THE REGIME

201-R05766
OSMA-22232
20 JAN 67
P7

UFG

R 6702030815

FILE IN 201-022396

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC [redacted] ASSET
Response to Requirement on Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE O'Leary

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Below.

Attached are copies of SW messages #107 and #108 from [redacted] ASSET which are in direct response to requirements on Dr. BUSTAMANTE levied in OWVL #12, dated 26 May 1966, and OWVL #93, dated 13 November 1966. It is requested that this information be brought to the attention of WH/C/CA/PA from whose office the requirement is believed to have originated.

Staff Employee
[redacted]

ASSET
Attachment H/W
[redacted] SW messages
#107 and #108

Distribution
3 - WH/COG w/att.

FILE IN 201- 022396

19-6-69/3

FEB -8 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-26930	7 February 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER

[illegible] SW IN

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

MICROFILMED
FEB 13 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

25 January 67

WIO-1084

10

TO: Chief, IS

THRU: Chief, IO
Chief, IO/2

FROM: STAFF employee [redacted]

SUBJECT: SW #107 from ASSET [redacted]

Distribution:
1-[redacted] File
1-C/IS
1-IO Chrono
1-RDG
1-[redacted] STAFF-employee

1. SW #107 from ASSET [redacted] was received at JMWAVE on 18 January 1967, via Headquarters. The envelope, addressed to a [redacted] accommodation address, showed a 27 December 1966 Havana postmark. The envelope contained two separate cover letters written on one side of each sheet. Each letter was dated December 1966 only. The two sheets bore one continuous SW message of medium development, legible, with no signs of censorship.

2. Following is the original Spanish text and its translation. The information in brackets in the translation are those of the translator. IS has been supplied an advance copy.

MGE UNO CERO SIETE (X) ESTIMADO JUAN (X) RECIBI SU NUEVE SEIS (X) DOCTOR JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY (X) LO CONOZCO DESDE ESTUDIENTE SIEMPRE SE DESTACO EN LAS ASAMBLEAS DE ESA EPOCA COMO PERTENECIENTE AL SECTOR DE IZQUIERDA (X) SE GRADUO DE MEDICO EN EL ANO DE UNO NUEVE TRES NUEVE (X) DESDE ENTONCES CASI VIVIA EN EL COLEGIO MEDICO DE LA HABANA Y EN EL NACIONAL (X) CONJUNTAMENTE CON EL DOCTOR JOSE LOPEZ SANCHEZ (ACTUALMENTE SECRETARIO DE LA ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS CHA COMUNISTA INTELIGENTE Y MUY PELIGROSO POR SUS INTRIGAS RPTO INTRIGAS) SE DEDICARON A TRABAJAR COGIENDO POSICIONES DENTRO DE LAS COMISIONES MEDICAS Y REPRESENTANDO AL COLEGIO MEDICO CADA VEZ QUE HABIA LA OPORTUNIDAD DE IR AL EXTRANJERO (X) ESTO TRAJO CIERTA PROTESTA DE LOS MEDICOS QUE CONTRIBUIAN A LOS FONDOS DEL COLEGIO Y QUIEN ERA EL QUE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SUFRAGABA LOS GASTOS DE LOS VIAJES CMA PORQUE SIEMPRE IBAN LOS MISMOS DOCTORES (BUSTAMANTE Y LOPEZ SANCHEZ) AUN CUANDO EL MOTIVO DEL VIAJE NO FUERA PROPIO DE SUS ESPECIALIDADES MEDICAS (X) ESTO MOTIVO LA REGULACION DE LOS FUTUROS VIAJES CMA PERO YA BUSTAMANTE Y LOPEZ SANCHEZ HABIAN APPOVECHADO PARA ESTABLECER RELACIONES YANKEE FUNDAR LA "CONFEDERACION MEDICA PANAMERICANA (C.M.P.) CON SEDE EN LA HABANA (X) ESTA CONFEDERACION (C.M.P.) ESTABA CONSTITUIDA POR LAS ASOCIACIONES NACIONALES MEDICAS RPTO ASOCIACIONES NACIONALES MEDICAS O SEAN LOS COLEGIOS MEDICOS PANAMERICANOS Y ENTRE ELLOS EL COLEGIO MEDICO DE CUBA (X) ENTONCES ELLOS OCUPARON POSICIONES EN EL COMITE EJECUTIVO CENTRAL (X) MAS TARDE SE ESTABLECIERON CUATRO ZONAS DE LA C.M.P. OCUPANDO BUSTAMANTE LA PRESIDENCIA Y EL DR. LOPEZ SANCHEZ LA TESORERIA DEJANDO LA SECRETARIA PARA ALGUN EJECUTIVO DE TURNO EN EL COGIO MEDICO NACIONAL QUE PUDIERA SERLES UTIL EN SUS MANEJOS ASI CONSIGUIERON EN SEPTIEMBRE DE UNO NUEVE CINCO CINCO QUE EL COLEGIO MEDICO NACIONAL AUSPICIARA LA PUBLICACION DE LA REVISTA DE LA C.M.P. YANKEE MANTENIENDOSE ELLOS HASTA ESTE ANO EN SUS RESPECTIVOS CARGOS DE LA ZONA CARIBE YANKEE SUSTITUYENDO AL SECRETARIO CUANDO CAMBIABA EL COMITE EJECUTIVO DEL COLEGIO MEDICO NACIONAL (X) ESTA REVISTA DE LA C.M.P. SE PUBLICO HASTA LA DISOLUCION DEL COLEGIO MEDICO (X) AL SURGIR EL COLEGIO MEDICO DE LA REVOLUCION APPROVECHARON PARA LLEVAR COMO SECRETARIO DE LA C.M.P. DE LA ZONA CARIBE AL DR. LEOPOLDO E. ARAUJO BERNAL QUE MANEJADO POR BUSTAMANTE COMO UNA MARIONETA SIRVE PARA SUS PROPOSITOS (X) CON

CONOCIMIENTO DE UN MOVIMIENTO DENTRO DEL COMITE EJECUTIVO CENTRAL DE LA C.M.P. AUSPICIADO POR LAS ASOCIACIONES MEDICAS DE LAS OTRAS REPUBLICAS PANAMERICANAS PARA LA EXPULSION DE CUBA DE LA C.M.P. BUSTAMANTE ACONSEJO LA DISOLUCION POR EL GOBIERNO DEL COLEGIO MEDICO DE CUBA VALIENDOSE DEL DR. ARAUJO COMO PRESIDENTE P.S. DEL COLEGIO MEDICO (X) EN ESA FORMA CAUSAR BAJA DE OFICIO DE LA C.M.P. POR DISOLUCION EVITANDO RPTO EVITANDO ASI QUE LA CMP PUDIERA TOMAR ALGUN ACUERDO DE EXPULSION RPTO EXPULSION POR NO EXISTIR ENTONCES EL COLEGIO MEDICO DE CUBA ESTO LA DISCLUCION SE HIZO EL TRES CERO ABRIL PASADO (X) SU ESPECIALIDAD HAN SIDO SIEMPRE (X) UNO (X) PSIQUIATRIA CON CONSULTA EN LA CALLE K NO 309 (X) A ESTA ESPECIALIDAD ESTA DEDICADO TAMBIEN EL DR. ARAUJO (X) DOS (X) PROFESOR AHORA DE ENFERMEDADES NERVIOSAS Y MENTALES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE LA HAVANA (X) TIENE COMO AUXILIAR EN LA CATEDRA AL DR. ARAUJO (X) TRES (X) DIRECTOR DEL INSTITUTO DE PSIQUIATRIA CMA OTRA INSTITUCION BUROCRATICA Y PRODUCTIVA DONDE TAMBIEN OCUPA CARGO EL PROTECTOR DR. ARAUJO (X) CUATRO (X) NO LE GUSTA LA PUBLICIDAD CMA TRABAJANDO OCULTO SIRVIENDOLE DE GUIA A LOS QUE APARECEN PUBLICAMENTE (X) CINCO (X) NO AYUDA A NADIE DESINTERESA DAMENTE PERO TAMPOCO LE HACE DANO (X) SEIS (X) SIEMPRE DURANTE TODAS LAS DIRECTIVAS DEL COLEGIO MEDICO CMA DURANTE LOS DISTINTOS GOBIERNOS Y HASTA EL PRESENTE HA VIVIDO BIEN SIN PROBLEMAS ALGUNO DE AHI QUE LE LLAMEN "EL HOMBRE CORCHO" PORQUE SIEMPRE ESTA FLOTANDO PARA LA OPINION PUBLICA SE LE ACUSA DE SUMINISTRARLE DROGAS EN EL G-2 A LOS PRESOS PARA QUE HABLEN Y

QUE ES EL DIRECTOR DE TODO ESE TIPO DE TRABAJO CMA PERO PERSONALMENT NO ME PUDIDO CONFIRMARLO (X) EN MI PROXIMO MGE ENVIARE LA CONTINUACION DE ESTE INFORME PUES ME TEMO QUE OTRA HOJA DE PAPEL HACE MUCHO VOLUMEN PARA UNA CARTA (X) FELICIDADES (X) "MESA" FIN

TRANSLATION

Message 107. Dear John. I received your 96.

I have known Doctor Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE O'Leary since student days. He was always conspicuous in the assemblies of those days as bdonging to the leftist sector. He graduated as a medical doctor in 1939. Since then he virtually lived in the medical school of Havana and in the National [Medical School] together with Doctor Jose LOPEZ Sanchez (at present Secretary of the Academy of Sciences, intelligent Communist and very dangerous). They set to work to obtain positions in the [illegible] Medical Commissions and representing the Medical College every time there was a chance to go abroad. This brought about a certain protest from the doctors who contributed to the funds of the college and who met the costs of the trips, because the same ones (Drs. BUSTAMANTE and LOPEZ Sanchez) went every time even when the reasons for the trip had nothing to do with their medical specialities. This brought about the regulation of futue trips, but by that time BUSTAMANTE and LOPEZ Sanchez had made their contacts and had founded the Pan American Medical Confederation (C.M.P.) with headquarters in Havana. This confederation was made up of the National Medical Associations rpt National

Medical Associations, that is to say, the Pan American Medical Colleges, among these the Cuban Medical College. They then occupied positions in the Central Executive Committee. Later there were established four zones of the C.M.P. with BUSTAMANTE occupying the position of president and Dr. LOPEZ Sanchez the office of treasurer, leaving the secretariat open on a rotating basis for an executive of the National Medical College who might be useful to them in their manipulations. Thus in September of 1955 they managed to have the National Medical College sponsor the publication of the periodical of the C.M.P. They maintained themselves in their respective offices up to the present year, alternating the secretary whenever the executive committee of the National Medical College was changed. The periodical of the C.M.P. was published until the dissolution of the National Medical College. When the Revolutionary Medical College was founded they were able to install as secretary of the C.M.P. for the Caribbean Zone Dr. Leopoldo E. ARAUJO Bernal who is manipulated by BUSTAMANTE as a puppet to serve his ends. When it was learned that a movement was afoot in the Executive Central Committee of the C.M.P. to expell Cuba——this being pushed by the medical associations of the other latin American Republics—— BUSTAMANTE advised the government to dissolve the Cuban Medical Association, using Dr. ARAUJO as President P.S. (sic.) of the

Medical College. In this way they brought about a resignation from the C.M.P. [by dissolving their organization] thus avoiding the possibility of the C.M.P. voting for expulsion rpt expulsion since the Cuban Medical College had officially ceased to exist. The dissolution took place on 30 April of last year [1965]. His specialties were, one; Psychiatry with offices at K Street #309. This is also the specialty of Dr. ARAUJO, two; now Professor of Nervous and Mental Disorders at the University of Havana. He has Dr. ARAUJO as professorial assistant, three; Director of the Institute of Psychiatry, another bureaucratic institute in which his protege Dr. ARAUJO also has a position, four; he does not like publicity, serving behind the scenes as advisor to those who appear in public, five; he does not help anyone disinterestedly but neither does he hurt anyone, six; he always has, and up to the present, lived well during all of the administrations of the Medical College and through the various governments. For this reason he is called the "man of cork" because he always remains afloat. Public opinion holds that he supplies drugs to the G-2 to make the prisoners talk and that he is director of all this type of work, but I have been unable to confirm this personally. I will continue this topic in my next message because I am afraid that another sheet of paper will be too bulky for one letter. Felicitations. Mosa. end.

3. The information in this message is in response to a requirement on BUSTAMANTE levied in OVWL 93 dated 13 November 1966.

SECRET

0 Betty

TO: Chief, IS

THRU: Chief, 10
Chief, 10/2

FROM: 10/1 [redacted] STAFF employee

SUBJECT: SW Message #108 from [redacted] ASSET

1 Feb 67

WIO-1124

ND

Distribution:
~~1-C/IS~~
1-C/10
1-C/10/2
1 [redacted] STAFF-OFFICER
1-[redacted] file
1-10 Chrono
1-REG
1-C/TSB

1. SW message #108 from [redacted] ASSET was received at JMWAVE on 23 January, via Headquarters. The message was on the back of a one page letter, dated only December 1966, with cover text written on the front side of the paper. The message was of medium development, legible, and with no indication of censorship. The envelope, addressed to a Newport, Rhode Island accommodation address, showed a 5 January Havana postmark.

2. There follows, the original Spanish text of the message and its translation. The information in brackets is that of the translator. An advance copy of the message has been supplied to IS.

MJE UNO CERO OCHO (X) ESTIMADO JUAN (X) SU RMJE NUEVE ________ ULTIMO MJE RECIBIDO ESTE ANO DE UNO NUEVE SEIS SEIS (X) ENTENDIDAS COMPLETAMENTE RPTO ENTENDIDAS COMPLETAMENTE SUS INSTRUCCIONES (X) TODAVIA NO RPTO NO HE RECIBIDO CARTA DE CALESTINA FECHADA TRES CERO DE NOVIEMBRE CMA NI TAMPOCO "NOTAS" DE JULIO Y AGOSTO (X) CONTINUACION DEL INFORME DEL DOCTOR JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE (X) SIETE (X) NO CREO SEA MEDICO PERSONAL DE CASTRO CMA PUES SU ESPECIALIDAD ES PSIQUIATRIA CMA PERO SI QUE ESTE LO UTILICE PUES ES INTELIGENTE Y ESTA RELACIONADO POR SUS ACTUACIONES PACIFICAS ANTERIORES CMA PUES NO HA FORMADO PARTE DE NINGUN GRUPO REVOLUCIONARIO DE ACCION (X) EL MEDICO YANKEE GUIA ESPIRITUAL YANKEE QUE SIEMPRE ACOMPANA A CASTRO ES EL DOCTOR VALLEJO (CON BUSTAMANTE CMA LOPEZ SANCHEZ YANKEE ARAUJO TAMBIEN COLABORA EL DOCTOR ARMANDO DE CORDOVA ALTO DILIGENTE DEL MINISTERIO DE SALUD PUBLICA (X) YO NO CONOZCO LOS CONTACTOS EN EL EXTRANJERO DEL DOCTOR

BUSTAMANTE CMA PERO ESTIMO QUE SEAN MUCHOS CMA PUES POR MAS DE DOS CINCO ANOS SE HA DEDICADO CON LA INFLUENCIA YANKEE LA AYUDA ECONOMICA DEL COLEGIO MEDICO A ESTABLECER RELACIONES EN TODO EL MUNDO YANKEE ASISTIENDO COMO MIEMBRO DE LAS DISTINTAS COMISIONES A CONGRESOS YANKEE REUNIONES CMA PERO COMO DIJE ANTERIORMENTE SIN PUBLICIDAD YANKEE TRABAJANDO YANKEE DIRIGIENDO OCULTAMENTE A LOS IMPROVISADOS INFLUYENTES (X) OTRO ASUNTO (X) HE SIDO LLAMADO EN PRINCIPIO POR EL DIRECTOR DE LA EMPRESA DE ARTES GRAFICAS PARA UN ESTUDIO EN TODA LA ISLA EN RELACION CON MI PROFESION RPTO PROFESION (X) HAN QUEDADO EN AVISARME PARA UNA ENTREVISTA EL PROXIMO MES (X) YO OPORTUNAMENTE LE INFORMARE CON DETALLES (X) ES CONVENIENTE QUE CONTINUE SUS TRANSMISIONES LOS SABADOS YANKEE LAS REPETICIONES LOS JUEVES CMA PUES COMO LAS CARTAS DEMORAN MUCHOS DIAS EN LLEGAR A SU DESTINO CMA PUDIERA SER QUE TUVIERA QUE IR ENTRE SEMANA AL INTERIOR SIN QUE USTED TUVIERA TODAVIA NOTICIAS MIAS YANKEE NO RPTO PUDIERA COPIAR ALLI SU MJE (X) YO TRATARE DE ESTAR LOS SABADO RPTO SABADO EN LA HABANA (X) SALUDOS (X) "MESA" FIN

TRANSLATION

Message 108. Esteemed Juan. Your message 9___ /believed to be 967 was the last message I received this year of 1966. Your instructions completely rpt completely understood. To date I have not rpt not received a letter from A55e6 [redacted] dated 30 November, nor "Notas" for July-August.

Continuation of report on Doctor Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE.

7. I do not believe that he is personal physician to CASTRO, because his specialty is psychiatry, but I do /believe7 that he is used by CASTRO since he is intelligent and is well connected

because of his previous peace activities, and because he has not been a part of any revolutionary action group. The doctor and spiritual guide who constantly accompanies CASTRO is Doctor VALLEJO /Dr. Rene VALLEJO Ortiz7. With BUSTAMANTE, LOPEZ Sanchez /Dr. Jose LOPEZ Sanchez7 and ARAUJO /Dr. Leopoldo E. ARAUJO Bernal7 as well, there collaborates Doctor Armando de CORDOVA /Dr. Armando de CORDOVA y de Castro7, high official of the Ministry of Public Health. I do not know the contacts of Doctor BUSTAMANTE abroad but I assume that t are many because for more than five years he dedicated himself with the influence and financial support of the medical college /National Medical College7 to establishing relations all over the world, attending congresses and meetings as a member of the various commissions, but as I reported previously, /In SW #1077 without publicity and working and directing covertly the /activities7 of his ad hoc puppets.

Other subject. I have been summoned by the Director of the Graphic Arts Enterprise for a study in all of the island in relation with my profession rpt profession. They have cited me for an interview next month. I will inform you in due time on the details. It is desirable that you continue your transmissions on Saturdays and the repeats on Thursdays since letters take a long time in arriving at their destinations and it is possible that I might have to go into the interior midweek without your having received news from me and that I would not rpt not be able to copy your message. I will try to be in Havana on Saturdays. Regards. ASSET [redacted] End.

3. This message is a continuation of the report on BUSTAMANTE sent via SW #107, and is in response to a requirement on BUSTAMANTE levied in OWVL #93, dated 13 November 1966.

[redacted]

STAFF employee

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY, JOSE ANGEL /DR/
201-022396 019-006-069/03
SEX M DOB ? UFGA-26930A01
08 FEB 67
CIT ? P4
OCC ?
CO-FOUNDER WITH JOSE LOPEZ SANCHEZ
/201-215814/ OF PAN-AMERICAN MEDICAL
CONFEDERATION /CMP./.

UFG R 6705100138

FILE IN 201-022396

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

[illegible] employee

[redacted]

SECRET

FEBRUARY 1967

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 56-6-42/3

210 4

15 ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE VR DDP

17049

SECRET 21 16 44 Z CITE DIRECTOR

CITY

INDICATOR INDICATOR INDICATOR

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

PANAMA CITY 2182 (IN 03712)*

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSET [redacted] TRIP TO CUBA.

A. DO YOU KNOW VICTOR PINA CARDOSO, OLD GUARD PSP LEADER. IF SO COULD YOU VISIT HIM AND SEE WHAT HIS POSITION IS.

B. HAVE YOU EVER HEARD OF DR. JOSE BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY, FIDEL CASTRO'S PSYCHIATRIST? WE INTERESTED IN ANYTHING YOU CAN PICK UP ABOUT BUSTAMANTE.

C. IS JORGE PUENTE BLANCO CURRENTLY IN CUBA?

D. TRY TO ASCERTAIN THE REAL MISSION OF THE CUBAN PLANE THAT CRASHED IN MEXICO ON 9 FEBRUARY AND THE TRUE CAUSE OF THE CRASH.

E. TRY TO CONTACT AS MANY SOVIET OFFICIALS AS YOU CAN IN HAVANA.

END OF MESSAGE

(CONTINUED)

201-22396

14-00000

SECRET

DISSEMINATION

PER ____ # ____

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:

FILE , VR ,

(date and time filed)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 77044

PAGE TWO

ASSET

WH/ Comment*: Cubans apparently financing [redacted] trip to Havana.

STAFF employees

WH/SAO [redacted]

WH/COG/RR [redacted]

WH/2/P [redacted]

STAFF employees

[redacted]

AC/WHD

STAFF employees

[redacted]

AC/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY, JOSE ANGEL
201-022396
SEX M DOB ?

201-825850✓
HMMA-33842A03
12 JAN 68

CIT ?
OCC ?
ATT. 3 PHOTOS OF SUBJ.

UFG
R 6801261741

FILE IN 201-22396

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

SECRET

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-46)

14-00000



1 See Angel 2R 201-22396 BUSTAMANTE O'Leary

Attachment 3 to HMMA-33842 17 Jan 68





DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/C

INFO.
Chief, EUR., [redacted] Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
C Psychological Studies Center

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

[illegible]

1. This report was prepared by a member of a group of Cuban emigres who have been trained in the techniques of information collection and who have provided useful reports since early 1962, from CC-3138, Jorge Julio X*BEATO Nuñez, M.D., Pediatrician, a Cuban refugee and former resident of Havana City who left Cuba on 30 April 1967. NO POI

2. In February or March 1967, Beato sent (Dr) Augusto NO 201 X*FERNANDEZ-Conde, employed at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee Florida, U.S.A., a copy of the magazine Tribuna Medica (Medical Tribune), which contains a complete list of all the "professionals" (presumably medical doctors) remaining in Cuba and all those who have left Cuba. Dr. Fernandez acknowledged receipt of the magazine. Dr. Fernandez was the last President of the National Medical College of Cuba, dissolved by Fidel Castro in April 1966.

3. In January or February 1967, Beato learned from medical files, the complete list of all the Cuban medical doctors who had taken the Foreign Board examinations in Florida, U.S.A., together with the grades received. This also "appeared in the School of Medicine, Havana University". The examinations are highly confidential and it is inexplicable how such private information could be published in Cuba. Medical doctors in Cuba presume that "said organization must be infiltrated by Communists" who pirated the information and forwarded it to Cuba.

4. (Dr) Jose Angel F*BUSTAMANTE ~~Olcares~~ (201-022396) directs a psychological center for superior studies the location of which was not known to Beato. It is believed to be a training school in methods of exploring the subconcious mind used by the Departamento de Seguridad del Estado (DSE, Department of State Security).

6116

[redacted]
STAFF employee

Att: Spanish Raw Report

CS COPY

Distribution:
2 - DC/WH/C w/att
2 - C/EUR w/o att; 1 - COS, JMWAVE w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[illegible]	OSMA-22756	3 July 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 65-6-38/3

3-6 67

9P

INFORME CONFIDENCIAL

Entrevistado: Dr. Jorge Julio BEATO Núñez

Entrevistador: Sr. Ramón SUAREZ Rodríguez

Mayo 19 de 1967

MICROFILMED
JUL 11 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REQUISITOS QSM 6

Programa científico

83. a. El único centro alto de estudios psicológicos es el que dirige el Dr. José Angel BUSTAMANTE Oleares, del que se cree sea un centro de aprendizaje de los métodos de exploración del subconsciente que utilizan en el Departamento Seguridad Estado, lo único que desconozco el lugar de ubicación de dicho centro, pero sé que existe por haberlo escuchado en otras ocasiones entre la clase médica.

b. No recuerdo nombres científicos extranjeros en Cuba y de cubanos que hayan ido a países socialistas. Pero he podido enviar por correo al Dr. Augusto FERNANDEZ Conde el último Presidente del Colegio Médico Nacional, un ejemplar de la revista Tribuna Médica, la cual fué publicada recientemente, donde aparece una lista completa de todos los profesionales que se encuentran en Cuba y de los que han salido al extranjero. Esta revista la envié por el mes de Febrero o Marzo de 1967 al Dr. Augusto FERNANDEZ, que se encuentra en el Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, en la Florida, habiendo recibido la notificación de que dicha revista llegó sin contratiempo alguno.

GENERALIDADES.

NOTA: El Dr. Jorge Julio BEATO Núñez, es médico graduado en la Universidad de la Habana en el año 1940. Por sus relaciones con el alumnado, por haber sido instructor de Cátedra de Pediatría, hasta el año 1960 y por sus vinculaciones con la clâse médica cubana, a través de su actuación profesional y de la dirigencia del Colegio Médico Nacional y del Colegio Médico de la Habana, instituciones

CS COPY

11 140 CSMA 22754 201 22376

en donde desempeñó diversos cargos, pudo conocer ampliamente el desarrollo de la medicina en Cuba hasta el 30 de Abril de 1967, es decir ha podido conocer también el desenvolvimiento de la medicina cubana durante el régimen castro-comunista. Siendo lo que a continuación expreso un enjuiciamiento del mismo en su triple aspecto docente, profesional y clasista.

Aspecto docente.

La Universidad de la Habana fué fundada en el año 1728 y fueron precisamente los estudios médicos los primeros en ser organizados como Facultad. Si el pasado puede vanagloriarse de haber sido cuna de dos nombres preclaros en la Historia de la Medicina, como son Tomás ROMAY, sabio introductor de la vacuna en Cuba y el Dr. Carlos J. FINLAY, genial descubridor del agente transmisor de la fiebre amarilla, En la época republicana adquirió justa fama por la calidad de sus profesores, la rigidez de sus planes de estudio y la brillantez de sus graduados. Pero no es el momento de citar nombres que justifiquen tales aseveraciones. Basta decir tan solo que la Facultad de Medicina, precisamente, estaba clasificada como A-1 en el ranking de las facultades similares del mundo entero, al igual que las mejores universidades de los Estados Unidos de América.

Con el advenimiento del régimen comunista de Fidel CASTRO, comenzó la desintegración de la Universidad de la Habana, para volverla a integrar, como una rueda más en la inmensa maquinaria comunista del Gobierno. Siendo precisamente la Facultad de Medicina la primera en ser atacada, alegando diversos pretextos de índole secundaria, lo que trajo como consecuencia la renuncia de la mejor parte de su profesorado. Con la emigración de los médicos cubanos casi en masa, que repudiaban el régimen totalitario y tiránico que se instauraba en la Isla, agudizándose la carencia de profesores en la Facultad de Medicina.

Modo de resolver este grave problema que se le creaba al régimen de Castro.

En primer lugar nombrando profesores de "dedo", es decir que nunca hicieron ninguna prueba de capacidad para adquirir sus cátedras, sino que deben su nombramiento por ser militantes comunistas o por la exclusiva voluntad del Rector o Decano, autoridades comunistas cubanas que dirigen la salud pública. En segundo lugar, importando profesionales extranjeros de Países Comunistas o Socialistas, o bien de Países Democráticos, pero que son militantes o simpatizantes ocultos de los partidos comunistas locales. Todos estos profesionales son habilitados inmediatamente, incluso para ejercer la profesión médica, por un simple decreto rectoral.

Así como un exámen imparcial de este profesorado, nos permite afirmar su baja calidad, y por una razón muy sencilla; por ser todos con rarísimas excepciones profesores improvisados, sin ninguna historia o experiencia médica-pedagógica. Y aquellos rarísimos, repetimos, que pueden poseer alguna, por haber sido anteriormente profesores de la facultad, no tienen la libertad de enseñanza propia del carácter liberal de la Medicina, sino que están sujetos a la férrea disciplina colectiva propia de los sistemas marxistas-leninistas.

Del alumnado puede decirse sin exageración alguna, que es el más malo en la larga historia de la ya bi-centenaria Universidad de la Habana. Como lo qué se quiere obtener es un tipo de médico político, ciego observante de las reglas comunistas poco importa la preparación médica de los alumnos. Si antiguamente se requerían 7 años de Escuela Primaria y 4 o 5 de Bachillerato, hoy cualquiera, con un simple exámen, las más de las veces amañado, puede hacer su ingreso en los estudios médicos sin haber cursado ningún tipo de preparación en la Primera o Segunda Enseñanza, lo que si se exige es una militancia activa dentro de los cuadros del Partido Comunista Cubano, es decir, que no estudia en la Facultad de Medicina, el que quiere o tiene vocación por estos estudios, para ello hay que demostrar de un modo fehaciente la vinculación al régimen. Y cuando se tiene sospecha de una tibia adhesión por cualquiera de los alumnos, inmediatamente se celebra una "Asamblea de depuración", en la que 99 veces de cada 100 es expulsado aquel que tenga la mala suerte de ser señalado por sus compañeros, en definitiva, que la clásica y consagrada libertad de enseñanza es un mito en el régimen comunista cubano.

En algunas asignaturas no existen las pruebas de capacidad generalmente aceptadas por todas las universidades del mundo, es decir el exámen, bien de un tipo u otro. Pues en el afán de graduar médicos con el fin de poder reemplazar inutilmente a la gran masa de profesionales emigrados, las notas se dan por simple asistencia a clases, hay que graduar médicos a toda costa, dicen los dirigentes comunistas y para que se vea hasta donde llegan en esté sentido, vaya la siguiente anécdota vivida por el Dr. BEATO, la cual refleja con exactitud esta gran preocupación de los jerarcas del régimen. Se trata de un antiguo alumno de la época pre-comunista, que cuando CASTRO se apodera del poder, le faltaban pocas asignaturas para graduarse de médico. Como es un cubano demócrata, aprobó todas menos una, que no quiso examinar, para no coger el título de médico bajo el régimen comunista, cosa que repugnaba a su conciencia, pero cuando los dirigente de su curso le apremiaron para que se examinara, so pena de ser expulsado si no lo hacía, no tuvo más remedio que hacerlo, pero buscó adrede el suspenso, contestando mal la casi totalidad del exámen, a pesar de esto, y de hacer malísimamente el exámen, fué aprobado. He aquí la nueva versión del castro-comunista, de hacer médicos a palos.

En el plan de estudios médicos, existe una asignatura "Marxismo" que es indispensable para continuar la carrera. El alumno que no posea el aprobado en la misma, jamás será médico, no importa que sea brillante en Patología o Terapéutica, jamás obtendrá el título mientras no se haga un alumno aventajado en esa asignatura. Así que lo que se quiere obtener por el régimen es un tipo de médico político, que responda siempre a las orientaciones de la dirigencia comunista y no a los cánones sagrados del clásico arte de curar.

Todas estas cosas han dado origen a un tipo especial de médico, que el pueblo cubano le ha dado a la broma y le conocen con la denominación genérica de "cinco picos", porque la prueba final, la gran prueba, la que los consagra ante los ojos de los jerarcas comunistas es "La subida durante cinco veces al Pico Turquino", la montaña más alta de la Isla. Esto que parece escapado de la mente de un alienado es lo que exige CASTRO, para que un médico se gradúe, no importa que el alumno tenga una gran vocación por los estudios médicos, no importa que haya demostrado su capacidad en la materia que son propias de la Medicina, si no tiene aptitudes de alpinista o no quiere hacer la gran escalada, no se gradua y no obtiene el título. Por estas razones, se podrá observar del temor casi sagrado con que son mirados estos médicos denominados "cinco picos" por la población cubana, que con razón los desprecia y que justificadamente rehusa tenazmente todos sus servicios.

Aspecto Profesional:

El ejercicio de la medicina es hoy una pesadilla para los médicos que tengan la desgracia de permanecer todavía en Cuba. No hablo, claro, está, de los médicos integrados al Partido Comunista Cubano, los cuales gozan de todos los privilegios y prerrogativas de la "nueva clase" sino del resto de la gran masa médica que aún vive en Cuba, cuyo 90% abandonaría el país si tuviera oportunidad para hacerlo.

Cuando un médico pide permiso para irse de Cuba, lo tiene que hacer ante un funcionario del Ministerio de Salud Pública, un tal Capitán FOLS, quien despacha los martes en los salones del antiguo Colegio Médico Nacional (hoy desaparecido). Teniendo que presentar la solicitud por escrito, y entonces dicho funcionario se la firma y le declara tranquilamente que tiene que esperar un año después de la fecha de la solicitud. Inmediatamente comienzan las represalias por parte del régimen, rebaja de categorías, traslado de empleos, cierres y confiscación de consultas, etc. es decir todo lo imaginable para que el médico cambie de opinión al sentir todo el rigor del gobierno esclavista que sufrimos actualmente en Cuba. Hay que decir con orgullo que son muy raros, rarísimos, los casos que renuncian a la salida del país, pues con moral altísima, la inmensa mayoría de los médicos soportan con dignidad toda esa clase de vejaciones, para poder obtener algún día la ansiada libertad.

Los que trabajan en alguna dependencia del Estado, y hoy en día todos los servicios médicos en su enorme totalidad, están bajo el control del Estado, se encuentran sujetos a una disciplina despótica que anula toda independencia personal, tan propia del ejercicio de la más liberales de toda las profesiones como es la Medicina. Se le controla lo que receta, el número de indicaciones que hace, los análisis que prescribe, tiene que cumplir su trabajo bajo un horario estricto, como cualquier burócrata secundario, y lo que es peor, está sujeto a la vigilancia no tan solo de sus colegas directores de la Institución sino también de los llamados Comités de Vigilancia y de las Secciones del Partido Comunista, encargadas de supervisar las funciones todas de la institución y que llaman inmediatamente al profesional "al orden" ante cualquier aspiración de quebrantamiento y que incluso lo juzgan ante Asamblea de todos los trabajadores, médicos y no médicos.

Las medicinas son pocas y malas, el Ministerio de Salud Pública, envía a todos los profesionales cada dos meses, una listica cada vez menguante, de los medicamentos que pueden obtenerse y que contados por el entrevistado no pasan de 700 productos. El avance de la Terapéutica, que día a día está registrado por la prensa médica mundial, no se conoce en Cuba, cuyos médicos se ven obligados a recetar medicinas ya en desuso en los países avanzados del orbe. Productos de uso general y obligado en la práctica moderna, como el Acth y los derivados corticosteroides, escasean frecuentemente y en esos casos, cuando el paciente de clientela particular va a comprarlos a una botica, por necesitarlos urgentemente, se le contesta que no las hay y que están a nivel de Hospitales.

Fuera de las investigaciones rutinarias de laboratorio en Cuba, no se practica ninguna de las técnica modernas de investigación clínica. Las radiografías están limitadas a una cantidad diarias, que no puede sobrepasarse, y determinad métodos de exploración radiológicas, como son las colecistografías y pielografías, son muy difíciles de hacer por la falta de los medios de contraste adecuados.

Las consultas privadas están llamadas a desaparecer en el régimen comunista según ya proclaman a todos los vientos, los jerarcas del gobierno y por una razón muy sencilla; porque, las consideran centros de competencia a la medicina oficial, pues todavía el médico privado a pesar de todos los obstáculos se esfuerza en dar al paciente una medicina de calidad superior a la que este encuentra en los Centros Hospitalarios y asistenciales del Régimen.

Aspecto clasista:

Los médicos cubanos, como clase habían llegado a una organización modelo en su género, que fué copiada y sirvió para organizarse a muchas instituciones similares de otros países, tal era el Colegio Médico Nacional (antigua Federación Médica de Cuba) que agrupaba hacie el año 1959 unos 7,000 médicos cubanos. Así como bajo su actuación se obtuvieron una serie de conquistas laborales y un ansiado Retiro Médico para la hora del descanso y de la vejez. Había un Código de Moral Médica y funcionaba dentro del Colegio, una serie de Tribunales de Disciplina, que valaban por el estricto cumplimiento médico, es decir agrupaciones con criterios disímiles en cuanto a la orientación de la medicina como clase, independientes de todo lo que significara militancia activa dentro de la política nacional. La dirigencia colegial se elegía a través de elecciones democráticas, en las que participan todos los médicos, repartiéndose los puestos ejecutivos de acuerdo con la representación proporcional de cada partido. Es decir que como en toda organización democrática, había una mayoría que gobernaba y una minoría alerta y vigilante a cualquier transgresión de las leyes colegiales.

Todo esto ha despparecido desde el mes de Abril de 1966, en que el régimen de Fidel CASTRO declaró disuelto el Colegio Médico Nacional y extinguida todas sus funciones de protección a los médicos, de esta forma, se perdieron de un plumazo, todas nuestras reivindicaciones, muchas de las cuales estaban regadas con la sangre y el sacrificio de muchos de nosotros. En su lugar existe hoy en día un régimen de trabajo esclavo, que no admite méritos y capacidad en el orden profesional, sino una ciega obediencia a los principios Marxista-Leninista. Habiéndome enterado por amigos colegas de la profesión, de que en el mes de Enero o Febrero de 1967, apareció en la escuela actual de Medicina una lista completa de todos los médicos cubanos que han tomado el Foreign-Board en Florida, U.S.A. y sus correspondientes calificaciones. Desconociendo como una cosa tan privada ha sido posible de que se pudiese publicar en Cuba, siendo las causas de que entre el sector médico, exista el recelo de hablar al ver que cosas confidenciales como son esos exámenes, puedan ser publicadas en Cuba, por lo que se piensa en la infiltración comunista dentro de dicho organismo.

A mediados del mes de Marzo de 1967, cuando me dirigía al Archivo Nacional, el cual se encuentra ubicado en la Calle de Compostela y San Isidro en la Habana, para realizar estudios de investigaciones históricas de la Medicina Cubana, adonde todos los días solía ir, pues en uno de esos días al salir de dicho Archivo Nacional y tratar de tomar la Ave. del Puerto para ir al British Club, que se encuentra en Prado, pude observar de que dicha Ave. estuvo interrumpida al tránsito durante varios días, no recuerdo días exacto, pero si sé que un solo día extremaron la vigilancia en el puerto, además de no permitir que se acercase nadie, logrando ver desde los muelles de la Terminal del Ferry Habana-Cayo Hueso y a una distancia de unos 50 a 100 mts. camiones y rastras cargando objetos de toda clase de tamaños, éstos objetos eran de madera y puedo decir de que un modelo de las cajas de madera era de unos 12 mts. de largo por unos 2 mts. de ancho, no recordando el alto de la misma, así como las medidas anteriores son aproximadas, ya que no lo recuerdo con lujo de detalles, por ser vista a ojo de aguila y a la distancia antes mencionada. También pude ver colocados a lo largo de los muelles y en la calle, depósitos de distintos tamaños, pareciéndome el menor de ellos como de unos 55 galones. Siendo todo cuanto puedo precisar al respecto.

RSR/cgt

Madrid, 16 de Junio de 1967.

[illegible]-133-66
20 February 1966

SUBJECT : Case 40632 -- Jose Bustamante

1. On 8 February 1966, [redacted] contacted [redacted] US Public Health Service, regarding Jose Angel Bustamante O'Leary. Fecud has been in the US since 1961, last saw Bustamante in 1959 or 1960. Although not a close friend, Fecud has known Bustamante for fifteen or twenty years; he refers to him as "a professional acquaintance--a medical acquaintance".

2. According to Fecud, Bustamante--now fifty-one years old--is well and widely known in Cuba as a strong Communist. He was a Communist Party member in his youth, a quite common situation in Cuban (and other Latin American) colleges and universities. Fecud stressed that it is only a matter of hearsay, but it is believed that Bustamante was a Communist Party member while in medical school, but was separated from the Party after his graduation, because of some trouble. The Communist Party then referred to him as a traitor, imperialist lackey, etc. Bustamante was thenceforth known as a strong left-winger, although not a Communist Party member. He proceeded to develop "a tremendous practice" during this period. Bustamante gradually worked his way back into the good graces of the Cuban Communist Party leaders and was returned to membership after Fidel Castro took power.

3. Also a matter of gossip in Cuba was a story of Bustamante having been involved in a love affair with a married woman during a visit to New York City some years ago and being denied permission to return to the US as a result of this alleged escapade. According to Fecud, Bustamante has also had other "troubles with the ladies", has been accused of making passes at female patients.

4. Fecud further describes Bustamante as "a brilliant, intelligent, clear-minded fellow and a good psychiatrist". He was President of the Cuban Medical Association for two years and was "President of a World Medical Association meeting held in Cuba". While a medical student, he was President of the Students' Association of the University of Havana.

5. Fecud again describes as "gossip" a story that Bustamante had been left at a well-known Havana institution for orphans (which has a turntable mounted in the wall where women may leave a baby, ring a bell, and have the device turned to take the child into the building). He was later [illegible] by taken care of by a woman referred

14-00000

to as an aunt. A pious, devout Catholic, she died in 1957 or 1958, left some property to Bustamante. Bustamante himself is a confessed atheist and Marxist; Reaud believes Bustamante's wife, a Ph.D teaching at the high school level, is probably the same.

6. Reaud further stated that Bustamante has two children, a son, now eighteen to twenty years old, and a younger daughter. When the son was "around twelve to fifteen years old he was, according to Reaud, extremely effeminate and, because of this, "a source of much strain" to his father.

7. Reaud feels that the circumstances of Bustamante's birth, adoption and upbringing may have embittered him and contributed greatly to his leftist philosophy. Reaud also believes that these same circumstances may have contributed to Bustamante's interest in psychiatry, i.e., they may have led to a search for a better understanding of himself and his problems. Reaud's own attitude toward psychiatry and psychiatrists is also worth considering; he flatly stated, "I don't believe in them. I prefer a good priest".

8. Based on the gossip regarding a New York City visit of Bustamante, mentioned in paragraph three, Reaud suggested a check with the US Immigration and Naturalization Service for further background on Bustamante. In discussing further leads, Reaud said that at least eighty percent of the Cuban physicians in the US would have known Bustamante to some degree or other, because of his two-year presidency of the Cuban Medical Association.

9. Of the many Cuban physicians in Washington, D.C., Reaud mentioned two men practicing at the dispensary in the "Public Health Service building downtown", Drs. (fnu) Machado and (fnu) Tremols. He knows little about Tremols; Machado is in his sixties, has been in the US about five years.

10. Reaud's prime recommendation as a source of information on Bustamante, however, is Dr. (fnu) Huertas, President, Cuban Medical Association in Exile, Miami, Florida. He would have much information on Bustamante and would be a source of leads to Cuban psychiatrists in the US (probably four or five individuals) who could be expected to have considerable information on Bustamante.

11. We assume Dr. Huertas has been contacted by the Miami Office. Drs. Machado and Tremols look like relatively marginal leads, but we will be pleased to contact them if desired. Otherwise, please close Case [illegible] for the Washington Field Office.

SECRET

NO-22-66
20 January 1966

Case 46,632 - Additional Information on Dr. Jose Angel Bustamante O'Leary

1. Dr. Augusto Fernandez-Conde promised to furnish additional details in an effort to complete the information which he had already supplied on Dr. Bustamante and which was presented for your consideration in NO-16-66 of 17 January 1966. He has now reported to us the following results of his efforts thus far.

2. In paragraph #15 of NO-16-66, Dr. Fernandez-Conde mentioned that in 1960 Dr. Bustamante had deposited money and some of his wife's jewels in a repository in Mexico City for safekeeping. He further recalls that on another occasion Bustamante arranged for a friend to take another sum of money and more jewelry to Mexico City and to deposit them there. Eliseo Perez-Stable, M.D., Veterans Administration Hospital, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15240, is reported to know the identity of Bustamante's friend who transported the money and jewelry to Mexico City for safekeeping and possibly might know more about the size of Bustamante's deposits abroad.

3. In paragraphs #9, 13, and 18 f of NO-16-66, our informant touched on the brainwashing techniques which Dr. Bustamante employed on certain individuals detained at the G-2 prison in Havana. He suggests that Oscar Sagredo, M.D., whose current address is Rodriguez Sampedro 10, Madrid 15, Spain, was well acquainted with Dr. Bustamante's professional methods and particularly with his brainwashing techniques. Dr. Sagredo was formerly one of Cuba's outstanding psychiatrists. After leaving Havana, he was employed as Professor of Psychology at Temple University in Philadelphia and later moved to Madrid to reside.

4. In paragraph #18 c of NO-16-66, Dr. Fernandez-Conde named Dr. Scarizza as the individual who psychoanalyzed Dr. Bustamante. His full name is Spartaco Scarizza, M.D., and his current address is Via Ammannati 61, Rome, Italy.

5. Dr. Fernandez-Conde recently received a letter dated 13 January 1966 from his good friend, Dr. Gunnar Gundersen, Gundersen Clinic, La Crosse, Wisconsin, in which the latter asked him the following:

"Sometime I wish you would write me in regard to our mutual adversary, Jose Angel Bustamante-O'Leary. I presume he might be one of Castro's henchmen if someone hasn't taken a pot shot at him which might have resulted in his liquidation. Even that would have been too good for him in my judgment!"

6. According to Dr. Fernandez-Conde, Dr. Gundersen was formerly President of the American Medical Association as well as President of the Council of the World Medical Association. Bustamante was a member of the Council during Dr. Gundersen's administration. Our source suggests that Dr. Gundersen should have accurate information about Bustamante's reactions and attitudes.

7. We shall pass on the remaining information promised in paragraph #19 of NO-16-66 as soon as it is received from Dr. Fernandez-Conde.

SECRET

SECRET

HU-15-66
17 January 1966

Case 46,632 - Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE O'Leary: Background Information/ Professional and Personality Evaluation

1. On 12 January 1966, our representative called on Dr. Augusto Fernandez-Conde at his office in the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, and discussed the requirements of Case 46,632 with him. He was most cooperative, gave his wholehearted attention to the subjects for discussion, and provided a considerable amount of pertinent information.

2. Dr. Fernandez-Conde has known Dr. Jose Angel Bustamante O'Leary since their undergraduate days in the late 1930's at the Facultad de Medicina, University of Havana. After Bustamante's graduation in 1939 and Fernandez-Conde's graduation in 1940, their professional contacts still continued although their political persuasions were quite different. From 1959 or 1960 to August 1961, Fernandez-Conde had little or no contact with Bustamante, and since August/1961, when he left Cuba for permanent residence in the US, Fernandez-Conde has had no first-hand knowledge of Bustamante's activities. The information which he provided on Bustamante is presented below and is dated between the late 1930's and 1959/1960.

3. Dr. Bustamante was born about 1911 in Havana and has lived there all of his life. He never knew his father. He made his home with his so-called aunt, who was locally believed to be his natural mother. His aunt is no longer living. The uncertainty about his ancestry has constantly plagued Bustamante, and Dr. Fernandez-Conde suggests that it may be one of the motivating factors in his personality.

4. Dr. Bustamante is married to the former Maria Luisa Rodriguez-Columbie, a native of Barracoa, Cuba. It is commonly believed that Maria Luisa is part Negro. Lending credence to this statement is the fact that Maria Luisa kept her mother completely in the background and never brought her to Havana where she would have become known to Maria Luisa's and Jose's friends. Dr. Fernandez-Conde suggests that Maria Luisa's excessive concern over her antecedents probably motivates her aggressiveness in seeking high social position in the community. Her brother is Dr. /fnu/ Rodriguez-Columbie, a child psychiatrist, who is a well-known homosexual.

5. Dr. and Mrs. Bustamante have two children, both of whom have been enrolled in the best Roman Catholic private schools in Havana. Their daughter is now about 18 years old and is described as being a pretty, healthy teenager. Their son, Jose, Jr., is about 19 or 20 years of age and is very effeminate in manner. Dr. Bustamante is known to have been worried about his son's personality problems when the boy was nine years old and his classmates taunted him as being a sissy. In the intervening years, Jose, Jr. has become a homosexual and has been under the psychiatric care of, first, his father, who was not successful in treating him, and more recently of Dr. Carlos Acosta-Nodal and of Dr. /fnu/ Soraegui (now deceased). On many occasions, Dr. Bustamante complained to our

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

informant that his son was frequently involved in scrapes and had caused him a great deal of trouble. Dr. Fernandez-Conde suggests that Maria Luisa's attitude towards and relationship with her son may have a strong bearing on the latter's behaviour. He also suggests that Maria Luisa, but not Jose, Sr., is vulnerable where their son, Jose, Jr., is concerned. /The subject of sexual aberrations came up several times during this interview. It seems appropriate to point out here that, according to Dr. Fernandez-Conde, there are many homosexuals among current Cuban government officials and the possible exposure as deviates would not serve as a threat to the security of these individuals. He states that homosexuality is given no importance in Castro's Cuba./

6. The Bustamante marital union has not run smoothly, to say the least. In 1945 or 1946, Jose, Sr. had an affair with Mrs. /fnu/ Alvarez-Tablo which became a "public scandal," as the saying goes in Cuba. Mrs. Alvarez-Tablo attempted suicide and came very close to death. While Jose, Sr. is known to have had affairs with other women both before and since his liaison with Mrs. Alvarez-Tablo, the one in which he was involved between 1951 and 1960 (and possibly later) brought him the greatest amount of notoriety. Unfortunately, Dr. Fernandez-Conde cannot recall the name of this mistress. On one occasion, Dr. Bustamante and his inamorata registered as man and wife in a New York City hotel. The lady's husband got wind of their whereabouts, had private detectives to obtain compromising photographs, and precipitated Dr. Bustamante's local arrest and detention on several charges. The latter put up bail, but subsequently fled the US before the case came to trial. When he was President of the Cuban Medical Association, Bustamante tried to use his professional influence to solve the problem of his being a fugitive from justice so that he could travel to the US with impunity. His efforts to exert pressure on certain important officials met with no success. The mistress was divorced by her husband and continued her relationship with Bustamante, as recently as 1960 and possibly later. She is reported to have become a "mental case."

7. During the course of this latter affair, Jose, Sr. and Maria Luisa on a few occasions came almost to the point of divorce. But, by then he had become a man of some importance in the Castro regime and for appearances' sake they remained together. As recently as 1960, Maria Luisa spoke vehemently against Jose, Sr. in private, while in public she tried to make it appear that all was well in their menage. Dr. Fernandez-Conde has no first-hand knowledge of Dr. Bustamante's extramarital affairs since 1960/1961. From refugees who left Cuba in recent years, however, he learned that Dr. and Mrs. Bustamante still live in their large residence in Miramar, located on 12th Street between First and Third Avenue, Havana.

8. Dr. Bustamante obtained his medical education at the University of Havana and received his MD degree from that institution in 1939. He was one ~~of the fifteen outstanding medical students in his class.~~ He interned at the University hospital in Havana. His specialty is psychiatry and his practice has been in the psychotherapy area of that field. He used to be a follower of Freud but has since switched to the Pavlovian school. He continues to maintain

his office for the private practice of psychiatry in K Street, between 17th and 19th Streets, Vedado, Havana. Our Informant agrees with your statement that Dr. Bustamante is currently considered to be the outstanding psychiatrist in Cuba. Dr. Bustamante speaks English fairly well and French to a limited extent. It is significant that in 1959 he was farsighted enough to begin lessons in Russian. Our informant has no knowledge of Bustamante's progress or current proficiency in that language.

9. Dr. Bustamante was a close friend of Dr. Emilio Mira-Lopez, who is now /1966/ reported to be practicing psychiatry in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Mira-Lopez was born in Catalonia, Spain, and is believed to be a Spanish national. During the Spanish Civil War, he was engaged in brainwashing prisoners and, at the conclusion of hostilities, he had to leave the country. He apparently proceeded to Cuba where he met Bustamante and subsequently exerted a profound professional influence on him. He is known to have trained Bustamante in the brainwashing techniques which he had used with prisoners during the Spanish Civil War. According to Dr. Fernandez-Conde, Dr. Mira-Lopez is a despicable, loathsome person and exerted an evil influence on Bustamante.

10. Dr. Bustamante's first public affiliation with Communist groups was as a member of the Liga De Juventud Comunista between 1931 and 1939. He was also a member of the Ala Izquierda, a medical leftist group, and he was President of the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria. By the time he had graduated from the University in 1939, he was believed to have been in agreement with the purposes of the Communist Party although he may not have been a party member. Later, he was for a while a member of the Accion Inmediata (founded in December 1938), a political group in the medical profession which was not Communist. In 1946, he was one of the founders of the Confederacion Medica Panamericana, which still exists (1966), and in 1959, after the Castro takeover, he founded another political party in the medical profession, the Partido Medico de la Revolucion.

11. During the 1940's and the 1950's, Dr. Bustamante gradually became well known in the medical profession and achieved some measure of affluence. In 1943, he held an office in the Colegio Medico Nacional de Cuba and in 1952-1953 he served as President of this organization. About 1954, Dr. Bustamante asked permission of the Colegio Medico Nacional de Cuba to become a member of Nanigo so that he could study and evaluate its influence on the Negro culture in Cuba. The Nanigo is a secret Negro society in Cuba which practices witchcraft, offers human sacrifices, and indulges in other activities repugnant to Western civilization. Permission was granted because of the allegedly scientific nature of Bustamante's interests. Some time later, Professor Federico Sotolongo, who is still /1966/ a member of the medical faculty of the University of Havana, told another doctor in the Colegio Medico Nacional de Cuba that Bustamante was doing a good job of infiltrating the Nanigo. Since Sotolongo is a Communist, the inference was that Bustamante's performance benefited the Communist Party. Dr. Fernandez-Conde stated that he needed no further evidence that Bustamante was a trusted member of the Communist Party. Moreover, he is a very good friend of the Chilean Communist Salvador Allende. Allende always stayed in the Bustamante home when he visited Havana.

12. Dr. Bustamante's actions during the Batista regime are of interest. Batista's mother-in-law (the mother of his third wife, Marta Fernandez de Batista) worked in some capacity for Maria Luisa Rodriguez Columbie de Bustamante about this time and, on the surface, the Batista and Bustamante families were on friendly terms. However, in reality, Jose, Sr. was working against Batista as a member of the underground group, Monte Cristo, headed by the well-known Justo Carrillo. At the same time, he maintained contact with the Communist Party and is known to have had private meetings on a continuing basis during the Batista regime with Carlos Font, now /1966/ Vice Minister of Health, and Jose Lopez Sanchez, current Vice President of the Cuban Academy of Sciences.

13. When Fidel Castro came to power, Bustamante's potential was brought to the attention of Raul Castro. He offered to take charge of the brainwashing activities of the G-2 and thus put into practice the techniques he had learned from Mira-Lopez. He was subsequently put in charge of such work and was assisted in it by Drs. Acosta-Nodal and Soraegui. After Dr. Soraegui's death, Raul Castro went to the latter's office and supervised the removal of patients' files, obviously for future use in building up dossiers on the subjects.

14. Dr. Fernandez-Conde pointed out that, also after the Castro takeover, Bustamante wanted to be made Director of the Mental Hospital in Mazorra, eight miles outside of Havana. The position was given instead to Dr. Ordaz, who had fought with Castro in the Sierra Maestra. At first, Bustamante complained bitterly about losing out, but since then he has not asked for or otherwise sought another similar important professional post. Dr. Fernandez-Conde suggests that Bustamante most probably has been told that he is performing an important military service for the regime and therefore it would be wise for him to remain in the background. He further states that Bustamante is believed to exert a considerable amount of influence in the Ministry of Health, although he holds no official position in it. It should be noted that Bustamante's importance in the regime, however great, stems principally from his usefulness to Raul Castro. Bustamante is currently /1966/ considered to be one of the 10 most effective enemies in the regime of the non-Communist Cuban doctors.

15. Dr. Bustamante is not believed to be in any sort of financial trouble. As his professional stature grew and his wealth increased, he and his wife soon acquired a taste for a luxurious way of life. They bought a pretentious home in an exclusive residential section of Havana, bought a Cadillac, and enrolled their children in select, private schools. They both are driven by ambitions for social prestige and high political position. They crave money and power, want to be associated with those at the highest echelon in the regime, and, above all, are opportunists of the first water. Maria Luisa has always longed to be a member of the Jockey Club and of the Liceo (a ladies' cultural society). She realized her dream of belonging to the Liceo and even became President of it. Then, in 1960, Maria Luisa was made interventor of all private schools in Cuba. She resigned from the Liceo; they sold the Cadillac and bought a small, compact car in an effort to play along with the regime's image. Another important point about their finances, Dr. Fernandez-Conde points out, is the fact

that in 1960, while on a trip to Montreal for a medical meeting, Dr. Bustamante took a large sum of money and his wife's jewels with him and deposited them in safekeeping somewhere in Mexico. The source of this particular information is Dr. Hector Weltz, a former close friend and confidant of Bustamante. Dr. Weltz still lives in Cuba and is described as being anti-Castro.

16. Dr. Fernandez-Conde states that Bustamante is intelligent, industrious, well-grounded in his profession, gregarious, able to make and carry out decisions, but is not a particularly forceful person. He is insincere, devious, a physical coward, and inordinately afraid when his life is in danger. He has many personality complexes. He seldom drinks and boasts about his abstemiousness where liquor is concerned. He may occasionally drink a glass of port or vermouth if the situation demands it. Maria Luisa drinks but not to excess. Neither is addicted to dope. Maria Luisa's Achilles heel is her overprotective attitude towards her son, Jose, Jr. Both Dr. and Mrs. Bustamante are opportunists, love money and power, and will go along with the regime so long as it serves their best interests to do so. They have already taken the precaution of depositing cash and valuables abroad to use in the event of the overthrow of the Castro government and the need for them to flee Cuba. Very little exact information is available about the state of Maria Luisa's health. Jose, Sr. is described as being in good health. He suffers continually from flat feet and is known to have undergone a hemorrhoidectomy in the distant past.

17. Dr. Bustamante has only three close friends in Cuba. They are all Communists. They are the following individuals:

a. Dr. Leopoldo Araujo-Bernal, President of the Colegio Medico Nacional de Cuba, Havana,
b. Dr. Carlos Acosta-Nodal, practicing psychiatrist in Havana,
c. Dr. Oscar Garcia Fernando, practicing physician in Havana.

Almost all of the doctors left in Cuba are anti-Communist and are violently opposed to Bustamante. The following two such individuals would be able to provide detailed background information on Bustamante:

a. Dr. Raul de Velasco Guzman, former President of the Colegio Medico Nacional de Cuba (1956-1959), 3rd Avenue between 10th and 12th Streets, Miramar, Havana. Dr. de Velasco has a sister and a son (Raul) now in Miami. Raul, Jr. is in his third year in the Medical School of the University of Miami.
b. Dr. Jorge Beato, Paseo Street and 17th Street, Vedado, Havana.

18. Dr. Fernandez-Conde suggests that the following individuals should be able to provide vital information on Dr. Bustamante or Mrs. Bustamante. With one exception, they are now living in the US.

a. Dr. Fidel Aguirre, 730 Livingstone Road, Elizabeth, New Jersey, telephone - 289-9000. Dr. Aguirre was formerly President of the Havana Medical Association. He will be able to provide background and professional information on Dr. Bustamante.

b. Dr. Enrique Huertas Pozo, now President of the Colegio Medico Cubano Libre (Cuban Medical Association in Exile). His address is 213 Arragon Avenue, Coral Gables, Florida. His unlisted telephone number is He 5-7500. He, too, will be able to provide all types of information on Dr. Bustamante.

c. Dr. [fnu] Scarizza, Rome, Italy. Dr. Scarizza is an Italian national, once lived in Cuba, but now practices psychiatry in Rome. During his residence in Cuba, he was the analyst used to psychoanalyze those Cuban medical students who expected to specialize in psychiatry. He had Dr. Bustamante under analysis for more than a year and therefore should have unique insight into this patient's personality problems. Dr. Scarizza on several occasions mentioned to Dr. Fernandez-Conde how much trouble he was having with Bustamante during his analysis. Bustamante frequently missed their sessions of treatment although he always paid for the professional services.

d. Mr. and Mrs. Enrique Leon, New York City. Mr. Leon is a lawyer and now [1966] works in the New York office of Julio Lobo, who was so prominent in the business life of Cuba before the Castro regime. Mrs. Leon is the former Rosario Rexach. Mr. and Mrs. Leon were probably the closest friends Bustamante had before 1959/1960. They were members with him of the Ala Izquierda and she was a former President of the Liceo. They are no longer Communists. They left Cuba in early 1960 for permanent residence in the US.

e. Mrs. Conchita Castaneda, 716 Fife Avenue, Wilmington, Ohio 45177. Mrs. Castaneda is a Quaker (one of the few in Cuba) and is now [1966] teaching in the Quaker High School in Wilmington. She was Maria Luisa's closest friend and confidante and lived with her. She should be able to provide detailed information about Maria Luisa's personal life, about Bustamante's extramarital affairs, and their effect on Maria Luisa's life.

f. A Cuban national who left Cuba in late 1961 for permanent residence in the US. Dr. Fernandez-Conde cannot recall his name, but will obtain his name and address from one of his friends in the US. This individual was believed to have been a member of the underground movement in Cuba and in March 1961 he was interrogated by Bustamante in a series of interviews at the G-2 prison at 5th Avenue and 14th Street, Miramar, Havana. He would be able to describe Bustamante's performance in this capacity.

19. Dr. Fernandez-Conde will be very glad to clarify any statements in his discussion of Dr. Bustamante or to amplify them if requested. In addition, he promises to obtain the current street address of Mr. and Mrs. Leon, the name and address of the individual who was brainwashed by Bustamante, and possibly Dr. Scarizza's first name and street address in Rome. We will forward this information as it is received.

HO-83-66
8 March 1966

Case 46632 - Final Details Identifying Additional Sources of Information on Dr. Jose Angel Bustamante O'Leary

1. Dr. Augusto Fernandez-Conde has notified us that the New York City address of Dr. and Mrs. Enrique Leon Soto is 310 East 70th Street, Apartment 9 K, and their telephone number is LE-50170. Mrs. Soto is the former Rosario Rexach. Dr. and Mrs. Soto were incorrectly identified in paragraph 18 d. of HO-16-66 of 17 January 1966 as Mr. and Mrs. Enrique Leon.

2. Unfortunately, Dr. Fernandez-Conde's efforts to learn the name and US address of the Cuban national mentioned in paragraph 18 f. of HO-16-66 of 17 January 1966 were unsuccessful. He states that Pepita Riera, who is now a radio commentator in Miami, was once a patient of Dr. Bustamante and knew him very well. She also has some knowledge of the brainwashing activities engaged in by Drs. Bustamante, Carlos Acosta-Nodal, and Abdo Canasi at the Cuban G-2 headquarters in Havana. He suggests that she may also be able to identify the Cubans who were brainwashed by Bustamante et al and who are now available for interview in the US. Miss Riera's address is Box 516, Coral Gables, Florida.

3. This completes the contributions made by Dr. Fernandez-Conde in satisfying the requirements of case 46632.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[illegible]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SUBJECT

Alleged Use of Sodium Pentathol to Obtain GOC Confessions/Dr Jose Bustamante

REPORT NO. CO-A-[illegible]/0[illegible]50-64

CAC

DATE DISTR. 17 August 1964

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 30 Apr 64

PLACE & DATE ACQ. La Vibora, Havana/Apr 64 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 14 013 601, age 52.

Source was a pediatrician who obtained his doctor's degree from the University of Havana. He worked for Clinica Santa Isabel, La Vibora, Havana from 1954 to 30 Apr 64 and maintained a private office at his home. He departed Cuba via Spain 6 May 64 with his wife and three children, arriving in the US 9 Jul 64. One of several reports from this source.

CAC

[This report was developed by an [redacted] representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

During many doctor's gatherings I heard various doctors comment that the GOC obtained confessions from people under interrogation by injecting them with pentotal [sodium pentathol.] This practice was carried out by Dr Jose Bustamante, a well known Cuban psychiatrist. He maintained an office in a large house [exact location and description of house unknown] near the new university annex in Reparto Country Club, Marianao, Havana. It was there that interrogations were conducted under Dr Bustamante's direction and supervision. I did not know Dr Bustamante personally.

-end-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]/ C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Dr (fnu) [illegible] was a [illegible] psychiatrist who came to Cuba in [illegible]. I did not know where he worked, or how long he remained in Cuba. Description: Caucasian, age 34, 5'7", 155 lbs, blond hair.

h. Dr (fnu) Orlandini was a Latin American psychiatrist who worked at the Las Villas Provincial Hospital in Cienfuegos. I did not know his nationality. Description: Caucasian, age 29, 5'10", 150 lbs, blond hair.

i. Dr (fnu) Zuniga was a psychiatrist from Nicaragua. I did not know where he worked. Description: Mulatto, age 34, 5'9", 170 lbs, cross-eyed.

j. Dr (fnu) Zorin was a psychiatrist from Argentina, who worked at the Brain Center Institute in Havana. Description: Caucasian, age 53, 5'4", 190 lbs, bald.

2. The following were leading Cuban psychiatrists who have cooperated with Castro:

Fernando

a. Dr (fnu) Barral was in charge of debriefing Cubans who were leaving the country through Varadero. Description: Caucasian, age 32, 5'4", 150 lbs, brown hair.

b. Dr Jose Caligarcia Hernandez, professor at Havana University. Description: Caucasian, age 50, 5'7", 155 lbs, dark eyes.

c. Dr Rene Yodir was a professor at Havana University. Description: Mulatto, age 47, 5'11", 180 lbs, dark hair.

d. Dr Armando Cordova, was a non-Communist professor at Havana University. Description: Caucasian, age 51, 5'8", 190 lbs, green eyes.

Leopoldo

e. Dr (fnu) Arau[illegible] was a professor at Havana University. Description: Caucasian, age 53, 5'10", 170 lbs, brown eyes, black hair.

f. Dr (fnu) Garcia Fleites was attached to the Cuban Armed Forces for psychological warfare instruction. Description: Caucasian, age 39, 6'1", 200 lbs, brown eyes.

g. Dr Jose Angel Bustamante, was allegedly Fidel Castro's personal psychiatrist. Description: Caucasian, age 42, 5'5", 135 lbs, black hair.

h. Dr Aramis Figueredo, had been assigned to work in Algeria from 1963 to 1965. Description: Mulatto, age 42, 6', 220 lbs, dark hair.

i. Dr Garcia Oliva was Ramon [illegible]'s personal psychiatrist and he worked closely with the DSE. Description: Caucasian, age 54, 5'8", 150 lbs, black hair, dark eyes.

-end-

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Cuba/USSR

Views on Castro's Alleged Mental Treatment in the USSR

REPORT NO. 00-K-[illegible]/10770-66

DATE DISTR. 6 Jul 66

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CSH: C-[illegible]-52332

Jun 66 and earlier

Jun 66 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 17 357 520, graduate medical doctor. Source is a specialist in psychiatry and served on the staff of Mazorra Hospital in Havana for over 20 years. He also had a large private practice. Source arrived in the U.S. via airlift on 14 April 66.

/ This report was developed by an CAC [redacted] representative assigned to the office of preparation. /

1. As of June 1966 rumors are rampant concerning Fidel Castro's mental condition and a U.S. wire service has reported that he is undergoing mental treatment in the USSR.

2. Although I have no first-hand knowledge, I do not believe that such would be the case. There are still competent psychiatrists in Cuba, particularly Dr. Jose Angel Bustamante, who reportedly gave Castro 16 electro-shock treatments starting in October [illegible]. I also do not believe reports that [illegible] is receiving electro-shock treatments because it would be too soon since the reported series of treatments he is said to have received in October-November [illegible]. Based on my long professional experience, I believe that a relapse of mental difficulties following such a series of electro-shock treatments would best be handled by medication. There are a number of medications which could be used and which are available in Cuba.

-end-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Cuba

...CT	Psychiatrists Conducting Research with Animals	REPORT NO.	CO- K 323/06863-69
		DATE DISTR.	3 APR 1969
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES (2356)	CIRL C-DC8-53741 D-7AX-40009

...OF INFO. 8 Mar 69 and earlier

...& DATE ACQ. Havana/8 Mar 69 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

...: Cuban national, A 17 999 372, who arrived in the US on 10 Mar 69. Source is a graduate psychiatrist who was on the staff of various hospitals, among them Mazorra Hospital for Mental Diseases from 1961 until 8 Mar 69.

CAC

[This report was developed by an [redacted] representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. Medical colleagues of mine have told me that there is a home near the Colon Cemetery in Alturas del Vedado Suburb, Havana, which has been converted into a research laboratory called Instituto de Investigaciones de Actividad Nerviosa Superior [Institute for the Research of Superior Nervous Activity.]

DF
ANTONIO

2. Dr. Jose Angel Bustamante, a well known psychiatrist in Havana, another psychiatrist, Dr. (----) Rosello, and some Sovbloc psychiatrists conduct research work and experiments there with animals, especially dogs, according to my colleagues. They report that these psychiatrists follow the Pavlovian theory in the "physiology of the nervous".

3. They also told me that Dr. Jose Angel Bustamante has for several years conducted, or supervised, interrogations of political prisoners at G-2 headquarters in Havana, using the narcohypnosis (sic) method, popularly called "brain washing".

4. Dr. Bustamante has been considered a card-carrying Communist long before Castro came to power. I can not vouch for the veracity of this, because I have not known him that well. However, I have heard it said repeatedly.

-end-

5
4
3
2
1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PERSONAL INFORMATION
(3 documents)

Volume 3 of 5

GROZDEA, Ion (Dr.) - 201-168880 RUMANIA has empl. -ars/12

"Health Unions Federation" (qv) pres.; was elected to the RPR Standing Committee for the Defense of Peace accd. to "Scanteia".

Am; Leg. PressReview#1515
Brit. Leg. PressReview#2484
9 Dec., '52

CIA-P-99946



Sent to RID/AN

23 Dec. 70

✓	HKHW-1847	4 Sept. 56	201-168881
✓	HKHW-1905	16 Oct. 56	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3115	3 Nov. 56	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3314	17 Jan. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3418	21 Feb. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3583	2 May 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-2282	27 May 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-2362	23 July 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-2422	12 Sept. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHA-4025	8 Nov. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-5825	14 Jan. 58	201-168881
✓	HMMW-5826	16 Jan. 58	201-168881
✓	MEXI-1364	10 April 58	201-168881
✓	HMMW-6377	22 May 58	201-168881
	HAVA 16 (IN 48405)	10 Sept 57	" "

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-6377
201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 24 MAY 1958

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL ⑥ Operational
SPECIFIC - Harold P. HOEMAYR (ps)

Reference: DIR 19152 dated 25 April 1958

Action Required: None.

Attached herewith for your information and records is a copy of the Letter of Cover Instructions signed by HOEMAYR on 16 May 1958.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

19 May 1958

Attachment:
1, (4 pages)

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City (w/1/ATT)
- 1 - WH/Mailroom (w/o/ATT)
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono (w/o/ATT)
- 2 - RI (w/o/ATT)

WH/III/Mexico/C. Zehrung:ngs

AN
AB X
IN
PS
BX
DES | IND
FI
RID/FIP

201-168881
ABSTRACT X INDEX
HMMW 6377
DATE 24 MAY 58

RID/EDI
RECORDED

CS COPY

J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

J. B. Bra
(Authenticating officer)
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
AUG 1949

201-168881
~~201-32723~~

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5825
201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE 14 JAN 58 13 05

SUBJECT GENERAL ~~B~~ Operational
SPECIFIC - Ross Lester CROZIER

REF: HMMW-5826 (KAPOK)

1. Personal data on Subject is forwarded for station's information in connection with the proposal contained in reference, which is being pouched separately.

2. Ross Lester CROZIER was born on 20 June 1922 in De Kalb, Illinois, the oldest of five children in a middle class family which now resides in Sterling, Illinois. In December 1945 he married Argentina de los Angeles CORDERO Calderon, a Costa Rican citizen, born in San Juan, C.R., on 15 March 1918. They have two children: Ross Arnulfo, 8; and Lillian Caridad, 6. Subject and his family currently reside in Havana, Cuba.

3. Subject received primary and high school education in DeKalb and worked at odd jobs until 1940, when he entered the Armed Forces, serving first in the Army, then in the Air Corps. Between 1941 and 1945 he served as an Intelligence Specialist in the Panama Canal Zone and in the India-Burma Theater. Discharged at the end of the war, he worked briefly in Illinois, then returned to the Canal Zone at the end of 1945 and obtained civilian employment with the U.S. Navy. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force and again served as an Intelligence Specialist until the expiration of his term of service in April 1949, at which time he was discharged with the rank of Technical Sergeant.

4. Upon discharge he went from the Panama Canal Zone to Costa Rica, where his wife's family resides, and from April 1949 to March 1953 he worked as a free lance photographer in San Juan. During this period he resumed his studies attending Economics courses at the University of Costa Rica. He returned to the United States during the latter part of 1953, resided in Washington, then for a few months attended the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City, until May 1954. Shortly after he transferred to the School of Economic Sciences of the University of Havana which he attended until 1957. Subject financed the first few years of his advanced education under the V.A. program. During his stay in Havana, Subject began

COPY

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

AN
AB
IN
RI
RI/FI

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

CS COPY

201-168881

201	168	881
X		
HMMW	5825	
DATE 14 JAN 58		

RI COPY

working on polling studies for the Public Surveys Institute of Dallas, Texas which employs him at present.

5. Subject is 6'1" tall, slender built, athletic (1954 Guatemala national record in discus, track, high and broad jump, etc); is a pistol expert; has some experience as a radio operator; is an accomplished photographer and has designed and directed a photographic laboratory in Costa Rica.

6. Subject speaks and reads Spanish fluently and except for his height and Anglo Saxon appearance could pass as a native of Latin American countries. Subject became a Catholic convert shortly after his marriage.

7. Subject's wife was educated at the Liceo de Senoritas in San Jose, C.R., and has travelled extensively. Her father was born in Cuba, attended the Spanish Military Academy and served in Spanish Morrocco. In 1933/34 he was involved in Cuban politics and was forced to take refuge in Costa Rica, where he resided until his death in 1939. Her mother, who resides with Subject's family, retains an interest in Costa Rican and Cuban political affairs but takes no active part in politics.

8. A copy of a 1948 photograph of Subject is attached. Further information is contained in reference, forwarded under separate pouch.

9. The information given above is based on a PRQ and a PHS compiled by Subject respectively in 1948 and 1956 and on observations made by KUBARK officers who have been acquainted with him.

for R B Gomez
J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

6 January 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono
- 1 - RI
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/ASpera:jck

SECRET

RI COPY

COORDINATE WITH:

WH/Carib

WH/Personnel

for R B Gomez
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

201-168881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA ~~AIR~~ (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HKH-W-1847~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SEP 4 1956

TO : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

Regarding clearance to discuss PP activities with the Station –

SUBJECT GENERAL – Operational/KUCAGE
SPECIFIC – Arthur C. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-A-2297, dated 9 August 1956 201-32723

Action Required: None

Headquarters feels that in the situation outlined in reference and within the limitations set forth in reference, no additional operational clearance for Subject is necessary.

SKShort for
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

28 August 1956

Distribution:
- 3 - Habana
- ✓ 1 - RI/D&P
- 1 - WH/III/Cuba
- 1 - WH/Mailroom

WH/III/Cuba/WKent:gp

COPY

201-168881

S.K.Short for
J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

J. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

~~201-168881~~
~~HKHW 1847~~
~~DATE 4 SEPT 56~~
~~201-32723~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

CS COPY

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-2282

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE JUN 57 13 33 z

TO Chief of Station, Habana

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/KUTUBE
SPECIFIC 0 Arthur G. VAIVADA

Action Requested: None

1. During his recent visit to Headquarters, Subject was asked by one of the Staff members if he would be interested in, and available for, recruitment approaches in various Latin American countries. Since Subject has a fine record in CP penetration work (i.e., his outstanding job in handling HUMANOID-3 operation in Costa Rica and his efforts in the CP penetration program in Cuba), it is believed that he would be an effective recruiter of possible CP defectors.

2. Subject stated that he was keenly interested in, and would like to engage in, such operations and would welcome the opportunity of being asked to hit a well-chosen target in any Spanish-speaking Latin American country.

3. The foregoing discussion with Subject was informal and without commitment on either side. However, the Station is being alerted to the possibility that Subject may be requested to perform such approaches at such time when worthwhile recruitment in-place CP targets are developed, or otherwise arise in other countries. Nevertheless, any such action originating at Headquarters or at any other Station, will of course be subject to Station Habana's consideration and approval beforehand, depending on his availability in reference to his work in Project AMPHODARCH, etc.

28 May 1957

CS COPY

for John T. Flynn
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

201-168881

Distribution:
3 - Habana
1 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom
1-WH/Cuba/Chrono
1- Subject

Hugh C. MacAuley
WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs

for John T. Flynn
J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

~~201-168881~~
~~HKH-A 2282~~
~~4 JUN 57~~

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

CS COPY

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2282

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 4 JUN 57 13 33 Z

TO Chief of Station, Habana

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/KUTUBE
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

Action Requested: None

1. During his recent visit to Headquarters, Subject was asked by one of the Staff members if he would be interested in, and available for, recruitment approaches in various Latin American countries. Since Subject has a fine record in CP penetration work (i.e., his outstanding job in handling HUMANOID-3 operation in Costa Rica and his efforts in the CP penetration program in Cuba), it is believed that he would be an effective recruiter of possible CP defectors.

2. Subject stated that he was keenly interested in, and would like to engage in, such operations and would welcome the opportunity of being asked to hit a well-chosen target in any Spanish-speaking Latin American country.

3. The foregoing discussion with Subject was informal and without commitment on either side. However, the Station is being alerted to the possibility that Subject may be requested to perform such approaches at such time when worthwhile recruitment in-place CP targets are developed, or otherwise arise in other countries. Nevertheless, any such action originating at Headquarters or at any other Station, will of course be subject to Station Habana's consideration and approval beforehand, depending on his availability in reference to his work in Project AMPHODARCH, etc.

28 May 1957

CS COPY

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

201-168881

Distribution:
3 - Habana
1 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom
1-WH/Cuba/Chrono
1- Subject

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

Hugh C. MacAuley
WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs
(Coordinating officer)

Wm Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

~~201-168881~~
~~HKHW 2282~~
~~4 JUN 57~~

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

CS COPY

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5826

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

KAPOK #599

DESENSITIZED

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 16 JAN

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Proposed assignment of Arthur C. VAIVADA (P)

REF: HMMW-5825

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-26

ACTION REQUIRED: Station comments and/or concurrence.

1. Subject is identified in reference which also gives his personal data and is forwarded in a separate pouch. Paragraph 4 of that dispatch outlines the cover activities of Subject for the period 1949 to the present, during which he has been actually employed by KUBARK, first as a contract agent then, since May 1957, as a career agent. He currently receives a salary approximately equivalent to that of a GS-11.

2. Subject's current, extended tour with the Havana station comes to an end in May 1958; due to his operational experience and performance with KUBARK in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Havana, Subject appears to be a good prospect as a replacement for Floyd POSTANY in CP operations.

3. Originally scheduled to be used by KUBARK in Panama, Subject was instead assigned to Costa Rica in 1949 under the HUMANOID project. While the operational files of this project have not yet been reviewed by this desk, entries in his personal file show that while in Costa Rica he handled a successful high level penetration of the local party. At the end of 1953, after a period of training at Headquarters, he was assigned to PBSUCCESS where he apparently also performed creditably. In July 1954 he was re-assigned to the Havana station as the principal agent of project AMTHUDARCH which involves the recruitment and handling of CP penetrations in that country. The AMTHUDARCH and Subject's personal files have been reviewed by this desk; together with the training and the assessments of the case officers for whom he has worked, the files show that Subject is eminently qualified as a recruiter and agent handler in CP operations. The records show that Subject possesses a great deal of integrity, resourcefullness and intelligence: he was highly rated both by Headquarters training officers and throughout his operational work in the field. He is particularly evaluated highly as to judgment and common sense.

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

CS COPY

201-168881
VAIVADA

FORM NO. 51-29
AUG 1949

SECRET DESENSITIZED

HMMW-5826
201-32723
KAPOK #599
Page two

4. Should his assignment to Mexico Station be agreed upon, cover possibilities can be considered in the fields of photography and athletic training which are among Subject's specialties. He lists himself as a "pistol expert" and a clarification of this term will be requested if, in the Station's opinion, it may enlarge cover possibilities, perhaps under LIMERICK. Subject's wife is still a Costa Rican citizen at present, while his two children are U.S. citizens.

5. Station's comments on this proposed assignment and possible cover suggestions will be welcome.

JCKing
J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

7 January 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - KAPOK/Chrono
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/ASpera:jck

JCKing
J. C. KING, C/WHD

COORDINATE WITH:

WH/Carib ____

WH/Personnel ____

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

DESENSITIZED

SECRET DESENSITIZED

201-168881

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

049 HH/MCB/

DATE : 22 MAY 1958

(49

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : (WH 5)

INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

May 23 07 58z58

RECD CABLE SECT

ROUTINE

IN 32413

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1608

RE: MEXI 1468 (IN 22383)
DIR 11212 (OUT 51534)

PLEASE ADVISE ETA HAROLD R NOEMAYR.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

Public Surveys Institute
General Polling Service

Albert E. Johnson
Executive Director

532 Fidelity Union Life Building
1511 Bryan Street
Dallas, Texas
Riverside 1-3674

LETTER HEAD STATIONARY USED BY THE
NOTIONAL COVER FIRM BACKSTOPPING
Harold R. NORMAYR

Received From CCB/NC
on 20 May 1958

201-168781

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SCO (Mr. Lustocher)

DATE: 19 May 1958

FROM : Operations Division, Medical Staff

SUBJECT: Harold R. NOEMAYR (p)

Subject has been evaluated by the Medical Staff and found qualified for proposed overseas assignment.

James R. Fearon
James R. Fearon
Administrative Officer

MS/JRF:clp

Distribution:
  Orig.- Addressee
    1 - WH/3 (Puckett)
    1 - MS

SECRET

201- 168881

201-168881

SECRET

C-1243 (Biladeau)
13 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION : WH/III/Mexico/Puckett

SUBJECT : Cover Story for Harold R. NOEMAYR (P)

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of the cover story prepared for Harold R. Noemayr.

2. You are requested to review the cover story, as well as Noemayr's contract, to insure that the cover arrangements satisfy the requirements involved. If the cover story meets with your approval, please sign the copy of this memorandum in the space provided and return it to this office.

3. The copy of the cover story should be forwarded to the appropriate Chief of Station for retention in his files where it can be reviewed by Noemayr whenever necessary.

Thomas K. Strange
JOHN G. SOUTHARD
CHIEF, CCB/NC

Attachment

SECRET

Mr. Harold B. Noemayr (P)
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Noemayr:

Your Cover

1. Cover has been contrived for you with two notional organizations, Public Surveys Institute and Betwins Travel Folders.

2. Public Surveys Institute is a notional organization which is ostensibly engaged in conducting all types of polls to determine public reactions on matters of interest to its many clients. This organization is located at Suite 532 Fidelity Union Life Building, 1511 Bryan Street, Dallas, Texas, telephone: RIverside 1-3674. The Institute is directed by Albert E. Johnson, a fictitious individual.

3. The above address is in actuality that of a telephone answering service where all normal calls of inquiry are handled by unwitting personnel during the course of their regular duties. However, any call which requires special attention is referred to a cleared and witting individual who has contact with headquarters. This person is adequately prepared to acknowledge your relationship with your cover firm and also answer any inquiries concerning you or your cover organization.

4. In addition to the above arrangement, you also have a contract with another notional firm to submit photographs and reports which are to be utilized in the preparation of travel brochures. This firm is Betwins Travel Folders which is located at Room 2101, 50 East 42nd Street, New York, New York, Telephone: MUrray Hill 7-4473. Betwins is directed by Charles H. Betwin, a fictitious individual, and is engaged in the preparation of material for travel folders, brochures, package tours, etc.

5. The above address for Betwins is in actuality located in the office of a cleared attorney who is prepared to backstop both the cover firm and your association with Betwins Travel Folders. This person also has contact with headquarters.

6. You are engaged on a contract basis to provide photographs and reports relating to possible tours, places of interest, eating establishments, hotels, etc. This information is then edited by Betwins and sold to various clients who desire travel folders.

7. You also have legitimate cover in the form of your free lance photography and short story writing. The past publication of this work can be used as a supplement to your Betwin cover.

8. Your cover story for having been engaged by the Public Surveys Institute is as follows:

During a visit to the United States in May 1957, you became acquainted with Albert E. Johnson, the Director of Public Surveys Institute. Johnson indicated that he was interested in engaging the services of several people to organize and conduct polls in various Latin American areas.

Since you were already located in Cuba and had a knowledge of the language and customs, he expressed an interest in employing you in Cuba. As you felt this type of work would not conflict with your photographic efforts, you accepted the position effective May 1, 1957, in order to have an extra source of income.

Early in 1958, Johnson advised you that he had acquired several promising accounts who were interested in Mexico and he desired to transfer you to Mexico City since you had both experience and the necessary language qualification. You readily agreed to the transfer and planned to leave for Mexico during the latter part of May after a short vacation in the United States.

9. Your cover story for having been engaged by Betwins Travel Folders is as follows:

While visiting in the United States during April 1958 prior to your departure for Mexico, you became acquainted with Charles H. Betwin through Albert Johnson in New York. Betwin had seen some of your published work and expressed an interest in engaging your services on a part-time basis in Mexico. Since it meant an additional source of income as well as an opportunity to utilize your photographic talents, you readily accepted his offer. You were to photograph various places which were of interest to Betwin's clients and also forward information relating to prices, possible package tours, historical points of interest, etc.

Documentation

10. Correspondence reflecting your progress or difficulties encountered should be carried on between you and your cover firms. Such correspondence should be at intervals which would make your association with your cover firms appear to be the normal relationship of employer and employee.

Financial Arrangements

11. It is understood that there actually will be no disbursement of funds for salary or other purposes to you through your cover firm, and therefore, arrangements for salary payments are a matter of concern between you and your division case officer. However, precautions must be taken to insure that the arrangements made will not conflict with your cover story.

Taxes

12. Your income tax returns will be filed with the Internal Revenue Tax Unit stationed at headquarters in accordance with Agency FN 20-660-4.

Restrictions

13. Should you at any time feel the necessity for a modification of this cover arrangement, or supplementing the cover outside of the present arrangement, or if any problems arise affecting your cover, direct a routine communication to your cover firms outlining the need or situation and concurrently notify your case officer of the conditions so that he may check with headquarters. Subsequently, you will receive advice from your cover concerns as would be normal and also be provided with official compatible instructions from your case officer.

14. With regard to any persons desiring to apply for a position with either cover firm, you are instructed to state that to the best of your knowledge and belief, the firms are adequately staffed. However, in order the the matter may be treated casually, the inquirer may be told to submit his application to the New York or Texas address, which ever applies, where it will receive due consideration.

15. You understand that these cover facilities have been established through cleared cooperative individuals who are witting, but not actually a part of the Agency. These persons know that you are actually an employee of the Agency and, as such, an extremely high standard of conduct will be expected of you.

16. A copy of this cover story will be retained in the station files. You may refer to it when necessary.

____

DATE __________________________

SECRET

I certify that I have read and understand the above Letter of Cover Instructions regarding my cover and agree to comply with it in every respect.

____

DATE _________________________

Distribution:
Orig.
cc: WH/III/Mexico/Puckett - 2114 B.H.

SECRET

SECRET

12 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

VIA: FI/OPS (Miss Paxton)

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA
Amendment of Contract

1. It is requested that Subject's contract effective 1 June 1957 be amended to include under Paragraph 4, Allowances, that Subject be entitled to the Educational Allowance for his children, effective from the initial date of the contract.

2. The above provision was inadvertently omitted from Subject's contract by the Area Desk, and since the Station notified Subject he was entitled to this allowance, it would be appreciated if this matter be corrected and the contract amended accordingly. The error came to the attention of the Area Desk when Subject's claim for educational allowance dated 18 April 1958, was turned down by Finance Division because of the aforementioned omission from the contract.

J. C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - Files

SECRET

201-168881

X

14-00000

025 ER/ER/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 29 APRIL 1958

25

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 30 05 49 '58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

IN 22383

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1468

RE: DIR 19152 (OUT 70226)*

1. CONCUR PARAS 2 AND 3 REF.
2. RECOMMEND USE JEREMY A TOLKING.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * CONCERNED COVER SET UP BY HQS FOR THE TRAVEL OF NOEMAYR.

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

582 MM/DJB/DJB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : L. D. PUCKETT
UNIT : WHD 582
EXT : 2555
DATE : 25 APRIL 1958

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

APR 25 19 46z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 70226
OUT70

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 19152

RE: A. DIR 16715 (OUT 64381)
B. MEXI 1446 (IN 20477)*
C. HMMW-5826

1. SUB REF C ASSIGNED NEW PSEUDO HAROLD R. NOEMAYR.

2. APPRECIATE REF B SUGGESTION. HOWEVER, HQS ARRANGING NOEMAYR BACKSTOPPED COVER AS REPRESENTATIVE NOTIONAL PUBLIC POLLING SERVICES FIRM IN DALLAS, WHICH NOEMAYR USED IN CUBA, AND PHOTOGRAPHER AND COLLECTOR OF TRAVEL DATA FOR NOTIONAL TRAVEL SERVICE FIRM IN NEW YORK WHICH SUPPLIES TRAVEL INFO FOR PACKAGE TOURS. ALSO, HE WILL CONTINUE SUBMIT ARTICLES TO BOYS LIFE MAGAZINE. BELIEVE ABOVE COVER WILL GIVE NOEMAYR GOOD FLEXIBILITY AND MOBILITY AND WILL ELIMINATE MEXI NEED ARRANGE LOCAL COVER.

3. NOEMAYR PLANS ETA MEXI END MAY AS TOURIST. WILL ARRANGE WORKING PAPERS THRU STATION RECOMMENDED MEXI LAW FIRM.

4. REQUEST MEXI CONCURRENCE PARAS 2, AND 3 ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *STATION CONCURS JOURNALISTIC COVER.

COORDINATED IN DRAFT WITH: CI/ICD/WH/MR. ANDERSON

COORDINATED BY PHONE WITH: CCB/NC/MR. BILADEAU

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for R N Dahlgren
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

NOEMAYR 201

for R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

482/MM/CG/~~[illegible]~~

DATE : 24 APR 1958

482

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 25 03 37 [illegible]

[illegible] CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 20477

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1446

RE: DIR 16715 (OUT 64381 *)

1. MR JOSEPH RAVOTTO, DEPUTY PAO, WHO KNOWS BENJAMIN AS WELL AS ANY ONE IN EMBASSY STATES HE SOUND, RESPECTED NEWS PAPER MAN WITH GOOD MEXI SOCIAL AND OFFICIAL CONTACTS. OUR FILES, ODENVY AND BIOG SECTION EMB TRACES NEGATIVE.

2. STATION CONCURS JOURNALISTIC COVER.

3. IF HQS APPROVES STATION WILL HAVE TALK BENJAMIN IN ORDER FURNISH DETAILS RE REIMBURSEMENT, FLEXIBILITY, DURABILITY AND OTHER ASPECTS GOOD COVER. WOULD NOT MENTION ANY NAME OR TARGET.

4. IF BENJAMIN UNDER CONSIDERATION URGE VAIVADA BE PERMITTED MEET, EVALUATE AND AGREE COVER ACCEPTABLE. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * CONCERNED VAIVADA COVER.

[illegible]

SECRET

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

24 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Commendation for Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA, a Career Agent, is hereby commended for his outstanding performance and devotion to duty in carrying out the assignment described below.

2. During the period 12 - 26 March 1958, VAIVADA, by working his way into the mountain stronghold of the Cuban rebel forces and winning their friendship, procured timely and valuable intelligence and operational information. While on this assignment, he worked under conditions of personal risk and hardship.

3. This memorandum is written to be included as a permanent record in Subject's personal file.

J C King
J. C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

201-168851

SECRET

17 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA : Chief, CI/OA

FROM : C/WHD

SUBJECT : Harold R. HOEMAYR (ps)
C-25507
#112569

It is requested that the OSA granted Harold R. HOEMAYR (ps), formerly called Arthur O. VAIVADA (ps), on 3 July 1957 for use in Cuba under Project AMPHORARCH, be amended to permit his use in Mexico City. HOEMAYR will be transferred PCS to Mexico City in May 1958 where he will be carried under Project LIEDGE which is being prepared for submission to FI/Projects for approval. Attached is a new PRQ Part II which covers our proposed use of HOEMAYR in Mexico.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI/OA
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - Mexico Chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/~~Mexico/CZahrung:jck~~

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET

16 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

VIA : Chief, Central Cover Branch

SUBJECT : Journalistic Cover for Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)

1. Attached are the pertinent data pertaining to Subject's background as required by CSI 240-6.

2. It is requested that approval be granted for Subject's use of journalistic cover and that CCB/EC undertake the necessary arrangements to facilitate Subject's affiliation with appropriate news media.

J. C. KING
CHIEF
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCUR:

Chief, Central Cover Branch

APPROVED:

Chief of Operations, DD/P

SECRET

201-168881

(5) Outside interests, hobbies, etc: Athletics in general, outdoor life, photography, writing, jungle lore and chess.

(6) Objective personality evaluation: Subject is an astute, experienced and highly competent career agent. He possesses an attitude and a personality which are quite suitable for prolonged existence as a deep-cover asset. His personality is well suited for the many agent handling and management responsibilities that he will have in Mexico City.

(7) Agent's personal financial status: Solvent. He depends entirely on his salary.

(8) Previous foreign residence: Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba since 1940. Military service in the Far East from 1944-45.

(9) Area experience: Area experience as reflected in the foregoing information is extensive.

(10) Language qualifications: Subject has fluent Spanish and English.

C. Security Considerations

(1) Period of employment with CIA: June 1949 - present.

(2) Frequency of visits to CIA installations: Not applicable, since CIA contacts made in safehouses.

(3) Extent of knowledge of others of subject's CIA affiliation: His wife is aware that subject is engaged in intelligence activities, however, not necessarily for CIA. No other non-agency personnel are believed to be aware of subject's CIA status.

(4) Past intelligence connections: With U.S. Army and Air Force as indicated above.

(5) Use of CIA as credit reference: None

(6) Future plans for agent: Contemplate continuation in non-official cover status upon completion of current assignment.

(7) Emergency contact: Mrs. Lester E. Crozier, mother
1745 S. 26th St.
Omaha, 5, Neb.

(8) Personal insurance held and beneficiaries: None, except as provided for in his contract. His wife is his beneficiary.

(9) Incidents involving security in NOEHAIR's past employment with this Agency:

While there is no reason to believe that NOEMAYR has been exposed or compromised during his years of operating in Costa Rica, Guatemala or Cuba for CIA, the following incidents involving his security are set forth for your information:

a. NOEMAYR was forced to leave Guatemala prior to his scheduled departure when a Costa Rican source informed us that she had heard from high-level party sources that a "U.S. agent, specialist in Communist matters, had departed San Jose for Guatemala." This vague reference unfortunately coincided with subject's arrival in Guatemala.

b. In 1953 when subject was leaving Costa Rica, he made two cold approaches, one to a woman communist who was a leader in the Union de Mujeres. As subject left her home, the lady went immediately to Party headquarters and reported the incident. However, she was unable to describe NOEMAYR and so confused the approach story that it was useless to the Party and absolutely nothing ever came of the incident.

c. While in Cuba, NOEMAYR was working with a municipal committee youth communist who was a translator and did a story for NOEMAYR in Spanish. They met in each other's homes and NOEMAYR gave the Communist his business card (PSI). Sometime later, the Cuban military intelligence officer (SIM) picked up the Communist and searched his premises. Among other things, they found NOEMAYR's business card. When queried about this, the Communist simply told the officials he did translating for NOEMAYR. Nothing came of this incident and NOEMAYR could detect no surveillance of his person or his premises.

d. While the Cuban police will probably have NOEMAYR's name registered as having visited the Sierra Maestra region, the publication of his photographs and perhaps an article at a later date, should cover subject as a writer thereby minimizing any security hazard in this connection.

D. Operational Information

(1) Type of operation: FI. Subject will be an outside case officer for several station operations directed at the Mexican Communist and Marxist parties.

(2) Location: Mexico City and Guadalajara.

(3) Degree of mobility desired: Subject will spend most of his time in Mexico City but he should be free to travel to Guadalajara and other towns in Mexico.

(4) Special groups to be contacted: While subject will be concerned principally with the local Communist party, it is not necessary for him to have personal access to any special group.

(5) Approximate annual income to be attributed to cover: $10,000 (including allowances).

(6) Hours which must be devoted to operational duties: Subject should be able to devote at least 80% of his time to operational activity. His proposed cover will allow him a maximum of flexibility in arranging his cover and operational activity.

(7) Physical security requirements: No problems anticipated in this respect.

(8) Communications: Subject will utilize station communications facilities and will have regular contact with station personnel.

(9) Cover suggestions: In view of subject's previous journalistic experience, listed below, it is believed that it would be most appropriate for him to utilize cover connected with journalism. Probably the most advantageous arrangement would be for subject to become affiliated with one or two relatively small U.S. newspapers who do not currently have representatives in Mexico City. His contributions to such news media should be in the field of feature and human-interest stories, rather than of current events. His salary could, and probably should, be based on a stringer or piecemeal basis, rather than having a fixed income. Since subject is also a competent and experienced photographer, he could be expected to make photographic contributions to the newspapers or magazines he represents.

In addition to the above arrangements, it is suggested further that the notional cover (Public Surveys Institute, General Polling Service, Dallas, Texas) previously utilized by subject be continued. Subject maintains that he has developed a very sound and detailed cover based on this notional arrangement and that it would be very logical for him to use it in Mexico. Also, this additional cover arrangement would give subject another means of income together with added social flexibility and geographic mobility.

(10) Previous journalistic and writing experience:

HOFMAYR's formal journalistic training consists of a two-year correspondence course in fiction writing with the Palmer Institute of Authorship.

HOEMAYR has had three short stories published: "Old Saber Nose" in Boys Life, September 1956; "The Golden Discus," in

14-00000

Boys Life, June 1958; and "Duelo a 300 Brazas," in Bohemia, a Havana magazine, on 9 September 1957. HOEMAYR has done quite a bit of photographic work. While working as a photographer and setting up a small studio in San Jose, Costa Rica, in 1952, he did some contract work for the Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture. They were so pleased with his work that they hired him to set up their photographic laboratory in the Ministry. During this period he had some photographs published, mostly portrait work. Within the last month, HOEMAYR has had one photograph of Fidel CASTRO published under his by-line, in the New York Mirror and four similiar photographs have appeared in the New York Times. He expects that several more of his photographs on CASTRO and his revolutionaries will be published, if the news value of the movement continues.

HOEMAYR has several personal friends in the newspaper and journalistic fields. Among them are: Francis Smith, Fiction Editor of Boys Life; G. Gordon Dewey, Fiction Instructor, Palmer Institute of Authorship, Hollywood, California; CWO Francis Williams, technical writer, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio; Andrew St. George, freelance writer and photographer who also works for Time-Life; Charles Schuman, staff writer and cameraman for UP; and Arthur Gregor, scientific writer, MIT and Nuclear Metals, Inc., Boston, Mass (married to his wife's sister).

14-00000

SECRET

DRAFT

Date: 16 April 1958

To: Honor Award Board

Through :

From: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Name: CROZIER, Ross L.

Position: Career Agent

Grade: GS-11

Office assigned to : WH/III

Station: La Habana, Cuba

Legal Residence : Washington, D.C.

Citizenship : American, by birth

If any of the above items......

Recommended award: Intelligence Star and Certificate of Merit

Postumous: No.

Name of next of kin: Argentina de los Angeles Cordaro de Crozier

Relationship : wife

Address: Washington, D.C.

If previous recommendation were submitted...... Not applicable

---

Were you an eyewitness to the act? No

~~Yes, name. Not applicable~~

Personnel in immediate vicinity or.........

Not applicable

List any of the above persons.....

Not applicable

Condition under which act was persformed: 201-168881

Location: I. Sierra Maestra mountains, Cuba. 12-26 March 1958 Not applicable

~~Cuba~~ II San Jose, Costa Rica. 1-2 May 1953 0400 AM.

Prevailing geographic conditions and obsticles encountered:

The area in which Mr. Crozier undertook his mission is the Sierra Maestra mountains located in the Oriente Province, Cuba, where the Cuban rebel leader, Fidel Castro has been able to hide-out and ~~resist~~ survive the efforts of the Cuban Army to ~~exterminate~~ capture or kill him for over a year. The ~~xxxxxx~~ mountainous area is an extremely rough and wild terrain, primarily ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ thickly vegetated with jungle growth. It is sparsely populated, and the only means of ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ access are foot paths and mountain trails. The approaches to the area are heavily patrolled by Cuban Government troops who are on the alert to ~~stop~~ intercept all persons ~~trying~~ attempting to enter or leave the area.

Office, component, or station: ~~Xxxxxxxxxx~~ Station, Habana, Cuba

Inclusive dates for which recommended: 12-26 March ~~1958~~ 1958

Assignment completed: Yes

Now in same or related assignment: No.

Achievement performed: x

I.

Towards the latter part of 1957, as a result of an increasing number of alarming reports concerning alleged Communist penetration and support of Fidel Castro's 26 of July Movement operating in the Sierra Maestra mountains, the Western Hemisphere Division became aware of the urgent need to mount an operation to acquire first-hand and reliable information and data on the Cuban rebel forces. In early January 1958, Mr. Crozier volunteered to undertake the precarious mission to contact Fidel Castro in his mountain retreat in the Sierra Maestras. He arranged for his free

SECRET

passage into the Sierras through contacts within the 26 of July Movement which the Station developed earlier. After the necessary arrangements, Mr. Crozier left La Habana on 5 April 1958 for Santiago de Cuba, from where he left for the Sierras under the escort of a rebel guide who conducted him safely through the Cuban Army lines. During the course of approximately twenty days' stay at the ~~mountain hideout~~ of Castro's headquarters, Mr. Crozier was exposed to many hardships and great personal risks. On 26 March 1958, Mr. Crozier accompanied Fidel Castro and a force of ~~xxxx~~ 200 men on a dawn attack on the town of Manzanillo, where he broke off contact with the Cuban rebels and returned to his base in La Habana. Mr. Crozier successfully accomplished his mission by reporting considerable intelligence and operational ~~data~~ information of noteworthy value, together with an excellent photographic coverage of his trip.

These exploits ~~together with the achievement set forth below~~, clearly demonstrate ~~denotes~~ Mr. Crozier's adaptability in precarious situations, as well as a deep devotion to his work and to CIA.

II

On 1 May 1953, Mr. Crozier..........

(Copy attached report)

Leave space after Section II

SECRET

On 1 May 1953, MR. CROZIER was in charge of an attempt to physically penetrate the home of Manuel MORA Valverde, President of the Costa Rican Communist Party for the purpose of obtaining documents which could be used to prove the Communist Party's control over the Partido Progresista Independiente, a front which had been organized to participate in the 1953 elections. The sub-agent who was to actually perform the penetration failed to appear and realizing the urgency of the operation, CROZIER voluntarily + on his own initiative made the penetration. At the time ~~[illegible]~~ (0400) he entered the MORA house, the entire family was known to be sleeping in the rear part of the house. Working quietly and quickly under conditions of ~~considerable~~ GREAT personal risk, Mr. CROZIER succeeded in carrying away approximately 85 percent of the legal PPI documentation and other records as well as a large amount of Communist Party documents such as minutes to meetings, code words, etc. A few days later a high level Party penetration reported that the PPI may have been eliminated from the electoral scene due to the almost impossible task of reconstructing the legally required records. However, the PPI was ~~[illegible]~~ able to reconstruct the records and registered by the deadline of 26 May. According to the Station, "this operation provided the station with a bulk of compromising documents, seriously hampered PPI activities because of missing records, almost eliminated them from the scene, spread distrust, suspicion, and confusion among the ~~x~~ Political Commission, and, because it was finally attributed to Figuerista ~~[illegible]~~ elements, enraged the Communists against FIGUERES and destroyed any possibility of an agreement with or support for FIGUERES." (HRS-A-212). On 29 May a careful slection of the more compromising documents obtained by CROZIER's penetration was mailed to the head of the Legislative Commission investigating the Communist affiliations of the PPI. On ~~May~~ 5 June an additional batch of the documents were mailed. These papers were selected for their authenticity, i.e. carbon copies of letters previously sent to the Assembly by the PPI, in order to establish the validity of the documents. On 24 July 1953 the President of Costa Rica signed a bill outlawing the PPI. The participation of Mr. CROZIER in the campaign to prevent the PPI from becoming a legal party is considered to have been instrumental in its success.

increasing reports concerning communist influence and penetration

As a result of the WHD's need to acquire first handed and reliable information and data on Fidel Castro and his rebel forces operating in the Sierra Maestra.

As a result of an increasing influx of alarming report concerning possible Communist ~~influence~~ penetration and support of Fidel CASTRO's ~~the~~ 26 July movement operating in the Sierra Maestra, WHD became aware of the need to mount an operation to acquire first handed and reliable information on the rebel forces.

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER L. D. Puckett

DIVISION WH

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION 2555 or 3162

DATE 16 April 1958

SECTION I GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Harold R. NOEMAYR

2. PROJECT LIEGE

3. ALLOTMENT NO.

4. SLOT NO.

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES
Arthur G. VAIVADA

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO *(If yes, describe and include salary)*
Career Agent GS-12 $7,570.00

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE *(Type and date)*
GSA 3 July 1957(Amendment in process to include Mexico City)

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER CONTROLLED CONDITIONS I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☐ NO X

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY *(Contract agent, contract employee, etc.)*
Career Agent

SECTION II PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP
USA

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE
35

14. DATE OF BIRTH *(Month, day, year)*
20 June 1922

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE *(City and state or country)*
Omaha, Nebraska

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE *(City and state or country)*
Alexandria, Virginia

17. MARITAL STATUS *(Check as appropriate)*
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS *(Not including individual)* RELATIONSHIP:
Three, wife and two children

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE
No

21. VETERAN
Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY *(Longevity, combat disability service disability non-combat)*

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE
Army - US Air Force

24. RANK OR GRADE
Tech Sgt

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY
$7,570.00 p/a

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL
None

29. COVER *(Breakdown, if any)*
Income derived from cover will be turned in to Station

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER ☐ YES ☑ NO

SECTION V ALLOWANCES *(NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)*

31. QUARTERS
0.00 p/a

32. POST
None

33. OTHER Temporary living allowance, if required, not to exceed additional $136.00
Educational (2 children) $504.0

34. T *(Breakdown, if any)*
None

SECTION VI TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO
Panama, C.Z. to Mexico City

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☐ NO

40. DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife, Costa Rican citizen, born 15 March 1918

Son, [redacted], born 4 September 1949 - US citizen

Daughter, [redacted], born 24 June 1951 - US citizen

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION

43. ENTERTAINMENT

44. OTHER of travel in Mexico. Yes, as

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED) NOTE: *SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.*	CASE OFFICER L. D. Puckett	DIVISION WHD
	TELEPHONE EXTENSION 2555 or 3162	DATE 16 April 1958

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-230 or successor regulations.)*

Annual leave
Sick leave
Death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under Federal Employees
Compensation Act.
Missing Persons Act.
Civil Service Retirement
Regular Staff Employees medical benefits for employee and dependents as stated in R-15-230
(Subject will meet requirements when completes covert medical on 21 April 1958)

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)*: ☒ PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE *(Check)*: ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☒ OTHER Notional

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)*
☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ___ MONTHS ___ 2 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 May 1958

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATIO
☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(PI, PP, other)* FI

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Case officer for Communist Party operations in Mexico.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Contract and career agent since June 1949.
Intelligence assignments in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba.

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*
GRADE SCHOOL — HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE — TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE — COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
COLLEGE No degree — COLLEGE DEGREE — POST GRADUATE — MA — PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK FLUENT	SPEAK AVERAGE	SPEAK POOR	WRITE FLUENT	WRITE AVERAGE	WRITE POOR	READ FLUENT	READ AVERAGE	READ POOR
English	X			X			X		
Spanish	X			X			X		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Extensive area knowledge of Central America and Caribbean areas. Has resided in Latin America since 1940.

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

[redacted]

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

SECRET

15 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: S.O./Investigations and Support

SUBJECT : Mr. Charles Rice

SUBJECT : Harold E. [illegible] (p), formerly Arthur G. [illegible] (p),
S.O. #112569, C-29507

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation between Mr. Rice of S.O. and Mr. Sulc of WH/III/Mexico (x3162, x2555) concerning an LCFLUTTER examination of Subject. The time agreed upon for this examination was 0930 hours on 24 April 1958.

2. A conference will be held at 2011 I Building at 1500 hours 21 April between the desk case officer and Mr. Rice.

R. H. Dahlgren,
Chief, WH/III

WH/III/Mexico/ISulc:ngs

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/Mexico/Chrono
1-Subject

SECRET

201-168881

FILE NO. 201-32723

31

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : [illegible] 563
UNIT : WH/3/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 1 JULY 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one)
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ______
RI file this copy as indicated ✓
Branch copy filed as indicated ______
RE Indexing (check one)
Marked ______ None requires ______
Signature Mary Therrien

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 1 21 10:30 '58
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE					
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE	X	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 95479
OUT95479

TO MEXI INFO HAVA CITE DIR 29306

201-

REQUEST HAROLD R. NOEMAYR REPORT TO HQS IMMEDIATELY FOR CONSULTATION PRIOR TO APPROX TWO WEEKS TDY CUBA TO REESTABLISH CONTACT FIDEL CASTRO. ABOVE MISSION RELATED TO KIDNAPPING OF U. S. CITIZENS. CALL MR. ROBERT REYNOLDS ON ARRIVAL. ADVISE ETA.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

WH/3

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

~~AN~~
~~AB~~
~~EA~~
~~FS~~
~~EX~~
~~[illegible]~~
FI

~~201-32723~~

WH/3/MEXI

for R. Gomez
J. C. KING, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
21 JUL 58
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FORM 2-58 1389

201-168881

(35)

SECRET

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957.

Effective 15 April 1958, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph two (2) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> " In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at the rate of $7570 per annum, GS-12. "

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Arthur G. Vaivada
Arthur G. Vaivada

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

____

15 April 58
201-168881

SECRET

SECRET

15 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH: FI/OPS/Projects
Attention: Miss Paxton

SUBJECT: Arthur G. Vaivada - Amendment of Contract

1. It is requested that Arthur G. Vaivada's contract, effective 1 June 1957, be amended by deleting the first sentence of Paragraph 2 (Compensation) and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

"2. Compensation. In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at the rate of $7570 per annum, GS-12."

2. All other terms and conditions of the original contract remain in full force and effect.

J. C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

11 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI/Staff

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA - Request for Promotion

1. It is requested that Arthur G. Vaivada, a Career Agent, be promoted from GS-11 to grade GS-12 for his outstanding performance in carrying out a precarious mission in line with the objectives of Project AMPHODARCH, in which he is the Principal Agent.

2. In early January 1958, Vaivada volunteered to undertake a mission to contact Cuban rebel leader Fidel Castro Ruz in the Sierra Maestra mountains in south-eastern Cuba. He arranged for his free passage into the Sierras through contacts within the 26 July Movement which he and the Station developed earlier. After the necessary arrangements, Vaivada left La Habana on 5 April 1958 for Santiago de Cuba, from where he left for the Sierras under the escort of rebel guides. In the course of approximately twenty days' stay at the mountain hideout of Castro's headquarters, during which time he was exposed to many hardships and great personal risks, he accompanied Castro and a force of about 200 rebels on their dawn attack on the town of Manzanillo on 26 March 1958. At Manzanillo, Vaivada broke off contact with the Cuban rebels and returned to his base in Habana.

3. During his relatively short stay in the Sierra Maestra mountains, Vaivada was able to gather considerable intelligence and operational information of noteworthy value, together with an excellent photographic coverage of his trip.

4. This exploit is another achievement to be added to the impressive past performances of Arthur G. Vaivada, who has always shown a deep devotion to his work and to the Agency.

5. Vaivada was born on 20 June 1922, and has been with CIA since 1949. He has been a career agent since 1 June 1957, and was promoted to the grade of GS-11 on 1 June 1957. His tour of duty in Cuba was from August 1954 until 31 March 1958.

JCKing

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

Journalistic Background - AGV   14 April 1958.

1) Employment with dates: None (Free lance)

2) Three short stories: "Old Saber Nose" pub BOYS LIFE, Sept 1956
"The Golden Discus" pub BOYS LIFE, June 56.
"Duelo a 300 Brazas" pub BOHEMIA, Havana, Sept 9, 1957.

3) Contributions - Photo: While working as photographer and setting up a small studio in San Jose, Costa Rica in 1952, I did some contract work for the Costa Rican Ministry of agriculture. They were pleased enough with the results to employ me for purpose of setting their photo laboratory within the ministry. During this time I also had some photos published - but cannot recall where and when - mostly portrait work.
Currently, I have had one photo (CASTRO Rev) come out in NY Mirror and about four come out in New York Times. About five more will be published if the news value of this movement holds up.

4) Connections - persons known: Francis Smith, Fiction Editor BOYS LIFE. (Correspondence only for about three years now.)
G. Gordon Dewey, Fiction Instruction, Palmer Institute of Authorship, Hollywood 28, California.
CWO Francis Williams, Technical Writer, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio.
Andrew St. George, Time-Life & Freelance writer and photographer.
Charles Schuman, staff writer and cameraman for UP, currently working out of Havana, Cuba.
Arthur Gregor, Scientific writer, MIT and Nuclear Metals, Inc., Boston, Mass. (Married to wife's sister).

Prepared by VAIVADA Linsley —

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

14 April 1958.

5) Societies - Memberships: Completed a two year correspondence course in fiction writing - Palmer Institute of Authorship.

Member of the American Legion - Havana.

Assessment (sec)

a) Last assignment: Arrived Havana in August 1954 with a one-year scholarship at the University of Habana (Pan American Foundation, University of Florida at Gainesville). This cover adequately set up and well back stopped. I travelled to Gainesville, met the man (Curt Wilgus) on that end of the line and the only documentation necessery was a series of letters from the Foundation that indicated my efforts to obtain the scholarship and finally their grant. After arriving, however, and matriculating at the U of H, it became immeddately obvious that the nature of my target was such that my presence within the university was more a handicap than an asset. After a few months at the university, I abandoned studies (it was becoming increasingly difficult anyway due to political disturbances) and turned to freelance photography and writing for my cover. For several months I had the photography on just enough of a paying basis that would satisfy any security surveillance.

Photography and writing was definitely superior to university as cover, since it then gave me the opportunity to work inconspicuously on penetrations within the university.

Concerning general security aspects of that assignment, there was that one incident with the threat to exposure coming out of the death of an amphodarch key agent and my proximity throughout the entire incident. However, there has never been any indication that I was exposed or compromised. The station in Cuba felt that if I could return and operate as free from surveillance as I did, that certainly Cuban security people did not have anything compromising on me.

b) Previous assignments: To the best of my knowledge, I have never been exposed or c ompromised during the years of operation in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Cuba. There was an incident which prompted an early departure from Guatemala for personal and operational security reasons - but again, there was never any further indication as to the validity of the warning. What occurred - the Costa Rican source MARY - apparently learned from high level party sources that "a US agent, specialist in communist matters, had departed San Jose for Guatemala" and of course, this vagery unfortunately coincided with my arrival at Guatemala. At any rate, I was doing very little at Guatemala and would have departed anyway in view of the deteriorating situation of June 1954.

SECRET

SECRET

Naturally, there are many intangibles involved with operating over long periods (almost 4 years in Cuba) in one place, and then travelling back and forth between areas of previous assignment (Costa Rica), and last but not least, cultivating communists in all these places. The question becomes, How thorough are these people? Does a Cuban CP character communicate with a Guatemalan or Costa Rican along lines of security, of movement of Americans in these areas, and actual approaches made ? Probably not, at their best, the administration is haphazard. A typical example: Once, in 1953, when I was leaving Costa Rica, I made a couple of cold approaches - one was with woman communist, a leader in the Union de Mujeres Carmen Lyra. I walked away from her house - she evidently got a taxi right behind me - and she went straight to the headquarters and reported to Manuel Mora. But she couldn't describe me - had the story so confused (the approach story) as to render it useless to them, and absolutely nothing ever came of the incident. (By the same token, it would have been a different story in Cuba.)

Although, even in Cuba, there is not persistence or perseverance in investigations. I was working with a municipal committee youth communist - he is a translator and did a story for me in Spanish - and he was visiting my home (twice) while I went to his apartment about four times. I gave him my business card (Dallas Corporation) and some time later a SIM net picked him - searched his premises - and among other things, turned up my business card. He was queried on it and stated that he was simply translating for me. Now this boy is a known communist, although they could get nothing on him at this time - but such an incident should have provoked at least a casual surveillance of me or my premises. Nothing came of this incident either - and the station down there would known.

Lastly, the mission up to the Sierra Maestra has security implications. Not so much concerning communism, but its reasonable to assume that Cuban security people will come up with my name as having been up there. However, with the pictures published, perhaps an article later, there should be enough cover as a writer to neutralize any hazard there.

Past employment (with us)

a) Company or foundation: Scholarship from Panamerican Foundation at University of Florida at Gainesville, from July 1954 to June 1955.

Then the notional cover set up last year (May 1957) was the Public Surveys Institute, General Polling Service, 532 Fidelity Union Life Bldg., 1511 Bryan street, Dallas, Texas. This arranged so that any mail or telephone to the above corporation would confirm my company connections and could even be used as a credit reference if necessary. This arrangement was quite satisfactory.

SECRET

b) The security aspects of the Dallas corporation were very good I believe. Since freelance writing at best is considered a weak cover, this corporation connection gave me a more solid standing with more serious creditors such as landlords, banks and the larger merchandizing houses. In addition to the above, this cover was utilized very conveniently in operational instances where a realistic approach story was needed. Communists were approached on the basis of a political polling - this could be narrowed right down to soliciting information on the communists party as a political party. Again, it was always nice to have a business card with adresses and tlephone numbers that could be given as immediate reference to any type of security interrogation.

Estimate of Journalistic capability:

While my contributions in fiction have been principally juvenile, my writing training has come largely over a period of years at reportorial writing. Since I have some experience as a photographer also, it is convenient to relate the two, and possibly my best field would be feature and article writing. However, while on the mission with the Castro revolutionary movement, I associated with various members of the press and had no difficulty whatsoever in passing as one of them. Given an adequate period for familiarization, I feel that I could just about move into any press or writing slot that did not require a great deal of copy or tight dealines.

AGV

DESENSITIZED

mr. Dahlgren

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-4306

Field File No. 23-89/2-180

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 10 April 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana SM

INFO: Chief of Base, Santiago de Cuba

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/Arthur G. VAIVADA

SPECIFIC— Commendation for Successful Completion of Mission to Sierra Maestra

JK

Action Required: At Headquarters' Discretion

1. The writer wishes to commend Station and Base personnel whose work contributed to the successful preparation, mounting, and execution of the clandestine operation thatrecently placed a KUBARK Career Agent, Arthur G. VAIVADA, in the Sierra Maestra headquarters of Dr. Fidel CASTRO Ruz for sixteen days in March 1958. This mission resulted in acquisition by KUBARK of considerable important and timely information regarding the CASTRO revolutionary movement that was being urgently requested by customer agencies. In the writer's opinion the operation was a team effort. Giving credit to the staff personnel will in no way detract from the praiseworthy performance of VAIVADA himself.

2. With regard to VAIVADA the personal courage and professional ability as an intelligence officer demonstrated on this mission were of the highest order and should be highly commended. Headquarters is aware, as is the Station, that VAIVADA is desirous of acquiring staff agent status with KUBARK. The writer believes that his desires in this respect should be given consideration as part of any action taken in recognition of VAIVADA's services in the subject operation.

3. Station and Base personnel directly concerned with laying on this operation, arranging for proper briefing and support of VAIVADA, and recovering him securely when he left the Sierra Maestras, were Humphrey I. EBERWEIN, James R. PALINGER, and Nelson L. RAYNOCK.

Sherwood P. Rochon

Sherwood P. Rochon

Distribution:
~~3~~ - Washington
1 - Santiago de Cuba
2 - Files

SPR/gwm

9 April 1958

DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED

RECLASSIFIED
RI/AN ✓
RI/MIS ✓
201-168881
RI/Files

10 April 58
201-168881 ✓

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A HKH-A-4306

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

CS COPY

ORIG : L. D. PUCKETT
UNIT : WHD 656
EXT : 2555
DATE : 9 APRIL 1958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

VAIVADA COVER

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 2 4 58
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				INITIALS
		DEFERRED	PRIORITY	
	X	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT64381

TO MEXI
INFO
CITE DIR 16715

MEXI 1017 (IN 26340)*

1. DISCUSSIONS WITH ARTHUR G. VAIVADA INDICATE JOURNALISTIC COVER SUITABLE FOR MEXI ASSIGNMENT. THIS BASED HIS PUBLISHED FICTIONAL AND NEWS STORIES DURING PAST FEW YEARS AND PUBLISHED NEWS PHOTOS TAKEN DURING RECENT VISIT FIDEL CASTRO CAMP.

2. HQS CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING U.S. COVER ARRANGEMENTS. HOWEVER, TO INSURE CONSIDERATION ALL POSSIBILITIES, REQUEST STATION OPINION USE ROBERT SPIERS BENJAMIN (REQUEST CURRENT TRACES), WHO KNOWN TO NAUMAN.

3. REQUEST STATION CONCURRENCE VAIVADA USE JOURNALISTIC COVER.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/S COMMENT: *VAIVARDA ACCEPTABLE, SUGGESTED ARRIVE MEXI ON 1 MAY FOR ORIENTATION.

COORDINATION WITH:
WH/III/CARIBBEAN RR
DC/CI/ICD Paul J. Burke
CCB/NC Mr. Lukoskie by phone

For R. P. Gomez
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
S-E-C-R-E-T

Robert H. Dahlgren
R. H. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

8 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General: Training/Briefing of DDP Personnel

Specific: Briefing of Ross L. Crozier, who is scheduled to be the new undercover CP Officer for Station Mexico City.

1. In Havana, Cuba on 5 March 1958, I briefed Ross L. Crozier concerning:

a) his proposed new assignment in Mexico; and

b) Headquarters desire that he receive special briefings from CI/ICD prior to going to Mexico.

2. Crozier stated that he was very glad to receive the briefing because he had not had a clear picture of what the proposed assignment in Mexico involved. He was pleased to find out that it was a pure penetration assignment. He also responded enthusiastically to the idea of receiving Headquarters briefings prior to going to the Field. He stated that he would like to have a short leave in Costa Rica prior to receiving the Headquarters briefing.

3. On 2 April 1958 in Washington, D.C., the undersigned and Mr. E. L. Anderson, Chief, CI/ICD-WH, briefed Crozier further concerning the matter discussed above, reaffirming our keen interest in the assignment. Mr. Anderson pointed out to him that his (Crozier's) "partner" in Mexico City (the inside CP officer), was in Costa Rica

201-168881

and that if securely feasible it would be a good idea for the two men to meet there. Mr. Crozier stated that he thought that it could be done readily and securely as he will contact the Embassy normally as an American citizen and he is well acquainted with COS, San Jose. One of the elements in our plan for intensification of the CPPP in Mexico is that these two very capable officers should get to know one another well in order to function smoothly and efficiently as a team.

4. Mr. Crosier stated that he plans to return to Washington, D.C., from his leave in Costa Rica during the approximate period 20-25 April 1958. Chief, CI/ICD-WH is handling arrangements for the briefing of Mr. Crozier.

Paul J. Burke
Deputy Chief, CI/ICD

cc: WH/Mexi

Activities of Fidel Castro's Rebel Forces in Cuba



The rebel leader's men set up a printing shop in upper Sierra Maestra in Oriente Province. They have three typewriters, a small press and mimeograph machine for pamphlets.



[illegible] L. Crozier

Mule train carries tanks of oxygen and acetylene for welding bombs, grenades and armor

[illegible]

8, 1958.

CONFLICT IN CUBA GAINS IN VIOLENCE

Army Reports Widespread Clashes—Thirty Rebels Listed as Captured

Special to The New York Times.

HAVANA, April 7—Fighting between Government troops and rebels under the command of Fidel Castro has intensified in Oriente Province in the last forty-eight hours, official sources said today.

A Cuban Army communiqué said seven rebels under the command of Raul Castro, a younger brother of the rebel chief, were killed in a clash in northern Oriente Province. The communiqué said thirty of the insurgent band were captured and the others were scattered and cut off from the main body of rebels in the Sierra Maestra.

This was the first announcement by the army of the capture of any rebels. It is believed here that the army has been following a policy of taking no prisoners.

Army Reports Plane Downed

Army headquarters also reported that troops had shot down a C-46 plane carrying arms and ammunition to the rebels. The announcement said the plane crashed and burned, killing the pilot and crewmen. Some unburned arms were found in the wreckage, the army said.

[A rebel announcement said insurgent forces had burned a disabled plane Friday near Manzanillo after it had landed with reinforcements and arms for Señor Castro's men, The Associated Press reported. The announcement did not say where the plane had come from.]

Another clash between Government troops and rebels occurred Sunday at Dos Palmas near Santiago de Cuba. The army asserted that a number of rebels had been killed or wounded and that seven jeeps

Continued on Page 3, Column 5

Ross L. Crozier

SECLUDED REBEL ARMS SHOP: In this enclosure in Cuba's Sierra Maestra, so remote that even mules cannot reach it, weapons are repaired for forces of Fidel Castro.

14-00000

CONFLICT IN CUBA GAINS IN VIOLENCE

Army Reports Widespread Clashes—Thirty Rebels Listed as Captured

Special to The New York Times.

HAVANA, April 7—Fighting between Government troops and rebels under the command of Fidel Castro has intensified in Oriente Province in the last forty-eight hours. official sources said today.

A Cuban Army communiqué said seven rebels under the command of Raul Castro, a younger brother of the rebel chief, were killed in a clash in northern Oriente Province. The communiqué said thirty of the insurgent band were captured and the others were scattered and cut off from the main body of rebels in the Sierra Maestra.

This was the first announcement by the army of the capture of any rebels. It is believed here that the army has been following a policy of taking no prisoners.

Army Reports Plane Downed

Army headquarters also reported that troops had shot down a C-46 plane carrying arms and ammunition to the rebels. The announcement said the plane crashed and burned, killing the pilot and crewmen. Some unburned arms were found in the wreckage, the army said.

[A rebel announcement said insurgent forces had burned a disabled plane Friday near Manzanillo after it had landed with reinforcements and arms for Señor Castro's men, The Associated Press reported. The announcement did not say where the plane had come from.]

Another clash between Government troops and rebels occurred Sunday at Dos Palmas near Santiago de Cuba. The army asserted that a number of rebels had been killed or wounded and that seven jeeps

Continued on Page 3, Column 8

CONFLICT IN CUBA GAINS IN VIOLENCE

Continued From Page 1

and trucks, eleven rifles and some ammunition had been seized.

Skirmish in Majagua

Government forces also reported a skirmish in the Majagua district near San Luis, near Santiago de Cuba. The army said the troops killed two rebels and seized three jeeps and some arme and ammunition. One soldier was wounded.

Señor Castro declared "total war" on the Government of President Fulgencio Batista starting April 1. The rebel chief has said he would call a general revolutionary strike at the "opportune" moment. So far no strike has occurred.

President Batista told newsmen yesterday he was confident hat his forces would defeat the ebels, but he conceded it could be a long struggle.

Meanwhile, rebel sources in Havana declared an announcement by army headquarters Saturday that a rebel band led by Señor Castro had been cut off from the Sierra Maestra was without foundation. These sources said that Señor Castro's officers had decided more than three months ago that he should ot lead any guerrilla expedions but should remain in his eadquarters in the Sierra Maestra.

An official of the Consoliated Railway Company of Caaguey, which serves tha eastrn half of the island, also deied reports that the railroad's nployes had gone out on rike. The official said the ebels had burned so many railay bridges in the eastern part f Camaguey Province that it as impossible to maintain ain service.

In Havana, the police anounced the arrest of eighteen ouths accused of terrorism and ttempts to provoke a general rike. Authorities said some of he youths were Communists nd others were members of the uthentic organization headed by former President Carlos Prios Socarras.

Michigan Students Freed

HAVANA, April 7 (UP)—Two University of Michigan student newspaper men arrested because they were suspected of making contact with Cuban rebels were released today in Santiago de Cuba.

James Elsman and Barton Hathwaite, who had been picked up at their hotel yesterday by army intelligence officers, were freed when Park Fields Wollam, United States consul in Santiago, intervened.

The two youths, correspondents of The Michigan Daily, a student publication, had arrived in Santiago from Havana a few hours before their arrest.

Miami Newsman Arrested

MIAMI, April 7 (UP)—Television station WCKT reported today that Ben Silver, one of its newsmen, missing in Cuba since Saturday, had been reported under arrest at Santiago de Cuba.

Gene Strul, news director of the station, said the United States Embassy had found after an investigation that Mr. Silver was "safe." The embassy said he would be released and returned to Havana tomorrow.

Ross L. Cramer

SECLUDED REBEL ARMS SHOP: In this enclosure in Cuba's Sierra Maestra, so remote that even mules cannot reach it, weapons are repaired for forces of Fidel Castro.

201-165551

SECRET

DD/P 3-8523

4 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

VIA : CCB/NC

SUBJECT. : Sale of News Photographs by Arthur G. VAIVADA (ps)

1. It is requested that Arthur G. VAIVADA be granted permission to sell news photographs of Fidel CASTROS' Cuban Revolutionary Group to an appropriate United States news agency.

2. VAIVADA is a Career Agent who has very recently returned from a PCS assignment in Cuba. At the direction of the Western Hemisphere Division, VAIVADA spent the last three weeks of his Cuba assignment in the Sierra Maestra camp of Fidel CASTRO for the purpose of collecting current intelligence information on CASTRO's activities. As a result of his notional cover as a representative of a U. S. public opinion polling service, VAIVADA was able to take numerous photographs of current news interest. This Division considers the sale of these photographs as an integral part of the cover backstopping necessary to protect the identity of VAIVADA's actual Sponsor (CIA) from three U. S. news media correspondents who were with VAIVADA during his visit with CASTRO. Also, the sale of these photographs would supplement a future news media cover for VAIVADA in his forthcoming PCS assignment in Mexico City.

3. All money resulting from the sale of these photographs will be retained by the Agency.

for R. Gomez
J. C. KING
CHIEF
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

CONCUR:

for Fred R. Youngblood
CHIEF, CCB/NC

APPROVED:

for T M Karamessines
COPS
4 april 1958

SECRET

201-168881

187 SE/LSB/135

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 31 MARCH 58

187

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 31 21 10:52

REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 10494

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 235

1. VAIVADA ARRIVING HQS EVENING 31 MARCH. WILL CONTACT CHAPRON.

2. ADVISING AMB PER DIR 12288 (OUT 54133)*APRIL 1 UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY. RELEASED 311703Z.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * VIEW SENSITIVITY AND POSSIBILITY LEAK TO PRESS BY EMBASSY, HQS PERFER NO MENTION VAIVADA MISSION UNTIL ITS COMPLETION.

301-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

330 MRL/LSB/

DATE : 27 MARCH 1958
330

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MAR 27 22 18:58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 49228

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION : WH 5
INFO : S/C 2

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 232

RAYNOCK RECEIVED NOTE FROM VAIVADA 26 MAR. WILL LEAVE SIERRAS VIA MANZANILLO 28-31 MAR AND CALL RAYNOCK FROM THERE. COMMENT. REBEL ACTIVITY MANZANILLO AREA MAY DELAY CONTACT. 271630Z.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

201-168851

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

057/ES/OT/

DATE : 10 MARCH 1958

(57

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 11 06 58 Z 58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 41341

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION : [illegible] 5
INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

TO SACU INFO DIR CITE HAVA 189

ADVISE IMMEDIATELY WHEN YOU CAN CONFIRM VAIVADA HAS REACHED DESTINATION.-

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

706/JW/DB/GHS

ORIG : R. REYNOLDS
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 5 MARCH 1958

76

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1 [illegible]	4
2 [illegible]	5
3 [illegible]	6

MAR 5 23 00 Z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HAVANA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, OP 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT51534

TO HAVA INFO MEXI CITE DIR 11212

RE HAVA 179 (IN 38161)(NOT SENT MEXI) *
MEXI 1017 (IN 26340)(NOT SENT HAVA)

1. FOR HAVA: LEAVE APPROVED.

2. FOR MEXI: VAIVADA ETA MEXI IS 20 MAY.

END OF MESSAGE

*C/S COMMENT: VAIVADA REQUESTED 15-20 DAYS LEAVE COSTA RICA PRIOR ARRIVAL MEXI. PAPATE INTERVIEWED HIM 3 MARCH.

5 March 58
201-168881

WH/III/MEXICO
WH/Support
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. N. Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.



Photos taken by Arthur G. Vaivada at Hqs. of Fidel CASTRO's forces in Sierra Maestra, March 1958.

For 201 file.

201-168571

U.S.N.



FILE NO. 201-168881

663 CR/DB/MCB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : R. REYNOLDS
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 27 FEBRUARY 1958

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 27 [illegible] 03 20Z

[illegible] CABLE SECT.

BY FILE 663 (check one).
No CS Record value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated ✓
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one).
Marked ____ None required ✓
Signature:

TO : HABANA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE					INITIALS
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	

OUT99340
OUT 99340

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 10195

RE DIR 06765 (OUT 91241) *

REQUEST REPLY

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS DESIRED TO ASSIGN VAIVADA PCS TO MEXI AS CP PENETRATION OPS CASE OFFICER UNDER UNOFFICIAL COVER AFTER COMPLETION CASTRO MISSION AND APPROX ONE MONTHS ORIENTATION AT HQS. QUERIED IF HE COULD COMPLETE MISSION AND MEET SCHEDULE.

RI COPY

[illegible]	
[illegible]	Z
[illegible]	
RI/Files	

27 Feb. 58

for J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881 ✓

14-00080

505 BC/JM/LR

Hugh O. Macauley

ORIG : H. O. MACAULEY
UNIT : WH/III
EXT : 2056
DATE : 10 FEBRUARY 1958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

584 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HABANA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				INITIALS
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	

OUT92831
92831

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 07387

REF: A. DIR 2147 (OUT 80587)
B. DIR 4551 (OUT 86187)

1. PROJECT AMPHODARCH AMENDED TO INCLUDE OBJECTIVES VAIVADA MISSION:
   - A. NAMES, BIOG AND BACKGROUND DATA AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENT TOP OFFICERS CASTRO STAFF.
   - B. STRENGTH, DEPLOYMENT, EQUIPMENT CASTRO ARMY.
   - C. EXTENT COMMIE PENETRATION CASTRO FORCES.
   - D. EXTENT COORDINATION AND SUPPORT FROM OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS, PARTICULARLY PSP.
   - E. GATHER OPS DATA FOR PLANTING FUTURE LONGTERM POLITICAL ACTION AGENT WITHIN CASTRO MOVEMENT TO DETECT AND COUNTERACT COMMIE PENETRATION.

2. PROJECT ALLOTMENT INCREASED $1000. APPROX COST MISSION ESTIMATED AS FOLLOWS: TRANSFER VAIVADA FAMILY SANJ $200; TRAVEL VAIVADA $200; STORAGE HHE AND CAR $600; MISC EMERGENCY OPS EXPENSE $1000. VAIVADA TO CONVERT SINGLE STATUS ALLOWANCE AND RECEIVE SEPARATION ALLOWANCE WHILE ON MISSION.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-168861

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1
2
3
4
5
6

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE : 10 FEBRUARY 1958

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

[illegible] 10 20 37 '58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

PAGE 2

DIR 07387
OUT 92531

TO INFO CITE DIR

3. VAIVADA TO USE COVER REF B. HE IS NOT USE POLLING COVER FOR CURRENT OPERATION. POLLING COVER TO BE REVEALED ONLY IF QUESTIONED REGARDING PAST ACTIVITY. STATION TO PROVIDE ESCAPE AND EVASION PLAN USE EVENT NEED.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *HQS SUGGESTED BUCH BE ADVISED VAIVADA IS FREE LANCE WRITER WITH GOOD ODYOKE CONTACTS.

for C. KING, C/WH/
RELEASING OFFICER

FI/OPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

656 WEJ/DB/MCB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : H. O. MACAULEY
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 5 FEBRUARY 1958

656

TO : HABANA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 5 23 18 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE					
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT91241
OUT 91241

TO HAVA INFO MEXI CITE DIR C6765

REF DIR 2147 (OUT 80587)*

1. HQS DESIRES ASSIGN VAIVADA PCS MEXI AS CP PENETRATION OPS CASE OFFICER UNDER UNOFFICIAL COVER AFTER COMPLETION CASTRO MISSION AND APPROX ONE MONTH ORIENTATION HQS.

2. MEXI REQUESTS VAIVADAS ARRIVAL MEXI ONE MAY FOR FURTHER ORIENTATION AND OVERLAP PRIOR DEPARTURE PREDECESSOR FLOYD N. POSTANY.

3. APPROVAL REQUESTED PAR 2 REF EXPECTED SHORTLY. ADVISE WHETHER HE CAN COMPLETE MISSION AND MEET ABOVE SCHEDULE

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DIR C2147 HQS AGREED VAIVADA WELL QUALIFIED TO UNDERTAKE MISSION PROVIDED MORE SUITABLE COVER COULD BE ARRANGED.

Coordinated by phone with:
ED ANDERSON, CI/ICD
WH/III/MEXI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

5 Feb. 58
201-168881

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. E. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

010 ER/DB/WS/ 10

DATE : 3 FEBRUARY 1958

SECRET

FEB 4 05 28 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, OP 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 26340

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1017

RE: DIR 02146 (OUT 80586*)

1. VAIVADA ACCEPTABLE.

2. SUGGEST ARRIVE MEXI ON 1 MAY FOR ORIENTATION PRIOR POSTANY DEPARTURE.

3. POUCHING SUGGESTIONS RE COVER.

END OF MESSAGE

S/C COMMENT: *REQUESTED COMMENTS RE ARTHUR G. VAIVADA AS REPLACEMENT FOR POSTANY.

SECRET

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

VIA: A-I-R
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-1292

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

(201-168-881)
Field File No. 23-88/2-147

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE: 30 January 1958

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/KUTUBE

SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2528, 6 January 1958

In reply to the query made in the referenced dispatch, VAIVADA has no objection to taking the LCFLUTTER test in June or as soon as he returns to Headquarters, and the Station sees no problem of morale or other nature for VAIVADA in the delay.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Distribution:
3 - Washinton
2 - Files

24 January 1958

JRP/mfm

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

COPY

201-168881 microfilmed

657 WCJ/DB/MCB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : R. REYNOLDS
UNIT : WH/III
EXT : 2056
DATE : 21 JANUARY 1958

65

ROUTING			
		4	
2		5	
3		6	

22 22 39:58
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE					
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO : HABANA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

OUT 86187

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 04551

RE: HAVA-133 (IN-18923)*

HQS CONCURS BUT SUGGEST BUCH BE ADVISED VAIVADA IS FREELANCE WRITER WITH "GOOD ODYOKE CONTACTS".

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: EBERWEIN THROUGH CLOSE CONTACT LUIS BUCH, KEY FIGURE IN 26 JULY MOVEMENT, CAN ESTABLISH BONA FIDES FOR VAIVADA MISSION.

21 Jan. 58
201-168881 ✓

J. C. KING, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

Robert N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

January 20, 1958

MEMORANDUM

Arthur Vaivada

SUBJECT: Subject of our letter number 4025; Interest in Assignment in U. S.

Palinger Sanger

1. In recent conversations with both JRP and RDS, Subject has broached the prospect of a possible assignment within the U. S. following completion of his Habana assignment. He says he would not want his statements re reassignment which were recently forwarded to Headquarters to be interpreted to mean that he is not interested in a U. S. tour. He says that he has been giving much thought to his future career, as well as to the needs of his family. He points out that he personally has now spent approximately 16 years, excepting vacations and short training periods, living and working outside the U. S., that his two children have never lived there, and that both he and his wife are concerned that too much time will elapse before they can provide their children with a period in the U. S. during their formative years.

2. It is the opinion of both RDS and JRP that Subject is at a point in his career development where a tour at Headquarters would be extremely beneficial. The Station lacks knowledge concerning the specific Headquarters jobs to which a person of Subject's status might be assigned; but it is our understanding that OTR sometimes employs these persons as instructors. We believe that a tour with OTR would not only remedy in great measure deficiencies in Subject's background caused by lack of Headquarters experience, but would at the same time afford OTR excellent instructor material.

3. In view of Subject's own interest in such an assignment, and our estimate of the potential value to him and to the Organization that would accrue from it, we recommend that Headquarters arrange such an assignment if at all possible.

4. In view of the likelihood of Subject's transfer in the near future, a prompt decision is requested.

201-168881

361 MJ/JM/RAC

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 16 JANUARY ~~1958~~ [redacted]

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JAN 16 21 33 '58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION : WH 5
INFO : S/C 2

IN 18923

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 133

RE: DIR ~~01247~~ 02147 *

1. EBERWEIN THROUGH CLOSE CONTACT LUIS BUCH, KEY FIGURE IN 26 JULY MOVEMENT, CAN ESTABLISH BONA FIDES FOR VAIVADA MISSION. VAIVADA THINKS CHANCES SUCCESS WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF CASTRO BELIEVES HE IS UNOFFICIAL U.S. OBSERVER. STATION CONCURS AND SUGGESTS BUCH BE DISCREETLY INFORMED ANYTHING CASTRO TELLS VAIVADA WILL FIND ITS WAY TO U.S. GOVT CHANNELS. LIGHT FREELANCE WRITER COVER WILL THEN BE ADEQUATE.

2. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL PROCEED THIS BASIS UNLESS EVENTS ORIENTE FORCE DELAY.

161445Z

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE.

SECRET

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : H. O. MACAULEY
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 7 JANUARY 1958

545

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JAN 8 19 47Z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 00537

TO : HABANA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 02147

REF: HAVA-119 (IN 13410)*

1. HQS AGREES VAIVADA WELL QUALIFIED TO UNDERTAKE MISSION PROVIDED MORE SUITABLE COVER CAN BE ARRANGED. BELIEVE HIS FORMER COVER AS FREE LANCE WRITER WOULD BE MORE ADEQUATE FOR CONTACTING CASTRO. PROPOSED COVER REF COULD BE USED ONLY EVENT CAPTURE BY AUTHORITIES. DESIRE HE LEAVE ON MISSION NOT LATER END FEB. MEANWHILE VAIVADA CAN ARRANGE INTERVIEW FAUSTINO PEREZ.

2. PROJECT AMPHODARCH AMENDMENT UNDER PROCESS TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES AND COVERAGE TRANSFER FAMILY COSTA RICA AND DISPOSITION HHE AND AUTO. HQS WILL ADVISE APPROVAL.

3. VAIVADA'S NEXT ASSIGNMENT UNDER STUDY AND EXPECT DECISION PRIOR END FEB.

4. FREAPANE PCS HAVA UNLIKELY BEFORE ONE APRIL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED HQS COMMENTS ON ASSIGNING ARTHUR G. VAIVADA TO VISIT CASTRO.

301-168881

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

Robert N. Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA A I R (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKHW-2528

201-168-881

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana

6 Jan 58 10 08

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/KUTUBE
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-A-2380, 16 October 1957
HKH-A-3990, 24 October 1957

Action Required: As indicated in paragraph 1.

1. With reference to KUSODA's request that VAIVADA be given an LCFLUTTER test as soon as possible, we have taken the position that, inasmuch as he is to return to Headquarters in June, there is little point in incurring the added expense for a trip now. However, he should understand that his continued employment under his new contract is contingent upon satisfactory completion of such a test. This, of course is no different from the requirements made of any employee; there merely is a time lag in his case because of distance. KUSODA has agreed to the delay providing VAIVADA is so advised.

2. Although we do not expect any problem, if VAIVADA is disturbed over having something like this hanging fire, and you feel there is a real morale problem involved, we will go ahead with it now. Our action will be entirely dependent upon KOCHCA's evaluation of the degree of importance this has for VAIVADA.

18 December 1957

Distribution:
3 - Habana
2 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - OS
1 - Chrono Carib.
1 - Subject.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

WH/III/Caribbean/HOMacAuley/js

J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

OS/IRD
(Coordinating officer)

Robert N. Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881
HKHW 2528
DATE 6 JAN 58

FORM NO. 51-29
AUG 1949

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

514

ORIG : A. G. SPERA
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 6 JANUARY 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, S/C 2, FI/OPS 2, CP 2

~~RE Filing (check one):~~
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ____
RI file this copy as indicated ____
Branch copy filed as indicated ____
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ____ None required ____
Signature:

FI NO. ~~[illegible]~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2	201-168881	5	
3		6	

JAN 8 14 47 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE				
X	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT80586
OUT 80586

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 02146

~~[illegible]~~

HMMW 5825 AND HMMW 5826 ~~[illegible]~~ FORWARD BIO AND OPS DATA RE ARTHUR G. VAIVADA CAREER AGENT WITH EXCELLENT COMMUNIST OPS RECORD IN COSTA RICA, GUATEMALA AND HAVANA STATIONS SINCE 1949. BEING CONSIDERED AS REPLACEMENT FOR POSTANY. NOW IN HAVANA COULD TRANSFER MEXI ~~AROUND~~ APRIL TO JUNE 58. PLEASE CABLE COMMENTS UPON RECEIPT DISPATCHES.

END OF MESSAGE.

RI COPY

COORDINATE WITH:
WH/CARIB R. Reynolds
WH/PERS J.C. Bowman

DECLASSIFIED	
RI/AN	2
RI/	
RI/Files	

6 Jan. 58
201-168881

J.C. King
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

32

032 WCJ/BP/WCJ

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 02 JANUARY 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

JAN 3 [illegible] 47Z58

RECD CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 13410

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 119

RE: DIR 00452 (OUT 76181) *

1. ARTHUR G VAIVADA BELIEVES CAN ARRANGE VISIT CASTRO THROUGH CASUAL CONTACT PROVINCIAL 26 JULY LEADER HE MET THROUGH AMOURETTE-9. COVER WOULD BE AS AMERICAN REP SURVEY CORP INTERESTED PENETRATING CENSORSHIP BARRIER TO LEARN EXTENT COMMIE PENETRATION OF MOVT. PROVINCIAL LEADER VOLUNTARILY ARRANGING VAIVADA INTERVIEW WITH FAUSTINO PEREZ (HKH 1535) HAVA NEXT TEN DAYS.

2. VIAVADA EAGER UNDERTAKE MISSION AND WELL QUALIFIED VIEW WARTIME TRAINING JUNGLE TECHNIQUES, KNOWLEDGE CUBA, LANGUAGE CAPABILITY AND CLANDESTINE EXPERIENCE. WOULD WANT SEND FAMILY COSTA RICA AND JOIN THEM AFTER COMPLETION TASK. THIS WOULD NECESSITATE FINDING NEW AMOURETTE-B CUT-OUT, BUT STATION CAN FIND TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT PENDING ARRIVAL FREAPANE.

3. VAIVADA WOULD NEED TWO-THREE WEEKS LAY ON CAREFUL ARRANGEMENTS AND PROBABLY COULD LEAVE FOR SIERRA END JAN. REQUEST HQS COMMENTS. RELEASED 022105Z.

201-168881

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: * HQS ATTACHES SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE CASTRO MOVEMENT JUSTIFY COVERAGE FROM SEVERAL ANGLES.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

VIA: A I R
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

D. .TCH NO. HKH-A-3990

(201-168881)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 24 October 1957

FROM : Acting Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT: GENERAL—Operational

SPECIFIC—Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2380, dated 16 October 1957

1. The Subject has no objection to submitting to an LCFLUTTER test at the convenience of Headquarters. This could be easily arranged here in the event an LCFLUTTER team is passing, or could pass, through Habana; on the other hand, VAIVADA could just as easily go to any designated place in Florida in order to take this test. It is understood that LCFLUTTER teams from time to time visit that state.

2. The Station will take such measures as are feasible to cover the activities of Subject and his wife while in Habana.

3. While the matter was not referred to in the reference, Subject's projected one-year tour of duty will end in June, 1958, at which time it is VAIVADA's desire to leave Cuba for a reassignment in another area in his present line of operational work and under similar unofficial cover conditions. A detailed dispatch on this subject will shortly be transmitted to Headquarters; it is referred to here so that the Headquarters desk may be alerted to the need for considering what assignments would be open to VAIVADA during the Spring or Summer of 1958.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Distribution:
✓3 - Washington
2 - Files

23 October 1957

JRP/mfm

FORM NO. 51-28 A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

24 Oct. 57
201-168881 ✓

RI COPY

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ [✓ SECRET]

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/Personnel

NO.

DATE 5 December 1956

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/Pers Ofcr	6 Dec	6	pcB	
2. WH/Admin	5 Dec	5	HB	
3. WH/Personnel	6 Dec	6	Jh	
4. DI/CSP, 2050 "L" BLDG	7 Dec 56	7 Dec 56	CWD	
5. ~~Contract Pers Div Wing 2F, Curie Hall~~				
6. 2309 "L" CS/CSP Sec B	10 DEC 1956			
7. [illegible] KAPON 1711-L	3 JAN 1957	9 Jan	EJP	7. For approval ~~[illegible] for proper routing [illegible] signs.~~ ~~Please call [illegible]~~ [illegible] XY641
8. 2309-L ~~CS/CSP Sec B~~				
9. ~~Chief FI Ops~~ 1711 L				7 & 10 & 11 - Chief FI Ops believes this man should be considered for Career Agent not Staff Agent Status. I have already discussed with Mr. Roland & therefore papers are returned herewith.
10. WH Personnel	11 Jan	11	pcB	
11. WH III/Cuba				
12. WH/Pers				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-168881

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ [✓ SECRET] ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Arthur G. VAIVADA (Pseudo)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 June 1922	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 5 Dec 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Excepted Appointment (Staff Agent) B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BAP- *
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $6390.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station Project AMPHODARCH
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana, Cuba
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

* A memorandum has been forwarded to the Director of Personnel requesting that position BAF-409, San Jose, Costa Rica, be transferred to Havana, Cuba and upgraded to GS-12.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
J. KOFLANOVICH X-8242

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO:	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			
F. APPROVED BY			

SECRET

SECRET

File

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER 91

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Arthur G. VAIVADA (Pseudo)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 30 June 1922	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 5 Dec 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Excepted Appointment (Staff Agent) B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED:	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) DAP- *
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-11 $6390.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station Project AMPRODARCH
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana, Cuba
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

* A memorandum has been forwarded to the Director of Personnel requesting that position DAP-409, San Jose, Costa Rica, be transferred to Havana, Cuba and upgraded to GS-12.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
J. [illegible] X-[illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

[illegible] in Havana

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-XI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO:	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) NO	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

201-168817

SECRET

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED) NOTE: *SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.*	CASE OFFICER James B. Noland	DIVISION WH/III
	TELEPHONE EXTENSION 2971	DATE 4 December 1956

SECTION VIII OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-230 or successor regulations.)*

All benefits normally given to a CIA staff employee.

SECTION IX COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)*	☐ PROPOSED	48. TYPE *(Check)*	☐ PROPRIETARY	☒ CULTURAL	☐ COMMERCIAL	☐ TOURIST
	☒ ESTABLISHED		☐ SUBSIDIZED	☐ EDUCATIONAL	☐ MILITARY	☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)*

☐ TOTAL ☒ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI TERM

51. DURATION						52. EFFECTIVE DATE	53. RENEWABLE
	DAYS		MONTHS	2	YEARS	Immediate	☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*

Thirty days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION

☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(FI, PP, other)*

FI Operations

SECTION XIII DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Spotting and recruiting agents. Obtaining information as principal agent for comprehensive youth-student net, with emphasis on Communist and revolutionary matters.

SECTION XIV QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Army and Air Force intelligence. CIA Training. Other as indicated in Number 6, above.

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☒ GRADE SCHOOL ☒ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ COLLEGE *(No degree)* ☒ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	x				x		x		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Very good.

SECTION XV PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

1940 - 1945: T/Sgt USA, USAF; Intelligence NCO

Jan 1945 - April 1946: Leading man labor, $12.88 per day, US Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone

April 1946 - April 1949: T/Sgt USAF, Intelligence NCO, Albrook Field, Canal Zone

SECTION XVI ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

Performance of Subject has been outstanding. He has proved particularly adept at spotting and recruiting of agents and his work has been highly praised by the COS, Habana. FI/Plans/Projects has stated of Subject that he "has obviously been a valuable, deep cover

☒ SIDE

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF DIVISION OFFICER	DATE	~~TYPED NAME~~ & SIGNATURE OF SENIOR STAFF OFFICER
	JK Galbraith		

14-00000

6-8473
[illegible] 6-72

13 November 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Request for Conversion of Arthur G. VAIVADA From Contract to Staff Status

REFERENCE : HKH-A-2577

1. Referenced dispatch from the field recommends the conversion of contract agent Arthur G. VAIVADA to staff status, and presents a strong case for such conversion. VAIVADA has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance; first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba and is expected to remain there indefinitely. VAIVADA is 34 years old and was promoted recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating. His expressed career interests lie in continued employment by CIA, more especially in the area ofunofficial cover assignments, for which he is highly suited.

2. Unfortunately Subject's spouse (since 1945) is a Costa Rican citizen, a situation which complicates his proposed conversion somewhat. She has expressed a desire to acquire U.S. citizenship, however, and it has been determined that this can be arranged within the next several months, barring unforeseen developments. She will be required to spend most of this period in the U.S. and is currently making plans to do so.

3. In view of VAIVADA's outstanding record as a contract agent, his strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it is recommended that he be granted staff status at grade GS-11, contingent upon his wife's first becoming a U.S. citizen, and providing he can meet Security and other requirements. There is available in WH Division a staff position (BAF-409) to which VAIVADA can be assigned.

4. WH Division contemplates bringing VAIVADA to the U.S. for covert training in the near future.

5. Approval for the conversion of VAIVADA from contract to staff status, as indicated above, is hereby requested.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

20 September 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA; Staff Status

1. The undersigned discussed case this date with Mr. Myers (2709 "I"; telephone extension 2551-2552) and with Mr. Pennington (2044 "I") both of Security Division. Mr. Myers was shown the content of HKH-A-________(recommendation for staff status for VAIVADA) and apprised of the problem of Mrs. VAIVADA not being a U.S. citizen. Myers stated that, while cases like this were usually very difficult, he felt this particular one might be justified in view of VAIVADA's long and excellent record with the Agency and the relatively long time during which he has been married. Myers indicated that the procedure would be as follows:

> Presentation of a formal request for waiver on citizenship requirements for spouse and granting of staff status to Subject. The memorandum would be prepared for Personnel, would then go to Security, and subsequently, with recommendations of both, to Deputy Director, who would have the final decision in this case.

Myers was to discuss the matter further with other elements of Security and advise within the next several days as to what the next step should be.

It later developed that this would be extremely difficult; that it would be much more practicable to concentrate on

2. Considering the possibility that such a request might be turned down, the undersigned discussed with Pennington the procedures for acquisition of citizenship for Mrs. VAIVADA, and determined that this should be relatively simple. The requirements were: presence in the U.S. (vicinity of Washington) for approximately forty-five days with some additional time to acquire passport. So long as we have nothing that would make her inadmissable to the U.S., the basic requirements would be: ability to speak English and to pass a relatively simple test based on pamphlet which would be given to her for study. Security would presumably handle her case when she arrives in the States.

3. It has occurred to the undersigned that perhaps, if it is necessary for Mrs. VAIVADA to acquire citizenship, VAIVADA himself could be brought to the Washington vicinity for training purposes in order to facilitate the visit of his wife, expenses, etc. This would at the same time afford an opportunity to provide VAIVADA with formal Headquarters or PBPRIME training ~~of which he has had none to date.~~

SECRET

J. S. NOLAND 201-168871

SECRET

24 September 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Proposed Staff Status for Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE : HKH-A-2577, 17 April 1956

1. Referenced dispatch from the field recommends the conversion of contract agent Arthur G. VAIVADA to staff status, and presents a good case for such conversion. VAIVADA has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949 with a continuous high level of performance; first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is 34 years old and was promoted recently to the equivalent of a grade GS-10. His expressed career interests lie in continued employment by CIA, more especially in the area of unofficial cover assignments, for which he is highly suited.

2. Unfortunately Subject's spouse (since 1945) is a Costa Rican citizen. Preliminary investigation at Headquarters has revealed that Subject's conversion to staff status is virtually out of the question so long as his wife remains an alien. It has also been determined, however, that the wife can acquire U.S. citizenship within a span of 45 days if she so desires and is willing to come to the U.S. for that period of time. This would remove the major stumbling block to acquisition of staff status for VAIVADA.

3. In view of VAIVADA's outstanding record as a contract agent, his strong overall qualifications and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it is recommended that (a) VAIVADA's wife be encouraged to seek U.S. citizenship under the terms outlined above (b) VAIVADA be granted staff status, contingent upon his wife's first becoming a U.S. citizen, and providing he can meet all other requirements. C/WH/III has endorsed the recommendation for staff status and a suggestion by C/WH/Admin that BAF-409, a new position currently alloted to San Jose, be transferred to Habana to be filled by VAIVADA.

4. It is further recommended that WH Division consider bringing VAIVADA to the U.S. for covert training to coincide with his wife's stay (at Headquarters' convenience). This would facilitate acquisition of citizenship for the wife and at the same time afford VAIVADA a chance for additional Headquarters training. Subject previously received covert training at Headquarters from 5 October through 25 November 1953.

J.B. Noland

J. B. NOLAND, C/WH/III/Cuba

SECRET

SECRET

AIR

HKH-W-1866

17 SEP 1956

: Chief of Station, Habana

: Chief, WHD

- Administrative
- Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: HKH-W-1819, 17 August 1956

Attached for your information and retention in Station files is a copy of the latest contract extension for Arthur G. VAIVADA.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachment:
1 - as above

12 September 1956

Distribution:
3 - Habana, w/att.
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Subject ✓
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - RI/D&P

WH/III/Cuba/JBNolan:cmcc

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

201-168881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HKH-W-2380~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

(201-168881)

TO Chief of Station, Habana

FROM Chief, WHD

DATE 16 OCT 57 11 07

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Arthur C. VAIVADA

References: HKS-W- 1326 (not sent to Habana)
HKS-A, 3 September 1957

1. At the time the request was submitted to convert Subject from Contract Agent to Career Agent status, a provisional covert security clearance was granted for that purpose. KUSODA recently advised that a full covert security clearance had been granted for the use of Subject as Principal Agent, under-official cover, in Project AM[illegible]ACH, in accordance with the provisions set forth in the memorandum of the Chief, KUBARK, dated 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances."

2. At the same time, KUSODA requested the following action to be taken:

a. That full overseas traces and such actual overseas investigation as is possible be taken on Subject and his wife and her family; and,

b. That arrangements be made to have Subject affronted with a LCFLUTTER test as soon as feasible.

3. Headquarters has already initiated the action set forth in Para 2 (a) requesting full traces and investigation of Subject and his wife and her family in Panama City and San Jose. Todate only San Jose has replied with HKSA-2938, copy of which was sent to Habana. Station Habana is requested to take appropriate action to cover Subject's and his wife's activities during their residence in Habana, and inform Headquarters of the results.

4. With reference to KUSODA's request for a LCFLUTTER test on Subject, they have expressed their desire to have Subject tested in the field as soon as possible, or as soon as the appropriate arrangements can be made. KUSODA has indicated that they will be happy to assist in arranging this test.

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

	201-168881
	K
HKHW	2380
DATE	16 OCT 57

RI COPY

However, Headquarters would appreciate receiving the Station's views and comments on the matter as quickly as possible so that KUSODA may be advised and can make the necessary planning.

5. The station is reminded that subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of KUBARK. Your attention is also called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions KUBARK Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if the station should desire at a later date to change the status or use of Subject, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to Headquarters.

11 October 1957

J. C. King
J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

Distribution:
3 - Habana
2 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
1 - Subject

Hugh O MacAule
WH/III/Cuba/HOMacAULEY/js

RI COPY

for J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL	DATE 11 September 1957 PROJECT
TO: ~~CI/Operational Approval and Support~~ Division	FROM: (Division) WH/BR-3/Cuba

SUBJECT	CI/OA FILE NO.	SO FILE NO.
TRUE NAME	C-25507	
CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM Arthur G. VAIVADA (Sp.)		
TYPE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE Career agent		

USE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE (Full details)

It is requested that Subject's OA be amended to allow the Station to use him as a contact between the Case Officer and Project AMOURETTE-B, and other PP assets at the Station's discretion, on a temporary basis until a permanent PP staff agent can be assigned to these duties. This temporary assignement will not interfere with Subject's regular FI duties.

Basis of the request: HAVA-016 (IN48405)

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐	GOVERNMENT NAME CHECK	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)	☒	OTHER: amendment of OA

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IS ATTACHED IN TWO COPIES	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐	PRQ II IS ATTACHED, IF OBTAINABLE	☐	GREEN LIST CHECK HAS BEEN INITIATED

FIELD TRACES

☐	REVEAL NO INFORMATION OF VALUE	☐	WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐	REVEAL INFORMATION AS ATTACHED	☐	NOT INITIATED. NOT EXPECTED TO POSSESS RELEVANT INFO.

SEP 12 1 54 PM '57

SUGGESTED INVESTIGATIVE COVER

☐	GOVERNMENT	☐	ACADEMIC
☐	COMMERCIAL	☐	OTHER:

RI TRACES		DIVISION TRACES	
☐ RECORD	☐ NO RECORD	☐ RECORD	☐ NO RECORD

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION OR SPECIAL COVERAGE DESIRED

SUBJECT	IS	☒	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF CIA INTEREST
		☒	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST
		☐	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF IMPENDING INVESTIGATION
	HAS	☐	BEEN	☐	NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON A "COVER STORY"

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Hugh D. MacAuley Hugh D. MacAuley, WH/3/Cuba	2056	J. Brady, AC/WH/BR-3

201-168181

FORM NO. 772
1 SEP 55

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

321 RLG/LB/RAC

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ATE , 26 AUGUST 57

321

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

AUG 26 20 47 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 42938

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION : WH 5
INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 999

RE: DIR 31708 (OUT 82423)

ADDRESS IS CALLE 6 NUMBER 311 ALTOS, ENTRE 15Y17, VEDADO, HAVA, CUBA. GROWERY ACTING.

END OF MESSAGE

Subject. Arturo G. VAIVADA -

Info passed to Cover Div.
1211 ALCOT Hall Wing B -
27 Aug 1957
MCG

201-168181

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

648 WCJ/DB/WS

ORIG : HO MACAULEY 64
UNIT : WH/III/CUBA
EXT : 2056
DATE : 20 AUGUST 1957

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Aug 20 22 1 5 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HAVA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT82423

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 31708

REQUEST VAIVADA'S HOME AND OR MAILING ADDRESS FOR COVER PURPOSE.

END OF MESSAGE

301-168881

C W Allison

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

J. BRADY, AC/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III - Willard Galbraith, Chief 15 Jul 57

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 26 Feb 56 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

Attachment:
so memo 3 Jul 57. ac

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

201-168881

SECRET

FORM NO. 388 REPLACES FORM 58-46
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

(47)

SECRET

3 JUL 1957

Chief, CI/OA

Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957 wherein a covert security approval was requested to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent status for use as principal agent for Project AMPHOGARCH in Cuba under non-official cover. Reference is also made to our memorandum of 2 April 1957 in which a provisional covert security clearance was granted for the above use.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949 entitled, "Security and Operational Clearances," a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. This clearance is contingent upon the following:

a. The receipt by this office of full overseas traces and such actual overseas investigation as is possible on Subject and on his wife and her family.

b. that Subject be afforded a polygraph interrogation as soon as possible and that the verbatum results be promptly furnished to this office. The Office of Security will be happy to assist in arranging this interrogation.

4. Subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

SECRET

8 JUL 1957

6. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

SECRET

3 JUL 1957

Chief, CI/OA

Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

C-25507
#112569

1. Concurrent with this memorandum a covert security clearance is being issued to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent for use as principal agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba under non-official cover.

2. This is to advise that information has been received from a confidential source of the Office of Security concerning Argentina CORDERO Calderon and her sister, Counsuelo, who are believed to be the Subject's wife and sister-in-law respectively. According to a December 1944 report, the above individuals were described as Costa Rican citizens then in Panama under suspicion and members of the Russian Ballet team of Pedro and Lidia CHUPRINE. Argentina is known to speak and understand German. She was formerly married to Pedro MARZAL, reportedly a German national and formerly on both British and U. S. Proclaimed List. She is reliably reported to have made pro-German remarks and is pro-German in her sympathies. It was further reported that both of the above individuals have at times attempted to secure information from members of the American Armed Forces.

3. In view of the above information, it is requested that current overseas traces and investigation be conducted on the Subject as well as on his wife and sister-in-law, Counsuelo, and other members of his wife's immediate family and that the results thereof be furnished this office.

4. The covert security clearance which is being issued in this case is made contingent upon the faovrable results of the requested overseas traces and investigation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

This data is the property of the Security Office and should be returned when it has served its purpose. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned. This material shall not be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the prior approval of the Security Office.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT KURICT TRAINING OF HUSKANAW AND HUMANOID-3	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION RI FILE NO. [illegible] - [illegible] - 0007 DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. [illegible] 02964 DATE [illegible] 57 SOURCE CRYPTONYM DATE OF INFO. EVALUATION
ANALYST [illegible] DATE PROCESSED 28 [illegible] 1957	DISSEMINATED IN DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

KURIOT TRAINING FOR THE SUBJECT

FDI

201-168881

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ~~241~~ ~~22881~~

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

20 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (Ps.)

1. Subject's contract dated 1 August 1954 was amended to provide him with an additional compensation to cover quarters allowance for his family in Costa Rica from 21 February 1957, when he and his family were ordered to leave Habana for operational security reasons; and to cover the period Subject was on TDY for training purposes at Headquarters.

2. Subject returned to Habana with his wife on 14 May 1957, to resume his duties as Principal Agent of Project AMHOBARCH. His children joined him in Habana from Costa Rica on 21 May 1957.

3. It is requested that Subject's Habana allowances, as set forth in his contract dated 1 August 1954, and subsequently amended, be reinstated for the period 14 to 31 May 1957. His new contract converting him to Career Agent status was effective on 1 June 1957.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

201-168881

X

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

D. ATCH NO. HKH-A-3675
201-032723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 13 June 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2268, 22 May 1957

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a copy of a Memo on Cover Status prepared by Subject as requested by Headquarters, outlining his estimate of the situation and including a draft statement for Headquarters' use in preparing the directive his cover firm will transmit to him.

2. Subject's Memo and outline appear adequate in the opinion of the Station; therefore Headquarters can proceed to prepare appropriate business letterheads and cards (described in paragraph 2 of the reference) and mail them to Subject.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger.

Attachment:
1 - Memo on Cover Status (single copy) U/S/C

Distribution:
3 - Washington w/att
2 - Files w/att

JRP/mfm

10 June 1957

RI COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

201-168881

SECRET

La Habana, Cuba

June 10, 1957

Memo on Cover Status - Arthur G. Vaivada

1. Enclosed herewith is the outline of an idea in keeping with the nature of this notional cover plan of a temporary nature. Careful consideration has been given to a number of ideas, all of which were rejected because possible local conflicts. This idea is still general enough (and I hope convincing) to leave opportunity for changes and/or improvement at Headquarters. The idea, and the terminology, was gleaned from the pages of "Investment in Cuba", a July 1956 study published by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

2. As I understand this cover arrangement, the PSI should mail me a directive somewhat along the lines of the enclosed information. This should "hold us" for a couple of months, with possibly some queries from me occasionally. Then when our operational picture requires investigation in some particular field, PSI can be notified through the Station to request a survey or poll in that field.

3. On the basis of the enclosed "directive" (plus stationary and allied materials) I can consult a local lawyer as to the registration of this "Agency" and then advise PSI as to the legal requirement.

Arthur G. Vaivada

SECRET

SECRET

1. Public Surveys Institute of Dallas, Texas, has placed a US representative in Cuba for the purpose of conducting public surveys, by polling, which will provide the home office with the requisite data for periodic market analyses. These periodic reports will be made available upon subscription to US investment and/or distribution agencies, and will contain comprehensive studies of market potentials and limitations, including the role of government as affected by current political developments.

2. PSI of Dallas will first compile reports of broad scope, from which subscribers may select their fields of special interest and place thier orders accordingly. These initial reports will cover such factors as:

a) The three P's - Population and Purchasing Power.

b) Productive Opportunities.

c) Improved Distribution Patterns.

d) Factors Affecting Demand.

e) A Study of Marketing Areas.

f) General Estimate of the Economic Situation.

3. The PSI representative will not require an office installation or local employees during the initial studies, but will prepare these at his residence until special requests are forthcoming from subscribers. At that time, all materials and installations as well as employment will be of temporary contractual nature, entirely dependent upon the scope of the survey.

Arthur G. Vaivada

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH/3/FI
ATTN : Mr. James B. Noland

DATE: 10 June 1957

FROM : AC/OS/TR

SUBJECT: Training Report on Arthur G. VAIVADA, (P)
Training Alias: "VICKS"

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA was trained covertly by instructors of this office in Washington, D.C. from 25 March 1957 through 7 May 1957. The original Training Request form dated 4 December 1956 reveals the following information concerning his background, experience and proposed assignment:

> "VAIVADA is thirty-four years of age, married and a U.S. citizen by birth. He attended high school in De Kalb, Illinois and entered the U.S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U.S. Air Force. The trainee served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China/Burma theatre and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945. Following his discharge, VAIVADA worked for a short period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling Silica-Gel Corporation, Illinois and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to work as a stevedor and a labor foreman. He reenlisted in the U.S. Air Force in April 1946 and was honorably discharged in 1949. On 1 June 1949, VAIVADA became a contract agent for this Agency. He served in this capacity in Costa Rica, handling a high level penetration of the Communist Party until 1953. In July 1954, the trainee became principal agent of Project AMPHODARCH. He has been operating under a student cover, working for his A.B. degree at the University of Havana. It is planned that VAIVADA will return to Havana, Cuba under cover of a representative of a well known U.S. polling agency. He will perform the duties of principal agent, handling a large net of sub-agent informants in Cuban university youth circles to provide coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities among these groups."

2. The instructors who participated in VAIVADA's training indicate that his overall performance was above average. He is a highly intelligent, practical and realistic young man possessing excellent judgment and common sense. His motivation is strong and his interest in clandestine activity as a profession appears to be genuine. VAIVADA should continue to develop as a skilled and competent agent.

The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

SECRET

SECRET

3. For the purposes of the record, it should be noted that VAIVADA received prior Covert Training during October and November 1953. The present training was more in the nature of a refresher.

4. VAIVADA received instruction in the subjects set forth on the attached Training Evaluation Reports. In addition, certain supplementary reading, discussion material, case histories, books, films and "live" problems were also covered.

5. His training was conducted by Mr. Pisanko known as "Hank" and Mr. Toth known as "Frank." Their Training Evaluation Reports are attached.

A. F. Schermerhorn
AUGUSTUS F. SCHERMERHORN

Attachments: 2

The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION REPORT

DATE (Day, month, year): 9 May 1957

NAME OF STUDENT (Pseudonym): VAIVADA, Arthur G.

TRAINING ALIAS: "VICKS"

PERIOD COVERED: 25 March to 10 April 57 and 26 April to 7 May 1957

RATING DEFINITIONS

SUPERIOR	An extremely outstanding performance.
EXCELLENT	An outstanding performance, above average.
SATISFACTORY	Requirements met without distinction.
POOR	A deficient performance, below average.
FAILURE	An extremely deficient performance.

TRAINING SUBJECTS	SUPERIOR	EXCELLENT	SATISFACTORY	POOR	FAILURE
1. Security					
2. Cover		X			
3. Observation & Description		X			
4. Interviewing					
5. Interrogation			X		
6. Surveillance			X		
7. Telephones & Mikes (Theory)		X			
8. General CI Methods			X		
9. Contacting			X		
10. Intrafield Communications					
11. Recruiting of Agents					
12. Training of Agents					
13. Agent Management & Control					
14. Double Agent Management & Control					
15. Reporting			X		
16. CE Operations		X			
17. Communist Theory			X		
18. Soviet IS		X			
19. Psychological Warfare		X			
20. Political Warfare					
21. Economic Warfare					
22. Sabotage					
23. Counter-sabotage					
24. Resistance Force Activities					
25. Guerrilla Warfare					
26. Evasion & Escape					
27. Weapons					
28. Demolitions					
29. Special Devices (R&D)					
30. Air Reception					
31. Sea Reception					
32. Map Reading					
33.					
34.					
35.					

The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns

FORM NO. 381 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
1 OCT 55

SECRET

(17-38) OVER

SECRET

STUDENT EVALUATION

STUDENT EVALUATION	RATINGS				
	ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE		NOT OBSERVED
1. Security consciousness	X				
2. Ability to work with and get along with others	X				
3. Ability to follow instructions		X			
4. Maturity of judgment and common sense	X				
5. Initiative	X				
6. Resourcefulness and independence of judgment	X				
7. Tactfulness and sense of discretion		X			
8. Cooperativeness	X				
9. Sense of discipline		X			
10. Imagination and creativeness	X				
11. Amenability to constructive criticism	X				
12. Attention to necessary details	X				
13. Observant and careful in the collection of facts	X				
14. Political sophistication and awareness	X				
15. Interest and enthusiasm for proposed assignment	X				
16. Motivation for clandestine activities	X				
17. Ability to relate theory to practice	X				
18.					
19.					
20.					

STUDENT'S COMPARATIVE EVALUATION TO OTHERS TRAINED FOR IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR ASSIGNMENT

ABOVE AVERAGE ☒ AVERAGE ☐ BELOW AVERAGE ☐

INSTRUCTOR'S COMMENTS

VAIVADA is a reliable, stable individual possessing a quick, alert mind. He was mature, serious and purposeful in his approach to training. His interest and attention remained at a high level throughout the instruction. In general, VAIVADA has the background and the desire to perform in a professional manner. The trainee possesses the ability to apply himself completely. He recognizes his shortcomings and was completely amenable to constructive criticism. VAIVADA zealously tries to find solutions to pertinent questions and problems. He analyzes facts and details thoroughly. He wants to know his job and, in any given situation, tries to learn as much as possible.

During the training, VAIVADA showed no signs of restlessness with the more routine aspects of clandestine activity. He is practical minded, adept, serious, willing to "dig in and do the grubbing." The trainee learns quickly and shows excellent promise for progressive improvement within the field of covert work. He carries out instructions and assignments in an efficient manner. VAIVADA possesses a calm, tenacious attitude. It is felt that he will develop steadily as a skilled and competent operator. He should become an increasingly valuable asset to this organization. His overall performance was above average.

INSTRUCTOR

/s/ HENRY J. PISANKO

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION REPORT

NAME OF STUDENT *(Pseudonym)* VAIVADA, Arthur G.	DATE *(Day, month, year)* 26 April 1957
TRAINING ALIAS "VICKS"	PERIOD COVERED 11 April 1957 through 25 April 1957

RATING DEFINITIONS

SUPERIOR	An extremely outstanding performance.
EXCELLENT	An outstanding performance, above average.
SATISFACTORY	Requirements met without distinction.
POOR	A deficient performance, below average.
FAILURE	An extremely deficient performance.

TRAINING SUBJECTS	RATINGS				
	SUPERIOR	EXCELLENT	SATISFACTORY	POOR	FAILURE
1. Security					
2. Cover					
3. Observation & Description					
4. Interviewing		X			
5. Interrogation		X			
6. Surveillance					
7. Telephones & Mikes (Theory)					
8. General CI Methods					
9. Contacting			X		
10. Intrafield Communications			X		
11. Recruiting of Agents		X			
12. Training of Agents		X			
13. Agent Management & Control		X			
14. Double Agent Management & Control					
15. Reporting					
16. CE Operations					
17. Communist Theory					
18. Soviet IS					
19. Psychological Warfare					
20. Political Warfare					
21. Economic Warfare					
22. Sabotage					
23. Counter-sabotage					
24. Resistance Force Activities					
25. Guerrilla Warfare					
26. Evasion & Escape					
27. Weapons					
28. Demolitions					
29. Special Devices (R&D)					
30. Air Reception					
31. Sea Reception					
32. Map Reading					
33.					
34.					
35.					

The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for its safekeeping. He may within his discretion [illegible] other members of his staff, [illegible] the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

FORM NO. 381 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
1 OCT 55

SECRET

(17-36) OVER

SECRET

STUDENT EVALUATION

		RATINGS				
		ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE		NOT OBSERVED
1.	Security consciousness	X				
2.	Ability to work with and get along with others					X
3.	Ability to follow instructions	X				
4.	Maturity of judgment and common sense	X				
5.	Initiative					X
6.	Resourcefulness and independence of judgment		X			
7.	Tactfulness and sense of discretion	X				
8.	Cooperativeness	X				
9.	Sense of discipline		X			
10.	Imagination and creativeness	X				
11.	Amenability to constructive criticism	X				
12.	Attention to necessary details		X			
13.	Observant and careful in the collection of facts		X			
14.	Political sophistication and awareness					X
15.	Interest and enthusiasm for proposed assignment	X				
16.	Motivation for clandestine activities	X				
17.	Ability to relate theory to practice	X				
18.						
19.						
20.						

	ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE
STUDENT'S COMPARATIVE EVALUATION TO OTHERS TRAINED FOR IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR ASSIGNMENT	X		

INSTRUCTOR'S COMMENTS

Arthur G. VAIVADA impressed this instructor most favorably. The trainee is highly intelligent, practical and realistic. He possesses excellent judgment and common sense. VAIVADA is mature, well-balanced, resourceful and positive. He appears to be open-minded and objective, possessing a questioning mind and a strong sense of curiosity. VAIVADA approached training with a strong desire to add to his knowledge and to refine his own methods and techniques. He was highly receptive and amenable to constructive criticism. The trainee has a feeling for detail and is observant and careful in the collection of facts. It was necessary for VAIVADA to spend considerable time on administrative matters during the training. However, he completed all outside assignments punctually and completely.

VAIVADA's performance was excellent. He is above average in every aspect. His motivation is strong and his interest in clandestine activity as a profession appears to be genuine. If properly supervised, he should be a valuable asset to this organization. The trainee appears to be industrious, possessing initiative with leadership qualities.

INSTRUCTOR

/s/ FRANK A. TOTH

SECRET

SECRET

Project AMPHODARCH
WH
19 May 58

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957.

Effective 1 June 1957, said contract is amended by adding after subparagraph (b) of Paragraph four (4), entitled "Allowances," the following:

> "(c) You will be entitled to an educational allowance in conformance with and at the rates prescribed in applicable Government regulations."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /s/
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

/s/

Field informed, HMMW-6448

201-168551

X

S

AIR SECRET HKH-A-3640

201-032723

Chief, WHD 29 May 1957

Chief of Station, Habana

Operational

Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2268, dated 22 May 1957

1. Subject and his wife arrived in Habana on 14 May 1957 and have taken permanent quarters here; their children rejoined them the following weekend.

2. As outlined in the reference, and after conversation with VAIVADA himself, the national polling cover arrangement set up for the approximate three-month trial period appears adequate. At present Subject and the case officer are engaged in working out a suitable area or areas for his polling activities and will shortly notify Headquarters of the results.

3. There is being forwarded as a separate cover attachment an administrative memorandum from Subject, informing Headquarters that he established a bank account in Miami, Florida, and his wishes respecting amounts of his salary and allowances to be deposited there following 1 June 1957. Subject's initial opening deposit in the Miami bank account was in the amount of $20.00; the "copy of check with true name and present balance" mentioned in the attached memorandum is being retained in Station files. It is requested that the Station be notified by cable of the amount of total salary and allowances to be paid direct to Subject each month in the field after 1 June.

James R. Palinger

Attachment:
1 - Administrative memorandum (single copy under separate cover)
3 - Self addressed bank envelopes U/S/C
Distribution:
3 - Washington W/att U/S/C
2 - Files W/O Att

28 May 1957

JRP/mfm

SECRET

COPY

201-165881

SECRET

XAAZ 16934

22 May 1957

TO: Colonel J. Caldwell King,
Chief, WH Division
Attention: WH/Cuba

FROM: Chief, CI/ICD LM by

SUBJECT: General: CP Penetration Program

Specific: Informal discussion with Ross Lester Crozier, 9 May 1957, re his interest in, and availability for recruitment approaches in various Latin American countries.

1. On 9 May 1957, Mr. Paul J. Burke, Deputy Chief, CI/ICD, held Subject discussion with Mr. Crozier, whom he met outside of official quarters through the cooperation of Mr. Hugh MacAuley, WH/Cuba.

2. Mr. Crozier has a fine record in CP penetration work. He did an outstanding job in handling the HUMANOID-3 operation in Costa Rica over an extended period, and he has worked hard in the CP penetration program in Cuba since his arrival there.

3. It is believed that he would be an effective recruiter in various countries in Latin America.

4. He stated that he was keenly interested in, and would like to engage in, such operations, and would welcome being asked to hit a well-chosen target in any (Spanish-speaking) Latin American country.

5. Mr. Crozier stated that he expects to return to Cuba shortly. If, after three months, there is no indication that his security has been adversely affected by the recent assassination of one of his agents, he expects to be there about a year.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-23

SECRET

CS COPY

201-168881

6. It is recommended that WH Division give consideration to employing Mr. Crozier as a recruiter when worthwhile recruitment-in-place CP targets are developed, or otherwise arise, in various Latin American countries. It is again made clear for the record that the foregoing discussion was informal and without commitment on either side.

cc: WH/CP (L. Sloan)

201-168881

1C

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2263

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana

DATE 22 MAY 57 11 14z

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

References: HAVA-891, 25 April 1957
HAVA-911, 7 May 1957
DIR-16302, 10 May 1957

1. Attached for your retention is a copy of Subject's new contract converting his status from that of Contract Agent - CS-10 to Career Agent - CS-11, to become effective 1 June 1957. Also attached is a copy of an amendment to his current contract, providing for the payment of storage of his household effects in Habana and quarters allowances for his family in San Jose, Costa Rica, for the period Subject was absent from his post. Subject read and signed the originals of both the amendment and new contract while at Headquarters.

2. Before Subject departed for the field, he was interviewed three times by one of the Headquarters staffs concerning his cover, and arrangements were made to fulfill the station's requirement for his return. However, since the polling cover originally planned for Subject could not be arranged at this time, a "notional" polling cover, adequately backstopped by a business mailing address and telephone number (being submitted under separate cover as Identity-A) was arranged as the alternative. Since Subject is returning to his post on a test basis, Headquarters feels that this notional cover is better than a more permanent arrangement would be; at least until it is more certain that Subject's stay will be permanent, thus avoiding any possible embarrassment vis-a-vis the employer company in the event Subject is forced to leave the country shortly after arrival. Furthermore, this notional cover will allow Subject almost complete freedom to pursue his other activity with very little time and effort necessary to maintain his cover. Appropriate business letterheads and cards to implement Subject's cover will be pouched to the Station as soon as Subject is able to survey the area and notify Headquarters of the type of polling activity he plans to use. He was instructed to select a polling activity not

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

22 May 57

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

RI COPY

presently covered by another agency, so as to minimize the possibility of instigating inquiries about his employer by the competitors in the area. Should Subject remain at his post, and it is hoped he will, the cover originally planned can be arranged later if Subject or the Station feels that the present cover is not adequate enough ; or, on the other hand, he can continue to use the present arrangement.

3. With respect to the payment of his salary and allowances, Subject was instructed to open a bank account here before he returned to the field. Headquarters requests he submit the name of the bank and the amount of his salary and allowances (preferably in round figures) he wishes to be paid by the Station. The balance will be paid monthly to his bank by Headquarters. Headquarters requires that this arrangement be set up to simplify and expedite his payments in the event of any changes in salary or allowances. Subject said he would give the information to the Station for transmittal to Headquarters.

4. It is regretted that Subject's wife was not able to become naturalized at this time, since she entered this country on a temporary visitor's visa, and it would have taken too long to change her status to that of a permanent resident and become naturalized. Since the conversion of Subject's status to that of a Career Agent was not affected by his wife's citizenship, it was suggested to Subject that he plan to have his wife become a citizen when he returns to this country in two years upon becoming eligible for statutory home leave.

5. Subject still has an outstanding travel voucher being processed at Headquarters, and the Station will be notified as soon as it is completed. Subject has been paid in full for his salary and allowances for the month of April 1957.

16 May 1957

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachments:
Copy of Contract
Copy of Contract Amendment
Identity A under Sep. Cover Attach.

Distribution:
- 3 - Habana w/attach.
- 1 - RI w/o attach.
- 1 - WH/Mailroom w/o attach.
- 1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono w/o attach.
- 1 - Subject w/attach.

WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs

J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing Officer)

(Coordinating Officer)

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating Officer)

RI COPY

201-168881

SECRET

RI COPY

Separate Cover Attachment to:
HKH-W-2268

IDENTITY A:

Public Surveys Institute
532 Union Fidelity Life Building
1511 Bryon Street
Dallas, Texas

Telephone: RIverside 1-3674

Contact: Mr. Albert E. JOHNSON

Distribution:
- 1 - Habana
- ✓ 1 - RI
- 1 - Cuba/Chrono

SECRET

RI COPY

201-168881

SECRET

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 August 1954, as amended.

Effective 14 May 1957, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting in its entirety Paragraph 1(b) and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

> "1(b) Additional compensation calculated at the rate of $5135 per annum."

All other terms and conditions of the original contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________

Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

Date: 10 MAY 1957

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 August 1954, as amended. Effective 31 MAY 1957, said contract, as amended, is hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. By virtue of your relationship with the United States Government in the performance of services under this agreement your legal status is that of a Government employee under contract. As such, you are entitled only to the rights, privileges and benefits stipulated herein. It is understood that you will act under cover suitable to disguise your relationship to the Government, but you will be subject to administrative and operational directions and control by the Government at all times.

2. Compensation. In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at the rate of $6390 per annum, GS-11. In addition, you will be entitled to within-grade promotions in a manner similar to the procedures prescribed for Government staff employees. In the event that the salary level of your indicated grade is altered by Federal legislation and adopted by the Government, the compensation authorized under this contract shall be altered accordingly. Payments will be made hereunder as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government.

3. Taxes. (a) In the event taxes are not withheld by your cover facility or in the event your cover facility withholds taxes on only part of the compensation due you hereunder, the Government, in view of security considerations involved, will withhold Federal income taxes from all or the remainder of taxable monies due you under this contract in an amount equivalent to the United States income tax withholding schedule based upon your taxable income under this agreement and _____ present exemption(s). Sums so withheld by the Government will be paid over to the Internal Revenue Service. No Form W-2 will be issued you by the Government and you will be instructed as to the method to be followed in making timely filing of returns, estimates and payments in order to preserve security.

(b) If for cover considerations your tax payments exceed your true tax liability under this agreement, the Government will make appropriate reimbursements in conformance with applicable policies and procedures.

4. Allowances. (a) You will be entitled to living quarters allowances in conformance with and at the rates prescribed in the Standardized Regulations, (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas).

(b) In addition to the above payments, you will be entitled to an equalization allowance calculated at the rate of $2180 per annum. This allowance is in lieu of any present or future standardized post allowance established for your present permanent post of duty overseas, but is subject to the entitlement provisions applicable to standardized post allowances. It is understood and agreed that this allowance is predicated upon the comparative cost of living between Washington, D. C., and your overseas post, your unofficial cover, family status and basic compensation. Consequently, this allowance may be unilaterally adjusted or discontinued by the Government whenever warranted by a change in any of these factors. No accounting will be required for this allowance.

5. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for the following travel and transportation expenses:

(a) For you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to reimbursement in accordance with standardized Government rates for the authorized official use of your private automobile.

(b) Upon the satisfactory completion of each two (2) years of successful overseas service under this contract, you will be entitled to home leave travel expenses for you and your dependents from your permanent post of duty overseas to your place of recorded residence in the United States and return travel expenses to your permanent post of duty overseas; provided, however, that you have fulfilled any other requirements relating to home leave which are applicable to Government staff employees.

(c) Upon the successful completion of your services under this agreement, for you, your dependents, your household effects and your private automobile from your permanent post of assignment overseas to your place of residence in the United States.

You will be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

6. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses includigg, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approvdd by the Government. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with Government regulations.

7. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

8. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by the Government in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A. App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government staff employees. Such annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government. All accrued but unused leave earned under your contract with the United States Government effective 1 August 1954, as amended, will be transferred to your leave account under this agreement in conformance with established crediting procedures.

(d) From the compensation paid you pursuant to this contract, there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6 1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. If the conditions of your cover warrant or require that you make contributions to the Social Security fund, such contributions shall be at your expense.

9. Cover. It is anticipated that you will undertake certain cover employment in the course of your performance under this agreement. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

10. Offset. Any and all compensation, allowances or other benefits (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities will be used to offset amounts due you under this contract and will reduce accordingly the Government's direct payment obligation hereunder. Sums so offset are payment by the Government under this contract and for purposes of Federal income taxation. You will report every six (6) months during the term of this agreement all benefits received from or through your cover activities and, if such benefits exceed those due you under this contract, the report will be accompanied by said excess amount, which you hereby agree is the sole property of the Government. Failure to submit timely reports and, as appropriate, excess payments, may result in suspension of any payments due you hereunder. As an alternative to the above, the Government may at any time exercise its basic right to require payment over to it of the emoluments received by you from or through your cover activities which would otherwise be offset as described above. In such cases the Government will pay directly to you the emoluments called for by this contract.

11. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required b the Government to evidence this relationship.

12. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

13. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

14. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

15. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 JUN 1957, and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By ninety (90) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government you will not be entitled to the travel expenses set forth in paragraph five (5)(c) supra. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Arthur G. Valvada

WITNESS: ____________________

APPROVED:

____

10 [illegible] 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. On this date the undersigned had a final meeting with Subject, at which time Subject was given a copy of his new contract to read and to acknowledge by signature the original copy. Subject had no questions concerning this document.

2. Mr. Biladou of Cover Division, was also present during the first part of this meeting, to advise Subject of the correct address of the cover firm he was to use as reference:

Public Surveys Institute
532 Union Fidelity Life Bldg.,
1511 Bryan Street,
Dallas, Texas

Phone: Riverside-1-3674

Mr. Albert E. JOHNSON

3. The address will give Subject the necessary backstopping in the event of any inquiries that might arise in the field concerning his employment. Subject was asked to ~~[illegible]~~ survey the field upon his arrival in Habana and submit his views on the best type of polling activity for him, so that the proper business letterheads could be printed and sent down to him. He was also promised that he will receive business cards. These items ~~will~~ are to be pouched to him through ~~the~~ Station channels.

4. Mr. Biladou also stated that he was preparing a memorandum concerning Subject's cover to be sent down to the station for Subject's acknowledgement and signature. This document will be coordinated with the Cuba Desk.

5. Subject was also paid his salary and allowances for the month of April 1957 in the amount of $ 639.72, for which he signed a receipt. 201-168881

Subject was also instructed to open a bank account in Miami, Fla., so the Finance Division will be in a position to make payment adjustments without delay. Subject was instructed to advise Hqs as to the amount of allotment to be paid him by the station - preferably in a round figure.

Mia

14-00000

039 BP/JM/EMW

Henry O. MacAuley

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : H. O. MAC AULEY
UNIT : WH/III/CUBA
EXT : 2056
DATE : 10 MAY 1957 639

TO : HAVA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, OP 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MAY 10 21 01 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT54239

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 16802

REF: HAVA-891 (IN 35508)
HAVA-911 (IN 40651)

VAIVADA ETA 15 MAY. POLLING COVER PROVIDED.

END OF MESSAGE

10 May 57
201-168881 ✓

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

378

SECRET

JM/BP/RAC

DATE : 7 MAY 57

TO : DIRECTOR

WAIVADA, ARTHUR G.

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, OP 2, /SC 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MAY 7 22 10 57

REC'D CABLE SECT

ROUTINE

IN 40651

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 911

RE: HKHA 3583

CUTOUT AMANTELOPE BEGINS MONTHS LEAVE PBPRIME 24 MAY. DESIRABLE VAIVADA RETURN PRIOR THAT DATE. 071945Z.

END OF MESSAGE

pl

201-168881

ABSTRACT X INDEX

DATE 04 JUN 1957

7 May 57

201-168881

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SCO (Mr. Lustecher)

DATE: 1 May 1957

FROM : Special Support Staff, Medical Staff

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (p)

Subject has been evaluated by the Medical Staff and found qualified for proposed PCS overseas assignment.

Vincent J. Ford

Vincent J. Ford
Administrative Officer

MS/VJF:elp

Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - WH/3 (Noland)
1 - MS

SECRET

301-168881

SECRET

CUBA

30 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Vaivada

1. During the morning of 30 April Mr. Millard of Cover telephoned regarding Subject, citing IN 35508. Mr. Millard said that he would be meeting with Vaivada at 1600 hours today and proposed providing him with a temporary rather than permanent cover with the new cover company which was being contemplated for long-range development. Mr. Millard's reasoning was that he did not wish to place Vaivada under the new company with the chance that the trial period approved for the Station might cause Vaivada to be pulled out from that cover in short order. Mr. Millard said that the temporary cover he intended offering Vaivada would be adequate.

2. I concurred with the above proposal.

G

W. GALBRAITH
C/WH/III

SECRET

201-168881

FROM:

ACTION

CABLE

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 35508
Date Received SA

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Admin		25 Apr 57	25 Apr	Pw	
2. II				McW	
3. Cuba/FI				MCa	VAIVADA -
4.					
5.					#2108
6.					30 April Mr. Millard and Mr. Billedau (cover) arranging notional Collins cover for V, until originally planned cover can be arranged - V in accord - Mr. B. making arrangements and will advise.
7.					
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer designations should be used in *To* column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to registry.
For officer designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

25 April 57
201-168181 ✓

FORM NO. 51-19
JAN 1947

14-00000

426

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

426 JM/JB/BJ

DATE : 24 APRIL 1957

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

VAIVADA, Arthur E.

APR 25 02 42:57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 35508

TO DIR

CITE HAVA 891

RE: DIR 13777 (OUT 98246)

1. STATION CONSIDERS VAIVADA CONTINUED ASSIGNMENT HAVA VERY DESIRABLE BUT DEPENDENT SECURE COVER ARRANGEMENT. SUGGEST HQS SET UP ADEQUATE COVER THEN HAVE VAIVADA COME HAVA TRIAL PERIOD TO DETERMINE ADVISABILITY CONTINUED ASSIGNMENT. RECOMMEND INDEPENDENT POLL TYPE COVER, ALREADY DISCUSSED.

2. STUDENT ACTIVITIES NOW MINIMAL OWING UNIVERSITY CLOSURE WITH NO PROBABLE OPENING PRIOR NEXT SCHOOL YEAR. HOWEVER FEEL VAIVADA, WITH FIRM COVER, COULD PERFORM VALUABLE SERVICE FOR STATION IN SUBVERSIVE AND COMMIE PENETRATIONS. 242000Z.

END OF MESSAGE

201/168881

ABSTRACT ✗ INDEX

DATE 04 [illegible] 1957

25 april 57

201-168881 ✓

S E C R E T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : J. [illegible] NOLAND
UNIT : WH
EXT : 2971
DATE : 22 APRIL 1957

TO : HAVANA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : FI/RI 2, OP 2, S/C 2

VAIVADA, ARTHUR G

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

APR 22 21 48 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT93246

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 13777

REF HAVA 824 (IN 14694)

HQS CONTEMPLATES RETURN VAIVADA CUBA EARLY MAY FOR TRIAL PERIOD SEVERAL MONTHS TO DETERMINE ADVISABILITY CONTINUING ASSIGNMENT THERE. CABLE STATION VIEWS.

END OF MESSAGE

See Hava - 891

22 april 57

	201	168891
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	
DATE 04 JUN 1957		

201-168891

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET

18 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA, Contract Agent, GS-10, assigned to Project AMTHODARCH in Habana, Cuba, was ordered by the station to leave Cuba for reasons of operational security following the killing of an indigenous member (AMTHODARCH-1) of his agent net by the Cuban authorities. Subject departed from Habana on 18 February 1957, and arrived in San Jose, Costa Rica, on or about 21 February 1957. He discontinued his residence in Habana, stored his household effects, and set up new quarters in San Jose for his family. He will maintain these quarters until about 6 May 1957, when he will be reassigned to Habana or PCS to another area. Subject, himself, is currently receiving training at Headquarters.

2. It is requested that authorization be granted to pay Subject quarters allowance to enable him to maintain residence for his family in Costa Rica for the time necessary to complete his training at Headquarters and be reassigned to the field.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Cuba Chrono
1 - VAIVADA File

WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

12 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Division
Attention: Mr. Raymond Millard

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA, Cover Data

Attached, in accordance with the requirements of your division, are certain data concerning Arthur G. VAIVADA, a WH contract agent, for whom cover as a pollster is being sought.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Cuba Chrono
1 - VAIVADA File

Attachment:
As mentioned above

WH/III/Cuba/Chrono/JENoland/fs

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

A. General Information on Agent

(1) Pseudonym and Previous Requests for Cover

Arthur G. VAIVADA. No previous request, although cover suggested herein has been under consideration for some time and has been discussed with representatives of Cover Division.

(2) Employment Status

Contract Agent, in process of conversion to career agent at GS-11; salary $6,390; quarters allowance $2,400; equalization allowance $2,120; and following benefits:

Retirement; sick and annual leave; home leave travel; Federal Employees Compensation and Missing Persons Acts.

(3) Clearance Status

Subject has regular Operational Approval and a Provisional Covert Security Approval pending receipt of full Covert Security Approval. No clearances on wife, who is only adult accompanying agent overseas.

(4) Medical Status

Check-up pending; believed to be in excellent physical condition, however.

(5) Assessment

As Contract Agent, has not been subjected to assessment.

(6) Current and Previous Covers

Cover since June 1949--Employment by Agency has been primarily that of University Student with part time photography work, and employment during one period with Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture, as supplementary. In all instances Subject has lived cover, thus acquiring no particular backstopping.

(7) Availability for Assumption New Cover

15 May 1957

SECRET

(8) Proposed Date of Departure for Overseas Post

Subject expects to return to overseas duty on or about 10 May 1957.

(9) Project Cryptonym

AMPHODARCH

B. Biographic Information on Agent

(1) Age, 34; Sex, Male; Religion, Catholic; Subject is married and has two small children.

(2) Wife— Argentina de los Angeles Cordero de Crozier—Born 15 March 1918, San Jose, Costa Rica; Married to Subject since 1945; Costa Rican citizen in process of obtaining U.S. citizenship. Additional biographic information available at country desk.

(3) Education

High School, DeKalb, Illinois
University—5 years undergraduate study at universities in San Jose, Costa Rica, Guatemala City, and Habana, Cuba.

(4) Past Employment

1940-1945	Intelligence NCO (Technical Sergeant U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force)
Jan. 1945-Apr. 46	Labor Foreman, U.S. Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone, Panama.
April 1946-Apr.49	Intelligence NCO (Technical Sergeant USAF) Chief of Section, Political Analysis, Caribbean Air Command.
April ~~1959~~ 1949-Mar.53	Freelance photography and University studies, San Jose, Costa Rica.
Mar. 1953-June 53	Photographer Ministry of Agriculture, San Jose, Costa Rica.

(5) Outside Interests, Hobbies, etc.

Athletics (general), outdoor life, photography, jungle lore, chess.

SECRET

(6) Personality Evaluation

Subject is both energetic and forceful and seems to dedicate himself wholeheartedly to any venture which he undertakes. At the same time, he has a pleasing personality, is versatile, and adapts easily to most situations. He presents a good appearance, has somewhat of a "soldier of fortune" background (much of which acquired while working for CIA), and is a good conversationalist. It should be pointed out that in spite of the "soldier of fortune" tag, Subject is essentially a stable individual and devoted to his family. His work to date and his relations with those in CIA with whom he has come in contact, have been excellent.

(7) Personal Financial Status

Solvent; Owns home.

(8) Previous Foreign Residence

Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba since 1949 as indicated above. Military Service in Far East 1944-1945.

(9) Area Experience

Area experience, as reflected in foregoing information, is extensive.

(10) Language Qualifications

Subject is fluent in Spanish language, which is indigenous to area in which he is and will be operating.

C. Security Considerations

(1) Period of Employment with CIA

June 1949 to present

(2) Frequency of Visits to CIA Installations

Not applicable. No visits other than to safehouses.

(3) Extent Knowledge of CIA Affiliation

It must be presumed that wife is aware of intelligence nature of Subject's work, though not necessarily the CIA connection. No other non Agency personnel believed to be aware of CIA status.

SECRET

(4) Past Intelligence Connections

With U.S. Army and Air Force as indicated above.

(5) Use of CIA Credit References

Not applicable

(6) Future plans for Agent

Contemplate continuation in non-official cover status upon completion of current assignment.

(7) Emergency Contact

In the process of being arranged.

(8) Agency-sponsored Insurance

No Agency-sponsored Insurance as of this writing. Extent of others not known, but believed adequate.

D. Operational Information

(1) Type of Information—Expected Duration of Assignment

FI; Duration of assignment indefinite, but at least two years. Operations from average to high. Sensitivity—no persons, other than Agency personnel and cover facility officials, will be made aware of CIA affiliation while under non-official cover.

(2) Location

Habana, Cuba

(3) Degree of Mobility Desired

Will spend most of time in capital (Habana). Should be free to travel al will throughout country, however.

(4) Special groups to be Contacted

From the operational standpoint, access to political circles is most desirable.

(5) Approximate Annual Income to Be Attributed to Cover Organization

$10,000 (including allowances)

(6) Hours Which Must Be Devoted to Operational Duties

Subject should be able to devote at least 50% of time to operational activity, although duties entailed in proposed cover will fit in very nicely with operational requirement.

(7) Physical Security Requirements

No particular problems anticipated in this respect.

(8) Communications

No special arrangements [illegible] required, as Subject will be in more or less regular contact with Station personnel.

(9) Cover Suggestions

A polling cover (employment as of representative of a large U.S. polling firm) has been suggested and seems highly appropriate in this case, as it would afford excellent mobility in addition to job backstopping. Mr. Ray Millard of Cover Division has been attempting for some time to arrange such a cover for Subject.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

10 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/111/Cuba/McAuley

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 26 February 1956 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Attachment:

so memo 2 April 1957/par

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

201-168881

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

475 ERB/RFL/JL

DATE : 05 APRIL 1957

475

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH-5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

APR 6 07 27 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 27923

TO PRITY DIR INFO: HAVA **CITE** SANJ 2531

RE: A. DIR 03998 (OUT 79438)
B. HAVA 866 (IN 27345)

1. DOSSIER HAS NOT ARRIVED. VAIVADA AND WIFE HAVE DECIDED SHE WILL JOIN HIM ZRMETAL NOW USING TOURIST VISA. CHILDREN WILL REMAIN SANJ WITH RELATIVES.

2. PARA 2 REF A STATES NO CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT WIFE.

3. SHE ARRIVING ZRMETAL EAL FLIGHT 534 MORNING 8 APRIL. REQUESTS VAIVADA MEET. HAVE ADVANCED HER NO FUNDS.

END OF MESSAGE.

Hugh MacAuley
CL 6-2547

Hugh MacAuley was called to contact and notify Vaivada

201-168881

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

5 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

Subject: Arthur G. VAIVADA

Naturalization of Subject's wife

1. Mr. Jerry MANSETT, Alien Affairs Officer, Office of Security, Room 2503, I Bldg., X-2141, stated that the following requirements and procedure are necessary to submit Subject's wife's application for naturalization:

a. Memorandum from C/WHD to the Director of Security, Attention: Alien Affairs Officer, requesting that the application for naturalization be expedited so that Subject's wife may accompany him overseas on or about____________

b. Application for Naturalization forms to be filled out in duplicate. They are NOT to be signed by the applicant.

c. 3 passport-size photographs.

d. 1 fingerprint card (Obtained at the Immigration Office in Room 313, Old Post Office Bldg., 12th and Penn. N.W.)

2. The above memo and documents are to be submitted to the Office of Security (OS). After a security check an appointment will be made for Subject's wife to appear for questionning and signing of application. Once this formality is done, the application is placed in the District Court for the final swearing in by the Judge (The swearings take place each 2nd Tuesday of the month).

3/ There will be a fee of $10.00.

4. VAIVADA can be one of the two witnesses required.

NCA.

201-168881

234

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

434/ERD/RFL/CG
DATE : 04 APRIL 1957

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

APR 5 03 30 57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION: WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 27345

TO SANJ INFO: DIR CITE HAVA 866

RE: SANJ 2523 (IN 26196)

CONSULATE ADVISES DOSSIER MRS ANGELA ARGENTINA IRIS CORDERO Y CALDERONA DE CROZIER FORWARDED SANJ VIA POUCH 21 MARCH.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

014 WCJ/BP/WS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 02 APRIL 1957

APR 3 05 26:57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : SAN JOSE
ACTION: WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 26196

TO DIR INFO: HAVA CITE SANJ 2523

REF SANJ 2495 (IN 18323)
HAVA 841 (IN 19663)

VISA FILE VAIVADA'S WIFE STILL NOT RECEIVED SANJ. LOCAL CONSUL CAN DO NOTHING PENDING RECEIPT FILE. CAN HQS ASSIST?

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET

2 APR 1957

Chief, CI/OA

Acting Deputy Director of Security (Investigations
and Support)

C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957, wherein a provisional covert security approval and a covert security approval were requested to enable the Subject's conversion to career agent status for use as Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba, under non-official cover.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Field Regulation 10-215, a provisional covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph #1, above.

3. It should be noted that the provisional covert security approval herein granted is based on limited investigative coverage and should not be in any way construed as a final security determination relative to a full covert security approval. Upon completion of additional investigation now pending, you will be appropriately advised as to our decision with regard to the issuance of a full covert security approval.

4. Subjects of provisional covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a provisional covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

6. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Fred H. Hall

201-168251

SECRET

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. WH-[illegible]-57

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL 7-2145-53-011

NAME Arthur G. VAIVADA (Ps)

OFFICE PHONE 2729

GRADE AND SALARY GS-10 $5915

TITLE Contract Agent

OFFICIAL STATION Havana, Cuba

YOU ARE HEREBY AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS.

ITINERARY

Havana, Cuba to Washington, D. C. and return.

PURPOSE

TDY - Training for approximately 6 weeks.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

AUTHORIZED PER DIEM

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

ADVANCE OF FUNDS IS AUTHORIZED.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL $ [illegible]

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT 22 March 1957

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY 3 May 1957

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY) Common carrier and private auto.

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER

☐ (B) XXX 10¢ CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY. SIGNED COPY ON FILE IN CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH. REVIEWED. NO CHANGE NECESSARY. AMENDED AS INDICATED.

SIGNATURE

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN 6 MOS. OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO. 7-2145-53-011

DATE 22 March 57

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER J. [illegible]

TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING TRAVEL C/WH J. C. KING

DATE 28 March 1957

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING TRAVEL

SECRET

FORM NO. 540 1 APR 56 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-48)

SOURCE -05

28
~~14~~ MAR 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NAME: CROZIER, Ross Lester

BIRTH: 20 June 1922, DeKalb, Illinois

ADDRESS:
Pres: 5th St. 655, Havana (Vedado) Cuba
Perm: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica

CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.

MARITAL STATUS: Argentina de los Angeles Cordero de Crozier, b. 15/3/18, San Jose, Costa Rica, m. 17 Dec 1945, Cristobal, Canal Zone
Address: Same as subject

CHILDREN:
Ross Arnulfo Crozier, b.c. 1949: Add: same as subject
Lillian Caridad Crozier, b.c. 1951 Add: Same as subject

PARENTS:
Father: Lester Earl Crozier, b. 15 Mar 1900, Palestine, Ill.
Mother: Elizabeth Lorene McKibben, b. Sept 1903, La Moille, Ill.
Address: RR No. 1, Tampico, Ill.

BRO & SISTERS:
James Earl Crozier, b.c. 1929, Add: Tampico, Ill.
Irma Lilly Crozier, b.c. 1924, Add: RR.1, Tampico, Ill.
Blanche Elaine Crozier, b.c. 1926, Add: 1900 Canal St., Rock Falls, Illinois
Norris Edwin Crozier, b.c. 1932. Add: 804½ 1st Ave., Sterling, Illinois

IN LAWS:
Father: Alberto Cordero Loizia, b. 1894, San Jose, Costa Rica, Deceased
Mother: Dora Cordero Calderon, b. 7 Sept 1893, San Jose, Costa Rica, Add: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica
Sister: Norma Cordero de Gregor b.c. 1932, Add: Box 2655, Cristobal, C.Z.
Isabel Cordero de Naranjo, b.c. 1929. Add: Plaza Viquez, San Jose, Costa Rica
Consuelo Cordero Calderon, b.c. 1927. Add: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica

EDUCATION:
1926-34: Elwood, DeKalb, Illinois
1935-39: DeKalb Township, DeKalb, Ill. (Grad)
1949-53: Univ. of Costa Rica, San Jose, Costa Rica
1-5/54: Univ. of San Carlos, Guatemala City, Guatemala
1954-Pres: Univ. of Habana, Habana, Cuba.-

Deadline 29 April 1957

MILITARY: 1940-49: U.S. Air Force T/Sgt. Serial 16001300

RECHECK

CONFIDENTIAL

Previously Checked Aug 1958
Please bring that check up to date.

28 March 57
201-168881

O.W.N.

15 APR 1957

CONFI[illegible]

~~18~~ 28 MAR 1957

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NAME: CROZIER, Ross Lester

EMPLOYMENT:
1940-45: U.S. Air Force
1945-46: U.S. Naval Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone
1946-49: U.S. Air Force
1949-53: Free lance photography and student, San Jose, Costa Rica
3-6/53: Section of Geology, Ministry Agriculture, Costa Rican Government, San Jose, Costa Rica (Dr. Cesar Dondoli)

TRAVEL:
1949-53: San Jose, Costa Rica
Jan-May 1954: Guatemala City, Guatemala
1954-Pres: Habana, Cuba

RESIDENCES:
4-11/55: Calle 11 No. 1013 Vedado, Habana, Cuba
1954-55: Calle 16, No. 511 Vedado, Habana, Cuba
8-11/54: Calle 3, No 6A, Miramar, Habana, Cuba
5-8/54: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica
1-5/54: 7th Ave., N. 9-04, Jocotanango, Guat. City
1953-54: 5008 7th St., NW., Wash. 11, D.C.
1949-53: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica
All prior residences was military service back to 1941

RECHECK

Previously Checked Aug 1954
Please bring [illegible]

CONFI[illegible]

201-168881

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA

Training and contact procedure for Subject was discussed with Mr. Schermahorn (Room 201-T-30, X-2778) on this date:

a) The training of Subject will last six weeks from 25 March through 6 May 1957.

b) Subject will use the code name "Mr. Vicks" throughout the training.

c) Contact procedure: Subject will call "Jim" on JA-7-9117 at 1:40 PM on 25 March 1957 (Monday). He will identify himself as "Mr. Vicks." He will be given instructions as to the place and time of pick-up to be taken to safe house. Subject will have identification card to be presented to instructor upon arrival at safe house.

d) In the event Subject has to be contacted during training period (i.e. wife's naturalization matters, etc.) the desk will contact Mr. Schermahorn's office (X-2778) the day before so arrangements may be made. Training Division will not release the phone numbers of their safe houses.

e) Subject will be in training full time during the six weeks' period and will be given assignments for homework to be done at night and over some week ends.

H. O. MACAULEY
FI/OPS_-Cuban Desk

22 March 1957

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

186

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

186 HM/JB/BRB

DATE : 19 MARCH 1957

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : SAN JOSE
ACTION: WH 5
INFO : FI/RI 2, S/C 2

MAR 19 15 59z57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 20033

TO OPIM HAVA INFO: DIR CITE: SANJ 2506

RE: DIR 07482 (OUT 86223)

1. REF ARRIVED 18 MARCH.
2. VAIVADA ARRIVING HAVA PANAM 506 MARCH 19. MEET.
3. HAVE ADVANCED HIM $400. ACCOUNTING TO BE MADE HAVA.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

JM/BP/MR

ORIG : J. B. NOLAND
UNIT : WH/III/CUBA
EXT : 2056
DATE : 13 MARCH 1957

717

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	~~Subject~~	4	
2		5	
3		6	07 '57

TO : HABANA

REC'D CABLE SECT.

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

VAIVADA

OUT 5483

INFO : ~~CI~~, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

TO: HAVA INFO: SANJ ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

REFERENCE: HAVA 833

CITE DIR 07107

NO OBJECTION PARA TWO. SUGGEST LENGTH STAY HAVA MIGHT BE CUT AND PUBLIC APPEARANCES MINIMIZED.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RLG/BP/J 481

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 57

DATE : 14 MARCH 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.
IN 18323

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: HAVA INFO: DIR CITE: SANJ 2495

REF: HAVA 833 (IN 17296)
SANJ 2474 (IN 11647)

1. VISA FILE ON VAIVADA'S WIFE NOT YET RECEIVED HERE ALTHOUGH LOCAL CONSUL HAS MADE TWO OFFICIAL REQUESTS OF CONSULATE HAVA. VAIVADA DOES NOT WANT LEAVE WITHOUT HER AND WANTS HER ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP FOR OWN PROTECTION IN FUTURE. STATION UNABLE PRESSURE LOCAL CONSULATE UNTIL FILE RECEIVED HERE.

2. VIEW ABOVE NOT FEASIBLE FOR VAIVADA LEAVE ON 18 MARCH. STATION HOPES WIFES VISA CASE WILL BE SETTLED BY 24 MARCH.

END OF MESSAGE

answered
15 March!

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

200 [illegible]/RFL/J

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 18 MARCH 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, S/C 2

MAR 18 20 03:57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 19663

TO PRITY SANJ **INFO** DIR **CITE** HAVA 841

RE: DIR 07482 (OUT 86223)

1. CONSULATE ADVISES VAIVADA AS WIFE'S DOSSIER AIR POUCHED SANJ VIA WASH 8 MARCH. SHOULD HAVE ARRIVED BY NOW.

2. REQUEST SANJ ADVISE FLIGHT AND TIME ARRIVAL VAIVADA HAVA.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE **Copy No.**

14-00000

C68

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

068—ES/DB/WCJ

DATE : 10 MARCH 57

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Mar 11 [illegible] 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.

IN 16366

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: HAVA   INFO: DIR   CITE: SANJ 2491

RE: HAVA 826 (IN 15237)

1. VAIVADA ADVISES SO FAR HE KNOWS NO OTHER CONTACT KNOWS TELEPHONE NUMBER. HAS NEVER REVEALED NUMBER TO ANY ONE AND HAS NEVER WRITTEN IT.

2. RE GARAGE ADDRESS, ONLY KNOWS IT IS A "DIAMOND-T AGENCY GARAGE" LOCATED SOMEWHERE ON CALLE 20 DE OCTUBRE. SUGGESTS PR DUE BE REVIEWED FOR POSSIBLE PINPOINTING ADDRESS AND PHOTO.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168871

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE   Copy No.

8 March 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA: Chief, CI/CA

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (sp.)
C-25507

1. Reference is made to OS's verbal request of 7 March 1957, for additional information on Subject in connection with our request for a Provisional Covert Security Approval dated 26 February 1957.

2. Subject was born in De Kalb, Illinois, on 20 June 1922. He received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U. S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U. S. Air Force. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-Burma theater and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945 with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge, he worked for a brief period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Gel Corporation and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to marry a Costa Rican girl in December 1945. For about four months he worked as a stevedore and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone and was discharged three years later, in 1949.

3. Late in 1948 he was recruited by the Agency, and on 1 June 1949 became a CIA contract agent. Since that date, he has served as a contract agent with continuing high level performance, first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba where he is utilized as Principal Agent of Project AMPHODARCH. Subject has worked principally and successfully so, on Communist Party penetration operations since his engagement with CIA, and his current work involves the handling of a net of agents providing coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities at the University of Habana, and the student-youth circles in general in Cuba.

4. Subject has always proven to be loyal and trustworthy. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status. He was promoted recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating.

201-168881

5. Subject's spouse, a Costa Rican citizen, has expressed desire to acquire U. S. citizenship, and has now made the necessary arrangements to accompany her husband to the U. S. for this purpose, when Subject returns for Covert training at Headquarters in the very near future.

6. Covert Security Approval, with an expedite Provisional Covert Security Approval, has been requested in connection with the recommendation to convert Subject from contract to staff status.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - Cuba Chrono
- 1 - VAIVADA File

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

361/SE/DH/AFT

DATE : 07 MARCH 1957

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 7 22 50 '57

TO : SAN JOSE

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.

IN 15237

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SANJ

CITE: HAVA 826

REQUEST SANJ CABLE VAIVADA REPLIES TO FOLLOWING: WHO AMONG HQS HAVA CONTACTS COULD ALSO KNOW TELEPHONE F-5019? GIVE DETAILED ADDRESS GARAGE WHERE JOAQUIN MARTINEZ VELASQUEZ, JS CONTACT, WORKS AND CAN BE REACHED.

END OF MESSAGE.

S E C R E T

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

416 RLG/JM/BRB

DATE 27 FEB 57 416

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 27 23 47 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 11647

TO DIRECTOR
FROM SAN JOSE
ACTION WH 5
INFO CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

TO DIR INFO: HAVA CITE SANJ 2474

REF DIR 03998 (OUT 79438)

1. VAIVADA PREFERS CAREER STATUS ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT CONCERNED FUTURE JOB SECURITY. WANTS WIFE ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP AND HAS ALREADY DISCUSSED IMMIGRATION VISA WITH LOCAL CONSUL WHO HAS CABLED HAVA CONSULATE FOR DOSSIER ON WIFE.

2. WILL TAKE WIFE WITH HIM TO ZRMETAL BUT WILL LEAVE TWO CHILDREN HERE WITH WIFE'S FAMILY. TENTATIVE ETD 23 MARCH.

3. TIME ELEMENT IN OBTAINING WIFE'S VISA ONLY PROBLEM PRESENT TIME. HHHW 2092 NOT YET RECEIVED.

4. FOR HAVA. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION PAY VAIVADA SALARY FOR FEB. ADVISE AMOUNT DUE HIM. ALSO REQUEST YOU ATTEMPT EXPEDITE FORWARDING DOSSIER ON WIFE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

454 JB/JM/MR 454

DATE : 27 FEB 57

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 28 [illegible] 45 57

REC'D CABLE SECT.
IN 11760

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: HAVA INFO: DIR CITE: SANJ 2476

RE: HAVA 811 (IN 49266)
DIR 03998 (OUT 79438)
SANJ 2474 (IN 11647)

OPERATIONAL MEMO DATED 26 FEBRUARY, PREPARED BY VAIVADA BEING POUCHED HAVA AS SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HRSA-2602.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL

DATE: 26 February 1957

PROJECT:

TO: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division	FROM: (Division) WH/III/CUBA

SUBJECT	CI/OA FILE NO.	SO FILE NO.
TRUE NAME: CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM: Arthur G. VAIVADA	C-25507	

TYPE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE:

USE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE (Full details)

Subject has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance. He is currently assigned to Cuba, where he is being utilized as the Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH. Project AMPHODARCH is an FI operation designed to provide information on political activities (including Communist) in university circles in Havana, Cuba. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☒	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐	GOVERNMENT NAME CHECK	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)	☐	OTHER:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IS ATTACHED IN TWO COPIES	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐	PRQ II IS ATTACHED, IF OBTAINABLE	☐	GREEN LIST CHECK HAS BEEN INITIATED

FIELD TRACES

☒	REVEAL NO INFORMATION OF VALUE	☐	WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐	REVEAL INFORMATION AS ATTACHED	☐	NOT INITIATED. NOT EXPECTED TO POSSESS RELEVANT INFO.

SUGGESTED INVESTIGATIVE COVER

☐	GOVERNMENT	☐	ACADEMIC
☐	COMMERCIAL	☐	OTHER:

RI TRACES				DIVISION TRACES			
☒	RECORD (Not derogatory)	☐	NO RECORD	☒	RECORD (Not derogatory)	☐	NO RECORD

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION OR SPECIAL COVERAGE DESIRED

SUBJECT	IS	☒	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF CIA INTEREST
		☐	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST
		☐	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF IMPENDING INVESTIGATION
	HAS	☐	BEEN	☐	NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON A "COVER STORY"

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Hugh O. MacAuley	2056 1021 Barton	W. Galbraith

201-168881

FORM NO. 772
1 SEP 55

SECRET

(9)

142

142 ED/GP/OBS

DATE : 23 FEBRUARY 1957

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 23 04 47 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT

ROUTINE

IN 10068

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: [✓ WH 5]

INFO : FI/RI 2, S/C 2

TO HAVA INFO: DIR **CITE** SANJ 2471

RE: HAVA 803 (IN 48050)

22 FEB VAIVADA CONTACTED BURNETTE FOR WHO HE WORKED IN WSBURNT.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 August 1954, as amended.

Effective ______________________, said contract, as amended, is further amended by the addition of sub-paragraph (e) to paragraph three (3) entitled "Travel" which reads as follows:

> "(e) For temporary storage of your household effects while you are temporarily absent from your initial permanent post of duty hereunder."

Effective 19 February 1957, said contract is further amended by deleting paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" in its entirety and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

> "1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of certain information and services, you will receive from the Government, payable in such an approved manner as you may direct in writing, the following:
>
> (a) Compensation calculated at the rate of $5915 per annum; and
>
> (b) Additional compensation for quarters procurement at San Jose, effective upon your arrival thereat in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum. As this additional compensation is based upon quarters costs at said post, it is subject to unilateral adjustment by the Government whenever warranted by a change in the factors affecting its initial establishment. Quarters will not be furnished you by the Government nor will you accept quarters provided by your cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

19 Feb 57

SECRET

201-167881

Copied

Subject

ORIG : J.B.NOLAND

611

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

UNIT : WH/III/CUBA

EXT : 2056

DATE : 18 FEBRUARY 1957

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 20 2 9 '57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HAVANA INFO: SANJ

FROM : DIRECTOR

6

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT78042

TO HAVA INFO SANJ CITE DIR 03253

REF HAVA 801 (IN 47267)

VAIVADA SHOULD CONTACT MR WILLIAM CLYONS IN SANJ.

FYI FUTURE PLANS, VAIVADA TRAINING HQS COULD START 25 MARCH. INDICATE AT ONCE IF DESIRABLE

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

D. C. HARELIUS, AC/WHD
for J.C.KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

158

188 RLG/JB/EMW

DATE : 18 FEB 57

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Feb 18 16 40 '57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.
IN 48050

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SANJ INFO: DIR CITE: HAVA 803

REF HAVA 801 (IN 47267)

VAIVADA AND FAMILY ARRIVING SANJ 18 FEB. WILL CONTACT COS THEREAFTER.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

301 HM/RFL/MR

DATE : 15 FEB 57

[illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible]

REC'D CABLE SECT.

IN 47267

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: HAVA 801

RE: HAVA 799 (IN 46908)

1. PRESS 15 FEB IDENTIFIES MAN FOUND SHOT TO DEATH AS AMPHODARCH 1.

2. AGENT KNEW ARTHUR G VAIVADA TRUE NAME AND RESIDENCE. DUE THIS AND AS PRECAUTION STATION ADVANCING VAIVADA AND FAMILY FUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY TRAVEL THEIR HOME SANJ WHERE WILL STAY AT LEAST UNTIL CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES RESTORED CUBA. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

301-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA A I R (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2092

201-32723

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana

FROM Chief, WHD

DATE 8 FEB 57 15 00 z

SUBJECT GENERAL Administrative
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

References: a. HKH-A-3314
b. HKH-W-1905
c. HKH-A-2577

Action Required: Notify Headquarters if Any Objection to Action Para. 3

1. Headquarters has no objection to the postponement of VAIVADA's training until the end of the current contract year (July-August 1957), and has cancelled immediate training arrangements accordingly. The Station should submit a new request several months prior to the desired new training dates.

2. There has been a change, meanwhile, in Headquarters thinking on the proposed conversion of VAIVADA to Staff status. Upon reviewing the case, the responsible Headquarters staff suggested that career agent status would be more appropriate and recommended that the requested personnel action be changed accordingly. The Staff pointed out that virtually all benefits which would accrue to VAIVADA under staff status are also obtainable as a career agent. These include Civil Service Retirement, Sick and Annual Leave, Home Leave Travel, Periodic Step Increases, and coverage under the Federal Employment Compensation and Missing Persons Acts. He would also be eligible for certain KUBARK insurance plans, subject to security and other special considerations. The one exception is that VAIVADA would remain on a contract basis, meaning that his job security would be somewhat less than that of staff personnel. His contract would be for an indefinite period, however, and his job security would closely approximate that of a staff agent.

3. In discussing VAIVADA's conversion, the reviewing staff also noted that VAIVADA would not necessarily be granted staff status, even though his wife were to become a U.S. citizen, and would definitely not qualify for same at this time. In view of this development and the generally favorable benefits accruing to a career agent, the Division has resubmitted its conversion request to provide for career rather than

COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

8 Feb. 57

RI COPY

~~201-32723~~

201-158881 ✓

SECRET

staff status, at Grade GS-11. It is felt that the career status provides most, if not all, of the benefits sought for VAIVADA in HBA-A-2577. It will now be unnecessary, moreover, for Mrs. VAIVADA to acquire U.S. citizenship, although Headquarters stands ready to facilitate acquisition of same if the VAIVADAs so desire.

4. Should there be any objection, on the part of the Station or VAIVADA, to this latest proposal, Headquarters would appreciate an early indication to that effect, in order that other arrangements might be made. It would appear at this time, however, that the proposed career status is the most favorable that VAIVADA could expect.

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

5 February 1957

Distribution:
- 3 - Habana
- 1 - RI
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Cuba/JHNoland/jt

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing Officer)

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating Officer)

RI COPY
201-168881
~~201-32723~~

SECRET

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: James B. Noland

DIVISION: WH/III

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2056, 2971

DATE: 30 January 1957

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE: Arthur G. VAIVADA

2. PROJECT: AMPRODARCH

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 3517-014

4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: NA

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include salary) (CYTE Subject first recruited in Panama as [illegible] in November 1948; transferred to Costa Rica in [illegible] Project Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL Project and [illegible].

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Operational Clearance - 19 July 1954

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Career Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 34

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 20 June 1922

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Sterling, Illinois

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Habana, Cuba

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP: Three dependents: wife and two children

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE:

21. VETERAN: World War II

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability service disability non-combat):

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: USA and USAF

24. RANK OR GRADE: T/Sgt.

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $6,390.00 GS-11

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL:

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any):

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: $2,400.00 (non-taxable)

32. POST:

33. OTHER: Equalization Allowance - $2,620.00 (non-taxable)

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): NA

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife - Costa Rican (expects obtain U.S. citizenship in near future)
Born 15 March 1918 - 38 years of age. Married to Subject since 1945

Son - U.S. Citizen, 7 years of age.

Daughter - U.S. Citizen, 5 years of age.

20-167881 X

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: X

43. ENTERTAINMENT:

44. OTHER: Normal operational expenses of field

SECRET

30 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Request for Conversion of Arthur G. VAIVADA from Contract to Career Agent Status

REFERENCE : HKH-A-2577

1. Referenced dispatch from the field recommends the conversion of contract agent Arthur G. VAIVADA to staff status and presents a strong case for such conversion. Upon receiving a formal WHD request for such action, however, your Plans Staff suggested that career agent status would be more appropriate in this case, and further indicated that staff status for VAIVADA is virtually out of the question at this time. The request is being re-submitted, therefore, in revised form to provide for conversion to career rather than staff status.

2. VAIVADA has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance; first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba and is expected to remain there indefinitely. VAIVADA is 34 years old and was promoted recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating. His expressed career interests lie in continued employment by CIA, more especially in the area of unofficial cover assignments, for which he is highly suited.

April 1956

3. In view of VAIVADA's outstanding record as a contract agent, his strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it is recommended that he be granted career agent status. A PHS and a new contract check list (in duplicate) are attached.

4. WH Division contemplates bringing VAIVADA to the U.S. for covert training during the latter part of 1957.

5. Approval for the conversion of VAIVADA from contract to career agent status, as indicated above, is hereby requested.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Attachments
PHS (2)
Contract Check List (2)

Armstrong
for
7 Feb 57

SECRET

×

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: *SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.*

CASE OFFICER: James B. Noland

DIVISION: WH/III

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2971, 2036

DATE: 30 January 1957

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (*See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-430 or successor regulations.*)

FECA
Missing Persons
~~Retirement~~
CIA Sick and Annual Leave
Home Leave Travel
Periodic Step Increases

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (*Check*): ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (*Check*): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☒ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (*If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.*)
☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: Infinite (DAYS / MONTHS / YEARS)

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: Immediate

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (*Number of days*): Ninety Days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (*FI, PP, other*): FI Operations

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Principal agent engaged in collection of positive intelligence and CE information.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Army and Air Force Intelligence. CIA Training. Other as indicated in Number 6, above.

59. EDUCATION (*Check Highest Level Attained*)
☒ GRADE SCHOOL ☒ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE (*No degree*) ☒ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (*Check Appropriate Degree Competency*)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	X				X		X		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Very good.

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

1940-1945: T/Sgt. USA, USAF, Intelligence NCO.
Jan. 1945 - April 1946: Leading man labor, $12.88 per day, US Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone
April 1946 - April 1949: T/Sgt USAF, Intelligence NCO, Albrook Field, Canal Zone
April 1949 - Present: Contact agent.

X

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (*Use other side if necessa-*

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF DIVISION OFFICER	DATE
	W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III	

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 15 17 [illegible]

JAN 15 1703Z 57

ROUTINE

IN 34563

204 FO/RFL/BRB

DATE : 15 JAN 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, S/C 2

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 755

REF: HAVA 745 (IN 32122)

REQUEST TRAINING BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. EXPLANATORY DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

353

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

353/DEF/RFL/CG

DATE : 08 JANUARY 57

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

IN 32122

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, CP 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: HAVA 745

RE: HKHW 1984

DUE DELAY FINAL PROCESSING WIFES VISA VAIVADA UNABLE DEPART HAVA PRIOR 16 JAN. WILL ADVISE ETA. GROWERY ACTING.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

ATTENTION: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT: Covert Training Request for Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: Project AMPHCDARCH

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 4 December 1956 requesting covert training for Arthur G. VAIVADA.

2. The CI Staff approves the training request subject to the comments and recommendations set forth in the attached memorandum prepared by CI/ICD under date of 20 December 1956.

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachment:
C/CI/ICD memo dtd 20 Dec. 56 - Subject; Comments and Recommendations on Proposed Covert Training of Arthur G. VAIVADA

SECRET

201-168881

Mrs. Argentina C. Crozier A-11 937 507
Admitted to the U S. as an immigrant: March 12, 1960
Type: O-1 Port: SNA (San Ontanio, Tex.)
Date of Birth: March 15, 1915

Received FOREIGN ADDRESS AND OCCUPATION INDEX CARD (Budget Bureau No. 43-R390) and Dept of Justice ID card Form No. 1-151 - thru my home address at Longmont Colorado about ~~March~~ 12 April 1960.
Index Card filled and mailed on 19 April 1960.

201-168881

22271 Universal

RECIBO POR DINERO

Nº 050

31 de January de 19 51

RECIBI de Cash

la suma de Seven hundred fifty and no/100 colones

por Services rendered, month of January

(₡ 750.00)

Ross L. Crozier

27-14

27-14

27-14

27-14

27-14

27-1

21-14

301-168881

RECIBO POR DINERO

25M99 Universal

Nº 009

30 de April de 1953

RECIBI de Cash

la suma de Eight hundred colones 00/100

por Services rendered, 16-30 April

(₡ 800.00)

Ross L. Crozier

201-168851

BIOGRAPHICAL: Consuelo Felicia CORDERO Calderon

From	To	Place	Employment	Employer	Address
1 Jan 57	20 May 57	San Jose, C.R.	Manicurist Salon BORDALLO	Juan BORDALLO	62 entre Av 3 - 5
20 May	1 July 57	Havana, Cuba	Unemployed.		
2 July	13 April 58	San Jose, C.R.	Salon BORDALLO	Juan BORDALLO	62 entre Av 3 - 5
14 Apr 58	July 58	160 Main St. Quincy 69, Mass.	Unemployed.		
July 58	27 Dec 58	Mexico City	Salon Moderno	Esperanza HERRERA	Av Alvaro Obregon No 174
27 Dec 58	Mar 59	180 Main St. Quincy 69, Mass.	Unemployed.		
Mar 59	17 Mar 60	550 Riverside Dr. New York 27, N.Y.	Student at Wilfred Academy -		1657 Broadway 51st
			also employed at Glamour Cut, 353 E. 204 St., Bronx, N.Y.		
			also employed at Ciro's Coffiure, Lexington Av 91st and 92nd.		
			also employed at Jacques Beauty Salon, Inc. 160 West 55th Street, N.Y.		
21 Mar 60	to date	226 Burgess Ave Alexandria, Va.	Temporarily unemployed.		

Harold R. Noemayr

DATES WERE TAKEN FROM PASSPORT TRAVEL

201-168271

RECIBO POR DINERO

272271 Universal

Nº 069

30 de June de 19 49

RECIBI de Cash

la suma de four hundred and no/100 colones

por services rendered, month of June

(₡ 400.00)

Ross L. Crozier

27-19-11

27-19-13

27-19-16

27-19-18

27-19-19

27-19-20

27-19-18

FILE IN 201- 168881

ROSS L. CROZIER
Representative

Public Surveys Institute
General Polling Service
RIverside 1-3674

332 Fidelity Union Life Bldg.
1511 Bryan Street
Dallas, Texas

See Subject's Cover file in Operations folder -

201-168 881

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM TO: PLANS

FROM: WHD

SUBJECT: Project HUMANOID

Project HUMANOID is the most important single project of the San Jose Station, and the basis for all existing and contemplated OSO activities in the area. It is requested that the restrictions imposed upon project HUMANOID, as contained in TRS-W-635, copy attached, be lifted at this time, and the Chief of Station be authorized to direct the activities of HUMANOID into the following channels.

(a) Direct and close supervision of HUMANOID-3, the Station's penetration of the Vanguardia Popular, Costa Rican Communist Party, in order to utilize fully the agents potentialities. HUMANOID-3 is intelligent, has a wide knowledge of Communist activities, plans and personalities and is desirous of cooperating to the extent of his ability. After a thorough de-briefing of HUMANOID-3 by HUMANOID, in order to acquaint him, HUMANOID-3 with the Station's specific interests and requirements, plus the subsequent close supervision which will be exercised by HUMANOID, and the continuing close supervision of HUMANOID-3 by HUMANOID, it is felt that the station will then be in a position to provide intensive and adequate coverage of the objectives assigned to it in the San Jose SOI.

(b) Direct and close supervision of HUMANOID-4, the Station's penetration of the Women's Fronts affiliated with the Vanguardia Popular. It is felt that the former cut-out HUCKLEBONE, who handled HUMANOID-4 until 1 June 1949, was somewhat inept in his operational dealings, which possibly may account for what seems to be a lack of productivity in the HUMANOID-4 project. HUMANOID-4 has an intimate relationship with active CP members in Costa Rica, both on a low and high level, and possesses a definite potential for both independent reporting, and for spotting a likely individual to be used as a parallel to the HUMANOID-3 project. HUMANOID, who will now handle HUMANOID-4, is capable of directing this agents efforts into the proper channels, and capitalizing fully on the talents possessed by the individual. It is felt that this is another instance whereby HUMANOID, by working closely and directly with the individual can make a substantial contribution to the efforts of the San Jose Station.

(c) Direct and close supervision of HUMANOID-1 and HUMANOID-2, the mail intercept operations presently covering the General Post Office in San Jose. The information that HUMANOID-1 has access to is important and is of documentary reliability. His position is important to the operational structure of the station. HUMANOID-2 is

201-168881

a very satisfactory type of agent. He displays a certain amount of initiative in voluntarily performing tasks not specifically requested by the Chief of Station through the cut-out HUMANOID. HUMANOID-2 has demonstrated the qualities of willingness, discretion, and cooperation.

(d) As to the principal agent of Project HUMANOID, the following observations are submitted, which will indicate unmistakeably the value of this project, and its contribution to the successful activities of the San Jose Station.

Evaluation of services - As the principal agent and station cut-out, HUMANOID is charged with the direction and guidance of HUMANOID-1; HUMANOID-2; HUMANOID-3; HUMANOID-4. His handling of these agents is carried out in a professional and efficient manner, and his personal comments and corrections on their reports, based on his long acquaintance with local personalities and conditions, are of considerable value. His attitude remains enthusiastic and willing.

Evaluation of information - The information produced by the agents being handled by HUMANOID is of great value to the station. In addition to his own production, this agents operations are well suited to checking on information received from other sources.

COMMENTS - Despite the fact that HUMANOID has been working under certain operational restrictions for a number of months, his value to the station continues to be of major importance. In addition to the tangible and measureable information produced by and through him, HUMANOID has proved to be the single most valuable source of background and orientation data for the Chief of Station. His knowledge of the history of Costa Rican communist activities and personalities, and his grasp of the various revolutionary movements and figures has been freely shared with the Chief of Station. These "briefing meetings" represent an intangible contribution to the over-all performance of the Station. HUMANOID is eager to expand his operations and upon the removal of present operational restrictions it is believed that he can be given further responsibilities, particularly in the recruiting of additional sub-agents. The station is presently interested in accomplishing a parallel penetration of the Communist Party of Costa Rica, in expanding routine investigative coverage and in developing additional sources on political movements. It is believed that HUMANOID can insure the success of these new ventures.

COSTA RICA

1. HUMANOID

A. Identifying data:

(a) Nationality: U.S. citizen, born 22 June 1922
(b) Education: High school and attending college in Costa Rica.
(c) Occupation: Sergeant in U.S. Air Force during World War II, and an agent of the Panama Station until early 1949
(d) Marital status: Married
(e) Time devoted to our work: Approximately 40%
(f) How contacted: By Chief of Station

B. Humanoid is a cutout for projects Hugger, Humankind 1 and 3, and Humanist-2. See attachments.

2. Production:

(a) Description of info produced: Communist penetration of labor groups and student groups.

(b) Statistics on reports received and disseminated:
July thru December 3 received 3 dissemed

(c) Headquarters evaluation of info received: B-2

3. Cost of Project: $89.05 per month. FD shows following payments

July	$34.42	October	$58.39
August	34.42	November	51.63
September	34.42	December	51.63 ?

4. Administration by headquarters:

(a) Operational clearance granted.

(b) Allotment sheet up to date.

5. General Evaluation:

Humanoid is considered an excellent agent in all respects. His value is more than commensurate with his salary.

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

/PRQ/

PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to Items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym Arthur G. VAIVADA

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?

Subject was first recruited in Panama as HYDROPATHIC in November 1948 and transferred to Costa Rica in approved HUMANOID project. Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL project, PBSUCCESS and in 1954 to AMPHODARCH project (Cuba) with which he is currently identified.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Yes To whom? Record over the past nine years shows that subject has easily been turned over to different projects and case officers.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation

Subject is motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, its remuneration and as loyal U. S. citizen.

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-958
MAY 1950

201-168881

/PRO/

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?

Checked upon recruitment in Panama in 1949 and subsequently upon transfer to other projects.

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?

Subject is controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty because of American heritage, past Army and Agency service, and a desire for a career in intelligence work.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?

Subject is cognizant of the identity of this organization.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.

Subject previously in U. S. Army and Air Force Intelligence.

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.

Subject has furnished information received from sub-agents on Communist and revolutionary activities throughout the Central American-Caribbean area. Is now P/A in Cuban project with those primary objectives. Work to date has been outstanding. Has been particularly valuable in development and recruitment of new agents.

/PRQ/

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

Only those functions (Administrative-Operational) normally exercised by P/A.

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

U. S. Army Intelligence Training and Agency covert training from 5 October through 25 November 1953. Additional covert training at Headquarters planned for April-May 1957.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

From indigenous student—youth elements, with whom he maintains contact and who in turn have entree to Cuban Communist and revolutionary circles.

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.

Subject is to receive $6,390 annually, plus allowances, with provisions for normal step increases, and promotion when justified.

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

No.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

Has native fluency in language and would at least pass as long-time resident and possibly even national of certain Central American-Caribbean countries, although has obviously foreign physical characteristics.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.?

Upper Middle Class

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers?

Believed to be normal in all respects.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.

All noted excellent.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?

Subject can send and receive Morse Code.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Previously submitted.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

From Subject personally.

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

Outstanding record led first to recommendation that subject be converted to staff status; following which it was determined that a career agent designation would be more appropriate in his case.

Case officer

SECRET

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH — ROSS L. CROZIER

Ross L. CROZIER was born on 20 June 1922 in De Kalb, Illinois and is the eldest of five children of a respectable middle-class family. His parents and his two brothers and two sisters now reside in Sterling, Illinois. Crozier received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U.S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the Army Air Corps. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-India-Burma Theatre and later in Panama. Crozier was discharged from the service in August 1945, leaving with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge, Crozier worked about three months as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Gel Corporation and then returned to the Canal Zone to marry Argentina CORDERO C., a Costa Rican girl in December 1945. He then worked about four months as a stevedore. and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone, from which he was discharged three years later in 1949 at his previous grade of Technical Sergeant.

Crozier became an Agency contract agent on 1 June 1949. He was originally scheduled to be used in Panama but was assigned to the HUMANOID Project in Costa Rica instead. While there he successfully handled a high level penetration of the Costa Rican Communist Party. In 1953 he was sent to Headquarters for training, and in 1954 he was assigned to PBSUCCESS for a brief period. In July 1954 he signed a new contract in Washington whereby he became the new principal

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

agent of Project AMPHODARCH. He is under student cover and is actually working for his BA degree at the University of Habana, for which he has approximately 1 more year of academic work to complete.

Crozier has a healthy appearance and appears to be about ? 25 instead of 32 years of age. He is athletically inclined and has been, and is at present, interested in organizing and participating in intra-mural athletics. He is happily married and the father of two children. He possesses a great deal of integrity, honesty, intelligence, and resourcefulness. His chief hobby, aside from sports, is photography. He has made quite a study of picture-taking and has developed a portrait photo technique which he has found useful in his work and as an aid to obtaining extra spending money while going to school. The Chief of Habana Mission and WHD have a strong feeling that this man will perform his duties in a superior manner and will make AMPHODARCH a valuable and worthwhile project.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION	
		RI FILE NO.	
		DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	DATE
		SOURCE CRYPTONYM / DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
ANALYST MW	DATE PROCESSED 22 July 58	DISSEMINATED IN	DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☐ CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	☐ TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/CA FOLDER ON THE SUBJ

OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER CI 25507

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-168881

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867. 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

E-PUNCH

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	04 APR 1960	ACTION ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM RID/20	ROOM NO. 1C14L	TELEPHONE 8514

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☐ NON-SENSITIVE

201 NO. 1. 168881

SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): CROZIER, ROSS LESTER

SEX 3. ☒ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
☒ YES ☐ NO	21 DC 22	USA	ILLINOIS	1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.
050	C50		

COMMENTS: CIT: USA

CS COPY

201- 168881

PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO

RESTRICTED FILE ☐ YES ☐ NO

SIGNATURE

FORM NO. 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 OCT 58

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

WH/3[illegible]

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

RE-PUNCH

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: [illegible]

FROM: WH/3M

ACTION: ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

ROOM NO.: [illegible]

TELEPHONE: [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE ☐
NONSENSITIVE ☑

201 NO. [illegible] 1.

SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) ROZIER (First) [illegible] (Middle) (Title)

SEX 3. [✓ M] F

TYPE NAME 2. NAME VARIANT (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4. YES NO

BIRTH DATE 5. D M Y

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6. USA

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7. ILLINOIS

OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM [illegible] HOLDER [illegible]
[illegible] (F. ROZIER)

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. MEX

ACTION DESK 11. WH/3M

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12. CI

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS:

CIT: USA

201-32723
Closed 3 May 57

VERIFIED

CS COPY PUNCHED

201-

PERMANENT CHARGE YES NO

RESTRICTED FILE YES NO

SIGNATURE

Form No. 831 1 Oct. 56 Use previous editions.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 3 May 1957	ACTION ☒ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM RI/CO Amelia Superfisky	ROOM NO. 2301 L	TELEPHONE 3127

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE ☒ NONSENSITIVE	201 NO. 1. 168881	SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) CROZIER	(First) Ross	(Middle) L.	(Title)	SEX 3. ☐ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
☐ YES ☐ NO	D [illegible] M [illegible] Y 22	USA	Illinois	1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION	OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM Arthur G. VAIVADA

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11. WH/III/Cuba	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS: WH/3 C4

201- 168881

PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO	RESTRICTED FILE ☒ YES ☐ NO	SIGNATURE Amelia Superfisky

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

PUNCHED

(38)

OZIER, Ross L.

201- 16888

SECRET

Vol. I of V

OFFICIAL CS FILE

(Undated - Dec. 51)

FORM 3-68 1505B

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

3 Feb 75
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on CROZIER (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ Should be closed. (If this category applies, affix Records Officer stamp.)

☐ Unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7.
Explanation:______________________

☐ Witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ Potential witting collaborator; date opened:______________________
OI Code A2.

☐ Former witting collaborator (relationship terminated).
OI Code A3.

☐ Potential witting collaborator never contacted. OI Code A4.

☐ Counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☒ All others. OI Code A6.

Signed Roy Gilson (name) Ops Offcr (title) LA/M/FI (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed NR (initials) 12 Feb 75 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file. 201- 168881

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061475

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

32-2 RW SB

SIGNAL CENTER USE

CONF	CO	ACP	TOO	TPE	BRO	OCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	m	1	2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	302024Z	DIRECTOR	650063

CONF: EA/CO-4 INFO: FILE IAW EA8 CA-10, DP/INT, TEG6-4 C/OP-2

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 13

TO: LIMA, QUITO, GUAYAQUIL, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES, MEXICO CITY

INFO PANTECH, DIRTECH, BANGTECH, TOKYTECH. Y

TAPPER/CO STARROYO TECHS Y

REF: DIRECTOR 618825 (BEING RELAYED MEXICO CITY) |*| Y

1. IN REFINEMENT OF REF REQUIREMENT QUERY WHETHER ADDRESSEES HAVE AN ASSET WHO IS ETHNIC CHINESE WITH LATIN AMERICA ORDINARY PASSPORT WHO COULD APPLY FOR A PRC TOURIST VISA. IF YES, PLEASE HAVE ASSET CONTACT PRC EMBASSY AND ASK IF THEY WOULD ISSUE TOURIST VISA AND HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE BEFORE ASSET COULD OBTAIN VISA. Y

2. WE ARE TRYING TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRC EMBASSY WILL ISSUE VISA FOR TOURIST PURPOSES TO SINGLETON TRAVELERS OF ETHNIC CHINESE ORIGIN WHO ARE NATIVE OR NATURALIZED LA CITIZENS WHO HAVE NO RELATIVES IN CHINA. Y

3. IF PER ABOVE AN APPROPRIATE ASSET CAN BE IDENTIFIED, WE B WOULD CONSIDER REQUESTING STATION CONCERNED TO LAUNCH HIM ON A SIMPLE OPS SUPPORT MISSION TO PRC: I.E., TO COLLECT INFO ON PRC DOCUMENTATION CONTROL BASED ON SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ASSET BEFORE LAUNCH. Y

DATE: 29 JANUARY 75
ORIG: JACK KOJIMOTO/YET
UNIT: CH/OCEA
EXT: 1730

	Init.
C/.../1	
DC/.../1	
C/...	
WH/C/...	
WH/1/...	

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

CL BY: 039306

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

COI	ACP	TOD	TPS	ARD	OCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
0	0	0	0	0	0	2		2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

DIRECTOR

650063

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

4. PLEASE ADVISE BY 14 FEBRUARY. E2, IMPDET.H

*REQUEST ADDRESSEE STATIONS NOTIFY HQS IN ADVANCE OF ANY UPCOMING TRIPS TO THE PRC BY ITS OVERSEAS CHINESE ASSETS.

COORD: OTS/AB - THOMAS KLINE (DRAFT)
AC/LA/M - R. U. STONE (DRAFT)
DC/LA/NW - J. HENNESSY (DRAFT)
(FOR) C/LA/SB - P. KITTREDGE (DRAFT)
DCEA/CH

LA/TRS -

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CHIEF, LA

CEA

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY:

SENT FOR MICROFILMING

Date 18 Dec 70

Corrective Microfilming

TRSA 347 20 May 49 201-162221

SENT TO RID/AN

22 Dec 70

TZPW 411	8 Jan 49	201-168881
TRSW 225	27 Dec 48	" "
TRSA 925	11 May 51	" "
TRSW 643	28 May 51	" "
TRSA 974	10 July 51	" "
TZPA 365/01	4 Nov 48	" "

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

TPS-W-698

DEC 7 1951

Chief of Station, San Jose

Acting Chief, WH

HUMANOID

REFS: a. TPS-A-1034
b. TPS-W-685

1. Headquarters files have just been admirably augmented through the receipt of reference a., which to say the least, sheds considerable, much-needed light on this operation. This was a most welcome clarification of many of our questions concerning HUMANOID.

2. Upon his return to Headquarters, Dennis E. COPELAND reported your desire to have HUMANOID sign a new contract. It is suggested in this regard that you furnish as soon as possible any provisions which you wish to recommend for inclusion in the contract. Such recommendations will of course be in conformity with Sec. [illegible] of the Regulations governing contract agents, not career agents. It would be most advantageous to submit such a contract for consideration simultaneously with a request for renewal of the operation at the end of February 1952.

3. Relative to your question in paragraph 2 of reference a., at the present time, TPS-W-685 is the current approved version of the extent of HUMANOID's operational activities. It is firmly believed that these restrictions will be removed when, in February 1952, this operation will be considered for renewal by the Staff which imposed the curtailment. It is urged that in your quarterly review for the period ending 31 December 1951 you give Headquarters the benefit of another specific detailed report. At that time, we will also submit a request for increased salary for HUMANOID.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

By J. C. Bonnet

ACWH

R. W. RASTETTER

JCB:cb
5 December 1951

7 Dec. 51
201-168881

SECRET

14-00000

VIA: Air (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECURITY INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-1084

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 19 November 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— HUMANOID Project

Ref: TRSW-685, TRSA-1056, WASH 14671

CS copy filed in 18-6-3-77

1. TRSW-685, which advises that the expiration date of this project has been determined to be 29 February 1952, was received several days after the forwarding of TRSA-1056, which recommended that subject be considered for career agent status. Although TRSA-1056 furnished certain of the data requested by headquarters, the following additional information, queries and comments are set forth with a view to facilitating a final evaluation of the project.

2. Pursuant to the approval contained in TRSW-655, dated June 29, 1951, HUMANOID has been and is currently acting as cutout for HUMANIST-2, as well as for HUMANKIND-1 and HUMANKIND-3. It is therefore not clear whether paragraph 2.b. of TRSA-685 is to be interpreted as a new restriction on his activities which is to be placed into effect at this time. In other words, is headquarters' approval of the suggestions contained in TRSA-950 now withdrawn?

3. As discussed in TRSA-950, assistance was extended HUMANOID in setting up a photography and photocopy shop on the fringe of the downtown area. Funds formerly used for rental of a safehouse were applied instead as rental for his photo shop, with the purpose of providing a safe meeting place between HUMANOID and HUMANIST-2 and to provide a more accessible spot for the processing of HUMANKIND material. Early in July 1951, after two or three weeks experience with photostating HUMANKIND material at the studio demonstrated the unsuitability of the arrangement, HUMANOID resumed his photostatic work in his own home. The studio has continued to serve as a meeting place for HUMANIST-2. The following considerations entered into the decision to discontinue processing HUMANKIND-1 and 3 material at the photo studio: 1) The conspicuous nature of the equipment in a small shop; 2) the security risks caused by the presence in the studio of HUMANOID's local employee; and 3) the lack of any secure storage space for compromising material

201-168881

4. Since the dispatch of TRSA-1056, HUMANOID has been notified by his photographic assistant that the latter is resigning

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
COPY

TRSA 1084
DATE 19 NOV 51
~~18-6-3-77~~

to seek more remunerative employment at the end of this month. HUMANOID states that he is unable to devote sufficient time to the business to keep it going without an assistant and that it would be quite difficult to locate a competent workman at the salary level he can afford to pay. The above facts, plus unfavorable findings of a recent financial analysis of his business, have convinced HUMANOID to close the photograph shop at the end of November.

5. In connection with paragraph 2.d. of TRSW-685, which states that HUMANOID must discontinue using his home to reproduce the material obtained from HUMANKIND-1 and HUMANKIND-3, the following brief history of safehouse experience at this station is set forth. A review of the files and discussion with HUMANOID reveals that seven safehouses have been utilized to date:

a. An office room in the Panana Company building in San José from June, 1959, to November, 1949, used to process HUMANKIND material. Abandoned when it was learned the room was called the "FBI office upstairs" by other residents of the building.

b. An apartment in Bella Vista from November, 1949, to January, 1950, used to process HUMANKIND material. Abandoned because landlord lived next door and used common entrance.

c. One-half of a house in San Pedro, which had private entrance. Abandoned because the notorious Frank MARSHALL was neighbor. MARSHALL is enemy of the Communist Party and knew HUMANIST-2 by sight.

d. An apartment in Parque Morazán. After two months this was abandoned as neighbors began making inquiries concerning infrequency of visits to the house.

e. Apartment in Barrio Luján, for four months. This was abandoned as many Party members lived nearby and knew HUMANIST-2 by sight.

f. A house near the Sabana airport for seven months, used to process HUMANKIND material. Frequent vacancy of the premises caused speculation by neighbors and landlord.

g. Photographic studio as discussed above. In addition to stated reasons for closing above safehouses, two house breakings were suffered, and it was frequently feared that the reproduction equipment might be stolen when it became apparent that persons were seldom in the houses.

6. In view of headquarters intention to terminate this project, it is not deemed advisable at this time to install HUMANOID in a new safehouse to process HUMANKIND material. Accordingly, headquarters advice is requested as to whether HUMANOID may continue using his house for the next few months, or whether this operation should be suspended immediately, inasmuch as no suitable alternate cutout has been located to date.

7. In reply to your request for comment on the salary increase for HUMANOID recommended by the former Chief of Station, please be advised that the writer concurs in the recommendation. As indicated in TRSA-1056 and TRSA-999, this agent has been living on a very close financial margin and has been aware of the recommended raise for some months. It is conceivable that he has taken the raise possibility into consideration in his personal financial arrangements. In any event, should headquarters decide to terminate subject, it is recommended that several months salary be authorized as a termination bonus in order that there will be no likelihood of security considerations arising from subject's possibly over-extended financial position. This bonus payment is believed justified by subject's long tenure of service.

8. With regard to paragraph 3 of TRSW-685, there have been no changes in subject's cover and current modes of contact and communication from those set out in TRSA-959. HUMANIST-2 makes a weekly door-slot drop at night at the photographic studio, and a live meeting takes place at the studio approximately three nights a month, with safety-danger signals being utilized. In addition, HUMANOID meets once or so a month with HUGGER, either at her home or at the studio. HUMANKIND contacts remain the same. My contacts with HUMANOID have taken place at his home, in a park, in a local pensión, at my home, and in coffee bars on a staggered schedule of about once a week.

9. With reference to WASH 14671, please be advised that absolutely no commitments have been made to subject, and, on the contrary, hints have been dropped to him of a possible curtailment of funds which might require discontinuing certain operations here. No difficulty is anticipated in terminating subject upon receipt of final instructions from headquarters.

10. With further reference to WASH 14671, your attention is respectfully invited to the following headquarters files which reflect opinions and evaluations of subject by other staff personnel:

TZPA-365 Part II	"Subject's superiors regard this man as highly dependable."
TZPA-365 Part I	"Subject's immediate superior is Lt. Col. Wm. R. FORBES, Director of Intelligence, CAIRC, who recommends subject highly."

TRSA-403	"Subject is considered to be extremely reliable and intelligent, which, combined with his past experience, qualify him for a wide range of assignments."
TRSA-588	"...services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been excellent from both an information and security viewpoint."
TRSA-646	"...his integrity, discretion, and industry cannot be too highly commended, and we feel that he is eminently suited for staff or cover employment in any capacity deemed commensurate with his intellectual and other abilities."
TRSA-860	"...the services of this agent are extremely valuable to this station."
TRSA-999	"...the services of this agent continue to be extremely valuable..... In view of his importance to this station, his ability and his willingness to devote time to the work when needed, it is recommended that he be considered for a raise in pay..."
TRSA-641	"...his experience and ability is such that he could probably be of use to the organization anywhere in Latin America."

11. The above file history, plus approximately three months observation and direction of HUMANOID served as the basis for my recommendation of career agent status.

12. At the risk of laboring the point, and solely on the basis of information available here, it appears that HUMANOID has provided valuable service in the past, that he is currently an important factor in the operational structure of this station, and that he possesses certain potential for future use by the organization. In this connection, it is noted that headquarters inquired some time ago (TRSW-641) whether subject would be interested in working for the organization in another country. Although it is realized your interest in this possibility may no longer exist, for your information HUMANOID has stated that he would go to any other Latin American country, in any capacity, on short notice.

13. The instant dispatch is respectfully submitted for your information and in response to your queries. It is to be emphasized that headquarters desires with regard to modifying or terminating this project will be followed implicitly.

SECRET

201-168881

James K. Russo

~~16-6-3-71~~

Form No. 35-6
(Dec. 1947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
"SECURITY INFORMATION"

PAGE No.

To:	SAN JOSE	ROUTINE
From:	POLICY COORDINATION/ SPECIAL OPERATIONS	8 NOV 51
Confirmation:	WHD (1-2)	OUT 87290
Information:	IR (3-4), AD/SO (5), OPS (6), PLANS (7), S/C (8-9-10), DDP (11)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (I) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 14671

TO: SANJFG CITE: WASHFG

RE: TRSA-1056

MAKE NO COMMITMENTS RE FUTURE STATUS SUBJECT.AT PRESENT HAVE NO PLANS CONTACT HIM HERE.HQS FILES DO NOT REFLECT BASIS YOUR ENTHUSIASM SUBJECT'S USEFULNESS THIS AGENCY. HQS FAVORS CONTINUING PRESENT STATUS.

201-168881

V.L.GRESHAM
RELEASING OFFICER

JCB
ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

R.W.RASTETER
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 2351Z 8 NOV 51

SECRET

COPY No.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2 November 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. RASTETTER AND MR. BONNET

FROM: Paul P. Paxton

SUBJECT: HUMANOID; Career Status

1. I do not feel that this man's position in the political and social life in Costa Rica lends itself to our need for a career agent in that area. His financial position negates his accessibility to high-level information, and our requirements for Costa Rica should not be satisfied through outright subsidization of an agent in order to place him in a position of influence. His wife's knowledge of his work for us is lamentable and her Costa Rican background with substantial local political ties should be sufficient reason to belay any further consideration on our part for increasing his knowledge of our operations. Admittedly, he has performed a satisfactory service for the San Jose station, but his efforts are not so vital that his termination, in the event he decides to sever connections with us because of his failure to achieve more permanent status, would be a permanent blow to our effectiveness there. With respect to his knowledge of future possibilities with us, we cannot be held responsible for unauthorized commitments that may have been made by the previous Chief of Station.

2. The current status of HUMANOID should be established in line with TRS - 685.

WH/PPP/ie
2 November 1951

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-1056

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 22 October 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Humanoid

Ref: Field Memo 218

1. Serious consideration has been given to the suitability of Humanoid for career agent status, and in this connection, it is to be noted subject is partially aware of the possibilities of career agent status by virtue of a discussion with the former Chief of Station.

2. It appears that Humanoid fills the requirements set out in reference memorandum, as follows:

a. Humanoid.

b. His existing cover is well established and believed to be durable. He has been attending the local university for over two years; he built and owns his own home in Costa Rica; he is married to a Costa Rican and has two children born here; and he has a going business in the form of a photographic shop which provides an excuse for additional income.

c. SOI objectives assigned to Humanoid include supervised direction of Communist Party penetration (Humanist-2); supervised direction of Postal Intercept Project (Humankind); direct provision of information emanating from local university and intellectual circles of which subject is a member. Also, subject formerly directed attempted penetration of the Communist Party women's "front" group (Hugger).

d. It has been noted that subject's efficiency and productivity have been hampered by financial considerations in the past. He has had unusually heavy medical bills, and the rising cost of living in Costa Rica has presented economic problems in view of his modest income. It is felt that subject has valuable potential for expanding his operations under the status of career agent. With the removal or partial removal of economic pressure, subject would be able to devote additional time to the exploitation of numerous personal contacts in labor, government, religious, and political circles. He is

201-168881

201-168881

74

COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

unusually adept at investigative technique, has the ability to balance risks involved against value of information to be obtained, and is thoroughly familiar with the geography and political trends in Costa Rica. To date, subject has confined his activities mostly to cutout and direction; however, it is believed that with additional freedom he could successfully engage in spotting, recruitment, general investigation, and independent reporting.

e. Subject has discussed his desire to send his wife and two children to his family in the United States late in October for a 60-day visit. He would then like to travel to the United States himself in late December for a brief visit with his parents in Illinois. This would be his first visit home in several years and would provide an excellent opportunity and cover for headquarters contact, either in Illinois or Washington, at which time formalities and necessary training could be accomplished. (NOTE: This planned trip of subject may temporarily interrupt contact with Humanist-2 and Humankind, as a suitable interim cutout has not yet been developed; but experience has shown that production from both sources practically dies out over the Christmas and New Year holidays in this country.

3. In connection with Paragraph e. above, it is to be noted that the travel plans of subject's wife have been complicated by advice from the Embassy Consular Section that the Immigration authorities at the port of entry into the United States may demand a $500.00 U.S. bond in substantiation of her intent to return to Costa Rica after the 60 days. This station is therefore considering advancing subject U.S. $500.00 in order to enable him to present the bond if it is demanded and to obviate the possibility of his spending several hundred dollars in travel money for his wife to a port of entry and return to Costa Rica if entry were denied. This money would not be used by subject for any other purpose and would be returned to station funds after successful entry of his wife into the United States.

4. In view of the fact that this Station has no basis for comparison with regard to possible salary figures which might be offered subject if career agent status is approved, no recommendation in this regard is being made. However, it is pointed out that subject has worked for the organization for almost four years, that his efficiency has been excellent, his grasp of intelligence requirements above average, his potential attractive, and that his present position in the operational structure of this Station is of major importance.

5. It is requested that this Station be advised if you are interested in considering subject for career agent status. If so, please advise whether contact will be had with subject while

he is in the United States. Also, will the government reimburse subject for travel expenditures for his trip. In view of the relatively short time remaining before his trip, it is requested that I be advised as soon as possible of pertinent details, such as length of time required for training, etc., in order that Humanoid may be briefed and in order that interim operational arrangements may be worked out.

6. It would be appreciated if a reply to the recommended salary increase of subject could be made available. (See TRSA-999 of July 1 and TRSA-1037 dated September 28, 1951.)

James K. Russo

18-6-3-74

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-1037

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 28 September 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Humanoid Project

1. In connection with a re-examination of the security factors of this Project, a pre-arranged visit to the home of Humanoid was made by the writer. As previously reported, subject has constructed a secret dark room under the floor of his house and processes the production from the Humankind Project in this work room. It is therefore necessary that certain compromising material is retained overnight by Humanoid, and, at present, this material is kept in a wooden desk with a cheap lock. Although Humanoid's personal security appears good at this time, the possibility of an unexpected house search or a pure case of housebreaking with theft as a motive cannot be overlooked, with resultant serious security considerations.

2. It is therefore requested that headquarters consider furnishing a small wall safe with a combination lock for installation in the above-mentioned dark room. It would be possible to sink the safe into the concrete wall, and even if complete concealment were not possible, the safety of the material would be greatly enhanced. Suitable safes are not available locally, but it is known that Remington Rand markets a small strong box with a combination lock (price about $20.00) which would be ideal.

3. I would appreciate receiving your opinion in this matter inasmuch as other measures must be taken in the event a safe cannot be made available.

4. Inasmuch as Humanoid is aware of the proposed salary raise recommended by the former Chief of Station in the Quarterly Report dated August 17, 1951, information as to the status of this recommendation is requested.

JKR
James K. Russo

COPY

201-168881

201-168881

~~[illegible] 73~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SPATCH NO.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TRSA-935

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 31 July 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations

SPECIFIC— Humanoid

Ref: Memorandum given writer by Zachary T. Cady in Panama

1. Humanoid advised that his mother-in-law, Sra. Dora Calderon de CORDERO, has no relationship with the family of former President Rafael Angel CALDERON Guardia. Humanoid advised that his mother-in-law was friendly with the CALDERON family years ago, but has had no contact with any of the family or the Calderonista Party since the revolution. This woman immigrated to Costa Rica as Dora INIKEN from Europe, and as it is customary for immigrants and illegitimate children to take upon themselves the name of the President, Dora INIKEN changed her name to CALDERON. Humanoid stated that she has no political connections whatsoever and is sympathetic to whatever administration is in power at the time. The information in the referenced memorandum was originally written by Humanoid three years ago and has no application to the present.

2. Regarding Humanoid's associates, Sr. and Sra. Miguel CORRALES, Humanoid stated that he has not seen CORRALES for over a year since CORRALES is in Guanacaste Province. It is true that CORRALES was a Figuerista during the revolution, but he is no longer sympathetic with FIGUERES.

3. Humanoid's intelligence activities are known to his wife, who has been of assistance to him in said activities on various occasions. However, Humanoid stated that his mother-in-law has no knowledge of these activities.

ETRoddy
Eugene T. Roddy

IR COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

31 July 51

201-168881 ✓

18-6-3-70

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET

16 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. THARP:

SUBJECT: a. HUMANOID
b. Technical Surveillance in Costa Rica

HUMANOID is an American agent used as a cut-out in several San Jose operations. He was employed in the technical surveillance on the home of Juan Bosch, as one of the two monitors. He also handles the photography incident to the HUMANKIND project, which work he performs in his own quarters. (This may now be performed away from his home, but until very recently it was done at home.)

HUMANOID's PHS shows the following points which Dave Wright may be able to clarify:

(see TZP-A-365, Part I)

1. His wife is related, through her mother, to the family of CALDERON. This might be a connection with the "Calederonistas" who are alleged to be the group of Costa Ricans responsible for mysterious bombings early this year.

2. Subject's mother-in-law, who resides with him, is described as follows: "strongly inclined to Sr. Calderon GUARDIA and Leo CORTES during their respective regimes in Costa Rica, and she is now (Oct 1948) enthusiastic about the Junta Government of Jose FIGUERES. However, she takes no active part in politics."

3. Other friends and associates of his wife are: Sr. and Sra. Miguel Corrales (San Juan Tibas Costa Rica). Miguel Corrales was a radio operator and intelligence operative for Jose FIGUERES during the Costa Rican Civil War in the spring of 1948.

Jose FIGUERES and Juan BOSCH were the target personalities of the technical surveillance. FIGUERES made the statement that "one of his boys told him all about the surveillance."

From the above circumstances, it appears possible that HUMANOID's intelligence activities are probably known to either his wife, his mother-in-law, or his friend, CORRALES, and that one of the three could have been the source through which the surveillance was blown. Would you discuss this informally with Dave Wright, please?

J. C. BONNET

SECRET

201-168851

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-972

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 9 July 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

KAPOK

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations

SPECIFIC— Project Humanoid

Ref: TRSA-925

Enclosed herewith is Part II - Operational Information - of the Personal Record Questionnaire for Project Humanoid.

Eugene T. Roddy

Encl: 1 in dupl

DESENSITIZED 7
per CSN 43-28

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28 A

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

TRS /PRQ/ 26

Part II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to Items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/13.

36. Cryptonym Humanoid

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?

Subject was first recruited in Panama as Hydropathic in November 1948 and transferred to San José as approved Humanoid project, July 1949.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? To whom?

Subject could be turned over quickly to any approved cutout, though at present he is himself acting as a cutout between Chief of Station and subagents.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation

Subject motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, and its remuneration.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

SECRET

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?

Recruited and checked in Panama (see TZPA-365).

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?

Subject can be controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty due to American heritage, past U.S. Army service, and desire for a career in this work--all are controlling factors, as well as his receipt of G.I. school benefits.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?

Subject is cognizant of identity of this organization.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.

Subject previously in U.S. Army Intelligence (see Part I, PRQ 26, No. 25)

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.

Subject furnishes only information received as a cutout from subagents, Communist Party activities and Caribbean revolutionary matters.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

None

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

U.S. Army Intelligence training.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

Subject acts as cutout for Humanist-2, Humankind-1, Humankind-3 and Hugger.

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.

Subject receives $,000 per month (approved TRSW-627)

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

No.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

No.

DESENSITIZED

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.? Upper middle class.

TRS/PRQ/ 26

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers?

Social drinker, very moderately. No gambling or mistresses.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.

All noted excellent.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?

Subject knows Morse code and can send and receive 16 words per minute at present, which rate can be quickly increased.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Photos forwarded with Part I. Handwriting and fingerprints being pouched separately.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

Subject submitted information personally.

DESENSITIZED
per CSI 43-26

TRS/PRQ/ 26

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

None.

Case officer

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-23

SECRET

TRSA-999

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica   PERIOD: 31 March-1 July 1951.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: No change.

SALARY: Subject was raised from 750 colones per month to 1,000 colones per month, effective 1 March 1951.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: Services of this agent continue to be extremely valuable as the principal cutout for three subagents. Subject also processes the information received, adding to it his own comments drawn from long personal acquaintance with local conditions. Subject maintains a good working relationship with subagents necessary for their continued trusted and unworried cooperation.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION: The information procured by subject is valuable though very little is his own, but rather that of his subagents.

OTHER FACTORS: Reference is made to TRSA950 and TRSW-655 wherein subject's operations, as planned by this station and approved by headquarters, were set out. These operations have continued as outlined without incident or danger to the security of this agent or this station.

COMMENTS: Subject is devoting increasingly more time to the coverage of mail intercepts, their photostating, and enlarging coverage of same. The intelligence consciousness as well as the trust he has built up in Humanist-2 in reporting on top level Communist activities has taken time and has produced good results in effective coverage. In view of his importance to this station, his ability and his willingness to devote time to the work when needed, it is recommended that subject be considered for a raise in pay from 1,000 colones to 1,500. Subject is living frugally on his present salary and his G.I. subsistance. His wife has recently had another child which was followed by complications necessitating considerable hospital-

SECRET

July 51
201-168881

SECRET

TRSA-999

COMMENTS: (Con'd)

ization. This raise is recommended since it will enable subject to devote a sufficient amount of time to this work without being harried over expenses which force him to look for additional outside work. At the present exchange rate $1,500 amounts to $200 per month.

SECRET

AIR

TRC-A- 605

JUN 29 1951

Chief of Station, San Jose

Chief, Foreign Division T

Operational
[illegible] - [illegible]

REF: TRC-A-750, TRC-W-613

1. A careful study has been made by the interested offices in headquarters of the referenced documents and other correspondence pertaining to the recent exposure of the technical surveillance. The course of action suggested and discussed by you under paragraph 2 of TRC-A-750 is concurred in by headquarters.

2. The recommendations contained in TRC-W-613, under paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 are hereby withdrawn.

3. Your headquarters has a continuing interest in this entire matter and would be pleased to receive any information as it is developed which would affect either adversely or otherwise the implementation of your suggested plan.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.
By T. J. Barrett

TJB:jr

SECRET

STC

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

201-168881

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-950

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 7 June 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

RE: KAPOK
DESENSITIZED

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations

SPECIFIC— Humanoid - Humanist

Ref: TRSW-643

1. Inquiry made of Humanist regarding the statements he made before the police during his interrogation reflects that he reportedly refused to testify before the police but made his deposition before the Procurador as to his part in the technical installation which implicated only the writer, and this only after he was told that Roddy had been identified. Humanist's testimony, as well as the line of questioning to which he was submitted, revealed the authorities' concern and their efforts to ascertain whether he had been engaged in or knew of any other similar installations on any other people. This he denied and maintained that the only installation was on Juan BOSCH. Humanist claims he made no mention of Humanoid, and he believes the police know nothing about him.

2. Humanist's claims also tally with the account of his confession as given writer by Manuel VENTURA, Presidential aide. Humanoid has been on the alert and has noted nothing of a suspicious nature which would indicate his activities being under observation or investigation. This matter of suspending his operations, as suggested by headquarters, was discussed by writer with Elmo R. Langtry during his recent visit in San José and the following suggestions are made for headquarters' consideration:

a. Humanoid at the present time is acting as cutout and chief agent for Humanist-2, Humankind-1, and Humankind-3. There is no other agent at the present time to whom these contacts can be given. It is believed that if these subagents are allowed a 6-months vacation, they will become practically worthless when picked up again and have to work for the money they have been receiving, aside from losing interim information and developments.

b. In an effort to establish a more secure, as well as a commercial, cover for Humanoid, this office has acceded to Humanoid's desire to set up a photography and photocopy shop in the downtown area, and has encouraged him in it by allowing funds paid for rental of a safehouse to be applied instead as rental for his photo shop. This provides Humanoid with a good cover in

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED 7
per CSN 43-26

KAPOK
DESENSITIZED

a business which he is enthusiastic about and is a more natural place for Humanist-2 to make unobserved contacts. It also supplies Humanoid with a more accessible spot and efficient means to photostat mail intercepts and return them to the post office in time instead of commuting back and forth from his home in the suburbs of San José.

c. Therefore, it is suggested that Humanoid's semi-weekly contacts with Humanist-2, instead of being cancelled, be changed to a weekly letterdrop, and a live contact once a month to take care of salary payments and briefing. This letterdrop can be effected by Humanist-2 passing by the photo shop at night and dropping his messages through the slot in the door usually used for after-hours delivery of films to be developed. The film drop will be into a padlocked box, accessible only to Humanoid.

d. Regarding Humanoid's contacts with Humankind-1 and Humankind-3, these are conducted in a thoroughly safe manner. Mail extracted from postal channels by them is deposited in an envelope and placed in a post office box. It is checked daily by Humanoid, and if anything is there, it is removed, photostated, and returned by him the same day. If anyone is noticed hanging around the post office boxes, Humanoid does not go near the box and returns later when the way is clear.

e. Another factor has arisen since the last dispatch which has made this post office operation more secure in that the Director of the Post Office is now beholden to Humanoid. In a recent legal squabble noted in the press which was raised by a local Communist complaining about the government confiscating his mail from abroad, the government desired to prove that this mail was Communist propaganda which they had a right to confiscate, and the President therefore requested the Director of the Post Office to furnish samples to prove this point. With this "heat" on him, the Director made a frantic appeal to Humanoid, who was able to procure these samples for him, which satisfied the President, and for which the Director was truly grateful. Therefore, no trouble is expected from this intercept operation as long as the present personnel are being used, and ample warning will be given Humanoid in advance of any change in the present attitude.

3. Since it is believed that there is more to be lost than gained by dropping contact with these agents, the above modifications of these contacts are respectfully submitted for headquarters' consideration and decision.

Eugene T. Roddy

Eugene T. Roddy

SECRET

Chief, STB

21 May 1951

Chief, FDT

HUMANOID Project

1. In accordance with conversations held between Chief, STC and FDT and with Mr. Johnston of your office, the following modifications and additional data concerning this project are set forth.

2. On 8 March 1951 a technical surveillance was installed on the residence of Juan BOSCH, a Caribbean revolutionary leader, utilizing the services of a telephone company employee, Marcos Aurelius Salazar, through HUMANIST. HUMANOID and HUMANIST carried on the monitoring in shifts, but at separated intervals. Shortly thereafter, it was noticed that some natives living nearby were unduly interested in the activities of the monitoring house, and, at the same time, mysterious bomb explosions were occurring in San Jose. HUMANIST learned that the police had received a report that unknown persons were spying on the airfield, which adjoined the monitoring post, and perhaps were manufacturing the bombs. The surveillance was discontinued and the equipment moved on 20 March.

3. It was deemed necessary to brief Salazar on a possible investigation and provide him with a suitable cover story. It is believed that Salazar became frightened, went to the police, and implicated HUMANIST, who was subsequently arrested. After three days, HUMANIST confessed and implicated the chief of station.

4. The chief of station, through his strong personal connections with the Vice President and other high officials, was able to convince the President this activity was not detrimental to the interests of Costa Rica and the whole affair was quashed. HUMANIST was released from jail and the chief of station continues to enjoy cordial and amicable relations with the Costa Rican officials concerned.

5. It is planned that the chief of station will be transferred in the near future, at which time HUMANIST will be terminated on the pretext that all operations are being discontinued. The only other current operation which HUMANIST knows anything about is HUMANIST-2, whom he was instrumental in recruiting in July 1949. He has had nothing to do with HUMANIST-2 since then and has never known who handles him or even if he is in contact with our station at the present time. It is believed that HUMANOID's true identity is unknown to him, and so far as he knows, HUMANOID was only helping on the one job, the technical surveillance.

SECRET

201-161881

SECRET

6. Although no evidence has been received from any source which would indicate HUMANOID has been compromised, the chief of station has been instructed, as a precautionary measure, to place HUMANOID on an inactive status for approximately six months. HUMANOID's salary will continue during this period, which is designed to permit further study and observation of all ramifications of this compromise as well as additional strengthening of HUMANOID's local cover. HUMANOID's responsibilities with regard to HUGGER, [illegible]-2, and [illegible] will be transferred to another American cutout (possibly HUMBUG) or temporarily suspended, at the discretion of the station chief.

7. For discussion with the Chief, SPC and Mr. Johnston, it is recommended that the HUMANOID project be approved as attached hereto, with the understanding that its reactivation will be dependent upon favorable results of the six-month period of observation.

WM. L. [illegible], JR.

SECRET

STC/OCO

SECRET

23 February 1951

Chief, FDT

HUMANOID

The following answers are keyed to your questionnaire dated 5 February 1951 concerning HUMANOID:

a. Subject is an active agent.

b. He is used substantially the same as when clearance was issued.

c. Subject has not been used in connection with projects other than originally contemplated.

d. All information on subject's personal and operational security has been submitted.

e. The operation has been considered excellent. The only test of HUMANOID's security has been the test of evaluating his information, and the evaluation of his reliability by the Chief of Station.

f. There have been no operational or other changes in the status of this agent which have affected our evalation of this agent.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

SECRET

201-168871

TRSA-860

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 1 October-31 December 1950.
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:	No Change.
SALARY:	$750 per month.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES:	Services of this agent are extremely valuable to this station. Aside from cutout services in contacting subagents, he has been used on other miscellaneous investigations suitable to his capacity and has given freely of his time and effort
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:	The information furnished continues to be of great value to this station.
OTHER FACTORS:	No change.
COMMENTS:	As previously reported subject's plans to transfer to Panama have changed, and he is staying in Costa Rica to finish his schooling. Due to subject's services and the time he devotes in performing them, as well as plans at this station for making greater demands on his time, it is planned to recommend that subject's salary be increased from $750 to $1,000 per month.

23 Feb. 51

201-168881

SECRET

CHIEF, STAFF "B" 19 February 1951

CHIEF, FDT

Project Outline---HUMANOID

1. To complete the attached field project outline, the following biographical information is submitted as required by paragraph 4:

> HUMANOID was born in 1922 in DeKalb, Illinois, USA, where he attended high school from which he graduated in 1940. Subject joined the United States Air Force in which he had five years' experience in general Air Force intelligence work. Subject is presently living in San Jose, Costa Rica, where he has been attending school.

2. This project dates from June 1949 in Costa Rica but subject was an agent of our Panama station for about six months prior to his departure for Costa Rica.

3. Subject's reliability is considered excellent and his operational services are also considered excellent. The value of this project, including the sub-agents, is considered to be of great value to our Costa Rican mission.

4. HUMANOID, in addition to being a principal agent, is employed as a cut-out for HUMANIST-2, HUGGER, and HUMANKIND. Attached are field project outlines for HUMANIST-2 and HUMANKIND, which includes HUMANKIND-1 and -3. Technically, HUMANIST-2, HUMANKIND-1 and -3 are sub-agents and therefore not required to have field project outlines submitted. The original development, however, of these agents was on an individual project basis, and the cut-out HUMANOID was later developed.

5. In lieu of a field project outline for HUGGER, the following is submitted:

> HUGGER is a Costa Rican by birth. She is private secretary in the main office of the United Fruit Company in San Jose, and is a secret agent of Guardia Civil of Costa Rica.
>
> HUGGER has the objective and task of developing contacts among Vanguardia Popular members, particularly in the women's front.
>
> While HUGGER's production is not great, it is valuable. Her pay is approximately $11.00 a month.

SECRET

201-168871

6. Since the Chief of Station has only direct contact with HUMANOID and not with the sub-agents, the project is considered as one project, the HUMANOID Project. For accounting purposes, however, the sub-agents are being handled as individual agents although under the control of the cut-out HUMANOID.

7. HUMANOID's salary if $28.00 a month and operating expenses are about $66.00 a month.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

Rev

SECRET

TO: Chief, FDT

5 February 1951

FROM: STC/CCO JC Bonnet

SUBJECT: HUMANOID

1. STC records reflect that subject was approved for operational use under Operational Clearance # 68 dated 19 July 1949 XXXX

2. The clearance was based upon information available at that time. It is desired to maintain a continuing or periodic review of the security status of this person and the projects with which he has been or may be associated.

3. Your comments on the following points would be appreciated. In the event field correspondence is necessary to obtain this information please coordinate with STC/CCO.

a. Is subject still in an operational status? If not please indicate disposition.

b. Is subject being used in substantially the same manner as when clearance was issued? If not please explain.

c. Has subject been used in connection with projects other than originally contemplated?

d. Has any information been reported affecting subject's personal or operational security status?

e. Has the operation, including security tests of the agent, been satisfactory?

f. Has any information been developed in connection with this or other operations or have changes in existing conditions occurred which would affect your original evaluation of this agent?

SECRET

201-168581

FORM NO.
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE No.

FROM:	SAN JOSE	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	7 DEC 50
ACTION:	FDT (1-2-3)	IN 12657
INFORMATION:	ADSO (4-5) , STA (6), STB (7), STC (8), IID (9), S/C (10-11-12)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (I) 60A AR-380-5

SANJ 678

TO: WASHF CITE: SANJ

RE: TRSA 756

Did not leave [illegible] Hum [illegible] Zu [illegible]

HUMANOID PLANNING PERMANENT TRANSFER TO PANAMA 1 FEBRUARY REQUEST HQS CONSIDER APPROVAL OF HUMBUG BY 1 JANUARY 1951 TO PERMIT SUFFICIENT OVERLAP FOR ORIENTATION IN DUTIES AND CONTACTS.

201-168881

TOR: 1611Z 7 DEC 50

SECRET

COPY No. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

TRSA-745

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 1 July to 30 Sept 1950.
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:	As set forth in TRSA-564.
SALARY:	$750.per month.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES:	No change.
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:	No. change.
OTHER FACTORS:	Subject is contact personally by Station Chief.
COMMENT:	Subject is contemplating moving to Panama approximately in April 1951, where he hopes to continue his schooling and work for this organization. He has had previous experience and contacts in Panama and can be highly recommended for similar work there. A substitution for subject has been considered and is being processed.

30 Sept. 50
201-168881

SECRET

SECRET

TRSA-646

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica PERIOD: 1 April to 30 June 1950.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: Objectives, tasks, and targets are set forth in detail in TRSA-564.

SALARY: $750 per month.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: Services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been excellent, from both an information and a security standpoint.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION: The information provided by the agents which subject handles, a great part of which is owing to his own industry and devotion in their development, is easily the most valuable produced by this station.

OTHER FACTORS: No comment.

COMMENTS: No changes are contemplated in subject's status. He is contemplating a move to Argentina some time within the next two years and hopes to continue his present employment in that country, and if possible to make a career of this business in any capacity he can obtain. His integrity, discretion, and industry cannot be too highly commended and we feel that he is eminently suited for staff or cover employment in any capacity deemed commensurate with his intellectual and other abilities.

SECRET

30 June 50

201-168881

AIR

SECRET

TGS-A-468

21-4-50

Chief of Station, San Jose

Chief, Foreign Division T

Operational Matters
[illegible]

REF: TGS-A-364
TGS-A-457

1. A review of the financial records on [illegible] shows that salary and expenses in the amount of $804.09 were charged to this allotment during the first six months of the current fiscal year. This reflects a rate of disbursements slightly in excess of that anticipated in the annual allotment of $1500.

2. Ordinarily it would not be necessary to change the allotment at this time but the pay increase for [illegible], effective 1 April 1950, will definitely increase the total disbursements for the fiscal year to a figure in excess of the $1500.

3. In view of this situation the allotment for [illegible] for the 1949-1950 fiscal year is being increased by the sum of $900. The total allotment previously set at $1500 is therefore increased to $2400.

4. Taking this action at this time will obviate the necessity of making a last minute adjustment at the end of the fiscal year.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

BY W.L.DEAN

WLD:jr

21 April 50

201-167871

STB

WM. M. WHEELER

SECRET

SECRET

TRSA-586

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 1 January to 31 March 1950.
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:	Objectives, tasks, and targets are set forth in detail in TRSA-564.
SALARY:	$500 per month during the quarter under consideration. $750 per month effective 1 April 1950.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES:	Services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been excellent, from both an information and a security standpoint.
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:	The information provided by the agents whom subject handles, a great part of which is owing to his own industry and devotion in their development, is easily the most valuable produced by this station.
OTHER FACTORS:	No comment.
COMMENTS:	No changes are contemplated in subject's status.

SECRET

31 March 50
201-168881

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-564

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 31 March 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations Gen. Operational Matters - Costa Rica

SPECIFIC— Project Humanoid

Ref: TRSW-447

1. In accordance with verbal agreement made by the Chief of Station in Washington and formalized in referenced memorandum, the monthly salary paid to Humanoid will be increased from the present $500 to $750.00 effective 1 April 1950.

11432

2. A revised "Field Project Outline" applicable to Project Humanoid is submitted herewith, in accordance with GOI No. 2.

3. Possible existing confusion with regard to our charging of expenses of Project Humanoid and allied projects for which Humanoid supplies cutout services will be clarified in the near future as revised "Field Project Outlines" applicable to these latter projects are prepared and forwarded.

4. The attached "Field Project Outline" supercedes TRSA-347.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

Encl: 1

Project running over allotment by $150.00
Increase in Humanoid for [illegible] = 120.00
270.00

Increase allotment 300.00

IID COPY

31 March 50
201-168881
~~16-6-4-60~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

TRS-A-506

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 1 October to 31 December 1949.
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS	This agent provides cutout services in connection with the penetrations of Vanguardia Popular and also for the postal intercept project. In connection with the latter he does all of the technical reproduction work required. He also reports miscellaneous information which he obtains from his school and business contacts. Project dates from June 1949.
SALARY	$500 per month. Increased from $400 November 1949.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES	Services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been good, from both an information and a security standpoint.
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION	The information provided by the informants of the subject has been valuable operationally and is considered generally reliable.
OTHER FACTORS	Contacts with the subject are made directly. He is now attempting to obtain a secure place in which to meet HUMANIST-2. Other informants handled by this agent are HUGGER, HUMANKIND-1, and HUMANKIND-3.
COMMENTS	No changes are contemplated in the manner of handling this agent.

SECRET

201-168871

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-468

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 1 November 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Project Humanoid
SPECIFIC- Amendment to Contract

1. Effective 1 November 1949 the salary of the individual designated as Humanoid was increased $100.00 to a total of $500 per month. This action was taken in consideration of excellent services, not in time, but in quality, in the management and direction of Projects Humankind, Humanist-2, and Hugger.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

~~REGISTRY COPY~~

14 Nov. 49
201-168881 ✓

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

X

~~SECRET~~ KAPOK DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-26

TRS-A-449

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 1 July to 30 September 1949
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:	(1) Cutout services. (2) Communist penetration of local labor organizations and/or student groups. (3) Discretionary reporting and operational pursuit of any and all intelligence information coming his way by reason of his normal daily activities.
SALARY:	$400 per month.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES:	(1) As Humankind cutout: Subject has continued to handle this delicate and time-consuming assignment in a completely satisfactory manner. As Hugger cutout: Although Hugger still does not produce as we would like, it is not the fault of subject, who has devoted time and effort to his education and direction. (2) Rather than employment or investigation of prospective informants developed by subject with regard to these objectives, we have assigned subject the handling and direction of Humanist-2. We have every reason to believe that he will do this satisfactorily, and based on the high-level information which we receive through this source, subject will be able to proceed more intelligently to the coverage of the topics assigned. (3) Subject is proceeding slowly as directed by us, and attempting first of all to integrate the three projects with which he is charged.
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:	Directly, subject has yet provided little information. That stemming from his projects, however, is among the most useful and valuable which we obtain.
OTHER FACTORS:	None.
COMMENTS:	Subject is considered to be the most valuable employee we have at the present time from the point of view of actual present usefulness, as well as that of interest, industry, and comprehension of objectives.

~~SECRET~~ KAPOK DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED 4 Oct. 49

per CSN 43-26 201-168881

14-00000

TRS-A-443

29 September 1949

Communist Organisers

REFERENCE: TRS-655, WASH 5590, TRS-W-377

Hugger

1. Every effort is being made to confirm with details - or deny - the information contained in TRS-655. The source of that report, as well as Hubbub, who is a personal friend of the original informant, have both been attempting for some time to extract more information from him. In addition, transfer of Humanist-2 to the management of Humanoid, which occurred this week, has provided us with an additional avenue of confirmation and Humanoid is making the matter his No. 1 priority job.

2. We expect to be able to cable our opinion of the truth or falsity of the original information within two weeks time, and if the story then appears to have some basis in fact, all our resources will be exploited for further details.

Original in Gen. Opera

CONFIDENTIAL

201-168881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-429

~~KAPOK~~ IZED
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 13 September 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Specific Operational Changes

REFERENCE: TRS-A-396, TRS-A-385

1. Certain rearrangements involving three current projects of this office are being made in order to produce greater effectiveness and security. The projects involved are Humanoid, Humanist and Humankind.

2. The owner of the separate office used by Humanoid to process the material received through Project Humankind has requested that the space be vacated by 15 September 1949. His reasons are purely business and have nothing to do with our operations. On that date, therefore, our effects will be moved to a new locale, which is incidentally more desirable from the point of view of convenience and security. The new "safe-house" will cost $400.00 per month, an increase of $275.00 over that paid for the former office, and is to be charged to Project Humankind effective 15 September 1949.

3. To offset this increased cost but principally to provide adequate exploitation of Humanist-2, that individual will be turned over to Humanoid for direct handling prior to 1 October 1949. Humanist-1, whose sole function has been to contact Humanist-2 and who has received a salary of $250.00 per month, will be eliminated on 1 October 1949. This arrangement has been carefully planned and discussed with all concerned and can be made without security risk. It will provide intelligent, American control of our potentially most valuable agent, and eliminate the present cumbersome communication and contact arrangement.

4. No change will be made in present symbol designations.

CS copy filed in 18-6-8/63

DESENSITIZED ~~CS COPY~~
per CSN 43-26

Elmer C. Mercer

~~KAPOK~~ [illegible]IZED
CLASSIFICATION

201-168771

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-403

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 9 August 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Operational Data, Project Humanoid

REFERENCE: TRS-A-347

The following operational data is forwarded in accordance with Field Memorandum No. 6 of September, 1947:

1. Humanoid.

2. Cutout services with a large amount of personal discretion permitted.

3. Subject is considered to be extremely reliable and intelligent, which, combined with his past experience, qualify him for a wide range of assignments.

4. San José, Costa Rica.

5. No.

6. He would, but at present is prevented from travelling by personal arrangements which it would be inconvenient for him to change.

7. All personnel are paid by us: Humankind-1, $100.00; Humankind-3, $100.00; Hugger, $100.00 (monthly).

8. No.

9. Yes.

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-25

10. Yes. Subject is charged with principal direction of Project Humankind and Project Hugger. Aside from this, he is charged with investigation and recruiting of information personnel as suggested by himself in accordance with his opportunities, but only after consultation with us.

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

11. By direct contact in a "safe house".

12. Material emanating from Project Humankind through Subject is photographic. Material from Project Hugger and from Subject himself is written.

13. Approximately 40%.

14. Written. Copy was forwarded as TRS-A-364.

15. The subject matter with which Subject is concerned under the arrangements noted under No. 10 above is that of communist activity in student and labor groups.

16. He works only as directed by us, but frequently suggests matters for his own consideration.

17. Subject is paid in colones at the rate of $400 per month.

18. After six months employment, approximately December, 1949, we expect to raise his salary to $500 per month.

19. Contact expenses in connection with Projects Hugger and Humankind are paid subject, and average $200 per month. Maintenance expenses and rent in connection with the "safe house" where he does his work average $125.00 per month.

20. We would, were such a contingency to occur. To date it has not.

21. (a) Superior (b) Superior

22. Semi-covert because of his nationality.

23. (A) High level.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-26

SECRET

No. 68

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

TO: Chief, FBT (Att. Mrs. Geary)

Operational Clearance is hereby granted for the use of HUMANOID.

Limitations: As defined in TRS-A-376.

John C. Bonnet
JOHN C. BONNET
Acting Operational Clearance Officer
for Assistant Director, Special Operations

Date 7/19/49

Copy 1 of 2 copies.

201-168881

19 July 49

21 July

Field Notified

WASH- 7509 out 862[illegible]

(see message [illegible])

C I B notice attached

SECRET

SECRET

Operational Clearance Officer, OSO 14 July 1949

Chief, FBT

Humanoid

1. It is requested that provisional operational clearance be granted for the use of Humanoid.

2. It is further requested that a covert investigation be made on subject.

RG:pbs

JRJ-a-347

SECRET

201-168551

SECRET TRS-A-376

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica PERIOD: 1 - 30 June 1949

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:

(1).- Cutout services.
(2).- Communist penetration of local labor organizations and/or student groups.
(3).- Discretionary reporting and operational pursuit of any and all intelligence information coming his way by reason of his normal daily activities.

SALARY: (¢) ¢400 per month. (approx $240 per qtr.)

EVALUATION OF SERVICES:

(1). As Humankind cutout: Subject has proven exceptionally successful in the face of some unusual difficulties. He has, however, developed the contacts necessary under this heading on a personal friendly basis to the point where all are lending their enthusiastic cooperation.

As Hugger cutout: For the first time in the history of his employment with us, Hugger is submitting well-organized reports and beginning to appreciate our needs. His progress is directly attributable to the time and effort devoted to direction by Humanoid.

(2). Subject has been fully occupied during the short period covered herein and has made no progress with respect to this assignment.

(3). Subject has cultivated three potential sources in fields of probable interest to us. After further local investigation of their possibilities, headquarters will be consulted.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION: Directly, subject has provided no information. That stemming from the projects he is now supervising, however, is accurate and always valuable.

OTHER FACTORS: None.

COMMENTS: In the immediate future, subject's cutout activities should settle into more or less of a routine, releasing his energies for development of other assignments.

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-28

SECRET

[illegible]SITIZED
EAPCK

30 June 49
201-168851

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-364

~~SECRET~~ ~~KAPOK~~ DESENSITIZED
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 13 June 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Humanoid

Reference: TRS-A-347

1. A copy of the contract signed by the individual principally concerned in subject project is attached. The signed original is retained in our files.

2. Pertinent operational data in accordance with Field Memorandum No. 6 dated 22 September 1947 will be forwarded when the operational routine has been established in more or less its final form and we are better able to judge the efficiency and value of the project.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

Encl:
Copy of contract

13 June 49
201-168881 ✓
201-168881

~~SECRET~~ ~~KAPOK~~ DESENSITIZED 7
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

TRS-A-369

22 June 1949

2. Informant Hugger, formerly reporting through subject, has been transferred to the control of Humanoid (see TRS-A-347)

Origin Huckleberry
cc - Hugger

DESENSITIZED
[illegible] 43-23

201-168881

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

USAF Personal History and security checks.

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-251

SECRET - ~~RESPON~~[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 5 January 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic
Reference: TZP-A-365; TZP-W-411

1. This station intends to make the fullest possible use of Hydropathic, but it is not considered feasible to proceed with a formal request for project authorization until he has established himself in this area and we have made his acquaintance. Tentatively it is planned to use him in a cut-out capacity, meeting informants which we will provide, for an orientation period of indefinite duration. In this period it will be possible to evaluate Subject's capacity to play an integrated part in our operational set-up, and approval for our plans in this respect will then be requested.

2. Hydropathic will be contacted upon arrival and initial arrangements for his cut-out services forwarded to headquarters.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

23-23
cc - Panama City

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-23

CS COPY

201 - 168 881
TRS A 251
DATE 5 JAN 49

SECRET - ~~RESPON~~[illegible] 7
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TBS-A-250

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station,
Panama City

DATE: 5 January 1949

FROM : Chief of Station,
San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic

Reference: TZP-A-365, Part I

The attached document, having served its purpose, is returned to your station.

Your cooperation in the matter is greatly appreciated.

23-23
1 Encl. – TZPA-365 11 Oct 48
cc - Washington ✓

Filed in chronological order.

Elmer J. Mercer

REGISTRY COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

5 Jan. 49
201-16888 ✓

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TZP-A-402

SECRET - ~~RESTRICTED~~
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FBT

DATE: 31 December 1948.

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama.

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- HYDROPATHIC

Ref: TZP-W-411

1. HYDROPATHIC is not a project (Memo to all Latin American Stations, dtd. 9 June 1947). It is a simple recruitment of an individual agent to be controlled exclusively by the San José Station. TZP-A-365 Part II suggested a manner in which he might establish contact with HYDROCYST I. Since HYDROCYST I is leaving Costa Rica temporarily, this is no longer a consideration.

2. All documents in our files have been forwarded to San José. This station has only contacted Subject twice and has told him nothing about our organization or any possibilities of any full time positions. If we can assist by arranging a contact between HYDROPATHIC and San José or in any other manner, we will be glad to do so. In the meantime, we will take no further action unless instructed to do so by the Home Office.

Grover J. Waring
Grover J. Waring.

Distribution:

Wash (2) ✓
Sanj (1)
Files (1)

DESENSITIZED
Per CSN 43-20

201 - 168881	
ABSTRACT x	INDEX
TZ PA	402
DATE 31 DEC 48	

CS COPY

SECRET - ~~RESTRICTED~~
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

14-00000
104-10215-10246
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CROZIER, ROSS L.

201-168

SECRET

Vol. II of V

OFFICIAL CS FILE

(Jan. 1952 - August 1956)

FORM 3-68 1505B

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/FIP HW GE66

EXTENSION: 29 [illegible] 4113

NO. HKHA 2897

DATE 9 Aug 56

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/AN GA50				201-165881
2.				SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross L. VAIVADA, Arthur G. (P)
3. RID/EDI				
4.				
5.				
6. RID/FIP GE66				6-1: Please note processing thru RID/EDI incomplete. Please forward to complete abstract process.
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

AN
AB
[illegible]
RID/FIP

201-168881

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-2897

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE 9 August 1956

FROM : Acting Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT GENERAL -6 Operational/KUCAGE
SPECIFIC - Artnur G. VAIVADA-Request for KUCAGE Operational Clearance

It is requested that an operational clearance be obtained for VAIVADA which will permit the Station to discuss with him KUCAGE operations in the student field. We realize that VAIVADA is fully occupied with his present duties, and it is not intended to place any responsibility on him for KUCAGE operations. It would be of great assistance to the Station, however, if the writer could be permitted to obtain VAIVADA's views on the type of KUCAGE activity in the student field which might be most likely to succeed, and capitalize on his knowledge of the field by using him as a spotter. (We have in mind the organization of a student political action team similar to the one operating in Brazil under project ALKALINE-C.)

Theodore K. Lislett
Theodore K. LISLETT

Distribution:
3 - Washington
2 - Files

8 August 1956
TKL/pls

201-168881

201-168881
x
~~HKHA 2897~~
~~9 AUG 56~~

~~201-227723~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

CS COPY

RI COPY

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL **SECRET**

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 17 April 1956

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS

TELEPHONE:

NO. HKH-A-2577

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE
1. WH	046 Barton		4 Apr 1956		
2.	Hall			M	
3. McAuley				MCA	
4. C/Admin					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12. WH/III/Cuba Montag			9 OCT 1956	dam	
13.					
14.					
15. RI/FI	1409 L				

COMMENTS

VAIVADA, ARTHUR G.

COPY DETACHED 2

See memo to Br III dated 12 June 1956

promotion requested

3 May - OK

further action - [illegible]

Subject granted GS-10 equivalent and station notified on 29 May '56 with notation that question of state status would be ~~would~~ handled separately.

201-168881

~~201 32723~~

ABSTRACT X ~~X~~ INDEX

DATE 19 APR 1956 9

FORM NO. 1 APR 55 610 REPLACES FORM 51-10 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-2577

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE 17 April 1956

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational - KUTUBE
SPECIFIC - Arthur G. Vaivada

REFS: (a) HKH-W-1607, 30 March 1956
(b) HKH-W-1505, 28 December 1955

1. Regarding reference (a) the Station concurs fully with the proposed promotion of Arthur G. Vaivada and desires also at this time to bring to the attention of Headquarters the merits of granting Vaivada staff status either concurrently with the promotion or as soon thereafter as may prove feasible.

2. The agent himself has expressed a keen interest in acquiring such status, for a number of obvious reasons. As a contract agent, Vaivada has not been entitled to the standard step increases that accrue to regular GS employees. Moreover he has not had the benefit of recent legislative increases in basic salary rates, such that his salary, originally set 16 August 1954 at the then GS-9 level, is still $5060.00 per annum. Perhaps of more importance than the foregoing considerations is the fact that this agent has been and is losing out in terms of the retirement, health insurance, and other more long-term advantages available to staff personnel. The agent has several times expressed to the case officer his concern, as a family man, over the fact that he is not receiving retirement credits with his years of service. Vaivada's expressed career interests lie in continued employment by KUBARK, more especially in the area of unofficial cover assignments in the field, and in view of his qualities of character and high level of performance for KUBARK the Station has no hesitation in recommending to Headquarters that he be awarded the desired change in status.

3. In view of the agent's present salary level it is recommended that the promotion from his present grade be to the equivalent of a GS-10 at a per annum salary of $5,915.00. If Headquarters concurs in the recommendation that the agent be granted staff officer status, the agent would move up to the GS-11 grade at that time.

Sherwood P. Rochon

Distribution:
3 Wash
2 Files

13 April 1956

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SPR/rrd

RI COPY

201-168881

~~201-32723~~

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

KAPOK #309

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-1524

SECRET CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Mission, Mexico City

DATE 17 JUN 1954

FROM Chief, WHD

DESENSITIZED

SUBJECT GENERAL 0 Operations
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. The following information on Arthur G. VAIVADA is being forwarded so that you may consider using him in Mexico City as a contact agent, in which capacity he has served KUFIRE most ably in the past four years. His present contract, which became effective on 1 September 1953 for a two year period, provides for a salary equivalent to grade GS-7, with allowances.

2. A review of the Headquarters file indicates that subject is an aggressive, rather well qualified operative, who has enjoyed a good measure of success and has exercised good judgment under operational stress. He desires a career with this Agency, and is devoted to the work. Subject's academic education has been designed to fit him to become an economist. Prior to entering a contract relationship with KUBARK, subject had received U. S. Army intelligence training and had worked for Air Force Intelligence in Panama. He was trained covertly by instructors of KUBARK in Washington, D.C. in the latter part of 1953. His instructors indicate that they were most favorably impressed and feel that he possesses a sound practical knowledge of basic clandestine operational principles and should become an increasingly valuable agent in the long range work of this organization.

3. The following is a summary and appraisal of subject's work which has been provided by the Costa Rican Desk at Headquarters:

   a. He was recruited by the Panama station in November 1948, but in early 1949 he moved to San Jose, Costa Rica, where he enrolled in the University of Costa Rica as a student of economics. In June 1949 subject acted as cutout for two mail intercept agents and handled a low level penetration of the Communist Party. In October 1949 a very high-level penetration of the Communist Party was also turned over to the subject, who was by this time devoting approximately

J. C. KING

CS COPY

J. M. Doerflinger

18 June 54

201-167181

SECRET CLASSIFICATION

1 ENCL.

FORM NO. 51 20

half his time to our work. Since that time his main duties have been to act as cutout and direct these agents. His most important single activity has been debriefing the high-level penetration agent whom he has been able to develop to a point where he and this one agent constituted the most important assets to the station.

b. In the course of his operational duties, subject has proved himself to be very security conscious and to possess a degree of initiative which has impressed the station chief on more than one occasion. He has participated in setting up safehouses, was responsible for recruiting the two mail intercept agents, and has provided the facilities for photographing the material these two agents turn over to him for rapid processing and return to normal mail channels. Subject has recruited two additional agents, both of whom are presently being used, and carried out a cold recruitment attempt on a Communist. He participated in a technical surveillance operation in early 1951 during which he was in charge of the monitoring post together with an indigenous agent under his direction.

c. Subject is an expert photographer and at one time operated his own photography shop in San Jose. He is also fairly proficient in sending Morse code, is trained in the use of firearms and has studied and worked with charts and maps. He is considered an expert in writing reports. Subject has proved himself to be knowledgeable in the usual techniques of covert operations after four years of working in San Jose, and has proved to be invaluable to the station in spotting and/or recruiting additional agents.

4. Subject will be available for duty in the near future. Should you find his qualifications of interest and favor his entry into Mexico as a contract agent, please advise as early as possible. Dunshurst has requested that Subject's possible use

DES[illegible]
[illegible] CSN 43-28

SECRET KAPOK

KAPOK #309
HMM-W-1524

in connection with future REDCAP questions be considered.

J. C. KING

Enclosure: under sep. cov.

11 June 1954

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/encl. under sep. cov.
1 - subj., w/encl.
1 - WH/III chrono, w/encl.

HJCasen:am

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-26

SECRET KAPOK

SECRET KAPOK

Separate Cover Enclosure to HMM-W-1524

Biographic information concerning subject is given below.
A photograph of subject is attached.

Name: Ross Lester CROZIER
Birth date: 20 June 1922
Birth place: DeKalb, Illinois
Documentation: valid U.S. passport
Marital status: Wife - Argentina CORDERO C., born 15 March 1918 at San Jose, Costa Rica. Married 17 December 1945 at Cristobal, Canal Zone.
Children - Two

Veteran status: Subject is no longer eligible to attend school under the G.I. Bill of Rights

Description: Height - 6'1"
Weight - 180 lbs.
Eyes - blue
Hair - brown
Other - Nose is slightly inclined to left. Subject has rugged, athletic appearance.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-29

CS COPY

Encl to HMMW 1524
17 JUN 54

SECRET KAPOK DESENSITIZED

201-168 881

HISTORY

"Sent" Sent to RID/AN

22 Dec 70

ok HMMW-1524	18 June 54	201-168881
ok HKHA-2577	17 April 56	201-168881
ok HKHA-2726	7 June 56	201-168881
ok HKHA-2868	30 July 56	201-168881
ok HKHA-2897	9 Aug. 56	201-168881
ok TRSW-816	6 Oct. 52	201-168881

SECRET

AIR

[illegible]

HKH-W-1819

AUG 17 1956

: Chief of Station, Habana

: Chief, WH

- Administrative

- Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-1731, 4 June 1956

1. Please advise Subject that effective 1 August 1956, his contract, as amended, is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

J. C. KING
Chief/WHD

14 August 1956

Distribution:
- 3 - Habana
- 1 - RI/D&P
- 1 - WH/III/Cuba
- 1 - WH/Mailroom

WH/III/Cuba/HOMacAuley:gp

J. C. KING, C/WHD

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Extension for Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Effective 1 August 1956, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 August 1954, is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY /s/
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

/s/

X

SECRET

1 Aug. 56

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT — (Appendix I)

Listed below are names of organizations identified by the Attorney General, under his responsibility pursuant to Executive Order 10450, dated 27 April 1953, to list the names of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which he designates as Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or as having adopted or having shown a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Each applicant or employee and spouse (if any) must review the following list of organizations for certification purposes, and sign on the last page.

- Abraham Lincoln Brigade
- Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
- Action Committee to Free Spain Now
- Alabama People's Educational Association (see Communist Political Association)
- American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
- American Branch of the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions
- American Christian Nationalist Party
- American Committee for European Workers' Relief (see Socialist Workers Party)
- American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born
- American Committee for Spanish Freedom
- American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidjan, Inc.
- American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
- American Committee to Survey Labor Conditions in Europe
- American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee for National Unity
- American Council on Soviet Relations
- American Croatian Congress
- American Jewish Labor Council
- American League Against War and Fascism
- American League for Peace and Democracy
- American Lithuanian Workers Literary Association (also known as Amerikos Lietuviu Darbininku Literaturos Draugija)
- American National Labor Party
- American National Socialist League
- American National Socialist Party
- American Nationalist Party
- American Patriots, Inc.
- American Peace Crusade
- American Peace Mobilization
- American Poles for Peace
- American Polish Labor Council
- American Polish League
- American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the United American Spanish Aid Committee)
- American-Russian Fraternal Society
- American Russian Institute, New York, also known as the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union
- American Russian Institute, Philadelphia
- American Russian Institute of San Francisco
- American Russian Institute of Southern California, Los Angeles
- American Slav Congress
- American Women for Peace
- American Youth Congress
- American Youth for Democracy
- Armenian Progressive League of America
- Associated Klans of America
- Association of Georgia Klans
- Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
- Association of Lithuanian Workers (also known as Lietuviu Darbininku Susivienijimas)
- Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party
- Baltimore Forum
- Benjamin Davis Freedom Committee
- Black Dragon Society
- Boston School for Marxist Studies, Boston, Massachusetts
- Bridges-Robertson-Schmidt Defense Committee
- Bulgarian American People's League of the United States of America
- California Emergency Defense Committee
- California Labor School, Inc., 321 Divisadero Street, San Francisco, California
- Carpatho-Russian People's Society
- Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent, also known as Central Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian Women
- Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai)
- Central Japanese Association of Southern California
- Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance (Deutsche-Amerikanische Einheitsfront)
- Cervantes Fraternal Society
- China Welfare Appeal, Inc.
- Chopin Cultural Center
- Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges
- Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)
- Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder
- Citizens Emergency Defense Conference
- Citizens Protective League
- Civil Liberties Sponsoring Committee of Pittsburgh
- Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations, including:
  - Civil Rights Congress for Texas
  - Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York
- Civil Rights Congress for Texas (see Civil Rights Congress)
- Columbians
- Comite Coordinador Pro Republica Espanola
- Comite Pro Derechos Civiles (See Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles)
- Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
- Committee for Constitutional and Political Freedom
- Committee for Nationalist Action
- Committee for Peace and Brotherhood Festival in Philadelphia
- Committee for the Defense of the Pittsburgh Six
- Committee for the Negro in the Arts
- Committee for the Protection of the Bill of Rights
- Committee for World Youth Friendship and Cultural Exchange
- Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland (See Congress Against Discrimination; Maryland Congress Against Discrimination; Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland)
- Committee to Aid the Fighting South
- Committee to Defend Marie Richardson
- Committee to Defend the Rights and Freedom of Pittsburgh's Political Prisoners
- Committee to Uphold the Bill of Rights
- Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas
- Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates
- Communist Political Association, its subdivisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates, including:
  - Alabama People's Educational Association
  - Florida Press and Educational League
  - Oklahoma League for Political Education
  - People's Educational and Press Association of Texas
  - Virginia League for People's Education

23 July 1956

201-165881

Congress Against Discrimination
  (See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Congress of American Revolutionary Writers
Congress of American Women
Congress of the Unemployed
Connecticut Committee to Aid Victims of the Smith Act
Connecticut State Youth Conference
Council for Jobs, Relief and Housing
Council for Pan-American Democracy
Council of Greek Americans
Council on African Affairs
Croatian Benevolent Fraternity

Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of Japan or Military Art Society of Japan)
Daily Worker Press Club
Daniels Defense Committee
Dante Alighieri Society (between 1935 and 1940)
Dennis Defense Committee
Detroit Youth Assembly

East Bay Peace Committee
Elsinore Progressive League
Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees (founding body of the North American Spanish Aid Committee)
Everybody's Committee to Outlaw War

Families of the Baltimore Smith Act Victims
Families of the Smith Act Victims
Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U. S. A., Inc. (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani, Federazione degli Stati Uniti d'America)
Finnish-American Mutual Aid Society
Florida Press and Educational League (see Communist Political Association)
Frederick Douglass Educational Center
Freedom Stage, Inc.
Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)
Friends of the Soviet Union

Garibaldi American Fraternal Society
George Washington Carver School, New York City
German-American Bund (Amerikadeutscher Volksbund)
German-American Republican League
German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische Berufsgemeinschaft)
Guardian Club

Harlem Trade Union Council
Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee
Heimusha Kai, also known as Nokubei Heieki Gimusha Kai, Zaibei Nihonjin, Heiyaku Gimusha Kai, and Zaibei Heimusha Kai (Japanese Residing in America Military Conscripts Association)
Hellenic-American Brotherhood
Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)
Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society — a group of Japanese War Veterans)
Hokubei Zaigo Shoke Dan (North American Reserve Officers Association)
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy
Hungarian Brotherhood

Idaho Pension Union
Independent Party (Seattle, Washington)
  (See Independent People's Party)
Independent People's Party
  (See Independent Party)
Independent Socialist League
Industrial Workers of the World
International Labor Defense
International Workers Order, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates

Japanese Association of America
Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)
Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940
Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City
Jewish Culture Society
Jewish People's Committee
Jewish People's Fraternal Order
Jikyoku Iinkai (The Committee for the Crisis)
Johnson-Forest Group
  (See Johnsonites)
Johnsonites
  (See Johnson-Forest Group)
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
Joint Council of Progressive Italian-Americans, Inc.
Joseph Weydemeyer School of Social Science, St. Louis, Missouri

Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of Japanese Ancestry who have returned to America after studying in Japan)
Knights of the White Camellia
Ku Klux Klan
Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League (Kyffhaeuser Bund), Kyffhaeuser Fellowship (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)
Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)

Labor Council for Negro Rights
Labor Research Association, Inc.
Labor Youth League
League for Common Sense
League of American Writers
Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts)

Macedonian-American People's League
Mario Morgantini Circle
Maritime Labor Committee to Defend Al Lannon
Maryland Congress Against Discrimination
  (See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Massachusetts Committee for the Bill of Rights
Massachusetts Minute Women for Peace (not connected with the Minute Women of the U. S. A., Inc.)
Maurice Braverman Defense Committee
Michigan Civil Rights Federation
Michigan Council for Peace
Michigan School of Social Science

Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military Friends Group or Southern California War Veterans)
National Association of Mexican Americans (also known as Asociacion Nacional Mexico-Americana)
National Blue Star Mothers of America (not to be confused with the Blue Star Mothers of America organized in February 1942)
National Committee for Freedom of the Press
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners
National Committee to Win Amnesty for Smith Act Victims
National Committee to Win the Peace
National Conference on American Policy in China and the Far East (a Conference called by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy)
National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
National Labor Conference for Peace
National Negro Congress
National Negro Labor Council
Nationalist Action League
Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
Nature Friends of America (since 1935)
Negro Labor Victory Committee
New Committee for Publications
Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre)
North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy
North American Spanish Aid Committee
North Philadelphia Forum
Northwest Japanese Association

Ohio School of Social Sciences
Oklahoma Committee to Defend Political Prisoners
Oklahoma League for Political Education (see Communist Political Association)
Original Southern Klans, Incorporated

Pacific Northwest Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Palo Alto Peace Club
Partido del Pueblo of Panama (operating in the Canal Zone)
Peace Information Center
Peace Movement of Ethiopia
People's Drama, Inc.
People's Educational and Press Association of Texas (see Communist Political Association)
People's Educational Association (incorporated under name Los Angeles Educational Association, Inc.), also known as People's Educational Center, People's University, People's School
People's Institute of Applied Religion
Peoples Programs (Seattle, Washington)
People's Radio Foundation, Inc.
People's Rights Party
Philadelphia Labor Committee for Negro Rights
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art
Photo League (New York City)
Pittsburgh Arts Club
Political Prisoners' Welfare Committee
Polonia Society of the IWO
Progressive German-Americans, also known as Progressive German-Americans of Chicago
Proletarian Party of America
Protestant War Veterans of the United States, Inc.
Provisional Committee of Citizens for Peace, Southwest Area
Provisional Committee on Latin American Affairs
Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland
(See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles (CLC)
(See Comite Pro Derechos Civiles)
Puertorriquenos Unidos (Puerto Ricans United)

Quad City Committee for Peace
Queensbridge Tenants League

Revolutionary Workers League
Romanian-American Fraternal Society
Russian American Society, Inc.

Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association — composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War)
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts
Santa Barbara Peace Forum
Schappes Defense Committee
Schneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee
School of Jewish Studies, New York City
Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Serbian-American Fraternal Society
Serbian Vidovdan Council
Shinto Temples (limited to State Shinto abolished in 1945)
Silver Shirt Legion of America
Slavic Council of Southern California
Slovak Workers Society
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee for European Workers' Relief
Socialist Youth League (see Workers Party)
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
Southern Negro Youth Congress
Suiko Sha (Reserve Officers Association, Los Angeles)
Syracuse Women for Peace

Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York
Trade Union Committee for Peace
(See Trade Unionists for Peace)
Trade Unionists for Peace
(See Trade Union Committee for Peace)
Tri-State Negro Trade Union Council

Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union
Union of American Croatians
Union of New York Veterans
United American Spanish Aid Committee
United Committee of Jewish Societies and Landsmanschaft Federations, also known as Coordination Committee of Jewish Landsmanschaften and Fraternal Organizations
United Committee of South Slavic Americans
United Defense Council of Southern California
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization
United May Day Committee
United Negro and Allied Veterans of America

Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York (see Civil Rights Congress)
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Virginia League for People's Education (see Communist Political Association)
Voice of Freedom Committee

Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey
Washington Bookshop Association
Washington Committee for Democratic Action
Washington Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights
Washington Commonwealth Federation
Washington Pension Union
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation
Workers Alliance (since April 1936)
Workers Party, including Socialist Youth League

Yiddisher Kultur Farband
Young Communist League
Yugoslav-American Cooperative Home, Inc.
Yugoslav Seamen's Club, Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I certify that I have read the names of the above listed organizations.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, I am not, nor have I been a member of, contributed to, received literature from, signed petitions of or in behalf of, or attended meetings of any organization listed above, or any organization outside the United States espousing Communist, Fascist, Totalitarian or Nazi causes, except as noted below.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, none of my close relatives are, nor have ever been members of, contributed to, received literature from, signed petitions of or in behalf of, or attended meetings of any such organizations, except as noted below.

INSTRUCTIONS

For the purpose of this certification, if an applicant or employee is completing this form, the term "close relative" will include spouse, children, parents, brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts. "Close relatives" of the spouse, for this purpose, will include children, parents, brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts.

If there are exceptions to this certification, set forth below under Remarks all pertinent information concerning the nature and extent of your activities or those of your close relatives in such organizations, including the names of the organizations, dates of membership, meetings attended, titles of positions held, amounts and dates of contributions, nature of petitions signed falling within the meaning of the above certification and circumstances thereof, titles and authors of literature received, and dates on which received.

In exceptions concerning relatives, include only such information presently known to you or available from your own records.

If necessary, use additional sheets and sign each sheet. Write none if there are no exceptions.

REMARKS: To be completed by Spouse	REMARKS: To be completed by Applicant or Employee

Date 23 JULY 1956	Date 23 JULY 1956
Argentina Cordero de Crozier (Signature of Spouse)	Ross L. Crozier (Signature of Applicant or Employee)
(City and State)	(City and State)
(Witness)	(Witness)
(Address)	(Address)

SECRET

23 July 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : FI/Plans

SUBJECT : Arthur G. VAIVADA; Request for Extension of Contract

1. It is hereby requested that the contract of Arthur G. VAIVADA, which expires on 31 July 1956, be extended for a period of one year. No changes in the present contract, as amended, are contemplated.

2. VAIVADA continues to serve as principal agent for the AMPHODARCH Project, and his performance has been outstanding. He has proved to be particularly adept at spotting and recruiting of agents. He was promoted to the equivalent of a GS-10, effective 1 April 1956.

F. P. HOLCOMB, AC/WHD

WH/III/Cuba/JNoland/jw

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - addressee
- 1 - FI/Plans
- 1 - chrono
- 1 - subject

SECRET

201-168881 X

SECRET

AIR HKH-W-1771

Chief of Station, Habana 5 JUL 1956

Chief, WH

Operational/KUTUBE
Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference HKH-A-2577

Headquarters has under consideration the question of staff status for Arthur G. VAIVADA, as set forth in reference. Before any action can be initiated in this respect, however, VAIVADA must complete, and return to Headquarters, the attached Personal History Statements and appendix.

J. C. KING
by

F. P. HOLCOMB,
AC/WH

28 June 1956

Attachments: 3
Personal History Statement in duplicate
1 Appendix

Distribution:
3 - Habana w/Attachments
1 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono

WH/III/Cuba/JBHoland/dem

F. P. Holcomb, AC/WH W. Galbraith, C/WH/III.

201-168881

SECRET

SECRET

19 June 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Branch III

ATTENTION: Cuba Desk

SUBJECT: Arthur G. Vaivada

1. The following is required to convert subject to Staff status:

a. Arrange for a full Agency clearance

b. Determine the position vacancy to be made available to accommodate subject on Division T/O

c. Approval of FI Staff and Chief, WH.

2. With respect to a. this action may be initiated now through WH Personnel.

3. It is suggested that one of the new positions allotted to Costa Rica or Mexico be made available to the Habana T/O if there are no firm plans to fill the position in the near future as presently allotted. This of course will have to be approved by Chief, WH.

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief, WH Admin

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

629 [illegible]

J. B. Noland

ORIG : J. B. NOLAND
UNIT : WH/III/CUBA
EXT : 2056
DATE : 4 JUNE 1956

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : HAVANA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

DIR 14707 (OUT 52727)   2232Z 4 JUN 56   ROUTINE

TO HAVA   CITE DIR

REF HAVA 541 (IN 25295)

FURTHER ACTION PROPOSED POLLING COVER AWAITING CLEARANCE PROSPECTIVE COVER ORGANIZATIONS. DISCUSSING WITH CROWERY.

(END OF MESSAGE)

201-168881

J C King
J. C. KING, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

J. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE   Copy No.

SECRET

AIR

HKH-W-1731

JUN 4 1956

Chief of Station, Habana

Chief, WHD

Administrative

Arthur O. VAIVADA; Increase in Salary

References a. HKH-A-2577
b. HKH-W-1710

1. Attached, for Station files, is a copy of a new contract amendment providing for an increase in salary and related compensation for Subject, as recommended in Reference "a." The increase was effective 1 April 1956.

2. The question of staff status for VAIVADA, as raised by Reference "a," is a rather involved one, and is being handled separately. The Station will be advised regarding any action taken in this respect.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

29 May 1956

Attachment
1 contract amendment

WH/III/Cuba/JBNoland/dsm

Distribution
3 - Habana w/attachment
1 - RI
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom

J. C. KING, C/WH

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

SECRET

201-168881

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

356 LK/RFL

DATE : 01 JUNE 1956

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

HAVA 541 (IN 25296) 2000Z 1 JUN 56 ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR CITE: HAVA

RE: HKHW 1707

VIEW UPCOMING RENEWAL AMPHODARCH PROJECT REQUEST STATUS OF EFFORT PROVIDE VAIVADA WITH NON STUDENT COVER. THIS WAS DISCUSSED WITH VERBECK EARLY 56.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET

29 May 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

VIA: FI/Projects Branch

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (P/A Project AMPHODARCH) Plans for Improvement of Cover

REFERENCE: FI Memo of 13 December 1955

1. Referenced memorandum requested that WH Division forward to Chief, FI, on or about 29 May 1956, a report concerning plans for improving VAIVADA's cover (Habana University student on notional scholarship from WHD proprietary).

2. Negotiations are currently underway for the establishment of VAIVADA as a representative in Cuba for one of several U. S. polling agencies. Such an arrangement would afford certain operational-contact advantages as well as a logical cover employment and apparent source of income for the agent. Efforts are being made to implement the proposed new cover arrangement prior to the 31 July 1956 renewal date of Project AMPHODARCH.

for John T. Flynn
J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

AIR

HKH-W-1710

MAY 28 1956

Chief of Station, Habana

Chief, WHD

Administrative

Arthur G. VAIVADA; Contract Amendment

1. A recent ruling by the Office of the General Counsel has ended the payment of allowances, as such, to contract personnel. In the future those amounts previously paid as allowances will come under the heading of compensation.

2. Since compensation is taxable, whereas allowances are not, additional adjustments have been made to compensate for tax losses incurred in the changeover. VAIVADA's contract has been so adjusted, and it is believed he will find the new quarters and cost of living figures to be equitable. The specific changes are as follows:

QUARTERS

Old "allowance" (non-taxable)	$2,100.00
New "compensation" (taxable)	$2,575.00

COST OF LIVING

Old "allowance" (non-taxable)	$1,650.00
New "compensation" (taxable)	$1,920.00

3. Forwarded herewith are the original and one copy of an amendment to VAIVADA's contract, which reflects the above-described adjustments. The original should be signed and returned to Headquarters.

Attachments:
Orig & 1-contract admendment

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

21 May 1956
Distribution: 3 - Habana w/attachs
1-RI;1-Mailroom;1-WH/III/Cuba/Chrono

WH/III/Cuba/JBNoland/dsm

J. C. KING, C/WH

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

SECRET

201-168871

SECRET

3 May 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : FI/Plans/Projects

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment, Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. It is requested that the contract of Arthur G. VAIVADA be amended to provide for an increase in salary from $5060.00 to $5915.00, effective 1 April 1956. It's further requested that the allowances be appropriately adjusted.

2. VAIVADA entered on duty with this organisation on 1 June 1949 as a contract agent. From June 1949 through August 1953 he was stationed in Costa Rica, where his record was outstanding and included the successful handling of a high level Communist Party penetration. He was subsequently given Headquarters training for several months and participated in PBSUCCESS.

3. VAIVADA has been in Cuba in his present capacity (P/A, AMPHODARCH Project) since July 1954. His performance there has continued to be outstanding. He has proved to be particularly adept at spotting and recruiting of agents and his work has been highly praised by the Chief of Station, Habana. In recommending renewal of the AMPHODARCH project recently, FI/Plans/Projects stated, with reference to VAIVADA, that he "has obviously been a valuable, deep cover agent handler during six years of service for WH." He had been qualified previously as the most valuable agent of the San Jose Station.

4. There are sufficient funds in the AMPHODARCH project (approved 13 December 1955 for the period 1 August 1955 through 31 July 1956) to provide for the above-requested increase in salary. Such an increase will be specifically provided for in the next project renewal request. VAIVADA has been at his present salary level since July 1954.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

APR 10 [illegible]

CONT PERS DIV

SECRET

X

SECRET

18 April 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Arthur G. VAIVADA

There follows information regarding the present status of Arthur G. VAIVADA, as requested by your division in a recent informal memorandum:

a. PCS Station - Habana

b. Marital-Dependency Status - Wife and two children (ages 5 and 7) living with subject in Habana.

c. Subject is currently receiving a quarters allowance of $2,100 per annum.

JAMES B. NOLAND
WH/III/Cuba

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - VAIVADA file

SECRET

201-168881

In connection with the information furnished on the following contract agent(s) regarding the taxability of Allowance Payments, the Contract Personnel Division is requesting the following information in order to adjust the contract to provide additional compensation to offset the increased tax liability.

NAME	INFORMATION REQUESTED
VAIVADA, Arthur C.	(a) PCS Station (b) Marital Status 1. Number of dependents 2. Location of dependents (c) Is he receiving a quarters allowance or does he have furnished quarters in lieu of an allowance.

Date:

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 August 1954, as amended.

Effective 1 April 1956, said contract, as amended, is further amended as follows:

(a) The figure $5000 in the first sentence of paragraph 1(a) is increased to $5915.

(b) The figure $2575 in the first sentence of paragraph 1(b) is increased to $2960.

(c) The figure $1920 in the first sentence of paragraph 1(c) is increased to $2175.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /s/
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

/s/

SECRET

AIR HKH-W-1607

MAR 30 1956

Chief of Station, Habana

Chief, WHD

Operational/KUTUBE
Proposed Promotion of Arthur G. VAIVADA .

The Headquarters desk feels that the performance of Arthur G. VAIVADA has been such as to warrant promotion from his present grade (equivalent to a GS-9) to the equivalent of a GS-11, and proposes to recommend such promotion if the field concurs. An early reply from the field will facilitate prompt action on this matter.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

26 March 1956

Distribution: 3 - Habana
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - RI

WH/III/Cuba/JBBoland/dsm

J. C. KING W. GALBRAITH

SECRET

201-168

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: WH/III/Cuba	TELEPHONE	NO.
		DATE 23 Feb. 1956

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
1. Central Cover Branch	1708	FEB 24 1956		√		?
2. attn: Ray Millard	2					C-1776
3.						
4. WH/III/Cuba Noland						memo to files (by 4) Millard not least bit enthusiastic about proposal set forth herein. Is working on polling cover which originally suggested by [illegible] and is apparently favored by all concerned. 17/4/56
5.						
6. Montag						
7.						
8.						
9.						
10.						
11.						for UAKWADA file
12.						
13.						1793
14.						1793
15.						201-168881

FORM NO. 610 1 APR 55 REPLACES FORM 51-10 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

8 Feb 1956.

COVER PREPARATION - (Arthur G. Vaivada)

In compliance with Station and Headquarters requests, I am submitting an outline of my efforts and plans for establishing a legitimate (and permanent) cover occupation that will be suitable for movement and operation almost anywhere in this hemisphere. It is my understanding that there are two (local) cover proposals up for consideration and these will not conflict in any way the plan outlined herein, but actually will contribute to the realization of it. That is, during my tour at this station, I can ostensibly develope and strengthen a career in writing to the extent that it may "stand alone" as cover occupation. It is also pertinent to make it clear at this time, that my aspirations for a career in fiction writing are personal, sincere, and not in any way based on a desire to establish a particular type of cover. For this reason, I have divided this outline in two parts, the first pertaining to my personal efforts and activities; the second being in the form of a proposal, available to me as a method of providing a writing career with a very legitimate appearance.

I - PALMER INSTITUTE OF AUTHORSHIP

When in the early part of 1955 it became obvious that my University cover was not only weak but also identified with my targets and thereby creating a security dilemma, I began exploring the possibilities of utilizing my secondary cover which was "street photography". Financially this started out well but soon became bogged down with labor and/or immigration technicalities. At this time I had simultaneously enrolled in the Palmer Institute of Authorship at 1680 N. Sycamore, Hollywood 28, California. Frankly, in the beginning, I had little incentive or interest other than taking a "crack" at something I had always desired, but as time and lessons have gone by, there is a very positive indication that I can make the grade. It is a one year course, considered quite competent and provides stepping stones into the publishing world. I am nearing completion of this course, have two 5000 word short stories submitted to publishers, one short story analyzed by the Institute and recommended for re-write and probable sale. My intentions are to try and "break the ice" in the fiction adventure at teen-age level. (Boy's Life, New Brunswick, N.J.)

II - CONTACTS IN PAPERBACK BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY:

When I realized that with very little "padding" such as contacts with paperback book publishers in addition to my legitimate correspondence with magazines, this writing career could be very adequate cover, I made the recommendation to the station some time in middle 1955.

10

COVER PREPARATION - (Arthur G. Vaivada) (Cont'd)

Along these same lines, I took advantage of the opportunity presented when an old friend and AAF companion came down on a visit in July 1955. Warrant Officer Francis Williams has been in the AISS (Air Intelligence) since 1940, actually one of the founders of the service and has written AISS technical bulletins for 15 years. Williams was practically present upon my entry into this organization (if not actually instrumental in my recruitment.) I discussed the plan in general terms with Williams and learned that one of his section AI Officers is currently in the publishing business. William s assures me that when the right time approaches, he can "arrange" a substantial contact with this company, with practically no security hazards. We have left this pending. ((His address: 5846 Access Road, Page Manor, Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio.))

While on a visit to San Jose, Costa Rica, I met and discussed this cover aspect with Arthur Gregor, currently a civilian employee of the Naval Air Station at Coco Solo, Panama Canal Zone. Art Gregor was considered by the station at San Jose (our station, that is) for recruitment in 1952. I submitted the complete Section I of the PRQ on him and we had a tentative arrangement that sometime in the future, whereever he might be, if approached by the organization, he would work or cooperate with a temporary project, what ever the case be. (Gregor is specializing in minerology at MIT, and shooting for a Masters at the Colorado School of Mining.) Gregor has an uncle who is in the paperback book business (publishing) and according to his appraisal, would not object to cooperating unwittingly to the proposal of such a contact. ((Gregor's address: Box 2655, Cristobal, Canal Zone.))

In conclusion: It is realized that all this wordage may look very nice, etc., but actually the accomplishment of such cover will depend on whether I can get into publication however minor it may be. The efforts to "pad" the existing authentic cover with the two projects above may sound "nebulous", but after all, outside of a tight professional league of staff writers (or immortals) writing is a nebulous undertaking. Finally, all of Part II here is submitted as a proposal, awaiting approval and dependent upon the success of Part I.

Arthur G. Vaivada

Arthur G. Vaivada

SECRET

Date:

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 August 1954, as amended.

Effective 1 January 1956, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting paragraphs one (1) and two (2) and all reference to Federal taxes and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of certain information and services, you will receive from the Government, payable in such an approved manner as you may direct in writing, the following:

(a) Compensation calculated at the rate of $5060 per annum; and

(b) Additional compensation for quarters procurement for you and your dependents presently calculated at the rate of $2575 per annum and applicable only to your initial permanent post of assignment overseas. As this additional compensation is based upon quarters costs at said post, it is subject to unilateral adjustment by the Government whenever warranted by a change in the factors affecting its initial establishment. Quarters will not be furnished you by the Government nor will you accept quarters provided by your cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement; and

(c) Additional compensation for cost of living expenses (other than quarters) for you and your dependents presently calculated at the rate of $1920 per annum and applicable only to your initial permanent post of assignment overseas. As this additional compensation is predicated upon the comparative cost of living between Washington, D.C. and your overseas post, your cover, family status and basic compensation, it is subject to unilateral adjustment by the Government whenever warranted by a change in the factors affecting its original establishment.

2. Taxes. (a) As your legal relationship to the Government is that of an independent contractor, all amounts paid directly or guaranteed by the Government under Paragraph one supra, are reportable as income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations.

(b) In view of the security considerations involved, the Government agrees, at your request, to withhold Federal income taxes from the monies due you under this agreement in an amount equivalent to the United States income tax withholding schedule based upon your taxable income hereunder and _____ present exemption(s). Sums so withheld will be paid over to

SECRET

201-165581

X

SECRET

the Internal Revenue Service. You acknowledge that this is an accommodation on the part of the Government and does not release you from fulfilling your obligations under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations. You will be instructed as to the method to be followed in making timely filing of returns, estimates and payments in order to preserve security.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Arthur G. Vaivada

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

AIR HKH-A-1793

Chief, WH 5 July 1955

Chief of Station, Habana

Agents and Projects/KUTUBE
Arthur G. Vaivada

REF: HKH-W-1213, 24 June 1955

In accordance with reference request, attached is Vaivada's contract amendment signed by him and witnessed by Stephen H. Karmany. A copy is being retained by the Station.

Claire B. Dombey

Attachment:
Contract Amendment (tripl.)

Distribution:
3 - Wash w/att.
1 - File (23-88)

1 July 1955
cbd

SECRET [illegible] 301.168881
~~19-6-3-434~~

COPY

SECRET

Air

HKH-W-1213

Chief of Station, Habana

24 JUN 1955

Chief, WHD

Agents and Projects/[illegible]
Contract Amendment for Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Four copies of the attached contract amendment are being forwarded to conform with the new KUBARK policy of accomodating Contract Agents by withholding income tax payments from their compensation. The payments to be withheld from their monthly taxable income will be an amount equivalent to that listed in the United States income tax withholding schedule based upon the number of exemptions claimed.

2. It is requested that VAIVADA sign all copies of the amendment and indicate thereon in the blank space provided, the number of exemptions he wishes to claim. It is suggested that VAIVADA claim as few exemptions as possible in order that a sufficient amount of money may be withheld to cover the entire tax.

✓ 3. One copy of the amendment should be retained by Station Habana and the remaining copies are to be returned to Headquarters.

J. C. KING

Attachment:
4 copies of Contract Amendment

17 June 1955

WH/III/PAArsenault:veb

Distribution:
3 - Habana w/att.
1 - RI w/o att.
1 - WH/Mailroom w/o att.
1 - WH/III/Chrono w/o att.
1 - Subject

201-168881

J. C. KING
CWH

SECRET

O. M. DOERFLINGER
CWH/III

Vaivada

✓ see HKH A-1793 for reply

SECRET

NOTE TO: WH/FI/Cuba

The attached amendment is forwarded to you for pouching to the field to conform with the new Agency policy in accommodating Contract Agents by withholding from their monthly taxable income amounts equivalent to the United States income tax withholding schedule based upon the number of exemptions claimed.

It is suggested that you forward a note with the amendment suggesting that the individual claim as few exemptions as possible in order that sufficient monies may be withheld to cover the entire tax.

JOHN L. BISCHOFF
Chief, Special Contracting,
Allowances and Processing
Staff

Return Orig & 1 cc of amendment to SCAPS.

basic document to HKHW-1213

SECRET

Pers

15 January 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operation, DD/P

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAITARA (P)

REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 28 December from Chief, I&R, to Chief of Operations, DD/P, same subject.

1. This is an interim memorandum regarding the subject matter. With respect to paragraph 4. of the referenced memorandum, the WH Division is trying to obtain a factual written statement regarding the circumstances under which the original advance of $1,500 was made to the subject. Circumstances regarding this advance were given verbally to Mr. Warren Dean of the Inspection & Review Staff in October. The difficulty in providing a written statement at this time is due to our inability to reach the officers in PBSUCCESS who authorized the advance. At the time of the advance the authorizing officers did not report directly to the Chief, WH Division.

2. With respect to paragraph 4.b. as to why the money has not been collected, we find that the PBSUCCESS Finance Officer did take immediate action to provide for the collection of this advance. In order to pay back this advance the subject requested that his salary be paid in the field rather than at Headquarters. We now find that the Finance Division, as of this date, has not taken the action requested.

3. This has been discussed on numerous occasions with the Finance Division with the assurance that it would be acted upon immediately. The Chief, Finance Division, has been advised of this matter and is taking the necessary action to facilitate the collection of the advance.

4. A detailed report as requested will be furnished as soon as possible.

J. C. King
C/WH

WHD/AD/RJP:mo

Distribution:
  Orig. & 1-addressee
  1-Finance Division
  1-Inspector General
  1-I&R Staff

1-C/WH/Admin

201-168881

SECRET

Mr. Arthur G. Valvada

Dear Mr. Valvada :

Reference is made to your contract (~~[illegible]~~) effective 1 August 1954 with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, for the (purchase) (~~[illegible]~~) of information and services of a confidential nature.

Effective 1 January 1955, said contract (~~[illegible]~~) is (~~[illegible]~~) amended by deleting therein all reference to your payment of Federal taxes and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

> "While it is recognized that you are an independent contractor, the Government at your request and in view of security considerations involved agrees to withhold from the monthly taxable income due you under this contract which is payable on and after 1 January 1955 amounts equivalent to the United States income tax withholding schedule based upon 1/0 (2) present exemption(s). Sums so withheld will be paid over to the Internal Revenue Service. You acknowledge that this is an accommodation on the part of the Government and does not relieve you from fulfilling your obligations under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations. You will be instructed as to the method to be followed in making timely filing of returns, estimates and payments in order to preserve security."

All other terms and conditions of the contract (~~[illegible]~~) remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Arthur G. Vaivada

WITNESS: Stephen H Kenney

APPROVED:

/s/ ______________

SECRET

1 Jan. 55

201-168881

AIR SECRET HKH-A-1310

Chief, WHD 15 December 1954

Chief of Mission, Habana INFO: COS Guatemala
COM Mexico

Operational

Angel BOAN ACOSTA

DESENSITIZED

1. On about 20 November 1954, Arthur G. VAIVADA (Identity A) met Subject by chance on the street in Habana. Vaivada states that he knew Subject from February to May of 1954 in Guatemala City where they lived in the same apartment building. Apparently Vaivada's wife was of considerable assistance to Sra. BOAN ACOSTA when the latter was sick and by the time Vaivada left Guatemala, a fairly good friendship had arisen between the two families. Sr. Boan Acosta was cultivated by Vaivada because of Boan Acosta's known high level CP contacts in Guatemala. Apparently Boan Acosta was of some assistance to Vaivada at the University of Guatemala.

2. Angel Boan Acosta is a Cuban, born in April 1925 at Camaguey, Cuba. He is currently a political writer for the weekly "Semanario", an anti-Batista magazine. He is married to Iraida MONTALVO of Las Villas, Cuba and has one child six months of age. They are currently residing with a sister-in-law in Santos Suarez, Habana. Subject was more or less an exile after 10 March 1952 because of his opposition to Batista. He went to Mexico first, and then received a fairly well paid job in the Government communist radio headquarters in Guatemala, where he was a political commentator and radio script writer.

3. Vaivada plans to continue here in Cuba his friendship with Subject with the idea of obtaining some local leftistyouth contacts of value. Vaivada does not believe subject is aware of Vaivada's employment by KUBARK or PBPRIME.

4. This Mission's files indicate subject and a number of communists and communist sympathisers signed an anti-Batista declaration in 1952, according to the communist newspaper, Hoy.

5. The Mission would appreciate any information tending to confirm subject's communist affiliations, or indicating that Subject is aware of Vaivada's employment by PBPRIME.

HMMA-2540
no info on any

Attachments:
1 separate cover enclosure (to Mexico & Guat)

Stephen H. Karmany

Distribution:
3 - Wash
1 - Mexico w/encl.
1 - Guatemala w/encl.
1 - Files

201-168881

10 December 1954 SHK/emp

SECRET

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-26

SECRET

AIR HKHW-778

AUG 20 1954

: Chief of Mission, Habana

: Chief, WHD

-Operational

-AMPHODARCH

Reference: HAVA-926 (IN-25759); DIR 10892; DIR 10893

1. Operational clearance has been obtained for Arthur G. VAIVADA on 22 July 1954 as a replacement for Wallace C. RIKON in Project AMPHODARCH.

2. VAIVADA has been a KUBARK contract agent since July 1949. His initial assignment was in Project HUMANOID in Costa Rica, where under a student cover he achieved a high-level penetration of the local BGGYPSY organization. He was recalled to Headquarters in the fall of 1953 to participate in a similar project in Argentina, which could not be carried out because of refusal of the Argentine Government to grant him a visa. Recently he was in PBSUCCESS with additional duties as a cutout under Project ESCROW. He has completed three years of work at the University of Costa Rica and has one more year to finish for his B. A. degree in economics. His previous work as a contract agent has been excellent.

3. VAIVADA's new contract becomes effective on 1 August 1954 and runs for two years. His salary will be $5060.00 annually (GS-9) and will be entitled to an equivalent quarters allowance. Transportation for VAIVADA, his dependents, and household effects, together with per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of the travel to Cuba is authorized. He is entitled to death and disability benefits under the Federal Employees Compensation Act, to continuance of pay and allowances under the Missing Persons Act, and to 14 days of annual leave per calendar year. Although VAIVADA is expected to get his B. A. degree in one year at the University of Habana, it is expected that the second year of his contract will be spent in some type of graduate work at the same institution.

J. C. KING C. L. BOOKER

SECRET

201-168881

4. During the month of August the following expenses for VAIVADA are anticipated in addition to the $450.00 monthly normally incurred by RIKOH under Project AMPHODARCH:

Compensation (GS-9)	$ 421.67
Allowances (post differential)	137.50
Travel in Cuba	25.00
Operational expenses	83.34
Transfer allowance	150.00
Living quarters	150.00
Transportation for VAIVADA and family to Cuba	340.23
TOTAL	$1,307.74

5. It is anticipated that the breakdown of annual expences for Project AMPHODARCH will be as follows:

Compensation (GS-9)	$ 5,060.00
Allowances (post differential)	1,650.00
Travel in Cuba	300.00
Operational Expenses	1,000.00
Living quarters	1,800.00
Transfer allowance (August 1954 only)	150.00
Transportation for VAIVADA and family (August 1954 only)	340.23
Tuition, books, and related expenses (September 1954 only)	300.00
	$10,600.23

The Mission is encouraged to make its own comments on the above expenses.

6. On 28 July 1954 VAIVADA left here for Gainesville, Florida, for a discussion with Henry C. Zbdoner. After obtaining his visa, VAIVADA was to leave Miami for Habana on 31 July. Upon arrival, he would register at the Packard Hotel and would stay there for a few days while looking for more permanent quarters. He was to be contacted by telephone the first time. At this time the Case Officer would use the one-time pseudonym of Sydney Stevens.

7. The Medical Office at Headquarters has found VAIVADA physically qualified for full duties.

8. Project AMPHODARCH is up for renewal on 1 September 1954. The Headquarter's desk plans to have the period covered by the project correspond to that of

VAIVADA's contract with the termination coming on 31 July 1955. At that time the project may be renewed for a year to coincide with the second year of VAIVADA's present contract. The Mission will be notified when approval is granted.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

10 August 1954

Distribution:

3 - Habana
1 - WH/III/Chrono ✓
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - RI/D&P

WH/III/JCurran/jwt

SECRET

Date:

Mr. Arthur G. Valvada

Dear Mr. Valvada:

Reference is made to your contract, as amended, effective 1 September 1953 with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, for the purchase of information and services of a confidential nature.

Effective 31 July 1954, said contract is hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto and in lieu thereof the following contract is substituted:

The United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $5060.00 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to CIA. No taxes will be withheld from this amount, but it will be your responsiblity to report such income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations.

2. Allowances. Effective upon your arrival at your permanent post of duty overseas, you will be entitled to: (a) A Quarters allowance equivalent to that granted a GS-9 Government employee stationed at the same permanent post of duty. This allowance will be at the maximum rates prescribed in the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas). No accounting for this allowance will be required by CIA. In the event that Quarters are provided by your cover facility, you will not be entitled to the Quarters allowance herein indicated.

(b) Cost of living allowances in conformance with the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas).

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for the following travel and transportation expenses:

(a) For you from Washington, D.C. to your permanent post of duty overseas.

(b) For your dependents and your household effects from your old to your new permanent post of duty overseas.

(c) For you alone for authorized travel within your operational area.

(d) For you, your dependents and your household effects from your permanent post of duty overseas to your place of recorded residence upon the satisfactory completion of the terms of this contract or any renewal thereof.

31 July 54
201-168881 X

You will entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with CIA regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition, books, entertainment and the purchase of information as specifically approved by CIA. Such funds will be subject to accounting in substantial compliance with CIA regulations.

5. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by CIA in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to fourteen (14) calendar days' leave per contract year. Such leave may be accrued during the term of this contract or any renewal hereof but payment in lieu of unused leave will not be authorized. Such leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of CIA.

6. Cover. It is anticipated that you will undertake certain cover employment in the course of your performance under this agreement. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

7. Offset. Any sums or substantially similar benefits or allowances received from your cover facility (if you use the G.I. Bill of Rights any allowances received by you under said bill except tuition payments) will be used to offset those due under this contract by the Government. Sums, similar benefits or allowances thus received are acknowledged and agreed to be payment by the Government within the provisions of this contract. You will report all sums or substantially similar benefits received at least every six (6) months during the term of this contract.

8. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by CIA to evidence this relationship.

9. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status, except as specifically enumerated herein.

10. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by CIA from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation

of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

11. Instructions. Instructions received by you from CIA in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

12. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

13. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 August 1954 and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by CIA either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice to you from CIA, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from CIA accepted by you. In the event of voluntary termination for cause by CIA prior to expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ______________________
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Arthur G. Vaivada

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

R.L. Malcolm

ORIG : R. L. MALCOLM
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 28 JULY 1954

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : CHIEF OF MISSION, HAVANA
FROM : DIRECTOR, CIA
CONF : WH 5
INFO : COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/PLANS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 10893 (OUT 65228) 1721Z 29 JUL 54 ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SHAVA CITE: DIR

RE: DIR: 10892 (OUT 65227) PARA 2

TRUE NAME IS MR. ROSS L. CROZIER.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168891

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

C. L. BOOKER
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SCO (Miller)

DATE: 29 July 1954

FROM : Special Support Staff, Medical Office

SUBJECT: VAIVADA, Arthur G. (p)

Subject has been evaluated by the Medical Office and found physically qualified for full duties (general).

E. J. Corrigan

E. J. CORRIGAN
Administrative Officer

MO/EJC:mjs

Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - WH/3 (Malcolm)
1 - File

SECRET

201-168581

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COVERT PERSONNEL SERVICES FORM
INSTRUCTION FOR AGENT PAYMENT

TO: Finance Division

Date 28 July 1954

1. Pending my departure from Headquarters, I authorize the Finance Division to pay all monies due me in cash to my designated Case Officer or his authorized successor for delivery to me.

2. Effective upon my departure, I authorize and request that payment of monies due me be made as follows:

a. $__________ (even dollar amount) to be paid to me by my overseas station. The first payment to be made on or about ____________, covering the pay period beginning ______________ and ending __________.

b. The balance or all as the case may be, of compensation, allowances, and other monies due me to be deposited in the - regular - special - (cross out one) checking account (savings accounts and Bank Foreign Branch accounts not permitted) as follows:

(1) Name of account as it appears on bank records * . . . . . . Ross L. Crozier
(2) Address on record with bank . P.O. Box 779, San Jose, Costa Rica
(3) Name of bank. . . . . National City Bank of New York
(4) Address of bank . . . . 55 Wall Street
(street and number)
New York 15, N. Y.
(City and State)

3. **Special provisions:**

Total salary and allowances to be paid into bank account.

Arthur G. Vairalda
Signature (Pseudonym)

* If checks are to be drawn by more than one person, account should be joint.

Received Finance Division:
By ____________________
Date ____________________

301-168881

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COVERT PERSONNEL SERVICES FORM
JOB SUMMARY

Pseudonym Arthur G. VAIVADA
Division WH/III
Project [illegible]
Case Officer R. L. Malcolm
Date 22 July 1954

(If this information is contained in an approved Project, this form need not be completed.)

I. Duties: (General Description of the Duties to be performed)
Penetration of the Cuban Communist Party and Communist fronts at the University of Havana.

II. Qualifications: (Indicate qualifications applicable to assigned duties)

a. Experience: Four years experience as a contract agent in WHD

b. Education: (Check) High School ___ College X Post Graduate ___

c. Language: English and Spanish - fluent

d. Other:

III. Present job and salary:
Formerly received $4205 plus allowances. This is to be raised to $5060 per annum plus allowances under new contract.

IV. Cover Activity: PROPOSED ESTABLISHED (Cross out one). Give general description, i.e., Proprietary, Subsidized, Cultural, Educational, Commercial, Nominal, Military, etc.
Subject was under student cover in previous project. This cover will be continued in the new project

201-168881

R. L. Malcolm
SIGNATURE OF PROJECT OFFICER

R. L. Malcolm, WHD/III

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 59-83A
FEB 1953

(4)

CB

SECRET

PROJECT AMENDMENT

CRYPTONYM AMPHODARCH

DIVISION WHD

STATION HAVANA, CUBA

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Roy L. Malcolm

Room No. 2104 Qtrs. I

Extension 2555

Date 22 July 1954

1. It is requested that an amendment to the Subject Project be approved wherein contract agent Arthur G. VAIVADA (P) will replace contract agent Wallace C. RIKON (P). Operational clearance for the use of VAIVADA in Project AMPHODARCH was granted 21 July 1954 (O.C. #25507).

2. Project AMPHODARCH is already approved for $5400 for the year ending 31 August 1954. This amendment will increase the cost of AMPHODARCH during the remaining month of this approved period by ~~[illegible]~~ $1232.74. RIKON'S compensation, allowances, and expenses for the same period is figured to be $450.00. A breakdown of VAIVADA's expenses for the period 1 August through 31 August 1954 is as follows:

Compensation	(GS-9)	421.67
Allowances		137.50
Travel	in Cuba	25.00
Operational Expenses		83.34
Transfer allowance		150.00
Living quarters		150.00
Transportation	to Cuba for Vaivada and family →	340.23
TOTAL		$1307.74

3. For a successful substitution of VAIVADA in place of RIKON in Project AMPHODARCH it is necessary that the two contract agents be in contact in Habana during the period 1-31 August 1954. Immediately following the submission of this amendment covering that period, a project renewal will be drawn up contemplating the use of VAIVADA in the project on a yearly basis with at least a two-year tour in view.

4. The general objectives, targets, and cover will remain the same in the project. As a part of the cover backstopping, a notional scholarship grant of $120 per month will be "awarded" VAIVADA by the DTEMBARCO mechanism. Complete correspondence and documentation on this grant will be carried by VAIVADA when he goes to Cuba.

5. Arthur G. VAIVADA has been a contract agent in the employ of KUBARK since July 1949, working in the HUMANOID Project in Costa Rica, and more recently in Project PBSUCCESS with additional duties as cutout under Project ESCROW. VAIVADA has one more year of academic work to finish in order to receive an A.B. degree in Economics. This furnishes a logical and natural reason for him to matriculate at Habana University, with which are associated the main tasks, targets, and objectives of Project AMPHODARCH. His previous work as a contract agent has been excellent and it is felt that with the substitution of ~~AG~~ VAIVADA for RIKON, a big improvement in the production of the project may be expected during the coming year. VAIVADA, a U. S. citizen married to a Costa Rican

1+1 for FI
1 for Cont. Office
[illegible] 59-40 - budget sheet

Cuban contacts than RIKON who is a Puerto Rican, as there exists a certain amount of antagonism between Cubans and Puerto Ricans. VALVADA also has the advantage of having had three years of university work in Costa Rica.

6. It is the consensus of opinion among the interested officers at Headquarters and in the field that Wallace C. RIKON should be given the opportunity of serving elsewhere in Latin America in a locality and situation where he will have greater opportunity to produce results. Plans are now being drawn up to shift RIKON to another country in September 1954.

J. C. KING, CWH

Approved: ______________________
Chief, FI

____
Date

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Case Officer R. L. Malcolm
Division WHD
Tel. Ext. 2555
Date 22 July 1954

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

I. General
A. Pseudonym Arthur G. VAIVADA B. Project AMPECDARCH C. Allot. No. 3517-014
D. Previous CIA Pseudonyms or Aliases
E. Category (Contract Employee, Contract Agent, etc.) Contract Agent
F. Is individual presently engaged or has he ever been engaged by CIA or its allied activities in any capacity? Yes Describe Contract Agent since 1949
G. Security Clearance: Type Operational Date O.C. #25507 21 July 1954
H. Permanent Post (City and Country) Havana, Cuba

II. Personal Data
A. Citizenship U.S. B. Age 32 C. Military Status Veteran
D. Legal Residence (City and Country) Sterling, Illinois
E. Current Residence (City and State) Washington, D.C.
F. Previous Years of Government Service (Military and Civilian) over 12 years
G. Has a draft deferment been obtained by CIA? None needed

III. Compensation

	CIA	COVER	
A. Basic	$ 5060.00	$	( )
B. Additional (Post Differential)	$	$	( )
C. Profit participation or bonus	$	$	( )
D. Total	$ 5060.00	$	( )

IV. Allowances: (Normally granted only to residents of the United States)

	CIA	COVER	
A. Living - Quarters	$ 1800	$	( )
B. Cost-of-Living	$	$ 1450	( )
C. Other	$	$ 150 (Transfer)	( )
D. Total	$	$	( )
E. Basis (1)	(2)	(3)	

V. Payments
What portion of compensation and/or allowances will be paid by cover? None

VI. Operational Expenses
A. Purchase of Information: B. Entertainment
C. Use of Personal Vehicle Basis
D. Other Cover Expenses (Univ. Tuition Books, etc.) Opera. Travel

VII. Travel
A. With/Without Dependents B. Household Effects C. Personal Vehicle
D. If With Dependents, state Relationship, Citizenship and birthdate of children:
1. Two children, both U. S. citizens.
3. born in 1949 and 1951 respectively
E. Expenses will be paid by: Cover CIA X
F. Basis: 1. Per CIA Regs X 2. Sub. Compliance 3. Other
Transportation to Cuba for VAIVADA and family

VIII. Miscellaneous Benefits
A. Death Benefits: Per F.E.C.A. X Other
B. Disability Benefits: Per F.E.C.A. X Other
C. Missing Persons Act X D. Life Insurance E. Hospitalization
F. Annual Leave X G. Sick Leave X H. Creditable Service
I. Rehabilitation Rights J. Other

IX. Term
A. Duration (Days, months, years) two years B. Effective Date 1 Aug 1954
C. Renewable: Yes X No D. Termination Notice (No. of days) 30
E. Forfeiture of return travel for resignation prior to Contract Term: Yes X No

X. Will individual take title to CIA property? Yes X No

XI. Will individual work under "controlled conditions", i.e. set office hours, supervision, etc.? Yes No X

XII. Additional or unusual requirements, justifications or explanations

SENIOR STAFF APPROVING OFFICER

DIVISION APPROVING OFFICER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. C-25507

TO: Chief, WH

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of Arthur G. VAIVADA as follows:

As requested in memorandum dated 19 July 1954

This clearance is for the specific use set forth above, and is based upon an appraisal of information currently available to this office. It must be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that derogatory information, if any, has been considered and evaluated for the instant purpose only.

Date JUL 22 1954

FI/STC/SPB
cr

201-168881

SECRET

FORM NO. 59-47 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED
1 MAR 54

(9)

STC/SPB 19 July 1954

Chief, WHD

Request for Operational Clearance for use of Arthur G.
VAIVADA in Project AMPHODARCH

1. Reference is made to Operational Clearance No. C-25507, dated 28 April 1954, wherein the Subject was cleared for use in Project PBSUCCESS.

2. It is requested that Subject now be cleared for use in Project AMPHODARCH.

3. PRQ Parts I & II have been submitted to your office. Green List Check No. 9467 was submitted to STD and this office was informed by phone on 16 July 1954 that no derogatory information on Subject was on record with STD.

J. C. KING
C/WH

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - addressee
- 1 - Chrono
- 1 - AMPHODARCH file
- 1 - VAIVADA file

RLMalcolm/jw

201-168881

16 JULY 54.

MEMO FOR THE FILE:

SUBJECT: Commercial Photography (VAIVADA)

1) By definition this type of photography is in a class by itself. Simplified, it is nothing more than a man with a 35 mm flash camera moving rapidly throughout industry, commerce and any institutional activity, concentrating on the "individual at his job." There is no contract with the subject photographed, each operator, secretary or official is "shot" with or without warning at his work. Within 24 hours the work is completed and the post card size, black and white copy is shown to the subject. Actually maintaining records, our experience has shown that approximately 93% of all shots are sold on the first exhibition.

2) Technically, the project is based on 3 very important precepts:—

I- Low unit cost of production is absolutely necessary since there is always a calculated sales loss. In flash photography,

201-168871

The use of conventional bulbs pushes unit cost way up (to say nothing of low operating speeds). Therefore it is necessary to use electronic flash equipment i.e., unit cost per flash = $.0075 ______

II - Highly Standardized photography and processing. Using one film (Kodak Plus X), one paper (Kodabromide F-2,3) and two developers always. (Dk-20 finegrain + D-72) One size, (postcard), continuity of framing and extension of enlargement, equal density in negatives.

III - The professional capacity to exploit a situation rapidly, establishing a verbal contract with the immediate management of an organization and the ability to take your pictures in very rapid succession while maintaining a high standard of quality in your negatives.

3) EQUIPMENT + COSTS:

1- Camera, 35 mm, preferrably a sharp and fast lense. f/2 XENON er. chgble 35 + 50mm lenses.	$120.00
1- Electronic Flash Unit, storage bttry type, 90 watt sec. out-put minimum.	75.00
1- ENLARGER, 35mm, single condenser, auto-focus, of very good quality.	145.00
3- TRAYS, 11 x 14 in. Hard rubber	20.00
1- TRIMMER, 8 x 10 (Kodak)	10.00
VARIOUS ITEMS allied equip. such as thermometer, scales, sponges, easel; electrical wiring, etc.	30.00
APPROX. TOTAL EQUIP.	$ 400.00

4) So far, this has been treated with a purely commercial point of view — in our work — the advantages are many:

a) All equipment may be carried from country to country in one small foot locker or suit case. May be set up and operating in 48 hours by one man — no labor problems, no security risks — adequate income appearances. May be taken down for movement in one hour.

b) Provides business contact in almost any point one might decide to penetrate, and almost at any time —

c) Absolute freedom of movement at all hours. Work if you want to — take care of other business when necessary.

Arthur G. Vaivala

SECRET

14 July, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

SUBJECT : OCR-________-B/WHD/Branch III, Forwarding Part I, PRQ, on Rose L. Crozier

1. Forwarded herewith is Part I, PRQ, on Rose L. Crozier

2. a. A Green List name check (Form 51-125) has been requested.

b. The Registry and WHD operational files have been checked and no information of investigative value or security interest was found on the subject.

c. Local Field Traces contain no derogatory information.

3. Part II, PRQ, is being forwarded under memorandum for STC/SPB OCR-________-A/WHD/Branch III, dated 14 July 1954

4. Additional comments (if any):

J. C. KING, Chief, WHD

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

~~14 July~~, 195~~4~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPC/SPB

SUBJECT : OCR-________-A/WHD/Branch ~~III~~, Forwarding Part II, PRQ, on ~~Arthur G. Vaivada (pseudonym)~~

REFERENCE : OCR-________-B/WHD/Branch ~~III~~, dated ~~14~~ ~~July 1954~~, Forwarding Part I, PRQ.

Previous OC obtained in No. 68, dated 19 July 1949, for project [illegible].

1. Forwarded ~~herewith is Part II, PRQ, on~~ ~~Arthur G. Vaivada~~

---

2. Operational....Security....Clearance is requested in order to employ ~~Arthur G. Vaivada~~ as (indicate: US, ~~or indigenous~~; witting or ~~unwitting~~; form and value of emoluments; FI ~~or PP~~; and ~~oral or~~ written contract.)

To receive a salary of $5060.00 annually, plus allowances.
To replace RIKON in project AMPRODURCH.

J. C. KING, Chief, WH

SECRET

301-168881

SECRET
THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED: SECURITY INFORMATION

1. SUBJECT (NAME, IN ROMAN LETTERS AND IN NORMAL ORDER) PRIORITY **Ross Lester CROZIER**	**RESPONSE TO GREEN LIST REQUEST NO.** 9467
2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC. Lester Ross CROZIER	DATE OF REQUEST 13 July 1954 REQUEST FROM NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER R.L. Malcolm OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/III ROOM, BUILDING 2104 Quarters I EXTENSION 2555
3. BIRTH DATE 20 June 1922	
4. BIRTH PLACE De Kalb, Illinois	14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED? X YES ___ NO
5. CITIZENSHIP U.S.	15. TYPE OF REQUEST ___ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED X ADDITIONAL DATA ___ COVER NAME
6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION Now in Washington awaiting assignment to Cuba.	16. INTEREST IN SUBJECT ___ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY X OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE ___ OTHER
7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION Previous experience has been in intelligence work with the armed forces of the U. S. College education at the Univ. of Costa Rica.	17. INFORMATION REQUIRED Derogatory.

8. MILITARY SERVICE

SERVICE ARM, COUNTRY	SPECIALTY	LOCATION	DATES
U.S. Army	Operations and intelligence -	U. S. and CBI Theatre	1940-45
U.S. Air Force		Albrook Field, Canal Zone	1946-49

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Stevedore and labor foreman for U.S. Navy	Canal Zone	Jan.-Apr. '46
CIA	Panama and Costa Rica	1949-to date



10. DESCRIPTION (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)
brown white

11. SPOUSE (IF
Arger Costa Rican

12. OTHER MEMBERS
Two small istered with the U.S. Embassy as
U. S. ci

13. OTHER SIGNIF
Catholic

ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

201-168881

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/STD. SEE CSI-10-7

FORM NO. 51-125
MAR 1953

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TO: R. Malcolm

12 Jul 54
DATE

FROM: FI/STD Jw

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/STD BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, STD IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☑ FI/STD HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF A CONTINUING SEARCH WAS REQUESTED IN SECTION 14, INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. Phoned, 16 Jul. 54.

E. ☑ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

Green List, FOT, 7 June 49.

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/STD.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/STD THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/STD'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/STD

DATE

FROM:
NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

Pan-American Foundation, Inc.
P.O. Box 3587
University Station,
Gainesville, Florida
June 30, 1954

Dear Mr. Crozier,

I am pleased to inform you that the council of the Foundation has met and agreed to grant your request for assistance for the amount of $2500 for the school year 1954-1955, which will commence upon a receipt of notice of your acceptance by the University of Habana. The Foundation, however, reserves the right to cancel the grant upon due notice, a provision which I am sure you will understand.

All of us here hope that you may find your work at the University of Habana both agreeable and profitable, and that you will comply without interest in you by furnishing brief periodic reports of your work there.

In event it should not be too inconvenient for you to stop at Gainesville on your way to Habana, I should be pleased to meet you personally.

Sincerely yours,

A. Curtis Wilgus
Director

SECRET

301-168881

14-00000

ORIG : T.J.DESMOND
UNIT : WH III
EXT : 3229
DATE : 29 JUNE 1954

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : CHIEF OF MISSION, SAN JOSE
FROM : DIRECTOR, CIA
CONF : WH 4
INFO : DD/P-ADMIN, FI/ADMIN, PP 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 07067 (OUT 58460) 1242Z 30 JUN 54 ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SANJ

CITE: DIR

REF: SANJ 1282 (IN 23201)

CALL REPUBLIC 7-3814 BETWEEN NINE A.M. AND FOUR P.M. ON ANY WORKING DAY AFTER ARRIVAL WASH. ASK FOR IDEN.

END OF MESSAGE

file Vivaracha

301-168881

JCKing
J. C. KING
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Charles L Bowen
for C. M. DOERFLINGER
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : T.J. DESMOND
UNIT : WH III
EXT : 3229
DATE : 29 JUNE 1954

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : CHIEF OF MISSION, SAN JOSE

FROM : DIRECTOR, CIA

CONF : WH 4

INFO : DD/P-ADMIN, FI/ADMIN, PP 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 07068 (OUT 58461) 1242Z 30 JUN 54 ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SANJ CITE: DIR

REF: DIR 07067 (OUT 58460)

IDEN - TIH.

END OF MESSAGE

file
[illegible]

201-168881

J. C. King
J. C. KING
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Charles L Burke
J. O. M. DOERFLINGER
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 28 JUNE 54

SECRET

ROUTING

1	Desmond	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 4

INFO : DD/P-ADMIN, FI/ADMIN, PP 2, FI/RI 2

SANJ 1282 (IN 23201) 0519Z 22 JUNE 54 ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR CITE: SSANJ

RE: DIR 06430 (OUT 57165)

1. SUBJECT REF PLANNING DEPART TO MIAMI 5 JULY VIA LACSA.

2. WILL PROCURE NEW PASSPORT LOCALLY FOR SELF AND SEPARATE ONES FOR CHILDREN SINCE OLD ONE ALMOST EXPIRED.

3. FAMILY REMAINING SAN JOSE PENDING SUBJECTS ARRIVAL AT NEW POST.

4. SUBJECT WILL PURCHASE ONE WAY TICKET TO MIAMI ONLY TO PREVENT LOCALS BECOMING AWARE TRUE DESTINATION. WILL PURCHASE BALANCE PASSAGE AND ARRANGE RESERVATIONS TO HQS.

5. SUBJECT BEING GIVEN 30 DOLLARS TRAVEL ADVANCE.

6. CABLE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] folder

R Vivanda

SECRET

201.168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

(6)

The Pan-American Foundation
Box 3587
University Station,
Gainesville, Florida
June 21, 1954

Dear Mr. Crozier,

The Pan-American Foundation wishes to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated June 15, together with the enclosed.

The committee which decides upon the fellowships will meet at the end of the month, at which time the result of its decisions will be made known to you.

Sincerely yours,

A. Curtis Wilgus
Director

SECRET

201-168851

(5)

Apartado 779
San Jose, Costa Rica
June 15, 1954

The Pan American Foundation, Inc.
Box 3587,
University Station,
Gainesville, Florida

Dear Mr. Wilgus,

Having received your letter dated June 7, 1954 , I am returning the enclosed application form completed, and a transcript of credits from the University of Costa Rica stating that I have satisfactorily completed my course work there. Since I have only one copy of this transcript, I request that it be returned after the foundation has decided upon my application.

I hope what I am submitting will be sufficient for your purposes.

Sincerely yours,

Ross L. Crozier

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. C-25507

TO: Chief, WH

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of Arthur C. VALLADA as follows:

As requested in memo of 27 April 1954 this clearance supersedes that of 19 July 1949 and permits subject's use under Project PBSUCCESS. Further, this clearance is so amended to allow for Subject's additional duties as cutout under Project ESCROW.

As requested in memorandum dated 27 April 1954

This clearance is for the specific use set forth above, and is based upon an appraisal of information currently available to this office. It must be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that derogatory information, if any, has been considered and evaluated for the instant purpose only.

Date APR 28 1954

FI/STC/SPB

TC/cr

SECRET

FORM NO. 59-47 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED
1 MAR 54

(9)

(4)

Pan American Foundation, Inc.
P.O. Box 3587
University Station,
Gainesville, Florida
June 7, 1954

Ross L. Crozier
Apto. 779
San Jose, Costa Rica

Dear Mr. Crozier,

I have just received with interest your letter of May 31 in which you requested information about the scholarships granted by the Pan-American Foundation to continue your studies in economics at the University of Habana for the school year 1954-1955.

The information which you submitted in your letter indicates that you are qualified to be considered for a scholarship. But before any action can be taken, you must complete the enclosed application form and also submit a transcript of credits from the university previously attended.

For your information the scholarship can be extended to cover graduate work. The scholarships granted by the Foundation make provision for food and housing sufficient for both you and your family, though not necessarily for the same amount as you have indicated. You are advised to submit the information requested by June 30, which the final date for applicants for the coming school year.

Sincerely yours,

A. Curtis Wilgus
Director

SECRET

201-161851

(3)

Apto 779
San Jose, Costa Rica
May 31, 1954

The Pan-American Foundation, Inc.
Box 3587,
University Station,
Gainesville, Florida, U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Wilgus,

As a student of economics with special emphasis on the Latin American areas, I wrote you in the letter dated 17 May for information about obtaining a scholarship through your organization for continuing my studies in economics at the University of Habana in Cuba. I should like to begin work there for the school year 1954-1955.

As to my qualifications, I have attended the School of Economics Sciences at the University of Costa Rica from 1949 through 1953. In all my previous courses I have done above average, as can be attested by the schools concerned.

My present desire is to continue my study of economics at the University of Habana for one year, or as long as it may be deemed necessary to obtain a Bachelor of Science degree in economics. I am also interested in the possibility of having the scholarship renewed at the end of the period, so that I may be able to begin graduate work in economics. Because I am a married man with two small children, I would like to know whether the scholarship granted would be sufficient to cover the cost of good and housing in addition to tuition, books, and the normal academic expenses, which I estimate to be about $3000.00 annually.

As to my personal history, I am a United States citizen and shall be 32 years old in June. I have served in the United States Army and Air Force between 1940 and 1949, with the exception of an eight month period in 1945 and 1946. The areas in which I served are India and Burma in World War II, and Panama after 1946. Because of my long residence in Panama and Costa Rica I speak Spanish fluently, as does my wife who is of Costa Rican nationality. As mentioned before, I have two young children born in 1949 and 1951 respectively.

I realize the above information may be insufficient in order to determine whether I qualify for a scholarship, and I should be glad to provide any additional information that you may require. Please also send me whatever forms necessary for making formal application for a scholarship.

Sincerely yours,

Ross L. Crozier

201-168881

AIR POUCH

HUL-A- 910

DESENSITIZED RYBAT/PBSUCCESS/SECRET

26 MAY 1954

Chief of Station, Guatemala

LINCOLN

INFO: Wash

Administrative
Report on Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Since you no longer contemplate using Arthur G. VAIVADA, ~~would~~ you please write a report on his tour of duty with Guatemala Station, and prepare a personnal evaluation?

2. This action is to be completed at your convenience and is not to interfere with importent operational duties.

JEROME G. DUNBAR

JGD/b

24 May 1954

Distribution:
Guat - 2
Wash - 2 ✓
Files - 3

DESENSITIZED/PBSUCCESS/SECRET

201-163881

The Pan-American Foundation
Inc.
Box 3587,
University Station,
Gainesville, Florida, U.S.A
May 24, 1954

Ross L. Crozier
Apartado 7[illegible]9
San Jose, Costa Rica

Dear Mr. Crozier,

The Foundation has received your letter dated May 17 in which you inquired about the granting of scholarships. The Foundation grants a limited number of scholarships to students wishing to study at Latin American Univereities, either for graduate or undergraduate work. These grants are usually for one year only.

Before the Foundation could take any action on your case, it would have to know what your field of interest is and something as to the nature of your personal qualifications and academic background. If you could supply this to me, even in a brief form, I would be better able to further advise you.

Sincerely yours,

A. Curis Wilgus
Director

201-168881

(1)

Apartado 779
San Jose, Costa Rica
May 17, 1954

The Pan-American Foundation, Inc.
Box 3587,
University Station,
Gainesville, Florida, U.S.A.

Gentlemen:

I have heard that your organization grants scholarships to students wishing to study at Latin American Universities. Since I desire to continue my education at the University of Habana, I should like to have information on this program and what I must do to qualify for such a scholarship.

Sincerely yours,

Ross L. Crozier

201-166821

SECRET

27 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

ATTENTION : Mr. Maurice Brady

SUBJECT : Clearance for Arthur G. VAIVADA (Ps) - PBSUCCESS

Confirming conversation on 26 April 1954 between Mr. Brady and Mr. Salerno, PBSUCCESS, it is requested that Operational Clearance No. 68, dated 19 July 1949, granted to Subject under Project BIRADIAL, now be amended and brought up to date for Subject's use on Project PBSUCCESS. In addition, it is further requested that the clearance issued be so amended as to also reflect Subject's additional duties as cutout on Project ESCROW.

J. C. KING
CWH

vaivada file

Subj

SECRET

201-168881

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	C/WH Division		
2	Attn: Mr. Hanks		
3	112 Qts. I		
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	FD/OPC/PSSEC/G. R. K. [illegible]		
2	3106 "I"		
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE

☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN

☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH

☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

Remarks:

NOTE. Field notified & contract amendment sent in H66-W-452. Add'l info sent in H66-W-

File in VAIVADA folder

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

10—62649-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief/WH Division
Attention: Mr. Hanke

DATE: 29 March 1954

FROM : FD/O & L/Agent Service Section

SUBJECT: Offset Clause - Arthur B. VAIVADA

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 26 February 1954 concerning the necessity of deducting Subject's GI allowances (not tuition payments) from salary due and payable by CIA.

2. Pursuant to the provisions of 38 U. S. Code 1952, Pocket Supplement 267, par. 6a regarding the payment of education and training allowances, the following limitation on such payments is imposed:

> "That in no event shall the rate of allowance plus compensation received exceed $210.00 per month for a veteran without a dependent, or $270.00 per month for a veteran with one dependent, or $290.00 per month for a veteran with two or more dependents: Provided further, that only so much of the compensation as is derived from productive labor based on the standard work week for the particular trade or industry, exclusive of overtime shall be considered in computing the rate of all allowances payable under this paragraph."

3. It is further provided by 38 U. S. Code 1952, Pocket Supplement 336 that:

> "No eligible veteran shall be paid an education and training allowance for any period during which * * * the payment of such allowance would constitute a duplication of the veteran from the Federal Treasury."

4. In view of the above quoted provisions of the U. S. Code restricting the entitlement to allowances under the GI Bill, Subject's contract will have to be amended to reflect an offset clause for such sums received under the GI Bill since he cannot reject such compensation from Veterans Administration for security reasons.

5. In this connection,

201-168881

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJ: Offset Clause - Arthur B. VAIVADA 29 March 1954

5. In this connection, Subject should be advised to submit a quarterly report of all sums received in the nature of allowances (not tuition) from the Veteran's Administration for offset purposes.

C B Klein
C. B. KLEIN
Chief/Agent Service Section

SECRET

14-00000

AIR POUCH

SECRET DESENSITIZED RYBAT

HCC-A-452

subj file

Chief of Station, Guatemala

Chief, WH

Operational
Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: HCC-A-687, paragraph 5

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

1. In answer to reference, it has been determined by the appropriate office at Headquarters that VAIVADA is not entitled to receive compensation from both this organization and the Veterans Administration. The enclosed contract amendment has been written to provide for an offset between subject's salary from this organization and the Veterans Administration.

2. VAIVADA should be informed that Headquarters is appreciative of his alertness to this situation since it will be easier to adjust his financial situation now rather than have to turn back a fairly large sum of money in the future. It is to be noted that the amendment is written in such a way that when he stops receiving the Veteran's payments at the end of his eligibility period, the full amount of his salary due from this organization will again be deposited as heretofore.

J. C. KING
CWH

27 March 1954
JH;jrc

Distribution:
1 - Headquarters
3 - GUATEMALA

J. C. KING, CWH

J. D. ESTERLINE

SECRET DESENSITIZED RYBAT

201-168881

AIR SECRET Security Information HGG-A-667

Chief, WHD

Chief of Station, Guatemala INFO: Lincoln

Operational

Arthur G. VAIVADA

questions re this dispatch being handled by Razberry

References:
1) SAHJ 1084
2) DIR 32680
3) GUAT 938
4) DIR 31729
5) GUAT 953
6) GUAT 957

1. As has already been reported, Arthur G. VAIVADA and dependents arrived in Guatemala City on 2 January 1954. The first of several contacts with him was successfully accomplished on the night of 4 January 1954. Subject currently is living temporarily in an apartment hotel; however, he has already rented a small, inconspicuous apartment located in a middle-class neighborhood. He has purchased a few pieces of inexpensive furniture for the apartment and intends moving his family to the premises within the immediate future. Subject's choice of neighborhoods in which to reside is believed excellent. The apartment is located in a fairly busy section of town, is on a busy street served by public buses which travel to all parts of the city and is of such modest appearance that it will attract no attention.

2. Subject has registered with the local university and is in the process of developing contacts which may prove valuable in the future. Concerning subject's entry into the University he has pointed out that this type of cover is poor here and that at an undetermined date in the future he may request authorization to discontinue this cover for one of a more logical nature. However, until this matter is discussed at greater length with headquarters in the future, subject will continue to attend his classes to put in an appearance.

3. Subject's wife is a native-born Costa Rican national. According to Guatemalan law she automatically becomes a Guatemalan citizen at the time she establishes a residence here. Because she does not wish to accept Guatemalan nationality but desires to retain her own nationality, subject has through a local attorney arranged to have his wife granted the status of a Permanent Resident but not a naturalized citizen. In this way she will enjoy all the privileges of a Guatemalan citizen except the right to vote. She will be able to work or engage in private business of her own. Subject will have all the necessary details completed in this connection within the next few days.

28 Jan. 54

SECRET
Security Information

COPY

201-168881
~~[illegible]~~

4. Subject currently is exploring the possibilities of having his wife open a small photographer's shop in her name. According to the attorney handling his wife's papers this is possible and subject would be able to attend classes and at the same time earn more money. Due to the fact he is known as an ex-G.I. and a married man with two children, the fact that he does commercial photographic work while attending university would appear only logical. However, this point will be discussed with headquarters if and when subject believes the time is right to branch out.

5. The following question was brought up by subject which we feel should be answered by headquarters: Subject is receiving a regular salary from our organization which is deposited in his bank in the U.S. In addition and commencing within the near future subject will be receiving $130.00 per month from the Veterans' Administration which will be sent by regular U.S. Government check to the local Consulate. He has raised the question as to whether or not at some future date he may be embarrassed for accepting two checks from our government, or whether headquarters will deduct from his stipulated salary that additional salary which he will receive from the Veterans' Administration. Any advice which headquarters can furnish will be appreciated by subject.

6. It was decided here that subject will in the future be the go-between in the ESCROW project. Accordingly, on the night of 22 January 1954, subject met ESCROW in a secure meeting place for the purpose of arranging danger signals, future meeting places and for the purpose of insuring correct recognition in the future. Henceforth, subject will meet subject twice or three times each week in order that ESCROW's potential may be exploited to the fullest extent. Subject is now scouting the used car lots in a search for a small used car. Once he has purchased a vehicle future meetings with him and between him and ESCROW will be held with a better degree of safety.

7. The $500.00 advance subject requested prior to his arrival here was handed to him by the undersigned. Subject had left his previous place of residence prior to time the authorization was cabled by headquarters. The advance will be accounted for in reporting station's accounting records.

8. In summary, it is the undersigned's belief that subject is fitting into the local picture easily and effectively. The fact his wife is Latin is helpful to him, according to subject. He has exhibited an enthusiastic attitude and a calm, purposeful manner which is gratifying. We will furnish headquarters with a progress report on this project in thirty days.

28 January 1954

Cyrus E. Burnette

CEB/cmh
Distribution:
  2-Linc
  3-Wash
  1-Files

SECRET
Security Information

25-6-3-247

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Plans Staff, FI

DATE: 18 December 1953

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Project BIRADIAL

1. Project BIRADIAL is being terminated as of 1 December 1953 inasmuch as BIRADIAL has been denied entry into Argentina.

2. As of 1 December 1953 he will have been transferred to the rolls of PB Success.

3. The purpose of Project BIRADIAL was to provide for the covert training and transfer of this contract agent from Costa Rica to Argentina where he would develop a penetration of the Communist Party of Argentina (PCA) and Communist front organizations and perform support functions as assigned.

4. Project BIRADIAL was approved for the period 1 August 1953 through 31 July 1954 in the amount of $10,475.00.

5. BIRADIAL's salary has been paid through November 1953 under this project. He has also been paid the amount of per diem due him while in the United States in accordance with the project authorization.

6. There are no present outstanding financial committments to BIRADIAL under this project.

W. B. Caldwell

W. B. Caldwell, Chief, FI/WH

Attachment
(a) Original of the Approved Project Action
dated 12 August 1953

Approved: J Osborn
Chief, Plans

26 January 1954
Date

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

CRYPTONYM BIRADIAL

AREA DIVISION WH

STATION Buenos Aires

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

John O. Cavadine JOC.
Room No. 2216
Extension 2298
Date 18 December 1953

The attached project is presented for termination.

R N Dahlgren
R. H. Dahlgren, Chief, Branch II, WHD

Wm B Caldwell
W. B. Caldwell, Chief, FI/WH

JCKing
J. C. King, Chief, WH

22 Dec. 1953
(Date)

SECRET

SECRET

16 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

PROJECT BIRADIAL

1. BIRADIAL, who was to have been dispatched to Buenos Aires, has been denied proper documentation from the Argentine authorities for entrance and residence in Buenos Aires.

2. There is attached hereto a copy of a letter dated 6 October 1953 at San Jose, Costa Rica, which BIRADIAL received from the Argentine Embassy, Consular Section setting forth pertinent data regarding subject's entry denial. (This letter, received on 24 November 1953 had previously been sent to a mailing address in Dayton Ohio, namely % Francis Williams, 5846 Access Road, Page Manor, Dayton. Since the letter was unclaimed at this address (BIRADIAL having learned later that Williams, an Army Officer friend of his had been shipped out), the letter was returned to the Argentine Embassy, Costa Rica and was subsequently forwarded to BIRADIAL's former address at Presidential Gardens, Alexandria, Va. The letter had been postmarked at Dayton, Ohio, 19 October 1953.

3. On 25 November 1953 while in contact with the Agent he indicated the possibility of writing his wife's relatives, Alicia De Cruz and family, in Mar De Plata, Argentina, with whom contact is maintained, for the purpose of attempting to assist agent at that end in having the proper entry permit issued. He also indicated the possibility of returning to Costa Rica and while in that area being plausibly and legitimately employed while awaiting another Agency assignment. Inasmuch as a combination of factors lead to the conclusion that it would be unwise to attempt to exert other influence in an attempt to have BIRADIAL granted an Argentine visa, and for other cover considerations as well as the time element which may be involved, the matter was discussed with other representatives of WH who desired to take the Agent over in connection with PB Success.

4. Arrangements were set up for Agent to meet the Chief of the Guatemalan Station. Subsequently, on 8 December 1953 Agent BIRADIAL was introduced in a secure manner, to Mr. E. Hobbing, by the writer. Hobbing will in the immediate future be handling BIRADIAL in connection with certain operational matters and as of 1 December 1953 BIRADIAL will be chargeable to PB Success.

5. In accordance with the provisions of the project, BIRADIAL was paid $350.00 for his November salary; $93.00 for his tuition fee at American University and $468.00 for his per diem to cover his period of time while in Covert training.

6. Proper receipts have been forwarded to Cedric Wolcott, Finance Division.

SECRET

201-165881

7. It should be noted, that Agent over a period of several contacts appeared to be very cooperative and his attitude was comendable. When he first learned that he had been denied entry to Buenos Aires, he was somewhat chagrined since he appeared to be set on an attempt to do a good job in a "tight" area. He had not given up hope to obtain proper authorization and was willing to pursue the matter further since he felt over a period of time he would be allowed proper entry authority. He suggested several possibilities.

8. Agent also expressed a desire to go to Cuba or anywhere else the Agency felt he could be of best service to the Agency regardless of the difficulties within reason, which may have been imposed on him and his family.

9. In view of Agent's past successful record with this Agency, in view of his attitude, his future possibilities and his comparatively limited salary, it was suggested to Mr. Hobbing that he might consider a raise in Agent's salary.

10. The Buenos Aires Mission was on 7 December 1953 advised that Agent was denied entry to Argentina.

11. It should be noted that Agent has indicated that his wife has been maintaining contact with her distant relative in Mar De Plata who is expecting Agent and his wife to go to Argentina. In this connection, Agent on 11 December 1953 informed his wife had received a letter from her cousin. The letter indicated that difficulty should be anticipated in obtaining an entry resident permit to Buenos Aires but that it nevertheless is possible. Agent states the letter points out a plan for Agent and his wife to work out. Agent informed the letter was received a little too late since he is now on the other operation. He stated however, he and his wife will be in contact with Alicia De Cruz and family with a view toward the possibility of entering Argentina at some future date. (BIRADIAL is forwarding the above mentioned letter through Mr. Hobbing).

12. FI/Plans Staff is being informed to cancel Project BIRADIAL as of 1 December 1953.

13. Attached hereto and for retention in Agent's file are the following:

(a) Copy of receipt # P-3283 for Agent's salary ($350.00) for the period 1-30 November 1953.

(b) Receipt F-556 dated 25 November 1953 for the amount of $93.00.

(c) Copy of claim for reimbursement dated 25 November 1953 in the amount of $93.00.

(d) Copy of a receipt dated 11 December 1953 for the amount of $468.00.

FORM NO. NOV 1951 35-82

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

5 [illegible] 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 52565

TO:

FROM: [illegible], SAN JOSE [illegible] [illegible] 456

DIRECTOR, CIA [illegible]

WH 3

1611Z 6 SEP 52

INFORMATION: CAO, RI 2, ADMIN

DIR 17894

TO: [illegible] CITE: DIR

REF: [illegible] (IN [illegible])

[illegible] COLON SCALE. APPROVE [illegible] MONTHLY SALARY FOLLOWS: [illegible] COLONES 1600.00, [illegible]-1 COLONES 150.00, [illegible]-2 COLONES 250.00, [illegible]-3 COLONES [illegible]00.00. RETROACTIVE PAYMENT TO 1 MARCH 52 AUTHORIZED. FURTHER DETAILS POUCHED.

201-168881

/s/ J. C. KING

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

D. F. [illegible]

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

28 AUG 52

IN 31520

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

SR REP SAN JOSE

WH (1-2-3)

ROUTINE

2204Z 28 AUG 52

INFORMATION: CFI (4), OPS (5), RI (6-7), CAO (8)

SANJ 882

TO: DIR CITE: S3ANJ

RE: DIR 16246 (OUT 50019)

PROMPT REPLY TO SANJ 884,(IN 30219) GREATLY APPRECIATED BUT INTENT NOT CLEAR. ASSUME FIGURES REFER TO DOLLAR MONTHLY PAYMENTS. DOES HQS CONTEMPLATE SWITCH TO DOLLAR SCALE IN PLACE OF PRESENT COLON SCALE? IF SO SITUATION COMPLICATED IN THAT PRESENT RATE OF EXCHANGE OF COLONS IN .63 TO DOLLAR RESULTS IN SALARY DECREASE HUMANOID 1 OF COLONES 18.00 MONTHLY, SALARY INCREASE HUMANOID 3 ONLY COLONES 12.00 MONTHLY ETC. ON DOLLAR SCALE AGENTS WILL SUFFER ADDITIONAL SALARY CUTS VIA ANTICIPATED RATE OF EXCHANGE FLUCTIONS. IF POSSIBLE, REQUEST ORIGINALLY RECOMMENDED INCREASE MONTHLY COLON PAYMENTS BE AUTHORIZED.

201-168881

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 1

(44)

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

FORM N
NOV 195 5-82

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 AUGUST 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 50019

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: CHIEF OF STATION (SAN JOSE) (SANJ)   R. E. [illegible]   EXT. 496

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

WH (1-2)

ROUTINE:

1451Z 26 AUG 52

INFORMATION: RI (3-4), CFA (5), OPS (6)

DIR 16246

TO: SANJ

CITE: [illegible]

Re: SANJ 334, TDS-N-771

1. APPROVAL TO 1 MARCH 1953 GIVEN FOR FOLLOWING SALARY SCALE BRAVOID PROJECT.

BRAVOID - 200.00 MONTHLY

BRAVOID-I - 20.00 MONTHLY

BRAVOID-II - 32.00 MONTHLY

BRAVOID-III - 115.00 MONTHLY

2. RETROACTIVE PAYMENT TO MARCH 1952 AUTHORIZED.

J. C. KING

201-168871

D. F. GIBBONS

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 1

(40)

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

22 AUG 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 30219

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP SAN JOSE

ROUTINE

WH (1-2-3)

2314Z 23 AUG 52

INFORMATION: RI (4-5) CFI (6) OPS (7) S/C (8-9-10)

SANJ 884

TO: DIR CITE: SSANJ

RE: TRSW 771

OPERA

PLEASE CABLE DATE DECISION EXPECTED RECOMMENDED SALARY INCREASE HUMANOID PROJECT, NOW PENDING ALMOST 14 MONTHS.

201-168881

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. 41

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TESA-1272

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 11 August 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Alfredo ~~T.~~ POVEDANO

MICROFILMED
JAN 6 1954
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. The above-named individual is Chief of the Commercial Department of the Ministry of Finance on a full time basis. However, he is also the code and cipher specialist within the Costa Rican Government and personally provided the codes now being used by the Foreign Office and Seguridad Pública. This latter responsibility apparently stems from his hobby of working with codes and ciphers and the absence of any better-qualified expert on this subject. He is a member of the American Cryptogram Association, is a "ham" radio operator, an expert photographer, and an amateur chemist, among other things. During the 1948 revolution, he provided the rebel forces with code systems and broke a code being used by the government forces. On other occasions he has furnished codes to the incumbent administration during times of emergency, such as the abortive invasion of Costa Rica from Nicaragua during 1949.

2. Officers of the Commercial Section of the Embassy have had cordial and cooperative relations with subject on commercial and economic matters for some time. Recently one of these officers advised us that subject had made tentative, informal inquiries concerning the possibility of obtaining technical advice and assistance from the Embassy or the Department of State with a view to improving the cipher system of the Foreign Office. It was suggested to subject that an official request to the Embassy for such information would probably result in a polite refusal, but that one of the Embassy officers, RUSSO, had had experience in codes and ciphers while serving in the Army, and that perhaps an unofficial discussion would be helpful.

3. On this basis, a luncheon date was arranged at which time subject stated that the Foreign Minister had recently questioned him for several hours on the security of the Foreign Office codes and possible means of improving them, and had instructed subject to study the problem. According to subject, the Foreign Minister then indicated serious concern over the threat presented by local and international Communist activities and speculated on various possibilities of covering their activities.

11 August 1952
201-168881 ✓
~~18-6-4-177~~

INDEX 51-28A

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

IR COPY

14-00000

4. Subject then digressed from code and cipher talk to the subject of secret inks, their use, and potentialities and possible methods of detection. He indicated that he was interested in establishing a secret censorship of suspect mail coming into the country, particularly the mail of known Communists, and inquired whether any assistance could be offered in this field of secret writing detection and clandestine censorship techniques.

5. In view of the fact that this sudden turn in the conversation struck uncomfortably close to the HUMANOID-1 and HUMANOID-2 operation, we attempted to discourage subject by pointing out that such a proposal was illegal and would have drastically dangerous political and legal repercussions if it were attempted and leaked out. We asked if Foreign Minister LARA had approved this censorship proposition and also inquired how the Foreign Office could possibly interest itself in a matter which would seem to come under the jurisdiction of Seguridad Pública. POVEDANO replied that it had not been discussed in plain words with LARA, but that he would discuss it with him in order to determine whether the matter should be dropped or explored further. He was cautioned not to tell LARA of his conversations with the Embassy officers.

6. Several days later subject advised that he had discussed the matter fully with Foreign Minister LARA and that the latter had been extremely interested in the proposal. However, LARA pointed out that the Foreign Office had no jurisdiction in this regard and told POVEDANO to discuss the proposition with Lt. Col. Gonzalo SEGARES, Oficial Mayor of Seguridad Pública.

7. According to POVEDANO, SEGARES became very enthusiastic about the idea and authorized subject to carry out further study and collect the necessary technical data and equipment. SEGARES offered to provide funds for purchase of required chemicals, etc., for experimentation in secret ink detection and instructed subject to make plans for the training of several additional persons in the procedure. Subject indicated to SEGARES that he would use his home darkroom and laboratory for this training and possibly even for the eventual processing of suspect correspondence.

8. With this official authorization and support, subject again inquired whether it would be possible for us to assist him in obtaining pertinent manuals, background literature, reference material, and technical advice on mail censorship procedures and secret writing detection. In view of subject's apparent official backlog and personal determination to continue his inquiries, we decided to make a gesture of assistance on a confidential, unofficial basis with a view to controlling and possibly directing his activities.

9. Accordingly, RUSSO described a personal friend in the Division of Communications and Records of the Department who had had considerable experience in censorship work and offered to make inquiries of this individual for any available material. It was also indicated that this person would be asked to comment on the probable reaction of the Department to an official confidential request from the Costa Rican Government for assistance. It was suggested to subject that he not discuss this matter with any other individuals pending a reply to our inquiries, to which he agreed. He also agreed that the best approach to this whole project would be to proceed only with training and planning activities at this time and not attempt to initiate actual censorship until an emergency arises, such as a Communist armed uprising or a third world war. However, on this latter point it is believed probable that subject would prefer to begin the activity regardless of whether an emergency arises, in order to obtain coverage of current Communist activities.

10. As is obvious from the above conversations, a number of operational possibilities (and hazards) are presented to us and headquarters comments and guidance are respectfully requested. Depending on headquarters desires and policies, we could possibly gradually discourage subject from ever initiating his project prior to an emergency while at the same time assisting him with pertinent written material provided by headquarters for his planning and training purposes. This would have the advantage of facilitating the organization of a competent crew on a stand-by basis who could be put to work if a world war were to break out. We could tap this government censorship activity. However, in view of our presently only limited post office coverage, a more attractive opportunity might be sincerely to assist subject, insure his development of a secure project, and substitute our present coverage by an all-Costa Rican operation. It appears that we could control such an operation either by working through subject or by dealing directly with Colonel SEGARES. In this latter situation, we could probably expand the activity to provide coverage of cable traffic, and possibly international telephone calls. A danger here is the traditional lack of security consciousness of Costa Ricans.

11. In any event we are faced with a situation which presents a potential security threat to our current post office censorship activity. Headquarters comments are requested as soon as possible on at least the following points:

a. Will headquarters provide technical data on censorship methods for passing to POVEDANO as though it were obtained from a friend of RUSSO? In this connection we have in mind possibly unclassified Army instructional manuals, etc.

b. Will headquarters approve our accepting POVEDANO's invitation to work with him on an unofficial basis in his planning and experimentation activities, thus keeping ourselves informed of his progress?

c. Is headquarters interested in the possibility of replacing our presently incomplete post office coverage with an all-Costa Rican operation which we could tap either through POVEDANO or directly through SEGARES?

d. Unless advised to the contrary, we will continue our present HUMANOID-1 and HUMANOID-2 activities during this period despite POVEDANO's project. HUMANOID will be alerted, however.

e. Is headquarters interested in our casually returning discussion to the subject of codes and ciphers with a possible view to assisting Costa Rica obtain systems to which we might retain a key?

f. Could headquarters provide an opinion as to what the reaction of the Department of State would be to a formal request from the Costa Rican Government for assistance on either codes and ciphers or clandestine censorship?

12. It is to be noted that POVEDANO knows RUSSO as just another Embassy officer. In all our discussion with him we have stressed that this is a subject which RUSSO cannot discuss in his official capacity, but would like to help on a personal basis because the activity would be directed against the Communists. POVEDANO has apparently accepted this relationship and assures that he has not indicated to LARA or SEGARES that he has talked with RUSSO, merely informing them that he, POVEDANO, would attempt to obtain reference material through friends in the American Cryptographic Society and elsewhere.

13. One last comment. If headquarters decision is to stay clear of this whole proposition, it is earnestly requested that some few items of background material on secret writing, or book titles of overt publications on the subject be furnished us to pass to POVEDANO for the purpose of indicating a reply has been received to our inquiries. The continued good will of POVEDANO is deemed of operational value as he appears to be well connected in high government circles.

14. Also, in view of the fact subject will be questioning us continually as to what we have learned, and will be suspending other action pending our advice, we ask that an immediate answer, preliminary if necessary, be made to this dispatch.

James K Russo / JB

James K. Russo

11 August 1952

201-168881

JKR/jb

14-00000

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TMG-A-826

SECURITY INFORMATION

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, San José

DATE: 9 July 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, Managua

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational Matters

SPECIFIC— HUFAROID

Ref: TRS-A-1259

At the present moment there are no projects under development requiring a cold recruitment. In the event a use for subject develops within the next two weeks, the San José station will be advised.

Francis D. Magoffin

Dist:
1 - Sanj
2 - Wash
2 - Files

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

COPY

CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

~~15-6-3-94~~

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-1239

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Managua

DATE: 3 July 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— HUMANOID

1. For your information, the above-named agent of this station is planning a three or four-day vacation trip to Managua within the next two weeks. He is an American, speaks Spanish and English, and has been handling sub-agents for a number of years.

2. It has occurred to us that perhaps subject could be of service to you in the carrying out of cold recruitment attempts or other minor operational tasks. If you are interested in having subject contact you for any reason, please let us know.

James K. Russo

Dist:
  1 - Mana
  2 - Wash ✓
  2 - Files
JKR/jb

RI COPY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

3 July 52
201-168881 ✓
6-3-94

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
Security Information

AIR

TRS-W- 771
13 June 52

Chief of Station, San Jose

Chief, WHD

HUMANOID

REFERENCE: TRS-A-1215, TRS-A-1142, TRS-A-1084

1. The remarks contained in TRS-A-1056 and TRS-A-1084, the basis for your recommendation that HUMANOID be transferred to career agent status as well as all information in Headquarters files, which is relevant to HUMANOID's connection with our organization, have been thoroughly studied by the individuals of your Headquarters organization authorized to render a decision in the case.

2. It is regretted that in spite of HUMANOID's outstanding performance and his valuable contribution to the Station's activities, his qualifications are not those which properly fit him for consideration and appointment as a career agent. Headquarters is very much aware of HUMANOID's desires in this matter of career agent status, and it is hoped that the above decision will have no effect on the present high standard of efficiency which is being maintained by the San Jose station.

3. Paragraph 3 of TRS-W-766 refers to a dispatch which will be forthcoming from Headquarters. We regret the confusion conveyed by the original dispatch.

4. As regards TRS-A-1215, the raises in salary requested for HUMANKIND-3, now designated HUMANOID-2; HUMANIST-2, now designated HUMANOID-3, and HUMANOID, the principal agent of the project, these salary increases have been incorporated in the revised project which was submitted for approval. X

5. Though HUMANOID-4, formerly designated HUGGER, has been terminated as a salaried agent as of March 1952, it would be appreciated if Part I PRQ were forwarded as requested in paragraph 4 of TRS-W-766, so that Headquarters records may be complete

J. C. KING

D. F. GIBBONS

SECRET

201-168881

771

SECRET
Security Information

-2-

6. Your action terminating HUCKABACK as a salaried agent, as of 31 March 1952 has been noted. Headquarters concurs in the action you have taken regarding both HUCKABACK and HUMANOID-4.

TJBarrett/ss
9 June 1952

J. C. King

By T.J. Barrett

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

AIR

TRS-W-766

MAY 19 1952

Chief of Station, San Jose

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Project HUMANOID

REFERENCE: TRS-W-745

1. Please be advised that the following changes have been made in Headquarters records, relative to subject project and the other projects which had formerly been under the direction of the agent of project HUMANOID.

From	To
HUMARKIED-1	HUMANOID-1
HUMASKIED-3	HUMANOID-2
HUMANIST-2	HUMANOID-3
HUGGER	HUMANOID-4

2. It would be appreciated if you would change your records accordingly. 7

3. It is hoped that a dispatch will be forthcoming from Hq. in the near future, covering in detail all the activities of the San Jose Station, as well as the points raised in TRS-A-1142.

4. Please forward Part I PRQ on HUMANOID-4 so that operational clearance may be formally requested.

TJBarrett/ss
12 May 1952

J. C. King

By T. J. Barrett

J. C. KING

D. F. GIBBONS

SECRET

201-168881

766

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

PLANS
VIA : Mr. Paul Paxton
Chief, WHD

12 May 1952

Project HUMANOID

1. Please be advised that the following changes have been made in the designations of WHD projects active at the San Jose, Costa Rica Station.

From	To
HUMANKIND-1	HUMANOID-1
HUMANKIND-3	HUMANOID-2
HUMANIST-2	HUMANOID-3
HUGGER	HUMANOID-4

2. It has been requested that all expenses be paid from funds alloted to project HUMANOID. This request has been acted upon favorably by the appropriate Headquarters office, and it is hoped that the changes indicated above meet with your approval.

cc: STC/SPB

J. C. KING
CWHD

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET
Security Information

PROJECT OUTLINE

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

T. J. Barrett
Room No. 2222
Extension 455
Date 12 May 1952

CRYPTONYM HUMANOID
DIVISION WHD
STATION San Jose, Costa Rica

1. The attached Field Project Outline is submitted for approval.

2. Full Operational Clearance has been received on HUMANOID: HUMANOID-1; HUMANOID-2; HUMANOID-3; and a four-way name check results received on HUMANOID-4. Results indicated no derogatory information. Full Operational is in the process of being requested on HUMANOID-4.

3. The original project HUMANOID was approved on 21 September 1951 for the period ending 29 February 1952.

Attachments: FPO-HUMANOID
TRS-W-685, dated 19 October 1951
WHD Memorandum dated 12 May 1952

J. C. KING

(Date)

SECRET

201-168851

SECRET
Security Information

FIELD PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM: HUMANOID

PART I

1. Area of Operations and Headquarters: Project is confined to the geographical limits of Costa Rica with Headquarters and principal activity located in the capital city of San Jose.

2. References: This Project is related through the provision of cut-out services and direction to the following:

Project HUMANKIND-1 (Now HUMANOID-1)
HUMANKIND-3 (Now HUMANOID-2)
HUMANIST-2 (Now HUMANOID-3)
HUGGER (Now HUMANOID-4)

3. A. Objectives:

a. cut-out services as assigned.

b. Supervised direction of Communist party penetration (HUMANOID-3).

c. Supervised direction of Postal Intercept Project (HUMANOID-1 & 2).

d. Supervised direction of the penetration of the Communist Party Women's "Front Group" (HUMANOID-4).

e. Direct provision of information emanating from local university and intellectual circles of which subject is a member.

f. Parallel penetration of Vanguardia Popular, Costa Rican Communist Party.

g. Development of additional sources of information on Costa Rican political movements.

B. Targets:

a. The personnel associated with the projects noted above are the only activities presently assigned under this heading.

b. Vanguardia Popular, and other V.P. sponsored groups.

c. Incoming and Outgoing mail units in general post office.

d. National and subordinate committees of the Union de Mujeres-Carmen Lyra.

C. Tasks: This project conforms to the tasks assigned to the San Jose Station in SOI-46, DI EI and E2.

4. Personnel:

a. This project, involves in addition to HUMANOID, HUMANKIND-1; HUMANKIND-3; HUMANIST-2; and HUGGER, to be designated hereafter as HUMANOID-1; HUMANOID-2; HUMANOID-3; HUMANOID-4 in the order they are listed.

b. HUMANOID, is an American citizen, was born in 1922 in DeKalb, Illinois. He joined the United States Air Force in April 1946 and spent approximately five years doing general Air Force intelligence work. Subject is presently living in San Jose, Costa Rica where he has been attending school, and since June 1949, when project HUMANOID was first activated, subject has been the most valuable single agent of the San Jose Station.

5. Cover: Subject is established in Costa Rica on a purely personal basis with no apparent connection with the San Jose station. He is a home owner, married, and is a fully accepted member of the community on that basis. Subjects activities in connection with HUMANOID-3 will be handled through safe house facilities to be acquired by the station. It is felt that the processing of the material acquired from HUMANOID-1 & 2, can be done in the office of the Chief of Station, because of the small quantity of this type of material. The cut-out and direction activities of HUMANOID-4, will be handled by HUMANOID in periodic meetings in cafes, bars, or coffee shops, logical meeting places in San Jose.

6. Contact and communications: Contact between HUMANOID and other personnel involved in this Project is described above under Cover.

7. Control: The control of HUMANOID is based upon his past service record with the US Government, demonstrated loyalty, and the judgment of the present and former station chiefs in San Jose. In addition HUMANOID is a US citizen, and needs the financial assistance he receives for the performance of his duties.

8. Special Equipment: No special equipment is involved.

9. Coordination: This Project was originally initiated with the cooperation of the Panama Station. Continued coordination with Panama, or any other station is not considered necessary or desirable.

10. Timetable: HUMANOID was engaged by this Station effective 1 June 1949 and has been functioning satisfactorily every since. HUMANOID is interested in making a career in the intelligence field, and has proved of inestimable value to the San Jose Station. We attach a memorandum, relative to the merits and contributions of Project HUMANOID to the activities of the San Jose Station.

11. Estimated Cost:

		FY1952	FY1953
Salary:	HUMANOID	$800.00	$1,600.00
	HUMANOID-1	76.00	152.00
	HUMANOID-2	128.00	256.00
	HUMANOID-3	452.00	904.00
	HUMANOID-4	72.00	144.00
Agent Expenses:		200.00	400.00
Safe House:		200.00	400.00
Local Transportation Miscellaneous supplies, etc.		50.00	100.00
		$1,978.00	$3,956.00

12. There are no special problems nor commitments.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TRSA-1215

CRYPTONYM: HUMANOID

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 1 January to 30 April,1952
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS	No change
SALARY	$1,000.00 per month.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES	Excellent and of major importance to this station.
Evaluation of information	Information produced by subject through his sub-agents is , in some instances, documentary and of value. In other cases, it is eye-witness, high level , and of considerable value.
OTHER FACTORS	Current operational restrictions on this agent presently prevent full exploitation of his potential.
COMMENTS	Due to financial pressure, explained in TRSA-1142, HUMANOID has recently undertaken a part time job at the School of Agronomy. His work deals with laboratory and dark room photographic assignments and is connected with a Costa Rican Government project in Geology. Subject is the most valuable agent available to this station and is believed capable of further development in the event current operational restrictions are removed. He is conscientious, hard working, loyal, imaginative, and amenable to supervision. In view of his interest in a long range career, a reply to the question posed in TRSA-1142 concerning career agent status would be appreciated. Subject has been aware of the recommended salary increase which has been pending for over ten months. Although he has not questioned the delay, it is obvious that his self-confidence and professional pride have been shaken somewhat by the lack of official recognition. We feel strongly that agent has earned a raise and that an increase at this time is not only justified but would be in the best interests of our present and future operations. PLEASE EXPEDITE ACTION ON THIS MATTER. 6 May 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

201-168881

SECRET

AIR

SECURITY INFORMATION

HHS-W-245

MAR 14 1952

Chief of Station, San Jose

Acting Chief, WH

Project HUMAHOID
Ref: HHS-A-1142

1. Subject project is being submitted for renewal, with the observations expressed by you in reference, incorporated therein.

2. You will be advised relative to the requested salary increase for HUMAHIND-3 and HUMAHIST-2, as well as to the status of subject project.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

By T. Barrett

TB:cb
12 March 1952
cc: HUMAHOID

ACWH

D. F. GIBBONS

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TRSA-1142

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 2 July to 31 December 1951
OBJECTIVES & TASKS:	No change.
SALARY:	Subject is presently receiving 1,000 colones per month. A raise in salary is believed justified and is recommended below.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES:	Services of this agent are extremely valuable. As the principal cutout of this station he is charged with the direction and guidance of the most productive sub-agents we have at the present time. His handling of these agents is carried out in a professional and efficient manner, and his personal comments and corrections on their reports, based on his long acquaintance with local personalities and conditions, are of considerable value. His attitude remains enthusiastic and willing.
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:	The information produced by the agents handled by subject is probably the most valuable being obtained by this station. In addition to routine production, this agent's operations are well-suited to checking on information received from other sources.
OTHER FACTORS:	Subject is presently seeking another safehouse to serve as a meeting place with subagents and for the processing of material produced by HUMANKIND-1 and 3. The photographic studio previously used as a safehouse has been given up as explained in TRSA-1084.
COMMENTS:	Despite the fact this agent has been working under certain operational restrictions for a number of months, his value to this station continues to be of major importance. In addition to the tangible and measurable information produced through him in the form of reportable material, HUMANOID has proved the single most valuable source of background and orientation data for the Chief of Station. His knowledge of the history of Costa Rican Communist

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

7 Feb. 52

201-168871

COMMENTS (Con'd) activities and personalities and his grasp of the various revolutionary movements and figures has been freely shared with the Station Chief. These "briefing meetings" represent an intangible contribution to the over-all performance of this Station. Subject is eager to expand his operations, and, if headquarters approves the removal of present operational restrictions, it is believed he can be given further responsibilities, particularly in the recruiting of additional sub-agents. This Station is presently interested in accomplishing a parallel penetration of the Communist Party, in expanding routine investigative coverage, and in developing additional sources on political movements. It is believed that subject has potential in each of these fields. However, as reported previously, HUMANOID is beset with financial problems which undoubtedly detract from his full working efficiency on matters of interest to us. His GI subsistence is currently terminated during the school vacations and a certain portion of his time is devoted to odd jobs in an effort to augment his income. The former Chief of Station recommended an increase from 1,000 to 1,500 colones in July, 1951, a recommendation in which the writer concurred. However, in the event current operational restrictions are removed, it is desired to recommend at this time an increase to sixteen hundred (1,600) colones per month. The additional one hundred colones permonth is suggested in view of the fact that subject has borrowed money in recent months to meet hospital bills, and because he has been aware of and probably counted on the raise recommendation of the former Chief of Station. Further, if the restrictions are lifted, it is desired to utilize subject's time to the fullest advantage without the handicap of his having to seek other outside employment.

In an effort to evaluate more accurately subject's agent-handling ability, the writer monitored a specially arranged 45-minute contact between HUMANOID and HUMANIST-2. From a concealed vantage point less than three feet from the participants, the writer was able to hear and see HUMANOID's handling of this sub-agent. The results were worth the effort. HUMANOID demonstrated complete control over the discussion, exhibited a natural ability to elicit desired details, and issued instructions in a commendable manner. It appeared that subject has the complete confidence and loyalty of HUMANIST-2 and that his working relationship with this important sub-agent leaves nothing to be desired.

COMMENTS (Cont'd)

With reference to TRSW-698, it is not desired to have subject sign a new contract at this time, as the current contract appears to be adequate. However, we would appreciate being advised definitely whether subject is being considered or has been rejected for career agent status. (TRSA-1056).

14-00000

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

29 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

FROM: WHD

SUBJECT: AMPHODARCH

1. Reference is made to memorandum from this office dated 15 February 1952, concerning an individual connected with Project AMPHODARCH.

2. In accordance with our paragraph 4 of the memorandum, Part II PHQ is attached herewith and forwarded for your information. Please return it when no longer needed by you.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.
ACWH

Attachment
WH/[illegible]/WEB/jep
Distribution:
Orig & 1: Addressee
cc: Chrono
SD/RE (2)

SECRET

(e) ~~Copy of the accounting by Individual for Advance, dated 11 December 1953 in the amount of $468.00.~~ (The signed original, signed on 11 December 1953 in the writer's presence, has been forwarded to Mr. Wolcott, Finance Division.

(f) Copy of a letter dated 6 October 1953 at San Jose Costa Rica from the Consul, Argentine Embassy, to Agent.

(g) Copy of a request for advance of $468.00 dated 7 December 1953 to reimburse Agent BIRADIAL covering period 5 October 1953 through 25 November 1953 (dates of Covert Training, per Covert Training Division).

9 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: STAFF C

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Ogden

SUBJECT: Arthur O. VAIVADA (pseudo)

It is requested that the proper clearance be granted for the use of subject, now on Project BIRADIAL, on Project PBSUCCESS. This will confirm telephone conversation between your office and WH/Personnel on 9 December 1953.

J. C. KING
C/WH

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

Residual

SECRET
Security Information

9 December 1953

I hereby request claim for per diem for the period October 5, 1953 through 25 November 1953 at the rate of $9.00 per day. This period covers the time spent by me in Covert Training.

Arthur G. Vaivada

SECRET
Security Information

201-161881

SECRET

9 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WHD-2/FI
Attention: Mr. John Cavadine

SUBJECT: Training Report on Arthur G. VAIVADA, (P) - Training Alias: "VICKS"

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA was trained covertly by instructors of this office in Washington, D. C. from 5 October through 25 November 1953. The original Training Request Form dated 31 August 1953 reveals the following pertinent information:

> "Subject is thirty-one years of age, married, and a U. S. citizen by birth. VAIVADA's previous intelligence experience includes eight years with the U. S. Air Force. During this time he served as an intelligence specialist in the Panama and Burma-India Theaters. In 1949 he was employed by CIA and spent most of the following four years in Costa Rica where he was engaged in the spotting, recruiting, and handling of agents. Although subject has never lived in his proposed area of operations, he possesses a fluent command of the Spanish language. VAIVADA's future assignment, under contract agent status, will be that of principal agent with the primary objective to develop information on the Communist Party in Argentina. He will also be expected to penetrate or direct the penetration of the Argentine Communist Party."

2. The instructors who participated in Subject's training indicate they were most favorably impressed with VAIVADA and feel that he is qualified for his proposed mission. He possesses a sound practical knowledge of basic clandestine operational principles. He should become an increasingly valuable agent in the long range work of this organization.

3. VAIVADA received instruction in the subjects set forth on the attached Training Evaluation Reports. The following supplementary reading and discussion material were also covered.

Introduction to Clandestine Operations
Glossary of Terms
Learning How to Interview
General Principles of Intelligence Interrogation

The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally [illegible] for it. Although he may, within his [illegible] contents of his [illegible], the report should [illegible] be shown to the student whom it concerns.

SECRET

Interrogation of Witnesses and Prisoners
Interrogation - Body Search
Interviewing and Eliciting of Information
Method of Surveillance
Basic Tradecraft Agent Training Manual
Personal Meetings
Signals
The Nature and Functions of CE
The CE Mission Abroad
Recruiting of Secret Agents
Agent Personal Qualifications
An Example of a Recruiting Operation
Recruiting
Problems of Agent Management
The Theory and Technique of Running Controlled Enemy Agents
Soviet Security Organizations
The Soviet Agent
Selection and Training of Soviet I.S. Personnel
Organization and Functions of MGB
Soviet Citizen Abroad
Theory and Practice of CE Operations
Modus Operandi of Security Services
Gospel According to Marx
The Communist "United Front" Technique
The Communist World Peace Offensive
National Party Organization
The Communist Technique in Seizing Power
Clandestine Communist Organization - Part 1 - The Communist
    Party Underground
Agent Reporting
Reporting and Dissemination of Positive Intelligence Information
Basic Information Objectives
The Techniques of Reporting
The Andersson Case
Sorge Case
Glading Case
Hercules Case
Operation "Keystone"
Moyzisch. Operation Cicero
Foote. Handbook for Spies
Willoughby. Shanghai Conspiracy
Pinto. Spycatcher
Philbrick. I Led Three Lives
Murray. I Spied for Stalin
Fischer. Soviet Opposition to Stalin
Leites. Operational Code of the Politburo
Selznick. Organizational Weapon

The official to whom this report is entrusted is per-
sonally [illegible] he may, with [illegible]
[illegible] members of his [illegible]
[illegible] shown to the student
[illegible] whom it concerns.

Problems: "Observation and Description"
"Casing"
"Contacting"
"Surveillance"
"New Delhi"
"Reporting"

4. Subject's training was conducted by Mr. Jolly known as "Tom," Mr. Pisanko known as "Hank," and Mr. Gollomb known as "Rudy." Their Training Evaluation Reports are attached.

Peter Hoehl
PETER HOEHL
Chief, Project Training Division, TR

Attachments: (3)

The official to whom this report is entrusted is per[illegible] he may, within [illegible] members of his staff. [illegible] report should [illegible] to the student whom it concerns.

14-00000

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION REPORT

Name of Student: Arthur G. VAIVADA (PSEUDONYM)

Date: 9 November 1953 (Day) (Month) (Year)

Training Alias : "VICKS"

Period Covered: 26 October 1953 to 5 November 1953

Rating Definitions:

Superior	An extremely outstanding performance.
Excellent	An outstanding performance, above average.
Satisfactory	Requirements met without distinction.
Poor	A deficient performance, below average.
Failure	An extremely deficient performance.

Training Subjects

	SUPERIOR	EXCELLENT	SATISFACTORY	POOR	FAILURE
1. Security					
2. Cover					
3. Observation & Description					
4. Interviewing					
5. Interrogation					
6. Surveillance					
7. Telephones & Mikes (Theory)					
8. General CI Methods					
9. Contacting					
10. Intrafield Communications		X			
11. Recruiting of Agents		X			
12. Training of Agents		X			
13. Agent Management & Control		X			
14. Double Agent Management & Control		X			
15. Reporting					
16. CE Operations					
17. Communist Theory					
18. Soviet IS					
19. Psychological Warfare					
20. Political Warfare					
21. Economic Warfare					
22. Sabotage					
23. Counter-sabotage					
24. Resistance Force Activities					
25. Guerrilla Warfare					
26. Evasion & Escape					
27. Weapons					
28. Demolitions					
29. Special Devices (R&D)					
30. Air Reception					
31. Sea Reception					
32. Map Reading					
33. ______					
34. ______					
35. ______					

The official to whom this form is entrusted is per[illegible]
[illegible] within his
[illegible] of his
his direct [illegible]
the report should never be shown to the student
whom it concerns.

SECRET

SECRET

Student Evaluation

	ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE	NOT OBSERVED
1. Security consciousness	X			
2. Ability to work with and get along with others	X			
3. Ability to follow instructions	X			
4. Maturity of judgment and common sense	X			
5. Initiative				X
6. Resourcefulness and independence of judgment		X		
7. Tactfulness and sense of discretion	X			
8. Cooperativeness	X			
9. Sense of discipline		X		
10. Imagination and creativeness	X			
11. Amenability to construct criticism	X			
12. Attention to necessary details		X		
13. Observant and careful in the collection of facts		X		
14. Political sophistication and awareness	X			
15. Interest and enthusiasm for proposed assignment	X			
16. Motivation for clandestine activities	X			
17. Ability to relate theory to practice	X			

Student's Comparative Evaluation To Others Trained For Identical Or Similar Assignment

ABOVE AVERAGE ☒ AVERAGE ☐ BELOW AVERAGE ☐

Instructor's Comments:

VAIVADA impressed the undersigned as an exceptionally conscientious, mature individual. He has had considerable field experience, yet, he conducted himself during training as though this experience was only secondary to the more important task of improving his basic knowledge of clandestine activity.

Subject completed several excellent reports covering assigned reading material. These reports revealed the extent to which VAIVADA went to do a thorough, complete job. His oral discussions of the training material further substantiated the sincere effort this student made to obtain as much as possible from the training program.

Subject demonstrated and personally expressed his satisfaction with the progress he made and the benefit he obtained from the instruction presented to him.

/s/ W. T. JOLLY
Instructor

SECRET

SECRET

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TRAINING EVALUATION REPORT

Name of Student: Arthur G. VAIVADA (PSEUDONYM)

Date: 1 December 1953 (Day) (Month) (Year)

Training Alias : "VICKS"

Period Covered: 9 November 1953 through 25 November 1953

Rating Definitions:

Superior	An extremely outstanding performance.
Excellent	An outstanding performance, above average.
Satisfactory	Requirements met without distinction.
Poor	A deficient performance, below average.
Failure	An extremely deficient performance.

Training Subjects

	SUPERIOR	EXCELLENT	SATISFACTORY	POOR	FAILURE
1. Security					
2. Cover					
3. Observation & Description					
4. Interviewing					
5. Interrogation					
6. Surveillance					
7. Telephones & Mikes (Theory)					
8. General CI Methods					
9. Contacting					
10. Intrafield Communications					
11. Recruiting of Agents					
12. Training of Agents					
13. Agent Management & Control					
14. Double Agent Management & Control					
15. Reporting		X			
16. CE Operations			X		
17. Communist Theory		X			
18. Soviet IS		X			
19. Psychological Warfare					
20. Political Warfare					
21. Economic Warfare					
22. Sabotage					
23. Counter-sabotage					
24. Resistance Force Activities					
25. Guerrilla Warfare					
26. Evasion & Escape					
27. Weapons					
28. Demolitions					
29. Special Devices (R&D)					
30. Air Reception					
31. Sea Reception					
32. Map Reading					
33.					
34.					
35.					

SECRET

[illegible] shown to the student whom it concerns.

SECRET

Student Evaluation

	ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE	NOT OBSERVED
1. Security consciousness		X		
2. Ability to work with and get along with others	X			
3. Ability to follow instructions	X			
4. Maturity of judgment and common sense	X			
5. Initiative	X			
6. Resourcefulness and independence of judgment	X			
7. Tactfulness and sense of discretion	X			
8. Cooperativeness	X			
9. Sense of discipline		X		
10. Imagination and creativeness		X		
11. Amenability to construct criticism	X			
12. Attention to necessary details	X			
13. Observant and careful in the collection of facts	X			
14. Political sophistication and awareness	X			
15. Interest and enthusiasm for proposed assignment	X			
16. Motivation for clandestine activities	X			
17. Ability to relate theory to practice	X			

Student's Comparative Evaluation To Others Trained For Identical Or Similar Assignment

ABOVE AVERAGE ☒ AVERAGE ☐ BELOW AVERAGE ☐

Instructor's Comments:

VAIVADA has had considerable experience in the field, but he was ready to broaden and enrich his experience with the help of training. He has a strong bent toward his own opinion and exhibited independence of mind in analyzing Communist Party activities. He had no difficulty in absorbing the material presented. He has the ability to apply theory to practice and apparently is a person who is accustomed to rely upon his own judgment. His written work was excellent. He recognized his own shortcomings and readily accepted constructive criticism. From all the evidence during training, VAIVADA appears capable of handling the assignment proposed for him.

/s/ HL J. PISANKO
Instructor

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION REPORT

Name of Student: Arthur G. VAIVADA
(PSEUDONYM)

Date: 29 October 1953
(Day) (Month) (Year)

Training Alias : "VICKS"

Period Covered: 6 October 1953
to
23 October 1953

Rating Definitions:

Superior	An extremely outstanding performance.
Excellent	An outstanding performance, above average.
Satisfactory	Requirements met without distinction.
Poor	A deficient performance, below average.
Failure	An extremely deficient performance.

Training Subjects

	SUPERIOR	EXCELLENT	SATISFACTORY	POOR	FAILURE
1. Security		X			
2. Cover		X			
3. Observation & Description		X			
4. Interviewing		X			
5. Interrogation			X		
6. Surveillance		X			
7. Telephones & Mikes (Theory)			X		
8. General CI Methods			X		
9. Contacting			X		
10. Intrafield Communications					
11. Recruiting of Agents					
12. Training of Agents					
13. Agent Management & Control					
14. Double Agent Management & Control					
15. Reporting					
16. CE Operations					
17. Communist Theory					
18. Soviet IS					
19. Psychological Warfare					
20. Political Warfare					
21. Economic Warfare					
22. Sabotage					
23. Counter-sabotage					
24. Resistance Force Activities					
25. Guerrilla Warfare					
26. Evasion & Escape					
27. Weapons					
28. Demolitions					
29. Special Devices (R&D)					
30. Air Reception					
31. Sea Reception					
32. Map Reading					
33.					
34.					
35.					

SECRET

[illegible] shown to the student whom it concerns.

SECRET

Student Evaluation

	ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE	NOT OBSERVED
1. Security consciousness	X			
2. Ability to work with and get along with others	X			
3. Ability to follow instructions	X			
4. Maturity of judgment and common sense	X			
5. Initiative		X		
6. Resourcefulness and independence of judgment		X		
7. Tactfulness and sense of discretion	X			
8. Cooperativeness		X		
9. Sense of discipline	X			
10. Imagination and creativeness	X			
11. Amenability to construct criticism		X		
12. Attention to necessary details		X		
13. Observant and careful in the collection of facts		X		
14. Political sophistication and awareness	X			
15. Interest and enthusiasm for proposed assignment	X			
16. Motivation for clandestine activities	X			
17. Ability to relate theory to practice		X		

Student's Comparative Evaluation To Others Trained For Identical Or Similar Assignment

ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE
XX		

Instructor's Comments:

VAIVADA appears to be a hard, conscientious worker. He is quick and alert of mind and possesses maturity of judgment. Subject studied the training material with enthusiasm and expressed the desire to improve himself. VAIVADA displayed an excellent understanding of tradecraft techniques as portrayed in his written work. He has the ability to apply theory to practice. His goal was to improve himself to the best of his ability, as his past experience in the field had been on a trial and error basis. His experience in South America might account for his unhurried thinking and action, but it will undoubtedly assist him in his future operations as he simply refuses to become ruffled or panicky. It is the belief of this instructor that VAIVADA is well qualified for his proposed field assignment.

/s/ R. P. GOLLOMB
Instructor

SECRET

File
BRADIAL

JOHN O. CAVADINE
WH
2298
7 DECEMBER 1953

SECRET

BUENOS AIRES

DIRECTOR

TO: SBUEN CITE: DIR ROUTINE

RE: HAB-A-540
MUEB 734

SUBJECT DENIED ENTRY ARGENTINE. WILL BE ASSIGNED OTHER DUTIES.

END OF MESSAGE

7 Dec. 53
201-168881

J. CALDWELL KING SECRET ROBERT H. DAHLGREN

SECRET

Air Pouch HRSA- 428

Chief of Station, Guatemala 6 December 1955

Chief of Station, San Jose Info: Chief, WHD

Operational

RUMANOID

REF: Dir 32628

Subject failed to make the scheduled contact to pick up the advance authorized by referenced cable. It is presumed that he changed his mind about needing the money.

Stefan R. Lebanow

COPY

201-168551

~~15-6-3-125~~

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Deputy, WH 4 December 1953

SUBJECT: Mr. Ross CROZIER

By pre-arrangement through Mr. Smyser I had an interview with Mr. Ross Crozier in my room at the Hotel Raleigh on the night of 2 December 1953 for the purpose of getting an impression as to whether it was possible that he could be used to advantage in our program.

Mr. Crozier has been a contract agent in Costa Rica for approximately 4 years. He is married to a Costa Rican and has 2 children, ages 2 and 4. He was in a student capacity in Costa Rica. From my knowledge of reporting done by the station in Costa Rica and the indication of sources of information in reports from that station, I am inclined to think that he very ably handled himself. In addition, I was very much impressed with him during the course of the interview and feel that he is an excellent type, having all the necessary qualifications for giving substantial assistance to our program. He has 7 months remaining under the GI assistance bill for educational purposes and it can be satisfactorily arranged by him to complete his education at San Carlos University, Guatemala. Under the Guatemalan law his wife, being a Costa Rican, becomes a Guatemalan citizen upon her establishment of residence in Guatemala and this is a distinct advantage.

He has a valid U.S. passport on which his two children are carried but it will be desirable that he enter Guatemala as a tourist, either with a tourist visa in his passport or on a tourist card. The children could also be issued tourist cards. The use of a tourist card eliminates the necessity of his reporting to the police. He can stay 6 months and then obtain a renewal of the tourist card without leaving the country. Within a relatively short time he unquestionably could be of distinct advantage to us on reporting on activities and attitudes of students and other elements.

He could act as a cut-out. I feel that he is qualified to actually develop a penetration into the Communist Party, a feat with which he had some success in Costa Rica. He could handle an important PP operation with Enrique SALAZAR Liquens(also known as Oscar H. CARTA in station files), which operation is presently being handled through Donald O. Hediger. Irrespective of whether Hediger continues with Guatemala or is given assignment outside the country, I believe that it is important to have Crozier with us in Guatemala. We can find plenty for him to do.

Birch O'Neal

BO'N/pm
4 Dec. 1953

SECRET
Security Information

201-168881

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

25 November 1953

SUBJECT: BIRADIAL

On Wednesday 18 November 1953 subject was introduced to John Heyn. The introduction was deemed advisable, inasmuch as it would probably facilitate subsequent meetings in Buenos Aires where it is anticipated that subject will be operating, providing his visa is granted.

BIRADIAL indicated he had not heard from the Argentine Embassy of Costa Rica, hence is planning to have his wife write to follow this matter immediately.

BIRADIAL mentioned the fact that his wife's relatives, and with whom he may dwell when he first moves to Buenos Aires, may be in a position to assist in obtaining a visa for subject. He indicated that having a native of the country render some assistance in this regard may be the solution to any possible difficulties. It appears logical, however, he was informed not to make any approaches at this time.

He again noted that inasmuch as it will be necessary to stop in Costa Rica to pick up his visa when granted, he suggested the possibility of leaving for Costa Rica shortly following the termination of his covert training. As previously indicated he felt that his presence in Costa Rica, where he can plausibly maintain himself and his family, and where he may be in personal touch with the Argentine Embassy, may be to his advantage in securing his visa.

On 24 November 1953, subject called to inform he had received a letter from the Argentine Embassy in Costa Rica informing him his visa had been denied. He informed he still felt he could obtain it but it may be necessary to seek assistance from his wife's relatives in Buenos Aires or it may be necessary to go back to Costa Rica for a short period to finalize the matter. Too, he suggested that in the event he cannot obtain the appropriate permission to enter Buenos Aires the Agency may desire to send him some where else in Latin America, possibly Cuba (he mentioned specifically) or some other country. In this connection, he felt that cover-wise he and his family would be in a more secure position if they were in Costa Rica while awaiting placement.

I plan to see BIRADIAL on 25 November 1953.

John O. Cavadine
John O. Cavadine

201-168881

SECRET

MEMORANDUM RECEIPT

25 [illegible] 195[illegible]

TO

FROM

SUBJ

Arthur G. Vance
24 Nov 53

[illegible]

SECRET

8 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Record

SUBJECT : Project HUMANOID

1. A total of $5934.00 was originally requested for this project for the period 1 March 52 to 28 February 53. The amount actually approved was $6000.00 (Form No. 51-91, project folder).

2. $5100.00 of the approved amount was to provide for the compensation of four agents who were to be reimbursed as follows:

HUMANOID	1600.00 (colones)
HUMANOID-1	150.00 (")
HUMANOID-2	250.00 (")
HUMANOID-3	900.00 (")

3. The funding requirements for agent salaries were calculated (by the Headquarters case officer, Tom Barrett) at a rate 8 to 1 (e.g., HUMANOID was to receive ¢1600.00 or $200.00 per month).

4. However, the rate of exchange has fluctuated since the original funding estimates were made. The present rate is 6.63 to 1. Accordingly, the monthly pay scale for HUMANOID in U. S. currency would be approximately $241.00 (or ¢1600.00). The pay scales of the other agents are similarly effected.

5. This situation was explained to the Budget office (Mr. Bauer, extension 2017) and the Plans office (Mr. Ziegler). I stated that dollar expenditures would be in excess of the amounts provided in the project if we were to continue payments to the agents at the colon rates previously established. Mr. Ziegler informed me that we could nonetheless continue the present colon pay scale. He further advised that budgetary adjustments could be made at a later date when it became evident that the project allotment would definitely be exceeded due to currency fluctuations. A project amendment is not then required at this time. The station may be advised to continue payments in colones in the amounts shown in paragraph 2, above.

References: TRS-A-1215
TRS-A-1142
TRS-W-771
SANJ-884 (IN 30219)
SANJ-882 (IN 31520)
DIR 16246 (OUT 5[illegible])
DIR 17884 (OUT 52565)

PEO
PAUL E. OBERST
Acting Case Officer

SECRET

201-168881

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

SECRET
Security Information

20 November 1953

SUBJECT: BIRADIAL

On Monday 9 November 1953 a meeting was held with subject for the primary purpose of delivering his salary for October 1953 amounting to $350.00. A receipt for the amount was obtained and returned to Mr. Wolcott, Finance Division. A copy of the receipt is retained in subject's file.

During the meeting, subject reported his schooling at American University will terminate in approximately three weeks. His scheduled Covert training will also come to an end during the first week in December 1953.

Subject related he has not as yet received any news on his visa for Argentina for which he made application approximately 90 days ago. You will recall that subject anticipated it would take approximately 90 days to obtain such a visa.

BIRADIAL informed if he doesn't receive word on his visa within the next week he plans to have his wife follow this matter by writing to the Argentine Embassy in Costa Rica.

Subject also presented this thought in the event no results are forth coming within the next two or three weeks: He related that in so far as his friends and wife's relatives in Costa Rica are concerned, he and his wife and family are in the states on an extended trip. They are expected to return to Costa Rica. In so far as he knows, he, his wife and the Argentine Consul in Costa Rica are the only persons in Costa Rica aware that they have made application for the visa under question. In the event no positive results are obtained on his visa application, subject wondered about the advisability of returning to Costa Rica, to finalize his visa affairs and depart for Argentina.

The question of maintaining cover while in Costa Rica was discussed. In this connection he informed he would have no trouble finding a suitable job which would lend authenticity to him and his wife's status. Too, it was indicated, and it appears somewhat reasonable, for subject to remain in the U.S. presently for too long a period of time may raise some question as to his true status in the minds of Argentine Embassy Officials in Costa Rica as well as his friends and relatives in Costa Rica.

It is suggested that consideration be given to allow subject to return to Costa Rica within the near future if the appropriate Argentine Visa has not been received to: (a) Allow him to finalize such details (b) To preserve his cover status.

Contact will be maintained with subject for further developments. It is anticipated that John Heyn will meet subject at the next meeting for the first time. This is recommended, inasmuch as Mr. Heyn who will be in the pertinent area, may be able to familiarize himself with subject.

John D Cavadine

John D. Cavadine

SECRET
Security Information

201-168871

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4 NOVEMBER 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 99075

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: SR REP, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA J. GRAHAM WH 2065

FROM: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ROUTINE

CONF: WH 4 1856Z 5 NOV 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, PP 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 25885

TO: SBUEN CITE: DIR

REF: HAZT-540, BUEN 855

SUBJECT OF REF PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED CRYPTONYM NBR 165 AT HEADQUARTERS. CANCEL CRYPTONYM NBR 134 FOR SUBJECT OF REF.

END OF MESSAGE

S. W. WASHINGTON

201-168881

J. C. KING R. H. DAHLGREN

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

35-83

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

3 NOVEMBER, 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 31509

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP BUENOS AIRES

ROUTINE

ACTION: WH 4

22492 3 NOV 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

BUEN 855

TO: DIR

CITE: SBUEN

RE: HABW 540

SUBJECT OF REF HAS BEEN ASSIGNED CRYPTONYM NBR 134.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

(44)

P.2219

SECRET
Security Information

27 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief/Plans Staff/FI
Attention: Projects Branch/Plans Staff

SUBJECT: Project BIRADIAL - Request for Amendment

1. Project BIRADIAL concerns the transfer of Contract Agent Humanoid from Costa Rica to Argentina, with interim training at headquarters. Since approval of the project on 12 August 1953 Humanoid is now known as BIRADIAL.

2. BIRADIAL, an American citizen born in Illinois in 1922, is married to a Costa Rican girl and has two small children. Since 1949 he has worked for CIA in Costa Rica as a contract agent and has proven himself particularly adept at spotting and recruiting agents and has successfully supervised the direction of a high level Communist party penetration agent. He has been the most valuable agent of the San Jose Station.

3. BIRADIAL has been accepted as a student at the University of Buenos Aires for the school year beginning March 1954. He is presently undergoing covert training.

4. In order to enhance BIRADIAL's cover while undergoing covert training, he has enrolled at American University at a cost of $93.00 a semester commencing 7 October 1953 and is pursuing his studies four days weekly.

5. Since BIRADIAL is attending class at American University to enhance his cover during his interim covert training at headquarters, it is requested he be reimbursed in the amount of $93.00 and the project amended accordingly.

Paul P. Payton
for J. C. KING, CWHD

Attachment - 1

Approved: ____________
Chief, Plans

2 Nov 1953
Date

SECRET
Security Information

201-168881

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

23 October 1953

SUBJECT: BIRADIAL

On Wednesday, 14 October 1953 I met with subject at his apartment in the Presidential Gardens, Alexandria, Virginia for the purpose of obtaining his signature on the Travel Voucher prevously submitted covering his travel from Costa Rica to Washington, D. C.

BIRADIAL indicated that the combination of his schooling at American University in the mornings and his covert training in the afternoons which also keeps him busy during the weekend, is keeping him fully occupied. Though he did not press the issue, he wondered whether it would be necessary to continue his schooling at American University. He indicated he thought he could handle any inquiries regarding his activities satisfactually. We both decided however that, regardless of the hardship placed on him, he should continue his schooling at American University since any inquiries could then be properly and legitimately backstopped. One of the difficulties involved is the amount of daily travel between the University and his residence.

Inasmuch as the distance involved plus the high rental cost factor (175.00 per month) present a few difficulties. This plus the fact that the plausibility of a student paying such rent is somewhat questionable, BIRADIAL indicated he might move to a more suitable location.

On 23 October 1953 he informed he was moving to 5008 - 7th St., N. W., Washington, D. C. as of this day for cover, convenience, and financial considerations. He will advise of his new phone number if and when it is available.

John D. Caundine

SECRET

201-168881

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HRSA-329

TO : Chief of Station, Buenos Aires
DATE: 9 OCT 1953

FROM : Chief of Station, San José
INFO: Wash

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational
SPECIFIC- HUMANOID

Ref: DIR 15613, HRSA-198, 17 July 1953

The attached file on subject is being returned herewith for your retention.

John J. Billington

Encl:
1. File, Part I
2. Files, Part II (u/s cover)

9 Oct 1953

NO ENCLOSURES FOR IR

RI COPY

9 Oct. 53
201-168881
~~1F 6 3-165~~

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE: 7 October 1953

SUBJECT: BIRADIAL (202-2723)

On Monday, 5 October 1953, the writer met with subject at his apartment to deliver the necessary "credentials" allowing his proper entry to covert training facilities.

During this meeting he informed that he was too late for entrance to George Washington University. He was then in the process of making inquiry at American University.

He also mentioned that he opened an account with a bank in Alexandria, Va. I'm not so sure that this was such a good idea--but the account has been opened. He had had an account with the Chase National Bank; however, he has closed this account since he claims he received such poor service from this bank while at his previous station. He stated he would like to have an account established with a large banking institution which has a branch affiliation in Buenos Aires where he will be assigned, so that his pay may be deposited in the U. S. securely by us. It is suggested this be worked out with Finance.

On Wednesday a. m. subject called to inform that his home phone number is now TEmple 6-8651. He has enrolled in American University and will attend classes daily from 9:30 a. m. to 11:30 a. m. He is studying Corporate Finance and other analysis courses. During the conversation he expressed amazement at the cost of $93 for schooling for one semester. Although he did not request reimbursement for this amount, it was inferred that he would undoubtedly appreciate it if this expenditure could be absorbed by us.

In view of subject's past excellent performance in behalf of this Agency, and inasmuch as he is not highly paid, it is recommended that Agent be reimbursed for this expenditure even if it means amending the project.

Agent has not been paid for the month of September. I shall check with Finance and deliver Agent's salary to him.

John O. Cavadine
John O. Cavadine, WH/II/Argentina

SECRET

201-168881

Copy of a
letter from
the Argentine Embassy
in Costa Rica (Consular Section)
Jor.

San Jose de Costa Rica, Octubre 6 de 1953.

Senor
D. Ross L. Crozier
c./o. Francis Williams
5846 Access Road,
Page Manor
Dayton, Ohio

De mi consideracion:

Cumpleme dirigirme a usted informandose que se ha recibido en esta Oficina Consular la Nota N°1043 de fecha agosto 7 del ano en curso (Exp. 11096/53) por la que la Direccion General de Inmigracion por disposicion atenta al destino en el pais, ha denegado el permiso considerando que la solicitud formulada por usted y familia ante esta Oficina se refiere a Inmigracion de Urbe.

Sin otro particular, me es grato saludar a ustedes.-

Carlos Alberto FERNANDEZ
Consejero
Seccion Consular

301-165881

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record   2 October 1953

SUBJECT: BIRADIAL 202-2723

1. On 1 October 1953 the writer as George Wheeler was introduced to Agent Arthur G. Vaivada (P) by J. G. Hanke at his apartment B-21, Van Buren, Presidential Gardens, Alexandria, Virginia. The introduction was deemed advisable, inasmuch as Agent is to be inherited by Branch II. Mr. Heyn informs he is not available to handle Agent at this time but will meet him in about three weeks.

2. In accordance with instructions received from Covert Training Offices, Agent is to report for covert training at 2400-20th St. N. W., Washington, D. C. on 5 October 1953 at 1415 Hrs. He is to ask for Mr. Cal when he arrives. Agent is to be known as Mr. Vicks. The instructions were passed on to the Agent. He was also informed to call X2298 and ask for George Wheeler in the event he desired to make an appointment to discuss business matters.

3. In connection with agent's previous inquiry regarding the possibility of obtaining U. S. Citizenship for his wife, Mr. Hanke informed him that under the circumstances under which his wife entered the U. S., namely as a tourist, it would not be possible to plausibly apply for U. S. Citizenship. Hanke also informed that although possible to rush the Citizenship through, it was felt inadvisable at this time since the proceedure might jeopardize the present existing cover arrangement. Agent seemed to understand the difficulties involved and raised no particular objection.

4. Agent informed several neighbors had inquired as to the nature of his business. He has informed them that he is a student and is studying at George Washington University in the field of Economics. This story had been decided upon before the writer came upon the scene. Since Agent has not commenced study at GW it was suggested to him that he commence taking a course or two as soon as possible. He informed he would do this as soon as he learns of the details as to his hours to be devoted to Covert Training.

5. Although there is no assurance subject will be granted permission to enter Argentina, subject previously indicated he could forsee no problem in this regard. He did make inquiry, however, as to what his status would be should he not be allowed entrance to Argentina.

6. It is unfortunate that Agent is residing in the Washington D. C. area inasmuch as that in itself is undoubtedly considered as a Government Stigma. The possibility exists that the wrong person or persons will learn of his and his wife's presence in this area.

7. The file fails to reflect what provision, if any, has been made to pay the Agent. This will have to be worked out.

SECRET

John Cavadine

201-168581

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

28 Sept. 53

SUBJECT: HUMANOID

1. During the debriefing of HUMANOID in Washington in August-September 1953, his wife mentioned an individual whom she had come in contact with while in San Jose.

2. This person was first seen in the Argentine Embassy where she was arranging papers for their travel there later. She had seen him previously around in San Jose, dressed in sport clothes and apparently a "playboy." He injected himself into a discussion between the Argentine Consul and HUMANOID's wife, showing great knowledge of Argentine visa regulations. This occurred in early July 1953.

3. HUMANOID's wife again saw the same individual in Panama on 22 August 1953, at which time the pretended at first not to know her, and then "recognized" her, but did not mention their meeting in the Argentine Embassy in San Jose.

4. Her description of the person is as follows:

height : about 6'
age: apparently 30
hair: ~~[illegible]~~ blond, receding at temples
eyes: not brown or black, probably hazel or grey
complexion: ruddy, young looking face, which was long and thin
characteristics:
XXXXX Smokes heavily, with dark stains right fingers. Top tooth on left side chipped. Wore dark glasses. Considered self quite a ladies man.
languages: Speaks Spanish with Argentine accent
Speaks English well since seen talking with XXXXXXXXX U.S. soldiers in San Jose

5. When XXXXXX this person was seen in Panama, he was dressed as a common laborer and told HUMANOID's wife that he was working on a "fertilizer ship" there.

6. At no time did HUMANOID himself see this person.

7. A pictture of Hugo Ramiro RODOLFO, the ex-Argentine labor attache in Panama, was shown to HUMANOID's wife who stated positively that he was not the person she saw in Costa Rica and Panama.

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

File in BIRAPIAL

AIR

HRS-W-179

Chief of Station, San Jose

Chief, WHD

SEP 21 1953

Operational

HUMANOID Report

Attached are the two keys for HUMIDOR and the Apartado.

J. C. KING
CWH

Enclosure: Two Keys

11 September 1953

Distribution:
  3 - San Jose, w/encl. as noted
  1 - WH/III Chrono, w/o encl.
  1 - WH/III/HUMIDOR, w/o encl.
  ✓1 - WH/II/HUMANOID, w/o encl.
  1 - WH/Mailroom, w/o encl.
  1 - Registry, w/o encl.

WHD/JHanke/ss

J. C. KING

O.M. DOERFLIGER

201-168881

SECRET

SECRET

Fil. BIRADIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

18 September 1953

SUBJECT: HUMANOID

1. During the time that HUMANOID was at Headquarters on TDY in late August and Early September, he raised the question of the citizenship status of his wife, who has not yet taken out her first papers but wished to do so if possible. His question was whether it was operationally desirable on our part, which I answered saying it would be (after talking with Mr. Heyn). Actually, there is no strong advantage, but at least it should be started sometime, and there is no advantage to us in having her remain a Costa Rican since she will be an American citizen at some date in the future.

2. When HUMANOID left on his vacation, it was understood that I would be checking with Mr. Heyn about the means by which his wife might be able to start her papers while HUMANOID is in training at Headquarters. My understanding is that she would have to leave the country and reenter as an immigrant quota since she is presently on a tourist visa and cannot as such apply for citizenship even if her husband in a U.S. citizen.

3. Mr. Heyn informed me that there is a section which handled these questions of citizenship for people we are interested in, and said he would be checking with that person. I told HUMANOID that the next person who handled him would be able to give him further details on this whole matter.

4. I would recommend that HUMANOID be given all help possible to have his wife started on her papers before they go our under BIRADIAL, since they will be gone for two years at a minimum and will be delaying her citizenship that much longer if nothing is started while they are here in the country.

Decided not to try for
30 day citizenship due
to Cover Problems

Wife would have to
return Costa Rica and
re-enter U.S. anyway

2 Dec 53.

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

DESENSITIZED
KAPOK

HAB-W-540

KAPOK NO. 91

Chief of Mission, Buenos Aires

18 September 1953

Chief, WHD

Operational
Arthur C. VAIVADA

Transmitted herewith is a copy of the contract of Arthur C. VAIVADA. He is the subject of HAB-W-403. VAIVADA signed the original of this contract at headquarters on 10 September 1953.

J. C. King
CWH

Attachment: 1

Distribution:
3 - Buenos Aires
~~3~~ - WHD (BA chrono, Subject file, BA KAPOK file)

WH/FI/II/JGraham:jcw

J. C. KING

R. N. DAHLGREN

301-168881

SECRET

DESENSITIZED
KAPOK

SECRET

10 Sept 53

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. On 9 September 1953 subject was again contacted at his apartment and the new contract was signed. Subject was told that the contract clause dealing with additional committments not included in the contract was standard agency protection against unauthorized promises by persons contacting him, such as the case officer. He was told, however, that the case officer's personal experience has been that the agency makes all possible efforts to act in good faith and with common sense if contract problems arise at a later date.

2. The"offset"provisions of the contract was explained, emphasizing the agency's view that any future cover business activity on his part would be possible only because of the salary we pay. Therefor, modest profits, if any, would be offset against salary due to him. It was pointed out that the case officer's understanding was that if subject's diligence resulted in sizable profits, the agency would probably consider revising the contract to allow subject a share of the profits. However, subject agreed that this question was really subordinate to the main purpose of a cover activity, which would be to obtain cover, not profits.

NOTE: Subject's questions appeared motivated by the contract form, which was more complicated and "legalistic" in appearance thatn the one written in the field under which he has been operating for the past four years. His attitude at all times was most cooperative, and he agreed that the spirit in which the contract was carried out, on both sides, was as important as the provisions. It was carefully explained to him that XXXXXXXXXXXX the contractserved the double purpose of defining the rights and obligations of both himself and the agency, XXXXXXX and for that reason my at points seem more "legalistic" than XXXXX regularly necessary. However, subject stated several times that he had had nothing but the best of relations with the persons who have directed him so far, and it is the case officer's opinion that he has XXXX the utmost faith in the good intentions of the agency.

3. Subject was informed that"Career" status, in which he has expressed interest over the past two years, would be considered at the end of the present two year contract, and would depend on his operational success during that period and his ability to provide durable cover which would enable him to continue working for us.

4. The subject's travel reimbursement is being handled by Hanke (x3504), and will be ready for him when he returns to Washington on or about 2 October. Subject went on vacation effective 10 September and will be at the following addresses during his vacation:

September 10-14: Fran Williams
5846 Access Road
Page Manor
Wright-Patterson
Dayton, Ohio

September 15-25: Mr. L. E. Crozier
RR No 2
Harmon, Illinois

201-168571

5. Subject will contact the case officer on his reutrn to Washington. He has been given the following address in case he wants to contact us before that time:

Paul F. Brandon, P.O. Box 262, Mt. Ranier Station, Mt. Ranier
Md.

(signed) J.G. Hanke

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

COMPLETE ONLY APPLICABLE BLANKS

Case Officer: John G. Heyn
Tele. Ext. : 3992
Date : 31 August 1953

I. General

A. Pseudonym Arthur G. VAIVADA B. Project BIRADIAL
C. Staff Agent ____, Career Agent ____, Contract Agent X
Contract Employee ____, Consultant ____, Covert Detail ____, Other ____ (see CFR, Part 14.1)
D. Is ultimate conversion to staff status anticipated? not known
E. Is the individual presently engaged by CIA in any capacity? Yes Describe Contract agent - contract written 1949
F. Clearance: Security ____, O/C X, P.O.C. ____ Date 19 July 49
G. T/O: Does this individual block a project T/O slot? No
Slot No. ____.
H. Acknowledgement of pseudonym on file in WHD/II

II. Proposed Assignment

A. Duties (cutout, courier, reports, liaison and contacts, major or part-time operational duties, administrative etc.)
Principal agent
B. Anticipated Duration two years
C. Permanent Post (City and Country) Buenos Aires, Argentina

III. Personal Qualifications

A. Citizenship U.S. B. ____
C. Normal Residence (City and Country) Sterling, Illinois
D. Marital Status Married E. Number of dependents (including spouse) 3
F. Education (check) High School ____, College X, Post Graduate ____.
G. Military Status: Retired ____, Reserve ____, Draft eligible ____. Has completed military service.
H. (1) Highest salary earned $3,000 (2) Last salary earned $3,000 ____.
I. Special qualifications for assignment (area experience, language contacts, technical or professional skills, general proven abilities)
Four years experience as Principal agent in Costa Rica have proved him to be an excellent agent.

201-168881

SECRET

FORM NO. 59-68
MAR 1953

(8-12)

IV. Cover Activity Proposed

A. U.S. Government No Other Student & possible proprietor of a small business - D/k
B. CIA Proprietary No
CIA Subsidized No
C. Does the individual have a cover activity which was previously established without the assistance of CIA and which will be continued? Yes
D. If the answer to (C) is no, explain CIA part in establishing the cover, indicating the amount of compensation which will be paid by the cover activity for bona fide services with reimbursement from CIA

Not applicable

E. Will any portion of the compensation or allowance paid by the cover activity be offset against amounts due from CIA? ~~No~~ yes D/k any business profits
If so, guaranteed minimum NA.

V. Special Field Conditions

A. Will the agent be able to make frequent contact with a CIA base possessing forms and regulation? Yes X No
B. If so, does the base have adequate communication facilities? Yes
C. Would detection of the possession of operational data probably result in the arrest of the individual or jeopardy to his safety? Yes X No

Emoluments and Conditions of Employment
(Add "R" within ( ), if reimbursable by CIA)

VI. Compensation:

D/k

		CIA	COVER	
A.	Basic	$ 4,200	$	( )
B.	Additional (Post Differential)	$	$	( )
C.	Profit participation or bonus	$	$	( )
D.	Total	$ 4,200	$	( )

VII. Quarters

Furnished by: Govt. Cover Individual X

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

VIII. Allowances: (Normally granted only to residents of the United States)

		CIA	COVER	
A.	Living-quarters	$ 1,500	$	( )
B.	Cost-of-living	$	$	( )
C.	Other (per diem)	$ 900 (max)	$	( )
D.	Total	$ 2,400	$	( )

E. Basis (1) ______ (PER CIA REGS.) (2) ______ (SUB. COMPLIANCE) (3) ______ (OTHER)

IX. Operational Expenses: (Check proper space. If maximum limit, give dollar value.)

A. Purchase of information. Yes X No ____
B. Entertainment. Yes X No ____ Limit (for A.&B.) 720
C. Use of personal vehicle basis No
D. Other (describe) None Limit ______ (AMOUNT)

X. Travel Expenses

Per diem while
in transit in U.S.
4 standard travel
per diem

A. Individual with dependents X without dependents ____
B. If "with" dependents, identify relationship wife and two children - limit as per project set at $3,550
C. Household effects Yes - $500 limit
D. Personal vehicle No
E. Will any travel expenses be paid by cover? (Describe and add "R" if reimbursable.) No
F. Basis (1) ______ (PER CIA REGS.) (2) ______ (SUB. COMPLIANCE) (3) ______ (OTHER)

XI. Miscellaneous Benefits: (Except in special cases, applicable only to Staff and Career Agents. Check as appropriate.)

A. Death and Disability:
  (1) Per Federal Employees' Compensation Act No
  (2) Other (give details) No
B. Leave: (If other than per CIA or State Dept. regulations, give amounts) Yes ← 14 calendar days - DH
C. Retirements Reserve No
D. Continuance pay and allowance per Missing Persons Act No
E. Life Insurance: No
F. Rehabilitation rights No

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

XII. Term

A. Duration of contract Two years
B. Effective date of contract:
(1) On execution (check)______ (2) Other (specify) 1 Sept. 1953
C. Renewable: Yes X No ______
D. Termination Notice 30
(NUMBER OF DAYS, IF ANY)
E. Forfeiture of return travel for resignation prior to contract term. Yes X No ______ (Explain) ______

XIII. Additional or unusual requirements, justifications or explanations.
Section B of Miscellaneous Benefits is requested for subject, although not a Staff or Career Agent, because of past service rendered.

XIV. Will agent take title to CIA property? Yes X No ______

Carlotta Fendig
APPROVING OFFICER
for FI/PLANS

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER

61 Bill to run through school year.

SECRET

DESENSITIZED
Security Information

COPY

Date:

Mr. Arthur O. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract effective 1 June 1949 with ODYOKE for the purchase of information and services of a confidential nature.

Effective 31 August 1953 said contract is hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto and in lieu thereof the following contract is substituted:

ODYOKE, as represented by the contracting officer, hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $4200 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to KUBARK. No taxes will be withheld from this amount, and it will be your responsibility to report such income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations.

2. Allowance. Effective upon your arrival at your permanent post of duty overseas, you will be entitled to a Quarters allowance equivalent to that granted a GS-7 Government employee stationed at the same permanent post of duty. This allowance will be at the maximum rates prescribed in the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas). No accounting for this allowance will be required by KUBARK. In the event that Quarters are provided by your cover company, you will not be entitled to the Quarters allowance herein indicated.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents and your household effects to and from your permanent post of duty overseas and for you alone for authorized travel within your operational area. You will be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence during such travel and while in training in PBPRIME. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with KUBARK regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. In addition to the allowance indicated above, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information as specifically approved by KUBARK. Such funds will be subject to accounting in substantial compliance with KUBARK regulations.

31 Aug. 53

301-168881

SECRET
DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED

5. Leave. You will be entitled to fourteen(14) calendar days' leave per contract year. Such leave may be accrued during the term of this contract or any renewal hereof but payment in lieu of unused leave will not be authorised. Such leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of KUBARK.

6. Cover. It is anticipated that you will undertake certain cover employment in the course of your performance under this agreement. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

7. Offset. Any sums or substantially similar benefits or allowances received from your commercial cover as differentiated from your student cover will be used to offset those due under his contract by KUBARK. Sums, similar benefits or allowances thus received through your commercial cover are acknowledged and agreed to be payment by KUBARK within the provisions of this contract. You will report allsums or substantially similar benefits received from said commercial cover at least every six months during the term of this contract.

8. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of ODYOKE, you hereby recognise and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by KUBARK to evidence relationship.

9. Status. You are not an employee of ODYOKE under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

10. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by KUBARK from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

11. Instructions. Instructions received by you from KUBARK in briefing or training are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

SECRET DESENSITIZED

SECRET DESENSITIZED
Security Information

12. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on ODYOKE.

13. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 September 1953, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by KUBARK either

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice to you from KUBARK, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from KUBARK accepted by you. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by KUBARK prior to expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to PBPRIME. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

ACCEPTED:

PBPRIME

BY ______________________

Arthur G. Valveda

Special Contracting Officer

APPROVED: ______________________

SECRET DESENSITIZED

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

SUBJECT: Interview with Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. On 28 August 1953, Arthur G. VAIVADA was contacted at a hotel in Washington, D.C., by the Costa Rican desk officer. Subject was briefed on the necessity of submitting an accounting of travel expenses and given the outlines of his training schedule. He also signed a pseudonym acknowledgement. In addition, subject was given his full August salary of $250 (old rate), although it developed that he had been given a half months' salary by the station prior to departure. He was told this overpayment would be subtracted from his travel reimbursement.

2. On the night of 30 August 1953, subject was contacted at his apartment in Virginia. He requested our opinion as to the possibility of his wife's starting to take out citizenship papers now prior to departing for Argentina, and the desirability of this for cover reasons. He was told that the agency would probably not object (he would be given a definite answere in the near future), but that it might not be possible anyway since his wife was on a tourist visa. (This answer was also promised soon.) He was told that the new contract to be signed would not give either life of hospitalization insurance, for reasons of cover. He was told that career agent status, which would be considered at the end of the two year contract to be signed shortly, would allow life insurance, but not hospitalization. It was explained to him that his present contract did not acknowledge him to be a U.S. Government employee, but that career agent status would grant that.

NOTE: At all times the subject impressed the case officer with sincerity, willingness to abide by agency decisions in all matters, and showed a most cooperative attitude.

3. Subject made the following points while discussing his Argentina assignment:

a. His application for entrance to Argentina as a student is now in the hands of the Argentine Consul in Costa Rica. It should be granted in three months. He does not forsee any problems in this respect, but did ask what our plans would be if any thing did prevent his going there. He was told that we would attempt to place him elsewhere, but that this was a contingency we couldn't make any plans about until something prevented his present assignment.

b. Subject will keep in touch with the Argentine Consul through a friend in Ohio who will handle incoming and outgoing mail. This address has been given to the Consul. He believes that this offers no security problem, since the friend is an officer in the Air Force who briefs outgoing military attaches at Wright Field and as such has a full security clearance. This friend is witting of subject's activities to the extent that he knows subject to be working partime for the U.S. Government in some sort of assignment. Subject's friend will be cautioned in this respect.

c. Subject has told his parents that he is studying at MIT for awhile before deciding where to complete his studies. Communication through them will be through a friend at MIT on whom he submitted PRQ data when this friend was in San Jose earlier this year. (A security clearance request has been made by WHD/III). Subject's friend is also witting to a certain extent since he gave very general information when obtaining the PRQ data. For personal reasons to do with his marriage to a Costa Rican, there is no chance that his family in Illinois would make any sort of a trip to see him.

30 Aug. 53
201-168881

SECRET
Security Information

d. Subject will use a cover story while in Washington that he is studying at George Washington University in the field of Economics.

d. Subject's wife has a close friend in Argentine who is married to an Argentine army sergeant. Her name is Alicia Castro de CRUZ, 25 de Mayo #5327, Mar del Plata, Argentina. This name has been given to the Argentine Consul as a character reference.

f. Subject has 6-7 months of GI bill eligibility left for Argentine studies.

g. Due to the fact that subject's wife has been witting of his general activities, it was carefully explained to him that the agency had certain reservations considering this point. Emphasis was put on the point that good operational security practices in his future assignment would be of extreme importance for obvious reasons. It was pointed out that this interim period in Washington would be an ideal time to separate his activities from home life since his wife would no longer be in a community where she and her husband were well known. He was frank in admitting that he realized the dangers also, and would cooperate to the fullest extent.

NOTE: Subject is sensible in his approach to secutity and appears to think through each problem on its own merits. The extent of his wife's knowledge was to know that he was "going out to (a section of San Jose) for business reasons". She was witting of his connection with Communist activities, since on several occasions she was able to contact persons when it was not suitable for him to do so. At no time has she pressed him for information, and his general feeling is that she should be told only enough to explain undue absences from home. He was cautioned that his future superiors would take a dim view of his wife's participation, even to the limited extent he has indicated did occur in the past. He agreed that being in a new community with no local friends of long standing would make ~~this~~ it easier for them to start on this new basis.

It is the case officer's opinion that subject has carefully controlled his wife's knowledge and acted prudently in matters involving security. His operational achievements are evidence that his secutity practises have been sound, and it is believed that four years of covert contact with a well-known Communist in San Jose with no security breaches are sufficient proof of his wife's security consciousness.

14-00000

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

№ SD 12291 A

DATE 28 August 1953

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE) Ross L. Crozier

ROSS L. CROZIER
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

WITNESS: Jonathan S. Hanke

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD12291 B

DATE 28 August 1953

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) Arthur C. Vaivada

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

ARTHUR C. VAIVADA
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

WITNESS: Jonathan S. Hawke

SECRET

201-168881

Nº SD 29681B **DATE**

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) Harold R. Noemayr

Harold R. NOEMAYR
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

WITNESS: ______________________

RIGHT THUMB PRINT



SECRET

201-168881

N° SD 29081

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE) Ross L. Crozier

Ross L. CROZIER
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS: ______________________

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

AIR

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

HGSW-168

Chief of Station, San Jose

AUG 25 1953

Chief, WH

Operational
HUMANOID

REF: HGSA-115

1. In order to re-write project HUMANOID as Projects HUMIDOR and HUMIST as described in reference, Headquarters needs a description of the new cover and communication system between the case officer, principal agents, and sub-agents.

2. You should also indicate any changes in objectives, targets, and tasks which may be necessary.

J. C. KING
CWH

17 August 1953

Distribution:
3 - San Jose

1 - WH/III chrono
1 - WH/III/HUMANOID
1 - WH/III HUMIDOR
1 - WH/III HUMIST
1 - WH Mail Room
1 - RI/DP

WH/III/JHanke:dk

J. C. KING

C. M. DOERFLINGER

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

201-168881

SECRET

13 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDQ

SUBJECT: HUMANOID's training in the U.S.

1. HUMANOID's transfer to the U.S. for training prior to assignment in another area of WHD was approved under Project EIRADIAL on 12 August 1953. A training slot for subject was arranged with Mr. Cal Batten on x2778 this date to start 5 October 1953.

2. Formal request for training will be made by the new area case officer through Ben Racusin on x3818 when HUMANOID has arrived in the U.S. sometime in late August.

J. Hanke

201-168881

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

REQUEST FOR COVERT TRAINING

INSTRUCTIONS: THIS FORM TO BE HANDCARRIED TO CHIEF, PROJECT TRAINING DIVISION, (TRS), AFTER COORDINATION WITH DIVISION AND STAFF TRAINING LIAISON OFFICER

IMPORTANT:
STUDENT MUST BE U.S. NATIONAL DEEP COVER EMPLOYEE WITH FULL OPERATIONAL SECURITY CLEARANCE UNDER AN APPROVED PROJECT.

1. NAME OF STUDENT (PSEUDONYM): Arthur G. VAIVADA
DATE SUBMITTED TO PTD/TRS:
TRAINING ALIAS (TO BE ENTERED BY PTD/TRS):
PROJECT DESIGNATION: BIRADIAL
DIVISION OR STAFF: Western Hemisphere
BRANCH:
FI:
PP:
PM:
PROJECT APPROVAL DATE: 12 August 1953
OPERATIONS OFFICER: John S. Heyn
TELEPHONE: 3994
KNOWN TO STUDENT AS: not yet introduced
TYPE SECURITY CLEARANCE: Operational Clearance No. 6
ALTERNATE OPERATIONS OFFICER: Jonathan Hanke
TELEPHONE: 2065
KNOWN TO STUDENT AS: Jonathan Hanke
DATE OF CLEARANCE: 29 July 1949
AGENT STATUS: ☒ Contract ☐ Career ☐ Staff Other:

2. GEOGRAPHICAL ASSIGNMENT

COUNTRY OR AREA WHERE STUDENT WILL OPERATE: Argentina
STUDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF AREA:
☒ None
☐ Research and study only In area None years

3. STUDENT'S BACKGROUND

U.S. CITIZENSHIP: ☒ Birth ☐ Naturalization
DATE NATURALIZED:
RACE (COLOR): White
AGE: 31
SEX: Male
MARITAL STATUS: Married
FORMAL EDUCATION COMPLETED: still in progress
DEGREES: Bachelor of Arts from University of Costa Rica
LANGUAGE QUALIFICATIONS (FOREIGN): Spanish - fluent

FLUENT ENGLISH		
READ	☒ Yes	☐ No
WRITE	☒ Yes	☐ No
SPEAK	☒ Yes	☐ No

PREVIOUS CONNECTIONS WITH ANY U.S. OR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, OR SECURITY SERVICE (GIVE NAMES, DATES AND GENERAL NATURE OF DUTIES PERFORMED)
1941-45 Intelligence specialist, US Air Force in Panama, CBI Theatre
1946-49 U.S. Air Force " , political analyst.

EXPERIENCE OR QUALIFICATIONS FITTING STUDENT FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT (INCLUDE MILITARY HISTORY)
~~Panama activities~~ 4 years covert work ~~in Costa Rica~~ in ~~Central America.~~ CR

GENERAL INFORMATION OF ASSISTANCE IN DETERMINING INSTRUCTOR'S APPROACH
Subject ~~is an~~ has been proved to be a very capable contract agent and had extensive ~~experience~~ in spotting, recruiting, and training other agents. He has participated in a technical surveillance, ~~and~~ set up safehouses, ~~and~~ he has been debriefing a Communist penetration for four years, and made several approaches to other Communist penetration prospects.
12 Aug 53

FORM NO. 51-93
JUL 1953

SECRET

201-168881 (45)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

4. COVER, OBJECTIVES AND DUTIES

STUDENT TO LIVE WITH FAMILY DURING TRAINING ☒ Yes ☐ No

STUDENT TO FOLLOW NORMAL BUSINESS ROUTINE DURING TRAINING ☐ Yes ☐ No

DESCRIPTION OF COVER UNDER WHICH STUDENT WILL OPERATE DURING TRAINING
Student at Geo. Wash U. in Economics -

DESCRIPTION OF COVER AND DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED IN FIELD
BIRADIAL has been accepted at the University of Buenos Aires for the school year beginning March 1954. While attending he will establish himself in a small photographic business. His duties will be Principal Agent with the chief objective of developing information on the Communist Party and penetrating or directing penetrations of it.

5. SCHEDULE (SECTIONS 5 AND 6 TO BE COMPLETED AT TIME OF DISCUSSION WITH CHIEF, PTD)

DATE TRAINING TO START: 5 October 1953

DATE TRAINING TO BE COMPLETED: about 5 December 1953

RECOMMENDED CITY FOR TRAINING (CONSISTENT WITH COVER): Washington, D.C.

"ISOLATION" UTILIZATION: None

STUDENT AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING
☒ Full time ☐ Part time - indicate portion of day or week available:

6. TRAINING SUBJECTS (CHECK THOSE TO BE GIVEN)

1. Security ☒
2. Cover ☒
3. Observation & description ☒
4. Interviewing ☒
5. Interrogation ☒
6. Surveillance ☒
7. Telephones & mikes (theory) ☒
8. General CI methods ☒
9. Contacting ☒
10. Intra-field communications ☒
11. Recruiting of agents ☒
12. Training of agents ☒
13. Agent management & control ☒
14. Double agent management & control ☒
15. Reporting ☒
16. CE operations ☒
17. Communist theory ☒
18. Soviet IS ☒
19. Psychological warfare ☐
20. Political warfare ☐
21. Economic warfare ☐
22. Sabotage ☐
23. Counter-sabotage ☐
24. Resistance force activities ☐
25. Guerrilla warfare ☐
26. Evasion & escape ☐
27. Weapons ☐
28. Demolitions ☐
29. Special devices (R&D) ☐
30. Air reception ☐
31. Sea reception ☐
32. Map reading ☐
33. Stay-behind operation ☐
34. Black border crossing ☐
35. ☐
36. ☐

7. SPECIALIZED TECHNICAL TRAINING

NOTE: 1. If student requires training in cryptography or W/T such training must be arranged with the Training Branch of the Office of Communications, Extension 2977.

2. If student requires training in photography, S/W, technical surveillance methods, or flaps and seals such training must be arranged with TSS, Extension 8007.

8. AUTHORIZATION

[illegible] J.C. KING, [illegible]

STAFF TRAINING OFFICER SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

5 August 1953

SUBJECT: Project BIRADIAL

1. The purpose of this project is to provide for the covert training and transfer of a contract agent from Costa Rica to Argentina, where the latter will develop penetrations of the Communist Party of Argentina (PCA) and Communist front organizations and perform support functions as assigned.

2. BIRADIAL, an American citizen born in Illinois in 1922, is married to a Costa Rican girl and has two small children. Since June 1949 he has worked for CIA, under the cryptonym HUMANOID, in Costa Rica as a contract agent. He has proven himself particuallrly adept at spotting and recruiting agents and has successfully supervised the direction of a high-level Communist Party penetration agent.

3. The agent has been accepted as a student at the University of Buenos Aires for the school year beginning March 1954. He will try to establish himself in the photography business, in which he is well-qualified and has had previous experience, as an ostensible means to make ends meet while completing his studies.

4. Contact and communications between BIRADIAL and his case officer will be clandestine, under pretexts still to be arranged. Communications between the former and any agents or sources he recruits will be arranged according to the circumstances.

5. BIRADIAL has been dependent upon this Agency for the past four years, which financial dependence has increased considerably over this period with the increase of his family. His motivation is patriotic, and his past actions and achievements have borne this out.

6. The estimated annual cost of this project is $5,705 salary and allowances (GS-7), $3,550 travel and per diem (to U.S. for covert training, leave and return to Argentina), $500 transportation of effects and $720 for operational expenses and travel, a total of $10,475.

7. WH requests approval of Project BIRADIAL for the period 1 August 1953 through 31 July 1954.

Chief, STC

for Chief, Operations

R. A. MacMillan
Chief, Plans

~~Approved:~~
Chief, FI

12 Aug 53
Date

ATTACHMENT: Project Outline BIRADIAL

cc: STC/SPB
RI for Vital Records

SECRET

201-168111

SECRET
Security Information

PROJECT PLAN

CRYPTONYM BIRADIAL

DIVISION WHD

STATION Buenos Aires

HQTRS CASE OFFICER

John G. Heyn
Room No. 2022, Qtrs. I
Extension 3992
Date 1 August 1953

1. The attached project is presented for approval.

2. Project BIRADIAL concerns the transfer of Contract Agent HUMANOID from Costa Rica to Argentina, with interim training at headquarters. Upon approval of this project, HUMANOID will henceforth be known as BIRADIAL.

3. Since 1949, BIRADIAL, a native-born American, has been the most valuable agent of the San Jose Station. He successfully directed and exploited a high-level penetration of the Communist Party of Costa Rica. Among other accomplishments, he recruited two mail intercept agents, processing the take himself, and has recruited three additional agents presently being used; he also set up safe-houses and was in charge of the monitoring post in a technical surveillance. In the latter instance, his quick thinking in removing the equipment prevented its discovery, when the operation was blown due to circumstances unrelated to his handling of the operation. More recently, BIRADIAL personally entered the Communist Party headquarters surreptitiously during the May Day celebration and carried off more than 75% of their official records. His case officers have been impressed with his initiative, security-mindedness, and ability to exercise good judgement under operational stress. BIRADIAL's transfer from Costa Rica to another area has become necessary due to the expiration of his cover status as a student there.

4. BIRADIAL has already created his cover for the first year of his new assignment in Buenos Aires, having been accepted as a student at the University of Buenos Aires for the term beginning March 1954. During this period he will develop a small photographic business, in which he has had professional experience, to cover his activities in Argentina after completing his university studies. No funds for this purpose will be required from this Agency.

The project's objectives are the development of penetrations of the Communist Party of Argentina (PCA), its front organizations and

SECRET

201-168881

to develop information on PCA penetration of government circles. BIRADIAL will perform cutout duties as assigned by the Chief of Mission.

5. The estimated cost of this project for the first year is $10,475.00. This includes: salary of $4205 (GS-7 level) plus allowances of $1500; operational travel $120; operational expenses $600; the balance of $4050 comprises $2650 for the travel of BIRADIAL, his wife and two children from Costa Rica to the United States and thence to Argentina; $500 for the transportation of personal effects either from Costa Rica or the United States to Argentina; and $900 for [redacted] per diem while in travel status and during training at headquarters. Subject is selling most of his personal effects in Costa Rica. The normal annual cost of this project therefore, would [redacted] be $6425.

6. BIRADIAL will be permitted to take one month of leave with pay, before entering training. He justly deserves this consideration. While in training a new contract will be signed with BIRADIAL embodying the features outlined in paragraph 5.

7. Since it is urgent for the preservation of BIRADIAL's cover that this project be implemented as soon as possible, it is requested that the effective date be 1 August 1953.

for J. C. KING
CWH

Attachment: 1 (Project Outline)

SECRET
Security Information

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM: BIRADIAL

Part I

1. Area of Operations:

Buenos Aires, Argentina.

2. References:

Project HUMANOID. The contract agent HUMANOID will become BIRADIAL in this new project through which he will be transferred from Costa Rica to Argentina.

BUEN 734 (IN 45639).

3. Purpose:

a. Objectives:

To bring to Washington for training and transfer from Costa Rica to Argentina a Contract Agent for the purpose of developing penetrations of the Communist Party of Argentina (PCA), and Communist front organizations, and to perform cutout duties as assigned.

b. Targets:

The Argentine Communist Party (PCA); Communist student and intellectual circles; Communist labor groups; PCA penetration of government circles.

c. Tasks:

To gather pertinent data from all available sources on leading Communists and their associates.

4. Personnel:

a. Pseudonyms or cryptonyms:

The project initially will involve the use of BIRADIAL, only. It will be amended as sub-agents are added subsequently.

b. Personal data:

BIRADIAL is an American citizen born in Illinois in 1922, who is married to a Costa Rican and has two small children. He spent approximately 5 years doing U.S. Air Force intelligence work in the CBI and Carribean Theatres. Since June 1949 he has worked for KUBARK in Costa Rica as a Contract Agent under student cover. He is particularly adept at spotting and recruiting agents and has successfully supervised the direction of a high-level Communist Party penetration agent.

5. Cover:

a. Clandestine contact will be arranged between the agent and the case officer. In view of the sensitive nature of his objectives and the modest position he is likely to occupy in the American community in Buenos Aires, it is regarded as inconsistent and insecure for BIRADIAL to enter into a social relationship with his case officer.

b. Subject has been accepted as a student at the University of Buenos Aires for the school year beginning March 1954. Having a wife and two children he will try to establish himself in the photographic business, ostensibly to make ends meet while completing his studies. He is qualified and has had experience in this business before. By the time his studies are completed (in about one year) he proposes to have developed his photographic business sufficiently to provide adequate cover, justifying his remaining in Argentina.

6. Contact and Communications:

a. The case officer will contact BIRADIAL directly to provide him with direction and collect his reports. Both are native-born Americans. Contacts will be clandestine upon pretexts still to be arranged.

b. Any sub-agents subsequently recruited also will be contacted clandestinely. They will be confined to persons within the normal social and business strata of BIRADIAL.

c. No special problems of contact and communication are anticipated.

7. Control:

a. Subject has been dependent upon this Agency for the past four years. The degree of financial dependence has increased considerably over this period with the increase in his family. The necessity to meet these responsibilities assure his readiness to comply with all directions to protect his job.

b. Subject is motivated by a sincere patriotic desire to render valuable service to his country. His aggressive attitude toward his work and the initiative he has summoned in pursuance of the tasks assigned to him have constantly borne evidence of his devotion to the protection of American ideals and interests.

8. Special Equipment:

None.

9. Coordination:

Coordination with the Costa Rican Desk and Headquarters Covert Training will be effected.

10. Timetable:

The project can be activated upon approval. For the preservation of BIRADIAL's cover it is important that the project be implemented as soon after 1 August 1953 as possible. On that date Subject must move from his home in Costa Rica, and should then travel to the United States, since his studies and work in San Jose have been terminated.

Duration of the project: indefinite.

Part II

11. Estimated Cost:

The following is an estimate of the cost for the FY 1954. (Subsequent fiscal years will show a smaller cost ratio, since the transportation of BIRADIAL and his family from Costa Rica to the United States for training and subsequent travel to Argentina will not re-occur.):

Salary (at the rate of GS-7):	$4205
Allowances:	1500

Per diem during training, briefing and travel to and from the U.S. (Per diem in U.S. @ $9.00):	900
Travel for self, and three dependents from Costa Rica to the United States and thence to Argentina:	2650
Transportation of effects from Costa Rica or the United States to Buenos Aires, Argentina:	500
Operational Travel:	120
Operational Expenses (for purchase of information and entertainment):	600
TOTAL PROJECT COST	$10,475

12. Special Problems and Commitments:

A new contract will be signed with BIRADIAL while he is at headquarters for training. It will embody provisions constituting an improvement for him in compensation and allowances. This is already provided for within the framework of this project.

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

28 JULY 53

IN 45639

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

SR REP BUENOS AIRES

ROUTINE

00552 29 JUL 53

INFORMATION: ACTION: WH 4

COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/PLANS, FI/RI 2

BUEN 734

TO: DIR INFO: SSANJ CITE: SBUEN

RE: DIR 11908 (OUT 74476), SANJ 1009 (IN 45027)

HUMANOID DESIRED FOR BUEN USE. OBJECTIVES: PENETRATION ARGENTINE COMMIE PARTY AND PERFORM CUTOUT DUTIES AS ASSIGNED. TARGETS: ARGENTINE COMMIE PARTY, COMMIE STUDENT AND INTELLECTUAL CIRCLES, COMMIE LABOR GROUPS AND PCA PENETRATION OF GOVT CIRCLES. TASKS: GATHER PERTINENT DATA FROM ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES ON LEADING COMMIES AND ASSOCIATES.

END OF MESSAGE.

201-168881

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

FORM NO. NOV 1950 35-83

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 JUL 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 44363 A

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP BUENOS AIRES

ROUTINE

ACTION: WH 4

CORR: 2140Z 23 JUL 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/PLANS, FI/RI 2

BUEN 731

CORRECTION

CORRECT PARA 2 LAST TWO LINES:

"...DEGREE ONE YEAR AFTER ARRIVAL. DOES HE INTEND REMAIN INDEFINITELY AFTER ONE YEAR. IF SO WHAT WIL HIS COVER BE."

201-168881

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

(44)

FORM NO. NOV 1951 35-83

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 JULY 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 44363

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

SR REP BUENOS AIRES

ROUTINE

ACTION: WH 4

1741Z 23 JUL 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/PLANS, FI/RI 2

BUEN 731

TO: DIR INFO: SSANJ CITE: SBUEN

RE: DIR 11908 (OUT 74476)

1. BUEN'S DECISION REUSE OF HUMANOID DEPENDENT LENGTH OF TIME INTENDS REMAIN ARGENTINA.

2. HE COMING HERE UNDER STUDENT COVER AND EXPECTS RECEIVE DEGREE ONE YEAR AFTER ARRIVAL. DOES HE INTEND REMAIN ONE YEAR AFTER THAT YEAR. IF SO WHAT WILL HIS COVER BE.

END OF MESSAGE.

201-168881

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

(44)

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 JULY 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 74476

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO:
SR REP: ARGENTINA (BUENOS AIRES) J. C. KING WH 3992

FROM:
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ROUTINE

CONF: WH 4 1400Z 15 JUL 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/PLANS, FI/RI 2

DIR 11908

TO: [illegible] INFO: ESANY CITE: DIR

RE: DIR 09030 (OUT 59485); HAB-W-103 ([illegible])

1. PLS CABLE REPLY.

2. IF [illegible] DESIRED FOR USE HERE INCLUDE ESSENTIAL DETAILS FOR PROJECT OUTLINE, BRIEFLY OBJECTIVES TARGETS AND TASKS.

201-168881

J. C. KING
J. C. KING,
CHIEF, WHD

WH/COSTA RICA

R. H. DAHLGREN,
CHIEF, BR. II, WHD

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. HRSA-207

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 13 JUL 1953

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational

SPECIFIC- HUMANOID-4

Ref: HRSW-124, 3 June 1953

1. ✓ HUMANOID has advised subject of his pending departure, assuring subject that past services have been made a matter of permanent record and that subject will be contacted at his place of employment in the event the need for his services arises at a future date.

2. HUMANOID-4 may be contacted in the future at the place of employment set forth in item 10 of TRS/PRQ-15, which was transmitted with HRSA-1305. The only identification which will be required of the contacting officer is as follows:

> "(True name of HUMANOID) has asked me to get in touch with you as I've recently arrived in Costa Rica."

James K. Russo

10 July 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

~~19-6-3-137~~

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

COPY

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HRSA-198

TO : Chief of Station, Buenos Aires
DATE: 17 JUL 1953

FROM : Chief of Station, San José
INFO: Wash

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational
SPECIFIC- HUMANOID

Ref: DIR 90960, 23 June 1953

1. Transmitted herewith is the HUMANOID file, which, through a regrettable inadvertence, was not forwarded to your station sooner. After perusal by your station, it is requested that the file be returned to San José for use in briefing the incoming Chief of Station on the over-all scope and ramifications of these activities formerly handled by subject which will be reassigned upon HUMANOID's departure.

2. In view of the fact that subject has sold his house and furniture and must effect delivery on 31 July 1953, and because a tentative departure date of 1 August 1953 has been set, your early attention to reference would be greatly appreciated.

3. The HUMANOID file will be returned to Buenos Aires for permanent retention after it has served the purpose set forth in Paragraph 1.

James K. Russo

Encl:
1. File

Dist:
1 - Buen w/ encl
1 - Wash w/o encl
6 July 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

7 July 53

RI COPY 201-168881 ✓

~~18-6-3-15-1~~

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

DESENSITIZED

AIR

HAB-7-403

SECRET
Security Information

KAFOK No. 87

Chief of Mission, Buenos Aires

2 July 1953

Chief, WHD

HUMANOID

REFERENCE: DIR 09060

1. Reference cable proposed subject for your consideration as a contract agent, in which capacity he has already served KUBARK most ably during the past four years in Costa Rica. The San Jose Station was requested to forward subject's file for your perusal; we hope that you are now in receipt of this file.

2. This dispatch has the purpose of presenting to you Headquarters' appraisal of HUMANOID. A review of the Headquarters file indicates that HUMANOID is an aggressive, rather well qualified operative, who has enjoyed a good measure of success and has exercised good judgment under operational stress. He desires a career with this Agency, and is devoted to the work. Subject's academic education has been designed to fit him to become an economist. Prior to entering a contract relationship with KUBARK, subject had received U. S. Army intelligence training and had worked for Air Force Intelligence in Panama.

3. There follows a summary and appraisal of HUMANOID's work which has been provided by the Headquarters Costa Rican Desk.

   a. HUMANOID was recruited by the Panama station in November 1948, but in early 1949 he moved to San Jose, Costa Rica, where he enrolled in the University of Costa Rica as a student of economics. In June 1949 Project HUMANOID was activated, with subject handling and acting as cutout for two mail intercept agents and a low level penetration of the Communist Party. In October 1949 a very high-level penetration of the Communist Party was also turned over to the subject, who was

J. C. KING

WH/III/Costa Rica

R. N. DAHLGREN

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

201-168881

by this time devoting approximately half his time to our work. Since that time HUMANOID's main duties have been to act as cutout and direct these agents, with the exception of the low level penetration who was dropped in mid-1952. HUMANOID's most important single activity has been in debriefing the high-level penetration agent who he has been able to develop to a point where HUMANOID and this one agent constitute the most important assets of the station.

b. In the course of his operational duties, subject has proved himself to be very security conscious and to possess a degree of initiative which has impressed the station chief on more than one occasion. He has participated in setting up safehouses, was responsible for recruiting the two mail intercept agents, and has provided the facilities for photographing the material these two agents turn over to him for rapid processing and return to normal mail channels. Subject has recruited two additional agents, both of whom are presently being used, and carried out a cold recruitment attempt on a Communist which is still pending. HUMANOID participated in a technical surveillance operation in early 1951 during which he was in charge of the monitoring post together with an indigenous agent under his direction. The operation was blown after a short time due to circumstances beyond his control, which had no relation to the operation itself or the way in which he ran it. Extensive checking subsequently showed that he was not compromised and that his quick action prevented any discovery of the technical surveillance equipment itself. Most recently, HUMANOID surreptitiously entered the Communist Party headquarters in Costa Rica on May Day and carried off over 75% of the official records of the Party.

c. Subject is an expert photographer and at one time operated his own photography shop in San Jose. He is also fairly proficient in sending Morse code, is trained in the use of firearms, and has studied and worked with charts and maps. He was trained in jungle warfare during eleven months in the CBI theater during the last war while with the Air Force. He is considered expert in writing reports. Subject has proved himself to be knowledgeable in the usual techniques of covert operations after four years of working in San Jose, and has proved to be invaluable to the station in spotting and/or recruiting additional agents.

d. HUMANOID is married to a Costa Rican woman and has two children. His wife is cognizant of his intelligence activities, and has aided him on several occasions. There are no indications that she has in any way compromised his security.

~~KAPOK~~ ITIZED

e. The question of a career status was discussed with subject over a year ago when he was in touch with the former chief of station now at Headquarters, but no commitments were made in this regard, although he was told that it would be considered, depending on his future activities. He indicated his willingness to continue his operational activities in any other country when his course of studies ended in March 1953 at the University of Costa Rica. He is presently accepted for the March 1954 class at the University of Buenos Aires where he hopes to get his BS in Economics. He has discussed the question of covert training at Headquarters some time in late 1953 prior to going to Argentina. It is Headquarters' understanding that he would come to Headquarters some time in late August or September for approximately two months covert training, after which he might be directed to await departure for Argentina until some time in mid-January 1954 in order not to arrive in the area too long before his schooling starts.

f. Additional personal information on subject will be found in the San Jose Station file.

4. HUMANOID appears to be a promising prospect for consideration as one of the individuals to be introduced into Argentina under unofficial cover, in accordance with Country Plan objectives. Should you find his qualifications of interest and favor his entry into Argentina as a Mission asset, please advise as early as possible, in order that necessary travel details and training schedules can be arranged at Headquarters. In view of the higher standard of living in Buenos Aires and subject's excellent record of service, an amendment of his present contract would be effected while he is in Washington. Our present thinking is in terms of annual compensation at GS-7 level ($4205). An American student with a wife and two children will probably discover this amount to be none too ample to maintain a normal standard of living. Your comments and suggestions will be appreciated, particularly with regard to any allowances that would be appropriate.

5. An early reply would be especially helpful, since HUMANOID has already remained in Costa Rica three months beyond the date of completion of his studies and should leave there by August. (He was requested by the San Jose Station to remain through July to cover the impending elections.) We shall await your reply pending any further action regarding HUMANOID.

2 July 1953 /mih

J. C. KING

By: J. Heyn

Distribution:
3 - Buenos Aires
2 - WHD ([redacted] ~~WH/III/Costa Rica~~ / B.A. Chrono)
1 - WH/II - Report (yellow)

~~KAPOK~~ DESENSITIZED

SECRET

NO. 1951 35-82

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 JUNE 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 69486

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: SR REP: ARGENTINA (BUENOS AIRES) J. G. HEYN WH 3992

FROM: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ROUTINE

CONF: WH 4 2041Z 22 JUNE 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/PLANS, FI/RI 2

~~DIR 09060~~

TO: BUEN INFO: SSANJ CITE: DIR

1. SUBJECT IS HUMANOID AMERICAN CONTRACT AGENT OF PROVEN VALUE, 4 YEARS SERVICE WITH COSTA RICAN STATION.

2. WHEN HUMANOID HERE LATE 52 HQ SUGGESTED ARGENTINE ASSIGNMENT IF HE ABLE DEVELOP COVER. HE HAS NOW ARRANGED ENTRANCE BUENOS AIRES UNIVERSITY. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS AFTER REVIEW HIS FILE. DISPATCH FOLLOWS WITH DETAILS.

3. FOR SSANJ: POUCH HUMANOID FILE TO BUEN.

201-168881

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

WH/III

R. N. DAHLGREN
CHIEF, BRANCH II, WHD

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

(44)

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HRSA-60

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO :Chief, WHD

DATE: 8 January 1953

FROM :Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Security Review of Current Operations
Project HUMANOID

Ref: TRSW-816

1. The following comments on reference are submitted for your information and files. It is to be noted that the headquarters reviewing officials have arrived at a number of the same conclusions that we have with regard to the security of the Project and the possible lines of action to be followed.

2. With regard to Paragraph 6 of reference, we feel that although the security risk of contact and communications between HUMANOID and HUMANOID-3 has not been removed, it has been reasonably minimized. After the closing of HUMANOID's photo shop in November, 1951, several meetings were carried out at night on park benches while attempts were being made to locate a secure safehouse. This method was not satisfactory because of the impossibility of handling and discussing written materials, the brief time limit demanded, and the possibility of accidental recognition of one or the other. A number of meetings were held at the home of HUMANOID at night with pre-arranged safety-danger signals. Although the obvious security hazards here were aggravated by the fact that a Communist Party sympathizer lives in the neighborhood, the risks were deemed less serious than park meetings. A safe house was located in May, 1952, and was used for several meetings, but was compromised and abandoned when several school acquaintances of HUMANOID passed by and saw him unlocking the front door. Meetings were again held at the home of HUMANOID on a staggered schedule while search for suitable safehouses continued. (At least ten apartments and offices were examined and rejected by HUMANOID and the writer during this period.) A new safehouse was rented on 1 November, 1952, and is presently being used for meetings. However, both HUMANOID and HUMANOID-3 have agreed to abandon this place at the end of the month, because actual use has demonstrated security weaknesses in exit and entry. Another safe office is presently under investigation, and attempts have been made to limit the live contacts by brush meetings in darkened streets and use of a post office box for non-sensitive reports. We are also actively searching for suitable two-way dead drop facilities in a further effort to minimize live contacts.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

201-168871

COPY

VDP

HRSA-60 1-3-101

3. With regard to Paragraph 7 of reference, it is to be noted that HUMANOID's relations with the Director of the Post Office have been strengthened considerably in recent months. The Director has been outspokenly anti-Communist in several long discussions and has referred once or twice to the fact that his personal war against the local Communists, i.e., interception and confiscation of Communist propaganda, appears to go unrecognized by the Costa Rican government. He intimated that he is more aware of the dangers presented by Communist activities than are the security authorities. We feel confident that no Costa Rican officials are actively attempting to identify higher elements in the net, control the operation, or detect the nature of our intelligence interests. The Director's personal censorship amounts to little more than confiscating obvious Communist propaganda (most of which is turned over to us in bulk) and opening letters for perusal. He has no facilities for copying such letters and maintains no files of past correspondence. The Chief of the Costa Rican Intelligence Service is well known to us and on the rare occasions when he requests the Director to intercept a letter we hear of it from either the Director or HUMANOID-2.

4. In view of the development of more intimate relations between HUMANOID and the Director and the latter's interest in whether any record exists of his cooperation in anti-Communist activities, we have obtained preliminary PRQ data from him and are presently considering the possibility of requesting clearance as a paid agent. This will be the subject of a future dispatch. Further indication of the lack of detailed information on the part of the Costa Rican authorities concerning this project is contained in TRSA-1272.

5. With regard to Paragraph 8 of reference dispatch, we have long been concerned over the lack of additional cutouts and the scope of responsibilities presently assigned to HUMANOID. We hope to separate the mail intercept and the Vanguardia Popular operations in the near future. As previously reported, the possibility exists that HUMANOID will depart Costa Rica some time during 1953. We have already begun turning over the postal intercept activity to HUMIST. When clearance is obtained for HUMORESQUE, and further observation is completed, we contemplate turning HUMANOID-3 over to HUMORESQUE. In addition, we are gathering PRQ data on additional potential cutouts.

6. With regard to Paragraph 9 of reference, it is to be noted that we were in the process of developing cordial relations with Major Jorge PACHECO as an Embassy officer concerned with visa security risks, international travel of Communists, arms smuggling from the U.S., etc. PACHECO resigned as Chief of Detectives some months ago and is not presently connected with the government. We have maintained friendly relations with him, however, on the possibility that he may again at some future date return to a responsible position.

7. Concerning Paragraph 10 of reference, it is to be noted that HUMANOID will quite likely depart Costa Rica during 1953,

VDP

thereby eliminating the security aspects of the fact that his intelligence activities are known to a wide circle of indigenous agents. The Director of the Post Office is under consideration for recruitment as a paid agent. It is not believed that subject's wife represents a security hazard. Our limited observation of her indicates that she is discreet, a conclusion which is strengthened by the fact that no security breaches have occurred as a result of her generalized awareness of HUMANOID's intelligence activities. It is expected that she will apply for U.S. citizenship in the near future.

8. Headquarters' recommendation that HUMANOID exercise extreme caution in all of his intelligence activities will be followed. The diagram attached to reference is accurate with the one addition that HUMIST is cognizant of the postal intercept activity. During this developmental period, HUMANOID has been acting as a cutout between HUMIST and the Chief of Station. In the near future direct contact will be established between HUMIST and the Chief of Station, and HUMANOID withdrawn from this activity.

9. We appreciate the exhaustive review of this project prepared by headquarters. It is our desire to keep headquarters promptly informed of all minor details as well as major developments. However, we frequently find in the sifting and evaluation of those matters demanding attention at any given time that either routine reporting or current operations must suffer.

James K. Russo

YDP

Humanoid

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HRSA-51

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 2 January 1953

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— HUMANOID

Ref: SANJ 905, DIR 24876

1. As indicated in references, subject travelled to Washington in early November, 1952, on personal business and contacted Elmer C. Mercer upon arrival in order to discuss the possibilities of a future assignment in another Latin American country. After discussion with WHD officers, according to subject, Mercer indicated that reassignment to another country would be considered. An assignment in Argentina was tentatively discussed with the understanding that subject must arrange his cover personally and his departure from San José must have our concurrence. It was also mentioned that subject might be afforded approximately three months training in Washington prior to departure for Argentina, and that a new contract would be prepared.

2. Since his return to San José, subject has ascertained that he can transfer to the School of Economic Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, in order to obtain his B.S. degree. He has approximately one more year of schooling before obtaining his degree. Contact with the Argentine Consul indicated no difficulties would be encountered in making the transfer or obtaining a visa and that job opportunities in the photographic field are favorable.

3. In view of the fact that subject's services will be needed here for the remainder of the presidential electoral campaign, it will be mid-July before he can be released. Subject is aware of this time consideration and is planning to enter the University of Buenos Aires at the beginning of the school year in March, 1954. This tentative schedule will permit a few months training in Washington subsequent to July, 1953, and will also permit a period of a few months orientation in Argentina prior to the start of the school year.

4. Headquarters comments are requested on the above matter as well as information as to what commitments, if any, were made to subject while in Washington. Subject states it will be necessary to take his wife and two children to the U.S. with him if training is required. His wife is planning to apply for U.S. citizenship.

201-168881

201-168881

HRSA-51

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

5. We would be interested in any available information for passing to subject, such as whether the organization will pay his passage to the United States for training and to Argentina for assignment, etc.

James K. Russo

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. HRSA-168

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO :Chief, WHD

DATE: 16 JUN 1953

FROM :Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational
SPECIFIC- Communist Party Penetration Operations

Ref: HRSW-106

1. Headquarters attention is invited to Project HUBLIANT which has as its objective the recruitment of a party member or the introduction of a new member into the Communist Party in the Quepos area. HUBLIANT-2 has made some progress in this regard, having been accepted in the Communist syndicate and having widened his circle of Communist acquaintances in the area. This project is expected to produce a low-level, long-term penetration of the party in one of the most critical labor areas of Costa Rica.

2. HUMAROID has recently been instructed to canvass the lists of second and third echelon Communists and sympathizers in the San José area for possible defectors. Heretofore, most of the station's attention has been directed towards members of the Political Commission with negative results. However, a review of available operational data on the top leaders is once again being made with the likelihood that HUMAROID will be used for at least one approach immediately prior to his departure. This approach will be in addition to the search for a second-string recruitment. Also, an effort is being made to locate an appropriate individual who will be instructed to join the party as a new member. On 6 June 1953 another contact was had with the subject of HRSA-95 with negative results.

3. Any penetration of the Communist Party is the same as a penetration of the PVP as the actual leadership is almost identical. We are hopeful that KUGOWN efforts will result in the PVP being declared illegal this week.

4. No specific plans have been made as yet for HUNDOR's use in the labor field except that we are considering the possibility

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

COPY

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

that his school work can be tied in with labor research or investigation, i.e. the preparation of a school paper which would require contact with labor leaders and conditions. Headquarters will be advised of this angle after HUMIDOR arrives in Costa Rica and gets settled.

James K. Russo

11 June 1953

15-6-3

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HPSA-175

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 16 JUN 1953

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL: Operational
SPECIFIC: HUMANOID

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum prepared by HUMANOID outlining his desire to depart Costa Rica on or about 1 August 1953 for training in the U.S. prior to reassignment to Argentina.

2. In view of the fact that HUMIDOR has arrived in San José and the presidential elections will take place in July 1953, we have no objection to a departure date of 1 August, feeling that sufficient time remains for a thorough briefing and orientation of HUMIDOR.

3. In the unlikely event that HUMANOID is unable to complete his cover arrangements in Argentina and in view of his willingness to serve in any area, it is suggested that consideration might be given to his use in Venezuela.

4. It is requested that headquarters advise as to the status of its plans for the training and reassignment of subject.

James K. Russo

Encl:
1. Memo

16 June 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

COPY 201-168551

~~[illegible]~~

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

5 June 1953

Memo to James K. Russo re Departure Timetable for HUMANOID

Certain circumstances surrounding my application for residence in Argentina through their Embassy here in San José have given rise to a suggestion in reference to my timetable for departure. Originally it was agreed by all concerned that a departure shortly after the local elections (say 1 August 1953) would be most convenient for the station. There was some question as to acceptance at the University of Buenos Aires, but it was later decided that a more direct assurance of entry could be arranged by actual application for resident status right here at San José. This process was begun immediately. Subsequent conversations with Russo, however, have given me the impression that headquarters will await the approval of the resident permit before arranging my departure for the U.S.

Actually there have been no unusual obstacles encountered in the routine preparation of documentation, but nevertheless, the Argentine Consul assures me that "results will not be forthcoming in less than three months." Accordingly, this would place the most optimistic results some time in late September.

Meanwhile, for rather urgent personal reasons, I am anxious that my departure for the U.S. be realized as per the original understanding, that is, shortly after the local elections. By this plan, correspondence can be maintained with the Argentine Embassy here at San José as concerns the arrival of the documentation, and my proposed training period can conceivably be accomplished within this interval of time. If the resident permit is denied, or the delay unusually great, an alternate area might then be considered.

I fully comprehend the uncertainties involved in making such a departure without the residence at the future station positively established and am prepared to enter and work in any area selected at the discretion of the organization. What I am trying to avoid most of all is a possible interim waiting period of several months in a more or less casual status. If such is inevitable, then let it take place Stateside!

HUMANOID.

201-168881

[illegible]

15-3-139

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 35-
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1 JUNE 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 29507

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP SAN JOSE

ROUTINE

ACTION: WH 4

0422Z 2 JUNE 53

INFORMATION: COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/PAD, FI/RI 2

SANJ 989

TO: DIR CITE: SSANJ

RE: DIR 06369 (OUT 64611), SSANJ 981 (IN 22509)

STATION CAPABILITIES BELIEVED STRONG. ALTHOUGH PPI MANAGED RECONSTRUCT CERTAIN VITAL DOCUMENTATION, WE IN POSSESSION 85% THEIR LEGAL PAPERS, RECORDS, ETC., ALONG WITH HIGHLY COMPROMISING VANGUARDIA POPULAR RECORDS DISCUSSING PLANS AND POLICIES FOR PPI. IMMEDIATE EXPLOITATION THIS MATERIAL WAS DELAYED PENDING OUR APPRAISAL PPI CURRENT AND POTENTIAL OPPOSITION FIGUERES CAMPAIGN, PARTICULARLY TO CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES. HOWEVER, CHECK WITH VICE PRESIDENT OREAMUNO ON 29 MAY INDICATED ASSEMBLY LIKELY TO LEGALIZE PPI FIRST WEEK JUNE IN VIEW LACK POSITIVE EVIDENCE COMMIE FRONT. OREAMUNO STATED PRESIDENT ULAIE (ALSO RECD ULATE) CONTINUES UNDERESTIMATE DANGERS COMMUNISM BUT THAT HE, UREAMUAO, WOULD LIKE TO SEE PPI KNOCKED OUT OF ELECTORAL RACE. ACCORDINGLY, WE MAILED PORTION PPI RECORDS AND SELECTED COMPROMISING VP MATERIAL TO CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE STUDYING LEGALITY WITH COVER LETTER STATING AUTHOR WAS DISAFFECTED COMMIE WHO HAD TAKEN PAPERS FROM COMMIE HQS. IF THIS FAILS,

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

201-168881
COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

SECRET

SANJ 989

PAGE TWO
IN 29507

WE PLANNING MAIL OTHER DOCUMENTS TO LOCAL PRESS. ALSO, SLATE OF PPI DEPUTY CANDIDATES VULNERABLE AS OUR FILES REFLECT COMMUNIST BACKGROUND OR SYMPATHIES IN MANY CASES. BILLINGTON PRESENTLY PREPARING LETTERS TO PRESS EXPOSING KNOWN COMMIES. FURTHER KUGOWN ACTION MAY NOT BE NECESSARY BUT WILL BE RECOMMENDED IF NEEDED.

(END OF MESSAGE)

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

Air Pouch

HFS-W-112

: Chief of Station, San Jose

MAY 14 1953

: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Operational
Renewal of project HUMANOID

REFERENCE: HFS-W-102

1. The appropriate Headquarters office has renewed project HUMANOID for the period 1 March 1953 to 28 February 1954.

2. Agent HUMIST was incorporated into project HUMANOID effective 1 March 1953 as a cut out for HUMANOID with HUMANOID-1 and HUMANOID-2.

3. The yearly expenses for project HUMANOID are approved as follows:

Salary:	HUMANOID	$3,000
	HUMANOID-1	288
	HUMANOID-2	480
	HUMANOID-3	1 2 1,680 14
	HUMIST	1,080
Travel:		150
Operational Expenses:		600
Safehouse:		600
	TOTAL	$ 7,878

J. C. King
By. A. O. Wagner

O.H. DOERFLINGER

5 May 1953

J. C. KING

Distribution:
- 3- San Jose
- 1- WH/Chrono
- 1- Subj. File
- 1- WH/Mail Room
- 1- Registry

WH/JH/mgdg

SECRET

301-168771

14-00000

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6 MAY 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 22509

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 4

ROUTINE

1824Z 7 MAY 53

INFORMATION: COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/PAD, FI/RI 2

SANJ 981

TO: DIR CITE: SSANJ

RE: SSANJ 978 (IN 21247)

PSYCH

1. HUMANOID-3 AND OTHER LEADERS PRESENT WHEN LOSS DISCOVERED 1800Z 4 MAY. HOUSE THOROUGHLY SEARCHED. COMPAIES CONCLUDED THEFT PROBABLY OCCURRED 2 MAY, PERHAPS AFTERNOON 1 MAY DURING MAY DAY PARADE WHEN HOUSE UNOCCUPIED. FIGUERISTAS BLAMED AND BELIEF IS THEY HAVE PENETRATED PARTY. INVESTIGATION PLANNED BUT WILL BE DISCREET AND ON LOWER LEVEL. NO NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK FOR CLUES DUE TO FEAR OUTSIDE KNOWLEDGE OF LOSS.

2. PARTY REACTION IS THAT THIS IS BIGGEST BLOW TO PARTY ORGANIZATION SINCE REVOLUTION. HUMANOID-3 THINKS PPI CRIPPLED, POSSIBLY ELIMINATED FROM ELECTION AS STOLEN PPI DOCUMENTS NEEDED FOR OFFICIAL ELECTORAL PROCESS.

201-168881-

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

SANJ 981 IN 22509

PAGE 2

SOURCE SAYS PARTYS ONLY CHANCE IS REPEAT WHOLE CONSTITUATING PROCESS OF PPI, TIME AND FINANCES PERMITTING.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

3 MAY 53

IN 21247

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP SANJOSE

ROUTINE

ACTION: WH 4

2054Z 3 MAY 53

INFORMATION: COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/PAD, FI/RI 2

SANJ 978

TO: DIR CITE: SSANJ

PSYCH

1. EARLY MORNING 1 MAY HUMANOID ENTERED COMMIE HQS, LIFTED PORTION PARTY FILES, AND MADE GETAWAY UNNOTICED. ENTRY UNDERTAKEN HIS INITIATIVE AFTER LEARNING FROM HUMANOID-3 COMMIES THINKING MOVING FILES.

2. TAKE CONSISTS VANGUARDIA POPULAR MILITANT VISITS, MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS, MINUTES POLITICAL COMMISSION MEETINGS; PARTIDY PROGRESISTA CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY RECORD WITH LISTS ALL NATIONAL DELEGATES; MISCELLANEOUS PARTY DOCUMENTS. EXTENT DAMAGE PPI CAMPAIGN NOT KNOWN YET. PROCESSING AND EVALUATION BY HUMANOID/HUMANOID-3 TO BE DELAYED PENDING PARTY REACTION. NO MENTION MADE IN COMMISSION MEETING 2400Z ON 2 MAY. AT PRESENT THIS BELIEVED INDICATING PARTY SIMPLY UNAWARE LOSS.

END OF MESSAGE.

201-161881

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

PROJECT AMENDMENT

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

J. Hanke
Room No. 2218 QI
Extension 2065
Date 10 April 1953

CRYPTONYM HUMANOID

DIVISION WH

STATION San Jose, Costa Rica

1. The attached amendment to project HUMANOID is presented for approval.

2. The renewal of project HUMANOID was submitted 6 February 1953 but has not yet been approved for the period 1 March 1953 to 28 February 1954.

J. C. KING
CWH

(Date)

301-168881

AMENDMENT NO. 1

1. Agent HUMIST was granted provisional operational clearance as cut out on 24 October 1952 and was activated 1 December 1952. He is presently being used in project HUMANOID as cut out between principal agent HUMANOID and sub-agents HUMANOID-1 and HUMANOID-2. As described in the project, it is planned to cancel project HUMANOID about mid-year when the principal agent leaves Costa Rica and re-submit it as two projects, one of which will be project HUMIST.

2. It is requested that the project outline renewal as submitted on 6 February 1953 be amended in Part II, section 11, to include the following:

		Fiscal Year 1953	Fiscal Year 1954
Salary:	HUMIST	$360	$720

3. It is therefor requested that project HUMANOID be authorized an increased cost, effective 1 March 1953, of $1080 over the estimated cost of $6,798 which has been submitted for approval, for the period ending 28 February 1954, making an amended estimated total cost of $7,878.

HRS-A-95 - 5 March 1953 -

Re: Operational

Attempted Penetration of Vanguardia Popular via
Victor CORDERO Segura, Former Syndicate Leader

This dispatch extracted from files by George M. HINE, ext. 3691, Staff C/ICB, Room 2613 L Bldg., on 16 June 1954, for use in connection with HUMANOID-3 case study.

George M. Hine

201-168881

SECRET
Security Information

CRYPTONYM HUMANOID
DIVISION WHD
STATION San Jose, Costa Rica

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

J. G. Hanke
Room No. 2218
Extension 2065
Date 6 February 1953

1. The attached Revised Project Outline is submitted for renewal effective 1 March 1953 to 28 February 1954.

2. This project encompasses all the agents presently used by the Station. The principal agent HUMANOID has demonstrated particular ability in closely directing sub-agents to realize their full potentialities. He has also provided the Station with valuable background data on the personalities and political movements with the country, in addition to his assigned objectives.

3. Reports have been factual, the information can usually be relied upon, and all information is of operational value. Security practices have been sound, though hampered by the problem of procuring a safehouse which is permanently secure.

4. The departure of the principal agent from Costa Rica sometime after the 26 July 1953 presidential elections will necessitate re-assigning cut-out duties to HUMIST and also to HUMORESQUE when the latter is cleared. At the present time HUMIST is gradually assuming full responsibility as cut-out for HUMANOID-1 and HUMANOID-2. The two agents who will assume HUMANOID's present cut-out and debriefing functions will be thoroughly familiar with their duties by the time HUMANOID leaves.

5. It is anticipated that at about mid-year this project will be re-submitted as two separate projects. In the meantime, however, it seems advisable to request renewal for a full year.

6. Attached is a list of the dispatches and disseminations based on information provided by the principal agent and sub-agents. Of the 118 reports submitted, 91 were used in 86 disseminations.

Attachments:
1 - List (see par. 6, above)
2 - Revised Project Outline
3 - Original Project Outline

J. C. KING

(Date)

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET
Security Information

REVISED PROJECT OUTLINE

CRIPTONYM HUMANOID

Part I

1. Area of Operations and Headquarters: Project is confined to the geographical limits of Costa Rica with Headquarters and principal activity located in the capital city, San Jose.

2. References: Project is related through the provision of 1) cut-out services and 2) direction to the following sub-agents:

HUMANOID-1
HUMANOID-2
HUMANOID-3
HUMIST

3. Purpose:

A. Objectives:

a. Out-out services as assigned.

b. Directs Communist Party penetration (HUMANOID-3).

c. Directs Postal Intercept Project (HUMANOID-1 and 2).

d. Provides information on local university and intellectual circles of which subject is a member.

e. Will endeavor to obtain parallel penetration of the Vanguardia Popular (Communist Party of Costa Rica).

f. Will endeavor to develop additional sources of information on Costa Rican political movements.

B. Targets:

a. The Vanguardia Popular (Communist Party of Costa Rica) and other VP sponsored groups.

b. Leftist university and intellectual groups.

c. Ultra-nationalistic and anti-U.S. groups.

d. Incoming and outgoing mail units in the general post office.

SECRET

C. Tasks:

This project conforms to the tasks assigned to the San Jose Station in SOI of 19 August 1952, 2a, 2b, and 2c.

4. Personnel:

a. This project, in addition to HUMANOID, involves the following agents:

HUMANOID-1
HUMANOID-2
HUMANOID-3
HUMIST

b. HUMANOID is an American citizen born in 1922 in Illinois. Subject spent approximately five years doing general Air Force Intelligence work after joining the U.S. Air Force in April 1946. Subject is presently living in San Jose, where he has been until recently attending school. Since June 1949, when project HUMANOID was first activated, subject has been the most valuable single agent of the San Jose Station. HUMANOID-1 is a Costa Rican, employed in the post office in San Jose. HUMANOID-2 is a Costa Rican, employed in the post office in San Jose. HUMANOID-3 is a Costa Rican, and member of the Vanguardia Popular. He has provided consistent high-level information on Communist activities by virtue of his position in the Party. HUMIST is a naturalized American born in Germany, who is self-employed and has lived in San Jose since 1947, after serving in the U.S. Army as an interpreter in a P.W. camp in Virginia.

5. Cover:

a. Case officer in contact with HUMANOID: Normal social contact of Americans.

b. By the agent performing his operational tasks: Subject is established in San Jose on a purely personal basis with no apparent connection with the San Jose Station. He is a home owner, married, and a fully accepted member of the community on that basis. He has been attending school in San Jose, but has recently resigned in preparation for his eventual departure from Costa Rica after the July presidential elections to attend school elsewhere. (See Timetable.)

6. Contact and Communication:

a. Case officer and HUMANOID have weekly appointments which are held in many places of natural communication between Americans.

b. HUMANOID and the following:

(1) HUMANOID-1 and 2: Mail intercepts by these two agents are deposited in an envelope and placed in a post office box. It is removed by HUMANOID who transmits it to the case officer, the material being returned to HUMANOID for replacing in the post office box after being photographed in the office of the Chief of Station.

(2) HUMANOID-3: A safehouse in use since May 1952 is presently being used. Due to certain security weaknesses in exit and entry, it will be terminated at the end of January 1953. Another safehouse is presently under development, as well as a two-way dead drop and post office box to minimize live contacts.

(3) HUMIST: Normal social contact between Americans.

c. A safehouse is indispensable to debrief HUMANOID-3, who has to report on Communist meetings which are often over 3 hours long. Three safehouses have had to be abandoned due to demonstrated weaknesses, but the new safehouse should prove satisfactory.

7. Control:

a. The control of HUMANOID is based upon his past service record with the U.S. Government, demonstrated loyalty, and judgment of the present and former Chiefs of Station. In addition HUMANOID is a U.S. citizen, and at present depends almost wholy on the financial assistance he receives for the performance of his duties.

b. The control of HUMANOID-1 and 2 is based upon the threat of exposure to the government. Motivation is the generally anti-Communist nature of their work and the financial gain from their duties.

c. Control over HUMANOID-3 consists of signed receipts, reports, etc., which could be used as a threat. However, the agent's high regard for his salary and developing personal friendship with HUMANOID are motivating factors.

8. Special Equipment:

No special equipment is involved at the present time.

9. Coordination: This project was originally initiated with the co-operation of the Panama Station. Continued coordination with Panama, or any other station, is not considered necessary or desirable.

10. Timetable: HUMANOID was engaged by the San Jose Station in June 1949 and has been a most satisfactory agent since inception. He is presently planning to leave San Jose, having completed his studies at the university, but has agreed to remain until after the presidential elections on 26 July 1953. When he leaves, his cut-out duties for HUMANOID-1 and 2, which are presently being gradually turned over to HUMIST, will be taken over by HUMIST, who will then have direct contact with the case officer on much the same basis as HUMANOID. By that time, HUMORESQUE should have operation clearance to act as an American cut-out for HUMANOID-3.

Part II

11. Estimated Cost:

		Fiscal Year 1953	Fiscal Year 1954
Salary:	HUMANOID	$1,000.00	$2,000.00
	HUMANOID-1	96.00	192.00
	HUMANOID-2	160.00	320.00
	HUMANOID-3	560.00	1,120.00
Agent Expenses:		200.00	400.00
Safehouse:		200.00	400.00
Local Transportation, Miscellaneous supplies, etc.		50.00	100.00
		$2,266.00	$4,532.00

12. Special Problems or Commitments: HUMANOID is interested in making a career in the intelligence field, and has demonstrated willingness to continue this work in Argentina. While in the United States in the fall of 1952, he talked with the former chief of the San Jose Station, now at Headquarters, and was told that in the event of his removal to Argentina for further schooling, he would be continued on his present salary as a minimum. He was also advised to request covert training in the United States preparatory to going to Argentina, and was told that at the time of that request it would be up to Headquarters to determine the advisability of paying any part of transportation for himself and family to the United States and from there to Argentina.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

21 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Humanoid

1. At the request of Mr. Caldwell, I met with Humanoid on the occasion of his visit to Washington last November and made certain oral commitments on behalf of the Division. No commitment, however, was very specific and all were cleared with the Division in advance. My participation in the matter was, of course, owing to the fact that I had recruited Humanoid originally and enjoy his confidence.

2. Humanoid in the past has pursued his activities on behalf of this organization as somewhat of a profitable avocation. His performance, nonetheless, has been outstanding from the point of view of initiative, production and understanding of operational principles. He would now like to make it a career but lacks sufficient information upon which to base a decision and, being partially aware of the uncertainties involved, insists upon maintaining an alternate vocation. In pursuit of this latter objective, he plans to move to Buenos Aires in June or July of 1953 and establish himself there on a permanent basis. His inquiries were to ascertain what effect these plans would have upon his present and future relationship with this organization.

3. I advised Humanoid to continue with his plans as outlined above, stipulating only that he remain in his present location until after the forthcoming elections and assured him that as a consequence of his past satisfactory service he would be picked up in Buenos Aires at a compensation at least equal to that which he is presently receiving.

4. I then explained that our participation in his move would necessarily have to be determined at a later date but requested him to keep us informed of his plans on a continuing basis, assuring him that it would do no harm to request such assistance as he might need. In this connection, I advised him to request formal training, which he has never had, implying that this would be granted, and suggested that a formal contract, future compensation, travel expense and so forth could best be negotiated here at that time.

5. I recommend, therefore, that Humanoid be brought to headquarters for a period of training and that a contract agent relationship containing the usual travel and allowance provisions be formalized at that time. Basic compensation should certainly consider his past record and proven reliability in addition to the initiative he has shown in laying on his own cover. Although his future assignment is none of my business, I would point out that he has proven adept at spotting, recruiting and agent handling and suggest that his talents would be greatly circumscribed if assigned to direct exploitation of a specific target.

EAMarelius 201-168881

Edward A. Marelius
Executive Secretariat, DD/P

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

HRSA-56

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM:: HUMANOID

COUNTRY: Costa Rica

PERIOD: May 1 to December 31, 1952.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: No change.

SALARY: ₡1,600 per month effective March 1 1952, per DIR 17884.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: Excellent and of major importance to this station.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION: Of considerable value with reference to information produced through sub-agents. During the period under review, agent has done independent reporting and has produced several reports of value on political matters and has contributed useful operational background data.

OTHER FACTORS: The removal of operational restrictions on agent's activities during this period has permitted fuller use of his capabilities, i.e., increased spotting and recruiting activities.

COMMENTS: Operation of this project was greatly enhanced by the salary raise which was effective in March, 1952. Subject has resigned his position with the School of Agronomy and is now able to devote more time to our interests as as result of the betterment of his financial status. In November Agent travelled to the United States and contacted Elmer C. Mercer, former Chief of Station, San José, at which time the possibilities of reassignment to another Latin American country were discussed. After discussion with WHD officers, Mercer advised HUMANOID A REASSIGNMENT WOULD BE CONSIDERED. (This matter is being covered in dispatch form).

9 Jan. 53

201-168181

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

21 OCT 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 63552

ROUTING	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	

TO: SR REP SAN JOSE

H.R. MAILINSON WHD 456

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

WH 4

ROUTINE

1445Z 23 OCT 52

INFORMATION: ADMIN, CAO, RI 2

DIR 24876

TO: SSANJ CITE: DIR

ASK HUMANOID TELEPHONE MERCER ON ARRIVAL JEF 2-6109.

MSG/CTR COMMENT: RETYPED IN MESSAGE CENTER.

W. CALDWELL

OM DOERFLINGER

201-168881

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

(44)

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 OCT 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 49232

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP SAN JOSE

ROUTINE

WH 4

1745Z 16 OCT 52

INFORMATION: CFI, OPS, RI 2

SSANJ 965

TO: DIR CITE: SSANJ

OPERA

HUMANOID PLANNING DEPART FOR STATES 4 NOV, ARRIVING WASHINGTON 6 NOV OR 7 NOV, LATER VISITING DAYTON, OHIO, CHICAGO AND RETURNING SAN JOSE ABOUT 30 NOV. PURPOSE IS TO VISIT STATES, FAMILY AND FRIENDS FOR FIRST TIME IN SEVEN YEARS. SUBJECT ALSO DESIRES CONTACT ELMER C MERCER AND/OR OTHER HQS OFFICER TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITIES FUTURE ASSIGNMENT IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY CUBA. WE IN FAVOR VACATION TRIP DESPITE TEMPORARY INTERRUPTION HUMANOID OPERATION AND RECOMMEND HQS CONTACT. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR REACTION AND CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS IF APPROPRIATE.

201-168811

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

(40)

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

13 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, BRANCH III

SUBJECT: HUMANOID

1. Attached hereto is a letter received from HUMANOID by Mr. Edward A. Marelius, now at Headquarters and the former Chief of Station at Costa Rica, who recruited HUMANOID.

2. Particular reference is made to Paragraph 6 regarding a change in assignment. Mr. Marelius thinks that when subject finishes his school year in 1953 he should be brought to Headquarters for training, and that he should be converted to Staff Agent for possible reassignment in Latin America under deep cover. Mr. Marelius thinks that HUMANOID will go stale in San Jose and that a change should be made to better utilize his services. Although subject is the principal source in Costa Rica, he feels that arrangements could be made for an orderly turn-over and departure.

3. While I was assigned in Panama I met subject, at which time he was contemplating moving to Panama, attending the University, and working for the Panama station. He impressed me very well and would have been quite an asset, but the deal fell through due to the higher cost of living in Panama and the fact that he would lose considerable credits in transferring.

4. I do not know whether it can be worked out but I certainly would go along with recommending that he be afforded training in the U.S. and that he be reassigned, preferably to Argentina or one of the other countries where ~~he~~ it is an urgent~~ly~~ need~~ed~~ for additional unofficial cover. The question of his converting to Staff Agent might be worked out also.

Wm. B. Caldwell
WM. B. CALDWELL
Chief, FI/WH

WBC:fff

201-168881

SECRET

Box 779
San Jose, C.R.
7 Oct 52

Dear Ed,

The interval has been long enough for me to wonder if you are still around ! We'll just go ahead with this and hope for a decent forwarding service at that end.

How are you and Betty these days ? I'll bet you miss the old days in LA at times...but just remember this, things are not what they used to be ! This place, (in spite of increasing political pulse) is deader than Hell. Take it from me.

This is our beloved winter now...you remember; dreamy, sunny mornings...until about 1100...then swoosh ! Your walking around thru another dark, clammy and moldy rainy season. - Well, I guess bitter cold waves are not so pleasant either.

Marco seems to be getting prematurely old. He's healthy enough, but I guess the country is just as boring for him as it is for me. He still cannot pass up a chance to jump in carfor a ride now and then and seems to be just about his Nº 1 thrill.

As for the family here, everyone is fine. I believe I had told you that Lilliam Caridad was born June 1951 so now we are quite satisfied with the pair. They are both fat, dumb and happy (and how I envy them for that). Ross A. is now over three years and quite the boy.

As for me, same old stuff. Fourth year at the U. with passing grades and possibilities of the degree next year whereever it may be undertaken. I am pretty well fed up with the environment (again) and this time am sure to be gone sometime within the first quarter of 53. I have very little idea where...Panama U. is once again encouraging. I would like Cuba in spite of the high standard of living there. Even Mexico would get me close enough to the continental US for more frequent visits which is what I need at the moment. (That is actually Doctors advice now.)At any rate, I feel that I might be able to do more somewhere else. Do you have any ideas ? They would certainly be welcomed.

All the old acquaintances are still around. Mary is well and apparently happy. Judy is fine. I like Dave's new friend very much and am reminded of the old Marelius touch. We haven't many new friends these days and its my impression that we had better be getting a little more social minded.

Well, going to clip this short and head for the U. Theee's a petty strike on and one must keep up with the current at least. Best wishes to you folks and hope to hear from you soon.

As ever,

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

29 SEPTEMBER 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 57898

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: CHIEF OF STATION (COSTA RICA) (SABJ) R. E. WHEDBEE WH 456

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA ROUTINE

WH 4 2208Z 29 SEPT 52

INFORMATION: CFI, OPS, RI 2

DIR 21343

TO: SSABJ CITE: DIR

RE: HRS-A-1272

PARA 13 REPRESENTS HQ VIEW TILL CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION CLARIFIED. ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT LATER BE MADE IF YOU FEEL NECESSARY TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL EXPERT FOR BRIEF POSTAL CENSORSHIP INSTRUCTION. HOWEVER, EXISTING EUMAHOOD ONE AND TWO FACILITIES AND COVERAGE BELIEVED ADEQUATE FOR OUR NEEDS.

301-168881

C/WH

D. F. GIBBONS

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

(44)

AIR

SECRET
Security Information

TRS-W- 808

Chief of Station, San Jose

SEP 12

Chief, WH

Project HUMANOID

REF: ~~TRS-A-1215~~
~~TRS-A-1142~~
~~TRS-W-771~~
~~SANJ-884~~ (IN 30219)
~~SANJ-882~~ (IN 31520)
~~DIR 16246~~ (OUT 30019)
DIR 17884 (OUT 52565)

1. Project HUMANOID was approved in the amount of $6000.00 for the period 1 March 1952 to 28 February 1953. This amount was based on the following funding requirements as set forth in the project outline which was presented for approval in May 1952:

		FY 1952	FY 1953
Salary:	HUMANOID	$ 800.00	$1600.00
	HUMANOID-1	76.00	152.00
	HUMANOID-2	128.00	256.00
	HUMANOID-3	452.00	904.00
	~~HUMANOID-4~~	72.00	144.00
Agent expenses:		200.00	400.00
Safe House:		200.00	400.00
Local transportation, miscellaneous supplies, etc.		50.00	100.00
		$1978.00	$5956.00

2. HUMANOID-4 has been terminated, therefore the total available for expenditure by the station ($6000.00) exceeds the amount requested ($5934.00) by $282.00 ($72.00 plus $144.00 plus $66.00).

J. C. KING

D. F. GIBBONS

SECRET

201-161881

SECRET
Security Information

3. Project financial records in Headquarters are maintained in U. S. currency. Accordingly, DIR 16246 (OUT 50019) was expressed in dollar units. Unfortunately, we were not aware of recent fluctuations in the rate of exchange when the message was sent and the amounts quoted were not sufficient to maintain agent salaries on the previously established colon scale. This problem has been discussed with appropriate offices here as indicated in the attached memorandum for record which we believe to be self-explanatory.

4. In the event that the current financial status of project HTMAROID is not hereby clarified to your satisfaction, we will be happy to furnish any additional information that may be required.

Attachment: Memo For Record

J. C. KING

PEO:bw
9 September 1952

By P. E. Oberst

SECRET

/12/ SECRET 23 FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/LA-8 INFO: DDPD-D, VR, FILE, DDRECORD, C/CI-4, C/EPS/EG-2, C/EUR-6, C/LCG/ID, C/PCS, (25/P)

80 3951664 PAGE 001
TOT: 042052Z MAR 80 DIRECTOR 627924

S E C R E T
STAFF 042052Z DIRECTOR 627924
TO: PRIORITY MADRID.

WNINTEL ~~RYBAT~~ AKULE AMLASH

REF: MADRID 48679 3918232

1. DEPT OF STATE HAS SENT MESSAGE TO CONSULATE AUTHORIZING THE GRANTING OF VISAS TO AMLASH FAMILY, BUT HAS APPARENTLY ATTACHED A PROVISO - SO LONG AS CONSULAR OFFICER SATISFIED THAT THEY ARE BONA FIDE VISITORS AND NOT IMMIGRANTS.

2. OFFICER WHO DEBRIEFED AMLASH-1 IN MADRID ON 11 JANUARY IS EXPERIENCED AND SAVVY PROFESSIONAL. HE HAS BEEN INTERVIEWING REFUGEES FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND HAS CONSISTENTLY PROVIDED ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS OF REFUGEE INTENTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS. AMLASH-1 TOLD THE DEBRIEFER THAT HE ONLY WANTED TO VISIT THE US AND THAT HE WANTS AND INTENDS TO SETTLE IN SPAIN, WHERE HE CAN MORE READILY SET UP A MEDICAL PRACTICE AND BE LESS NEWSWORTHY THAN WOULD BE THE CASE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE DEBRIEFER BELIEVES AMLASH-1 MEANT WHAT HE SAID.

2. FILE: 201-252234. RVW 4 MAR 00, DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.> ORIG: ADC/LA/OPS (PALMER X-9011); AUTH: ADC/LA/OPS (PALMER); COORD: PCS/LGG/ID (CANTRELL); C/E/IB/S(STOVER); REL: C/E/IB (BERGER); CL BY 037029.

R.m.

X X 9

LAcu/EC

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

RECORD COPY

04 MAR 80
201-252234

38/44/ SECRET 2 FRP: ,2, , , , ,

ADV C/LA & C/EUR 1814Z PRECEDENCE STAFF

ACTION: C/LA-8 (078) INFO: ODPD-D, VR, FILE, DORECORD, C/CI-4,
C/EPS/EG-2, C/EUR-6, (23/W)

80 3918225 PAGE 001 IN 3918225
TOR: 271804Z FEB 80 MADR 48680

S E C R E T 271748Z FEB 80 STAFF

CITE MADRID 48680

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR. 0 IDEN TO MADR-48679

WNINTEL RYBAT AKULE AMLASH

REF: MADRID 48679 3918232

1. IDENS:
WIFE: MIRTA NOVOA DELGADO, DPOB: 9 AUG 1938, MATANZAS, CUBA.

SON: ROLANDO CUBELA NOVOA, DPOB: 26 JUNE 1960, HAVANA, CUBA.

MOTHER: VIRGINIA SECADES ZELAVA, DPOB: 30 APRIL 1908, LAS VILLAS, CUBA.

2. ABOVE IDENS ARRIVED MADRID FROM CUBA ON SAME DAY AS SUBJECT REF, 11 DECEMBER 1979.

3. FILE: 201-252234. RVW 27 FEB 00; DRV D9C.1.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

LACEY

27FEB80
201-252234

RECORD COPY

/12/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/LA-8 INFO: ODPD-D, VR, FILE, DORECORD, DDO-4, C/CI-4, C/EPS/EG-2, C/EUR-6, C/LCG/ID, C/PCS, C/PCS/LCG, C/PCS/PGLO, DDO/DO, (32/P)

---

80 3620398 PAGE 001
TOT: 022211Z JAN 80 DIRECTOR 583488

S E C R E T
STAFF 022211Z DIRECTOR 583488
TO: IMMEDIATE MADRID.

WNINTEL [illegible] 30 AMLASH

1. LNERGO HAS ADVISED THAT AMLASH/1 (A/1)(IDEN A), CUBAN ASSET 1963-1965, ARRIVED MADRID 11 DEC 79 AND CONTACTED LNERGO SOURCE IN U.S. REQUESTING MEETING WITH RTACTION REPRESENTATIVE. ACCORDING LNERGO SOURCE A/1 HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY NUMERUUS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES SINCE ARRIVAL MADRID BUT HAS REFUSED GRANT INTERVIEW.

2. IDEN B TENTATIVELLY SCHEDULED DEPART 7 JAN 80 FOR MADRID TO MEET AND DEBRIEF A/1 AND DETERMINE HIS FUTURE PLANS. LNERGO HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PROVIDE BONA-FIDES AND CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS. WILL ADVISE WHEN RECEIVED.

3. PLS PROVIDE NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IDEN B CAN USE TO CONTACT STATION ON ARRIVAL MADRID. REQUEST REPLY IMMEDIATE.

4. FILE: 201-252234. CADL RVW 2 JAN 2000 DRV D9C.3. ALL SECRET.>
ORIG: SA/C/LAD (STURBITTS, X-9127, GREEN-3215); COORD: DC/LACO; DC/LA/OPS; C/EUR/IB; AUTH: DC/LA; C/LA; REL: DC/EUR/S THOMPSON. CL BY 12180.

Lacfey

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

RECORD COPY

02 JAN 79
201-252234

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. CS DB-312/01409-68

DATE DISTR. 28 June 1968

COUNTRY Cuba

DOI Late April 1968

SUBJECT Prison Break at El Principe Prison in Havana

ACQ Canada, Ottawa (25 June 1968)

FIELD NO.

SOURCE An official Canadian service from officials in Havana.

1. In late April 1968 there was a successful prison break at the El Principe Prison in Havana. A group of prisoners escaped by digging a tunnel to the courtyard of a neighboring hospital. After the escape, ex-Major Rolando Cubela Secades, who was convicted in March 1966 for plotting to assassinate Fidel Castro, was transferred from El Principe to a prison in Oriente Province.

252234

2. It was rumored that Huber Matos, imprisoned since October 1959, was one of the escapees. However, according to the wife of a prisoner in La Cabana Prison in Havana, Matos and 20 other political prisoners were still in Gallery 23 of that prison. Although none of them wore prison uniforms, it is said that the authorities stopped being severe with them on this count.

3. Field Dissem: None.

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

(classification) (dissem controls)

201-252234

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
DCS		FBI 2						

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WHC/RR	5	WH/SAO	1	E/IB/R	1	OTTAWA-5480 (IN-37968) NP (SMACT-1)
WHC/OPS	2	WHC/JMCOBRA	1	E/MADR	1	
WHC/EW	1			E/R	1	
WHC/PP	1	CI/OPS/WH2		E/OTTA	1	
WHC/WAVE	1					E/BC/C/R RH RRH hm
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO 1, WH/C 9 (2), EUR 2 (2), WH 1				LIAISON 14 *		

FORM 1-66 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Acting Chief of Station, Djakarta

INFO

FROM
Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT
Visit of Identities

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : DBA-12821 (25 June 62)

1. OKENVY reports that they were advised by Identity A that his associate, Identity B would be visiting Djakarta in mid-July and that probably he (Identity A) would be summoned by General Jani in the near future to assist in procurement activities for the military.

2. Identity A expressed himself as being willing at the same time to serve ODYOKE without remuneration, on a confidential basis or otherwise, if his services can be of assistance.

3. Identity A has done some dickering with the local attache regarding aeronautical spare parts for which export permits have been difficult to obtain, claiming that he would have no difficulty in obtaining permits if the parts were purchased through his organization.

4. Identity A has also been in contact with another ODYOKE component since January 62 and therefore cannot be approached by KUBARK.

for CHESTER D. DAINOLD

Attachments:
Idens U.S.C. True Name Pouch

FORWARDED HEREWITH

Distribution:
2 — Djakarta

23 July 1962

RI Files 201-41581

201-41591

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
23 July 62

DATE DISPATCHED
27 JUL 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
FBDW-5498

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
-41581

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

FE/PIA
1 - RI

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	RBH
RID/?IS	
FI/IC	
RID/FI	WH
FE/PIA	
DESTROY	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
FE/PIA/I	Dexter E. Kelpe.	jdk	5503

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
CFE	26/7/62	esmond .1 .erald

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

IDENTITIES U.S.C.
TRUE NAME POUCH Att. to
FHDW-5498

IDENTITY A I Irving Davidson, Public Relations, 1612 K St., N.W.

IDENTITY B Paul Pesik, formerly employed by the Indonesian Embassy, Washington.

FNDW - 5498
23 July 1962
Encl. #1

SECRET

CS COPY

201-41581

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief of Station, Quito
Chief of Base, Guayaquil

INFO

FROM Chief, WH

SUBJECT Report of PBPRIME Citizen on Connections with Ecuadorean Government

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Please comment on Subject and his statements

other agency

1. The following paragraphs are quoted from an ODENVY report resulting from an interview with Identity. The addressees are requested to comment on the Subject's statements and to send to Headquarters information concerning the Subject's activities in Ecuador bearing on his statements.

A. On August 29, 1960, Identity was interviewed by ODENVY at his request. Identity related that he had just returned from a trip to Ecuador where he had been offered a job to represent that country as an agent in PBPRIME and he was seriously considering this offer. While in Ecuador, he had conferred with four individuals who he believed would run the new government which was to be sworn into office on August 31, 1960. These persons were identified as follows: Jaime Nebot Velasco, Minister of Development; Pedro J. Menendez Gilbert, Mayor of Guayaquil, Ecuador; Luis Noboa, an Ecuadorean businessman; and Enrique Ponce Luque, a Senator and partner of Noboa.

B. According to Identity, the new president of Ecuador, Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, has been elected to that office for the fourth time and is an aged person. The above-listed individuals will control and operate the Government of Ecuador with the approval of Ibarra. As a result of his conferring with the above persons, Identity expressed the belief that Nebot will be the strong in the government. He described these individuals as patriotic with a sincere desire to better the plight of the common man in Ecuador. Identity stated that all of them are definitely pro-PBPRIME and Nebot said that all Identity has to do is tell him what PBPRIME

UNDER SEPARATE COVER

CONTINUED

Distribution:
2 - Quito
1 - Guayaquil

DATE TYPED 5 Oct 1960
DATE DISPATCHED 6 OCT 1960

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HQW-2393

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 01-41581
~~FILE HELD BY [illegible]~~

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

1 - RI (Subject)
1 - Registry

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
RI/FI	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/E	HEMendenhall	sel	3847

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/1/E	5/6/60	ASWisniowski

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1	5 OCT 1960	E. M. TERRELL

desires and the Ecuadorean Government will do its best to cooperate with PBPRIME.

C. Identity was also told that the Government of Ecuador has commenced negotiations with an electronics firm in Dallas, Texas, believed by Identity to be the Continental Electronics Company, for the construction of a 50,000 kilowatt radio station in Guayaquil. This station will be used to combat antigovernment propaganda beamed into Ecuador from Cuba. Nebot felt that PBPRIME could make use of this radio station. Identity told Nebot that he believed this could be arranged.

D. It is the opinion of Identity that this is a golden opportunity for PBPRIME to commence cooperation with a new government in a pro-PBPRIME country. He stated that the Ecuadorean Government would be most willing for KUBARK to utilize the above radio station; however, it would necessitate KUBARK's paying half of the expenses for its construction. Identity was advised that the information he had given ODENVY would be furnished to KUBARK pursuant to his request. He desired to be contacted within a period of ten days if KUBARK is interested in the information he had to offer. No further action concerning this matter will be undertaken by ODENVY.

2. ODENVY has previously reported at length on the Identity, a public relations counsel. Identity registered as a purchasing agent for various bureaus of the Republic of Nicaragua on 15 April 1955; on 22 July 1958, he registered as an agent of the Israeli Military Industries, which was controlled by the government of Israel.

3. The Identity appears to be an international businessman with special interest in Latin American Countries. He has previously frequently contacted PBPRIME agencies on subjects he thought appropriate to bring to their attention. A cursory check of his 201 file revealed no derogatory information. Further information can be supplied if the field so requests.

END OF DISPATCH

cs copy

DISPATCH

FPMW-5545

TO Chief of Station, Manila

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 201-41581

FROM Chief, Far East Division

DATE OCT 16 [illegible]

SUBJECT I. IRVING DAVIDSON

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED None

REFERENCE(S) FPMA-8470, 13 May 1958, Transmittal of MIRAVELIN Tap Transcripts

1. The information obtained in the name check of DAVIDSON reveals that Subject is an aggressive international businessman who would possibly participate in any business proposition for a commission; however, when negotiating with representatives of other countries, Subject usually protects himself by reporting the business proposition to a U.S. Government agency or official. The name check reveals that the relationship between Drew Pearson and MIRAVELIN may have resulted from Subject's personal contact with both men. The information re MIRAVELIN may have reached Pearson through Subject's office associates.

2. The following are the details of the check on Subject:

a. Subject, a U.S. citizen, born 19 January 1921, is married and maintains his residence and office in Washington, D.C. As reported by KUJUMP, 8 November 1955, Subject shared his office suite in the Wyatt Building with James Farriss, a former ODACID employee, and Jack Northam Anderson and Frederick G. Blumenthal, Washington representatives of PARADE magazine. Frederick G. Blumenthal is a former Drew Pearson leg-man while Anderson continues to work for Pearson.

b. An ODENVY report dated 6 November 1957, stated that Subject filed a registration statement, No. 886, 18 April 1955, with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of Justice. Subject listed as his foreign principal President A. Somosa, Republic of Nicaragua. The nature and purpose of his representing the foreign principal was given as purchasing agent for various bureaus of the Republic of Nicaragua, including the military forces. He also stated that he dealt in general public relations and was self-employed. Another ODENVY report of 18 June 1957 stated that Subject listed his occupation as a Public Relations Counsel and Business Consultant in a report to a local credit bureau. The report indicated that Subject previously spent some time in Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic and is well acquainted with various business and government officials in the above-mentioned locations.

c. On several occasions in the past Subject volunteered information to various government agencies and offered his assistance to the U.S. Government. In an ODENVY report dated 15 September 1950, Subject advised that through a friend, Max Henriquez, who Subject claimed to be a representative for the Dominican Republic to the United Nations, Subject had become acquainted with Vincente Toledano, and was sufficiently close to him to obtain important information concerning activities of the Communist Party in Mexico. Subject offered his assistance to the U.S. Government in this matter. According to a KUJUMP report, submitted by the Office of International Trade, dated 1953, Subject furnished information regarding travel in 1950 between Mexico and the USSR and information on trans-shipments through Mexico.

201-41581

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO FPMW-5545

A Memorandum of 8 November 1955, reported that Subject had approached a KUBARK representative on 30 September 1955, at which time he requested guidance and possible financial assistance for a proposed business arrangement with Peter MIHALDEC, former Yugoslav Assistant Military Attache in Washington, and now Chief of the Foreign Division of PUTNIK, a travel and tourist agency. The proposed business partnership was for the purpose of opening a PUTNIK travel agency in New York City. Subject had not been interested in participating in the travel and tourist agency in New York City but had suggested to the Yugoslavs that he would act as their public relations expert and publicize Yugoslavia's tourist attractions throughout the U.S. Subject stated he had initially contacted KUBARK for the purpose of obtaining financial backing in exchange for any information that he might be able to obtain through his contacts with the Yugoslavs. Subject was informed by KUBARK representative that KUBARK would neither give him financial assistance nor influence in any way his personal decision in the matter.

d. Also the files reflect that Subject has had contacts with other purchasing agents for foreign countries: In MANA 2217, 19 March 1957, Subject and Isaac Cohen, Israeli purchasing agent in New York, visited Nicaragua ostensibly to discuss the purchase of Israeli corvettes by the Nicaraguan Government. An ODENVY report dated 31 March 1958, from a confidential source, stated one Sam Cummings, an international arms dealer, presently has a quantity of guns in bond in the "free trade zone", New York City, and Subject and James Farriss had been attempting to locate buyers for these guns. An ODENVY report dated 31 March 1958, stated that Abdul Rachman SURIOKUSUMO, Djakarta, Indonesia, connected with the Indonesian Police Force, had been in the U.S. in the early part of 1956 seeking arms for Indonesia. Due to U.S. regulations, he was unable to obtain arms. At this time Subject interested SURIOKUSUMO in purchasing arms from the Dominican Republic. According to source, Subject and SURIOKUSUMO made a trip to the Dominican Republic in June 1956 accompanied by a U.S. arms expert and Enrique Garcia, Jr. who had claimed to be a personal friend of Gen. Rafael L. Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and who is registered with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, listing his foreign principal as the Dominican Republic. It was reported in HMMA 0923, 6 August 1956, that Subject had written a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua in which he stated the purpose of his recent trip and informed the Ambassador that "other reds" were attempting to undercut the arms price as quoted by the Dominican Republic. As reported in ODACID on 6 May 1958, Subject, as representative of the Government of Nicaragua, last year purchased 73 Staghound armored cars from Israel for the GON and also negotiated the subsequent sale of 30 of these vehicles to Cuba. Recently Subject approached U.S. officials in Nicaragua re disposal of 20 of these vehicles to the Guatemalan Government.

e. The only reference to MIRAVELIN reflected in this name check was a KUJUMP report dated 22 April 1957 which stated that a letter, found by a law enforcement officer in February 1957 among MIRAVELIN's personal effects, seemed to imply that a joint effort was being made by MIRAVELIN and the late Nicaraguan president SOMOZA to open a casino in Nicaragua. This letter dated 27 August 1956 was written on the letterhead of the Nicaraguan Government Agency, Suite 1224, Wyatt Building, Washington, D.C., I. Irving Davidson, U.S. representative, and stated: "Enclosed are Ex-Im bank particulars you asked for. Sam Waugh will cooperate with us 100%. Be sure that Pres. Somoza and only Pres. Somoza designates you 50% partner in the casino. You don't need any partner for the hotel end of the deal at all. You don't want one either. I am sure Pres. Somoza won't care about this. Don't hesitate to ask Somoza anything about anything. I already talked with him and told him that I hope that you would take over this project

FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

with your group and experience. I will then know that Nicaragua will have the nicest, best operated facility in the hemisphere. Give my best regards to Pres. Somoza when you see him. If you don't see him for any reason, you don't have a deal regardless what papers you see or whoever else you may meet. Somoza is a regular guy and our kind of people. He has also been helpful to our people on the other side. Your boy, Irv Davidson."

3. This information has not been cleared for passage to our liaison services.

for CHESTER D. DAINOLD

6 October 1958

Distribution:
3 - COS, Manila
1 - RI
1 - FE/PSH

COPY

201-41881

SECRET

16.02-97

FS-1247-74
31 July 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: I. Irving Davidson

1. At 1000 hours on 31 July 1974, in compliance with instructions from Mr. Halpern, I met with Niel Ainsley, Chief, Covert Procurement/OL, relative to the Davidson matter. Ainsley read the Washington FO memo regarding the subject and then called Billy Morgan and asked him to join us. Morgan as Chief, Operations Support Branch, Supply Division/OL, has the direct responsibility of funding for, receiving, and storing items of the type that Davidson is seeking to peddle. After Morgan read the Washington memo, a long discussion ensued from which the following points emerged:

a. Per instructions from Mr. Colby, the CIA is currently engaged in a dialogue with the DoD to determine the mutual responsibilities of the CIA and the DoD in future paramilitary operations. One of the most important aspects of this matter is logistical support. Although this has not yet been settled, the assumption is that the CIA will continue to bear the major responsibility for procuring Soviet, Bloc, and PRC arms and ammo to support paramilitary ops. This has never been a mission of the three military services and they have no capability for this type of acquisition. (The principal CIA rep in these discussions with the DoD is James Glerum, Deputy Chief, SOG.)

b. The CIA inventory of 7.62 Soviet ammo has been seriously depleted in the past year and, for several months, Ainsley has been seeking to procure up to 4 million rounds through different sources without success. Each attempt to secure ammo involves some security risk.

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

SECRET

FS-1247-74

SUBJECT: I. Irving Davidson

c. In view of this fact, Morgan offered the opinion that from a logistical point of view it would be advantageous to purchase the entire 25 million rounds from Davidson (at a cost he estimated to be in the range of $3,125,000.00). This would provide the Agency with a five-year supply and eliminate the necessity for Ainsley running the security gauntlet every few months to replenish the inventory.

d. Nevertheless, because of Davidson's unsavory reputation and his close connection with columnist Jack Anderson, it was generally agreed that his utilization would be risky in the extreme.

2. Ainsley suggested that we run the problem by his boss, Michael Malanick, Chief, Office of Logistics. Accordingly we met with Malanick and his Deputy, James McDonald. After a thorough rehash of the matter, it was agreed that:

a. Morgan will confer with SOG and determine the feasibility of taking the entire 25 million rounds.

b. Ainsley and Morgan will check with their legitimate arms dealers and see if any of them have ever heard of Davidson. If so, one of them will approach him and ask (innocently) if he knows of any 7.62 ammo available.

c. There is also a possibility that one of Ainsley's regular contacts might have some idea as to who Davidson's source is. In that case the source will be approached directly and Davidson will be cut out of the pattern.

d. DCD will instruct the Washington Field Office to tell Davidson that there is no CIA interest in this acquisition and bow out of this affair.

WILLIAM D. MATHER
Chief, Format Section

WDMather/pk
File: Services/Control
Chrono

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

TO	Chief, Special Affairs Staff
INFO.	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE
SUBJECT	TYPIC/Operational Transmittal of Operational Plan for AMTRUNK VII

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
▨	ABSTRACT
▨	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Request Approval

References : A. UFGA-8312, AMTRUNK Op Plan, 1 June 1963
B. UFGA-10436, Amendment of AMTRUNK Op Plan, 31 July 1963
C. UFGA-10533, Op Plan AMTRUNK V, 31 Aug 1963
D. UFGA-12725, Op Plan AMTRUNK VI, 27 Nov 1963
E. UFGA-13138, Amendment to AMTRUNK VI Op Plan, 18 December 1963

Transmitted for approval herewith is the operational plan for AMTRUNK VII. The AMTRUNK team is scheduled for infiltration on 7 February and for exfiltration on 17 February. A five-man team with Intermediate Craft will be infiltrated into northern Matanzas Province from which point the team leader, AMICE-14, and AMTRUNK-13 will proceed into Havana to accomplish the MHAPRON objectives of this operation. Approval is requested at the earliest possible time.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Op Plan (3 cys) - H/W

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/atts.

DATE TYPED	22 Jan 64
DATE DISPATCHED	
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	UFGA-13707
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	19-6-84/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

OPERATIONAL PLAN

KIBA

DESENSITIZED

CRYPTONYM

AMTRUNK VII

2. REFERENCES

A. UFGA-9312, AMTRUNK Operational Plan, 1 June 1963

B. UFGA-10436, Amendment of AMTRUNK Operational Plan, 31 July 1963

C. UFGA-10933, Operational Plan - AMTRUNK V, 31 August 1963

D. UFGA-12725, Operational Plan - AMTRUNK VI, 27 November 1963

E. UFGA-13138, Amendment to AMTRUNK VI Operational Plan, 18 December 1963

3. BACKGROUND

Operation AMTRUNK III/IV which was mounted in August 1963 was successful in that the two principals of the team, AMICE-27 and AMICE-14, were able to contact and to recruit two principal agents and several other action agents to lay the groundwork for the MHAPRON objectives of the AMTRUNK operation. One of the two internal P/A's, AMTRUNK-9, was exfiltrated with the four-man AMTRUNK infiltration team for training and operational discussions in the JMWAVE area. In early September, AMTRUNK-9 was re-infiltrated into PBRUMEN in Operation AMTRUNK V, the same operation which exfiltrated AMFAUNAs -1, -3, -13 and -34. In late October AMICE-27 was separated from the clandestine part of the AMTRUNK operation. The original objectives of Operation AMTRUNK VI, postponed from December 1963 to January 1964, were to revitalize and re-direct the efforts of the two internal P/A's toward their primary task, i.e. to spot and recruit among high level figures who are dissatisfied with the Castro regime. In late December, the scope of this mission was altered by the receipt of a commercial telegram in open code from AMTRUNK-9 indicating that he was in grave danger and wished to be exfiltrated. The twin objectives of Operation AMTRUNK VI then became: first, to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-9 and, this accomplished, for AMICE-14 to proceed to Havana for his task of re-channelling AMTRUNK-10's responsibilities. The exfiltration of AMTRUNK-9, who brought with him his entire family consisting of wife, brother-in-law, and three small children, was accomplished on 9 January 1964. The unexpected presence of AMTRUNK-9's family, coupled with reports of increased vigilance in the infiltration area, forced AMICE-14 to exfiltrate the same night without attempting to accomplish the second part of his mission.

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

KYBAT

RYBAT

DESENSITIZED

4. OBJECTIVES

A. To re-establish personal contact with AMTRUNK-10 and to secure his full cooperation in spotting dissidents within the higher levels of the military for the purpose of organizing a conspiracy against Fidel Castro.

B. To obtain from AMTRUNK-10 operational information on other MHAPRON recruitment targets.

C. To attempt the recruitment of FAR Captain and Cubana pilot Jose Alberto SEMIDEY Isalgue, a frequent personal pilot for Fidel and Raul Castro and an influential figure in civilian and military aviation.

D. Through the AMTRUNK ratline, to transport to Havana and cache a clandestine radio set for the future use of an infiltrated AMTRUNK radio operator. At the same time, to explore with AMTRUNK-10 and other internal contacts the possibility of safehousing and supporting a radio operator in Havana.

5. TASKS

A. The AMTRUNK Intermediate Craft will be towed by the KUBARK mother craft to the DRP at coordinates 221668, AMS Sheet 4085 IV (23° 14' 00" N and 80° 47' 00" W, H. O. 2624).

B. The AMTRUNK IC will then proceed to the vicinity of coordinates 133511, AMS 4085 III. At this point, AMICE-14 and/or AMTRUNK-7 will make contact with either Oscar DIAZ Jabiela-Garcia or his son Antonio DIAZ Torres in Casualidad (17654795, AMS 4085 III). These two individuals are knowledgable of the fact that the AMTRUNKs may return to the infiltration area although they do not know even the approximate date. Oscar DIAZ and his son Antonio are prepared to activate the ratline consisting of three different taxis, to move AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 into the Havana area. AMTRUNK-7 and -16, the team guides, and AMAGREE-1, the radio operator, will remain with the IC in the mangroves in the vicinity of the infiltration area until the return of AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13.

C. Once in Havana, AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 intend to split up and seek refuge in different safehouses. They will maintain contact with each other, however.

D. AMICE-14's primary task vis-a-vis AMTRUNK-10 is to cement the recruitment of AMTRUNK-10 and to obtain his full cooperation to work toward MHAPRON objectives. In addition, AMICE-14 will teach AMTRUNK-10 an OWVL system and leave a receiver with AMTRUNK-10. AMICE-14 also intends to give AMTRUNK-10 a review

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT

in the principles of secret writing.

E. Secondary tasks to be accomplished with AMTRUNK-10 are:

(1) To debrief him on his activities since AMICE-14 recruited him in August 1963.

(2) To collect operational information on other possible recruitment targets

(3) To explore the possibilities of accommodating and supporting an infiltrated radio operator.

F. AMTRUNK-13 will attempt the recruitment of Jose Alberto SEMIDEY Isalgue, a close friend of AMTRUNK-13's for 18 years and a first cousin of AMICE-14. The following is a short biographical sketch of SEMIDEY:

target sheet

Age 37-38 years old. Born in Matanzas, the son of Brig. Gen. Jose SEMIDEY, ex-Comptroller of the National Army and veteran of the Spanish-American War. SEMIDEY studied for one year at Purdue University, Indiana. He and AMTRUNK-13 graduated from the second class of ANACRA Pilot Training School in 1942. SEMIDEY flew for Expreso Aereo Inter-Americano and Cuba Aeropostal for about 11 years before he became Interventor or Administrator for the latter company after the Revolution. After Cuba Aeropostal was absorbed into Cubana, SEMIDEY held various positions of importance in Cubana. He also holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Air Force and reportedly has made reconnaissance flights and black flights carrying arms and/or agents to and from other Latin American countries. SEMIDEY has a close friendship with Victor PINA Cardoso, the Director of Civil Aviation, and is reportedly close to Raul CASTRO for whom he is a frequent personal pilot. Because of the close former friendship between AMTRUNK-13 and SEMIDEY and because of reports from AMICE-14's family which indicate that SEMIDEY has become disenchanted with the Castro regime, both AMTRUNK-13 and AMICE-14 consider SEMIDEY a prime candidate for recruitment.

G. If SEMIDEY should be out of the country on a flying trip at the time of infiltration, AMTRUNK-13 will attempt to set up contact with Commandante Rene de los SANTOS Ponce, who is reportedly stationed in Las Villas Province with a unit of "Lucha Contra Bandidos", an anti-counterrevolutionary force. AMTRUNK-13 and de los SANTOS are friends from boyhood and, for a period of 6 or 7 years, de los SANTOS worked as an apprentice plumber for AMTRUNK-13's

Target sheet

father and lived in their home. AMTRUNK-13 and de los SANTOS also worked together in the 26th of July underground in Havana.

H. To return through the ratline to the infil/exfil area. Recognition signals will be established with AMTRUNK-7 and -16 and AMAGREE-1 who will be waiting with the IC in the mangroves in the vicinity of the lagoon at coordinates 129498, AMS 4085 III.

6. TIMETABLE

The scheduled date for the infiltration of the AMTRUNK team at the DRP is 0200 hours, 7 February 1964. The exfiltration of the five team members with the AMTRUNK IC and rendezvous with the mother craft at the DRP is 2355 hours, 17 February, with an alternate on 18 February. If exfiltration is not successful on either of these dates, the radio operator will be in contact with the base and contingent plans for exfiltration can be set up through this medium.

7. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

A. See references for biographical information on AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-7.

B. AMTRUNK-13

AMTRUNK-13 is a 42-year-old Cuban citizen who has been a commercial airline pilot for most of his life. He is a high school graduate. In early 1959, AMTRUNK-13 was named Interventor of "Aerovias Q", one of the major Cuban airlines. He defected in December 1960 while still in that post. He is a native of Havana who was active in the 26th of July underground in that city from early 1957. While later in exile in the United States, AMTRUNK-13 made two clandestine flights into the Sierra Maestras during the war against Batista, the last bringing Provisional President Manuel URRUTIA Lleo from Venezuela for his first meeting with Fidel Castro in December 1958.

C. AMAGREE-1, Radio Operator

AMAGREE-1 is a 33-year-old Cuban citizen who has two college degrees, in education and in journalism. He is native to the province in which the infil/exfil area is located. Until his departure from Cuba in August 1961, AMAGREE-1 was a municipal official in Matanzas Province and was active in the propaganda section of the 30th of November Movement. AMAGREE-1 began his association with KUBARK in April 1963 as a radio operator trainee. As in the case of AMTRUNK-13, this is his first operational mission.

SENSITIZED

D. AMTRUNK-16, Guide

AMTRUNK-16 is a 41-year-old single Cuban citizen who, as a commercial fisherman, lived and worked in the infil/exfil area all of his life. He participated in Operation AMTRUNK VI in December 1963 and his up-to-date knowledge of the infil/exfil areafrom which he fled in late October 1963, proved invaluable on this mission. While he was still in Cuba, AMTRUNK-16 was a trusted contact for the AMTRUNKs on both Operation III/IV and V.

8. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Primary.

RS-501 with special signal plan with continuous guard channel. This equipment will remain with the AMTRUNK IC and will not be carried into Havana.

B. Alternates.

(1) OWVL

AMICE-14 will carry a RR-44 receiver with appropriate signal plan on the trip into Havana.

(2) AMICE-14, AMTRUNK-13 and AMAGREE-1 will all have in their possession a S/W system with indicators, materials and accommodation addresses in the JMWAVE area.

C. Case Officer Challenge

To be used to determine whether or not the radio operator, AMAGREE-1, is being controlled by a hostile force. C/O: "Diganos si los barcos de patrulla estan equipados con radar y armas pesadas". ("Tell us if the patrol boats are equipped with radar and heavy armament"). Radio Operator, if free from hostile control, will reply: "En Cuba no hay culebras venenosas". (In Cuba there are no poisonous snakes). Any other response to this question which the radio operator might give would indicate hostile control.

9. COVER

The entire infil/exfiltration using the IC will be black. During the trip to Havana, AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 will devise their own cover stories to fit the individual situation, All five agents will be provided with false documentation.

RYBAT DESENSITIZED

10. FINANCES

The team will carry P5,500.00 of which P1,500.00 will remain with the personnel in the IC. AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 will each take P2,000.00 into Havana.

11. CONTROL

Control over the five members of the AMTRUNK team takes the form of providing or denying them the wherewithal, both financial and material, to engage in clandestine operations against the Castro regime.

12. COMMITMENTS

No commitments have been made to any member of the team other than a broad commitment to continue to pay their salaries in the event they are captured and to continue to provide support to their families for a reasonable period of time in the event of their death.

13. SECURITY

Both AMICE-14 and AMAGREE-1 have been granted OA's. The other three team members, AMTRUNK-7, -13 and -16, have been granted POA's. All five have been LCFLUTTERed.

14. TRAINING

A. AMICE-14

The earlier training of AMICE-14 has been supplemented with three additional weeks of tradecraft training and he has since received review training in weapons firing, maritime, OWVL and S/W.

B. AMTRUNK-13

Prior to dispatch of Operation AMTRUNK VII, AMTRUNK-13 will have received the following training:

(1) Three weeks of tradecraft training

(2) One week of maritime training

(3) One week of survival training

(4) One week of PM training accenting map and compass and weapons firing

(5) Three half-day sessions in S/W

C. AMAGREE-1

AMAGREE-1 has received the same training as AMTRUNK-13 above plus basic radio operator training which included the use of medium speed communications gear. AMAGREE-1, prior to dispatch time, will have received training in a special signal plan with continuous guard channel.

D. AMTRUNK-7

Since AMTRUNK-7's primary function on the AMTRUNK team is as a coastal guide, his formal training has been necessarily limited. He has received extensive maritime and weapons training and three days of instruction in basic tradecraft principles.

E. AMTRUNK-16

This agent's function on the AMTRUNK team is similar to that of AMTRUNK-7. He will have received PM and maritime training prior to dispatch.

15. DAMAGE REPORT

See Attachment A

16. EQUIPMENT LIST

See Attachment B

SECRET RYBAT ATTACHMENT A

DESENSITIZED

DAMAGE REPORT

A. The damage report for AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-7 remains the same as was transmitted in Attachment A to Reference D with the addition of Rudolph W. SOSPINE as "Jack".

B. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to AMTRUNK-13:

Safehouse #216
Maritime Training Site
Firing Range
Survival Training Site

C. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-13:

Irving N. PEGGINS as	"Joe Webster"	
Reuben A. HANNULA as	"Fred Folsom"	
Rudolph W. SOSPINE as	"Jack"	
Andrew S. PARMERS as	"Angel Martin",	training instructor
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as	"Dewey" ,	" "
Alton T. PIRNACK as	"Larry" ,	" "
Fletcher K. THENE as	"Harry" ,	" "
Paul V. MENDECINO as	"Ted" ,	" "
Wilfred R. KNEAFSY as	"Pete" ,	" "
Floyd H. RUSANOWSKI as	"Jack" ,	" "
Keith D. WINETT as	"Jim" ,	LCFLUTTER operator
Paul I. NAPOLILLI as	"Paul" ,	" "

D. Agent Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-13:

AMICE-27 by true name
AMICE-14 by true name
AMAGREE-1 as "Mario Ramirez"
AMAKA-1 as "Antonio Garcia"
AMTRUNK-7 as "Carlos Menendez"
AMTRUNK-8 as "Tomas Rodriguez"
AMTRUNK-9 as "Jose Lopez"
AMTRUNK-16 as "Juan Gonzalez"
AMPAL-1 as "Joe"
AMSKILL-1 by training alias
AMSWING-2 by training alias
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"

E. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to AMAGREE-1

Safehouse #174
Safehouse #216
Maritime training site
Survival training site
Firing range

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT

RYBA

DESENSI

F. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to AMAGREE-1:

Irving N. PEGGINS as	"Joe Webster"	
Reuben A. HANNULA as	"Fred"	
Rudolph W. SOSPINE as	"Jack"	
Andrew S. PARMERS as	"Angel Martin"	, training instructor
Daniel V. GUSSOW as	"Bill"	, " "
Humphrey O. EDDERY as	"Ski"	, " "
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as	"Dewey"	, " "
Alton T. PIRNACK as	"Larry"	, " "
Fletcher K. THENE as	"Harry"	, " "
Paul V. MENDECINO as	"Ted"	, " "
Wilfred R. KNEAFSY as	"Pete"	, " "
Floyd H. RUSANOWSKI as	"Jack"	, " "
Paul I. NAPOLILLI as	"Paul"	, LCFLUTTER operator

G. Agent Personnel Exposed to AMAGREE-1:

AMPANIC-14 as	"Enrique"	, training instructor
AMPAL-1 as	"Joe"	, " "
AMSKILL-1 by training alias		, training instructor
AMSWING-2 " " "		, " "
AMLABEL-1 as	"Terry"	,
AMTRUNK-7 as	"Carlos Menendez,	
AMTRUNK-8 as	"Tomas Rodriguez,	
AMTRUNK-9 as	"Jose Lopez"	
AMTRUNK-16 as	"Juan Gonzalez"	
AMSONIC-1 as	"Juan Sanchez"	
AMHINT-48 as	"Paco Gonzalez"	
AMLITAINT-1 by true name		
AMICE-14 " " "		
AMAKA-1 " " "		
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"		

H. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to AMTRUNK-16:

Safehouse #104
Safehouse #216
Maritime Training Site
Firing Range

I. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-16:

Irving N. PEGGINS as	"Joe"	
Reuben A. HANNULA as	"Fred"	
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as	"Dewey"	, training instructor
Alton T. PIRNACK as	"Larry"	, " "
Wilfred F. KNEAFSY as	"Pete"	, " "
Keith D. WINETT as	"Bill"	, LCFLUTTER operator

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT

J. Agent Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-16:

AMICE-14 by true first name and training alias
AMTRUNK-7 by true name
AMTRUNK-8 by true name
AMTRUNK-9 as "Jose Lopez"
AMTRUNK-13 as "Maximo"
AMAGREE-1 as "Mario"
AMAKA-1 as "Antonio"
AMLABEL-1 as "Terry"
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"

SECRET RYBAT **ATTACHMENT B**

DESENSITIZED

EQUIPMENT LIST

Five-man infiltration team (2 infiltrees, 2 guides and radop)

A. Material to be Cached:

1 RT-48 Medium Speed Communications Gear

B. Personal Weapons and Equipment

1. 5 Belgian Browning 9 mm. Pistols
2. 2 M-3 SMGs
3. 2 FAL 7.62 Automatic Rifles
4. 200 Rounds 9 mm. Ammo
5. 400 Rounds 45 Cal Ammo
6. 300 Rounds 7.62 Ammo
7. 12 Magazines for 9 mm. Ammo
8. 10 Magazines for 45 Cal Ammo
9. 15 Magazines for 7.62 Ammo
10. 2 Sten Ammo Carriers
11. 2 BAR Ammo Carriers
12. 5 Pistol Belts
13. 5 Belt Holsters for 9 mm. Pistols
14. 5 Pr. Suspenders
15. 4 Canteens w/cup and cover
16. 1 Entrenching Tool
17. 1 Machete w/scabbard
18. 3 Trench or Bowie Knives w/scabbards
19. 1 Pr. Binoculars
20. 5 Silva Compasses

21. 5 UDT-type Watches
22. 5 Plastic Waterproof Flashlights
23. 5 Backpacks
24. 20 Waterproof Bags
25. 5 Swiss Pocket Knives
26. 5 Zippo Lighters
27. 2 Metascopes
28. 5 Penlights
29. 10 Plastic or Rubber End Caps for 45 Cal SMG Magazines
30. 6 Hand Grenades

C. Rations

1. 12 Black Concentrated Rations
2. 20 C-Rations (1 box = 3 meals)
3. Assorted Cans Fruit, Meat, Beans, etc.
4. Assorted Packages Rice, Dry Beans, Coffee, etc.
5. 100 Bouillon Cubes
6. 6 Packages Tropical Chocolate Bars

D. Medical Supplies

1. 1 Corpsman's First Aid Kit with Morphine Syrettes and Codeine (in metal container)
2. 5 Individual First Aid Kits
3. 100 Coricidin Pills
4. 100 APC Tablets
5. 100 Water Purification Tablets
6. 100 Vitamin Tablets
7. 100 Acromycin Tablets

RYBAT

DESENSITIZED

E. Clothing

1. 5 Sets Fatigue Uniforms, HBT Shirts and Trousers
2. 5 Fatigue Caps
3. 5 Civilian Sport Shirts
4. 5 Prs Civilian Trousers
5. 5 Pr. Civilian Shoes
6. 5 Pr. Jump Boots
7. 5 Leather Belts
8. 15 T-Shirts
9. 15 Pr. Undershorts
10. 15 Pr. Socks
11. 5 Pr. Light Gloves
12. 5 Sets Foul Weather Rubber Uniforms
13. 5 Berets
14. 5 Green Ponchos
15. 5 Pr. Insulated Underwear
16. 5 Field Jackets

F. Communications Gear

1. 1 RR-44 Receiver (for OWVL)
2. 1 RS-501 w/Signal Plan (continuous guard channel)

G. Secret Writing Materials

1. 3 Sets S/W Materials with Extra Carbons and Extra Vials of Developer Pills

H. Intermediate Craft

1. 16' 7" Boston Whaler, "Currituck" Model, Painted Dark Green, Outfitted with Wide-Angle Towing Rig

RYBAT DESENSITIZED

2. 2 75 hp Commercial Outboards w/Tool Kit
3. 7 Fiberglass Outboard Fuel Tanks, Capacity 13 Gal. Each
    6 Horizontal Tanks, Size 11½ x 26½ x 12½"
    1 Vertical Tank, Size 13½ x 26½ x 10½"
4. 5 Flotation Cushions
5. 2 Air Mattresses
6. Extra Propellers and Drive, Shear and Cotter Pins for both Commercial Outboards
7. 5 Black UDT-type Life Preservers
8. 1 Fire Extinguisher (for Gasoline Fires)
9. 1 12-lb. Anchor
10. 2 Hoses for Transferring Fuel from One Tank to Another (or 3 feet of 3/4 inch Plastic Tubing)
11. 2 Oars, Length 10 feet
12. 2 Wooden Push Poles, Length 12 feet, Diameter 2½"
13. 1 Plastic Bailing Bucket, 1 foot deep
14. 2 5-Gallon Plastic Jerrycans (for water)
15. 8 Extra Spark Plugs (4 for each Commercial Outboard)
16. 3 Rolls, Non-Shiny Plastic Tape
17. 50 ft. ½ inch Nylon Rope
18. 200 ft. Parachute Cord
19. 1 Small Hammer
20. 1 Pr. Pliers
21. 1 Screwdriver
22. 1 Spark Plug Wrench
23. 2 Upright Poles, 3½ feet in Length, w/Oarlocks

RYBAT

DESENSITIZED

24. 1 Ritchie Compass

25. 1 Sheet Camouflage Material, 20' x 10'

26. 1 RB 9.6

27. 1 HRT-7 Beacon

I. Maps

Maritime Charts

2 H.O. 1002

2 H.O. 2624

2 H.O. 0944

Series E723, 3-AMS, 1:50,000

2 ea. Sheets 4085 I 4085 IV

4085 II 4085 III

4084 I 4084 IV

J. Miscellaneous

1. Cleaning Gear for 9 mm Pistol, M-3 SMG and FAL including RIG Gun Grease

2. 200 ft. Parachute Cord

3. Box of Matches and Waterproof Containers for same

4. 12 Polyethylene Bags
   4--Large Enough to Contain FAL
   4--Large Enough to Contain Assembled M-3
   4 18" Size for Personal Documents, etc.

5. 2 Sheets Infra-Red Paper, 18" x 24"

6. 1 Dynalite

7. 14 Extra Flashlight Batteries

8. 4 Flashlight Bulbs

9. 8 Extra Penlight Batteries

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT

BAT

DESENSITIZED

10. 4 Packs Lighter Flints
11. 4 Cans Lighter Fluid
12. 1 Set Parallel Rulers
13. 1 Set Dividers
14. 2 Protractors, Metal
15. 2 Pocket Rulers, Metal
16. 1 Flat Mill File
17. 1 Pocket Carborundum Stone
18. 1 One-Burner Gas Stove--Butane Gas or Similar Type--w/Extra Cylinders of Gas
19. 1 Cooking Pot (at least 8" in Diameter)
20. 5 Knife-Fork-Spoon Sets
21. 2 Messkits
22. Box of Insect Repellent, 48 Small Plastic Bottles
23. 6 Cans Spray Paint, Black
24. 1 Can Saddle Soap
25. 1 Package of Sponges
26. Toilet Paper
27. Hand Soap and Detergent
28. Paper Plates
29. Plastic Spoons
30. Assorted Fishhooks and Line
31. 8 Burlap Bags
32. Assorted Empty Cardboard Boxes

DESENSITIZED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/TSD/EB	EXTENSION	NO.	DATE 24 June 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/SA/MOB/PM GH4408 Hdqrs.			Cgl	Bushnell 1.3 X phantom scopes are made in Japan - w/w distribution all have English marking
2. WH/SA/SO/NS			PG	To 2: I have [illegible] attached copy this is for your attention.
3. WH/SA/EOB/Wainwright			W	file Amcrossf1 seems like a tough job too. Ⓦ
4. Cotter				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

24 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

SUBJECT : Improved Sight for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

REFERENCE : a) Memo for the Rcd. dated 25 May 64, Subject: "FAL Silencer/Sights", from C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

1. In accordance with reference a) the following material is provided:

   a) Three open rear sight hoods for the subject rifle.
   b) Three copies of instructions for installing the sight and zeroing the rifle.
   c) Three tool kits containing an adjustment screw driver and two files.
   d) 400 rounds of improved underloaded ammunition with cream of wheat filler. (Boxes marked with red strip. These should be substituted for the rounds already delivered).

2. It must be understood that the limited time available would not permit more that cursory acceptance testing and the superiority of this sight over the standard unit has not been definitely established.

3. The scope and mount requested in reference a) proved to be an unfeasible development in the time available. A mount could not be devised which was interchangeable with any FAL without extensive modification to the weapon.

4. For additional information regarding this matter contact D. J. Hogan or D. R. Dunn on extension 3319.

WALTER L. ERHARDT
Chief
TSD/Engineering Branch

Attachments: As Stated

Distribution:
1 - Addressee
1 - TSD/SDB
1 - C/TSD
1 - EB-81J

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SNAP-ON SIGHT HOOD FOR

THE 7.62 BELGIUM (FAL) RIFLE

1. The sight hood snaps over the existing rear sight on the 7.62 Belgium (FAL) rifle. It is designed to raise the rear sight to compensate for the more curving trajectory of the underloaded ammunition and is an open sight for increased night sighting capability.

2. The sight hood is oriented with the three screws facing the muzzle end of the rifle (See attached drawings). Press down on the hood until the ball detent snaps into the peep hole

3. The slot for the existing rear sight is made tight so that the hood will fit firmly in place. If it fails to fit, file the existing rear sight as necessary. If the sight fits the slot but is difficult to snap on and off, or is too loose, adjust the ball detent by turning the center set screw on the sight hood.

4. The weapon must be zeroed on a known distance firing range to determine the sight settings and proper sight picture for standard and underloaded ammunition when using the hood. The only adjustments possible are those already on the rifle. (That is, elevation control using the graduated ramp and windage control by adjustment of the two locking screws at the base of the existing rear sight dovetail.)

NOTE: It is very important to hold the rifle the same way each time so that the relation of the eye to the rear sight remains constant. The user must determine his own zero for each rifle and hood combination and maximum effective range for each ammunition type.



FRONT VIEW



REAR VIEW

10 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Tests of Modified Sights for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

REFERENCE: Memo for Rcd. dated 23 May 64, Subject FAL Silencers/
Sights, from C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

1. On 2 June 1964, Mr. Donald R. Dunn, TSD/EB and the undersigned went to Isolation to test a modified sight and a telescopic sight developed for the 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle in answer to reference a). The tests were performed with the assistance of Mr. James Earb and Mr. Glen Winstead, Isolation.

2. The first tests were conducted with a Williams Peep sight modified to fit an aluminum block which was mounted in place of the standard FAL rear sight. The Williams sight has a larger diameter peep than the FAL sight and has a wider range of elevation settings as well as more positive control over both elevation and windage. The main purpose of the test was to establish a point of reference on the aluminum block to match the graduations on the Williams sight and allow the sight to be set visually for the desired range once the weapon was zeroed.

3. Firing commenced from 100 yards at a silhouette target using the hood of a jeep as a rest. Both underloaded and full load rounds were used. Light rain which gradually increased in intensity during the day served to complicate the procedure. The test results at ranges from 25 yds. to 130 yds. using the Williams sight are summarized in Attachment I. Exceedingly erratic results were obtained throughout the tests and one attempt to duplicate the 100 yd. zero resulted in a different setting later in the day.

4. A 2X scope of Japanese manufacture equipped with aluminum mounting rings front and rear to fit the rear gas port and rear sight mount respectively then tested. The scope was attached to the rifle with difficulty and attempts to zero it were frustrated by the inability to determine where the rifle was shooting. The mounting moved while attempting to adjust the elevation knob and it was determined that the mount could not be attached firmly enough to insure in retaining a proper zero. The test with the scope was aborted.

Lash-1 File

SECRET

3. It is recommended that the scope and mount be discarded as unfeasible. The Williams sight is acceptable although the number of clicks per revolution of the knob should be reduced. Further testing of the underloaded ammunition should be conducted to determine the reasons for the erratic performance.

DANIEL J. HOGAN

cc: C/TSD
C/WH/SA/MCB/PM (Col Hicks)
Attachment: As Stated

DDP/TSD/EB/DJH/EC

C/TSD/SDB

SECRET

ATTACHMENT I

2 June 1964

Williams Peep Sight

At 25 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 60 clicks from bottom
Match ref. line to 4th line from top

At 50 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 80 clicks from bottom
Match ref. line to 5th line from top

At 75yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 80 to 110 clicks from bottom
Ammunition performance very erratic, wide variance on target

At 100 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 120 to 160 clicks
1st trial, 160 clicks, little variance
Match ref. line to 9th line from top
2nd trial 3 hrs. later, 120 clicks
Match ref. line to 7th line from top

At 150 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 230 clicks (1 trial)
Match ref. line to 12.5 line from top

Could not mount telescopic sight properly. Began process of shooting in scope, found it moved.

At 100 yds., full loads
Raise sight 4 clicks from bottom

At 150 yds., full loads
Raise sight 8 clicks from bottom.

1. Intermittant rain throughout tests.
2. Cases with reduced loads were noted to be blackened at neck after firing. Suspected to be low pressures not causing sufficient case expansion to obtain proper seal. This can contribute to erratic performance. Recommend gas port be turned to off position to prevent action from opening and allowing gas leak. Also investigate soft annealing case necks.

SECRET

Original in
Vital
Documents
file

T/N: Rolando CUBELA Secades

POSITION: Medical Doctor, Cmdte. Cuban Army
The Cardiovascular Department of Cmdte. Fajardo Hospital

LOCATION: Havana.

COMMO: S/W system, agent sending - #15136 carbon
agent receiving - #56638 pills

ACC Address: agent sending

Srta. Maria Dolores, GOMEZ
Apartado 12318, Madrid, Espana

Mr. Humphrey R. Boncavil
P.O. Box 892
General Post Office,
New York 1, New York
(this address is to be used only for rapid commo)

In Nov 1963 Paris Station agreed to following address with Subject: Parents-in-law of UNSNAFU/9 Paris, France. (When letter is received, UNSNAFU/9 will deliver letter to the Station via UNSNAFU/5)
20 Rue De La Glaciere, Paris 13

Agent signs letters "Ramon"

ACC. Addresses, agent receiving:

Ernestina ACOSTA Gonzalez (Ene" Subjects former secretary)
#526, Apartment 8
Esquina Calle 25 y H.
(top floor Apt, Tel: 303865)

Edf #526 Apto 8
Esquina Calle 25 y H.

(Emergency)
Virginia Secades (Subject's mother)
Calle 38 #122
Esquina Avenida Zoologico
Alturas de Vedado
Havana.

Letters to the ACOSTA address signed "Pepe" will contain S/W. Letters to the ACOSTA address signed "Luis" will be written on S/W carbon and indicate resupply of S/W material.

SECRET

NOTE: Subject can receive or send S/W messages out through the AMTRUNK/10 S/W system.

Emergency Commo: If contact cannot be made through above systems, Carlos TEPEDINO in N.Y.C. can probably arrange a means of contacting Subject.

C/O: Wainwright.

201-252234

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG: WILLIAMS/blc
UNIT: /IOS
EXT:
DATE: AUGUST 64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-252234

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

25 AUG 64 15 19z
SIG CEN

TO: PARIS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: DC/WH/SA 3 INFO: DDP, VR

TO PARI INFO: CITE DIR 44511

SENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMLASH UNSNAFU

REF: PARI 5922 (IN 57147)*

NO IDEN HQS TRACES CANTO.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SA/COMMENT: *Ref XX RYBAT.

AMLASH-1 file

201-252234

WH/SA/EOB W. Wainwright (by phone)
WH/SA/INT Kitchens
WE/3 Roger Pierre (by phone)

Thomas F. Thiele
for WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
C/WE

for Kitchens
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

201-252234

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 24-28

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

AMLASH-1

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Test of Open Sight Hood for 7.62mm Belgium (FAL) Rifle

REFERENCE: A) Memo for Rcd. dated 25 May 1964, Subject: FAL Silencers/Sights, from C/WH/SA/MOB/PM
B) Memo for Rcd. dated 10 June 1964, Subject: Tests of Modified Sights for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

1. On 15 and 16 June 1964, the undersigned and Mr. Bob Ricker, TSD/SDB went to Isolation to test an open sight hood for the 7.62mm Belgium (FAL) Rifle developed in answer to Ref. A. The Modified Williams peep sight developed previously in answer to Ref. A and reported on in Ref. B. proved unsatisfactory to the requester. The snap-on sight hood was then developed on a quick reaction basis to be simpler to install and easier to use than the Williams sight. In addition some improved underloaded 7.62mm NATO rounds having soft. annealed cases and cream of wheat filler were tested for performance. These were developed in hopes of correcting the erratic ammunition performance noted in Ref. B.

2. The open sight hood snaps over the existing rear sight of the FAL rifle, and in theory makes shooting in poor light or at night easier. It can be used with either standard factory loads or the underloaded ammunition in conjunction with the muzzle attachment silencer. The notch on the rear sight hood is "U" shaped and raised to compensate for the more curving trajectory of the low velocity ammunition. The hood is easily detached making the conventional peep sight available any time it is desired.

3. The attached data sheet summarizes the test results. It was found that some familiarization was necessary to get used to the open sight. Under ideal conditions the sight was as easy to use as the peep sight although it was more difficult to maintain uniform vertical grouping. The relationship between the eye and rear sight was found to be very critical. As the tests proceeded a change was noted in the point of impact vs. point of aim which was thought to be due to a change in sight picture on the part of the undersigned.

4. The improved ammunition was found to be quite consistant in performance. The use of cream of wheat filler to tamp the powder charge against the primer was an attempt to get more even ignition with correspondingly improved accuracy. The expended cartridge cases were checked periodically and no evidence was found of the soft annealed cases not expanding properly. During the tests the rifle and ammunition combination instilled a degree of confidence in the undersigned not present in the previous tests.

SECRET

[illegible]

5. Tests were conducted in the evening to determine the degree of usefulness of the sight in poor light. In this respect a 22 Caliber Hi-Standard pistol with folding shoulder stock and Bushnell 1.3X Phantom scope was tested in comparison. The scope was equipped with yellow filters to brighten the sight picture for low light level use. It was the opinion of both test personnel that the scope was superior to either the peep sight or open sight for as long as their was some illumination on the silhouette targets. Once the light failed the scope was completely useless although the undersigned could still discern targets with the naked eye out to 50 yds. All actual shooting was done with the open sight and some difficulty was experienced in hitting the targets at ranges of 100 yds. or more even at dusk. The closer targets could be easily hit up until it became too dark to see them at all. A large rain cloud moving from behind the firing position gradually obscured all available light. For the final shooting at 25 yds. occasional lightning flashes gave only a vague awareness of the target location. At no time during the night trials was there any muzzle flash visible from the under loaded ammunition and muzzle silencer combination. The gas port which was in the off position during the daylight trials was turned on at night but no flash was visible at the breech. A fine white cloud of cream of wheat powder was visible in front of the muzzle at almost full darkness but could not be seen more than 30 feet away.

6. Listener trials were conducted the following day to determine how far away an alert listener could discern the mechanical noise of the mechanism and that of the round being fired. Mr. Ricker walked away downwind at an angle of 90 degrees to the line of fire and stopped to listen every 25 paces. The undersigned fired single rounds, (hand actuating the mechanism) each time Mr. Ricker stopped. At 325 paces, or roughly 275 yds., Mr. Ricker reported he could still hear the mechanism being actuated, the round being fired, and the bullet striking a concrete pillar 200 yds. downrange. However, he stated that he might not have noticed the sound at that range had he not been listening for it specifically.

7. One of the major causes for concern at the start of the tests was that the cream of wheat filler might clog the silencer and render it ineffective. A total of 200 rounds were fired with the silencer in place and the noise level did seem to be higher at the finish of the second day. (Round numbers 180 to 200 were the ones expended during the previously mentioned listener trials). Inspection of the silencer at a later date revealed considerable cream of wheat residue in the screening. Sound level measurements made in the AMF sound lab showed that while the total noise level was no higher, the duration was relatively longer. This would make the silencer seem louder to near by observers but not increase the range at which it could be heard. However, from a standpoint of the ability for a listener to discriminate a silencer being fired from random noise, the longer duration gives him a better chance to recognize what he hears.

8. On 19 June 1964, the undersigned went to the warehouse at Franconia to try to fit the sight hood to other 7.65mm FAL rifles. It was suspected that the fit might be a problem when it would not fit over the rear sights of three FAL rifles at Isolation. Although it was later determined that the three rifles were of a different lot and may therefore have different tolerances on the rear sight casting, it was felt that further checking was necessary. Nine FAL rifles from the same lot as those obtained by WH/SA/MOB/PM were unpackaged and the sight hood tried on the rear sight. Of the nine, two were perfect fits and the other seven too thick for the hood to fit. This created a problem in that the sight hoods had to fit rifles which for operational reasons could not be measured before hand to determine the thickness of the rear sight blade. Providing adjustment in the slot of the sight hood would have complicated the fixture to the point where it could become operationally unsuitable. Therefore it was determined that the best solution was to provide several small files with the hoods. The peep sight on the rifles, a soft casting, was found to be quite easy to file. In most cases it would be necessary only to file several thousandths to obtain a proper fit. This procedure was explained to C/WH/SA/MOB/PM and he stated that it would be acceptable.

This
ck
yr
To

9. On 24 June 1964, three open sight hoods with accessories consisting of two files and a small screwdriver were turned over to C/WH/SA/MOB/PM. In addition, 400 rounds of improved underloaded ammunition with cream of wheat filler were provided as a replacement for the original 400 underloaded rounds.

[illegible]

10. On 29 June 1964, it was discovered that a scope was availabl for the 7.62mm Belgium (FAL) Rifle (Sniper Version) and in the Agency supply system. Steps are being taken to obtain a scope for evaluation. The results will be forwarded to C/WH/SA/MOB.

DANIEL J. HOGAN
TSD/EB

DDP/TSD/EB/DJH/EC

cc: C/TSD
C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

SECRET

STANDARD VELOCITY AMMUNITION, DAYLIGHT:

RANGE	RAMP SETTING	SIGHT TYPE	POINT OF IMPACT (RELATIVE TO POINT OF AIM)	EXTREME SPREAD	NO. OF ROUNDS
100 yds.	No. 2	Peep	On	6 1/4"	5
100 yds.	No. 2	Peep	On	5 [illegible]"	5
100 yds.	No. 2	Open Hood	24" high	4 [illegible]"	5
100 yds.	No. 3	Open Hood	26" high	4 [illegible]"	5

ERLOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN SIGHT HOOD, DAYLIGHT:

RANGE	RAMP SETTING	POINT OF IMPACT (RELATIVE TO POINT OF AIM)	EXTREME SPREAD	HORIZONTAL SPREAD	VERTICAL SPREAD	NO. OF ROUNDS
25 yds.	No. 2	3" high	1 3/4"	--	--	5
25 yds.	No. 6	3" low	2 3/4"	--	--	5
50 yds.	No. 6	On	5"	--	--	5
75 yds.	No. 6	4" left, 4" low	--	2"	7"	5
100 yds.	Full Elevation	6" left, 8" low	9"	--	--	10
100 yds.	Full Elevation	On (Diff. Shooter)	--	5"	13"	5
100 yds.	Full Elevation	8" left, 8" low	--	6"	8"	10
125 yds.	No 2	8" left, 18" low	--	8 1/2"	11	5
125 yds.	Full Elevation	On (Changed Sight Picture)	--	6"	10"	8 (2 missed target)
150 yds.	Full Elevation	On (Changed Sight Picture)	--	6"	18"	8 (2 missed target)
[illegible] yds.	Full Elevation	6" low (Changed Sight Picture)	--	8"	26"	10

UNDERLOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN SIGHT HOOD, DUSK:

RANGE	NO. OF ROUNDS	NO. OF HITS	HORIZONTAL SPREAD	VERTICAL SPREAD	REMARKS
200 yds.	10	6	15"	25"	Could see target more clearly through Peep sight but no rounds were fired.
[illegible] yds.	10	6	6"	6"	Could see target very clearly with 1.3X scope.

UNDERLOADED AMMUNITION, ALMOST FULL DARK, OPEN SIGHT HOOD:

RANGE	NO. OF ROUNDS	NO. OF HITS	HORIZONTAL SPREAD	VERTICAL SPREAD	REMARKS
75 yds.	10	9	9"	9"	Peep sight useless
25 yds.	10	10	14"	25"	Could see targets out to 200 yds. with filtered scope at start of firing, could not see at all w/scope at finish.

OVERLOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN SIGHT HOOD, FULL DARK:

RANGE	NO. OF ROUNDS	NO. OF HITS	REMARKS
25 yds.	10	5 (scattered)	Target in total darkness, rain cloud overhead, intermittant lightning flashes gave a vague awareness of target location.

LCP.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2/

PI ☒ COPY ☐ DIRECT

2 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	MOB	INT	5	SS	SB
2		IOS	6	PERS	AB
3			7	LOG	CA
4	(SOD)	RPT	8		

FROM MADRID

ACTION WH/SA 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT CI SI

INFO VR, FILE, ADP WEL-CA CI/OPS CI/IC4 FI

SECRET 281046Z

DIR CITE MADR 2662 (GROWERY ACTING)

TYPIC AMLASH

REF DIR 73234

28 DEC [illegible] IN 49756

AMLASH/1

X-Cantillo

1. RE PARA 2 REF, CIS CONTACT IS LU. MANUEL CANTILLO TOIRAC, NEW SECOND SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY MADRID, WHO REPORTEDLY CONNECTED CUBAN SECURITY.

2. FYI AT STATION DIRECTION QUJAW 1 DEVELOPING CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH CANTILLO.

SECRET

Suarez de la Osa, Mario Silvestre

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/MHAPRON/AMTRUNK/Operational
AMTRUNK Progress Report for Period 1-30 November 1964

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Action Required: FYI.

Key

1. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

A. Preparations were underway in early November to dispatch AMTRUNK-13 to Madrid in mid-November to cement the recruitment of AMTRUNK-19. These plans fell through when the Madrid Station notified Headquarters and WAVE that their workload would not allow sufficient case officer time to handle AMTRUNK-13 in Madrid at this time. WAVE agreed to postpone AMTRUNK-13's trip to Madrid several weeks until Madrid Station's workload abated somewhat.

B. The prospects of finalizing the recruitment of AMTRUNK-19 increased however with the receipt at WAVE of another open letter from AMTRUNK-19, this one mailed from Mexico City in mid-November. In AMTRUNK-19's first letter, mailed from Montreal in mid-October, he suggested using a friend in Mexico City as a cut-out to initiate a channel of communications between himself and AMTRUNK-13. In his second letter, AMTRUNK-19 stated that he had made the necessary arrangements with his friend in Mexico. Although WAVE, Headquarters and MEXI traces on AMTRUNK-19's friend, IDEN A, were fragmentary, Mexico Station stated that IDEN A was well-known to one of its PBRUMEN assets who vouched for IDEN A's loyalties. WAVE intends to send an innocuous letter to AMTRUNK-19 in AMTRUNK-13's handwriting to keep the channel with A-19 alive. AMTRUNK-19 appears eager to see AMTRUNK-13 again and has stated in both letters that he has considerable information to discuss in detail. It is well realized that this open letter channel is far from ideal but it is hoped that in early January 1965 AMTRUNK-13 can re-contact AMTRUNK-19 and provide him with a system of S/W.

Attachment: USC
IDEN Sheet

LASH-1 file

Distribution:
3 - Addressee,
w/att. USC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
10 Dec 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-19045

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-84/3-1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

as well as debrief him thoroughly and levy PI and MHAPRON requirements upon him.

C. In mid-November after the postponement of AMTRUNK-13's Madrid trip, preparations began to launch Operation AMTRUNK X in early December. This operation would attempt to re-organize the ratline to and from Havana and the AMTRUNK infil area for the future use of infiltrated MHAPRON recruiters and other agent assets as necessary. Secondary objectives are to bring into the infil area a cache of weapons and explosives for AMTRUNK-10/AMLASH-1 and to teach a system of S/W to one or more assets in the area. The team is to be composed of the same four individuals who participated in Operation AMTRUNK IX in October 1964: AMAGREE-1, Team Leader; AMAKA-1, Radio Operator; and AMTRUNK-16 and -20, Guides. It was decided to shelve the V-20 as the Intermediate Craft (IC) for this operation and substitute a 17' Johnson boat with twin 75 hp. outboard motors which could maneuver through shallower water and which could be more easily camouflaged. The basic reason for this decision was the fact that December through February are the low-water months in the AMTRUNK operational area. During this shallow water season, the heavier, wider V-20 can only be used in the deeper and more heavily-guarded infiltration canals.

D. Through the combined efforts of AMICE-14, the AMTRUNK P/A, and AMAGREE-1 and AMAKA-1, four radio operator candidates, to be trained for future use in PM operations, were recruited during the reporting period.

E. Recruiting for MHAPRON infiltration candidates continued during the reporting period. One prospective infiltree was recruited during the month of November and the case officer was active in assessing and debriefing two other candidates. It is hoped that by March 1965 one or more of these candidates will be trained and prepared for infiltration for clandestine MHAPRON recruiting. In large measure this will depend upon the success of Operation AMTRUNK X in re-organizing the ratline to and from Havana.

F. S/W Message No. 13 was sent to AMTRUNK-11 in response to his Message No. 15 in which he stated that both OWVL receivers were now in his possession. WAVE Message No. 13 to AMTRUNK-11 gave directions for the disposition of the OWVL receivers and the activation of OWVL contact with both AMTRUNK-11 and AMTRUNK-10.

2. INTELLIGENCE REPORTING

None

3. OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES

Salaries:	AMICE-14	$400.00
	AMAGREE-1	300.00
	AMAKA-1	250.00
	AMTRUNK-13	300.00
	AMTRUNK-16	225.00
	AMTRUNK-20	200.00
		$1,675.00
Mileage (AMICE-14 and AMAGREE-1):		$202.40
Household Expenses:		61.97
GRAND TOTAL		$1,939.37

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-19045

4. **PROJECTED PLANS**

Primary tasks to be accomplished are the mounting of Operation AMTRUNK X in early December, the dispatching of AMTRUNK-13 to Madrid to finalize the recruitment of AMTRUNK-19, and the staging of another contingent of MHAPRON recruiters for infiltration in March 1965.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
TO UFGA-19045

IDEN Sheet

IDEN A	—	Dr. Francisco BORGES M. Escobedo No. 692-16 Mexico 5, D. F.

SECRET

W

MESSAGE FORM 13

ORIG : W. WAINWRIGHT/dl
UNIT : WH/C/FI/TC
EXT : 6153
DATE : 24/MARCH/1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX 2
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET/RYBAT

DESENSITIZED

1	TC —	5	CA-PA
2		6	C
3	FI	7	2
4	AR-OS	8	X

24 MAR 65 [illegible] 1

TO : PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: OC/WHC 5 INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WE 3, C/CI

TO PRITY PARI INFO CITE DIR

DESENSITIZED RYBAT PBRUMEN UNSNAFU AMLASH AMWHIP

9550

REF: PARI 9995 (IN 29053)*

1. DO NOT BELIEVE UNSNAFU/9 FIRING IN ITSELF A HAZARD TO AMLASH/1. HOWEVER, DO FEEL IT NECESSARY ATTEMPT DETERMINE BACKGROUND TO UNSNAFU/19 STATEMENT THAT U/9 WAS "DIRTY KUBARK AGENT", I.E. WAS THIS JUST HEATED UNCOMPLIMENTARY EPITHET OR WAS IT BASED ON DSE KNOWLEDGE MADE AVAILABLE TO U/19. IN EITHER CASE, BELIEVE IT MERITS RELAY TO AMLASH/1. SUGGEST FOLLOWING: WHEN AMWHIP/1 ARRIVES PARI IN NEAR FUTURE, ASK HIM ATTEMPT WITH GREAT CAUTION DETERMINE IMPLICATIONS U/19 ABOVE ACCUSATION. THEN HAVE HIM CALL HIS JEWELER FRIEND IN HAVANA, JOSE IGLESIAS, OSTENSIBLY ON BUSINESS MATTER AS COVER, AND RELAY PERTINENT DETAILS OF U/9 INCIDENT AS ROUTINE FRIENDLY GOSSIP. AMWHIP/1 SHOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM INSURING THAT MUTUAL FRIEND IGLESIAS WILL RELAY THE NEWS POSTHASTE TO AMLASH/1. BELIEVE THIS SECURE ENOUGH AND EMINENTLY FASTER AND MORE CERTAIN THAN S/W LETTER.

2. IF AMWHIP/1 FEELS THIS METHOD UNSAFE AT THIS TIME for ANY REASON, ADVISE SOONEST. [illegible] WW

3. PLS KEEP HQS CURRENT ALL ASPECTS THIS MATTER.

END OF MESSAGE

CONT........

RELEASING OFFICER 24-20 COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET/RYBAT DESENSITIZED GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

S E C R E T/RYBAT

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO :

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 95584

*WH/C/Comment: UNSNAFU/19 fired in row with UNSNAFU/9. Requested guidance.

C/WH/C/FI

WE/5/C J. Wright (telecon)

WE/3 R. Pierce (telecon)

WH/C/CHIEF C. Anderson

THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T/RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

S E C R E T/RYBAT

ORIG : R. H. WEBSTER/dl
UNIT : DC/WH/C/FI
EXT : 6153
DATE : 25/JUNE/1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1 RE SP
2 CA-RR
3 FE 7 C
4 RR 8 D

26 Jun 65 13 09 z

SIG CEN

TO : ROME
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: DC/WH/C-5 INFO VR FILE ADDP C/WE 3 C/CI-C/FI 2

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 23142

DESENSITIZED
~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMLASH

REFS: A. DIR 22113
B. ROME 6642 (IN 98023)
C. ROME 6652 (IN 98586)

can't even brief Mr. Hanke properly on AMLASH-1 Doesn't know that much about him. [illegible]

1. BACKGROUND THIS CASE TOO EXTENSIVE TO RELAY. HOWEVER, PLAN HAVE JOSEPH LANGOSCH, WHO BEING ASSIGNED FRAN AS PBRUMEN ~~REGIONAL REP~~ CASE OFFICER S VISIT ROME TO BRIEF PRESLAND, PROBABLY IN AUGUST.

2. NO DEFINITE EVIDENCE AMLASH COMPLEX PART OF DOUBLED OP BUT CERTAINLY AN INSECURE ONE. REF A WAS DESIGNED TO PRESENT CURRENT HQS THOUGHTS AND INTENTIONS ON OPERATION.

3. INVOLVEMENT AMWHIP/2 RELATIVELY MARGINAL AS HE APPEARS BE [illegible] S ON FRINGES OF MAIN GROUP ~~AND NOT~~ THOUGH PROBABLY PRIVY TO PLANS. HOWEVER, UNLESS ROME HAS SPECIFIC OPS PLANS INVOLVING HIM WHICH MUST BE IMPLEMENTED NEAR FUTURE, SUGGEST CONTACT WITH HIM BE MINIMIZED UNTIL LANGOSCH CAN PROVIDE BACKGROUND.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/FI
WE/4 S. Munger (by phone)

Amlash-1

(5)

C. J. Ryan
THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

25-34

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T/RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

John T. Flynn
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

15 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMLASH-1 in Paris,
31 January to 3 February 1965

1. AMLASH-1 returned from Rome to Paris on 31 Jan 1965 and was met for a very brief meeting the same night by ONTRICH in order to arrange a meeting for the following day. The following subjects were discussed at the two meetings on 1 and 2 February 1965:

a. The primary reason for again meeting AMLASH-1 before his planned return to Cuba was to brief him on the security implications involved in the infiltration and possible capture of Modesto Orlando Orozco Basulto AKA Bebo Orozco, who infiltrated into Cuba on 21 Dec 1964. Orozco, according to his wife, went to Cuba to rescue Jose Vasquez Merey and three others who were hiding in the home of a woman named Gloria Cabrera, who lived at No. 72 27th Street, between N & O, Apartment 3, Vedado, Havana. Orozco's capture, if he has been captured, presents an indirect threat to the security of AMLASH-1 and a more direct threat to the security of AMTRUNK-10 since Orozco in Jan 1964 exfiltrated through the rat line established by AMICE-14 (Miguelito). Upon his return to Cuba, AMLASH-1 will check the above with AMTRUNK-10; and, if Orozco is under the control of the security service, will decide and communicate with Miami whether AMLASH-1 and AMTRUNK-10 believe it necessary to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-10. AMLASH-1 was briefed to send a letter to UNSNAFU-9 to indicate whether Orozco has been arrested or whether he is still in hiding. If the letter to UNSNAFU-9 mentions a good and pleasant return trip, this will mean that Orozco is not under the control of the security service. If the letter talks about a long, tiring trip, this will indicate that Orozco has been arrested. AMLASH-1 was also requested to send a report on the above and any complications which have developed or may develop from Orozco's infiltration.

b. AMLASH-1 suggested that his nom de guerre "Charles," which we have been using for the past three years, be changed to "Gerardo."

c. AMLASH-1 was given a resupply of S/W developer pills and carbon. He planned to take the S/W material back with him to Havana. AMLASH-1 again reviewed with UNSNAFU-9 and reminded UNSNAFU-9 to turn over to his Paris case officer all letters regardless of how received from AMLASH-1 to either UNSNAFU-9 or letters that may be addressed to his parents-in-law. ? AMLASH-1 also agreed to send S/W out in letters addressed to Juan Ventura (AMWHIP-1's business partner) in Geneva or Rome. AMWHIP-1 was briefed to inform Ventura that any letters he received from AMLASH-1 should be immediately air mailed to AMWHIP-1 in New York. Since AMLASH-1 will probably find it necessary some time not to sign the letters to Ventura in his true name, AMWHIP-1 was also briefed to inform Ventura to forward to New York any letter received from Cuba addressed to him and signed by a person unknown to him. S/W letters to AMLASH-1 should continue to be addressed to Ernestina Acosta, Edf. No. 526, Apt. 8, Esquina Calles 25 y H. In an emergency a letter can also be sent to AMLASH-1's mother.

d. AMLASH-1 was again debriefed on the cache that had been put down for him in Matanzas. He repeated what he had previously reported and attempted to answer most of the questions in the WAVE cable. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters, info WAVE, on 2 Feb. AMLASH-1 was requested to send a message either through his channel or through AMTRUNK-10's S/W channel reporting how much of the radio equipment and other material had been recovered from the cache.

e. AMLASH-1 was asked if he knew of any individual in Cuba whom he could recruit and who could be inserted into the Cuban Intelligence Service with the idea of attempting to get the DGI to assign this man to Caracas, Venezuela. AMLASH-1 could think of only one possibility, an individual known as Gustavo Gonzalez. AMLASH-1 has full confidence in Gustavo and Gustavo has previously been approached on several occasions by Pinero to work for him. Upon his return to Cuba AMLASH-1 will check to find out if Gustavo can still get himself recruited by Pinero and then be sent on a mission abroad, hopefully to Caracas. (AMWHIP-1, who also knows Gustavo, will provide the background information upon his return to New York.)

f. AMLASH-1 reported on the upcoming FEU elections on 10 February 1965. AMLASH-1 stated that Crombet, the president of the Communist Youth, will become the new president and that his man, Lazaro Mora, would be one of the vice-presidents. (A cable on this subject was sent to Headquarters from Paris.)

g. AMLASH-1 was requested to check with Fizzolo regarding the precautions being taken to prevent sabotage of the locomotives being shipped from France to Cuba; specifically, how carefully do they check the placement of the seals, are they special seals or regular load seals, are there going to be any additional checks once the locomotives reach Cuba, will they drain the oil and lubricants from the factory to the port, and do they run the locomotives under their own power or are they towed. AMLASH-1 agreed to attempt to develop answers to the above requirements and pass the information to his contact in the Paris Station. AMLASH-1 also agreed to attempt to find out and pass to the Paris Station through UNSNAFU-9 the names of the Cuban techs training at La Rochelle.

h. In a general discussion regarding the persons with whom AMLASH-1 had been in contact either personally or through letters, AMLASH-1 mentioned Alfredo Portela. AMLASH-1 stated he had received a letter from Portela and had in turn written to Portela. He considers Portela a friend which was the only reason for writing to him.

i. AMLASH-1 was debriefed on Cuban Intelligence Service personnel. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters.

j. A cable was sent from Paris to Headquarters suggesting WAVE send a S/W letter to AMTRUNK-10 stating: "Este tranquilo. Carlos regresa pronto."

k. AMLASH-1 was asked for information on the following persons:

(1) Samuel Gonzalez Rodriguez-Planes. AMLASH-1 reports he is a member of the Ameijeiras group and is a good and brave man.

(2) Antonio Lusson y Batlle, Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Occidental Army. AMLASH-1 reports Lusson is an independent and rare type individual who keeps to himself and doesn't involve himself in political matters. AMLASH-1 has heard nothing bad about Lusson.

(3) Cmdte. Raul Diaz Arguelles, Chief of Artillery of the Occidental Army.

(4) Elpidio Baez Bigo. According to AMLASH-1, Baez is a trusted Fidelman.

(5) Luis Manuel Cantillo Toirac. Assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and one of the security people. He was formerly assigned to Brazil, is young and has for several years been with Pinero and the Cuban IS.

(6) Enrique Oltuski Osacki. Oltuski is a close friend of Faustino Perez and his stock with the regime rises or falls as does that of Faustino.

(7) Sergio Tolon. Code clerk in the Embassy in Paris. Tolon is staying in Paris at the request of Ambassador Carrillo.

l. Gastro enteritis, water pollution and unsanitary conditions. AMLASH-1 states there are no real problems, although the scarcity and lack of a balanced diet do cause some problems. The purification of water has been a problem which probably has been the cause of some of the sickness in the country.

m. AMLASH-1 did not believe that Aragones had invited him to fly back to Havana with him in order to get him back because of any serious security matter. AMLASH-1 did state that Aragones was concerned that AMLASH-1 may not return to Cuba. Since Aragones cleared AMLASH-1 for his trip abroad, he is in a way responsible that AMLASH-1 does not defect and returns to Cuba. AMLASH-1 feels Aragones does not want any problems with Fidel in case AMLASH-1 decides to stay out.

n. AMLASH-1 was unable to provide any information on the political developments in Cuba in mid-November and December since he had been out of the country since early November. AMLASH-1 was asked to check on the problems between the opposing factions in the Cuban leadership and explained the issues, the background and personalities involved.

o. Soviet advice or influence in political and economic matters creates resentment among the middle and higher level Cuban officials. Basically, the Soviets are not respected.

p. Rank of Cuban officials under Fidel in terms of their influence in making national policy. Raul is still the heir apparent to Fidel. Next to Raul is Che Guevara. After that, no other official, according to AMLASH-1, has any great influence in the making of Cuban national policy. President Dorticos' relationship with Fidel is good since he is a hard and serious worker, has good administrative ability and is able to work within the general outline laid down by Fidel. Raul Castro has some political influence and control in Oriente where he has placed his men in positions of influence, but only Fidel personally has any political influence in the rest of Cuba. Even within the military Fidel selects and appoints high army officers. Che Guevara is still strong in the economic field and has not suffered a decline in his influence and authority because of his earlier policy of industrialization. Guevara restricts himself to the economic field and plays a very small role in the political field. He is serious and very hard worker, one of the few, according to AMLASH-1, who has worked seven days a week without leave since the revolution. Emilio Aragones holds an important position as the organizational secretary of the PURS. He is the official who was always at the office of the National Directorate of the Party and has contact with all the officials in the regime. He plays an important coordinating role. Faure Chomon has been accused of organizing former 13th of March Revolutionary Directorate people, but, according to AMLASH-1, this probably based on the fact that Chomon always gives jobs in the ministry he heads to DR people. Because of this Chomon today controls to a large degree the Ministry of Transportation. Of all the ministries, the DR's stronghold is in the Ministry of Transportation. Other DR people who continue to hold important positions in the regime are Alberto Mora, Ambassador Carrillo and Jose Naranjo.

q. AMLASH-1 and AMWHIP-1 were unable to develop any specifics, but from their conversations with Ambassador Carrillo got the impression that Carrillo would prefer and welcome a transfer from the Embassy in Paris to the Embassy in Madrid.

r. According to Emilio Aragones, Anibal Escalante is being considered for a job outside Cuba. The job will probably be in the commercial/economic field, but a decision had not been made as of November 1964 as to location.

SECRET

s. AMLASH-1 again reported that he feels Orlando Blanco, Consul of the Cuban Embassy in Bern, is approachable since he is unhappy with the Cuban regime. AMLASH-1 also feels that Enrique Rodriguez Loeches, Cuban Ambassador in Rabat, is approachable if approached and developed by the right person. Marina Garcia Gonzalez, assigned to the commercial section of the Cuban Embassy in Rabat, AMLASH-1 feels is also approachable and feels money can be used as an inducement. Ambassador Carrillo, AMLASH-1 feels, if the proper person developed him, could probably be compromised with Fidel. He is a character and could easily be entangled according to AMLASH-1 in a compromising situation. Ambassador Carrillo is a close friend of Lucy Echevarria.

2. AMLASH-1 was also asked information on a long list of other requirements on Cuba. On many he was unable to provide information and cables were sent to Headquarters on the requirements on which he did provide information.

Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/AMWORLD

cc: WH/SA/EOB
WH/SA/MOB

File:
AMLASH-1 201
Internal Op

SECRET

C[illegible]TIAL

10 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

16

1. On 29 April 1963 Dorothe Matlack, Domestic Exploitation Section, ACSI, telephoned to the effect that a banker named Clemard Joseph Charles had left Haiti six days earlier and had just arrived in New York. A friend of Charles, named Joseph Dryer, 109 Lakewood Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida, had written to General Delmar, former CO Antilles Command, recommending Charles as a man of great interest to the US government in view of the events in Haiti. Charles was described as President of the Banc Commerciale, Port au Prince, Haiti, who is in President Duvalier's favor. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that she had alerted Col. Sam Kail in Miami to contact Dryer in order to obtain more background information and an assessment on Charles.

2. On 1 May 63 Mrs. Matlack advised that Charles was staying at the Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, and that he had telephoned her since her name had been supplied to him by Dryer. Charles considered her to be his point of contact in Washington. According to Mrs. Matlack, Charles had appointments to see Vice President Johnson, Senator Keating, and Congressman Rogers (Florida). However, Charles was willing to talk to representatives of Mrs. Matlack's office. Mrs. Matlack stated that the Haitian Desk man in ACSI was ready to go to New York to talk to Charles and invited CIA to accompany him. Charles speaks very little English and a fluency in French was therefore required for the interview. Mrs. Matlack stated that she might be able to obtain a French linguist from First Army, Governor's Island, but he would not be an intelligence officer. It was decided that James Balog, New York Office, who has a knowledge of the French language would accompany the ACSI representative under Army cover. It was also arranged that Balog would meet the ACSI representative (Captain Rogers) at the Park Sheraton Hotel where Charles was staying.

3. On 2 May 63 Mrs. Matlack reported that Col. Kail had interviewed Mr. Dryer in West Palm Beach. Dryer had appointed Charles as Director of his bank in Haiti. Charles, according to Dryer, formerly had no political ambitions but in view of the current political situation in Haiti, Charles now thinks that he may some day be president. Dryer described Charles as well-connected, politically and financially, on both sides of the fence in Haiti. He is also a good friend of President Duvalier. Dryer had given Charles letters of introduction to Senator Keating and to other officials in Washington. Charles wanted to see President Kennedy and indeed had gone to the White House to arrange for an appointment. He was well received by the President's appointment secretary and invited to dinner that evening with the appointment

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

secretary. Through a misunderstanding, however, Charles did not attend the dinner but went to New York instead.

4. Charles is travelling, according to Dryer, with a Texas geologist named de Mohrenschildt. de Mohrenschildt is associated with Charles in a business venture in Haiti and is trying to arrange a meeting for Charles with Vice President Johnson.

5. On 3 May 63 Jim Balog telephoned to advise that he had had a five-hour session the previous day with Charles and that he had obtained both personality data and views by Charles on what the United States should do in the current Haitian situation. Balog advised that he was transmitting the information to Washington. Upon arrival, copies of the teletypes were transmitted to ACSI (Mrs. Matlack), WH Division, and the Latin America Branch.

6. On 6 May 63 Mayo Stuntz, Support Branch, advised that WH Division wished to speak to Charles and Balog was asked to arrange an appointment. Mrs. Matlack telephoned at approximately 1715 to advise that she had just received a telephone call from Mrs. de Mohrenschildt asking assistance in obtaining hotel reservations in Washington. Upon being told that we had no special means of obtaining reservations, Mrs. Matlack stated that she would check with the State Department Protocol Office to determine which hotels would admit negro guests. Mrs. Matlack finally made reservations at the Alban Towers. A check with Jim Balog revealed that he had arranged for Charles to meet the WH representative in the lobby of the Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 12:00 noon on 7 May. Attempts to reach Mrs. Matlack that afternoon were unsuccessful. At 0830, 7 May, a call was made to Mrs. Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in Washington on that day and that arrangements had been made for a meeting with an Agency representative for 12:00 noon. Mrs. Matlack retorted that both Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and Charles had called her that previous evening to confirm a 12:00 luncheon appointment with her. Mrs. Matlack was concerned that CIA and Army should not be working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from ACSI to meet Charles at lunch and felt that it would not be politic for her to withdraw from her appointment since Army considered her the point of contact with Charles. Mayo Stuntz informed WH Division of the conflict and passed on the suggestion that the WH Division representative might meet Charles and Mrs. Matlack at noon and that Mrs. Matlack offered to withdraw shortly thereafter. The WH representative declined the offer and requested that a meeting later in the afternoon be arranged. Mrs. Matlack believed that due to conflicting instructions, she had been placed in the middle in the situation from which she could not graciously withdraw and requested that someone accompany her.

C.........AL

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

7. I met Mrs. Matlack in the lobby of the Hotel Willard shortly before noon, and a few minutes later, Mr. Charles arrived, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt. We lunched in the restaurant in the hotel. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he had been born in Batum, Russia, but during the Bolshevik Revolution had been taken to Poland as a small child. He had spent approximately 20 years in Poland prior to World War II and had served in the Polish Army. He also mentioned that he had been a member of an ICA Team to Yugoslavia in 1957 and while in Belgrade had met Gomulka who was visiting Belgrade at the time. He had spoken to Gomulka and was invited to visit Poland, which invitation he had accepted. His home is in Dallas, Texas. He has a PhD. in geology and has had some teaching experience. Mrs. de Mohrenschildt was born in Peking, China. Her father was Russian and her mother French, and she is now or has been a fashion designer. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he has known Charles for sometime and that he is a partner with him in a sisal business in Haiti.

8. Both Charles and de Mohrenschildt were anxious to arrange meetings with government officials in Washington. I mentioned to Charles that a meeting had been arranged for him at 2:15 and that a Mr. Green would meet him in the lobby. At 1410 Mrs. Matlack, Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and I departed and Charles remained in the lobby waiting for contact.

9. In the course of the luncheon conversation, Charles had mentioned to Mrs. Matlack that he desired to see a Mr. Wise, AID, to discuss US aid to Haiti. Later that afternoon Mrs. Matlack called to state that she had called the State Department to pass along Charles' request. Mr. Zagorski (State) had called her back to pass on the Haitian Desk man's extreme displeasure that anyone in the United States Government should be in official contact with Charles. The desk man considered Charles to be close to the Duvalier Government, to have been involved in several shady financial dealings, and in general, to be an undesirable character. Mrs. Matlack asked whether the Agency had any interest in Charles which would dictate further contact with Charles.

10. Maye Sturts checked with WH Division and determined that as a result of the meeting with Charles, the DD/P Haitian Desk had no further plans to contact him. I told Mrs. Matlack that our interest seemed to have been satisfied and that I believed we should disengage ourselves as gracefully as possible.

11. Wayne Nelson, DD/P Coordinator, called on 7 May to inquire concerning our involvement in the Charles case. He stated that ACSI had called him earlier that day to assure him that ACSI had no direct interest in Charles and that it was acting as an intermediary at the request of General Delmar who had passed the lead to General Fitch. ACSI was concerned that due to the mix up in appointments to see Charles, charges might later be made that ACSI had interferred or had obstructed CIA contact with Charles. I explained to Nelson what had happened and he later called back to state that ACSI was completely satisfied in the way the matter had been handled.

12. On 8 May Mrs. Matlack telephoned to advise that the Operational Branch of ACSI was discussing the Charles case with DD/P to determine future course of action. She was still somewhat concerned over her own position in the case since Charles considered her to be the focal point in Washington. I reiterated to her that the matter was one for either the State Department or the operational elements to handle and that we preferred to disengage ourselves. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that a dispatch had been received to the effect that a cousin of Charles was prominiently mentioned as a successor to Duvalier should the latter be overthrown. She was of the opinion that the US government should continue to "play ball" with Charles as a future asset in Haitian affairs.

A. F. CZAJKOWSKI

Distribution:
Orig - C/Chief
1 - New York Office
✓1 - Support (Stunts)
1 - LA Branch
1 - Index (Control)
1 - Dep/Coll chrono

AFCzajkowski:acr

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22-1

X

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

ACTION NO. 078

S E C R E T 301720Z MAR 71 CITE MADRID 13428

MADR

DIRE~~COS~~ CTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

30 Mar 71 IN 299724

TYPIC QUANTUM

1. QUANTUM-57 PROVIDED STATION WITH NOTE DATED 6 OCTOBER 70 FROM LAZARO G U T I E R R E Z MENOYO, IN CUBAN PRISON, TO ADDRESSEE WHOSE IDENTITY Q-57 CHOSE NOT REVEAL. WRITER'S FATHER, DR. ZABALETA G U T I E R R E Z, WHO STILL CUBA, ARRANGED FOR NOTE TO BE SMUGGLED OUT CUBA. MAIN PURPOSE OF NOTE WAS TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH REGULAR COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL BETWEEN WRITER, VIA ADDRESSEE AND HIS FATHER, AND PEDRO M. DIAZ, 1251 NORTHWEST 30 STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA.

201-269349

no 201

2. ON BASIS ABOVE, GUTIERREZ APPEARS TO BE ELOY G U T I E R R E Z MENOYO (201-269349) ON WHOM FILE NO LONGER HELD AT STATION. PLEASE ADVISE IF ASSUMPTION CORRECT, INCLUDING TRACES ON DIAZ.

3. DILE 201-269349. GP-1

S E C R E T

WU

FI

CS COPY

SECRET

30 Mar 71

201-269349

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 2-1   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ________

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, C/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION NO. 951

SECRET 051617Z APR 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 10963
WMIM

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

5 Apr IN 304300

TYPIC QUANTUM

REF MADRID 13428 (IN 299724)

1. BELIEVE STATION ASSUMPTION CITED PARA 2 REF CORRECT.

2. AMOTS UNABLE IDENTIFY PEDRO M. DIAZ. STATION FILES CONTAIN CARD REFERENCE TO ONE PEDRO MANUEL DIAZ, CUBAN CITIZEN RESIDING 124 SW 18TH COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA, WHO WAS MEMBER OF ISLE OF PINES ASSOCIATION IN EXILE. DOI: JAN 63). THIS MAY BE DIAZ OF REF IN VIEW OF FACT THAT ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO AT ISLE OF PINES PRISON.

3. FILE 201-269349. GP-1

SECRET

AN	RTZ
~~AB~~	
IN	
PS	
BX	
DES	NPD
FI	

CS COPY
SECRET

5 APR 71
201-269349

SECRET

For Subject's (201-269349) role in coordinated U. S. Army clandestine operation F/PC/15-63, please see 201-269895.

F: 201- 269349

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1971

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: NOEL SALAS SANTOS

FBI FILE NO: 105-7548 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 6 MAY 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEWARK)

DATE: 26 FEBRUARY 1971
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTONIO MATEU RODRIGUEZ
FBI FILE NO: 105-19301 (MIAMI)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M COB ?

019-005-046
323 -2071470
15 JUL 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
NOTED IN REPORT ON STATUS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

R 7008191478

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION .LASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER #

APR 5 3 34 PM '71

ACTION COPY

~~SEC 8~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ALBRIGHT

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, C/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION NO. 751

S E C R E T 051617Z APR 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 10963

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC QUANTUM

5 APR IN 304300

C

REF MADRID 13428 (IN 299724)

1. BELIEVE STATION ASSUMPTION CITED PARA 2 REF CORRECT.

2. AMOTS UNABLE IDENTIFY PEDRO M. DIAZ. STATION FILES CONTAIN CARD REFERENCE TO ONE PEDRO MANUEL DIAZ, CUBAN CITIZEN RESIDING 124 SW 18TH COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA, WHO WAS MEMBER OF ISLE OF PINES ASSOCIATION IN EXILE. DOI: JAN 63). THIS MAY BE DIAZ OF REF IN VIEW OF FACT THAT ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO AT ISLE OF PINES PRISON.

3. FILE 201-269349. GP-1

SECRET

Parole Total Card

DoD Rpt No - 5720-0009 71, 5 Feb 71

reportedly suffering from many years of malnutrition & in ill health.

G.M.E. & other "ex militia" were apparently ~~[illegible]~~ moved during end Dec 70 to El Comercial Prison (allegedly maximum security prison in the [illegible]) from Guanajay Prison in Havana province

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22-1

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

1	5 ops	5	
2		6	
3	~~[illegible]~~ R	7	
4		8	

allright

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER

MAR 31 12 15 AM '71

ACTION COPY

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

ACTION NO. 078

S E C R E T 301729Z MAR 71 CITE MADRID 13428

DIRE~~COT~~CTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

30 Mar 71 IN 289724

TYPIC QUANTUM

1. QUANTUM-57 PROVIDED STATION WITH NOTE DATED 6 OCTOBER 70 FROM LAZARO GUTIERREZ MENOYO, IN CUBAN PRISON, TO ADDRESSEE WHOSE IDENTITY Q-57 CHOSE NOT REVEAL. WRITER'S FATHER, DR. ZABALETA GUTIERREZ, WHO STILL CUBA, ARRANGED FOR NOTE TO BE SMUGGLED OUT CUBA. MAIN PURPOSE OF NOTE WAS TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH REGULAR COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL BETWEEN WRITER, VIA ADDRESSEE AND HIS FATHER, AND PEDRO M. DIAZ, 1251 NORTHWEST 30 STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA.

2. ON BASIS ABOVE, GUTIERREZ APPEARS TO BE ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO (201-269349) ON WHOM FILE NO LONGER HELD AT STATION. PLEASE ADVISE IF ASSUMPTION CORRECT, INCLUDING TRACES ON DIAZ.

3. FILE 201-269349. GP-1

Requested CI traces 1 April 71.

S E C R E T

ACTION

SECRET

SECRET

FP

ALBRIGHT KEN
WH/C/OP
EXT. 7144

GB-547
3D38
TUBE DU3

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE
2 April 71

RID CONTROL NO.
00016 APR 571

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	3 April 1971	bp
REQUESTER			5 June 71	lk
RID/FILES	DT-	GC52		
REQUESTER				
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-	GA50		
RID/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003		

APR 2 01 AM '71

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS AND NOTES

Enter no. of references ordered ____

Cable request for traces.

Cubans only listed

c-2000 VDS

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME
✓ DIAZ,

GIVEN NAMES
Pedro M.

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*
One Lazaro Gutierrez Menoyo, in prison in Cuba, is attempting to establish regular letter commo channel to DIAZ.

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M	?	Cuba (?)	Cuba	1251 NW 30 Street, Miami, Fla

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ ~~CARD~~ REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS
[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS:

a. Review index card reproductions.

b. Draw green diagonal line across items you do not want.

c. Forward to RID/Files.

After receipt of documents, edit the card reproductions (See CSI 70-19):

a. To destroy cards: Mark green D and cite reason on card reproduction
b. To make corrections/additions: Enter appropriate changes to card reproductions in green.
c. Forward to RID/AN.

201 CONSOLIDATION: SEE CSI 70-20

1. If subject has a 201 file, return only this form to RID/AN with reproductions of index cards marked in green to reflect the consolidation action taken.

2. When subject has no 201 file, but meets a requirement for opening a 201 file, return this form to RID/201 with a. and b. below:

   a. Completed Form 831

   b. All pertinent documents, extracts, and properly edited index card reproductions for consolidation of the new 201 file by RID/201.

NOTE 1. Predecessor records that meet indexing criteria are carded in the CS Main Index. If a further search of COI, SSU, OSS, or CIG records is desired contact RID/ARD.

NOTE 2: Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) is available in BR/CRS.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

FORM

DIAZ, PEDRO /SGT./

019-007-001
HKSA-00050
04 JUN 56
SER 7
P1

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC POLICE AGENT
MBR OF THE NATL POLICE AND OF THE SERVICI
OF INTELEGENCIA REGIMENTAL /SIR/ WHO HAD
KNOWLEDGE OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN ORIENTE
PROV. [illegible]

DIAZ, PEDRO

019-300-003
DBA -96854
27 JAN 65
FP1
P4

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
IDENTIFIED IN A TEXT PREPARED BY SOC.
AS A MERCENARY AT THE PUNTA PRESIDENTE
BASE IN D. R. FOR SFNE.

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB 02 JUN 42
CUBA, MATANZAS PROV
CIT ?
OCC FISHERMAN
Δ USA, FLA, MIAMI
REF ISRM-13149, 27 SEP 63
AKA OF VERGARA DIAZ, HUMBERTO
SEP 63

201-735925.

#751

CS COPY ATTACHED
PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY

[illegible]-4-173-818
[illegible]-2004

DIAZ, PEDRO

THE
CARD
[illegible]ED IN

If this card is of value
Please complete

[illegible] of birth
Place of birth
Citizenship
Pers. info

127941

DIAZ, PEDRO
SEX ? DOB ?
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
OF INTEREST TO SUBJECT OF 201-816434

201-815935
DBC -55476
23 JUN 69
P4

Yes

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

6907101034

~~DIAZ, PEDRO~~
~~SEX M DOB ?~~
~~CIT CUBA~~
~~OCC ?~~
~~AT MOSCOW STATE U~~
~~< USSR STUDYING IN USSR DURING 68-69 SCHOOL YR~~

~~200-006-226/03~~
~~EX -03327~~
~~05 DEC 68~~

~~DIAZ, PEDRO~~
~~SEX M DOB ?~~
~~CIT CUBA~~
~~OCC ?~~
~~Δ CUBA, HABANA PROVINCE, SAN JOSE DE LAS LAJAS~~
~~SUBJ DESCRIBED AS NEO-COMMUNIST.~~

~~019-004-134~~
~~UFGA-04561~~
~~27 JUN 62~~
~~•201-314230~~
~~P2~~

~~DIAZ, PEDRO /DP./~~
~~SEX M DOB ?~~
~~CIT CUBA~~
~~OCC GOVT OFFICIAL~~
~~DIV CHIEF OF THE MIN OF STATE DIV DE CONVENIOS, TRATADOS, CONVENCIONES Y REUNIONES'. SUBJ'S NAME APPEARS IN MEMO 85, DATED 02 OCT 56.~~

~~019-002-004~~
~~HKHA-03063~~
~~18 OCT 56~~
~~SER 174~~

24

127964
CORR CARD

6501252586

SECRET

14-00000

DIAZ, Pedro Manuel
[illegible]

75-[illegible]
(HVC-613)

DIAZ, PEDRO MANUEL

75-6-4-522Y
HVC-1579
ENCL. 1
PG. 25

DIAZ, Pedro Manuel

[illegible]

75-4-134-17
HVC 937

DIAZ, PEDRO MELITON
DOB ?

201-251144

CIT ?

@ OF DIAZ-LANDA, PEDRO MELITON, BORN 10 MAR 24
MATANZAS, CUBA. CIT CUBA
Δ EL SALVADOR
FORMER MEMBER OF BRAC
RECEIVED POLITICAL ASYLUM TO EL SALVADOR MAY 59

127989

DIAZ, Pedro Martinez

4-4-5-491
(TABA-1611)

Martinez Diaz, Pedro

DIAZ, Pedro Maximo

[illegible]

DIAZ, Pedro Manuel

75-4-11-2
(TYCA-[illegible]
[illegible] 2
(P. 194

DIAZ, PEDRO MANUEL

75-6-4-572
HVCA-1983
ATTACH.
PG. 476

127983

DIAZ, Pedro

201-53613
(TAB-A-1685)
~~(TS# 92809)~~
(Page 3)

THIS CARD FILED

127949

SECRE

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER AND EMPLOYEE OF THE ROADS AND PUBLIC WORKS DEPT. OF VICTORIA DE LAS TUNAS, CUBA.

019-004-109
HKS -01067
20 MAY 57
SER 57
P4

01252585

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
BUSINESSMAN. SPANIARD ACTIVE IN PROMOTING PEACE CONF. IN URUGUAY AUG 52.

200-004-278
TUM -01383
00 000 52
SER. 490

CORR. CARD
DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC POLICE AGENT
PLAIN CLOTHES NATL POLICE SGT ALLEGEDLY IN CHARGE OF THE DETAIL INVESTIGATIN ANTI BATISTA ACIVITIES. CHIEF OF BRAZ IN SANTIAGO
NOD.

019-002-000
HKSA-00016
21 NOV 55
SER 14

DIAZ PEDRO 201-161423*

BORN 07-06-04 CUBA GUANTANAMO

RES. CUBA OCCUPATION

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX

127937

[illegible], PEDRO

SEX M DOB C 05

019 004-134
UFGA-06655 E01
15 NOV 62
P2

CIT CUBA
OCC PUBLIC WORKS EMPLOYEE
Δ CUBA, MATANZAS, COLISEO, URRITIA SECTION.
SUBJ IDENTIFIED AS COMMUNIST IN COLISEO, DOI APR 52.

1279

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

015-004-304
HCS -20189
00 JAN 53
CHILE
SER. 871

CIT ?
OCC ?
COMMIE EMPLOYED BY CHILEAN STATE RR.

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

073-124-003
HUVW-00253 E02
00 JUL 53
SER. 22

CIT ?
OCC ?
IN URUGUAY. PRES. OF ATENSO IN MONTEVIDEO.

DIAZ, Pedro

IN 21177
Guat 646

Guat - 30 Mar 50

If this card is of value
Please Complete

Date of birth
Place of birth
Citizenship
Pres. info

127940

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

050-006-008
PRA-01641
30 DEC 52
SER. 1006

CORR. CARD

DIAZ, Pedro (Dr.)

73-6-2 [illegible]
([illegible]
TDP-[illegible]
(p. 2)

[illegible] card is of value
[illegible] complete.

[illegible] of birth
Place of birth
[illegible]
[illegible]

DIAZ, PEDRO

56-4-133
HZP-02140
4 JUN 57

ALIAS OF DE BELLO PEDRESCHI,
CARLOS GUILLERMO

CARD [illegible]
FILED [illegible]

If this card is of value
Please complete:

Date of birth:
Place of birth:
Citizenship:
Pert. info:

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB C 07

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-500
UFG -00889
11 APR 62
P3

MEMBER DEFENSE COMMITTEE LOCATED AT CORNER OF PRIMERA AVENIDA AND CALLE 29, VERADERO, MATANZAS PROVINCE, CUBA

127944

0142915

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

104-006-004
TABW-01697
00 NOV 50
SER. 202

CIT ?
OCC ?

COMMIE PARTY MEMBERS REFERENCES TO THE
FOLLOWING: PEDRO ORTEGA DIAZ /1947/,
PEDRO J. DIAZ /1950/, PEDRO P. DIAZ /1949/,
PEDRO OLIVER DIAZ /1950/.

CORR. CARD

127943

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

015-004-004
TCS -01307
00 000 51
CHILE
SER. 642

CIT ?
OCC ?

COMMIE PARTY ORGANIZER.

CORR. CARD

DIAZ, Pedro

[illegible]

aka Pico DIAZ xref

If this card is of value
please complete

2

127951

DIAZ, Pedro

37-6-4-28
EET 28
(Encl 17
(Page

If this card is of value
please complete

Date of birth
Place of birth
Citizenship
Pert. info.

2

THIS
CARD
FILED IN
[illegible]

127948

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 18 JANUARY 1971

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ENRIQUE MUNEZ ALVAREZ

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN JUAN)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 152 ROUTING AND OR INITIALS

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO

BY: AT: Z

X REF TO CS FILE NO

DISSEM BY 4 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI,

ACTION NO. 192

S E C R E T 191325Z DEC 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 9322 19 DEC IN-22991

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

1. AMPALM-4 INFORMED STATION ON 11 DECEMBER THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY CARLOS (SARAGAT), WHO IMPORTANT ALPHA 66 SUB-CHIEF, WHO LEARNED OF IT FROM ANDRES (NAZARIO) SARGENT, LEADER OF ALPHA 66 THAT ALPHA 66 HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED A LETTER FROM ELOY (GUTIERREZ) MENOYO WRITTEN FROM A CUBAN JAIL. SARAGAT TOLD AMPALM-4 THAT HE WANTED HIM TO LOOK AT THE LETTER AND ADVISE SARAGAT ON POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. (APPARENTLY NAZARIO HAD ASKED SARAGAT FOR ADVISE.) AMPALM-4 EXPECTED TO SEE THE LETTER DURING WEEKEND 12-14 DECEMBER. HOWEVER, SARAGAT INFORMED AMPALM-4 THAT HE COULD NOT SHOW HIM THE LETTER AS ALPHA 66 HAD DECIDED TO LIMIT ITS READERSHIP.

201-355380

201-269349

2. ACCORDING TO SARAGAT, THE LETTER APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY GUTIERREZ, ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY MORE THAN ONE PERSON PARTICIPATED IN THE EDITING. GUTIERREZ PRESENTED THREE POINTS FOR ALPHA 66'S

19-300-3

SECRET

file: 201-269349

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO

X-REF TO CS FILE NO

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

DEC 23 10 29 AM '70
FORWARDED
RIDIAN

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 9820 SECRET

CONSIDERATION REGARDING POSSIBLE EVENTS IN CUBA. GUTIERREZ CONTINUED WITH OTHER POINTS CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER EXILE GROUPS IN THESE EVENTS. GUTIERREZ REQUESTED A RESPONSE TO HIS PLANS.

3. AMPALM-4 NOT ABLE LEARN MORE THAN INFORMATION PRESENTED PARAS 1 AND 2, ALTHOUGH HE STILL TRYING.

4. FILE: 19-300-3 AND 201-273453. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

201-269349

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
CONNECTED WITH THE 2ND FRONT ESCOMBREY AND MENTIONED IN THE DEBRIEFING OF SUBJ OF 201-354143

201-354143
UFAA-01387A01
16 OCT 69
P2

R 6910300820

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ-MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-033/03
UFAA-01136
25 JUL 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
ATT 2 P1 AND 2. FORMER FAR MAJOR, CURRENTLY IN JAIL IN CUBA SINCE AN INFILTRATION MISSION FR MIAMI IN 66.

R 6908040524

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 25 SEPTEMBER 1968

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: RAFAEL RAMON NUGUET DEL VALAS

FBI FILE NO: 105-10798 (MIAMI)

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO ALL NAMES
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-269349
X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-321168
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

WH/COG/FI
[redacted]
28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 39

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, EUR 8, C/CI/OPS, C/FI, FI

ANGLE 125
PS
ABSTRACT ✗ INDEX ✗

MICROFILMED
DEC 4 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

LWAVE

S E C R E T 271807Z CITE JMWAVE 9958 27 Oct 67 IN 81447

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR NFG

TYPIC OSM

1. ON 26 OCT AMCONCERT/1 REPORTED HE RECEIVED OPERATIONAL LEAD FROM TANYA SALAS DE GUITERREZ, WIFE ELOY (GUITERREZ) MENOYO (201-269349), FORMER HEAD SFNE (SECOND FRONT ESCAMBRAY, EXILE GROUP) WHO CAPTURED IN INFIL ATTEMPT CUBA APRIL 63 CLAIMS GLADYS (RODRIGUEZ) DE LA OBRA ARRIVED MADRID CIRCA 22 OCT ON IBERIA FLT FROM HABANA. RODRIGUEZ IS COUSIN RAMON (QUESADA) GOMEZ (201-321168) FORMER REBEL ARMY COMANDANTE WHO CAPTURED WITH MENOYO. AMCONCERT/1 SAYS QUESADA AND RODRIGUEZ CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH 13TH MARCH REVOLUTIONARY DIRECTORATE, INCLUDING THOSE WHO PRESENTLY HOLD GOVT AND ARMY POSITIONS.

SEX: F CIT: CUBA

SEX: F

18

2. NO JMWAVE TRACES RODRIGUEZ. FILE CHECK QUESADA SHOWS HE WAS 13TH MARCH MEMBER AND CLOSE FRIEND AMLASH/1 AND OTHER GOC OFFICIALS.

3. SUGGEST MADRID ATTEMPT LOCATE RODRIGUEZ AND DEBRIEF ON TARGETS OF INTEREST.

S E C R E T

201-269349
27 Oct 1967

SECRET

B-201-321168

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUEIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-122/03
UFGA-28030
20 JUL 67
P3

CIT ?
OCC PRISONER
SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED FROM ISLA DE PINOS
PRISON TO ~~LA CABANA PRISON IN OCT 66.~~
FFN ~~19-120-30-71/4~~

R 6708031283

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349 201-300086
SEX M DOB ? MEXI-09677
29 DEC 66
CIT ? P1
OCC ?
SNFE PLANS NEGOTIATE WITH GOC FOR EXCHANGE
HERNANDEZ ARMAS /201-301755/ FOR SUBJ, FORMER
HEAD SNFE AND NOW POLITICAL PRISONER CUBA.

R 6704210128

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-62 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED
10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

201-300086
MEXI-09163
08 NOV 66
P1

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
SUBJ IS FIRST ON JORGE ROBLEJO-LORIE 201-300086 PRISONER LIST IF NEGOTIATIONS FOR EXCHANGE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS FAIL. ROBLEJO ALTERNATE PLAN IS TO KIDNAP GUTIERREZ, WHO IS CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO, AND HOLD HIM FOR RANSOM OF 70 PRISONERS IN CUBA.

UFGMCS

R 6701121101

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

REGISTRATION REQUEST

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	
ISRM NO.	3703
DATE	
201 NO.	

NAME
[redacted] GUTIERREZ Menoyo, Eloy

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
PRESENT ADDRESS		OCCUPATION

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT

TRAVEL

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA

SUBJECT terminated w/o prejudice 4 May 66.

Gp 3

~~GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In) CONFIDENTIAL

ISR LOG

FROM			SERVICE NO. SD 8831
INDEX		SECURITY	DATE
TO:	FROM:		DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
TO OO:	RESULTS	COVER	ISRM NO. / DATE
AREA DESK	OTHER		201-

COMMENTS

FORM 11-63 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 4 MARCH 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

SUBJECT: ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ-MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

201-791330
USMA-20300A01
29 OCT 65
P12

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
TOP COMMANDER IN SEGUNDO FRENTE DE ESCAMBRAY AND ORGANIZATION AUTENTICA. NOW IN A G-2 PRISON SINCE TAKING PART IN SMALL INVASION IN MAY 65.

: WAS 065-002-010/03
OS8

R 6706021137

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 28 MAY 1965
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN ANTONIO)

DATE: 19 MAY 1965
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.
FBI FILE NO: 105-1998 (MIAMI)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-269349
X-REF TO FILE NO 201-749653 - filed by Branch
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 24

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
Jmwave

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION
WH/SA 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WH/8 - FI

R I COPY

S E C R E T 120126Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE WAVE 8185

MICROFILMED
MAY 9 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

12 FEB 65 IN 78972

TYPIC AMSPICE

1. 8 FEB 65 WAVE RCVD TELEGRAM DTD 7 FEB FROM AMSPICE/1 URGENTLY REQUESTING CONTACT WITH WAVE C/O. WAVE FOUND AMSPICE/1 REQUEST RATHER ODD YET INTRIGUING PARTICULARLY VIEW FACT AMBLINK/1 HAD LAST CONTACTED AMSPICE/1 ON 6 FEB PRIOR DEPARTING MEXI FOR WAVE AREA.

3

2. NOT WISHING USE PHONE FOR REASONS SECURITY, WAVE DISPATCHED AMBLINK/1 MEXICO CITY 8 FEB ORDER DETERMINE NATURE AMSPICE/1 PROBLEM.

3. 9 FEB AMBLINK/1 PERSONALLY CONTACTED AMSPICE/1 AT HOME. SHE STATED HAD RCVD URGENT TELECON FROM IDEN'S WIFE WAVE AREA ASKING HER COME WAVE AREA HELP HER CARRY OUT CAMPAIGN OBTAIN PBRUMEN GOVT CLEMENCY FOR HUSBAND. AMSPICE/1 STATED SHE FULLY COMMITTED ASSIST IDEN AND WIFE SINCE THEY OLD FRIENDS AND THAT UNLESS WAVE CO HAD STRONG OBJECTIONS SHE PLANNED PROCEED WAVE AREA WITH CHILDREN. SHE IMPLIED WOULD NEED WAVE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO MAKE TRIP.

4. AMBLINK/1 WAS INSTRUCTED BY WAVE INFORM AMSPICE/1 HIS SUPERIORS GREATLY DISPLEASED AT FRIVOLUOUS MANNER IN WHICH SHE BECKONS ASSISTANCE AND WHIMSICAL NATURE HER REQUEST. AMBLINK/1 FURTHER

over

~~12 Feb 1965~~

B-201-749653

201-269349

~~12 Feb 65~~

SECRET

INSTRUCTED AMSPICE/1 REFRAIN FROM SUCH TACTICS IN FUTURE.

5. WAVE NOT DESIROUS HAVE AMSPICE/1 CONTACT IDEN'S WIFE THIS TIME ORDER ATTEMPT SALVAGE AMSPICE OPERATION, IF POSSIBLE, FROM DAMAGES THAT WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY ACCRUE AS RESULT IDEN'S ARREST. AS STATED PARA 11W UFGA 16565 DTD 29 JUNE 64, AMSPICE/1, PRIOR HER INITIAL CONTACT WITH WAVE, CONFESSED HER CIS MISSION TO IDEN AND HER INTENTION DISCLOSE EVERYTHING TO ODYOKE AUTHORITIES. IDEN ALLEGEDLY COUNSELED HER DO LATTER. AS WILL BE RECALLED PART AMSPICE/1'S MISSION WAS PENETRATE IDEN AND HIS ORG.

6. WAVE OF BELIEVE F? IN SPITE FOREGOING THAT AMSPICE OP HAS FIFTY-FIFTY CHANCE BEING SALVAGED. SINCE AMSPICE/1 IS CIS AGENT, WAVE DOES NOT FEEL IT LIKELY THAT CIS WILL HAVE SURFACED HER NAME DURING IDEN'S INTERROGATION AS IT NOT LOGICAL CIS WOULD DISCUSS THEIR AGENTS WITH ONE OF THEIR AGENTS' VICTIMS. IF A/1 NOT MENTIONED BY CIS, IT POSSIBLE IDEN MAY HAVE SEEN FIT NOT BRING HER NAME UP. HOWEVER, SINCE IDEN'S CURRENT SITUATION IS ONE OF LIFE OR DEATH, IT VERY POSSIBLE IDEN MAY HAVE VOLUNTEERED FACT A/1 BETRAYED CIS ORDER GAIN ONE MORE POINT HIS FAVOR.

7. ORDER SAVE A/1 OP, WAVE HAS INSTRUCTED A/1 AS FOLLOWS:

A. SHE TO REFRAIN FROM MIXING IN IDEN AFFAIR.

B. IF CONFRONTED BY CIS WITH IDEN ADMISSION SHE TO DENY SHE TOLD IDEN HER MISSION AND SUGGEST HER HUSBAND MAY HAVE BEEN CULPRIT.

C. SHE ALSO TO CLAIM SHE DID NOT INFORM ODYOKE AUTHORITIES

AND WILL POINT TO HER INSOLVENCY, LOSS OF HER BUSINESS, HER PRESENCE MEXICO, AND VARIED ASSORTMENT PAWN TICKETS AND BILLS AS EVIDENCE SHE NOT WORKING FOR ODYOKE. SHE TO STATE THAT IF SHE WERE IN ODYOKE EMPLOY SHE WOULD BE LIVING IN LUXURY RATHER THAN POVERTY.

8. WAVE WILL CONTINUE CLOSE MONITORING OP IN HOPES A/1 CAN EXTRICATE SELF FROM CURRENT RATHER PRECARIOUS SITUATION.

SECRET

12 Feb. 1965
201-269349

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
AMDELL-1 Information on Eloy *GUTIERREZ Menoyo

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI:

1. AMDELL-1 spoke with AMRAZZ-1 on two separate occasions and learned the following information with the dates and sources as indicated.

2. AMRAZZ-1 spoke on 31 January 1965 with Sergio (LNU) who had just reached Miami from the Dominican Republic. Sergio stated that GUTIERREZ had gone to Cuba with three other men on 20 December 1964, landing near Baracoa, Oriente. The only members in this first infiltration were those arrested. GUTIERREZ had promised to contact his base by radio on 31 December 1964, but no message was ever received. Plans called for another group of about seven men to infiltrate into Cuba at Baracoa on or before 20 January 1965. The group left the Dominican Republic on 20 January according to plan. Near the Cuban coast, they were pursued by three Cuban patrol boats and one airplane but managed to escape. The boat used in both infiltration attempts was called the "Betrand" which may mean a Bertram boat.

3. AMRAZZ-1 reported on 1 February that he had spoke on 31 January 1965 to Reynaldo ABREU in charge of GUTIERREZ' affairs in Miami who in turn had spoken to Celio VAZQUEZ, GUTIERREZ' main contact in the Dominican Republic by telephone on 30 January 1965. VAZQUEZ stated he could not come to Miami at that time as he was taking charge of dismantling the base there. He also needed about $10,000.00 to clear up back bills owed by the group. However, on 3 February 1965, AMDELL-1 reported AMRAZZ-1 had again spoken to Reynaldo ABREU who declared the members of GUTIERREZ' group in the Dominican Republic intended to go ahead with the plan to infiltrate Cuba. To his knowledge a leader had not been decided upon but ABREU believed the only person capable was Angel BAÑOS. (See paragraph 5 below for traces).

/ CONTINUED /

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA

c/s copy filed 19-9-12

201-269349

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 10 Feb 65	DATE DISPATCHED FEB 15 1965
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 19,816	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-9-12-2	

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

4. Finally, on 31 January 1965, AMRAZZ-1 was invited to the home of "Pepe" (Jose) AGUIAR, secretary to Manolo RAY, to meet an Englishman whom AGUIAR privately described to AMRAZZ-1 as the head of British intelligence in the Caribbean just released four months ago from jail in Cuba. Later, after being introduced, the Englishman told AMRAZZ-1 the British Embassy in Havana had information that GUTIERREZ had been arrested on 4 January 1965. He did not state how he received this information or when and how he had come from Cuba. AMRAZZ-1 added he did not know how AGUIAR met this individual or where he was residing. AMRAZZ-1 described the Englishman thus: about 30 years old, 5' 10", medium build, 160 pounds, dark complexion, British accent, spoke little Spanish, wore sport shirt and pants.

5. WAVE files describe Angel Gilberto *BANOS Pantoja as a former U. S. citizen who fought in the Escambray, was a rebel army captain, arrived in the U. S. by boat along with Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo in 1961. He is considered a possible DSE agent. Extensive traces are as follows:

a. WAVE files: AMOT report of 21 September 1963, BANOS reportedly stated II-Front had boats stolen from Varadero in action credited to II-Front and Alpha 66; 12 June 1961 "Miami Herald" reported Subject arrived in Key West with Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo and others. Detained by Immigration and Naturalization Service at McAllen, Texas, released, arrived Miami 11 June 1961; AMOT report of 11 December 1962 describes subject as II-Front member waiting on a Key for supplies necessary to go to Escambray mountains; AMOT report of 22 January 1963 describes subject as contact of Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo, an ex-rebel army captain in Escambray during fight against Batista. Born Miami on 12 August 1943, lost citizenship for serving in Cuba under arms, came to U. S. with GUTIERREZ Menoyo and detained in McAllen, Texas; CSCI 3/775,277 of 12 March 1963 describes subject as confidant and courier for GUTIERREZ Menoyo; memorandum dated 22 January 1963 stated subject reportedly returned from 40-day trip inside Cuba as courier for II-Front; AMOT report of 11 April 1963 included Subject on list of those presented with prevention of departure notices by FBI; CSCI-3/772,476 describes subject as reportedly anti-United States, pro-Communist; AMCHEER-1 report and AMOT report of 16 June 1962 describe subject as having worked in G-2 offices at Rancho Boyeros Airport and being commander of a militia group there. Belonged to National Air Federation in 59/60. Reportedly had problems with Cuban authorities over theft of a jewelry store.

b. Headquarters traces: DBA 49631 of 28 August 1963; UFGA 11981 of 18 October 1963; DBA 55602 of 24 October 1963; OSMA 13,496 of 26 January 1962; 00-1512, February 1961; DBF 49905 of 17 May 1960; DBF 77248 of 18 May 1961; WAVE 3206 of 26 January 1961 and WAVE 3228 of 27 January 1961; CS-3/378,712, HKH-1754 of 24 November 1958; CO-A-3/180,639 of 7 March 1961 and CSCI-3/764,579 typed 22 March 1961; DBA-32298 of 18 January 1963; FBI-105-6243 of 15 April 1963; UFG-04958 of 14 April 1964; UFGA 07467 of 30 January 1963; WAVE 03604 of 23 January 1963; UFGA 05173 of 9 August 1962;

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

14965

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

201-762117
UFGA-19792A01
15 FEB 65
P4

CIT ?
OCC ?
INFO RE CONNECTION WITH BLANCA ROSA MAURE (DE) CABRERA. WIFE OF SUBJ 201-762117.

R 6502191772

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9.57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 269349 201-269349 ✓

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 269349

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SECRET

PRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH/SA 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED WH/SA

TIME 2145

BY

INFO VR, FILE, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF, WH 7, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT

S E C R E T 040052Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO SDOM CITE WAVE 7988

TYPIC

REF WAVE 7588 (68557) *

AB FI INDEX ABSTRACT

4 FEB 65 IN 73186

1. AMSCREAM-1[1] REPORTS KEY WEST JAMMED BY EXILES NIGHT 2 FEB TO WATCH HAVANA TV APPEARANCE GUTIERREZ MENOYO, DOMINGO ORTEGA, NOEL SALAS AND RAMON QUESADA. AMSCREAM-1[1], UPI'S MIKE ALONSO, AMOTS[2], AND AMSHADY-1[3] SUBSOURCES WHO WATCHED TV AT KEY WEST SAY PRISONERS LOOKED BETTER GROOMED AND DRESSED, MORE RELAXED THAN G-2 INTERROGATORS, SHOWING NO VISIBLE EVIDENCE TORTURE OR "BRAIN WASHING." ALONSO OBSERVED MENOYO LOOKED AND SOUNDED COLD AND CALCULATING, UNEMOTIONAL, IN CONTRAST WITH PREVIOUS CASTRO CAPTIVES SHOWN TV WHO SEEMED WEARY, TIRED, HOPELESS PRISONERS. AMSHADY-1[3] SAYS SOME PEOPLE DO NOT BELIEVE MENOYO WAS DRUGGED OR TORTURED, BUT PLAN SAY SO FOR PROP PURPOSES.

2. INFO RESULTING FROM MENOYO'S TV INTERROGATION BASICALLY SAME GIVEN BY MINFAR FROM PREVIOUS INTERROGATION (REPORTED PARA 3 REF). NEW ITEM WAS RAMON QUESADA'S TV STATEMENT THAT HE RECEIVED CIA TRAINING MAP READING AND ARMS HANDLING. ALSO NEW WAS MENOYO'S ADVICE TO EXILES GIVE UP EFFORTS BECAUSE PEOPLE INSIDE SUPPORT CASTRO. GENERAL CONSENSUS AMONG EXILES MENOYO DID NOT REVEAL ANYTHING NOT

201-269349

4 Feb 1965

SECRET

SECRET

IN 73186
P-2

PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY EXILES OR CASTRO REGIME. THIS FEELING REFLECTED MIKE ALONSO'S REPORT FOR UPI, AND IS THE INTERPRETATIVE LINE GENERALLY BEING FOLLOWED BY MIAMI PRESS AND RADIO. EMPHASIS CONTINUES ON ALLEGED ROLE DOMINICAN AND PUERTO RICAN GOVTS.

3. CANVASSING OF EXILE REACTIONS SHOW IMPACT MENOYO'S CAPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS HEAVIER AND MORE DOMORALIZING THAN MANOLO RAY'S FIASCO. PARTICULARLY UPSETTING WAS MANOYO'S ADVICE TO EXILES THAT THEIR EFFORTS CAUSING UNNECESSARY BLOOD LETTING WITHOUT CHANCE SUCCESS BECAUSE PEOPLE INSIDE SUPPORT CASTRO. MENOYO'S UNEMOTIONAL DELIVERY AND WARNING TO EXILE ADVENTURERS THEIR FATE WILL BE WORSE THAN HIS BEING INTERPRETED AS EVIDENCE HE EITHER COWARD OR TRAITOR WHO KNEW WOULD NOT BE SHOT. AMCORE-2 REPORTS THAT EXILES UNABLE TO RECONCILE MENOYO'S ALLEGED BACKGROUND AS BRAVE GUERRILLA FIGHTER WITH LAST NIGHT TV PERFORMANCE AND FEEL ONLY EXPLANATION IS MENOYO WAS CASTRO AGENT ALL ALONG.

4. MOST EXILE LEADERS CONSIDER WORST DAMAGE FROM MENOYO EPISODE WAS UNDERLYING PROMOTION CASTRO GOVT AS POWERFUL REGIME AGAINST WHICH EXILES OR INSIDE RESISTANCE ELEMENTS CAN DO LITTLE. AMCORE-2 REPORTS SOME PEOPLE ARE WISHING OUT LOUD FOR RAID BY ARTIME OR ORLANDO BOSCH TO COUNTER EFFECT MENOYO MUST HAVE HAD AMONG ANTI-CASTROISTS

SECRET

SECRET

IN 73126
P-3

INSIDE CUBA. AMCORE-2[4], AMRAZONR-1[5], (AS RCVD) AND AMSHADY-1[3] AGREE THAT DEMORALIZING EFFECT MENOYO TV PERFORMANCE WORST AMONG OPPONENTS CASTRO REGIME INSIDE.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

*Reports on JMWAVE area publicity concerning captured exile Gutierrez Menoyo.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 269349
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ ~~RET TO BRANCH~~ ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. Ant

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 16
SECRET
RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
JMWAVE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION
WH/SA 8

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO
VR, FILE, DDP, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2

AN	FI	
PG	DEST	
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

SECRET 040052Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7909 (INGHURST ACTING)

IN 73193

TYPIC PSYCH

REF A WAVE 7908 (73156)

B WAVE 7906 (IN 73176)

1. STATION BELIEVES MAIN DAMAGING IMPACT MENOYO CAPTURE AND TV APPEARANCE WILL BE ON MOTIVATION ANTI REGIME ELEMENTS INSIDE CUBA. MAIN PSYCH TARGET WAS OBVIOUSLY CUBAN POPULATION AND TV SHOW WAS DESIGNED IMPRESS DOUBTING THOMASES AND ANTI REGIME ELEMENTS THAT REGIME INVINCIBLE AND ANY RESISTANCE USELESS. AS LATEST IN SERIES EXILE FAILURES MOUNT EFFECTIVE ACTION OPS AGAINST CASTRO, MENOYO CASE BOUND HAVE STRONG NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ANTI REGIME ELEMENTS INSIDE WHO WILL VIEW THIS AX ONE MORE INDICATION NO OUTSIDE HELP FORTHCOMING. BEST COUNTERACTION OF COURSE WOULD BE FEW SUCCESSFUL AND DRAMATIC RESISTANCE ACTS EITHER BY INSIDE GROUPS OR FROM OUTSIDE.

2. WHILE PROPAGANDA CANNOT CHANGE BASIC PSYCH ATMOSPHERE INSIDE HOEPFULLY CAN PARTIALLY COUNTER IMPACT MENOYO CASE BY RE-DIRECTING CUBAN AUDIENCE ATENTION TO LONG-TERM PROBLEMS CASTRO REGIME NOTING THAT CAPTURE FEW INDIVIDUALS CANNOT SAVE CASTRO FROM ULTIMATE

201-269349
4 Feb 1965

SECRET

SECRET IN 73193, pg. 2

INEVITABLE DOWNFALL. UNDERLYING THEMES WAVE PROP WILL BE RESISTANCE TO CASTRO INSIDE CUBA CONTINUALLY INCREASING, ECONOMIC SITUATION DETERIORATING, INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE SLOWLY ISOLATING CASTRO, DOWNFALL INEVITABLE. FOLLOWING PARAS REPORT SPECIFIC PROP ACTIONS BEING CARRIED OUT.

3. FEB 3 AMCORE-2 RELEASING TO PRESS AND BROADCASTING OVER JMHOPE AMTHIGH LETTER FROM INSIDE INFORMANT REPORTING SUGAR CANE BURNING. RELEASE PICKED UP BY UPI AND AP 3 FEB. BROADCAST WILL ALSO POINT OUT MENOYO CASE ONE ISOLATED PROPAGANDA OPERATION BY CASTRO REGIME AND CANNOT CHANGE BASIC FACT FIGHT AGAINST CASTRO CONTINUES OVER WIDE FRONT: SABOTAGE, PRODUCTION SLOWDOWNS, ECONOMIC BLOCKADE, DISAFFECTION IN UPPER LEVELS REGIME, ETC., AND SUCH EVENTS AS MENOYO CAPTURE WILL ONLY INSPIRE AMCORE AND OTHER RESISTANCE ELEMENTS IN CUBA REDOUBLE EFFORTS SABOTAGE PRODUCTION WHICH ACHILLES HEEL CASTRO REGIME.

4. AMICE PROGRAMS WMIE (3 FEB) JMHOPE (5 FEB) AMTHIGH (6 FEB) EXPLOITING DECISION PANAMANIAN WORKERS NOT SERVICE SHIPS TRADING WITH CUBA AS SIGN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE CONTINUING, AND BLOCKADE TOGETHER WITH WORK SLOWDOWNS AND SABOTAGE BY WORKERS HITTING CASTRO MOST VULNERABLE SPOT.

SECRET

IN 73193 PG 3

SECRET

5. AMDOFF-1 AIRPORT STATEMENT PER REF B EXPECTED TAKE SOME PUBLICITY LIMELIGHT AWAY FROM MENOYO CASE AMDOFF-1 WILL ALSO APPEAR AMCORE-2 PROGRAM 3 FEB.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

201-264349

~~INDEX~~ ☐ ~~YES~~ ☒ ~~NO~~
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-269349
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☒ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

84 SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM CARACAS

ACTION ~~WH 8~~ WH/SA 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH

TIME 1802

BY DD

Jan 26 22 37 Z 65

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH/SA 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

R I COPY

SECRET 262010Z

AN NH

FI

~~DESTROY~~

ABSTRACT

INDEX

26 Jan 65 IN 67522

DIR INFO WAVE CITE CARA 5635

IMMEDIATE ACTION

ON 26 JANUARY, DR. ARMANDO FLEITES, OF SEGUNDA FRENTE DE ESCAMBRAY, URGENTLY CALLED ON POL COUSELLOR EDWARD LONG (TWO WEEKS PRIOR VIA MUTUAL FRIENDS FLEITES HAD REQUESTED ONE WEEK VISITOR VISA "ON COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS" TO VISIT FAMILY IN WAVE AREA; BOWDLER IN PERSONAL LETTER TO LONG ADVISED THAT FLEITES HAD FORFEITED RIGHT TO SPECIAL TREATMENT AND WOULD HAVE TO APPLY FOR IMMIGRATION VISA). FLEITES, WHO ACCEPTS AS PROBABLY ACCURATE PRESS STORIES RE CAPTURE GUTIERREZ MENOYO, NOW CLAIMS THAT IN CAPACITY AS NUMBER TWO LEADER OF FRENTE, IT URGENTLY NECESSARY HE TRAVEL TO WAVE AREA TO SPEND ONE WEEK WITH HIS GROUP. STATES HE WOULD NOT EVEN WANT TO SEE HIS FAMILY, ADDING NOW WAS TIME FOR PBPRIME TO PROVE WHETHER "FRIEND OR ENEMY" OF CUBAN FREEDOM. ON OFFHAND CHANCE KUBARK MAY HAVE OPERATIONAL EQUITIES IN FRENTE, COUNSELLOR LONG ASKS STA CHECK WITH HEADQUARTERS. TENTATIVELY ADVISED HIM KUBARK NOT INVOLVED, BUT WOULD INQUIRE IN ANY CASE. SUGGEST HQS ADVISE BOWDLER AND ASCERTAIN WHETHER IN LIGHT ABOVE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES ODACID POSITION RE FLEITES ENTRY (AS STATED IN HIS LETTER TO LONG)

RI COPY

SECRET

201-269349
26 Jan 65

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY

RECEIVED
RID/MIS
FEB 65

IN 67522
PAGE 2

IN ANY MANNER CHANGED. IF NEGATIVE, LONG WILL ADVISE FLEITES ACCORDINGLY.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

15 SECRET

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CD

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/SA 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH/SA

TIME 1335

BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/SPG, WH 7

S E C R E T 261724Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 7519

TYPIC

REF WAVE 7501 (IN 66863)

26 JAN 65 IN 67362

1. ACSI REPS MIAMI CONTACTED WAVE CIRCA 1800 HOURS 25 JAN AND ASKED FOR EMERGENCY MEET 2200 HOURS 25 JAN IN ORDER COORDINATE PRIORITY OP WHICH WOULD BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN ACSI AND KUBARK HQS AM 26 JAN. WAVE AGREED MEET AS REQUESTED BY ACSI.

2. UPON INITIATION 2200 HOURS MEET ACSI REPS STATED SITUATION HAD CHANGED COMPLETELY SINCE 1800 HOURS 25 JAN AND THEY NO LONGER HAD PRIORITY

O

OPS PROPOSAL WORTH CONSIDERING. ACSI INDICATED HOWEVER THEY DID WANT BRIEF REUTEMAN AND EDWARD F. HUSEBY, WHO WAVE LIAISON TO ACSI, RE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THEIR OP. THIS BRIEFING REVEALED FOLLOWING:

A. MAY 64 MIAMI ACSI INHERITED FROM ACSI PUERTO RICO OP WHICH INVOLVED USE RAFAEL HUGUET DE VALLE (201-269895) AS POTENTIAL W/T OPERATOR AND SINGLETON INTEL COLLECTOR. CONCEPT IN THIS OP WAS HUGUET WOULD INFIL CUBA WITH SFNE LEADER ELOYO GUTIERREZ MENOYO BUT WOULD REPORT BY W/T TO ACSI ON OB ETC. GUTIERREZ MENOYO KNEW OF THIS ARRANGEMENT AND HAD GIVEN HUGUET PERMISSION MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ACSI. GUTIERREZ KNEW SPONSORING ORGANIZATION FOR THIS OP WAS ACSI. IT ACSI THESIS

201-269349

IN 67362 PAGE 2

THAT IN THIS OP THEY WORKING WITH INDIVIDUAL AGENT, I.E. HUGUET BUT THEY NOT SPONSORING GUTIERREZ OR SFNE.

B. GUTIERREZ INFILTRATED CUBA CIRCA 18 DEC 64. OP MOUNTED FROM BASE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BUT DETAILS UNKNOWN ACSI. IDENTITIES OF MEN INFILTRATING CUBA WITH GUTIERREZ NOT KNOWN ACSI.

C. HUGUET RECENTLY OBTAINED WORD FROM GUTIERREZ TO JOIN HIM IN CUBA. ACSI WANTED DISPATCH HUGUET SOONEST AND WANTED COORDINATED SUCH INFIL WITH WAVE. IMPLICATION BEING ACSI WAS GOING ASK FOR WAVE ASSISTANCE IN THIS OP. EXTENT OR NATURE THIS ASSISTANCE NOT IDENTIFIED.

D. ACSI LEARNED CIRCA 2000 HOURS 25 JAN OF HAVANA ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT GUTIERREZ APPREHENSION THUS ALL PLANS FOR HUGUET INFIL CANCELLED FOR TIME BEING. MIAMI ACSI NOT SURE WHAT FUTURE HOLDS FOR HUGUET BUT WOULD LIKE DISCUSS THIS WITH WAVE AT LATER DATE.

E. MIAMI ACSI MOST CONCERNED GUTIERREZ WOULD IDENTIFY ACSI TO GOC AS AGENCY SPONSORING HIS MISSION. IF THIS EXPLOITED IN PROP FIELD BY GOC THEY WANTED KUBARK KNOW ACSI DID NOT SPONSOR GUTIERREZ.

3. AFTER FURNISHING PARA 2 INFO ACSI ASKED IF WAVE WOULD GIVE THEM TRACES ON HUGUET AS THEY HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY TRACED HUGUET WITH WAVE. WE AGREED FURNISH TRACES WHILE CHIDING ACSI IN LOW KEY THAT THIS LATE DATE FOR RUNNING LOCAL TRACES.

SECRET

IN 27330 PAGE 3

4. MIAMI ACSI ASKED INFORMALLY WHAT WAVE THOUGHT OF THEIR OPS CONCEPT RE HUGUET AND GUTIERREZ. WE POINTED OUT THAT BASED FRAGMENTARY INFO AVAILABLE TO US WE FELT THEY HAD LIAISON AND NOT AGENT RELATIONSHIP WITH HUGUET THUS IT HARD ENVISION HUGUET AS CONTROLLED ASSET. ADDITIONALLY IT POINTED OUT EXPERIENCE WITH WIDE VARIETY OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC EXILE GROUPS HAD CONVINCED REUTEMAN IT IMPOSSIBLE MAKE ACSI CONCEPT RE HUGUET WORK. THIS EXPRESSED AS REUTEMAN OPINION AND NOT AS KUBARK DOCTRINE.

5. TRACES RE HUGUET FOLLOW IN SEPARATE CABLE.

6. ASSUME HUGUET OP COORDINATED WITH KUBARK AT HQS LEVEL. IF NOT, PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-269349

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☒ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG 47726

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

27 SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RI ☒ COPY ☐ SUBBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/SA 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

RI COPY

30 JAN 65 IN 70252

SECRET 292332Z

DIR INFO CARA CITE WAVE 7634

TYPIC

AN | FI | DEST | ES | INDEX | ABSTRACT

1. ON 28 JAN AMSHADY-1 WAS AT HOME ZENAIDA (MARRERRO) WIFE OF RENE (DECHARD) FORMER CUBAN CONSUL TO US, WHO ALTHOUGH AUTENTICA AND NOT BELONG SNFE IS CONSIDERED PERSONAL FRIEND MOST REVOLUTIONARIES WHILE AMSHADY-1 THERE AMAURY (FRAGINALS) ARRIVED AND SAID SENT WAVE AREA BY ARMANDO FLEITAS WHO STILL CARA AS NOT YET RECEIVED PASSPORT FOR US. FRAGINALS HAD SEVERAL MISSIONS ACCOMPLISH ACCORDING PART CONVERSATION AMSHADY-1 HEARD. FIRST, FLEITAS CONCERNED THAT INTERVIEW GUTIERREZ WIDOW GIVEN TO BATISTIANO BENJAMIN DE LA VEGA WHO IN TURN GAVE SAME TO ONLY BATISTIANO COMMENTATORS. FRAGINALS TO ASSURE THIS NOT RECUR EVEN IF NECESSARY BEAT UP DE LA VEGA. FLEITAS ALSO AUTHORIZED FRAGINALS BEAT UP ANYONE CALLING GUTIERREZ COMMUNIST AS THAT LAST STRAW. ACCORDING FRAGINALS, FLEITAS PLANS REORGANIZE SNFE WAVE AREA AS DISPLEASED THEIR HANDLING GUTIERREZ INCIDENT. ALSO FLEITAS PLANS GO PBRUMEN SOON AS CAN SAY GOODBY TO WIFE AS OWES MORAL DEBT OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS AND GUTIERREZ.

201-269349
30 Jan 1965

2. AMSHADY-1 ALSO HEARD FROM SAME SOURCE THAT PARENTS

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

14-00000

SECRET FORWARDED RID/MIS IN 70252 PAGE 2

FEB 17 8 39 AM '65

FEB 16 [illegible] 65

QUESADA, ONE OF THOSE CAPTURED, ARRESTED. ALSO SEVERAL ATTEMPTS CONTACT PARENTS GUTIERREZ BY PHONE UNSUCCESSFUL HENCE ASSUME THEY ALSO PRISONERS.

3. FRAGINALS SAID AFTER FLEITAS REANIMATED EXILES CARA FOLLOWING FIRST WAVE DEPRESSION UPON NEWS CAPTURE, THEY COLLECTED ABOUT $4000 CARA.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 269349
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

fs

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 44

49 SECRET GROUP 1

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH/SA 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO
VR. FILE, ~~PDP~~, SR 7, CA 2, CA/PEG 2, DO 4, DD/H 3, FI, FI/SPG, OGC 2, CI, CI/PS, CI/IC 2, RI WH 7

AN ✓ FI
ABSTRACT X
30 JAN 65 IN 7

SECRET 300142Z

DIR INFO SDOM CITE WAVE 7712

TYPIC

REF WAVE 7648 (IN 69406)*

1. AS REPORTED REF, AMLYRIC-1 TRIED CONTACT AURELIO NAZARIO SARGEN AS ONE OF FEW MEMBERS REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE SANE ENOUGH HELP REPAIR PROP LINES DAMAGED IN SFNE CONTENTION GUTIERREZ BETRAYED BY INTERNAL CONTACTS. BEFORE MAKING CONTACT HOWEVER AMLYRIC-1 ADVISED BY AMHIM-2 THAT AURELIO WAS AMONG THOSE AT 27 JAN PRESS CONFERENCE ARGUING IN FAVOR DELEGATION TO APPEAL POW STATUS FOR GUTIERREZ THROUGH SOV AMBASSADOR. AMLYRIC-1 THREW IN SPONGE AT THIS POINT; SEES NO HOPE BRINGING ORDER OUT OF CURRENT CHAOTIC ACTIONS THIS HEADLESS EXILE GROUP. SFNE OFFICIAL AMAURY FRAGINALS WHO CAME FROM CARA LATE 27 JAN ALSO DISSATISFIED PUBLICITY HANDLING BUT MOSTLY ON SUCH MATTERS AS EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH MRS GUTIERREZ BEING GIVEN TO WELL KNOWN BATISTIANO BENJAMIN DE LA VEGA.

2. 28 JAN DIARIO LAS AMERICAS REPORTS LETTER BEING SENT UN SECGEN ENCLOSING PETITION POW STATUS FOR GUTIERREZ SIGNED BY "NUMEROUS" EXILE ORGANIZATIONS (TO OUR KNOWLEDGE NOT INCLUDING WAVE GROUPS). ACCORDING WMET NEWS BROADCAST CUBAN EXILES MEXI CALLING FOR EXECUTION

SECRET
SECRET

201-269349
30 Jan 1965

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2

RID/IAS 70281

ALL COMMUNIST PRISONERS HELD LA IF GUTIERREZ GETS DEATH SENTENCE.

FEB 17 8 39 AM '65

3. AMATEUR ANALYSTS AMONG LOCAL EXILES KNOWINGLY POINT OUT EXPENSIVE LATE MODEL ARMS CARRIED BY GUTIERREZ AND APPARENT "GREEN LIGHT" FROM U.S. AND DOMREP AUTHORITIES AS EVIDENCE HE SPONSORED BY KUBARK, BUT LEFTIST BROADCASTER MAX LESNICK REFUTED THIS POSSIBILITY ON RADIO REPLICA (WMIE) 28 JAN.

4. MOST TALK OF GUTIERREZ NOW LIMITED TO GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS HAVING DIRECT INTEREST OR INVOLVEMENT. SOME DISINTERESTED PARTIES OPINE HE MAY BE DEAD ALREADY. OTHERS LOSING INTEREST BECAUSE RECENT REPORTS LACK DETAIL. THREE CAPTAINS WAVE VESSELS EXPRESSED SORROW FOR GUTIERREZ PLIGHT BUT RELIEF THAT HE NO LONGER IN POSITION ENDANGER KUBARK MARITIME OPS.

5. GUTIERREZ ISSUE DIMINISHING IN IMPORTANCE ON LOCAL SCENE. THERE PRESENTLY NO REPORTED REACTIONS ON ARREST FROM CUBA VIA TELEPHONE CALLS TO EXILES THIS AREA, THUS IT DIFFICULT JUDGE WHAT IMPACT THIS ARREST HAS HAD ON OPS CLIMATE CUBA.

6. PLA RESTRICT PROP COVERAGE ON GUTIERREZ ARREST TO STRAIGHT NEWS REPORTING FOR NEXT FEW DAYS, I.E. WILL PUBLICIZE D.R. DENIAL THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THIS OP, ETC.

SECRET + 28 JAN CONFUSION STILL REIGNS AMONG EXILES ON NEARLY ALL ASPECTS ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO CASE.

SECRET

SECRET

OE4 JY MT

3 AUG 64 WE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : WE 8

INFO : FE 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI, VR

ADDED: CI/IC 2, VR

file-Gibson

SECRET 01 02135Z

01 Aug 64 IN 40821

DIR CITE PARI 5567 BINGHAM ACTING

LCHARVEST

1. VERGES MAGAZINE REVOLUTION COMBINED ISSUES NO'S 10-11 APPEARED ON PARIS NEWSSTANDS 30 JULY. STA BUYING UP COPIES FOR STUFFER PSYCH OP. WILL ADVISE.

2. FYI BULLETIN INSIDE FRONT COVER STATES:

FOLLOWING GRAVE ACCUSATIONS CONVEYED BY COMRADES IN NEW YORK, LONDON AND ACCRA AND CONFIRMED ON INQUIRY, REVOLUTION INFORMS ITS READERS THAT RICHARD GIBSON WHO MISUSED HIS OFFICE AS FORMER SECRETARY OF "FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE" IN ORDER PENETRATE RANKS OF INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT MUST NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED COLLABORATOR OF THIS REVIEW. NO EDITION OF REVIEW MAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS DOINGS.

3. DURING OUR OWN PREVIOUS CONSIDERATION OF APPROACHING GIBSON FOR WTRK JERVAY (ALSO RECD JERVAY) ASKED LOCAL ODENVY IF HE WAS THEIR AGENT AND WAS TOLD NO.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, RICHARD
201-306052
SEX M DOB ?

040-006-138/03
NBDA-10084
12 MAR 64

PAZR 1918303

```
000000 00000000000 0
111 1 11111111 1 1111
2 222222222222222222
3333333333333333333 3
44 4444444444444444444
55555555555555555555
66666666666666666666
7777 7777777777777777
88888888888888888 888
999999  999999 99999
```

CIT USA
OCC EDITOR
Δ FRANCE

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDITION OF REVOLUTION DISPATCH CONTAINS CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SUBJ AND PADBAYON/1

1 918 303

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

SECRET

PRQ NO.

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM: QREBONY/1

2. PSEUDONYM: Frederick T. Dominic

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

In response to Headquarters requests, London Station officer George H. KatZenbach contacted Subject in London in mid-January 1965 for the purpose of debriefing him on his experiences in the pro-ChiCom milieu in Africa and western Europe up to the time of his departure from the staff of Revolution in sping 1964. This was followed up by in-depth debriefing sessions carried out by Katzenbach in a PBSWING conference room on 17,18,19 and 23 February. On the basis of these talks it was decided to recruit Subject for a test assignment in Algiers during the summer of 1965 during which time he would attempt to build long-term access and cover for reporting on activities and personalities in the Afro-Asian community. KUDESK/ICG staffer Joseph S. Tiffany was dispatched to London TDY 1-7 June for this purpose. ~~Afxm~~ After recruitment and agreement to LCFLUTTER examination, Subject was introduced to his Paris-based Case Officer, Rufus F. RODIGAST, on 3 June.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Yes/ To any Case Officer introduced to him by RODIGAST, TIFFANY or KATZENBACH.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

KATZENBACH - known to Subject as "Earl Wilson"

TIFFANY - " " " " "Robert 'Bob' Gustke"

RODIGAST - " " " " "Paul Weller"

FORM 7-59 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-20)

SECRET

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "a communist.")*

Subject's lack of funds and a job are of primary importance. His need for cash (evidenced to some extent by his attempt to peddle articles to China Quarterly, Encounter and Atlantic Monthly in the fall of '64) was critical. But of even greater significance is his desire to effect his long-range rehabilitation in order not to be stuck in the morass of the impecunious and "morally fraudulant" extreme left

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

for the rest of his life. Also important in Subject's motivation is the sense of adventure connected with "The Game", which is enhanced by his desire to deceive (to put one over on) those persons, such as Verges, who exploited and deceived him. Subj. evinces deep contempt for these professional revolutionaries and what he refers to, with feeling, as their "moral fraud".

Control exists quite strongly in the area of Subject's material welfare and need for rehabilitation.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subj. explained to his wife that "Wilson" (Katzenbach), who telephoned his home was an American publisher's representative. Subj. and Rodigast will use a journalist/literary agent cover in the unlikely event their clandestine meetings are compromised.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Freelance journalist, author. · sympathetic leftist

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

KUBARK

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subj. applied for association with KUBARK in 1950 and again in 1960; his enemies have tried to discredit him by calling him a KUBARK agent, but there is good evidence that this rumor campaign has not hurt him among his friends, even his friends on the extreme left of the political spectrum. No known I. S. connection.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

None.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Basic security tradecraft briefings in London 1 - 7 June 1965;
SW training in Paris 14 June 1965.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

British. Subj. resided in London from June '64 to June '65. His wife is a British subject.

SECRET

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

In December 1963 Subj. was interviewed by a consulate officer in Paris for information on Lee Harvey Oswald, who reportedly had some contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Subj. was completely co-operative and the interviewer suggested follow-up, but the contact was dropped.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subj. elicits information from his broad circle of friends and acquaintances in the Afro-Asian/liberation movement areas.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Nothing

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject will operate under free lance journalist cover to develop contacts in the target milieu of Afro-Asian "Anti-imperialist" activity and solicit information from them on their activity, plans and views. It is possible that such contacts may lead to a possibility of employment or association with some organization in this field, but whether or not he will be instructed to accept will depend on the specific nature of the job and similar factors which cannot be anticipated now.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

No PM duties or use is anticipated. No systematic CA exploitation is anticipated given the risk of compromise. Selective CA exploitation within his cover situation - i.e. as a provacateur or means to surface anti-Soviet material from a "National Liberation" standpoint - will be continually possible.

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

None.

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subj. has a contract for 1 June - September 1965 providing for salary of $500.00 per month, non-accountable expenses of $100.00 per month and per diem computed at the rate of $20 for days spent travelling to and from Algiers and $10 for period of residence in Algiers. (The $10 rate represents an oral amendment to the contract.) This is to be renegotiated o/a 1 September for extension to two years with 30-day termination clause.

SECRET

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject's skill as writer/editor may qualify him for CA work.

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

See Section VIII. In addition it is set forth in the Letter of Agreement with Subject, that KUBARK will compensate Subject for any relocation of his family required by virtue of an approved change in place of employment.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

See Letter of Agreement. KUBARK recognizes its moral obligation to protect Subject against any adverse action which might result from activities engaged in by Subject at the request of KUBARK during his period of employment.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

London, Algiers, Paris Station files; JAGUAR, ODENVY traces and reports are also included in material available on Subject.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

Reports have been received by various QKOPERA contract agents.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

No POA required under the terms of CSI 10-5.

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is a rather cynical intellectual. He has a keen sense of what is in his best interest, however, and there is xxx every reason to believe that he considere a reliable and secure performance for KUBARK to be in his best interest. He showed a good sense of security in communications during his recruitment period. LCFLUTTER examination 13 June 1965 revealed no deception by Subject.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

While working for AFP in Paris (1958) Subject forged the signature of a personal enemy, Ollie Harrington, to a letter to the editor calculated to get Harrington in trouble with French authorities. Subject ahsamed of this action.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS; GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Liquor in moderatiion, no drugs. He is believed to have engaged in extra-marital sexual affairs, but in a discreet manner.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

None known

SECTION XIV **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject speaks fluent but foreign-accented French. He has a functional speaking command of Spanish and Italian and can read German. Except for his language, he could pass as an Algerian.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

All source, including extensive interview of Subject during the period January - June 1965

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra.)*

None anticipated

SECTION XV **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Original method of contact was phone call to Subject's home (by Katzenbach) using ~~hix~~ the name Wilson. Subsequent RODIGAST contacts have been laid on at prior meetings and vary as to time and place. A~~x~~ signal is provided for (removal of glasses, which both wear) should either wish to prevent the meeting. A simple carbon-pad type, low level SW was used by Subject for sending emergency messages to a Paris drop. This has been replaced by an open code system to cover specific requirements, laid ~~xx~~ on at each meeting

SECTION XVI **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

LCFLUTTER examination of Subject o/a 13 June (no deception reported PALP 4056).

DATE 29 June 1965	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER Austin Goodrich (CI/ICG/Ops)

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES 8	
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052	SECRET	GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
X-REF TO FILE NO.	43		
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		1 · 2 · 3 · 4 · 5 · 6 · 7 · 8
DESTROY ☐ SIG. Bill Mcloy	AF/CD		
FROM ALGIERS			
ACTION AF 7	☒ ~~RID~~ COPY	ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	UNIT AF · TIME 0720 · BY RFC
INFO FILE VR, WE 6, FE 6, CA 2, CA/04, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, TSD 6			

AN 4	~~FI~~	CI/ICG
~~SS~~	~~DEST~~	~~[illegible]~~
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

29 ... 65 IN 01815

S E C R E T 290825Z

IMMEDIATE PALP ~~DIR SITE~~ ALGI 6237

KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY ZIEET

REF : PALP 4712*

LOCAL SECURITY EXPECTED BE GIVING SPECIAL ATTENTION ANYONE PREVIOUSLY CONNECTED BEN BELLA, COMMUNISTS (LOCAL HUMANITE REP FORCED DEPART YESTERDAY). HAVE NO ENTRY INFO EXCEPT BELIEVE LIKELY BE EASIER FROM TUNISIA. SUGGEST YOU CHECK ALGI EMB PARI ON VISA POLICY. FROM HERE ASSUME IF IT NOT EXPIRED CAN BE USED WITHOUT REVALIDATION. **

S E C R E T

*APPARENTLY WRONG REF. POSSIBLY PALP 4172 (IN 88695) INTENDED

** STEBONY UNABLE ENTER ALGI.

201-306052

29 June 65

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OELA-43,459
TO Chief, ~~KUDESK~~ AF; Chief, LCPIPIT INFO Chief, WE; Chief, ~~AF~~ KUDESK; Chief, KUWCLP		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-
FROM Chief of Station, London		DATE 28 June 1965
SUBJECT STEBONY JAGUAR JAGUAR Report of STEBONY Surveillance		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		
REFERENCE(S)		

1. Pursuant to the suggestion contained in DIR 04341, 23 April 1965, we asked JAGUAR to lay on such coverage as they could manage. After some weeks has passed, and JAGUAR had not moved in this direction, we repeated our request, pointing out that STEBONY/1 would soon be leaving. Short-handed and hampered by certain restrictions, JAGUAR moved in to do what they could, and their coverage was due to start almost at the same time as TIFFANY was to begin his meetings with S/1. We contacted JAGUAR and told them to lay off (much to our chagrin) for the time being. This they did, but then, without our being advised, they resumed their coverage. We don't know exactly how long they actually had him in their sights, but they have now given us a letter (text below) suggesting that he was watched on 5, 6 and 7 June. A JAGUAR officer advised us informally that S/1 "seemed to be out of town" for one or two days. (TIFFANY had mentioned that he might take S/1 to the country for a day, but we don't know whether in fact he did so.)

2. Here is JAGUAR's note:

> "As explained in conversation on the 8th June, 1965, we have received a report on S/1's movements during the period 5th - 7th June, 1965. Nothing of interest was learnt about his movements on the 6th and 7th June, but you may be interested in the following information relating to the 5th June: -
>
> "S/1 left his home at 11.25 and travelled by taxi to the Haymarket where he entered the American Express offices. He obtained a ticket for an air passage to Brussels and a train journey to Basle, thence to Lausanne and Paris where he was due to arrive on the 10th June. He paid £20-29-1d for his ticket. He left the American Express at 12.30 and subsequently returned home at 13.20 hours.
>
> "He left home again at 14.05 and went to the Clarendon Court Hotel in Maida Vale. He came out of the building after five minutes and wandered around for twenty minutes before returning to the hotel. He stayed there until 18.45 when he left alone and returned home.

3. The JAGUAR officer also told me that S/1's contact at the Clarendon Court Hotel was not identified by the surveillant, who in fact did not know which room S/1 had visited. The contact, of course, was TIFFANY, registered as GUSTKE.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
- ~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK
- 2-Chief, LCPIPIT
- 3-Chief, WE
- ~~2-~~Chief, AF
- 2-Chief, KUWCLP

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CS COPY

30 JUN 1965

SECRET/KAPOK

Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF
Chief, WH;
Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief of Station, London.

X

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT
DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHEY/Launching the Good Ship STEBONY

REFERENCES: A. PALP 4056

B. PALP 4057

201

ACTION REQUESTED: Para 7, Para 8, Para 46.

SUMMARY

On 12 June 1965 STEBONY/1 met KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST in Paris in accordance with instructions and for the next three days underwent debriefings, briefings, an LCFLUTTER examination, and training in preparation for his summer 1965 assignment to Algiers. At the conclusion of this period LCPIPIT felt that S/1: had absorbed sufficiently the guidance given him, had responded satisfactorily to Case Officer control, was apparently clear of hostile direction, and was motivated to perform creditably throughout his three-month trial employment.

ATTACHMENTS U.S.C.:

A. Idens.
B. RODIGAST contact reports for 12,14&15 June meetings
C. RODIGAST report on STEBONY/1's comments re Frantz Fanon Documentation Center, Milan.

D. RODIGAST report on STEBONY/1's comments re the British Guiana PPP office in London.

E. RODIGAST review of two published works by STEBONY/1
F. Cy of STEBONY/1 initial s/w letter to RODIGAST.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - C/KUWOLF w/atts. A,B,C,D,E,F u.s.c.
1 - C/KUDESK w/atts. A,B,C,D,E,F u.s.c.
1 - C/AF w/atts. A,B,F u.s.c.
1 - COS/Algiers w/atts. A,B,F u.s.c.
1 - COS/London w/att. A u.s.c.
1 - C/WH w/atts. A,B,C,D u.s.c.

JUN 29 1965

OPLA 2555 25 June 1965

SECRET/KAPOK 201-306052

Personally, S/1 appeared to understand and to follow good security practices by and large, but he was concerned that his wife now suspected him of being "up to something" of which she did not approve. In short, his overall long-term security appeared weakest closest to home. Nevertheless, he appeared highly confident that previous denunciations to which he had been subjected would not "stick" and that he could rapidly reestablish himself among revolutionary circles.

His relationship to KUBARK over the longer period has apparently been of considerable interest to him, to the extent that he stated he would be interested in some sort of career status with KUBARK (with retirement benefits) and perhaps one day a "less covert" position. At this time in our relationship with S/1, however, LCPIPIT is concerned primarily with what to do with him on 1 September 1965. In fact, in view of the 19-20 June developments in Algiers and the possible postponement of most of the activities S/1 was to cover in efforts to reestablish himself as a legitimate propagandist for national liberation movements, KUBARK may find it not only feasible, but necessary, to revise S/1's initial KUBARK mission.

In the days and weeks to come we will be reporting S/1's progress as he relates his accomplishments and problems through S/W communications and in meetings with RODIGAST. We shall be submitting recommendations on S/1's longer term utility to KUBARK as we have more information upon which to make some judgments. We know that addressees will be subjecting the STEBONY operation to constant evaluation and analysis throughout the summer, and we will appreciate continued and coordinated guidance on how best to exploit the unique potential represented by this asset.

I. LCPIPIT SUPPORT FOR THE STEBONY OPERATION

1. On 3 June 1965 STEBONY/1 signed a letter of agreement with ODYOKE in London, in effect a contract with KUBARK. Upon signing the letter of agreement and agreeing to undergo an LCFLUTTER examination, S/1 was introduced to Rufus F. RODIGAST, a KUWOLF Career Agent based in Paris who had been designated S/1's outside case officer. RODIGAST is known to S/1 under the alias "Paul Weller." RODIGAST met at length with S/1 on 3, 5, and 6 June and made arrangements for S/1 to meet him in Paris 12 June and undergo further training, briefing, and security processing prior to embarking on a trial assignment of some 10 weeks.

2. On 12 June 1965 S/1 made contact with RODIGAST in Paris in accordance with instructions and was taken immediately to a safehouse for debriefing on his 8-11 June trip in West Europe and for training in the use of S/W system #64. RODIGAST's Contact Report on this meeting and his report of the debriefing are included in Attachment B (USC.). S/1 was passed $200.00 to make travel arrangements for his trip to North Africa. (See also PALP 4057).

3. On 13 June S/1 again met RODIGAST in accordance with instructions and was taken to his LCFLUTTER examination at an LCPIPIT safehouse. The results of this examination were forwarded in PALP 4056. In short, the outcome of the examination was considered satisfactory for the proposed operational use of S/1.

4. On 14 and 15 June RODIGAST again met with S/1 for further debriefings on the latter's contacts in Paris. RODIGAST then briefed him on KUTUBE requirements for [illegible] and passed on the requirements and information forwarded in DIR 18107 and DIR 18675. RODIGAST's reports on these meetings are also included in Attachment B (USC). On 14 June S/1 was passed $500.00 as an advance on his per diem and travel expenses for his next meeting with RODIGAST. RODIGAST considers S/1 an apt student who learned the S/W system well in some two hours of instruction. Paris KURIOT Officer DONAHY noted some carelessness on S/1's part in the test messages, and this was subsequently brought to S/1's attention in the overall security briefing he received from RODIGAST.

5. The communications system established with S/1 consists of pre-arranged meeting sites and times, a one-way S/W system, and the use of the classified advertising section of the Algiers El Moudjahid (received daily in Paris) by S/1 to signal a postponement of meeting dates. The one-way system was chosen for this initial stage of the agent's operational relationship with KUBARK for reasons of security; given the operational climate in Algiers and the specific circles in which S/1 must move, and adding to the sudden political upheaval in Algeria, S/1 would not be in a position to receive incoming communications safely. As of 23 June S/1 had initiated S/W correspondence, his initial effort being clearly legible and the content operationally worthwhile. (See Attachment F).

6. The next RODIGAST contact with S/1 is scheduled for 15 July in Rome. (See OFLA 2538 for LCPIPIT's request for Rome Station support.) In view of the events that have just taken place in Algeria the meeting may well be concerned as much with rethinking S/1's operational objectives for the period following 16 July as with debriefings, briefings, and passage of funds. Even though latest indications are that Bandung II will proceed as scheduled, it is questionable whether the AAJA or the Afro-Asian Women's conference will be held in Algiers this summer. Moreover, there is no assurance at this writing that MHWINCH will not be either postponed, canceled, or moved elsewhere. Add to this the possibility that IDEN A might be on the scene profiting from the sudden rise in the political fortunes of his friends, and Algiers suddenly loses some of its appeal as an area in which to carry out a meaningful test of S/1's operational capabilities. The next three weeks will tell us much and perhaps allay many of our apprehensions.

7. Nevertheless, RODIGAST must be prepared to handle a number of eventualities in his 15 July meeting, not the least of these being a possible revision of S/1's mission. The following possible alternatives present themselves; we ask Headquarters to address its attention to them and to other developmental targets and to cable recommendations and guidance prior to 13 July:

A. S/1 to remain on site, continue his efforts to establish credentials and find a job in Algiers, or elsewhere, in the national liberation movement, and report on political developments in Algeria.

B. S/1 to travel to Dar es Salaam to look into the job offer made some time ago by Dennis [illegible].

C. S/1 to proceed to Brussels to continue development of IDEN B (see OFLA 2541).

D. S/1 to return to London to write up reports and operational proposals and polish up the translation of IDEN B's book.

E. S/1 to follow the MHPINCH caravan wherever it may lead (perhaps Sofia?) and continue to look for job leads (outside the Bloc).

8. The second RODIGAST meeting of the summer with S/1 is tentatively scheduled for the second week in August, site to be determined. Addressees will know that S/1's wife is expecting their third child o/a 11 August and that S/1 intends to be in London at that time if at all possible. Although he told RODIGAST he would forego a visit to London at that time if it were operationally necessary, he would find it difficult to justify his absence to his wife unless he were to have a truly plausible and urgent cover assignment. We must therefore anticipate in all likelihood that S/1 will be out of action for most of the second week of August. In any event, RODIGAST will probably be able to meet S/1 somewhere in Europe when S/1 returns to be with his wife and will at that time hope to be in a position to discuss with S/1 the best employment of his talents for the balance of the three-month contract period and to pursue with him his longer range utilization as well. Headquarters views, then, are needed both with respect to the weeks immediately following the 15 July meeting referred to in the previous paragraph as well as with respect to the post-August period.

9. Administratively, LCPIPIT has so far funded S/1 to the extent of $700.00 and has initiated action to have his salary and nonaccountable operational advance deposited to his Swiss bank account. These payments are being made in advance because of S/1's initially pressing financial needs. It is our understanding that the 1 July and 1 August 1965 deposits of $600.00 to S/1's Swiss bank account will be effected securely and on time through KUHAD/1 (see DIR 20944 and DIR 21703). Action was also taken to clarify the question of S/1's per diem. We have received his initial accountings for travel, per diem, and operational expenses for the period 8 - 12 June.

10. ON the basis of information available to LCPIPIT, S/1 has received the following payments from KUBARK since he was first contacted in London by George H. KATZENBACH in January of this year (we have no record at hand of the KUBARK funds passed S/1 by FAINMAN of KMCRESIS):

AMOUNT	DATE	COMMENT
$300.00	1/25/65 (o/a)	Ops payment per DIR 78506
400.00	2/23/65	Ops payment per ORLN 21869
400.00	April/65	Ops payment per DIR 98974
400.00	May/65	Ops payment per DIR 04341
100.00	6/2/65	Ops payment per DIR 04341 (signing bonus)
500.00	6/3/65	Ops salary advance for June/65
100.00	6/3/65	Nonaccountable ops advance for June/65
200.00	6/3/65	Travel and per diem advance
200.00	6/12/65	Travel Advance
500.00	6/14/65	Travel and per diem advance.

TOTAL: $3,100.00

11. Beginning with the Ops payment in May 1965, these payments have been T/A'd to Headquarters for charge to YQHITCH. In addition to his present salary of $500.00 per month and his $100.00 monthly nonaccountable advance for operational expenses, S/1 is entitled to the following under the letter of agreement he signed 3 June 1965:

a) necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by ODYOKE.

b) operational expenses in excess of $100.00 monthly nonaccountable advance as are specifically authorized by ODYOKE.

c) compensation in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of S/1 and his family to a new residence if such relocation is considered desirable by S/1 and ODYOKE.

d) per diem at the rate of $20.00 per day during periods of authorized travel (i.e.: during absence from London).

II. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

12. At this stage in KUBARK's relationship with STRBONY/1 it is well to note certain factors that must be taken into consideration as we seek to devise a longer-term operation centered on his capabilities and potential. For the sake of brevity, if not precision, we will discuss these factors under the following headings: Personal Assets, Motivation, Handling & Guidance, Security, Termination, and KUBARK Operational Requirements.

PERSONAL ASSETS:

13. STRBONY/1, as has been noted in OELA 42,750 "really astonishes with the breadth of his personal information and understanding... [of] African affairs (especially in left-wing fields), European Trotskyists and Communists and their general milieu, and Chinese-oriented international front organizations. Similarly, he appears to be informed on certain Chicom efforts at subversion and propaganda in Latin America." Combined with this knowledge and understanding is a long list of personal contacts in left-wing revolutionary circles and a reputation as an articulate and committed agitator for national liberation movements.

14. The Agent exudes an air of self-confidence and presents himself well and dynamically in interpersonal relationships. He has demonstrated talent as a working journalist, especially as a reporter. While we have limited information here upon which to base an evaluation of the accuracy and thoroughness of his reports, they have tended to be consistent on the whole and reveal the workings of a mind capable of storing away vast amounts of information and recalling it with minimal stimulation. S/1 seems to have good command of the French language and can get by in Italian and Spanish. He has had considerable experience in international travel, apparently accommodating well to various degrees of discomfort and hardship as the case may require. He is able to use cameras and tape recorders operationally, and he quickly learned s/w techniques.

15. Because of his coloring and facial characteristics S/1 can pass relatively unnoticed as a North African, Near Easterner, South Asian, or American Negro, inter alia. He gives the impression of being able to strike up casual friendships readily and easily.

MOTIVATION:

16. This is a sticky area open to considerable speculation at this point, though there are specific actions and statements on the part of S/1 indicating he has sought some professional relationship with KUBARK for several years. We understand, for example , that he tried to establish contact with ODYOKE while a student in Italy in 1951-52, that he appeared to be most cooperative when questioned by PBSWING Paris in relation to the assassination of President Kennedy, and that he took a calculated (?) risk by writing in directly to KUBARK in the summer of 1962 offering his services. In his contacts with KUBARKers since January of this year he has given every indication of being forthcoming and, apparently, sincerely interested in cooperating with us. One has the impression he was hoping to be recruited, and he certainly didn't play hard to get.

17. Now that he has signed a letter of agreement, undergone an LCFLUTTER, and been passed a considerable amount of KUBARK money he may consider himself already "on the team," though in effect he was told specifically at the outset that he had to prove himself over the next three months. He has intimated to RODICAST that he would like to parlay his present association with KUBARK into a long-term career relationship including retirement, insurance, etc. He has even alluded to an interest in working for RODICAST's "service" in a "less covert" capacity sometime in the future.

18. One basic question rests with all of us concerned: Why?

In his early talks with the London Station and again in his talks with BODIGAST and TIFFANY the Agent has indicated some degree of disenchantment with the organizations and personalities, if not the ideology, of the left-wing factions with which he had been so intimately involved. He has never gone so far as to renounce his birthright and citizenship, nor does he consider himself disloyal after several years of professional anti-PBPRIME activity. He intimates that he would someday like to return home, though he doubts he would be allowed to live down his past and start a new career in PBPRIME.

19. On the basis of information available to us we could not say that [illegible]/1 is or ever was an ideologically committed Marxist-Leninist. We might say that he has nurtured over the years a smouldering prejudice against the "in" group, both domestically and internationally. He has been an "out" most all of his life, and he has shown a strong attachment to the causes of the downtrodden Cubans, the colonially oppressed Africans, the organizationally subdued "young Turks" of orthodox communist and other leftist movements, etc. There is no question that in his sympathy for such causes he overstepped the bounds of reason and good sense, but it is doubtful that he actually committed any treasonable offense. One has the feeling that S/1 really sought to hedge his bets on the revolutionaries by putting out feelers to KUBARK.

20. There is a strong case for the argument that hard cash plays a significant role in motivating S/1 to cooperate with KUBARK at this point in time. All reports emphasize that he was not just broke, but deeply in debt, when he began talking to London Station. Subsequently he has been receiving what amounts to a salary at a rate somewhat in excess of average for a European journalish, let alone a professional small-time revolutionary. Since he has had no valid cover story for anything other than the first advance(s) from QKOPERA, we cannot be sure that he has let his wife, his in-laws, or his immediate circle of associates know the extent of his newly-acquired affluence. He is quite capable of thinking big operationally and has bluntly stated that it takes money to "move" in Algiers and that "poverty is no virtue in the 'Third World' ".

21. But S/1 does not appear to be an out and out mercenary. There must be other factors than money alone that would lead him to cooperate with KUBARK. It could well be that he is reacting philosophically to an outlook on life that let him down despite years of devoted cultivation. In the long debriefings he rarely, if ever, mentioned anyone who he felt had really accomplished anything as a professional left-wing revolutionary. There are indications that he regards his activities over recent years as somewhat unrewarding, though there is little indication that he didn't enjoy much of what he did or that he doesn't consider the cause of the national liberation movements a just and honorable cause. He may, simply, have reappraised the results of some years of revolutionary activity with a somewhat jaundiced eye and decided it was time for a change.

22. Certainly S/1 builds a convincing case about the reasons for his break with IDEN C, but it must also be noted that ideology is not among them. If anything, it would seem he was reacting to a breach of contract and perhaps wounded pride. The net result seemed to be a well of resentment against one individual, which resentment fermented into spite and determination to "get even." If this assumption is granted, then the letter he had published in ZHEARTH and the manuscript he submitted to KMGENESIS are both explainable and explain much. It was his involvement with these publications that triggered KUBARK's operational interest in him, and we initiated contact at a period when he was, perhaps, basking in (what he probably considered) the success of his attack on IDEN A.

23. Looked at from still another angle, S/1's future prospects in January of this year (both in his professional and his personal life) were anything but bright for: he was jobless, in debt, to some extent cast off by the revolutionary movement, apparently felt homeless (as far as having something to which he could return in PBPRIME), and (from what scraps of information we can piece together) was not experiencing a mutually agreeable marital life. (He asserts he was unfaithful and that his wife knew it. We have learned from KAYZENBACH's talks with the SMOTHERS that she was unfaithful in her turn,

though we have no confirmation of this from S/1). In such a situation KUBARK was able to offer S/1 an opportunity to, in effect, begin anew, get out of a hole, rebuild his own self-esteem, and perhaps even build up some credit toward an eventual return to PBPRIME under conditions which he would find bearable.

24. It is interesting that in his long conversations with RODIGAST he should raise the question of his motivation as if to reassure ODYOKE that he was "on the level." He protested that we must not think that he had taken on this job just to "get out of a hole" for three months and explained that he wasn't really in a hole. He claimed that his debts to his brother-in-law were not a pressing matter at all. (However, during his LCFLUTTER examination we are told that the area in which he reacted most strongly was that concerning personal obligations, especially financial. We were probing to find out if he was indeed under some obligation, financial or otherwise, to certain of his revolutionary associates of the past two and a half years, and what ensued was an outpouring of all the small and not so small debts he owed virtually everyone he knew. Foremost among these was the debt of some £ 1,500 to his brother-in-law. Whether or not he feels pressed to repay is not as important as the fact that there seem to be times when it weighs heavily on his mind.)

25. Giving S/1 the last word, the following report from RODIGAST on his 14 June conversation with the Agent should be given careful consideration: "It was clear that he was telling me, without spelling it out in words, that he had made up his mind to cooperate with us because, or partly because, he had decided he wanted to be on our side. He even used expressions like 'our side'. I had the feeling that he did not want to say outright that he was changing his political orientation for fear that we would not believe him, but that in fact he might very well be doing so; I think there was something genuine in his protestation that he wasn't with us 'only for the money'."

HANDLING & GUIDANCE:

26. The least that can be said of S/1 in summarizing his relationship with his KUBARK contacts so far is that he is not docile and passive. He appears to be a self-starter with a sense of what is necessary to get an operation off the ground. From his account of his work for IDEN C it would appear that he can honestly claim a great deal of credit for putting the English edition into business.

27. To date S/1 has expressed no reluctance to undertake his current mission nor to consider other missions for KUBARK which might work a hardship on him or place his person or reputation in jeopardy. His responsiveness, in fact, encourages us to believe that he will accept assignments which permit him to move easily in those revolutionary left circles which are natural to him and which comprise, in effect, his natural target. He has, of course, made a case for working out of Paris, Rome, or Geneva rather than Algiers or Djakarta, but this was prior to his entering into a formal relationship with ODYOKE.

28. RODIGAST feels that he has been able to establish a good degree of working rapport with S/1 and perhaps even some degree of personal rapport. They have had some half-dozen meetings so far, including three working sessions in Paris. RODIGAST has stressed to him the vital importance of good security habits, not the least of which involves such personal behavior as will keep him out of compromising situations (in respect to his work for KUBARK).

29. S/1 has been on time for all his meetings with RODIGAST and has complied well with instructions; he submitted without hesitation to the LCFLUTTER and agreed to work with S/W (accepting the risks involved in disposal of the working materials). S/1 has not failed to remind RODIGAST of the probable cost of his upkeep and operational activities while in Algiers and has been assured that RODIGAST "fought for the $20.00 per diem

right on up the line." Needless to say, STEBONY/1 seemed most happy to know that RODIGAST was concerned for his welfare.

30. RODIGAST feels that he can manage S/1's self-assertion and dynamism, and LCPIPIT points to RODIGAST's record of handling "difficult" agents. RODIGAST's experience is reassuring in this connection, and we have no reservations about RODIGAST's ability to keep STEBONY/1 motivated in the months ahead.

31. A last word on the matter of handling: turn-over. So far S/1 has dealt with KATZENBACH, TIFFANY, and RODIGAST and has been forthcoming with all. There is no indication at this early stage that he has placed his relationship with KUBARK on a person-to-person plane nor are we sure he should be encouraged to do so. As representatives of ODYOKE the three persons mentioned above have apparently earned S/1's trust, and anyone introduced to him by one of them would probably be accepted with the same degree of confidence should the introduction of another case officer become necessary. In effect, then, we foresee no handling problem with S/1 as far as a change in case officers might be concerned. We would point out, though, that S/1 has been handled sympathetically and without hostility to date and that those who have dealt with him would strongly advise firm intelligent direction and against a provocative or heavy-handed approach to such a complex and self-centered personality.

SECURITY:

32. S/1's very background is enough to pose all the security problems one would want to contend with in any operation. At the same time it is that very background that makes him valuable to KUBARK. Therefore we can discount many logical apprehensions about his personal loyalty and motivation (discussed previously) and proceed to questions of operational security.

33. First of all, S/1 has been denounced as a KUBARK agent since the mid-1950's when, to the best of our knowledge, he wasn't actively involved in revolutionary activities. He traces this original denunciation to an incident in which he resorted to some rather unscrupulous practices (forgery and false denunciation) to get an erstwhile friend and CPUSA member (with whose wife he had become involved) discredited in France. (See Attachment to OELA 43,272). The upshot was that S/1 was considered by many who knew him in Paris to be a KUBARK agent who had informed on his communist "friend" to the French police. From that time to the present the KUBARK tag has stuck in certain circles, though STEBONY/1 feels those who really know him, and those important revolutionaries and communists whom he knows and who are his potential targets as a KUBARK agent, have largely discounted the possibility that this could be so. There is no denying the fact, however, that this denunciation is a handicap. It has been used fairly effectively by his last employer, IDEN A, to burn him in a number of places where he was probably previously unknown. Certainly the publication of the denunciation in IDEN C did not raise his stature in some quarters. LOND 7620 indicates S/1's enemies have little desire to let sleeping dogs lie.

34. Furthermore, IDEN A seems at this moment to hold as great a grudge against S/1 as S/1 holds against him, and IDEN A may still have better connections in the national liberation movement than S/1. This is especially so in view of the 19-20 June 1965 downfall of the Ben Bella regime in Algeria. IDEN A was not a Ben Bella man, and his fortunes declined sharply in inverse proportion to the rise of Ben Bella's. IDEN A's closest link to Algeria's power elite has long been Rabah Bitat, according to S/1. In the papers of 22 June we read that, in a "startling development," former Vice-President Mohammed Bitat flew into Algiers from exile in France and said he was ready to "assume his responsibilities." We presume that IDEN A will seek to move quickly to derive personal advantage from this sudden change in Algeria. As if operating in the Algerian security climate were not hazardous enough, S/1 may well have to contend with a vendetta mounted by IDEN A.

35. [illegible]/1's family situation presents some cause for concern, also. As noted in the discussion on motivation, he has been receiving funds since January with only QKOFFRA to give as a source. His wife, who is a conscientious leftist, is presently suspicious of his activities, he says, largely because he received a phone call from PBSWING London in January. He explained it was a PBPRIMER journalist passing through who wished to talk with him, to which she was supposed to have retorted: "Why should someone from PBPRIME be interested in you, and, moreover, why should you be interested in working for anything or anyone from a PBPRIME?" S/1 told RODIGAST that the backstopping effort initiated by LOND 8004 did not fully dispel her skepticism. S/1's reaction to the FLUTTER examination on the question of "what his wife thinks" suggests that the matter is not laid to rest.

36. S/1 seems to be most concerned that his wife not find out he is working for ODYOKE, let alone KUBARK, and we presume he has reason to feel she would probably say or do something, whether deliberate or not, that would compromise him in his present situation. We do not know the history of S/1's marriage, but we have received indications from him that lead us to believe he could not count on her discretion and loyalty in all circumstances. His relationship with his wife, therefore, must be watched with some care to insure that it does not comprise an undue hazard or that she does not become vulnerable in some way to forces inimical to his effectiveness in his work for KUBARK.

37. Aside from speculation about possible repercussions in this area of their marital relationship, there remains the question of cover for some $3,180 passed S/1 by KUBARK in the past six months. His wife has been in the journalism business long enough to know that virtually unemployed journalists are not usually given travel and salary advances merely for the asking, especially when their press credentials are largely notional or the nominal sponsor has yet to go into publication. Thus, we have reason to believe she has some rather nagging doubts as to the legitimacy of S/1's present cover job. This is implicit in Paragraph 5 of the attachment ot OELA 43,272.

38. On 15 June S/1 told RODIGAST his wife told him on the phone that a letter to him from IDEN D warned him to be careful "as things might be 'hot' for him in Algeria." IDEN D had apparently heard of S/1's forthcoming trip from contacts in New York and Paris, and S/1 surmises this means news of his summer's travels must be rather common knowledge by now.

39. At TIFFANY's request S/1 let IDEN E know he was in Paris, and S/1 says that latter "came rushing around" to see him. S/1's report on this contact was passed to the Paris Station 17 June by LCPIPIT. In the report is S/1's assessment that IDEN E would probably be willing to talk to RODIGAST's "service." We shall discuss this case further with Paris Station, but in the meantime it should be noted for the record that as long as S/1 is said by many to be a KUBARK agent, it would not be unreasonable to assume that IDEN E might connect an approach by an ODYOKE representative with his recent conversations with S/1. Therefore, the possibility of a flap here should not be ignored.

40. As far as S/1's contacts with KUBARK, he knows no one by true name and his case officer will continue to use an alias in all future contacts. At the same time, there is the ever-present danger that he may some day come to know RODIGAST's true name because of the number of acquaintances they have in common in Paris. It was largely for this reason that RODIGAST will avoid holding future operational meetings with S/1 in Paris. RODIGAST has already reportedthe rather unsettling experience of having S/1 tell him: "I think I've seen you someplace before." RODIGAST says this is quite possible. Were S/1 ever to stay in Paris for a considerable length of time the chances are Not remote that RODIGAST's identity would be compromised to S/1.

TERMINATION:

41. The question of termination is not academic at this time, for explicit in the letter of agreement which S/1 signed is his termination on 1 September 1965 unless specific conditions are met. It is doubtful that KUBARK will indeed terminate S/1 on that date unless such action is made imperative for reasons of security or of gross malfeasance on his part.

42. In the event of the termination of S/1 we foresee at this time no great cause for concern about possible repercussions against KUBARK personnel or installations. In addition to the use of aliases, RODICAST's meetings with him will be in third countries, and S/1 has not been passed classified information. He does keep in his possession materials for the use of S/W System #64. He received training in the use of these materials (and underwent his LCFLUTTER) 2 in the apartment of two LCPIPIT contract personnel. This apartment, an LCPIPIT safehouse, was used only once previously for a clandestine meeting, and it will not be used again for at least two months.

43. Should it prove necessary to terminate S/1 the greatest danger which we can anticipate at this time grows out of his considerable skill as a writer and the possibility that this skill might be used to attack KUBARK or ODYOKE in some way, perhaps from the forum of the national liberation movement propaganda machinery which he has now foresaken. His knowledge of our operations and personnel has been kept to a minimum. Hence the danger of his pen speaking with great force or effectiveness is, we believe, not great and a problem which, though we must anticipate it, we believe to be remote.

11. KUBARK OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS:

44. All concerned would agree that a KUBARK agent who is unable to service KUBARK operational requirements would not be worth his keep. At the same time, it would be presumptious to expect that in a situation where the agent is being handled at arm's length and under such disadvantages in time and distance as in S/1's case, KUBARK's operational requirements could be regularly and, if necessary, speedily measured against the agent's capabilities and specific requirements levied on the agent.

45. So far in KUBARK's relationship with S/1 we have outlined a general target area for him, levied the requirement that he prove to KUBARK he can effectively penetrate that target area and operate in place, and levied subsidiary KUTUBE requirements for him to service as a by-product of his basic operational task. What we have assigned, in effect, is a short term operational mission upon which longer term operations might be based.

46. There is evidence in the reams of "testimony" KUBARK has taken from S/1 that he is a man who likes to operate, act, produce. There is also evidence that he, like any other human, consciously seeks approval and recognition of his work. The question to be posed is: Has KUBARK at this time, or will it have on 1 September 1965, an assignment for S/1 in which he can find satisfaction in producing a marketable product and find that approval and recognition which he requires? We must be more specific with him than to say: "Go out to Djakarta and see what you can dig up. We'll meet you again in two months for discussions." Rather, it would be well at this stage to review with the various area divisions those geographic areas in which S/1's talents could be fully exploited (Chile with FUSEB?, Venezuela as an FALN penetration?, Djakarta as an AAJA staffer?, Ghana as a DAA writer?, Tanzania as a Government Radio editor?, etc., etc.) and to have a definite assignment for S/1 in hand at the moment we negotiate the extension of his contract.

47. Certainly the sudden change of leadership in Algeria can be expected to affect the national liberation movement and personalities in that movement who have drawn succor from the Ben Bella regime. As noted in the section on security, it is reasonable to assume that S/1 will be in a less

than fortuitous position if his efforts to reassert himself on the national liberation movement stage are to meet with brickbats from IDEN A from a front row seat. ALGI 6171 and PARI 1934 tend to support the estimate that S/1's friends in the Ministry of Information may now be gone, while IDEN A's Algerian friends may soon be in positions of power. While it is still too early to assume that such a situation will arise, it is not too soon to assess the possible damage this could do S/1 in the general target area so far assigned him and to watch closely for signs that he may truly be burned beyond operational usefulness to KUBARK. We would hope this should not come to pass, but we cannot ignore the possibility.

48. In the event, then, that the next two month's activities compromise S/1's credentials in the national liberation movement, where would we go from there? One suggestion would be a TDY to ZRMETAL where his brain might be picked for operational leads and KUTUBE, KUDESK, and KUWOLF information. He could also be urged to write out and edit a number of exposés on fraud, deception, and general double-dealing in the national revolution movement and in certain communist circles. He might find a job with IDEN B who may well need a new crutch if S/1's reports of his diminishing influence are to be given credence. In short, steps ought to be taken now to define the alternatives awaiting S/1 as of 1 September 1965.

Harvey G. FAHRRICH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OELA-43,458

TO
Chief, KUDESK

INFO
Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, WE; Chief, AF

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-

FROM
Chief of Station, London

DATE
25 June 1965

SUBJECT
KUDESK STEBONY
6 STEBONY-Related BAIRN Items

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

1. Attached are selected extracts from BAIRN reports. BAIRN is a very sensitive SMOTH operation, and the items should be treated accordingly.

2. Marc SCHLEIFFER (misspelled in BAIRN) is of interest. Pablo is Pable FERNANDEZ, Cultural Attache at the Cuban Embassy in London. Other items should be self-explanatory. On page 3 of the attachment, "integration", where underlined, should read "segregation."

3. As with these items, London will try to bring to Headquarters (and other addressees') attention STEBONY-related items that we notice. On the other hand, we do not require to be info'ed on all STEBONY traffic in the future. We would like to see copies of all of his intelligence reporting, whether for passage to the SMOOTHERS or not. On that topic, we would like to recommend that a liberal policy be followed in determining what of his stuff to pass to liaison here. We will be glad to review his reporting for passage, if there is doubt about whether to pass it. We would also like to see any materials relating to him that may have a bearing on London Station operations, relating principally to the U.K., or relating to any of our liaison services here, of course.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

JUN 1965
201-306052
~~201-128665~~

FORM 10-57 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.
1

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,458
25 June 1965

31 May 1965 17.10 hours: Mark SCHWEIFFER (or SCHWEISSER ph) calls Pablo, tells him he arrived in LONDON two hours ago. (Note : he speaks English with a U.S.A. accent) Pablo says he had been talking about Mark last Saturday with Richard GIBSON, who Mark had thought to be living in Switzerland. Pablo says Richard has lived in LONDON for a year. Mark is now married, his wife and two children are with him. Pablo says that Roberto Yepe and his wife Galina are also in LONDON at the Embassy. Mark is in a hotel near the British Museum. Will come to the Embassy at once. Farewells.

17.15 hours: Roberto Yepe calls Galina at home, tells her Mark is in LONDON. Both overjoyed. They arrange to meet. Yepe does not know yet what he is doing here or how long he will be staying.

18.30 hours: Present: Pablo and Mark SCHW[illegible]ER (pres.). Voices very indistinct.

Pablo and Mark appear to be talking about mutual acquaintances, who are mostly poets and authors. Pablo goes out.

Yepe comes in and greets the visitor; he says that his wife Galina would like to see Mark this evening. Yepe explains about his transfer from Glasgow to London; he then asks Mark when he is going to Nigeria (?Algeria). Mark appears to say that he will not be going until February next year, after he has been to the States; after that he would like to settle down in Africa, in Zanzibar, or in (?Tanzania) - he does not know.

Yepe asks where he can find Dennis PHOMBEAH: Mark says that he is in the Tanzanian High Commission at 43 Hertford St. and that Yepe can mention his name. Yepe goes out (pres. to telephone Dennis) and does not return.

10.00 hours: Richard GIBSON (ph, speaks English with U.S.A. accent) calls Pablo in some excitement to say that SCHWEIFFER (ph) "is arriving today". Pablo says he already knows, had seen him yesterday (see 31st May above) and had given him Richard's telephone number. Richard asks for Mark's address. Pablo checks with Yepe, who was taken by Mark SCHWEFFER to the latter's hotel, but does not remember the name or address. Richard remarks that he knows Mark's plan. He is on his way

/ to . . . . .

1st June, Cont.

to Africa, is going to ALGIERS and wants to stay. Is going to Tanzania if he can. Had planned to leave LONDON today, but is staying over. Pablo replies, to see Richard and someone else. Richard thinks this is Dennis POMBEY (ph) to whom Mark had written from NEW YORK. Richard is ready to find accommodation for Mark and family while they are in LONDON, as Mark has little money. Richard is going out now until 16.00 hours when he will return to PRImrose 8775. Then he is due to go out again to the Tunisian Embassy. Asks Pablo to tell Mark that he (Richard) is going to Algeria, that he wants to see Mark, that there are possibly things that they can do together, that he or Mark could take the job offered by Dennis (POMBEY) in DAR-ES-SALAAM. Pablo says Mark is staying here to see Richard and presumably Dennis, then going to PARIS for five days, then on to Algeria. Richard says Mark can call him at home between 12.30 and 13.30 hours or after 16.00 hours.

Richard gives Pablo greetings from PETITA (or BETITA, ph) who says she is sending Richard and Pablo a new magazine called "Street" to be shared. She is working for the "Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee", Sue WRIGHT's (ph) group, and has "given up her job at the Nation". Pablo will send her some collaboration for the magazine. Farewells.

13.55 hours: Mark SCHLEIFFER (ph) calls Pablo (out). Then
1 June (cont'd asks for Yepe. Tells Yepe that they (Mark and family) had
slept late and are checking out of the hotel now. Confirms
with Yepe that the latter's wife Galina is at home. Is going
to telephone her. Yepe confirms Mark's having Galina's
number, then remarks that one of the two people Mark had
wanted to contact - GIBSON - had rung the Embassy. Mark
reminds Yepe of their having looked up together the telephone
numbers of the Tanzanian Mission. Mark has two numbers, one
GRO number and one FLA number (Note: the FLA number is
FLA 2327, home number of Dennis PHOMBEAH, Administrative
Attache. Mark had earlier said he had two people in LONDON
to contact, Richard GIBSON and Dennis.) He asks Yepe which
is the office number. Yepe checks then says it is GRO 8951.
Mark notes the Mission's address. Farewells.

1st June, Cont.

17.10 hours: Mark SCHLEIFFER calls from the Embassy to Yepe's flat, speaks to Yepe's wife, Galina, says he, "Maria and the children" will spend the night with the Yepes. His wife and children are at present in Pablo's flat (Note: Both flats are in Park West).

17.30 hours: Mark SCHLEIFFER called at Embassy by Richard GIBSON, who suggests their sharing a flat in ALGIERS. Both need to brush up their French before "the others pour in" to ALGIERS. Mark agrees to go to Richard's flat, 30 Stockleigh Hall, Prince Albert Road, to discuss various points. Mark mentions that his wife is an "Afro-American". Richard says that integration is much worse here than in the U.S.A.

2nd June

11.00 hours: Yepe calls the C.P.T.E., speaks to telex room, asks whether they can send a telex to Yepe's brother in Rumania. He explains that his (Yepe's) brother is Cuban Ambassador to Rumania and is due to go to Cuba today or tomorrow. He wants first to establish whether his brother is still in Rumania. If he is, Roberto wants the following message passed: "If you see Leo HUBERMAN in Cuba, please pass this message to him - 'If you come to LONDON, Dennis PHOMBEAH is anxious to see you'. (Signed) Roberto Yepe".

3 June

12.30 hours: Pablo calls Cuban Embassy (believed PARIS) (Obtained by direct dialling.) Speaks to Esther, then asks for Paco, who mentions that Guillermo has to return to Cuba, because his daughter has a cerebral haemorrhage. Pablo says he and Manuja are also "going to return". Paco asks "But they haven't called you?" Pablo replies "No". Gives no further explanation, but will write to Paco. Mentions that Mark SCHLEIFFER is coming to PARIS and will telephone Paco. Guillermo, Paco remarks, has already caught his plane to PRAGUE. Miriam is alone. Guillermo had been in touch with FRANQUI, and ROA had agreed to his going. This leaves the Commercial Attache.

SECRET

24 JUN 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Directory for Plans

SUBJECT: a Telephone Conversation Malcolm X - Carlos Moore and Sandy Bethune. (Afro-American Unity Group in Paris)

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment is a Xerox copy of a photostat of a transcript of a telephone conversation between Carlos Moore (and his friend Sandy Bethune) and the late Malcolm X, which took place 8 or 9 February 1965. SUGAR obtained this transcript on 4 June from the editor of the West Indian Gazette, (fnu) Manchanda. SUGAR believes that Manchanca got the photostat from the Ghana High Commission office in London. He further believes that the Afro-American unity group in Paris (among whom there is only one member with U. S. citizenship: the American Negro photographer, John Taylor) probably supplied the transcript to the Ghana officials as a means of building their credentials as a bona fide revolutionary organization, perhaps one entitled to receive financial support.

2. SUGAR gave the current (June 1965) address of Jamaican/Cuban Carlos Moore as: c/o Pedro Filipe, 168 Rue Grenelle, Paris 7e, France. SUGAR said that Filipe is a Cuban national.

12

INDEX
ABSTRACT

CSCI-316/02636-65

Attachment: 1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CI/ICG-AGoodrich:lac
22 June 1965

SECRET

201-759145

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addresee

1 - C/CI
1 - CI/L
1 - CI/RA
1 - RID
1 - CI/ICG/AMS

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 37

11 SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM LCPIPIT (PARIS)

ACTION AF 7 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT AF/OF TIME 0735 BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/O 4, WH 7, WE 6, OF, CI, ADDP, FE 6

AN 2	FI	
PS	DES.	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

S E C R E T 231117Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY BUEN CITE PALP 4115 CILIBERTI ACTING

ZIBET QRPREY STEBONY KUDESK QKFIND SGFLAG

23 Jun 65 IN 98790

REF A DIR 20944
B DIR 21708
C PALP 3983 (NOT SENT BUEN) (IN 83309)

1. REQUEST DIR RELAY BUEN SUBSTANCE REF C, ESPECIALLY DEADLINES FOR DEPOSITS IN SWISS ACCOUNT.

2. BUEN PLS ADVISE WHEN TRANSFERS EFFECTED.

3. NO INDEX

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

201-306052

23 June 65

14-00000

file Stebony ops

01 June 65

Talked to Cy Goodrich this morning about STEBONY. He feels that he is on the level with us, that he is legitimately disenchanted with the far left, that he sees himself as a loyal American, that KATZENBACH was incorrect in saying that STEBONY would find it morally repugnant to act as a political action agent but would willingly serve as an FI collection asset (which doesn't make a whole lot of sense.) STEBONY was not in the least reluctant to take the LCFLUTTER; passed it apparently clean. The cover is admittedly a bit flimsey, but is supplemented by a connection with Tunisian L'Action for which he will do some layout work and writing. Cy believes that ~~he~~ ST understands perhaps better than he did the need for cover and attribution of income. Contract provides for $500 a month plus $100 non-accountable ops expenses plus $10 a day while in Algiers, plus $20 a day while in travel status, 1 June through 31 August, renewable for a two year period if mutually desirable and satisfactory, with 30 day termination clause. We have told ~~XXXXX~~ JAGUAR of our recruitment of STEBONY - Cy does not believe that they are in direct touch with him, but that they are in contact with friends of his, particularly one ?MARCHANY? or some such name. I asked Cy what STEBONY had been asked to do for us in Algiers, and he replied " to work himself into a position of access - to get information on factions and all developments in the conferences which have not been publicized." I asked if he had been given any requirements which dealt with strictly Algerian matters and he said No, that Rodigast had been told that we would send further requirements for the meeting tentatively scheduled with STEBONY in Rome or Tangier around 16 June.

I talked to Bob Wiley, who will draw up a list of requirements to send RODIGAST.

Cy Goodrich and I agreed that I would open ops files on STEBONY, even though we have no project yet, and he will give me the contents of his soft file to include in it. He is also having the 201 file tidied up by RI and will have it charged to AF/1

NP

SECRET

Chief KUWOLF X

Chief, KUDESK; Chief of Station, Brussels; Chief, WE

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT
DTDORIC/Operational
STEBONY/QRPREY/Operational Contact with Iden A

201

1. For the Information of COS, Brussels: KUDESK and KUWOLF are jointly engaged in the operational exploitation of the peculiar talents and contacts of a newly-acquired asset, STEBONY/1 (Iden B). STEBONY/1 has had a rather turbulent career as a leftist revolutionary agitator and propagandist over the past several years during which time he came to know (and be known by) a number of significant personalities in the pro-Chinese factions of several European Communist Parties. Among these personalities is Iden A. STEBONY/1 has been denounced within these same circles as a KUBARK agent for some time, though until January of this year KUBARK was not in contact with him. It was only early June of this year that he actually signed a letter of agreement with an "ODYOKE Service". Currently STEBONY/1 is in Algeria seeking to re-establish himself in revolutionary circles as a prelude to a long-term penetration operation (at KUBARK's behest) targeted against the revolutionary cadres of Africa, Asia and Latin America which are apparently being given increasingly direct support by Peking.

2. One of STEBONY/1's bona fides in revolutionary circles is his acquaintance with Iden A who has told him that, personally, he does not share the doubts spread about STEBONY/1 because, as Iden A puts it, STEBONY/1's primary accuser not only charges he is a KUBARK agent but also an Iden A agent, which Iden A of course knew not to be the case. However, STEBONY/1 is actually in the process of seeking to ingratiate himself with Iden A and of winning his confidence to such an extent that their personal relationship might serve as STEBONY/1's credentials for some time to come. At present the relationship shows signs of being off to a good start. STEBONY/1 visited Iden A in Brussels on 9 June 1965 with the intention of getting himself accredited as a correspondent of Iden A's newspaper, Iden C. Iden A told him that, in fact, Iden C was sending Iden D to Algiers to cover the summers activities there. Iden A then added that Iden D would get in touch with STEBONY/1 in Algiers (c/o Iden E) so that STEBONY/1 could "introduce him around". STEBONY/1 considers this a fortuitous circumstance in that

-continued-

Attachments:
Identity List usc
Book usc

Distribution:
3 - Chief, KUWOLF w/atts usc
✓2 - Chief, KUDESK w/att 1
2 - COS, Brussels w/att 1
2 - Chief, WE w/att 1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

OFLA-2541

18 June 1965

JUN 22 1965

SECRET

200-126-9/3

he can exploit Idem D as a "walking credential" in Algiers a unique way to suggest he himself is one of Idem A's "boys". It should be noted on the other hand that this situation provides Idem A a unique means of monitoring STEBONY/1's activities and contacts

3. Of priority interest at this moment, however is the fact that Idem A has expressed to STEBONY/1 his dissatisfaction with the progress to date in getting his book (Idem F) published in English Idem A claims that an Australian is supposed to be working on a translation but that he has heard nothing from him in over six months STEBONY/1 then told Idem A that he himself could do the translation job with the aid of friends but that he would have to spend some time with Idem A to work over fine points and to write together a new chapter updating the book In this way STEBONY/1 feels he could cement his personal relationship with Idem A

4. There are obviously operational and Station policy questions that should be considered in this context. First of all, our sole reporter on the STEBONY/1-Idem A relationship is STEBONY/1 himself Is he really seeking to set up a meaningful operational gambit to be exploited by KUBARK, or is he seeking to regain status among his former peers? We tend to believe the former on the basis of the results of STEBONY/1's LCFLUTTER examination and his long conversations with his deep cover case officer. Secondly, would the damage to the PBPRIME national interest inherent in the publication of Idem A's book in English outweigh the operational gain to be made by putting STEBONY/1 in Idem A's confidence. STEBONY/1 argues that, on the contrary, the publication of the book in English could hurt no one except possibly Idem A himself, because STEBONY/1 claims the book is a tiresome polemic against one small communist group by another small communist group. LCPIPIT has no intention of recommending that KUBARK help get the book in print in any case for that would be Idem A's own problem Moreover, if STEBONY/1 did not undertake the translating job, the Australian would probably come through before too long anyway.

5. We are sure that addressees can see in this situation the seeds of a useful operational contact with Idem A who, according to various reports STEBONY/1 is receiving from other of his contacts in the pro-Chinese factions of the European Communist Parties, is starting to lose his grip on his own organization

6 In any event, unless advised to the contrary, we intend to encourage STEBONY/1 to continue developing his relationship with Idem A, especially as regards translation of the book. We are forwarding to Headquarters (usc) a copy of the book and request that the appropriate office in KUCAGE be approached immediately and asked to provide, on a priority basis, an English-language translation which we can pass to STEBONY/1 He could then rework this translation somewhat and involve his wife in the editing of it presenting the finished product to Idem A as a family effort Of particular importance from a critical point of view is that translations of quotations from non-francophone sources (Marx and Lenin for example) should be consistent with the "official" English-language version of the quotations.

7 The time element involved is this: KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus F BODIGAST will be meeting STEBONY/1 in Rome on or about 15 July. At that time he should have some firm word from KUBARK on the status of the translation effort In matter of fact of course, the ideal situation would be to have the translation in hand at that time though we cannot gauge from here whether that is within the realm of possibility In any case BODIGAST would have to have the translation definitely in hand the first week of August when he will be leaving Paris for his second one meeting with STEBONY/1

8. Paris/LCPIPIT would welcome advice and guidance from addressees on this venture and would be happy to clarify further any points which may have been raised in this dispatch but not fully answered

Harvey G. FABBRICH

SECRET

Attachment to OFLA 2541
Under Separate Cover

Identity A - Jacques Grippa

Identity B - Richard T. Gibson, formerly of Fair Play for Cuba Committee and former editor of English edition *Révolution Africaine*

Identity C - *La Voix du Peuple*

Identity D - Arnold Hauwaert

Identity E - Georges Arnaud

Identity F - *Marxisme-Léninisme ou Revisionnisme*?

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO AF
Chief, KUDESK

INFO. Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, WE; Chief of Station, Algiers CHIEF KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT STEBONY
O JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1 LR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: LOND 8101

1. Following is the full text of the JAGUAR letter, a part of which was transmitted under ref:

> "We have received the following two items of intelligence about S/1:
>
> 1. Some time in May this year, S/1 said that he would be going to Tunisia on 15th June to work on the staff of the paper "L'Action."
>
> 2. After his quarrel with Jacques VERGES in 1964, S/1 received £200 as "personal financial assistance" from Jacques GRIPPA, the leader of the pro-Chinese Communist faction in Belgium. Nils ANDERSSON also gave him financial help.
>
> Our sources were not able to say when the financial assistance was given to S/1 but presumably that from GRIPPA was made available some time between July and November last year."

2. S/1 reported to Station in May that he had had an offer of a job on L'Action, but there was no intention of his accepting it.

3. London has some doubts about whether S/1 in fact received this much money from GRIPPA. We suspect that he has told people this to enhance his stature as a "Chinese agent"; we still wonder, though, what funds he may have been covering this way, since we had not contacted him as of the time in question. Perhaps, as a result of ref, LCPIPIT may shed some light on this point.

George H. KATZENBACH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-Chief, KUWOLF
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, AF
2-COS, Algiers - Out Pouch

(S/1 told [illegible] in [illegible] that he was going to [illegible] to [illegible] work & [illegible] L'Action - not a [illegible] [illegible])

201-306052

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
17 June 1965	2[illegible] JUN 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,38[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Rome, Chief KUWOLF X

Chief, KUDESK; Chief, WE (Attention: WE/4)

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT **PRIORITY**

DTDORIC/Operational

QRPREY/STRBONY/1 Contact in Rome.

1. KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST is now the deep cover case officer for STRBONY/1 a newly-acquired potential penetration asset targeted on the pro-Chicom revolutionary movements of Africa Asia and Latin America. On or about 15 July 1965 STRBONY/1 will proceed from his current base of operations (Algiers) to meet with RODIGAST in Rome per Iden A

2. While in Rome STRBONY/1 plans to stay with Iden B Moreover Iden B's apartment may be used as a meeting site for RODIGAST and STRBONY/1 when Iden B is at work. In view of this we request Station and Headquarters traces (KUDASK and ODENVY only) on Iden B.

3. While in Rome RODIGAST will more than likely require Station support in the nature of pickup and pouching facilities for documents cash travel advances for STRBONY/1 (which are to be T/A'd to Headquarters, charge YOWITCH) and cable commo facilities should the need arise. RODIGAST is known to Rome Station Officer Lowell F AISTON and perhaps others in the Station. RODIGAST is also known to and knows the witting personnel in PERREGALE.

4. We would appreciate hearing from Rome Station at your earliest convenience concerning your capability to render the type of support noted above. RODIGAST would plan to make contact with the Station through PERREGALE unless the Station should desire an alternate contact plan

Harvey G FAHRIDGE

Attachments:
Identity List (See PALP 4070) TO: ROME + ~~[illegible]~~ DIR

Distribution:
3 - COS Rome
✓2 - Chief KUWOLF
2 - Chief, KUDESK
2 - Chief, WE

CS COPY

JUN 17 1965

201-306052

OPLA-2538 17 June 1965

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S E C R E T 200-126-79/3

file STEBONY/1
201-306052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, KUDESK

INFO.
Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, WE; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM
Chief of Station, London R/F

SUBJECT
KUDESK STEBONY SMOTH
BAIRN Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached is a copy of an item culled from a report of BAIRN (a sensitive SMOTHop) reflecting contact between Mrs. Sarah GIBSON and Pablo FERNANDEZ, the Cultural Officer at the Cuban Embassy. There is nothing particularly new or startling here, and it is forwarded for inclusion in the records.

2. Maruja is Pablo's wife; Sarah is, of course, the wife of Richard GIBSON.

KCF
George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w

201-306052

1 att

CS COPY

DATE TYPED
16 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
17 JUN 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,353

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,353
16 June 1965

26th May, Cont.
16.40 hours: Mrs. Sarah GIBSON (ph), of the Press Department, Tunisian Embassy, calls Cuban Embassy, explains to Margo that she wants Pablo to send, as previously discussed, some copies of "Revolucion Pueblo y Cultura" and "Lunes de Revolucion", either just on temporary loan, or if some copies can be spared, for retention by the Tunisian Embassy. The Press Secretary in the Tunisian Embassy is on the point of leaving to go back to TUNIS (going on 28th May) and before doing so, he very much wants to have a look at those papers. Margo promises to arrange this matter with Pablo, for delivery of copies to the Press Department, Tunisian Embassy, 29 Prince's Gate. Sarah GIBSON asks for delivery today if possible, if not, the following morning.

16.50 hours: Pablo calls Mrs GIBSON at KNI 4133 on Christian name terms, asks how her husband, Dick, and the children are, confirms that he will let her have some copies of "Ruega" (ph) given to him by a Cuban in LONDON, also "Pueblo y Cultura", but has no copies of "Revolucion". Confirms he will come to Sarah's house on Saturday afternoon (29th May) with Maruja and the children if it is fine, but he will come anyhow, as he wants to have a talk with Sarah. The GIBSON's home number is PRI 8776. Sarah remarks that the Tunisian Press Secretary is being sent back to Tunisia to take charge of a newspaper, and he has been most impressed by the Cuban layout in their publications. He needs the copies to give him ideas for his own work, and Sarah wants the influence to be Cuban.

Jeune Afrique?

att #1 to OELA-43353

CS COPY

201-306052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, KUDESK

INFO.
Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, WE; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief, AF

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
KUDESK STEBONY
Processed STEBONY/1 De-Briefing Material

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are copies (one for KUDESK, one for LCPIPIT) of the processed material resulting from the initial series of debriefings of STEBONY/1. Again London Station is indebted to Roberta L. HORRELL for her superb work in preparing this excellent study.

2. We have made most of this material available to JAGUAR. The sections headed "Interest of Foreign Communist and Leftist Groups in the American Negro Problem," "The Robert Williams Case," "Black Nationalism," and "The American Negro" were not passed to JAGUAR.

3. We are retaining one copy of the entire study, which we are making available for review by ODENVY/London, who have expressed interest in this material. We trust that ODENVY Headquarters will be appropriately advised of the contents of these papers.

4. We see no reason for London Station to retain this copy in the files, and propose to destroy it unless Headquarters asks us to send it on to some other addressee. Similarly, we plan to destroy our copy of the rough transcript of the debriefing (previously forwarded under OELA 42,706, 9 March 1965) unless Headquarters would like us to send it on. In either case, let us know of your wishes regarding these items by, say, 15 July. In the absence of any instructions by that time, we will destroy them.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/o att
2-COS, Algiers, w/o att
2-Chief, AF w/o att

201-306052

CS ~~CI~~ COPY IN 200-124-156/4

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
15 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
17 JUN 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,329

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. RLM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 37

15 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM: ~~[illegible]~~ (LCPIPIT)

ACTION: EE 7

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TYPED

UNIT AF TIME 1132 BY [illegible]

INFO: FILE, VR, ADDP, [illegible], [illegible], CA 2, CA/O 4, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]

S E C R E T 151532Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO BERN LOND CITE PALP ~~4052~~ 4053

ZIBET QRPREY STEBONY KUDESK QKFIND

REF A PALP 3983 (IN 83509)

B BERN 5384 (IN 83502)

1. IN VIEW REF B, REQUEST HDQS EXPLORE WITH DIEARN CAPABILITY EFFECT SUGGESTED EXTERNAL BANK TRANSFER UNDER CONDITIONS SPECIFIED REF A. BRUSSELS MIGHT BE LOGICAL SOURCE IF CAPABILITY EXISTS.

2. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

15 JUN 65 IN 83772

AF	CI	
RG	[illegible]	
ABSTRACT ☒	INDEX	

SECRET

4 SUGGESTED EXTERNAL BANK TRANSFER.

201-306052

[illegible] 15 Jun 65

INDEX ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 42

201-3

9 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIB

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM PARIS (LCPIPIT)

ACTION WE 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/O 4, AF 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, TSD 6, FE 6, RI/AN

S E C R E T 151530Z

DIR INFO ALGI LOND PARI CITE PALP 4056

KUDESK STEBONY CRPREY

15 JUN 65 IN 90665

REF A. LOND 7991 (IN 81357)

B. LOND 7995 (IN 81479)

C. DIR 15660

D. FRAN 5087 (IN 82159)

ABSTRACT X

1. STEBONY/1 (S) MET RODIGAST (R) 12 JUNE PARI AS PLANNED AND PROCEEDED SAFEHOUSE WHERE R DEBRIEFED S AND TAUGHT HIM S/2 SYSTEM 64.

2. IN 13 JUNE LCFLUTTER S ANSWERED NEGATIVE TO FOLLOWING KEY QUESTIONS WITH NO INDICATION DECEPTION:

A. HAS ANYONE EVER APPROACHED YOU TO SERVE NON-PBPRIME IS?

B. HAVE YOU EVER SERVED ANY NON-PBPRIME IS IN ANY CAPACITY?

C. ARE YOU NOW A PAID AGENT OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT?

D. DOES YOUR WIFE KNOW YOU HAVE A CONNECTION WITH AN ODYOKE SERVICE?

E. HAVE YOU TOLD ANYONE ABOUT YOUR CONTACTS OR YOUR AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE WITH AN ODYOKE ORGANIZATION?

F. ARE YOU UNDER OBLIGATION TO ANYONE TO REPAY ANY DEBTS

SECRET

R' COPY

201-306052

SECRET

FUIN 90665 Page 2

RID/MIS

Jun 21 11 11 PM '65

OR FAVORS? (PER LOND 8131) (IN 87361)

G. IS THERE ANYTHING THAT WOULD MAKE YOU A TARGET FOR BLACKMAIL? (PROBE TO SEE IF REVOLUTION ASSOCIATES HAVE ANY HANDLE)

H. HAS ANYONE EVER ATTEMPTED TO BLACKMAIL YOU?

I. HAVE YOU EVER ATTEMPTED TO BLACKMAIL ANYONE?

J. HAVE YOU DELIBERATELY GIVEN US ANY FALSE OR FABRICATED INFO IN TALKS WE HAVE HAD WITH YOU?

3. 14 JUNE R BRIEFED S RE BANDUNG II MHNINCE AAJA, ETC, PASSED S ONE S/W SYSTEM 64 CARBON, ADVANCED 733 DOLLARS CASH TOWARD TRAVEL AND PER DIEM.

4. S ETA ALGI O/A 20 JUNE VIA SURFACE TRANSPORT FROM MOROCCO. S FUTURE CONTACTS WITH R SCHEDULED OUTSIDE ALGERIA. NO RPT NO STA CONTACT REQUESTED BUT WOULD APPRECIATE INFO HIS ALGI ACTIVITIES AS MAY BE ACQUIRED PASSIVELY BY STA STAFF PERSONNEL.

5. POUCHING COMPREHENSIVE WRAP-UP.

6. INDEX 201-336352.

* Suggested SW Carbon for STEBINY be obtained from Paritech.

SECRET

SECRET

CFN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OELA-43,311

TO Chief, KUDESK

INFO Chief, WE; Chief, AF; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief of Station, Algiers

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-

FROM
Chief of Station, London

DATE
11 June 1965

SUBJECT
O STEBONY
JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

Following is the text of a JAGUAR letter, dated 2 June:

"According to a secret and reliable source, STEBONY/1 has stated that he is working for the Belgian newspaper 'La Voix du Peuple'. He will be leaving London shortly for the Continent and will later be going to Algiers. He has told his friends that his job with 'La Voix du Peuple' turned up in time to save him and his family from 'starvation'."

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
- 2-Chief, KUDESK
- 3-Chief, WE
- 2-Chief, AF
- 2-Chief, KUWOLF
- 2-COS, Algiers - Out Pouch
- 2-Chief, LCPIPIT

[illegible] 1
[illegible]
[illegible] and
[illegible]

CS COPY

201-306052

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PAGE NO.
1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OELA-43,308

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO: Chief, KUDESK

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, LCPIPIT; (Attn: RODIGAST); Chief, AF; Chief of Station, Algiers

FROM: Chief of Station, London

DATE: 10 June 1965

SUBJECT: KUDESK STEBONY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Officer's Comment on STEBONY/1 and Wife

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

1. In the course of an informal discussion on 8 June with the JAGUAR officer most familiar with the history of STEBONY/1 (and our relationship with him), the JAGUAR officer commented that he was frankly surprised at the volume of sexual activity of the African Communists and far-leftists. His first reference was to types such as Jeanne PYNOR, but he broadened the comment to include Rosalynde AINSLIE and others, and of course there were the recipients of these girls' affections as well - Africans (usually black) such as Kenyatta and Babu.

2. The JAGUAR officer then added that S/1's wife was also known to have shared her favors with other black men than S/1 - to such an extent, at any rate, that her promiscuity had come to JAGUAR's notice. (I mentioned that this must be some new news, since we had not heard of it before, but he indicated that this was old news, and apparently not of the type to be considered "derogatory.") The JAGUAR officer went on to say that S/1 himself has put in a certain amount of time in the beds of other white girls, and perhaps this is how he knows of the promiscuous propensities of some of them.

3. While S/1 has not particularly affected prudery in our talks, neither has he professed himself to be a great and universal lover.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK
3-Chief, WE
2-COS, Algiers - Out Pouch
2-Chief, AF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

201-306052

FORM 1957 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

3 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AF/1/CI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	201	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM LONDON

ACTION WE 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/O 4, AF 6, CI, ADDP, CA 4, C/OPS, [illegible] CI/OA,

10 Jun 65 IN 87361

S E C R E T 101531Z

PALP INFO DIR ALGI CITE LOND 8101

STEBONY KUDESK KUWOLF JAGUAR

1. JAGUAR REPORT STATES "AFTER HIS QUARREL WITH VERGES IN 1964, STEBONY/1 RECEIVED 200 POUNDS AS 'PERSONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE' FROM JACQUES GRIPPA. NILS ANDERSSON ALSO GAVE HIM FINANCIAL HELP".

2. JAGUAR DO NOT KNOW WHEN GRIPPA FUNDS GIVEN TO S/1, BUT ASSUME BETWEEN JULY AND NOVEMBER 1964.

3. IT POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, ULTIMATE SOURCE JAGUAR INFO IS S/1. MIGHT BE USEFUL, NONTHELESS, GET S/1 COMMENTS.

S E C R E T

CFN

201

SECRET

unsolicited, or did we ask for traces?

2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Paris (Attention: COVERDALE)

INFO
Chief, WE; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, KUDESK;
Chief of Station, Madrid

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STBONY/Operational
Data on Antonio LOPEZ Campille

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Ref: OFPA 79622, 19 May 1965 (not sent all addressees)

1. On 4 June STBONY/1 provided the following information on the personality and living pattern of Subject which we hope will be helpful to COVERDALE in mounting an eventual recruitment approach.

a. Subject is smarting with desire for revenge against those who have cut him off from all meaningful political activity and probably from a source of income as well. (NOTE: Subject told S/1 that currently GRIPPA is providing his PCE-ML with the equivalent of $1,000 per month.) He is particularly angry with [illegible], who owes him some money.

b. An intellectual, Subject has never been particularly effective in the area of practical organisational politics. He is rather weak in the sense that in a conflict situation he tends to pull back. In other words he is not aggressive by nature. At the same time, S/1 felt certain that Subject's indignation and desire for revenge were deeply seated in his emotions and he would not be able to rationalize away these feelings.

c. Subject is basically a friendly and courteous person.

d. Subject speaks French and Spanish but no English. His wife, described by S/1 as a stronger personality than Subject, does speak English. She teaches school.

e. Subject has mixed feelings towards GRIPPA, but uppermost is his desire to rehabilitate himself with the Belgian "gauleiter." It is thought that if someone telephoned Subject and made reference to "Jacques" or "a message from a friend in Belgium" Subject would most likely come out for a meeting.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

f. Subject has irregular working hours at the CNRS and it would be easy for him to leave the job for an hour or two without anyone becoming suspicious. He works on research projects and more or less sets his own hours.

g. Asked if he thought Subject would be in a position to provide such information on the PCE Pro-ChiCom dissident groups, S/1 said that he thought Subject was well-informed and, if willing, would be

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER COPY
OELA-43,294

DATE ~~201-109727~~
9 June 1965 201-306050

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

able to provide a great deal of information despite his having been pushed aside from active and direct participation in recent months.

2. Based on the foregoing, the best ploy for getting at Subject might be a telephone call to his place of work with the caller using a cover pretext for meeting him alone and deferring all detailed questions to such a meeting on the grounds of not wanting to discuss these over the telephone. If this gets Subject out, then COVERDALE could apologize for the minor deception while explaining that it was required by reason of his not wanting to cause Subject embarassment or injury in the course of contacting him. Good hunting.

3. It may be possible for STEBCNY/1 to contact Subject during his visit to Paris 11 - 17 June. If COVERDALE would like to get a more current reading on Subject, please get in touch with Rufus F. BODIGAST, who will be meeting S/1 on 12 June.

Joseph S. TIFFANY

Distribution:
  2-COS, Paris (Attn: COVERDALE)
  3-Chief, WE
  2-Chief, LCPIPIT
  2-COS, Madrid
  2-Chief, KUDESK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
KAPOK

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, KUDESK

INFO.
Chief, WE; Chief, FE; Chief, AF; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KURIOT; Chief, LCPIPIT

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY
Asian-African Journalists' Association Correspondence

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted as separate cover attachment are copies of correspondence from the AAJA to STEBONY/1. Among these materials is an original copy of one letter, which is forwarded for KURIOT's exemplar stockpile.

2. These materials were passed to TIFFANY by S/1.

3. London Station is not retaining copies of this material, nor do we anticipate passing any of it to JAGUAR.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
(USC)

Distribution:
~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK w/att (USC)
3-Chief, WE w/o att
2-Chief, FE w/o att
2-Chief, AF w/o att
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/o att
2-Chief, KURIOT w/att (USC)
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/o att

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
KAPOK

DATE TYPED
8 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,273

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

Asian-African Journalists' Association

(Persatuan Wartawan Asia-Afrika)

Sekretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. [illegible]

No.:

Djakarta, April 3rd 1964

Dear Colleague,

Warmest greetings!

As you are aware the Secretariat at its Second Meeting held in Gadok, Bogor (Indonesia), from November 30th to December 1st 1963, decided, inter-alia, to name April 24th, the opening day of the first Asian-African Journalists' Conference, "THE ASIAN-AFRICAN JOURNALISTS' DAY".

You will readily agree that the naming of April 24th, as Asian-African Journalists' Day, is of immense importance to us Afro-Asian journalists.

The Secretariat call on all its member organizations and members to observe this Day by celebration and meetings; press statements, articles and write-ups etc. in the various Afro-Asian newspapers and mass media generally.

This day will also mark the first anniversary of our Association and we earnestly call on you, dear members and colleagues, to mark this day as a historical event in the life of all Afro-Asian journalists particularly, and the Afro-Asian peoples generally.

We hope that you have by now received copies of the first issue of "the Afro-Asian Journalist". If you have not, please contact us and we will gladly let you have some (state how many).

We further call on you to continue sending us articles on the press-as well as on the struggle either for independence, or for the defence of your independence in your country-for publication in "the Afro-Asian Journalists".

We look forward to receiving material, newspapers etc. from you.

So as to inform all our member colleagues of your activities could you write us of or send us clippings of your activities on "the Asian-African Journalists' Day".

We look forward to hearing from you soon and wish you, in the Bandung spirit, all success and the further solidarity of our Association.

Yours fraternally,

LM/hif.-

Asian-African Journalists' Association
(Persatuan Wartawan Asia-Afrika)

Sekretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. [illegible] 62109 ext 777

ns.-

No.:

Djakarta, March 31st 1964.-

Statement on Cambodia

In response to an urgent appeal by the Cambodian Journalists, to journalists throughout the world, the AAJA calls on all its members to voice support for Cambodia's policy of peace and neutrality and to denounce the U.S. Imperialists, Thailand and South Vietnam, for their aggression against peaceful Cambodia.

We urge all our members to join their voices in demanding that the U.S. Government and all its allies agree readily to the proposal made by the Cambodian Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk for guaranteeing the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia; and to give valuable support to the just struggle of the Khmer people for developing their economy independently.

oooOOOooo

Enclosed a complete set of the daily bulletin that we ran for the duration of the A.A. Film Festival III, which ended in great success, and which thoroughly exposed all those who refuse to recognise that our common enemy is ~~xxx~~ imperialism headed by the U.S. The bulletin helped much to make the Communique possible.
We will be writing to you more fully,

comradely yours,

[illegible] Morrison.

With our compliments and best wishes !

PS Some Translations at the back

Secretariat
Asian — African Journalists' Association
Press House
Djakarta
Indonesia

Phone : 61749

[illegible]

Asian-African Journalists' Association
(Persatuan Wartawan Asia-Afrika)

cretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

mg

Registered.

No.: 110/KL/LK/64/P.

Djakarta, 11th. May 1964

Richard Gibson,
Editor
"Revolution",
40 rue Francois 1er,
P A R I S.-

Dear Colleague,

Thank you ever so much for readdressing the letters of comrade Viriato da Cruz to him in Algiers. We are eagerly waiting for some response from him.

Your suggestions of sending us 100 copies of the English and a further 100 copies of the French editions is most welcome. We will gladly accept any subscription funds here in Indonesia and hold such funds until it can either be transmitted or used it by you here in Indonesia.

Your remarks about devoting some efforts to encouraging the progressive press for Afro-American in the USA were noted. We will be discussing the matter soon. (There is no objection in principle- indeed there can't be any at all). What is worrying us the prospects of getting information and articles regularly from any Afro-Americans progressive pressmen. Maybe you have some suggestions and ideas. Let us know, as we urgently feel the need to widen and strengthen unity, with our Afro-American brothers in the states. (We have dispatched 50 copies of the second issue of the AAJ to you).

We are just having some material typed and would let you them as soon as they are done. We would like you to assist (we can supply the articles) in popularising the convening of the next Bandung Conference (Heads of Afro-Asian States). Various forces are already working against such a conference and we have to forcefully put forward the suitability etc of a Second Bandung Conference.

Have you any suggestions etc.?

Our Deputy Secretary-General Joesoef who attended the Sixth session of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council meeting in Algiers as an observer, had hoped to call on you in Paris, but unfortunately he was delayed somewhere else and could not thus meet you. However we hope that soon one of our colleagues will have the pleasure of meeting you and colleague Verges and discuss various common problems.

In the meantime, dear colleague, accept our warmest greetings.

Fraternally yours,

Joesoef
Deputy Secretary-General

Asian-African Journalists' Association
(Persatuan Wartawan Asia - Afrika)

Sekretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

No : 962/Sekr/63

Djakarta, 30th December, 1963.

REGISTERED AND AIR MAIL

The Director,
"Revolution",
Metropole,10/11,
LAUSANNE,
Switzerland.

Dear Colleague,

Greetings! The Asian-African Journalists Association founded in April,1963 by 48 countries and Asian African Journalists Unions, took various far reaching decisions and resolutions.

Inter-Alia, it has decided to publish a monthly news bulletin; and to set up a Lumumba Academy, which will serve as a centre of information and reference.

The worthly magazine "Africa Latin America Asia Revolution, is of such a revolutionary content and import that we would like to receive two or three copies regularly monthly. In our turn we will send you copies (state how many) of our bulletin, the first issue which will be ready for dissemination mid January6- next month.

Is there a possibility of you also sending us back number issues of your magazine, as well as the special illustration-"Revolution"- for our office and for usage in the Lumumba Academy.

We are sending you, under seperate cover, some documents relating to the decisions and resolutions passed by the histroic conference; and hope that you will keep in close contact with us, as we are aware that we have much in common, in our struggle against the common enemy-imperialism, colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

Wishing you a prosperous New Year and further successes in your revolutionary work,

Yours fraternally,

Djawoto

SECRETARY GENERAL.

56-6, 6
2, 3, 4-5,

Asian-African Journalists' Association

(Persatuan Wartawan Asia - Afrika)

etariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

MH/AB

REGISTERED

No.: Djakarta, March 13th 1964

Richard Gibson,
Editor-in-Chief,
REVOLUTION
Paris.

Dear Colleague,

We have received the various copies of REVOLUTION, which we heartily thank you for.

Your letter was ver encouraging, and we have noted the contents. We share your ideals, and are thoroughly convinced that our struggle against the forces of reaction will still further advance, and triumph.

We will bear in mind your request for articles etc., and will do all in our efforts to help.

REVOLUTION plays an important part in our revolutionary struggle against imperialism and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, and as such we would like to help in the further distribution of REVOLUTION. We are widely distributing it in Indonesia, and hope to do the same in South EastAsia as well. In addition, because of the foreign exchange problem, we will rather give you names of other interested persons outside Indonesia to whom you can send sample copies. Or we could do that if you so desire. Please let us know! A little note to the effect that we will distribute and wherever possible in South East collect articles for you, in REVOLUTION will be welcomed and facilitate matters.

We are printing initially 6.000 English copies of the 'the Afro-Asian Journalist',and hope to have an extra 4.000 in French ready soon.

We will dispatch 50 copies of 'the Afro-Asian Journalist' to you, under seperate number immediately -(one we will send airmail). If you would like more please do not hesitate to contact us.

Can you also send us some more French copies of REVOLUTION, if possible, as well as some posters.

Dear Colleague, our struggle is gaining momentum and the forces of reaction manifested in colonialism and imperialism in all its forms and manifestations are on the retreat. Our very close co-operation will further help in destroying colonialism and imperialism, which is the curse of all makind.

/We look .....

Asian-African Journalists' Association
(Persatuan Wartawan Asia-Afrika)

retariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

No.:

Djakarta, ______________ 19____

We look forward to hearing from you again. Greetings and warmest wishes to your Director Comrade Verges and all the other revolutionaries who are working together with you.

Fraternally yours

Djawoto
Secretary-General
A.A.J.A.

4-65 SUIU

cifICG
Fornter
2001

File

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
PARIS (LCPIPIT)

ACTION		ADVANCE COPY	UNIT	TIME	BY
WE 8	☑ RID COPY	☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED	WE	0946	

INFO
FILE, VR, CA2, CA/O4, CI, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, RI/AN

S E C R E T 071148Z

7 Jun 65 IN 84527

PRIORITY DIR INFO LOND CITE PALP 3990

AF/1 - C. Billings will reply. JR

KUDESK STEBONY QKPREY

REF LOND 7991 (IN 81357) *

1. IN FINAL LOND MEETING STEBONY/1 (S) TOLD RODIGAST TIFFANY HE ASSUMED PER DIEM WOULD ACCRUE S ENTIRE ALGI STAY. S CLAIMED IMPOSSIBLE LIVE WITHOUT PER DIEM BECAUSE:

A. HIGH COST LIVING ALGI

B. MAINTAINING TWO HOUSEHOLDS

C. WIFE BEGINS MATERNITY LEAVE 1 JULY.

AN/SAS	EI	ci/icg
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

2. TIFFANY SUGGESTED TEN DOLLAR PER DIEM COMPROMISE AND S ACCEPTED. ESTIMATE TOTAL ADDITIONAL EXPENSE 450 DOLLARS.

7 JUN 1965

3. CONSIDER THIS REASONABLE ARRANGEMENT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES AND REQUEST HQS APPROVAL BY COB 10 JUNE.

4. S SUPPLIED FURTHER EVIDENCE GOOD FAITH 6 JUNE IN PASSING ADDRESS BOOK AND REVOLUTION AFRICAINE AND AAJA CORRESPONDENCE FOR COPYING. LOND POUCHING.

SECRET

5. INDEX: 201-306052.

S E C R E T

*RYBAT REF

201-306052

RID \ 7 JUNE 65

CFN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief of Station, Algiers

INFO. Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT; Chief, AF
Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT STEBONY/Operational
- Plans and Progress with STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OELA 43,237

Forwarded herewith as Attachment is a report written by TIFFANY and RODIGAST covering their meeting with STEBONY/1 during the period 1-5 June. Though meetings will be held with S/1 on 6 and 7 June, it is not expected that these will produce any new information to alter the substance of Attachment. Info supplied by S/1 on a variety of personalities and activities will be handled by separate dispatch and info reports.

Joseph S. TIFFANY

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
2-COS, Algiers w/att h/w
2-COS, Paris/LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

201-306052

DATE TYPED
4 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,272

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

att - 1

TO: Chief,
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,272
4 June 1965

1. Cover Situation. S/1 was not successful in lining up any cover arrangement in the U.S. Around 28 May he received word from New York of a flat turn-down on his offer to serve as correspondent for Monthly Review. ~~Maro Schleiffer, who was on the spot got this job, and~~ MR's chief editor Leo Hubermann plans to attend 2nd Bandung himself. Locally, however, S/1 was able to line up the following sponsors (though none is in a position to pay much for his services they collectively provide him with sufficient reason for being in Algiers; he will let on that his travel costs were advanced him by his wealthy brother-in-law):

a. Cinnamon, a sort of British Ebony scheduled to bring out its first issue on 20 June.

b. West Indian Gazette, described in earlier correspondence, will provide S/1 with a letter of accreditation.

c. Institute of Race Relations. This politically neutral, academic outfit publishes a monthly newsletter. Connected with Chatham House, the Institute's secretary, Sheilla Paterson is a good friend of S/1. She has asked him to do a paper back book for the Institute on Africa. Again, though they could pay little for this effort it constitutes a highly respectable piece of cover.

During the last two months, S/1 has explained his income to his wife as coming from advances, expense money and articles for Encounter. This has not pleased her, as she dislikes both the Congress for Cultural Freedom and Laskey, but has at least satisfied her curiosity. To explain Katzenbach's telephone calls to his home (K. identified himself to S/1's wife ~~xxx~~ as "Mr. Wilson") S/1 had to improvise a purely notional affiliation with an American feature story syndication service called "Metropolitan Features". This will help explain some of his income to his wife, but will not be used with others.

2. The above skeletal cover will hopefully be reinforced in Algiers where S/1 will scour around for bits and pieces of work for his many contacts there. His visits to Grippa and Andersson on his way to Algiers will also help to fill out his ostensible sources of income, though S/1 has agreed not to overplay this angle. In other words, he will not pretend that these two have given him any funds, but if others want to make the assumption, so much the better.

3. On 1 and 2 June, Tiffany expounded at some length on the importance of S/1 trying to get an Opposition (Soviet, Cuban, Algerian or ChiCom) sponsor for any further cover, such as the researching of a book or establishment of an Afro-Asian news service for U.S. leftist periodicals and/or individuals. While we could easily set him up in this enterprise, we ~~do~~ not ~~want~~ to for the simple reason that this would at best only provide him with a superficial sort of access. What we want him to strive for is Opposition sponsorship that will lead him into one of the nerve centers of the national liberation movement in Algiers or Djakarta. (S/1 ruled out Cairo on the grounds that his wife is Jewish) S/1 accepted this reasoning and agreed to go for a position that holds out the prospect of long-range penetration in depth.

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

Att #1 to OELA-43272

CS COPY

201-306052

4. Turnover to Rodigast. After getting S/1's unhesitating agreement to an LCFLUTTER examination and his signature on a Secrecy Agreement on 2 June, Tiffany introduced him to Rodigast, under the alias "Paul Weller" on the morning of 3 June. It was explained that Rodigast would serve as S/1 point of contact in the future. S/1 and Rodigast hit it off well from the outset, the latter's knowledge of Paris and Tangiers-based American beatniks and other intellectuals serving him well in the rapport-building process. Rodigast has laid ~~xxxxxx~~ on firm meeting arrangements for Paris and has discussed arrangements for meeting S/1 at least twice during the summer outside Algiers. Final agreement on a mid July meeting will be made in Paris to conform to a normal pattern by S/1 and ~~xxxxx~~ arrangements which S/1 succeeds in developing in Lausanne and Paris. In the process of discussing communications Rodigast is also imparting instruction in good security practices on the part of S/1. Rodigast will instruct S/1 in the use of SW in Paris. Hopefully, Rodigast will be able to spend a day or two with S/1 in Paris, even though we want S/1 to get to Algiers as soon as possible.

5. Financial Arrangements. After discussing all possible alternatives, it was decided that the most secure arrangement would be to give S/1 an advance of the equivalent of $200 for his travel London-Brussels-Lausanne- Paris and per diem and ~~his~~ an advance of the equivalent of $600 for his June salary plus non-accountable expenses. These advances were made and signed for on 3 June. One ~~xxxxxx~~ important reason for the large cash advance was the fact that S/1 ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ was completely broke, and he had to make some funds available to his wife to meet expenses and pay off a 65 pound Sterling debt to his brother-in-law before leaving on his trip. (S/1 will explain the funds as the last of the advances and payments for articles by Encounter and other publications.) For essentially the same reason (poverty) we agreed to make S/1's July and August salary payments in advance (to be paid into his Swiss bank account on the first of each month). We recognize that this procedure is

somewhat irregular, but we went ahead with it principally on the grounds that this was necessary to head off the security and morale problems posed by an irate wife.

6. In the course of his initial talk with S/1, Rodigast pursued the matter of the allegations made at various times in the past to the effect that S/1 is or was a "CIA agent" or "FBI agent". S/1 explained the situation as follows:

a. S/1 was a schoolmate of William Gardner Smith, and with Smith's encouragement came to Paris and worked with Smith on the English desk of Agence France Presse. S/1 took over the left bank apartment of Ollie Harrington, American Negro cartoonist and CPUSA member. S/1 had a falling-out with Harrington over the apartment (rent), and in what he describes as a moment of weakness he sought revenge by forging a letter with Harrington's signature which indicated support for the FLN (Algeriah nationalists); at that time the French were extremely sensitive to the subject, of course, and S/1's act was designed to hurt Harrington, and perhaps his friends as well. S/1 was found out, and questioned by the French police; his break with William Gardner Smith and that crowd dates from this moment. S/1 had been forced to write an apology to Harrington, confessing to the forgery.

b. S/1 believes that Jacques Vergès obtained the letter of apology (to Harrington) from Smith or from Ellen Wright (an American, white, widow of the Negro novelist Richard Wright; she continues to reside in Paris as a literary agent handling books of writers connected with Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir; S/1 says that she is a friend of Harrington). As for Harrington, S/1 believes he is now in Ghana or in East Germany; in East Germany he has American friends: a Negro singer Aubrey Pankey and his white wife Kay; she is an editor of the East German publishing house Seven Seas (which prints books in English), and is close to Shirley Graham Dubois.

c. The CPUSA knew of the Harrington forgery and according to S/1 told the Cubans about it, since the CPUSA hoped to discredit S/1 and put their own people in touch with the Cubans. S/1 told the Cubans a tall tale which he hopes they believed (among those he spoke to was Roa): he said that during the French drive against the FLN various people were writing letters in support of the Algerians and signing prominent names to them, and that the Harrington forgery was carried out in this spirit.

d. The hostility to S/1 from Ainslee and McGowan had as its origin their anger that Vergès had given S/1 a job that should have gone to an Englishman (or woman); they felt that Africa was a problem of the British CP; and so they spread the story about S/1.

e. Rodigast recalled that William Gardner Smith had once written a letter to the Paris Herald Tribune denying that a pro-Castro letter which appeared several days earlier signed W G Smith had been sent by him. At the time (perhaps 18 months ago) Smith told Rodigast, who questioned him on the matter, "Oh, that's an old story." Without indicating that he knew Smith, Rodigast raised the question of Smith's Herald Tribune letter to S/1, who said he had never seen it or heard of it before.

f. Rodigast gave S/1 the recent clipping from Le Monde which indicated that Patricia MacGowan's husband or lover Carlos Lansa had been arrested by the Algerians in connection with the investigation of the Delgado killing. Rodigast warned S/1 that we did not know whether a charge would be made, or indeed whether Lansa had already been released along with others arrested at the same time. Nevertheless S/1 thought the clipping would be useful to show to those not terribly familiar with the details, but who might be favorably influenced by a report showing that the people who denounced S/1 as a "CIA agent" had also sent Delgado to his death.

7. Questioned on his residence status vis a vis French and Swiss authorities, S/1 said:

a. He feels he can come and go to Switzerland without problems. When Revolution was closed down by the Swiss, S/1 was called in and notified that he had three months to leave the country because of the undesirable nature of his activities; the Swiss told Nils Anderssen informally that should S/1 change to a "desirable" activity he would be allowed to stay. Following his departure on what S/1 considered very polite terms (i.e., the three-month notice period), S/1 traveled regularly to Switzerland (once a month, on Revolution business), although he tries to arrive by means which expose him to minimal border checks (train rather than plane, and Trans Europe Express best of all) and while in Switzerland lives with friends rather than in a hotel to avoid having to fill out police cards. (S/1 was notified of his expulsion in September 1963 and left in December before the deadline. His most recent trips were in January-February 1965.)

b. S/1 was never arrested by the French, merely interrogated on the Harrington forgery charge. He has resided in Paris since that time. During the early stages of S/1's suit against Vergès for payment of back wages, Vergès' attorney said in open court that S/1 had been in France illegally (as he had no carte de sejour; he could not obtain one since Vergès never agreed to a work contract which would be required at the time of application for a carte de sejour). (In connection with the Vergès suit: S/1's French lawyer Pierre Schwarzenberg, has not pressed the charges; he is a Communist and an old friend of Vergès, and told S/1 he believed he could obtain a settlement through persuasion. S/1 has already paid Schwarzenberg's fee (the money was obtained from S/1's brother-in-law), and does not know whether he can whip up Schwarzenberg's enthusiasm. Should S/1 win a judgement for the some $5000 owed to him, he could force Vergès' bankruptcy (there is a printer in the same legal position who has not insisted on payment because he is reluctant to bring on bankruptcy). S/1 says that it is possible that if he engaged a first-class non-Communist attorney in France (who would have to be paid in advance) he might achieve this goal, but it is not certain that he could get the original fee back from Schwarzenberg.

8. For future contacts, Rodigast gave S/1 "an alias I am using: James Sunderland, c/o American Express, 11 rue Scribe, Paris 9, the "c/o American Express" being optional. Rodigast will also look into the possibility of emergency contact via want ads placed in Alger Republicain or Le Peuple (the latter is preferred by S/1), which Rodigast believes will be purchased and read daily by LCPIPIT during the summer anyway-- they arrive in Paris a day or two after publication. S/1 could advertise for a stenographer able to take perfect English shorthand, for example.

Rufus F. Rodigast
Rufus F. Rodigast

Joseph S. Tiffany
Joseph S. Tiffany

CS COPY

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief of Stations; Algiers; Paris/LCPIPIT; Chief, AF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, KUWOLF (Attn: Noel D. KAMMERMAYER)

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STEBONY/KUDESK/QRPREY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: A LOND 7991
B DIR 15660

1. Forwarded under separate cover true name pouch as Attachment 1 is the original Letter of Agreement signed by STEBONY/1 on 3 June. Attachment 2 forwarded with this dispatch is a santized version of this contract.

2. Attachment 3 forwarded under separate cover true name pouch is a Secrecy Agreement signed by STEBONY/1 on 2 June.

3. Attachment 4 forwarded underseparate cover true name pouch is PRQ Part I, filled out by STEBONY/1 on 2 June. It should be noted that due to limitation of time this was prepared in great haste.

4. Attachment 5 is the top half of the signature specimen assigning a pseudonym to STEBONY/1. The bottom half of this document is forwarded as Attachment 6 under separate cover true name pouch.

Joseph S. Tiffany
Joseph S. TIFFANY

Attachments 1,3,4,& 6 (USC)
Attachments 2 & 5 Herewith

automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
~~3~~-Chief, WE w/o att
2-COS, Algiers w/o att
2-Chief, AF w/att 2 h/w & 4 (USC)
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att 1, 3, 4 & 6 (USC) & 2 & 5 h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/o att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
4 June 1965	

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,237

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET-RYBAT

UELA-43,- /, 4 June 1965

SECRET

LETTER OF AGREEMENT

Mr. Richard T. Gibson

Dear Mr. Gibson:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $500.00 per month. Payments will be made in a secure manner acceptable to you. No taxes will be withheld from this amount. Escrow: A mutually agreed portion will be withheld in an escrow account for you for reasons of security as soon as this becomes a practical possibility.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the U. S. Government. You will be required to account for such expenses in a manner consistent with good security. Since security conditions generally preclude the detailed accounting of miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20 per day during periods of authorized travel.

201

3. Operational Expenses. You will recieve $100.00 per month for necessary operational expenses on a non-accountable basis. Any operational expenses incurred beyond the amount must be specifically authorized by U. S. Governemnt.

4. The U. S. Government will compensate you in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of you and your family to a new residence if such a relocation is considered desirable by you and the U. S. Government.

5. The Organization, in recognition of a clear moral obligation will undertake to protect you against any adverse actions related to your activities and associations entered into at the request of the U. S. Government during the term of this agreement.

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by U. S. Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under applicable laws and regulations.

7. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment hereto shall be binding on the U. S. Government.

8. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 June 1965 and shall continue thereafter for three months (to 1 September 1965). Extension to two years (to 1 June 1967) will be contingent upon the granting of full operational clearance and your performance during the summer 1965 assignment in North Africa and access acquired during that period. Furthermore, it is understood

   a. That on or before 1 September 1965 it will be possible to renegotiate the terms of compensation of this contract for the period following that date;

   b. That after 1 September 1965 this contract (and its extension) can be terminated by either party with 30 days notice.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath (Secrecy Agreement) you have signed.

United States Government

By

SECRET

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: ief of Station, London
Attachment No. 2 to OELA-43,237
4 June 1965

LETTER OF AGREEMENT

STEBONY/1
Dear Mr. STEBONY/1

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, Hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $500.00 per month. Payments will be made in a secure manner acceptable to you. No taxes will be withheld from this amount. Escrow: A mutually agreed portion will be withheld in an escrow account for you for reasons of security as soon as this becomes a practical possibility.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the U. S. Government. You will be required to account for such expenses in a manner consistent with good security. Since security conditions generally preclude the detailed accounting of miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20 per day during periods of authorized travel.

3. Operational Expenses. You will recieve $100.00 per month for necessary operational expenses on a non-accountable basis. Any operational expenses incurred beyond the amount must be specifically authorized by U. S. Governemnt.

4. The U. S. Government will compensate you in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of you and your family to a new residence if such a relocation is considered desirable by you and the U. S. Government.

5. The Organization, in recognition of a clear moral obligation will undertake to protect you against any adverse actions related to your activities and associations entered into at the request of the U. S. Government during the term of this agreement.

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by U. S. Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under applicable laws and regulations.

7. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment hereto shall be binding on the U. S. Government.

8. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 June 1965 and shall continue thereafter for three months (to 1 September 1965). Extension to two years (to 1 June 1967) will be contingent upon the granting of full operational clearance and your performance during the summer 1965 assignment in North Africa and access acquired during that period. Furthermore, it is understood

   a. That on or before 1 September 1965 it will be possible to renegotiate the terms of compensation of this contract for the period following that date;

   b. That after 1 September 1965 this contract (and its extension) can be terminated by either party with 30 days notice.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath (Secrecy Agreement) you have signed.

United States Government

ACCEPTED: 3 June 1965

/s/ STEBONY/1

By
Robert C. Gustke

OELA-43,237, 4 June 1965

SECRET

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Richard Gibson, understand that upon entering on duty I am undertaking a position of trust in the Organization responsible for intelligence relating to the security of our country. I understand that in the course of this association I will acquire information about the Organization and its activities and about intelligence acquired or produced by the Organization.

2. I have read and understand the provisions of the espionage laws of our government and I am aware that unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to the national defense may subject me to prosecution for violation of such laws, whether such disclosure be made while I am associated with the Organization or at any time thereafter.

3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have a responsibility to the Organization not to disclose any classified information relating to the Organization without proper authorization. I undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it from information relating to the Organization, its activities, or to intelligence material under the control of the Organization. I further understand that this undertaking is a condition of my association with the Organization, that its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or to other appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally binding upon me after my association with the Organization as during it.

4. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it, and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized officials of the Organization on these points prior to disclosing information relating to the Organization, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my dismissal.

5. I understand that my unauthorized action or verbal or written utterance which would reasonably be expected to result in publicity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation of government and Organization regulations and would be grounds for my dismissal.

6. I understand that there are established procedures within the Organization permitting appeal at all times of any legitimate criticism, grievance, or complaint and that to carry any such grievance or complaint which I may have outside the Organization will be considered a violation of the undertaking set forth above in paragraph 3.

7. I further understand and agree that my association with the Organization is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with the Organization security requirements.

8. I will not undertake to publish or participate in the publication of any information or material relating to the Organization, its activities, or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of my association with the Organization without specific prior approval by the Organization.



Visas

20

611035

IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR YOU

- TRAVEL IN DISTURBED AREAS

If you travel in disturbed areas, you should keep in touch with the nearest American diplomatic or consular office.

- PROLONGED RESIDENCE ABROAD

If you make your home or reside for a prolonged period abroad, you should register at the nearest American consulate.

- LOSS OF NATIONALITY

You may lose your United States citizenship by being naturalized in, or by voting in the elections of a foreign state; by taking an oath or making a declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; by serving in the armed forces or accepting employment under the government of a foreign state. If you are a naturalized citizen of the United States, you may lose citizenship by residing for 3 years in the country of your birth or former nationality, or by residing for [illegible] in any other foreign state or states. For [illegible] information consult the nearest American diplomatic or consular office.

- VIOLATION OF [illegible]

If you use or [illegible] passport in violation of the conditions [illegible] contained in [illegible] may lose the [illegible] States [illegible] continue to reside [illegible] may be liable for prosecution (Title [illegible] U. S. Code).

- LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF PASSPORT

If this passport is lost, stolen or destroyed, report full details immediately to the [illegible] Service, Department of State, Washington [illegible] D. C., or to the nearest American consulate. If in an outlying possession of the United States, report to the chief executive, and to the local police authorities. In loss or destruction cases, new passports are issued only after exhaustive investigation.

- ALTERATION OR MUTILATION OF PASSPORT

This passport must not be altered or mutilated in any way. You must not alter any entry, make changes in your description, or the photograph, on any other page of this passport. Altering [illegible] is illegal. Only authorized officials of [illegible] States or of foreign countries [illegible]

[illegible]

9. I agree that all information or intelligence acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the Organization remains the property of our government, and I will surrender, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Organization or upon separation from the Organization, any material relating to such information and intelligence in my possession.

10. I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 2nd [redacted]
day of June 1965.

Richard Gibson (SEAL)

Witness:

Robert [illegible] Approved:

Date

14-00000

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

___/PRQ/___

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Instruction: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable" (NA)
3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. Full Name RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
First Middle Last

2. Name in native script NA

3. Name at birth (if different from 1.) NA

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.) NONE

5. a. Date of birth 13 MAY 1931 b. Place of birth LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate Negro

7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.) U.S.

8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) 30, STOCKLEIGH HALL, PRINCE ALBERT ROAD, LONDON, N.W.8 (tenant)

9. Permanent address (if different from 8.) NA

10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.) FREELANCE JOURNALIST

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate granted.) NA

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship) MRS. SADIE THOMAS (grandmother)
MR. CLARENCE GIBSON (father)

13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

CLARENCE LOUIS GIBSON, CURRENT ADDRESS UNKNOWN IN PHILADELPHIA, PA. RETIRED MAILMAN. US. CITIZEN BORN IN U.S. BUT DATE AND PLACE UNKNOWN

14. Mother - same information as 13.

ALICE M. GIBSON (NÉE THOMAS)
DECEASED 1936 or 37 (?)

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

JOY MARJORIE GIBSON (NÉE KAYE), BORN HENDON, ENGLAND 12 July 1926, British, 30 STOCKLEIGH HALL, PRINCE ALBERT RD., LONDON, N.W.8
Married 24 MARCH 1956 in PARIS.

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Dominique Elisabeth Gibson, F. 29 Oct. 1956 en Paris, Nationality U.S.
Frederick William Gordon GIBSON, M. 5 March 1958 in Paris — U.S.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

None

/PRQ/

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisnor of war

Entered U.S. Army in Trieste, Italy - Dec. 1952
~~Sent to~~ Fort Dix, N.J. for basic training, later
transferred Fort Benning, Ga., then to 37th Engineer
Gp (Const), Gottingen Germany as Public Information
NCO - discharged in Germany Dec. 1954

26. Present and past membership in organization (professional, social, political, etc.) FPCC - see #21

member NAACP, Urban League and American
Society of African Culture

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Can operate camera, tape recorder

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property

Owe £1500 to my brother-in-law (Gordon
Kaye)
Various lesser debts in Paris resulting from
Revolution fiasco

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

cub reporter - Philadelphia Afro-American (newspaper)
Autumn 1950 -
Spring 1951 - salary approx. $50 per week - left for
literary fellowship at "Yaddo", Saratoga Springs, N.Y.
1951-1952 - Rome - worked freelance for
Italian Films Export, film publicity outfit, and
Edmund Stevens, then Rome correspondent of Christian
Science Monitor

/PRQ/

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

None

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

EPISCOPAL — NOT PRACTICED

21. Present and past political affiliations

FOUNDING MEMBER, FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

1960 — 1962

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited (see attachment)

1951-52 ITALY John Hay Whitney Fellowship:
1954 — W. GERMANY — U.S. ARMY
1954-58 FRANCE — GI BILL at Sorbonne, then editor Agence France Presse 1960-61 Four or Five visits to Cuba for FPCC

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language French Speak good Read good Understand good
Language Italian Speak poor Read fair Understand fair
Language Spanish Speak poor Read fair Understand fair
German poor fair fair

___/PRQ/___

29. (Continued)

Also assisted late Italian writer and film producer, Curzio MALAPARTE, on Italo-American film project. Salaries were all small and based on piecework. Drafted in US. Army in Dec. 1954.

1955-58 English editor at Agence France-Presse in Paris. - was discharged when "Ollie" HARRINGTON brought forgery charges against me. Salary 900 frs. per month

1959-61 CBS News, New York - newswriter - salary approx. $200 per week. Discharged because of involvement in Fair Play for Cuba, but was given CBS Fellowship at Columbia Grad. School (mainly African studies) for 60-61

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates. A MIRROR FOR MAGISTRATES (novel), London, 1958. Numerous articles in many periodicals, such as KENYON REVIEW, GIORNALE D'ITALIA, PERSPECTIVES U.S.A., MONTHLY REVIEW, THE NATION, REVOLUTION, BOHEMIA (Havana), REVOLUCION (Havana), etc.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

Wife and children live with me.

~~See attached~~ Correspondents at home and abroad too numerous to list here but have been reported earlier.

32. List five character references.

NA

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

None

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age 34

Apparent age 36 or 37

Height 5 ft 10 in

Eyes black

Face - shape oval

Complexion light

Sex M

Posture stooped

Weight 165 lbs.

Teeth gap in front

Hair kinky black

Scars —

Build medium

General appearance fairly neat, reasonably well dressed

Prominent features none

Other identifying features wear glasses

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

22. Travel (cont.)

1962 - ENGLAND, FRANCE, MOROCCO, ALGERIA Departure from FPCC, no fixed objective abroad, Employed by Jacques VERGES and *Révolution Africaine* in Algiers, Nov. 1962

1963 - 64 SWITZERLAND, FRANCE, BELGIUM HOLLAND, ENGLAND - residence or trips involved with business of editing *Revolution*

1964 - ENGLAND - Stay with wife's family, seeking employment

1965 - JAN. + FEB. ITALY, SWITZERLAND, FRANCE, BELGIUM - trip financed by *Encounter* to research article

29. EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

1961-62 Acting Executive Secretary, Fair Play for Cuba Committee - salary ran from $150 to nothing per week. Left because of unwillingness to continue an unpleasant task.

1962-64 - Editor *Révolution Africaine* and later Editor of its English edition - salary 1000 (new) French frs. at first and later 1500 frs. per month - rupture based on financial collapse of publication and various disagreements with Vergès, its publisher.

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 5 to OELA-43,237
4 June 1965

Signature Specimen London 2 June 1965

In the future I will use the following pseudonym and signature.

Frederick T. Dominie
Frederick T. Dominie

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 6 (USC) to
OELA-43,237, 4 June 1965

Richard T. Gibson
Richard Gibson

14-00000

FBI doc.
24 May '65 (Wash.)
Re: Richard Thomas Gibson
no Bufile given

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief, KUDESK; AF; FE; LCPIPIT; Chief of Stations, Algiers; Paris

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
KUDESK STEBONY QRPREY JAGUAR
O JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

JAGUAR had made the following available to us, in response to our request for information on a continuing basis relating to STEBONY/1:

"In mid-May STEBONY/1 was still trying to arrange a visit to Algiers this summer - on the strength of help he has received from 'some comrades'.

"Robert WILLIAMS in Havana has given STEBONY/1 the impression that he may visit Algiers as a member of a Cuban delegation. Also, STEBONY/1 understands that William WORTHY, who has been in Hanoi, will be going to Algiers. STEBONY/1 expects to meet a number of his friends there and his main reason for wishing to make this trip is to discuss his problems, past and present, with these friends and other interested parties. He hopes to clear up doubts and uncertainties and, in this context, he has commented that one of the reasons for much of the hostility shown to him has been the reluctance of others to involve themselves in the differences which arose between himself and Jacques VERGES because the latter was clearly more influential and more important than STEBONY/1.

"STEBONY/1 had heard that VERGES was still insisting that STEBONY/1 was a KUBARK agent and that Nils ANDERSON and Jacques GRIPPA were 'ODYOKE double agents'. GRIPPA, who is leader of the pro-Chinese Communist group in Belgium, is planning to bring up-to-date his book 'Marxism-Leninism or Revisionism', published two years ago, by adding a new chapter. STEBONY/1 is looking into the possibility of its publication in the UK or PBPRIME and, in this context, he considers 'Monthly Review' to be the only possible medium although Leo HUBERMAN, one of the publication's editors, is not enthusiastic about the idea."

Kat
George H. KATZENBACH

201- 306052

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, AF
2-Chief, FE
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-COS, Algiers
2-COS, Paris

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DATE TYPED
2 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
9 JUN 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,235

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. L. Dullard

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

34 SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM LONDON

ACTION C/WE3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT WE TIME 1534

INFO FILE VR, ADDP, C/CI

S E C R E T 021651Z

2 JUN 65 IN 81357

PRIORITY DIR INFO ALGI PARI PALP CITE LOND 7991

KAPOK STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY

2. ON 1 JUNE KATZENBACH INTRODUCED TIFFANY TO STEBONY/1 (S/1). ON 2 JUNE S/1 FILLED OUT PRQ PART ONE, SIGNED SECRECY AGREEMENT AND PSEUDO CARD, AGREED SIGN TWO YEAR CONTRACT 3 JUNE ON FOLLOWING TERMS:

A. COMPENSATION: FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS SALARY PLUS ONE HUNDRED NON ACCOUNTABLE EXPENSE ALLOWANCE PER MONTH.

B. TRAVEL COST PLUS AUTHORIZED MISCELLANEOUS OPS EXPENSES.

C. TERMINATION: TERM FIXED 1 JUNE THROUGH 31 AUGUST AT END OF WHICH IT POSSIBLE RENEGOTIATE SALARY IN LINE WITH S/1 ALGI PERFORMANCE AND DEGREE ACCESS HE HAS ACHIEVED FOR LONG TERM PENETRATION ASIAN AFRICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT. ALSO ON 1 SEPT THIRTY DAY CANCELLATION CLAUSE BECOMES OPERATIVE.

D. KUBARK AGREES PAY COST RESETTLEMENT S/1 FAMILY AT END ALGI SUMMER TOUR IF THIS REQUIRED BY S/1 JOB LOCATION.

E. QUESTION OF HOLDING PART S/1 COMPENSATION IN ESCROW TO BE DECIDED 3 JUNE. DUE OBLIGATION FAMILY MAINTENANCE, HOWEVER, IT UNLIKELY LARGE PORTION CAN BE WITHHELD DURING NEXT THREE MONTHS.

SECRET

3 JUN 1965

ANT ✗	~~25~~	WE/BC/LL
~~DC~~	~~[illegible]~~	
ABSTRACT ✗		~~INDEX~~

201-306052

IN 81357 PAGE 2

2. SINCE THIS CONTRACT IN LINE WITH TIFFANY TALKS WITH AF DIV PRIOR DEPARTURE HQS, WILL ASSUME APPROVAL UNLESS NOTIFIED OTHERWISE AND PRESENT CONTRACT FOR S/1 SIGNATURE 1000 HOURS 3 JUNE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER WILL INTRODUCE RODIGAST. S/1 PASSED EQUIV 100 DOLLARS SIGNING BONUS.

3. TENTATIVE ITINERARY FOR S/1 IS DEPART LOND 8 JUNE SPEND ONE DAY TO VISIT GRIPPA AND OR RAINDORF BRUS; TO LAUSANNE BY RAIL 9 JUNE; TO PARI BY RAIL LATE 11 JUNE; TO TANGIER BY AIR 16 JUNE AND ON TO ALGI BY RAIL 17 OR 18 JUNE.

4. WE BELIEVE S/1 HAS ADEQUATE COVER FOR ALGI SUMMER, DETAILS BY POUCH.

5. ON BASIS TALKS WITH MARC SCHLEIFFER 1 JUNE S/1 SUGGESTED THAT HE TAKE TAPE RECORDER (OSTENSIBLY SUPPLIED BY BROTHER IN LAW) TO ALGI TO USE TOGETHER WITH S FOR RECORDING INTERVIEWS FOR PACIFICA FOUNDATION NEW JERSEY RADIO STATION WBAI. TIFFANY GAVE TENTATIVE TURNDOWN THIS IDEA, SINCE IT HIGHLY IMPLAUSIBLE REPORTER IN S/1 POSITION WOULD SPEND TIME MAKING TAPES FOR POSSIBLE (NOT CERTAIN) NOMINAL PAYTS BY WBAI. HOWEVER, THIS GIMMICK MIGHT BE USEFUL TO GET S/1 ACCESS FOR PRIVATE TALKS WITH TARGET PERSONALITIES. LEAVE TO ALGI AND HQS DISCRETION WHETHER

TO AUTHORIZE TAPE RECORDER FOR S/1 WHICH RODIGAST COULD PROCURE AND TURN OVER S/1 PARI 13-16 JUNE.

6. FORWARDING PRQ ONE AND SECRECY AGREEMENT. WITH THIS AND S/1 AGREEMENT LCFLUTTER TRUST HQS CAN EXPEDITE APPROPRIATE SECURITY CLEARANCE S/1.

SECRET

SECRET

CFN

3 JUN 1959

file R. Gibson

Tely

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

3 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	/	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM LONDON

ACTION OS 2

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, EE 4, WE 6, CI/OA, CI, AF 6, CI/OPS,

S E C R E T 271700Z

DIR INFO FRAN GMNY CITE LOND 7909

FJDUST LCFLUTTER KUDESK STEBONY

27 MAY 65 IN 77375

REF DIR 13891

DUE HIS NATIONALITY, WE DO NOT NEED SMOOTHERS OKAY TO FLUTTER STEBONY/1. HOWEVER, OUR GENERAL POLICY IS NOT TO FLUTTER HERE ANYONE WHO LIKELY REACT AND RAISE FUSS CAUSING SERIOUS POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT FOR US OR HMG. BECAUSE OF POINTS IN HIS HISTORY AND PERSONALITY, WE HAVE REASON TO DOUBT STEBONY/1 WILL COTTON TO FLUTTER, AND PREFER DEFER DECISION UNTIL TIFFANY BRIEFED AND HAS TALKED TO STEBONY/1. MAY THEN DECIDE, IF FLUTTER IN ORDER, CONDUCT IN EUROPE WHILE HE EN ROUTE ALGIERS.

CFN

SECRET

SECRET

201

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, London

INFO.
Chief of Station, ~~LCPIPIT~~ (Paris)

FROM
Chief, WE

SUBJECT
STEBONY - Transmittal of Interview Tapes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. PALP 3904 (IN 75497)
B. OELA - 42,706
C. OELA - 42,410

1. Forwarded herewith as Enclosure are the tapes of KATZENBACH's interviews of STEBONY/1 requested in Reference A. Hopefully, this package will reach London in time for background use by Rodigast.

2. After Rodigast is finished with the tapes, please save one reel or send it back to Headquarters for retention, and destroy the other three.

STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - London w/att
1 - Paris w/o att

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELW - 22233 [illegible]

DATE
26 May 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

1 - RI
1 - CI/ICG
1 - WE/BC/U

AN SPFI
~~RE~~ ~~DESK~~
ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CI/ICG	A. Goodrich	dab	5928

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WE/BC/U		John K. Roberts

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	26 May	John F. Caswell

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, FE Attn: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris [illegible]

SUBJECT: KOBIRD/LCHARVEST/KUDESK/STEBONY - "Revolution" Mailing List

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OELA-43,113 of 13 May 1965

Action: Please provide copy of subject list.

We note London Station's comment that the only copy of the "Revolution" mailing list, as provided by STEBONY, has been sent to Headquarters. We are not clear whether the STEBONY list was for the English-language edition of "Revolution" only, or for all subscribers. If possible, we should appreciate Headquarters' forwarding a list of "Revolution" subscribers and addresses in France.

Ann E. Ducote

Ann E. DUCOTE eoj

Distribution:
- 2 - Chief, FE
- 3 - Chief, WE
- 2 - COS, London

201-306052

MAY 21 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFPA - 79535

CS COPY

DATE: 21 May 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Paris; Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief, FE

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
KUDESK STKBONY LCHARVEST QRFREY
"Revolution" Address List

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OFPA 79410, 3 May 1965

London Station was able to make only a single copy of the list, and, due to its bulk and the length of time required to copy it, we have not retained a copy. We doubt that the entire list, which runs to several thousand names (mostly in the U.S.) would be useful to Paris Station, but Headquarters may be able to supply an extract of names to suit your need — or the whole thing, if you wish.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
- 2-COS, Paris
- ~~3~~-Chief, WE
- 2-Chief, FE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
13 May 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
14 MAY 1955

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,113

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

BF

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

GROUP 1

☐ RI ☑ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM LONDON

ACTION WE 8

File STEBONY/1

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, AF 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, FE 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 121711Z

DIR INFO ALGI PARI PALP CITE LOND 7620

12 MAY 65 IN 65581

KUDESK STEBONY

JAGUAR HAVE INFORMALLY ADVISED US OF NEW REPORT THAT "RUMORS HAVE RECENTLY REVIVED SAYING THAT STEBONY/1 IS CONNECTED WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY." STA REQUEST FOR ELABORATION, INDICATION OF AREA IN WHICH RUMOR CIRCULATING, ETC., MET WITH COMMENT THAT JAGUAR UNABLE TO SAY ANY MORE AT PRESENT, AND CANNOT "YET" LET US HAVE THIS COMMENT IN WRITING. WILL PURSUE AND ADVISE ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

201

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO. Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF; Chief, FE; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief of Station, Paris

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY
Cover Possibility for STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

1. During a recent meeting, STEBONY/1 called my attention to the book Political Africa, by honald SEGAL, published London 1961 by Stevens and Sons, Ltd. STEBONY/1 used the book to look up a brief bio squib on, as it happened, Patrick Duncan. He commented that the book, although out of date and far from objective (one of the collaborators was Rosalynde AINSLIE), was extremely useful to him.

2. I subsequently got a copy of the book, and find it useful. Nonetheless, it is far out of date. It would appear that there is a great need for an up-dated version, more comprehensive and more objective. STEBONY/1 might be the ideal person to work up such a book (he could even put some of his wife'r talents to work, in such a project), and, in turn, such a project could augment nicely his cover for, say, a year.

3. For Headquarters consideration then, the following suggestion: Contact Praeger (who published Political Africa in the U.S.) or another appropriate firm, and lay on a commission to compile such a compendium of facts, figures and faces on the African scene. Have them in turn commission STEBONY/1 to do the job, and provide him with enough of an advance to help cover his needs for a period of a year, say, starting after STEBONY/1's summer in Algiers. (Alternatively, of course, STEBONY/1 could be instructed to come to Praeger with such a proposal, which we could encourage Praeger to accept.) This could run concurrently with STEBONY/1's news-letter, if it materializes, and without any apparent conflict. It could also afford him additional cover for travel and interviews, as well as funds. And a useful reference tool could result.

4. This is just a suggestion, but we'd like to know what you think of it.

George H. KATZENBACH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
~~3~~-Chief, WE
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, AF
2-Chief, FE
~~2~~-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-COS, Algiers - Out Pouch
2-COS, Paris

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DATE TYPED
11 May 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
13 MAY 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,110

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201- 306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

201-306052

☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

71/30 SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
ALGIERS

ACTION
CI

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE AF 2, CA/02

11 MAY 67 IN 64377

SECRET 111100Z

LOND INFO DIR PARI PALP BRUS CITE ALGI 5878

LCHARVEST* (PRTN GRBLD-BEING SVCD) QKOPERA QRPREY

REF: LOND 7141 (IN-46013)

RE PARA 8 REF. SOURCE IN ALGERIAN DIRECTORATE OF INFO SAYS [illegible] IS STILL HERE, ON PAYROLL OF DIRECTORATE ALTHOUGH NOT PRODUCING. CASE OFFICER SAYS SOURCE CAN PROVIDE SPECIFIC INFO [illegible] SUBJECT IF DESIRED.

SECRET

CFN

*

AN SAFE | AF/1/A
RS | INDEX
ABSTRACT Y

SECRET

201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

14-00000

201 - 306052

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID. ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MES. 2 TOTAL COPIES 28 RI ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

27 SECRET GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
LCPIPIT (PARIS)

ACTION
~~WE 8~~ CI/IC 2

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE ADDP, AF 6, FE 6, CA/O 4, CA 2, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, CCS 3, CI/OA, CA/PROP

RI COPY

S E C R E 031055Z

DIR INFO LOND ALGI CITE PALP 3756 3 MAY 65 IN 57528

KUDESK STEBONY QRPREY

REFS A DIR 04341

B LOND 7341 (IN 55353)

C DIR 98974

1. RE PARA 2 REF A, RODIGAST (R) MOST INTERESTED THIS ASSIGNMENT. HE AVAILABLE FOR JUNE 1 INTRODUCTORY MEETING LOND. WILL POUCH SHORTLY OUR THOUGHTS RE COVER ACCOMMODATION, ADDRESS, ETC.

2. MEANWHILE LCPIPIT AND R AGREE WITH REF B PARA 4 POING CONCERNING S/1-R MEETING ALGI. ALTERNATIVELY SUGGEST CONSIDER TANGIERS TRAVEL TO WHICH R CAN COVER AS TRIP TO DEVELOP FEATURE ARTICLE ON AMERICAN EXPATRIATE LITERARY COMMUNITY WHICH CONGREGATES THERE. CASA ALSO A POSSIBILITY.

3. HAS PRECIS E TAPE DEBRIEFING MENTIONED REF C BEEN FORWARDED? PLEASE CABLE DISPATCH NUMBER.

4. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

8 MAY 1965

~~AF/CB~~	~~RI~~	AF 2 A
~~FE~~	~~[illegible]~~	
ABSTRACT		

201-306052

14-00000

DISP

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF; Chief, FE; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief, LCPIPIT; COS, Paris

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Records on STEBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Separate cover attachments to this dispatch are:

1 - A JAGUAR letter, forwarding
2 - A poor photocopy of STEBONY/1's passport, and
3 - A list of STEBONY/1's movements from 14 September 1962 to 7 October 1964, all derived from entries in the passport.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachments 1, 2 & 3:
(USC)

Distribution:
~~3~~-Chief, WE w/att 1, 2 & 3 USC
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-Chief, AF w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-Chief, FE w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-COS, Algiers w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-COS, Paris, w/att 1 & 3 USC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

306052
~~201-128663~~

CA/CF

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 3 MAY 65

DATE TYPED
27 April 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
28 APR 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,000

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 AT

SECRET

TO: Chief, WE
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 1 to OELA-43,000
27 April 1965

Richard Thomas GIBSON
Born: Los Angeles on 13.5.31
Address: 30 Stockleigh Hall,
Prince Albert Road, London. N.W.8.

2. As requested, I am now enclosing for your perusal a photocopy of GIBSON's passport, number B.131994. I should be grateful if you would return this to me at your earliest convenience.

3. I am also enclosing for your easy reference a list of GIBSON's movements between 14th September 1962 and 7th October 1964 which has been compiled from his passport.

4. Apart from a visit to Paris for three weeks earlier this year, GIBSON and his wife, Joy Marjorie, have continued to live with their two children at the London address shown above. On his return from Paris on 14th February 1965, GIBSON was landed for three months as a visitor. In April he was reliably reported to be still apparently unemployed.

5. The above information, together with a copy of the list of GIBSON's movements, is being sent to ODENVY/LOND

SECRET

[illegible] Chief,
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 3 to OELA-43,000
27 April 1965

Richard Thomas C[illegible]

United States Passport [illegible]

Issued 25.1.61 (valid 3 years)
renewed in London (valid for further 2 years)

Born 13.5.31 in California

U.S. address struck through

Foreign address: c/o Mr. Sidney Kaye,
3 Langland Mansions,
Finchley Road, N.W.3.

Passport not valid for communist controlled parts of China, Korea, Vietnam, or for Albania or Cuba.

		Passport Page No.
14.9.62.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	9
5.10.62.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	5
23.10.62?	Arr. MOROCCO, Casablanca.	7
20.11.62.	Dep. MOROCCO, Oujda-Gare.	5
20.11.62.	Arr. ALGERIA, Zoudj-el-Beghel.	5
28.2.63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7
6.3.63.	Arr. ALGERIA, Maison Blanche.	7
[illegible].63.	Dep. ALGERIA, Maison Blanche.	5
[illegible].63.	Arr. FRANCE, Orly.	7
[illegible].63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7
[illegible].4.63.	Dep. FRANCE, place illegible.	5
21.4.63.	Arr. U.K., Folkestone, visit up to 3 months.	9
[illegible].4.63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	9
[illegible].63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7.
[illegible].63.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	8
[illegible].63.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	7
[illegible].6.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	9

14.6.63. ....

SECRET

		Passport Page No.
4.6.63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	9
5.6.63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	9
7.6.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Orly.	7
6.6.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	8
26.6.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Orly.	7
26.6.63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	10
2.7.63.	Dep. U.K., Gatwick.	10
2.7.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	5
[illegible].63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	10
[illegible].63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	10
[illegible].63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7
1.10.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	5
1.10.63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	10
3.10.63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	10
3.10.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	10
27.10.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	8
[illegible].10.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	11
[illegible].10.63.	Arr. BELGIUM, ? Brussels.	7
[illegible].12.63.	VD/R Rubber Stamp.	11
10.1.64.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	11
23.1.64.	Dep. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	11
23.1.64.	Arr. U.K. Folkestone, visit up to 3 months.	11
26.1.64.	Dep. U.K., Folkestone.	11
26.1.64.	Arr. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	11
1[illegible].2.64.	Dep. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	11
1[illegible].2.64.	Arr. BELGIUM, Brussels.	11
20.2.64.	Dep. BELGIUM, Brussels.	12

/17.3.64. ....

SECRET

		Passport Page No.
17.3.64.	Dep. SWITZERLAND, Geneva-Cornavin.	11
1.4.64.	Dep. SWITZERLAND, Geneva-Cornavin.	12
27.5.64.	Arr. BELGIUM, Brussels.	8
30.5.64.	Arr. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	8
7.10.64.	Arr. U.K., Dover, visit up to 3 months.	10

201-306052

TO: Chief, WE
FROM: Chief of St on,
London
Attachment No. 2 to
OELA-43,000, 27 April 1965



IMPORTANT

This passport is NOT VALID until signed BY THE BEARER on page two. Please fill in names and addresses below.

BEARER'S ADDRESS IN THE UNITED STATES

Name [illegible]

Address [illegible]

[illegible]

BEARER'S FOREIGN ADDRESS

[illegible]

[illegible] London [illegible]

IN CASE OF DEATH OR ACCIDENT NOTIFY

Name [illegible]

Address [illegible]

[illegible]

EXPIRATION AND RENEWAL

Unless limited to a shorter period, this passport expires three years from the date of issue shown on page two. It may be renewed for an additional period not exceeding two years from the date of issue shown on page two. The renewal fee is Five Dollars. This passport must be presented with the renewal application. Renewal is shown by a stamp placed in the passport on page [illegible]

NEW PASSPORT

When this passport expires and you require a new one, this passport should be presented with your application for the new passport.

[illegible]

The Secretary of State of The United States of America hereby requests all whom it may concern to permit the bearer to pass without delay or hindrance and to extend such courtesies aid and protection as would be extended to like citizens of foreign states travelling to the United States.



WARNING—Alteration, Addition or Mutilation of Entries is Prohibited.
Any Unofficial Change Will Render This Passport Invalid.

RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON

MAY 13, 1951

CALIFORNIA

5 FEET 10 INCHES

BLACK

BROWN

XXX

ISSUE DATE

JAN. 23, 1951

XXX

Richard T. Gibson

PASSPORT RENEWED
LONDON, ENGLAND.
Martha C. Frankel
V.C. CONSUL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

IMPORTANT: Unless Otherwise Limited
This Passport Expires Three Years From Issue Date.
If Renewed, It Expires Five Years From Issue Date.

Photograph of bearer

ATTACHED
OF STATE

Richard T. Gibson



THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID FOR TRAVEL TO OR IN COMMUNIST CONTROLLED PORTIONS OF

CHINA
KOREA
VIET-NAM

OR TO OR IN
ALBANIA

CUBA

"A person who travels to or in the listed countries or areas may be liable for prosecution under Section 1185, Title 8, U.S. Code and Section 1544, Title 18, U.S. Code."

4

Extensions, amendments, limitations and restrictions

5 OCT 1963
FRANCE

JUIL 1963

5



Visas

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PASSPORT BEARER
TO OBTAIN NECESSARY VISAS

Visas

SUISSE
E -6 SEP. 1963
Aéroport

JUIN 963

SUISSE
E 26 AVR. 63
Genève

250

SUISSE
E 28 FEV 63

ORLY A
9 MARS 1963
FRANCE

VALLORBE
02 08 63
FRANCE

1963 A

26

29 X 1963

E 11

AÉROPORT



Visa

SURETÉ NATIONALE
VALLORBE G
10. 05. 63
FRANCE

BELGIQUE
27 MAI 1964
BRUXELLES-No 12

VALLORBE
G
05. 05. 63
FRANCE

SURETÉ NATIONALE
VALLORBE G
63
FRANCE

SURETÉ NAT
Gare du Nord
30. 05. 64
FRANCE

Visa

LE BOURGET
4 JUIN 1963
FRANCE

VISIT UP TO THREE MONTHS
IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(27)
14 SEP 1962

IMMIGRATION
(202)
EMBARKED
LONDON AIRPORT

VISIT UP TO THREE MONTHS
IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(111)
4 JUN 1963
LONDON AIRPORT

VISIT UP TO THREE MONTHS
IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(21)
21 APR 1963

IMMIGRATION
(126)
EMBARKED



LE BOURGET A
OCT 1963
25 FRANCE

26JUN1963
LONDON AIRPORT

GATWICK (A)

29 AUG 1963

OFFICER
EMBARKED

-1 OCT
LONDON AIRPORT

-7 OCT 1963
DOVER

VD J 8323
R 15-12-63

23 JAN 1964

EMBARKED
JAN 1964

VALLORBE
16. 01. 64
73 FRANCE

13. 01. 64
FRANCE

BELGIË

VALLORBE
14. 12. 63
FRANCE

11



Visas

GENÈVE-CORNAVIN
S -1 AVR 1961
Frontière Suisse

[illegible]
BRUXELLES

12

Visas

13

14-00000

46

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG: A. Goodrich
UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 1176
DATE: 22 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

AF ABSTRACT ~~INDEX~~ A

23 APR 65 23 19z

TO: LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C1/IC2

INFO: CI, WE6, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI/OPS AF6, FE6, FI, DO4, DO/H3, FI/INT2

TO LOND INFO PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR CCS 3, CI/OA, VR, FILE 04341

RI KUDESK, STEBONY, QKOPERA, QRPREY

REF: LOND ~~7064 (IN 43053)~~ 7141 (IN 46013) NP

1. ON BASIS KATZENBACH (K) DEBRIEFING STEBONY/1 BELIEVE S/1 KNOWLEDGEABILITY CONTACTS IN AREA WHERE CURRENT KUBARK ACCESS THIN SUFFICIENT WARRANT OPS FOLLOW THROUGH. STILL BELIEVE THAT ALGI DURING PERIOD MID JUNE TO MID AUGUST OFFERS BEST TESTING GROUND FOR PROBATIONARY ASSIGNMENT AND POSSIBILITIES FOR S/1 DEVELOP NATURAL COVER FOR EVENTUAL LONG RANGE PENETRATION PRO CHICOM GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL FRONTS.

2. FOR PALP: DESIRE RODIGAST (R) HANDLE S/1 DURING LATTERS VISIT ALGI AND PROBABLY AFTERWARDS~~, IF S/1 SETTLES WEST EUROPE~~. WOULD HOPE THAT DURING PROBATIONARY PERIOD PARA 1 ABOVE, R COULD USE JOURNALIST COVER FOR SOME TRIPS ALGI TO COVER BANDUNG AND FESTIVAL. THIS SUPPLEMENTED WITH S/1 VISIT LOND OR PARI AND ONE WAY SW SHOULD INSURE CLOSE AND EFFECTIVE MONITORING S/1 CONTACTS, INFO AND DEVELOPMENT JOB PROSPECTS IN TARGET AREA. BELIEVE R CONTACT COULD BE KEPT ON SECURE ALIAS BASIS EVEN IN PARI ALONG LINES TPSHRIFT OP. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE.

201-306052

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 1176
DATE : 22 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	11 PM	8	

Jun 21

TO : LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

TO LOND INFO: PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

AND AVAILABILITY R FOR INTRODUCTION AT LOND MEETING WITH S/1 FIRST WEEK JUNE. IF AGREE ABOVE, SUGGEST ALSO PALP DEVELOP ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE PARI FOR S/1 CONTACT R IN FUTURE.

3. UPON RECEIPT POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM R, REQUEST K MEET S/1 AND EXPLAIN FOLLOWING:

A. ODYOKE INTERESTED AND GRATEFUL HIS COOPERATION AND HOPEFUL RELATIONSHIP CAN MATURE.

B. AS EARNEST OUR CONTINUED INTEREST WE EXTENDING ONE HUNDRED DOLLAR WEEKLY RETAINER ADDITIONAL FOUR WEEKS. IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE CONTINUED RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER, WE CANNOT KEY SUCH PAYT TO SPECIFIC NEEDS SUCH AS KIDS TUITION. THIS PAYT CAN BE MADE IN LUMP SUM ADVANCE.

C. PRETEND K WILL BE ABSENT LOND UNTIL LATE MAY.

D. PRESENT THINKING IS THAT MID JUNE TO MID AUGUST PERIOD ALGI, WITH AFRO ASIAN CHIEF OF STATE MEETING AND WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL PLUS PERHAPS ALSO AFRO ASIAN WOMENS AND JOURNALISTS CONFERENCES, COULD OFFER VALUABLE AND APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 1176
DATE : 22 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : LOND
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: INFO

TO LOND INFO: PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

FOR S/1 CLARIFY HIS REPORTING VALUE TO ODYOKE AND HOPEFULLY DEVELOP LONG RANGE ASSOCIATION OF INTEREST TO US.

E. AS PRELIMINARY STEP WE WANT HIM USE NEXT MONTH TO LINE UP VIABLE COVER VISIT ALGI THIS PERIOD. IN ADDITION ANY NOTIONAL OR REAL HELP FROM BROTHER IN LAW, S/1 XXO SHOULD TRY LINE UP FIRM AGREEMENTS WITH ONE OR MORE FAR LEFT PUBLICATIONS FOR ACCREDITATION TO COVER ALGI EVENTS. EXPLOITATION CONTACT WITH INDO EMBASSY MIGHT FACILITATE. (SEE PARAS 5 - 7 FOR GUIDANCE ON REF QUERIES.)

F. EXPRESS CURRENT INTENTION TO LINE UP DEFINITIVE MEETING WITH K COLLEAGUE 27 MAY TO HANDLE FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS. ARRANGE FOR S/1 CONTACT K 24 or 25 MAY FOR FIRM MEETING INSTRUCTIONS. FYI KUDESK STAFFER JOSEPH S TIFFANY PLANS TDY LOND 26 MAY FOR SHAKE DOWN OPS TALKS WITH S/1 PRIOR TURNING OVER TO R EARLY JUNE. THIS STEP CONSIDERED DESIRABLE IN ORDER SCREEN OUT K AND PBSWING FROM OPS FOLLOW THROUGH.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 1176
DATE : 22 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : LOND
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO

TO LOND INFO: PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

4. BELIEVE NOW USEFUL BRIEF JAGUAR SMOTH OUR INTENTION DEVELOPING OPS RELATIONSHIP S/1. WE SHALL FORWARD SUMMARY ALL S/1 DEBRIEFING SHORTLY MOST OF WHICH CAN BE PASSED. IN VIEW POSSIBILITY S/1 WORKING WAY INTO SENSITIVE POSITION, PERHAPS IN DENIED OR SEMI DENIED AREA, TRUST JAGUAR/SMOTH WILL TREAT CASE AS SENSITIVE FROM OUTSET. REQUEST JAGUAR COOPERATION TO SHED LIGHT ON S/1 WIFE AS POTENTIAL SECURITY PROBLEM AND PROVIDE LIMITED SURVEILLANCE S/1 CONTACTS OVER NEXT MONTH. COULD THEY SECURE PHONE TAP ON S/1? TRUST IT WILL BE POSSIBLE ENLIST JAGUAR/SMOTH COOPERATION WITHOUT NECESSITY ACKNOWLEDGING EITHER TIFFANY OR RODIGAST (LATTER NON OFFICIAL COVER) TO THEM. PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS ASSUMPTION INCORRECT.

5. RE PARA 1 REF PROPOSAL, SUGGEST K DISCUSS WITH SMOTH AS FUTURE POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER BELIEVE SECOND S/1 TRIP SUISSE AT THIS TIME WOULD LOOK SUSPICIOUS NOT LEAST TO NILS ANDERSON AND S/1 WIFE. MEANWHILE, IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR S/1 TO ATTEMPT RAISE FUNDS FOR WEST INDIA GAZETTE FROM LOCAL SYMPATHIZERS AND MAKE ARTICLE CONTRIBUTION TO PUBLICATION.

5
4
3
2
1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 1176
DATE : 22 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : LOND
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: INFO:

TO LOND INFO: PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

6. RE PARA 2 REF PROPOSAL S/1 SHOULD SHOP THIS AROUND AS AN IDEA BUT SHOULD NOT START ANYTHING YET AS EVERYONE KNOWS THAT EVEN MODEST EFFORT THIS TYPE IN PUBLISHING FIELD REQUIRES START CAPITAL OF WHICH S/1 CANNOT CURRENTLY EXPLAIN SOURCE.

7. RE PARA 3 REF, S/1 MIGHT WRITE A FEW LETTERS RECOMMENDING WILLIAMS BOOK TO PROSPECTIVE WESTERN PUBLISHERS.

8. PLEASE TA PAYT PARA 3 B ABOVE TO HQS YQHITCH ~~ALGERIA HQS FINAN ACCOUNT NUMBER 5138-1708~~. M

AF/CCPS
AF/B+F
AF/1
DC/WE/BC J. Roberts (in draft)
CA/CF J. Murphy (in draft)
CA/PROP J. Culbertson (by phone)
CA/3 S. Braham ✓
CO/IO J. Downes (by phone)

5
4
3
2
1

Thomas F. Thiel
WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Lothar Metzl
C/CI/ICG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

14 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : CA/CF; CI/ICG

SUBJECT : Richard Gibson

1. Areas of Knowledgeability. A reading of the transcription of Gibson's taped debriefing clearly underlines KATZENBACH's assessment that Gibson possesses an encyclopedic knowledge of personalities and groups ranging from Zanzibar to the U.S. It is not always clear from the debriefing to what extent Gibson enjoys either a first-hand knowledge or even a friendly relationship with specific individuals or groups. What is clear is that Gibson moves in a milieu on which we presently have very little coverage; that he is already a member of this loosely defined society and thus can be presumed capable of developing new contacts or strengthening old ones by means of present and past associations.

It is difficult to categorize or devine what this milieu is. It is not the world of communist parties -- although it contains a preponderance of communists; and it does not seem to be a society which necessarily revolves about the Chinese. The primary common denominator covering most of the personalities involved in Gibson's reporting is some association with the revolutionary movement in Africa -- particularly Algeria. A secondary means of characterizing these contacts is a correlation with the radical French and Belgian left which lies outside such organized party structures as the PSU, PCF, BCP. (His main access to Chinese communists runs through Jacques GRIPPA in Belgium and Nils ANDERSSON in Switzerland with whom he claims to be on good terms at the present time.) Another common thread, almost as general, is association with Trotskyism, although the meaning or clarification of this political description is never spelled out. In general, Gibson displays a good and often personal knowledge of target areas which might be grouped as follows:

a. African exile revolutionary circles in France, Algeria and London, including the PAC, ANC, MPLA, MPA, and other less organized pockets.

b. European leftist sympathizers of the liberation movement in Africa.

c. Algerians or Algerian contacts in Europe who were associated with the war for independence.

d. Algerian personalities currently active or occupying official positions in Algiers.

SECRET

e. The exile American Negro community.

f. Minor political writers and polemicists in exile leftist circles in Europe.

2. Access and Limitations on Access. There apparently has been circulated a charge that Gibson is a CIA agent. (This is reflected in his 201 as dating from his days with the FPCC.) In dealing with this question, however, KATZENBACH cites Gibson's own belief that he is still able to operate in the circles which would be of interest to us. It is, of course, difficult to tell from his debriefing the extent and seriousness of this charge against Gibson, insofar as it affects his bona fides. It does seem that in Gibson's milieu, gossip, personal attacks, muddled loyalties and an aura of conspiratorial confusion are everyday facts of life and that personal contact and effectiveness in building rapport would far outweigh such critical personal charges -- which, indeed, probably circulate about most people. At the present time, for reasons not entirely clear, Gibson feels that he would be unwelcome and restricted were he to visit Ghana, and, in fact, would not like to make such a trip. He has indicated, on the other hand, that he has friends in Algeria and believes he could probably get some kind of job there or at least find a receptive and generally friendly reception. He also appears to have some contact and standing with the Indonesian government, since he claims their London Embassy offered him employment. It is not known to what extent he might be able to parley such a contact into employment in Djakarta or some form of official association in Europe, although these questions could be explored further. The termination of his association with Revolution and Verges would not, according to his account of it, discredit him in the eyes of those who might have been partisans of the ideological line which this magazine purveyed. According to his account, Verges is not in good standing with the pro-Chinese like Grippa or even the Chinese, and that his (Gibson's) quarrel with Verges over unpaid salary is well known. While this may not be unbiased, it is apparently true that he has lodged a claim for payment against Verges, and thus is not in the position of having been expelled from Revolution for ideological deviation. As Gibson recounts it, it is Verges, not he, who is discredited.

3. Motivation and Readiness to Cooperate. The debriefing reflects between the lines what KATZENBACH judges in his covering dispatch to be a readiness to collect information for us knowing that we are an official agency and probably suspecting that we are KUBARK. His professed motivation is monetary, and frankly so, although a certain degree of fatigue with his past profession of ideological punditry is discernable. There are also a number of indications that Gibson would like to rehabilitate himself lest he be forced to make his living for an indefinite period of time in an environment that he finds both unpleasant and materially unrewarding. It is not possible, of course, to make an intelligent judgement from this debriefing on the firmness and consistency with which he

might undertake continuing assignments for us, but this is not an unusual area of uncertainty with a new agent and one which a probationary period should dispel. (It should be noted that in one instance, he volunteered a name as an operational lead -- i.e., as someone whom we might find it worthwhile to look up. He also provided what is apparently an accommodation address in Bogota for Chinese mailings.)

4. Long-Range Usefulness and Initial Targetting. Gibson's long-range usefulness, of course, would depend not only on his effectiveness and dependability, but on the opportunities which will emerge and take shape as a result of his initial activity. As a general proposition, he can be viewed as an intelligence collection asset targetted at radical independence movements, pro-Chinese personalities and organizations, and official personalities in newly emerged countries, primarily in Africa. Specifically, these targets would include:

a. PAC and ANC: Gibson claims to have friends in both.

b. FLN and Algerian government and publishing circles.

c. Afro-Asian Journalists Association, and by extension, other Afro-Asian groups, such as exist or promised in youth, labor, women, and so forth.

d. Pro-Chinese European parties, including the Belgian (he claims to have access to Grippa), the Marseilles faction and the Swiss activity of Nils Andersson.

e. By extension from these, although at present only a remote possibility, developing Chinese propaganda and intelligence instrumentalities.

In the short range, a current assignment for us should meet the following criteria:

a. lend itself to probationary exploitation;

b. not tie Gibson down indefinitely to one location or involve him in an identification with one faction, group or party that would limit his later flexibility;

c. permit him to respond to targets of opportunity as we may define them, both to have a maximum test of the range of his capability and access, and to probe for the best long-range use we can put him to;

d. enable him to build his bona fides and his contacts as we may direct.

The best likely assignment to fulfill these requirements is that of a journalist, preferably operating from Europe, capable of credible travel in Europe, Africa and even Asia, with some associations which will preserve his bona fides with target Afro-Asian groups. Assuming the development of adequate cover, he could then spend an initial period this spring and summer in Algeria to cover the Second Bandung Conference (29 June) and the World Youth Festival (28 July). (Other international conferences, including followup AAPSO meetings to the Ghana Congress in May, an Afro-Asian Journalists Conference or further PAJU meetings cannot be anticipated as targets at present either because of indefinite planning or because of unsuitable location. There is little doubt, however, that additional meetings will take place in Algiers and Africa bringing together interesting target personalities from Africa and Asia whom Gibson might attempt to report on.) In addition to his contribution in coverage of these meetings he might also attempt to develop his access and contact among the official Algerian community at least with the value of developing biographical and operational support data.

5. Proposed for Discussion. The following questions seem to present themselves for discussion at this time:

a. decision on the continuation of support to Gibson on a probationary period;

b. determination on targetting for initial probationary and possible long-range employment;

c. mechanics of establishing a project;

d. timetable for assignments.

James M. Murphy
CA/CF

Attachments:
LOND-7065 (re tentative cover arrangements)
Partial list of names cited in Gibson's debriefing
Selections from the initial processing of Gibson's debriefing

Distribution:
1 - AF/1 Mr. Baker
1 - CO/XD Mr. Downs
1 - CA/B3 Mr. Raymond; CA/PROP Mr. Culbertson
1 - CA/PEG
1 - WE/INT Mr. Landreth
1 - WE/BC/U Mr. Roberts (w/o att.)
1 - CI/ICG Mr. Goodrich
1 - CA/CF Mr. Murphy

NO

CLASSIFY

FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

15 SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
LONDON

ACTION
WE 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
VR. FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CA 2, CA/C 4, AF 6, [redacted], ADDP,
FI, FI/INT 2, FE 6

RI COPY

12 APR 65 IN 43053

S E C R E T 121250Z

DIR INFO PARI PALP BRUS ALGI CITE LOND 7065

LCHARVEST KUDESK QKOPERA QRPREY

REF DIR 98974

AN SA

PS

ABSTRACT X

AF 1 A

1. STEBONY/1 (S), STILL UNEMPLOYED, IS PLEASED WITH PROSPECT OF ACTIVE SUMMER IN ALGI. WHILE WE REPEATED WE NOT READY MAKE ANY COMMITMENT BEYOND CURRENT MONTH'S RETAINER, HE NOW MAKING PLANS TO CONTACT POTENTIAL SPONSORS FOR PROLONGED VISIT ALGI. BEST BET MAY BE CONTACT WITH MONTHLY REVIEW RPT MONTHLY REVIEW. FRANCES KELLY (UK CITIZEN) WHO NOW IN LONDON WAS SECRETARY TO MONTHLY REVIEW WHILE IN US. HUBERMAN, WHO RUNS MR RPT MR, DUE COME UK SOON ON TRIP. PABLO FERNANDEZ OF CUBAN EMB HAS ALREADY SUGGESTED KELLY CONTACT S, AND S WILL INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES GETTING MR RPT MR ACCREDITATION FOR ALGI. STA POINTED OUT THAT SEVERAL SMALL OSTENSIBLE BACKERS COULD EACH BE PAYING S, IN ABSENCE ONE LARGE AND WELL-KNOWN OUTFIT. S WILL BEGIN SERIOUS CANVASS POSSIBILITIES, KEEP STA INFORMED, AND WILL NOT COMMIT SELF WITHOUT OUR OKAY. S EVENTUAL MOVE TO ALGI NICELY COVERED IF MORE PEOPLE AWARE OF HIS GROWING DISSATISFACTION PRESENT STATUS.

13 APR 1965

2. LOND DISSEMING (ZRWAHOO) TWO ITEMS FROM MEETING. HQS

SECRET

201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted] (35)

SECRET

RECEIVED RID/HIS

RID/HIS

IN 43053 PAGE 2

JUN 25 3 53 PM '65

ADVISE WHAT SYSTEM YOU WISH FOLLOWED IN FUTURE ON SUCH ITEMS. SUGGEST ANY FOREIGN DISSEM CHANGE RADR. ADVISE ALSO ON PASSING SMOOTHERS. SUGGEST WE PASS AT OWN DISCRETION, ADVISING HQS IN EACH CASE.

3. OF POSSIBLE INTEREST, S MENTIONED THAT WILLIAM WORTHY RECENTLY ARRIVED DJAKARTA FROM CAMBODIA. INDONESIANS DID NOT KNOW HE COMING, UNTIL HE SENT TELEGRAM FROM CAMBODIA SAYING HE ARRIVING SOON. S AMAZED AT WORTHY'S ABILITY TRAVEL SO DISCREETLY, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE DID NOT APPEAR HAVE PASSPORT.

4. DID NOT DISCUSS DIR 88977 QUESTION, BUT S NOTED SCHLEIFER NOW IN NEW YORK. HQS MAY WISH REFINE QUESTIONS ON BASIS FORMER DEBRIEFINGS, OR WE CAN INCLUDE IN NEXT MEET. PLS ADVISE.

5. S FINANCIAL CONDITION DIRE. NEEDS 150 POUNDS FOR KIDS' TUITION. CURRENTLY LIVING OFF WIFE'S SMALL SALARY, BUT STILL HAVE TO PAY RENT AND TUITION. S CLOTHES OBVIOUSLY VERY SHABBY, HE SAID HE WEARING HIS LAST WHOLE PAIR OF PANTS. WILL NEED BUY SOME CLOTHES BEFORE HE GOES ANYWHERE. MAY WE GIVE HIM 150 POUNDS FOR KIDS TUITION IN ADDITION TO 400 DOLLARS AUTHORIZED?

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 34

48 | 60 SECRET

ORIG: A. Goodrich AJ
UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 5928
DATE: 5 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1
2
3
4

JC

Return to JC

TO: LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CI/IC 2

ve, File, WE6, FE6, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, AF6

INFO: PARI PALP BRUS ALGI

AN SAFE | AF | 1 | A

ABSTRACT | CITE DIR 98974

TO LOND INFO:

LCHARVEST KUDESK QKOPERA QRPREY

REF: A. OELA 42750 (SENT HQS ONLY)

B. OELA 42410 (NOT SENT ALGI)

RICHARD GIBSON

1. SUBJ REF B (IDEN TO ALGI) ASSIGNED CRYPTO STEBONY/1. WE PROCESSING SUMMARY REF DEBRIEFING TRANSCRIPTS WHICH WILL BE POUCHED ADDEES MID APRIL. TENTATIVE APPRAISAL IS THAT S/1 OFFERS PRIMARILY KUDESK KUTUBE POTENTIAL IN PROCHICOM NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FRONT AREAS. PERHAPS SERIES CONFERENCES ALGI THIS SUMMER BKKHX BRINGING TOGETHER KEY TARGET FIGURES OFFERS BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR S/1 DEVELOP NATURAL COVER AND GAIN NATURAL ACCESS TO TARGET AREA.

2. PENDING FINAL DECISION AND SELECTION CASE OFFICER FOR FUTURE HANDLING REQUEST KATZENBACH CONTACT S/1, GIVE HIM RETAINER FEE ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER WEEK FOR NEXT FOUR WEEKS TO INSURE HE DOES NOT TAKE ON FULL TIME JOB WHICH WOULD LIMIT OR PRECLUDE FUTURE OPS ACTIVITIES. DURING THIS PERIOD K (OSTENSIBLY ACTING ON BEHALF ODYOKE FRIEND WHO KEENLY INTERESTED IN INFO ON

CA
COPY

201-306052

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 5 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

Jun 21 11 [illegible] PM

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : LOND
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: INFO

TO LOND INFO: CITE DIR

PRO CHICOM ACTIVITIES) SHOULD REQUEST S/1 SURVEY POSSIBILITIES JOBS TO PROVIDE COVER FOR ATTENDING SECOND AFRO ASIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (AAJA) CONFERENCE (CAN S/1 DETERMINE EXACT DATES?), SECOND BANDUNG CONFERENCE AND WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL IN ALGI. FOR EXAMPLE AS STRINGER FOR MONTHLY REVIEW AND/OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH AAJA. PERHAPS LETTER TO OLD FRIEND LIONEL MORRISON OF AAJA IN AJ DJAKARTA MIGHT HELP. TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT INDONESIAN EMBASSY LOND MIGHT ALSO FACILITATE S/1 REENTRY TARGET AREA.

3. WITHOUT MAKING ANY COMMITMENTS BEYOND THE RETAINER SUGGES K PUT RELATIONSHIP WITH S/1 ON CLANDESTINE BASIS. SPECIFICALLY MEET OUTSIDE PBSWING, GET AWAY FROM NECESSITY K TELEPHONING S/1 HIS HOM AND PROVIDE S/1 WITH MEANS CONTACTING K FOR MEETING TO REPORT ON ANY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS.

4. REQUEST WINTERROWD DISCOURAGE FAIRMAN FROM PUBLISHING S/ ARTICLE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG: A. Goodrich
UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 5928
DATE: 5 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO: LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

TO LOND   INFO: CITE DIR

WE/BC John G. Roberts
CO/IO
AF/1
CA/CF J. MURPHY (by phone)
CA/PROP J. CULBERTSON (by phone)
CA/3 W. RAYMOND (by phone)
WE/3/INT. R. LANDRETH (by phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas J. Thiele
DC/WE
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

LOTHAR METZL
C/CI/ICG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 34

48 SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1			
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

9 APR 65 10 2

SIG CEN

TO : ALGI

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WE 2

INFO VR, File, WE 6, FE 6, CA 2, ~~CA/PROP~~, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, AF 6

TO ALGI INFO: Re DIR 98974

CITE DIR 98975

N/R

IDEN: RICHARD T. GIBSON

R
I

C
O
P
Y

END OF MESSAGE

AF 1 A

201-306052

5
4
3
2
1

W D Malloy CSDO
for C/WE/INT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, London R.F

SUBJECT
O Richard Thomas GIBSON (201-306052), Memo of Understanding

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of a memorandum of understanding signed by GIBSON on 23 February 1965. The original is being retained in the Station.

2. Two receipts signed by GIBSON on 19 February and 23 February 1965, each in the sterling equivalent of $200, were forwarded to Headquarters with London's TA 5-190. We suggest that these receipts be obtained from Finance and incorporated in GIBSON's 201 dossier.

Kat

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

201-306052

1 ATT

DATE TYPED
25 March 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
26 MAR

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-42,807

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

14-00000

To: Chief, WH
From: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-42,807
of 25 March 1965

I hereby acknowledge that I have voluntarily provided information to the United States Government, for which I received compensation. I have no further claim against the United States Government for this activity.

I further understand and agree that the entirety of this relationship is confidential and that nothing relating to it will be revealed by me to anyone.

Richard Gibson

Date: 23 February 1965

ATT #1 to

OELA 42807

CS COPY

201-306052

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FROM: England, London

REPORT NO. OEL-40,731

REPORTS OFFICER: Leroy T. WADSWORTH

cnp

DATE 19 March 1965

NO. OF PAGES 2

REPORT APPROVED BY: Victor T. CRONEIGH

8W

ATTACHMENTS

SOURCE: [illegible] JAGUAR

REFERENCE

COUNTRY: International

SUBJECT: Plans for the Sale of "Afro-Asian Journalist" in Europe

DATE OF INFO: 17 March 1965

SOURCE: Official British Service from "A reliable but very delicate source which must be given the utmost protection."

LONDON STATION COMMENT: Will Field Addressees please consider this report as for KUBARK BACKGROUND USE ONLY.

N.D.

DISTRIBUTION: ~~Washington 1~~
Bern 1
Rome 1
Paris (LCPIPIT) 1
Brussels 1

Registry

CS COPY

201-306052

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Plans for the Sale of "Afro-Asian Journalist" in Europe

201-306052

Richard GIBSON, the former editor of the pro-Chinese Communist publication "Revolution", left London towards the end of January 1965 and returned in the second half of March, having visited Lausanne, Milan, Rome, Paris and Brussels. During his travels he met Nils ANDERSSON, who was formerly connected with "Revolution" in Lausanne and Jacques GRIPPA, the leader of the pro-Chinese dissident group of the Belgian Communist Party. Since his return to the U.K. he has made proposals to the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association for these persons to receive copies of the Association's publication, "Afro-Asian Journalist". He has also suggested to the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association that copies of the publication should be sent to the following:-

i. Bulletin d'Information Marxiste-Leniniste,
11, rue du Landry,
Clichy,
France.

ii. The English Bookshop,
42, rue de Seine,
Paris 6e.

iii. Nuova Unita,
Piazza Cavour 2,
Milan.

iv. Marxtisch-Leninstisch-Centrum,
Postbus 1505,
Rotterdam.

2. It appears that GIBSON is trying to establish contacts in Europe with the object of expanding sales of the English and French editions of "Afro-Asian Journalist".

17th March, 1965.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

23 MAR 1965

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
PRIORITY
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE; Chief, AF

FROM
Chief of Station, London JKC

SUBJECT
KAPOK
Richard Thomas GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OFLA 42,706

1. Ref forwarded the tapes and a rough transcription of the debriefing session with Subject, which were held on February 17, 18, 19, 23, 1965.

2. In accordance with Headquarters' instructions, these meetings were kept on a don't-call-us-we'll-call-you basis - in fact GIBSON was given no means for calling us. Also in accordance with Headquarters' instructions, we did not pay GIBSON at a constant rate of over $100 per hour. The first ($300) payment to GIBSON was in fact more than we had originally intended to give him as a "binder", but in light of the imminence of his trip to Europe we advanced him that sum to help him to meet his expenses. This nicely coincided with our own time table, since the time he was gone - some three weeks - should have provided adequate time for the initial tape to be reviewed and for requirements to be prepared and pouched to the field. At any rate, the total sum given to GIBSON, for his time and a shot at his mailing list, was $700.

3. LCHARVEST may well feel that it has been done out of $700 in COA funds. The information obtained on ChiCom contacts of GIBSON, or on any ChiComs at all, was slight. GIBSON claims not to have had more than very little contact with them, and not to know too much about them. Unless there is hard info to the contrary, we are inclined to believe that GIBSON was telling pretty much the truth in this respect, as indeed seems to have been the case almost all of the time. While this is a bit of a disappointment, in a way, and seems to lessen the immediacy of LCHARVEST interest, it certainly does not appear to eliminate GIBSON's potential worth.

4. The London Station continues to feel that GIBSON has considerable potential as a source of positive intelligence on a wide range of targets - targets that appear to be only lightly covered otherwise, although we are not always able to judge this. A review of this debriefing can only cause one a certain amount of amazement at GIBSON's encyclopedic knowledge of many, many groups, personalities and parties of the far left, literally from America to Zanzibar. We leave it to Headquarters, of course, to evaluate

201-306052

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, FE
2-Chief, AF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY

DATE TYPED
15 March 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
18 MAR 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-42,750

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

CLASSIFICATION
PRIORITY
SECRET

his material; to the London Station, however, it appears to be not only rather massive but detailed as well. We do not doubt that he will be caught out from time to time on facts, and perhaps interpretations as well. But the totality of his information - and the whole performance was without notes - is astonishing.

5. Several points should be noted. First of all, a conscious effort was made to show GIBSON that his comments on the American scene were not being made a matter of record. (I took notes during our talk, and always stopped making notes when such a topic came up.) This is, as KULPA noted in OELW 1903 of 12 February 1965, an area of sensitivity with GIBSON. The only times that GIBSON really became emotional were when he talked about the American scene, his involvement, and the involvement of his close associates. And he kept reverting to the topic, and his involvement in it, throughout our conversations. We did not share KULPA's impression that GIBSON's dissatisfaction with the state of racial relations in America makes him generally anti-American. He does say that he would not like to be living in America for the coming year; but in the context of one who does not wish to be caught up in a period of growing violence, which GIBSON appears not to believe to be the solution to the problem. He states: "I can understand how they feel that way, I can recognize the problems, but I sure don't know what the solution to the problem is." His judgments on Negroes in the front of the racial struggle (Walter Bowe, Malcolm X, etc.) reflect not only an intimacy with the problem and a genuine concern, but also a generally reasonable and real understanding of many of the forces at work. GIBSON tends to condemn individuals - he spares no sympathy for the FBI, understandably - but he does not appear to condemn the United States as a whole, nor even the United States Government as a whole. At the same time, he makes no phoney protestations, either.

6. Regarding Cuba, GIBSON showed a similar emotional involvement (he acknowledges "my pro-Castro bias") but, withal, manages to give a more balances portrayal of the situation than many rabidly anti-Castro commentators. (Cuba, and Cuban matters, were also similarly low-keyed by me during our talks.)

7. Where GIBSON really comes into his own, and really astonishes with the breadth of his personal information and understanding, (and largely, it appears, without the same personal involvement and bias) is in African affairs (especially in left-wing fields), European Trotskyists and Communists and their general milieu, and Chinese-oriented international front organizations. Similarly he appears to be informed on certain ChiCom efforts at subversion and propaganda in Latin America.

8. Rather as if reading our thoughts, GIBSON offered to recruit himself. He didn't get too specific, and neither did we. But he did make it quite clear that he would be willing to collect information for us, knowing only that we were ODYOKE, probably suspecting that we were KUBARK, and probably equally doubting (because he knows the difference(that we were ODENVY. His motivations can be compiled from his own words. He has for some time been unable to find a suitable job here in London, He has economic pressures working on him - now exacerbated by the fact that his wife has caused her brother to withdraw some of the support that he had been providing. Venal? Opportunistic? Or someone who has a wife and two kids to support, and no job for the past eight months? GIBSON acknowledges that he has become somewhat bored with the "micro-biology" of chasing petty ideological differences, the kind that make factions of six members or less. At the same time, he acknowledges that he has to have a job, and that his access to and knowledge of these persons and groups are marketable commodities. His preference, he says, would be to have a nice quiet journalistic or public relations job here, but his efforts to find such a job have been fruitless. How, obviously, can one of his background and talents better employ them than as a collector and reporter of information? He says that he would like public relations or press work for the UN, perhaps, or an ODYOKE agency, but he is certain that he could never get the requisite security clearance. Still, obviously, he suspects that an "irregular" arm of ODYOKE, such as we, might be able to work something out.

9. How about his ideological motivation? We had hoped for some more concrete expression than we got, on this score, but what we have is not too bad. He states that he will not be "intellectually dishonest" to the point of becoming a "professional anti-Communist," by which he means a propagandist. At the same time, he agrees that he has no desire to be a professional revolutionary. Again we note that he is not blindly or unduly critical of ODYOKE. Granted, he criticizes many elements of ODYOKE policy and tends to defend some enemies of ODYOKE. A failure for him to do so would be sufficiently remarkable to make us totally suspicious of him. Note further his comment that he would havebeen perfectly willing to talk to us a year ago in Paris in the same fashion as he has here. This would sound rather suspicious and difficult to believe, were it not for the fact that he did show himself to be candid and cooperative in his Paris interview with a PBSWING officer.

10. How badly blown is GIBSON, then, if we are thinking of using him. After all, he has been publicly labelled a "CIA agent." Could he, then, work for KUBARK successfully? GIBSON himself is certainly a better judge of that than the London Station, and we feel that there are only two indices that can be used to judge the matter. The first and most immediate is GIBSON's own opinion, since he has lived with the problem, and has tested the idea in practice. He feels that he could still operate ("move" is his term) in most of the desirable areas successfully, provided he has adequate cover for being where he is and doing what he does. The second index would be for us to test his continuing access to targets of interest. It should not take too long to make such a test without putting anything into real jeopardy.

11. Cover for GIBSON, of course, would be a serious problem. He himself proposes the obvious answer: some kind of vaguely left journalistic tie-up. We should think that such cover could be arranged. And we propose to discuss a number of possibilities with Headquarters in due time.

12. Utilization and locale are most closely related, of course. From our vantage point here, it would appear that Algiers would be the most desirable home base for GIBSON. He could range out from there into Europe or the rest of Africa (the two best targets, apparently) and maintain a regular flow of information on Algerian affairs while "at home." He has spoken several times of the ease with which he is integrated into the Algerians environment, and he has a fairly well established base there from which to expand his operations. He has said that he would be willing to go there, or France, or most any other place where his children can continue their education in French. And Algiers appears to be, for the foreseeable future, a worthwhile target in its own right, as well as the site of a growing number of international front organization meetings, for which GIBSON would appear to have exceptionally fine credentials. As he says, he could go elsewhere in Africa, but Algiers is where he would fit best. We would be inclined to keep him, for the most part, away from the Cuban milieu (except, perhaps, incidentally) to avoid straining his reportorial objectivity. In the African, European, and international front areas, we suspect that careful checking would ensure such objectivity.

13. His utilization could best be considered on a straight information-collecting basis. To use him as a propaganda tool would be not only repugnant to him but destructive of his utility as well. Presumably he could be permitted to continue to write, not only for his overt employers (in a straight news fashion), but perhaps occasionally for leftist periodicals of his own choosing, in order to maintain his own cover. (This is, admittedly, seeing rather far into the future.) We do feel, however, that GIBSON could be an admirable and highly valuable collector of positive information on that whole spectrum of the left with which he is already so familiar.

14. GIBSON and security, to this point: GIBSON has met only myself, under alias, and under the impression that I was here temporarily. This idea was apparently made to stick, throughout our conversations. We would propose that, if GIBSON be recruited in fact, he be handled in alias and at a good, safe distance - more than arm's length. Until sufficient operational testing had been carried out, we would suggest that he not have a "resident case officer" anywhere - i.e., neither here nor in Algiers. Control of GIBSON is partly exercised by the documents we have received from him (receipts, memo of understanding) plus the voluminous taped comments. These, while not worthy of a court, are sufficient to do him considerable professional and personal damage - note particularly that his wife, according to him, would not approve of any of our contacts, and this appears to be quite meaningful to him. Financial control would be a continuing factor. And, perhaps to an unusually high degree, we feel that GIBSON would feel considerable gratitude to whoever (i.e., KUBARK) rescued him from his present and difficult position, "forgiving all", and providing him with a measure of respectability (at least in his own eyes) that he has henceforth been unable to achieve and maintain. In sum, we feel that a reasonably strong combination of control factors exist, and can be continued for as long as GIBSON would be properly handled.

15. We should also like to comment on the reliability of GIBSON's comments in the course of our meetings to date. We have found him to be thoroughly consistent in his comments and attitudes throughout. We found no indication of deliberate deception or serious attempts to mislead. He may have provided some erroneous materials, or he may have erroneously interpreted some events; but his comments and attitudes remained sufficiently consistent to lead us to believe that he was being reasonably honest all the way. He played down some items, no doubt, and played up others. In the course of a debriefing such as this was there seemed little or no point in pushing hard at such points - besides, his knowledge of the areas covered so far outdistanced mine that I could not have attempted to probe or pin him down on specifics. (Note also his tendency to make corrections in the debriefing questionnaire, as when the wrong name would appear for a political group in Switzerland.)

16. GIBSON's present status is that he is out of work, in debt, and without any prospects of reasonable employment in the near future. He is somewhat occupied with an article he is writing for Encounter; this will probably keep him from taking another job for the next few weeks. Beyond that, nothing is definite. If we would like to give him a try, then, some move should be made to formalize matters with him before he accepts some job that will put him out of the market.

17. Recognizing that there are risks involved, it nevertheless seems most undesirable to pass up what has the earmarks of being a highly useful asset. We request, therefore, that Headquarters review and consider the entirety of our knowledge of GIBSON to this point, and give us a reading on his potential worth, as viewed by LCHARVEST, AF Division, KUDESK/ICG and other interested parties. If, for reasons of which Headquarters is aware, and we are not, GIBSON is considered unacceptable as a KUTUBE asset, let us know. If, on the other hand, there appears to be a market for his talents and capabilities, we should move rather rapidly to pre-empt him. His present flexibility is not likely to last for long, and any plan to use him should take this into account. As WE/BC is aware, we are not in a position to put this into the form of a London Station project. This should not be the reason for neglecting what appears to be such a potentially rewarding asset for KUBARK, however.

18. We would appreciate a reply within a couple of weeks of Headquarters' receipt of this dispatch.

Kat

George H. KATZENBACH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
—	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
~~Chief, WE~~

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, London JAC

SUBJECT KUDESK/LCHARVEST
Debriefing of Richard T. GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are the tapes of the 17, 18, 19 and 23 February sessions with GIBSON. Also transmitted is a copy of the Station-prepared transcript of the tapes. The quality of the transcription varies: the first session is mostly summarized, the subsequent ones are almost verbatim. Roberta L. HORRELL did the transcripts, and I subsequently reviewed them, filling in comments, names, etc., that HORRELL had missed.

2. As rough as these transcripts are, a careful review of them is fairly revealing about GIBSON, and about his knowledge of the topics discussed. Further comment from this end will be contained in an operational dispatch. Right now we are anxious to get the present material into Headquarters' hands for further processing. This is about as far as we can take the material here, due to extreme time limitations. We are retaining a copy of the transcript, however, for further use and future reference.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
2 ~~3~~ - Chief, WE w/att h/w
1 - CO

Attachment ~~filed~~ CI/ICG 20 Mar 65

201-306052

reattached 5/7/67

CS COPY

DATE TYPED
9 March 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
15 MAR 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-42,706

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Satt.

I was in Rome when there was sun.

I had left Rome when the snow arrived.

I had a reasonably cordial reception almost everywhere. I got some information. I didn't push too hard. Where I encountered a little bit of suspicion but not very serious, was in Brussels, and actualy I think it was because Gaippu was so busy there. He said if I could have stayed on a few days, but I didn't have time or money to hang around. But I can always go back and see him again.

I went from here to Zurich, to Lausanne. The only reason I went to Zurich was simply because Nils Andersson claimed that the Swiss had, you know we had been expelled from Switzerland with the magazine, and he said that they had told him that I was interdit de ~~[illegible]~~ séjour, that is, can't come into the country.

But I have been in the country numerous times since then; ~~but~~ nevertheless I wanted to make certain. I know they know me in the Geneva airport. I went in the Zurich airport, and took the train there, (for Lausanne). And there I didn't stay in a hotel so that the local police would probably not know about it. They probably were aware, but they weren't going to bother, anyway. From Lausanne I went to Milan, Milan to Rome, Rome back to Lausanne to ~~[illegible]~~ Andersson again, then Paris, and from Paris to Brussels and back here. Altogether it took three weeks. One could have taken much more time. Actually, it was more establishing of contact. I got some information for this thing I am writing for Encounter. In fact I got enough to do what I want to do. (I have to) first see what Lasky ~~he~~ wants.

I would like to follow up - - to go on to Algiers, to talk to some more people down there - apparently they have got a lot more information about Verges. Or so they told Andersson,

B

of course useful if I'm going to play the money market. But for Algerian currency it was hard to find a buyer. The opposition has been the principal buyer of the new currency. In other words ~~he daren't~~ Krieger and the people who were ~~go~~ out of the country when the change in currency came and who were short of ~~in~~ hard cash for their people going in and out, were buying this currency. And this has created a more favorable exchange rate. In any case, at that time the exchange rate was hardly favorable and you had to give a sell order 24 hours in advance for the bank to find someone. And that was the thing. The money, he (Anderson), says that the exact sum in the bank he is not certain, in that account. He knows that Verges's figure was around ~~[illegible]~~ 75,000. He thinks that was fairly accurate. That is, 75,000 dollars, in Algerian currency. The money was placed there between the end of July or August of 1962 and December of that year. In other words it was just after independence but during the period of struggle ~~[illegible]~~ for power between the GPRA and the ~~clandestine (?)~~ Tlemcen (pl) TLEMCEN group. Where he got the money from. As for the second $75,000, Verges said he had another account. He knows (Anderson knows) as he said before, nothing about this. And frankly he doesn't believe it existed.

① ②

However, he does think that Verges has received small amounts of money, where from he doesn't know. The Chinese line is ending. In fact, you can tell from looking at the magazine, the last editorial. He changes- The editorial is called Compagnon de Route, which means Fellow Traveler, This is just what he didn't want to ~~xxx~~ be called. And it ends up by saying in French- en a fait nous des compagnons de route- - we're fellow travelers, we're for a united front of all the liberation movements with comprehension but without condescension. It's much more ~~[illegible]~~ modest, it's a playing down of their own role. In fact some of the articles ~~[illegible]~~ inside the magazine of course are not in line with the editorial. The editorial doesn't have Verges's style, either.

((Who do you suppose wrote it?))

That is very difficult to say. It doesn't to my mind seem to be the style of ~~Chem~~ Kier. either. I would suspect that it was written by ~~Gassard (?)~~ Kessel but for what purposes? Grippa's people told me, well, they considered this a favorable turn, that they were willing to accept Verges as a fellow traveler but as nothing more, and they told him that long ago. This is a power struggle. They told him that and what's more they're still not certain that they want to have anything to do with him. And apparently it's gotten to be the standard-- something that you ~~demand~~ need-- they demand that people who come to see Grippa now are - forced to say "we have nothing to do with Verges; if we had something to do with Verges, we make our self-

I would like to follow ~~up~~ [illegible] ~~For~~ instance, I would ~~have~~ like to ~~go~~ have gone to Algiers.

~~Apparently~~

~~[illegible]~~ some people down there that I could talk to. Apparently they've got a lot more information about Verges and so on. ~~[illegible]~~ That's ~~what they told Anderson~~.

Who told Anderson?

Oh, some member~~s~~ of the Algerian Foreign Ministry who, I think, is ~~in~~ was traveling ~~Anderson he sees a lot of Algerians~~ Geneva Switzerland. He sees a lot of Algerians because he worked with them during the Algerian war, in various capacities. So he still sees them. He has kept on fairly good terms with them. ~~[illegible]~~

You turned up some information in your talks with Anderson

Yes, some. You mean about the source of his funds. He (Anderson) assures me that the money was not as I thought it was; ~~but~~ it was in the form of Algerian currency. I thought it was in stocks and bonds. My assumption that it was in stocks and bonds was based on his (Verges) statements that he used to ~~say~~ make whenever we would ask him for money he would say, "I must go to the bank to tell them to sell". Now apparently what this meant was that they were holding ~~the~~ Algerian currency. You could deposit money in Swiss banks, It is held ~~as~~ currency of ~~in~~ the deposit. If I deposit ~~I could hold in~~ pounds they hold it in [illegible] ~~. and~~ give a sell order. . this is

to

criticism. You know, we ~~[illegible]~~ do so, and we won't do this anymore."

A number of groups, apparently so. . You know, they have created the so called Spanish Communist Party, (parenthesis . Marxist-Leninist, and this was

1 one of the conditions. There are talks going on in France between the ~~Tricny~~ Clichy group and the Marseilles group and that was one of, ~~Verges~~ again, the conditions of the Marseilles people who were tied up with ~~----nard~~ Kien and,

(up) that Verges had nothing to do with them. On the other hand there are talks between ~~the Tricny group~~ Clichy and ~~a~~ young left ~~[illegible]~~ students, they call themselves the Drapeau Rouge group. It's a very small group anyway. That again was a condition. They put out a magazine, a news letter, called Drapeau Rouge which had been mainly written— it's one single edition- mainly written by ~~Chou?~~ Kien. So obviously, the wind has turned very much against

(2) him(them). Verges has said, however, ~~[illegible]~~ strange things too. To Maspero, not very long ~~[illegible]~~ ago at a cocktail party, he said, "I don't see why people reproach me for accepting the aid ~~from~~ of African friends and comrades" African comrades, no longer Chinese comrades. He also says that he admitted that they had made mistakes, that the magazine had been too sectarian, dogmatic.

((Verges said this to Maspero?))

Yes. Anderson told me that.

((When he says African, does he mean Black African or Arab?))

This is what we don't know. We have no idea who would waste that much money on him. First of all, who has the money, with which parties does he have connection? The UPC and the Cameroons, that split. The UPC and the Cameroons, a certain amount of money comes from Russia, other money

7 coming from the Chinese, but very small amounts, because no one wants to pour money into this very divided organization. And he had contacts with one wing of it. I ~~[illegible]~~ can't see them giving him any money. The Salaba, Salawa party - ~~Lugere and~~ in Niger, they also, according to Anderson, ~~Mani~~ ? Mamani, who is one of their executives ~~x~~ people, who is in Algiers, and who comes to Switzerland quite often, said that he no longer even bothers

(2) when he goes to Paris, to see Verges, that he sort of considered it worthless, (that he was) sort of an adventurer, an opportunist.

The thing that was for me a bit frustrating in all of this was that every once in a while — — — — this that and the other, ~~He~~ (Verges) has always had this equivoque, this doubt hanging over him. But no one has anything hard and fast about him. You can get- well in the past, what did he do. We know vaguely what he did, but nevertheless, what would you say

that he did that would be really decisive and so on. It seems a his ambition, but his ambition seems to shift from one thing to the other. You don't know exactly what does he want. When he started this magazine, obviously he wanted to play a role in Algeria and Africa. Driven out of Africa, he still thinks he's going to get back to Algeria within a relatively brief period of time, six months to a year. And he kept saying to us, "Oh, yes, we'll be back, we'll be back." He's already prepared a list of people he's going to have thrown in jail, or shot, (laughing) or threaten with firing squads and so forth. That fell through (going back to Algeria). And now, of course, I suppose it must be extremely bitter to him to see Bitat, who had been ~~his~~ really, the closest, and ~~Zohardin~~ Zora DRIFF, (they had) been his closest associates inside of Algiers, with exception of ~~Bs~~ Djamila Bouhired, but she doesn't have any real weight, politically, ~~so~~ Bitat is back in Algiers, has made his peace with Ben Bella, and now represents, he's the General Manager for Volkswagen. (laughing)

2

Anderson's conversation with the Algerian (in Switzerland) about Verges was based just on Bitat. He said "Well, Bitat is going back. I suppose Verges will be following behind." He said (the Algerian), "No he won't. We have a file on him," what he's done. With money, in particular. Apparently they claimed that he had been dipping into the ~~pot~~ funds for years.

((This is the Algerian claim--)) Yes, that's what they told Anderson.

I think it's probably true. The funds of ~~the FLN~~ the Federation in ~~of~~ France. You see he was, after all, a lawyer and then became the top lawyer of the FLN defense ~~typing~~ team ~~(?)~~ in France, The legal defense team, and this meant that he had access to enormous sums of money. The ~~Alger--~~ FLN obviously an~~d~~ underground organization, even as well-structured a one as the Algierian one, in France, cannot demand very accurate bookkeeping. There were all sorts of very funny jokes about how ~~they were~~ this money was handled, (receipts) receipts written on the corner of a newspaper for millions of old francs. And so under those circumstances — Verges himself has told ~~that~~ me some thing~~s~~ about ~~that~~ this.

As for his connection with Khider, Anderson thinks that Khider may have helped him (Verges) to get money ~~out~~ inside of Algeria, but he doesn't think that he got anything after he left and Khider left Algeria. In other words, he said as long as he was on the scene and formed part of this vague opposition to Ben Bella which Khider sought to at least unite on a few issues around himself , he may have received some money. But afterwards, he doesn't think he received any. He has no proof, of course. If he did receive money, it would have been small sums given to ~~Jamisa Buhares~~ Djamila Bouhired as a token of friendship more than anything else. That may have explained her trip to Geneva, when she did bring some money.

14-00000

That was in March or April, last year.

((What is the current financial relationship between Verges and Anderson?))

FOURTH SESSION

23 February 1965
(morning)

~~His connection with Khider. Anderson thinks he got no money after he left (Algiers).~~ ?

~~If any came it would have been small sums given to Geneva as expression of friendship.~~

Anderson and Verges ~~V~~ V maintains A owes him money because of a Swedish offset press bought originally for Revolution. He was very careless about money. At one point V asked A to buy a house. Evidently V thought he had enough money for anything. They bought press which turned out to be useless.

A. then took it. ~~Xx~~ A said he wanted it. Haggled over price. Then Vergès went to Brussels to ~~buy~~ to sell the same press to Grippa, to play off Grippa and Anderson, because Grippa was also looking for an offset press. In fact, he did eventually buy an identical press, which is now installed in his place in Brussels. Anyway, Anderson did pay ~~paid~~ ~~bought~~ a certain amount. But they didn't decide The price definitely.

But A. paid a debt to a ~~printers~~ (Gauguin) Swiss printer (which was) owed by Verges.

This (Gauguin) printer has sued for ~~XXXXX~~ 48,000 swiss francs. He has blocked Revolution's account at NMPP (Nouvelle Messagerie de Presse Parisienne) ~~[illegible]~~. They had 7.50 francs in the account when he blocked it. They had a previous debt with a French printer.

Amount of money coming in from sales is very small. Verges has not contacted Gauguin to settle the matter. Gauguin) Could put the magazine out of existence. He has ~~Has~~ only to demand money and if Verges don't find it in 48 hours, Gauguin could force bankruptcy. But he wouldn't do that unless someone would guarantee he would get his 48,000. Creditors wait, hoping they will get something.

To Guarantee Gauguin ~~for~~ that amount of money, (would be) the best way to put Rev. out of business. I could do it myself if I could get the money. I could get a similar judgment and force bankruptcy.

Actual legal composition of the company Nouvelles Editions Internationales found by my lawyer:

22 Aug 1963, Verges through a lawyer deposited papers of corporation for a Societé Anonyme RL limite at ~~16th~~ 6th bureau Paris. capital of 10,000 new francs ~~8~~8,000 held by Verges and 2000 by Maurice ~~Binet?~~ ~~Pinet~~ Sinet.

I thought there were at least five members there were but only two.

The money was actually deposited by a check through the lawyers guild.

There is 10,000 francs somewhere along the line. So Gauguin could get that much.

Company does exist but nobody is able to find it.

my current legal status- we are fighting for back wages. V ~~he~~ denies. He said we were paid too much. Then he said

then it goes before fact-finding agent. ~~says~~ ~~they were "in confidence"~~ were incompetent – one look at the magazine disproved that. This continues to drag on. The lawyer in Paris is not energetic. Th Bro-in-law paid the lawyer 5oo francs. He probably thinks that is all he is going to get out of it. Question of propaganda. Translations, etc. He shows lack of will power. He is an orthodox Communist. He is very honest. But hates scandal. So why push it? probably thinks "they are out of France", Idon t think he has sold out of Revolution I can do it in 48 hrs. Lots of people want Rev out of business. ~~Question~~ (?)

Question is where does Verges get the small sums necessary to keep going.
He's paying at least 5 people full-time. plus the ~~[illegible]~~ printer.
Delduecca printed No. 12. it is a high powered firm. what terms of agreement?

13th issue has gone back to offset press, the old printer. ~~I~~ don't know why.

I should have spent more time in Paris. I dont want to overplay my hand.
The last thing I should have done was
~~Recognize need~~ to question people systematically.

In Paris only important contact is Valdes, Spanish. Gave ~~me~~ some info

(N) on Spanish groups. Claims ~~they~~ Verges asked Cuba for money and got turned down. (SINÉ)
Cubans don't have much money.

It's a Great shock to these people to find that Chinese aren't putting in money.
It is always someone else, like ~~Pinot.~~ Sinet — Vergès
Verges always indirect. doesn't want to ask anybody for money.
probably through Juan Arcocha, press & cultural attache, Paris, former ~~secretary~~ sec. story

(N) of Carlos Franqui, editor of Revolución, Havana Arcocha is very anti-Communist, hipped on persecution of homosexuals. Not necessarily one himself. Very interesting.
I did not see Franqui. I don't know where he is.

I was getting enough info for ~~personal~~ needs. but didn't want to overdo it.
I do need a better story to travel around on.

Grippa generally was busy, lot of people around, obviously delegations, from where I don't know. there was a catastrophe, Something had happened. He is rather vague.

Sharp
~~Shock~~ clash between Grippa and ~~Verges~~ V came on question of money. After

(N) many months, ~~Verges~~ V went to Brussels, talk ended abruptly. V said: "~~He~~ Grippa went too far, laid down political line, etc. I rejected." But this came only after an exchange over the source of funds. Grippa asked
~~mx~~ Verges where he was getting his money, and Verges got huffy.
~~axm~~ Delegate general said Grippa didn't believe any of the stuff Verges said about me. Predisposed to oppose ~~Verges~~ → Verges.
(Verges will not confide to anyone — even Anderson — where the money comes from.)
Verges and Algerian money. ~~Hm~~ Did he just say, just tell them, that he got the money from the Chinese? Did he get it from someone in Algeria but he is afraid of disclosing.
He wouldn't tell the Chinese at Bern the source of his funds.
(Q: Verges debts total $30,000?) ~~D~~ Now he must have cleared away at least the big debt with the original French printer. I said 30,000,000 francs or about $60,000. ~~Castel~~ Kessel confirmed that it was about that amount. ~~Castel~~ Kessel
Kiem and I and my wife worked out the estimate. I don"t rembmber the breakdown.
Mainly Printing, photographs, paper, rent. We said between 30 and 40 million (old francs)

promissory notes. and having them countersigned by Jerome Landon publisher of l'Edition Minuit

I have to leave around noon. my little girl at home by herself. (5) Wife working in Tunisian Embassy, 14£ a week. She is (isn't) very happy there. Not much money, remember taxes.

Anderson: general background- he is Swedish, 32 years old, born in France of French mother and Swedish father. His parents settled in Lausanne when he was 6 months old. He was raised in Switz. had so little connection with Sweden that when finally had to go into Swedish army had to learn Swedish. Married to woman who is daughter of a prominent Conservative Swiss politician, may be a member of the ~~Federal~~ Parliament Council. Don't know his name. Husband does not see her parents. He chose Swedish nationality because most convenient, during Algerian war and didn't want to go into French army. Swiss nationality would cost both money and military service. Therefore took Swedish. In his youth he was involved with literary and dramatic groups, still has keen interest in poetry and drama. He is connected with Theatre Populaire Romande .His press serves mainly for material for them. About all he prints. He is forbidden to print any political material but he can print or have printed Chinese literature, which is classified as philosophical. He can't print October. Fidel - now printed by Gauguin in Montreux

He has never incorporated name la Cite -

privately owned press and business, means personal risk.

He is distributor, mainly, for French books in Switz. has some substantial deposits.

Most of his things are not political (now) but ~~has some~~ literary. Not essentially a political operation. Has two employes, a secretary and a Spanish boy who takes care of the press.

He for a time very much involved with the FLN, how it happened don't know, He was one of their principal agents in Switz. Operated as far as Paris and Lyons, He represented ~~with~~ Swiss end of the support net work, to do tasks FLN couldn't do themsevles. Carrying weapons, money, etc. He operated the Swiss ~~end~~ base. Much material was smuggled over Swiss border at Geneva. With Henri LeClerc?

Through connection with FLN, A probably made ~~first~~ personal contact with Verges and with Maspero. He got into publishing from distributing through contacts with Maspero who was printing books. Algerians wanted these books to contenue coming out in French. They ~~Proposed~~ proposed that A print them. He took them to ~~Gandin~~ Gauguin who agreed to print and that's how he became a publisher.

He had no trouble. Swiss police thought his life was in danger. ~~From~~ the SBS.

Text 6

Is he solvent? Yes. But his wife works ~~is~~ as a school teacher. They have a car. They pay low rent. B All his operation is in one building - the Me[illegible]. Building of very mixed occupancy. His father and mother had flat in this building. The father and mother were decorators. Has office on upper ground floor and press on lower ground floor. His father dead. His mother remarried. Still a decorator.

Dont know just when A started this business. He began in decorating busines paper hanging, etc. Then got into poetty, ~~xm~~ etc. had a little magazine. He had some money and bought the distributorship of these publications. From that he went into publishing, during Algerian war.

Octobre

October- Anderson and group around him, established in 1964, summer, after fiasco of the Swiss Communist Party. Extremely small group. I doubt if they have more than 30 people. Operate mainly inside of the ~~P.C.P.~~ PdT official Communist party - Workers' Party. Aim to convince the peop'e inside of PdT rightness of Chinese ~~thinking~~ thesis and provide a rallying point for those expelled from the party. Print October in Italian, French & German

I estimate 30 to 40 people involved. Swiss CP has all of 15 people. VEry weak organization. It might be discreetly financed by the Chinese. Though a little money handed over to Anderson

A is obviously no longer really the center of it. He was the initiator. Fact he is not Swiss may have helped. I feel he was gradually pulling back from political involvement. Is under close surveillance by the Swiss police - has been warned what he can and can't do. People from Vevey even went up to Berne and asked for his expulsion. They got very little satisfaction.

There still are numbers of Spaniards who come in -- he has Chinese and Albanian literature in ~~XX~~ Spanish.

Once they get out of Spain and can get this stuff they do go and look at it. MOR no longer exists - has been fused into new Spanish CP. They are just workers. Mundo Obrero Revolucionario produced in Anderson's office on offset or mimeograph, principally by Tiafer (phon) Tagliaferro. Catalan. The two leaders are out of it.

Three groups: [illegible], proletario, Chispa group is third. That has two people according to ~~Anderson~~ Valdes. The leaders of the other two groups were expelled from this Lenin-Stalin party.

Don't think he still has distribution of October officially. Penguin prints it, he stores it.

That's political. [illegible] This ban derived from the Revolution incident. Swiss authorities told us, We, could stay in Switzerland if we wanted to but had to get out of all political activity.

Don't know ~~where~~ further A still acts as a contact between various groups on the outside and the Chinese Embassy in Berne - couldn't tell. ~~I~~ I feel that he is much less active than he was. He was not well informed about Italian group, (Nuova Unità)

& don't [illegible]

He is in contact with Grippa/ and with Maspero but very unhappy about the political line of Maspero's paper.

Andersson's wife: a silly woman -- self-dramatizes.

She went to Albania (anniv of Albanian rev.) and some other people from the October group. Went to reproach them for the aid they had given ~~Guiyard~~ Builliard-Venvey. His wife does many things he can't do because he is a foreigner. She would act as his agent - did not go in her own right.
He doesn't have much to do with Albanians. Her trip gave him a better impression. But she thought the Albanians ~~were~~ better informed about Europe and Marxist affairs party in Europe than the Chinese.

She at one time was a member of the central committee of the ~~French~~ Swiss Communist Party. ~~Maybe~~ Party only had about 35 members. Practically anybody who joined the party was immediately on the Central Committee.

~~Among~~
Andersson is ~~A~~ known as the man in Switzerland to see if you want to set up a base for any kind of a revolutionary movement. Maybe this is how he got in touch with Spaniards.

There is a ~~Churiel~~ Curiel group very active he had contacts with them. Rev Father ~~Donde~~ Dadsis? former worker priest, from Lyons, formerly with FLN now involved in Congolese, etc. rebel groups.
Always gun-running - with missal in one hand, sub machine gun in other.
Extraordinary priest. Had high protection in the Church, with Cardinal Jerlié (ph) of Lyons who recently died. When priest was arrested, money to help from Cardinal.

Some left the Catholic church. I would say this Algerian generation provides the basis for the pro-Chinese element within the left-wing youth of France. The ones who saw the total ineffectiveness of the Party in a colonial situation and who were, from idealistic reasons, disgusted with it and sought to make up for this failure on the part of the Communist Party.

Spanish, Italian, Portugese workers in Switz. Many are left-oriented and interested.

~~dax~~ they are just workers.

~~Tifer~~ Tagliaferro, Catalan.

Marxist-Leninist Communist party made of the three groups- Mundo Obrero, Proletario, Chispa groups. Two members.

I can perfectly believe it.

cease any activities on behalf of Revolution which was felt as undesirable. Whether he is still a contact between groups on outside and Chinese Communists in Berne cannot say. He is much less active.

Much of this page appears on left page in fuller transcription.

14-00000

all these movements di~~ nishing in size and impor ~~ ce----

He may be going to Brussels. He is in contact with Grippa. I don t know about it. He is unhappy with Ma political line of Maspero's publicatios

Bruilliard

aid they had given ~~guillard~~.

Apparently that was ironed out. His wife does manythings that he can't do because he is a foreigner. She acts as his agent.

But he doesn't have much to do with Albanians, but her visit has somewhat raised the pretige of Albania in their eyes.

I think he would much rather deal with the Chinese.

He may have come in contact with the Spaniards through the Algerians.

the

He is known as ~~a~~ man in Switz to go to see if you want to set up a base for

ary movement

any kind of revolution, Can give you advice,

put you in touch with the right bunch of people to sell you arms, if that's

what you want~~xxxxxx~~.

group sorts of things

There was a group called Curie~~l~~i, extremely activein all, Daney

~~Curiel group~~. ~~He~~ had contacts with them, with the Rev Father Donde, who is

a former

Catholic priest from Lyons, worker priests~~x~~, involved with the FLN,

very much on the left, now involved in various things, rebels, Congolese,

with missal in one hand and machine gun in the other. an extraordinary fig.,

always gun-running, but had very high protection in the Church, ~~his~~

were

ties with Cardinal Gesier of Lyons, who just died. He ~~had~~ had ties with the

Algerians. whenever [illegible] the

Cardinal would be informed and

would

money be made available to take care of him.

from the

Many of people were Catholic, just Catholic, some left the church. The

Com Party didn't want anything to do with the Algerians.

Some are now in Algeria. Algerian gave basis for Chinese elements

in leftwing youth of France generation pro-

ones who saw the total ineffectiveness of the Com party in France

were disgusted with it and sought to make up for this failure

~~and sought to make up for this failure~~ of the Com party. I understand

among

now that there is great conflict ~~not with~~ new generation in youth movement,

in France. As far as Spaniards concerned, suspect it came about that way.

A's contacts with the Spaniards were extremely broad, many not even Marxists,

Spanish Social Democrats, some of them. Broad left spectrum. He published

a book about ________ Spanish Workers. Bitterly attacked by Kien

and Valdes. It wasn't Marxist at all.

has

A fairly easy access to Chinese Embassy. With Ambassador? No with a

one

man named Chu, think First Secretary. He apparently is the delegated to deal

with Europeans, Communists and so on.

in Bern mission

Don't know whether A has contact with other Chinese. Some Chinese came

to him. Normally a question of publishing books. And a very modest type

of thing.

A has nothing to do with ~~NEADs~~ NCVA His [illegible] is basically with the Embassy.

He told me had an incident with the Sov First Sec. at the Cuban Embassy last Jan. The Sov heard his name. said are you ~~Swiss~~ English? He said, no, I'm Swedish. ~~Swiss~~. You must be the Anderson. Sov. told him he couldn't get away with that sort of thing long. They had ways of stopping people like him. An emotional outburst. The Russian Tried later to leave better impression- I admire what you have been doing, etc.

A is known. to the Soviets.

He has been in contact with the [illegible] Party, with the Eritreans, Liberation movement. That was slight. He is in touch with Curiel and company.

I'm not certain he is in complete approval of what Curiel group doing.

At one time Curiel group interested in something in the French West Indies. I understand that they were ~~trying~~ to send arms into Martinique and Guadeloupe - which arms one can get in Switzerland, and ship.

A was in contact with French West Indians. I don't know how far that went.

Here in London Curiel wanted to found a magazine last summer to be devoted to West Indies.

Two published here, ~~x~~ Flamingo and Daylight. Don't know whether Curiel has ~~xxtxx~~ anything to do with it. There is a new one, Magnet. And said to be another one on the way. I've seen Dabois (?) in Algeria and Lausanne, as a courier-priest, but I really don't know what Curiel is up to.

The Spaniards- I had no real knowledge onthat.

He is likely to keep up contacts with the Spaniards. Also has contact with the Portuguese - e.g. students in Lausanne. Knows what's going on.

~~Therex~~ He is mixed up with Angola, was involved with the MPLA.

He was disappointed when the exaggerated claims of the MPLA were exposed: i.e. their claims that they had planes, arms on the inside, etc. But they couldn't document their claims for the OAU.

Turned out a monstrous bluff. The UPA much more conservative organization, it did have a fighting force. And continued until quite recently to struggle. And that was when Viriato da Cruz and others switched from the MPLA.

Understand Dr. Neto still running around, trying to mend his fences ~~has contacts~~ with the Chinese.

He probably is in Algiers now.

A. has contacts which consist of merely being there. Anyone who came to Lausanne comes to see him.

A. kept in contact with Verges when Verges in Algiers. He had cultivated the Andersons. Mrs. A. went down there to visit Verges. Anderson doesn't tell me everything about Verges' money. A. had full power ~~to~~ ~~so~~ of attorney to sign for the Verges bank account in the Union des Banques Suisses in Lausanne. This account [illegible] from ~~xxxxx~~ November 1962 until probably Jan 1964. Verges claimed that A had taken money. A Anderson claimed the funds were down to 500 Swiss francs anyway.

Verges sent [illegible] to close the account. Behind A's back, and when A found out he was furious. Verges claimed he also had a second account in Geneva.

Anderson & Verges haven't seen each other since spring 1962.

CURIEL ? MUST MEAN QUERIELLE

In Oct of 62 before I went to Algiers, ~~but~~ when I came to Paris I saw

SINE

~~F~~Sinet who had ~~a~~ large amounts of Algerian curreency in his flat, it was indiscreet — several million of Algerian francs. the clost shelves were covered with bundles of Algerian currency.

I had met Sinet in New York when he came back from Cuba. He and his wife.

He came through FPCC office.

He asked me if I had time to help him change some of this money, which ~~eh~~ he claimed was given him by an Algerian friend~~s~~ who was going on a world tour, and had brought it from Algiers, but banks after independence did not want to change large amounts of Algerian money — would only take up to a certain amount. He was sending it by various people to airport, etc. small banks, to change a little at a time at a one-for-one rate. This of course was part of the money that Verges got, I assume.

Verges had met ~~Finet~~ Sinet during the Algerian war, when and how I don-t know. Sinet had been closely involved with the Algerians during the war. But He was ~~xxxx~~ too conspieuous to do much in an open way. He may have given money and such. certainly helped in propaganda.

He knew Chandesli at the UN, and His Algerian connections very good. He was in contact with Ben Bella.

The French govt would never allow ~~Finet~~ Sine to go to see Ben Bella but did allow ~~Finet's~~ Sinet's wife to go. When Ben Bella was suddenly released, he said he had no proper clothes. It was she who took clothes to Ben Bella when he was released, and went to Cairo. Rabat

In 62 when I saw Sinet in Paris I was thinking of going to Algiers. I was vague about. He told me all about Verges and someone named Maurice Masquino (ph.) who then was editor of El Moujahid, weekly, official organ of the FLN.

It was actually throgh ~~Finet~~ Sinet that I really got the job with Verges.

I had heard of him (Verges) and he apparently had heard of me, but I had never known him before. Sinet had proposed that I meet him then — in October — but he couldn't, I don't know why. He had gone to Morocco or something.

This was at the time between the struggle between the ~~GRA~~ GPRA and the ~~Tlemsen~~ TLEMCEN group for power in Algeria. And I don't know where he was. Again, he played a role in the transfer of funds. They needed money for a large parade. Verges carried the money ~~to~~ from Morocco for Khider ~~to~~ Algiers.

July - First meeting with Verges about 15 minutes. Talking about an English lang. edition then of Revolution Africaine

Ali Buzuren, was then business manager, later sec of Algierian Embassy in Leopoldville.

First meeting (with Verges) was in November. 1962

Offices of Journal d'Alger had to be cleaned up. had been bombed. by OAS.

get staff, etc. ~~He~~ (he) in meantime ~~when~~ went to Paris, saw people connected with Maspero — Gerard Chaliand — to whom he proposed coming to Algiers as editor.

He was careful to make sure he had foreign editors not Algerian.

Revolution Africaine lasted 18 issues. I have the full file if you are interested.

Why did Verges lost post.

Bureau

The politicalsection was breaking up. Bitat & Khider disagreed with Ben Bella.

Khider was seeking to use his post as secretary of the party to ensure he had some sort of hold but his middle class background used ery successfully against him by Ben Bella. Since he came out of this milieu of small shop-keepers and grocers, and there were scarcities, it was easy to blame Khider every time there was something short.

Everyone knew of Khider's speculation with money. Turned out he had $12,000,000 in Switzerland, probably much more elsewhere.

Verges was originally the head of the African Section of the Algerian foreign ministry. After the Tlemcen group came in. Due to his African contacts

He did not get along at all well with Khemisti who was then ~~was Ben Bella's~~ foreign minister.

He ~~them~~ at same time made contacts with Bitat and Khider, I'm certain, for money.

Ben Bella never gave approval, but other members of the political bureau did. And the money came from Khider - it was un-blocked by Khider, finally - Fifty million francs in cash brought in to start magazine.

It went behind Ben Bella's back. Once it came out it was a fait accompli, and he didn't care.

Verges

He maintained later he didn't expect to hold out as long as he did.

Djamila Bouhired

His wife under Moslem law, was asked by Ben Bella if she would marry him. She had ferocious animosity against Ben Bella, still has, I think.

So all this bad blood - frustrated desire - came into play. When Verges was asked to go to the Addis Ababa conference (he was not busy in the Foreign ministry) he smelled something fishy, and he begged off. Two or three days later he was called to party headquarters - it was already - [illegible] - and they told him ~~Was asked~~ to turn over everything to ~~a man named HARVEY~~ [illegible]. At 11 next morning,

That same evening he left by car, with Djamila Bouhired's niece, went to Morocco and then he went to Paris.

He has connections in Morocco. as high as the Palace, so I understand, but I don't know who.

Verges always cultivated a myth of big connections. But he does circulate in worldly circles. Claims contacts in Pompidou's office. I never saw any benevolence from Pompidou's office, though.

obviously the money Sinet had had

So he went to Paris and then he came to Switzerlandm and then he started to set up -- he had some money, obviously in France . . . and then he started transferring his funds from Algiers-from Lausanne - - transferred it on his person, on my person - no he never carried any money, but I carried some, and Kessel did too. Kessel claimed that he was actually stopped and searched and that he had this money in 500 franc bills in his hip pocket and they never looked in there. Any way, he did get the money in from Fracne. And he began publication of Revolution as a monthly in September of 1963.

((Had you known in advance what he was going to do?))

No. In fact, it was a question for a while, whether he would do it in Switzerland.

6

A wanted Verges to set up magazine in Switzerland. ~~Sinet~~ was very much against it. I'm certain Verges never intedned to go to Switzerland

Hachi

~~Harvey~~ immediatey spread story that Verges had stolen something like

[illegible] Was very upset. He was

very upset when he heard that Verges was in Paris. He didn't like being connected with somebody who had stolen money. I called Verges and said he better get in touch with Andersson himself, better see him soon, because he would keep putting him off. The fact was that Andersson and I went to Paris. That's when we saw Verges. Verges placated him, said there was no truth in the charges. In fact, the charges were reduced. Harbi himself came to London. (The amount) went down, from 300 million to 200 million from 60 million to 50 million, and the whole thing was dropped. Buzerin, the business manager, was extremely indignant about the talk about misappropriation of funds and demanded an audit of the books. They found 6 million francs surplus. That was even more disturbing to them down there. ~~Habbi~~ Harbi is supposed to have said "this isn't swindling; this is an affair of state." Buzerin was then given his clean bill of health and he went off to be secretary (of Embassy) in the Congo, in Leopoldville. On his way back ~~[illegible]~~ last Spring from Leopoldville ~~[illegible]~~ -- he was no longer going to stay there; I think he is in Algeria now-- he and his wife stopped in Paris and saw Verges. He had been in contact with Verges and he was very much tied, family-wise, with this whole Bitat-Zohra Driff crowd.

Our transfer/was simply that here we had been working for Verges personally. The money, there -in Switzerland, had been his money and the Algerians never made any attempt to get in touch with us. None whatsoever. There was a letter to Andersson from Chalion, who remained with the Algerians. There was an attempted phone call from them down there- probably Chalion or someone with the magazine- which Andersson refused to accept. So we really were never before the choice. In other words, he proposed (the work); we were doing what he proposed. He was going to continue and the Algerians had no coherent story about the money and what was going on. At that time they weren't interested in the English edition. Later, when it continued, they did produce in Algiers one issue of an English edition, an imitation of ours [illegible], which was very badly done. That was the last. They never did any more. That was edited by Patricia McGowan Pinheiro, ~~(the wife of)~~ who was involved with a half-English, half-Portuguese leader from Mozambique who allegedly-- his group is extremely small-- He was kept going by the ~~Filemo~~ FRELIMO people from Mozambique because of the fact that they needed a European to represent the progressive European element (laughing) for when the day comes for takeover by Africans- well, Carlos (her husband) was waiting for the day when Carlos will be produced as a genuine Mozambiquan of European origin. She was also involved with the Portuguese. She wrote a book about Portugal a man by the name of ~~(under the name,)~~ Peter Fryer, published it in 1962. I can't remember the title. She speaks Portuguese. May be- apparently is connected with the Trotskyist group.

The ~~Portuguese~~, from what I understand is going on —

— I would like to get back to Algiers to see what is going on — as in Great (ferment - splitting - the Eldorado business was)

Just part of the iceberg that stuck up above the water. She was close to the Algerians. She produced this one issue. Then that flopped. She had been asked by Verges to go with me to Lausanne to be the joint editor of the edition in English. She refused because she wanted to stay in Algiers, stay close to her Portuguese group. She didn't think very much of me simply because she had set up the publication of the English edition, (which) was supposed to have been done in London. And then suddenly behind their backs Verges arranges it Switzerland. The British Communist Party was very much upset about the whole thing. They had thought that they might be able to have something to do with it, that they might take it over. They had a woman who was working for us here, named Rosalind Ainslie, South African, a European woman from South Africa, who obviously — she works for East Germ News Agency here now — would have been their agent. It was even going to be incorporated here under her name. Verges was going to be the junior and silent partner abroad. Obviously he wasn't going along with that. This was the summer of 63. At the time of the break with Algiers, she was working as our correspondent here; (she) was extremely upset. She was holding £1000 of Verges' money. She didn't know which way to go. Harbi came here and talked to her. The whole thing fell through. Finally she chose the Algerians and then they dumped her. And she was forced to repay the money to Verges that she owed.

And so we then stayed on in Switzerland. We were perfectly content to stay in Switzerland. Out of the . . .

Verges wanted to move to Paris. He had little justification for a move to Paris. He was absolutely delighted when the Swiss expelled us. They gave us three months to get out. It really wasn't any expulsion. We continued it (the magazine). The editor and publisher were out of the country.

X Andersson had nothing to do with it. It was still being produced by Pangum ~~Gongin~~. Only the English edition was banned. That was to prevent any further publication (in Switzerland, presumably). That's why it had to be done

SECOND SESSION

18 February 1965

(Tape starts a little late. G. had brought in bound volume of Revolution Africaine - all 18 issues - and we are discussing this when tape picks up.)

18 Feb 1965 10 to 11:30

It was essentially put together by Europeans. The actual editor of the magazine being Gerard Chalion ~~and she~~ which he got ~~it~~ from Maspero who now works for a professor Bettelheim Bemelhart. These are the entire issues that were put out by Verges. (all 18 issues.) ~~It~~ We started 2 Feb. ~~The~~ His last issue, (was later than I thought) 18th May.

I have two copies of these. I'm trying to sell these to the University of California. (Just as the last issue of Revolution [illegible] - [illegible] sell at about $10 a copy.) Don't know what I'll get for this, something between $25 and $50.00 for the full set. Verges doesn't even have this. There are three sets. Andersson has one, I have two. I'm planning to keep one. Verges departed precipitously from Algiers - didn't even take a mailing list.

This I got together in Lausanne.

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~ I got them out of the binder.

Andersson had a file. ~~He distributed them.~~

I had to take Andersson with me to the binder to get them out. He kept one.

What I would like to talk to you about (is future work possibility.)

(I have the Atlantic Monthly article to do.)

~~They want autobiographic article.~~

~~I don't mind writing about Revolution.~~

CY: Does this page refer only to the Algiers phase?
Do the 18 issues refer only to French ed, only to ENG. ed., or to both?
What year (2 Feb. & 18 May)?

But what they want is a sort of autobiographical type of article. I don't mind writing about Revolution. Here's the problem. Once I write about-- it's all right for me to write about Revolution. Nobody will object about how far I go one way or the other. What I feel told you I could put in the public press generally, except for this about the other group, but in terms of Revolution itself there's no objection. However, if I have to go any further than that, that means that as far as I'm concerned most of these people will never touch me with a ten foot pole. As it is, what contacts I have, ~~I do~~ some are more delicate than others- - but I ~~feel~~ see that after this trip they could be ~~[illegible]~~ built up again, after somehow finding some means of interviewsing people relatively regularly. So what I want to ask you is, ~~10~~ one- what sort of ideas-if ~~[illegible]~~ any,- you ~~[illegible]~~ had in relation to me for future things; were you interested in my going, investigating anything ~~[illegible]~~ further for you or are you satisfied with what little I know now. As I say, I don't think I know terribly much really, except incidental things which might corroborate what you know from other sources. ~~—~~ Secondly, in terms of following up, if there's anything in particular- For instance, I would suggest, the person to get ~~this~~ the Algerian ~~thing from~~ side of this story from would be Georges Arnault, ~~[illegible]~~ the French writer who was in Algiers and who worked on the first issue of Revolution Africaine, ~~and~~ after that never ~~[illegible]~~ was there ~~[illegible]~~ any more, ~~the~~ The split with Verges, who now works in the Ministry of Information and ~~who~~ remains fairly friendly (to me) on a personal basis and who could get me a good deal of information on the Algerian side if that's what you're interested in.

Secondly there is again a possibility — through [illegible] and the Atlantic Monthly, that we might both try to cover the Second Bandung Conference.

((Through who?))

~~[illegible]~~ Jate (?), the European representative of the Atlantic Monthly, and we might cover the Second Bandung in Algiers together. That's in June if it is going to be held at all. ~~[illegible]~~ # Soviet pressures and other pressures might call it off-

If you're interested in other things, you know, now I have contacts

That's why I'd like to know/ ~~I don't know what-- really,~~ for instance - I've got a possibility - although it's a very slim one- just over across the street here. The Indonesian press office needs somebody. But I don't know whether---. These are little things. The people of the Pan African Congress- South Africa, the PAC, they came to see me to know if I could help them a little here in London, in setting up their offices and handling their press campaign. Of course they haven't real money, ~~and~~

((That wasn't so appealing on that ground))

No, that wasn't so appealing on that score. And then also, they don't have a policy. They're sort of wavering between a policy which means telling one thing to the Congress for Cultural Freedom and telling another to the Chinese in Peking, which any nationalist group has to do, obviously. It's extremely difficult to get any kind of a straight answer even inside the organization. And they are going through a period of reorganization, after some highly scandalous, not political offense, but just plain misappropriation of funds, the usual thing that happens in many, many African organizations, it's incredible (laughs). But I think the people here in London, at least on the surface, are somewhat more honest.

((Basically, you're not interested per se, in staying in the same milieu.))

No, no. But I'm not interested per se, ~~let's~~ say, in becoming a sort of professional anti-Communist. That isn't---

((Not either way- either a professional anti-Communist or a professional revolutionist-))

(laughs) No, no. No. The two careers. Frankly, I do have a feeling, You know I feel very bad about someone like Walter Bow; I know his problems. Only I don't know how the hell to solve them, and what interests me is to see-- again it is always a problem- what can the US government do - what will the people do now that they've got Walter Bow — — — —. To a certain extent I'm certain it was provocation, though Walter was game for anything, if you had gone to him and proposed to shoot the President, he would have said yes. Well, he would have thought about it anyway, and probably would have agreed. He would probably suggest that you'd ~~have to fight~~ [illegible] ~~the~~ President and the Supreme Court along with it, you know. And he's not wild. He's a very sensible, moderate boy, except that he has such a it's not a chip on his shoulder, he's got half of the forest, a redwood on his shoulder. He comes from , the papers say he comes from Philadelphia; he doesn't, he comes from Camden, New Jersey. I remember when he was playing jazz as a kid. I [illegible] met him through this fellow in the Department of Agriculture

I told you about, [illegible] Haggard. He was a very good friend of his as well. Poor Tony he must be very nervous, down there in Agricultre, because he's known me personally, he's known Walter personally, they'll think he had some very strange friends.

Anyway, I'm certainly — you asked me for some information which I'm perfectly willing to give you. And if you had come along a long time ago and asked, in Paris, I probably would have given the same information. The point was that nobody seemed to want to know. I was talking to an American newsman-- I ~~was~~ wasn't running around peddling information, either- but I talked to people, sometimes saying just the opposite of what Verges was saying. He never really protested too much about this. He pretended that what he was doing was fairly on the level but it was fairly obvious that it wasn't. Anyway, I — what I want to know, if possible, in a relatively short period of time... I've got to make up my mind what I'm going to do. I don't know how I'm going to do anything, in fact, ~~but~~ But I do not intend, even for economic reasons, to do something which I think is absolutely dishonest, in the sense of writing an article, ... (for example) if someone asked me to write an article about Communist attractions for African students in France- in fact the Communist Party has very ~~little~~ few ~~attractions~~ for African students in France. It's just the opposite. The ~~A Fay~~ FEANF - - - -, the association ~~organization~~ for African students, is very resentful of what they consider - - - - and they would only love to be enticed and wooed. But this American had an idea which was based on some, on his own mythology actually, of beautiful French white girls, Frenchgirls, being sent to lure these simple-minded boys. In actual fact that's not true at all. I'm perfectly well aware that people have written articles which bear no relation to reality, they think what the hell, they want this sort of ~~thing~~ size, they pay for it. The Reader's Digest at one time was a regular market for that sort of thing.

~~[illegible]~~ (( ))

[Speaking of race and sex?]

But what's the point. It isn't true and even though it might- it isn't even good propaganda in the long run. (It [illegible]) [illegible] a titillation value, especially the racial thing with sex thrown in- -

((What about your wife?))

Well, my wife, doesn't ~~know~~ just - first of all, she knows of only once that I was seeing you, and she would highly disapprove of it. Not because my wife is a— has ever been a member of anybody's ~~any party, (including the~~ Communist party! it's just that she would feel that that would be a highly the Encounter thing. She doesn't really like it at all. I hate to [illegible] Revolution and all— [illegible] I don't see any reason not to. She can accept that.

The fact is, the reason we have our financial problem, to a certain extent, is because her family is by no means poor but— My brother-in-law who has carried us for months, has to pay rent, right this week and she has practically told him we didn't want any money. So now, there I am, you know. This has caused— I respect, I know what her problem is— very often children that come from ~~very~~ [illegible] wealthy homes— ~~and her family—~~ She comes from the poorest branch of her family, which is quite wealthy in this country. It's an Anglo-Jewish family, has a sort of monopoly on kosher food, prepared kosher food here, sort of like a Manischevitz operation— or racket. One of the relatives is — they're all in business. [illegible] Her brother, one brother, is constantly having business ~~fam~~ failures. He's a very nice fellow, and all, but at one point he made phonographs, now the last thing, he made tape recorders, a little transistor tape recorder, but that's just flopped too. The other brother is a chartered accountant. He has his own firm in the City. ~~which~~ He does quite well. He's married.

As I say, she gets along very poorly with ~~them~~ him. And while I was away, unfortunately relations deteriorated to such a point that I [illegible] don't know quite how I'm going to— . . .

She's happy that she's got this job in the [illegible] ~~Indonesian~~ Embassy. The only thing she's not happy about is the salary but she likes the job. — — — It's not serious. The ~~Indonesians~~ [illegible] spend most of the time telling her stories about ~~people~~ [illegible] - - - If I take a job [illegible] this thing in the Indonesian Embassy [illegible] the [illegible] practically in a state of war with Indonesia. Although my wife is English that doesn't give me an automatic right to stay in England, not that I'm terribly (eager) — — — to ~~be~~ stay in England. I would much rather be some place on the Continent. I would much rather, for instance.. take a job with some sort of a [illegible] — Obviously that's out of the question. I could never get a security clearance, but I think a job with some sort of international organization— the UN, in Paris, Rome, or Geneva, which would be for me, [illegible] information— I'd be quite happy at that. As for working for an American outfit, I can't see much possibility either, except this ~~[illegible]~~ sort of free lance business, which could perhaps be extended. That I would certainly like, but ~~it~~ it is precarious— when you have — kids, and then [illegible] what I feel pretty solid commitments [illegible] here — and then 3000 miles of water in between— [illegible]

((Let me see what I can find out. . soon as I can. . . now questions and answers. Who invited Verges to Algeria in 63))

He didn't go to Algeria in 63. He went to China. He was already in Algiers. He was in Algiers from the point of independence, that was in July of 62. And Verges arrived there ~~clandestinely that is, a~~ with the clandestine group, that is, Ben Bella, Khider, Bitat, I suppose in October or November of 62. He was invited to China in March of 1963.

((How invited?))

The first time he went as the Director of Revolution Africaine and he (went with) Djamila [illegible], the heroine of the Algerian War, and [illegible] an enormous amount of publicity in the Chinese press was given to her. ~~They~~ In fact ~~had~~ there had been a book about her. She was well known for her part in the Algerian war and this is how he got the interview with Mao, as he was an official Algerian representative, the Director of Publications sponsored by the Political Bureau of the FLN, and, I think it was, The Committee For Foreign Relations, something like that, that handled the visit.

((When did he marry Djamila)) [illegible]

Nobody knows. Nobody knows whether they are really married. This is again one of the things that he loves to keep a mystery. It is rumored, it has been said by a lot of people that he has a ~~marvelous~~ Moslem marriage. We know he was converted to Islam. During the war, the Algerian War, he used the code name of MANSOUR for his contacts within the Front. After he came to Algeria, apparently he became a Moslem. and became J. M. Verges, Jacques Mansour Verges. Now he becomes Mansour Verges, then it becomes J. M. (referring to the magazine file)

((When he went to China. .))

Here he is back already. It must be about the ~~29th~~ 30th of March. It must be, because he and Djamila and my wife and I and our children left Algeria on the same plane for Paris when we left Algiers definitively, he changing planes in Paris for Moscow, and I going a day or so later to Geneva., and from ~~not~~ to Geneva, Lausanne.

(checking on name) He uses J. M. all the way through. ~~This was only at the~~ this is the last issue of his. There are sixteen issues here. ~~last when~~ He knew that he was under pressure and he tried to protect

put [illegible]
himself. He ~~took~~ Djamila along with ~~him~~ — — — — and himself as a
[illegible]
Comité de Direction — — — — Number 1 and 2, ~~to~~ could
protect him from the wrath of Ben Bella, but it didn't work.

did they
((How long- we wont say when ~~they got~~ married- -))

It must have happened in the month right after independence. That's what I think. You see she had been held in prison, in France, she'd been sentenced to death and he had won her - well, he didn't win anything
In the course of this
but he managed to keep her from being executed. He became extremely
phys[illegible]
close to her. Not only ~~in~~ sexual ~~life~~. And this is very strange, his sexual
I don't know if he has one, in fact.
life. He has a French wife and the French wife has a child, a boy about
apparently
12-14 years old and he still is ~~happily~~ married to the French wife. By becoming a Moslem he could take a second wife.

((Did he live with her- with Djamila B[illegible]))

In Algeria
Never, really. He had his own place and she lived with her family. When she comes to Paris she stays with him and actually they sleep in the
(So, ~~as~~ it's more than (platonic.)
same bed. But I dont think that- - it's a sort of - a very curious
[illegible]
relation ~~it seems to me~~.

((If they were married, they were married when they went to China))

treated
Yes. I don't know about how the Chinese ~~regarded~~ it. They never referred to her as his wife. But that is done very often. [illegible]
He is very close to her family, her brothers. One is in Czechoslovakia, the other one was ~~the~~ in Leningrad, I think, going to school. And it was Verges who arranged for transfers of money. Her uncle is head of the family. Her father is a terrible alcoholic and skirt chaser who has no
He and his wife had ~~a~~ divorced.
respect from his children. The father came to Paris and Lausanne once and caused us a great deal of difficulty (laughing). Anyway, Verges
is
has family connections there. This marriage, that ~~was~~ supposed to have
Nobody knows.
taken place, who saw it I don't know. Even the father doesn't know. He said "Well, if she's married to him, why doesn't she say it. Why doesn't she tell even me."

He was never really accepted as a Moslem in Algiers. People thought, you know, you don"t take a man ~~[illegible]~~ — a man who is a Communist or
[illegible]
even — an ex-Communist, of his kind, he wasn't a member of the Communist
[illegible]
Party, and convert him into a Moslem just like that. And yet there are certain characteristics of his behavior which are very strange to explain. One would say he did it for expediency, like going along with Ramadan, for instance, this is by no means pleasant, fasting- And even in Paris, ~~when~~
during
he would fast ~~when it was~~ Ramadan. He used to drink ~~[illegible]~~ rather heavily,
[illegible]
I'm told. He no longer touches any kind of alcohol. And this he does all the time, whether there are Algerians around or not.

optics,

And his ~~objectxxxpurpose~~ perspective toward ~~the~~ Algerians. He was always talking of going back to Algiers, going to shoot ~~xxxxxxxx~~ Gerard Chalion just because Chalion had ~~xxx~~ double-crossed him with the staff. He thought, well, since I have these Europeans they won't be able to take over the magazine, ~~so quickly?~~ He's -very clever. He surrounds himself with people who are in a weaker position than he. Kien,

~~Chem~~ in other words, a little defense. — — — —

have to be very strong willed. — — — — — ~~things that~~ took place in Algeria, other side,
But Chalion made a deal with the Ben Bella people and kept the entire staff on.

((Revolution in Switzerland or Pa ris))

Once he saw that the old charges against him on account of the Algerian War would not be that the French Government had forgotten all this, that the Ministry of Justice had no ~~xxxx~~ intention of prosecuting not only him, but Francis Jeanson) celle was sitting there. He was under sentence of death. And Jean — — — — , no one had ever bothered. ~~them~~.

(~~Embassy. .~~)

He claimed he had contact with somebody in Pompidou's office

He had- well the only person who worked with the magazine was somebody in the Ministry of Finance who writes under the name of Jalet. He does the economic section. I forget his real name-- maybe Roget. He handled Common Market things. That's why his ~~xxxxx(xxxxxxx)~~ articles for Revolution always deal with the Common Market. Maybe he writes one paper for the Ministry and another for Revolution.

((How long did V stay in Switzerland))

He never really stayed in Switzerland at all. He just came through there and stayed a few days, ~~there~~. And he was traveling on an Algerian diplomatic passport. He still ~~xxxx~~ has one. I don't know how he went to Japan, because he had been very reluctant to reply to the demand- ~~the~~ to request, for renewal of his ordinary French passport. It was quite possible to have dual nationality- French- Algiers. I don't know whether the Algerians (recognize) this. I think that he ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ didn't have ~~had~~ a normal Algierian passport, that he only had a diplomatic one, which should, I think, have been cancelled once he ceased to have any thing to do with the government. ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ So he didn't want to travel on it. He wanted to come to London on several occasions but he didn't dare to try his Algerian passport. He could travel around much of Western Europe with his expired French passport. Most European passports are considered valid for five years after the date of expiration

You don't really need it anyway, just an identification. They will take an expired passport In Common Market countries, up to five years.

How he got to Japan I don't know. He may have finally applied for a French passport. I thought that he still wanted to maintain the fiction of his Algerian nationality, by not making any request for French passport. In Japan he was called the Delegate from ~~the Union(?)~~ Reunion and no mention was made of Revolution. There has never been, to the best of my knowledge and the knowledge of Andersson any mention in any Chinese publication whatsoever of Revolution, and they have mentioned all sorts of two-bit publications that they have financed lock, stock and barrel. And yet the Chinese did purchase it. I understand they do not purchase it any longer. And according to Andersson all along ~~also had~~ contact between the Chinese group, Embassy and Verges in Paris had ceased.

((When))

As of last month.

((When they ceased purchasing))

According to Andersson. He says he has heard it from other people. He doesn't know from Chinese sources. He did tell the truth (was) in Berne, I had written a letter to the China Quarterly about the article by Fejto on Verges, refuting what Fejto said, Asking what he thought of that. And he replied that they had no objection but they thought it was about time that somebody ended the fiction... that they thought Revolution was extremely embarrassing to them.

((How long did the Eng lang edition stay with Andersson))

The Eng lang edition was produced in Switz for the first year, the ~~first~~ entire twelve issues, And was printed in Switzerland on the press of this Mr. ~~Gonguin~~ Garguin in Montreux. And Gonguin was introduced to Verges by Andersson. Andersson paid him and so forth. But Andersson didn't have any official connection with Revolution as of November I think, December, of 63. I went back and forth and Strelkoff, who did the layout and art work, ~~when~~ went back and forth to Lausanne and saw Gonguin almost every months, once or twice a month, ~~every months~~, from Paris. But once I left Paris, the bank account was closed down - I mean, shortly thereafter, by ~~Gessell~~ Kissel, who came in behind Andersson's back and closed the account, at the Union des Banques Suisses.

((That ended the Swiss production))

No, the Swiss production continued, but Andersson had nothing to do with it from that point. The twelve issues of that year were printed there.

He represents nothing. He's a sort of hopeless person. She's a very dynamic woman. Verges claimed that she had become a police informer, for the Algerian police, and that ~~she~~ she talks to ~~very opposite groups~~ [illegible] occasionally, and to ~~She talked~~ to Mamani of the Salawa ~~group~~ party in Algiers. But she no longer has anything to do with Revolution Africaine. ~~I don't know what she is doing~~. She ~~wouldn't~~ ~~didn't~~ [illegible] have anything to do with Verges after the moment that she refused to go to Lausanne. ~~You see, he was~~

((Why))

Why did she refuse to go? Well, she couldn't leave Carlos there by himself. God knows what would happen to him. Secondly, she ~~had to~~ wanted to be ~~all the time~~ In the spirit in Algiers. She wasn't ~~interested~~ interested in running a magazine in Switzerland, the magazine interest was secondary to her.

2 There was another Portuguese-speaking person in Algiers. That was a man by the name of Aquino Braganza. Braganza is a Goan and a Goan who has lost his reason for being with the end of the Portuguese colonial rule in Goa, he should have gone ~~back~~ back! But ~~with~~ he had been a Goan revolutionary with the Portuguese opposition. For years he ~~was~~ had been in Rabat hooked up to the, at that time it was the CONCP, Conference [illegible] Nationaliste des Colonies Portuguese use, which grouped together ~~the Filemo~~ what later [illegible] came to be the Falimo and the MPLA. It was part of the hard line countries There was another one elsewhere which was soft line. Braganza was also sort of adviser to the magazine Revolution Africaine ~~and~~ [illegible] questions of India and so on. He stayed on and worked with Mohammed Harbi and came to London.

2 ((Did he have anything to do with Patricia Mcgowan))

Yes. They had been together in Rabat.

((Did he have anything to do with Carlos))

Yes. It's all the same crowd. But Carlos was waiting for destiny to call him and Braganza had already lost his chance. The Indians had got in. They'd liberated Goa, so what next, you know. Go back to India. He obviously wasn't going to go back. He was living too well, as it was. ~~And~~ What was he going to do in Goa, nobody knew him in Goa. He was a Goan educated in Portugal. One of these people ~~really~~ without a real national identity. He knew that he wasn't Portuguese and had this feeling of alienation from Portugal, which made him like most of the colonials students there-- the MPLA really started in Portugal- made him an oppositionist. He didn't have enough roots with the homeland. So he's just sort of floating around. His wife is a school teacher. He speaks excellent French. He was working for Revolution Africaine. I don't know if he still is. I'm certain he'll find something to do. He'll never go back to Goa.

((This points up the need for a continuing revolution, when the revolution is completed))

Yes. You don't have jobs unless you're in the government. And that's a problem, too. In his case, he never really did much, [illegible] wasn't even a real revolutionary, just a bureaucrat in Rabat and other places.

((How did ~~[illegible]~~ Macgowan get involved with Verges))

That I don't know. I don't know how he ~~[illegible]~~ knew her in the beginning, I imagine he met her ~~[illegible]~~ in Rabat. He used to go to Morocco quite often and had contact with all the African, [illegible] ~~the race~~ people there. I suspect that's where he met her.

((So ~~How~~ much for ~~[illegible]~~ those guys))

Now you've got Harbi. He was ~~[illegible]~~ the person who replaced Verges. He's out now, but ~~he, one of the,~~ I'm told by Andersson, who ~~[illegible]~~ has his ear to the ground in Algiers as well as in Switzerland, that Harbi is still in a very good position. He is one of the leading advisers to Ben Bella, represents the Left position. He's a Trotskyist, or a Trotskyist sympathiser without any formal organizational ties. He is very close to the Pablo (group). That's Michel ~~Walter~~ Raptis. He's Pablo, ~~[illegible]~~ we could'nt havé overlooked him, he's a feature of Algiers life. He played an extremely important role in the agrarian reform, in (determining the type of agrarian reform that was going to be carried out. He came down on the Yugoslav model, that is collectives which are privately owned by the collectives and run on The profit model, that is [illegible] profit basis.

Harbi, (and [illegible]) ~~they~~ were all inside of this Bureau des Biens Vacants ~~de Bien~~ which then became the Bureau of the Socialist Sector. I once did an article for ~~the~~ Monthly Review, [illegible] ~~so I know all~~ about how it operated. What really happened was that the Europeans fled just before and just after Independence, [illegible] ~~or rather~~ should have, considering what they had done. ~~But~~ they had expected a blood bath. The blood bath never took place. It was ~~an~~ incredible. That was one of the most incredible things to me in Algeria was that the Algerians didn't — — — — —

Because the stories were horrifying. You know what happened. A month or so before, they (The French) were just shooting everybody on the street, trying to provoke them, and the discipline of the ~~[illegible]~~ FLN was incredible. Nobody would shoot back, no matter what they did. So they [illegible] fled and ~~they~~ left all ~~[illegible]~~ these farms. [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ It was a question of ploughing and seeding. There is only a certain time of year that you ~~have to~~ [illegible] do this. This had to be organized and it was organized almost spontaneously locally. ~~And then~~ This was ~~sort of~~ institutionalized later, ~~[illegible]~~ an accomplished fact. They wanted some sort of a socialist system of agriculture. They

didn't know how and the institutionalizing of it was really directed by these Trotskyists. There was Pablo, Harbi, a French lawyer named Matthieu from Grenoble who had been involved with the FLN, and he began sort of legal adviser of Biens Vacants, which was vaguely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture which was at that time under Omar Usgan ?
who is now Minister of State, and Director of Revolution Africaine at present. He replaced Harbi.

Harbi is deeply resented by the army elements which are pro-Egyptian. However, the Army, despite its religious inclination, had its socialist bias and would like to see more centralization, more on an Egyptian model. In other words, they would like to see much more control from the center than this confused type of regional or local control. They feel that in the long run the business of the private collective ownership is going to cause trouble. It's all right if it is a rich one, but what happens if you are in a poor one? You don't split a profit, you split a deficit. Obviously, according to the Yugoslav model, the state intervenes. The State taxes the rich ones and then distributes subsidies to the poor ones, but this a debate that is still going on in Algeria, ~~and~~ Curiously enough these Trotskyists have been in contact, very close contact, with the Yugoslavs. As you recall, the campaign, the so-called campagne de labeur, the ploughing, was made possible only by the delivery of 563 Yugoslav tractors which turned out to the great (disillusionment) deception, of some of the Algerians not to be Yugoslav but to be American tractors put together in Yugoslavia under license.

((This is getting us a little bit far afield))

This is Harbi and this is the group. Harbi represents the leading spokesmen within the FLN of this sort of Trotskyist-leaning Left group, and his post is still very high, even though he is no longer Director.

((When was he dropped))

I think last summer. I'm not certain. With Usgan it has become much more ________________ the word Socialism appears in Arabic because it is felt that Socialism in French doesn't have the same meaning as it has in Arabic. It's very ~~sort of~~ silly, It represents the very muddled mind that Usgan has. He is very much split between his religious (and politically) inclinations. Usgan is a full member of the Communist party of Algeria but he left for natonalist reasons when they refused to support the rebellion, and joined the FLN. His wife is supposed to be fanatically religious and has made him more religious than he was.

({Curious mix-up- - this religion and politics.}

(Returning to our first subject, Strelkoff. Is he a practicing Jew?))

No.

(Just an ethnic Jew))

Yes.

((Next on the list here is Robert Williams. Whoever made this up calls him an American in Peking.))

But ~~where was he now~~

He's in Havana. He was in Peking recently and he may still be there, for that matter. He went on a second trip to the Far East. He was in one of the countries that had a celebration. I think he was in Hanoi, if I'm not mistaken. He was in Asia. He may still be there.

Robert Williams

Robert Williams is a Negro, former President of the Union County North Carolina branch of the NAACP, who had a hell of a battle on his hands against the local Ku Klux Klan and discovered the the best way to deal with the Ku Klux Klan was to shoot back at them. And it worked. They never had seen it, in that part of the south, anyway, the small towns of the South. ~~town pants~~. Up until recently there's been sort of gentlemen's agreement in the south that the Negro civil rights groups would go into the big cities, where they would be reasonably protected. But they had to leave the rural areas alone because they couln't expect much. Williams of course, was a there is no doubt, great embarrassment to everybody, and they were on his back. He got no sympathy from the NAACP leadership. He first came to national prominence after a case of obvious injustice where a white man had done something to a Negro woman and some local jury had thrown it out. He came to (Williams) said, "well if we can't get justice in the courts we'll have to take justice in our own hands." [illegible] But even the fact that Negroes would fight back got the older, more conservative Negro leaders very upset. ~~He was immediately~~ People immediately came to his support, particularly the Trotskyits, not the Communists. The Trotskyites came in, and tried to take him over. They did give him some support. There had been a case before, another case, locally called the [illegible] Kissing Case. Two Negro boys, you may have heard of it, were sentenced to indefinite terms in prison for having kissed a six-year-old white girl. He was involved in that and again, it was the Trotskyites who came to his support, with other liberal groups. In terms of organizational support it was the Trotskyites. I heard of him at the time I was in CBS and I thought that it was very understandable and sent him a message of support. I met him at the time of the NAACP Conference in New York in 1959 and when the FPCC was formed he was among the eight Negroes who were among the 30 founding members, to the great shock of of the Communist Party of the United States, which did not particularly approve of seeing the two issues mixed, Cuba and ~~the~~ Negroes.

Williams, very volatile, a very determined person, on a local level, has no ability whatsoever on a national level. He has become a symbol now to Negro youth in particular, as a Negro who is not an Uncle Tom, who will fight, but We knew ~~that~~ what was coming in the summer of 61, ~~perhaps it was before. . no~~ obviously it was embarrassment, for the national executive of the NAACP, embarrassment for the Justice Department, and more than embarrassment for Terry Sanford, who was the Governor, and who told him, "I wish you were dead. Period." ~~They~~ Finally, by one of these flukes of fate, there was a demonstration over a swimming pool. They (the Negroes) didn't want to integrate the pool. They just wanted to swim in it. But the local people said they didn't want to do that because they would have to change the water, and it would take too much time to change the water after Negroes swam in the water. So they had some demonstrations. Williams was almost murdered on one of these occasions. The demonstrations were getting pretty violent. And then King sent in some Freedom Riders who were going to show them how non-violence was going to work in this town. They decided to make an example. So Williams said, "I'm going to get out of this. I don't want anything to do with your non-violence. But you go ahead and I'll see what happens."

Well the non-violent demonstration ~~became~~ even more violent. There were people shot. There were arrests. There was an English girl who now figures here in the British Trotskyist party, who was over there. People were coming from all over, there were reports in the European press. ~~The rumor went around~~ - Williams now had nothing to do with this. He was just sort of staying there saying well you see where non-violence gets you-- but there was a report that they were going to lynch the people who had been arrested. As often happens in this type of thing the Negroes and whites, outside whites who were involved, really came in for a hell of a beating, and as in the Philadelphia, Mississippi, case, they even have been killed. Williams, was more or less a victim of the mob in the Negro community which said "we've got to do something. We've got to free these people, and get them out of jail."

He had arms, including ~~some~~ machine guns, which had been purchased in New York, and sent down there. They didn't use them because they got scared, but they had arms. The community was armed. The people were out in the street in front of his house, when a car with a white couple, came down ~~this~~ the road. It was surrounded and the couple was told to get out. The crowd wanted to string them up right there. ~~Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ This man came from a neighboring town, claimed had lost their way. They said, no you're a member of the Klan in this town." They wanted to kill him, or hold him as hostage. Williams said, "Bring these people in my house and you know I won't let them go." He called the Sheriff, and said, "Look, I have these people here and my people are very upset and I want you to know that I don't want anything to happen to our people that you have in the jail." The Sheriff immediately called the National Guard, State Troopers and what not. They couldn't hold out very long. Williams escaped. Julian Mayfield was there, a well known Negro writer who now lives in Ghana as a result of this. Minnie ~~Edith~~ Mallory, a Negro woman from New York who was there ~~who~~ was later arrested and convicted and sentenced to 16 years in prison for ~~just~~ kidnapping, and the case is on appeal now. ~~[illegible]~~

Williams was spirited across the United States — I knew vaguely where he was, but he (was) kept very carefully by Cubans and by Negro groups in contact with the Cubans, to Canada. From Canada he was flown by private plane ~~and by~~ [illegible] Castro himself, to Havana, where he is now.

On two occasions the FBI came to me asking for information about Williams, and I damn sure wasn't going to give any ~~[illegible]~~ of what I knew. We had tried to get in touch with Bobby Kennedy himself. I had sent ~~[illegible]~~ telegrams. I even tried to get a telephone call in. Because I knew what was going to happen on this thing, (unjustified) to get some kind of Federal intervention. ~~—~~ It was one of ~~those sickening things~~ the most sickening things that I ever saw. ~~The~~ They wanted him out of the way. Even the ~~[illegible]~~ way they came to me later — two of the agents came to the FPCC office in New York. They said, "We have 500 agents. We'll get him. He'll never get away." Well, he was away at that ~~[illegible]~~ point. His aunt died ~~and they~~ in New York around that time. They went to the funeral parlor where the body was and put a wanted ~~a~~ poster for Williams, on the coffin — and stood there to see if he would come by. Really, they should have been thrown ~~[illegible]~~ out on their heads, frankly. If it hadn't been Negroes I'm certain they would never have done that sort of thing. The trouble was — ~~[illegible]~~ the trouble is — the whole attitude. ~~attitude.~~ Anyhow, as it is, Williams is not a Communist, he's not a Trotskyite. He's a former Marine, who's just had enough. Really, you know. And he's turned into a world-wide figure. ~~And now he has turned into a world-wide figure~~ because people like Bobby Kennedy and others could not just bother to try to see what could be done about it. It was no use, though. I mean, it's no use now. ~~[illegible]~~ I'm certainly [illegible] ~~and~~ everybody."

Well, that's too bad. Just like the case of these boys, Walter Bow, and so on. And they're not the only ones. ~~Now~~, for every Walter Bow there must be at least a hundred (others). I must say, I would no more want to live in the States now — you're going to really see something. I don't really

~~The twelve issues were~~ only 200 copies ~~maximum,~~

It was still printed until No. 12, ~~the end of the year.~~ the end of that first year. The twelfth issues were printed there. The twelfth issue was
It was never distributed.
only 200, or 366 copies maximum. I still have some. Those are the ones I sold for $10.00 a book. The American libraries are desperate to complete their sets. It was never distributed because Verges hadn't paid Gonguin the money that he promised and, while the copies were
arrangement of the financial busins, Federal Council
sitting there waiting for some ~~financial arrangement~~ the Swiss finally took action and seized them. Actually the seizure was more "platonic"
anything. I understand
but they just wanted to ~~say~~ said you can't send out Gonguin had
which of every issue,
50 copies, ~~of every issue,~~ ~~that~~ he had salted away, He knew he could sell them. I think he could sell them in the States.
university libraries, you know,
American ~~libraries~~ are extremely - - political files. Revolution
(If
became a sort of -- it was, the American press. Revolution had a success, it came from the American press, not the French press, or the British press, the American press. It was really fortuitous but many journalists that you can't blame them - seeing this move to Paris, a new magazine ~~that~~ with a pro-Chinese line which really ~~was a~~ vaunts its pro-Chinese line, coming out at the same time as French recognition of China. So obviously you write things about a new twentieth century Europe, Verges, the Chinese
(And that was what started it
top man in Europe, and this that and the other. We had three articles,
(One even
I believe, in the Christian Science Monitor, ~~and~~ of them had the
came in,
address in. Right ~~[illegible]~~ then the letters the subscriptions
All sorts of people wanted them.
came in. ~~[illegible]~~ A subscription agency in the United States saw it, and and started taking orders from university libraries. ~~[illegible]~~
copies, I think.
~~[illegible]~~ The State Department took 20 ~~[illegible]~~ ~~The Congress for Cultural~~
There was
~~[illegible]~~ one airmail subscription for the Embassy ~~[illegible]~~ in Tokyo. The Congress for Cultural Freedom had even more than that. They had a list of every one of their correspondents, magazines, etc. Everyone got one. ¶ So we were doing well. And he could have, actually, on the English edition, whichhad a much lower cost than the others, he could have broken even. He would never have made anything, (however).

But (with) his policy for the French edition, including printing and all, he could never have balanced the budget without a hefty subsidy from someone.

((Some colleagues on the editorial staff))

The ~~[illegible]~~ editorial staff was again a fiction. ~~There was no~~
If you've been following Revolution since, you can see each month, (and with) each
~~use issue this~~ [illegible]

~~because he want s to make sure that they have~~ grows larger. ~~Its~~ [illegible] mainly fictitious names, many of them. [illegible] people.

He's got Carlos [illegible]. He's supposed to be from Spain. This was a name made up by ~~Mme Chen~~ Klein to replace Valdes. Valdes was actually a person, who ~~is~~ is a Spanish scientist, a chemist, who works for the CNRS, The Centre Nationale de ~~Research~~ Scientifique, in Paris. He did write the articles on Spain under ~~Chen~~ Klein's supervision with strong ~~rewirint~~ rewriting. And his real name is Lopez. ~~M~~ I saw him. His first initial is S. Martin Valdes is not his real name. His address . . . [illegible]

~~Mmmmmxxxxxxm~~ He ~~is the person who~~ he is now wandering about very much at odds, but he is still very well informed about the Spanish situation. I think that if approached in the proper fashion, ~~I~~ he might be ~~w~~ willing to talk. [illegible]

((How old is he))

In his late thirties. I had no trouble talking with him. He is very bitter. ((Why)) He was expelled from the Proletario group which he had founded, (or) ~~and~~ more or less relegated. He isn't really made up for practical politics and he . . . ~~xxx~~ matter of pride, etc. but he keeps his hand in. He said he wanted to go see Grippa, but he didn't have much idea of doing ~~it~~ anything. He is the one who told me about what was going on in the Spanish group. I could have gotten more. He had no idea that I was pumping him for information ~~Excxxxxx~~ He seemed to be approachable, willing to talk about the Spanish ~~sitqtuion~~ situation. He can lecture for hours. He is the professorial type, not for the rough and tumble of ~~practical~~ clique-like politics. He was used by ~~Chen~~ Klein.

((What caused his rupture with group))

I ~~didn't get~~ don't know the exact story. He had group called Proletario. They put out a four-page news letter of the same name, ~~I~~ most of which was in theory written by Valdes. But was rewritten by ~~Chen, xxxx Chen~~ Klein. Klein was in contact with the members of the group and at one time Valdes and his wife were actually told that they were going to edit Revolution, a Spanish edition, ~~that~~ which was going to be publised in Europe. By the way the Spanish edition does exist, so I'm told, in Bogota. They have managed to get out a Spanish ~~I~~ edition - [illegible] Has nothing to do with Verges. It was brought out by the MOEC committee - Movimiento Obreros Estudiantes y Campesinos . . . a kind of Fidelista. ~~movement~~, a ~~and~~ which is quite pro-Chinese ~~I think. I RH~~ And is getting Chinese subsidy I think. They had quite a scandal about misappropriation of funds. Apparently the Chinese were giving them ~~xxxxx~~ fifteen thousand, twenty-five thousand and twenty thousand, and ten thousand of it would arrive, and somewhere along the line ~~on the way to Europe~~ 8,000 or 20,000 on the way in Europe would disappear. One of the persons was expelled.

((What's relationship of Spanish edition to))
It has — takes some of the articles — --

Said to have copies in Brussels. I haven't seen. Brussels is used as a European headquarters for ~~Western Europe~~ MOEC. People going through either to China or ~~toxxx~~ North Vietnam coming through there. ((Can they take stuff without any copyright problems?)) Oh, yes, at first Verges wanted them to be identical-- same as Revolution in France, but and they would say, well,-- they wanted the editorial work done in Paris, which he would finance, and they would finance all of the production side. But he was unable to pay ~~them~~ for even the editorial thing, so they said they would do all of it in Colombia.

He would finance and they would finance all of the production, but ~~theyxxwere~~ unable

They had a commercial printer, who was going to front for them in Bogota on the same format as the English edition, the old English edition; now the English and the French editions are exactly identical. The pocket format. I donx't know what they've done. They didn't expect it to last very long- sort of a prestige operation.r Expected tjree tjree 3 or 4 issue to get out, before it would be seized, but that was enough for them. I think what they wanted to do was to establish themselves on an international plane, even nationally, as the leading left party

They've had a running battle with the Communist Party. MOEC They accuse the CP of having given the names of all their liaison people between the ~~tmx~~ city and countryside - they are running ~~xcountrxxx~~ - a guerrilla campaign in certain areas of the country which has become quite serious. And they do have organizational ties with the

* FALN of Venezuela. / They are by no means a joke. And they are having people trained in North Vietnam. They were supposed to. And in China.

They have some people in Algeria. They may even have persuaded the Algerians to train some people. I don't know. But they were trying.

// Actual editorial policy of the magazine- selected by me.
When I was at magazine, I selected the articles as I chose.
In the English edition, with very few exceptions, almost everything was
Then there was a hiatus when no French edition. Then I was completely on my own. While there was a French edition, all I had to do was pick out and translate. Basically it was a translation. ~~Then there was~~

(Who now in control)
Verges strangely has very little concern about what goes into his magazine.
as it seems
He doesn't write and he doesn't even care terribly much.

Hoc
~~Manh~~ Lan, former prof of philos. taught at ~~the Lycee~~, a Lycee in Paris, has connections
~~Chen~~. His true name is
with Trotskyist groups. Is now suspected by the group, the people in Clichy, who make up the
French
Chinese group on the fringe of the Communist Party of being a Trotskyist agent. Certainly is a person who has had extremely close ties and maintains them with ~~Trotskyist~~ groups, particularly the so-called Lambert- (Groupe Lambert)
(How old) Probably
~~He is~~ in late thirties. Married to French woman, from whom he was separated.

~~His route from Vietnam to Algeria. He never went to Algeria. He can't~~
French but can stay as long as wants- French Viet
leave France because has no passport. Has been in Fr 12-15 years.
definitely
Came end of the forties or early fifties, in the forties, after the war.
his
He finished Lycee in France and went to Sorbonne, received doctorate.
apparently
philosophy, sociology. He is quite brilliant. He went into French Communist
I don't think he was in the CP in Vietnam, but he was connected to the Communist
party./ In France have organizational structure and also have ~~prominent~~ permanent
their permanent people.
people. Think he was one of the ~~latter~~. Was at one time to write a book
title- "Vietnam depuis Dienbienphu," published by Maspero.
on Vietnam, now being translated into English and will be pub in US
within month or so
by Monthly Review Press. This represents the most cogent ~~thought~~ soft line
that - one could put up for the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.
This is the soft position. It is not the Chinese position. It's an equal co-existence one where they don't talke about socialist revolution. They don't even talk about taking power. but coalition, neutralization.
He wrote it '63. Has been updated with a new chapter. He does not still remain within the Com party. Neither expelled nor did he leave but just became inactive. He was a member of the economics commission of the party.

~~When~~ Verges ~~when he~~ was in the party, was a member of the colonial ~~xxxxxxxx~~ commission

He has much less imagination than Verges, does not have the verve, certainly
none of more than anything else.
not the gambling instinct. He is a hack, is very cautious, wants to protect his situation. For quite some time ~~hmin~~ has been going to see Maspero after each issue of Maspero's ~~his~~ mag comes out to say how good it is, etc. He thought [illegible]
~~Maspero told Andersson.~~ Andersson told Maspero ~~that~~ "he launched a terrible campaign against you.

~~Complex person, numerous ties.~~

even proving his good faith by bringing manuscripts that were originally destined for Revolution. That Verges knew anything about that I seriously doubt . This went on to such an extent that Maspero told Andersson. Andersson said, "why he has launched a terrible campaign against you as a Trotksyite——" Maspero said he didn't believe it, so Andersson showed him a letter that ~~Chen~~ had written in which he demanded that he sever all ties with Trotskyists. with Maspero, and so on.

He is a complex person. He has numerous ties, ~~With~~
He printed two articles by British Trotskyists about the British Communist Party, printed in Revolution, under the name of Joshua Linton which turned out to be Thomas Kent, written by one of the executive members of the British Trotsky Socialist Labor League, which is an incredible thing. Now he (Kiesel) is really considered by many of these Chinese people to be a Trotskyist, or a Trotsky sympathiser. I don't know about it. He does have very curious ties. I don't what he present relationship is to the Vietnamese though he claimed that he had received a letter from Hanoi from a friend who was in a high position there who urged him not to do anything that could be considered anti-Soviet. This was some time before - in the spring. And they said that really He should be returning home. But he has no intention of returning.

((Why))

He quite used to the life in the west. He's one of these fellows who particularly likes running around and having a girl . . says he's gathering information from — one day a girl said I'm not an encyclopedia, will you stop asking me all these questions?

((His relationship with the Chinese))

He has some contact with the New China News Agency but it is a very slight contact, He was the one who finally in a state of panic went to the one of the ~~Chi Emb and~~ Chinese/news agency correspondents in Paris and told him of the financial plight of the magazine. And that's when the mans from Chinese agency told him to prepare a budget. They Said they would see what they could do. He told ~~Castell~~ Kiesel and Kiesel ~~Castell~~ put his foot down. He said that Verges . . .

((Who did he see))

* A Mr. Yan. They were at that time Yan and Yang. Yan a heavy set man, in his forties the senior of the two, had contacts with various groups of political people. The Embassy aparently didnt want any direct contacts because the people in Marseilles and elsewhere used to go to Berne. [illegible]
They had obviously first made contacts with the Chinese in Berne and then they continued them in Berne (after French established relations with Chinese) because obviously it wouldn't look very good to be....

+ Possibly ID

~~contacts with groups.~~

(Shouldn't be too aggressive too soon, after established in France, that sort of thing?)

I don't know. After all, they have reasonably good relations with the French so I think probably the French will be disappointed that they haven't been able to get more concrete things out of ~~the Chinese~~ them, trade and so forth.

(The French don't want the Chinese to d—)

dabble in French politics too much. However, ~~everyone knows one of the things that - - Verges once said,~~ someone threatened- - No nothing to do with Verges, ~~it was~~ a friend of mine who works for ABC television in Paris, ~~[illegible]~~ Lou Chioffi, ~~and~~ talking to someone about Revolution in the French Foreign Ministry he said- ~~what do you think about this Chinese.~~ He always thought there was ~~something about this~~ what do you think about this Chinese magazine put out ~~[illegible]~~ here? And he said- I don't know anything about it. Besides if we wanted to examine subsidies that go into the political publications in France we would certainly start with the Russians and Humanite and then go on with some of your American financed publications. (laughs) And that was the end of that!

That may have just been a sort of snide rejoinder. I think that they do ~~tend~~ intend to be discreet, that they were very happy about the situation there. I was in the Chinese Embassy only once. I was invited to a reception. I never saw so many people from ~~the~~ top brackets of government as at that reception. ~~Everybody~~ - - they had ~~the Legion de'Honneur, the Almost~~ the top structure of

Everywhere you went ~~they had~~ a Legion d'Honneur in ~~his~~ the button. The top structure of the civil service were there _ _ _ _ _ from all the important industries.

(What's ~~Chen's~~ Kien's loyalty then)

~~Chen's~~ Kien's loyalty is ~~[illegible]~~ basically to himself. He's interested in Marxism, He's very academic minded. He really is a pedantic, academic person. And he's got a tremendous number of interests. He is a very hard worker when he works. It's he who writes and rewrites most of the magazine. He used to write most of the editorials. Verges does very little. He does not like to write. He doesn't like to be bothered with editorial things. He likes the promotional aspects of things. He likes to convene meetings every so often ~~and~~ to discuss things. But as for the actual running of things- though he did exercise a closer control over the French edition than he did over the English edition, he never- well once or twice he said put this in or don't put this in. He printed an article about Algeria which

or
was veiled criticism in the French issue, and he told me not to print that, for instance, in the English edition, his story being that he didn't want to embarrass the Chinese. He said that after all the Chinese were buying it ~~this~~ and this ~~[illegible]~~ wasn't their line ~~on~~ about Algeria and they might be asked embarrassing questionsby the Algerians — — — — ~~[illegible]~~ ~~distributor~~ saying why do you distribute this magazine, which has this sort of unfriendly article. ~~magazines which has this unfriendly article.~~

((You mean the Chinese were buying))

The Chinese at that time were buying 3000 copies of the English edition. — 300 of the French. They didn't seem to mind ~~about~~ the

300 French

In actual fact, the Chinese so far as I know never made any comment about the magazine, or its contents. None whatsoever.

((Is ~~Chee's~~ Kier's willingness to go to Maspero and knock Verges and go ~~to~~ to Andersson and knock Maspero- is this inconsistent with his pedantic Marxism?))

For him a lot of it is academic. It's not related too much to life, except that he is a plotter, a born conspirer. He loves to have ten people around him and to tell them what to do, how to maneuver. Of course whatever he tells them generally turns out to be disastrous for them. For example, the so-called pro-Chinese students inside of the UEC, the Union des Etudiantes ~~Communiques~~ Comunistes at their congress last year-- ~~let's see they've got one coming up~~ —he was the one behind who was telling them what to do, their tactics and strategy. They had a terrible catastrophe. (laughing) In fact the pro-Chinese students represent a negligible faction now inside ~~of~~ the Communist students, the largest faction being the Italian faction, which is actually financed by the Italian Communist Party. The Struggle has gone on for years between the French party and the Italian party and it continues there.

Then he had a group of youths who called themselves the Drapeau Rouge group. They put out again a four-page, like a newsletter, ~~[illegible]~~ which he promised to get money from Verges to subsidize. Verges had no money, as you know. One single issue came out.

Proletario, with Valdes, managed to keep on because Valdes had his own sources of income from the Spaniards who belonged to ~~it~~ (his group) apparently. They kicked in quite a lot, a month, you know, to keep it going. It wasn't too expensive. The main thing is finding a printer who will print it clandestinely, in France. ~~Because all these things that have no~~ Under French law you're supposed to have a [illegible] ~~Gerant(?)~~ ~~Directeur Association~~ who is responsible for it and anything in a foreign language is exempt from the liberty of press, from freedom of press, in France. The only foreign languages that you can use are Basque and Breton and I think, the Alsatian dialect.

For a magazine addressed to the Spanish workers in France and in Western
Europe, the problem was for them to find someone to print it, clandestinely.
And they found someone I think with Sinet and Strelkoff.

(What about Strelkoff)

Let's go down the line. The next one ~~is~~ in order would be Castell:
~~Chastel (?)~~ is the nephew of Joseph ~~Casteli~~ of the French Academy.

(~~Castelli's~~ first name?)

Patrique
Patrick. He is the nephew of a very famous ~~hm~~ man and he has worked,
again, for Maspero. All these people worked for Maspero. Verges takes
great pleasure in sort of taking people away from Maspero. He used to boast
about the people that he had gotten away from Maspero. I suppose this — — —
fellow can't do anything for us, so why do you want to get him?
~~tantalizing~~ but the idea that he might be able to undercut
or
Maspero ~~to~~ bring Maspero down ~~is~~ — he is extremely petty in this sense,
~~and once he~~ built up this grudge against Maspero, because he felt that
to buy, and then when he wanted
Maspero didn't support him 100% when he wanted ~~to buy, and they he wanted~~
to buy out Maspero, Maspero wasn't interested in
in a petty way,
combining forces. So from that point on he did everything possible ~~to~~
~~he did~~ can't do too much now,
~~everything possible~~ to draw people away, ~~the~~ play down. He went
to the Chinese and said Maspero was a Trotskist. The joke of the matter
and who are
was that all of the Trotskyists who had been in this organization, and
Kien Kien
I'm sure they are there, came through ~~Chen~~. It was ~~Chen~~ who had introduced
really
them to Maspero. And Maspero was the sort of person who couldn't care less
whether the Trotskyites got in as long as there was some sort of free
the sort of
discussion. He's not a committed person anyway; he's a man who is
sentimentally on the left but outside of any party, and for whom this
thing has become a fairly good business. Those magazines are by no means
expensive. Only sell about 2000 copies per issue, which is all now that
sells
Revolution — it has come down a long way.

Anyway, Chassel ~~is~~ was one of Maspero's authors and he worked for
Algeria.
Liberation. He's been to Laos and to the French West Indies. He's a
journalist. He's worked I think for France Observateur. — — — .
He's never been a member of the Communist Party. His main problem is trying
to be bigger one day than his uncle, whom he dislikes intensely but
though he claims
nevertheless finds very useful. His uncle is very tight with his money,
gets
but in any case he ~~gives~~ him credit — He says I am Kessel, and they aren't certain
whether it's him or the nephew or son, so they give him credit.
He was the business manager. He knows damn little about business, but ~~he was~~.
— Verges had a great deal of confidence in him and he knew a lot about
money manipulation and so forth.

Verges tried to divide things up. On two occasions Verges asked ~~him~~ me to change some money. In one case he gave ~~him~~ me a brief case which contained $30,000 to cash, and asked ~~him~~ me to go to the bank and change it to French francs. I went into the bank and said I wanted to change some money. They didn't faint, nor ask any questions either. Then on the second occasion I think I changed only $2000. It was in cash, in hundred dollar bills. And the other one was in ten dollar bills. That was the problem, they had to count it all. They weren't at all pleased. Where he got the money from I don't know. ~~They~~ It was in used American bills, old bills, ~~[illegible]~~ wrappers on them had no identification. But he didn't want anyone else to know. He didn't want ~~Cassell~~ [illegible] to know I had changed it.

((You say ~~Cassell~~ was never in the French Communist Party))

No.

((Why not?)) homme de gauche (he is without)

I don't think ~~Cassell~~ Kessel is a person ~~de gauche~~ — without even intellectual [illegible] he likes to live well and the party's bureaucratic organization doesn't attract intellectuals very long. Many of them go through it but just that. They go in and out. In fact it's almost- it's very good reference if you've been in and out of the party. You've got so many people who have been in and out of the party that you can go almost anywhere and find sympathy and jobs and so on. People at Expresse and so on are made up of people of that type.

((Does ~~Cassell~~ write?))

Yes. He has written one or two articles for Revolution, but very little. The only thing that he used to do was to re-write some of ~~Chen~~ Kien's things, the editorials in particular, after ~~Chen~~ Kien had worked on them, to put them into really good French. ~~Chen~~ Kien's French sometimes has a tendency to be very esoteric and baroque.

((No substantive editorial work))

No. He is definitely a lesser figure but he likes his position. He likes being the sort of front man. ~~He he~~ (Though) with the financial troubles, he was the one who did suffer most. Because all the creditors got to him. Verges was hiding, didn't come into the office sometimes for days, or would come in only for a very short period of time, because he was afraid that people would want to serve summones and whatnot on him for debt. ~~Cassell~~ [illegible] was there. ~~Cassell~~ [illegible] was not a member of the company, [illegible] I thought he was.

By the way I don't know whether I got that correct, yesterday. That was the Bureau No. 6 where the- - this thing was - - not 16 22nd of August- - that was 63. When they set up the company.

(That's Bureau no. 6)

Now Sine.

Sinet is listed ~~as~~ with Strelkoff as Secretaire de la Redaction, which sounds like he had something to do with the editorial side of it but has nothing to do with that. He is of course the partner of Verges, at least on paper. Whether the ~~70~~ 2000 thousand francs in his name actually represent his money I doubt. I think it is probably all Verges' money. I think that Verges needed at least another person to go into the . . . He is the lay-out, make-up (man). ~~When Verges went into~~ the layout, art work, cartoons, ((He handle photos, too??)) Well, yes,

They ~~look~~ just send around to see where they can get them. But as they have no money now, it's just a matter of begging. They used to buy almost exclusively from Magnum.-- that's why they had so many Cartier-Bresson. Magnum has beautiful photos, ~~but~~ except they are expensive. And then they couldn't pay them.

((Sinet is French))

His real name is Maurice Sinet. He is French. He is in his thirties. Married, rather unhappily; has one child, which his wife claims is not his. He's more of an anarchist. He was in the French Communist Party but for a very brief period, I gather. He is very virulent. Before Revolution came out he put out his own little magazine, a cartoon magazine called Sine Massacre which (had) ~~was~~ ~~pinked~~ the most virulent cartoons I've ever seen. ~~Thus~~ They depicted things like the clergy, or love - a very, very sick type of cartoon, which contrasted greatly from what made him famous, ~~Sine's cat.~~ the Sine cat. He made a fortune with his ~~cat~~ cats and he also had a tie-in with some promotional things, Key-chain and others - That's where of course he made a lot of money. He does a lot of commercial art work. He sells quite a bit here in England. He does work for British ad agencies.

((Why does a man this successful put this much effort into Revolution?))

Because he is-- again, the same sort of thing- he is an emotional Leftist, ~~very much~~ - He is incapable of any real organizational (work)- - So is Verges. I think that no matter what sort of organization, he couldn't stay (with it) too long. He must be the big boss of it. He must be a grand patron ~~garçon~~. Sinet is more , much more juvenile. He is forever throwing bottles of ink, you know! His financial success has been seriously endangered ~~by~~ - not from Revolution, but the business of Sinet Massacre because Mme. De Gaulle did not like what she considered blasphemous cartoons, and so he was arrested for Outrage au ~~moeurs~~ publique, outrage a la police, outrage au chef d'état- - He got out of most of them but it cost a lot of money ~~[illegible]~~- it put this thing out of existence and Mme de Gaulle said she thinks he is a very nasty man.

((Does he get paid by Revolution or does he supply funds for Revolution))

No, he supposedly gets the same thing that ~~everyone~~ everyone else gets- [illegible] getting 1500 francs a month. Everyone allegedly gets or did receive 1500. He has an assistant because he can't devote much of his time to it. He's got to earn a living. He has a very expensive establishment. His mother and father, wife and child, [illegible] maintains two cars and has a three story- sort of duplex, bigger than an apartment. It is magnificent, on the Rue ~~Plichie~~ Clichy? in Paris. In order to maintain this he's got to find ways of earning ~~[illegible]~~ a living, mainly advertising work. He had worked for Express which paid him very well, but he broke with them on a political issue. He likes to eat well, drink well and run around after women and this is expensive. So a lot of the work, the donkey work, is done by Strelkoff, whose real name is Alexander Strelkoff.

(arrangements for [illegible])

The main thing to read in Verges are the editorials. That's the only thing ~~ginsberg~~ (?) cared about. The editorials are very-- towards the end for example, there's the ~~[illegible]~~ phrase - "it's better to have for the future a failure that is luminous, ~~une~~ chef lumineux, than success in confusion" whatever that means. This is Verges' line in many things. ~~[illegible]~~ They're (editorials) filled with phrases [illegible] - it's no point ~~[illegible]~~- - he wanted at one point to circle these ~~[illegible]~~ phrases with a crayon to show people that his line has always been the same.

GINZBERG? – is Pierre Villon (FCF CC) real name) coincidence?

THIRD SESSION

19 February 1965

Reel no. 2

((You have an acute memory for the last phrase of yesterday.))

I happen to be a journalist.

((You have~~x~~ a very retentive mind. You do very well about these things.))

As you get older you forget. Doesn't it frighten you sometimes when you can't think ~~x~~- of a name- - I'm really beginning to feel bad about . . ~~x~~ something ~~xx~~ I can't remember- - I think my God, what's happening. .

Strelkoff is Alexander Strelkoff. He is in his early thirties, son of Russian immigrant parents in France,

((Born in France?))

Born in France. Speaks Russian fluently. His parents were members of the Communist Party in Russia, / Bolshevik Party but with ~~Trotsk~~ Trotskyite tendencies. That's why they had to get out of Russia after the Revolution but he has no Trotskyist leanings at all. In fact because of his parents, he seems more or less to lean the other way, to be at least verbally, a violent Stalinist. He is married and has three (children), thsee by one wife, has one illegitimate and several others. He is very active sexually. He is a very handsome fellow and has a great deal of success with girls. He earns his living as a graphic designer. He worked for Hachette ~~doing~~ doing layouts for them, until the great Sinet Massacre scandal, when Mme. de Gaulle finally took umbrage at this. He and Sinet were the two cartoonists who put this out, ~~and~~

((Strelkoff can draw, as well))

Yes. In those things I gave you you will see cartoons by Strelkoff. He is essentially an artist, a cartoonist, though no one ever printed his cartoons before he ran into Sinet because they were considered just too ~~disgusting --~~ ~~too~~ disgusting for {publication}. He is really the acolyte, if you will, of Sinet. And any success, any money that he has come~~s~~ to him through Sinet. He is Sinet's man, and Sinet passes on work to him. They sort of pass around girls to each other and that sort of thing. He does, nevertheless, count for a certain amount in the magazine. He did count, because he was considered reasonably disinterested. That is, he wasn't concerned very much about money. He lives very poorly, with ~~[illegible]~~ his wife and children, and has made far more sacrifices than Sinet but he is a very loyal, I was going to say, a faithful retainer, of Sinet's. I think that would sum him up. His loyalty is to Sinet and not to Verges.

((What are his principal types of contact outside of ——))

He doesn't have any contacts outside of —— His contacts are mainly body to body with girls. In terms of politics, he didn't like the idea that perhaps ~~Chen~~ [illegible] was deeply involved with Trotskyism, that sort of thing, but that was just a small ca~~libre~~ comuk and (?), his scruples in this point. He wanted to keep it going. He was very ~~xxxxxx~~ anti-Chinese in the sense that he didn't think that the magazine should accept any Chinese money if the Chinese were willing to give it, the reason for this being that he thinks that [illegible] should have a free hand in the arts, and so forth, jazz and all this, which of course he and Sinet are very much interested in.

((He's a literary liberal, then-))

Yes, in terms of the arts, he would be. He doesn't care much for abstract art, ~~but~~

((But he's not a party liner))

By no means. A former Communist, but he wasn't expelled. He also just withdrew.

((If his parents were emigres from Russia, I assume this would have been in the twenties, ~~or~~))

(They did).

Yes, in the twenties, just before he was born. — because of their Trotskyist leaning. I suppose they were members of the Trotskyist faction,* of the Soviet Communist party at that time.

((Do you know whether they were expelled or left voluntarily))

I don't know. I think they left voluntarily, but that's just supposition. I think he mentioned something about it. I think that they really ~~fsixx xxxxxxxxxx~~ fled ahead of the Soviet police, the Cheka- - he's Jewish, and maybe some of his relatives, did end up in Soviet concentration camps. I think he still has some living relatives (in Russia) yes, because he was one of the chefs de chantier, construction foreman, in the final stages of the French ~~expeditionxinxMosxx~~ exposition in Moscow. That was in 61 or 62. He speaks Russian fluently. There ~~xx~~ he met some of his relatives.

((Has he made other trips to the Soviet Union))

I think he has made two trips. ~~but~~ One was with the French exposition. ~~and~~ He was there before and I think throughout the exposition, putting it up and so on. He is very competent ~~xx~~ as a designer, a little bit lazy — ~~but other than that~~ —— he tries to get other people to do his work for him if he can, just as Sinet passes it on to him he tries to pass it on to others. Where money is concerned he is not terribly scrupulous but he's not money hungry. [illegible] His weakness is women. Very much so. He shocked the Anderssons. He used to come to Lausanne and he had so many girls

to meet(?)
~~xxxxxx~~ they couldn't keep up (with it).

((Did Sinet bring him to ~~xxxxxxxx~~ Revolution))

~~xxxxx~~ Yes. He was delegated to do the work of the English edition. Sinet couldn't do it and this was before the French edition~~s~~ was started in France, so it was Strelkoff who did it. He came to Lausanne for a couple of days to do the layout~~s~~ and so on. Then he found someone in Lausanne, a Swiss graphic artist, ~~xxxx commercial artist~~, who then did the major ~~main~~ part of the work. Strelkoff came to oversee it.

That's about all there is about him. It's not very much, really. He's not very active politically. His life centers around females, jazz, night clubs. He would get drunk occasionally. He shares Sinet's tastes there - and women.

Now after Chen, Kien [illegible] ~~Oswell~~ and Sinet and Strelkoff, you have really reached the end of the immediate editorial staff~~x~~ as such. There was an editorial board which was a fiction. It had names of people like Babu on it. Babu saw Verges actually twice. He never contributed anything to the magazine except one interview which I did with him, taped in Geneva, when he was at the UN Conference ~~office~~ on Trade and Development.

BABU

((Babu's biographic details are well enough known but how did he come to get involved in Revolution in the first place.))

He was suggested by Dennis Phombeah ~~Denis Pombere.~~ ~~Denis Pombere is~~ now the delegate from Tanzania to the UN. Phombeah ~~Pombehr is spelled with an h. - Phombeahx.~~ Dennis Phombeah is a former student - he's a Tanzanian diplomat now, He is Tanganyikan by birth. He was the secretary of the Committee of African Organizations here in London for a number of years. This was a Ghana-subsidized attempt to group together and unify all of the various African national groups. He's married to a girl by the name of Ilona ~~Bidlowna~~. She is a Jewish girl from London. Her parents also former leftists. But she is very much anti-Communist. Dennis has very close ties with the British Communist party. He was a member of their African student committee. They had a committee headed by a woman named Kay Beauchamp/Beecham(?) who was delegated the task of ~~to~~ sort of watch over the African students in London and they didn't have very much success. But Dennis was able to milk them, the Ghana Government, by getting a subsidy, plus he had direct ties with the Soviets. He was a graduate student at Moscow University under Professor Ivan Potekhin (r.i.p.) ~~Potecki~~. He is now dead, as you know, he was the head of their African studies department. He was getting his doctorate. I think it was ~~it~~ in anthropology, I don't know exactly. But he was one of the very few persons

Dennis Phombeah

getting a doctorate in Moscow while sitting in London, and his wife spent most of her time writing his thesis. He would tell her, "now read this book and tell me what it says" and then "work this into my general ~~thing~~ thesis". He had very little time. He also had some connections with the Chinese and had been to Peking, when I don't know, and had been invited to go to Peking last summer. He managed to keep from getting there. I suppose he felt that if he went ... He did go to Moscow on several occasions, theoretically it was to see Prof. Pote~~kin~~ Kr'n. That was just before ~~Potekin's~~ P's death. The Zanzibar revolution is a year old, so it was before the Zanzibar Revolution ~~but was~~ early last year, ~~must have been January~~. I saw him last at Orly Airport when he ~~was i~~ - -

~~He~~ came through ~~I guess severl weeks later~~ on his way to Moscow. He took the Air France flight and he had an hour to kill in Paris, and I went out to the airport and saw him. He gave me ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ photos of Zanzibar.

((You had known he was coming))

Yes. They told me. This was for the magazine. Some of the photos that later appeared were the photos he brought. They were Pretty bad photos. They were all one could get.

Then he took the Air France flight to Warsaw and Moscow. When he came back of course, although he was Tanganyikan, Babu knew him and ~~h~~ had strong confidence in him and ~~he~~ appointed him adviser to the Zanzibar High Commission here in London. The Commissioner, who had been one of the Sultan's men, had left. There had been a Civil Servant by the name of Omar, Omar Zohran, who remained. He said he didn't want to lose his pension, this was his main concern revolution or no revolution. He didn't know much about revolutions. In fact, he was very touching, because he asked us could we suggest books that he could read about revolutions. He was a time server. While he was quite useful as the First Secretary, nevertheless Babu couldn't trust him.

So Dennis Phombeah, was put in as a sort of watchdog.

When the Geneva Conference came up, Dennis was there ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx delegatex~~ as ~~Babu xxxxx~~, until Babu arrived, the chief delegate, from Zanzibar. In fact, he had everybody ~~xxxxdelegatex~~ sitting in as delegates, I sat in as a delegate from ~~Z~~ Zanzibar for a few minutes without even knowing it. He said "sit down. I've got to go ~~went~~ out." ~~till I xxxxxx to go out.~~ There I was sitting there. Somebody came up and took my photograph. I assumed that I was either being photographed by the CIA or by the State Department or the Soviet side ~~axx~~ or probably both.

((Did you ever see the product))

No. I assume it was for ~~[illegible]~~ private consumption. There was an East German which I assume [illegible] (commentary

for press purposes. He wanted to take portraits of all the Africans. He got their names. He had a tremendous file there. (laughing) And he also had a wire-photo machine which worked right out of his studio. He did Phombeah and another African fellow while I was there.

Anyway, Phombeah was known to Verges. He may have met him when Verges was in the IUS, International Union of Students, in Prague. He was ~~the~~ a VicePresident. There are four vice presidents. Verges was one of them.

As I said, when we were in Algeria, we had this woman Rosalind Ainslie as our correspondent here. When there came the blow-up there was Phombeah- - he knew Rosalind Ainslie and was giving her political advice. In other words, he was much higher up in the hierarchy of the British Communist Party, although theoretically he is not a member of the party. That I don't know. He maintains he isn't. But she certainly accepted what he said to a great extent. But he was going ~~with~~ between everyone. So when she ceased to work for us he agreed to work, for £50 a month, but not to have his name used. He didn't want his name to appear in the magazine. He said "however, I'm certain that Babu — now this was before the revolution — I'm certain that Babu will be willing." He sent a ~~cable~~ cable to him and got a reply which was favorable. Babu then turned up in Paris and London. He was at the Labor Party congress at Scarborough. On his way back to Africa from that congress he stopped in Paris and that was his meeting with Verges.

He told Verges ~~then~~ then: He said "we will be in power within six to eight weeks after independence" ~~after independence~~ And of course he was. And really that shocked Verges, ~~Verges~~ to see somebody who really knew what he ~~would~~ would do. Also Babu- - very strange in that he doesn't dress well at all. He looks very sloppy. ~~[illegible]~~

~~I saw him next~~. We both saw him next, at ~~after~~ the UN conference, the Geneva Conference. He came to Paris with the Omar character who ~~was~~ is still here. I saw he was presented to the Queen not too long ago. And his so-called Chef de Protocol, who just happened to be a boy who could speak French which was a convenience. He also came with an Italian girl by the name of Betti, [illegible] her last name, and I suspect, although I am not certain, that she is Laura Betti, who is a well-known Italian actress and the alleged mistress of Pierre Paolo Passolini, [illegible] the film director, He was the man who made Accatonia and just made the Gospel According to St. Matthew which got a big prize and all that. He is a homosexual and so it is a very strange sort of relationship. She was supposed to be a member of The

Phombea Ainslie

Babu

Nenni Socialists. I don't know if she has gone with the PSIUP, ~~people~~ the new left split, or not. I tried to get more information about her in Rome but I couldn't just walk in and say "weren't you the girl I ~~found~~ found in bed with Babu". She speaks English well and she spent a considerable amount of time in Geneva with him and came to Paris with him.

He (Babu) was also with Murray ~~Fells~~ Sales (phon) ~~Sallis? Sales?~~ an Australian who spent most of his time as a mutual funds salesman. ~~x~~ Murray was based in Geneva. I suspect that he also was supplying girls.

Murray was also in contact with and introduced Babu to a man by the name of Victor Herbert, who is an American Mutual Funds salesman. He used to be an executive with OIS, Overseas Investment Service, in Geneva, which is the biggest American overseas fund, run by a man by the name of Bernie ~~Canfm~~ Kornfell ~~Cornbelt~~ (?). Exactly what this curious crowd was doing with Babu there in Geneva I don't know. Murray Sales then later told stories which were not quite true of a man who was going around the Hotel Intercontinental in Geneva knocking on doors saying ~~xxxx~~ "are you a Foreign Minister?" "Yes" " Well, I want to invest ~~$x~~ $50,000 in your country. Which country ~~xxxxx~~ do you come from." Now Murray ~~Fell's~~ Sales' story is different. He told ~~[illegible]~~ Melvin Lasky of Encounter that someone came and said, "I'm from the CIA. Here's a gold watch and I'll give you $50,000 if you'll work for us." ((Who are you)) Yes, who are you? ~~Exacty~~ Exactly.

Despite some of the curious antics I heard of with Cubans, I can't believe anybody would get that way. And besides, Babu was very amused by the man who did come. And he didn't get a watch. He told me that he'd gotten a camera from the West Germans once. They said "don't recognize Ulbricht and we'll give you this lovely camera." Of course they had already made a deal with East Germany.

((What was Victor Herbert's role in all this?))

I suspect that they were trying to invest money, that was all. The thing which interests me about all of this is that Babu, despite the fact he is a revolutionary, and a very competent one, I think, he has other strings to his bow. ~~[illegible]~~

One, he is very much interested in women. Two, he drinks heavily. Money, which is extremely scarce in Zanzibar like most places in the world, is of great interest to him. He also ~~[illegible]~~ told us, [illegible] that he had informed the Chinese that he was going to carry out the coup and the Chinese were opposed to it. They went ahead anyway. They thought it was an adventure. Then afterwards—— They said — well, since you were able to do it, — but Babu thinks [illegible] ((Is that what he told you?))

Extract all phone data

Babu

Yes, that's what he told Vergesi and me. Actually, that wasn't for publication.

Phombeah brought in Babu. Babu had no real connection with the magazine except on these two occasions. He gave me an interview which was printed in the last issue - in both issues of Revolution, and that was all. Then he went off to Indonesia. That's history. The merger was ~~being~~ made between Tanganyika and Zanzibar and it was ~~partly~~ partially behind his back although he knew that it was going to go on and he was not at all opposed. He felt that it was ~~g~~ a good thing. We found it difficult to understand why he felt it was a good thing, but he thought that ~~at~~ in Tanganyika the chaos was so great and the lack of defined goals, the lack of ability, even ~~the~~ capacity to satisfy the growing needs of the masses there would be such that the Indians community ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ which had its hand on the small ~~floor~~ business, and also the big ~~time~~ fibre plantations and what-not were an especially vulnerable target group, that [Julius] Nyerere, despite all of his humanism and his Catholic religion wouldn't be able to put up much resistance. I think he was quite right. That's what happened. That is, Zanzibar ~~which~~ is taking over Tanganyika into Tanzania. There was a struggle between Babu and Hanga, but that seemed to calm down to a great extent. I think that's over now. I've heard different things. I don't know.

One of the things that this fellow Curtis Kate Cabe of the Atlantic monthly proposed to do - he has more proposals than he has dollars- unfortunately, is that we try to go to Zanzibar. No one has even done any (reporting) I probably could get in. No one really has written anything of any particular note about Zanzibar since the revolution. Don't know whether that is possible or not.

((There was a great deal of noise at the time of the Zanzibar revolution about Babu's relationship with Kao Liang, the NCNA man.))

Well, yes, it's true he has worked for them. And after he informed them of what he was going to do, they — — — — —
that was about two or three days before the revolution. They had given him a small amount of money, but not much. . it wasn't their money - - the Zanzibar revolution, it was extremely confusing because he was out of the country at the time. He knew what must be done. But for instance, the bringing in of- - the fellow - - Okello which was an incredible thing to do. the former police corporal from @ Uganda. I have the feeling that he was by no means all powerful , that it was a coalition of forces, ~~The~~ It revolution. was popular in the sense that the overwhelming majority of the island's population ~~was~~ were represented among ~~xxx~~ the revolutionaries who turned against the Arab and Indian populations.

which had long had a standing grudge against that and saw no way of doing away with, but obviously they weren't all as left as Babu. You had for instance Osman ~~Othman~~ Sharif, who may be made Ambassador to United States. the main reason he was made Ambassador in United States [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Zanzibar go keep him out of Tanganyika. He was going to be here in London, I think he was the High Commissioner in London, for a very short period of time. And then when the merger came, it was the Tanganyikan High Commissioner who represented the merged countries, with Omar Zoran still staying on as the Secretary, Dennis ~~then with~~ Phombeah going to ~~[illegible]~~ the UN where he had been, in Geneva at one point, now in New York, Sharif going to Washington

((And was recently recalled))

Yes. Sharif's position is extremely shaky, but they really disliked him greatly, but because he is the head of the Sheraji Community ~~Sharaffi~~ they couldn't strike him down right away. What they wanted to do really was to put him in a position where he would finally be bought out. They figured that he would go over to the Western side. One day or the other he would jump. And that's the way of getting rid of him- without them having to do anything. That's one reason he was sent to Washington. They thought that after a while he would. .

((So much for Babu. Now on the Board))

Now we have ~~the~~ the Mulana Bashani- - he is a Pakistani. Dennis Phombeah was unable to continue his work. He was unable really to do anything. He was just collecting £60 a month. The reason that he did absolutely nothing was that the actual work was done by a Pakistani named ~~Hamsa Alavi~~ Hamza Alavi a former secretary, Third Secretary or something, Of the Pakistan National Bank. He is a Marxist, I doubt that he is actually a member of the Pakistan Communist party. He comes from one of the Ismaili ~~Sect~~ Moslem Sects, and his family is extremely ~~weleth~~ wealthy and has holdings in a Tanganyika, a fibre plantation. He also has relatives in Zanzibar. When he was asked by Dennis Phombeah to go to Zanzibar to help straighten out their balance of payments problems, which he wanted to do, his family told him that if he did he'd never come back to them, since they had lost some money. He is a great friends of Ralph Milleband of LSE (London School of Economics) here. He is an academic. He has contacts with Trotskyist groups. His contacts with the British Communist party are not very good. He is very easy going, a rather soft personality. He is by no means 100% or even 50% pro-Chinese. In ~~[illegible]~~ particular because he doesn't approve of Chinese support for President Ayub Khan. This led to his replacement finally.

Hamza Alavi

Yes, that's what he told Vergesi and me. Actually, that wasn't for publication.

Phombeah brought in Babu. Babu had no real connection with the magazine except on these two occasions. He gave me an interview which was printed in the last issue - in both issues of Revolution, and that was all. Then he went off to Indonesia. That's history. The merger was ~~being~~ made between Tanganyika and Zanzibar and it was ~~partly~~ partially behind his back although he knew that it was going to go on and he was not at all opposed. He felt that it was a good thing. We found it difficult to understand why he felt it was a good thing, but he thought that ~~in~~ in Tanganyika the chaos was so great and the lack of defined goals, the lack of ability~~, the~~ our capacity to satisfy the ~~growing~~ growing needs of the masses there would be such that the Indians ~~[illegible]~~ community which had its hand on the ~~floor~~ small business, and also the big ~~time~~ fibre plantations and what-not were an especially vulnerable target group, that [Julius] Nyerere, despite all of his humanism and his Catholic religion wouldn't be able to put up much resistance. I think he was quite right. That's what happened. That is, Zanzibar ~~which~~ is taking over Tanganyika into Tanzania. There was a struggle between Babu and Hanga, but that seemed to calm down to a great extent. I think that's over now. I've heard different things. I don't know.

One of the things that this fellow Curtis Cabe Kate? of the Atlantic monthly proposed to do - he has more proposals than he has dollars- unfortunately, is that we try to go to Zanzibar. No one has even done any (reporting) (of any particular note) I probably could get in. No one really has written anything about Zanzibar since the revolution. Don't know whether that is possible or not.

((There was a great deal of noise at the time of the Zanzibar revolution about Babu's relationship with Kao Liang, the NCNA man.))

Well, yes, it's true he has worked for them. And after he informed them of what he was going to do, they — — — - —

that was about two or three days before the revolution. They had given him a small amount of money, but not much. . it wasn't their money - - the Zanzibar revolution, It was extremely confusing because he was out of the country at the time. He knew what ~~must~~ be done. But for instance, the bringing in of- - the fellow - - Okello which was an incredible thing to do. the former police corporal from Uganda. I have the feeling that he was by no means all powerful , that it was a coalition of forces, ~~The revolution.~~ It was popular in the sense that the overwhelming majority of the ~~[illegible]~~ island's population ~~was~~ were represented among ~~[illegible]~~ the revolutionaries who turned against the Arab and Indian populations.

which had long had a standing grudge against that and saw no way of doing away with, but obviously they weren't all as left as Babu. You had for instance Osman ~~Othman~~ Sharif, who may be made Ambassador to United States. the main reason he was made Ambassador to the United States was to exile him from Zanzibar. go keep him out of Tanganyika. He was going to be here in London, I think he was the High Commissioner in London, for a very short period of time. And then when the merger came, it was the Tanganyikan High Commissioner who represented the merged countries, with Omar Zoran still staying on as the Secretary, Dennis ~~Then with~~ Phombeah going to ~~[illegible]~~ the UN where he had been, in Geneva at one point, now in New York, " Sharif going to Washington

((And was recently recalled))

Yes. Sharif's position is extremely shaky, but they really disliked him greatly, but because he is the head of the Shirazi Community ~~[illegible]~~ they couldn't strike him down right away. What they wanted to do really was to put him in a position where he would finally be bought out. They figured that he would go over to the Western side. One day or the other he would jump. And that's the way of getting rid of him- without them having to do anything. That's one reason he was sent to Washington. They thought that after a while he would. .

((So much for Babu. Now onthe Board))

Now we have ~~the~~ the Mulana Bashani- - he is a Pakistani. Dennis Phombeah was unable to continue his work. He was unable really to do anything. He was just collecting £60 a month. The reason that he did absolutely nothing was that the actual work was done by a Pakistani named ~~Hamza Alavi.~~ Hamza Alavi a former secretary, Third Secretary or something, Of the Pakistan National Bank. He is a Marxist, I doubt that he is actually a member of the Pakistan Communist party. He comes from one of the Ismaili ~~Sect~~ Moslem Sects, and his family is extremely ~~welath~~ wealthy and has holdings in a Tanganyika, a fibre plantation. He also has relatives in Zanzibar. When he was asked by Dennis Phombeah to go to Zanzibar to help straighten out their balance of payments problems, which he wanted to do, his family told him that if he did he'd never come back to them, since they had lost some money. He is a great friendz of Ralph Milleband of LSE (London School of Economics) here. He is an academic. He has contacts with Trotskyist groups. His contacts with the British Communist party are not very good. He is very easy going, a rather soft personality. He is by no means 100% or even 50% pro-Chinese. In ~~parti~~ particular because he doesn't approve of Chinese support for President Ayub Khan. This led to his replacement finally.

Hamza Alavi

~~Xxxxxxxx~~

Verges wanted somebody from Pakistan on the board. He (Alavi) said "I'm certain that the Mulana Bashani Kahn will agree".

((That would be Mulana Abdul Hamid Bashani))

That's right. He's sometimes called Kahn as a title of respect. He's a 70 or 80 years old man. He's called the Red Mullah, sort of like the Red Dean of Canterbury.

He's the leader of one of the East Pakistan parties. He had been to China and was quite pro-Chinese. He was more than willing. But he had absolutely no contact whatever with the magazine.

((Did he come in to replace Hamza Alavi))

Yes.

((How long did Hamza Alavi work with the magazine))

You would have to check the issues, of the English edition. He was there until slightly before we dropped Rosalind Ainslie. That would be May of 63. right up to spring of 64.

((Did Hamza Alavi do anything actually)) ~~or did he just~~

Hamza

He ~~got~~ found manuscripts and so on. He actually did the work that Phombeah never did. But that was all. And it was sort of contra coeur with him because he did not agree with the thing. He had the idea that the magazine was an open forum, sort of rostrum for debate between all sorts of revolutionary movements. But when it became very obvious that Verges wanted to try, at that time, at least, to stay with the Chinese line, it particularly because of ~~the state of his~~ his feelings about the situation in Pakistan and he wasn't happy. Also on the question of India, he felt that the Chinese position vis-a-vis India wasn't just, and he didn't like the hook-up, ~~between Pakistani~~ the ~~willing~~ growing friendship and actual solidarity between Pakistan and China.

((So he was through amicably. What is the present relationship between Alavi and Verges))

I doubt if he has any at all. He is very active here in London with Pakistani groups. He has money. His wife's family has money, his own family has. It wasn't a question of money for him.

((Has he continued to be active in AfroAsian things))

He's an academic. ~~Xxxxx~~ The Socialist Register published last year ~~by~~ — an article on Imperialism by him. He is active around the London School of Economics. He is known to the academic Left, friends with the boys who do Left Review and so on. His only practical work would be working with Pakistani groups, for instance during the last election the Tories ran in several constituencies Pakistani independent candidates in the hope of breaking the Labor vote, hoping that the Pakistanis would vote for these Pakistani independents. Hamza worked with the Labor Party in those constituencies, to counter this; in fact ~~and apperently~~ they were quite successful. He has very good connections inside the Labor Party. And he does not have very good ties at all with the Communist Party, though he is not by any means anti-Communist. He's a skeptic.

((How about Bashani))

He has never done anything. Never heard from him except once when he ~~xxix~~ said we could put his name on the board. As far as I know there has never been any contact.

((Do they get paid for this))

No.

Next is Hassan ~~[illegible]~~ Riad. He is ~~E.~~ S. Amir. He is an official of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, (with headquarters in Dakar ~~UN economic adviser in Dakar~~). He has a very high position inthat. He is Egyptian, a full member of the Egyptian Communist Party with very very pronounced Trotskyist views. That is, he feels, he has a theory about the role of bureaucracy in under-developed countries - the progressive and reactionary bureaucracy- ~~xxx~~ fits into general Trotskyist theories but applied there. He has done work on Egypt, state capitalism in Egypt. A book of his published recently by Edicion de Minuit ~~Victor Mia~~ in Paris, part of which appeared in Revolution. Some of it was so obviously Trotskyist that Kian ~~Chen~~, despite his somewhat partial agreement with parts of it felt that it was too obvious even to print in Revolution. He only comes through Paris occasionaly. His main interest in REvolution is getting his things printed. He is very interested in having his things published. He is very cynical about many of the African States. His article on Senegal appeared recently in Revolutian, in French, I think in No. 12. It was written under a pseudonym ~~by him~~ and based on the UN Economic Commission for Africa research , stuff that he couldn't say in his official ~~publication~~ capacity. (~~Pseudonym~~ Like Jalet ~~Lajalle~~, yes.

Hassan Riad — [illegible]

He is not overly pro-Chinese. He feels that the Chinese philosophical position isn't quite adequate, the ~~ideoloi~~ ideological model isn't adequate for under undeveloped countries, certainly for Africa.

((Do you know him- How old is he))

Yes I know him. He is in his thirties. About 35. Married. He is Egyptian. He is anti-Nasser really. He feels that the Egyptian Communist Parties, because there are many, has really abdicated any constructive role inside Egypt, even from the concentration camps where they were held putting out secret clandestine tracts supporting Nasser, which was the craziest thing I've ever heard. ~~Because~~ Now they've been liberated - in fact the old Communists are now being given very high organizational posts in the new Egyptian Party, ~~and~~

Egypt Communism and ~~Marxism~~ Marxism ~~is~~ are extraneous to Arab socialism but they are very useful people so ~~can~~ lets use them in there. And the group that are under Soviet influence are perfectly willing to go along with this".

2 ((Is he pro-anything in Egypt))

No, I think that he is sort of resigned to the flow of events of history. He analyzes what he considers state capitalist developments, the rise of a new bureaucratic middle class, the officer ~~class~~ caste and he tries to show in his writings how the officer class has crushed the old land-owning Wafdist ruling class which had its links with British and French financial interests, and has now consolidated itself in power, ~~and~~ there is a certain social mobility, but for them only. In other words, how limited it is and the officer caste certain of its functionaries — but still the problem of the masses remains.

Hassan Riad

((does he concern himself very much with the state of Egypt?))

From an academic point of view only. He's more academic. He's not even particularly comerned wih revolution. If you want his address . . ~~not here~~

Marcos Ferrer

Now who do we have- Marcos Ferrer- that's Colombia. I don't know anything about it. It probably stands for Dr. Leiva ~~Semper~~ ~~(or Sempar)~~ SEMPER of the MOEC IN Paris. He is a Colombian doctor, the representative in Paris of the MOEC. He is the one who conducted negotiations with Verges for a Spanish edition in Colombia. I assume Marcos Ferrer ~~(or Ferra)~~ to be a pseudonym.

Frene Ginwalla

~~Frenda~~ ~~Freddy~~ Frene Ginwalla, next on the list, is a member of the Indian Congress for South Africa. She was a correspondent of Revolution in Dar es Salaam and she published a magazine called Spearhead until she was expelled from Tanganyika under a cloud and accused of being a Western spy. The accusations were not made openly. She was known to have contacts with the ~~Western~~ West German Embassy. She received West German money from the Carl Ebert Foundation and actually printed West German propaganda in the her magazine. She had gone to West Germany and done this so obviously that ~~I dont know~~ she couldn't have been very sophisticated about it because it was just too (open). She was accused, of having ~~told the Soviet Embassy of having~~ offered to carry information for the Soviet Embassy, volunteering as ~~a Communist~~ a South African Communist, to give them information, two-thirds of which turned out to be totally useless and false, which again might have ~~been~~ been to ingratiate herself. ~~I ... She works~~ She was here in London after she was expelled, I'm not certain of the exact dates. She was also known to have slept around with almost every Minister of the Tanganyikan government including Julius Nyerere. This is one of the reasons why there was so much hushhush about her, that she had obviously gotten a lot of information out of these fellows. She was very close to Oscar Kambona and she claimed that Oscar Kambona was going to get her back into the Foreign Ministry.

She was just Revolution's correspondent there. She did practically nothing. When she got out, she managed to keep her little office going. They didn't seize anything, and she turned over the mailing list of her Spearhead magazine to Revolution. Verges had paid her £1000 ~~a~~ for a deposit so she could do some work but she really didn't do anything, but she, unlike Rosalind Ainslie, turned over the unspent portion of that to Verges when she came to London. ~~and~~ She wasn't interested really in continuing her work with Revolution. Being Indian of course posed a problem ~~with any~~ for her with anything to do with the Chinese. She was very close to the Indian community, as anyone who looks through that mailing list will see we have lots of missionaries, Indian businesses, and so forth in East Africa, who were taking subscriptions to the magazine more or less out of friendship and solidarity with another Indian. They didn't care much whether she was a Communist or not.

She was supposed to have been the mistress of Dr. Dadu. At least ~~any~~ they say she slept with Dr. Dadu and they had a very close relationship to him. Dr. Dadu is the president of the Indian Congress for South Africa and a member of the Communist Party of South Africa, a very important member. Because ~~Indian - the Indians have holdings~~ the Indian community has holdings up and down East Africa, Mozambique as well, their role in the liberation struggle is very equivocal . Obviously the Africans want to go ahead while the ~~Indians~~ Indians are thinking - ~~[illegible]~~ well— also Africanization menaced them - we ~~meant to the [illegible]~~ Indians. The English used them as a sort of buffer, they preferred to bring an Indian clerk to East Africa rather than to train an African. That was a typical colonial maneuver but now it has put the Indians in a situation historically which is untenable, for a long period. You know people talk about multiracial states but in East Africa it is a joke. It won't hold up. I don't think it will, anyway.

The Indian Congress of South Africa is related to the African National Congress, the Colored people's congress, all of this in a so-called Congress Alliance. She had contacts with the African - the ANC people. the ANC people here in London. They were suspicious of her ~~as well~~. But she managed somehow to get back in, she was ill, she was in hospital ~~She was~~ hurt in an auto accident, and she had to have a very complicated bone operation . That put her out of action for some time. I don't know, but I heard that she is now back in Tanganyika. She may well be. She has quite a bit of money; her family has money. Of course the Indians do have money. She did very little for the magazine. She occasionally told me about people in the ANC who might do something for the magazine. But most of the people she told me abut were members of the South African Communist Party. That party has taken a pro-Moscow stand and most of its people don't want to do anything for Revolution, though we did have articles by Bryan Bunk another South African Communist. That was before their party took their stand on the Sino-Soviet conflict. And there is a struggle going on right now inside of the ANC. That's a long complicated thing. That has nothing to do with Revolutin.

((On my list here we have Diallo))

Diallo is an adviser of the President of Mali- ~~what's his name~~ Modewa Keida.

His married to a French woman, ~~is~~ a Leftist, he knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him in contact with ____________________ who is Minister of Information, who is very, very pro-Chinese.

((In Mali))

Yes. When Chou en Lai visited Mali, you recall, that he got quite committed. There were some gratuitous, open handed slaps

over to next page

~~There's nothing very much. He just knew him.~~

~~This is again one of Verges attempts to have a finger in another African country.~~

I didn't mention, with Phombeah, one of the reasons that he (Verges) kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga, ~~in~~ in Kenya. Phombeah at one time had hoped to be made the secretary of this new Lumumba Institute there, ~~in~~ Nairobi. Verges, odd as it may seem, had at one time, proposed himself as a sort of security adviser to Odinga. We felt that he continued to pay Dennis Phombeah for doing nothing mainly to keep a line of communication open to Odinga. He had met Odinga but got nowhere with him. In Algiers he was ~~a friend of~~ Le Chinois

insert

Phombeah

President of Mali,
Modibo ~~Bedara~~ Keita. ~~xxxx~~ Married to a French woman. Leftist.
He knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him
~~He offered to help. Put him~~ in contact with a man by ~~the name of~~ Mogotogo (?)
who is Minister of Information, who is very very pro-Chinese, ~~in Mali.~~
~~And~~ When Chou en Lai visited Mali you recall that he got quite a committed welcome~~s~~ in Mali. And there were some gratuitous open-handed slaps the Russians made. Didn't have to be made but were.

((How did Verges and Diallo get together))

I don't know. He had known him for a considerable time. There is nothing very much. This is again one of Verges's attempts to have a finger in another African country. One of the reasons that he kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga.

→ insert from page missing

If in Algiers he was referred to as Le Chinois (as he was), I don't think ~~Odinga~~ the Kenyans would accept him.

This is a real problem. He says, "well, we colored people and so forth" and it is true that he is part - he's Eurasian, but it is very hard for Africans to accept that. They just put him down as Chinese.

Diallo

I don't know very much about ~~Gama~~ Demba Diallo. He played very little role in the Magazine except that he was a contact inside of Mali. He came to France early last year, the spring of last year (64), with his wife. He went to Vichy for his health and drank the waters for two or three weeks and he saw Verges. Verges had ideas, had mentioned to ~~Chen~~ Ken that if he couldn't keep the magazine going ~~that~~ was) he might go to Mali. ~~If~~ ~~Chen~~ Ken was going to be sent off to wherever, Viriato da Cruz of the Angolan Federation of Liberation, as adviser, and I was going to be sent to Indonesia for the Afro-Asian ~~jxxxxx~~ Journalists. That was how he was going to take care of everybody.

(How about Castro Da Silva)

Castro de Cruz

Castro Da Silva is the pseudonym used for Viriato da Cruz, formerly of the MPLA, and now of the UPA~~s~~. He is a poet, again, the late thirties, married, has a child and is based mre or lessin Algiers. He has virtually no money at all. He has a small group which went into the UPA.

Holden Roberto, the head of the UPA is very suspicious of him. but nevertheless he needs him. He needs the Left. He has been to China ~~s~~ and this give him a sort of, ~~-~~ gives the Chinese a guarantee, but on the other hand the Chinese didn't even want to give Viriato money to transfer himself from Algiers to Brazzaville. And he was threatened by the MPLA people, who are of course Soviet-backed to the hilt, in fact more ~~so~~ Dr. Neto, apparently more than ever now. And the Algerians, Ben Bella, who had supported the MPLA up until the great fiasco when people discovered that they didn't have what they claimed to have — [illegible] fighting forces — have given their support to the UPA. Nevertheless, the MPLA people still remain and they are promising to reform and really carry out things. I think that ideologically ~~logically~~ the MPLA is much more congenial to the Algerians and to all of the ~~than~~ hard revolutionary line people.

Holden Roberto is considered to be an American agent pure and simple and always has been. In actual fact, he received a lot of money through various Protestant missionary groups, American Protestant missionary groups ~~missionaries.~~ ~~And~~ He himself is a Christian Protestant. These tie-ups have helped the Rightists to back him. He did go off to China, made some rather loud statements which the Chinese were pleased with.

The Chinese haven't made any real decisive choice between the MPLA and the UPA. They're just waiting to see who is going to be able to produce.

((What about da Cruz? What is his function))

He has no function except to write articles about Angola, which he has done, one of which he signed with his own name. He has very little money and he hoped that Verges would be able to smooth the way with the Chinese, but alas! poor fellow, he learnt, I understand, to his horror that Verges was by no means the Chinese agent that he presumed him to be. I understand that he has virtually retired from politics. He is a poet. And he'd much rather be a poet than anything else. He told me on several occasions ~~that~~ in Paris when he came to my house there for dinner that he really wished he could get out of the whole thing, but what was he going to do, he didn't have a passport, he had ~~all these~~ all these people sort of pushing him in into this. He didn't have any money. He didn't know what to do.

Viriato da Cruz

((He lives in Paris))

No, he lives in Algiers. He is still in Algiers to the best of my knowledge. He is one of the people in Algiers I would see. If I were to go to Algiers I would ~~xxxxxxx~~ look him up. He's not terribly dynamic but events ~~xxxxxx~~ threw him up into a leading position and he sort of stuck there and doesn't know how to get out. The Chinese haven't given him the all-out support that he had hoped for

((Neither have they turned him down))

No.

((Amilcar Cabrera))

That was a name used, not a pseudonym, a false name. It doesn't represent anyone, it represents the FALN [illegible] of Venezuela in Europe. They have a bureau in France. I didn't really know them. I knew there were several people. One of them, [illegible] a graphic artist, some of whose drawings ~~[illegible]~~ were printed in Revolution. They [illegible] brought the things ~~to him~~. They are authentic. Because when Verges had a young French boy traveling through Latin America he went to Venezuela. They got him into the guerrillas. They got him all around. We had some very authentic first-hand reports. So whoever they are they are authentic. They were very, very cautious, probably suspicious of me because I was an American, so I never had any real ~~[illegible]~~ conversation with them.

((Do you known anything about who Verges's link to them was))

No.

((Do you know if he still has them))

FALN

I know this, that they asked him to remove the name Amilcar Cabrera and it has been removed, because it was identified with them. ~~So~~ He then put in a note in the twelfth French edition that in the future he would receive an article from the information department of the FALN. They'd be foolish not to send material, but they didn't want to be identified with the editorial policy of the magazine. This many reflect verious tendencies inside of the FALN which I have read about. I don't know anything [illegible] first-hand [illegible] that they [illegible] split between a hard line, those who want to continue the real guerrilla struggle and those who want to look for possible negotiated solutions. One group ~~that is~~ [illegible] a little more pro-Chinese.

In any case these people did represent the FALN. There is no doubt about it. I didn't know any of them. They never had any dealings with me.

((Patricia Magowan))

I know very little about her. She did this book on Portugal. She was connected with the —— she has ties with the British Communist Party but also with British Trotskyists. She was the one who found Rosalind Ainslee to work here in London for the magazine. She is the mistress of a man named Carlos

~~([illegible])~~ (Lanca?))

I'm not certain. That might be it. He is a European born in Mozambique, a Portuguese, who has been kept going by various African movements for years because he represents (laughing) [illegible] ~~to be~~ what the French call an interlocateur, when they want to call him out

He represents nothing. He's a sort of hopeless person. She's a very dynamic woman. Verges claimed that she had become a police informer, for the Algerian police, and that ~~[illegible]~~ she talk~~ed~~s to ~~very opposite groups~~ occasionally, and to ~~She talked~~ to Mamani of the Salava ~~group~~ party in Algiers. But she no longer has anything to do with Revolution Africaine. ~~I don't know what she is doing~~. She ~~wouldn't~~ didn't have anything to do with Verges after the moment that she refused to go to Lausanne. Y~~ou see, he was~~

((Why))

Why did she refuse to go? Well, she couldn't leave Carlos there by himself. God knows what would happen to him. Secondly, she ~~had to~~ wanted to be in the spirit ~~all the time~~ in Algiers. She wasn't ~~interste~~ interested in running a magazine in Switzerland, the magazine interest was secondary to her.

There was another Portuguese-speaking person in Algiers. That was a man by the name of Aquino Braganza. Braganza is a Goan and a Goan who has lost his reason for being; with the end of the Portuguese colonial rule in Goa, he should have gone ~~[illegible]~~ back! But ~~[illegible]~~ he had been a Goan revolutionary with the Portuguese opposition. For years he ~~was~~ had been in Rabat hooked up to the, at that time it was the CONCP, Conference des Organisations Nationaliste des Colonies Portuguese, which grouped together ~~the Filemo~~ what later came to be the Falimo and the MPLA. It was part of the hard line countries There was another one elsewhere which was soft line. Braganza was also sort of adviser to the magazine Revolution Africaine on ~~and~~ questions of India and so on. He stayed on and worked with Mohammed Harbi and came to London.

((Did he have anything to do with Patricia Macgowan))

Yes. They had been together in Rabat.

((Did he have anything to do with Carlos))

Yes. It's all the same crowd. But Carlos was waiting for destiny to call him and Braganza had already lost his chance. The Indians had got in. They'd liberated Goa, so what next, you know. Go back to India. He obviously wasn't going to go back. He was living too well, as it was. ~~And~~ what was he going to do in Goa, nobody knew him in Goa. He was a Goan educated in Portugal. One of these people ~~really~~ without a real national identity. He knew that he wasn't Portuguese and had this feeling of alienation from Portugal, which made him like most of the colonials students there-- the MPLA really started in Portugal- made him an oppositionist. He didn't have enough roots with the homeland. So he's just sort of floating around. His wife is a school teacher. He speaks excellent French. He was working for Revolution Africaine. I don't know if he still is. I'm certain he'll find something to do. He'll never go back to Goa.

((This points up the need for a continuing revolution, when the revolution is completed))

Yes. You don't have jobs unless you're in the government. And that's a problem, too. In his case, he never really did much, wasn't even a real revolutionary, just a bureaucrat in Rabat and other places.

((How did Macgowan get involved with Verges))

That I don't know. I don't know how he knew her in the beginning, I imagine he met her in Rabat. He used to go to Morocco quite often and had contact with all the African, militant ~~the race~~ people there. I suspect that's where he met her.

((So much for those guys))

Now you've got Harbi. He was the person who replaced Verges. He's out now, but ~~he, one of the,~~ I'm told by Andersson, who has his ear to the ground in Algiers as well as in Switzerland, that Harbi is still in a very good position. He is one of the leading advisers to Ben Bella, represents the Left position. He's a Trotskyist, or a Trotskyist sympathiser without any formal organizational ties. He is very close to the Pablo (group). That's Michel Raptis ~~Walter~~. He's Pablo, we could'nt have overlooked him, he's a feature of Algiers life. He played an extremely important role in the agrarian reform, in (determining the type of agrarian reform that was going to be carried out. He came down on the Yugoslav model, that is collectives which are privately owned by the collectives and run on the profit model, that is on a profit basis.

Harbi (and [illegible]) were all inside of this Bureau des Biens Vacants which then became the Bureau of the Socialist Sector. I once did an article for ~~the~~ Monthly Review, [illegible] ~~so I know~~ ~~all~~ about how it operated. What really happened was that the Europeans fled just before And just after Independence, [illegible] ~~or rather~~ should have, considering what they had done. ~~But~~ they had expected a blood bath. The blood bath never took place. It was an incredible. That was one of the most incredible things to me in Algeria was that the Algerians didn't — — — — —

Because the stories were horrifying. You know what happened. A month or so before, they (the French) were just shooting everybody on the street, trying to provoke them, and the discipline of the FLN was incredible. Nobody would shoot back, no matter what they did. So they (The French, of course,) fled and ~~they~~ left all these farms. [illegible] It was a question of ploughing and seeding. There is only a certain time of year that you can ~~have~~ to do this. This had to be organized and it was organized almost spontaneously locally. ~~And then~~ This was ~~sort of~~ institutionalized later, an accomplished fact. They wanted some sort of a socialist didn't know how and the institutionalizing of it was really directed by these Trotskyists. There was Pablo, Harbi, a French lawyer named Matthieu from Grenoble who had been involved with the FLN, and he became sort of legal adviser of Biens Vacants, which was vaguely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture which was at that time under Omar Usgam ________ ? who is now Minister of State, and Director of Revolution Africaine at present. He replaced Harbi.

Harbi is deeply resented by the army elements which are pro-~~Egy~~ Egyptian. However, the Army, despite its religious inclination, had its socialist bias and would like to see more centralization, more ~~on~~ an Egyptian model. In other words, they would like to see much more control from the center than this confused type of regional or local control. They feel that in the long run the business of the private collective ownership is going to cause trouble. It's ~~also~~ all right if it is a rich one, but what happens if ~~it is~~ you are in a poor one? You don't split a profit, you split a deficit. Obviously, according to the Yugoslav model, the state intervenes. The State taxes the rich ones and then distributes subsidies to the poor ones, but this a debate that is still going on in Algeria. ~~and~~ Curiously enough these Trotskyists have been in contact, very close contact, with the Yugoslavs. As you recall, the campaign, the so-called campagne de labeur, the ploughing, was made possible only by the delivery of 563 Yugoslav tractors which turned out to the great deception (disillusionment) of some of the Algerians not to be Yugeslav but to be American tractors put together in Yugoslavia, under license.

((This is getting us a little bit far afield))

This is Harbi and this is the group. Harbi represents the leading spokesmen of this sort of Trotskyist-leaning Left group within the FLN, and his post is still very high, even though he is no longer Director.

((When was he dropped))

I think last summer. I'm not certain. With Usgan it has become much more ________________ the word Socialism appears in Arábic because it is felt that Socialism in French doesn't have the same meaning as it has in Arabic. It's very ~~sort of~~ silly, ~~and~~ it represents the very muddled mind that Usgan has. He is very much split between his religious (and political) inclinations. ~~and~~ Usgan is a full member of the Communist party of Algeria but he left for nationalist reasons when they refused to support the rebellion, and joined the FLN. His wife is supposed to be fanatically religious and has made him more religious than he was.

((Curious mix-up- - this religion~~s~~ and politics.))

((Returning to our first subject, Strelkoff. Is he a practicing Jew?))

No.

((Just an ethnic Jew))

Yes.

((Next on the list here is Robert Williams~~.~~, Whoever made this up calls him an American in Peking.))

But ~~where was he now~~

He's in Havana. He was in Peking recently and he may still be there, for that matter. He went on a second trip to the Far East, ~~he~~ He was in one of the countries that had a celebration. I think he was in Hanoi, if I'm not mistaken. He was in Asia. He may still be there.

Robert Williams is a Negro, former President of the Union County North Carolina branch of the NAACP, who had a hell of a battle on his hands against the local KuKlux Klan and discovered that the best way to deal with the KuKlux Klan was to shoot back at them. And it worked. They never had seen it, [illegible] in that part of the south, anyway, the small towns of the South. ~~town pants~~. Up until recently there's been sort of a gentlemen's ~~general~~ agreement in the south that the Negro civil rights groups would go into the big cities, where they would be reasonably protected. But they had to leave the rural areas alone because they couln't expect much. ~~[illegible]~~ Williams of course, was a there is no doubt, ~~the~~ great embarrassment to everybody, ~~[illegible]~~ and they were on his back. He got no sympathy from the NAACP leadership. ~~The~~ He first came to ~~light thing of~~ national prominence after a case of obvious injustice where a white man had ~~has~~ done something to a Negro woman and some local ~~the~~ jury had thrown it out. the courts ~~He~~ Williams said "well if we can't get justice in the courts we'll have to take justice in our own hands." ~~[illegible]~~ But even the fact that Negroes would fight back got the older, more ~~old leaders, the old~~ conservative Negro leaders very upset. ~~He was immediately,~~ People immediately came to his support, particularly the Trotskyits, not the Communists. The Trotskyites came in, and tried to take him over. They did give him ~~[illegible]~~ some support. There had been a case before, another case, locally called the [illegible] Kissing Case. Two Negro boys, you may have heard of it, were sentenced to indefinite terms in prison for having kissed a six-year-old white girl. He was involved in that and again, it was the Trotskyites who came to his support, ~~along~~ with other Liberal groups. In terms of organizational support it was the Trotskyites. I heard of him at the time I was in CBS and I thought that it was very understandable and sent him a message of support. I met him at the time of the NAACP ~~Naacp~~ Conference in New York in 1959, and when the FPCC was formed he was among the eight Negroes who were among the 30 founding members, to the great shock of

Robert Williams

of the Communist Party of the United States, which did not particularly approve of seeing the two issues mixed, Cuba and ~~the~~ Negroes.

Williams, very volatile, a very determined person, on a local level, has no ability whatsoever on a national ~~[illegible]~~ level. He has become a symbol now to Negro youth in particular, as a Negro who is not an Uncle Tom, who will fight, bi ~~quick~~ We knew ~~that~~ what was coming in the summer of 61, ~~perhaps it was before. . . no no~~ Obviously it was embarrassment, for the national executive of the NAACP, embarrassment for the Justice Department, and more than ~~[illegible]~~ embarrassment for Terry Sanford, who was the Governor, and who ~~[illegible]~~ told him, "I wish you were dead. Period." ~~They~~ Finally, by one of these flukes of fate, there was a demonstration over a swimming pool. They (the Negroes) didn't want to integrate the pool. They just wanted to swim in it. But the local people said they didn't want to do that because they would have to change the water, and it would take too much time to change the water after Negroes swam in the water. So they had some demonstrations. Williams was almost murdered on one of these occasions. The demonstrations were getting pretty violent. ~~And~~ Then King sent in some Freedom Riders who were going to show them how non-violence ~~[illegible]~~ was going to work in this town. They decided to make an example. So Williams said, "I'm going to get out of this. I don't want anything to do with your non-violence. But you go ahead and I'll see what happens."

Well the non-violent demonstration ~~became~~ (even more violent. There were people shot. There were arrests. There was an English girl who now figures here in the British Trotskyist party, who was over there. People were coming from all over, there were reports in the European press. ~~The rumor went around~~ - Williams now had nothing to do with this. He was just sort of staying there saying well you see where non-violence gets you-- but there was a report that they were going to lynch the people who had been arrested. As often happens in ~~[illegible]~~ this type of thing the Negroes and whites, outside whites who were involved, really came in for a hell of a beating, and as in the Philadelphia, Mississippi, case, they even have been killed. Williams, was more or less a victim of the mob in the Negro community which said "we've got to do something. We've got to free these people, and get them out of jail."

He had arms, including ~~some~~ the machine guns, which had been purchased in New York, and sent down there. They didn't use them because they got scared, but they had arms. The community was armed. The people were out in the street in front of his house, when a car with a white couple, came down ~~this~~ The road, It was surrounded and the couple was ~~were~~ told to get out. The crowd wanted to string them up right there. ~~[illegible]~~ This man came from a neighboring town, claimed had lost their way. They said, no you're a member of the Klan in this town." They wanted to kill him, or hold him as hostage. Williams said, "Bring these people in my house and you know I won't let them go." He called the Sheriff, and said, "Look, I have these people here and my people are very upset and I want you to know that I don't want anything ~~it~~ to happen to our people that you have in the jail." The Sheriff immediately called the National Guard, State Troopers and what not. They couldn't hold out very long. Williams escaped. Julian Mayfield was there, a well known Negro writer who now lives in Ghana as a result of this. Minnie ~~Robin~~ Mallory, a Negro woman from New York who was there ~~who~~ was later arrested and convicted and sentenced to 16 years in prison for kidnapping and the case is on appeal now. Williams was spirited across the United States—I knew vaguely where he was, but he was kept very carefully by Cubans and by Negro groups in contact with the Cubans, to Canada. From Canada he was flown by private plane ~~and by~~ [illegible] Castro himself, to Havana, where he is now.

On two occasions the FBI came to me asking for information about Williams, and I damn sure wasn't going to give any ~~[illegible]~~ of what I knew. We had tried to get in touch with Bobby Kennedy himself. I had sent ~~him~~ telegrams. I even tried to get a telephone call in. Because I knew what was going to happen on this thing, [illegible] to get some kind of Federal intervention. It was one of the most sickening things that I ever saw ~~those sickening things~~. They wanted him out of the way. Even then they came to me later— two of the agents came to the FPCC office in New York. They said, "We have 500 agents. We'll get him. He'll never get away." Well, he was away at that point. His aunt died ~~and they~~ in New York around that time. They went to the funeral parlor where the body was and put a wanted poster for Williams on the coffin and stood there by to see if he would come. Really, they should have been thrown out on their heads, frankly. If it hadn't been Negroes I'm certain they would never have done that sort of thing. The trouble was— ~~even that~~, the trouble is— the whole attitude. ~~attitude.~~ Anyhow, as it is, Williams is not a Communist, he's not a Trotskyite. He's a former Marine, who's just had enough. Really, you know. And he's turned into a world-wide figure ~~And now he has turned into a world-wide figure~~ because people like Bobby Kennedy and others could not bother to ~~just~~ try to see what could be done about it. It was no use, though. I mean, it's no use now. ~~[illegible]~~ I'm certainly [illegible] ~~and~~ everybody."

Well, that's too bad. Just like the case of these boys, Walter Bow, and so on. And they're not the only ones. ~~Now~~, For every Walter Bow there must be at least a hundred [illegible]. I must say, I would no more want to live in the States now — you're going to really see something. I don't really

Verges wanted somebody from Pakistan on the board. He (Alavi) said "I'm certain that the Mulana Bashani Kahn will agree".

((That would be Mulana Abdul Hamid Bashani))

That's right. He's sometimes called Kahn as a title of respect. He's a 70 or 80 years old man. He's called the Red Mullah, sort of like the Red Dean of Canterbury.

He's the leader of one of the East Pakistan parties. He had been to China and was quite pro-Chinese. He was more than willing. But he had absolutely no contact whatever with the magazine.

((Did he come in to replace Hamza Alavi))

Yes.

((How long did Hamza Alavi work with the magazine))

You would have to check the issues, of the English edition. He was there until slightly before we dropped Rosalind Ainslee. That would be May of 63. right up to spring of 64.

((Did Hamza Alavi do anything actually)) ~~or did he just~~

He found ~~got~~ manuscripts and so on. He actually did the work that Phombeah never did. But that was all. And it was sort of contre coeur with him because he did not agree with the thing. He had the idea that the magazine was an open forum, sort of rostrum for debate between all sorts of revolutionary movements. But when it became very obvious that Verges wanted to try, at that time, at least, to stay with the Chinese line, it particularly because of ~~the state of his~~ feelings about the situation in Pakistan and he wasn't happy. Also on the question of India, he felt that the Chinese position vis-a-vis India wasn't just, and he didn't like the hook-up, ~~between Pakistani~~ the growing ~~willing~~ friendship and actual solidarity between Pakistan and China.

Hamza

((So he was through amicably. What is the present relationship between Alavi and Verges))

I doubt if he has any at all. He is very active here in London with Pakistani groups. He has money. His wife's family has money, his own family has. It wasn't a question of money for him.

((Has he continued to be active in AfroAsian things))

He's an academic. The Socialist Register published last year ~~by~~ an article on Imperialism by him. He is active around the London School of Economics. He is known to the academic Left, friends with the boys who do Left Review and so on. His only practical work would be working with Pakistani groups, for instance during the last election the Tories ran in several constituencies Pakistani independent candidates in the hope of breaking the Labor vote, hoping that the Pakistanis would vote for these Pakistani independents. Hamza worked with the Labor Party in those constituencies, to counter this, ~~and apparently~~ in fact they were quite successful. He has very good connections inside the Labor Party. And he does not have very good ties at all with the Communist Party, though he is not by any means anti-Communist. He's a skeptic.

((How about Bashani))

He has never done anything. Never heard from him except once when he ~~[illegible]~~ said we could put his name on the board. As far as I know there has never been any contact.

((Do they get paid for this))

No.

Hassan Riad — [illegible]

Next is Hassan ~~[illegible]~~ Riad. He is ~~P.~~ S. Amir. He is an official of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, (with headquarters in Dakar UN economic adviser in Dakar). He has a very high position inthat. He is Egyptian, a full member of the Egyptian Communist Party with very very pronounced Trotskyist views. That is, he feels, he has a theory about the role of bureaucracy in under-developed countries - the progressive and reactionary bureaucracy- ~~[illegible]~~ fits into general Trotskyist theories but applied there. He has done work on Egypt, state capitalism in Egypt. A book of his published recently by ~~Victor Min~~ Edition de Minuit in Paris, part of which appeared in Revolution. Some of it was so obviously Trotskyist that ~~Chen~~ Kim, despite his somewhat partial agreement with parts of it felt that it was too obvious even to print in Revolution. He only comes through Paris occasionaly. His main interest in REvolution is getting his things printed. He is very interested in having his things published. He is very cynical about many of the African States. His article on Senegal appeared recently in Revolutian, in French, I think in No. 12. It was written under a psepdonym ~~by him~~ and based on the UN Economic Commission for Africa research , stuff that he couldn't say in his official ~~publication~~ capacity. (~~Pseudonym~~) ~~Lajalle,~~ Like Jalet, yes.

He is not overly pro-Chinese. He feels that the Chinese philosophical position isn't quite adequate, the ~~ideolol~~ ideological model isn't adequate for under undeveloped countries, certainly for Africa.

((Do you know him- How old is he))

Yes I know him. He is in his thirties. About 35. Married. He is Egyptian. He is anti-Nasser really. He feels that the Egyptian Communist Party ~~has~~ is, because there are many really abdicated any constructive role inside Egypt, even from the concentration camps where they were held putting out secret clandestine tracts supporting Nasser, which was the craziest thing I've ever heard. ~~Because~~ Now they've been liberated ~~,~~- in fact the old Communists are now being given very high organizational posts in the new Egyptian Party, ~~and~~

Communism and ~~Marxism~~ ~~is~~ are extraneous to Arab socialism but they ~~are~~ very useful people so Lets use them in there. And the group that are under Soviet influence are perfectly willing to go along with this".

Q ((Is he pro-anything in Egypt))

No, I think that he is sort of resigned to the flow of events of history. He analyzes what he considers state capitalist developments, the rise of a new bureaucratic middle class, the officer ~~class~~ caste and he tries to show in his writings how the officer class has crushed the old land-owning Wafdist ruling class which had its links with British and French financial interests, and has now consolidated itself in power, ~~and~~ there is a certain social mobility, but for them only. In other words, how limited it is and the officer caste certain of its functionaries — but still the problem of the masses remains.

((does he concern himself very much with the state of Egypt?))

From an academic point of view only. He's more academic. He's not even particularly concerned wih revolution. If you want his address . . ~~and here~~

Marcos Ferrer

Now who do we have- Marcos Ferrer- that's Colombia. I don't know anything about it. It probably stands for Dr. Leiva ~~Semper~~ ~~or Semper~~ SEMPER of the MOEC IN Paris. He is a Colombian doctor, the representative in Paris of the MOEC. He is the one who conducted negotiations with Verges for a Spanish edition in Colombia. I assume Marcos Ferrer ~~(or Ferra)~~ to be a pseudonym.

Frene Ginwalla

~~Farnda~~ ~~Freddy~~ Frene Ginwalla, next on the list, is a member of the Indian Congress for South Africa. She was a correspondent of Revolution in Dar es Salaam and she published a magazine called Spearhead until she was expelled from Tanganyika under a cloud and accused of being a Western spy. The accusations were not made openly. She was known to have contacts with the ~~Western~~ West German Embassy. She received West German money from the Carl Ebert Foundation and actually printed West German propaganda in ~~the~~ her magazine. She had gone to West Germany and done this so obviously that ~~I dont know I~~ she couldn't have been very sophisticated about it because it was just too (open). She was accused of having ~~told the Soviet Embassy of having~~ offered to carry information for the Soviet Embassy, volunteering as ~~a Communist~~ a South African Communist, to give them information, two-thirds of which turned out to be totally useless and false, which again might have been to ingratiate herself. ~~I She works~~ She was here in London after she was expelled, I'm not certain of the exact dates. She was also known to have slept around with almost every Minister of the Tanganyikan government including Julius Nyerere. This is one of the reasons why there was so much hushhush about her, that she had obviously gotten a lot of information out of these fellows. She was very close to Oscar Kambona and she claimed that Oscar Kambona was going to get her back into the Foreign Ministry.

She was just Revolution's correspondent there. She did practically nothing. When she got out, she managed to keep her little office going. They didn't seize anything, and she turned over the mailing list of her Spearhead magazine to Revolution. Verges had paid her £1000 ~~a~~ for a deposit so ~~that~~ she could do some work but she really didn't do anything, but she, unlike Rosalind Ainslie, turned over the unspent portion of that to Verges when she came to London. ~~and~~ She wasn't interested really in continuing her work with Revolution. Being Indian of course posed a problem ~~with any~~ for her with anything to do with the Chinese. She was very close to the Indian community, as anyone who looks through that mailing list will see we have lots of missionaries, Indian businesses, and so forth in East Africa, who were taking subscriptions to the magazine more or less out of friendship and solidarity with another Indian. They didn't care much whether she was a Communist or not.

Ginwala

She was supposed to have been the mistress of Dr. Dadu. At least ~~any~~ they say she slept with Dr. Dadu and they had a very close relationship to him. Dr. Dadu is the president of the Indian Congress for South Africa and a member of the Communist Party of South Africa, a very important member. Because ~~Indian - the Indians have holdings~~ community the Indian community has holdings up and down East Africa, Mozambique as well, their role in the liberation struggle is very equivocal . Obviously the Africans want to go ahead while the ~~Indians~~ Indians are thinking - ~~[illegible]~~ well ~~(about~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~else~~ also Africanization ~~meant to the [illegible]~~ menaced them - the Indians. They The English used them as a sort of buffer, preferred to bring an Indian clerk to East Africa rather than to train an African. That was a typical colonial maneuver but now it has put the Indians in a situation historically which is untenable, for a long period. You know people talk about multiracial states but in East Africa it is a joke. It won't hold up. I don't think it will, anyway.

14-00000

The Indian Congress of South Africa is related to the African National Congress, and so the Colored people's congress, all of this in a so-called Congress Alliance. She had contacts with the Africans- the ANC people. the ANC people here in London. They were suspicious of her ~~as well~~. But she managed somehow to get back in, she was ill, she was in hospital ~~She was~~ hurt in an auto accident and she had to have a very complicated bone operation . That put her out of action for some time. I don't know, but I heard that she is now back in Tanganyika. She may well be. She has quite a bit of money; her family has money. Of course the Indians do have money. She did very little for the magazine. She occasionally told me about people in the ANC who might do something for the magazine. But most of the people she told me abut were members of the South African Communist Party. That party has taken a pro-Moscow stand and most of its people don't want to do anything for Revolution, though we did have articles by Bryan Bunk (?) another South African Communist. That was before their party took their stand on the Sino-Soviet conflict. And there is a struggle going on right now inside of the ANC. That's a long complicated thing. That has nothing to do with Revolution.

(On my list here we have Diallo)

Diallo is an adviser of the President of Mali- ~~what's his name~~ Modewa Keida.

He is married to a French woman, a Leftist, he knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him in contact with ______________ who is Minister of Information, who is very, very pro-Chinese.

(In Mali)

Yes. When Chou en Lai visited Mali, you recall, that he got quite committed. There were some gratuitous, open handed slaps

over to next page

~~There's nothing very much. He just knew him.~~
~~This is again one of Verges attempts to have a finger in another African country.~~

(Verges)

I didn't mention, with Phombeah, one of the reasons that he kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga, in Kenya. Phombeah at one time had hoped to be made the secretary of this new Lumumba Institute there, ~~in~~ Nairobi. Verges, odd as it may seem, had at one time, proposed himself as a sort of security adviser to Odinga. We felt that he continued to pay Dennis Phombeah for doing nothing mainly to keep a line of communication open to Odinga. He had met Odinga but got nowhere with him. In Algiers he was ~~[illegible]~~ Le Chinois ?

insert

Phombeah

President of Mali,
Modibo Keita. ~~xxxx~~ Married to a French woman. Leftist.
He knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him
~~He offered to help. Put him~~ in contact with a man by the name of Mogotogo (?)
who is Tele Minister of Information, now who is very very pro-Chinese, ~~in Mali.~~
~~And~~ When Chou en Lai visited Mali you recall that he got quite a committed
welcome in Mali. And there were some gratuitous open-handed slaps
the Russians made. Didn't have to be made but were.

((How did Verges and Diallo get together))

I don't know. He had known him for a considerable time. There is nothing very much. This is again one of Verges's attempts to have a finger in another African country. One of the reasons that he kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga.

→ insert from page remaining

If in Algiers he was referred to as Le Chinois (as he was), I don't think ~~Odinga~~ the Kenyans would accept him.

This is a real problem. He says, "well, we colored people and so forth" and it is true that he is part - he's Eurasian, but it is very hard for Africans to accept that. They just put him down as Chinese.

Diallo

I don't know very much about ~~Gama~~ Demba Diallo. He played very little role in the Magazine except that he was a contact inside of Mali. He came to France early last year, the spring of last year (64), with his wife. He went to Vichy for his health and drank the waters for two or three weeks and he saw Verges. Verges had ideas, had mentioned to ~~Chen~~ Ken that if he couldn't keep the magazine going ~~that~~ he might go to Mali. ~~If~~ ~~Chen~~ Ken was going to be sent off to wherever, was Viriato da Cruz of the Angolan Federation of Liberation, as adviser, and I was going to be sent to Indonesia for the Afro-Asian ~~journalist~~ Journalists. That was how he was going to take care of everybody.

(How about Castro Da Silva)

Castro da Cruz

Castro Da Silva is the pseudonym used for Viriato da Cruz, formerly of the MPLA, and now of the UPA. He is a poet, again, in the late thirties, married, has a child and is based more or less in Algiers. He has virtually no money at all. He has a small group which went into the UPA.

Holden Roberto, the head of the UPA is very suspicious of him. but nevertheless he needs him. He needs the Left. He has been to China ~~&~~ and this give him a sort of, ~~-~~ gives the Chinese a guarantee, but on the other hand the Chinese didn't even want to give Viriato money to transfer himself from Algiers to Brazzaville. And he was threatened by the MPLA people, who are of course Soviet-backed to the hilt, in fact more ~~so~~ — Dr. Neto, apparently more than ever now. And the Algerians, Ben Bella, who had supported the MPLA up until the great fiasco when people discovered that they didn't have what they claimed to have — didn't have the fighting forces — have given their support to the UPA. Nevertheless, the MPLA people still remain and they are promising to reform and really carry out things. I think that ~~logically~~ ideologically the MPLA is much more congenial to the Algerians ~~than~~ and to all of the hard revolutionary line people.

Holden Roberto is considered to be an American agent pure and simple and always has been. In actual fact, he received a lot of money through various Protestant missionary groups, American Protestant ~~missionaries.~~ missionary groups. ~~And~~ He himself is a Christian Protestant. These tie-ups have helped the Rightists to back him. He did go off to China, made some rather loud statements which the Chinese were pleased with. The Chinese haven't made any real decisive choice between the MPLA and the UPA. They're just waiting to see who is going to be able to produce.

((What about da Cruz? What is his function))

He has no function except to write articles about Angola, which he has done, one of which he signed with his own name. He has very little money and he hoped that Verges would be able to smooth the way with the Chinese, but alas! poor fellow, he learnt to his horror, I understand, that Verges was by no means the Chinese agent that he ~~assumed~~ presumed him to be. I understand that he has virtually retired from politics. He is a poet. And he'd much rather be a poet than anything else. He told me on several occasions ~~that~~ in Paris when he came to my house there for dinner that really he wished he could get out of the whole thing, but what was he going to do, ~~he~~ didn't have a passport, he had ~~also these~~ all these people sort of pushing him in into this. He didn't have any money. He didn't know what to do.

Castro da Cruz

((He lives in Paris))

No, he lives in Algiers. He is still in Algiers to the best of my knowledge. He is one of the people in Algiers I would see. If I were to go to Algiers I would look him up. He's not terribly dynamic but events threw him up into a leading position and he sort of stuck there and doesn't know how to get out. The Chinese haven't given him the all-out support that he had hoped for

((Neither have they turned him down))

No.

((Amilcar Cabrera))

That was a name used, not a pseudonym, a false name. It doesn't represent anyone, it represents the FALN, of Venezuela in Europe. They have a bureau in France. I didn't really know them. I knew there were several people. One of them, a graphic artist, some of whose drawings were printed in *Revolution*. They brought the things ~~to him~~. They are authentic. Because when Verges had a young French boy traveling through Latin America he went to Venezuela. They got him into the guerrillas. They got him all around. We had some very authentic first-hand reports. So whoever they are they are authentic. They were very, very cautious, probably suspicious of me because I was an American, so I never had any real conversation with them.

((Do you known anything about who Verges's link to them was))

No.

((Do you know if he still has them))

FALN

I know this, that they asked him to remove the name Amilcar Cabrera and it has been removed, because it was identified with them. ~~So~~ He then put in a note in the twelfth French edition that in the future he would receive an article from the information department of the FALN. They'd be foolish not to send material, but they didn't want to be identified with the editorial policy of the magazine. This many reflect various tendencies inside of the FALN which I have read about. I don't know anything first-hand, that they split between a hard line, those who want to continue the guerrilla struggle and the sabotage struggle and those who want to look for possible negotiated solutions. One group ~~that is~~ a little more pro-Chinese.

In any case these people did represent the FALN, there is no doubt about it. I didn't know any of them. They never had any dealings with me.

((Patricia McGowan))

I know very little about her. She did this book on Portugal. She was connected with the —— she has ties with the British Communist Party but also with British Trotskyists. She was the one who found Rosalind Ainslie to work here in London for the magazine. She is the mistress of a man named Carlos

~~(Saik)~~ ((Lanca?))

I'm not certain. That might be it. He is a European born in Mozambique, a Portuguese, who has beenkept going by various African movements for years because he represents (laughing) [illegible] ~~to be~~ what the French call an interlocateur, when they want to call him out obviously Neto does ~~xxxxx~~ have some American support as well or had some American support. His father did, I think.

((Do you know Michael Tabasa))

No, never heard of him.

((We come to Maspero))

Maspero

Maspero is just a third-generation French elite intellectual who has a little bit of money, runs a publishing house, and magazine, and who is extremely non-committed in his Left commitment. In other words he is a leftist but he is not a member of any party and is not really involved in active politics. His magazine more and more is taken over by Trotskyists at present. That was not always the case. He came really to the fore with the Algerian War. Considering the failure of the French Communist Party to do anything about ~~xxx~~ the Algerian question, it was intellectuals, the ~~the Left~~ Intellectuals who were out of the party who responded, who made up the Jeanson network, the support ~~network~~ for the FLN underground in France, and who did the propaganda work and who gave the support. If ~~is~~ the FLN had French support it was among these people, not among the Communist party.

((Verges consistent efforts to))

Yes.

To wean ~~xxxx~~ away authors (from Maspero). Hassan Riab wrote for him. Chalion, whom he got for Revolution Africaine wrote for him and now is back again working for him, writing for him. Kisali ~~Cassell~~ also. Kien ~~Chen~~ also. Almost everyone. Even I knew him because he published student material and he used ~~to things to~~ [illegible] in the States and I had correspondence and I used to send him material that we had.

((The competition between Verges and Maspero- was this a personal as opposed to ideological competition))

No it was personal. There is very little of the ideological about Verges. Verges is an extremely ~~heady~~ [illegible], personal person. He is generous in many ways but ~~xx~~ even his generosity is ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] personally. ~~He is either for you~~ [illegible] ~~xx~~ He is a grand patron. He is extremely generous with money when he has it. He throws it around. You could never go anywhere with Verges that he doesn't ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ want to pay. When we traveled it was ~~most times~~ [illegible] first class, ~~xxxxxxxanythingxxxxxx~~ on a plane. He ~~xx~~ has a deep-seated desire to be big, (he is a small man, he is short) to be talked about. He wants publicity. He wants to be known. He doesn't have any real commitments, I ~~don't~~ think, that are terribly deep. And I'm certain that if he were sure of money from the other side but nevertheless so that his name would stay big, I'll bet he'd. . . [illegible] ~~He wants money not for himself but for prestige. After all Verges's father was the founder of the Communist Party-~~

Verges

money not for itself but for prestige. After all, Verges's father was the founder of the Communist party of Reunion, member of the French Assembly. ~~He~~ His brother is the head of the Communist party of ~~the~~ ~~L-i-lle~~ [illegible] right now. ?

Verges

He grew up in this sort of French Left-wing upper class, which in France is ~~a~~ the hereditary Left which goes all the way back to 1848 or before. Some families were extremely distinguished. ~~They really had . .~~ . And he is in that sort of ~~thing... families~~ group. In France it is very much ~~ex~~ respected, ~~just as you might respect Flandeu~~ just as you might respect a very old landowning ~~Flandeu~~ family. You know that a member of such and such a family obviously must be Left ~~but~~ because his grandfather and his greatgrandfather were.

((Maspero again))

Maspero fits just into that category.

((That same Leftist heritage))

That's right.

((Does he run his operation on a self-sustaining commercial basis))

More or less except that for instance he published a book on China recently, which the Chinese ~~subsiders~~ and found subsidized. I suspect that he has received some aid from the Italian Communist party. The Italians look with great favor on him because of his openness, his critical approach, his Anti-Stalinism. Andersson says he got money from the Chinese for this ~~b~~book on China.

Verges has tried desperately to smear him with the Chinese as a Trotskyite but apparently the Chinese didn't give a damn.

((You said that the Trotskyists seem to be moving in on Maspero))

Yes.

((Would they be giving him any kind of financial aid))

I really doubt it. The Trotskyists generally are poor. ~~I don't think so~~. I think that what it is, is that he is really short of hands, short of manuscripts, short of people ~~withother~~ who can think and produce something. And here are these Trotskyist-leaning ~~individuals~~ intellectuals who don't have any outlet, so naturally ~~F~~.. It's just that he doesn't ~~have~~ doesn't have any great sectarian feelings against them, so more and more tend to come in.

((Andre Belge?))

Never heard of him.

(Neither have I. ~~[illegible]~~ Imokay in Nigeria)

Oh, Imokay is a student. He's no bureau man at all. He was a student at the university of ~~Esuka~~ Nsukka Esuka. He distributed the magazine. ~~He never did anything~~ else.

He never did anything else. ~~Just a student, grdduttaxxja~~ he has graduated now. I think he is working in the government somewhere.

((Did he get paid))

No- oh yes, he did, he got a commission on subscriptions. He got 30-some subscriptions from students at the university, in one week, as I recall, which was unheard of. Just a student, and just by sheer chance he handled the magazine.

((Mme. Michele Mestre))

Oh, My, Michele Mestre ~~ixxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Madame Mestre I don't know anything about. Michel Mestre is one of Maspero's people. I thought it was a man. I've never met him, don't know anything about him. I know there is a Michel Mestre who has written a number of books on the Congo for Maspero. Had nothing to do with Verges although Verges did put out feelers to get this person, man or woman, to work for Revolution. He wasn't successful. It was part of his general campaign of leaving Maspero with no authors at all.

((Rosalind Ainslie))

She's married, twice. She works for the East German news agency ~~APN~~ ADN. She is obviously connected with the South African Communist party. She is a member of the Congress Alliance in South Africa and she is married to an Indian. She has ~~some~~ several children and she lives here in London. She comes from a wealthy family in South Africa, I imagine. She was found by Patricia McGowan Pinheiro to work for Revolution. That flopped after a short period. They didn't know which way to go, to stick with the Algerians or stick with Verges. The business of the magazine being pro-Chinese by no means was obvious, nor even clear in Verges's mind. The magazine was to be pro-Chinese for an awful long time, ~~It wasn't~~ [illegible] a question of being pro-Chinese. Certainly not when I was hired. It was Algerian, that was all.

Ainslie

((Americans attending subversive sabotage school in Prague))

I never heard of a subversive sabotage school in Prague. The Americans that I have known (who were) going through Prague have gone to Havana.

((Between Moscow and Havana en route))

Yes. I ~~dont~~ don't know anything about a subversive sabotage school. I don't doubt that there might be one. I imagine there's one in Washington too.

((I never heard of it. Either one))

(Laughs)

((Current addresses of some of these people))

Well, who do you want? ~~Chen~~ Kien now, has no address. He sleeps around everywhere. He literally was sleeping on my floor at one point. If you had told me, I could have brought my book. I gave you people whom I contacted on my trip.

Hamsa [illegible] I can give you his- 74 ~~Hartford~~ ~~[illegible]~~ Roadx London NW 11

FALN- they have an office here in London. I don't have much.

(Mamani, ~~BR~~ BP 35, Plateau ~~[illegible]~~ Saulière, 121 Rue ~~[illegible]~~ Mouradidouch, Algiers. I have a bigger address book at home.

((You mentioned DuBois. Do you know very much about his group in ~~[illegible]~~ Ghana)

Dr. DuBois had a number of people around him but he ~~is~~ was an elderly man; he was more interested in producing the African Encyclopoedia than anything else, which he did set up before his death. His wife is now one of the directors of Ghana television. She is a Ghana citizen, she has renounced her American citizenship. There are a number of people who are close to her or were close to Dr. DuBois such as Dr. Alpheus Hunton ? who is an American Negro who has written on Africa, ~~worked~~ and works for the enclyclopoedia, The Ghana Institute of Science. He was a member of the Communist party of the US. I think Shirley Graham may have been a member. Certainly Dr. DuBois became a member several years before his death. At the time of his death he was extremely pro-Chinese and was very ~~[illegible]~~ unhappy. His wife, Shirley Graham DuBois, is very pro-Chinese. There is William Gardner Smith, an American Negro writer, who works for Ghana radio and who worked with me at the AgenceFrance Presse in Paris. Smith is close to Shirley Graham, or was. ~~Mayfield.~~ There is a girl by the name of ~~Maya~~ Miya Angelou, who was married, still married but separated, to former representative of the PAC ? ~~in~~ in South Africa in Accra. He has been removed from his post for misappropriation of funds- ~~Musisi~~ Vu[illegible] Make. Those are the ones that I know of.

((Subsidiary question- Hammer and Steel ~~group~~))

~~[illegible]~~ The Hammer and Steel group in Boston is an alleged Chinese group that operates in Boston, (they are) former members of the US Communist ~~group~~ party. After a period of inactivity it has suddenly become active and not more than a few days ago, while I was out of the country , without any effort on my ~~[illegible]~~ behalf (i.e. my own part) they had my address here and I received two of their publications. Two recent publications~~, here in London,~~ which were sent to my London address. So someone here, someplace, has sent them my new address. Very interesting that they should have it. We had an exchange ~~with the with~~ between them and Revolution, but I had not kept this ~~[illegible]~~ up. They have just formed a so-called New England party of Labor which is supposed to be ~~the~~ the Chinese party, Marxist-Leninist party, and is opposed, and they give the reasons for

This

their opposition to the progressive labor group and to the POC, Provisional Organizing Committee for a new Marxist-Leninist party which was an old pro-Albanian group. Progressive Labor is of course a split~~-off~~ from the Communist party and split off because of the Cuban revolution and the civil rights question and so forth. POC has a large number of Negro and Puerto Rican members, almost the majority of them. PL has a number of Negro contacts and has been extremely active in the South but has made some serious mistakes. They had people in Monroe, North Carolina, after Williams, taking Williams place they ~~had~~ [illegible] a white man, which is a ridiculous thing to do. They didn't understand what ("black [illegible]") nationalism means.

This new Hammer and Steel group, which has been a sort of group without a party, has now announced the formation of this New England Party of Labor which they hope will be the nucleus of a new Chinese Communist Party in the United States. But I don't know anything about them. (sic!!)

Back to ((Switzerland)

How long were you in Lausanne.))

From March, 1963, to ~~September of~~ December 63. Then I used to go back every month [illegible] magazine [illegible]

((What contact did you maintain there))

With Andersson.

((Did you have any American contacts))

No. What do you mean- with the American Embassy?

((Any Arab contacts))

No. Just the people that came in and out of Andersson's place. But I didn't . . Being an American I was very much aware of the fact that everybody was suspicious of me. So I made it a point not to bother.

((You talked about Drapeau Rouge. Is ~~that~~ there any relationsship with the John Llewellyn Davis Red Flag))

(laughing) Who is John Llewellyn Davis! That sounds like something out of- - - The Drapeau Rouge is a group of young, French students, university and licee students who had been connected with the youth group of the JSU which is the PSU, ~~the party~~ [a roughly equivalent to] the Nenni Socialist Party in France. This was their youth group. They were dissatisfied with - - for instance, the Belgian section, ~~Arras~~. One of the boys had been in ~~Chen~~'s philosophy class in Licee had got in touch with ~~Chen~~ and he had given them advice and helped them to form this group, 61

or to continue
~~They continued~~ the group and it produced a news letter. He had promised them money, they put out one issue, and he never got any money. I heard that they were in contact with the Clichy group down [illegible] and were seeking some sort of recognition there, ~~and~~ among the things that they had promised they did a self-criticism admitting that they had done wrong to have accepted ~~Chea~~ Kiva's supervision and saying that they will never do this again.

((John Llewellyn Davis, you say who the hell is he))

Yes.

((We talked about Pablo. Is this Michael R[illegible]))

He is a member of the Trotskyist IVth International - or was. He has been expelled ~~for~~ for his heretical views, not that they all don't have heretical views, but his were extremely pro-Algerian. I think he has become an Algerian citizen. He is Belgian, I believe, or Dutch, but I think it is Belgian. He was arrested in Holland. He worked ~~for~~ with the FLN during the War, went to Algeria, was arrested in Holland, spent some time in jail, was released, went to Algiers with his wife and became very active in the Bureau de Biens Vacantes, ~~and then~~ later the Bureau of the Socialist Sector. His influence has been of an ideological nature and he has very close ties with the Yugoslavs, ~~and~~ despite his Trotskyism he is also not at all persona non grata with the Soviets, and he has now been expelled. He has a group called Pabloites.

"Pablo"

((How did he hit on Pablo))

This was his nom de guerre, I suppose.

He represented for a while a majority tendency in the international Trotskyist movement. ~~helped~~ being held by the American SWP Socialist Workers Party. Finally expelled. I don't know the ins and outs of the Trotskyists very much.

((When did you first run into him))

I had heard of him for years. The first time I saw him in the flesh was sitting in a cafe in Algiers. I never had anything to do with him. He used to hang out in a cafe which was right under the offices of Revolution Africaine, which was sort of a center for European Leftists and whatnot. It was called the Cafe Very (?) [illegible]

((Did he ever have anything to do with Revolution))

He made have had something to do with it later with Harbi but not under Verges.

((I meant in Europe, not Algiers.))

No, no, nothing.

((Do you know anything about the formerly dissident PDP of Montreux? The Pro-Chinese Communist party of Switzerland)

They've got it wrong. There's only one pro-Chinese Communist party and that's the so-called ~~Baxxx~~ Parti Comuniste Suisse, started in Vevey ~~Verve~~, not Monteaux, Vevey, [illegible] ~~Verve~~, Nestle's headquarters. Headed by Gerard Bulliard ~~Buillard~~, a small businessman who has become a member of the PLP, ~~that~~ the Communist Party. He went ~~When~~ to Albania last year, last ~~summer~~, as a tourist, and sold the Albanians on the idea of supporting a breakaway Marxist-Leninist party. He came back to Switzerland and with five people formed this Swiss Communist Party, which grew to the awesome size of ~~they often size~~ 35 people. ~~Baxk xBx~~ Andersson was hostile at first, but when the Chinese took a more or less benevolent view on it in Berne, he went along ~~and~~. He (Bulliard) may have received some money from the Chinese, I don't know. But we know that he received money from Albania. He became increasingly quarrelsome, he was very much worried about Andersson because Andersson was ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ printing his newspaper, ~~Les~~ L'Etincelle (The Spark) on [illegible] ~~He owned~~ this offset press in Lausanne. Anderson also was recruiting people for the group and he has more connections inside the Communist party, the PLP, than Bulliard ~~Guilliard~~ did, since Bulliard ~~he~~ had been only a recent member. ~~The~~ Lausanne group became larger than the Verve group. I don't know what happened after that. But ~~then~~, relations deteriorated rapidly and both the Albanians and the Chinese realized that they had made a drastic mistake. Bulliard then phoned the Albanians or ~~and~~ the Chinese in Berne and told them that if he didn't receive 3000 francs by a certain time of day that he would denounce Andersson to the police. Obviously, he didn't receive the 3000 francs and he went to the police about gun-running and one thing and another - some of it fanciful, some real. Apparently they (police) knew more than Bulliard about Andersson ~~him~~. Then Bulliard ~~he~~ got a delegation and went to the Federal Council, to the Parliament in Berne, and ~~they~~ made an open public request ~~demand~~ that this foreign agent, this Swedish national, who had taken advantage of Swiss neutrality ~~hospitality~~, be expelled. The Federal Police came in. They banned Revolution and there was the gneral blowup. ~~They~~ didn't get very far, except that now it is suspected that Bulliard ~~he~~ is more or less subsidized by the Swiss police, that he is keeping ~~in going and~~ his group going and it is down to about 15 people, according to Andersson. He obviously has a small amount of money which he is not getting from the Chinese. He later told Andersson, he proposed ~~that~~ Andersson retire from politics, if he would ~~he would~~ be paid the sum of 5,200 Swiss francs. (~~[illegible]~~ definitely) The reason for this was he wanted to keep the mimeograph machine that he (Andersson) had given him and he was deducting the price. I think he wanted 7,000 francs altogether, for his exit from politics.

Bulliard

but he was willing to deduct the price of the mimeograph machine. He didn't receive that either. So he can't be considered very (important). At one point, to show you how silly he is, he was in contact with Kevin ? DELVIN ! Delman of Radio Free Europe, in Munich, asking him to organize a meeting for him there. This~~x~~ I found out ~~throur~~ through the Congress for Cultural Freedom people. With his copies of "[illegible] (?) he has many ties, DET [illegible] with his furniture business and his wine business. He also sells wine.

((Relationship ~~of~~ and persons involved in Revolution with the N ~~New~~ ~~leftxxxxx~~ Lefti~~st~~ review in Great Britain)

They didn't particularly agree with the views of Revolution but they were sympathetic neverthess. They are ~~lef~~tists, some inside the Labor Party, people like ~~Balid~~ Thomas ~~Balig~~ Balogh, one of the economic advisers, they are very well connected there (Labour Party). They helped us here for a while. Hamsa Alavi had friends (among them). Dennis Phombeah also knew the editors, Perry Anderson, Roger Murray, who is now in Ghana, professor Hodgkins of the African Study Institute in Accra. There was no connection other than that, sympathetic cooperation. They were willing to help. Their views are quite different. They're not Communists. We weren't Communist either.

((They didn't buy space. You just swapped ads))

Yes. That's a normal arrangement between magazines. You exchange advertising.

((Movement for Colonial Freedom))

With Movement for Colonial Freedom ~~is~~ it was the same thing. We got very little real cooperation from ~~themxxthemx~~ Movement for Colonial Freedom. We exchanged ads, they promised to accept subscriptions on our behalf but John Eber, who is the Secretary~~s~~, was very much afraid that he might lose Algerian support, because Movement for Colonial Freedom ~~and~~ depends on getting support from all different African countries, Asian countries, etc. Therefore anything that might be anti-governmental in terms of Algeria he was very much afraid of. He is an ex-Communist. He told me - "What are you doing going around with Phombeah? He has been here with Harbi, the week~~s~~ before you came with him. Which side are they on?" Phombeah walked in just as he ~~mmmmx~~ was saying this, and overheard it. He (Eber) was very embarrassed, but ~~He~~ had to go on with it. Phombeah said, "I'm just helping all the brothers- -" (laughing) He was hopeless.

I have both children home now. This is mid-term, so the little boy is out.

My exact address: 30 Stockl~~ey~~eigh Hall an apartment house on Prince Albert Road, 21-31 engrance. 4th floor.

((Cannot give definitive answer for some time, would advise- play it reasonably safe, maintain access you have or could ~~xx~~ reestablish.))

My problem is short-range. I need money by next week. I have people who want me to write things. The things about Revolution, nobody particularly will care about. That's no embarrassment to anybody. Not even to the Chinese. Andersson said in fact they would be rather pleased with it, if somebody would finally get this off their backs, because they can't say anything at all. I'm committed to write the article for Encounter. There's a letter, in time which is appearing in the current issue of the China Quarterly. The question is what to do with the Atlantic Monthly people.

I've got to arrange something quickly. I didn't expect the situation to crop up quite so quickly as this. It was relatively well taken care of when I left here, with my brother-in-law but my wife has gone and fixed up, loused up. ~~some~~ things with her brother which makes it extremely difficult. I can probably get some more money, but not very much more out of the Encounter people. They have already given me a large sum of money, more than they expected-, they expected Atlantic Monthly to come through and pick up part of it; which they never did. Now it is a question of exchange of letters. (Just one or two mis-steps and the whole thing... So far as Revolution is concerned, I can continue this article, but I have the problem of getting money. That should be self-evident.

Anyway, I shall try to hold things off. I'm going to try to see if I can arrange something as a temporary emergency measure, this afternoon. If I can and if I'm successful, then everything will be all right ~~for~~ till the end of next week.

((I can let you have $200 this afternoon.))

That would certainly be a great, (pro) That would be very helpful. That would solve my needs-- Thirty-five pounds. How much is £35, in dollars?

((Under $150.00))

That's what, (The amount) I need. That's what I actually need, immediately. If I take care of that I'm off the hook until next week. Now I've got to go and clear myself with Lasky of Encounter. You haven't been in touch with Lasky in any way, have you, with these Encounter people?

(No)

Well, somebody has. Some very strange- - you see ~~[illegible]~~ the Congress for Cultural Freedom are sort of pushing in the background, and I know vaguely that they have the idea that maybe, that I might like to take a long-term ~~for long term,~~ job, with them in Paris. Personally I'm not terribly keen on some of the things the Congress for Cultural Freedom does. Some things are not too bad, besides the pay. But worse still, my wife would just about blow sky high over the Congress for Cultural Freedom, even though she knows Chi Quarterly and Encounter were subsidized by the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Encounter is no longer. But there has been a lot of hankypank going on between them . Even the letter- I told you about the letter. They did everything possible to try to keep the editor of Chi Quarterly ~~to keep~~ from printing the letter, telling him all sorts of reasons, that it would blow my cover completely, and then the money that I got from Encounter, Lasky said well, maybe you won't write anything at all. I don't know, why They give me any money at all, send me off to write. .

((I don't know. You're talking mysteries to me))

As I say there are verious people who are hovering around and since I've been back, now here is the truth, he (Castro) hasn't bothered to really, to find out what I have.

((Couple of questions occur to me-- you mention the possibility of going to Paris to work for Congress for Cultural Freddom. . . Would you also be interested if things worked out, in going back to Algeria)

Oh, yes.

(To stay)

Sure. Certainly. All I need is a proper cover, ~~one that is not a~~ ~~[illegible]~~ that's (not) very hard. The suspicions of these groups are extremely slight. There was a fellow, we haven't mentioned. You've probably heard about Dr. Robert Ramsey who was an American who was in Zanzibar. He's now locked up in jail in Algeria. He may be a Negro although I doubt it. I've never met him. I think that he's white, a liberal, member of the NAACP and all sorts of things. I forget what he's a doctor of, not M.D. ~~He wrote~~ He was sending out ~~UAFD~~ wild letters in favor of the Zanzibar revolution. Then he claimed he was expelled from Kenya by sinister forces. He didn't have a US passport. He was here without a US passport. For a short time the British National Council for Civil Liberties gave him some support and the next thing I knew he was in Algeria. Now what is game is, and whether he is just a crackpot, God knows. Every ~~thing Revolution and~~ revoltionary movement brings ~~[illegible]~~ forth such a bunch of screwballs as one can only see inside a madhouse, you know.

((He's now in jail?))

Now in jail, in Algiers no charges against him. I understand the US Embassy is trying to get him out (laughing). I don't know whether Dr. Ramsey was actually an agent of some kind, although he had too many confusions to be really a good agent. Yes, too confused. There was too much wrong. In any case, what I found was that people were generally ([illegible]) if you had something to do and didn't live too lavishly, though Africans don't question too much on money. This business of feathering one's nest goes on all over Africa, apparently in Algeria now more than ever. Andersson said there are large transfers of money in Algerian francs into Switzerland (which are still being bought up by the opposition ~~even still~~ for their own purposes, One day.

Yes, Algeria would be fine-- provided I could find some reasonable - any kind of a newspaper assignment , a vaguely Left thing, better than anything else. but the more innocuous the better.

((You said once before, you fit well in Algeria, you didn't fit well in Black Africa))

I could move throughout Africa, but one has to ~~chart~~ start ones-thing. For instance, for me to go to Ghana would create, at this point, innumerable suspicions, but to go to Algeria ~~when~~ where I have people like Georges ~~Arnaux~~ [illegible] Arnaud? who is a very close personal friend, they would welcome me, and try to find something for me to do . .
That would be easy, to arrange. And from there-- I have South African friends ~~in the~~ with both PAC and ~~ANC~~ ANC, I have very good contacts. Wherever they have offices I can move inside. But one has to have some reasonable sort of thing. On this trip I used some of the Afro-American journals, the magazine (Encounter) which was quite successful in some places.
In fact Grippa said, "why don't I have this magazine. They send it to Verges and don't send it to me." Nevertheless with Grippa there was some suspicion. And I had the opinion-- I'm not paranoic and I don't like playing cops and robbers- or go for cloak and dagger stuff, but I had the opinion that somebody was watching me, was following me when I left there, which was one reason why I didn't see all the people I was going to see.
I knew some Trotskyists there who (could) give me some stories about Grippa's organization - they're on the fringes of it, etc.- but I just didn't go to see them because I thought that Grippa might have someone watching to see where I was gong. He wouldn't like the connection with Trotskyites, anyway.

((I'll be away. . closed on Monday. Washington's birthday))

Oh, my God, is it?

((You'll have to buy a cherry pie this week end))

The kids know all about the cherry tree.

((Can you come on Tuesday))

Yes. But my coming in and out of this Embassy is not the best thing ~~##~~ in the world. Right over there are the Indonesians, whom I know. Around the corner are the Cubans who know me very well. All it would take is one Cuban to see me walk in here.... I can always concoct a reason but . . I don't know how many people are watching. For one thing, certainly ~~take~~ the British Home Office, they've had me under surveillance ever since I've been here . There's no doubt about that. I got a tip on that from Mar~~k~~tin ~~Kegel~~ Ennals of the National Council of Civil Liberties~~xxx~~. . . British may be allies and all, but after all....

As far as my wife is concerned, she is by no means a dyed-in-the-wool Communist. She is not a Communist at all, never has been, but she would not like that in the slightest. . . I can't get her to understand. .

Editorial signs

(( ))	query or comment by interviewer
( )	editorial insert
------- or - - -	omission
. . .	incomplete statement
--	dash

Taspe No. 3 Gibson

((What do you think about that - Malcolm X))

I could have told you it was coming.

((Well, you did. You didn't single out Malcolm X))

it becomes make
Now comes the real thing. It's going to affxxx the Algerian struggle. You remember the Algerian struggle throughoutwas marked by clashes between the MNA and the FLN right up to and after the Independence. And this is what is going to happen now in the States, as far as I can see. But what I don't really like is -- there are so many small groups, uncontrollable
little
groups, kids, fifteen-year-old kids who are planning to shoot the President, and that sort of thing. You don't know how far it goes.
leading what, at this point.
So the idea of being a leader- leader of what? As to Black Ghettoes, there this thing-- I don't know (who responsible).

((Do you think that was Elijah))

I'm not at all certain. There are many, many, many people who would be glad to see Malcolm out of the way. For one thing, it does resolve a certain problem and that -is, there was a clash, certainly it was going to come about between Williams's group and Boggs' men in Detroitx and Malcolm X, people who were more committed to an armed struggle. Malcolm's major contradiction was that he xxixxx-- logically, what he was preaching
w
~~could~~ have led even to negotiations with Washington, to some kind of arrangement, or else to an armed struggle, an underground struggle. As soo n
as you on
have a vocal leader who is exposed and who is in the country, one hand he knew what was happening. He was very much aware of this proliferation of groups and activities, like the little business of Walter Bowe, which
~~really~~
~~was highly innocuous, in comparison~~
highly symbolic and almost innocuous, in comparison with some of the things His trips abroad, most of his btips abroad were in a way - he wanted to create unity by contacts with Williams and otherxx people, but here, in Europe and Cairo. One of the problems that he had was simply in getting
see
to Williams. He didn't want to go to Havana. He probably could have brought an extraordinary amount of pressure on the State Department to allow him to go as a journalist or something like that if he really wanted to. But
a
he didn't want to, because he didn't want to be exposed on political issue which might have cost him support. So where was he going to see Williams? Prague, perhaps, Moscow. But he didn't want to go to Eastern European countries either.

aims
((You said that one of his ~~things~~ might have been to negotiate with

Washington))

Exactly. At first the whole idea was that there was going to be a Black State. This was originally. But no one had any real. . . except for Elijah Muhammed's people -- I think that some of them did have. You saw the London Times article todayg? One of the things that disgusted him with the Elijah group was this talks with the American Nazi Party and with the Ku Klux Klan, particularly with the Klan, to buy a county, if you will, a county in Georgia, which the Ku Klux Klan was going to sell. They were going to see that all property in the country was turned over and this was going to be the nucleus of a Black State. He felt that the Muslims were seeking to perpetuate segregation for their purposes. He really was not a segregationist nor did he at the end believe in -- he wasn't a racist. This is whole thing, backing away from a religous point, from a racist poin trying to find some modus vivendi for a modified Black nationalism. But he wanted to talks this over. ~~Thisxisxhisx~~ I don't know if he ever had any contacts with anyone beside New York City and State officials and police. He had rather good relations. He was extremely moderate in person and you could talk to him. I think this is what he really wanted or what would have come out of it. He just wanted the contact - to feel that there was somebody opposite him. To a lot of these people, ~~thisx~~ a lot of the stink could be taken out just ~~hm~~ by talking to them, not necessarily with publicity.

for benefit
((If he wasn't involved on the racial or theological grounds, what was))

Not a racist. For instance, it is said that the Muslims are anti-white and there is an anti-white elementx, and particularly ~~and~~ an anti-Semitic directed elementx,against Jewish shopkeepers. Obviously the Jewish shopkeepers, being exposed, being in the Ghetto, the resentment comes out against them. In New York it comes out against the Jewish element in the garment district. as many Negroes work in the garment district. It is unskilled, underpaid. and sweat shop type of thing. I must say that Malcolm sometimes played this tune himself. He knew it was facile, and also it pleased the Arabs. ~~frgxxxgx~~ from whom he received considerable support.

((You mean the Cairo type Arabs?))

Yesx, the Nassertype. I don't know how much support he ever received financially, but I think they did receive support. And also the Black Muslimsx did receive support at certain times. It was no accident that he set ~~x~~up a headquarters in exile in Cairo. He did go to Ghana and I know that in Ghana he was attacked by the orthodox Marxists. They are the first to launch an attack, for Black fascism or something. I feel that he was evolving, trying to get out of a box. His reaction was that of a Negro who

Grew ~~goes~~ up in a Ghetto, who becomes a criminal under pressures, he is intellignt he ix extremely intelligent. Not an intellectual but far more capable as an organizer say, than Williams. Williams is utterly hopeless. ~~And~~ He is not slow to catch ideas, but he has certain fixed ideas which have developed, certainly under pressure. Malcolm was moving and he as a figure could have done a lottoo.

((Was this a maturing))

Yes, a maturing, a process of facing reality also. I suppose this is an explanation to a large extent of why there are so many children who are young kids, who are really involved in (the nationalist movement). They're facile, frustrated. They don't know what elsei They feel that the older organizations are incapable of doing anything for them. There is a class thing. They feel that there is sort of a Black bourgeoisie for whom there is now in general a possibility of integration, has sold them out, but they, but they who live in the Ghettoes, who go to the bad schools, who come out of poor homes and so forth, by the time they're sixteen, ~~they~~ their hope of, their the real hopes of integration, of being something in contemporary American society, is dead. It's this whole business, the motivation in schools, the good schools, the housing and the family even. If a child grsows up in a home where they don't have books- there is a great difference between a Jewish child in the Lower East Side, ~~xxxx~~ no matter how poor that family, motivated by a ~~xxxx~~ long Jewish tradition, ~~xxxxxxx~~ and a Negro child or would still a Puerto Rican child, Middle Class ideals are beginning to sink down into the ~~Jewish xxxx~~ Negro community, but among Puerto Ricans there is an even greater gap, so I understand, ---------

Many of these Negro kids, they just feel this enormous wall around them, and one of the things that I am most aware of, even-- when I was a child, I grew up in Philadelphia. Many of my friends were white. We lived in a neighborhood in West Philadelphia which had Negro and white Irish, Italians ~~Catholics~~, Jewish people, Italian, in proximity. Lived in the same block. That neighborhood now is solidly black. The school I went to was always mixed. Now most of these schools are black. There is more de facto segregati today, yhrough real esáate, through housing, than there was 20 years ago.

((Is this intentional or is this because this was an area that was mixed and where a Negro could move in and so Negroes did.))

Yes. One of the problems is that around most American cities the city line marks the end of expansion for Negroes. They can't move into the suburbs. A middle class Negro who has money can move into the sububbs. And what areas they can move into are filled up . The whites flee out of the city,xX

((Washington would be the primary example of that))

Washington is that much more complicated because you are in the midst of the Southern States. Except that I notice, I have relatives that live around Washington. As a kid I used to go to Washington every summer. And going out towards Chevy Chase and Montgomery county, the Maryland side, there is a certain desegregation that has gone on. Obviously on the Virginia side it is the opposite. Also the Maryland counties to the South. That is a more segregated area. That is also the history-- the sort of slave line. in Maryland before the Civil War sort of went where Washington is now. across the State, to the South were they grow tobacco there was slavery, to the North there was no slavery. And there was a great deal of intermarriage- not intermarriage but racial intermixture. I have relatives who are to all intents and purposes white. When I was a child and went there in the summer, I really had no real awareness of race. It was a curious back~~groud~~ [illegible] of interracial mixture, that had gone on just before and after the Civil War. Now that has changed considerably., [illegible] That's in Montgomery county.

I brought the address book.

((It's extremely interesting to consider the racial problem at home but I would like to finish this up.))

Yes. What sort of addresses do you want.

((The people we talked about))

NN

Note names & address

This is Hassan Riad. ~~Amoui~~ Amin is his name, we ~~may have Ameer~~ S. AMIN.Boit postale . 3186 - Dakar, Senegal

M. Amiabel. was a Canadian, former Communist. He was setting up, he did set up a pro-Chinese group near Vancouver. Apparently there was considerable activity there. (6323 Marine Drive, Burnaby 3, B.C., Canada)

This is address of the Mulana. To the best of my knowledge Verges never heard from himx yet (Bhashani — c/o Janata Weekly, 16/20 Haba Roy Lane Dacca 1, E. Pak.)

~~Vokegra~~ BOSGRA Is a very interesting person, in Holland. He is a man who works with Andersson occasionally. He is not a Communist, is a vague Leftist with the ~~Christian Pacifists~~, the Pacifist Socialist Party, in Holland, which has gathered in a strange grouping of Leftists. He has contacts with the Angolans and Algerians. He goes to Algeria quite often. I have a feelin' he is somewhat connected with the ~~Giriut~~ Curiel people. (Vinkenstraat 13" Amsterdam (Angola Comite)

CHARTRAN Montreal P.Q., Canada

Michel
Chartain xix, you know. He is secretary general of the Partie Socialiste de Quebec and is of course very much connected with the Cubans. And has had a great deal of contact with American Negro groupsx of the Left.

- GLN, Congo, in Brazzaville. It's so open, and so obvious, you know. They used to send things

CUELLAR - (Apartado Aéreo 13777, Zone 1 Bogota - or Ap. Aereo 15332 Bogota

In Colombia, Alfonso ~~Quoila~~- this address is where they receive
Not(?)
special materials. Things that they think will get by the censorship.
These things came from peking. They came to Revolution.

* The one great advantage of Revolution was if one watched it closely you could find i . . at one time, not any more, but certainly in the arly period, they weren't told by the Chinese to come there but they had seen Revolution on sale. (Orlando LINERO - Calle 56, No. 63-30, Barranquilla, Colombia)

17
Colonia Anahuac Mexico D.F.

Federico Emery, was a Mexican ~~sitizen~~ citizen, who had been in Peking and was supposed to be representing ~~the~~ Mexican Marxist-Leninist group, the pro-Chinese group. (Tizoc # 19, Col. Anahuac, Mexico 17, D.F.)

Jurema Finamour, this poor Brazilian. who was involved in a most vague way. Verges put this person's name- I don't know whether it is a man or woman- think it's a woman- on the magazine, actually never received ~~xxtxin~~ anything from her. I heard later that she was pro-Moscow, certainly not pro-Chinese. She's probably in jail now, after the coup down there.

~~iMmsxJaxnnnxPayeux~~

M. & Mme Jean ~~Fayeu~~ FALLOT. This is the fellow who was Communist leader in the Haute Loire, who is the only one who is still supposed to remain in contact.
still

Le Chambon sur Lignon, Haute Loire

Everybody knows Mrs. Gunawardene . The Russians claim is parachuted everywhere. (P.O. Box 300, Dept 245, Peking)

Gregorio Goldenberg, in Peking, is Chilean. He works, think he works, inside of the Foreign Languages press. He is correspondent for El Mundo. of Havana. At one time he was correspondent for the Cuban radio. He was a very curious fellow. He wanted to set up a Spanish edition of Revolution with Chinese money and offered to do this, when he came through Paris, ~~hmix~~ about a year ago. Verges managed to avoid ever giving him any answer on this. He actually offered to bring the money. for this.

Han Su-yin. Very interested in the magazine. She sent material from Cambodia and Verges does have some contacts in Cambodia, someone in the office of Norodom Sihanouk ~~Norda~~. A Frenchman, I think his name is Mayer. He was close to the chief of state.

Alpheus Hunter. W. A. ~~Hunter~~ Hunton. Anyone would know him in Accra.

(undoubtedly Charles Meyer, well-known figure in Phnom Penh

His group at the university of Ghent, which no longer exists, so I'm told.

Masao KITAZAWA - 20 Muhammed Said Flat 81, Cairo ~~gawa~~, was the Japanese representative to the Afro-

✓ Asian Solidarity Conference . He used to pass through Paris quite regularly. I don't think he is there any longer. Was much interested in the magazine. He used to use the ~~pxxyxx~~ pseudonym of Walter Johnson sometimes.

Ab ~~Corina~~ Karina? was one of the leaders of the SWAPU ~~Swapo~~ of Southwest Africa.

used to send in articles. I knew him personally from New York.

has been going back and forth between Peking and also East Germany and West Germany. He's playing all sides. on this Southwest Africa thing.

Corenqizi is the head of SWANU ~~Swand~~, the other Southwest Africa group. (SWANU & SWAPU) ~~Thexe~~ They have a unity. . once there was a struggle between Karina ~~Corina~~ and Korenqizi ~~Gochambina~~. Karina ~~C~~ was virtually eliminated. Karina ~~Corina~~ is an American agent, and so forth. The Last story that I heard about Karina ~~Corina~~ was that he was working for the Peace Corps in Bechuanaland. These are the stories that they circulated. Karina ~~Corina~~ has been unable to hold up his end of it. He is kind of sulking. And violence hasn't helpt him at all. Korenqizi ~~Gochambina~~ has embarrassed people i over and over- - monomania but its ~~for his~~ worked.

✓ Abdul Rahim KARIM (190a Finchley Rd., Lond NW3) special representative now, in London, for Verges. He is in Singapore. His article on Malaysia, against Malaysia, was greatly appareicated by the Indonesian government and a large number of copies of the issue of Revolution which contained it were bought up and i twas later reproduced. We received from Indonesian Embassies all around sub- ~~scriptions~~. orders for that issue. Subscriptions came from the UN, their missions to the UN, perhaps here in London.

✓ Julian Mayfield, Acadamy of Science, P.O. Box 2848 Accra. in Ghana doesn't use this address as often as he used to. because he is now editor of something called the African Review. It is a new magazine..

✓ Now here's an interesting fellow- F. M. MOLL - Amstelkade 157, Amsterdam Phone 717032. ~~Mema~~, I aver quite figured him out. He is a Surinam ~~Pnnh Pnom~~ nationalist. in Amsterdam. He is close to almost all the Left parties. there. He pret4nds to be Marxist but claims that he is not involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute ~~schism~~. He doesn't want anything to do with that. That is the reason he never wrote anything for the magazine. though I did see him. x

Carlos Moore. I have no address for him. He is an Afro-Cuban boy whom I first met in New York. He is in Paris and you might be able to reach him through Presence Africaine. He ~~supposedly~~ was writing a book about Cuba He was very much involved with Robert Williams, with Malcolm X, he is extremely young but very active in ~~body~~ --- . He is of Jamaican origin. There is a Jamaican minority in eastern Cuba, in Camaguey and Oriente Province. That's how you get names like Moore, etc. His father and brother live in New York, his mother is still in Cuba. He went back to Cuba after the Bay of Pigs, and went to school there. He became very disillusioned. He left, claiming that there was racial discrimination and so forth in Cuba. Very, very anti ——. He went to Cairo. He managed to get out, and he went on a Yugoslav ship, I think or a Greek ship, and got to Egypt. He had met some Angolans ~~of~~ through the UPA who had been in Havana and they took care of him for a while until there was a split inside of the UPA, and the fellow who was there quit and went to Switzerland. He brought Moore out to Switzerland. Then Carlos wound up in Paris, where still is, to best of my knowledge. He supposedly has written an article for Presence Africaine which is violently counter-revolutionary. He claims there is no revolution. His position, is relatively bizarre. . It's not terribly justified. But what I think is, that here is a case of Black Nationalism in the States being transported to Cuba. What he claims is that the only Cuban revolution that remains to be made that would be valid would be a black revolution. and that really the population of Cuba is overwhelmingly black, or of African descent, and that this has been a plot that has gone on for generations even now with Fidel Castro, particularly Dorticos, he claims, the white leadership has been able to perpetuate itself regardless of the political thing. This is his theme. He is interesting but extremely wild and emotional. I think it's a case where the intoxication of Harlem never went off. Anyway he might be worth talking to.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom people were going to try to get in touch with him but they weren't any too convinced that his thesis was correct. I don't think so. He claims of course that I am completely blinded by my pro-Castro sympathies. He claimed that Williams was very unhappy for racial reasons in Cuba. I thought that Williams was simply unhappy. He couldn't speak Spanish. He was under pressurex from the American Communists and Soveit Communists that didn't like him, the old Cuban Communists, which was one of the reasons for his whole-hearted turn towards Peking. That was the only way out. And he wanted to come back to the States.

The FBI was in no mood- we could probably have arranged ~~xxxxxx~~ something if the Federal thing ~~xxxxx~~ werent going to be held against him, that is that he was a fugitive, that Rockefeller most likely wouldn't extradite him to New York. There were talks on this. A lawyer by the name of Conrad Lynn had discussed this ~~xxxxx~~, a Negro lawyer who was connected with a party called the Freedom Now Party, another Black Nationalist group, but with basically a Trotskyite front. It was put up 99% by the SWP which was one of the reasons for its failure. This lawyer was well aware of Williams's desire to come back to the United States if he could stay out of the hands of a North Carolina lynch mob. The one talk I had with the FBI people convinced me that they were in no mood whatsoever, even though they realized what the situation was.

(Pan African Press - P.O. 8364 - Pinto, Private Box 8159, [illegible]

Pinto is a very curious fellow. Pinto is a man who is close to Kenyatta. In Kenya. who has or is involved with ~~a~~ the Pan-African Press, who is not hooked up with Odinga, not openly in any case, but who is sort of playing all sides, looking for hand-outs. I understand that he -received substantial ~~help~~ sums from Russia, so that he has shown more Muscovite color than any other.

William J. Pomeroy 48 Balcombe, Lond NW1 is the American who was captured with the Huks in the Philippines, you remember? He lives here in London, more or less retired from politics except that he writes. That's how he earns his living. But he depends more or less on the good graces of the British Labor Party the Left of that party and the British Communist Party to stay here. What he has to say about the failure of the guerrilla campaign in the Philippines and the present Leftward turn in the Philippines apparently---

There is an outfit called the Philippine Progressive Review which I think we (Revolution) gave publicity to- here it is- - the Progressive Review. It is connected with Pomeroy. They are about as Communist as they can get under the present law of the Philippines. They have hopes of what they call ~~the~~ and an Anti-Imperialist ground swell, in other words, an anti-American trend in the present government. They felt that the anti-Malaysia campaign might help, and the editor has been very much in contact with the Indonesians. He has been to Djakarta on several occasions recently. He is in contact with Pomeroy. Pomeroy's position is one inwhich he has to be very careful of what he says because the British Communists will dump him. His wife is Philippine. She can't get an American visa, so they have to live here. This makes him the captive of a certain part of the British Labor Left and the British CP. His book, The Forest, was published here and in the States by Communist publishing houses. It is an account of the guerrilla campaign in the Philippines, at least his personal account, but he pointed out to me, that it is also an account of its failures. He has tried to keep out of the Sino-Soviet thing but I have a feeling that if the situation in the Philippines changed both he and his wife would like to go back there. This is what he may be going (working for) through his contacts with the Progressive Review. I don't known how far they have contacts with the people inside the Philippine~~xx~~ government but they claim to have.))

Shashikant P. Patel — 8 Mochav Kunji, Dixit Rd, Bombay 57. was an Indian from Bombay who wrote among other things, several articles. He is a business man and I imagine a rather successful business man. He is in on the fringe of the Indian Communist Party and now involved with the pro-Chinese wing of the party.

~~MadngxKundi~~ 8 Modhav Kunj - Dixit Rd Bombay 57

Strelkoff address - 151 Ave. Sufrin, Paris 15, Phone 54F 54 36

Miss C.J. SNETHLAGE ~~Nem lage~~ from Amsterdam is the head of the Cuba group. the com Cuba committee in Holland, She is very prominent in this Pacifist Socialist Party. She ~~is very~~ has been to Cuba, ~~but~~ despite her advanced age she is seventy-some, and very active. She

Torild SKARD, c/o GOMNAES, C 14 Studentbyen, Oslo, Norway ~~Sklaar~~ is a student leader in Norway. I think she is now a member of Parliament. She did a lot of publicity for the magazine.

Dr. Leiva Samper- MOEC representative in Paris He is a doctor, a cardiologist and seems to be quit a distinguished one. He is a heart surgeon. (129 Rue de Tolbiac, Paris 13e Phone POR 47-39 (hospital)

Schwartzenberg is my lawyer in Paris.
SINE - 35 Rue de Clichy - ph. TRI 73-32.

Manuela Sikes is a member of the Liberal Party (U.K.) She's a standing candidate for Ipswich, very pro-Cuban and pro-Algerian. She's got a lot of influence inside the party because of who she sleeps with. I don't know who it is, but I've heard an awful lot of stories.

Jose Venturelli, ~~Torrelli~~ Calle E, #158 1-B, Vedado Havana Havana, is a Venezuelan artist and member of — — — supposedly very very interested in the magazine. He is a friend of ~~Mxxxmx~~ Martha Dodd, you may find on the cards the magazin was going to him c/o Martha Dodd at the Havana Libre hotel.

Martha Dodd had no direct contact with the magazine. She ~~mmmt~~ reportedly had taken quite a pro-Chinese position but to be so hopelessly compromised with the Czechs and Russians that she can't say too much except en cachet, to everybody she meets, especially young people. Whether this is her real attitude or not, I don't know. She might also be doing this to gain the confidence of people. There is no question that Venturelli is her very close friend.

Costas Veropolous (?) is a student group leader from Greece, who edited a magazine in Greek called Africa Asia Latin America. It was a cut-down version of Revolution and represented for the Greek youth, the left wing of the ~~EG~~ EDA who were unsatisfied with the reformist tactics the Social democratic tactics of the EDA and EDAMx youth. He got in contact with the magazine he wanted material to reproduce in Greek. I suppose he did. I took one year of Greek and I know nothing of modern Greek, I could just about make out the title.

Pierre Vallieres(?) is a Canadian Communist who was setting up a thing called Revolution Quebequoise. He was dissatisfied with Chartain. He had been ~~sxxx~~ close to Chartain and he was going to be holier than Chartain. He worked for La Presse, which was on strike

Sydney WANASINGHE was a Ceylonese Trotskyist in member of the ~~tenth~~ committee of the Lanka Sama Maja ~~Lakisama Hamaya~~ party before it split. the militant part of it split. He distributed I think 25 to 50 -- more likely 25 copies of Revolution, each issue. I understand that his group of the Trotskyists were more pro-Chinese than the pro-Chinese wing of the Ceylnese Communist party. He tried to get us to take their magazine in exchange.

That covers all of the real addresses that I have.

((At this point let's take stock of you. Is your kid back in school?))

Yes.

((You're not under pressure))

No. Thank the Lord, I've got that off the hook for a little while.

22 ((You have largely answered the question- What is the function of the Advisory Board of Revolution))

Nothing more unless it was to give prestigex to the enterprise. This is why it keeps growing larger and larger. First it started out as an editorial board, then he changed the title, to advisory board. then he calls it permanent collaborators. I don't know why. He claimed that under French law you had only exemption from seizure if you were really French - - now I do know what it was- - one issue of the magazine was seized in France. That was No. 7 which had Ho Chi Minh on the cover. It wasn't seized for Ho Chi Minh but because of an article on Reunion and the French West Indies. It was a platonic seizure, more in the way of a warning. The seizure order came down after the matazine had been distributed. There were virtually no copies picked up-. Undistributed and returned copies were seized but the money wasn't seized. That's about the nicest way you can seize a magazine. It was a warning. And he felt that an editorial board made ~~mf~~ up of foreigners didn't give him enough protection in France. That was the reason for changingx to permanent collaborators.

They certainly are quite active. For instance, the Colombian I mentioned-- I still can't think of his name-- but his daughter was put in an Albanian school. Poor girl, about eleven years old, and she didn't know a word of Albanian and most of the Albanians didn't know Spanish. She has managed to suffer through a year of it. It is very interesting to talk to this little girl, now about 12, She was in Cuba, where you might think of the revolution as extremely informal lax in many ways easy-going. It's a libertarian type of revolution. Certainly it hasn't had the puritannical type of after-period that one finds in most revolutions, certainly ~~in and these the puritans~~ in China which proves a great obstacle for the Africans who go there. They are virtually unable to keep African students because of the fact that there is no sex. They used to let them go to HongKong and they would all come back with syphilis and gonorrhea to the great disgust of the Chinese. This girl, who seemed to ~~[illegible]~~ like Cuba, in Albania was shocked by the degree of formality of relationships and for instqance she said that at the beaches -- in Cuba all the beaches were open, anybody can go to the beach. In Albania they have, as I suppose you find in many Communist countries, high officials, middle officials, low officials and then just plain working people. (and [illegible]). This to her was (shocking). Whe wasn't aware of politics as such and that is what made talking to her so interesting.

((What do you think of Cuba nowadays?))

I know one thing, that the PS~~C~~P has virtually been defeated in every way, the old Communists. I was very much involved, obviously, the Cubans who were my friends ~~were~~ are not Communists. I suppose that one of the things that made the Cuban revolution attractive was that it wasn't doctrinaire. For Americans, college students, the young people, after all of the years of disenchantment about revolution as such, the Cuban revolution looked like a romantic thing. It was extravagant. All these bearded fellows coming out of the mountains, and anyone who went to Cuba coulad't help but feel the contagion.

((I think there was a sympathetic feeling within the States because it was not alien to our own revolutionary background, the idea of little men hiding behind trees shooting at the Redcoats.))

Right. Only they were shooting at Batista's troops who were armed by the United States. This is one of the things that many Americans are unable to realize, how deeply involved the US is with these military regimes. It has obviously been exploited from ~~their~~ an academic point of view, but from the popular imagination, we just don't think of it.

The Fidelista youth were not Marxist. They are more so today than they were before, but they have had this experience of dealing with the United States - - I have had a lot of arguments with them about it.

- - - - -

For instance when they came to the United States in- - 28 March of 59, you remember, Felipe Pasos (?) came, Fidel went to Washington and he went to New York and it was extraordinarly badly handled. Christian Herter wouldn't see him at the State Department. He insisted on taking a hotel suite, rather than do that. Certainly it wasn't an official visit but a lot of people have gone to Washington xxx. . . Then it was a question of whether the Cubans wanted money or not. The Cubans claimed, . . . that they asked for $3,000,000 on short term credit, just a stop-gap and that this was turned down cold. until they ~~[illegible]~~ made some guarantees about American property. From that point on I think that their attitude towards the United States was one of expecting, looking for the worst. They were able to work out a few arrangements with xxfax American companies concerning take-overs. EAch time, they were vetoed by the State Department or someone else, who said don't go into this, because we want to have a solid front, no one should make an agreement with them otherwise.

It was provocation and counterprovocation. They would do something then there would be American xxxxx reaction, then a Cuban counterreaction until it was real escalation, diplomatically, to the point at which it fell completely into the hands of the Russians. That could have been short-circuited and prevented. They really are not happy where they are now. They want some independence, ~~of over~~ vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Ideologically they are not very happy with the Russians. They have managed though to maintain incredible independence, not signing the nuclear test ban agreement, they have never made any anti-Chinese statements at all, though Fidel came very close-- he did in one of the statments where Kruschev mentioned peaceful coexistence, and said that there had never been disagreement with the Russians over the missiles .xxxxxxxx In actual fact they were boiling. They were furious about the missile business. This left a bad taste in their mouths. The Escalante business, you know the ~~president~~ first attempt of the old x PSP ~~was going~~ to to take over and create a faction which would displace the romantic revolutionaries, if you will. It failed but that didn't mean that Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and more capable technocrats inside the party didn't continue. They failed. Now Carlos Rafael who had the highest place of the old Communists is out as you know. And almost all of them went out at this point.

I am always struck by - Grippa said, for instance, of Guillermo Cabrera Infante, the Cuban Cultural Attache in Brussels, whom I know very well, that: "he's an anti-Communist". Which is true. He is a nationalist. That's all. And that's the one thing that keeps him there. But he and many of the people like CArlos Franqui and around Carlos Franqui and Haidee Santamaria. her husband, who is the Minister of Education, they are liberal, in their views about the arts, they are non-dogmatic, non-doctrinaire, Leftist if you will, but Leftist by situation and circumstance. They represent, if there is anyone in Washington who still has a sober mind about Cuba and who is not completely filled with venom ~~or~~ - and frustration - about Cuba, they would, I think, represent the real hope of reaching a modus vivendi in the future. They are the real heirs, I think, the people who will take over. I do not think the PSP can do it. They have the mass support in the country behind them. It is always said, that If anything ever happens to Fidel and there is the slightest suspicion that it was done by a Communist, there wouldn't be a Communist left alive in the Island in about five hours. These were many people who felt that the Communists would have liked to do this. At one time it became almost a hysterical rumor spread around that the Communists wanted to kill Fidel.

The bitterness that I found against the old Communists was because they were compromised with Batista. Even now, this explains their pro-Chinese stand. But that can't go very far, either. Because they are not doctrinaire. The Chinese have been extremely flexible in dealing with Cuba - they can't offer them very much - and they can't push them, so they have been easy-going. - - - The handling of the October crisis between the Russians and the United States when they got ~~kxmx~~ together over the heads of the Cubans, was an insult. Being a small country and semi-colonial, it was a colony, it has an exaggerated sense of its national rights. This was, in terms of Cuba, not the world~~xxbmtxmfxCmbx~~, situation in general, ~~for the~~ perhaps. it was the only way to solve the October question, it seemed to be the only way, but in the terms of Cuba that was one of the grave mistakes of the Russians. The way the handled it. They didn't seem to soften the blow for the Cubans.

((They're very sensistive people.))

Right. And they've never forgotten it. They have nourished lots of hopes about DeGaulle and the possibility of trade with France. Trade is increasing, ~~bmt~~ they've tried desperately to get DEGaulle to visit Cuba which he wouldn't do. He would do lots of things against Washington, but there are certain limits (laughing), and that's one of them.

I know that's one of the things in back of their minds, in Paris. Every French delegation to Havana, even one just recently, I heard about, ~~that~~ Fidel went around sayings- why doesn't De Gaulle come and visit us.

~~x~~There is a Gaullist group, France -Cuba (?) , not the Communist, but there is a Communist organization, There is also one inside of the government party concerned with Cuba and they have made recommendations for increasing trade. One of the things also encouraged is the increase of Spanish trade. Ironically one of the heroes of Cuba is Franco, because he continued trade and they say "You know, when we go to Madrid, there is never any trouble from the counter-revolutionaries. They behave themselves." I have a feeling that the Spanish attitude has some influence on the French. I would imagine that they hope that eventually this will be communicated to the West Germans.

Cuba certainly, I feel, if they did have ~~exhaisex~~ diversification of trade and an opening horizon -- because so many problems with the United States become emotional problems that no matter what the head of government or the State wants to do, you've got the problem of how to put it before the Congress and public opinnon, which has been so sensitized to it that this is the problem of American statesmanship that you don't have in any other places. De Gaulle, for example, say "the people! [illegible]" but even he wouldn't go beyond a certain point.

~~Another thing~~, Algeria. Probably only DeGaulle cold have reached a settlement.~~x~~

((In two minutes, that's your prognosis for future ~~UNxDab~~ US-Cuban relations.))

It depends very much on the United States. I think, I know, there are elements in Cuba who are more than willing. But they don't want to be pushed. The trouble is that when a Cuban talks to America, the next question is "when are you going to get rid of the Red regime," or something like that. That is the end of ~~dix~~ the dialogue. I would ~~imagxixtxthax~~ imagine that it would have to be through talks. I understand - this is one thing thatthis Carlos Moore, the Afro-Cuban boy who is extremely ~~Cuban~~ anti-revolutionary- he says he wants a real revolution. He worked in the Foreign Ministry at one time. What he ~~He~~ used to claim was that Dorticos and ~~pops~~ people around Dorticos are very very anxious for a rapprochement with the United States. That they would love to have contact. I certainly know that Dr. Roa, Foreign Minister, wanted somehow to have contacts, more direct contacts. He ~~has~~ had a problem too, that in public he couldn't say anything, and whenever he was in New York he was boxed in.~~x~~

((I don't want to start a debate but you say that the -- when are you going to get rid of the Red regime-- this is ~~the~~ a reflection of the sensitivity that you spoke about. ~~isxitxreally~~ Similarly, isn't the Cuban population sensitized in such fashion as to come up with a comparably provocative and ~~and~~ dialogue-ending remark.))

It seems a little bit less. One of the problems is that of the ~~Cuban~~ Cuba immigration. There isn't in Cuba, to the best of my knowledge, a broad anti-Americanism. Always ~~in~~ even in Fidel's speeches, he makes a distinction between the American government and the American people. ~~Then~~ There is a very open ~~nuance~~ equivocation about the Cuban counter-revolutionaries. They may be counter-revolutionaries but they also happen to be uncles, cousins, nephews, and almost everybody has some one among them, from Fidel on down.

((The exiles in Miami and elsewhere))

That's right. They are relatives. Just as the treatment for instance of the people at the Bay of Pigs- which was extraordinary. In many countries they would have been -- in ~~our~~ [illegible] country, they would have taken them all out and shot them. There they weren't allowed to beat them; they said they "had been misled" and so forth. This ~~wasxforxpropaganda~~ ~~notxentirely~~ ~~really~~ wasn't merely for propaganda, this was a feeling. I have seen it happen over and over again They might shoot someone. They did, they shot three people, a Batista sergeant and some others. It was an incredible gaffe ~~thatxwasxmade~~ to include among these people an old Batista torturer. He was shot and no one much protested. I have been told by people who have been there recently that you have only to say that you are an American to get a sympathetic audience around you immediately. People want to discuss with you, why did they do this, that. You see they can hear Miami. They listen -to the American radio all the time, and they listen to Radio SWAN. I heard Radio SWAN in Cuba. Radio SWAN ~~Radi~~ was a CIA radio operated off of SWan Island off of Nicaragua. [actually off Honduras] an island which is claimed by Nicaragua but in actual fact is possessed by the United States (laughing). [Hondurans] The Nicaraguans have never been able to persuade us to leave. We just have some sailors on it. They built this enormous radio which broadcast to Cuba. It wasn't an official radio. It was called Radio SWAN. It was a CIA operation. It was so crude, it was really pathetic, the type of thing-- people are starving, that type of thing. Now this was directed at Cuba and when you have propaganda like that - ~~xxx~~ it is very little that can be confirmed. You say people are starving, and they are able to go out and buy something. There was a lot of racist material in there about Congolese troops stationed in Central Cuba. There were no Congolese troops. This short of attitude came out later. During the time of the Bay of Pigs operation ~~they~~ the press releases were incredible. This isn't going to be Machiavellian, my God you don't do it like that, you know. The best propaganda is the one that comes closest to the truth, that just slightly goes off, you don't have to push the point.

In any case, I do feel that there are an enormous number of people in Cuba and inside of the government, particularly among the old 26th of July people, who would be - - they don't want to make a capitulation to the United States. They want an independent government. They would like trade . They would like to get out of the dependence on the Soviet Union such as it is. They have managed to keep from being swallowed up by the Russians just by enormous effort on their part.

((Do you think that both sides have committed themselves so far that it is impossible to have any kind of rapprochement or normalization of relations without a feeling that one sidd or the other or both, had been forced to capitulate?))

I think at one point this was true, but ~~I should have made one point~~. I don't think it's true any more. To a certain extent in recent months there has been a sort of cooling down in Cuban'-American relations, though there have been continued charges abut Venezuela, and it is certainly true that the Cubans were encouraging the Venezuelan FALN. They certainly gave financial support not so much in the way of arms, I think, but money , and in a guerrilla campaign you get your arms anyway from the police and the army, from the army that's a~~sur~~rounds you. That's the easiest way.

I have the feeling, nevertheless, that the Cubans are somewhat disappointed, disillusioned, about their ability to agitate these revolutionary groups elsewhere in Latin America, their ability to carry out any effective revolution, just as the Alliance for Progress has proved to be a great disappointment to many people in Washington so has the Cuban open solidarity with other, almost any, revolutionary movement in Latin America, proved a disappointment.

On the other hand, the Cubans are not going to issue a statement saying that we will not export revolution. Certainly in the first years of the (Cuban) revolution, they ~~had become~~ did some extremely insane things, with expedition to Haiti, expedition to Santo Domingo, expedition to Panama, remember, and they had to send people in to Panama to get them to surrender. It was totally ineffective. The people in Santo Domingo were just slaughtered. In Haiti they were slaugtered also.

((Probably got them by Black magic in Haiti))

A messy situation. On the other hand, every once in a while Duvalier makes overtures. He's not beyond anything.

Well, if you want to get in touch with me again, you have only to give me a call. I don't imagine that anything much will happen. If I'm not there just say that Earl called, or something like that. But do avoid giving this address or telephone number. I imagine with my wife working now for the ~~Indonesians~~ Tunisians

((It would be someone else answering))

It would be ~~thaxmxidx~~ me. I dont think I'm quite going to set up shop down ~~at~~ with Leo Labedz ~~right away~~ & Company.

((Again, I do appreciate your cooperation))

No. Thank you.

MESSAGE FORM 32 RI

ORIG : A. GOODRICH
UNIT : CI/IC/G ☐ INDEX
EXT : R-1176 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 8 MARCH 1965 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. Gibson's 201

28 S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : LONDON
FROM: DIRECTOR

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

CONF: CI/IC 2 INFO WE 6, ADDP, FE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, AF 4, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, VR, FILE 8 Mar 65 21 07z

RI COPY

TO LOND INFO PARI PALP CITE DIR SIG CEN

KUDESK LCHARVEST QKOPERA

REFS: A. LOND 6396 *

B. OELA 42604

C. LOND 6360 *

90655

1. APPRECIATE ADDRESS LIST RECEIVED HQS 4 MARCH.

2. DO NOT WISH YOU ACKNOWLEDGE HAVING IT TO SMOOTHERS FOR TIME BEING.

3. REF C PARA 1: APPROVE YOUR PASSAGE SUMMARY OF TRANSCRIPT YOUR DEBRIEFING OF GIBSON INCLUDING DETAILS ON REVOLUTION ORGANIZATION AND HOW IT WORKS. HOWEVER, DO NOT PASS INTELLIGENCE OF POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL VALUE.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

AN SPD	~~RI~~	AF/1/A
~~PS~~	~~[illegible]~~	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

RI 16552
RI COPY 14617

201-306052

CO/OPS ✓
AF/CI ✓
CA/3 W. Raymond (by phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for DCWE(BC)
RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WE/BC/II
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

5 4 3 2 1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted] 138

OBSOLETE PREVIOUS [redacted] RI COPY [redacted]

FORM 1389a

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-306052
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☒ RET TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

2 · SECRET

GROUP 1

RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM LONDON

ACTION · FE 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE WH 6 ADDP CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 FI FI/INT 2 AF 4 CA 2 CA/OA

SECRET 031139Z

DIR INFO PARI PALP CITE LOND 6360

KUDESK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 85977 *

AN FI
DESK
ABSTRACT INDEX

3 MAR 65 IN 14617

1. GIBSON DEBRIEFING COMPLETED 23 FEB. STA DOING ROUGH TRANSCRIPT TAPES AND PREPARING OPS DISPATCH, TO BE POUCHED NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. WHILE REF QUESTIONS NOT PUT TO G, HE DID MAKE COMMENTS ON SMITH AND GRAHAM, WHICH IN TRANSCRIPT. NO MENTION OF SHLEIFER. QUESTIONS CAN BE INCLUDED IN SUBSEQUENT MEET WITH GIBSON, HOWEVER. ASSUME ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL DERIVE FROM MATERIAL NOW IN HAND.

SECRET

CFN * QUESTIONS FOR DEBRIEFING

RI COPY

201-306052
3 MAR '65

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief of Station, LCPIPIT;
Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
LCHARVEST/KUDESK/MHSPAWN
Revolution Mailing List

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith is one copy of the cards that constitute the mailing list for Revolution. These were borrowed from Richard GIBSON and copied in the station. GIBSON's wife, who compiled the cards and was responsible for distribution of Revolution (and to whom, therefore, they more properly belong) is not aware that GIBSON has "loaned" the cards out. They were returned to GIBSON's flat the same day he brought them in for copying.

2. We have not made any attempt to count them. There are several thousand. A few comments will be in order about some of the marks and notations that appear on the cards.

3. One general category is "Promotional". The first bunch of sheets - about twenty, it appears - are in this category. They are marked "Promotional" or "PR". These were sent out gratis either to induce publicity, or to encourage new subscribers, or to make friends happy. (Presumably, Robert WILLIAMS and several others are in this category).

4. Thereafter, the cards run in categories of one sort or another, with given countries generally lumped together. Those where the address was obviously stapled onto a card are some of those that were taken from Frene GINWALA's Spearhead mailing list. Some are marked "ex-Spearhead"; which means that the name came from the Spearhead list, and the person subsequently subscribed on his own, after a little promotional treatment.

5. The coded symbols, unfortunately, GIBSON could not explain, since this was his wife's territory, rather than his own. The first set of letters obviously refers to the country (e.g.,UK/). Other numbers and letters are not clear. The name that appears apart from the name of the subscriber usually indicates who arranged the subscription (this may be an agent, or something like a gift subscription). For instance, S. V. LEE is Sheldon LEE, who handles

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AF 1
CS COPY
ABSTRACT

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
25 Feb. 65

DATE DISPATCHED
2MAR

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
201- 306052
OELA-42,604

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
~~[illegible]~~

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO OELA-42,604

some subscriptions. Expiration dates are obvious. "Private" merely means that someone ordered a subscription directly, himself, rather than through an agency.

6. Any further questions relating to the list can be included in any subsequent contacts with GIBSON, if they merit inclusion, and if it seems likely that he will know the answers.

7. We note that the list's accuracy cannot be guaranteed, especially after the time when the GIBSON's parted ways with Jacques VERGES.

8. At some time, the SMOOTHERs may ask us for this list. We would appreciate being advised as to whether Headquarters would like us to acknowledge having it.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
~~3~~6-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-COS, LCPIPIT w/o att
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/o att
2-Chief, KUDESK w/o att
2-Chief, FE w/o att

USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28 51 28A AND 51 29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONT

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 31 RI

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 18 Feb 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 306052

21 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

18 FEB 65 [illegible] 42z

TO : LONDON

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: CI/IC 2 INFO WE 6, FE 6, FI, ADDP, DDP, WH/SA 8, FI/INT 2, CI, CI/OPS, VR, FILE

TO LOND INFO: CITE DIR 86097

KUDESK LCHARVEST

RE: A. LOND 6129 (IN 81502)*

B. OELW - 21869

1. IN ADDITION QUESTION THIRTY-SIX REF B, WE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN DESCRIPTION GIBSON'S CURRENT CUBAN CONTACTS AS BASIS FOR FOLLOW UP REQUIREMENTS. SPECIFICALLY HAS G BEEN IN TOUCH RECENTLY WITH ANY CUBAN OFFICIALS WHO SUPPLIED INFO ON CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION, STRUGGLE BETWEEN CASTRO AND OLD COMMUNISTS, STABILITY OF CUBAN REGIME, OR CUBAN SOVIET RELATIONS?

2. BELIEVE PROBING INTO HISTORY G RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT OUTSET SINCE THIS APPEARS TO BE AREA WHERE HE MOST SENSITIVE ABOUT GIVING POTENTIALLY SELF INCRIMINATING INFO AND FURTHERMORE OF MARGINAL VALUE.

END OF MESSAGE.

201-306052

*Lond query re rqmts on Gibson's Cuban contacts if any.

AN SB	FI	AF	1A
	D		
ABSTRACT			

WH/SA/EOB
WH/SA/CI R [illegible]

John Caswell
DCWE(BC)
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

John G. [illegible]
C/WE/BC/U
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

5 4 3 2 1

RI COPY RI COPY

FORM 1-64 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. (35) Copy No.

1176

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-306052
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 9

18 FEB 1965

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

FROM LONDON	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	~~1~~ 2 3 4	5 6 7 8
ACTION WE 8	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	TIME	BY

INFO VR, FILE, FE 6, FI, ADDP, DDP, WH/SA 8, FI/INT 2

SECRET 161247Z

16 FEB 65 IN 81502

DIR CITE LOND 6129

KUDESK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 84695

OELW 21369

NOTE NO RQMTS ON GIBSON'S CUBAN CONTACTS INCLUDED REFS. IS THIS OVERSIGHT, OR IS THERE REASON FOR NOT FOLLOWING THIS LINE? PLS ADVISE, INCLUDING RQMTS IF ANY.

SECRET

AN SR EI		AF 1/A
RS		
ABSTRACT		

201-306052

SECRET

(laughing) That's right. I think that going into that would tale a long time and I'm not that it's also very hard to say, ~~taking contacts~~ ~~making~~ ~~your~~ contacts with the ~~Africans, with~~ and the Chinese, you ~~say~~, look, we need a car, for political work. ~~The~~ Chinese ~~say~~ turn up a car, take ~~your~~ car. If the US embassy turned up a car, they would say take a car from the US Embassy. It doesn't make them any more American agents, It makes them Chinese agents. It's just a matter of who can produce. Africa is full of poor people. Just as the Negro community in the United States is full of poor people. Poor people don't have any sense of loyalty in the ordinary sense of the word. They have a sense of loyalty to their poverty, and colonial experience also mixed in ~~nationalism~~ nation-hood. The national sense is extremely weak. They see things in terms of Western ~~Nigeria~~, former colonial ~~power~~, that's all.

Roberto

(Holden Roberto is down here. You ~~already~~ talked about ~~him~~ him. I know ~~him~~ something about him))

You ought to know him better than I do. (laughing) I met him only once and that was in New York. I had a long discussion with him about ~~what~~ 1 to 3 in the morning, and he was terribly afraid that somebody would think he was a Communist. I tried to assure him I didn't think he was a Communist no matter what (laughing).

((Did he have anything to do with the magazine))

None, ~~No~~, because ~~the magazine~~, while Verges was there in Algiers, and up until ~~xxxxxxxx~~ Viriato da Cruz changed his position, the magazine ~~would follow~~ was following the MPLA and only changed about with when Viriato changed from the MPLA to the UPA.

Holden went to China and I suppose he gave the Chinese some guarantees but I don't know.

((Mario d'Andrade))

He is the active Secretary - I don't know his official title- of the MPLA and represents another tendency different from Dr. ~~Nationalist~~ Neto is the President. He had contacts with Revolution and with Viriato da Cruz. He sought to get Viriato to come back to the MPLA. He is a poet also. They are all poets. They are all former students in Portugal. The last time he came through Paris ~~he saw~~ . After Viriato published his article in Revolution, he asked for the right of reply which was granted by Verges but he never wrote the article. He could be said to be much more pro-Soviet than pro- ~~(Chinese)~~ if anything. I think that ~~Andrade~~ Neto ~~Viriato~~ and Andrade are playing the field. to a certain extent because

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, London
Attention: KATZENBACH

INFO
Chief of Station, Paris
Chief, LCPIPIT

FROM
Chief, WE

SUBJECT
DEBRIEFING OF RICHARD T. GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
RE: OELA - 42,410, 26 January 1965

1. On 11 February KUBARK Staff Agent Errol S. KULPA, who had contact with GIBSON in 1963-64, listened to reference tape and made the following comments, which may be helpful to Katzenbach. KULPA felt that the GIBSON that he was hearing on the tape had indeed changed rather radically since the last time KULPA had any contact with him or the Revolution. KULPA remembers GIBSON as anti-white and probably (because of this racial orientation) anti-U.S. KULPA is therefore quite suspicious of GIBSON's motivations and advises that extreme precaution be taken in the handling of GIBSON.

2. KULPA's view of Gibson's motivations:

KULPA has strenuous doubts as to any idealogical motivation on the part of GIBSON. He recognizes the obvious monetary motivation and feels that this probably plays a large part in the man's being willing to talk to ODYOKE. Another very possible motivation is GIBSON's disaffection with VERGES. Parenthetically, KULPA added that in Algiers and probably in Paris, GIBSON was really nothing more than a name that VERGES wanted on the masthead. GIBSON's primary duties as "editor" were probably in the area of translation. In light of this KULPA feels that perhaps some legitimate information of value can be obtained in the area of the Revolution. Again, parenthetically, it might be noted that KULPA felt that GIBSON was not as "idealistic" as his wife. Where GIBSON might adhere to the aspects of Marxism-Leninism that called for revolutionary change (probably because of his dissatisfaction with a world in which the black man had to endure a certain amount of discrimination), he is not a strict doctrinaire in any of his beliefs. On the other hand, KULPA pointed out that GIBSON's wife (who by the way is a Central European by birth--not British) is idealistic in the sense that she feels her brand of leftism must be internally and idealogically consistent. (This is why she objected to GIBSON's writing for Encounter and why she probably would get upset if she knew exactly what type of game her husband was currently playing with ODYOKE.)

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE...

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	OELW - 21903	15 FEB 1965 12 February 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052 201 - 306052

ROUTING / INITIAL
RI ~~(201-306052)~~
1 - AF/1
1 - CI/ICG
1 - CA/3
1 - CO/IO
1 - WE/BC/Chrono
RID/FI
DESTROY

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CI/ICG	A. GOODRICH	dab	5928

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AF/1	12 Feb 65	C. Baker (in draft)
CA/3	12 Feb 65	W. Raymond (by phone)
CO/IO	12 Feb 65	R. Brown (by phone)
WE/BC/U		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	12 Feb.	John F. Caswell

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OELW - 21903

3. We are currently having reference tape transcribed and will forward the transcription to the field as soon as it is completed.

JST
JOSEPH S. TIFFANY

James L. Griffiths
STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - London
1 - Paris
1 - LCPIPIT

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 33 N

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 12 Feb 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 306052

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : LONDON INFO: PARIS, LCPIPIT

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

12 FEB 65 22 12z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CI/IC 2 INFO ADDP, WE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, FE 6, FI, FI/INT 4, WH 7, VR, FILE

SIG CEN

RI COPY

TO LOND INFO PARI, PALP CITE DIR

84695

LCHARVEST/KUDESK/QKOPERA

RE: A. OELW 21369

B. OELA 42410

15 FEB A.M.

RI COPY

FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTARY REQUIREMENTS MAINLY DERIVED FROM REF B TAPE, FOR USE KATZENBACH DEBRIEFING GIBSON (G):

1. G SPEAKS ABOUT VERGES CONTACTS WITH FLN FEDERATION OF FRANCE AND FACT THAT $75,000 WAS FUNDED TO HIM THROUGH THE FEDERATION FOR REVOLUTION. WOULD BE INTERESTED IN G'S DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF ALGERIANS IN FRANCE: LEADERSHIP, TIES WITH BEN BELLA, TIES WITH ERSTWHILE ALGERIAN OPPOSITION, TIES TO VERGES, SOURCE OF FUNDS, HOW MUCH SENT TO ALGERIA IN FORM OF REMITTANCES.

2. ENCOURAGE G TO TELL MORE ABOUT HIS WIFE, HIS WIFE'S CONNECTIONS WITH RABAH BITAT AND LATTER'S WIFE, HER POLITICAL IDEAS AND ANTECEDENTS.

3. "VERGES HAS DEBTS AMOUNTING TO MORE THAN $30,000". CAN G GIVE US A BREAKDOWN, ESTIMATE?

RI COPY

201-306052

INDEX
RS
ABSTRACT
AF 2/17

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE...

5
4
3
2
1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1-64 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

RECEIVED
[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG. : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 12 Feb 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 306052

3 52 PM 65

S-E-C-R-E-T

JUN 20 10 11 AM 65

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : LONDON INFO: PARIS, LCPIPIT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO:

- PAGE TWO -

TO LOND INFO: PARI, PALP CITE DIR 84695

4. WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE G TALK ABOUT HIS CONTACTS WITH ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR CHANDERLI IN GREATER DETAIL. WHAT FAVORS DID HE DO FOR CHANDERLI AND VICE-VERSA.

5. ANY INFORMATION ON ORGANIZATION, PERSONALITIES AND ACTIVITIES OF LATIN AMERICAN BUREAU BRUSSELS. ANY INDICATION THIS BUREAU INVOLVED IN TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN ALGERIA?

6. INFORMATION ON RELATIONS OF VERGES WIFE WITH ALGERIANS BITAT AND KHIDER.

7. INFORMATION ON REVOLUTION BUREAUS ABROAD. HOW WERE STAFFS CHOSEN? WHAT ARE THEIR FUNCTIONS, OVERT AND COVERT?

END OF MESSAGE.

CA/B3 - W. Raymond (by phone)
CO/IO - R. Brown (by phone)
AF/1 - C. Baker (in draft)

John Caswell
DCWE(BC)

C/WE/BC/I

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 3

RI ☑ COPY ☐ SUDOIT

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

FROM LONDON

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WE 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, FE6, CA2, CA/O4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/A, FI, FI/SPG, FI/INT2

S E C R E T 04/1802Z

4 FEB 65 IN 73844

DIR INFO PALP PARI CITE LOND 5957

KUDESK LCHARVEST QKOPERA

REF LOND 5867 (IN 71348) *

ABSTRACT

1. JAGUAR STATE (SHAME-FACEDLY) THEY NOW LEARN GIBSON DEPARTED LOND 25 JAN FOR ZURICH.

2. OBVIATES NEED FOR IMMEDIATE PASSAGE FUNDS PER REF, BUT WOULD STILL LIKE KNOW STATUS FAIRMAN/GIBSON RELATIONSHIP PRIOR 15 FEB.

S E C R E T

CFN

* CLARIFICATION INSRUCTIONS GIVEN FAIRMAN

201-306052?

✓ Richard Thomas Gibson's 201-

201-306052

4 Feb 65

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

RI COPY

RI COPY

(35)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, London

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WE

SUBJECT
KUDESK/LCHARVEST
~~Debriefing of Richard T. GIBSON - Transmittal of Requirements~~

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OELA - 42,410, 26 January 1965

1. Forwarded as enclosure are requirements for the debriefing of Subject. Together with the requirements is a KUDESK narrative on VERGES-ANDERSSON-Revolution complex for the background information of Katzenbach. Further background on Revolution can be found, if you have not already done so, in the following dispatches:

OELA - 39,346, 26 Sept '63
OELW - 20,852, 16 Dec '63
OELA - 40,208, 24 Feb '64
OELA - 40,542, 15 Apr '64
OELA - 41,545, 10 Sept '64
OEL - 30,251, 24 Sept '64

2. We have not yet had time to review the tape of your first session with Subject forwarded with Reference, nor do we expect to get a transcription completed in time to reach you by 15 February. The list of names attached to Reference indicate considerable knowledgeability on the part of Subject as well a tendency to pour out his knowledge in a sort of stream of consciousness style. We fear that, if given the opportunity, Subject will take the bit in his teeth and as much money as he can in his hot little hands and be off and running. To prevent this we would like to suggest that the debriefing be set up on a tightly organized, businesslike basis. It would probably be advisable to write up the terms in a Letter of Agreement contract for Subject's signature before getting started, making sure to include a paragraph in which ODYOKE's obligations and promises are limited to the terms specifically enumerated in the document. We think that any meaningful debriefing will take 3 - 5 days, and there is good reason to believe that Subject will have information of sufficient interest to justify this expenditure of Case Officer time. We do not foresee any long range operational relationship with Subject. While we look at the debriefing as basically a one-shot proposition there will probably be follow-up questions and, perhaps, specific action requests, requiring a later contact. Therefore, the communication channel to Subject should be left open on a "don't call us, we'll call you" basis.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE...

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
1 Att CS COPY	OELW - 21869	3 FEB 1965 201-306052 3 February 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 306,052

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS
1 - RI (201-306052)
1 - CI/ICG w/encl
1 - C/CO/IO w/encl
1 - CA/3 w/encl
1 - WE/BC
RID/AN
RID/MIS
~~RID/~~
RID/FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
C/WE/BC/U	John G. Roberts	dab	7220

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/ICG	3 Feb 65	Mr. Goodrich Coord in draft
C/CO/IO	2/3/65	Mr. ~~Brown~~ Brown
~~OFC~~ C/CO	2/4/65	[illegible]
C/CA/3	2/4/65	[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	5 Feb 65	John F. Caswell

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	OELW - 21869

3. In line with the need to put the debriefing on a businesslike (rather than a "flexible") basis, it might be a good idea to start by getting Subject to supply a personal history statement from the time of his first entry into leftist political movements to the present day. (This can be presented to Subject as a basis for us to formulate meaningful questions, not as any sort of personal "confession" on his part.) In addition to providing us with a check on his veracity, this will set the stage for a debriefing conducted on KUBARK's terms, not Subject's. It is important that it be made clear to Subject at the outset that we want facts, not speculation, commentary and analysis.

4. Please charge payments to Subject for the debriefing to Acct. Nr. 5137 - 1468 (Hqs. LCHARVEST OOA). Three hundred dollars for the initial 2½ hours talk with Subject is on the steep side. We are thinking in terms of $700 for five days debriefing with a bonus for a copy of the Revolution mailing list.

JST
JOSEPH S. TIFFANY

for James K. Griffith
STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - Lond w/2cc encl.

FEB [illegible] 22

Narrative

Nils ANDERSSON, Swedish-born resident of Switzerland, heads a printing and publishing establishment ("Editions la Cite") in Lausanne, said to have been set up in 1957 for the printing and distributing of Chinese literature. (This ties in with other information that the firm was established in Switzerland during the Algerian war in order to publish printed matter banned in France.) Since 1963 the firm had been responsible for the English-language edition of Revolution, but in 1964 the printing of the English-language edition was transferred to Paris where Revolution's main office is located. Swiss authorities had ordered ANDERSSON to cease publication of Revolution.

1

Revolution has had a complicated history. It is descended from African Revolution which first appeared in early 1963 in Algeria. Its editor, Jacques VERGES, is a former member of the French CP who broke with that party over the Algerian question. After VERGES, who briefly headed African Revolution, had a falling out with Algerian officials later in 1963 and left that country, he began a new publication in Switzerland using the facilities of the already established ANDERSSON firm. His new publication was called Revolution, sometimes known as Revolution — Asia, Latin America, Africa. (The Algerians continue to publish African Revolution, which has no known connection with Revolution.) Initially both the English and French editions of Revolution were handled by ANDERSSON's firm, but the publishing operations of the French edition were very soon moved to Paris. Later the printing, too, of the French edition was moved to Paris and only the English edition continued to be printed in Switzerland. VERGES and the main offices were located in Paris.*

Currently ANDERSSON is reported to publish Octobre, which is described as the organ of an organization in Switzerland called the "Centre Lenine." Both Octobre and the Centre Lenine are said to be controlled by ANDERSSON, but very little information is available about either. The Centre has been described as a propaganda arm of the Chinese Communists. There is some indication that they also have some connection with pro-Chinese dissident elements of the Spanish CP.

ANDERSSON's firm has also printed Mundo Obrero Revolucionario (MOR),

---

* Although the English edition was printed in Switzerland, its editorial office was also in Paris, headed by Richard GIBSON, American negro. In late May and early June 1964 — when it was already apparent that Swiss authorities were going to close down the printing of Revolution in that country — GIBSON and Alexandre STRELKOFF went to The Netherlands seeking a firm there to print and distribute the English-language edition. It is not known why this effort was made instead of transferring the printing directly to Paris as was ultimately done.

CS COPY

ATT #1 to CELW 21869

201-306052

the clandestine publication of a major pro-Chinese Spanish Communist group called the Partido Comunista Revolucionario. In view of recent reports that the MCR group may merge with one or more of the other dissident Spanish Communist groups and that a joint organ will be published, MCR may soon cease (or may already have ceased) publication. What role ANDERSSON may play in new publication efforts of the pro-Chinese Spanish dissidents is not known.

The clandestine leadership of the Partido Comunista Revolucionario has been located in Lausanne, Switzerland, with some representation also in Paris, but this group has apparently been receiving Chinese financial assistance through the GRIPPA party in Belgium. Another pro-Chinese Spanish group in Switzerland, the Oposicion Revolucionario Comunista located in Geneva, has been publishing *La Chispa*. The *Chispa* group has reportedly been receiving funds from the Chinese Embassy in Bern. Still another pro-Chinese Spanish group, the Agrupacion Comunista Proletario, has been publishing *Proletario*, apparently from Paris but with some representation also reported in Belgium. While the group has apparently had some contact with GRIPPA in Belgium, the Paris-based group at one time at least appeared to be sponsored or aided by VERGES. (GRIPPA has played an active role in trying to bring the different Spanish dissident groups to a merger.)

The relationship between GRIPPA and ANDERSSON, GRIPPA and VERGES, and VERGES and ANDERSSON is anything but clear. Some part of the confusion may result from GRIPPA's driving efforts to function as the director of Chinese political operations in Europe, and to try to bring the activities of others under his control.

a. GRIPPA was once reported to have said he had "lost confidence" in *Revolution*. Among his reported reasons was a belief that VERGES wanted to be designated absolute leader in Europe for the "revolutionary movement." Somewhat later GRIPPA was reported as saying that the Chinese were no longer subsidizing *Revolution* and that it was now being backed by Paris editor Francois MASPERO.

b. GRIPPA or his aides also appear to have been responsible for stories circulating among some pro-Chinese European dissidents that ANDERSSON had been written off by the Chinese as a "Trotskyite." GRIPPA has also been quoted as saying that the printing of MCR would be transferred from Lausanne to Belgium and to GRIPPA's own publishing facility. (This is not known to have taken place.)

c. There have been reports, unexplained, that there is bad blood between VERGES and ANDERSSON.

REQUIREMENTS

ANDERSSON

1. Life story, with particular coverage of the founding of his firm "Editions la Cite" in Switzerland. Dates, contacts, financing. Biographic data also on his wife.

2. Details on "Centre Lenine" and its publication Octobre. Why founded, by whom, how financed, present activities?

3. Details of relationship between ANDERSSON and the MOR group of dissident Spanish Communists. How were they put in contact with each other, how is MOR printing financed? Does ANDERSSON play any role vis-a-vis other Spanish dissident groups?

4. Methods and channels by which he has contact with the Chinese Communists?

5. Full details on the relationship between ANDERSSON and VERGES, past and present?

Revolution

6. How is "Revolution" financed? We should like to have the whole funding situation described: amount of support, from what sources, method of transmittals, payment of editorial and publication costs.

7. Life story of VERGES, with particular coverage of period 1962 to present. Who invited him to Algeria in 1963, why did he quarrel with the Algerians? Who directed him to ANDERSSON in Switzerland, why did Revolution's main office move to Paris? Did VERGES live in Switzerland in 1963. Where and for how long?

8. Why was the English-language edition continued with ANDERSSON's firm?

9. Biographic data on members of editorial staff.
   a. What is the magazine's policy toward the use of stringer correspondents?

10. Relationship of VERGES to pro-Chinese dissident Spanish factions, in particular the group publishing Proletario.

11. Any info on the mechanics of international distribution of Revolution. How are mailing lists compiled? Use of foreign distributors? (NOTE: We are keenly interested in procuring a copy of the mailing list.

12. Methods and channels by which VERGES has contact with the Chinese Communists or any others who currently provide him with backing.

13. With whom does VERGES associate most closely in Paris?

14. With which Algerians is VERGES in contact today. How and where is this contact maintained?

15. Discreet probing on STRELKOFF and his orientation and sponsorship is also indicated.

16. What are the functions of the advisory board of Revolution? Were members chosen by Verges? How do they communicate with VERGES?

17. What guidance if any do the financial sponsors of Revolution give the editorial staff? Do they supply packaged articles? Who decides what articles are to be used in the different language editions?

18. Complete review of GIBSON's relationship with Verges. When and where did they meet, under what circumstances? What briefing did Verges give GIBSON concerning the purposes, sponsorship and line of Revolution?

19. What exactly were the duties of GIBSON in Paris and Lausanne on Revolution?

20. Does "Revolution" grant reprint authorization? If so, do you know of any publications that have carried "Revolution" material?

21. What is the source of photographs used by the magazine?

GRIPPA

22. Explain his relationship to other pro-Chinese dissident factions in Western European CPs. Is he in contact with VERGES? With ANDERSSON? Details.

23. Why was GRIPPA not asked to assist in finding a new printer for the English edition of Revolution?

24. Has he ever made any financial contributions to VERGES or ANDERSSON?

FRONT GROUPS

25. All information available on Lionel Morrison, including biographic data, current status of Gibson-Morrison relationship.

26. All information available on the Afro-Asian Journalists Association, headquartered in Cairo. (Note, an AAJA conference is slated for March in Algiers).
    a. Identify any of the individuals (outside of Morrison) connected with it.
    b. Identify any AAJA contacts in Europe or Africa.

27. Any information on the structure, plans, finances or personalities of the Pan African Journalist's Union, headed by Kofi Baatsi, and headquartered in Accra.

28. Any knowledge of the International Organisation of Journalists, headquartered in Prague. Has GIBSON met any of its officials, or attended any of its meetings.

29. Any direct knowledge of the officers, employees, procedures etc. of Prensa Latina offices in Europe.

30. Any knowledge of the officers and operations of the NCNA offices in Europe and North Africa?

31. Any contact with representatives of, or any knowledge of the propaganda operations of the NFLSV (National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam), which has an office in Algiers?

32. Knowledge of any officers or national leaders of the World Peace Council in Noth Africa or Europe?

Carribean

33. Any current or past contacts with Caribbean revolutionaries? Describe.

34. Info on the present status of the Mouvement de Liberation pour la Zone des Caraibes (MLZC), which has been mentioned by name in the *Economist*.

35. We are interested in the present stage of organization or disorganization of the MLCZ (which has not been heard from for almost two years) and any other info available on the coordination of the anti-colonial struggle in the Caribbean; especially involvement of Cubans, Algerians, Soviets, Trotskyists, others. (See attached dispatch, OCOW-6718, for background on the MLCZ.)

36. Does *Revolution* receive Cuban assistance? Specifically what is the nature of the relationship with *Revolution* in Havana? Contact with Carlos FRANQUI?

Miscellaneous Leftist Groups

37. Describe relationship, and persons involved, of *Revolution* with the *New Left Review* and the Movement for Colonial Freedom in Great Britain. (These

groups have placed ads in the magazine. What did they pay for the space? How?

38. Any info on GIBSON contacts with members of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Switzerland (formerly dissident PDT of Montreux).

39. Did GIBSON or any other member of the Revolution staff ever have dealings with Michael RAPTIS (aka "Pablo") or any of his group? Describe in detail.

40. Any info on the Red Flag and that monthly's editor John Llewellyn DAVIS. Describe contacts between the DAVIS group and Revolution.

41. Any info on, contacts with, the Du Bois group in Ghana? Hammer and Steel in Boston?

Switzerland

42. What American contacts did GIBSON maintain in Lausanne and surroundings, particularly with young students in the area? Any Arab contacts?

43. Describe the Party mechanism to which you belong, if any, in Switzerland. Indentify the individuals involved, meeting places.

Personal Contacts

Biographic data, including current addresses and activities and the status of your relationship with the following individuals and/or groups would be appreciated:

44. Maurice SINE, cartoonist. His past and present role, first in Revolution Africaine and then Revolution. Others in Express crew (e.g. STRELKOV) who went to Algeria? Did all return to France?

45. Do you know any Americans attending the subversive/sabotage school in Prague? Any info on this institution and the indentities of participants would be much appreciated.

46. Rosalynde AINSLIE (London).

47. Mme. Michele MESTRE (Paris) Relationship to VERGES group.

48. F.E.L. DIOKHAI, Rev. bureau man in Nigeria.

49. Hamza ALAVI. Former editorial board who reportedly resigned his post. Circumstances of his resignation? Current position? Revolution Editorial Board Members:

50. BABU

51. Amilcar CABRERA

52. Demba DIALLO

53. Castro da SILVA

54. Martin VALDES

55. Hasan RIAD

56. Maulana Abdul Hamid BHASHANI

57. Marcos FERRER

58. Frene GINWALA, East African residing in London.

59. Carlos LANCA and Patricia McGowan PINHEIRO, reported to be Lanca's wife, in Algeria? Any other current Algerian contacts?

60. Muhamed HARBI, who replaced VERGES as editor of Revolution Africaine.

61. Robert WILLIAMS (American in Peking)

62. Muhamed KHIDER. Was his departure from Algeria related in any way to the depature of VERGES?

63. Sub Sahara Africans, particularly in Guinea, Mali and Ghana, with pro-ChiCom links or sympathies.

64. Holden ROBERTO (Angola)

65. Mario DeAndrade (Angola)

66. Michael TABATA (South Africa)

67. Francois MASPERO, Paris publisher of Partisan. How financed?

68. Andre BELGE. Any connection with Rev.?

69. Nguyen KIEN (or Lan Ngo MANH or Ngo Manh LAN).

Latin America

70. Background circumstances leading to the decision to publish Revolution in Spanish in Bogota.

71. Biographic info on Cesar PALACIOS P., described as editor of the Bogota edition.

72. Mario ARANGO, Director of the Bogota edition.

73. Is it intended to publish a Spanish edition of Revolution in other cities in Latin America? Are any other foreign editions planned?

74. Are articles translated into Spanish in Europe and then sent to Bogota, or is the translated work done in Bogota.

75. How and through whom is the Spanish language edition of Revolucion financed. Details.

76. Biographic info on Jerome FINAMOUR, bureau man in Brazil.

ChiCom Contacts

77. Did you have any contact with the New China News Agency? If so, explain the nature of the relationship and persons with whom you dealt.

78. In the course of your editorial activities did you meet any Chinese Communists? If so, please provide information on the individuals with whom you had contact.

79. Any info on contacts by VERGES and/or other Revolution staff members with NCNA representatives or ChiCom diplomats in Paris or Bern.

80. An account of GIBSON's time in Algiers when he worked on Revolution Africaine would be useful. Also, circumstances under which GIBSON went to Algiers and then to Switzerland to start English-language edition. With whose funds?

☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-306-052
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. J. Brickley

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

24 SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☑ COPY ☐ SUMMARY

FROM
LONDON

ACTION
WE-8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO
VR. FILE, AddP, CI, CI/OPS, CA/O-4, CA-2, FE-6, FI, CI/IC-2

AN | | B3 | | DESTROY
FI
ABSTRACT | | INDEX

RI COPY

SECRET 01/1714Z

PALP INFO DIR PARI CITE LOND 586

1 FEB 65 IN 71348

QKOPERA LCHARVEST KUDESK

1. REQUEST CLARIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN FAIRMAN RE PASSAGE MONEY TO GIBSON AS DISCUSSED WITH SOTHERN 25 JAN.

2. LOND BELIEVES GIBSON HAS NOT YET DEPARTED FOR EUROPEAN TRIP AND HOLD-UP MAY BE DUE NON-RECEIPT 100 POUNDS FROM FAIRMAN. IF NOT INCONSISTENT YOUR LATEST INFO FROM FAIRMAN AND UNLESS HQS OBJECTS SUGGEST LOND CONTACT FAIRMAN AND AUTHORIZE PASSAGE FUNDS NOW RATHER THAN AS STATED DIR 72506.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

201-306052
1 Feb 65

2 FEB 1965

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO. Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE; Chief, AF; Chief, WH; COS, Paris; Chief, LCPIPIT; COS, Brussels

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT LCHARVEST/~~KUDESK~~/JAGUAR
JAGUAR report on GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: OELA-42,410, 26 January 1965

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of JAGUAR's latest report on Richard Thomas GIBSON, which they compiled for us on being informed of our current operational interest in him. We expect that further information will be forthcoming since, as previously noted, they have instituted additional coverage of GIBSON's activities.

2. JAGUAR refer us to their previous reporting on GIBSON, which has been contained in their reports on Revolution. These include OEL-36,105(29 August 1963); OELA-40,542(15 April 1964); OELA-41,545(10 September 1964); OEL-39,251(24 September 1964); OELA-4[illegible],788(20 October 1964).

3. JAGUAR also point out that the paper contains information received from a number of secret sources, and they request that we not give it any distribution beyond KUBARK without consulting them, unless, of course, we have the information from other sources. JAGUAR have made a copy available to ODENVY London.

4. JAGUAR also informed us orally that the persons they suspect to have played a most prominent role in the 1963 charges of GIBSON's CIA affiliation - the two persons referred to in para 3 of their paper - were Rosalynd AINSLIE and Patricia McGOWAN. JAGUAR gave us this information informally and off the record. It is interesting to note that, in Ref, GIBSON agreed that AINSLIE was one but made no mention of McGOWAN.

5. GIBSON spoke of the affair of JAGUAR's para 3 (a) at some length, giving a rather different interpretation, however. Paras 3 (b), (c), and (d) are rather more speculative.

6. JAGUAR also told us, informally, that some of their information on GIBSON, as contained herein, derives from some of his correspondence. The implication is not that JAGUAR has been reading GIBSON's mail, but that, by intercepts or penetrations, they have been reading the mail of some of the

201-306052

[illegible]

1att.

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
27 Jan. 65

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-42,411

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

persons to whom he has written - or, of course, mail of other persons, in which mention is made of GIBSON.

7. As a belated footnote to Ref, we learn that JAGUAR had previously identified the Swiss printer as Nils ANDERSON (see OEL-39,251, 24 September 1964).

8. JAGUAR informed us on 26 January that GIBSON had requested (prior to 23 January) a one-month extension of his residence permit, to enable him to make his proposed European trip and return to the U.K. The extension was granted without demur.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
JAGUAR report, herewith

Distribution:
- 3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, FE w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, WH w/att h/w
- 1-COS, Paris w/att h/w
- 1-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
- 1-COS, Brussels w/att h/w

Richard Thomas GIBSON
Born: Los Angeles on 13.5.31
Address: 30, Stockleigh Hall,
Prince Albert Road, London, N.W.8.

GIBSON has been connected with the pro-Chinese Communist publication "Revolution" and its predecessor, "African Revolution", at least since April, 1963. He made available the following information about himself as part of a publicity campaign planned for "African Revolution" in the first half of 1963:-

1951-52:	worked in Rome for the Mediterranean News Bureau of the "Christian Science Monitor";
1955-58:	editor with the English language service of "Agence France Presse" in Paris;
1958:	arrested by the French authorities because of his work for the Algerian National Liberation Front;
1959-60:	returned to the U.S.A. and employed by the C.B.S. News in New York until dismissed because of his pro-Cuban activities;
	awarded a C.B.S. fellowship in African Studies at Columbia University;
1960-September, 1962:	Executive Secretary of the "Fair Play for Cuba" Committee in the U.S.A.

2. In 1963, GIBSON lived in Lausanne, where "African Revolution" and subsequently the English edition of "Revolution" were printed, but he paid frequent visits to "Revolution's" Paris office until the end of the year when "Revolution" was banned in Switzerland and he was refused permission to continue to live there. He then settled in Paris where, according to one report, he and his wife lived in "quite a luxurious flat". It would, however, be wrong to infer from this that GIBSON's means enabled him to enjoy high living standards, as another source subsequently reported that he had not paid any rent for the flat from May to October, 1964.

3. As far back as August, 1963, there were rumours in Communist circles in London that GIBSON was an American agent and that he had provided United States Intelligence with the names of certain unidentified United States negroes in accordance with a brief received from the Americans. Information from a well-placed source suggests that these rumours may have originated from the jealous reactions of two persons, connected with "Revolution", whose aspirations with the publication were cut short when GIBSON became Editor of the English edition. However, by mid-1964, VERGES, the Editorial Director of "Revolution", was claiming that complaints about GIBSON's activities had been received not only from London, but also from Cuba, American negroes in New York and a relative of GIBSON's who was working for the magazine "Spark" in Ghana. As a result, GIBSON was dismissed from the editorial staff of "Revolution". Charges made against him include the following:-

/ (a) ...

att #16
OELA-42411

CS COPY

201-306052

(a) denouncing, in 1958, an unidentified negro, possibly a Communist, who was expelled from France;

(b) informing the publication's contacts in China that "Revolution" was disintegrating;

(c) providing "Newsweek" and the "New York Herald Tribune" with information in an attempt to discredit "Revolution";

(d) connections with the C.I.A.

Although GIBSON has denied the charges made against him, he realises that they have stuck and that it will be some years before he will be acceptable to any left wing organisation.

4. Having failed to find employment in Paris after leaving "Revolution" in July, 1964, GIBSON went to the United Kingdom on 7th October and was joined later by his British wife, Joy Marjorie, and his two children. He hoped to find work in London, but at the end of November, he was still without a job and dependent on his wife's family, who were paying the rent of his flat at 30, Stockleigh Hall, Prince Albert Road, London, N.W.8. It is now known whether GIBSON has been able to find employment.

5. Nothing is known at present about GIBSON's contacts in the United Kingdom. Although during the time he worked for "Revolution" he was in touch with members of the pro-Chinese Communist splinter group in the United Kingdom - the Committee to Defeat Revisionism, for Communist Unity - it is not known whether he has resumed contact. It has been reported that he still keeps in touch with the coloured South African journalist, Lionel MORRISON, who is employed by the Chinese-backed Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (A.A.J.A.) in Djakarta.

Comment: "Afro-Asian Journalist", no. 4, dated July, 1964, and published by the A.A.J.A.,
Para. 5: contains an article "Two Revolutionary Journals" by MORRISON, the journals being "Revolution" and "Spark".

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief, WE

INFO.

Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE; Chief, AF; Chief, WE; COS, Paris; Chief, LCPIPIT; COS, Brussels

FROM

Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT

KUDESK/LCHARVEST/REVOLUTION
Tape of Interview with Richard Thomas GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: LOND 5706, 21 January 1965

1. Attached is the tape of the interview with GIBSON, recorded in an Embassy office, using a Uher 4000 Report - 5 recorder, recording at a speed of 15/16 feet per minute. The interviewer used the alias of Earl Wilson. Gibson arrived at 1745 and departed at about 2030.

2. We are not attempting to summarize or analyze GIBSON's comments in this dispatch. The tape provides a much more revealing picture than our subjective comments could. A few notes, however, appear to be in order.

3. Speaking of his departure, GIBSON said he planned to leave London on 24 or 25 January. As of noon 24 January, at least, he was still in London because I saw him walking on St. John's Wood High Street. (A potential problem exists here: GIBSON and I live within a few blocks of one another and not infrequently ride the same bus line. This problem can only be met when it manifests itself.) JAGUAR, incidentally, has alerted its immigration contacts (prior to our meeting with GIBSON) and requested that his name be put on a watch list. They said that they would inform us if they learn that he has left the country. We have not yet heard that he has left.)

4. GIBSON was given money amounting to $300. Under the circumstances of his plans, as he expressed them, it seemed reasonable to do so, to ensure, at least partially, that he would come back to talk more. He was more than willing to take the money and raised the initial suggestion of $200 to $300 or $400. His obvious shift in his line regarding dollars (as opposed to pounds) is further indicative of his willingness to get what he could.

5. The considerable number of names mentioned by GIBSON makes the transcription of the notes a sizable chore, and in order to lessen this burden a listing has been compiled of almost all of the names, in the order in which they appear in the tape, with the exception of VERGES and the Free Play for Cuba Committee, CBS and a few others. The names appear only one time each on the list, although many of them crop up repeatedly in the tape.

201-306052

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 26 Jan. 65

DATE DISPATCHED: 27 [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-42,410.

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Gatts.

A few of the phrases that do not appear too clearly on the tape are included on the list. Occasionally the names are written phonetically, indicated by (ph.).

6. GIBSON's offer of a photograph of VERGES was not accepted, on the assumption that KUBARK already has a photo. If this is not the case, let us know, and we will include that in our requirements for a subsequent meeting.

7. The Afro-Asian Journalists Association man is apparently Lionel MORRISCN. He is also referred to as the "man from Djakarta". (See LOND 5575 of 12 January 1965.)

8. The reference to the Cultural Attache of the Cuban Embassy corroborates (rather, is corroborated by) the material referred to in para 4 of LOND 5337 (22 December 1965). We are not fully aware of the Cuban's political orientation, however,

9. In reviewing the tape, it will become apparent that the arrangements with GIBSON were left fairly flexible for the future. It would appear, from his responses, that a longer range relationship with him could, in fact, be established if, after thorough review of his materials, that seems necessary or desirable.

10. We will expect, in addition to the requirements that have been promised, that Headquarters will advise us on their desire to arrange for the one-shot approach previously suggested by Headquarters, or a different arrangement. We are unable to assess the validity or worth of all the comments he made. Our impression, however, is that he is reasonably knowledgeable of a number of fields of interest to us. We also suspect that in some areas his knowledge is quite superficial. His access to various areas of potential interest may be partially proved by his trip around Europe and should be a useful indication of how we may be interested in playing him. The possibility of his being a provocation has not been overlooked, of course, and we welcome Headquarters' comments on this score as well.

11. We would also appreciate further comments on various personalities, with whom we are not familiar - "Anderson" is the most obvious in this category.

12. Headquarters is requested to provide us with a transcription of this tape, as well as the promised requirements, prior to 15 February. ODENVY should also be provided with as much of the material as is of interest to them, and a copy of that material should be given to us to pass to the ODENVY office here. We are also obliged to pass to JAGUAR such elements of this material as is of legitimate concern to them. In this case, we would suggest that this be interpreted rather liberally and Headquarters-prepared copy be forwarded along with the other items listed above. (Note that JAGUAR has been quite cooperative while we have been approaching this case, and their recent run-down on GIBSON is being pouched almost simultaneously with this dispatch.)

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment: herewith
1-List of names
2-Tape (WE only)

Gibson was not aware that the interview was being taped.

Distribution:
1~~3~~-Chief, WE w/att +2 h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, FE w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-Chief, WH w/att h/w
1-COS, Paris w/att h/w
1-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
1-COS, Brussels w/att h/w

Attachment to OELA-42,410
26 January 1965

List of names on tape, approximately in order of appearance:

PRJTO - "very silly man in Paris"
"next to Balmain"

"PR stunt"

"told by ANDERSON"

DELDUCCA (ph.)

to BABU

in POMPIDOU's office

Rabah BITAT

Zohra DRITT (ph.)

Revolution Africaine

Djamila BOUHIRED

Bill GRIFFITHS

French DST

articles for Encounter

Jerome LANDON (ph.)

Edition Lingui (very ph.)

Argument

Reunion Island

Hachete

Ngo Kanh LAN - Nguyen KIEN

Mr. SOONG

Fanonist - FANON

ODINGA of Kenya

Robert LEHMAN

Dennis POMBEYE of Tanzania Foreign Office

BABU and HANGA

Rosalynd AINSLIE

Sen BASHID (??ph.)

Jack WODDIS

Kay BEAUCHAMP (ph.)

POMBEYE (again)

CHANDRA (Algierian Ambassador to UN - ph.)

SARTRE saw Fidel

att #16
OELA-42410

CS COPY
SECRET

201-306052

Dienbienphu - Evian

GPRA

Ollie HARRINGTON (the comment "You take Harrington" means "You use Harrington's name.")

Pittsburgh Courier

Richard WRIGHT

William ___________ SMITH - Ghana television

C. L. R. JAMES

George PADMORE

AFP

Miles STEWART

Tony BLOND (ph.)

Tony HAGEN

(Robert) WILLIAMS

Bayard RUSTIN

Emmet TILL

PATTERSON

ANDERSON (again)

(Jacques) GRIPPA

Veuvey

Bill WORTHY (ph.)

Monthly Review

??? SUBERMAN and Paul SWEAZEY (ph.)

Centre d'Etudes et Documentation de Marseilles

Amitie Franco-Chinoise

Clichy

BEAULIEU

TSHOMBE

ADOULA

Bob TABER

Cleanth BROOKS

Carlos FRANQUI

Leo LABEDZ

Ved MEHTA

Magnum

Week - published in Nottingham

☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ~~24~~ 41

27 SECRET GROUP 1

RI ☑ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM LONDON

ACTION WE 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE CA 2, CA/O 4, FE 6, ADDP, CI, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, AF 4, DO 4, DO/H 3, FI, CCS 3

RI COPY

S E C R E T 211612Z

21 JAN 65 IN 64592

DIR INFO PALP PARI CITE LOND 5706

LCHARVEST KUDESK

REF DIR 78506

AF | 1 | A
ABSTRACT X

1. LOND OFFICER, POSING AS ODYOKE TDY FROM WASH, ARRANGED FOR GIBSON COME EMBASSY FOR INTERVIEW. G, WITHOUT ASKING QUESTIONS, CAME WILLINGLY FOR INTERVIEW, WHICH LASTED OVER TWO HOURS, MOSTLY SQUIRT TRANSMISSION WITH DIRECTIONAL PRODS FROM INTERVIEWER.

2. G VEHEMENTLY, REPEATEDLY AND APPARENTLY SINCERELY VOLUNTEERED HIS CONVICTION THAT NO CHICOM FUNDS, OTHER THAN 3000 SUBSCRIPTIONS, SUPPORTING REVOLUTION, ALTHOUGH VERGES HAS LONG HOPED ENTICE THEM TO DO SO. IN GENERAL TERMS, G COVERED HISTORY HIS INVOLVEMENT ANTI-COLONIALIST AFFAIRS SINCE 1958 - ALGERIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PARI, FPCC WORK IN NEW YORK, TRAVEL ALGIERS AND SUBSEQUENT VICISSITUDES WITH REVOLUTION.

201-306052
22 JAN 1965

3. G LEAVING NEXT FEW DAYS TO TRAVEL EUROPE, TO INTERVIEW VARIOUS LEFTISTS AND COMMIES (INCL GRIPPA) AS WELL AS NUMBER OF PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH PRODUCTION OF REVOLUTION. LATTER

SECRET

RECEIVED
RID/MIS
JUN 4 3 PM '65

IN ORDER PRY FURTHER INTO VERGES' FINANCIAL CONDITION AND SOURCE OF REVOLUTION FINANCING, WHICH G BELIEVES HAS BEEN FROM ALGERIAN SOURCES VIA SUISSE. WILL TALK WITH "LITTLE MAN WHO DOES MANY THINGS FOR CHICOMS IN BERN" FNU ANDERSON, WHO ONE OF G'S BEST SOURCES ON VERGES RELATIONSHIP CHINESE BERN. WILL BE AWAY FROM LOND TILL ABOUT 15 FEB WHEN NEXT CONTACT SCHEDULED. STA GAVE G 300 DOLLARS TO HELP PAY COSTS OF TRIP, MAKE SURE HIS FUTURE COOPERATION. G SAYS HE EXPECTS RECEIVE 100 POUNDS FROM FAIRMAN 300 DOLLARS FROM ATLANTIC MONTHLY, WHICH WILL ALSO MAKE TRIP POSSIBLE. HAS AGREED PROVIDE MANUSCRIPTS AND, IF WAY CAN BE FOUND GET THEM OUT WITHOUT AROUSING WIFE'S SUSPICION, SEVERAL BOXES OF CARDS WHICH CONSTITUTE MAILING LIST.

4. DISPATCH WILL FOLLOW, PLUS TAPES (FOR DIR ONLY) OF MEETING.

SECRET

CFN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-306052

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☒ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. LUR

FROM PARIS

ACTION CA/O4

INFO VR. FILE, CA 2, CA/PROP, WE 6, FE 6, CI/IC 2, RF/AN

SECRET

GROUP 1

31

RI ☑ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

ABSTRACT RI INDEX DESTROY

S E C R E T 201543Z

LOND INFO DIR PALP CITE PARI 8742
KOBIRD LCHARVEST DIDCRIC QKOPERA KUDESK

RE A LOND 5652 (IN 61219)

B PALP 3873 (IN 60705)

20 JAN 65 IN 63559

1. PARI CONCURS REF A.

2. PALP INFORMS US GIBSON LETTER (REF B PARA 1) NOT BEING PUBLISHED. HOWEVER LETTER ITSELF PROMPTS FOLL STA QUESTIONS: (A) DOES GIBSON BELIEVE OWN DENIALS OF CHICOM SUPPORT "REVOLUTION"? IF SO HE LESS WELL INFORMED THAN WE HOPED. NOTE HE OFFERS NO EXPLANATION FOR MAGAZINE FINANCIAL RECOVERY, WHICH RECENT PRICE REVISIONS AND BI-MONTHLY ISSUE UTTERLY FAIL EXPLAIN. (B) IF GIBSON DELIBERATELY FALSIFYING QUESTION CHICOM SUPPORT, WHAT WERE HIS MOTIVES SINCE HE PRESUMABLY HOPED LETTER BE PUBLISHED?

3. OFPA 77970 (POUCHED HQS 18 JAN, LOND 20 JAN) PROVIDES BACKGROUND MATERIAL INCLUDING MEMO GIBSON CONVERSATION WITH GOSSETT, AMEMBASSY PARI.

4. INDEX 201-306052.

20 Jan 65

201-306052

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, London

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WE

SUBJECT DTDORIC LCHARVEST KUDESK
Transmittal copy of Gibson Letter to KUBARK

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: DIR 78506

As stated in reference we forward herewith copy of Gibson's letter which the Station might consider using ultimately to establish bona fides if other means of establishing bona fides (such as phone call to Embassy) does not satisfy Gibson. London case officer in showing the letter to Gibson need not admit to or represent himself as a member of KUBARK, though Gibson might well make that assumption.

STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - London
(w/att U.S.C.)
T.N.

201- 306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO
GR COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELW-21828

DATE 21 JAN 1965
19 January 1965

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T-

HQS FILE NUMBER
201 - 306052

1 - RI w/att
1 - WE/BC

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	595
RID/[illegible]	
[illegible]	
RID/[illegible]	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WE/BC(U)	John G. Roberts	jb	7220

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	19 Jan '65	John G. Roberts JOHN F. CASWELL

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WE ATTN: Chief, FE

INFO.: Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT: KOBIRD/LCHARVEST/UNBOUND - Identity A, formerly employed by Identity B

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: PARI 8052

NOTE: The following round-up and commentary on Iden A had been drafted before PALP 3017 of 6 January 1965 and later traffic presented the case in a somewhat different light. We forward the following anyway, as some of the background and suggestions still seem pertinent. Several questions raised below have now been resolved, notably the allegation of an Iden A/KUBARK link (explained by the ODENVY letter of 1 December 1964, not available when the following was written). Copies of recent PALP correspondence on Iden A, passed to us on 13 January 1965, are attached as Attachment 3, USC.

1. Upon receiving the memorandum cited in the reference, we requested further details from UNBOUND, stressing our interest in the report that CPUSA members had given IDEN C documents which showed IDEN A belonged to "the services of KUBARK". D/5986 of 30 December 1964, UNBOUND's answer to our query, merely reiterates that the UNBOUND source, a good one, based the report on a "communication of documents" by American Communists to IDEN C, which supposedly established that IDEN A belonged to KUBARK; UNBOUND states that the source is not in a position to identify the persons in question. UNBOUND's reply suggests the information might have come from an audio operation; we might mention here that IDEN A has appeared occasionally on UNPAY, but never in an informative way. A mail intercept might also be the source of UNBOUND's report, or it may have come from a third service (conceivably JAGUAR or SMOTH).

2. Our continuing preoccupation with the IDEN A question is three-fold: (a) his expulsion from IDEN B (and thus from acceptance by pro-Peiping groups) opens the door for his possible recruitment; (b) we would like to determine whether his ouster was engineered by personal enemies or whether he actually did work for an intelligence service, and which one; (c) as Peiping regards the USA as its primary target, the Chinese can be expected to continue propaganda attacks designed to create IDEN D tension and inflame the Afro/Asians

Attachments:
1. Excerpt from RFE research bulletin, 19 Nov 64, h/w
2. Memorandum of Conversation, USC
3. Letters dated 4 and 6 Jan 65, USC
4. Identities, USC

S/C attached in RI/AN

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WE w/atts
~~2 - Chief, FE w/atts~~ 4 atts
2 - COS, London w/atts

CS COPY

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFPA - 77970

DATE: 15 January 1965

JAN 18 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

against the U.S.A. While domestic effects of such propaganda are properly handled by ODENVY, the manipulation of IDEN Ds to further Chinese propaganda abroad becomes KUBARK's concern.

3. KUBARK's recruitment of IDEN A, or establishment of controlled access to him, could be extremely useful in countering attempts to undermine the USA with the Afro-Asians. IDEN A presumably still has a reasonably up-to-date idea of IDEN B plans in this regard, and he must know the names and locations of many persons involved. The most effective approach to IDEN A would probably be through an offer of money (his history indicates venality, and at present he appears to be in financial difficulties), and by stressing his chance to get even with IDEN C. The purity of IDEN A's Communism is open to question and should not impede recruitment; a more formidable obstacle to a successful operation is his possible connection with a foreign intelligence service. This could be a Western service but might also be the Soviets, for whom he would serve the dual purpose of causing trouble for the USA and at the same time reporting on the Chinese propaganda machine; it is a matter of record that the Soviets view IDEN B seriously. Whatever the basis for a KUBARK approach to IDEN A, it would require careful security planning, taking cognizance of his instability and his known attitude toward ODYOKE as an IDEN D.

4. "Revolution" has featured articles by three American Negroes, Richard GIBSON, Robert Franklyn WILLIAMS, and Malcolm X, all obviously intended to prejudice readers against the USA on ground of racial injustice. All three men are or have been involved with foreign Communists: GIBSON and WILLIAMS with the Chinese and the Cubans, notably, and Malcolm X with the Chinese and various African Communists (actual or crypto). The "New York Herald Tribune" of 4 January 1965 reported Malcolm's statement that he hopes to "internationalize" the American Negro problem, and that he claims to have influenced several African governments to make representations in the U.N. against the USA's treatment of its Negroes. This may be a foretaste of Chinese plans for foreign exploitation of this issue; Malcolm was interviewed by "Revolution" in Cairo, which has since proved its enthusiastic anti-Americanism.

5. OFP-14693 reports that Philip BART, a pro-Soviet official of the CPUSA, stated in December 1964 that the CPUSA has positive proof that four members of their Chinese faction are being paid by the Chinese Communists. (It is perhaps relevant to note here that the advent of "Revolution" was hailed by letters to the Editor from American leftists, including the FPCC; according to OFPA-37875, Vincent T. LEE of "All Worlds Publications" in New York City takes subscriptions for "Revolution"). It is hard to say where IDEN A enters into the clouded picture of American Communist partisanship in the Sino/Soviet rift, but in view of his shifting allegiances he may have divulged to pro-Soviet CPUSA members, or to the Soviets themselves, information on Chinese subversion in the USA. The October 1964 issue of "Hammer & Steel Newsletter" is cited by the Radio Free Europe research bulletin of November 1964 in the latter's review of pro-Chinese factions among Western Communist Parties; RFE research describes "Hammer & Steel" as a monthly produced in Boston by a small American faction. (Portions of the RFE research bulletin with its citations from "Hammer & Steel" are attached as Attachment 1). The marked paragraph from "Hammer & Steel" hits at the idea of white nations' inherent superiority; this is consistent with China's claim of a bond among the colored peoples of the world, which permits such effective anti-Soviet propaganda as the cover of "Revolution" for May 1964, which shows KHRUSHCHEV saying, "We, the whites...".

No. That was Strelkoff

6. IDEN C's denunciation of IDEN A may have been at least partially caused by suspicion he was trying to gain control of IDEN E; it will be recalled that very shortly before his ouster, IDEN A was in Holland negotiating for that type of printing equipment (HAGU 6137 and OCHA 23818). He is now living in London; he has presumably been obliged to find work there (unless he actually is on an intelligence payroll), and he may have landed with some leftist publishing outfit or even with the CPUK, which is sufficiently divided to afford room for his current views, whatever they may be. In addition to IDEN A's potential for reporting on Chinese propaganda efforts, his uses as a penetration of British or other European Communist publishing circles are obvious.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	OFPA 77970

7. UNBOUND reported that American Communists had allegedly given IDEN C documents showing IDEN A worked for KUBARK. One explanation of this allegation may lie in IDEN A's visit to the American Embassy, Paris, in late 1963, at the request of Mr. John G. GOSSETT, then Acting Consul General. GOSSETT was interested in any information he might have on possible connections between IDEN F, with which IDEN A had been connected, and President Kennedy's assassination. (A copy of GOSSETT's Memorandum of Conversation is attached under separate cover as Attachment 2; his appraisals of IDEN A and his reservations concerning his motives are interesting). IDEN A and GOSSETT had a far-ranging talk, including what may have been a tentative feeler by IDEN A for ODYOKE employment. It seems likely that IDEN A would have reported an American Embassy inquiry to his friends in IDEN F, and he may even have mentioned the possibility of future "work" for ODYOKE, which could have led to eventual allegations that he had been recruited by KUBARK. This is of course speculation, but IDEN A's flexible loyalties and liking for money are surely known to his colleagues, and, if he had already aroused antagonism among them, the Embassy visit would serve as a peg for sincere or expedient denunciation.

8. We can shed no light on the allegation that IDEN G is a KUBARKER (LOND 5337). Our only trace is OELA 39346, stating he is IDEN H. We are not clear as to the relationship between IDEN A, IDEN G, and IDEN I, also mentioned in OELA 39346, which states she "appears to be" IDEN A's wife. According to ODENVY Paris, however, IDEN A is married to IDEN J. OEL 39251 of September 1964 reported that IDEN A and his wife (unnamed) had successfully sued IDEN B for salary arrears; the fact that the wife was also employed recalls the IDEN I professional status, which might make her operationally significant whether or not she is married to IDEN A.

Ann E. Ducote

Ann E. DUCOTE

WH

Believe IDEN "G" does not exist, & that someone confused him with IDEN "A".

Iden "I"* is wife of IDEN "A"
She is British and not negro
Don't believe there is an IDEN "J"; again there must have been confusion, and her name is that given for IDEN "I"

Att. to: OFFA - 77970, HW

RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

November 17, 1964

United States

One of the most violent reactions came from the heartland of capitalism, from the small American faction which produces the monthly Hammer & Steel Newsletter in Boston. The October issue of the mimeographed bulletin vengefully gives a list of eight reasons why Khrushchev fell -- each one a vindictive crow of triumph, and many attacking not only Khrushchev but basic Soviet policies such as "the distortion of peaceful coexistence." Points 2, 3 and 8 will serve as illustrations:

2. His German policy -- Khrushchev sought to ingratiate himself with West Germany. He was obviously ready to sell out the German Democratic Republic...

3. The declining influence of the CPSU among the Socialist countries and the Communist Parties. The proposed Moscow gathering was shaping up as a conference of only those Party leaders ready to openly serve U.S. imperialist aggression against the national liberation struggles. For example, Asian supporters of Khrushchev could have gathered in a telephone booth.

8. The nuclear success of People's China. Khrushchev had maintained that nuclear power was the exclusive responsibility of revisionists and imperialists -- of white nations. Khrushchev's great power chauvinism was blown sky high in Sinkiang Province.

Although there is no evidence that the politically insignificant Hammer & Steel group enjoys any direct support from the Chinese (as the Russians alleged in their "Open Letter" of July 14, 1963), it has always offered its allegiance to Peking in the most extreme form. This is expressed again in the claim that "Khrushchev's failure to recognize the contradiction between the oppressed peoples and imperialism as the focal contradiction of our time resulted in blindness concerning the leading rôle of the Chinese Party."[8] This is a claim that the Chinese themselves would not want to make, expecially at this juncture.

att #16
OFPA-77970

CS COPY

201-306052

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-306052

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. WTC

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM PARIS (LCPIPIT)

ACTION CA/04

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO VR. FILE CA2, WE 6 1126, FI, CI, CI/INT, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H5, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 151646Z

DIR INFO LOND PARI BRUS CITE PALP 3073 (CILIBERTI ACTING)

DTDORIC QKOPERA LCHARVEST KUDESK

REF A. DIR 76497 (IN 58385)

B. LOND 5575 (ALSO PER BASTEAR)

AN ABSTRACT ~~INDEX~~ ~~DESTROY~~

all 201

15 JAN 65 IN 60705

1. AIRMAILING TO BASYUAR KATZENBACH LETTER WRITTEN TO ENCOUNTER BY GIBSON AT LASKY'S INVITATION RE FINANCIAL BACKING OF REVOLUTION. LASKY WILL NOT RPT NOT PUBLISH SINCE OBVIOUSLY WOULD BURN BRIDGES BETWEEN GIBSON AND OLD COLLEAGUES.

2. SABA LCPIPIT SUGGEST FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION:

A. KUBARKER UNDER ODACID POLITICAL OFFICER COVER GET ALL POSSIBLE INFO OUT OF GIBSON USING NECESSARY MINIMUM FINANCIAL INDUCEMENT. DEBRIEFING SHOULD START ASAP AND RELATIONSHIP SHOULD CONTINUE AS LONG AS FRUITFUL (LASKY FEELS GIBSON, AS "RACIAL REVOLUTIONIST, ENTHUSIAST AND OPPORTUNIST" WOULD RESPOND BADLY TO OPEN KUBARK PITCH);

B. MEANWHILE LASKY GIVE GIBSON 100 POUND GRANT TO TRAVEL AND PREPARE ARTICLES WHICH WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED UNTIL EVIDENT THAT GIBSON BURNED AMONG FORMER CONTACTS;

C. WHEN EVIDENT GIBSON BURNED AND FI POTENTIAL EXHAUSTED

SECRET

15 Jan 65

201-306052

RI COPY RI COPY RI COPY RI COPY

SECRET

IN-60705
PAGE 2 of 2.

ENCOUNTER AND OTHER CONGRESS PUBLICATIONS WOULD TRY FOR MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA IMPACT GIBSON'S WRITINGS.

3. APPREC ADDRESSEES REACTIONS ABOVE.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

4. HQS KEENLY INTERESTED KUBARK DEBRIEFING SUBJ.

FEB 3 2 25 PM '65

FEB 3 11 03 PM '65

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : A. GOODRICH
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 14 JAN 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

43 S-E-C-R-E-T

2 6
3 7
8

☐ ~~DESTROY~~
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

TO : LONDON BRUSSELS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CI/IC 2

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, FE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, WE 6, FI/INT 2, [illegible]

RI COPY

TO LOND INFO BRUS CITE DIR

77493

KUDESK LCHARVEST DTDORIC

FRIEND

RE LOND 5575 (IN 58385)*

DIR 76497**

WHILE APPRECIATE ANY INFO AVAILABLE JAGUAR, HQS HAS VOLUMINOUS FILE ON GIBSON WHICH ADEQUATE BASIS FOR LONDON STATION'S DIRECT CONTACT WITH GIBSON NOW TO DETERMINE AVAILABILITY AND PRICE FOR ONE WEEK DEBRIEFING BY ODYOKE OFFICIAL ON CONTINENT. WISH CONTACT HIM NOW WHILE HE UNEMPLOYED AND ~~[illegible]~~ PROBABLY AVAILABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

*CITED INFO FROM JAGUAR RE GIBSON.

**REQUESTED LOND STATION CONTACT GIBSON DETERMINE HIS AVAILABILITY FOR DEBRIEFING.

AN 5B FI
RS

AF 1/h

201-306052

John Caswell
DCWE(BC)

FE/CH ~~[illegible]~~ SMITH
[illegible] BY PHONE
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WE/BC/C

RELEASING OFFICER [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] E-[redacted]-[redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted] AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 1-64 1389a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(35)

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-306052
X-REF TO FILE NO 201-725837
FILE RID ☒ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. WP

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (100)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☒ COPY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM LONDON

ACTION CA/O 4

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, CA 2, WE 6, FE 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/SPG, FI/INT 2, CI/IC 2

2P

RI COPY

SECRET 121737Z

DIR INFO PALP PARI BRUS CITE LOND 5575 (CAWOOD ACTING)

XUDESK LCHARVEST DIDO[illegible]

REF A. DIR 76457

B. BRUS 1858 (NOT SEN[illegible]

AN | PS | FI | ABSTRACT | ~~INDEX~~ | ~~DESTROY~~

all 201

12 JAN 65 5838

MICROFILMED FEB 10 1965 DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. MATTER DISCUSSED BROAD TERMS WITH JAGUAR. EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT GIBSON OF CURRENT INTEREST TO US, WITH POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES WHICH NOT YET RESOLVED. WOULD APPRECIATE THEIR READINGS CURRENT ACTIVITIES, ATTITUDES, ETC BY CHANCE THEY HAVE RECENTLY DIRECTED THAT FULLER INFO BE GATHERED ON SUBJECT, IN SUPPORT OF CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INFO CURRENTLY IN HAND. WILL MAKE AVAILABLE ROUND-UP ON SUBJ WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. ITEMS CITED FROM MEMRORY BY JAGUAR REP: GIBSON DOES NOT YET HAVE JOB; NOT STAYING WITH KAYE (IN-LAW), BUT IN SEPARATE FLAT WITH WIFE AND KIDS; KAYE (BROTHER-IN-LAW) HAD BEEN SUBSIDIZING GIBSONS; GIBSON CORRESPONDING WITH (NEGRO) SOUTH AFRICAN ANC ACTIVITIST CURRENTLY IN INDONESIA WITH AFRO-ASIAN JOURNALISTS ORG, LIONEL MORRISON (201-725837); THERE OBVIOUSLY EXTREMELY BAD BLOOD BETWEEN GIBSON AND JACQUES VERGES (VERGES WAS IN LONDON IN DECEMBER

SECRET

12 Jan. 65

B-201-725837

201-306052

14-00000

SECRET

IN 58385 pg. 2

64; JAGUAR TRYING FIND OUT WHOM HE VISITED BUT THINK HE DID NOT SEE GIBSON); GIBSON HAS CONTACTED BBC IN SEARCH OF JOB AND AT LEAST ONE PERSON OF "PREVIOUS RECORD" AS LEFTIST; JAGUAR HAVE COPIES OF SEVERAL OF GIBSON'S LETTERS OVER PAST YEAR; JAGUAR VERY CURIOUS ABOUT WHERE GIBSON'S MONEY IN PAST CAME FROM, SINCE HE LIVED IN VERY ELEGANT STYLE IN PARIS.

3. LOND FEELS DECISION RE DIRECT APPROACH TO GIBSON SHOULD BE DEFERRED AT LEAST PENDING FUTHER ANALYSIS INFO DUE TO BE RECEIVED. TOLD JAGUAR WE KNOW GIBSON IN TOUCH MACFARQUHAR AND CAN ASK SMOTH PROVIDE FURTHER INFO THIS CHANNEL IF MACFARQUHAR NOT ALSO IN TOUCH JAGUAR, BUT PREFER KEEP QUERIES IN ONE PLACE. WILL DEFER QUERY OF SMOTH TILL THIS POINT RESOLVED.

4. VIEW FOREGOING, NO PRESENT NEED THESSIN LOND. WILL ADVISE IF SERVICES REQUIRED. APPRECIATE REF B.

5. ODENVY/LOND BEING KEPT INFORMED AND MOST COOPERATIVE.

6. FURTHER INFO FROM JAGUAR WILL BE FORWARDED SOONEST.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

FEB 4 11 08 PM '63

(When Filled In) PROCESSING COPIES

☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-306052

X REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☒ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG UR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

☑ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM London

ACTION AF 7

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, WE 6, FE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2,

C O P Y

S E C R E T 061550Z

DIR INFO PALP PARI CITE LOND 5512 CAWOOD ACTING

10 Jan 65 IN 56408

ZIBET LCHARVEST OKOPERA

REF A. LOND 5337 (IN 47512)

B. PALP 3017 (IN 55241)

AN

ABSTRACT

RI

INDEX

DESTROY

1. WHILE LOND HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT DTLEAFAGE/GIBSON TIE UP, SUGGEST DEFER DECISION TILL MORE INFO IN HAND. REF B DEVELOPMENT WOULD SEEM PROVIDE USEFUL MEANS GETTING MORE THOROUGH ASSESSMENT OF GIBSON (VIA SMOTH/MACFARQUHAR) AND IT WOULD BE INTERESTING KNOW HOW HE GOT ONTO MACFARQUHAR.

2. VIEW MACFARQUHAR ASSOCIATION SMOTH AND CONTINUED JAGUAR INTEREST GIBSON AND REVOLUTION, WOULD APPRECIATE HQS' PERMISSION DISCUSS WITH SMOTH AND JAGUAR. WILL BE SEEING APPROPRIATE JAGUAR OFFICER 12 JAN AND WOULD LIKE DISCUSS AT THAT TIME.

S E C R E T

CDN 5512 5337 3017 DTLEAFAGE/GIBSON REF B GIBSON VIA SMOTH/ MACFARQUHAR MACFARQUHAR SMOTH JAGUAR HQS' 12 JAN

BT

8 Jan 65

201-306052

RI COPY

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

RI COPY RI COPY

(35)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

7 January 197 5
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on GIBSON, Richard (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☒ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ______ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Robert W MAYHEW (name) Ops/Off (title) EUR/ROG (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed Km (initials) 22 Jan (date) 1975

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-306052

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

SECRET 23 Dec (date) 1974

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on GIBSON (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☑ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ______ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Barbara Bush (name) IA (title) SS/CAG/PAB (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed EH (initials) 8 Jan (date) 1975

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-306052

SECRET

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

14-00000
104-10217-10223 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

(WHEN MATERIAL INSERTED)

BLACK TAPE 201 FILE

TO: IP/Files, GC-52

FROM: EUR /RMO, 4B4402 6771
(Rm. #) (Ext.)

TO BE OPENED BY Personnel of EUR/ROG ONLY!
(DON 5-50 Designation)

VOL. V of VII enclosed.

Inclusive Dates of Enclosed Material (Multi-Vols. Only):

From 1 July 65 to Dec 68
(Date) (Date)

I certify that the enclosed 201 volume has been checked before sealing to ensure that the material is arranged in chronological order, duplicates have been removed, each Record Copy has been properly input to the DO Records System, and that all Record Copy material in this volume is classified to this file. Form 2021 to restrict this file is attached hereto.

(Signature of RMO)

201- 306052

FORM 11-73 3299 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-20)

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

THIS VOLUME CLOSED AS OF

31 DECEMBER 1968

LIVER FUNCTION TESTS

On 24 October 1968, I saw Dr. Daly of the Bio-chemistry Laboratory of West London Hospital for liver function tests. My family doctor, Dr. Hodes, sent me to Daly as a private patient, as British practice is not to take these tests unless the patient's condition seems to be worsening. My doctor thought I showed no signs of a recurrence of hepatitis and the normal practice would have been, at most, for me to have been examined by the specialist at the hospital, who might then decide to ask for the tests.

Daly said that all required tests, except the B.S.P., would be done. He said he thought the B.S.P. unnecessary unless the others indicated negative factors. In which case, he said he would ask me to come in again for that test.

Daly will send me the results of the tests and his bill c/o American Express, Rome, within a week.

MATERIAL HAS BEEN ACQUIRED BY SENSITIVE SOURCE. IT IS NOT TO BE ROUTED OUTSIDE DOCUMENTS DIVISION OR STAFF, DISSEMINATED, RELAYED TO THE FIELD, OR FORM THE BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL FOLLOW-UP, WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH C/CA/CF.

201-306052

TM# 072369, 29 Oct 68

14-00000

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
CRPHONE 1	802799	12/01 12/31	20	1242930	000

1968

CD	EARNINGS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
C9	[illegible]		REG SAL

NOTE:

THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
73	8000-		LIQ PAYMT
80	89000		CPA EX CR
96	8000		FED TAX F

REMARKS:

Changing tax code for the quarter and reducing tax to $80.00 per memo, dated JULY 1968.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER:

802799 QRPHONE

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete (20-51)

SECRET

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	NT/HRS	HD/HRS	RATE	O/T-NT AMT	H/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
											00		

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

(20-51)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. After considering several alternatives and given QRPHONE/1's lack of financial forward planning, LCPIPIT believes that it would be beneficial and advantageous for WOFIRM to offer to subsidize a portion of an overt life insurance program designed to give him both life insurance and a cash value toward retirement. We have discussed this with QRPHONE/1 and he has agreed to the desirability of such a program. He is willing to participate in such an arrangement and has undertaken to explore the possibilities available to him. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of several proposals which he has received from the local representative of a reputable WOLADY insurance firm.

2. LCPIPIT requests authority to subsidize up to 1/2 of the cost of a life insurance program for QRPHONE/1. (This WOFIRM portion not to exceed $50 per month.) From an administration standpoint this would merely take the form of an increased monthly payment and we would take the necessary steps to verify that the funds were indeed being devoted to their designated purpose.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
As stated above

DOC FORWARDED U/S S/C
BY RID/SD 29 OCT 1968

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

RYBAT CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-1397

DATE
OCT 23 1968
22 October 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

c atchmen
to OEPA-1397

J. SPENCER LANGFORD, C.L.U.
REPRESENTING
MUTUAL LIFE OF NEW YORK
(MONY)
31 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON, S.W.1
01-930 971*

13 September 1968

[redacted]

Dear [redacted]

The following will give you an idea of the protection, cash at 65, and retirement income you will get under three different plans on the basis we discussed on the phone. Let me know if you need any more information.

Premium -	$50/month	$ 75/month	$100/month
Plan Type			
Whole Life			
Death Benefit	23000	35000	47000
Cash at 65	21200	33100	44400
Life Income @ 65	133	207	278
Endowment at 65			
Death Benefit	17000	25000	33000
Cash at 65	25600	38100	50300
Life Income @ 65	160	239	315
Retirement Endowment @ 65			
Death Benefit	11000	17000	23000
Cash at 65	25300	39100	52900
Life Income @ 65	158	245	331

I look forward to hearing from you in the near future.

1 - The retirement income figures are monthly income at 65 using the 10 year certain option

CS COPY

Note:

I would be willing to put up, or have deducted, part of such a scheme, say $25 a month.

201-306052

2 - Any figures concerning dividends are not guarantees nor estimates since dividends depend upon future experience and the annual action of the companies trustees

3 - All figures are in the US dollars and based on standard male issue at age 37.

Sincerely,

Spence

J Spencer Langford, C. L. U.

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 9 Oct 68

38

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 46 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/CA 3 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR, c/ca/s3, c/eur4, c/ci

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

SECRET 10 21 22z Oct 68 CITE DIRECTOR 40570

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON, ROME

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE MHPROBE

REFS: A. LCPIPIT 7508 (IN 08511)

B. OEPW - 405, 8 Oct 68

1. DEFER PARA 2 REF A TO ROME (PER OIRW-27586, TELEPOUCHED 9 OCT). ~~TODAY)~~.

2. REF B, POUCHED 8 OCT, REPORTS GENERALLY SANGUINE MEDICAL PROGNOSIS QRPHONE/1 HEALTH FOLLOWING HEPATITIS, PERMITS SHORT TRIPS TO CONTINENT PROVIDED HE WATCHES DIET CAREFULLY AND DOES NOT OVERTIRE, UNTIL CLINICAL AND CHEMICAL TESTS RECOMMENDED IN REF B PRONOUNCE HIM FULLY RECOVERED.

3. FILE 200-124-156/3.

END OF MESSAGE

EUR/1 [illegible]
EUR/BC/UK [illegible]

Q/201

D. Chatelan
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

C/CA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: RYBAT SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

INFO: Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief, WOLIME

SUBJECT: RYBAT/DTDORIC/QRPHONE
QRPHONE/1 Physical Condition

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OEPA-1312, 10 September 1968

1. On the basis of the documentation submitted under reference dispatch, the Medical Staff feels that QRPHONE/1 made a surprisingly fast recovery and seems well on the way to complete health. However, the hospital report (a quick translation of which into English is attached for your ready reference), dated as it is, still reflects some inconclusive levels in the results of the various chemical tests shown. Undoubtedly these have by now been lowered to completely safe levels, since QRPHONE/1 apparently felt well enough to travel to France, but the Medical Staff believes it would be advisable for QRPHONE/1 to undergo another series of liver function tests, to include the following:

- a. SGOT
- b. SGPT
- c. Bilirubin (1) Direct
  - (2) Indirect
  - (3) Total
- d. B.S.P. (Bromsulfophthalein)
- e. Serum Proteins
  - Albumin
  - Globulin
  - Total

We assume QRPHONE/1 has consulted his own physician on his return to the UK, but the Medical Staff has pointed out that clinical examination alone is not always sufficient to determine complete recovery from hepatitis.

(continued)

Attachment:
Hospital report

Distribution:
2 - Chief, LCPIPIT/London w/att
1 - COS, London w/o/att

CS COPY

8 OCT 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OEPW - 405

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE: 7 October 1968

CLASSIFICATION: RYBAT SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: ✓ 201-306052

1 - EUR/BC/UK
1 - RID - files ✓
2 - CA/CF

~~AB~~ ~~CMPI~~	
~~PS~~ ~~TEST~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	Diane L. Chatelan gm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
OMS/OD		Dr. Patrick Thurston E. Patrick, M.D.
EUR/BC/UK	7 OCT 1968	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/CA	8/10/68	Fred W. Valtin

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MPG. 1-66

DISPATCH

2. In terms of our operational utilization of QRPHONE/1 at this time, while they reserve finite comment until all the returns (per above) are in, the Medical Staff did stress the paramount importance of proper rest and ~~of~~ not over-taxing the strength of the agent, coupled with his strict adherence to regular, warm, balanced meals in accordance with the dietary restrictions usually imposed, and complete absence of alcohol, in order to prevent a relapse. So long as these caveats are adhered to, however, there is no reason why he could not make some more short trips during the next few months, if necessary. However, since he also has an office to set up and we would like him to concentrate on the Kambona offer, perhaps it would be a good idea to keep those trips to a minimum for the time being.

3. The Medical Staff will be glad to review any further chemical tests per para. 1 above suggestions, or any others which his doctor may have already run.

JULIA R. CONGREVE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM
Acting Chief, LCPIPIT/London (PARFORTH Acting)

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE/Illness

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. At their meeting on 4 September QRPHONE/1 submitted a report to RODIGAST on his hospitalization for hepatitis. Attached to his report is a copy of this medical record with results of blood and urine analyses written in Serbo-Croatian. We are forwarding a copy of the report under separate cover for evaluation by the Medical Staff. We are interested in having as thorough as possible an evaluation made of QRPHONE/1's illness in order that we may assure ourselves of his condition and the degree to which he ought to be active in the forthcoming months. We will appreciate it if Headquarters will pursue this matter with the Medical Staff and advise us of its findings and recommendations.

2. Also forwarded under separate cover is a memorandum prepared from RODIGAST's notes which elaborates upon QRPHONE/1's symptoms.

ACL

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
1 - QRPHONE/1 Report & Medical Record
2 - Memorandum for the Record

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/atts
1 - COS/London w/o atts
1 - C/EUR w/o atts

DOC FORWARDED U/S S/C
BY RID 12 Sep 68

CS COPY

201 — 30605-2

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-1312

DATE
10 September 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO: OEPA-1312

HEPATITIS BOUT

What I had thought was a touch of malaria and the extreme fatigue I felt when I returned to London in July proved in time to have been acute infectious hepatitis. The disease -- which takes two to three weeks to develop -- was probably contracted in Uganda. At least, I imagine so because my principal contact in Kampala insisted on taking me to a number of local restaurants of dubious cleanliness to sample Uganda delicacies.

Hepatitis was diagnosed by a doctor in Komiza, Vis, where my family had been holidaying since the beginning of July, and I was hospitalized in the isolation section of Split Hospital (there is no hospital on Vis) on the 7th of August.

My liver was swollen by one finger and blood and urine analysis indicated a fairly severe infection. Treatment consisted of terramycin and cortisone therapy, with massive doses of vitamins.

I was put on a fat-free diet, which I have been told to follow for at least six months. Naturally, no alcohol.

On 20 August, I was released from the hospital, mainly because I was pestering the doctors to let me go. I was told to have ~~x~~ "absolute rest" for four to six weeks and to have another blood test within several weeks.

(Attached is the Yugoslav doctor's description of my case and treatment, with results of all blood and urine analyses. It is written ~~Croatian~~ in Serbo-Croatian.)

THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN ACQUIRED FROM A SENSITIVE SOURCE. IT IS NOT TO BE ROUTED OUTSIDE OF THE RESPONSIBLE DIVISION OR STAFF, DISSEMINATED, RELAYED TO THE FIELD, OR FORM THE BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL FOLLOW-UP, WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH [illegible]

CS COPY

#14/22a to OEPA 1312

201-306052

SEPARATE COV[illegible] ATTACHMENT 2 TO:
OEPA-1312

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 7 September 1968

SUBJECT: [redacted] Illness

1. The following information was obtained by [redacted] from [redacted]/1 at their meeting on 4 September 1968. It supplements the report which was submitted by [redacted]/1 which deals with his recent hospitalization for hepatitis.

2. Toward the end of his African trip [redacted]/1 had been feeling rather weak and nauseous, with no appetite. He was constipated, feverish and had gas pains. These symptoms persisted and after his return from Africa and on 6 August, while in Yugoslavia on vacation, [redacted]/1 suffered from acute gas pains and vomiting. He was taken from Vis, where he was vacationing, to Split where he was hospitalized. The address of this hospital is:

Opca Bolnica
Zarazni Odjel (Firule)
Split, Yugoslavia

His doctor was Dr. Juraj FILIPOVIC.

3. [redacted]/1's treatment was free inasmuch as he was able to show his British National Health Card and a reciprocity agreement exists between Britain and Yugoslavia.

4. [redacted]/1 states that at no time did he receive narcotics nor was he ever unconscious. During his stay in the hospital a young British youth (Derek WHITTAKER, age 19, from Shoreham-by-Sea, Surrey) was in his ward suffering from food poisioning.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN ACQUIRED BY SENSITIVE SOURCE. IT IS NOT TO BE ROUTED OUTSIDE RECIPIENTS' DIVISION OR STAFF, DISSEMINATED, RELAYED TO THE FIELD, OR FORM THE BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL FOLLOW-UP, WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH C/SA/CF.

CS COPY

2 s/c att to OEPA 1312

201-306052

①

att to OEPA-1312
10 Sept. 68

Admitted to the section for infectious diseases 7. August, 1968

Observation: Malaria

Medical history: The patient had felt for about a week definite weakness, lack of appetite, an inclination to eructation and distress, a somewhat feverish temperature, heaviness under the right rib cage and in stomach.

Clinical observation under hair follicles showed: subicteric, afebrile, the liver + the epigastrium about 1 p.f., slight feeling accompanied by other regular findings.

Hepatitis tests showed damage of the liver parenchyma of an average nature, resembling infectious hepatitis.

Clinical course: Icterus progressed in the first 2 days, till CORTicostroide was introduced in the body, after which there began an improvement and the Icterus disappeared.

After 8 days the whitish-red disappeared from the urine, appetite was restored, abdominal pains disappeared and after 13 days a control hepatogram was made /see findings/.

As it was necessary to continue

treatment of the disease, the patient asked to be discharged under medical supervision.

Diagnosis: Acute infectious hepatitis

Treatment: Only Serbo-Croatian words translated in this section. Names of drugs are English

Discharged - 20 Aug 1968 as recovered

The patient needs to observe absolute quiet + stay at home, follow diet as instructed, under supervision of doctor and control of hepatogram for about 14 days.

He will continue with the recommended medicines [medicines not translated. Only Serbo-Croatian words

kroz / 3 dana   kroz 5 dana]
translated for   days   for 5 days]

and further depending on the condition of the patient /ULTER TBL/ while he takes dexason/

Translation penciled in on attachment, where meanings could be found.

EPIKRIZA:

primljen na zarazni odjel 7.VIII.68 pod dg: Observatio-Malaria.

Anamnestički: zadnj.. oko tj. dva dana osjeća izvjesnu slabost, napetost i nadutost, [illegible] eruktaciju, nevoljkost i subfebrilne temperature, te težinu pod desnim rebrenim lukom, i [illegible]. Kliničkim pregledom kod dolaska utvrdi se subikteričan, afebrilan, jetra opipljiva za oko 1 p.p., lagano osjetljiva uz uredan ostali nalaz.

Hepatalni testovi ukazuju na oštećenje jetrenog parenhima srednje jakog karaktera, odgovarajući slici infektivnog hepatitisa.

[illegible]

Klinički subikterus progredira u prvih par dana, dok se ne uvede u terapiju kortikosteroide, nakon čega očito dolazi do poboljšanja općeg stanja, te iščezavanja ikterusa.

Nakon 8 dana nestaje bilirubin iz mokraće, apetit uspostavljen, abdo abdominalne tegobe iščezavaju, te se nakon 15. dana napravi kontrolni hepatogram /vidi nalaz/.

Iako je bilo potrebno nastaviti liječenje u bolnici, bolesnik želi otpust, te se uz upute otpušta.

DIAGNOZA: HEPATITIS INFECTIOSA ACUTA tablet or tablespoon

dragee

LIJEČEN: Bevitplex drg-C vit tbl-Bilamid-cholin drag-Terramycin caps-Dexason amp i tbl-Ulter tbl-Antipernicin amp+Bedoxin amp+Aneurin amp-Digestal tbl-dijeta. (diet)

OTPUŠTEN: 20.VIII.68. kao poboljšan.

Potrebno je nastaviti apsolutno mirovanje u kućnoj njezi, dijetalnu ishranu po uputi, te kontrolu liječnika, te kontrolu hepatograma za oko 10-14 dana.

dragee for

Od lijekova preporuča se nastaviti Bevitplex drag 3x2 - [illegible] cholin drag 3x2 - Tetracyclin caps 4x1 - Dexason tbl/4x1 kroz 5 dana, 3x1 2 dana, 2x1 kroz 5 dana, a dalje prema stanju bolesnika/ Ulter tbl/dok uzima dexason/-

days

Odjelni liječnik:
/dr. J. Filipović/

THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN ACQUIRED BY SENSITIVE SOURCE. IT IS NOT TO BE ROUTED OUTSIDE RECIPIENTS' DIVISION OR STAFF, DISSEMINATED, RELAYED TO THE FIELD, OR FORM THE BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL FOLLOWUP, WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH [illegible]

dir. ______ [illegible]
- indir. ______
- ukup. ______ [illegible]

Thymol ______

Holesterin ukup. 160

- esteri [illegible]

Cjel. bjelančevine [illegible]

Albumini [illegible]

Globulini [illegible]

Weltman [illegible]

Sublimat test [illegible]

Alkalna fosfataza: 5 K.j. – alkale (?) phosphate
SGOT=4o6 W.j.
SGPT=7oo W.j.
SE=12mm
L=4.1oo
DKS: eo 1, st 5, seg.31, Ly 56, mo 7
E=4,14o.ooo
Hb: 86%
I.B.=1,o
Fe=242 gamma %
Cu=15o " "

Gusta kap – drop of blood smear
Razmaz krvi malarija ⌀ – malaria

Urin: alb. – +
urobil. 1:32
bil. ++
sahh. ⌀ – sediment
Sed: nešto L i sluzi – some L in service

Sugar
ŠUK=93mg%

14.VIII
URIN: alb trag
urob. 1:4
bil. ⌀ – sediment – small types of fields
Sed: 3-4 L na sv. vid. polju

15.VIII

Ukupan dir. 1,[illegible]
- indir. [illegible]
- ukup. [illegible]

Thymol 7

Holesterin 20[illegible]

- [illegible]

Cjel. bjelančevine [illegible]

Albumini [illegible]

Globulini [illegible]

Weltman ______

Sublimat test ______

SGOT = [illegible]
SGPT = [illegible]

[illegible]

THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN ACQUIRED BY SENSITIVE SOURCE. IT IS NOT TO BE ROUTED OUTSIDE RECIPIENTS' DIVISION OR STAFF, DISSEMINATED, RELAYED TO THE FIELD, OR FORM THE BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL FOLLOW-UP, WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH C SA/SF.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER

ACTION clca 3 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ~~200-124-156/3~~

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ CI/ICF DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE VR. cl/ls, ci/ciss, clEUR 4

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

~~AN~~	~~FI~~	
~~PS~~	~~DEST~~	CI/ICF
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

SECRET 061556Z SEP 68 CITE LCPIPIT 5726 (PARFORTH ACTING) DALP

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE 6 SEP 68 IN 86805

1. QRPHONE/1 MET 4 SEPTEMBER IN BRUSSELS. HE NOW UP AND ABOUT FOLLOWING HOSPITALIZATION FOR HEPATITUS BUT MUST SEVERELY RESTRICT ACTIVITIES FOR AT LEAST NEXT MONTH. SOME ITEMS OF INTEREST OBTAINED WHICH BEING FORWARDED BY TM.

2. NEXT MEETING SET UP FOR DUBLIN 18 SEPTEMBER.

SECRET

BT

CS COPY

201-306052

SECRET

14-00000

c F

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
QRPHONE 1	802799	08/01 08/31	20	1242930	000

1968

CD	EARNINGS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
09	89000	2000	REG SAL

NOTE: THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
73	9000-	2000-	LIQ PAYMT
80	89000	2000	CPA EX CR
96	9000	2000	FED TAX F

REMARKS:

Amendment for additional compensation and tax liability increased from $870.00 to $890.00 per month for free compensation at $800.00 per month, effective 1 July 1968. Actual amount of tax liability increased from $70.00 to $90.00 per month, for the July 1968 pay period.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: QRPHONE - 1

802799

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete

SECRET

CA/000

70

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	HT/HRS	ND/HRS	RATE	O/T-HT AMT	N/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
											00		

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

Richard Gibson

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
3708 S. STATE 324-6520
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

9-25 19

Richard Gibson

Two Hundred & no/100

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

Robert Gibson

PAYEZ A L'ORDRE DE
UNION DE BANQUES SUISSES

Robert Gibson

Robert Gibson

NEW YORK, N.Y.
1-8 1-8

01 14.68 608 5225

RECEIVED FOR ... TRUST CO.
OF NEW YORK

5 SEP 1968

BY BARCLAYS BANK LTD.

1-29 12
K · P.E.G.
1-30



NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
[illegible] S. STATE ST.
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

NOV 27 19[illegible]

10-25 19[illegible]

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson

Two Hundred [illegible] DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001260⑈ ⑆0710-0077⑆ 339022⑈ ⑈0000030000⑈

Richard Johns

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1172

2-77
710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF

DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001172⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 339036⑈ ⑈0000000000⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1166

19

2-77
710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson

DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001166⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 339036⑈ ⑈0000000000⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1155

500716

4-26 19

2-77
710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $200 —

Two Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001155⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 339036⑈ ⑈0000000000⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6326
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

2-77/710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF [illegible]

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001149⑈ ⑆0710-0077⑆ 339026⑈ ⑈0000030000⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC. 1144
5708 S. STATE 324-6326
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

439177

2-29 19

2-77/710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF [illegible] Gibs [illegible] $[illegible]

[illegible] DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001144⑈ ⑆0710⑈0077⑆ 339026⑈ ⑈0000030000⑈

SECRET

Chief of Station, London/LCPIPIT

Office of Finance

Increased Federal Income Tax Liability - QRPHONE-1, Employee No. 802799

Steve
Gayle - file

In compliance with the recent Enactment of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Subject's tax liability has increased from $70.00 to $90.00 per month. This represents the additional Surtax charge and begins with the July 1968 pay period. Effective 1 December 1968 (1969 tax year) the tax liability will be reduced to $80.00 per month. The Station should effect the change and continue to T/A tax withholdings to Headquarters.

HARRIET C. VINCOLEER

Distribution:
3 - C/S, London/LCPIPIT

15 AUG 1968

OFPB-396

8 August 1968

SECRET

~~2~~ - CA/Staff
1 - EUR/Div.
3 - APB/CAAS
2 - OF/Registry

CMTD/APB/CAAS/THorsley:bj (8 August 1968) 2213

C/CA/EF

Q-201

C/EUR/SS 13 AUG 1968 [illegible]

Richard Gibson Reports
International news & features

Opća Bolnica
Zarazni Odjel
(Firule)
Split
Yugoslavia
13 August 1968.

Dear Mrs. Randall,

Unexpectedly, I found myself in the hospital in Split, Yugoslavia, on the 7th of August, confined to the isolation ward with a fairly rough case of infectious hepatitis, undoubtedly picked up in West Africa. (They tell me the incubation period is about 3 weeks.) In any case, I am hoping to be released from here in another 10 or 15 days at the most. The treatment is good and seems thorough. My biggest problem was originally linguistic. I still speak with the doctors, who know no English, in German or Italian, but my knowledge of Serbo-Croatian has increased steadily with the injections, blood testing and intravenous injections of glucose-saline solution, etc.

The urgency behind this note is, through you, to inform the firm of my condition. I hope to return to London — without many, if any, days on the beach — as planned, but I am told that I should restrict my activities physically for another month. There are many things to do in Britain and on the Continent, but I regret not being able to undertake the conference assignment in September, but least, I do not think my strength will be sufficiently restored for that event. Anyway, we shall see...

Fortunately, my family is on Vis, an island 5 hours boatride from Split, and have not had their vacation completely ruined because of me. Since this is an isolation hospital for infectious diseases, no visitors are allowed and there is no temptation or urgency on my wife to make that lengthy crossing just to see me. For me, also, my holiday on the beach in the sun has simply turned into lying on my back in a hot room, but it could be worse and I hope to be up and about in the next week or two, at most. I feel certain that I will be able to meet all my major commitments in London and elsewhere at the beginning of September but wanted to draw ~~the~~ firm's attention, as soon as possible, to my possible inability to handle another big assignment immediately.

Very sincerely yours,

Richard Gibson


BY AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

R. Gibson, Opća Bolnica, Zarazni Odjel, (Firule), Split

Mr. J. Henry Randall
Negro Press International
5708 South State Street
Chicago, Illinois 60621
U.S.A.

FBI doc.
6 Aug 68 (NY)
Re: The "Guardian," Formerly Known
as "National Guardian," Weekly
Guardian Associates, Inc.
Bufile: 100-357044
NY file: 100-93572

14-00000

cf

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
QRPHONE 1	802799	04/01 04/30	20	1240062	000

CD	EARNINGS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
09	74600		REG SAL

NOTE:

THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
80	74600		CPA EX CR
96	4600	7200	FED TAX F

REMARKS:

T/A 270 from London transferred taxes for the month of Dec., Jan., and Feb. in the amount of $210.00. $70.00 for each. payrolled was $46.00 each month, adjustment made herewith. Sub-object code changes for Accounting Only.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER:

QRPHONE/1

802799

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete

CA/Staff ~~000~~

(30-51)

SECRET

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	NT/HRS	ND/HRS	RATE	O/T-NT AMT	N/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
								86	4600-	7200-00			

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

(30-51)

2

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: (22)

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 23 Apr 68

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 PER ____ #
CONF: CA5 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-156/2

INFO: FILE, VR, 3R8, CA/PROP, C/ICD, CA/PEG, MPS/RBZ

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 27 16 48 Z CITE DIRECTOR 95140

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QRPREY QRPHONE

REF: OEPA 1003, 19 MARCH 68

MOC APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/PERS
CA/B&F Lo Healy
DC/CA
EUR/BC/UK

B Hugh Tovar
C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Diane Chatelan
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET RYBAT

April 66

REVISED MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

1. QRPHONE/1 collaborates with WOFIRM as a Field Agent who provides certain services of a confidential nature. He has received a Provisional Operational Approval, dated 23 MAY 66. Financial aspects of his activity are charged to approved Project QRPHONE.

2. QRPHONE/1's employment by WOFIRM, which began 1 June 1965, was originally formalized by a Letter of Agreement for a period of three months, replaced by a Memorandum of Oral Commitment dated 1 September 1965. Under this MOC, which remains in effect (as amended) since that date, QRPHONE/1's employment continues on a month-to-month basis. It can be terminated by either party on a 30-day notice.

3. QRPHONE/1 receives the following financial entitlements:

a. Compensation so computed as to give QRPHONE/1 a "tax-free" income of $800 per month (this figure effective 1 July 1967).
NOTE: The actual breakdown of QRPHONE/1's finances as carried on WOFIRM's books is $800 monthly salary and $70 per month tax supplement withheld at Headquarters to discharge QRPHONE/1's WOLADY tax obligation. These taxes are remitted through the Covert Tax Committee. This procedure was devised to honor the original "tax free" commitment made at the time of his recruitment and at the same time to fulfill the requirement that all WOLADY citizens pay taxes on funds received from LNFORT.

b. Reimbursement for operational expenses and travel unless these are paid by other sources in which case WOFIRM will offset such outside reimbursement against WOFIRM financial obligations to QRPHONE/1. Since security considerations preclude processing of detailed accountings for miscellaneous operational expenses, and as an added inducement to QRPHONE/1 in connection with his obtaining certain confidential information of interest to WOFIRM, a small operational payment, as authorized by Chief, LCPIPIT will be made to QRPHONE/1 for each day during which he is required to be absent from his home on confidential business.
NOTE: Write-off of the funds passed to QRPHONE/1 is to be effected on the basis of the procedure approved by Chief, LCPIPIT and COS/London, a copy of which is attached. This procedure is authorized in view of the security considerations applicable to QRPHONE/1 and the need to limit the knowledge of this operation within WOMACE.

c. QRPHONE/1 is authorized to receive a non-accountable office allowance of $100 per month.

SECRET RYBAT

4. QRPHONE/1 will be compensated by WOFIRM in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of himself and his family to a new residence if such relocation is considered desirable by him and WOFIRM. NOTE: This provision was included in QRPHONE/1's original Letter of Agreement and was retained in this MOC since it may be operationally desirable for QRPHONE/1 to accept employment with a target organization based elsewhere.

5. WOFIRM has arranged for a portion of QRPHONE/1's financial entitlements to be funded to him by QRPURE, which has also agreed to repatriate QRPHONE/1 to WOLADY. This has been done for operational reasons to enable QRPHONE/1 to qualify for foreign residence. Should QRPURE be obliged to honor this commitment, WOFIRM will guarantee this QRPURE commitment and will reimburse QRPURE for any costs incurred.

6. LCPIPIT is authorized to approve purchase by QRPHONE/1 of certain items of operational equipment which are to be non-accountable and which shall be charged against the operational expense category of approved Project QRPHONE.

7. QRPHONE/1 signed a separate Secrecy Agreement (in true name) at the time of his original recruitment. He is aware that its provisions are still in effect.

8. QRPHONE/1 is aware that he may be required, from time to time, to undertake an SGSWIRL.

9. QRPHONE/1 is aware of all provisions of the Memorandum of Oral Commitment with the exceptions of paragraph 6, which describes an internal WOFIRM procedure; certain aspects of paragraph 3a--specifically that WOFIRM is paying LNFORT taxes in his behalf; and certain aspects of paragraph 3b--specifically the procedure for write-off of funds since this is an internal WOFIRM procedure.

SIGNED: Aaron C Laginestra
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA
Case Officer

REVIEWED AND APPROVED:

Maslott

Adrian B. MASLOTT
Chief, LCPIPIT

Date

April 25, 1968

O + 2 to CPD - 26 Apr 68
(1 for FD
1 for CCS)

SECRET RYBAT

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: (22)

SECRET

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 23 Apr 68

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 3 PER #

CONF: CA 5 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-156/2

INFO: FILE , VR , BR8, CA/PROP, C/IC2, CA/PEG, MPS/RGZ

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 27 1641 Z CITE DIRECTOR 95140

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QRPREY QRPHONE

REF: OEPA 1003, 19 MARCH 68

MOC APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/PERS
CA/B&F Lo Healy
DC/CA
EUR/BC/UK

(201)

B Hugh Tovar
C/CA

Diane Chatelan
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

23 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/SG

VIA: DC/CA

SUBJECT: QRPHONE/1 Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. Forwarded herewith is the original revised MOC for QRPHONE/1, submitted by LCPIPIT under OEPA - 1003, dated 19 March 1968. The field requests notification of approval.

2. The MOC appears to cover adequately all points previously at issue; it is therefore requested that, subject to DC/CA approval and CA/PERS and CA/B&F concurrence, the attached outgoing cable to LCPIPIT signifying this approval be coordinated and released.

3. It is also requested that the MOC be further transmitted to the Office of Finance, via appropriate administrative procedures.

DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

Attachments: 2
MOC for QRPHONE/1
Cable to field

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
2 - CA/CF ✓

SECRET

201

14-00000

Who said he is CIA agent:

1. Andersson said Hamza Alavi told Franz Fanon Institute in 1964 Gibson an Am. agent (Eb. rept. 18/2/66)

2. William Demby said he had recently been assured by Ignazio Silone Gibson was a CIA agent (Gibson had not seen Silone since 1952) (20/2/66 – Eb Rome rept.) (Demby said he had been accused of the same thing, by whom unspecified.)

3. "British" professor, China hand, told Franz Fanon Institute

Loose – Gibson
201

BRITISH VISA GRANTED

On 10 April 68, I was finally granted a British visa, without restrictions, valid until 15 Feb. 1969. No questions were asked when I went to the Home Office to get the visa.

My Home Office file number is: G 110880.

From the Metropolitan Police, I received Aliens Registration Certificate E 662567, which lists me as correspondent for Negro Press International.

I was told by the police that I could apply within a year to have the registration requirement waivered because I am married to a British subject. Moreover, I am free to take any sort of employment or open a business without restrictions or having to request permission from the Ministry of Labour.

Trnd 07385 23/4/68

B.E.1

1070

HOME OFFICE

Princeton House, 271 High Holborn, LONDON W.C.1
Telegrams: Alidep, London WC1
Telephone 01-405 4321
Telex 261867

Please address any reply to
THE UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE
and quote: 6 11 0180
Your reference:

10·4·68

Name	
Nationality U.S.C.	**Date of Birth** 17·5·31
Passport Particulars U.S. Passport no. issued on 1·12.6	

This is to certify that the bearer of this letter, named above, does not require to obtain permission of the Ministry of Labour or of the Home Office before taking employment, either paid or unpaid, in Great Britain. (For work in Northern Ireland the Ministry of Labour and National Insurance for Northern Ireland should be consulted.) The bearer is free, so far as the Home Office is concerned, to set up in business, subject to any statutory laws and regulations governing the business or professional activities in which he/~~she~~ may be interested.

This letter should be retained for production to the Ministry of Labour or other authority if required.

for Under Secretary of State

TM# 072385/ 23/4/68

1071

INLAND REVENUE MONOLOGUE (required)

Until April of this year (1968), I lived mainly on assistance from my wife's family and occasional freelance journalism outside Britain. Also, I had some savings and investments in America and Switzerland to draw upon. My brother-in-law, Gordon Kaye, purchased a house at 32 Hartswood Road, Stamford Brook, London, W.12 for us — the price of the house being considered a loan to be repaid over the years as is possible. My children's school fees were paid by convenant by my brother-in-law, as well as a grant in convenant to my youngest daughter.

I was not a legal resident of the U.K. until 8 April 1968, and on that date I began officially my duties as Overseas Representative and Correspondent for Negro Press International of Chicago, with a salary of $300 per month.

TM# 072385, 23/4/68

My brother-in-law asked me to send him from abroad the following letter, which I mailed on 16 April 68 from Rotterdam.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Jeffreys, Henry Rxx Rudolph & Marks
Lee House
Londonx Wall, E.C.2

Dear Sirs,

In response to the Inspector's request, I confirm that I have xxxx authorized my wife, Mrs.   , to apply for Monique's income repayment for 1967. And I also confirm that she has no other incomex other than the XXXX Covenant for that year.

Yours faithfully,

TN# 072385, 23/4/68

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WOLIME

INFO

Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM

Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT

DTDORIC/MHPROBE/Operational
QRPHONE/Memorandum of Oral Commitment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. OEPW-160, dated 18 October 1967
B. OEPA-240, dated 21 September 1967

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a revised Memorandum of Oral Commitment covering the WOFIRM relationship with QRPHONE/1. This revision reflects most of the suggestions made in Reference A.

2. As said in Reference B, QRPHONE/1 does not fall into the category of WOFIRM asset usually handled by LCPIPIT. This fact plus the very stringent security considerations which must apply to this operation dictate that certain procedure be followed in QRPHONE/1's case. Handling of this case has been facilitated by Headquarters' understanding and approval of the need for such care.

3. We request that this revised Memorandum of Oral Commitment be approved, and that we be so notified.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
Memorandum

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

QRPHONE
201

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

OEPA-1003

DATE

19 March 1968

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER

REVISED MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

1. QRPHONE/1 collaborates with WOFIRM as a Field Agent who provides certain services of a confidential nature. He has received a Provisional Operational Approval, dated 23 MAY 66. Financial aspects of his activity are charged to approved Project QRPHONE.

2. QRPHONE/1's employment by WOFIRM, which began 1 June 1965, was originally formalized by a Letter of Agreement for a period of three months, replaced by a Memorandum of Oral Commitment dated 1 September 1965. Under this MOC, which remains in effect (as amended) since that date, QRPHONE/1's employment continues on a month-to-month basis. It can be terminated by either party on a 30-day notice.

3. QRPHONE/1 receives the following financial entitlements:

a. Compensation so computed as to give QRPHONE/1 a "tax-free" income of $800 per month (this figure effective 1 July 1967).
NOTE: The actual breakdown of QRPHONE/1's finances as carried on WOFIRM's books is $800 monthly salary and $70 per month tax supplement withheld at Headquarters to discharge QRPHONE/1's WOLADY tax obligation. These taxes are remitted through the Covert Tax Committee. This procedure was devised to honor the original "tax free" commitment made at the time of his recruitment and at the same time to fulfill the requirement that all WOLADY citizens pay taxes on funds received from LNFORT.

b. Reimbursement for operational expenses and travel unless these are paid by other sources in which case WOFIRM will offset such outside reimbursement against WOFIRM financial obligations to QRPHONE/1. Since security considerations preclude processing of detailed accountings for miscellaneous operational expenses, and as an added inducement to QRPHONE/1 in connection with his obtaining certain confidential information of interest to WOFIRM, a small operational payment, as authorized by Chief, LCPIPIT will be made to QRPHONE/1 for each day during which he is required to be absent from his home on confidential business.
NOTE: Write-off of the funds passed to QRPHONE/1 is to be effected on the basis of the procedure approved by Chief, LCPIPIT and COS/London, a copy of which is attached. This procedure is authorized in view of the security considerations applicable to QRPHONE/1 and the need to limit the knowledge of this operation within WOMACE.

c. QRPHONE/1 is authorized to receive a non-accountable office allowance of $100 per month.

SECRET

4. QRPHONE/1 will be compensated by WOFIRM in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of himself and his family to a new residence if such relocation is considered desirable by him and WOFIRM. NOTE: This provision was included in QRPHONE/1's original Letter of Agreement and was retained in this MCC since it may be operationally desirable for QRPHONE/1 to accept employment with a target organization based elsewhere.

5. WOFIRM has arranged for a portion of QRPHONE/1's financial entitlements to be funded to him by QRPURE, which has also agreed to repatriate QRPHONE/1 to WOLADY. This has been done for operational reasons to enable QRPHONE/1 to qualify for foreign residence. Should QRPURE be obliged to honor this commitment, WOFIRM will guarantee this QRPURE commitment and will reimburse QRPURE for any costs incurred.

6. LCPIPIT is authorized to approve purchase by QRPHONE/1 of certain items of operational equipment which are to be non-accountable and which shall be charged against the operational expense category of approved Project QRPHONE.

7. QRPHONE/1 signed a separate Secrecy Agreement (in true name) at the time of his original recruitment. He is aware that its provisions are still in effect.

8. QRPHONE/1 is aware that he may be required, from time to time, to undertake an SGSWIRL.

9. QRPHONE/1 is aware of all provisions of the Memorandum of Oral Commitment with the exceptions of paragraph 6, which describes an internal WOFIRM procedure; certain aspects of paragraph 3a--specifically that WOFIRM is paying LNFORT taxes in his behalf; and certain aspects of paragraph 3b--specifically the procedure for write-off of funds since this is an internal WOFIRM procedure.

SIGNED: Aaron C Laginestra
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA
Case Officer

REVIEWED AND APPROVED:

Maslott

Adrian B. MASLOTT
Chief, LCPIPIT

Date

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: QRPHONE/1 FINANCES

1. This memorandum outlines a new procedure which is to be followed in the handling of the operational costs of field agent QRPHONE/1. This new procedure is being instituted in order to enhance the security and compartmentation of the handling of the administrative aspect of this project and parallels revisions in the handling of operational traffic. The new procedure which is discussed below is in accordance with accepted field procedures.

2. Currently QRPHONE/1 receives advances and accounts for these with detailed statements of expenses accompanied by true name receipts, etc. These accountings and the accompanying receipts have been maintained in the LCPIPIT files. This system is to be changed. Henceforth monies for operational expenses will be given to QRPHONE/1 by his handler (Career Agent Rufus P. RODIGAST) and will be carried on RODIGAST's accountings as operational expenses supported by receipts from QRPHONE/1 acknowledging receipt of the funds. This RODIGAST accounting and the QRPHONE/1 receipt will be used for write-off of the funds against approved project QRPHONE. No detailed accountings and no receipts carrying QRPHONE/1's true name are to be maintained in the LCPIPIT/Admin files.

3. It will be the responsibility of Chief, LCPIPIT and the project case officer to ensure that QRPHONE/1 is supplied with the funds necessary for the furtherance of the operation and to ensure that these amounts are carefully controlled to avoid overpayment. In discharging this responsibility the Chief, LCPIPIT may require QRPHONE/1 to itemize the various expenses to be covered by the payments.

APPROVED:

Chief, LCPIPIT — Date 1/29/68

Chief of Station, London — Date 8 Feb 68

SECRET

FBI doc
30 Jan. 68 (Wash.)
Re: Richard Thomas Gibson
no Bufile given

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME
Chief of Station, Bern

INFO.: Chief of Station, London; Chief of Base; Geneva; Chief, EUR Division

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/MHPROBE/Operational
QRPHONE/Switzerland

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. GENEVA-2464
B. LCPIPIT-1711

1. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of QRPHONE/1's report on his expulsion from Switzerland. In it QRPHONE/1 concludes that the Swiss Border Police must have learned of his planned arrival through a phone tap on a call he made to Lausanne from Italy on the 18th of January.

2. Regarding QRPHONE/1's statement in paragraph two of his report concerning his having visited Switzerland many times since 1963, please see PALP-4738 of 1 October 1965.

3. QRPHONE/1 has been instructed not to pursue any further protests with the authorities (either Swiss or American) over this matter.

ACL

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
Report

Distribution:
✓3 - C/WOLIME w/att
2 - COS/Bern w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att ——— EUR/BC/UK, who given copy of attachment, will route to Swiss desk
1 - COB/Geneva w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 200-124-156/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OEPA-892

CS COPY

DATE: 6 February 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

[redacted]

[redacted]

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:
OEPA-892

ARREST AND EXPULSION FROM SWITZERLAND

Brigue, 20 Jan. 1968.

The Milan-Geneva TEE reached the Swiss border at Brigue at about 1030. It was evident that the Border Police were expecting me -- the usual lone civilian inspector of passports was accompanied by a uniformed policeman. I was taken, with baggage, to the station immigration office. My wife went with me, but was apparently not covered by the ban on me. When the official in charge of the office phoned Lausanne and Berne, he was informed that I was to be expelled immediately and that they did not want to interrogate me.

Great effort was made by the official in charge of the office to be polite, especially when I made a rather vigorous protest at the expulsion, claiming that I had never been informed of the ban on my entry in Switzerland, said to date from 16 Dec. 1963, and that, in any case, I had visited Switzerland on numerous occasions since 1963 without interference. Moreover, I was a professional journalist accredited to the United Nations and was indeed on my way to Geneva to visit the U.N. Office there, I said. The official seemed somewhat baffled by this, because he had been informed I was en route to Lausanne, but I showed my tickets valid to Geneva. Nevertheless, with the greatest of apologies, I was escorted -- this time by a plainclothesman -- to a train back to Italy at 1130. My wife could have stayed in Switzerland but I asked her to return with me.

During my detention, my wife phoned Gilbert Etienne in Lausanne, informing him of the situation, the Associated Press office in Geneva (speaking to a Mr. Atkins) and the U.S. Press Attaché, Frederick Steiner, in Berne. Actually, I had told her to phone as many wire services as possible, but she assumed I also wanted to get the Press Attaché to protest on my behalf. In any case, the shortness of time between trains prevented her from making more calls.

When given the attached formal notice of the travel ban by the Swiss official, I refused his request that I sign it and warned that the expulsion was a violation of Swiss agreements concerning the freedom of access to the U.N. Office in Geneva which I fully intended to protest formally and bring to world attention.

Later, from Verona, I spoke myself with Gilbert Etienne, who was convinced -- quite correctly, I believe -- that his phone is tapped and that my arrival was communicated to the Swiss Federal Police through a phone conversation I had with Etienne from swiss explusion - 2 last

Milan on 18 Jan. (My train reservation was made in Milan, not London.) I also spoke with Atkins of AP in Geneva, who told me he had filed a story after my wife's call about an American Negro journalist being refused entry into Switzerland. He asked for more background on me, claiming that New York had expressed interest in developments. Atkins believed that I could get the ban lifted by protesting to the Swiss Press Attaché in London as a professional newsman. He said he believed Swiss authorities were rather jumpy about "suspicious" individuals entering the country since the large Biafran shipments of Nigerian currency to Zurich earlier in January. Whatever the real reason, although I do resent not being able to talk with Etienne -- I was counting on him to reestablish links with Nils Andersson in Albania and to give me a picture of the altered situation among pro-Chinese Communist parties in Western Europe since the latest split from Jacques Grippa's party in Belgium --, I think the expulsion is a most useful incident to prove that I am indeed a good revolutionary and I intend to exploit it as fully as possible, within reason. That is, no overt diatribes against "how the Man operates in Switzerland," say in the Los Angeles Herald Dispatch, but to inform as many people on the Left as possible of the incident and let them draw their own conclusions.

Michael Bakafa/Petros Defta, who was expecting me in Geneva for an interview on 22 Jan. was informed by a wire from Verona that force majeure prevented me from keeping the appointment and that I would be writing him when I returned to London.

VALAIS WALLIS

POLICE CANTONALE
KANTONSPOLIZEI

Poste 3900 Brig-Bhf. , le 20.1.1968.

An Herrn

GIBSON Richard Thomas

3900 Brig - Bahnhof

Référence : Notifikation einer Verfügung der Eidg. Bundesanwaltschaft.

Objet :

Wir bringen Ihnen zur Kenntnis, dass Sie im Schweiz. Polizeianzeiger des Jahres 1963 unter Einreisesperre gültig ausgeschrieben sind. (Art. 33 667/1963)

Die Verfügung wurde durch die Eidg. Bundesanwaltschaft am 16.12.1963 getroffen.

Dauer: unbestimmte Zeit.

Von der Verfügung Kenntnis genommen: Zugestellt durch:

GIBSON Richard Thomas
des Clarence und der Alice
Thomas, geb. 13.5.1931
Los Angeles/Amerikaner.

KANTONSPOLIZEI
Passkontrolle Brig

SECRET

QRPHONE 1   802799   24   000   20

1967 EARNINGS

	TAX W/H	FICA W/H	ST. TAX W/H	TAX GROSS
(96)	67200			945280

SECRET

Paid Gross by Cover
No Covert Return Req.
Tax Committee
Flat Rate Tax W/H

SECRET

20 December 1967
(C-2929)
Murray

MEMORANDUM FOR: CA/CF

SUBJECT: Accountings from QRPHONE/1

Enclosed in the attached sealed envelope are copies of accountings from QRPHONE/1.

Thomas K. Strange
Chief,
Central Cover Staff
Nonofficial Cover Branch

Attachments: One

201-306052
Dec 67

~~201-306052~~

[redacted]

SECRET

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 321- 20
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1050

8-3 1967 $\frac{2-77}{710}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $100 ^{00}

One Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001050⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈00000 10000⑈

THIS IS AN
UNNUMBERED TRANSACTION

PAID
SEP 18 1967

BARCLAYS BANK LIMITED
ST. JOHN'S WOOD
40 WELLINGTON ROAD, ST. JOHN'S WOOD, LONDON, N.W.8
(4)
20-74-63

NEGRO PRESS INTER
5708 S. STATE 24-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

418166 1067

8-31 1967 $\frac{2-77}{710}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $100 ^{00}

One Hundred DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

R.A.B.

⑈001067⑈ ⑆0710⑉0877⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈00007 10000⑈

14-00000

DISPATCH SECRET

Chief of Station, **London for LCPIPIT**	XX	
Chief of Station, London		
Chief, WOLINE		

[illegible] Admin/Agent [illegible]
ORPHONE/1 Employment Agreement

REFERENCES: A. [illegible] T-349, 21 Sept. 1967
B. [illegible]-161 (PYDAT) (enroute)
C. LCPIPIT 0782 (IN 56628)

1. We appreciate LAGINESTRA's effort to combine and bring up to date all commitments made to ORPHONE/1 in a revised MOC, forwarded under REF A. We hope that the following comments, geared to the paragraphs as numbered in the MOC, will help to further streamline the product:

a. Para. 1:

Please see Reference B, PYDAT dispatch.

b. Para. 2:

As indicated in the REF A covering dispatch, ORPHONE/1's initial employment began 1 June 1965, rather than the 1 September 1965 date given in the draft MOC. Since the effective date of his relationship with WOFIRM will one day be the basis for an equitable terminal settlement, or might assume other administrative significance, we suggest that the paragraph be amended to reflect this: "ORPHONE/1's employment with WOFIRM which began 1 June 1965, was originally formalized by a Letter of Agreement for a period of three months, replaced by a Memorandum of Oral Commitment dated 1 September 1965. Under this MOC, which remains in effect (as amended) since that date, ORPHONE/1's employment continues on a month-to-month basis. It can be terminated by either party on 30-day notice."

(continued)

Distribution:
2 - COS, LCPIPIT
1 - COS, London

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPW-169	26 OCT 1967 18 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-124-156/2

1 - CA/B&F
1 - CA/Personnel ✓
1 - C/CA/SG
1 - EUR/BC/UK
2 - CA/CF
1 - RID-Files

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	Diane L. Chatelan	gm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CA/B&F		L. O. Healy
CA/PERS		
C/CA/SG DC/CA		Fred W. Valtin
EUR/BC/UK		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA		B. Hugh Tovar

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. DISPATCH

c. Paragraph 5a:

From talking with RODICAST, it would appear that the fine line of demarcation between ORPHONE/1's real "salary" and his "non-accountable [illegible]" is so vague to him (if indeed he was ever fully aware of it in our own bureaucratic terms) as to be virtually non-existent. It is equally confusing and often non-recognizable in other administrative paper-trails (see REF C). In terms of the tax situation, the $100 has already been adjudicated taxable and the $70 supplement has been computed as tax due on the $800 total. We suggest, therefore, in the interest of administrative simplicity, that we convert the total $800 to salary, and amend the MOC to reflect this.

d. Paragraph 5b:

A question came up concerning ORPHONE/1's per diem in connection with the three accountings which RODICAST submitted for processing direct at Headquarters. Included were several operational lunches and dinners. ORPHONE/1 indicated he was leaving the computation of per diem due him up to Headquarters (we have allowed for 27 days @ $20 per day). Since regulations state that no one may receive double compensation for any reimbursable expenditure, and ORPHONE/1's per diem by definition is supposed to cover food, etc., we will have to deduct 15% for each meal specifically claimed by him in his detailed accounting (i.e., $3.00 per meal). This will be the subject of separate correspondence when the accountings are processed and we T/A the appropriate amount for credit to ORPHONE/1's account, but we raise it now as we are not certain as to LCPIPIT's intent or previous practice in this regard. The amount that ORPHONE/1 would be assessed is, of course, not very substantial, but if LCPIPIT feels ORPHONE/1 should receive greater financial assistance to further defray his personal as well as operational costs while in travel status, we suggest that this enabling paragraph be amended to permit greater flexibility in the establishment of the per diem amount. Now would be an appropriate time to amend the MOC to give Chief, LCPIPIT/London, the authority to set ORPHONE/1's per diem at ". . . $20 to $30 per day during periods of authorized travel, amount to be set in advance by Chief, LCPIPIT/London." Fifteen per cent will, of course, still need to be deducted from ORPHONE/1's accounting for every meal he correctly claims as an operational expense. As to travel which does not extend overnight, regulations only require that 35% be deducted from his per diem, rather than the 50% which, in effect, the $10.00 represents. We leave it up to you as to which provision you wish included in the final MOC, but in any event we suggest that it be incorporated in the body of the paragraph, rather than set apart as a quotation from another document.

2. We have no further comments concerning the remainder of the MOC.

3. If you concur with the above suggestions, please resubmit an amended MOC which would also reflect these additional changes. We are sorry not to have been able to meet LCPIPIT's 15 October requested deadline, but press of business related to ORPHONE/1's WOLADY mission intervened.

JULIA R. CONGREVE

SECRET
RYBAT

26 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CCS/NC

SUBJECT: QRPURE/QREBONY/1 Relationship

1. This will confirm our conversation of 18 September 1967, in which we discussed QREBONY/1's plan to visit QRPURE some time during the week of 25 September 1967, and you agreed to give QRPURE/2 prior warning of this visit. In accordance with the same conversation QREBONY/1 was briefed that his visit should be mainly a question of touching base with QRPURE, maybe a friendly luncheon with QRPURE/2 -- but that no substantive discussions affecting their ostensible relationship (i.e., amount of money, amount of QREBONY/1 production for QRPURE, etc.) were to take place. You were to brief QRPURE/2 along the same lines, and also to indicate to him that, contrary to our original thinking, we would now like to have QREBONY/1 given a by-line, whenever QRPURE/2 feels he can do so.

2. In addition to the above, we would appreciate it if you would take up with QRPURE/2 (and/or QRPURE/1, as appropriate) the possibility of increasing the amount of money funded to QREBONY/1 via QRPURE. As indicated to you, we would like to increase the current $100.00 monthly to $300.00 monthly, but would like your careful examination with QRPURE principal(s) that this amount is not excessive either in terms of their willingness to handle or in terms of QRPURE's ostensible ability to cover.

3. Please also mention to QRPURE/2 our desire to have QREBONY/1 open a small office in London, and our thought of perhaps including QRPURE (along with other publications) as a name on the door or on his letterhead. Would QRPURE/2 (or QRPURE/1) have any objections? Would he have any objections if any of the other names are of more radical publications? It would not be operationally feasible or desirable to let him know in advance which these would be, but since both

RYBAT
SECRET

Ebony
201-306052

SECRET

RYBAT

QRPURE's have been briefed carefully as to QREBONY/1's radical aura, presumably they would have a good idea as to the kind of publications these might be.

4. For operational reasons, we would prefer that the arrangements indicated in paras 2 and 3 above not be broached until after QREBONY/1's departure from the United States, some time in mid-October. We will advise you of his departure so that you can make the necessary arrangements thereafter at your convenience.

DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee - Attn: J. Murray
2 - CA/CF ✓
Routed thru DC/CA

SECRET

RYBAT

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN:G..
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 18 Oct. 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 7 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-306052
~~200-124-156~~
201-107116
201-848183

CONF: C/CA/O 2 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR C/RI/SD

C/CA 2 C/EUR 4 CABLE SEC TENG

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

Oct 19 15 11 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 44750

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QREBONY

1. FOR SECURITY REASONS RELATING TO ITS ACTUAL DESCRIPTIVENESS, IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO CHANGE THE QREBONY CRYPT TO IDEN A. THIS NEW CRYPT WILL BE USED HENCEFORTH.

2. TO ASSIST IN EASIER COMMUNICATION IN AN AREA OF HIGH SENSITIVITY, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL CRYPTS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED: QRPEONY (IDEN B); AND QRPETTY (IDEN C).

3. IN FUTURE, PLS SEPARATE ALL QREBONY/1 PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE, EXCISE QREBONY/1 NAME, AND FORWARD BY RYBAT CHANNEL ONE COPY TO DTDORIC ~~[illegible]~~ AND ONE COPY TO KEYWAY.

END OF MESSAGE

CI/OPS/DO - Ober (in draft)
EUR/BC/UK P.F. Ri
EUR/CA

C/CA

Diane Chatelain
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

19 Oct 67

COPY NO.

CS Copy

201-306052

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 3

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN:gm
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 18 Oct. 67

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 7 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-366052 ~~200-124-156~~ 201-108746 201-248083

CONF: C/CA/OZ ☑ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/CA2, C/EUR4

CABLE SEC TENG O.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

OCT 19 15 11 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 44751

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QREBONY

REF: 44750

IDEN A - QRPHONE/1

IDEN B - ROBERT F. WILLIAMS - 201-108746

IDEN C - DANIEL WATTS - 201-248083

END OF MESSAGE

DC/CA ____

EUR/BC/UK P.F.

EUR/CA ✓

C/CA

DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WOVIEW		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. COS/London (Support)		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, LCPIPIT/London		MICROFILM

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Administrative
QREBONY/1 Employment Agreement

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. QREBONY/1 was recruited by WOFACT on 3 June 1965. This recruitment was performed by an officer from WOMUSE/ICG since QREBONY/1 (then known as STEBONY/1) was viewed as a "double agent" penetration of pro-Chinese communist groups. QREBONY/1 has performed well in a difficult and dangerous environment. He is a clandestine agent operating against targets violently anti-WOLADY and of priority interest. The administration of QREBONY/1 requires special care since, by the very nature of his role, he is not typical of the average LCPIPIT asset.

2. QREBONY/1's initial employment was by Letter of Agreement for a period of three months. This Letter of Agreement expired 1 September 1965 and was replaced by a Memorandum of Oral Commitment dated the same day. This oral employment agreement remains in effect at this date--some two years later--, but has been amended to adjust compensation. Certain inaccuracies in the original MOC have also been corrected subsequent to its preparation. Given the sensitive nature of QREBONY/1's relationship with WOFACT it is sometimes difficult to adapt the operational realities of his situation to the administrative requirements of WOFACT. However, with great understanding at home and in the field, we have reached a very manageable situation.

3. In order to codify the entitlements and procedures applicable to QREBONY/1's employment the undersigned has prepared the attached revision of the MOC underwhich QREBONY/1 is employed. It is requested that HQS approve this revised MOC and notify LCPIPIT of approval by 15 October.

Attachment: HW
MOC

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW w/att HW
1 - COS/London (Support)

SEP 27 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPT - 240	21 September 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

#

ACTION C/EA/04

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CA2, C/EUR4, C/CI

ACTION

S E C R E T 301632Z CITE LCPIPIT 1286

30 AUG 67 IN 42132

DIRECTOR INFO: LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QREBONY MHPROBE

1. BELIEVE QREBONY/1 SHOULD MEET WITH QRPURE IN ORDER DISCUSS HIS COVER AND ITS EVOLUTION AND IMPROVEMENT. IN LAST FEW WEEKS QREBONY/1 HAS NOTICED HIS ARTICLES STILL BEING USED BY QRPURE BUT WITHOUT HIS BYLINE. THIS MAY INDICATE SOME POLITICAL SENSITIVITY ON PART OF QRPURE, WHICH WOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE. HOWEVER THIS MAY NOT BE THE CASE AT ALL. THUS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS SHOULD BE FOR HQS TO DETERMINE STATE OF QRPURE MIND RE QREBONY/1. IF THIS POSITIVE, MEETING, WITH WOFACTER PRESENT, WOULD BE HELPFUL IN SOLIDIFYING RELATIONSHIP.

[redacted]

2. SHOULD SITUATION BE PROPITIOUS WE WOULD APPRECIATE HQS DISCUSS TWO ITEMS WITH QRPURE ON AN IN PRINCIPLE BASIS. FIRST, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE PAYMENTS FROM QRPURE TO QREBONY/1. QREBONY/1'S COVER HERE IS SUFFICIENTLY

SECRET

Jack Murray will be in Tuesday.
1/9/67

WELL ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT, AND INDEED TO REQUIRE, AN ANNUAL SALARY FROM QRPURE OF AT LEAST $3-4,000. WHILE WE UNSURE OF QRPURE'S FEELINGS THIS SUBJECT IT OUR IMPRESSION HE MOST ACCOMMODATING AND WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT INCREASE WOULD ENHANCE QREBONY/1'S COVER. SECONDLY, WE ARE DISCUSSING THE IDEA OF QREBONY/1'S ESTABLISHING A DINGY ONE-ROOM OFFICE FROM WHICH TO CONDUCT HIS AFFAIRS. THIS WOULD FACILITATE HIS OPERATIONS BY GETTING HIM OUT OF HIS HOUSE. IT WOULD ALSO BE A CONVENIENT GATHERING PLACE FOR HIS CONTACTS AND IF COST FACTOR CAN BE KEPT MINIMAL, ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH HIS COVER. WE DESIRE OBTAIN QRPURE REACTION TO IDEA OF QREBONY/1 HAVING OFFICE WITH QRPURE ON DOOR, EITHER ALONE OR IN TANDEM WITH QREBONY/1 REPORTS OR SOME OTHER TITLE. ALSO COULD QRPURE ACTUALLY PASS THE FUNDS FOR THE OFFICE IN THE FORM OF A MONTHLY CHECK OR SOME OTHER ARRANGEMENT? REALIZE THAT OFFICE PLUS SALARY RAISE TOGETHER REPRESENT CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN QRPURE INPUT TO QREBONY/1 AND WE NOT NOW IN POSITION TO ASSESS QRPURE WILLINGNESS DO SO.

SECRET

PAGE 3 LCPIPIT 1286 SECRET

NEVERTHELESS WE WOULD APPRECIATE HQS EXPLORING THIS WITH GRPURE IF POSSIBLE.

3. HQS SHOILD DISCUSS ABOVE QITH RODIGAST WHO IN POSITION EXPAND ON THIS SUBJECT.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14 September 1967

REVISED MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

(Revised to include all changes and amendments operative as of 14 September 1967)

1. QREBONY/1 is employed by WOFACT as an independent contractor for certain services of a confidential nature. He has received an Operational Approval, dated . Financial aspects of his activity are charged to Project QREBONY.

2. QREBONY/1's employment under this agreement commenced 1 September 1965 and continues on a month-to-month basis. It can be terminated by either party on 30-day notice.

3. QREBONY/1 receives the following financial entitlements:

a. Compensation so computed as to give QREBONY/1 a "tax-free" figure of $800 per month (this figure effective 1 July 1967). NOTE: The actual breakdown of QREBONY/1's finances as carried on WOFACT books is $700 monthly salary; $100 non-accountable operational allowance; $70 tax supplement withheld at HQS to discharge QREBONY/1's WOLADY tax obligation. These taxes are remitted through the Covert Tax Committee.

b. Reimbursement for operational expenses and travel, unless these are reimbursed by other sources in which case WOFACT will offset such outside reimbursement against WOFACT financial obligations to QREBONY/1. Since security considerations generally preclude the detailed accounting for miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20 per day during periods of authorized travel. This per diem authorization was qualified by a personal ruling of Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT dated 12 July 1965:

> "If subject is absent from his home station on authorized travel for part of one day and returns to his home station the night of the dame day (i.e. if no hotel expense is involved in the sense of overnight accommodations), then he shall be entitled to draw 1/2 of his authorized per diem of $20 per day (i.e. $10)."

NOTE: QREBONY/1 has a revolving fund (advance) to assist in meeting operational and travel expenses.

SECRET

4. QREBONY/1 will be compensated by WOFACT in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of himself and his family to a new residence if such relocation is considered desirable by him and WOFACT. NOTE: This provision was included in QREBONY/1's original Letter of Agreement and was retained in this MOC since it may be operationally desirable for QREBONY/1 to accept employment with a target organization based elsewhere.

5. LCPIPIT is authorized to approve purchase by QREBONY/1 of certain items of operational equipment which are to be non-accountable and which shall be charged against the operational expenses category of the budget attached to the FY 1968 project renewal.

6. QREBONY/1 signed a separate Secrecy Agreement (in true name) at the time of his original recruitment. He is aware that its provisions are still in effect.

7. QREBONY/1 is aware of all provisions of this Memorandum of Oral Commitment with the exception of paragraph 5, which describes an internal WOFACT procedure, and certain aspects of paragraph 3b, specifically that WOFACT is paying LNFORT taxes in his behalf. NOTE: He was promised tax-free compensation in his original recruitment and we have devised the current procedure to honor this commitment while fulfilling the requirement that all WOLADY citizens pay taxes on funds received from LNFORT.

SIGNED: ______________________
AARON C. LAGINESTRA
Case Officer

REVIEWED AND APPROVED:

____
ADRIAN B. MASLOTT
Chief, LCPIPIT

- - - - - -

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM
#1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION
C/CA/O 2

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT C/CA/O TIME 1610Z

INFO
FILE, VR, CS/DO C/CA 2, C/EUR-4 C/CI C/FE 4

965-5422 sterile phone for this operation

S E C R E T 251459Z CITE LCPIPIT 1268

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

25 Aug 67 IN 39155

RYBAT DTDORIC MHPROBE QREBONY DIOVERTAX

REF ~~DIRECTOR~~ 29537

1. WILL CABLE ITINERARY REQUESTED REF AFTER RODIGAST MEETING WITH QREBONY/1 25 AUGUST.

2. APPRECIATE THAT WASHINGTON PROBABLY MOST CONVENIENT LOCATION FOR HQS MEETINGS WITH QREBONY/RODIGAST BUT BECAUSE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS MUST BE PARAMOUNT REQUEST THAT SESSIONS TAKE PLACE ELSEWHERE, PREFERABLY NEW YORK CITY. HAVE SO INFORMED RODIGAST.

3. SECURITY RISKS ATTENDANT QREBONY MEETINGS WITH WOFACT IN U.S. ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN. THUS REQUEST THAT QREBONY CONTACTS WITH WOFACT OFFICERS BE HELD ONLY WHEN ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED AND LIMITED TO ESSENTIAL PARTICIPANTS. ALSO BELIEVE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT AND PROBABLY INSECURE HAVE QREBONY/1 SET ASIDE BLOCK OF DAYS FOR MEETINGS ONCE HE ARRIVES IN U.S. AND THAT CONTACTS WITH QREBONY/1 WILL HAVE TO BE AD HOC INSTEAD OF AD SERIATIM. QREBONY/1 WILL DO HIS BEST ADHERE TO ITINERARY, HOWEVER

SECRET

SECRET

WE FEEL IT ONLY REALISTIC TO ASSUME THAT HIS MOVEMENTS AND SCHEDULE WILL BE CONDITIONED BY DEVELOPMENTS FROM MOMENT HE STEPS OFF PLANE.

4. FOR SECURITY AND HANDLING REASONS IT MOST IMPORTANT FOR RODIGAST TO MEET AND BRIEF EACH WOFACTER IN ADVANCE WOFACTERS MEETING WITH QREBONY/1. NO TRUE NAMES OF WOFACTERS SHOULD BE USED AND SPECIAL CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN PROTECT RODIGAST, WHOSE TRUE NAME AND ADDRESS NOT KNOWN BY QREBONY/1.

5. RODIGAST ETA NEW YORK 10 SEPTEMBER. HE WILL PHONE VARASANO WHOM HE HAS MET MORNING 11 SEPTEMBER AT EITHER IDEN A OR IDEN B TO ARRANGE FOR MEETINGS WITH HQS OFFICERS. QREBONY/1 WILL BE TOLD ARRIVE NEW YORK 15 SEPTEMBER THUS GIVING FEW DAYS LEAD TIME FOR RODIGAST/HQS PREPARATIONS. REQUEST VARASANO, WHO WILL WISH DISCUSS RODIGAST PERSONAL AND DTOVERTAX OPERATIONAL MATTERS, ARRANGE FOR INTRODUCTION TO CONGREVE.

6. NO FURTHER REGULAR MEETING WITH EITHER QREBONY/1 OR RODIGAST BEING SCHEDULED ALTHOUGH PROVISIONS FOR EMERGENCY MEETING BEING LAID ON. ANY INFO FOR EMERGENCY PASSAGE TO

SECRET

PAGE 3 LCPIPIT 1268 SECRET SECRET

EITHER MUST REACH LCPIPIT BY COB 31 AUGUST.

SECRET SECRET

BT

We all agree.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOVIEW

INFO.
COS/London

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London aBm

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/Basic Project Documents

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LCPIPIT is revising the QREBONY Project files--which have been rather haphazardly maintained over the past year or so (much of this time the project was without a case officer). In our attempts to locate basic project documents we have been unable to find any copy of the provisions of the Operational Approval applicable to QREBONY/1. We do have a copy of the Provisional Approval granted 23 May 1966 forwarded with OFLW - 1591, 7 July 1966. Possibly the relevant document was destroyed during the reduction of files attendant upon the LCPIPIT move, or possibly it was inadvertantly not forwarded to LCPIPIT. At any rate we will appreciate being sent a copy.

2. We would also like to have a sterile version of the FY 68 Project Renewal as well as all other basic documents which ought to be available to LCPIPIT.

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW
1 - COS/London

AUG 30 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPT - 210

DATE
24 August 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOVIEW

INFO.
COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London ABM

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
O QREBONY/Jacques Verges

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

We are forwarding USC a copy of a letter sent QREBONY/1 by Jacques Verges' lawyer in which he makes a settlement offer on behalf of his client. QREBONY/1 will probably accept this, after a suitable waiting period, as it offers very telling and effective ammunition for use in his continuing battle to counter Verges' allegation that he was a WOFACT agent. It is our reading at this point that QREBONY/1 has been quite successful in this effort and that this settlement from Verges will be the final triumph in his campaign.

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: USC
Letter

[illegible] 5 SEP 1967

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW w/att USC
2 - C/Eur Div w/o att [illegible]
1 - COS/London w/o att

201-306052
~~[illegible]~~
AUG 30 1967

1 att a/s

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA - 499

DATE
24 August 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
28, FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS - IXe

TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-19
OU 824 63-19

SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

AFF. GIBSON C/ VERGES

Paris, le 24 Juillet 19

Monsieur et Madame GIBSON
32, Hartswood Road
Stamford Brook
London, W. 12
Grande Bretagne

Chers Madame et Monsieur,

Je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que le Conseil des Prudhommes par jugement rendu le 20 juillet 1967 a retenu sa compétence conformément au rapport du Conseiller rapporteur.

En tout état de cause, j'attends votre réponse à ma dernière lettre par laquelle je vous ai transmis les propositions de reglement à l'amiable faites par M. VERGES.

Je vous remercie de votre prochain courrier à ce sujet et,

./...

CS COPY

201-306052

S/C Att 1 to OEPA-499

~~201-186164~~

Vous prie de croire, Chers Madame et Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
25, FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS - IXe

TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-10
OU 824 63-10

SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

PARIS, le 13 juillet 1967

Monsieur et Madame GIBSON
30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
LONDON N.W.8 - Grande Bretagne

AFF. GIBSON/ VERGES

Chers Madame et Monsieur,

Je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que Maître VERGES propose de vous régler en dinars algériens la moitié des sommes demandées, ce qui me semble intéressant pour vous, compte tenu de l'ensemble des circonstances de cette affaire, soit :

7.500 fr pour M. GIBSON d'une part, et
5.250 fr pour Mme GIBSON d'autre part
total : 12.7 0 fr

Je dois vous indiquer que cette proposition est un peu inespérée, car il est clair qu'en poursuivant la Société des NOUVELLES EDITIONS INTERNATIONALES, vous gagnerez une certaine somme dont je ne puis fixer le montant, mais ne toucherez jamais rien.

En ce qui concerne la lettre dont M. GIBSON m'avait entretenu, mon Confrère ne me répond rien sur celle-ci. Je pense qu'il n'y a quand même pas lieu d'en faire une question de principe et que nous pourrions, dans le cadre d'un reçu, obtenir une phrase sur ce qui a été dit à votre sujet.

En tout état de cause et si nous parvenions à un accord sur cette base, Me VERGES propose de tenir cette somme à votre disposition dès votre premier voyage en Algérie.

Je crois qu'il serait préférable que, d'une manièr ou d'une autre, cette somme soit remise à une personne ayant votr confiance.

Si toutefois vous pensez que je dois tenter d'obtenir un peu plus, vous voudrez bien je vous prie me le faire savoir, mais j'insiste sur ce point qu'il est quelque fois préférable d'attraper une proposition à la balle, plutôt que de risquer de tout perdre.

CS COPY

201-306052

...

DISPATCH

SECRET SECRET

TO Chief of Station, London - for LCPIPIT	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief of Station, London		MARKED FOR INDEXING ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Acting Chief WOVIEW		MICROFILM
SUBJECT DTDORIC/GREBONY LNERGO Report		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Transmitted, under separate cover, for your information only, is a copy of a LNERGO Report dated August 10, 1967. Please note paragraph 4 and bring to the attention of RODIGAST.

ISABELLE R. PRIAMI

Attachment: 1
LNERGO Report u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, LCPIPIT w/att u/s/c
1 - COS, London w/att u/s/c

File in 201-306052

25 AUG 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-306052	OEPW - 117	18 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER CS Copy 200-124-156/3

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

2 - RID files w/att
1 - E/BC/UK w/o/att
1 - CI/ICG w/o/att
2 - CA/CF w/att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	Ann J. Long	gm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/CA/CF	18 Aug 67	Diane L. Chatelan
CI/ICG		Dave Hornstein

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/CA		B. Hugh Tovar

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)
MPO. 1-66

DISPATCH

FBI doc
10 Aug 67
Re: Communist Party of Belgium
Bufile - illegible

14-00000

SECRET

18 AUG 1967

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: SUGAR's Trip to the United States

1. This is to advise the Bureau that this Agency plans to have SUGAR come to the United States during the month of September 1967. In addition to periodic consultation with Headquarters elements, the purpose of this trip will be to renew previous contacts, particularly among American Negro radical elements, primarily in order to develop information on possible Cuban (or other foreign) financial or other lines of support to these groups. He will be under instructions not to engage directly in any civil rights or other protest activities while in the United States.

2. We would appreciate the Bureau's concurrence in this activity. We would also welcome any Bureau requirements which the Agency would levy on SUGAR for servicing during his stay in the United States.

CSCI-316/03777-67

DDP/C/CA/CF/DCastelsaraJl (18 August 1967)

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/LSN
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/ICG
1 - X/BC/UK
1 - CA/SEC
2 - CA/CF
1 - RI (201-306052)

CS COPY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

14-00000

CONTINUING BRITISH IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

Returning to London from Stockholm on 10 July, I was again queried by British Immigration about my failure to register as a permanent resident. My excuse has always been that I did in fact go to the Home Office, but no action was ever taken because I rarely remained in the country more than a month. However, this tale is wearing thin and I fear that I may have much more serious trouble in the near future.

It would seem to me that the best solution might be to become the official London correspondent of KPI or any other outfit that might have me. I would need a letter to that effect and would require a notional salary of about $5,000 per year,* I believe, but even this might raise questions from the British Inland Revenue.

Some advice on this problem would be appreciated.

* Must be at least £1000 yearly.

Q/ 201 file

TPI# 072269 15/8/67

FBI (X-ref)
10 Aug 67.

FBI doc
8 Aug. '67 (Wash)
Re: Richard Gibson
Bufile: (15) 105-93072

14-00000

NYT. 16 JULY 67

NEGRO, IN PEKING, ACCUSES CUBANS

'Vicious Smear' of China in 'Forged' Letter Charged

Robert F. Williams, an American Negro who is now a black nationalist spokesman in Peking, has charged that the Cuban regime of Premier Fidel Castro has counterfeited a newsletter he puts out and used the bogus periodical for "a vicious smear attack" on Communist China.

In the May issue of the newsletter, The Crusader, which has arrived here, Mr. Williams asserted that the "forged" version "carries a metered postmark that is available only for Cuban Government bulk mailing." He charged that the newsletter was put out by "the Cuban G-2", which he said was heavily infiltrated by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Williams left his home in Monroe, N. C., in 1961 and went to Cuba, where he advocated a "freedom struggle" for Negroes in the United States. He left Cuba last year.

Another American Negro nationalist, Richard Gibson, in a current newsletter from London, describes Mr. Williams as "chairman-in-exile of the all-black Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) in the United States." Sixteen persons, who were said to be members of the revolutionary movement, were arrested in Queens last month on charges of having plotted to murder moderate Negro civil rights leaders.

The Crusader that Mr. Williams contended was mailed from Havana last month, has a headline, "China Betrays The Cuban Revolution," and has Mr. Williams saying that he was "deceived by the soft lies and subtle flattery" of Chinese Communist leaders. It goes on to say that Mao Tse-tung was now "old and sick and can no longer control his arrogant, power-mad underlings who, although acting in his name, have abandoned the people's revolution."

Mr. Williams' current Peking newsletter asserted that "Afro-Americans should refuse to fight" in Vietnam. But it added that "those who are trapped into it" could "work among the troops to educate them to the true facts of life."

As advice to Negroes at home, the newsletter said:

"Revolutionaries must play it cool. Infiltrate the police and the master infiltrators, the C.I.A. We must learn to subvert him at his own expense while using his facilities to advance our cause of Black liberation."

On Monday, Workers World, a weekly here with a Trotskyist tendency, announced that it had obtained a statement from Mr. Williams denouncing the alleged murder plot here as a "frame-up."

"It is not my policy nor RAM's to kill condescending Uncle Toms," the statement said. "We are not an organization advocating pointless assassinations. We are dedicated freedom-fighters stressing armed self-defense. Our objective is to make America a just and decent place to live."

Q/1 201

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOVIEW

INFO.
Chief, EUR; Chief, LCPIPIT

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
DTDORIC QRPLAY QREBONY JAGUAR LEPAGE
QREBONY's Group

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Refs: OEPA 256, 5 May 1967
OELA 4737, 10 May 1967

1. We now have JAGUAR's comments on the proposed "group" designed to allow QREBONY to expand his access by "representing" something - even if only a purely notional group. The letter from JAGUAR is attached.

2. We would observe that JAGUAR's comments are obviously made in a constructive vein. Similarly, JAGUAR seems to take a protective, almost proprietary interest in considerations affecting the QREBONY project. We naturally welcome this feeling on their part, since QREBONY continues to exist as a U.K.-based operation at their pleasure. And we think that JAGUAR's comments are sound, in substance. Their final comment also veils, to say the least, the understandable SMOTH reluctance to see yet another splinter group a-spawning, with the frightful political implications if a WOLADY spy were exposed while running a phoney "pro-Chinese" group in the U.K.! (It would probably be not too good in WOLADY, for that matter, but a government could fall here as a result.)

3. We have now had an opportunity to talk this over with CILIBERTI, LAGINESTRA and RODIGAST, and all are agreed that QREBONY's trial balloon will not be re-floated. We think no harm is done. If JAGUAR should come into possession of a copy of QREBONY's letter, and ask us about it, we will acknowledge that he wrote it to try out on a limited number of friends and aimed at his Swedish audience, preliminary to (he hopes) Lou WILLIAMS' arrival in Sweden. We are now merely replying to JAGUAR that we are grateful for their cogent comments, and that "the group" will not be activated unless there is a significant change in the QREBONY operational situation such as to require "the group" to be created, in which case we will again seek their concurrence.

Arthur T. JOELVICK

Attachment: h/w
Letter - as stated
Distribution:

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO
2-C/WOVIEW, w/att
3-C/EUR, w/att
2-C/LCPIPIT, w/att.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-47,660

DATE
16 June 1967

JUN 1967

CC - Q 301

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
200-124-150

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

a) [illegible]

b) [illegible]

c) [illegible]

d) [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
C/WOVIEW

INFO.
COS/London, C/WOMUSE, C/Eur Div

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT CTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/QREBONY/1 and AMSQUAW/1's Relationship

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The relationship between QREBONY/1 and AMSQUAW/1 is a particularly important one from both the production and security points of view. AMSQUAW/1 has been a prolific and reliable reporter, especially on items dealing with the International War Crimes Tribunal, and it will be highly desirable for her to continue to serve in this capacity in the forseeable future. It is recognized that AMSQUAW/1 is not a controlled agent and that her personal willingness to serve as a clandestine informant of QREBONY/1 is based upon a complex and inter-related series of reasons, both personal and ideological. QREBONY/1 helped her out of a tight situation in Africa and has befriended her since her arrival in London. For the last several months she has been living at his house. QREBONY/1 has a very agreeable personality and is a genuinely likeable person. At the same time, although she is not an ideological person, she shares his pro-Chinese ideological position and she has never questioned his explanation - that her reporting is for the Chinese. Lastly, we cannot and have not, overlooked the likelihood of a physical attraction between the two. In the last analysis it is impossible for us to state exactly what motivates her to act as a clandestine informant for QREBONY/1.

2. It is quite possible for the relationship between QREBONY/1 and AMSQUAW/1 to change at any time. Should their relationship take a turn for the worst it might possibly have adverse security implications for QREBONY/1. This subject has been discussed at length with QREBONY/1 and he agrees that great care must be taken. He is careful to use AMSQUAW/1 only in situations where it would be plausible for the Chinese to have an interest. Thus far this has been relatively easy, indeed at the Stockholm sessions of the Russell Tribunal the absence of any Chinese representatives served to confirm in AMSQUAW/1's mind that QREBONY/1 was the Chinese man on the scene. At this point no actual problem exists, but both LCPIPIT and QREBONY/1 are alert to the possibility that one could arise.

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW
2 - C/WOMUSE
2 - COS/London
2 - C/Eur Div

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA - 281

DATE
15 May 1967

1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
CS Copy filed 201-294316

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
C/WOVIEW

INFO.
C/WOHUSE, COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
OREBONY/OREBONY/1's Meeting with RNSLIVER

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Transmitted herewith is a brief memo for the record summarizing a conversation between the undersigned and RNSLIVER in which the latter recounted his impressions of a meeting with OREBONY/1. Transmitted USC is a brief note from OREBONY/1 to RODIGAST covering the events of the same evening.

P.F. CILIBERTI

Attachments: H/W & USC
As stated memo H/W
Brief note USC

Distribution:
- 3 - C/WOVIEW w/atts H/W & USC
- 2 - C/WOHUSE w/atts H/W & USC
- 2 - COS/London w/atts H/W & USC
- 2 - C/Eur Div w/o atts

CS COPY FILED IN ~~200-124-156~~/3

File in 201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA - 268

DATE
MAY 11 1967
10 May 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CILIBERTI Conversation with RNSLIVER 26 April Concerning His
Meeting with QREBONY/1

1. On 25 April BASTEAR told me that RNSLIVER was in London and was planning to meet with QREBONY/1. BASTEAR accordingly suggested that RNSLIVER be debriefed by the undersigned the following morning. Accordingly I met with RNSLIVER for about one hour, from which meeting the following highlights seem worth recording:

A. I told RNSLIVER that we (WOFACT) had been interested in QREBONY/1 at the time that he was writing for China Quarterly concerning his dispute with the editor of Revolution, Jacque Verges, but that we had lost tract of him of late. Now that we are in QREBONY/1's home town, RNSLIVER was told that we and Headquarters would be interested in any information on QREBONY/1 which could be reported as a result of such meetings as RNSLIVER had had with him.

B. RNSLIVER said that he had told Leo Labedz that he would like to meet Ibrahim to gain some understanding of what was going on in the African exiled community, particularly as it related to the Sino-Soviet split. Labedz said that he thought that RNSLIVER would do much better by talking to QREBONY/1 whom he, Labedz, said was one of the few people around from whom Labedz could learn anything.

C. RNSLIVER met QREBONY/1 at QREBONY/1's house. RNSLIVER did not have a complete roster of those who were there to participate in what RNSLIVER described as a "political bull session". He remembered only (in addition to himself and QREBONY/1) of Matthew Nkoana and a girl from Mexico City named Sucesos, who he said knew a great deal about guerrilla goings-on in Venezuela and whose address he said was Calzada, Tacuboya 103, Mexico 18. RNSLIVER said that Nkoana said practically nothing throughout the evening, apparently because he found RNSLIVER's presence odd and unnerving.

D. RNSLIVER was as impressed with QREBONY/1 as Labedz had predicted he would be. He described QREBONY/1 as remarkably knowledgeable concerning Chinese factions of Communist movements in Western Europe and Africa. He said that QREBONY/1 had described his recent trip to Nicosia and Cairo, had mentioned that he had visited Dar-es-Salaam, that he knew Jacques Grippa, and that he intended to visit Stockholm in connection with the Pussell Tribunal and a possible Stockholm visit by Robert Williams.

SECRET

CONTINUING BRITISH IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

Returning to London from Stockholm on 10 July, I was again queried by British Immigration about my failure to register as a permanent resident. My excuse has always been that I did in fact go to the Home Office, but no action was ever taken because I rarely remained in the country more than a month. However, this tale is wearing thin and I fear that I may have much more serious trouble in the near future.

It would seem to me that the best solution might be to become the official London correspondent of KPI or any other outfit that might have me. I would need a letter to that effect and would require a notional salary of about $5,000 per year,* I believe, but even this might raise questions from the British Inland Revenue.

Some advice on this problem would be appreciated.

* Must be at least £1000 yearly.

9/ 201 file

Tpi# 072269 15/8/67

E. RNSLIVER was particularly impressed by QREBONY/1's library of radical books and pamphlets. RNSLIVER turned over to the undersigned for copying and return a recent issue of Williams' The Crusader, and a copy of QREBONY/1's own newsletter. These were received with feigned interest, although of course we had earlier received the same items from RODIGAST (already forwarded to Headquarters).

F. RNSLIVER did not recall meeting Mrs. QREBONY/1, and did not know how many children QREBONY/1 had. He described QREBONY/1's house as attractively middle class. He was aware of the fact that QREBONY/1 had gone to Kenyon College and praised QREBONY/1's writing skills. QREBONY/1 showed him a number of articles he had written which RNSLIVER said completely followed the Chinese Communist line. RNSLIVER was surprised that some of these articles had been printed in the United States in spite of their political orientation.

P.F. CILIBERTI

att to OEPA-00268

Att

GRIFFITH VISIT

Conversation with Prof. William S. Griffith, London, 25/4/67.

Tadeusz Horko phoned my home to tell me that XXXXXX Griffith, who is spending a sabbatical year in Munich from MIT, wanted to see me. Later that evening, Leo Labedz and Griffith arrived. Stella Joyce of Amnesty International and Matthew Nkoana also arrived unexpectedly. It turned out that Lebedz and Joyce had often talked over xxxxxxxx the phone, but had never met.

Griffith told me that he had recently visited East Africa. In Dar es Salaam, he had met David Sibeko and Ahmed G. Ebrahim of the PAC (Pan Africanist Congress). He said his distinct impression was that PAC was on a strong pro-Chinese course. Griffith said he had written to Nana Mahomo's old address in London in an effort to contact him, but had learned later that Mahomo was now at xxxxx Kirkland House, Harvard University. He said he looked forward to talking with Mahomo when he went briefly to the USA in May.

CS COPY

S/C att 1 to OEPA 268

850-124-15/3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
C/WOVIEW

INFO.
C/WOMUSE, COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT 2061

SUBJECT
LTDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

As HQS is aware, QREBONY/1 has been pursuing a legal action against Jacques Verges. He has now received a letter from his lawyer which seems to indicate that Verges is willing to make some sort of settlement--although he can only pay in Algerian dinars. QREBONY/1, of course, is willing to accept a settlement provided it includes some sort of apology from Verges. Armed with this apology QREBONY/1 could then dispose of any lingering doubts regarding his political reliability caused by Verges' accusations and would also have the ego gratification of forcing Verges to eat his own words.

FX 201-190164

ACL
AARON C. LAGMESTRA

S/C ATT'D BE [illegible]
Dated 12 MAY 1967

MICROFILMED
MAY 15 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment: USC
As stated above USC

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW w/atts USC
2 - C/WOMUSE w/o atts
2 - COS/London w/o atts
2 - C/Eur Div w/o atts

CS COPY

15/C

MAY 3 1967
201-306652

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 245	2 May 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

Me Serge Schwartzenberg

Me Schwartzenberg
Avocat à la Cour
[illegible] Faub. Montmartre
PARIS-IXe TRU 63-19

PARIS, le 17 AVRIL 1967

1P

Monsieur GIBSON
30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
LONDON N.W.8 (Grande Bretagne)

AFF. GIBSON C/Nouvelles Editions Internationales

Cher Monsieur,

Mon confrère adverse, Conseil de la Société Nouvelle des Editions Internationales, et de Monsieur VERGES, me fait savoir qu'il a eu une conversation avec Me VERGES qui lui a indiqué qu'il vit actuellement en Algérie et serait disposé à rechercher un règlement amiable des difficultés qui vous opposent.

Il m'a fait part qu'actuellement sa situation ne lui permet pas de payer en une autre monnaie que la monnaie algérienne, savoir le dinar.

Il y a là une question de principe. Pourriez-vous, je vous prie, me faire savoir si vous pourriez envisager une transaction aux termes de laquelle vous seriez réglé en dinars. J'ignore d'ailleurs dans quelles conditions l'exportation des capitaux d'Algérie est encore possible à ce jour.

Quoi qu'il en soit, peut-être seriez-vous intéressé par cette proposition.

Je n'ai pas encore discuté de chiffres avec mon confrère adverse puisqu'il s'agit là d'une question préjudicielle à toute discussion sur le fond de la somme due.

J'attends donc votre prochaine réponse et vous prie de croire, cher Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

MICROFILMED
MAY 15 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

I phoned Schwartzenberg and informed him I would agree
to a settlement, but the amount to be paid in any currency
would necessarily depend on the extent to which Jacques
Vergès apologized for his accusations against me in 1964.
I said I did not mind if Vergès attempted to lay the blame
for those accusations on a "misunderstanding" or on erroneous
or malicious misinformation given him by others.

[Copies sent to J. Griggs, R. Reindorf, Nils Anderson,
Gilbert [illegible] (Lausanne).]

CS COPY

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
QREBONY 1	802799	04/01 04/30	20	1240062	000

CD	EARNINGS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
09	74600	18400	REG SAL

NOTE:
THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
80	74600	18400	CPA EX CR
96	4600		FED TAX F

REMARKS:

Increase Normal Salary from $700 to $746 effective 1 December 1966.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER:

802799 QREBONY-1 CA/000

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete (30-51)

SECRET

PP	OT/HRS	HT/HRS	HD/HRS	RATE	O/T-HT AMT	H/D AMOUNT		AND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
								CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
								86	4600-		00		

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

(30-51)

[illegible]

CHANGING PLACES

[illegible] R Wilmot Rogers is one of two [illegible] staff members of the Car[illegible] Cumberland Journal who have [illegible] to the production side [illegible] (Carlisle) Ltd. — the [illegible].

[illegible] Brothers have an expanding web-offset printing [illegible] and among [illegible] they handle is the new [illegible] JAG (U.K. Press Gazette, [illegible]).

Rogers, who is 37, is to become [illegible] controller after five years in [illegible] post. He started in journalism [illegible] News and later worked [illegible] Newspapers in the [illegible]. Before joining the Journal he was [illegible] for five years of the Cumberland [illegible] Cumberland Evening Star.

[illegible] appointment is that of chief photo[illegible] Laurie Kemp as works manager [illegible]. He succeeds Charles [illegible] shortly to take up a post on the [illegible].

Rogers' successor is assistant editor [illegible] Atkins, a former Merchant Navy [illegible].

[illegible] TO SUNDAY MIRROR

[illegible] GARROTT, former features editor [illegible] Bristol Evening Post, is joining the [illegible] Mirror's features sub-editors after [illegible] as a features sub-editor with the [illegible] Mail.

[illegible] SHONE has joined the Flintshire [illegible] reporters at Mold after three [illegible] a reporter and sub-editor on The [illegible] Gazette and the Islington Gazette.

HE'LL EDIT QUARTERLY

[illegible] L. RANSLEY has been appointed [illegible] officer to the Muscular Dys[illegible] Group of Great Britain and will [illegible] its quarterly Muscular Dystrophy [illegible].

FROM WMN INTO TV

[illegible] VACK, who joined Plymouth's [illegible] Morning News from the [illegible] last September, has moved to [illegible] Television as reporter and news[illegible]. KATIE CRIBB is leaving WMN [illegible] Recorder. Two newcomers [illegible] are JON ADDISON and NEIL [illegible] from Auckland, New Zealand.

NEW DEVON EXECUTIVE

[illegible] NOON has been appointed assist[illegible] of the South Devon Journal, [illegible]. He has worked with the [illegible] Express and Daily Mail and has [illegible] a magazine editor before moving [illegible].

[illegible] from 'Queen' [illegible] its colour weekly

[illegible] ROBERTS, formerly with Queen [illegible] and London Evening Standard, [illegible] of Colour News Feature Weekly, [illegible] on April [illegible]. The magazine will be printed web-offset by the [illegible] Publishing Co. at [illegible] incorporates the old Londoner [illegible].



ALISTAIR COOKE HAS SAID IT 1,000 TIMES

ALISTAIR COOKE, home from the US to celebrate the thousandth BBC broadcast of his "Letter from America", was chief guest at a luncheon of the Association of Circulation Executives on March 27 in the Connaught Rooms, London.

Mr. Cooke gave an off-the-cuff, off-the-record talk which ranged from international affairs to golf and religion.

Chairman Bernard Aron welcomed continental members of Distripress, including Dr. G. Lesrio, Inter-Orbis, Milan; M. Vandevelde, Societe de Bibliotheque des Gares, Brussels; K. Olsen, Dansk Central-agentur, Copenhagen; Dr. Hans Meinert, Distripress Secretariat; David [illegible]-Chappelle, Consultant to Distripress Committee.

PICTURED with Mr. Cooke, at microphone, are Mr. Aron and N. H. Nelms, managing director of [illegible] Books.

Express O'Farrell gets racing post

MICHAEL O'FARRELL has been appointed racing correspondent of Dublin's Irish Times. He joined the newspaper's sports staff six years ago from the London office of the Daily Express.

JOHN SANDER has left the London advertisement staff of Eastern Counties Newspapers after three years as a media representative to join the Kensington and Chelsea Post's reporting staff.

SHE'S GROUP PRESS OFFICER

JUDITH TURNER has joined the Wedgwood Group as press officer, based in London, for Wedgwood, William Adams, Susie Cooper and Royal Tuscan.

PETER MUMMERY, formerly Time sales representative in Britain, is moving to South Africa to handle the US news magazine's advertising sales following the opening of a new office there. Another new office has opened in Amsterdam.

AGENCY HEADS SET [illegible] DATE

[illegible] meeting of the Newspaper Con[illegible] tributors' Association — formed in [illegible] March 11 (Press Gazette No. 115) — will be held at the Midland Hotel, Manchester on April 22. Idea of the meeting is to bring together freelances from the north with those from the south who attended the inaugural meeting.

Hendon editor now group MD

GRANT MILLARD, at present editor and general manager, has been appointed managing director of the Hendon Times group, owned by Merritt & Hatcher.

He began with the London and Essex Guardian series at Walthamstow and moved to Hendon after three years with Mansfield's Chronicle-Advertiser.

NEGRO PRESS MOVE

RICHARD GIBSON has been appointed overseas representative and correspondent of Negro Press International, a news and feature service based in Chicago. He remains editor for Africa, Asia and Europe of the New York Afro-American monthly Liberator and international columnist for another US monthly, Independent.

ILIFFE TO MACLAREN

JOHN FENNER has been appointed advertisement manager of Maclaren's Modern Refrigeration and Air Conditioning. He was previously advertisement manager for Iliffe's Data Processing.

REPORTER FOR PR

RICHARD GUEST, deputy chief reporter of the Warley News Telephone, has joined Nicholas Mendes and Associates Ltd. — a Birmingham-based public relations company — as press service editor.

NEWS CONTACT DIRECTORY

New entries include:

USA EXHIBITION AT IEA
See under ELECTRONICS

J. & E. HALL LIMITED
See under REFRIGERATION

AVON RUBBER COMPANY
See under MOTORING

ROVER COMPANY LIMITED
See under MOTOR CAR MANUFACTURERS

OMAL GROUP LIMITED
See under BUSINESS EFFICIENCY

HOME BREWING AND WINE MAKING
See under HOME BREWING

CONSUMER COUNCIL
See under CONSUMER ORGANISATIONS

See Pages 30-[illegible]

TM# 114551, 17/5/68

R. Gib

201-306052

22 Apr 68

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO C/WOVIEW

INFO. COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/QREBONY/1's Taxes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. QREBONY/1 told RODIGAST at their most recent meeting that he did not have to file an overt tax form for 1966 because his gross overt income for 1966 was less than $600. This will not be true for the 1967 tax year and he will have to file in the Spring of 1968. The operative sentence in the 1966 Tax Guide For US Citizens Abroad, US Treasury Dept IRB Pub No 54 states--"Every citizen of the United States, regardless of where he resides who is under 65 years of age and has a gross income of $600 or more during a tax year must file an income tax return."

2. For the record the undersigned who is as yet unfamiliar with all administrative details, would appreciate HQS confirmation of the above.

ACL

AARON C. LAGIMESTRA

Distribution:
- 3 - C/WOVIEW
- 2 - COS/London
- 2 - C/Eur Div

CS COPY

201-306052

APR 25 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA - 228

DATE
22 April 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

YA

ACTION CA/PEG

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA 2, EUR 8, C/IC 2, CI/OA

ACTION

13 MAR 67 43420

S E C R E T 191034Z CITE LCPIPIT 0701

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QREBONY

REF: DIRECTOR 90256

1. AGREED PARA 3 REF THAT RAISE NOT BE PASSED THRU QRPURE. ALSO AGREE JULY EFFECTIVE DATE. REQUEST HQS TAKE STEPS HAVE RAISE ADDED TO SALARY DEPOSITS MADE BY HQS TO QREBONY'S ACCOUNT.

2. WILL COMMENT ON PARA 4 REF WHEN PROMISED DISPATCH RECEIVED.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

Harrison =

2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
C/WOVIEW

INFO.
COS/London, C/Eur Div, C/WOMUSE

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT LAS

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/British Immigration Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The USC memoranda sets forth a problem which QREBONY/1 recently encountered at London Airport and how it was solved with the assistance of London Station and JAGUAR.

2. As matters now stand, British Immigration will take no action against QREBONY/1 without checking with JAGUAR.

ACL

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: USC
As stated above para 1 USC

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 1 MAY 1967

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW w/att USC
2 - C/WOMUSE w/att USC
2 - COS/London w/o att
2 - C/Eur Div w/o att

CS COPY

APR 18 1967

15/c [illegible]

201-306057

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA - 211

DATE
17 April 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

TO: KILAPERTI

[illegible] with Home Office [illegible] Roddy can tell [illegible] what the Immigration people at the airport say. As long as he's properly documented (visa current and all that) they can't keep him out (unless, of course, they catch him in flagrante delicto. So as long as he keeps his nose relatively clean, he's okay. He doesn't need to worry until the Home Office comes to him; when that happens - IF it happens, and that is unlikely, the way the British law works - we will look into things further. Tell him that having a British wife makes him immune to most out-kicking activities - as long as his nose is clean.

In fact, it is all fixed with the Home Office. They will not take any action against him without checking with JAGUAR, and they, of course, will check with us. He should not be encouraged to be flippant or sassy with the Immigration people, but he doesn't need to panic, either. He should behave in a reasonably straightforward and natural way - so he should not be encouraged to think we have "fixed" things for him.

I also discussed again with JAG the question of having him taken off the watchlist. They are willing to do so, if we want, but their counsel still is that it is better for him to be watchlisted. There could probably be no better credential for him, if traveling with Ebrahim of Manchanda or Rain[illegible], or someone of that sort, than to get the business from the Customs or Immigration people. And, of course, he should, for our sake (security, and all that) be discouraged from carrying anything incriminating, and if he knows that he may be searched any time he comes or goes, that should help his discretion along.

Now, if, on the other hand, the airport harrassment really gets to be too much of a burden, maybe we will have to review the situation. On the basis of the two incidents to date, however, I vote for leaving him watchlisted.

Let me know if you see any problems, or if there are any unanswered questions.

(Oh, yes: consensus is that he should not apply for permanent residence permit. If he bothers about it, Roddy should point out that in applying for one he would have to give some info about his income, etc., which he doesn't have to do now. And, again, since his British wife is an ace in the hole, he doesn't have to volunteer that information; so he shouldn't.

FROM: JOZEVICK

OEPA - 211
15 Apr 67

URGENT

BRITISH IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

Returning to the U.K. on 15/3/67, I was warned by British Immigration at London Airport that I was spending more time in Britain than outside the country. The Immigration Officer inspected my passport closely, counting the number of trips I had made since getting that passport, which had been issued by the U.S. Embassy in London, on 1 December 1965. However, no explanation was asked for concerning the travel. I explained that I had intended to resettle in Switzerland or France and was spending so much time in Britain only because my wife, who was British, had been helping to take care of her elderly parents in London. I was told nevertheless that I should go to the Home Office and apply for temporary residence in Britain.

Before doing so, I would need to know:

1) whether I should in fact do so;

2) how should I describe my work, if any, and source of income.

At present, upon investigation, the British would learn that I have no visible means of income, except for perhaps for my Reports and some freelance journalism, but nevertheless receive money regularly from a Swiss bank account.

If I told the Home Office, I was a freelance journalist, I imagine they would demand some sort of bank or other financial statements, which would probably be examined by British tax authorities for possible taxation. Even if I say I have no employment of any consequence and maintain myself on income from investments made in Switzerland and elsewhere, I might have to verify that statement and pay some sort of British taxes. Considering the positions of my brothers-in-law, I doubt if either could get away with claiming to fully or partially support my family, although my brother-in-law Gordon Kaye, who is a Chartered Accountant, has been deducting my children's school fees from his taxes by means of an educational trust fund, although he no longer pays anything towards the fees. I could say that I was the beneficiary of a tax-free U.S. fellowship, but this might ~~[illegible]~~ prove more cumbersome and dangerous than necessary, in the present circumstances.

In any case, I need advice on this matter urgently, as I suspect I may soon have a visit from the Home Office if I do not go to them voluntarily.

CS COPY

S/c att to OEPA-211

201-306052.



AFRO - ASIAN-PEOPLES'
SOLITARITY ORGANISATION

VIII Council Session

NICOSIA - CYPRUS

201

Journalist Card No. 34

Name Richard Gibson

Country Englan

Organisation

ΚΥΠΡΟΥ

14-00000

TO: Chief of Station, London For LCPIPIT

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

MARKED FOR INDEXING

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

INFO: Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief, WOVIEW

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/QREBONY/Operational
QREBONY/1 Mentioned in Senate Hearings

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See paragraph 4.

1. Transmitted under separate cover is an excerpt from a recent Senate debriefing of a PBRUMEN defector, in which QREBONY/1's name was mentioned.

2. We do not believe that the testimony is particularly awkward for QREBONY/1, and while we had an opportunity to have this portion of the testimony stricken from the record, we elected not to do anything about it since it would have involved revealing WOFACT interest in QREBONY/1.

3. FYI, In order to avoid any concern on the part of QRPURE should this portion of the testimony ever hit the press, KAMMERMAYER mentioned the reference to QREBONY/1 in low key to QRPURE at a recent meeting. QRPURE exhibited no concern.

4. Please have RODIGAST brief QREBONY/1 concerning the testimony at an early opportunity.

JULIA R. CONGREVE

Attachment:
As stated above (u/s/c)

Distribution:
Original & 2 - LCPIPIT w/att.
1 - COS, London w/o att.

15/c 11L

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OEPW-46

DATE: 13 APR 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

GROUP 1

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

Distribution:
1 - RI/w Att.
1 - E/BC/UK w/o att.
1 - CI/IC w/att.
1 - WH/COG/CA/EW
1 - CCS/NC

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	EXT
CA/CF	Diane Chatelan	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/IC	4/4/67	D. Hart
for WH/COG/CA/EW	3/67	J. Moughan

RECEIVED
11 10 30 AM '67

AN
PS
ABSTRACT
CA/CF

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA		Cord Meyer, Jr.

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

So att to OEPW-46

Mr. Volta. I don't know, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know if they did in fact organize this conference in London, involving --.

Mr. Volta. I think they did, but I never heard of it --

Mr. Sourwine. Involving the North Vietnamese. You heard nothing further?

Mr. Volta. No, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, did you have any information about the presence in London of any other United States citizens who had attempted to obtain a visa to travel to Cuba?

Mr. Volta. No, sir. Not that I remember.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you have something to do with an individual who wanted to go to Cuba, to interview Castro?

Mr. Volta. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Tell us about this.

Mr. Volta. There was a newspaper man, a colored man.

Mr. Sourwine. A Negro?

Mr. Volta. Yes, a Negro. And he used to be, I think, president of Fair Play for Cuba here in the States, I think in New York. I don't know if this was in New York. And he visited the Embassy, trying to get a visa.

Mr. Sourwine. The Cuban Embassy in London?

Mr. Volta. Yes, the Cuban Embassy in London.

Mr. Sourwine. To get a visa to go to Cuba?

Mr. Volta. Yes. And then we sent this request to Cuba,

SECRET

S/C Att 1 to OEPW 46

201-306052

But we never had a reply. He wanted to have an interview with Castro for a magazine -- Playboy Magazine.

Q Playboy Magazine.

What did this Negro newspaper man do, do you know? Do you know where he worked?

Mr. Volta. As far as I know, he was editing a bulletin, newspaper bulletin, in London.

Mr. Sourwine. In London -- not in Paris?

Mr. Volta. I hardly can tell you exactly. But I know he was editing a news bulletin.

Mr. Sourwine. What kind of a news bulletin?

Mr. Volta. Well, a sheet of paper with news about different aspects.

Mr. Sourwine. Well, do you know whether this was really a news enterprise, or whether it was a propaganda enterprise?

Mr. Volta. I think it was a private news service, because his name was in the head.

Mr. Sourwine. What was that name?

Mr. Volta. I tried to remember his name.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you tell our man in Miami that it was Richard Gibson?

Mr. Volta. Right, that one, yes, sir. Richard Gibson.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, do you have any details about the alleged contract with Playboy Magazine for an interview with Fidel Castro?

SEE REVERSE OF THIS PAGE

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES

3 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	~~2~~	5	
2		6	
3	R.B.	7	
4		8	

FROM
LONDON

ACTION
CA/O 4

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE VR, CA2, WE8, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2

S E C R E T 021318Z

PALP INFO DIR CITE LOND 2425

2 MAR 65 IN 65923

DTDORIC QRPREY QREBONY

1. QREBONY RAW REPORTS RECEIVED 1 MARCH. APPRECIATE PROMPT FORWARDING.

2. SINCE WILL BE CONTINUING REVIEW OF CASE WITH JAGUAR IN NEXT FEW DAYS (THEY HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE OUR CONTINUED RUNNING OF HIM IN UK), WOULD APPRECIATE CABLE SUMMARY LATEST MEETING WITH QREBONY AND PLANS FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

S E C R E T

CFN 2425 QREBONY RAW 1 JAGUAR UK QREBONY

BT

SECRET



SECRET

1[illegible] FEB 1966

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

201

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: SUGAR's Involvement with American Radical Organizations

1. This memorandum requests your Agency's comments, on a priority basis, relative to improving the operational capabilities of SUGAR, a source of this Agency known to you, whose reporting on expatriate American leftist personalities we are forwarding on a continuing basis.

2. Despite our hopes and his efforts, SUGAR was unable to obtain an invitation to the Tri-Continental Conference recently held in Havana, which was a target for collection by this Agency. It is our belief that SUGAR's reputation of being pro-Chinese was responsible for his exclusion. In discussing this problem with important pro-Chinese communist personalities in Europe recently, the latter suggested that his ability to secure access to such meetings would be considerably enhanced if he could obtain a "grass-roots" base or connection in the United States which he could represent. In reporting this suggestion--which strikes us as valid--SUGAR speculated on the possibility that he might attempt to become the European "representative" of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), an American organization of which he knows little but which seems, from what he does know, to be consistent in its outlook with his ostensible political orientation.

3. In this connection, we would very much appreciate receiving any information you possess on RAM, its structure, personalities and membership. We would welcome particularly, any mailing list or address roster of this organization which might be passed on to SUGAR without compromise to security considerations.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4. Most of all, we would welcome your comments on this general problem, given your Agency's broad knowledge of such organizations as RAM in this country. As a negro expatriate with pretended pro-Chicom sympathies, SUGAR has also cultivated a reputation for sympathy toward the admittedly vague and diverse manifestations of "black nationalism", and toward such personalities as Robert Williams who embody it. We would be most interested in receiving both your comments on this general movement of opinion in the United States, and your descriptions of the organizations associated with it which could enable us to provide information and guidance to SUGAR for developing an association which would increase his operational access and effectiveness.

CSCI-316/00844-66

CA/CF:JBMurphy:ajl (16 February 1966)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressees
1 - CI/LSN
1 - CI/R & A
1 - CI/IC
1 - RID (200-124-156/3)
1 - CA/INT
1 - CA/SEC
2 - CA/CF

SECRET

15 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. John Brewer

SUBJECT: Field Investigation of QREBONY;
Qrebony Clearance (201-306052)

1. Pursuant to our conversation of 11 February in your office, this memorandum requests that the usual field background investigation not be undertaken in the clearance process instituted for QREBONY.

2. We make this request for limitation because of our strong belief that such an investigation would run an unacceptably high risk--approaching certainty--of causing serious damage to QREBONY's reputation and therefore his effectiveness with the targets against which he is directed as an informant. In the past, both here and abroad, QREBONY has made warm enemies, as well as friends, among dissident and leftist circles. He has particularly alienated both U.S. Communist and Trotskyist elements, apparently by his dealings with them while serving as Executive Director of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in the early 60's. His reputation for pro-Chicom sympathies--which is the basis of his present operational usefulness to us as a source--constitutes an additional grievance against him by such parties as the CPUSA and the CPGB which are pro-Moscow and anti-Peking. We know from independent sources as well as from his own testimony, that such hostility has taken the form of charges--completely false at the time--that he was an ODENVY or KUBARK agent. (Apparently a favored smear technique in such circles, this charge has been leveled in other cases with equal lack of justification.) These allegations against QREBONY' have not prevented him from winning the apparent confidence of many leftist target elements who, if they are aware of them at all, no doubt realise the prevalence of such backbiting and gossip and who have not been prevented from developing personal and confidential relations with him. Such charges, however, do represent a dormant vulnerability: they have made Subject something of a controversial figure in a millieu which rightly feels itself a target for intelligence collection and is extremely sensitive to the dangers of penetration.

SECRET

3. Against the background of this vulnerability, it must also be stressed that the sources to be contacted by such a field investigation would include many individuals whose suspicions of government interest--and hostility toward it--we could not reasonably expect to disarm. QREBONY's career in the United States in FPCC and similar groups put him in contact with a wide range of individuals who are not merely sophisticated but highly sensitive concerning any such inquiry. It is not possible to conceive of any method of approach which would not provoke their suspicions that a government connection with QREBONY was involved. (It is, moreover, hardly likely that cooperation could be expected of any of them, except in such cases where the individual sensed an opportunity to record damaging information.) In view of what we know about the rapid circulation of gossip among such individuals, and their great interest in, and suspicions of government interest, such an inquiry could be calculated with reasonable confidence to spell the end of any effectiveness QREBONY could offer this Agency.

4. While we realise fully that the aim of such an inquiry is to resolve unknowns in an individual's background and develop materials beyond those presently available, we note that QREBONY has been a subject of continuing interest to ODENVY for many years, and that, as a result, the basic politically derogatory associations in his past are a matter of record. As you know, a successful polygraph was performed on him indicating the absence of IS connection beyond such associations, and confirming (to the extent that it can be said to do so) his assertions of loyalty despite them.

5. In requesting clearance in this case, we are seeking to exploit QREBONY's ability to report information to us which he receives in the course of his contacts with national liberation leaders, pro-Chinese communists and similar personalities. Such information represents general political and biographical material relative to the interests, activities and plans of such individuals. Requirements passed to him in this connection involve instructions for the refinement and completeness of the reporting he is capable of providing from his normal intercourse with source personalities. It is anticipated that his usefulness will be increased by travel to those areas where his access to targets known to him permits firsthand reporting. It is also anticipated that he may be able to serve selected CA purposes by surfacing information available to him, when this does not prejudice his cover status.

His use is understood to be, and has been, limited and precludes revelation of classified information, either by operational assignments supporting or servicing other KUBARK operations, witting participation in the recruitment of other agents, or the passing of such requirements as would reveal a classified status of KUBARK knowledge or interest in any collection target.

James M. Murphy
C/CA/CF

Austin Goodrich
CI/IC

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 10 February 1966

TO:
☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM:
James Murphy
[illegible]
4 D 30 X7767

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Richard Thomas GIBSON

PROJECT: QREBONY

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:
QREBONY/1
Frederick T. Dominic (P)

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-306052

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

International

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

It was planned to use Subject in a test assignment at the Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference and the IX World Youth Festival, bothi in Algiers during summer 1965. When both of these events were cancelled, out test of Subject came to be based on his reporting capability relative to accessible contacts. His value confirmed in this way, we intend to help him expand his circle of contacts, using him as a penetration and informant on Afro-Asian national liberation and pro-Chicom elements in various countries.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION? See F below		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM? CIA has not been explicitly identified, but subject doubtless suspects CIA interest.	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. No FBI - All info from them has been received and reviewed.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. Only extreme left-wing cover truly applicable. Very limited credit cover interest is conceivable but inadvisable in US.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY
Possible long-range assignment to cover Communist targets in Algiers, Cairo or Djakarta makes case highly sensitive from the start.

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
X	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED. NO: 169669

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED Rome Frankfurt Algiers London Paris		
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 1-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

Green List
#169069

8 February 1966

Richard Thomas GIBSON

201- 306052

13 May 1931, Los Angeles, California

U.S.

Freelance Journalist London, England

James Murphy
CA/CP
4 D 30
7767

X

Journalist

X

Student John Hay Whitney Fellowship	Italy	1951 - 52
NCO U.S. Army	Germany, U.S.	52- 1954
Editor Revolution Africaine	Algiers	1962-64
Executive Secretary for Fair Play for Cuba Committee	New York	1961-62
Newswriter,XXX CBS News	New York	1959-61
English Editor Agence France Presse	Paris	1955-58
Freelance Italian Films Export & Christian Science	Rome	1952-52
Cub Reporter Philadelphia Afro-American	U.S.	1950-51

Emg Founding member of Fair Play for Cuba Committee; member NAACO, Urban League and American Society of X African Culture

5'10" 165 Black Kinky black Negro

Joy Marjorie Nee Kaye

Son - Frederick William Gordon Gibson DPOB 1958 Paris
Daughter Dominque Elizabeth Gibson DPOB 1956 Paris

FULL SEARCH

X 7468

SECRET

Chief of Station, Paris (LCPIPIT)

Chief, WE, Deputy Chief, WH/C; Chief, KUDESK

CA/6

Chief of Station, Madrid
HYDORIC, QRPRIMY, GREBONY/PBRUMEN
Transmittal of Background Reports on Subjects of Reference
: A. PALP 5275, 30 December 1965
B. MADR 6774, 12 January 1966

Attached herewith are copies of the reports prepared by AMTONE/2 concerning the Subjects of reference.

George D. SOORGONY

Attachments:
As stated above, herewith

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris (LCPIPIT), w/att, h/w
2 - C WE, w/o att
1 - DC/WH/C, w/att, h/w
1 - C/KUDESK, w/att, h/w

CA/EF

GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

OSMA-20639

14 JAN 66

ALGUNAS OPINIONES SOBRE LA VIDA Y PERSONALIDAD DE:

ROBERT TABER
RICHARD GIBSON
ROBERT WILLIAMS
WILLIAM WORTHY

[redacted]

Robert Taber

(Los datos sobre la vida y currícula de estos señores anteriores a su visita a Cuba deberán encontrarse en otra parte.)

Bob es el mejor del grupo, casi el único que realmente vale. Hombre gran valor personal y un buen periodista, estuvo en la Sierra en 1957 y de nuevo en 1958, donde entrevistó y filmó una película para la CBS, de Fidel Castro y sus guerrilleros. Al triunfo de la Revolución, estuvo en Cuba de visita varias veces y fue luego uno de los fundadores del Fair Play Committee For Cuba. Aparentemente, perdió su puesto en CBS y se enajenó el amor de su esposa (de esto se quejaba a menudo en Cuba) por causa de la Revolución Cubana. Amigo personal de Raúl Roa y Gómez Wanguemert y también de Fidel Castro, según parecía en 1961. Con relaciones personales con Manuel Piñeiro (de quien se reía de sus ínfulas de policía) y Ramiro Valdés y Raúl Castro, aunque nunca pareció estimarlos mucho. Este sentimiento parecía recíproco. Gran enemistad hacia los miembros del PSP y enemistad de ellos hacia Taber, sobre todo de Aníbal Escalante y Joaquín Ordoqui y Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. Una de las tragedias en la vida de Bob Taber fue el darse cuenta de que se había malquistado con Fidel Castro por hacerle, personalmente y cada vez que lo veía, críticas periódicas. Fue entonces (a fines de 1960 y principios de 1961) que comenzaron verdaderamente sus problemas y que comprendió que no solamente había perdido el favor de sus amigos, sino que estaba en desgracia con sus enemigos. Fue esto, sin duda, lo que le hizo buscar la muerte en Playa Girón, mientras actuaba como corresponsal del periódico Revolución. Fue gravemente herido en un muslo y salvó la vida por pura suerte. Antes había renunciado a su pasaporte o había sostenido una polémica pública con periodistas o senadores norteamericanos, desde las páginas del "El Mundo", donde colaboraba. En Cuba por poco muere también, poco después, de una infección amebiásica contraída en Guatemala, en los días de la revolución contra Arbenz. A fines de 1961 salió de Cuba con un documento (ni siquiera pudieron darle un pasaporte cubano, el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores ya en manos totalmente de los comunistas) personal de identidad, tratando de ir a China como corresponsal, pero en Praga le negaron el permiso para visitar este país y la URSS. Pasó a Francia y luego a Londres —y de ahí regresó a USA vía Canadá.

Taber no es un comunista ni parece haberlo sido nunca. Es un romántico político y un hombre ingenuo, que creyó que la Revolución cubana, de alguna manera, encarnaba algo de los ideales de Jefferson y Lincoln, asombrosamente. Hoy sabe que nada hay que esperar del comunismo en general y de la Revolución Cubana en particular.

2. Robert Taber (continued)

En la actualidad mantiene lazos de amistad en Cuba con Carlos Franqui, Juan Arcocha y Gómez Wangüemert, ya que una de las características de Robert Taber es su sentido del agradecimiento. Es uno de los hombres que mejor conocen en USA la Revolución Cubana, sus motivaciones, sus verdaderas intenciones, sus intenciones enmascaradas, sus logros reales y falsos y sus verdaderos fracasos. Políticamente, por sus cartas, parece ser alguien que regresa a un socialismo ingenuo y primitivo, a lo Oven y Proudhon y aborrece el cinismo comunista de que el fin justifica los medios.

En Cuba, en 1961, realizó un acto de gran coraje intelectual, poco después del coraje físico en Playa Girón, al ser el único periodista (siendo extrahjero, además) que defendió el film "P.M.", que prohibieran Alfredo Guevara y el ICAIC y que originara la gran, primera purga de intelectuales de izquierda y fueran el pretexto para las llamadas Conversaciones de la Biblioteca Nacional y el famoso discurso de Fidel Castro a los intelectuales, tan citado dondequiera. El artículo de Taber fue aceptado por la dirección del periódico El Mundo, pero no fue publicado--aunque Fidel Castro conociera su contenido al ser leído públicamente en una de las sesiones de la Biblioteca. Este gesto apresuró su salidade Cuba y selló su suerte política.

Richard Gibson

Ultimamente residía en París con su esposa francesa. Era director de la edición en Inglés del mensuario "Revolution", publicado en Lausana por Jacques Vergés, antiguo director de "Revolution Africaine", argelino de madre china y amigo de Ben Bella, con quien disputó al probársele que recibía dinero de China Comunista para expresar los puntos de vistas chinos en el periódico argelino. "Revolution" era o es (ignoro si se publica todavía) financiado por China Roja. Gibson salió de su puesto en estas publicaciones, al ser acusado de ser un agente infiltrado de la CIA. En 1964 estuvo en Bruselas, ofreciendo una conferencia en la ULB (Universidad Libre), con motivo de una Exposición Latinoamericana, auspiciada por la facción pro-china de la Federación Comunista de Estudiantes de Bélgica (Federación de Bruselas) y pagada por el grupo de disidentes del PCB, Grippa, Reindorf, etc. Esa noche habló sobre la Revolución cubana y su visita a Cuba y en la presidencia del acto estaba el propio Jacques Grippa.

Richard Gibson estuvo en Cuba en 1960, invitado especialmente por el periódico Revolución y por el magazine Lunes de Revolución. Era entonces presidente del Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Fue invitado a sugerencias de Bob Taber por Pablo Armando Fernández, que viajó a Nueva York para invitar a un grupo de intelectuales negros norteamericanos a los festejos del 26 de julio de 1960. Junto con Richard Gibson viajaron a Cuba Robert Williams, Leroy Jones, Julian Mayfield, su esposa y un nutrido grupo de escritores y poetisas negras. Fue entonces que Williams conoció a Cuba. La presencia de Gibson fue mal acogida por el PSP y los núcleos intelectuales y políticos que en Cuba giraban en la órbita del Partido Comunista Cubano, ya que Gibson era acusado por el PC de USA de dejar fuera del Comité Pro Justo Trato a Cuba a prominentes figuras comunistas norteamericanas, mientras daba cabida en el mismo a trotzkyistas y gente de la Nueva Izquierda. Williams, por su parte, era considerado un agitador casi anarquista, por estos mismos círculos comunistas cubano-americanos.

Richard Gibson es hombre de un carácter turbio. Un buen periodista y no mal escritor, pero una persona más bien desagradable, dentro de un complejo no solamente político, sino también psicológico, alimentados por su problema racial. Es un intelectual fracasado y hombre poco franco, de una comunicabilidad torcida. La policía francesa le consideraba un agente al servicio de una potencia extranjera--China Roja.

Robert Williams

Robert Williams es considerado en Cuba como una calamidad que hay que soportar—al menos esa es la opiniión que se tiene de él en los círculos políticos y revolucionarios y oficiales. Conversé con él, brevemente, en La Habana, en agosto de 1965. Es hombre con quien no se puede hablar mucho, no solamente por su complicado acento del Deep Sputh, sino también por su incoherencia mental y verbal. Suele vérsele acompañado siempre de un traductor, por lo general un negro cubano. Su penúltimo traductor fue Carlos Moore, que hoy reside en París y que provocó una aguda polémica en los círculos cubanos y amigos de Cuba en Francia, al publicar en el periódico "Solidarité Africaine" un artículo que tomaba las tesis del intelectual negro cubano, Walterio Carbonell, sobre la pretendida discriminación racial que existe en los medios políticos y dirigentes cubanos. Este asunto tuvo repercusiones en Cuba y no solo trajo problemas al verdadero autor del artículo (Walterio Carbonell, hoy expulsado de la Unión de Escritores de Cuba), sino al propio Williams; quien más de una vez había expresado tal opinión en público y en privado. Las desventuras de Williams no comenzaron aquí, sino cuando insistió en su línea china revolucionaria mucho tiempo después que todos los medios políticos, oficiales, intelectuales y dirigentes de Cuba se habían re-orientado hacia Moscú. Williams complicó su situación con un viaje a China Roja y a su vuelta a Cuba se encuentra casi aislado y ya no suele ver a Fidel Castro, a Dorticós y a los otros dirigentes revolucionarios; con la facilidad con que solía hacerlo antes. Todavía conserva muchos de sus privilegios (el traductor perenne, la casa, la comida, la educación de sus hijos y, creo, que la hora radial anti-americana), pero solamente porque su caso es muy conocido fuera de Cuba y en el Sur llegó a tener una cierta audiencia después de su fuga de Estados Unidos a Cuba y de haber dispuesto de una potente emisora (Radio Habana Cuba) para sus confusos mensajes de odio racial.

No me extrañaría que Robert Williams fuese declarado insane por un grupo de psiquíatras competente. En Cuba, la gente de la calle, lo tiene por tal. Ahora, en la Conferencia Tricontinental, estará asimilando su inestabilidad psíquica a la teoría de la revolución permanente —o a la lucha de la liberación de los pueblos de color.

William Worthy

Es el menos conocido de los cuatro y quizás el más peligroso, porque es el más estable emocionalmente, el más mediocre y más trabajador del grupo. Fue a Cuba en 1961, recomendado por Richard Gibson y el Fair Play Committee, pero también por su cuenta. Se hospedó en el Havana Riviera, no sin dificultades, pues sus puntos de vista, nada asimilables por los comunistas cubanos, fieles perritos de Moscú, le atrajeron el odio del PSP y una --ligera acusación-- de posible agente del FBI infiltrado en el Movimiento Negro y en Cuba. Hablé poco con él y solamente recuerdo su extraño acento, tal vez de Chicago o simplemente algún defecto anatómico, su aspecto de metodista negro y los shorts de cuero de alpinista italiano que siempre usaba en el hotel. Luego se hizo famoso en Cuba y en Europa, cuando fue procesado por haber ido a Cuba y a China Comunista sin permiso válido. Worthy no es un fanático ni un comunista ni un oportunista, pero parecía en camino de convertirse en un abanderado de cualquier causa que le fuera afín. Entonces me pareció que esta causa sería el Movimiento Por Avance de la Gente de Color. Hoy podría ser la Revolución Negra o Latinoamericana --o, simplemente, mundial.

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT XX

Chief, KUWOLF

DTDORIC/QRPREY/QREBONY

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REF: A. PALP 5033 (IN 96553)
B. OFLA 3128 (18 November 1965)

1. We have discussed the substance of the question raised in Ref B through the regular Headquarters channel with the ODENVY Rep here who has acted as a point of liaison for QREBONY material in the past. We passed on, also, the materials which you prepared for the ODENVY representative with whom you are in contact in Paris. We raised specifically the question of passing QREBONY's identity to the Paris ODENVY representative, which you mentioned in Ref B, stating that, so far as KUBARK is concerned, we had no objections. The ODENVY representative here, however, thought that this might serve to confuse somewhat the lines of coordination for QREBONY's information, for which ODENVY headquarters has sole responsibility. He therefore felt that we should continue the present arrangement by which, in effect, QREBONY's identity is held here at the point where his material within ODENVY originates. He appreciated, however, your initiative in filling in the Paris ODENVY representative on the targets which QREBONY can service, thus alerting him to possible leads he might look into. He suggests also that we be kept aware of your liaison with ODENVY in the field to guard against false confirmation or other possible duplication which could lead to confusion here in those quarters of ODENVY responsible for processing the QREBONY material.

2. With respect to Freedomways, discussed in Ref A, and Q's possible relationship with it, we will report separately.

Howell D. KAMMERMAYER

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT

7 JAN 196

OFLW-1414

S-E-C-R-E-T 200-124-156/2

1 - 200-124-156/2 CA/CF James C. Murphy mht (30-12-65) 7767
1 - CA/CF Chrono
1 - CI/ICG

CI/ICG

C/CA

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES, 43

PI ☑ COPY ☐ DIRTY

3 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM LONDON

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION AF 7

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, WE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, FE 6, FI, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2, DDP, WH/SA 8

SECRET 221745Z

22 DEC 64 IN 77512

MOB	IMP	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
EOB	RPTS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	BF	HH
		SEC	NS

PARI DIR INFO PALP CITE LOND 5337 CAWOOD ACTING

ZIBET ~~LCHARVEST~~

REF PARI 8052 (N 39470)

201

1. UNBOUND HAS MADE AVAILABLE TO ODENVY SAME INFO AS CONTAINED REF. ODENVY LOND INSIST THEY HAVE NO OPS INTEREST GIBSON. SERIOUSLY DOUBT EITHER SMOTH OR JAGUAR HAVE ANY RELATIONSHIP GIBSON., SINCE WOULD BE GROSS (AND SOONER OR LATER APPARENT) CONTRAVENTION OUR AGREEMENTS RE USE ONE ANOTHER'S NATIONALS.

2. LOND PHONE DIRECTORY LISTS JEFFREYS ALFRED HENRY AND MARKS (CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS), 9 BASINGHALL ST., E.C.2. NO STA TRACES.

3. ODENVY FILES HERE REFLECT FURTHER INFO ON CHARGES GIBSON A KUBARKER, ALTHOUGH NOTHING TO INDICATE BASIS FOR SUCH CHARGES. (SEE ODENVY/WASH LETTER TO KUBARK INFO ODENVY/LOND AND PARI, 1 DEC64, CAPTIONED RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON.) CAN HQS SHED ANY LIGHT?

4. SINCE ARRIVAL LOND, GIBSON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH CUBAN EMB

SECRET

AND MR. KENNETH TYNAN (LATTER IN CONNECTON JOB POSSIBILITY FOR GIBSON). (THIS INFO SENSITIVE, FROM SMOTH. HQS SEE OEL 39690 AND OEL 39490.)

5. SMOOTHERS HAVE PREVIOUSLY ACKNOWLEDGED THEY WOULD LIKE SCUTTLE REVOLUTION REPEAT REVOLUTION. REQUEST LOND BE ADVISED OF SCHEME OF DIR 63751. THEN, IF APPROPRIATE, SUGGEST WE DISCUSS WITH SMOTH/JAGUAR/LCBEFORE AS NECESSARY TO ENLIST THEIR COOPERATION. JAGUAR IN PARTICULAR MAY BE USEFUL IN PROVIDING CURRENT DATA ON GIBSON AND MAY BE ABLE GET SOMEONE CLOSE TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN OPS DATA IN SUPPORT ANY PLAN FOR OP AGAINST REVOLUTION REPEAT REVOLUTION. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

* UNBound INFO Re Richard GIBSON.

RICHARD GIBSON

30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
London, N.W.8
Tel.: PRI 8778

Age: 34.   Born: Los Angeles, Calif., U.S.A., 13 May 1931.

Married - wife English.   Three children - ages 7, 9 and 5 mos.

Education: Primary schools, Philadelphia, Pa., U.S.A.
Central High School, Philadelphia, Pa.
Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio (read English lit.)
University of Rome (Italian lit., 1951-52)
Sorbonne, Paris (French studies, 1955)
Columbia University Graduate School, New York
(CBS Fellowship, 1960-61)

First entered journalism in 1950 as reporter-clerk for Philadelphia Afro-American, a Negro weekly.

In 1951-52, while attending the University of Rome, I worked as legman for Edmund Stevens, then chief of the Mediterranean News Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor of Boston. I also did parttime work -- English-language public relations -- for Italian Films Export, a semi-governmental Italian agency for the export of Italian films to English-speaking countries.

1953-54: drafted into U.S. Army. Served as non-com in Trieste, West Germany and U.S.A.

1955-58: English-language editor, Agence France-Presse, the French national news agency in Paris. Also wrote for the Agence Intercontinentale, AFP's feature service.

1959-61: newswriter for Columbia Broadcasting System for radio and television in New York. Fired from this job because of my activities in founding the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in the U.S.A. to support the Cuban Revolution.

1961-62: Secretary-treasurer of the Institute for the Improvement of Inter-American Relations, Inc., chartered as an "educational foundation" under the laws of the State of New York. The Fair Play for Cuba Committee was a permanent committee of the Institute. As the chief paid officer of the organization, I directed a public relations campaign aimed at countering U.S. propaganda against Cuba. I published books, newsletters and placed advertizing on behalf of Cuba in the U.S. press.

1962-64: English-language editor of the international review Revolution. Was one of the founding editors of Revolution Africaine in Algiers and was later sent to Switzerland to edit a monthly in English. Directed all aspects of the editing, publishing and distribution of the magazine.

1965- : Publisher of Richard Gibson Reports, a regular news and features service, mainly for Afro-American newspapers.

201-306052

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☒ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 31

8 SECRET

ORIG : JAMES M. MURPHY
UNIT : CA/CF ☐ INDEX
EXT : 7767 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 9 DEC 1965 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-306052

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

10 DEC 65 14 32z

TO : PARIS/LCPIPIT LONDON

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: CA/O 4 INFO: VR, FILE ☑ RID COPY, WE 8, WH/C 8, CA 2, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CCS 3

TO PALP INFO LOND

CITE DIR

AN 22	FI	64369
~~RS~~	~~REP~~	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

10 DEC 1965

DTDORIC QRPREY QREBONY

REFS: A. LOND 0723 (IN 00407)

B. DIR 61637

1. CONSULTATION WITH STATE CONTACT YIELDS FOLLOWING:

A. TRAVEL WITH U.S. PASSPORT FROM AREA OUTSIDE U.S. CONSIDERED TECHNICAL VIOLATION, NOT BASIS FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

B. EVIDENCE OF SUCH TRAVEL, E.G. CUBAN VISA STAMP, IS BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BY STATE DEPT AGAINST HOLDER OF PASSPORT. I.E. WHEN HE PRESENTS HIS PASSPORT FOR RENEWAL, EMBASSY WILL REFER TO DEPARTMENT FOR GUIDANCE. ~~USUALLY RESULTING IN ISSUANCE OF NEW PASSPORT GOOD ONLY FOR ONE WAY TRAVEL HOME.~~

C. DESPITE REF A REPORT FROM ODENVY THAT LOND PASSPORT FILE IS CLEAN, DEPARTMENT CONTACT HERE CANNOT ASSURE THAT LOND PASSPORT OFFICE PROCEDURES WOULD AUTOMATICALLY RENEW QREBONY PASSPORT ON REQUEST, WITHOUT REFERRAL ~~[illegible]~~ TO DEPT IF SUCH MADE, THERE MAY EXIST DEROG IN EBONY PASSPORT FILE HERE RESULTING IN INSTRUCTIONS TO LOND EMBASSY ISSUE LIMITED PASSPORT FOR TRAVEL HOME. CAN NOT CLARIFY FURTHER STATUS EBONY FILE HERE WITHOUT DIVULGING TRUE NAME.

Continued...

201-306052
14 Dec 65

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DEC 14 8 56 AM '63

TO :

PAGE TWO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 64369

2. IN ANY CASE WE ABLE PROTECT QREBONY THRU CLEARED STATE CONTACT. IF EBONYS REQUEST FOR RENEWAL IS REFERRED TO DEPARTMENT BECAUSE OF CUBAN TRAVEL OR SOME OTHER CAUSE, WE CAN HAVE DEPT INSTRUCT EMB ISSUE FULL RENEWAL ON BASIS THERE INSUFFICIENT LEGAL GROUNDS PROCEED OTHERWISE.

3. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN EBONY PASSPORT EXPIRES. IF IT HAS BEEN RENEWED RECENTLY, CUBAN VISA WILL PRESENT NO PROBLEM FOR LIFE OF DOCUMENT. EBONY SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT RENEW WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH HQS.

4. PLEASE ADVISE ALSO WHETHER EBONY HAS RECEIVED CUBAN VISA FOR TRAVEL, HOW ACQUIRED, AND WHAT ARRANGEMENTS HE PLANS FOR TRAVEL. APPRECIATE/ESTIMATED TRAVEL COSTS.
BREAKDOWN

END OF MESSAGE

CCS
CI/IC
WE/BC/U

CORD MEYER, JR.
C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JAMES M. MURPHY
CA/CF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

Chief, KUWOLF XX

Chiefs: KUDESK; KURIOT; CSB, FRANKFURT (MKTOPAZ for OVERSEAS);
WE. Chiefs of Station: Germany; Paris (TECHS).

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT.
DTDORIC/Operational
QUEBONY/Security of QUEBONY/1 S/W Communications System

201

References:

A. OFIA 3044 (Not sent Chief, CSB, Frankfurt; COS, Germany; COS, Paris)

B. FRAN 9240

1. Forwarded herewith is a Memorandum for the record concerning Paris/LCPIPIT's investigation of the security of QUEBONY/1's S/W communications system following an episode involving an 11 October 1965 message received from him by LCPIPIT.

2. We request Headquarters' guidance concerning this situation, with special reference to Paragraph 3 of the attached Memorandum, in order that we may take all appropriate steps to resolve the problem of maintaining secure communications with QUEBONY/1, especially in view of the plans to send QUEBONY/1 on an extended visit to Cuba commencing sometime in mid-December 1965.

Harvey C. FAHRICH

Attachment:
Memorandum hw

Distribution:
1 - C,KUDESK w/att. hw
1 - C,KURIOT w/att. hw
1 - C, CSB,Frankfurt w/att. hw
1 - COS, Germany w/att. hw
1 - COS, Paris w/att. hw
1 - C,WE w/o att.
3 - C,KUWOLF

NOV 26 1965

OFIA 3152

24 November 1965

SECRET

200-124/156/2

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

FROM : Harvey G. FAHNRICH

SUBJECT : Security of QREBONY/1 S/W Communications System

REFERENCES : A. OFLA 3044
B. PALP 4385
C. FRAN 5087

1. In early June of this year KUWOLF developmental agent QREBONY/1 (formerly STEBONY/1) was trained by KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST in the use of the S/W system prescribed by MKTOPAZ per Reference C. QREBONY/1 took one carbon sheet of the system with him on a brief trip to North Africa and used it for four messages in the latter part of June. Concurrently, Paris Station TECHS, on LCPIPIT's behalf, requested in OFPT 10348 that MKTOPAZ prepare for QREBONY/1's use an S/W carbon pad which would alleviate the carbon concealment problem for the agent. The pad was received subsequently and passed to QREBONY/1 on 18 July 1965, at which time his original single carbon sheet was withdraw.

2. QREBONY/1 first used his new S/W pad for a message dated 22 July 1965, comments on which were transmitted to interested KUBARK Headquarters and Field components in Reference B. QREBONY/1 underwent a corrective briefing on the use of his pad on 4 August 1965, carbon No. 1 (rearmost of three in the back of his pad) was withdrawn since it bore an imprint of the 22 July message, and QREBONY/1 was authorized to use carbon No. 2 (middle of three) but only for "essential" messages. (a 24 July S/W message was also critiqued at the 4 August meeting--because the carbon impression was relatively weak.)

3. On the basis of LCPIPIT's instruction to refrain from using his S/W pad except for "essential" messages, QREBONY/1 did not employ it again until 11 October 1965. The nature of the message indeed met the criteria for use of the pad, but as in the 22 July letter the message was clearly legible without development. To quote Paris Station TECHS:

> "SW impressions were clearly visible under Ultraviolet Light (short wave and long wave) and also under a plain desk light."

On the basis of this report, QREBONY/1's previous performance in use of the pad, and the fact that the next point from which he was to use the pad would be Algiers, LCPIPIT determined that the risk of compromise outweighed the necessity of QREBONY/1 carrying this communications system with him and withdrew the S/W pad on 20 October 1965. LCPIPIT retains possession of the pad which contains the two remaining carbon sheets (No. 2 detached and inserted in the back of the pad, No. 3 still bound in the pad.) The 11 October message is clearly legible to the naked eye on carbon No. 2.

4. Of greater concern to LCPIPIT, however, were the following additional comments of Paris Station TECHS regarding the 11 October message:

> "The envelope you sent has evidence of tampering. There was glue bleeding plus fiber tears. Plus, additional glue had been added to the upper flap (glue must have run and was sticking inside on the letter.)"

5. In the 20 October meeting at which his S/W pad was withdrawn QREBONY/1 stated that he had written the 11 October message on a sheet of glass, perhaps with a pencil that was too soft. He conceded that there was some imprint on the carbon, but nothing which could be read on the actual message sheet. He said he wrote the message at 1100 hours when he was alone at his home and burned the remainder of the message stack immediately. He said he then put the message in an envelope immediately and sealed it gently under another sheet of paper to avoid rubbing it. He added that he then placed the proper postage on the envelope, placed it in his pocket, and mailed it two hours later at the closest mailbox to him home. QREBONY/1 asserted that he did not reopen the letter after sealing and was certain that his wife had not seen it.

6. Pursuant to LCPIPIT's exploration of this question with QREBONY/1 we sent an informal note to MKTOPAZ via a Paris Station Officer on 20 October 1965 requesting assistance in efforts to determine whether QREBONY/1's correspondence was indeed subject to tampering. MKTOPAZ prepared five "booby-trapped" envelopes for our use. Two of these were mailed to the LCPIPIT letter drop from two different cities on the continent, and the remaining three were passed to QREBONY/1 on 5 November for him to mail from his home.

7. The five "boody-trapped" envelopes were picked up at the LCPIPIT letter drop over a period of a week and were handcarried by a Paris Station Officer to Frankfurt on 18 November for processing by MKTOPAZ. Paris/LCPIPIT asked the opinion of MKTØPAZ on the following points:

a) Was there evidence of tampering with any of the five envelopes?
b) If so, which envelopes bore evidence of tampering?
c) Was it possible to determine from a study of the cachets whether such tampering occurred before or after the cachets were applied?
d) Did such tampering appear to be of a professional or of an amateur nature?
e) Any other MKTOPAZ observations which would help LCPIPIT determine the source of any tampering that may have taken place.

8. MKTOPAZ advised LCPIPIT on 19 November via FRAN 9240 that there was "no evidence of tampering on the five booby-trapped letters."

14-00000

2

Report Q REBONY/1's Security Aspects

OFLA-3146/1
30 Nov. 1965

In reply to the attached (Memo on Home Situation) Rodigast told QREBONY/1:

1. We can't do anything about his housing problem in view of non-permanent nature of our present arrangement.

2. Avoid formalizing periodical at this point; it should require no authorizations for publication as it is merely a news correspondent's report, mimeographed for convenience—not a magazine.

3. In order to control content, Q alone should have responsibility for putting out issues— can't delegate to wife and above all to other contacts.

CS COPY

201-306052

MTG:

OFLA 3146/1

HOME SITUATION

My wife was rather hostile to my news about my contacts with the Chinese comrades. She said she was sorry I couldn't work something out with Metropolitan Features. I hadn't done enough work for them because I was lazy, she said. She said if I weren't careful I'd be treated by the Chinese just as Nils? What future was there in that? she asked. Anyway, she added, I didn't really give a damn about the Chinese.

[illegible]/1

She pointed out the situation was difficult for us. The landlord in London was trying to evict us and we had no idea where we were going. I had no substantial funds from the Chinese and was still living on the generosity of the Americans (Metropolitan), she said.

Moreover, she was tired of being a grass widow. I was keeping secrets from her, she had been certain for sometime, she said. She had had enough trouble with my "secrets" in the past, she said.

However, she liked the idea of [redacted] Reports, but was sorry about the "objectivity" and the 50 copies only limit. There was no reason, if I could get some help from the Chinese, that I couldn't make a success of the newsletter and really be independent, she said.

I emphasized to her that I had had contacted with the Chinese without Nils' knowledge and that she should on no account ever mention the matter with him. She said that showed how the Chinese treated people. Nobody was more honest than Nils, she added. What was happening to him now would happen to me one day, she said.

However, she was genuinely pleased with the newsletter and spent some time trying to collect material for the dummy I was preparing. She wrote herself a piece on C.A.R.D. (I have the feeling that a lot of her resentment would be dissipated if she would allowed to handle most of the business involved with the newsletter.)

The housing problem remains a serious one and we may have to move. A temporary furnished flat in London would cost us at least £25 to £30 a week today — at present, we pay £12-12-0 per week. We have given the case to a lawyer, but, because it is a furnished flat, we will probably have to get out sometime soon.

The other important question to be settled is that of a mailing address for the Report. Should I get a London mail drop and run the risks of running into the Home Office or should I get a lawyer and set the thing up legally, perhaps under my wife's (British subject) name? In that case, I could take a one-room office somewhere around Fleet St. and my wife could take care of the mail with an occasional office temporary worker during my absence.

OFLA 3146/1

I suggest that the Report always be mailed out from the same address, London or whereever. My wife will be able to get sufficient copy from various people, such as Pomeroy and Jeanne Pynor [30-year old freelance journalist who specializes in African affairs, now married to a Kenya parasitologist studying in London, formerly worked for Dennis Phombeah]. For my purposes, if I can obtain press rates, I can wire copy to London ~~xx~~ from Havana or Dar es Salaam, thus giving tangible evidence of my activities as a bonafide newsman. It would be helpful if I could get an American Cable & Radio System Credit (Transferred Account) Card, such as I got from Revolucion in Havana for use at the U.N. in 1961.

Copy to Katzenbach

18 Nov 65

OFLA 3146/1

Subject: QREBONY/1 - Security at home

1. At his 17 November meeting with Rodigast QREBONY/1 (Q) was asked some questions concerning keep of files and correspondence. He keeps copies of all correspondence (except routine letters transmitting articles he has written, for example) in a file to which his wife has access. He maintains a minimum of questionable notes, and keeps his personal notebook (with addresses, expenses, etc.) in his coat pocket day and night.

2. His wife has two brothers. The one to whom Q owes money is Gordon, a chartered accountant, who during World War II was in British Military Intelligence. He visits the Q home to bring gifts from the wife's mother to the Q children, but has a cat-and-dog relationship with Q's wife; indeed, he will not stay for a meal because he can't stand talking to her, and the feeling is mutual. Q is certain she would never think of confiding in Gordon, for example to say: "Look at these awful letters Q has written!" Gordon is more likely to confide in Q himself. Gordon's politics are apparently solidly conservative. (His wife's other brother, less involved with them, works for Rank.)

3. Q mailed the three test letters as follows: one in the morning, the two following on successive afternoons, at the local box in the normal way. One of the three envelopes actually contained a note: a simple statement that "William" (Guillermo) had not defected but his brother had (Cabrera Infante), information acquired from a Cuban official (see separate contact reports).

4. Q wanted to get a lawyer's opinion on what regulations govern publishing a periodical in his country of residence (he is not of course officially a resident at all). Sensing additional costs and unnecessary formality, Rodigast suggested that he keep it on the basis of being a correspondent's reports, not a separate commercial press venture requiring eventual licenses or payment of business taxes, at least for the time being. Mailed first class, the material should require no permit from the mail authorities. A contact had suggested he might have difficulty with the locals (see report of Q's 15 November contact with WP).

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CL ,IFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

2 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM PARIS (LCPIPIT)

ACTION CA/04 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR CA 2 WE 8 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 FI, FI/INT 2

SECRET 171642Z

DIR CITE PALP 5033

DYDORIC QREBONY KUDESK

REF DIR 57747, PARA 3

17 Nov 65 IN 96553

201

1. PALP POUCHING DETAILS FIELD LIAISON WITH ODENVY/PARIS RE EXCHANGE INFO PERTAINING QREBONY PBPRIME CITIZEN CONTACTS. QREBONY/1 (Q) IDENTITY NOT DIVULGED LOCALLY.

2. AMONG INFO RECEIVED FROM ODENVY IS REPORT DATED 17 DEC 64 NEW YORK (FILE NO: BUFILE 100-434819) RE FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INC (F). REQUEST HDQRS STUDY THIS DOCUMENT WITH PURPOSE ASSESSING FEASIBILITY HAVING Q ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH F IN ATTEMPT SECURE SPONSORSHIP/OUTLET HIS JOURNALISTIC VENTURES, INCLUDING POSSIBLE COVER RE PROJECTED TRIP HAVANA.

3. APPRECIATE Q-F LINK MAY BE INADVISABLE IN VIEW: A) F RELATIONSHIP CPUSA; B) Q'S CLAIM HE ON CPUSA BLACKLIST; C) SEEMING INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN INDIRECT ASSOCIATION CPUSA AND EFFORTS BUILD BONA FIDES AMONG PRO-PEKING ACTIVISTS AND ORGANIZATIONS

SECRET

14-00000

IN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT. ALSO APPRECIATE Q-F ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH ODENVY.

4. FOREGOING NOT YET DISCUSSED WITH Q OR RODIGAST AND WILL NOT BE RAISED WITH FORMER PENDING HDQS REPLY.

5. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN 5033 57747 PARA 3 PALP ODENVY/PARIS RE QREBONY PBPRIME REBONY/1 (Q) NOT DIVULGED INFO ODENVY 17 DEC 64 NEW YORK BUFILE 100-434819 RE FREEDOMWAYS INC (F) HDQS Q F RE HAVANA Q-F A) F CPUSA B) Q'S CPUSA C) CPUSA BONA FIDES PRO-PEKING Q-F ODENVY NOT YET Q RODIGAST NOT BE HDQS NO INDEX

T

SECRET

Chief, KUWOLF X

Chiefs, AF, WE, KUDESK, KURIOT; Chiefs of Station, LONDON,
BRUSSELS, ALGIERS.

Chief of Station, PARIS/LCPIPIT

DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY 20 October 1965 Contact with LCPIPIT

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment A is Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST's Contact Report of his 20 October 1965 meeting with QREBONY/1.

2. Forwarded as Attachment B (USC) is the identity list for RODIGAST's Contact Report.

3. Forwarded herewith as Attachment C is the "Progress Report" submitted by QREBONY/1 to RODIGAST at the 20 October meeting. A careful review of the report's content did not justify KUTUBE dissemination of any of the material therein.

4. Copies of recent correspondence addressed to and sent by QREBONY/1 will be forwarded by nonaccountable manifest as appropriate.

5. Paragraph 5 of Attachment A refers to a security flap which has arisen in QREBONY/1's use of his S/W system. In a letter to LCPIPIT dated and postmarked 11 October and picked up by LCPIPIT 14 October, QREBONY/1 had prepared an S/W message. LCPIPIT received the following report from TECHS in Paris concerning this letter: "The envelope you sent has evidence of tampering. There was glue bleeding plus fiber tears, plus additional glue had been added to the upper flap (glue must have run and was sticking inside on the letter). S/W impressions were clearly visible under ultraviolet light (short wave and long wave) and also under a plain desk light."

Attachments: As stated.

Distribution:
(2) - C,KUWOLF w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - C,AF w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - C,WE w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - C,KUDESK w/Atts A,C hw; B use
1 - C,KURIOT w/Att. A hw
1 - COS, LONDON w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - COS,BRUSSELS w/Atts. A,C hw; B use
1 - COS, ALGIERS w/Atts. A, hw; B use

OCT 28 1965

CS copy filed in 200-124-156/3

File in 201-306052

OFLA 3044

26 October 1965

SECRET

~~200-124-156/3~~

6. Because of QEBONY/1's repeated carelessness in use of his S/W system and the obvious risk inherent in his seeking to use this system from Algeria, LCPIPIT withdrew the system from him at the 30 October meeting. His carbon sheet carried deep impressions that were easily readable by the naked eye. Also, we have, in cooperation with KUSODA/Paris, taken urgent action on an informal basis (to be followed up by dispatch) to have KKTOPAZ prepare a set of envelopes in order that we may run a series of tests on the possibility, as well as the source, of tampering with QEBONY/1's correspondence to us. A full report on this matter, including its resolution, will be forwarded appropriate addressees as soon as the investigation can be completed.

Harvey G. FAIRRICH

C

File in: 201-306052

~~[illegible]~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, ~~KUDESK~~ AF

INFO.
Chief, WE; Chief, ~~AF~~; Chief, KUWOLF;
Chief, LCPIPIT KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STEBONY QRPREY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: A OELA 43,522, 2 July 1965
B OELA 43,802, 11 August 1965

1. The following is the text of a JAGUAR report on STEBONY/1 and Marc SCHLEIFER. JAGUAR states that the information was received from a "most secret and delicate source which has been found reliable on previous occasions."

> "STEBONY/1 was in contact with Marc SCHLEIFER while the latter was staying in London with his family, en route for Algeria. SCHLEIFER had planned to leave London for Algiers via Paris on the 2nd June, but he deferred his departure in order to meet STEBONY/1. It seems that SCHLEIFER wanted, if possible, to visit Tanzania also. STEBONY/1 apparently was prepared to help SCHLEIFER and his family to find accommodation while they were in London because they had little money. He is also reported to have said that there was a possibility of his co-operating with SCHLEIFER in Africa.
>
> "According to our source, SCHLEIFER, while in London, arranged to contact the Tanzanian Mission, in connection with a job in Dar-es-Salaam which might be taken by either SCHLEIFER or STEBONY/1."

2. Ref A contains previous JAGUAR comments about STEBONY/1 and SCHLEIFER, of about the same period. While TIFFANY was in London (which puts it at the right time) STEBONY/1 was in touch with SCHLEIFER, and TIFFANY should be able to compare JAGUAR's comments with what STEBONY/1 said at the time. Ref B reflects a different contact between the two, from a different source.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
- 2-Chief, KUDESK
- 3-Chief, WE
- 2-Chief, AF
- 2-Chief, KUWOLF
- 2-Chief, LCPIPIT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ES COPY

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OELA-44,033	30 SEP 1965 29 September 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

RID

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-725837
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ C/1/ICG
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 4

30 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
PARIS (LCAPIT)

ACTION
CA/O4   ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR, CA 2, ADDP, CI, WE 8, AF 7, FE 8, CI/IC 2, CA/PROP, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT

RMS-KM

C/1/ICG

SECRET 271812Z

ALGI INFO DIR CITE PALP 4723

27 SEP 65 IN 60611

UNCRISP

DTDORIC QRPREY STEBONY KUDESK

REF ALGI 6529 (IN 58856)

1. RELUCTANT GIVE UP STEBONY/1 (S) FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. S TO BE ACCREDITED JOURNALIST TO CONFERENCE, WITH RENEWED PRESS AUTHORIZATION AND NEW VISA. AS GUEST NEW REGIME WITH NO CONNECTION TO OLD, LESS LIKELY TO BE DISTURBED. S TO REMAIN IN NORMAL CONFERENCE MILIEU THROUGHOUT.

B. EVIDENCE AVAILABLE HERE IS ONLY ORTHODOX COMMUNISTS OR TROTSKYISTS ASSOCIATED WITH OLD REGIME HAVE BEEN TROUBLED, BUT NOT PRO-CHINESE. S IS PART OF MINORITY WHICH FOLLOWED CHINESE IN SUPPORTING NEW REGIME FROM FIRST DAY.

C. MOST OF S' OLD LIBERATION MOVEMENT CONTACTS IN ALGI ARE GONE SO HE NOT LIKELY BE INVOLVED WITH THEM. EXCEPTION IS ARNAUD WHO SEEMS TO HAVE MADE PEACE WITH REGIME. S' OTHER CONTACTS WILL BE LIKE HIMSELF BE GUESTS OF NEW REGIME AND OF CONFERENCE. THEY WILL USUALLY BE PRO-CHINESE ELEMENTS SUCH AS AAJA BANDUNG CROWD.

D. WE CONTINUE HOLD TO ORIGINAL VIEW THAT S ATTENDANCE AT

201-306052
~~201-725837~~
27 Sept. 65

SECRET

SECRET

IN 60611

PAGE 2

CONFERENCE WOULD BE USEFUL TO BUILD UP HIS CONTACTS AND COVER FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS. S WILL CONTINUALLY BE MOVING IN POTENTIALLY HOSTILE CIRCLES; THIS COULD BE TRUE OF TRIPS HAVANA, DARE, DJAK AT SOME TIME OR ANOTHER. IN VIEW OF NATURE OF OPERATION, THE RISK WOULD SEEM TO BE WORTH TAKING.

- 2. PALP UNABLE EVALUATE POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS VERGES REAPPEARANCE MIGHT PRESENT. AS OF 15 SEPT S NOT OVERLY APPREHENSIVE.

3. PALP REMAINS MOST INTERESTED DISCUSSING ABOVE WITH ALGI OFFICER PER PALP 4689 (IN 56988) AND PALP 4712. (IN 59208) PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T

* ALGI CONCLUDED IT UNWISE TRY HAVE STEBONY/1 OPERATE IN ALGI

CFN 4723 6529 STEBONY/1 S S NO CONNECTION S MILIEU TROTSKYISTS NOT PRO-CHINESE S CHINESE S' ALGI ARNAUD S' PRO-CHINESE AAJA BANDUNG S S HAVANA DARE DJAK PALP VERGES 15 S NOT OVERLY PALP ALGI PER PALP 4689 PALP 4712 PLS

BT

AUG 19 74

HS

RECEIVED
RID/MIS
SEP 31 11 34 AM '65

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-726122

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

N/A SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM PARIS (CCP, P, T)

ACTION WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WE8 DAJ CA/04, ADDP, CI, DD4, DO/H3, CA/PROP, CI/ICS, CI/OPS, SR8, FE8, FI, FI/INT2

AN, ~~[illegible]~~ FS ~~[illegible]~~ WH/C/FS ABSTRACT X INDEX X

SECRET 221643Z

DIR INFO MADR LOND CITE PALP 4675

OSM DEV

22 SEP 65 IN 55673

IN 55673

UNCRISP TYPIC PBRUMEN STEBONY ORPREY KUDESK

ZZ PROCESSED 27 Sept. 65 P

REF: DIR 41939 ✓

1. IN 15 SEPT MEETING STEBONY/1 (S) TOLD RODIGAST PABLO FERNANDEZ (F) NAMED AMBASSADOR LOND PER LEE BAXENDALL 1 SEPT REMARKS TO S AND 5 SEPT STORY LONDON "OBSERVER". (BAXENDALL EDITS "VIET REPORT" OF U.S. "EMERGENCY COMMITTEE ON VIETNAM" AND HAS BEEN AN EDITOR OF "STUDIES ON THE LEFT.")

2. FIVE SEPT S (Stebony/1) CABLED F (Fernandez 201-726122) C/O FORNMIN HAVANA ASKING F (Fernandez) CONTINUED SUPPORT S (Stebony/1) EFFORTS RE FREE RIDE HAVANA AND ROBERT WILLIAMS (IR USA 201-108746) CONTACT.

3. S HAS KNOWN F AND WIFE SINCE 1963. F WIFE'S FAMILY HAS FURNITURE BUSINESS NEW YORK CITY AND F WORKED LAS AMERICAS BOOKSTORE AND PUBLISHING HOUSE.

4. S HAS MET WITH F IN NYC HAVANA PARI LOND OVER PAST FIVE YEARS. THOUGH CLOSE FRIENDS, S CLAIMS F WARY OF HIM BECAUSE OF S "PRO-CHINESE" ORIENTATION (BUT NOT BECAUSE OF OLD CHARGES S IS KUBARK AGENT.)

5. S CLAIMS F NONAMARXIST, NOT EMOTIONALLY ANTI-AMERICAN, NOT IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED, NEITHER COMMUNIST NOR ANTI-COMMUNIST. F "FRANK" WITH S THAT HE HAS BEEN ACCUSED IN CUBA OF HOMOSEXUALITY, BUT S SAYS F

20 Sept 65

B 201-726122

201-306052

SECRET

SECRET IN 55673 PAGE 2

ALSO SHOWS INTEREST IN WOMEN. F/S WIFE NOT PHYSICALLY ATTRACTIVE AND OTHER ACQUAINTANCES CLAIM HE MARRIED FOR MONEY.

6. S SAYS F DOES NOT APPEAR HAVE MUCH MONEY AND HAS MAINTAINED MODEST LOND APARTMENT.

7. F'S WIFE WORKS CUBAN EMBASSY. WIFE'S SISTER CAME LOND AT BIRTH F'S THIRD CHILD THREE MONTHS AGO. ON RETURNING HAVANA WITH F 31 AUG UNDERSTANDING WAS SHE TO CARE FOR INFANT SIX MONTHS SINCE F'S WIFE WORKED MORNINGS EMBASSY AND COULDNOT CARE FOR INFANT UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS.

Why didn't S/1 report this at the time? ? A

8. S SAYS F TOLD HIM MONTH AGO HE WANTED TRANSFER MADR OR HOPED OBTAIN FELLOWSHIP OR LEAVE ABSENCE PERMITTING STAY WESTERN EUROPE. DESCRIBES F AS POET OF BEATNIK BENT BUT NATIONALIST "LIKE ROA AND FRANQUI". X S CLAIMS F LOST NOTHING IN COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER CUBA.

OR News [illegible]?

9. A. MANCHANDA,* PEKING-LEANING EDITOR VIRTUALLY BANKRUPT "WEST INDIAN GAZETTE" JUST RETURNED LOND FROM PEKING HAS PREVIOUSLY TOLD S THAT F SPOKE AT COMMUNIST RALLIES LOND AND TOOK PRO-MOSCOW LINE ON SINO-SOVIET ISSUES. S KNOWS NOTHING OF THIS AND QUESTIONS MANCHANDA ACCURACY. 22

10. APPARENTLY S NOT FOREWARNED F HASTY DEPARTURE.

11. S. VOLUNTEERED F WOULD "QUIT" ONLY UNDER TERRIFIC ATTACK AND

SECRET

SECRET

IN 55673 PAGE 3

PRESSURE FROM HOME OR IF SOVIET AMBASSADOR LOND TWISTED ARM (RODIGAST DID NOT SPECIFY REASON FOR DEBRIEFING.) LCPIPIT WILL TRY CLARIFY.

12. POUCHING FULL REPORT.

13. NO INDEX.

* HQS HIGHLY INTERESTED STEBONY-1 CUBAN CONTACTS

SECRET

CFN: 4675 41989 15 SEPT STEBONY/1 S RODIGAST PABLO FERNANDEZ F PER LEE BAXENDALL 1 SEPT S 5 SEPT LONDON OBSERVER BAXENDALL EDITS VIET U S VIETNAM SEPT S F C/O FORNMIN HAVANA F S RE HAVANA ROBERT WILLIAMS

S F 1960 F WIFE'S NEW YORK CITY F LAS AMERICAS S F NYC HAVANA S F S PRO-CHINESE NOT BECAUSE S KUBARK AGENT S F NON-MARXIST NOT EMOTIONALLY ANTI-AMERICAN NOT IDEOLOGICALLY NEITHER COMMUNIST NOR ANTI-COMMUNIST F FRANK S CUBA HOMOSEXUALITY S F F'S NOT PHYSICALLY S F NOT APPEAR F'S CUBAN F'S HAVANA F 31 AUG F'S NOT CARE S F WESTERN EUROPE FRANQUI S F NOTHING IN CUBA A MANCHANDA PEKING-LEANING WEST INDIAN GAZETTE PEKING S F PRO-MOSCOW SINO-SOVIET S NOTHING OF MANCHANDA S NOT FOREWARNED F S F SOVIET RODIGAST NOT SPECIFY LCPIPIT NO INDEX

BT

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

1 September 1965

TO: Director, DTEARN

VIA: Contract Approving Officer

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

SUBJECT: Engagement of STEBONY/1, as Independent Contractor

1. Term and Project Charge. The subject individual has been engaged under oral contract as a developmental agent for an as yet unwritten Project involving KUWOLF and KUDESK and coordinated through QRPREY. Subject's salary and expenses are to be charged against the BOLINABLE Field Allotment per DIR 36066. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 September 1965, and it shall continue thereafter on a month-to-month basis subject to termination by, and at the convenience of, ODYOKE without prior notice.

2. Security Approval. Per CSI 10-5, STEBONY/1 does not require a POA (cf: DIR 15660), and OA not being requested pending establishment definite STEBONY Project (cf: DIR 36066). LCPIPIT advised 2 June 1965 STEBONY/1 granted clearance for LCFLUTTER (cf: DIR 15660).

3. Citizenship. The subject is not a foreign national.

4. Compensation. The subject will be paid $600.00 per month. The subject will be advised that he must file a covert income tax return through KUBARK.

5. Operational Expenses.

(A) The subject will be reimbursed for operational travel, except as noted in para. 8 below.

(B) The subject will be reimbursed for operational expenses, except as noted in para. 8 below.

6. Other Commitments. The following additional commitments have been made to the subject: "Since security conditions generally preclude the detailed accounting of miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20.00 during periods of authorized travel." Per Personal Ruling of Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT dated 12 July 1965: "If subject is absent from his home station on authorised travel for part of one day

SECRET

SECRET

and returns to his home station the night of that same day (i.e., if no hotel expense is involved in the sense of overnight accommodations), then he shall be entitled to draw 1/2 of his authorized per diem of $20.00 (i.e., $10.00)." Per diem under the above terms will be paid except as noted in para. 8 below.

7. Contingent Obligations. No additional commitments have been made to the subject under this oral contract. However, in the original Letter of Agreement signed by subject 3 June 1965 and which expired on 31 August 1965, paragraph 4 stipulated: "ODYOKE will compensate you in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of you and your family to a new residence if such a relocation is considered desirable by you and ODYOKE." Under the circumstances ODYOKE may have to supplement such funds as subject may receive for relocation from a target organization, institution, or government in order to defray such relocation expenses as subject may personally incur.

8. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the subject. Moreover, in cases where travel and/or operational expenses and/or per diem are provided or furnished in money or in kind from other than ODYOKE sources, ODYOKE will offset such funds, goods, or services against the obligations assumed in the above oral commitments.

9. The substance of paras. 1, 4, 5, 6, and 8 (except as noted in the second sentence of para. 4) have been communicated to, and accepted by, the subject.

SIGNED ______________________________
Richard D. SOTHERN
Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

REVIEWED: ______________________________
Contract Approving Officer

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
*	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

INFO Chief, of Station, Paris

FROM Chief, KUWOLF

SUBJECT DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL
0 STEBONY/STEBONY/1 Reporting

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
OFLA-2658

1. OFL-12 and OFL-13 were passed to the appropriate Headquarters desk for the evaluation requested in reference.

2. The results of the evaluations were that the reports based on STEBONY/1's elicitation contained "nothing more than chit-chat and opinion" with no new information that could be disseminated. As indicated in the last sentence of reference this result was not unanticipated by LCPIPIT.

3. In view of STEBONY/1's reportorial capabilities however, we hope that his continued efforts to elicit and report timely information will be vigorously maintained.

Raymond N Endlein
RAYMOND N. ENDLEIN

EMERY T. RAMTHUN

Distribution:
3 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT
1 - COS, Paris

201- 306052

23 AUG 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS [illegible]	OFLW-1240	20 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-6-81

1 - RI
1 - WE/3
1 - CA/B3
1 - CA/INT

DDI
CA/CF
EXTRACT X [illegible]

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/INT	Karl W. Kalassay	ped	7486

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	26 H 10 22 LU 01	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/CA		for L. J. MacKenzie

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT X

Chief, KUWOLF

DTDORIC/QRPRSY/KUDESK/SPZHONY/1 - Transmittal of Background Materials

REF: OPLA-2613, 9 July 1965

1. Forwarded herewith is the following material compiled in response to your request in reference dispatch.

a. Copy of the final draft paper on the pro-Chinese dissident element in Belgium (SECRET NOFORN).

b. Copy of the "Applications for Membership" presented to the IV AAPSO Conference (UNCLASSIFIED - Possession by KUBARK is CONFIDENTIAL).

c. "The Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement - A Status Report" (SECRET).

d. "Notes on Africa - #7 - The Fourth Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference" (CONFIDENTIAL).

e. CS-3/569,256, 8 January 1964, AAPSO Mailing list (SECRET NOFORN).

f. Comments on Afro-Asian Journalists Association (SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED).

g. _The Afro-Asian Journalist_, No. 1, Vol. 2, January-February 1965.

h. Bibliography - AAPSO and Afro-Asian Liberation Movements (OUO).

Book Dispatch No. 4761, 21 January 1965, and its attachment, "Pro-Chinese Elements in the International Communist Movement," which LCPIPIT already has, would also be useful for this purpose.

2. It is likely that we shall be able to work up a more comprehensive bibliography than the one included above (h), and will forward the books as they become available.

Attachments: H/W
A-H, as listed above

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HOWELL D. [illegible]

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT, w/atts., h/w

201-306052 OPLW-1234 19 AUG 1965

SECRET

200-126-79

1 - CI/ICG
1 - CA/CF
1 - RID/Files (for 200-126-79 file)
→ 1 - 201-306052

CA/CF Robert Daniel mcm 7767

CI/ICG 17 Aug 65 A. Goodrich (in draft)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, LCPIPIT

INFO.
Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY JAGUAR
Info Requested from STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. JAGUAR, in acknowledging receipt of the processed STEBONY/1 material that we forwarded to them, have also asked for "further information about Francois MASPERO and Professor Nguyen KIEN. We should be most grateful for any further identifying particulars for both MASPERO and KIEN and with regard to the latter, we should particularly like to know his present position in connection with 'Africa, Asia, Latin America Revolution' and whether he still holds a teaching appointment in France."

2. JAGUAR's note was shown to RODIGAST in London on 12 August, just before RODIGAST met with STEBONY/1. LCPIPIT please provide anything that can be had for passage to JAGUAR.

3. As should be fairly apparent, I think, from reading the material we passed to JAGUAR, plus the fact that there has been no "Revolution" for lo! these many months, the status of anyone connected with the magazine is about as uncertain as the status of the magazine itself. Nonetheless, we will be happy to let JAGUAR know as much as we can.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
- 2-Chief, LCPIPIT
- 3-Chief, WE
- 2-Chief, KUDESK
- 2-Chief, KUWOLF

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,827

DATE
16 August 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, LCPIPIT

INFO.
Chief, WE; KUWOLF; KUDESK; WH

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY SMOTH
BAIRN Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. BAIRN, a sensitive SMOTH operation, provides the following report relating to STEBONY/1 (date of info, 26 July 1965):

> "STEBONY/1 (previously in touch with Pablo FERNANDEZ while in London, en route with family to Algiers for the international conference postponed when Ben BELLA was overthrown) calls Pablo FERNANDEZ, tells him he (S/1) is just back from North Africa if the confernece is held in November. Says he has been unable to get any news of (Marc) SCHLEIFFER, and asks whether Pablo has heard of him. Pablo says he had a letter, brought by hand from SCHLEIFFER in Algeria, saying he (SCHLEIFFER) was going the next week to Cairo, and would write to Pablo from there. He has not yet written. S/1 says they had hunted for him high andlow in Algiers - he disappeared completely from the conference scene, and they thought that perhaps he had got mixed up in the (troubles between the new regime and Ben BELLA's faction), Pablo assures S/1 that SCHLEIFFER is all right. He knows this from a negro journalist, on "the Guardian" in the U.S.A. and coming from Pennsylvania, who covered the Algiers conference preparations. The journalist's name is, Larry HENRY or something similar. Pablo and S/1 agree to meet to-morrow (27th July), S/1 will call Pablo then to fix time and place. At 10.35 S/1 calls FERNANDEZ, arranges to call for him at the Embassy at 13.30 hours for them to lunch together."

2. This is for background information only.

Not to be Dissem outside U.S.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
- 2-Chief, LCPIPIT
- ~~2~~-Chief, WE
- 2-Chief, KUWOLF
- 2-Chief, KUDESK
- 2-Chief, WH

#7

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OELA-43,802	11 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

DISPATCH

SECRET

		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT	X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO	Chief of Station, Rome	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief, KUWOLF	MICROFILM
SUBJECT	DTDORIC/QRPREY/STEBONY/Grace Elizabeth Anne Russo	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

REFERENCES: A. OFLA-2538

B. DIR-27779

ODENVY traces on Subject have turned up general background data containing no derogatory information.

HOWELL D. HAMMERMAYER

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT
2 - COS, Rome

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFDW-1222	9 AUG 1966
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

1 - WE/4
1 - CA/CP
→1 - RID/Files

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CP	Mary C. Massey	mcm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WE/4		John J. Sh

3	ZFL
ABSTRACT Y	INDEX

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/CA		Lewis J. Lapham

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 39

SECRET GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM LONDON

ACTION CA/O 4

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR, WE 8, CA 2, CI, CI/OPS, WH 2, FE 9, FI, FI/INT 2, AF 7

S E C R E T 291003Z

DIR INFO PALP CITE LOND 8835

KUDESK GRFREY STEBONY

REF: PALP 4385 (IN 20682)

201-25837

1. LOND HAS LONG SUSPECTED LIONEL MORRISON A JAGUAR SOURCE. WHILE WISH PASS REF INFO, WOULD LIKE WAIT WEEK OR SO TO SEE IF WE GET SAME FROM THEM.

201

2. REQUEST PERMISSION PASS CAREFULLY SANITIZED VERSION REF INFO TO JAGUAR ABOUT AUG 10, UNLESS THEY PROVIDE SAME INFO IN MEANTIME.

3. FIRST SUBJ PARA 2 D REF IS AUSTRALIAN COMMIE WILFRED BURCHETT.

S E C R E T

CFN 8835 4385 LIONEL MORRISON A JAGUAR REF REF AUG 10 2 D AUSTRALIAN COMMIE WILFRED BURCHETT

BT

29 Jul 65 21357

AB FI

ABSTRACT X

SECRET

29 July 65

201-306052

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 201-306052

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

7 SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
LONDON

ACTION
WE 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE VR. FE 8 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 FI FI/INT 2 CA 2 CA/O 4 CI/OA

23 JUL 65 IN 17638

S E C R E T 231422Z

PALP INFO DIR CITE LOND 8762

KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY

REF: LOND 8728 (IN 46730)

LATER JAGUAR NOTE STATES STEBONY/1, WHO NOW HAS U.K. VISITOR'S PERMIT FOR THREE MONTHS, STATED HIS INTENTION TO GO TO PARIS TO GATHER MATERIAL ABOUT FRENCH GOVT'S FOREIGN POLICY.

S E C R E T

CFN 8762 8728 JAGUAR STEBONY/1 U K PARIS FRENCH GOVT'S

BT

SECRET

CA/CF

23 JUL 1965

201-306052

23 July 65

CONFIDENTIAL

DBB 15

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

1 6 JUL 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: 0 Grace Elizabeth RUSSO

CIA Paris has requested that material on Grace Elizabeth RUSSO be made available. Subject was born 23 September 1925 in Boston, Massachusetts. She is presently employed by FAO, Rome, and resides at Via Annia Faustina 56, Rome. CIA Washington traces reveal no pertinent information on Miss Russo. It is therefore requested that a check be made of the Bureau's records.

In response to your request
there are attached 5
reports which appear to relate
to the subject of your inquiry.

see additional reports on
subject DBB-15788
DBB-15591
DBB-15592

CSCI-316/02909-65

[illegible] abstract as of 29 July 1965

28 July 1965

This reply is result of check of FBI
investigative files. To check arrest
records request must be submitted to
[illegible]

CS Copy

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

201-306052
~~100-218~~

DBS 15788
FD-204
(5-7-54)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

O **Title:** GRACE ELIZABETH ANNE RUSSO
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Report of: Special Agent JOSEPH HOLIDAY

Date and Place: Albany, New York, July 16, 1957.

PROPERTY OF FBI
This report is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.
This is an FBI investigative report and makes no recommendation for clearance or disapproval.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

DBD 15788

GRACE ELIZABETH ANNE RUSSO
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Albany, New York
July 16, 1957

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

Professor JOHN K. GALBRAITH, Economics Department, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, presently vacationing at his summer residence, Newfane, Vermont, advised on July 12, 1957, that applicant has been his secretary and general assistant at Harvard University for the past four years. Professor GALBRAITH said he highly recommends the applicant as to character, reputation and loyalty. He further stated the applicant is a first-rate person, very superior, intelligent, and well qualified for the position she seeks. Professor GALBRAITH stated he is aware of the position the applicant seeks in view of the fact that he recommended her for this position.

Professor GALBRAITH was investigated in 1950 as "JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, also known as J. KENNETH GALBRAITH, KENNETH GALBRAITH, Consultant-Appointee, Commodities Division, Office of the Director, Office of Industry and Commerce, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., - LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES" under the provisions of Executive Order 9835. On March 2, 1951, the Civil Service Commission advised that JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH resigned or otherwise separated from Federal service, prior to decision on loyalty.

DISPATCH

STATION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

INFO: Chief of Station, Brussels

FROM: Chief, KUWOLF

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/QRPREY/STEBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF. CFLA-2541, 22 June 1965

1. Subject to Brussels Station views, Headquarters believes that STEBONY's proposal in Reference is a good one and very consistent with our interests that he develop his access and acceptability within the circles of which Ref Iden A is a significant figure. We realize that the picture is a complicated one, and that Iden A of Ref may or may not yet prove to have the staying power of the successful political figure. At the same time, it does seem that he is the most outstanding leader of the anti-revisionists today, and as such merits our attention.

2. With regard to Reference para 4's concern about possible damage to our national interest by publication of the book in English, we tend to side with STEBONY in feeling that the support which such a publication might render to our enemies could not really be detected by the naked eye. Similarly, while agreeing with the sentiment that would critically scrutinize all proposals by new assets, we note that STEBONY is, indeed, supposed to be seeking to regain status among his former associates, and that Ref proposal does not, to our view, contain any hint which would suggest that in following out this line of action at our direction, he is motivated by any ulterior or concealed aim different from that which led us to impose the commission in the first place.

3. We are attempting to get a rough translation done on a priority basis. STEBONY, of course, should understand that such a translation will be unfinished, and should be carefully reviewed for the proper "feel," to rule out usage or interpretation which STEBONY, with his background, would never have inferred from the French text. Nonetheless, as the document has come to hand only on 2 July, and given the holiday weekend, the limitation on the number of translators available, the existence of other translation assignments, and, finally, the pouch transit time back to Rome, we regret that it will not be possible to get this product to RODICAST for his 15 July meeting.

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT
2 - COS, Brussels

CLAYTON P. NURNAD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFLW-1152

GS COPY

DATE: 15 JUL 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 2019306052

1 - CI/IC
1 - WE/2/BL
1 - CA/CF
→1 - 201-306052

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT
CA/CF James M. Murphy	mcm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/IC		Ralph Bergland (in draft)
WE/2/BL	12/7	W. W. Peake

DEST	CA/CF
ABSTRACT X	INDEX

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA	13 JUL 1965	Cord Meyer, Jr.

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OELA-43,589

TO
Chief, KUDESK

INFO
Chief, WE; Chief, AF; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, LCPIPIT;
Chief of Station, Algiers

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-306052 10 JUL 1965

FROM
Chief of Station, London

DATE
13 July 1965

SUBJECT
O KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY
Old Letter from STEBONY/1

RE: "43-3" – (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

1. Cleaning out some old papers, I ran across a letter from STEBONY/1 (copies attached). The letter was seen by TIFFANY, RODIGAST, et al., during the busy week they all spent in London, and is sent along now to bring the record more or less up to date.

2. A batch of other materials, which arrived through our postal arrangement, were turned over to TIFFANY, and they are presumably now a part of Headquarters' records.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-COS, Algiers w/att h/w

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

1 att.

201-306052

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.
1

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,589
13 July 1965

Dear [redacted] Katzenbach,

I'm pleased you have received at least one of my letters, but I still wonder if you got a large envelope containing three letters which had been held and returned all at once. As one of the letters was rather detailed and dealt with matters of some importance, I'm rather disconcerted -- to say the least -- to think that it may not have found its way to you. The envelope measured 8 by 5 inches and was light tan in color. A confirmation of its receipt would be appreciated.

Of course, I understood about the service, the newsletter, not being a definite thing. In any case, I am not looking for a sinecure, but for a good, deep cover and that seemed to be one. It also gave me something to offer contacts and would have strengthened my position considerably. At present, my cover is as light as the Emperor's new clothes.

Still no positive reply from any publication in the States, and the general silence from my American "friends" is not very encouraging. Here, the situation is much better, and if I can get to Algiers in good time, after visiting Grippa and Andersson and seeing some contacts in Paris, my position will be better, but I still see myself representing the West Indian Gazette or Cinnamon and/or the Institute of Race Relations. Mrs. Sheila Patterson, their editor, even suggested that I do a short paperback book for them, gathering together the conference documents with an analysis. All of this is better than nothing, but it definitely isn't much.

On the other hand, for the future, Noureddine Medjdoub, who has been Tunisian cultural attaché here, is returning to Tunis to take over the editorship of the Socialist Destour Party paper, L'Action. He has suggested that I write some features for him, after the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers and that I try to get to Tunis to discuss future projects with him while I am in North Africa. You well know what many Africans and Arabs think of Tunisia at present, so there may not be much that we can do with this arrangement.

This afternoon, I saw Dennis Phombeah at the Tanganian High Commission. Until three months ago, he was at the U.N. He claims that Vergès came to London last December and saw Babu about me and other matters, but that Babu was not convinced. He says he did not know that I was in London until recently -- this was our first meeting since the spring of 1964. Now, he proposes that he try to get the editorship of The Nationalist, the TANU paper in Dar es Salaam, for me. We will discuss the matter again at lunch next Monday. It would be a fixed post in Dar and I can't yet fathom why he is willing to suggest me for the job. He claims he has not been in touch with Vergès.

att 1 to OELA-43589 CS COPY [redacted] STEBON/11 201-306052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, KUDESK

INFO
Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, WE

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

SUBJECT
C DIDORIC/Operational
ORPHEY/STKBONY/Request for Background Materials

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action requested: Paragraph 3.

1. Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST has been briefed by Paris/LCPIPIT on an ad hoc basis to date regarding information on the Afro-Asian national liberation movement of operational interest to his handling and guidance of STKBONY/1. As the STKBONY operation progresses, however, it is LCPIPIT's intention that those handling STKBONY/1 become more knowledgeable on the subject of the national liberation movement than STKBONY/1, himself, as a means to ensure the best possible operational guidance to the agent and to provide another element of agent control--superior knowledge.

[illegible]

2. LCPIPIT's limited files include two basic documents: Attachment to OFLW 630, and Book Dispatch No. 4463. We also have selected disseminations and reports on Chinese Communist activities in Africa. What would be most useful, however, would be a collection of reports and analyses, whether overt or covert, discussing the following topics: a) Jacques GRIPPA and the pro-Chinese European Communist factions; b) the Afro-Asian Journalists Association (the Headquarters TPRANSACK c/o has had a file on this organization's founding); c) the individual national liberation movements and their leaders; d) operations of the national liberation movements, individually and collectively, out of such centers as Algiers (at least up to 19 June 1965), Dar es Salaam, Accra, Cairo, Djakarta, Havana, etc/.; e) national liberation movement relations with, and operations out of, the Bloc, both Moscow and Peking oriented; f) support and guidance of the national liberation movement by non-Bloc communist parties and selected fronts.

Don Logan

3. We recognize that much of the information on the above mentioned topics may not yet be collated, if indeed it is available; however, we should appreciate receiving from Headquarters such materials as you feel would best meet LCPIPIT's operational needs in working with STKBONY/1. Of special value would be a bibliography of overt writing on the subject, greatly alleviating the security problem and mere logistics of bringing RODIGAST and a large volume of classified reading together, in a secure environment, over an extended period.

Harvey G. Fahnrich
Harvey G. FAHNRICH

[illegible]

201-306652

Distribution:
2 - C/KUDESK
1 - C/KUWOLF
1 - [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE JUL 9 1965
	OFIA 2613	9 July 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-126-79/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, ~~KUDESK~~ AFRICA 65-355

INFO.
Chief, WE; Chief, ~~AF~~; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STEBONY JAGUAR
Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted under separate cover is a JAGUAR report on STEBONY/1. While JAGUAR did not state what the DOI was, JAGUAR's letter was dated 15 June 1965.

2. ARNOUD, in JAGUAR's para 2 ii, should be ARNAUD.

3. The comments contained in the report are either consistent with what STEBONY/1 has told us or consistent with what STEBONY/1 is supposed to have been telling other people - sometimes both.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
(USC)

Distribution:
4 ~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK w/att USC
3-Chief, WE w/att USC
~~2-Chief, AF w/att USC~~
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att USC
2-COS, Algiers w/att USC
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att USC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Dated 15 JUL 65

CS COPY

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,522

DATE
2 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

SECRET

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Separate Cover Attachment to
OELA-43,522, 2 July 1965

Richard Thomas GIBSON

[redacted]

2. The following further information has been received from a secret and reliable source:

i) GIBSON was to leave London on the 8th June en route to Algiers via Brussels, Lausanne and Paris, and he expects to arrive in Algiers about the 20th June.

ii) GIBSON has said that he will be in Algiers in his capacity as a journalist and that while there he may be contacted through Georges ARNOUD at the Directorate of Information or through an American, Marc SCHLEIFER, who is the representative in Algiers of the 2nd of May Movement. He has also said that he is anxious to meet some responsible members of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association Secretariat in order to clear his name of the charges brought against him by VERGES.

iii) As a journalist GIBSON is hoping to be allowed to attend the Second Afro-Asian Journalists' Association Conference and he has made enquiries as to when it will be held.

iv) In commenting on an invitation which has been extended to Hodee EDWARDS to visit North Korea, possibly via Indonesia, GIBSON has said that he would very much like to visit Indonesia but that there is little chance of his doing so as the West Indian newspapers by which he might be employed would be unlikely to pay the cost of his fare.

15 Jul 65

SECRET CS COPY

201-306052

14-00000

DIANE CHATELAN
CA/CF
7767
6 APRIL 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 37

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 46 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☒ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-156/2
XFILE 201-306052

CA/64 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR CA2, FI/AN, EUR5, C/CI2, FI, FI/INT2, WH/COG8, CCS3, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) CA/PEG (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 6 23 25 Z CITE DIRECTOR 90256

LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QREBONY

REFS: A. OEPA 90
B. OELA 43237
C. LCPIPIT 0619 (IN 38606)

[illegible]

1. CONCUR $ 100 PER MONTH PAY RAISE FOR QREBONY/1 RECOMMENDED REF A. WOULD PREFER EFFECTIVE DATE 1 JULY 67. TAX SUPPLEMENT WILL BE $70.

2. TO SATISFY ADMIN REQUIREMENTS, PLS PROVIDE AMENDMENT TO LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING REF B, REFLECTING THIS AND OTHER INTERMEDIATE RAISES GRANTED QREBONY/1 SINCE DATE REF B.

3. WOULD ALSO PREFER ABOVE RAISE BE GIVEN QREBONY/1 IN THE HAND RATHER THAN THRU QRPURE, RESERVING LATTER CHANNEL FOR SPECIAL EXPENDITURES (SUCH AS TRAVEL COSTS) WHICH INVOLVE RELATIVELY LARGER SUMS OF MONEY AND FOR WHICH IT MIGHT BE MORE USEFUL USE QRPURE COVER FOR ATTRIBUTION. PLS ADVISE.

4. BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TIME SATISFY QREBONY/1 CLEARANCE REQUIREMENT FOR PERIODIC SGSWIRL. IN ADDITION OBVIOUS QUESTIONS, REQUEST HE BE SPECIFICALLY QUERIED

File in
201-306052

CS COPY FILED IN ~~100-124-157/2~~

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

APR 13 0 33 PM '57

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ____ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 90256

PAGE TWO

RE (A) KNOWLEDGEABILITY HIS WIFE AND AMSQUAW/1 REGARDING HIS WOFACT AND OR LNFORT CONNECTIONS AND (B) HIS ESTIMATE THEIR RESPECTIVE ACCEPTANCES HIS PRO-CHICOM COVER AURA.

5. DISPATCH, ORIGINALLY PREPARED TO INCORPORATE ABOVE CONCURRENCE, FOLLOWS WITH ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/B & F L H Shoemaker

E/BC/UK R.H. Webster

CI/ICG

CHIEF, CA

JAMES MURPHY
CHIEF, CA/CF

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

4 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: QREBONY/1 - MOC Amendment

REFERENCE: OFLW - 1699, 1 November 1966

1. Effective 1 September 1966, the MOC of QREBONY/1 was amended to provide compensation of $746.00 per month.

2. Please see attached reference for the salary breakdown.

3. We regret that due to an administrative oversight, this memorandum was not submitted at an earlier date.

Signed Thomas Mc Kinley

Thomas Mc Kinley
Chief, CA Support Group

APPROVED:

CPD

Attachment:
OFLW - 1699

DDP/CA/Pers/JChaplin:nd (30 March 1967)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - OF/APB/CA(S)
1 - CA/Pers

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 77-7
DATE: 24 MARCH 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

_22_ PER ______ # ______

DISSEM: CA/04

☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO CA/CF BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-306052

INFO: FILE , VR DA2, EUR8, CI/IC2, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) 25 15 32 Z (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 86838

LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DYDORIC QREBONY QKOPERA

RE LCPIPIT 0519 (IN 24171)

AN	FI
~~RS~~	~~FI~~
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~
	CA/CF

RE PARA TWO REF, PLS ADVISE DETAILS OF CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH WINTERROWD AND SABA WERE MADE WITTING WOFACT'S CONTINUING INTEREST IN QREBONY/1.

END OF MESSAGE

C/CA/B3 - Mr. Fallow (telecord)
EUR/BC/UK - Mr. Webster (telecord)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CA/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

D. Chatelan
DIANE L. CHATELAN
CA/CF 25 March 1967
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-306052

FBI doc.
23 Mar. 67 (Wash)
Re: Richard Thomas Gibson
no Bufile given

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

		MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	XX	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOVIEW

INFO
Chief, EUR; COS, London; Chief, WOMUSE

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY/Institution Base

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. LCPIPIT-8161
B. DIRECTOR-66211, paragraph 3

At their 15 March meeting, QREBONY/1 and RODIGAST discussed QREBONY/1's running his own pro-Chicom group, at least as a paper organization to allow him to get close to target conferences and institutions as a bona fide delegate rather than bystander. QREBONY/1 feels that if not done right this could cause trouble, because of usual organizational rivalries. He is thinking of beginning by writing and circulating a statement in support of the statement on "Afro-American Liberation" which appeared in the 6 December Ad Hoc Bulletin (Marxist-Leninist) in Chicago. He would use a pseudonym to sign his statement, but would let all his friends know that the pseudonym was really himself, and he might use Manchanda's address. Perhaps Grippa would agree to circulate or print it. If this statement goes over, QREBONY/1 could escalate into a small organization. He will show RODIGAST a draft of his statement, but also will discuss it with Manchanda for "ideological purity".

P. P. CILIBERTI

Distribution
3-C/WOVIEW
2-C/WOMUSE
1-C/EUR
2-COS/London

MAR 22 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-164

DATE
20 March 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
200-124-156/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOVIEW

INFO.
COS, London; Chief, EUR

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/Salary Raise for QREBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. At the time of his recruitment in June 1965, QREBONY/1 was told that his $600 monthly tax-free salary would be raised to $800 once he got a job in a target organization, which of course was the goal of his planned summer activity in Algiers.

2. Through no fault of his own, the Algiers assignment (and other possibilities, such as Djakarta) evaporated shortly thereafter. Meanwhile, WOFACT changed its signals and eventually decided to base QREBONY/1 in Europe targeted against individuals and groups in various countries.

3. From the beginning, QREBONY/1 has proved more than satisfactory as an agent. He has carried out assignments given to him with knowledge and tact and the proper spirit, has used his own initiative as much as our guidance, and has not violated our instructions. No one will argue that he hasn't proved to be better than we collectively thought he would be, and in terms of his own abilities—apart from targets which may or may not be accessible to him—he is getting better all the time.

4. Last year, about a year later than QREBONY/1 might have expected his salary to go up from $600 to $800, we raised it to $700. He was pleased, and he has not complained as much as he used to about a shortage of funds. (Presumably QREBONY/1 is responsive to the generally good treatment he has had, to the respect for him as an individual and the appreciation of his services; probably he is carried along as much by his own personal satisfaction in knowing he is meeting requirements and continually breaking new ground.)

5. Nevertheless, LCPIPIT believes the time has come to raise QREBONY/1's salary to the promised level. We can all agree that we are still getting his services cheap; QREBONY/1 receives no quarters, living allowance, or educational allowance for his children. His increased gratitude, the relief he will undoubtedly feel at being able to reduce his present financial worries, are more than worth the extra $100.

(continued)

Distribution:
3-C/WOVIEW
2-COS/London
1-C/EUR

201

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-090

DATE
FEB 24 1967
21 February 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
200-126-156/~~X~~ 2

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEPA-090

6. If Headquarters agrees, the money can be paid through QRPURE (whose monthly check will go up from $100 to $200 in this event). QRPURE could write to QREBONY/1 expressing his pleasure at the results of syndication of QREBONY/1's material, and announcing that the monthly fee will go up to $200; alternatively, QREBONY/1 could write to QRPURE saying he feels the sum should go up, and QRPURE would reply affirmatively.

P. F. CILIBERTI

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

Monsieur et Madame GIBSON
30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
LONDON N.W.8 -(Grande Bretagne)

AFF. GIBSON C/VERGES -

Chers Madame et Monsieur,

Je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que j'ai fait citer la Société des NOUVELLES EDITIONS INTERNATIONALES pour l'audience du 13 avril prochain.

Or, je viens d'appendre que celle-ci est mise en faillite et que Monsieur PINTA, Syndic de faillite, a été nommé par jugement du Tribunal de Commerce.

Je ne vois pas, dans ces conditions, l'intérêt que vous avez à poursuivre le paiement de sommes qui vous sont dues par cette Société dont le passif dépasse de loin tout actif.

Voudriez-vous, je vous prie, me donner vos instructions définitives compte tenu de cette situation.

Je vous indique d'ailleurs que vous pouvez produire à la faillite entre les mains du syndic, mais que bien entendu celui-ci vous demandera un jugement pour pouvoir inscrire votre créance toute théorique contre la Société qui, comme je vous l'indique plus haut n'a que des dettes et aucun actif.

J'attends donc de vos nouvelles et vous prie de croire, chers Madame et Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

S. SCHWARTZENBERG,
Avocat à la Cour.

TM# 798462

201

Ebony/soft
201



Joy Gibson, fwded in
OEPA-0006, 26/1/67, filed
QREBONY/ops.

DBB 71942, 25 January 1967   100-300-004

Abstracted from pages 36 and 37

q · At a meeting held on August 14, 1966, STANFORD mentioned that Rbbert Williams allegedly has $1,000,000 available for the use of RAM.

NY T-10 advised on September 26, 1966, that STANFORD prior to moving to Philadelphia on September 18, 1966, discussed RAM and ROBERT F. WILLIAMS with him. According to the source, STANFORD has alleged WILLIAMS has money available for RAM.

During the course of the conversation, STANFORD stated that the contact man between RAM in the US and R. Williams' is one Richard GIBSON in Paris, France. STANFORD stated that GIBSON passes on messages from WILLIAMS and will be the man contacted by whoever is designated as a courier to go to China to get the money.

Source also stated that he was told Richard GIBSON was living in the ~~CEX~~ Crystal Hotel (phonetic), Paris, France, and was working out of the La Royale Cafe (phonetic), Paris, France.

Gibson

SECRET

14-00000

OBB-61450

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 105-93072

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

BY LIAISON

Date: October 24, 1966

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: RICHARD GIBSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING

A source of this Bureau who has furnished reliable information in the past recently advised that during the Fall of 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist organization stated that one Richard Gibson was suspected of being a spy for the Central Intelligence Agency. According to this individual, Gibson recently had been in Milan, Italy, in the company of a female secretary from Paris, whose home is in New Rochelle, New York. At that time Gibson remarked his travel and activities were possible because he had married a wealthy English woman. Other things were said which aroused the suspicions of the Italian.

According to our source, the Italian pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist subsequently relayed his suspicions concerning Gibson to Rene Raindorf, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belgium (Marxist-Leninist). Raindorf reportedly thereafter met in Brussels, Belgium, with Gibson although he had indicated the Belgian pro-Chinese communists would look into the charges of the Italian Marxist-Leninist.

CS COPY

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-306052

Chrono

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 34

SECRET

ORIG: JAMES M. MURPHY
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 31 AUGUST 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-156/3

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 30/3 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE EUR8, AF7, CA2, CCS3, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2, CI/IC2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

1 1745Z CITE DIRECTOR 32195

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

REF: LCPIPIT 7388 (IN 83410)

DTDORIC QREBONY

1. RE REF PARA 7: GHANA DESK REP MET QREBONY FOR ASSESSMENT WITH VIEW TOWARD
H
HIS POSSIBLE LATER USE AGAINST GHANA TARGET. DISCUSSION HODEE EDWARDS WAS GENERAL PROBING OF QREBONY RELATIONSHIP AND ESTIMATE ~~XXX~~ HER PERSONALITY. WHILE QREBONY MAY HAVE INFERRED POSSIBILITY RELATED OPERATION CAL ~~XXXXXXX~~ COMMISSION, WOFACT REP AVOIDED SUGGESTING SUCH WAS PLANNED MUCH LESS IMMINENT. IN FACT, DESK HAS NOT DEVELOPED SUCH DETAILED HQS PLANS FOR QREBONY OPERATION GHANA, GIVEN UNCERTAINTIES IN DEVELOPING SITUATION ON GROUND. WHEN AND IF CLEAR FOCUS SUCH OPERATION WORKED OUT AND AGREED WITH ACCRA STATION, WEST ~~EE~~ AFRICAN TRIP WOULD PRESUMABLY BE FIRST STEP.

2. WHILE SUCH TRIP MENTIONED TO QREBONY AS PROBABLY USEFUL, EMPHASIZED TO QREBONY THAT VIETNAM IS TOP PRIORITY AT THIS TIME. STRONGLY FEEL HE SHOULD SIT TIGHT AND PLAY OUT THIS STRING WITHOUT PLANNING FOR EXTENSIVE AFRICA SWINGS, PARTICULARLY AFTER HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM ~~XXXX~~ WOLADY TDY. WITH VIET TRIP AND RUSSELL FOUNDATION MORE IMMEDIATE HIGHER PRIORITY TARGETS CLOSE TO HOME AT THIS TIME, SEE LITTLE VALUE AND UNNECESSARY RISKS IN OVEREXTENDING HIM IN WIDE AFRICA SWINGS OF LESS IMMEDIATE INTEREST. THIS EVEN MORE TRUE FOR EAST AFRICA GIVEN STATION VIEWS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 32193

TO

PER AJDA 1989 ON NEED FOR LONGER STAY, WITH ACCOMPANYING COVER AND CONTACT PROBLEMS, AND INDICATIONS OF PHOMBEAH HOSTILITY, NATURE AND EXTENT OF WHICH WE CANNOT IMMEDIATELY ASSESS. HQS VERY SATISFIED WITH QREBONY PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT SO FAR. WHILE UNDERSTAND HIS TEMPERMENTAL INCLINATION TO PRESS FOR ACTION ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVING TRAVEL, HE SHOULD BE ASSURED, IF NECESSARY, THAT SUCH DEMONSTRATION OF ~~USE~~ BEING CONSTANTLY USEFUL, NOT NEEDED AND NOT ALWAYS IN BEST INTERESTS PROJECT DEVELOPMENT.

3. REF PARA 8: WILL BE POUCHING LONGER REPORTS ON QREBONY VISIT HERE WHICH DELAYED BECAUSE OF PRESSURE OTHER WORK. KATSCHMAYER RETURNED TO QREBONY ORIGINALS FINEMAN AND OTHER CORRESPONDENCE HE LENT, BUT SENDING COPIES WE HAD MADE OF THESE AND REPORTS HE SUBMITTED ON WOLADY CONTACTS BY TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST 722028.

4. RE PARA 9 REF: YES. WE WOULD STRONGLY PREFER THAT RAISE BE MADE AVAILABLE TO QREBONY BY TRANSFER FROM COVER FIRM, WHICH WE WILL EXPECT ARRANGE SOON (AWAITING CLEARANCE ON ONE INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD HAVE TO BE CUT IN). CAN YOU MAKE DIRECT TRANSFER UNTIL THIS IS SET UP.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/COPS

AF/4/3. Foy (in draft)

JAMES M. MURPHY
CHIEF, CA/CF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

[illegible]: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

NSSEM A43

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION

CA/O 4

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR, CA 2, EUR 8, WH/C 8, FE 8, SAVA 2, AF 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

25 Aug 66 [illegible] 83410

SECRET 251622Z CITE LCPIPIT 7388 (CILIBERTI ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE

DTDORIC QREBONY

1. RODIGAST (R) QREBONY/1 (Q) AS SCHEDULED 23 AUGUST. BALANCE WOLADY REPORTING BEING POUCHED AS WELL AS NEW RPORTS. Q PLANNING TRAVEL PARI BRUS-ROTTERDAM POSSIBLY FRANKFURT, VIENNA 2-12 SEPT. ROD WILL MEET Q ANTWERP 8 SEPT.

2. ROBERT WILLIAMS IN LETTER TO Q 25 JULY FROM PEKING SAID HOPES BE EUROPE LATER IN YEAR PROBABLY GOING SWEDEN TO MAKE SPEECH. ALSO ADVISED HE MAY TRY PUBLISH CRUSADE FROM PEKING AND ASKS Q'S HELP WITH DISTRIBUTION. ATTACKED HYPOCRITICAL RACIST CUBANS. (THIS INFO BEING DISSEMINATED).

SECRET

3. Q THINKS ENTRY NORTH VIETNAM MAY BE DIFFICULT AT PRESENT BECAUSE OF MILITARY SITUATION AND PROBABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE DESIRE NOT TO ENTERTAIN ELEMENTS OPENLY HOSTILE SOVIET UNION. LIONEL MORRISON SAYS WILLIAMS CAN'T GO HANOI AT PRESENT. RICHARD WARD TOLD FINEMAN ENTRY WOULD BE DIFFICULT. GRAY IN SAN FRANCISCO SAID HIS TOUR POSTPONED INDEFINITELY BECAUSE OF MILITARY SITUATION.

4. AT KATZENBACH SUGGESTION Q MADE PRECISE APPOINTMENT NORTH VIETNAMESE JOURNALISTS SAW AND DINH, LONDON 26 AUGUST WHICH KATZENBACH INFORMING JAGUAR TO ALLOW SURVEILLANCE.

5. RE DIR 26709, Q HOPES OBTAIN FURTHER INFO MOCK TRIAL FROM RALPH ROSENBAUM, US LEFTISTS CONNECTED RUSSELL FOUNDATION BUT WHO OPPOSED TO TROTSKYISTS. Q'S STRATEGY IS EXPOSURE FOUNDATION AS RIFE WITH CONFLICTS AND INFILTRATED BY TROTSKYISTS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 LCPIPIT 7388 SECRET

6. POUCHING FULLER REPORT Q CONVERSATIONS SUTHERLAND NEW YORK WHICH Q TOLD KAMMERMAYER BY PHONE. SUTHERLAND INSISTED CARMICHAEL HAS NOT ACCEPTED RUSSELL INVITATION.

7. IF NOT SENT, PLEASE CABLE DETAILS HQS PLANS FOR Q OPERATION GHANA INVOLVING HODEE EDWARDS DISCUSSED WITH Q AT HQS. WOULD THIS BE IN FRAMEWORK Q VISIT WEST AFRICA AND APPROXIMATELY WHEN? WHERE DOES THIS PLACE EAST AFRICA TRIP, NOT MENTIONED TO Q BY HQS?

8. ASSUME HQS POUCHING ALL Q WOLADY REPORTING AS WELL CORRESPONDENCE. FOR EXAMPLE Q HAS NO COPY LETTERS FROM FINEMAN ON PARIS SITUATION WHICH SUBMITTED KAMMERMAYER.

9. CAN RAISE OF $100 IN Q TAKE-HOME AFTER TAXES BE MADE EFFECTIVE 1 SEPTEMBER? PLS CABLE WHEN BEGINNING DEPOSITS SO CAN NOTIFY Q.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

£106.50 /

Cable sent answering 9 in affirmative.

8 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT: Field Traces on QKEBONY/1 201-306052

This is to inform you that there were no additional traces on QKEBONY/1 from the Field Stations--Algiers, Rome, Paris, or London. Negative traces from Frankfurt Station.

Ann Jane Long
CA/CF

201 file

201-306052

SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

INFO.

FROM Chief, KUWOLF

SUBJECT POA for QREBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

None, information only

Attached herewith is the text of the Provisional Operational Approval on QREBONY/1. An Operational Approval is awaited pending receipt of final Agency traces which, we understand have not yet come in. Your attention is directed to paragraph 3 and to paragraph 5. The latter will be the subject of further correspondence in the future.

HOWELL D. KAMMERMAYER

Attachment:
POA h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT w/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFLW-1591

DATE
17 JUL 1966

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

Distribution:
1 - RI w/o att.
2 - CA/CP w/o att.

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CP	James M. Murphy	ajl	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA	6 JUL 1966	Cord Meyer, Jr.

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

8. Not applicable. The Agent is not in the status of a tour of assignment but will be exploited in his current operational role as long as it is viable.

9. This request is not for interim cover.

10. No relative is witting for such emergency contact, nor is Benefits and Counseling Branch involvement applicable in this case.

11. None.

12. Agent has served in the U.S. Army, is not now eligible for induction.

13. Spouse is not witting and not clearable.

D. Operational Information

1. Type of Operation. FI. Duration is indefinite. Should be considered a penetration asset of a hostile propaganda establishment, rather than of an organized hostile intelligence service. No one, other than those indicated, are to be made witting.

2. Location: The Agent is to reside in London, with a possible alternative of Rome.

3. The Agent should be free to visit Cuba, all European countries, West Africa and E. Africa (particularly Tanzania) as well as North Vietnam and China. Impossible to anticipate the times or duration of such visits, which will, however, be at his (and our) control.

4. Special groups Agent should be able to contact: Not applicable.

5. Approximately $2,500 to $3,000.

6. Not applicable.

7. Communications channels desired: None.

8. Cover Suggestions: None not already expressed in previous documents prepared by CA Staff in identifying the cover mechanism and requesting DDP approval.

SECRET

II The arrangement between the cover firm and QREBONY/1 should be on the basis of a regular subvention to QREBONY/1 to act as a foreign stringer contributing feature-type material to the press service. An agreement having been ostensibly entered into by QREBONY/1 and the cover firm during the former's trip to the U.S. (expected around 20 July), a regular monthly check should be forwarded to QREBONY/1 by the cover firm, along with any correspondence it may see fit (suggestions for pieces to write, comments on pieces received etc.)

III The following steps are proposed to set this cover in motion:

A. At a meeting on 6 July, QREBONY/1 will be instructed to write a number of U.S. news media organizations stating that he expects to travel to the U.S. shortly, describing his news background and indicating he would be interested in developing some outlets for his writing. The cover organization is one of those addresses.

B. CIA's contact in the cover organization receives this letter and, pursuant to our direction, writes an answer stating 1) what his firm does, 2) that it would be very interested in handling QREBONY/1's product if it seems to fit the needs and 3) that it would be ready to reimburse some of QREBONY/1's expenses if he could come to Chicago to discuss the matter further.

C. QREBONY/1 does not meet the contact in the cover organization. He is briefed to offer the story, on his return, that he had entered into a regular arrangement with the cover firm to produce feature material usable by the cover firm (not specifying the frequency) in return for which he is to receive a monthly retainer.

D. Any letter QREBONY/1 may later wish to send to the cover firm should be given to us in copy preferably before it is sent.

E. Copies of any correspondence initiated by the cover firm should be made available to CIA and, particularly, to the Project Case Officer.

James M. Murphy
Chief, CA/CP

SECRET

SECRET

28 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

VIA: Chief, CCS/NC

SUBJECT: Request for Approval for Operational Use of U.S. Free-Lance Writer - QREBONY/1

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval pursuant to CSI 240-6, 10 January 1963, paragraph 6, governing operational involvement of personalities in the field of journalism. This request concerns cover support for QREBONY/1, an asset currently handled by CA Staff, and involves the cooperation of Russell R. DeBow, a Chicago city official and proprietor of the Negro Press International Inc. QREBONY/1 was granted a POA on 23 May 1966, and a full operational approval is pending. The project under which he is handled was approved by Acting ADDP on 14 June 1966. Mr. DeBow was granted a Covert Security Approval on 19 April 1966.

2. QREBONY/1 is an American Negro expatriate journalist and author presently residing in London. He is the author of one novel and numerous contributions to a wide variety of publication, such as the Kenyon Review, Monthly Review, The Nation, The Liberator and others. He worked as a reporter for the Philadelphia Afro American in 1950, for Agence France Presse in 1959, for CBS in 1960 and, in Europe, for the now defunct, pro-Chinese magazine Revolution. As a result of broad contacts and acceptance among radical, pro-Chinese and Negro militant circles, he has offered valuable access to important targets spanning four continents, and has demonstrated considerable skill in elicitation and exploitation of contacts for intelligence purposes in the process. The immediate and paramount operational objective for this agent is to gain direct access to hostile political targets in North Viet Nam and China. The outstanding requirement to be met in support of this objective, and of his continued effective exploitation generally, is the development of a backstopped and viable explanation for at least a portion of his income, which presently derives almost exclusively from clandestine CIA support. The proposal outlined below represents the conclusion of considerable research, including an interview with Mr. DeBow, to identify suitable cover arrangements which would make possible this explanation.

SECRET

201-306052

3. Mr. DeBow, a lawyer, is an Administrative Assistant to the Mayor of Chicago as well as a long time, if casual, contact of Domestic Contacts Service. His background includes assignment to the Intelligence Division of the Chicago police and cooperation with CIA in the course of a trip to Africa in 1961. Mr. DeBow also is part owner and in effective control of a very small feature syndicate in Chicago, the Negro Press International, Inc., which distributes rewritten news to Negro newspapers in the United States on a subscription basis.

4. On 20 June 1966, Mr. DeBow was approached by representatives of CA Staff and Central Cover Staff, acknowledging CIA connection, and interviewed with a view to determining the feasibility of using his service to backstop modest payments to QREBONY/1 for real or ostensible contributions of feature stories and reporting. (Since the contact was made to develop information pertinent to the present request for DDP approval, the interview was conducted on a hypothetical basis: QREBONY/1's identity was not revealed nor were any commitments entered into.) This conversation, despite its limitation, demonstrated clearly that such an arrangement involving Mr. DeBow and his firm would be practical from Mr. DeBow's point of view and well suited to the needs of the QREBONY Project. Mr. DeBow grasped the problem involved and suggested various means by which he could plausibly implement a cover arrangement should this be our decision. He was made aware of and understood the incongruity between his and QREBONY/1's ostensible political positions, and stated that this need offer no impediment to creation of the type of relationship which would be involved. The nature of Mr. DeBow's feature service and its modest size clearly enhance its usefulness and appropriateness for our objectives. Mr. DeBow, in conclusion, expressed his agreement in principle to participate in this cover support activity should CIA, on further review of its needs, decide to proceed with a request for his cooperation.

5. In the light of the very favorable response from Mr. DeBow and the determination, from reviewing the outlines of his operation, that it would be a uniquely appropriate backstopping for QREBONY/1, your approval is requested to recontact Mr. DeBow and establish with him suitable cover

SECRET

arrangements for this purpose.

for CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief
Covert Action Staff

RECOMMEND APPROVAL:

Chief, CCS/KC

APPROVED:

AA DDP 30 June '66

SECRET

SECRET

27 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

VIA: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: QREBONY/1 - Amendment of Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. The Memorandum of Oral Commitment with QREBONY is amended effective 15 June 1966 to provide indemnification in the amount of $10,000 in case of death, and payment of $600 per month up to $10,000 to his wife in case of total incapacitation or disappearance.

2. It is anticipated that a trip planned for late summer or early fall will take QREBONY into VC controlled areas of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and China. Indemnification is intended to apply to death or disability resulting from air accident, act of war, or for disappearance.

3. Without being able to specify the possible circumstances, it is intended that such indemnification as outlined above be deemed to apply to loss of life or functions suffered by QREBONY as a direct result of his KUBARK relationship during the trip. Such indemnification, if made, must be presented to his widow by a cover mechanism which would hide KUBARK involvement.

Signed Thomas Mc Kinley

Thomas Mc Kinley
CA Staff Contract Approving Officer

CA/PERS/RHBELL:bg (24 Jun 66)

Distribution:
2 - Addressee
1 - CPD
1 - CA/Pers
1 - CA/Chrono

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, KUWOLF			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, KUDESK; Chief, EUR		XXX	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT	RJS/8		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY/Photo of QREBONY/1 and Contact

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded under separate cover is a photograph of QREBONY/1 with one of his contacts.

Zaffaresi
Karen H. ZAFFARESI (Dams)

Attachment usc
Photo usc

EBRAHIM, Gora

Distribution
3-C/KUWOLF w/att usc
2-C/KUDESK w/o att
1-C/EUR w/o att

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 13 JUN 1966

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-306052
JUN 2 1966

18/C ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFLA-3903	1 June 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-124-156/3

SECRET

1-OFLA-3903

201-306052

DTDORIC/QRPREY/QREBONY

To: Chief, [illegible]WOLF

USC Att to OFLA-3903

Photo: Do not bend.



SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
CA/CF - James Murphy

NUMBER
201 - 3[illegible]52

SUBJECT
QRBBONY/1

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
10 February 1966 jab

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

(1) POA is granted to utilize Subject in an international context to exploit his contacts and/or associations with a wide variety of personalities and organizations (particularly Cuban and Chinese) engaged in "anti-imperialist" propaganda operations. Subject will be expected to renew his old relationships and expand his circle of contacts with Afro-Asian national liberation leaders, pro Chinese Communist, and similar personalities and to report general political and biographic material relative to the interests, activities and plans of such individuals and their organizations.

(2) Requirements passed to Subject will be confined, insofar as it is operationally feasible, to instructions for the refinement and completeness of the reporting he is capable of providing from his normal intercourse with source personalities. Disclosure of classified information will be held to a minimum, he will not be given operational assignments supporting or servicing other KUBARK operations, nor will he participate directly and/or wittingly in the spotting and/or recruitment of other agents.

(3) In addition to this background, certain of Subject's past statements and behavior are inconsistent with, and give rise to an uncertainty about, the nature and degree of his presently professed motivations and loyalties. It is impossible to resolve this uncertainty with the knowledge now available. At the present time, therefore, it is believed that his bona fides have not been established to an extent which would warrant handling him in any way than "at arms length".

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	23 May 1966

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Continuation of PCA - 201 - 306052 - 23 May 1960

(4) This case has been discussed in detail on several occasions between representatives of CI/CA, CI/ICG, and CA/CE and there is agreement that it is primarily because of Subject's background and contacts that he is of interest and, therefore, it is believed, if he is handled with circumspection, the possible benefits to be derived justify the security risks involved in the use of Subject within the limits set forth above.

(5) Polygraph is recommended at least once a year.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

ISOMUSE
QRPREY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, Richard Th [redacted] 201-306052

9 May 1966 poa os [redacted] James Murphy 7757

THERE IS A [redacted] /OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

FORM 11-56 448 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [redacted] ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

THERE IS A [redacted] CI [illegible] FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 30 60 52

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, London (ATTN. KATZEN[illegible])

INFO. Chief, KUWOLF

FROM Chief of Station, Paris (LCPIPIT)

SUBJECT DYDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OKLA 45254

1. At his 6 April meeting with RODIGAST, QREBONY/1 pointed out that his brother-in-law (the accountant) still thinks that QREBONY receives regular income from an American radio or news feature service, paid through Switzerland, and undeclared for tax reasons (QREBONY's and the American company's taxes).

2. RODIGAST thought that if the brother-in-law finds this story hard to believe he may guess that QREBONY is really working for KUBARK and may have passed this information on to the British. Thus he would be the source of the story relayed in reference.

3. At the same meeting, on another subject, RODIGAST asked QREBONY whether he had ever told anyone pointblank that he (QREBONY) is a Chicom agent. He said that he never had. RODIGAST broke in: "or the agent of any other country, including ODYOKE?" QREBONY said he had not.

Karen H. ZAFFARESI

Distribution:
2 - COS, London
3 - C/KUWOLF
1 - C/WE

CS COPY

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052
~~200-124-56/3~~
APR 18 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OPLA-3731	15 April 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XXXX
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, KUWOLF NEC AJD

INFO
Chief, NE; COS, Cairo; COS, Dar-es-Salaam; Chief, AF
COS, London; Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; COS, Rome; CIR
CEL

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY/QREBONY/1's New Contact, Carole Piña

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. We are manifesting reports and correspondence concerning QREBONY/1's new contact, Carole Piña, an American, age 31, born in New York City (possibly Bronx County), whose father's last name was Appel or Appell. Her husband's name is Carlos Piña (Mexican), but she is separated from him and he is seeking a divorce. She holds US passport, No. D633873, issued 5 August 1963 in New York; it comes up for renewal in August (at which time she expects to be in Rome). She is afraid that her having traveled to Cuba in 1964 with a Progressive Labor delegation will hurt her chances of getting a renewal of her passport.

2. Subject had been having a series of political and amorous affairs during her stay in Dar, and was in serious trouble when Q met her. After rejecting Dennis Phombeah's advances, she was in serious danger of being declared a prohibited immigrant; Q befriended her, and he and Colman Ferrer of the Cuban Embassy (who had been having an affair with her) saw that she got out of Dar safely. Q was to meet her in Cairo (but in fact had no intention of doing so) and later caught up with her in Rome. She indicated a desire to work with Q (without quite knowing for whom she would be working--he hinted rather broadly to her that he was in cahoots with "our friends in the East," but it will be noted that in one of her letters there is this disarming phrase: she warns him about how to deal with certain persons and adds: "Be cool with them--do not show your true colors (whatever they are)").

3. Q seized on the opportunity of using subject as an unwitting informant and eventually agent on the same basis. She submitted to an interview on tape in a Rome hotel room which lasts about 2-1/4 hours, in which Q debriefs her on her knowledge of every Tanzanian, liberation movement, or Bloc personality with whom she had contact, and in view of her attractiveness and willingness she knew quite a few. (She had some amusing run-ins with ODYOKE personnel in Dar, which we shall edit out of the tape only for a fee.)

Distribution
- 3-C/KUWOLF
- 2-C/KUDESK
- 2-COS/London
- 2-COS/Dar
- 2-COS/Rome
- 2-COS/Cairo
- 1-C/NE
- 1-C/WE
- 1-C/AF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MAR 31 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFLA-3638	30 March 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	200-124-156/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLA-3638

4. Q feels that she is emotionally unstable--his firmness in dealing with her, his making it clear he was not out for her body, have made him a guardian and true friend. She seems to be a good political reporter, understanding her own (confused) political yearnings and where her various contacts stand; she also seems to have a good memory for details. Q says that her "anti-revisionism" is incipient anti-Communism. He could eventually recruit her as an ODYOKE witting agent, but that would take a lot of time and trouble; with much less effort he could effect a false-flag recruitment, and indeed, he has already done this on an informal basis by making it clear that he was collecting material for his Chicom friends. She would undertake further assignments for him. He actually asked her, "Suppose I asked you to go somewhere, would you go?" To which she replied, "If it's not cold." It is unlikely, however, that she would be able to return to Dar because of Phombeah's hostility. Wherever she goes, her main asset will be her physical attraction.

5. She could be debriefed further on any point raised in the tape interview. The ideal would be to have the questions by the time Q goes to Rome in the second half of April, but this does not seem to be a likely possibility.

Karen H. ZAFFARESI

SECRET

202

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OELA-45,254

TO: Chief, KUWOLF

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, LCPIPIT

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 200-124-156/3

MAR 31 1966

FROM: Chief of Station, London

DATE: 30 March 1966

SUBJECT: DTDORIC QRPREY QREBONY
Relations with JAGUAR

RE: "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCES

Ref: LOND 2425, 2 March 1966

1. A number of lengthly and fruitful discussions have been held with JAGUAR officers regarding our continued running of QREBONY in the U.K. Their comments on the quality of QREBONY's reporting have been reported from time to time. Similarly, we will not dwell here on the mechanical arrangements we have evolved (with SMOTH's agreement) to expedite the passage of information to JAGUAR, on the one hand, and avoid duplicate reporting (prinicpally by passing the same materials as CS dissems to SMOTH) on the other hand. Suffice it here to say that achieving both of these goals, without compromising QREBONY as a source throughout both JAGUAR and SMOTH (due largely to the wide range of areas he reports on), is a complex problem. We think we have reached a mutually satisfactory arrangement for achieving both aims.

2. What we are concerned with here, then, is JAGUAR's permission for us to run QREBONY from here, for the time being at least. The exact phrasing from JAGUAR's letter, agreeing to our request is: "With regard to the continued use of QREBONY by your service on a temporary basis while he remains in this country we have no objection to this provided we are kept fully informed of as much detail as possible."

3. JAGUAR pointed out that QREBONY operates in the same areas as some of JAGUAR's own agents, and this necessitates a fair amount of frankness regarding his activities in the U.K. We have made every effort to date to display to them that frankness. In return, JAGUAR has been cooperative, if not downright helpful. In one of our discussions, SMILL confidentially stated that one of their sources had quoted a sub-source as saying that QREBONY had admitted tohim that he is a KUBARK agent. We assured JAGUAR that QREBONY is under instructions not to reveal his KUBARK relationship, of course; that QREBONY is not supposed to be recruiting any sub-agents and has not done so; that the remark could well have been made in jest, in reference to the charges levelled against QREBONY three years ago (or longer). We told JAGUAR that it would obviously be advantageous for us to know to whom QREBONY is alleged to have made the statement, and we would be grateful if JAGUAR could tell us. We have repeated this request in writing, but with no reply to date. SMILL stated at the time that he had doubts about whether they could identify to us the person who had made the statement; he was sure that they could not go back to their agent for elaboration without showing an undue interest in QREBONY. We may yet hear who the person was. All this is repeated here merely to indicate how far JAGUAR will go to be helpful, and how far, to date, they will not go.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

USE PREVIOUS EDITION | CLASSIFICATION | PAGE NO.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO OELA-45,254

4. This, then, reflects the state of our relations with JAGUAR as it relates to QREBONY. We trust that this will be of value to Headquarters and LCPIPIT in planning QREBONY's future.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
- 2-Chief, KUSOLF
- 3-Chief, WH
- 2-Chief, KUDESK
- 2-Chief, LCPIPIT

SECRET

29 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT: Cover Arrangements for QREBONY/1

This memorandum contains information solicited by CCS to implement cover arrangements, already proposed by CA Staff and approved by DDP, involving Russell R. deBow of Chicago and CA Staff asset QREBONY/1. It is keyed to the headings set forth in the "Nonofficial Cover Request for Individual, Headquarters Edition."

A. General Information

1. QREBONY/1 (previously carried as STEBONY). No previous request has officially been forwarded for cover support.

2. Currently a Contract Agent. Currently compensated at the rate of $7,200 per year with a $1200 nonaccountable allowance.

3. Agent has not nor will be reviewed by the Agency's medical psychiatric assessment and evaluations Staff. He is already overseas and will remain there.

4. The Agent uses a complex of related cover stories, based primarily on exaggerated implications of fact: Namely, that his income derives from free-lance journalism and money available from his wife's family. Some quarters suspect or believe that he may possess funds from the CPR, but this has never been alleged by the Agent himself.

5. Agent is available now for cover.

6. Agent is overseas.

7. QREBONY Project.

B. Biographic Information

1. DPOB: 13 May 1931, Los Angeles, California; M; Negro; None; U.S.; No prior citizenship; Married; 3 children; 30 Stockleigh Hall, Prince Albert Road, London NW 8.

2. Adult and minor dependents are already in place and sharing the same residence. No readily available biographic information. He has 2 sons and one daughter, ranging in age from one to ten years.

SECRET

.P 1
... automatic
... rading and
declassification

QREBONY - 201 file

3. BA Kenyon College 1950; Foreign graduate study 1951-52.

4. Reporter, Philadelphia Afro American 1950; Miscellaneous: public relations--Italian Film Exports 1951; 1952-54 U.S. Army; 1957-58 Agence France Presse, Paris; 1960-61 CBS news, New York.

5. N.A.

6. Perceptive, aggressive but effective in personal relationships, literate.

7. Agent has fairly sizeable, but not pressing, debts to his in-laws. He lives modestly within his income from us.

8. Has resided only in U.S., Algiers, Paris and London, although he has travelled widely in other areas.

9. Fluent in French, competent in Italian and Spanish, and can read German.

C. Security Considerations

1. Agents has been receiving CA support for 13 months. POA granted 23 May 1966 with caution requiring care in view of the considerable derogatory information developed as a result of the Agents'past association with left-wing and radical organizations.

2. Agent is aware of U.S. intelligence interest, has not been explicitly apprised of CIA involvement but no doubt suspects it.

3. Agent has never entered any installations associated with CIA.

4. There is no U.S. identification of the Agent with CIA outside of Staff personnel. British intelligence (see paragraph 5 below). His wife (whose family resides in England) is unwitting.

5. The Agent is known in true name to the MI-5 and MI-6 of the United Kingdom.

6. None. It should be noted that the contemplated cover will not be a relationship which the Agent (any more than the cover) will proclaim or flaunt, given the fact that in his highly anti-American circle, such a connection would be regarded as unsavory. The purpose of the cover is to backstop the Agent's story that he receives income from hack journalism which he keeps separate from his "real" if unrewarding involvement with radical politics.

7. No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

QREBONY
201-306052
SEX M DOB ?

200-124-156/02
MALP-06112
30 MAR 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ RPTS HIS FAMILY SITUATION DIFFICULT BCAUSE MUST LEAVE APT 1 JUN AND MAKES LOT OF DIFFERENCE WHETHER MOVE IS PERMANENT /ALLOWING LONG-TERM ADVANTAGEOUS LEASE OR PURCHASE/OR TEMPORARY.

R 6605110149

FILE IN 201-306052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, KUWOLF

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT RJS

SUBJECT
ODTDORIC/Operational Assessment of QREBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OFLW-1494

1. Forwarded herewith is a 6-1/2 page answer by RODIGAST to the questions posed in reference. If any further clarification is required by Headquarters, please advise.

2. With regard to QREBONY/1's overt tax return, it has been determined that declarations must be filed by all citizens with over $600 income. If it turns out that QREBONY/1 cannot justify a $600 income from overt sources, and we think he cannot, he simply has no declaration to file and will be advised to so state to the Embassy.

Zaffaresi
Karen H. ZAFFARESI

Attachment h/w
As stated above

Distribution
3-C/KUWOLF w/att h/w

MAR 29 [illegible]

1A77

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLA-3627	DATE 29 March 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

A. QRBONY/1 (Q) gives the convincing impression that he is at home in his new work. He responds well to suggestions and instructions, adds suggestions of his own for improving the plan-- an indication that he wishes to please. In the beginning he showed a tendency to raise minor objections involving personal material problems (e.g., inconvenience to family life of a long tdy) but less of this was remarked as he came to realize that requirements were to be reasonable and he was to be treated as a human being with his own problems.

He has stated that he would not continue his present involvement with target personalities and institutions if it were not that we wish him to, i.e., his own inclination would be to withdraw from the political fringe. Rodigast feels that this is consistent with his background, which was not a party career; in his youth he was willfully apolitical and hostile to the "movement"; later he was involved in opposing party people in his New York work; in Paris he didn't get along with his party friends (the affair of the forged letter) and of course broke with the magazine crowd there.

He seems to be genuinely committed to working against enemies of ODYOKE, ready to accept even deeper commitment; he has expressed no reservations as to what he will do. He doesn't object to reporting on old friends, fellow PBPRIMERS, et al. He raised no objection to FLUTTER, or using s/w techniques (which he took with him on a trip to what was then a very hostile area, where he had known enemies, and where there was a recent history of dealing roughly with outsiders). When orders conflict with personal desires (for example, when he planned to spend a weekend in a city he enjoys but was told he should proceed immediately to his next stopping place), he obeys without hesitation.

The foregoing is a collection of miscellaneous facts, but taken together they paint the portrait of a promising agent, both in terms of motivations and abilities.

B. Rodigast's knowledge of Q's attitude in the months prior to recruitment (June 1965) is limited. Rodigast has the impression Q had simply reached the end of his rope-- he had nowhere to go, he had earlier decided that he would like to work for or at least cooperate with ODYOKE (although earlier attempts to make contact met with no success). The humane treatment received at the hands of his recruiter, the subsequent sympathetic handling by his case officer, undoubtedly convinced him that he had not made a mistake.

The material factor is not to be underestimated. The demoralizing position of living on his wife and worse, on her family, must have lowered his resistance to any possible alternative. Rodigast simply doesn't know how Q might have responded to a reasonable offer from enemies of ODYOKE at that point. The prospect of immediate engagement at a decent wage may have been decisive.

Since that time, Rodigast feels Q's motivation has been reinforced and perhaps considerably altered: he has been asked to do obviously necessary tasks, and so he can feel he is needed by someone; he has been given reasonable instructions on how to accomplish them; he sees that others are concerned for his personal safety and material wellbeing. Rodigast has taken pains to avoid giving the impression that there was any confusion or error or difference of viewpoint in running the project (even at a time when there were plenty of all three); such problems were

ATT-1 OFLA-3627 CS COPY 201-306052

resolved before being taken up with Q, and thus he has a somewhat rosy view of the operation. The satisfaction of accomplishment (i.e., being able to produce useful answers to our questions) is surely a factor in his present attitude.

Though light-skinned, with a voice and accent which would be considered acceptable in any PBPRIME society, Q is extremely sensitive to the fact that he is a Negro. He has not said or suggested any such thing to Rodigast, but this is so obvious a factor in his correspondence (even discounting the extent to which the correspondence is part of his conscious cover) that it seems to Rodigast that it must be a factor in his life. On the other hand, Rodigast has known another Negro who was a close friend of Q (and now one of his major enemies, as a result of the Paris forged letter incident and contributing events) who was so sensitive about race that he makes Q in retrospect seem like an Uncle Tom.

Still, Rodigast does not believe Q could be handled by someone who is not genuinely a "nigger lover", i.e., who could not convey a convincing image of a person for whom a color difference was not a barrier (Q would surely detect the false "pal"). Q has mentioned anti-Negro prejudice as a reason for his refusal to cooperate with ODENVY officers who talked to him while he was in New York. In fact, Q deals with his present case officer as a possible if not a true friend; they share an interest and involvement in writing, English literature, living happily abroad, etc.; Rodigast has tried to read Dante in the original and Q has done so; Rodigast would like to write a novel and Q has published one; Rodigast doesn't know much about the post-logical positivists who interest Q but probably gives a convincing impression that he would like to know about them, and just might be capable of understanding them. What all the foregoing means is that in Q we have an accomplished person, and it is a useful tactic to treat him if not as a superior than at the very least as an equal.

There remains the possibility that opportunistic reasons are primary: Q joined the organization and stayed with us because he could not do as well in any other job, could in fact get no job (because of his background, his alien status abroad, etc). Rodigast does not exclude this, although he feels that whatever the original motivation, it has been strengthened and perhaps converted into something more worthy. But even if his primary motivation remains material, the history of the project over its first nine months suggest it is a viable one.

C. Q has lived in the underground for so many years without breaking that it is likely he will be able to continue to do so. He thinks fast, handles himself well in matters presenting security problems. He is not fully trained for clandestine activity. Rodigast's long meetings with him always include advice on one or more specific aspects of clandestine work, which when added yp may be taken to represent a short course, but that is all. The lack of training has led Q to do or say things which Rodigast would not have wished him to do or say, and whenever possible this has been brought to Q's attention, and he seems responsive to such instruction.

Rodigast would not recommend that Q be given a training course, but this would not preclude more formal sessions with Rodigast during which Rodigast could give more complete instruction on various phases of clandestine work.

Q gives the impression of not being easily moved. He has already survived violent attacks, questioning by legislative committees and police (including abroad), public denunciation; now that he has KUBARK as a friend he should resist at least as well as before. One negative trait is his need to take revenge for injury, and this tendency must be controlled; his instinct to be spiteful to an enemy could conflict with a longer-range plan.

It is to be hoped that the present situation regarding his wife (who believes him to be working for the arch foe of PBPRIME) will be possible to maintain. She doesn't like the situation much, but accepts it, and apparently hasn't betrayed his "confidence". If he is moved to another city which both Q and his wife would consider agreeable (Rome) she would probably be even happier and less likely to revolt, especially if a quarters allowance helped them get out of their present financial straits (they can pay rent and buy food but not save or repay debts— so his wife says he is doing an unpleasant thing without even being able to say they are better off than they were in Paris). If he were sent to a less agreeable place for six months or a year (say Dar) he would want to settle his wife in a desirable place (London but preferably Rome) for the children's schooling; here too her attitude would depend on their material position and on the possibility of his being able to visit on occasion (if he were in Dar, say, and she in Rome, he would return for visits— which would also be cover for his meetings with his case officer). Rodigast recommends that once in place, Q's basic wage be raised (as promised in June 1965) from $600 to $800, but that he also receive quarters and if possible an educational allowance.

D. Q says he is a local PBPRIMER. He now does act like one. Rodigast feels the evidence for his loyalty is at least as good as it is for most other PBPRIMERS he knows. Early in their relationship (probably mid-June 1965 in Paris) Q had said he had turned away from the revolutionary movement and toward his own country; even though there were opportunistic reasons for him to have done so, he is seemingly not anti-PBPRIME. His views on Negro problems in PBPRIME probably have not changed, but he never was a black nationalist, and has many friends, besides his wife, who are white). He might not agree with ODYOKE policy in Vietnam, Cuba, or elsewhere-- he obviously has not been questioned on his personal beliefs— but his dissent, if dissent there be, is not disloyalty, and in any case should not prevent him from executing KUBARK policy to the letter. Undoubtedly he has a leftist economic orientation, but there is no evidence that it is an orthodox Marxist one (or that it ever was).

He seems to like Rodigast; in any event they work well together. He has made no effort to develop a warm relationship with Rodigast, however, apparently feeling that this is not necessary, might not be appreciated, and would conflict with the compartmentalization so obviously kept in force by Rodigast (who hasn't told Q his true name, address, marital status, or any other personal fact which might lead to identifying him). Seemingly Q does not believe the name which Rodigast used at their introduction was a true name, for he didn't bother to remember it (the last name), and all this would tend to discourage the building up of a personal friendship.

It is probable that he respects rather than scorns KUBARK for its decent treatment of him. KUBARK through Rodigast has always kept its promises, Rodigast has never been a minute late for a meeting (Q has rarely been a minute or two late, and in recent meetings—presumably because he feels that Rodigast's never-failing appearance on the precise second of the meeting must mean that this is required KUBARK practice— he has been even more precise. Rodigast is always ready with a suggested solution to a security or other problem which will be faced by Q in carrying out a new assignment.

On the other hand, part of Q's satisfaction with KUBARK might derive from a feeling that KUBARK is a "soft touch". Rodigast does not recommend that anything be done to change Q's opinion (if he really does hold it); Rodigast feels that we are going to pay Q as much whether he likes us or doesn't, and for the same money we might as well make sure he likes us and will do his utmost for the organization rather than simply be a timeserver keeping up appearances. If given cause for resentment, his behavior is unpredictable, for he hasn't much to lose— reputation for loyalty, good name, etc. One solution would be to give him enough so that he would indeed stand to lose much.

Q appears to possess a realitsic, sane view of ODYOKE, what its people are like, what can and can't be done by it. As already indicated, he seems to be as loyal a PBPRIMER as other people who don't give much thought to the matter, certainly a lot more loyal than his background would lead one to expect. In any case, we have no recent evidence to contradict his statement that he considers himself to be a loyal PBPRIMER; it may just be true. If it isn't, this won't make any difference to the project as it is understood by Rodigast.

Q is unlikely to hold sympathetic feelings for ODENVY, having had what he described as an unfortunate experience or two with them. On the other hand, he is sophisticated enough to assume that his reporting on PBPRIMERS is of concern to ODENVY, and he must know that his own suggestion for tdy in PBPRIME to contact target instititions and old friends there would put him into ODENVY territory. He would probably accept any necessary collaboration without showing that he didn't like it.

E. Rodigast does not believe Q is at present working for another service, but it is difficult to know what would happen if another service approached him. Rodigast assumes he would report this to us, just as he reported in detail the overtures by two persons apparently working with the services of the country in which he resides. As part of the present operation involves the possibility that Q will in fact be approached by the opposition, and Q is aware of this, one assumes he is prepared to remain loyal to KUBARK; one would also assume he would recognize the heightened value of his services to us should he be approached by the other side and continue to remain loyal to us.

Q certainly would not agree to work for an opposition service for peanuts, but if offered a considerable sum of money (given that he just breaks even in his present arrangement with us, in the thinking of Q's wife), there is no telling what he would do. When recruited, Q was told he would get a raise once he got settled "in place" (to $800), and when this promise is kept he will have enough extra money to begin to pay debts and buy clothing, and thus have more concrete evidence of the material advantages of his present arrangement.

Rodigast would be very surprised if Q agreed to work for an opposition service not for financial reasons but through ideology.

Q likes to live well. He believes in wearing good clothes, staying in good hotels, being able to invite others out for food and drink. He says that in the revolutionary movement poverty is no virtue, but merely indicates lack of influence. He says that the most popular persons are those who can dispense money, alcohol, and women. This may well be true. It is certainly true that such a role would please Q immensely (that is, having a plush apartment in which he could entertain target personalities, satisfying KUBARK's requirements and his personal desires).

F. Q must be dealt with firmly, with continued serving of requirements and planned itineraries for trips. At the same time, it is obvious that he improvises well when left without instructions; he is versatile, and can create situations which will result in an intelligence product. Rodigast's method is to suggest reasonable plans and to be ready to show that they can be implemented, and how they can, anticipating objections.

While there is no evidence that if left alone Q would drift, dragging out an assignment to fill time, it is possible that he would. He has not written as many free-lance articles as Rodigast would have liked him to, because each requires thinking out a subject, gathering material, selecting a point of view and thinking of the public to which it would be addressed-- a lot of work for articles meant to serve mainly as cover, for publication in obscure organs, or perhaps merely to be used to convince editors that he was active. On the other hand, he produced the first issue of the newsletter in record time, following instructions to the letter (indeed, accepting what must at times seem like petty editorial changes made by Rodigast). Perhaps he produced the latter so efficiently because he saw in it added prestige, an opportunity to get his name back before the public in a respectable context.

Ideological motivation would not seem to be a level of control in his case. What is most important is his contentment with being (he hopes) a permanent part of a large organization, with a steady salary (he has never said this, of course); the power of ODYOKE is less important than its known reputation for keeping its promise to pay, something one doesn't find among the opposition groups known to Q, and he finds new examples of this daily.

Doubtless, his tendency to bear a grudge is a factor here-- Q is now in a position where he can thumb his nose at some of his enemies.

Rodigast feels that considerate dealing with Q, letting him know where he is going, what he can expect, not changing the rules abruptly or pulling a rug from under his feet, letting him see the possibility of small but certain increases in material benefits in the course of his career, compose the ideal formula for handling him. In the course of time, the ideological factor, which is perhaps marginal at this time, would probably be reinforced, could one way be a major factor. Q, meanwhile, must feel that the persons who deal with him are concerned with his material wellbeing and also of his physical safety, appreciating the risks in his work and understanding that not all assignments will bear fruit. Our relationship with Q could be destroyed very rapidly if we failed to pay him as promised, or wasted his time with make-work, or gave him confusing or contradictory instructions which suggested that KUBARK was not the all-powerful institution he may now think it is.

G. Very early in our relationship Q said that he would like to make a career in KUBARK, outside now, perhaps inside some day. He would work in PBPRIME or abroad. There was no indication then, and has been none since, that he regards the present relationship as a distasteful one to be terminated as soon as conditions permit.

He would like to settle in en expatriate's paradise, such as Paris or Rome, presumably involved in journalism and other writing. If he could do these things in connection with his work for us, so much the better.

H. Q is conscious of the need for security and handles himself well— as well as an amateur could in this context. But he is far more naive about techniques and especially the nuances of technique than Rodigast would have expected in one who had been involved in the revolutionary movement for so long. He often needs instruction on obvious points, and responds quite well to it, the exception being his clumsy handling of the s/w method-- he is an intellectual and not a technician, and Rodigast assumes that he (Rodigast) would not do much better if forced to use some technical system.

Q is quite observant. He will recall a personal remark made to him by Rodigast from one month to the next. His reports written some time after the event are thorough and apparently accurate.

He read A Spy and His Master by Christopher Felix, and has mentioned it a couple of times when a remark by Rodigast reminds him of something said in the book.

Rodigast doesn't think that even after training Q would be very good at throwing off surveillance (for example) as he seems too matter of fact to be sly, and perhaps slightly lazy about what might be gratuitous behavior (e.g., changing subway trains or taxis just on the assumption that someone might be following him). Rodigast's solution is not to depend on Q for such things, but to attempt to plan meeting and stage other operations so as to minimize the need for dependence on Q's skill in such areas. After patient briefing Q does understand the need for tradecraft efficiency, and as already noted he follows the advice.

I. At first Q qas quite concerned about money— he needed an advance for clothes, for travel, etc. His requests were really plaints, and he may have left the impression that he thinks of nothing but money. It was the complex of a poor boy who never had anyone he could turn to— despite a scholarship he had to leave a fine college after a brilliant freshman year. Once he received his advance and began receiving his money at the beginning rather than at the end of each month, and when he realized that he would receive complete and prompty reimbursement of expenses, he began to relax. Now he submits accountings without himself totalling the figures or keeping his own record (Rodigast knows this for he has seen Q's notes), so he must rely on us to tell him how much he claimed for (even Rodigast would never do that). He is, in sum, relaxed.

The same ease is to be noted in his substantive work; he submits his reports knowing he has done his best, and done well; he accepts compliments with a very slight nod. When Rodigast first met Q in a hotel room, Q had something of the hunted man. He still seems harried, slightly nervous at the moment of contact, but on the whole he is more sure of himself.

At the outset, Q would argue about assignments, suggesting alternatives, worrying about not having time to buy tickets, or enough money to pay for them. Now he accepts instructions without a murmur, even when they contradict a previous tentative plan. His excellent response to instructions may be his desire to please, his satisfaction with his job, or personal pride in accomplishment. Whatever the reason or reasons, the fact is that he does respond well.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

INFO.

FROM Chief, KUWOLF

SUBJECT ○ Assessment of QREBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See below

It would prove very useful to us--both as a contribution to the preparation of the Project Outline now in progress and as a backgrounder for possible discussions of QREBONY's operational utilization--if RODIGAST could provide us with an interpretive assessment of him based on the impressions and judgements he has been able to develop over the past months. We have some such initial assessments, of course, and can infer more from current reporting. However, we would like to get the benefit of RODIGAST's unique and direct contact, now that QREBONY has passed through a breaking-in phase and settled down in a regular relationship which, at its inception, is certainly a difficult one for most people to adjust to. We would suggest the following outline of topics for RODIGAST to follow:

A. Estimate of loyalty to ODYOKE and QREBONY's psychological adjustment--his comfortableness--in working for ODYOKE clandestinely: his attitude, as RODIGAST can infer it, toward targets hostile to ODYOKE: in short, his ideological motivation.

B. Estimate of his motivation generally: his personal reasons for association with KUBARK.

C. Psychological suitability and staying power in leading a "double life". Possible or actual strains on him by virtue of his wife's attitude. Qualms about the "morality" of his position or fears about being found out.

D. His own views of his patriotism or loyalty. His attitude toward RODIGAST, KUBARK, ODYOKE and ODENVY.

E. His susceptability to approach or control by an opposition service.

F. Methods of control to which he is mort, and least, responsive. What represents the effective lever of his control--internal ideological

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT

continued

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLW-1494	DATE 17 MAR 1966
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	James M. Murphy	ajl	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/ICG	15 March 1966	Goodrich (in draft)

Distribution:
1 - RI (201-306052
2 - CA/CF

A	FI	
ABSTRACT X	[illegible]	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER SIGNATURE
C/CA	17 MAR 1966	Cord Meyer, Jr.

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(40)

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLW-1494

motivation? financial need? resentments? a desire to identify himself with ODYOKE's power? or some combination of these?

G. His longer range plans, if any.

H. His security consciousness--i.e. his efficiency in tradecraft.

I. Any changes in his attitudes or personality which RODIGAST has detected over the period of their association.

HOWELL D. KAMSKEMEYER

201-306052

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

DISPATCH SECRET/[illegible]

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, London for LCPIPIT

INFO. Chief of Station, London

FROM Chief, WOLIMR

SUBJECT RYBAT/DTDORIC/PLQRPHONE/MHPROBE/STFLIMFLAM Training

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 294821

1. Being forwarded USC are copies of the QRPHONE/1 training report, the JBMINIMUM evaluation, contact reports of meetings with QRPHONE/1, a WOGEAR review of QRPHONE/1's book and some notes made by the STFLIMFLAM Headquarters officer, Harvey B. DAITCHMAN (IDEN), after his meetings with QRPHONE/1. These are for the information of both LCPIPIT and London Station and, taken together, should give you both the flavor of the variety of measures taken to assess the operational potential of QRPHONE/1.

2. During PAUPEROS' TDY at Headquarters we discussed the necessity of having QRPHONE/1 undergo an intensive seven day STFLIMFLAM training program to be conducted by DAITCHMAN. It is our opinion that in order for this training to be of maximum benefit, QRPHONE/1 and DAITCHMAN ought to be ensconced in a safehouse facility which provides security, comfort and an atmosphere conducive to learning. It is important that the training be conducted in a locale which will allow QRPHONE to give his full attention without being disturbed by his multitude of business and social contacts. Therefore, we recommend that LCPIPIT rent a cottage or beach house away from London for the duration of the training cycle. In discussing this with QRPHONE, he readily agreed and indicated that there would be no difficulty in getting away from his family for as long as we thought necessary. He

Attachments:
A. As Stated (u/s/c)
B. Iden Sheet (u/s/c)

Distribution:
2 ATT Orig. & 1 - COS, London for LCPIPIT (w/att)
1 - COS, London (w/att)

[illegible]

approval of OCI

CS COPY

CLASSIFIED BY

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE [illegible] SOURCES

CA/B3

CROSS-REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPW-1814	4 AUG 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[illegible]	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-124-156/1 ~~200-124-156/3~~

Distribution:
1 - E/BC
1 - E/CA
1 - AC/CA/B3
1 - CA/B3
1 - CI/SO

CA/B3

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
DDP/CA/B3/Ken Rosen:ckj		(31 July 1972)	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/CA/B3	2 Aug 72	
E/BC	2 AUG 1972	
E/CA	2 Aug 72	
CI/SO	2 Aug 72	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
ADC/CA	2 AUG 1972	Dino J. Pionzio

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION.

(40)

DISPATCH

simply would tell them and his business contacts that he was traveling on the continent. Please advise us of the dates which are determined to be convenient to PAUPEROS and QRPHONE/1. The Headquarters officer would prefer either the third or fourth week of September, and certainly not before.

3. As indicated in the reference we solicit comments from LCPIPIT and London Station on the results of our varied assessments of QRPHONE/1 and our decision to move ahead in the new operational directions described in OKPW-1661. We view the coming year as a trial one for these purposes and the Project Renewal has been submitted with that understanding clearly described.

4. Since QRPHONE/1 might refer to conversations he had with Andrew F. TELQUIST (P), PAUPEROS should know that TELQUIST used the alias "Bob" in all his meetings with QRPHONE/1.

Allan W. TEUTSCHMAN

200-124-156/1
~~200-124-156/3~~

17 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WOLIME

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRPHONE/1, Training Program "SHAM"

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of WOMOLD From Chief, WOLIME , dated 23 May 1972; Subject: "Covert Training for QRPHONE/1"

1. QRPHONE/1 was trained covertly in New York from 22 June to 14 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty seven training hours.

2. This was a happy reunion of trainee and instructor. Less than two years ago, PHONE was given three days of reports training (Please see Completion of Training Report dated 19 October 1970). Just as then, PHONE was totally engrossed in every training session from the moment of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the instructor does not eat lunch, PHONE brought a sandwich with him daily and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every minute of every day was made to count.

3. The only time lost was three hours for [illegible] and on the several phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, these calls took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.

4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion, everyday, of his free time with the result that he could not do any thing to speak of for subsequent preparation of commo plans for exercises. For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop commo plans, he was not able to come up with anything till the last week — and then with only one written one and one that he received orally. As a result he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of his countersurveillance exercises and one of his agent developmental exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time out during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.

5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother. He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).

S/C Att. 1 to OEPW-1814 CS COPY

200-124-156/1
~~200-124-156/3~~

On Tuesday, July 4th, his publisher appointed him baby sitter for the publisher's teen age son and there went any hope of getting any casing done that day. At least one time, he continued that he did not go to bed till two that morning and as he had left the afternoon before, he had stated that he had meetings starting at four thirty that afternoon. With all that, he nevertheless was fully alert and attentive every minute of every training session.

6. In his developmental recruitment series of exercises, his instructor played the role of operations officer -- and a real dumb-dumb he was. In such circumstances, PHOKE had to do all the thinking, all the planning, all the casing for meeting sites, all the analyzing, all the preparing and pointing for the recruitment. It was pure joy to watch this man, after each meeting and again before the next one, go to work on the problem. He knew where he was, knew where he wanted to go, knew how to get there. When TELQUIST , during the critique at the end of the series of exercises said: "He did a beautiful job," PHOKE had earned that accolade all by himself. The instructor's only contribution had been in the teaching of the subject of Agent Acquisition.

7. At this point, the instructor wishes to execute a low bow in the direction of TELQUIST He played his agent role excellently well and made the exercise a meaningful one for PHOKE. The three trips to New York by TELQUIST must have been very taxing, particularly in view of his immediately upcoming TDY trip, but they were efforts well spent.

8. No man, of course, is perfect. Each has an Achilles heel, a weakness, or an all-too-human trait, at the very least. Our PHOKE has his. He has a very quick mind. He knows it. And knowing it, he relies on it, counts on it. This, in turn, leads to a small failure in self-discipline. For example, told to write out his plan for the recruitment pitch, he came in with six words (maybe not that many) scratched on a 3 by 5 leaf torn out of his pocket notebook. He then proceeded, from these few words, to run off his plan without a single pause for an uh, hm, er, etc. It was as though he was reading a definition from a dictionary, so smoothly did his mind and thoughts run. He prepares everything in his mind, it appears, and does not like to write out that which he feels he should not have to write out. While it is great to have so facile a mind, a bit of discipline, to write out in full so important an act as a recruitment pitch, might one day save grief when an error would have been spotted had the entire plan been written out then looked over for possible flaws.

9. This small flaw, the instructor feels, accounts in considerable measure for PHOKE's failure to bring in a written dead drop plan till the last days of the program. PHOKE felt he could just as easily report orally. In fact, the other dead drop (he had been asked to do two) on which he reported orally, he discussed as though the paper was in front of him and he was reading from it. Nothing was missing -- area

description, access, hours of availability, the opposition, pros and cons as to suitability -- it was all there. He just didn't like to write out that upon which he could report orally.

10. In writing reports on the two counter-surveillance exercises, he dashed those off in jig time. No pause for thinking, no pause to look up at the ceiling or out the window. Just straight writing, including paragraphing. Mind and pen were as one. Same thing for his oral analysis before and after each meeting -- no pause to think, to review, to reconstruct, to remember -- just an IBM-type printout.

11. The instructor sets down this reluctance on our hero's part to write out certain things, not to downgrade him, but to alert desk and field officers that if they must have a certain report by a certain time, and they want it in writing, they must be firm. For example, after the second meeting in the developmental series, the instructor said: "I must have that report first thing in the morning. Do you want to take time out from this afternoon's training session to do it?" And, as already reported above, PHONE preferred to save the training time and he answered "I will make time to write it". In this case, time was of the essence because TELOUIST had to see the report before the next meeting. To sum up this item: When PHONE feels that an oral report is adequate he finds it a little difficult to bring himself to find time to make a written report. Told definitely that he must write a report and given a deadline, he meets the deadline and the report is everything it should be.

12. His reports on his recruitment meetings, Mr. Sweet said, were excellent. No jumping to conclusions, no padding, no misinterpretations, no omissions.

13. The surveillance team captain, reading PHONE's report on his actions during the countersurveillance exercises, marvelled at the completeness, total accuracy of description of the surveillants PHONE had made, including their ages (but always made each man an inch or two shorter than the actual height -- which PHONE admitted he does consistently), and the total recall of every move, every street crossing, every compass direction. (In the first countersurveillance exercise, sprung on PHONE without a moment's prior notice, he made one of his two surveillants. In the second one, with plenty of time to prepare, he made all three of them. These were two different teams from the New York WOBONE ___). Concluding his admiration of PHONE's reporting, the surveillance team captain said to the instructor: "You should be very proud of him".

14. In both exercises, the surveillance teams criticized the rapidity of PHONE's movements. He walks very rapidly from place to place, then spends time to browse in a book shop. Then off again at a high rate of speed to his next stop. They also criticized his looking both ways while crossing a one way street. They felt it made him appear

tail conscious. These are a typical New Yorker's habits. The instructor, also a New Yorker, is guilty of the identical actions. We are highly kinetic in our movements and as for looking both ways while crossing a one-way street, we follow the old Marine Corps adage: "There's always one S.O.B. that doesn't get the word". By sheerest coincidence, when the instructor was on his way to the safesite to deliver the surveillance team's report, he violated his own rule of looking both ways in crossing a one-way street and was bowled over by a hippie on a loaded bike -- going the wrong way. Only the large heavy film case the instructor was carrying kept him from being knocked flat.

15. Nevertheless, PHOME is now fully cognizant of the appearance that his actions create and will watch it in the future.

16. One last note on the counter-surveillance exercises: He chose his positions well and he camouflaged his actions beautifully. One example: The instructor called the surveillance team for a quick feedback on the first exercise and caught the men just as they returned to their office. They got on different phones for a three way conversation. They reported one incident as follows: "So rapid were PHOME's movements, that when he met a friend of his, he hardly paused to speak with him, just waved him off". The second surveillant: "No, it didn't look like that at all, to me. To me it looked like this Indian-looking person stopped PHOME and asked him for directions and PHOME gave them and just went about his business". PHOME's own report, which he wrote up before he learned about the two different interpretations of the incident: "--- where I stopped a foreign-looking man, apparently Indian in origin and asked him for the Museum which I knew perfectly well is on 53th Street. I turned around as he pointed south to 55th Street and spotted the same man in the grey suit, now holding his hat in his hand".

17. In the second exercise, there were two items of note: One, the team was surprised to note in PHOME's report that PHOME even had the name of the book that the surveillant picked up when he followed PHOME into a book store. Second, when the exercise was over, the team compared notes and decided that PHOME may have made two of them but could not possibly have made the third man. The team captain, on reading PHOME's report, was stunned to see that PHOME had indeed made the third man also, but good.

18. PHOME had an elicitation exercise (in addition to the developmental acquisition series) with an instructor in the New York office. After relating the fine job that PHOME had done, the instructor's __ report concluded: "A first rate performance by PHOME, who's obviously been around -- both coverwise and for real".

19. His choice of meeting places with his agent could not be faulted. For one, he chose an East Side restaurant (where diplomats, as Mr. Sweet held himself out to be, would properly be seen dining).

Yet it was far enough away from the United Nations building to lessen the chances that [illegible] himself and his putative diplomat target would be spotted by friends or acquaintances. His choice for the next meeting was at an impressively named new restaurant near the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts on the West Side of town. This restaurant was located in the safesite complex. He was thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the safesite from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

20. He did very well in executing two recognition meetings and two brush passes. He had no time to write his own commo exercises (as stated, he was able to write up only one dead drop commo plan) so he was given commo plans written up by another trainee. To give him variety, he was alternately the higher and the lower echelon, alternately accepted and made the hand-off.

21. In operational and intel reports, he did very well. He very successfully separated the operational from the intel info and the source comments from the positive intelligence.

22. Instructor's Observation: [illegible] is a proud man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure genius. This, like the previous item, is noted not to down-grade [illegible], but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report [illegible]/[illegible]/1/SHAW. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF WOJOLD

Chrono

SECRET/RYBAT

18 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with QRPHONE/1

1. I met with QRPHONE/1 for much of the 12th of July and wearing two hats. We first went through the third phase of the training exercise in which I had been playing the role of an agent prospect whom he was to assess and recruit, and then later in the OTR safehouse I identified myself as the Headquarters officer responsible for his project. Incidentally, he did an excellent job in all three phases of the training exercise and did particularly well on the recruitment itself. QRPHONE/1 is clever, imaginative, has an excellent grasp of this aspect of tradecraft and handled himself particularly well in a complex and changing training scenario.

2. As the Headquarters staff officer responsible for his project, I described in detail the reasons for the long, serious look at his performance these last several months, the changing intelligence and operational requirements we face, and the careful scrutiny he had been given as we began to map out new directions for him, all of which ended with this advance four-week training program, testing, and evaluation and substantive briefings. He said he was a bit confused by the WOMUSE briefing of last week so I explained how that tied in with this evening's planned discussion on the China program.

3. We discussed his itinerary, personal plans and the pacing of the next several months, all of which were clarified to his satisfaction.

a. He will be debriefed on 24 July at 1000 hours at the OTR safesite in NYC following his return from the operational trip around the country.

b. I will meet him for the final operational briefing session at 1000 hours on 26 July in the same OTR safesite.

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
APDIR
[illegible] or event)

CLASSIFIED BY

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

RYBAT

c. He will depart New York the night of 26 July on the 8:00 p.m. TWA flight to London.

d. This will get him in London in time for a previously scheduled ops meeting with PAUPEROS on 27 July. He leaves on 1 August for a one-month vacation touring most of Europe with his family and spending one week in Malta.

4. Before the arrival of DAITCHMAN we discussed other operational matters as follows:

a. His friend in New York City, Richard Ward, (Apt. 11K, 372 Central Park West) recently returned from Hanoi and Paris with the manuscript of a new book written by Cambodian Prince Nordom Sihanouk titled "My War with CIA." Sihanouk gave the manuscript to Wilfred Burchett who gave it to a North Vietnamese friend to give to Ward. Ward was asked to find an American publisher and he, in turn, asked for QRPHONE/1's help. Burchett is an old friend of Ward's and stays at his apartment whenever he visits New York. The manuscript has already been given to a publisher in Europe. QRPHONE/1 asked if we would be interested in a copy. I told him to get one if he could do so without straining his cover.

b. His friend, Lyle Stuart, the publisher, has been trying to buy the American branch of the Oxford University Press, and apparently is about to consummate the deal. He offered QRPHONE a job as his European representative if the deal goes through.

c. Per TEUTSCHMAN' request I asked QRPHONE to give his instructor a copy of the long list of names and organizations given to him by Sibecho. Also per Ken's request, and in answer to my question, QRPHONE said he received the magazine published by the Turkish party in Collards Book Shop in London.

5. From 5:00 p.m. until a little after midnight on 13 July, DAITCHMAN of FE Division briefed QRPHONE/1 in substance on the STFLIMFLAM program, our interest in having QRPHONE/1 pursue such a role, and explained the great amount of dreary work that would be involved in learning the communist dialectic thoroughly if the whole venture were to be successful. I will make no effort to condense these seven hours

of ethereal discourse, but QRPHONE was fascinated, captivated by it and clearly interested in pursuing that long murky path to "enlightenment." /DAITCHMAN did an outstanding job in setting the stage, describing the target, and then explaining step by step how he and QRPHONE/1 and PAUPEROS would work together as the operation progressed. Regarding QRPHONE's upcoming trip in the U.S., /DAITCHMAN explained exactly how QRPHONE should act as he meets each of his friends and how he should develop his new-found "interest" in studying Marxist-Leninism as he meets with those various people. QRPHONE was very responsive, took notes, had ideas of his own, but more importantly was very appreciative of the tactical advice that /DAITCHMAN described. QRPHONE/1 will meet the following people over the next ten days.

a. Richard Ward in New York City.
b. Libel Bergman in Newark (on three different occasions)

c. Benjamin Blake, Milton Henry and a fellow named Boggs in Detroit (he's with NAR).

d. Don Wright, Herb Block, and Sidney Lens all in Chicago.

e. LPWEAKLY/1 and family in Chicago

f. Davida Fineman and Saul Landau in San Francisco.

g. The Martin Luther King Foundation in Atlanta.

6. All of the above were carefully chosen because of who they were, what organization or philosophy they represented, or their interest in the Chinese, and the extent to which the whole would knit together and form a viable base which QRPHONE can use as a springboard when he returns to London. /DAITCHMAN urged QRPHONE to join, or in some cases rejoin, Maoist study groups in London including the one conducted by Manchanda. The role that QRPHONE should play with these groups, as well as others in Europe who were singled out during various parts of the conversation, was also spelled out in detail. By the end of the evening QRPHONE had clearly in mind what it was all about, what he should do next and the purpose of our reconvening on the 24th and 26th to decide finally what it all amounts to.

7. I asked QRPHONE to call on the sterile line using the "Mr. Stanley" indicator on Monday afternoon, 21 July. This is simply to check in and let us know he is on the way and how things have come thus far. He calculated that he needed another $500.00 for the U.S. portion of his overall trip since LCPIPIT apparently had not anticipated this when he was given his original advance. I arranged through the good offices of in New York to get $500.00 to QRPHONE today.

8. QRPHONE asked if we had any intelligence requirements for him to pursue while he is in Malta. I said Ken would brief him on those requirements on the 24th of July if we had any. Incidentally, QRPHONE mentioned that Libol Bergman comes to New York City every Thursday and told QRPHONE that he could be reached on telephone number 265-2500. QRPHONE said if we cared to we might want to track that number and see where Bergman hangs out.

Andrew F. TELQUIST

SECRET/RYBAT

31 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Final Contact with QRPHONE/1 in New York City

1. As arranged previously, I met with QRPHONE/1 at the WOMOLD safesite in New York City from 1000 hours to 1230 26 July. The meeting was intended to wrap up loose ends, convey our decision to pursue the STFLIMFLAM program (providing QRPHONE/1 himself was amenable), and to make clear that we expect measurable operational progress within the next year.

2. Although QRPHONE/1 had been debriefed on 24 July by other Headquarters officers regarding his trip around WOCORK, I asked him to review it again for my information so I could put it clearly in perspective as it related to our plans for him in the coming year. I'll not bother with the details here because such have already been written for the record elsewhere, but suffice it to say that QRPHONE/1 was both pleased and relieved at the reception he got from his old contacts because of the reflection these receptions had on his own bona fides. The allegations of his BKTRUST affiliation which had floated through Europe were never mentioned by his WOCORK contacts; on the contrary at least one of them urged QRPHONE/1 to return soon to WOCORK because this is where the action is. This same individual gave QRPHONE reading materials on the Communist dialectic and urged him to study them closely. This greatly impressed QRPHONE because it showed how accurate were the briefings given him by the Headquarters STFLIMFLAM officer and demonstrated that we knew our tactics.

3. I then reviewed with QRPHONE/1 the reasons for our long close scrutiny of him and his performance these last several months followed by our selection of him for advance training, testing, and redirection in the strong hope we had that he would accept this new task because of its priority importance to our national collection requirements. I asked

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
APDIR
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

CLASSIFIED BY Signer

SECRET/RYBAT

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

QRPHONE/1 his impressions of it all, his reaction to the STFLIMFLAM proposal, and whether he would accept its demanding obligations. QRPHONE said he certainly would and that he found it a real challenge to his intellect and his operational skills. The tedious study of the dialectic would not deter him. His only concern was how he should actually play it as he developed relationships with appropriate party members and, ultimately, the Chinese in SMORANGE. I pointed out he needn't concern himself with the last point because that would be part of the purpose of the ten-day training program in SMORANGE in September which would be given him by the Headquarters STFLIMFLAM officer. I said the training would require total emersion for ten days straight, probably in some secluded beach house on the coast where all involved could reside full time. He said this would present no problem cover-wise; he would simply tell his family he had gone to the continent. I said that PAUPEROS would be working out the details of this with him, probably after his return from vacation.

4. I said that given QRPHONE/1's past performance, his credentials with the radical left, and his apparent interest in vigorously pursuing the STFLIMFLAM program we expected to be able to measure in six to eight months the likelihood of his being able to achieve all the STFLIMFLAM objectives based upon the progress he would have made by then with his Chicom contacts. Should it appear that the STFLIMFLAM operation would not succeed we would be discussing alternative courses of action with him by the end of the year. He did say that of all the countries in Europe where his STFLIMFLAM and radical left potential is probably the best, Italy would be first and Denmark second.

5. I told QRPHONE/1 that his meeting with PAUPEROS had been moved to 31 July as he requested, reviewed his European vacation plans and his Malta trip and wished him the very best of luck. At this point QRPHONE/1 certainly seems willing and able aggressively to pursue our operational plans. We shall see.

Andrew F. TELQUIST

WOGEAR Review of African Liberation Movements

In general, the author has done a reasonably good job describing the historical development of the various African liberation movements, especially when one considers the complexity and number of splits and mergers that have occurred within and among the movements over the years. There are several glaring inaccuracies, however, in the author's conclusions about the current position and effectiveness of the several Portuguese African liberation movements.

Regarding Angola, the author characterizes the MPLA as an ideologically-oriented group (i.e., Soviet doctrine) that has failed to grasp and utilize to its advantage the tribal realities that exist in Angola. The author fails to acknowledge, however, that the MPLA has had some success, albeit limited, in building a movement that is national and multiracial in character rather than tribally oriented. Despite its urban intellectual leadership, the MPLA has had some success winning local support in rural eastern Angola.

By contrast, GRAE ranks a poor second. From inception, its primary base of support has been the large Angolan refugee population of Bakongo tribesmen who live in southwestern Zaire. Although the organization has won some support among Bakongo kinsmen across the border in northwestern Angola, it has failed to broaden its base because of its thinly disguised regional and tribal make-up. Moreover, Roberto's unwillingness to delegate authority or compromise have produced chronic disputes at the leadership level. The author's conclusion that GRAE is a formidable force to be reckoned with in the future of Angola is contradicted by the fact that the MPLA is by far the largest and most effective of the three nationalist groups opposing the Portuguese in Angola.

MOZAMBIQUE

The present FRELIMO leadership does not appear to be in the state of disarray in 1972 that the author believes it is. Although some differences undoubtedly persist, the present leaders seem to have closed ranks somewhat since the departure of Simango in late 1969. For the present, any internal squabbles that may exist are not noticeably affecting FRELIMO's fighting abilities inside Mozambique.

RHODESIA, SOUTH WEST AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA

Reasonably straightforward and up to date. No serious deficiencies.

Direct Psychological Assessment
of
ORPHONE/1

The psychological evaluation consisted of an extended interview and the JBMINIMUM test. His intelligence as measured by the JBMINIMUM is within the Bright Normal range by U.S. standards. The test scores were not as high as would be expected in comparison to his behavior and life style. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that he suffers from inferiority feelings and is working overtime to compensate. He gets considerable satisfaction and mileage out of his authorship; however, it takes a great deal of his energy in order to discipline himself enough to write a book. His talents are much more in the field of journalism. Mentally alert and very perceptive, he is aware of what is happening around him. These same traits would serve him well as an access agent. However, his reporting may reflect some distortions because his memory is not strong, and he tends to remember those events that are of interest to him. He naturally has good manual-manipulative skills, plus a practical bent that should enable him to easily and effectively learn and carry out tradecraft techniques.

Emotionally, Subject is fickle. "Out-of-sight - out of mind," describes the way he relates to others. The reason for this is that one of his primary needs is to be accepted and liked. Most of his life has been spent seeking acceptance, and because he is emotionally dependent he rapidly and intensely becomes involved. If separated from someone with whom he is involved, he has difficulty maintaining loyalty, and begins to look for another way to satisfy his needs.

An important fact which his case officer should remember is that he is not motivated by an ideology, but rather by the person who represents a particular ideology. His relationship with his case officer is of prime importance. To ensure his loyalty to the organization and consistent performance, he will need intense handling. The problem is that he may balk since he resists authority. He has the tendency to think that he knows it all, as witnessed by his never completing a degree.

Subject is not by nature a role player, and it would not be operationally advantageous to have him switch roles, for he cannot psychologically handle role playing over a period of time. He has worked hard to establish an identity for himself, and could not cope as effectively with a new one.

Conclusion:

Subject is a bright, extremely ambitious, and aggressive individual who appears to be motivated to work for the Agency by three needs: 1) a need to be accepted and liked; 2) a materialistic need; and 3) as a vehicle to be vindictive to former loyalties, i.e., the far left or radical movement in this country.

Though he is capable of switching loyalties, and his life history attests to this fact, it is very difficult to predict his future behavior since so much depends on his life circumstances. One statement that can be made is that, given his personality, it is very doubtful if he would return to his former allegiances. But if not personally involved with someone from this agency who can give him acceptance and support, he is likely to look elsewhere for his need satisfactions.

PAS Formula: 14(E+u+c Rc+c+ Uoo)L+

Notes on QRPHONE by Harvey B. DAITCHMAN

1. Revolutionary Image: Discussed briefly how it is obtained. Pointed out there is a pattern to it which is discernable among revolutionaries. It is usually issue oriented in the beginning, the war being one of the key issues, and it gradually evolves into a desire to engage in practical activities which usually expressed best on a continuing basis through work in an organization. Also connected with this process is the gradual development of a different "outlook." It is usually a mixture of idealism and Marxism-Leninism-socialism-Mao Tse-tung thought. Usually unstructured but developing.

It is possible in this stage to move from one group to another without any particular approbation being attached for this transience. This is particularly so if one starts way outside a M-L-ist group and moves inward towards it. Quite a different thing to start in a M-List group and go out.

Also in development of a new outlook one comes to study a variety of revolutionary literature. This can take one into different areas, anarchism, GW advocacy, revolutionary nihilism, socialism, Marxist-Lenism, etc. However, to get to latter it must be done logically.

2. Tightly Structured Op: Emphasis upon tight, controlled contacts which seek to accomplish a specific purpose--collection of info not necessarily one nor always one. Purpose is to lay ground work for future developments. Purpose to establish certain contacts which can be later used in either positive or negative fashion. Structured conversation is also essential. It too should seek to accomplish something, directed so as to be useful to future development of op: e.g., desire to have an explanation for an action to be undertaken later--so bring up in conversation with someone so that can use that conversation later as explanation for interest in a subject, knowledge of a subject, etc. It is checkable.

3. Study: Most important aspect in opening phases of op. Without correct study and without development (understanding) of "correct outlook" one will always be a dilettante to the, outside looking in, someone who is useful to them "under certain conditions," but not someone who is reliable, and not a dependable revolutionary. This is really the key, the ideological tool, it will open doors that cannot otherwise be entered.

4. Contacts: Those to be exploited now and those to be used in or for future time. In the beginning the contacts which are developed are to be used as a means of building his justification for having begun the serious study of Marx,

Lenin, and Mao. This must be discussed with people so that many are aware of it. These conversations will be later used when he explains how and why and when he became interested.

5. Diffuse Nature of Op: In beginning op has a diffuse nature. It is necessary to make many contacts. Some will be more useful than others, but all have potential for use in one circumstance or another. Since we have no way of knowing how or from whom the Chinese collect their intelligence, seek out, or otherwise spot budding revolutionaries we can assume that some one of his acquaintances will report his interest in Mao, etc. We can assume that through some of his activities Chinese will build up his dossier so that at a later date when we go directly to the Chinese for help they can look in their dossier and see that x number of months ago, etc., various things were reported. Etc.

6. Ops as a Process of Development: Permit no diversions or detours which might become permanent. This would include targets of opportunity, etc. Must always maintain correct operational line and cannot reach target by following various diversionary tributaries in the temporary interest of collecting marginal intelligence. Must be prepared to sacfrice diversionary tasks in pursuit of main goal or objective. If tangential things are folled up we then have a different op, and a new op line, must be cautious with this. Ops line serves as guide for whole op from beginning to end.

7. Tactics in Op: Must always be carefully thought out so as to insure forward development of op. Something must be seen emerging or useful, or having potential future value for development of op, otherwise it is pointless to undertake it. Tactics are details. Details are most important aspect in day to day running of op. They must be paid attention to, must be contributory, must be carried out in correct sequence, and we must keep in mind that at one or more points it is these details which will be subject of the scrutiny of the opposition. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE DETAILS APPEAR LOGICAL TO THIS OPPOSITION, even if they may seem illogical to us at times. Our logic is not the same as communist logic.

8. Ops is Step by Step Process: Op should/or can be divided into steps, phases, stages, segments, whatever. Each phase should dovetail into the next. To some extent a general outline can be developed. Each of the major phases should be sub-divided into stages so that they can be dealt with step by step. For example: Three broad categories:

1st Phase: All initiatives are ours. We do all the work, lay ground for future stages. We have a flexible line which permits making maximum contacts to be correctly exploited. We give training. Also devise concrete activities for him to carry out.

2nd Phase: Chinese and others have shown interest. We will exploit this interest. After he has completed first phase we will begin to make structured contacts with the Chinese. In these contacts he will show that he has a grasp of the ideology, is interested in learning more, desires to study more intensively. Will use as negative examples: his book, Panthers, some aspects of Bergman's behavior, the unstructured and undisciplined nature of most revolutionary activists in U.S., particularly among the blacks, or whatever may seem appropriate at time contact is made. However, will seek their help to further his study and will indicate recognition of need to return to U.S. in order to undertake correct role in revolutionary struggle. At this stage we will have an idea of interest of Chinese. We will be able to determine whether we can expect progress or not. If they prove willing to help they will then be asked to guide his further study, to help him. Through this help they will be able to see the development which has taken place. We should get a good feeling of their willingness to guide him after a couple of meetings. If we are shut out then must make ops judgement from that point on--can always target against Soviets and use Chinese as negative example. If they are interested we will then lose some aspects of our initiative, but in essence the more initiative we lose to them, the more they try to direct him, the deeper he becomes involved with them, which is our objective--one of them. He must continue his study.

3rd Phase: Continue his study; continue his contacts all around, but by now should have significant contacts and can dispense with the more general "sparrow" approach. Once certain of their willingness to help we ask about a trip to Peking to study after which he wants to return to U.S. and take active role.

Recognize that this may be a sticking point. We don't want him here. However, this idea has to always be in the forefront as far as the Chinese are concerned otherwise they have little reason to be interested in him. This MUST appear to be his goal. We may be able to circumvent it later for one reason or another, or it might be useful to bring him back temporarily. This decision must be reserved for that time.

These stages and sub-stages must be further divided if we are to understand the operation correctly and are to carry it out correctly. Each action he is asked to undertake must be seen leading to something concrete in the next or another step. The whole op goes STEP BY STEP. We do not insert unrealistic objectives, or those which would be desirable but may be difficult. This is a waste of time. We only seek to do what is possible--possible is what can be turned into reality.

Emphasis must be made on "step by step" approach and must be maintained. Otherwise we can trip ourselves up by trying to accomplish something which is out of sequence FOR THEM. For example: He has read Marx and Lenin. We might say he's quite familiar with it. We could then say that he will read Mao and after that he will be able to pretend to be a Maoist. All of this is true. He could say it and act like he and others thought a Maoist should act. However, appearance and essence are not synonomous. It might appear to non-Maoists that our troop is a Maoist because he can talk as good a game as anyone else--or better than those who have not studied as much--but the essence of being a Maoist is not contained in such superficialities. Nor is the essence of being a Marxist-Leninist so contained. He cannot, for example, bloom or emerge as a Maoist and find acceptance with the Maoists. They know the process it takes to get there: "Several years of assiduous study can produce good results." (Some Chinese quote on studying Mao.)

9. **Their Weapon is Also Our Tool:** Once we understand correctly how they wield their weapon, the dialectical method, it can serve as our tool to pry our way into their camp. Through proper study and understanding we can develop and promote Q's superiority among his friends and acquaintances. To Marxists he will be much more acceptable and his intel product will probably be enhanced since they will talk on subjects they might not have touched upon in the past, he will be more trusted, and also he will have better recognition of key developments in Marxist world through better understanding of their reality.

10. Some activities which we might consider enroute.

a. Start His Own Study Group: Chinese would be very interested. Unlike most study groups with which I am familiar he would stress study of ideology--in correct way. However, to prevent them from profiting from such study they can be tied in knots for months dealing with a variety of ideological problems. There is no point in our developing for their use good revolutionaries. However, it would provide reason for frequent contact with Chinese in order for them to help him in the development of his group. Would probably lead him into contact with other interesting types. Might have it for "Americans only" abroad--to avoid problems with Brits: whatever:

b. Might Talk About Starting a One Man Institute for Studying African Revolution: could put out a four page broadsheet for peanuts. It would discuss various African problems. His book gives him good reason for such study. He might draw one or two people to him. Can use this too as basis for approach to Chinese. He will have come to recognize that he had not painted the true picture of national lib struggle in his book and through his broadsheet he seeks to rectify some his ideas.

c. He could seek to do another book on "The Dialectics of African Revolution." Here again the help of various communists, Marxist-Leninists, and particularly the Chinese in providing guidance (correct guidance) would give him frequent access and contact--providing the Chinese are willing to help.

d. Start a Broadsheet for American Revolutionaries Abroad: This would give him contct with a wide variety of radical U.S. types abroad. It would also have feed back into the American scene and in part fulfill his requirement to have an active role with U.S. revolutionary developments. Etc. Etc.

e. There are other activities which he might also undertake. The above are a few ideas of what we can do to "promote" QRPHONE. He can do a number of different things at the sametime since much of it overlaps and is hence compatible. However, each must be structured, carefully handled, with great attention to the details. STEP BY STEP.

Some Words of Caution: Our experience clearly indicates that it is incorrect to rely upon either the agent or the station to provide the impetus. This seems to be true for a number of reasons. Case officers change often, chiefs of ops, bases, or stations change--there is not much continuity. We are thinking of a long term operation which, as it grows, becomes very complex. It is not easily understood by someone who gets involved after it has been going for sometime. It is even more true of changes in station leadership whose attitude is largely developed on his subjective feelings from reading only cable traffic. The initiative, the operational ideas, etc. are best kept in Hqs. There is so much more information here to work with, people with whom one can talk, staffs, etc. Also most officers in the field simply do not have the time to sit down and plan in the kind of detail that is needed to continue and develop the op. It calls for solid knowledge of the communist reality in order to insure that no errors creep in those contacts he may make. It calls for someone to have the time to read, study, certain publications, articles, etc., and then to figure out whether or not a given publication or article can be used to make a useful contact, write a useful letter, etc. If so, how, and then go the field with the idea, and concrete directions about how it should be used. Case officers most likely won't be exposed to the same material and probably wouldn't have the planning time necessary, or the various resources of Hqs to do what needs to be done.

This is not to suggest that the field has nothing to say. However, if the understanding can be clearly made that this is in fact a joint operation, with Hqs having an opportunity for big input, with the understanding that the only thing which matters to all concerned is the correct development of the operation in the given concrete conditions and not either the Hqs or the field trying to establish some kind of supremacy of rights over the other--there is a good chance of success.

200-124-154/1
~~200-124-154/3~~

Under Separate Cover Attachment B to OEPW-1814

IDEN - Andrew Ness

S/C ATT 2 to OEPW-1814

CS COPY

200-124-156/1

~~200-124-156/3~~

Agent Profile - QRPHONE/1

QRPHONE/1 is an American citizen and a singleton agent who has been a recruited asset for some seven years. He has extensive contacts among leftist, radical, and communist movements in Europe and Africa and was able to sustain his relations with many such figures for operational purposes in spite of a formal disassociation some years ago. Originally a member himself of a radical pro-communist group, his disenchantment with internal personal and political dissension in an organization to which he had firmly committed himself led later to his acceptance of an operational relationship with the Agency. Although targeted after his recruitment at the plethora of new left and radical elements in Europe, essentially for intelligence collection purposes, QRPHONE/1 has recently been redirected toward the Chinese Communists with a view to ingratiating himself and seeking their guidance and support as he demonstrates an interest in more effectively acting on their behalf. Our ultimate objective is to precipitate invitations to Mainland China which will lead to successively higher echelons of contact within the Chinese Government.

To prepare QRPHONE/1 for this demanding task, extensive retraining, assessment and remotivation were recently accomplished and selective recontact was made by him with his more influential and pertinent communist contacts. Reactions to QRPHONE/1's alleged desire to more fully commit himself to the communist Chinese cause and the assistance rendered thus far by these communist contacts are encouraging indicators of the potential success of this agent to achieve our goal.

Although a complex man to manage operationally because of his own background and the mix of his ideological and professional motivations, QRPHONE/1's intelligence and personality are such as to well equip him to meet the challenge of the tests the Chinese are likely to throw his way. He is based in England, as is his case officer, and operational meetings are held in secure safe sites, sometimes on the continent.

QRPHONE/1 has produced numerous intelligence reports on communist and radical targets in addition to his covert action functions as a journalist and author. His long-term tenure with the Agency will be determined in part by the degree of success of his new Chicom directions.

201

SECRET/RYBAT

1 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with QRPHONE/1

1. On 24 July 1972, Andy Ness (in alias as Andy), Frank Falko (in alias as Frank) and the undersigned (in alias as Ken) converged on the OTR safesite in New York City to meet with QRPHONE/1 in order to debrief him on his trip through WOCORK.

2. The discussion was started by having QRPHONE relate the details of his trip on a city by city basis describing the people he met and his reception by them. It should be noted here that several of the individuals that QRPHONE was to have seen were out of town or unavailable, however, QRPHONE will correspond with these individuals in order to maintain his relationship with them.

NEWARK

QRPHONE met with Leibel Bergman at his home and stayed overnight (14-15 July) as his guest. QRPHONE told Bergman that he had decided to make a full-time commitment to the study of Marxist-Leninist (M-L) doctrine in order to become more proficient in M-L theory and would like to join the RU to further this ambition. Bergman's reaction, according to QRPHONE, was enthusiastic. Bergman gave QRPHONE some M-L literature (which was the same as the literature Andy gave him several weeks ago to study) which he felt would be helpful. Bergman stated that if QRPHONE was really interested in becoming involved in the M-L movement he should return to WOCORK because that "was where all the inconsistencies were." Bergman invited QRPHONE to

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
approval of DCI
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

CLASSIFIED BY

SECRET/RYBAT

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

QRPHONE 201

take part in some M-L study groups but didn't say what exactly would be studied. The following are some general comments QRPHONE provided about Bergman. Bergman doesn't like Newark, he has been mugged several times and would like to go back to California; however, that is not possible at this time, so Bergman will instead move to New York City. Bergman is pleased with the current development of the RU. He said that the recent trip to China by several RU members was successful and that the trip had been pleasant for them. QRPHONE commented that it appears that Bergman does not have the same control of the RU that he formerly had, although he is regarded as the "guru" of the RU.

NEW YORK

QRPHONE said that Richard Ward is attempting to sell the English language rights of Prince Sihanouk's book My War With the CIA. Ward had been trying to get Lyle Stuart to purchase the rights but Stuart's antipathy toward Wilfred Burchett, "that old Communist" according to Stuart, was too great. Burchett apparently wrote the forward and Stuart doesn't want to publish anything with his name on it. QRPHONE, in our presence, called Stuart and convinced him to at least read the manuscript of the book before he turned it down. Ward has a South Vietnamese student living with him as a combination houseboy/companion. This student, whose name is David Truong, is the son of the South Vietnamese presidential candidate Truong Dinh Dzu, who ran in the 1967 South Vietnames election on a peace platform and who is now in prison. QRPHONE said that this student has amassed a large collection of books on intelligence, that the books are expensive and that he doesn't have any idea where the money to buy the books came from. He also said he doesn't think Truong has immigration papers to stay in WOCORK legally. I asked if Truong was in any way involved with the recent attempt to hijack a plane to Hanoi. QRPHONE stated that Truong knew the hijackers and might have known something about the attempted hijacking because the hijackers had also stayed at Ward's apartment.

Ward is going to France soon for a vacation with a girlfriend he refused to identify because he feels his apartment and phones are bugged "by at least ten intelligence agencies." Before he goes on vacation he intends to stop in Paris and meet with DRV and PRG officials as well as with Wilfred Burchett. (Ward also met with Jane Fonda prior to her recent trip to the DRV). Ward will try to visit QRPHONE in London sometime in September before he returns home. Ward claimed that a "wealthy benefactor" gave him some $1000 to cover the cost of his vacation. Ward himself is broke and makes only about $60 per week salary.

DETROIT

QRPHONE was unable to see Milton Henry, leader of the New Republic of Africa, who was on vacation in Japan. He did manage to see FNU Boggs, who is apparently no longer involved with radical organizations but who is acting as a clearinghouse for black and white radicals. QRPHONE characterized Boggs as less doctrinaire and less dogmatic than he had been in the past. Boggs' feeling about the black radical movement is that it is in considerable disarray.

CHICAGO

QRPHONE saw LPWEAKLY/1 who told him that he was trying to get an invitation to visit China. LPWEAKLY/1 told QRPHONE that if he went he would see about taking him along. This was the first that QRPHONE knew about LPWEAKLY/1's plans. QRPHONE was unable to see either Sidney Lens or Hal Block because they were out of town. He did corroborate the fact that Block had recently been to China. QRPHONE spent some time with Don Wright, who was a member of the RU delegation to China. Wright is now a full-time RU official responsible for organizing RU cells in the Mid-West and seems committed to revolution although he doesn't speak in M-L terminology. Wright stated that one problem now facing the RU involves national exposure, i.e., getting minorities to become involved with the RU. This is a change from past RU philosophy which was that minority groups should form their own organizations separate from the RU. QRPHONE said Wright is very bitter toward the Black Panther movement and thinks that Eldridge Cleaver is "bad" and that Huey Newton and Bobby Seale are "corrupt".

SAN FRANCISCO

In San Francisco QRPHONE stayed with Davida Fineman. The mysterious M, who appeared in several of her letters to QRPHONE, is Martin Nichols, a Marxist scholar of note who translated into the English the entire Fundamentals of Political Economy. He was once a member of the RU.

Emotionally, Davida is not as depressed as she was several months ago, even though her brief exposure to the world of labor union organizing was a failure. Her comments about the RU were to condemn the Bruce Franklin group (Venceramos Organization) which she said is going to bring disaster to the whole RU because of its predilection for violence before the groundwork for revolution has been laid. Fineman feels that Robert Avakian, a high RU official, is less wild and erratic than in the past and has in fact become a good M-L.

QRPHONE saw Paul Richards, Hodee Edwards' son-in-law. Richards is a former CP member from the Mid-West, which he left because of the people. He feels that the Mid-West is a part of the country where the Government ought to test nuclear warheads. QRPHONE also met with Earl and Lee Rose. Earl was in the RU delegation to China where he must have caused some embarrassment to the delegation by his naivete. He attempted to meet African revolutionaries, particularly members of the MPLA, which he didn't realize were Moscow-oriented. Rose asked QRPHONE to write and send him material on the various African liberation movements. Lee Rose works for Bell Telephone Company although Earl, her husband, is unemployed.

ATLANTA

QRPHONE went to the Martin Luther King Center for Social Change, formerly the Martin Luther King Foundation, where he met with Tom Porter, the head staffer of the organization. There was recently a split in the Center and the Executive Director, a Dr. Scott, was forced out of office. The office is still vacant and, according to Porter, will remain so for the immediate future. The reason for the continued vacancy is apparently to allow Coretta King and other members of the Board of Directors to maintain direct control. Porter is a former writer for Freedom Ways Magazine. QRPHONE said that Porter knew of him but didn't say exactly how. QRPHONE told Porter he would consider writing a brief on the Center for LPWEAKLY. QRPHONE said that the Center is going to establish a foreign affairs staff which will be headed by Jack O'Dell, an old CP member.

3. After QRPHONE's discourse on his trip, Andy discussed in broad terms what he could expect in the next year with regard to securing entre to the Chinese. QRPHONE was told that once he was proficient in M-L he would be expected to go out and test his knowledge with various individuals and organizations in order to gain access and become known to the Chinese. Andy emphasized it wouldn't be easy, that QRPHONE would have to be diligent and patient, but that in the end, if he was successful, the benefits would be many. QRPHONE accepted this.

Kenneth Rosen
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/KRosen:ckj (1 August 1972)

Distribution:
Orig. - routed to AC/CA/B3
1 - AC/CA/B3
1 - CA/B3

Phon 201

TSD/BAB MEMO #275-72
20 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rod Sweet, Chief CA-3

ATTENTION : Mr. Ken Rosen, Rm 3D18

SUBJECT : ORPHONE/1

1. Attached is the psychological assessment of ORPHONE/1. A preliminary verbal read-out was given on 7 July in which it was stated that Subject was an emotionally stable individual. We still support this statement, but a more in-depth analysis revealed there are certain aspects of his personality that are susceptible. These are discussed in the report. If any part of the report is unclear or requires further discussion, please contact us. Meanwhile, we would appreciate receiving follow-up information on Subject's performance in order to help us refine and improve our methods of assessment.

James M. Keehner
TSD/BAB

Attachment:
Report

Direct Psychological Assessment
of
ORPHONE/1

The psychological evaluation consisted of an extended interview and the JBMINIMUM test. His intelligence as measured by the JBMINIMUM is within the Bright Normal range by U.S. standards. The test scores were not as high as would be expected in comparison to his behavior and life style. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that he suffers from inferiority feelings and is working overtime to compensate. He gets considerable satisfaction and mileage out of his authorship; however, it takes a great deal of his energy in order to discipline himself enough to write a book. His talents are much more in the field of journalism. Mentally alert and very perceptive, he is aware of what is happening around him. These same traits would serve him well as an access agent. However, his reporting may reflect some distortions because his memory is not strong, and he tends to remember those events that are of interest to him. He naturally has good manual-manipulative skills, plus a practical bent that should enable him to easily and effectively learn and carry out tradecraft techniques.

Emotionally, Subject is fickle. "Out-of-sight - out of mind," describes the way he relates to others. The reason for this is that one of his primary needs is to be accepted and liked. Most of his life has been spent seeking acceptance, and because he is emotionally dependent he rapidly and intensely becomes involved. If separated from someone with whom he is involved, he has difficulty maintaining loyalty, and begins to look for another way to satisfy his needs.

An important fact which his case officer should remember is that he is not motivated by an ideology, but rather by the person who represents a particular ideology. His relationship with his case officer is of prime importance. To ensure his loyalty to the organization and consistent performance, he will need intense handling. The problem is that he may balk since he resists authority. He has the tendency to think that he knows it all, as witnessed by his never completing a degree.

Subject is not by nature a role player, and it would not be operationally advantageous to have him switch roles, for he cannot psychologically handle role playing over a period of time. He has worked hard to establish an identity for himself, and could not cope as effectively with a new one.

Conclusion:

Subject is a bright, extremely ambitious, and aggressive individual who appears to be motivated to work for the Agency by three needs: 1) a need to be accepted and liked; 2) a materialistic need; and 3) as a vehicle to be vindictive to former loyalties, i.e., the far left or radical movement in this country.

Though he is capable of switching loyalties, and his life history attests to this fact, it is very difficult to predict his future behavior since so much depends on his life circumstances. One statement that can be made is that, given his personality, it is very doubtful if he would return to his former allegiances. But if not personally involved with someone from this agency who can give him acceptance and support, he is likely to look elsewhere for his need satisfactions.

PAS Formula: 14(E+u+c Rc+c+ Uoo)L+

I HIGH (Digit Span) Low E

INTERNALIZER	EXTERNALIZER
Self Contained	Responsive, reactive
Inner Directed	Outer Directed
Physically Inactive, contemplative	Physically Active, relating
Values ideas, symbols	Practical, concrete, realistic

R HIGH Block Design LOW F

REGULATED	FLEXIBLE
Organized	Loose
Focused	Diffuse attention
Persistent	High imagination
Rote learning	Trial and error
Emotionally insulated	Spontaneous, expressive, sensitive
Memory good for procedures and routines	Memory good for feelings and impressions

A HIGH (Picture Arrangement) LOW U.

Role ADAPTIVE	Role UNIFORM
Versatile role player	Limited role player
Socially responsive and suggestible	Socially guarded and negativistic
Socially imitative	Often ignored
Reflects group behavior	Socially specialized or stereotyped
Overestimated	Often in conflict with group behavior
	Underestimated

OS 0257-72

SECRET

17 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff
ATTENTION: Mr. Jim Anthony

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRPHONE/1, Training Program "SHAW"

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of Training, From Chief, Covert Action Staff, dated 23 May 1972; Subject: "Covert Training for QRPHONE/1"

1. QRPHONE/1 was trained covertly in New York from 22 June to 14 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty-seven training hours.

2. This was a happy reunion of trainee and instructor. Less than two years ago, PHONE was given three days of reports training (Please see Completion of Training Report dated 19 October 1970). Just as then, PHONE was totally engrossed in every training session from the moment of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the instructor does not eat lunch, PHONE brought a sandwich with him daily and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every minute of every day was made to count.

3. The only time lost was three hours for JBMINIMUM and on the several phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, these calls took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.

4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion, everyday, of his free time with the result that he could not do any casing to speak of for subsequent preparation of commo plans for exercises. For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop commo plans, he was not able to come up with anything till the last week -- and then with only one written one and one that he reviewed orally. As a result he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of his countersurveillance exercises and one of his agent developmental exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time out during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.

5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother. He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E. O. 11652, E.O. [illegible] CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
by authority
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

On Tuesday, July 4th, his publisher appointed him baby sitter for the publisher's teen age son and there went any hope of getting any casing done that day. At least one time, he mentioned that he did not go to bed till two that morning and as he had left the afternoon before, he had stated that he had meetings starting at four-thirty that afternoon. With all that, he nevertheless was fully alert and attentive every minute of every training session.

6. In his developmental recruitment series of exercises, his instructor played the role of operations officer -- and a real dumb-dumb he was. In such circumstances, PHONE had to do all the thinking, all the planning, all the casing for meeting sites, all the analyzing, all the preparing and pointing for the recruitment. It was pure joy to watch this man, after each meeting and again before the next one, go to work on the problem. He knew where he was, knew where he wanted to go, knew how to get there. When Mr. Rod Sweet, during the critique at the end of the series of exercises said: "He did a beautiful job," PHONE had earned that accolade all by himself. The instructor's only contribution had been in the teaching of the subject of Agent Acquisition.

7. At this point, the instructor wishes to execute a low bow in the direction of Mr. Sweet: He played his agent role excellently well and made the exercise a meaningful one for PHONE. The three trips to New York by Mr. Sweet must have been very taxing, particularly in view of his immediately upcoming TDY trip, but they were efforts well spent.

8. No man, of course, is perfect. Each has an Achilles heel, a weakness, or an all-too-human trait, at the very least. Our PHONE has his. He has a very quick mind. He knows it. And knowing it, he relies on it, counts on it. This, in turn, leads to a small failure in self-discipline. For example, told to write out his plan for the recruitment pitch, he came in with six words (maybe not that many) scratched on a 3 by 5 leaf torn out of his pocket notebook. He then proceeded, from these few words, to run off his plan without a single pause for an uh, hm, er, etc. It was as though he was reading a definition from a dictionary, so smoothly did his mind and thoughts run. He prepares everything in his mind, it appears, and does not like to write out that which he feels he should not have to write out. While it is great to have so facile a mind, a bit of discipline, to write out in full so important an act as a recuritment pitch, might one day save grief when an error would have been spotted had the entire plan been written out then looked over for possible flaws.

9. This small flaw, the instructor feels, accounts in considerable measure for PHONE's failure to bring in a written dead drop plan till the last days of the program. PHONE felt he could just as easily report orally. In fact, the other dead drop (he had been asked to do two) on which he reported orally, he discussed as though the peper was in front of him and he was reading from it. Nothing was missing -- area

description, access, hours of availability, the opposition, pros and cons as to suitability -- it was all there. He just didn't like to write out that upon which he could report orally.

10. In writing reports on the two counter-surveillance exercises, he dashed those off in jig time. No pause for thinking, no pause to look up at the ceiling or out the window. Just straight writing, including paragraphing. Mind and pen were as one. Same thing for his oral analysis before and after each meeting -- no pause to think, to review, to reconstruct, to remember -- just an IBM-type printout.

11. The instructor sets down this reluctance on our hero's part to write out certain things, not to downgrade him, but to alert desk and field officers that if they must have a certain report by a certain time, and they want it in writing, they must be firm. For example, after the second meeting in the developmental series, the instructor said: "I must have that report first thing in the morning. Do you want to take time out from this afternoon's training session to do it?" And, as already reported above, PHONE preferred to save the training time and he answered "I will make time to write it". In this case, time was of the essence because Mr. Sweet had to see the report before the next meeting. To sum up this item: When PHONE feels that an oral report is adequate he finds it a little difficult to bring himself to find time to make a written report. Told definitely that he must write a report and given a deadline, he meets the deadline and the report is everything it should be.

12. His reports on his recruitment meetings, Mr. Sweet said, were excellent. No jumping to conclusions, no padding, no misinterpretations, no omissions.

13. The surveillance team captain, reading PHONE's report on his actions during the countersurveillance exercises, marvelled at the completeness, total accuracy of description of the surveillants PHONE had made, including their ages (but always made each man an inch or two shorter than the actual height -- which PHONE admitted he does constantly), and the total recall of every move, every street crossing, every compass direction. (In the first countersurveillance exercise, sprung on PHONE without a moment's prior notice, he made one of his two surveillants. In the second one, with plenty of time to prepare, he made all three of them. These were two different teams from the New York Office of Security). Concluding his admiration of PHONE's reporting, the surveillance team captain said to the instructor: "You should be very proud of him".

14. In both exercises, the surveillance teams criticized the rapidity of PHONE's movements. He walks very rapidly from place to place, then spends time to browse in a book shop. Then off again at a high rate of speed to his next stop. They also criticized his looking both ways while crossing a one way street. They felt it made him appear

tail conscious. These are a typical New Yorker's habits. The instructor, also a New Yorker, is guilty of the identical actions. We are highly kinetic in our movements and as for looking both ways while crossing a one-way street, we follow the old Marine Corps adage: "There's always one S.O.B. that doesn't get the word". By sheerest coincidence, when the instructor was on his way to the safesite to deliver the surveillance team's report, he violated his own rule of looking both ways in crossing a one-way street and was bowled over by a hippie on a loaded bike -- going the wrong way. Only the large heavy film case the instructor was carrying kept him from being knocked flat.

15. Nevertheless, PHONE is now fully cognizant of the appearance that his actions create and will watch it in the future.

16. One last note on the counter-surveillance exercises: He chose his positions well and he camouflaged his actions beautifully. One example: The instructor called the surveillance team for a quick feedback on the first exercise and caught the men just as they returned to their office. They got on different phones for a three way conversation. They reported one incident as follows: "So rapid were PHONE's movements, that when he met a friend of his, he hardly paused to speak with him, just waved him off". The second surveillant: "No, it didn't look like that at all, to me. To me it looked like this Indian-looking person stopped PHONE and asked him for directions and PHONE gave them and just went about his business". PHONE's own report, which he wrote up before he learned about the two different interpretations of the incident: "--- where I stopped a foreign-looking man, apparently Indian in origin and asked him for the Museum which I knew perfectly well is on 55th Street. I turned around as he pointed south to 55th Street and spotted the same man in the grey suit, now holding his hat in his hand".

17. In the second exercise, there were two items of note: One, the team was surprised to note in PHONE's report that PHONE even had the name of the book that the surveillant picked up when he followed PHONE into a book store. Second, when the exercise was over, the team compared notes and decided that PHONE may have made two of them but could not possibly have made the third man. The team captain, on reading PHONE's report, was stunned to see that PHONE had indeed made the third man also, but good.

18. PHONE had an elicitation exercise (in addition to the developmental acquisition series) with Mr. Harry Webster, an instructor in the New York office. After relating the fine job that PHONE had done, Mr. Webster's report concluded: "A first rate performance by PHONE, who's obviously been around -- both coverwise and for real".

19. His choice of meeting places with his agent could not be faulted. For one, he chose an East Side restaurant (where diplomants, as Mr. Sweet held himself out to be, would properly be seen dining).

Yet it was far enough away from the United Nations building to lessen the chances that PHONE himself and his putative diplomat target would be spotted by friends or acquaintances. His choice for the next meeting was at an impressively named new restaurant near the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts on the West Side of town. This restaurant was located in the safesite complex. He was thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the safesite from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

20. He did very well in executing two recognition meetings and two brush passes. He had no time to write his own commo exercises (as stated, he was able to write up only one dead drop commo plan) so he was given commo plans written up by another trainee. To give him variety, he was alternately the higher and the lower echelon, alternately accepted and made the hand-off.

21. In operational and intel reports, he did very well. He very successfully separated the operational from the intel info and the source comments from the positive intelligence.

22. Instructor's Observation: PHONE is a proud man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure genius. This, like the previous item, is noted not to down-grade PHONE, but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WOMOLD/QRPHONE/1/SHAW. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

CALEB L. BATTEN
DC/OS/ALT/TR

Originated by:
Aristides G. Lazarus

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 10 March 1972

TO:
☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Ann Jane Long
CA/B3

SUBJECT: *(true name)* Richard Thomas Gibson

PROJECT: QRPHONE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA, OR ALIASES: QRPHONE/1

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-306052

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SPECIFY)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B
☐	SECURITY AND RELIABILITY DETERMINATION		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: International

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE: See PRQ Part II, page 3, Section VI, 4 and 5.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM? ~~OS [illegible]~~ Identified but ~~subject doubtless~~ suspects CIA	X	
E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. No FBI - All info from them has been received and reviewed.		
F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.		

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY: See Memorandum dated 15 February 1966

5. PRQ STATUS

☒ PRQ I OR BIO DATA IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED Updated
☒ PRQ II OR EQUIVALENT WILL BE FORWARDED PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF POA. 1 COPY Updated

6. R.I. TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT

☐ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☐ NON-DEROGATORY ☐ DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT previously sent

☐ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☐ NON-DEROGATORY ☐ DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

*8. FIELD TRACES ** NA previously sent

☐ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☐ NON-DEROGATORY ☐ DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

9. CRS/ISG ** NA

☐ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☐ NON-DEROGATORY ☐ DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

SPECIAL CHECK NSA INDICES — 10. FI/D ** — CS REFS TO FI/D (BR. FILES)

☐ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☐ NON-DEROGATORY ☐ DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

*LIST AREAS CHECKED — **IF NOT CHECKED - WHY? ☐ NOT APPLICABLE ☐ OTHER *(EXPLAIN)*

Comint no additional since last check 1966

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: Roderick I. Sweet

EXTENSION: 1055

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF:

FORM 3-71 772 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-306052

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO PRQ PART I

Name: Richard Thomas Gibson

DPOB: 13 May 1931 Los Angeles, California

Section II, 12

Present Residence: 32 Hartswood Road
Stanford Brook, London W. 12 (owner)

Section X

Monique Gibson Female Born 1966 U.K. U S. Citizen

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.

2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.

3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.

4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.

5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM

QRPHONE/1 formerly QREBONY/1

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I **CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT**

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

No change

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM. See previous Part II

Yes To any Case Officer introduced to him by RODIGAST, or Aaron C. LAGINESTRA.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN. See Previous Part II

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA known to Subject as "Mike"
Louise R. CONGREVE " " " " "Louise Chapman"
XXXXX
Isabelle R. PRIMMI " " " " "Ann"
Howell D. KAMMERMAYER " " " " "Jim"
Marie M. LUEBBERT " " " " "Pat"

FORM 11-60 1050a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-20)

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")* See Previous PRQ Part II

This image of BKTRUST as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in QRPHONE/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of BKTRUST and of the importance of his contribution to the XXXXX BKTRUST EFFORT. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case,

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

QRPHONE/1 is dependent upon a BKTRUST salary and has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. QRPHONE/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and RODIGAST use a journalist/literary agent cover in the unlikely event their clandestine meetings are compromised. Other officers will use cover of both being Americans in a foreign country.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Freelancexx jornalist, authero, and as a sympathetic leftist

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

BKTRUST

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

No change from previous PRQ Part II

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

None

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

See Previous PRQ Part II

Reporting Instruction with emphasis on spotting and assessment reports 14-16 Oct. 197

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

No change

PRQ PART II

QRPHONE/1

SECTION II Motivation and Control

1. but every one of the wild anti-BKTRUST stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

Having accepted BKTRUST employment for a combination of reasons, it must be added that QRPHONE/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

QRPHONE/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. BKTRUST has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

SECRET

SECTION VI — **OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT**

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

No Change

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

No Change

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Nothing

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES. Subject will operate under free lance journalist cover and as a sympathetic leftist to develop contacts in the target milieu of Afro-Asian radical, pro-commie groups and solicit information from them on their activity, plans and views. Subject will also contact, assess recruit and possibly handle assets in these groups. In pursuit of operational objectives, he may be required to join a radical organization and/or travel to Bloc countries.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

No PM duties or use are anticipated. Selective CA exploitation within his cover situation - i.e. as a provacateur or means to surface anti-Soviet material from a "National Liberation" standpoint - will be continually possible.

SECTION VII — **PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY**

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

None

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

SECTION VIII — **AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT**

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT; I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject has MOA providing for salary of $950.00 per month, (tax free), reimbursement for operational expenses and travel unless these are paid by other sources.

SECRET

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

None known

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject speaks fluent but foreign-accented French. He has a functional speaking command of Spanish and Italian and can read German. Except for his language, he could pass as an Algerian.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Research, files,correspondence and assessment by previous case officers

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

None anticipated

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

SGSWIRL EXAMINATION OF SUBJECT on 21 September 1970 (no deception reported).

DATE 10 March 1972	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

7 MAR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT: Review of Project QRPHONE

1. A review in some depth of Project QRPHONE was conducted in January 1972 by DC/CA and me with Branch 3 personnel, with the participation of Richard Berkey (now of Branch 4, formerly QRPHONE Case Officer at LCPIPIT). Attached at Tab A are the questions which formed the basis for the review. A full record of the responses to these questions and the review discussion is not practical so I have attempted below to summarize the general conclusions which emerged. Attached at Tab B are two charts prepared by Branch 3 for the review plus a rough draft "CI Assessment" which they also prepared.

2. FI and CA/ Excluding FBI Sensitive Reports, QRPHONE dropped from 157 reports in FY 1968 to 6 reports in FY 1971. His FI reports have evidently not been used as a basis for CA activities since 1967. This situation is apparently due to a variety of factors: the character of the man himself, restrictions placed upon him, a changing political context which compounded targetting difficulties, the complications of his own security situation, and the method by which he was handled. It was agreed that QRPHONE does have inherent skills which should have an application to either FI or CA work. He is politically attuned; he writes well; he can handle contacts in several languages; he knows how to move internationally; he has an engaging social personality; he has an established (if controversial) reputation as a left-oriented journalist/writer with some scholastic credentials. The problem remains one of focussing his talents and determining the platform from which he should operate.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

3. Mobility. QRPHONE can be viewed as essentially possess mobility and has expressed a willingness to move. There are, however, qualifications on this. He small children and an unwitting, anti-US, white, English wife, who would only be willing to leave her England if the overt job to which QRPHONE was going was clearly a step upward in his career.

4. Handling. The method by which QRPHONE has been handled, i.e. mainly through Rodigast (although there has been direct LCPIPIT contact recently), is unnessarily cumbersome and not suited to the close consultation needed to explore QRPHONE's future directions. Having been declared to the British Services the most secure place to meet QRPHONE is in the UK and he should be handled directly by an LCPIPIT officer.

5. Security. QRPHONE cannot escape the record of allegations that he is Agency-connected. What he can do, however, is face-up to these charges, challenge them and deny them. There may thus always be some element of suspicion attached to him, but, as time passes without definite proof of such a connection, its impact on his activities may be minimized and he may be able to engage in effective work inspite of it.

6. Sub-agents. It was felt that QRPHONE may possibly have a flair for recruiting and handling sub-agents. It was believed that this should be explored and that he should be given relevant training, based in New York. This would also provide the opportunity for Headquarters exploration with him of his future development.

7. Future Focus. What QRPHONE's own thoughts might be on his most natural course of development are not clear. He may have an inclination toward African Liberation Movements—the subject of his most recent major writing—but it could be questioned whether on this or on anti-fedayeen work, there is sufficient Agency interest to merit such focus. He has no significant base in the American black community (rather the contrary) which would make him of interest to others on this basis. His overt political orientation is described

as "radical," but it is an intellectual "radicalism," not revolutionary. Further, he is basically a theoretician not a personal activist by nature. He might be asked and might undertake an activist role--but it is felt that it would not sit naturally upon him and would probably not achieve whatever access might have been postulated. Within his theoretician, non-activist context it was nevertheless felt that the probably-to-be-expanded field of Chinese Communist activities in Europe provided the focus which might most usefully be explored. The expansion of Chinese Communist activities in Europe may come quite slowly but, in view of the probable shortage of assets in this field, it was a matter on which we should have some patience. It is also a field which could be explored without QRPHONE's needing to move. Whether he focusses on this field or another, however, QRPHONE needs to develop some job or organizational base which will make him interesting as a target himself to those we wish to focus him on. At the present time his cover does not provide a power or influence base and he is essentially completely dependent upon us.

8. CA Staff Termination/Redirection Responsibility. It was felt that in this process of redirection of QRPHONE, CA Staff should retain responsibility for QRPHONE. Even if a London-based assignment did not work out and it was decided to move QRPHONE to another area CA Staff should keep the project during the trial period and with this the responsibility for termination if the trial proved unsuccessful. If the trial was successful, on the other hand, then we would have discharged our responsibility for QRPHONE and could relinquish control.

9. Some time has passed since the above discussions took place. I am not aware of the extent to which there may already have been a follow-up to them. Needless to say, they have decided field implications in which LCPIPIT needs to be consulted, should they be pursued.

James E. Knott
Programs Officer
Covert Action Staff

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - ADC/CA
1 - C/CA/B3
1 - CA/B3-Sweet
1 - CA/B4-Berkey
2 - CA/PO

AGENT EVALUATION

NAME: QRPHONE/1

DATE: 18 January 1971

PROJECT: QRPHONE

STATUS: Contract Agent (Under a Memorandum of Oral Agreement)

OVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: International correspondent for "Sunday supplement" type color magazine distributed by twenty major newspapers in the U.S. Also represents owner of this color magazine in other of his business ventures in Europe. This overt job was assumed in December 1970. Prior to that, Q/1 was the London representative of small U.S. news service. Q/1 does free lance journalism and is an occasional contributor to several magazines and newspapers.

COVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: Singleton agent targeted at the radical left, including Maoist, African liberation, and Palestinian groups. Q/1's access derives from his many contacts in these circles.

PERFORMANCE OF COVERT DUTIES: Q/1 continues to perform well and without posing problems for his handler. His personality is easy-going and his attitude positive. If his efforts are not always totally successful -- leaving us with tantalizing bits of information and many unanswered questions -- this is generally due to operational circumstances in which he was simply unable to elicit more information on a given subject.

PERFORMANCE OF OVERT DUTIES: Q/1 does a solid and workmanlike job as a journalist. He has acquitted himself well both as a representative of his cover firm and in his free lance activity. Occasional prompting on this subject produces added effort and in this connection the operation profits particularly from the energy and knowledge of the deep-cover agent handler who himself has faced similar cover demands over many years.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: QRPHONE/1's attitude is positive. (See below under Motivation.)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COVER EMPLOYER: Q/1's attitude is good. He has made an effort to discharge his part of the cover arrangement and to understand the weaknesses and problems which plagued his former cover organization. He is approaching his new cover arrangement with enthusiasm.

MOTIVATION IN ACCEPTING JKLANCE RELATIONSHIP: This is a subject on which a good deal has been said over the course of this operation. The following points can be made on the subject of Q/1's motivation:

A. His basic image of JKLANCE is positive.

B. This image of JKLANCE as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in Q/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of JKLANCE and of the importance of his contribution to the JKLANCE effort. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case, but every one of the wild anti-JKLANCE stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

C. In his political evolution over the years, Q/1 has become active in at least two "causes". In both instances he saw these causes undermined by petty jealousy and factional struggles and in both cases he was personally harmed as a result. The product of this situation has been a certain disillusionment with "causes" and a cynical political outlook. (In other circumstances this might be called political maturity.) Q/1 now tends to view political trends as a detached observer rather than a participant.

D. Following on the foregoing thought is the fact that he is an American (and does not consider himself disloyal). Given his citizenship and his disinclination to feel "involved" in the currents of the radical left, he has been perfectly willing to accept employment by JKLANCE to report on those currents. He does not give any indication that he views this as "squealing" on his friends -- indeed the contrary seems to be the case.

E. On a more mundane level, it must be realized that Q/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. He was without a job and was living off the charity of his wife's family. JKLANCE has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

F. Having accepted JKLANCE employment for a combination of the reasons set forth above, it must be added that Q/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

G. In assessing the relative importance of these several factors which make up Q/1's motivation, the undersigned would stress that C and E were probably the immediate causes of his acceptance of recruitment while A and D were more underlying. B and F have arisen since recruitment and probably play an important role in his current motivation.

WIFE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: Q/1's wife is not witting of his JKLANCE affiliation. She was allowed to believe that he was working indirectly for the Chinese. She certainly is aware of the past JKLANCE accusations which have been leveled at Q/1, but as far as Q/1 can determine (and this is not a subject on which he can come right out and ask a direct question) she continues to accept the Chinese story . It should be added that Mrs. Q/1 is British and is the holder of some rather typical "left" anti-JKLANCE attitudes. It should also be noted that the relationship between the two is fraught with a variety of problems thereby adding to the complexity of the situation. Certainly the whole subject of Q/1's activities is one which Mrs. Q/1 views with misgivings and which is simply not discussed -- lest it lead to acrimony. Mention should also be made that Mrs. Q/1 seems to accept as legitimate the small amount of money received from Q/1's cover and to regard this as a genuine stringer relationship.

RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING: QRPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and responds well to Case Officer handling. He is a most willing asset requiring no special handling care -- other than the normal professionalism expected in the handling of a sensitive asset such as Q/1.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE: Q/1 is willing to accept guidance and criticism -- provided it is constructive. If anything, he may sometimes be too willing. His willingness occasionally exceeds his sense of security and it then falls to his handler to bear in mind security and/or operational considerations which may affect his pursuit of a given target. However, this should not be over dramatized.

RESPONSIVENESS: Q/1 is most responsive to requirements levied upon him. In this connection it should be recalled that his ability to respond fully is usually restricted by the nature of his relationship with his informants; i.e., since he is only eliciting the information from unwitting informants he is rarely able to press for all the desired details.

JKLANCE CONTROL: Q/1 is dependent upon a JKLANCE salary and he has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. We hasten to add that Q/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

PERSONAL SECURITY: Q/1 has a good sense of personal security and his handler makes an effort to build upon this at every opportunity. As cited above, Q/1's enthusiasm sometimes leads to his failure to consider all aspects and implications of a given situation.

OTHER SECURITY AND COVER SITUATIONS: The past allegations of Q/1's affiliation with JKLANCE, many pre-dating his actual recruitment, add an extra dimension to Q/1's cover situation. We have no indication that any of these allegations are based on any proof, nor have they produced a significant reduction in his number of contacts.

ABILITY TO WORK WITHOUT SUPERVISION: Q/1 is a self-starter and can work well for extended periods without supervision.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS: Q/1 poses only a minimum administrative burden. He is not overly concerned about his administrative and financial position, allowances, payments, etc. He merely expects JKLANCE to do the fair thing by him. However, on the rare occasion when JKLANCE has failed to perform as he expected, he can be very upset.

REPORTING: Q/1 is a journalist by training. He is an effective reporter -- both in terms of ability to elicit and writing style.

PERSONAL ENERGY AND ENDURANCE: Q/1 is quite energetic and can continue his efforts on a sustained basis.

LANGUAGES: In addition to his (native) English, Q/1 can speak French, Italian and German. AND SPANISH

WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: Q/1 is quite willing to travel -- and even enjoys it!

AREA KNOWLEDGE: Q/1 is quite widely travelled in Europe and Africa and consequently has acquitted an extensive area knowledge.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ABILITY: Q/1's present operating context does not provide an adequate basis to evaluate these talents. It is assumed that he has a satisfactory competence in both these areas, however.

WEAKNESSES; PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL: Q/1 has no major weaknesses, either personal or professional which inhibit his operational use. The existence of his "reputation" as a JKLANCE asset -- which is believed by some and rejected by others of his contacts is a definite limitation on his employment.

CAREER POSSIBILITIES: Q/1 has mentioned to his handler that he hopes to be able to make a career of his relationship with JKLANCE. He enjoys the work and presumably the financial security. However, the combination of the security factors operative in this case and the unlikelihood of Q/1's continued access to targets of interest over a prolonged period argue against his being regarded as a career asset.

Aaron C Laginestra

AARON C. LAGINESTRA
FIELD CASE OFFICER

COMMENTS OF SUPERVISOR: This is another thoughtful evaluation of this agent, and reflects the views of the agent handler as well as of the Case Officer.

I doubt that we have really divined Q/1's motivations for working with JKLANCE, and this evaluation should be read as the best stab we can make at this enigmatic subject.

I disagree - I think we do know.

ADRIAN B. MASLOTT
CHIEF, LCPIPIT

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Rod Sweet
CA/B3

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 5 January 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DC/CA/B3		5 Jan		- I'm all for the long-range objective cited in attached - An assessment of [illegible] by Andy Hern, re [illegible] potential to become a permanent dialectician, will be of value
2.				
3. C/CA/B3		6 Jan	D	3-4 FYI - attached background info on QR Phase alternatives may be useful to you prior any 17 Jan. meeting this subject. DM
4. DC/CA/3		6 Jan		- I have been proposed to re-direct [illegible] to [illegible] & then East Africa. - A.
5. Rod Sw.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

5 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3

SUBJECT : Chicom Aspect of QRPHONE/1's Operational Potential

1. In continuing my efforts to probe operational areas for the redirection of QRPHONE/1, I talked at length on 3 January with his former case officer (Mr. Richard Berkey) and received a very favorable prognosis regarding QRPHONE/1's mobility (i.e. his possible move to another European city or to Africa), his agent recruiting capability (preceded by additional training), and the prospects of making himself attractive to the Chicoms (again preceded by appropriate training).

2. In pursuit of the latter item I talked at length today with Mr. Andrew Ness, the FE Division expert on long-range Chicom and CP penetration programs. I described in detail QRPHONE/1's background, current status, and the variety of plans we have in mind and received Ness' reactions as follows:

A. The butterfly characteristics that QRPHONE has demonstrated thus far will never result in his becoming of interest to either the Chicoms or the Soviets for any operationally meaningful purpose. While the Soviets would perhaps see him as potential FI source, the Chicoms would not even do that.

B. Chicom officers abroad are still totally obsessed with Communist doctrine and its strategic and tactical application to a degree significantly more zealous than their Soviet counterparts. Therefore, in looking at potential foreign assets the Chicoms discard persons of shallow substance as far as their knowledge of Communism is concerned. They are interested in only those who have a serious intellectual understanding of Communist doctrine and a serious revolutionary goal. The thousands of leftists of whatever coloring floating around Europe are seen as only of marginal use to the Chicoms and certainly not the sort that they would take into their confidence.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C. To become of long-term operational use to us in the sense of exploiting his possible long-term use to the Chicoms, QRPHONE/1 should do two things: join an existing "acceptable" organization such as the Trotskyite Party or a black radical party and, at the same time begin a serious study of Marxist/Maoist doctrine. As he gets into this program (preceded by some ten days training and close Headquarters direction) he should begin to seek out Communist intellectuals, party members, leaders of radical groups, etc., to ask questions about the dialectic, seek additional guidance, borrow books and so forth. In doing this he will in time come into the attention of the professional spotters the Chicoms have and begin to develop the sort of bona fides that the Chicoms, in time, will find appealing. He should also in this period seek out Chicom officials with the same requests for help. The key here is to demonstrate not that QRPHONE/1 is simply sympathetic, with Maoism or any other Communist shading but that he is a dedicated serious revolutionary.

D. A quicker way to come into the Chicom spotlight might be for QRPHONE/1 to join the Black Panthers, the SDS or one of the other radical groups with which the Chicoms are already known to be in touch. He will obviously have to sweat out a period of probation in joining any such group until he divests himself of his tattered leftist reputation and those JKLANCE accusations. Ness feels that a successful passing of this baptismal period will depend solely on QRPHONE/1's willingness to plunge wholeheartedly into a serious study of the terribly boring and lengthy volumes of the dialectic. As he demonstrates his capability to move more deeply into this field to the satisfaction of the "spotters" he will be accordingly provided additional help and encouragement by Chicom contacts and officials.

E. The Chicoms will be looking at him as a possible asset in their long-range targetting of the American revolution, hence QRPHONE/1's utterances ought to be couched in terms of his ultimate aim of contributing to and participating in the American revolution. In other words the Chicoms would see little or no use for QRPHONE/1 operationally in Europe or Africa (just as we would assess and recruit a Thai for operations in Thailand, not in Nigeria).

F. Ness felt that should we pursue the above as a long-term operational goal for QRPHONE/1, the city in which this takes place is almost irrelevant. He could do it perhaps as well in an African setting as in Europe and his cover status i.e., with LPWEAKLY, really makes no difference because the Chicoms would test the fiber of the man himself and would not be deterred by his external trappings.

3. In answer to my question, Ness said he would be happy to meet with QRPHONE to assess his potential in this area and then, assuming we all decided to go ahead with such redirection, Ness could train him and guide him thoroughly enough to get him well on the track by spending some seven to ten days with him on a concentrated program.

Sweet

Roderick I. Sweet
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/RISweet:ckj (5 January 1972)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/CA/B3
2 - CA/B3

SECRET

28 DEC 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA Branch 3

SUBJECT: Review of Project QRPHONE

REFERENCE: My Memorandum, "Review and Planning," dated 23 November 1971

1. As stated in referenced memorandum we are beginning a review in depth of certain CA Staff projects. I propose to meet with you and relevant branch personnel to examine Project QRPHONE on or about 21 January 1972. Please advise me when the necessary preparations have been made for this review and we will fix a mutually convenient time.

2. Prior to our meeting, I request that the two charts of Part A of the attached listing be drawn up and copies sent to me and CA/PO. It is not necessary to prepare written responses to the questions posed in Part B of the attachment. These questions provide the basis for our oral review at the time the meeting is held.

Fred W. Valtin
Acting Chief
Covert Action Staff

CA-71-1369

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Donald W. Muntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION: 6053

NO.:

DATE: 17 DEC 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/CA		17	AF
2.			
3.			
4.			
5. DC/CA		27/12	TD
6.			
7. C/CA/B3		27/2	DM
8. Rod			
9. DC/CA/3			
10. C/CA/3			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

FYI.

7-8 — let's discuss

DM

Hold for

1-5, 7 In discussions with China Ops last week, I asked them to take a joint look with us in terms of possible attractiveness to CPR if, as I assume, they become more aggressive in Europe. Want to talk about this w/ me before my trip.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

17 DEC 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT: QRPHONE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Same Subject, Dated 29 November 1971

1. What follows below are some initial comments of mine on the referent memorandum, per your request. We really feel in Branch 3 that for a variety of reasons, we need more time to deliberate on QRPHONE's future operational activity than the previous two weeks. Partly this is due to extended absence by the case officer in charge who has been plagued with a recurring illness--I believe you are familiar with this. It is also in part attributable to the Section Chief's being new to the position and having his time absorbed by matters of current priority. So if you don't mind, we should like to address ourselves further to this subject following the Christmas holidays. At that time we should like to initiate some meetings on this matter both with yourself and with other area components including representatives from CI Staff.

2. Background: Your memo, of course, was triggered by an earlier one of mine which proposed that QRPHONE become operationally engaged in attempting to establish a black Communist cell in either Paris or Rome. The purpose of this would be twofold--namely, to exacerbate relations thereby between the Soviet Union and mainland China through various low-key covert action undertakings, and in the process to further enhance QRPHONE's own credentials as a Maoist activist. This tentative assignment, it should be noted, arose because Branch 3 personnel had become increasingly aware of the possibility that QRPHONE's project status might be terminated in the not too distant future. While it is true that in the immediate preceding month or so, we have benefited from his intelligence reporting, it is all too clear that over the past two years, he has been of diminishing utility to CA Staff and other area divisions. In discussing his future with his recent case officer, Miss Chatelan, her recommendation was that unless something could be found for him in the near future, we should give serious consideration to terminating

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

his services during the coming year. Thus my foregoing proposal arose from a desire on my part not to terminate an asset of proved capabilities without giving the agent in question suitable opportunity to become useful once more.

3. CI Type Review/QRPHONE Personal Security: Your memo makes out there have been frequent security reviews of QRPHONE's security status, and you question the efficacy of our doing still one more. On this let me point out that in making such a security assessment, we would be doing so in response to a current request by the area division concerned whose cooperation we need to direct this agent. One hardly needs stress that such a request probably should be honored in the interests of maintaining good relations even if its fulfillment means redundant work. But apart from this, the case officer also informs me that the case file does not contain any general summary of the alleged security breaches involving QRPHONE and their implications vis-a-vis his activities. It is true however that his security status has been reviewed for each annual project review and that assessments of his security status were made following each alleged breach, but no up-to-date summary exists. As for our own gut feelings on his personal security, one hazards that he is still in pretty good shape. I agree with you that many of the past charges leveled against him are of the same ilk as those leveled against other leftist colleagues(who do not have any Agency association) by their rivals. And as for the structure of his case officer relationship--that is, having him handled by a deep cover officer from an adjacent country--this would appear to be secure in the extreme (so much so that one would advocate that it be dropped due its operational inefficiency.)

4. Location: We tentatively agree that in all likelihood Paris should not be the venue for our proposed operational undertaking due the location of the Wright clan. Rome, however, might do very well. If not Rome, perhaps you or EUR Division might suggest another locale. As for the question as to whether or not the Rome station would want him permanently, only time and his own operational success could determine this. One hazards that if QRPHONE were able to make his way with some good local leftists and had promise of developing some kind of relationship with mainland China representatives, the station might come to regard him as a capital asset.

5. Substance: You noted that QRPHONE . . . "cannot just simply show up and start a leftist nuclei . . ." Why not? Others have. He is a well-known leftist in intellectual circles in Europe and has written many articles in praise of Mao. This should do for a start. As for what he might have to offer local leftists . . . money, energy and ideas will do. A great deal of money. of course, is unneeded, but some is. We can supply it. As for ideas and energy, he has both. Concerning the "built-in jealousy, animosity, etc." which such action would likely engender on the part of local rival leftists, this may or may not occur. But is this such a calamity if it should occur? Are not leftists usually fighting among themselves anyway? In any case, we have nothing to lose by trying to salvage this agent. What we have to lose by not trying is an agent asset of proved worth.

6. Credentials: You say in effect that QRPHONE has not been known as an activist but only as an intellectual. (Frankly, the distinction is not very important in my mind.) Be that as it may, he has written many articles on leftist subjects and has talked to innumerable leftists around Europe over the years. True, he has not been involved in such actions as street demonstrations, but we would not like him to be so personally involved in the future in any case. What we would want him to do is to write pamphlets, informally recruit associates to his group and provide a little money to the group as might be required for various undertakings. Aside from the organizing and funding, actually this is not very different from what he has been doing--except that it will be in one place for a change.

7. Book Dispatch Sale: You may be very correct in saying that shopping him around to European stations by book dispatch is a poor way to solicit useful tasks for QRPHONE. But again, I took my lead from C/EUR/CA who made a request along these lines. Certainly sending book dispatches wouldn't hurt any. If Spence is willing at some future time to visit various field stations and to attempt selling QRPHONE's services personally, we would be happy to have him do so. We, of course, don't know when he will be available to do so, and time is passing.

8. Concluding Comment: I really feel that we should relate to you in some detail the success which Andy Ness once had with the kind of undertaking which we have proposed for QRPHONE. It may interest you. On the other hand, it may be perfectly possible that the situation which Andy Ness once manipulated is not applicable to

the conditions which would confront QRPHONE in say Rome. But if we are not to channel his energies in this direction, it is incumbent upon us to think of something else for him to do before we begin thinking about writing him off. And so when you suggest that . . . "the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessment of the project. . ." I agree. And to this end, we should like a couple of weeks more before coming to you with some general conclusions of ours about the current viability of this case and some future alternative course of action.

Donald W. Muntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Roderick I. Sweet Branch 3 Covert Action Staff	EXTENSION 7767	NO.
		DATE 17 December 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CA/B3		13/1	D	
2. DC/CA/3			B	
3. Don			D	
4. Poo S.				
5. Jane				
6.				
7.				
8. Phone 201				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

1-4.
Ted has always taken a big interest in this case, and so he will have to be brought into the planning. This is of course a good idea — and your analysis of past failures is excellent. Providing AF is for it, we should give it major consideration. Let us not, however, wholly discard the home play just yet.

---

4 to 3 -
Returned per your request

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

17 December 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3

SUBJECT: Operational Redirection of QRPHONE/1

1. In response to your request that I examine the QRPHONE/1 project to determine how it might best be redirected in order to gain greater value for the time and money involved, I have talked at some length with appropriate officers in CI/SO and Africa Division. I have been advised that the primary reasons for QRPHONE/1's dwindling productivity are as follows:

A. Key centers of activity of the radical left in Europe are London, Paris, and Stockholm. For different reasons QRPHONE/1's access in these three capitals is either circumscribed or off target. The British have asked that he not operate in London against African targets. His reputation among much AOS target groups of interest to us in Paris and Stockholm has been so tarnished that he has not taken into their confidence significantly enough to be of value.

B. Although he has a multitude of contacts among the left, virtually all are shallow, periodic, and then very brief when they do occur. Even his correspondence to the more important radical leaders, which used to be quite informative, has fallen to almost nothing.

C. Because his contacts are so cursory, he has been unable to develop a close and continuing personal relationship with any one of them in order to develop the intimate confidence so necessary for operational exploitation.

D. His cover has always been thin and thus has circumstantially at least lent credence to the periodic allegations of his being a JKLANCE agent.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

E. Close case officer direction has been made very difficult because of the echelons existing between QRPHONE/1 and LCPIPIT, coupled with relative infrequency of field case officer meetings.

F. What contacts he has within the African target, for example, are rendered virtually useless because his case officers are unfamiliar on a timely basis with Africa Division requirements and also miss valuable operational leads simply because they do not recognize them. (This is no fault of the case officers because they obviously have little opportunity to keep abreast of such requirements.)

G. The somewhat artificial nature of his trying to portray a pro-Mao stance may help him a bit with targets similarly inclined but renders him ineffective with other political shadings among the left.

2. With all of the above in mind and without belaboring the history of this project, the following recommendation is offered and has been concurred in informally by CI/SO and Africa Division officers with whom I have talked.

A. Accepting the fact that QRPHONE/1's operational utility in Europe is minimal, I propose LCPIPIT be directed to begin making arrangements for his transfer PCS to Africa and, hence, his operational control transferred to Africa Division as soon as feasible.

B. From the point of view of MHCHAOS requirements and Africa Division's own requirements, both elements felt QRPHONE/1 could best be exploited in Tanzania. It is one of the two most active cities in Africa for the radical left, it is a hot-bed of both Soviet and Chicom shenanigans, and it is politically vital to East African stability.

C. However, because of QRPHONE/1's well-known association with two exiled Tanzanian opposition politicians in London and current reports that these oppositionists are plotting the overthrow of President Nyere (perhaps with Soviet assistance), it would be very imprudent for QRPHONE/1 to arrive bag and baggage in Dar es Salaam in the near future. Nyere and his police might well conclude that QRPHONE represents the advance probe of the coup plotters and promptly throw him into jail.

D. Both to give QRPHONE/1 time to cleanse his tattered image and because there are almost as important operational tasks in West Africa, the idea is to move him (1) to Nigeria or (2) to Ghana for perhaps a year. This is to be done in concert with a suitable strengthening of his cover (i.e. two or three more stringerships) and a concurrent mutation of his political posture to that of a plain old anti-imperialist rather than the more confining pro-Mao stance. He would be run directly by Lagos or Accra Station against local targets but with periodic trips to other parts of Africa for cover as well as operational purposes. Meantime, in the intervening months the dust may settle a bit in Tanzania, the close association with opposition elements would be allowed to fade and QRPHONE/1's writings and pronouncements concerning Tanzania would be calculatedly designed to support the Nyere government.

E. At the appropriate time, a year or so perhaps, he then moves PCS to Tanzania.

3. If you concur with the above, I will procede to staff this out more formally here at Headquarters and to advise LCPIPIT.

Sweet

Roderick I. Sweet
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/RSweet:ckj

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/CA/B3
2 - CA/B3

PROJECT QRPHONE

PART A. CHARTS REQUESTED

Chart I: For the period FY 1967 through FY 1971 provide the number of disseminated reports according to the subject field of the report. The headings would be: Fiscal Year, African Independance Movements, Anti-US Demonstrations, European Maoist Groups (etc., or whatever other subject fields you wish to set up).

Chart II: List the specific events or organizations against which covert action was in fact undertaken and give the number of QRPHONE reports which were submitted on such events/organizations.

PART B. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is the basic reason for this being a CA Staff project (other than history)? To provide multi-divisional tasking for FI purposes of general U.S. intelligence interest? To provide CA operational information for possible DDP use?

2. As regards FI reports, which have lately been described as being of only marginal interest, the main criticisms appear to be a lack of depth and detail. CA Staff's counter to this has been that QRPHONE goes as far as he can, and can go no further through elicitation. Have these depth/detail criticisms been valid? Is our defense valid, or could he reasonably be expected to elicit more depth and detail than he does?

3. If he can go no further through elicitation and we wish to keep him on the FI path, what is implied? That he develop and run agents himself? That he actually goes to work for an organization of intelligence interest to us? How realistic would either of these lines of pursuit be?

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

for Rod: this rough draft.

Draft.

CI Assessment

1958 Q/1 worked for Agence France Presse - Paris. He was discharged by AFP when Ollie Harrington (American negro) brought forgery charges against him. Q/1 sent to a weekly American publication and to to the British daily The Observer, over the signature of O. Harrington, xx xxx violently anti-French articles which were printed and counld have brought about the expulsion of author. William G. Smith (still in Paris), Richard Wright (deceased) widow still living in Paris and John Flint all took sides with Harrington.

2

30 July 1964. Accusations received from unidentified Americans, members of USA CP reportedly forward to Verges, editor of Revolution, certain documents which established Q/1 was working on behalf of CIA. This was because of fight over money that was due Q/1 and his wife. (Q/1 had his lawyer bring suit against Verges and finally in 1969 Verges agreed to pay certain amount and also an apology. This Q/1 can use to counteract the accusations by Verges.

Fall 1966 FBI Report: Source recently advised that during the Fall 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist Leninist Organization stated that Subject was suspected of being a spy for CIA. This person reported this to Rene Raindorf a member of the Jacques Grippa Pro Chinese Belgian CP.

June 1967: XXXXX FBI Report: GRIPPA and RAINDORF indicated to a member of an American pro-Chinese Communist organization that they thought highly of Q/1 and that they were of the belief he was doing a good job (in the cause of militant Marxism-Leninism).

March 1968: Stockholm. AFTONBLADET - Radical Social Democratic Daily 18 March 1968 published Photo and Biog Data on Q/1 in conjunction with story recent redefection American soldier Ray Jones implying Q/1 responsible in part Jones redefection.

Note: Bjorn Kumm, an Aftonbladet journalist who is a friend of Q/1's wrote himx a long ~~lxtter~~ and unsolicited letter the day following the appearance of the article in which he denounced his paper for libeling Q/1 and gave Q/1 advice on how to proceed to clear his name.

Stockholm. TIDSIGNAL / Radical Weekly - Also published article re Q/1. Bo Hammar editor of TIDSIGNAl is pro- Cuban. and [redacted] Q/1 loyal to Williams who is anti-Cuban. They oppose Q/1 for his pro-Chinese and anti-Cuban stance.

May 1969: ~~X~~ Report from Pretoria 6916 (in 49487) That Q/1 is now suspected widely of being both a CIA agent and a South African Intell contact.

Dec. 1969" Report from FBI: Source stated that he overheard Cleaver accuse Bon Wright from Chicago of being seen in company of Q/1 whom Cleaver characterized as a well known CIA agent. This was at the Algerian Congress - Palestine Dec. 1969.

Feb. ~~1969~~ 1970 SYNIC: a London publication of leftist orientation, carried an article mentioning Q/1 by name and stating that he is widely believed to be an CIA agent. (Two of the Four persons listed as contributons to SYNIC were at the Algiers Palestine Solidarity Meeting which Q/1 attended in Dec. 1969. They were members of the British delegation representing the Palestine ~~XXX~~ Solidarity Committee (PSC) which was a rival delegation to that led by A. Manchanda in which Q/1 sat. ~~This~~ ~~WX~~ Q/1 believes this story was printed in order to discredit the Manchanda-led Palestinian group which is in competition with the PSC.)

8 Feb. 1970: BEIRUT 6963 (IN 262712). Reliable Source reported that during his conversation with Ghassan KANAFANI, latter mentioned Q/1 and accused him of being a CIA agent. (Q/1 believes KANAFANI ~~picked~~ suspicion of Q/1 due to accusations against Q/1 spread in Beirut by Palestinian personalities who were formerly in London and who picked up story as result of accusation leveled against Q/1 in SYNIC.)

SECRET

QRPHONE REPORTING

	Cuban	AAPSO AAJA	African Liberation	War Crimes Tribunal	Anti-US	European Communism	FBI	FBI SR*	Total Dissems
FY67	3	5	13	27	12	24	22	-	106
FY68	1	3	24	32	27	27	43	30	187
FY69	1	-	12	-	17	10	2	43	85
FY70	-	-	13	-	-	9	-	9	31
FY71	1	-	1	-	1	3	-	31	37
	6	8	63	59	57	73	67	113	446

*Sensitive Reports

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Fred W. Valtin
Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 29 Nov 71

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CA		29	✓	
2.				
3. DC/CA		11/30	✓	
4. C/CA			✓	
5. Chief, CA/B-3		12/2	D	
6. DC/CA/B3			A	
7. Room 5				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

2-3
My real question is: Does this fellow really have it? Your comment in the 1st para under "credentials" seems to me about right. Who knows him personally besides Roddy?

He has it, but not (I think) for what has been proposed. Several of us here and in the field know him well.
FD

Pls. read, return to me. We will discuss answers
Don

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

29 November 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/B-3

SUBJECT: QRPHONE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Subject: QRPHONE Operations in Europe, Dated 24 November 1971

1. I made some notes in the margin of referent memorandum upon first reading it. However, since these are too brief, I thought it best to let you have my thoughts on this matter in fuller form.

2. As you may know, we had tried for years to give QRPHONE more meaningful assignments, but there are certain facts about him and the operation today which simply cannot be ignored. It seems to me that your memorandum takes inadequate account of these factors.

a. Security: RODIGAST's and QRPHONE's personal security cannot be faulted, in my judgment. However, that has not protected QRPHONE from accusations of being CIA, which have haunted him throughout the years. This is such an endemic charge in the milieu in which he operates that I feel certain he would have had the same charges leveled at him whether or not the Ollie Harrington incident had happened in Paris.

b. Location: Apart from the efficiency of the French police, there are a number of good reasons arguing against the desirability of QRPHONE's even going to Paris for a meeting, let alone being stationed there (e.g., protection of RODIGAST's identity, the Harrington incident, and the location there of the Wright clan). I cannot imagine why he would consider it, or why we should advocate it.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

A different cover for a move to Rome might be developed, but not that of a Maoist developing new cells. Rome Station is glad to have him come there and give them "grass roots" reports whenever he visits, but would they want him permanently??

c. Substance: More generally, QRPHONE cannot just simply show up and start forming nuclei -- there are already Maoist nuclei -- the various Marxist-Leninist parties (miniscule though they may be) that existed, and they continue to exist with or without Chinese help. If he were to have something to offer them -- money, preferably -- they might welcome him with open arms. Otherwise he will encounter built-in jealousy, animosity, rivalry, and a source of accusation all over again.

d. Credentials: As a Maoist intellectual (or an intellectual Maoist??), QRPHONE can travel all over. As a Maoist activist, he has only minimal credentials. The only group he is actively involved with is Manchanda's insignificant group -- and even with that he has never carried a placard, and I doubt if he has even helped them with making up a placard. He has helped them with their press releases, leaflets, etc. In short, with the written word, not the deed. By nature -- which we must also take into consideration -- QRPHONE is no longer a "doer" -- if he ever was one. And I doubt very much that he can at this stage in his life become a "doing" radical. We would be misusing his natural talents, which could still serve us well, in favor of dubious undertaking.

[illegible]

In effect, the proposal (if I read it correctly) is to have QRPHONE develop a group which would serve to distribute anti-Soviet material. I cannot judge if that would be worth the cost ($40,000??) to Rome, but I doubt it. I also do not know enough about the "Andy Ness" operation to comment on that aspect, particularly as to its feasibility in a sophisticated European community.

e. Book Dispatch Sale: Shopping him around to the European Stations is the wrong approach, in my judgment. In the first place, any Station likely to have a use for him is already extremely well up on QRPHONE's background. There are only three Stations really heavily involved in anti-CP ops (in which field I suppose this would fall), and those three have former CI/ICG men who know QRPHONE well: Breckenridge, Hornstein and Friend. QRPHONE has talents and abilities and weaknesses which can best be explained/sold in person, not through dispatch. I think, that the way to do it, if at all, is by Spence during a visit to these Stations.

f. "CI-Type" Review: A review of the file will show how often this has been done, and how thoroughly. (I can understand Horvath asking for a security review -- he had no background knowledge of the operation that would have given him this information.) I do not know what you now expect to find. In all frankness, and unless CI Staff feels the need for yet another review and is willing to undertake it, I would consider a Staff-internal review pretty much a waste of time.

3. Having gone around this problem several times in the past several years with CI Staff and the pertinent area divisions (as the files will clearly show), I am most doubtful that any of them will consider QRPHONE of sufficient interest (current or potential) to pay what it costs to maintain him. We may be able to justify it since we attempt (as no one area division would) -- and to some extent succeed -- to target him on a multi-divisional basis. In light of these considerations, and since I have developed serious reservations on the long range viability of this operation (in terms of the cost-effectiveness factor), I believe that the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessment of the project. After some internal discussions, this will also, of course, entail consultations with the CI Staff and at least three area divisions.

4. I will appreciate receiving your comments by mid-December.

Fred W. Valtin
Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee

SECRET

24 November 1971

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

SUBJECT: QRPHONE Operations in Europe

1. Mr. Leo Horvath, EUR/CA, and myself briefly discussed prospective QRPHONE operations on 8 November. During the discussion I outlined to him a general proposal which had been bruited about during my recent TDY at LCPIPIT in mid-October. In substance, this proposal was that following QRPHONE's forthcoming trips through Scandinavia and Africa, he then repair to either Rome or Paris for an extended period of time. In either of these locations he would then attempt to identify and to enlist the cooperation of various unwitting contacts in the left sector of the student and youth population, who could assume in time the trappings of a Maoist study group. QRPHONE would have excellent cover for doing so inasmuch as he is an established writer of the Maoist stripe. His relationship with these contacts or followers would not be set in the routine JKLANCE operational context. Rather, he would guide and motivate such contacts as would an alleged covert representative of a Maoist group, and would claim to have been a member of a larger such group say, in Britain. He would, of course, imply to his followers that he is attempting to develop a similar nucleus in (France) (Italy) or whenever, as good Communists should.

2. Operational activity would be of a twofold nature. First, exploitation of the prospective group of Maoists would follow along lines of a typical black Communist cell, emulating the kind of notional movement which Mr. Andy Ness developed in the Middle East some seven or eight years ago. Hopefully, these unwitting followers, in turn, would each recruit two or three other sympathizers who over time could distribute anti-Soviet literature and perform other low-key CA operations, as directed by the Station, and which could be attributed to the PRC. Presumably their actions would result in some local embarrassment to the USSR and the PCI. Second, QRPHONE, himself, would no doubt enhance his own Maoist credentials--already strong--to the point where he might well become

Is this really still true?

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

of focal interest to the PRC. This could lead to invitations to Peking (as it did in Ness's case) and possibly an FI operation of consequence vis-a-vis the China target. ?

?

3. The efficacy of the aforementioned scheme seemed to pose some doubts to Mr. Horvath. On the one hand, he did not feel that either Rome or Paris Stations had sufficient case officer strength on hand to direct and support a tricky operation of this type which might have only marginal utility, in their view. As for Paris, the French police, being as efficient as they are, would probably come upon QRPHONE's "black net" in time, and could conceivably pose security problems for him. As an alternative, Mr. Horvath proposed that CA Staff write a general dispatch to all EUR Stations describing the asset and indicating that the Staff would like to see greater use made of QRPHONE's capabilities on the Continent. The dispatch should ask the Stations to comment on the service that QRPHONE might provide them and suggest the means for accomplishing it. Mr. Horvath also asked that, prior to forwarding the dispatch, a security review be conducted of this case. He did comment that, if the security review indicated no severe compromises of QRPHONE's cover or personal security, it would be a pity not to make greater use of this agent's notable contacts in the European leftist community.

I am not surprised - and I am inclined to agree

I believe that the stations likely to be interested [illegible] know already

4. Accordingly, I agreed with Mr. Horvath's two recommendations; namely, to conduct a security review of the case and, subsequently, to forward a blanket dispatch to the Field, if appropriate. I mentioned that we would still like to raise the possibility of a black operation in Paris and Rome in that dispatch and to this, Mr. Horvath posed no objections.

Donald W. Muntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

Addendum: Following the above conversation, Miss Jane Long has initiated a CI type of review of the Subject's security status.

I'm not opposed to another CI-type review but, frankly, am under the impression that this has been done quite exhaustively several prior times.

DDP/CA/B3/DMuntz:lb

Distribution:
  Orig - C/CA
    1 - DC/CA
    1 - C/EUR/CA
    1 - QRPHONE 201
    1 - C/CA/B3
    2 - CA/B3/Chronos

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1-1	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1	1 5 2 6 3 7 4 8
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	
BY: AT: Z	JUN 24 12 37 AM '71 ACTION COPY	
DISSEM BY 24 JP PER CA 1		
ACTION UNIT CA-3	INFO FILE, VR DDP Add'l C/EUR C/CI/SO	
ACTION NO. 436		

S E C R E T 231613Z JUN 71 CITE LCPIPIT 21251 23 JUN IN 363995

m

BERN INFO DIRECTOR LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REFS: A. OEPA-3285

B. LCPIPIT 20673 (IN 344001)

1. DATES OF QRPHONE/1 VISIT TO SWITZERLAND CHANGED. Q/1 WILL NOW VISIT GENEVA 27 JUNE TO 4 JULY.

2. FILE: 200-124-156/3, AND 201-306052.

GP-1

SECRET

C2

Form 547a Processed

P&L DISSEM
RYBAT
CS COPY

SECRET

201-306052

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 0-1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 33/30 PER CA #1

ACTION UNIT dCA 3

INFO FILE, VR DDP ADDP dEUR dcl/so

ACTION NO 081

S E C R E T 271644Z MAY 71 CITE LCPIPIT 20673

BERN INFO DIRECTOR LONDON

27 MAY IN 344001

4

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REF: OEPA-3285

1. PER REF AND MASLOTT CONVERSATION WITH BACHMAN, QRPHONE/1 RECEIVED VISA TO VISIT SWITZERLAND 10-17 JUNE TO COVER EXHIBITION OF BLACK AMERICAN ART BEING HELD AT RATH MUSEUM IN GENEVA.

2. QRPHONE/1 INSTRUCTED LIMIT SELF TO JOURNALISTIC PURSUITS DURING SWISS STAY.

3. FILE: 200-124-156/3 AND 201-306052.

GP-1

S E C R E T

P&L DISSEM

RYBAT

CS COPY

Form 547a Processed

CS Copy

201-306052

27 May 71

SECRET

4. The charge is made that QRPHONE is too thinly spread and there is a recurring urge that his targetting be better focussed. Can he in fact be better focussed on a multi-divisional basis or would focussing, in practice, result in his being narrowed down to a primarily divisional target?

5. Granting that the CIA label is somewhat indiscriminately used for character assassination in the conspiratorial fringe in which QRPHONE has been operating, isn't he in fact stuck with this label and in view of the international character of this conspiratorial fringe, won't it turn up wherever he goes? In this milieu is there really much chance he will be given any significant information (and not deception information) by anyone who will do so because he wants the information passed to CIA?

6. When he was looked into in April 1968 by a Chicom official, what do we suppose to be meant by the officials finding that it was not clear if he was completely reliable in a Marxist-Lenist sense?

(a)

(b)

(c)

7. How eagerly sought-after are travelers to China now-a-days? What is the forecast as to demand for such travelers by next summer?

8. With a reportedly anti-US, white, British wife and 3 small children, how really mobile is QRPHONE in a PCS sense? If we should move QRPHONE and family to a new location for a trial period and it didn't work out, wouldn't resettling him have considerable complications?

9. In how many languages does QRPHONE have verbal and written fluency?

10. What are the current clearance limitations upon our use of QRPHONE?

11. One gathers from the project renewals that QRPHONE's CIA status is known to MI-5, MI-6 and Scotland Yard. A French service penetration (UNDERBID/39) indicated

that Rodigast was under some suspicion. QRPHONE has been refused entrance at the border by the Swiss authorities. Does anyone doubt that in view of the groups and individuals he contacts on his travels he has a dossier in each of these countries? Does anyone doubt that in many of these dossiers the alleged CIA connection is recorded? In view of this, isn't it a fact that probably the safest place for him to be contacted is London, in spite of whatever tradecraft he and Rodigast may practice? In spite of a rapport and background knowledge elements which he undoubtedly benefits from with Rodigast, are these factors worth the extra handling complications? Doesn't this handling method essentially double the cost of the operation?

went 1 [illegible] 71 [illegible]

12. What were the reasons for the break with "Fair Play for Cuba?" the break with Verges? Does QRPHONE have a power base at all among American negroes (SNCC doesn't like him and it is recorded in the renewals that blacks and revolutionaries sense that he is not "sincere")?

[illegible] office of [illegible] fight over money.

13. Can't we determine right here at Headquarters the degree of interest in the Italian branch in having a rather low-level propaganda operation involving anti-Soviet propaganda ostensibly emanating from pro-Chicom sources? Now that the PRC has decided to go "legit," what is our best estimate as to the likelihood that they will lose interest in previous and current pro-Chicom fringe groups?

14. Other than on the above, if we asked QRPHONE to become involved in depth with one of the groups he is in touch with, wouldn't he have to act "more Royalist than the King," and wouldn't he be the first to come under suspicion in case action against the group pointed to a leak?

15. If he could not take covert action himself through such a group to what extent are we now or potentially likely to become involved with covert action by other groups against:

- anti-Vietnam action
- African liberation movements
- New Left groups
- pro-Chicom groups
- Fedayeen groups

16. What are QRPHONE's real talents? Why hasn't he been able to do more about establishing himself on a more self-sustaining basis? Is it because of the targets we keep pushing him on? What is meant by these allusions to QRPHONE's "work discipline?" Do his talents possibly point toward some covert action use in a role where the CIA label is relatively less important?

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T/R[redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

37

TO

COS, London

INFO.

C/LCPIPIT

MICROFILMED
MAR 31 1971
DOC. MICRO

FROM

Chief, AF via Chief, EUR

SUBJECT

JAGUAR Reporting on African Expatriates in London

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: a. OBLW-25,380 (26 Feb 70)
b. OELA-53,167 (24 Dec 70)
c. DIRECTOR 063010 (27 Aug 70)
d. OBPA 3090 (18 Jan 70)

[redacted]

1. For over a year ZIBET personnel have sought to stimulate more SMORANGE reporting on the activities of certain high level African expatriates in London. Up to now the results have been meager and discouraging, and in addition JAGUAR gained JKLANCE's agreement that QRPHONE/1 should desist from pursuing these London targets.

2. Perhaps stemming from the recent visit of SMOVID to Headquarters, however, we have just received an informative and useful report, prepared by JAGUAR, on Osumba Langi, the principal radical Kenyan expatriate in London, along with promises of other studies on targets mentioned during the Headquarters discussions. This is possibly a hopeful note for the future.

3. Prior to this development, JKLANCE had received only one report from JAGUAR in response to various appeals and the submission of requirements. That report, received in December 1970 was in response to Headquarters-supplied requirements forwarded the previous February (and resubmitted in August 1970), but contained very little positive information. Furthermore, the report's format and tone suggested that JAGUAR's reply was intended as a one-time affair. It certainly did not invite further questions nor indicate an intention to volunteer further details later.

4. In reviewing the correspondence on this matter, it was noted that the verbatim minutes of February 1970 Headquarters discussions with SMENCB and SMUMBRAGE contained a passage that may cast new light on JAGUAR's position. In response to ZIBET officers' queries about what JKLANCE could expect from JAGUAR (it previously having been made clear by the SMOTH officers that the target was JAGUAR's), the visiting SMOTH officers said of JAGUAR's position: "They have a quite serious

~~DUPLICATE COPY~~
~~FOR CROSS FILING IN~~
201-306052

W/1 Att   S/c 1 Att

[redacted]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
200-124-156/3	OBLW-26059	Typed: 19 Mar 71 PHONE
CS COPY FILED IN 11-2-24	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/[redacted]T	HQS FILE NUMBER 11-2-24

Distribution: 1 - C/CA
1 - EUR/B
1 - AF/OPS
1 - RI/D&P

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
DDP/AF/OPS/FID	MZimmerman	aeo	5564

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/CA/B-3		
EUR/BC	23 MAR	✓
AC/AF/4	1 MAR	
DC/CA	27/3/71	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/AF DC/EUR/BC	27/3/71	

(40)

DISPATCH

30 Mar 71

constitutional problem with their responsibilities to IDEN. The idea of passing out political information on exiles is repulsive to him." It should be noted for the record that JAGUAR itself has not given such an explanation to JKLANCE, but, knowing JAGUAR's bureaucratic position and its traditionally conservative role in the SMORANGE community, it may be that JAGUAR in fact is thus inhibited.

5. As to QRPHONE/1, SMOVID on 15 June 1970 followed up his March 1970 complaints to JADWIN about QRPHONE/1's contacts with expatriates in London. SMOVID expressed JAGUAR's concern about QRPHONE/1's security and its view that QRPHONE/1's information was of marginal value. SMOVID, emphasizing that he was expressing a view personally endorsed by SMUPSILON, outlined three possible options: withdraw QRPHONE/1 from the country; stop running and tasking QRPHONE/1 as an agent; or have JAGUAR take over the running of QRPHONE/1. (QRPHONE/1 subsequently was instructed to stop pursuing his SMORANGE targets.)

6. Thus JKLANCE is stymied. The question is whether there is anything that can be done to improve the situation. The one new factor in the equation that possibly could be used to reopen the discussion with a view to ameliorating the situation is the fact that there now is a different IDEN than when the February 1970 SMOTH explanation was offered. Even though JAGUAR has not specifically given that explanation, to JKLANCE, the Station, without reference to SMOTH's explanation presumably could elect to reopen the discussion in terms of a possible change of atmosphere since the change of IDEN. Such a discussion at least should give an indication of whether SMOTH's explanation is JAGUAR's (and JKLANCE's) major obstacle.

7. Were QRPHONE/1 permitted to resume his London contacts he could obtain some information of the type JKLANCE would like to get from JAGUAR. But, in view of the June 1970 SMUPSILON-approved SMOVID demarche to JADWIN, it might be unwise, for the moment at least, to sound out JAGUAR about reactivating QRPHONE/1. We would appreciate receiving London Station's views on this subject.

8. One final point that should be noted is that McGRILLEN, in forwarding the above-mentioned JAGUAR report on 24 December 1970, mentioned that visiting ZIBET officer Jeremy K. FREYMARK recently had discussed these JKLANCE requirements in London with SMOVID, SMENDIVE and SMEVICT and that it was McGRILLEN's understanding that "it was generally agreed to limit our requests in the future to selected targets on which there is evidence of coup plotting or subversion." McGRILLEN added that he looked forward to any followup questions based on the above criteria that Headquarters wanted the Station to submit to JAGUAR. FREYMARK's recollection of his talks with JAGUAR is at slight variance with McGRILLEN's account. FREYMARK recalls that he had agreed to limit JKLANCE's future requests to those cases in which JKLANCE had an active interest and where there was good reason to suspect a real threat to the stability of the African country against which the London-based African might be acting. Accordingly, there is attached a select list of individuals about whose contacts and activities JKLANCE would like to have updated information from JAGUAR. The type of information we desire is indicated by the illustrative questions and other data in support of our request. Whereas we would like to have unsolicited and regular reporting on these targets, we realize that JAGUAR is not equipped or prepared to accept such a continuing requirement. We believe that the attached list along with the paragraph five discussion pegged to a change of IDENS are good pegs for GIBSON or his designee in reopening the discussion with JAGUAR.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S E C R E T/[redacted]	OELW-26059

9. London Station's report on the outcome of its discussions with JAGUAR is awaited with considerable interest.

RICHARD I. FELS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS London (Att. herewith)
1 - C/LCPIPIT (Att. herewith)

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 306052

[redacted]

ATTACHMENT TO DISPATCH NO. OELW-26059

ZIBET would appreciate receiving from JAGUAR any current material on the activities and contacts of the following Africans who either reside in London or who visit there frequently. These targets have been selected according to the criteria outlined in paragraph 6 of the referenced dispatch.

Ghana

William BEDOE-ANSAH - Sensitive Headquarters' sources have indicated that John K. TETTEGAH is planning to return to West Africa. Since BEDOE-ANSAH is known to maintain contact with TETTEGAH and was in fact responsible for TETTEGAH's employment with a Japanese business firm in Cairo, we feel he may be involved in any new subversive moves undertaken by TETTEGAH.

Kojo BOTSIO - There has been some indication through sensitive sources that BOTSIO has recently been travelling in Africa and that he too may be involved in TETTEGAH's current activities.

(In addition we are still interested in the other targets mentioned in Reference C.)

Nigeria

L. BALOGUN - He is the purported author of the recently published Manifesto of Nigerian Young Revolutionaires Organization.

Alex CHINA - He is an Ibo resident in London who is not only a self-described Marxist but is also a regular contributor to Advance the organ of the Marxist Nigerian Trade Union Confederation.

Sam IKOKU - Although IKOKU is the Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction of the Nigerian East Central State and is resident in Europe, we understand that he occasionally visits London. We would appreciate being alerted to these visits and receiving information on his London contacts.

MICROFILMED
MAR 3 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 306052

[redacted]

[redacted]

w/ ATT 1 TO OELW 26059

[redacted]

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET/R~~YBAT~~	OELW-26059

11

IDEN: The Home Secretary

MAR 1 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 306052

[redacted]

FORM 8-64 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO
	SECRET/R~~YBA~~T	☐ CONTINUED	

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
Chief, EUR; COS, London

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT
RYBAT/DTDORIC/QRPHONE/MHPROBE/British Residence Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. QRPHONE/1 has received a letter from the Home Office which removes the previous restrictions on his stay in Britain. There is now no limit on the length of his stay in Britain and he does not need to report his address, etc., to the police. Further, he may now obtain employment in Great Britain without the need to obtain official permission.

2. For the record, we are forwarding under separate cover, a copy of the letter.

MICROFILMED
MAR 30 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: USC
Letter

S/C ATTD BY RID/~~AN~~
Dated 30 MAR 71 ANK

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Chief, WOLIME, w/att.
1 - COS, London, w/att.
1 - Chief, EUR, w/o att.

1ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO 200-124-156/~~8~~2	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEPA-3221	DATE 18 March 1971
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

GRACIOUS, EUROPEAN-BORN LADY in mid-60s, of independent means, residing in Berkeley, seeks gentleman companion, scholar, writer, artist, with progressive political interests and desire to share tomorrow. NYR, Box 3511.

WOMAN, 50, Manhattan resident, 5'2" attractive, articulate, seeks male companion to share interests and experiences. Loves politics, music, time at home and cooking. NYR, Box 3507.

FEMALE UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, 27, marooned in Ottawa seeks unattached, intelligent man, 25-35, who appreciates food, music, travel and the outdoors. PO Box 4445, Station E, Ottawa.

CREATIVE, petite woman, in search of sensitive mature unattached man 55-60, whose poignant longing is for more than just hello-goodby. NYR, Box 3501.

UNIVERSITY TEACHER, Denver area, 37, wishes to meet interesting and warm woman. All letters answered. NYR, Box 3495.

ATTRACTIVE, INTELLIGENT LADY, stable, responsive personality, sense of humor, seeks gentleman companion with similar attributes, prefers successful professional who enjoys home and country living. Minimum age, 45. NYR, Box 3494.

I AM 36, beautiful, intelligent, accomplished, strong, wise, modest. I have much love to give vital, expansive, solvent, rich adult male seeking mate. NYR, Box 3493.

SUCCESSFUL WRITER IN LATE FIFTIES, tall, attractive, amusing, seeks quasi-Platonic relationship with mature, sensitive woman interested in wearing rubber. Montreal area. NYR, Box 3500.

MODERN, IRONIC PENELOPE, tired of waiting for wandering Odysseus seeks eligible suitors who are tall, over 40, and who have intellect, imagination, and integrity. No need to fear, Odysseus, unless you are a male chauvinist pig and answer all advertisements placed by females. NYR, Box 3491.

REPUTEDLY CHARMING MAN, turning youthful 60, Southwestern Connecticut cliff dweller, writer-communicator of many interests, considering modest early retirement, seeks committed relationship with intelli-

BERKSHIRES: 1½ beautifully wooded acres, 175 foot paved road frontage, 500 feet brook frontage. PO Box 98, South Egremont, Mass. 01258.

WILL EXCHANGE 2 bedroom Manhattan apt. (E. 41st) and car for similar accomodations in London during May and June. NYR, Box 3488.

PUTNAM COUNTY, year-round rental, charming country cottage, two rooms, fireplace, all facilities. Sixty miles from NYC, suitable for single person or weekend couple. $125 per month plus utilities. (914) 225-8086 or write NYR, Box 3487.

RENT. Cliffside Cottage, Barbados, Sleeps four, secluded beach, maid service. Will meet arrival. $135. weekly. NYR, Box 3430.

LONDON, BARNES AREA, separate furnished flat in Edwardian house. Livingroom, bedroom, kitchen, bath, central heating, maid service, linens, dishwasher. Private garden faces common and lovely babbling brook. Near transport, shops and Thames. 20 minutes Hyde Park. $300 per month to June, $350. per month through September. Write Langdale, 21 Cedars Rd., London S.W. 13, England, Phone, London, 878-0963.

FRANCE: ROYAN. Furnished four bedroom house. Near beaches, Language Center. April-July, Sept.-July $145 month including all utilities. Johnson, 16 Rue des Orchidees, Paris (13e).

UNUSUAL LOFT, beautifully designed and furnished. Safe, quiet, convenient. Spacious, Sky-light. $300/month. (212) 962-1054.

COMMODIOUS VACATION HOME, secluded village location nr Manchester, Vt., May-Jun-Jul, $350/mo. Sheedy, 1 Schoolhse. La., Syosset, N.Y. 11791.

VILLA SALE/RENTAL. Completely modern. Classic style. Galilea Mallorca. Near Palma/Mediterranean. Fully equipped large pool grounds five bedrooms furnished. Ideal year round use/investment. Write illustrated brochure: 160 East 70 Street. New York, 10021.

VILLA RENTAL. Galilea Mallorca. Modernized 18th century stone house. Four bedrooms, terraces, pool. Write illustrated bro-

LONDON—light, airey four bedroom family home of American correspondent, large garden, all conveniences, completely furnished, close to Thames, Underground and bus, 25 minutes to Picadilly, from 23 July to 5 September for $600, all utilities included. Write Mrs. Joy Gibson, 32 Hartswood Road, London, W12 9NA or phone 01-749-0546.

PIERMONT, NEW YORK. June 1 to Oct. 1. Artist's tastefully furnished house. Terraced garden. Every convenience. Overlooking Hudson. 15 miles from City. $1,500. (914) EL 9-0077.

MARTHA'S VINEYARD. 2 bedroom cottage. Oak Bluffs. Memorial Day to Labor Day. $1000 or by month. NYR, Box 3477 or (212) 254-7127 after 8 p.m.

MAINE rental (Mt. Desert Island): 3 bedroom furnished farmhouse on cove. Swimming, barns, separate study. Rent month or season. Call 413-584-1550.

EAST HAMPTON house available to share with teacher-writer couple. Private bedroom. Near beaches. Car needed. 691-7697, 790-4613, Wa 4-9465.

ETC.

RATIONALISTIC, non-occult astrology. Natal chart interpreted, $15. Give place, date exact time of birth. Sag/Aries, Box 51, RD 3, Hudson, NY 12534.

POETRY WANTED for cooperative poetry anthology. Include stamped return envelope. Idlewild Press, 1807 East Olympic Blvd., Los Angeles, California 90021.

STAINED GLASS STUDIO authentically recreating small parts of 11th-16th century windows. Colorful, decorative. Herbs, animals, Medieval scenes. Available window hanging, shelf standing. We use technique, material of Medieval craft. Color catalog, 25c. Glass Masters, Box 272R, New York, N.Y. 10009.

COUNTERACT! If you were reluctant to support Friends of Art at your local museum, join ENEMIES OF ART. $1.00. ENEMIES OF ART, Box 5615, Milwaukee, Wis. 53211.

WILL BUY participation in Broadway or Off Broadway plays. Those running, past shows. Give full details. NYR, Box 3485.

HELP THE CAUSE OF ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION. The Providence Free School

SINGLE! — See PHOTOS of 4-10 ideal mates to select before dating! Advanced matching systems assure compatibility! All ages. Write for information and free questionnaire: YALE PHOTO-DATING® SERVICE INC., P.O. Box 509, Dept. E, New York, N.Y. 10028.

MEET YOUR IDEAL MATE (computerized matching). All ages. Write TEAM Project, 101 W. 30th St., Suite 531, NY 10001.

AUSTRALIA WANTS YOU!!! Government Assisted Passage 1971 Government Information and Forms. Most Complete Information Available $1.00 Reports on Employment, Business, Taxes, Education, Teaching, Housing, Ranching, Maps, etc. AUSTCO, Box 3623 NY, Long Beach, California 90803

WRITERS sell an editor before he reads your manuscript. Send for free booklet, catalogue. Writers Craft Systems, Box 181NYRA, Narberth, Pa. 19072.

I REQUIRE . . .

a "dating service" that

- ☐ has outgrown pop prattle about the "swinging scene" (ages 21 to 65)
- ☐ has the enlightened versatility to match flower children and Wall Street tycoons (although only sometimes with each other)
- ☐ has penetrated bigtown anonymity to date deal only with its more cultivated, intelligent, literary community (48% through personal referrals)
- ☐ offers exclusive, expensive, exhaustive, individual processing by trained consultants

☐ A LOOK AT YOUR OUTSTANDING QUESTIONNAIRE

MIND MATES
Bureau for Interpersonal Relations
1 East 42nd St., New York, New York 10017
MU 2-3757

CLASSIFIED SECTION

Effective with May 6, 1971 issue.

40c per word—15 word minimum.

Six insertions: 39c per word
12 insertions: 38c per word
18 insertions: 37c per word
24 insertions: 35c per word

MICROFILMED
MAR 30 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

001

7P

HOME OFFICE
Princeton House, 271 High Holborn, LONDON W.C.1
Telex: 261867 *Telegrams: Alidep, London WC1*
Telephone: 01-405 4321

Please address any reply to
THE UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE
and quote: P.E.O
Your reference:

- 9 MAR 1971

Sir/~~Madam~~

I am directed by the Secretary of State to inform you that he is now prepared to remove the restrictions on your stay in this country. The conditions attached to it have therefore been cancelled.

Cancellation of conditions means that you are now also exempt from the requirement to report changes of address and other particulars to the police.

There is now no necessity for you to obtain permission from a government Department to take employment in Great Britain. The Secretary of State would, moreover, have no objection if you wished to establish yourself in business or a profession, but it should be clearly understood that this does not relieve you of the obligation, in that event, to conform to any regulations governing the business or professional activities in which you may be interested.

This cancellation of your conditions does not extend to the Channel Islands which have their own laws relating to aliens. You should therefore consult the Immigration

SECRET

SECRET

Authorities of the island concerned if at any time you contemplate going there to live.

This cancellation of conditions extends to Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man only as far as residence is concerned. If you are going to take work in either place, you will have to consult the Northern Ireland Ministry of Health and Social Services or the Employment Division, Government Office, Isle of Man.

Your passport and police registration certificate have been endorsed and are returned herewith. The endorsement in the registration certificate shows that you are now exempt from registration.

I am Sir/Madam
Your obedient Servant

Also enclosed:

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO.: Chief, EUR; COS, London

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/QRPHONE - Agent Evaluation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached is an Agent Evaluation for QRPHONE/1 covering the period to 31 December 1970.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: H/W
Agent Evaluation

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Chief, WOLIME, w/att.
1 - Chief, EUR, w/o att.
1 - COS, London, w/o att.

file

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
200-124-156/3	OEPT-1289	JAN 21 1971 19 January 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

AGENT EVALUATION

NAME: QRPHONE/1 **DATE:** 18 January 1971

PROJECT: QRPHONE **STATUS:** Contract Agent (Under a Memorandum of Oral Agreement)

OVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: International correspondent for "Sunday supplement" type color magazine distributed by twenty major newspapers in the U.S. Also represents owner of this color magazine in other of his business ventures in Europe. This overt job was assumed in December 1970. Prior to that, Q/1 was the London representative of small U.S. news service. Q/1 does free lance journalism and is an occasional contributor to several magazines and newspapers.

COVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: Singleton agent targeted at the radical left, including Maoist, African liberation, and Palestinian groups. Q/1's access derives from his many contacts in these circles.

PERFORMANCE OF COVERT DUTIES: Q/1 continues to perform well and without posing problems for his handler. His personality is easy-going and his attitude positive. If his efforts are not always totally successful -- leaving us with tantalizing bits of information and many unanswered questions -- this is generally due to operational circumstances in which he was simply unable to elicit more information on a given subject.

PERFORMANCE OF OVERT DUTIES: Q/1 does a solid and workmanlike job as a journalist. He has acquitted himself well both as a representative of his cover firm and in his free lance activity. Occasional prompting on this subject produces added effort and in this connection the operation profits particularly from the energy and knowledge of the deep-cover agent handler who himself has faced similar cover demands over many years.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: QRPHONE/1's attitude is positive. (See below under Motivation.)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COVER EMPLOYER: Q/1's attitude is good. He has made an effort to discharge his part of the cover arrangement and to understand the weaknesses and problems which plagued his former cover organization. He is approaching his new cover arrangement with enthusiasm.

MOTIVATION IN ACCEPTING JKLANCE RELATIONSHIP: This is a subject on which a good deal has beensaid over the course of this operation. The following points can be made on the subject of Q/1's motivation:

A. His basic image of JKLANCE is positive.

B. This image of JKLANCE as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in Q/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of JKLANCE and of the importance of his contribution to the JKLANCE effort. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case, but every one of the wild anti-JKLANCE stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

C. In his political evolution over the years, Q/1 has become active in at least two "causes". In both instances he saw these causes undermined by petty jealousy and factional struggles and in both cases he was personally harmed as a result. The product of this situation has been a certain disillusionment with "causes" and a cynical political outlook. (In other circumstances this might be called political maturity.) Q/1 now tends to view political trends as a detached observer rather than a participant.

D. Following on the foregoing thought is the fact that he is an American (and does not consider himself disloyal). Given his citizenship and his disinclination to feel "involved" in the currents of the radical left, he has been perfectly willing to accept employment by JKLANCE to report on those currents. He does not give any indication that he views this as "squealing" on his friends -- indeed the contrary seems to be the case.

E. On a more mundane level, it must be realized that Q/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. He was without a job and was living off the charity of his wife's family. JKLANCE has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

F. Having accepted JKLANCE employment for a combination of the reasons set forth above, it must be added that Q/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

G. In assessing the relative importance of these several factors which make up Q/1's motivation, the undersigned would stress that C and E were probably the immediate causes of his acceptance of recruitment while A and D were more underlying. B and F have arisen since recruitment and probably play an important role in his current motivation.

WIFE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: Q/1's wife is not witting of his JKLANCE affiliation. She was allowed to believe that he was working indirectly for the Chinese. She certainly is aware of the past JKLANCE accusations which have been leveled at Q/1, but as far as Q/1 can determine (and this is not a subject on which he can come right out and ask a direct question) she continues to accept the Chinese story. It should be added that Mrs. Q/1 is British and is the holder of some rather typical "left" anti-JKLANCE attitudes. It should also be noted that the relationship between the two is fraught with a variety of problems thereby adding to the complexity of the situation. Certainly the whole subject of Q/1's activities is one which Mrs. Q/1 views with misgivings and which is simply not discussed -- lest it lead to acrimony. Mention should also be made that Mrs. Q/1 seems to accept as legitimate the small amount of money received from Q/1's cover and to regard this as a genuine stringer relationship.

RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING: QRPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and responds well to Case Officer handling. He is a most willing asset requiring no special handling care -- other than the normal professionalism expected in the handling of a sensitive asset such as Q/1.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE: Q/1 is willing to accept guidance and criticism -- provided it is constructive. If anything, he may sometimes be too willing. His willingness occasionally exceeds his sense of security and it then falls to his handler to bear in mind security and/or operational considerations which may affect his pursuit of a given target. However, this should not be over dramatized.

RESPONSIVENESS: Q/1 is most responsive to requirements levied upon him. In this connection it should be recalled that his ability to respond fully is usually restricted by the nature of his relationship with his informants; i.e., since he is only eliciting the information from unwitting informants he is rarely able to press for all the desired details.

JKLANCE CONTROL: Q/1 is dependent upon a JKLANCE salary and he has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. We hasten to add that Q/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

PERSONAL SECURITY: Q/1 has a good sense of personal security and his handler makes an effort to build upon this at every opportunity. As cited above, Q/1's enthusiasm sometimes leads to his failure to consider all aspects and implications of a given situation.

OTHER SECURITY AND COVER SITUATIONS: The past allegations of Q/1's affiliation with JKLANCE, many pre-dating his actual recruitment, add an extra dimension to Q/1's cover situation. We have no indication that any of these allegations are based on any proof, nor have they produced a significant reduction in his number of contacts.

ABILITY TO WORK WITHOUT SUPERVISION: Q/1 is a self-starter and can work well for extended periods without supervision.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS: Q/1 poses only a minimum administrative burden. He is not overly concerned about his administrative and financial position, allowances, payments, etc. He merely expects JKLANCE to do the fair thing by him. However, on the rare occasion when JKLANCE has failed to perform as he expected, he can be very upset.

REPORTING: Q/1 is a journalist by training. He is an effective reporter -- both in terms of ability to elicit and writing style.

PERSONAL ENERGY AND ENDURANCE: Q/1 is quite energetic and can continue his efforts on a sustained basis.

LANGUAGES: In addition to his (native) English, Q/1 can speak French, Italian and German.

WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: Q/1 is quite willing to travel -- and even enjoys it!

AREA KNOWLEDGE: Q/1 is quite widely travelled in Europe and Africa and consequently has acquitted an extensive area knowledge.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ABILITY: Q/1's present operating context does not provide an adequate basis to evaluate these talents. It is assumed that he has a satisfactory competence in both these areas, however.

WEAKNESSES; PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL: Q/1 has no major weaknesses, either personal or professional which inhibit his operational use. The existence of his "reputation" as a JKLANCE asset -- which is believed by some and rejected by others of his contacts is a definite limitation on his employment.

CAREER POSSIBILITIES: Q/1 has mentioned to his handler that he hopes to be able to make a career of his relationship with JKLANCE. He enjoys the work and presumably the financial security. However, the combination of the security factors operative in this case and the unlikelihood of Q/1's continued access to targets of interest over a prolonged period argue against his being regarded as a career asset.

Aaron C Laginestra

AARON C. LAGINESTRA
FIELD CASE OFFICER

COMMENTS OF SUPERVISOR: This is another thoughtful evaluation of this agent, and reflects the views of the agent handler as well as of the Case Officer.

I doubt that we have really divined Q/1's motivations for working with JKLANCE, and this evaluation should be read as the best stab we can make at this enigmatic subject.

ADRIAN B. MASLOTT
CHIEF, LCPIPIT

SECRET

05 0415-70

SECRET

19 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

ATTENTION: Miss Diane Chatelan

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRPHONE/1 (P), Training Alias: PERSHING

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Director of Training dated 28 September 1970, Attention: Chief, Covert Training/CS/TR, Subject: Covert Training for QRPHONE/1, From: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

1. QRPHONE/1 was trained covertly in New York on 14, 15, 16 October 1970. There were twelve hours of training in the three sessions.

2. In accordance with the reference training request and discussions between the instructor and the two Case Officers, QRPHONE/1 was given a concentrated dosage of reporting instruction with emphasis on spotting and assessment reports.

3. QRPHONE/1 is a professional writer, so there was no problem in the writing department. The need was for channelling the writing capabilities of this man who has been an Agent for five years, into our type of reporting and to end his "stream of consciousness" style of reporting, as one Case Officer put it.

4. QRPHONE/1 quite quickly got into the spirit of the training and by the end of the first session was obviously enjoying it and appreciating the opportunity to learn to write our way. He pointed out that his big problem is having to retain substantial amounts of information in his head for two or three weeks, then put it all down the night before he meets his Case Officer. From his conversation, it appeared that organizing a report had never occurred to him before and he several times said "no one ever told me about this", "this is the first I've learned of this, etc." These things were said in happiness at having discovered ways of improving his reporting and simultaneously making his reporting less of a chore and more of a joy.

If true, this is a sad reflection on C/O: failure to train

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

5. In organizing a report exercise, he did extremely well. In exercises separating fact from inference, he did only fairly well, considering his background and compared to trainees with no where near his experience or education. He has a slight tendency toward jumping to conclusions and reading meanings into words. He realized this and from then on he overcame this weakness to a considerable degree. However, even on the last day, writing reports based on New York Times newspaper articles, he twice (out of five reports) substituted his own word for a word in the article for no valid reason and which new word in fact changed the meaning of the sentence, though only slightly.

6. This small weakness is not unique to QRPHONE/1. It is also true of other equally highly literate trainees, who, like QRPHONE/1, unconsciously substitute their own language for that which has been directly given to them, not realizing that they thereby sometimes change the meaning of that which they are reporting. Happily, QRPHONE/1 realized this during the exercises, recognized the changed meaning, and earnestly stated that he will watch it in the future.

7. In observation and description exercises, he did well after a rocky start. Here, he at first concentrated on individuals, almost completely ignoring the actions they were engaged in. He soon saw that he has a mental capacity to watch both at once and there was no problem thereafter.

8. He was excellent in his ability to separate hard facts and put those in the body of his reports while listing as comments those items which legitimately were comments and which had no place in the report itself.

9. For the final session, he had been asked to do assessment reports on two people. He was mortified when he came in on the last morning, happily handed in his five intel reports and suddenly realized that he had completely forgotten to do the other reports. However, in discussing spotting and assessment reports, it appears that he now understands them.

10. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in November 1971 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WOMOLD/QRPHONE/1/PERSHING. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

Caleb L. Batten

Caleb L. Batten
DC/OS/ALT/TR

Originated by:
Aristides G. Lazarus

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) QRPHONE/1

FROM: CI/OA

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CA/CF 3-D-0002			✓	
2. ATT'N- GLORIA BENNETT			✓	
3. TUBE EW-7				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

GLORIA -

I WILL CALL YOU ON THIS BY MID-AFTERNOON, BUT AM SENDING THIS ADVANCE COPY SO THAT YOU WILL HAVE THE BASIC INFO ~~[illegible]~~ IF DIANE CALLS BEFORE 1:00.

THE TRAINING MEMO WILL BE CARRIED ON TO THE DDP/TRAINING OFFICER THIS AFTERNOON.

CAL BATTEN, CHIEF, COVERT TRAINING WILL BE BRIEFED ORALLY (BY ME) AS TO CI/OA'S RESERVATIONS AS EXPRESSED IN THE STIPULATION ATTACHED TO THE POA AMENDMENT.

DICK RUPPNER

YOU WILL NOTE THAT THIS IS AN AMENDMENT TO THE POA AND NOT ~~AN~~ THE OA WHICH DIANE IS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING.

THE OA, ~~[illegible]~~ I BELIEVE, WILL HAVE TO AWAIT FURTHER DISCUSSION BETWEEN DIANE AND CI/OA.

201-file

12OCT70

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 12 October 1970	CASE NO. 201- 306052	
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ ORSD	AREA:

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
✓	~~ISSUE~~ AMEND PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below.* or see remarks)	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE. ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

ADVANCE COPY

☐ POA EXPIRED __________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

CA/CF - D. L. CHATELAN

Subj's POA is amended herein, only to include the covert training outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 of CA's 20 Sept 1970 memorandum for the Director of Training and with the stipulation that any information revealed to Subj during the training will not be of such a sensitive nature that its later revelation by the Subj to anyone, particularly anyone inimical to the US and/or the Agency, would represent a loss.

SIGNATURE

FORM 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-65

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

SECRET
SENSITIVE

28 SEP 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION: Chief, Covert Training/OS/TR

SUBJECT: Covert Training for QRPHONE/1

1. This is to confirm telephone conversation between Mr. Caleb L. Batton and Miss Diane L. Chatelan, Chief, Counter Front Branch, requesting covert training for subject contract agent.

2. We would like to have this training begin 14 October 1970, and can make the agent available full time for three days only. We are planning to have the training take place in New York City, and Mr. Lasarus has already indicated orally to Miss Chatelan that he will be available.

3. Our main objective is to provide QRPHONE/1 with a firm understanding of what is required for good intelligence reporting and also the skills needed for spotting and assessments. QRPHONE/1 has been an Agent for over five years and has absorbed a good deal of tradecraft in the process. He has not, however, had any formally organized training.

4. We would like to have QRPHONE/1's outside case officer (handler) present during this training.

5. Subject and his operational background represent a highly sensitive area and we would appreciate the selection of a training site with this in mind. Biographic background as needed by your instructor will be provided by Chief, CA/CF with whom all further arrangements for this training should be made.

FRED W. VALTIN
Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

CA-70-933

QRPHONE/1
306052

SECRET SENSITIVE

SECRET

DDP/CA/CF/DLChatelan:djr (25 September 1970)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/TQRO
1 - DC/CA
1 - CA/CRU (Dummy)
2 - CA/CF

SECRET SENSITIVE

SECRET

TO : ID/1 23 September 1970

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT: Richard Thomas GIBSON IRD# 54454
201-306052

BACKGROUND:

Subject is a 39-year-old, married, male U.S. citizen who has been utilized by this organization since 1966 as a covert action asset. He was granted a POA on 23 May 1966. His previous polygraph examination was on 13 June 1965.

PROCEDURE:

On 21 September 1970, Subject was interrogated and given a polygraph examination in a Commodore Hotel suite in New York City which was used as a covert site. Subject's interrogation and examination were conducted in the English language.

PURPOSE:

The examination was requested through Miss Diana Chatelin of the CA Staff. ADDP approval was granted for the examination. The examination was conducted in order to determine if Subject had revealed his covert relationship with this organization, whether or not Subject had been approached by any other intelligence organization seeking his cooperation, whether or not Subject was maintaining a secret relationship with any other organization, whether or not Subject was deliberately withholding any contacts which he has developed from this organization, and whether or not Subject is currently subject to blackmail or other direct forms of coercion.

201-306052

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

23Sept70

IRD# 54454
Page 2

CONCLUSION:

Subject's polygraph examination did not contain any indication of deception to any of the above listed specific areas of inquiry.

Lawrence J. Howe

Distribution:
Orig. - True, Coleman, Gaynor
1 - Coleman
1 - CI/OA
1 - File

OS/IRD:LJH:ydc

14-00000



→ **WARNING**—Alteration, Addition or Mutilation of Entries is Prohibited.
Any Unofficial Change Will Render This Passport Invalid.

NAME
RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON

BIRTH DATE
MAY 13, 1931

BIRTHPLACE
CALIFORNIA, U.S.A.

HEIGHT
5 FEET 10 INCHES

HAIR
BLACK

EYES
BLACK

WIFE
X X X

ISSUE DATE
NOV. 10, 1969

MINORS
X X X

EXPIRATION DATE → NOV. 9, 1974

Richard Gibson
SIGNATURE OF BEARER

→ **IMPORTANT:** This Passport is NOT VALID Until Signed BY THE BEARER.

Richard Gibson

PHOTOGRAPH ATTACHED
FOREIGN SERVICE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NEW YORK, N.Y. 271
SEP 20 1970

201-306052



Visas

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PASSPORT BEARER TO OBTAIN NECESSARY VISAS

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(200)
EMBARKED
12 NOV 1969
LONDON AIRPORT

EMBARK
-2 DEC 1969

IMMIGRATION
13 NOV 1969
LONDON AIRPORT

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer/later than
11.2.70

Permitted to land on con[illegible] the holder does not rem[illegible] United Kin[illegible]
15. [illegible] 70

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(700)
-6 DEC 1969
LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(237)
EMBARKED
25 DEC 1969
LONDON AIRPORT

6

LUCHTHAVEN
12 XI 1969
BRUXELLES NATIONAL

LUCHTHAVEN
BRUSSEL - NATIONAAL
-2 XII 1969
AEROPORT
BRUXELLES - NATIONAL

LUCHTHAVEN
11 II 1970

GEN. MARECHAUSSEE
NEDERLAND
-4 DEC 1969

31 DEC 1969
FRANCE

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer/later than
15.2.70

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(819)
31 DEC 1969
LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(220)
EMBARKED
11 FEB 1970
LONDON AIRPORT

7



-6 IV 1970

Visas

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer / later than ONE MONTH

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (247) EMBARKED 26 FEB 1970 LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER 3 OCT 1970 LONDON AIRPORT

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer / later than ONE MONTH

CAIRO AIRPORT PASSPORTS

٢٨ فبراير ١٩٧٠

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom ~~longer / later~~ than 15 2 71

IMMIGRATION OFFICER 1 SEP 1970 LONDON AIRPORT

MAR 1970

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (310) EMBARKED 20 SEP 1970 LONDON A.

8

THE CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC LONDON

Entry Visa No. 201
Type of Visa Tourist
Date 10 2 70
Good for One journeys
of One Month duration
from date of arrival. The validity of this Visa is for 3 Month from date of issue provided passport remains valid.
Fee received 500 Mills

B. El Tal
Consul General

UAR

9



-6 IV 1970

Visas

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer / later th...
ONE MONTH

(047)
EMBARKED
26 FEB 1970
LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
13 FEB 1970
LONDON AIRPORT

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer / later than
ONE MONTH

CAIRO AIRPORT PASSPORTS
٢٨ فبراير ١٩٧٠
RESIDENCE VISA /18

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer / later than
15 2 71

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
CAIRO
1 SEP 1970
LONDON AIRPORT

MAR 1970

(30)
EMBARKED
20 SEP 1970
LONDON A

8

THE CONSULATE GENERAL OF
THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
LONDON

Visas

Entry Visa No. 501
Type of Visa Tourist
Date 10 2 70
Good for One journeys
of One Month duration
from date of arrival. The validity of this Visa is for 3 Months from date of issue provided passport remains valid.
Fee received 500 mms

B. El ...
Consul General

UAR

9



Visay

The conditi a attached to the grant of leave to land is hereby varied so as to require departure from the United Kingdom not later than 15th Feb. 1971

for Under Secretary of State Home Office.

Date 12 MAR 1970

The holder is hereby required to register at once with the police.

for Under Secretary of State Home Office.

Date 26 MAR 1970

Cancelled

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (C50) EMBARKED 6 APR 1970

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer than 15/2/71

30 JUN 1970

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (216) EMBARKED 11 MAY 1970 LONDON AIRPORT

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer than 15th February 1971

26 JUL 1970 Harwich Harbour

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (752) 12 APR 1970 LONDON AIRPORT

10

GRATIS مجاناً

Visay

Valid for several journeys

سفارة المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية — لندن

Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan — London

Consular Section القسم القنصلي

Ordinary Visa تاشيرة عادي

Transit Visa تاشيرة مرور

Serial No. 42 الرقم المتسلسل

Valid Till صالح لغاية

Provided the passport is so long valid ما دام الجواز معمولا به

Date تاريخ

The Consul القنصل

دخول

CONSULAR

11

Visa

[illegible]

Visa

السفارة اللبنانية في لندن
Ambassade du Liban à Londres

No. 1004 رقم
Visa séjour سمة
موافقة خارجية رقم ___ تاريخ
Autorisation A.E.O. ___ du
Motifs ___ أسباب الدخول
صالحة لغاية
Utilisable jusqu'au 24 Août 1970
N. de Voyages ___ عدد السفرات
Londres, le 24 FEB 1970 لندن في

S. EL KHOURY

PERCU
Piastres Libanaises
1000
Monnaie Locale
[illegible]

Visa holder must not take up Employment in Lebanon

لا يحق للحائز على هذه السمة العمل على الاراضي اللبنانية

AMBASSADE DU LIBAN * LONDRES *

SECRET/RYBAT

1

FBI info concerning Richard Gibson

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z. ✗ REF

DISSEM BY 35 PER CA # 1

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/CA 3

INFO FILE, VR DDP, ADDP, C/EUR, C/CI/SO, C/CCS

ACTION NO. 95

S E C R E T 121600Z AUG 70 CITE LCPIPIT 3737 (THOHURST ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

12 AUG 70 141393

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REF: DIRECTOR 057975

1. IN VIEW REF WE INCLINED ASK QRPHONE/1 MAKE OFT-POSTPONED VISIT TO U.S. IN SEPTEMBER AT WHICH TIME HE COULD FULFILL SGSWIRL REQUIREMENT AND ALSO MEET PERSONALLY WITH PRESIDENT OF LPWEAKLY TO FIRM UP DETAILS OF NEW CIER. MID-EAST TRIP WOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER U.S. VISIT.

✱ cover

2. WILL DISCUSS WITH RODIGAST WEEK OF 17 AUG AND ADVISE RE DATES, DETAILS, ETC.

3. FILE: 200-124-156/3. GP-1

S E C R E T

✱ will sec upon REQ.

Q-201

cc Q/Cover.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 9

RIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
NIT: C/CA/CF
XT: 1959
ATE: 27 February 1970

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
48/53 PER CA # 1

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: C/CA3 INFO FILE. VR. DDP, ADDP, C/EUR, C/CI/SO,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 03 00 10Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 013859

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REFS: A. LCPIPIT 9405 (IN 031696)

B. LCPIPIT 9348 (IN 029903)

~~1. IF YOU BELIEVE PROJECT CEILING FY 70 CAN BEAR COST, SEE NO PROBLEM REF A TRIP. NOTE HIS OPS EXPENSES AND OBLIGATIONS END JAN TOTAL $7,800. TO THIS MUST ADD $800 RECENT PAY AND TAX INCREASES, LEAVING ONLY SOME $2,500 ALL OPS TRAVEL REMAINDER FY 70 (UNLESS THIS SUM FURTHER OBLIGATED).~~

2. ~~[illegible]~~ VIEW REF B ACCESS POSSIBILITY, REQUEST TRIP BE DELAYED ADDITIONAL FEW WEEKS IN ORDER PERMIT Q/1 FOLLOW-UP ON ISSA CONTACT AND SERVICE RELATED DETAILED REQUIREMENTS (FORTHCOMING SOON) AFTER HIS EXTENDED ABSENCE MIDDLE EAST. SUGGEST HE BE GIVEN GREENLIGHT FOR TRIP MID-MAY, SUBJECT TO URGENT LEADS THAT MIGHT MEANWHILE EMERGE FROM TRIP OR ISSA/PHOMBEAH/STANDARD.

File: Q/201
cc: Q/Firzanca
cc: Q/Kambora

2 ~~3~~. RE PARA 2 REF A, AGREE SUBJECT TRIP NOT BE OPERATIONAL.

(continued)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 3 Mar 70 COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE, VR.

(elite) (pica)
:assification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

CRET PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 013859

ER, REQUEST Q/1 ALLOCATE TIME FOR DEBRIEFINGS/ANALYSIS A/PHOMBEAH POSSIBILITIES BY ZIBET OFFICER WITH CONGREVE NEW. ALSO ~~[illegible]~~ THERE STILL IS STANDING REQUIREMENT FOR RL, WHICH CAN POSSIBLY BE ACCOMPLISHED SAME TIME. UNLESS YOU OBJECTIONS, SUGGEST Q/1 BE PREPARED SPEND WEEK IN NEW YORK HESE MEETINGS.

SINCE CONGREVE HAS MET Q/1 AND ANTICIPATES NO PROBLEMS VISE ABOVE, NO NEED RODIGAST PRESENCE UNLESS HE TAKING LEAVE SAME TIME.

FILE: 200-124-156/3. GP-1

END OF MESSAGE

CA/B&F

CI/OA

CI/SO

EUR/BC

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CA
LEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DC/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.







14-00000

Photos of office
at
35 Long Acre, W.C.2

201-306052













Photos of office
at
35 Long Acre, W.C.2

201-306052













PHONE 201

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
COS, London; C/EUR

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT London

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
~~QRPHONE/Verges~~

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For the record we are forwarding, u/s/c, a copy of the letter to QRPHONE/1 from his Paris lawyer which outlines the status of QRPHONE/1's action against Jacques Verges. As Headquarters will recall this letter was used by QRPHONE/1 to good advantage in connection with his recent trip to Algiers. The letter says, in effect, that Verges has proposed a settlement of the matter and has agreed to pay this settlement in Algerian dinars. Needless to say, QRPHONE/1 has yet to receive payment. Nevertheless QRPHONE/1's purposes are well served by this attestation of Verges' expressed willingness to pay, with its implied admission of guilt!

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
QRPHONE/1 - Verges Letter

S/C ATT'D BY [illegible]D'SD
Dated 9 mar 70

Distribution:
- 3 - C/WOLIME w/att
- 1 - COS, London w/o att
- 1 - C/EUR w/o att

1 ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 2425	26 February 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052 ~~201-306-352~~ 200-124-136/3

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
29, FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS-IX°
TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-10
OU 824 63-10
SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

PARIS, LE 19 DECEMBRE 1969

AFF. GIBSON C/VERGES -

Monsieur GIBSON
32, Hartswood Road
Stamford Brook
LONDON W.12 -
(Grande Bretagne)

Cher Monsieur,

Je vous confirme l'entretien téléphonique que nous avons eu au sujet de votre affaire.

A de nombreuses reprises, Maître VERGES a proposé de régler votre affaire et notamment le 1er juillet 1967 ~~et~~ il a proposé - ce que j'ai accepté immédiatement - de vous régler ainsi qu'à votre femme , en dinars, lors de votre premier voyage en Algérie, une somme équivalente à la moitié de vos demandes respectives.

J'ai vu dans le cadre de nos pourparlers, la proposition manuscrite de Maître VERGES, dont les termes sont assez fidèlement reproduits ci-dessus.

A plusieurs reprises, Maître CAIN m'a confirmé l'accord de Maître VERGES pour régler sur ces bases ; toutefois ces derniers mois, il m'a fait savoir qu'il ne l'avait pas revu depuis un certain temps.

Pour vous permettre de discuter utilement avec Maître VERGES, si vous le rencontrez, je vous rappelle le montant des deux demandes :

1°) pour vous-même :	salaire	:	4.500 Fr -
	préavis	:	9.000 Fr -
	congés payés	:	1.500 Fr -

Il est demandé en outre un certificat de travail, des fiches de paye et la régularisation de votre situation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale.

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-02425 CS COPY 201-306052

Je pense que vous abandonnez ces trois derniers postes qui n'ont aucun intérêt pour vous. je crois.

2°) pour votre épouse : salaire : 4.500 fr
préavis : 4.500 fr
congés payés: 1.500 fr .

Il est en outre demandé des fiches de paye et la régularisation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale. Ces deux derniers postes me semblent sans intérêt, comme pour vous-même.

Je pense donc que vous pourriez demander à Me VERGES de remplir les engagements qu'il a pris à votre égard, savoir paiement de la somme de 12.750 fr français convertis en dinars.

Merci de me tenir au courant.

Veuillez, je vous prie, transmettre mes amitiés à votre épouse.

J'espère avoir le plaisir de votre visite lors de votre retour en Angleterre.

Je vous prie de croire, cher Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

201-306052

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
59, FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS-IXe

TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-19
OU 824 63-19

SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

PARIS, LE 19 DECEMBRE 1969

AFF. GIBSON C/VERGES -

Monsieur GIBSON
32, Hartswood Road
Stamford Brook
LONDON W.12 -
(Grande Bretagne)

Cher Monsieur,

Je vous confirme l'entretien téléphonique que nous avons eu au sujet de votre affaire.

A de nombreuses reprises, Maître VERGES a proposé de régler votre affaire et notamment le 1er juillet 1967 xx il a proposé - ce que j'ai accepté immédiatement - de vous régler ainsi qu'à votre femme , en dinars, lors de votre premier voyage en Algérie, une somme équivalente à la moitié de vos demandes respectives.

J'ai vu dans le cadre de nos pourparlers, la proposition manuscrite de Maître VERGES, dont les termes sont assez fidèlement reproduits ci-dessus.

A plusieurs reprises, Maître CAIN m'a confirmé l'accord de Maître VERGES pour régler sur ces bases ; toutefois ces derniers mois, il m'a fait savoir qu'il ne l'avait pas revu depuis un certain temps.

Pour vous permettre de discuter utilement avec Maître VERGES, si vous le rencontrez, je vous rappelle le montant des deux demandes :

1°) pour vous-même : salaire : 4.500 Fr -
préavis : 9.000 Fr -
congés payés : 1.500 Fr -

Il est demandé en outre un certificat de travail, des fiches de paye et la régularisation de votre situation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale.

Je pense que vous abandonnez ces trois derniers postes qui n'ont aucun intérêt pour vous, je crois.

2°) pour votre épouse : salaire : 4.500 Fr
préavis : 4.500 Fr
congés payés: 1.500 Fr .

Il est en outre demandé des fiches de paye et la régularisation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale. Ces deux derniers postes me semblent sans intérêt, comme pour vous-même.

Je pense donc que vous pourriez demander à Me VERGES de remplir les engagements qu'il a pris à votre égard, savoir paiement de la somme de 12.750 Fr français convertis en dinars.

Merci de me tenir au courant.

Veuillez, je vous prie, transmettre mes amitiés à votre épouse.

J'espère avoir le plaisir de votre visite lors de votre retour en Angleterre.

Je vous prie de croire, cher Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

Rod: this rough draft.

^ Draft.

CI assessment

1958 Q/1 worked for Agence France Presse - Paris. He was discharged by AFP when Ollie Harrington (American negro) brought forgery charges against him. Q/1 sent to a weekly American publication and to to the British daily The Observer, over the signature of O. Harrington, ~~xx xxx~~ violently anti-French articles which were printed and could have brought about the expulsion of author. William G. Smith (still in Paris), Richard Wright (deceased) widow still living in Paris and John Flint all took sides with Harrington.

2

30 July 1964. Accusations received from unidentified Americans, members of USA CP reportedly forward to Verges, editor of Revolution, certain documents which established Q/1 was working on behalf of CIA. This was because of fight over money that was due Q/1 and his wife. (Q/1 had his lawyer bring suit against Verges and finally in 1969 Verges agreed to pay certain amount and also an apology. This Q/1 can use to counteract the accusations by Verges.

Fall 1966 FBI Report: Source recently advised that during the Fall 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist Leninist Organization stated that Subject was suspected of being a spy for CIA. This person reported this to Rene Raindorf a member of the Jacques Grippa Pro Chinese Belgian CP.

June 1967: ~~XXXXX~~ FBI Report: GRIPPA and RAINDORF indicated to a member of an American pro-Chinese Communist organization that they thought highly of Q/1 and that they were of the belief he was doing a good job (in the cause of militant Marxism-Leninism).

March 1968: Stockholm. AFTONBLADET - Radical Social Democratic Daily 18 March 1968 published Photo and Biog Data on Q/1 in conjunction with story recent redefection American soldier Ray Jones implying Q/1 responsible in part Jones redefection.

Note: Bjorn Kumm, an Aftonbladet journalist who is a friend of Q/1's wrote him a long [illegible] and unsolicited letter the day following the appearance of the article in which he denounced his paper for libeling Q/1 and gave Q/1 advice on how to proceed to clear his name.

Stockholm. TIDSIGNAL / Radical Weekly - Also published article re Q/1.

Bo Hammar editor of TIDSIGNAl is pro- Cuban. and [illegible] Q/1 loyal to Williams who is anti-Cuban. They oppose Q/1 for his pro-Chinese and anti-Cuban stance.

May 1969: Report from Pretoria 6916 (in 49487) That Q/1 is now suspected widely of being both a CIA agent and a South African Intell contact.

Dec. 1969" Report from FBI: Source stated that he overheard Cleaver accuse Don Wright from Chicago of being seen in company of Q/1 whom Cleaver characterized as a well known CIA agent. This was at the Algerian Congress - Palestine Dec. 1969.

Feb. 1970 SYNIC: a London publication of leftist orientation, carried an article mentioning Q/1 by name and stating that he is widely believed to be an CIA agent. (Two of the Four persons listed as contributors to SYNIC were at the Algiers Palestine Solidarity Meeting which Q/1 attended in Dec. 1969. They were members of the British delegation representing the Palestine Solidarity Committee (PSC) which was a rival delegation to that led by A. Manchanda in which Q/1 sat. ~~This~~ Q/1 believes this story was printed in order to discredit the Manchanda-led Palestinian group which is in competition with the PSC.)

8 Feb. 1970: BEIRUT 6963 (IN 262712). Reliable Source reported that during his conversation with Ghassan KANAFANI, latter mentioned Q/1 and accused him of being a CIA agent. (Q/1 believes KANAFANI suspicion of Q/1 due to accusations against Q/1 spread in Beirut by Palestinian personalities who were formerly in London and who picked up story as result of accusation leveled against Q/1 in SYNIC.)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, RICHARD
201-306052
SEX M DOB ?

200-009-054
OEP -00737
26 JAN 70
P3

CIT UK
OCC ?
JOURNALIST FOR LIBERATOR
< ALGERIA, ALGIERS ATTENDED CONGRESS OF
PALESTINE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEES ALGIERS 26 -
28 DEC 69

080

R 7002111871

FILE IN 201-306052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➪

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
CHIEF, WOLIMS

INFO.
COS, LONDON: Chief, EUR Division

FROM
CHIEF, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL
Quarterly Operational Status Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: OEPW-792, dated 11 September 1969
OEPA-2325, dated 20 January 1970

Forwarded herewith are Quarterly Status Reports for the period ending 31 December 1969 for QREPITOME/QRMISSION, QRSTRIP, QRPADRE, and QRPHONE.

ADRIAN B. MASLOTT

Attachments: h/w
As stated (in duplicate)

Distribution:
- 3 - C/WOLIMS, w/atts (2 copies)
- 1 - COS, London, w/o atts.
- 1 - C/EUR, w/o atts

201-306052
200-124-156/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-2327

DATE
JAN 21 1970
21 January 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

QUARTERLY REPORT

STATION/BASE : LCPIPIT (London)
AGENT'S CRYPT : QRPHONE/1
PERIOD COVERED : 1 October-31 December 1969
CASE OFFICER TIME: 12 working days per month (average)
PROJECT : [illegible]
DATE OF PRA/OA: [illegible]
COSTS : [illegible] (Field Costs Only)

1. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING PERIOD: During the quarter an effort has been made to target QRPHONE/1 on the activities of the Palestinian liberation groups and their European supporters. A good start has been made in this effort. QRPHONE/1 undertook a "reconnaissance" of those European leftist groups active on this issue. (See OLPA - 2227) This in turn led to his being invited to attend the Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees which was held in Algiers in late December. (See LCPIPIT 7667).

In early November QRPHONE/1 made a brief visit to Paris to re-contact certain of his radical contacts there. (See OLPA - 2229) He likewise made a visit to The Netherlands in mid-December.

In October QRPHONE/1 made another extended visit to Italy in order to "take the temperature" of the radical left. The reporting from this visit was forwarded to Headquarters and Rome in OLPA - 2116 and OLPA - 2175. This visit was deemed to have been useful by Rome Station which asked that another such visit be scheduled for February 1970.

A visit to Nairobi by QRPRANK in late December may offer an opportunity for an added assessment of her - something which has been sought for some time.

QRPHONE/1 continues his cultivation of various African personalities in London who are of operational interest. See OLPA - 2141 for a discussion of QRPHONE/1's relations with Dennis Phombeah and OLPA - 2197 for a discassion of his relations with Genevieve [illegible].

2. SPECIFIC MATTERS OF OPERATIONAL SECURITY: [illegible] QRPHONE/1 by the Special Branch of Scotland Yard - spurred by his activity in connection with the Palestine issue - [illegible] security problems. The decision was taken to brief the leadership of the Special Branch in order to end the police [illegible]. See LONDON 8082, DIRECTOR 090343 and LONDON [illegible] for added details.

The suspension of activity by QRPURE has [illegible] for a new cover to be found for QRPHONE/1. Although the [illegible] story can continue to be used for one or two more months, a new cover arrangement must be sought with all deliberate speed. One suggestion in this was made in LONDON [illegible]. It is our understanding that Headquarters is [illegible] and possibly others. Meanwhile QRPHONE/1 has been instructed to project a "business as usual" image. He should be able to do so with no adverse effect on his cover.

3. ESTIMATE OF AGENT'S CONTINUED DEGREE OF ACCESS TO TARGETS: QRPHONE/1's access remains substantially unchanged - with a possible improvement in access to the Palestinian target due to his attendance at the Algiers meeting.

4. EXTENT TO WHICH AGENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO [illegible] INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: QRPHONE/1 has appr[illegible] with energy and enthusiasm. He has fulfilled [illegible] maximum degree feasible - given the limitations imp[illegible] by the unwitting informant-type relationship [illegible]. Despite every effort by QRPHONE/1 to [illegible] - it must be recognized as a factor in this operation.

During the quarter QRPHONE/1 was the source [illegible] reports.

5. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS LEVIED UPON AGENT [illegible]: QRPHONE/1 will follow-up on his access to the Arab/Palestinian target. He will attempt to cultivate leaders in this cause - both European and Arab - with the objective of taking a trip to the Mid-East (Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut).

QRPHONE/1's postponed trip to the U.S. has been tentatively re-scheduled for April (in the next quarter).

QRPHONE/1 will re-visit Italy, per Rome Station's request, for another look at the activities and attitudes of the [illegible] left in Italy.

QRPHONE/1 will continue his development of African personalities of operational interest in London.

6. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENTS [illegible] PERSONAL SECURITY, ETC.: QRPHONE/1's response to assignments, like his performance, continues to be enthusiastic and energetic. The comments made in previous quarterly (and other reports) remain valid insofar as LCPIPIT and RODIGAST are able to judge.

7. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER [illegible] REPORTING TECHNIQUE: QRPHONE/1 has a very [illegible] personality and relates easily to others. This is a positive factor in [illegible] eliciting information from his many contacts and also [illegible] with him a pleasant and uncomplicated experience. QRPHONE/1 accepts case officer handling - including direction and criticism - well and in a constructive vein. The same holds true of critique of his reporting.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER, INCLUDING PROMOTION, [illegible]: A new method of funding the bulk of QRPHONE/1's salary to his Swiss bank has been approved and will be put into operation in January. This was necessitated by the problems of BIRNEE - which were cited in previous reports.

An increase in salary of $100 per month has been approved for QRPHONE/1. This will be effective 1 January and will be paid into an escrow-type arrangement in order that it not increase QRPHONE/1's standard of living.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON AGENT PERFORMANCE: QRPHONE/1 is an excellent asset. He has performed well and effectively against his targets.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF [illegible]: The initial effort to gain useful access to the Palestinian target seems to be progressing well. In subsequent quarters we will see whether or not this progress can be maintained.

The progress toward operationally useful contact with key Africans in London (Phombeah and Kambona) is painfully slow. In this - as in all other situations - the problem is mainly the nature of QRPHONE/1's access to his contacts (that of an unwitting informant). We feel that given this situation QRPHONE/1 is doing as well as might reasonably be expected.

OEPW - 858 was a much appreciated analysis of QRPHONE/1's recent reporting on the Italian target and explained why much of this has not been judged disseminable. Having reflected on this we realize that this is actually not surprising. It should be recalled that Rome Station specifically requested that QRPHONE/1 get away from rigid formal CS-type reporting and render more opinionated journalistic type reports. This type of reporting has been judged quite useful by Rome Station - but it is useful in an operational manner and for general appreciation of the situation. Thus it was not surprising that an analysis of this particular group of reports turned out as it did. Rome Station has orally noted to LCPIPIT that QRPHONE/1's visits will continue to be welcome and his reporting of definite use - even if this utility is outside the CS framework.

In general we feel that this operation is progressing well. In the past there may have been a tendancy on the part of certain "customers" to exaggerate QRPHONE/1's potential - with a consequent let-down when the realities of QRPHONE/1 the man and his access to targets was brought home. We now feel that this is behind us. Judged against the realities of his situation, his access and the nature of his targets, we think that QRPHONE/1 makes excellent progress against those targets assigned him.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

FBI (X-ref)
14 Jan '70

14-00000

December 1969

Z105762

Richard Gibson



→ WARNING—Alteration, Addition or Mutilation of Entries is Prohibited. Any Unofficial Change Will Render This Passport Invalid.

NAME
RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON

BIRTH DATE
MAY 13, 1931

BIRTHPLACE
CALIFORNIA, U.S.A.

HEIGHT
5 FEET 10 INCHES

HAIR
BLACK

EYES
BLACK

WIFE
X X X

ISSUE DATE
NOV. 10, 1969

MINORS
X X X

EXPIRATION DATE NOV. 9, 1974

Richard T. Gibson
SIGNATURE OF BEARER

→ IMPORTANT: This Passport is NOT VALID Until Signed BY THE BEARER.

201- 306052

SECRET

17 Dec 69

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division, OP

VIA: Chief, OPSER

SUBJECT: QRPHONE/1 - Amendment of Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. It is requested that QRPHONE/1's Memorandum of Oral Commitment be amended to increase Subject's tax free income from $850.00 to $950.00 per month effective 1 January 1970.

2. This $100.00 a month increase will be set up in an interest bearing escrow account.

/s/

B. HUGH TOVAR
Chief
Covert Action Staff

Concur: /s/ Rogers C. Brooks
Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Chief, OPSER
1 - CA/PERS
2 - CA/CF
1 - CA/CRU
1 - C/CA

CA-69-1163

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
COS, Paris; COS, London; C/EUR

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE/Passport

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OEPA - 2223

ZR 201-306052

1. Reference reported QRPHONE/1's having lost his passport and having obtained a replacement at the U.S. Embassy in London.

2. On 17 November Air France returned the lost passport by mail. No explanation was offered regarding the delay in finding and returning the passport. Since QRPHONE/1 had already obtained a new passport, he returned the old one to the U.S. Embassy in London for cancellation.

ACL
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

MICROFILMED
DEC 17 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
- 3 - C/WOLIME
- 1 - COS, Paris
- 1 - COS, London
- 1 - C/EUR

CS COPY

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 2263	DEC 10 1969 10 December 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~[illegible]~~ 200-124-156/3

24 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: CA/BF

SUBJECT: Escrow Statements of Account

1. Forwarded herewith is the 30 September 1969 Statement of Account for the escrow accounts maintained by Project MHMUTUAL for your division.

2. If any of these statements do not relate to your division, please advise so that we may change our records.

3. Effective 1 May 1969 the interest rate was increased from four to five per cent per annum on interest bearing accounts.

Daphne H. Merriman

DAPHNE H. MERRIMAN (P)
OGC/MHMUTUAL

Attachments: a/s

201-306052

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

ATLANTIC INVESTMENT CORPORATION
ESCROW ACCOUNT
Statement of Account
LARRY A. CUR

June 17, 1969 - September 30, 1969

Date	Receipts	Disburse-ments	Interest Payable*	Principal Balance	Account Balance
6/17/69	$ 3,200.00			$ 3,200.00	$ 3,200.00
6/30/69			$ 6.22	3,200.00	3,205.22
9/30/69			40.00	3,200.00	3,246.22

* 5% interest from day of deposit to day of withdrawal compounded annually on value date (6/17).

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
COS, London; C/EUR; COS, Paris

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 - 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational/MHPROBE
QRPHONE/Passport

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

2A 201-306052

1. At their most recent meeting QRPHONE/1 reported to RODIGAST that he had lost his passport in Paris during his recent visit to France. The loss occurred on 8 November in the departure lounge at Orly Airport as QRPHONE/1 was waiting to board AF 822 for London (leaving at 1755 hours). QRPHONE/1 had shown his passport to the immigration officials when he entered the lounge. He then went to the duty free shop to purchase a bottle of Scotch and a carton of cigarettes for his wife (she smokes Galoises). He presumes that his passport slipped from his pocket during the process of producing his wallet to pay for these items. At any rate he did not discover the loss until the flight was airborne.

2. QRPHONE/1 had no difficulty re-entering Britain using his Home Office Certificate of Registration. He reported the loss to Air France immediately but as of his meeting with RODIGAST on 13 November it had not been located.

3. On 10 November QRPHONE/1 went to the U.S. Embassy in London and obtained a new passport (the number of this passport is IDENTITY - u/s/c).

4. We advised CHALEMSKY, of Paris Station, of this loss during his visit to LCPIPIT on 14 November.

ACL
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

S/C ATTD BY RID/SD
Dated 9 Dec 69

Attachment: u/s/c
Passport Number

Distribution:
- ✓3 - C/WOLIME w/att
- 1 - COS, London w/o att
- 1 - COS, Paris w/att
- 1 - C/EUR w/o att

1 ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA - 2223

DATE
21 November 1969

201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
~~201 306 052~~
~~200-134-156/3~~

11P

SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

TO: OEPA - 2223

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 - 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IDENTITY

Z 1057628

SECRET

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-2223 CS COPY

201-306052
~~200-124-156/3~~

SECRET

7 NOV 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, CA Staff

SUBJECT: LCPIPIT Request for QRPHONE/1 Salary Increase

REFERENCE: OEPA - 2122

1. The following is a breakdown of QRPHONE/1's salary history:

Starting salary, June 1965	$600 per month
1 September 1966	$700 per month
1 July 1967	$800 per month

All of the above figures are tax free. In addition, as of 1 May 1969, Subject was given an additional $50 per month (also tax free) as our contribution toward some form of insurance against the future (endowment, lump sum cash value, or whatever the Field and he finally selected). This appears on the books as a salary increase. However, although to his ultimate advantage, it does result in a small decrease in take-home pay since Q/1 is also required to make a contribution to the payment of the premium.

2. In addition, Q/1's MOC also provides for $10,000 indemnification in case of death, or payment of $600 per month up to $10,000 to his wife in case of his total incapacitation or disappearance while employed by CIA. Allowance had originally been made for this provision when he seemed to have an excellent chance for travel to Peking; this year we included the provision as a general benefit, not tied to any particular type of hazardous travel alone. Finally, this year's amendment to his MOC also included a severance bonus of one month's salary for each year of satisfactory service. We placed $3,200 in a special escrow account to cover his previous four years' service, and are providing in our Project renewals for each year's required deposit to that escrow account. Please note, however, that this benefit has not yet been surfaced either to QRPHONE/1 or to RODIGAST, by decision of LCPIPIT (a decision which I believe was wise).

3. It is my feeling that the proposed salary increase of $250 tax free per month is way out of line. I believe that paragraph 3 of the reference, comparing Q/1 with a hypothetical GS-12 is a rather specious and unrealistic argument. Q/1, although an American, is an agent, and nothing more, and as you note in your penciled comment the question of quarters, allowances, and periodic step increases is not relevant. In addition, while I do not subscribe

SECRET

[illegible]

Q/201

to some of the criticisms that have been leveled at his production, the fact remains that I have not seen any marked improvement during the past two years in the quality of the material he provides us. As time goes on and the realistic criteria of what is disseminable and what is not are applied more and more to his production, and this production in turn remains at its present level of superficiality, we will see less and less of it qualify for dissemination. Since he is an FI agent, this has considerable significance, although it of course does not present the full picture of his capabilities. His operational intelligence has been received with mixed evaluations; usually his initial coverage of a subject is very well received and often whets the appetite of the recipient for more; somehow, however, that "more" never seems to materialize -- they get more of exactly the same caliber, but little more in terms of depth of reporting. Perhaps the fault lies in ORPHONE/1, in which case we should realize early that what we have here is not a true FI agent, but a sort of "operational intelligence butterfly." Perhaps, on the other hand, the fault lies in RODIGAST's handling of the man, not in terms of the personal relationship which RODIGAST has been able to build up with him, but maybe even because of that relationship. I remember when I first talked with RODIGAST I quickly realized that he felt he knew more than Headquarters as to what was important for O/1 to cover and what was not; I am sorry I missed RODIGAST on his TDY here and when I was in London, and that his home leave has been postponed, for I had hoped to determine for myself whether RODIGAST still felt that way. Whatever the reason, I am by no means giving up on O/1, but will continue to try to narrow down his targets so that he will have a fair shake at showing what he can do when he is not allowed to cover the waterfront.

4. What the above paragraph is leading up to, is that I do not in all honesty feel that he has done anything to really deserve a promotion, except build longevity since the last one, and perhaps not follow up (actively) on that newspaper job offered to him (his preference, in any event). However, I do realize that a man must have an incentive, and would like to propose that we suggest to LCPIPIT that a more realistic increase might be in the neighborhood of $100 a month, and that the severance bonus mentioned in paragraph 2 above might now be surfaced both to RODIGAST and to O/1 as a new benefit.

5. Attached for your ready reference is a copy of the ORPHONE quarterly report for 1 April to 30 June 1969; this is the last one we have received.

DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

Attachment: as stated
Distribution:
1 - CA/CF
Orig. & 1 - DC/CA

INF

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, RICHARD
201-306052
SEX M DOB ?

200-124-156/03
OEPA-02115
14 OCT 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
< UK, ENGLAND, LONDON
FORM ON EDITORIAL BOARD OF REVOLUTION
PRESENTLY IN ITALY

R 6911060376

FILE IN 201-~~30~~ 6052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

QUARTERLY REPORT

STATION/BASE : LCPIPIT (London)
AGENT'S CRYPT : QRPHONE/1
PERIOD COVERED : 1 July-30 September 1969
CASE OFFICER TIME: 12 working days per month (average)

PROJECT : QRPHONE
DATE OF POA/OA: 23 May 1966
COSTS : ~~$4,334.14~~ 6,619.14 (Field Costs Only)

1. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING PERIOD: Pursuant to plans developed as a result of Marie R. LUEBBERT's TDY, QRPHONE/1 made a continuing effort to deepen his contacts with various African personalities connected with the "London group". Although some progress has been made with persons who seem of secondary importance, QRPHONE/1 still is unable to gain the confidence of the central characters such as Dennis Phombeah and Oscar Kambona.

   QRPEONY's one week stay in the U.K. was a week of intense activity for QRPHONE/1 and saw his local "credentials" put to a most demanding test. QRPHONE/1 performed extremely well throughout the week. See OELA - 51297 for details.

   QRPHONE/1 has been able to monitor the activity of Belgian Communist Rene Raindorf who is attempting to become a key figure in the Palestinian liberation movement. See OEPA - 2037, 2099 and 2123.

   Following an overature from a U.S. newspaper QRPHONE/1 made a quick trip to New York to consult with Headquarters officers regarding the implications of this overature on his RVROCK status. See LCPIPIT 4222 and DIRECTOR 28728 for details.

   Through two unwitting female informants QRPHONE/1 was able to obtain reporting on the Algiers Cultural Festival. See OELA - 51298.

   QRPHONE/1 has continued his monitoring of the activity of various African liberation movement figures in London.

2. SPECIFIC MATTERS OF OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND COVER: QRPHONE/1's vacation in Italy with his family produced a marked improvement in his domestic situation - with its consequent impact upon the cover and security of the entire operation. This remains a matter of concern and one which will be carefully monitored.

   QRPURE is now entering into a more meaningful overt correspondence with QRPHONE/1, including discussions of his participation in the new magazine. This will have a positive impact upon QRPHONE/1's cover as a representative of QRPURE.

   A new means of funding QRPHONE/1's salary is being sought to replace BIKNEE, which is no longer functioning due to unrelated problems encountered by the principal agent of that operation. For a review of the security implications of this matter (which are thought to be minimal) please see DIRECTOR 46178.

3. ESTIMATE OF AGENT'S CONTINUED DEGREE OF ACCESS TO TARGETS: QRPHONE/1's access to his various targets remains substantially unchanged.

4. EXTENT TO WHICH AGENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO SERVICE ASSIGNMENTS, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: QRPHONE/1 has approached all his assignments with enthusiasm and energy. He has fulfilled these assignments to the maximum

SECRET

degree feasible - given his cover and the unwitting informant-type nature of his relationship with his many contacts. QRPHONE/1 makes every effort to overcome this limitation and in this regard a plentiful supply of background information greatly facilitates his elicitation of added details from his informants. However, this limitation is one which will always be with us in the case of QRPHONE/1 and it is one which can sometimes be particularly frustrating. During the past quarter QRPHONE/1 has been the source of 11 intelligence reports prepared by LCPIPIT/Reports.

5. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS LEVIED UPON AGENT FOR ENSUING PERIOD: QRPHONE/1 will make a trip to Italy in late September and early October in order to survey the situation within the Italian new left/radical sector. This trip is one which has been requested by Rome Station. (The trip will have been completed by the time this report is received by Headquarters.)

QRPHONE/1's contact with an official of the Eritrean Liberation Front led to a TDY by AF Division officer Geoffrey B. DRANSTON to brief LCPIPIT on the ELF and to discuss possible operational exploitation of this contact.

QRPHONE/1's trip to the United States has been deferred until spring 1970 by which time any possible repercussions from QRPEONY's return will be relatively unlikely.

An effort will be made to explore the operational possibilities posed by QRPHONE/1's existing (or potential) contacts within the Arab liberation movements. Headquarters views on this matter were requested in OEPA-2044.

A re-scheduling of QRPHONE/1's trip to Germany has been proposed and Headquarters and Bonn have been asked for guidance/requirements.

6. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENTS LEVIED INCLUDING MOTIVATION, PERSONAL SECURITY, ETC.: QRPHONE/1's response to assignments, like his performance, continues to be enthusiastic and energetic. The comments made in previous quarterly reporting regarding his security and motivation remain valid insofar as RODIGAST and LCPIPIT are able to judge.

7. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING OR CRITIQUE OF HIS REPORTING TECHNIQUE: QRPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and relates easily to others. This is a positive factor in his elicitation of information from his many contacts and also makes dealing with him a pleasant and uncomplicated experience. QRPHONE/1 accepts case officer handling - including direction and criticism - well and in a constructive vein. The same holds true of critique of his reporting. Please see previous reporting on this subject for added details.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS, INCLUDING PROMOTIONS, TRAINING: A new means of funding QRPHONE/1's salary is now being devised. This has been the subject of several items of correspondence between Headquarters and LCPIPIT. We plan to consult with the SGFLAG representative in Bern on this matter.

QRPHONE/1 has had some purely overt problems with his Chicago bank (an apparent error in his statement, etc.) He is also being charged very high service charges for the performance of routine transfers. If he is not able to resolve his problems with this bank it may be necessary for him to change banks.

At LCPIPIT's insistance QRPHONE/1 has begun to invest a portion of his monthly salary in a reputable Mutual Fund of his choice. This modest investment program will enhance his financial security in the event of termination and/or a rainy day".

14-00000

Negro Press International Inc.
5708 S. State 324-6320
Chicago, Ill. 60621

1514

4-11 1969 2-77/710

Pay to the order of Richard Gibson $200.00

Two Hundred & no/100 Dollars

PAID

APR 25 1969

American National Bank of Chicago
CHICAGO ILLINOIS
2-77

American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001514⑈ ⑆0710⑈0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

Negro Press International Inc.
5708 S. State 324-6320
Chicago, Ill. 60621

1555

April 30, 1969 2-77/710

Pay to the order of Acct. of Richard Gibson -6288401 Harris Trust & Savgs Bank $200.00

TWO HUNDRED AND NO/100-- Dollars

PAID

MAY 2 1969

American National Bank of Chicago
CHICAGO ILLINOIS
2-77

American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001555⑈ ⑆0710⑈0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

Negro Press International Inc.
5708 S. State 324-6320
Chicago, Ill. 60621

1409

3-1 1969 2-77/710

Pay to the order of Richard Gibson $200.00

Two Hundred & no/100 Dollars

American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001409⑈ ⑆0710⑈0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

Negro Press International Inc.
5708 S. State 324-6320
Chicago, Ill. 60621

1369

1-6 1969 2-77/710

Pay to the order of Richard Gibson $200.00

Two Hundred & no/100 Dollars

PAID

JAN 17 1969

American National Bank of Chicago
CHICAGO ILLINOIS
2-77

American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001369⑈ ⑆0710⑈0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

2 BANKERS TRUST COMPANY 2
3 1-103 NEW YORK 1-103 3

JAN 15'69 000 10

PRESENTED FOR COLLECTION TO
BANKERS TRUST CO.
20-7

1969

PAY ANY BANK
FEB CHICAGO
2-30

Richard Gibson

Richard Gibson

COD
LONDON, N.W.3.
20-74-65
40 WELLI
20-7

PAY ANY BANK
FEB CHICAGO

PRESENTED FOR COLLECTION TO
GUARANTY TRUST CO.
OF NEW YORK

BARCLAYS BANK LTD.
26 FEB

FEB 25

Credited to the account
of the within payee
TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK
CHICAGO 90, ILLINOIS

PAID 1969

7 3 3 9

APP.

Richard Gibson

Any Bk., Bkr., or Tr. Co., P.E.G.
FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK
NEW YORK, N.Y.
1-8

PAY ANY BANK
FEB CHICAGO
AP 22
3 000
20-74-6

PRESENTED FOR COLLECTION TO
THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK

BARCLAYS BANK LTD.

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1316

PAID

11-29 1968 $\frac{2-77}{710}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard G. [illegible] $200.00

Two Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank of Chicago
CHICAGO
ILLINOIS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

Henry [illegible]

001316 0710-0077 289086 0000020000

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

14

PAID

MAR 18 1969

6 1969 $\frac{2-77}{710}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $200.00

Two Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank of Chicago
CHICAGO
ILLINOIS 2-77
2-77

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

Henry [illegible]

001465 0710-0077 289086 0000020000

Richard Gibson

Richard Gibson

PAY ANY BANK
FEB ... 1963

PAY ANY BANK
FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK
NEW YORK N.Y.
1-8 1-8

DEC 12 68 3901

BARCLAYS BANK LIMITE
ST. JOHN'S WOOD
40 WELLINGTON ROAD, LONDON, N.W.8.
20-74-65 20-74-6

PAY ANY BANK
FEB ... 1963

REMITTED FOR COLLECTION TO
THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK
BY BARCLAYS BANK LTD.

BANK LTD.

FOR COLLECTION
GUARANTY TRUST CO
OF NEW YORK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT		**PROCESSING ACTION**
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WOLIME	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, EUR; Chief, LCPIPIT/London		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, London		MICROFILM

SUBJECT QRPREY/QRPHONE/MHPROBE/JAGUAR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As previously reported, we related to JAGUAR the incident in which Lionel Morrison is believed to have searched QRPHONE's papers while the latter was out of town. As you know, there have been some indications in the past which might be taken to suggest that Morrison was a JAGUAR contact - he works for the Daily Telegraph and seems to be in touch with David Floyd, and on one occasion provided QRPHONE with a report (on QRPEONY) which came almost simultaneously from JAGUAR. Clearly, this does not add up to much of a case, and we could hardly conceive that JAGUAR would be involved in the harrassment of QRPHONE. Even if there was no JAGUAR contact with Morrison, however, we felt it might be possible that JAGUAR could add to our understanding of this peculiar development from sources available to their own net. JAGUAR's reply is as follows (CORONET is the agreed crypt for QRPHONE):

> "With reference to your letter of 24th April 1969, we have been informed by a secret and delicate source that David M. SIBEKO, the newly appointed P.A.C. representative in London, has recently been told by Elias NTLOEDIBE, the P.A.C. representative in Nairobi, of the incident of MORRISON's search of CORONET's papers. According to Elias, MORRISON had written him a letter in an attempt to blackmail him. Elias told SIBEKO that what annoyed him was that MORRISON had sent photostat copies of Elias's own correspondence with CORONET.
>
> "Elias went on to say he was satisfied that MORRISON must have had covert access to CORONET's personal effects. Elias was surprised that CORONET had not replied to letters

/Continued/

Distribution:
- ②- C/WOLIME
- 3 - C/EUR
- 1 - C/LCPIPIT/London

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	**DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER** OELA-50928	**DATE** 26 June 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	**HQS FILE NUMBER** 201-306052

A substantial increase in QRPHONE/1's salary has been requested by LCPIPIT. We have further proposed that this increase be paid into an escrow-type account. See OEPA - 2122 for details.

9. GENERAL COMMENTS ON OVERALL AGENT PERFORMANCE: QRPHONE/1's overall performance has been superior.

10. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF PROJECT: QRPHONE/1 continues to perform in a most effective manner.

AcL
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OELA-50928

he had written to him about the A.N.C. and enclosing press cuttings. He has asked SIBEKO fo find out if CORONET got those letters, and to warn CORONET that MORRISON or someone acting for him has been stealing mail from his (CORONET's) house.

"Elias speculates that the spy, whoever he is, may be working for Black Power or Marxist/Leninists or The Telegraph or even M.I.5., and wants CORONET told of this.

"Elias has written to MORRISON telling him to go to hell and that he (Elias) and his friends will stand by SIBEKO.

"Elias has said that he held no brief for CORONET, but he notes that CORONET was introduced to the party by MORRISON and that in June 1968, MORRISON wrote an article in the Zambian Mail describing CORONET as a great Afro/American and a great revolutionary.

"According to Elias, CORONET was then living in London and he recalls that there was correspondence between CORONET and MORRISON at that time; and that CORONET used to supply MORRISON with pocket money. SIBEKO wonders when MORRISON began to work for CIA and infers that he and his friends should no longer be taken in by the 'coloureds.'

"In view of the delicacy of the source I should be grateful if the above information is not passed on to CORONET."

2. This reply does not of course answer all our questions, but it does seem to be in accord with what we know of the incident from QRPHONE. It seems reasonable to attribute Morrison's actions to factional fending with PAC - a crossfire in which QRPHONE happened to be caught.

NDK
Nowell D. KAMMERMAYER

201-306052

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

VIA: MPS/BG
OGC/MHMUTUAL

SUBJECT: MHMUTUAL Escrow Account for QRPHONE/1

1. It is requested that an MHMUTUAL interest-bearing escrow account be set up in an appropriate alias for agent QRPHONE/1. In accordance with an amendment to the agent's MOC concerning a severance bonus, the account is intended to accommodate annual payments of one month's salary for every completed year of satisfactory service. The initial deposit consists of $3,200, retroactively covering four years' service and computed at the rate of $800 per year. Additional deposits, in the amount of the agent's salary on the anniversary date of his contractual relationship (1 June), will be made annually to his account on or about that date.

2. Any additional questions that might arise may be taken up with Chief, CA/CF, ~~or with Miss Ann Jane Long~~.

B. HUGH TOVAR
Chief
Covert Action Staff

APPROVED Thies
MPS/BG
signed June 6

201-306052

CA-69-560

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - MPS/BG
1 - OGC/MHMUTUAL
1 - C/CA
1 - C/CA/SG
1 - C/CA/BF
1 - CA/CRU
2 - CA/CF

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	A	10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/CA 3 ☐ RID COPY

735

INFO: FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/EUR 5, C/CI

S E C R E T 201634Z MAY 69 CITE LONDON 2779

LOND

20 MAY 69 IN 62534

ASD		~~CA/PROP~~
ABSTRACT	X	

DIRECTOR INFO LCPIPIT

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE MHPROBE

REF: DIRECTOR 03219

1. LOCAL USIS HAS REPORTED THAT VISITING USIA OFFICIAL HAS INFORMED THAT QRPURE IS A LEGITIMATE OUTFIT BUT APPEARED TOO SMALL TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT FULL TIME STRINGER ABROAD. ADVISED LNPURE NOT ENCOURAGE LANDY TO GO TO BAT FOR ARPHONE.

2. LANDY IN MEANTIME FOUND THAT QRPHONE OUT OF TOWN AND FREQUENTLY TRAVELS ABROAD. THIS HAS SET LOCAL USIA TO SPECULATING THAT QRPHONE MIGHT HAVE WANTED PRESS PASS TO ESTABLISH BONA FIDES AS NEWSMAN ABROAD. LOCAL USIA HAS DETERMINED THAT MORNING STAR (CPGB) HAS PRESS PASSES, BUT THAT THEY NOT GIVEN TO BLOC JOURNALISTS.

3. LANDY WILL SIMPLY INFORM QRPHONE THAT SCOTLAND YARD TURNED DOWN APPLICATION AND THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT. QRPHONE WILL DROP MATTER.

4. FILE: 201-306052.

SECRET

CS COPY

20 May 1969

201-306052

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______

ACTION
c/CA 3 ☐ RID COPY
604

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:
FILE, VR, c/RI/SD, c/EUR 5, c/CCS 2, c/CI, c/FI 2

UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 081705Z MAY 69 CITE LONDON 2484 8 MAY 69 IN 53923

DIRECTOR INFO LCPIPIT

RYBAT QRPHONE MHPROBE

REF: LCPIPIT 2389 (IN 51831)

1. USIA CABLE DISCUSSED REF WAS UKNT MAY 7, NO. 3516, FOR ATTENTION IOS MCNICHOL.

2. FILE: 201-306052.

S E C R E T

CS COPY

8 May 69
201-306052

SECRET

14-00000

INCOMING TELEGRAM **United States Information Agency**

14 CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

SDO 2
AF
ONE.
OCI/WES
DCS
INDIO
CA/E

ACTION
IOS

INFO:
IAE

EH1193
RR RUEHIA
DE RUDTCR 3516 1271020
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071012Z MAY 69

02940

PF

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO USIA WASHDC-~~802~~

STATE GRNC

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 3516

file QRPHONE

USIAC

FOR IOS MCNICHOL. FOR GUIDANCE OF PRESIDENT OF AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS IN LONDON WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL OF CHICAGO IS LEGITIMATE CLIENTEL. ALSO WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS ANY INFORMATION OF RECENT ACTIVITIES OF RICHARD GIBSON, NPI REPRESENTATIVE HERE WHICH WOULD MAKE HIS CLAIM TO BE REPUTABLE PRESS REPRESENTATIVE SUSPECT. FYI SCOTLAND YARD HAS REFUSED ISSUE POLICE PASS TO GIBSON AND ASSOCIATION WISHES TO SUPPORT HIS REQUEST UNLESS HE HAS RECORD WHICH CLEARLY INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS. WOULD APPRECIATE CABLED REPLY CONTAINING ESTIMATE WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO ASSOCIATION OFFICERS PURELY AS GUIDANCE. KING

EUR 3
CA 3
CI
⑰

201- 300052

CONFIDENTIAL

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
MAY 1 [illegible]
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO Chief, WOLIME
Chief of Station, Bern

INFO. Chief of Station, London; Chief, EUR Division
Chief of Base, Geneva

FROM Acting Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE/Switzerland

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As addressees are aware QRPHONE/1 has officially been denied entry into Switzerland since 16 December 1963. This order was issued in connection with his employment with Identity A, which was then receiving money from the Chinese--in violation of Swiss neutrality. A similar order was also issued at that time for Identity B, who was the Editor of Identity A.

2. It is now some six years later and QRPHONE/1 (at least overtly) is employed as a legitimate journalist. He is not a member of any group which is proscribed by the Swiss authorities--although, of course, he maintains contact with a wide variety of leftist individuals in pursuit of his operational tasks. QRPHONE/1 has noted that Identity B has been allowed back into Switzerland--in connection with his defense of Arab terrorists and feels that if the Swiss are willing to do this for Identity B then they should also lift the ban on his entry into Switzerland. QRPHONE/1 obviously feels personally about this, and it may be that future operational benefit could be gained if QRPHONE/1 were again able to enter Switzerland.

3. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of a report written by QRPHONE/1 following his contact with the Swiss Embassy in London on this matter. We are also forwarding under separate cover a copy of the letter which he sent the Embassy in which he formally states his request that the entry ban be lifted.

/CONTINUED.../

Attachments: u/s/c
1-As Stated above
2-Identity Sheet

DOC FORWARDED u/s/c
BY RID/SD 1 3 MAY 1969

Distribution:
- C/WOLIME w/atts
2 - COS/Bern w/atts
1 - COS/London w/o atts
1 - C/EUR w/o atts
1-COB/Geneva w/atts

CS COPY

MAY 8 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D 200-124-156/3	OEPA-1794	7 May 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET/RYBAT	201-306052

4. You will note that the Swiss Embassy suggested that QRPHONE/1 work through the U.S. Embassy on this matter. We have told QRPHONE/1 not to do this, but rather to deal directly with the Swiss. If he needs certification of his status as a working journalist we suggested that QRPHONE/1 obtain this from the appropriate professional organization (of which he is a member) in London.

5. We presume that the Swiss Embassy in London will be forwarding QRPHONE/1's letter to Bern. We will appreciate being advised of any Swiss action, or statements, on this case which may come to the attention of Bern Station. Any advice which Bern Station can offer regarding QRPHONE/1's pursuit of this matter will be welcome.

6. Of course Bern Station should continue to be guided by the contents of DIRECTOR-69543 in any dealings with the Swiss concerning QRPHONE/1.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO: 1660

OEPA-1794

3P

MICROFILMED
MAY 13 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SWISS ENTRY BAN PROBLEM

On 15 April 1969, I spoke with Charles Henry Bruggmann, First Secretary at the Swiss Embassy in London and who handles press affairs, by phone. I tried to arrange a personal meeting with Bruggman, who insisted on knowing the exact nature of my business with him. He claimed there was nothing he could do for me in London, except to forward a letter from me through channels to the proper authorities in Berne. (I later sent him ~~him~~ such a letter.) Bruggmann urged me to work through the U.S. State Department, which could take up the matter through the Embassy in Berne. If the U.S. Embassy would only vouch for me as a professional journalist, Bruggmann added, I would be almost certain to get the ban lifted.

Naturally, I have made no efforts to contact anyone at the Embassy in London, but perhaps something might be done to get the Embassy in Berne to acknowledge at least, when queried by the Swiss, that I am a bonafide journalist in the employ of a reputable U.S. news and features agency?

CS COPY

SCA #16
OEPA-1794

D 200-124-156/3

201-306052

1984

REGISTERED

17th April, 1969.

Mr. Charles Henry Bruggmann,
First Secretary,
Embassy of Switzerland,
77/81 Gloucester Place,
London, W.1.

Dear Sir,

Following our telephone conversation a few days ago, I am now writing formally to you to request that the ban on my entry into Switzerland be lifted. This ban, which dates from 1963, was never personally directed against me but against the publication for which I was then working as an Editor. That publication, 'African Revolution', no longer exists and I note that its former Algerian publisher, Me Jacques Verges now visits Switzerland frequently. In any case I am now in no way connected with him.

As you know, I am the overseas representative and correspondent, based in London, of Negro Press International, the major Negro news and features agency in the United States, which serves some 270 newspapers. This is a bona fide commercial journalistic enterprise and serves no political purpose. I personally am a member of the Foreign Press Association and the Association of American Correspondents in London and am accredited to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office here.

It is part of my duties to report on the activities of the United Nations and its agencies. I have been, for many years, accredited at United Nations Headquarters in New York and I was also an accredited correspondent at the founding conference in Geneva of UNCTAD. Many important meetings are scheduled to be held in Geneva during this year and I have been asked by my firm to cover these conferences. Therefore, I ask your consideration and cooperation in obtaining the removal of the ban on me in Switzerland which prevents me from fulfilling pressing professional duties.

I wish to make it most clear here that I am in no way connected with any political organization or bodies in Switzerland or elsewhere and am an established and well-known professional international journalist.

Sincerely Yours,

14-00000

SECRET RYBAT 1P

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 2 TO: OEPA-1794

IDENTITIES

MICROFILMED
MAY 13 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

A - Revolution Magazine

B - Jacques VERGES

CS COPY

SCA #2 to
OEPA-1794
D 200-124-156/3

SECRET RYBAT

201-306052

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
CA
BY: 9 AT: 1325 Z
DISSEM BY: 5 PER
ACTION
c/CA 3 ☐ RID COPY
573

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
INFO: FILE, VR, c/WH 2, c/EUR 5, c/CI, c/FI 2

PRECEDENCE

6 MAY 69 IN 51831

S E C R E T 061128Z MAY 69 CITE LCPIPIT 2389
PALP

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE MHPROBE

AT~~XM~~	~~FI~~	
~~PS~~	~~DEPT~~	CA/2F
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

1. USIA REPS HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY JEROME LANDY, UK REPRESENTATIVE OF WESTINGHOUSE BROADCASTING AND PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION IN LONDON, CONCERNING YQPHONE. LANDY FORWARDED QRPHONE'S APPLICATION FOR A POLICE PASS TO SCOTLAND YARD (METROPOLITAN POLICE), WHICH TURNED IT DOWN, REFUSING TO GIVE A REASON. LANDY HAS CAPABILITY RAISE CONSIDERABLE FUSS ON QRPHONE BEHALF AND WANTS TO REPRESENT MEMBERS OF HIS ASSOCIATION AS BEST HE CAN. QRPHONE HAS PUT SOME PRESSURE ON HIM, CLAIMING TO BE LEGITIMATE REP OF QRPURE, ETC., RAISING QUESTION WHETHER TURN DOWN HAS SOME RACIST OVERTONE. SOMEWHAT CAUGHT IN MIDDLE, LANDY TURNED TO EMBASSY TO ASK WHAT IT CAN TELL HIM ABOUT QRPHONE TO HELP HIM JUDGE LATTERS JOURNALISTIC BONA FIDES. ACCORDING TO USIA OFFICER WHO INTERVIEWED HIM, LANDY IS ALSO HAVING QUIET INQUIRY INTO QRPURE MADE THROUGH HIS CHICAGO CONTACTS.

2. USIA QUERIED LOCAL LNER~~[illegible]~~ GO WHICH REPORTED IT HAD

CS COPY

SECRET

6 May 69

201-306052

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION		1 / 6 2 / 7 3 / 8 4 / 9 5 / 10
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		
BY: AT: Z	INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO		
	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.		
	X-REF TO FILE NO.		
DISSEM BY: PER #	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.		
ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO: FILE, VR.		

PAGE 2 LCPIPIT 2389 SECRET

NOTHING SINCE 1962 AND FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA CONNECTION. IN ANSWER TO USIA QUESTION, STATION REPLIED THAT IT HAD COME ACROSS QRPHONE NAME ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BECAUSE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH REVOLUTION, EXPULSION FROM SWITZERLAND, ETC. TOLD USIA THAT IT SOUNDED TO US THAT JUDGMENT WHETHER TO GIVE OR WITHHOLD POLICE PASS IS POLICE DECISION, AND WE WOULD NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO TELL LOCAL USIA WHICH WOULD ARGUE THAT LANDY SHOULD MAKE A CASE OUT OF IT. DID STATE THAT OUR RECOLLECTION FROM THE FILE WAS THAT QRPURE WAS A LEGITIMATE OUTFIT, BUT DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING FURTHER ABOUT IT THAN THAT.

3. IN ORDER TO PERMIT US CHANCE TO ALERT YOU, WE PERSUADED USIA DELAY ITS MESSAGE "WHILE WE CHECKED STATION FILES FOR ANY RELEVANT INFO." USIA CABLE WILL REPORT PROBLEM AND ASK GUIDANCE ON HOW TO ADVISE LANDY.

4. WILL FORWARD USIA MESSAGE NUMBER WHEN AVAILABLE. SUGGEST YOU ALERT QRPURE TO POSSIBLE INQUIRY (ALTHOUGH THEY MAY NOT, OF COURSE, BECOME AWARE OF IT).

5. QRPHONE OUT OF UK SINCE 24 APRIL, RETURNING 13 MAY. WILL BE TOLD NOT RPT NOT TO PRESS LANDY TO ESCALATE THIS MATTER INTO MAJOR ISSUE.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY:________ AT:____________ Z

DISSEM BY__________PER________#

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO________

X-REF TO FILE NO.________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 LCPIPIT 2389 SECRET

6. FILE: 201-306052.

SECRET

SECRET

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ~ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE • TOTAL COPIES 3 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

VANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

: ______ AT: ______ Z

SSEM BY 6 PER

TION UNIT AF 7 | INFO | FILE, VR 2/AA c/ci 2, EUR 6, CA 5, CA/PROP, FI 2

TION NO. 099

S E C R E T 021205Z MAY 69 CITE PRETORIA 6916 PRET 2 MAY 69 IN 49487

OEL

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

SECROWBAR

IP d/

1. SELEVER/17 PROVIDED FOLLOWING MEMO ON 2 MAY:

"SUBJECT: RICHARD GIBSON 201-306052

Δ U.K. LONDON
CIT: USA
OCC: Journalist

SUBJECT IS BELIEVED TO BE AN AFRO-AMERICAN JOURNALIST RESIDING IN LONDON. HE TAKES A KEEN INTEREST IN AFRICAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

IT HAS COME TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THAT SUBJECT, WHO HAS OFTEN BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL EXPATRIATES, IS NOW SUSPECTED WIDELY OF BEING BOTH A (WOFIRM) AGENT AND A SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE CONTACT. THE TANZANIAN ASSISTANT HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON HAS APPARENTLY ALSO BEEN INFORMED OF THE SUSPICIONS AGAINST SUBJECT AND HAS PROMISED TO ALERT HIS GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TO HAVING SUBJECT DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA IN AFRICA. ABOVE MERELY FYI."

AH	PR
13	X
14	X
~~RS~~	
~~RX~~	4
~~FI~~	
AF/2/SA	

2. IN PASSING THE ABOVE, SELEVER/17 COMMENTED GIBSON PUTS OUT SOMETHING CALLED "THE GIBSON LETTER" ON ABOUT A WEEKLY BASIS AND SELEVER HAS FOUND THAT HIS INFO RE

MICROFILMED
MAY 19 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

SECRET

02 May 69
201-306052

MAY 6 3 20 PM '69

MAY 9 3 58 PM '69

RECEIVED RID/EDI

INDEXED RID/EDI

PAGE 2 PRETORIA 6916 S E C R E T

PAC, AAC, ETC. IS FAIRLY ACCURATE. ALSO STATED HE NOT RPT NOT ONE OF SELEVER CONTACTS.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON GIBSON, WHICH WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE FOR PASSAGE TO SELEVER.

4. INDEX.

5. FILE: 72-2-2/3.

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET/RYBAT	OEPA-1708

as MANCHANDA, which are obviously known to the security authorities. Furthermore QRPHONE/1 himself might think it odd that he was being treated in that fashion and suspect that the Home Office was aware of his role which would not help your relationship with him. Alternatively (a) would obviously be a nuisance to say the least, so we felt that the obvious answer was (b) i.e. an extension of another year on present conditions."

3. We have attached QRPHONE/1's brief report of his visit to the Home Office to obtain this visa renewal.

ACL

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

I think JAGUAR was absolutely right!

HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO: OEPA-1708

BRITISH VISA RENEWED

On 12 March, I got my British visa renewed until 15 February 1970. As in the past, my request seemed to cause some panic at the Home Office and I had to wait from 0930 until 1500 before finally obtaining the visa, albeit with apologies for the lengthy delay — normally it takes about an hour.

H/w att #1 to
OEPA-1708

CS COPY

201-306052

SECRET

20 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jane Long, CA/CF, 3D0101

SUBJECT : Laboratory Tests, QRPHONE/1

REFERENCES : (1) OEPA-1662, 28 February 1969
(2) OEPW-405, 7 October 1968

Review of the laboratory studies from the initial dispatch and the one dated 28 February indicate a definite improvement of the liver function tests. It is our opinion that the individual has recovered from his hepatitis and should have no complications if he continues to follow his doctor's advice as to diet.

ROBERT A. INGRAM, M.D.
Operations Division
Office of Medical Services

Attachments:
Above references

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/R Y B A T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
Chief, EUR Division
Chief of Station, London

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London QBM

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE/Medical Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

QRPHONE/1's doctor has determined that his liver function has now returned to normal following his attack of hepatitis last Fall. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of the report of clinical tests given QRPHONE/1.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
Report

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/SD 19 MAR 1969

Distribution:
✓3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

2' Mar. 69
cf. x [illegible]

MAR 3 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-1662

DATE
28 February 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/R Y B A T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-306052
~~200-124-156/3~~

Dr. J. R. DALY

1 RIVERSIDE CLOSE
KINGSTON UPON THAMES
SURREY
01 - 546 5828

Dept. of CHEMICAL PATHOLOGY
WEST LONDON HOSPITAL
HAMMERSMITH
LONDON, W.6
01 - 748 3441

Jan. 20th, 1969.

To professional charges for biochemical investigations carried out on Jan 14th, 1969 :

£6. 6. 0.

With the compliments of Dr. Daly.

Dr. J. R. DALY

1 RIVERSIDE CLOSE
KINGSTON UPON THAMES
SURREY
01 - 546 5828

Dept. of CHEMICAL PATHOLOGY
WEST LONDON HOSPITAL
HAMMERSMITH
LONDON, W.6
01 - 748 3441

Jan. 20th, 1969.

Dear

Herewith your liver function tests, which now seem virtually as good as new.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

John Daly

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: OEPA-1662

1 RIVERSIDE CLOSE
KINGSTON UPON THAMES
SURREY
KINgston 5828

Dept. of CHEMICAL PATHOLOGY
WEST LONDON HOSPITAL
HAMMERSMITH
LONDON, W.6
RIVerside 3441

Jan 20th, 1969.

Liver Function Tests, Jan. 14th, 1969.

Plasma	total bilirubin	less than 0.5	mg./100ml.
	alkaline phosphatase	3	K-A. units.
	alanine aminotransferase	9	i.u./l.
Serum	total protein	7.4	g./100ml.
	albumin	3.8	g./100ml.
	globulin	3.6	g./100ml.

Electrophoresis of serum protein showed a normal pattern.

Comment : All parameters of liver function tested appear to have returned to normal.

Chemical Pathologist.

187

NOTE:

This is sensitive information and must be cleared with E/AS/S prior to forwarding to HSCA.

(Gibson) OLC-78-1790/1

NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PROC. POSTED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, AF 1P

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Algiers

SUBJECT
Monthly Report/Errol S. KULPA

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Attached find contact and subject reports covering activities of KULPA during the month of January 1963. The two outstanding characteristics of this project remain a helter-skelter operational pattern and the usual difficulties in administration.

2. We can not really blame KULPA for the former. His forte is moving around and being able to convince. These two qualities are rare enough not to demand in too loud a voice for the third--serious concentration on a long range target. It is not that KULPA lacks the professionalism, rather it is the tempo of his personal and professional life that inclines him to speed rather than accuracy. As last month was marked by the stop and go of SCIMITAR/6, so this month was hampered by the upcoming Congo voyage. It is not that these ventures are unimportant, it simply remains difficult to judge KULPA's performance on events occuring outside our area of competence.

3. We can say nothing new or nothing untrue on the administrative aspects of the project. The cry is the same from all small stations--why must so much valuable time be spent on tiny administrative detail. In KULPA's case the matter is perhaps compounded by his transfer from Casablance but his complete file is living evidence of the imbalance of the outside staffer. In the regular four way breakdown, the file reflects almost no paper in Plans and Development, Production is not fat, Operations is fuller but transitory, Support is a swollen, blistering monster. We see no end to it. Our present agenda for the next KULPA meeting calls for a discussion of eleven separate administrative items. One more chestnut and we are finished. The KULPAS of the world take precise careful case officering with sufficient time prior and post the meeting to bring order from chaos. It is just this time that a small station lacks. So far, we are glad to state, KULPA seems to be worth the price paid.

David W. Lawton
DAVID W. LAWTON 3-6-25/4

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/AF (w/att h/w)

INDEX

Attachments:
a.s.a (1 copy of each)

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE TYPED
17 Feb 1963

DATE DISPATCHED
FEB. 19 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
AAAA-554

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
3 - 6 - 25/4

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

SUBJECT : [illegible]
TIME/DATE : 15 [illegible]
PLACE : [illegible]

1. [illegible] out with E. the [illegible] very helpful for E's [illegible] to the spirit of [illegible] drinking, however. [illegible] putting off the [illegible]

2. [illegible] our previous reports [illegible] really useful. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] asked that [illegible]

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUPPLIED

14-00000

no action on this [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] restrictions [illegible] [illegible]

3. [illegible] at least to [illegible], [illegible] real [illegible] [illegible] according to this, [illegible], his CE3 [illegible] [illegible] second hand and at least part of the [illegible] based upon [illegible] [illegible]. This is [illegible] [illegible], 10 [illegible] [illegible] been [illegible] [illegible] on this [illegible].

4. [illegible] of his [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in his [illegible] [illegible] of his [illegible] [illegible]

5. The matter of his [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. He told him [illegible] [illegible] to forward a breakdown of his pay and [illegible] [illegible]

6. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on [illegible] of the silly thing for [illegible] [illegible]

7. [illegible] Government pay for [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] his [illegible] and this [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]), [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] on [illegible] 21 January at [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible]

Secret

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/R Y B A T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/MHPROBE/Operational
QRPHONE/British Immigration Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 12 March 1969 QRPHONE/1 was granted an extension on his British visa valid until 15 February 1970.

2. Since QRPHONE/1's file at the Home Office indicates an interest on the part of JAGUAR in his case, JAGUAR was consulted prior to the issuance of the extension. (This is not unusual in the cases of persons such as QRPHONE/1 and does not necessarily imply an "agent" status. Of course WOFIRM is not mentioned at all in this file.) In coordination with London Station it was decided that a re-newal of QRPHONE/1's one-year visa was preferable to the granting of permanent resident status--which would normally have been the case. We quote from the appropriate memorandum from JAGUAR to London Station on this matter:

> "The choice was between:-
>
> a) an extension of two months
> b) an extension of one year i.e. a repeat of what was granted to him last year
> c) that his temporary residence should be made "unconditional" which would be the normal procedure if there were no special considerations.
>
> Our feeling was that for QRPHONE/1's cover purposes (c) would be undesirable; if his friends got to know of it they might think he was being treated over-generously in view of his contacts with leftwing revolutionaries such

/CONTINUED.../

Attachment: h/w
Report

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

1att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-1708

DATE
2 April 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/R Y B A T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

Secret

22 January 1962

CONTACT REPORT // PROJECT LUS[illegible]IKER.

1. The record of KULPA'S dealings with Serge Michel and Roberto Holden appear to be as follows.
   a. Four (4) initial meetings with Michel on 17 and 18 Jan.
   b. Two (2) meetings with Holden on 19th and 20th Jan. It was evidently at these meetings that the trip to the Congo was arranged.

2. KULPA contacted Farmore during the afternoon [illegible] January, Saturday. Farmore explained that he could not pass on the [illegible] plan discussed that day between KULPA and Holden. K. should call Farmore at 0900 the following day, Sunday and discuss the matter with him.

3. Farmore contacted Lawton that same evening and [illegible] between the two showed that it would be difficult to ask [illegible] on the minimum info Kulpa had give Farmore over the phone. [illegible] wait for the next day's contact and to advise KULPA to hold off [illegible] with Holden. The latter was leaving for Tunis at 1300 on Sunday.

4. KULPA telephoned Lawton at 1030 instead of 0900 [illegible] his watch was wrong. He had quite obviously overslept. Lawton advised him to put Holden off and KULPA gave no indication of any difficulty in this respect. A meeting was set up for 1000 on Sunday, 21 January.

5. It was at this meeting that it became apparent that KULPA had indeed committed himself and that Holden was making firm plans to have K. join him the following week in Leopoldville.

Secret

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

LUSTRUM-R REPORT 228, [illegible] 19 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts with Serge Michel

PLACE: Aletti Hotel, two meetings 17 Jan and two meetings 18 Jan

1. Michel is starting a new publication to be called ATLAS, much on the order of Pari-Match, which will be aimed at French-speaking North Africa, Middle East, and Algerians in France. An Algerian trained at Franc-Tireur in Paris will be editor (he was unnamed) and Michel will be the guiding genius. Color will be used for the cover and adds inside, the plates being made in West Germany. An Arabic edition will be issued later.

2. Michel plans to use three photographers for the magazine, fnu Lakhdar aka Djamal (trained in Czech), Djmal Tchanderli (if he consents to use a camera instead of a movie camera), and me. (Michel said he had to use Algerians even they were not "photographers", but that he needed me to back them up technically.) He has already taken twenty-some photos from me and has given me a long listof others he wants. He has promised to pay 150 francs each to start, with raise in pay as the magazine progresses. I said my present work earns my living, and a question ofprestige was more important than pay for the moment. (Comment: I'm not sure how serious Michel is, nor if he has the authority to use me. At least he talks a good game, and he has taken some photos to show the editor for use in the first few issues.)

3. Before Michel offered employment on the magazine, he asked if I would be free to spend three or four weeks in Angola and the Congo with Roberto Holden to take "several thousand" photos which could be used for the next several years in a continuing campaign for the liberation of Angola, with me retaining selling rights in the negatives and the entire trip being paid by Holden. I said I was willing if I could arrange it with my employers. That was at noon 18 Jan. At six p.m. 18 January, Michel announced to me that Holden had agreed to sponsor a trip for me to Angola. As a first step, Holden wanted me present at 1000 Jan 19 to take photos of his interview with Ben Bella. I will be there.

4. Michel then said the Atlas once underway would not be his responsibility, just as he had loosed the reins of Al Chaab once it was started. Then he will publish an entire series of slick,one-time publications on the various phases of the Algerian government and its efforts, a photo book on Algeria, photo books on the various regions and problems of Algeria. Concurrently, he will be doing publications on Black African subjects, taking many, long swings through Africa to gather the information andphotos. He said, "You will be working more with me and traveling through Africa at that time than working on Atlas, which should have a good backlog of Algerian photos by then." He added, "Of course, I'll have to get permission to take you on these trips—maybe they'll want an African photographer instead."

5. After the Holden/Ben Bella interview today, I am to meet Holden and Michel to make further plans.

REPRODUCTION CARD

LISTRIK JR REPORT #230, Paris

21 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts 17-20 Jan

1. Serge Michel: Saw twice daily. He proceeded very rapidly re the proffered trip to Angola, including arrangements with Roberto Holden to pay for the trip. Only other interesting subject discussed was Atlas/ Al Chaab/ Afrique Revolution. He says the [illegible] will be merged with Atlas some time this year.

Ne-2-1

2. Josie Fanon: Met her twice with Serge Michel, xxxxxx same subject. She seems to be quite in the heart of Atlas, is very strong, treated as equal by Serge.

201-114045

3. Roberto Holden: Saw him twice, on 17th and 20th. On 19th after Ben Bella interview, Josie Fanon presented me to him, and he mentioned that "Mr. Serge" had talked of me. He made [illegible] for him to [illegible] publicity for Angola. The 20th with Michel & Fanon, before I could [illegible], Holden told me he was applying for my visa in Tunis that afternoon, and that he would send me my ticket to Leopoldville the day that he returned to [illegible]. He is stopping at Congress, but the ticket would be here [illegible] 27th. I explained that I was willing—as I had told [illegible]—but that [illegible] country might not let me go if things were happening in Algeria. (Holden is going to Moscow in the very near future, according to Taleb Jamal who says Holden told him.)

4. Commandant [illegible]: Saw him twice, once at Villa Joly on 19th and at my home night of 20th. Said he was going to Congo for 10 days at maximum, would see me when he returned to give me his impressions. Said Algerians prepared do anything possible for Angolans.

5. Taleb Jamal: Saw him several times, including once at my home. Said never saw anything like the swamping of the UGTA congress by the FLN and Polit Bureau. Williams Irving [illegible], and his new assistant [illegible] who is "stupid", are both CIA agents.

6. Mahjoub Ben Seddik & Ben Aveh, of UGTA: Had cocktails and dinner my home 20 h. Mahjoub declined talk about the Congress or anything faintly resembling politics.

4

14-00000

DISPATCH

S E C R E T/RYBAT

XXX

Chief, WOLIME

COS, London; C/EUR'

Chief, LCPIPIT/London

DTDORIC/Operational/WHPROBE
QRPHONE/JAGUAR Reporting

1P

Through London Station's liaison with JAGUAR we are sometimes able to monitor the reactions and attitudes of QRPHONE/1's enemies within radical circles in the U.K. We are forwarding, u/s/c, copies of two such recent JAGUAR reports. In this case they were particularly helpful in underlining the continuing need for attention to the cover backstopping of QRPHONE/1's sources of income.

AcL
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachments: u/s/c
stated above

S/C A11D BY RID/SD
Dated 04 NOV 69

Distribution:
- ③ - C/WOLIME w/atts
- 1 - COS, London w/atts
- 1 - C/EUR w/o atts

1 ATT

CS COPY

	OSPA - 2115	14 October 1969
	S E C R E T/RYBAT	200-124-156/3

2R 201-725837   2R 201-301058 18 Lc
OEPA-211

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON

MORRISON says Richard GIBSON is running for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara when he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

1P

2. MORRISON said GIBSON was worried because he did not know exactly what information MORRISON has about him. There was a confrontation of the two at a meeting of the Race Relations Institute at which GIBSON refused to sit with MORRISON. MORRISON asked him on that occasion to report the matter to "his masters", implying that GIBSON was an agent provocateur.

3. MORRISON says Sara told him that they live far above their means but are never in debt, and she could not understand it. That is why she had started a nursery school, and no longer did any work for GIBSON. Previously she had taken part in a number of GIBSON's activities, for instance "the MANCHANDA attempt to break up the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign".

4. Once GIBSON went to the Foreign Press Association claiming that MORRISON had forged an application form and was not working for "Zambian Mail". MORRISON is now a weekly contributor to that paper but was not when he first applied to the F.P.A. MORRISON says that at present GIBSON and his wife are on holiday for two months in Italy.

1.

2R 201-833039 A secret and reliable source states that. TARIQ ALI is certain that GIBSON is working for the Americans. He claims that the Chinese have documentary proof of this, and for that reason they removed him from the editorial board of "Revolution", the Paris magazine they were financing. GIBSON had then come to London.

2. TARIQ ALI says GIBSON is very wealthy but no-one knows where his money comes from. From time to time he hands out donations to sympathisers saying that they are "on behalf of the Chinese".

2R 201-108746
3. TARIQ ALI also has suspicions that Robert WILLIAMS, "who was thrown out of both Cuba and Peking" may be working for the C.I.A.

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

124-156/3

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON OEPA-

MORRISON says Richard GIBSON is gunning for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara when he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

1P

2. MORRISON said GIBSON was worried because he did not know exactly what information MORRISON has about him. There was a confrontation of the two at a meeting of the Race Relations Institute at which GIBSON refused to sit with MORRISON MORRISON asked him on that occasion to report the matter to "his masters", implying that GIBSON was an agent provocateur.

3. MORRISON says Sara told him that they live far above their means but are never in debt, and she could not understand it. That is why she had started a nursery school, and no longer did any work for GIBSON. Previously she had taken part in a number of GIBSON's activities, for instance "the MANCHANDA attempt to break up the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign".

4. Once GIBSON went to the Foreign Press Association claiming that MORRISON had forged an application form and was not working for "Zambian Mail". MORRISON is now a weekly contributor to that paper but was not when he first applied to the F.P.A. MORRISON says that at present GIBSON and his wife are on holiday for two months in Italy.

2R 201-833039 A secret and reliable source states that TARIQ ALI is certain that GIBSON is working for the Americans. He claims that the Chinese have documentary proof of this, and for that reason they removed him from the editorial board of "Revolution", the Paris magazine they were financing. GIBSON had then come to London.

2. TARIQ ALI says GIBSON is very wealthy but no-one knows where his money comes from. From time to time he hands out donations to sympathisers saying that they are "on behalf of the Chinese".

2R 201-108746 3. TARIQ ALI also has suspicions that Robert WILLIAMS, "who was thrown out of both Cuba and Peking" may be working for the C.I.A.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-2115. CS COPY 200-124-156/3

SECRET

INFORMATION REPORT COVER SHEET

FROM: England, London/LCPIPIT OEP-737

23 January 70

JAN 26 1970

CASE OFFICER: Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

REPORTS OFFICER: Norman C. BULSTRODE

RELEASING OFFICER: Adrian B. WASLOTT

080

7P

DISTRIBUTION:

[illegible] - WOLIME, w/master
2 - LONDON (OK for SMOTH and JAGUAR, provided source description is
changed to read "a fairly reliable source".)
2 - Algiers
2 - Paris
2 - Bonn
2 - Rabat
2 - Tunis
1 - Geneva
2 - Bern
1 - Amman
1 - Beirut
2 - Rome
2 - LCPIPIT

DTDORIC/QRPHONE

SUPDATA:

Subject: First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers, 26 - 28 December 1969

Source: QRPHONE/1

Note: Request Headquarters verify and correct names. INDEX participants.

Congress documents gave several English translations for this Congress. We have chosen the one which we believe is the most accurate translation of the French.

File: 200-124-158/4

RTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

SECRET

CS COPY

9-50

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS OEP-737

DATE DISTR. 23 January 1970

COUNTRY International/Algeria

DOI 26 - 28 December 1969

SUBJECT First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers, 26 - 28 December 1969

ACQ (16 January 1970)

FIELD NO.

SOURCE Radical European who attended the Congress. His reporting has been generally reliable.

Summary: The First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers was sponsored by the Algerian Committee of Solidarity with Palestine. About 200 delegates, most of whom were Western European pro-Chinese militants, attended the event. In the proceedings of the Congress these militants sought to apply the Chinese theses of the "People's War" to the Palestinian struggle. The Congress firmly backed the notion that Al Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were one and the same body with Al Fatah acting as the vanguard body for bringing about unity among all Palestine commando/liberation organizations. A major decision of the Congress was the acceptance of a Palestinian proposal to create an information bureau in Algiers. The Algerians claimed that fifteen countries were represented. There was no list of delegates and the Algerian hosts went out of their way to assure anonymity among the participants. End Summary.

1. The Premier Congres International des Comites "Palestine" (First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees) was held at the Club des Pins conference site ten miles outside of Algiers from 26 to 28 December 1969. It was attended largely by pro-Chinese militants from Western Europe. The total number of delegates was 188 -- 148 foreign, 20 Palestinian and 20 Algerian. The French delegation was the largest one present and the most divided into various factions.

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

[illegible] REPRODUCTION

DISTRIBUTION

NONE

The Congress was officially sponsored by the Algerian Committee of Solidarity with Palestine.

2. The participants, for the most part, espoused the Chinese theses regarding the "People's War" and applied these theses to the Palestinian struggle. While not directly criticizing the Soviet policies in the Middle East, it was evident in the Congress documents that the European militants sought to do so. For example, they strongly condemned the United Nations resolutions on the settlement of the Middle East conflict. The main conclusions of the Congress were: an acceptance of the Al Fatah as being the only genuine Palestinian revolutionary organization, and a decision to create an information bureau in Algiers which will be run by Palestinians. The bureau will provide information on developments in the Palestinian revolution to all the Palestinian committees throughout the world and to all revolutionary movements which support the Palestinian people. In conjunction with those Palestine committees, the bureau will sponsor meetings, lectures, debates, film shows and an annual conference. (Source Comment: Abu el Hassen, a prominent leader of the Palestinian delegation, confided to one of the delegates after the Congress that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would probably sponsor a conference in Jordan sometime in 1970 or 1971.)

ALL CARDS "II" -- Δ ALGERIA, ALGIERS = ATTENDED CONGRESS OF PALESTINE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEES, ALGIERS, 26-28 DEC 69

3. (Source Comment: In private conversations with some of the Algerian participant-observers, they were not altogether pleased with the Congress, feeling that its conclusions were excessively Maoist. The chief spokesman for the Algerians was M'bamed FR Yazid, who is the Algerian representative on the United Nations Security Council.)

M
33 APR 23
ALGERIA ALGERIA, BLIDA
DIPLOMAT
~~ALGERIA~~

4. The delegates slept at the Zeralda Tourist Center located about eleven miles from the Club des Pins, and were bussed daily to the Congress site. The Algerian hosts saw to it that the delegates were kept busy and together. Strict security was maintained and the delegates had no chance to mingle with the Algerian people. There was no list of delegates and several of the participants used pseudonyms.

M
ALGERIA
LAWYER
Δ

5. The first session of the Congress on 26 December, which included the attendance of a large group of Algerians, was chaired by Larbi FV Bentoumi (Algerian). (Field Comment: TDCSDB 315/05408-69, dated 31 December 1969, described Bentoumi as the Algerian defense lawyer in the recent trial in Switzerland of the three Palestinian terrorists charged with attacking an El Al Boeing 707 in Zurich in February 1969.) Most of the first session was devoted to assigning the delegates to the commissions and in arranging the timing of the various speakers, such as Yasir FR Arafat, Al Fatah's official spokesman and chairman of the PLO. Upon the recommendation of a Palestinian representative, the Congress voted by a majority of 33 votes to create three commissions for the event. These were commonly known as follows: Political Commission, Information Commission and Organization Commission. (Source Comment: The Palestinians obviously had come to the Congress with only one immediate practical aim, i.e., to obtain left-wing acceptance of the creation of a Palestinian information bureau.)

M
C 28
PALESTINE
ENGINEER
Δ

6. At the beginning of the second day of the Algiers Congress, 27 December, Bentoumi ceded the chair to Nabil FV Nasser of the PLO. For the rest of the Congress the Algerians played no active role, thus leaving the Palestinians with considerable freedom of action in the proceedings. The

M
Δ
PLO MEMBER

SEX M
DOB
CIT
OCC

Palestinians took over the chairmanship of the three commissions and guided much of the work of these groups. A "Comrade Habsout" from Paris chaired the Information Commission; Abu El Hassen chaired the important Political Commission. (Field Comment: Source did not know the name of the Palestinian who chaired the Organization Commission.)

SEX M
DOB
CIT UK
OCC

7. The most important Congress document was a political declaration which had been drafted in the Political Commission mainly by Abu El Hassen and Abhimanyu M. Manchanda, a British citizen of Indian descent who is chairman of the pro-Chinese British-Vietnam Solidarity Front (BVSF). (Source Comment: Manchanda confided that he was not completely satisfied with the text of the document, but considered it worthwhile nonetheless because it came close to what he considered were general Chinese positions, although it did not condemn the Soviet Union by name. Abu El Hassen and other Palestinians congratulated Manchanda for his success in ramming through such a hard-line political document. Manchanda had in fact dominated the final plenary session of the Congress on 28 December which voted affirmatively on the declaration.) On one occasion during the discussions in the Political Commission, Yazid tried to persuade the Commission (whose revolutionary commitments he claimed to share) that it should go easier in its condemnations of the United Nations.

8. Delegations from the following countries were represented at the Congress:

a. Austria - Represented by an observer from the Moscow-line Communist Party of Austria

SEX M
DOB 22 DEC 18 BELGIUM
CIT BELGIUM
OCC

b. Belgium - a divided delegation headed mainly by Reno Raindorf but which included a few supporters of Jacques Grippa, a current political enemy of Raindorf.

SEX M
DOB 30 MAR 13 BELGIUM
BELGIUM

c. Brazil - Represented by a youth named McGill who lives in London. SEX M CIT: BRAZIL

d. Great Britain (two rival delegations) - Delegation led by Manchanda as follows:

(1) Manchanda, representing the Solidarity Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Arab Peoples, and the Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League

SEX F CIT: UK

(2) Diana Langford, of the Women's Equal Rights Campaign MEMBER OF

(3) Mike Krylitsias, of the SEX M MEMBER Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League CIT. UK

(4) Mishek Chinamassa, of the MEMBER Zimbabwe Students Union in Europe (ZSUE). (Field Comment: An official British Service reported in August 1969 that Chinamassa was expelled by the executive committee of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) as president of the ZSUE.)

SEX M
CIT UK
DPOB. 13 MAY 31, USA

(5) Richard Gibson, journalist for "Liberator" SEX M CIT: UK

SEX F
CIT: UK

(6) Jane Williams, a school teacher OCC

from London who came as an observer

SEX M
CIT: UK

F ✓ (7) Max Hunt, a teacher in London who came as an observer for the Schools' Action Union
MEMBER

SEX M
CIT: UK
OCC: BOOK SHOP MANAGER ASSOCIATED WITH

F ✓ (8) Matt L [illegible], manager of the Scottish Vanguard Bookshop at 27[illegible] Paisley Road, Glasgow, which is owned by the Scottish Workers Party

F ✓ (9) David R. Shanks, from the Scottish Workers Party who lives at 66 Dundee Street in Edinburgh
MEMBER

SEX M
CIT. UK

Delegation from the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) as follows:

F ✓ (1) Roger Young, treasurer of Friends of Palestine which is now affiliated with the PSC

F ✓ (2) Norman Temple, of the Friends of Palestine
MEMBER

F ✓ (3) Abdullah Yasameeo, of the Friends of Palestine
MEMBER

F ✓ (4) Louis Eakes, of the Young Liberals
MEMBER

(5) an unidentified girl friend of Eakes

F ✓ (6) (fnu) Hallier, of Agit-Prop (a PSC member)
MEMBER

F ✓ (7) (fnu) Walker, who came as an observer

F ✓ (8) Bill Gunn, of Reg Birch's Communist Party of Britain/Marxist-Leninist and of the PSC
MEMBER

F ✓ (9) Dave Blundell, of the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation (RSSF) in London
MEMBER

[illegible] M
[illegible]
: UK
[illegible]
AFFILIATED WITH
~~MEMBER OF~~
PALESTINE SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN

SEX M

(Source Comment: This delegation had been sent to Algiers by the London-based PLO representative, (fnu) F Armanazi, who is apparently the editor of the newspaper "Free Palestine". The newspaper, however, lists its editor as F "Aziz Yafi". Armanazi had supplied the airfare for this delegation because he did not want the PSC people to go to Algiers under the arrangements of Manchanda. All of the PSC people were young and no match for Manchanda who, in the final session of the Congress, was able to isolate them completely inasmuch as they opposed the recognition of Al Fatah and the establishment of the information bureau in Algiers.)

e. Italy - Represented by delegates from the Italian Communist Party and the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). They decided to be in an observer status, although they were entitled to be participants by the fact that they belong to a Palestinian Solidarity Committee in Italy. The only open political opposition to the overall political line of the Congress came from the Italians who passed out a statement at the final session deploring the importation of left-wing quarrels into the issue of Palestine.

CARD REPRODUCTION

M
3
FRANCE
OCC
Δ

f. France - The delegation was initially divided into factions but, on 27 December, a sort of truce was worked out and there was no overt trouble. Prominent members of the delegation were: Roger [illegible]ury, a leftist university lecturer, Jean-Pierre Vigier; [illegible] Kravitz, brother of Alain Krivine [illegible]astro; and Marie-Claude Vignaud, the mistress of Abderrezak Benhadji (Algerian living in Paris).

FR
FR
F
F SEX M CIT: ALGERIA

F
3
FRANCE
ASSOCIATE OF ABDERREZAK BENHADJI

g. West Germany - The delegation was composed primarily of unidentified militants of the Socialist German Student League -- SDS. The group took a very left sectarian position and joined with the PSC from Britain in openly refusing to give full support to the Al Fatah. On the other hand the Germans played no role, speaking only briefly in the Political Commission.

h. Spain

i. Switzerland

M
3
NETHERLANDS

F

j. The Netherlands - Represented as observers by Kees Wagtendonk and Bertus Hendriks who came from Amsterdam. (Source Comment: Wagtendonk said that he was still a member of the Pacifist Socialist Party; Hendriks described himself as a Marxist-Leninist.)

k. Scandinavia - Included Sweden, and perhaps two other Scandinavian countries (Source Comment: The small Scandinavian group, which came as observers, was guided during the proceedings by Samir Boutani who resides at [illegible] 31, Hagersten, Stockholm. He is an Arab journalist who claims to write for Lebanese and Syrian publications and who had attended the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal in Stockholm.)

M
3
SWEDEN
OCC JOURNALIST
Δ

l. Algeria

m. Palestine

n. United States - Delegation as follows:

F SEX M CIT: USA

(1) Herb Block, of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party who led the delegation

F SEX F CIT: USA

(2) Mrs. Block, wife of Herb Block (Source Comment: The Blocks announced that they were attending the Congress under the pseudonym of "Douglas". Mrs. Block even went to the length of wearing a reddish wig and dark glasses. Neither Block played any significant role.)

F
AKA "Douglas"

DPOB 31 AUG 35 USA FR ( ) SEX M CIT: USA

(3) Eldridge Cleaver, Black Panther Party leader now residing in Algiers

F SF

(4) Don (LNU), a Negro from Chicago who accompanied the Blocks and who claimed to be a member of the Black Panther Party.

DPOB: 5 MAY 15 USA FR ( ) SEX M CIT: USA

(5) Lewis Bergman, a former member of the Communist Party of USA in Chicago who now

OCC [illegible] FFR

14-00000

[illegible] F
[illegible] 11-7-43 USA, CALIF
[illegible] USA
[illegible] STUDENT

resides in San [illegible].

FR (201 [illegible])

(8) David Fineman, who resides in San Francisco.

(Source Comment: The US delegation was accompanied by two newsreel photographers from the West Coast, one who gave his name as "Hardesty" FNU. They only attended the final session of the Congress and were primarily concerned with lobbying the PLO for facilities to go to Jordan to photograph guerrilla activities there.)

SEX M
CIT: USA
OCC: PHOTOGRAPHER

200-9-54

14-00000

DISPATCH

S E C R E T/RYBAT

Chief, WOLIME — XXX

COS, London; C/EUR

Chief, LCPIPIT/London

DTDORIC/Operational/[illegible]
QRPHONE/JAGUAR Reporting

18

Through London Station's liaison with JAGUAR we are sometimes able to monitor the reactions and attitudes of QRPHONE/1's enemies within radical circles in the U.K. We are forwarding, u/s/c, copies of two such recent JAGUAR reports. In this case they were particularly helpful in underlining the continuing need for attention to the cover backstopping of QRPHONE/1's sources of income.

ACL
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachments: u/s/c
stated above

S/C ATTD BY RID/SD
Dated 04 NOV 69

Distribution:
③ - C/WOLIME w/atts
1 - COS, London w/atts
1 - C/EUR w/o atts

1 ATT

CS COPY

OSPA - 2115

14 October 1969

S E C R E T/RYBAT

200-124-156/3

2R 201-725837   2R 201-30105 418 lc
OEPA- 211

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON

MORRISON says Richard GIBSON is gunning for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara when he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

2. MORRISON said GIBSON was worried because he did not know exactly what information MORRISON has about him. There was a confrontation of the two at a meeting of the Race Relations Institute at which GIBSON refused to sit with MORRISON. MORRISON asked him on that occasion to report the matter to "his masters", implying that GIBSON was an agent provocateur.

3. MORRISON says Sara told him that they live far above their means but are never in debt, and she could not understand it. That is why she had started a nursery school, and no longer did any work for GIBSON. Previously she had taken part in a number of GIBSON's activities, for instance "the MANCHANDA attempt to break up the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign".

4. Once GIBSON went to the Foreign Press Association claiming that MORRISON had forged an application form and was not working for "Zambian Mail". MORRISON is now a weekly contributor to that paper but was not when he first applied to the F.P.A. MORRISON says that at present GIBSON and his wife are on holiday for two months in Italy.

2R 201-833039 A secret and reliable source states that TARIQ ALI is certain that GIBSON is working for the Americans. He claims that the Chinese have documentary proof of this, and for that reason they removed him from the editorial board of "Revolution", the Paris magazine they were financing. GIBSON had then come to London.

2. TARIQ ALI says GIBSON is very wealthy but no-one knows where his money comes from. From time to time he hands out donations to sympathisers saying that they are "on behalf of the Chinese".

2R 201-108746
3. TARIQ ALI also has suspicions that Robert WILLIAMS, "who was thrown out of both Cuba and Peking" may be working for the C.I.A.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

[illegible] 124-156/3

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON

OEPA-

MORRISON says Richard GIBSON is gunning for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara when he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

1P

2. MORRISON said GIBSON was worried because he did not know exactly what information MORRISON has about him. There was a confrontation of the two at a meeting of the Race Relations Institute at which GIBSON refused to sit with MORRISON. MORRISON asked him on that occasion to report the matter to "his masters", implying that GIBSON was an agent provocateur.

3. MORRISON says Sara told him that they live far above their means but are never in debt, and she could not understand it. That is why she had started a nursery school, and no longer did any work for GIBSON. Previously she had taken part in a number of GIBSON's activities, for instance "the MANCHANDA attempt to break up the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign".

4. Once GIBSON went to the Foreign Press Association claiming that MORRISON had forged an application form and was not working for "Zambian Mail". MORRISON is now a weekly contributor to that paper but was not when he first applied to the F.P.A. MORRISON says that at present GIBSON and his wife are on holiday for two months in Italy.

1.

2R 201-833039 A secret and reliable source states that TARIQ ALI is certain that GIBSON is working for the Americans. He claims that the Chinese have documentary proof of this, and for that reason they removed him from the editorial board of "Revolution", the Paris magazine they were financing. GIBSON had then come to London.

2. TARIQ ALI says GIBSON is very wealthy but no-one knows where his money comes from. From time to time he hands out donations to sympathisers saying that they are "on behalf of the Chinese".

2R 201-108746

3. TARIQ ALI also has suspicions that Robert WILLIAMS, "who was thrown out of both Cuba and Peking" may be working for the C.I.A.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-2115. CS COPY 200-124-156/3

LISTICKER REPORT #221, ralpa 9 Jan 63

Subj: PRESIDENT BEN BELLA'S VIEWS

PADA: Ben Bella's apartment, Villa Joly, 20-2200 Jan 8
N.B. BEN BELLA REQUESTED ANY OF THESE VIEWS BE KEPT PRIVATE.

1. The moment of crisis in Algeria is over, and relatively speaking a breathing spell is here. Opposition is nil, with the students and labor unions won over, the Federation disbanded, other opposition dispersed or too unorganized to be effective, and the people persuaded to give Ben Bella's government a lengthy and sincere support to overcome Algerian problems. For the first time since emerging from prison, Ben Bella is getting six or seven hours sleep per night. He is relaxed, calm, confident.

2. Algeria's greatest problem now is reconstruction of the economy, including housing, agricultrual reform, dams and irrigation, and some roads. In this respect, foreign aid is essential. He wishes that talks with the U.S. could start as soon as possible, and feels the best method to do this is to have an economic delegation visit Algeria to see on the spot the needs and special conditions. (He repeated several times that he wished the talks could start as soon as possible.) As for aid, he does not wish aid "which will help us eat better or have a higher standard of living" but rather aid "which will be of a developmental, constructional type" to permit the Algerian economy to help itself. In reply to the question whether he hoped more aid would come from the U.S. than from Russia, he said "I hope so, I hope so." (He gave the slight impression he felt the U.S. was much better equipped to aid. The preliminary estimate of the government committee for the reconstruction of Algeria [illegible] is one hundred billion francs. This figure might go higher, but the final figure will be what Algeria will ask from France in additional help over the next two years. He stressed his appreciation for the American Ambassador, Mr. Porter, saying one of his most valuable qualities is that he actually loves the Algerian people, a trait extremely appreciated by him and the Algerian people.

3. The above help is in addition to the regular administrative budget and the operational budget. The administrative budget of 280 billion francs is a balanced budget, with receipts—especially because of the new taxes—expected without fail to equal expenditures. He mentioned several times that Algeria is too proud to ask anyone else to pay its administrative budget, i.e., pay its running expenses.

4. On the question of the economy, there will be a code established soon which will delimit the private and public sections of the economy. He was peeved that some people do not believe there will be a private section, and said "People will someday learn to take me at my word. If I didn't mean it, I didn't have to say it. And if I change my mind, I will say that too, and I will give the reasons. But, there will be aprivate section of economy, and we do want foreign private investment."

5. Land reform in Algeria is and will be an experiment never tried anywhere. There will be both collective and state farms—Ben Bella does not believe in giving land to individual peasants because cut-up plots are economically un-productive. And in any case, the question of communal lands has been a tribal custom in Algeria for thousands of years, which even the French could never wholly erase, and the new arrangements are but a slight change from this ancient custom. To butress this argument, he pointed to the fact that the peasants have

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

already accepted with no difficulties the communal arrangement for the one million hectars of Biens Vacants (abandoned French lands) now being put into production. He contrasted this with the resistance of the Russian peasant "which caused the slaughter of millions of Russians from which Russian agriculture has not yet recovered". He feels even if production on these million hectares is lower than it was under French control, it is definitely worth it, since the profits won't go to one rich class which spends the money on the Riviera but will greatly boost the peasants' standard of living. In this respect, he was definitely not in agreement with Prof. Dumont's major criticisms of Algeria given on 8 January, and so told the professor in private.

6. With respect to Cuba, He was disappointed to return home to find that the missle bases did exist. His main hope in visiting Cuba—as he told President Kennedy quite frankly but correctly—was to help lower temperatures. He had advised President Kennedy not to invade, andhe had advised Castro to be more discreet in acceptance of arms. The end result was not disappointment, however, since "no man can be disappointed if a nuclear war has been avoided."

7. The U.S. reaction to the Yemen revolution disappointed him also, and he felt U.S. early actions were mistakes. It had appeared relations between Cairo and Washington were going to well prior to the Yemen crisis, andit had been a shame to ruin good relations. U.S. recognition of the Republic of Yemen however was highly welcome to him, and he feels this will do much to return U.S./Cairo relations to the previous high plane.

8. With respect to a United North Africa, he feels the time to act is now on a cultural and economic level. He feels identical textbooks, exchange of teachers, cultural exchanges, lowering of frontier custom and administrative barriers, etc. will start a movement which in the end will force constantly greater unity, even if the politicians don't really feel the time is ripe. He feels this is especially true in education and the exchange of economic advantages, such as procuring electricity from Oujda for Marnia or Tlemsen instead of from Oran.

9. "Upon his honor as a man" he swore he nor any Algerian had anything to do with the attempted assassination of Bourguiba. He also felt sure the two Youssefists in Algeria, who are good friends of his, had nothing to do with it. He felt his friendship with these two persons might have led to ~~[illegible]~~ suspicions that Algeria was involved. He said "that is not my way, and I have too many problems of my own to meddle in Tunisian affairs. It was a plot mounted andsupported in Tunisia itself."

10. Personal information gained: DOB 25 Dec 1916, Marnia, of parents born in Marrakech, Morocco, secondary studies at Tlemsen college, French army in France 1937-40, then demobilised, then French army 1943-45 in Italy where he received Military medal and two others (highest medal possible, and he was first of three so decorated), then back to Algeria. In 1945 he was in 5th Moroccan regiment in Setif when 45,000 people were slaughtered, which marked his entry into politics. That action branded him for life, and he realised that force was the only answer to Algeria's cry for liberty. He does not hate the French in any way, however. That is in the past.

*** Both at the beginning and the end of the evening, Ben Bella remarked how each time we met, he was reminded of the "fine" times at Tlemsen and how much he apprecia
the help those broadcasts were to him. I delivered the tea set he had requested in D

LUSTRIMER REPORT #222, K lpm 9 Jan 63

Subj: Americans/ Marc Schleifer/Richard Gibson/Afrique Revolution

PADA: Home of Jean Marie Boeglin (Jeanson Network), 7 January 63

1. Boeglin scheduled an informal discussion between himself, Schleifer, an exile leader from the Union of South Africa, and Yves Mathieu (phonetic) at the Boeglin/Mathieu apartment. I was invited to participate, and to translate for Schleifer who speaks no French. The South African didn't appear, but we were joined later in the evening by a French lawyer Maurice lnu who works in Biens Vacants and by Francois lnu, another Jeanson network character.

2. Boeglin has accepted me as being very leftist, "objective", and perhaps even communist—an impression I have nurtured with him. Thus, his acceptance of me as a like-minded person gave confidence to the others.

3. The evening was a discussion of the Cuban and Algerian revolutions. Schleifer was more or less the oracle, having been in Cuba twice, once for two months Dec 60/Jan 61 and recently for nine months. Personally, I felt Schleifer is so extremely left that he is a communist in everything except perhaps the card and the party membership. He is intelligent, reasons well, and is obviously well-read, being able to give quotes from books by title of the principal communist authors, especially Lenin. He is also fuzzy in that he seems to suspect U.S. positions as being propaganda positions and does not assume the same for Russian positions. At the same time, he gave me an impression of sincerity, quite a bit of criticism for Russia, and an obvious search for the truth. He didn't blink an eye when Mathieu assumed that we were all "Marxist, Socialist, and hoped for the eventual implantation of socialism even in the U.S." If he is not a communist, he is an extreme left fellow traveler.

4. The principal conclusions of the evening were that the Algerian revolution has proceeded along the path of socialism much faster than the Cuban revolution did, but that the Cuban revolution will reach true socialism before the Algerian revolution because of the limitating factor of the Evian agreements; the Cuban army was the spearhead of the revolutionary reforms in Cuba, but the Algerian army has not been due to the political crisis, a defect which is being corrected at the moment as plans are now being made for the Algerian army to assume the same position here; Russia and the U.S. after the Cuban crunch have implicitly or explicitly made an agreement to keep out of Algeria in particular and Africa in general in favor of French and other European domination in order to keep from having a further stand-off as in Cuba; Russia is not ready for nor does it want further revolutions in Latin America or Africa—as opposed to Asia—since it is not ready to back such revolutions in the face of American or European opposition to the limit, and thus she can only lose face and the position of monopoly of communist leadership which she wishes to retain. Schleifer made one interesting statement that Morgan had been killed by Castro because he took funds from the CIA to finance a counter revolution.

I caused a flurry of dropped jaws during the evening, especially Mathieu—which was later forgiven because of my "known" objectivity—when I described the lower middle-class farm of my family with its 80 hectares, tractors, combine, etc., and declared communism couldn't work in such a wealthy atmosphere. Mathieu agreed that perhaps in the U.S. no more effective utilization and distribution of land could be envisaged.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

5. Later I took Schleifer to his room, the home of Richard Gibson. He was due to leave for Morocco on 9 January, but stayed over to get an interview with Ben Bella which was to be arranged, or "guaranteed" as he put it, by Boeglin. From there he is to go to the States. I asked him what he was doing here, and he replied just traveling. Boeglin had told me he was a sociologist with a study grant, but Schleifer denied he was a sociologist, volunteering nothing about a grant. He told me Gibson was staying in Algiers to put out a new paper called "Afrique Revolution" which was to be a big, slick publication with many photos and a selling price which would enable it to replace Jeune Afrique throughout Africa. When I asked about financing, he said the Algerian government was financing it heavily. He suggested we meet again 8 January so he could present me to Gibson who was looking for a photographer, and suggested I could be that photographer at a nominal salary. I replied I would be interested more from the point of prestige and publication rather than salary since I was doing well in my present journalistic endeavor as far as salary went. I was kept from making the meeting, but I talked by phone with Gibson (who speaks French so badly he couldn't complete a sentence on the phone) and the meeting is to be set up on 10 January.

6. Boeglin requested Mathieu, who is a high official in the Biens Vacants section dealing with agriculture problems to set up a series of photos for me. Mathieu met me at the OB office 8 January and sent me on a visit to communal lands in Zeralda with an assistant, Mohamed Cherif Mosteghanemi (a real "pure" militant) on 9 January. Mathieu also presented me to the Director of the program, Mahjoub (phonetic) whom I had known since his days in the Ben Khedda cabinet. Mahjoub has given me carte blanche for a report in depth of the entire program, to be made over the next few weeks. At Zeralda, the regional monitor turned out to be an acquaintance from Tlemcen FLN office, and I was permitted to photograph any and everything I desired. To finish this report, I will be furnished with complete figures, etc., as well as further trips in the field, especially in the Constantine area.

/c

APERTURE CARD

Secret

LUSTRIKER REPORT #223, Kulpa 9 Jan 63

Subj: Requested list of continual contacts, for which requirements are to be tailored.

1. President Ben Bella; seems to answer quite frankly whatever question I pose.

2. Commandant Slimane; slippery in questioning, but has evidenced desire to make recorded interview which will "shock" America on whatever subject I choose; Also has suggested a report on the army of the south with him as guide; has also agreed to explain army system to me; also has agreed to intercede with Boumedienne to permit me to photograph Angolan trainees.

3. Braham Bouzar; has sewed up Gendarmerie and Army oil contracts for Shell and sees army leaders frequently, worked on budget with Boumedienne; is married to sister of Minister of Finance Francis; step-daughter married to Bedjaoui of Ben Bella's office.

4. Dr. Hadj Hamou and brother of same name who works in Finance ministry; has suggested I arrange informal meeting with him and Ambassador Porter at my home.

5. Mohamed Madjad; former Director of Security, now to work in Ministry Foreign Affairs; to present me to his successor Yousseffi.

6. Jemal Kiari, Director of Tourism; good friend Security Director Yousseffi, Madjad, other important government members.

7. Jean Marie Boeglin, former Jeanson Network now assistant Ministry of Information.

8. Yves Mathieu & Mahjoub (promotia) of Biens Vacants

9. WHAMMY/4, now Algerian Radio.

10. Marc Schleifer/ Richard Gibson, American "leftists", connected with Afrique Revolution.

11. Louis Aletti, Hotel Aletti; good friend of Chinese Ambassador, agrees/and to find produces generally any information I request of him. Knows most bloc people.

12. fnu Nahi (in spite of lack of firstname, we are quite good friends & exchange visits frequently), formerly with Shell, now in Government office dealing with all Oil questions.

13. Mohamed Yazid, deputy; seems anxious deepen our old but rather light friendship.

//

Secret

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

Secret

LUSTRIKER REPORT #231, Kulpa 30 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts, Jan 25-29 Jan.

1. Serge Michel: Saw him Aletti hotel, his house, and three times my house. He says Yazid is de facto Minister of Information now, and will become Minister of Information over the next few weeks or month. Michel stayed with El Chaab long enough to get it on its feet, then moved on to plans for Atlas. When Atlas is established, he will move on again to books on Algeria and one-shot publications. He is going to the Congo in early April for a week to gather material for articles on Angola and the Congo. He is taking the line that Kennedy and Khruschev are "allies", with De Gaulle and Mao as enemies; thus Algeria should not support nor attack either one too much. He feels the Afrique Revolution is making political mistakes in this respect by attacking the United States (presumably with an article on Meredith & Mississippi) and can be termed the extreme left in Algeria. He feels Afrique Revolution will be taken over by Atlas staff in six months or less, and run on a less violent basis. Serge talked of his ancestors, saying they were all from Georgia, and that a translator was used when he talked with his grand parents who only spoke Georgian not Russian. He is an apatride with a Moroccan passport (which I saw but couldn't get the number) which contains his nationality as Moroccan, as opposed to other Moroccan passports for Algerians which have the nationality lined through. His father was apatride also, and Serge claims he feels more for Algeria than any other country. He arrived here the first time when he was 20 years old, and from that time lived with Algerian rebels. He is 41 years old now. He has three boys, about one year, four and six, all with Russian first names, and occupies a villa in Hydra. His wife speaks French with an accent, Russian I believe. His infant is very sick with athsma.

2. Richard Gibson & wife: Saw them in his office as result of his request for photos for Dave Watts in New York for the latter's "Liberator" publication, which is a slick, leftist publication with a format something like a cross between Newsweek and The New Yorker. I gave him fourphotos without my name, but he insisted on putting my name on the back for credit. He said Watts would pay me directly, since he had my address already. He also said I would probably get photo requests from London from a person whose name he didn't remember. This person and Watts are also correspondents for Afrique Revolution in their cities. Mrs. Gibson is white, and appeared to me to be jewess, probably from Brooklyn, judging from her accent. However, she could be foreign since the accent is difficult to place. Eduardo dos Santos was in the office, but wasn't very friendly. Gibson knew of my trip to Angola, probably from dos Santos via the Congo embassy in Tunis, and wanted some photos when I returned.

3. Jean Marie Boeglin: Boeglin phoned me, after having missed a luncheon with me last week. He has acted on my request to speak to Jacques Verges about using me when possible for Afrique Revolution. Verges is to meet me tomorrow to discuss photos. I am to bring one—violent action if possible—which is to be used as the first cover of Revolution, if it is a suitable photo. Boeglin will be there, and we are to meet today to plan the conversation with Verges to make sure I benefit.

4. Djmal Tchanderli: (brother of U.N. Chanderli, although name spelled differently). He came to my home with Michel. He is going to the Congo to film Angolans in March, and wanted my agreement not to film for my cover company while there. I finally agreed, extracting a promise from him that he would not take any photos, thus leaving me that monopoly in exchange for the film monopoly. He & Michel feel they are related, both families coming from Georgia, & Michel having an uncle named Tchanderli.

14-00000

Secret

AF/Ded.

LUSTRIPER REPORT #231, Kulna 25 Jan 62

Subj: Contacts 21-24 January

1. Serge Michel: Saw him four times at Hotel Aletti, discussed mostly "Atlas". Asked me to prepare six color covers in advance, first one to illustrate ancient Corbusier plan for face-lifting of Algeria which is now planned by Algerian Government. Claims Afrique Revolution will be "absorbed" by Atlas (probably both under same editorship). Roberto Holden phoned Josie Fanon from Tunis, he will be in Rome Saturday, will send my ticket and visa for Congo from there. I am to leave soon as possible.

No 201 ✓ 2. Louis Aletti, about sixty years, 220 pounds, 6'2", white hair, blue eyes, French, worked in States several years in 1920's, speaks English well, friend of most diplomats in city including Chinese, is accepted by Algerians as being anti-OAS in spirit. He claims the East German government has full recognition by the Algerians, cited Ben Bella's attendance at national holiday of East Germans, though Scharfenberg is only Charge d'Affaires. Gave me Chinese embassy address as 35 Rue Luciani, El Biar, phone [illegible]-48. Will have me to lunch with East Germans whenever I wish.

3. Taib Jarai, Hotel Aletti & the city. Jarai had difficulty with reporters of RepubliqueAlgeric and was in rage over "stupid communists". Again claimed Irving Brown was CIA agent in front of a French radio speakerine.

~~[illegible]~~

4. Dr. Hadj Hamou, Jamal Aisri, Braham Bouzar, at my home and at their homes. Nothing of interest conversed.

✓ 5. Fmu BOUZAR, police xxxxxxx officer, plus two of his friends, at Rome. Nothing of interest except the three of them very idealistic, insisting everyone must work to maximum for minimum pay in order build Algeria. Seems to be typical attitude among young Algerians.

No 201 ✓ 6. Zerati, fnu police commissioner, Les Pecheries for lunch. Extremely pro-American, talked of all his OIS friends from Morocco at Ben Guerir while he worked in Marrakech. He should be contacted by someone under official cover as being "sent by his old OIS friends" or some such ploy. He can be developed.

No 201 ✓ 7. Abdelkader Maxery (phonetic), Secretary General of the Assembly, my home. Nothing of interest, but he is quite likeable and certainly of importance. Will see him again rather feequently.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

Secret

Secret

LUSTRIKER REPORT #852, Fulpa 31 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts, 30 Jan— 31 Jan.

1. Jean Marie Boeglin: Saw him three times, his home, office of Revolution Africaine, and Brasserie du Berry, 30-31 January. He arranged meeting with Jacques Verges, Director of Revolution Afrique, having told Verges that I was "practically a militant" who would work well for the cause instead of the salary. He also offered me the "exclusive" job as photographer for the Information Bureau of Biens Vacants, with all expenses for trips etc paid for by the ministry, but with very little extra salary. I accepted, saying that was a good method to study the reforme agraire deeply for an article. Yves Mathieu will be my boss in that job. Boeglin then took me to the Opera where he has an office in capacity as Technical Director of the National Theatre. He requested me to furnish him with photos he could use for the Theatre posters and for the programs for the first production scheduled in mid-March. I agreed.

2. Jacques Verges: Saw him 1100 31 Jan in the office of Revolution Africaine, of which he is director. Madame Zohra Bitat is to be the editor in chief of this publication. Verges immediately offered me a job as a regular salaried photographer of Revolution or as a piece-meal photographer. I indicated I thought payment by the job was better, since my cover outfit is not "liberal" as I am. Regular salary for everyone on the paper, from the lowest secretary to Verges himself, as decided by Verges, is to be 100,000 francs per month. My job payments will amount to about thatmuch. I will take a trip once a week with Georges Arno (phonetic) to do photos on the feature article on Algeria for each week's publication. Verges also ordered six photos from me from my contact prints, and took one photo on the spot for the cover of the second issue due out 9 February. The cover of the firstissue of 2 February is to be a photo of Lumumba. Verges took me around to introduce me to the rest of the staff—all sullen characters who hardly said hello with the exception of Cinet, the ex-Express cartoonist—and showed me the physical layout. He invited me to the opening cocktail party for Saturday night also. Boeglin later said he was quite impressed with my photo collection.

3. Serge Michel: Came to my home 31 Jan when I wasn't home, but I talked with him from Botras' house. Michel had with him "an FLN responsable" who wants to commission me to produce the photos for an FLN publication, slick style one-shot but presented as a "weekly", on Algerian women. We set up a meeting for Saturday morning to discuss it. We will take a trip into the Kabyle area to start these shots of women.

4. Djamal Tchanderli: Saw him down town, said he wanted to discuss something important with me, made date for tonight, but he didn't show. Will see him tomo:

5. Talked by phone with Tony Pell and Frank Kearns (directing CBS Paris since Kleiman is in New York since Christmas with rumored sick wife—he may be getting fired) in Paris. They are extremely interested in the Congo trip, approve it fully in spite of leaving radio uncovered here, want both radio broadcasts and actuality tapes. Also want me to shoot movies, and insist I make a deal with Tchanderli to permit me to shoot movies. Am to phone them tomorrow for latest word from New York on actual requirements and possible premium payments for Congo/Angolese movies.

/3

6. Abdelkader Bel Hacene, two Deputies, at Hotel Aletti. Nothing of interest.

[illegible]

APERTURE CARD REPR

·C/NE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

1P

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO
Chief, NE
Chief, WE

FROM
Chief of Station, New Delhi

SUBJECT
KOBIRD/LCHARVEST/PADBAYON
PADBAYON/1 Relationship with Jacques M. Verges

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-179164

Action: FYI
RI: Index this dispatch to 201 file of Jacques M. Verges, French citizen, Director of pro-Chinese Communist magazine, "Revolution". Also index to 201 file of Richard Gibson, U.S. citizen, Editor-in-Chief of the English language edition of "Revolution".

201-306[illegible]
7155

1. Forwarded, herewith, as Attachment 1 to this dispatch is a copy of the letter cited in the reference from PADBAYON/1 to Jacques M. Verges. Attachment 2 is a copy of the reply written by Richard Gibson on behalf of Verges. Attachment 3 is a personality sketch of Verges prepared by PADBAYON/1.

2. Regarding Attachment 1, Tilak is a mutual friend who currently is studying in Canada. "Algerian Sister" refers to Jamila Bouirhead. The remainder of the attachments are believed to be self-explanatory.

3. Headquarters asked (DIR 05476) if PADBAYON could furnish any information on Hamza Alavi of Pakistan who is on the Editorial Board of "Revolution". PADBAYON/1 had not previously heard of this individual.

Attachments
1,2,3 as stated

Edmund F. LAHSENE

Distribution:
2-COS, Paris w/att
2 - C/NE w/att
2 - C/WE w/att
2 - Files

INDEX H

CS COPY

Encls A,B+C. h/w

40-6-138/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
NPDA-10,084

DATE
12 March 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
40-6-138/3
201-
201- (Verges) (Gibson)

3

Jacques Verges 21 10 March 1964

Physical details

Verges is about 38 years old; about 5'5" tall and of medium build. He is fair colored, has a Chinese-looking face and wears spectacles. He has dark hair and dark eyes.

Parentage

Verges was born in Reunion Island which is a French Protectorate. His father is a citizen of that Island and his mother was from INdo-China. He has at least one older brother. The father was a Member of the French Parliament representing Reunion Island. Now the brother Paul Verges, is a Member of Parliament from that Island.

Marital Status

Verges was married about 1946 but was divorced in about 1959. He has one son from this marriage. It is now heard that he has married again in about 1963 to Jamilla Bouirhead, the famous Algerian prisoner who was sentenced to death but was given a reprieve. He defended her during her trial.

Personal Habits

Verges was a prominent student in Paris and was from the very beginning a very good debator. He is a charming conversationist and can keep any audience completely enraptured by his talk. He has been extremely popular with all groups and particular with females. He is very fond of eating well. He takes spicy food which would put even an Indian to shame. He drinks very little, works late hours, sleeps long in the mornings. He has an artistic temperament and good taste.

Career

In about 1950 Verges started working in the International Union of Students in Prague. There he was Secretary of I.U.S. and later also of International Students' Relief which was formed moreor less in his time. He remained there till 1954. After this he returned to Paris and studied to get his law degree. From about 1955 to 1962 he worked as a lawyer in France. As a lawyer he rose to prominence immediately. He was elected to the first Secretaryship of the French Young Lawyers' Body, which is a post of academic distinction. From the very beginning Verges started taking political cases of those who were accused in the various French colonies of "sedition". He was adopted by the F.L.N. of Algeria as the Chief of the Legal Defence Bureau in Paris. He conducted several famous trials including that of Jamilla and at the same time carried on the campaign for Algerian independence in France and elsewhere. For

[illegible] CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CS COPY

some time he was in trouble at the hands of the political groups opposed to Algerian independence. He was provided a guard outside his house and for a little while had even to leave France to live in Geneva because of fear for his life. Even in the legal defence that he conducted, the basis was entirely political. He was all this period subscribing to an extremist view which may be called ultra-revolutionary. For example, in his legal defence his theory was always to justify an act of killing by an accused on the ground that it was part of a war of independence.

Almost from the very beginning and in any case from 1951 Verges had serious difference with the French C.P. He considered them to be reformists and accused them of being cowardly in their support to the Algerian revolution. He was never a member thereof in this period and often worked against them.

In 1962 he shifted to Rabat as Political Adviser to the King. He was very friendly with a Senior Minister, "Ahmad", and his post in Rabat was brought about by the Minister. However, it appears he did not continue long in this post and was back in Paris in 1963. Now he is the Chief Editor of a political monthly journal called "Revolution". He is also reported to be the head of the China Lobby in Paris.

Acquaintance

The writer met Verges in 1951 when he visited Delhi. In 1955 the writer stayed with Verges in Paris twice and twice again in 1958. The last time the writer saw Verges was in Paris in 1961. (In 1951 Verges was in Delhi in connection with an I.U.S. meeting. In 1955 the writer was in Paris on his way to and from Prague in connection with I.U.S. matters. In 1958 he visited Paris going to and from Stockholm for the Youth Festival Preparatory Committee meeting. And in 1961 the writer was in Paris to attend an I.A.D.L. Commission on Algeria.) Verges has always been very friendly and cordial with the writer and openly discusses his problems, views, activities, etc.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: CELA-38,485

TO: Chief, WE

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 11-500.

FROM: Chief of Station, London

DATE: 14 May 1963

SUBJECT: OKEYWAY/JAGUAR
Charles GIBSON

California U.S.A.

Cit. U.S.A.
Lausanne, Switzerland

ACTION REQUIRED: Provide traces

X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

1. JAGUAR have reported that a secret and delicate source has provided information about an Afro-American who is editing the English edition of a new publication, entitled "African Revolution". French editions of this paper are being published in Algiers under the title of "Revolution Africaine" and the English edition is being published in Lausanne, where the journal has established an office. The American editor is Charles GIBSON, who was born in California in 1931, and was until September 1962, the Executive Secretary of an organisation styled "The Fair Play for Cuba" Committee in the United States. GIBSON is said to have been previously employed by the CBS News in New York, who dismissed him for his pro-Cuban activities. He is also said to have worked for the F.L.N. in Paris and to have had a Fellowship in African Studies at Columbia University Graduate School at one time.

No 201

2. JAGUAR would appreciate any additional information that Headquarters could provide about this man's background and activities.

Lawrence L. Noldy
LAWRENCE L. NOLDY

Distribution:
4-Chief, WE

X-INDEX

CS COPY

100-300-11

11-2-3

14-00000

38

SECRET CONTROL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

REPORT NUMBER: OEL-30,251

FROM: ENGLAND, LONDON

DATE. 24 September 1964

NUMBER OF PAGES: 1

NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS:

REPORT MADE BY: LEROY T. WADSWORTH

REPORT APPROVED BY: VICTOR T. CRONEIGH

DISTRIBUTION BY COPY TO:
Washington 1
Paris (LCPIPIT) 1 OFL
Paris 1 OFP
Bern 1
Registry

INDEX

JAGUAR
ORIGINATING [illegible] SECTION: E.1

REFERENCE OELA-41,545 of 10 Sept 64.

11-4-105

SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA AND COMMENTS:

JAGUAR Comment: "The attached report contains some further information (see reference which was not sent Bern) about the difficulties experienced in recent months by "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

"Please do not give contents of this report any further distribution, other than to ODACID, WASHINGTON, without prior reference to us."

CS COPY

SECRET CONTROL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

D 200-4-305
D 29-4-105

11-4-105

SECRET

Att. to OEL-39,251
24 Sept 1964

RICHARD GIBSON
CIT. U.K
OCC PUBLISHING
RA ENGLAND

WAS ED. "AF, LAT AM, ASIA REVO." SEPT 64 TOOK LEGAL ACTION + WON £1,500 DUE HIM IN PAST SALARY. SUBJ DOESN'T EXPECT J. VERGES WILL BE ABLE TO PAY.

O "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

A secret source has provided the following information about "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" and its French counterpart "Revolution" and about the differences between Jacques VERGES, the publication's Director, and Richard GIBSON who was Editor until he was dismissed about two months ago.

2. On 13th August 1964, the Swiss Federal Council banned "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution", which had hitherto been printed in Lausanne, and the Swiss authorities took possession of previous issues and subscription lists. GIBSON was however able to retain possession of one copy of the subscription list, as well as distribution records and most of the unpublished manuscripts.

3. When GIBSON was removed from his position as Editor of the publication he and his wife were owed a substantial sum in arrears of salary. Jacques VERGES made no attempt to pay these arrears with the result that the GIBSONs took legal action and received judgement in their favour early in September for a sum in excess of £1,500. GIBSON expects that VERGES will be unable to pay this sum or to meet other debts and that he will be declared bankrupt. GIBSON hopes that it will then be possible for Nils ANDERSSON, the Swedish printer of the English edition, to take over both the English and French editions.

4. 201-[illegible] <Because of his financial difficulties with "AF, Lat Am, Asia Revo" JACQUES VERGES has had to give up the tenancy of the Paris office of the publication at rue François 1er, and has moved to 52 rue Galande, Paris 5e. Richard Gibson expects he will be declared bankrupt.>

14-00000

RICHARD GIBSON
CIT. U.S. OCC PUBLISHING
RA ENGLAND
FMR ED. "AF, LAT AM, ASIA REVO." SEPT 64 TOOK LEGAL ACTION + WON £1,500 DUE HIM IN PAST SALARY. SUBJ DOESN'T EXPECT J. VERGES WILL BE ABLE TO PAY.
O "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

A secret source has provided the following information about "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" and its French counterpart "Revolution" and about the differences between Jacques VERGES, the publication's Director, and Richard GIBSON who was Editor until he was dismissed about two months ago.

2. On 13th August 1964, the Swiss Federal Council banned "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution", which had hitherto been printed in Lausanne, and the Swiss authorities took possession of previous issues and subscription lists. GIBSON was however able to retain possession of one copy of the subscription list, as well as distribution records and most of the unpublished manuscripts.

3. When GIBSON was removed from his position as Editor of the publication he and his wife were owed a substantial sum in arrears of salary. Jacques VERGES made no attempt to pay these arrears with the result that the GIBSONs took legal action and received judgement in their favour early in September for a sum in excess of £1,500. GIBSON expects that VERGES will be unable to pay this sum or to meet other debts and that he will be declared bankrupt. GIBSON hopes that it will then be possible for Nils ANDERSON, the Swedish printer of the English edition, to take over both the English and French editions.

4. <Because of his financial difficulties with "AF, Lat Am, Asia Revo" JACQUES VERGES has had to give up the tenancy of the Paris office of the publication at rue François 1er, and has moved to 52 rue Galande, Paris 5e. Richard Gibson expects he will be declared bankrupt.>

NILS ANDERSON
A ENGLAND
OCC. PRINTER
SWEDISH PRINTER OF ENG EDITION OF "AF LAT AM ASIA REVO
RICHARD GIBSON HOPES SUBJ WILL TAKE OVER BOTH ENG + FR EDITIONS.

22nd September 1964.

INDEX -X

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PROC. ACTION	ACTION	ACTION TAKEN
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WE

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: KEYWAY Psych
Jacque VERGES & Richard T. GIBSON Expelled from Switzerland

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OELW - 20852 (9 December 1963)

1. LCBEFORE reported on 17 January 1964 that Subjects, both of whom are mentioned in reference dispatch concerning Révolution Africaine (GIBSON is a US citizen) and were working from that publication's Lausanne office, have left Switzerland at the request of the Swiss Government. According to LCBEFORE, VERGES departed Switzerland on 25 November 1963 for Latin America (possibly Brazil); and GIBSON departed on 15 December 1963.

[illegible]

2. LCBEFORE believes that in part it can take credit for these expulsions in view of the fact that LCBEFORE-inspired publicity about Révolution Africaine has appeared in the Swiss press and that this publicity helped to draw the matter to the Swiss authorities' attention, thus prompting them to expel these two propagandists.

3. LCBEFORE also noted on 17 January 1964 that the November 1963 issue of Révolution Africaine lists Lausanne as a bureau (and Paris as the Main Office) whereas the October 1963 issue listed Lausanne as the Main Office and Paris as one of the bureaus.

Luke B Tanchester
LUKE B. TANCHESTER

3 - C/WE

<Richard T. Gibson [illegible] were working in the publication's office of Revolution Africaine Lausanne Switz. [illegible] depart Switz 15 Dec 63 at request of Swiss govt.>

11-2-24

<Jacque Verges [illegible] were working in the publication's office of Revolution Africaine Lausanne Switz. At request of Swiss Govt [illegible] depart Switz on 25 Nov 63 for Latin America possibly Brazil.>

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 22 Jan 64

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA - [redacted] 40613

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WE

INFO
Chief, KUWOLF; Chief of Station, Paris
Chief of Station, Paris(LCPIPIT); Chief, KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
JAGUAR Paper on Revolution

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: OELA-40,542(15 April 1964)

1. Reference forwarded a JAGUAR paper dealing with the well-known Communist magazine Revolution. Attached are (1) another JAGUAR note from SMOCK's office, and (2) the paper received with it. Please note JAGUAR's caveats on the use of the material.

2. SMIMPISH also remarked to me, on one recent occasion, that he had learned that Richard GIBSON had been expelled from the staff of Revolution (as is indicated here), but the reason that SMIMPISH gave was that GIBSON had been accused of working on behalf of "subversive" elements, which SMIMPISH implied to mean KUBARK. Maybe SMIMPISH was speculating on or misquoting this JAGUAR report. I haven't been able to go back to SMIMPISH on this, because he has subsequently gone on leave.

3. We (and JAGUAR) would appreciate any comments on this report.

INDEX

George H. FATLENBACH

Attachment: herewith
1-Letter
2-Report

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-C/KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-C/LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-C/KUDESK w/att h/w
2-COS/Paris w/att h/w

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
10 Sept 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-41,545

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

att/2

SECRET

2P

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

Reports received from a number of sources make it clear that "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" has been in difficulties for several months and it appears that the last issue was No. 11 dated March 1964. The trouble began, apparently, when the French authorities seized copies of issue No. 7 of the French edition, "Revolution", dated March 1964 because of an article it contained on French overseas territories. Creditors became alarmed, fearing that the publication might be banned, and demanded settlement of their debts which were then 201-180164 estimated to exceed £10,000. Jacques VERGES, the publication's Director, tried to effect administrative economies in order to cope with the situation but according to VERGES, Richard GIBSON, the Editor, argued that the Chinese should be asked to pay the debts. Matters worsened when, again according to VERGES, GIBSON persuaded the Lausanne printer to write to Peking and ask the Chinese to settle the publication's debt to him. VERGES regarded GIBSON's activities as deliberately disruptive and designed to produce proof of China's support for the publication.

2. Also, VERGES complained that GIBSON was working for Communist splinter groups in Europe to the detriment of the international Communist movement, and that he was dealing tactlessly with the magazine's agents and contributors. The situation was such that VERGES visited the U.K. in mid-July to discuss the position with 201-378225 BABU, a member of the Editorial Board. BABU, who is now Minister of State for Development Planning of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, was in London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

3. In July 1964 there were rumours that the English edition had gone bankrupt but these were denied by GIBSON who suggested that the English and French editions should be made quite separate, and that the former should be published in London. At about this time the split between VERGES and GIBSON became complete and the latter was removed from his position as Editor and from the Editorial Board, which issued the following "warning":-

> "Comrades from New York, London and Accra (Ghana) have raised up grave charges against Richard GIBSON. These charges have been confirmed and underlined by Richard GIBSON's present disruptive activities. Revolution's Editorial Board has decided to dismiss Richard GIBSON from all his responsibilities and expell him from the Editorial Board.
>
> "From now on, Richard GIBSON's activities can not in any way engage the responsibility of the review in all its editions.
>
> for the Editorial Board"

A similar statement was published in "Revolution" No. 10-11 dated July-August 1964.

<JACQUES VERGES (201-[redacted] 180164) DIRECTOR OF AFRICA, [redacted] LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION, EXPELLED RICHARD GIBSON EDITOR, BECAUSE LATTER ARGUED THAT CHINESE/4. With GIBSON . . SHOULD BE ASKED TO PAY [redacted] DEBTS OF PUBLICATION.>

SECRET

CARD. REPRODUCTION

4. With GIBSON out of the way, VERGES and his supporters were hoping to resume publication of the English edition. GIBSON also seemed determined to carry on and it has been reported that as early as June 1964 he was enquiring into the possibility of publishing an English version in the Netherlands.

201 ✓ ✓

5. The only other change of significance which has occurred during 1964 has been the resignation from the Editorial Board of Hamza ALAVI who objected to the publication's pro-Chinese attitude. Issue No. 11 of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" shows that he was replaced by another Pakistani - the 78 year old Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan BHASHANI. BHASHANI, who lives in East Pakistan, is the leader of the National Awami Party.

201-070343

1st September 1964.

HAMZA ALAVI
CIT. PAKISTAN

RESIGNED FROM EDITORIAL BOARD OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION" BECAUSE HE OBJECTED TO ITS PRO-CHINESE ATTITUDE

FR

<MAULANA ABDUL HAMID KHAN BHASHANI (201-070343) LIVES EAST PAKISTAN + IS LEADER OF NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY. ON EDITORIAL BOARD OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION" REPLACED HAMZA ALAVI WHO OBJECTED TO ITS PRO-CHINESE ATTITUDE.>

FR

< RICHARD GIBSON (201-30[illegible]52) EXPELLED FROM STAFF OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION". JACQUES VERGES CLAIMED HIS ATTEMPT TO HAVE CHINESE PAY PLA'S DEBT DELIB DISRUPTIVE + DESIGNED TO PROVE CHINA'S SUPPORT, THAT HE WORKING FOR COM SPLINTER GROUPS TO DETRIMENT OF INTERNAT COM, + THAT HE DEALING TACTLESSLY WITH PLA'S AGENTS + CONTRIBUTORS.>

from London who came as an observer

SEX M

CIT: UK

F ✓ OCC

(7) Max Hunt, a teacher in London who came as an observer for the Schools' Action Union

MEMBER

F ✓

SEX M

CIT: UK

(8) Matt Logan, manager of the Scottish Vanguard Bookshop at 270 Paisley Road, Glasgow, which is owned by the Scottish Workers Party

OCC: BOOK SHOP MANAGER ASSOCIATED WITH

F ✓

(9) David R. Shanks, from the MEMBER Scottish Workers Party who lives at 66 Dundee Street in Edinburgh

SEX M

CIT. UK

Delegation from the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) as follows:

F ✓

(1) Roger Young, treasurer of Friends of Palestine which is now affiliated with the PSC

F ✓

(2) Norman Temple, of the Friends of Palestine MEMBER

F ✓

(3) Abdullah Yasamee, of the Friends of Palestine MEMBER

F ✓

(4) Louis Eakes, of the Young Liberals MEMBER

(5) an unidentified girl friend of Eakes

F ✓

(6) (fnu) Hallier, of Agit-Prop MEMBER (a PSC member)

F ✓

(7) (fnu) Walker, who came as an observer

F ✓ MEMBER

(8) Bill Gunn, of Reg Birch's Communist Party of Britain/Marxist-Leninist and of the PSC

F ✓ MEMBER

(9) Dave Hundell, of the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation (RSSF) in London

[illegible] M

: UK

AFFILIATED WITH
~~MEMBER OF~~
PALESTINE SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN

SEX M

F ✓

(Source Comment: This delegation had been sent to Algiers by the London-based PLO representative, (fnu) Armanazi, who is apparently the editor of the newspaper "Free Palestine". The newspaper, however, lists its editor as "Aziz Yafi". Armanazi had supplied the airfare for this delegation because he did not want the PSC people to go to Algiers under the arrangements of Manchanda. All of the PSC people were young and no match for Manchanda who, in the final session of the Congress, was able to isolate them completely inasmuch as they opposed the recognition of Al Fatah and the establishment of the information bureau in Algiers.)

F ✓

e. Italy - Represented by delegates from the Italian Communist Party and the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). They decided to be in an observer status, although they were entitled to be participants by the fact that they belong to a Palestinian Solidarity Committee in Italy. The only open political opposition to the overall political line of the Congress came from the Italians who passed out a statement at the final session deploring the importation of left-wing quarrels into the issue of Palestine.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

M
3
FRANCE
OCC
Δ

f. France - The delegation was initially divided into factions but, on 27 December, a sort of truce was worked out and there was no overt trouble. Prominent members of the delegation were: Roger [illegible]ury, a leftist University lecturer, Jean-Pierre Vigier; (fnu) Kravine, brother of Alain Krivine; (fnu) Castro; and Marie-Claude Vignaud, the mistress of Abderrezak Benhadji (Algerian living in Paris).

FR
FR
F
SEX M CIT: ALGERIA

F
3
FRANCE
ASSOCIATE OF ABDERREZAK BENHADJI

g. West Germany - The delegation was composed primarily of unidentified militants of the Socialist German Student League -- SDS. The group took a very left sectarian position and joined with the PSC from Britain in openly refusing to give full support to the Al Fatah. On the other hand the Germans played no role, speaking only briefly in the Political Commission.

h. Spain

i. Switzerland

M
3
NETHERLANDS

F

j. The Netherlands - Represented as observers by Kees Wagtendonk and Bertus Hendriks who came from Amsterdam. (Source Comment: Wagtendonk said that he was still a member of the Pacifist Socialist Party; Hendriks described himself as a Marxist-Leninist.)

M
1-3
SWEDEN
OCC JOURNALIST
Δ

k. Scandinavia - Included Sweden, and perhaps two other Scandinavian countries (Source Comment: The small Scandinavian group, which came as observers, was guided during the proceedings by Samir Boutani who resides at [illegible]lubacken 31, Hagersten, Stockholm. He is an Arab journalist who claims to write for Lebanese and Syrian publications and who had attended the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal in Stockholm.)

l. Algeria

m. Palestine

n. United States - Delegation as follows:

F SEX M CIT: USA

(1) Herb Block, of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party who led the delegation

F SEX F CIT: USA

(2) Mrs. Block, wife of Herb Block (Source Comment: The Blocks announced that they were attending the Congress under the pseudonym of "Douglas". Mrs. Block even went to the length of wearing a reddish wig and dark glasses. Neither Block played any significant role.)

F
AKA

DPOB 31 AUG 35 USA FR ( ) SEX M CIT: USA

(3) Eldridge Cleaver, Black Panther Party leader now residing in Algiers

F SF

(4) Don (LNU), a Negro from Chicago who accompanied the Blocks and who claimed to be a member of the Black Panther Party.

DPOB: 5 MAY 15 USA FR ( ) SEX M CIT: USA

(5) Lewis Bergman, a former member of the Communist Party of USA in Chicago who now

SCC

SEX F
DOB 03-4-43 USA, CALIF
CIT USA
OCC STUDENT

resides in San Francisco.

(201 [illegible])

(S) David FINEMAN, who resides in San Francisco.

(Source Comment: The US delegation was accompanied by two newsreel photographers from the West Coast, one who gave his name as "Hardesty" FNU. They only attended the final session of the Congress and were primarily concerned with lobbying the PLO for facilities to go to Jordan to photograph guerrilla activities there.)

SEX M
CIT: USA
OCC: PHOTOGRAPHER

200-9-54

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROC ACTION	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO
Chief, KUWOLF; COS, Paris; Chief, LCPIPIT, Chief, KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
KEYWAY
JAGUAR Paper on Revolution-Africa, Latin America, Asia

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OELS 6746 (7 January 1964)

1. Reference authorized the Station to pass the 5 January 1964 issue of Propaganda Notes, Series B-40 (b) on Subject Chicom-financed publication to liaison.

2. We passed the KUBARK paper to SMOTH, LCBEFORE, and JAGUAR and requested comment.

3. JAGUAR's 3 April 1964 response, prepared by SMOCK, is attached. Please note the caveat in SMOCK's paragraph five; and that SMOCK indicates in paragraph four that the JAGUAR response is on behalf of LCBEFORE and SMOTH as well.

Luke B. Tanchester
LUKE B. TANCHESTER

Attachment: herewith
1. SMOCK response
2. Note "Africa, LA, Asia Revolution"

Distribution.
5 - Chief, WE w/att.
1 - Chief, KUWOLF w/att.
1 - COS, Paris w/att.
1 - Chief, LCPIPIT w/att.
1 - Chief, KUDESK w/att.

INDEX

CS Copy

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
15 April 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA - 40,542

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

S E C R E T 301295Z

DIR INFO ROME LOND CITE PALP 6112 IN 30 MAR 66 86048

DTDORIC QRIBONY QRPREY

REF PALP 6111 (IN 86062)
201-366056

21

1. QREBONY REPORTS HIS FAMILY SITUATION DIFFICULT BECAUSE MUST LEAVE APARTMENT 1 JUNE AND MAKES LOT OF DIFFERENCE WHETHER MOVE IS PERMANENT (ALLOWING LONG-TERM ADVANTAGE/OUS LEASE OR PURCHASE) OR TEMPORARY. IF STAYS LONDON WIFE CAN GET JOB, AND IS TRYING AT INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR FAMILY PLANNING, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE TRAVEL NEAR EAST ETC. WIFE WOULD NOT MIND STAYING IN LONDON BUT WOULD LIKE ROME AS WELL. IN ANY CASE, DECISION NECESSARY. REQUEST ADDEES COMMENTS.

2. Q WOULD LIKE HAVE WIFE IN ROME OFR AT LEAST 3-4 DAYS DURING HIS END-APRIL STAY THERE TO IMPROVE HER MORALE (COMPLAINS SHE NEVER GOES ANYWHERE) AND MAINLY TO MEET CAROLE PINA, ABOUT WHOM SHE HAS HEARD. MORE INVOLVED USE OF PINA WILL REQUIRE PUTTING TO REST WIFE'S JEALOUSY. PALP REQUESTS AUTHORIZATION TRAVEL NOT PER DIEM FOR Q WIFE TO

CRET

201-124-156/2
30 march 66

98

AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION

Origin

The monthly publication "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is the successor to "African Revolution" which was the monthly English digest of the Algerian weekly "Revolution Africaine". "Revolution Africaine", which is published in French, first appeared in February 1963 with the declared aim of helping to build socialism in Africa. In order to increase its effectiveness it began to publish a monthly edition, "African Revolution", consisting largely of material selected from previous issues of "Revolution Africaine". The editorial office of "African Revolution" was established in Lausanne, Switzerland by March 1963 and the first issue appeared two months later.

2. When the first editor of "Revolution Africaine", Jacques Mansour-VERGES, was replaced by Mohamed HARBI in May 1963, he left Algiers and took control of "African Revolution" in Lausanne. After two issues had been published the connection between it and "Revolution Africaine" was severed and "African Revolution" became "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution". In December 1963 the editorial board moved from Lausanne to Paris, and the publication now appears monthly in English and French, although the two editions are not identical. The former is printed in Switzerland and the latter, which carries the title "Revolution", is printed in Paris.

Editorial Policy of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution"

3. The Editorial "Europe too . . ." in issue No. 8 (December, 1963) urged the European working-class movement to take up the revolutionary struggle. Thus "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" made it clear that it intended its message to have a world-wide application. At first, however, it had directed its attention to the destruction of colonialism in Africa and the establishment of national independence and socialism, and had later acknowledged the logic of its arguments by changing its title to "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

4. To begin with, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" did not give the impression that it was advocating any particular brand of socialism. The Editorial on "Ideology" in issue No. 3 acknowledged the existence of various types of socialism in Africa and recognised that they were based on the "profound logic of experience". In time, however, it became increasingly apparent that the publication was lending its support to the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution, and the Chinese Communist interpretation of it. The principal article in issue No. 7 (November, 1963) which had the anodyne title "Third World? Which Third World?", was largely an exposition of the Chinese Communist attitude towards the national liberation movement, drawing material and inspiration from the Chinese Communist Party's document "A proposal concerning the general line of the International Communist Movement". (This was the letter, dated 14th June 1963, from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; it is a major document in the ideological dispute between the two parties.) The article contained the following quotation from the Chinese letter:

> "The various types of contradictions in the contemporary world are centred in the vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America; these are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm-centres of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism."

/As if . . .

As if to emphasise the extent of Chinese influence in the publication's policies and at the same time to denigrate those Communist Parties which supported the Soviet line, the Editorial in issue No. 8 referred scornfully to "the proponents of the peaceful road to socialism" and the "treason of the revisionists", and proclaimed the end of the "isolation in which revolutionary Marxists have been held because of the revisionism of the leaderships of the Communist parties". Clearly, therefore, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" supports the Chinese Communist argument that it is most unlikely that socialism can be achieved by peaceful means.

5. "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" has for the most part shunned theoretical discussion, although issue No. 9 (January, 1964) has a heavier ideological content than previous issues. It has made its appeal in extremely practical terms: its range of subjects has been wide and by no means confined to politics. Appendix A contains a list of the articles, and the names of their authors, which have appeared in issues 1 - 2 of "African Revolution" and issues 3 - 9 of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

Chinese Support and Influence

6. When VERGES was in Peking in the early part of 1963, the Chinese agreed to take out 3,000 subscriptions to "African Revolution" and these were in due course transferred to "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution". It is quite likely that this was a form of subsidy and, initially, when the publication sold for 5s. 0d., it was worth £750 a month. An article in "Newsweek" dated 9th March 1964 refers to a report that the Chinese Embassy in Berne provided the publication with £25,000 in 1963. In addition, each issue has contained at least one full page advertisement of Chinese Communist publications. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that it has been stated that the Chinese are in a position to control to some extent what appears in "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" but no clear, reliable information is available to show how this is done. The publication has also had contact with the Chinese through Abdul Rahman Mohamed BABU, a member of the Editorial Board who is now Minister for External Affairs and Trade in Zanzibar. He visited China in 1960, became the East African correspondent of the New China News Agency in 1961 and went to China again in October 1963.

Cuban Support

7. A Spanish edition of the publication was envisaged as early as May 1963 and it has been reported that members of its staff have been in touch with Cuban diplomats in Europe with a view to the latter editing the proposed Spanish edition. There is however, no confirmation that it has yet been published in Spanish. It may be that this Cuban connection was of assistance in providing the pictures of the Cuban revolution which appeared in issue No. 3 (July, 1963).

Contact with the Communist Splinter Group in the U.K.

8. By the end of 1963, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" had established contact with the Communist splinter group in the U.K. which is sympathetic to the Chinese line in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Publications of this group - the British Committee to Defeat Revisionism, for Communist Unity - were advertised in issues No. 8 and 9. An article on "The Fight Against Revisionism" by Michael McCreery the leader of the group was published in issue No. 9.

-/Staff, Editorial . .

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

Staff, Editorial Office and Agencies

9. The following persons are listed in issue No. 9 as members of the Editorial Staff:-

Director	Jacques M. VERGES	
Editorial Board	Hamza ALAVI	- Pakistan
	A.R. Mohamed BABU	- Zanzibar
	Amilcar CABRAL	- Venezuela
	Richard Thomas GIBSON	- U.S.A.
	Nguyen KIEN	- Vietnam (This is believed to be a pseudonym)
	Hassan RIAD	- U.A.R.
	Castro DE SILVA	- Angola

The same names are listed in issue No. 6 of "Revolution" as members of the editorial staff of that paper.

10. Secret sources have reported that the Business Manager of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is Nils ANDERSON, a Swede, and the Legal Adviser Bernard Arthur MARDER, a U.K. lawyer whose main task is to check proofs. Brief pen-pictures of some of the individuals prominently concerned with the production of the publication are given in Appendix B, from which it will be seen that, of the ten persons named in this paragraph and paragraph 9, at least three are Communists and two Communist sympathisers. Appendix C contains details of the Editorial Office and Agencies.

Publication and Circulation

11. "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is published by Nouvelles Editions Internationales and is printed in Switzerland. The circulation of the English edition is believed to be about 20,000 while that of the French edition, which is printed in France, may be as much as 50,000. The English edition is given a world-wide distribution.

3rd April 1964.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

APPENDIX A

LIST OF ARTICLES WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN ISSUES Nos.1 - 2 of "AFRICAN REVOLUTION" and ISSUES Nos.3 - 9 of "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

"AFRICAN REVOLUTION"

Volume 1 Number 1 (May 1963)

Liberate Our Brothers of South Africa	Ahmed Ben BELLA
Umkonto we Siswe	Oliver TAMBO
For Revolutionary Unity	Bakary DJIBO
Blida, Year One	J. MINCES and M. BEKKOUCHE
Yemen: A New Beginning	Ahmed DJIDJELLI
The New Strategy of Imperialism	A.R.
The Holy Alliance	Joaquin DIAZ
"Our Victory Depends on All the African Peoples"	Agostinho NETO
"Five Months of Independence in Angola"	Commander BENEDITO
We Will Avenge Lumumba	Abdou ALFA
Hammer or Sickle?	Charles BETTELHEIM
War in South Vietnam	Ir. RAKJAT
The Slums of Nanterre	P.P.
Moscow, Peking and the Third World (documents)	.. ..
Guinea: Two Steps Forward?	Gerard CHALIAND
Mali's Road to Socialism	Gerard CHALIAND
Swaziland, Verwoerd and the British	.. ..
Larbi Ben M'Hidi	.. ..
Sine Looks at the News	SINE
London, Colonial Capital	Abdou ALFA
Abd-El-Krim Is Dead	M. VERGES
Agrarian Reform in Morocco (document)	.. ..
New Colonial War in Borneo	.. ..
An American in Algiers	Don STEFFEN
Cuba Si!	SINE
Negroes with Guns	Robert F. WILLIAMS
African Art	.. ..
Jazz: Renaissance or Decline	Philippe KOECHLIN
Jazz: The Avant Garde	Le Roi JONES
Sports and Racism in South Africa	Rosalynde AINSLIE

Volume 1 Number 2 (June 1963)

The Chinese Spring	Djamila BOUHIRED and M. J. VERGES
I. Interview with Mao Tse-tung	
II. The Army and the Party	
III. The Commune of the "Four Green Seasons"	
The Peoples Will Decide	.. ..
Africa in Question	Noureddine TIDAFI
The Working Class in Africa	
The Perspectives	A. SPANELA
The Stages	Anusse SALAH-BEY
Clarity in the Struggle	A.R.
Economic Planning in Tropical Africa	Charles BETTELHEIM
Modibo Keita Speaks	Gerard CHALIAND
Sine Looks at the News	SINE
The U.A.R.'s New Victory at Suez	Mansour EL RIFFI
The People Have Spoken	A.R.

/Algeria's . . .

Algeria's Workers Management Committees	Gerard CHALIAND
End of an Era. Borgeaud Leaves Algeria	J. MINCES and M. BEKKOUCHE
The U.A.M. and French "Presence"	Albert-Paul LENTIN
Algeria's Investment Code	Jacques CHARRIERE
The Kenya-Somali Crisis	Tony HUGHES
The Malagasy Rebellion	Aristide RATSIMBAZAFY
The Testament of Andrianampoinimerina	.. ..
The Virtues of the Truth	SEKOU TOURE
The War in "Portuguese" Guinea	Amilcar CABRAL
Black Africa between the Two Wars	Jean SURET-CANALE
The Workers University in Conakry	Gerard CHALIAND
What Is Sanwi?	.. ..
Force and Violence in South Africa	Johannesburg Correspondent
Walter Sisulu, Underground Leader	Johannesburg Correspondent
South West Africa and the Nazis	.. ..
Agrarian Reform in Morocco (Part Two)	.. ..
Tsara: "Negritude? Dangerous Mystification"	.. ..
Towards an African Cinema	G.C.
Martinez: Painter of the Repression	G.C.
The Civilization of Benin	.. ..
Algeria: Sports and Independence	.. ..

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

Volume 1 Number 3 (July 1963)

The Cuban Revolution in Pictures	.. ..
Our New Name	.. ..
Ideology	.. ..
Ghana Builds Socialism	Jack WODDIS
National Revolution in Africa and Asia	Mehdi BEN BARKA
Modibo Keita: Lenin Peace Prize	.. ..
Africa and the Common Market	V. PILLAY
Morocco and the Common Market	Abdelaziz BELAL
The Dangers of Foreign Aid	Afana OSENDE
"I Accuse!"	Nelson MANDELA
The Poqo Affair	Johannesburg Correspondent
Algiers, Capital of Youth	.. ..
A School for Building the Future	Mohamed BEKKOUCHE
An Open Letter to President John F. Kennedy	.. ..
The Chinese Spring	Djamila BOUHIRED and J. M. VERGES
Spanish Students Fight Fascism	.. ..
Four Deserters from Mozambique	.. ..
For the Defence of Democratic Freedoms in Africa	.. ..
Sine Looks at the Jews	SINE
The Politics of Culture	Abdou ALFA
The Manding Epic: The Death of a Tyrant	.. ..
Young Artists of Southern Rhodesia	.. ..
Two Jazz Artists	Philippe KOECHLIN

Volume 1 Numbers 4-5 (August-September 1963)

The Afro-American Struggle	.. ..
Negro Nationalism and the Left	Harold CRUSE
Uncle Tom Goes to Africa	Julian MAYFIELD
You Can't Come Home Any More	William WORTHY

/Aiding . .

Aiding the Struggle in "Portuguese" Guinea	Aulio Monteiro DUARTE
The New Slave Trade	MAURIENNE
Aswan. Monument for the Future	Wilfrid BURCHETT
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu	General Vo Nguyen GIAP
Towards Victory in South Vietnam	.. ..
The F.N.L. of South Vietnam	Nguyen KIEN
Notes for a Biography of Fidel Castro	Carlos FRANQUI
"If Fidel Castro Were Elected President of the United States"	William WORTHY
African Nationalism and the Common Man	Julius NYERERE
The War of National Liberation of Irak' Kurdistan	Ismet Cheriff VANLY
Documents from Addis Ababa:	
Resolutions of the African Summit Conference	.. ..
Charter of the Organization of African Unity	.. ..
The Powers Behind Apartheid	C. FASULO
Education for African Servitude	Johannesburg Correspondent
Two South African Poets:	
Musisi Kunene	
Dennis Brutus	
Modern Poetry in Africa	Ken GEERINO
Ibn Khaldun Today	Mouloud MAMMERI
The Magic Art of the Congo	.. ..
Sini-Kory	Keita FODEBA
A Jazz Great: John Coltrane	Le Roi JONES

Volume 1 Number 6 (October 1963)

The Freedom Struggle in South Africa	.. ..
An Introduction to African Economic Problems	Stephen KAZADO
Dr. DuBois is Dead	Julian MAYFIELD
My Last Message to the World	Dr. W.E.B. DUBOIS
State Capitalism in Egypt	Hassan RIAD
The O.A.S: "U.S. Ministry of Colonies"	Carleton BEALS
Why I Came to China at the Age of 72	Anna Louise STRONG
Socialist Planning in Cuba	Major Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA
Barbudos Si!	NUEZ
Techniques of the Guerrilla Fighter	Robert TABER
The Real Meaning of the Washington March	A.B. SPELLMAN
The Agrarian Situation in India	Dr. Sulekh C. GUPTA
Five Poems	Faiz Ahmad FAIZ
Will Handicrafts Survive?	Interview with Leonardo CREMONINI
White Critics, Black Musicians, New Music	Le Roi JONES
Appeal of the Executive Committee of Afro-Asian Writers	

Volume 1 Number 7 (November 1963)

Third World? Which Third World?	Pierre JALEE
The White Dictators of Southern Rhodesia	Fenner BROCKWAY, M.P.
"Malaysia" - the Neo-Colonialist Federation	Abdul RAHIM KARIM
The Agony of the Spanish Bourgeoisie	E. FERNANDEZ
A Day with Francisco Juliao	Dulce RODRIGUEZ
Venezuela: Empire of Oil and Iron	Carleton BEALS
Cuba at the United Nations	Interview with Dr. Carlos LECHUGA

/The . . .

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

The Preparation for November	Rabah BITAT
Verwoerd's Bantustan Bluff	Brian BUNTING
Illusion, Emulation and Integration	Wilmot Alfred FRAZER
Free Mae Mallory!	Clarence Seniors
Robert Williams Speaks from Peking	
Our Struggle in British Guiana	Dr. Cheddi JAGAN
Which Way for British Guiana?	Jeannette SCOTT
Crude Weapons that Helped Destroy an Army	Chou Chih-ching
New British Poets of the Left	Ken GERRING
Mr. Rockefeller's Museum of Primitive Art	Marion BROWN, Jr.
A Handful of Wheat	Prem CHAND

Volume 1 Number 8 (December 1963)

Europe, too!	.. ..
Spain - the Strikes and the Parties	Martin VALDES
The Crisis in Soviet Agriculture	A.H. EVANS
The Alliance for Plunder	Robert TABER
The End of the Mexican Revolution?	Carleton BEALS
Why We Went to Cuba	Phillip Abbott LUCE
The Road of Revolution in Peru	The C.C. of the M.I.R.
Cartoons from Cuba	CHAGO
The National Liberation Struggle in South West Africa	J. KOZONGUIZI
Underdeveloped Countries and the Problem of Peace	Andrew Gunder FRANK
The Kennedy Assassination	Fidel CASTRO
The Rights of Man in an Age of Abundance	James BOGGS
Repression and Torture in South Africa	Brian BUNTING
"Negroes" (filmed and staged in the U.S.A.)	Wilmot Alfred FRASER
The Failure of the "Peaceful Road" in Chile	Pedro ANDINO
U.S.A: The Shady Side of the Street	Thomas TOPOR
Protest Through Music in South Africa	Todd T. MATSHIKIZA
Ornette Revisited	Marion BROWN, Jr.

Volume 1 Number 9 (January 1964)

The Revolution in Africa	Editorial
The People's Victory in Zanzibar	J.M. VERGES
What Kind of Independence for Angola?	Viriato da CRUZ
The Class Struggle in Africa	.. ..
Must They Hang?	.. ..
The Fight Against Revisionism	Michael McCREERY
Panama: "Big Steal"	Carleton BEALS
Support the Panamanian People's Just Struggle	MAO Tse-tung
The Unfinished Revolution in the Philippines	William J. POMEROY
China: Where, How and Whither?	Keith BUCHANAN
What China Means by "Readjustment"	Anna Louise STRONG
The Meaning of Black Revolt in the U.S.A.	James BOGGS
Five Young Afro-American Poets	A.B. SPELLMAN Lorenzo THOMAS Sonia SANCHEZ Joe JOHNSON Le Roi JONES
Unchain My Soul	C. LINDSAY BARRETT
Don Cherry: Trumpet of the Year	Le Roi JONES

SECRET

APPENDIX B

INDIVIDUALS PROMINENTLY CONCERNED WITH THE PRODUCTION OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

201	Hamza ALAVI	- was born on 10th April 1921. He is a Pakistani resident in the U.K. and has strong Communist sympathies. Member of Editorial Board
201	Freddy Nils ANDERSON	- was born on 14th February 1933 at Lausanne. He is a Swede and the business manager of "Revolution". He has been a Communist for a number of years.
201-339225	Abdul Rahman Mohamed BABU	- was born on 22nd September 1924 at Zanzibar and is at present Minister for External Affairs and Trade in the Zanzibar Government. His sympathy towards Communism is well known. Member of Editorial Board
201-306052	Richard Thomas GIBSON 201-306052	was born on 13th May 1931 in the U.S.A. He is the Editor-in-Chief of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" and works in the Editorial Office in Paris. An American negro, he was Executive Secretary of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" in the U.S.A. until September 1962.
201	Bernard Arthur LARDER	- was born on 25th September 1928 at Manchester. He is a Communist and has taken a close interest in African affairs. Reported to be Legal Adviser
201-180164	Jacques Camille Raymond VERGES 201-180164 alias Jacques Mansour VERGES	- was born on 5th March 1925 or 5th March 1929 at Oubone, Thailand. He was a member of the French Communist Party in 1951 and subsequently was employed by the I.U.S. as Secretary of its International Relief Organisation. More recently he was Defence Counsel in the trial of a number of members of the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N.). Director and key figure of the publication, "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

SECRET

APPENDIX C

EDITORIAL OFFICE AND AGENCIES OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION" and "REVOLUTION"

The Editorial Office is at 40, rue François 1er, Paris 8e and there are the following agencies.-

Brazil - Jurema FINAMOUR, Avenida Viera Souto 86,
Ipanema, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara.

Britain - 4, Leigh Street, London, W.C.1
(Note - This is the business address of a Pakistani Communist, Tusaduq Ahmed)

China - A.M. KHEIR, 9 Tai Chi Chang, Peking;
distribution: Guozi Shudian, P.O. Box 399,
Peking (37)
(Note - KHEIR, a Sudanese Communist, is a member of the World Council of Peace and works for the China Peace Committee which is located at 9, Tai Chi Chang, Peking. Guozi Shudian is the official Chinese Government centre for the distribution of Chinese literature and propaganda)

Cuba - General Suarez entre Ayestaran y Calzada de
Rancho Boyeros, Havana.

Nigeria - F.E.I. ILOKHAI, 309, Awolowo Hall, University
of Nigeria, Nsukka.

Switzerland - Metropole, 10-11, Lausanne.
(Note - This is Nils ANDERSON's home and business address)

Tanganyika - Jweli MGOGO, P.O. Box 9221, Dar-es-Salaam.

U.S.A. - Room 603A, 1 Union Square, New York, N.Y.

Zanzibar - P.O. Box 1146, Zanzibar.

18

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

ABSTRACT

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF;
OFP Chief of Station, Paris; Chief of Station, LCPIPIT

FROM
Chief of Station, London RIF

SUBJECT
O "Revolution, Africa, Latin America, Asia"

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: (A) OELA-41,545 (10 September 1964) 11-4-35
(B) OEL-39,251 (24 September 1964)

Attached is a recent JAGUAR report dealing with Subject publication, and the comments of Richard GIBSON. In light of the continuing interest of the Addressee offices, this material is being made available on a strict KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY basis. JAGUAR has asked that the report's PBPRIME distribution (if any) be limited to ODACID only. Any distribution beyond that indicated above should first be cleared with JAGUAR.

INDEX -x

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Report, herewith

Distribution:
2-Chief, WH w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-COS, Paris w/att h/w
2-COS, LCPIPIT w/att h/w

COPY

D 200-4-305
D 200-4-331

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D 29-4-105
D 29-4-131

DATE TYPED
20 Oct. 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-41,788

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
11-4-105

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

Richard Gibson
Cit of [illegible] A [illegible]
Former ed of [illegible]
said money [illegible]
Chinese [illegible]
financing [illegible]
said only in
respect they
had standing
order 3,000
copies

The following information was received in the first half of October 1964 from a source in close touch with Richard GIBSON, the former Editor of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

2. GIBSON was aware that a number of people had thought that the Chinese Communists had provided some financial backing for "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution", but this was true only to the extent that the Chinese had a standing order for 3,000 copies of each issue of the English edition. If the Chinese had given more general financial assistance VERGES, the publication's Director, would not have had to contend with the present financial difficulties and possible bankruptcy.

3. VERGES had had access to a relatively large sum of money which had been held in Switzerland from the time of the Algerian war of independence. When this had dried up VERGES had been unable to replenish it. Reports that VERGES had stolen this money were not true.

4. The publication owed 40,000 Swiss francs to a business-man, possibly Swiss, named KESSEL and 30,000 francs to the French printers. In GIBSON's view too much money had been spent on maintaining prestige offices at 40 rue François 1er, Paris.

[illegible]

5. When "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" was banned in Switzerland all except 100 copies of issue No. 12 were seized by the Swiss authorities. These 100 copies had already been sent to GIBSON.

6. The French edition "Revolution" has not appeared since August 1964.

16th October 1964.

Comment 1) Para. 4

Source could not provide any further particulars about KESSEL.

14-00000

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

RICHARD GIBSON
CIT. U.K & ENGLAND
FORMER ED OF L A A R NEWS
SAID ALLEGED MANY THOUGHT
CHICOMS HELP
FINANCE [illegible]
SAID ONLY IN
RESPECT THEY
HAD STANDING
ORDER 3,000
COPIES

The following information was received in the first half of October 1964 from a source in close touch with Richard GIBSON, the former Editor of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

2. GIBSON was aware that a number of people had thought that the Chinese Communists had provided some financial backing for "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution", but this was true only to the extent that the Chinese had a standing order for 3,000 copies of each issue of the English edition. If the Chinese had given more general financial assistance VERGES, the publication's Director, would not have had to contend with the present financial difficulties and possible bankruptcy.

3. VERGES had had access to a relatively large sum of money which had been held in Switzerland from the time of the Algerian war of independence. When this had dried up VERGES had been unable to replenish it. Reports that VERGES had stolen this money were not true.

4. The publication owed 40,000 Swiss francs to a business-man, possibly Swiss, named KESSEL and 30,000 francs to the French printers. In GIBSON's view too much money had been spent on maintaining prestige offices at 40 rue François 1er, Paris.

[illegible] ref

5. When "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" was banned in Switzerland all except 100 copies of issue No. 12 were seized by the Swiss authorities. These 100 copies had already been sent to GIBSON.

6. The French edition "Revolution" has not appeared since August 1964.

16th October 1964.

Comment i) Para. 4

Source could not provide any further particulars about KESSEL.

ii) Para. 4

Source did not say whether the sum owed to the French printers was in French or Swiss francs.

(JACQUES VERGES FR. [illegible]
HAD ACCESS LARGE SUM MONEY
HELD SWITZ. SINCE ALG. WAR.
AFTER WHEN THIS GONE WAS
UNABLE TO REPLENISH IT. REPORTS
THAT SUBJ HAD STOLEN
THIS MONEY UNTRUE.)

COPY

SECRET

OELA-41788 - Encl-1

011-264-105

14-00000

11

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO
Chief, KUWOLF; Chief of Station, Paris (LCPIPIT); Chief, AF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief of Station, Paris

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
LCBEFORE Draft of Round-up on Revolution

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: OELA-42,233, 5 January 1965

1. As noted in Ref, mention was made during one of LCBEFORE's bi-weekly meetings that I did not attend, of a "round-up in preparation". The apparent antecedent was Richard Thomas GIBSON, and I undertook to find out from LCBEFORE just what was what.

2. As it turns out, LCBEFORE was preparing a round-up of information on Revolution, rather than on GIBSON. In response to my somewhat agitated query (due to recent traffic relating to GIBSON, in particular), LCBEFORE rushed forth with the rough draft of their round-up, which is attached. They point out, however, that this draft is completely uncleared; it has not made the rounds of the responsible political departments and should not be regarded as a final product. In addition, it should be noted that it is intended, when completed, only for circulation within the SMOOTHER government - principally in overseas elements - and not for general publication.

3. LCBEFORE, after expressing the foregoing qualifications, invite any contributions that KUBARK would like to offer. The substance of the round-up seems to offer little room for controversy, although KUDESK/ICG may be able to contribute additional information. We also wonder whether the English-language edition has made any impact in the Western Hemisphere.

4. We assume that the appendix of personality data will be forwarded to us along with the final draft, or the final edition.

George H. [illegible]

Attachment: herewith

Distribution:
3-Chief, WH w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-COS, Paris w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS c.,

DATE TYPED 12 Jan. 65	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OELA-42,304	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

[illegible] CARD REPRODUCTIONS

DRAFT SECRET

RÉVOLUTION

1. During the past year Révolution and its English edition Africa Latin America Asia Revolution have undergone extremely important changes. For a time during the summer it was reported that the publication was in financial difficulties but in the most recent French edition, No.12, dated October/November it was announced that the magazine would continue on a new basis, with an enlarged Advisory Board, appearing every two months, not only in an English and a French edition but also in a coming Spanish edition to be published in Bogota for Latin America.

2. The changes which are being made do not in any way alter the pro-Chinese complexion of the magazine. Though the magazine now seems on a much firmer financial basis, there is as yet no evidence that the Chinese are directly subsidising it. They are however buying copies and taking advertisements. It has been reported that when Verges was in Peking in the early part of 1963, the Chinese agreed to take out 3,000 subscriptions to "Africa [illegible]" and these were in due course transferred Africa Latin America Asia Revolution. When the publication sold for five shillings, this was worth £750 a month. Each issue has contained at least one full page advertisement of Chinese Communist publications.

201-357226

3. The publication (Révolution) has also had contact with the Chinese through Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu, 201-357285 a member of the Advisory Board who is Minister for Commerce and Co-operatives in the Tanzanian Government. Babu visited China in 1960, became the East African correspondent of the New China News Agency in 1961, and went to China again in October, 1963.

22

4. By the end of 1963, Révolution had established contact with the Communist splinter-group in the UK, led by Michael McCreery, 201-757205 which is on the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet cold war.

/The ...

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

The French Edition

5. Entitled Revolution, this is now published in Paris by S.A.R.L. Nouvelles Editions Internationales, 79, rue Galande - Paris 5°. The first issue of Revolution in September, [illegible] was published at 40, rue François 1er - Paris 8°, printed by "La Cité", Lausanne, Switzerland, but bound by Brigny, France. When in the spring, the Director, Jacques M. Verges, had run into financial difficulties, he found cheaper premises for his editorial office at 52, rue Galande - Paris 5° and with No.10/11 of July/August changed his printers to Offset-Presse. It seems that Revolution was in financial difficulties for several months. The trouble began, apparently, when the French authorities seized copies of issue No.7 of the French edition of March 1964 because of an article it contained on French overseas territories. Creditors became alarmed, fearing that the publication might be banned, and demanded settlement of their debts which were then estimated to exceed £10,000.

The Editorial Board

201-170164

6. Under the new arrangements Jacques M. Verges remains Editorial Director, or [illegible] with the following as Advisory Board ("Collaborateurs permanents"). Newcomers to the Board since the last issue in July/August are marked with asterisks.

Details of ... [illegible]

In Advisory Board of "Revolution" [illegible]

Mohamed Babu		- Zanzibar
Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani	201-700?43	- Pakistan
Amilcar Cabrera	No 201	- Venezuela
Demba Diallo	201-756290	- Mali
Nguyen Kien	201-511932	- Vietnam
Hassan Riad	No 201	- UAR
Castro da Silva	Antonio 201-32793	- Angola
Carlos Ferran	No 201	- Spain
Marcos Ferrer	No 201	- Colombia
Abdul R. Karim	201-22477	- Malaya

The first change on the original Advisory Board came with the inclusion in No.8 of Martin Valdes - Spain. The next change was in issue No.9 when Hamza Alavi - Pakistan - was replaced

/by ...

by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani also from Pakistan. It was reported that Hamza Alavi resigned because he objected to the publication's pro-Chinese attitude. An important further change came with the appearance of issue No.10/11 last July in which was prominently published a "Communique" announcing the dismissal from the Advisory Board of Richard Gibson - U.S.A. The Communique accused Richard Gibson, who is an American Negro, of having "used his former position as secretary to the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" to infiltrate the International Revolutionary Movement". Some details of personalities are given at appendix.

[appendix to follow]

7. In Revolution No.12 it is claimed that the total issue of the new and enlarged bi-monthly magazine, including French English and Spanish editions, will be 50,000. However, since his dismissal, Richard Gibson has stated that, during his time on the magazine, while about 20,000 copies of the French edition were printed, the top sale of any issue was never more than 7,500 copies. In the case of the April No.8 issue, he says that the total sale in France was 3,000 copies. The prices of Revolution are given as: Africa: 2.5 dirham, 2.5 dinars, 150 C.F.A. Europe: 4.50 Francs. This represents a 15% increase in the price of the French edition. But this is accompanied by a lowering of the price by 35% in countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Those taking out annual subscriptions are informed that they are entitled on request not only to make use of Revolution's Documentation Centre on International Workers' Movement and the Struggle for National Liberation, but also to free copies of the magazine Pekin-Information. Those taking out a long-term subscription now will also be entitled to "publications in foreign languages from Peking".

8. A main feature of issue No.12 is a leading article by Jacques Verges entitled "Hiroshima, plus jamais!" Possibly by coincidence, this was published at the same time as the

First ...

first Chinese nuclear device was exploded.

9. The Russian view of Révolution was made clear in Pravda on June 3 in an article attacking China, containing the following passage: "fractionist groups ... are also involved in the publication in several languages, with Peking's help, of a new "international" journal with the high-flown title of Révolution."

The English Edition

10. Now entitled Africa Latin America Asia Revolution, the English edition was originally published in Algiers with the title African Revolution. From the third issue onwards it was published in Lausanne as Africa Latin America Asia Revolution. In issue No.7 of November 1963, it was announced that the editorial offices were then located in Paris, with the offices of the French edition, but it continued to be printed in Switzerland. In August, 1964, the Swiss Government banned the "printing edition and the transit" through Switzerland of the English edition because they considered Africa Latin America Asia Revolution "an organ of propaganda of the Chinese Communists, designed for non-European countries, which does not limit itself to supporting the liberation struggle of the so-called colonial peoples but also propagates the political views of Red China".

11. The last English issue in the old series which has come to hand was No.11 of March. The first in the new series, No.1 Vol.II dated September/October is published in Paris by S.A.R.L. Nouvelles Editions Internationales, from the same address as the French Edition, 52, rue Galande - Paris 5e. This English edition, which was previously similar in format to Readers Digest, is now glossy and similar in format to the French edition. Most of the articles in it are re-printed from the French edition of Révolution.

The Editorial Board

12. As with the French edition, the Editorial Director remains Jacques M. Vergès, with the same Advisory Board except except

that ...

SECRET

that Amilcar Caldera - Venezuela - is not included and there are two members not listed on the French board - Rewi Alley - New Zealand - a member of the Peace Liaison Committee of the Asian and Pacific Regions, and A.M.-Kheir of the Sudan.

13. Prices of this new edition are given as follows: Africa: 2 shillings; America: 75 cents; Europe: 5 shillings, 3.50 Francs.

Secret

CONTACT REPORT #12 25 January 1963.

TIME/PLACE : Safe House #2, 1000 Jan 25.

PRESENT : Kulpa, Tiptoft, Lawton.

1. Purpose of this meeting was to inform Kulpa that Headquarters had agreed to his trip to the Congo and to pass certain instructions re McInturff. K. said that he had not as yet received instructions from Holden and that the latter planned to be in Rome on Saturday. He would send the airline ticket from that city. K. also stated that Serge Michel had agreed that the first six covers on the new Afrique Revolutionaire (?) would be shot by K. K. hit us up for a light meter since he said that his present one was broken and since he had to take the pictures prior to his departure for the Congo which he anticipated would be either early or mid next week.

2. Another twist was that he had been contacted by Gibson, who informed him that a certain Dave Watts who runs a highly [illegible] sheet in New York City had written to Gibson asking him for photos. Gibson will purchase and forward several of K.'s negatives. Since all this is vague enough, Kulpa promised to get more facts.

3. The rest of the meeting was taken up by Tiptoft straightening out his accountings.

4. Next meeting. 1000 Tuesday 29 Jan.

5

[illegible]

Secret

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LEDNOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
VOL, III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFIC
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA.

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

SECRET

MEXICO CITY

[illegible] DULOKT

REFERENCES: A. [illegible]-[illegible]77

B. MEXI 4834 (IN 60690), [illegible]

1. PER A, PARA 9-B, [illegible] HAS CONNECTIONS [illegible] CARDENAS [illegible] (201-248906) AND SUGGESTS [illegible] BE ASKED TO INTERROGATE CARDENAS ABOUT THESE CONNECTIONS. REF B DESCRIBES [illegible] PLAY IN 1963 AGAINST NIKOLAI SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139) IN WHICH AN ARTICLE WAS PLACED IN "ULTIMAS NOTICIAS" 31 MAY 1963 CITING CARDENAS AS CLANDESTINE CONTACT OF LEONOV FOR SMUGGLING ARMS TO GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES. REQUEST LIAISON BE GIVEN ABOVE NEWS REFERENCE AS ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION FOR [illegible] OF CARDENAS ABOUT HIS AND DULOKT-1'S PAST RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS AND INVOLVEMENT OF [illegible] WITH SOVIETS.

2. FILE: 200-124-182/3; 201-248906; 201-132139.

Leonov

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/SAO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-132139

14-00000

201-132159

LA REPUBLICA

EL DIARIO DE LOS HOMBRES DE TRABAJO

Tarifa Postal Reducida número 10 de la Administración Postal Nal.

BOGOTA, D. E., VIERNES 25 DE JULIO DE 1969.

Dirección: Calle 14 número [illegible] Conmut. [illegible] Dpt. [illegible]

201-132139

Los Secuestros, Clave de Siniestro Plan Comunista

Denuncian Actividades en Colombia

El secuestro de que acaba de ser víctima en Cali el conocido médico y ganadero Ernesto González Caicedo, ha venido a confirmar trágicamente la existencia de una vasta conjura comunista para subvertir el orden constitucional y sumir de nuevo al país en una ola de terrorismo y violencia que parecían sepultados para siempre.

En efecto, este periódico así como también los demás diarios de la capital, habían anunciado en sus ediciones del 12 y del 18 de los corrientes, basadas en informaciones oficiales, que el Departamento del Valle había sido escogido por los comunistas prosoviéticos para continuar la ola de atracos, atentados terroristas y secuestros iniciados recientemente en el Departamento de Antioquia.

Después del secuestro del hacendado antioqueño Rubén Noreña, se produce ahora en el Valle el del médico Ernesto González Caicedo por cuyo rescate los bandoleros comunistas están exigiendo la crecida suma de cuatro y medio millones de pesos. Se vienen cumpliendo así, cronológicamente, las etapas del nuevo plan subversivo, comenzando por estos cuyos objetivos son obviamente los de conseguir los dineros necesarios para financiar las cuadrillas de bandoleros en las áreas rurales ya escogidas.

Este incremento de la violencia en Colombia, al que hay que sumarle el reciente asalto en cuadrilla a San José de [illegible], similar al "simacotazo" de años pasados, se produce inmediatamente después de la denuncia formulada hace pocos días por el diario "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires, uno de los periódicos más serios y prestigiosos del continente; en esa oportunidad, el rotativo argentino mencionó editorialmente a Colombia como uno de los países q' serían más gravemente afectados por la violencia comunista, junto con Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia.

Los hechos indican, además, que, pese a las divergencias ideológicas, la fauna comunista en sus diversas tendencias "maoísta", "castrista" y "moscovita" está solidamente unida y comprometida en el plan de terrorismo y violencia que se viene denunciando.

Estamos en capacidad de informar a la opinión pública, que en poder del DAS, la Policía y el Ejército, reposan informaciones según las cuales el partido comunista colombiano, adicto a la "línea de Moscú", ha cursado instrucciones a todos sus afiliados para que se apresten a ingresar a la clandestinidad.

En las mismas fuentes se informó que los secuestros del señor Noreña y del doctor González, obedecen a móviles y tienen características similares a los perpetrados por bandoleros a las FARC en años pasados, a resultas de los cuales fueron asesinados los conocidos hombres de negocios, Harold Eder y Oliverio Lara Borrero.

Las FARC, como lo sabe todo el mundo, es un organismo paramilitar, creado por los comunistas prosoviéticos y dirigido por el tristemente célebre "Tirofijo", quien es miembro del comité central del partido comunista adicto a Moscú. Precisamente para revitalizar a este organismo, que había quedado reducido a las más precarias condiciones, gracias a la patriótica labor de las Fuerzas Armadas, un funcionario de la embajada soviética, entregó en México la suma de cien mil dólares al comunista colombiano Feliciano Pachón Chocontá, quien, por fortuna, fue descubierto y capturado cuando estaba a punto de culminar con éxito su fatídica misión.

En torno a este sonado asunto que en su época tubo resonancia mundial, el diario "La Tribuna", de Lima, identifica en una serie de crónicas recientes a un ruso de apellido Lenov como "el funcionario soviético que le dio el dinero a Pachón en México", y agrega basado en informaciones de la Interpol que Lenov viaja con otros agentes de la KGB, Alexander Opeetbunov y Victor Mednikov, todos ellos disfrazados de "sindicalistas", en una extraña correría que comprende justamente los países mencionados por "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires como enclaves del nuevo plan violento del comunismo, es decir, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú y Bolivia.

Según "La Tribuna", de Lima, estos tres rusos estuvieron en Colombia recientemente, y es justamente después de su paso por aquí que se están presentando los secuestros y actos violentos mencionados.

En abundancia de detalles, el importante periódico "Ya", editado en Madrid (España), se ocupó también en fecha muy reciente de la conjura comunista contra Colombia y otros países de América Latina. Según el diario madrileño, las sedes de las agencias Tass y Novosty son verdaderos "nidos de espionaje y subversión" a través de los cuales se desarrolla la más peligrosa actividad del comunismo soviético.

7 cable

COMMUNISTS PROMOTE VIOLENCE IN LATIN COUNTRIES

Source: La Republica, 25 July 1969

The kidnapping of which the noted doctor and rancher Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo was recently the victim in Cali has served to confirm, tragically, the existence of a vast communist plot to subvert the constitutional order and to plunge the country again into a wave of terrorism and violence which appeared to be buried forever.

In fact, this newspaper, like the other dailies in the capital, reported in its 12 and 18 July issues, on the basis of official statements, that the Department of Valle had been selected by the pro-Soviet communists as the scene of the continued wave of terrorist attacks and assaults and kidnappings recently begun in the Department of Antioquia.

Following the kidnapping of Antioquia rancher Ruben Norena, the kidnapping of Doctor Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo has now occurred. The communist bandits are demanding the enormous sum of 4.5 million pesos in ransom. Thus the chronological stages in the new subversive plan are being carried out, beginning with the steps which are obviously designed to obtain the money necessary to finance the bandit gangs in the rural areas they have already selected.

This increase in violence in Colombia, to which must be added the recent gang attack in San Jose de Urama, similar to the incidents of past years, occurred immediately after the charges made a few days ago by the Buenos Aires daily La Prensa, one of the most serious and prestigous newspapers on this continent. On this occasion, the Argentine newspaper made editorial mention of Colombia as one of the countries which will be most seriously affected by the communist violence, along with Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia.

The facts indicate, moreover, that despite the ideological differences, the various "Maoist," "Castroist," and "Muskovite" categories of communist fauna are solidly united and pledged to the plan of terrorism and violence denounced in these charges.

We are in a position to inform the public that the DAS /Departmento Administrativo de Seguridad; Administrative Department of Security/, the police and the army have in hand information revealing that the Colombian Communist Party, a supporter of the "Moscow line," has issued instructions to all its affiliated organizations calling for immediate engagement in secret activity.

The same sources have stated that the kidnappings of Mister Norena and Doctor Gonzalez were similar in motivation and method to the kidnappings committed in past years by FARC /Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia/ bandits, resulting in the murder of the well-known businessmen Harold Eder and Oliverio Lara Borrero.

The FARC, as everyone knows, is a paramilitary organization established by the pro-Soviet communists and headed by "Tirofijo" (Dead-eye), of unsavory notoriety, who is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party supporting Moscow. Precisely in order to revitalize this organization, which had been reduced to the most precarious status thanks to the patriotic efforts of the armed forces, an official of the Soviet Embassy handed over the sum of 100,000 dollars to Colombian communist Feliciano Pachon Choconta in Mexico. Fortunately, he was found and captured when he was on the point of successfully completing his prophetic mission. On the subject of this notorious matter which had worldwide repercussions at the time, the Lima daily La Tribuna identified a Russian called Lenov in a series of recent reports, as "the Soviet official who gave Pachon the money in Mexico," and, on the basis of information obtained from Interpol, it added that Lenov is traveling with two other KGB agents, Alexander Operbunov and Victor Mednikov, all claiming to be "trade union leaders," on a fantastic tour which covers precisely the countries mentioned in the Buenos Aires La Prensa as the targets of the new communist plans for violence, that is to say, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia.

According to the Lima daily, La Tribuna, these three Russians were recently in Colombia, and it was precisely after their stay here that the kidnappings and acts of violence referred to erupted.

Providing an abundance of detail, the major periodical Ya, published in Madrid, Spain, also analyzed the communist plot against Colombia and the other Latin American countries in a very recent issue. According to this Madrid daily, the headquarters of the Tass and Novosty news agencies are real "hotbeds of espionage and subversion" in which the most /illegible/ activity of the Soviet communists is carried out.

201-132139

EL TIEMPO

[illegible] 25 de
Postal Nacional

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA ◆ 1969, VIERNES 25 DE JULIO

Un Investigador Especial Nombró la Procuraduría

La Procuraduría General de la Nación [illegible] la investigación por el secuestro del médico Ernesto González Caicedo.

Para [illegible] el [illegible] del [illegible], fue comisionado el [illegible] Carlos Julio Trujillo [illegible] de [illegible] en Cali y se [illegible] cargo del negocio.

Juez 14

También la Procuraduría comisionó al [illegible] el instructor Braulio Gutiérrez para que investigara penalmente al juez catorce penal municipal doctor Eduardo Ramírez Jiménez. Este funcionario, según lo informamos oportunamente, hizo [illegible] a don Enrique Gutiérrez Salazar, en un bar de la ciudad [illegible]. La investigación especial [illegible] el [illegible] de la parte civil, doctor Santiago Romero Sánchez.

Secuestros en Colombia Tienen Fines Políticos

Nueva denuncia sobre el plan subversivo internacional hace el principal diario de Lima.

Que los secuestros de ricos ganaderos y agricultores, ocurridos últimamente en Colombia obedecen a fines políticos, denuncia ayer "La Crónica", de Lima, el más [illegible] órgano informativo del Perú, basado en informaciones suministradas por la Interpol.

Haciendo eco a la denuncia formulada anteriormente en días pasados por "La Prensa", de Buenos Aires, el diario limeño denuncia, igualmente, la existencia "de un vasto plan subversivo comunista a escala continental que afecta igualmente a Colombia, Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia".

Al dar cuenta de las andanzas de tres agentes soviéticos de la KGB en América del Sur, dice el diario que "viajan disfrazados de sindicalistas" y que "uno de ellos Lenov, es el mismo funcionario de la embajada soviética en 32 [illegible] que entregó al bandolero colombiano Feliciano Pachón la suma de $ 100.000 para los grupos subversivos de este país".

Lenov ha estado en compañía de los agentes de la KGB Alexander Operkinov y Víctor Donaikov. Y ha sido notorio el hecho de que poco después de la visita de los "sindicalistas" a varios países del Continente, han estallado en ellos actos violentos contra las autoridades, terrorismo citadino y secuestros como en el caso de Colombia, y más concretamente, en Medellín y Cali.

Alerta.

"El plan de los comunistas prosoviéticos está encaminado a crear un nuevo clima de incertidumbre en el Continente", dice el diario limeño, mediante la utilización de toda clase de atentados terroristas, atracos, secuestros, etc.

En el caso colombiano estos hechos están dirigidos, tal como a principios de este mes lo denunciaron altos funcionarios, a obtener recursos económicos para reorganizar el movimiento guerrillero de las FARC, actualmente en plena quiebra.

Los recientes atentados ocurridos en Medellín contra las residencias del jefe del DAS, de varios conocidos profesionales y el periódico "El Diario", lo mismo que el secuestro del hacendado antioqueño Rubén Nevera, forman parte del plan de los extremistas de la línea moscovita.

Crisis Nerviosa Sufrió el Médico al Ser Rescatado

Cali, 24 (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). — Familiares [illegible] de su [illegible] informaron que este, una vez que había recobrado [illegible] y [illegible], había sido conducido a una [illegible] para evitar [illegible] de que entrara en una crisis de [illegible] [illegible].

No [illegible] algunos empleados de la familia González Caicedo afirmaron que González Caicedo se encontraba en la residencia de su padre [illegible] desde tempranas horas de la mañana y fue atendido por varios médicos que esperaban su llegada.

De acuerdo con las informaciones recogidas, González Caicedo recibió calmantes para controlar su estado de ánimo y vencer la crisis nerviosa que al parecer sufría al ser rescatado.

Familia Elogia la Información de EL TIEMPO

Cali, 24. *(Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). Ignacio Valencia López, uno de los familiares de Ernesto González Caicedo, más accesible a la prensa, elogió la forma responsable y seria como El Tiempo suministró las informaciones sobre el secuestro de su cuñado.*

Valencia López, hermano de Alma Valencia de González Caicedo, vino acompañado desde Popayán de su cuñado Aurelio [illegible] [illegible] vez se conoció la noticia del secuestro.

Estamos Reconocidos.

Valencia López añadió: "Estamos reconocidos con El Tiempo por la forma que presentó las informaciones en torno a este caso y de [illegible] su seriedad y responsabilidad".

Sinembargo criticó algunas otras informaciones publicadas en órganos distintos a El Tiempo, que estuvieron a punto de hacer fracasar las negociaciones y el rescate de Ernesto González Caicedo.

No Hubo Intento de Secuestro en Tuluá

Cali, 23. (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). Quedó totalmente desvirtuado que en el caso de Ignacio Ávala Mosquera, se trataba de intentar un secuestro. Al respecto se reveló que se trata simplemente de un caso de extorsión cometido por un ex-agente del F-2 de la Policía Nacional, según lo informó un alto vocero de la institución armada.

Los hechos ocurrieron el martes en Tuluá, cuando Carlos Alberto Lozano, quien fue agente secreto del F-2 y retirado de esta institución por mala conducta, acompañado de Plutarco Idarraga y José de Jesús Ortega, exigió a Ignacio Ávala Mosquera quien varias veces fue detenido por ejercicio ilegal de la medicina, una fuerte suma de dinero bajo las amenazas de ponerlo preso.

Se aclaró, por parte de voceros de la Policía, que Lozano e Idarraga portaban fotocopia de carnés de la institución y placas que hábilmente lograron conseguir. Los tres inculpados se encuentran detenidos en Cali para la correspondiente investigación.

201-132139

POLITICAL MOTIVES BEHIND COLOMBIAN KIDNAPPINGS

Source: El Tiempo, 25 July 1969

Day before yesterday the Lima daily La Tribuna, the most prestigous newspaper in Peru, charged on the basis of information obtained from Interpol that the reasons behind the kidnappings of rich ranchers and farmers which have occurred in Colombia recently are political.

Echoing the charges made in the editorial pages in recent days by the Buenos Aires newspaper La Prensa, the Lima daily also claimed that there is "a vast plan for communist subversion on an international scale affecting Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia equally."

In reporting the activities of three Soviet KGB agents in South America, this daily said that "they travel under the guise of trade union leaders," and that "one of them, Lenov, is the employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico who turned over to Colombian bandit Feliciano Pachon the sum of 100,000 US dollars for the subversive groups in that country."

Lenov is traveling in the company of the KGB agents Alexander Operkunov and Victor Dednikov. And no one is unaware of the fact that shortly after the visits of the "trade union officials" to various countries on this continent, there were outbreaks of acts of violence directed against the authorities, incidents terrorizing the population and kidnappings, as in the case of Colombia, or more specifically, Medellin and Cali.

"The plan of the communist sympathizers is designed to create a climate of uncertainty on the continent again," said the Lima daily, adding that all kinds of terrorist incidents, attacks, kidnappings, etc., are being used.

In the case of Colombia, these acts are designed, as high officials asserted at the beginning of this month, to facilitate obtaining economic resources for the reorganization of the FARC [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] guerrilla movement, which is currently in a state of complete collapse.

The recent attacks made in Medellin on the homes of the head of the DAS [Departmento Administrativo de Seguridad; Administrative Department of Security], various well-known professional people and the premises of the newspaper El Diario, like the kidnapping of the Antioquia rancher Ruben Norena, are a part of the plan of the extremists pursuing the Moscow line.

* * *

Relative of Victim Comments on Press Coverage of Kidnapping

Cali, 24 July (By Cristian Martinez Sarria). Ignacio Valencia Lopez, one of the members of the family of Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo, who has been most willing to talk to journalists praised the responsible and severe manner in which El Tiempo reported on the kidnapping of his brother-in-law.

Valencia Lopez, the brother of Alma Valencia de Gonzalez Caicedo, traveled from Popayan, accompanied by his brother-in-law, Aurelio Iragorri Hormaza, as soon as the news of the kidnapping became known.

Valencia Lopez said: "We are grateful to El Tiempo for the way in which it presented the report about this matter, and stressed its severity and criminal nature."

However, he criticized some other reports published by other newspapers, which very nearly caused the failure of the negotiations for the rescue of Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo.

Tulua Incident Not a Kidnapping Attempt

Cali, 23 July (by Cristian Martinez Sarria). The report that the case involving Ignacio Ayala Mosquera was one of attempted kidnapping has been entirely discredited. In this connection it was revealed that all that occurred was an attempt at extortion committed by a former national police F-2 agent, according to a highly placed spokesman for that armed branch.

The incident occurred on Tuesday in Tulua, when Carlos Alberto Lozano, a former F-2 secret agent with a dishonorable discharge for bad conduct from that organization, accompanied by Phaller /name not clearly legible/ Idarraga and Jose de Jesus Ortega, demanded a large sum of money under threat of arrest from Ignacio Ayala Mosquera, who had previously been arrested several times for the illegal practice of medicine.

Police spokesmen added that Lozano and Idarraga were carrying photostats of police identification papers and cards which they had managed to obtain secretly. The three criminals are being held in Cali pending the pertinent investigation.

14-00000

201-132139

additional (& [illegible] translation)

FOR PRESS MATERIAL PERTAINING TO SUBJECT OF THIS 201

SEE FILE # 74-126-60/3. (AEASSAULT Program, SB/PO/A, 4D30)

LA REPUBLICA

EL DIARIO DE LOS HOMBRES DE TRABAJO

Tarifa Postal Reducida número 13
de la Administración Postal Nal.

BOGOTA, D. E., VIERNES 25 DE JULIO DE 1969.

Dirección: Calle 16 número 4-24
Conmut. 433-160. Dist. "la Avianca"

Los Secuestros, Clave de Siniestro Plan Comunista

Denuncian Actividades en Colombia

El secuestro de que acaba de ser víctima en Cali el conocido médico y ganadero Ernesto González Caicedo ha venido a confirmar trágicamente la existencia de una vasta conjura comunista para subvertir el orden constitucional y sumir de nuevo al país en una ola de terrorismo y violencia que parecían sepultados para siempre.

En efecto, este periódico así como también los demás diarios de la capital, habían anunciado en sus ediciones del 12 y del 18 de los corrientes basadas en informaciones oficiales que el Departamento del Valle había sido escogido por los comunistas pro soviéticos para continuar la ola de atracos, atentados terroristas y secuestros iniciados recientemente en el Departamento de Antioquia.

Después del secuestro del hacendado antioqueño Rubén Noreña se produce ahora en el Valle el del médico Ernesto González Caicedo por cuyo rescate los bandoleros comunistas están exigiendo la crecida suma de cuatro y medio millones de pesos. Se vienen cumpliendo así cronológicamente las etapas del nuevo plan subversivo, comenzando por estos cuyos objetivos son obviamente los de conseguir los dineros necesarios para financiar las cuadrillas de bandoleros en las áreas rurales ya escogidas.

Este incremento de la violencia en Colombia, al que hay que sumarle el reciente asalto en cuadrilla a San José de Urama similar al "Simacota" de años pasados, se produce inmediatamente después de la denuncia formulada hace pocos días por el diario "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires, uno de los periódicos más serios y prestigiosos del continente; en esa oportunidad, el rotativo argentino mencionó editorialmente a Colombia como uno de los países q' serían más gravemente afectados por la violencia comunista, junto con Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia.

Los hechos indican, además, que, pese a las divergencias ideológicas, la fuerza comunista en sus diversas tendencias "maoísta", "castrista" y "moscovita" está solidamente unida y comprometida en el plan de terrorismo y violencia que se viene denunciando.

Estamos en capacidad de informar a la opinión pública, que en poder del DAS, la Policía y el Ejército, reposan informaciones según las cuales el partido comunista colombiano, adicto a la "línea de Moscú", ha cursado instrucciones a todos sus afiliados para que se apresten a ingresar a la clandestinidad.

En las mismas fuentes se informó que los secuestros del señor Noreña y del doctor González, obedecen a modelos y tienen características similares a los perpetrados por bandoleros a las FARC en años pasados a resultas de los cuales fueron asesinados los conocidos hombres de negocios Harold Eder y Oliverio Lara Borrero.

Las FARC como lo sabe todo el mundo, es un organismo paramilitar creado por los comunistas pro-soviéticos y dirigido por el tristemente célebre "Tirofijo", quien es miembro del comité central del partido comunista adicto a Moscú. Precisamente para revitalizar a este organismo, que había quedado reducido a las más precarias condiciones, gracias a la patriótica labor de las Fuerzas Armadas, un funcionario de la embajada soviética, entregó en México la suma de cien mil dólares al comunista colombiano [illegible] Pachón Chocontá, quien por fortuna, fue descubierto y capturado cuando estaba a punto de culminár con éxito su fatídica misión.

En torno a este sonado asunto que en su época tubo resonancia mundial, el diario "La Tribuna", de Lima, identifica en una serie de crónicas recientes a un ruso de apellido Lenov como "el funcionario soviético que le dio el dinero a Pachón en México", y agrega basado en informaciones de la Interpol que Lenov viaja con otros agentes de la KGB, Alexander Overbunov y Victor Mednisov, todos ellos disfrazados de "sindicalistas", en una extraña correría que comprende justamente los países mencionados por "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires como enclaves del nuevo plan violento del comunismo, es decir, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú y Bolivia.

Según "La Tribuna", de Lima estos tres rusos estuvieron en Colombia recientemente, y es justamente después de su paso por aquí que se están presentando los secuestros y actos violentos mencionados.

En abundancia de detalles, el importante periódico "Ya", editado en Madrid (España), se ocupa también en fecha muy reciente de la conjura comunista contra Colombia y otros países de América Latina. Según el diario madrileño las sedes de las agencias Tass y Novosti son verdaderos "nidos de espionaje y subversión" a través de los cuales se desarrolla la más peligrosa actividad del comunismo soviético.

7

cable

201-132139

EL TIEMPO

...ida Nº 25 de ...ostal Nacional

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA ◆ 1969, VIERNES 25 DE JULIO

Un Investigador Especial Nombró la Procuraduría

La Procuraduría General de la Nación [illegible] la investigación por el secuestro del médico Ernesto González Caicedo.

Para que [illegible] el [illegible] de secuestro, fue comisionado el [illegible] Carlos Julio Trujillo [illegible], que se halla en Cali y [illegible] del negocio.

Juez 14

También la Procuraduría comisionó al [illegible] el inspector Braulio Gutiérrez para que investigara posiblemente al [illegible] catorce penal municipal, doctor Eduardo Ramírez Jiménez. Este funcionario, por lo menos [illegible], halló [illegible] a don Enrique González Salazar en un bar de la ciudad, por lo que le [illegible] la investigación especial [illegible] de la [illegible], doctor Santiago Romero Sánchez.

Secuestros en Colombia Tienen Fines Políticos

Nueva denuncia sobre el plan subversivo internacional hace el principal diario de Lima.

Que los secuestros de ricos ganaderos y agricultores ocurridos últimamente en Colombia obedecen a fines políticos, dijo ayer el diario "La Prensa", de Lima, el más prestigioso órgano informativo del Perú, basado en informaciones suministradas por la [illegible].

Haciendo eco a la denuncia formulada [illegible] en días pasados por "La Prensa", de Buenos Aires, el diario limeño denunció, [illegible], la existencia "de un vasto plan subversivo comunista a escala internacional que afecta igualmente a Colombia, Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia".

Al dar cuenta de las andanzas de [illegible] agentes soviéticos de la KGB en América del Sur, dice el diario que "viajan disfrazados de sindicalistas" y que "uno de ellos, Lenov, es el mismo funcionario de la embajada soviética en México que entregó al bandolero colombiano Feliciano Pachón la suma de US$ 100.000 para los grupos subversivos de [illegible]".

Lenov ha [illegible] en compañía de los agentes de la KGB Alexander Operasanov y Victor Donikov. Y ha sido notorio el hecho de que poco después de la visita de los "sindicalistas" a varios países del Continente, han estallado en ellos actos violentos contra las autoridades, terrorismo citadino y secuestros como en el caso de Colombia, y más concretamente, en Medellín y Cali.

Alerta.

"El plan de los comunistas pro-soviéticos está encaminado a crear un nuevo clima de incertidumbre en el Continente", dice el diario limeño, "mediante la utilización de toda clase de atentados terroristas, atracos, secuestros, etc."

En el caso colombiano estos hechos están dirigidos, tal como a principios de este mes lo denunciaron altos funcionarios, a obtener recursos económicos para reorganizar el movimiento guerrillero de las FARC, actualmente en plena quiebra.

Los recientes atentados ocurridos en Medellín contra las residencias del jefe del DAS, de varios conocidos profesionales y el periódico "El Diario", lo mismo que el secuestro del hacendado antioqueño [illegible] Noreña, forman parte del plan de los extremistas de la línea moscovita.

Crisis Nerviosa Sufrió el Médico al Ser Rescatado

Cali, 24 (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). — Familiares de Ernesto González P. [illegible] y [illegible] Ernesto, afirmaron [illegible] que [illegible] había regresado sano y salvo a su casa [illegible] sido conducido a una finca [illegible] que entraron en una clínica de reposo, después de las [illegible] horas [illegible].

No obstante, algunos empleados de la familia González Perdomo afirmaron que González Caicedo se encontraba en la residencia de su padre [illegible] desde tempranas horas de la madrugada, y fue atendido por varios médicos que esperaban su llegada.

De acuerdo con las informaciones recogidas, González Caicedo recibió calmantes para dominarle su estado de ánimo y [illegible] la crisis nerviosa que al parecer sufría al ser rescatado.

Familia Elogia la Información de EL TIEMPO

Cali, 24. *(Por Cristian Martínez Serrano). Ignacio Valencia López, uno de los familiares de Ernesto González Caicedo, más accesible a la prensa, elogió la forma responsable y seria como El Tiempo suministró las informaciones sobre el secuestro de su cuñado.*

Valencia López, hermano de Alma Valencia de González Caicedo, vino acompañado desde Popayán de su cuñado Aurelio [illegible], una vez se conoció la noticia del secuestro.

Estamos Reconocidos.

Valencia López anotó: "Estamos reconocidos con El Tiempo por la forma que presentó las informaciones en torno a este caso y destaco su serenidad y responsabilidad".

Sin embargo criticó algunas otras informaciones publicadas en órganos distintos a El Tiempo, que estuvieron a punto de hacer fracasar las negociaciones y el rescate de Ernesto González Caicedo.

No Hubo Intento de Secuestro en Tuluá

Cali, 23. (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). Quedó totalmente desvirtuado que en el caso de Ignacio Ayala Mosquera, se trataba de intentar un secuestro. Al respecto se reveló que se trata simplemente de un caso de extorsión cometido por un exagente del F-2 de la Policía Nacional, según lo informó un alto vocero de la institución armada.

Los hechos ocurrieron el martes en Tuluá, cuando Carlos Alberto Lozano, quien fuera agente secreto del F-2 y retirado de esta institución por mala conducta y acompañado de [illegible] Idárraga y José de Jesús Ortega, exigió a Ignacio Ayala Mosquera, quien varias veces fue detenido por ejercicio ilegal de la medicina, una fuerte suma de dinero bajo las amenazas de ponerlo preso.

Se aclaró, por parte de voceros de la Policía, que Lozano e Idárraga portaban fotocopia de carnés de la institución y placas que hábilmente lograron conseguir. Los tres particulares se encuentran detenidos en Cali para la correspondiente investigación.

201-132139

EL SIGLO
Bogotá, D. E., Viernes 25 de Julio de 1969

Secuestros y Atracos del F.L.N.

Para Financiar el Movimiento Guerrillero

Las autoridades han recibido informes allegados por la Interpol en relación con el plan subversivo a escala continental que el comunismo internacional viene ejecutando en varios países con el fin de turbar el orden público y allegar fondos para el sostenimiento de los focos alzados en armas.

De acuerdo con los datos obtenidos por la Interpol y que ya han sido divulgados por el diario "La Tribuna" de Lima, una fuente allegada a los servicios de inteligencia adscritos a las secciones de orden público informó que los atentados dinamiteros ocurridos en la ciudad de Medellín, la distribución de propaganda subversiva y los saboteos ocurridos en los teatros en donde se exhibe la película "Las Boinas Verdes", hacen parte del plan denunciado por "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires y que por no alarmar a la ciudadanía, algunas autoridades han afirmado que no se sabe nada.

Tambien se supo que las autoridades han dispuesto el adelanto de severas investigaciones y la intensificación de la vigilancia en varias regiones de los departamentos de Antioquia y Valle, en donde se ha venido notando la actividad subversiva, que de acuerdo a documentos hallados en el campamento de Jesús de Dios Aguilera, cuando huyó ante el avance de las tropas de la IV Brigada, de las cercanías de Segovia en Antioquia, está orientada por el comunismo pro-soviético, que intentan crear un clima de zozobra mediante la ejecución de atentados terroristas, atracos, secuestros y chantajes, para asimismo financiar la reorganización de los grupos guerrilleros que han sido notificados en el s[illegible] que no recibirán [illegible] ayuda eco[illegible] haberse dilapidado los dineros en manos de los jefes.

En el Departamento del Valle, como ya se había informado hace pocos días, también se está notando un clima de incertidumbre, y dicen las autoridades, nada tendría de extraño que los secuestros de conocidos hombres de negocios, ocurridos recientemente, hagan parte del plan subversivo.

Sobre esta nueva ola de agitación la Interpol ha informado que se sabe de tres agentes soviéticos de la GKB que bajo la apariencia de "sindicalistas" y que han sido identificados como Victor Medunkov, Alexander Opera[illegible]rov y N. Lenov vienen recorriendo a Latinoamérica y quienes precisamente estuvieron recientemente en Colombia. El último de los nombrados, según la Interpol, fue el diplomático ruso que en México entregó al bandolero colombiano Feliciano Pachón Chocontá la suma de 120 mil dolarés para que junto con una mujer que lo acompañaba los trajera al país y los hiciera llegar a los jefes de las FARC. Como se recordará Pachón fue descubierto en Eldorado por el DAS que le decomisó el dinero y lo puso a órdenes de un juez que lo mantuvo preso por algún tiempo hasta que hace poco fue beneficiado con una excarcelación.

Las revelaciones de la Interpol sobre las actividades subversivas en Latinoamérica y que ya en Medellín han dejado como saldo un muerto y varios miles de pesos en perdidas, también hacen mención de las agencias TASS y Novosty, señalándolas como centros de agitación, hecho del cual, anotaron las autoridades, se divulgo en el periódico "Ya" de Madrid.

En cuanto hace al terrorismo en la capital antioqueña, los servicios de inteligencia ya han efectuado cerca de diez capturas de conocidos extremistas contra quienes recaen graves indicios de estar comprometidos en los atentados terroristas ocurridos recientemente en Medellín.

Por otra parte se dijo que en cuanto hace a Bogotá, el DAS investiga, dentro del mayor hermetismo, a unas ocho personas que fueron capturadas cuando transportaban apreciable cantidad de dinamita, fulminantes, cajas de proyectiles de diverso calibre y otros elementos bélicos, que se cree iban a ser enviados a otros lugares del país o a servir para perpetrar actos terroristas en esta capital.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2	21	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY:______ AT:______Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.______

X-REF TO FILE NO.______

DISSEM BY______PER______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, EUR 6, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

183

S E C R E T 182147Z JUL 69 CITE LIMA 5271

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS

REDTOP AEKICK (N 03241)

1P

21 JUL 69 IN 06694

REF LIMA 5256 (NOT SENT PARIS)

1. ON 17 JULY NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139) DEPARTED PERU FOR SOVIET UNION VIA PARIS WHERE HE WILL STAY APPROX 2 DAYS ACCOMPANIED BY NORMA SERRA, MEMBER OF JCP/PCP, WHO WILL STUDY IN THE SOVIET UNION. PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE, LEONOV TOLD DULAUREL-1 THAT IF LATTER WANTED SEND CORRESPONDENCE OR MESSAGES VIA SOVIET DIPLOMATIC POUCH TO CONTACT VLADIMIR IVANOVICH SHPAKESVICH (201-343894) WHO WILL HANDLE IT.

2. ABOVE RECEIVED FROM DULINDEN-11.

3. FILE: 58-8786, 201-132139, 201-343894.

S E C R E T

AN PRP
AB X
FS
EX 9
FI

MICROFILMED
AUG 01 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B 201-343894

201-132139 ✓
21 July 69

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: STEINBUEHLER
UNIT: WH/3/Peru
EXT: 6223/9388
DATE: 11 JULY 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE. VR. EUR 6, RI/AN, CI/IC 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 11 22 21z Jul 69 CITE DIRECTOR 201170

TO LIMA INFO: MADRID

REF: LIMA 5122 (IN 90235)*

1. NO HEADQUARTERS TRACES ON CARLOS JIMENEZ ORTEGA. W [illegible].MEXICO CITY REPORT DATED NOVEMBER 1947 IDENTIFIED A CARLOS JIMENEZ, WRITER AND NEWSPAPERMAN, AS SIGNER OF A GREETING SENT BY GROUP OF SPANISH INTELLECTUALS TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ON ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET REVOLUTION. ACCORDING TO A SANTIAGO REPORT, JUNE 1949, CARLOS JIMENEZ, FORMER MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MADRID (SIC), HAD DEPARTED CHILE IN 1943.

2. FILE: 201-132139.

AB HF-3
AB
FI

END OF MESSAGE

* Request for traces on Carlos JIMENEZ Ortega, Spanish journalist who the Station is considering recruiting as an access agent to Soviet Novosti representative LEONOV.

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

ALFONSO G. SPERA
C/WH/3

201-132139
11 Jul 69

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-132139

EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Miércoles - 9 julio de 1969

[illegible] 3995

Enviados Sindicales Soviéticos

Por FELIPE RUSSEK

Tan poco respetuosa de las decisiones de nuestros gobiernos es la URSS, que no obstante que el seudodiplomático ruso Alexander Openkunov fue expulsado por las autoridades de Colombia el año 1964 —a causa de sus actividades subversivas y nada diplomáticas—, ahora ha sido enviado por el Kremlin al Perú como miembro de una misión sindical soviética. Tanto Openkunov como Lenov que lo acompaña, son oficiales de la K.G.B., así como también Victor Mednikov y Boris Papov, quienes también estuvieron en Perú como representantes sindicales moscovitas.

Los gobiernos latinoamericanos que recientemente han reanudado relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS, parten de dos supuestos completamente erróneos. El primero es creer que pueden mejorar en forma sustancial su situación económica incrementando el actual intercambio comercial con Rusia. Un examen de las relaciones mercantiles entre nuestros pueblos y la URSS, pone al descubierto lo ilusorio de tales esperanzas. El insignificante comercio con Rusia soviética no aumenta con los convenios protocolarios. Sigue siendo igualmente pequeño y precario. Los artículos que podemos ofrecer, tales como café, azúcar, no interesan a los rusos. El primero porque consumen muy poco café; para beber tienen otros líquidos más exitantes. El azúcar, porque están obligados a comprarlo a Cuba Castrocomunista. Por lo que toca a los artículos que nuestros países necesitan adquirir en el exterior, la URSS no los puede ofrecer ni en la calidad, ni en el precio, ni en las condiciones que en Europa o Estados Unidos podemos conseguir. El trato comercial más formalizado entre nuestros países y la URSS, carece así de validez para justificar relaciones de más alto nivel, que los actuales trueques de mercaderías de poca monta.

El segundo supuesto de que parten nuestros gobiernos para reanudar relaciones diplomáticas con Rusia, es suponer que los designios del comunismo internacional han cambiado, y que la subversión contra los gobiernos constituidos y la lucha de clases violenta, ya no son los propósitos de los soviéticos. Si nos atenemos a un análisis frío de la conducta moscovita en nuestros países, veremos que no sólo sigue proclamando sin ambages sus pretensiones de conquistar el imperio mundial a ultranza, sino que las actividades de sus nutridas delegaciones diplomáticas, que nada tienen que hacer en materia de comercio, están dedicadas a exportarnos agitaciones y la rebelión contra nuestros gobiernos nacionalmente constituidos. En este aspecto, la presencia de los llamados "enviados sindicales" resulta muy importante.

201-132139

SOVIET LABOR UNION ENVOYS

By Felipe Russek

Source: El Universal Gráfico (Illustrated Universal Daily), 9 July 1969, Mexico City

The USSR has so little respect for the decisions of our governments that even though the Russian pseudodiplomat Aleksandr Openkunov was expelled by Colombian authorities in 1964 (for his subversive, not at all diplomatic, activities), he has now been sent by the Kremlin to Peru as a member of a Soviet labor union mission. Both Openkunov and Lenov, who is accompanying him, are officials of the KGB, as are likewise Viktor Modnikov and Boris Papov, who also were in Peru as Moscow's labor union representatives.

The Latin American governments that recently renewed diplomatic relations with the USSR did so on the basis of two completely mistaken assumptions. The first was to believe that they can substantially improve their economic situation by increasing their present trade with Russia. An examination of trade relations between our countries and the USSR reveals the illusory nature of those hopes. The insignificant trade with Soviet Russia is not increased by the protocolar agreements; it continues to be equally small and precarious. The articles that we can offer -- coffee, sugar, etc -- are of no interest to the Russians. Not coffee, because they drink very little coffee: they have other, more stimulating liquids to drink; and not sugar, because they are committed to buying it from the Communist Cuba of Castro. As for the articles that our countries need to buy abroad, the USSR is unable to offer them to us with the quality, or at the price, or on the terms that we can obtain them in Europe or the United States. The best executed trade treaty between our countries and the USSR is therefore incapable of justifying relations on a higher level than the present exchange of merchandise of small importance.

The second assumption on which our governments base their decision to renew diplomatic relations with Russia is to imagine that the intentions tions of international Communism have changed and that subversion of con- [illegible] continuing to pro- [illegible] world domination [illegible] missions -- which have nothing to do [illegible] -- are devoted to the business of exporting to us agitation and rebellion against our nationally constituted governments. In this respect, the presence of the so-called "labor union envoys" has proved to be very significant.



EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Miércoles 9 de Julio de 1969

Enviados Sindicales Soviéticos

Por FELIPE KUSSEK

Tan poco respetuosa de las decisiones de nuestros gobiernos es la URSS, que no obstante que el seudodiplomático ruso Alexander Openkenov fue expulsado por las autoridades de Colombia el año 1964 —a causa de sus actividades subversivas y nada diplomáticas—, ahora ha sido enviado por el Kremlin al Perú, como miembro de una misión sindical soviética. Tanto Openkenov como Lenov, que lo acompaña, son oficiales de la K.G.B., así como también Victor Mednikov y Boris Popov, quienes también estuvieron en Perú como representantes sindicales moscovitas.

Los gobiernos latinoamericanos que recientemente han reanudado relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS, parten de dos supuestos completamente erróneos. El primero es creer que pueden mejorar en forma sustancial su situación económica incrementando el actual intercambio comercial con Rusia. Un examen de las relaciones mercantiles entre nuestros pueblos y la URSS, pone al descubierto lo ilusorio de tales esperanzas. El insignificante comercio con Rusia soviética no aumenta con los convenios protocolarios [illegible] que siendo igualmente pequeño y precario [illegible] artículos que podemos ofrecer, tales como café, azúcar, no interesan a los rusos. Al primero porque consumen muy poco café; para beber tienen otros líquidos más excitantes. El azúcar, porque están obligados a comprarlo a Cuba Castrocomunista. Por lo que toca a los artículos que nuestros países necesitan adquirir en el exterior, la URSS no les puede ofrecer ni en la calidad, ni en el precio, ni en las condiciones que en Europa o Estados Unidos podemos conseguir. El trato comercial más formalizado entre nuestros países y la URSS, carece así de validez para justificar relaciones de más alto nivel, que los actuales trueques de mercaderías de poca monta.

El segundo supuesto de que parten nuestros gobiernos para reanudar relaciones diplomáticas con Rusia, es suponer que los designios del comunismo internacional han cambiado, y que la subversión contra los gobiernos constituidos y la lucha de clases violenta, ya no son los propósitos de los soviéticos. Si nos atenemos a un análisis frío de la conducta moscovita en nuestros países, veremos que no sólo sigue persiguiendo sin ambages sus pretensiones de conquistar el imperio mundial a ultranza, sino que las actividades de sus nutridas delegaciones diplomáticas, que nada tienen que hacer en materia de comercio, están dedicadas a exportarnos agitación y la rebelión contra nuestros gobiernos nacionalmente constituidos. En este sentido la presencia de los llamados "enviados sindicales" resulta muy importante.

DISPATCH

SECRET 6

TO: Chief, WH Division
(ATTN: Thomas C. [illegible])

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: [illegible]/Forwarding of Interrogation

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : MEXICO CITY-0342

1. In accordance with Reference, forwarded herewith are two xerox copies of the results of the interrogation of Lorenzo CARDENAS Barajas (201-248806).

2. SOURCE: LITEMPO-12 on 2 July 1969.

for/John A. PROBERT

Attachment:
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - Chief, WHD, w/att

201-133135

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-37402	2 July 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-124-162/3

nas, de los cuales el principal es el denominado "Modelo"; que la relación que en este acto tiene a la vista en fotocopias negradas del uno al seis, que se inician con el título de: "Domicilios de logias Ajef de diferentes partes de la República", los nombres y domicilios que aparecen en las mismas, corresponden a los miembros responsables de cada logia, pero esta relación la recibió el declarante de JORGE PAEZ, conservándola en su poder porque pensó que le sería útil para el caso de irse al Estado de Guerrero, ya que todos los citados en la relación son gentes de absoluta confianza, incluyendo desde luego las direcciones que corresponden a esos Estados, y por lo que hace a la relación compuesta de nueve hojas, igualmente en fotocopia, que contienen exclusivamente nombres y lugares del mencionado Estado de Guerrero, le fue entregada al de la voz por un compañero del Frente Revolucionario de Liberación, diciéndole que todos los nombres allí anotados son "contactos". Que en el mes de Diciembre del año anterior, el dicente solicitó a la Embajada del Perú en nuestro país que su Gobierno le concediera asilo político, toda vez que consideraba ese el único medio para salir de México, pero además con la intención de reunirse en la ciudad de Lima, con CARMERO ROCHE, para continuar sus trabajos pre-revolucionarios a nivel continental, pero como el asilo solicitado se le negó, optó a final de cuentas por trasladarse a Belice, como lo hizo, con la mira de obtener la protección de JORGE PRICE y además de continuar los trabajos del Movimiento Latinoamericano de Liberación con el apoyo de éste, como Primer Ministro de aquella colonia Británica, pues el plan trazado era de viajar de todas maneras a Perú para hacer el contacto con CARMERO ROCHE y discutir sus problemas, como ya dijo, a nivel Continental, a efecto de insistir en la revolución en Belice, buscando su independencia, para de allí prolongar el movimiento armado hacia México, infiltrándolo en Quintana Roo, para seguirlo a Yucatán y demás Estados del sureste hasta Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, por ser ésta la primera fase conforme a la planeación hecha, teniendo la seguridad de poder contar para ello, con las armas y elementos en general que produjeran la re-

14-00000

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY INFO

c/WH8

FILE [illegible]

863

S E C R E T 142330Z AUG 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1184 (PRALLETT ACTING)

DIRECTOR, INFO LIMA

14 Aug 69 IN 23909

RYBAT JMROD DULOXI

REF DIRECTOR 27524

1. CONCUR.

2. FILE 200-124-162/3; X-REF 201-76401, 201-248906, 200-300-55.

S E C R E T

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 1 JULY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FBI FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: CONTACT, SOVIET EMBASSY,
MEXICO CITY, JUNE 26, 1969

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAI
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

074-126-060/03
LIMA-05128
27 JUN 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
AEASSAULT ARTICLES PLACED BY LIMA
STATION NOVOSTI REP ASSIGNED LIMA TDY

R 6907290847

132139
FILE IN 201-

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

~~E. Rick~~
~~[illegible] PC~~
Patricia - Please
File: Peru/Leona

SECRET

Chief, S B
C/WHD, Chiefs of Stations Bogota, Caracas,
Santiago, and Mexico City

Chief of Station, Lima
REDTOP AEASSAULT AEKICK DUIRIS/
Forwarding of Clips

Reference: LIMA-5128, 27 June 1969

Forwarded for all addressees are copies of the clips described in Reference.

Samuel K. CASTELON

CAS/twb

Attachments:
B/W as stated above

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - C/SB Division
~~2~~ - C/WHD
2 - COS, Bogota
2 - COS, Caracas
2 - COS, Santiago
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-132139

HPLA-10143

27 June 1969
201-132139
201-213261; 74-120-60/3
56-126-32/3

SECRET

La Cronica
9 Junio 69
H/w attachment
to HPLA-10143

Contrapunto

Por [illegible]

Los Manifiestos del Apra y AP

Sincronizadamente el Partido Aprista y Acción Popular emitieron anteayer comunicados, en vísperas de la fecha que el Gobierno anterior tenía pensada para la realización de las Elecciones Generales

Es respetable la posición de ambos Partidos al exigir al Gobierno Revolucionario que fije fechas y objetivos. Merecen también tomarse en cuenta las críticas que el APRA, especialmente, formula en su Manifiesto. El PAP admite que hay buenos propósitos al intentar la reforma de estructuras, pero que ésta sólo puede llevarse a cabo con una democracia representativa en el país.

Ayer muchos se hicieron esta pregunta: ¿Qué resultados estaríamos comentando de haberse realizado las Elecciones bajo el Gobierno de Belaunde?

A nada conduce, ahora, hacer especulaciones sobre el desenlace de un proceso que ni siquiera llegó a iniciarse. Pero, con todo, es interesante recoger opiniones y, siempre en el terreno de "lo que pudo ser", dar la propia

Muchos creen que Acción Popular (belaundista) y el APRA iban a formar un solo bloque en las Elecciones del 69. Basan esta presunción en el acercamiento que hubo entre ambos Partidos al final del Gobierno, y, también, en el rompimiento del APRA con la UNO, que dejó al Partido de Haya de la Torre sin el aliado —tradicional en las luchas políticas políticas de los últimos 25 años— que lo avalara ante las fuerzas de derecha. Y esos mismos piensan que para hacer frente al PAP-AP se hubieran unido UNO-MDP-PPC e Independientes, dejando en el "tercer frente" a la izquierda con los democristianos y los seoanistas.

Nosotros creemos que un pacto AP-APRA se habría tornado difícil por la designación del candidato a la Presidencia. Los apristas habrían reclamado uno de los suyos. Y en este caso, el nombre de Haya de la Torre tenía que salir al frente. Es difícil que AP gobiernista hubiera aceptado la candidatura de Haya. Más bien podía haber exigido la de un elemento independiente, pero el APRA ya no tenía salida ante sus huestes para pedirles que votaran por un candidato que no fuera aprista. Los motivos del 45 y del 57 habían desaparecido

El segundo frente se tornaba con muchas posibilidades, si consideramos el desgaste del Gobierno de FBT, muchos de cuyos errores eran compartidos al final por la mayoría aprista del Parlamento. Debemos admitir que esta colaboración del PAP se debió, en parte, a su deseo de hacer lo que fuera necesario para evitar el pronunciamiento militar y llegar a las Elecciones de 1969.

Para comandar ese "segundo frente" se sindicaba a Bedoya Reyes, aunque muchos consideran hasta ahora problemático que el Alcalde de Lima hubiera recibido el visto bueno del jefe de la UNO y de los líderes del MDP. Mas como todo es posible en política, la candidatura de Bedoya apoyada por esos sectores habría tenido una fuerza singular y una chance de primera.

El repunte en cifras de la izquierda estaba asegurado. Se dejó entrever en las Elecciones de 1967 con la buena votación de Malpica. El refuerzo del DC y seoanistas, aunque no muy cuantioso, hubiera significado de todas maneras pasar los 200 mil votos, lo que representaba llevar un bloque aceptable de representantes al Parlamento.

En fin, todas son especulaciones, considerando lo que era nuestra política por octubre de 1968. Lo que sí es hecho concreto que a los siete meses de establecido el nuevo Gobierno, los únicos grupos que están realmente en la oposición son el APRA y AP belaundista. Y ellos han sido, precisamente, los que acaban de añorar las Elecciones que pudieron haberse realizado ayer.

● A fines de la próxima semana llegarían a Lima los diplomáticos rusos que se establecerían en el Perú. Ha trascendido que antes de ellos vendría Nicolai Leonov con el objeto de escribir notas en torno a las relaciones peruano-soviéticas. Según publicaciones de diarios de Venezuela y Colombia, Leonov sería muy adepto a intervenir en los asuntos internos de los países que visita. Últimamente habría residido en México, desde donde habría sido eje de un vasto movimiento subversivo en países americanos. "El Tiempo" de Caracas lo denunció el 24 de mayo de este año como el jefe de "Gregorian", un ruso expulsado de Venezuela. "El Siglo" de Bogotá (22 de mayo de 1969) sindicó a Leonov como el diplomático que entregó 120 mil dólares a dos grupos subversivos colombianos. "La República" de Bogotá (17 y 22 de mayo) sindica a Leonov como el elemento clave de una red de subversión y espionaje. ¿Qué hará en Lima? Ya lo veremos. Pero no deben echarse en saco roto las denuncias que se han formu-

abaratar el precio de los artículos alimenticios merece todo el apoyo de la ciudadanía. Lo propio debe ocurrir con el control de precios que entrará a regir dentro de seis días, pese a tratarse de una medida sumamente peligrosa.

El control que anuncia el Gobierno, si no es llevado cuidadosamente y si no se toman las providencias necesarias, puede constituirse en un remedio más grave que la propia enfermedad.

Y es que aún está fresco el recuerdo de lo que ocurrió hace 20 años, cuando el Gobierno de Bustamante y Rivero decretó el control general de precios que a la postre, originó el mercado negro y largas colas en los puestos de abastecimiento.

Creemos que la disposición dictada puede aceptarse como un paliativo, pero no como solución de un problema que radica en el acentuado déficit de la producción alimentaria.

El control de precios puede dar resultados si se lleva a efecto con el máximo cuidado posible, pero consideramos que el Gobierno debe también

---

Qu

WASHINGT
— El Gobern
York Nelson
ció hoy por la
sitará Perú, C
a pesar de la
visita decidida
Rockefeller
tres países me
la situación de
sita a ellos a
marco de la m
cana de infor
cargó el Pres
xon.

WASHINGTO
— Mostrándos
Gobernador ne
A. Rockefeller
piensa continu
América Latina
sea posible fija
ra visitar los
pudo ir por la
nifestaciones h

"Se ha dado
ve a las mani
Rockefeller en
televisión, para

Ante Juez
Declaraci
Del Inter

El Juez Instr
mará hoy su m
nistro del Inter
do Artola, en t
leri" y sería e
mente al Segu
rreccional.
El Juez Dr. A
lencia, recibirá
Ministro Artola
curso de Habeas
do por la espos
riodista Enrique
do su retorno a
extrañado el 24
Se sabe que
Valencia, concu
pacho del Mi
para que éste
tación. La dilig
puesta por el
Correccional qu
cal Dr. Carlos C
ra que dicha sa
fallo respectivo
hora para la d
el Juez, aunque
será antes del

Ruiz El
Que no

El Decano de
gados de Lima,
Eldredge comu
sidente del Con
su decisión de
elección de Fisc
prema de la Rep

El Dr. Ruiz
con este propósi
nesto Montagne
despacho. Le a
sideración y m

Belco
Oper

La Belco Pet
tica of Perú a
diante un com
so, que la emp
mado decisiones
ración de sus

La Prensa 12 de Junio de 1965

Infiltración Soviética en Sindicatos Peruanos

Por la revelación de un soviético que se encuentra en Lima, se ha tenido noticia de que un grupo sindical peruano de inspiración comunista mantiene tratos personales constantes con miembros del Presidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética.

Las organizaciones sindicales peruanas están ciertamente en libertad de mantener contactos con cualquier entidad similar extranjera, mientras esa relación no represente una interferencia foránea en problemas que son de incumbencia exclusiva de los peruanos. Pero no es éste el caso del vínculo entro el grupo sindical que, ni de hecho ni de derecho, tiene títulos para presentarse como la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, y el Presidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética.

Es menester señalar que el grupo sindical local no tiene la representación genuina y mayoritaria de los trabajadores peruanos. Se trata de conocidos dirigentes comunistas que aspiran desde hace tiempo a lograr la división de los sindicatos, objetivo que no han llegado a cumplir. Los dirigentes de la verdadera CTP conservan la representación de los trabajadores de los gremios y sindicatos principales. Los dirigentes de la CTP, conformando la representación peruana con el Ministro de Trabajo, han viajado a Ginebra a la reunión internacional que ha organizado la OIT, con la participación principal del Sumo Pontífice.

Es, pues, con una organización apócrifa con la que está manteniendo relaciones el Presidium de Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética. Y esto quiere decir que está interviniendo y alentando una maniobra divisionista en desmedro de los trabajadores peruanos que son contrarios al sistema totalitario de trabajos forzados y de represión de los trabajadores libres que encarna la Unión Soviética. En otras palabras: bajo la fachada de una organización sindical, la Unión Soviética está inmiscuyéndose, en convivencia con un grupo falsamente representativo de los trabajadores peruanos, en problemas que son de competencia de nuestros grupos laborales.

De otro lado, a nadie escapa que en la Unión Soviética no existe ninguna especie de libertad laboral y que los trabajadores están sometidos a un régimen completamente opuesto a la concepción sindicalista imperante en el mundo democrático. Si esto es así ¿qué clase de asesoramiento sindical pueden ofrecer quienes no son sindicalistas sino agentes de un gobierno totalitario que nunca ha admitido una reclamacion salarial, una huelga o cualquiera de los procedimientos conocidos en Occidente?

El establecimiento de relaciones con la Unión Soviética implica riesgos como éste que se ha descubierto en el nivel sindical. Es imperioso que las autoridades gubernamentales impidan la intromisión soviética en los asuntos sindicales, porque, entre otras infracciones, significa el menoscabo de la soberanía peruana.



¿Espías em Casa?

Parece que los agentes extranjeros están últimamente muy activos en el Perú. Esta vez se trata de agentes de la Unión Soviética —pais con el que acabamos de entablar relaciones diplomáticas— que trabajan para la K.G.B., la tristemente célebre policia secreta que alguna vez estuvo dirigida por Lavrenti Beria.

En editorial del 14 de junio, CORREO se referia a dos presuntos "dirigentes sindicales" soviéticos, los señores Beris Popov y Victor Mednikov, quienes han asistido como observadores a las reuniones de una rama fantasma de sindicatos que pretende erigirse como rival de la Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú o CTP. Señalaba nuestro diario la contradicción que supone el hecho de que dichos señores se atribuyan calidad de dirigentes sindicales cuando es sabido que, en Rusia, el régimen sindical no es libre y los sindicatos son alli nada más que apéndice del régimen totalitario.

También ha estado en el Perú el titulado periodista Nikolay Leonov, y fue entrevistado por el diario "La Crónica". Respecto de Leonov, recuerda el diario "El Siglo", de Bogotá, en su edición del 17 de mayo del año en curso, que Leonov, actuando entonces como diplomático, fue sorprendido en México cuando entregaba a agentes extremistas la cantidad de cien mil dólares en efectivo presumiblemente destinados a financiar la insurrección. Por su parte, el diario "El Tiempo" de la misma Bogotá se refiere a la "red de espionaje y subversión que desde México dirige el seudoperiodista soviético Leonev, protegido además durante varios años, con el fuero diplomático como "segundo secretario" de la embajada rusa".

Según informa "La República", igualmente de Bogotá, en su edición del pasado primero de mayo, otro agente soviético Alexander Operkunov, quien fuera expulsado de Colombia en 1964, regresó como miembro de una misión sindical soviética. Tanto Leontov como Operkunov han estado, recientemente, en el Perú, lo que indica que a la Unión Soviética no le importa emplear en nuestro pais a los mismos agentes que ha empleado en otras latitudes, y lo que vendría a justificar a quienes estiman como peligroso el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con Moscú.

SUCESO Dominical de CORREO

22 Junio 1969

14-00000

"LA TRIBUNA" — Lima, Jueves 12 de Junio de 1969

ALARMANTE PENETRACION COMUNISTA EN EL PERU

Por Nicolás LYNCH JR.

Se comentó ayer en esta misma página la expulsión del conocido agente del comunismo internacional, Ezequiel Ramírez Novoa, ordenada por el gobierno de Colombia. Y se recordó que ese agitador indeseable está realizando una activa campaña al servicio del imperialismo soviético con el título de "Secretario General del Comité de Abogados Pro Defensa del Petróleo Peruano", en una costosa gira a lo largo de todo el Continente que no se sabe quién paga.

Ayer, un diario local ha publicado con honores de primera plana, la prueba fotográfica de que otra organización fantasma —llamada "Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú"— celebra sus sesiones bajo el control y supervigilancia de dos procónsules sindicales soviéticos, llamados Boris Popov y Víctor Medinkov. Ambos actúan libremente en nuestro país e intervienen en la política obrera nacional sin que nadie se lo impida; pues la supuesta "confederación" no es sino una agencia más del comunismo imperialista internacional, cuyas actividades aquí son del dominio público.

La expulsión del agitador comunista Ramírez Novoa, ordenada por el gobierno de Colombia, y la reveladora fotografía e información publicada ayer, son dos expresivos testimonios de la avanzada intervención política rusa en nuestro país.

El comunismo que ya hizo su ingreso clandestino y sangriento en el Perú por medio de las bien financiadas y armadas guerrillas de tantas vidas han costado a nuestras fuerzas militares y policiales, vuelve ahora por los caminos legales y diplomáticos. Los enviados comunistas extranjeros tienen libre entrada. Y, como ya lo vemos, su derecho para tomar parte en actividades obreras, y consiguientemente políticas y sociales, parece ser irrestricto y público.

El comunismo internacional está actuando a dos manos en el país: Los soviéticos realizan la penetración pacífica, suave, agazapada y adiestran a sus agentes y secuaces en la infiltración burocrática; a tiempo que los "pekineses" se presentan como disidentes violentos y agresivos usando todos los medios de la delincuencia y del terror. El antagonismo entre unos y otros es aquí, en nuestro medio, más ficticio que real. Al usar como recurso y táctica la supuesta división entre dos bandos, la acción de cada uno está bien distribuida y ubicada. Uno encubre al otro y ambos engañan a los crédulos y tontos útiles al aparecer como contrapuestos.

Es innegable y es obligante remarcarlo que ya va cundiendo en la opinión pública una creciente alarma ante los desembozados avances de los agentes extranjeros del comunismo internacional en el Perú. Con muy buenas razones se comenta y se interroga acerca de los alcances y peligros de esa penetración. Hechos como los que comentamos justifican la inquietud general que las actividades solapadas de los comunistas del lado ruso y las vandálicas de los del lado pekinés están causando entre los peruanos que no quisieran ver a su patria arrastrada a los horrores que el comunismo causa a donde llega.

"LA TRIBUNA" Lima, Viernes 13 de Junio de 1969

¡ANTIMPERIALISMO, SI, PERO COMUNISMO, NO!

Por J. HIDALGO VALERA

Día a día aparecen nuevas pruebas de la torcida interpretación y del interesado aprovechamiento que el Comunismo Internacional está haciendo de las sanas corrientes antimperialistas que son sincera expresión democrática de la conciencia cívica del pueblo peruano.

Bajo el pretexto de un nacionalismo que no pueden sentir, quienes están a órdenes y paga de una potencia extranjera, los comunistas criollos esconden su mercenarismo apátrida al servicio del Imperialismo ruso apareciendo como "patriotas" peruanos adversarios del Imperialismo yanqui.

Y con esta máscara se embanderan como defensores de la "soberanía nacional" o del petróleo. Y ya realizando correrías continentales que cuestan muchísimo dinero — como es el caso del agitador Ramírez Novoa—, o ya organizando "confederaciones generales de trabajadores", bajo la auditoría vigilante de agentes del gobierno ruso, están actuando en el Perú en una siniestra obra de penetración disolvente.

Neutralizada Cuba como base irradiadora de la propaganda y subversión comunista, aparece claro que los grandes empresarios del imperialismo ruso han escogido al Perú para trampolín de sus actividades sobre América Latina. El aislamiento de la isla cubana, su incomunicación con América y el fracaso de su política de "guerrillas" han hecho que su propaganda resulte desacreditada e ineficiente. Pero las facilidades que el Perú depara ahora, con amplias relaciones diplomáticas y abierto paso a los emisarios de todo tipo y camouflage comunista, permiten un trabajo de penetración sin restricciones y de expansión continental, ilímite. A él contribuye la festejadora tolerancia de nuestra bien llamada "fuerza de los vivos", listos a todo acomodo, y dispuestos a entrar en tratos con Moscú como el mercader que caído en el pozo trataba de salir de él tirándose de las orejas.

La táctica de penetración rusa está actuando ventajosamente sobre la confusión de una llamada "clase dirigente u oligarquía peruana", (sin conciencia y sin clase), y valiéndose además del caos ideológico dominante en el improvisado oficialismo que por la fuerza gobierna al Perú. La odiosa ceguera antiaprista de "El Comercio". — gran mentor y mandamás reaccionario del país—, ha arrastrado a muchos "izquierdistas" de nuevo cuño a aceptar el lema proditor de "Primero los comunistas que el APRA", Y de aquí que por no haber aceptado el constructivo antimperialismo aprista, basado en el principio del "interamericanismo democrático sin imperio", de la integración y del fortalecimiento de una democracia social representativa jurídicamente institucionalizada, es que está cayendo el país en un confusionismo desmoralizador.

Bueno es recordar que el izquierdismo democrático aprista trajo al Perú la verdadera concepción e imagen de un antimperialismo de veras transformador y progresista. Jamás dijo el Aprismo que ser antimperialista era ser xenófobo o demagogo, ni menos enemigo del pueblo norteamericano. Y siempre afirmó que nuestra posición revolucionaria es resistir al imperialismo, pero sin olvidar que nuestro país necesita de capitales extranjeros y de ayuda tecnológica para su desarrollo.

En consecuencia, menos pudo el Aprismo propiciar nuestra entrega al colonialismo comunista como remedio contra los males que acarrea nuestra interdependencia con los Estados Unidos, tan mal llevada por ambas partes. Tal recurso habría sido copiar la receta castrista que por librarse de un amo al cual juzgaba malo se echó a los pies de otro que ha resultado peor.

No, el lema aprista ha sido y es el de propiciar una conciencia y actitud antimperialista constructiva y no caer bajo otro imperialismo rival, enemigo de la libertad del hombre. Nuestro antimperialismo es democrático y se basa precisamente en la libre integración de nuestros pueblos, en la afirmación de nuestra soberania continental sobre la base de las soberanías nacionales, que emanan de las soberanías populares libremente ejercidas y en el nuevo concepto de la justicia de pan y libertad.

14-00000

◆ "Sindicalistas" Soviéticos Pretenden Colonizarnos

Entre risas, protestas y estupor, se ha recibido la noticia de que dos "sindicalistas" rusos han estado en enjuagues con pretendidos dirigentes del sindicalismo peruano.

Boris Popov y Victor Mednikov, miembros del llamado Presidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética, asistieron el lunes a una asamblea de delegados de la fantasmal Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú. Y en esta ocasión se hizo público que los "sindicalistas" rusos mantienen contacto con el laborismo peruano desde que se iniciaron las gestiones para que el Perú y Rusia entablasen relaciones diplomáticas.

Esta "confederación general", alentada por los comunistas y "El Comercio", carece de reconocimiento y sólo se representa a sí misma. La forman un puñado de trabajadores y agitadores que hacen, sin resultado alguno, la guerra a la Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú (CTP), que sí es el organismo auténtico del sindicalismo peruano, goza de reconocimientos nacional e internacional y representa a los trabajadores en las cajas de los seguros sociales. A mayor abundamiento, la CTP también tiene la personería legal y masiva de los trabajadores peruanos, pues sus dirigentes, acompañando al Ministro de Trabajo, General Jorge Chamot, viajaron a la reunión de la OIT en Ginebra, donde el martes habló Paulo VI.

Si los "sindicalistas" rusos tuvieran honestos propósitos de solidaridad e intercambio laboral, podrían haber buscado contacto con la auténtica representación peruana, esto con la CTP. ¿Por qué, en cambio, "confraternizan" con la institución divisionista y fantasmal?

Una sola es la respuesta. En Rusia no existe sindicalismo. Sus entidades sindicales, su pomposo "Presidium", sólo son una farsa. Porque en Rusia los trabajadores carecen de derechos, están virtualmente esclavizados y jamás, desde que allí impera el comunismo, han hecho una huelga. Por eso Popov y Madnikov, "confraternizan" con sus pares, los comunistas peruanos que se suman a la mascarada moscovita.

Por lo demás, lo ocurrido —y más y más sucesos que tendremos que lamentar— era de esperarse. Las embajadas de los países comunistas según lo hacen en América Latina y en el resto del mundo, son agencias de penetración, propaganda y subversión.

Ya están llegando, como puntas de lanza, "sindicalistas", "periodistas" y "técnicos". Sin duda tienen buenos métodos de persuación, disponen de mucho dinero y dispensan favores a manos llenas. Frente a todo ello, por suerte, el auténtico sindicalismo está en alerta.

◆ ¡Medicinas Baratas!, Verdad...

El General FAP Eduardo Montero Rojas, Ministro de Salud, debe estar muy contento. La asistencia hospitalaria es necesariamente costosa, y los recursos que el Estado tiene nunca serán suficientes.

Pero ha recibido un ofrecimiento extraordinario: medicinas a precio de costo que pueden cubrir las necesidades de los múltiples servicios gratuitos que el Estado mantiene dentro de su política asistencial.

El ofrecimiento le ha sido hecho por la Asociación de Laboratorios Farmacéuticos del Perú (Alafarpe) "consecuente con su espíritu de servicio y su sensibilidad social".

Montero recibió el ofrecimiento de viva voz, de los directivos de Alafarpe que lo visitaron en su despacho. Agradeció, sin duda complacido, y dijo que una comisión especial estudiará debidamente el ofrecimiento.

Que una industria ofrezca sus productos renunciando a lícitas ganancias, para beneficiar a quienes lo necesitan, es algo que tiene muy pocos precedentes. Es cosa que recuerda los felices tiempos en que los perros eran amarrados con sartas de salchichas. Algo que a todos parece bien, que se agradece, y que, como queda dicho, debe tener contento a un Ministro que nunca tendrá todo el dinero que necesita su Ministerio.

Siete Dias. (La Prensa)

17 de Junio de 1969.

LA [illegible]
DIARIO POPULAR PARA TODO EL PERU

DIRECTOR: Manuel Solano R.
EDITOR: Eduardo Obando Lino

VI EPOCA — Lima, Martes 17 de Junio de 1969 - N° 1.500

QUEBRAR SINDICALISMO DEMOCRATICO ES CONSIGNA COMUNISTA EN EL PERU

Con la llegada de las misiones diplomáticas y "especiales" de la Unión Soviética y con el apoyo que desde esferas del gobierno de facto se brinda al comunismo, en todo el país está arreciando la ofensiva contra el sindicalismo democrático, llevada a cabo por los agentes coloniales al servicio de la misma causa que provocó las guerrillas. La protección oficial está testimoniada por informaciones que se recogen diariamente en el ambiente sindical: en el Norte, donde los trabajadores saben que las autoridades "protejen" "toda maniobra destinada a eliminar apristas y reemplazarlos por dirigentes comunistas", maniobras que son patentes en Lambayeque y la Libertad; en el Sur y en el Centro, la ofensiva se está realizando en el sector bancario, asi como en Loreto y en Lima; y hay que decirlo con claridad, con la protección inclusive de algunos torpes elementos patronales semiquebrados, que creen que contribuyendo a la división del sindicalismo democrático "se pondrán bien" con los comunistas y que mantendrán sus buenas relaciones con la Junta, para salir de su crisis.

En cuanto al apoyo exterior, es sabido que los "diplomáticos" comunistas y otros visitantes con pasaporte especial, visitan cuotidianamente a las organizaciones que se agrupan en la espuria Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, ofreciendo a esas organizaciones toda clase de apoyo. No es extraño este procedimiento, porque de él hay experiencia en todo el mundo. Pero lo que sí resulta insólito es que haya autoridades complicadas en esta política.

Para los comunistas romper el movimiento democrático es una línea necesaria y lógica. Ellos están en su juego internacional. Pero para lo peruanos, ese juego entraña los caminos de la traición, porque equivale a sujetar la fuerza básica de la producción a los intereses foráneos. Tán negativo es esto como la política que entregó el petróleo. Y si traición se llama a tal política, traición a la patria hay que llamar también a lo que facilite o proteja la penetración comunista en el país, a través de la quiebra del sindicalismo democrático.

Correo
SU DIARIO DE LA MAÑANA
Jefe de Redacción: Jorge Merino
Jefe de Edición: Julio Higashi
Es una Publicación de EMPRESA PERIODISTICA NACIONAL S.A.
Gerente General: Enrique Agois Paulsen
SE EDITA EN: LIMA, TACNA, AREQUIPA, PIURA Y HUANCAYO
Of Principal: Av. Garcilaso de la Vega 1219, LIMA
Publicidad: Av Garcilaso de la Vega 1251, LIMA (antes Av. Wilson)
CENTRAL TELEFONICA: 23-4400

Junio 1969

Infiltración Comunista en la Política Sindical

Es universalmente sabido que en la Unión Soviética no hay sindicatos. La férrea dictadura que impera en ese país, la organización totalitaria en torno a una sola fuente de poder y decisiones, que es el Partido Comunista, hacen tan imposible la existencia de asociaciones libres de trabajadores para la defensa de sus intereses colectivos, como sería la vida en el interior de un alto horno.

Que los rusos hayan decidido escamotear también esa verdad, esencia misma de su concepción doctrinaria del Estado y la sociedad, y llamen "sindicatos" a las organizaciones mediante las cuales el Partido todopoderoso ejerce precisamente su dictadura y su activismo entre el sector laboral, es cuestión que sólo interesa a los soviéticos. Ante tamaña mistificación sólo cabe sonreir.

Pero lo abismal es que los trabajadores comunistas peruanos, que protestan por la "política antisindical" del gobierno peruano, reciban con aplausos a dos "dirigentes sindicales" soviéticos, los señores Boris Popov, y Victor Mednikov, que han tenido la gentileza de concurrir a las celebraciones de la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP), dominada por los comunistas peruanos, que a su vez están dominados por ellos.

Esta es la primera vez que la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, a menudo descrita en algunos órganos de prensa como "democrática", "independiente" o libre de influencia "sectaria" aprista, se identifica tan ostensiblemente con el centro productor de su energía, Moscú.

La penetración comunista en la vida sindical peruana no es, por cierto, nueva. Data de fines de la década del veinte. Pero rechazada por la abrumadora mayoría de los trabajadores nacionales, que quieren la satisfacción de sus aspiraciones colectivas y no servir de instrumento a una política cuyo sentido y proyecciones escapan del todo a su control; que desean, en una palabra, ser actores y no títeres, quedó simplemente reducida a las proporciones de un pequeño mecanismo, perfectamente localizado y de influencia reducida, de presión foránea.

Durante los últimos años, empero, el movimiento comunista sindical ha cobrado nuevo y peligroso auge en el Perú. Al amparo de la extraordinaria movilización laboral estimulada por el gobierno constitucional anterior, que reconoció muchos más sindicatos que los organizados en toda nuestra historia; escudados en esa sana política participatoria, propia de un estado democrático, los comunistas tomaron posiciones, precisamente para destruir la democracia.

Como resultado de esta política la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, totalmente dominada por los comunistas, se ufana hoy de contar a medio millón de trabajadores peruanos en los organismos de base que controlan. Más todavía, sostienen que próximamente se agregarán a sus filas otros 150 mil trabajadores.

Aun pasando por el colador estos cálculos optimistas, no podemos dejar de expresar cierta preocupación por el logro obtenido hasta el momento por los comunistas en su permanente esfuerzo por infiltrar el movimiento sindical, a fin de desviarlo hacia sus propios fines, contrarios por igual a los intereses de la clase obrera y del país.

¿Cuáles son estos fines comunistas? La CGTP nos tiene, por suerte, bien informados. Son, entre otros, la modificación de la política económica con el establecimiento del control de cambios, la moratoria de la deuda externa, la explotación estatal del cobre, la nacionalización de las exportaciones, la anulación de las concesiones petroleras, los aumentos de sueldos por decreto, la prohibición del cierre de fábricas y varias medidas adicionales que bastarían para provocar un colapso del país y nuestra entrega, como presa de la miseria, a la dominación internacional del Partido Comunista, que —como bien lo sabe la CGTP—, jamás ganó una elección en país alguno, ni capturó pueblo que [illegible]biese sido antes sacudido p[illegible] conmoción social y económica

LAS RELACIONES PELIGROSAS.

Cuando se anunció que nuestro país iba a establecer relaciones con los países socialistas, entendimos que dichas relaciones serían aprovechadas convenientemente desde el aspecto comercial, sin descartar por supuesto la vinculación de amistad que siempre robustece transacciones y mejora el cuadro de los negocios a nivel internacional.

Al mismo tiempo que expresábamos nuestro respaldo pleno a dicha resolución, que marcaba, lo creíamos de buena fé, una nueva etapa con el ensanchamiento de las posibilidades económicas para el Perú; hicimos constar también nuestro recelos por los datos que aporta la experiencia acerca de este tipo de vinculación con países de la órbita roja, que siempre llevan escondido el propósito subversivo, de ingerencia en los asuntos internos, de penetración en sindicatos y de financiación de movimientos contra el órden establecido.

Estos temores estan recibiendo confirmación. Y lo estan siendo apenas iniciadas las relaciones con los países socialistas, en especial con la Unión Soviética. Cuando todavía no llega la delegación diplomática más importante ya han visitado el país prominentes miembros de organismos comunistas, caracterizados más que por una honesta función diplomática,por la acción subversiva que realizaron en otros países.

Uno de esos personajes que nos visitara recientemente bajo la inocente apariencia de una actividad periodística, fué NICOLAI LEONOV, elemento que registra antecedentes subversivos, que ha sido cabeza de un movimiento financiador de extremistas y que en distintos puntos de América ha dejado sentir su acción discciadora, de ingerencia en asuntos internos y como elemento de apoyo a movimientos nacionales de acción contra el órden establecido.

Nicolai Leonov ha sido sindicado por diversos órganos de prensa de América Latina, como elemento peligroso, tal como lo señalan diarios de Venezuela y Co-

Radio Victoria
12 June 69

lombia, como lo confirman autoridades y voceros de expresión de Méjico y como también lo deben haber registrado los servicios de inteligencia de varios países. En Méjico por ejemplo se le ha sindicado como cabeza de un vasto movimiento subversivo en países ltinoamericanos. "El Tiempo" de Bogotá en su edición del 24 de mayo del presente año, lo señala como jefe de un sujeto apodado "Gregorian", ruso expulsado de Venezuela. Lo mismo sostienen los diarios "El Siglo" y La República de Bogotá.

Todo esto pues nos indica que, mientras el Perú tiende su mano amiga hacia el mundo socialista, concretamente, hacia la Unión Soviética, ya empiezan a deslizarse elementos que, coludidos o no con su Gobierno, esto deberán establcerlo nuestros servicios de inteligencia, tienen el propósito de inmiscuirse en nuestra política interna con propósitos subversivos.

Avala aún más este aserto el concluyente registro gráfico de un diario local donde se muestra a dos miembros del Praesidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos, con sede en la Unión Soviética, participando en las deliberacione de una llamada Asamblea Nacional de la denominada Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, organismo paralelo a la CTP y que no es sino el reducto de unos cuantos sindicatos comunistas.

Este era el tipo de relaciones que esperábamos con la Unión Soviética y l países del mundo socialista? Creemos que no. Y por ello convendría que se movilicen nuestros elementos de seguridad y detecten las actividades que realizan o van a realizar los diplomáticos que se han de establecer en nuestra Capital. Que tendamos una mano de amistad, no quiere decir que toleremos el abuso de confianza de quienes pretenden corromper nuestras instituciones par enfrentarlas con el órden establecido... Si los elementos Boris Popov y Victor Mednikov que aparecen en la foto con trabajadores peruanos, forman parte de la delegación diplomática no lo sabemos, pero de todos modos, estan avalando, auspiciando y quizá hasta financiando un movimiento laboral divisionista que no podemos permitir... por que ello no es amistad, sino abuso de confianza y penetración inadmisiole en los asuntos internos de nuestro país.

[illegible]


YO TE VOY A ASESORAR EN TU TRABAJO
SINDICATOS ROJOS PERUANOS

¿Qué clase de asesoramiento?

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
L

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER #

ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY
321

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE VR. EUR-6, SB-8, RI/AN, FI-2, CI/OA

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 262105Z JUN 69 CITE LIMA 5122

26 JUN 69 IN 90235

4

MADRID, DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

1. REQUEST TRACES CARLOS JIMENEZ ORTEGA, SPANISH JOURNALIST, DIRECTOR-GENERAL EFE IN LIMA. JIMENEZ BORN CIRCA 1923, MARRIED. HE IS PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN LIMA. JIMENEZ HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH TDY SOVIET NOVOSTI REPRESENTATIVE, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139), KNOWN KGB.

2. STATION PLANS ASSESS JIMENEZ AS POSSIBLE ACCESS AGENT.

3. FOR MADRID: LIAISON MAY BE QUERIED.

4. FILE: 201-132139.

SECRET

AN	MFJ
AB	X
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~BX~~	
~~DES~~	~~EPD~~
FI	

CS COPY

SECRET

201-132139
26 JUN 69

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Lima

INFO.

FROM
Chief, SB via Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AEKICK
Translations of Intercepted Letters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HPLA 10070, 16 May 1969

1. As requested by the Station in Reference, we have had translated the letters written by Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, and the translations are forwarded herewith.

2. The attachment to LEONOV's letter of 2 May, and all but the postscript of the 3 May letter are, as the Station pointed out, apparently pure propaganda. The same cannot be said, however, for the 2 May letter, which is full of less than laudatory comments on Lima, its climate, and the insect population of the Hotel Savoy. Of even more significance are LEONOV's opinions on the VALCARCELS, which appear in the 2 May letter, and the revelation in the 3 May letter postscript of the precarious financial position of the magazine. One wonders why an intelligence officer of LEONOV'S experience and intellect would include such matters in letters sent through the open mail.

NORMA W. LETCHWORTH

Attachment:
As stated H/W

Distribution:
3-COS, Lima

1 cc

201-132139 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HPLW 5320

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE
24 JUN 1969
19 June 1969

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-132139

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SB/X/WH	D. Davis DD	bm	6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/SB/X/WH	19 June 69	E. Ernest
SB/CI/O	19.6.69	J. Walters
WH/3/P	20 June 69	R. Connolly

SB/X/WH
SB/MC
SB/CI/O
WH/3/P

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
~~IS~~
~~BZ~~
~~DRS/NPB~~
FI

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	24 June	Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11-68 (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

Post and Telecommunications of Peru

Mr. Khachaturov K. A. [as given]
Novosti Press Agency
Ploshchad Pushkina 4
Moscow USSR

Moscow, Attention K. A. Khauaturov [sic]

Sender: N. Leonov
Hotel Savoy 525
Lima
Peru

CS COPY

h/w Att Ht HPLW-5320

201-132139

Lima 2. 5. 1969

Karen,

Beside my greetings, which you do not need, I wish to inform you of the following: all the assignments concerning the office I have completed to the best of my ability. Violetta is excessively subservient toward our people, and because of this I warned her [to see to it] that this side of her character shouldn't touch or infringe upon APN [Novosti Press Agency] interests. Our fellows are real cads. Her life is terrible: her husband is a cripple; besides that he is dangerous (he drinks), she has two children, barely makes it from one payday to the next, is torn between household duties and her work, and on top of that she has "guests," and what guests!! She works conscientiously, but she is short on experience and training and does not have much time. The print shop where the magazine is printed is excellent. It can function as well as the one in Mexico, and without difficulties. The owner insists that we immediately increase the circulation to 3,000 copies [, the number] currently needed to cover the cost. Based on the two issues published so far, we have discovered that we are selling [raskhodyatsya] [only] 50 percent. The remaining [copies] we distribute free after the next issue has been issued. She even complained about Arisalu, who has been selling his magazine in Peru at a cheaper price. They settled that question between themselves.

At her place I saw newspaper clippings covering our materials: there are not many of them, but they are there, and she insists that she sent duplicates to you. Here the situation is worse than in Mexico (in the press) and one must maneuver between competing newspapers.

It seems I will have an interview with the president. Answers to questions will be in writing - guaranteed 100 percent. But I want a personal interview. And that is the whole business.

The situation is altogether normal. The humidity is terrible: 98 percent. I am wet all day long. A strange city: the skies are sullen all day long but there is not a drop of water, and they tell me there never is. Can you believe it, the annual rainfall is 1 mm, but dampness penetrates to your intestines. In comparison with Mexico this is a backward province and one can see this in everything. But it has much charm. Its colonial buildings are good. I cannot talk about the provinces, I have not seen them, but I have heard that in their picturesqueness they are unique. There are as few hotels as in Moscow. I live in a [illegible] for 8 dollars and kill cockroaches day and night and place patches on the scratches on my legs which I do not know where to put because of the restricted area. I am very happy that this one was built for the Americans. They deserve it.

Give me a call. It seems everything is in order [illegible].

/s/ N. Leonov

For Kuznetsov, Yu.

International Information

Lima 2 May 1969

Robbery on the High Seas

"To a strong man it is a weakling who is always guilty" - that is the sad conclusion to which Latin Americans have come again when they face the payments for deeds with which they had nothing to do. Some time ago the dock workers of the Pacific coast of the U.S.A. went on a strike which lasted almost 2 months. As a result of interference in loading and unloading operations, the vessels' demurrages greatly increased and the curve line of profits of the shipping companies turned downwards. The shipowners, instead of helping with a speedy solution of this labor conflict, decided to turn to the high seas robbery to compensate for their "losses," which is their name for the profits they have missed. With this in mind the U.S. companies arbitrarily introduced on 12 March a 10-percent increase in rates for transporting goods to the Pacific ports of Latin America.

This piratic step means that the Latin American countries from now on will be losing annually 60-80 million dollars, paying for the internal disturbances in the U.S. In former times pirates attacked only defenseless ships. These habits have lasted up to these days. The U.S. monopolies calculated that Latin America, which has no meaningful navy, will simply have to turn out its pockets. But these calculations overlooked the fact that now resistance to the economic dictations of the U.S. is increasing daily in Latin America.

In reply to the freight rate increases, the victimized countries--Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Chile--are planning to raise the cost of port services for the ships of the U.S. companies and to adopt measures for utilization of their own vessels for sea-borne transportation. Taking into consideration increased competition and the chance that vessels of other countries will engage in the transport of Latin American goods, it may still happen that the sea robbers who aimed to clip will find themselves clipped.

[Signature: ~~illegible~~]
N Leonov

Post and Telecommunication

of Peru

Certificate No 220936

Receiver: Mr.Khachaturov, K.A.

Agency Prensa Novosti

Pushkin Ploshchad 4

Moscow USSR

Sender: L. Neonov

Hotel Savoy 525

Lima

Peru

for Yu. Kuznetsov

International Information

Lima, 3 May, 69

Peruvians Are Becoming More Determined To Defend Their Independence.

From ancient days, there has existed a custom in Latin America to convene in the time of great danger open meetings by representation of all the estates to adopt special measures. So in times of attacks by pirates, of large-scale domestic disturbances, unusual natural calamities, and at present in connection with the threat of economic intervention in Peru as a revenge by the US for the nationalization of the property of the American oil firm International Petroleum Company this ancient custom has been resurrected.

Not very long ago such a meeting took place in the largest Peruvian port, Callao, where the participants adopted a "Declaration To Proclaim The Economic Independence of Peru." It was pointed out there that the people of Peru will not abandon their just demands and that they will achieve their economic independence in the same manner as they won their political freedom.

Yesterday an all-peoples gathering took place in Arequipa, the second largest city in the country. The public court dealing with the imperialist policies of the U.S.A. lasted approximately 4 hours. It has been a long time since Arequipa heard such passionate and patriotic speeches. The speakers petitioned the government to organize a general campaign of protest against USA policies to get the people out on the squares and streets, to arm them if possible to repel any attempts by the USA to carry out military or economic attacks.

The question was brought up of returning to the Peruvians all the natural resources of the country, particularly copper and [illegible] which are owned by American companies. One should point out that USA capital investments in mining are six to seven times as great as those in the nationalized oil company, whose property has been appraised at 72 million dollars.

The open meeting of the inhabitants of the city of Arequipa sent a messenger to the president of the country assuring him of their support for the nationalistic policies of the government. After this act the spontaneously assembled demonstration went along the main streets of the city accompanied by the sound of a historical bell, which in its day called the people to resist the Spanish aggression of 1866. The bell was especially brought to Arequipa for this occasion.

The powerful [illegible] of patriotism of the Peruvian people has blossomed forth. No internal or external enemy will be able to control it. The hope of these enemies is to lull it to sleep or to cheat it.

/s/ N. Leonov

P.S. Everything is o.k. with me.

The office has received no money. The situation is desperate. The mess is unendurable. If this continues, there will be no work done. I question whether EY will be published on time because the printers will not do this just on my promise. They require 50 percent deposit before they begin with their work. This is no Mexico, where [illegible] cooperation became the basis for great trust. Here everything is just beginning to take shape; because of this, accuracy is very much needed.

What will the readers say when they do not receive their next issue?

201-132139

14-00000

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú

Sr. JACHATUROV K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti
Plaza Pushkin 4
MOSCU
URSS

Mockha,ATT,K.A.Xayatypoby

Remite: N.Leonov,Lima Perú
H."Savoy"525

14-00000

CORREO AEREO

Лима 2. 5. 1969 г.

Карен! Кроме моих приветов, в которых ты мало нуждаешься, хочу тебе сообщить следующее: все поручения, касающиеся бюро я выполнил по мере сил моих. Виолетта страдает излишком услужливости по отношению к нашим людям, поэтому я ей предупредил, чтобы эта черта характера не заставила ее [illegible] интересы АПН. А наш брат — порядочный хам. Удивляюсь как у Смирнова С.Р. хватило такту отправить Виолетту в отпуск. У неё ужасная жизнь: муж калека, да к тому же пьяница (запои), двое детей, мать от получки до получки с палочкой, сама разрывается между хозяйством и работой, а тут ещё "гости" да какие!! Работает она добросовестно, но опыта у нее нехватает, подготовки тоже, да и со временем худо. Типография, где печатается журнал обычно, может работать так же как в Москве без трудностей. Впредь настаиваю на немедленном увеличении тиража до 3 тыс. при нынешней себестоимости книги. Хотя по цифрам бухгалтерии данные о продаже свидетельствуют, что расходится 50%. Остальное идёт после выхода очередного номера в бесплатную рассылку. Она даже [illegible] на Арисагу, который продавал в Перу свой журнал по несколько более низкой цене. Этот вопрос они решили между собой.

Я у нее видел вырезки из газет с нашими материалами: их немного, но они есть, и она утверждает, что публикуют много чаще. Здесь, конечно, обстановка лучше чем в Москве (в прессе) и надо лавировать между соперничающими газетами.

У меня было интервью с президентом. Ответы на вопросы в письменной форме — гарантия на 100%. но я хочу всё-таки лично. Ну вот, собственно, и всё дело.

Обстановка в целом нормальная. Только ужасная влажность: 98°. Целый день жаркий. Чудной город: небо весь день хмурое, а дождей ни капли и, вообще, никогда не бывает. Представление — 0 мм. годовых осадков, а сырость до кишок пробирает. По сравнению с Москвой это конечно глубокая провинция и, видно, это во всем. Но своих прелестей много — хорошие коммунальные постройки. О провинции говорить нечего — я пока не видел, но говорят по [illegible] бесподобные. Зелени мало как в Москве. Живу в отеле за 8 долларов, а всю день и ночь тараканы и зеленые [illegible] по ногам, которые [illegible] [illegible] от [illegible]. Одно радует, что это очень [illegible] для [illegible]: так ни и [illegible].

[illegible]. Скажи что все в порядке, что, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Р.

Для журнала "Международной информации"

CORREO AEREO

Лима 2 мая 1969 г.

Грабеж на морских дорогах.

"У сильного всегда бессильный виноват" — к этому печальному выводу ещё раз пришли латиноамериканцы, которые поставлены перед необходимостью расплачиваться за дела, к которым они не имеют никакого отношения. Некоторое время тому назад Атлантическое побережье США охватила забастовка докеров, продолжавшаяся почти 2 месяца. В результате нарушения погрузочно-разгрузочных работ, резко возрос простой кораблей и покатилась вниз кривая доходов пароходных компаний. Судовладельцы, вместо того чтобы способствовать скорейшему разрешению этого трудового конфликта, решили встать на путь морского грабежа, чтобы компенсировать свои "убытки", но потерями они покрывают недополученную прибыль. С этой целью компании США ввели с 12 марта с.г. произвольное увеличение на 10% цен тарифов на транспортировку грузов в тихоокеанские порты Латинской Америки.

Этот пиратский шаг означает, что латиноамериканские страны теперь будут терять ежегодно сумму от 60 до 80 миллионов долларов, расплачиваясь за внутренние неурядицы в США. В старое время морские разбойники нападали только на беззащитные суда. Эти повадки сохранились и поныне. Монополии США рассчитывали, что Латинской Америке, не имеющей сколь нибудь значительного флота, придется покорно вывернуть карманы. Но эти расчеты упустили из виду одно обстоятельство, что теперь в латиноамериканских странах с каждым днем растет решимость к сопротивлению экономическому диктату США.

В ответ на увеличение грузовых тарифов, потерпевшие страны — Перу, Эквадор, Колумбия и Чили — намерены поднять ~~цены~~ расценку на портовое обслуживание кораблей компаний США и принять меры по всемерному использованию своих собственных судов для морских перевозок. Учитывая большую конкуренцию и возможность фрахта кораблей других стран для перевозки латиноамериканских товаров, может вполне случиться, что морские разбойники, пойдя по шерсть, вернутся стриженными.

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú
•••••

Carta Certificada Nº 220936

DESTINATARIO: Sr. Jachaturov K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti, Plaza Pushkin, 4

MOSCU URSS.
Mockba,

REMITENTE: L. Neovov, Lima Perú,
Hotel Savoy 525.

Кузнецова Ю.
межд информ 15-51

CORREO AEREO

Лима : марта 69.

Крепнет решимость перуанцев
защитить свою независимость

В давние времена в перуанских муниципалитетах существовал обычай, созывать в дни особой опасности, открытое собрание представителей всех сословий для принятия чрезвычайных мер. Так было в период налетов пиратов, крупных внутренних потрясений, необычных стихийных бедствий. Сейчас в связи с угрозой экономической интервенции в Перу в отместку за национализацию имущества американской нефтяной компании "Интернэшнл петролеум К°" - этот древний обычай возрожден.

Не так давно такое собрание состоялось в крупнейшем портовом городе Перу - Кальяо, где присутствовавшие приняли текст "Декларации о провозглашении экономической независимости Перу", в которой указывается, что народ Перу не отступит от своих справедливых требований и добьется экономической свободы, так же, как он завоевал свободу политическую.

Вчера, всенародное вече состоялось в АРЕКИПЕ, втором по величине городе страны. Около 4 часов проходил публичный общественный суд над империалистической политикой США. Давно Арекипа не слышала таких страстных, патриотических речей. Ораторы обращались к президенту с просьбой организовать всеобщую кампанию протеста против политики США, вывести народ на площади и улицы, вооружить его, если это возможно, для отражения любой попытки военного или экономического нападения со стороны США.

Был открыто поставлен вопрос о возвращении государству всех без исключения естественных богатств страны и главным образом меди и железа, которые находятся в руках американских компаний. Кстати, следует отметить, что капиталовложения США в горнорудную промышленность составляют сумму в 6-7 раз более крупную чем доля национализированной нефтяной компании, имущество которой [illegible] в

CORREO AEREO

-2-

в 7.2 млн. долларов.

Открытое собрание жителей города Арекипы в послании президенту страны заверило его в поддержке националистической политики правительства. После окончания акта стихийно собравшиеся демонстранты уже в 11 часу ночи прошли по главным улицам города под набатный звон исторического колокола, созывавшего в свое время людей для отражения испанской агрессии в 1866 г., и который был специально привезен на этот случай в Арекипу.

Могучий дух патриотизма перуанского народа вырвался наружу. Совладать с ним не под силу ни внешним, ни внутренним ~~[illegible]~~ врагам, вся надежда которых состоит в том, чтобы расколоть либо ослабить его

P.S. У меня все О.К.

Деньги в Боготе этот раз и не получил.
Положение хуже отчаянного. Бардак невыносимый.
Если так будет и дальше, то работа не пойдет.
Стоит вопрос о том, что N 4 не выйдет в свое время
к моменту выгрузки не хочу [illegible] под честное слово.
Она требует 50% задатка до начала работ. Это не
мешало, он четверть века сотрудничества дали было
большого доверия. Люди все разочарованы,
поэтому оккупироваться от как нужно.
И что скажут чиновники, не лучше ли предположить?

Ref [illegible] 4LA 10124, 20 Jun 69



NIKOLAY SERGEEVICH LEONOV
Photo taken BY DULINDEN-8
on 13 June 1969 at Lima Airport.

201-132139

201-132139

RUSSIA FINANCES GUERRILLA WARFARE IN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA

[Unsigned article; San Jose, Costa Rica; *La Prensa Libre*; Spanish, 19 June 1969]

Caracas (PI). There exists adequate proof that journalist Mario Renato Menendez Rodriguez, the former director of the journal *Sucesos* and of the new subversive publication *Por Que?*, has met with Soviet agents and received the 50,000 dollars directed toward the guerrilla warfare in Colombia and Venezuela which have been reported by the international press.

Menendez Rodriguez, who once more foiled the Venezuelan police, is being actively sought in Colombia, where he arrived following his interview with Venezuelan guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo. Two years previously, the same Menendez visited Colombia and went on to Venezuela, where he carried out another mission of economic aid from the Soviet Union to the armed groups in that country. Now it is known with firsthand proof that a third mission will be directed to Venezuelan territory, following the assumption of the presidency by Dr. Rafael Caldera.

The 50,000 dollars. It has been reported that the 50,000 dollars carried by the Mexican to the two countries in question were destined for the Colombian bandit leader "Tiro Fijo," but subsequent documentation proves that the sum delivered on this occasion by the Soviet Union is approximately 200,000 dollars, part of which is to go to the armed groups in Venezuela.

Another Communist agent, Colombian Feliciano Pachon Choconta, traveled to Bogota carrying 100,000 dollars of the 150,000 he had received in Mexico, and 60,000 of which he had delivered to a dealer in clandestine arms in Panama. Choconta was arrested at the "El Dorado" international airport, and the police confiscated the 100,000 dollars. The sum had been delivered to him by a member of the embassy of the Soviet Union.

"Communist unity" money. The activities of the Soviet embassies in Mexico and Colombia — especially with regard to Menendez Rodriguez — confirm the great falsehood that Russia and Castro are marching "apart" with respect to armed subversion, with the dictator of Cuba being depicted as the great seditious and interventionist chief and the Soviet Union as the great power opposed to Castro's methods.

201-132139

The money which Moscow has been supplying with criminal objectives against the democracies of Latin America, especially against Venezuela and Colombia, throws off the mask and shows that "communist unity" between Russia and Castro with respect to subversion is as clear as the impunity which the Soviet diplomatic missions enjoy in Bogota and Mexico City.

It is believed here that, with the establishment of relations between the Soviet Union and Venezuala, Menendez Rodriguez and his accomplices, with a Russian embassy in Caracas, will not have to travel such a long way. Instead, the funds for the guerrilla groups of the two countries will flow from the Venezuelan capital itself.

For now, the third "economic" mission to Venezuela is "approved" and ready. With respect to the denial issued by Colombian police authorities with respect to the activities of Menendez Rodriguez in that country, it is known here that this involves instructions issued by the Presidency of the Republic for the purpose of minimizing the importance of the subversive activities, because of the fact that there is a Soviet mission in Bogota. The Colombian press has criticized the Lleras Restrepo government because of its existence.

6202
CSO: 408-D

Rusia financia a las guerrillas de Colombia y Venezuela

CARACAS —(PI)— Hay suficientes pruebas de que el periodista Mario Renato Menéndez Rodríguez, ex-director de la revista "Sucesos" y de su nueva publicación subversiva "¿Por qué?", se entrevistó con agentes soviéticos y recibió los 50 000 dólares de que ha informado la prensa internacional, dirigidos a las guerrillas de Colombia y Venezuela.

Menéndez Rodríguez, quien una vez más burló a la policía venezolana, es activamente solicitado en Colombia, adonde llegó después de su entrevista con el jefe guerrillero de Venezuela Douglas Bravo. Dos años antes el mismo Menéndez visitó Colombia, y pasó a Venezuela donde igualmente cumplió una misión de ayuda económica de la Unión Soviética a los grupos en armas en ese país. Ahora se sabe de acuerdo con elementos probatorios a la mano que una tercera misión será dirigida a territorio venezolano, después de la toma presidencial del doctor Rafael Caldera.

Los 50.000 dólares.— Se había informado que los 50 000 dólares llevados por el mejicano a los dos países en cuestión estaban destinados al jefe de bandoleros colombianos "Tiro Fijo", pero documentación posterior prueba que la suma entregada esta vez por la Unión Soviética se aproxima a los ... 200.000 dólares, parte de los cuales corresponde a los grupos en armas en Venezuela.

Otro agente comunista, el colombiano Feliciano Pachón Chocontá, había viajado a Bogotá llevando 100 000 dólares, de ... 150.000 que había recibido aquí en Méjico y de los cuales entregó 60.000 a un vendedor de armas clandestinas en Panamá. Chocontá fue detenido en el aeropuerto internacional de "El Dorado", y la policía le incautó los 100.000 dólares. La suma le había sido entregada por un miembro de la Embajada, de la Unión Soviética.

Dinero de "unidad comunista".— Las actividades de las Embajadas de la Unión Soviética en Méjico y Colombia, especialmente en cuanto a Menéndez Rodríguez se refiere, confirman la gran mentira de que Rusia y Castro marchaban "separados" en cuanto a la subversión armada, mostrando al dictador de Cuba como el gran jefe sedicioso e intervencionista y a la Unión Soviética como la gran potencia contraria a los procedimientos de Castro.

El dinero que viene suministrando Moscú con fines criminales contra las democracias de América Latina especialmente contra Venezuela y Colombia descorre el velo y muestra q' la "unidad comunista" entre Rusia y Castro en materia de subversión es tan clara como la impunidad de que vienen gozando las misiones diplomáticas soviéticas en Bogotá y Méjico.

Se considera aquí que la extensión de las relaciones de la Unión Soviética a Venezuela significa que Menéndez Rodríguez y sus cómplices de situarse una embajada rusa en Caracas no tendrán que viajar tan largo trecho sino que, desde la propia capital venezolana, fluirán los fondos para grupos guerrilleros de los dos países.

Por ahora, está "aprobada" y lista la tercera misión "económica" hacia el país venezolano. En cuanto al desmentido dado por las autoridades policiales de Colombia sobre lo actuado por Menéndez Rodríguez en ese país, se sabe aquí que se trata de instrucciones impartidas por la Presidencia de la República a fin de minimizar la importancia de las actividades subversivas, por el hecho de que en Bogotá existe una misión de la Unión Soviética respecto de la cual la prensa colombiana ha hecho críticas al gobierno de Lleras Restrepo.

548

LA PRENSA LIBRE
SAN JOSE COSTA RICA
19 JUN 1969

13 JUN 1969

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible] SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Lima

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AEKICK - Forwarding of Intercepted Letters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HPLA-10070, 16 May 69

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of letters written by Nikolay LEONOV, the NOVOSTI representative described in Reference. The letters were intercepted through liaison (DUBRIDE) and passed to the Station with request for translations.

2. Attachment A was translated into Spanish by DUMAGENTA-3, while Attachment B was translated into English by our Headquarters translator. The latter attachment was subsequently translated from English to Spanish by Byron W. GUTRADT.

3. For the information of the WH Desk, we are forwarding (as Attachment C) a Spanish translation of Attachment A and an English translation of Attachment B.

for Clarke A. Stodola
Samuel K. CASTELON

CAS:mes

Attachments: hw/
A,B,C as stated

Distribution:
2 - C, SB w/atts. A,B,
1 - C, WHD w/att.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Decentralized
Signed: Donald E. [illegible]
R.O. #323 - Unit SB/CI/X
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

WH/CI W/ATT
0 W/ATT.

CS COPY

2 ATT.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HPLA-10111

DATE
6 June 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-132139

Для Ю. Кузнецова
международная информация.

CORREO AEREO

Лима, 6 мая 1969.

ATTACHMENT A
HPLA-10111

Chief, SB

Политическая карьера и воровство

В Лиме, в ресторанные часы "пик" в лучших алтарях обжорства, собираются группами бесчисленные профессиональные (политические) жулики и просто бывшие околоправительственные проживалы, отброшенные сейчас от государственной кормушки военным правительством президента Веласко Альварадо. Эти "канцлеры в отставке" и пикейные жилеты на все лады критикуют нынешнее правительство, с каким-то прямо садистским наслаждением обсасывают действительные и воображаемые экономические трудности, которые, по их мнению, вот-вот придавят военную администрацию, и тогда вновь будет открыт путь к вакханалии казнокрадства и [illegible]. Все те, что ныне больше других шумят о демократии, о народном представительстве, те, кто 7 месяцев назад стоял у власти в Перу, они более других повинны в тяжелом экономическом положении страны. Буржуазные политические партии Перу полностью обанкротились в глазах общественного мнения страны. Глумясь над самим понятием "демократия" политические дельцы этих партий грабили и разворовывали и без того скудную казну нации.

Рано пока судить о военной администрации президента Веласко Альварадо. Время, и весьма недалекое, покажет, сколь глубоко лемех реформ взрежет панцирь феодальных отношений и зависимости от США. Но сейчас факт остается фактом: то, о чем без умолку болтали профессиональные политики на протяжении многих лет, т.е. о необходимости национализации американской нефтяной компании "Интернэшнл петролеум", сделали военные через 6 дней после прихода к власти.

То, что было нормой для правительств "представительной демократии", т.е. спекуляции, казнокрадство и злоупотребление служебным положением в корыстных целях — стало теперь законно квалифицироваться как преступление. Кампания по оздоровлению нравов, аресты и отдача под суд

h|watt| to HPLA-10111

CS COPY

201-132139

жуликов и воров государственного масштаба, среди всех проходимцев, для которых американская карьера стала синонимом самого бессовестного личного обогащения. О морали этих людей, брюзжащих в адрес военной администрации, говорит скандальный эпизод разыгравшийся на днях в Нью-Йорке.

Член Верховного Суда Перу (с 1967.) Феликс Портокарреро Олаве выехал 27 июля в Нью-Йорк, испросив 30-дневный отпуск для лечения. Однако вместо госпиталя, он махнул в Тель-Авив, где пост посла Перу занимает его брат Фелипе Портокарреро. В поездке его сопровождал не врач, а известный перуанский ювелир Эктор БАНЧЕРО. Купив на черном израильском рынке бриллиантов на сумму более 100 тыс. долларов эти блюстители закона с дипломатическими паспортами в карманах, пытались нелегально провезти их через США в Перу, где уже обеспечили их продажу за 170 тыс. долларов. В аэропорту Нью-Йорка накануне были свидетелями тяжелой сцены, когда таможенник один за другим извлек из карманов вельможного контрабандиста 5 мешочков с бриллиантами.

Правительство Перу дало знать властям США, что они могут поступить с Портокарреро по законам их страны, ибо действия его не совместимы с дипломатическим статусом. Он уже исключен из Верховного Суда Перу и будет лишен права заниматься адвокатской практикой.

Случай с Портокарреро яркий, но, к несчастью для Перу, рядовое явление. Под следствием находится бывший министр финансов Сандро МАРИАТЕГИ, обвиненный в содействии крупным долларовым хищениям. Мелкая сошка не отставала: бывший депутат конгресса НАПОЛЕОН МАРТИНЕС МАКАЙРА ввез беспошлинно 10 автомашин из ФРГ, нажив немало денег на перепродаже. Более миллиона солей присвоил себе бывший начальник продовольственного отдела министерства здравоохранения Луис Берналес, который от срока укрылся в Гвате-

CORREO AEREO

Нельсон Лосильос, изображая из себя политического беженца.

Военное правительство Веласко Альварадо получило всенародную поддержку в конфликте с "Интернэшнл петролеум" и вызвало понимание в борьбе с коррупцией, насквозь изъевшей механизм буржуазной политической машины.

Н. Леонов

P.S. Как в Институте все нов. и т.д. У меня вроде все О.К. Привет всем родным и знакомым.

Есть возможность заснять интервью с президентом для телевидения Москвы и записать его голос. Этого добивалась находившаяся здесь группа наших тележурналистов во главе со Шрагиным В. У них не получилось из-за нехватки времени. А я бы смог на 5 минут отснять с помощью местных операторов. Стоимость — 100-150 долларов. Если Вы считаете возможным и нужным, дай Виктору телеграмму, а если нет, то нет.

С большим уважением

для Ю. Кузнецова
международная информация.

CORREO AEREO

Лима, 6 мая 1969.

Политическая карьера и воровство

В Лиме, в ресторанные часы "пик" в лучших алтарях обжорства, собираются группами бесчисленные профессиональные (политические) деятели и просто бывшие околоправительственные приживалы, отброшенные сейчас от государственной кормушки военным правительством президента Веласко Альварадо. Эти "канцлеры в отставке" и пикейные жилеты на все лады критикуют нынешнее правительство, с каким-то прямо садистским наслаждением обсасывают действительные и воображаемые экономические трудности, которые, по их мнению, вот-вот придавят военную администрацию, и тогда вновь будет открыт путь к вакханалии казнокрадства и воровства. Все те, кто ныне больше других шумит о демократии, о народном представительстве, и кто 7 месяцев назад стоял у власти в Перу, они более других повинны в тяжелом экономическом положении страны. Буржуазные политические партии Перу полностью обанкротились в глазах общественного мнения страны. Глумясь над самим понятием "демократия" политические дельцы этих партий грабили и разворовывали и без того скудную казну нации.

Рано пока судить о военной администрации президента Веласко Альварадо. Время, и весьма недалекое, покажет, сколь глубоко лемех реформ взрежет панцырь феодальных отношений и зависимости от США. Но сейчас факт остается фактом: то, о чем без умолку болтали профессиональные политики на протяжении многих лет, т.е. о необходимости национализации американской нефтяной компании "Интернэшнл петролеум", сделали военные через 6 дней после прихода к власти.

То, что было нормой при правительстве "представительной демократии", т.е. спекуляции, казнокрадство и злоупотребление служебным положением в корыстных целях — стало теперь законно квалифицироваться как преступление. Кампания по оздоровлению нравов, аресты и отдача под суд

жуликов и воров государственного масштаба среди всех проходимцев, для которых политическая карьера была синонимом самого беспардонного личного обогащения. О морали этих людей, брюзжащих в адрес военной администрации, говорит скандальный эпизод, разыгравшийся на днях в Нью-Йорке.

Член Верховного Суда Перу (с 1967.) Феликс Портокарреро Олаве выехал 27 апреля в Нью-Йорк, испросив 30-дневный отпуск для лечения. Однако вместо госпиталя, он махнул в Тель-Авив, где пост посла Перу занимает его брат Фелипе Портокарреро. В поездке его сопровождал не врач, а известный перуанский ювелир Эктор БАНЧЕРО. Купив на черном израильском рынке бриллиантов на сумму более 100 тыс. долларов этот блюститель законности с дипломатическим паспортом в кармане, пытался нелегально провезти их через США в Перу, где уже обеспечил их продажу за 170 тыс. долларов. В аэропорту Нью-Йорка пассажиры стали свидетелями тяжелой сцены, когда таможенник один за другим извлек из карманов вельможного контрабандиста 5 мешочков с бриллиантами.

Правительство Перу дало знать властям США, что они могут поступать с Портокарреро по законам их страны, ибо действия его не совместимы с дипломатическим статусом. Он уже исключен из Верховного Суда Перу и будет лишен права заниматься адвокатской практикой.

Случай с Портокарреро яркий, но, к несчастью для Перу, рядовое явление. Под следствием находится бывший министр финансов Сандро МАРИАТЕГИ, обвиненный в содействии крупным долларовым хищениям. Мелкая сошка не отставала! Бывший депутат конгресса НАПОЛЕОН МАРТИНЕС МАКАЙРА ввез беспошлинно 10 автомашин из США, нажил немало денег на перепродаже. Более миллиона солей присвоил себе бывший начальник продовольственного отдела министерства здравоохранения Луис Берналес, который от срока укрылся в Гвате-

мальчиком лакейства, изображая из себя политического беженца.

Военное правительство Веласко Альварадо получило всенародную поддержку в конфликте с "Интернэшнл петролеум" и вызвало признание в борьбе с коррупцией, настолько разъевшей механизм буржуазной политической машины.

Н. Леонов

P.S. [illegible] в [illegible] все [illegible] и т.д. У меня вроде все о.к. Привет всем родным и знакомым.

Есть возможность записать интервью с президентом для радиостанции Москвы и записать его голос. Это договаривалась находившаяся здесь группа наших тележурналистов во главе со Шратиным В. У них не получилось из-за нехватки времени. А я могу на 5 минут снять с помощью местных операторов. Стоимость — 100-150 долларов. Если Вы считаете возможным и нужным дай вскоре телеграмму, а если нет, то нет.

С большим приветом

LIMA, 6 de MAYO de 1969

CARRERA POLITICA Y ROBO

EN LIMA, EN LAS HORAS NORMAL DE RESTAURANTES EN MEJORES ALTARES DE GOLTONERIA, SE REUNEN LOS GRUPOS PROFESIONALES Y POLITICOS, EX EMPLEADOS DEL GOBIERNO Y LOS ACOSTUMBRADOS ABANDOÑADOS DE LA ALIMENTACION DEL GOBIERNO, POR EL GOBIERNO MILITAR DEL PRESIDENTE VELASCO ALVARADO. ESTOS "CANCILLERES DESTITUIDOS" CON CHAQUETAS DE PIQUE POR TODOS LADOS ESTAN CRITICANDO AL GOBIERNO ACTUAL, CON MUCHA DELICIA SADICOS ESTAN CHUPANDOS DE FANTASIA IMAGINANDOSE DE GRANDES DIFICULTADES ECONOMICAS, LOS CUALES, SEGUN OPINIAN ELLOS, ESTAN APRETANDO LA ADMINISTRACION MILITAR, Y ENTONCES SERA DE NUEVO ABIERTO EL CAMINO BACANAL, DILAPIDACION Y SAQUEO. TODOS AQUELLOS, QUIENES ACTUALMENTE HACEN MAS RUIDO SOBRE LA DEMOCRACIA Y REPRESENTACION DEL PUEBLO, 7 MESES ATRAS, LOS MILITARES LLEGARON AL PODER EN PERU ELLOS MAS QUE LOS OTROS SON INOCENTES EN ESTA DIFICIL SITUACION ECONOMICA DEL PAIS. PARTIDOS DEMOCRATICOS-BURQUESES DEL PERU TOTALMENTE ESTAN EN QUIEBRA EN VISTA DE LA OPINION PUBLICO DEL PAIS. BURLANDE SOBRE LA NOCION "DEMOCRACIA" NEGOCIADORES POLITICOS SAQUEABAN Y ROBABAN TODO LA POBRESA DE LA CAJA DE LA VIDA.

ES TODAVIA TEMPRANO PARA JUZGAR LA ADMINISTRACION MILITAR DEL PRESIDENTE ALVARADO TIEMPO, EN LA PRIMAVERA, VEREMOS QUE PROFUNDIDAD REJA DE REFORMAS EXCAVARA EL CORAZON FEODAL DE LAS RELACIONES Y DEPENDENCIAS DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS. POR EL MOMENTO HECHO SE QUEDA HECHO: ES DECIR, DE QUE SIN CESAR DE HABLAR LOS POLITICOS PROFOSIONALES DURANTE LARGOS AÑOS HABLABAN SOBRE LA NACIONALISACION DEL PETROLEO DE LA COMPANIA AMERICANA "INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM", PERO LOS MILITARES LO HAN HECHO DURANTE 68 DIAS DESPUES DE LLEGAR AL PODER DE GOBERNAR.

EN LOS TIEMPOS PASADOS "REPRESENTACION DEMOCRATICA, E DE LA DEMOCRACIA" DE LOS GOBIERNOS FUERON DILAPIDACION Y ABUSO DE AUTORIDAD EN PROVECHO PERSONAL-AHORA LEGALMENTE ESTA CALIFICADO COMO CRIMEN. LA COMPANIA DE MEDIDAS, O SALUBRIDAD DE LAS COSTUMBRES, O MORALIDAD, ARRESTOS Y ENTREGA AL JUICIO LADRONES Y ESTAFADORES EN GRAN ESCALA DEL GOBIERNO SE ASUSTA A TODOS BRIBONES, PARA CUALES LA CARRERA POLITICA ERA SINONOMA, O COMO SINONIMO. LA MORAL DE ESTA GENTE, REFUNFUNANDO EN DIRECCION DE LA ADMINISTRACION MILITAR, SEÑALA, O DEMUESTRA DE UN EPISODIO ESCANDALOSO DESENDADENADO EN ESTOS DIAS EN NUEVA YORK. MIEMBRE DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO EN PERU DESDE 1967, FELIX PORTOCARRERO OLAVE PARTIO 27 DE ABRIL A NUEVA YORK, PEDIENDO PERMISO POR 30 DIAS PARA CURARSE. SIN EMBARGO, EN LUGAR DE IR AL HOSPITAL, EL PARTIO A TEL AVIV, EN DONDE SU HERMANO FELIPE PORTOCARRERO OCUPA CARGO DEL EMBAJODOR. EN SU VIAJE EN LUGAR DE SER ACOMPAÑADO POR EL MEDICO, FUE ACOMPANADO POR EL CONOCIDO JOYERO PERUANO HECTOR BANCHERO. COMPRANDO EN EL MERCADO NEGRO ISRAELITA LOS BRILLANTES POR MAS DE CIEN MIL DOLLARES AMERICANOS, ESTE GUARDIAN DEL ORDEN PUBLICO CON PASAPORTE DIPLOMATICO EN SU BOLSILLO, LLEVADA LOS BRILLANTES ILEGALMENTE ATRAVES DE USA AL PERU, EN DONDE TENIA GARANTIZADO Y ASEGURADO VENDERLOS POR UN VALOR DE 170 MIL DOLLARES AMERICANOS. EN EL AEROPUERTO DE LOS ESTADO UNIDOS DE NORTE AMERICA LOS PASAJEROS FUERON TESTIGOS DE LA ESCENA E ESCANDALOSA Y PENOZA, CUANDO LOS ADUANERO UNO POR UNO EL EXTRAJERON DE BOLSILLOS AL ALTO DIGNATARIO DEL CONTRABANDO 5 SAQUITOS DE BRILLANTES.

EL GOBIERNO DEL PERU HA DADO CONOCER AL GOBIERNO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE NORTE AMERICA, QUE LOS AMERICANOS PUEDEN APLICAR LAS LAYES DE SU PAIS A PORTOCARRERO PORQUE EL EFECTO, O ACCION NO RESPONDEN AL ESTATUTO DIPLAMATICO. EL, YA ESTA EXPULSADO DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DEL PERU Y SERA RETIRADO DEL DERECHO DE PRACTICAR LA CARRERA DE ABOGACIA. ACONTECIMIENTO DE PORTOCARRERO ______________________________, NO, DESGRACIADAMENTE EL FENOMENO ES ORDINARIO PARA EL PERU. BAJO DE LA INSTRUCCION JUDICIAL ESTA ES EX MINISTRO DE FINANZAS SANDRO MARIATEQUI, ACUSADO DE LA, O CON LA COOPERACION DE GRAN ROBO DE DOLLARES. EL CAÑON PEQUEÑO NO SE QUEDO ATRAS: EL EX DIPUTADO DEL CONGRESO NAPOLEON MARTINEZ MACAYRA IMPORTO SIN DERECHOS DE ADUANA 10 AUTOS DE ______________________, GANANDO MUCH PLATA DE REVENTA. MAS DE UN MILLON DE SOLES USURPO EX JEFE DE ABASTECIMIENTO DE ALIMENTACION DEL MINISTERIO DE LA SALUD PUBLICA LUIS BERNALES, CUAL POR EL MIEDO SE ASILO EN LA EMBAJADA DE GUATEMALA, COMO REFUGIADO POLITICO.

EL GOBIERNO MILITAR DE VELASCO ALVARADO HA RECIBIDO EL APOYO DEL PUEBLO EN EL CONFLICTO CON LA "INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY" Y ENCONTRARIA ENTENDIMIENTO, O COMPRENCION LUCHANDO CONTRA LA CORRUPCION, DE PARTE A PARTE ROER, O CORROER EL MECANISMO DE LA MAQUINA POLITICA PERUANA.

P.S.
ME PARECE QUE TENGO TODO O.K.

TENGO POSIBILIDAD DE FOTOGRAFIAR, O RETRATAR UNA ENTREVISTA CON EL PRESIDENTE PARA LA TELEVISION DE MOSCU Y INSCRIBIR SU VOZ. EL GRUPO DE NUESTROS TELEVISORES HAN TRATADO DE CONSEGUIR ESTA POSIBILIDAD CUANDO ELLOS ESTABAN AQUI CON EL JEFE SCHRATIN V. ELLOS NO LO HAN PUDIERON HACER POR FALTA DE TIEMPO. YO LE PODRIA HACER EN 5 MINUTOS. EL PRECIO ES DE 100 a 150 DOLLARES. SI HUBIERA POSIBILIDAD Y NECESARIO ____________
TELEGRAMA, Y SI NO, ____________
CON MUCHOS SALUDOS.

65

[illegible] of the [illegible]

Latin-American public intensively has been ultra-[illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] over the [illegible]. [illegible] had lived nation [illegible] of Latin America as 'gorillas' at any time ready to come with assistance of the American Monopolies interests. The Peruvian generals and officers turned into energetic courteous diplomats, seeing their countrys future only in safeguarding of its economic and political independence. The Military Government shapes and takes ~~necessary~~ steps which carry wise and necessary for this country characteristics under difficult economic situation created by severe cuts in influx of foreign credits due to the conflict with the American oil company and the Peruvian wealthy class, preferring at the present situation to hold their capital, or for safety reason, to transfer it abroad.

Few years ago in sparsely populated area of Peru the construction of ironic famous luxurious highway was undertaken. It was one of those constructions not for (accomplishments) of countrys real needs, but it was dictated only by self-satisfaction of commericial leaders wishing at any cost that their

ATTACHMENT B
HPLA-10111

Chief, SB

H/watt. #2 to HPLA-10111   CS COPY   201-132139 name is written in history books. At the time when the population had known distress because of lack of good [illegible] in irrigation system and shortage of electric power, the construction of the superhighway became a haemorrhage wound in the country's economy. American companies had sucked 9 million soles per 1 mile of road from the skinny Peruvian treasury for the building and supervising at the time when average cost of highway did not exceed 1-2 million soles (1 dollar - 43 soles). For the maintaining USA technical personnel Peruvians were bearing huge charges. However, the patience got exhausted when the company - contractor presented an additional bill in amount of 130 million soles besides the fantastic estimate.

The Finance Minister, general (?Hanibal Mesa Quadra?) announced that supervision over works in the future will be carried out by the Peruvian engineers, that construction will be re-examined into more convenient direction of the route and that necessary steps were taken to use construction as means of contractors enrichment.

Recently the Government decided to nationalize land and live-stock belonging to the American company "Sierra de Pasco Corporation". Over 96,000 hectares of land and tens of thousand of cattle went under control of the Government. Naturally, the nationalization was accomplished with condition to pay off a considerable sum as a compensation, however, it is necessary to say that Americans are not accustomed to such treatment in Peru.

Even more they are worried by a unclear future. Hints by Peruvian generals that in the future the Government will develop state-owned sector in mining industry as a counterbalance vis-a-vis American capitals, and that it intends little by little to force out foreigners from banking system, etc, chills and puts in fever USA businessmen because their investments in Peru exceed 600 million dollars and they never before experienced such a disturbing time?

P.S. Everything is OK. Regards to all. On the 20th [illegible] I'm leaving for Chili, ~~After the arrival of the Embassy it became more gay~~, if there are no unencountered unexpected difficulties. Life became more joyous after the arrival of the Embassy. (Kitten?), I ask you to phone (Lera?) and tell her literally the following: "The hero forgot your letter in Moscow and after the arrival to Mexico mixed up everything. He gave all your [illegible] and Voskoboynikov's reports to Alla and she does not know what to do with them. Take steps you consider necessary. The Kozmukhins, who came from Mexico to Lima told me about this." To comfort her, tell that books in her line I will collect: I have already 5 good researches/or explorations concerning Peru and a choice of [illegible] concerning agrarian reform.

Not a word from you. I am sending this as to the other world. Answer at least a few words, fear overcomes me.

Sr. Jachaturov K.A
Agencia Prensa Novosti
Plaza Pushkin N°4
Moscu
Urrs

цензуру
[illegible]

CORREO AEREO

г. Лима. 13 мая 1969 г.

НАЦИОНАЛИСТИЧЕСКИЕ ШАГИ ПЕРУАНСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА.

Латиноамериканская общественность тщательно следит за развитием событий в Перу. Где руководство вооруженных сил, взявшее контроль над страной, серьезно поколебало традиционное представление о латиноамериканских военных, как о „гориллах", готовых в любое время прийти на выручку интересам американских монополий. Перуанские генералы и офицеры превратились в энергичных администраторов, ученых дипломатов и прежде всего в политиков, которые видят будущее своей страны только в защите её экономической и политической независимости. В условиях тяжелой экономической обстановки в Перу, вызванной резким сокращением притока иностранных кредитов из-за конфликта с американской нефтяной компанией и трусостью имущих классов Перу, предпочитающих в нынешней обстановке придерживать капиталы или вывезти их ради сохранности за границу, военное правительство формулирует и принимает меры, которые носят разумный и нужный стране характер.

Несколько лет назад в Перу было предпринято строительство роскошного шоссе по малонаселенным районам тропической сельвы. Это было одно из тех строительств, которые не вызываются насущными экономическими требованиями страны, а продиктованы лишь тщеславием политических руководителей, желающих любой ценой [illegible] попасть в историю. В то время как население страдало от безработицы, отсутствия элементарных [illegible] от катастрофической нехватки жилищ, строительство супершоссе превратилось в кровоточащую рану в экономике страны. Строившие и осуществлявшие контроль над строительством американские

CORREO AEREO

компании драли с тощей перуанской казны по 9 млн. солей за 1 км. дороги, в то время как обычная стоимость дорожного строительства не превышает 1-2 млн. солей (1 доллар = 43 соля). Огромные расходы несли перуанцы по содержанию технического персонала США. Однако чаша терпения пролилась, когда компания-подрядчик предъявила к оплате счета ещё на сумму в 100 млн. солей сверх бюджета и без того фантастического.

Министр транспорта генерал Анибал Меса Куадра заявил, что впредь контроль над работами будут осуществлять перуанские инженеры, что строительство будет переориентировано в более выгодном направлении трассы и что будет положен конец использованию стройки в качестве орудия обогащения подрядчиков.

На днях правительством было принято решение о национализации земель и скота, принадлежавших американской горнорудной компании "Серро де Паско Корпорэйшн". Более 96 тыс. га земли и десятки тысяч голов скота перешли под контроль правительства. Правда, национализация была совершена при условии выплаты солидной компенсации, но при всем этом нельзя не признать, что к такому обращению с ними в Перу американцы не привыкли.

Ещё больше их беспокоит "неясное" будущее. Намеки перуанских генералов на то, что впредь правительство

CORREO AEREO

будут развивать государственный сектор в горнорудной промышленности в качестве противовеса американским капиталам, что оно намерено мало-помалу вытеснить иностранцев из банковской системы и т.д. бросают в жар и холод бизнесменов США, чьи вклады в Перу превышающие 600 млн. долларов, никогда еще не переживали здесь дней "смутного времени."

P.S. Все О.К. Привет всем. Числа 20 еду в Чили, если не возникнут непредвиденные трудности. По приезде посольство ещё дало веселья. Карен, прошу тебя позвони Леле и скажи ей текстуально следующее:

„Богатырев забыл твое письмо в Москве и по приезде в Мексику все перепутал. Отдал все ~~[illegible]~~ твои шмотки и просьбы Воскобойниковой Алле, которая не знает, что с ними делать. Принимай меры, которые сочтешь нужными. Обо этом мне сказали Корнюхины, приехавшие из Мексики в Лиму". Скажи ей в утешение, что книги по сельхозу я ей подберу: уже есть 5 хороших исследований по Перу и текст закона об аграрной реформе.

От Васи ни слуха, ни духа. Посылаю как на тот свет. Хоть бы пискнул в ответ, а то страх одолевает.

В архив
нач. [illegible]

CORREO AEREO

г. Лима. 13 мая 1969.

НАЦИОНАЛИСТИЧЕСКИЕ ШАГИ ПЕРУАНСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА.

Латиноамериканская общественность пристально следит за развитием событий в Перу, где руководство вооруженных сил, взявшее контроль над страной, серьезно поколебало традиционное представление о латиноамериканских военных, как о "гориллах", готовых в любое время придти на выручку интересам американских монополий. Перуанские генералы и офицеры превратились в энергичных администраторов, умелых дипломатов и прежде всего в политиков, которые видят будущее своей страны только в защите её экономической и политической независимости. В условиях тяжелой экономической обстановки в Перу, вызванной резким сокращением притока иностранных кредитов из-за конфликта с американской нефтяной компанией и трусостью имущих классов Перу, предпочитающих в нынешней обстановке попридерживать капиталы или вывезти их ради сохранности за границу, военное правительство формулирует и принимает меры, которые носят разумный и нужный стране характер.

Несколько лет назад в Перу было предпринято строительство роскошного шоссе по малонаселенным районам тропической сельвы. Это было одно из тех сооружений, которые не вызываются насущными экономическими требованиями страны, а продиктованы лишь тщеславием политических руководителей, желающих любой ценой ~~[illegible]~~ попасть в историю. В то время как население страдало от безработицы, отсутствия средств транспорта и катастрофической нехватки жилищ, строительство супершоссе превратилось в кровоточащую рану в экономике страны. Строившие и осуществлявшие контроль над строительством американские

CORREO AEREO



Компании драли с тощей перуанской казны по 9 млн. солей за 1 км. дороги, в то время как обычная стоимость дорожного строительства не превышает 1-2 млн. солей (1 доллар = 43 соля). Огромные расходы несли перуанцы по содержанию технического персонала США. Однако чаша терпения переполнилась, когда компания-подрядчик предъявила к оплате счета ещё на сумму в 100 млн. солей сверх бюджета и без того фантастического.

Министр транспорта генерал Анибаль Меса Куадра заявил, что впредь контроль над работами будут осуществлять перуанские инженеры, что строительство будет переориентировано в более выгодном направлении трассы и что будет положен конец использованию стройки в качестве орудия обогащения подрядчиков.

На днях правительством было принято решение о национализации земель и скота, принадлежавших американской горнорудной компании "Серро де Паско Корпорэйшн". Более 96 тыс. га земли и десятки тысяч голов скота перешли под контроль правительства. Правда, национализация была совершена при условии выплаты солидной компенсации, но при всем этом нельзя не признать, что к такому обращению с ними в Перу американцы не привыкли.

Еще больше их беспокоит "неясное" будущее. Намеки перуанских генералов на то, что впредь правительство

CORREO AEREO

будет развивать государственный сектор в горнорудной промышленности в качестве противовеса американским капиталам, что оно намерено мало-помалу вытеснить иностранцев из банковской системы и т.д. бросает в жар и холод бизнесменов США, чьи вклады в Перу превышающие 600 мил. долларов, никогда еще не переживали здесь дней "смутного времени."

P.S. Все О.К. Привет всем. Числа 20 еду в Чили, если не возникнут непредвиденные трудности. По уходе посольства США стало веселее.

Катя, прошу тебя позвони Леле и скажи ей текстуально следующее:

"Богатырев забыл твое письмо в Москве и по приезде в Мексику все перепутал. Отдал все ~~[illegible]~~ твои шмотки и просьбы Воскобойниковой Але, которая не знает, что с ними делать. Принимай меры, которые сочтешь нужными. Обо этом мне сказали Корнюхины, приехавшие из Мексики в Лиму." Скажи ей в утешение, что книги по её теме я ей подберу: уже есть 5 хороших исследований по Перу и текст закона об аграрной реформе.

От Васи ни слуха, ни духа. Посылаю как на тот свет. Хоть письмишко в ответ, а то страх одолевает.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 30 ______ PER ______ #

ACTION

SR 8 ☐ RID COPY

OBP

[illegible] cs caller

SECRET

SECRET 241625Z MAY [illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO LIMA, CARACAS [illegible] CITY

24 MAY 69 IN 86012

REDTOP AEAS[illegible]

REF A. BOGOTA 2981 [illegible]

B. BOGOTA 2984 [illegible]

1. STATION PLACEMENT [illegible] GREGORIAN APPEARED 24 MAY EL TIEMPO [illegible] FIELA EXPULSA A UN ESPIA SOVIETICO [illegible] GREGORIAN DECLINED REVEAL [illegible] WHEN DETAINED VENEZUELA AND ASSIGNED [illegible] CONSUL. [illegible] ALSO IDENTIFIED [illegible] DIRECTORY SOVIET DIPLOMATIC [illegible].

2. FORWARDING CLIP FOR [illegible] FROM REF A AND B.

3. FILE 74-[illegible] AND [illegible]

SECRET

CS COPY FILED IN 201-851562

file 201-132139

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 33 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 54

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO. FILE, VR. WH 8, RI/AN, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI,

(043) CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI 2

S E C R E T 232215Z MAY 69 CITE BOGOTA 2281 BOGO

DIRECTOR INFO: LIMA, MEXICO CITY, SA~~NTIAGO~~, CARACAS

24 May 69 IN 65682

REDTOP AEASSAULT

4

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 99095 (SENT LIMA, MEXICO CITY)

B. LIMA 4775 (IN 62617) (SEND SANTIAGO)

C. BOGOTA 2114 (IN 47944)

2p

1. STATION PLACED ARTICALS "LA REPUBLICA" AND "EL SIGLO" 17 MAY WHICH IDENTIFY SOVIET NIKOLAY LEONOV AS DIPLOMAT WHO PASSED ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PLUS US DALLARS TO COLOMBIAN FELICIANO PACHON IN MEXICO CITY IN APRIL 1968. PACHON ARRESTED ENTERING COLOMBIA WITH FUNDS. ARTICLES TIE LEONOV TO PACHON BY REVEALING THAT SCRAP OF PAPER IN POSSESSION PACHON WHEN CAPTURED HAD WRITTEN NOTATION OF "AVENIDA MAZATLAN." LEONOV OFFICE ADDRESS WHILE PRESS ATTACHE IN MEXICO REVEALED AS SAME "AVENIDA MAZATLAN, NO. 206." FACT THAT LEONOV RECALLED TO MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARREST PACHON ALSO CITED AS CONFIRMING EVIDENCE.

MICROFILMED
JUN 27 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2. LEONOV IDENTIFIED AS KGB FORMERLY INVOLVED SUPPORT L.A. GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS, WHO ON 23 APRIL TRANSITED BOGOTA WHERE HE MET IN AIRPORT WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF CLANDESTINE

AN	RW
AB	X
~~IN~~	
PS	
BX	9
~~DESTROYED~~	
FI	

74-120-115

SECRET

CS COPY
201-132139
24 May 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY. AT: JUN 13 1 45 PM '69

RECEIVED

DISSEM BY RID/EDI

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 26 9 25 AM 69

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE. VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MAY 69 CITE BOGOTA 2281 SECRET

APPARAT. INTERPOL SOURCES QUOTED AS SAYING LEONOV SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT NEW GUERRILLA FRONTS PANAMA-COSTA RICA BORDER, VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA AND URBAN TERRORISTS PUERTO RICO.

3. FORWARDING CLIPS. SUGGEST REPLAY CONTAIN DETAILES AND GUIDANCE PER REF C. DEFER HEADQUARTERS TO FORWARD CLIPS ADDITIONAL STATION.

4. FILE: 74-120-115/1 AND 201-132139.

SECRET

MICROFILMED
JUN 27 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

JUL 2 '69
ZM

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 76 PER ______

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

787

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR, EI/SI, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 201845Z MAY 69 CITE LIMA 4775 20 MAY 69 IN 62617

SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR, BOGOTA

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ACCORDING DUHIKE SURVEILLANCE, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139), KNOWN KGB, SUB-DIRECTOR OF NOVOSTI FOR LATIN AMERICA, TRAVELED FROM LIMA TO SANTIAGO VIA AIR FRANCE 19 MAY 1969.

2. SUGGEST FUDUEL-5 DETERMINE IF LEONOV HAS FURTHER TRAVEL RESERVATION FROM SANTIAGO. LEONOV MAY BE RETURNING LIMA AFTER TDY SANTIAGO. IF SO PLEASE CABLE TRAVEL DATA.

3. FILE: 201-132139

S E C R E T

AN CRP
AB X
~~IM~~
~~PS~~
~~EX~~
~~DE~~ ED
FI

CS COPY

201-132139
20 May 69

SECRET

C, SB

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Lima CAS

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AEKICK - Forwarding of Intercepted Letter

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-132139

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment A are copies of two letters written by Nikolay LEONOV, a Soviet journalist with "NOVOSTI" who is currently in Lima on an extended TDY. The letters were intercepted and reproduced by liaison (DUBRIDE) and passed to the Station with a request for a Spanish translation.

2. The letters were translated for the Station from Russian to Spanish by DUMAGENTA-3. Following the correction of some obvious Spanish grammatical erros by DUMAGENTA-3 and a re-typing for security reasons, the translation was passed to DUBRIDE. A copy of the Spanish translation (marked as Attachment B) is attached for the information of the Desk. The letters give the appearance of being pure propaganda and the information contained therein may well appear in the Soviet press.

3. We assume that the Attachment will be translated from Russian to English and we would appreciate a copy of the English translation being forwarded to the Station.

Clarke A. Stodola
f Samuel K. CASTELON

CAS:mes

Attachment: h/w
as stated

Distribution:
2 - C, SB w/att. A
1 - C, WH w/o att. B
1

CS COPY

2 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HPLA 12070
~~HPLA-10070~~

DATE
16 May 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-132139
~~201-LEONOV~~

ATTACHMENT A
(HPLA-10070)

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú
•••••

Sr. JACHATUROV K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti
Plaza Pushkin 4
MOSCU
URSS

Mockba,ATT,K.A.Xayatypoby

Remite: N.Leonov,Lima Perú
H."Savoy"525

CS COPY

L/W Att 1 TO HPLA-10070

201-132139

COBREO AEREO



Лима 2.5.1969 г.

Карен! Кроме моих приветов, в которых ты мало нуждаешься, хочу тебе сообщить следующее: все поручения, касающиеся бюро, я выполнил по мере сил моих. Вологда страдает излишком услужливости по отношению к нашим людям, поэтому я ей предупредил, чтобы эта черта характера не заставила её не учесть интересы АПН. А наш брат — известный хам. Удивлен как у Смирнова С.С. хватило такту оставить Вологду в покое. У неё ужасная жизнь: муж калека, да к тому же [illegible] (запой), двое ребят, [illegible] от получки до получки с [illegible], сама разрывается между хозяйством и работой, а тут ещё "шуры" до кучи!! Работает она добросовестно, но опыта у нее нехватает, подготовки тоже, да и со временем худо. [illegible], что [illegible] журнал "Огонёк", может работать так же как в Мексике без трудностей. Особенно настаивает на немедленном увеличении тиража до 3 тыс. при нынешней себестоимости журнала. Пока по первым двум номерам данные о продаже свидетельствуют, что расходится 50%. Остальные идут после выхода очередного номера в бесплатную раздачу. Она даже [illegible] на Арисалу, который продавал в Перу свой журнал по несколько более низкой цене. Этот вопрос они решили между собой.

Я у нее видел. Вырезки из газет с нашими материалами: их немного, но они есть, и она утверждает, что публикуют немало [illegible]. Здесь, конечно, обстановка лучше чем в Мексике (в прессе) и надо лавировать между соперничающими газетами.

У меня видимо выйдет интервью с президентом. Ответы на вопросы в письменной форме — гарантия на 100%, но я хочу всё-таки лично. Ну вот, собственно, и всё дело.

Обстановка в целом нормальная. Только ужасная влажность: 98°. Целый день [illegible] [illegible]: небо всё время хмурое, а дождя ни капли и, говорят, никогда не бывает. Представление — 0 мм. годовых осадков, а сырость до кишок пробирает. По сравнению с Мексикой это конечно глубокая провинция и, видно, это во всем. Но своих изысков много — хорошие колониальные постройки. О провинции говорить нечего — я пока не видел, но говорят по колориту бесподобно. Зелени мало как в Москве. Живу в отеле за 8 долларов, а [illegible] день и ночь тараканы и зеленые стадами по полу, которые никуда [illegible] от [illegible]. Одно радует, что это очень страшно для [illegible]: так им и надо.

Позвони маме. Скажи что всё в порядке, что, мол, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Для
рубрики
международной
информации Р.



CORREO AEREO

Лима 2 мая 1969 г.

Грабеж на морских дорогах.

"У сильного всегда бессильный виноват" — к такому печальному выводу ещё раз пришли латиноамериканцы, которые поставлены перед необходимостью расплачиваться за дела, к которым они не имеют никакого отношения. Некоторое время тому назад тихоокеанское побережье США охватила забастовка докеров, продолжавшаяся почти 2 месяца. В результате нарушения погрузочно-разгрузочных работ, резко вырос простой кораблей и покатилась вниз кривая доходов пароходных компаний. Судовладельцы, вместо того чтобы способствовать скорейшему разрешению этого трудового конфликта, решили встать на путь морского грабежа, чтобы компенсировать свои "убытки", под которыми они понимают недополученную прибыль. С этой целью компании США ввели с 12 марта с.г. произвольно увеличенные на 10% новые тарифы на транспортировку грузов в тихоокеанские порты Латинской Америки.

Этот пиратский шаг означает, что латиноамериканские страны теперь будут терять ежегодно сумму от 60 до 80 миллионов долларов, расплачиваясь за внутренние неурядицы в США. В старое время морские разбойники нападали только на беззащитные суда. Эти повадки сохранились и поныне. Монополии США рассчитывают, что Латинской Америке, не имеющей своего сколь-нибудь значительного флота, придется покорно вывернуть карманы. Но эти расчеты упускают из виду одно обстоятельство, что теперь в латиноамериканских странах с каждым днем растет решимость к сопротивлению экономическому диктату США.

В ответ на повышение грузовых тарифов, пострадавшие страны — Перу, Эквадор, Колумбия и Чили — намерены поднять ~~цены~~ расценки на портовое обслуживание кораблей компаний США и принять меры по всемерному использованию своих собственных судов для морских перевозок. Учитывая большую конкуренцию и возможность фрахта кораблей других стран для перевозки латиноамериканских товаров, может случиться, что морские разбойники пойдя по шерсть, вернутся стриженными.

201 - 13 2129

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú

Carta Certificada Nº 220936

DESTINATARIO: Sr. Jachaturov K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti, Plaza Pushkin, 4

MOSCU URSS.
Mockba,

REMITENTE: L. Neovov, Lima Perú,
Hotel Savoy 525.

CS COPY

[illegible] — HPLA-10025

Для Кузнецова Ю.
Межд. информация



CORREO AEREO

[illegible] МАЛСУ

Крепнет решимость перуанцев защитить свою независимость

В давние времена в Латинской Америке существовал обычай, созывать в дни особой опасности, открытое собрание представителей всех сословий для принятия ~~[illegible]~~ ответственных решений. Так было в периоды налетов пиратов, крупных внутренних потрясений, стихийных бедствий. Сейчас в связи с угрозой экономической интервенции в Перу в отместку за национализацию имущества американской нефтяной компании "Интернэшнл петролеум К°" - этот древний обычай возрожден.

Не так давно такое собрание состоялось в крупнейшем морском порту Перу - КАЛЬЯО, где присутствовавшие приняли текст ~~[illegible]~~ "Декларации о провозглашении экономической независимости Перу", в которой указывается, что народ Перу не отступит от своих справедливых требований и добьется экономической свободы, так же, как он завоевал свободу политическую.

Вчера, всенародное вече собралось в ~~[illegible]~~ АРЕКИПЕ, втором по величине городе страны. Около 4 часов происходил публичный общественный суд над империалистической политикой США. Давно Арекипа не слышала таких страстных, патриотических речей. Ораторы обратились к правительству с просьбой отказаться выплачивать компании ущерб [illegible] помощи США, вывести народ на площади и улицы, вооружить его, если это возникнет для отражения любой попытки военного или экономического нажима со стороны США.

Там открыто поставлен вопрос о возвращении государству всех без исключения естественных богатств страны и главным образом меди и железа, которые находятся в руках американских компаний. Кстати, следует отметить, что капиталовложения США в горнорудную промышленность составляют сумму в 6-7 раз более крупную чем доля национализированной нефтяной компании, имущество которой отошло к

CORREO AEREO

-2-

в 7.2 млн. долларов.

Общегородское собрание жителей города Арекипы в послании президенту страны заверило его в поддержке националистической политики правительства. После окончания акта стихийно собравшиеся демонстранты уже в 11 часу ночи прошли по главным улицам города под набатный звон исторического колокола, созывавшего в свое время людей для отражения испанской агрессии в 1866 г., и который был специально привезен на этот случай в Арекипу.

Мощный взрыв патриотизма перуанского народа вырвался наружу. Совладать с ним не под силу ни внешним, ни внутренним врагам, вся надежда которых состоит в том, чтобы усыпить либо обмануть его.

P.S. Учтите всё О.К.

Деньги в банк ещё так и не поступили.
Положение просто отчаянное. Бардак невыносимый.
Если так будет и дальше, то работа не пойдёт.
Стоит вопрос о том, что N 4 не выйдет в свет во время
поэтому отказываюсь не хочу дать вам честное слово.
Она требует 50% задатка до начала работ. Что и
можно, [illegible] сотрудничество дома было
большого доверия. Уже всё раньше налаживалось,
поэтому аккуратничаю как нужно.
И что скажут знатоки, не получив представителя?

14-00000

SECRET 132104Z MAY 69 CITE LIMA 4745

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REPLANT

13 May 69 IN 57530 3/0

INTEL

SUPDATA DULINDEN SOURCE DULINDEN-8 WHO OBTAINED INFORMATION FROM VIOLETA CALVARCEL. CITATION PARA 2 IS FROM HPL-4987, NOT USED AS REFERENCE BECAUSE OF LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. INDEX BOGDOVOV, SERGEYEVICH. FILE: 58-8-1.

FILED 132104Z

RI	1
AB	>
IE	<
PS	6
EX	2
DSE	DPD
FI	

SECRET

13 MAY 69

58-8-17

201-132139

14-00000

COUNTRY: PERU/USSR

DOI : 12 MAY 1969

SUBJECT: PRE: COMMENTS BY VIOLETA CARNERO HOKE DE VALCARCEL, NOVOSTI REPRESENTATIVE, REGARDING THE VISIT TO PERU OF ALEXEI BOGODOVOV, SOVIET GEOLOGIST

ACQ : PERU, LIMA (13 MAY 1969) FIELD NO. HFL-4939

SOURCE : A MEMBER OF THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU. SOURCE HAS BEEN REPORTING FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR AND HIS INFORMATION AT TIMES HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.

1. VIOLETA CARNERO HOKE DE VALCARCEL, NOVOSTI REPRESENTATIVE ZZ IN PERU AND LONG-TIME MEMBER OF THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY [illegible] OF PERU (PCP/SOVIET), SAID THAT ALEXEI BOGODOVOV, SOVIET occ. GEOLOGIST WHO ARRIVED IN A: PERU LIMA ON 7 MAY, IS MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY. SHE SAID BOGODOVOV HAS COME WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO STUDY AND DETERMINE IN WHAT MANNER THE SOVIETS MIGHT ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU IN EXPLOITING AND ADMINISTERING THE

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COPPER INDUSTRY IF THE INDUSTRY WERE UNDER STATE CONTROL. SHE SAID HIS PRESENCE IN PERU IS VERY IMPORTANT AND THAT SHE WAS INTRODUCED TO HIM BY NOKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV, A NOVOSTI JOURNALIST ~~CURRENTLY VISITING PERU.~~

2. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, ALEXEI BOGODOVOV, GEOLOGIST AND PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD TECTONIC MAP COMMITTEE, IS THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF GEOLOGY WHICH IS BEING HELD IN PERU. ANOTHER SOURCE, USUALLY RELIABLE, HAS REPORTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU PLANS TO NATIONALIZE THE COPPER INDUSTRY IF IT RECEIVES ASSURANCE OF ASSISTANCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SOURCE ALSO CITED GENERAL JORGE FERNANDEZ MALDONADO SOLARI, MINISTER OF ENERGY AND MINES, AS THE FURTHEST LEFT MEMBER OF THE CABINET.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USAID USIS CINCSO CINCLANT.

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

30

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY:______ AT:______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.______

X-REF TO FILE NO.______

DISSEM BY 9 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION SB8 ☐ RID COPY

353

INFO: FILE, VR, C/AJ. CA/PEG, CA/PROP. CI. CI/OPS

DDP. ADDP. WH8 C/AN

S E C R E T 131715Z MAY 69 CITE LIMA 4733

13 MAY IN 57264

BOGOTA INFO DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEASSAULT

REF: BOGOTA 2193 (456480)

1. LEONOV EXPECTED REMAIN LIMA APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS. DO NOT ANTICIPATE DEPARTURE PRIOR JUNE 69.

2. FILE: 74-120-115/1, 201-132139.

S E C R E T

AH RRP

AB X

CK

201-132139

13 May 69

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	WH	5	CI
2	PS	6	
3	C	7	
4		8	

H.Mulloy
WH/3/C
1535
9 May 69

LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 26 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

WH 8 | INFO | FILE. VR. RI/AN, SB 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 09 21 35 z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 0070

PRIORITY BOGOTA INFO MEXICO CITY LIMA

REF: BOGOTA 2157 (IN 53837)*

1. APPROVE USE MAZATLAN ADDRESS.

2. FILE 201-841194.

END OF MESSAGE

*Ref requested approval to surface Mexico City address of N.S. Leonov who known RIS.

C/WH/3/P E.Conolly

SB/X/WH D.Davis

SB/PO Thomas F. Thiele

SB/CI/O F. Walters

C/WH/1 Charles M. Bauer

C/WH/CA ✓

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-132139

DISPATCH | SECRET | PROCESSING ACTION

TO: Chief of Station, Guatemala City
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: JMTEAK
Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar (201-042366)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Guatemala City, see Paragraph 6.

1. Attached for Mexico City and Guatemala City Stations is a Guatemalan Personality Report (GPR) on Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar (201-042366). The GPR covers his activities up to 25 March 1968. In preparing this GPR, we have noticed a few items which addressees may wish to comment on and, if possible, provide Headquarters with information, as it may become available, to supplement the available information on CARDOZA.

2. We would appreciate Station Mexico City furnishing additional information on CARDOZA's legal status in Mexico. From subsequent immigration material (on CARDOZA or his wife), please determine if CARDOZA ever informed the Mexican authorities of his departure from Mexico following his obtaining political asylum there on 22 June 1954? Note he left Mexico clandestinely in September 1961 destined for Guatemala. Further, the Mexican Immigration Department, as of August 1967, had no intention of granting him any immigration documents.

3. Following are some questions concerning CARDOZA's health. In addition to his heart ailment, does he also have (or did have) liver trouble? This is raised because [illegible] reported in HGG-4509, CS-311/10740-67, dated 18 October 1967, that CARDOZA, while in the USSR, was to receive medical treatment for a liver ailment according to statements made by Bernardo ALVARADO Monzon, Secretary General of the PGT. On the other hand, [illegible] reported that CARDOZA was traveling to the USSR and would remain there for three months to undergo medical treatment for an ailing heart. As for the number and the significance of CARDOZA's heart attacks, the following questions are raised: Has his health affected his attitude and motivation towards his involvement and dedication in PGT activities? Will any medical assistance remedy or control his problem? What exactly is his illness? Who are the doctors in Mexico and the USSR who are treating CARDOZA?

4. Following are questions concerning CARDOZA's attitudes towards his family which may have a bearing on his motivation.

CONTINUED...

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-160430
201-821311
201-828917

Leone P.5 Att.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HGGW-4744

DATE: 6 May 69

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-042366

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/2/CI	M. Osborne	bjr 201-135139	4438

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/2/G		
WH/1		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/2		John C. Murray

What are his feelings toward his wife and toward his mistress, Fantina RODRIGUEZ? What are his attitudes and aspirations for his children?

5. In connection with his financial status, we would appreciate learning if the PGT is still supporting and paying him a salary? If so, please furnish details concerning the salary.

6. For Guatemala City: Headquarters defers to Guatemala City as to whether Mexico City may query liaison.

Milton C. SANTRELLA

Attachment:
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Guatemala City, w/att
2 - COS, Mexico City, w/att

22 April 1969

Guatemalan Personality Report (GPR)

201-023466

NAME: Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar (2)

ALIASES:
1. Julian was his alias when he was secretary of the Buro in 1956 in Mexico City (7).
2. Robert ROCA was his pseudonym when, in May 1961, he was chief of the Department committee (10).
3. Roberto ARGUETA Rodriguez (variations: Roberto RODRIGUEZ, Roberto URGUETA Rodriguez) was the name which appeared on documents which he used for his 1967 travel to Havana and to the USSR (14).
4. ANITA was his cover name which he used in his correspondence between Cuba, Mexico and Guatemala as of 13 June 1962 (18).
5. Claudio AVILA Godoy was the name on documents which he used for his 30 September 1961 trip to the USSR (13).
6. MARIO is his PGT alias in Mexico as of 6 September 1968 (15).
7. CHAYO is his PGT alias in Guatemala as of 6 September 1968 (15).

DPOB: 1922 in Guatemala (2).

CITIZENSHIP: Guatemala (2).

OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYMENT: Printer (2, 20).

By letter on 21 October 1955, he provided the Mexican Immigration Department with reasons and information on his prospective employment at Impresiones Moderna, S.A., a publishing house in Mexico City. The Immigration Department granted him authorization to work for Impresiones Moderna, S.A. on 10 March 1955 provided that within 60 days from 10 March 1955 he offer proof that he had paid to the cashier of the Immigration Department the fee provided in Article 1, Paragraph (F) of the Immigration Taxes Act (20).

ADDRESS(ES):

Current -

July 1955 - 15 Avenida and 14 Calle No. 14-27, Guatemala City (20).

September 1954 - Pension Zalamel, at Jose Maria Iglesias and Edison, Mexico City, Mexico (20).

1953 - 21 Avenida y 2A Calle de la Palmita No. 82, Guatemala City (3).

PASSPORTS AND DOCUMENTS:

1. Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar's Official Passport 1483 was issued on 29 October 1951 and was valid until 29 October 1953 (2).
2. For his travel to the USSR on 20 September 1961, he used a passport which was issued to Claudio AVILA Godoy who was described as a bachelor farmer, born in Guanagazapa, Escuintla, Guatemala and living at 3 Avenida 40, Escuintla (13).

3. For his 1967 travel to Havana, he used Passport 20[illegible]9 issued in the name of Roberto ARGUETA Rodriguez, born 13 May 1924, Guatemala and a commercial agent (17). (COMMENT: The application for the above described passport did not bear a signature of any issuing immigration official. The photograph on the application without any doubt was that of CARDOZA).

4. With reference to the fraudulent Cedula A1-19334 which he used for the 1967 travel to Havana, this number was issued to a woman named Maclovia ROMERO Lopez (17). (COMMENT: No traces as of 30 October 1967).

5. Travel records reflect information on one Julian GONZALEZ, a Guatemalan Army man who was in Havana on 26 June 1967.

6. On 13 August 1954, CARDOZA and his wife were granted safe-conduct numbers 13564 and 12899 and issued document no.'s 890 and 891, dated 7 September 1954, by the Mexican Embassy, Guatemala (20).

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:

A. Race:

B. Height:

C. Weight:

D. Hair:

E. Eyes:

F. Health:

G. Dress:

H. Handwriting Specimen:

I. Fingerprints:

J. Other Physical Characteristics:

K. Photograph(s):

POLITICAL AFFILIATION:

He is currently a central committee member of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT - Guatemalan Communist Party) (2, 7, 10). (COMMENT: As early as 1953, he was reported as being possibly a central committee member of the PGT (3). As of 6 April 1961, he was serving as the PGT liaison with the printers' cell of the PGT (11). As of 9 May 1961, he was Chief of the Department Committee of the PGT for the Department of Guatemala (10). Sometime prior to 13 September 1966, he was named Secretary of the PGT Political Commission for Workers and Peasants (10).

LANGUAGE(S):

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND INFLUENCE:

FINANCIAL STATUS:

VEHICLES OWNED/USED BY SUBJECT:

ARREST RECORD:

RELATIVES:

WIFE: Yolanda Consuelo RODRIGUEZ Artiaga was born in 1931 and is a Guatemalan citizen (20). They were married on 28 March 1953 (3). Her PGT alias is OFELIAS as of 14 February 1958 (7). Sometime prior to 26 November 1968, she visited CARDOZA in Mexico City, according to Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez and Carlos Enrique FORNO (15). On 30 May 1951, one Yolanda RODRIGUEZ, a suspected communist sympathizer, departed Guatemala for Mexico with Eliosa de RODRIGUEZ, Alicia RODRIGUEZ and Luis I. RODRIGUEZ, Mexican Ambassador to Guatemala (29). (COMMENT: It is not known if the above Yolanda RODRIGUEZ is identical with CARDOZA's wife who was 20 years old in 1951).

CHILDREN: A son, Jorge Alberto CARDOZA Rodriguez was born in January 1954 (20). This son and Cristobal CARDOZA Rodriguez accompanied their mother back to Guatemala sometime after 19 October 1956 (9).

FATHER, MOTHER: CARDOZA is the legitimate son of Patrocino CARDOZA and Angela AGUILAR de CARDOZA (3).

BROTHER(S):

SISTER(S):

ASSOCIATES:

1. ALVARADO Arellano, Humberto (201-065125), PGT member.

On 4 April 1957, CARDOZA suggested that ALVARADO Arellano replace him on the three-man secretariat of the BURO of the PGT in Mexico City since CARDOZA planned to return to Guatemala (7).

2. AREVALO, Juan Jose (201-006603), former President of Guatemala.

On 18 March 1957, CARDOZA was in mail contact with AREVALO and addressed a letter to AREVALO using the latter's alias Juan Francisco CLAYTON. AREVALO was receiving mail at P.O. 10396, Santiago, Chile (30).

3. CAPUANO DEL VECCHIO, Ernesto (201-086191), Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico City.

On 17 July 1966, CARDOZA informed Manuel CONTRERAS, a member of the CAOC, to contact CAPUANO for travel arrangements to Cuba via Mexico (14). (COMMENT: Although, there is no reporting on CARDOZA and CAPUANO's relationship, CAPUANO is included due to his apparent importance in the lines of communications between Guatemala via Mexico to Cuba as well as the likely possibility that both are collaborators).

4. *DEBROT Yaguin, Guillermo

In 1957, CARDOZA gave DEBROT Yaguin's address: Septima Calle 1-35, should aid be necessary during his re-entry into Guatemala (7). In April 1967, DEBROT, Jr. in Guatemala P.O. Box 342, was listed as presumably a correspondent of Carlos Manuel PELLECER (201-225) (7).

5. DEL CID, Oscar (201-149558), former active member of the PGT.

On 3 January 1957, DEL CID contacted CARDOZA in Mexico. They had been very close through DEL CID having served as assistant secretary of the federation and as a member of the Graphic Arts Union of Guatemala. Through his friendship with CARDOZA, DEL CID won the confidence of the PGT directors in Mexico City and carried out political tasks of some significance, including serving as one of Jacobo ARBENZ' bodyguards (7).

6. *GALICIA, Concha - Influential PGT member (6)

CARDOZA's wife lived at Concha GALICIA's home in February 1958 and reportedly the home served as a means of communications between Guatemala and Mexico (7). In 1957, she was the mistress of Florencio MENDEZ Orozco, (201-787943) who in 1965 was a businessman, owner of a drug store, in Guatemala.

7. GONZALES Coronado, Otto Raul (201-066999), alias Otto Raul GONZALES, is a PGT member.

GONZALES was named as successor to Subject as one of the delegates of the PGT to the meeting of the UPG as of 26 March 1957 (7).

8. *GUTIERREZ Garbini, Victor Manuel, Secretary-General of the Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) (7)

During December 1961 to February 1962, relations between Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ and CARDOZA worsened considerably (7). In January 1962, GUTIERREZ told friends that he and CARDOZA have not had good relations, since CARDOZA is jealous of GUTIERREZ (7). Further, CARDOZA, then secretary of organization of the PGT, had raised obstacles to prevent GUTIERREZ from regaining the power he once had in the PGT and has tried to keep him out of the limelight (7). As of 4 September 1968, CARDOZA was to take the place of GUTIERREZ who had been the head of the PGT in Mexico. GUTIERREZ was killed by Guatemalan police in early 1966 (15).

9. LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich (201-132139), former Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and known KGB officer.

CARDOZA and Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (201-160330) as of 18 October 1968 were in direct contact with LEONOV for handling travel of Guatemalans to the USSR and for receipt of money from the Soviets. When handling travel matters, contact was arranged by having the Guatemalan travelers to the USSR, accompanied by CARDOZA or BALCARCEL, go near the Soviet Press Office in a car. The Guatemalan travelers were given an identification document to present to LEONOV and they then would visit the office alone. When arranging for receipt of money or the exchange of documents, contact was accomplished by CARDOZA or BALCARCEL by one of them going directly to the Soviet Press Office (15). However, the wife of BARCARCEL has had most of the contact with LEONOV as an extra precautionary measure. LEONOV and family departed Mexico PCS on 22 December 1968 and Svyatoslav Federovich KUZNETSOV (201-087222) replaced LEONOV as the Soviet Press Attache (21).

10. fnu LNU.

As of 26 November 1968, a secretary at the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Mexico City was a contact of CARDOZA. BALCARCEL has been present on two occasions when Subject and the secretary met (15).

11. LOMBARDO Toledano, Vicente (201-000229)

As of 10 March 1955, CARDOZA was receiving mail, from the Mexican Immigration Department, at LOMBARDO Toledano's address: Villa Obregon, D.F., Mexico City, Mexico (20).

12. MACIAS Mayora, Julio Cesar (201-303518) alias Cesar MONTES, leader of the FAR.

In 1967 when CARDOZA was preparing for his trip to Cuba in behalf of the PGT at the First OLAS Conference, Bernardo ALVARADO Monzon, PGT Secretary General, cautioned CARDOZA that MACIAS may attempt to attend the OLAS despite an agreement with the PGT that MACIAS would not attend (14).

13. PELLECER Duran, Carlos Manuel (201-00225)

Subject in 1957 gave PELLECER's address: Primera Calle Poniente 6, should aid be necessary during his re-entry into Guatemala (7).

14. REYES, Olegario (201-733761), FAR member.

CARDOZA, Jose Luis RAMOS Martinez, and Huberto ALVARADO Arellano were seen riding together in the PGT "undercover" vehicle prior to 8 September 1966 (1, 15).

15. RODRIGUEZ Padilla viuda de LEON, Fantina (201-828917), PGT member.

She is CARDOZA's mistress. On 11 July 1967 when CARDOZA was departing Guatemala for Cuba, she took him to the Guatemala Airport (14). Sometime prior to 5 December 1967, she received a letter from CARDOZA who was then in Moscow (14). The above mentioned letter arrived in Guatemala from the Soviet Union via Peru (14).

16. SANCHEZ Gonzales, Hector (201-323311), bonafide Cuban Diplomat and suspected DSE officer.

.. Between 11 and 18 October 1966, CARDOZA met Hector SANCHEZ Gonzales and the latter informed CARDOZA that he has authority from Cuban government to do whatever is necessary to reorganize FAR (15).

17. SOLIS Barrios, Rafael (201-225483), PGT member.

In 1957, SOLIS, CARDOZA and families were photographed together. In the transmittal dispatch it is not clear whether the SOLIS and CARDOZA families are related (7).

CURRICULUM VITAE:

1922	born in Guatemala (2) .
29 August 1952	issued an official visa for China (2)
30 August 1952	issued an official visa for Mexico (2)
	issued an official visa for Cuba (2)
1 September 1952	traveled via Mexico en route to China by TACA according to Nuestro Diario, 31 July 1952 and (5).
5 September 1952	arrived in Mexico City via TACA Flight 100 (Travel)
6 September 1952	departed Mexico City for Miami via Cuest Flight 100 with reservations for connections with EAL Flight 602, for Idlewild to travel on to Zurich (Travel).
7 September 1952	was to depart Idlewild for Zurich via TWA Flight 902, (Travel). He was traveling without a visa for the U.S. but with an official Guatemalan passport.
8 September 1952	arrived in Switzerland (2)
14 September 1952	departed Switzerland (2)
14 November 1952	arrived in Switzerland (2)
17 November 1952	issued an official visa for Mexico (2)
18 November 1952	departed Switzerland (2)
18 November 1952	arrived in France (2)
23 November 1952	departed France (2)
	arrived in Switzerland (2)
25 November 1952	departed Switzerland (2)
February 1954	traveled from Guatemala to Mexico City (5)
29 June 1954	requested political asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala (20).
8 September 1954	arrived in Mexico at Tapachula, Chiapas from Guatemala with his family (20).
14 December 1956	departed Mexico City for Tapachula, Mexico (7).
23 December 1956	Arrived in Mexico City from Tapachula (7).

12 April 1957	and his family departed Mexico for Veracruz where they were to remain for one day and then go by train to Tapachula. His wife and son were to travel legally to Guatemala while he planned a clandestine re-entry into Guatemala (7).
June 1959	traveled to Czechoslovakia (10).
30 September 1961	was planning to travel via Panama and South America to the USSR where he planned to attend the 1961 CPSU Congress (13). Early in the morning of 30 September 1961, he departed Guatemala by land for Mexico enroute to Moscow, USSR (13).
3 October 1961	arrived in Mexico by air from Guatemala (7).
January 1962	was in Moscow and was expected to return to Guatemala by the following route: Moscow, Havana, Ecuador, Central America, Guatemala (7).
February 1962	was in Moscow and planned to travel to Havana (7).
7 December 1962	was in Moscow and attended the WFTU Conference (7).
2 January 1963	was in Cuba (12).
26 June 1967	arrived in Cuba possibly traveling in the name Julian GONZALEZ according to travel records.
11 July 1967	had plans of leaving Guatemala by air for Mexico City destined for Havana and to attend OLAS (14). He departed Guatemala City for Mexico by ACR at 1930 hours but the plane had to return to Guatemala City the same night because of engine trouble (14).
12 July 1967	departed Guatemala City 0845 by Air PANAM for Mexico City using fraudulent documents in the name of ARGUETA (14).
18 July 1967	departed Mexico for Europe on Aeronaves/BOAC airlines Flt. 676/068 using fradulent documentation (ARGUETA). He was expected to travel via Prague to Cuba (15). He was to travel to the USSR and remain there for three months to undergo medical treatment for an ailing heart (15).
19 July 1967	traveled to Mexico via London, UK and was destined for Cuba according to travel records.
22 July 1967	traveled from the United Kingdom via Frankfurt to Czechoslovakia and to Cuba according to travel records.
26 July 1967	traveled to Cuba possibly using the name Julian GONZALEZ, according to travel records.
August 1967	traveled from Cuba to the USSR probably using the passport of ARGUETA (15).
As of 5 December 1967	was in the USSR and planned to remain there until June 1968 (14).

8 April 1968	was to return to Mexico within a few days according to Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (15).
15 April 1968	arrived in Mexico according to Jose Luis RAMOS Martinez who said on 23 April that CARDOZA had arrived in Mexico some 8 days previous (14).
28 May 1968	was in Mexico according to his mistress Fantina RODRIGUEZ Viuda de LEON (14).
9 August 1968	was still in Mexico but planned to travel to Salvador and then return to Mexico with a new visa (15).
Prior 26 November 1968	his wife, Yolanda Consuelo RODRIGUEZ Artiaga visited him for a week in Mexico (15).

PERSONALITY, ASSESSMENT AND HEALTH:

1. As of 10 March 1952, his name was on a list of persons considered by CTAL as being loyal to WFTU policies and to Marxism (27). He requested political asylum at the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala on 29 June 1954 because he was subject to persecution by forces of the new administration in Guatemala due to his political ideals and his sympathy with the former ARBENZ administration. He served as Deputy in the Congress of the Republic of Guatemala (20). In January 1957, he was unhappy in Mexico and was anxious to return to Guatemala because he believed life would be better in Guatemala. He personally set April 1957 as the target date for his departure from Mexico (7). As of 7 February 1957 at a Buro meeting of the PGT, he announced to other members on the Commission of Organization and Control that he would be replaced since they (PGT in Guatemala) had summoned him to Guatemala and he was in the process of preparing for the trip (7). On 6 July 1957, he was in charge of notifying the interested persons of the exact date of the Central American Labor Conference and he apparently forgot to do so and one delegate was delayed in attending the conference (7).

2. In early September 1961, he was planning to travel to the USSR and to seek medical treatment for a stomach ailment believed to be aggravated by ulcers(10). In the USSR he was to serve as a Guatemalan delegate to the CPSU October 1961 celebrations (10). When discussing his problems and aprehensions on his prospective travel to the USSR for the 1961 Congress, he feared that the Guatemalan Government would unleash a wave of persecution against the Communists because of rumors that the Communists were ready to attack the government. He blamed the rumor on the Cubans who had issued a news bulletin claiming that the Guatemalan and Salvadoran Communist Parties had agreed to take up arms to overthrow their respective governments (13). Also in September 1961 when he was using a fraudulent passport for his travel to the USSR, he became worried because a border official asked him if he would be accompanied on the trip since another Guatemalan traveler on the previous day had the same visas listing Mexico, Switzerland, Europe. He reported the incident to the PGT central committee (13).

3. In January 1962 he had a heart attack in Moscow and had been seriously ill according to comments made by GUTIERREZ. CARDOZA had recuperated physically, but he was morally depressed and felt that he would be an invalid (7).

4. As of 5 December 1967, CARDOZA had suffered another heart attack and would remain in the USSR until June 1968 (14). He was expected to come to Mexico from the USSR within a few days after 8 April 1957, according to Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez

5. As early as April 1958, he was recuperating from a heart ailment which resulted from a highly nervous condition (15). As of 26 November 1958, he was in Mexico City and still undergoing treatment for a heart condition (15).

6. As of 15 February 1959, he had suffered another heart attack and was confined to his bed at home (15). According to BALCARCEL on 19 February 1959, BALCARCEL's replacement as Chief of the PGT exile group in Mexico by CARDOZA has caused discontent among PGT exiles. BALCARCEL thought the change had been made in order to justify CARDOZA's continued membership on the PGT central committee and felt that CARDOZA was not suited for the post because CARDOZA is ill and in Mexico illegally (15).

COMMUNIST AND OTHER SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

(Political and Organizational Involvement)

5 - 11 September 1949	attended the American Continental Congress for Peace as the Guatemalan delegate. The Congress met in Mexico City (5, 27).
6 September 1950	was very active in FSG affairs, holding executive offices and signing among other things, a resolution affiliating the FSG with the CTAL and the FSM and a letter from the FSG to the Venezuelan government dated 6 September 1950 which protested the rumored round-up of Spanish Republicans into concentration camps for deportation to Spain (9).
13, 18 and 19 September 1950	was a delegate and present in the gallery of the Guatemalan National Congress. He tried to influence the Congress against ratifying the Rio Treaty (9).
7 November 1950	attended the October celebration of the 33rd anniversary of the Russian Revolution (9).
14 December 1950	was a Congressional candidate of the "PAR RN CPNT" coalition and made a communist-line speech at the Concha Acustica in Guatemala City (9).
March 1952	was invited to the Conferencia Continental Americana por la Pas in Brazil (26).
1 September 1952	was one of fifteen Guatemalan delegates to the Peking Peace Conference which was held in October 1952 in China (5). According to the Guatemalan daily newspaper Nuestro Diario, 31 July 1952, he was to be a delegate to the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference (9).
1951, 1952, 1953	was an addressee on three different occasions for letters from Cuba. Prior to 6 March he had received letters from Cuba addressed to him as Deputy, Congreso de la Republica, Guatemala, April 1952. He was on the mailing list of Prensa Continental Publication, dated 5 April 1952. On 3 August 1953, he was the addressee for a letter sent by the PSP (Cuban CP) calling for solidarity against BATISTA, liberty for the arrested PSP leaders and CP propaganda (25).

10 March 1953	was one of the signers of an open letter to the Soviet Government and people expressing sympathy on the death of Stalin. The letter was published in the 10 March 1953 edition of La Hora (3).
18 March 1953	was a member of the greeting party at the Guatemala City Airport to meet Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano and Henri JOURDAIN (WFTU directors who stopped on the way to CTAL Congress in Santiago) (3).
As early as April 1953	was a member of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) (2, 3). As of 18 June 1953, he was serving as a Congressional deputy to the National Congress from the Department of Guatemala, having been elected on the ticket of the PGT. His term was to expire in 1955 (2, 3).
18 June 1953	was regularly receiving the News Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City at the address of the Communist-dominated Sindicato de Artes Graficos (SAG) (3).
October 1953	was scheduled to act as Secretary General of the CGTG while Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ and four other CGTG members attended the World Federation of Trade Unions' Third World Labor Conference, which was to meet in Vienna, Austria, in October 1953, according to the Communist newspaper Tribuna Popular (5).
1954	was in Caracas and acting as Secretary General of CGTG. He denounced the U.S. proposal to put the question of Communist activity in the Western Hemisphere on the agenda of the Tenth International.
As of 20 January 1954	was a member of the presidium of the Second Guatemalan Syndical Congress (19).
28 January 1954	was among the members of the presidium at the Second Guatemalan Syndical Congress which was inaugurated in the Teatro America before a large audience (28).
February 1954	was a delegate to a mass meeting in Mexico City which was sponsored by the Society of Friends of Guatemala (5).
5 May 1954	met Obdulio BARTHE and family at the La Aurora Airport, Guatemala City and was accompanied by other Guatemalan Communist leaders and leftists (9).
29 June 1954	requested for himself and his family asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala.
14 September 1954	he and his family appeared before Licenciado Gustavo GARCIA Guerrero, Assistant Chief of the Immigration Department, Department of the Interior, in Mexico City for the purpose of clarifying the matter of his internment and stay in Mexico (20).
30 October 1954	was listed as an exile on whom extradition procedings had been filed (4).

25 January 1955	was included on a list of exiled Guatemalans who applied for political asylum in Mexico (8).
June 1956	was identified together with Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, Cesar MONTENEGRO and Rafael SOLIS Barrios as being directors of the Central Guatemalan Confederation of Trade Unions in Exile (CGTG). In June 1956 the CGTG and other various exile groups in Mexico joined together in the Union Patriotica Guatemalteca (UPG) to form both a clandestine and legal group inside and wherever possible as an opposition party to the Guatemalan Government (24).
19 October 1956	his wife, Yolanda Rodriguez de CARDOZA, name appeared on a list of 157 exiles who were being permitted to return to Guatemala according to the Ministry of Foreign Relations (9).
As of 3 December 1956	in Mexico, he was the Secretary of the Directive Organism (BURO - Buro de la Fraccion del Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo (PGT) (7). Also he was a member of the PGT central committee which was located in Mexico. At the time there were two PGT central committees, one in Mexico and one in Guatemala (6). During 1954-57, he was a member of the PGT cell "LUBE" in Mexico (7).
5 December 1956	attended a meeting of the Directive Organism (BURO) in Mexico where he with others discussed political problems of one Guatemalan member in Prague (7).
14 December 1956	departed Mexico City for Tapachula, Mexico where he met a courier. He coordinated the plans of the PGT as to the stand to take in the event of a revolt which was planned for 24 December 1956 (7).
23 December 1956	returned to Mexico City after having made clandestine contact with a party leader from the interior (7).
18 January 1957	he would be pulled off of his job in the printing shop at Tabasco 2750 in Mexico in order to make him into a professional of the PGT, but the possibility was remote since it was difficult to obtain a job as advantageous as that which he then had, one which permitted him to take part in political activities during the afternoon (7).
24 January 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT faction in Mexico where a communique on the Hungarian Problem was made known to the rank and file of the PGT in Mexico (7).
7 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico at the home of Jose Manuel FORTUNY where he and others discussed the organizational report first presented by the PGT in Mexico (7).

12 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico at the home of Manuel SANCHEZ to discuss the regulations governing the UPG as proposed by the Partido Accion Revolucionario Unificado (PARU) (7).
14 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico which was held at the home of Manuel SANCHEZ (7).
21 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico which was held at the home of Jose Manuel FORTUNY (7).
April 1957	in Guatemala, he replaced Carlos Rene VALLE y Valle, PGT member, who was then ill (7).
	carried eighty dollars from Mexico to Guatemala. The funds had been sent to Mexico by the Guatemalan exiles in Costa Rica (7).
16 April 1957	was to enter Guatemala to carry out clandestine work for the PGT there according to a letter that Alfredo GUERRA Borges received from Mario SILVA Jonama (7).
31 May 1957	signed a petition dated 31 May 1957 which was prepared by the members of the UPG for the Consul General of Guatemala in Mexico to request the restoration of his passport and permission to return to Guatemala (23).
14 February 1958	his wife was living at the home of Concha Galicia. GALICIA's home served as one of the principal means of communications between Guatemala and Mexico (7).
June 1959	traveled to Czechoslovakia to work on the publication, Problemas de la Paz y del Socialismo (10).
18 February 1961	was director of El Militante, internal organizational bulletin of the PGT (10).
7 September 1961	attended a meeting with members of the Departmental Committee of the PGT in a home located at 5 Avenida 5-42, Zone 7, Guatemala City (13).
21 September 1961	attended a meeting of the Departmental Committee and delivered a lecture on the foundation, growth and strengthening of the Party (13).
October 1961	was to attend the CPSU Congress. He was making plans in early September and was to serve as one of the two Guatemalan delegates (10).
7 December 1961	attended the WFTU Conference in Moscow (7, 13).

As of early January 1963	was aware of the possible return of Jacobo ARBENZ Guzman to Guatemala with a Cuban guerrilla group. He and ARBENZ were in Cuba as of 2 January 1963.
29 January 1963	met with labor leaders of the PGT at the home of Manuel Francisco CONTRERAS to consider and approve a document which sets forth the 1963 PGT line for labor matters (12).
14 February 1963	he and eight other top labor leaders of the Labor Commission of the PGT were arrested. The PGT and the Communist (PGT) controlled FASGUA were without leaders (13).
29 June 1963	released by a Guatemalan military court. He and others had been accused of having plotted against the Ydigoras government in accordance with International Communist plans according to El Impercial, Guatemala City, 29 June 1963.
July 1963	assumed the direction of the Comision Sindical, the labor commission of the PGT, in Mexico (13).
October 1963	planned to be made head of the Escuintla Departmental Committee of the PGT (13).
November 1963	was a member of the Labor Commission of the PGT which is under the direct authority of the central committee which was formed to fulfill the following missions: 1. direct the activities of the Chamale Committee (Communist faction of the Federacion Autonoma Sindical Guatemalteca (FASGUA-Communist dominated labor federation); 2. issued propaganda favoring the working class; run a labor school in Quezaltenango for Party members involved in labor matters, etc. (12). and others were PGT members who received a salary from the Party. The lowest paid is sixty quetzales (U.S. $60) and the highest at least two hundred quetzales (U.S. $200) per month. In addition to salaries, the Party pays the expenses for houses, cars, and maintenance and the cost of printing leaflets and other publications (13).
3 December 1963	met with other leaders of the PGT in the Headquarters of the Federacion Autonoma Sindical Guatemalteca (FASGUA - PGT dominated labor federation). The group discussed the current political and general situation in Guatemala (14).
8 March 1965	had been delegated by other Party leaders to come out of hiding in order to make plans for an important meeting of opposition leaders (14).

23 December 1965	Huberto ALVARADO Arellano, and Arturo HERNANDEZ Garcia met in TASGUA headquarters with a small group of PGT party members to discuss the expected overthrow, probably on 24 December 1965 of the government of Colonel Enrique PERALTA Azurdia. CARDOZA and ALVARADO ordered the members of the group to remain within their homes on call on 24 December (14).
24 - 27 February 1966	was renamed to the PGT central committee at the National Conference of the PGT which was held 24 through 27 February 1966 (14).
27 March 1966	was in charge of a meeting which PGT leaders attended in order to discuss the status of the investigation on the disappearance of some PGT members (14).
19 April 1966	told a group of leading members of Party and Party Labor leaders that a new labor policy has been adopted by the PGT and the FAR, in response to instructions from Moscow (14).
	was the chief spokesman at a meeting of a group of 15 leading members of the PGT and announced that the PGT and FAR have decided to initiate a new campaign of violence on 1 May 1966 (14).
28 April 1966	and Armando CASTILLO Morales, PGT and FAR members, met with a group of Party members and labor leaders on 23 April to discuss plans for May Day and a week of terrorism. According to CARDOZA, the PGT would go along with a peaceful parade on May Day. However, if the police attempt to obstruct the parade or halt the speeches, the PGT and FAR will be ready to put up strong resistance (14).
9 and 11 May 1966	met with PGT and PGT labor leaders to bring them up to date on the attitude of the Party toward the present state of siege and to reveal Party plans for the adoption of a new labor policy (14). CARDOZA informed the group that the PGT and FAR are ready to initiate a new type of labor plan, as a result of which Communist-controlled labor throughout Guatemala would be geared to acts of violence, sabotage, and terrorist activity in general. According to CARDOZA, the first step in the plan was to give military training to selected key labor people (14).
18 May 1966	met with leaders of the PGT for the purpose of furnishing them with a report on the National Party Conference which was held in late February 1966 and to distribute a booklet entitled La Guerra Revolucionaria del Pueblo (14).

29 May 1966	met with a group of PGT labor leaders and members of the FAR. It was announced that a meeting will definitely be arranged with representatives of the Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre (MR-13 November Revolutionary Movement), guerrilla organization headed by Marco Antonio YON Sosa (14).
13 -17 July 1966	was at meetings of the Comision de Asuntos Obreros y Campesinos (CAOC - Commission for matters concerning peasants and workers), labor commission of the PFT which were held on 13 and 16 July 1966. He had extensive knowledge about Guatemalans who already were in Cuba and others who were scheduled to go there (14).
Prior 8 September 1966	was seen in Zone 6, Guatemala City with Jose Luis RAMOS Martinez, Huberto ALVARADO Arellano and Olegario REYES. They were riding in one of the "undercover" vehicles used by the PGT and the FAR (1).
22 November 1966	was in charge of a meeting of the National Labor Commission of the PGT which met in the home of a Party member in Guatemala City to discuss the present situation in Guatemala insofar as the PGT and its revolutionary fighting arm, the FAR, are concerned (14).
12 January 1967	gave members of the PGT's National Labor Commission a situation report on the results of the PGT central committee members who had been in the mountains of Guatemala with a leader of the FAR (14).
25 January 1967	discussed with PGT labor leaders the growing dissension between the PGT and the FAR (14).
24 February 1967	came to Guatemala City from Escuintla, where he has been in hiding, to meet with PGT labor leaders. He and other political commission and central committee members of the PGT had been in hiding since 20-22 February as a means to avoid capture by the military and police forces. The Party at that time was underground and almost completely inactive. According to him, for all practical purposes the PGT and the FAR were then two separate organizations (14).
9 March 1967	called an urgent meeting with Party Labor leaders to inform them that during the latter part of March 1967, he would be occupied in organizing and later, attending a National plenum of the central committee of the PGT (14).
27 March 1967	gave Party labor leaders a hasty and incomplete version of the so-called plenary session of the PGT central committee held at an undisclosed site in the mountains of Guatemala from 20 through 24 March. Among the few agreements reached was that the PGT will form its own guerrilla force and call it "Guerrilla Leonardo Castillo Flores" (14).

22 April 1967	gave Party labor leaders information on the PGT plans for May Day celebration and explained that the party will cooperate with the Rebel Armed Forces in a terrorist campaign after 1 May 1967 (14).
8 July 1967	was to head the PGT delegation to the First Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS). After OLAS he had plans to travel on to the USSR (14).
11 July 1967	was provided false bottom suitcase to carry documents to Cuba prior to his departure from Guatemala City enroute to Cuba via Mexico City (14).
22 July 1967	transitted Orly Airport for Prague with documents belonging to Roberto ARGUETA Rodriguez (16).
14 - 27 July 1967	under the name Julian GONZALES, he was reported as having arrived in Havana as a "FAR delegate" to LASO according to a 28 July 1967 Havana broadcast.
27 July - November 1967	was to receive a two-month course in military tactics as well as medical treatment for a liver ailment in the Soviet Union following his attendance at the 1967 LASO Conference according to Bernardo ALVARADO Monzon, Secretary General of the PGT (14).
11 August 1967	The Mexican Immigration Department by letter on 11 August 1967 informed the Mexican Consul (presumably in Guatemala) that the Immigration Department would not issue any document granting any immigration status, nor would CARDOZA be allowed to enter Mexico without the previous authorization of the Immigration Department (20).
Late December 1967	was Chief of the Mazatenango Regional Committee of the PGT and the FAR, which consists of the Departments of Retalhuleu and Suchitepequez for the most part, according to Francisco HERNANDEZ Alvarez during his interrogation (22).
Early April 1968	had strict orders to remain inactive in Mexico and do no work as CARDOZA is recuperating from a heart ailment. CARDOZA probably would remain inactive for at least one year according to Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (15).
28 May 1968	was to stay in Mexico and work with PGT exile community there, according to his mistress, Fantina RODRIGUEZ Viuda de Leon (14).
18 July 1968	is receiving complete financial support from the Mexican Communist Party because of his high position in the PGT. This support includes money for room and board and doctor bills. In Mexico, he visits his doctor once a week (15).
9 August 1968	was still in Mexico but was to leave Mexico because his visa has expired, according to Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez. Also, CARDOZA had plans of traveling to Salvador and then returning to Mexico with a new visa because he needed approximately six more months of medical treatment (15).

5 October 1968	met Jose MEJIA, aka Carlos SALINAS Murillo on the street and latter told CARDOZA about the attempted recruitment of him by a "special agent". MEJIA asked CARDOZA for money but the latter refused (15).
As of 18 October 1968	he and Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez are handling travel of Guatemalans to the USSR and receipting for funds and documents directly with Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, know KGB officer and Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico (15).
4 September 1968	headed a meeting of Guatemalan Communist exile leaders in Mexico and they discussed the reorganization of the exiles in Mexico (15).
15 February 1969	had been named overall Chief of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) exile apparatus in Mexico to replace Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez, according to Carlos Enrique FORNO Reynoso. The change had been made as the result of instructions which had just been received from the PGT in Guatemala. The change was twofold. CARDOZA is a member of the central committee of the PGT whereas BALCARCEL is not, and BALCARCEL has been lax in his duties, once being unavailable when some important PGT members passed through Mexico. However, BALCARCEL will continue to act as chief of the exile group until CARDOZA is on his feet again since the latter had suffered another heart attack and was confined to his bed at home. Until this change CARDOZA had been the central committee representative in Mexico and had functioned as an advisor (15). Presumably BALCARCEL replaced GUTIERREZ and CARDOZA replace BALCARCEL although on 4 September 1968, CARDOZA was to take GUTIERREZ' place in Mexico (GUTIERREZ was killed in Guatemala in 1966) (15).
As of 19 February 1969	was replaced by BARCARCEL as Chief of the PGT exile group in Mexico in order to justify CARDOZA's continued membership on the PGT central committee (15).
Prior 9 March	met with Jose Maria ORTIZ Vides who had recently arrived in Mexico City from Cuba. ORTIZ informed CARDOZA that the Cubans had sent him to Mexico to "spy" on the PGT in Mexico in behalf of Cuba (15).

SOURCES

(1) ESRECESS-19
(2) No source, passport
(3) ESCONSON
(4) ESODIC-1
(5) LNPURE
(6) ESGEM-7
(7) LINLUCK
(8) LIBETHERITE-4
(9) No source
(10) ESPEG-1
(11) ESADAGE-1
(12) ESRECESS-11
(13) ESMESSAGE-3
(14) ESRECESS-16
(15) LIREBEL-2
(16) UNBOUND travel information
(17) ESMICA
(18) LNERGO
(19) ESCROW
(20) LIKAYAK-2
(21) LIFEAT, LIENVOY
(22) ESRECESS-17
(23) HUSSY
(24) ESABIDE
(25) AMPLECT
(26) JURANT
(27) LIFTER
(28) ESCROW
(29) ESCALATOR
(30) FUGLEMAN-13

ORIG: J.Castoro
UNIT: WH/3/C
EXT: 1535
DATE: 5 May 69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	FS	5	
2	WH	6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH-8 INFO FILE, VR. KI/AN, CA-5, CA/PROP, SB-8, CA/PEG

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 05 22 18 z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 99095

TO BOGOTA INFO LIMA MEXICO CITY

PSYCH

REFS: A. BOGOTA 2114 (IN 47944)*

B. LIMA 4575 (IN 44867)**

C. MEXICO CITY 5719 (IN 20342)*** (BEING RELAYED TO LIMA)

1. IF NOT ALREADY PLANNED, SUGGEST EXPLOIT LEONOV PRESENCE LIMA BY NAMING HIM PERSONALLY IN STATION-INSPIRED ARTICLES AS PAYMASTER FOR FABIO VASQUEZ GROUP AS HE WAS IN PACHON CASE. IF IMPLEMENTED COULD REPLAY WIDELY IN LA.

2. FILE 201-841194.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1

WH/3/P R Connolly

SB/X/WH L.MESTRES

SB/POA V. VALPY

CONTINUED WH/CA -

201-733137

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF:
INFO
FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 99095

TO

*Outlines prop play being conducted by Station Bogota in connection with recent discovery of an ELN cache.

**Reports arrival of Leonov in Lima a Soviet RIS officer who is under cover of Second Secretary of Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

***Reports connection between Leonov and Pachon.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

…LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION … …SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7-7 …ITING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

		6	
		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

639

S E C R E T 011620Z MAY 69 CITE SANTIAGO 9169 (DIFFENDAL ACTING)

SAGO

1 MAY 69 IN 48858

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REFS: A. LIMA 4603 (IN 46110)

B. SANTIAGO 9164 (IN 47992)

1. BELIEVE SUBJECT REF A IS GUILLERMO RAVEST SANTIS, POLITICAL EDITOR PCCH DAILY "EL SIGLO". 30 APRIL "EL SIGLO" REPORTED RAVEST IN LIMA COVERING IPC SITUATION.

2. INDEX: RAVEST.

3. FILE: 58-8-1.

S E C R E T

201-132139

1 May 69

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

3

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION SB8 ☐ RID COPY

581

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR. WH8. RIAN. CI. CIOPS SR2

UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 301742Z APR 69 CITE SANTIAGO 9164 (DIFFENDAL ACTING)

SAGO

30 APR 69 IN 47992

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: LIMA 4608 (IN 46110)

1. PLEASE CHECK AND RETRANSMIT NAME OF CHILEAN JOURNALIST. NO TRACES ON GILLERMO RAVOSL S. RAVOSL.

2. FILE: 58-8-1.

SECRET

AT PRP
ID X

Leonov 201

Leonov, Nikolay Sergeyevich

201-132139 ✓

30 apr 69

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER

ACTION SB-8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO. FILE. VR. RI/AN, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI-2

496

S E C R E T 291859Z APR 69 CITE LIMA 4608

29 APR 69 IN 47110

DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ON 20 APRIL FOLLOWING ARRIVED LIMA FROM SANTIAGO VIA LAN NO 4251:

A. LEV NOVIKOV, PASSPORT NO. 062220

B. VICTOR CHRAGQUINE, PASSPORT NO. C-159754, JOURNALIST

C. VILLY GOREMIKINE, PASSPORT NO. C-139862, JOURNALIST

ALL THREE STAYING HOTEL SAVOY, NOVIKOV ROOM 623 AND OTHER TWO ROOM 614. REQUEST TRACES ON B AND C ABOVE.

Guillermo RAVEST Santis, No 201 ✓ political editor PCCH daily "El Siglo"

2. REQUEST TRACES ON CHILEAN JOURNALIST, ~~GILLERMO RAVOSL~~ S. RAVOSL OCCUPIES ROOM 523 AT HOTEL SAVOY AND HAS BEEN OBSERVED IN CONTACT WITH B AND C ABOVE AS WELL AS NIKOLAI LEONOV (201-132139) NOVOSTY REP FROM MOSCOW AND KNOWN KGB WHO OCCUPIES ADJOINING ROOM 525 OF SAVOY.

3. FILE : 58-8-1

S E C R E T

PRP
X

Leonov ✓
201-132139
29 Apr 69

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

299

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO. FILE, VR, CI/AN, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 252043Z APR 69 CITE LIMA 4575

25 APR 69 IN 44867

DIRECTOR INFO BOGOTA

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: A. BOGOTA 2047 (IN 41592)

B. DIRECTOR 91987

NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH

1. LEONOV ARRIVED LIMA FROM BOGOTA VIA APSA FLIGHT 61 ON 23 APRIL. ACCORDING DUHIKE SURVEILLANCE, LEONOV MET BY DULAUREL-1 AND FAMILY, RICARDO TELLO NEYRA AND WIFE BEATRICE AND ONE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT. LEONOV TAKEN TO HOTEL SAVOY WHERE CHECKED INTO ROOM 525. EARLY AFTERNOON OF 23RD LEONOV WITH ABOVE PERSONS WENT TO DULAUREL-1 HOME WHERE REMAINED UNTIL EARLY EVENING. LEONOV LEFT DULARUEL-1'S HOME IN COMPANY ALL ABOVE PERSONS, TOOK DRIVE ALONG OCEAN AND HAD DINNER BEFORE BEING DROPPED OFF AT SAVOY WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT.

2. MORNING OF 24 APRIL VISITED FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH DULAUREL-1 AND HUSBAND AND MET ABOVE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT AT FOREIGN MINISTRY. DURING AFTERNOON OF 24TH AND MORNING OF 25TH, LEONOV OBSERVED WITH ABOVE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT AND ON SEPARATE OCCASSIONS WITH GUSTAVO VALCARCEL AND RAUL ACOSTA SALAS.

3. ACCORDING TO DULINDEN-8, DULAUREL-1 INSTRUCTED HIM NOT GO TO AIRPORT TO MEET NEW VISITOR AS NO PHOTOS TO BE TAKEN OF

CS COPY

SECRET

25 APR 69 ✓

201-132139

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION　CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　TOTAL COPIES　ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY:　AT:

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY　PER

☐ RET. TO　BRANCH ☐　DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION　☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 LIMA 4575 SECRET

HIM.

4. DUHIKES HAVE DETECTED POLICE SURVEILLANCE OF LEONOV AT HOTEL AND AREA OF FOREIGN MINISTRY. POLICE SURVEILLANCE APPEARS BE VERY CLOSE. STATION WILL ATTEMPT CONTINUE UNILATERAL COVERAGE TO EXTENT POSSIBLE BUT POLICE ACTIVITY WILL NECESSARILY LIMIT STATION EFFORT.

5. FILE: 201-132139, 201-758184, 201-845308, 201-026294, 201-054508

SECRET

MAY 7 69

DN

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 8 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH 8, FI 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

279

S E C R E T 241715Z APR 69 CITE BOGOTA 2075 BOGO 25 APR 69 IN 44613

C

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REFS A) BOGOTA 2047 (IN 41592)

B) DIRECTOR 95945

1. DUE INDICATIONS FROM GIWREN BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139) TRASITED BOGOTA 23 APRIL. UNFORTUNATELY COLOMBIAN AUTHORITIES DO NOT KEEP RECORDS OF PASSENGERS IN TRANSIT. CAN LIMA CONFIRM LEONOV'S ARRIVAL THERE?

2. FILE: 201-132139.

S E C R E T

AN	mS
AB	X
FI	

CS COPY

SECRET

25 APR 69 ✓

201-132139

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG: P. LARNEST
NIT: SB/X/WH
XT: 6412 1315
DATE: 23 APRIL 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y 48 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: SB8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

24 23 28 Z APR 69

CITE DIRECTOR

95945

TO BOGOTA INFO LIMA

REDTOP ALKICK

BOGOTA 2047 (IN 41592)*

1. APPRECIATE REFERENCE NOTIFICATION. TRACES ALREADY FORWARDED LIMA ON BASIS PREVIOUS INFORMATION ABOUT LEONOV TRAVEL.

2. FILE: 201-132139.

END OF MESSAGE

*Reference reported information acquired from Teltap that known KGB Officer LEONOV, who implicated in "PACHON Case", traveling to Lima.

C/SB/X/WH
SB/BIO
SB/CI/O J Walters
WH/3/C Calvin M. Smith
C/WH/3/F Spera

AB MS
AB X
FI

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

SB/XO C T Malton

24 APR 69
201-132139

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED SB ☐ SLOTTED

BY: 6/ AT: 1626 Z

DISSEM BY: 5 PER

ACTION

SB8

☐ RID COPY

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30 28

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE. VR. R/AN WH8 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 FI2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

006

S E C R E T 221517Z APR 69 CITE BOGOTA 2047 BOGO

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, LIMA HPL

MICROFILMED
MAY 2 1969

22 APR 69 IN 41592

REDTOP

1. GIWREN REPORTED JOSE ARIZALA POSSO M(201-815588) CHIEF NOVOSTI OFFICE BOGOTA AND MEMBER COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA, REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM PROSPERO MORALES, PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY, CONCERNING LEGALITY OF SOVIET CITIZEN NICOLAY LEONOV ENTERING COLOMBIA ON TOURIST CARD. ARIZALA STATED HE HAD RECEIVED A CABLE INFORMING HIM LEONOV WOULD ARRIVE BOGOTA 22 APRIL ON AVIANCA FLIGHT 71 FROM PARIS AND WOULD TRAVEL TO LIMA ON 23 APRIL. ARIZALA ADDED LEONOV WAS AN IMPORTANT MEMBER OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO BUT HAD NOW GIVEN UP HIS DIPLOMATIC CARREER AND IS A MEMBER OF THE APN "TEAM". MORALES LATER TOLD ARIZALA THAT HE HAD LEARNED FROM DAS THAT LEONOV COULD ENTER COLOMBIA ON A TOURIST CARD.

CIT COLOMBIA
A COLOMBIA, BOGOTA
PRESS
CONTACTED by JOSE ARIZALA POSSO /201-815588
RE SOVIET ENTERING COLOMBIA

2. BELIEVE SUBJECT IS NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139) WHO ONCE STATIONED MEXICO CITY AS SOVIET EMBASSY PRESS ATTACHE AND KNOWN RIS. SUGGEST HQS TRACES TO LIMA SOONEST.

CS COPY

SECRET

22 APR 69 Leonov
201-132139

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

APR 26 1 49 PM '69

BY: AT:

RECEIVED

DISSEM BY: RID/EDI

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 APR 69 CITE BOGOTA 2047 SECRET

3. FILE: 201-132139 AND 201-815588. INDEX MORALES.

SECRET

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief of Station, Lima
INFO.	
FROM	Chief, SB via Chief, WH
SUBJECT	REDTOP AEKICK Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

PROCESSING ACTION
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 92246, 13 April 1969

As promised in Reference, there are attached hereto two of the latest and best photographs available of Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV. The date of the photographs is sometime in 1964.

Norma W. LETCHWORTH

Attachment: H/W
Photographs H/W

Distribution:
3-COS, Lima

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HPLW 5283	DATE 15 APR 1969 14 APRIL 1969
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139

RID
SB/CI/O
SB/X/WH
WH/3/P

AN MS
AB
FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SB/X/WH	D.Davis DD	bm	6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SB/X/WH	14.4	
SB/CI/O	14.4.69	Jwalters
WH/3/P	14 Apr 69	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	14 Apr	Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG 1-68 (40)

DISPATCH

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ORIG: LEE G. MESTRES
UNIT: C/SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412/1315
DATE: 12 APRIL 1969

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: SB-8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, CS/DO, CI, CI/OA, WH-8, RI/AN, CI/IC-2, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 13 01 30 Z APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 92246

TO PRIORITY LIMA ROUTINE MEXICO CITY

REDTOP AEKICK

REFERENCE: LIMA 4446 (IN 34730)*

1. LEONOV DPOB AUGUST 1928, RYAZAN OBLAST. SUBJECT IS 170 CENTIMETERS TALL, SLENDER BUILD, BLOND HAIR, BLUE EYES. LEONOV IS VERY ATHLETIC AND HIS GENERAL FACIAL FEATURES AND BUILD ARE THOSE OF RICHARD WIDMARK, STEVE MCQUEEN, AND ALLAN LADD. HIS SPANISH IS FLUENT. HIS APPEARANCE IS NORDIC. OCCASIONALLY HIS LONG BLOND HAIR IS WORN IN CREW CUT STYLE.

2. LEONOV WILL BE SURVEILLANCE CONSCIOUS AND IS ADEPT IN COUNTERMEASURES.

3. POUCHING PHOTOGRAPHS PRIORITY WEEK 14 APRIL.

END OF MESSAGE

*HQS COMMENT: STATION REQUESTED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS PRIORITY TO FACILITATE SURVEILLANCE.

CSDO NOTE: TYPED AND RELEASED BY DIRECTION OF JOHN HORTON, DC/WH.

13 APR 69 ✓
201-132139

C/WH/3 AL SPERA (TELECOORD)

Cornelius G. McCauley
CORNELIUS MCCAULEY
CSDO
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

L.MESTRES
SB/XO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2 SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY 1 2 3 8 4 9 5 10
ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED CSDO BY: D AT 2200 Z	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO CLASSIFY TO FILE NO X-REF TO FILE NO	PRECEDENCE
DISSEM BY 21 PER #	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO	BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG
ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CS/DO, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2 CI/IC 2	
309		

S E C R E T 122205Z APR 69 CITE LIMA 4446

12 APR 69

IN-34730

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

REDTOP AEKICK

REF DIRECTOR 91937 (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY)

1. IN ORDER FACILITATE SURVIELLANCE KGB OFFICER, NOKOLAY SERGEYVICH LEONOV (201-132139) REQUEST DETAILED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION BY CABLE AND PHOTOS BY POUCH.

2. FILE: 201-132139.

S E C R E T

CS COPY

SECRET

12 APR 69 ✓

201-132139

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DIANA DAVIS
SB/X/WH
IT: 6412 1315
T: 11 APR 69
ATE:

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 33 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: SB 8 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 23 22 Z APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 91987

PRIORITY LIMA

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ACCORDING TO SENSITIVE HEADQUARTERS SOURCE, FRENCH DOUBLE ENTRY TRANSIT VISA GRANTED TO NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV WHO PLANS TRAVEL TO PERU DEPARTING MOSCOW 10 APRIL.

2. LEONOV IS SUBJECT OF 201-132139. HE WAS PREVIOUSLY PCS IN MEXICO FROM 1953 TO 1956 AS INTERPRETER AND AMBASSASDOR'S SECRETARY AND FROM 1961 TO 22 DECEMBER 1968 AS SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE. LEONOV IS KNOWN KGB AND HIGHLY EXPERIENCED OFFICER. HE WOULD BE WORTHY OF DISCREET UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE (IF IT DETERMINED PERUVIANS NOT FOLLOWING HIM.) IT QUITE ~~PROBABLE~~ POSSIBLE THAT LEONOV IS NOVOSTI CHIEF TO WHOM DULINDEN-8 WAS REFERRING.

RC

RC

3. FILE 201-132139.

END OF MESSAGE

MS

SB/X/WH L. MESTRE

SB/CI/O F. Walters

WH/3/P R.L. Conolly

C/WH/3 Spera

11 APR 69
201-132139

CS COPY

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

L. MESTRE
SB/XO

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, SB Division		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT REDTOP/AEKICK
○ Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LEONOV, his wife, Valeriya Ivanovna, and Daughter, Irina Nikolayevna, departed Mexico PCS on 22 December 1968. They travelled on Sabena Flight 556 with destination Moscow via Brussels. Upon his PCS departure, LEONOV completed seven and one half consecutive years on his second tour in Mexico.

c37388

2. LIFEAT and LIENVOY have reported that Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV (201-087222) is replacing Subject as the Soviet Press Attache. LEONOV held the title of Second Secretary. KUZNETSOV is a First Secretary.

3. Travelling with the LEONOV family on the same flight was Petr Fedotovich GORELOV (201-265458).

for Willard C. CURTIS

REC ... 12

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
② - C/SB
2 - C/WH

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-36147	31 December 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139

File: S.F. – KUZNETSOV

RA

DISPATCH

Leonov ✓

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION D.Ø
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
POA and Trace Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: (A) HMMW-15480, 4 May 1967

(B) MEXICO CITY 7743, 22 October 1968

1. We would appreciate receiving Headquarters traces on Identity, subsequent to the negative results per ref. (A), and a POA for contact and assessment. We are considering Identity as a possible access agent in the REDTOP field, specifically against Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139), known KGB, and his eventual replacement.

2. As Headquarters is aware, the Station maintains an active interest in LEONOV. Per ref. (B), he has been a principal contact and source of both funds and documents for Guatemalans travelling to the USSR and for Central American exiles, and he has also been linked repeatedly and prominently with the support activity provided to Latin American Communist parties.

3. Although LEONOV may depart before Identity can be used effectively against him, we feel certain that his replacement will be engaged in similar extra-Press Office activities of prime interest to us.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Identity Sheet, under separate cover

Distribution:
2 - C/WH, w/att. CS copy in 201-842977
2 - C/SB, w/att.

Leonov ✓

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-35828	14 November 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-

Separate Cover Attachment:

HMMA-35828, 14 November 68

IDENTITY SHEET

Identity: Rolando CABALLERO Pedraza (201-).

He has been an employee-messenger of the Soviet Press Office in Mexico City for several years. To supplement his salary, he took a job in November, 1966, as a salesman for Searle de Mexico, S.A., a pharmaceutical firm. Although he was considering resigning from the Press Office in May, 1968, to work for a higher salary in a detergent factory, he was still working in the Press Office as of September, 1968. As of July, 1966, he was married to Celia SILVA de Caballero and had two young daughters. He has several paramours, at least one of whom he has met regularly since 1966.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

201-770128
HMMA-35797
08 NOV 68
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
LEONOV 15-23-04 SOV PRESS ATTACHE HIS HOME AND OFFICE PHONE NO /KNOWN KGB/ MENTIONED IN DOC RE SILANTYEV, V. I. /201-770128/

R 6811290831

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

IN 18668

EXO

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

XXXXXX DIA NMCC/MC XXXXXXXXXX ARMY NAVY AIR CIA/NMCC XXXXXXXX SDO XXXXXXX

STATE/DIR NIC (HENDRICKSON ONLY) FBI D/NE DDI XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET

CITE TDCS DB-315/03882-68

DIST 24 OCTOBER 1968

COUNTRY GUATEMALA/MEXICO/USSR

4 21 36z OCT 68

DOI 18 OCTOBER 1968

24 21 35z OCT 68

SUBJECT IDENTITY OF SOVIET DIPLOMAT IN MEXICO CITY WHO SERVES AS INTERMEDIARY FOR GUATEMALANS IN TRANSIT TO THE USSR

ACQ GUATEMALA, GUATEMALA CITY (22 OCTOBER 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEMBER OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) WHO RECENTLY TRAVELLED TO MEXICO. HE HAS BEEN A RELIABLE REPORTER IN THE PAST. HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM A PGT TRAVELLER WHO TRANSITED MEXICO EN ROUTE TO THE USSR.

TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES
TO DIA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL
TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL MCCHRISTIAN;
NAVY ACNO (INTEL), ADMIRAL HARLFINGER;
AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS
TO NSA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER
TO FBI : FOR MR. S. J. PAPICH

SECRET (classification) NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY (dissem controls)

1. NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE IN MEXICO CITY, IS THE CONTACT MAN FOR GUATEMALANS IN TRANSIT FOR THE USSR. JOSE LUIS BALCARCEL ORDONEZ AND JOSE ALBERTO CARDOZA AGUILAR, EXILED MEMBERS OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) IN MEXICO CITY, SERVE AS LIAISON BETWEEN PGT TRAVELLERS AND LEONOV.

2. IF TRAVELLERS NEED TO CONTACT LEONOV ONLY TO FIRM UP TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, THEY ARE GIVEN AN IDENTIFICATION CARD BY BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA AND DROPPED OFF NEAR LEONOV'S OFFICE TO VISIT HIM ALONE. WHEN AN EXCHANGE OF MONEY OR DOCUMENTS IS INVOLVED, BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA GO TO LEONOV'S OFFICE WITH THE TRAVELLER. (SOURCE COMMENT: LATELY BALCARCEL'S WIFE HAS BEEN MAKING MOST OF THE CONTACTS WITH LEONOV AS AN ADDED SECURITY MEASURE.) LEONOV'S MOST RECENT CONTACT WITH GUATEMALANS WAS TO ARRANGE ONWARD TRAVEL FOR SIX PGT MEMBERS ENROUTE TO PARTY SCHOOLS IN MOSCOW. HE GAVE EACH ONE U.S.$600.00. (FIELD COMMENT: SEE HGG-4853, CS-311/09285-68 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THIS TRAVEL.)

3. LEONOV IS SOON TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM MEXICO CITY, BUT HIS REPLACEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO CARRY ON CONTACT WITH THE GUATEMALANS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: LEONOV IS A KNOWN KGB OFFICER WHO HAS BEEN IN

5
4
3
2
1

MEXICO SINCE 1961.) (SOURCE COMMENT: IT WOULD APPEAR AS IF LEONOV ALSO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTACTS WITH OTHER CENTRAL AMERICANS.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DOCUMENT
DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: 24962-601
SUBJECT: ENCOUNTER WITH SOVIET NATIONAL

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 49   TOTAL COPIES 28   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 76 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG:

ACTION
F WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO
FILE, VR, CI/IC 2, RI/AN, SB 8, FI 2, IW, CI, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 230031Z OCT 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY GUAT 9611

IN 18707
23 Oct 68

MEXICO CITY ~~SEC~~ INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT MHIGLOO

REF: MEXICO CITY 7743 (IN 18668)

1. STATION GUATEMALA CITY MOST INTERESTED IN REF INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY EXILE INVOLVEMENT IN PGT FUNDING CHANNEL, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE INFO DISSEMINATED, PROVIDED, OF COURSE, ADEQUATE PROTECTION CAN BE GIVEN LIREBEL-2.

2. IT SUGGESTED THAT NOTIONAL BYLINE (I.E., MEMBER OF PGT WHO TRAVELLED TO MEXICO CITY AND RECEIVED INFO FROM BALCARCEL)) AND FULL CONTROLS ON REPORT MAY PROVIDE NEEDED SOURCE PROTECTION. REQUEST ADDRESSEES' COMMENTS.

3. NO INDEX. FILE 201-132139.

S E C R E T

AN CW
PS
EX H
I/S/D
FI

MICROFILMED
NOV 13 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-132139

CS COPY

SECRET

201-132139

23 OCT 68
50-9-11

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4 2

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 21 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR. SB-8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI-2, DDP, AddP

#759

S E C R E T 222220Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7743

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

22 OCT 68 IN 18668

REDCOAT MHIGLOO

4

1. AT HOME OF JORGE ALBERTO CARDOZA AGUILAR EVENING 18 OCT 68, LIREBEL-2 RECEIVED FOLLOWING INFO DIRECTLY FROM CARDOZA.

2. JOSE LUIS BALCARCEL ORDONEZ AND JORGE ALBERTO CARDOZA AGUILAR ARE GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS IN MEXICO WHO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH SOVIETS IN MEXICO TO HANDLE TRAVEL OF GUATEMALANS TO SOVIET UNION AND FOR RECEIPT OF MONEY FROM SOVIETS. THEIR CONTACT IS NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139), PRESS ATTACHE WHO LIVES AT MAZATLAN 206 (PRESS OFFICE).

3. IF CONTACT REQUIRED FOR GUATEMALAN TRAVELLERS TO SOVIET UNION, BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA TAKE TRAVELLERS NEAR PRESS OFFICE IN CAR AND THEN GIVES THEM IDENTIFICATION CARD TO PRESENT TO LEONOVM THEY THEN VISIT OFFICE ALONE. IF CONTACT FOR RECEIPT OF MONEY OR EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS, BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA GO DIRECTLY TO PRESS OFFICE. LATELY, WIFE OF BALCARCEL HAS HAD MOST CONTACT WITH LEONOV AS EXTRA PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE.

4. ACCORDING CARDOZA, LEONOV TO BE TRANSFERRED SOON AND

201-132139

Leonov

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY______ AT____________Z

DISSEM BY__________PER_______#

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.__________

X-REF TO FILE NO.__________

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7743 S E C R E T

HIS REPLACEMENT WILL CARRY ON CONTACT WITH GUATEMALANS. CARDOZA SAID HE BELIEVES LEONOV PROBABLY CONTACT FOR ALL CENTRAL AMERICAN EXILES BUT HE NOT POSITIVE OF THIS. MOST RECENT CONTACT WAS TO ARRANGE TRAVEL FOR SIX GUATEMALANS WHO TO ATTEND CONSOMOL SCHOOL IN SOVIET UNION (SEE MEXICO CITY 7575). EACH GIVEN 600 DOLLARS FOR TRIP.

5. LEONOV IS KNOWN KGB OFFICER WHO HAS BEEN MAKING PLANS FOR TRANSFER AFTER BEING IN MEXICO SINCE 1961.

6. DUE SENSITIVITY OF SOURCE, REQUEST ABOVE INFO BE LIMITED TO WOFIRM ONLY AND NO DISSEMINATION.

7. NO INDEX. FILE 50-6-141/4, 35-4-100 AND 201-132139.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, SB via Chief, WH Division
REDTOP AEKICK
Vladimir Ivanovich Silantyev (201-770128)

Reference: Mexico City 6054 (IN 39508)

Forwarded under separate cover is a LNERGO report concerning Subject. Persons mentioned by surname on page six of the report are identified at Headquarters as the subjects of 201-205304, 201-132139, 201-763035 and 201-285412 respectively. Can the Station identify any of the other persons mentioned on pages five and six?

Ambrose T. RIBARICH

Attachment:
as stated u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City
w/attachments
u/s/c

24 OCT 1968

201-132139, 201-205304, 201-763035, 201-285412

HMMW-16779

16 October 1968

SECRET

201-770128

Internal Dist:
1 - 201-770128
1 - 201-205304
1 - 201-132139
1 - 201-763035
1 - 201-285412
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - SB/CI/K
1 - C/WH/1

SB/CI/K F. Walters rah 6991

C/SB/CI

SB/X/WH

C/WH/1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	WH	6	
2	BI	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	CI	10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. SEP 27 1 14 PM '68

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ACTION COPY BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION 5B8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN WH8 FI2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2

S E C R E T 262320Z SEP 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7359

26 SEP 68 IN 00477

M

DIRECTOR, INFO SAN JOSE

REDTOP

REF: A. SAN JOSE 0480 (IN 98375)

B. MEXICO CITY 7301 (IN 98545)

1. LIFEAT REPORTED KAREN ARMENOVICH KACHATUROV ARRIVED MEXICO 22 SEPTEMBER. WAS MET BY NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE.

2. FILE HEADQUARTERS 201.

S E C R E T

Leonov
201 file

SECRET

201-132139

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER ________

ACTION #765 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

26 SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE VR. RI/AN, SD 8, CA 5, CA/PROP, EUR 6, CI/OPS

CI/IC 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 281920Z AUG 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6949

RIO DE JANEIRO, RECIFE INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

28 Aug 68 IN 80609

M

REF: RECIFE 4670 (IN 79641)

1. ACCORDING LIENVOY 24 AUG 68, FRANCSICO JULIAO DE PAULA CONTACTED NICOLAY LEONOV THAT DATE AND REAFFIRMED HIS SOLIDARITY WITH THE SOVIETS IN REFERENCE TO THE CZECH SITUATIONS. HE THEN MENTIONED BOOK H E JUST FINISHED WHICH SHOULD BE PUBLISED END SEPTEMBER. HE HAS A COPY IN FRENCH WHICH HE WANTS TO GIVE TO LEONOV. BOOK IS TO BE PUBLISHED IN MEXICO, FRANCE, ITALY, GERMANY, SWEDEN. LEONOV MIGHT BE ABLE TO HAVE IT PUBLISHED IN SOVIET UNION.

2. PER REQUEST PARA THREE REF, STATION ATTEMPTING OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO ON BOOK. WILL ADVISE.

3. ABOVE MAY BE PASSED CONGEN.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-132139

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

BY ______ AT ______ Z

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

DISSEM BY 30 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN SBP CAS CA/PROP FI 2

415 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 CA/PEG DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 240016Z AUG 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6885

PRIORITY RIO DE JANEIRO INFO ROUTINE DIRECTOR 24 Aug 68 IN 77213

REDCOAT 4

1. ACCORDING LIENVOY 22 AUG 68, FRANCISCO JULIAO DE PAULA CONTACTED NICOLAY LEONOV, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE IN MEXICO, AND KGB AND DECLARED HIS SOLIDARITY WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO AND WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (APPARENTLY REFERRING TO CZECH SITUATION).

2. STATION PLANS INCLUDE THIS IN ROUNDUP OF LOCAL REACTIONS TO INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY THE SOVIET UNION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET 201-132139

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

2P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SB

INFO: Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP DIZTAG: Unconfirmed Report of Travel to Mexico of Oldrich NOVICKY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. It was first reported by the LITEMPO airport personnel (according to their list of passports photographed by them at the airport) that Oldrich NOVICKY was among the passengers arriving in Mexico from Havana on 7 June 1968, at 0958 hours. According to the LITEMPO list, he was the only Czech on the CUBANA flight.

2. However, the CUBANA manifest did not list NOVICKY's name; the only Czech on the manifest was:

F [illegible] bio data.

Frantisek PROCHAZKA

OCC Diplomatic Courier

Diplomatic Passport No. 3076

CIT: CSR

Δ CSR

Therefore, the LITEMPO film, accompanying the list, was checked carefully, and it was found that the only Czech passport actually photographed by LITEMPO was that of PROCHAZKA, (even though his name was not on their list).

3. The LIFIRE team was then queried (and showed a photograph of NOVICKY), and they responded that the only Czech they

.......continued

Distribution:
- ~~2~~ - C/SB
- 2 - C/WH

CS COPY

201-257691

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 200-8-34

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-35196

DATE: 7 August 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-257691

201-132139

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

recalled seeing arrive on the CUBANA flight was the courier PROCHAZKA; they could not recall having seen NOVICKY. LIENVOY reports during this period gave no indications of NOVICKY's presence here. LIHABIT-1 also reported that NOVICKY was not seen in the vicinity of the Czech Embassy.

4. Nevertheless, there are several mystifying aspects to the LITEMPO report. It is quite incredible that the LITEMPO airport team would know NOVICKY's name, and equally incredible that they could confuse this name with that of PROCHAZKA. They listed NOVICKY's full name, correctly spelled. Where then, if NOVICKY had not actually arrived, did they get his name?

5. Secondly, it is most unusual, and the only instance the Station can recall, for only one courier to make the trip to Mexico. They have always traveled here in pairs. (NOTE: It has been the case recently, however, for the couriers to travel to Mexico via Cuba and leave via Cuba, instead of traveling via Air France through New York, then to Havana, return to Mexico and depart Mexico via Air France again.) Further, PROCHAZKA's name is not on the list of known career couriers or audio technicians and sweepers of Book Dispatch 6423, dated 21 June 1968. A further curious departure from normal procedure was that according to LIENVOY (7 and 8 June 1968) reports, the courier PROCHAZKA did not stay at the Czech schoolhouse but at the Ambassador's residence. Per LIENVOY, and confirmed on the CUBANA manifest, PROCHAZKA departed Mexico on 10 June 1968, for Havana.

6. Finally, but quite possibly purely coincidental, there were two references to NOVICKY about the same time as his reported arrival. In one of the DISPERSE tapes, #351, in mid-June 1968, Oldrich STANCL (201-777862), in a rambling, slightly drunken speech, refers to ~~one Jirka~~ NOVICKY, as "his brother" (presumably referring to Oldrich NOVICKY). Another even more oblique reference, but again intriguing because of the timing, was a reference in a LIFEAT report dated 7 June 1968; a local ~~leftist~~ journalist, Jorge ROSALES Natividad in a conversation with Nikolai LEONOV (201-132139), the Soviet Press Officer, sometime before 1120 hours, said that he "had asked NOVICKI for an opinion on SIEMPRE" (a Mexican magazine). There was no further explanation of who "NOVICKI" was, but Station records indicate ROSALES Natividad had been a regular contact of Oldrich NOVICKY, during the latter's tour here as Press Attache of the Czech Embassy. Just prior to this reference to "NOVICKI", ROSALES had been talking to LEONOV about having gotten a lot of material from Cuba (for an article about Che GUEVARA). Does Headquarters have any information about a possible trip or assignment for NOVICKY in Cuba?

7. In summary, the Station does not know exactly how, or why, NOVICKY, a Czech intelligence officer, might have entered Mexico clandestinely, but believes it was possible.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

201-257691

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CU ~~ IED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26 RO ~~ NG AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) 2 GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	81	6	KR
2	WH	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	C/	10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X REF TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 5

S E C R E T 020057Z JUL 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6103

DIRECTOR

2 JUL 68 IN 41948

REDTOP

1. FERNINAND ROBERTOVICH GINNO (201-256876) ARRIVED MEXICO CITY 25 JUNE ON SABENA FLT 555. GINNO ACCOMPANIED BY NINE SOVIETS, WHO PER MAY 68 LICOZY-5 REPORT ARE HERE TO ATTEND THIRD INTERNATIONAL ENDOCRINOLOGY CONGRESS BEING HELD MEXICO.

2. LIENVOY REPORTED GINNO CALLED OLD FRIEND, NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (201-132139) ON 26 JUNE. TOLD LEONOV HE TRAVELLING TO LEON, GUANAJUATO ON 27 JUNE TO RETURN 5 JULY. WANTED TO GIVE SOMETHING TO LEONOV. GINNO ADDED THAT GROUP WILL DEPART MEXICO 7 JULY.

S E C R E T

BT

CS filed 201-726604 (GINNO)

SECRET

201-132139

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

ORIG: ROBERT BUCKMAN
UNIT: WH/3/C
EXT: 7271
DATE: 18 JUNE 1968

S E C R E T 33

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 43/50 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY INFO: FILE , VR SB8, CI, CI/OPS, DDP, ADDP
CAS, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

18 22 31z JUN 68 CITE DIRECTOR 09166

TO PRIORITY BOGOTA INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS

REDTOP AEASSAULT

REFS: A) BOGOTA 0123 (IN 32576)* NOT SENT CARACAS
B) DIRECTOR 04579** NOT SENT CARACAS
C) BOGOTA 0127 (IN 32609)*** NOT SENT MEXICO CITY

1. UPON RECONSIDERATION HQS FEELS THAT IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE IN TERMS OF GREATEST IMPACT TO SURFACE LEONOV CONNECTION WITHOUT PEG OF MAZATLAN ADDRESS. WITHOUT ADDRESS CONNECTION WOULD AT BEST BE TENUOUS.

2. IN VIEW REPERCUSSIONS FROM REF C LEAK CONSIDER IT INADVISABLE FOR TIME BEING TO CONTINUE EXPLOITATION ANY ASPECT PACHON CASE IN CARACAS. SP

3. FOR BOGOTA: PER REF C, HQS APPRECIATIVE NEED OF KEEPING EXPLOITATION UNATTRIBUTABLE AND KEEPING PRES. LLERAS' [redacted] NAME OUT OF IT. WILL CABLE ALL STATIONS TO REPLAY ONLY MATERIALS WHICH CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OVERT COLOMBIAN SOURCES. /41 SP

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1 Ernest J. [illegible]

COORD: SB/O/WH Jim Noland (telecord)
WH/3/V Keith Gardiner (draft)
WH/CA 2-P. 201-132139

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI[illegible]

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________ #________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pacc)

PAGE 2

CITE DIRECTOR 09166

TO

WH Comments: *Station will continue to attempt placement of Leonov's connection in case in Bogota press

**Advised Station Bogota of pitfalls of surfacing Leonov connection without Mazatlan address, but deferred to Station's judgment.

*** Leak of case in Caracas newspaper. Information sourced to "a high official of American Intelligence Service."

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera

ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chiefs of Station, Bogota and Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
AEASSAULT/Forwarding of Photographs on Nikolay Sereyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 08247

Forwarded herewith, for Bogota and Mexico, are seven photos of LEONOV.

James M. BEGLINGER

MICROFILMED
JUL 2 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachments: NO
Photos, h/w, for Bogota
Photos, h/w, ~~for Mexico~~
Negatives, h/w, ~~for Mexico~~

Distribution:
2 - Bogota
2 - Mexico City

201-132139

20 JUN 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D-17-4-135 CS COPY	HLBW-5907	17 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139

Distribution:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono

32 ABSTRACT INDEX FILES

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	L. Therry	sh	7271

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SB/O/WH		(in draft)
C/WH/1	17/6/68	Walter J. Kaufman

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	17 June 68	Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

TO: Mr. Scott

FROM: Deputy Chief of Mission

By hand please

1/4

Ambassador Freeman told me on 24 June that he used this for full discussion with Foreign Minister Antonio Carrillo Flores on 22 June 1968

SECRET

17 June 1968

Discussed with ACP 6/22/68

MEMORANDUM TO : THE AMBASSADOR

FROM : Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT : Soviet Participation in Colombian Subversive Activities

Returned 24 June 68

1. On the morning of 16 April 1968 our surveillance of Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, Soviet Press Attache and Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, who is a known KGB officer, determined that he had a clandestine meeting with a Latin American male. LEONOV passed a small bundle to this individual. We followed the Latin American to the Hotel Principal, Bolivar 29. Checks at the hotel revealed that he was registered at the hotel as Feliciano PACHON Chaconta, a Colombian citizen, and that a woman, Librada MORENO Leal, also a Colombian citizen, was registered in the same room with him. Airline checks revealed that PACHON arrived in Mexico City on 6 April 1968 and that MORENO arrived on 12 April 1968. Both came from Bogota. Checks with our representatives in Bogota showed that they were both important members of the (PCC) Communist Party of Colombia. Further checks revealed that PACHON and MORENO had air reservations for 20 April 1968 to return to Bogota on separate airlines. Our surveillance confirmed their departure from Mexico City on 20 April 1968 on separate flights.

2. We informed our representatives in Bogota who informed the Colombian Security Service. Both were picked up upon arrival in Bogota. PACHON was carrying $70,000 (U.S.) and MORENO was carrying $30,000 (U.S.).

3. Both couriers broke and provided considerable information, the most important of which is:

a. Identification of the entire clandestine leadership of the PCC and FARC.

b. FARC: personnel and plans.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

201-132139

c. One courier has made several trips to Mexico to receive money from the Soviets. The largest amount was $200,000 (U.S.) which he got from LEONOV in June 1967. The smallest amount received was $75,000 (U.S.).

d. The address and identification of the PCC clandestine printing press. The Colombians raided this installation and captured the operator plus false documents and passports, forging material, presses, etc. He talked and said that he had received 1 1/2 years of training in the USSR in forgery. All equipment and false passport blanks were supplied by the Soviets.

e. All clandestine support and direction to the PCC and FARC comes from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. The regular contact is Nikolay S. LEONOV. The chief referent for Communist Party matters in Latin America is Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

4. This whole affair has been personally very embarrasing to Colombian President LLERAS because he had just agreed to diplomatic relations with the USSR. (The new Soviet Ambassador to Colombia, Nikolay A. BELOUS, presented his credentials on 27 May 1968). LLERAS had already been criticized in the press, when it was learned after BELOUS had been accepted, that BELOUS had been declared Persona Non Grata in Argentina in 1958, for direct involvement in fomenting Communist inspired strikes. (COMMENT: In the official curriculum vitae which the Soviet Foreign Office sent to Colombia on BELOUS, his assignment in Argentina was omitted.) Although LLERAS ordered a forceful prosecution of this matter, he insisted that the blame be put on the Cubans rather than the Soviets in order to avoid personal embarrassment.

5. We have been covering LEONOV thoroughly because he is the principal KGB contact in Mexico for Communist Parties in other Latin American countries. He has been in Mexico for ten (10) years doing very little other than handling Communist Party matters.

6. One of the principal clandestine activities of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico is the support, direction and financing of Latin American Communist parties in those Latin American countries where the Soviets do not have diplomatic representation. The Soviets have diplomatic relations with only six (6) Latin American countries, namely, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina and Mexico. Thus, the importance of Mexico in this matter.

12,979

7. Please return this material to Room 521 for filing.

#12,979

Distribution:
Orig - THE AMBASSADOR
Mr. Scott

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ORIG: LEN THERRY:red
UNIT: WH/3/C
EXT: 7271
DATE: 14 JUNE 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 4 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 17-4-135

CONF: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR C/SB 5, C/CA 3, C/CI
DDP, ADDP, CS/DO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

14 15 10z JUN 68 CITE DIRECTOR 08247

TO BOGOTA INFO: MEXICO CITY
RYBAT AEASSAULT
REF: A. HLBA 10,698

B. MEXICO CITY 5893 (IN 29961)

1. CAN BOGOTA FORWARD ORIGINALS OF REF A LETTERS TO HQS. FOR POSSIBLE SW ANALYSIS?

2. HQS WILL POUCH SEVEN PHOTOS OF LEONOV 17 JUNE TO MEXICO AND BOGOTA. THESE INCLUDE TWO CLOSEUPS OF LEONOV (1964) AND FIVE OTHERS OF LEONOV WITH CASTRO AND KHRUSHCHEV. (1963)

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: SB/O/WH ~~[illegible] (by phone)~~

Calvin M. Smyth
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

Maurice J. Gremillion
MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

201-132139

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 49 PER

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-132139

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO SB/O/WH BRANCH ☒ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO: FILE, VR, CAS, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, DDP, ADDP, SB8, CSDO,

S E C R E T 130122Z JUNE '68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5893

(Mexi-5893)

PS	DEST	SB/C/WH
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

BOGOTA, INFO DIRECTOR

AEASSAULT

Nikolay S.

13 JUN 68 IN 28081

T

1. PASSPORT AND OTHER PHOTOS OF LEONOV DO NOT APPEAR SUITABLE. AIRMAILING NEGATIVE OF PRESS PHOTO OF LEONOV SCOWLING OVER SHOULDER OF YEVGENIY YEVTUSHENKO. IN PHOTO LEONOV APPEARS TO BE TRYING TO CONTROL YEVTUSHENKO AND LOOKS VERY SINISTER. BELIEVE THIS PHOTO WILL BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE FOR PRESS USE.

2. MEXICO STATION BELIEVES FROM PAST EXPERIENCE THAT ONCE LILISP-E PUBLISHERS ARTICLE REPORTING LEONOV INVOLVEMENT IN COLOMBIA SUBVERSIVE NET CASE, GOM WILL ISSUE ORDERS TO MEXICAN PRESS NOT TO PUBLISH ANY FURTHER ARTICLES ON THIS TOPIC. STATION THEREFORE IS HOLDING OFF ANY FURTHER PUBLICATION OF MATERIAL ON COLOMBIA SUBVERSION UNTIL IT CAN PUBLISH STORY OF LEONOV INVOLVEMENT. ONCE STORY PUBLISHED HERE STATION ASSET SIMONCINI WILL ALERT UPI CONTACT TO STORY IN ATTEMPT TO GET STORY RELAYED ON WIRE SERVICE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

13 June 68
201-132139

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH
201-132139 017-004-135
SEX M DOB ? BOGO-00096
11 JUN 68
CIT USSR ?
OCC ?
< MEXICO

HMM R 6807170475

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

CIT USSR
OCC ?
< MEXI
SOV PRESS ATT MECICO CITY

017-004-135
BOGO-00037
04 JUN 68

R 6807170479

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO
ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY: D AT: 0145 Z
DISSEM BY: 3 PER
ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11
SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-132139
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG
INFO FILE. VR. SB8, WH/COG8, CA5, CA/PROP, CA/PROP, CA/PEG, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CI/IC2, CI/OPS,

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 290050Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5719 Mexi

29 MAY 68 IN 20342

FS-1

C/SB/CS

ABSTRACT X INDEX

PRIORITY DIRECTOR PRIORITY BOGOTA

REDCOAT MHSHAWN AEASSAULT

REF: A. BOGOTA 0969 (IN 16602)

B. DIRECTOR 03594

1. ON BASIS AVENIDA MAZATLAN NOTATION THAT PACHON WAS CARRYING AND FACT NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (201-132139) LIVES AND HAS OFFICE AT AV. MAZATLAN 206 AND IS KNOWN KGB WHO HAS CLANDESTINELY SUPPORTED CP ACTIVITIES, STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT LEONOV BE IDENTIFIED AS THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT IN REF A WHO GAVE PACHON MONEY IN MEXICO.

2. BY SURFACING ADDRESS BOGOTA CAN TELL PRESS CONTACTS ADDRESS BELONGS TO LEONOV ON WHOM BOGOTA OBTAINED FOLLOWING TRACES: NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV DOB 22 AUGUST 1928 IS A KGB OFFICER WHO USES THE COVER OF SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE OF THE SOVEMB IN MEXICO. ALL OF HIS FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS HAVE BEEN IN MEXICO WHERE HE HAS SERVED A TOTAL OF TEN YEARS STARTING IN 1953. HE IS THE MASTERMIND FOR SOVIET CLANDESTINE SUPPORT, DIRECTION AND FINANCING OF CPS IN LATIN AMERICA.

3. FYI - LEONOV ABOUT TO LEAVE PCS AFTER SEVEN YEARS MEXICO ON CURRENT SERIES OF TOURS. IF BOGOTA CAN SURFACE HIM, MEXICO

action to SB/0/WH ✓ 29 MAY 68
201-132139

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: JAN 7 8 13 AM '68 Z

DISSEM BY: RECEIVED RID/EDI PER

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR,

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5719 SECRET

CAN PICK UP CONCURRENT WITH HIS DEPARTURE AND SAY HE BEING SENT HOME FOR POOR TRADECRAFT, UPSETTING CURRENT SOVIET DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE IN LA, ETC.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES COMMENTS.

SECRET

BT

JAN 10 68

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: (27)

SECRET

ORIG: TOM WHITE
UNIT: SB/O/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 27 MAY 68

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 3 PER

CONF. SB8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO SB/O/WH BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-132139 ✓

INFO: FILE, VR WH8, CA5, CA/PROP, CI/ICZ

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 03613

TO 28 19 01 Z MAY 68

MEXICO CITY INFO BOGOTA

REDTOP

AN [illegible]
PP [illegible]
SB/O/WH
ABSTRACT ✓
INDEX

REFS: A. BOGOTA 0978 (IN 18170)

B. DIRECTORX 00038

IN VIEW RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS AS REPORTED IN REF A, REQUEST STATION ALSO FORWARD TO BOGOTA PRESS CLIPS REQUESTED IN REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SB/O/WH
C/WH/1
C/WH/3/C
C/WH/3

27 MAY 68 ✓
201-132139

C/WH

DC/SB/AO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 41 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 41 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, SB 8, WH/COG 8, SOD 6, FI, FI/INT 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 241932Z MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0976 (KRUSKALL ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO: CARACAS MEXICO CITY

25 MAY 68

170

M

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

#183

MHSPAWN

PAGE 6 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)

BY DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN EFFORT TO PUT SOME BACKBONE IN PRESIDING JUDGES.

6. DEFER TO HQS TO FILL IN OTHER STATIONS ON BACKGROUND THIS CASE.

7. SINCE AS PER PARA 4 ABOVE STATION IS AWARE OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL REPERCUSSION WHICH 24 MAY EL TIEMPO ARTICLE MAY PRODUCE ON PRESIDENT, STATION IS KEEPING LNPURE CLOSELY INFORMED ON CASE AND HAS ALERTED REELFOOT AND OTHER STATION SOURCES WITH ACCESS TO PALACE TO KEEP US INFORMED ON LLERAS' REACTIONS.

8. CLIPS BEING SENT KMFORGET.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-132139

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES 47

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	FR	10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY 24/21 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, SB-8, FI, FI/INT-2, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, SOD-6

S E C R E T 241932Z MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 8978 (KRUSKALL ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO: CARACAS MEXICO CITY

SECTION ONE FOR TWO

24 MAY 68 IN 18170

MHSPAWN

REFS: BOGOTA 0969 (IN 16602)

1. FOLLOWING TWO DAYS OF DISTORTED, FUZZY, CONFLICTING ARTICLES APPEARING IN ALL BOGOTA DAILIES CONCERNING ROLL UP OF CLANDESTINE APPARAT OF PCC INCLUDING GRADUAL APPEARANCE OF PACHON AS A FACTOR IN CASE AND INSERTION OF THE UNCOVERING OF VAST LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSIVE NET INVOLVING COLOMBIA, BOLIVIA, MEXICO, VENEZUELA,, THE 24 MAY EL TIEMPO BROKE OUT WITH FOLLOWING HEADLINE: "LA RED SUBVERSIVA: EN MEXICO ENTREGARON LOS DOLARES A FELICIANO PACHON...ERAN 150,000 Y NO LOS 101,000 QUE LE HALLARON EN BOGOTA - PACHON CHOCONTA ES HERMANO DE 'RAPIDOL', JEFE DE LAS 'FARC', AL SUR DEL CAQUETA. EL CASO DEL VENEZOLANO JOSE MARIA QUERALES MERCHAN. -LA 'AVANZADE CHE GUEVARA' FUE DESEMBARCADA EN VENEZUELA Y EN LAS BOCAS DEL AMAZONAS".

2. ARTICLE GOES ON TO SAY "LA RED SUBVERSIVA DESENMASCARADA EN COLOMBIA ES APENAS PARTE DE UNA INMENSA CONJURA COMMUNISTA CON RAMIFICACIONES EN GRAN PARTE DE AMERICA LATINE...Y EN DESARROLLO DE UNA DE LAS CUALES

SECRET

201-132139

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
(When Filled In)

TOTAL COPIES
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 8978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)

FUE CONDENADO EL SUJETO FELICIANO PACHON CHOCONTA, A QUIEN AGENTES DEL DAS Y UNO DE INTERPOL DETUVIERON EN ELDORADO, DESPUES DE SEGUIRLO DESDE MEXICO, Y EN SU PODER HALLARON LA NO DESPRECIABLE SUMA DE 101,000 DOLARES GIRADOS CON DESTINO A LOS 'FRENTES REVOLUCIONARIOS DE COLOMBIA' SEGUN FUENTES DIGNAS DE TODO CREDITO, FELICIANO PACHON CHOCONTA CONFESO HABER RECIBIDO LA VALIOSA SUMA EN MEXICO DE MANOS DE UN FUNCIONARIO DE LA EMBAJADA SOVIETICA EN CUBA, Y QUIEN SE TRASLADO A LA CAPITAL AZETECA CON ESTE FIN..."HAY SIN EMBARGO EN ESTE CASO UN DETALLE CURIOSO Y ES QUE, DE ACUERDO CON ALGUNAS INFORMACIONES, FELICIANO RECIBIO DE MANOS DEL DIPLOMATICO LA SUMA DE 150,000 DOLARES. Y EN ELDORADO UNICAMENTE LE HALLARON 101,000. LOS 49,000 RESTANTES DESAPARECIERON 'MISTERIOSAMENTE". ALGUIEN DIJO QUE HABIAN IDO A PARAR A MANOS DE 'LOS TESOREROS DE LA REVOLUCION' AL PARECER EN PANAMA." LOS ABOGADOS DEFENSORES DE FELICIANO PACHON MANIFESTARON AYER PARA UN PERIODICO LOCAL QUE LO OCURRIDO A SU PODER ANTE NADA TIENE QUE VER CON LAS GUERRILLAS Y QUE SIMPLEMENTE 'DON FELICIANO LO QUE ESTABA

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT __________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 6978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)

ERA TRAYENDO DOLARES A PAIS'. PERO RESULTA QUE PACHON CHOCONTA ES HERMANO DE EDUARDO PACHON PRIETO, ALIAS 'RAPIDOL', UNO DE LOS MAS SOBRESALIENTES JEFES 'GUERRILLEROS' DEL GRUPO QUE OPERA AL SUR DEL CAQUETA (FARC) U QUE SIGUE LA LLAMADA 'LINEA DE MOSCU' Y PARA ESTE 'FRENTE' ESTABA DIRIGIDO EL DINERO ENTREGADO POR EL DIPLOMATICO SOVIETICO EN MEXICO, MIENTRAS LOS DOLARES QUE LLEGABAN POR VENEZUELA A TRAVES DE BOLIVIA TAL COMO AYER LO INFORMAMOS EN FORMA EXCLUSIVA, IBAN DIRIGIDOS PARA LOS ALZADOS EN ARMAS EN EL 'ALTO SINU' Y AL NORTE DE SANTANDER ESTABLECIENDOSE ASI UNA FUERTE RELACION ENTRE LOS CASOS DE FELICIANO PACHON Y EL DE LOS ARQUITECTOS CASAS Y TAPIA, QUE A LA VEZ SON APENAS ESLABONES DE LA MISMA CADENA QUE ENVUELVE A VENEZUELA, ECUADOR, PERU, BRASIL, Y BOLIVIA." ARTICLE GOES ON TO TIE RUSSIAN SHIP "KEGOSTROV" INTO TRANSPORTING A GROUP OF "GUERRILLEROS CASTRISTAS...PERTENECIENTES A UNA NUEVA UNIDAD DENOMINADA 'AVANZADA CHE GUEVARA'".

3. STATION THEREFORE HAS MORE THAN ENOUGH AMMUNITION TO KEEP PROP PLOY BOILING ALONG LINES THIS CASE DRAMATIC PROOF

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
(When Filled In)

TOTAL COPIES
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ________ AT: ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 4 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 SECRET (KRUSKALL ACTING)

SOVIETS HAVE NOT ONLY NOT CHANGED THEIR WAYS BUT HAVE NO INTENTION OF DOING SO AND FACT THAT ALSMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH BELOUS ARRIVING IN COLOMBIA, OOZING SWEETNESS AND GOOD FELLOWSHIP, STOUTLY DECLARING SOV GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVER INTERFERE IN INTERNAL COLOMBIAN AFFAIRS AND EMPHAZING THAT NO COUNTRY SHOULD EXPORT REVOLUTION OR COUNTER REVOLUTION, THAT SAME SOV GOVERNMENT WAS SECRETLY PUMPING IN FUNDS, MATERIAL SUPPORT, AND PRPAGANDA MATERIALS FOR SUBVERSIVE USE IN UNDERMINING COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT. TIMING MOST PROPITIOUS AS BELOUS PRESENTING CREDENTIALS AFTERNOON 24 MAY. PROP PLOY WILL ALSO HAVE SLANT THAT RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION MIGHT CONCEIVABLY PROVIDE USEFUL ECONOMIC DIVIDENDS BUT COUNTRIES PRESENTLY SO AFFILIATED PLUS THOSE CURRENTLY CONTEMPLATING SUCCUMBING TO SOVIET WOOING BEST BEWARE THAT BEAR BEARING GIFTS SINCE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF SOVIET RELATIONS IS EXPORT OF SUBVERSION, NOT GOODS AND MATERIALS AND COLOMBIA IS ALREADY EXCELLENT CASE IN POINT.

4. ANY PROP PLAY THAT CAN BE GENERATED ALONG LINES PARA 3 MOST WELCOME. BOGOTA STATION CAUTIONS AGAINST

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **SECRET** *(When Filled In)*	TOTAL COPIES GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY 3 8 4 9 5 10 6 7
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO CLASSIFY TO FILE NO X-REF TO FILE NO.		
BY AT DISSEM BY PER	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO	BRANCH ☐	DESTROY ☐ SIG
ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE. VR		

PAGE 5 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 SECRET (KRUSKALL ACTING)

ATTACKING OR ACCUSING PRESIDENT LLERAS PERSONALLY HOWEVER SINCE HE REACTS UNPREDICATABLY AND SOMETIME RASHLY TO PERSONAL CRITICISM. THEREFORE REQUEST THAT COLOMBIAN PERSONALITIES BE KEPT OUT OF ANY PROP PLAY SINCE CURRENT SITUATION INEVITABLY WILL PRESENT LLERAS WITH EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND EMBARRASSING POLITICAL PILL TO SWALLOW AS WELL AS CREATE AN INTERNAL COLOMBIAN POLITICAL RHUBARB INVOLVING LLERAS GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY, AND THE OSPINISTAS. POSSIBLE RESULTS FROM SUCH A SITUATION COULD INVOLVE DISMISSAL OF GISOY-92 FOR PERMITTING STORY BE BREAK IN ALL ITS GLORY AND STATION WANTS TO MINIMIZE PERSONAL REPERCUSSIONS, SINCE ON~~E~~C ST~~RO~~ORY STARTED LEAKING, STATION URGED GISOY-92 TO RELEASE AS FACTUAL A PRESENTATION AS POSSIBLE. WHETHER OR NOT STATION RECOMMENDATIONS HAD ANY WEIGHT IN PRODUCING WIDE-SCALE PUBLICITY, STATION COULD WELL BE MADE SCAPEGOAT BY LLERAS AND GISOY-92.

5. STATION ALSO MOVING TO HAVE VARIOUS PRESTIGIOUS LOCAL ATTORNEYS COME OUT WITH STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY TRIALS AND REFUTATIONS OF INANE POINTS BEING MADE

SECRET

BT

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Bogota

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT Forwarding of Documents of Correspondence between Carlos A. BONILLA and Nicolay Sergeyevech LEONOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 99758, 14 May 1968

Action Required: For Information

Forwarded herewith are copies of documents relating to an exchange of correspondence between Carlos A. BONILLA Sanchez (201-273728) and the Soviet press attache in Mexico City, Nicolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139). The Station may wish to look into this relationship, possibly through GI[illegible]OR-10.

James M. BEGLINGER

Attachment: documents, h/w

[illegible] 201-273728

Distribution:
2 - Bogota

201-132139
20 MAY 1969 Leonov

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-132139	HLBW - 5869	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-273728

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
O REDTOP/Headquarters Request for Press Clippings

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 00038, 16 May 1968

1. Transmitted herewith are the press clippings described below. The Station has no record that the clips requested in Paragraph (5) of reference were ever received; though MONTERREY 0766 of 4 November 1963 stated clips were being pouched, a check of Station records does not reveal a transmittal dispatch.

2. In response to Reference Paragraph (3) request, only the Ultimas Noticias article was located. The original clip is forwarded as Attachment A. It will be noted that according to MEXICO CITY 4814 dated 1 June 1963, this is the same article as that appearing on the same date in Atisbos.

3. The article requested in Reference Paragraph (4) is forwarded as Attachment B, in copy, since the original was not in our files. It was Station inspired.

4. The clip requested in Reference Paragraph (6) is also forwarded in the original as Attachment C. This was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMYA-2032 (received HMYA-032) of 5 December 1963.

5. The Station is unable at this time to come up with additional information to support future exploitation, but will be on the lookout for material that may be of use.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
Press Clippings, A,B,&C.

Distribution:
1 ~~2~~ - C/SB, w/atts.
2 - C/WH, w/o/atts.

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

3 Atts. h/w

CS COPY

201-132139 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34693	20 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139

14-00000

(A)

Últimas de Noticias
PRIMERA EDICION EXCELSIOR DIARIO DE MEDIODIA
MEXICO, D. F.—VIERNES 31 DE MAYO DE 1963
GERENTE GENERAL
J. JESUS GARCIA

México en los Planes de Castro y Krushchev



EN ESTA FOTO, tomada en la URSS, durante la actual visita de Fidel Castro, puede verse en el extremo izquierdo al tercer secretario y agregado cultural de la embajada soviética en México, Sergeyevic Lenov Nikolai, en animada charla con Castro Ruz y Krushchev. Discutieron la agitación en Iberoamérica, alentada desde Cuba y México.

Huyó Aniceto del Valle, que Estuvo Allegado a Castro Ruz

Dice que se Planea la Agitación Continental Desde Cuba y México

Aniceto del Valle, uno de los más conocidos abogados de La Habana y que hasta hace veinte días parecía ser un simpatizador de Castro (ahora se ha exiliado) declaró anoche, antes de salir para Panamá, que la Unión Soviética prepara un plan subversivo para los países de la América Central, especialmente.

Según Del Valle, "Cuba será la cabeza de playa visible y México el centro distribuidor de armas de marcas mexicanas y norteamericanas".

El abogado aseguró que él obtuvo esta información en el Departamento de Asuntos Latinoamericanos del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba en donde tiene muchos amigos.

Dos "hombres-clave" son los más importantes para realizar el plan, según Del Valle: Sergeyevic Leonov Nikolai, tercer secretario de la embajada rusa en México y agregado cultural de la misma embajada; y el capitán mexicano Lorenzo Cárdenas Barajas, el encargado de comprar armas y el encargado de entregarlas a Nikolai, que es el distribuidor.

De estas dos personas se habla (dice Del Valle) en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Fidel Castro, como de los más importantes a los complotistas centroamericanos.

SIGUE EN LA PAGINA TRES

HUYO ANICETO DEL CALLE, QUE ESTUVO ALLEGADO

Sigue de la primera plana

Por otra parte, afirmó que Nikolai salió de México el 21 de abril de este año rumbo a la URSS para que su llegada a Rusia coincidiera con la llegada de Castro a Moscú. Así, Nikolai participó en las reuniones de Castro y Krushchev. Para el caso afirmó que Nikolai apareció fotografiado junto con Castro y Krushchev en el periódico "El Mundo" de La Habana. El periódico es del 8 de este mes y la foto se encuentra en la página 8.

(B)

Excelsior, Mexico City
26 March 65

Lee Oswald en México

Por ALBERTO WILLIAMS

HACE poco se exhibió en un bonito salón de cine de la ciudad de México, una película que a quienes sómos admiradores del Presidente asesinado de los Estados Unidos, nos interesó y nos conmovió en alto grado. Era un filme muy realista, basado en la vida y la muerte del insigne estadista que supo ganarse el cariño y la admiración de todo el mundo. Se llama la película "Años de Relámpago, día de Tambores". Para la mayoría del público ese filme, no importa hasta qué grado haya despertado su interés, sólo significó un filme más acerca de John F. Kennedy.

Para nosotros los periodistas representó mucho más de eso, porque nos recordó [illegible] tragedia de Dallas y depertó nuevamente nuestra curiosidad respecto al asesino Lee Oswald y su visita a México en septiembre de 1963. Pensamos que tiene importancia el recordar a las personas con quienes tuvo tratos el asesino durante su permanencia en nuestra capital.

Aunque suele dudarse de la exactitud del informe rendido por la Comisión Warren acerca de sus investigaciones en torno a ese doloroso crimen, anotamos que ese reporte hace saber que Oswald visitó en la ciudad de México la embajada de Cuba comunista y la de la Unión Soviética. Como miembro activo que era de una organización llamada "Juego Limpio para Cuba en los Estados Unidos", ya se imaginarán los lectores que era bien conocido del presonal de la embajada de la Cuba comunista en México.

No se ha llegado a saber con seguridad los términos de la conversación que sostuvieron Lee Oswald y los rojos cubanos; pero es un dato seguro que Oswald salió de la embajada de Castro y se dirigió a la de la Unión Soviética, donde ya era conocido por los muchos años que pasó Oswald en el paraíso soviético. En esa misión diplomática sostuvo largas conversaciones con dos agentes rusos de la KGV, famosa agencia policíaca secreta cuya principal misión es dirigir campañas de terror y subversión desde puestos diplomáticos que simuladamente les asigna el Gobierno de Moscú para que actúen protegidos por un derecho internacional mal aplicado.

Diremos de paso que ese arreglo desleal de las cosas, que hace aparecer a la Unión Soviética como país amigo, en tanto que sus representantes diplomáticos asestan puñaladas traperas al país que no sabe defenderse, facilita el que los agentes rusos enviados a países pacíficos como México, sean muchos y que cada embajada soviética disponga de un personal tan numeroso, que aquello no es un misión diplomática, sino una verdadera inmigración de rojillos.

Lee Oswald tuvo tratos con los agentes secretos Pavel Yatskov y Valery Kostikov. Estos "diplomáticos" de la KGV están todavía en servicio. El primero aparece como segundo secretario de la embajada rusa en la ciudad de México. Kostikov figura como "agregado" de la misma embajada. Este diplomático tiene fama de representar en forma destacada la escuela antigua de accion de la KGV. Es de carácter frío, brusco y de poco refinamiento. Muestra poco respeto para sus compañeros soviéticos y menos todavía para los mexicanos en general.

Yatskov, en cambio, es el ejemplo moderno de los agentes secretos graduados por aquella institución de espionaje. Cortés, atento, no expresa nunca críticas de México y de los mexicanos, como suele hacerlo su compañero Kostikov. Pero ambos son agentes activos y de mucha confianza de la KGV en nuestro país. Los dos son personajes de cuidado, a quienes sin duda vigilan de cerca las autoridades para impedir que repitan el caso de otro esbirro soviético, Nikolai S. Leonov, que hace unos dos años estuvo dedicado por el Gobierno de Moscú a meter de contrabando armas de la Cuba castrista en los pacíficos países de la América Latina.

Nikolai S. Lenov, que vive y trabaja en la ciudad de México, dirige y realiza un amplio programa de distribución de impresos subversivos en la República, en Centroamérica y en la parte septentrional de la América del Sur. ¡Hay impresos que son más terribles que las armas y los pertrechos!

---

su discurso,
y luego, con
"Querem
de Alabama,
en marcha y
haga retroce
King enc
manda negra
la brutalidad

ORTIZ MEN
ANTE LOS

Sigue de la

por el crecim
sión privada,
estancada de
decenio.

A continua
Ortiz Mena
siguientes 17
en materia e
ciera que p
men durante

1—Logr
real del ingr
seis por cier
1970.

2—Crear u
trocientos m
rales al año.

SE MANTE
EL TIPO D

3—Manten
tipo de cam
4—Asegur
de los precio
5—Comple
llo y la est
más equitati
ingreso que
metas ingent
cial y crear
adicional qu
pansión econ
6—Promov
dinámico ent
agropecuaria
entre la expl
servación de
turales, entr
producción d
rrespondiente
tre las activ
les y los al
maetrias pri
transportes
distribución.
7—Propici
dientes a qu
tribuya a r
mas del can
8—Fomen
sica median
de la inici
del Estado
9—Com
regionale
ción inte
10

Estado de la Nación

H/W att #2 to HMMA-34693 CS COPY.

201-132139

14-00000

MUNDO MEJOR (C)

México D. F., 7 de Diciembre de 1963.

EN NUEVO LEON

Piden al Gobernador Meta en Cintura a los Rojos

Agentes Castristas, "Diplomáticos" Rusos y Rojos Criollos se Mueven en Monterrey, como Peces en el Agua.

DESCARADAMENTE, los agentes castristas que agitan en la Universidad de Nuevo León solicitan apoyo de los mexicanos para "las fuerzas armadas de Liberación Nacional en Venezuela" en tanto que los marxistas hechos fuertes en el "Instituto de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso", sección Monterrey, también abiertamente realizan labor de proselitismo entre el estudiantado, los obreros y otros fuertes núcleos ciudadanos.

En el número anterior, MUNDO MEJOR denunció que esos mismos "agentes castristas pretenden hacer un congreso comunista en Monterrey en complicidad con los rojos criollos, con intención de crear en esa ciudad el primer "Campamento Juvenil por la Paz y una Vida Mejor", uno de tantos señuelos de los rojos para engañar a la juventud mexicana". Nuestro periódico también dio cuenta de la propaganda abiertamente marxista que en favor de los rojos de Venezuela fijado y repartido por toda la ciudad los agitadores comunistas. He aquí las leyendas de algunos de esos carteles y volantes:

"Venezuela en armas. Hacer la patria libre, morir por Venezuela. Las fuerzas armadas de Liberación Nacional libran en estos momentos una lucha decisiva contra el imperialismo norteamericano y la pandilla entreguista y traidora de R. Betancourt. ¡Solidaridad con el pueblo venezolano! ¡Viva la revolución de América Latina! (Leyenda alrededor de una paloma que empuña un fusil que sirve como asta a una bandera tricolor en cuyo centro se leen las iniciales: FALN —Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional).

"Venezuela adelante en la revolución antiimperialista. Los pueblos de América Latina están contigo! Juventud Comunista de Nuevo León".

"Los monopolios yanquis saquean las riquezas de América y nos hunden en la miseria y explotación. Apoyemos a un pueblo hermano que lucha heroicamente por liberarse: ¡Venezuela! ¡Adelante, los obreros, campesinos y estudiantes de toda América están contigo, pueblo hermano! ¡Vivan las F. A. L. N.: Juventud Comunista de Nuevo León".

EL GOBERNADOR YA ESTA ADVERTIDO

Por otra parte, una muestra de la propaganda marxista que se incuba en el llamado Instituto de Intercambio Cultural (???) Mexicano-Ruso de Monterrey es


VENEZUELA EN ARMAS
FALN
HACER LA PATRIA LIBRE
MORIR POR VENEZUELA
LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION NACIONAL LIBRAN EN ESTOS MOMENTOS UNA LUCHA DECISIVA CONTRA EL IMPERIALISMO NORTEAMERICANO Y LA PANDILLA ENTREGUISTA Y TRAIDORA DE R. BETANCOURT.
¡SOLIDARIDAD CON EL PUEBLO VENEZOLANO!
¡VIVA LA REVOLUCION DE AMERICA LATINA!

Uno de los volantes que han pegado en los muros de la ciudad de Monterrey agentes castristas y rojos criollos que agitan en la Universidad de Nuevo León. Asimismo, una "invitación" a estudiantes, obreros y campesinos del "Instituto de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso" de Monterrey a asistir "con su apreciable familia" a un acto en apoyo de las fuerzas comunistas de Liberación Nacional en América.

esta invitación: "El próximo viernes... en el local de nuestro Instituto, el Honorable Agregado Auxiliar de la Embajada de la URSS en la República de México, señor Nikolay Sergeyevich Leonov, disertará sobre el papel de la URSS en la lucha por la liberación nacional y las revoluciones populares de la América Latina.

Nos permitimos invitar a usted y a su apreciable familia, así como a sus amistades, y esperamos tener el gusto de verlo entre nosotros. La Directiva".

Por supuesto que el gobernador del Estado, Lic. Eduardo Li-Eduardo Livas Villarreal, ya tiene en su poder las denuncias y protestas contra esta situación por parte de más de 50 profesionistas —como también informó MUNDO MEJOR en su número anterior—, por los padres de familia y numerosos organismos de todo tipo, por lo que toca a ese mandatario tomar las medidas en forma energica con los alborotadores rojos, tal como el pueblo de Sabinas hace unos meses los arrojó de sus límites.

CS COPY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 3 PER ______ #

ACTION SB8 ☒ RID COPY

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-132139

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO 5 B/ u/WH BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE. VR. WH8, CA, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, CI/IC2, CAS, CA/PROP

NG AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	WH	6	CA
2	CI	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	RR	10	

temp cy - KI cy
sent 21 may

SECRET 161828Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5583

DIRECTOR

ACTION

16 MAY 68 IN 12506

REDTOP

REF: DIRECTOR 99929

1. LISADDLE-2 DID NOT REOPEN CHANNEL TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE NOR DID HE MAKE EFFORT TO DO SO. HE CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NEVER VALID EXCUSE OR OPPORTUNITY.

2. STATION SKEPTICAL ABOUT INFO IN PARAS FOUR AND FIVE OF HMMA-31117, 19 JANUARY 1967, DUE FACT ALLEGED VISITS TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE TOOK PLACE SOMETIME BEFORE HE REPORTED INCIDENT TO STATION, AND HIS PROVEN FABRICATION OF INFO IN OCTOBER 1967. ON OTHER HAND, EXCEPT FOR OCTOBER 1967 FABRICATION DURING PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO CIUDAD JUAREZ, HIS INFO BELIEVED BE RELIABLE. IN MANY CASES STATION WAS ABLE CHECK THROUGH OTHER SOURCES, AND ON STILL MANY OTHER OCCASIONS HIS INFO VERIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND PRESS.

SECRET

BT

tom ✓

File in Leonan 201

SECRET

201-132139

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ORIG: LEN THERRY:MLD
UNIT: WH/3/COLOMBIA
EXT: 7271
DATE: 14 MAY 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-273728
x 201-132139

CONF: WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN, SB 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI
CI/OA

SECRET Ma 14 22 07 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 99758

TO BOGOTA

[redacted] REDCOAT

REFERENCES:
A. BOGOTA 0735 (IN 88470)
B. BOGOTA 5109 (IN 33580) 1 DEC 64
C. HMMA 30130, 26 SEPT 66
D. HMMA 33295, 17 OCT 67

STATION MAY WISH TO LOOK INTO TIE-IN OF GITEMBLOR-15 (201-273728) WITH SUBJ (201-132139). AS HAVING POSSIBLE CONNECTION WITH REF A. REFS C & D INDICATE HE HAS BEEN IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH 201-132139 IN MEXICO CITY SINCE AT LEAST 1964. REF B REPORTED THAT GITEMBLOR-15 HAD LEFT BOGOTA FOR MEXICO ON 26 NOVEMBER 1964. REF C NOTED THAT SUBJ 201-132139 WAS ALSO IN MEXICO CITY AT THIS TIME, AND THAT FROM A LETTER INTERCEPT IT APPEARED THAT GITEMBLOR-15 KNEW SUBJ AND HIS FAMILY PERSONALLY. MOST RECENT INDICATION OF THEIR CORRESPONDENCE IS A LETTER FROM MEXICO TO BOGOTA FORWARDED WITH REF D. WE WILL POUCH COPIES OF REFS B & C.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH Lee Mestres (by phone)

CONTINUED

201-132139

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

TW

ORIG: TOM WHITE
UNIT: SB/O/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 14 MAY 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: V

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 2 PER #

CONF. SB 8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO SB/O/WH BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-132139

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

SECRET Ma 15 17 30 Z CITE DIRECTOR 99929

TO MEXICO CITY

AB/	~~2~~	
~~2~~	~~[illegible]~~	SB/O/WH
ABSTRACT ✓		INDEX

REDTOP

REF: HMMA 31117, 19 JANUARY 67

1. PARAS 4 AND 5 OF REF RELATE ALLEGED VISITS BY LISADDLE/2 (FORMERLY LISATURN/1) 201-809883 TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE WHERE LISADDLE/2 SUPPOSEDLY RECEIVED SOME MONEY FROM VARIOUS SOVIETS. PARA 6 OF REF INDICATES LISADDLE/2 DIRECTED TO REOPEN THE CHANNEL TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE. FILE DOES NOT REFLECT ANY FURTHER ACTION ON ABOVE. REQUEST STATIONS COMMENTS RE ACTION SUBSEQUENT TO ABOVE.

2. IN VIEW OF LATER DISCOVERY OF LISADDLE/2'S UNTRUSTWORTHINESS, REQUEST STATIONS COMMENTS RE VERACITY OF INFO IN PARAS 4 AND 5 OF REF.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SB/O/WH nolan

C/WH/1 [illegible] Kaufman

for C/WH Calvin M. Smyth

CO DC/SB/AO

15 May 68

201-132139

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO. 824

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ORIG: TOM WHITE
UNIT: SB/O/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 13 MAY 68

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 80 PER

CONF: SB8 ☑ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO SB/C/WH BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-132139

INFO: FILE, VR WH8 CI/ICZ CAS CI/PROP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic

SECRET 15 20 10 Z CITE DIRECTOR 00038

TO MEXICO CITY

REDTOP

AN/	FI	
ES 0	[illegible]	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 5455 (IN 03860)

B. MEXICO CITY ~~[illegible]~~ 4814, 1 JUNE 63

C. MONTERREY 0766, 4 NOVEMBER 63

D. HMYA 2032, 5 DECEMBER 63

1. REVIEW OF FILE, SUBJECT OF REF A, DISCLOSES CONSIDERABLE PRESS PLAY RE SUBJECT'S CONTACTS IN MEXICO ALTHOUGH SOME BACKUP MATERIAL MISSING FROM FILE. FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE EXPLOITATION REQUEST STATION FORWARD MATERIAL CITED BELOW AND ANY COMMENTS OR ADDITIONAL INFO STATION MAY HAVE RELATIVE THERETO.

2. SUBJECT'S PERSONAL CARD (PLANTED) FOUND IN ADDRESS BOOK OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ WHEN LATTER ARRESTED 21 JUNE 56 BY MEXICAN POLICE AND THIS FACT APPARENTLY PLAYED UP IN PRESS AT TIME. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIPS OF PRESS ARTICLE.

3. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIPS OF PRESS ARTICLES REFERRED TO IN PARAS 2 AND X 5 OF REF B.

15 May 68
201-132139 ✓

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO. 804

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE: JUN 3 10 35 AM '68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY RECEIVED RID/EDI PER #
CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO 2 30 PM '68 BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
INFO:
FILE , VR .

PAGE TWO

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 00038

TO

4. ON 26 MARCH 65 ARTICLE APPEARED IN "EXCELSIOR" UNDER TITLE "LEE OSWALD EN MEXICO." ARTICLE WRITTEN UNDER BYLINE "ALBERTO WILLIAMS" AND APPARENTLY STATION INSPIRED. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIP OF ARTICLE.

5. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIPS OF PRESS ARTICLES REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF REF C AND PARA 2 OF REF C IF LATTER EVER CONSUMATED.

6. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIP OF PRESS ARTICLE REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF REF D.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SB/O/WH
C/WH/1

C/WH

DC/SB/AO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

5 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SB

Chief, WH

SUBJECT : Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, KGB Officer Possibly Linked to PACHON Case in Colombia

1. BACKGROUND:

Feliciano PACHON Chaconta is the Colombian Communist courier apprehended by Colombian security officials in late April 1968 when alighting from a commercial flight from Mexico with U.S.$80,000 apparently destined for the Communist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Military Arm of Orthodox Communist Party - FARC). A female cohort of PACHON was picked up several hours later alighting from a second aircraft with U.S.$20,000. Both arrests were based on a tipoff by another Colombian Communist, Adelmo URREA Garcia, whose motives are as yet unclear. URREA who first claimed that the funds were of Cuban origin later changed his story to the effect that they are in fact Soviet. Subsequent interrogation of PACHON, URREA, and the female courier has failed to shed further light on either story.

2. However, a re-examination of PACHON's suitcase turned up a compartment in which were found several cryptic notes, including a reference to Avenida Mazatlan. Mexico City 5455 (IN 03860) reports Avenida Mazatlan 206 to be the address of the Soviet Press Office, and Soviet Press Attache Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139) to be a KGB officer, known to have handled CP operations in the past.

3. A review of LEONOV's file reveals the following possibly significant information, when related to the PACHON case:

a. 1956: Subject's personal calling card was found in an address book taken from Fidel CASTRO Rus when Fidel was arrested by Mexican police on 21 June 1956 in Mexico City. (See MEXICO CITY 6839, 27 June 1956, IN 35556.) This event was apparently reported in the Mexican press but the file does not contain a copy nor the date of publication, and there is some indication that the card may have been a plant. (See HMMW 10265, 24 Nov 61.)

NOTE:
CARD WAS
DEFINITELY
PLANTED BY
LIVESTOCK-2.
This was discovered
by the Station much
later.

SECRET

201-132139

b. 1963: April. Subject was Fidel Castro's interpreter during the latter's tour of the Soviet Union. The file contains many photos of the two with all the big-wigs of the USSR. The event was reported in El Mundo with a picture of Subject, Fidel, etc. on 8 May 63.

c. 1963: May. Subject was observed in a meeting with a former Mexican army captain Lorenzo CARDENAS Barajas who was supposed to be an arms smuggler to the Guatemala guerillas. A Station inspired article appeared in the 31 May 63 edition of Atisbos, Mexican newspaper, accused Subject and Cardenas of being the key figures in Central American revolution plans. The source of the information was attributed to a former lawyer exiled from Cuba. The article was picked up and played in the 31 May 63 edition of Ultimas Noticias. A photo copy of the article is in Vol. 3 of Subject's file attached to HMMA 33295, 18 Oct 63.

d. 1964: A letter was obtained through LIMUD addressed to Subject from Carlos A. BONILLA S. (201-275728). The letter indicated that the two were apparent close friends. Bonilla at that time was the president of the Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca (FTC) and a leading Colombian Communist. (See HMMA 30130, 26 Sept 66 and HLBA 5415, 7 Oct 66.)

e. 1966: Subject was reported as being a close friend of Bernardo LEMUS Mendoza (201-91575) since 1955. LEMUS was at one time a prominent Guatemala communist, on Central Committee. Subject was also reported as being in contact with Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana, also a prominent Guatemalan communist who is now dead, during January 62 (201-737506).

f. 1967: Soviet Press Office, where Subject also lives, was used as a payoff point for funds given to support the Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democraticas which organization is controlled by the Communist Party of Mexico. Subject was not the contact man for the funds. (See HMMA 31117, 19 Jan 67.)

g. HMMA 33215, 5 Oct 67, gives a rundown on other contacts of Subject with Guatemalan communists or guerillas.

4. LEONOV was in Mexico from July 1953 to October 1956, as Secretary to the Ambassador, and returned in July 1961 as a Third Secretary and Assistant Cultural Attache. He has served since October 1964 as Second Secretary and Press Attache.

James B. Noland
C/SB/O/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, SB Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT REDTOP
Yuliy Mikhaylovich VORONTSOV (201-113626)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : MEXICO CITY 5269

1. LIFIRE reported Subject's arrival in Mexico City on 9 April 1968 aboard PAA Flight 501. According to LIENVOY Subject departed Mexico City for Washington, D.C. on 13 April 1968.

2. The reason for Subject's trip to Mexico City is unknown. LIFEAT reported that Subject was in contact with Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139), Soviet Press Attache and known KGB officer. Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA described Subject as being "a husband of her friend, visiting from Washington". LEONOVA on another occasion stated that her husband was quite busy with a visitor and mentioned Subject by name. LIFEAT also reported that Subject was a guest at the LEONOV's house on 10 April.

3. LILYRIC reported that Subject visited the Soviet Embassy on 11 April 1968. He was seen arriving at 0953 hours in a car driven by Soviet Embassy chauffeur, Viktor Petrovich STRIZHOV (201-779301). It is not known with whom Subject had contact while at the Soviet Embassy. He left the Embassy at 1240 hours.

.......continued

Attachments:
- #1 - Legal Attache Memo
- #2 - Station Memo
- #3 - Photos

Distribution:
- 2 - C/SB, w/atts. 1, 2, &3
- 2 - C/WH, w/atts. 1 & 2 only

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

R. 201-132139

201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-34575	DATE 2 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-113626

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-34575

4. On 26 April 1968 the Legal Attache in Mexico City requested information concerning Subject's visit to Mexico City and to Brazil. Attached is a copy of this memorandum. Forwarded also is our answer to the Legal Attache, in which your attention is called to Paragraph 5. We leave it to Headquarters discretion on the dissemination of any further information on Subject, particularly that contained in RIO DE JANEIRO 5932 concerning Subject's request for a Brazilian visa.

5. Forwarded herewith for Chief, SB are photographs of Subject as obtained through LILYRIC.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

1P

DISPATCH

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		X MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, SB Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
REDTOP - Personality Sketch on 201-132139

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-33215, 5 October 1967

1. Transmitted herewith is a personality sketch prepared by LIFEAT transcriber Carol K. ZINSMEISTER on Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139), Soviet Second Secretary and Press Attaché in Mexico.

CIT A MEXICO

2. Of the three persons mentioned in the sketch with whom LEONOV appears to be in clandestine contact, the only one identifiable is Juan *REJANO (Parras), 201-109935. He is a Spanish Communist, one of the leaders of the Spanish Communist Party in Mexico, with close ties to other Communist groups, especially Cuban and Czech; and at least once he was seen going into the Cuban Embassy with a leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party in Mexico. REJANO is in frequent contact with the Czech Press attaché. He is editor of the Czech bulletin published in Mexico. He is also frequently in touch with employees of the Soviet Press Office. In December 1967, according to an LNERGO report, REJANO gave NELSON (LNERGO double agent?) material on American bases in Spain when NELSON visited the Spanish Communist Party Headquarters in Mexico. On 28 January 1968, REJANO was among a group of "old friends" attending a dinner in Mexico City for Juan MARINELLO Vidaurreta, President of the Cuban-Mexican Society and Cuban UNESCO Ambassador.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Sketch

Distribution:
~~1~~ 1 - C/SB, w/att.
2 - C/WH, W/o/att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 Att

CS COPY

201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO 3. 201-109935	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-34470	DATE 15 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139 201-109935

1P

MICROFILMED
APR 19 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Nicolas LEONOV, Press Attache

LEONOV is an extremely bright, intelligent man, and very quick-thinking. He is popular among the press people because he appears very frank, open and nice to them. He is not the kind, like many other Soviets, who is afraid to make comments, in his own name, on news items and this pleases the press who like personal opinions if nothing more. He is helpful and hard-working and any reasonable request he makes an effort to fulfill.

Apart from his work with the press, he does appear to be involved in intelligence work. He meets with David, Juan Rejano and another man (name not known) on matters which appear to have nothing to do with his press activities. It is possible that money is channeled through LEONOV for economic aid to certain magazines and propaganda work (perhaps even to the University groups although he is very cautious and this many not be true).

LEONOV tolerates (but does not love) his wife, who is quite a shrew. He apparently continues to live with her for the sake of their daughter, Irina, but they appear to have nothing in common. LEONOV is very popular with nearly everyone, but LEONOVA is almost universally disliked.

The actual work of the Press Office he leaves nearly entirely in the hands of his employees, who appear to do their job quite well. They only consult him on special problems and money matters, but he appears to devote very little time to the actual work done at the office. He is busy making contacts, seeing people, visiting newspapermen and doing extra and special jobs for the Embassy (since his Spanish is so good and his personality so nice). He interprets for most of the important Soviet artists when they come to Mexico and he accompanies the Ambassador on many occasions. The previous Amb. apparently trusted his judgment greatly and called on him frequently.

LEONOV apparently plays chess quite well and likes to hunt and fish, but is unable to devote much time to this. He has quite a social life, but mostly alone, and he appears to be high in favor in the USSR since he is able to take vacations frequently and do, more or less, as he likes.

H/w att. #1 to HMMA-34470

CS COPY

201 — 132139

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 REDTOP/Nikolay LABROV (201-) ✓ NO 201

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
[illegible]
occ - Historian

Photo [illegible]

1. Headquarters attention is invited to Department Airgram A-696 of 4 February 1968 reporting on a lecture given by Subject at Mexico's National University on 30 January 1968. The lecture dealt with Latin American Studies in the USSR and carried the current Soviet line that what was progressive in the Mexican-American war was the fight of the Mexican people against U. S. imperialism.

2. Nikolay LABROV, a Soviet scholar, arrived in Mexico City in late October 1967 to do research on Mexican revolutionary history. He has booked return passage via Canadian Pacific for 27 February. During his stay he has resided with the family of Soviet Press Attache Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139). The information in this paragraph is from LIENVOY.

3. Forwarded herewith are photographs received from LILYRIC taken on 7 November 1967 of the man believed to be Nikolay LABROV with Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV and wife.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Photos

Distribution:
2 - C/SB, w/att.
2 - C/WH, w/o/att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1 att h/w

CS COPY

201-132139 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-34078

DATE
15 February 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-~~132139~~



MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LEDNOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
VOL. V

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

DY 19319

SECRET

1. A trace reply prepared for the FBI in November 1976 indicated that from 1956 until 1961 LEONOV was in Moscow during which time he was reported to have attended the KGB school from 1958 until 1960. From 1960 until 1961 LEONOV was at the Fifth Department of KGB Hqs. A statement was also included which said that during his tours in Mexico LEONOV was consistently active in clandestine support of Latin American revolutionary and subversive activities,particularly relating to Guatemala.

PDSTORAGE: As of 1976 LEONOV was Chief of Service No. 1 (Information) of KGB Headquarters First (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate in Moscow. LEONOV has been considered for at least two Ambassadorial posts.

A statement that a reliable defector had identified LEONOV as a KGB officer was transmitted to the State Department in August 1966 (NOTE: DERYABIN's iden in September 1964 was inconclusive but could have been misinterpreted.)

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE PASSED TO
MR. CHEPANEK ON 9 August 1978
FOR PERUSAL OF MR. BRECKINRIDGE.

IF APPROVED, DOCUMENT WILL BE
SENT TO HOUSE SUB-COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATION. FOUR PHOTOS
WERE INCLUDED FOR PASSAGE.

MR. CHEPANEK IS LOCATED IN 2D18.

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE
OF
NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV

1. Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV was born on 22 August 1928 in Almazovo, USSR (also reported as Ryazan, USSR.) LEONOV graduated at an unknown date from the Institute of Foreign Relations in Moscow. He was assigned as Interpreter and Secretary to the Ambassador at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from May 1953 until 17 October 1956. On 31 July 1961 LEONOV returned to Mexico City as Third Secretary and Assistant Cultural Officer. He served in this capacity until his PCS departure in June 1964. LEONOV and his family went on home leave to the USSR from 21 April to 20 July 1963. During this leave LEONOV served as Fidel CASTRO's interpreter in the USSR in May 1963. LEONOV was assigned to Mexico City again on 10 October 1964 as Second Secretary and Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy. He departed PCS for the USSR on 22 December 1968. From April to July 1969 LEONOV served temporarily as representative of the Soviet News Agency "NOVOSTI" in Lima, Peru.

2. Additional travel information reflects that LEONOV served as interpreter for Soviet Vice Premier Anastas MIKOYAN on his trips to Mexico and Cuba in November 1959 and again in February 1960 when the Soviet Cultural and Technical Exposition was being held. LEONOV traveled to the Dutch West Indies and Trinidad in September 1962; his position and purpose of his

SECRET

trip are unknown. LEONOV was a delegate to the 31st Session of the United Nations General Assesmbly in New York City from 19 September to 10 October 1976. In late June 1977 LEONOV accompanied two other Soviet officials on a visit to Panama where they were scheduled to visit with Panamanian Government officials. The next day LEONOV traveled to Bogota, Colombia where he remained until 3 July 1977. On this date he departed for Frankfurt, West Germany, presumably enroute home to the USSR.

3. LEONOV and his wife, Valeriya Ivanovich, who was born 30 April 1928 in Ryazan, have a daughter, Irina Nikolayevna, who was born on 16 March 1962 in Mexico City. LEONOV reportedly speaks excellent Spanish, good English, some French and little German. He has been described as pleasant, outgoing, intelligent, shrewd, conscientious, and reliable. He has a sense of humor but displays a temper at times.

4. Based on his activities and associations in Mexico City during his tours of duty between May 1953 and December 1968 LEONOV is considered to be a staff officer of the KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security.)





14-00000

-/29/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-7 INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (9/P)

78 0800005 PAGE 001
TOT: 051451Z JAN 78 WASHINGT 234172

SECRET
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 051451Z WASHINGTON 234172
TO: GUATEMALA CITY.

FROM KA/MGSB, INFO SE/X/LA
SUBJECT: INTEL ESNOTCH

REF: DIRECTOR 222905

1. UPON FURTHER REVIEW OF FILE ON BERNARDO LEMUS MENDOZA (201-0091575) FOR CLEARANCE PURPOSES, ONE DOCUMENT WHICH MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE TO STATION INDICATES THAT LEMUS WAS IN CONTACT WITH A KGB OFFICER WHILE IN MEXICO. ACCORDING TO HGGW-4035 DATED 2 DEC 66, INFORMATION TAKEN FROM CAPTURED PGT DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT LEMUS, WHILE IN EXILE IN MEXICO FROM 1953-56, WAS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF KNOWN KGB OFFICER NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-0132139).

2. LEONOV WAS BORN 22 AUG 28 IN USSR. HE SERVED IN MEXICO FROM 1953-56 AS INTERPRETER/SECRETARY TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. (FYI: PER POSTORAGE FROM 56-61 HE ATTENDED KGB SCHOOL AND SERVED AT KGB HQS.) DURING 1961-64 LEONOV WAS THIRD SECRETARY, ASSISTANT CULTURAL OFFICER AT SOVIET EMBASSY, AND FROM 64-68 HE WAS SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE. DURING HIS TOURS IN MEXICO, LEONOV WAS REPORTEDLY CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE IN THE SUPPORT OF LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO GUATEMALA. LAST KNOWN LOCATION OF LEONOV WAS TRIP TO BOGOTA FROM 27 JUNE TO 3 JULY 1977.

3. FROM ABOVE DATA IT WOULD SEEM THAT LEMUS KNEW LEONOV PRIOR TO LEONOV'S KGB TRAINING.

4. FILE: 201-0091575, 201-0132139. E2 IMPDET.> 2078 2078
ORIG LA/MGSB/GSB GUILIANI/HEILMA X1091 COORD SE/OR/X SE/OP/S
SE/X/LA 2078
(PHIPPS); REL: C/LA/MGSB/GSB (SIEGLE); CL BY: 029163.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

Victa
1/4/4 NO

3 [illegible] 33139

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-0132139 074-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/74

CIT USSR

KNOWN KGB.

DATE 23 JUN 78 09616515

201-132139

E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER [redacted] TOTAL COPIES 28 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT LA 8

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE. VR IP/DMS, SE 8, CI 4
EPS/EG 2, SIA, SIA/IC, DCS/INT

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 996916 EIA055 PAGE 01-21 IN 338551

TOR:282235Z JUL 77 BOGO 31270

S E C R E T 282212Z JUL 77 STAFF

Margett
Sana

CITE BOGOTA 31270

TO: PANAMAC CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL CKLEG INTEL

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 41931 (IN 329718) [illegible]

B. BOGOTA 31003 (IN 330958)

1. ACCORDING TO TRAVEL RECORDS RECEIVED TODAY ONE NIKOLAI LEONOV ARRIVED IN BOGOTA ON 27 JUN ABOARD AIR FRANCE FLIGHT 301. HE HOLDS PASSPORT DK030674, VISA 53. HE IS A RUSSIAN NATIONAL, AGE 48, MARRIED AND A PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT. WILL ADVISE WHEN AND IF SUBSEQUENT TRAVEL RECORDS INDICATE FURTHER TRAVEL TO PANAMA AND RETURN TO BOGOTA.

2. FILE: 56-8-0. E2 IMPDET

202079

SECRET

CKTOP - Colombia

71 MFG 7/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER [redacted] TOTAL COPIES 26 — 1 [redacted] BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT LA8 ACTION #	INFO	RF. FILE. VR. 1 ADMS SEP PCS/INT CI4 EPS/EG2	STAFF 1 4 2 5 3 6

T 976965 EIA122 PAGE 01-01 IN 330952

TOR:302110Z JUN 77 BOGO 31023

S E C R E T 302233Z JUN 77 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 31023.

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL CKLEG INTEL

REF: PANAMA CITY 41831 (323660) 23 Jun

1. ACCORDING TO TRAVEL RECORDS COVERING PERIOD 20-26 JUN ONLY ONE SOVIET ENTERED COLOMBIA VIA BOGOTA. HE WAS ONE YURY TIMOFEEV, PASSPORT CK277749, AGE THIRTY-NINE, MARRIED. HE ARRIVED ON AVIANCA FLIGHT 83 ON 26 JUN AND LISTED HIS PROFESSION AS ENGINEER. HE APPARENTLY ARRIVED WITHOUT A COLOMBIAN VISA AND DID NOT LIST AN ADDRESS FOR HIS STAY IN BOGOTA.

2. FILE: 56-8-0. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER TOTAL COPIES 22-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT 1A8

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF.~~ FILE VR. IP/DMS PCS/INT, SEB SIATIC, SIA, CA4, EPS/EG2 CI4

1	KK	4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 973902 EIA136 PAGE 01 IN 329718

TOR:292231Z JUN 77 PACY 41931

SECRET 292130Z JUN 77 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 41931

TO: BOGOTA INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL CKLEG INTEL

1. STATION IS ATTEMPTING TO IDENTIFY HIGH SOVIET OFFICIAL WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE CURRENTLY VISITING PANAMA. ACCORDING TO SENSITIVE SOURCES, THE SOVIET OFFICIAL WAS EXPECTED TO VISIT COLOMBIA SOMETIME BETWEEN APPROXIMATELY 20-27 JUNE, AND FROM THERE TRAVEL ON TO PANAMA.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO BOGOTA MIGHT HAVE AS TO POSSIBLE IDENTITY THIS SOVIET OFFICIAL.

3. FOR HQS: ACCORDING TO HYGRUFF-1, THE THREE SOVIET OFFICIALS REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 OF PANAMA CITY 41917 (IN 329530) ARRIVED IN PANAMA ON 28 JUNE ABOARD KLM FLIGHT 779 FROM LISBON. THEIR ARRIVAL AND MEETING WITH PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REPORTED IN PANAMANIAN PRESS ON 29 JUNE.

4. FILE: 56-8-0. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

[illegible]	LEONOV, IVAN LEONTYEVICH (T)			USSR		
270249	LEONOV, IVAN MAKSIMOVICH (T)			USSR		
252489	LEONOV, IVAN PETROVICH (T)			USSR		
270113	LEONOV, IVAN PETROVICH (T)			USSR		
292539	LEONOV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH (T)			USSR		
080279	LEONOV, L (T)			USSR		
037653*	LEONOV, L I (T)			USSR		
118692	LEONOV, LEONID (T)	USSR		USSR		
062588	LEONOV, LEV IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
267822	LEONOV, MATVEY IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
173604	LEONOV, MIFHA		+1965	+USSR		
[illegible]	LEONOV, MIKHAIL ALEKSANDROVICH (T)	USSR	CA 16	USSR		
[illegible]	LEONOV, MIKHAIL ALEKSANDROVICH (T)			USSR		
[illegible]	LEONOV, MIKHAIL IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
[illegible]	LEONOV, MIKHAIL VASILEVICH (T)			USSR		
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY ALEKSEYEVICH (T)	USSR	22 JUL 29	USSR		
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY ANDREYEVICH (T)	+USSR	+DEC 20	USSR	+201-0285216	+WIFE MARINA PETROVNA B
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY GAVRILOVICH (T)	USSR	07 AUG 21	+USSR	+201-0285094	+WIFE TAISIYA B 19 FEB
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	19 MAR 34	USSR	+201-0774548	+WIFE YULIYA SERGEYEVNA
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	22 MAY 06	USSR	+201-0264522	
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
023539	LEONOV, NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH (T)	USSR	21 SEP 41	USSR	+201-0836586	+WIFE TATYANA ANATOLYEV
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH (T)	USSR	22 AUG 28	USSR	+201-0132139	+WIFE VALERIYA IVANOVNA
259455	LEONOV, PARFIRIY LUKICH (T)			USSR		
242286	LEONOV, PAVEL AFANASYEVICH (T)			USSR		
251028	LEONOV, PAVEL BORISOVICH (T)			USSR		
[illegible]	LEONOV, PAVEL SEMENOVICH (T)	+USSR	+01 JAN 16	USSR	+201-0309517	+WIFE KLAVDIYA GRIGORYE
003835	LEONOV, PETR IVANOVICH	+USSR	+13	+USSR		+WIFE KLAVDIYA TIMOFEYE
003885	LEONOV, PETR IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	13	USSR		+WIFE KLAVDIYA TIMOFEYE
266645	LEONOV, SERGEY ANDREYEVICH (T)			USSR		
271051	LEONOV, SERGEY ARKHIPOVICH (T)			USSR		
221860	LEONOV, STANISLAV (T)	USSR		USSR		+WIFE LYUDMILA IVANOVNA
259061	LEONOV, TIMOFEY IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
246777	LEONOV, V A (T)			USSR		
071099	LEONOV, V. S. (T)			USSR		
408182*	LEONOV, VADIM VASILYEVICH (T)	USSR	19 AUG 49	USSR	+201-0948594	+WIFE-YEKATERINA VLADIM
246417	LEONOV, VALENTIN IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
227715*	LEONOV, VALERIY PAVLOVICH (T)	USSR	20 OCT 42	USSR	+201-0915566	+WIFE FNU
284769	LEONOV, VASILIY DMITRIYEVICH (T)			USSR		
179071	LEONOV, VASILIY IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
265862	LEONOV, VASILIY OSIPOVICH (T)			USSR		
017085	LEONOV, VASILIY PAVLOVICH (T)	USSR	24 JUL 05	USSR	+201-0732595	
405781*	LEONOV, VIKTOR (T)	USSR	36	USSR		+WIFE NEONILA B 37
186423*	LEONOV, VIKTOR IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	43	USSR		+WIFE TATYANA PAVLOVNA
228604*	LEONOV, VIKTOR MIKHAYLOVICH (T)	USSR	12 AUG 36	USSR	+201-0921769	+WIFE SVETLANA VLADIMIR
047955*	LEONOV, VILEN NIKONOROVICH (T)	+USSR	+29 APR 25	USSR	+201-0241239	+WIFE LENINA ANDREYEVNA

SECRET/NOFORN-

SOVIET GICS INDEX

M.D.NO	SURNAME,GIVEN NAME,MIDDLE NAME	POB	DOB	CITZ	201 NUMBER	WIFE NAME
295237	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ALEKSANDROVICH (T)			USSR		
017021*	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ALEKSEYEVICH	+USSR	+03 SEP 31	+USSR	+201-0732596	+WIFE ZINAIDA VASILIYEV
017021*	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ALEKSEYEVICH (T)	USSR	03 SEP 31	USSR	+201-0732596	+WIFE ZINAIDA VASILIYEV
024730*	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ANDREYEVICH (T)	USSR	26 JUN 26	USSR	+201-0148594	+WIFE VALENTINA MIKHAYL
053991	LEONOV, VLADIMIR F		+06 DEC 38	+USSR	+201-0788619	+WIFE OLGA PETROVNA B 1
053991	LEONOV, VLADIMIR FEDOROVICH (T)		06 DEC 38	USSR	+201-0788619	+WIFE OLGA PETROVNA B 1
284882	LEONOV, VLADIMIR PORFIRYEVICH (T)			USSR		
294423	LEONOV, VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH (T)			USSR		
226294*	LEONOV, VYACHESLAV STEPANOVICH (T)	USSR	13 JUN 39	USSR	+201-0916881	+WIFE VALENTINA YEGOROV
22448[illegible]	LEONOV, YURIY	+USSR	+CA 33	+USSR	+201-0921125	
18831[illegible]	LEONOV, YURIY (T)	USSR		USSR		
22448[illegible]	LEONOV, YURIY (T)	USSR	CA 33	USSR	+201-0921125	
09482[illegible]	LEONOV, YURIY ALEKSANDROVICH (T)	USSR	03 JUN 26	USSR	+201-0831521	+WIFE TAMARA GRIGORYEVN
003886	LEONOV, YURIY BORISOVICH (T)	USSR	12 MAR 30	USSR	+201-0182275	+WIFE GALINA ALEKSEYEVN
040399	LEONOV, YURIY PETROVICH (T)		25 NOV 39	USSR	+201-0776624	+WIFE SVETLANA
[illegible]	LEONOVA, ALEKSANDRA FEDOROVNA (T)			USSR		

14-00000

```
  72A01 R  [illegible]                 [illegible]          [illegible]EVICH     [illegible]
  72A01 S   ITAL                       ROME                 29 DEC 72
  72A01 T   REPLACEMENT-MOSKVICHEV CONTACTS TURNED OVER TO ISTOMIN
  72A01 U                              OIRA-56345                             07 FEB 73
A 73A01 R  MOLCHANOV                   VLADIMIR             VLADIMIROVICH.    007483
A 73A01 S   ITAL                       ROME                 24 FEB 73
A 73A01 T   REPLACEMENT-MOLCHANOV REPLACED MOSKVICHEV
A 73A01 U   PCS REPORTS                OIRA-56871                             14 AUG 73
*************************************************************************************
  00A00 A 011155                       201-0172134
  00A00 B  LEONOV                      NIKOLAY              SERGEYEVICH
  00A00 C   USSR                       RYAZAN               22 AUG 28
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE VALENTINA IVANOVNA B 26 APR 28 RYAZAN
A 61A01 B  LEONOV                      NIKOLAY              SERGEYEVICH
A 61A01 C   USSR                       RYAZAN               22 AUG 28
  00A02 D   USSR
A 53A01 P                              [illegible]0724      MOSCOW            [illegible] 52
A 61A01     USSR                       [illegible]
A 61A01                                [illegible]663       MOSCOW            [illegible] 64
  64A01 D                              [illegible]
A 50A01 F  EA GOOD                                                            [illegible]MAN

08/07/77    PAGE      [illegible]                   011155
                    SECRET NOFORN SOV RIOS FILE    E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]5877
```

```
A 73A05 T   REPLACEM
A 73A05 U   PCS REPO
A 73A06 R  DEGTYAR
A 73A06 S   MEX
A 73A06 T   REPLACEM
A 73A06 U   PCS REPO
A 76A06 R  ROGOV
A 76A06 S   UK
A 76A06 T   REPLACEM
A 76A06 U   PCS REPO
***************************
  00A00 A 011180
  00A00 B  BURINSKIY
  00A00 C
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE TAIS
T 46A01 B  BURINSKI
  52A01 B  [illegible]
T 46A01 C
  52A01 C
T 46A01 D   USSR
  52A01 D   USSR

08/07/77    PAGE
```

```
                        SECRET/NOFORN SOV RIOS FILE
011155                            CONT.

A 50A01 F   EA GOOD                                                       POLISH
A 53A01 F   5.07 W 155 H GRY BLD SMALL
A 61A01 F   WIFE VALENTINA IVANOVNA B 26 APR 28 RYAZAN
A 61A01 F   DAU IRINA NIKOLAYEVNA B 62
  61A02 E   EA EXCELLENT                                                  SPANISH
A 61A02 [illegible]                                                       FRENCH
  00A01 [illegible]  SUSP RIS FROM ST SEC
  00A01 [illegible]  EMPLOYMENT                            74-6-[illegible]
  00A02 [illegible]   CHIEF OF TECHNICAL SECTION
  00A0[illegible]    KNOWN SOV ST SEC
  00A0[illegible] N  AUST                   BADEN
  00A0[illegible] N  MEX
  00A0[illegible]                                                         [illegible]7018
  00A0[illegible]    KNOWN SOV ST SEC
C 00A0[illegible]    POSTCARAGE             5[illegible]-555[illegible]62     [illegible]-5-[illegible]    [illegible]AN 72
C 00A0[illegible]    SEE HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
A 50A01 [illegible]  EMPLOYEE
A 50A01 [illegible]   SUSP RIS FROM ST SEC
A 50A01 M   CONSULATE
A 50A01 N   POLA                    WARSAW              CA 50           [illegible]
A 50A01 U   PCS REPORTS             ST-400                              [illegible]
A 53A01 G  EMPLOYEE ADMINISTRATIVE
A 53A01 H                                                               [illegible]
A 53A01 M   EMBASSY
A 53A01 N   MEX                     MEXICO CITY         CA 25 MAY 53    [illegible] 56
A 53A01 U   PCS REPORTS             ST-400                              [illegible] AUG 6[illegible]
  60A01 N   CUBA                    HAVANA              60              UNK
  60A01 Q   MEMBER MIKOYAN ENTOURAGE TO CUBA FOR EXPOSITION
  60A01 U                           REDCAP                              13 NOV 64
A 61A01 G  3RD SECRETARY/ASSISTANT CULTURAL OFFICER
A 61A01 H                                                               H602777
A 61A01 M   EMBASSY
A 61A01 N   MEX                     MEXICO CITY         31 JUL 61       PR JUL 65
A 61A01 Q   PROMOTED 2ND SECRETARY PR JUL 65
A 61A01 U   PCS REPORTS             SCI                                 2 OCT 63
A 61A01 W   MEXICAN DIP LIST JUL 65
  61A02 M   PACHUCA CONDESA                                             153/405
  61A02 N   MEX                     MEXICO CITY         61              64
  61A02 Q   RESIDENCE
  61A02 U   REDCAP                  HMMA 33293          201-132139      18 OCT 67
  61A03 N   USA                     NEW YORK            61              UNK
  61A03 Q   SUBJ LEFT NEW YORK FOR MEX 31 JUL 61
  61A03 U                           REDCAP                              13 NOV 64
A 61A04 G  2ND SECRETARY/ PRESS ATTACHE
A 61A04 K   KNOWN SOV ST SEC
A 61A04 M   EMBASSY
A 61A04 N   MEX                     MEXICO CITY         PR JUL 65       22 DEC 68
A 61A04 Q   PROMOTED PR JUL 65
A 61A04 U   PCS REPORTS             HMMA 33293          201-132139      18 OCT 67
A 61A04 W   HMMA-36146, 31 DEC 68 HMMA-36147, 31 DEC 68
A 61A04 X   LEONOV AND WIFE FREQUENTLY [illegible] WITH EACH OTHER       ENGLISH
C 62A01 J   OFFICER
C 62A01 K   KNOWN SOV ST SEC
C 62A01 N   MEX                     MEXICO CITY         62              UNK
```

```
011180

T 46A01 E   WIFE TAIS
A 51A01 F   WIFE TAIS
A 51A01 F    DAU GALI
T 00A01 [illegible]    KNOWN SOV
T 00A01 V    OVERT
T 00A01 W    BARR
T 46A01 G   EMPLOYEE
T 46A01 H    UNRRA
T 46A01 N    USA
T 46A01 [illegible]    NATL ARCH
T 46A02 [illegible]   CHIEF OF R
T 46A02 [illegible]    UNRRA
T 46A02 N    SLAVISTA
T 46A0[illegible] [illegible]    OVERT
T 46A0[illegible] [illegible]    MARSHALL
A 51A01 [illegible]   DEPUTY EXE
A 51A01 H    [illegible]
A 51A01 M    [illegible]
A 51A01 N    [illegible]
A 51A01 [illegible]    [illegible]
  52A01 G   EXECUTIVE
  52A01 H    OFFICE
  52A01 J    OFFICER
  52A01 K    KNOWN SOV
  52A01 N    SUIS
  52A01 U    POLAPLE
***************************
  00A00 A 011188
  00A00 B  [illegible]
  00A00 C
  00A00 D   SWED
  57A01 B  [illegible]
  57A01 C
  57A01 D   SWED
  57A01 G  DIPLOMAT
  57A01 J   TARGET,
  57A01 K   T/KNOWN SO
  57A01 N   USSR
  57A01 Q   EITHER UKR
  57A01 U   POLAPLE
  57A01 Z   ENU SWED
***************************
  00A00 A 011191
  00A00 B  MESHKOV
  00A00 C   USSR
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE VALENT
A 62A02 B  MESHKOV
F 00A01 C   USSR
  62A01 C   USSR
A 63A02 D   USSR
A 63A01 D
A 68A01 D
A 75A01 D
```

14-00000

```
 50A01 E  E4 GOOD                                                GERMAN

08/07/77   PAGE      5309                 011155
                             SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE   E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877
```

```
                                                        ** C18**

                             SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
 011155                                 CONT.

 A 50A01 F   E4 GOOD                                                    POLISH
 A 53A01 E   T 5/07 W 155 H DRK BLD SMALL
 A 61A01 E   WIFE VALERIYA IVANOVNA B 28 APR 28 RYAZAN
 A 61A01 F    DAU IRINA NIKOLAYEVNA B 62
   61A02 E   E4 EXCELLENT                                               SPANISH
 A 61A04 F                                                              FRENCH
   00A01 K    SUSP RIS PROB ST SEC
   00A01 U    FDHELMET                                 74-6-626/A
   00A02 J    CHIEF OF TECHNICAL SECTION
   00A02 K    KNOWN SOV ST SEC
   00A02 N    AUST                  BADEN
   00A03 N    MEX
   00A04 H                                                              50023018
 C 00A06 K    KNOWN SOV ST SEC
 C 00A06 U    PDSTORAGE             SX-5555/62         74-5-312         JAN 77
 C 00A06 W    SEE HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
 A 50A01 G   EMPLOYEE
 A 50A01 K    SUSP RIS PROB ST SEC
 A 50A01 M    CONSULATE
 A 50A01 N    POLD                  WARSAW             CA 50            CA 53
 A 50A01 U    PCS REPORTS           RT-400                              19 AUG 69
 A 53A01 G   EMPLOYEE ADMINISTRATIVE
 A 53A01 H                                                              MB02778
 A 53A01 M    EMBASSY
 A 53A01 N    MEX                   MEXICO CITY        CA 25 MAY 53     12 OCT 56
 A 53A01 U    PCS REPORTS           RT-400                              19 AUG 69
   60A01 N    CUBA                  HAVANA             60               UNK
   60A01 G    MEMBER MIKOYAN ENTOURAGE TO CUBA FOR EXPOSITION
   60A01 U                          REDCAP                              13 NOV 64
 A 61A01 G   3RD SECRETARY/ASSISTANT CULTURAL OFFICER
 A 61A01 H                                                              MB02777
 A 61A01 M    EMBASSY
 A 61A01 N    MEX                   MEXICO CITY        31 JUL 61        PR JUL 65
 A 61A01 Q    PROMOTED 2ND SECRETARY PR JUL 65
 A 61A01 U    PCS REPORTS           SCI                                 2 OCT 63
 A 61A01 W    MEXICAN DIP LIST JUL 65
   61A02 M    PACHUCA CONDESA                                           153/405
   61A02 N    MEX                   MEXICO CITY        61               64
   61A02 Z    RESIDENCE
   61A02 U    REDCAP                HMMA 33293         201-13[illegible]        [illegible] OCT 67
   61A03 N    USA                   NEW YORK           61               UNK
   61A03 G    SUBJ LEFT NEW YORK FOR MEX 31 JUL 61
   61A03 U                          REDCAP                              13 NOV 64
 A 61A04 G   2ND SECRETARY/ PRESS ATTACHE
 A 61A04 K    KNOWN SOV ST SEC
 A 61A04 M    EMBASSY
 A 61A04 N    MEX                   MEXICO CITY        PR JUL 65        22 DEC 68
 A 61A04 Q    PROMOTED PR JUL 64
 A 61A04 U    PCS REPORTS           HMMA 33293         201-132139       18 OCT 67
 A 61A04 W    HMMA-36146, 31 DEC 68 HMMA-36147, 31 DEC 68
 A 61A04 X    LEONOV AND WIFE FREQUENTLY AT ODDS WITH EACH OTHER        ENGLISH
 C 62A01 J    OFFICER
 C 62A01 K    KNOWN SOV ST SEC
 C 62A01 N    MEX                   MEXICO CITY        62               UNK

08/07/77   PAGE      5310                 011155
                             SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE   E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877
```

```
                                                        *** D***

                             SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
 011155                                 CONT.

 C 62A01 U   PDSTORAGE-241          SX-3735                             14 MAY 63
 C 62A01 W   CONTACT HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
   [illegible]      [illegible]             CURACAO            62               UNK
```

```
 [illegible]         USSR
 52A01 D    USSR

08/07/77   PAGE
```

```
 0111[illegible]

 T 46A01 E   [illegible]
 A 51A01 E   WIFE TA[illegible]
 A 51A01 F    DAU [illegible]
 T 00A01 K    KNOWN
 T 00A01 [illegible]    OVERT
 T 00A01 W    BARRON,
 T 46A01 G   EMPLOYE[illegible]
 T 46A01 H    UNREA
 T 46A01 N    USA
 T 46A01 [illegible]    NATL A
 T 46A02 G   CHIEF [illegible]
 T 46A02 H    UNREA
 T 46A02 N    USA/[illegible]
 T 46A02 [illegible]    OVERT
 T 46A02 W    HARSHA
 A 51A01 G   DEPUTY
 A 51A01 H    [illegible]
 A 51A01 M    UN SOV
 A 51A01 N    SWIS
 A 51A01 U    PCS RE
   52A01 G   EXECUTI
   52A01 H    UN [illegible]
   52A01 J    OFFICE
   52A01 K    KNOWN
   52A01 N    SWIS
   52A01 U    PDLAC[illegible]
   00A00 A 01118[illegible]
   00A00 B  [illegible]
   00A00 C
   00A00 D   SWED
   57A01 B  [illegible]
   57A01 C
   57A01 G   SWED
   57A01 H  DIPLOMA
   57A01 J   TRADE
   57A01 K   T/[illegible]
   57A01 N   USSR
   57A01 Q   EITHER
   57A01 U   [illegible]
   57A01 Z   [illegible]
   00A00 A 011191
   00A00 B  MESHKOV
   00A00 C   USSR
   00A00 D   USSR
   00A00 E  WIFE VA
 A 61A02 E  MESHKOV
 F 00A01 C   USSR
   62A01 C   USSR
 A 61A02 G   USSR
 A 62A01 D
 A 62A01 D
 A 75A01 D

08/07/77   PAGE
```

```
 011191

 A 52A01 E  E4 SOME
 A 61A02 E  WIFE VAL
 A 61A02 F   DAU IR
   62A01 E  E4 FLUEN
```

14-00000

```
                          MEXICO CITY          62                UNK
08/07/77   PAGE     5310                      011155
                         SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE   E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877
```

```
                                                               ** 018**
                         SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011155                              CONT.

C 62A01 U   POSTORAGE-241          SX-3735                          MAY 63
C 62A01 W   CONTACT HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
  62A02 N   DWIN                   CURACAO           62             UNK
  62A02 Q   SUBJ TO LEAVE MEX FOR DWIN 27 AUG 62 ENROUTE TRIN
  62A02 U                          REDCAP                           13 NOV 64
  62A03 N   MEX                    MEXICO CITY       62             UNK
  62A03 Q   SUBJ RETURNED MEX FROM DWIN AND TRIN 8 SEP 62
  62A03 U                          REDCAP                           13 NOV 64
  62A04 N   TRIN                   PORT OF SPAIN     62             UNK
  62A04 Q   SUBJ TO LEAVE DWIN FOR PORT OF SPAIN 28 AUG 62
  62A04 U                          REDCAP                           13 NOV 64
  63A01 J   INTEL OFFICER
  63A01 K   KNOWN SOV ST SEC
  63A01 M   PACHUCA                                                 153
  63A01 N   MEX                    MEXICO CITY       63             UNK
  63A01 U                          REDCAP                              63
  63A02 N   USSR                   MOSCOW                           UNK
  63A02 U                          REDCAP                           13 NOV 64
  63A02 Y   SUBJ WENT MOSCOW WITH CASTRO SEE KRUSHCHEV RE PLAN FOR
  63A02 Z   SUBVERSIVE ACTION TO BE CARRIED OUT FROM CUBA AND MEX
  63A03 N   MEX                    MEXICO CITY       63             UNK
  63A03 U                          REDCAP                           13 NOV 64
  63A03 X   SUBJ IN CLANDESTINE CONTACT ARMS SMUGGLERS MAY 63
  64A01 N   MEX                    MEXICO CITY       64             UNK
  64A01 Q   RETURNED MEXICO CITY 10 OCT 64
  64A01 U   LIFIRE/LICRAVE-1       MEXI 1218                        14 OCT 64
  64A01 X   SUBJ HAD NEW PASSPORT BELIEVED BE WORKING AS TRANSLATOR
C 75A01 K   KNOWN SOV ST SEC
C 75A01 N   USSR                                     75
C 75A01 U   POSTORAGE              SX-5555/25        74-5-102       07 APR 75
C 75A01 W   CONTACT HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
B 76A01 G   DELEGATE
B 76A01 M   UNGA 31ST SESSION
B 76A01 N   USA                    NEW YORK          19 SEP 76         OCT 76
B 76A01 U   PRESENCE REPORTS
B 76A01     FBI                    MACHINE DOSSIER   L-319 L UNS    22 NOV 76
  00A05 R   SHEALEVICH             VLADIMIR          IVANOVICH      017922
  00A05 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY
  00A05 U                          201-SUMMARY                             65
A 54A01 R   SAPRONOVA              VERA              VLADIMIROVNA
A 54A01 S   MEX                                      SEP 54
A 54A01 T   SAFRONOVA LIVED WITH LEONOV FAMILY
A 54A01 U   PCS REPORTS            SER                                 JAN 55
  56A01 R   CASTRO                 FIDEL                            013128
  56A01 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY       21 JUN 56
  56A01 T   WHEN CASTRO ARRESTED MEXI 21 JUN 56 HAD CALLING CARD LEONOV
  56A01 U   REDCAP                                                  13 NOV 64
N 56A02 R   SALGO                  RENEE             BURGER         287911
N 56A02 S   FRAN                                     FEB 56
N 56A02 T   LEONOV CONTACT SALGO
N 56A02 U   AGENCY                 RT-400                           20 JUN 74
  61A05 R   BROVKIN                ALEKSANDR         MIKHAYLOVICH   022520
  61A05 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY       61             67
  61A05 T   LEONOV WORKS CLOSELY WITH BROVKIN

08/07/77   PAGE     5311                      011155
                         SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE   E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877
```

```
                                                               ** 016**
                         SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011155                              CONT.

  61A05 U   REDCAP                 HMMA 33293        201-132139     18 OCT 67
  62A05 R   NOVIKOV                VLADIMIR          G              010484
  62A05 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY       62
```

```
A 75A01 D

08/07/77   PAGE
```

```
011191

A 52A01 E   EX
A 61A02 E
A 61A02 F   EAU
  62A01 E   EX PU
  62A01 F   EX
A 68A01 E   SON
F 75A01 F   1 S
F 00A01 U
F 00A01 W   201
A 52A01 G   ATTA
A 52A01 M   EMB
A 52A01 N
A 52A01 Q
A 52A01 U   PCS
A 52A01 Z   SEA
A 52A02 G   IND S
A 52A02 M   EMB
A 52A02 N   USA
A 52A02 Q   PROP
A 52A02 U   PCS
A 52A02 W
  61A01 N   GER
  61A01 Q   FR
  61A01 U
A 61A02 G   2ND S
A 61A02 K
A 61A02 M   EMBA
A 61A02 N
A 61A02 Q   FROM
A 61A02 U   PCS
A 61A02 W   AVAR
  62A01 X   SUSP
  62A01 W
  62A01 Q
  62A01 U
A 63A01 G   1ST S
A 63A01 M   EMBA
A 63A01 N
A 63A01 Q   FROM
A 63A01 U
A 68A01 G
A 68A01 K   SUSP
A 68A01 M   EMBA
A 68A01 N
A 68A01 U
A 68A01 W   TELE
  69A01 U
A 75A01 G   MINIST
A 75A01 M   EMBA
A 75A01 N   CHNA
A 75A01 U   PCS
A 75A01 W
F 75A02 U   TRAC
F 76A01 L   14 M

08/07/77   PAGE
```

```
011191

* 76A01 U
  61A03 R   NECHA
  61A03 S   ETHI
  61A03 T   MESH
```

```
                                                                  ** E18**

                          SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011155                              CONT.

   61A05 U   REDCAP                    HMMA 33293          201-132139         18 OCT 67
   62A05 R   NOVIKOV                   VLADIMIR                               010484
   62A05 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         62
   62A05 T    LEONOV FORMERLY WORKED AS ASST FOR NOVIKOV
   62A05 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   62A06 R   BAZAROV                   SEMEN               TARASOVICH         000559
   62A06 S    IWIN                     CURACAO             27 AUG 62
   62A06 T    LEONOV ACCOMPANYING BAZAROV TRIP TO DWIN AND TRIN
   62A06 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   62A07 R   BAZAROV                   SEMEN               TARASOVICH         000559
   62A07 S    TRIN                     PORT OF SPAIN       23 AUG 62
   62A07 T    LEONOV ACCOMPANYING BAZAROV ON TRIP
   62A07 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   62A08 R   KUZNETSOV                 SVYATOSLAV          FEDOROVICH         003738
   62A08 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         62
   62A08 T    LEONOV WORKED FOR KUZNETSOV
   62A08 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   62A09 R   GLOTOV                    VIKTOR              NIKOLAYEVICH       008172
   62A09 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         62
   62A09 T    GLOTOV CRITICIZED LEONOV FOR FAILING APPEAR WHERE ORDERED
   62A09 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   62A10 R   SL[illegible]             NIKOLAY                                 000489
   62A10 S    [illegible]              MEXICO CITY         SEP 62             JUL 64
   62A10 T    COLLEAGUE
   62A10 U    LILYRIC                  HMMA-23983                             30 JUL 64
   62A11 R   FLORES                    HORACIO                                032096
   62A11 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         62
   62A11 T    NO REPORT ON NATURE LEONOV CONTACT WITH FLORES
   62A11 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   62A12 R   BAZAROV                   SEMEN                                  000559
   62A12 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         27 AUG 62          08 SEP 62
   62A12 T    UNKNOWN
   62A12 U    REDCAP                                                          05 OCT 64
   62A13 R   FLORES                    HORACIO             SANCHEZ            025125
   62A13 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         62
   62A13 T    NO REPORT ON NATURE OF CONTACT W/FLORES
   62A13 U    AGENCY                   REDCAP                                 13 NOV 64
   63A04 R   ANTONOV                   SERGEY              NIKOLAYEVICH       15312
   63A04 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         SEP 63
   63A04 T    LEONOV IN FREQUENT TOUCH ANTONOV DURING THE LATTER MEX
   63A04 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   63A05 R   CARDENAS                  LORENZO                                032191
   63A05 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         19 APR 63
   63A05 T    LEONOV VISITED HOME CARDENAS.
   63A05 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   63A06 R   FERRER                    OLGA                                   032095
   63A06 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         [illegible] SEP 63
   63A06 T    FERRER MADE ARRANGEMENT MEET LEONOV EVENING 02 SEP 63
   63A06 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   63A07 R   FLORES                    ROBERTO JARAMILLO                      32197
   63A07 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         [illegible] AUG 63
   63A07 T    FLORES TALKED TO LEONOV RE URGENT MATTER AGUA PRIETA, SENOR
   63A07 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   63A08 R   JOHNSON JR                CHARLES WILLIAMS                       032101

06/07/77    PAGE      5312                   011155
                         SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE    E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877
```

```
                                                                  ** E18**

                          SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011155                              CONT.

   63A08 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         08 OCT 63
   63A08 T    LEONOV PHONED JOHNSON RE RUSSIAN LESSONS
   63A08 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   63A09 R   TULIO                     HUGO                                   032110
   63A09 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         30 OCT 63
   63A09 T    TULIO IN TOUCH LEONOV RE SUPPLY SOV BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS
   63A09 U    REDCAP                                                          13 NOV 64
   64A02 R   KONSTANTINOV              SERGEY              SERGEYEVICH        003200
   64A02 S    MEX                      MEXICO CITY         23 MAR 64
   64A02 T    UNKNOWN
   64A02 U                             201 SUMMARY                            16 MAR 65
```

```
63A08 U   REICAP                                                        13 NOV 64
63A0? R   JOHNSON JR              CHARLES WILLIAMS                      032101

08/07/77    PAGE      5312                      011155
                                SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE   E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877
```

```
                                                                     F1--

                                SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011155                                   CONT.

   63A08 S   MEX                     MEXICO CITY          08 OCT 63
   63A08 T   LEONOV PHONED JOHNSON RE RUSSIAN LESSONS
   63A08 U   REICAP                                                   13 NOV 64
   63A09 R   TULIO                   HUGO                             032110
   63A09 S   MEX                     MEXICO CITY          30 OCT 63
   63A09 T   TULIO IN TOUCH LEONOV RE SUPPLY SOV BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS
   63A09 U   REICAP                                                   13 NOV 64
   64A02 R   KONSTANTINOV            SERGEY               SERGEYEVICH  003200
   64A02 S   MEX                     MEXICO CITY          23 MAR 64
   64A02 T   UNKNOWN
   64A02 U                           201 SUMMARY                      19 MAR 65
   64A03 R   CULIN                   VLADIMIR                         023605
   64A03 S   MEX                     MEXICO CITY          03 FEB 64
   64A03 T   COLLEAGUE
   64A03 U                           201 SUMMARY                      [illegible]
   64A04 R   KUKHARENKO              SERGEY                           018479
   64A04 S   MEX                     MEXICO CITY          10 OCT 64
   64A04 T   LEONOV TO REPLACE KUKHARENKO AS CHIEF PRESS ATTACHE EMB
   64A04 U   STATE                                                    24 OCT 64
   64A05 R   FERRER                  OLGA                             032095
   64A05 S   MEX                     MEXICO CITY          29 JAN 64
   64A05 T   FERRER MET WITH LEONOV 29 JAN 64
   64A05 U   REICAP                                                   13 NOV 64
 A 65A01 R   BELFRAGE                CEDRIC               HENNING     015079
 A 65A01 S   MEX                     MEXICO CITY          65
 A 65A01 T   LEONOV AND WIFE ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH BELFRGE AND WIFE
 A 65A01 U   FCS REPORTS             HMMA 33293           201-132139  18 OCT 67
   66A01 R   NIKOFOROV               LEONID               VASILYEVICH 027106
   66A01 S   MEX                     MEXICO CITY          DEC 66      67
   66A01 T   LEONOV PROB MET NIKOFOROV IN CHAPULTEPEC PARK
   66A01 U                           SPR                  201-756168  22 SEP 67
   67A01 R   CARDENAS                LORENZO              BARAJAS     032091
   67A01 S   MEX                     MEXICO CITY          67
   67A01 T   CLANDESTINE CONTACT
   67A01 U                           HMMA 33293           01-63.139   18 OCT 67
*************************************************************************************
   00A00 A 011162
   00A00 B  MALRAUX                  ANDRE
   00A00 C
   00A00 D   FRAN
   00A01 B  MALRAUX                  ANDRE
 T 29A01 B  MALRAUX                  ANDRE
 T 29A01 C
 T 29A01 D   FRAN
 T 33A01 E  WIFE CLARA
   00A01 U  FUNDLND                  OFPA 28540           100-6-113   15 MAR 57
   00A01 W   FROM INTERROGATION OF A OEC80 JANE ZLATOVSKY
 T 00A05 V   OVERT                   CD-864 P384          100-6-13974 63
 T 00A05 W   SERGE VICTOR.MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTIONARY
 T 29A01 G  WRITER
 T 29A01 N   USSR                    MOSCOW               29          UNK
 T 29A01 Q  ON VISIT
 T 29A01 V   OVERT                   CD-1100 P195-351                 41
 T 29A01 W   FISCHER, LOUIS MEN AND POLITICS

08 07/77    PAGE      5313                      011162
                                SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE   E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877
```

```
                                                                     G1--

                                SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011162                                   CONT.

 T 33A01 N   FRAN                    PARIS                33          UNK
 T 33A01 V   OVERT                   CD-1444 P222  207    100-6-13974  67
```

```
 60A01 N
 60A01 G
08/07/77   PA

011192
   60A01 U
   61A01 M
   61A01 N
   61A01 P
   61A01 U
   62A01 M
   62A01 N
   62A01 P
   62A01 U
 A 63A01 G
 A 63A01 H
 A 63A01 K
 A 63A01 M
 A 63A01 N
 A 63A01 U
 A 63A01 W
 A 70A01 G
 A 70A01 H
 A 70A01 K
 A 70A01 M
 A 70A01 N
 A 70A01 U
 A 70A01 W
 C 75A01 K
 C 75A01 N
 C 75A01 U
 C 75A01 W
 F 77A01 G
 F 77A01 K
 F 77A01 M
 F 77A01 N
 F 77A01 U
 F 77A01 V
 F 77A02 U
 F 77A02 V
   00A05 R
   00A05 S
   00A05 T
   00A05 U
   00A06 R
   00A06 S
   00A06 T
   00A06 U
   63A02 R
   63A02 S
   63A02 T
   63A02 U
   63A03 R
   63A03 S
   63A03 T
   63A03 U
 A 67A01 R
 A 67A01 S
 A 67A01 T
08/07/77

011192
 A 67A01 U
```

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4A PER 52/11 TOTAL COPIES 13-1 BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/LA 5

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE. VR. C/IP/DMS C/SS 4

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 041941 EIA533 PAGE 01-01 IN 355710

TOR:262225Z JUL 77 BOGO 31183

S E C R E T 262216Z JUL 77 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 31183

TO: DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL RYBAT CKLEG PDQUICK TRACE

REF: DIRECTOR 070125

in Image

1. TRAVEL INFORMATION RECEIVED TODAY INDICATES LEONOV DEPARTED BOGOTA FOR FRANKFURT ON 3 JUL ABOARD VIASA FLIGHT #903.

2. FILE: 201-0132139; 201-0101794. E2 IMPDET

PANAMA CI/TOP

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11-3

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

OMF

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 222154Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 070125

CONF: C/LA 5 INFO: FILE C/IP/DMS, C/SE 4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 43
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER 32P
0 IP FILES # 111

IP,EBI		SERIAL PROGRAM	
	X	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP,MB		CODE NO. (2, 3)	
		RYBAT REST. CODE	
		CABLE IDEN (11)	
		NFO (8)	
~~IP/[illegible]~~		FOR FILING	

SE/X/6A

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO BOGOTA.Y

UNINTEL RYBAT CKLEG PDQUICK TRACE Y

REFS: A. X/00/9787-77, 18 JULY 1977 (NOT SENT BOGOTA)

B. DIRECTOR 060370

C. PANAMA CITY 41931 (IN 329718) Y

1. FOLLOWING IS FOR STATIONS' BACKGROUND ONLY. Y

2. BELIEVE SOVIET PERSON CITED REF A MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139), BORN USSR 22 AUGUST 1928. GRADUATED AT UNKNOWN DATE FROM THE INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN MOSCOW. FROM JULY 1953 UNTIL OCTOBER 1956 SERVED AS INTERPRETER AND SECRETARY TO THE AMBASSADOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. FROM 1956 TO 1961 REPORTEDLY ATTENDED KGB SCHOOL AND SERVED AT KGB HQS. HE TRAVELED TDY TO MEXICO IN NOVEMBER 1959 AND TO CUBA IN 1960 AS INTERPRETER. IN JULY 1961 HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AS THIRD SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT CULTURAL ATTACHE OF SOVIET EMBASSY AND SERVED THERE UNTIL JUNE 1964. FROM OCTOBER 1964 UNTIL DECEMBER 1968 HE WAS SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE AT MEXICO CITY EMBASSY. FROM APRIL 1969 UNTIL JULY 1969 HE SERVED

DATE: 22 JULY 77
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

B 201-101794

RECORD COPY

201-132139
22 Jul 77

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION SECRET E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOO TPE MRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

070125

TEMPORARILY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF SOVIET NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY IN LIMA. DURING TOURS IN MEXICO LEONOV WAS CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE IN SUPPORT OF LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO GUATEMALA. Y

3. SENSITIVE FYI ONLY: PER PDSTORAGE, AS OF 1976 LEONOV WAS CHIEF OF SERVICE NO. 1 (INFORMATION) OF KGB FIRST (FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE) DIRECTORATE IN MOSCOW. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: POSITION IS EQUIVALENT TO BKHERALD CHIEF OF REPORTS.) LEONOV HAS BEEN CONSIDERED FOR AT LEAST TWO AMBASSADORIAL POSTS. Y

4. REF A INDICATES THAT LEONOV RECENTLY WAS IN PANAMA. THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT VISIT WAS MADE IN COMPANY OF VLADIMIR KONSTANTINOVICH TOLSTIKOV, FELLOW KGB OFFICER WITH WHOM LEONOV SERVED IN MEXICO DURING 1962-66 PERIOD (REF B). WASHINGTON CUSTOMERS ARE VERY INTERESTED IN OBJECTIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS DURING VISIT TO PANAMA AND PROBABLY TO BOGOTA (REF C). HAVE STATIONS OBTAINED ANY INFORMATION ON THIS TOPIC? Y

5. FILE: 201-132139, 201-101794. E2 IMPDET.#

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	SRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3		3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF		DIRECTOR	

CONF: / INFO: FILE

070125

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

ORIG: LA/PNC/P {THOMPSON-1454}; COORD: SE/CI/X {CROCKER}; LA/OPS {DiStefano }; SE/RR{EVERETT}; AUTH: C/LA/PNC {DESMOND}; REL: DC/LA ~~{WARREN}~~ LAUDER}.

LA COMMENT: A. SENSITIVE SOURCE INFORMATION REFERING TO SOVIET PERSON

B. TRACES ON SOVIET INTEL OFFICER WHO MAY RECENTLY HAVE VISITED PANAMA

C. PANAMA CITY REQUESTS BOGOTA STATION ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING SOVIET VISITOR

DATE: 22 JULY 77
ORIG: D. THOMPSON:RJ
UNIT: LA/PNC/P
EXT: 1454

SE/X/LA M. Ashton
SE/RR - [illegible] Everett

Lauder
DC/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

SE/CI/X
LA/OPS DiStefano
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Desmond
C/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET

SECRET

28 JUL 1977 ofHK

TO : Office of Central Reference/
Information Services Group
ATTN: Karen Davis, USSR Division

FROM : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich (U/AIUO)

1. (U/AIUO) Reference is made to your telephonic request dated 19 July 1977 for information concerning Subject.

2. (S) Our files show no indication of any connection between Subject and prominent Soviet officials.

3. (S) According to a reliable defector source, Nikolay LEONOV was identified as a KGB officer.

4. (S) Subject was graduated from the Institute of Foreign Relations in Moscow, at an unknown date. From July 1953 until October 1956 he served as an interpreter and Secretary to the Ambassador at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico. He traveled to Mexico in November 1959 and to Cuba in February 1960 as an interpreter. In July 1961 he returned to Mexico City as Third Secretary and Assistant Cultural Attache at the Embassy and served in this capacity until June 1964. He was assigned there again in October 1964 as Second Secretary and Press Attache. He remained in this position until December 1968. From April 1969 until July 1969 he served temporarily as representative of the Soviet News Agency Novosti in Lima, Peru.

CIR-316/02384-77
IP/EIS: J Edwards/L Foltz/et
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER: C/IP/RB
BASED ON: XAE 1251 dated 15 October 1976
HMMA 29141 dated 8 June 1966
FILE IN: 201-132139
COORD IN DRAFT:
SE/CI/X: M Biskup
LA/MEXI: R Lehman

RECORD COPY

21 July 1977
316-02384 77
201-132139

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

Classified by Auth Officer
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TELEPHONIC REQUEST

DATE

REQUESTING AGENCY FOI OCR via Karen Davis for State X9117	REPLY

REQUEST TAKEN BY Stacey	DATE 19 July 1977	ANALYST

SUBJECT (Last, First, Middle): Leonov, Nikolay Sergeyevich

AKA OR NEE:

DATE OF BIRTH 22 Aug 1928	PLACE OF BIRTH USSR	CITIZENSHIP

OCCUPATION (Include Dates)	RESIDENCE (Country, Town/City, Street, include Dates)
FATHER (Last, First, Middle)	MOTHER (Last, First, Middle, include Nee)

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA

IP/615		20 July 77
ANALYST	Linda Foltz	
OFFICE	PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE
SE/CI/X	M. Burking	MIBISKVP
EA/MEX	R. LEHMAN	R. Lehman

OCR telephoned 20 July

REQUEST FOR:	(Check appropriate box)	REPLY NEEDED BY no later than noon tomorrow
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION	
☐	ALL INFORMATION	201-132139
☑	SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIRED: any intelligence affiliation or connection with prominent Sov officials	

FORM 5-73 3541

SECRET

CL BY: 007622

(4-38)

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-0132139 074-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/68

KNOWN KGB

DATE 21 JUL 77 09524016

201-132139

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

SIEMPRE
20-4-77



DESTACADO LATINOAMERICANISTA RUSO NIKOLAI LEÓNOV, QUE VIVIÓ 12 AÑOS EN MÉXICO, HABLA A SIEMPRE! DE LOS MUCHOS PROBLEMAS DE NUESTRA AMÉRICA

POR INNA VASILKOVA

Estimado Sr. Pagés:

Nikolái Leónov –uno de los principales latinoamericanistas soviéticos de hoy, doctor en Ciencias Históricas y hombre por lo regular moderado en manifestar sus sentimientos– se pone sentimental cuando se habla de México...

"Considero a México, hasta cierto punto, mi segunda patria –dice–. He vivido allí doce años en total. Me enamoré de él a primera vista y estoy seguro de que mi cariño a este país no se empañará con los años."

Poco amigo de las entrevistas, esta vez Nikolái ha hecho una excepción. Para **SIEMPRE!** y para mí.

Ante todo, hablamos de la capital. Tanto más que Leónov publicó hace poc[illegible]n la revista soviética *America Latina*, un extenso ensayo sobre ella. Pido a Nikolái que diga lo que, a su parecer, determina la fison[illegible]a de esa ciudad.

Leónov: Cuando rememoro la ciudad de México e intento dilucidar en qué conjuntos arquitectónicos de la capital mexicana está mejor reflejado el espíritu de la nación, me vienen a las mientes, ante todo, los nuevos monumentos. Esos en los que se ha perpetuado la heroica lucha del pueblo por su independencia política y económica. Y entre ellos, en primer lúgar, el dedicado a los "Niños Héroes", los cuales, aunque no pudieron librar de los norteamericanos a la ciudad, a costa de sus vidas salvaron el honor y la dignidad de la nación. Eso para mí es el símbolo de México... Recuerdo que el general Ridgway, verdugo del pueblo coreano, visitó México y depositó una corona al pie del monumento. A la mañana siguiente la corona estaba ante la puerta de la embajada de los EE.UU. con la siguiente inscripción: "De asesinos no admitimos coronas".

Un símbolo de México es también el monumento a los trabajadores del petróleo. No se puede ver con frecuencia en un Estado capitalista un monumento a obreros, y que además, éstos no estén representados en un estilo banal-alegórico, sino en el proceso del trabajo.

Al pensar en México, recuerdo siempre asimismo la obra simbólica de Francisco Eppens en la fachada de la Facultad de Medicina de la Universidad. La gigantesca cabeza que ocupa el centro de la composición es, para mí, personificación de la nación mexicana; en ella parecen haberse fundido tres caras: la de una mujer india, la de un hombre español y la de un mestizo.

Y por último, la singular plaza de las Tres Culturas. Me parece que esa "triada" es precisamente lo que da a la ciudad de México su originalidad sin par.

Pregunta: Pero una ciudad no son sólo las

En 1968, en la inauguración de la XIX Olimpiada.

Leónov con Siqueiros, en su taller de Cuernavaca.

Leónov: Para comprender aunque no sea más que un poco el alma mexicana hay que ver, por lo menos, tres cosas: la plaza del Zócalo en la noche del 15 al 16 de septiembre, una corrida y la plaza de Garibaldi.

En la plaza del Zócalo se percibe con particular agudeza el hálito del pasado remoto, de la rica y turbulenta historia del país, que forjara el carácter de la nación. Allí se llega a comprender a fondo el arrogante amor de los mexicanos a su patria, sus seculares anhelos de libertad e independencia y su odio abrasador a los colonizadores de todo género, que hollaran inclementemente la antigua cultura y las tradiciones del país.

La corrida es una emocionante fiesta de valor, destreza y, de seguro, suerte, donde brota a raudales el fogoso temperamento de los mexicanos. Entre las infinitas tradiciones de la corrida mexicana, una es de mi grado en particular: la de perdonar la vida y poner en libertad al toro que por su bravura, potencia y tesón se gana la simpatía del público. Me subyuga la sabiduría del bicho que tiene como base tal costumbre y que emplear al hablar

nes que interpretaban mariachis. Para mí eso era siempre una fiesta. Y no sólo porque estoy enamorado del arte popular mexicano. Allí el alma mexicana se ofrece abierta de par en par, poniendo en evidencia su prodigalidad espiritual, su afecto y, lo que es más importante, la habilidad de compartir con uno –sin que ello resulte importuno– la alegría y la tristeza. Se sienta usted alegre y afligido, los mariachis están siempre dispueto a embellecer la alegría o a hacer romántica la tristeza.

El Robin Hood de América Latina

En agosto del año pasado, cuando Fidel castro cumplio cincuenta años, Leónov publicó en la revista soviética América Latina un artículo titulado "Salud te deseamos, Fidel". Aquello no era tanto una característica de relevante hombre, cuando una exposición de todo lo grande que tiene la nación cubana. Aparte de que, como historiador, Nikolái Leónov se ha dedicado a estudiar la Revolución Cubana y a sus líderes, con Fidel le liga

Rubén Figueroa Come
Ave De Las Tempestad

mía universitaria, entendida según el concepto ya generalizado de la libertad de cátedra y de investigación científica, no como zona extraterritorial en el marco de las instituciones jurídicas ni como fuero para vulnerar el orden público ni los intereses sociales". Insistió en que son las autoridades judiciales las que han realizado averiguaciones sobre la presunta injerencia de universitarios, maestros y alumnos, en el secuestro y muerte de varias personas. Ante eso Figueroa Dijo: "Yo no he inventado los secuestros; mucho menos los muertos, cosa bien difícil". Añadiría, tras otras consideraciones, que "a nadie se le ha detenido en razón de sus ideas o de su militancia políticas Cuando éstas han sali[illegible] a relucir en los procesos legales, [illegible] sido por propia declaración de los inculpados". En 1976 el gobierno del estado concedió a la Universidad de Guerrero un subsidio total de 19 millones 610 mil 482 pesos con 64 centavos, que casi duplica el otorgado el año inmediato anterior al inicio del gobierno de Figueroa. El gobernador reveló ante el Congreso y el numeroso públicó, que hay sectores locales que le han llamado la atención sobre un uso inadecuado del subsidio por parte de las autoridades de la Universidad y afirmó que "toda institución que recibe un subsidio tiene la obligación ineludible de informar a la sociedad respecto de su empleo, del mismo modo que los gobernantes informamos de nuestros actos y de la aplicación del presupuesto".

Al margen de la polémica, que siguió mantenida en esta parte del informe –o quizás como consecuencia de ello– Rubén Figueroa, hizo una proposición que constituye novedad en la materia; advirtiendo que no se vaya a interpretar mal su opinión y se piense que él se propone proscribir la enseñanza superior en Guerrero. Lo que desea es –aclaró– contribuir a la búsqueda de una solución pronta, eficaz y realista a este problema. Su gobierno está en posibilidad de aplicar una parte equitativa de su gasto educativo en becas otorgadas a alumnos de escasos recursos que deberían asistir a lo que llamó la Universidad compartida y solidaria. En el ambiente quedó una interrogante que demandaba una explicación de este concepto sorpresivamente nuevo. No flotó por mucho tiempo, pues acto seguido el gobernador contestó así: "Entiendo por Universidad compartida y solidaria un sistema nacional de enseñanza superior que, independientemente del que existe en el Valle de México, pueda instituir en cada entidad federativa una o varias escuelas, institutos o facultades que adopten aquellas especialidades que reclamen las características y las más ingentes necesidades de cada estado, a fin de que no se despilfarren recursos ni se malogren esfuerzos en la repetición de las mismas especialidades o profesiones, lo que redunda en la formación de profesionales frustrados, que no tienen ocupación".

la pesca, actividades de enorme importancia y de gran entidad, la cual carece de verdaderos especialistas. Esto n carreras liberales, las cuales según el plán del gobernado sujetas a otro régimen en el que los interesados cubran e enseñanza, mediante becas, crédito educativo o cuotas rer Otra vez frente a cualquier interpretación, el gobernador "no estoy colocándome en el plan de reformador de l universitaria a escala nacional. Sólo indago las posibilid solución a un problema que p[illegible]cularmente en mi estado y sobrepasa nuestra capacidad económica".

Refiriéndose en circulo [illegible]mo esta incursión en delicada cuanto conflictiva, el ingeniero Figueroa dijo al más, propio de su estilo: "Ni modo, me lancé al agua fría comentó: "¿Y qué? Si usted nada todos los dias".

Al licenciado Reyes Heroles, el gobernador Figuer llevarle al presidente López Portillo el recado de que e toman en cuenta todas sus recomendaciones para impulsar e del estado, en lo agropecuario, lo industrial, en lo educa turístico, igual en lo relativo a la salud del pueblo como a la familiar, lo mismo a los derechos sociales como a las individuales, "pues deseamos que la incipiente democrac Guerrero empieza a abrirse paso, lo sea sobre bases sólidas, e y políticas, en un ambiente de verdadera solidaridad social".

Si bien el informe del gobernador no fue un mazacote h reiterativas afirmaciones burocráticas, tampoco la respuesta sentante presidencial, Reyes Heroles consistió en las palat tradicional cortesía que el centro debe a los estados. Sí Guerrero, por conducto de su gobernador, expresa su decidida en la alianza democrática popular y revolucionari producción, para satisfacer las auténticas necesidades de la mayorías. Pero lo más significativo fue que el secretario de Gol escogiera Guerrero para anunciar una serie de reformas que p a las minorías tener representación reconocida. Y esas minoría son más que los partidos y grupos de izquierda afuera del electoral. Clamó allí contra la intolerancia que "sería el camir para volver a México bronco y violento. Señaló, ante los enfre tos ideológicos, a quienes desearían que surgiera la autor derecho, y, en otro lado, a los que recurriendo a las vías d violentas o atentatorias de derecho, desearían que en México se triste caso del derecho sin autoridad. Para unos y otros, dijo, la del Gobierno Federal es bien clara: ni autoridad sin derecho ni

Jinete sobre el espinazo de Améric

El 'Charro' Leono



Durante la ceremonia solemne de la entrega por Leonid Brezhnev a Fidel Castro de la Orden de Lenin y la Estrella de Oro del Héroe de la Unión Soviética, en mayo de 1963. A la izquierda, N. Leónov.

Castro es, sin duda, una Personalidad con mayúscula. ¿Cómo definiría usted el papel de él en la historia de Cuba?

Leónov: Los numerosos biógrafos de Fidel, de entre los historiadores burgueses, hacen desesperados intentos de hallar ciertos factores externos que puedan explicar la victoria de la Revolución en Cuba. Se suelen remitir a fenómenos de orden subjetivo, repitiendo la versión sobre la "culpabilidad" de Eisenhower, que prefirió jugar un partido de golf a entrevistarse con Castro cuando éste visitó los EE.UU. en la primavera de 1959. Y ninguno de esos "investigadores" ha querido analizar las regularidades objetivas de carácter socioeconómico ni el papel del mismo Fidel, quien sutil y oportunamente captó la orientación principal del desarrollo histórico y guió enérgicamente al país por el nuevo camino. Aquél fue un trabajo muy duro. Si antes Fidel hubo de dar reiteradas muestras de heroísmo personal, ahora ponía de manifiesto una colosal valentía política como hombre de Estado, asumiendo la responsabilidad por todas las decisiones relacionadas con la reestructuración del país. El aporte personal de Fidel a la primeros años consecutivos a la victoria de la Revolución habia que dar a las masas trabajadoras la posibilidad de palpar inmediatamente los frutos de esa victoria, sus resultados prácticos. Y en un país subdesarrollado, atrasado, se buscaron los recursos para construir una vasta red de hospitales y escuelas.

Los sistemas de salud pública y educación, creados en breve plazo, son hoy los mejores de América Latina. Pero una reestructuración de la economía tan rápida y profunda no podía, naturalmente, llevarse a cabo sin dificultades ni errores. Hay que reconocerlo: Fidel ha admitido más de una vez lo erróneo de algunas decisiones, y eso únicamente ha reforzado su autoridad entre el pueblo.

Una cualidad relevante de Fidel es, a mi entender, que sabe inculcar a la gente una fe inquebrantable en la victoria de su causa. La gente le sigue dominada por la idea y segura de que todo lo ideado se hará realidad.

Me vienen ahora a la memoria las frecuentes intervenciones de Fidel por la televisión, en asambleas y mitines. Recuerdo cómo personas de miras superficiales, adoptando la pose de comentaristas políticos, pretendían ironizar [illegible]

Castro para educar al pueblo cuban colosal autoridad de Fidel, su profunc erudición científica y sus vivas dotes de mista desempeñaron un papel que es sobrevalorar.

Debido al gran porcentaje de analf que había en el país y a la débil prepa política de la población, las intervencio Fidel eran una verdadera academia p para el pueblo cubano

Hoy la autoridad de Cuba ha crec manera inconmensurable. Los nombres dirigentes no se caen de las páginas prensa mundial. Por pequeña que sea de la Libertad y por fuertes que se tradiciones imperialistas de no tener en ta los intereses de los pueblos [illegible] quei cubanos se han hecho respetar. [illegible] firm defender sus derechos es un ra[illegible] impo de la nueva política exterior de[illegible]is, d por Fidel Castro

Este hombre de sino legendario, el Hood de América Latina, el artífice de las revoluciones socialistas más originale Edad Contemporánea, cuenta sólo cinc años. Estamos acostumbrados a que los cos y estadistas extranjeros, a esa edad, regular sólo empiezan a dar los primeros en la palestra nacional e internacional. ha dejado tras de sí montañas de logros. todo eso quiero hablar yo en un libro Fidel Castro, el cual estoy escribiendo actualidad.

América Central en el Espejo de la Historia

Me han contado que cuando Nikolái nov defendió las tesis de su doctorad Ciencias Históricas, la sala de conferenci Instituto de América Latina de la Acad de Ciencias de la URSS estaba literaln de bote en bote, tan grande era el interé el tema del estudio: "La historia mode contemporánea de América Central".

Cuando esa disertación publicóse en M en separata, al cabo de unos días er imposible encontrarle en las librerías: e bajo atraía no sólo a los especialistas, también al más amplio círculo de lectore lo singular de los datos reunidos por el durante su estancia en América Latina.

Nikolái Leónov me contó que, en los a vos centroamericanos, la mayoría de los mentos de esos tiempos han sido destru los dictadores han procurado no dejar ni rastro de sus crímenes. Y Leónov reuni una en una, en archivos de México y d EE.UU. y comprándoselas a particulare pias de valiosísimos documentos, las c abriga el propósito de regalar en breve a

cartas a Siempre!

ACLARACIÓN...

(Viene de la página 5) co muy a mi pesar (a pesar también de los esfuerzos realizados por el gobierno) por causas insuperables fue imposible emprender la construcción de una nueva Penitenciaría. Sin embargo, siempre he tenido confianza en las instituciones y los gobiernos, esperando con vehemencia que algún día continuará esa cruzada de humanidad carcelaria. Algún día también, habré de tener la oportunidad de comentar directamente al admirable Blanco Moheno, que en efecto mi sueño no es tranquilo, mientras existan problemas vitales que resolver en México. Como no soy millonario ni corruptor, siento como hombre y en carne propia las desgracias de los míos.

Agradeceré, señor Director, su benevolencia y atención para estas aclaraciones que espero sean publicables, rogándole de igual modo me tenga desde siempre, como amigo y devoto de SIEMPRE!

Respetuosamente,
Lic. Alberto Rosas Benítez.
Av. Corona 380-A 1º piso.
Guadalajara, Jal.

c.c. al Sr. D. Roberto Blanco Moheno.
Oficinas Generales de SIEMPRE!

A ESPAÑA...

(Viene de la página 15) multitudinario de la península.

Va a ser invitado don Gustavo a partidas de caza. En los Montes de Toledo, podrá echarle el ojo aunque difícilmente la bala al gato montés y al lince, al ciervo seguramente meterle en las paletas un pedazo de plomo y de todos modos abismarse con el espectáculo de las liebres trigaleras que por el rumbo se multiplican como estrellas en una noche de verano. Igual hará en Pontevedra, en la Sierra de La Estrada y Lalín; en Teruel igual. Y en Salamanca, con menos suerte que puntería cobrar un jabalí de los centenares que nomadean los cotos aledaños.

Y vuelta a la comida que no lo dejará jamás; que de él va a ser sombra y manera de calar sus excelencias de gastrónomo "Indiano". Y el vino, sin el cual no es imaginable tragar ningún bocado español. Vamos a ver, a repasar, a presentir el bicarbonato que don Gustavo utlizará de continuo: en la misma Pontevedra, para no ir más lejos, pulpos a la Marinera, chuletas de Moaña y empanadas de todo lo que vive la tierra, el mar y el aire. ¡Recuerda usted, jefe, las panzurronas de bacalao con pasas y piñones y las apretaditas de lampreas, anguilas, salmonetes y mejillones? Para que toda esa masa luculesca se quede en el fondo hay que ayudarla con melindres de Silleda y Fuenteareas.

Tendrá que beber don Gustavo. En verano, valdepeñas ligerito. Y llegado el invierno los vinos espesos de Rioja. Recuerdo, jefe, que allá en Logroño, una tarde de frío junto a la chimenea de don Augusto Chenel, di cuenta de unos bizcochos de Torrecilla que insistía en mojar en un riojano de color igual al terno de luces que Paco Camino estrenó un domingo en Madrid, cabe el recuerdo de una Feria de San Isidro. ¡Mi dios, qué vino aquél para darle calor a mis huesos y andando el tiempo a mis nostalgias! Volveré.

Si le digo cuántos primores más lucirá el Embajador de México obli-

gremio de pedantes que exige que debe saber tanto de España que pueda distinguir entre Picasso y Dalí, entre Gaudí y Tarragó, entre Albeniz y Falla, entre Camilo José Cela y Unamuno, entre un colmao y una venta de gitanos, entre una farruca y una bulería. ¡Bah! Tanto de todo eso saber. ni los nacidos allá.

Usted movía tristemente la cabeza cuando intentábamos el diseño del Embajador. Yo hacía lo mismo. El meneadero lo hemos interrumpido. Ya tenemos. Y hay que reiterar que no me parece mal. Don Gustavo tiene apariencia formal, muy formal. Pero no sé por qué presiento que también gusta de vivir intensamente, a la manera española.

Cosas que platicamos hace poco, jefe, en su casa de Emerson, mientras dábamos cuenta de un arroz con azafrán hecho por las manos bordadoras de doña Beatriz, su señora esposa; de un cordero chilindrón con igual sello culinario y de una montaña de Lacón de El Bierzo leonés.

No exijo exclusivamente tragón a don Gustavo. También, jefe, es menester que sepa beber. A más de otras cosas intrínsecamente españolas. Lo demás, será lo de menos.

Lo saludo con afecto
Luis Gutiérrez y González.

EL ANTICOMUNISMO...

(Viene de la página 34) París, consideraba que la batalla a ser trabada en 1978 por las fuerzas liberales en defensa del régimen actual será la última frente al programa común de los partidos de izquierda cuya meta es alcanzar una sociedad que no sólo se transformará en marxista sino que será irreversible.

[illegible]eigh y su grey no se convencen de que Europa siempre modeló el destino de nuestra América. De ahí partieron nuestros conquistadores. De ahí vinieron las ideas liberales de la Revolución Francesa. De ahí se derivó el fascismo que, derrotado en la segunda guerra mundial, se refugió en nuestro Continente para vivir oculto en los países que, hoy, lo exhiben, como una fiera sedienta de sangre, aun sabiendo que sus días están contados.

Los crímenes que el fascismo comete en Chile, en Uruguay, Argentina y otros países, muestran que su naturaleza no mudó, mas no abaten la resistencia de los pueblos afectados, sobre todo cuando esos pueblos se alientan con las victorias alcanzadas en Europa contra Franco y Salazar, en Asia (Vietnam, Camboya, Laos) y en África (Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Argelia, etc.). Si los muros erguidos por el fascismo, el imperialismo y el neocolonialismo están cayendo, estrepitosamente, en otros Continentes, ¿por qué nuestra América habría de ser la excepción?

El mundo es una totalidad. Los dinosaurios de Asunción no pueden ignorarlo. Ellos suman 180. Y la América Latina son 300 millones. Es eso lo que los exaspera, que los irrita, que los atormenta.

Estas bestias ya no duermen. El marxismo es su pesadilla.

Francisco Juliao
Cuernavaca, 4/abril/77.

EL CHARRO...

(Viene de la página 43) una obra originalísima, que sin duda alguna llamará la atención también de los historiadores latinoamericanos.

Pregunta: ¿Por qué eligió usted precisamente ese tema?

Leónov: La historia de Centroamérica, me

queños países a quienes los grandes "manejaban" como les daba la gana. Y en segundo, quería rendir tributo de respeto al gran historiador y científico guatemalteco Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, un hombre de extraordinaria honradez e inaudita valentía, quien me inculcó el cariño a la América Central y me regaló una parte de su biblioteca particular. Entonces me dijo unas palabras que resultaron proféticas: "Por lo que se ve, ni yo ni mis compañeros podremos ya escribir acerca de la sufridísima América Central. Tal vez eso lo hagas tú".

Víctor Manuel sucumbió en las mazmorras de la dictadura guatemalteca. Y esas palabras suyas devinieron para mí un mandato, que yo consideraba indispensable cumplir.

Pregunta: ¿Qué enseñanzas puede sacar la humanidad, a entender de usted, de la experiencia histórica de América Central?

Leónov: La historia de cada país, aunque sea pequeño, y más aún la de toda una subregión, es aleccionadora. Lo importante es seleccionar los problemas y acontecimientos significantes que caractericen con más plenitud las peculiaridades del desarrollo histórico de esos países precisamente.

A mí me parece que América Central, ante todo, da una lección de lucha por la unidad. Toda su historia es la mejor confirmación de una vieja y sabia verdad: "La unión hace la fuerza".

Al mismo tiempo, al analizar la lucha por la unidad en América Central, se llega a la conclusión de que la unidad por sí misma no es un bien o un mal. Todo depende de en interés de quién se realiza. En las condiciones históricas concretas del siglo XIX, la lucha unionista de Francisco Morazán y Justo Rufino Barrios era, sin duda, un fenómeno progresista, pues se mantenía bajo las consignas que postulaban la defensa de la independencia de la región, el acelerado desarrollo socioeconómico y la ampliación de la democracia. Pero no se debe olvidar que también el aventurero norteamericano Willian Walker, que se apoderara de Nicaragua, lanzó asimismo la consigna de la unidad centroamericana: "¡Cinco o ninguna!", pero a base del restablecimiento de la esclavitud y de la supeditación absoluta de esa región a los Estados Unidos. Los pueblos de América Latina rechazaron y rechazarán la unidad en tales condiciones.

Quisiera señalar otra importante enseñanza que se puede sacar al estudiar la historia de América Central: la importancia que tiene valorar y comprender a tiempo a los grandes patriotas y luchadores por la libertad, apoyarlos cuando aún están vivos. Por trágica ironía de la suerte, todos los verdaderos héroes de América Central fueron ejecutados o asesinados por compatriotas suyos, cuyos descendientes hoy idolatran literalmente a aquéllos. Esos héroes son hoy la gloria y el orgullo de las naciones. Pero como suele acaecer con frecuencia, el reconocimiento y la comprensión de sus ideales llegaron sólo muchos años después de haber muerto ellos.

Pregunta: En el libro de usted se menciona con bastante frecuencia a los Estados Unidos. ¿Qué podría decir usted del papel de los mismos en la historia de América Central?

Leónov: A mi entender, la noción más plena sobre la política de los EE.UU. en esa subregión la dan las instrucciones redactadas por el Departamento de Estado para William Jeffers, el primer enviado extraordinario de los EE.UU. en América Central. Se decía en ellas que Centroamérica ofrecía un interés singular para los EE.UU. debido a la situación geográfica de la misma y a la posibilidad de

Central. En particular se decía en ellas que el bajo nivel de desarrollo industrial y la necesidad de capitales y de hombres diestros debían poner a América Central, para largo tiempo, en dependencia de los suministros extranjeros de diversas mercancías.

Ofrece gran interés en este plano, a mi entender, el discurso que pronunciara el 14 de septiembre de 1853 el enviado extraordinario norteamericano en Nicaragua, Solon Borlund, al hacer entrega de sus cartas credenciales. Declaró sin ambigüedades que la nación que ocupaba tan favorable posición geográfica no podía poseer esa riqueza sólo y exclusivamente en su propio interés, cerrando el acceso a todas las demás.

Mientras tanto, el enviado extraordinario mexicano en América Central (con residencia en Guatemala) escribía a México el 1 de abril de 1854 que los norteamericanos no ponían freno a sus actividades y con una insolencia inaudita procuraban el dominio de todo el subcontinente, apoderarse de él, por lo que crecía la necesidad de dar otro giro a las relaciones entre los Estados hispanoamericanos, pues se trataba ya de defenderse, mediante la creación de alianzas militares, de la catástrofe que les amenazaba.

Pregunta: Por cierto, ya que se ha tratado de México, ¿qué influencia ejerció éste, a juicio de usted, en el desarrollo del acontecer en América Central?

Leónov: Se dio el caso de que en algunos periodos, bajo la presión reaccionaria, México actuó en la región de común acuerdo con los EE.UU. Así fue, por ejemplo, en los tiempos de la lucha de Justo Rufino Barrios por la reunificación de América Central (1871-1885). Pero en general, el papel de México ha sido progresista. No cabe ninguna duda de que el acontecer en México ejerció con frecuencia una gran influencia [illegible] en sus vecinos meridionales. Como ejemplo aduciré aunque no sea más que el periodo de las Reformas en Guatemala, parecido al periodo de las transformaciones realizadas en México por Juárez, quien simpatizaba con sus correligionarios políticos en aquel país y los ayudaba.

Recordaré asimismo que precisamente a bordo de un buque de guerra mexicano marchó al exilio José Santos Zelaya, presidente de Nicaragua depuesto bajo la presión de los EE.UU. Y en los años veinte de nuestro siglo, el gobierno de México concedió a Sandino y a sus compañeros más inmediatos –en los tiempos más duros para ellos– la posibilidad de entrar en México para descansar y curarse y hasta se encargó del mantenimiento de los mismos.

Con frecuencia México hubo de hacer equilibrios en sus relaciones mutuas con sus vecinos norteño y meridionales. Así, explicando el porqué se había negado la ayuda en armas y municiones a los patriotas nicaragüenses, el expresidente mexicano Portes Gil decía en sus memorias que aunque el gobierno y el pueblo de México simpatizaban con la lucha de aquéllos, él no había podido entregarles armas, ya que durante los últimos dos años México mantenía las relaciones más cordiales con los Estados Unidos y él no debía dar ningún paso que redundara en perjuicio de dichas relaciones...

• • •

Para terminar le pregunto a Nikolái Leónov ¿qué quisiera transmitir él a sus numerosos amigos en México?

"Mis más cordiales, más fervientes y más sinceros votos de felicidad, éxitos y salud", responde. A continuación toma mi libreta de apuntes y escribe

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-0132139 C74-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/62

CIT USSR

KNOWN KGB
SEE HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO.

DATE 18 FEB 77 09475796

201-132139

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-0132139 074-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/25
POB USSR
CIT USSR

RES USSR.

DATE 01 FEB 77 CORR CARD 09274849

201-132139

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

SECRET SEP 17, 1976

[illegible] LOCHOV FINDLAY SERGEYEVICH

[illegible] NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
[illegible] ALEKSANDR [illegible] 22.26
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] SEP 6 76
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

FBI NAME TRACE REQUEST. These data were furnished by the FBI COINS Program. These and any additional data from the COINS Program are being incorporated into appropriate DDO area division machine collation programs.

MD011155

201-132139

SECRET CS

CLASSIFIED BY 37
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY NUMBER 2
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDEFINITE

```
                                    SECRET                    NOV 22, 1976


00 04319  011155  LEONOV                     NIKOLAY               SERGEYEVICH
 3 G-2  DURATION            SEP 14 76
 E DELEGATE
 F UNGA 31ST SESSION                                                  SEP 19 76
 J 09/19/76 -A
 M                                                        SEP 19 76


                                   INACTIVE
 J 10/10/76 -D
```

THIS CONTAINS ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION FROM FBI

```
                                    SECRET                CS
                 CLASSIFIED BY  37
                 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
                 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
                 EXEMPTION CATEGORY   NUMBER 2
                 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDEFINITE
```

OUTGOING MESSAGE

13- 1/

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPG	MRO	OCI		PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1		

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
	082020Z	CIA/DDO	939725

CONF: IP/EI 8 INFO: FILE — C/OPS CI LSN/ID, SE 8

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 25
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SOP

201-132139 104

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.Y

ROOM 4426 J EDGAR HOOVER BUILDING

SECRET WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

EHR

TRAVEL PROGRAM

CIR-316-04209-76

REF: MACHINE LISTING REQUEST NUMBER 00 04319 DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1976 AND RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE 7 OCTOBER 1976

1. SUBJECT: LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH (MD NO 011155)
(AKA KOLYA AND KOLYECHKA LEONOV)
DPOB: 22 AUGUST 1928, ALMAZOVO, USSR (ALSO REPORTED AS RYAZAN, USSR)

2. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA: USSR; PASSPORT NO. 10724, ISSUED IN MOSCOW 29 JANUARY 1952; D 6863, ISSUED 22 JULY 1964; D 18009.

3. CURRENT POSITION: EMPLOYEE OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

4. LANGUAGES: EXCELLENT SPANISH, GOOD ENGLISH, SOME FRENCH, LITTLE GERMAN.

5. RELATIVES: SPOUSE: VALERIYA IVANOVNA LEONOVA DPOB: RYAZAN,

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

8 Nov 1976

201-132139

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF	AGL	COI	ACP	YOB	TPS	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		

CLASSIFICATION

S EC R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA/DDO

CONF: INFO: FILE

939725

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER

0201-132339

USSR, 28 APRIL 1928. PASSPORT DATA: C 11507, ISSUED 28 FEBRUARY 1953; D 6862; D 18010. DAUGHTER: IRINA LEONOVA DPOB: 16 MARCH 1962, MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

PT
6. PHYSICAL DESCRI■■ION: AS OF 1966 SUBJECT WAS DESCRIBED AS THIN WITH A LONG FACE, BLONDE HAIR AND BLUE EYES. ■■■ HE WAS FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TALL.

7. PERSONALITY TRAITS: SUBJECT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS PLEASANT, OUTGOING, INTELLIGENCT, SHREWD, CONSCIENTIOUS, AND RELIABLE. HE HAS A SENSE OF HUMOR BUT DISPLAYS A TEMPER AT TIMES.

8. CURRICULUM VITAE: SUBJECT WAS GRADUATED FROM THE INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN MOSCOW, AT AN UNKNOWN DATE. FROM JULY 1953 UNTIL OCTO■BER 1956 HE SERVED AS AN INTERPRETER AND ■■ SECRETARY TO THE AMBASSADOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEX■■ICO CITY, MEXICO./FROM 1956 TO 1961 HE WAS IN MOSCOW DURING ■WHICH TIME HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ATTENDED THE SCHOOL FOR THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY {KGB} ■FROM 1958 UNTIL 1960/ /FROM 1960 UNTIL 1961 HE WAS AT THE FIFTH DEPARTMENT OF KGB HEADQUARTERS/ HE TRAVELED TO MEXICO IN NOVEMBER 1959 AND T■O CUBA IN FEBRUARY 1960 AS AN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

4

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ROG CDI ACP TOD TPS MRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA/DDO

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER

939725

0 201-132139

INTERPRETER. IN JULY 1961 HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AS THIRD ■■■■■■■ SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT CULTURAL ATTACHE AT THE EMBASSY AND SERVED IN THIS CAPACITY UNTIL JUNE 1964. HE WAS ASSIGNED THERE AGAIN IN OCTOBER 19■64 AS SECOND SECRETARY A■ND PRESS ATTACHE. HE REMAINED IN THIS POSITION UNTIL DECEMBER 1968. FROM APRIL 1969 UNTIL JULY 1969 HE SERVED TEMPORARILY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY NOVOSTI IN■ LIMA, PERU. / DURING HIS TOURS ■IN MEXICO, HE WAS ■■■■■■■■■ CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE IN CLANDESTINE SUPPORT OF LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY RELATING TO GUATEMALA. //

9. FOR FU■RTHER INFORMATION YOU ARE REFE■RRED TO CSCI-316/■ 0■3956-66, DATED 5 AUGUST 1966, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH AN INFORMATION COPY TO YOUR BUREAU.

10. NO CRS INFORMATION

11. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

12. CLASSIFIED BY 062147. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY PARA: 5B(2). AUTOM■■■ATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE.H

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

062147

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE OF PAGES 4

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER

CONF: INFO: FILE

939725

0201-132139

BASED ON: HMM 1524, 9 APRIL 1956

HMMA 18303, 15 DECEMBER 1961

MEXI 9740, 04 JUNE 1964

MEXI 1218, 14 OCTOBER 1964

HMMA 24698, 6 NOV 64

HMMA 29141, 8 JUNE 66

HMMA 29934, 31 AUG 66

FILE IN: [redacted] 201-132139

DATE: 2 NOV 76
ORIG: D HAMMER
UNIT: IP/EIS:JE/DM
EXT: 9245

Ralph Katrosh
C/PCS/SLN
RELEASING OFFICER

COORD IN DRAFT:
SE/X/FR: B WILHITE
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for Murray A. Reitch
C/IP/EIS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

062147

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET   SEP 17, 1976

[illegible]   KIRSLAY   SERGEYEVICH

[illegible]   KIRILOV   SERGEYEVICH
[illegible]   ALMAZOVO   AUG 22 28
[illegible]   RESIDE   SEP 6 74

7-10 76

IP/FIS COORDINATION	DATE: JUL 1976	
ANALYST:	NOTE:	
OFFICE	PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE
SE/K/FBhy	B. WILHITE	B Wilhite

FBI NAME TRACE REQUEST. These data were furnished by the FBI COBICS Program. These and any additional data from the COBICS Program are being incorporated into appropriate DDO area division machine collation programs.

MD#011155

SECRET   CS

CLASSIFIED BY 37
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY NUMBER 2
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDEFINITE

201-132139

CONFIDENTIAL

15 October 1976

COVER MEMORANDUM FOR XAE-1251

SUBJECT: Nikolay Sergeyevich Leonov (201-132139)

SOURCE : Petr Deryabin, a former KGB officer whose information has proven reliable in the past.

1. The attached report on Leonov was prepared by Deryabin, who knew him personally in Moscow as an officer of the KGB First Chief Directorate.

2. A review of Leonov's 201 file indicates that he had been granted a US visa as a member of a Soviet delegation to the United Nations General Assembly scheduled to depart Moscow on 19 September 1976.

Thomas A. Ryan
C/CI/R&A/E

Attachment:
As Stated, XAE-1251

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-132139
DO NOT DESTROY

E2 IMPDET CL BY 19759

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

11 September 1976

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Deryabin comments on ([illegible]-132131)
Nikolay ~~Sergeyevich~~ Leonov, KGB Officer and Personal Friend of Fidel ~~Castro of Cuba.~~

1. Soviet magazine Latinskaya Amerika, issue No. 4, for July-August 1976 (pp 127-142) published an article entitled "To Your Health, Fidel!" by N. S. Leonov, who is identified in the article as a "journalist".

On page 138 there is a photograph of Fidel Castro with the author of the article, journalist N. Leonov. In this photograph I definitely recognize KGB officer Nikolay Sergeyevich Leonov. I knew Leonov in Moscow as a KGB officer of the First Chief Directorate (FCD). The last time I saw him in KGB Hqs was during the summer of 1953. At that time I did not know in what department of the FCD Leonov worked. (Copy of this photo is enclosed)

2. I recognized another photo of Leonov, N.S., in the late 1950's or the beginning of the 1960's for the Agency or the FBI.

N. S. Leonov also was recognized by me on the photograph published in the Soviet book Viva Cuba, which was published in Moscow in 1963 or 1964. In this photograph Leonov appeared in the company of Khrushchev, Castro and Alekseyev (Shitov) Aleksandr Ivanovich, (also known to me personally as a KGB senior officer.) the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba at that time.

N. S. Leonov also was recognized by me in the photograph published by Golos Rodiny, issue No. 32, for April 1963. In this photograph Leonov's face is shown between Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Castro at Vnukovo Airport on 23 April 1963 when Castro arrived on his visit to the USSR. (Copy of this photograph is enclosed)

XAE-1251
14 Sept. '76

Routing:
C/CI/RA/E
C/CI/RA
SE/CI
SE/C

RP/AN

3. In his article, highly praising Fidel Castro, Leonov reviews Castro's life and his accomplishments as a "revolutionary leader". The author revealed that when Castro lived in Mexico, 1955-56, he established contact with Alberto Bayo, former colonel of the Spanish Republican Army, who emigrated to Mexico after the Spanish Civil War, and who became Castro's "military instructor". Also, in Mexico Castro was joined by Che Guevara, who became his close friend. The author briefly mentioned that the CIA had planned "a physical liquidation of Fidel Castro".

In 1963 Castro was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The article was written in connection with Castro's 50th birthday, which was on 13 August 1976.

The article provided photographs of Castro and some of his associates. The photographs for the article were provided by Novosti press agency, and by the Soviet magazine Kuba, which is published in Russian and in Spanish.

Petr Deryabin

CIRA/E Comment: According to information in Leonov's 201, he had applied for a visa as an employee of the MFA to the UNGA, in September 1976.

According to SE/CI/Ext. Leonov is presently chief of Service #1 (Information) of the First Chief Directorate.

Первое посещение Советского Союза Рядом с Фиделем Кастро на трибуне митинга, состоявшегося на Уралмаше,— автор статьи, журналист Н. Леонов

Latinskaya Amerika # 4,
July-August 1976. (p 138)

Caption: "First visit to the Soviet Union. Next to Fidel Castro ... author of the article, journalist N. Leonov".



Golos Rodiny, # 32 for April 1963.

Caption under the photograph:
"23 April 1963. Arrival in Moscow of Fidel Castro, Prime-Minister of the Revolutionary Government Republic of Cuba. Greetings at Vnukovo Airport. From left to right: N. Khrushchev, Chairman Council of Ministers of the USSR, /N.S. Leonov/, L. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and F. Castro."

attachment to
XAE-1251
14 Sept. 1976

14-00000

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

PDSTORAGE
SBSR- 2051

Country: USSR

Subject: Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV

[illegible] : 1975-1976

Source : Two sources Reporting Separately

X

Any dissemination of this information to Field Stations or to officers not on the initial distribution must be coordinated with SE/CI/X. As a general rule, PDSTORAGE information is not releasable to foreign or domestic liaison services or to any office outside the DDO.

1. LEONOV, a high-ranking KGB officer, is currently Chief of Service No. 1 (Information) of the KGB's First (Foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate in Moscow. According to one source, LEONOV was to be appointed Ambassador to Poland, but that assignment was cancelled when he became Chief of Service No. 1. Another source reported in early 1975 that LEONOV was Chief of Service No. 1 and was scheduled to be appointed as Ambassador to Portugal when he received his Service No. 1 assignment instead.

2. LEONOV is very knowledgeable on Latin America and speaks excellent Spanish.

COMMENTS:

1. For previous PDSTORAGE reporting on LEONOV, please see PDSTORAGE report 984, 16 September 1964.

Con't

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

d-11996
201-132139

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2. According to LEONOV's 201 file, he is scheduled to attend the 1976 session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

22 October 1976

Distribution:
1-C/SE/CI/X
1-SE/CI/X (Grimes)
1-C/SE/CI/R
2-SE/CI/R (Vault)
1-C/SE/IO
1-C/SE/CI/I
1-C/SE: DC/SE: SE/COPS
1-C/SE/XO
1-C/CI/R&A
1-C/CI/R&A/F
1-IP/AN - 201-132139

201-132139

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

UNIT NOTIFIED

FILE VR c/elsov3

c/ely sel3, CI/SI/IC, [illegible]

SE7

T 211605 EIA765 PAGE 01-01 IN 91[illegible]

TOR:291129Z SEP 76

(3)

R 290013Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6476
RUEHFB/DIRECTOR FBI
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN 5443
BT
UNCLAS MOSCOW 14177
DEPT FOR VO AND EUR/SOV INFO
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: CVIS UR/UN (KHRUSTALEV, YEVGENIY VLADIMIROVICH)
SUBJECT: VISAS: SOVIETS TO UNGA
1. VISAS FOR
2. KHRUSTALEV, YEVGENIY VLADIMORIVICH
JAN [illegible] 1927 ROSTOV NA DONU
EMPLOYEE OF MFA
3. LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
[illegible] 1928 RYAZANSKAYA OBL
EMPLOYEE OF MFA
4. [illegible], PETR PORFIR'YEVICH
[illegible] 19[illegible] VOROSHILOVGRAD
EMPLOYEE OF MFA
ETD SEPT 19, 1976
[illegible] OF SOVIET DELEGATION TO UNGA. STOESSEL

NAI to CSCI-316/03740-69, dated 29 Oct 69 & repts to FBI. 17 SEP 1976 3

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

201-132139

create chrono copy.

IR-475

19 June 1975

SECRET

To: J. A.

DJR's Preliminary Rundown of Soviet KGB Officers in Mexico City ~~Associated with~~ OSWALD Assassination of Pres. KENNEDY; ~~Notes on~~

This is what I could dig out so far.

1. Notes on : ALEKSEYEV, A. I., known to me personally, senior KGB officer.

2. LEONOV, N. S., known to me personally, KGB officer.

3. SAGATELYAN, M. R. I didn't know him personally, but I have no doubt he is an RIS/KGB officer.

4. ANDRONOV, I. On the basis of his writings, he is probably RIS/KGB officer. For certain, at least a co-optee.

5. KOSTIKOV, V. V. I don't remember whether I identified him previously. He is exposed as a known KGB officer.

6. YATSKOV, P. A. Known RIS KGB officer and I have no doubt about him.

7. I have found some interesting writings in the Star for 18 June 1975, in the column: Party Talk Is Always CIA, by Betty BEALE. There is a discussion about the KGB involvement in the assassination.

Also, in the Washington Post for 19 June 1975, in the editorial page "Russia Reports on the CIA." A copy of these articles is included.

Please let me know if I can provide more assistance to you.

cc chrono (p.1 only)
Temp

Thank you,

Orig t J.A. 19/6/75

Att - 2 pages of clippings

LKM

SECRET

D.J.R.

Cl by 012208
E2 Impdet
XAE-857
19 June 75
100-6-154/4

14-00000

X-REF. SHEET S-E-C-R-E-T DATE 03/01/76

X-REF.	SYMB. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-0132139	HMMA-30416	28 OCT 66	201-0885685

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT(S) ARE CROSS-REFERENCED
TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF
THE FILE CONTAINING THE RECORD COPY DOCUMENT,
CALL FILES SECTION, EXTENSION 4127.

S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FILE IN 201-0132139

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

X PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIREALM Progress Report, 31 October 1965 through 30 April 1966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HMMA-27674, 2 December 1965

B. HMMA-28838, 6 May 1966

3P

1. Attached is the second LIREALM progress report, which covers largely the period during which Robert L. EASBY has assumed the handling of this agent. It will be noted that the main headings are those laid out in the statement of objectives forwarded with reference B.

2. Each month, LIREALM gives EASBY a list of new contacts, a brief sketch of each, and any ideas he has on how they might be used to get at his main targets. These are routinely traced in order to give him indications of people of particular interest, or of possible danger to his cover. For example, when he listed Charles and Bertha SMALL as persons he had met at an art exhibit, he was told to avoid them and their group unless at a social function where they could not be avoided. We have no desire to have ODENVY open a dossier on him.

3. Of the attached listed contacts, Station has traces only on the following:

Attachment:
Progress Report, h/w

CONTINUED

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WHD, w/att

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

CS COPY

1cH

201-773327

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28979	18 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	FFN:/ P-11185

a. Alimuddin LUBIS. The only material available is that contained in HMMW-14223, 22 December 1965.

b. Suzanne *FELICIEN. LIREALM has previously reported she is in charge of "medical relations" and scholarships at the French Embassy. The only other information in the files is that provided by Albert de BONFILS in June 1962 through a casual Station contact. Since we were never in direct touch with him, and owing to the questionable nature of the whole BONFILS background and the lack of any solidity, this information must be accepted with some reserve. "Extreme Communist--propagandist--extremely dangerous--bad influence on scholarship students whom she uses as instruments and contacts--head of the scholarship service--much favoritism in the distribution of scholarships--accepts and demands gifts and money--obliges certain applicants to take French lessons which she gives and charges for. These lessons are her method of indoctrinating them."

c. Jean-Claude *DUCLAY. A routine memo from Barbara C. HUFIG, dated 26 November 1964, mentioned subject as having been in charge of the intensive French course taken by members of the doctoral and the history programs at El Colegio de Mexico. On 23 November 1964 he married Irene *AZNAR, then about 27, who was also teaching in the course and who had been here only since 1963, coming directly from France where she had been a teacher.

d. Beno and Carol Cook *LIEBERMAN. LIREALM and his wife met Mrs. Lieberman shortly after they arrived here. Beno they met in late January at the Mexican Folklore Association, which they conduct weekly at their home. It is a variety of "hootenanny" where both hosts and guests perform, and occasionally visiting entertainers appear. It is a meager living indeed, with 25 pesos a person being charged, and fortunately they do not have to depend on it, since Carol Lieberman has a fairly well paying job at The News. Beno was described as aesthetic-looking, undernourished, ill-kempt and very Jewish looking. However, LIREALM found him sensitive, gentle and interested in people. It was at one of these evenings where LIREALM met Nikolay LEONOV (see below). The Lieberman's were also reported to have attended a luncheon at the home of Pearl GONZALEZ, one of the reporters for The News, at which two officers of the Soviet Embassy were guests.

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

e. Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132134)
Leonov and LIREALM spent the evening discussing chess and later made an appointment to play at LIREALM's house. This visit was marked by totally unpolitical conversation and Leonov asked no leading questions. The two couples got on well, and a return match is planned. (A personality report is being prepared on Leonov and will be submitted after the second meeting. LIREALM is being encouraged to see Leonov, about whom little concrete is known outside of his cover work.)

4. The format of these reports will require some reworking, and this will be done following EASBY's return from home leave. During EASBY's absence, LIREALM will report to Willard C. CURTIS whom he has already met.

RLEasby
for
Willard C. CURTIS

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

45

LIREALM Progress Report

31 October 1965 - 31 April 1966

1. The period October 1965 to February 1966 was largely devoted to building a circle of useful contacts in the French colony and intellectual world and getting to know the case officer. When the latter left in early 1966, I was introduced to my present case officer. Past activity was reviewed and evaluated, targets discussed and objectives clearly defined.

2. The following will give some indication of advances made so far against the target objectives laid out in HMMA-28838:

   a. French Embassy floor plan. Under various pretexts, numerous visits have been made to the Embassy. A rough diagram is ready with the occupants of most of the offices identified. Remodeling of the building is in process. Some officers will be transferred from one room to another. The basic structure of the building will not be altered.

   b. Contacts leading toward the French target. Those persons named below have all been met at least once during April and are deemed to be worthy of further development for their apparent access in the French community. This number represents only a fraction of persons met and virtually discarded for lack of operational promise:

      201-[illegible] 68

      (1) Regis Thillaye du Boullay. Met on several occasions. Press Attache of the French Embassy, and possibly their Political Section head. Several sources

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

CS C[illegible]

describe him as displeased with his present rank at the Embassy. Some bio data is now available, but further development is definitely warranted. He is friendly and approachable. His value lies in (a) his leading to other Embassy officers and providing bio data about them; (b) his being disgruntled and providing information wittingly; (c) his being an intelligence officer.

(2) Henri de *Coignac. Met on several occasions. Have made tentative tennis date. Is very close to the Ambassador. The nature of his relationship or the services provided to the Ambassador have to be determined.

(3) Genevieve *San Jose. Have seen on several occasions and have established fairly friendly relationship. She is a journalist with the Le Journal Francais. Has already been a source of some bio data about Embassy officers, introduced to some members of French colony, corroborated some information obtained elsewhere.

(4) Marie Bideault *Lesort. Switchboard operator at Embassy. Unmarried, friendly, helpful. Have visited her on various pretexts, now stop by just to say hello. Hope to set her up for another agent to meet and develop.

(5) Valentine *Honorat. Secretary to Jacques Seigle, Attache at Embassy. Elderly, friendly, helpful. Corrected letter I wrote to Ambassador. In return I gave her a box of chocolates for which she seemed genuinely grateful. Offered to help me in future in any way she could.

(6) Suzanne *Felicien. Assistant to Cultural Attache. Seen several times on business. Friendly. Known to mutual friends. Possible source of bio data on other Embassy personnel. Has invited my wife and me to dinner. This could be our first important break.

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

c. Possibly Significant Contacts. Because of my close friendship with them, their access or their lack of apparent income.

(1) Jacques C. *Derney. Private businessman, "Artistic Counselor." Lives outside his apparent income, probably homosexual.

(2) Jean-Claude *Duclay. Professor at Centre Scientifique. Very friendly. Function of Centre and reason for its enormous staff not clear.

(3) Francois and Monique *Gilliot. Commercial Attache. He is very anti-U.S. She is friendly to my wife.

(4) Andre and Norma *Lesur. Close ties with Andre could lead to close friendship. Very prominent in French colony. Wealthy businessman. Possibly willing to collaborate with us wittingly.

d. Mexican Intellectuals

(1) Beno and Carol Lieberman. Run Mexican Folklore Association. Have access to large circle of Latin American semi-professional musicians and entertainers. Gradually obtaining bio data on Beno and his friends.

(2) Feliciano *Bejar. Prominent artist. Friend of the U.S., but has many friends among the Mexican left.

(3) Martin *Foley. British national. Manager of Bejar. Technical director of Ballet Folklorico. Brilliant, friend of many Mexican artists and intellectuals, left and right.

(4) Adrian *Leyva Schoonmaker. Professor at Unidad Prof, de Zacatenco. A professed socialist. Brilliant student, introverted and peculiar. Access to leftist circles.

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

e. UAR

(1) Michel •Hamed. Low ranking member of Embassy. Met once, January 1966. No further progress or efforts made.

f. Indonesia

(1) Alimuddin •Lubis. Press and cultural attache. Very friendly. I have not yet followed up.

g. Soviet

(1) Nicolay T. Leonov. Press Attache. Off to a very friendly and casual start socially. Have permitted one month to pass without contacting him in order not to seem overly eager. I feel I can call him next week and proceed cautiously to develop him if mutual interest seems to be there.

3. Over the next few months, these contacts will be further refined, in coordination with the case officer. Owing particularly to the variety of French contacts, it should be possible to settle before too long on a handful of fairly productive sources of personality information.

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 984
Nikolay LEONOV (201-132,139)

DOI: 1964

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

1. Subject is an officer of the Fifth Department (Latin American), First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence), KGB who has been assigned to the residentura in Mexico City since approximately 1961. Source has no information on his specific assignments in Mexico.

2. Prior to his service in the KGB, Subject graduated from the Institute of Foreign Relations. He then served in Mexico for four years as a member of the Soviet representation there. Source does not know what his position in Mexico was. (Comment: Subject was an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from July 1953 to October 1956). He then returned to Moscow and entered the KGB Intelligence School in ca 1956 and graduated in 1960. (Comment: Presumably Subject joined the KGB after his return from Mexico). He was then assigned to the Fifth Department, First Chief Directorate in KGB Headquarters where he served until his assignment to Mexico in 1961.

3. Subject is reported to be an excellent Spanish

SECRET

speaker. In Mexico he had additional duties as "government interpreter". He acted as Fidel CASTRO's interpreter during the latter's trip to the USSR. He also accompanied Anastas MIKOYAN on the latter's trip to Mexico and Cuba. In addition on several occasions he has served as interpreter to official Cubans visiting the USSR.

P.L.DILLON
C/SR/CI/KGB

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - SR/O/WH for 201-132,139
1 - WH/1
1 - SR/CI/KGB
1 - RID
1 - AESTORAGE chrono

P.Dillon,C/SR/CI/KGB:mbg 16 September 1964

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

11 March 1964

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 928
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

DOI : 1962

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

- In August, 1962, Source reported that Subject, reportedly assigned to Mexico City, was a KGB agent.

Distribution:
- 1 - LEONOV dossier
- 1 - DC/SR/CI
- 1 - SR/CC/S&T/CI:TRyan

SECRET

14 May 1963

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 841
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

DOI: 1962

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

In August 1962 Source identified Subject as a KGB officer, presently assigned to Mexico City.

Distribution:
Orig. - LEONOV dossier
1 - DC/SR/CI
1 - SR/CI/K

SR/CI/K:DRyan

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-0132139 074-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/25
POB USSR
CIT USSR

RES USSR. KNOWN KGB

DATE 28 APR 75 09274849

201-0132139

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NICHLAS
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

050-008-010
HMMA-32864
23 AUG 67

CIT COLOMBIA
OCC ?
PRESS ATTACHE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY.

HLR

R 6709110184

FILE IN 201-~~132731~~
132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

4. On 6 January 1956 the [illegible] they were having some trouble getting the documents [illegible] because of the [illegible] but said they should be ready in about five days.

5. On 6 January 1956 Dr. Enrique [illegible] informed Juan Pablo [illegible] y [illegible], that on Tuesday (calculated to be 10 January) there would be a meeting at the home of General JARA. Later that day [illegible] told [illegible] there would be a meeting on Monday at [illegible] home at [illegible] of the "peace council." [illegible] said the "other doctors" had been informed of it but that [illegible] (probably [illegible] of Lazaro [illegible]) and [illegible] (who is believed probably to be Lazaro [illegible], active in the Peace Movement and the Partido Popular) had not yet been informed. [illegible] said that there would then be a meeting with the General Tuesday afternoon.

6. On 7 January [illegible] informed [illegible] that the meeting with the General had been changed to Monday (9 January) at 2000 hours. Apparently the group which would meet with JARA was to gather first at the home of [illegible] at 1930. Among them, in addition to the names mentioned before would be Dr. [illegible] (believed to be Dr. Guillermo [illegible] O [illegible]). (It is concluded that the meeting referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 must have referred to the Mexican Peace Committee since the people mentioned are all active in it.)

7. On 12 January 1956 Mrs. [illegible], daughter of General JARA, again called the Soviet Embassy about the clinical histories. They were not ready. She stated her father was ill in Veracruz. She gave her telephone number as 14-14-39, which is that of Dr. [illegible] Romo at [illegible].

Action: It is proposed that when [illegible] is finally cleared, he be given the assignment of identifying as many as possible of JARA's supporters who have positions in the Mexican Government. It is believed that JARA still has many supporters in the government and that they, like the followers of Lazaro [illegible], are in a position to exert a good deal of influence.

Meanwhile, it seems likely that other [illegible] will be received through [illegible].

201-132139

HMM-A-3735
[illegible]
5 Dec. 1955
Page 79

73. NERVO, Rodolfo
[illegible] 9[illegible]   Telephone: 36-32-[illegible]

On 23 May 1955 this subject called Nikolai [illegible] [illegible], Soviet Embassy employee, and was told: "We have found the books and material you requested (re Soviet foreign policy)." [illegible] said he would take the books to NERVO the next day.

On 3 August 1955 NERVO called the Embassy to inquire about the type of dress to be worn to a social function that evening.

This matter aroused the interest of the Station because it is not often that the Soviets deliver documents to private parties.

LI[illegible] was requested to supply information on this subject on 1[illegible] Sept. 1955. On [illegible] Sept. he replied (B-2) that NERVO was for many years active in the Mexican Diplomatic Service, at one time being Charge of the Mexican Legation in Warsaw, Poland. He was never very highly regarded. He is now about 75 yrs. old, inactive in the government, but does write articles for the newspaper Excelsior. He is a brother of the poet, Amado NERVO.

Action: None contemplated.

14-00000

-4600
23 [illegible]
[illegible] 61

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Security

1. [illegible] contact with [illegible]

2. On 2 [illegible] left a message for [illegible] that "If he has time [illegible] hope he will [illegible]".

3. [illegible] reference [illegible] that [illegible] is a representative of the Mexican [illegible] Federation. On 7 March 1960 he called the [illegible] Mexico [illegible]. In this conversation it was [illegible] that [illegible] has a telephone in his home and he [illegible] of work. He stated that he was "back in classes" and that [illegible] no longer be [illegible] in his [illegible]. He told [illegible] that a tournament [illegible] a person named [illegible] would begin [illegible] (2 March) and invited [illegible] to [illegible] of it. [illegible] said he would attend [illegible] had time. [illegible] then asked when he could see [illegible] to give him a list of books [illegible] want." [illegible] told him to come to the [illegible] at any time and [illegible] he would [illegible] over.

4. Although the last reference may serve to explain the [illegible] relationship between [illegible] and the Soviets, the role of [illegible] is less clear. It should be kept in mind that the Soviets here are not accustomed to [illegible] entire time playing chess or socializing with people for the pure pleasure of the thing. Furthermore, the allegation that Andres [illegible] is a Communist should be noted.

5. The Mexico City telephone directory lists one Andres [illegible] at 5 de Mayo [illegible], with telephone 2[illegible]-61

6. The following information on the name [illegible] was reported by [illegible] on 2[illegible] April 19[illegible]

a. Andres [illegible] Frankel de [illegible] Immigration file [illegible]
Born in Hungary.
Past addresses: [illegible] 40; [illegible] 131-2; [illegible] Insurgentes 40?-present
Occupation: [illegible]
No police record of record in Federal or [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Lima CAS

SUBJECT
Operational/JMROD
Transmittal of Letter

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 26978

Forwarded herewith is a copy of the torn letter as requested per Reference.

for Harriet J Guillermo
Samuel K. CASTEL

DOC MICRO. SER.
FEB 11 1972
MICROFILMED

HJG/chf

Attachment: h/w
as stated

Distribution:
✓2-C/WHD w/att h/w
1-C/SBD w/o att

1 ATT H/W
1 cc w/o ATT TO SB/X/WH

CS COPY

201-132139 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D 200-124-162/3	HPLA-10216	3 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~[illegible]~~ ✓~~200-124-162~~/3

14-00000

att to HPLA-10216
in C/~~[illegible]~~ WHD

18 июня 1969 г. АПН

DOC. MICRO. SER.
FEB 11 1972
MICROFILMED

3P

ПЕРУ: ВСТРЕЧА С МИНИСТРОМ

Нужно немало поколесить по Лиме, прежде чем выберешься на окраины города. На одной из них, на пустыре возводится новое здание министерства энергетики и горнорудной промышленности Перу. Раньше такого министерства не существовало, так как соответствующие отрасли народного хозяйства были на откупе у монополий США. Но времена меняются. Перуанцы не только берут под свой контроль иностранные капиталовложения в столь жизненно важной сфере народного хозяйства, но намерены сами управлять этой отраслью ш ш ш экономики своей страны.

Третий этаж здания еще в лесах, крыши нет. Кругом - лязг и грохот, как на всяком строительстве. А в цокольном и первом этажах уже кипит работа. Сотрудники нового министерства разрабатывают основы политики в области энергетики и горнорудного дела.

Министр Хорхе Фернандес Мальдонадо, в январе этого года произведенный из полковников в генералы, один из активных участников военного переворота 3 октября 1968 года. Он согласился встретиться с корреспондентом АПН. Кабинет министра находится в полуподвальном помещении. Ни приемной, ни секретарей. Внутри - скромная мебель. За столом Фернандес Мальдонадо.

Нефть и горнорудная промышленность являются основой экономики Перу. (В 1968 году продукция этих отраслей составила 52 процента национального экспорта и дала стране

CS COPY

8 aug 69

201-132139

440мин. долларов).

-Каковы будут главные принципы политики правительства в этих важных отраслях экономики? - Спросили мы министра.

- Революционное правительство намерено обеспечить эксплуатацию горнорудных богатств в интересах страны. Находясь в руках частного капитала, эти богатства нередко служили спекулятивным целям, - заявил он. - Мы примем законы , которые в обязательном порядке заставят концессионеров разрабатывать месторождения и не позволят приобретать за бесценек право собственности на эксплуатируемые месторождения.

Мы надеемся развивать мелкие и средние предприятия, росту которых будут содействовать и налоговые льготы, и особенно наша кредитная политика, система государственного строительства дорог, геологических исоледсваний и т.д. Конечно, - подчеркивает министр, - это не значит, что мы [illegible] действовать развитию крупных горно- [illegible] й, когда их деятельность не будет противв [illegible] сам нации.

Учитызая частые заявления прессы и политических деятелей США о том, что в Перу-де начкнаются "гонения" на американские капиталы, мы поинтересовались у министра, чем обоснованы подобные заявления.

- На иностранный капитал, - ответил Фернандес Мальдонадо, - у нас не накладывается других ограничений, кроме необходимости подчиняться перуанским законам. Мы намерены создать из разрозненных законоположений единый кодекс норм, регулирующих деятельность иностранцев. Этот кодекс охватывает проблемы налогообложения и контроля над использованием валютных средств, вопросы техники безопасности и гигиены труда, основы взаимоотношений между иностранными концессионерами и рабочими и т.д.

В области ископаемых энергетических ресурсов (нефть, газ, уголь) государство оставляет за собой преимущественное право добычи, обработки и реализации продукции. Основная нефтехимическая промышленность также будет принадлежать государству. Революционное правительство заявило: частный капитал будет допускаться только на основе временных производственных контрактов.

Касаясь перспектив укрепления энергетической базы страны, министр сказал, что сейчас в центральной части Кордильер ведется строительство гидроэлектростанции. Мощность первой очереди составит 325 тыс.киловатт. Затем она будет доведена до I млн.квт. Осуществление многих других проектов, имеющихся в портфеле министерства, пока задерживается из-за напряженности в платежном балансе страны. Специалисты министерства работают над проблемой быстрейшего использования для выработки электроэнергии попутных газов нефтяных месторождений.

Министр говорит о том, что придет время, когда Перу наверстает потерянное и сможет приступить к использованию ядерной энергии в народном хозяйстве. Для выполнения намеченных планов стране потребуется экономическая и техническая помощь извне, и любое участие СССР в этой области будет приветствоваться.

– Путь революции не усыпан розами, но мы готовы идти по нему вперед, невзирая на разные уколы и занозы, – сказал министр в заключение встречи.

Лима.

Н.ЛЕСНОВ,
спец.корр.АПН.

8 Aug 69

[illegible] ATTITUDES

[illegible] TYPED IN PRIVATE [illegible] PASSED

[illegible] INSTRUCTIONS TO [illegible]

SHOULD [illegible] INFO WITHOUT REQUESTING

[illegible] 201-132139, GP-1

CS COPY FILED IN 201-806345

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 132139

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION	
	2. RI FILE NO.	
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ KNOWN KGB, SECOND SECY AND PRESS
ATTACHE, MEXICO 61-68

201-193170
DIR -105659
27 JAN 71
P2

R 7102190049

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET

21

WH-8 FILE, VR SB-2, RI/AN, FI-2, IW, CI

C20 DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CA-5

S E C R E T 162238Z NOV 70 CITE LIMA 7932 16 Nov 70 207552

DIRECTOR

REF: LIMA 7923 (IN 207566)

1. SUSPECT DULAM-2 SPEAKING FOR EFFECT ON HIS SPECIFIC AUDIENCE IN VIEW PAST COOPERATION WITH STATION, INCLUDING PART HE PLAYED IN LEONOV EXPULSION. IN JANUARY 1970 HE HAD SPOKEN FRANKLY OF HIS BELIEF THAT U.S. WAS BUILDING CHILEAN MILITARY STRENGTH AS COUNTER TO VELASCO GOVERNMENT BUT C/O HAD BELIEVED HE HAD DISABUSED HIM OF THAT MISCONCEPTION (LIMA 6345). ATTEMPTS TO DISABUSE DULAMA-2 OF VELASCO GOVERNMENT ACCUSATIONS SURROUNDING CHAPPERS' DEPORTATION POSSIBLY LESS SUCCESSFUL. IN ANY CASE, DULINDEN-11'S ACCOUNT OF DULAMA-2'S OBSERVATIONS ACCEPTED AS FACT AND WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FUTURE DEALINGS WITH THIS STATION CONTACT.

2. FILE: 201-852600 GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-132139

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — [CLAS]SIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 20 — [ROU]TING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SB 5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/WH 8, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI 2

207

S E C R E T 021729Z DEC 69 CITE LIMA 6145

2 DEC 69 IN 95959

DIRECTOR

[redacted] REDTOP AEKICK

REFS: A. LIMA 6094 (IN 90718)

B. LIMA 5278 (IN)

C. HPLW 5421

SB/X/1UH

1. IN RECHECKING REF A STORY WITH IDEN A REF A, DUBRIDE 20 LEARNED SOVIET INVOLVED WAS NOT NIKOLAY ROMANOV BUT KGB OFFICER NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV WHO WAS HERE ON TDY FROM 23 APRIL TO 17 JULY 69. HOWEVER IDEN A CLARIFIED REF A STATEMENT ON "QUIET" PNG ACTION BY STATING "IT IS PRESUMED" THAT DIPLOMATIC NOTE REQUESTING LEONOV'S DEPARTURE WAS PASSED TO SOVIET EMBASSY. IDEN A ALSO STATED THAT REASON FOR PNG ACTION BASED ON REPORT WHICH REVEALED THAT ON 8 JULY 69 LEONOV DELIVERED SPEECH AT LUNCHEON MEETING OF FLN COMMITTEE.

IDEN A ADDED THAT THIS REPORT, WHICH WENT TO (ARMY INTELL SIE), PROVIDED CONFIRMATION OF HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN PERU.

2. STATION ATTEMPTING CONFIRM "QUIET" PNG ACTION. WE KNOW DUBRIDE KEPT CLOSE WATCH ON LEONOV PARTICULARLY AFTER RECEIVING STATION TRACES ON HIM. SIE INTEREST PROBABLY AROUSED AS RESULT OF MEETING BETWEEN NADELHOFFER AND DULAMA/2 ON 4 JULY 69 WHEN LATTER GIVEN LEONOV PAPER. QUIET PNG WAS DISCUSSED AS POSSIBLE COURSE OF

CS COPY

PNG WAS DISC

Leonov files 2 Dec 69

201-132139

64516

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION		1 / 6 2 / 7 3 / 8 4 / 9 5 / 10
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO		
BY ______ AT ______	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______		
	X-REF TO FILE NO. ______		
DISSEM BY ______ PER ______	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.		
ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE, VR.		

PAGE 2 LIMA 6145 SECRET

ACTION DURING THIS MEETING. PER REF B, DELAMA/2 STATED 18 JULY THAT ORIGINAL OF PAPER WENT TO PRESIDENT VELASCO AND COPIES TO FOREIGN MINISTER MERCADO AND TO INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. DULAMA/2 ALSO STATED THAT MERCADO READ LEONOV PAPER TO CABINET 15 JULY THUS QUIET PNG TWO DAYS LATER APPEARS PLAUSIBLE.

3. STATION NOT RULING OUT POSSIBILITY THAT CURRENT GOP EFFORT AGAINST COS AND LNPURE OFFICER MAY BE CONNECTED WITH ABOVE ACTION PARTICULARLY IF GOP POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN BALANCE AND IMPARTIALITY IN DEALING WITH U.S. AND USSR.

4. VIEW ABOVE DEVELOPMENT, MODIFIED FORM OF REF C JMROD PAPER ON LEONOV MIGHT BE VERY SUITABLE FOR PRESS EXPOSURE IN BOGOTA OR SOME OTHER LA CAPITAL WITH ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF REPLAY HERE AND IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS BOLIVIA AND VENEZUELA WHERE ESTABLISHMENT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS PENDING.

5. FILE 201-132139

SECRET

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ✓ ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

7P

FROM: RID/CE [illegible] SB USSR

EXTENSION

NO. CSCI 316/ 03740-69

DATE 15 OCTOBER 1969

TO (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI STAFF 2C 35	2 [illegible]		
2.			
3. RID/CE GA 10			
4.			
5. RID/AN GA 50	2 [illegible] 1969		
6. RID/CE/SB			
7. RID/EDI GB 34			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. RID/FI 1B 4003			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

TO: STATE

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

AN
AB
IN
[✓ PS]
BX 2
[✓ FI]

FILE NUMBER 201-851222

DOCUMENT DATE 27 OCT 1969

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

21 Oct 69

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

A.C
C4..

EDC

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: VOL[illegible]V, Valeriy
(aka. VOL[illegible]V, Valeriy Vasilyevich)

[redacted]

1. Reference is made to your request dated 12 September 1969 concerning Subject.

2. On 22 December 1968, an article entitled "Russians Continue Passing Themselves Off As Journalists" appeared in La Prensa Libre, a newspaper published in San Jose, Costa Rica, which made the following statements concerning Subject. According to the article, Subject, a journalist, had shortly prior to the date of the article arrived in Chile to attend the Congress of the CUT (Central Worker's Union). In this respect Subject's name was linked with that of one Mikhail KOLESNIKOV and one Aleksandr OPEKUNOV, who were also to attend the Congress, and who, according to the article, on a previous visit to Colombia, had been accused of espionage activities by the Colombian authorities. La Prensa Libre article goes on to quote the Chilean magazine Politica, Economia, Cultura as stating that Subject "does not work for any publication or information medium of the USSR which operates regularly. He prudently has not bragged about doing it, because recently no less than 100 representatives of Soviet newspapers, radio, or information agencies who work abroad (Pravda, Izvestia, TASS, Novosti, Radio Moscow) have been accused of being spies in the service of the KGB. In Latin America alone 15 Russian journalists have been declared persona non grata."

3. According to a report dated 12 August 1969 from a usually reliable source, Subject, the editor (sic) of Komsomolskaya Pravda, who had been permanently stationed in Havana, Cuba, since March of 1966, had visited Peru from 4 July to 5 August 1969. The files of this office contain the following reports concerning Subject's visit to Peru which may be of interest:

CS COPY

SECRET

a. A report dated 8 July 1969, from the same usually reliable source of paragraph 3, provided the information that on arrival in Lima, Peru, on 4 July, Subject was not met at the airport by representatives of the Soviet Embassy, but went directly to a private residence where he spent the night. Source stated that shortly following his arrival in Lima, Subject made comments to the effect that he was a very close friend of one Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV. For your information, LEONOV had arrived in Peru on 23 April 1969, as a NOVOSTI representative and remained until 17 July 1969. Based on his activities and associations during his tour of duty in Mexico from May 1953 to 22 December 1968, LEONOV is considered to be a staff officer of the KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security). Further comments by Subject on this occasion which were reported by Source referred to a trip to Moscow to attend a World Peace Conference which Subject had made shortly prior to the date of the report. According to Source, Subject stated that while in Moscow he met one Felix Cabada ARIAS Schreiber, a member of the Central Committee of the Pro-Soviet Communist Party (PCP/Soviet) of Peru, and followed this statement with various questions concerning members of the PCP/Soviet, the situation in the universities, and the current strength of the revolutionary vanguard. Finally, Source also reported that on the following morning, 5 July 1969, Subject contacted the Soviet Embassy and was instructed to immediately obtain a room at the Savoy Hotel, where LEONOV was staying. According to Source, Subject was informed by the Soviet Embassy that staying at a private residence in Lima might create suspicions on the part of the local authorities and that the Soviet Embassy preferred to avoid such problems.

b. A second report, dated 11 July 1969, from a reliable source, provided the information that since Subject's arrival in Lima, Peru, on 4 July 1969, he had been in frequent contact with the Soviet Ambassador to Peru, one Yuriy Vladimirovich LEBEDEV, and with LEONOV (paragraph 3a). Source also stated that Subject was treated with notable deference by the Ambassador.

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

c. According to a report dated 1 August 1969 from the same reliable source of paragraph 3b, during his Peruvian visit Subject contacted one Edwin PEREZ, Traffic Manager of Faucett Airlines, and offered to sell him a small aircraft on very attractive terms. Source stated that PEREZ is interested in planes for a small private air service which he runs apart from his job with Faucett Airlines.

[redacted]

d. In an additional report dated 11 August 1969, the same usually reliable source of paragraphs 3 and 3a reported that prior to his departure from Peru on 4 August 1969, Subject stated that he hoped to have his office of Komsomolskaya Pravda transferred from Havana, Cuba, to Lima, Peru. He stated that the Soviet government is extremely interested in the current situation in Peru and is watching developments closely. According to Source, Subject also stated that he believed he had made a good impression on the Peruvian government and had made friends in Peru. In this regard, Subject mentioned that he had become very friendly with one (General Marco Fernandez BACA Carrasco, the head of PETROPERU (Peruvian State Petroleum Agency). Subject also stated that BACA had arranged trips for Subject at the expense of the Peruvian government to Talara and Iquitos, Peru. [Comment: No immediate explanation was apparent for Subject's activities and comments as reported in paragraphs 3a and 3d.]

[redacted]

4. For your information, in the same 12 August 1969 report of paragraph 3, the same usually reliable source stated that Subject stated before his departure from Peru that he planned to return to attend the Congress of the Youth Faction of the Pro-Soviet Communist Party of Peru (JCP/Soviet), and stated that he planned to visit other Latin American countries, including Colombia and Ecuador, after leaving Peru. The comment was made in this report that Subject might also be planning to attend the meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth which was scheduled to be held in Bogota, Colombia, the 9th through the 12th of October 1969.

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

SECRET

CSCI-316/03740-69

Encl. 1 name check

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation
with copy of name check

RID/CE: JFS/JLB/nkc

BASED ON: 201-850222

para 2: La Prensa Libre
article dated 22 December 1968

para 3: IN 22200
12 August 1969

para 3a: IN 98046
LIMA 5209
8 July 1969

para 3b: HPLA-10167
11 July 1969

para 3c: IN-15298
LIMA-5366
1 August 1969

para 3d: IN 21242
LIMA-5421
11 August 1969

para 4: IN 22200
12 August 1969

FILE IN: 201-850222

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

TO: FBI WH FE CIA 3C/R

FROM: SCA/VO

DATE: 9/12/6[illegible]

FULL NAME (Married women include maiden name): VOLYIN, Valeriy

ALIASES NICKNAMES:

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: May 24, 1938 Pinsan Region, US.S.R

HOME ADDRESS:

SEX: M

CITIZENSHIP: Russian

MARITAL STATUS: Married

SPOUSE'S NAME:

OCCUPATION: News a er man

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER:

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

③

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE: SCA/VO

DATE: 9/12/6[illegible]

NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER: OCDurke:gcb

TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM:

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SB 3??
RIS - NPTI
SCI - NPTI

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION

	INITIALS
[illegible]	
[illegible]	JLB
	[illegible]
SB WH	DD
WH WH/3/P	RR
SB /X/Do	D
[illegible]	Dra
BY TYPIST	

FILE IN 201-950222

15 SEP 1969

FORM DS 439
9-65

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

30 September 1969

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Interim Reply- VOLKOV, Valeriy

1. The final reply to your request for information on Subject is being delayed due to detailed analysis of file material that may be relevant. Every effort is being made to expedite this processing and to reduce any further inconvenience to you.

2. Should you desire additional information on the processing of this case you may contact this Office through normal liaison channels.

RETURN TO:
SCA/VO
GCBurke:gob

DATE:
12 September 1969

J. BARNES

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD [illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

[illegible] 33A

SECRET 091703Z OCT 59 CITE LIMA 2623

HAB

BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3335 (46/647)

28 C.

1. PERUVIAN POLICE LIAISON CONTACT (DUBRIDE-30) ADVISED THE STATION ON 8 OCTOBER THAT COL. JORGE (ROSAS) BENEVIDES, CHIEF OF PERUVIAN ARMY INTELL SERVICE WAS ABOUT TO DEPART FOR TWO WEEK "BUSINESS TRIP" TO BUENOS AIRES. DUE TO SENSITIVITY OF SOURCE OF REF, THIS INFO MAY NOT BE OF VALUE, BUT COL. ROSAS WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY VALUABLE ALLY IN ANY EFFORT TO DISCREETLY REMOVE HUGO BRESCANO FROM PERU TO ARGENTINA.

Cit: Peru

Occ: [illegible]

2. QUITE APART FROM ABOVE, IF BUENOS AIRES HAS CONTACT IN MILITARY INTELL THAT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE IN TOUCH WITH COL. ROSAS, WOULD BE PARTICULARLY BENEFICIAL TO LIMA IF ARGENTINE EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH SOVIETS COULD BE DRIVEN HOME TO COL. ROSAS. GROWTH OF SOVIET OFFICIAL MISSION HERE IS ALARMING AND SHOWS NO SIGNS OF STOPPING. LARGE NUMBER OF TDY'ERS, MANY OF THEM KNOWN OR SUSPECT RIS, INCLUDE TWO (TOP) EXPERTS IN LABOR AFFAIRS, NICOLAI [illegible] AND VADIM KUCHERTOV (WHO NOW TRAVELLING IN PERU UNDER ALIAS VADIM LISTOV). PROOF OF EFFECTIVENESS THESE PROFESSIONALS IS FACT THAT ALMOST FROM A STANDING START, PCP/SOVIET CONTROLLED LABOR CONFEDER-

IN	
PC	
DX	2
FI	

58-8-17

CS COPY

SECRET

50-5-1

09Oct59

[illegible] CARD REPRODUCTION

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

OCT 14 10 39 AM '69

BY ____ AT ____

RECEIVED

DISSEM BY ____

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____ OCT 16 1 33 PM '69

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ FILED

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 LIMA 5823 SECRET

ATION HAS GROWN TO PRACTICALLY DOMINATE THE LABOR FIELD, AND WITHIN SIX MONTHS COULD HAVE COMPLETE CONTROL OVER PERUVIAN LABOR AND REPRESENT DIRECT CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING ANYTHING LESS THAN MOST RADICAL OF REFORM MEASURES. IF BUENOS AIRES STATION COULD ARRANGE SUCH A CONVERSATION, LIMA WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN ROSAS' VIEWS.

3. FILE: DEFER.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
VOICE SAMPLE ATTACHED

050-008-010
HMMA-37724
20 AUG 69
P2

R 6909030716

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

201-850222
SX -16129
12 AUG 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
CONTACT IN LIMA PERU
WITH VALERIY VASILYEVICH VOLKOV
NOVOSTI REP AND KNOWN KGB OFFICER

R 7003100149

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

C, 21142)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD; Chief, SBD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Lima

SUBJECT
0 OPERATIONAL/REDLEG
Copy of EL CASO LEONOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None

References: A. HPLA-10157, 3 July 69
B. LIMA-5278

1. Forwarded herewith is a copy of the Spanish language version of the paper EL CASO LEONOV which is the subject of paragraph three (b) of referenced dispatch. Please refer to Reference B for the details concerning the passage of this document on to DULAMA-2.

2. The Station inadvertently destroyed the rough English draft from which the Spanish version was made. Should a translation of this document be desired, it is requested that this be accomplished at Headquarters.

Samuel K. CASTELON

DPN:mes

Attachment: h/w
As stated

Distribution:
2 - C, WHD w/att.
2 - C, SBD w/att.

CS COPY

1 ATT 2 cc w/ ATT TO SB/X/11 #

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HPLA-10204	DATE 6 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139 [redacted]

14-00000

HFLA-10204

EL CASO LEONOV

Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV arribó a Lima el día 23 de Abril de 1969. LEONOV, subdirector del servicio de prensa NOVOSTI en Latino-America, es experto en asuntos latino-americanos. Y también es alto oficial de la KGB, el servicio secreto de inteligencia de la Unión Soviética. Durante su estada de diez años en Mexico, funcionaba como segundo secretario y agregado de prensa de la Embajada Soviética para dirigir el curso y financiamente del apoyo clandestino de la Unión Soviética a todos los partidos comunistas de Latino-America. Si estos años de actividad subversiva muestran indicios del papel que desempeñó como representante oficial del gobierno soviético (y así lo indican los contactos que tomó) se puede suponer que el propósito de su misión en Lima no consiste meramente en informar al pueblo soviético sobre el Peru y los Peruanos.

Las actividades de LEONOV tambien incluyen apoyo a los movimientos guerrilleros. Como se vera, en Abril de 1968, mientras que desempeñaba su misión como oficial de la Embajada Soviética en Mexico, LEONOV fué identificado como el diplomático soviético que entregó más de cien mil dólares al colombiano Feliciano Pachon Choconta para uso de la FARC y el ELN. PACHON fué capturado al ingresar a Colombia con este dinero. (Al ser capturado PACHON, se le incautó un trozo de papel que contenía la dirección de la oficina de LEONOV en Mexico en la Avenida Mazatlán.) Como una prueba más de su complicidad en este caso, Moscú ordenó su regreso inmediato cuando el citado asunto fué desenmascarado por la prensa.

Pero, a pesar del riesgo que acarreaba la publicación de dicho incidente, de conducir a la ofensiva diplomática de los soviéticos en Latino-America hacia un fracaso, el régimen soviético persistió en su propósito de alentar la subversión en nuestro continente y para lograr su objetivo nos ha enviado a LEONOV por segunda vez. El 23 de Abril, cuando se encontraba de tránsito en Bogotá, tomó contacto en el aeropuerto con varios miembros de la unidad clandestina del Partido Comunista de Colombia. Se presume que en esta ocasión se discutió sobre la presunta complicidad de LEONOV y su dirección de los nuevos frentes guerrilleros que vienen operando en la frontera panameña-costarricense, así como también de los grupos en Venezuela y Colombia y los terroristas en Puerto Rico.

A su arribo a Lima el mismo día, LEONOV se reunió con los representantes locales a quienes dió a conocer su plan de establecer oficialmente un despacho de NOVOSTI en Lima---un bien establecido método de los soviéticos para sentar la base legal y abierta que luego se emplea para ocultar el verdadero propósito de los soviéticos que es la dirección y financiacion de la actividad subversiva. (Hasta la fecha no menos de cien representantes de la prensa soviética han sido publicamente desenmascarados como agentes de espionage en diversos paises del mundo. Treintaidos de estos fueron expulsados como persona non grata, incluso quince que operaban en Latino-America.)

LEONOV no ha perdido cualquier oportunidad para establecer sus contactos. De fuentes fidedignas bien informadas en Mexico se destaca que LEONOV ha tomado contacto en el Peru con estos miembros del PCP: Jorge Vladimiro del PRADO, Raul ACOSTA Salas; Isidoro BAMARRA Ramirez; Mariano Eleuterio MUNIZ Yabar; y con los activistas del FLN, Pedro Anibal MOROTE Cornejo; Angel CASTRO Lavarello; Walter SOLORZANO; Jesus HORNA Galvan; Purificacion ROMERO Esquivel; y Amelia FLORES, Ademas, ha visitado en Piura y Talara donde tomó fotografias de las instalaciones petroleras; y en Pisco y Tambo de Mora donde estableció contacto con los sindicatos de obreros pesqueros; y en junio viajó tambien a Arequipa y Cuzco. Lev Aleksandrovich NOVIKOV, representante de Radio Moscú en Santiago de Chile y presunto agente de espionaje, se reunió en Lima con LEONOV y estuvo con él varios dias.

Durante su estada en Mexico, LEONOV viajaba a menudo a Cuba donde se reunía con altos dirigentes del régimen cubano, incluso

ATT 1 TO HFLA 10204 [illegible]S COPY [illegible] 137 con Fidel Castro y Che Guevara. Como entonces no existían relaciones diplomáticas entre la Unión Soviética y los países de Centro-America, ni tampoco con los de la costa norte de Sud America, uno de los cargos principales de LEONOV era coordinar con los cubanos la guerrilla armada, y especialmente en Venezuela y Colombia. Ademas LEONOV era el especialista de la Embajada Soviética en Mexico en las actividades con los exiliados comunistas que vivían en esa capital. Interesa saber que en 1961 LEONOV viajó a Cuba con el cargo especial de actuar como interprete en las charlas secretas sostenidas entre Fidel Castro y el entonces representante soviético a las Naciones Unidas, Anastas Mikoyan. No cabe duda de que entre la Unión Soviética y Cuba existen diferencias ideología y táctica, pero en lo que se refiere al establecimiento clandestino de focos guerrilleros en Centro-y Sud America, existe amplia evidencia de estrecha cooperación entre los dos gobiernos y del financiamiento soviético de estas operaciones. El caso Pachon, previamente citado en este informe confidencial, es uno de los muchos que se divulgó publicamente, gracias a la diligencia del servicio nacional de seguridad de Colombia. El interés de Cuba por los hechos que ocurren en el Perú sin duda estarían ligados a la presencia de LEONOV aqui y con sus largos y frecuentes viajes al interior. Ocurre preguntar: ¿se le permitiría a un periodista peruano tomar fotografías de refinerías de petroleo en la Union Sovietica, tal como lo ha hecho LEONOV en el Peru? ¿Se le permitiría a un diplomático o periodista peruano viajar tan libre y extensivamente por la Unión Soviética, pretextando estar reuniendo informaciones y articulos para NOVOSTI? ¿Existe alguna relación entre los desordenes provacados por estudiantes y campesinos que se vienen desencadenando en el interior del país y los extensos viajés de LEONOV a esta región? La respuesta parecería lógica si se toma en cuenta la vasta experiencia de este agente en las actividades subversivas. Y más lógica aparece la conclusión cuando se sabe que estableció contacto clandestino en el Perú con el comunista Pedro Anibal Morote Cornejo, citado en los primeros parrafos de este informe, que también es miembro y dirigente del FLN. Morote se entrenó en la guerra de guerrillas en Cuba en 1962 y a petición personal de Fidel Castro se unió al FLN para actuar como enfermero. Ahora se encuentra en el Perú y ha tomado contacto con LEONOV. Precisa preguntar por qué, y para qué

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Lima
: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : JMROD/Monograph on Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 2 and 3 below.

Reference : DIRECTOR 27524, 6 August 1969

1. Attached herewith is a draft version of the monograph on Subject, which has been prepared by JMROD per discussions between Thomas G. URQUHART and Samuel K. CASTELLON during the former's TDY to Lima in July 1969.

2. It is requested that the Mexico City Station review the paper and cable Headquarters and Lima as soon as convenient, signalling approval of the paper for passage to Peruvian liaison, or any changes which should be made. This paper has been reviewed and approved by the REDWOOD division and by the Guatemalan desk. For the convenience of Station Mexico, appended to the paper are copies of the references on which material pertaining to Mexico has been based.

3. Upon receipt of Mexico City's cabled approval Headquarters will prepare a Spanish translation and pouch it to Lima for passage to liaison.

Thomas G. Urquhart for
Wendy R. HARRIDGE

Attachments:
A. Monograph on Leonov h/w
B. Backup material h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Lima w/att A
2 - COS, Mexico City w/att A & B

Note: The paper was by WH
deemed unsuitable
for passage to
Peruvian liaison.
Because of the ~~ta~~
preponderance of Mexico City
Station ok info.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
200-124-162/3	HPLW-5390	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139

Monograph of Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV

Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, the Soviet official who visited Peru from 23 April 1969 to 17 July 1969 as a representative of the Soviet news agency NOVOSTI, is a long-time, firmly identified KGB officer who served in Mexico during most of the period 1953-1963. Although he was able to function effectively in his overt jobs as Cultural Attache and later Press Attache, he was consistently active in clandestine support of Latin American revolutionary and subversive activities, particularly relating to Guatemala. Following are details of his career.

LEONOV was born 22 August 1928 in Ryazan oblast, USSR. His wife, Valeriya Ivanovna, was born 28 April 1928 in Ryazan. As of 1968 the LEONOVs had one daughter, Irina, born in 1962.

LEONOV was first posted to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico in May 1953. His initial position was secretary to the Soviet Ambassador. In addition to administrative duties and cultural matters, LEONOV functioned as a translator and interpreter, since he spoke excellent Spanish.

Two of LEONOV's most interesting contacts from his first tour in Mexico were:

a. Fidel CASTRO. CASTRO, who was in exile in Mexico from 1953-56, was arrested by the Mexican police in June 1956, and a ~~police~~ search revealed LEONOV's calling card in CASTRO's possession.[1]

b. Bernardo LEMUS Mendoza. LEMUS, an important Guatemalan Communist youth leader, was a close friend of LEONOV's dating from the period 1953-56, during part of which time LEMUS was in exile in Mexico.[2] LEMUS, who was a friend and former prison-mate of Raul CASTRO, allegedly conducted liaison in Mexico City during 1955-56 between the Cuban Communist Party exiles and the Fidel CASTRO group.

LEONOV and his wife departed Mexico City on 17 October 1956 for the USSR, where they remained until their return to Mexico in 1961. While in the USSR, LEONOV was used for important interpreting chores; most notably, he accompanied Soviet Vice Premier Anastas MIKOYAN on his trips to Mexico and Cuba in November 1959 and February 1960. During the

February 1960 trip to Cuba, LEONOV first met Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana, Guatemalan Communist and revolutionary who was then in Cuba recovering from wounds received in a Cuban-sponsored, Nicaraguan-led movement to overthrow Nicaragua's President, General Somosa. Leonov was to have later clandestine contact with MIRANDA in Mexico.

On 31 July 1961, the LEONOVs returned to Mexico. This time, LEONOV was listed as Third Secretary and worked as assistant to the Cultural Affairs Officer, Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV. A KGB officer KUZNETSOV is, as of this writing, once again serving in Mexico, this time as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

During this tour of duty, LEONOV's particular responsibility for support of the Guatemalan revolutionary effort began to emerge. In January 1962, Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana, Guatemalan revolutionary mentioned above, passed through Mexico City on his way to Cuba for guerrilla training. MIRANDA, reported to be in charge of accumulating arms for the activist arm of the PGT (Guatemalan Communist Party), brought to Mexico a message for the Soviets. He delivered this message to the leading Guatemalan exile in Mexico in direct touch with the Soviets, Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, who passed it to his Soviet Embassy Contact.[2] During MIRANDA's stay in Mexico, LEONOV met with him. MIRANDA returned to Guatemala from Cuba in October 1963 and thereafter took a leading role in PGT/FAR guerrilla actions. As of 1965, he was a member of the Military Commission of the PGT and conducted terrorist actions. He had in his possession at that time sketches of the homes of various Guatemalan officials who were on the PGT/FAR assassination list. MIRANDA was arrested in September 1965 on charges of assassination of two Guatemalan businessmen. He apparently was released, or escaped, about mid-1966. He left Guatemala, and is believed to have gone to Mexico and to have had clandestine contact with LEONOV there in December 1966.[3] MIRANDA returned to Guatemala after spending some time in El Salvador, and was killed on 3 May 1967 near Guatemala City by unknown assailants.

In 1963, LEONOV was also in clandestine contact with a former Mexican army officer named Lorenzo CARDENAS Barajas, who was heavily involved in the procurement of arms for the Guatemalan revolutionaries. CARDENAS, a fervent adherent of the revolutionary left, had contact with Victor N. GLOTOV, another KGB officer in the Soviet Embassy, Mexico, as well as LEONOV. LEONOV is known to have met CARDENAS clandestinely two days before LEONOV left for the USSR on vacation on 21 April 1963.

LEONOV is believed still to have been in contact with CARDENAS as recently as March 1967.[5] In recent years, CARDENAS has been active in the Movimiento Latinoamericano de Liberacion, a Latin American revolutionary organization founded in Mexico in 1964 and headed by Guillermo CARNERO Hoke, a Peruvian who has spent many years in exile in Mexico, and is now back in Peru. CARDENAS' activities have involved agitation among Mexican students and peasants, which led increasing difficulties with the police, and he claims to have asked for asylum in Peru in 1968.[6]

LEONOV and his family went on home leave to the USSR 21 April 1963 to 20 July 1963. During this leave, LEONOV renewed an old acquaintance with Fidel CASTRO, serving as CASTRO's interpreter in the USSR in May 1963. After home leave, LEONOV returned to Mexico, where he remained (except for two more trips to the USSR in 1964 and 1966) until 22 December 1968, when he and his family departed permanently from Mexico. Upon his return to Mexico from home leave in 1964, LEONOV was promoted to Second Secretary and Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy.

LEONOV, in his role as Press Attache, was energetic and effective. Although he was mainly responsible for the work of the Press Office, which was in the same building as his living quarters, he spent a great deal of time at the Soviet Embassy proper, going out frequently for his many meetings. He was popular among his wide contacts among newspapermen in Mexico and his most intimate press contact was Luis SUAREZ Lopez, a Spanish Communist journalist with the Marxist weekly magazine, Siempre. LEONOV saw SUAREZ very frequently on press placements and possibly other matters. SUAREZ has a long history of pro-Soviet activities, is a member of the Communist front International Organization of Journalists, and has traveled extensively in the Soviet bloc, Communist China, and Cuba.

As to LEONOV's personality, he has a pleasant, outgoing manner, is extremely intelligent, and gets along well with both his colleagues, and his numerous outside contacts. He is hard-working, generally accommodating to people, and is a good conversationalist. He enjoys playing tennis, volleyball and soccer. He also likes to hunt and fish, and enjoys chess. In addition to excellent Spanish, he speaks English. On the negative side, LEONOV gets along badly with his wife; they often quarrel violently, and he neglects her for his numerous sports and social activities. He is also quite unkind and cutting with those whom he regards as his intellectual inferiors, treating them quite rudely when he is in a bad mood.[7, 8, 9, 10]

As Press Attache, LEONOV had the pretext for contact with many people with whom he had apparently innocuous relationships, but probably developed for intelligence purposes.

As an example, he had close contact with Victor RICO Galan, a Spanish-born, naturalized Mexican Communist journalist, who has very close ties to both the Guatemalan revolutionary movement and the Cubans.[11] RICO was a founding member in 1962 of the MLN, a pro-Cuban Communist front organization. A regular writer for Siempre and Politica magazines, RICO acted, in Spring of 1965, as the Radio Havana representative in Mexico for coverage of the Dominican situation. LEONOV consulted frequently with him at this time, meeting in RICO's home or in cafes. LEONOV also established direct contact with certain Dominican exiles through RICO.[12] In August 1966, RICO was arrested and imprisoned because of his leading role in the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, which had been organizing an armed insurgent movement in the Mexican countryside.[14] This movement was reported to have secret radio contact with Cuba. RICO was arrested as he was about to board a flight to Cuba.[15.]

Other LEONOV's Mexican contacts of particular interest are:

Roberto JARAMILLO Flores, Mexican former President of the youth Section of the Mexican Socialist Party (JPS), and in 1967 involved with the revolutionary Students Front, youth affiliate of the National Organization of Revolutionary Action. JARAMILLO and LEONOV were in frequent contact, particularly in 1963-64, on matters involving the JPS, over which the Soviets were exerting active control.[16]

Juan REJANO Porras, Spaniard, member of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, leading intellectual and poet. REJANO and LEONOV had been in regular contact since at least 1965. Meetings between them were arranged through a third person, another Spanish Communist employed in LEONOV's Press Office.[17] REJANO was, as of 1968, editor of the Czech Bulletin, published in Mexico by the Czech Embassy.

Enrique SEMO Calev, Bulgarian-born long-time member of the Mexican Communist Party. LEONOV and SEMO had frequent social contact, as well as dealings on press and cultural matters. SEMO assisted LEONOV in developing social contacts outside of his normal area of access.[18]

A particularly interesting foreign contact of LEONOV's was Carlos BONILLA Sanchez, Communist labor leader from Colombia. He and LEONOV, reportedly close friends, were in correspondence during 1966-67. BONILLA was President of the Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores de Cundinamarca (FESTRAC) until November 1964, when he was removed because of his Communist sympathies. He visited Cuba at the special invitation of Fidel CASTRO in November 1964, transiting Mexico on the way,[19,20] where LEONOV was at that time. It should also be noted that LEONOV traveled to Lima on 23 April 1969 via Bogota.

LEONOV's connections with Feliciano PACHON Choconta, Colombian Communist courier arrested in April 1968, have been discussed in a paper previously provided to you, and so will not be repeated here.

Although LEONOV's sphere of KGB activity obviously broadened considerably over the years, as he gained contacts and area knowledge; his involvement with Guatemalan matters continued throughout his long stay in Mexico. As recently as 1968, he was reliably reported to still be the main clandestine Soviet contact for the Guatemalan Communists in Mexico.[14]

The LEONOVs left Mexico permanently on 22 December 1968, and returned to the USSR.

LEONOV, during his years in Mexico, showed himself to be a capable, hard-working intelligence officer, who was able to fulfill his cover job with skill and at the same time pursue his clandestine missions. It may be presumed, on the basis of his capacities demonstrated in Mexico, that he will have worked effectively in his apparent task of setting up the Novosti news agency in Peru, and that he will also have begun to develop contacts among the Peruvian Communist Party and other sympathetic elements with an eye to spotting and assessing prospective agents for subsequent exploitation by the KGB reszidentura which will inevitably function as a part of the new Soviet Embassy.

Footnotes to LEONOV Monograph

1. MEXI 839, 26 June 1956, S: LIVESTOCK-3.
2. HGGW-4035, 2 December 1966 (Headquarters compilation), S: LINLUCK, ESDEW-1.
3. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.), page 20, para 51, S: LIFEAT.
4. HMM-6405, 22 May 1962, S: LINLUCK
5. HMMA-33215, 5 October 1967.
6. HMMA-37462, 2 July 1967, (CARDENAS Interrogation), page 10, S: LIEMPO-12
7. HMM-1524, 9 April 1956, S: Station compilation of mostly LIFEAT.
8. 7 March 1958, S: LIFEAT.
9. HMMA-29141, 8 June 1966, S: FRINGLASS (transcriber)
10. HMMA-34470, 15 April 1968, S: ZINSMEISTER (Transcriber).
11. HMM-10628, 24 August 1966, S: LIFTER-8.
12. HMM-6770, 5 October 1962, S: LICOOKY (RICO)
13. HMMA-26223, 28 May 1965, S: LIFEAT (raw LIFEAT-7 May 65)
14. MEXI 7743, 22 October 1968, S: LIREBEL-2.
15. MEXI 8310, 24 August 1966, S: Press Accounts (RICO).
16. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.), page 17, 18, para. 38, S: LIENVOY.
17. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.), page 22, 23, para. 62, S: LIFEAT since 5 April 1965.
18. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.) page 20, 21, para 55, S: LIFEAT (on LEONOV since 5 April 1965), (on SEMO).
19. HMMA-32864, 23 August 1967, S: LIMUD
20. HMMA-30130, 26 September 1966, S: LIMUD.

Comments on Dispatch HPLW-5390
Prepared by WH/SAO

These Comments were prepared by Ernest Talierdaues, AC/WH/1.

SUBJECT: The LEONOV Matter (Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, (201-132139)

REF : HPLW-5390, Typed 29 August 1969

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

1. With one exception (HGGW-4035, 2 Dec 66), the personality and biographic report on LEONOV is based entirely on Mexico City reporting. Much of this appears to be quite sensitive if passage to Peru liaison is intended.

2. Since the report concerns a Soviet official, the fact that the report is based upon WH Division material exclusively appears to be self-limiting and, possibly, self-defeating.

3. Although the writer of the report refers to its acceptability to SB Division, there is no SB coordinator.

4. It would appear that, to achieve the desired result (and we don't really know what this is), it would not be necessary to go into such exacting detail. A more generalized report, following more or less an AEASSAULT format, might achieve the results desired by Station Lima without the pitfalls of utilizing the sensitive material incorporated in the present compilation.

5. Seeking approval of Station Mexico City for the release of the total report seems to violate the concept of Headquarters control of operational information. Would it not be more appropriate to ask Station's opinions only in areas of doubt in the matter of source-sensitivity?

6. Although this dispatch was coordinated according to para 2 with SB Division and the Guatemalan Desk, the first inkling this Branch got of the paper is when the dispatch arrived on my desk.

7. This is a good paper for the Lima Station background information. For passing to a third liaison service, it poses some potential danger to the Mexico Station clandestine sources:

a. page 2 - LIVESTOCK-3 is now dead but he was also a Soviet Embassy contact in Mexico and was run by the British. He was fired by us for unreliability.

The search team that arrested Fidel CASTRO and did the interrogation was LITEMPO-4 (now an important Station contact) and only about four years or so ago told COS about the calling card of LEONOV.

b. page 3 - Specific information about MIRANDA trip in January 1962 and delivery of message to GUTIERREZ could pinpoint the source : LINLUCK/ ESDEW-1.

c. page 4 - Specific date of clandestine contact between MIRANDA December 66 could pinpoint LIFEAT on LEONOV residence.

d. page 4 - Specific date of clandestine contact between LEONOV and CARDENAS 19 April 1963 might reveal surveillance (LIEMBRACE though probably would not identify team members. It could also be argued that Soviets have long ago identified these teams.)

e. page 5 - CARDENAS' request for asylum in Peru could pinpoint LITEMPO-12. In any event, references to the police sources throughout the report definitely tell Lima authorities that CIA is working closely in Mexico with the Mexican officials.

f. page 8 - REJANO Porras and LEONOV. The sentence "Meetings between them were arranged through a third person, another Spanish Communist employed in LEONOV's Press Office" implies clandestine coverage of that office (LIFEAT).

g. page 8 - the same is true with Enrique SEMO Calev and LEONOV.

h. page 9 - BONILLA Sanchez and LEONOV "being in correspondence" implies mail intercept (LIMUD) which it is.

i. page 9 - LIREBEL-2 is a sensitive source and about the main source right now on Guatemalan exile activities. The last sentence might implicate him. At least it tells the Peruvians that CIA has a penetration here.

8. Finally - It tells the Peruvians that the Station (CIA) Mexico has phone taps, mail intercepts, penetration of the Cuban IS, penetration of Guatemalan exiles, surveillance and police liaison.

It concentrates throughout that the information was developed by coverage of LEONOV while he was stationed in Mexico. These activities are treated in specific terms whereas his activities outside Mexico are treated in a very general manner.

The Branch would prefer to have the paper re-written omitting all specific dates and references which reveal the clandestine collection technique which produced the information, and should incorporate AEASSAULT information and be coordinated with SB Division in writing. It might be pointed out that previous efforts to "burn" LEONOV have not been successful.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Lima		MICROFILM

SUBJECT REDLEG
Conversations between DULINDEN-11 and Nikolay S. Leonov and DULAUREL-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. On 15 July after leaving a local publisher's office DULINDEN-11 drove Nikolay S. Leonov to his hotel. DULAUREL-1 who accompanied them to the publisher's office was left at her home and DULINDEN-11 and Leonov were alone during the course of the drive. Leonov proceeded to ask DULINDEN-11 various questions about his private life including his economic situation and also queried him about his future goals in life. DULINDEN-11 responded to all questions and said he enjoyed his work with DULAUREL-1 and was interested in journalism and felt that he had learned quite a bit in the short time he has been involved in assisting DULAUREL-1 with Panorama Internacional. He said that he did not work with DULAUREL-1 for money alone but because he saw this as an opportunity to improve himself which would eventually lead to an improvement in his economic standard. DULINDEN-11 said that it was a relaxed conversation, Leonov was very friendly and appeared to be interested in DULINDEN-11's goals and aspirations.

2. On 16 July DULINDEN-11 saw DULAUREL-1 and the latter asked him how his conversation went with Leonov. DULINDEN-11 gave DULAUREL-1 a summary of what had been discussed and commented that Leonov appeared to have a genuine interest in his future. DULAUREL-1 then told DULINDEN-11 that previously she had a rather lengthy conversation with Leonov about DULINDEN-11 and told Leonov the problems he had with the party, the accusations made against him, her conversations with DULINDEN-11 during this period and the investigation she had conducted while DULINDEN-11 was under party control. Leonov told DULAUREL-1 the fact that DULINDEN-11 was under party control is of no significance and once again re-iterated his general disgust with the party leadership.

[illegible] 201-736290

KTR/cng

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

[illegible] 132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-850222 201-132139	HPLA-10206	6 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-736270

3. It appears from the foregoing that DULAUREL-1 arranged the circumstances which led to the private conversation between Leonov and DULINDEN-11. The above "interest" displayed by Leonov in DULINDEN-11 might be nothing more than politeness on his part but the Station believes that DULINDEN-11 is undergoing an assessment by Leonov, DULAUREL-1 and Valeriy V. Volkov and at least up to this juncture apparently has made a favorable impression.

Samuel K. CASTELON

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

ORIG: Patricia L. Johnson:ddm
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 9061
DATE: 5 August 1969

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☒ RETURN TO WH/SAO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8
INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN SB8 FI2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO LIMA 5 20 [illegible]

REFERENCE: LIMA 5335 (IN 13361)*

269778

1. IF AVAILABLE TO STATION, PLS POUCH COPY OF TORN UP LETTER CITED SUPDATA REF.

2. FILE: 200-124-162/3; 201-132139.

RE P-[illegible]

file: [illegible] Leonov 201 (p[illegible])

END OF MESSAGE

*DUBRIDE-30 provided info on interview between LEONOV and Minister of Energy and Mines FERNANDEZ MALDONADO based on torn up letter collected from wastebasket in hotel room occupied by Sovs.

C/WH/SAO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ALFONSO G. SPERA
C/WH/3
201-132139
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

TICHBORN

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LOPEZ, HENRY P.
201-253203
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
18 Sep 78	15 Sep 78	Lopez	Edwin Juan Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

DISSEM: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

15

ACTION Eur 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2, DO 4

SECRET 141003Z CITE MADRID 2011

DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 13385

14 Jul 67 IN 11548

B OSMA 22,778

1. TICHBORN DEPARTED MADRID 12 JULY FOR BARCELONA. RETURNING WOLADY VIA PARIS ARRIVING 16 JULY.

2. TICHBORN WILL PREPARE FULL REPORT IN WOLADY. STATION POUCHED REFERENCE B 14 JULY COMMENTING IN SOME OF QUESTIONS RAISED REF A. INCLUDES DISCUSSION OF SUITABILITY WUSALINE COVER FOR HARRIOTT.

3. CONSIDERING SHORTNESS OF VISIT BELIEVE TICHBORN DID VERY COMMENDABLE JOB, THOUGH ONLY SCRATCHED SURFACE SOME TARGETS. CONSIDER TICHBORN TRIP WORTHWHILE.

4. HARRIOTT ETA HEADQUARTERS CITY 27 JULY. SUGGEST HEADQUARTERS OFFICERS POSTPONE DISCUSSIONS WUBRINY/1 AND TICHBORN UNTIL ARRIVAL REFERENCE B.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

201-253263

30 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN - Cover Company Listing of Operational/Travel Costs

1. On 22 June 1967, WH/6 received an informal listing from TICHBORN (first requested in April 1966) which was made by the ICAP accountant (unwitting) of TICHBORN's expenses for travel and entertainment during the period 1 October 1966 - 31 March 1967. These expenses were incurred by TICHBORN in (1) developing his cover by cover company-directed travel; (2) actual Agency-directed travel and entertainment; and (3) travel and expenses for the primary benefit of the cover company.

2. WH/6 had earlier submitted Travel Orders on all foreign travel with the exception of the October 1966 trip to Central America/Mexico. Following is a listing of the travel involved (largely domestic) chargeable to the Agency:

a. October 1966 - Travel by air to Central America-Mexico on ICAP and Silverco business. Cost: about $350. Charge: Probably Agency, since it contributed to cover development.

b. 10 March 1967 - Travel by rail to Boston from New York City. Purpose: Inquiry related to PRI study. Note: May have been paid for by ICAP.

c. Travel to Washington:

(1) November 1966 - Hqs consultation (general).

(2) 5-6 February 1967 - Headquarters consultation (general).

(3) 10-11 February 1967 - Headquarters' briefing on trip to Puerto Rico for AMANTHEM-4 training (WH/7).

201-253203

(4) 22 February 1967 - Headquarters debriefing (WH/7) on Puerto Rico trip.

(5) 27-28 February 1967 - Headquarters consultation on PRI study.

(6) 14 March 1967 - Headquarters consultation on PRI study.

(7) 3 April 1967 - Headquarters consultation on PRI study.

(8) 8 May 1967 - Headquarters final consultation on PRI study.

(9) 21-22 June 1967 - Headquarters consultation/briefing on trip to Spain and on finances.

3. The above travel expenses were incurred by TICHBORN pursuance to instructions from WHD. When the exact accountings are received from ICAP, travel orders can be written covering these expenses.

Lee E. Patton
AC/WH/6

Distribution:
1 - TICHBORN
1 - Chrono

30 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN
Indebtedness to WHD

1. On 21 June TICHBORN promised Hank Connor, WH/B&F that he would send him a check covering the following amounts owed:

a. $171.00 - rebate on April trip to Mexico.

b. $5.00 - owed from his last accounting

c. $250.00 - two months payments on his loan

2. At a meeting with TICHBORN on 20 June, Lee E. Patton impressed on TICHBORN the need for clearing up all charges from WHD before 30 June. At two earlier meetings, Lee E. Patton had requested that TICHBORN bring in a full listing of all charges for travel, etc., which will be made by ICAP to DODS. TICHBORN promised to submit such a list to Connor at the 21 June meeting.

3. In order to cover the travel not previously covered by Travel Orders, T.O.'s will be written on these trips, largely domestic as follows:

a. October 1966- Central America-Mexico trip (split charge for air fare).

b. Travel from New York City to Washington (for WHD or DO) - by air shuttle):

201-253203

(1) November 1966 (general)
(2) February 5-6, 1967 (general)
(3) February 10-11, 1967 (re PR trip)
(4) February 27-28, 1967 (re PRI study)
(5) February 22, 1967 (re PR trip)
(6) March 14, 1967 (re PRI study)
(7) April 3, 1967 (PRI study)
(8) May 8, 1967 (PRI study)

c. Travel from New York City to Boston (by rail) re PRI study - 10 March.

Lee E Patton

Lee E. Patton
AC/WH/6

SECRET

23 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Transfer of Operational Responsibility of Edward G. TICHBORN (201-253203)

REFERENCE : a. WH/6 - 453, 3 November 1966
b. CI/OA memo dated 22 November 1966

1. Operational responsibility for Subject is being transferred, effective 1 July 1967, from WHD to DODS. The WHD project under which Subject is supported, UOACE, is being terminated effective 1 October 1967.

2. The new case officer for Subject will be Mr. Gale Allen, DO/CO, who can be reached at the following telephone extension: 11-61274.

Lee E. Patton
AC/WH/6

SECRET

Tich 201

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ORIG: SIMunger:jr
UNIT: DC/E/IB
EXT: 6353
DATE: 21 June 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 28 PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: EUR 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR DO4, CCS3, CSPS, C/OPS, C/CA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

22 17 25 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 13385

TO MADRID

REF: MADRID 1663 (IN 85824)

1. EDWARD G. TICHBORN (IDENTITY A) ARRIVES MADRID SUNDAY, 25 JUNE. WILL CALL ROPARD AT HOME DURING DAY, IDENTIFYING SELF AS HANK.

2. TICHBORN BRIEFED AS FOLLOWS. NATURE OF HIS MISSION IS TARGET STUDY ON DYNAMICS OF SPAIN AS AN ECONOMIC ENTITY. TOGETHER WITH MILITARY, CHURCH AND POLITICAL INTERESTS, ECONOMIC-FINANCIAL SECTOR REPRESENTS ONE OF FOUR PRIMARY TARGET AREAS. WITHIN THIS SECTOR WE SEEK TO IDENTIFY GROUPS, INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS WHICH WILL PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN DETERMINING BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY, NOW AND IN FRANCO SUCCESSION ERA. PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN PERSONS AND GROUPS OF STATURE IN THIS FIELD WHOSE PERSONAL INCLINATIONS OR BUSINESS INTERESTS LEAD THEM TO ATTEMPT SHAPE POLITICAL EVENTS. AMONG THEM WOULD BE ECONOMIC ADVISORS, FINANCIAL PRESSURE GROUPS, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT MECHANISMS, OPUS DEI, WEALTHY MILITARY.

/Continued/

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-253203

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________ #________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 13385

TO

3. SECONDLY, AFTER TARGETS IDENTIFIED, TICHBORN SHOULD ATTEMPT DETERMINE CHANNELS TO THEM THROUGH WHICH VIABLE OPERATIONS CAN BE MOUNTED WITH PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS. SUCH CHANNELS MIGHT INCLUDE CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACTS OF TARGET INDIVIDUALS, PERSONS OR GROUPS WHOSE ACCESS TO TARGETS IS ASSURED BY MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST, WOLADY FIRMS WITH SPECIAL ENTREE.

4. THIRDLY, TICHBORN TO SURVEY IDENTITY B FROM TWO POINTS OF VIEW: AS A VIABLE CHANNEL TO TARGETS, AND/OR AS POSSIBLE COVER FACILITY THROUGH WUSALINE IBERIA. IDENTIFY TO EXTENT PRACTICABLE WITHIN CAREFULLY WEIGHED LIMITS HIS COVER, POLITICAL AND MILITARY PEOPLE WITH WHOM IDENTITY B WORKS TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF ITS PROJECTS, RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH, EXISTENCE OF KICKBACKS OR OTHER CLANDESTINE AGREEMENTS WITH INFLUENTIAL LEADERS, CONTACTS WITH NON-COMMUNIST OPPOSITIONISTS.

5. AS REGARDS COVER, SUGGEST WE STUDY FURTHER THE POSSIBILITY OF USING WUSALINE IBERIA DESPITE MADRID'S NEGATIVE RECOMMENDATION IN OSMA-22592. AGREE WITH STATION THAT SUCH COVER NOT SUITABLE UNDER

/Continued/

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______ PER______ #______

☒ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE THREE CITE DIRECTOR 13385

TO

CONDITIONS EXISTING HERETOFORE IN WHICH WUSALINE HAS GENERATED NO BUSINESS ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE. RECENTLY, HOWEVER, IDENTITY B HAS COMMENTED TO WUSALINE THAT WOLADY FIRMS ARE MISSING MANY GOOD OPPORTUNITIES IN SPAIN AND HAS SUGGESTED THAT WUSALINE ASSIGN TO MADRID AN OFFICER TO WORK ON THESE POSSIBILITIES. HENCE, SHOULD WE DESIRE TO PURSUE THE MATTER, WUSALINE'S EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN THE WOLADY BUSINESS COMMUNITY COULD PROBABLY PRODUCE SUFFICIENT BUSINESS TO JUSTIFY SUCH AN ASSIGNMENT WITH AN ASSURED WELCOME BY IDENTITY B. IN VIEW PROBLEMS AND LACK ACCESS INHERENT HARRIOTT'S PRESENT COVER, WE WOULD ASK STATION GIVE THOUGHT TO THIS POSSIBILITY FOR HARRIOTT WHO MAY BE PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED. WITHOUT SPECIFYING HARRIOTT OR ANY OTHER OFFICER, WE ASKED TICHBORN ASCERTAIN UNDER HIS WUSALINE COVER CURRENT VIEWS OF IDENTITY B ON NEED AND DESIRABILITY OF WUSALINE'S ASSIGNING AN OFFICER TO MADRID. URGE STATION REVIEW THIS FURTHER WITH TICHBORN IN COURSE HIS SURVEY.

6. WUBRINY/1 (IDENTITY C), PRESIDENT OF WUSALINE, WILL ARRIVE MADRID ABOUT 27 JUNE TO INTRODUCE TICHBORN TO IDENTITY B AND PROVIDE FULL SUPPORT HIS SURVEY. WUBRINY/1 FULLY CLEARED AND WITTING.

/Continued/

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING	AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______ PER______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE FOUR CITE DIRECTOR 13385

TO

7. ENTIRE BRIEFING GIVEN TICHBORN AS FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH ROPARD WILL PROVIDE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON CONTINUING BASIS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/CCS/NC

DO/CO - Mr. Gale Allen (telecoord)

AC/EUR/SR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/E/IB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ORIG: SJMunger:jp
UNIT: DC/E/IB
EXT: 6353
DATE: 21 June 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: EUR 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR DO4, CCS3, CSPS, C/OPS C/CA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

22 17 26 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 13386

TO MADRID

REF: DIRECTOR 13385

IDENTITY A - MR. HENRY (HANK) LOPEZ

IDENTITY B - BANIF

IDENTITY C - JOHN TRAIN

END OF MESSAGE

C/CCS/NC

DO/CO - Mr. Gale Allen (telecoord)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/EUR/SR
RELEASING OFFICER

DC/E/IB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

Lopez

SECRET

21 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DO

SUBJECT : Operational Survey in Spain by Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. After considerable coordination, agreement was finally secured from EUR Division and COS/Madrid for Edward G. Tichborn (P) to undertake an operational survey in Spain. Chief and Deputy Chief EUR/IB plus the undersigned had a preliminary meeting with Tichborn on 20 June 1967. Background reading was provided him preparatory to a detailed briefing. The latter was effected by DC/IB and the undersigned on 21 June 1967.

2. Tichborn's mission is to identify operational targets, primarily in the business community but not excluding those in the military establishment, the Government, and the church, including Opus Dei. Identification is desired of elements, particularly in the business community, which have political influence now and which could be more important after Franco's death. After identifying such elements, Tichborn is to seek ways and means of access to them. He will, of course, pay particular attention to the local Spanish partners of ICAP Iberia in terms of their political activities and their contacts with key officials. He will assess ICAP Iberia as a cover mechanism, and in the event of a favorable assessment, explain in detail how it could be exploited. He will assess one of ICAP Iberia's local partners whose aunt was a famous RIS agent.

3. Tichborn is leaving New York on 24 June 1967 and will arrive in Madrid on the morning of 25 June 1967. He has been given the telephone number and address of DCOS/Madrid, Mr. Osborne Day, who will be his contact. Tichborn, upon arrival, will telephone Mr. Day. The latter has been alerted by WOFACT cable of Tichborn's arrival. WUBRINY/1 will meet Tichborn in Madrid on 28 June and make appropriate introductions.

4. It is anticipated that Tichborn will spend about a month in Madrid or as long as it is commercially plausible and operationally necessary to fulfill his mission. Necessary commercial groundwork

SECRET

201-253263

SECRET

has been laid. Tichborn recently met one of the Spanish partners in New York who was on a short visit to the U. S. They agreed that when Tichborn visited Spain, they would jointly work on a prospectus that could be used to increase business for ICAP Iberia.

5. It is estimated that Tichborn's trip will cost about $2,500.00. Approval is requested to obligate $2,500.00 of FY 67 OOA or D&TO funds for this purpose.

Gale W. Allen
Gale W. Allen
DOCO

CONCUR:

C/DOCO

Date 6/21/67

APPROVED:

Chief, DO

Date 6/23/67

Orig - Adse
1 - C/DO/B&F
1 - Tichborn file
1 - DOCO chrono
1 - ICAP Iberia/Ops

SECRET

SECRET

CA/PEG PROJECT DATA SHEET

Date [illegible] 67

Div/Br/Desk	Country	Type of Action	Function	Project Cryptonym
[illegible]	Area-wide	Extension and Termination in FY 1968	Political Action	UOACE

1. | Funds | Programmed | Requested | Approved | Obligated |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY 1967 | | $ 16,000 | $ 16,000 | $ 15,67[illegible] (as of 30 June 1967) |
| FY 1968 | $ 20,25[illegible] | $ 5,500 | | |
| FY 1969 | $ 20,000 | | | |

2. Description of Activity:

UOACE is a WH area-wide support project which provides funds to cover salary, travel and miscellaneous operational costs of [illegible] C. Tichborn (P), contract agent and political action asset. Tichborn has been used primarily as an advisor in CIA-connected election operations throughout Latin America. From 1961 to August 1965 he served the Mexico City station in the development of a cultural magazine Dialogos and carried out spot assignments in other WH areas. In August 1966, he was assigned PCS to New York City and (as of October 1966) placed under cover as Latin American referent in the DO proprietary, ICAP Corporation (WUBRINY Project). In the past year, he served briefly as advisor to a Santo Domingo Station asset ([illegible]-4) and in an unsuccessful attempt to conduct an in-depth study of the PRI Party in Mexico. The present UOACE extension and termination request coincides with DOD assumption of Tichborn's support costs under Project WUBRINY as of 1 October 1967.

3. Funding:

Since October 1966, UOACE funds have been passed to Tichborn under cover of the ICAP Corporation (Project WUBRINY).

4. Interagency Coordination and Approval:

U.S. Ambassadors in countries where Tichborn's services are utilized in special operations are briefed as appropriate and necessary regarding his assignment. No State coordination or 303 Committee action.

SECRET

[illegible] PROJECT EVALUATION

Date

	Initials	Date		Initials	Date
1. FC CA/PEG			5. MPS/BG/CA		
2. C/CA/PEG (or in absence)			6. ADDP		
3.					
4.			7.		

PEG Eval. Officer	[illegible]
Date Received	13 July 1967
Date Due in MPS&BG/CA	17 July 196

EVALUATORY COMMENT:

1. Although Tichborn's services have not been fully utilized in the past, due primarily to the lack of continuing, regular requirements in the WH area for his special capabilities, there continues to be a need for an agent of his wide experience and talents in the political action field, particularly as ad hoc advisor and monitor in priority election operations.

2. The transfer of Tichborn from an exclusive WHD status under UOACE to a wider-ranging assignment under WUBRINY makes him available for DDP-wide use. Because of language and background experience, he will continue to be used primarily in Spanish language (primarily WH) areas, but his ICAP employment status should also enable him to gradually expand his usefulness to other areas as well.

3. Recommend approval.

Div/Br/Desk	Country	Type of Action	Function	Project Cryptonym
WH/6	Area-wide	Extension and Termination in FY 1968	Political Action	UOACE

ADDP Action:

Amount:

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT
UOACE

☐ CA
☐ FI/CI

☐ PARAMILITARY
☐ SUBSIDY
☐ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION WH
	AMENDMENT	
	RENEWAL	BRANCH 6
XXX	TERMINATION	DESK Area-Wide
XXX	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Lee [illegible] Patton — EXTENSION 6032
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY
ADDP 16 August 1967

PERIOD OF APPROVAL
FROM 1 July 1967 TO 30 September 67

TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED
$ 5,500

FY	AMOUNT
68	
69	

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL 8135-2104

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

Extension of Project UOACE approved in the amount of $5,500 for the period 1 July 1967 to 30 September 1967.

NOTE: Project UOACE terminated effective 30 September 1967.

SIGNATURE
MPS/BG
(Signed) Paul A. Maggio

DATE
21 AUG 1967

DISTRIBUTION

JUN 3-16

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1		1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1	CASE OFFICER	2	MPS/BG

FORM 6-66 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(3)

PROJECT ACTION

[illegible]	Western Hemisphere Division
[illegible]	WH/6
X EXTENSION	Lee E. Patton 15 June 1967
TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3D12 · BUILDING Hqrs · EXT. 0000 · 2282

CONCURRENCES OF DIV SIGNS

COMPONENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE IN	DATE OUT	
C/WH/COP	Elliott C. Watt			
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson			
C/WH/CA	Gerard Droller			
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius			
C/WH	William V. Broe			

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

COMPONENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE IN	DATE OUT	
C/DO	Gordon L. Jorgensen			
MPS/BG/C	Paul A. Maggio	Jul 67	15 Aug 67	
MPS/C/BG		15 Aug 67	16 Aug 67	
CA/C-PEG		10 Jul 67		
CCS/NC	(Signed) G. Donald McLaughlin	17 Jul 67	17 Jul 67	
OPSER/P	W. G. Tharp			✓

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 July 1967	30 Sept. 1967	$ $5,500	196	$
			1968	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans	Cord Meyer Jr.	16 Aug 67

FORM 12-66 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

REQUEST FOR FY 1968 PROJECT EXTENSION

AND TERMINATION -- UOACE

1. Total Funds Requested. $5,500

2. Amount in which Project was included in the Operational Program for FY 1968. $20,250

3. Current Objectives. To support Contract Agent Edward G. TICHBORN (P) who is used as a covert action advisor and political action agent by WHD. In addition TICHBORN is available for election campaign research, special political surveys on selected countries and allied research requirements which can utilize his political expertise and area knowledge.

4. Background. In 1959 TICHBORN, a bilingual Harvard-trained lawyer with political experience, was hired as a political action advisor for Agency-sponsored election operations throughout Latin America. He has participated in political operations in Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina and the Dominican Republic. Based in Mexico City from 1961 until 1966, he was primarily a Headquarters asset but also assisted the Mexico City Station in its CA program. In August 1966 he was assigned PCS to New York City where he has been employed for cover purposes since October 1966 by the DO proprietary WUSALINE.

5. Effectiveness. During the period 1 October 1966 -- 30 June 1967, WHD has had an opportunity to use TICHBORN in his primary role of political action advisor on only one occasion. In February TICHBORN was sent to Puerto Rico to conduct a political action briefing of a Station Santo Domingo asset, AMANTHEM-4, which task he performed effectively. In order to maximize the benefits of his availability, he was assigned the continuing task of monitoring the Dominican Republic press and analyzing media reactions towards Balaguer and opposition elements. Several detailed summaries were submitted to the Dominican desk. A major effort was made to develop an in-depth study of the PRI party in Mexico. After a number of meetings with Headquarters and

Mexico City Station officers and early enthusiasm on the part of TICHBORN's PRI contacts, those contacts became reluctant to delve into sensitive PRI areas or to introduce TICHBORN to other contacts with inside access. In May Headquarters, the Station, and TICHBORN all agreed that the effort should be dropped.

6. Cover and Security.

a. Cover. TICHBORN has done an excellent job of building his cover with WUSALINE. His area knowledge and language ability have proven of real help to the cover company, and he has shown himself unusually well suited to the needs of that company. The cover company demands on his time, both on-the-job and for foreign and domestic travel, have not interfered with his operational utilization.

b. Security. While in Mexico, TICHBORN acted as an unofficial legal advisor for the Center of Studies and Documentation which was mentioned in the MHDOWEL flap as being funded by a CIA conduit. However, there was no publicity in Mexico which linked him with the Center. Similarly there was apparently no public exposure of the funding of the intellectual magazine with which he was connected, "Dialogos", by other CIA conduits. There is no available evidence that his security has been compromised by the MHDOWEL flap.

7. Termination and Extension.

a. While TICHBORN has been available for assignments calling for his abilities as a political action advisor, the Division has not had the requirements for such activities which were anticipated. The continuing use of TICHBORN for CIA tasks of lesser priority, together with the time and travel demands of his new cover business, have kept him well occupied during the period. However, in view of the future anticipated lack of demand for TICHBORN's services on a frequent basis, and the comparatively high cost in administrative, financial, and WH case officer time required, it is felt that the project should be terminated, effective 30 September 1967.

b. As indicated in the section above on "Cover and Security", TICHBORN has proven himself to be of real value to his cover company WUSALINE and to DO. Because of their interest in using him as a full-time asset, DO has agreed to assume full administrative and operational responsibility for TICHBORN, effective 1 July 1967. Responsibility for the fulfillment of TICHBORN's contract (effective through 30 September 1967) will be transferred to DO, effective 1 July 1967. Full financial responsibility for TICHBORN's salary and expenses will be transferred to DO on 1 October 1967. WHD and DO have agreed that because of TICHBORN's area knowledge and experience, WHD would enjoy a primacy of interest in his possible future operational use. WHD agreed to reimburse DO for the costs of salary and expenses for any such future use of TICHBORN.

c. In order to cover costs of salary and expense of TICHBORN until DO assumes financial responsibility on 1 October 1967, a FY 1968 extension of three months (from 1 July - 30 September 1967) is requested.

8. Coordination. Coordination outside the Agency is not necessary.

9. Costs. (1 July 1967 - 30 September 1967)

Salary (three months)	$4,250
Travel	1,250
TOTAL	$5,500

The Agent will be funded as follows:

a. WH Division will make funds available to DO to cover salary and travel expenses. DO will pass these funds to WUSALINE through existing funding channels.

b. The Agent will conform to Agency requirements in all his accountings.

10. Action Requested. Extension of Project UOACE for the period 1 July - 30 September 1967 in the amount of $5,500 and termination effective 30 September 1967.

IDENTITY

Edward G. TICHBORN   Henry R. Lopez

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION		
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Santo Domingo			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Operational/MHSPAWN/TICHBORN Press Analysis

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HDCW - 2588

Action: FYI

The Station appreciates the press analysis contained in the Reference, which was prepared by Edward G. TICHBORN. We feel that TICHBORN's comments on the press image of EMANTHEM/1 are particularly useful. As Headquarters is aware, however, EMANTHEM/1 has not shown himself particularly willing to take strides to improve his press image and continues to manifest a rather callous disregard for principles of public relations in general. While thus of no real immediate use, a continuing TICHBORN analysis would prove valuable should the opportunity present itself to render EMANTHEM/1 public relations advice and aid. We also believe such an analysis would be worthwhile in that it would keep TICHBORN himself up to date on the Dominican situation. Should it be decided to offer EMANTHEM/1 direct public relations or political advice, TICHBORN, in view of his established rapport with this individual, would be a natural candidate for the job. We would therefore appreciate further TICHBORN analysis, if practicable and convenient.

Michael C. CHOADEN

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

201-253203

JUN 1 [illegible] 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HDCA - 6319	14 June 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 22-126-10/3

SECRET

[illegible]

WH/6-586

6 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CAAS

SUBJECT : Payments Received by Edward G. TICHBORN (P) From Cover Company

Per your telephone request of 5 June, this is to certify that Subject received salary payments from his cover company for the period 1 January - 31 March 1967 based on equal monthly installments of his total yearly salary of $17,000.

Lee E. Patton
AC/WH/6

SECRET

201-253203

Lopez

WH/6-584

2 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Foreign Travel of Edward G. TICHBORN (201-253203)

REFERENCE : WH/6-509, 15 February 1967

1. In accordance with your request for information on TICHBORN's foreign travel (CI/OA Memorandum dated 22 November 1966) the following is forwarded for your information.

2. TICHBORN travelled to the following countries since our referenced memorandum:

a. New York City to Mexico City and return during period 14 January - 20 January 1967.

b. New York City to Mexico City and return (via Caracas on cover company business) - 15 March - 29 March 1967.

c. New York City to Mexico City and return - 24 April - 30 April 1967.

d. New York City - San Juan, Puerto Rico - 12 February - 18 February 1967.

Lee E. Patton
AC/WH/6

Distribution:
Orig & 1 addee; 1 - chrono; 1 - TICHBORN

201-253203

14-00000

orig in Tichborn 201

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Gale W. Allen DOCO	EXTENSION 11 61455	NO. DATE 25 May 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/DOCO	26	MAY 1967		Tichborn [illegible] $17,100 a year. [illegible]
2. DC/DO	26	May		
3. C/DO	26 May			
4.				
5. DO/BF				#5 please pull your copy
6. Mr. Allen				Tichborn 201 Tichborn will be a [illegible] operations officer [illegible] in training and to be available for special assignments. He is [illegible] scheduled [illegible] of 3-6 weeks [illegible]. He is a candidate [illegible] assignment [illegible]. Chief WH/CA anticipates that WH will have [illegible] for him [illegible]
7.				
8. Mr Patten AC/WH/6				
9. advised 31 May 1967				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-253203

FORM ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

25 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DO

VIA : Chief, DO/CO

SUBJECT : Edward G. Tichborn (P)

1. The undersigned on 23 May 1967 reviewed in WH Division Tichborn's 201 file (4 folders) and related operational files. Particular attention was given in this review to Tichborn's security.

2. The files reflect that Tichborn is very security conscious. There is no evidence that Tichborn was ever suspected of being a WOFACT operative.

3. Tichborn practiced law in California and was active in state and national politics. He was recruited as a political advisor on a part-time basis in 1959 by the CA Staff. In 1962, he was taken on full-time under contract by WH Division and assigned to Mexico City. His cover for this assignment was publishing and movie interests in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America. In Mexico City he published a magazine, Dialogos aimed at left-wing intellectuals. The CI/OA staff review in 1965 stated that Tichborn's cover story was completely accepted by his friends and associates. The SGSWIRL of Tichborn in 1965 revealed that he had informed only his wife of his association with WOFACT.

4. The files reflect that Tichborn is very sensitive about security. He balked at working with a WOFACT officer in Mexico City, because a friend told Tichborn that the WOFACT officer not only was WOFACT but had openly admitted it to the friend. A proposed trip to Bolivia was aborted because Tichborn felt there was no suitable cover.

5. Tichborn has traveled extensively in Latin America on training and election assignments. Three countries in which he worked are Chile, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. On these assignments Tichborn used his legal, publishing, and movie cover. It is understood that he also used aliases and disguises, although this was not noted in the quick review of the files. He can, of course, be debriefed in detail on this aspect.

SECRET

201-253203

6. The files show that Tichborn's magazine, Dialogos was funded through Tichborn by various individuals through arrangements made by CCS. The AC/WH/6 interrogated Tichborn on any foundation funding. Tichborn could recall only one instance of foundation funding, some $2-2,500 given Dialogos Editor Ramon Xirau by the Fairfield Foundation. There is also a reference in the files that one, Louis Mercier, was informed that ODACID also supported Dialogos.

7. The files reflect very favorably on Tichborn's performance - two reports by the Mexican Station and one from COS/Santo Domingo are most commendatory. On the negative side, administrative details bore him.

8. The undersigned has confirmed with Chief, WH/CA that if DO will take over Tichborn's contract, WH will pay Tichborn's salary and expenses for the first quarter of FY 1968. Chief, WH/CA is awaiting DO's decision.

9. The undersigned is very favorably impressed by Tichborn. By 1 October, it is believed that Tichborn will be sufficiently well-trained in commercial and investment banking matters to do legal-business consulting on a fee basis for WUSALINE. He should be able, depending on the number of operational requirements, to earn a part, if not all, of his salary. On this basis, it is recommended that DO assume administration of Tichborn effective 1 July 1966, under WUBriny, with the understanding that WH Division will defray Tichborn's salary and expenses during the first quarter of FY 1968.

Gale W. Allen
Gale W. Allen
DO/CO

CONCUR:

Chief, DO/CO

26 MAY 1967
Date

APPROVED:

Chief, DO Division

26 May 1967
Date

CC: DO/EF
cc: Briny/Support

8 May 1967

(typed 12 May 1967)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Contact Report, 8 May 1967

PARTICIPANTS: Edward G. TICHBORN, Stephen Chaconas, and Lee E. Patton

PLACE : Shoreham Hotel, 1230-1500 Hours

1. Preliminary meeting was in the hotel room but the bulk of the discussion took place during lunch and afterwards. The gist of the discussion with TICHBORN was as follows:

a. TICHBORN explained how he had been surprised at the sudden loss of interest by Antonio Menendez in the project and particularly in introducing TICHBORN to other contacts. TICHBORN says that the reason for this is Menendez' sudden recognition of the danger to his political future in even indirectly being connected with what could become a controversial book. TICHBORN attempted to develop various hypotheses for the revelation of this fear at this time rather than earlier in the negotiations. There was, however, no really clear explanation of why Menendez had so suddenly drawn into his shell.

b. TICHBORN was asked whether he felt that in some ways we were not "taken" by Menendez. He responded with considerable heat by saying that it was a calculated gamble that "just didn't pay off". He became very defensive when the discussion turned to the original evaluation of Antonio Menendez. He says that he is convinced that Menendez has the information as well as the contacts and in short was the right man but one who turned out to be unwilling to run the risks involved for the "small amount of money" he would be paid. TICHBORN attempted to make a strong case for his belief that Menendez was the right man and emphasized (somewhat apart from the point) that some day he will have an important post in a future PRI government. TICHBORN says the whole problem was discussed with Stan Watson who agreed that the project could not be

201-353263

productive now due to the sudden reluctance of Antonio Menendez and Jose Luis Siqueiros to introduce TICHBORN to their contacts. Stan Watson also felt, according to TICHBORN, that it would be risky for TICHBORN to contact Gonzalez Casanova, Cholula and Urquidi. While details of the discussions between Watson and TICHBORN were not given, it seems that the decision not to proceed was reached without any major hassle between TICHBORN and Stan Watson. (Comment: TICHBORN appears to be not at all unhappy about terminating what could have become a long and unproductive research effort built on a shaky story of TICHBORN writing a book on the PRI.)

c. Antonio Menendez wrote up in English some of his comments based on his approach to the research problem. This 13 page double spaced report is attached.

d. Chaconas asked TICHBORN how well he knew Carlos Fuentes (for possible BGBERET targeting). TICHBORN replied that he knew him very well and that he felt he could approach him directly if he had a reason for being in Paris (vacation, for example) or wherever Fuentes is now living. TICHBORN said that he believed Fuentes would accept an assignment to write articles on North Vietnam based on a future visit to that area but he also indicated that he believed we could not control the tone of the articles which would be likely to be pro-North Vietnam.

2. TICHBORN was asked by LEP to review the list of trips TICHBORN had made outside the country and to confirm the dates and advances involved. LEP asked TICHBORN to get a list from his cover company of his domestic trips so that when the cover company submits a claim, WH will have a record of what trips were authorized for operational purposes involving TICHBORN. TICHBORN, on the same subject, said that he feels as does his cover company boss that some other arrangement should be made for some of his travel for WH. TICHBORN says he feels that the amount of travel he is involved in may appear unusual to the cover company accountant. LEP agreed that this was not a good situation over the long run and that he would talk to Gail Allen about making different arrangements for the future.

3. TICHBORN was requested to rebate the $171.18 owed from the advance given him in Mexico for his trip there on 17 March. He offered to write out a check but LEP suggested that he send the check through the proper channels to the post office box number given him. He also promised to send the accounting for the latest trip to Mexico City in as soon as possible. TICHBORN was reminded of the need to send in his April and May loan payments which he agreed to do right away.

Lee E. Patton, AC/WH/6

Distribution: 1 - UOACE/ops; 1 - WH/1/Chaconas/ 1 - Chrono

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-253203
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☒ SIG. Chaim

FROM 21

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CCS-3, CSPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 021905Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1294 MEN

DIRECTOR

2 MAY 67 IN 58328

REF DIRECTOR 83282

201995

LIOGLE

~~2.~~ 1. TICHBORN WILL RECOMMEND THAT PROPOSAL TO PREPARE FULL DRESS APPRECIATION OF THE PRI THROUGH HIS CONTACTS BE DROPPED. STATION CONCURS.

ABSTRACT X
INDEX
cw/k

A5

2. HIS REASONS FOR HIS RECOMMENDATION CENTER ON REACTIONS OF SOURCES TO HIS INSISTENCE THAT FINAL DRAFT MEET FULL SCHOLARLY STANDARDS, AND TO THEIR TIMIDITY WHEN ACTUALLY FACED WITH REQUIREMENT TO GO ON PAPER WITH PRI CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL.

3. TICHBORN DEPARTED FOR NEW YORK 30 APRIL.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

✓

201-253203

2 MAY 67

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Outstanding Loan Account - Edward G. TICHBORN (P)
Henry R. Lopez

1. In the attached informal note by Edward G. TICHBORN, he states that he recalls on or about September 10, 1966 that, in a meeting with several Agency representatives, he received tacit acknowledgement that there would be no problem for the temporary delay in his repaying of an outstanding account. None of the Agency representatives believed to have been present at this vaguely described meeting specifically recalls discussions of this outstanding account and specific arrangements for its handling. Nevertheless, it is believed quite possible that casual reference to it may have been made at one of the meetings with TICHBORN and either through misunderstanding or general oversight, the problem was not followed through, in that repayments are being made on a continuing regular basis in satisfactory manner. Its believed no further action is required provided that repayment continues at the rate of $125 per month as agreed until the advance is meet in full.

2. The purpose of this memo is to state the reason of non-payment during the period August 1966 - January 1967 and will be to document TICHBORN's loan account.

Gerard Droller
C/WH/CA

Attachment:
Note by TICHBORN

201-253203

20 April 1967

(typed 26 April 1967)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Contact Report, 20 April 1967

PARTICIPANTS: Edward G. TICHBORN and Lee E. Patton

PLACE : Hotel Barbizon Plaza and Restaurant, 1945-2230 Hours

1. The following administrative details were discussed with TICHBORN:

a. The change in insurance premiums was explained. He is to pay $26.88 for his next premium and in the future will pay $25.89.

b. His income tax problems were discussed, and he feels the matter has now been arranged satisfactorily as a result of his trip to Washington to talk to WH/B&F officers.

c. In regard to Spain--he was told that the situation still has not been settled but that a decision is expected around the end of April.

c. LEP requested a statement from TICHBORN with regard to his authorization to have a six month moratorium on his $125 a month loan payments. TICHBORN wrote out a statement per B&F's request. He also signed a certification for his recent trip to Mexico. LEP requested TICHBORN to give him a check for the rebate for his 17 March trip to Mexico of $171.18. In response to a question as to how much he had paid Menendez, he said he had given him $500.

2. In a discussion on the objectives and plans for his 25 April trip to Mexico City, TICHBORN said he intended to contact the following: Menendez, Siqieros, Cholula, Casanova Gonzalez. He said he had called and confirmed specific meeting dates with Menendez and Siqieros. TICHBORN said he could not call Cholula and Casanova because such a long distance call would seem unusual to these acquaintances. TICHBORN says he believes a firm decision can be made re the possible success of

201-253263

the PRI study as a result of this trip. He was told that lacking clear signs of progress, we would not consider sending him down again. He will be staying at the Hotel Del Paseo and will arrive the afternoon of 24 April for a week's stay. He will call Stan Watson when he arrives.

Lee E. Patton
AC/WH/6

Distribution:
1 - WH/1
1 - TICHBORN file
1 - Chrono
1 - UOACE/ops

Copy

typed 23 Apr 1967

Copy of letter from Edward G. TICHBORN

"On or about September 10, 1966 I had a meeting with three or four gentlemen in Washington (as I recall, they were Jerry Droller, Jack Kaufman, Paull Kittredge and someone else) and I informed these gentlemen that my moving expenses had been considerably more than I had estimated. However, I told these gentlemen that rather than ask for an additional amount, I wished to serve a moratorium of loan payments for six months. One of these men (with a nod from another) said "okay--don't worry about it--just don't ask for an additional allotment. We'll take care of it."

"At this point we moved on to another topic, and I assumed I would be allowed to skip payments for six (6) months.

(signed) Edward G. TICHBORN

(no date)

201-253203

SECRET

DO-67-162

10 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Request for Services of Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. Pursuant to exploratory discussions participated in by Mr. Allen of DO, Mr. Munger of EUR, and Mr. Patton of WH, your approval is requested to assign contract agent Edward G. TICHBORN (P) to Madrid for approximately three weeks TDY. DO would, of course, defray the expenses of Tichborn's trip.

2. As you know, Tichborn is provided cover in New York by DO's proprietary WUSALINE under Project WUBRINY. WUSALINE has an affiliate in Madrid. The operational potential of WUSALINE's Spanish affiliate and that of its local directors has not been fully determined. DO, EUR and COS, Madrid, are interested in determining the access of the local directors to intelligence targets and in assessing the affiliate as a cover vehicle. As WUSALINE's officer concerned with Latin America, Tichborn is considered a logical choice from the cover viewpoint for this assignment. He also has considerable WOFACT experience, meets people easily, is fluent in Spanish, and is a graduate of the Harvard Law School. The latter fact is important, considering the legal background of the affiliate's local directors.

3. If you approve, it is envisaged that the operation will be closely coordinated by DO, EUR, and WH. COS, Madrid has concurred in a TDY by Tichborn and can provide on-the-spot guidance.

GORDON L. JORGENSEN
Chief, DO Division

SECRET

SECRET

24 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/Support

ATTENTION : Mr. Ed Burroughs

SUBJECT : Compensation Paid by WUSALINE to Edward G. TICHBORN (P) During the Period 1 October 1966-31 January 1967

Edward G. TICHBORN (P) is being salaried by WUSALINE at the rate of $17,000 per annum. His employment with WUSALINE began on 1 October 1966. During the period 1 October 1966-31 January 1967, TICHBORN was paid by WUSALINE a salary of $5,666.67.

Gale W. Allen
DOCO

GWA/ekw

cc: WH/6/Lee Patton

SECRET

201-253203

Tichborn

Check Has Wesseline
sent back Vida

File
[illegible]
Support

March 16, 1967

Vida Internacional, S.A.
222 West 33rd Street
New York, New York 10001

Attention: Mr. R. S. Macbeth, Assistant Secretary

Dear Sir:

I am enclosing a check in the amount of $14,750 for deposit to VIDA's account. This amount represents client's funds from Nassau ~~International, Inc.~~

no

I will advise you very soon as to how these funds should be disbursed, therefore, please make the deposit as soon as possible.

Thanks for your cooperation.

Best regards,

Don

Enclosure:
Check Number FE 85635

WH funds for
Tichborn
put in as income

201-253203

Tichborn 201
Working / Support

March 13, 1967

Vida Internacional, S.A.
222 West 33th Street
New York, New York 10001

rded.

ORN ler

Twelve (12) months consulting services -- HENRY P. LOPEZ

(September 1, 1966 -- August 30, 1967)

@ $1,000.00 per month	$12,000.00
Estimated expenses	2,750.00
TOTAL ..	$14,750.00

201-253203

2 March 1967

(typed 13 March 1967)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Contact Report, 2 March 1967

PARTICIPANTS : Edward G. TICHBORN and Lee E. Patton

PLACE : Hotel Barbizon Plaza 1900-2200 hours. LEP's hotel room.

1. LEP reviewed in detail TICHBORN's knowledge of the early funding of the magazine Dialogos. TICHBORN made the following comments:

a. The original $4,000 given him came from the Station, and there was no mention of any cover story or indication of the ultimate source of the funds.

b. With regard to the Farfield Foundation contribution to Dialogos, TICHBORN said that it did not go to him due to some mixup but did go to Editor Ramon Xirau. This amount was, he recalls, between $2,000 and $2,500.

c. TICHBORN replied in regard to his knowledge of any foundation's having given support to Dialogos by saying that none did to his knowledge. The only sources he can recall were individuals including the following: Cass Canfield; McEnroe; R. Strauss; Dowling; McKenna.

2. With regard to the PRI study on which the decision has been given on 28 February by Chief, WH/CA to go forward, LEP gave TICHBORN the following instructions:

a. He was asked to provide prior to his departure a pre-travel work plan which would include who he is going to see, where, and what he hopes to accomplish during this one-week stay in Mexico City. He agreed to submit this information prior to his departure. LEP told

201-253203

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

Lopez Go

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : C/WH/6

ATTN : Mr. Patton

FROM : WH/Pers/Contracts

DATE: 27 February 1967

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN

1. Edward G. TICHBORN has sent three checks to Wm. Rodgers P.O. Box 10146, Woodridge Station, Washington, D.C. without any accompanying explanation.

$125.00	dated 15 Feb 67
125.00	dated 15 Jan 67
25.89	dated 15 Feb 67 (for "medical insurance")

The above checks were received 27 Feb in an envelope postmarked 21 Feb 1967.

2. Please advise if you have any idea as to what the two $125. checks are for.

3. It would facilitate processing of checks (payments) if TICHBORN were asked to forward a brief explanation with the check as to what individual checks are for when such cannot be indicated on the check.

Wm. Renehan
Wm. Renehan

Renehan notified on 28 Feb. 1967 that $125.00 amounts are for repayment of loan - to be sent to H. Lanam

SECRET

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

DC 1253203

X

WH/6-509

15 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Travel of Edward G. TICHBORN (201-253203)

1. In accordance with your request for information on TICHBORN's foreign travel (CI/OA Memorandum dated 22 November 1966) the following is forwarded.

2. Edward G. TICHBORN left New York City for Mexico City on 9 January 1967, returning on 21 January. He travelled primarily on cover company business but extended his stay to consult with Station Mexico City on a possible research project of interest to the Station and Headquarters.

Paul E. Oberst
Chief, WH/6

201-253203

14-00000

Mr. Allen's Copy

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AUTHORIZATION TO EXPEND FUNDS FROM OTHER COMPONENTS ALLOTMENTS	DATE **24 January 1967**

TO : **Chief, DODS**
THRU :
ATTN : **Chief, DODS/B&F**

SUBJECT : **Funding WUSALINE/UOACE, FY 1967**

REFERENCE: WUBRINY

SUPPORT, OR SERVICES, TO BE PROVIDED

Funding for WUSALINE/UOACE in the amount of $14,750 for salary and travel expenses of Edward G. TICHBORN (P). WH Division/B&F should be advised and receive a copy of each advance request.

Cite MOR 2504XX; use liquidation code 1

Orig. & 1 - DODS/B&F
1 - OF/PSAD
1 - WH/B&F
1 - WH/6-Area Wide

CHARGEABLE TO	IF CHARGEABLE TO ACCOUNT NO. 144.1
PROJECT **UOACE**	FORWARD RECEIPTS SUPPORTING EXPENSES TO ROOM NO. / BUILDING / EXTENSION
ALLOTMENT NO. **7135-3104** **MOR 2504XX** **LIQ CODE 1**	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF / DIVISION
OBLIGATION REFERENCE A. EXPENSE / B. 144.1 ACCOUNT	
SIGNATURE OF ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER **Chief, WH/6**
FUNDS AVAILABLE	CONCURRENCE
SIGNATURE OF BUDGET OFFICER **David W. McIlhatten**	SIGNATURE FOR FINANCE DIVISION

FORM 11-62 1716 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(3)

SECRET (When filled in)

REQUEST FOR ADVANCE OF FUNDS

NAME OF ADVANCEE: WUSALINE/UOACE

DATE: 9 March 1967

AMOUNT: $14,750.00

DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12

PAYABLE TO: See Form 1834 attached

ROOM

BUILDING

TELEPHONE EXT.

PURPOSE

Funding for WUSALINE/UOACE in the amount of $14,750.00 for salary and travel expenses of Edward G. TICHBORN (P). (Copy of Authorization to Expend Funds From Other Components Allotments is in OF/PSAD)

STATUS OF OUTSTANDING ADVANCES

DATE	AMOUNT	UNACCOUNTED BALANCE

I agree that I will fully account for this advance by submission of vouchers and refund of any unexpended balance to the place of accounting stated and by the due date checked below. In the event of my failure to so account and refund any unexpended balance, I authorize deduction from my salary to effect settlement.

DUE DATE	✓
ON ARRIVAL AT DESTINATION ON OR ABOUT	
MONTHLY—ON THE LAST WORKDAY OF EACH MONTH	

PLACE OF ACCOUNTING

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ________ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF ADVANCEE

DATE

SIGNATURE OF AGENT

REQUESTING OFFICER

DATE

SIGNATURE: Gale W. Allen, DO/CO

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.: Liq. Code 1 2504 XX

CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.: 7135-3104

DATE

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER: Frances Klayman, DO/BF

APPROVED

DATE

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Thos. P. Schreyer, C/DOCO

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE

AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS ADVANCED

I acknowledge receipt of funds in the amount stated hereunder to be used for the purpose stated and accounted for as shown above.

DATE

AMOUNT

SIGNATURE OF ☐ ADVANCEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION—ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33			34-39 STATION CODE	40-41	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO.	48-49	50	51-54	55-66 COST—FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL			67-70 OBJECT CLASS	71-80 AMOUNT	
DESCRIPTION—ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. SHIP. DOC. NO	32-33 DIV.	REC. RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.	EXPEND EXCODE	ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	OBL. REF. SUB. NO.	CLOSE	GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	FY	FUNDS	61-66 CK. NO. X REF. NO.	68-70 DUE DATE	DEBIT	CREDIT

DATE

PREPARED BY

DATE

REVIEWED BY

TOTALS

FORM 7-65 281 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(38-42)

D

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance Date: 9 March 1967

FROM : DOCO

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.) Lic. Code #1 2504XX be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to Vida Internacional, S. A. ____________ $14,750.00
NAME OF PAYEE (True) STATUS (e.g.) CA: SA: CE: INTEGREE AMOUNT

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1) ______ Devised Cover Check. Account No. ________-1100
(2) X Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

	BOSTON		DALLAS*		KANSAS CITY		MIAMI		NEW ORLEANS		RICHMOND		ST. LOUIS
	CHICAGO		DENVER		KNOXVILLE		MILWAUKEE	X	NEW YORK*		SAN FRANCISCO		WASHINGTON, D.C.*
	CLEVELAND		DETROIT		LOS ANGELES		MINNEAPOLIS		PHILADELPHIA		SEATTLE		WILMINGTON

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following:
(1) Account Name: ____________
(2) Account Number: ____________
(3) Bank Name: ____________
(4) Bank Address: ____________
____________ Zip: ______
(5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
(6) Payment to be originated from ____________
(SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)

(7) Indicate remittor if desired: ____________

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ______ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Officer

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☐ Check to be picked up
PLEASE DELIVER TO DO/BF BY MOBILE TELLER

Donald G. Lemieux, DO/CM 11-61171 Thos. P. Schreyer, C/DOCO 11-61274
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER EXT. SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER EXT

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment ____________ City ____________

FORM 1-64 1264 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(23)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Admin/Finance Edward G. TICHBORN Promissory Note

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMS-5093, dated 29 December 1966

In response to reference, attached is the original of reference together with related originals of authority for Payroll Deductions and receipt for the loan amount.

for/WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As Stated Above, h/w

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-7494	DATE 18 January 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

Tichborn

15 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/DO

SUBJECT : Discussions with WH/6 re Possible Use of Edward G. Tichborn (P) in Spain

1. The undersigned lunched on 15 December 1966 with Mr. Lee Patten, the WH/6 Case Officer for Edward G. TICHBORN (P), who is under WUSALINE cover in New York. Mr. Patten was formerly COS Managua and now Deputy Chief, WH/6 under Mr. Paul Oberst. He is a very competent and conscientious case officer. He believes that WH Division should get the most operational benefits possible from Tichborn, inasmuch as WH Division is paying Tichborn's salary. He is working diligently to come up with operational assignments for Tichborn. He has Tichborn working on two research projects and hopes to establish Tichborn as a political advisor to the Government of the Dominican Republic. Although WH Division is suffering budget cuts, which Mr. Patten laments, his project for Tichborn has been approved for one year and funds are available.

2. In view of Mr. Patten's conscientious approach as case officer for Tichborn and some known parochialism in WH, the undersigned felt it unwise to press Mr. Patten for more than approval for Tichborn to make a 2-3 weeks trip to Spain. In fact, the undersigned had to present a considerable case for even this limited use of Tichborn. However, as a result, it is believed that Mr. Patten will support in WH Division a TDY in Spain for Tichborn of 2-3 weeks duration at DO expense. Mr. Patten will call the undersigned on 19 December to report the WH position.

3. The undersigned seized upon the budget cut point to volunteer that DO would be amenable to helping out with Tichborn's salary if WH is hard pressed. Mr. Patten declined, inasmuch as his project is approved for one year. He hopes to get so many operational benefits from Tichborn that he will have no problem renewing the project next year. He did admit that DO's willingness to pay Tichborn's expenses and salary while on a TDY to Spain should help him sell the proposal to his superiors.

4. The undersigned pointed out that he had not yet approached the Spanish Desk on a TDY for Tichborn, because it was desired to

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

201-253203

get WH Division's views as a first step. Mr. Patten said that in the event of WH approval of a TDY to Spain for Tichborn that he would like to participate with DO and the Spanish Desk in the briefing of Tichborn. The undersigned readily concurred. Mr. Patten thinks that Tichborn should not be a global asset but rather one limited to Latin America. However, he did concur with the undersigned that Spain represents an exception because of language and historical ties to Latin America. Mr. Patten strongly hopes Tichborn can be a political advisor to the Dominican Republic Government. He would not think of recommending to his superiors more than a 2-3 weeks TDY for Tichborn with the understanding that the advisor requirement has priority. The undersigned pointed out that DDP considers the Spanish requirement high priority, and that use of Tichborn for a TDY to Spain would surely be an important justification when project renewal time comes around.

5. It is hoped that WH's position will be favorable for a 2-3 weeks use of Tichborn in Spain. Any pressing of WH for use of Tichborn over a longer period is a matter of delicacy. The undersigned knows that WH feels they were coerced into accepting Project WUBRINY. The undersigned would not recommend pressure. On the contrary, the undersigned has hoped to use Tichborn as a means of opening up Latin America for Project WUBRINY.

Gale W. Allen
DOCO

GWA/ekw

Distribution:
- Orig - Adse
  - 1 - WUBRINY/Ops
  - 1 - Tichborn (P) file
  - 1 - chrono

14-00000

9 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Contact Report, 8 December 1205-1600 hours

PARTICIPANTS: Edward G TICHBORN and Lee E. Patton

PLACE : Hotel Hoosevelt and Charley Brown's Pub

1. TICHBORN arrived at the meeting site in the lobby five minutes late. We went up to the hotel room where the following business items were discussed.

a. He was told of his overpay of $872.37 which he said he would return at once by check to Manuel P. Goodtwo, mailed to Mr. William S. Rodgers, P.O. Box 10146, Woodridge Station.

b. TICHBORN was reminded of the requirement that he pay his premiums of $8.63 for his health insurance. He was told he owed for the period of October through January, and it was suggested that he pay by check directly to the above box. He was told that there was no expiration notice sent out on the premiums being due; hence, it was up to him to keep the matter current.

c. He was told that Finance was interested in obtaining his monthly payments of $125 in repayment of his loan of $3,000. Apparently he had last paid in July. He requested an extention or moratorium through January 1967 due to his heavy expenses involved in moving.

d. TICHBORN was shown copies of the "White" FBIS publication. After he has looked at these, he will notify LEP as to whether he wants copies in the future mailed to the post office box which he has now obtained.

e. TICHBORN was told that the $575 which he had lost on a TDY trip about a year and a half ago has now been officially written off.

201-253203

f. TICHBORN was told NOT to use his pseudo, TICHBORN, on mail (LEP had received an envelope from TICHBORN which carried his pseudo on the outside as sender but had a phony address).

2. TICHBORN submitted his proposal on the PRI study which he estimated would cost $3,800. Since it did not have a research plan or outline, LEP requested him to send one as soon as possible. TICHBORN believes Menendez is indispensable and that his services are worth the $2,000 he has projected. TICHBORN feels that his plan is not as complete as it might be but would be of a very useful size and scope and could be completed in six months. LEP briefed TICHBORN on the peculiarities of our operational interest in research as contrasted to the traditional academic approach. TICHBORN seemed to understand these distinctions very clearly.

3. TICHBORN had a preliminary report entitled "Press Reaction to Balaguer". He said that last week he had finally found a newstand on 146th Street where he could buy daily issues (only about a day late) of El Caribe, Listan Diario and Ahora.

4. LEP briefed TICHBORN on our (WH) reluctance to send him on ICAP missions to other areas. He indicated that he had not heard of the Spanish tripfrom John. He quickly said that he thought such a trip was justifiable from the standpoint of Spanish relations with Latin America, etc. etc.

5. He agreed that he would be of very limited use for ICAP in other areas and said that he had so informed Train when such travel had been proposed earlier.

LEP

Lee E. Patton
DC/WH/6

Distribution:
Orig - TICHBORN (UOACE/ops)
1 - Chrono

Zichborn (P)

SECRET

6 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DO

SUBJECT : Spain

REF : A. DO memorandum 66-294 dtd 1 Nov 1966 to Chief, EUR Division re Possible Exploitation of ICAP, Iberia S. A.

B. Memorandum dtd 8 November 1966 from Chief, DO to Mr. Gale W. Allen re Information about Spain (and Portugal)

1. Chief and DC/E/IB informed the undersigned that Chief, EUR does not think Ref A contains sufficient specific information to permit adequate evaluation of ICAP Iberia's access to intelligence targets in Spain. He, therefore, refuses to permit transmittal to the field of available information as agreed in discussions held with DC/COS Madrid prior to his departure. They also informed the undersigned that the requirements in Ref B should be more specific and requested that the undersigned discuss the matter with them.

2. The undersigned had previously discussed Ref B requirements with WUBRINY/1. He submitted a list of U. S. firms operating in Spain; a previous report on the ten leading Spanish banks with the interlocking connections in industry of the officers and directors of the banks; and a proposal for additional study. WUBRINY/1 proposed that, in the guise of publishing a financial directory, ICAP approach U. S. firms operating in Spain and obtain detailed information on their operations. WUBRINY/1 also proposed to approach ICAP Iberia's Spanish partner, Banif S. A, allegedly in behalf of a client bank interested in Spain, to do a study from the political viewpoint on the most significant power elements in the economic and commercial field. He said that the study could be as elaborate as WOFACT is willing to pay. The undersigned, armed with WUBRINY/1's thinking and list of U. S. companies, met with Chief and DC/E/IB at their request on 30 November 1966.

met 3. Chief and DC/E/IB asked some very specific questions on the access of Banif, S.A. either as a firm or through its Directors to intelligence targets. They must be in a position to justify to the satisfaction of Chief, EUR that ICAP and ICAP Iberia have intelligence capability which can be operationally exploited. Therefore, answers must be forthcoming on this matter or DO assure them that Banif, S. A. has such access but can't exploit it unless an officer is assigned to ICAP Iberia.

Excl

SECRET

201-253203

4. The principal questions asked are listed as follows:

a. What are the normal commercial relations, if any, between Banif, S. A. and the Spanish Government?

b. If such relations exist, give details. How did the commercial relations arise? Was it because of commercial reasons or relations between individual Banif Directors and officials of the Spanish Government? If the latter, what is the nature of the relationship? Was it friendship or under-the-table deals such as kickbacks, rebates, etc. Describe each Banif-Spanish government deal giving the substance, participants, and arrangements?

c. Does Banif, S.A. or its Directors have connections with any political group, either in the regime or in the opposition? Does it contribute funds to any political group?

d. Does Banif have any deals with the military on arms and equipment? If so, give details.

e. What are the specific projects Banif has worked on in the past two years, either for its own account or the account of others. Give details.

f. What information does Banif have, or a capability for obtaining, on Spain's economic, industrial, and financial situation as it might affect a post-Franco Government.

5. Re Ref B requirements, Chief and DC/E/IB affirmed interest in the most significant power elements in the economic or commercial field in Spain, particularly those having political ties. They are interested not in all U. S. firms operating in Spain, but in those which are politically conscious and have the capability by virtue of size or nature of work to influence political life in Spain. For example, a small U. S. firm raising chickens in Spain is of no interest. Conversely, the Bank of America in the banking field or Brown & Root in the construction field or a U. S. firm manufacturing military equipment could be of great interest. In these firms with a capability to influence Spanish political life, the Chief and DC/E/IB would be interested in knowing the U. S. managers in Spain who deal with the Spanish authorities.

6. The undersigned asked, and Chief and DC/E/IB agreed, to send Chief, DO their specific requirements on a formal basis. Chief and DC/E/IB opined that Project WUBRINY appears to have the best capability for Spain and Project WHEETREE for Portugal.

7. The undersigned, on 1 December 1966, apprised WUBRINY/1 of the specific nature of the Spanish Desk requirements, inasmuch as WUBRINY/1 could go to Spain while on his current trip to Europe. WUBRINY/1 said that answers to such specific questions would require someone spending considerable time on the spot. He could not spend the time, but suggested that WH contract agent, Edward G. TICHBORN (P) be made available for two weeks assignment with ICAP, Iberia. WUBRINY/1 noted that Tichborn is fluent in Spanish and an experienced hand in ferreting out such information. Moreover, it would be perfectly natural for Tichborn to visit ICAP Iberia prior to undertaking commercial ventures in Latin America. A visit by Tichborn would be very logical from a training viewpoint and in the light of the traditional ties between Spain and Latin America.

8. The undersigned concurs with WUBRINY/1 that Tichborn would be an excellent means of obtaining the desired information. Subject to WH Division's operational demands on Tichborn, it is hoped that WH Division would make him available for a couple of weeks. This matter can be developed further when WUBRINY/1 returns from Europe and it is determined whether Tichborn will be needed for a two weeks training job in the Dominican Republic.

Gale W. Allen
DOCO

Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 - ICAP Iberia/Ops
1 - Tichborn
1 - WUBRINY/Ops

23 November 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Addresses and Phone Numbers of Edward TICHBORN

Following are addresses and phone numbers for TICHBORN:

Office: Train Cabot Associates
375 Park Avenue
New York City (in Seagram Building)

Office Phone: PL 1-1944

House Address: 5900 Arlington Ave.
Riverdale, New York

Home Phone: Code 212 884-8728

Lee E. Patton

Lee E. Patton
DC/WH/6

201-253203

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

TO : DC/WH/6

DATE: 15 November 1966

FROM : WH/Pers/Contracts

ATTN Mr. Patton —

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN--Salary Overpayment; Payment of Contract Hospitalization Insurance Premiums

1. The following pertains to a salary overpayment to Edward G. TICHBORN and procedure for payment of his Contract Hospitalization Insurance premiums.

2. It is requested you advise T:

a. Although full salary for October, 1966 was paid him by his cover office, Headquarters payroll erroneously sent the amount of $872.37 to his bank representing his October salary.

T is to liquidate the overpayment by forwarding ~~your~~ his check in the amount of $881. ($872.37 plus 8.63 insurance premium) payable to Manuel P. GOODTWO.

b. As T, beginning with October, receives full salary from cover, it will be necessary for him to provide payments to Headquarters for his contract hospitalization insurance. The monthly premium is $8.63.

It is suggested that premium payments be made on a quarterly basis beginning with the period Oct 66 - Jan 67 inclusive. Subsequent quarterly payments should be made during the last month of the preceding quarter. Check should be made payable to Manuel P. GOODTWO.

If T indicates quarterly payments are inconvenient, he may pay in any multiple of one month in advance. In such case, the initial payment must be for two months (Oct and Nov). Subsequent payments should be made in advance of the month for which premium is due (premium for Dec should be received during Nov, etc.).

Advise T that expiration notices are not sent.

c. The above checks should be forwarded to this office for processing.

d. If you desire for T to send the checks directly to me, the following sterile address may be used (let me know if he is to use).

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

201-253203

Mr. William S. Rodgers
P.O. Box 10146
Woodridge Station
Washington, D.C. 20018

3. If any questions on the above, let me know.

Wm. Renehan

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/Pers/W.S. Renehan 3D 3113

EXTENSION: 4460

NO

DATE: 1 November 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. ~~C/WH/PERS~~				
2. WH/B&F				
3. C/WH/6 3B 4404				
4.				
5. C/WH/SS 3D 3113	1[illegible] NOV 1966			
6.				
7. ~~Chief, Support~~ DOD 1750 Penn.			HA	To 7 -CC sent OP/CSTD/CA91 - Subject has Contract hospitalization - will make separate payment voucher So will not affect cover payroll Renehan
8. DO/Per	21 Nov		ac	
9. ~~C/Dot Support~~				
10. ~~DO/B&F~~				-Pls direct attention to appropriate office(s)
11. Mr Gale Allen				I have no knowledge of this person -
12.				
13. File: [illegible]				10. Do you pay this man?
14.				
15.				

201-253203

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

17 NOV 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Domestic Operations Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN, Compensation

1. The contract for Edward G. TICHBORN has been amended effective 1 October 1966 increasing his basic compensation from $12,000. to $17,000. per annum.

2. It is requested that your office effect the necessary action for WUSALINE to payroll the increase.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Lee Patton / WH/6	EXTENSION 6032	NO.	DATE 10 Nov. 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. Gale Allen			GWJ	Tichborn file
2. Room 1H19				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

MEMORANDUM FOR:

10 November '66

Mr. Gale Allen

Dear Gale,

Just received this from Bill Renehan who in turn got it from the tax man who recently saw TICHBORN (o/a 8 November) in order to straighten out his tax responsibilities and to have him sign his new contract amendment. The amendment will be sent over to you by WH/Contracts shortly. Let's get together on this shortly--call me about Tuesday and maybe we can have lunch together near your shop.

i.e. the trip

L.

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

MEMO : To ICAP Directors

FROM : Train and Lopez

IN RE: Projected trip through Latin America

Bearing in mind that our executive committee may (at some future but presently undetermined date) desire Lopez to undertake in-depth surveys of economic conditions in certain Latin American countries, we consider it highly desirable to establish prior contacts with the banking and business communities of several selected areas which are most likely to offer ICAP sound investment opportunities. Our past experience indicates that it is much easier to assess spontaneous financial ventures if one is already acquainted with the business ambiance of a particular country. Thus, having previously touched base with local bankers and industrialists, Lopez would have the advantage of thier personal advice in matters relating to any specific subsequent projects.

The countries that would seem to offer the most promising opportunities for ICAP are PERU, CHILE, ARGENTINA, URUGUAY, BRAZIL and VENEZUELA. Fortunately, we have already established certain minimal ties with most of these countries, but it would be best for Lopez himself to become personally acquainted with our contacts therein.

In order to save time and money, it would be advisable to visit all these countries in a single round-the-hemisphere trip. Taking into account the normal travel delays, the trip would require about eighteen (18) days.

Budget requirements:

1) Airline fares - $550 per person. This is Pan American Airlines special "winter fare." Normally, the trip costs $840 per person.

2) Lodging, food and minimal entertainment expenses - about $35 daily per person. Total for each person would be about $630.

3) Miscellaneous expenses (cab fares to and from airports, in-town cab fares, phone calls, secretarial costs, etc.) - about $100.

Since the month of December is generally a slow business period in most of these countries, we would suggest that this trip be made in the month of January, 1967.

Tickborn file

3 November 1966
WH/6 - 453

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN (201-253203)

REFERENCES : CI/OA Memorandum of 8 November 1965

1. Subject has been transferred from Mexico City to the New York City area where he is employed in WUSALINE, a WOFACT controlled proprietary corporation. He will no longer be connected with Project LICOLIC or involved in furnishing FI information on the intelligentsia of Mexico as dilineated in the memorandum of reference.

2. TICHBORN's new assignment will involve the following operational duties:

a. Various research activities in the political and psychological warfare fields. His area knowledge, language ability, and political expertise will be utilized in the production of political analyses-in-depth of key campaign issues, personalities, and parties in selected Latin American countries.

b. Availability on short notice for travel in the Latin American area as political action and election campaign advisor to those countries where WOFACT has been assigned such responsibilities.

3. It is requested that a new OA on Subject be expedited.

Lee E. Patton
DC/WH/6

201-253203

14-00000

1 November 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Contact Report, 26 October

PARTICIPANTS: (1) Edward G. TICHBORN, John P. C. Train, Gail Allen, and Lee E Patton

(2) TICHBORN, Allen, and Patton

PLACE : (1) Train's apartment at 700 Park Avenue, 1500-1730 hours.

(2) Mannie Klein's Restaurant 1730-2000 hours

1. During the meeting at Train's, the majority of the discussion cenetered around ICAP, the trip to Central America and CIA/DO relations with ICAP. The following points of interest were gleaned in this period.

a. Train is a highly-trained promoter who is coldly reserved and capable. He seems to be generally pleased with TICHBORN and his capabilities for serving the firm as legal advisor, contact man, and unofficial economic consultant on economic matters.

b. TICHBORN likes his cover company, Train, and the work itself.

c. Train, if let alone, would use 100% of TICHBORN's time. When he brought this up, LEP used it as a starting place for briefing on the general nature of TICHBORN's functions of the past. Train was told that he would need TICHBORN for "research activities" in addition to any use involving special trips to Latin America. He was told we would need 50% or more of TICHBORN's time to carry out these activities. It was pointed out to him that because of the nature of TICHBORN's services, we would have to insist that he be available for immediate use and hence could not be on any long-range Train projects which would be difficult to drop. Train accepted these limitations without visable annoyances or objections.

d. Tichborn says his office cover is good and there are no indications that he is not accepted for what he purports to be.

TRAIN
~~TICHBORN~~ concurs in this estimate of the lack of security problems within the office.

2. After leaving Train, we went to dinner where the following subjects were discussed:

a. LEP pointed out clearly that he was "the boss" and responsible for TICHBORN's operational utilization. TICHBORN was told that Gall is responsible for the Train commercial setup. There appeared to be no doubt in his mind as to who calls the shots.

b. TICHBORN was told of our need for an experienced Latin American specialist who could handle political action research on key issues in certain countries. He was also told of our interest in possible CA covert action advisory tasks. Our need for someone able to make meaningful interpretive analyses was explained in some detail and examples of probable areas and issues were presented. TICHBORN said he had no special experience in content analysis or survey analysis techniques. However, he was apparently very much interested in the idea. He said that he would get the book suggested on content analysis. He will check into the availability of the Dominican Republic papers mentioned and let LEP know by 5 November if they can be had in New York City. He was requested to approach the problem along the general following lines: Analyze the Bosch anti-government statements for indications of whom he is trying to reach, how, and for what reason (since June 15). Similarly analyze the Balaguer statements and determine:

1) Influences the news media is having on his public image.

2) Where and how could he strengthen this image.

3) What issues should be raised or surpressed.

It was suggested that he try to get issues of El Caribe and Listin Diario.

3. LEP's initial impressions of TICHBORN were as follows: He is very intelligent and in addition is "sharp". He has a professionally smooth and friendly manner. He is a natural politican. He is an "operator" and will collaborate very closely and enthusiastically so long as there is real benefit in it for him. He is probably sensitive to his Mexican-American ancestory as indicated by his obvious annoyances (albeit presented jokingly) at the fact that

he has not been invited out to lunch by any members of Train's company in the six weeks he has worked there. He is probably not a detailed man and is impressed by social position and wealth and consequently likes to function on a high level. Although there is no real reason to believe that TICHBORN may see another career ahead, LEP feels there is a possibility that Train will try to hire him for his company or he may make contacts in New York City which could lead to his getting a non-CIA job.

Lee E Patton
DC/WH/6

Distribution:
Orig - Tichborn
1 - Chrono
1 - Mr. Allen

14-00000

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT [illegible] ☐ CA ☐ FI ☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible]

ACTION		AREA
[illegible]	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION WH
	AMENDMENT	
	RENEWAL	BRANCH 6
	TERMINATION	DESK Area-Wide
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Lee E. Paton · EXTENSION 4735
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY	TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED	FY	AMOUNT
ADD/P 13 January 1967	$ 16,000	1967	
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1966 TO 30 June 1967		195	
	FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL 7135-3104		

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

Project UOACE approved in the amount of $16,000 for FY 1967.

SIGNATURE
DDP/PG [illegible]

DATE

NOV 7 [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1	SSA-DD/S	1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1	CASE OFFICER	2	DDP/PG

FORM 8-61 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

[illegible] ACTION

NEW PROJECT [illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	FIELD STATION	
[illegible]	WH/[illegible]	[illegible]
EXTENSION	Lee E. Patton	3 Oct. 1966
[illegible]	ROOM NO. 3B4402	BUILDING Hqs.	9000 6735

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

[illegible]	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE	DO NOT [illegible] THIS SPACE
C [illegible]	Paul E. Oberst		
[illegible]/SA	Gale Allen		
[illegible]/B&F	Robert Carter	[illegible]66	
[illegible]/SS	George Thomson	10/[illegible]	
C [illegible]/CA	Gerard Droller		
[illegible] DO	Donald C. Marelius		
C [illegible]	William V. Broe		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
CI/OPS						
CCS/CCG		1/[illegible]/66				
DC/CA		[illegible]				
MPS/BG/CA						
MPS/C/BG		17 Jan 67				
OPSER/P		6 Jan 67				
C/DO	(Signed) C. T. Barnes	7 Dec 66			X	

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	REVISED TOTAL
1 Oct. 1966	30 June 1967	$16,000	[illegible]	$
			1967	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans		18 Jan 67

FORM 8-64 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

CA/PEG Project Record Sheet

	Initials	Date		
1. DC/CA/PEG			Project Name:	[illegible]
2. C/CA/PEG			Country:	WH/Area-wide
3. [illegible]				
4.			Type of Action	New Project Approval
5. DDP/PG			PEG Evaluation Officer	[illegible]
6 ADDP			Date Received:	6 December 196[illegible]
7.			Date Due in DDP/PG:	23 December 1966

Interagency Coordination: [illegible]

COMMENTS:

1. [illegible] is a new WH/6 project designed to support contract agent [illegible] G. TICHBORN (P) as a political action agent on a regional WH basis. It replaces an earlier, now-terminated support project, [illegible], under which TICHBORN was handled by Mexico City Station through 30 September 1966. The new [illegible] project covers TICHBORN's salary, travel and operational/miscellaneous costs in the amount of $15,000 from 1 October 1966 through the end of FY 1967. The FY 1967 WH Operational Program contains sufficient funds to cover this project.

2. TICHBORN has served CIA as a political action agent in Mexico City since 1961. His work there centered primarily on the development of a cultural magazine, [illegible], which attempted to counter the persistent leftist monopoly of the Mexican intellectual community. From time to time he also carried out spot assignments in other WH areas, usually as a top-level consultant in election campaign operations (e.g., in support of Balaguer in the Dominican presidential elections).

3. In August 1966 TICHBORN was obliged to move himself and his family to the United States for personal reasons. The [illegible] project establishes him under a new cover, the [illegible] Corporation in New York City, a DOD Proprietary under project [illegible], which is expanding its activities in Latin America. Under this cover, TICHBORN will continue to be available on short notice for a variety of political action (election-targeted) assignments, as in the past.

4. TICHBORN's unique ability to serve CIA objectives in key election situations has been amply documented. The new cover arrangement under WUSALINE appears well suited, in terms of flexibility and backstopping, to enable CIA to continue to utilize TICHBORN's services in the future. Recommend approval.

SECRET

PROJECT UOACE

a. Identification. Base - New York City. Political Action Support.

b. Objectives. To support contract agent Edward G. TICHBORN (P) who will be used as a covert action advisor and political action agent by WHD. In addition TICHBORN will be available for election campaign research, special political surveys on selected countries and other allied research requirements which will utilize his political expertise and area knowledge.

c. Background. In late 1959, TICHBORN, a bilingual Harvard-trained lawyer with considerable domestic political experience, was hired as a political action advisor for Agency-sponsored election operations throughout Latin America. In 1961 he became a full-time contract agent and was assigned to Mexico City, under personal cover, which permitted him to travel readily on third country political action assignments. He has participated in political operations in Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile and the Dominican Republic. While based in Mexico he was primarily a Headquarters asset but in addition did an excellent job for Mexico City Station in first establishing and running a magazine aimed at Latin American intellectuals and second reporting on the activities and attitudes of Mexican left-wing intellectuals. TICHBORN has shown himself to be a very intelligent, outgoing Mexican-American with initiative and energy who has highly developed political sensibilities.

This project is being presented to cover the salary and operational expenses of Contract Agent Edward G. TICHBORN.

d. Operational Aspects.

(1) Personnel. Edward G. TICHBORN was granted Operational Approval No. C-77119 on 14 October 1959, and this clearance was extended on 8 November 1965.

TICHBORN departed Mexico City on 1 August 1966 for PCS assignment to New York City where he will be employed for cover purposes by the DO proprietary WUSALINE. WUSALINE is expanding its activities into the Latin American area and can readily utilize the legal/economic background and area knowledge which TICHBORN possesses. TICHBORN initially will devote a substantial amount of time to his duties at WUSALINE for cover-building purposes but will be available for Agency assignments on short notice. It is not planned to make any other persons or organizations in the U. S. witting of the Agency/TICHBORN relationship with the exception of the principal agent WUBRINY-1, WUBRINY-2 and WUBRINY-11 of the WUSALINE project.

TICHBORN will enter on duty with WUSALINE on 1 October 1966.

(2) Mechanisms. The WUSALINE mechanism operates as a subsidiary of the investment firm of WUSALIFY and is a DO proprietary. Arrangements for the use of WUSALINE by WH Division have been coordinated with the DO office concerned.

e. Security Evaluation. It is estimated that the danger of a security compromise in this project is minimal. TICHBORN will be involved in cover activities in WUSALINE which fit his academic and area interests and experience. WUSALINE has a well-established cover as a part of the bona fide WUSALIFY company and has had no security problems which could adversely effect the cover provided TICHBORN.

There are no known security risks which could have been passed on from his former cover in Mexico City as a consultant with a Mexican legal firm. The new WUSALINE cover arrangements will strengthen TICHBORN's cover security by permitting the income backstopping and the operational and travel flexibility required in his assignment.

In the event of compromise, TICHBORN probably would be discharged from WUSALINE in order to minimize the damage to that mechanism. Depending on the gravity of the compromise, steps might be taken by WUSALINE to disown TICHBORN to protect the cover mechanism and WUSALIFY.

An LCFLUTTER test in May 1965 indicated that TICHBORN had told no one other than his wife of his relationship with the Agency.

f. Coordination. Coordination outside the Agency is not necessary.

g. Costs. (1 October 1966 -- 30 June 1967)

Salary ($17,000/yr.)	$12,750 (9 months)
Travel (domestic and international travel incident to establishment and maintenance of his cover position)	2,250
Operational entertainment and miscellaneous expenses	1,000
TOTAL	$ 16,000

The agent will be funded as follows:

(1) Overt salary and necessary cover travel expenses will be paid by WUSALINE on a monthly basis.

(2) WH Division will make funds available to DO to cover TICHBORN's salary. DO will pass these funds to WUSALINE through existing funding channels.

(3) Operational expenses will be reimbursed by the case officer directly to the agent.

(4) The Agent will conform to Agency requirements in all his accountings.

h. Annexes. None of the special considerations listed under this heading is applicable to this project

i. Emergency Conditions. In view of TICHBORN's location in the U.S., no special planning is required for emergency conditions.

IDENTITIES

Edward G. TICHBORN	Henry R. Lopez
WUSALINE	ICAP Corporation (Project WUBRINY)
WUBRINY-1	John P. C. Train President, ICAP
WUBRINY-2	
WUBRINY-11	
WUSALIFY	Train, Cabot and Associates, Inc.

ORIG: Lee E. Patton:pe
UNIT: WH/6
EXT: 6735
DATE: 27 Sept. 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

1	Allen	5	B
2		6	
3	ct	7	
4	C	8	

DISSEM BY 48 PER ______ # ______

File Tichborn ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE C CS 3, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA 2, CA/O 4, ~~CS 3~~, CSPS, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CA/PEG

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 27 22 15Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 38623

TO MANAGUA, SAN JOSE, GUATEMALA, MEXICO CITY

1. EDWARD G. TICHBORN (IDEN A) A LONG TIME DYVOUR CONTRACT AGENT FOR POLITICAL ACTION OPERATIONS HAS RECENTLY BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM MEXICO CITY AND ASSIGNED TO THE NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF HIS NEW COVER ORGANIZATION WUSALINE (IDEN B) WHICH IS A DO PROPRIETARY AND A SUBSIDIARY OF WUSALIFY (IDEN C). TICHBORN WILL ACCOMPANY WUBRINY-1 (IDEN D) THE WITTING HEAD OF WUSALINE ON A BUSINESS ORIENTATION TRIP TO COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, GUATEMALA AND MEXICO CITY 3-10 OCTOBER.

2. FOR STRICTLY BUSINESS PURPOSES TICHBORN AND WUBRINY-1 WILL PROBABLY INITIATE CONTACT WITH EMBASSY AND AID IN ALL COUNTRIES. NO STATION CONTACT SUGGESTED BY HQS AND UNLESS STATIONS SHOULD SPECIFICALLY REQUEST CONTACT NO WOFACT PERSONNEL WILL BE IDENTIFIED TO TICHBORN ON THIS TRIP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/1 C. Cisneros
C/WH/2 Ben
DOD [illegible]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Paul E. Oberst
PAUL E. OBERST, C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-253203

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

SECRET

ORIG: Lee E. Patton:pe ☐ FILE
UNIT: WH/6 ☐ INDEX
EXT: 6735 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE: 27 Sept. 1966 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1	Wilson	5	B
2	cc	6	
3		7	
4	C	8	

DISSEM BY 48 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE CCS 3, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA 2, CA/O 4, CSPS, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CA/PEG

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 38624

TO MANAGUA, SAN JOSE, GUATEMALA, MEXICO CITY

REF: DIR 38623

IDENTITY A: HENRY P. LOPEZ

IDENTITY B: INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL CORPORATION (ICAP)

IDENTITY C: TRAIN, CABOT & ASSOCIATES

IDENTITY D: JOHN P. C. TRAIN

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: PLEASE REF ATTACHED CABLE.

C/WH/1 [illegible]
C/WH/2 [illegible]
DOD [illegible] by phone
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Paul E. Oberst
PAUL E. OBERST, C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

21 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Support

SUBJECT : Edward G. Tichborn

1. Contract Agent Edward G. Tichborn, formerly assigned to Mexico City Station, departed that post on 1 August 1966. Effective that date he has been assigned PCS to New York City, New York, to carry out political action tasks as required by WH Division and other operational components of the Agency. While located in New York City, he will be employed for cover purposes by the DODS proprietary WUSALINE.

2. Incident to this transfer, WH Division has agreed with Tichborn to an increase in salary to $17,000 and a new contract reflecting this amount as the new gross salary should be prepared to be effective 1 October 1966. The new contract should include a salary offset clause to insure there will be no duplication of payment and reflect the various hospitalization and insurance benefits included in the existing contract.

3. Salary payments through 30 September and other costs arising from his transfer from Mexico City to New York City should be charged to Project LICOLIC. A new project reflecting the increase in salary will be prepared by Branch 6 to be effective as of 1 October 1966, and salary as well as other operational expenses incurred subsequent to that date should be charged to the new project. WH Division Branch 6 will have responsibility for project management as of 1 October.

4. I suggest that this matter be brought before the reactivated WH agent board for "official ratification."

Gerard Droller
C/WH/CA

SECRET

201-253203

SECRET

21 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Edward G. Tichborn (201-253203)

1. Contract Agent Edward G. Tichborn has been reassigned PCS from Mexico City to New York City as of 1 August 1966. For cover purposes in New York he will be employed by the DODS proprietary WUSALINE. All necessary arrangement for use of WUSALINE by WH Division has been coordinated with the DO office concerned and Tichborn will formally EOD with WUSALINE on 1 October 1966.

2. It is requested that the operational clearance for Tichborn be amended to reflect his transfer to New York City. His primary operational responsibilities will remain the same, i.e., political action tasks in election situations throughout Latin America, but he will no longer be connected with the LIREAM project which has been terminated. WH Branch 6 will have project responsibility as of 1 October 1966.

Gerard Droller
C/WH/CA

WH/GD/PK:jly

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - CI/OA
1 - WH/Personnel
1 - C/WH/CA
1 - Kittredge Chrono
1 - Tichborn 201 File

SECRET

201-253203

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : WH/CA

ATTN : Mr. Kittredge

FROM : WH/Pers/Contracts

DATE: 6 September 1966

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Compensation

1. Per your tele-request this a.m., the following has been extracted from the contract for Edward G. TICHBORN, Independent Contractor.

a. Basic Compensation (salary) of $12,000. per annum. (Increase was from 9 to 12 and based on his devoting almost full time to Agency duties; contract does not provide offset of income from his business/cover.

b. Additional compensation for quarters of $3,000. per annum and applicable only to initial permanent post of assignment overseas. (NOTE: Payroll has advised me they have stopped paying this amount effective 1 August, his departure from Mexi.)

c. Travel and Operational Expenses. Will be advanced or reimbursed funds on an actual, reasonable and necessary expense basis for those expenses incurred by you in connection with such travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government and while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment.

d. Health Insurance. Has Agency Contract health insurance (group plan) which costs him $8.63 per month.

e. Social Security deductions are made at the rate of 4.2% on the first $6,600. of basic compensation.

2. The above confirms tele info provided you earlier

Wm. Kenehan

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

201-253203

2 September 1966

The telephone number through which Edward G. TICHBORN can be reached is as follows: 212 884 8728

Pls file Tichborn 201.

201-253203

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR DP

S E C R E T 091805Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8185 9 Aug 66 IN 73142

DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 25344

STATION NOT IN TOUCH WITH TICHBORN'S SHIPPERS. SUGGEST HEADQUARTERS AWAIT TICHBORN CONTACT AND INSTRUCT HIM DIRECTLY.

S E C R E T

SECRET

DEFER HHG SHIPMENT

BT

Tichborn 201-

201-253203

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 20

[redacted]

ORIG: R.Graham
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 5 Aug 74

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-

SECRET

	ROUTING		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE . OP-2, CCS-3, CA-2, CI/OA, CSPS

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

5 20 30Z CITE DIRECTOR 25844

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: MEXICO CITY 8014 (IN 62196)*

RE PARA THREE REF, PLEASE DEFER SHIPMENT TICHBORN'S HHE PENDING RESOLUTION OF ASSIGNMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

*TICHBORN to contact LUNDX on arrival Washington. Sta advancing travel expenses, to include movement of his HHE which will be accounted for in Hqs.

201-253203

file TICH's 201

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/Pers - Renehan			EXTENSION	NO. DATE Aug 5

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. C/WH/1/Chacones	AUG 16		GV	I have stopped the dispatch and returned to originator as Tichborn has left Mex. When T is in Wash, pls advise Mr. Burton of Finance x221380 he can discuss the attached with T and settle same. Thx. Renehan
2. Graham Kaufman			GC	
3. Chacones				
4. [redacted] pls hold for Tich arrival		nyk		
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				201
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-353703

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Office of Finance

Tax Assessment - Edward G. TICHBORN - #040535

REF: HMMT - 6611 dated 6 May 1966

1. Transmitted herewith is T/A 80-0273 dated 2 August 66 in the amount of $147.34, which represents tax withholding adjustment for Edward G. TICHBORN for the period 1 December 1965 through 31 July 1966.

2. Upon receipt of reference and the tax assessment percentages from the Tax Committee, Finance was able to clear Subject's tax accounts for the years 1963, 1964 and 1965.

3. A breakdown of the 1966 adjustment is as follows:

Subject has been assessed at the rate of 11.9% for 1966. For the period 12/1/65 - 7/31/66, Headquarters has withheld $1189.09, but the new assessment is only $1041.25 (11.9% of gross salary of $8750.00), thus a refund due Subject in the amount of $147.34. Therefore, it is requested that the Station pay TICHBORN the $147.34, and also beginning with the salary due for the month of August 1966 please pay Subject, and T/A to Headquarters the following net salary:

GROSS	QTRS	TAX	EHBP	NET
$1000.00	$250.00	$143.75	$3.63	$1102.62

4. It was noted by Headquarters, that the Station is still withholding FICA for 1966. The Station should have made a deduction of $14.70 in the month May, which would give TICHBORN maximum credits ($277.20) for 1966. Therefore, it is requested that the Station refund Subject any FICA that was withheld after a deduction of $14.70 for May, and please note this adjustment in the next T/A to Headquarters.

HARRIET G. VINCOLESE

Distribution:
3 - COS/Mexico City

HMMW-4390 8/2/66

S E C R E T

OF/CSTD/APB/CAAS:HBurton:ghb 2213

2 - WH/Division C/WH/BF
3 - APB/CAAS
1 - RI/DP
1 - OF/Registry

DISPATCH

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

INFO.
Chief, WH Division ATTN: WOHEADCST/WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Admin/Finance - Mexico City T/A 24-67 $2,229.71 Edward G. TICHBORN TDY SDOM Accounting.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith is subject T/A and accounting. Receipts under separate cover.

2. The accounting is in form of usual TICHBORN day-to-day actual expenses cost, approved for TICHBORN by Headquarters contract amendment, instead of per diem basis. It is regretted that TICHBORN illness in June/July delayed submission of subject accounting and that settlement could not be made until his 29 July departure PCS Headquarters.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As Stated Above, h/w & usc.

Distribution:
2 - COS, Santo Domingo, w/att
1 - Chief, WHD, w/att

201

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-7004

DATE
2 August 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C/WH/1

DATE: 25 July 1966

FROM : WH/Pers/Contracts

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN, Travel Orders

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8014, 22 July 66

1. Recommend you cable Station to defer shipment TICHBORN's HHE pending resolution of assignment.

2. Per telecon with Mr. Fisher on July 22, he indicated the travel of TICHBORN was all right. I have therefore assumed the same pertains to travel of dependents.

Correct

Wm. Renehan

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

201-253203

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DO 4, PO/H3, CS/PS, CCS 3, CA 2, CA/PROP, MPS/BG 2

ACTION

S E C R E T 222212Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3214 22 JUL 66 IN 62196

DIRECTOR

LIREAM LICOLIC

REF DIRECTOR 21594 *

* RE TICHBORN COVER POSITION

1. TICHBORN SHOWN PARAS ONE AND TWO OF REF; WILL CONTACT LUND ON ARRIVAL WASHINGTON. PLANS LEAVE MEXICO BY POV ABOUT 1 AUGUST.

2. TERMINATION LIREAM AND ITS PUBLICATION NEARING COMPLETION, PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY SO FAR. STATION WILL PASS FUNDS DIRECTLY AS NEEDED FOR FINAL WRAP UP.

3. WILL ADVANCE TRAVEL EXPENSES, TO INCLUDE MOVEMENT HHE. TICHBORN WILL ACCOUNT AT HQS.

4. NARRATIVE EVALUATION IN PREPARATION. WILL FWD ASAP.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Tichborn 201-

201-253203

[illegible] 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Staff, Non-Official Cover

SUBJECT : Cover for Edward G. Tichborn

1. Edward G. Tichborn, a Contract Agent, is presently assigned to Mexico Station under non-official, personal cover. He is in Mexico ostensibly as a consultant with a Mexican legal firm and acts as editor/publisher of a left-wing intellectual publication, Dialogos. He has requested reassignment to the United States, preferably the East Coast and particularly the New York City area. WH Division has concurred in his request to leave Mexico City in mid-August 1966 and desires to arrange suitable cover which would permit rapid disengagement at any time from regular day-to-day cover duties to undertake temporary duty assignments throughout Latin America at the request of this Division.

2. WH Division in its investigation of cover possibilities discussed the problem with Mr. Stanley Gaines, DO/H, Mr. Robert Fallow, CA/3 and Mr. Gale Allen, DODS. Mr. Gaines investigated the possibility of Tichborn's assignment to the Domestic Operations facility in New York but the New York office did not believe it could devise suitable cover; Mr. Fallow checked on the possibility of inserting Tichborn into two of the Covert Action Staff run operations in the New York area but these were finally judged as not providing the necessary flexibility; and finally, as you have seen in cable traffic, Mr. Allen came up with a possibility of assigning Tichborn to WUSALINE.

3. On the basis of information made available by Mr. Allan, WH Division believes the WUSALINE proposal has merit and wishes to develop this cover proposal further. It would appear that a satisfactory resolution at this time ultimately rests upon WH Division agreement with Tichborn on terms of his contract, primarily salary, and WUSALINE agreement that Tichborn's background is of sufficient depth to provide a modicum of credibility and his personality is of such a nature that he would be compatible with the principal agent. This will be resolved after Labor Day when Tichborn will be in the United States and the WUSALINE principal agent will have returned from a vacation which he is starting about 1 August. In the meantime, in compliance with regulations for the establishment of non-official cover, the following background information is provided concerning Tichborn and is keyed to your memorandum, "Non-Official Cover Request":

SECRET

A. General Information:

1) Edward G. Tichborn. Central cover has been queried concerning possible covers to be used by him for a number of TDYs in Latin America as well as for his original location in Mexico.

2) Contract Agent; $12,000 per annum with a housing allowance at present of $3,000. His contract is now under review.

3) He is fit for overseas duty.

4) To the knowledge of officers presently available in the WH Division, he has always operated under personally arranged, non-official cover. However, the Central Cover Staff has provided a non-attributable funding channel for transfer of KUBARK funds to the Tichborn operations on a number of occasions. This information should be available in Central Covor Staff files.

5) Approximately 1 September 1966.

6) Mid-August 1968.

7) There is no project at present. Authority for the relocation of this individual will be included in orders transferring him from Mexico. Following this and his establishment under the proposed WUSALINE or other cover, a project will be written.

B. Biographic Information

1) DPOB: 28 May 1920, Denver, Colorado.
Male; Caucasian; Catholic; U.S.; married; three children; Mexico City, d.f., Mexico; Los Angeles, California.

2) Wife and three children presently in residence with him in Mexico City.

3) University of Denver, 1942-45, BA Pol Sc.
Harvard University, 1945-46, MA Economics
Harvard Law School, 1946-48, LLB.

SECRET

4) See attached memorandum.

5) See attached memorandum.

6) Extremely gregarious; highly presentable; intellectual interests.

7) Not known.

8) Extensive travel in Latin America and Caribbean area both privately and under KUBARK sponsorship (see attached Memorandum).

9) Bi-lingual in Spanish and has a smattering of French, German and some Portuguese.

C. Security Considerations:

1) KUBARK employment initiated in 1959 and he has maintained this association since then. Security approval was last granted by KUDESK/OA on 8 November 1965. This approval was given for his use in "...publishing and furnishing intellectual guidance re Dialogos magazine and furnishing FI information on the intelligentsia of Mexico." Apparently derogatory information, developed or provided by Tichborn, was resolved in an LCFLUTTER given in Mexico City on 14 May 1965, a copy of which is available in his 201 file.

2) He is aware that he is in the employ of KUBARK.

3) Not known.

4) In LCFLUTTER it was revealed that his wife was the only individual to whom he has revealed his relationship with KUBARK.

5) Not known.

6) Not known.

7) Not known but it is highly doubtful that he has ever utilized such cover.

8) It is planned that he will remain in non-official cover.

9) Not applicable.

10) His wife who is witting (see C 4 above).

11) He carries KUBARK life and hospitalization insurance. His wife is listed as beneficiary.

12) N.A.

13) His wife is witting but no formal clearance procedure has been initiated. Last LCFLUTTER was on 14 May 1965.

D. Operational Information

1) It is presently planned to cover Tichborn under Project WUSALINE. He will be utilized in highly sensitive political operations. It is not planned to make any other individual or organization in the United States witting of the KUBARK/Tichborn relationship with the exception of the principal agent of the WUSALINE Project.

2) Location: New York City.

3) He should be sufficiently mobile to permit his travel to any country in the world, but particularly Latin America and Africa.

4) Any strata of commercial or political life in Latin America or Africa.

5) Contract is presently being negotiated but his salary will be on the $12,000 to $15,000 level.

6) Cannot be judged at present.

7) Not known at present. However, communications for this type operation is usually directly to and through the Chief of Station.

8) As noted above, the WUSALINE cover would appear to be excellent for Tichborn.

/s/ Donald C. Marelius

William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment: As stated

BIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET - EDWARD G. TICHBORN

1. Edward G. Tichborn, 46, is bilingual and has a wide range of business and social contacts throughout Latin America. Following graduation from Harvard Law School in 1948, Tichborn became affiliated with a law firm in Los Angeles which represented many Latin American corporations with California business connections. In the mid-1950's he became active in California State politics and served in various capacities in Democratic Party state and national organizations. He participated actively in the California gubernatorial campaign of James Roosevelt, the senatorial campaign of Helen Gahagan Douglas and both the 1952 and 1956 Stevenson campaigns for the presidency. He has been President of the Southern California Young Democrats, a member of the California Democratic State Central Committee, a member of the Host Committee for the 1956 Democratic National Convention and a member of the Board of Directors of the National Democratic Minority Conference. In 1960 he served as Los Angeles coordinator of the Kennedy Movement for Americans of Mexican Extraction which, it is reported, contributed substantially to the success of the Kennedy campaign in Southern California. His only try for elective office was in 1958 when he was defeated in his bid for the position of California Secretary of State.

2. In late 1959, Tichborn was hired by the Agency as a political action advisor for Agency-sponsored election operations throughout Latin America. In 1961 he became a fulltime contract agent and was assigned to Mexico City, under personal cover, to establish a degree of security and mobility which would permit him to travel readily on third country political action assignments. Since the beginning of his relationship with the Agency, he has participated in Agency-sponsored political operations in Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile and the Dominican Republic.

3. Tichborn has contributed stories, articles and interviews to a variety of United States publications. An interview by Tichborn of Catherine Anne Porter, Pulitzer prize winner, appeared in a recent edition of Harpers and a Tichborn essay concerning the cultural dichotomy under which Mexican Americans exist, will appear in an early edition of the American Heritage publication. He is working on a series of articles and a book on the population problem in Latin America and is considering a book on Mexican political institutions, particularly the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI).

14-00000

SECRET

4. At present Tichborn runs a Mexico Station funded left wing intellectual publication (LIREAM). His cover in Mexico is nominal and he attributes his presence and activities primarily to his connections in the legal field through his former partner's law firm and his own intellectual interests.

SECRET

WH/WVB:GD:PK:jy (18 July 1965)

Distribution: (Attachment to all addees)
Orig & 1: Central Cover Staff
1: C/WH/1
1: WH Registry (via CWH)
1: C/WH/CA
1: WH Personnel
1: WH/CA (Kittredge Chron)
1: DO/CO (Gale Allen)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM [illegible]

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR DDP ADDP OF 2 SOD 6

20 JUL 66 IN 60475

SECRET 201815Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7978

SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR

REFERENCE SANTO DOMINGO 1385 (IN 54355)

EMARGOSY/ EMFICTION

TICHBORN ACCTG FOR $3,004.71 AGAINST MEXI AND SDOM ADVS WILL BE T/AD WITHIN ONE WEEK.

file

SECRET

*AUDIT PENDING.

BT

file TICHBORN-201

201-253203

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

ORIG: KITTREDGE:jly
UNIT: WH/CA
EXT: 5006
DATE: 19 JULY 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	C
4		8	

DISSEM BY 48 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE DO4, DDP3, CCS3, CSP5,
CI/OPS

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

20 22 00 Z CITE DIRECTOR 21594

TO MEXICO CITY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 7859 (IN 55174)

B. HMMT-6826, 9 JUNE 1966

1. YOU MAY INFORM TICHBORN THAT NEXT STEPS IN ESTABLISHMENT NEW COVER ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. ARRANGE MEETING BETWEEN TICHBORN AND WUBRINY/1 TO PERMIT LATTER'S DIRECT ASSESSMENT TICHBORN. THIS NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL AFTER 6 SEPTEMBER DUE WUBRINY/1 VACATION PLANS. HQS WILL ARRANGE THIS MEETING AS SOON ~~AFTER THIS DATE~~ AS PRACTICABLE.

B. HQS AND TICHBORN WILL HAVE TO AGREE ON LATTER'S COMPENSATION. TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS MENTIONED REF B REACHES SOMEWHAT HIGH, ~~IN RELATION PRESENTLY FORESEEN INFREQUENCY OF YOUR REQUIREMENTS FOR TICHBORN SPECIALTY~~.

C. OBVIOUSLY ABOVE MEANS THAT WE ARE ANXIOUS RETAIN TICHBORN'S SERVICES BUT THIS SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS A COMMITMENT FOR EMPLOYMENT BEYOND THE 19 NOVEMBER 1966 EXPIRATION DATE OF HIS CURRENT CONTRACT.

2. TICHBORN SHOULD CONTACT LUND PRIOR 6 SEPTEMBER TO ARRANGE CONSULTATION HQS RE HIS CONTRACT AND DETERMINE TIMING PROPOSED MEETING WITH WUBRINY/1.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-253203

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

TWO CITE DIRECTOR 21594

PAGE [redacted]

TO

3. REQUEST STATION PREPARE FITNESS REPORT OR NARRATIVE EVALUATION TO BE AVAILABLE HERE PRIOR TICHBORN ARRIVAL. THIS SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED TO ASSESSMENT TICHBORN CONTRIBUTION STATION OBJECTIVES OVER ENTIRE PERIOD HIS ASSIGNMENT MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref A. Advised Tichborn interested WUSALINE cover assignment.

Ref B. Forwarded Tichborn proposal for possible cover company and stated he interested in salary in $20,000 range.

William V. Broe
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH Personnel mr Renehan (phone)
DODS (Gale Allen) (phone)
WH/2 [illegible]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

4-65 3UIU

O. J. seal
~~Mc Kista~~ H

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	SS	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem BY 21

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, OF-2, SOD-6

S E C R E T 120005Z CITE SANTO DOMINGO 1385

CHRONO DETACHED

12 JUL 66 IN 34355

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

EMARGOSY/EMFICTION

REFERENCE: SANTO DOMINGO-1094 (IN 30676) *

1. DUE IMPENDING AUDIT, STATION WOULD APPRECIATE MEXICO CITY OBTAINING APPROPRIATE ACCOUNTING AND/OR REFUND FROM EDWARD O. TICHBORN FOR $775.00 ADVANCED BY SANTO DOMINGO DURING APRIL ($375) AND MAY ($400) 66. FUNDS ADVANCED REPRESENTED PER DIEM AND OPS EXPENSES INCURRED FOR PRIOR TICHBORN TDY SANTO DOMINGO IN SUPPORT OF EMARGOSY ACTIVITIES.

2. MEXICO CITY EARLY ACTION AND CABLE REPLY WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

S E C R E T

BT

*Request STN obtain accounting for $400 advanced to Edw. Tichborn for expenses

201-253203

File Tichborn 201-

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-253205 ✓

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☒ SIG.

DISSEM BY 28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

14 JUL 1966

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, DO 4, DO/H 3, CCS 3,

ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 122240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7895

12 JUL 66 IN 55174

DIRECTOR

LICOLIC

REF DIRECTOR 18832 *

* RE COVER EMPLOYMENT IN NEW YORK FOR TICHBORN

1. TICHEORN ENTHUSIASTIC REF COVER POSSIBILITY, WHICH HE CONSIDERS EXCELLENTLY SUITED TO OPS REQUIREMENT AND TO HIS OWN BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS. REQUESTS HIS NAME BE PROPOSED AS LATIN AMERICAN SPECIALIST FOR WUSALINE.

2. NO SPECIFIC IDENS GIVEN HIM.

S E C R E T

BT

✓

201-753203
12 July, 1966

— CS —

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

ORIG: P. KITTREDGE
UNIT: WH/CA
EXT: 5006
DATE: 8 JULY 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 76 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE DDP, DD/S, CI/OA, OPS, CA/OH, CCS 3, CA/PROP

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

09 16 21 52 CITE DIRECTOR 18832

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: DOST/WASHINGTON

1. SUGGEST STATION ADVISE TICHBORN THAT HQS CONTINUING REVIEW COVER EMPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES IN NEW YORK AREA WHICH COMPATIBLE HIS EXPERIENCE AND EXPRESSED INTERESTS. FOR STATION INFO, BEST LOOKING PROSPECT AT PRESENT IS KUBARK PROPRIETARY INVESTMENT AND INVESTMENT CONSULTING FIRM (WUSALINE), IDEN A, WHICH OPERATES WITH SEVERAL PRIVATE COMPANIES UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF WUSALIFY (IDEN B), A RESPECTED INVESTMENT BANKING FIRM. THE PRESIDENT OF WUSALINE AND PRINCIPAL AGENT IS WUBRINY/1 (IDEN C). WUSALINE ESTABLISHES INVESTMENT CONSULTING AFFILIATES ABROAD AND MAKES EQUITY INVESTMENTS FOR KUBARK PURPOSES. IT DOES NOT NOW HAVE A LATIN AMERICAN SPECIALIST ALTHOUGH A WIDE AREA OF INVESTMENT AND INVESTMENT CONSULTING POSSIBILITIES EXIST. THESE INCLUDE ARRANGEMENTS FOR INVESTMENT IN SHORT TERM PAPER, CONSULTING ON WORKERS BANKS, ESTABLISHMENT OF ECONOMIC PUBLICATIONS, INITIATION OF PROJECTS FOR UNIT COVER, ETC.

2. TICHBORN COULD BE CONSIDERED POSITION LATIN AMERICAN SPECIALIST IF HE INTERESTED AND BACKGROUND SUFFICIENT. HE WOULD BE

file TICHBORN 201

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-253203
COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN [illegible] FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET
(DATE AND TIME FILED)
(ELITE) (PICA)
(REFERENCE NUMBER) 18832

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: DOST

PAGE TWO

LOCATED WUSALINE OFFICE NEW YORK AND HAVE MOBILITY REQUIRED DYVOUR PURPOSES. TICHBORN AND WUBRINY/1 HAVE COMMON BACKGROUND OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, EXPERIENCE PUBLISHING INTELLECTUAL MAGAZINE AND KENNEDY CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES.

3. ON BASIS ABOVE OUTLINE, PLS DISCUSS COVER IN GENERAL TERMS WITH TICHBORN WITHOUT DISCLOSING SPECIFIC IDENTITY FIRM OR PRINCIPAL AGENT AND LET US KNOW HIS REACTION. FYI IN YOUR TALK WITH HIM YOU CAN IMPLY THAT $20,000 TAG TICHBORN PUTS ON HIS SERVICES FOR US APPEARS NOT TOO REALISTIC.

END OF MESSAGE

William V. Broe
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

DODST (MR. ALLAN IN SUBSTANCE)
WH/1 (MR. FISHER BY PHONE)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

GERARD DROLLER
C/WH/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible] OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

SECRET

P. KITTREDGE
WH/CA
5006
8 JULY 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	✓
3		7	
4		8	

SSEM BY 26 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DIRECTOR

WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE DO4, MH3, CI/OA, OIZ, CA/4, CCS3, CA/PROP

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

9 1621Z CITE DIRECTOR 18833

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: DOST/WASHINGTON

REF: DIR 18832

IDEN A: ICAP CORPORATION

IDEN B: TRAIN, CABOT & ASSOCIATES
375 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK

IDEN C. JOHN P.C. TRAIN

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: PLS FILL IN DIR NUMBER OF ATTACHED CABLE.

DODST (MR. ALLAN IN SUBSTANCE)
WH/1 (MR. FISHER BY PHONE)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

GERARD DROLLER
C/WH/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

7 July 61

Memo For C/WH/CA

Subject : Tichborn Employment

In followup to our conversation of 30 June, I contacted Stan Gaines of DO/H and Spence Braham of CA/3 on 30 June; Bob Fallow of CA/3 on 5 and 6 July ; and Gale Allen of DO Washin on 6 July .

Covert Action Staff:

Braham had indicated a possibility there might be a slot open for Tichborn with a "publishing company" which CA/3 controls in New York and he said that he would discuss it with Fallow upon the latters return from New York on 1 July. Fallow on 5 and 6 July concluded that this would not be good cover since they were eventhen planning to terminate that project. Fallow then said that he would investigate other possibilities ,including QUA TER, and let me know within a couple days. He also implied that he would discuss Tichborn with his ~~front~~ front office and see what Gord Meyer might have floating about in the back of his head which might be applicable to this problem. He indicated some interest in the QUARTER possibility ~~xxx~~ and,while pointing out Tichborn's background is primarily Latin American and QUASTER at present does no business in Latin America, he said that he would investigate this more closely and be in touch with me.

Domestic Ops Headquarters:

Stan Gaines stated that Rudy Gomez and Tir DaSilva,with whom he had discussed the possibility of Tichborn's employment in New York ,indicated that as far as the UN contingent was concerned ,they did not believe that they could use him. Rudy described him ,from personal relationship in Santiago, as a "cowboy type operator" who would not fit into the UN Station activity. DaSilva apparently was non-committal . Following Gaines return from New Yrok ,he said that he had planned on talking with Tracey Barnes concerning Tich but had not had a chance as yet. Howeve he will discuss with Barnes and let us know as soon as possible concerning an investment firm which they have a connection with in New York

Domestic Ops Washington:

201-253703

I talked with Gale Allen concerning his project and he stated that he would discuss Tichborn with his PA who was scheduled to be in Washington on 7 July. Allen stated that he knew of Tichborn and had a fairly good grasp of his previous experience. I gave him a general outline of his education and experience on the phone — Allen expressed a good deal of amazement concerning this sketch because apparently his principal pretty much followed the same educational and job experience trail as had Tich e.g. Harvard Law School 48 or 49, private practice with small firm; intellectual leaning and ultimate connection with a Paris intellectual magazine .

Allen said that he would be in touch with me on 8 July to let me know xxxx the results of his preliminary soundings are

P Kittredge.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

37

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN

O

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See below

REFERENCE: A. SDOM-1020
B. MEXI-6828

MICROFILMED
JUL 1 6 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Edward G. TICHBORN spent June 1 and 2 in the Headquarters area and departed the morning of 3 June for an overnight stop in Dallas before his return for Mexico City. Prior to his departure, TICHBORN was advanced $100 which will be TAd to the Station for final accounting.

2. During his stopover here, he met with representatives of the Dominican Republic Desk as well as DYVOUR Staff and Mexico Branch personnel. In these debriefings we touched specifically on his activities in connection with the Dominican Republic election; his estimate of the outcome of this election; his plans for the future, particularly his departure from Mexico; the termination of LIREAM; and his proposal for the continuation of his relationship with KUBARK.

a. Dominican Republic Election:

Although TICHBORN painted a rather bleak picture of the possible results of the election, his comments concerning the situation pertaining at the time of his departure from the island contributed to Headquarters understanding of developments in the days immediately preceding the election and on the election day. The DYVOUR Staff representative and the Dominican Republic Branch representatives specifically commended TICHBORN for the excellent work he had done during his temporary assignment to the Dominican Republic in connection with this election operation.

b. TICHBORN Future:

We discussed TICHBORN's personal situation and desires for the future at some length. Although not being able to offer specific promises of long-term employment on his terms at this time, we advised him that the Agency would probably have recurring requirements, albeit relatively infrequent, for a man with his talents and experience. However, the limited requirement for such specialized activity in the DYVOUR area

CROSS REFERENCE TO D-50-126-36/3	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-14638	DATE 17 JUN 1966 9 June 1966 ✓
1 Att. CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-253203 201-253203

1 - [illegible]
1 - Chrono
RI-(1 - 201-253203)
(1 - 50-126-36/3)

AN ✓	FI	
PS	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Paul Kittredge		3655

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		W.J. Kaufman

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-11636

would probably require a broadening of his horizons to include undertaking activities in response to requirements from non-DYVOUR areas. TICHBORN indicated some reservation concerning this point as well as stating a definite lack of interest in TDY assignments which would require him to be away from his family for protracted periods.

c. Cover and Access:

TICHBORN explained his present thinking concerning a seminar-type political action service for which, in his mind, there is a definite requirement and which, incidentally, he considered himself eminently qualified to provide in the DYVOUR area. This would consist primarily of the same type direct contact with candidates which he carried out in the recent election in the Dominican Republic. In this, he envisions a short TDY, about six to nine months before an election, to assist in the establishment of a candidate's machine as well as the selection and training of his pricipal assistants; another short visit about two months before the election to assist the candidate and his assistants in defining issues and refining strategy; and a last short visit, about two weeks before the election, to assist in planning last minute tactics for the final week of the campaign. To provide cover for such a service, TICHBORN proposed that he establish a commercial office of some sort in New York. Through this office he would establish relations with commercial clients whom he would propose to represent on business (cover) travels trhoughout the DYVOUR area. Failing the actual establishment of these ties, he proposes to construct a fictional commercial relationship with various national companies which would ostensibly offer goods or services of interest to residents of the DYVOUR areas. While expressing interest in both the service and the cover concept, we asked that TICHBORN prepare a paper on his specific proposal and forward it to Headquarters for more detailed study. No commitment was made by Headquarters and none was implied. In fact, a number of the problems and weaknesses of the proposal were pointed out and a specific KUBARK disinterest in underwriting the establishment or maintenance of the commercial cover required for such a venture on a continuing basis was noted.

d. Termination of LIREAM

The problems which might arise from the termination of LIREAM were investigated rather perfunctorily since TICHBORN, needless to say, was more interested in discussing the results of the Dominican Republic election and his own future with KUBARK. However, TICHBORN does not foresee any major problem arising in the termination. According to him, there is no real contractual relationship with his co-editor (Identity) which would require reimbursement; there is no office equipment or other major physical or overhead investment which would require sale or other disposition; in accordance with Mexican law he will be required to pay a termination bonus to his secretary but this should not be very large; and, to his knowledge, there are no outstanding bills or commitments of which we are not presently aware. TICHBORN was told of the deposit of $4,500, requested in Ref. B, which should be in his account now, and he promised to forward drafts of two letters to be mailed from New York and Denver to cover the deposit of these funds. Headquarters would appreciate early receipt of the draft letters as well as some sort of schedule for a logical and phased termination of the LIREAM subsidy.

3. Headquarters will be interested in seeing the promised outline and any refinement of the commercial cover and election seminar concept which TICHBORN might develop and requests that the Station follow up on his agreement to prepare such a paper for transmittal to Headquarters. We are still investigating the requirements in other Divisions for the type expertise offered by TICHBORN and, following receipt of his written proposal, we will be better able to come up with a definite decision concerning what form the TICHBORN/KUBARK relationship might take in the future. In the meantime, be assured that no specific commitment for continued employment or subsidy of relocation or resettlement costs were made during TICHBORN's TDY.

17 JUN 1963

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS/Mexico

Joseph P. LANGBIEN

Attachment: IDENTITY u.s.c. (2 cys)

FORM 10-57 53a
USE PREVIOUS EDITION
REPLACES FORMS

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:

HMMW-14638

1P

IDENTITY: Ramon XIRAU

MICROFILMED
JUL 18 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

S/C ATT #1 To HMMW

201-253203

FORM 10-57 53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CL FIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 30/ M

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, D/MS 2, CI/OA, SECUR 4

S E C R E T 150010Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7621

15 Jun 66 IN 37527

DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO

LICOLIC

FYI, TICHBORN WILL UNDERGO SURGERY FOR HEMORRHOIDS 16 JUNE; WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR DUTY UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 25 JUNE. NO COMPLICATIONS ANTICIPATED, LOCAL ANESTHETIC.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

Tichborn 201

Kittredge
201-253203

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XX	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memorandum from TICHBORN Regarding his Proposed Activities in New York

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a memorandum from Edward G. TICHBORN regarding his proposed activities in New York as requested by Headquarters on his recent TDY. There are no Station traces on the Antonio Menendez mentioned on page two of the attached memorandum.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
~~3 - WHD w/att hw~~
3 - Files

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-6826	9 June 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-116/1

MEMO :

FROM : Tichborn

IN RE: Proposed activities in New York

1. Establish cover position:

Since much of my activity would involve travel to foreign countries, I should establish a position with some organization involved in international business. I would strongly suggest that I try forming an association with Bernard McKenna, who has an international law practice. He has helped in funding Dialogos, so I would assume that he might be willing to cooperate. Should you agree, I could pop up to New York and set up the details with him personally. Ted Prounis, who helped in the Volman-Alba deal, is another possibility.

2. Proposed activities:

a) Continue election-aid trips such as Dominican Republic, Chile and San Salvador trips

Would strongly suggest, in view of my past experiences, that we approach these missions on broader range and in greater depth. Suggest the following:

(1) One-week survey at least six months before election.

(2) Campaign work-shop with candidate and his campaign staff at some hide-away spot for period of ten (10) days. This would take place about four or five months before the election.

(3) First follow-up trip to check on progress of campaign, climaxed by two-day weekend meeting with candidate and his staff. This would be three months before election

(4) Spend final month of campaign on the spot, tying together loose ends and advising on closing phase of campaign

b) Prepare a handbook for election campaigns similar to the one written by Larry O'Brien for Kennedy's campaign. Written in Spanish and specifically tailored for Latin America.

c) Prepare an in-depth study of growing political unrest in Mexico, particularly analyzing the inner workings of PRI. Several recent incidents

(Madrazo's forced resignation from PRI; the run-away riots at the National University which compelled Chavez to resign; the increased number of paracaidista squatters on private lands; campesino revolts in Northern Mexico) indicate that the famed political stability of Mexico may be facing trouble soon. Needless to say, such an ominous possibility should be studied and analyzed in great depth. No Mexican political observer would dare produce a truly candid study for fear of political and governmental pressure, but I'm sure I can obtain the sub-rosa counsel and aid of Antonio Menendez, a gifted and perceptive Mexican who wrote MOVILIZACION SOCIAL. Menendez, who was a Lopez Mateos speech writer, is now director of public relations for the Instituto Nacional de Seguro Social and also head of the Consejo Nacional de Publicidad.

This long-range project would probably require about two years, taking into account my aforementioned political trips.

d) Undertake such other quasi-political missions as may be required: possible back-up trip to Santo Domingo; surveys of student unrest in Spain, Panama, Peru and elsewhere; mid-term surveys of political situations in Chile, Guatemala, Venezuela, etc.

3. Budget Considerations:

a) I would require a salary of $20,000 per year, since I would have to forego any legal practice in order to be "on tap" and available on almost instant notice. In these past few years I have lost certain clients due to my sudden and prolonged absences for special trips to Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, Santo Domingo, etc. I would therefore devote all my normal working time to the activities outlined ~~ixx~~ in the foregoing paragraphs. But I would probably supplement my income by occasional articles and fiction, written on my own time.

b) Office rental (if McKenna or X have office available) would be about $200 per month, with services of a receptionist included.

c) Costs of telephone: about $240 per year.

d) Additional costs on Mexico project (paragraph 2 c)

1. Fee for Antonio Menendez, about $2,500 payable in two installments.
2. Two trips to Mexico for consultations with Menendez as work progresses: plane fare would be $256 per trip, plus about $150 expenses for four or five days. Total for two trips would be about $800.
3. Secretarial help, only part-time: about $750 per year, for a total of $1,500.
4. Tape recorder and tapes for two-year period: about $200.
5. Costs of reference books and periodicals: about $150.

Over-all total would be $5,150

e) Costs of preparing election campaign handbook

1. Secretarial costs: about $750
2. Translators' help with special terms for the different Latin American countries (they would have to read long lists of words or meet with me personally), about $500.

5 JUN 1966

SECRET

REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Name: Edward G. TICHBORN

Grade: Contract Agent
$12,000 salary
3,000 housing
$15,000

Current Assignment:
Non-official cover (Personal), Mexico City. He directs a Station funded, left wing intellectual magazine (LIREAM) and is on call for TDY assignments throughout WH.

Cover History:
TICHBORN has always operated under personal, non-official cover. In TDY assignments, he has asked for some cover help from the Stations but usually he is strictly on his own.

Personal Circumstances:
He has indicated personal preference for East Coast U.S. where he would be available for short TDY assignments.

Type of work preferred:
Political action, gathering political information, cultivation of left wing intellectuals for operational use.

Training desired:
None at present. Depends upon future assignment.

Areas or countries of particular interest:
See "Personal Circumstances"

Special considerations:
See attachment.

201-253703

Signed: ______________________
C/WH/1

Date: ______________________

SECRET

SECRET

1. TICHBORN, 46, is bilingual and has a wide range of business and social contacts throughout Latin America. Following graduation from Harvard Law School in 1948, TICHBORN became affiliated with a law firm in Los Angeles which represented many Latin American corporations with California business connections. In the mid-1950's he became active in California state politics and served in various capacities in Democratic Party state and national organizations. He participated actively in the California gubernatorial campaign of James Roosevelt, the senatorial campaign of Helen Gahagan Douglas and both the 1952 and 1956 Stevenson campaigns for the Presidency. He has been President of the Southern California Young Democrats, a member of the California Democratic State Central Committee, a member of the Host Committee for the 1956 Democratic National Convention and a member of the Board of Directors of the National Democratic Minority Conference. In 1960 he served as Los Angeles coordinator of the Kennedy Movement for Americans of Mexican Extraction which, it is reported, contributed substantially to the success of the Kennedy campaign in Southern California. His only try for elective office was in 1958 when he was defeated in his bid for the position of California Secretary of State.

2. In late 1959, TICHBORN was hired by the Agency as a political action advisor for Agency-sponsored election operations throughout Latin America. In 1961 he became a fulltime contract agent and was assigned to Mexico City, under personal cover, to establish a degree of security and mobility which would permit him to travel readily on third country political action assignments. Since the beginning of his relationship with the Agency, he has participated in Agency-sponsored political operations in Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile and the Dominican Republic. He has just returned from the Dominican Republic where he participated in the Station operations which contributed to the election of Mr. Belaguer to the Presidency. The Station has described his role in the election operation as "....a vital aspect....at a critical moment in the operation...."; also "....Station knows few, if any, people who could have handled this assignment the way TICHBORN did."

3. TICHBORN has contributed stories, articles and interviews to a variety of United States publications. An interview by TICHBORN of Catherine Anne Porter, Pulitzer prize winner, appeared in a recent edition of Harpers and a TICHBORN essay concerning the cultural dichotomy under which Mexican Americans exist, will appear in an early edition of the American Heritage publication. He is working on a series of articles and a book on the population problem in Latin America and is considering a book on Mexican political institutions, particularly the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI).

SECRET

4. At present TICHBORN runs a Mexico Station funded left wing intellectual publication (LIREAM). His cover in Mexico is nominal and he attributes his presence and activities primarily to his connections in the legal field through his former partner's law firm and his own intellectual interests.

8

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	SS	5	
2		6	
3	DR	7	1
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM DISSEM BY 53

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CF 2

SECRET 040015Z CITE SANTO DOMINGO 1094 4 JUN 66 IN 30676

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

EMARGOSY

1. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF STATION COULD OBTAIN AND FORWARD ACCOUNTING FOR $400 ADVANCED TO EDWARD O. TICHBORN FOR EXPENSES DURING HIS RECENT TDY SANTO DOMINGO.

2. NO INDEX.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

Tichborn
201

201-253203

K

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Dixon lg 21

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR DDP ADDP CCS 3 CA 2 CA/O4 CA/PEG C/IOA CA/PROP FI FI/INT 2 SOD 6

S E C R E T 302331Z CITE SANTO DOMINGO 1020 30 MAY 66 IN 26936

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS

EMARGOSY

Ar 1. TICHBORN DEPARTED SANTO DOMINGO FOR WASHINGTON ON LATE 29 MAY FLIGHT. STATION GAVE HIM STERILE TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PONCHAY (ONLY ONE IT HAD), INSTRUCTED TICHBORN TO CALL MORNING OF 31 MAY, ASK FOR PONCHAY BY TRUE FIRST NAME, AND INTRODUCE HIMSELF AS "HANK" WITH REGARDS FROM "DAVE".

2. STATION WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR HQS AND MEXICO CITY SUPPORT IN MAKING TICHBORN AVAILABLE FOR EMARGOSY ACTIVITIES. FOR THE RECORD, TICHBORN HAS DONE BRILLIANT JOB WITH EMANTHEM-1 IN EXTABLISHING QUICK RAPPORT, CREDIBILITY, AND HANDLING DIFFICULT ASSIGNMENTS WITH DIFFICULT PERSONALITY AND SITUATION. HE HAD TO DO ~~GGUVV~~ GOOD DEAL OF QUICK thinking TPANFIVVY ON HIS FEET IN ADDITION AND, NOT ONCE, DID HE GET CROSSED UP IN VERY COMPLEX AND FLUID SITUATION INTO WHICH HE CAME COLD NOT MANY WEEKS AGO. STATION KNOWS OF FEW, IF ANY, PEOPLE WHO COULD HAVE HANDLED THIS ASSIGNMENT THE WAY TICHBORN DID. IN ADDITION, HE ASSISTED STATION GREAT DEAL WITH SUGGESTIONS ON POLITICAL MOVES, GETTING UP ORGANIZERS

SECRET

201-253203

Tichborn 201

PAGE TWO SANTO DOMINGO [illegible] S E C R E T

IT, AND OTHER ASPECTS * OF OUR EMARGOSY OPERATIONS. ... ROLE WAS VITAL ASPECT OF EMARGOSY AT CRITICAL POINT IN OPERATION.

3. MEXICO CITY: WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK STATION FOR EXCELLENT PROP AND INTEL SUPPORT. FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, IT HAS BEEN BEST FROM ANY STATION AND WE HAVE HAD SOME GOOD SUPPORT FROM OTHERS.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET *PORTION GARBLED - BEING SVCD.

BT

SECRET

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

6

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/CA/O 2 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CA 2, C/EUR 4, C/WH 6, C/CCS 3

S E C R E T 261428Z CITE LCPIPIT 6596

26 MAY 66 25130

DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT [illegible]DORIC QKOPERA

REF: DIRECTOR 07099

1. APPRECIATE SUGGESTION PER REF PARA 2, HOWEVER IN VIEW FACT THAT RNEYEDROP HAS ACCEPTED REPORTS THAT LIREAM SUPPORTED BY ODACID FUNDS, CONSIDERATION OF ASSIGNMENT TICHBORN TO RNMESIAL INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME.

2. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNNMM

Tichborn

201

201-253203

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

ORIG: RSO HARDING
UNIT: CA/B3
EXT: 7697
DATE: 24 MAY 1966

☐ FILE R.I.
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SIGNED BY 25 PER

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/CA/O2 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE C/CA2, C/CA/B4, C/WH/6, C/CCS:

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) C/21 (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 24 22 00Z CITE DIRECTOR 07099

TO LCPIPIT

DESENSITIZED DTDORIC QKOPERA

REF: LCPIPIT 6565 (IN 23525)

1. AGREE IT APPEARS POINTLESS ATTEMPT PERSUADE JACOMET WITHDRAW RESIGNATION AT THIS POINT. SEPARATE MESSAGE FOLLOWS COVERING ADMIN POINTS RAISED PARA FOUR REF.

2. EDWARD G. TICHBORN PLANNING LEAVE MEXICO IN NEAR FUTURE BECAUSE WIFE
[illegible] HAS EXPRESSED DESIRE STAY U.S. FOR A WHILE, HOWEVER
UNWILLING CONTINUE RESIDE THERE. IT POSSIBLE HE WOULD BE INTERESTED JACOMET SLOT. HQS FEELS HE HIGHLY QUALIFIED FOR THIS POSITION AND THERE ARE NO DISQUALIFYING SECURITY FACTORS INVOLVED. UNLESS LCPIPIT OBJECTS, MASLOFF WILL SOUND HIM OUT IN JUNE AND REPORT RESULTS CONVERSATION TO LCPIPIT. DISCUSSION WITH TICHBORN WOULD BE EXPLORATORY ONLY VIEW FACT DYVOUR HAS NOT RELINQUISHED CALL ON HIS POSSIBLE SERVICES ELSEWHERE.

3. PLS ADVISE YOUR REACTIONS POSSIBLE TICHBORN ASSIGNMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

Tichborn 201

WH/CA
C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R L Fallon
C/CA/B3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-253203

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-253203

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 12

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM DISSEM BY 33

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH 6 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CCS 3, C/CI, C/CA 2

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

MEXI

S E C R E T 192312Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7331

DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED IREAM

19 MAY 66 IN 20743

REF: DIR 05081, PARA ONE*

SO FAR AS STATION AWARE, TICHBORN DECISION TO RELOCATE UNRELATED TO OTHER JOB PROSPECTS. IN DISCUSSION HE SPOKE AS IF HE HOPED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE ON WITH KUBARK IN MUCH THE SAME CAPACITY AS NOW. CAN NOT, OF COURSE, RULE OUT POSSIBILITY HE HAS BLOCKED OUT ALTERNATIVE COURSE IN CASE KUBARK CANNOT USE HIM BASED IN US, BUT HE SEEMED SINCERE IN DESIRE REMAIN IN PRESENT EMPLOYMENT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

*RE TICHBORN FUTURE KUBARK AFFILIATION.

201-253203

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

ORIG. P. KITTREDGE
UNIT. WH/1
EXT. 3654
DATE 16 May 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	C
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 55 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , C/PG, C/CCS 3, C/CA 2, C/CA/P 2,

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) C/C 17 20 44 Z

(ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 05081

TO MEXICO CITY

DESENSITIZED LIREAM

REF MEXI 7272 (IN 12241)*

1. REGRET TICHBORN FAMILY SITUATION PRECLUDES REMAINING MEXI. TO STATION KNOWLEDGE IS TICHBORN DECISION RELOCATE BASED ON FIRM OFFER OR DOES HE HOPE FOR CONTINUED KUBARK EMPLOYMENT WHILE ATTEMPTING REESTABLISH HIMSELF IN PRIVATE LAW PRACTICE OR OTHER EMPLOYMENT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH USG? WE NOW INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITIES BY WHICH HE MIGHT BE OF SERVICE TO KUBARK ON TEMPORARY OR CONSULTANT BASIS IF HE DOES ESTABLISH HIMSELF ON EAST COAST BUT DO NOT SEE REQUIREMENT FOR REGULAR EMPLOYMENT HERE AT THIS TIME. FYI, WE BELIEVE HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH SOME DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADERS WHILE IN WASH LAST MONTH BUT DO NOT KNOW SPECIFICS OF CONTACTS.

2. PRIOR MAKING ANY DECISION CONCERNING CONTINUATION PROJECT LIREAM HQS WOULD APPRECIATE STA RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING PRESENT OPERATIONAL NEED IN MEXICO FOR OP THIS NATURE AND YOUR COMMENTS CONCERNING VIABILITY PROJECT IN EVENT A NEW CASE OFFICER WITH SUITABLE QUALIFICATIONS (ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE) COULD BE

CONTINUED.../

Tichborn
201

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-253203

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #________

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 05081

PAGE 2

TO

FOUND. SINCE IT OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT PROJECT OPERATES PRIMARILY ON BASIS RAPPORT DEVELOPED BETWEEN TICHBORN AND XIRAU WHAT IS POSSIBILITY THIS RELATIONSHIP COULD BE TRANSFERRED READILY TO ANY OTHER CASE OFFICER. IN STATION OPINION WHAT IS POSSIBILITY OBTAINING XIRAU AGREEMENT CONTINUE PROJECT IF HE ADVISED OF USG SUPPORT? IF HE ACCEPTED FACT OF SOURCE OF FUNDS WOULD HE BE AMENABLE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH STATION OFFICER OR AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN CUTOUT WHO WOULD OSTENSIBLY REPRESENT US CONTRIBUTORS LIREAM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Ref states TICHBORN desires depart Mexi mid-summer.

WH/CA

WH/Pers (by phone)

WH/Exec

by Jean

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WE/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/Pers/Contracts - Reneham

EXTENSION: 4460

NO.:

DATE: June 6, 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/1 - Ames Bldg		6 June	
2.			19 May
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. RI - file 201 - Tickler			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

[illegible] when [illegible] + from [illegible] 27 May? [illegible]

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)

Mr. Kaufman - Re comments on the attached cover sheet. The dispatch with the attachment was recd. in my office on May 27. At the request of Miss Petric on May 27 a copy of the attachment was forwarded to her for your office. Apparently her request was based on receiving a copy of the dispatch w/o the attach from WH/Registry.

When Mr. Kittredge called on June 2 re getting an advance for T., I asked him if C/WH/1 was going to discuss the Disp & attach. with T. and, as I recall, he indicated yes.

Reneham

12 May 66

201-253203

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
RID/D&P/INCOMING
GB-12

EXTENSION: x7737

NO.: HMMT-6608

DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Chief/WH/Reg.	19 May, 1966		Jf
2. C/WH/Pers	May 27/31		
3. C/WH/1			
4. Fisher		6/2	
5.			
6. Kittredge			✓
7. C/WH/CA			
8.			
9. WH/Pers-Contracts-	June 6/6		
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

irrelevant!

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

19 May !
2 June

For your review-recommendation, etc. Suggest, if you concur to use in the W.S. discuss with WH/SEO whether case requires and Agent Board Action

27 May

cy of HWA [illegible] ~~Arneborg~~

WH/1, Kisiva

3-9: Because of undue delay in receiving I met with Sully 1 June and discussed his affairs without even knowing of this disp!! Very inefficient and embarrassing. Note last Pa!!

Mr. Kaufman:
This arrived in WH/1 morning of 2 June. Kittredge read this before going to see Tichborn & then gave it to me. You had already left. Apparently WH/Pers had it from 19 May until 2 June.
Jf

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XX	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LICOLIC/Administrative
Memorandum from Edward G. TICHBORN Re His Leaving Mexico City

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a memorandum received from Edward G. TICHBORN regarding his necessity to move from Mexico City.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
③ - WHD w/att hw
3 - Files

Excluded from automatic [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMM-6608	12 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-116/2

FROM: Tichborn

In Re: Necessity of moving from Mexico City

1. For several years my wife has suffered in varying degrees from the high altitude of Mexico City; but we had ~~xlzyx~~ always been hoping she would eventually adjust. On the occasions we went to Acapulco and even Cuernavaca, she has felt much better. But each time she came back to Mexico City she again felt as if her head were stuffed with cotton. This whole business came to crisis-point recently when she went back to Kentucky for a visit while I was in Santo Domingo. While in Lexington she had a long consultation with a family friend who teaches at the Univ. of Kentucky medical school, and he frankly informed her that she was one of those persons who would never adjust to the Mexico City altitude. Knowing that I wish to stay in Mexico (particularly because my son by my ex-wife lives here permanently), she agreed to investigate the possibility of our moving to Cuernavaca - but we have both reached the conclusion that the Cuernavaca has very inadequate school facilities for our two children, aged 9 and 11. Moreover, the sanitation situation in Cuernavaca is notoriously bad, and our children have already had difficulties with amoebas here in Mexico City. Thus, reluctantly, I have decided that we must move back to the United States. Aside from her physical condition~~s~~, I'm afraid Millie's increasing nervous tension will make it impossible for her to stay here.

2. Depending upon their respective appeal to the company, I have been thinking of several projects that would substitute for my work with Dialogos:

a) The preparation of a thorough in-depth study of PRI and Mexican politics, with projections as to the future. I would gather all my materials (interviews, literature, etc.) in a couple of months; then collate and analyze the materials in some U.S. university, discussing and analyzing same with local political science professors.

b) The preparation of a similar study about the student revolutions now occuring or about to break out in various parts of Latin America or Spain. The recent Univ. of Mexico riots would be my point of departure.

~~SINCE NEITHER OF THESE STUDIES~~

SINCE NEITHER OF THESE STUDIES WOULD TIE ME DOWN TO A RIGID SCHEDULE, I WOULD BE MORE READILY AVAILABLE THAN I AM NOW FOR ASSIGNMENTS SUCH AS THE SANTO DOMINGO CAPER.

2. My wife and I are considering two possible sites for our future home:

a) Denver, Colorado, where I attended the public schools and the Univ. of Denver, and thus have long-established connections. Denver's altitude is 2,500 feet less than Mexico City, about the same altitude as Cuernavaca; so Millie could probably adjust to it. I could easily obtain the facilities of the Univ. library for the above-mentioned studies - and several of my friends on the faculty could serve as sounding boards for some of my theories and prophecies in re Mexican politics. My cover there would be easily established.

c. Cambridge, Massachusetts, is also a good possibility

b) Washington, D.C. (i.e. Virginia or Maryland) Here I could have benefit of many sounding-boards for the above studies. The "cover" situation for me in Washington would be a bit more ticklish than in Denver - but I could probably come up with a viable one.

Since I do not want to go back to the crabs-in-the-barrel political situation in California (and I could not escape it, were I to move back), we have ruled out returning to that state. In any event, there is no cover I could devise in California to explain long absences for assignments to South America or the Carribean.

ASSUMING THAT HEADQUARTERS WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE ABOVE MATTERS WITH ME AT GREAT LENGTH AND IN PERSON, I PLAN TO GO TO WASHINGTON FROM SANTO DOMINGO ABOUT THE FIRST OF JUNE.

good to know!
(after I saw him)
vjr

14-00000

1

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 18

40/53 SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	/	5	
2		6	
3		7	DC
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, SOD 6, CI/OA

S E C R E T 120026Z

ACTION

IN 15165

12 MAY 66 IN 15165

SDOM INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7304

REFS: A. MEXI 7269 (IN 13342)

B. SDOM 0688 (IN 13465)

IN TELECON WITH TICHBORN IN SAN JUAN, STATION RELAYED REF B ADVICE. TICHBORN CONFIRMED HE WILL CALL CHOADEN OR PATAKER UPON ARRIVAL SDOM 1500 HRS 12 MAY FOR ADVICE RE ROOM.

S E C R E T

CFN 7304 7269 0688 TICHBORN SAN JUAN REF B TICHBORN CHOADEN PATAKER SDOM 1500 HRS 12 RE

BT

SECRET

Tichborn 201

201-253203

K

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES
CLASSIFY TO FILE
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 7

37/21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/PEG, CI/OA

S E C R E T 101750Z

10 MAY 65 IN 14183

PRIORITY SDOM INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7284

REF SDOM 0688 (IN 14115)*

TICHBORN DEPARTED BEFORE REF ADVICE COULD BE RELATED TO HIM. HE INSTRUCTED CALL CHOADEN OR PATAKER UPON ARRIVAL SDOM HOWEVER, AT WHICH TIME HE CAN BE ADVISED PER REF.

S E C R E T

CFN 7284 0688 TICHBORN CHOADEN PATAKER

BT

*SUGGEST TICHBORN PROCEED TO EMBAJADOR AND REGISTER

SECRET

Zeroxed

Tichborn
201

201-253203
K

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 28

4/53 SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO FILE, H, SOD6, CA2, CCS 3, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA

9 MAY 66 13485

13465

S E C R E T 100050Z

PRIORITY MEXI INFO DIR CITE SDOM 0688

REF: MEXI 7269 (IN 13342) *

SUGGEST TICHBORN PROCEED TO EMBAJADOR AND REGISTER. SHOULD CALL CHOADEN OR PAIAKER IF NO ROOM AVAILABLE. STATION WILL PROVIDE SAFE APARTMENT FOR TICHBORN PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF CONGRESSMAN GONZALEZ (IF HE COMES) AND/OR OTHER PERSONS WHO MIGHT KNOW TICHBORN. BELIEVE STATION WILL BE AWARE OF ARRIVALS PRIOR TO FACT, INCLUDING NEWSMEN.

S E C R E T * RE TICHBORN DESIRE, NOT TO MEET OLD ACQUAINTANCES.

CFN 0688 7269 TICHBORN EMBAJADOR CHOADEN PAIAKER NO ROOM GONZALEZ

SECRET

BT

NNNN

Tichborn
201-253203
K.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE D TOTAL COPIES

28 SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8
☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CCS 3

S E C R E T 092115Z

9 MAY 66 13342

PRIORITY SDOM INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7269

REF A SDOM 0667 (IN 12559)

B MEXI 7250 (IN 12246)

TICHBORN DEFINITELY DOES NOT WANT MEET OLD ACQUAINTANCES AND EXPECIALLY NOT CONGRESSMAN HENRY GONZALEZ. TICHBORN HAS NO LEADS RE HOTELS, REQUESTS THAT STATION SDOM ARRANGE ROOM OR SAFE APT OTHER THAN HOTEL EMBAJADOR, WHERE GONZALEZ PROBABLY WILL STAY. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CFN 7269 0667 7260 TICHBORN NOT WANT NOT CONGRESSMAN HENRY GONZALEZ TICHBORN NO LEADS RE HOTELS APT HOTEL EMBAJADOR GONZALEZ

BT

SECRET

201-253203

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

26 SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR, CCS 3,

7 MAY 66 12559

S E C R E T 071810Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE SDOM 0667

REF: MEXI 7260 (IN 12246)*

* GAVE TICHBORN ETA SDOM.

1. SUGGEST TICHBORN CABLE DIRECTLY TO HOTEL EMBAJADOR TO MAKE RESERVATION FOR 11 MAY, AS ROOM SITUATION TIGHT. (STATION CAN PROVIDE ROOM IF NECESSARY, BUT DIRECT RESERVATION WOULD BE BETTER FROM SECURITY STANDPOINT).

2. PLS ADVISE TICHBORN TO POLISH HIS COVER STORY CAREFULLY. THERE MAY BE NEWSMEN FROM MEXI (MR CARL MIGDAIL INDICATED HE HOPED TO RETURN SDOM TO COVER ELECTIONS). ALSO UNDERSTAND CONGRESSMAN HENRY GONZALEZ, BELIEVED TO BE KNOWN TO TICHBORN, MIGHT ALSO BE HERE AS AN OBSERVER.

S E C R E T

CFN 0667 UWYP TICHBORN HOTEL EMBAJADOR 11 MAY TICHBORN MR CARL MIGDAIL HENRY GONZALEZ TICHBORN

BT

SECRET

Tichborn 201

201-253203

Kittridge

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 4

58

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CCS 3

S E C R E T 070115Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7260

TICHBORN ETA SDOM 11 MAY.

S E C R E T

CFN 7260 TICHBORN ETA SDOM 11 MAY

BT

12246

7 May 66 12246

SECRET

ACTION

NNNN

Jane Tichborn

201

201-253203

K

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

8 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Santo Domingo

ACTION C/WH6 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/CA/O2, C/CA 2, C/CI

S E C R E T 071600Z

MEXI INFO SNDR DIR CITE SDOM 0657 7 Mar 66 12521

DESENSITIZED SMARGOSY

REF: DIR 02484

1. REQUEST FREAPANE ELICIT FROM AMCHIME-1 INFO CONCERNING FOLLOWING POINTS: IF, AS FREE-LANCER, HIS STORIES BEING REGULARLY USED BY ANY PBPRIME NEWSPAPER; MAJOR OR SMALL? ARE STORIES FILED AIRMAIL OR CABLE? WHETHER HE PLANS OR WISHES COVER DOMREP ELECTIONS.

2. AS SDOM RECALLS, AMCHIME-1 NOT WITTING FREAPANE'S KUBARK ASSOCIATION. IF THIS STILL TRUE, ANY APPROACH TO HIM MIGHT BEST BE MADE DIRECTLY BY STATION. SINCE CHOADEN KNEW AMCHIME-1 WELL IN HAVANA AND MEXI, CHOADEN NAME COULD BE USED.

3. FOR DIR: IF PARA ONE ELICITATION PROVES FRUITFUL SDOM WOULD FIND AMCHIME-1'S PRESENCE HERE VALUABLE. AS FREE-LANCER HE MIGHT BE HAPPY ACCEPT ASSISTANCE IN TRAVEL AND PER DIEM EXPENSES TO COVER ELECTIONS.

S E C R E T

* REQUESTED FREAPANE ATTEMPT LOCATE AMCHIME-1

CFN 0657 02484 FREAPANE DOMREP NOT WITTING FREAPANE'S HAVANA CHOADEN PER DIEM

BT

SECRET

201-253203

Freapane 201

Kittredge

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Monetary Division, Office of Finance		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT ZRPLAD
Edward G. TICHBORN # 340536 Payment of Covert Income Taxes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith is one Mexican bank cashiers check in the amount of US $2,308.00 payable to a nominal payee. This check was turned in to Station by subject for settlement of covert income tax obligation as determined during subject's recent Headquarters TDY.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As Stated Above, h/w

Distribution:
2 - Chief, Monetary Division, w/att
1 - Chief, WHD

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-6611	DATE 6 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Edward G. TICHBORN, Income Tax

Reference: [illegible] 0326, 14 April 1966

1. Following is a report of a meeting held with Edward G. TICHBORN, Independent Contractor, on 15 April by a representative of the Tax Committee, Victor D. [illegible], and of the Support Staff.

2. As the Tax Committee Representative, by dealing directly with TICHBORN was able to settle the entire tax matter of his tax returns there is no need to cite previous correspondence.

a. During the first part of the meeting it was determined TICHBORN had not filed the 1963 tax return with Internal Revenue but had given it to the Station Support Office with a check for the tax owed. The return held by Headquarters is a copy of the covert return for 1963, not the overt return. Whether an overt return was filed is not clear and TICHBORN does not remember. In 1965 TICHBORN was instructed and took action to stop payment on his check for the 1963 taxes. TICHBORN stated the check has not been returned nor processed to his knowledge but that he had set aside money in a bank account for the 1963 and 1964 taxes.

b. It was agreed that the 1963 return on file in Headquarters would be processed as a covert return.

As TICHBORN's son by a previous marriage had not been listed as an exemption, he submitted a certified statement claiming the son as an exemption based on his having provided at least 51% of the son's support.

TICHBORN also agreed he would forward a check to Headquarters for the tax due on the return.

Tichborn 201

CONTINUED....

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMS - 4723

DATE: 05 MAY 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-253203

Distribution:
- 1 - WH/Pers w/att
- 1 - WH/1 w/att
- 1 - CCS/NC wo/att
- 1 - WH/REG wo/att

ORIGINATING

WH/Pers/W.S. Kenehan: gms 26 April 1966 6576

COORDINATING

C/WH/PERS

C/WH/1

CCS/NC

RELEASING

C/WH/SS

William E. Brooks

c. As the covert tax return for 1964 was also apparently among the missing documents and as TICHBORN did not have a copy, it was agreed to assess him beginning with the 1964 tax year and thereafter under the Revised Tax Procedures. The assessments were prepared and reviewed by him and are summarized as follows.

1964--Contract Compensation	$13,500.
Tax less Tax Credit	1,460.
Tax Assessment Rate	10.8%
1965--Contract Compensation	$15,000.
Tax less Tax Credit	1,790.
Tax Assessment Rate	11.9%

TICHBORN was instructed to forward a check for the 1964 tax less the excess withholding for 1965 plus Social Security tax of $174. for 1964. Social Security tax had been withheld for tax year 1965.

d. The Revised Tax Procedures were explained to TICHBORN and he was advised that a Letter of Instruction regarding the filing of tax returns under the procedures would be forwarded to the Station for his signature. Simply stated, the procedures obviate the filing of covert returns but that a copy of the overt return would be provided Headquarters in a timely manner.

e. STATION ACTION

TICHBORN was advised that a cable would be sent to the Station citing the amount due and he agreed to send the check upon receipt of the cable. He was also advised to make the check payable to some fictitious name of his own selection.

3. TICHBORN showed great signs of relief when he was told that the above actions would settle the subject of his past tax returns and simplify his filing of future returns.

UNITSKY did an excellent job in a minimum amount of time and with no waste of time concerned with any negative aspects of "who struck who or why wasn't something done". TICHBORN was completely cooperative and when the meeting was concluded the sincerity of his thank you to UNITSKY was evident.

4. As a separate matter, TICHBORN asked for more detailed information relating to settlement of a claim for reimbursement of hospital and related expenses which he incurred last year.

STATION ACTION

a. Attached is a copy of the settlement sheet relating to the above claim which is to be made available to TICHBORN.

b. In discussing the matter of payment with Finance they have advised they have not received the T/A requested in DIR 77138 dated 3 Feb 1966.

Howard D. MYNARD

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico

[illegible] OF TECH ORB (P)

MENT OF CLAIM

MEMBER'S NUMBER	SEX	CODE	VOUCHER NUMBER	DEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP	DATE CLAIM INCURRED
[illegible]	M	902	39506	Self	5-26-65

AUDIT BREAKDOWN

	AMOUNTS OF ACTUAL CHARGES	AMOUNTS PAYABLE UNDER BASE PLAN
1 Hospital Admission Date — 5-26-65		
2 Hospital Admission Count—This Payment — 1		
3 Hospital Room 6 Days @ $ 22.02	132.12	120.00
4 Hospital Room Days @ $		
5 Inpatient Hosp. Misc (Include Ambulance)	247.26	217.23
6 Outpatient Hosp. Misc.		
7 Surgeon	150.32	200.00
8 Anesthetist (Other than hospital)	60.05	10.00
9 Physician (Other than Surgeon) 5-26-65-5-31-65	70.00	
10 Drugs (Other than Hospital)		
11 Other Covered Expenses		
12 TOTAL BASE PLAN BENEFITS THIS WORKSHEET →		447.23
13 Total Actual Charges	704.35	
14 Show Any Excess of Line 13 over Line 12	307.02	
15 Add Any Accumulation of Deductible Applicable		
16 Total Line 14 and Line 15	307.02	
17 If Line 16 Exceeds Deductible ($100, Plus Any Private Room Charge Exceeding $25 a Day Enter Amount of Excess	207.02	
18 PAYABLE at 80% → 207.02	165.67	
19 PAYABLE at 50% →		
20 TOTAL MAJOR MEDICAL BENEFITS THIS WORKSHEET →		165.67
21 TOTAL BENEFITS THIS WORKSHEET (Line 12 Plus Line 20) →		612.91

ITEM 9 BREAKDOWN:

Asst. Surgeon

Others

ITEM 11 BREAKDOWN:

Appliances

Nurse

Others (Explain)

REMARKS:

ACCUMULATION OF DEDUCTIBLE FROM PREVIOUS CLAIMS

Previous Calendar Year
Voucher No Amt.
Voucher No. Amt.
Voucher No Amt.

Current Calendar Year.
Voucher No Amt.
Voucher No Amt.
Voucher No Amt.

TOTAL →

Show any excess on this claim which may be applied toward satisfaction of the deductible in the:
Current Calendar Year
Following Calendar Year

MAJOR MEDICAL MAXIMUM PAID CONTROL

Total Major Medical
Previously Paid
Amount Major Medical
Paid This Claim 165.67
Less Any Reinstatement
Credit Not Previously Taken
Total Accumulated
Major Medical Paid 165.67

Date October 27, 19 65

Tichborn 201

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Extension

ACTION REQ: FYI

Attached for Station retention is an amendment to the contract for Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Agent, extending the term through 18 November 1966.

Howard D. MYNARD

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico

HMMS - 4738

SECRET

201-253203

WH/Pers/G.M. Spettigue: gms 2 May 1966 6576

Distribution:
1 - WH/Pers w/att
1 - WH/1 w/att
1 - WH/Reg wo/att

C/WH/PERS

C/WH/1 2 May 66 (coord in draft) P. Kittredge

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for
Edward G. TICHBORN

1. Effective 19 November 1965, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 19 May 1961 is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

Group I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

15

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : G. Powell
UNIT : CCS/NC
EXT : 5004
DATE : 20 April 1966

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

21 [illegible] 66 17 01z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CCS 3
INFO WH8, VR, FILE, CF 2, 0

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: CITE DIR 98097

REF: HMMT-6453, 31 March 1966

TICHBORN TAX SITUATION CLEAR THROUGH 1965 UPON PAYMENT OF $2,308.94. THIS REPRESENTS $938.82 FOR 1963; $1,460.00 PLUS $174.00 (SOC.SEC.) FOR 1964, LESS REFUND OF $263.88 ON 1965 TAX. DETAILS WILL BE FORWARDED WITH LETTER OF TAX INSTRUCTION.

END OF MESSAGE

OF/C&TD/CTB Tel Coord. S.M.O'Leary
WH/PERS
WH/1/MEX

WH/1

C/WH/SS

C/CCS/NC

201-253203

Tichborn 201

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

☐ D ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

ORIG : P. KITTREDGE/nr
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 18 Apr 1966

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

15 SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, OP2, CCS 3, CA 2

19 APR 66 14 07z

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 97332

1. TICHBORN WILL ARRIVE MEXI 19 APRIL.

2. HQS WILL TA $100 ADVANCE MADE 15 APRIL. ACCOUNTING SHOULD BE MADE MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

WH B&F

201-253733

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 1

3/21 **SECRET**

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION	ADVANCE COPY	UNIT	TIME	BY
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY	☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED	CS DO	0000Z	m

INFO
FILE, VR, CS/DC, CA2, CA/PEG

S E C R E T 182253Z 18 APR IN 99122

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7017

REFS: A. HMMS-4650

B. SDOM-0326 (IN 96007) *

REPLY REF A IN PREPARATION; SUGGEST HQS CONSULTATION WITH TICHBORN REGARDING PARA C IF HE STILL IN US.

S E C R E T * RE TRAVEL EDWARD TICHBORN

CFN UPQU HMMS-4650 SDOM-0326 REF A HQS TICHBORN C US

BT

SECRET

NNNN

Tichborn 201

201-253203

14-00000

[redacted]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 1

23/24 SECRET GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	55	5	10
2		6	
3		7	
4	DC	8	

FROM SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CCS3, OCC2,

S E C R E T 132330Z 14 APR 65 96007

MEXI INFO DIR CITE SDOM 0326

EMARGOSY

1. EDWARD O. TICHBORN ADVANCED $375 (U.S.) FOR TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES IN DR ON EMARGOSY ASSIGNMENT. SINCE INVOLVED AIRLINE TICKET AS WELL, ACCOUNTING COULD NOT BE SUBMITTED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. WOULD APPRECIATE IF MEXI COULD OBTAIN ACCOUNTING AND POUCH TO SDOM.

2. TICHBORN DEPARTED SDOM 13 APR FOR NEW YORK AND EXPECTS TO BE BACK IN MEXI 17 APR.

3. FOR DIR: IN NEW YORK TICHBORN WILL ATTEMPT FIRM UP COVER FOR NEXT VISIT SDOM. HE WILL TELEPHONE HQS, HOPING TO MEET WITH HQS OFFICERS FOR DISCUSSION SEVERAL SUBJECTS, INCLUDING INCOME TAX, PRIOR TO RETURN TO MEXI.

S E C R E T

CFN 0326 EDWARD O TICHBORN $375 U.S. DR EMARGOSY NOT BE 13 APR NEW YORK 17 APR

BT

201-253203

SECRET

Tichborn
E 201 file
c

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ S.C.

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

22

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	1.	5	
2		6	
3		7	DL
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CC53 D/DP, C/CI C/CA2

X DISSEM PER [illegible] CABLES

97

ACTION

S E C R E T POWEWTZ

PRIORITY SDOM INFO DIR CITE MEXI [redacted] 2 APR 63 IN 88459

REF SDOM PQRW 0142 (IN 84763)

CHOADEN PLS NOTE THAT THERE ARE TWO HILTON HOTELS IN SAN JUAN. TICHBORN WILL BE AT SAN GERONIMO.

S E C R E T

CFN YUEI PQRW CHOADEN PLS HILTON HOTELS SAN JUAN TICHBORN SAN GERONIMO

BT

* WILL CONTACT TICHBORN AT SAN JUAN HILTON.

201-253203

SECRET

NNNN

Tichborn 201

14-00000

Memo For Tichborn 201 file

Marginalia from two meetings with Tichborn in Washington in April and May 1966

Tichborn is planning to write a book which he has tentatively titled "The Humanity Bomb--Latin American Population xixi Crisis". ixxydyjyjyxykyxyiyxgxjxy As a part of his research on the subject, he has prepared two articles and submitted thme to kkxkx Life Magazine and the Atlantic Monthly. Atlantic Monthly has accepted his article "Birth control is a Dirty Word---The Semantics of Birth Control" an d this will aprear in some future issue of Atlantic.

Tichborn's article concerning his own ethnic problems ,i.e. a Mexican-American , kyxykyzn which appeared in the March -April issue of DIALOGOS has been accepted for American Heritage and will appear in the near future. He showed me the check ($450) for this article.

Does he need any clearance from Security on these?
VJK

File Tichborn 201 file

201-253203

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

☐ D[illegible] ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

1 APR 66 19 29z

ORIG : P. ~~KITTREDGE~~
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 31 MAR 66

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO : MEXI

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY CA 2 CA/PROP CCS 3 CI/OA

TO MEXI INFO SDOM CITE DIR

92812

REF MEXI 6588 (IN 76734)

1. ALTHOUGH COMMEND ATTEMPT ESTABLISH HARPERS AS NATURAL BACKSTOP ~~WOULD~~ ~~PREFER~~ TICHBORN SHOULD NOT UTILIZE AMERICAN PUBLICATION AS COVER THIS OP. FROM HERE WOULD SEEM DIALOGOS RELATIONSHIP COULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION INTEREST AND ACTIVITY THIS ~~PERIOD~~ EFFORT.

2. TOURIST COVER WOULD APPEAR SUFFICE FOR APRIL VISIT SAN JUAN AND SANTO DOMINGO. MAY TDY COULD BE ATTRIBUTED DESIRE OBSERVE ELECTION IN CONTEXT SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING UNDERWAY IN COUNTRY OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST TO MEXICO AND DEVELOP BACKGROUND POSSIBLE ARTICLE FOR DIALOGOS AND OTHER UNIDENTIFIED OUTLETS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref advised TICHBORN would go D. R. as SDOM requested.
MEXI Suggested he arrange Harpers cover this trip.

Tichborn 201

WH/DR Spera
WH/CA

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

201-253203

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, KUWEST ATTN: Victor D. UNITSKY

INFO
Chief, WH Division
Office of Finance

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Admin/Income Tax - Request for Direct Assessment of Covert Tax Liability for Edward G. TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Per para 3

REFERENCE : A. Dir 83146, dated 26 February 1966
B. MEXI-6266, dated 14 February 1966
C. MEXI-6062, dated 27 January 1966
D. HMMT-6033, dated 14 December 1965
E. HMMS-4128, dated 10 May 1965
F. HMMT-5226, dated 24 February 1965
G. HMMS-3952, dated 12 January 1965
H. HMMT-5111, dated 17 December 1964

1. Furnished herewith is a request for direct assessment of Covert Tax Liability form, dated 30 March 1966 for Edward G. TICHBORN. The forms were left by Victor D. UNITSKY for completion by TICHBORN, since TICHBORN was not in Mexico City during UNITSKY's visit.

2. The TICHBORN tax case was discussed with UNITSKY who was made aware of the multitude of problems. The series of cable correspondence in regard to the location of TICHBORN's 1964 Tax returns and check, the final cable of which, Ref A, stated that they could be located in a folder titled "Covert Taxes", was of no avail in locating the missing documents. A through search of Station files failed to uncover them.

3. It is hoped that UNITSKY can effect an assessment for 1964 as well as 1965 taxes as a solution to the matter. Also, it would be appreciated if UNITSKY could review the reference concerning the 1963 taxes to ascertain if there is any further action required.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As Stated Above, h/w

Distribution:
1 - Chief, KUWEST, w/att
1 - Chief, WHD, w/o att
1 - Office of Finance w/o att

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-6453	31 March 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

57

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	DK	5	
2		6	
3		7	SS
4	1	8	

FROM
SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION
C/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/CCS 3, D/OP, C/CI, C/CA 2

S E C R E T 290131Z

MEXI DIR CITE SDOM 0142 (IN 82529)

REF: A. SDOM 0098 (NOT SENT MEXI)

B. MEXI 6560 (IN 83879)

C. DIR 91189 *

2[illegible] 84768

* Re Tichborn's DomRep Trip

1. CHOADEN WILL CONTACT TICHBORN AT SAN JUAN HILTON EARLY EVENING 4 APRIL.

2. FOR DIR: AS NOTED REF A, CHOADEN HAD PLANNED DEPART SDOM FOR HQS 3 APRIL. NOW FIND HOWEVER THAT POLITICAL SECTION REQUESTED TO HOST DESPIDIDA FOR AMBASSADOR BENNETT NIGHT 3 APRIL AT CHOADEN HOME. CONSEQUENTLY CHOADEN WILL DEPART SDOM FOR SJAN 4 APRIL, BRIEF TICHBORN, THEN PROCEED HQS ASAP 5 APRIL. WILL REPORT TO OFFICE MORNING 6 APRIL.

3. FOR MEXI: APPRECIATE YOUR WILLINGNESS SPARE TICHBORN TO ASSIST SDOM.

S E C R E T

CFN 0142 0098 6660 91189 CHOADEN TICHBORN SAN JUAN HILTON 4 A 3 DESPIDIDA BENNETT 3 4 5 6

BT

201-253203

K

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	1	5	
2		6	
3		7	DX
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR C/CA C/CCS3

S E C R E T 261845Z

SDCM INFO DIR CITE MEXI 6660

ACTION

26 [illegible] 8C079

REF DIR 91189

DESENSITIZED LCOLIC EMARGOSY

TICHBORN PLANS TRAVEL SAN JUAN ON 4 APRIL EASTERN AIRLINES ARRIVING 1630. RESERVATION MADE AT SAN JERONIMO HILTON, WILL AWAIT CONTACT. ADVISE IDENTITY OF OFFICER WHO WILL MEET HIM IF ABOVE SATISFACTORY.

S E C R E T

CFN 6660 DIR 91189 TICHBORN SAN JUAN 4 APRIL EASTERN 1630 SAN JERONIMO HILTON

SECRET

BT

201-253203

/C

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 5

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

☐ [illegible] ☐ RETURN TO [illegible] ☐ [illegible]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: AN LINTON:ks
UNIT: WH/DR/CA
EXT: 4221
DATE: 25 Mar 1966

TO: Santo Domingo

[illegible]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 6 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, C/CS 3, C/CI, D/DP, C/FE 2

TO SDOM INFO MEXI CITE DIR 91189

REF: MEXI 6568 (IN 76734)*

DESENSITIZED ARGOSY LICOLIC

APPROVE TICHBORN TRAVEL EARLY APRIL IN ACCORDANCE REF. SDOM PLS ADVISE MEXI WHETHER CASE OFFICER CAN MEET TICHBORN IN SAN JUAN AND WHAT CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS DESIRED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * Tichborn enthusiastic about DOMREP assignment. Suggests he meet with SDOM case officer at San Juan en route DR in order avoid arriving SDOM cold.

WH/1/Mexico (Kittredge in draft)
WH/CA

by

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BRENDAN A. BURNS
C/WH/DR
201-253203
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET

2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR CI/OPS CI/2 RF 2 ADDP

S E C R E T 242257Z 24 MAR 66 IN 82529

DIR CITE SDOM 0298

REF DIR 89556

CHOADEN PLANS DEPART SDOM AFTERNOON 3 APRIL. WILL REPORT HQS EARLY AFTERNOON 4 APRIL.

S E C R E T

CFN 0298 89556 CHOADEN 3 HQS 4

BT

SECRET

NNNN

201-253203

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CL IFIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES

49 SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, ADDP, C/CCS 3, C/CA 2, C/CI

S E C R E T 170105Z

DIR INFO SDOM CITE MEXI 6568

17 MAR 66 IN 76734

DESENSITIZED ARGOSY LICOLIC

1. CONCUR REF; TICHBORN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT ASSIGNMENT AND PLANNING TRAVEL SDOM EARLY APRIL SUBJECT HQS FINAL APPROVAL. SUGGESTS HE MEET WITH SDOM CASE OFFICER AT SAN JUAN EN ROUTE DR IN ORDER AVOID ARRIVING SDOM COLD.

2. PROBLEMS WILL COME UP IN REGARD ON TIME PUBLICATION LIREAM MAGAZINE IN ABSENCE BOTH XIRAU AND TICHBORN, BUT BELIEVE THEY MANAGEABLE. MAY BE NECESSARY FOR TICHBORN TO RETURN MEXI FOR FEW DAYS MIDDLE OF MAY, BUT WILL AVOID THIS IF POSSIBLE.

3. COVER THAT OF WRITER GATHERING MATERIAL FOR BACKGROUNDER. TICHBORN WRITING HARPERS TO SEE IF THEY INTERESTED COMMISSIONING SUCH PIECE.

S E C R E T

CFN 6568 TICHBORN HQS SAN JUAN EN DR XIRAU TICHBORN MAY

BT

SECRET

Tichborn 201 file

201-253203

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/P/SOH (MR. BOATMN.)		
2			
3			
4			
5	WH/CA		
6	C/WH/1	201	

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: TISHBORN GOING TDY TO D.R. TO HELP OUT DURING ELECTION. —

PLS NOTE PARA 3 ATT.

I GUESS THIS - i.e. TISCHBORN WRITING TO HARPERS WITHOUT ANY CIA INVOLVEMENT - IS OK, IF NOT WE CAN LIVE WITHOUT THIS "COVER."

PLS ADVISE.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/WH/CA	30/3

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

(40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

201-253203

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: C LICOLIC, Fiscal Year 1966 Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: A. HMMA 27025, 26 August 1965

B. HMMW 14392, 10 March 1966

1. Project LICOLIC has been renewed for Fiscal Year 1966 in the amount of $19,000 as requested. This approval was effective 2 March 1966.

2. As you are aware there has been a good deal of discussion here concerning TICHBORN's operational activities and how he might best contribute to the overall objectives of the Station. It was agreed during EDGEBROOK's visit here (See Ref B) that TICHBORN would be considered henceforth as a full time Station asset and attention would be given to gaining maximum value from his continued presence in Mexico. Within this context, however, it should also be noted that this Project was renewed for Fiscal Year 1966 with the condition that ". . . prior to the end of the current fiscal year (1966), adequate cover is found to afford TICHBORN not only the needed mobility and safeguards for his work in behalf of the Mexico Station, but also for his possible third country political action assignments. . .". In addition, the following recommendation was made in the event Project LIREAM should not be renewed (which should not really be considered at present since agreement was

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

10 March 1966

✓

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW 14406 CS COPY

DATE: 14 MAR 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-253203

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT.
WH/1/Mexico	Paul Kittredge:nre		10 Mar	4523

RI
Chrono

C/WH/1

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		W. J. Kaufman

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW 14406

reached to approve Project LIREAM also), ". . . If this turns out to be the case we would recommend that TICHBORN be reassigned to another area (suggest ZRMETAL) under the type of cover (e.g. JMTUBA) which would offer him the needed mobility and protection for area-wide political action assignments . . .". Needless to say, although the latter point should be kept in mind as a last alternative in any decision regarding TICHBORN's continued relationship with this Agency, the Branch believes that the LIREAM publication has improved and has a good chance to gain acceptance and expand its influence throughout the hemisphere. This being the case, and as Station plans for expanding TICHBORN's activity within Mexico take form, we hope his contribution to KUBARK objectives in Mexico and throughout Latin America will become more substantial and recognized.

3. As a matter of information, Headquarters would appreciate TICHBORN preparing a summary of his present cover situation, particularly his appreciation of his present residence and work status in Mexico, and his estimate of what the future holds for him in this regard. Further, we would appreciate any indication the Station may have concerning TICHBORN's personal plans in regard to his continued residence in Mexico and his future relationship with KUBARK.

Joseph P. LANGBIEN

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 15

☐ ROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

Linton

ORIG : J.LINTON:bd
UNIT : WH/DR/CA
EXT : 4221
DATE : 11 March 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO : MEXICO INFO: SANTO DOMINGO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 6

INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY C/CA 2 C/CA/PROP C/CCS 3

TO MEXI INFO SDOM CITE DIR 87630

DESENSITIZED

EMARGOSY

1. SDOM HAS INQUIRED WHETHER EDWARD O. TICHBORN COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR USE IN DOMREP DURING ~~THREE WEEKS~~ PERIOD PRECEDING ONE JUNE ELECTION. HQS AGREES TICHBORN'S QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE IN ELECTION FIELD WOULD BE VALUABLE FOR LAST MINUTE CHECKING OF TROUBLE AREAS, AND ISSUES IN DOMREP. Although recognize problem due XIRAU [illegible] time ~~[illegible]~~ WOULD APPRECIATE MEXI COMMENTS ON TICHBORN AVAILABILITY AND ON ANY COVER OR OTHER additional PROBLEMS SUCH ASSIGNMENT MIGHT INVOLVE.

2. IF MEXI HAS NO OBJECTION SDOM WOULD LIKE HAVE TICHBORN COME FOR TWO WEEK TDY EARLY IN APRIL TO READ IN ON SITUATION, THEN RETURN DURING FIRST WEEK MAY FOR CONCENTRATED ELECTION EFFORT.

3. PLS ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Sally Tichborn 201

C/WH/DR

C/WH/CA

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-253203

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 15

24 S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : SMO'LEARY
UNIT : COV. TAX BR.
EXT : 2391
DATE : 21 FEB. 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1	SS	5	1
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

25 FEB 66 19 36 z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CC S-3

INFO VR, FILE, WH-8, OF-2

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 83148

REFS: A. [illegible]-6033
B. MEXI-6266 (IN 54787)

BALSIS QUERIED. HAS NO RECOLLECTION CASE AS STATED REF A. BALSIS SUGGESTS SWECKER CHECK FOLDER "COVERT TAXIS" WHICH WAS LOCATED IN HIS WORK FILE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: REF. A REQUESTED BALSIS KNOWLEDGE OF TICHBORN 1964 COVERT AND OVERT RETURNS.

Tichborn - 201

201-253203

C/WH/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/BF

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/CTD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, [illegible]

INFO
Director of Finance
Chief, [illegible] Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
[illegible] - Tax Administration

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. During the stay of the Tax Committee representative seventeen individuals were briefed and sixteen were assessed. Attached is a copy of the briefing schedule prepared by the Station.

2. [illegible] was requested to obtain a signed blank return from [illegible] when he saw him on a recent TDY and to obtain as much information as possible on his tax problem. [illegible] was going to hand carry the signed return and the information to Headquarters.

3. [illegible] was advised of the I.R.S. interpretation of the Code as it affected his claim for a standard deduction. He stated that he would appreciate I.R.S. making a ruling on his particular circumstances. Under separate cover the request is being forwarded.

4. [illegible]'s assessment was prepared and an estimate of his 1965 tax liability was computed. Based on this estimate he requested that the personal check forwarded under separate cover be applied to the tax withholding account thereby satisfying his estimated 1965 tax liability.

5. [illegible], and Douglas J. [illegible] are in the Headquarters area and should be contacted directly. [illegible] was not returning to the Station until after the Committee representative left.

6. The forms for Jeremy K. [illegible], Douglas J. [illegible], [illegible], John R. [illegible] will be completed upon [illegible]'s return to Headquarters.

7. Edward [illegible] was not available for a briefing.

Attachment:
As Stated Above, h/w & usc

Distribution:
1 - Chief, [illegible], w/att
1 - Director of Finance, w/o att
1 - Chief, WHD, w/o att

201-253203

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-6339	21 February 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]'s forms were forwarded earlier.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

14-00000

P.K. Westphal

ORIG : PAUL K. WESTPHAL
UNIT : FINANCE
EXT : 2213 or 2214
DATE : 23 JAN 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

3 SECRET

☐ DE ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

3FEB66 15 16z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: OF2 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY WH 8

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

FINAN 77138

REF: MEXI 6067 (IN 43037)

1. PLEASE PAY TICHBORN $642.93 AND T/A HQS.

2. NO BANK ON FILE FOR DEPOSIT OF ABOVE AMOUNT.

END OF MESSAGE

Tichborn 201

Edwin W Burroughs

C/WH/SS C/WH/EF C/CSTD

201-253203

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

24 SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	SS	5	1
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Mexico City

ACTION OF-2 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8

S E C R E T 280005Z

28 JUL [illegible] 40037

DIR CITE MEXI 6067

DTEARN

PLEASE ADVISE RE DISPOSITION OF CHECK SENT TO DTEARN PER HMMA-4495 IN SETTLEMENT OF EDWARD G. TICHBORN HOSPITALIZATION CLAIM PER HMMT-5791.

S E C R E T

CFN 6067 RE DTEARN PER HMMS-4495 EDWARD G TICHBORN PER HMMT-5791

BT

SECRET

N
NNN

file 201-253203

K

14-00000

S. Short

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

☐ ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : S. SHORT
UNIT : WH/3/C
EXT : 5126
DATE : 11 JANUARY 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

3Z SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO CITY INFO: BOGOTA

11 JAN 66 23 33 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: C/WH 6 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY ADDP C/CA 2, C/CCS 3,

TO MEXI INFO BOGO CITE DIR
RYBAT

71438

8

1. AMB. [redacted] BOGO HAS FORWARDED [redacted] RECOMMENDATION TO ODACID THROUGH BOGO STATION CHANNEL THAT PBPRIME ADVISER WITH EXPERIENCE IN ELECTIONS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS TECHNIQUES BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST CARLOS LLERAS RESTREPO IN HIS CAMPAIGN FOR PRESIDENCY COLOMBIA. ODACID/KUBARK DISCUSSION NOW UNDERWAY CONCERNING REQUIREMENT AND DESIRABILITY SUCH ASSISTANCE.

2. IN EVENT DECISION MADE CARRY OUT THIS PROGRAM KUBARK WILL BE ACTION AGENCY. SINCE TICHBORN STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR POSSIBLE BOLIVIA ASSIGNMENT, HQS NOW CONSIDERS REDLICH BEST QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL PRESENTLY AVAILABLE THIS TASK. REDLICH COVER WOULD PROBABLY BE THAT OF PRIVATE PBPRIME CITIZEN WHO IS SPECIALIST IN ELECTION TECHNIQUES AND HAS WIDE EXPERIENCE THIS FIELD. HQ AND BOGO STATION WOULD ESTABLISH NOMINAL COVER SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BONA FIDES AND ~~PRECUDE~~ PRECLUDE WEAKENING REDLICH SECURITY UPON RETURN MEXICO. S.S.

3. REQUEST MEXI COMMENTS RE SUITABILITY AND AVAILABILITY REDLICH FOR PERIOD THREE TO ~~FOUR~~ WEEKS SOMETIME PRIOR TO COLOMBIAN

(CONTINUED)

201-253203

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 71438

PAGE TWO

CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION WHICH NOW SCHEDULED 20 MARCH. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION FOLLOWS IN MAY BUT REDLICH CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE GREATEST IN PERIOD PRECEDING CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CA

AC/WH/3

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ITKIN, HERBERT
201-836808

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 9-1 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	53
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: __________ AT: __________ Z

DISSEN BY ______ PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR IP/AN CI/OPS CI/SO CI FI [illegible]

ACTION NO 890

DOC. MICRO. SER.
SEP 15 1972
MICROFILMED

S E C R E T 282234Z AUG 72 STAFF

SDOM

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 13099

694715

DIRECTOR.

WOMUSE EMPYREX

201-836808

1. EMPYREX LIAISON ADVISES HERBERT ITKIN ARRIVED SANTO DOMINGO 22 AUG 72 FROM NEW YORK PAA 235 PROHIBITED ENTRY AND RETURNED NEW YORK SAME DAY PAA 236. ITKIN BORN 19 NOV 26, NEW YORK, US PP B 1220178.

2. NO STATION TRACES. EMPYREX RECORDS INDICATE SUBJ BLACKLISTED BECAUSE HE ENGAGED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND HAS MAFIA CONNECTIONS. ACCRODING SAME FILE, NY TIMES REPORTED SUBJ PROVIDED INFO TO BKCROWN ON PERSONS IN DOMREP.

3. TRACES REQUESTED.

4. INDEX. FILE 201-836808 22-2-20/3. E2 IMPDET WH-SISM.

S E C R E T

AN
AB
IX
PS
BX 3
DF
FI

CS COPY

D-22-2-20/3

SECRET

28 Aug 72

201-836808

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18-3

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY: 57

ORIG: ELISABETH VETTER:BA
UNIT: WH/7/DR
EXT: 5156
DATE: 20 AUGUST 1972

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 2B PER
☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH8
INFO: FILE, VR. Selps, cilso, secur 4, ci, cilops,

DOC. MICRO. SER.
SEP 2 9 1972

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 25 AUG 72 23

CITE DIRECTOR 306944

TO SANTO DOMINGO

21

REF SANTO DOMINGO 13099 (IN 694715)

1. BELOW ARE ILLUSTRATIVE TRACES HERBERT ITKIN (201-836808), PARTNER LAW FIRM ITKIN, ROBERTS, GREENBAUM, NEW YORK. REGISTERED AGENT FOR "HAITIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE" REPRESENTING LOUIS DEJOIE (201-240483) AND OTHER HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS 1963. REPORTEDLY FURNISHED MONEY TO GROUP INVADING HAITI AUG 63. A AND B ARE FOR STATION USE ONLY.

A. HAITIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE USED SUBJECT'S OFFICES IN NEW YORK CITY; SUBJ SAID HE MADE PERSONAL LOAN OF $15,000 TO DEJOIE. (DBA-63510, 19 FEB 64).

B. SUBJECT'S FORMER FATHER-IN-LAW CALLED WODISH, NEW YORK TO SAY SUBJ CLOSELY TIED TO BKCROWN, GIVING IT MUCH ASSISTANCE HAITI AND ELSEWHERE, IMPLYING SUBJ TRUSTED INFORMANT OR AGENT, NOT STAFF EMPLOYEE. WARNED BKCROWN SUBJ NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF DOUBTS RE RELIABILITY, DISCRETION, ABILITY TO MEET FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS, AND MENTAL EQUILIBRIUM. (WODISH MEMO, 15 FEB 66)

C. NEW YORK TIMES, 9 MARCH 68, REPORTED U.S. OFFICIAL DESCRIBED SUBJ AS UNDERCOVER AGENT WHO INFILTRATED ORGANIZED

(CONTINUED...)

AN
AB X
PS 4K
BX 4
DE3 RFD
FI

29 Aug 72

CS COPY

201-836808

D-22-2-20/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: ELISABETH VETTER:BA
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION SEP 5 9 32 AM '72
BY ____ PER ____ # ____
☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____
RECEIVED
IP/EDI
CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 366944

TO

CRIME, REPORTING REGULARLY TO LNERGO. ONE HIGH OFFICIAL SAID SUBJ RISKED HIS LIFE TO "STAND UP TO MAFIA." ARTICLE ALSO STATES SUBJ REGISTERED SEPT 63 AS FOREIGN AGENT DOM REP, MAKING NUMEROUS TRIPS THERE. (TM-ING COPY THIS ITEM.)"

D. WASHINGTON POST, 19 JULY 68, REPORTED SIX ALLEGED ASSOCIATES OF SUBJ, A KEY FIGURE IN JAMES L. MARCUS (FORMER NYC WATER COMMISSIONER) KICKBACK CASE, INDICATED CHARGES OF ANOTHER KICKBACK CONSPIRACY INVOLVING MORTGAGE APPLICATIONS MADE TO TEAMSTERS UNION PENSION FUND; TWO OF SIX ALLEGED ASSOCIATES IDENTIFIED AS MAFIA MEMBERS. SUBJ NOT INDICTED BUT NAMED IN FOUR OVERT ACTS CITED INDICTMENT.

E. NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 15 OCT 68, REPORTED SUBJ, LABOR LAWYER, TRYING HAVE HIS TRIAL MOVED FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT, CONTENDING HE ACTING AS LNERGO AND BKCROWN AGENT IN CONNECTION ABOVE CASE.

2. JULY 68 CHECK NUMEROUS BKCROWN COMPONENTS FAILED REVEAL ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN SUBJ AND BKCROWN.

3. FILE: 201-836808 AND 22-2-20/3. E 2 IMPDET

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: ELISABETH VETTER:ba
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S ~~E C R E T~~

CITE DIRECTOR 300944

TO

PAGE THREE

WH COMMENT: REQUESTED HQS TRACES SUBJ WHO ARRIVED DOM REP 22 AUG 72 FROM NEW YORK, PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING, AND RETURNED NEW YORK SAME DAY.

CI/EXO F.E. HUBBARD - IN DRAFT

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

William P. MacLean
WILLIAM P. MACLEAN
C/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

secret

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

US Army file ([illegible]) on
ITKIN.

To Itkin folder

9 June 71
(DATE)

RM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

PRIORITY

FILE WHEN INITIALLED

NAME CHECK REPORT - MPRC	DATE CHECKED 7 JUN 1971
SUBJECT ITKIN, Herbert	CASE NO. AND CATEGORY 544867-FDB-HRK.

NAME(S) FROM RECORD (No Middle Name)

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 19 NOV 1925 Richmond Hill, LI, N.Y.

ADDRESS (include date)
1738 48 St.
Brklyn, NY - (1/47)

SERVICE	RECORD	NR
ARMY	X	
NAVY		
AIR FORCE		
COAST GUARD		
USMC		

ACTIVE DUTY

	DATE (From-To)	SERIAL NO.	RANK	TYPE DISCHARGE
OFFICER	—		—	
ENLISTED	14 Feb 45 – 26 NOV 46	12 230 694	S SGT	Hon

MILITARY SPECIALTY OR CHIEF DUTIES Admin.	EVALUATIONS (Forms, etc.) Exc.
FOREIGN SERVICE (date from - to) 8/45 – 10/46	THEATRE APTO
EDUCATION (College, if shown) 1½ yrs – Cornell (44) / Brooklyn Coll (45)	CIVILIAN OCCUPATION Student

SECURITY CLEARANCES

		DATED	BASED ON	BY	COMPLETED ON
X	NONE INDICATED				
	SECRET				
	TOP SECRET				
	CRYPTOGRAPHIC				

COURT MARTIAL(S) X NONE ☐ YES (see remarks)

REMARKS – (Give details re court martials, disciplinary actions, special qualifications, language abilities, unusual info., decorations, citizenship, etc. Use extra page and/or add attachments if required.)

1) Mother: ~~E~~ ITKIN, Edythe
2) Good Cond. Med.

WILLIAM P. KOSTERMAN
Special Agent in Charge
7 JUN 1971

DISTRIBUTION				ATTACHMENTS	
HQS	ORIG X	ORIG & 1	OTHER X CC-CFO	YES	NO X

OUC

Herbert ITKIN

Date and Place of Birth: 19 Nov. 1926, Queens (also given as Jamaica, L.I., New York).

Description: 5'11". Brown hair. Brown eyes. (Photos in file).

Passports and Travel:

Ppt. B122634, issued 4 Jan. 1961. Renewed 11 Feb. 1964.

Ppt G097867, issued 14 Jan. 1966.

a. Was to depart NYC for UK, BOAC 506 o/a 14 Jan. '66. Had made 4 trips abroad in earlier 12 months.

b. Was to depart o/a 8 Jan. '61, UK & Western Europe. Two weeks vacation.

Father: Arthur ITKIN. Born 18 May 1901, Russia (also given as "Poland", 18 May 1900). US citizen (by naturalization? marriage?) Last stipulated residence: 118 Front St., Dublin, Ga (?) .

Mother: Edith HAVES, born 27 April 1907 (also given as "27 April 1905"). US citizen by birth.

Permanent Residences:

440 E. 79th St., NYC (Jan. 1966)

33 Greenwich Ave., NYC (Jan. 1964)

168 Rim Lane, Hicksville, New York (Jan. 1961)

Shelton Towers Hotel, Lexington Ave., NYC (Aug. 1966)

300 Madison Ave., NYC (Legal offices, 1965).

Marital Status/Spouse:

Adah Itkin, born 4 May 1925, married 12 Dec. 1963

Diana Kane, born 8 Feb. 1930

DEPT OF STATE PASSPORT APPLICATION

DATE: 14 JANUARY 1966

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: HERBERT ITKIN

14-00000

RH:

Zulu

Is there a current appl. for this person? If so, this c/B should be attached to it.

Jim 1/18

ITKIN HERBERT

Not in file yet 1/19/61 - Datchu

1/24/61

1/30/61

2/1/61

2-2-61

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EFERENCE SLIP

1-13-60

TO: NAME OR TITLE	ORGAN. SYMBOL	ROOM NO.	BLDG.	INITIALS	DATE
1. PT/RAF					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					

☐	APPROVAL	☐	NOTE AND FORWARD
☐	AS REQUESTED	☒	NOTE AND RETURN 4 copies
☐	COMMENT	☐	PER CONVERSATION
☐	FOR YOUR INFORMATION	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	INITIAL FOR CLEARANCE	☐	SEE ME
☐	NECESSARY ACTION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

Our records indicate ppt.
B122634 Issued 1-4-61

FROM (NAME AND ORGANIZATION) PT/NY	ROOM NO. AND BLDG.
SIGNATURE	PHONE NO.

TATE.
ENCY
CENTER
630 FIFTH AVENUE
EW YORK 20, NEW YORK

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PASSPORT OFFICE

1/4/61
B122634

IT5IN

NEW YORK PASSPORT AGENCY
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

Itkin, Herbert

Bureau of Records and Statistics **Department of Health** **The City of New York**

CERTIFICATION OF BIRTH

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Herbert Itkin

Sex Male was born in the City of New York on Nov. 19 1926

according to Birth Record No 11185 filed in the QUEENS

Office of this Bureau on Dec. 3, 1926

In witness whereof, the seal of the Department of Health of the City of New York has been affixed hereto this 4 day of Jan 1961

Carl L. Erhardt

Director of Bureau *Borough Registrar*

Q 60104

Warning: This certification is not valid if it has been altered in any way whatsoever or if it does not bear the raised seal of the Department of Health.

5411-115M 701361(59) 114

DISSEM BY 90

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE VR [illegible]

ACTION NO. 690

S E C R E T 232234Z AUG 72 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 13099

694715

DIRECTOR.

WOMUSE EMPYREX

1. EMPYREX LIAISON ADVISES HERBERT ITKIN ARRIVED SANTO DOMINGO 22 AUG 72 FROM NEW YORK PAA 235 PROHIBITED ENTRY AND RETURNED NEW YORK SAME DAY PAA 236. ITKIN BORN 19 NOV 26, NEW YORK, US PP B 1220178.

2. NO STATION TRACES. EMPYREX RECORDS INDICATE SUBJ BLACKLISTED BECAUSE HE ENGAGED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND HAS MAFIA CONNECTIONS. ACCORDING SAME FILE, NY TIMES REPORTED SUBJ PROVIDED INFO TO BKCROWN ON PERSONS IN DOMREP.

3. TRACES REQUESTED.

4. INDEX. FILE 201- , 22-2-20/3. E2 IMPDET WH-SISM.

S E C R E T

Coord: CI ~~CEO~~
CI/EXO

SECRET

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) **CURRENT CABLE**

FROM: RID/SD /17
1 D 17
DW-3

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. E/BC			W
2.			
3.			
4.			
5. DC/CI Office	8 JUN 1970	12 JUN 1970	✓ p
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.		ys	

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

TO: ACTION ADDRESSEE

1. Cables forwarded herewith have not been integrated into the CS record system.
2. If you feel they should be classified into a CS file, please indicate file number (and other necessary processing) and return to RID/SD, Room 1 D 17, TUBE: DW-3.

RETAIN: ______________
CS File Number

INDEXING: YES NO
(If yes, indicate names.)

3. If these cables do not require processing into the CS Records System, please destroy.

To 5: E/BC cable action turned over to Office of General Consul with DIRECTOR 035476, 19 May 70; with following from CI office DIR 037202. No file designation on either outgoing. Per telecom with DC/CI Secy forwarding RID cable for proper disposition on clandestine element. Particularly info that sheds some unfavorable publicity toward Agency.

D: We have this already don't we -?

Rp: Yes we have c/e cy. Shall I just file this in his 201 file?
D-

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED
GP 129 3-70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

30

c/EURS FILE, VR c/RI/SD c/CI c/FI2 DDP ADDP CSDO

c 513

S E C R E T 181745Z MAY 70 CITE LONDON 1613 (LAUTERBACH ACTING)
LOND

DIRECTOR

[illegible] 005508

RYBAT KEYWAY

1. SMOTH (SMUPROOT) EXPECTS BE ASKED BY HMG TO COMMENT ON ACCURACY LONDON TELEGRAPH ARTICLE 16 MAY TO EFFECT THAT MR. HERBERT ITKIN, AMERICAN LABOR LAWYER, WAS ON JKLANCE SECRET MISSION IN BRITAIN IN 1965. ARTICLE SAYS JKLANCE HAS FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED IN PAPER SUBMITTED TO NEW YORK SUPREME COURT THAT ITKIN WORKED AS AN AGENT IN BRITAIN AND THAT THIS ONLY SECOND TIME JKLANCE HAS PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN UNDERCOVER AGENT NOT OFFICIALLY ON JKLANCE PAYROLL (POWERS WAS FIRST).

2. ACCORDING LOCAL LNERGO, IT ACTUALLY HANDLED ITKIN IN LONDON AS INFORMANT ON CRIMINAL MATTERS IN 1965. JAGUAR AWARE OF THIS. HOWEVER, LOCAL LNERGO AS CONFUSED AS WE ARE AS TO ITKIN'S JKLANCE CONNECTION AT THAT TIME.

3. REQUEST HQS ADVISE WHAT WE MAY TELL SMOTH.

4. NO STATION RECORD ITKIN.

5. FILE DEFER.

18 May 70

CS COPY

GP-1

S E C R E T

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Holmes CI/R&A		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

We would appreciate confirmation at your earliest convenience ~~and~~ of a prior indication of G.'s response

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks: if one is forthcoming on the

Seen by John Greaney and John Warner. Neither has any problems with it.

questions concerning G's knowledge of HARBM. If ~~there is any question~~ ~~this dispatch~~ there is anything unclear in this ~~intent of this~~ dispatch is not clear, hqts would welcome any questions by cable.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
OGC	2/13/69

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions GPO : 1968 O - 297-542 (40)

[illegible]

TO Chief of Station, San Salvador		MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division	X	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WOMUSE		MICROFILM

SUBJECT

Interview of Mr. Luis E. GUTIERREZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See paragraph 1 below.

1. Your assistance is requested in interviewing the Salvadorian citizen, Luis E. GUTIERREZ, for information which would be helpful to this Government in determining the accuracy of certain claims made confidentially by Herbert L. ITKIN. Mr. ITKIN is a prime witness in legal proceedings presently underway in New York City involving the Mafia and related underworld organizations. ITKIN lives under the protection of U.S. Federal Marshals.

2. The following data is for your information. It should not be used in dealing with GUTIERREZ or outside of this Organization. ITKIN has been an FBI informant since March 1963. He has now claimed to have worked for this Organization during the period 1954/55 to 1960. ITKIN asserts that his contact during these years was one Philip HARBIN. This inquiry is concerned solely with ITKIN's claimed relationship with this Organization from 1954/55 to 1960 when he alleges HARBIN was his contact. As will be seen, GUTIERREZ, ITKIN alleges, also knew HARBIN during that time and that fact, therefore, is material to the credibility of ITKIN's story.

ITKIN's first contact with Philip HARBIN was in 1955 when he claims to have been contacted pursuant to a meeting he, ITKIN, had in Philadelphia with a leading personality of this Organization and another high-government official late in 1954 or early 1955. According to ITKIN, HARBIN never made the specific claim of being from this Organization but that was ITKIN's assumption.

ITKIN describes HARBIN as about 42 or 43 (in 1955), an American. He had receding hair, combed back but parted. He was about 5'8" in height,

Attachments:
As stated (2 copies)

Orig & 1 - COS, San Salvador

5 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HSSW-2742	14 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-836808

Dist:
2 - COS, Salvador w/a
1 - WH/2/ES&HD w/o
1 - CI/R&A w/a
1 - 201-836808 w/a

CI/R+A

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CI/R&A	R. B. Holmes	np	7468

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/2/ES&HD	14 Feb	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/2	14 FEB 1969	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66 (40)

DISPATCH

well-built with little evidence of fat. He always wore a vest. He spoke fluent Spanish and could have been of Polish or Russian family background. HARBIN always drank tea, never coffee. He appeared affluent with a professorial air about him.

Following an initial meeting, ITKIN alleges that he and HARBIN met periodically in New York City. ITKIN alleges that he passed to HARBIN copies of the correspondence developed by his law firm, Delson, Levin and Gordon, dealing with Indonesia, Burma, and India. ITKIN left that law firm in mid-1957, presumably thereby losing total access. Among the materials ITKIN claims he passed to HARBIN before he left the Delson, Levin and Gordon firm was information he picked up from a friend who worked at the United Nations for the Government of El Salvador. This friend was Luis E. GUTIERREZ (see biographic sketch, Attachment A). ITKIN claims that he became very friendly with GUTIERREZ, who was studying either at New York University or Columbia where he prepared a master's thesis on El Salvador's economic position. HARBIN, he says, was interested in the topic and ITKIN alleges he furnished HARBIN notes of GUTIERREZ' monograph.

Sometime presumably after mid-year 1957, HARBIN asked ITKIN if he knew anybody else who could do (intelligence) work. ITKIN recalled GUTIERREZ, who meanwhile had moved to the position as Consul General of El Salvador in New Orleans, Louisiana. HARBIN--ITKIN says--accepted the suggestion and ITKIN provided an introduction for HARBIN by letter, which he sent to GUTIERREZ in New Orleans. ITKIN asserts that HARBIN--according to his own statement--went to New Orleans and made the "new contact". ITKIN claims he last saw HARBIN in 1960.

3. A comparison between the key points of ITKIN's account as summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph with the data set out in Attachment A and E will show immediate contradictions that tend to destroy any credibility in ITKIN's account, particularly with respect to his relationship to GUTIERREZ. We also point out, solely for your information, that we have found no confirmation in our records of any relationship between this Organization and ITKIN during the period 1954-1960. No traces have been found in our records or anywhere in government thus far of a Philip HARBIN, and there is explicit denial that there was any meeting in Philadelphia in 1954 between ITKIN and the high officials he nominates. Finally, there is no substantiation in our files of any of the intelligence product which ITKIN allegedly passed to HARBIN. This case, however, is of such a nature that we must strive, if possible, to have GUTIERREZ' own statement for the record.

4. We leave to the Station determination of the best manner to approach GUTIERREZ. It is our preference that a Station officer, under suitable cover, perform the interview, but it may well be that a consular or embassy officer might be the best person to do the job. We repeat that we are concerned in this matter solely with the verification or denial of ITKIN's statements, specifically the allegation that he introduced HARBIN to GUTIERREZ in New Orleans and that as a consequence GUTIERREZ would be in a position to identify and describe HARBIN in a way that would permit us to locate him if he exists. The request for GUTIERREZ' assistance in this matter is in no way predicated upon hostility towards ITKIN nor is there any predisposition against his claims if indeed evidence is found to back them up. If GUTIERREZ indicates that he is willing to provide whatever information he can, you can assure him that his information is solely for U.S. Government use and will not be made public by us at any time without his expressed consent. Also, it is clear that we are prepared to accept his decision to give no assistance in the matter.

5. We have compiled a short statement that might be used by the interviewer to explain to GUTIERREZ the purpose of the interview (see Attachment B). A list of questions, which should be given orally, is elaborated in Attachment C. You will note that these questions concern the larger as well as narrower elements of GUTIERREZ' relations with ITKIN. We are willing to settle for a specific answer to the narrower question of Philip HARBIN in preference to generalizations about the whole relationship. If, as a consequence of your handling, GUTIERREZ is willing to talk in depth, we will be grateful.

6. Attachment D is a copy of a New York Times article concerning ITKIN and one of the completed federal cases in New York City. This item is attached for your background reading. This may be shown to GUTIERREZ, of course. Attachment E is a copy of a letter dated 26 February 1965 from GUTIERREZ to ITKIN. Again, the content of this letter tends to support the theory that ITKIN's story, as elaborated in paragraph 2 above, is a fabrication. While possibly based on a real relationship, it appears to be a fabrication with respect to chronology and with respect to the exact mutual interests involved. Also included in this attachment is ITKIN's answer to the letter. We feel in retrospect that GUTIERREZ might be unhappy to read his own letter in the course of a consular interview. We, therefore, suggest that this not be shown to him. However, there is no objection to an indication that the U.S. Government is aware that GUTIERREZ was in perfectly correct correspondence with ITKIN during 1965 on business matters.

7. We would appreciate compliance at your earliest convenience and a preliminary indication by cable of GUTIERREZ' response, if one is forthcoming, on the questions concerning GUTIERREZ' knowledge of HARBIN. If there is anything unclear in this dispatch, Headquarters would welcome any questions by cable. All correspondence should be addressed Chief, WOMUSE, via Chief, WH.

James R. Rumsey

SECRET/RYBAT

Attachment A to HSSW-2742

GUTIERREZ, Luis Enerique

Born in San Salvador, El Salvador, on 15 July 1916; son of Luis and Concepcion G.; B. Commerce from Sir George Williams University, 1948; M.A. from New York University, 1951; Ph.D. in Economics, University of San Salvador, 1959; married Lydia DIAZ on 21 September 1940; one daughter, Maria Marta; vice consul of El Salvador in Montreal, 1944-1949; consul in New York City, 1949-1952; consul general, New Orleans, 1952-1958 (30 December 1952-3 April 1958)*; supt. banks and corporations, El Salvador, 1958-1961; general manager inversiones commerciales, 1961 - present; professor of economics, University of El Salvador, 1958 - present; commissioner, City of San Salvador, 1964 - present; served to first lieutenant, Salvadorian Army, 1933 - 1939; member of American Economists Association, Association of Salvadorian Economists; home: 83 avenida Norte 619; office: Apartado Postal 1144, San Salvador, El Salvador.

Who's Who in Commerce and Industry, 1968-1969, page 558.

* Foreign Consular Offices in United States, 1954 through 1959.

14-00000

SECRET/RYBAT

Attachment B to HSSW-2742

Suggested Statement to GUTIERREZ

I understand you have a friend named Herbert ITKIN, a lawyer, now living in New York. Mr. ITKIN is under the protection of United States authorities because he is the prime witness in very significant legal cases presently pending before the Federal court in New York City. Mr. ITKIN, in private testimony to U.S. authorities, has indicated that you were a friend of his; he met you in New York while you were at the United Nations. He has also indicated that sometime in 1957 he sent a letter of introduction to you in New Orleans, presenting one Philip HARBIN whom ITKIN claims did go to New Orleans and introduced himself to you. Your answers to questions relating to the above would be of great help to the U.S. Government in determining the veracity of ITKIN's statements.

SECRET/RYBAT

H/Watt to HSSW-2742

201-836808

SECRET/RYBAT

Attachment C to HSSW-2742

Questions to be presented orally to Luis E. GUTIERREZ

Would you describe the circumstances leading to your introduction to Mr. Herbert ITKIN and the nature of your contacts with Mr. ITKIN? When did you first meet Mr. ITKIN? Where were you working at the time? What was your position?

What school or university were you attending at the time? For what degree were you preparing? In what subject? What subject did you use for your thesis? Did you show it to ITKIN and/or did you give him a copy?

Did you continue to maintain contact with him after your departure from New York? Do you still maintain correspondence with him? When did you last have contact with Mr. ITKIN?

In 1957 or 1958 did you receive a letter from Mr. ITKIN introducing a Philip HARBIN?

Did a man named Philip HARBIN come to New Orleans and introduce himself to you? Did he have a letter of introduction from Mr. ITKIN? (How did he represent himself, i.e., whom did he represent?) Would you describe Philip HARBIN? Would you describe your first meeting with Philip HARBIN? What subjects were covered? How long were contacts maintained? When were they terminated? For what reason?

SECRET/RYBAT

COPY

H/W att # 3 to HSSW-2742 201-836808

Attachment E to HSSW-2742

DR. LUIS E. GUTIERREZ
ECONOMISTA

APDO. POSTAL [illegible]
TELEFONO No. [illegible]

SAN SALVADOR,
EL SALVADOR, C. A.

February 26,1965.

Mr. Herbert Itkin,
300 Madison Ave.,
New York City, N.Y.

Dear Herby:

It was a real good surprice to receive your letter of February 15, 1965. I had written you twice in the last three years, and I had no answer. I went to New York to the C.I.O. Convention in September 1963; then I looked for you every where, but I found you nowhere. So I realized that you had disapeared from New York and moved to another place. But what a relief now;; You still are in the Empire State kicking around and thinking about your old friends.

As you probably remember we do not see each other since 1952. Let me give you a rough breifing on what happens during this time. In November 1952 I was appointed Consul General of El Salvador at New Orleans; in 1958 I resigned and came back to my country and was appointed Comptroler of the Bank Inspecting Bureau; then in 1960 I was appointed General Director of the Social Security Bureau. then in 1961 I moved to private business as General Manager of INVERSIONES COMERCIALES, S.A., a small insurance company. Among some of my present extra activities, I am: a) member of the City Government (City Commissioner); b) member of theAdvisory Board of the Central Bank and c) Professor of Economics and Business Management at the School of Engineering of the University of El Salvador.

Although, as you can see, I am in the High Brass category I belong at the same time to the low income bracket group. For that reason I have been looking for a more juicy business, but so far I have found nothing. That is why I would say you are just on time offering me to do some business with you. I hope you will write and tell me more about what you have in mind. Also I will be waiting for you in April or any other time; the sooner the better.

There is something else I must tell you. I want to go back to New York and I need your help very badly. You know that in order to work in the States one must have a resident visa and to obtained such visa one must have an affidavit from an American Citizen. Could you be so kind giving me such a help? I hope you will say YES.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,
Luis

H/W att. #5 to HSSW-2742

CS COPY

201-836808

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 300 Madison Avenue
(14th Floor)

March 2, 1965

Dr. Luis E. Gutierrez
APDO, POSTAL 1144
San Salvador, Central America

Dear Luis:

I will plan to see you in April and will let you know a few weeks before.

I am sure that we will be able to work out something together that will be to our mutual benefit in getting you back to America.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Itkin

HI:gtc

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MARCH 2, 1968

U.S. Officials Say Itkin Was an Agent, Reporting to F.B.I.

ITKIN AN INFORMER WHO HELPED F.B.I., U.S. OFFICIALS SAY

Figure in Marcus Case Said to Have Risked Life to 'Stand Up to Mafia'

By BARNARD L. COLLIER

Herbert Itkin, one of six persons indicted in the Marcus kick-back scandal, has been described by Federal officials as an undercover agent who infiltrated the world of organized crime and reported regularly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Itkin, now under 24-hour armed guard by Federal marshals, is to be the Government's key witness in a Federal conspiracy case. He is a co-defendant along with former Water Commissioner James L. Marcus; a reputed Mafia leader, Antonio (Tony Ducks) Corallo; Henry Fried, owner of a New York construction company; Daniel J. Motto a union leader, and Charles J. Rappaport, a former law partner of Mr. Itkin.

Mr. Itkin—called one of the most important Government informers in recent years—is described as having provided undercover information to the F.B.I. while he engaged in numerous private business ventures around the world.

There is no solid information on his motives for becoming an informer. However, one high Federal official has called the 41-year-old Manhattan lawyer a "strange" man who risked his life to "stand up to the Mafia."

An Element in Other Cases

Federal officials disclosed that Mr. Itkin was providing the Government with large quantities of "inside" information on underworld characters and their dealings. He is a potential witness, they say, in numerous criminal cases apart from the Marcus affair.

These cases are said to involve labor racketeering, gambling, bribery, income-tax evasion and a whole range of other frauds at the city, state and federal levels, some with international dimensions.

The story of Mr. Itkin's activities as an undercover agent was pieced together by The New York Times—and then confirmed by Government officials—after extensive interviews and a search of public and private documents and letters in New York, Washington, the Caribbean area and elsewhere.

Along with his activities as an undercover agent, Mr. Itkin was involved in numerous international business ventures.

Some of His Involvements

His associations and business dealings—at least those indicated by the available documents and by people who are willing to talk about him—show that his involvement was not only with Mafia figures like Corallo and public figures like Mr. Marcus, but with politicians in the Dominican Republic, coup-minded exiles from Haiti, businessmen in Miami, union officials in New York and Detroit, and gamblers in London.

Investigations are already proceeding on the basis of in-

Continued on Page 35, Column 2

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

[illegible] Mr. Itkin has provided. Federal officials say they are hopeful that the inquiries will enable them to obtain several indictments in the near future.

Government officials would not specify whether Mr. Itkin was a paid or unpaid informant.

Government officials are quick to point out, however, that Mr. Itkin, despite his free-spending ways over the last several years, did not, as far as is known, amass a lot of money from his business activities.

"In fact," said one Federal official, "he is damned near broke, his family life is in a mess, he can't practice law and he can't do anything but wait it all out."

Concern has been expressed by some high Government officials about a disclosure of Mr. Itkin's background.

"There are many people," said one official, "who would like to discredit Mr. Itkin as a witness in this [Marcus] case and in other cases that might be made."

Edward Bennett Williams, the Washington lawyer who is representing Mr. Marcus in the conspiracy case, said he could not comment on the disclosure of Mr. Itkin's role.

Also of concern, some Government officials say, is Mr. Itkin's personal safety.

"But we are going to preserve him in good health until he can testify," one official said. Federal investigative agents say privately that Mr. Itkin had already been the target of an alleged murder plot for which two Long Island men are now under Federal indictment, although he has never been officially identified as the intended victim.

In a development of this aspect yesterday, Federal Judge Marvin E. Frankel ordered the Government to disclose officially who the murder target was. The indictment did not name anyone as the intended victim.

Identification Due Soon

Assistant United States Attorney Robert G. Morvillo said he would identify the alleged victim next week to the lawyers for two men indicted in the murder plot.

The two under indictment are Robert Schwartz, 43, a lawyer, of Huntington Station, L. I., and Robert Roden, 39, of Uniondale, L. I., a carpenter. No motive has ever been ascribed to the alleged plot, but it is said that it had nothing to do with the Marcus kickback case.

Judge Frankel also ordered that the Government name the city or other place where the two men or "collaborators carried on any activities connected with 'arranging the murder' as charged in the indictment," and the names of any persons who allegedly collaborated or conspired in "arranging the murder."

Mr. Itkin's relationship with Mr. Marcus, as far as is now known, was as a friend, business partner and his personal lawyer. City Hall officials say that Mr. Marcus introduced Mr. Itkin to other commissioners and city officials as "my lawyer."

According to some of these commissioners, Mr. Itkin made attempts afterward to meet and discuss business matters with them.

Mayor Lindsay has said that every city official who came into more than casual contact with Mr. Marcus or Mr. Itkin has reported in full to city investigators.

Mr. Itkin has been under protective custody since shortly after he was arrested by the F.B.I. last Dec. 18 in connection with the Marcus case. Aside from Federal and local law-enforcement officials, only a few close friends know his whereabouts.

People who have spoken recently to Mr. Itkin describe him as extremely nervous. His second wife is under guard with him.

Several of Mr. Itkin's friends have described him as confident that when the Marcus case comes to trial his "real role" as an undercover agent will be made clear.

'Won't Be a Defendant'

"I won't be a defendant when the case comes up," Mr. Itkin is quoted as having told a friend. "I didn't do anything. I didn't have to do it to keep from being suspect."

His current status as a defendant in the Marcus case could be changed before the trial and the charges against him could be dropped, Federal officials say.

Mr. Itkin has also told close friends that within the last five years he provided information to the Central Intelligence Agency on the activities of persons in the Dominican Republic, where he often traveled, and in Haiti, where he is also known to have had dealings.

A spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency denied that there was anything about Mr. Itkin in its files.

Mr. Itkin appears to have been many things to many people. To some lawyers who knew him he was, as one put it, "brilliant in his law practice." Another described the swarthy, well-dressed Brooklyn Law School graduate as "formal, retiring, not one to seek the spotlight."

Called a 'Fast Talker'

But a friend describes him as "a fast-talking guy, a fast-thinking guy, who said he knew everybody and could make a deal in the blink of an eye." He added: "He was always on a jet going somewhere—to London, Geneva, Rome, Santo Domingo, Haiti, Puerto Rico."

Many people regard Mr. Itkin as a specialist in labor law, but several labor leaders and mediators say they know little of his activities for unions.

It was the highly publicized Marcus case, a scandal that stunned Mayor Lindsay's administration, that first brought Mr. Itkin to wide public attention.

He was charged in a Federal indictment, along with Mr. Marcus, Corallo and others, with being part of a scheme whereby 5 per cent of an emergency contract awarded without bidding by the Department of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity would be paid as a kickback.

The contract, estimated at $[illegible], was awarded to S. T. Grand, Inc., which is owned by Mr. Fried and his family. It called for the cleaning and refurbishing of the Jerome Park Reservoir in the Bronx.

The indictment charges that Mr. Fried and his company paid Mr. Marcus 2 per cent of the total contract price, and gave 1 per cent each to Mr. Itkin, Mr. Motto, and Corallo.

It further charges that the conspiracy began on or about Jan. 1, 1966—eight months before Mr. Marcus became Water Commissioner on Sept. 1 and 10 months before Mr. Marcus awarded the contract to S. T. Grand.

At the same time the alleged conspiracy began, Mr. Marcus was acting as an unpaid mayoral assistant—he took responsibility for water department business and Mr. Itkin was his lawyer and partner in several joint ventures.

On Jan. 11 the case took its bizarre murder twist when the F.B.I. arrested Mr. Roden on charges of trying to buy the murder—for $2,500, a Federal official said then—of an unidentified witness in the Marcus affair. Mr. Itkin was said then to have been that witness.

Four days later, Mr. Schwartz, the Long Island lawyer, was arrested in Manhattan as a participant in the same alleged murder conspiracy. He was charged with being involved in an attempt to murder "a witness and defendant" in the Marcus case.

Exactly a month after the Federal kickback indictment was obtained by United States Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, both Mr. Marcus and Mr. Itkin were arrested for the second time on a warrant by District Attorney Frank S. Hogan.

They were charged with having accepted a $10,000 bribe as a down payment on any emergency contracts that a company called Vintray Enterprises, Inc., might receive from Mr. Marcus's department.

Scarcity of Documents

There are very few public documents in which Mr. Itkin's name appears. And even what is available only serves to deepen the mystery surrounding his career.

On Sept. 16, 1963, for example, Mr. Itkin filed with a form with the Justice Department to register himself as a foreign agent of the Dominican Republic.

He declared that his purpose was to act for a Coral Gables, Fla., company called Westrade, Inc., in efforts "to negotiate on behalf of the Dominican Republic and bank or brokerage company in the United States, a bond issue in the amount of $35-million to extend over a period of 15 years."

Westrade, Inc., described as

a concern that dealt in the export of furniture and the production of prefabricated buildings, has since gone bankrupt and was formally dissolved last year for nonpayment of Florida state taxes.

Despite the filed registration, the company's former president, a Haitian-born Miami businessman named Robert Deschamps, denies that Mr. Itkin was ever authorized to represent him or the company.

"I spoke to him exactly twice," Mr. Deschamps said recently. "Once in New York and once in Miami in either late 1961 or early 1962. He was sent to me, I recall, by Louis Dejoie [a Haitian political exile who opposed the Haitian President, François Duvalier]. He said he had met Dejoie in the Dominican Republic.

"We talked first in a hotel in Miami and he told me he could get us financing from a union pension fund—I think he said the teamsters, or maybe the teachers union. I told him to see what he could do and we'd discuss it again."

"Then I went to New York," Mr. Deschamps said, "and saw him in his office. I was put off by him right away. One thing was, he opened a black cabinet behind his desk and I saw a secret telephone and a nightstick. I had done some checking on him and I didn't like all the secrecy business."

Can't Recall '$2,000 Fee'

Mr. Deschamps insists that the New York meeting was the last he had with Mr. Itkin, and that he is completely unaware of any agreement between Mr. Itkin and Westrade, Inc.

As for a $2,000 fee that Mr. Itkin stated in the registration form that he received from Westrade, Inc.: "Perhaps that was for some expenses he might have had, but I don't remember paying it," Mr. Deschamps said.

Mr. Itkin was also registered as a foreign agent for the Provisional Government of the Republic of Haiti in San Juan, P.R. This exile group was headed by Mr. Dejoie.

In an agreement filed with the registration and dated May, 1963, Mr. Itkin was to be paid an annual retainer of $50,000 for a period of two years—"immediately due and owing as soon as the said Provisional Government becomes the de facto or de jure Government of the Republic of Haiti and Haitian Territory."

The records indicate that the relationship between Mr. Itkin and the Haitian group was terminated in September, 1964, and that instead of getting his retainer, Mr. Itkin personally lent Mr. Dejoie $15,000 for unstated purposes.

Mr. Dejoie was unavailable for comment, but Haitian exiles, who asked not to be identified, said that during the time the registration was in effect Mr. Dejoie was often in the Dominican Republic, and was active in one abortive attempt in 1963 to invade Haiti across the Dominican frontier.

A Washington public-relations man, who also asked not to be named, said that during that same period Mr. Itkin met with him [illegible] in New York [illegible] the possibility [illegible] arms and developing a clandestine organization to help overthrow the Duvalier regime in Haiti.

In the years since, Mr. Itkin's contacts in the Dominican Republic have been maintained, and records show that he traveled to Santo Domingo numerous times up until his indictment last fall.

Dominican 'Mission'

According to businessmen, Mr. Itkin made about 20 visits to the Dominican Republic in 1965, beginning shortly after the civil war broke out in April of that year.

A close friend said Mr. Itkin described his trips to Santo Domingo as "missions" having to do with United States efforts to bring stability to the war-torn country.

It is not clear exactly when Mr. Itkin first became involved with Corallo, the reputed Mafia figure, but federal officials say it was before 1965 and after 1961.

The officials confirm that Mr. Itkin traveled with Corallo to London—a city Mr. Itkin visited often—in 1966, when the British Government refused to permit Corallo to remain. The reported cause of Corallo's ouster was that he was trying to gain control of some of England's legal gambling casinos for Mafia "families" in the United States.

John F. Malone, assistant director in charge of the F.B.I.'s New York office, said he would not comment on any aspect of the Marcus case. United States Attorney Morgenthau was unavailable for comment.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Newspaper Argicle on Herbert Itkin

On 22 October 1968, the attached article from the 15 October 1968 edition of the New York Daily News concerning James Marcus and Herbert Itkin was shown in a low key to Mr. Edward Long, Country Director ARA/CAR, by Mr. Paul V. Harwood, Chief, WH/7. Mr. Long expressed no interst in the article.

Bob Berg
WH/7/Ht

CONFIDENTIAL

New York Daily News
15 October 1968

Marcus Sentencing Put Off

The sentencing of former city Water Commissioner James L. Marcus on state charges of bribery was put off yesterday for two months pending developments in the related case of labor lawyer Herbert Itkin.

Marcus, 37, is serving a federal term for conspiracy to obtain a $10,000 kickback on a job bid. He was to have been sentenced in Manhattan Supreme Court on charges for which he had been indicted with Itkin. Marcus pleaded guilty.

Sentencing was put off until Dec. 18 to await the outcome of Itkin's effort to have his trial moved from state to federal court. Itkin contends he was acting as an agent for the FBI and CIA when he committed the alleged criminal acts. Itkin's trial in state Supreme Court is tentatively set for Nov. 6.

Note:

[illegible]

[illegible] Marcus on state charges of [illegible] Supreme Court [illegible] was put off yesterday [illegible] for two months pending developments in the [illegible] of [illegible] Hahn.

Marcus, 37, is serving a [illegible] for conspiracy [illegible] a jail [illegible]. He was [illegible] sentenced in Manhattan Supreme Court on charges for which he had been indicted with [illegible] Marcus [illegible].

Sentencing was put off [illegible] fight to have his [illegible] moved from state to federal court. [illegible] he was acting as an agent for the FBI.

Note:

Reminder: do you Oliver this or does Harwood Long it?
(He prefers the latter.)
JH

c/WH 7

Long it
B

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, WH/FI

SUBJECT : Herbert Itkin (201-[illegible])

1. There has been no Agency contact with ITKIN. Ray ROCCA, C/CI/R&A stated that CI Staff definitely never was in contact with him. Ray ROCCA's source of info on the DEJOIE-Max BOLTE-ITKIN & Company, activities was Max BOLTE and not ITKIN.

2. Offices checked for possible contact, all of which proved negative, were: Office of Security, Domestic Contacts Service, Domestic Operations Division, CA/3, CA/4, WH/7 and CI/R & A.

3. On 13 May 1963 ITKIN reported to DIA in San Juan the results of his meeting with DEJOIE, BOLTE, FIGNOLE and Luc STEPHEN in their formation of the Provisional Haitian Government in Exile formed in San Juan on 12 May & that ITKIN had been hired by that group as its Attorney. On 10 June 1963 ITKIN registered with the Department of State as a Foreign Agent for this group adding that he made a personal loan to DEJOIE of $15,000.

4. A 22 May 1963 Memorandum of Conversation from the Department of State sets forth the results of an informal meeting (possibly held on 28 April 1963) attended by Forrest E. ABBUHL (Officer in Charge, Haitian Affairs, State ARA/CRA), DEJOIE, BOLTE, a (fnu) BRODIE, and ITKIN, in which DEJOIE expressed his political views, asked for U.S. support for an invasion of Haiti, U.S. recognition of the Provisional Government in Exile, etc.

5. Appropriate documents substantiating above are herewith attached.

James T. O. Braafladt

James T. O. Braafladt
C/WH/7/CI

19 July 1968

Cs in 201's f:
Dejoie
Fignole
Bolte
[illegible]

201-[illegible]

18-19 July 1968

Herbert ITKIN (201-[illegible])

Security (Frederick [illegible])
Security has checked this name out many times & still comes up NEGATIVE on any Agency connections

Domestic Contact Service (2000) (Sucharo)
No contact w/ DCS. In 1966 ITKIN's (former) father-in-law (E. Kent KANE, a prominent attorney in Pennsylvania, Republican politician & close to Hugh SCOTT) called DCS in N.Y. asking if ITKIN was affiliated in any way w/ CIA as ITKIN bragging of being agent for CIA. DCS says that for years ITKIN has bragged of being agent or informer for CIA, but he is not.

Domestic Operations (John MARKHAM)
No record of any contact.

CA/4 - Labor - ([illegible])
No record of any contact. However, since info in D.J.O.C file indicates some Haitians were involved w/ ORIT - CA/4 will check w/ an ORIT asset over weekend & will advise Manley 22 July of any possible connection of ITKIN with ORIT.

CA/3 (Glenn [illegible])
No record of any contact with ITKIN.

CI/[illegible] Ray Rocca - No contact with ITKIN whatsoever by WH Division or CI/R&A. CI/R&A [illegible] 201-836808

14-00000

ITKIN, Herb

Eric Eisenstadt of Funding Branch reported on 1 Apr 68 that he found a piece of paper which said that subject was once registered as a Duvalier agent. WH/7/HT checked with State who in turn checked with Mr. Lanvin of Registration Section of Justice who said there is no record of Itkin as ever having been a Duvalier registered agent. In Jan 63 he registered as a representative of the Dejoie-Fignole provisional government in exile and was to have been paid $50,000 when this government took power. No further info.

ITKIN, Herbert

JMWAVE [illegible] —ordered
[illegible]
1 [illegible] 1968

Louis Dejoie [illegible] Herbert Itkin, 103 Park Ave, NY [illegible] contact for funds against Duvalier. Dejoie stated Itkin previously gave Dejoie $200,000 and [illegible] provide additional financial [illegible] future date (JMWAVE [illegible], 2 July 1968) —ordered

Unbelievable that Itkin gave Dejoie $200,000. In 1961 Dejoie still had enough following so that if he had that kind of money he would have upset the [illegible]

ITKIN, Herb

New York Lawyer and friend of Ambassador [illegible]. [illegible] called desk to advise [illegible] Wayne Carley (formerly of WH/3) [illegible] the ambassador that [illegible] subject had advised the ambassador that [illegible] revolutionary undertaking would take place in Haiti on [illegible] in Aug. Mr. Carley did not know what subject's connections with [illegible] matters is not the source of his info. Desk Comment: Nothing happened.) Source: Harold C. [illegible] Date 1[illegible] Aug 67.

Article about subject appeared in the New York Times on 13 January 1968. Described as a superb story teller, fast mover and wheeler. Article filed in 100-9-16.

ITKIN, Herbert   HAITI

Subj , under the Foreign Agents Registration [illegible] as follows.

Foreign agent for Provisional [illegible] Government of the Republic of Haiti San Juan, Puerto Rico . Had various [illegible] with Mr. Louis DEJOIE who was Leader of the Provisional Government. On [illegible] 1963 made personal loan of $500,00 to Louis DEJOIE (Chairman Prov Gov't of the Republic of Haiti - San Juan , Puerto Rico.)

ATTENTION 203 Park Avenue, N.Y. 10017

Residence 33 Greenwich Avenue, NY.NY.

[illegible]
12 Oct 1964
Filed: [illegible]

C1/R+A

201-836818
201-[illegible]

1

Washington Post
19 July '68

N.Y. Jury Indicts 6 in Marcus Kickback Case

NEW YORK, July 18 (UPI)—A Federal grand jury indicted today six alleged associates of attorney Herbert Itkin, key figure in the Marcus kickback case, on charges of another kickback conspiracy involving mortgage applications made to the Teamsters' Union pension fund.

U.S. Atty. Robert Morgenthau identified two of the defendants, Salvatore Granello, 45, and James Plumeri, 65, both of New York, as members of the Mafia. Their codefendants were David Wenzer, 57, Great Neck, N.Y.; John Kielly, 37, Oyster Bay Cove, N.Y., and Hyman Levine, 58, of Coral Gables, Fla., and Leonard Russo, 45, of Larchmont, N.Y.

Itkin was not indicted but was named in each of four overt acts cited in the indictment.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1968

6 LINKED TO ITKIN INDICTED BY U.S.

Accused of Kickback Plot Involving Teamster Fund

By MARTIN TOLCHIN

Six men linked to Herbert Itkin — the key Government informant in the James Marcus kickback case — were indicted yesterday by a Federal grand jury in an alleged kickback conspiracy involving a teamster union pension fund.

Itkin was not indicted, but was named in most of the overt acts charged in the indictment, and he appeared to be the unifying figure in the conspiracy.

Itkin, who was an informant for the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified in Federal Court that he had paid off teamster officials and criminals to arrange loans from the fund on behalf of individuals and corporations.

Itkin did not name the persons who allegedly received the payoffs. However, Government officials indicated privately that the indictment—and three previous indictments involving teamster pension funds — had resulted from Itkin's information.

Construction Involved

Yesterday's indictment charged that the six men had participated in a scheme to get a $1,350,000 mortgage for Big Value Discount Department Stores, Inc., of 24 West 25th Street, for the construction of three discount centers in Pompano Beach, Cocoa and Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

Robert M. Morgenthau, United States Attorney, said that the men had obtained a tentative mortgage commitment from the Central States Southwest and Southeast Areas Pension Fund of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, based in Chicago. Mr. Morgenthau added, however, that the loan never was made.

This was the fourth indictment involving the pension fund since May. Three of the

201-536808

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTER' USE O... ☐ CONFIDEN AL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
LIGrant/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO:

DATE: 12 March 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CCS/Funding Mr. Erich Isenstead	13 MAR 1968			Attached is copy of the letter our New York office sent to Kune in answer to his inquiry re ITKIN.
2.				13 Mar: 1 cy: DC/WH Mr. Goodwin
3.				

P.O. Box 1294
Grand Central Station
New York 17, New York
February 18, 1966

Mr. E. Kent Kane
R. D. #1
Kane, Pennsylvania

Dear Mr. Kane:

While in New York on February 15, 1966 on your way to Florida, you phoned me to inquire about a New York attorney. You will recall that I promised to make some inquiries and communicate the results to you. Please be advised that the gentleman in question is not affiliated or connected with my colleagues or myself.

I regret I was unable to convey this information to you prior to your departure from New York.

Very sincerely yours,

W. L. Freund

WLFreund:mae

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Inquiry Concerning CIA Connection of Herbert Itkin, New York Lawyer

FROM:
Lillian I. Grant/js
CCS/Operational Support Staff
34 900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2203

NO. CS 3051

DATE: 5 March 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CCS/Funding Mr. Erich Isenstead	8 MAR 1968			Per our conversation, attached is copy of our file record re: Mr. Herbert Itkin. This office has no record of direct contact with Itkin at any time.
2.				
3.				
4.				1 copy to CI/LPGLOBE 11 MAR 1968
5.				1 copy To JC/NH
6.				1 copy To Mr. Gaagwin

CONFIDENTIAL

NY 104-66
15 February 1966

FOR : Director, Domestic Contact Service
C. Delaney

Chief, New York Field Office

Inquiry Concerning CIA Connection of Herbert ITKIN, New York Lawyer

1. A call received on the listed telephone of the New York Office on the afternoon of 15 February 1966 concerned claims by Herbert Itkin, a lawyer now practicing in New York City, to the effect that he was closely tied in to the CIA.

2. The call was made by Mr. E. Kent Kane, R.D. #1, Kane, Pennsylvania. Mr. Kane is a prominent attorney in Pennsylvania, Naval Reserve Officer (USNR 192547), a Republican politician who gave the present Governor and Senator Hugh Scott as references.

3. Herbert Itkin is a former son-in-law of Mr. Kane's. Itkin allegedly claimed that he had been of considerable assistance to CIA in Haiti and elsewhere. The implication was that he was a trusted CIA informant or agent, not a staff employee.

4. Mr. Kane contacted this office for two specific reasons:

(a) He wanted to warn CIA that Itkin was not at this time a desirable CIA contact because of doubts concerning his reliability, discretion, ability to meet his financial obligations, and mental equilibrium.

(b) He (Kane) did not wish to proceed any further in pursuing his (unspecified) course of action against Itkin if there were any substance to Itkin's claims. Put in another way, Kane is planning to take some action against his former son-in-law, and he wants to disprove the latter's claims of some CIA affiliation or backing before proceeding further.

5. Mr. Kane phoned the New York office from a room at the Hotel Drake, New York City, prior to his departure for

CONFIDENTIAL

NY 104-66

15 February 1966

Florida. He thought perhaps this office could clear up his problem. Recently, Itkin phoned Kane from New York and put on an alleged CIA staffer, who identified himself only as "Charley" and who dutifully confirmed Itkin's great value to the Agency. Kane is suspicious of the whole business.

6. We explained that it would take some time to have our headquarters check this out. Although Kane would have liked an immediate response, he agreed that a written advice to his Kane, Pennsylvania, address within two weeks would satisfy him. Such a reply could be quite cryptic and need not be signed. We assumed that it would originate in Washington rather than in New York. Mr. Kane did not ask for our name and was given no name.

Jay B. L. Reeves

WLFreund:mac

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FROM 26

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI

SECRET 292324Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1469 —ADDED: C/WH 6 VR

DIRECTOR

IN 61161 m

RYBAT JMOCEAN

REF: JMWAVE 1464 (IN 61103)

FOLLOWING TRACES SUBJECTS LISTED IN PARA 3 REF:

1. ROBERT DESCHAMPS (201-748946), HAITIAN EXILE AND OWNER OF WESTRADE IMPORT-EXPORT COMPANY, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA; SUPPLIED HAITIAN EXILES WITH ARMS; ASSISTED BY BUSINESS ASSOCIATE LOUIS DEJOIE (201-242483), CONTACT OF EVLUCID FEBRUARY 1964. (UFGA-14392, 2 MAR 64; UFGA-17300, 17 AUG 64; UFG-6428, 29 DEC 64) LNERGO TRACES INDICATE HE BORN 25 NOV 28, ST MARC, HAITI; ARRIVED IN U.S. AS PERMANENT RESIDENT 28 JAN 60, RESIDED 5010 SAN AMARO DRIVE, CORAL GABLES. GENERAL REPUTATION: GOOD. INTERVIEWED BY LNERGO IN DEC 1961 IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT WITH HAITIAN EXILE GROUP, PATRI. STATED HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF PATRI AND WHILE SYMPATHETIC WITH THE AIMS OF THE HAITIAN EXILES AND DESIROUS OF SEEING A DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN HAITI, WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE FUNDS OR OTHERWISE INVOLVE HIMSELF IN HAITIAN POLITICAL MATTERS. DESCRIBED AS A MAN OF MEANS WHOSE NET WORTH WAS APPROXIMATELY

SECRET

PAGE-2 JMWAVE 1469 SECRET
$500,000. LNERGO CLOSED CASE ON 29 DEC 61.

2. ROBERT LEGER: HAITIAN COMMUNIST, SECRETARY FOR LOUIS DEJOIE AND ASSOCIATE OF ROBERT DESCHAMPS (WAVE 6104, 16 DEC 64; EVLANE/4 CONTACT REPORT 3 JAN 66) (201-727690). LNERGO TRACES INDICATE HE BORN 16 FEB 30, PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI. OCTOBER 1961 RESIDED AT 5840 SW 93RD COURT, MIAMI AND WAS TRAVELING SALESMAN FOR WESTRADE, INC. JANUARY 1962 WAS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF WESTRADE, INC. INTERVIEWED BY LNERGO AND STATED HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY HAITIAN EXILES BUT DID NOT PLAN TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH THEM. LNERGO CLOSED CASE 13 JULY 62. (SISTER, LISA LEGER, ALSO WORKED FOR WESTRADE.)

3. LOUIS DEJOIE (201-240483): FORMER HAITIAN SENATOR BORN 23 FEB 96, AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. SINCE EARLY 60'S EXILE LEADER PLOTTING AGAINST DUVALIER, TRAVELS EXTENSIVELY. ARRIVED MIAMI JULY 1964 AND BECAME ASSOCIATED WITH EVLUCID-1. BUSINESS ASSOCIATE OF ROBERT DESCHAMPS (WAVE 8541, 8792, 8916 (1964), UFGA 17300, 21374, 22527). LNERGO TRACES INDICATE HE REPUTED TO BE INVOLVED IN HAITIAN ACTIVITIES IN OCTOBER 1958 AND RESIDED 16 E. 96TH STREET, NEW YORK CITY

IN JUNE 1964 WAS INTERVIEWED BY LNERGO AT HOME OF ROBERT DESCHAMPS, 5150 GRANADA BLVD., CORAL GABLES, DISCLAIMED ANY INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-DUVALIER ACTS. OCTOBER 1964 WAS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AS A SALES MANAGER FOR WESTRADE, INC. LNERGO CLOSED CASE DECEMBER 1964.

4. BUENAVENTURA (SANCHEZ) FELIX (201-130312): DOMINICAN EXILE, ANTI-COMMUNIST, RESIDED HAVANA, CUBA DURING LATE 50'S AND WAS STATION SOURCE. ASSOCIATE OF JUAN BOSCH (TKH-1383, 1459, 1474, 1484) MINISTER OF EDUCATION DURING JUAN BOSCH'S ADMINISTRATION AND LEADER OF PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DOMINICANO (PRD) 1964. APPOINTED AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA, AUGUST 1966 ((UFG-3958, 4718; SDOM 1537). NO LNERGO TRACES.

5. VICTOR AYBAR - NO STATION TRACES. LNERGO TRACES INDICATE FULL NAME VICTOR LEON (AYBAR) DE SOSA; DPOB 15 MAR 28, SANTO DOMINGO, D.R.; MARRIED TO MARY BOSWELL, AMERICAN CITIZEN; FORMER D.R. CONSUL IN CHICAGO. LNERGO HAD ALLEGATION HE WAS AGENT OF SIM. INTERVIEWED IN JULY 1961 AND DENIED ANY SIM CONNECTIONS. STATED HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY SIM WHILE IN CHICAGO AND THAT WAS THE REASON HE HAD LEFT

SECRET

PAGE FOUR JMWAVE 1469 S E C R E T

THE D.R. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE. WAS EMPLOYED BY WESTRADE, INC., BUT RESIGNED AND RETURNED TO OTHER EMPLOYMENT IN CHICAGO.

6. GUAROA (VE) LAZQUEZ - NO STATION TRACES; NO LNERGO TRACES.

7. COL (?) WILLIAM BOND: POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH MAXWELL WILLIAM BOND (JR.); DPOB: 30 APRIL 21, SAN FRANCISCO. SUBJECT OF 201-283995 WHICH NOT AT STATION. POA REQUESTED 7 SEPT 60 WHEN HE WAS PROCUREMENT OFFICER AT THOMPSON-CORNWALL INC., CONSTRUCTION COMPANY IN GUATEMALA. POA GRANTED 29 SEPT 60; LATER CANCELLED. NO SUBSEQUENT RECORD AND NO LNERGO TRACES.

8. JMWAVE FILES CONTAIN FOLLOWING ITEM ON HERBERT ITKIN: LOUIS DEJOIE PROPOSED HERBERT ITKENS (SIC), 103 PARK AVE., NEW YORK, AS POSSIBLE CONTACT FOR FUNDS AGAINST DUVALIER. DEJOIE STATED ITKENS PREVIOUSLY GAVE DEJOIE $200,000 AND COULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL BACKING SOME FUTURE DATE. (WAVE 8792, 2 JULY 64)

9. JMWAVE FILES CONTAIN FOLLOWING TIDBITS ON BARNARD (ALSO BERNARD) COLLIER; WAS OCCASIONAL CONTACT OF AMCARBON-1

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE JMWAVE 1469 S E C R E T

IN 1964-65. HAD SERIES OF EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEWS WITH FIDEL CASTRO IN SUMMER 1964, COMMENTED UPON IN WAVE 0640, 17 AUGUST 64. WORKED FOR NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE AT THAT TIME. DENIED CUBAN VISA IN FALL 1965. ALLEGEDLY WROTE REPORT ON FOREIV PROCUREMENT IN U.S. OF T-28 AIRCRAFT CRITICAL OF WOFIRM AND LNERGO IN 1966. THIS DOCUMENT WAS OFFERED FOR SALE TO A STATION CONTACT BY LOCAL HOTEL OPERATOR, BILL THOMPSON IN OCTOBER 1966; NO OFFER WAS MADE AND MATTER DROPPED.

SECRET

SECRET

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

DATE: 30 JUNE 1966

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION TO THE
INAUGURAL CEREMONIES AT SANTO DOMINGO,D.R.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DOCUMENT

REGISTRATION STATEMENT (REGIS. NO: 1774

NAME OF REIGSTRANT: JEAN ANTOINE MAX BOLTE, AKA
MAX BOLTE

DATE: NOT LEGIBLE

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 4 AUGUST 1964

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: LOUIS DEJOIE

FBI FILE NO: 105-31661 (NEW YORK)

14-00000

37 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

: DIRECTOR

201-240483 ✓

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT 2, WH/SA 8, VR D.A.

ROUTING

RID/AN

RID/MIS

RID/FI

ABSTRACT

Call [illegible] to
DR DESK

SECRET 032103Z

DIR INFO PRIN CITE WAVE 8792

03 JUL 64 IN 20818

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 8541 (IN 15961)

1. DEJOIE LEFT 30 JUNE 64 FOR VISIT NEW YORK AND TALK JOAQUIN BALAGUER RE LATTER'S COLLABORATION DEJOIE OPERATIONS AGAINST HAITI. WILL PROBABLY VISIT WASH BEFORE RETURN MIAMI. PRIOR LEAVING, DEJOIE JOINED FORCES WITH EVLUCID-1. UNTIL DEPARTURE, DEJOIE AND EVLUCID-1 WERE PLANNING ORGANIZATION OF HAITIAN GOVT FOLLOWING TAKEOVER BUT STILL NOT SUCCESSFUL IN MUSTERING WHEREWITHAL MOUNT INVASION. (SOURCE: UOAMBER-3 AND UOAMBER-6 COMBINED.)

2. DEJOIE SAID HE MET ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO IN SDOM EARLY JUNE AND CLAIMS GUTIERREZ SAID HE HAD CUBAN EXILE ARMS CACHED IN IGUANA ISLAND BUT USE OF ARMS FOR DEJOIE FORCES NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT KUBARK APPROVAL. DEJOIE GETTING SAME STORY OTHER CUBAN EXILE GROUPS. (SOURCE: 201-240483

201-240483

~~201-2[illegible]~~

D 36-124-23/3

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

RI COPY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

(35)

201-836505

UOAMBER-6, 29 JUNE.)

3. ON 1 JULY E-1 CONTACTED BY ELISEO GOMEZ, BUSINESS PARTNER OF TEOFILO BABUN, CUBAN SHIPPING MAGNATE WHO NOW OPERATING IN MIAMI AND PROBABLY INVOLVED CONTRABAND ACTIVITIES. GOMEZ TOLD E-1 THAT GOMEZ REPRESENTED GROUP WHO ABLE TO HELP E-1 IN OPS AGAINST HAITI AND WOULD COLLABORATE IN RETURN FOR HAITIAN BASES. E-1 ASKED UOAMBER-3 OPINION GOMEZ, WAS TOLD THAT HE BUM AND DEALING WITH GOMEZ GROUP SURE TO END IN FAILURE IN VIEW FACT BABUN AND COMPANY AFTER MONEY ONLY AND WITHOUT SCRUPLES. WOULD PROBABLY LEAD E-1 ON FOR ADVANCE ON ARMS, THEN NOT DELIVER MID-STREAM. (SOURCE: U-3 FROM E-1, 1 JULY).

4. CONTACTS PROPOSED BY DEJOIE FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE INCLUDE HERBERT ITKENS, 103 PARK AVE., NEW YORK, IN EFFORT OBTAIN FUNDS FOR ANTI-DUVALIER OPERATION. (DEJOIE SAYS ITKENS PREVIOUSLY GAVE DEJOIE $200,000 AND MAY PROVIDE ADDITIONAL BACKING SOME FUTURE DATE.) DEJOIE ALSO PLANNING APPROACH EDWARD JOSEPH, 17 BATTERY PLACE, NEW YORK. (JOSEPH APPARENTLY LEGAL COUNSEL FOR BALAGUER AND DIEGO BORDAS.) WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT OTHER CONTACTS MIAMI AREA ON RETURN. (SOURCE: UOAMBER-6).

☐ ☐

5. IN DISCUSSING FINANCIAL SUPPORT HAITIAN OPS DEJOIE SAID EX-DOM GEN LUIS REINISO TRUJILLO PASSED DUVALIER $370,000, LATER GAVE ADDITIONAL $140,000 FOR DUVALIER PROTECTION TRUJILLO CLAN. DEJOIE DID NOT REVEAL WHEN FUNDS PASSED BUT SAID USED BY DUVALIER FOR PURCHASE WEAPONS IN EUROPE. (SOURCE: UOAMBER-3, 28 JUNE.)

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: * GAVE SUMMARY DEJOIE ACTIVITIES FOR 24 AND 25 JUNE 64.

RI COPY

RI COPY

RI COPY

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1964

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: JEAN ANTOINE MAX BOLTE

FBI FILE NO: 97-1576 (NEW YORK)

14-00000

DISPATCH | SECRET

TO	Chief of Station, Port au Prince
INFO	
FROM	Chief, WHD
SUBJECT	Conversation with IDEN-A on 3 October 1963 with HQS Rep (Using Alias)
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES	

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

Dejoie [illegible]

1. I called on IDEN-A at the home of his son-in-law in ZENITAL. IDEN-A remembered me from our previous meeting in May of this year, and his greeting was cordial. He said that he was in ZENITAL and was going to New York for the purpose of making the situation of his followers known and to see if he could obtain support for maintaining his activist following in the DR.

2. IDEN-A believes that it has now been proven that no reliance could be placed on any of the Haitian military: EVLUSH/1 is obviously finished; EVLITE/1 is unwilling to act without positive guarantees of ODYOKE support; Colonel Armand is able but weak; and General Boucicaut lacks courage. Colonel Biambi is a good man but is being supported by the Dominican government. If anything effective is to be done, it must be done through non-military personalities. Only a national leader who has the support of the people can do anything effective. Had he been in charge of the EVLUSH/1 effort, the peasants would have rallied to the invading forces, but they will not do so to a force under the command of a military man.

3. IDEN-A's camp is still in existence in the DR and contains about 70 men at present. Among these are EVLUTE/4 and Henri Clermont. He said that EVLUTE/4 is able but somewhat erratic and he (IDEN-A) fears that he would accept support from any source including the Communists, though he knows that EVLUTE/4 is not himself a communist. He likewise mistrusts the EVLUTE group because it s leadership is too far to the left. Again, he does not believe that the members of EVLUTE are themselves Communists, but they attempted to obtain support from Mexican Communists.

4. IDEN-A concerned at the moment in obtaining support to enable him to continue feeding the men in his camp. He said that he has been informed that the former followers of EVLUSH/1 are now flocking in, thus placing an intolerable burden on his slim resources. He needs a few thousand dollars for food supplies and hopes to get some help in New York from CARE or some other philanthropic organization.

5. IDEN-A regrets the overthrow of the Bosch government. He says that he is aware of Bosch's shortcomings as an administrator, but that he had the interests of the Dominican Republic at heart and had demonstrated his sympathies for IDEN-A and his followers. Nevertheless,

CONTINUED

201-240483

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HTPW-627	11 OCT 1963 9 October 1963
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-240483

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/6	Norman Descoteaux ND	jar	4596

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		201-836808

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	9 Oct 63	J. C. KING

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID~~	
RID/FI	

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

IDEN-A believes that he will be able to have a friendly relationship with the new regime. He has an appointment to see Ambassador Jose BONILLA Atiles today and hopes to obtain his support. He also is a good friend of [illegible] and believes this will stand him in good stead. He thinks that the new government must be recognized within 60 days.

ITKIN

6. He has received some aid from PBPRIME friends and from Cuban and Dominican private individuals. He did not further identify them other than to say that they were not the same persons who had supported EVLUSH/1 who had been counting on the support of Masferrer. This support had not been forthcoming due to the fact that certain of the Haitians and Cubans that Masferrer was supposed to provide, refused to work with Masferrer. IDEN's Cuban supporters' aim is to use Haiti as a base against Cuba. He agrees this should be done.

7. IDEN-A is certain that Garrido informed EVMAYA of EVLUSH/1's plans. He said that Garrido was greedy and would take money from any source.

8. IDEN-A says that ODYOKE plans to send a new ambassador to Haiti will greatly strengthen the government. He said this fact is known and has caused considerable disappointment among exiles. (I made no comment on this.)

9. IDEN-A had wanted to bring these matters to the attention of IDEN-B. He has no selfish ambition. In outlook, he is a Catholic and a capitalist who wants to do what he can for his country. This is his sole reason for wanting to be President. I explained that his views would be made known to IDEN-B and other interested senior officials. IDEN-B regretted not being able to talk to him personally, but was prevented from doing so at present due to the many demands on his time caused by the present critical situation in the Caribbean.

10. Our parting was cordial and IDEN-A said that when he returned to the DR in the next few days, he would be glad to establish contact with one of my associates should we desire to do this. I told him that should it be necessary to get in touch with him, the person chosen would identify himself as my friend.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
- Original & 1 - Port au Prince

IDENS (U/S/C)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 21 AUGUST 1963

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: :PIOS DEJOIE - REGISTRATION ACT - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 6 AUG 63 30

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : DODS

ACTION: WH 8. (WH & IW NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1715 6 AUG BP)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, DODS/L, DODS 4, CA 2 CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, DD/I, AD/CI 2, RF 2.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

AUG 6 2108Z 63

PRIORITY

IN 94397

TDCS [illegible]

PRITY DIR CITE DODS 0466

INTEL

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO.[1] WUARMOR/1[2] WHO RECEIVED HIS INFORMATION BY PHONE ON 6 AUGUST 1963 FROM ARTHUR HAAS, PRESIDENT OF CARIBBEAN MILLS, OWNER OF THE BIGGEST FLOUR MILL IN HAITI WHO RESIDES IN DALLAS. HAAS OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION ON 6 AUGUST FROM HERBERT ITKIN, A NEW YORK CITY LAWYER WITH THE FIRM ITKIN, ROBERTS, AND GREENBAUM. ITKIN TOLD HAAS THAT HE REPRESENTS LOUIS DEJOIE, ONE OF THE HAITIAN EXILE LEADERS, AND GAVE HAAS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS INFORMATION COMES FROM DEJOIE. ITKIN TOLD HAAS THAT, BECAUSE ALL OF THE HAITIAN EXILES ARE NOW WORKING TOGETHER, HE REPRESENTS ALL OF THE EXILES AS WELL AS DEJOIE. HAAS TOLD WUARMOR/1[2] THAT CARIBBEAN MILLS WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO SUPPORT THE INVASION OF HAITI IF IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE INVADING FORCE WILL SUCCEED

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

CS in 36-1-6

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 94397

TDCS

AND IF ALL OF THE OTHER COMPANIES CONCERNED CONTRIBUTE. WUARMOR/1[2] HAS ASKED DODS WHETHER KUBARK[3] WOULD ADVISE THAT HIS COMPANY CONTRIBUTE ALSO. DODS UNDERSTANDS KUJUMP[4] DALLAS OFFICE RECEIVED SIMILAR AND AMPLIFIED REPORT FROM HASS DIRECTLY AND THAT THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PASSED BY KUJUMP[4] TO HQS BY PHONE. HQS MAY PREFER DISSEM AS FROM HAAS ONLY AND OMIT WUARMOR/1[2]. REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD CONTROLLED DISSEM. HAITI SUBJ: HAITI INVADING FORCE DOI: 6 AUGUST 1963 PADA: OMIT PLACE ACQUIRED 6 AUGUST 1963 APPR: DEFER HQS. UWC-22 SOURCE: AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH INTERESTS IN HAITI (F) FROM A SECOND AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WHO OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM HERBERT ITKIN, NEW YORK ATTORNEY WITH THE FIRM OF ITKIN, ROBERTS, AND GREENBAUM WHO SAID THAT HE REPRESENTS LOUIS DEJOIE AND ALL OF THE HAITIAN EXILE LEADERS. ITKIN GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT LOUIS DEJOIE IS HIS SOURCE FOR THIS INFORMATION.

IW COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, USC Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY
REPORT NO. TDCS
SUBJECT
DATE DISTR.
PRECEDENCE
DATE OF INFO.
REFERENCES IN 94397
PLACE & DATE ACQ.
APPRAISAL
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. THE FORCE INVADING HAITI ON 6 AUGUST 1963 REPRESENTS ALL OF THE HAITI EXILES AND IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE ONLY OF THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH LEON CANTAVE. ACCORDING TO LOUIS DEJOIE, HAITIAN EXILE LEADER THE PRESIDENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES SOME TIME AGO ARRANGED THAT ALL OF THE HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS SHOULD ACT TOGETHER AS ONE BODY.

2. THE FORCE IS COMPOSED OF 500 ARMED MEN RATHER THAN THE 250 FIRST REPORTED BY THE PRESS. THE GROUP HAS 1500 ARMED MEN STANDING BY. (FIELD COMMENT. WHERE THE GROUP IS STANDING BY IS NOT STATED.)

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

-3

3. THE FORCE MUST RAISE U.S. $250,000. IN ORDER TO MAKE THE INVASION SUCCESSFUL. HALF OF THAT AMOUNT HAS ALREADY BEEN RAISED IN EUROPE. HERBERT ITKIN, A NEW YORK ATTORNEY REPRESENTING LOUIS DEJOIE AND OTHER HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS, IS PHONING AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN IN AN ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE OTHER HALF.

END OF MESSAGE

3

STATE DEPT DOCUMENT - MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: 22 MAY 1963

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF HAITIAN OPPOSITION LEADER LOUIS DEJOIE

FILE NO: 819192

DEPT. OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

DATE: 16 MAY 1963

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL - NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SUBJECT: HAITIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

REPORT NO: 2231011563 (Puerto Rico)

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE [illegible]

FROM: Name [illegible]
OFFICE [illegible]
ROOM [illegible]
PHONE
TUBE ADDRESS [illegible]

1. TYPE ACTION ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

2. FILE RESTRICTED ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) [illegible], (First) [illegible] (Middle) 01

5. 201 NO. 336308 02

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
02			
02			
02			
02			
02			
02			

7. SEX 01 M F

8. DATE OF BIRTH 01

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH [illegible] 01

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible] 01

11. CITIZENSHIP US 01

12. OCCUPATION (clear text) Lawyer 01 OCC. CODE [illegible] 02

13. SWL 01

14. OI CODE 01

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER [illegible] 01 DATE [illegible] 01

16. RESIDENCE [illegible], New York City

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

Registered agent for [illegible] Govt [illegible] in [illegible]. Partner in law firm of 01

[illegible], Roberts & Greenbaum 01

01

01

01

01

01

01

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION USA CODE [illegible] 01

19. ACTION DESK [illegible] CODE [illegible] 01

20. SECONDARY DESK [illegible] CODE [illegible] 01

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES [illegible] 01 & C1

22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO. 336308

FORM 9-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38-51)

104-10218-10032

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES: JAN 65 - JAN. 75

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

Vol. 1	STATE DEPT (Moscow #19074, 28 Aug 59)	
	STATE DEPT (Moscow #20771, 31 Aug 59)	
	STATE DEPT (Moscow #22299, 30 Jun 61)	
Vol. II	STATE DEPT fm Tijuana	14 Mar 63
	STATE Memo fm Tijuana	15 Mar 63
	STATE Tijuana	15 Mar 63
	FBI (Oklahoma City)	2 Apr 63 re TUMBLEWEED
	FBI (Hoover to CIA)	31 May 63 re TUMBLEWEED (E)65-65652
	FBI (Excerpt only fm document dated 27 May 63 (CIA #DBA 43665)	
	STATE (Tijuana ConGen)	10 Sep 63
	STATE Dept #CA-3646	29 Oct 63
	FBI (San Diego)	7 Oct 63
	STATE Airgram A-12 fm Tij	10 Oct 63
	STATE Official-Informal Memo fm Mexico to Tijuana	10 Oct 63
	FBI (San Diego)	7 Feb 64
Vol.III	STATE (Mexico #4042)	23 Jul 69
	STATE (Moscow #4192)	12 Aug 69
	FBI - travel items (4)	August-October 1969
	FBI (San Diego)	18 Dec 69
	STATE (Mexico #4475)	14 Aug 70
	STATE (Mexico 4693)	26 Aug 70
	FBI travel items (2)	10 Sep 70 re KOSTIKOVA
	STATE Request for Bio	29 Sep 70
	FBI travel items (2)	21 Oct 70
	FBI travel items (2)	30 Oct 70
	FBI (San Antonio #78206)	13 May 71
	STATE (Mexico #5211)	14 Sep 71
	FBI travel items (2)	28 Sep 71
	FBI travel items (2)	1 Oct 71
	FBI (Oklahoma City)	24 Jan 75 re TUMBLEWEED

Rc'd by [illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

FROM: NAME (Use gummed labels)
Hopkins, Chas

BADGE NO.
1C-516

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

BRANCH: LAD/COG
ROOM: 3D57
EXTENSION: 4272
DATE: 12 Apr 77
IP/FI CONTROL NO.:

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	04/12/77		
REQUESTER					
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52			
REQUESTER					
IP/RMS	DB-6	CA-20			

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED:

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO (Doc. Ref.):

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS (TO IP/IN)

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME: KOSTIKOV

GIVEN NAMES: Valery

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED:

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 201- 305052

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.):

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

☐ NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT

☐ SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES

☒ INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED

☐ THERE ARE ________ RECORDS OF WHICH ________ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME
122019 1977 APR 12 AM 9:35

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622 (4-3-38)

XAE - 852 - 20775

```
                              S-E-C-R-E-T
                           MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE                      122019      016
                                                                         ***IMMEDIATE***
  REQ NO: 122019A01    REQUESTER: HC516  HOPKINS CHRI  LA/C/CI  305331  9061  BU7

  NAME: KOSTIKOV, VALERY                          YOB:      SEX:   CIT:
  ORIGIN:A  DOR:     PURPOSE:FOS  PRTY:I  OTPT:D999  FNU:   SPELL:   MASK:   MAT:

  CONTROL CODE 016-VCF-770412-093553-00002    093550
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  0001 KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH                        074-005-102
       SEX M                                                  SX-05555/05
       CIT USSR
       RES MEXICO
       FORMERLY: DD NO DATE,
       ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO SE/CI/X, 4D18   , 1203, 13/03/75
       SX-05555/05                          01 FEB 77  02175526


  0002 KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH                        201-0305052*
       SEX M DOB 17MAR33              POB USSR, MOSCOW        TYPE NAME T
       CIT USSR                                               RCD DATE 61
       REF HMMA-25722, 02 APR 65
       RES USSR KGB OFFICER, FORMER EMPLOYEE SOV EMB,
       MEXICO CITY, DEPARTED PCS 04 AUG 65. WIFE KOSTIKOVA,
       RIZA ALEKSANDROVNA
       ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                            31 DEC 65  00150737
```

CI

X

```
                                                                        PAGE 0001
  ---CONTINUED---     HC516                                          122019      016
                              S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

```
                                   S-E-C-R-E-T

    0003 KOSTIKOV,                                                ARDP-00011
         OSS REFS ARE AVAILABLE TO THIS NAME IN THE MAIN          01JAN46
         INDEX CAT. III FILE. THESE REFS MUST BE MANUA LLY
         SEARCHED AND APPLICABLE CARDS REPRODUCED AN D ATTACHED
         TO THE NAME TRACE REQUEST.
         ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
         ARDP-00011                            01 JAN 46  01859765


    0004 KOSTIKOV, FNU                                            078-004-002
         APPEARS TO HAVE LEFT PERMANENTLY. POSSIBLY PETER         KAHI-00650
         PAKHOMOVICH, BORN 21 SEP 11 CHAUFFEUR SOVIETS            01JUN53
         STATIONED IN KARACHI.-                                   SER-41
                                                                  IN29381
         ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                               APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
         KAHI-00650C0653                       24 AUG 59  05877390


    0005 KOSTIKOV, FNU                                            041-008-005
         AKA ANIRUT KALITROV KOSTOKOV AKA KOSTAKOV, ISSAD         NIT-00693
         KALISTROVICH                                             27MAR54
                                                                  74-7-2041.206-
                                                                  4
         FORMERLY: FCN NO FCN, DO NO DATE.
         ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                               APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
         NIT-00693                             27 MAR 54  07478948







                                                                         PAGE 0002
    ---CONTINUED---      HC516                                    122019      016
                                   S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

```
                              S-E-C-R-E-T

   0006 KOSTIKOV, FNU                                     EGQA-89069
        RIS OFFICER, EAST GERMANY                         13MAY57
                                                          11 MAY 56
                                                          ATT DATED
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
        EGQA-89069                 13 MAY 57  07602864

   0007 KOSTIKOV                                          201-0805767
        SEX M                   OCC INTELL                DST-14913
        CIT USSR                                          07OCT66
        < USSR, SAMARKAND AKA OF KOLCHOV 6FT 1IN TALL,     STATE
        SLENDER BUILD, RECEDING HAIR, REDDISH IN COLOR. SMALL    P9
        V-SHAPED SCAR ON UPPER LEFT FOREHEAD. RESPONSIBLE FOR
        INTURIST RELATIONS WITH THE SAMARKAND AUTHORITIES. MAJ
        FIGURE IN LT. JON VIEGEL /201-805767/ CASE. QUESTIONER
        AND INTER+#DEFERRED
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                        APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
        DST-14913                  18 APR 67  03492759

   0008 KOSTIKOV                                          074-005-011
        SEX M                                             CD-00406
        < OF KRAVCHENKO, M. KH. NAME APPEARED IN GERMAN   08APR65
        PROPAGANDA LEAFLET WRITTEN IN RUSSIAN WHICH CONTAINED    P4
        NKVD AGENTS AND INFORMANTS PLANTED IN SOVIET 44TH
        RIFLE DIVISION, 42
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
        CD-00406                   25 AUG 65  03694375

                    END OF REPLY - 0008 RECORDS LISTED

                                                               PAGE 0003
              HC516                                END OF  122019    016
                              S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

14-00000

Ross

1. Which was TUMBLEWEED - seems related with Dept. 13 of KGB - (assassinations). KOSTIKOV ever involved in TUMBLEWEED. Was in clandestine contact with TUMBLEWEED.

CONFIDENTIAL

XAE-852
7 October 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Photo Identification of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, XAE-852, 20 June 1975

The attached photo identification request was generated by DJR himself on the basis of XAE-851, also attached. It is being processed into the record as a part of a backlog which is currently being processed.

Lee H. Wigren
Lee H. Wigren
C/CI/R&A/E

File: 201-305052
D-100-6-154/22

RIB.

SUBJ on Pg 2

[illegible]
7 OCT 75
201-305052

RECORD COPY

D-100-6-154/22

E2 IMPDET CL BY 02201

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City 81 ✓

SUBJECT
Mexico City Soviet Personality Files

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith, for inclusion into their Headquarters 201-files, are the Station's Personality Files of the following Soviet Diplomats who were previously assigned to Mexico City. The Files have been purged of all Headquarters correspondence.

BOLSHAKOV, Aleksandr Vladimirovich	201-[illegible]
FEDIN, Yevgeniy Ivanovich	201-[illegible]
KOSTIKOV, Valeriy Vladimirovich	201-[illegible]
KUCHEROV, Valentin Ivanovich	201-758[illegible]17
PETROV, Vladimir Stepanovich	201-050[illegible]67
VANOVSKIY, Yuriy Yakovlevich	201-[illegible]47

Felix C. PECATURO

Distribution:
2 cys - C/SBD, w/att h/w
1 cy - C/WHD, w/o att

CLASSIFIED BY

EXEMPT [illegible]
OF E [illegible]
§ 5B(1) 0
APDI.2
IMPOSS[illegible]

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-42157

DATE
21 July 19[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

KOSTIKOV VALERIY VLADIMIROVICHA-018973 S 036780

DPOB: 17 MAR 33 MOSCOW 201-0305052 PPT
WIFE: ROZA ALEKSANDROVNA B 02 MAR 32 REF: OBBA 31097 07 JUL 72



Deleted from photo system

14-00000

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2/8 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

Y ______ AT ______ Z

ISSEM BY 28 PER ______ #

CTION UNIT SB8 FILE, VR IP/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

CTION NO 115

S E C R E T 310020Z MAY 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19978

DIRECTOR

REDTOP (IN 543028) 30 MAY 72 IN 623421

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 19049, 22 FEB 72

B. DIRECTOR 237413, 29 FEB 72

R

1. KDADORN REPORTED PCS ARRIVAL 22 MAY 1972 AEROMEXICO FLT 401 OF:

A. VLADIMIR MIKHAYLOVICH MELNIKOV (201-820393), DIP PASSPORT D-003383, ACCOMPANIED BY WIFE, TATYANA IVANOVNA AND SON, MIKHAIL, AGE THREE. BIO DATA CONTAINED IN AMEMB MOSCOW 1153, 8 FEB 72. PER SENSITIVE HQS SOURCE, MELNIKOV IS THIRD SECY, TO OCCUPY SLOT VACTED BY VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052), KNOWN KGB.

B. ANDREY BORISOVICH GLIKHOVTSEV (201-897655), SERVICE PASSPORT S-253248. SEE AMEMB MOSCOW 5264, 26 JULY 1971. GLIKHOVTSEV TO OCCUPY ADDITIONAL SLOT AS "TRAINEE" AND GUARD AT SOVEMB. NO FAMILY REPORTED.

2. TRAVELLING WITH MELNIKOV FAMILY WAS VADIM V. VENEVTSEV, 14 YEAR OLD SON OF 201-738468, TO SPEND VACATION WITH PARENTS.

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 305052

CS COPY FILED IN 201-820393 SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

Chief, Western Hem[illegible]

Chief of Station, Mexico City

[illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED: [illegible]

REFERENCE: [illegible]

1. [illegible] collected [illegible]

2. [illegible] late afternoon. He was not [illegible] drinking. [illegible] with Subject than with [illegible] appeared [illegible] but [illegible]-10 offered him some [illegible] glasses, which Subject [illegible] his son, a [illegible] and now living in Guadalajara.

3. While talking about [illegible] 10 would understand his feelings [illegible] learned that his only son, [illegible] been inducted into the Soviet Army [illegible] would be sent to the Chinese border, [illegible] had served for one year, [illegible] Subject stated that there are as many as 20 [illegible] killed daily at the border [illegible] known in the USSR. Subject [illegible] there himself and from [illegible] Subject indicated that he could [illegible] his son transferred but he was [illegible] friend [illegible] and "Vladimir" [illegible] could help him get his son [illegible] would not ask for their help.

4. Subject became very emotional as he [illegible] son. [illegible]-10 reported that Subject was [illegible]

CS COPY 201-351744

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - C/SRD
[illegible] 1 - C/WHD

Kostikov

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.	DATE
[illegible]	[illegible]41,729	29 [illegible] 197[illegible]
	S E C R E T	

[illegible]

[illegible] a "Pistola C[illegible]" [illegible] he had [illegible] [illegible] Chinese [illegible].

5. Subject, who arrived in Mexico [illegible] developed this friendship and [illegible] visits to the [illegible] [illegible] girl.

6. Bulcin is officially an employee of the Polish Commercial Office, although he physically works in the [illegible] of the Embassy and spends the entire [illegible]. He functions as an all-night security guard once a week at the Embassy. He is paid and also takes his turn at duty at the Polish Commercial Office. We carry Subject as a known [illegible] officer [illegible] almost exclusive contacts with RIS officers, [illegible] pattern of activities, the fact that he replaced a known [illegible] officer in slot, and from AMMUG [illegible] identification. It is believed he functions as the [illegible] code clerk and [illegible] support officer. [illegible] folder appears on KDBADGER, so there is no information available on his outside contacts.

7. In January 1972, Subject and family moved to General Zuazua 39, Apt. 102, Colonia San Miguel Chapultepec. He drives a recently purchased 1972 yellow-brown Opel with diplomatic license plates AA[illegible].

8. We felt the information provided by [illegible]-10 was of sufficient significance to forward to Headquarters for your information. Our only viable access to Subject is [illegible]. Subject has no known outside contacts; and he is [illegible] diplomat, a situation which precludes social access by [illegible] officers. We will continue to monitor Bulcin's activities through KDADAGE-10 and seek some other way to get to know him better.

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?
CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ DEPARTED MEXICO PCS IN 71 REFER TO DOC
FOR ADDITIONAL INFO

050-008-010
HMMA-41550
26 JAN 72
P2

R 7202110020

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 305052

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-41,070, 27 September 1971

TO : Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SECRET

201-305052

H/w att. 1 to HMMA-41070 CS COPY

Priority
① Bear
② PR
③ Horst 9/15

request reply COB
Sept 15.

No. 247

La Embajada de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas saluda muy atentamente a la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América y tiene el honor de pedir que se sirva extender las visas de tránsito en los pasaportes diplomáticos del Sr. KOSTIKOV Valeri, Segundo Secretario de la Embajada de la URSS en México, y pasa su esposa Sra. KOSTIKOVA Roza.

Las personas mencionadas salen de México a Nueva York el día 20 de septiembre del año en curso por la cía "EA-902" y van a continuar su viaje rumbo a Moscú el día 22 de septiembre por la cía "Aeroflot".

La Embajada de la URSS agradece de antemano la atención que la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América tenga a bien de prestar a esta solicitud y aprovecha la oportunidad para reiterar las seguridades de su más alta y distinguida consideración.

México, D.F., 13 de septiembre de 1971

A LA EMBAJADA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
DE AMERICA

APELLIDO: Costikov
NOMBRE: Valeri
SEGUNDO NOMBRE: Vladimirovich
DOCUMENTO DE VIAJE: pas diplomático D N 022184

RESIDENCIA: Embajada de la URSS en México

FECHA Y LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: Moscú
DIA: 17 MES: 3 AÑO: 1933
TEZ:

CABELLO:
OJOS:
ESTATURA:
NACIONALIDAD: Rusa
SEÑAS:

ESTADO CIVIL: ☒ C ☐ S ☐ V ☐ D
SEXO: ☒ M
PROFESION: 3o secretario de la Embajada de la URSS
DURACION Y PROPOSITO DE ESTANCIA EN LOS EE UU: tránsito por Nueva York por 3 días

Entiendo que la posesión de una visa no le concede al portador el derecho de entrar a los EE UU si al llegar al puerto de entrada se descubre que es inadmisible.

Certifico que la información que figura en la presente solicitud, incluso cualesquiera declaraciones que formen parte de la misma, fue toda suministrada por mí y es correcta y completa según mi saber y entender.

El solicitante fué entrevistado por mí y su solicitud fué firmada en mi presencia.

el:

Kostikov

(Firma del solicitante)

FORM FS-257 SPANISH

Form Approved



CATION FOR
IMMIGRANT
VISA
AND ALIEN

CLASSIFICATION

POST SERIAL NO

REMARKS

9/13/71
Visa Blaz

ISSUED ON

FOR

Valid or ( ) Appl

VALID THROUGH

REFUSED

SERVICE NO.

TARIFF ITEM NO

FEE PAID: U S $

LOCAL CY. EQUIVALENT

APPLICATION FOR
NONIMMIGRANT
VISA
AND ALIEN
REGISTRATION





UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES
PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 022184

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК
ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № 022184

RESIDENCIA Embajada de la URSS en Mexico

FECHA Y LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO [illegible] de Azerbaijan	DIA 2	MES 2	AÑO 1932	TEZ
CABELLO	OJOS	ESTATURA	NACIONALIDAD Rusa	SEÑAS
ESTADO CIVIL ☒ C ☐ S ☐ V ☐ D	SEXO ☐ M ☒ F	PROFESION Esposa del segundo secr. [illegible]	DURACION Y PROPOSITO DE ESTANCIA EN LOS EE UU transito por 2 meses Mexico [illegible] 3 dias	

Entiendo que la posesión de una visa no le concede al portador el derecho de entrar a los EE UU si al llegar al puerto de entrada se descubre que es inadmisible.

Certifico que la información que figura en la presente solicitud inclusive cualesquiera declaraciones que formen parte de la misma, ha sido examinada por mí y es correcta y completa según mi saber y entender.

El solicitante fué entrevistado por mí y su solicitud fué firmada en mi presencia.

(Firma del solicitante)

FORM FS-257 (Spanish)

Form Approved

CLASSIFICATION	POST SERIAL NO	REMARKS
ISSUED ON	FOR Unltd	
VALID THROUGH	REFUSED ON	
SERVICE NO		
TARIFF ITEM NO		
FEE PAID U. S. $		
LOCAL CY. EQUIVALENT		

APPLICATION FOR
NONIMMIGRANT
VISA
AND ALIEN
REGISTRATION



9/13/71

Visa, Bien



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 022185

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № 022185

Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV: He is a 38-year-old officer of the KGB who occupies the cover position of Second Secretary. He first visited Mexico in 1959 for a Soviet Industrial Exposition and later came from September 1961 until August 1965. He returned again in September 1968 to replace another KGB officer. KOSTIKOV is considered to be one of the most effective and dangerous of the intelligence officers in Mexico. He has had a wide range of responsibilities which have included operations among emigre groups in western Mexico, operations directed against the United States and currently against the governments of Central America. He presently meets with exiles from Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras. He is known to have passed funds to these groups as well as tactical guidance.

14-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

11

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

DOC. MICRO. SER.

DEC 1 7 1971

MICROFILMED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 38 PER ______ # ______

ACTION UNIT SBB

INFO FILE, VR eplay, WHB, CI, CI/OPS, C/IC 2, FI,

ACTION NO. 333

(9)

S E C R E T 262220Z OCT 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 18258

DIRECTOR

26 OCT IN 454800

REDTOP AEKICK AESMASH Soviet Travel from Mexico

2P

REF: DIRECTOR 194115

1. VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH PETROV (201-858287), KNOWN KGB OFFICER, DEPARTED MEXICO WITH FAMILY ON 13 AUGUST 71 ON WHAT PRESUMED BY STATION TO BE HOME LEAVE, ~~DIE~~ DUE HIS LENGTH OF SERVICE IN MEXICO, AND DUE FACT OUR COVERAGE SOVIET INSTALLATIONS GAVE NO INDICATIONS PRIOR DEPARTURE THAT PREPARATIONS BEING MADE FOR PCS MOVE, KDBADGER OF 7 OCTOBER 71, HOWEVER, CONTAINED REFERENCES TO PACKING AND SHIPMENT OF PETROV'S HHE. STATION INCLINED BELIEVE NON-RETURN OF PETROV LINKED WITH HIS POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN VALINK CASE (SEE MEXICO CITY 17460 IN 405813 AND RELATED TRAFFIC). WHILE NOT CONNECTED AESMASH DEFECTION, REFERENCE POSES POSSIBILITY OUR SUSPICIONS VALID AND KGB FEARED FLAP POTENTIAL IN PETROV'S CONTINUED PRESENCE IN MEXICO.

2. VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052), KNOWN KGB AND SUSPECTED DEPARTMENT 13 OFFICER, DEPARTED MEXICO WITH FAMILY 20 SEPTEMBER 71. KOSTIKOV ARRIVED MEXICO 13 SEPTEMBER 68, AND PCS DEPARTURE MAY HAVE BEEN ROUTINE, ALTHO 1 JUNE 71

AS

AB

P HK

4

26 Oct 71

B201-858287

D74-6-756/3

CS COPY

201-305052

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City 52 ✓

SUBJECT
O REDTOP/AEKICK - Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

1. KDADORN reported the 20 September 1971 departure of Subject and his wife Roza Aleksandrovna for New York via Eastern Airlines Flight 902 en route to Moscow.

2. Although Station has no information concerning a replacement, recent KDBADGER coverage has contained comments regarding the packing and moving of Subject's household effects, indicating his departure was PCS.

3. Attached for Subject's Headquarters file is a copy of his visa request, including a photograph, and the opening page of his passport. Subject's Station file will be retained until it is known that his departure was PCS.

Olive S. Eckholm
Olive S. ECKHOLM

ATTACHMENT:
Envelope containing visa requests and applications and opening page passports, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - C/SBD (w/att, h/w)
1 - C/WHD (w/o att) - 1 info to WH/1

AIS INPUT NO. 33

CS COPY

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-41,070	27 September 1971
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 201-305052

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY	
201-305052	200-124-200
SEX M DOB ?	MEXI-16022
	24 MAR 71
CIT ?	
OCC ?	
PHOTO AVAILABLE	
HVCHRSHL BHBRHBBHBC-	R 7104120340

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	WH	5	
2	CI	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: _____ AT: _____ Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER _____ #

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN, SB8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

ACTION NO. 419

S E C R E T 241956Z MAR 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 16021

24 Mar IN 295186

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: A. MEXICAN EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1581 (#99460)

*B. GUATEMALA CITY 12912 (IN

1. TO BE READY FOR ANOTHER REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON GUATEMALA BY KDGLACIERS ON BEHALF ECHEVERRIA, TORMET IS PULLING TOGETHER INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUAL PGT AND FAR TARGET PERSONALITIES LOCATED MEXICO. IN CASE OF FAR, OUR KNOWLEDGE THEIR ACTIVITIES MEXICO SO LIMITED FEEL WE HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE IN TRYING BRING GOM DOWN ON HEADS OF LEADING SUSPECTS TO SEE WHAT WE CAN TURN UP. RE PGT, WE PLAN PASS NAMES OF MOST PROMINENT ACTIVISTS, LEAVING OUT KDLADDER-1 AND OTHER SECRET MEMBERS. WE PREPARED PASS INFORMATION ON FUNDING OF PGT BY SOVIETS, INCLUDING IDENTIFICATION OF VALERIY KOSTIKOV AS PGT CONTACT IN SOVIET EMBASSY. ALSO PREPARED USE INFORMATION ON PURCHASE OF ARMS IN U.S. FOR PGT BY CARLOS MANUEL PERZABAL MARCUE. IN BOTH CASES WILL TAILOR INFORMATION IN SUCH A WAY TO INSURE PROTECTION KDLADDER-2.

2. THIS WOULD BE GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE ECHEVERRIA

* BEING SVC'D.

LEE_____
CON 7
CHA 7
CLY_____
DIA D
KAT K
BOB_____
FIL Kostikov
DES_____
RET_____

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ____

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 16021 SECRET

BACKGROUND BRIEF WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE HIM TO TAKE STEPS IN MEXICO AGAINST PGT OR FAR. DEFER TO YOU AS TO WHETHER YOU OR HQS PREPARE IT BUT SUGGEST YOU DO SO.

3. HEADQUARTERS: REALIZING DIFFICULTY YOU HAD MEETING ECHEVERRIA'S PREVIOUS REQUEST, WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE NOT MERELY TRYING TO "BRIEF LIAISON" BUT TO ENCOURAGE ECHEVERRIA TAKE ACTION OF THE SORT COS, GUATEMALA, HAS BEEN SEEKING IN MEXICO FOR SOME TIME. THUS, WOULD APPRECIATE RELAXING PREVIOUS STRICTURES AGAINST PASSAGE OF INFORMATION FOR PURPOSE ACCOMPLISHING AN END WHICH, IT SEEMS TO US, IS TO U.S. ADVANTAGE.

4. IF KDGLACIERS DO NOT ASK US FOR INFORMATION, THINK WE CAN EVENTUALLY COME FORWARD WITH IT ON BASIS PAST REQUESTS (AND ON BASIS RECENT SURVEILLANCE TEAM FLAP IN ARANA'S MEET WITH ECHEVERRIA.

5. GUATEMALA CITY: PLS POUCH PHOTOS ARTURO "CHINO" RIVERA ESCOBAR, PERCY AMILCAR JACOBS DE LEON, AND FRANCISCO ANTONIO VASQUEZ RIVERA, AND ADVISE US OF YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT ABOVE. GP-1

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 3013 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
5-69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____ 129

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 43/44 PER ____

ACTION UNIT WH 5

INFO

FILE. VR. RID [illegible]

SERVICE

ACTION NO.

MEXICO CITY 1[illegible]21
STA & NR

2[illegible] MARCH 71
DATE

2[illegible]1[illegible]-A
IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"REF B. GUATEMALA CITY 12192"

ALSO CORRECT PARA FOUR (4) TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"TEAM FLAP TOO)

WITHOUT REVEALING THAT WE HAVE TAKEN ANY INITIATIVE IN"

SECRET

201-305052
Kostikov
Mexico

FOR PRESS MATERIAL PERTAINING TO SUBJECT OF THIS 201

SEE FILE # 74-126-60/3. (AEASSAULT Program, SB/PO/A, 4D30)

201-305052

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 5 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT SB-8 | INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2

ACTION NO. 921 | FI-2

S E C R E T 222214Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 5743 (Midi)

DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: MEXICO CITY 3712 (IN 125025) 22 Jul 70 IN 127835

1. CUBANA MANIFEST SHOWS VALERIY V. KOSTIKOV RETURNED MEXICO 17 JULY FROM HAVANA ABOARD FLT 464.

2. FILE: 201-305052. GP-1

S E C R E T

AT MC
AB
IN
PJ
PY
D DB
FI

CS COPY

SECRET

22 July 70
201-305052

34742

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY. ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER ________ # ____

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
		8	

ACTION UNIT
SB8

INFO
FILE, VR RI/AN, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI2

ACTION NO.
728

17 JUL 70 1 25025

4

S E C R E T 171921Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3712
(7 JUL 70)

DIRECTOR

0 REDTOP AEKICK

1. VALERIY V. KOSTIKOV (201-305052) UNEXPECTEDLY DEPARTED MEXICO CITY 13 JULY ON COBANA FLT 465. REASON FOR TROP UNKNOWN AND UNEXPECTED. WIFE AND CHILD REMAIN MEXICO.

2. FILE: 201-35052. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN	YE10
AB	XU
IN	
PS	
SX	
~~DES~~	HPD
FI	

CS COPY

SECRET

17 July 70

201-305052

-55 29 Sep. 64 L34-M8-1329 #304
In. 1352 hrs. Casa de Modas Bell (?) talks to KOSTA in Spanish.
Mrs KOSTIKOVA speaks excellent Spanish, ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~.

2.
15-60-55 3 Oct. 64. L34-M8-T535 #122
Out. 2034 hrs. MO (KOSTA) asks to talk to her husband, he answers but starts to fool around talking to her in Spanish, French, English and Russian. Both KOSTIKOV and Roza KOSTIKOVA speaks Spanish well and very little English.

Voice samples,
Kostikov

Voice sample
Kostikov

14-00000

TO

Chief of Station, Mexico City

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

INFO.

FROM

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT REDLEG AEKICK AEBURBLE/Request for Assessment Information on Subject of 201-305052.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: Send Assessment if available.

Reference: A. HMMA-36888, dated 9 April 1969
B. DIRECTOR 021485

In our review of AEBURBLE's Headquarters file, we noted that he has been in a position to provide PAQ (now PCQ per reference B) information on Subject of 201-305052 according to reference A. Please advise if Station can arrange to obtain the PAQ information from LNERGO locally. If not, we will attempt to obtain the assessment information through LNERGO Headquarters.

Milton C. SANTRELLA

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMW-17908

DATE

27 MAY 1970

14 May 1970

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

201-305052

[redacted]

1 - RI-
1 - Chrono
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - CI/OPS/WH
1 - SB/CI/O

AH
AB X
IN
PS
SX
FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE WH/1 TYPIST L.M.Osborne lmr EXT. 4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SB/X/WH	21/5/70	
CI/OPS/WH	21/5/70	F. W. [illegible]
CI/OPS/SB	22 May	[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL C/WH/1 DATE 22 14 May 70 OFFICER'S SIGNATURE John C. Murray

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(40)

DISPATCH

57) Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV: Works in the consular department. He goes out a lot at night and always alone. He travels often in the interior of the republic. He has Mexican friends. He studied philology in the University of Moscow. He is very intelligent and clever in carrying out his work, which he does meticulously, taking every precaution. He apparently belongs to the KGB group. He was in Mexico as a bachelor more than 10 years ago.

58) Roza Aleksandrovna KOSTIKOVA: Wife of above. Speaks very little Spanish. Apparently has no job.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City HGG
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City HMM

SUBJECT
LIAREMA/REDLEG/Confirmation of Contact Between Valery KOSTIKOV (201-305052) and Guatemalan Communist Party Representative in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI.

References: A. HMMA-38449, 10 February 1970.
B. MEXICO CITY 2303, 21 January 1970.

(in contact with Subject of 201-305052)

1. On 10 February 1970 LIREBEL-2 provided the details of his 6 February meeting with Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (201-160430), leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) exile organization in Mexico. LIREBEL-2 reported that he arrived at BALCARCEL's home at 2000 hours on the 6th, and found BALCARCEL about to leave. BALCARCEL requested that LIREBEL-2 take him to a garage where his car was being repaired, which LIREBEL-2 did. Since BALCARCEL's car was not ready, BALCARCEL asked LIREBEL-2 to drive him to a meeting which he had scheduled for 2100 hours with his "Soviet contact." (Note: BALCARCEL had previously told LIREBEL-2 that Valery KOSTIKOV was his contact in the Soviet Embassy.) LIREBEL-2 and BALCARCEL drove to the "Parque Escondido," also known as the "Parque Hundido," located on Insurgentes Sur between Gomez Farias and Millet Streets. LIREBEL-2 parked and BALCARCEL held his meeting with his "Soviet contact" standing on the sidewalk of Gomez Farias Street bordering on the park. The meeting lasted for 30 minutes.

2. BALCARCEL commented after re-joining LIREBEL-2 that his "Soviet contact" had been very upset about a long distance telephone call which he had received from a Guatemalan student. The student had asked to talk to the Soviet by true name and asked him for some information on the Soviet national soccer team, which is scheduled to play some games in Guatemala. The Soviet told BALCARCEL that he had told the student that he could not provide any current information on this subject, and that the student should try to get this information from El Salvador, where the team was to play some games prior to their arrival in Guatemala. BALCARCEL said that the Soviet was angry that this student had asked for him by true name, and he speculated that the University Students Association (AEU) leader who was recently in Mexico (see Reference B) may have been indiscreet in giving his name out to unauthorized persons.

Continued.........

MICROFILMED
FEB 26 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
✓Orig & 1 - C/WHD
1 - COS/Guatemala City
1 - C/SBD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO ~~B 201-160430~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-38463	DATE 13 February 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~201-160430~~ ✓201-305052 ~~cc: 35-4-3~~

3. Addressees will recall that per Reference A, LIENVOY reported that KOSTIKOV received a long distance call on 6 February in which the conversation conformed exactly to that described by BALCARCEL to LIREBEL-2 in paragraph 2 above.

4. It is of interest to note his contact with Subject 201-305052 ~~that past LIENVOY reporting has shown~~ KOSTIKOV setting up clandestine contacts with Alejandro ~~BERMUDEZ Alegria~~ (201-062689), leader of the Nicaraguan Communist Party exile organization in Mexico, and similarly with Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero (201-045172), a Honduran Communist in Mexico. By virtue of these contacts, it appears that at least one of KOSTIKOV's responsibilities is maintaining contact with representatives of Central American Communist Parties in Mexico.

Leonard S. [illegible]
for/Horace E. PRALLETT

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

201-305052

14-00000

2

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, Guatemala City		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM
SUBJECT Phone Call from AEU Representative to Valery KOSTIKOV			

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI.

Reference : MEXICO CITY 2303, 21 January 1970

1. LIENVOY reported that on 6 February 1970 Valery KOSTIKOV (201-305052), 2nd Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, received a long-distance telephone call from Guatemala. The operator asked for KOSTIKOV by name, then told the caller "Mr. MONTENEGRO, I have your call to Mexico ready". When KOSTIKOV came to the phone, the caller stated he was calling on behalf of the Guatemalan University Students Organization, but did not further identify himself. The caller and KOSTIKOV discussed the USSR national soccer team and its scheduled appearance in Guatemala. KOSTIKOV stated he was not certain exactly what date the team was scheduled to arrive in Guatemala, and suggested that the caller contact the soccer federation in El Salvador, where the team would be playing prior to its arrival in Guatemala. The caller also inquired whether there was any information on the Ballet (Reference) and was told that there was none.

2. It should be noted that normally queries concerning the Soviet soccer team or the appearance of a Russian Ballet troupe would be handled by one of the Cultural or Sports Affairs officers of the Embassy. KOSTIKOV's participation in these matters, as reported above, would seem to confirm previous Station reporting that KOSTIKOV handles dealings between the Soviet Embassy in Mexico and Guatemalan leftist organizations.

For: Horace E. PRALLETT

Distribution: Orig. + 1-COS, Guatemala City
2-Chief, WH Division

MICROFILMED
FEB 19 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
0 50-4-124	HMMA-38,449	Typed: 10 February 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-305052 ~~35-8-0~~

2 1970

Kentikow

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM :

SUBJECT : TUMBLEWEED
(65-455)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 6 March 1970.

2. The telephone number (14-16-34) given to Subject as one he could use in contacting the Soviets if necessary, is an unlisted number registered to Rolla WEISS Sajovitz at Liverpool 165-702.

3. This is the same telephone number given to Subject by his Soviet case officers on 4 February 1969, to be used only if it was absolutely necessary to contact the Soviets. We refer you to page 19 of your Memorandum, same Subject as above, dated 1 April 1969.

4. Our coverage of Rolla WEISS Sajovitz is continuing. We would like to be informed if Subject is given a new address to be used as a letter drop in Mexico City.

#14,210

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL FROM THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

Grace H. FARNSWORTH:mes (23 March 1970)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - P-2296
1 - P-12,375
1 - Memo chrono
2 - Hqs pouch (return to SB/SEC)

792502

305052

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION · CLASSIFIED MESSAGE / TOTAL COPIES 3) ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 75/21 PER SOP .117

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. FEB 25 1970

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

1	WH	5	
2	DF	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/SB 5 INFO FILE, VR DDP ADDP C/SC C/CI C/WH 2

ACTION NO. 182

S E C R E T 252314Z FEB 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2565

DIRECTOR

RYBAT REDTOP AEMIDRIFF FJPASTIME

26 FEB IN 031930

REF: MEXICO CITY 2557 (IN 031735)

1. PER REF, AEMIDRIFF CONTINUED REVIEW OF PHOTOS WITH HQS DEBRIEFER AND LITEMPO-14. REVIEW OF 83 PHOTOS (INCLUDING WIVES) DURING 20 AND 21 FEBRUARY SESSIONS PROVIDES FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS IN ADDITION TO OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WAS ALREADY KNOWN:

VALENTIN BAKULIN: CHIEF OF ONE OF AEGRIP SECTIONS. EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA FROM PRIOR TOURS BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA.

LEV GOLOUZOV: WORKS UNDER BAKULIN (WHICH TENDS CONFIRM AEGRIP STATUS PREVIOUSLY SUSPECTED). WHILE DRUNK AND NASTY, INFORMED AEMIDRIFF SHE BEING SENT HOME.

SERGEY PROVOROV: WORKS UNDER BAKULIN. AEGRIP.

NIKOLAY SOKOLOV: CHIEF OF REFERENTURA.

LYUDMILA SHAPOVALOVA: WORKS UNDER SOKOLOV IN REFERENTURA. SERVED IN CUBA AT ONE TIME.

ALEKSANDR KOZLOV: WORKS IN REFERENTURA UNDER SOKOLOV. IN CHARGE OF PHOTO PROCESSING AND MICROFILMING. ALSO WORKS AT INTERNAL SECURITY AND AS WATCHDOG. HAPPY AND AGREEABLE PERSON.

LEE

BOB

JACK

JERRY

TRISH

KATHY

DIANA

BARB

KATHY

FILE

DESTROY

RETURN TO.

P&L DISSEM

RYBAT

CS COPY

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT
INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2565 SECRET

VLADIMIR TSERADZE: WORKS IN REFERENTURA BUT IS ALSO UNDER ORDERS OF BAKULIN. TIMID, DOMINATED BY WIFE.

YURIY ROMANENKO: WORKS IN REFERENTURA. FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES PAVEL KOVALEV OUT AT NIGHT. DRINKS A LOT AND HAS TROUBLE WITH WIFE BECAUSE OF IT.

YURIY KUPLYAKOV: HAS JOB SIMILAR TO KOLOMYAKOV'S. VERY IMPORTANT PERSON WITHIN EMBASSY AND HAS ACCESS TO REFERENTURA. VERY REFINED AND CULTURED. MANY IICMU CONTACTS THROUGHOUT MEXICO AND ALSO CULTIVATES FRIENDSHIPS WITH DIRECTORS OF MUSEUMS, LIBRARIES AND OTHER SUCH INSTITUTIONS.

BORIS CHMYKOV: VERY EXPERIENCED. SEEMS TO HAVE PERFORMED BRILLIANTLY IN PAST WITH NO FAILURES. SOMETHING OF A LADIES' MAN AND HAS, ON OCCASION, BEEN MIXED UP IN INTERNAL SCANDAL. ENAMORED OF SOKOLINA. TRAVELS FREQUENTLY THROUGHOUT MEXICO.

VLADISLAV KORMUSHKIN: AEKICK. SERVED IN BRAZIL, SEVERAL MONTHS IN FRANCE AND FOUR TO SIX MONTHS IN ARGENTINA. SPEAKS SPANISH, FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE.

VALERIY KOSTIKOV: AEKICK

OLEG KOROLEV: AEKICK

VLADIMIR MAKAROV: NOT CERTAIN, BUT PROBABLY AEGRIP. HOWEVER, FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES BOLSHAKOV. APPEARS COLD AND CRUEL. ONE

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 2565 S E C R E T

OF AEMIDRIFF'S WATCHDOGS DURING JANUARY 1970. SPENT TIME IN RED CHINA.

IOAKIM BULAVIN: ASSIGNED TO COMMERCIAL OFFICE BUT DOES NOT PHYSICALLY WORK THERE. PROBABLY WORKS FOR KOLOMYAKOV, AEKICK REZIDENT.

SERGEY VERBENYEV: RIS, SERVICE UNKNOWN. PERFORMS INTERNAL SECURITY AND WATCHDOG FUNCTIONS.

VLADIMIR GORDEYEV: BELIEVES HE AEKICK WORKING FOR SOKOLOV AND KOLOMYAKOV.

PAVEL KOVALEV: CONSIDERS HIM DANGEROUS. SPEAKS SPANISH AND ENGLISH ALMOST WITHOUT ACCENT. HAS MANY FRIENDS IN GOVERNACION.

ANATOLIY STEKLYANNIKOV: BACHELOR. BODYGUARD FOR KOVALEV. WORKED FOR SECRET POLICE IN MOSCOW AFTER THREE YEARS IN MILITARY. WILL RETURN MOSCOW SOON.

KONSTANTIN BOGATYREV: CHIEF OF ALL GROUPS OF MILITARY INTEL IN MEXICO. (AEMIDRIFF PREVIOUSLY INDENTIFIED CHMYKOV AS AEGRIP CHIEF. STATION BELIEVES CHMYKOV POSSIBLY CHIEF FOR THOSE UNDER CIVILIAN COVER BUT JUNIOR TO BOGATYREV.)

OLEG SHEVCHENKO: SPEAKS SPANISH WITH ARGENTINE ACCENT. THIS IS FIRST TOUR IN LATIN AMERICA.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 2565 S E C R E T

VALENTIN LOGINOV: ALTHOUGH HAD AFFAIR WITH AEMIDRIFF, RECALL SIX MONTHS EARLY WAS DUE TO SOME FAILURE AND NOT TO AFFAIR.

VALERIY SOKOLIN: RECALLED SIX MONTHS EARLY DUE TO SOME FAILURE ALSO.

VIKTOR IVANOV: LIKED TO LIVE WELL. OWNED 27 SUITS AND OFTEN CHANGED TWO OR THREE TIMES A DAY. GOOD FRIEND OF OCTAVIANO CAMPOS SALAS, SECRETARY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE. NOW IN MOSCOW IN CHARGE EXPORTING FURS FOR SOYUZPUSHNINA.

BORIS KAZANTSEV: SERVED IN CUBA WHERE HAD SOME PROBLEM OR FLAP DUE TO DRINKING AND HIS CHARACTER. DOMINATED BY WIFE WHO INFLUENCES MANY OF HIS DECISIONS. WIFE WORKS AS TYPIST IN REFERENTURA. SHE VERY JEALOUS OF HUSBAND, YET FLIRTS WITH YOUNGER OFFICERS WHICH HAS CAUSED MARITAL PROBLEMS.

FEDOR YEVESYEV: BELIEVES HE RIS, PROBABLY AEGRIP. BODYGUARD FOR AMBASSADOR AND CURRENTLY FOR CHARGE. BELIEVES HE HAS NO OTHER FUNCTION.

MIKHAIL DAVIDOVSKIY: GRADUATED MFA ACADEMY ABOUT THREE YEARS GO, MEXIC IS FIRST POST. AEKICK. HAS ACCESS TO REFERENTURA. FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES KAZANTSEV AND YEVSEYEV.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 2565 SECRET

HAS MARITAL PROBLEMS DUE TO NEUROTIC WIFE AND FACT HE HAS, BY FORMER WIFE, EIGHT YEAR OLD CHILD WHO MENTALLY RETARDED FROM INFANTILE PARALYSIS.

DMITRIY DYAKONOV: MEMBER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE CPSU. BELIEVES HE AEKICK. HAS MANY FRIENDS IN GOBERNACION AND RELACIONES EXTERIORES. SERVED IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL. MORE REFINED AND INTELLIGENT THAN PRESENT CHARGE, KAZANTSEV.

BORISKOLOMYAKOV: AEKICK REZIDENT, THIRED IN IMPORTANCE IN EMBASSY. GRADUATE ACCOUNTANT, SERVED AS ACCOUNTANT IN USSR, ARGENTINA AND FIRST TOUR MEXICO. RETURNED TO MEXICO AS REZIDENT. VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD, STRONG PRINCIPLES. DRINKS MODERATELY. CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS WITH ARGENTINE DIPLOMATS. FREQUENTLY TRAVELS WITH KAZANTSEV, SOMETIMES WITH BOLSHAKOV.

YEVGENIY FEDIN: FOURTH IN IMPORTANCE IN EMBASSY. FREQUENTLY WORKS IN REFERENTURA. HAS FEW FRIENDS WITHIN EMBASSY BECAUSE OF FICKLE CHARACTER, AND FACT HE AT ROOT OF MANY INTERNAL INTRIGUES BY SENDING ANONYMOUS ACCUSATORY LETTERS.

VALERIY NIKOLAYENKO: AEKICK. IN CHARGE OF ASSIGNING HOUSING AND FURNISHINGS. SPENT SIX MONTHS IN CUA AS EMPLOYEE, RATHER THAN DIPLOMAT, BEFORE MEXICO. ATTENDED MFA ACADEMY IN MOSCOW.

2. FILE: 201-835670. GP-1 SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WH Division

INFO.

Chief of Station, Guatemala City
Chief, SB Division

FROM

Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT

LIARENA/REDLEG/Confirmation of Contact Between Valery KOSTIKOV (201-305052) and Guatemalan Communist Party Representative in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI.

JH. Jerry

2. Kostikov 201

References: A. HMMW-38449, 10 February 1970.
B. MEXICO CITY 2303, 21 January 1970.

1. On 10 February 1970 LIREBEL-2 provided the details of his 6 February meeting with Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (201-160430), leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) exile organization in Mexico. LIREBEL-2 reported that he arrived at BALCARCEL's home at 2000 hours on the 6th, and found BALCARCEL about to leave. BALCARCEL requested that LIREBEL-2 take him to a garage where his car was being repaired, which LIREBEL-2 did. Since BALCARCEL's car was not ready, BALCARCEL asked LIREBEL-2 to drive him to a meeting which he had scheduled for 2100 hours with his "Soviet contact." (Note: BALCARCEL had previously told LIREBEL-2 that Valery KOSTIKOV was his contact in the Soviet Embassy.) LIREBEL-2 and BALCARCEL drove to the "Parque Escondido," also known as the "Parque Hundido," located on Insurgentes Sur between Gomez Farias and Millet Streets. LIREBEL-2 parked and BALCARCEL held his meeting with his "Soviet contact" standing on the sidewalk of Gomez Farias Street bordering on the park. The meeting lasted for [illegible]0 minutes.

2. BALCARCEL commented after re-joining LIREBEL-2 that his "Soviet contact" had been very upset about a long distance telephone call which he had received from a Guatemalan student. The student had asked to talk to the Soviet by true name and asked him for some information on the Soviet national soccer team, which is scheduled to play some games in Guatemala. The Soviet told BALCARCEL that he had told the student that he could not provide any current information on this subject, and that the student should try to get this information from El Salvador, where the team was to play some games prior to their arrival in Guatemala. BALCARCEL said that the Soviet was angry that this student had asked for him by true name, and he speculated that the University Students Association (AEU) leader who was recently in Mexico (see Reference B) may have been indiscreet in giving his name out to unauthorized persons.

Continued.........

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/WHD
1 - COS/Guatemala City
② - C/SBD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-38463	13 February 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-160430 201-305052 cc: 35-4-3

3. Addressees will recall that per Reference A, LIENVOY reported that KOSTIKOV received a long distance call on 6 February in which the conversation conformed exactly to that described by BALCARCEL to LIREBEL-2 in paragraph 2 above.

4. It is of interest to note that past LIENVOY reporting has shown KOSTIKOV setting up clandestine contacts with Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria (201-062689), leader of the Nicaraguan Communist Party exile organization in Mexico, and similarly with Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero (201-045172), a Honduran Communist in Mexico. By virtue of these contacts, it appears that at least one of KOSTIKOV's responsibilities is maintaining contact with representatives of Central American Communist Parties in Mexico.

for/Horace E. PRALLETT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, SB Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SB/X/WH

SUBJECT: REDLEG
LISACK Progress Report, 1 July - 30 September 1969

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-37451, 1 July 1969

1. Operations

Under this roof project, operations continue to be directed against the HMMARSH target and, on occasions, Bloc targets. Activities covered by the Project include providing information on HMMARSHers, their activities, personalities, visitors, and contacts (LISACK-2, -4, -6, and LICOWL-1); serving as access agents (LICRAVE-1, -2, -3, LIROCKET-1, and BESABER); spotting, assessing and occasionally recruiting access agents (LIEMPTY-3); providing information on DMLET activities (DMPETAL-1) and BEDOX activities (BESABER); and performing such other tasks as may be required on an ad hoc basis (LISACK-7 and all other assets of the Project).

2. Administration

As assets take on a permanent character in terms of expenditure or other continuing administration, they are transferred from SB/OOA to LISACK for orderly handling. Beginning with this reporting period, and as outlined in the LISACK Project Renewal, BESABER, DMPETAL, and LICOWL-1 were transferred from SB/OOA to LISACK. Details of the functions, security, and meeting procedures are reported below for each asset.

Distribution:
② - C/WH
1 - C/SB

Copy to SB/X/WH

CS COPY

201-305052

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-38126	18 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	✓ ~~50-6-144/3~~

3. Assets

a. LICRAVE-1, -2, and -3: The activities of these assets have been covered in detail in recent and continuing correspondence dealing with AETAKEOFF. Please see HMMA-38064 of 5 November 1969.

b. BESABER: During the reporting period, BESABER was met six times. When he travels to Mexico City, meetings are held in his hotel room at a pre-arranged hour using a telephone code to establish the location. On occasions, he is met at his home in Cuernavaca. BESABER is currently targetted against Subject of 201-268115, with whom he has re-established a good social relationship. Through Subject of 201-268115 he also met Subject of 201-276184, Chief of the Referentura. In addition to serving as an access agent to Subject of 201-268115, he has fulfilled spot requirements such as providing information on Centro Intercultural de Documentacion (CIDOC) and personalities of Station interest. Although BESABER has a fairly good social relationship with the BEDOX Ambassador and his wife and has entree to other BEDOXers and MHHARSHers, we are having him concentrate his efforts on the higher priority MHHARSHer, Subject of 201-268115.

c. LICOWL-1: He was met routinely once a month during the reporting period. Each meeting date is established at the preceding meeting and no further contact or confirmation is required. LICOWL-1 arrives by bus at a car pick-up point and is then driven by the case officer to a small coffee shop where he reviews his diary with the case officer. Due to the nature of his job and the level of his access, LICOWL-1 is not in a position to do more currently than to report on the brief encounters he has with MHHARSHers who come into his store. His reports normally consist of his assessment of personalities, description of new arrivals and, occasionally, biographic information he has been able to pick up. He also gives timely reports of demonstrations and other unusual activity in the vicinity of the MHHARSH installation.

d. LIEMPTY-3: LIEMPTY-3 is met at irregular intervals at various out-of-the-way restaurants for the purpose of briefing and debriefing on operational assignments and discussion of his written reports. Meetings are arranged by phone using open code. His most recent assignment has been the development, assessment, and recruitment of 201-810981. LIEMPTY-3 has few peers at the art of developing an operational lead, but his extensive operational activity in past years against the MHHARSH target has required that he be used sparingly, selectively, and always under alias. Development of 201-810981 has been his only assignment during the reporting period, and LIEMPTY-3 made good early progress. Purporting to be the representative of a film club for architects, LIEMPTY-3 was able to get 201-810981 to agree to become a consultant. Thereafter, LIEMPTY-3 continued to ask questions about 201-810981's work, to the point where 201-810981 realized that more than a film club for architects was involved. At this point it was decided to let LIEMPTY-3 break cover, recruit 201-810981 to supply information on the work of his office (but not--at this point--the people in his office), and continue to handle him until the recruitment was firm and previous questions about the stability and reliability of 201-810981 had been resolved. This was done, and 201-810981 accepted recruitment, knowing that WOLADY intelligence was involved. LIEMPTY-3 held several meetings with 201-810981 after recruitment, and countersurveillance did not reveal any signs of MHHARSH surveillance. For about a month, however, LIEMPTY-3 has not been able to contact 201-810981, and it is possible that the latter has developed cold feet. If LIEMPTY-3 can reestablish contact, he will continue to handle this case for the time being. If he is unable to reestablish contact, he will be given another lead to follow up. LIEMPTY-3 is a very active person who has an extremely full business day, with many contacts. The Station believes that within this busy "cover" life, LIEMPTY-3 can handle selected operational tasks without coming to hostile attention. As long as proper security precautions are taken by him in his operational activities, and by him and the Station officer (who meets him in alias) in their meetings, there is no reason why LIEMPTY-3 cannot be a useful part-time contributor to the Station's REDTOP program for the foreseeable future.

e. LIROCKET-1:

1) LIROCKET-1 is met monthly, time and place arranged at the previous meeting. During these meetings he is debriefed on his twice-weekly teaching sessions at the MHHARSH Embassy. His regular student has been the Subject of 201-028975, and he has had occasional dealings with other MHHARSHers, particularly AESEASICK. The meetings with 201-028063 have not been of particular interest, and we had been waiting impatiently for the latter's replacement to arrive, so that LIROCKET-1 would have a better target to work on. It was LIROCKET-1 who came up with the first local confirmation of the identity of this replacement (MEXICO CITY 1105, 2 August 1969). Dealings with AESEASICK have been concerned with attempts by the director of the school where LIROCKET-1 teaches to borrow sociological films from the MHHARSH film office.

2) It now appears, however, that LIROCKET-1 has reached the end of the line. For some time he has been involved in a rather messy divorce action, and in August LIROCKET-1 reported that his wife had denounced him to Mexican authorities as an RVROCK agent (a few months previously, she had denounced him as an MHHARSH agent). LIROCKET-1 was not inclined to take his wife's ravings too seriously since he considered her slightly nuts. However, LIENVOY reported that on 16 September 1969 LIROCKET-1's wife called 201-028975 and told him she had to see him urgently on something of extreme interest about her husband. 201-028975 told her to come to the Embassy, which she did, and she presumably repeated her accusation. Since that time, LIROCKET-1 has received a polite brush-off. He has been told that the MHHARSH Embassy has run out of funds for English language training, and that there would be no more lessons unless 201-028975's replacement, or the new Ambassador (when and if one arrives) wanted to rehire him. He was told, however, to check in regularly, and he was given, as usual, an invitation to the annual MHHARSH national day reception (he did not attend because he was ill). LIROCKET-1 has not spoken with 201-028975 since his wife's visit--all dealings have been through AEPOLYP, who has for some time been the paymaster for LIROCKET-1.

3) LIROCKET-1 was not aware of his wife's visit, and even after the case officer, without telling him that we knew of the visit, brought LIROCKET-1 around to the conclusion that she might have done this, he still does not think that she spilled the beans to 201-028975. (It is apparent that the MHHARSHers, whether or not they believe Mrs. LIROCKET-1's story, have concluded that LIROCKET-1 represents a security hazard, and they are simply going to drop him. LIROCKET-1 will continue to press the MHHARSHers for an answer regarding his future with them, and if, as suspected, they keep putting him off, he will be instructed to break contact and he will be terminated by the Station.)

4) Other than the blowing of LIROCKET-1 himself, little damage has been done. The wife has never seen the current case officer and knows none of the meeting arrangements or other

details, and neither she nor LIROCKET-1 knows the true name of any of LIROCKET-1's past or present handlers. Necessary security precautions have been taken at all meetings with LIROCKET since his wife's conversation with 201-028975, and there have been no signs of MHHARSH surveillance.

f. DMPETAL-1: She has been met weekly for a total of 13 times during the period. Meeting hours are prearranged and the location is always a safehouse. Her normal function has been to report on the activities at the DMLET installation where she is employed as the secretary to the DMLET Ambassador. In addition, she performed some casing and investigation in support of the AETAKEOFF audio operation. Since the DMLET target is of low priority, DMPETAL-1 has been attempting to increase her usefulness to us by trying to obtain a job in the office of the President of the PRI, the ruling political party, with excellent prospects for success.

Paid?.

g. LISACK-2: Until he lost his job in September, he was the resident administrator of the apartment building in which both AEMERGER and AEMAESTRO reside. Meetings were held bi-weekly for a total of four times, pre-arranged by telephone call several days in advance to his office in a publishing firm. Meeting location was a restaurant/cafe and meetings normally lasted about thirty minutes. He provided information on the activities of these two MHHARSHers and their families, license plate numbers, and descriptions of visitors.

h. LISACK-4: He is the portero of the apartment building in which Subject of 201-305870 resides. He maintains a daily log of the movements and activities of this and other MHHARSHers, and he reports the license plates and description of visitors to the building. He was met weekly for a total of 12 times, always in a small restaurant within walking distance of the downtown office where he works a half day. Meeting hours are pre-arranged to permit LISACK-4 to attend on the way to or from this second job. He compensates for his lack of formal education by responsiveness to case officer direction, natural intelligence and cooperation.

i. LISACK-6: He is the portero of the building in which Subjects of 201-837203 and 201-788861 (who took the apartment of Subject of 201-205304) reside. He maintains a daily log of these two MHHARSHers, their families and visitors. He was met 12 times during the period. Since he cannot be absent from the building for over thirty minutes without arousing suspicion, meetings are always for a brief ten minutes and are held in a nearby park. As has been reported, the case officer who handles LISACK-6 became the target of unknown surveillance in August, and again in October, following meetings with LISACK-6. The Station believes that the surveillance was accidental, in that the meeting place was in a neighborhood frequented by male and female prostitutes and other undesirable characters. In any event, LISACK-6 has been put on ice, to be revived if the occupants of his building become higher priority targets.

j. LISACK-7: She was not met during the reporting period. She remains a "reserve asset" for special requirements in the real estate field for such potential uses as safehouse rental, key acquisitions and locating tenants when needed. Although there is no immediate requirement for her talents, we would like to maintain her Operational Approval so that she can be called on as a cleared asset when needed.

4. Problems

There are no problems connected with this Project.

14-00000

5. Security

There are no known unresolved problems of security. The security problems relating to LIROCKET-1 and LISACK-C (discussed above) are under control with no adverse effects noted.

6. Plans

a. There are several assets of the REDTOP section who have been carried under SB/COA for a fairly long period of time. Since the targets of their access change from time to time, as well as the nature of the information they provide, we do not believe they warrant special or new projects to cover them. We do believe, however, that they should be brought under a project to facilitate orderly reporting and administration without resorting to separato progress reports on each.

b. Since their activities closely parallel those of assets already covered by LISACK, we believe it would be logical to include LIROBBIN-1 and -2, LIORDER-1 and Subject of 201-843659 (on whom we are awaiting an Operational Approval) in this Project. Although none of these is paid a salary, such a change will require some cost amendment to the Project to account for minor operational expenses which have heretofore been charged to SB/COA. Separate correspondence will follow on these assets.

c. There are several additional assets currently in the developmental stage who may eventually be administered under LISACK. These include Subject of HMMA-37742 of 28 August 1969, targetted against AEPOLYP; Subject of 201-851552, targetted against AEMERGER; Subject of 201-848881, currently in social contact with Subjects of 201-259583 and 201-029068 under Station direction; and Subject of 201-859225, who reports on his contacts with Subjects of 201-305052 and 201-744341, among other MHHARSHers.

Timothy M. Archbold
for/John A. PROBERT

201-305052

~~50-6-144/3~~

entitled [illegible] que trabaja poco" ("Russian Embassy in Mexico has a large staff which does little work") Cy sent to 201 in Aug 69 with translation.

vv - SB/PO/A z6495

3

"EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO"

One article in "La

Viernes 17 de enero de 1969

Las "Instalaciones Diplomáticas" Rusas en Lima

Por CARLOS MONTIEL

En una carta llegada a esta redacción, periodistas peruanos me informan que, enterados de mi artículo del 11 de enero "Ahora Perú", preguntaron al Canciller de aquel país, Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, si la llegada de una misión comercial rusa a tierras peruanas sería sólo la primera entrega de otra misión más importante, la de una representación diplomática soviética.

En ese artículo comentaba que miembros de la Embajada moscovita en México, habían asegurado en los corrillos sociales de esta ciudad, que en menos de dos semanas Perú establecería relaciones diplomáticas con el Kremlin, a nivel de embajada.

Según me informan en esa misiva, apenas tres días después, el 14 de enero, el diario limeño "La Prensa", confirmó en su primera plana la noticia que comenté en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, y que obtuve gracias a la indiscreción de los diplomáticos soviéticos que figuran en el "circuito coctelero" que aquí se lleva al cabo por los embajadores y encargados de negocios de las naciones extranjeras.

Recuerdo que también en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, el colega Alonso Fonseca G. publicó el 20 de diciembre una nota titulada "Alegres Diplomáticos", con la divertida historia de la "juerga de Vladislav Kuromovshkin y Valeri Kosuzov, agregado y segundo secretario, respectivamente, de la embajada rusa en México, quienes la empezaron "entre burbujas de vinos caros en la zona rosa de la ciudad de México, y se vieron obligados a ponerle fin en Ciudad Victoria entre sus insultos a México bajo inmunidad diplomática". Al parecer los diplomáticos soviéticos no sólo han renunciado a ser decentes, sino que también están [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]-cea.

El Canciller peruano, Mercado Jarrín, quien anunció la llegada de la misión comercial rusa, respondió a la pregunta de los periodistas con un lacónico "oportunamente tendrán información si es que el Gobierno decide dar ese paso" (el de establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS). Antes de que el Gobierno de Lima "decida dar ese paso", quisiéramos pasarle traslado de estos dos párrafos que el periodista Bernardo Escalante acaba de publicar en un artículo de "El Sol de Mexico" (14 de enero de 1969), bajo el título: "La Embajada Misteriosa".

"Lo extraño está en que la Embajada de la URSS es una de las que cuentan con personal más numeroso y las que menor quehacer tienen. Las dependencias contadas que tienen trato con el público —sección consular, sección cultural, agencia turística— laboran sólo cuatro horas a la semana. Con los dedos de la mano se podrán contar los mexicanos que en un año van a solicitar una visa. El comercio entre Mexico y la URSS es casi nulo. Las "relaciones culturales", como todos lo saben, consisten sólo en hacer propaganda "de allá para acá", ya que en los dominios de Brezhnev y de Kosygin ni idea tienen de lo que es México".

"¿A qué se dedica, pues, ese enjambre de personal ruso —en esa Embajada en que no trabaja un sólo mexicano y hasta la servidumbre es soviética— en esa enorme mansión que podía ser guarida de vampiros? El misterio sube de punto si se toma en cuenta que la Embajada de Mexico en Moscú apenas si está integrada por unas seis o siete personas, y en cambio la URSS mantiene aquí más de un centenar. ¿Por qué la URSS tiene una Embajada tan numerosa en nuestro país, si hace lo mismo que la nuestra en Moscú?

201-305052

14-00000

UNIT: WH/1 3E04
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 15 October 1969

SECRET

2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 41 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T

16 23 24 Oct 69

CITE DIRECTOR 47091

TO MEXICO CITY

REDLEG AEKICK

REF: MEXICO CITY-1672 (IN 64675)*

1. SUBJECT REF ASSIGNED 201-859225. HQS TRACES FOLLOW:

A) HMMA-30563, 17 NOV 66. SUBJECT IN SOCIAL AND BUSINESS CONTACT WITH 201-756168, KNOWN KGB.

B) HMM-10877, 30 NOV 66. SUBJECT IN CONTACT WITH SOVIET EMBASSY CONCERNING TRAVEL OF SOVIET TOURISTS.

C) HMMA-31965, 9 MAY 67. SUBJECT AND 201-744341, KNOWN KGB, IN APPARENT FREQUENT PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONTACT. BOTH WERE PLANNING TO MEET LATER WITH 201-202379, KNOWN KGB.

2. POA ACTIONS BEING DEFERRED PENDING FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF CASE. INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF SUBJECT ENCOURAGING, BUT IN VIEW OF REPORTED CONTACTS WITH KGB STAFFERS, SINCE 1966, BELIEVE CASE BEST HANDLED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CSI-F-10-5, PARA 19. COVERT NAME CHECKS IN PROCESS.

3. FILE: 201-859225.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

RIG:
NIT:
CT:
ATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS	SEEN BY
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE DIRECTOR 47091

PAGE TWO

WH Comments: *Heriberto SAGREDO Mugica, Senior Sales Rep. for Sabena Airlines in Mexico City, has good access to a number of Soviet KGB Staffers.

(Soviets above are: 1 a., Leonid V. NIKIFOROV; 1 c., Vladislav S. KORMUSHKIN and Aleksandr V. PRIKHODKO.)

SB/X/WH Davis
SB/CI/O
CI/OPS/WH
CI/OA
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

5
4
3
2
1

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES (20)   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	WH	6	
2	C1	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 33 PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION WH 8

☐ RID COPY

INFO. FILE VR. R/AN, SB 8, CI/OA

317

S E C R E T 132342Z OCT 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1672

DIRECTOR

13 Oct 69 IN 64675
U

REDLEG

1. REQUEST TRACES, POA HERIBERTO SAGREDO MUGICA, MEXICAN CITIZEN DPOB: 13 JAN 32, MEXICO, D.F. HE IS EMPLOYED LOCALLY AS SENIRO SALED REP FOR SABENA AIRLINES AND IS CURRENTLY APPLYING FOR POSITION OF MANAGER OF CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES IN GUADALAJARA.

2. SAGREDO IS IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCAIL CONTACT WITH VARIOUS MHHARSHERS, AMONG THEM, SUBJECTS OF 201-305052 Restricted AND 201-744341. Kormushkin HE HAS BEEN CONTACTED AND ASSESSED AS COOPERATIVE, RELIABLE AND TRUSTWORHTHY BY BRUCE H. FERNALD (P) AND HAS PROVIDED INITIAL REPORTS ON HIS CONTACTS WITH MHHARSHERS.

3. WILL FORWARD PRQ APRTS I AND II WHEN COMPLETED.

4. FILE 201-SAGREDO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ________ #

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	WH	5	CI
2	S/C	6	
3		7	
4		8	

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN, SB 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ACTION NO. 303

S E C R E T 012230Z OCT 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1547

1 Oct 69 IN 56648

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

LIARENA REDLEG

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 1433 (IN 55393)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 0754 (IN 56342)

C. MEXICO CITY 1102 (IN 15322)

1. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED 30 SEPT HE CONTACTED BY JORGE ANTONIO (CRUZ) ROJAS AND CARLOS ENRIQUE (RODRIGUEZ) ECALANTE 28 SEPT. CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIREBEL-2 THEY HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM GUATEMALA AND HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY PGT CONTACT LIREBEL-2 UPON ARRIVAL HERE. CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ REQUESTED LIREBEL-2 ARRANGE FOR MEETING WITH JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-160430) SO THAT BALCARCEL COULD ARRANGE FOR ONWARD TRAVEL CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ TO PATRICE LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY IN MOSCOW.

2. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED HE PASSED ABOVE MESSAGE TO BALCARCEL 29 SEPT. BALCARCEL ADVISED LIREBEL-2 TELL CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ GO TO SOVIET EMBASSY AND ASK FOR VALERY KOSTIKOV (201-305052), WITH MESSAGE THAT "THEY SENT BY SRA. MARTHA." KOSTIKOV WOULD THEN MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRAVEL TO USSR. BALCARCEL ALSO TOLD LIREBEL-2 THAT KOSTIKOV WOULD GIVE CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ AN ENVELOPE

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 1547 SECRET

FOR THEM TO DELIVER TO LIREBEL-2, AND THAT LIREBEL-2 SHOULD DELIVER THIS ENVELOPE TO BALCARCEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. LIREBEL-2 SHOWED ENVELOPE TO TORVESTAD, WHICH HE REPORTED HE HAD RECEIVED FROM CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ MORNING 30 SEPT. ENVELOPE CONTAINED THREE STAPLES AND HAD SCOTCH TAPE ALONG FLAP AND COMPLETELY AROUND ENVELOPE. UNDER TAPE ALONG FLAP WAS SHORT, WAVY INK LINE. DUE APPARENT TRAP AND FACT LIREBEL-2 FELT HAD TO GET ENVELOPE TO BALCARCEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, NO ATTEMPT MADE TO OPEN IT. HOWEVER, TORVESTAD CERTAIN ENVELOPE CONTAINED MONEY PLUS SOME NOTES. LIREBEL-2 TO ATTEMPT TO SEE WHAT IN ENVELOPE WHEN HE DELIVERS IT TO BALCARCEL.

4. ACCORDING LIREBEL-2, CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ DEPARTED MEXICO CITY VIA AIR FRANCE ON 30 SEPT, EN ROUTE TO MOSCOW.

5. LIREBEL-2 ALSO REPORTED ANA MARIA (GOMAR) VILLACORTA DE ORTIZ SCHEDULED DEPART MEXICO CITY 4 OCT. FOR GUATEMALAN FRONTIER BY BUS. STATION WILL FORWARD PRIORITY ANY CHANGE GOMAR TRAVEL PLANS OR CONTACT PLAN FORWARDED REF A.

6. INDEX CRUZ, RODRIGUEZ FILE : 201-160430, 201-305052.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SB Division

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP AEKICK
Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: MEXICO CITY 1102, 1 August 1969

1. LIFIRE reported that Subject had departed for Moscow on 29 July 1969. Previously LIENVOY had reported that Subject would be going to Moscow for approximately one week. Subject's wife did not accompany Subject to the USSR. LIFIRE reported that KOSTIKOV returned to Mexico City on 18 August 1969 on Air France flight 707.

2. The reason for Subject's trip to Moscow is unknown, but such TDYs are unusual.

Grace H. Parmilent
for/John A. PROBERT

SB TRAVEL INPUT PROGRAM

Distribution:
2 - C/SB
1 - C/WH

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-37839

DATE: 17 September 1969

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052

SECRET

24 SEP 1969

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: KOSTIKOV, Valeri Vladimyrovich 201-305052

1. Reference is made to your request dated 25 August 1969 concerning Subject.

2. The files of this office contain the following information concerning Subject. On 19 September 1961 Subject arrived in Mexico City, Mexico, as an employee of the USSR Embassy. Subject was subsequently promoted to the rank of Vice Consul, and as of March 1963, held the position of Consular Attache. Subject was reassigned to Moscow on 4 August 1965. On 13 September 1968 Subject was again assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, this time as a Second Secretary of the Embassy. Subject is currently serving in this position.

3. In a report from a reliable source dated 27 June 1967, Source stated that Subject was in constant contact with Alejandro BERMUDEZ ALEGRIA, the leader of the Nicaraguan Communist Party (PCN), while the latter was in Mexico City during June and July 1965.

Nc 201

→ CIT: NICARAGUA
A NICARAGUA

SUBJ. MENTIONED AS CONTACT OF ONE [redacted] VALERI V. KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

IN TRACE REPLY ON
KOSTIKOV SENT:
TO [redacted] STATE
DEPT. CONTACTS
BETWEEN THE TWO
TOOK PLACE IN
MEXICO CITY
JUN AND JUL 65

4. On 13 December 1968, a reliable source reported that Subject and another member of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City were arrested in Ciudad Victoria, Mexico, on 12 December 1968 for physically assaulting four Mexican citizens with whom Subject and the second Soviet had been socializing. Subject and the second Soviet claimed diplomatic immunity and were released by the Mexican authorities.

MICROFILMED
DEC 16 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-305052

CS COPY

SECRET

5. Based on his activities and associations while in Mexico City, Mexico, this office considers Subject to be a staff officer of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).

6. For additional information concerning Subject, you are referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

CSCI-316/03381-69

~~Encl. 1 name check~~

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation
with copy of name check

RID/CE: JKS/EGV/akc

BASED ON: 201-305052*

para 2: 201-305052*

para 3: 201-305052
HMMA-32359
27 June 1967

para 4: 201-305052
MEXI-8437
13 December 1968

para 5: 201-305052*

FILE IN: 201-305052

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

COPY REQUEST - Original is dated 7/25/69

TO: CIA

FROM:

DATE

FULL NAME (Married woman include maiden name): Valeri Vladimyrovich KOSTIKOV 305052

ALIASES, NICKNAMES:

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: March 17, 1933 Moscow

HOME ADDRESS: previous check 7/3/61

SEX: m

CITIZENSHIP: Soviet

MARITAL STATUS:

SPOUSE'S NAME:

OCCUPATION:

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER:

HTB

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

①

Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

C-3 visa issued; arriving NY July 29, 1969 via Air France flight 700. Departing for Moscow July 30, 1969 via Aeroflot 001.

SB/BIO
1. #18973 -memo [redacted]
2. Ref-ND

Ref 26/8/69 GB

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE: Visa Office

DATE: 8/25/69

NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER: SCA:VO:BWDuncan

TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM:

FEDIN, Evgeni I.

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FILE IN 201-305052

10 Sept. 1969
EJU

SB	SB/CI/O	
SB	SB/X/DC	
SB	SB/X/WH	
WH	WH/1	cms

3

26 AUG 1969

FORM DS-939
9-65

201-305052

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2-5 33

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ______ # ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN SB8 FI2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2

ACTION NO 787

S E C R E T 012320Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1102 MEXI

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

2 Aug 69 IN 15322

LIARENA REDCOAT

1P

m

REF: MEXICO CITY 0831 (IN 93513)

1. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED 30 JULY HE TOLD BY JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-160430) 27 JULY THAT "VALERIAN" LEAVING THAT WEEK-END FOR MOSCOW.

2. ACCORDING AIR MANIFESTS, VALERY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052) DEPARTED MEXICO CITY 29 JULY FOR MOSCOW. ACCORDING LIENVOY, KOSTIKOV RETURNING MOSCOW FOR 8 DAYS CONSULTATIONS.

3. ABOVE ADDS WEIGHT TO REF SPECULATION THAT "VALERIAN", WHO REPORTED BY BALCARCEL BE CONTACT OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO, IDENTICAL WITH KOSTIKOV.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-160430, 201-305052.

S E C R ET

AN	Pu
AB	X
IP	
PS	
BX	4
DES	NFD
FI	
WH	1

MICROFILMED
AUG 1 9 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

Colleen: Pls file ↓

050-6-151/3
B201-160430

SECRET

201-305052
02 Aug 69

19 SEP 1969

SECRET

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: KOSTIKOV, Valeri Vladimyrovich

1. Reference is made to your request dated 25 July 1969 concerning Subject.

2. In a report dated 27 August 1962 from a reliable source, Subject was listed as a known or suspect KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security) officer. Although this report did not specify how Subject's position or possible position as an intelligence officer was determined, numerous additional reports have established that Subject is an officer in the KGB. Several of these reports are noted below.

a. A report dated 12 January 1962 from a reliable source indicated that Subject had a background which "smelled strongly" of Soviet intelligence service (RIS) connections (i.e., a graduate of the Foreign Language Institute and/or the Institute of Foreign Affairs in Moscow). Subject was described as possibly RIS as early as 1959 when he attended an Electrotechnical Congress held in Madrid, Spain, from 30 June to 10 July 1959. During this congress, Subject was frequently absent from the delegation, studiously avoided having his picture taken, and was generally noted for his "suspicious" behavior.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

CS COPY

201-305052

SECRET

b. According to a report dated 16 March 1962 from a reliable source, Subject participated in a Soviet effort to cultivate an American Embassy employee.

c. A report dated October 1962 from a reliable source indicated that Subject was believed to be a KGB officer because of his position in the Consular office where most of the personnel were connected with the KGB. Subject had been known to attend meetings in place of other identified KGB officers.

<Subject is mentioned as a contact of one Valeri V. Kostikov (201-305052) in a trace reply on Kostikov sent to Dept. of State.

d. According to a report dated 20 December 1963 from other reliable sources, Subject Kostikov had apparently taken over as the case officer for one Margarito LNU, an agent of the Soviets who was formerly handled by First Secretary ~~Viktor Nikolaevich~~ GLOTOV 201-003674 GLOTOV was suspected by reliable sources to be the KGB Resident in Mexico City. Subject also had <Valeri V. Kostikov had considerable contact with Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV 201-236701, the Pravda correspondent and suspect KGB officer with whom Subject Kostikov traveled to Tijuana, Mexico, on 1 September 1963. Subject frequently escorted diplomatic couriers to and from the airport, a function primarily of the consular section officers and, as far as was known, strictly a KGB responsibility. This same report identified all of Subject's close friends as KGB officers.

Per trace reply on Kostikov (201-305052) sent to Dept. of State>

3. In a report dated 14 May 1965, a reliable source, in an attempt to analyze the KGB Residentura in Mexico City, Mexico, stated that Subject was probably a KGB officer.

4. According to reports dated 22 December and 27 June 1967 from reliable sources, when Subject came to Mexico he replaced a suspect KGB officer. When he left Mexico, he was replaced by an identified KGB officer.

4. For further information concerning Subject, you are referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

CSCI-316/03145-69 SECRET

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation with copy of name check

Encl. 1 name check

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

RID/CE: JKS/SC/nkc

BASED ON: Review of 201-305052*

Para 2: HMMA-19696, 27 August 1962

Para 2a: OSMA-13451, 12 January 1962

Para 2b: HMMA-18727, 16 March 1962

Para 2c: HMMA-19996, 10 October 1962

Para 2d: HMMA-22652, 20 December 1963

Para 3: HMMA-26081, 14 May 1965

Para 4: HMMA-32359, 27 June 1967
HMMA-30941, 22 December 1966

FILE IN: 201-305052*

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

TO: C 1 ~~b~~ 20 ~~11~~

FROM:

DATE

FULL NAME (Married woman include maiden name)
Vladimyrovich
Valeri KOSTIKOV

ALIASES, NICKNAMES

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
March 17, XX 1933
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

HOME ADDRESS
previous check 7/3/61

SEX
M

CITIZENSHIP
Soviet

MARITAL STATUS
UK

SPOUSE'S NAME

OCCUPATION

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER
Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Mexico.

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

C-3 visa issued; arriving New York July 29, 1969 via Air France flight 700. Departing for Moscow July 30, 1969 via Aeroflot 001.

GN
30/7/69
REF

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE
Visa Office (Room 511 SA-2)

DATE
July 25, 1969

NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER
SCA:VO:BWDuncan:bjf

TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM
V FEDIN, Evgeni I.

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SB/B10
*14973 ✓
1
2 ✓

3E04
482607

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION	
Date 14 AUG 1969	INITIALS
RI ANALYST	SC
DIV. BRANCH	
SB/X/DO	
WH/1	
E/B/5	LFR
RI EDITOR	

SB/CI/O

28 JUL 1969

FILE IN 201-305052

201-305052

FORM 9-65 DS-939

3LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSA | SEC (When Filled In) | TOTAL COPIES 25

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1	wi7	5	
2	CI	6	
3		7	
4		8	

ON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ________

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO FILE, VR RI/AN SB8/F2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2

ACTION NO 787

S E C R E T 012320Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1102

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

2 AUG 69 IN 15322

m

LIARENA REDCOAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 0831 (IN 93513)

1. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED 30 JULY HE TOLD BY JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-160430) 27 JULY THAT "VALERIAN" LEAVING THAT WEEK-END FOR MOSCOW.

2. ACCORDING AIR MANIFESTS, VALERY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052) DEPARTED MEXICO CITY 29 JULY FOR MOSCOW. ACCORDING LIENVOY, KOSTIKOV RETURNING MOSCOW FOR 8 DAYS CONSULTATIONS.

3. ABOVE ADDS WEIGHT TO REF SPECULATION THAT "VALERIAN", WHO REPORTED BY BALCARCEL BE CONTACT OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO, IDENTICAL WITH KOSTIKOV.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-160430, 201-305052.

S E C R ET

SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES 32
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In)	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	1 7/7/ 6
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO	2 C/ 7
AT: Z	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.	3 8
DISSEM BY 48 PER	X-REF TO FILE NO.	4 9
	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.	5 10
ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, SB8, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, 825 FI2,	

S E C R E T 020007Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0831

2 JUL 69 IN93513

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

LIARENA REDCOAT

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH LIREBEL-2 27 JUNE, JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-160430) COMMENTED UPON DIFFICULTIES GETTING RAPID

ACTION IN HIS CONTACTS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY HERE. IN THIS CONTEXT BALCARCEL STATED HIS CONTACT IN EMBASSY ONE "VALERIAN". BALCARCEL STATED SOMETIMES "VALERIAN" TAKES HIM INSIDE SOVIET EMBASSY GROUNDS IN "VALERIAN'S" CAR, BUT OTHER TIMES HE MUST GO TO EMBASSY FRONT GATE AND ASK SEE "VALERIAN". BALCARCEL STATED HE AND "VALERIAN" USUALLY MEET IN OFFICE OF "KUNETSOV", SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE.

how about AETTAKEDIFF?

2. THERE NO SOVIET OFFICIALS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED MEXICO CITY WITH FIRST NAME "VALERIAN". IT POSSIBLE "VALERIAN" IDENTIFIABLE WITH VALERY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052), 2ND SECRETARY IN EMBASSY AND KNOWN KGB OFFICER. ACCORDING STATION FILES, IN 1965 KOSTIKOV IN CONTACT WITH ALEJANDRO (BERMUDEZ) ALEGRIA (201-62689), NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCN) LEADER WHO SUSPECTED RECEIVE FUNDING FROM SOVIET FOR USE BY PCN. SEE ALSO HMMA-37406, WHICH REPORTED ONE RICARDO RAMIREZ, POSSIBLE IDENTIFIABLE WITH RICARDO (RAMIREZ) DE

L C C C

14-00000

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

VANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

AT: Z

SEEN BY PER #

TION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0831 S E C R E T

LEON (201-083287), CALLED SOVIET EMBASSY 18 JUNE ASKING SPEAK WITH KOSTIKOV.

3. "KUNETZOV" ASSUMEDLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH SVYATOSLAV KUZNETSOV (201-87222), CURRENT SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE MEXICO AND KNOWN KGB OFFICER. HOWEVER, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE OFFICE LOCATED IN HOME KUZNETSOV, RATHER THAN IN EMBASSY.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-160430; 201-305052.

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]
201-305052

Embajada rusa en México tiene un gran personal que trabaja poco

Por Carlos Montiel, desde México.

En una carta llegada a esta redacción, periodistas peruanos me informaron que, enterados de mi artículo "Ahora Perú", preguntaron al Canciller de aquel país, Edgardo Jarrín, si la llegada de una misión comercial rusa a tierras peruanas sería sólo la primera entrega de otra misión más importante, la de una representacion diplomática soviética.

En ese artículo comentaba que miembros de la Embajada moscovita en México, habían asegurado en los corrillos sociales de esta ciudad, que en menos de dos emanas Perú establecería relaciones diplomáticas con el Kremlin, a nivel de embajada.

Según me informan en esa misiva, apenas tres días después, el diario limeño "La Prensa", confirmó en su primera plana la noticia que comenté en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, y que obtuve gracias a la indisreción de los diplomáticos soviéticos que figuran en el "circuito coctelero" que aquí se lleva a cabo por los embajadores y encargados de negocios de las naciones extranjeras.

Recuerdo que también en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, el colega Alonso Fonseca G., publicó una nota titulada "Alegres Diplomáticos", con la divertida historia de la "juerga de Vladislav Koremovshkin y Valeri Kostikov, agregado y segundo secretario, respectivamente, de la embajada rusa en México, quienes la empezaron "entre burbujas de vinos caros en la zona rosa de la ciudad de México, y se vieron obligados a ponerle fin en Ciudad Victoria entre sus insultos a México bajo inmunidad diplomática". Al parecer los diplomáticos soviéticos no sólo han renunciado a ser decentes, sino que también están demostrando ser incapaces.

El Canciller peruano Mercado Jarrín, quien anunció la llegada de la misión comercial rusa, respondió a la pregunta de los periodistas con un lacónico "oportunamente tendrán información si es que el Gobierno decide dar ese paso" (el de establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS). Antes de que el Gobierno de Lima "decida dar ese paso", quisiéramos pasarle traslado de estos dos párrafos que el periodista Bernardo Escalante publicó en un artículo de "El Sol de México", bajo el título: "La Embajada Misteriosa".

"Lo extraño está en que la Embajada de la URSS es una de las que cuentan con personal más numeroso y las que menor quehacer tienen. Las dependencias contadas q' tienen trato con el público — sección consular, sección cultural, agencia turística— laboran sólo cuatro horas a la semana. Con los dedos de la mano se podrán contar los mexicanos que en un año van a solicitar una visa. El comercio entre México y la URSS es casi nulo. Las "relaciones culturales", como todos lo saben, consisten sólo en hacer propaganda "de allá para acá", ya que en los dominios de Brezhnev y de Kosygin ni idea tienen de lo que es México".

"¿A qué se dedica, pues ese enjambre de personal ruso —en esa Embajada en que no trabaja un solo mexicano y hasta la servidumbre es soviética— en esa enorme mansión que podía ser guarida de vampiros? El misterio sube de punto si se toma en cuenta que la Embajada de México en Moscú apenas si está integrada por unas seis o siete personas, y en cambio la URSS mantiene aquí más de un centenar. ¿Por qué la URSS tiene una Embajada tan numerosa en nuestro país, si hace lo mismo que la nuestra en Moscú?

LA PRENSA LIBRE
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA
6 - MAY 1969

201-305052

SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO HAS LARGE STAFF WHICH DOES LITTLE WORK

by Carlos Montiel

Source: La Prensa Libre (Free Press), 6 May 1969, San Jose, Costa Rica

Mexico City -- In a letter addressed to our editorial department Peruvian newsmen informed me that, being acquainted with my article "Ahora Peru" [Now Peru], they asked that country's chancellor, Edgardo Jarrin, whether the arrival of a Soviet trade mission in Peru would be only the prelude to another more important mission, that of Soviet diplomatic representation.

In that article I had observed that members of the Soviet embassy in Mexico City had predicted in that city's social circles that in less than 2 weeks Peru would establish diplomatic relations with the Kremlin at the embassy level.

According to the letter, barely 3 days later the Lima daily La Prensa confirmed with prominent play the report that I had made in El Universal Grafico whose substance I had obtained thanks to the indiscretion of Soviet diplomats included in the "cocktail circuit" organized here among the ambassadors and trade representatives of foreign countries.

I recall that also in El Universal Grafico my colleague, Alonso Fonseca G., published a note entitled "Alegres Diplomaticos" [Tipsy Diplomats] recounting the entertaining story of the "binge of Vladislav Koromovshkin and Valery Kostikov, attache and second secretary respectively ~~of~~ at the Soviet embassy in Mexico. These officials began their spree "between glasses of expensive wines in the 'red' district of Mexico City but had to bring their adventure to a close at Ciudad Victoria amidst the abuse they hurled at Mexico under the diplomatic immunity which they enjoyed." Apparently, the Soviet diplomats not only have given up decent beha but are also demonstrating their incompetence.

The Peruvian chancellor, Mercado [sic] Jarrin, who announced the arrival of the Soviet trade mission, answered the newsmen's question with a laconic comment that "at the appropriate time you will learn whether the government has decided to take that step" (of establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR). Before the Lima government "decides to take that step," we would like to reproduce these two paragraphs which the journalist Bernardo Escalante published in an article entitled "La Embajada Misteriosa" [The Mysterious Embassy] in the newspaper El Sol de Mexico.

"The strange thing is that the Soviet embassy is one of those with the largest staff but with the least to do. Those branches that have contact with the public -- consular section, cultural section, tourist agency -- work only 4 hours a week. One can count the number of Mexicans applying for a Russian visa on the fingers of one hand. Trade between Mexico and the USSR is practically nil. The 'cultural relations,' as everyone knows, consist simply in making propaganda 'from one place to another' inasmuch as in the land of Brezhnev and Kosygin they do not even have a remote idea of what Mexico is like.

"What is this plethora of Soviet personnel used for then in that embassy where not even a single Mexican citizen is employed, where the domestics themselves are Soviet, in that huge mansion that could serve as a den of vampires? The mystery deepens if one considers that the Mexican embassy staff in Moscow barely numbers six or seven employees whereas the USSR has more than a hundred in Mexico. Why does the Soviet Union have such a large embassy staff in our country if it does what ours does in Moscow?"

201-305052

EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Viernes 20 de Diciembre de 1968 (Mexico)

[illegible]

Alegres Diplomáticos

Por ALONSO FONSECA G.

Querido lector: esta es la [illegible] divertida historia de una "pachanga" que [illegible] en la gélida madrugada del 13 de diciembre, entre barbajos de [illegible] rusos en [illegible] la ciudad de México, y que terminó [illegible], en Ciudad Victoria. Se trata de dos marxistas-leninistas de la URSS que por haber sido las [illegible] de la [illegible] de los diplomáticos [illegible] "tomaron el coñac" en [illegible] burgueses, no para integrarse y olvidar una que otra tristeza que les [illegible] el [illegible], sino para lanzar una arremetida de denuestos e injurias a México y a los mexicanos, con el pretexto de que cuando uno está "alegrito" todo se le dispensa.

Los diplomáticos de la embajada rusa en México, Valeri Kostikov, segundo secretario, y Vladislav Korenovskin, agregado, no sólo olvidaron entre hippies la moral socialista, para colocarse una "guarapeta de esas que hacen época", sino que en medio de una gran "fuga" a base de whiskies [illegible] y [illegible], [illegible] acompañados y [illegible] ingenieros de PEMEX en un viaje en automóvil a Ciudad Mante, [illegible], después de varias [illegible] que elevaron los humos del alcohol, la "fuga" [illegible] a las pistolas [illegible] "[illegible]", de [illegible] que la [illegible] de la Academia de [illegible] señala como los grandes [illegible] conquistados por los hombres [illegible] del [illegible], y [illegible] los denuestos contra los mexicanos. Los cuatro ingenieros de PEMEX —como lo hubiera hecho cualquier hijo bien nacido— defendieron con firmeza a su Patria. Sin [illegible] los rusos se convirtieron [illegible] en diplomáticos pistoleros, al empuñar sus armas contra los ingenieros, pero sin duda [illegible] la preparación rusa consiste más bien en el manejo de cohetes teledirigidos hacia la Luna, que en manejar con habilidad [illegible] pistolas [illegible], se vieron prontamente desarmados por los mexicanos.

Al llegar a Ciudad Victoria, los ingenieros de PEMEX entregaron a las autoridades locales los agregados rusos y sus pistolas. Pese al deseo unánime de todos los allí presentes para que los soviéticos fueran castigados, éstos, con arrogancia insultante, exigieron el respeto a su inmunidad diplomática. Tomemos nota de la agresividad de ambos [illegible] al gobierno chino de Mao Tse Tung tan empeñado en seguir la línea dura, aunque no creemos que los contrate, ya que son pistoleros malos.

El lector que quiera confirmar los detalles de esta borrachera interplanetaria y sideral con demonios de quienes creen que con la conquista soviética del poder en Rusia el [illegible] y la decencia en todo el [illegible] [illegible]

201-744341

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AEKICK/AEBURBLE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-36517, 14 February 1969

1. On 1 April 1969 the Station received a memorandum from local LNERGO concerning the latest meeting AEBURBLE had with his Soviet Case Officers. This memorandum is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment #1. The meeting took place in Mexico City on 3 and 4 February 1969. The Soviet case officers were Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (201-784917) and Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052).

2. On 8 April 1969 we answered LNERGO's memorandum with comments concerning NIKITIN's and KOSTIKOV's whereabouts on 3 and 4 February 1969, the possible meeting place on 4 February 1969, and the cars used. Recent photographs of NIKITIN and KOSTIKOV were forwarded to local LNERGO also. This Station memorandum is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment #2.

3. It is interesting to note that the 1969 Volkswagen with Mexico City plates 787 IW, assigned to Stanislav Vasilyevich SYCHEV (201-326963) was used as the vehicle to drive AEBURBLE to the meeting site on 4 February 1969. The use of SYCHEV's vehicle, which is one of two Soviet vehicles which do not have diplomatic license plates, strengthens our suspicion that SYCHEV is a KGB officer.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. LNERGO Memo u/s/c
2. Station memo u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att u/s/c
2 - C/WH w/o att

201-248427

file 201-305052

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-784917 201-305052 201-326963	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-36888	DATE 9 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-248427

SECRET

27 FE[illegible]

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV
Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN

Per your request, enclosed are the following most recent photographs available of subject Soviets who are presently assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City:

a. Photo 1: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, born: 13 March 1933, Moscow, photo dated 1959.

b. Photo 2: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV - 1965

c. Photo 3: Rosa Aleksandrovna KOSTIKOVA, born: 2 March 1932, Arkhangelsk, photo dated 1965.

d. Photo 4: Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN, born 7 June 1929, Sverdlovsk, photo received 1965.

e. Photo 5: Nina Afanasyevna NIKITINA, born 1931, Arkhangelsk Oblast, photo received 1965.

CSCI-316/00518-69

SB/CI/P:AJHPeck X-4496 17 Feb 69

Distribution:
1 - CI/LS
1 - CI/OPS/SB
1 - CI/R&A
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - SB/CI/P/AP - Chrono
1 - SB/CI/P/AP - Comeback
2 - RID/AN/SB - Please classify: ✓KOSTIKOV, 201-305052
NIKITIN, 201-784917

MICROFILMED
MAR 14 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

VB 201 - 784917

CS COPY

SECRET

201-305052

H

Valeri V.Kostikov I have met him but I do not know him much.

Valentin Longuinov, in charge of consular affairs, his wife Alexandra has been an ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ skating star, both are friendly very nice, speak very good Spanish and fair English. Their daughter ~~xxxxxxx~~ Kirina, sixteen years old, very sophisticated, came here for a holiday. The only child of that age we have ever seen here. They have another child, who is in Moscow. Both have been at our house for a party. In general soviet people come alone, leaving the wives behind. Longuinov with wife an exception.

Dmitri Prygov, wife Natalia, have an small child born here, he has been writing a book on the Mexican revolution. We are fairly good friends. He was introduced to me by Boris Kazantsev who invited me for lunch for the ocasion. When we go to the Soviet embassy both he and Tchmykhov are always very attentive.

I know several other people from the Soviet embassy but really I could not place them together with their names.

Extract from HMMA-36436, 12/2/69 (RedTop Ops)

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 7cf PER ______

ACTION
WH-8
629

☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FILE VR RF/AN, SB-8, CA/REG, CA/PROP

S E C R E T 211825Z JAN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 8796

DIRECTOR INFO LIMA, BUENOS AIRES

21 JAN 69 IN 76296

MHSPAWN REDCOAT

REF: LIMA-3640 (IN 71317)

201-305052

1. FOLLOW UP STORY REF REF PARA 2 PUBLISHED "EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO" OF 17 JAN. POUCHING CLIPS ALL ADDEES.

2. FILE 50-126-22/3.

S E C R E T

Montiel-
Koromarrolkin
Krotikov

SECRET

201-305052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT **REDTOP**
Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN (201-185114)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMS-6229, 19 December 1968

1. LIFIRE reported the PCS departure of the BROVKIN family on 22 September 1968 aboard Sabena Flight 556. Subject travelled on Soviet Diplomatic Passport D-008133.

2. BROVKIN held the position of Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. He was replaced by Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052), who assumed the title of Second Secretary.

3. Forwarded herewith are recent LICALLA photographs of Subject.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Photo h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att h/w
2 - C/WH w/o att

CS copy filed in 201-~~80~~ 185114

file in 201-305052

[illegible] automatic
[illegible] downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-305052	HMMA-36121	27 December 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-185114

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	83	6	B1
2	WH	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	C1	10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO

DISSEM BY 30 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO. FILE. VR. RI/AN WH8 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 FI2

CAS CA/PEG CA/PROP DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 241800Z DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8531

DIRECTOR

24 Dec 68 IN 60590

REDTOP AEKICK AEASSAULT

REF: MEXICO CITY 8437 (IN 54340)

1. LILYRIC REPORTED THAT KORMUSHKIN AND KOSTIKOV LEFT THE SOVIET EMBASSY TOGETHER AT 16:33 ON 9 DECEMBER. THEY WERE NOT SEEN UNTIL THEY RETURNED TOGETHER AT 15:00 ON 20 DECEMBER. THEY LEFT AND RETURNED IN THE REGULARLY ASSIGNED TO YURIY S. CHERMYSH. UPON RETURN KORMUSHKIN, KOSTIKOV, AND THE CAR WERE GRIMY AND DIRTY.

2. ON 20 DECEMBER ONE OF LIQUIFIER'S WRITERS PLACED STATION WRITTEN ARTICLE IN EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO. ENTITLE "HAPPY DIPLOMATS," IT IS TONGUE IN CHEEK TWO COLUMN ARTICLE STATING TWO SOVIETS GOT OFF MARX-LENINIST WAGON TO ENJOY BOURGEOISE JOYS AND ENDED UP INSULTING MEXICO AND PULLING GUNS. THEY DEMANDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY WITH INSULTING ARROGANCE. INVITES READERS TO CALL SOVEMB TO CONFIRM STORY.

3. AMBASSADOR WHO INTRIGUED WITH STORY PASSED IT TO HIS FRIEND, GARCIA VALSECA, PUBLISHER OF EL SOL CHAIN. VALSECA SENT REPORTER FROM TAMPICO TO CIUDAD VICTORIA. ON 21 DECEMBER EL SOL FRONT PAGED STORY ENTITLED " MEMBERS OF SOVIET EMBASSY, DRUNK,

D. 74-126-60/3

B 201-305052

24-12-68

201-741341

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)   GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO   BRANCH ☐   DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION   ☐ RID COPY   INFO   FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8531 S E C R E T

TREACHEROUSLY ATTACKED TWO MEXICAN ENGINEERS," A PURE MIRACLE THAT THE TWO MEXICANS WHO ARE NAMED ESCAPED WITH THEIR LIVES WHEN SOVIETS THREATENED THEM WITH A RIFLE AND PISTOL AFTER DRIVING THEM TO REMOTE POINT. INDIGNANT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SET FREE WITH ONLY 200 PESO FINE. HOPES FOR INVESTIGATION ABOUT WHAT SOVIETS DOING IN TAMAULIPAS (STATE) AND SPECUALTES THEY ENGAGED SUBVERSIVE WORK. UNFORTUNATELY KORMUSHKIN'S NAME IS HOPELESSLY GARBLED.

4. ON 22 DECEMEBER THE NEWS, ENGLISH DAILY, RAN SHORTER VERSION OF EL SOL STROY. ON 24 DECEMBER THE NEWS IN FOLLOW-UP GIVES MORE DETAIL AND QUESTIONS LENIENCY OF 200 PESO FINE. NOTES THAT KOSTIKOV IS IN DIPLOMATIC LIST BUT CANNOT FIND NAME OF VLADISTOK KOMOSKID(KORMUSHKIN) THERE.

5. ON 23 DECEMBER COS GAVE AMASSADOR PICUTES OF KORMUSHKIN AND KOSTIKOV WITH FACT THEY GONE FROM MEXICO CITY FROM 9 TO 20 DECEMBER AND CORRECT SPELLING FOR KORMUSHKIN. AMBASSADOR PASSED TO GARCIA VALSECA WITH SUGGESTION HE DO FOLLOW-UP STORY INSISTING ON INVESTIGATION AND EXPLANATION BY SOVEMB ABOUT ABSENCE OF SOVIET "DIPLOMATS" FOR 11 DAYS PROWLING MEXICAN COUNTRY SIDE. WILL ALSO SUGGEST THAT GARCIA PUBLISH STORY AND PICTURES IN HIS CHAIN OF

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

TING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE. VR.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 8531 SECRET

PROVINCIAL PAPERS ASKING READERS IF THEY SAW THESE TWO SPYS DURING ABOVE PERIOD.

6. LITEMPO-12 HAS STATED THAT STORY WILL APPEAR IN 24 DECEMBER EDITION OF "ALARMA," A WEEKLY SCANDAL MAGAZINE.

7. ON 20 DECEMBER USIS GAVE STORY TO LOCAL UPI AND AP CORRESPONDENTS. DO NOT KNOW IF STORIES CABLED.

8. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND POUCH COPIES ALL ARTICLES.

9. FILE: 74-126-60, 201-744341, AND 201-305052.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

050-002-004
HMMA-36090A01
20 DEC 68
P3

CIT ?
OCC ?
12 DEC VALERIY KOSTIKOV 2ND SECY AND VLADISLAV KORMUSHKIN ATTACHE LEFT HOUSE OF PROSTITUTION HAD SPENT ENTIRE EVENING DRINKING IN ZONA ROJA COMPLETELY DRUNK LEFT WITH FOUR PEMEX ENGINEERS ARGUMENT BROKE OUT INTO FIST FIGHT BOTH DREW PISTOLS MEXICANS DISARMED THEM PREFERRED CHARGES CLAIMED DIPL IMMUNITY NOT SEEN SOV EMB SINCE

R 6901020073

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Viernes 20 de diciembre de 1968

201-305052

Alegres Diplomáticos

Por ALONSO FONSECA G.

Querido lector, ésta es la divertida historia de una "parranda" que empezó en la pálida madrugada del 12 de diciembre, entre burbujas de vinos caros en la zona rosa de la ciudad de México, y que terminó muy lejos, en Ciudad Victoria. Se trata de dos marxistas-leninistas de la URSS, que por haber roto las cadenas de la oprobiosa tiranía de los diplomáticos decentes, "empinaron el codo" en bares burgueses, no para alegrarse y olvidar una que otra tristeza que les rasguñaba el corazón, sino para lanzar una andanada de denuestos e injurias a México y a los mexicanos, con el pretexto de que, cuando uno está "alegrito" todo se le dispensa.

Los diplomáticos de la embajada rusa en México, Valeri Kostikov, segundo secretario, y Vladislav Koromovshkin, agregado, no solo olvidaron entre hippies la moral socialista, para colocarse una "guarapeta de esas que hacen época, sino que, en medio de una gran "feria" a base de odiosos [illegible] y whiskys capitalistas, decidieron acompañar a cuatro ingenieros de PEMEX en un viaje en automóvil a Ciudad Mante. En el camino, después de los desmanes habituales que provocan los humos del alcohol la "cruda" los hizo llegar a los peores extremos de la grosería, expuesta sin ningún "academicismo", de esos que la Universidad de la Amistad de Moscú señala como los grandes derechos conquistados por los hombres avanzados del leninismo, y llovieron los denuestos contra los mexicanos. Los cuatro ingenieros de PEMEX —como lo hubiera hecho cualquier hijo bien nacido—, defendieron con firmeza a su Patria. Sin más, los rusos se convirtieron súbitamente en diplomáticos pistoleros, al empuñar sus armas contra los ingenieros, pero sin duda porque la preparación rusa consiste más bien en el manejo de cohetes teledirigidos hacia la Luna, que en manejar con habilidad prosaicas pistolas obsoletas, se vieron prontamente desarmados por los mexicanos.

Al llegar a Ciudad Victoria, los ingenieros de PEMEX entregaron a las autoridades locales los agregados rusos y sus pistolas. Pese al deseo unánime de todos los allí presentes para que los soviéticos fueran castigados, éstos, con arrogancia insultante, exigieron el respeto a su inmunidad diplomática. Corremos nota de la agresividad de ambos moscovitas al gobierno chino de Mao Tse Tung tan empeñado en seguir la línea dura, aunque no creemos que los contrate, ya que son pistoleros malos.

El lector que quiera confirmar los detalles de esta borrachera interplanetaria y sideral, con desmanes de quienes creen que con la conquista soviética del poder en Rusia el respeto y la decencia en todo el [illegible] de [illegible], puede llamar al teléfono [illegible].

201-305052

TIPSY DIPLOMATS

by Alonso Fonseca G.

Source: ~~Not Identified.~~ [illegible]

This is the amusing story of a "spree" which began in the frosty dawn of 12 December among bubbles of expensive wines in the "red light" district of Mexico City and reached its conclusion very far off, at Ciudad Victoria. What are involved are two Marxist-Leninists from the Soviet Union who, on breaking the chains of disgraceful tyranny weighing on respectable diplomats, "tanked up" in bourgeois bars, not in order to cheer up and forget some sorrowful episode or other that gnawed at their hearts but rather to fire a broadside of abuse and insults at Mexico and Mexicans under the pretext that when one is "tipsy" everything that he does is absolved.

The diplomats of the Russian embassy in Mexico, Valery Kostikov, second secretary, and Vladislav Koromovshkin, attache, not only forgot among hippies the socialist ethics in order to indulge in a "small drink among those who are in the limelight" but, in the midst of a big "binge" made possible by hateful capitalist brandy and whiskey, they decided to accompany four engineers of PEMEX [Petroleos Mexicanos; Mexican Petroleum] in an old automobile to Ciudad Mante. On the way, after the customary excesses that alcoholic fumes provoke, the "wine" drove the Russians to the worst extremes of crudeness exhibited without any of the "academic bearing" that the Friendship University of Moscow notes as the major assets acquired by the progressive men of Leninism. Accordingly, abuse rained on the Mexicans.

The four PEMEX engineers, as any well-born sons would have done, defended their country with firmness. Thereupon, the Russians suddenly became transformed into diplomat-gunmen, brandishing their weapons at the engineers. However, no doubt because Russians are better at getting ready to handle remote-controlled spaceships directed at the moon than in the skillful discharge of prosaic pistols, they found themselves disarmed in short order by the Mexicans.

On reaching Ciudad Victoria the PEMEX engineers handed the Russian attaches and their guns over to the local authorities. Despite the unanimous desire of all those present to see the Soviet representatives get their comeuppance the latter, with insulting arrogance, insisted that their diplomatic immunity be respected.

Let us compare the aggressive stance of both Muscovites with the Chinese government of Mao Tse-tung so insistent on following the hard line even though we do not believe that Mao would hire Russians of this ilk considering how ineffective gunmen they proved to be.

201-305052

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

DISSEM BY 49 PER ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR, WH8; CI, OPS, CI/IC 2, FI-2

ACTION NO.

ISECRET 140225Z DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8437

DIRECTOR

13Dec68 IN54340

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ON 13 DEC LITEMPO-12 CALLED COS AND SAID HIS MAN IN CIUDAD VICTORIA HAD REPORTED THAT AT CA 05:02 ON 12 DEC VLADISLAV S. KORMUSHKIN (201-744341) AND VALERIY V. KOSTIKOV (201-305052), BOTH KNOWN KGB, LEFT A WHORE HOUSE IN CIUDAD VICTORIA WITH FOUR MEXICAN PEMEX ENGINEERS. ENTIRE PARTY WAS DRUNK. ALL GOT INTO

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

A CAR AND STARTED TOWARD CIUDAD MANTE. ON WAY ARGUMENT BROKE OUT BETWEEN SOVIETS AND MEXICANS. CAR WAS STOPPED AND FIST-FIGHT ENSUED OUTSIDE. BOTH SOVIETS DREW PISTOLS AND COVERED MEXICANS. MEXICANS MANAGED TO DISARM THEM BY TACKLING FROM BEHIND AND TOOK THEM IN CUSTODY TO CIUDAD VICTORIA WHERE CHARGES AGAINST SOVIETS WERE PREFERRED. SOVIETS PRODUCED DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS AND CLAIMED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY WHEREUPON JUDGE RELEASED THEM. DISPOSITION OF PISTOLS UNKNOWN.

2. LITEMP-12 STATED GOBERNACION IS PREPARING FACTS FOR MEMO TO RELACIONES EXTERIORES WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT SOVIETS BE PNGED FOR ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC STATUS.

3. STATION IS ENCOURAGING LITEMPOS TO GET INCIDENT INTO PRESS IN SENSATIONAL MANNER WITH PHOTOS.

4. FILE: 201-744341 AND 201-305052.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 56 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 28/21 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION SB8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR, RI/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, FI2

S E C R E T 192015Z SEPT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7224 MEXI

1P

DIRECTOR

19 SEP 68 IN 95628

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: DIRECTOR 16046, 13 JULY 1968

1. LIFIRE REPORTS PCS ARRIVAL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052), ACCOMPANIED BY WIFE, ROZA ALEKSANDROVNA AND DAUGHTER, SVETLANA. THEY ARRIVED 13 SEPTEMBER ON KLM FLIGHT 683. KOSTIKOV TRAVELLED ON DIP PASSPORT D-022184. WIFE AND DAUGHTER ON DIP PASSPORT D-022185.

AN
AB
IN
PS
EX
~~[illegible]~~
FI
SB/6/WH

2. PER REFERENCE KOSTIKOV 201-305052 SCHEDULED REPLACE ALEKSANDR MIKHAYLOVICH 2R BROVKIN (201-185114), THIRD SECRETARY. ACCORDING TO LICOZY-5, BROVKIN HAS RESERVATION TO DEPART MEXICO 22 SEPTEMBER.

3. LIFIRE REPORT INDICATES KOSTIKOV HAS TITLE OF SECOND SECRETARY.

4. FILE 201-305052. CROSS FILE 201-185114.

SECRET

BT

MICROFILMED
OCT 4 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

19 Sep 68

CS COPY

201-305052

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: DIANA DAVIS
UNIT: SB/O/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 11 JULY 68

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 3 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-305052
x- 201-185114 (BROVKIN)

CONF: SB8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE RI/AN, WH8 clops. alicl. CI, F

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 22 05z JUL 68 11 July 68 CITE DIRECTOR 16046

MICROFILMED
JUL 29 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO MEXICO CITY
REDTOP

Box 4

ANMDB	FI
PS	
ABSTRACT ☒	INDEX ☒

1. ACCORDING TO SENSITIVE HQS SOURCE VALERIY KOSTIKOV, WIFE ROZA AND DAUGHTER SVETLANA HAVE BEEN GRANTED NINETY DAY DIP VISAS, EXTENDABLE IN PROTOCOL OFFICE OF FOREIGN MINISTRY. 201-305052 KOSTIKOV IS SCHEDULED TO REPLACE ZR 201-185114 BROVKIN, ALEKSANDR MIKHAYLOVICH

2. SUBJECT IS IDENTICAL WITH VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052) PREVIOUSLY PCS MEXICO 1961-1965. HE IS ~~XXX~~ KNOWN KGB.

END OF MESSAGE

ACSB/O/WH L Hestres
C/SB/CI/K T Comin
for C/WH/1 W Belt

CS COPY

C/WH+ [illegible] Polgar
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DC/SB/AO H Hestres
11 JUL 68
201-305052
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 465 COPY NO.

DISPATCH | SECRET | PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Chief, WH Division

Chief, SB; COS, Managua; COS, Panama City

Chief of Station, Mexico City

REDCOAT [illegible]

Soviet Contact with Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria (201-062689)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The Station believes that Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria, Nicaraguan Communist living in exile in Mexico and known to have been the link between Moscow and the Nicaraguan Communist Party in regard to sending Nicaraguans to both CPSU school and Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, is identical with the Modesto *RIVAS who in 1965 was reported in contact with identified KGB officer Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052) as well as with the Modesto *BERMUDEZ, originally thought to have been a Panamanian, who in 1965 was reported in contact with KOSTIKOV and then with his successor, Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (201-744341), who is also an identified KGB officer. It is noted that Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria uses the alias Modesto RIVAS for receiving mail at his post office box letter drop.

2. Following is a chronology of the LIENVOY reporting on "Modesto's" contact with the Soviets. As will be seen, it appears that the combination "Modesto BERMUDEZ" was a conclusion jumped to by LIENVOY and was in fact probably never given as such. The references to "Panamanians" could be a cover for "Nicaraguans."

a. On 1 Jun 1965 "Modesto RIVAS" called at the Soviet Embassy for KOSTIKOV and arranged to meet him at four o'clock "in the same place."

.........continued

Attachment:
Photograph

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, w/att.
1 - C/SB, w/att.
1 - COS, Managua, w/att.
1 - COS, Panama City, w/att.

CS COPY [illegible]

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-32359	27 June 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-062689

b. On 29 Jun 1965 "Modesto RIVAS" called KOSTIKOV to say he would like to talk with him and also to give him the message that Ricardo was waiting in his office for him. KOSTIKOV asked if Modesto was working that day, and when Modesto said no, he would be working at home all day, then KOSTIKOV said he would stop by his house in the afternoon.

c. On 6 Jul 1965 "Modesto" called KOSTIKOV and asked if there was anything new about the people travelling to Helsinki. KOSTIKOV said nothing yet, but he hoped to have word by the end of the week. KOSTIKOV also asked if Modesto had received any news from the doctor, and Modesto said no, even though he had sent a telegram. Modesto said he would keep a copy of the telegram he sent for KOSTIKOV.

d. On 7 Jul 1965 "Modesto" told KOSTIKOV that, after he had talked to him the day before, he had received a cable asking the same question, i.e., what was with the trip to Helsinki, and Modesto wanted to know what to answer. KOSTIKOV said that they would have to wait about two more days but that he would send a cable to pressure for an answer. Modesto said he would answer his cable saying that they were trying to get a cabled reply and added that he would be in his office in the afternoon, if KOSTIKOV wanted to reach him.

e. On 8 Jul 1965 a man identified by voice as the above Modesto called at the Soviet Embassy for the Vice Consul (i.e. KOSTIKOV). He was told to call back, and when asked who was calling, he said he was calling on behalf of the Panamanians ("de parte de los panamenos").

f. On 9 Jul 1965 a man called at the Soviet Embassy for KOSTIKOV, who was out. The man then said to leave the message that "BERMUDEZ...no...tell him that Modesto called." (This is evidently what made the LIENVOY monitors assume that the caller's name was "Modesto BERMUDEZ.")

g. On 9 Jul 1965 a man left a message at the Soviet Embassy for KOSTIKOV saying that Modesto had called. (This comes out in LIENVOY as being a call from "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno," but this was probably the monitor's way of identifying the same man of the above conversations and not what the man actually said.)

h. On 12 Jul 1965 Modesto again spoke to KOSTIKOV (and is again described by LIENVOY as "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno"). Modesto informed KOSTIKOV that the job from Ensenada ("el encargo de Ensenada") had arrived. KOSTIKOV suggested meeting Modesto at the usual place and asked if (he, she, it?) was with Modesto. Modesto said yes, at his house, and KOSTIKOV said then it would be better for him to visit them at his house. Modesto also asked about the "other matter," but KOSTIKOV still had no news.

i. On 14 Jul 1965 it was again reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" called and left a message to tell KOSTIKOV that he had called. (Again, the "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" is probably a LIENVOY assumption, rather than what Modesto actually said.)

j. On 4 Aug 1965 "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" (again, probably the LIENVOY assumption) called at the Soviet Embassy for KORMUSHKIN and was told to call him on another number. (No record of a second call.)

k. On 12 Aug 1965 LIENVOY reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" called KORMUSHKIN and asked whether the young man had been dispatched. KORMUSHKIN said he had just left [illegible]

201-305052

14-00000

l. On 22 Sep 1965 LIENVOY reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" called from inside the Soviet Embassy at 1128 hours to a local travel agency (T.C.I./Greyhound) and spoke with Miss LABASTIDA, asking her about the price of the ticket to Prague under the same system they had used to send the other people. LABASTIDA asked for one of the names in order to pull the card to see how it had been done, and "BERMUDEZ" gave her the name Guillermo AGUIRRE. LABASTIDA gave him various possible flights and asked that he call back in the afternoon for more definite information. (Station traces show that Guillermo AGUIRRE Rodriguez, 201-245711, is a Nicaraguan who was at the CPSU school in Moscow in 1965.) (LILYRIC reported that the man in the attached photograph, who is undoubtedly identical with Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria, visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from 1111 to 1137 hours. There therefore seems no question that he is the "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" who has been reported by LIENVOY in all the above conversations.)

m. On 29 Sep 1965 LIENVOY reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" called KORMUSHKIN and said he had some things ("encargos") for him. KORBUSHKIN said he would see Modesto at seven o'clock in the usual place.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

201-305052

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SB Division

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP - Voice Samples of Soviets in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith for Headquarters retention are voice samples, taken from LIENVOY, of the following Soviets previously stationed in Mexico :

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701)
Yuriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV (201-230429)
Ivan Afanasyevich BEKETOV (201-754500)
Ina Nikolayevna BOLDOVA (201-245416)
Vasiliy Karpovich BUTSEV (201-273883)
Yuriy Aleksandrovich DOMRACHEV (201-297666)
Aleksey Ivanovich GARMASHEV (2010277418)
Vladimir Petrovich GULIN (201-734985)
Viktor Petrovich KALININ (201-735049)
Nikolay Konstantinovich KHLEBNIKOV (201-227420)
Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV (201-101794)
Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)
Sergey Semenovich KUKHARENKO (201-260831)
Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870)
Vladimir Petrovich OBRUBOV (201-731394)
Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)
Aleksandr Petrovich PAVLOV (201-761265)
Georgiy Aleksandrovich SHCHUCHKIN (201-242726)
Vasiliy Vasilyevich SIMONOV (201-735055)
Sergey Iosifovich SOKOLOVSKIY (201-025485)
Gennadiy Fedorovich STROGANOV (201-735056)
Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (201-243602)

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Voice samples

Distribution:
2 - CSB, w/att., H/W
1 - CWH, w/o att.

file Kostikov
201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 31217	27 JANUARY 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	50-8-10/1

Wayne CTS
Jocker
Joan
Va.

ORIG : J. CARLSON
UNIT : SR/0/7A
EXT : 8268 6213
DATE : 15 APR 66

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-305052

26 SECRET

201-305873

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

①	DA	5	B1
2	WH	6	C1
3	C	7	RR
4	6	8	

18 APR 66 20 12z

TO : SANTIAGO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF : SR 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY WH 8, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2,

TO SAGO INFO CITE DIR 97152

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF: MEXI 6866 8888888888 (IN 95002)*

THE FOLLOWING IS FYI:

A•Y.ff

1. NECHIPORENKO OF REF BORN 4 JUL 32, WIFE LIDIYA N. ATTENDED CONFERENCE CARACAS ALSO 8888 POSSIBLY BUEN DEC 57, VICE CONSUL 8888 MEXI AUG 61 TO AUG 65. SPEAKS FLUENT ENGLISH AND SPANISH. ABLE TO PASS AS MEXICAN. CLEVER, INTELLIGENT, RESERVED. THOROUGH BACKGROUND MEXICAN CULTURE.

A 18173

2. KOSTIKOV OF REF BORN 17 MAR 33, WIFE ROZA ALEKSANDROVNA BORN 2 MAR 32. IN 58 AND 59 ATTENDED CONFERENCES IN MADRID, IN 59 AND 60 INDUSTRIAL FAIRS IN MEXI AND HAVANA. EMPLOYEE THEN VICE CONSUL MEXI SEP 61 TO AUG 65. SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH AND SPANISH.

3. BOTH SUBJS KNOWN KGB PER EXTENSIVE ACTIVITIES MEXI. KOSTIKOV BELIEVED IN THIRTEENTH DEPT FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE.

4. EXTENSIVE TRACES SUBJS AVAILABLE HQS. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST IF SUBJS ARRIVE SAGO. WILL THEN POUCH SPRS WITH PORTION FOR LIAISON.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	-	8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

18 APR 66 20 12z

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF : INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 97152

*REF ANNOUNCED POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT ~~XOXSAGOMORXBMBXSXM~~ OF SUBJS TO SAGO.

~~DDDDSDDDDDX~~

DC/SR/O/PA
SR/O/WH
SR/CI/K
WH/4/CH

C/WH Thomas Polgar
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

SR/COP F. Gasicke

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 45

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PA	5	BT
2	WH	6	CI
3		7	RR
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION SR 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

UNIT TIME BY

ACTION

INFO FILE, VR, WE 8, CS/DO, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O, [illegible], CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, IW, DDP/ESD, [illegible]

S E C R E T 121526Z

SAGO INFO DIR CITE MEXI 6866

12Apr66 95002

REDWOOD

LICOWL-1 REPORTS THAT ON 2 APR SOV EMB GUARD STANISLAV SERGEYEVICH SILNIKOV 201-271103 TOLD HIM THAT VITALIY BORISOVICH SHUBIN 201-266547 WAS NOW CONSUL IN CHILE, ADDED THAT PROBABLY OLEG MAKSIMOVICH NECHIPORENKO 201-305870 AND VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV 201-305052 WOULD ALSO BE GOING TO CHILE.

S E C R E T

CFN 6866 LICOWL-1 2 APR SOV EMB STANISLAV SERGEYEVICH SILNXEV 201-271103 VITALIY BORISOVICH SHUBIN 201-266547 CHILE OLEG MAKSIMOVICH NECHIPORENKO 201-305870 VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV 201-305052

BT

SECRET

Kostikov

3 March 1966
HMMA 28421
File: 201-305025) (KOSTIKOV)

From the LICOWL-1 Progress Report

HMMA 28421, 3 March 1866

(Original filed in 201-741655)

Processed by Millie Rodriguez, SR/O/WH. Date Process: 28 March 1966

Valeriy V. KOSTIKOV (201-305025) [Subject reported on KOSTIKOV in detail in Reference]. During the summer of 1965, KOSTIKOV also asked Subject to obtain a prostitute for him. Subject did so but KOSTIKOV failed to meet the girl. Shortly thereafter, KOSTIKOV returned to Moscow. ak

Reference mentioned is : HMMA 25677, March 1965

201-305052
~~201-305025~~

SECRET

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
LEFT MEXICO PCS DURING 4 AUG 1965-

050-008-010
HMMA-27102
08 SEP 65
P2

R 6509151382

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

3/1. CSR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD - Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LIFIRE reported the departure on 4 August 1965, Sabena flight 556 of Subject, his wife and daughter. Subject was travelling on Soviet diplomatic passport no. 2240, his wife and child on no. 2241. Travelling on the same flight with Subject, was Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV, who has been assigned as guard at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and was returning to the USSR.

Assigned Soviet Embassy [illegible]

2. Subject has left Mexico PCS. His replacement, Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN, arrived on 27 July 1965.
of USSR (201-744391)

3. The bulk of Station information on Subject has already been reported to Headquarters. Below are a few additional items of interest.

Kostikov's (201-305052)

4. LICOWL/1 reported that Subject's only close friends among the Soviets in Mexico were Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870) and Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV (201-756168). LICALLA reports also show that ~~Subject~~ is almost constantly seen at the Embassy with these two individuals.

5. Subject speaks French (Source: LIENVOY, 14 June 1965).

6. Subject has hemorrhoids (Source: LIENVOY, 2 June 1965).

7. Subject has occasionally made appointments to see individuals "at the same time" or "at the same place." The Station has not, however, been able to identify these individuals. These individuals have identified themselves on the telephone as :

a. "Senora MONTIEL."

b. "Ricardo."

MICROFILMED
AUG 20 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

-continued-

Attachment: Photos of Subject & wife
Appropriate photos retained in B.O.

Distribution:
2 - CSR, w/att, H/W
1 - CWH, w/o att.

CS COPY

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26853	11 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-305052 FFN: P-7455

c. "Froilan." The latter is possibly identical with a "Froilan TIRADO" who called Subject on 29 March 1965. There are no Station traces on Froilan TIRADO.

Source of the above is LIENVOY.

8. Attached are LICALLA and LILYRIC photographs of Subject and his wife.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

KOSTIKOVA

20 May 65

LILYRIC

V.V. KOSTIKOV

19 Jun 66

LICALLA

Att to HMMA-26853 11 Aug 65 201 305052

(When Fi...

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
IDENTIFIED KGB OFFICER.

201-744341
HMMA-26823
10 AUG 65
P1

R 6508251399

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD - Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LIFIRE reported the departure on 4 August 1965, Sabena flight 556 for Brussels (and Moscow) of Subject. (It is not known whether Subject's travel was PCS or TDY. Subject's wife and son had left Mexico on 7 July 1965).

2. LIFIRE reported that Subject was travelling on Soviet service passport no. 009260; his wife and daughter had travelled on no. 009270. Subject's age was given as 35, that of his wife as 34, and that of his son Vladimir as 9. (Comment: These ages may be as of 1962, when Subject originally entered Mexico.)

3 3. Travelling on the same flight with Subject were Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052) and his family. KOSTIKOV is an identified KGB officer who was returning to the USSR PCS.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - CSR
1 - CWH

COPY

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26824	10 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-779495 FFN: P -8125

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 35

1/2 SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

9 AUG 1965

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PA	5	BI
2	WH	6	CI
3		7	RR
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
SR8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH8, CI/IC2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT, WH/C8

SECRET 261701Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4349

6 Aug 65 IN 27258

REDWOOD

1. LIFIRE AND LITEMPO REPORT ARRIVAL 27 JULY VLADISLAV SERGEYEVICH KORMUSHKIN, AGE 31, WIFE INNA NIKOLAYEVNA AGE 30, SON SERGEY AGE 5. KORMUSHKIN ASSIGNED AS ATTACHE SOVIET EMB, BELIEVED REPLACING KOSTIKOV (201-305052).

2. REQUEST TRACES AND 201.

SECRET

CFN: 4349 LIFIRE LITEMPO 27 VLADISLAV SERGEYEVICH KORMUSHKIN 31 INNA NIKOLAYEVNA 30 SERGEY 5 KORMUSHKIN SOVIET EMB KOSTIKOV 201-305052 201

BT

SECRET

~~201-744344~~

~~A-22936~~

File
201-305052

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES: 4

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CI	5	131
2	WH	6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, SR8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S
E C R E T 262244Z

file Kostikov

26 JUL 65 19199

DIR CITE MEXI 4247

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

1. ACC LIENVOY 15 JULY MR BRECK (PHONETIC) CALLED SOVEMB FROM PBPRIME ASKED FOR SOV CONSUL WHO NOT IN. CALLED TWICE AGAIN 15 JULY WAS TOLD CONTACT KOSTIKOV (201-305052) WHO SPEAKS ENGLISH.

2. 0952 HRS 19 JULY UNK MEXICAN CALLED SOVEMB ON PART AMERICAN WHO JUST ARRIVED BY BUS FROM PBPRIME AND WHO HAD SPOKEN KOSTIKOV. SINCE K NOT IN MAN CALLED AGAIN 1124 HRS SAID WAS MR BRECK. ARRANGED SEE K SAME DAY 1200 HRS AT EMB.

3. LIEMPTY 6 RPTED YOUNG AMER TYPE MALE ENTERED SOVEMB 1233 HRS 19 JULY. LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE MOUNTED WHEN HE LEFT EMB AT 1317 HRS. NOT DROPPED UNTIL 23 JULY WHEN HE IDENTIFIED BY LIEMBRACE THROUGH HOTEL AS EUGENE ALLEN BREKKE, "RADIO ANNOUNCER," 1257 ROBERT ST., "DESMOINES, IOWA."

4. EMB CHECK SHOWED PROTECTION WELFARE CASE JULY 64 EUGENE ALLYN BREKKE DPOB 4 MAY 37 BRITT, IOWA. RES 1257 ROBERT ST., HILLSIDE, N.J. BREKKE COULD NOT PAY HOTEL BILL AND SOUGHT EMB AID.

5. 23 JULY STA OBTAINED ACCESS TO LARGE ENVELOPE CONTAINING LTRS TO BREKKE. ENVELOPE MAILED FROM JULIA BREKKE, 605 STOCKDALE

SECRET

201-305052

SECRET

IN 19199 2/2

S
T. WEBSTER CITY, IOWA. SENT C/O MR. E. PEARSON, 4001 FREIDA ST., LITTLE ROCK ARK. PEARSON APPARENTLY SENT TO PBSWING. LTRS TO BREKKE SHOWED HE WRITING BAD CHECKS, SEEKING IMMIGRATION AUSTRALIA, BEHIND ON LOANS, SEARCHING FOR HIS FATHER, ANTONE SAUERIN BREKKE AND HAS MADE FCC APPLICATION FOR RADIO OPERATOR'S LICENSE.

6. POUCHING PHOTOS AND FURTHER DETAILS. LOCAL ODENVY ADVISED. REQUEST HQS TRACES.

SECRET

CFN 4247 ACC LIENVOY 15 JULY MR BRECK NOT IN 15 JULY KOSTIKOV (201-305252 ENGLISH 0952 HRS 19 JULY UNK MEXICAN AMERICAN BUS K NOT IN 1104 HRS MR BRECK K 1200 HRS LIEMPTY 6 RPTED 1233 HRS 19 JULY 1317 HRS NOT DROPPED 23 JULY HOTEL EUGENE ALLEN BREKKE 1257 ROBERT ST "DESMOINES IOWA JULY 64 EUGENE ALLYN BREKKE DPOB 4 MAY 37 BRITT IOWA RES 1257 ROBERT ST HILLSIDE N.J. NOT PAY HOTEL 23 JULY BREKKE JULIA BREKKE 605 STOCKDALE ST WEBSTER CITY IOWA C/O MR. E. PEARSON 4001 FREIDA ST LITTLE ROCK ARK AUSTRALIA ANTONE SAUERIN BREKKE FCC HWS

BT

SECRET

NNN

14-00000

1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
XXXXX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Panama City H2 P

INFO. Chief, WH; Chief, SR

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDCOAT - Modesto BERMUDEZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES Δ MEXICO CIT PANAMA

MICROFILMED
JUL 23 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REFERENCE: PACY - 7321, 8 July 1965

1. Panama City traces are requested on Modesto BERMUDEZ, a Panamanian currently in Mexico City. BERMUDEZ has been in touch with Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052), Vice Consul at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and identified KGB officer on several occasions.

2. On 7 July 1965 "Modesto" called KOSTIKOV, saying that he had just received a cable asking about the trip to Helsinki, to which "Modesto" wanted to cable a reply. KOSTIKOV said that they had to wait a day or two, but that he would send an urgent cable. On 8 July 1965 an individual identified by voice as the "Modesto" above called KOSTIKOV, who was out, and left the message to tell him that he had a call "from the Panamanians." On 9 July "Modesto BERMUDEZ," a Panamanian, left a message for KOSTIKOV to call him. (Source: LIENVOY.)

3. It appears that the conversations above refer to the Panamanian delegation to the World Peace Congress being held in Helsinki 10-17 July 1965. BERMUDEZ is not, however, one of the Referenced six Panamanians who arrived in Mexico on 6 July on their way to the Congress.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - COS, Panama City
1 - CWH
1 - CSR /cc SR/c/WH

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 26602

DATE 14 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER 201-305052 ffn: 7455

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, SR via Chief, WH		MICROFILM

SUBJECT REDWOOD
SPR ON Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for information only.

REFERENCE : HMMA-25722, 2 April 1965

Subject SPR typed in final form is forwarded herewith.

John T. Ossenbrink

3-COS, Mexico City, W/attachment
ATTACHMENT:
Orig & 1 SPR

1WU

201-305052

15 JUL 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-13801 CS COPY	DATE 9 July 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S E C RE T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-305052

1-WH/1 w/att
1-SR/O/WH w/att
1-RID w/att

AN	~~EI~~	ORF
~~PS~~	~~DEPT~~	SR/CI/
ABSTRACT	~~INDEX~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/O/WH	George Finney	lam	6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SR/O/WH	9 July	
C/NH/1		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH		

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

SPR PREPARED BY: Vera T. WEISCARVER

DATE: 15 February 1965

201 NUMBER: 305052

A-NUMBER: 18973

1. NAME: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

2. DPOB: 17 March 1933, Moscow. (1)

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA (including past citizenship and passports, with dates):

Soviet citizen.

Service passport no. C-64352, when he arrived in Mexico City on 19 September 1961. (2)

4. ETHNIC ORIGIN:

Unknown.

5. OTHER NAMES USED (with dates, circumstances, DPOB, citizenship and passport data, if appropriate):

Unknown.

6. CURRENT POSITION (non-intell):

When Subject arrived in Mexico City, he had employee status. Later Subject was raised to the rank of Vice Consul and, since March 1963, Subject has held the rank of Attache in the Consular Office. (3)

SECRET

Att #1 -HMMW-13801

201-305052

7. RELATIVES (including DPOB, location/address, passport and other personal information where available and appropriate):

a. Father: Not known.

b. Mother: Not known.

c. Spouse (including maiden name and date of marriage):

Roza Aleksandrovna KOSTIKOVA

DPOB: 2 March 1932, Arkhangel Oblast. (1)

Service passport No. C-64353, 19 September 1961.

According to LICOWL/1, Subject's wife has blond hair, blue eyes, is short in stature and speaks excellent Spanish. LICOWL/1 also stated that Subject's wife appears to be in charge of the Embassy kitchen. (4) (5)

About 18 February 1964, Subject's wife underwent a stomach operation for an unknown ailment. (6)

Dr. SORIANO (See Western Contacts) has treated Subject's wife for her illnesses. (7) (8) (9)

Subject's wife was to be the Soviet Representative in the annual U.N. Parade held in Mexico City in October 1962. (10)

d. Children.

Daughter - Svetlana Valeriyevna. DPOB: 1959, Moscow. (11)

Passport No. C-64353. (Child arrived in Mexico on Mother's passport.)

e. Others:

None known.

8. LANGUAGES (with degree of fluency):

   a. English:: Good. (11)

      Subject used English while conversing with NAMSTROM (See Western Contacts). (12)

   b. Spanish: Good. (11) (13)

   c. Subject is reported to be a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Languages: (14)

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:

(March 1965 - basis LIEMPTY, LICOWL/1 and Staffer Observation.)

a. Apparent age - 35-38 years.

b. Height - 5'10".

c. Build - Stocky, paunchy stomach.

d. Hair - Dark brown, receding hairline, giving effect of widow's peak, kinky hair.

e. Eyes - Small, color not definitely known but believed to be hazel, always wears tinted sunglasses.

f. Complexion - White, rough, with heavy beard that is not always well shaved.

g. Shape of face - Round, somewhat heavy jowls, thin lips, wide nostrils, Head goes up to point at top but this is covered by his hair.

h. General appearance - More Semitic or Near Eastern than Slavic. In general a sloppy dresser with ill fitting clothes.

i. Outstanding features and identifying marks - Always wears tinted sunglasses.

j. Others - Drinks, uses profane language. (Source - LICOWL/1)

Public photographs taken at the Mexico City Airport in 1964. Picture attached to original only.

10. PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, HABITS (with specific details and examples where appropriate including subjects covered in personality/operational assessment questionnaire):

Subject plays volleyball. (16) (17)

Subject is a frequent visitor to LICOWL/1's store and according to LICOWL/1, Subject is a person who can be very polite and very kind. LICOWL/1 and Subject have a very friendly relationship. (16) (19) However, see also HMMA-25516, 4 March 1965.

LICOWL/1 gave a fiesta at his home on 12 September 1964, which was attended by several Soviets. Subject and Yuriy Dmitriyevich KALININ (see Soviet contacts) became drunk and sick. When Subject fully realized what a state KALININ was in, he pulled himself together and drove KALININ home. During this fiesta, Subject became interested in Juana Valdes aka Juana Prieto GONZALES (see Western contacts). Sra. GONZALES (see Western contacts) Juana's mother, told LICOWL/1 that Subject had offered the girl 300 pesos a week to be his girl friend. (4) (20)

Prior to the fiesta, LICOWL/1 told Yuriy Dmitriyevich KALININ (see Soviet contacts) that Subject and Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (see Soviet contacts) were also invited. KALININ stated that he did not like these two, that they were tyrants and felt that they were important personnel since they were diplomats. KALININ also said he did not like the idea of their attending the fiesta, and while speaking appeared to be very disgusted and spat on the floor. (21)

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

Date	Entry	Source
	Subject graduated from higher studies at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages.	(22)
September-October 1958	Subject was a member of the Soviet Bloc Delegation to the 17th International Railroad Congress Meeting in Madrid, Spain.	(22)
June 1959	Subject visited Barcelona after the Congress, listed as an interpreter, and used passport no. S-39990.	(22)
June 1959	Subject attended the CEI Congress in Madrid.	(22)
September 1959	Subject requested a U.S. visa as a member of KHRUSHCHEV's party. Subject was listed as an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	(22)
November 1959	Subject attended the Soviet Industrial Exposition in Mexico City.	(22)
6 January 1960	Subject flew from Mexico City to Havana.	(22)
February 1960	Subject attended the Soviet Industrial Exposition in Havana, Cuba.	(22)
7 March 1960	Subject departed Havana for Europe, still using passport no. S-39990.	(22)
19 September 1961	Subject arrived in Mexico City, accompanied by his family, via Sabena no. 555.	(23)
8 December 1961	An unidentified male called the Embassy and asked for Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN (Third Secretary, suspect KGB officer). The caller was told BROVKIN had left Mexico and Sr. KOSTIKOV had taken his place.	(24)
6 January 1963	Subject was in Vera Cruz.	(25)
7 April 1963	Subject departed Mexico City, via Sabena no. 556, accompanied by his family for home leave in the USSR.	(26)
14 May 1963	Subject returned from home leave, accompanied by his family.	(27)
4 December 1963	Subject's address was Progreso 9, Apt. 6. In early 1965, Subject still had the same address.	(28) (29)
	March 1965, "Diario Official" lists Subject at this same address.	
7 December 1963	Subject went to Cuernavaca.	
	(COMMENT: Duration of his stay unknown, but believed to have been a pleasure trip.)	(30)

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION (including justification, sources and narrative discussion):

Subject is a known KGB Officer probably from the 13th Department of the First Chief Directorate, identified as such through the AEBURBLE case. (See Intelligence Activities). (31)

Subject was a member of the group who met Sergey Nikolayevich ANTONOV, Chief of the Latin American Department of the KGB, at the Airport. (32)

Subject continued the clandestine contact with Margarito LNU (See Western Contacts), an unidentified agent previously handled by First Secretary Viktor Nikolayevich GLOTOV, formerly KGB Rezident. (33)

Subject has frequently escorted diplomatic couriers to and from the airport, a function primarily of the consular section officers and, as farras is known, principally a KGB responsibility. (33)

In the consular office all of Subject's immediate associates are identified KGB officers. (See Soviet contacts). (34)

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (positions, functions, agents, contacts, other details, including how we learned about each item, all in chronological order including narrative summary where necessary, such as D/A cases, incidents, etc):

About March 1963, Subject and CARMASHEV (see Soviet Contacts) flew from Mexico City to Tijuana, Baja California, where they rented a Hertz car allegedly for a recreational visit. The men travelled to Mexicali and Ensenada and departed for Mexico City on 13 March 1963. (35) (36)

On 1 September 1963, Subject and ALFERYEV (see Soviet contacts) flew from Mexico City to Tijuana where they rented a Hertz auto. While renting the auto, Subject was asked for identification. Subject stated he was an employee of the Mexican Department of Exterior Relations, Later, when pressed for identification, Subject stated he was an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Subject and ALFERYEV spent most of their time in the company of Isaak Carlos Chapluk (see Western contacts). The Soviets visited Estero Beach, Punta Banda and Nuna SIMANOVICH's curio shop (see Western contacts). On 7 September 1964, they visited the Bahia Motel for dinner and a floor show in the company of Miguel POPOFF (see Western contacts). On 10 September 1963 the Soviets purchased 20,000 bales of cotton to be shipped to Ensenada, final destination unknown. Subject and ALFERYAV were also in contact with Demetrio ALMAGUER (see Western contacts). ALMAGUER was allegedly authorized by the Soviets to find three Mexican youths to travel and study in the USSR. The two Soviets departed Tijuana on 13 September 1963. (37)

On 19 January 1964, when LICOZY/5 (a Station double agent) returned to his apartment building, SHUBIN (see Soviet contacts) and Subject were seated in a car outside and NECHIPORENKO (LICOZY/5's case officer) was about to ring the door bell. NECHIPORENKO told LICOZY/5 that PRIKHODKO (the former KGB case officer) was in town and wanted to see LICOZY/5. NECHIPORENKO also gave LICOZY/5 tickets for the Soviet Soccer game on 19 January 1964. (38)

(COMMENT: LICOZY/5 is being handled by NECHIPORENKO and is a KGB agent. This is the only known occasion of Subject being involved with LICOZY/5 in anything but an overt business contact.)

Subject met with AEBURBLE in Mexico City on 9, 11 and 12 February 1963 and received information from AEBURBLE on industrial and missile sites in PBPRIME. Subject also gave AEBURBLE requirements of the same nature to be carried out in the future. Subject made arrangements with AEBURBLE for his next meeting, to be held in New York City, with a different, unidentified Soviet. On 6 May 1963, AEBURBLE was met in accordance with the above arrangements by Oleg Danilovich BRYKIN (201-292588), a translator assigned to the U.N. Secretariat in New York City. BRYKIN has been identified by a sensitive reliable source as a member of the KGB's 13th Department. (31)

Substantiating information that Subject is a member of the KGB is derived from his connections with Margarito LNU (see Western contacts) undoubtedly an agent (unidentified) formerly in contact with the former First Secretary and KGB Rezident Viktor Nikolayevich GLOTOV. (33

Subject attempted to cultivate David T. PATON (see American contacts) an American Embassy officer formerly assigned to the Visa Section and who now has protocol functions (1965). This cultivation ceased, as far as is known to the Station, immediately after the Station (with Embassy approval) advised PATON to indicate to Subject his disinterest in socializing with him. (33)

201-305052

Since 1 August 1964, Subject has received in double talk, apparently clandestine calls from Ricardo LNU, an unidentified male with a Central American or Cuban accent. Meetings have been arranged at unnamed places.

(COMMENT: A Ricardo LNU with a Central American or Cuban accent has been in contact with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Second Secretary and Intelligence Officer, Cuban, Embassy, Mexico City.) (39) (40)

On 11 March 1963, one Ricardo PEREZ (not further identified) attempted to call Subject and left a message that he would like to meet with Subject at the "place Subject knows" on the next Friday. (41)

(COMMENT: Ricardo PEREZ may be identical with RICARDO LNU of the above paragraph because of the similar trend in conversation in arranging meetings. One Ricardo PEREZ called the Cuban Embassy, on 26 June 1964 to tell Antonio GARCIA Lara, 201-328338, Commercial Attache and Intelligence Officer, Cuban Embassy, Mexico City, that he had a message for GARCIA from Marguerita DALTON Mexican citizen, student at University of Havana and sister of Raque DALTON, Cuban IS Agent. (42)

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (positions, function, contacts, general activity):

On 18 January 1962, Subject called Valeriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV, GRU Chauffeur, and asked for data on the trade of Mexico with Red China for "this year". (43)

On 27 March 1962, Subject called the Belgian Embassy to obtain transit visas for two Soviet artists transiting Belgium. (40)

On 7 July 1962, Subject was in Cuernavaca, probably for a pleasure trip. (44)

Subject called LICOZY/5 on 24 August 1962, and asked about travelling by plane from Mexico to Trinidad. LICOZY/5 explained that one would have to go from Mexico to Caracas to Trinidad. Subject stated he would order tickets in September. (19)

(COMMENT: The Station has no additional information on this matter.)

Subject called Jorge RUEDA to complain because two weeks previously an order had been placed with RUEDA to find a specialist to repair the billiard table at the Embassy. (45)

On 7 January 1963, Subject called GARMASHEV (see Soviet contacts) long distance from Vera Cruz, where he had gone to make medical arrangements for a Soviet seaman burned in a shipboard fire. Subject had an automobile accident while on his trip which he related to GARMASHEV. GARMASHEV told Subject he would have to pay his own expenses back to Mexico City and also pay his expenses when he returns for the car after it's repaired. (25)

In mid-November 1963, Subject went to Cuautla, (near Mexico City) apparently for recreational reasons. (46)

On 16 April 1964, Subject called the Embassy and asked that Aleksandr Mikhaylovich DENISOV, Third Secretary and GRU officer, call New York and tell "them" (not further identified) the couriers left on Aeronaves de Mexico, flight # 400 at 10:45 am and also asked that DENISOV then call Vladimir P. GOULINE, Attache-Chief of the Secret Files and Suspect KGB Officer, and tell him "everything is all right". (47)

On 29 January 1963, an unidentified man called the Embassy and left a message for Subject to go to the EDITORIAL to see the new edition. The caller also said "it's urgent". (48)

(COMMENT: EDITORIAL may be identical with Editorial Jus S.A. Plaza de Abasolo 14, Col. Guerrero, Mexico 3, D.F.)

In September and October 1963, Lee Harvey OSWALD (see Western contacts) was in contact with Subject regarding a visa so that OSWALD might return to the Soviet Union.

On 14 September 1964, FNU ALFARO of Mexicana de Aviacion called Subject to say that Subject's Customs Declaration for importing two cameras to Mexico was valid until the 17th, and that he (ALFARO) needed information for the financial details to be arranged. (50)

Subject has made travel arrangements for members of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and also visiting delegations and Soviet TDYers. Subject has [illegible] relationship with Sabona, Cubana and LICOZY/5 for this purpose. (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59)

Subject has acted as an interpreter and guide for visiting Soviet delegations. (60) (61) (62) (63) (64)

Subject directed Sr. HERON (see Western contacts) in sending packages to the USSR. Subject advised that the duties for the Soviet value for the articles to be sent had to be paid in Mexico. (65)

Subject has often been in contact with Villana Cia, a customs brokerage firm, about shipments of articles to or from Mexico. (66) (67) (6)

Subject is a member of the Consular Corps in Mexico (Organization of Consular Officers). (68) (69)

15. CONTACTS (all known friends and associates; including foreign diplomatic, business and social contacts, with dates, nature of association and identifying data broken down in the following categories):

a. Soviet friends and associates:

Luz Maria Koulfman de SERLOVA aka Luz VERNOVA, wife of Carlos LAGUNAS Zavala (201-138040). Subject was called on 5 June 1962 by SERLOVA, who said she would like to see him. The arranged a time. (70)

Oleg Pavlovich MOSKVICHEV: Former employee of the Commercial Office and identified KGB Officer for S&T work. Subject called MOSKVICHEV on 13 November 1962tto ask if he might borrow MOSKVICHEV's car to go to the dentist. (71)

Antonia Libertad PATAN Lopez: Spanish "nino" employed in the Soviet Information Bulletin Office. PATAN called Subject on 21 November 1962 and stated that she'd left some documents at the Consular Office and was told to call Subject. Subject said he looked through her documents and they were all in order. (72)

(COMMENT: It is unknown what kind of documents these were, but they may have concerned a Soviet passport.)

Aleksey Ivanovich GARMASHEV: First Secretary and KGB Officer, suspect deputy KGB Rezident. Subject and GARMASHEV flew from Mexico City to Tijuana in March 1963. (35)

Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO: Vice-Consul and known KGB Officer. Subject and NECHIPORENKO are social contacts. NECHIPORENKO called Subject at the Embassy on 26 June 1964 and told Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV, Employee Guard and suspect KGB Officer, to get Subject on the phone, "but don't say anything to the others". NECHIPORENKO instructed Subject to go to his (NECHIPORENKO's) house and said, "I'll wait for you near the store that sells paints, but not the nearest one, the one on the corner." NECHIPORENKO called Dr. SORIANO (see Western contacts) for Subject who was sick in bed. Subject and NECHIPORENKO share the use of a Volkswagon. (73) (74) (75) (13) (76)

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV: Pravda Correspondent and identified KGB Officer. Subject and ALFERYEV flew to Tijuana on 1 September 1963. (77)

Vitaliy Borisovich SHUBIN: Attache and identified KGB Officer. Subject and family and the SHUBINs have taken vacations together at Cuernavaca. SHUBIN and Subject are personal friends. (78) (79) (80) (13)

Igor KRUGLIY: Member of the Soviet Trade Union Delegation visiting Mexico in December 1963. Subject accompanied and interpreted for members of this group. Subject and SHUBIN drank with KRUGLIY while on the town one night. (64)

Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV: First Secretary and KGB Rezident. Subject and KONSTANTINOV are in business and social contact. (13) (76)

Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV: Minister Counsular and suspect KGB Officer. Subject has dined at the KAZANTSEV home. (13)

Rudolph Petrovich SHLYAPNIKOV: Soviet Youth Leader on UNESCO scholarship (suspect KGB) who visited Mexico during September 1964 and was in contact with Subject at this time. (81)

Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV: INTOURIST Representative in the Commercial Office and suspect KGB Officer. Subject used NIKIFOROV's car in January 1965, after he'd had an accident with his own car. (82)

Yuriy Demitriyevich KALININ: KGB Chauffeur. He visits LICOWL/1's store frequently and Subject is often with him. Subject drove KALININ home after KALININ got very drunk at LICOWL/1's fiesta in September 1964. (20) (83)

Jana KANKOVSKA: Secretary at the Czech Commercial Office. KANKOVSKA called Subject on 16 December 1964 and apologized for not being at home when Subject came over to pick up the "notes". (84)

Alfredo MIRABAL Diaz: Cuban Consul in Mexico City and known Cuban Intelligence Officer. MIRABAL called the Soviet Embassy on 22 November 1963 and asked to speak to Pavel Antonivich YATSKOV, Consul and identified KGB Officer, who was unavailable. Subject took the call and spoke to MIRABAL using the familiar tu.

SUBJECT: Forgive me for arriving late.

MIRABAL: Did you recover the suitcase?

SUBJECT: Yes.

MIRABAL: Then it was arriving on the other trip.

SUBJECT: Yes.

MIRABAL: I called to tell you the following, that regarding that matter that we had talked about, to see if we would spend Sunday in Chapultepec park because my wife is preparing some food to eat there.

SUBJECT: I'm sorry but I've just made plans for another trip and I'm leaving this very day. So please forgive me for not being able to go with you. (At this point Subject in error addressed MIRABAL as AZCUE and MIRABAL corrected him. COMMENT: MIRABAL replaced Eusebio AZCUE Lopez, Former Cuban Consul. COMMENT: According to LILYRIC Subject did not go on a trip.) Have you already talked with NECHIPORENKO?

MIRABAL: I'd like to talk with Pavel YATSKOV.

Subject: Wait a minute, he'll come now.

MIRABAL: If he's busy I'll call him later, but I'll be available for the next half hour on # 11-28-47 (phone).

SUBJECT: Okay. (121) (122) (123)

b. PBPRIME citizens, official and non-official, including KUBARK staff officers and contract types:

Lee Harvey OSWALD: When OSWALD was attempting to return to the USSR he contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and spoke with Subject. (49)

David PATON: U.S. Embassy Clerk in charge of processing diplomatic visas. Subject was in contact with PATON, when Subject went to the U.S. Embassy to obtain a transit visa for Yelene Nikolayevna FILIPPOVA. Subject handed to PATON, CARMASHEV's calling card on the back of which was a time notation for a previous invitation CARMASHEV had extended to PATON. PATON explained to Subject that he could not accept this invitation. Subject continued to have legitimate contact with PATON arranging transit visas for travelling Soviets. (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92)

Carol MILLER: Employee of Life Magazine. MILLER called Subject on 2 October 1964 to ask if there were anything the Soviets wished to add to an article being printed in Life magazine. Subject said no. (149)

LIERECT-1: A former Mexico City Station asset of current interest to the Station as an LCIMPROVE possibility. See 201-212649 Subject visited LIERECT-1's Cuernavaca home on Easter 1964. (58)

c. Other Western officials and citizens:

LICOZY-5: Subject has had legitimate business contact with LICOZY/5 while making travel arrangements for Soviets. Subject has also been in social contact with LICOZY/5. (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (72) (98)

Dr. Mario LAGUNILLA Leca: Medical Doctor used by the Soviet Embassy personnel. Subject has been in contact with LAGUNILLA for medical reasons. (7)

Margarito LNU: An unidentified male who has been in seemingly clandestine contact with members of the Soviet Embassy since 27 January 1961. Subject has had several calls from Margarito arranging times to meet at places "they know". Margarito has usually stated in his calls that he has some new books. (99) (100) (101) (102) (103)

Oscar GUTIERREZ: A Cuban who called the Embassy on 28 November 1962 and asked for "Valeriy". (104)

201-305052

Natalia DARE: (Not further identified.) DARE called Subject on 21 October 1963 and left a message that "Natalia DARE from Acapulco called and she will return to do it because tomorrow she is leaving by plane". (105)

Maria de la Paz CERVANTES: Mexican employee of Sabena Airline's downtown office. Subject has made travel arrangements with CERVANTES. On 16 April 1962, CERVANTES called the Embassy to invite Soviets to a dinner she was giving for Igor OISTRAKH, the violinist, to which Subject invited himself.

(COMMENT: The entire guest list consisted of RIS types.)

CERVANTES and Subject have a friendly relationship and on one occasion after she had taken care of some problems with passports for him, Subject asked what he owed her. The answer was "caviar", Subject then asked what else, CERVANTES replied "a kiss". (113) (114) (115) (116) (117) (118) (119) (120)

Dr. Emilian SORIANO: Medical doctor used by Soviet Embassy personnel. Subject was in contact with SORIANO on several occasions because his wife required an operation. (7) (124) (9) (125)

Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero: Honduran Communist and member of the PPS in Mexico. ZELAYA called Subject on 4 January 1963 to ask if Subject had heard anything about Rafael LNU (not further identified). Subject has been in subsequent contact with ZELAYA for unknown reasons. (64) (126) (127)

Jorge de la GARZA Corcho: Employee of La Libertad Cia Gral de Seguros, S.A. Insurance Company. Subject was in contact with GARZA following his car accident in Vera Cruz. (128) (129) (130) (131) (103) (132) (133)

Terro de WANSTROM or WANSTROHM (phonetic): Swedish citizen. On 12 November 1963, WANSTROM called the Soviet Embassy and asked to speak to Mr. Andre PURITS (phonetic) later spelling it as Anheny PYRCZ, who alledgedly worked for the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, in the Trade Commissions Department. WANSTROM stated he had met this man in a restaurant in Oaxaca and related his problem of finding a ship on which to travel to Europe. The unidentified man suggested he call the Soviet Embassy, which WANSTROM did, and was referred to Subject with whom he spoke. On 13 November 1963, Subject told WANSTROM there was a Polish Ocean Lines Co., at Alvaro Obregon 223-102, leaving Vera Cruz and going to Bremen, Germany, and Gdynia, Poland. WANSTROM thought Bremen would suit their purpose. Subject gave WANSTROM the telephone number of the company and was most solicitous about WANSTROM's arranging proper accomodations. (134) (12) (135)

(COMMENT: The response of the Soviet Embassy Officials was very unusual in this case. Requests of this nature are usually brushed aside and most often in a very rude manner. Judging by his non-British accent and almost flawless English, WANSTROM must have lived in the U.S. or Canada for some time.)

Dr. Antonio KARCZMAR Bugarskiy: Medical Doctor used by the Soviet Embassy. Subject's wife was treated by KARCZMAR. (66)

Ramon PENUNERE and Demetrio ALMAGUER: PENUNERE is an MLN member and a farmer residing in the Ejido Mezquital, Mexicali, Baja California. ALMAGUER is a PCM member residing in Mexicali, Baja California. (136)

ALMAGUER contacted PENUNERE some time before mid-November 1964, stating he'd been in contact with to two Soviets in Tijuana. ALMAGUER said the Soviets had authorized him to locate three youths for travel and study in the USSR. ALMAGUER asked PENUNERE if he had a son who could meet the qualifications. PENUNERE subsequently stated he had received information leaflets on scholarships in the USSR from ALMAGUER, who allegedly had gotten them from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City when he visited there. ALMAGUER later stated he had seen Subject and ALFERYEV (see Soviet contacts) in Baja California and that they had given him two bottles of vodka and instructed him to select two students to attend the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in the USSR. (136)

Antonina SHIPPER Podernick: SHIPPER is a contact of Pavel Atonovich YATSKOV, Consul and KGB Officer. YATSKOV apparently instructed SHIPPER to call Subject. On 29 June 1964, she requested that Subject go to the Judge with her, since she had problems arising from the fact her father died leaving an estate without a will. (138) (139) (140)

Sr. Justo BRETON: (not further identified) BRETON called Subject on 3 July 1964 about a "help" certificate (certificado de ayuda).

LICOWL/1: Owner of a store frequented by Soviets. Subject has attended parties at LICOWL/1's home, and also frequents the store. (143) (144)

Ricardo LNU: (Not further identified) Ricardo LNU calls Subject at the Embassy, and meetings at unstated places are arranged. These calls do not seem to have a specific pattern but definitely seem to be clandestine. Ricardo LNU and Subject always know where they will meet, usually the calls are for arranging the time. (145) (146) (147) (148) (61)

Isaac Carlos CHAPLUK: (201-229418) Owner of Playa Bungalows in Ensenada, Baja California. Subject and ALFERYEV were guests of CHAPLUK's for dinner on several occasions when they visited Ensenada. CHAPLUK also took them to SIMONOVICH's store (see Western contacts). (37)

Miguel POPOFF: Allegedly Richfield Oil Distributors in Ensenada, Baja California. Russian-born with Mexican citizenship. Subject and ALFERYEV were in contact with POPOFF in September 1963, while in Ensenada. (37)

Miguel BAZHER: Hungarian living in Mexico. BAZHER spoke to Subject on 17 October 1964 in regard to bringing a Hungarian to Mexico. Subject stated he was only authorized to handle problems of this nature for Soviets, but, that if BAZHER could get a letter from Hungarian officials, Subject would see what could be done about it. (150)

Unidentified Nicaraguan: An unidentified Nicaraguan male called Subject on 8 November 1965 and stated he had something for Subject. Subject asked him to come by the Embassy the next day. (151)

Virginia GOMEZ Nieto: Hairdresser, member of the Women's Group of International Organization of Journalists, and a leftist. GOMEZ called the Embassy and left a message for Subject, stating she would be over to see him on the following Monday. (152)

Sra. Maria GONZALEZ and her daughter Juana: Subject became interested in Juana at LICOWL/1's fiesta in September 1964. Maria GONZALEZ stated to LICOWL/1 that Subject had offered her daughter 300 pesos a week to be his girl friend. Subject and Viktor KALININ, Administrator, met with Maria GONZALEZ and Lourdes CUEVAS on 26 September 1964, in an attempt by GONZALEZ to fix Subject up with CUEVAS, because she didn't want her daughter going with Subject. (4)

Sr. fnu HERON or HARON: HERON called Subject on 19 January 1965, in order to find out how to mail a package to the Lithuanian USSR. Subject gave HERON a detailed explanation. (65)

Dr. Arseny LEPEAUCA: Medical doctor residing at Sinaloa 109, telephone 28-95-28. LEPEAUCA called Subject on 5 January 1965 to invite him to a "Rosca" party at his home the next day. (153) (155)

Jose Luis FERNANDEZ: FERNANADEZ was in contact with Subject concerning a trip to the USSR for an operation. (154) (155)

Manuel SUAREZ Angeles: Pianist who has studied music in Moscow (1963). Subject, NECHIPORENKO (see Western contacts) and the Ambassador were invited to the SUAREZ home. (156)

Dr. Luis QUINTANILLA del Valle: Leftist Director of the Institute for Living, Mexico. QUINTANILLA's secretary called the Embassy and told Subject, 19 manuals of Marx were missing from the package Subject or Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, First Secretary, Cultural Officer and KGB Officer, sent over and would they please send copies when they are again available. (158)

fnu SAN MARTIN: Employee of Television Channel 11. SAN MARTIN called the Embassy on 5 March 1964 to cancel a date he had with Subject. (159)

Armando MARTINEZ: MARTINEZ called the Embassy on 26 October 1964 and left a message that he wanted to speak to Subject. He also stated that he had told Subject he would call, and that it was urgent. (29)

Nuna SIMANOVICH: Owner and operator of the NUNA SIMANOVICH Curio Shop, Ruiz Ave., Ensenada, Baja California, Mexico. Subject and ALFERYEV (see Soviet contacts) visited SIMANOVICH's store in September 1963, and Subject told him if he wished to travel to the USSR, it could very easily be arranged. Subject also told SIMANOVICH he was attached to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. (136)

Marta BORQUEZ de la Fuente (201-745287): BORQUEZ called the Embassy on 29 April 1964 and asked for the Vice-Consul. It is unknown whether she meant Subject or NECHIPORENKO (see Soviet contacts), as neither was available.

d. OTHERS (Subject has numerous business and social contacts at Sabena Airlines, especially the following):

Jorge CORTES R.: Assistant Station Manager of Sabena Airlines at the Mexico City Airport. CORTES has invited Subject for a beer at his house and was also one of the signers of a Christmas card sent to Subject by Sabena Employees. (106) (107) (78)

(COMMENT: NECHIPORENKO (see Soviet contacts) LICOZY/5's case officer, levied a requirement on LICOZY/5 for information on CORTES. According to LICOZY/5, CORTES is a young, serious, honorable employee who was previously in Sabena's cargo department, later promoted to assistant Station Manager and is now on his way up.)

Adolfo BUCIO G.: Employee of Sabena at Mexico City Airport. BUCIO called Subject to invite him to a party at the home of Maria del Socorro VOLLRATH. Subject often calls BUCIO to find out arrival times of planes. BUCIO was also a sigeroof the above Christmas card. (108) (109) (57) (110) (111)

Maria del Socorro VOLLRATH: Employees at Sabena Mexico City Airport. VOLLRATH resides at Pennsylvania 254, Apt. 2. VOLLRATH signed the above Christmas card and is apparently on a friendly relationship with Subject. T She expected Subject to meet her at the airport "with a drink" when she returned from a trip to Europe. (57) (109) (110)

The following are employees of the Sabena office at the airport which LIFIRE found to be in contact with Subject. (112)

Alberto L. ALFARO
Carlos ALANIS Cantu
Jorge CASTILLO Carrera
Carlos MENDOZA S., Jr.
Enrique NUNEZ S.
Yvonne HENONIN

16. PAST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AGAINST SUBJECT:(chronological, with narrative summary of each item):

During his tours in Mexico City, Subject has been under routine LIENVOY and LIEMPTY surveillance. However, during the period following 22 November 1963, LILYRIC, LIEMBRACE, [illegible] and LIRICE surveillance were mounted on Subject because of his telephone contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD. (49)

After 23 November 1963, the LIEMBRACE surveillance team and LILYRIC and LIMITED base houses all reported Subject under DFS surveillance and Station surveillance was dropped. (160)

On 19, 20 and 21 January 1965, Subject was under LIEMBRACE surveillance as a followup to a report from LIEMPTY stating that Subject was not behaving in his normal fashion. Nothing significant was developed. (16)

17. OPERATIONAL PLANNING DATA:

a. for access:

(1) current residence (address, floor plan, owner, neighbors, other pertinent data):

Subject lives at Progreso 9, Interior (apartment) 6, Mexico D.F. (28)

(2) phone:

Subject has no known home phone.

(3) Car (license, description, where garaged and serviced):

Subject shares a 1963 white Vokswagon, license # D-336, with NECHIPORENKO. During 19,20 and 21 January 1965, while Subject was under LIEMBRACE surveillance, it was noted Subject had had an accident and was using a white 1963 Volkswagon, license # D-335 usually used by NIKIFOROV (see Soviet contacts) and Boris Sergeyevich ZOBNIN, Commercial Officer Employee and suspect KGB officer. (13) (34) (82)

(4) Office (location, floor plan, phone number, immediate associates, etc.):

Subject usually occupies a desk on the second floor of the Embassy in an area allotted to the Consular section. (76)

(5) current pattern of daily activity (including routes taken, hours, where eats, sports, hobbies, clubs):

Subject arrives at the Embassy at approximately 9:00am and leaves and re-enters many times during the day. (161)

(6) usable contacts:

Members of the Consular Corps:

Subject seems to be more than moderately active in this organization.

LICOOL/1

b. for assessment:

(1) exploitable points

(2) Other data

(3) Handwriting samples

18. OPERATIONAL STEPS TO BE CARRIED OUT NEXT YEAR (planning, with concrete steps for action or investigation, acquisition or further data, etc):

a. Continuance of regular LIEMPTY and LIENVOY reporting and occasional coverage by LIEMBRACE surveillance.

b. Continuance of LICOWL/1 regular reporting on Subject and, in addition, further LICOWL/1 effort to get Subject embroiled in intimate relationship with indigenous females.

c. Effort to obtain another access agent against Subject. The Station is presently investigating the possibility of developing one of Suject's several Sabena Airlines contacts for this purpose.

19. SOURCES

(1) USEMB Moscow 3662, Control 22299, 30 June 1961

(2) LIFIRE, 29 September 1961

(3) KUBARK Memo to Political Section, 25 September 1963

(4) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 29 September 1964

(5) LICOWL/1, Contact Report, 27 August 1964

(6) LIENVOY, 18 February 1964

(7) LIENVOY, 27 October 1962

(8) LIENVOY, 29 October 1962

(9) LIENVOY, 9 November 1962

(10) LIENVOY, 17 October 1962

(11) DIR-20944, 28 February 1963

(12) LIENVOY, 13 November 1963

(13) LIENVOY

(14) Memot to State Dept, 25 September 1963

(15) Memo to Legal Attache, 13 November 1964

(16) MEXI-7061, 25 November 1963

(17) LIENVOY, 19 February 1964

(18) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 20 August 1964

(19) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 24 August 1964

(20) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 17 September 1964

(21) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 3 September 1964

(22) REDCAP Sheet from Headquarters

(23) MEXI-9079, 3 October 1961

(24) LIENVOY, 18 December 1961

(25) LIENVOY, 7 January 1963

(26) MEXI-4126, 9 April 1963

(27) MEXI-4615, 16 May 1963

(28) LIENVOY, 4 December 1963

(29) LIENVOY, 26 October 1964

(30) LIENVOY, 7 December 1963

(31) HMMW-13305, 13 January 1965

(32) MEXI-7690, 8 January 1964

(33) HMMA-22652, 20 December 1963

(34) STATION OBSERVATION

(35) PBSWING Telegram, 14 March 1963

(36) PBSWING Memo, 15 March 1963

(37) FBI Memo to KUBARK, 31 January 1964

(38) MEXI-7930, 24 January 1964

(39) Cuban LIENVOY Resumen, 6 March 1962

(40) Cuban LIENVOY Resumen, 27 March 1962

(41) LIENVOY, 11 March 1963

(42) Cuban LIENVOY 26 June 1964

(43) LIENVOY, 18 January 1962

(44) LIENVOY, 7 July 1962

(45) LIENVOY, 21 August 1962

(46) LIENVOY, 15 November 1963

(47) LIENVOY, 16 April 1964

(48) LIENVOY, 29 January 1963

(49) MEXI-7025, 23 November 1963

(50) LIENVOY, 14 September 1964

(51) LIENVOY, 6 August 1964

(52) LIENVOY, 5 April 1963

(53) LIENVOY, 17 August 1964

(54) LIENVOY, 26 September 1964

(55) LIENVOY, 19 July 1963

(56) LIENVOY, 9 January 1964

(57) LIENVOY, 3 March 1964

(58) LIENVOY, 18 September 1964

(59) MEXI-0277, 15 July 1964

(60) LIENVOY, 31 January 1964

(61) LIENVOY, 1 October 1964

(62) LIENVOY, 6 November 1964

(63) LIENVOY, 3 November 1964

(64) LIENVOY, 6 December 1963

(65) LIENVOY, 19 January 1965

(66) LIENVOY, 19 Febeuary 1964

(67) LIENVOY, 24 February 1964

(68) LIENVOY, 14 February 1962

(69) LIENVOY, 6 October 1964

(70) LIENVOY, 5 June 1962

(71) LIENVOY, 13 November 1962

(72) LIENVOY, 21 Nobember 1962

(73) LIENVOY, 23 May 63

(74) LIENVOY, 26 June 1964

(75) LIENVOY, 6 January 1965

(76) LIEMPTY Observation

(77) PBSWING Memo, 10 September 1963

(78) LIENVOY, 23 October 1963

(79) LIENVOY, 8 December 1963

(80) LIENVOY, 29 May 1964

(81) MEXI-1242, 14 October 1964

(82) LIEMBRACE

(83) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 10 September 1964

(84) LIENVOY, 16 December 1964

(85) HMMA-18727, 16 March 1962

(86) LIENVOY, 21 March 1962

(87) LIENVOY, 28 May 196862

(88) LIENVOY, 6 June 1962

(89) LIENVOY, 2 July 1962

(90) LIENVOY, 21 July 1962

(91) LIENVOY, 13 July 1962

(92) LIENVOY, 16 July 1962

(93) LIENVOY, 24 August 1962

(94) HMMA-20199, 14 November 1962

(95) HMMA-20775, 20 February 1963

(96) LIENVOY, 9 August 1963

(97) LIENVOY, 18 July 1964

(98) LIENVOY, 27 August 1964

(99) MEXI-7051, 24 November 1963

(100) RESUMEN, 15 August 1962

(101) LIENVOY, 22 November 1962

(102) LIENVOY, 4 January 1963

(103) LIENVOY, 25 February 1963

(104) LIENVOY, 28 November 1962

(105) LIENVOY, 21 October 1963

(106) MEXI-2436, 8 February 1965

(107) LIENVOY, 22 October 1963

(108) LIENVOY, 26 August 1964

(109) LIENVOY, 26 September 1963

(110) LIENVOY, 21 April 1964

(111) LIENVOY, 28 May 1964

(112) LIFIRE, 21 March 1964

(113) LIENVOY, 16 April 1962

(114) LIENVOY, 24 December 1963

(115) LIENVOY, 10 December 1963

(116) LIENVOY, 28 March 1963

(117) LIENVOY, 10 June 1964

(118) LIENVOY, 20 May 1964

(119) LIENVOY, 0 March 1964

(120) LIENVOY, 9 March 1964

(121) MEXI-7035, 23 November 1963

(122) LIENVOY, 22 NOvember 1963

(123) MEXI-7038, 23 November 1963

(124) LIENVOY, 29 October 1963

(125) LIENVOY, 10 November 1962

(126) LIENVOY, 17 March 1964

(127) RESUMEN, 4 January 1963

(128) LIENVOY, 21 January 1963

(129) LIENVOY, 22 January 1963

(130) LIENVOY, 21 February 1963

(131) LIENVOY, 22 February 1963

(132) LIENVOY, 27 February 1963

(133) LIENVOY, 6 March 1963

(134) LIENVOY, 12 November 1963

(135) HMMA-22630, 19 December 1963

(136) Memo from Legal Attache, 11 March 1964

(137) LIENVOY, 29 April 1964

(138) LIENVOY, 3 June 1964

(139) LIENVOY, 2 June 1964

(140) LIENVOY, 29 June 1964

14-00000

(141) LIENVOY, 1 July 1964

(142) LIENVOY, 3 July 1964

(143) HMMA-23982, 27 July 1964

(144) LICOWL/1, Contact Reports

(145) LIENVOY, 5 October 1964

(146) LIENVOY, 1 August 1964

(147) LIENVOY, 9 December 1964

(148) LIENVOY, 18 December 1964

(149) LIENVOY, 2 October 1964

(150) LIENVOY, 17 October 1964

(151) LIENVOY, 8 November 1963

(152) LIENVOY, 15 November 1963

(153) LIENVOY, 5 January 1965

(154) LIENVOY, 31 July 1964

(155) LIENVOY, 5 August 1964

(156) LIENVOY, ~~25 April 1964~~ 9 June 64

(157) LIENVOY, 24 April 1964

(158) Memo, 2 April 1964

(159) LIENVOY, 5 March 1964

(160) MEXI-7041, 23 NOvember 1963

(161) LILYRIC Logs

201-30505

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

2

SECRET

PAGE 1 OF 2

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

Mexico City

ACTION

C/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, ADDP, C/SRS, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/RI/SD

S
E C R E T 222354Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3885

MEXI 3885

SUBJ TO LEAVE MEXI 28 APR FOR ABOUT A WEEK TRIP NEW YORK, WASH.

KAPOK REDCOAT LCIMPROVE LICOZY 5

23 Jun 65 IN 96432

REF MEXI 3339 (IN 61154)

per CSN 43-43

22 June 65

1. SUBJ RETURNED MEXI 13 JUNE. NECHIPORENKO AND KOSTIKOV AT HIS OFFICE 14 JUNE ARRANGE EMB RESERVATIONS. HAD LUNCH WITH N 17 JUNE.

2. RE EUROPEAN TRIP, N ASKED IF HAD LOOKED UP TOUR OPERATOR ASSOCIATES. GOT GENERAL AFFIRMATIVE FROM SUBJ WHO EXPLAINED CONDUCTED LITTLE BUSINESS SINCE WITH FAMILY. OUT OF BLUE, N ASKED IF SUBJ KNEW GINETTE PALACCI OF SIRTAM VOYAGES 49 RUE ST ROCHE PARIS. L 5 SAID SUPERFICIALLY ACQUAINTED, SHE ABOUT 27, JEWISH ORIGIN, LEFT CAIRO AFTER SUEZ CRISIS, WENT PARIS AFTER STAY ROME. N SAID SHE OF INTEREST SINCE MARRIED BRIT ABOUT FEW MOS AGO, AND BRIT IS NATO EMPLOYEE. INSTRUCTED SUBJ ASSESS CULTIVATE WHEN NEXT SEES HER. L 5 DID NOT CATCH BRIT'S NAME AS GIVEN BY N.

3. N ADVISED SUBJ OF HIS "PROMOTION" TO CAPTAIN AND SAID WOULD BE ADVISED MORE FORMALLY OF SAME BY PRIKHODKO OR HIGHER LEVEL PERSON IF SUBJ VISITS MOSCOW. SUBJ JUST ABOUT TOLD N THIS A JOKE, WENT ON VEHEMENTLY ASK N WHAT WAS OP ALL ABOUT, WAS THERE POSSIBILITY END OF SOV PROCRASTINATION RE BRANCH OFFICE, HAVE THEY

SECRET

201-305052

LEARNED BY NOW HE HAS NO TIME OR INCLINATION SNEAK AROUND SATISFY PERTH AMBOY TYPE REQUIREMENTS. WOUND UP ASKING IF COULD DISCUSS MATTERS WITH PRIKHODKO. N REPLIED WITH USUAL ROUTINE OF NECESSITY PATIENCE, SUBJ'S INVALUABLE POTENTIAL, THAT PRIKHODKO'S PRESENT HIGH OVERT POSITION INHIBITED CLANDESTINE MEETS. SAID HAD WRITTEN ANOTHER REPORT HOME RE BRANCH OFFICE, INCLUDING INFO OF SUBJ'S AFL CONNECTIONS AND THEREBY POINT OUT THAT BRANCH WOULD HAVE NO MONEY LOSSES. BUT NO MOSCOW REPLY YET. N STILL WANTS SUBJ FIND CANDIDATES BRANCH MGR.

4. NO ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR NEXT MEET.

5. SUBJ TENTATIVELY PLANNING GO LOS ANGELES 9 JULY FOR BUSINESS WITH UNITOURS.

6. INDEX PALACCI.

SECRET

S E C R E T

KOSTIKOV

DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | PROCESSING ACTION

TO Chief, WH Division		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO Chief, SR Division	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT Operational/REDCOAT/Sylvia MCDONALD

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MEXI 3395

Transmitted herewith is a report amplifying reference information.

for
Willard C. Curtis

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 WHD, w/att, (2 copies)
1 SRD, w/att, (1 cy)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26118 HMMA-26118	21 May 65 21 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-

12 May 1965

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ Silvia McDonald
12 May; Maria Cristina garden

1. Gestetner, known as Don Jackson, and Marheine, introduced as Mort Bryan, met Subject on 12 May. Subject reported on her attendance at the WWII Victory celebration at the SovEmb held on 9 May, and its aftermath on 11 May at the art gallery of Alfredo Santos.

2. Subj, who attended the reception alone, her invited friend Georgina did not go, attracted a small circle of companions during the evening. First, there was a Guatemalan, a professor at the National University, who made conversation, learned she was a singer, and spoke of having her appear at a concert in Puebla. Next, Vladimir Andreev, his receiving line duties ended, joined her. Their conversation dealt with artists in Mexico, a pick-up from the first time they had met at the Santos Gallery some two months ago. Then, Valeriy came by and seemed to be mostly interested in watching Subject. Subj took an instant dislike to Valeriy (probably Kostikov). A short, blond Russian then drifted into the group, whom Subj pegged as a parachutist. This turned out to be accurate (probably Nikolai Leonov). Andreeva came by just about the time Subj was inviting the group to visit the Santos Gallery. Subj was just about able to include Andreeva in the invitation, and then Andreeva was gone from the group. The invitation was for 11 May at 1100. During the evening Andreev mentioned that he would like Subj to perform at the SovEmb. Subj said she would, but no details for the engagement were made.

3. On 11 May Andreev and Valeriy showed up at the Santos Gallery. Subj introduced them to Alfredo Santos. Andreev seemed to be enchanted by the Gallery; Valeriy was less demonstrative. They had brought a bottle of Vodka and passed a few hours in the company of Alfredo. Subj confirmed her distaste for Valeriy, and formed her impression of Andreev that he wanted to break out of dull Soviet circles into the gayer, freer atmosphere of the artist set in Mexico. No specific appointment was made for Subj to see either of the two Sovs another time.

4. Subj, in her concern to know where this operation was taking her and the part she was to play in it, rang in some additional characters in her personal life. There was Georgina (lnu), her very good friend, aimless, clinging to Subject's orbit, student at U of A, who considered Andreev a "dear." Subj considered that Andreev and Georgina might very well develop a relationship

because she, Subject, though willing to pursue a platonic friendship with Andreev would have none of the other, and it was not unlikely that Georgina might captivate Andreev. There was Antonio Garza, Subject's current boyfriend, a bodyguard to Dias Ordaz, who was giving evidence of growing serious about her. Subj was concerned that her participation in the operation might in some way cause harm to Antonio. Subject who entertains a host of artist friends at her home expressed concern that if she were followed and spied upon, a misleading impression might be gained.

5. Other personal matters about Subject that came out in the conversation were that she has income from stocks (sufficient to maintain her in Mexico), she is in visitante artista status, would like to attain inmigrado because she has difficulties with the Musicians Union (AMDA) that hampers pursuit of her profession; she is not interested in marriage; she is opposed to by-passing the limitations on her work imposed by her status.

6. The C.O.'s, in their guidance to Subject, made it clear that she could pull out of the operation any time she wanted, that it was in her power to terminate it either with us or with the Sovs, if she got involved with them. She was told that there was absolutely no harm that could befall her boyfriend, Antonio, from her continued participation. As for Georgina, the chips would have to fall as they may with Andreev; since Subject was Georgina's confidante, we would be appreciative of knowing about Andreev's involvement in any affair. She wanted to know why we were interested in Andreev, and the C.O.'s gladhanded her to the extent of telling her that it was our business to know about important Soviets, since one never knew when a Soviet might be in need of "help." Subject indicated she was willing to go along further at a slow pace.

7. In talking about the Soviet Victory reception, the presence there of LICRAVE-1 (his picture had been in the News) came up. Subject said she knew L-1. She characterized L-1 as flighty. She said he didn't get along with his wife. She intimated that when L-1 was lonely, he chasedxf after female companionship. L-1 drops by Subject's place every so often. She knew that L-1 had left his father's business and had gone in for crop-dusting (a relatively recent development).

8. Arrangements were made that "Mort" would keep in touch with Subject about once a week by phone (Tel. 46-71-06, Calle Rio Neva #32) and that later she would be given an emergency number to call.

PRM

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, V. V.
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
C/O 13TH DEPT.
MEMBER KGB REZIDENTURA, MEXICO CITY.

050-008-010
HMMA-26081
14 MAY 65
A01 P1

R 6505262127

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WHP

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

RR. FILE SP.8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WE 6, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 130150Z

KOSTIKOV

DIR CITE MEXI 3395 MEXI 3395

13 May 65

13 May 65 IN 65759

REDCOAT

1. SUBJ IS SYLVIA MCDONALD NEE MELANSON BORN 25 AUG 1934 BEVERLY, MASS. MARRIED 11 YEARS, DIVORCED MAR 1964 FROM BENSON MARION MCDONALD, AGE 40, RESIDENT MULLBERY, FLA. FATHER GREGORY MELANSON, MOTHER CAROLINE. SUBJ'S PROFESSION IS CONCERT LIEDER SINGER, RECENTLY CHANGING OVER TO POPULAR AND FOLK SINGING, ABOUT TO HAVE RECORDING RELEASED. IN MEXI THREE YEARS, VISITANTE STATUS. LIVES RELATIVELY POORLY, INCOME PRINCIPALLY FROM STOCKS DERIVING FROM ALIMONY SETTLEMENT. NO STA OR EMB TRACES.

2. PHONED EMB POLITICAL SECTION 8 MAY ASKING ADVICE RE PROPRIETY ATTEND 9 MAY SOVEMB RECEPTION. STATION DEBRIEFING YIELDED FOLL: ABOUT TWO MOS AGO SENT INVITATIONS TO ENTIRE DIP CORP FOR PAINTING EXHIBITION OF FRIEND. ONLY SOV ATTENDING WAS FIRST SEC VLADIMIR IVANOVICH ANDREYEV, SUSPECT KGB. LATTER THEN TENTATIVELY INVITED SUBJ TO EMB RECEPTION, EXPRESSED MUTUAL INTEREST FOLK SINGING, ALSO INVITED SUBJ HIS HOME HEAR SOV RECORDS BUT MADE NO SPECIFIC DATE. BASIS STA CURRENT INTEREST ANDREYEV (SEE BELOW), C/O ASKED SUBJ ATTEND, TAKE NO INIATIVE CULTIVATE A, REPORT RESULTS.

SECRET

201-305052

3. 12 MAY SUBJ ADVISED THAT A, KOSTIKOV AND LEONOV SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME WITH HER AT RECEPTION, SMALL TALK PRINCIPALLY, BUT THEY EXPRESSED INTEREST VISIT FRIENDS ART GALLERY AND THAT SHE GIVE RECITAL AT EMB. A AND KOSTIKOV AT GALLERY 11 MAY FOR TWO HOURS WITH HER.

4. SUBJ'S IMPRESSION OF ANDREYEV FOLL: ADEQUATELY SOPHISTICATED AND WESTERNIZED, PROBABLY UNHAPPILY MARRIED, ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN ASSOCIATIONS AND MENTAL CLIMATE AWAY FROM SOVEMB ENVIIRONMENT.

5. APART FROM SPR ON A, STATION'S ONLY RECENT SUBSTANTIAL INFO IS FROM SMATTER WHO SAYS A RELATIONSHIP WITH WIFE PARTICULARLY STRAINED, AND IS ONLY SOV HAS NOTED WITH POSSIBLE VULNERABILITY AT EMB. (AS SEPARATELY REPORTED, SMATTER AND A HAVE RECENTLY BEGUN ACT MUTUAL CULTIVATION.)

6. ALTHOUGH PREMATURE JUDGE SUBJ'S ABILITY AND INTEREST FOR LONG TERM ACCESS ROLE, SHE ATTRACTIVE, APPEARS INTELLIGENT PERSONABLE AND LEVEL-HEADED. REQUEST TRACES AND INITIATION POA.

7. ALSO REQUEST HQS RETRACE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO ANDREYEV, PARTICULARLY FROM ODENVY.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

2nd - [illegible] associates with LA dips

55-60 Attache, 3rd Secty Wash.

63 - Mexi, 1st Secty

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

GROUP 1

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	WH	5	US
2	CI	6	BI
3	C	7	
4	B	8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, SB 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, [illegible]

E C R E T [illegible]

DIR CITE MEXI 3151 (EASBY ACTING)

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

REF A MEXIC 3090 (IN 43571)

B MEXI 3113 (IN 45367)

19 APR 65 IN 47738

1. FOLLRESUTS INTERROGATION SUBJ 19 APRIL:

A. BOTH SUBJS (SEEN SEPARATELY) FREELY ADMITTED TWO VISITS SOVEMB. MET AT FIRST SESSION 12 APR BY SOV FITTING DESCRIPTION SERGEY NIKOLAYEVICH LEONOV (KGB). LATTER ACTED SYMPATHETIC THEIR INTEREST LIVE USSR, GOTSOME BASIC BIO DATA, AND ASKED THEM RETURN 13 APR TO SEE CONSUL.

B. SOV AT SECOND VISIT FITS DESCRIPTION VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (KGB). THEY FILLED OUT AND SIGNED LENGTHY SPANISH OR RUSSIAN LANG FORM COVERSING BIO DATA, AND ALSO WROTE AUTO-BIOGRAPHIES. ACCORDING CRAYNE, GREEN AGREED JOIN COMMUNIST PARTY AND ACT AS SPY. ACCORDING GREEN, NO MENTION WHATEVER OF ESPIONAGE. SOV GAVE THEM IMPRESSION THEY WOULD GET ASYLUM USSR, SAID PROCESSING WOULD TAKE 2-3 MONTHS, IMPLIED SOVEMB WOULD GIVE THEM LIVING EXPENSES IN MEXICO UNTIL THEN. TOLD THEM RETURN THE NEXT DAY FOR POSSIBLE HANDOUT.

SECRET

201-305052

SECRET IN 47738 -pg.2

C. SOV ASKED CRAYNE IF HAD BEEN IN ARMY, GOT NEGATIVE REPLY. SOV ASKED IF COULD JOIN ARMY. YES. SOV IMPLIED INTEREST BUT NO FURTHER COMMENT. SOV APPEARED INTERESTED GREEN ALLEGED ABLITY READ BLUEPRINTS.

2. SUBJS ADMITTED THAT TALE REF APUREFABRICATION. NOW ACT REPENTANT AND MEK ABOUT ENTIRE MISADVENTURE.

3. LOCAL ODENVY ADVISED. SUBJS WILL BE DEPORTED THIS WEEK.

SECRET

CFN

# INFO ON ABOVE SUBJS,

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
	2. RI FILE NO.		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052 074-126-060/01
SEX M DOB ? HMMA-25843
16 APR 65
CIT ? A01 P4
OCC ?
CONSULAR OFFICE ATTACHE. KNOWN KGB OFFICER.

R 6505032151

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

mgm

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

```
KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMEROVICH
201-305052                                050-008-004
SEX M DOB ?                               HMMA-25800
                                          08 APR 65
CIT ?                                     050-8-4/2-1
OCC ?                                     P1
ATTACHE IN THE CONSULAR OFFICE OF THE USSR
EMBASSY, MEXICO. RE 19 MAR 65 CONTACT WITH
LUBOMIR BLAZIK /201-206043/ 2ND SECT CONSUL
AT CZECH EMB IN MEXICO.

                                            R 6504260537
```

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-40)

201-305052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO : Chief, SR Division
INFO. : Chief, WH Division
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT : REDWOOD/Transmittal of Soviet Personality Report on Identified KGB Officer, ~~Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV~~
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith is the completed SPR on Subject prepared by Vera T. WEISCARVER.

2. Because of the lack of secretarial help, the Station is transmitting this to Headquarters with the request that one copy be returned to the Station in final form when Headquarters has the possibility of re-typing it.

for
Willard C. Curtis

Attachement:
as stated above

Distribution:
2 SRD w/att, h/w, (1 copy, including photos)
1 WHD w/att, h/w, (1 copy, without photos)

1AH.

CS COPY

201-305052

[illegible]
Excluded from [illegible]
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-25722
DATE: 2 April 1965
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052
FFN: P-7455

mg m

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT USSR
OCC ?
RE SUBJ ACTS IN MEXICO CITY AND RELATIONSHIP
WITH SUBJ OF 201-741655.

201-741655
HMMA-25677
26 MAR 65
P8

R 6504091301

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. · 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM · 8. DATE OF INFO. · 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST · 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED · 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052 201-101794
SEX M DOB ? HMMA-25693
26 MAR 65
CIT ? ØP-8187
OCC ? P2
OLEG MAKSIMOVICH NECHIPORENKO AND SUBJ,
BOTH KGB

R 6504070066

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO : Chief, WH Division
INFO. : Chief, SR Division
: Chief, KUDESK
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

W.

SUBJECT: Operational/REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE/Characterization of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith is a characterization of Subject prepared by Douglas J. FEINGLASS. The SPR on Subject has been prepared and will be forwarded as soon as typed.

2. It is interesting to note that LICOWL-1 describes KOSTIKOV as follows: He is a man who would do anything to anybody. He is without morals, education or manners. He uses foul language and has no respect for others. When KOSTIKOV drinks at his (LICOWL-1's) establishment, with Soviet women present, KOSTIKOV will run his hand over the legs of the wives of other Soviet employees, while their husbands are present, and thinknothing of it. According to LICOWL-1, the husbands say nothing when KOSTIKOV does this. (Comment: However, from a recent LICOWL-1 tape, it appears that Yuriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV, GRU chauffeur, was complaining to Viktor Petrovich KALININ, administrative employee, that his wife was running around with KOSTIKOV and he (ANDRIANOV) was going to say something to KOSTIKOV - someday - but had not said a word to him as yet.)

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 WH w/att. h/w (2 copies)
1 SR w/att. h/w (one copy)
1 KUDESK w/att h/w (one copy)

1 SR/0/WH
1 KU DESK

CS COPY

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-25516	DATE 4 March 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-305052 FFN P-7455

Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV is approximately 35 years of age, corpulent and paunchy, with a round somewhat fleshy face that sports a 5 o'clock shadow, and wears oversized tinted glasses in dark heavy frames, which partially obscure a pair of small, but piercing eyes. His heavy jowls, thin lips, wide nostrils and dark hair add to an impression that his features are more of a Semitic, or a Near-Eastern type than that of a Slav. A shapeless dark suit-coat, carelessly put over a white shirt, with unbuttoned collar, through which protrudes a tuft of dark hair complete a photograph of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, Attache ot the Consular Office and identified member of the KGB.

KOSTIKOV arrived in Mexico in December 1961 and assumed his duties as an attache at the USSR Consulate at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Owing to his extrovert nature and propensity for drinking, he soon acquired several "buddies" of similar background and with similar tastes. Among these individuals, his closest associates have been, or still are, the following: Vitaliy Borisovich SHUBIN, Attache and identified member of the KGB, who left for the USSR in July 1964; Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERIYEV, Pravda Correspondent and KGB officer, who left for the USSR in October 1964; and Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO, Vice-Consul and identified member of the KGB, who is still in Mexico, and who has accepted KOSTIKOV into his circle of intimate friends.

att 1 to HMMA 25516 CS COPY 201-305052

However, it was mostly with SHUBIN and ALFERIYEV that KOSTIKOV felt entirely at ease. Many a time KOSTIKOV would talk to either one of them on the phone and indulge in a friendly exchange of obscenities, whereas he has never spoken to NECHIPORENKO in a like manner, even though KOSTIKOV has been a frequent guest at NECHIPORENKO's house. KOSTIKOV developed an exceedingly close relationship with SHUBIN. They used to travel together to various parts of the country and to spend time together with their families at the Casino de la Selva, a hotel in Cuernavaca. But it was ALFERIYEV's wife Roza, who became the prime target of KOSTIKOV's attentions. An embittered acrimonious woman, Roza, who despised her husband and had a fierce hatred for NECHIPORENKO, was transformed into a different human being when KOSTIKOV talked to her on the phone in his best unctuous and ingratiation manner. It is impossible to say whether they had sexual relations, but the obvious and strong sexual overtones in Roza's voice led one to presume that she had more than just a friendly interest in KOSTIKOV, who on the other hand, was probably using Roza as a target for his amorous or illicit aspirations.

It seems that KOSTIKOV is quite preoccupied with matters of sex and if given an opportunity would turn into a veritable profligate. Apparently his wife Roza has a tolerant attitude towards KOSTIKOV's probable incursions into the domain of marital infidelity, since, on one occasion, when KOSTIKOV had been invited to a supposed stag party at ALFERIYEV's home, and Roza KOSTIKOV had phoned to caution KOSTIKOV against drinking too much, a woman answered the call and then called KOSTIKOV to the phone. When Roza talked to KOSTIKOV it sounded that she was more peeved at the fact that she had not been invited to the party rather than that other women were present there at the time.

When KOSTIKOV started talking to his wife on this particular call, he already had had a few drinks and in disguised voice spoke to her in Spanish, French and English, possibly to impress those who were present. His Spanish is quite good and fluent, his French is rather tolerable, but his English is somewhat stilted and of a school-room type. Possibly, he studied these languages at the Moscow Institute of Languages.

This fluency in Spanish affords KOSTIKOV a great latitude for making friends among Mexicans and his easy-going earthy approach is presumably of considerable help to him in developing contacts. Since his consular duties are quite negligible, he can easily engage in this sort of activity. In fact, this neglect of official duties prompted a heated argument between NECHIPORENKO and the visiting Soviet correspondent Timur GAYDAR, who declared that ostensibly the consular staff does not preform any useful function, but just loafs around. His assertion has been confirmed in part by the attitude of this particular group of Soviet Embassy employees, who quite often seek some diversion of a non-intellectual type. Thus, on one occasion, when a group of Soviet tourists has a brief stay in Mexio, one of them - a woman, complained during a phone call to the Embassy that KOSTIKOV and Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV, Intourist representative in Mexico, had taken the group leaders to NIKIFOROV's apartment in order to have a few drinks, leaving the rest of the tourists without any information about their next move and letting them shift for themselves.

Since the departure of SHUBIN and ALFERIYEV, KOSTIKOV has started to "cultivate" NIKIFOROV, presumably as a potential drinking companion, and has been talking to him on the phone a number of times recently in quite a familiar tone of voice. It seems that NIKIFOROV, a younger man, is being influenced by KOSTIKOV to a certain degree.

KOSTIKOV's family life does not appear to be a stormy one, because his wife Roza A. sounds easy-going and friendly. She is in charge of the Embassy's dining-room. Her co-workers treat her with a good-humored tolerance and a slight contempt. KOSTIKOV's daughter Svetlana, born in 1959, seems to be an average child, who does not present any outstanding problems to her parents.

To summarize KOSTIKOV's character traits and abilities: KOSTIKOV is well trusted to take trips around the country in the company of another Soviet Embassy employee on various matters of importance and, on occasions, he acts as an interpreter for visiting Soviet officials. His known physical defect is weak eyes. Sometime ago KOSTIKOV called up an eye-specialist for an appointment, because his eyes were troubling him and that is probably the reason for his wearing tinted glasses. Sometimes Mexicans refer to him as the man with glasses. It is quite possible that an auto accident KOSTIKOV had in Vera_cruz may have been caused by his somewhat defective vision and was not the result of carelessness. However, when KOSTIKOV was excusing himself for it, GARMASHEV, to whom he spoke on the phone, told him dryly that it was about time KOSTIKOV learned to drive.

Owing to this shortcoming of having weak eyes and his physical make up, KOSTIKOV does not participate in various indoor or outdoor sports as much as do other members of the Soviet Embassy. It seems that billiards are about the most strenuous exercise that he undertakes. However, it must not be surmised that he is a weak individual in a physical sense and will probably give a good account of himself if a situation will demand it. Many of his intimate collaborators call him "Kopchenyy" or "Smoked" which in Russian slang may mean an individual with a dark skin, or may refer to the fact of his wearing tinted glasses, or it may signify that he went through a school of hard knocks

It is quite certain that KOSTIKOV and ALFERIYEV belong to the same group of former hooligans, who by dint of sheer disregard for moral standards forged ahead and became "somebodies".

KOSTIKOV seems to be quite unsrupulous, ready to perform any sort of task set before him, not in a cold and methodical way, but with a certain zest and bravado. It appears that he has no moral, religious, or any other type of scruples. He is vulgar, untidy and lecherous, with a penchant for using lewd and obscene expressions in conversation with his "buddies", with whom he drinks quite a lot, circumstances permitting. In addition, it must be noted that he is a shrewd and resourceful individual unquestionably loyal to the Communist system.

KOSTIKOV

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH 5

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY

VR. FILE ADDP, C/SR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, RI/AN/DUMMY, C/CA 4, C/CA/[illegible]

[illegible]

S E C R E T 292230Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2337

30 JAN 65 IN 70188

KAPOK REDCOAT ICMPROVE LICOZY-5 AEPETREL

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-48

REFS A 2123 (IN 55744)

B MEXI 1377 (IN 39578)

1. 11 JAN PRIKHODKO WENT SUBJ OFFICE, ASKED L-5 GET ASTHMA MEDICATION FOR HIM WHICH PRODUCED BRAZIL. SUBJ PROMISED DO SO THRU FRIEND TRAVELLING RIOD. REQUEST HQS CHECK P STORY THAT WENT RIOD DURING 63 OR 64 WITH SOV SOCCER TEAM. P SAID WOULD SOON HAVE OP MEET WITH HIM AND NECHIPORENKO.

travel list

2. 12 JAN N WENT SUBJ OFFICE CANCEL TRAVEL RESERVATIONS SOV FAMILY, URGED SUBJ PREPARE REPORT IN ANSWER QUERIES REF B AND MAKE REPORT ON IMMIGRATION CUSTOMS PROCEDURES ENTER U.S. L-5 TOLD N GOING LOS ANGELES ON BUSINESS, N HAD NO REQUIREMENTS.

3. 25 JAN SUBJ PREPARED REQUESTED REPORTS, CLEARED BY STA, PASSED TO N 28 JAN. (SEE HMMA 25275 FOR REPORTS) N APPEARED REASONALY SATISFIED REPORTS, BUT QUIZZED SUBJ CLOSELY ON STATEMENT THAT TOWN PARA 3 C REF B KEPT ONLY ONE REGISTRY BOOK. L-5 EXPLAINED LACKED TIME MAKE CAREFUL INVESTIGATION, BUT OBTAINED GENERAL INFO RE SMALL TOWN FROM CIVIL REGISTRY PERSON. (L-5 DID NOT

201-305052

IN 71177 PAGE 2

SEE TORTELLA. HIS INFO BASED ONLY ON TALK WITH NOTARY AT RECENT CIVIL WEDDING.)

4. BASIS NOTES WHICH CONSULTED CAREFULLY, N GAVE SUBJ FOLL INSTRUCTIONS:

A. NOW HAS CONCRETE DEAL. WANTS SUBJ SPOT AND NAME 3-4 CANDIDATES PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED OPEN BRANCH OFFICE NEW YORK. PERSONS MUST NOT NECESSARILY BE AMERICAN BORN, BUT SUBJ MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THEM FOR HIS PURPOSES AND ALSO FOR OWN PURPOSES SINCE [illegible] BE USED FOR MANY THINGS BY US. If they really put an [illegible], I don't think [illegible]
N WANTS LIST IN MARCH WHEN ~~[illegible]~~ SUBJ RETURNS FROM EUROPE. L-5 ASKED IF REQUIREMENT MEANT CANCELLATION MOSCOW MAN. N SAID BY NO MEANS, HIS ARRIVAL WILL BE DELAYED CONSIDERABLY DUE NECESSITY PLAN EVERY ASPECT CAREFULLY. L-5 REMONSTRATED THAT TIME SPAN SPOTTING AND HIRING BRANCH MGR COULD NOT BE PROTRACTED, ASKED IF N PREPARED EXECUTE THIS PLAN QUICKLY IF CAME UP WITH SUITABLE TYPE. N DID NOT [illegible].

(COMMENTS: A. IT PATENTLY UNREALISTIC FOR [illegible] BELIEVE L-5 [illegible] SHORT TRIPS TO NEW YORK CAN SPOT PERSONS WHO WOULD [illegible]. AT NEXT MEET 3 FEB SUBJ WILL ASK FOR CLARIFICATION [illegible], SAY HAS ~~[illegible]~~ THOUGHT OVER REQUIREMENT AND CATEGORICALLY [illegible] UNABLE UNWILLING GO FAR ENOUGH WITH CANDIDATES TO ASSURE WOULD

14-00000

ENGAGE ESPIONAGE, REQUIREMENT RUNS COUNTER OUR PROMISES HE NOT ENDANGER SELF. 9. ABOVE FLIP IN KGB PLANS OBVIOUSLY STRANGE. DEFER HQS, ODENVY IF AND HOW INSERT CONTROLLED AGENT AS MGR. PLS ADVISE. NOTE ALSO H ASKED IF SUBJ PREFERRED OPEN BRANCH IN LOS ANGELES RATHER THAN NEW YORK. SUBJ SAID HAD NO BUSINESS INTEREST WHATEVER IN BRANCH, CHOICE IS SOVS.

B. N SAID WESTERN EUROPEAN TOUR OPERATORS (AS DISTINCT FROM TRAVEL AGENCIES) WHO RUN TOURS INTO USSR BEING UTILIZED BY RIS INSERT AGENTS INTO TOURS. WANTS SUBJ PROVIDE LIST HIS EUROPEAN TOUR OPERATOR FRIENDS BY NEXT MEET. UPON L-5 RETURN FROM EUROPE WANTS SUBJ'S RECOMMENDATIONS OF CANDIDATES WHOM "OUR PEOPLE IN EUROPE CAN WORK ON".

C. N URGENTLY NEEDS INFO ON JORGE CORTES, ASSISTANT STATION MGR FOR SABENA. L-5 KNOWS BY SIGHT ONLY. (COMMENT: WILL FORWARD BIO DATA WHEN OBTAINED. ONLY STA TRACES ARE LIENVOY. ON 16 JAN 65 CORTES CALLED FOR IDEN KGB VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV WHO NOT IN. 18 JAN CORTES TOLD K THAT SINCE NOW IN SABENA TRAFFIC DEPT HAS TIME BEGIN RUSSIAN LANG STUDY AND ASKED K'S HELP ON ENROLLMENT (PRESUMABLY FOR IICMR). K SAID WILL HELP AND SET MEET FOR 19 JAN.)

SECRET

IN 701224

INTERESTING NOTE THAT HECH ASSOCIATES MOSTLY WITH K AND THEY
~~[illegible]~~
WELL ACQUAINTED
~~[illegible]~~ SABENA PERSONNEL.)

D. N WANTS NAMES OF MEXICAN POLICE PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY OF FED JUDICIAL POLICE, WHO VISIT HIS OFFICE SOLICITING ADS FOR THEIR PUBLICATIONS (IN EFFECT FOR PETTY GRAFT).

E. DURING MEET N BORROWED COIN TO MAKE PHONE CALL. WHEN RETURNED L-5 ASKED WHO CALLED, ANSWERED PABLO KUSHER. (COMMENT: L-5 TOLD C/O FOR FIRST TIME THAT N HAD MADE COUPLE CASUAL INQUIRIES RE KUSHER RECENTLY, L-5 GIVING INFO THAT NOT ACQUAINTED WELL. K IS YOUNG JEWISH LAD WORKING FOR U.S. TRAVEL SERVICE OFFICE CONNECTED BUT LOCATED APART FROM AMEMB. NO STA TRACES BUT SEC FILES REFLECT FOLL: PABLO KUSHER RAZOVSKY BORN 28 OCT 1942 MEXICO CITY, EDUCATED MEXICO CITY, FATHER NU DECEASED, MOTHER CIMA NEE RAZOVSKY BORN 5 SEP 23 BARANOVICH, POLAND. WORKED FOR AERONAVES FROM SEP 59 TO AUG 63 WHEN EMPLOYED AS TRAVEL PROMOTION CLERK U.S. TRAVEL SERVICE.)

F. N TOLD L-5 PHONE ROSENBLUTH WHEN PASSES THRU NEW YORK 7 FEB ENROUTE EUROPE, AND ALSO MAKE VISUAL OBSERVATIONS PERTH AMBOY. SUBJ HEATEDLY REFUSED PERIH AMBOY REQUIREMENT, WHICH PROVOKED N STATE SUBJ COULD NOT REFUSE ANY ASSIGNMENT (NELZYA OTKAZTSA). SUBJ STUCK TO GUNS, N CALMED DOWN AND DID NOT PRESS.

IN 73177 PAGE 5

5. IN DISCUSSING PRIKHODKO, N CONFIRMED STATEMENTS REF A THAT P NOW THIRD RANKING MAN SOVEMB.

6. INDEX.

SECRET

CFN

X ASKED FOR SOV TIMETABLE OF PLANS.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
OPERATIONAL/REDCOAT Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN, Third Secretary, and Suspect KGB Officer	2. RI FILE NO. 201-18511			
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-25256		4. DATE 28 Jan 65	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY	8. DATE OF INFO. Jan 65	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST Virginia Sturdivant	6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Feb 65	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

2. According to LIEMPTY, BROVKIN has been seen within the compound mostly with Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV and Aleksandr Ivanovich PRIKHODKO, KGB officers, since his arrival. LIEMPTY also reports that he has been using a 1964 green Ford sedan, also driven by YATSKOV and KGB chauffeur, Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV, and a 1962 beige Volkswagon which has also been used by Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, KGB officer and Valentin Ivanovich KUCHEROV, Tass Correspondent and suspect KGB.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-505052

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
KNOWN KGB OFFICER

201-727109
HMMA-25188A01
22 JAN 65
P2

R 6502033268

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

13 Jan 65

AEPURPLE

AEPURPLE positively identified photo of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV as Soviet who had met him in Mexico City on 9, 11 and 12 Feb 1963. KOSTIKOV gave PURPLE meeting arrangements for next meeting to be in NYC. Soviet who appeared in NYC was Oleg D. PRYKIN. PRYKIN has been identified as member 13th Dept of KGB's FCD.

PURPLE is naturalized German American, has crop dusting business in Middle West, furnished info on industrial and missile sites in area. PRYKIN particularly interested in pipelines, [redacted]

The 13th Dept may have exercised its prerogative and taken over case from First (American) Dept. Former case officer Yuriy V. MOTIKOV was apparently from American Dept, not 13th. But it appears that PRYKIN asked PURPLE for same type of info assigned by KOSTIKOV, suggesting that KOSTIKOV was from same KGB dept as PRYKIN.

SR/CI/G

ch

This information should not be released without permission of SR/CI.

14-00000

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME:

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED | DATE RETURNED

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, SR via Chief, WH

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

C - 946

1. We have recently reviewed available information on Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, a consular attache at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. It appears quite possible that KOSTIKOV may be a member of the Thirteenth Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, as will be seen below.

2. KOSTIKOV has been positively identified as the Soviet who met AEBURBLE in Mexico City on 9, 11 and 12 February 1963. (Mexico City Station identified KOSTIKOV as the only Soviet in Mexico who fit the description, and subsequently AEBURBLE identified him from a photo spread.) KOSTIKOV received information from AEBURBLE on industrial and missile sites in PBPRIME and gave him requirements of the same nature for the future. KOSTIKOV also made arrangements with AEBURBLE for his next meeting, to be held in New York City with a different, unidentified Soviet. On 6 May 1963 AEBURBLE was met in accordance with the above arrangements by Oleg Danilovich BRYKIN (201-292588), a translator assigned to the United Nations Secretariat in New York City. BRYKIN has been identified by a sensitive, reliable source as a member of the KGB's Thirteenth Department. AEBURBLE passed BRYKIN aeronautical charts and was given additional requirements particularly relative to missile bases. Nothing transpired during the latter meeting to suggest that BRYKIN wished to change the nature of the case, and in fact he told AEBURBLE that he was doing a good job. It therefore can reasonably be assumed that BRYKIN and KOSTIKOV both were representing the same KGB department.

(Continued)

3 - COS, Mexico City

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: CS COPY
HMMW-13305

DATE: 13 January 1965
21 JAN 1965

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SR/CI/G	C. Hausmann	FS	7735

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/CI/K		IN DRAFT V.Valpey
C/SR/CI		IN DRAFT T.Bagley
CI/OPS/SS	15 Jan 65	William Patrick
SR/O/WH	15 Jan 65	Kendall G. Fry
WH/1/Mex		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	18 Jan	C. S. Spera

ROUTING	INITIALS
1 - RID	
1 - SR/CI/K	
1 - SR/CI/G	
1 - SR/O/WH	
1 - CI/OPS	
1 - WH/1/Mex	
SR/CI/G	
DESTROY	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

3. It has been reliably reported that at present the KGB's Thirteenth Department places the greatest emphasis on its sabotage mission. Sabotage targets include the most important strategic military and industrial facilities of Western countries. The requirements assigned to AEBURBLE by both KOSTIKOV and BRYKIN correspond to this mission.

4. In view of the obvious ODYOKE interest in any activities of the Thirteenth Department, we urge that you prepare an analysis of KOSTIKOV's activities and contacts in Mexico.

JONATHAN L. WEENING

[illegible]

SECRET

KGB 201 FILE REVIEW CHECKLIST

NAME: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV 201-305052

ACTION **DATE** 12 Jan 65

FULL TRACE CONSOLIDATION no

RIS INPUT SYSTEM done

INTEL AFFILIATION known KGB (AEBURBLE, LINILE c/o)

ASSIGNMENTS
Sept 61 - Attache & Vice Consul in Mexico

FUNCTIONAL/ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT possibly 13th dept. (AEBURBLE case)

AGENTS/OPERATIONS
c/o for AEBURBLE in 63

COMPROMISE

AEASSAULT

MISCELLANEOUS CHECKLIST TDY trips

KUBARK OPS AGAINST

(This form is primarily for the use of SR/CI/K and should be attached to the 201 file of any known or highly suspect KGB officer. Its purpose is to enable SR/CI/K to determine quickly whether, and if so when, a file has been reviewed and what degree of action has been taken regarding extraction of certain categories of operational information of special interest to SR/CI/K. For additional information, consult SR/CI/K.)

SECRET

201-305052

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KORENGOLD, ROBERT

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA.

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

SECRET

SX-25505
1 Sept 66

AEWIGWAG/2

September 1966 Debriefing

Soviet Personalities

AG-895
74-6-636/3

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

M H

Viktor MARTYNOV

Age about 30-35. Not very tall. Rather French looking. He is a photographer for Novosti. Source met him through visitors from Paris Match, whom MARTYVOV makes a practice of guiding around town. He has never been stationed abroad but comes out to Paris once in a while. The next time he comes he will look up Source. He speaks very good French, and has a pleasing personality. He is rather outspoken at times. For instance, when someone said "bunch of stupid people" about the Soviets, MARTYNOV replied, "You're damn right." He appears to be tempted by western living. He concentrates on the French. He is married to a nice girl with brown hair and eyes. They have children, but Source is not sure whether one or two.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Vladimir y H ZAKHAROV

About 40 years old, he is the administrator of the Conservatory, and Source will see him in Paris when he next goes there. He speaks very good Spanish, having formerly been stationed in Buenos Aires as a cultural attache or something. He is probably a KGB officer, but he works hard at his cover job. During a trip to Paris, he called Source's father to arrange for the quick renting of two pianos for the orchestra he was with. He looks like a frog and is rather bald, short, blond, with dark blue eyes. He is very friendly and accommodating, lively, and nice. He goes out a lot, and sees a lot of foreign colony, particularly Argentines and other Spanish speaking people. He is married and has a little boy called Emilyan. He once invited Source to go to his dacha, but she didn't have time. She intends to send him a postcard with her new address.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date Acquired: 13 August 1966

√2R 201-875492

Valeriy LEDNEV

Works for Sovietskaya Kul'tura. Speaks no foreign languages. Blond, almost bald. Blue eyes, very nearsighted. Wears glasses. Roman profile. A little plump. Tall. Formerly stationed in Iran for TASS or Izvestiya. Source thinks undoubtedly KGB. A big flirt. Chases women. Likes to have a good time. Knows the KORNGOLDS very well. Expects to come to Paris for two weeks circa 15 September 1966, where he will contact Source, who expects to take him to see some striptease acts.

CO Comment: Attached are Headquarters traces on Subject.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Valeriy Vadimovich LEDNEV

1. Subject, an IZVESTIYA correspondent, was identified as a good source of information for two American journalists in Moscow who were suspected of having been recruited by the KGB.

2. Although we have no record of his being stationed abroad, Subject has made several visits to non-bloc countries. In June-July he visited New Delhi and Bangkok. In December 1962 he visited Iran. While in Iran he was introduced as IZVESTIYA's special correspondent. He corrected the individual who was making the introduction by saying that he was an international observer.

3. Subject visited Turkey in April 1963. While in Ankara he is reported as having participated in "propaganda tactics" and made an "attempt to feel the pulse of the public" as part of the Soviet efforts at that time to establish closer relations with Turkey. During visits with various heads of mass media organs he commented that while in Iran he had written "friendly articles" which were well received by the Iranians. As a result he was the first Soviet journalist to be admitted to the oil regions of Abadan and Ahvas.

4. LEDNEV is described as tall, balding dark hair, high cheek bones, small mouth, wears clear plastic-rimmed glasses, smokes Kent cigarettes. He speaks English, but speaks better German.

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

~~FL - 295~~

SX-25502
15 Sep 66

AEWIGWAG/2

September 1966 Debriefing

New Third National Personalities

SX-25502
~~FL 295~~ is
15 September 66 briefing
C'65 briefing is SX-4896

SECRET

74-6-636/3
15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Omar H OUSSEDIK, Algerian Ambassador

He came to Moscow after the fall of Ben Bella. He is intelligent, but rather pro-Soviet. He was very active in the FLN. He and his wife are both Kabyles, a non-Arab tribe.

SECRET 15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Frank H BOURGHOLTZER, American NBC Correspondent, 1962-?

After this tour in Moscow, BOURGHOLTZER returned to Moscow without his wife, lived in a hotel, and went around with a lot of Soviet girls.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEKIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Jose Antonio H MENDIA, Counsellor (Cultural and Press)
Argentine Embassy

He was chief correspondent of La Prensa in Paris and married a Frenchwoman. Source thinks he is a likely target of the KGB because he needs a lot of money. This is because his wife is very snobbish and ambitious and insists on buying quantities of expensive clothes. MENDIA thinks he is shrewd, but he is not.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

J.A.L. H MORGAN, 1st Secretary, British Embassy

He had an affair with the ballerina PLISETSKAYA eight or nine years ago, while previously stationed in Moscow, and was kicked out of Moscow for it. However, he is now married, apparently happily, and has three children. He is a very bright and charming man who speaks Mongolian and Chinese. He is a cultural officer, but since these languages are rare among cultural officers, Source assumes that he is MI-6.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Huy KANTHOUL, Cambodia Ambassador

Very anti-American regarding the war in Viet Nam, but doesn't like the Chinese. He hopes the Soviets will step up aid to Cambodia.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

H

Catherine BARSACQ, Secretary Archivist, French Embassy

She is young and speaks Russian well. She is the daughter of the well-known French theatrical producer (?) Andre BARSACQ. She works in the cultural office of the Embassy. She goes out with Soviet men, one of them Andre VOLKONSKY, the well-known pianist.

C.O. Comment: VOLKONSKY, as a teen-age boy, came to the USSR after World War II with his father, who repatriated voluntarily from France. He was the target of an SR/10 recruitment operation, since he groused openly about his father's decision to leave France and go to the USSR.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Marina LOPOUKHINE, Secretary Archivist, French Embassy

This girl comes from a prominent family in imperial Russia, now in the emigration in France. She resigned to marry a Soviet (NU) who is a translator for the Moscow News. She will stay in the USSR, but will retain her French passport.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Daniel PRIOLLET, Agence France Presse

This is a very nice bachelor, who recently arrived in Moscow. Source warned him against taking on Jean RAFAELLI's Soviet girl-friend Olga Lnu, which he has not done. He has a girl friend, Gerda Lnu, who works as a secretary at the West German Embassy. Source has absolutely nothing against this girl, but she refugeed out to West Germany from East Germany and still has relatives there. She is unmarried, attractive, and goes out with a lot of Americans (unspecified).

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Georges H BORTOLI, Representative of Radiodiffusion Television Francaise (ORTF)

His wife is an emigre Russian who thinks everything is wonderful in the USSR and wrote an article to this effect in Paris Match, praising the wonderful Moscow markets. BORTOLI is under his wife's influence, but Source does not know his politics. (Source obviously was concealing something she knew about BORTOLI, as she sometimes does about the French).

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

2R 201-125368

Igor WITSINOS, Correspondent for Der Spiegel (West Germany)

His wife is a Soviet citizen, Jewish. He is a German citizen, but of Latvian or Russian origin. They have been in the USSR a long time. Source thinks his wife has been allowed out. She doesn't know their political views.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

George D. H VARSAMY, Greek Ambassador

Looks like a peanut vendor. His wife is always covered with vulgar jewelry, and she looks like a manicurist. He endulges in a great deal of commercial operations (personal) buying and selling rugs, icons, etc.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Dimitri S. MANOLATOS, First Secretary, Greek Embassy 1963-?

MANOLATOS conducted an extensive trade in icons and rugs, far above the norm even for Greeks in Moscow.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

zR 201-766698

Ahman MIRFENDERESKI, Iranian Ambassador

He is a very interesting character. His grandfather was Ambassador to Russia before the revolution, and he speaks extremely good Russian. He is a very sharp man who knows a lot of Soviets, and has excellent rapport with them because of his language and open manner. In his diplomatic pose, he doesn't seem to be anti-Soviet, but Source does not know his true feelings on that score. He is not anti-American, although he sometimes considers some American actions stupid. He is married, but his wife is often out of Moscow. He is able to stand a lot of liquor.

C.O. comment: AEPASSIVE stated that the Ambassador had some of his primary education in Russia and confirmed his expertise in the language and knowledgeability, but stated definitely that the ambassador is 100% anti-Soviet.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

7R 201-868224

Giovanni MIGLIUOLO, Counselor, Italian Embassy

Married to a Czech. They both speak fluent Russian, English, German, French, and Italian. He married his wife while stationed in Prague. He is a very bright, intelligent man, whom Source regards as an intelligence officer. He is tremendously interested in politics, and is a Kremlinologist. Source does not know his attitude toward the Soviets.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Dino H CAPELLO, Italian Counsellor (Commercial)

He is from Sicily and is a member of the Mafia.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

LUCCAN, Fnu

A correspondent for an Italian paper, age about 42, who lives in Source's building. (Not listed Information Moscow). He has been in Moscow for at least ten years and is married to a Soviet woman. They have two children. His Soviet wife has a miserable life and never leaves the apartment. He is always out, hanging around the Hotel National bar, trying to make friends with businessmen and journalists. He is a crashing, insensitive, boor and bore. He drinks a lot and probably goes out with girls. He comes to a lot of cocktail parties without an invitation, always without his wife, whom Source has never seen. He has another wife in Italy, which causes him serious financial problems, but in spite of this he has a very expensive apartment. He speaks Russian, French, and English, and occasionally makes anti-Soviet remarks. Source is certain he is a KGB agent because of his Soviet wife, his need for money, his expensive apartment, and the way he operates in trying to make contacts and crash parties.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

2R 201-271332

Kaname TAKAHASHI, business representative of International (Japanese firm)

This man is about 55 and lived in China for a long time. He married a White Russian girl from Harbin. They left Shanghai in 1951, which Source considers strange, i.e. it would have been normal for them to leave in 1949 when the Communists took over. They have a son in the United States who is married, and possibly a daughter there as well. They have another daughter, unmarried, Svetlana TAKAHASHI, who lives in Japan. Source met her by chance at Orly airport and also in Moscow. She is a beautiful girl, half Japanese and half Russian. She speaks good Russian, as does her father. Her mother, TAKAHASHI's wife, is in Japan. TAKAHASHI also speaks Chinese and poor English. He has a lot of Soviet contacts. Source thinks he is probably somebody's agent, theirs or ours, probably ours and/or the Japanese. A curious and interesting man.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Edward GHORRA, Lebanese Ambassador, 1960-63

GHORRA's wife was an American who had an antique shop in New York City. The two of them made a great deal of money in a three-way antique business, Moscow-Lebanon-New York, using their diplomatic privileges.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Hassine H EL GHOUYEL, Tunisian Counsellor

Drinks a tremendous lot. Source saw him dead drunk at the British Club. He stayed at the Ukraina Hotel without his family for a while. The police took his car keys away so he couldn't drive in a drunken condition. He is a very weak man.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

2R 201-140017

Yusuf Abd-al-Aziz SHARARA, First Secretary, UAR Embassy

He has a very good looking wife, for which reason he is always invited out in ambassadorial circles, which he normally would not be in. Source instinctively thinks he is an intelligence officer, without being able to say why.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

CANADIAN

H
Mr. Robert A. D/FORD

Position (Jan 65): Ambassador, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, USSR

Closest English speaking friend of SOURCE in Moscow. Anti-Gaullist in outlook but otherwise quite "French-friendly." Is a cripple but often tries to take a few steps on the dance floor. Suffers from Polio. Former university professor in Canada (medieval history) before becoming diplomat. Wife is the most charming ambassador's wife in Moscow. She was introduced to FORD by the former Brazilian ambassador to Moscow (currently the Brazilian foreign minister) when the latter served at the UN in New York as a member of Brazil's delegation. The Fords are very much in love with each other and are a fine couple. Mrs. Ford is the best dressed, most cultured woman in town, also has the best jewels. Her name is Terese. Both speak good Russian and he is probably one of the most competent ambassadors in the Soviet Union. Mrs. Ford is a particularly close friend of the Israel ambassador Mr. TEKOAH.

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966.

He is very pro-American.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

AEWIGWAG/2

August 1966

MUGBOOK Debriefing

74-6-654/3

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date Acquired: 13 August 1966

MUGBOOK Debriefing

C. O. Comment: The following information is the result of a hurried debriefing which lasted one hour only.

I Previously identified by Source, not yet in new book.

#1 (SAMOYLOV, Nikolai A.)

Nothing to add. Has not seen in a long time.

#2 (ZARUBINA, Zoya V.)

Has something to do with the press or Inturist. Speaks French.

#3 (TOCHILIN, Sergei)

Has seen, but remembers nothing.

#4 (MEDVEDEV, Vladimir A.)

Source remembers this man, because he is a dead ringer for Kosygin. The picture is a good likeness, although he now has somewhat less hair. He is about 55, is dark and of medium height.

#5 (KHARLAMOV, Mikhail A.)

This is a good likeness. He is of medium height, with a "typical Soviet figure." Nothing more remembered.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

#6 (SHIBAYEV, Pyotr A.)

Source does not remember seeing this man.

#7 (KOBYSH, Vitally)

Source has not seen this man.

#8 (NOSENKO, Yuriy A.)

Source has never seen this man, nor #192 in regular Mugbook.

#9 (VLADYKIN, Nikolai A.)

Source had difficulty identifying this picture. Said she hardly knows this man.

II New Mugbook: Previously identified by Source

#13 and #60 (SUNTSOV, Aleksei V.)

Source has never seen this man.

#25 (PETROV, Vladimir I.)

Source has never seen this man.

#27 (SHUBNYAKOV, Fyodor G.)

The picture looks familiar to Source, but she can state nothing about the man.

#32 (SUMSKOY, Mikhail M.)

Source has never seen this man.

#34 (SHCHERBAK, Fyodor A.)

Source definitely has seen this man, but can say nothing about him, other than that he is about fifty, stout, upper medium height, and she saw him at the 14th July French reception, 1966.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

#37 (FEDYANIN, Vladimir P.)

Source does not recognize this man.

#40, 93, 138, 172 (PANASENKO, Ivan A.)

#40: Source thinks this man has something to do with the military; she has seen him with military attaches.

#93: No recognition.

#138: This man is from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaks a lot of languages, including English and French. He is a good-looking, charming man, about 38-40 years old, 178 cm. tall, well built. She saw him at the 14th July French reception, 1966.

#49 (SUNTSOV, Aleksandr V.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

#72 (KURILENKO, Ivan P.)

At first Source did not recognize this picture. She later said she had seen him during the de Gaulle visit and at various national day parties.

#97 (DITYATYEV, Dmitriy A.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

15 SEP 1966

#101 (GLAZUNOV, Ilya S.)

Source recognized this picture by name. GLAZUNOV is about 35; the picture is a good likeness but makes him look too healthy. He looks like an "uncooked spaghetti," pale complexion, thin, short. He speaks Italian. Source considers GLAZUNOV not intelligent, and entirely too eager to mix with foreigners. Source sent the Canadian, Benoit de Margerie, to GLAZUNOV when the Canadian was interested in having his portrait painted. GLAZUNOV's wife (NU) is about thirty, has long dark hair; is very intelligent.

#106 (SHVARTS, Ilya P.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

#122 (FILIPPOV, Grigoriy A.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

#163 (GUK, Yuriy I.)

Source stated she may possibly have seen this man a long time ago at a diplomatic party.

#192 (NOSENKO, Yuriy I.)

Source did not recognize this picture, nor #8 in Section I.

15 SEP 1966

III New Mugbook: new identifications.

#5 (FEDYANIN, Vladimir P.)

Source has seen this man but could not remember anything about him.

#20 and #76 (ALYOSHIN, Yevgeniy N.)

Source thought these two pictures might be of her husband's "friend", meaning the case officer who keeps dogging him, turning up at the next seat in the theatre, etc. She said she would check with her husband as to this man's name, and ask him for details. She said she already discussed this "friend" during the last debriefing. He poses as a history professor.

#39 and #63 (ZHUKOV, Georgiy A.)

Source identified this picture as that of Yuriy ZHUKOV, either TASS or MFA press department man. She last saw him at the farewell party for Source and her husband at their embassy. She could not remember anything else about him, but promised to ask her husband, who, she knows, hates him for some reason.

#61 (ZAITSEV, Lev N.)

Source identified this picture as that of a Novosti man, or at least a journalist. He is about 35, tallish, good looking. Speaks French. Has been abroad. Deals with foreign journalists.

15 SEP 1966

#125 (LOUIS, Viktor)

Source identified this picture as Viktor LOUIS. There was no time to update her previous information. She made the remark that she was sorry to see him in such sorry company, meaning in the Mugbook.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date Acquired: 13 August 1966

Tatyana PHILIPOV or PHILIPOVA

Has an American passport. She was employed by Waldemar VICHNEVSKY, AFP correspondent in Moscow, as a governess for his children. Source claims Subject was a bad children's nurse and very stupid. VICHNEVSKY wanted to fire her. She always goes around with Soviet men. She went off for a three day weekend and was gone for eight days. VICHNEVSKY reported this disappearance to the French Embassy.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

AEWIGWAG/2

1965 and 1966 Debriefings

U.S. Citizens in Moscow

5X-4876(65) 74-6-636/3

SECRET ~~HC-6470~~(66) 15 SEP 1966

SOURCE : AEWIGWAG-2

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966

American Intelligence Officers in Moscow

During the debriefing, Source was encouraged to state which diplomats in Moscow she thought were intelligence officers, including the Americans.

Source said she and her husband had wondered about which Americans were intelligence officers and had come to the conclusion that the following Americans were:

Roger Kirk

Alan Logan

Abraham Katz

Their reasons for picking Logan and Katz are contained in the individual reports on these two gentlemen.

19 SEP 1966

SECRET

NEW YORK TIMES

Mr. Peter GROSE

Position (July 1965): Chief, New York Times Bureau in Moscow, USSR

Appears to be a very intelligent chap, new on the scene in Moscow. Getting married to a 19 year old girl. He is Jewish.

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966.

He married an American girl who appears to be of good family. She is expecting a child and has been very sick during her pregnancy, so they both stayed home. Normally they give occasional cocktail parties with a lot of Soviets present. The only Soviet friend of theirs that Source knows about is (Fnu) Shnirson, a music critic. They are friendly with the Loorys (NY Herald Tribune) and Hughes Rudd (CBS).

15 SEP 1966

LIFE MAGAZINE

Mr. Robert BRIGHAM

Position (Jan 65): Correspondent for LIFE MAGAZINE in Moscow, USSR

No Comments - SOURCE only knows him slightly.

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

BALTIMORE SUN

Mr. Adam CLYMER

Position (JAN 65): Correspondent for BALTIMORE SUN in Moscow, USSR

Called "head of the calf" (French expression) because he accident-prone.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

Mr. Nicholas DANILOFF

Position (Jan 65): Member, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL Bureau in
Moscow, USSR

Very nice, intelligent man. Not Jewish. Overworked by SHAPIRO, who tends not to like him. Very sick when he left Moscow (ca. March/April 65). Saw a good many Russians and tended to be well informed. Has good promise as a journalist.

Very close to Korengolds.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

NEW YORK TIMES

Mr. Henry TANNER

Position (Jan 65): Chief, New York Times Bureau in Moscow, USSR

Peggy Tanner, secretary-archivist in the Danish embassy, is TANNER's wife. Terribly intelligent and good-hearted individual. Both SOURCE and SOURCE's husband like them a lot. Remarkable thing about TANNER is that he never gets mad and is always smiling, even when things are most trying. Appears to be a very good, happy marriage. Both are first class people. Neither is Jewish. Transferred to Paris in the late spring of 1965.

15 SEP 1966

NEW YORK TIMES

Mr. Theodore SHABAD

Position (Jan 65): Member, New York Times Bureau in Moscow, USSR

Most Jewish type of Jew in the entire Moscow press corps (exactly what SOURCE means by this hard to pin down - but would appear she means he keeps to his own co-religionists, and does not mix with others.) Lives in the same entryway as SOURCE. Did not like TANNER (Bureau Chief) and TANNER felt the same way about him. Has a stupid wife who talks too much at parties.

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966.

Shabad's wife had a nervous breakdown and left Moscow.

& How to be a Jewish Mother

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

America House Club

SOURCE comments this is little more than a brothel where the lower echelons of the foreign diplomatic colony arrange trysts. There is a great deal of passing whiskey and cigaretts here, particularly among the foreign service personnel (maids, etc) of members of the diplomatic corps. At least within the French embassy the general feeling is that one should stay away from the place, since no diplomats of status go there, except on rare occasions (an especially good film). The enlisted American military personnel are known to use the facilities of the club to shack up with foreigners.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

The tone of the Club has improved greatly owing to security measures which have been introduced in controlling the people who may enter. It has now become chic and even ambassadors go there.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Mr. Marshall BREMENT

Position (Jan 65): Second secretary, US Embassy in Moscow, USSR

SOURCE speculates B. may be an intelligence officer because of the penetrating questions he asks. Also he appears to be far better informed than the run-of-the-mill American foreign service officer. Has a good memory and speaks some Chinese. Wife is socially cautious.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

He drinks and flirts. His wife is very jealous. He loves girls but Source does not think he goes around with Soviet girls.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Mr. Abraham KATZ
Position (Jan 65): First secretary, US Embassy, Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and her husband see more of KATZ and his wife at than almost any other Americans of the US embassy. He is quite sharp and intelligent and SOURCE's husband has a high professional regard for him.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source's husband thinks he is an intelligence officer because of his position in the Embassy.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

NEWSWEEK

Mr. Robert KORENGOLD

Position (Jan 66): Correspondent for NEWSWEEK Magazine in Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and SOURCE's husband like the K's a lot, they are clever people and both well informed. Has good Soviet contacts and digs out the news through them. Both speak good Russian. He goes by the name of "Bud". Both are Jewish.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Wife is French and would be a very good source for information on the nefarious activities of third nationals in Moscow. She is not Jewish as previously stated.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Mr. Alan LOGAN

Position (Jan 65): Second secretary, US embassy, Moscow, USSR

A too serious type, wife never smiles. Very impressed with his position in the embassy - a "heavy" person. Both drink a good deal and only after they've had a few drinks do they let their hair down. His wife is French. SOURCE sees them at a number of American and British parties. Frequently present at African parties, since he is embassy officer responsible for African affairs. Wife is a bore.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source and her husband think LOGAN is an intelligence officer because the Soviets are very interested in him and publicized him as a spy for his interests in Africans in Moscow. After this article, the Africans stopped seeing LOGAN. He was very well liked however.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Mr. Stuart H. LOORY

Position (Jan 65): Chief New York Herald Tribune Bureau in
in Moscow, USSR

Both LOORY and his wife are Jewish. SOURCE considers them nice but does not see a very great deal of them socially.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Has problems with his job because of the closing down of the New York Herald Tribune.

SECRET 15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Mr. Roger A. PROVENCHER

Position (Jan 65); Second secretary, US embassy in Moscow, USSR

They are the most socially adept members of the US embassy. They entertain well and their parties are fun. They both dance well. She serves wonderful buffets. She is French. Has visited SOURCE's father in Paris on one occasion. SOURCE has had the Provenchers to her apartment about 15 times (since Oct 62). SOURCE speculates Provencher may be an intelligence officer based on the fact that he has "too good" an apartment for his rank and more care is taken of him than of Mr. Logan in the political section.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source says her husband has changed his mind about PROVENCHER's being an intelligence officer. Possibly he is one, but not in Moscow.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

WASHINGTON POST

Mr. Stephen ROSENFELD

Position (Jan 65): Correspondent, WASHINGTON POST (USA) in Moscow, USSR

Noted for fact that he has a very large apartment by Moscow standards. Wife knows what she wants and gets it from the UPDK by constant badgering of this office. Lives in same block with SOURCE but entryway three. Wife was in Moscow before as a single girl correspondent. They both speak very good Russian. Both are Jewish.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source heard no comments from the Soviets about ROSENFELD's PNG for the Washington Post publication of the Penkovskiy Papers. Third National Colonies also had no comments but were very sorry for ROSENFELD.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI)

Mr. Henry SHAPIRO

Position (Jan'65): Chief, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL Bureau in
Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and SOURCE's husband like S. He is Jewish, sharp and quick, speaks excellent Russian. Knows a tremendous amount about Russian, very well informed. SOURCE speculates SHAPIRO may have helped the Russians in the past (she means the RIS) but does not think he has to now that he has established himself. SOURCE comments that SHAPIRO, like all Western press people have to be extremely careful what they file, otherwise they will be thrown out of the SU. This is very true in SHAPIRO's case, since he married to Soviet national who might not be able to leave with him if he were thrown out. Most noteable thing about SHAPIRO is his very extensive contacts in the dip circuit - Henry literally knows everybody worth knowing. On very good terms with past US ambassador (Thompson). Probably because of religious bonds, he is also on very good terms with current Israeli ambassador.

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966.

Shapiro hates to spend money. He is very hard on his assistants, and very quick-tempered. He hates Edmund Stevens and his wife. He is close to the Austrian ambassador (Walter Wodak), the Italian ambassador (Federico Sensi) and the Norwegian ambassador (Frithjof Jacobsen). Recently Shapiro decided to do a story on the prostitutes who hang out at the Hotel National. He sent someone to interview some of these girls. As a result he was attacked in Pravda. Shapiro was terribly upset at this, almost crying. He is normally a very careful man. He knows all the Soviet journalists well, and possibly cooperates with them.

15 SEP 1966

NEWSDAY

Mr. Edmund STEVENS

Position (Jan 65): Correspondent for NEWSDAY (USA) in Moscow, USSR

Neither SOURCE nor SOURCE's husband like. Drinks a lot, especially early in the morning - often drunk, and when so tends to make stupid remarks. However, terribly well informed about what is going on in the Soviet Union, in fact one of the best informed Western correspondents in Moscow. He has a find collection of modern paintings. SOURCE believes he probably works for the KGB, since he openly involved in black marketing, selling of ikons, and always seems to have more than enough money. He is the type who would sell his sould for cash. Daughter now in Rome, trying to become a movie actress. She was formerly a student at the Bolshoi Theater, studying ballet. She was something of a whore and slept with a number of Russians.

15 SEP 1966

Edmund Stevens

Date Acquired: September 1966

STEVENS' wife told Peter GROSE of the New York Times that she was buying up paintings from Soviet artists and reselling them for a profit. Source considers Mrs. STEVENS a real bitch. STEVENS argues with her a lot. Source thinks he is no longer capable of having a sex life. Source has no doubts that he works for the KGB.

STEVENS' contacts in the foreign colony are extensive. He sees most of the important ambassadors, including KOHLER (US), HARRISON (UK), and SENSI (Italy). Among the many Americans he sees are GUTHRIE and ARMITAGE.

The only Soviet contacts of the STEVENS whom Source knows are figures from the artistic world: musicians MOISSEYEV and KAGAN, and the ballerina PLISETSKAYA.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

US EMBASSY MOSCOW

General Comments:

Embassy officers all believe they are very important people by virtue of the fact that the Department sent them to Moscow to represent the States. They try to impress everybody with their position and with their knowledge of Soviet affairs (which is not too good in the first place). They tend to live a getto-like existence, do not mix with other members of the dip set. Stay at home or in the embassy and do not get out around in the city. From a social point of view they are for the most part boring - only wish to talk business and office politics. No lightness of sense for "things gay." Heavy. Do not have many of the social graces, do not dance well, do not play cards well, etc. Wives are poor dressers and can not cook.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI)

Mr. Jordan AXELBANK

Position (Jan 65): Member, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL Bureau, in Moscow, USSR

"Jay" is stupid, more so than average press correspondents. Not intellectually quick. SHAPIRO runs rings around him.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Capt. James W. BIZZELL, USAF

Position (Jan 65): Assistant air attache (medical), US Embassy, Moscow

SOURCE is very fond of Dr. Bizzell and considers him an excellent doctor, especially for children. Much more friendly than this predecessor. SOURCE gave Dr. Bizzell the name of her sister (UNSOX 10) and suggested he look her sister up when he went to Paris on vacation. The sister would show him around Paris. SOURCE does not know whether Dr. Bizzell contacted her sister. Mrs. Kohler is very fond of him. Bizzell used to squire young Miss. Stoessel around town. Dances well; plays good bridge.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP)

Mr. Henry S. BRADSHER

Position (Jan 65): Chief of the ASSOCIATED PRESS Bureau, Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and SOURCE's husband do not like B. Consider him rude, barbarian. He is a very nervous man. Tries very hard (but does not make the grade) to keep up with chief AFP man (ULLMAN) and chief UPI man (SHAPIRO).

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY

Mr. Sam JAFFE

Position (Jan 65): Representative, AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY in Moscow, USSR

Sam and June are attractive people and SOURCE would like to become more friendly with them. However, neither SOURCE nor her husband trusts the JAFFES completely - in their view something about them does not add up. JAFFE good newspaper man - knows how to ask questions that will get news. SOURCE feels she has to watch what she says to JAFFE, lest he uncover some of her husbands "sources" for news. JAFFE does a good job, knows the ropes of his profession and is a thoroughly competent journalist. Knows a great many Russians and now has very good contacts with the North Vietnamese - this rather unusual for an American correspondent in Moscow. Both are Jewish.

His Soviet news contacts? no info
Photos 56 and 77? X no info

15 SEP 1966

Mr. Foy D. KOHLER

Position (Jan 65): US Ambassador in Moscow, USSR

SOURCE wonders why, in view of his position, Mr. Kohler has a Chinese cook - she thinks this is a poor security practice. SOURCE knows of no specific things about the ambassador's cook which would make him a security risk other than his nationality. The fact that the American ambassador has a Chinese cook is often the subject of conversation on the Moscow dip circuit. Wife has no taste in clothes.

15 SEP 1966

UNITED STATES

Mr. Walter J. STOESSEL, Jr.

Position (Jan 65): US Minister-Counsellor in Moscow, USSR

The STOESSELs tried to entertain in a grand way but were obivously amateurs. They would serve entirely too much liquor before dinner and get their guests potted. Their food at dinners was indifferent though of good quality. They did serve good French wines. One got the impression Mrs. STOESSEL did not take too many pains in planning and serving her dinners. She has a terrible cook. SOURCE entertained the STOESSELS in her home on about 10 occasions (from Oct 62 to the time the STOESSELS left). Wife dresses badly, even worse than Mrs. Kohler.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

UNITED STATES

Mr. Malcolm TOON

Position (Jan 65): Counsellor for political affairs, US Embassy, Moscow

Socially better than most of the US Embassy personnel.

Wife dresses badly.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

201-132739

Moscow News - 8 Jun 63

The hero of the Island of Freedom about to leave for home. Fidel Castro and his party were seen off by N. Khrushchov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and R. Malinovsky, Soviet Minister of Defence.

The handshake followed the signing of the Soviet-Cuban joint statement in the Kremlin

Soviet Weekly 6 June 63

201-132139

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, SR 6, S/C 2

S E C R E T 312304Z

IN50644

DIR CITE MEXI 4811

1 JUN 1963

LCIMPROVE

REF MEXI 4329 (IN 24821)+

RE REF PLEASE RECHECK DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DIP PLATE 171.

SAME CAR AND PLATES OBSERVED AGAIN, PLATES EXPIRED 3-31-60.

S E C R E T

201-132139

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

S E C R E T [illegible]

DIR CITE MEXI [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

REF: MEXI [illegible] (IN 24[illegible])

✓ 1. 9 MAY ISSUE OF HAVA NEWSPAPER EL MUNDO PUBLISHED PHOTO OF NIKOLAY [illegible]VICH LEONOV TOGETHER WITH KHRUSHCHEV AND FIDEL CASTRO IN USSR, LEONOV EVIDENTLY INTERPRETING.

✓ 2. 31 MAY STATION PLACED ARTICLE IN [illegible] [illegible], ENTITLED "PLAN PREPARED COMMUNIZE ALL LATIN AMERICA". ABOVE PHOTO ALSO APPEARED. NOTIONAL CUBAN EXILE RELATED SOV-CUBAN PLAN FINANCE SUBVERSION LA, AND WET ON TO STATE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT LEONOV IN CHARGE OF ARMS SMUGGLING INTO CENTRAL AMERICA, AND LATTER WORKS WITH UNNAMED MEXICAN ARMY CAPTAIN THIS PURPOSE.

3. DIRECT HQS ATTENTION REF RE CARDENAS INVOLVEMENT WITH LEONOV.

4. FORWARDING CLIPS MAJOR STATIONS FOR REPLAY.

✓ 5. ADDENDUM: SAME ARTICLE WITH PHOTO APPEARED 31 MAY FRONT PAGE ULTIMAS NOTICIAS, NAMED LORENZO CARDENAS BARA[illegible] AS MEXICAN CAPTAIN INVOLVED.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED SURVEILLANCE OF LEONOV.

SECRET [illegible] EXCLUDED [illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER [illegible]

201-132139

MOSCOW NEWS Saturday, May 25, 1963



At the Bratsk hydroelectric project.

201-132139

In the assembly shop of the "Uralmashzavod" enterprise in Sverdlovsk.

201-132139

25 May '63

MAGNIFICENT PAEAN TO SOVIET-CUBAN FRIENDSHIP



"Long live eternal friendship!" Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro at the Luzhniki Stadium during the Soviet-Cuban friendship rally.

CUBA-USSR
CASTRO, FIDEL (L3) CUBA, WITH KHRUSHCHEV (L2) USSR, V.F. PROMYSLOV [illegible] BREZHNEV, (L6) USSR, AT FRIENDSHIP MEETING, CENTRAL LENIN STADIUM [illegible]
NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (L1) USSR, INTERPRETER FOR CASTRO.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY [illegible]

¡Saludo caluroso al comp
Горячий привет мужествен

CUBA-USSR
CASTRO, (L1) CUBA, RESPONDING TO ACCLAIM ACCORDED HIM DURING SPEECH [illegible]
MIKOYAN (L4) USSR, JOINS IN APPLAUSE. NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (L2) USSR, INTERPRETER FOR CASTRO ON VISIT TO USSR.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY CIA-P-162771

201-132139

Fidel Castro visiting the Volgograd Tractor Works.
(For material on Castro's visit to the USSR see pages 3 and 7.)

18 May 63
Moscow News

201-133139

14-00000

Moscow News 18 May 63



Fidel Castro watches the antics of a "Baikal" bear cub he has received as a present.

201-132139

Moscow News.
18 May 63

'WE ARE FORGING HAPPINESS AND PEACE ON EARTH'

Fidel Castro at the Bratsk Hydropower Station.

201-132139

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SX-3735
14 May 1963

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 841
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

DOI: 1962

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

In August 1962 Source identified Subject as a KGB officer, presently assigned to Mexico City.

Distribution:
  Orig. - LEONOV dossier
    1 - DC/SR/CI
    1 - SR/CI/K

SR/CI/K:DRyan

CS COPY

RIS INPUT NO. 6
27 May 63

[illegible]

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

✓
201-132139

Moscow News
11 May 63

201-132139

Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro. In the background, right, Leonid Brezhnev

Soviet Weekly
9 May 63

201-132/35

◆

Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro at the Likhachov Automobile Works, which they visited the day before May 1.

The workers of the plant were holding a social evening at their Palace of Culture, and the distinguished guest was greeted by thousands of people. Both Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro were presented with models of the ZIL car made at the Works. Before the concert, Nikita Khrushchov, Fidel Castro and his party saw a documentary film about the Works, which was the first Soviet automobile plant. Famous performers and amateurs took part in the concert, which wound up th the "July 26th March". The last rs were drowned in enthusiastic applause, and cries of "Viva Fidel!" and "Viva Cuba!" resounded in the hall long afterwards.

◆



Moscow News

-7 May 63



Fidel Castro *(centre)* pictured with Nikita Khrushchov and Leonid Brezhnev on the tribune in Red Square, during the Cuban leader's tumultuous welcome last weekend

Soviet Weekly
3 May 63

201-132139

LEFTIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES-Soviet Directed Insurgency

Monthly CI Report
OSI District 30
May 1963

See third
Publication HCSI
Their Source was

(S) (Gp-1) A Soviet Embassy official in Mexico City, Nikolai S. LEONOV, is allegedly actively planning an insurgent movement in Latin America. LEONOV left Mexico for the USSR on 21 April to confer with KHRUSHCHEV and CASTRO. Credence is given this report by the publication of a photograph of the three on 8 May in a Cuban newspaper. The photograph was purportedly taken during a recent meeting.

(S) (Gp-1) Cuba and Mexico, according to LEONOV's schemes, would serve as bases for the insurgency. Cuba would be the "invisible beachhead" and Mexico the point for covert distribution of arms.

(S) (Gp-3) The individual selected as the contact man for arms acquisition is said to have been engaged in similar activity in Guatemala about a year ago.

(S) (Gp-3) Another report from sources in Colombia stated that pro-CASTRO ex-President CARDENAS planned to call a meeting in Mexico City of "leftist bent", disgruntled retired military officers from Latin American countries on the subject of insurgency. (DIA, 3 June 1963)

201-132135

NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY, MAY 5, 1963.

WS OF THE WEE

CASTRO AND SOVIET LEADERS WATCH MAY DAY PARADE IN MOSCOW



132139

SUBJ in
Moscow with
This Group
As interpreter
Apr May 63



CUBA-USSR APRIL 28, 1963
CASTRO IN USSR. LEFT TO RIGHT, LEONOV, N, USSR; KHRUSHCHEV, N., USSR; CASTRO, F., CUBA; BREZHNEV, L., USSR; SHVERNIK, N., USSR; SUSLOV, A., USSR; KOSYGIN, A., USSR; AND POLYANSKY, D., USSR.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY CIA-P-163872

14-00000

1 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	1	C/(A)	4	B.
SECRET	2	4	5	RP
30	3	C	6	6

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SR 6, DD/I, AD/CI 2, S/C 2

S E C RFICBXW52226Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4327 25629 26 APR 1963

REDCAP

ACCORDING LIFIRE NIKOLAY LEONOV LEFT MEXI FOR USSR WITH FAMILY 21 APR ON SABENA.

SECRET

Bill

Frank

201-132139 25 APR 1963

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
CABLE	2. RI FILE NO. 201-2 8906
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. MEXI-04309
	4. DATE 24 APR 63
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-132139

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH /201-132139/

NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV /201-132139/ STATIONED MOUNTED LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE FOR EVENTUALITY HE MIGHT MAKE LAST MINUTE CLANDESTINE MEETS. MEXI EFFORTS PAID OFF IN THAT TEAM ABLE SPOT OVIOUS CLANDESTINE HALF HOUR MEET EVE 19 APR. TEAM TAILED MEXICAN CONTACT WHOM STATION HAS NOW IDENTIFIED AS LORENZO CARDENAS BARAJAS, CIT MEXICO. FOR INFO CARDENAS, DIRECT HQS ATTENTION LINLUCK TRAFFIC MEXI 0545 ON 11 APR 62, MEXI 0563, 0698, 0827, 0873, AND ALSO OTHER MEXI REPORTING RE CARDENAS.

LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE LEONOV 20 APR DROPPED DURING LATE AFTERNOON AFTER LEONOV MADE OBVIOUS EFFORTS DETERMINE IF HE UNDER SURVEILLANCE. INTERESTING NOT E THAT LEONOV WAS THEN DRIVING AROUND SAME AREA WHERE HAD CLANDESTINE MEET PREVIOUS EVE. TEAM BELIEVES LEONOV DID NOT DETECT THEIR PRESENCE.

ACCORDING LATEST LIEONOV INFO, APPEARS LIKELY LEONOV RETURNING MEXI AFTER HOME LEAVE, USSR.

STATION FILES REFLECT THAT BASIS LINLUCK INFO, MEXI ADVISED LITEMPOS DURING APRIL 1962 THAT CARDENAS INVOLVED SMUGGLING ARMS GUAT, APR 63 MEXI LITEMPO PROVIDED FOLL INFO CARDENAS- ENROLLED MILITARY COLLEGE.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-132139

FORM 1-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

S E C R E T

COUNTRY Cuba/Mexico

SUBJECT Travel of Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist, to Cuba

REPORT NO. 1221-6770

DATE OF REPORT 5 October 1962

NO. OF PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 27 July to 2 October 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (27 July to 2 October 1962)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Para. 1: Person (B) in close contact with Rico Galan.
Para. 2: Person (B) with good access to travel information.
Appraisal of Content: 2

Rc 201

1. Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement, rabidly anti-United States, pro-Cuba, Communist front, plans to write a political biography on Fidel Castro Ruz, Communist Prime Minister of Cuba. Rico Galan, who proposed the idea to the Cuban Government and was accepted, will spend two months in Cuba working on the project.

2. On 2 October Rico Galan left Mexico for Habana, Cuba, on Cubana Airlines. He carried Mexican passport No. 51115, with a Cuban courtesy visa.

201 FILE OPENED ON THE BASIS OF THIS DOCUMENT

S E C R E T 201-336474

DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

[illegible]

ar 1725,084

14-00000

W

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

REPORT NO. [illegible]

FROM: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 22 May 1962

REPORTING OFFICER: Louis J. S[illegible]

RD NO.: 200-7-28-1

REPORTS OFFICER: Portia L. SP[illegible]

PROJ.: LITLICK

APPROVING OFFICER: Willard C. CURTIS

SUBJ CO.: LITLICK

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

Source got the information reported in the attached from his conversation with Lorenzo Cardenas on 5 May. Cardenas told Subject he received the information from Viktor Nikolayevich Glotov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

RI - PLEASE INDEX AS INDICATED AND FORWARD CARDS TO THIS STATION FOR ITS FILES.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4-Headquarters (JMPUCK) 1-Guatemala City 4-Files HCC	1-EMB, PAO, MA, NA, AA, INS 1-LA 201-132139

COUNTRY:

NO. OF ENCLOSURES: None

NO. PAGES: 1

SUBJECT:

REFERENCES:

INDEX

S: 5-1

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

FORM 1867

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE. A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT. 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY Cuba/Guatemala/USSR/Mexico

REPORT NO. HMM-6405

SUBJECT Soviet Assistance to Cuba and Guatemala

DATE OF REPORT 22 May 1962

NO. OF PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 5 May 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (5 May 1962)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Persons (B) with good connections in Guatemala Communist circles in Mexico City. Appraisal of Content: 2

The Soviet Government has assured the Cuban Government that it will give its assistance to the Cubans in the event of an aggression against Cuba. The Soviets consider Guatemala to be the most sensitive spot in Latin America at the present time, and are very interested in the Guatemalan problem. Because of this the Soviets are prepared to give their all out assistance to both countries in their current political struggles.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

DISTRIBUTION

COPY

DISPATCH

TO: Chief, WHD	HMMA-18507 HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-126-3
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE 15 December 1961
SUBJECT: Possible Exploitation of Links of Soviet Embassy Officer with Cuban 26th of July Movement	RE (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: For your information	

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-10265, 29 November 1961

Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV returned to Mexico 11 July 1960 and has been assigned to the Soviet Embassy staff, Third Secretary, diplomatic rank, as an assistant to Vladimir NUTIKOV in the Office of Cultural Affairs. While the Station feels that Fidel CASTRO Ruz's recent public statements admitting his long-time sympathies and associations with Communism somewhat lessens the exploitation impact of this "expose", it is also felt that LEONOV's Mexican background, dating back to 1955 and including the incident played up by the Mexican press in 1956, is worthy of press replay. LEONOV's return and present responsible position in the Soviet Embassy of Mexico will provide added interest in the story. The Station will therefore attempt to obtain the Mexican press accounts of the 1956 incident, updating this information into a press article for exploitation as suggested in reference.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. Curtis

14 December 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
5 - Files

201- 132139

FORM 10-57 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

Chief, WH Division

KUCAGE/Operational/Exploitation of Possible Contact of Soviet Embassy Employee with Fidel CASTRO Ruz

ACTION REQUIRED: Publicize previous links of Soviet Embassy with Cuban 26th of July Movement and return of LEONOV, if feasible; see para. 5.

REFERENCES : A. [illegible]-039, (IN 35356)
B. HMMA-9793, 23 March 1958
C. MEXI-8593 (IN 49057)

1. Your attention is directed to reference A which mentioned the proposed KUCAGE exploitation of the finding of the personal calling card of Nikolai S. LEONOV in the address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz.

2. Although there were ODYSEX reports at the same time as reference A, which reported that the Mexican press carried a generally accurate and complete account of the breakup of the Cuban revolutionary conspiracy, that the leader was linked with the Soviet Embassy and that he carried in his wallet a card of LEONOV, secretary to the Soviet ambassador, it can not be determined at Headquarters whether there was specific Station play-up of this incident.

3. In reviewing Station dispatches pertaining to the CASTRO case, reference B was examined, as well as its attachment, the report of LEONOV. The latter apparently attempts to explain the circumstances under which the personal card of LEONOV was "planted" in the CASTRO address book. A discrepancy is noted in the reconstruction of the incident of the arrest of CASTRO and the discovery of LEONOV's card in that both the reference and the attachment describe the circumstances surrounding the arrest of CASTRO as occurring in November 1956 whereas reference A had already reported the arrest and discovery of the card in the address book as having occurred in June 1956.

4. Now, there is renewed interest in this matter due to the fact that reference C reported LEONOV's return to Mexico for what appears to be a second tour of duty.

CONTINUED

201-132139

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-132139

DATE TYPED: 24 Nov 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW 10265

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-12-3

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATING

WH/3/Mexico A. E. Grunwell baf C/WH/3/Mexico [illegible]

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/10		Frank Lovy (In Draft)
WH/C/CA		

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono
1 - SR/10

See 2017 14 Nov 63
50-6-83

RELEASING

C/WH J. C. King

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-10265

5. The views of Station Mexico are requested as to whether it would be feasible to replay the original incident indicating the tie between CASTRO and LEONOV. Even if the incident was not exploited before, it is the opinion of Headquarters that it would be useful to cite a specific CASTRO tie with the Soviets before he took over in Cuba. From a Headquarters viewpoint the alleged action of LIVESTOCK/2 in "planting" the card would still not impair the replay of the original incident.

END OF DISPATCH

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 9 AUGUST 1961
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
FBI FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)
SUBJECT: LEONOV, NIKOLAI SERGEEVICH aka
N. S. Leonov

manifest # 360902
1-Sept 61

SECRET 1-1 5

PERSONAL INFORMATION DATA

201 NUMBER 201-132139 A#11155

NAME LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich

TITLE (Position and country) * 3rd Secy ~~Employee?~~ Asst CULTURAL OFFICER MEXICO

Dipl List 1 Sept 61

HMMA 17731 5 Sept 61

DATE OF ARRIVAL 31 July 1961

PCS DEPARTURE

MEXI 8593 6 Aug 61

PASSPORT NO. D-18009 Wife: D-18010

DBF 85321 9 Aug 61

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 22 August 1928/Ryazan

MAILING ADDRESS Pachuca - 153-405 Condesa

NAME OF WIFE Valeriya Ivanovna

WIFE'S DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 30 ~~28~~ April 1928/Ryazan

CHILDREN Dau: Irina, b. 62

HMMA 22430

HMMA 18913 27 APR 62

LANGUAGES Spanish EXCELLENT

PHOTO



DESCRIPTION

HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COLOR OF EYES	COLOR OF HAIR	COMPLEXION

IDENTIFYING MARKS

OTHER (Include personality, habits, hobbies, vices, etc.)

MEXI 839 27 Jun 56 — Subject's calling card found in address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz when latter arrested in Mexi 21 June 1956.

~~HMMA~~ 18305 15 Dec 61 — Disptch re poss exploitation of Subj with Cuban 26th of Jul Movement.

HMM 8492 15 Feb 64 — Subj's wife works at Sov. Emb. (capacity unknown, probably typist).

CAREER

1. See old REDCAP sheet from previous tour of duty Mexi 1953-56.
2. Subj accompanied MIKOYAN entourage to Cuba for the Soviet Exposition February 1960.

RIS INPUT NO. 20

FORM 5-59 498 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (20)

201-132138



USSR 1963

~~IVANOV, LEONID.~~

INTERPRETER FOR

CASTRO.

OFFICIAL USE

ONLY

CIA-P-163160

[illegible], Nikolay Sergeyevich



CUBA-USSR

CASTRO, FIDEL (L2) CUBA, WITH KHRUSHCHEV (L3) USSR, SHAKING HANDS WITH FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN RED SQUARE. NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (L1) USSR, ACTING AS INTERPRETER FOR CASTRO.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CIA-P-162805

201-132139

S E C R E T [illegible] HM-4770

FROM
Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT
5 October 1962

REPORTING OFFICER
Clyde K. SHROCK

RD. NO.
P-7354

REPORTS OFFICER
Portia L. SPARESUS

PROJ.
LIFIRE

APPROVING OFFICER
Willard C. CURTIS

S'CE CR.
Para. 1: LICOOKY-1
Para. 2: LIFIRE

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS.

The information in paragraph one of the attached was taken from several small items submitted by LICOOKY-1 since 17 July. The information in paragraph two was taken from the LIFIRE airlists.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4-Headquarters (JMFUCK) 1-WAVE 019 LIGF 3-Files	1-EMB, PAO, MA, NA, AA, I&NS 1-LA

COUNTRY

NO. OF ENCLOSURES
None

NO. PAGES
1

SUBJECT
[illegible]

REFERENCES
201-132139

PADA

APPR

S E C R E T

DOI

FORM 8-60 1467

CS COPY!

201-336474

(20)

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 9 AUGUST 1961
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
FBI FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)
SUBJECT: LEONOVA, VALERIA IVANOVNA aka
V. I..Leonova

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible]

363
DATE : 4 AUG 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, SR 6, DD/I, AD/CI, S/C 2
COP, CI/IC 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2	RP	5	6
3		6	

AUG 6 06 14Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 49057 2

DIR CITE MEXI (WARE ACTING) 8593

REDCAP

1. ACCORDING AIRLISTS FOLL ARRIVALS 31 JULY VIA AIR FRANCE 707: NIKOLAI SERGEYEVICH LEONOV AND WIFE VALERIYA IVANOVNA.

2. REQUEST HQS PROVIDE TRACES SUBJS ACTIVITIES SINCE DEPARTURE MEXI OCT 1956.

3. ODENVY ADVISED.

END OF MESSAGE

RI trace req 10 Aug 61
Bio card typed 10 Aug 61

SECRET

201-132139

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

COLITHO - PATD. BY MOORE BUSINESS FORMS, INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

14-00000

30 June 61 X

SR/6/Bio (Rebecca T. Clarke) 1608 J. 8550

X X X

SR/6/Bio cards 1953 to 1960

LEONOV NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH X X

22 08 28 USSR RYAZAN USSR USSR

Probably and interpreter

SR/6/Bio 706

Administrative clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City between March 53 and October 1956. In February 1960 accompanied MIKOYAN entourage to Cuba for the Soviet Cultural and Technical Exposition.

201-132139

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1960
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FBI FILE NUMBER: 105-83963 (BUREAU)
SUBJECT: SOVIET CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL
EXPOSITION
HAVANA, CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY, CUBA

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible]: [illegible] Report No: [illegible] Local [illegible]

No. of Pages: 11 of Enclosures: None

Report Made by: Janice J. [illegible] Approved by: Willard C. [illegible]

Distribution: 4-Hqs (2 [illegible], 1 [illegible] Div)
By copy to: 2-Files
Orally to:

12P 5 Dec 56

Source Cryptonym: LIFEAT/[illegible] References: None

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

SUBJECT: Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, October 1956

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

Classification SECRET

Form No. Feb 1949 51-59

RI COPY

~~56-4-3-1~~

201-132139

SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO. [illegible]-2278

SUBJECT: Activities of the Soviet Embassy Mexico City, October 1956.

DATE OF INFO: 1-31 October 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 1-31 October 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 5 December 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Source having access to Soviet diplomatic circles in Mexico (B). Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

I. SOVIET EMBASSY ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO:

The following information on the activities of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico was developed during the month of October 1956. Separate reports will be furnished on the Commercial and on Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Embassy. References made below to the visiting Soviet musicians will be detailed in a special report concerning the activities of the musicians while in Mexico.

II. DIPLOMATIC:

A. Relations with Mexican Government:

1. On 1 October the secretary of Alfonso ROSENZWEIG Diaz, Private Secretary to Foreign Minister Luis PADILLA Nervo, conferred with Leonid [illegible], Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, about a dinner being given by the Embassy the following evening. Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy G. KULAZHENKOV invited ROSENZWEIG and his wife to attend a piano concert with him after the dinner. On 3 October ROSENZWEIG informed [illegible] that he was very embarrassed about what had happened the previous evening, but he had had a meeting with PADILLA Nervo and had not gotten out until 8:30 p.m. He had not known whether to go to the Embassy or to the concert, and asked that [illegible] excuse him with the Ambassador.

2. The private secretary of Jose GOROSTIZA, Sub-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, left a message at the Soviet Embassy on 3 October indicating he would be unable to accompany the Ambassador to the concert by a Soviet violinist that evening, as he had to attend a special dinner. However, GOROSTIZA had apparently accompanied the Ambassador to a piano concert the previous evening.

SECRET

50-4-1-303

SECRET

3. Eduardo JULIAN of Perex and (fnu) GARCIA Rojas, also of Perex, accepted invitations from Boris A. KAZANTSEV, recently appointed Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, to lunch on 5 October at 2:30 p.m. When GARCIA Rojas became ill that day, KAZANTSEV and JULIAN decided to lunch alone, and meet another day with GARCIA Rojas. Later JULIAN had to postpone the luncheon because of a special meeting with Antonio [illegible] of Perex. Both JULIAN and GARCIA Rojas were invited and since the latter could not attend, JULIAN had to be present. JULIAN suggested to KAZANTSEV that they postpone their luncheon date until 8 October when GARCIA would probably be able to attend also.

4. On 4 October KAZANTSEV contacted Bernardo REYES Morales of the Press Section of the Foreign Ministry and apologized for not being able to obtain a third ticket for him for a concert that evening. REYES had requested a ticket for his daughter, but KAZANTSEV assured him that since their tickets were for the balcony all three could probably enter on the two tickets.

5. The secretary of Ricardo J. ZEVADA (of the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior) informed the Embassy on 8 October that ZEVADA was back at work. The Embassy had been trying to contact him, probably for the purpose of inviting him to a dinner or concert.

6. On 10 October a farewell reception was held at the Soviet Embassy in honor of Mikhail F. CHERKASOV, Counselor of the Embassy, who was scheduled to leave Mexico on 17 October. On 9 October Jose MARTINEZ Caballos of the Protocol Office told Viktor N. GLOTOV, First Secretary, that Jose MUNOZ Zapata of the Foreign Office wanted to know if it would be possible for the Embassy to give four invitations to the following friends of Mrs. PADILLA Nervo (believed to be the wife of Luis PADILLA Nervo, Secretary of Foreign Relations): Enrique [illegible] and wife; Dr. Grover [illegible] and wife; M. [illegible]; and Mrs. Mary [illegible]. The Embassy agreed to send the invitations to Mrs. PADILLA Nervo, who would pass them on to her friends. MARTINEZ Caballos also indicated that in case the Ambassador and CHERKASOV did not know, that Eduardo ESPINOSA Prieto of the Mexican Diplomatic Service, and his wife Tamara were in Mexico and it would be a good idea to invite them. GLOTOV replied that these people were their good friends. MARTINEZ Caballos did not know if Minister PADILLA Nervo and Sub-secretary GOROSTIZA would be able to attend, but added that he and MUNOZ Zapata would be there. Federico A. MARISCAL, new Director of Protocol, also planned to attend. Pablo CAMPOS Ortiz of the Foreign Ministry could not be there because he was still in the hospital recovering from an operation.

SECRET 50-4-1-303

7. Eduardo CHAVEZ Ramirez, Minister of Hydraulic Resources, and his wife received an invitation to a concert of the Soviet musicians on 21 October and requested eight seats. On 20 October they asked that eight seats be reserved for the 28 October concert.

8. Enrique ROSA Pontones, private secretary of Antonio CARRILLO Flores, Minister of Finance, informed [illegible] on 15 October that CARRILLO enjoyed attending the concert with the Ambassador on Sunday, but would not be able to accompany him on Wednesday, 17 October because of a meeting with the French Economic Commission.

9. Soviet Ambassador [illegible] made an appointment to meet with Director Rodrigo GOMEZ of the Banco de Mexico on 18 October at 12:00 noon.

10. On 16 October the Ambassador consulted with [illegible] Zapata concerning an idea he had of organizing a small concert at the Embassy for a very restricted group - only Secretaries and some Sub-secretaries and their wives. MARISCAL had told [illegible] Zapata that the question of attending was difficult because of the limited time and the protocol. [illegible] Zapata suggested that the Ambassador send out invitations or indicate to him who might be interested. He and MARISCAL could not attend on the 17th because they were invited to a cocktail party in the afternoon at Bellas Artes and a dinner in the evening. [illegible] had already heard the artists at Bellas Artes and at the cocktail party at the Embassy.

11. On 24 October, [illegible] received a message from Salvador OLMOS, secretary of President RUIZ Cortines, thanking the Embassy for offering a concert by the Soviet artists as mentioned in the note received from the Soviets. However, they would not be able to attend due to the fact that the wife of the president had some engagements out of town.

12. The private secretary of GOROSTIZA informed [illegible] on 27 October that GOROSTIZA had received the Ambassador's invitation to the concert on 28 October, but had to go out of town and would not be able to attend. He asked that the tickets be given to his son.

B. Relations with Other Latin American Diplomats:

1. Ambassador [illegible] made arrangements with Dr. Gabriel ARCE Quiroga, Bolivian Ambassador, to meet at the Bolivian Chancellery on the afternoon of 2 October.

50-4-1-303

SECRET

2. On 5 October [illegible] contacted Jorge [illegible], Attache at the Panamanian Embassy, to make an appointment with Ambassador Eusebio A. [illegible]. However, the ambassador was in Panama City so [illegible] made arrangements to meet with RAMIREZ the following day.

3. On 17 October [illegible] informed (Dr) Otto [illegible] Salazar, Second Secretary at the Nicaraguan Embassy, that the Soviet Ambassador would participate in the ceremony in honor of Carlos PEON del Valle, former Chief of the Mexican Protocol Office. The Soviet Ambassador had indicated that they could handle the matter of the money as they liked, taking from the funds of the diplomatic corps if they wished.

4. On 31 October [illegible] invited Bolivian Ambassador ARCE and First Secretary Raul Alfonso GARCIA and their wives to lunch on behalf of the Soviet Ambassador as a farewell to ARCE. However, ARCE was leaving on a trip that day and could not accept.

C. Relations with Iron Curtain Missions:

1. Czech Legation: On 2 October Ambassador [illegible] invited (Czech Minister) Bedrich PISTORA and his wife to attend the concert of Soviet pianist [illegible] to be held that evening at Bellas Artes. On 4 October Karel [illegible] of the Czech Legation met with CHERKASOV. PISTORA and [illegible] and their wives accepted invitations to the farewell cocktail party for CHERKASOV given on 10 October. On 29 October Boris P. [illegible], Attache, invited Bedrich [illegible] and Lubomir BLAZEK to a small recital which the visiting Soviet artists were to give at the [illegible].

2. Polish Legation: Polish Charge d'Affaires Bernard [illegible] was scheduled to visit the Soviet Embassy the evening of 11 October, probably with his wife.

D. Miscellaneous Diplomatic Relations:

1. CEPAL: On 1 October [illegible] made arrangements to visit (fnu) VILLASECA, assistant to (fnu) URQUIDI of CEPAL (Comision Economica para la America Latina).

2. Indian Embassy: [illegible] K. [illegible] of the Indian Embassy received an invitation to the farewell party for CHERKASOV on 10 October. He also invited CHERKASOV to lunch on 15 October and indicated that CHERKASOV should bring along any other friend or couple he chose. It is believed that Ambassador [illegible] attended the luncheon. On 20 October [illegible] and his wife were invited to a concert of Soviet singer [illegible].

SECRET 50-4-1-303

3. Office of the Indonesian Republic: On 1[illegible] October the Soviet Embassy was informed that the Indonesian Charge d'affaires would not be able to attend (the reception for [illegible]OV) that day because of illness. The following day the secretary of the Indonesian Charge contacted the Soviet Embassy concerning the premiere of some Indonesian dancers on 21 October, indicating that she would send invitations to the Ambassador, [illegible]TSEV, [illegible]OV, and First Secretary Victor N. [illegible]OV. She also expressed an interest in learning Russian and was directed to contact the IICR. On 26 October the Indonesian Charge and Bees Effendi were invited to lunch by the Soviet Ambassador.

4. French Embassy: Mme. Guillaume GEORGES-PICOT, wife of the French Ambassador in Mexico, attended a dinner and showing of two films at the Soviet Embassy on 23 October. While with the Soviets she contacted the French Embassy and asked someone there to inform Mrs. ROSENZWEIG Diaz of a change of a meeting time at the hotel after the following morning.

5. Yugoslav Embassy: The Soviet Ambassador invited Mirko [illegible]SIC, First Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy, and (fnu) [illegible]LIC (pn), new Charge d'affaires, and their wives to dinner on 29 October at 1:30 p.m.

6. Israeli Legation: On 21 October the Minister of the Israeli Legation received the Soviet Ambassador at the Chancellory, Alejandro Dumas 231, Mexico, D.F. Vladimir M. [illegible]OV of the Soviet Embassy had attempted to make an appointment for KULAZHENKOV with the Minister earlier in the month, but the latter had been on a trip to Panama, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY:

A. Nikolay I. ROSCHIN, employee in the office of the Soviet Naval Attache, contacted Enrique [illegible]AZ Holt, Acting G-2 of the Mexican Navy, on 3 October and said he had received a letter stating that the Secretary of the Navy could not attend a reception by the Ambassador to be held sometime between 5 and 10 October. ROSCHIN wanted to know if the other officers could attend, or whether they should wait until the Secretary could come also. ROSCHIN suggested that perhaps the Secretary could come sometime after 10 October, but [illegible]AZ indicated that he was not sure, because the Secretary was often out of town on inspection tours. [illegible]AZ consulted with Comandante [illegible]ZCO and said they would let ROSCHIN know later about the date and whether the officers would attend. ROSCHIN said they would be glad to give a reception to the Secretary on any date he chose. (Comment: As usual, [illegible]AZ did not seem particularly enthusiastic in his dealings with ROSCHIN.)

50-4-1-323

B. On 4 October [illegible] (lnu) [illegible] contacted Nikolay M. [illegible], Assistant Naval Attache, on behalf of the "Comandante" and stated that the latter could not (see [illegible]) that evening because he had been called to Veracruz.

C. On 4 October an unidentified person in Vancouver, Canada unsuccessfully attempted to contact the Soviet Military Attache.

D. Comandante Alfonso/[illegible] Gomez of the Comision Inspectora invited [illegible] to join him on 6 October. However, [illegible] had plans to go fishing at the Lack of Valle de Bravo, and since it had been four Saturdays since he had been able to go, he would prefer to get together some day during the week.

E. On 3 October Major Alfredo [illegible] Arguello of the Army Second Section asked Vladimir N. [illegible] of the Soviet Military Attache's office, how General (lnu) [illegible] could send some things to his relatives in the USSR. [illegible] suggested he send them by international airmail.

F. On 19 October Major [illegible] informed KAL[illegible]N that the list of high officials of the Defense Department which he had requested, was ready. On 25 October [illegible] informed [illegible] he would like to talk with him about some motion pictures.

G. On 27 October Major Miguel/[illegible] Penafiel was in contact with Nikolay [illegible], employee of the Office of the Military Attache and a known Soviet Intelligence Officer. (see [illegible])

IV. [illegible]:

A. Communist and Pro-Communist Contacts:

1. An unidentified hotel employee called the Soviet Embassy on 1 October on behalf of Mrs. Ayten Onanian de [illegible], wife of Communist professor Macedonio GARZA, and inquired whether Consul [illegible] had received a reply from Baku, USSR or if he had received a copy of the bachelor's certificate from that city. The Embassy informed him that [illegible] was no longer in Mexico and that the new Consul would be receiving the public on the following day.

2. [illegible] RIVERA, wife of Communist artist Diego RIVERA, informed KALATSEV on 2 October that she hoped they could enjoy together some of the vodka she had received from the Ambassador. She had just come from Acapulco where her husband still was staying, and she was planning to return that afternoon. They would call the Ambassador when they came back to Mexico City the first of the week. (For further contacts between the RIVERAs and members of the Soviet Embassy, see [illegible].)

50-4-1-303

S[illegible]CRET

3. An unidentified individual from F[illegible] (Federacion de Organismos de Ayuda a la Republica Espanola) asked [illegible]OV on 3 October if he could sell him an ampoule of Bogomoletz. [illegible]OV replied that they expected to have some in a few months, but did not have any at the moment. ?

4. Sra Zita Vasich de CA[illegible]SI was in contact with Vladimir [illegible], Second Secretary, on 3 October concerning an ampoule (of Bogomoletz) he had for her. He indicated that this one was free, but in case she needed more there were six other ampoules for sale in Mexico and they would cost seventy-five pesos each. (Comment: The caller is the wife of Federico [illegible], ~~pro-Communist artist.~~)

5. Jose R[illegible]S, pro-Communist writer, and (fnu) [illegible]OS, a lawyer, visited C[illegible] during the month of October.

6. (Miss) Rosario SA[illegible], journalist, accepted an invitation from KOLOMYAKOV to a cocktail party at the Soviet Embassy on 8 October. (Comment: SA[illegible] is known to be pro-Communist.)

7. On 12 October (Dr. [illegible] de [illegible] of the Society of Friends of China attempted to contact [illegible]OV concerning some pictures.

8. On 19 October Joaquin MAC[illegible] Sanchez told [illegible]EVICH that he had looked for him at [illegible]'s concert but had not seen him there. MAC[illegible] went on to say that he had seen an article about a Brazilian man of science who was in the USSR. [illegible] informed him that this man was an Armenian who had been repatriated from Brazil to the USSR. MAC[illegible] indicated that he might be the right person to read his thesis, since he had studied existencialism, spoke Spanish, and was enrolled in the Soviet Academy of Science. [illegible] said the thesis had been sent two months ago, and that they were working on it and would probably show it to the individual mentioned.

9. Josefina ZAVALA of the Propaganda Office contacted (fnu) [illegible] on 19 October to ascertain if she had issue #9 of the magazine Comunist, but it has not arrived. ([illegible] is believed to be identical with one Sra. del Carmen [illegible] [illegible]ERRAT Puchi, who is connected with a shop known as "Todo para el Nino," located at Pte. de Alvarado [illegible]. She is believed to be a Communist and is frequently in contact with the Czech Legation.)

10. On 30 October Rosa [illegible], pro-Communist journalist, arranged to go by the Embassy to see [illegible]OV concerning some articles she had written and wanted to send to TASS, Soviet news agency.

SECRET 50-4-1-303

SECRET

B. Contacts of Special Interest:

1. On 26 October (fnu) RIVERA, a lawyer, informed [illegible] that he had found an article in the "Diverse Column" of [illegible] which suggested the name of one Ing. DIAZ as a person to assist people with the type of problem [illegible] had been handling for RIVERA. (Comment: The newspaper advertisement read as follows: "Tiene Ud. algun problema migratorio? Se lo arreglo. Mexico Tacuba 598. Ing. Diaz" (Do you have any migration problem? I will arrange it for you. Mexico Tacuba 598. Eng. Diaz.) It appears that RIVERA and [illegible] have been having discussions concerning migratory matters.

2. A. MONTASSI Bradley, and Lev [illegible], First Secretary, arranged to meet for lunch on 31 October. [illegible] suggested meeting somewhere other than their usual place since there were so many couples, etc., there, and he didn't like it. However, [illegible] replied that they would meet "alone" at the usual place. (An article in the 24 November issue of [illegible] listed one A. MONTASSI Bradley as attending the inauguration of an art exhibit by Diego RIVERA. MONTASSI is believed to be identical with the individual previously reported as (fnu) [illegible] y Bradley. There is no record in station files on MONTASSI.)

3. Mauricio de la SELVA was in contact with [illegible] on 22 October. (see [illegible]-2055)

4. (fnu) [illegible] contacted [illegible] on 23 October and suggested that they get together for a chat and a drink. They arranged to meet that afternoon "in the old place."

5. On 27 October Nicolas (probably [illegible]) called David ALFARO, son of Mexican Communist artist David ALFARO Siqueiros. On 20 October ALFARO was in contact with Matvey P. [illegible] of the Soviet Commercial Office (see [illegible]-2062).

6. On 30 October Sergio [illegible], leftist journalist, attempted to contact [illegible] or [illegible]. On 27 October he conferred with [illegible] (see [illegible]-2045).

C. Miscellaneous Contacts:

1. On 20 October Lic. (fnu) [illegible] Mejia contacted Georgiy [illegible] of the Commercial Office on behalf of Lic. [illegible] about some Bogomoletz serum.

2. On 20 October [illegible] attempted to call Federico de la [illegible] Sotomayor, indicating that [illegible] had left a visiting card at his home.

SECRET 50-4-1-303

SECRET

3. Carlos LA[illegible] contacted Pavel [illegible] on 27 October concerning a visa to the USSR. (see HMM-2066)

4. On 30 October [illegible] contacted Jose Alfredo [illegible] (see HMM-2117)

5. Yuriy N. PAPOROV, Cultural Attache, and his wife, were invited on behalf of Diego RIVERA to a cocktail party being given on 5 November by Silvia PINAL to show the portrait RIVERA had painted of her. The party was to be held at Avenida de los Fuentes 629, Jardines del Pedregal. PAPOROV indicated he still had no fixed address, but would send out address cards when he found a permanent place of residence. (Comment: PINAL is a movie actress.)

6. On 20 October [illegible] contacted Carlos CALDERON of the Asociacion Nacional de Importadores y Exportadores de la Republica Mexicana, Isabel la Catolica 38, and informed him that the Ambassador would like to postpone their dinner to 25 October.

7. One Luis Julio [illegible] arranged to visit PAPOROV at the Embassy on 26 October.

V. GOODS AND SERVICES:

A. On 3 October the wife of Leonid I. [illegible], Commercial Counselor, visited Dr. Walter SCH[illegible], a dentist with offices at J. Moran 12, to have her teeth cleaned.

B. During October members of the Soviet Embassy were in contact with Mrs. Mercedes [illegible] of Tokyo 5, a seamstress.

C. On 22 October Albert A. [illegible], Attache, ordered a tank of oxygen from 11-81-74, Unidad Medica de Oxigeno. They promised to send him the note for renting the other tanks. (In the 1956 Mexico City telephone directory this number is listed under the name of Dr. Guillermo de [illegible], Plaza Miravalle 3-A, and also under Oxigeno Para Enfermos at the same address.)

D. Also on 22 October [illegible] contacted Juan DIAZ Rodriguez, Extinguidores, Moctezuma 246, and asked that they send mechanics to check and recharge the fifteen or sixteen extinguishers at the Embassy.

E. Aleksey D. [illegible], Assistant Commercial Officer, contacted Dr. Jorge SEGURA Millan, well-known doctor with offices at Articulo 123 #116, on 25 October concerning some x-ray treatments for his heart.

SECRET

50-4-1-303

SECRET

[illegible]-2173
Page 10

VI: [illegible]

A. One Daniel [illegible] is believed to be the new chauffeur for the Soviet commercial office.

B. On 4 October [illegible] reserved a room, the cheapest available with a ten-percent Embassy discount, at the Hotel Roosevelt for Yevgeniya Petrovna [illegible], new employee in the Commercial office who arrived in Mexico on 5 October.

C. On 9 October Nikolay S. LEONOV, Secretary to the Ambassador, contacted one (Lic.) [illegible] (ph) and informed him that [illegible] had to leave Mexico in a hurry, and would like to postpone their appointment until Thursday, 11 October.

D. Georgiy [illegible], new employee in the Soviet Commercial office (motion pictures), arrived in Mexico on 10 October.

E. On 11 October KAZANTSEV explained to an unidentified person that the Embassy did not have a Press Attache, but that MASYUKEVICH was head of publications and he ([illegible]) was in charge of the press department.

F. On 17 October [illegible] was reported to be in Veracruz and was expected back in Mexico City on the 20th.

G. [illegible], [illegible], and wife, and [illegible] and wife and children departed Mexico on 17 October as previously reported.

H. Mariya [illegible] and Yury and Galina [illegible] returned to Mexico on 23 October following home leave. The [illegible] were accompanied by their son.

I. Soviet diplomatic couriers Jouri (Yuriy) [illegible] and Anatoliy [illegible] are believed to have arrived in Mexico on 22 October. According to Air France manifests, they departed on 29 October for New York.

J. Tamara [illegible], the wife of Second Secretary Nikolay [illegible], is working in the film section of the Soviet Embassy.

K. Mariya [illegible], wife of the Soviet Naval Attache, appears to be having a clandestine affair with a person believed to be Nikolay [illegible], subordinate to her husband and assistant Naval attache.

VII. [illegible]

A. On 12 October Vitaliy [illegible], First Secretary, left a message for one (Fnu) [illegible] (ph) at Departamentos de la

SECRET 50-4-1-303

Paz, Iturbide 18, that he would not be able to visit them that day, because they were having a reception.

B. On 16 October [illegible] talked with (fnu) RIVERA concerning a recorder which the Embassy wished to buy to use for music. RIVERA said that the National University had ordered three and he had asked for one extra so as to get it into the country without taxes. There was also the possibility of obtaining one in Mexico. [illegible] promised to discuss the possibilities with the friend who was interested.

C. Ultramar Express contacted [illegible] of the Commercial Office on 16 October concerning data on visas for Mexican citizens going to the USSR. They were making up a list (of visa regulations) for Consulates and Embassies.

D. [illegible] contacted Mariano JIMENEZ Huerta during early October and indicated that a family would be moving from one of JIMENEZ' apartments at Cuautla 1[illegible], and another family would like to move in. JIMENEZ replied that since they were from the Soviet Embassy there would be no problem and they could make whatever arrangements would be easiest for them. The family leaving were in apartment 9 and would move out on the 19th. ([illegible] is listed as living at Cuautla 1[illegible]-9.)

E. On 19 October the Soviet Commercial Office moved to Saltillo 19, Mexico, D.F.

F. General Alberto SALINAS Carranza, Director of Civil Aeronautics, informed [illegible] on 25 October that during the month of November there was to be a series of lectures at the Department of Communications and SALINAS was to give one of them on the subject of "The Future of Civil Aviation." He wanted to obtain some data on Soviet commercial planes and planes from the other countries in that part of Europe. [illegible] indicated that if they had anything he would be glad to give it to him.

G. On 23 October [illegible] called Alfonso ROSENZWEIG Diaz of the Foreign Office and reported that a group of some one-hundred persons had met in front of the main door of the Soviet Embassy and were shouting imprecations, making a lot of noise, and obstructing passage to and from the Embassy. [illegible] asked ROSENZWEIG if he could do anything, since he could not get in touch with Protocol or any other responsible person. ROSENZWEIG made arrangements for members of the Mexican police force to give protection to the Embassy.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

Mexico City Report No: [illegible]-2035 File No:

Pages: 17 No. of Enclosures: None

Report Made By: Janice J. Mulchrone Approved By: Willard C. Curtis

Distribution: 4 - Hqs (1 KUGRAP
By copy to: 1 SR Div)
2 - Files

Orally to: [illegible]

188

7 Nov 56

Source Cryptonym: LIFEAT/LIMERICK References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

F

SUBJECT: Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, September 1956

p. 14

201-132139

Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV

Known KGB

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

INDEX

Classification

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-58
FEB 1953

CHARGED FROM RID/FI COPY

50-4-1-294

201-132139

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO. [illegible]-2038

SUBJECT: Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, September 1956.

DATE OF INFO: 1-30 Sept. 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 1-30 Sept. 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City.

DATE OF REPORT: 7 November 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Source having access to Soviet diplomatic circles in Mexico (B). Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

I. SOVIET EMBASSY ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO:

The following information on the activities of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico was developed during September 1956. Information on Soviet commercial activities is detailed in a separate commercial report.

II. DIPLOMATIC:

A. Relations with Mexican Government:

1. On 11 September Jose MUNOZ Zapata of the Mexican Foreign Ministry invited Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Georgiyevich KULAZHENKOV to a luncheon to be held on 12 September in honor of Jose FIGUERES, President of Costa Rica, visiting in Mexico. Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV, First Secretary, informed (fnu) CARRION Andrade of the Protocol Division that he would accept the invitation to the luncheon for FIGUERES, but that he would attend alone as his wife was in Moscow.

2. On 12 September Rafael FUSONI, formerly of the local United Nations Office of Information, thanked Mikhail Frolovich CHERKASOV for the use of the typewriter, and asked what the Russian delegates had thought of the Geology Congress. CHERKASOV indicated that they thought it "magnificent." FUSONI also informed CHERKASOV that on Friday evening, 14 September at 8:00 p.m., a small dinner was being held at his home for an engineer named Eduardo GUZMAN of Pemex, (fnu) GARCIA Rojas, and some other engineers who helped organize the Congress, and that he would like to invite CHERKASOV and the man who accompanied him the last time. CHERKASOV indicated that he and Vitaliy Aleksandrovich KHARITONOV, First Secretary, would be pleased to attend.

FORM NO. 1 NOV 51 51-58 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

sc-4-1

-97

3. KAZANTSEV informed the Oficina de la Comision Economica para la America Latina (CEPAL) on 13 September that the Ambassador would be unable to attend the reception that day, but that CHERKASOV would come in his place.

4. The Ambassador's request for an audience with the Mexican Foreign Minister was postponed until 11:00 a.m., Tuesday of the following week, 18 September, which is the usual reception day.

5. On 19 September Carlos PEON del Valle, Chief of Protocol, informed Nikolay Sergeyevich LEZHOV, Secretary to the Ambassador, that he would be unable to accept Ambassador KULAZHENKOV's invitation to dinner on 27 September because of a previous engagement with the Ecuadorean Ambassador.

6. On 20 September Boris A. KAZANTSEV, First Secretary, discussed with Cristobal LARA of CEPAL a meeting of the Economic Commission scheduled to take place in La Paz, Bolivia at the beginning of 1957. No definite date has been set, but LARA estimated it would probably be held in May of the following year. Since LARA was leaving the city on Monday, 24 September, for a two-week vacation, he could not accept KAZANTSEV's invitation to lunch, but promised to call him on returning to Mexico City.

7. On 25 September KAZANTSEV indicated he was sending a gift to Delfin SANCHEZ Juarez, a lawyer, of the International Affairs Office of Seguro Social (Social Security).

8. Also on 25 September KAZANTSEV tentatively arranged a luncheon date for Thursday, 27 September, with Eduardo GUZMAN and (fnu) GARCIA Rojas to thank both of them, in the name of the Ambassador, for all the attention they had paid to the Soviet delegation to the Geological Conference.

9. Alfonso ROSENZWEIG Dias of the Foreign Ministry invited Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich POPOV, Third Secretary, and his wife to dinner at his home on Tuesday, 2 October. POPOV, who expected to be out of town from Saturday until Tuesday or Wednesday, suggested a later date. Arrangements were then made for Thursday, 4 October, at 8:30 p.m. at ROSENZWEIG's home, Pirules 136. ROSENZWEIG promised to send POPOV directions for reaching his home, since it was a little difficult to find.

10. Octavio PAZ of the Foreign Ministry accepted an invitation to dinner at the Soviet Embassy on 27 September.

SECRET

HMM-2038
Page 3

11. Arrangements were made for KAZANTSEV to meet with Bernardo REYES Morales of the Direccion General de Prensa (Foreign Ministry Press Section) on 29 September at 12:00 a.m.

B. Relations with other Latin American Diplomats:

1. Vladimir Mikhaylovich PANOV of the Soviet Embassy arranged a meeting between CHERKASOV and the Venezuelan Ambassador on 4 September. The Ambassador had previously expressed a desire to see CHERKASOV on that date.

2. On 3 September PANOV made arrangements for CHERKASOV to see the Haitian Ambassador ~~at 1:00 p.m.~~ at the Haitian Embassy. PANOV also made similar appointments at the Guatemalan, Dominican, and Costa Rican Embassies. An attempt to contact [illegible] with the Honduran Charge d'Affaires was unsuccessful at that time, but an appointment was made later in the week.

3. Gaston MORALES Barragan, Second Secretary of the Peruvian Embassy, contacted the Soviet Embassy on 7 September concerning a communication about the disarmament question addressed to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and a note of Soviet opinion on the Suez question. Since Peru does not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, MORALES could not send these notes to his country, and would return them to POPOV.

4. On 12 September KAZANTSEV contacted Hugo NAVARRO Bolandi, First Secretary of the Costa Rican Embassy, who said he had attempted to reach KAZANTSEV about a certain matter, for President FIGUERES had told him that he would have an opportunity to see the Russian Ambassador both at dinner at the Foreign Office that day and at the reception in the evening.

5. On 17 September The secretary of the Nicaraguan Ambassador made arrangements through Nikolay LEONOV, Embassy official, for a meeting between the two Ambassadors for 27 September at 8:00 p.m. in full dress.

6. KAZANTSEV attempted on 19 September to arrange a meeting with Antonio CHOCANO Batres, First Secretary of the Guatemalan Embassy. CHOCANO appeared hesitant to commit himself to a specific date, and finally asked KAZANTSEV to call him on the 25th. KAZANTSEV seemed to ignore CHOCANO's disinterest in the matter.

7. On 19 September LEONOV left a message at the Ecuadorean Embassy, saying that Ambassador KULAZHENKOV wished to invite the Ecuadorean Ambassador to luncheon or dinner on 25 or 26 September. No definite plans were made.

SECRET

SECRET

8. On 20 September the Argentine Ambassador attempted to contact KULAZHENKOV who was busy at the time with the Norwegian Charge d'Affaires. He wished to know the time of the Soviet dinner on 27 September as the Venezuelan Embassy was having a ceremony from 7:00 to 9:00 p.m. on the same day, and he would like to attend both functions. The Soviet invitation was for 8:00 p.m. so the Argentine Ambassador decided he would go to the Venezuelan ceremony first, and arrive a little late for the Soviet dinner.

9. On 21 September the secretary of the Cuban Ambassador informed Albert Alekseyevich MATVEYEV, Attache, that she had just talked to the Cuban Ambassador who was ill, and would like to postpone their luncheon date for that day until Thursday or Friday of the following week. They decided on Friday, 28 September and MATVEYEV said that the Soviet Ambassador would also like to invite the wife of the Cuban Ambassador to a motion-picture showing that same day. After checking with the Ambassador arrangements were made for 7:30 p.m., Friday, 28 September. The Cuban Ambassador and his wife, and Francisco DOMINGUEZ Conard, Second Secretary of the Cuban Embassy, would attend.

10. Plans were made for KAZANTSEV and DOMINGUEZ of the Cuban Embassy to meet for lunch on Wednesday, 26 September. However, KAZANTSEV later cancelled the date upon learning that they would have an opportunity to see each other at the Soviet Embassy.

11. On 25 September KAZANTSEV talked to Francisco AGUILAR, Counselor of the Salvadoran Embassy, concerning some records which ROZANOV had sent to AGUILAR. The latter put off a proposed meeting with KAZANTSEV, suggesting that he contact him the following week.

C. Relations with other Iron Curtain Missions:

1. Appointments were arranged between CHERKASOV and Bedrick PISTORA, Minister of the Czech Legation, for 3 and 10 September.

2. Plans were made between Boris PUTILIN, employee of the Soviet Embassy, and Lubomir BLAZIK, Czech Cultural and Propaganda Officer, for a volley-ball game to be held at 10:00 a.m., 9 September, at the Balneario Olimpico.

3. On 7 September Bedrich KUBES, Attache of the Czech Legation, made arrangements to stop by the Soviet Embassy on 10 September to discuss some motion pictures. Although the Soviets had no special representative for motion pictures, KUBES was told that either Leonid Ivanovich BOLSHAKOV, Commercial Counselor, or Aleksey Danilovich MAYEVSKIY, Assistant Commercial Officer, could help him.

SECRET

50-41-294

4. Czech Minister PISTORA and his wife were expected at the Soviet Embassy at 1:00 p.m. on 19 September.

5. On 22 September a member of the Czech Legation informed Mariya ZINOVOYVA, Soviet employee, that Minister PISTORA accepted the invitation to dinner at the Soviet Embassy. On the same day BLAZIK arranged to confer with Lev Nikolayevich ZHUKOV, First Secretary, concerning the fiesta which was to be held at the Minister's residence, Amores 923, on 29 September. Further information indicated that some forty Soviets were expected to attend the party.

6. On 27 September an appointment was set up for Karel STARECKY, Counselor of the Czech Legation, to visit the Soviet Ambassador that day.

7. The Czech Legation contacted the Soviet Embassy on 29 September to ask if they had a truck or pick-up that could be used to transport a ping-pong table from the Czech Legation to the Minister's residence for the party that evening. At first PANOV replied that they did not have such a vehicle, but later offered to pick up the table for them in their "truck."

D. Miscellaneous Diplomatic Relations

1. On 7 September Mrs. (fnu) MARCHETTI of the Italian Embassy thanked KHARITONOV for the photos he had sent her, and indicated that she and her husband were planning to have a dinner at her home for the people, including CHERKASOV, who had been together in Aguascalientes. (This probably refers to the group who attended the Grape Fair in Aguascalientes in August.)

2. The Indonesian Charge d'Affaires accepted an invitation to a motion picture showing at the Soviet Embassy for 8 September.

3. On 14 September a woman from the Association of Diplomats advised GLOTOV, KAZANTSEV, POPOV, and ROMANOV that the association would meet at 1:30 p.m. on 17 September at the Restaurant 1-2-3. GLOTOV informed her that all would probably attend, and that KAZANTSEV would like a receipt for his association dues.

4. Arrangements were made for Ambassador KULAZHENKOV to receive the Israeli Minister at 12:00 on 17 September, and the Norwegian Charge d'Affaires at 11:45 on 18 September.

SECRET

5. KULAZHENKOV, CHERKASOV, and POPOV and their wives were invited to attend a reception on Friday, 28 September at the Lebanese Legation in honor of the Lebanese Ambassador to Washington, D.C., who was passing through Mexico. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires also accepted an invitation for dinner at the Lebanese legation on 29 September at 8:00 p.m.

6. On 19 September ROMANOV made arrangements to call on (Dr) Guillermo de ASSA (ph) of the Cultural Committee of the Organization of American States, who had recently been home to Argentina. ROMANOV mentioned that he had also spent three months away from Mexico on vacation in the Soviet Union.

7. Felice STERN (ph) of the British Embassy contacted CHERKASOV on 19 September concerning plans for a luncheon and some table tennis games on Saturday, 22 September at 1:00 p.m. Since she could only seat ten persons and there would be five from the British Embassy, she would like to invite five of the Soviets. They decided on the Ambassador, CHERKASOV, AKSENOV and his wife, and GLOTOV and his wife. However, since that added up to too many guests, CHERKASOV agreed to let her know exactly the following day, and added that since he played table tennis badly, he would serve as referee.

8. On 21 September J. K. Ganju of the Indian Embassy congratulated KAZANTSEV on his promotion (see section on Personnel) and asked about the chart which the Soviet geologist delegates had distributed at the cocktail party at the Embassy. Part of the chart received by the Indians was missing and they would like another copy. KAZANTSEV said that all but six or eight of the delegates had returned and the rest were visiting in Yucatan. He would try to get another copy, but if he could not, he was sure the Indian delegates could get it through the Soviet delegate at New Delhi.

9. Olavi K. MURTO, Charge d'Affaires of the Finnish Legation and his wife, accepted an invitation to a reception at the Soviet Embassy on 27 September.

III. CULTURAL AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES:

A. Relations with Cultural Institutes:

1. Instituto Mexicano Bellas Artes

   a. On 12 September Luis SANCHEZ Arriola of Bellas Artes invited Vladimir K. KHASYUKEVICH, Second Secretary, and Boris P. [illegible]

SECRET

50-4-1-294

KOLOMYAKOV, Attache in the Cultural Office, to a cocktail party being given at the Palacio de Bellas Artes that same day in honor of Maestro (fnu) HERRERA de la Fuente who was leaving for Europe. SANCHEZ apologized for not having been able to notify them sooner, but stated that he had been sick. He informed MASYUKEVICH that Jan PAWALOWSKI, Cultural Attache of the Polish Legation, was going to attend and that he thought that it would be very interesting for the people from the Soviet Embassy to speak with the people that were going to be there. MASYUKEVICH promised he would do everything possible to be there.

b. On 13 September SANCHEZ Arriola apologized to MASYUKEVICH for not having come that morning and said he had been with KOLOMYAKOV the night before. MASYUKEVICH was aware of this and said arrangements had been made. SANCHEZ inquired about some pictures, but KOLOMYAKOV knew nothing about them and was leaving next day for San Luis Potosi, so MASYUKEVICH would talk to him about it later.

c. Arrangements were made for the Ambassador to see Miguel ALVAREZ Acosta, Director of Bellas Artes, at 1:30 p.m. on Monday, 24 September.

2. IICMR (Mexican-Russian Institute for Cultural Interchange)

a. KOLOMYAKOV contacted the IICMR on 13 September and told Tomas CHAVEZ Morado that it would not be necessary for the Institute to send over an operator and projector as they had been able to obtain a 35mm copy of the film they were going to show.

b. On 25 September the president of the Sociedad de Guerrerense contacted the Soviet Embassy and requested some motion pictures to take on a cultural tour through his state of Guerrero. He was referred to the IICMR as the films were not kept at the Embassy..

B. Specific Cultural Activities of the Embassy:

1. Art:

a. Ignacio MARQUEZ Rodiles, prominent Mexican leftist in education and artistic circles, informed KOLOMYAKOV on 7 September that he had received at the Comite del Trece a letter from the Soviet Painters' Federation or Union, and would like to talk to KOLOMYAKOV concerning it, because it was related to a plan which they had already taken up at the Embassy about Mexican cultural relations. An exposition of Mexican paintings would be ready to leave China around the end of November and they must decide whether it would return to Mexico, or whether they should take advantage of the invitation which the Soviet painters had made for 1957. The Soviet painters could not receive the exhibition this year because of lack of space and other expositions being presented. MARQUES indicated that they would like to have the exhibition go to the Soviet Union, and he would like to talk with both KOLOMYAKOV and the Ambassador concerning this matter.

b. MARQUEZ called MATVEYEV on 7 September, and told him that the committee of the Frente Nacional de Artes Plasticas, of which he is a member, had received a letter from the Union de Artes Plasticas in the USSR and he would like to talk with the Ambassador concerning it. He was told to take the matter up with the Cultural Attache first. Later arrangements were made for MARQUES to see the Ambassador at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, 13 September. MARQUES wished to bring all the committee with him, because of the importance of the matter, but was told to bring just one other person.

2. Motion pictures:

a. Gaston GARCIA Cantu (of previous record) contacted MASYUKEVICH to ascertain if he had any photographs of the film "Viva Mexico." MASYUKEVICH replied negatively, but added that they did have a photograph of "Sergio" and he would look for a copy.

b. On 15 September MATVEYEV conferred with Mario CALVET to see if he had received the new Soviet films. CALVET said they had received the following: "Las Damas"; a short entitled "Monumentos Historicos del Kremlin"; "El Gallito de la Cresta de Oro"; a short, "Antilope de Oro"; "Kashtanta"; and "La Daga" of which they had a previous copy. Later the same day a man from CALVET's office contacted BOLSHAKOV to see if he could come for by/the film, "Cerilla Sueca," which was to be used for a matinee showing to the Sindicato de Cinematografistas (Motion Picture Union), who had requested it. The man was told to come by the Embassy and ask for Boris [illegible]KOV.

3. Dance - Theatre:

a. On 12 September, Luis SANCHEZ Arriola, of INBA asked MASYUKEVICH if Juan TOLEDO had to ask authorization to put out publicity on the ballet. MASYUKEVICH said he only had to make some arrangement with the Soviet Embassy so as to be in agreement about the publicity, but he believed they could publish what they wanted.

b. KOLOMYAKOV confirmed to Juan TOLEDO on 19 September what they had previously said, and stated that they were supporting his idea. TOLEDO said that it was only a matter of consultation because (fmu) LUMBROSO had told him that they usually asked for the opinion of the Embassies of each country to be certain that no country would object. Soviet opinion was positive. KOLOMYAKOV promised to go by one day and greet TOLEDO in person.

[illegible]

e. Jose Luis MARTINEZ of Esto informed MASYUKEVICH that the article on the Russian ballet had been published.

C. Soviet Information Bulletin:

1. During the month of September Honorio MATEOS Mendez, of Privada General Jesus A. Flores 3, Colonia del Observatorio, D.F., called the Soviet Embassy and requested that they send his copy of the bulletin to his new address as listed above.

Public.

2. On 18 September Salomon KAHAN, music critic for Tiempo, contacted the Embassy to ascertain how he could obtain a copy of the bulletin which carried an article about the Russian pianist, Yevgeniy MALININ. KAHAN gave his address as: Tribuna Israelita, Bolivar 36, office 505, DF.

3. Honorato de CASTRO called the Embassy to give them a change of address for mailing his bulletin: Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra 547, Colonia Irrigacion. (CASTRO is a member of the Spanich Peace Committee)

D. Miscellaneous Cultural Activities:

1. On 3 September an unidentified woman contacted the Soviet Embassy in an attempt to locate some pamphlets on Hungary. She was referred to the Soviet Cultural Attache.

2. Also on 3 September an unidentified man called the Embassy, stating he was interested incobtaining literature on the Social Security Law of the USSR. He was told to contact Matvey Petrovich IZOTOV, the representative of International Book in Mexico.

3. On 17 September Srta (fmu) FLORES Covarrubias of Pemex, Paleontology Laboratories, informed SAFRONOVA that on Saturday she had delivered some micro-paleontological samples to the Embassy for Madame ZUBOTINA, in care of AZIZTASHKOV (phonetic), and she wanted to be sure they had reached the proper persons, as the gateman to whom she had given them spoke very little Spanish. She also stated that she had left a small box containing a silver item and Mexican cent-piece which she was sending to ZUBOTINA as a remembrance of Mexico. Sra Maria Luisa ROBLES, Chief of Paleontology of Pemex, had asked her to check on these things. She would stop by the Embassy around 3:00 p.m. to check further, as she lived near by.

50-4-1-294

C.

SECRET

4. On 28 September MASYUKEVICH talked to (fnu) RODRIGUEZ Toro and his wife and apologized for the glass broken by their child when they were at the RODRIGUEZ home. He said he had some gifts for them, perfumes from Moscow, and was only awaiting an occasion to give them to them. RODRIGUEZ told MASYUKEVICH that he had his lighter. MASYUKEVICH had thought it lost and bought another. RODRIGUEZ mentioned that he had been in Veracruz and had seen [illegible] there. He also had spoken with Alberto BELTRAN, pro-Communist artist, concerning the possibility of going out to the country on Sunday. MASYUKEVICH thought it an excellent idea.

IV. ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY:

1. Captain Carlos SANTANDER Bonilla of the Second Section of the Mexican Army Staff informed Naval Attache Nikolay [illegible] REMIZOV on 2 September that Captain Vladimir Nikolayevich KALININ, of the Soviet Military Attache office, had brought them a list of Soviet tecnicolor movies from which they could choose. It was arranged that KALININ would talk to SANTANDER about sending the following pictures which they had chosen: "Circo Ruso," "Los Virtuosos del Ballet Ruso," "Cerilla Sueca," "Romeo y Julieta," "Deporte Sovietico 57," and "Vuelo a la Luna." On 5 September KALININ contacted the office about the movies, stating that they could not send them all at once, but that he would bring by "Los Virtuosos de Ballet Ruso" and "Romeo y Julieta" when they were ready.

2. Naval Lt. Jesus RAZO Reguero cancelled a luncheon engagement with REMIZOV on 4 September because of the illness of his daughter. (Field Comment: RAZO, who joined the Mexican Navy on 14 September 1939, was promoted to Lt. j.g. in 1948, served as an assistant at Petty Officers School in 1950, and currently is an aide to Vice Admiral CHAPITAL, Inspector General of the Navy.)

3. On 6 September REMIZOV contacted Comandante Alfonso CASILLAS Gomez and asked when they were going to "hear Mexican music." Arrangements were made to get together at 8:00 p.m. on 11 September at REMIZOV's home. Both men sent greetings to each other's families.

4. Nikolay Desmidovich BYKOV, Assistant Naval Attache, talked to (fnu) RAY at the Second Section concerning the invitations they had received to the ceremony of delivering of flags to the Naval Units of Mexico and checked on the address.

SECRET

SECRET

5. On 11 September ROSCHIN attempted to make arrangements for Admiral Mario RODRIGUEZ Malpica to visit Grigori Korneyevich NIKIPORETS, Naval Attache, at the latter's home. However, RODRIGUEZ was leaving for Guaymas early the next morning and would not be back until January. RODRIGUEZ expressed the hope that NIKIPORETS would still be in Mexico when he returned so they could renew their "friendship."

6. On 12 September Major Isver [illegible] (of previous record) left work with TROFIMOV for NIKIPORETS and the Military Attache that he would be pleased to have them attend a luncheon at "Jardines del Pedregal" on Friday, 14 September to celebrate the inauguration of his equestrian school. He also invited TROFIMOV and told him that the school is on Boulevard de la Luz at its furthest point.

7. On 13 September REMIZOV informed Enrique BALTANAZ Holt, Acting G-2 of the Navy under [illegible], that ROSCHIN had not received an invitation to the Independence Day parade. BALTANAZ later contacted ROSCHIN to say that the Defense Department had sent out invitations to four officers in the Naval Attache's office, but they had obviously been mislaid. A duplicate would be sent to ROSCHIN, but in case it was not received in time ROSCHIN would have no problem getting into the stand, as he was expected. ROSCHIN was business-like in the conversation to the point of being curt. Later KALININ called Major Alfredo NUNEZ Arguello, Army Second Section, concerning the same matter of the invitations.

8. Comandante SANDOVAL of the Naval Staff contacted ROSCHIN on 18 September and said he had just received a letter from Luis NUNEZ Cepina (ph), whom he described as a very small man. ROSCHIN knew to whom he was referring. NUNEZ has asked SANDOVAL to convey his thanks to ROSCHIN, stating that the injections had a marvelous effect, and that his wife would require further injections in four or five months. He said he would make another request for serum at that time, and ROSCHIN promised to order five more ampoules for December. ROSCHIN also expressed his pleasure at the recovery of Comandante ZETINA and sent greetings to ZETINA and SANDOVAL. (Field Comment: The Soviets appear extremely polite with all members of the Naval Staff, surpassing all efforts at courtesy with other officials in the Mexican government. This may possibly be attributed to better indoctrination of the Naval Attache's staff.)

9. The secretary of the Guatemalan Military Attache advised REMIZOV on 19 September that invitations were on the way for the Military Attaches Association meeting to be held on 21 September in the Restaurant Los Montejos, Insurgentes 675. After checking, REMIZOV advised that the following would attend: NIKIPORETS

SECRET

50-4-1-391

and his wife, MAKOVIN and wife, REMIZOV and wife, BYKOV and wife, and CHELPANOV. He was not certain about CHELPANOV's wife, who had a one-month old baby at home.

10. An appointment was made for NIKOPORETS to see SANDOVAL at 12:00 on 24 September. NIKIPORETS also wanted to see Comandante OROZCO but the latter had not yet returned from Tamaulipas.

11. On 24 September KALININ informed Ricardo RAMOS Flores, then Army G-2, of the proposal of the Ambassador "for this meeting" on 29 September. RAMOS Flores agreed to inform the appropriate persons.

12. On 27 September ROSCHIN took a message for REMIZOV that Lt. Jesus RAZO Reguero of Comision Inspectora had to go out of town and could not meet with REMIZOV that day.

13. On 28 September Yuriy Alekseyevich CHELPANOV talked to Col. RAMOS Flores and asked if General Tomas SANCHEZ Hernandez were coming to the reception at the Embassy the following day. However SANCHEZ had left for Toluca and Tenancingo, and Col. Eduardo SOBRINO Quintero, Chief of Staff, Air Force, would attend alone, as his wife was ill. In all, four persons with wives would attend and SANCHEZ without his wife. RAMOS Flores mentioned that Col. Rosendo ESPARZA Arias would be taking his place on the first of January, and asked if they would like for him to invite ESPARZA also. However, CHELPANOV apparently did not understand, and they decided only on those mentioned previously.

14. On 29 September ROSCHIN contacted Lt. Miguel LOSADA of the Second Section of the Navy and asked why they hadn't sent for any motion pictures. LOSADA answered that the projector had been out of order for about a month, and was being fixed at Casa Steele. ROSCHIN said that they had some new pictures, and that BALTAZAR should let them know when they wanted some.

V. **CONTACTS:**

A. **Communist and Pro-Communist Groups:**

1. On 6 September Jose REVUELTAS, calling from the Sindicato de Trabajadores de Produccion Cinematografica de la RM, Seccion de Autores y Adaptadores (Sindicate of Motion Picture Workers of Mexico, Section of Authors and Adapters), attempted to contact CHERKASOV.

2. On 19 September Rosa CASTRO, pro-Communist journalist, and MASYUKEVICH held a friendly conversation. MASYUKEVICH who had been meaning to call her, but had had a great deal of work, indicated that his wife had seen Rosa in the Regis. Rosa mentioned that she was writing an article on a place she had visited and was afraid the dimensions were wrong because she had two different sets of data. MASYUKEVICH said he could not help her. Rosa invited him out to eat, and he indicated he would call her early the following week to set the time.

3. Juan REJANO, Spanish Communist, contacted MASYUKEVICH on 27 September, and said that he would like to see him for just a few minutes. MASYUKEVICH who appeared glad to hear from him, stated that he had to go out for ten minutes, but that if REJANO wanted to come by in about twenty minutes, he would be back.

B. **Contacts of Special Interest:**

1. **(fmu) MONTES y Bradley (ph)** - On 3 September (fmu) MONTES y Bradley contacted First Secretary Lev ZHUKOV, who asked if he had something so they could get together for lunch the following day. MONTES replied that he wanted to invite ZHUKOV for 5 September, and said he would go by the Embassy for him. However, on the fifth, ZHUKOV suggested meeting at a bar. On 13 September MONTES contacted ZHUKOV and explained he was unable to call him on the day they had agreed upon, for he had been out of town and had just returned three days ago. Arrangements were made to meet at the Embassy at 10:00 a.m. the following day and lunch together afterward. (MONTES' phone number, 21-96-07, was listed in the 1956 Mexico City telephone directory under the Hotel Apartamentos Dolores, Sombrereros 9.) On 27 September MONTES talked to ZHUKOV and indicated that he had not been able to do some work, as he had been very busy. MONTES suggested they have coffee together, and ZHUKOV said he would phone him about the hour.

2. Sra. de ESCAME - On 4 September one Mrs (fnu) ESCAME and Aleksandr/DRUZHININ of the Military Attache's office discussed the matter of the books which her husband wanted to know about, because he had to have some bound, and needed to know the quantity of which DRUZHININ planned to dispose. She asked DRUZHININ to call her on the following day to let them know, because they were leaving on the 11th. She added that her husband has few books bound and these are for the Siderurgica (Steel Works). The following day Mrs. ESCAME contacted DRUZHININ who informed her he had only talked to one man, but that he told him he would talk with his friends. He had not seen him yet because they were all busy attending the congress. Mrs. ESCAME gave him the following number to use to contact her: 31-91-57. This number belongs to a woman who lives in front of her, and she can be phoned there at any hour. (The 1956 telephone director lists this number in the name of Luisa/GARCIA Galva, Revillagigedo 108-304, D.F.

3. Sergio NOVELO - On 21 September Sergio/NOVELO, leftist journalist of previous record, cancelled an appointment he had for that day with MASYUKEVICH and "Nikolay", because something urgent had come up. On 27 September he unsuccessfully attempted to contact AKSENOV. The same day he chatted with MASYUKEVICH who greeted him with pleasure, calling him "the disappeared one." NOVELO apologized, saying he had had a great deal of work and adding that he wanted to issue them an invitation for today at 6:00 p.m. MASYUKEVICH replied that he could accept, but Nicolas had gone out, and it would be better to make the date for the following day. He would notify Nicolas.

4. On 21 September KAZANTSEV contacted Genaro/CARNERO Checa, Peruvian Communist journalist, and arranged for an appointment for Tuesday, 25 September. CARNERO suggested they meet at the same place where they had been with "Paco" (Francisco MARTINEZ de la Vega) the day before.

C. Miscellaneous Contacts:

1. Jorge/SUAREZ advised LEONOV on 13 September that they would be playing chess at his home that day from 4:30 p.m. on. LEONOV promised to come if he had time.

2. LEONOV called Estudios Universitarios on 13 September, identifying himself as the Attache from the Soviet Embassy who called on Hector/MURILLO a week ago, and added that he would like to speak to him concerning an inquiry about requirements for receiving a doctorate. MURILLO was not in.

50-4-1-294

3. On 19 September Mikhail SHLERAU Kogan (of previous record) unsuccessfully attempted to contact KOLOMYAKOV, and left a message to call him at the Joyeria Louvre.

4. On 19 September ROMAKOV received a message that (Lic) CASTANEDA was pleased to accept the invitation to luncheon on 25 September at the Normandia.

5. On 20 September one Pedro AGUILA called the Embassy concerning Russian lessons. He was told that the lessons were given at the Institute.

6. On 26 September "Paco" and Lino, husband of Consuelo(lnu) of the Propaganda Office, contacted Consuelo to determine the address of Santiago ALVAREZ, who lives in the same place as Martin IGLESIAS. Consuelo offered to ask IGLESIAS who was in the Embassy, but Paco did not want to bother him, and Lino said they could check with IGLESIAS' wife.

See Mem. 117 7. On 27 September Consuelo unsuccessfully attempted to contact Gordon CARMONA on behalf of MASYUKEVICH.

VI. GOODS AND SERVICES:

1. Hermanos Rosas, Enceradores de Pisos, Martires de Tacubaya 7, D.F., were contacted during the month of September concerning cleaning and waxing floors.

2. On 5 September Josefina ZAVALA ordered two tubes of ink from Guillermo PAIRO. (The phonenumber, 23-89-10, is listed in the 1956 phone directory under the name of Luis BAZ, Av. Col. del Valle 104-2, D.F.)

3. An appointment was made for the Ambassador to see (Dr) SODI y Pallares at the Cardiology Institute on Monday, 17 September at 11:00 a.m.

4. On 13 September Josefina ZAVALA ordered 50,000 sheets of paper from one (fnu) ARGUELLES.

5. On 20 September MASYUKEVICH tried to contact one Teodoro ESTRADA of the Mexico Auto Service, 13-18-02. This number is listed under Mexico Auto Service, S.A., Atenas y A. Gonzalez, DF.

6. On 20 September TROFIMOV made arrangements to see (Dr) Jose Felix VALDES, Gutenberg 61-6, D.F.

7. On 24 September MASYUKEVICH called one (fnu) ARANIU (at 11-61-59, listed under the name of Francisco LEON Diaz, Puebla 377-3) at

Consultorio Medico, and asked when they could come by so the doctor could see his wife. ARANDU informed them that the new office was on Puebla. MASYUKEVICH asked about Ofelia, and ARANDU told him that she had gone to New York on a scholarship. MASYUKEVICH was afraid they would have a problem bringing the child then, but ARANDU said he could recommend a friend of Ofelia, who was dedicated to ortodoncia. Arrangements were made for an appointment.

8. A representative of Jose R. Villesara y Cia., Landero y Coss 31, Veracruz, forwarded information to the Embassy concerning some things for them that had arrived in port.

VII. PERSONNEL:

1. The home address of Vasiliy Mikhaylovich DRONOV was established as Tacambaro 4-6. DRONOV's wife recently had an operation.

2. Matvey Petrovich IZOTOV of the Commercial Office serves as the representative of International Book in Mexico.

3. Soviet couriers Gennadi ZHUKOV and Konstantin IPATOV held reservations for a flight to New York on 5 September, departing Mexico City at 8:00 a.m.

4. KULAZHENKOV and KAZANTSEV returned to Mexico from the Soviet Union on 6 September.

5. The following Soviet Embassy personnel planned to depart Mexico by rail on 17 October: CHERKASOV; LEONOV and wife; LARIN, wife and two children. They held reservations on the Queen Elizabeth which was scheduled to leave New York for Southhampton on 24 October, and on the Molotov, scheduled to leave London on 31 October. They planned to be in Leningrad on 5 November.

6. A reporter from Public Excelsior was told on 21 September that Boris KAZANTSEV was promoted from First Secretary to Counselor of Embassy.

7. BYKOV told Rafael MUNOZ that he was now working in "Communications" and usually arrived home late. MUNOZ invited him to his home to have a drink "with some friends." Apparently it was the first time BYKOV had been invited for he asked for the address - Jardin 5.

8. An Operation on (Sra.) BURENKOVA was scheduled to take place on 27 September. She was to be in the hospital located at Guadalquivir 78.

9. LUKASOV informed BOLSHAKOV on 27 September that he had returned from his trip and would be in town for one more day, then would leave at 8:00 a.m. by air the day after for New York, and from there on to Paris and Moscow.

10. A son was born to DRUZHININA on 28 September.

11. AKSENOV was reported to be in Veracruz during September, according to (fnu) RODRIGUEZ Toro who saw him there.

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Mexico/USSR

SUBJECT Photographs of Soviet Diplomatic Personnel

DATE OF INFO. 1 October 1956

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City 1 October 1956

REPORT NO. CS-LT-10962

DATE DISTR. 2 November 1956

NO. PAGES 1

REQUIREMENT NO. RD

REFERENCES

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Person with good contacts in diplomatic circles (B).
Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

Available from CIA Graphics Register are photographs of the following former members of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, who left Mexico on 17 October 1956:

a. Mikhail Frolovich Cherkasov, Counselor of Embassy, born on 16 September 1909 at Moscow. Cherkasov arrived in Mexico with his wife, Aleksandra Cherkasova, and their minor son on 27 September 1952. His wife and son left Mexico on 24 July 1956.

b. Nikolai Dementyevich Larin, chauffeur, born on 15 January 1922 at Riazan; and his wife Praskovia Artemovna Larina, born on 30 November 1923 at Riazan; and their minor children, Aleksandr and Irina. The Larins arrived in Mexico on 11 September 1953.

c. Nikolai Sergeyevich Leonov, administrative employee, born on 22 August 1928 at Ryazan; and his wife, Valeriya Ivanovna Leonova, born on 30 April 1928 at Moscow. The Leonovs arrived in Mexico on 11 July 1953.

Distribution of Attachments:
OCR Graphics Register (Retention)

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-132139

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI	X	AEC		I&NS	X
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)													

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

EE		SR	x	CI	x	WH/CP	x			HMMA-5440; 5439;5438
FE		WE		CI/ICD	x	WH/PW	x			
NE		WH	x	(IE-Brit, Fr)		WH/3/Mexi	4			
SE		IO		SR/CE/Redcap	x					NONE

HL LNZ
LNG LNG
MK
des.

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 31 OCTOBER 1956
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF SOVIET NATIONALS
LEONOV, NICOLAI SERGEVICH
FBI FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 25 OCTOBER 1956
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
FBI FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)
SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF SOVIET NATIONALS
LEONOVA, VALERIA IVANOVNA

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONAL INFORMATION DATA

USSR ADDRESS	NAME LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich
OFFICE ADDRESS	ALIAS OR CRYPTONYM
HOME ADDRESS	TITLE Administrative Employee, Embassy Mexico City
INCOME	DATE OF ARRIVAL c. 25 May 1953 Date of Dep-Last Tour 17 Oct 56-
HEIGHT / WEIGHT	PHOTO
EYES / HAIR / COMPLEXION	
DATE OF BIRTH 22 August 1928	
BIRTHPLACE Ryazan	

FAMILY

Wife: Valeriya Ivanovna, born 28 April 1928 Ryazan

DOCUMENTATION

Service PP 10724 issued 29 October 1952
Wife's 11507 issued 28 February 1953

LANGUAGES

Spanish (good)

PREVIOUS CAREER AND EDUCATION

Prior January 1950: One Nikolay Alekseyevich LEONOV, mechanic, arrived India. Description: 5'5", fair complexion, brown hair & eyes, previously AMTORG employee U.S. from 1947 to Oct 48 (NELA 6701). One N. L. LEONOV private secretary to Ambassador in India (ZID 38).

8 October 1951: Above LEONOV arrived Italy from India (NIR 258) en route USSR.

PERSONALITY (Habits, use of money, hobbies, literature, vices)

FORM NO. 498
1 FEB 55

SECRET

201-132139

SECRET

RIS

(AEDIPPERs Negative

CONTACTS

MISCELLANEOUS

9 May 1953: Subject arrived Rome from Moscow. Stayed Primrose Pensione (R-374-53 6/53).

13 May 1953: Subject departed for Genoa to leave by sea for Mexico (R-374-53).

c. 25 May 1953: Subject and wife met in Vera Cruz by Aleksandr BELYAKOV (HMM 370 7/53).

SECRET

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A- 5438

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WHD

DATE 10 OCT 1956

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT
GENERAL Operational/REDCAP
SPECIFIC Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV,
Secretary to Ambassador,
Soviet Embassy, Mexico

REF: MEXI 137, MEXI 230

ACTION REQUIRED: None

1. A U. S. transit visa has been issued for subject and his wife, Valeriya Ivanovna LARINA. Subject plans to depart Mexico by rail on 17 October 1956, entering the United States through the Port of Laredo. Subject will depart the United Stated on 24 October 1956 on the "Queen Elizabeth" through the Port of New York.

2. Two sets of photostatic copies of subject passport and of the accompanying completed questionnaire which was furnished to the Embassy visa section are enclosed. With these are included 6 additional photos of subject. Photostats, identical in number, are furnished of the same items for subject's wife.

SOURCE: Visa Section
DISSEM: ODENVY

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:

Photostats(2 sets each)

8 October 1956

Distribution:
4 - HQS(1 for REDCAP)(w/atts)
2 - Files(w/atts)

gfb

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-132139

FORM NO. MAR 1949 51-28A

RI COPY

14-00000

Oct 6 02 54 56

481 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ED/WS

DATE : 05 OCT 56

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

IN 34844

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, SR 3, S/C 2

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: MEXI 231

RE: MEXI 137 (IN 27164)

1. U.S. TRANSIT VISAS ISSUED 1 OCT TO FOLLOWING SOV EMB PERSONNEL:

MIKHAIL FROLOVICH [redacted] CHERKASOV, COUNSELOR;

NIKOLAY LEONOV, EMPLOYEE AND WIFE, VALERIA;

NIKOLAY LARIN, EMPLOYEE AND WIFE, PRASKOVIA, CHILDREN ALEKSANDR AND IRINA.

2. GROUP DEPARTING MEXI 17 OCT BY RAIL, ENTERING U.S. VIA LAREDO; DEPARTING NEW YORK 24 OCT ON QUEEN ELIZABETH. SOURCE: VISA SECTION, EMBASSY; DOC. DISSEM: ODENVY, KUBARK.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-132139

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM
FROM MEXICO CITY TO SECRETARY OF STATE
DATE: 1 OCTOPER 1956
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FILE NUMPER:
NUMBER 566, OCTOPER 1
SUPJECT: NONE GIVEN

LEONOV, Nikolai Sergeyevich

MEXI-839 27 Jun 56	Personal calling card of subject found in address book of Fidel Alejandro CASTRO Ruz, Cuban revolutionary who was arrested by Mexican police on 21 Jun 56. (LIVESTOCK-3; B-Doc)
USArma MexCity MEX C-20 28 Jun 56	At time of his arrest Cuban revolutionary Fidel CASTRO had in wallet personal card of Nicolas L. LEONOV, adminis officer in Soviet Embassy and Secretary to Soviet Ambassador.
HMM-1752 5 Sep 56 No dissem	Translator for Soviet delegates to Eighth Internat'l Radiology Congress at Mexico City, 22-29 Jul 56.
Tele 566 AmEmb MexCity 1 Oct 56	Embassy today issued C-3 visas to: Mikhail CHERKASOV, b. Moscow, 16 Sep 1909, Counselor Nicolai Sergevich LEONOV, b. Russia 22 Aug 1928, Clerk Valeria Ivanovna LEONOVA, b. Russia, 30 Apr 1928 Nicolai Dementievich LARIN, b. Riazan, 15 Jan 22, Clerk Praskovia Artemovna LARINA, b. Riazan 30 Nov 1923 minor children Alexandre LARIN and Irina LARINA Departing Mexico 17 Oct by train via LAREDO; dep NYC 24 Oct 56 via QUEEN ELIZABETH.
MEXI 231 IN 34844 5 Oct 56) OUT to FBI	(Same info as above)

201-132139

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO. 201-124630
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-04994
	4. DATE 4 Aug 1956
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-132139

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT HELD IN OG/SIS.

TS#-145923

(This document contains no information pertaining to kthe investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.)

LEONOV, Nikolay S.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-132139

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

4P

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-1833

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WHD

DATE 29 June 1956

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/REDCAP
SPECIFIC Soviet Embassy Personnel

1. In an effort to standardise spellings of names of personnel assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Mexico, and to conform with the transliteration table employed by KUBARK, the following spellings are being provided. Inasmuch as many of the names have not been seen, verification through pronounciation and their spelling has been made by Faith S. GRIELS while on TDY here. In the future, reports concerning local Soviet Embassy personnel will carry the spellings are provided herein.

AKSENOV, Nikolay Vasilyevich - Second Secretary
wife: Tamara Aleksandrovna AKSENOVA
dau: Natalia Natalya

BOGUNOV, Mikhail - employee
wife: Nadeshda N. BOGUNOVA
son: Georgiy (or Yuriy)

BOLSHAKOV, Leonid Ivanovich - Commercial Counselor(on leave)
wife: Tamara Sergeyevna BOLSHAKOVA

BURENKOV, Boris Stepanovich - employee/guard
wife: Nadeshda Grigoryevna BURENKOVA
dau: Olga

BYKOV, Nikolay Damidovich DEMYANOVICH - Asst. Naval Attache
wife: Taisiya Pavlovna BYKOVA

CHELPANOV, Yuriy Alekseyevich(or Aleksandrovich) - Asst. Military Attache
wife: Valeriya CHELPANOVA

CHERKASOV, Mikhail Frolovich - Counselor of Embassy
wife: Aleksandra Vladimirovna CHERKASOVA
son: Andrey

COPY ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28 JUN 1949

RI

00-4-1

201-132139

SECRET

DRONOV, Vasiliy Mikhaylovich
    wife: Galina M. DRONOVA
    son: Vyacheslav

DRUZHININ, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich - employee, Military Attache office
    wife: Irina M. DRUZHININA
    son: Andrey

GLOTOV, Viktor Nikolayevich - First Secretary
    wife: Klavdiya Mikhaylovna GLOTOVA
    sons: Yuriy and Aleksandr

GUNDAREV, Ivan Yefimovich - employee, Cultural Office
    wife: Lyudmila Ivanovna GUNDAREVA

ILIN, Vasiliy Semyonovich - Attache
    wife: Valentina ILINA

IZOTOV, Matvey Petrovich
    wife: Anastasiya IZOTOVA
    sons: Igor and Aleksandr

IVASHKOV, Leonid Dmitriyevich - employee/guard
    wife: Lyudmila Vasilyevna IVASHKOV
    dau: Tatyana

KALININ, Vladimir Nikolayevich - employee, Military Attache office
    wife: Olga N. KALININA
    son: Yevgeniy

KAZANTSEV, Boris Aleksandrovich - First Secretary
    wife: Varvara Andreyevna KAZANTSEV
    son: Boris
    dau: Irina

KOLOMYAKOV, Boris Pavlovich - Attache
    wife: Lidiya Alekseyevna KOLOMYAKOVA
    dau: Irina

KOTOV, Sergey Maksimovich - Third Secretary
    wife: Valentina Ivanovna KOTOVA
    dau: Galina

KULAZHENKOV, Anatoliy Georgiyevich - Ambassador(on leave in USSR)
    wife: Yekaterina Ivanovna(in USSR) KULAZHENKOVA

SECRET 50-4-1-282

LARIN, Nikolay Demyanovich - chauffeur
wife: Praskovya Artemyevna LARINA
son: Aleksandr
dau: Name unknown

LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich - Secretary to Ambassador
wife: Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA

MAKOVKIN, Vladimir Sergeyevich - Military Attache
wife: Sofia MAKOVKINA
sons: Arkadiy and Aleksandr

MASYUKEVICH, Vladimir Ilyakovich - Second Secretary
wife: Lyudmila Kirillovna MASYUKEVICHA
son: Aleksey

MATVEYEV, Al'bert Alekseyevich - (employee? - attache?)
wife: Yelisaveta Zakharovna MATVEYEVA
dau: Yelena

MAYEVSKIY, Aleksey Danilovich - Asst. Commercial Officer
wife: Zoya Ivanovna MAYEVSKIYA
son: Viktor and Vladimir

MITROFANOV, Vasiliy Vasilyevich - Guard/chauffeur
wife: Klavdiya Semenovna MITROFANOVA
son: Yevgeniy

NASEDKIN, Dmitriy Pavlovich - Guard/chauffeur
wife: Lidiya Grigoryevna NASEDKINA
son: Boris(not believed to be here)

NAUMOV, Anatoliy Ivanovich - employee, Military Attache office
wife: Yevgeniya NAUMOVA

NIKIPORETS, Grigori Korneyevich - Naval Attache
wife: Mariya Antonovna
son: Viktor

PANOV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich - employee, Commercial Office
wife: Lyudmila Vasilyevna PANOVA
dau: Tatyana

POPOV, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich - Third Secretary
wife: Vera Dmitriyevna POPOVA
son: Yevgeniy

PUTILIN, Boris - employee
wife: Margarita PUTILINA

50-4-1-282

SECRET

REMIZOV, Nikolay Matveyevich - diplomat, Naval Attache office
wife: Nelli A. REMIZOVA
son: Aleksandr
dau: Larisa

ROSHCHIN, Nikolay I. - employee, Naval Attache office
wife: Larisa ROSHCHINA

SAFRONOVA, Vera Vladimirovna - employee

SHIKIN, Aleksandr Sergeyevich - employee
wife: Lilya Nikolayevna SHIKINA
son: Yevgeniy

SIDYAKIN, Vasiliy Fedorovich - employee
wife: Aleksandra Nikolayevna SIDYAKINA

SOKOLOV, Vladimir Nikolayevich - Asst. Military Attache

TROFIMOV, Nikolay Ivanovich - employee, Military Attache office
wife: Lyudmila TROFIMOVA
son: Sergey
dau: Nataliya

TROFIMOV, Viktor Nikolayevich - employee, commercial office
wife: Lyudmila TROFIMOVA
dau: Nataliya

VERIN, Konstantin Andreyevich - employee/guard
wife: Lyudmila Vladimirovna VERINA
dau: Larisa

ZABRODIN, Fedor Nazarovich - employee/guard
wife: Mariya Konstantinova ZABRODINA
daus: Nina and Margarita

ZHUKOV, Lev - First Secretary

ZINOVYOVA, Mariya Ilinichna - employee

2. This list comprises a roster of personnel known to be present at the Soviet establishment as of 15 June 1956 and includes positions which they are known or presumed to hold.

Gene F. Braddock
Gene F. BRADDOCK

Distribution:
4 - Wash(1 for REDCAP)
2 - Files

28 June 1956

HKM-A-1833

SECRET

60-4-1-7

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Mexico
Report No: [illegible]-1610
Local File No:

No. of Pages: 1
No. of Enclosures: 1 (5 pages)

Report Made By: Howard O. [illegible]/Inc
Approved By: Peter R. [illegible]

Distribution:
By copy to:
  2 - Headquarters
  1 - Embassy (incl'LA & MA)
  1 - Havana
  2 - Files

Orally to:

28 June 56

Source Cryptonym: [illegible]-1
References: MEXI-839

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Subject/ Arrest of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban Exile in Mexico

Classification

FORM NO. 51-50
FEB 1949

CONFIDENTIAL RI COPY

201-97456

EI-132139

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO. HM-1640

SUBJECT: Arrest of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban Exile in Mexico

DATE OF INFO: 22 June 1956

DATE ACQUIRED 22 June 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 23 June 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Person with connections in Mexican Federal Security Police (B).

Appraisal of Content: 2

Among the personal effects of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban exile arrested 21 June 1956 by the Mexican Federal Security Police as a suspected plotter against the government of Cuba, was an address book. ~~Addresses extracted from this book are attached to this report.~~ The contents, including addresses and telephone numbers, are listed below.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 51-58 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

201-9743-6

CONFIDENTIAL

ALDAMA, Hector
[illegible]ma 17 (Detras de la iglesia)
~~Frente a la Iglesia~~ Mexico D.F.
46-50-64

ALVAREZ, (Dr)
13-03-55

BARREGO, Rodolfo Armand
H. Royalty
Hab no.29 (~~13-42-22~~)
13-42-20 [illegible]

PENCISIA, Armando
313 Vandelinda Ave.
Teaneck, New Jersey, USA
6-1155

VANEGAS, Arsacio
2a. Penitenciaria 27
Colonia Morelos. Mexico D.F.
22-38-54

Blanco
Luis Moya 87. Apto 105
~~Apto. 105~~ Mexico D.F.
21-41-99

BOUDET, Ooispio
Emilio Carranza 99
Col. Mocleannis. Mexico D.F.
22-27-29 (Cafeteria)

BORIA, Alfonso
Cadiz 215-B. Mexico D.F.

BOSH, Juan
Roma 37-(13). Mexico D.F.
36-52-54

BENITEZ R.
14-06-76

CABRERA, José (para DIAZ, Rolando).
1397 Webster
Corner 170 Bronx, N.Y.C.

NIEVA, Carlos
B no.510 - 25 y 27
Vedado, Habana. Cuba
FO-2554

CASTRO, Orlando
Infanta 53.
Apto 302
Habana. Cuba

CARDENAS, Lorenzo
R. Cuba 19, Apto 801.
(Luz 350 Este. Vibora
Habana. Cuba

ROMAN, (Dr.) Alfonso
Castro Madero 34
Apto 38
"Edif. San Luis". Mexico D.F.

CABALLERO, Catalina
[illegible]
Lopes 50-293. Mexico D.F.
[illegible]

CALZADILLA, Miguel
Victoria 94, Apto 1. Mexico D.F.
18-46-25/Trata(?)

CASTRO, Lydia
18 no.512 Apto 15
Védado, Habana. Cuba
F-9022

DARO, Cartoya
14-01-61

DUBOIS, Elia (altos)
Godines no. 3118, Apto 4.
Esq. a 33 Marianao, Habana, Cuba

ROCHA, David D.
21-96-24
Etex 53-C. Mexico D.F.

FRANCO, Mary
Alejandro Dumas 131
altos Tenancingo 8, Montes
de Oca. y Juan Escutia
14-11-17
(Col. Polanco & Col. Condera)
Mexico D.F.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIDALGO, José M.
Agustín Lara no. 8-D
Veracruz, Mexico

FERNANDEZ, Angel
Calle 18 no. 371
Lawton, Habana, Cuba

GARCIA, Fela Campo
Luis Maya 87/312. Mexico D.F.
21-44-90

GOMEZ, Cesar
Ave. Chapultepec 512
(San Antonio) Apto 21. Mexico, D.F.
11-71-84

ANTONIA, Maria
13-25-52

GONZALEZ, Isidoro (& Lucrecia?)
Rio de la Plata 55, Mexico D.F.
28-86-68

ANGUSTIA, Gailan
Fronton, México
[illegible]-84-62

GUTIERREZ, Norma
Lopez no. 134
Altos 2. Mexico, D.F.
21-34-99

GUTIERREZ, Alberto
Ponciano Arriego 16
Apto.B., Mexico, D.F.

GUEVARA, E.
Napoles 40
Apto 105 Mexico D.F.
laboratorio: 19-27-69

Guadalupe
Espinish
Igrl Mariscola
36-31-80

GOMEZ, Mercedes(de Alvarez)

GUTIERREZ L., Alfonso
Av. Juarez no. 119-53, Mexico D.F.
14-89-22 office: Perforaciones,S.A.
21-37-25, 21-36-42

JIMENEZ, Eva y Gra.
Independencia y Balderas
Edif. Altamira, [illegible]
~~Apto 12~~, Mexico, D.F.
18-14-94

Juan Manuel
26-42-17

Lucy
Atenas 31, Mexico D.F.
36-23-16

LOPEZ, Nico
MI-6501

LOPEZ, Juan
Gutenberg 16
Apto no. 1. Mexico D.F.
11-22-05

LINARES, Gloria
Calizo no. 92
Cd. Pepalrillo
Apto 8, Mexico D.F.
26-93-77

Granado 139

VELAZQUEZ, Lucila
Rhin 28, Apto 17. Mexico D.F.

LOZANO, Pascual
Rio Tigris no. 42-3
Col. Cuauhtémoc, Mexico D.F.

MARCOLLES, Fdo.
P.O.Box 351
2477 N.W. 34 St.
Miami 48, Fla., USA.

MENDEZ, Marta Cabezón
San Frco. 712, (alto)14 y 15
edo ego Lauiton, Habana Cuba

de JESUS, Mario
Casa 16-06-92
Trab. 35-57-49

MENENDEZ, Victor Ruiz
Tamaulipas no. 65, Mexico D.F.
23-36-69

CONFIDENTIAL

MARTINEZ, Carlos ([illegible])
Cerradade Vallarta no. 10. Mexico D.F.
13-83-46

NUIRY, Juan.
B-7958

OSUNA, Maria Luisa
Rn Guzmán 19, Apto 5 Mexico D.F.
Alfredo
21-07-45

PEREZ, Alvaro
Canaria 605, Apto 2
Colonia Portalao
Mexico. D F
(above X'd out)

PEREZ, Dora
Dominguez no. 4507
Steinhart, Rosendo Collazo
Marianao. BO-9691

PIERRER, Ramón Aguilar
Cuauhtemoc no. 647
Apto no. 6, Colonia Narvarte. Mexico D.F.

COELIO, Pina
Ave. México
Cd. Hipódromo, Mexico D.F.
13-34-23
Frontón 35-25-82
Casa : 25-37-51
Apto 302.

"PAPI" Fotografía
Insurgentes Sur 18. Mexico D.F.
12-66-05.

PEÑA, Lazaro
Lopez 44-203. Mexico D.F.
36-10-66

MORERA, José
PI, Aida
Nicolas San Juan 125
Apto 3 (23-37-81). Mexico D.F.

NARVARTE, Col.
Pardo Lleda
C.O.C.O. Reina 314
Habana. Cuba

RODRIGUEZ, Raúl Santos
29-16-38

ROSELL (Chaja)
Apto 1
11-90-55

SAADI, Ramón
A-31-27

SANCHEZ, Fdo. Amaya
Ramón Guzmán no. 6, Apto. 21
~~Apto21~~, Mexico D.F.
21-31-51

SEVILLA, Ninón
36-82-89

SAVIUR (John Sabatin)
Benoit
23-13-55 (apto. 7)

SOLIZ, Piedad
Trab. 18-06-60, ext 222
13-44-28

SPINDOLA

TULIO, Guido
18-53-50

VEGA, Juan Valero
Garaje "Mirtío" Uncanta y 23
Vedado, Habana. Cuba
(above X'd out)

VANEGAS, Arsacio Arroyo
2a Penitenciaria no. 27
Col. Morelos, Mexico D.F.
22-23-98 H 22-93-57

VASALLO, Antonio
Figuras 52 (bajas)
Esq. Lealtad, Habana. Cuba

VERTIS, Capitán
Bar Riviere
Col. Polanco. Mexico D.F.
13-08-93
gobernación 12-95-96
botica 20-58-53
casa 20-18-13

CONFIDENTIAL

WALBERG, Enrique
22-34-14

Miscellaneous, cards, etc.

LEONOV, Nikolas S.
Embajada de la U.R.S.S. Mexico D.F.
Tel. 15-61-55

SUAREZ, Jose Blanco
República no. 120
Artemisa
~~[illegible]~~ Pinar del Rio,
Cuba

SANTOS, Francisco Herrera
(Pintura General)
Don Martín no. 19
Col. Irrigación
20-39-35
México, D.F.

FERRER, Marta
Sec. Defensa
Lomas de Sotelo Camión
Reformas: Hosp. Militar
(en la puerta)

CASTRO, Alfonso Ramón
Madero 34, Apto 38. Mexico D.F.

Radio Servicio Franco
Laboratorio Tecnico de Radio y TV
(Ing.) FRANCO, Roberto T., Dir.
Niños Heroes No. 191 y Dr.
Erazo Lts. D y E. Mexico D.F.
tels: 13-45-01, 36-07-73

VERTIS (Dr.) Papy, No. 631
13-31-70, 19-32-50

PERFORACIONES, S.A.
Av. Juarez No. 119-55
21-37-25 y 21-36-42
Mexico, D.F.
Ing. GUTIERREZ, Alfonso L. (gerente)
Fuego 731, esq. Risco. Mexico D.F.
14-39-22 (casa)

GONZALEZ, Eduardo Reyes
Tigris 42, esq. Balsas
Apto 8
Col Cuauhtemoc. Mexico D.F.

[illegible] EDITORES, S.A.
SANDOVAL, Gonzalo E.
Libreria Juarez
Av. Juarez 552, Mexico D.F.
Revillagigedo 25.
tel. 21-35-74

[illegible]
Calzada de Guadalupe, no. 55, Mexico D.F.
17-17-03

GREAVES Y CARTAYA
(compra y venta de autos.)
CARTAYA, David de J.
Av. Chapultepec 451
Mexico, D. F.

ROCHA, D.
Donceles 24-[illegible]
Apto 53-C
Altos Teatro Fabregas. Mexico D.F.

Importadora Fotográfica, S.A.
Insurgentes Sur 13
(antes Ramón Guzmán)
Mexico 4, D. F.
tel. 12-55-05

"California"
Gral. Prim y Paseo de la
Reforma
Mexico, D. F.
36-55-78, 36-73-55 (hab 205)

PADRON, Arnaldo
203 W. 85th St., Apt. 5
New York, N.Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

COTU, Enrique
No. 439
Reforma y Elba. México D.F.
28-63-13

FERNANDEZ, Sr. Roberto
Gagueruela no. 17
Esq. Agustina
Vibora, Habana. Cuba

CHICO, Srta. Cruz
25-06-60

de la BARRERA, ~~Juan~~ 95
~~no. 95~~
Colonia Condesa, México D.F.

MARTINEZ, R.
Calle 11 no. 1007, 10 y 12
Apto. 12
Vedado - Habana, Cuba

BUSTANGARTE, Guido
Hotel Rey
C. no. 21

Yolanda
Ave. Cuitlahuac. México D.F.
23-44-48

Nicolás SAN JUAN, ~~Nicolás~~ 125 (?)
Apto 3
Colonia Navarte. México D.F.

ANDRADE, C.
Mina 137, apto 305
Col. Guerrero
Mexico, D. F.

REYES, Esther Fina.
29 Nor. no. 53
Veracruz, Ver. Mexico

CAZALI, Augusto Avila

CONFIDENTIAL 201-97056

20 May 1955: Rodolfo NERVO called Subject and was told "We have found the books and material you requested (re Soviet foreign policy)." LEONOV said he would take the books to NERVO the next day. NERVO for many years active in the Mexican Diplomatic Service, at one time being Charge of the Mexican Legation in Warsaw, Poland. Now about 75 and inactive in Government, but does write articles for the newspaper Excelsior (HMMA 3736 5 Dec. 55).

6 January 1956: The daughter of General Heriberto JARA spoke with Subject at the Soviet Embassy saying she had been told that he was the person who could inform her of when she should come by to pick up translations of the "clincial documents" relative to herself and her father. Subject said they were having some trouble getting the documents translated because of the medical terms, but said they should be ready in about five days (HMMA 4200).

1 February 1956: Subject called Velia Jara de NIETO, daughter of General JARA, and told her that the translations of her father's clinical history had been made from Russian into Spanish. Mrs. NIETO said she would visit the Embassy the next day and ask LEONOV for the materials (HMMA 4410).

24 February 1956: One Samuel RAMOS contacted Subject who acts as secretary to Soviet Ambassador, Mexico. RAMOS told LEONOV "We are not going to meet at my house this afternoon, but at SALGO's (which is at) Insurgentes 429-51 at the usual hour." Subject replied that he thought he could get to the meeting at 1900 hours and sent greetings "to the boys." RAMOS said "we have some books we want to order through LEONOV" (HMMA 4336).

2 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS left a message for Subject that "if he has time I hope he will come to my house today" (HMMA 4600).

7 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS called Embassy and asked for data on the possibility of staging an international chess match in Mexico. In this conversation it was indicated that RAMOS is in the academic line of work. He stated that ~~xx~~ he was "back in classes" and that meetings could no longer be held in his home. He told LEONOV that a tournament featuring a person named "POMMARD" would begin Monday (12 March) and invited Subject to see some of it. LEONOV said he would attend if he had time. RAMOS then asked when he could see LEONOV to give him a list of books "we want". LEONOV told him to come to the Embassy at any time, and RAMOS said he would come right away (HMMA 4600).

c. 27 June 1956: Subject's personal calling card found in address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban revolutionary detained in Mexico (MEXI 839 IN 35356 REF: MEXI 826 IN 34161).

22-29 July 1956: Subject served as translator for Eighth International Radiology Congress Soviet delegates (HMM 1752).

1 October 1956: Subject and wife requested U.S. transit visas to leave Mexico 17 Oct by rail, entering U.S. via Laredo; to depart New York 24 October on Queen Elizabeth (MEXI 231 IN 34833 6 Oct 56).

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Leonov

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

204 RIG/M.

DATE : 26 JUNE 56

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, SR 3, S/C 2, (SUSPENSE DD/I)

Revolutionary Activities - Cuba

MEXI 839 (IN 35356) 1520Z 27 JUN 56 ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR INFO: HAVA CITE: MEXI

RE: MEXI 825 (IN 34161) July

1. PERSONAL CALLING CARD OF NIKOLAS S. LEONOV, SOV EMBASSY EMPLOYEE, FOUND IN ADDRESS BOOK OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. SOURCE LIVESTOCK 3, EVAL B-DOC.

2. PLANNING KUCAGE EXPLOITATION.

not Police Lerner

END OF MESSAGE

Frank: copy was sent to Paul Oberst 18 Aug 61.

19	7	6	

Mexi 817

DATE 30 July 56

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No

201-132139

~~TOP~~ SECRET

HMM-1524 (9 Apr 56)
LEONOV
page 49

S: mainly LIFEAT

Personal Data

Name: Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV
Born: 22 August 1923, Ryazan
Arrived in Mexico: 11 July 1953 with wife
Documents: Soviet Service Passport 10724 issued 29 January 1952
✓ **Title:** employee
✓ **Position:** Believed to be administrative. Secretary to the Ambassador. Possible Translator and interpreter overlapping with the cultural section work
✓ **Residence in Mexico:** July 53 - Nov 53: Industria 71-4
Nov 53 - ?? Juanacatlan 81
at least Feb 54 to ?? : Cuautla 161-9
Jan 55 to present: Unknown, possibly in Embassy, possibly at Juanacatlan 71
Wife: Valeriya Ivanovna, nickname "Lera"
Children: None known
Languages: Spanish (good to excellent)
✓ **Other Personal Data:** Nickname "Kolya," "Kolyechka"
Drives car

Official Activities

LEONOV remains an obscure figure and although we assume he is employed in the administrative section of the Chancellery, we cannot pinpoint his duties. He has identified himself from time to time as the secretary to the Ambassador, has been noted taking his turn as embassy duty officer and has taken hospital bedside guard duty. During 1953, before the arrival of the regular administrative officer, Vladimir Ivanovich ZHUKOV, in November 1953, LEONOV was handling calls concerning goods and services but was probably merely filling in, because of his facility with the Spanish language, until ZHUKOV's arrival. In December 1954 APARINOV asked one of the guards whether he had the keys to LEONOV's room in the embassy. Since, during that time, we believe LEONOV was residing at Industria 71, it would appear that LEONOV had a private office in the embassy, one which was apparently kept locked when he was away. One or two other very vague references indicate he might have something to do with communications work. Beginning about November 1955 LEONOV began to emerge as an interpreter and translator. He spent a good deal of time with the Social Security delegation, with Soviet pianist GILELS and with Soviet movie director ALEKSANDROV, each time appearing as the interpreter or translator. His recent association in January 1956 with the daughter of Communist General Heriberto JARA also involved translation work. Other more recent references make us begin to wonder now if LEONOV might not be connected with the Cultural Section. During the last two months of 1955 he appeared to be associated in work with NASTUKEVICH, director of the Soviet Embassy Information Bulletin. In March 1956, when PAPOROV could not keep an appointment at University City at the invitation of Mexican President RUIZ CORTINES, he asked that either LEONOV, GUNDAREV or POPOV keep the appointment. It is known that PAPOROV, GUNDAREV and POPOV are all definitely assigned to the Cultural Section indicating further that LEONOV may be associated with that group. We, therefor, classify LEONOV as

~~TOP~~ SECRET

~~145076~~
201-132139

SECRET

having worked in the administrative section until late 1955 when his position began to appear as that of translator and interpreter, perhaps more clearly associated with the cultural section. Again, however, he may still be assigned to administrative work in the Chancellery which overlaps with the cultural end.

LEONOV's contact with Samuel RAMOS as dispatched in HMM-A-4336 (19 March 1956) was reported again on 7 March 1956 when RAMOS called LEONOV and the two discussed a chess tournament to which Soviet delegates were apparently to be invited. When LEONOV asked from where RAMOS was calling, he replied from his home. RAMOS stated he was now back in class "at the University" and so "we won't be able to meet at my house now." RAMOS invited LEONOV to one of the tournaments the following week and also made arrangements to visit subject at the embassy to give him the list of books "which we (want)..."

Unless LEONOV has something to do with consular affairs, we are at a loss to explain the following LIMERICK reference. On 10 November 1955 a man identifying himself as "your friend, Col. GONZALEZ" asked LEONOV if he had found out about some matter he had requested. It appeared that LEONOV had forwarded the "request" to the USSR and that the Mexican Ambassador to the Soviet Union was to notify Col. GONZALEZ. GONZALEZ stopped short after starting to ask what happened to that matter, explaining it would be better if they got together and talked it over. The two arranged to meet at the embassy. At the beginning of the conversation GONZALEZ, in recalling to LEONOV's mind who he was, stated, "We were chatting about this project which I have to present to the Presidencia about the use of the waters from the Toluca volcano, Chinantecatl." The Cia. Exportadora e Importadora Mexicana, S.A. (CEIMSA) had commissioned GONZALEZ to go to Chihuahua to see some farmers and therefore he was not able to contact LEONOV earlier.

Other than the two preceding LIMERICK references, which in themselves are inconclusive, we have no indication that LEONOV is engaged in RIS activities.

There are vague references suggesting that the LEONOVs may be leaving Mexico in April 1956.

Private Activities

During February 1954 LEONOV was hospitalized at the Sanatorio Dalinde where he underwent an appendectomy performed by Dr. Gustavo BAZ.

A LICOOL-2 reference of August 1954 revealed that former Soviet Consul MELNIKOV and his wife agreed that LEONOV played well (possibly a musical instrument or a ball game ??). During March 1955, after he had arranged a movie or given a lecture, two of the embassy wives remarked on how good LEONOV was. (It is known that LEONOV has taken his turn at giving Political Information Class lectures.) LEONOV also appears to enjoy athletics -- he plays tennis, attends shooting matches, arranges football games with the Czechs, and plays volleyball. He takes some sort of lessons, not necessarily Spanish, in the embassy. As for LEONOV's feeling about American movies, he was heard to tell one of the Social Security delegates, "You can really run into trash in an American film."

SECRET

It is reported by LIMERICK that LEONOVA gives some sort of instruction to embassy personnel and although it is not known just what type of lessons these may be, we venture a guess that she teaches Spanish. During October 1955 LEONOVA underwent a very serious operation, lasting two hours, during which the anesthetization had to be discontinued because her heart could not take the strain. LEONOVA returned to work again in November 1955.

Although one vague reference hinted that LEONOVA may be pregnant now, there have been no allusions to any children the LEONOVs might have. When MATVEYEV returned from home leave in the USSR in October 1955, while LEONOVA was undergoing her operation, he said he had seen LEONOVA's father but, because of his age, it would be better that he not be told of her sickness.

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION
Changed to Secret
BY AUTHORITY OF
Name Jm Galbraith WA
Office TSCO [illegible]
Date 14 June 56

AIR

HMM-A-4336

Chief, WHD

29 March 1956

Chief of Station, Mexico

Operational/LCIMPROVE
Samuel RAMOS; Renee SALGO Burger; et al

1. LIMERICK reported that on 24 February 1956 one Samuel RAMOS contacted Nikolai S. LEONOV, who acts as secretary to the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico. RAMOS told LEONOV "We are not going to meet at my house this afternoon but at SALGO's (which is at) Insurgentes 429-51 at the usual hour." LEONOV replied that he thought he could get to the meeting at 1900 hours and sent greetings "to the boys." RAMOS said "we have some books we want to order" through LEONOV.

2. On the face of it, this conversation appeared to be quite unusual and attracted the interest of this Station. Furthermore, it is known that for years the Soviets have used the hours between 1900 and 2000 for meeting clandestine or unusual contacts in Mexico.

3. The following steps were taken to ascertain general information on RAMOS and "SALGO":

a. Station file record on Samuel RAMOS resulted in no clear identifications. There is a Samuel RAMOS who was listed in 1948 as Rector of the School of Philosophy and Letters of the University.

b. LIENTHENITE ascertained that the address mentioned is occupied by a female doctor named Renee SALGO Burger, allegedly of French nationality, who operates a beauty parlor. This is confirmed in the telephone book.

c. Files of this office indicate an ODENVY report that one Renee SALGO was a member of the Hungarian club EMUNA in 1951. The files also show that one Alejandro BURGER was a member of the club and that he and Renee lived at the same address. The file further shows that one Andres SALGO was a member of the club and describes him as a Communist sympathizer.

SECRET

201-132139 2 of 4

SECRET

HMM-A-4336
19 March 1956
Page 2

4. Further investigations of the SALGOs will be conducted and their name, together with that of RAMOS, included in our CE suspects list.

Thomas G. URQUHART

Distribution:

4 - Wash(1 for LCIMPROVE)
2 - Files

SECRET

14-00000

~~TOP~~ SECRET

From: Mexico City

Report No.: HMM-1464 Local File No.:

Number of pages: 8

Number of enclosures: none

Report made by: Arthur S. Stough

Arthur S. Stough

Approved by: Peter R. Aumont

5 Mar 56

Distribution:
By copy to: 3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

Orally to:

Source cryptonym: LIFEAT/LIMERICK

References: none

Source, operational data, and comments:

Subject: Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

Comment:

1. Forwarded herewith is the first in a proposed series of monthly reports on Soviet commercial activities in Mexico City. Source LIFEAT has since December 1955 developed so much more information on this subject than ever before, that this Station feels a separate monthly summary should be put out.

2. This initial report contains some general background and personnel information on the Soviet commercial office in Mexico for the guidance of Headquarters.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION
Changed to Secret
BY AUTHORITY OF
Name [illegible]
Office [illegible]
Date 5 June 56

Classification TOP

SECRET / [redacted]

FORM NO. FEB 1948 51-59

~~144535~~

173

132137

14-00000

TOP SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO. HMM-1464

SUBJECT: Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

DATE OF INFO: December 1955

DATE ACQUIRED: Same as above

PLACE ACQUIRED Mexico City.

DATE OF REPORT: 5 March 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: LIFEAT/LIMERICK. B-Documentary.

I. ORGANIZATION:

The commercial office of the USSR is located at Calle General Leon 32, in Mexico City. The phone number of the commercial office is 15-12-64. The commercial office was formerly located in the Soviet Embassy, main building at Tucubaya 204. Due to expansion of activities, additional personnel, and the resultant need for greater operating space, the office was moved in April 1955 to its present address.

II. PERSONNEL:

A. Commercial: Soviet Commercial Office - Mexico City

(1) BOLSHAKOV, Leonid Ivanovich, Diplomat-Commercial Counselor, since September 1954.
Diplomatic Passport - 04300
Residence - Calle General Leon 32
Phone - 15-12-64
Arrived in Mexico, 9 September 1954, accompanied by wife Tamara Sergeyevna
Children in USSR.

(2) VAYEVSKI, Aleksei Danilovich, Employee-Assistant Commercial Officer (and intelligence officer). Not on diplomatic list.
Soviet Service passport - 15975
Residence - Carlos B. Zetina 2-3?
Phone - None.
Arrived in Mexico, 20 March 1954, accompanied by wife Zoya Ivanovna, and sons Viktor and Vladimir, aged eight (8) and four (4) respectively.

(3) IZOTOV, Matvei Petrovich, Employee-Commercial Office.
Soviet Service passport - 18051
Residence - Tamaulipas 125?
Phone - None Known
Arrived in Veracruz 25 January 1955, accompanied by wife Anastasiya and sons Igor and Aleksandr, aged eight (8) and four (4) respectively.

(4) TROFIMOV (OR TROFINOV), Viktor Nikolayevich, Employee-Commercial Office.
Soviet Service passport -
Residence -

TOP SECRET

~~144535~~

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Phone - None Known
Arrived in Mexico 8 July 1955, accompanied by wife Lyudmilla, and daughter Natalia, age unknown.

B. Clerical: Soviet Commercial Office Mexico City

(1) KOTOVA, Valentina Ivanovna, Secretary-Typist since December 1954, does not work full time here (believed that commercial office has a branch in the Embassy and that KOTOVA works there too).

Passport -
Residence - Tacambaro 4-3
Phone - None
Arrived in Mexico May 1951, with husband and daughter Galina age unknown. (Husband is 3rd Secretary-Consul).

(2) PAPOROVA, Galina Petrovna, part time translator (Spanish?), since May or June 1955.
Passport -
Residence - Nuevo Leon 138-6
Phone - 11-35-67
Arrived April 1954 with husband and son Sergei age three (3) (husband is diplomat - 2nd Secretary, Cultural Attache).

III. HISTORY OF SOVIET COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION SINCE 1949:

SAMOILOV, Mikhail Kuzmich, was Commercial Officer from November 1949 to 14 November 1954, part of the time under Commercial Counsellor KUDIN, since departed.

MAYEVSKI, Aleksei Danilovich, went through a break-in period in administrative and operational routines from March 1954, to September 1954, with SAMOILOV still nominally in charge.

BOLSHAKOV, Leonid Ivanovich, appeared in September 1954, and also went through a similar break-in period until 14 November 1954, when SAMOILOV left. From 14 November 1954, to date, BOLSHAKOV has been in complete charge of the Commercial Office.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE:

The main efforts of the Soviet Commercial Office as evidenced by its past and current activities are as follows:

(a) A determined effort to infiltrate into Mexican industry and trade, by the introduction and implementation of transactions advantageous to local industry and trade.

(b) Establishment of important economic and financial contacts in the Mexican government.

(c) Establishment of contacts with Mexican rank and file business people.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

~~144585~~

(d) Coordination with Soviet Cultural Office in the procurement of certain films, books, and other propaganda material, and distribution of same.

(e) Utilization of Mexico as springboard for trade with other countries in Latin America.

V. METHODS OF ECONOMIC PENETRATION:

In order to attain economic objectives in Mexico, the Soviets utilize various methods. According to observations made about past and current activities, most of them fall under two headings, which overlap. These are:

(a) Extensive use of local business contacts.

(b) Cultivation of key people in various organizations which can be easily used as propaganda outlets (i.e., films and newspapers) or as more conventional contacts (banks and customs officials, etc.).

VI. SOVIET COMMERCIAL CONTACTS AND TRANSACTIONS:

Set out below is a listing of the contacts made by the Soviet Commercial Office during December 1955, together with details as to the nature of these contacts, and the transactions made or proposed with them.

A. Combined Propaganda and Commercial Contacts:

1. BANDERA, Molino, Juan,
Peliculas Mexicanas
Ejido 43-107-105
Phones: 35-33-55; 36-46-05; 10-12-99; 18-22-48; 18-60-05; 21-30-81; 10-12-74.

BANDERA is a direct contact of the Soviet Commercial Office in the matter of film procurement, as well as an intermediary in securing Mexican films for the Soviets. It is known that the Soviets must purchase a certain amount of Mexican films, in order to be able to sell and exhibit theirs here. BANDERA was consulted several times during the month of December 1955, on film procurement. On 1 December 1955, MAYEVSKI (see IIA 2 Personnel), consulted BANDERA in reference to having BANDERA procure a certain film on time, so that a contract could be signed. Due to BOLSHAKOV's absence on a trip (see HMM-A-4109, pp. 2,3,4, 6 February 1956), MAYEVSKI wished to have the contract signed before 1 January 1956.

On 20 December 1955, BOLSHAKOV consulted BANDERA on whether the Mexican film "Raices" could be acquired. BANDERA explained that Cimex (a film company) controlled this film, but arranged a meeting for BOLSHAKOV with the director of Cimex, for 1100 on 21 December 1955.

2. CALVET Mario Arce, CALVET Arce, Mario
Dicina Films De Mexico SA
Av. Morelos 45-206-Bis 7-8
Phones: 21-13-46; 35-98-04.

CALVET appears to be a very important contact for the Soviets in the coordination of various factors. According to information received, he is very

~~144535~~

active in [illegible] Soviet films presented in Mexico, smoothing out customs difficulties, arranging for favorable publicity for Soviet films, and is making an effort to circulate Soviet films elsewhere in Mexico beside in the capital. CALVET, according to one report, is the sole exhibitor of Soviet films in Mexico.

On 1 December 1955, MAYEVSKI consulted CALVET about some books which he (MAYEVSKI) wished sent to the Soviet Export Film Office. MAYEVSKI had received a cable from Soviet Export Films on returning films which were on permit No. 117778242. CALVET arranged an appointment with Jorge FERRETIS, head of Cinematografia (Mexican Government film department), for MAYEVSKI on 3 December 1955. It is believed that FERRETIS is the man to see for withdrawal approvals.

On 17 December 1955, LEONOV, Nikolai Sergeyevich, an administrative employee of the Soviet Embassy, contacted CALVET in reference to possible receipt by CALVET of new Soviet films. CALVET informed LEONOV that the only information he had, had been given to MAYEVSKI a few days back.

On 17 December 1955, it was ascertained that BOLSHAKOV had been shown parts of the films and titles of Soviet pictures, as revised for showing in Mexico. It was further ascertained that plans were afoot to inaugurate Soviet film showings at the "Teatro Ideal". The Teatro Ideal is alleged to have 1600 seats.

MAYEVSKI repeatedly told CALVET that he was interested in obtaining showings for the Soviet films, "Romeo y Julieta," and "Gran Familia."

On 17 December 1955, POPOV, Yevgeni Mikhailovich, 3rd Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, asked CALVET through MAYEVSKI to give certain films to the Soviet Embassy.

Sov Embassy Mex

Arrangements were made for POPOV and ROMANOV, Leonid Mikhailovich, 3rd Secretary in the Embassy, to pick up some films. Among those obtained were "Gran Familia," "Romeo y Julieta," and the "Golden Antelope."

On 19 December 1955, it was arranged for POPOV to call on CALVET for certain films.

On 30 December 1955, the Soviet Embassy was notified by the Mexican Government that permission had been received for showing certain films, but not for "The Best in the World."

3. Editorial Popular (also known as Fondo De Cultura Popular).
Hidalgo 75
Phone - 12-37-77

Address Mexico & Hidalgo 75 Mexico City "Editorial Popular"

This Communist publishing and bookselling shop has been noted as an outlet for Soviet books and periodicals for years. Its two managers, Jesus LAZCANO and Miguel Angel VASQUEZ, are both Communist Party members. Over the years they have imported a steady though relatively small amount of Soviet material.

In general, contact between the Editorial Popular and the Soviet Commercial Office takes place through LAZCANO and VASQUEZ on the one hand and IZOTOV and MAYEVSKI on the other.

It was ascertained that in December 1955, the Editorial Popular was selling copies of two Maxin Gorki's works, their titles as translated into Spanish being "Los Sarta Monos" and "Mi Infancia."

4. GRIJALVO (or GRIJALBO) Serres, Juan,
General Manager of Exportadora De Publicaciones Mexicanas S. de R.L.
Av. De La Granjas 82
Phone: 27-46-57

On 20 December 1955, GRIJALVO sent word to the Commercial Office that a book entitled "Economia Politica," which the Soviets were apparently anxious to acquire, was ready and asked the Commercial Office to state the quantity needed.

B. Purely Commercial Activities:

1. EISENBERG, Jacques, was contacted on 16 December 1955, and reportedly told the Soviets that the affair with the electrodes would have to be postponed until 10 or 15 January 1956, due to his (EISENBERG's) sickness. This electrode transaction was connected with the visit to Mexico of two Soviet engineering experts (Comment: See HMM-A-4129, pp. 2-4, 6 February 1956). EISENBERG is known to be considering a deal with the Soviets in agricultural machinery, and to be participating in a trade agreement with the French Government in cotton. EISENBERG has been noted in connection with Czech commercial activities in Mexico.

2. GONZALEZ, Jose R.
Uruguay 55-218

GONZALEZ is a frequent contact of the Soviet Embassy Commercial Section, and their actual and proposed transactions cover a rather wide range.

a. Rails and Pipe:

Early in December GONZALEZ and MAYEVSKI discussed the prospects for importing Soviet pipe and standard gauge railway rails into Mexico. It is reported that the market for rails in Mexico was not considered to be very hopeful, but the Soviets believed they might be able to arrange some sales in Central America.

b. Petroleum:

GONZALEZ brought news that the Matarazzo industrial combine in Brazil had bought sufficient petroleum (from outside the Soviet orbit) to cover its needs for four months, but would need more when the above time expired. MATARAZZO asked for an estimate on about 15-20,000 tons of Soviet petroleum delivered in about 100,000 drums per boat.

c. Cellulose:

Firm - US

GONZALEZ informed BOLSHAKOV that a US firm named PARSONS & [illegible] wished to know why GONZALEZ was selling cellulose to Brazil, and further wished to know GONZALEZ' source of supply.

GONZALEZ informed BOLSHAKOV that an unnamed Chilean company wanted to buy a 1000 [illegible]s of raw cellulose. Other information given by GONZALEZ was to the effect that he had received correspondence giving Finnish and Swedish prices on cellulose.

d. Wood Pulp:

GONZALEZ informed BOLSHAKOV that a large wood pulp company in Brazil was interested in doing business. It was reported that the transactions would be made with a Senor AMARAL in Rio. The difficulty in dealing with AMARAL was that he wished to have cargos marked as coming from another country, rather than the country of origin.

e. Copper

It was also reported by GONZALEZ that someone named CHILDS was interested in making a deal in copper (no details).

3. NASSER Quinones, Guillermo,
Director-Manager of Compensacion Internacional, SA
Bolivar 51
Phone: 21-70-63

NASSER engaged in talks with BOLSHAKOV on several occasions, discussing the following items:

a. Wood and the need for a factory and equipment of a (Sr.) RIVERA (fnu), probably sawmill machinery.

b. Samples of agricultural machinery from the USSR.

c. Information on unspecified chemical products.

d. Vague talk on watches, cigars, and medical equipment.

4. RIVERA, fnu,
Member of Comercial Ultramar SA
Hamburgo 138
Phones: 35-81-17; 35-81-18; 14-55-81.

RIVERA and BOLSHAKOV discussed the impending arrival of certain recorders reportedly due at the end of the month of December 1955 in Veracruz.

5. PEREZ Urizar, Adolfo,
Manager of Tractor Dept., Ford Motor Company SA
Calzada Guadalupe y Henry Ford
Phone: 17-50-00

PEREZ was visited twice in December 1955, by MATEVSKI; the talks were held on farm equipment, i.e., agricultural machinery, such as tractors, etc.

6. [illegible]RAAN, Mony De (For more detailed report see HM-A-1166, 16 Feb. 1956)

TOP SECRET

7. MORAN Valdes Ramon
Donatello 17

It is reported that MORAN discussed on various occasions the mechanics of credit modifications with MATEVSKI. It was reported that MORAN mentioned the fact that other business firms had requested banks to modify the letters of credit, and it was also ascertained that the modifications for the letters of credit are done. MORAN may be connected with the Naval foodshop.

8. ZELLINGER [illegible]

A man named ZELLINGER also has various deals under discussion with the Soviets, among them being:

a) Alkalines and Alkaloids: ZELLINGER sought information on establishing a trade in alkalines. It is believed that this deal may be well advanced. ZELLINGER expressed a need for alkaloids and for a special machine needed for this. It is reported that BOLSHAKOV informed ZELLINGER that either the machine or information on the machine had already been sent, and that ZELLINGER had an excellent mechanic with General Electric experience to install this machine.

b) Acids: According to information received, the USSR claimed not to have Letters of Credit for transactions involving Red Black and Blue Black acids.

c) Radios: ZELLINGER claimed to have a market for radios on the condition that these not be imported fully assembled. The purchasing people desired information on parts, assembly, details and pictures. It was highly desirable to import and assemble the radios here. In conjunction with this ZELLINGER claimed to have a market for TV parts.

d) Drills (Unspecified type): It is reported that ZELLINGER was involved in a transaction for $8,200 worth of drills (ZELLINGER is reportedly connected with ZLOTNIK, see below).

e) Medicines: It was ascertained that ZELLINGER had presented a list of medicines most widely used in Mexico. ZELLINGER, according to reports, had stated that he could sell as much of the medicines as could be provided him by the USSR.

f) Cameras: It was reported that ZELLINGER claimed to have a market for cameras

9. ZLOTNIK, Abraham
Toltecas 166

Mexican businessman

ZLOTNIK appears to be both an independent businessman and intermediary for other businessmen dealing with the USSR. It was ascertained that most of ZLOTNIK's transactions during the month of December concerned dyes. According to information gathered, delay on shipment of several types of (unspecified) dyes, was caused by the wait for a Letter of Credit. Direct Violet K dye, for which a Letter of Credit was opened on or about 30 November 1955, was not sent evidently due to shortage of same. It was reported that the Soviet Commercial Office stated that, according to a contract dated 29 October 1955, all the dyes were packed and awaiting shipment from an unknown

TOP SECRET

144535

port of exp . It was stated that no Letter of Credit had been received for certain dyes, but ZLOTNIK claimed to have sent a Letter of Credit some time back to Sojuzchim-Chemic Export, through the "Banco Popular."

ZLOTNIK stated that Violet Dye had arrived a few days back, but that he lacked information on how it was charged.

There was also some brief information to the effect that ZLOTNIK had given an order for tools.

C. Miscellaneous Commercial Activity:

Other transactions on which vague information has been received were:

1) Dyes: Confirmation received from Moscow on Letter of Credit 18 978 for Violet Dyes.

2) Coffee: BOLSHAKOV ridiculed a newspaper story that a Latin American country (Colombia?), claimed the Soviet Union was offering dollars for that country's coffee.

3) TV: Vague information has been received to the effect that Soviet Export Film is interested in the TV market in Mexico.

Information on certain contacts is rather vague; but it was ascertained that the Soviet Commercial Office had dealings with the following in December 1955, the exact nature of which was not clear:

1) GARCIN, Francisco, a member of the "Comision de Vigilancia" (Part of Mexican Social Security).

2) GARCIA Vidal, Raul, was contacted by BOLSHAKOV during the month of December 1955, with information that certain material was in readiness for GARCIA. It has not been ascertained exactly what GARCIA's relationship with the Soviet Commercial Office is.

~~144535~~

~~KAPOK~~ 8P

5P

VIA ____________
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. EAVA-12223

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, EE
Attn: Silvan A. Hobson

DATE 31 October 1955

FROM Chief of Station, Vienna

INFO: Chief, SR

SUBJECT
GENERAL Operational/GREPIC
SPECIFIC DS-623 Identifications from Soccer Match Photographs

1. Shortly following DS-623's defection in January 1955, and again on 28 April 1955, Douglas M. Moir of FOB showed him the Vienna Station collection of soccer match photos. DS-623 was able to make 43 identifications from this collection, some by name and position, some only by function. In a few instances, as indicated specifically below, his identifications were erroneous, but are nonetheless forwarded on the assumption that even this fact will be of interest to you.

2. A total of twenty-one (21) separate photographs, some of them merely sections cut out of the original enlargements, are sent as an attachment to this dispatch. Persons identified by DS-623 are indicated on them by a heavy black inked circle around their heads; in a separate circle to the side, or in some instances above the circle surrounding their heads, are the numbers keyed to the list in Paragraph 3 below. In the event you have difficulty deciphering the numbers inked in on the front of the photos, you may refer to the reverse side, on which you will find the same numbers in approximately the same positions. We have just completed transmission of all negatives of the photos represented in the attachment. From these negatives, it will be possible for Headquarters to make individual blowups of the personalities identified by DS-623 for the appropriate Washington files. As you are already aware, the numbering system used on these negatives is that devised by the USIA Photo Section, which was responsible for taking the photos. For the six different matches represented in the attached photos, the following are the pertinent references:

a. Series 9954: Austria vs. Germany, Fall 1951. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12175, 25 October 1955.

b. Series MFR 526: Austria vs. Portugal, 27 September 1953. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12184, 25 October 1955.

c. Series MFR 532: Austria vs. Hungary, 11 October 1953. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12183, 25 October 1954.

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED
RESTRICTIONS ON REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INDEXED

~~KAPOK~~

RI COPY

6-6-9-/677/

14-00000

~~KAPOK~~

SECRET

EAVA-12223
Page 2.

d. Series NFR 582: Austria vs. Hungary, 11 April 1954. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12185, 25 October 1955.

e. Series NFR 631: Dynamo Moscow vs. Austria Rapid, 20 July 1954. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12183, 25 October 1955.

f. Series NFR 653: Austria vs. Yugoslavia, 3 October 1954. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12195, 25 October 1955.

3. The following are DB-623's identifications, the photo number(s) from which the identifications were made, and the DB-623 identification number:

DB-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(1)	NFR 526/8	(fnu) AKOPOV, Acting Chief of USIA between departure of KRIVOSHEIN and takeover by [illegible]. Comment: this name given as "OKOPOV" in EG-2805.
(2)	NFR 631/14	Georgi Azarovich [illegible], Acting Chief of A/O KABEL Accounting Section.
(3)	NFR 526/8	Ivan Alekseyovich [illegible], Secretary of CPSU Organization, A/O KABEL. Comment: this identification very uncertain.
(4)	NFR 582/8	(fnu) [illegible], Chief of SEW-Energie-Abteilung.
(5)	NFR 631/16	Feodor Nikiforovich BARANOV, Chief Engineer of A/O KABEL.
(6)	NFR 526/5	NU, Soviet intelligence officer under SEW cover. Comment: apparently i/w individual holding Interzonal Pass in name of N. V. BELOV.
(7)	NFR 582/8	Alexander Petrovich [illegible], CPSU representative in Austria.
(8)	NFR 582/8	(fnu) [illegible]CHENKO, General-Director of USIA A/O [illegible].
(9)	NFR 653/4	(fnu) [illegible], member of GO/MGB, Vienna Garrison. Comment: [illegible] (1) confirms identification of [illegible] (fnu) [illegible] as Deputy Chief, Vienna Detachment, GO/MGB, CGF Baden.
(10)	NFR 631/18) NFR 653/9)	Sergei Nikolayevich DYACHKOV, General-Director of (USIA) Siemens-Schuckert I.

SECRET

6-9-7074/

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

(continued)

DG-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(11)	NFR 653/9	(fnu) [illegible], General-Director of (USIA) Afa-Varta.
(12)	NFR 582/4) NFR 582/6) NFR 631/14)	Sergei Vasilyevich CHALYY, General-Director of (USIA) A/O KABEL, and his wife.
(13)	NFR 582/4	Petr A. GRICHIN, Chief of USIA.
(14)	NFR 631/18	(fnu) [illegible], General-Director of (USIA) Wiener-Kabel. Comment: incorrect, [illegible] identified this individual as D. A. [illegible], case officer of the Austria Group, KGB Residentura.
(15)	NFR 631/14) NFR 653/17)	Alexander Ivanovich IYEVLEV, head of the Finance Section, A/O KABEL.
(16)	NFR 653/17	(fnu) KARYAGIN, member of the Commercial Section, A/O KABEL.
(17)	NFR 631/16	Alexander Ivanovich KRUPNOV, General-Director of (USIA) Brown-Boveri.
(18)	NFR 582/4) NFR 653/17)	Anatoly Kirilovich KRUTKO, Second Deputy-Chief of USIA.
(19)	NFR 582/8	Franz [illegible], Austrian interpreter at the Soviet Information Center, allegedly an RIS agent.
(20)	NFR 582/4	Gregori Alexandrovich [illegible], Secretary of the CPSU organization, USIA.
(21)	NFR 653/17	(fnu) LAVRICHEV, Deputy-Chief of USIA. Comment: name reported as "LAVRENOV" in [illegible].
(22)	NFR 582/4	Nikolai Sergeyevich [illegible], assistant to [illegible] and probably an RIS officer. Comment: [illegible] replaced V. I. [illegible], officer of the KGB Soviet Colony Group, in latter's cover position; DG-623's assumption that he is KGB, therefore, seems valid.
(23)	9954/3	Maria MAYER, Austrian interpreter in the 20th Bezirk Kommandatura. Comment: this identification made by DG-623 A.

SECRET

~~KAPOK~~

6-6-9-90791

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

~~KAPOK~~

SECRET

EAVA-12223
Page 4.

(continued)

DS-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(24)	KFR 582/4	Vitaly Ivanovich [illegible], KGB Officer under USIA Personnel Section cover. Cf. (22) above.
(25)		No. 25 eliminated; first identified by DS-623 as OZEROV, later changed to [illegible].
(26)	KFR 653/3	(fnu) [illegible], Chief Bookkeeper at (USIA) Porr A. G.
(27)	KFR 582/5) KFR 653/3)	Yevgeni Arsentiyevich POLYAKOV, General-Director of an unspecified firm subordinated to A/O TEXTIL.
(28)	KFR 631/14	Gregoriy Ivanovich [illegible], Chief of Personnel, A/O KABEL.
(29)	KFR 582/4	Sergei Mikhailovich ROZHKOV, Chief of Personnel, USIA.
(30)	KFR 653/4	NU, colleague of (fnu) CHERNISHEV, No. 9 above. Comment: this individual is, of course, Ivan I. [illegible], Chief, Vienna Detachment, OO/KGB, and CHERNISHEV's immediate superior.
(31)	KFR 582/4	(fnu) [illegible], member of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Vienna. Comment: IAP in name of N. A. [illegible].
(32)	KFR 582/4) KFR 631/14)	Nikolai Fedorovich SHIKHOVTSOV, Chief, Commercial Section, A/O KABEL.
(33)	KFR 631/18	Robert [illegible], Austrian chief of the Technical Section, (USIA) AEG-Union.
(34)	KFR 631/16	Yevgeni Aleksandrovich [illegible], member of the Production Section, A/O KABEL.
(35)	KFR 631/18	(fnu) SVETKOV, Cultural Referent, USIA. Comment: incorrect; [illegible] 80 has identified this man as Ivan I. [illegible] of the KGB Rezidentura.
(36)	KFR 631/18	(fnu) VINOGRADOV, Chief Engineer of (USIA) Waagner-Biro.
(37)	KFR 631/14	Nikolai Savich VOLCHENKO, Chief, Production Section, A/O KABEL.

~~KAPOK~~

SECRET

6-6-9-707 7/1

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

EAVA-12223
Page 5.

(continued)

DB-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(38)	MFR 631/14) MFR 631/18)	(fnu) ZAVIALOV, Deputy to BRAZHNIKOV, CPSU representative (cf. No. 7 above)
(39)	MFR 582/10	Sergei A. [illegible], coordinator of Soviet economic enterprises in Austria.
(40)	MFR 653/9	NU, Chief, Commercial Section, (USIA) Siemens-Schukert I.
(41)	MFR 582/4	NU, bookkeeper in Soviet Military Bank.
(42)	MFR 631/18	NU, works with BRAZHNIKOV, CPSU representative (cf. No. 7 above)
(43)	MFR 582/4	NU, Soviet General-Director of (USIA) Walfram liqueur distillery.
(44)	MFR 532/12	NU, frequently seen with V. I. [illegible], [illegible] officer under USIA cover (cf. No. 24 above).

4. Since the Vienna Station has adequate copies of photographs of the few individuals of current interest to Vienna among these identifications, strictly USIA personnel being of no further interest to us, the attached are for Headquarters use and files. No further servicing of them is required here.

Giles T. Crowen
Giles T. Crowen

Attachments: 21 photographs

Distribution: ← 1 cc destroyed 26 July 68 FR
3-EE w/atts
1-[illegible]
1-CCS
1-CCPS
3-Crowen/2152/2712/2185

6-64-7077

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

[illegible]FFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA [illegible]
Specify Air or Sea Pouch

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Vienna

DATE AUG 26 1955

FROM Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/[illegible]
SPECIFIC Possible Members of the [illegible]

REF: [illegible] 2[illegible]7 — 201 - 69573

1. In the referenced report it is noted that [illegible] stated he thought Nikolay [illegible]ergeyevich [illegible] and Grigoriy Ivanovich [illegible] were members of the [illegible]. Traces were run on these two men and are forwarded for whatever value they may be to VOB.

a. [illegible] Nikolay [illegible]ergeyevich. Possible traces. Information evaluated [illegible] contained in [illegible] 17 July 1952 from Karachi, Pakistan, states one [illegible], Passport No. [illegible], dated [illegible] April 1952; Visa No. 73, was leader of [illegible] agriculture delegation from Moscow to attend the Asian Regional Conference [illegible] held at Karachi on 3 May 1952.

There are numerous references on one Nikolay Sergeyevich [illegible], born 22 August 1922 in [illegible]. This [illegible] has been, and believed to be at the present time with the [illegible] Embassy in Mexico City. We did not collect the information on this person as it is not believed he is identical with the person in Vienna. However, if the [illegible] and VOB feels there is a chance that the two men are identical, the information can be obtained as well as photographs. There is also a photograph of the above mentioned [illegible]. There is a striking resemblance between the two men mentioned even although [illegible] is a much older man.

b. [illegible] Grigoriy Ivanovich. The only trace found was [illegible] dated 3 November [illegible], subject: "Miscellaneous Information from [illegible] Headquarters" states "The personnel head of [illegible] is [illegible]." No other information.

INDEX

[illegible] SE/A

[illegible] STYLES
SE/A

22 Aug 195[illegible]

Distribution:
3 Vienna
1 RI
2 SE/A

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI [illegible]

26 Aug 55

201-[illegible]

201-132139

FORM NO. 51-29

the young priests undergo a thorough study of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. After graduation they are appointed to parishes where they exercise their pulpit prerogative by preaching Communism to the faithful. ~~According to Source~~, when one of these young priests is first appointed to a given parish, his first step is to go to the [illegible] Communist Party secretary and ask him what the Party missions in the area are and how the priest would be of assistance in carrying out these missions.

6. ~~Source feels that~~ religion is becoming a tool of the Communist Party of the USSR since most of the elder priests of the last generation, who would have fought Communism, have died off or have been purged and the younger priests, who have replaced them, are completely dominated by Communist Party influence.

26 Aug 55

26 Aug 55
201-69572

SECRET

REPORT NO. DS-2307

DEFECTOR RECEPTION CENTER

COUNTRY USSR/Austria

DATE DISTR. 23 Apr 55

SUBJECT Soviet Personalities in USIA

NO. OF PAGES 16

178

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to December 1954

REFERENCES: DS-2805

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE DS-623, a Soviet electrical engineer, born in 1914, is a graduate of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute. From May 1950 to January 1953, he was General Director of the USIV Siemens-Schubert plant in Budapest. From January 1953 until his defection in January 1955, he was General Director of the USIA AEG Union plant in Vienna. During the war he became a member of the Communist Party and was always active in Party affairs, primarily because he found such participation expedient in furthering his career. He defected to the West because he feared that lengthy imprisonment would result from a forthcoming investigation of production of faulty transformers at his plant. Source is a well-educated, intelligent, and shrewd individual. Source was relatively reluctant to provide data on personalities known to him personally.

Following are biographic sketches of USIA Soviet personalities known to source. For further information on the duties of these individuals, see the above referenced report.

INDEX

[illegible]

SECRET

28 apr 55

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: ANDREYEV, Georgiy Azarovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1905

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Accountant

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Acting Chief of the Accounting Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 66 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Thin, sharp nose and face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as Chief Accountant of the "Asbest" Trust in the city of Asbest in the Urals, USSR, prior to coming to Austria in February 1954. Source knew nothing of his military record.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A CP member although not active

REMARKS: A careerist, subservient to superiors, unprincipled in matters pertaining to work

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February to December 1954. **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: ANDRONOV, Ivan Aleksandrovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1925

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown to source

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of the Osram Plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 168 cm. **WT:** c. 90 kg. **BUILD:** Stout **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member; he was the secretary of the Soviet Party organisation for A/O Kabel, USIA.

REMARKS: A stupid individual; blindly carried out the orders of the Party and his superiors at work without reflection

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February 1953 to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: [illegible]ASHIN, Mikhail Vasilyevich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1915

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: A commercial specialist

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of the Supply and Sales Office of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. [illegible] cm. **WT:** c. 65 kg. **BUILD:** Short, medium **HAIR:** Light **EYES:** Unknown to source

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Round "Russian" face. He wears glasses with metal frames.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married; he graduated from the Academy of Foreign Trade (Akademiya Vneshney Torgovli) in Moscow in 1946 or 1947.

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown to source

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member; active Communist

REMARKS:

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: BARANOV, Fedor Nikiforovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: 1905-1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Electrical engineer (Inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Deputy Director and Chief Engineer of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: 173-174 cm. **WT:** c. 93 kg. **BUILD:** Quite stout **HAIR:** Blond **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Prior to coming to Austria in March 1954, he worked as Chief of the Equipment Department of the Chief Directorate of Electrical Machine Building, Ministry of Electrical Industry (Otdel Oborudovaniya, Glavnogo Upravleniya Elektromashino - Stroyeniya, Ministerstvo Elektropromyshlennosti). Military record unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member, very active Communist

REMARKS: A very good engineer; fawns before his superiors in an effort to advance himself further. Does not treat subordinates fairly.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from March to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: [illegible]ACHKOV, Sergey Nikolayevich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1915

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Electrical engineer (Inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Siemens Schukert I, plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USSR

HT: c. [illegible] cm. **WT:** c. 65 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Light **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Was formerly Chief of Personnel Section of A/O Kabel but was transferred to present position

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Good engineer, honest, and a thorough worker. Was frequently ill with some sort of stomach ailment.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: FELOSENKO, (fnu) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1923

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY:

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Member of Production Section of A/O Kabel, USSR

HT: c. 160 cm. **WT:** **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Thick, red **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full Russian face; wears reading glasses

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Unknown

REMARKS:

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: GLADKIY, Sergey Vasilyevich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Mechanical engineer (Inzhener-mekhanik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: 173-175 cm. **WT:** c. 85 kg. **BUILD:** Stout **HAIR:** Dark, blond, partially bald **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full face, Austrian haircut.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Prior to World War II worked as a plant director in Leningrad. After the war he worked in East Germany as director of a USIG plant. Came to Austria in January or February 1954. Source had no information about his military record.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member, devoted Communist to point of fanaticism

REMARKS: Very dull person, rough, uncultured, poorly educated. Speaks Russian like a country muzhik.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January or February - December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: GRITCHIN, Pëtr Aleksandrovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1903

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief of USIA

HT: c. 175 cm. **WT:** c. 65 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Thick, black **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wore glasses for reading

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came to USIA from Moscow at the end of 1953; military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member, active Communist

REMARKS: A very competent chief, had reputation of being honest and fair; intelligent, was generally quiet, never shouted at subordinates.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

NAME: IGNATYEV, Sergey Ivanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1903

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Electrical engineer (Inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Wiener Kabel and Ariadne plants subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown to source

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as a plant director for USIG in East Germany before coming to Austria in December 1953. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: Honest, a good technical specialist

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: IEVLEV, Aleksandr Ivanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1912

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Financial specialist

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of the Financial Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Hunched shoulders, thin face, straight nose, wears reading glasses. His right hand has no index and middle fingers up to the second joint.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown to source

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A CP member but not active

REMARKS: Liked to drink and was often drunk; considered a cultured, decent fellow who was well liked

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February 1953 to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

NAME: KHAYLOV, Ivan Stepanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1908

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Electrical engineer (Inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Siemens Schukert II, plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Light **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as a plant director for USIG in East Germany before coming to Austria in July 1954. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: A scoundrel, very impudent to equals and subordinates; typical careerist

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: KRUPNOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of the Brown Boveri plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 168 cm. **WT:** c. 75 kg. **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: A big careerist who has no convictions. He would work as readily for any party that happened to be in power.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work since January 1953, when source came to Austria. **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: KRUTKO, Anatoliy Kirilovich

DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

DOB: c. 1908

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Commercial specialist

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Second Deputy Chief of USIA, responsible for commercial and financial matters

HT: c. 180 cm. **WT:** c. 100 kg. **BUILD:** Heavy-set **HAIR:** Blond, brush-cut, slightly receding hairline **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wide shoulders, athletic build, full Ukrainian face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Graduate of the Academy of Foreign Trade in Moscow

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came to USIA in beginning of 1954 from East Germany where he worked for USIG, presumably in a similar capacity; military record unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Active CP member

REMARKS: Very competent worker, however very stubborn; well thought of by his superiors

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work

DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: KRYLOV, Grigoriy Aleksandrovich

DEGREE OR RANK: Engineer

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1915

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Party worker

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Head of the Soviet Communist organization in USIA

HT: c. 170 cm. **WT:** Unknown **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Brown **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came from Moscow to Vienna about the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954; military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Party member, devoted Communist

REMARKS: None

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work

DATE OF INFO: December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: [illegible]
DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 190[illegible]

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: believed to be an economist

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief of USIA Labor and Wage Section

HT: c. [illegible] cm. **WT:** c. [illegible]0 kg. **BUILD:** Slender **HAIR:** [illegible], partially gr **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came from Moscow to Austria in the summer of 1953; replaced YERS[illegible]. Military record is unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Active CP member

REMARKS: Lazy, not very competent in his job, always involved in intrigue

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: KUZNETSOV, Sergey Afanasyevich
DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1915

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of the Paul Goerz plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 1[illegible] cm **WT:** c. 70 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Light **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A Party member; active Communist

REMARKS: Deceitful individual; great "bootlicker" who would stoop to any baseness in order to advance himself or keep out of trouble

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February 1953 to December 1954
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

[illegible] CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: LAVRENOV, (fnu) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1903

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Engineer

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief Engineer and First Deputy Chief of USIA

HT: c. 160 cm. **WT:** c. 80 kg. **BUILD:** Short, stout **HAIR:** Blond, partially bald in front **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wore glasses

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked for USIG in East Germany prior to coming to USIA in early part of 1954. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Very active CP member

REMARKS: Had reputation for being a heavy drinker, lazy except in Party work; not very competent in his work

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work. (Source actually met him only once.) **DATE OF INFO:** October 1954

NAME: LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1920

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Personnel worker

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Deputy Chief of Personnel Section, A/O Kabel, USIA, in charge of personnel matters for Austrian personnel

HT: c. 160 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Short, thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Had worked in the Soviet Embassy in Poland before coming to Austria in December 1953. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not an active CP member

REMARKS: Believed by source to be a member of the MGB (KGB)

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January 1954 to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

put also with
201-0132135

[illegible] f/s [illegible]
53/54—

APERTURE CARD

NAME: LYKOV, Ivan Ivanovich

DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian from Moscow

DOB: c. 1892

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Economist

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief of USIA Planning Section

HT: 170-175 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Grey **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Erect posture; lined face; wore pince-nez

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked in GUSDZ in Moscow as planning accountant before coming to Austria about the end of 1953; military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Cultured, intelligent, very competent specialist; gave appearance of an old Russian squire. Dressed very neatly, wore string tie; was generally well-liked

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work

DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: NAZAROV, (fnu)

DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1902

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief of the Labor and Wage Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 170 cm. **WT:** c. 75 kg. **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Grey **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A Party member but not an active Communist

REMARKS:

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work

DATE OF INFO: December 1954

APERTURE CARD

14-00000

NAME: PECHATNAYA, (fnu) (female)

DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1930

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Secretary-typist

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Secretary to GLADKIY, Chief of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 50 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Black, short, wavy **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Long nose, thin face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Quiet, serious, hard-working girl, pleasant to everyone and seemed to be quite intelligent. She did not like her boss, thought he was stupid, and stated as much to source.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work

DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: PLUCHKIN, (fnu)

DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1892

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Unknown

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Sichtermann plant of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 170 cm **WT:** c. 70 kg. **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Gray **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wore glasses

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Competent worker, fair to subordinates

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work

DATE OF INFO: December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: PUZYREV, Grigoriy Ivanovich
DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian Jew

DOB: c. 1912

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Personnel worker, believed by source to be MGB (KGB) worker

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of Personnel Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: 165-170 cm. **WT:** c. 75 kg. **BUILD:** Heavy **HAIR:** Red with bald spot combed over **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Long full nose

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as chief of a personnel section in a division of USIG in East Germany prior to coming to Austria during the latter part of 1953. Military record unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Party member; devoted to the Party, strong belief in the Party.

REMARKS: Very unpleasant individual

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January to December 1954
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: ROZHKOV fnu
DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Personnel worker (also probably a worker for MGB/KGB)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Assistant to Chief, USIA, for personnel matters

HT: c 170 cm. **WT:** c. 65 kg. **BUILD:** Slender **HAIR:** Blond, balding on the sides **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came from Moscow at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954; military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Active CP member

REMARKS: Reputed to be very stupid; generally disliked by everyone

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work. (Source met him on only one occasion.)
DATE OF INFO: November 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: EMIN, Vasiliy Nikitich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1900

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Economist

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief of the Planning Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c 165 cm. **WT:** c. 85 kg. **BUILD:** Stout **HAIR:** Dark, bald on the top and sides **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full face, occasionally wears dark horn-rimmed glasses, inside and on dark days, and has another pair of glasses for reading

PERSONAL HISTORY: Divorced

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked in the Ministry of State Control in Moscow prior to coming to Austria. He lost job in this organization along with many others as a result of large personnel cuts invoked by government in this and other organizations. He came to Austria in January 1954. Military record unknown.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active and loyal CP member

REMARKS: Acted like a lord (barin). He was used to commanding people all his life and did not like to work himself.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: SERGEYEVNA, Klavdiya (female) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: Unknown

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Engineer

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Engineer economist on staff of Planning Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** Unknown **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Black **EYES:** Black

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wide nose, wide face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Wife of SERGEYEV of Torgpredstvo

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Assistant to Vasiliy Nikitich SEMIN, Chief of Planning Section of A/O Kabel

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Unknown

REMARKS:

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

NAME: [illegible], Nikolay Fedorovich
DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1920

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Commercial specialist

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of the Commercial Section of A/C Kabel, USIA

HT: c [illegible] cm **WT:** c [illegible] kg **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Has a round Ukrainian face and wears his hair combed straight back

PERSONAL HISTORY: Graduated from the Academy of Foreign Trade (Akademiya Vneshney Torgovli) in Moscow in [illegible]. Married.

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Served as Commercial Section chief in a division of USIG in East Germany prior to coming to Austria in December 1953. Military record unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active Party member and a loyal Communist

REMARKS: He was lazy and did not know his specialty well.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January to December 1954
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: [illegible], Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich
DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1928

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Electrical-technician (Tekhnik-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Engineer in the Production Section of A/C Kabel

HT: c [illegible] cm **WT:** c [illegible] kg **BUILD:** Short, thin **HAIR:** Thick, blond **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Had worked in East Germany for USIG prior to January 1954 when he arrived in Austria and began working as an engineer in Production Section of A/C Kabel, USIA. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: An able engineer

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

28 April 55

NAME: [illegible] **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: [illegible] nationality Jewish

DOB: [illegible]

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: [illegible] engineer (Inzhener-elektr[illegible]

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief engineer [illegible] plant which was subordinate to A/G Kabel, USIA

HT: [illegible] **WT:** [illegible] **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Blond **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: [illegible]

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: [illegible] as an engineer at "Kabel" plant in Moscow before coming to Austria [illegible]. Never served in the army

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Very [illegible] individual and a gossip. He would serve any government or organization which paid him good money.

BASIS OF INFO: [illegible] **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: [illegible] **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: [illegible]

DOB: ca. 190[illegible]

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Mechanical engineer (inzhener-mekhanik)

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of the Production Section of A/G Kabel, USIA

HT: [illegible] **WT:** [illegible] **BUILD:** Very thin **HAIR:** Dark and gray long, balding on sides **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Has long neck, a long, thin nose and face, and very large [illegible] "[illegible] like Chamberlain". Looks younger than he actually is.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as chief of a production section in a division of USIG prior to coming to Austria during the latter part of 1953. Source knew nothing about his military record

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A CP member and loyal Communist, almost a fanatic

REMARKS: Very egotistical, stubborn, and stupid. He liked to squabble and was always involved in intrigue

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from beginning of 19[illegible] to December 19[illegible]. **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

14-00000

DISTRIBUTION

14 - 7997th Composite Group
1 - 7982 USAREUR Liaison Group, Detachment A, APO 742
2 - HICOG (APO 757-A)
3 - London
4 - Vienna
3 - British Military Intelligence, Austria
1 - Ass't. Chief of Staff, G-2, USPA

1 - DRA
1 - 66th CIC Group, APO 154
1 - FBI Liaison, ID, USAREUR
4 - COMNAVGER, APO 757
12 - BLC (B)
5 - Hqs., USAREUR
4 - Hqs., USAFE

INDEX

CS COPY

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

Mexico City
three
Benedict O. Dunshurst/pdb

HMM-623
24 March 54
Hubert B. Tabakin

3 - Headquarters
3 - Files

LIMERICK, LIPSTICK,
LIVESTOCK

HMM-562, dated 27 Jan 54

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION
CHANGED TO: Secret
BY AUTHORITY OF
Name: David Brady
Office: C/WH/3
Date 8 Nov 1959
M. Bradley
16

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~
#3
201-132139

Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV
Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA

IDS-623

2 Aug - 31 Dec 1953

Mexico City

same

B-Doc

24 March 1954

LIMERICK , LIPSTICK, LIVESTOCK

Name: Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV
Born: 22 August 1928 in Ryazan
Arrived in Mexico: 11 July 1953 aboard SS Andrea Gritti, Veracruz, with wife
Documents: Holds service passport 10724, issued 29 January 1952, in Moscow
Title: Unknown **Position:** Unknown
Residence in Mexico: Juanacatlan 81
Wife: Valeriya Ivanovna
Children: None known. None in Mexico
Languages: Spanish good
Other personal data: Nickname - KOLYA
Occasionally drives one of Embassy automobiles

Official Activities

Our few references to LEONOV make it appear that he, like BELYAKOV and ANTYASOV, with whom he seems to be vaguely associated, is a third echelon functionary who probably performs a variety of administrative tasks in support of one or another phase of the Embassy operations and might be in on-the-job training for a specialized job as assistant to, at a guess, SAMOILOV. In early August, shortly after his arrival, he called a woman instructor at an obscure local business school and was told that he could come by for his grades the following week. (We infer from another conversation that MATVEYEV was attending this school with him.) LEONOV was also with ANTYASOV and BELYAKOV when ANTYASOV was detained on their way "back from the University" at the end of September. (See: ANTYASOV.) This should indicate that he was principally occupied during the weeks after his arrival in acquainting himself with local business methods and commercial practices, and perhaps taking some further formal instruction. Otherwise, his appearances in the traffic have been limited to answering the telephone for both KOLOMYAKOV and SAMOILOV in their absence (without making decisions or taking any action) and, under the tutelageof LAZAREV before the latter's departure, making routine calls connected with ordering wine, repairing the movie projector, and the like. He has also occasionally been seen driving one or another of the Embassy automobiles, apparently filling in for one of the chauffeurs.

Private Activities

Our only information on LEONOV's private life is the fact that the ZHUKOVs moved into the LEONOVs' apartment (No. 4 at Industria No. 71) upon their arrival on 7 November and the two couples lived together for about three weeks, when the LEONOVs moved into other quarters at Juancatlan 81. (There were no indications that the original arrangement had ever been intended to be other than temporary or that the subsequent move of the LEONOVs was due to friction between the two couples.) This raises the suggestion that ZHUKOV may be associated in some way with LEONOV within the Embassy as well, a possibility which is borne out to some extent by the fact that both habitually answer and make calls from the same Embassy telephones.

Comment

We cannot yet assess LEONOV for operational purposes.

~~22372~~

SECRET

LEONOVA
184-623
24 March 54
Page 3

Name: Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA
Born: Unknown
Arrived in Mexico 11 July 1953 aboard MS Andrea Gritti in Veracruz with husband
No known title or position
Residence in Mexico: Juanacatlan 81
Children: None known. None in Mexico
Languages: Unknown
Other personal data: Nickname: LERA

Private Activities

Although we have no definite indications to that effect, there is a fair possibility that LEONOVA is employed in some administrative or clerical position in the Embassy, since she seems to be present in the Chancery area a good deal during office hours and, without children, would not otherwise have a great deal to do.

Our only information relating directly to LEONOVA occurs during a conversation between APARINOVA and MELNIKOVA on 26 October in which APARINOVA complained bitterly that LEONOVA was shirking her share of responsibility in preparing food for the 7 November reception. LEONOVA had apparently failed to buy ingredients, after being asked to do so, on the plea that she had not been told exactly what kind of apples to get nor where to buy them. APARKINOVA: "KOMSOMOLTSI always brag about being in the front line, but in actuality, bah!" MELNIKOVA: "Yes, when I was at their home, we happened to discuss the reception, and Rita (ANTYASOVA) said, 'Why should we do the work for the reception?' I told her she should be ashamed of herself. I work in the Embassy and hold out during receptions and all holidays, and I don't complain. LEONOVA claims she is not going to do any shopping because she was not given the responsibility." APARINOVA: "What does she mean? I met her and said 'Lera. . .' She said she'd come over Sunday and make a list of the things to be bought." MELNIKOVA: "And she didn't come over. She was probably afraid of the work and the money involved. APARINOVA: "How silly. I told her we would refund all expenses."

Comment

We infer that LEONOV (and perhaps her husband as well) is a good KOMSOMOL and may be endowed with the aggressively unpleasant personality which the Soviet system seems to foster so often. As shown in our photo coverage, both she and her husband have the appearance of persons who could be the well-disciplined, unquestioning, devoted Communists idealized in Soviet propaganda.

~~323~~

TOP SECRET

LEONOV, Nikolai

LIMERICK TS 90085 HMM-370 24 Jul 53 P. 5

P. 5-6 Nikolai LEONOV, "collaborator", and his wife, Valeria LEONOVA arrived at Veracruz aboard an Italian vessel 11 July 1953. Forwarded with this report are copies of photos of the subjects taken by LIVESTOCK. LEONOVs were met at Veracruz by Alexander BELIAKOV.

P.10 **Nikolai Sergeevich LEONOV and his wife, Valeria Ivanovna LEONOVA arrived at Veracruz by ship 11 July 1953. Forwarded with this report are the following pertinent photographs taken by LIVESTOCK:**

6 copies of the pair leaving the ship
6 copies of LEONOV leaning over the ship's rail
3 copies of BELIAKOV speaking with LEONOVA at the dock
1 copy of pages from LEONOV's passport
1 copy of pages of LEONOVA's passport
Foreign Ministry cards with photos of LEONOV and wife are also attached (see Attachments 2 and 3)

SECRET

201-132139

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: DB
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. HMA-743

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief of Mission, Mexico
DATE: JUL 1953

FROM: Chief, WH

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Soviet Embassy Personnel
SPECIFIC— Nikolai L[illegible]KOV

REF: R[illegible]-5[illegible]; R[illegible]-542

Headquarters files contain the information given below concerning one N. L[illegible]KOV, who may be identical with subject. [illegible] was not able to provide additional information.

According to information evaluated B-2 contained in P-K-176, dated 17 July 1952, from Karachi, Pakistan, one N. L[illegible]KOV, passport number [illegible], dated 2[illegible] April 1952, visa number 70, dated 25 April 1952, was leader of an Agriculture delegation from Moscow to attend the [illegible] Regional Conference on Epizootics held at Karachi on 3 May 1952.

COPY

J. C. King
C. K[illegible]
By R. [illegible]

2[illegible] June 1953

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
2 - E/IA
1 - E/IA [illegible]
✓ - R[illegible]

E/[illegible]C/sr

CO[illegible]
DATE [illegible] JUL

Paul P. Pelton
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SE[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

SD NO. 51-59
[illegible]

[illegible]

201-132139

SECRET
Security Information

AIR

HMGW-748

JUL 1 - 1953

Chief of Mission, Mexico City

Chief, WHD

Soviet Embassy Personnel
Nikolai LEONOV

REF: ROMZ-5398, ROME-5242

Headquarters files contain the information given below concerning one N. LEONOV, who may be identical with subject. KUPALM was not able to provide additional information.

> According to information evaluated B-2 contained in ROK-176, dated 17 July 1952, from Karachi, Pakistan, one N. LEONOV, passport number 09492, dated 24 April 1952, visa number 70, dated 25 April 1952, was leader of an Agriculture Delegation from Moscow to attend the Asian Regional Conference on Epizootics held at Karachi on 3 May 1952.

J. C. King

By R. Connally

24 June 1953

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 2 - WH/III
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - Registry

WHD/CMC/ss

J. C. KING

O.M. DOERFLINGER

SECRET

201-132139

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT

ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U S Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Italy/USSR	REPORT NO.	CS-11590
SUBJECT	Travel of Soviet Diplomatic Personnel	DATE DISTR.	2 June 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	16 May 1953	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Italy, Rome (23 May 1953)	REFERENCES	CS-1.879

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: Through an official Italian channel. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Nikolai Leonov, an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, and his wife, Valeriya, left Genoa on 16 May 1953 aboard the SS ANDREA GRITTI, destined for Mexico.

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	x	ARMY	x	NAVY	x	AIR	x	FBI		AEC					

(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

EE		SR	x	home	2x	WE/FI/Procaccino	2x			IN-28996 ROME-5898 H	DSO
FE		WE	x			SR/FI/Sanford	x				WLG
NE		WH				WH/FI/Ogden	x				JAF
SE		STD				STC/CB	x				EM

CABLE

201-132139

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT

...ional Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Italy/USSR/Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS- 10879
SUBJECT	Travel of Soviet Diplomatic Personnel	DATE DISTR.	27 May 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	13 May 1953	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Italy, Rome (19 May 1953)	REFERENCES	

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: An individual with good contacts in Italian Police circles. (B). Appraisal of Content: 3.

The following Soviet diplomatic personnel arrived in Rome on 9 May 1953 from Moscow and took lodgings at Primrose Pensione until 13 May 1953, when they departed for Genoa to proceed by sea to Mexico:

a. Nikolai Leonov, collaborator at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, who carries service Passport C 10724, issued in Moscow on 29 October 1952; and

b. Valeria Leonova, wife of above, who was born in Moscow on 28 April 1928 and who carries service passport C 11507, issued in Moscow on 28 February 1953.

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	x	ARMY	x	NAVY	x	AIR	x	FBI		AEC					

(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

EE		SR	x			~~WE/FI/Procacci~~	2x	Rome	2x	IN-26713 ROME- 5842
FE		WE	x			WH/Ogden	x	STC/ICB	X	
NE		WH	x			SR/Sanford	x			
SE		STD				SR/CE/Grad	x			

DSG
WLG
JAP
ACB

C A B L E

201-132139

ROME 5842 Nikolai LEONOV and wife Valeria arrived in Rome on 9 May 53 from Moscow and took
IN 26718 lodgings at Primrose Pensione until 13 May 53 when they departed for Genoa to
22 May 53 proceed by sea to Mexico. LEONOV carries service ppt C 10724, issued in Moscow
on 29 Oct 52. Wife carries service ppt. C-11507, issued in Moscow 28 Feb 53

Nikolai b. Riozan (prob. Ryazan) 22 Aug 1928. Valeria b. Moscow 28 Apr 1928.

80-96339 22 Sept '52: One N. LEONOV, passport No. 09492 dtd 24 Apr'52 Visa No. 70. dtd 25 Apr'52, arrived in Peshawar from Kabul on 2 May'52. This individual is leader of Agriculture Delegation from Moscow on way to Karachi. (this info. taken from ROK-176 dtd 17 Jul'52 and was acquired in Karachi, Pakistan.) Purpose of this trip was to attend Asian Regional Conference on Epizootics which was held in Karachi 3 May'52.

14-00000

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

22 MAY 53 IN 28713

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP ROME

ACTION: WE 6

ROUTING 1955 22 MAY

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RCM/DB, CR 2, WH 2, FI/RI 2

ROME 5642

TO: DIR INFO: SMEXI CITE: SROME

INTEL REDCAP CONTROL

1. FOLLOWING ARRIVED ROME FROM MOSCOW 9 MAY, TOOK LODGING PRIMROSE PENSIONE UNTIL 13 MAY THEN DEPARTED FOR GENOA TO [illegible] BY SEA TO MEXICO:

A. NIKOLAI LEONOV, BORN RIOZAN (PROBABLY RYAZAN) 22 AUGUST 1928, COLLABORATOR SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO CITY, SERVICE PASSPORT C 10724 ISSUED MOSCOW 29 OCT 52.

B. VALERIA LEONOVA, BORN MOSCOW 23 APRIL 28, WIFE OF ABOVE, SERVICE PASSPORT C 11577 ISSUED MOSCOW 23 FEB 53.

2. SOURCE: DEVIATOR, RECEIVED 19 MAY, 3 3. GENOA [illegible] DATA NOT RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COPY

ABSTRACT
DATE 23

SECRET

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

201-132139

14-00000

SECRET

TARGET PERSONNEL

NAME: LEONOV (Last) Nikolai (First) Sergeyevich (Patronymic)

ALIASES: Nickname - "Kolya"

TITLE: Collaborator at SovEmb, Mexico City

INCOME:

Height: **Weight:**

Eyes: **Hair:**

Complexion:

Special features:

Date of birth: 22 August 1928

Birthplace: Ryazan

Religion:



Wife: **Name:** Valeria (First) Ivanovna (Patro

Birthplace: Moscow

Description: **Date of Birth:** 28 Apr 1923 **Weight:** **Height:**

Eyes: **Hair:** **Complexion:**

Special features:

Comments: Service Passport C 11507, issued Moscow 28 Feb 1953

Religion:

Children: **Name:** None known. None in Mexico **Age:** **Residence:**

Name: **Age:** **Residence:**

Name: **Age:** **Residence:**

Documentation:

Nikolai LEONOV - Service Passport C 10724, issued in Moscow 29 Oct 1952.

201-132139



Отметки. Notes.

136093

30 [illegible] 52

Леонов

Николай Сергеевич

~ один ~

15 [illegible] 53

любой

АННУЛИРОВАНО

АННУЛИРОВАНО

201-122187



a/ Nombre completo: Leonov Nicolai Sergueivich

b/ Fecha y lugar de nacimiento: 22 de agosto de 1928, URSS.

c/ Dirección: Tacubaya 204, México D.F. [illegible].

d/ Ocupación: Empleado de la Embajada de la URSS en México

e/ Color de pelo y ojos: rubio; azules

f/ Señas particulares: no tiene

g/ Estatura: 170 cm

h/ Nombre completo y dirección del pariente más cercano en la URSS: no tiene

i/ Motivo y período de su estancia en los EE.UU.: desde el 19 de octubre de 1958 hasta el 24 de octubre de 1958. en viaje de tránsito.

Fecha y lugar de su llegada en los EE.UU.: El 18 de octubre de 1958 en Laredo (Tex)

Manera de viajar: por ferrocarril

Fecha y lugar de su salida de los EE.UU.: El 24 de octubre de 1958 de Nueva York

Manera de viajar: por barco - Queen Elizabeth

Dirección durante su estancia en los EE.UU.: Park Avenue, 680





Observations Notes

dans le présent passeport

dans le présent passeport

435929

6 (шестнадцатого) апреля, 53

Лескова

Валерия Ивановна

— одна —

СССР

01 (первого) июня, 53

Люб...

Attachment to HMMA-5438, 10 Oct 56

a/ Nombre completo: Leonora [illegible] [illegible]

b/ Fecha y lugar de nacimiento: 30 de abril de 1928, URSS

c/ Dirección: Tacubaya 204, México D.F. [illegible]

d/ Ocupación: ama de casa

e/ Color de pelo y ojos: rubio; azules

f/ Señas particulares: no tiene

g/ Estatura: 158 cm.

h/ Nombre completo y dirección del pariente más cercano en la URSS: no tiene

i/ Motivo y período de su estancia en los EE.UU.: desde el 1 de abril de 1958 hasta el 27 de octubre de 1958 en viaje de tránsito

Fecha y lugar de su llegada en los E.UU.: el 24 de abril de 1958 en Laredo (Tex)

Manera de viajar: por ferrocarril

Fecha y lugar de su salida de los EE.UU.: el 27 de abril de 1958 de Nueva York

Manera de viajar: por barco

Dirección durante su estancia en los EE.UU.: Park Avenue, 680



МИНИСТЕРСТВО ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ СССР

СЛУЖЕБНЫЙ ПАСПОРТ

С № 11507



MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES DE L'URSS

PASSEPORT DE SERVICE

C № 11507

Le titulaire du présent [illegible] de l'URSS [illegible]

Valeria [illegible]

[illegible]

A ces fins, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de l'URSS prie toutes les autorités de l'URSS et des Pays étrangers de laisser passer librement le citoyen Valeria [illegible] et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Le porteur a le droit, pendant la durée de validité du présent passeport, de retourner en URSS par tout poste de contrôle frontalier.

LE PASSEPORT EST DELIVRE

à Moscou

le 24 février 195[illegible]

LE PRESENT PASSEPORT EST VALABLE

jusqu'au 11 mars 195[illegible]

[illegible] du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de l'URSS [illegible]

[illegible] du Département [illegible]

Signature

14-00000





- 8 MAI 1953



МИНИСТЕРСТВО
ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ СССР

СЛУЖЕБНЫЙ ПАСПОРТ

С № 10721

Предъявитель сего гражданин Союза
Советских Социалистических Республик
Леонов Николай Сергеевич,
сотрудник Посольства СССР в
Мексике
родившийся 22.VII.1928 г. в Рязанской обл.
отправляется в Мексику
в сопровождении

[illegible]
Леонова
Николая Сергеевича

[illegible]

ПАСПОРТ ВЫДАН
в гор. Москве
29 сентября 19[illegible]

НАСТОЯЩИЙ ПАСПОРТ ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЕН
до 15 ноября 19[illegible]



MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE L'URSS

PASSEPORT DE SERVICE

C № 10724

Le porteur du présent, citoyen de l'UNION DES REPUBLIQUES SOVIETIQUES SOCIALISTES Nikolai Leonov collaborateur de l'Ambassade de l'URSS au Mexique

Né le 22 V. 1928 dans la r. de Riazan

se rend au Mexique

accompagné de

Au nom du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de l'URSS prie toutes les autorités de l'URSS et des pays amis [illegible] citoyen Nikolai Leonov

et de sa [illegible] de besoin.

Le porteur [illegible] présent passeport [illegible]

LE PASSEPORT EST DÉLIVRÉ

à Moscou

le 29 septembre 1952

LE PRÉSENT PASSEPORT EST VALABLE

jusqu'au 15 novembre 1954



Отметки Notes



1.55

Juin 1.55

1.53

avril 1.53

30 марта 1.5

30 mars

17 сент.

17 septembre

Nikolay LEONOV

20 May 1955: Rodolfo NERVO called Subject and was told "We have found the books and material you requested (re Soviet foreign policy)." LEONOV said he would take the books to NERVO the next day. NERVO for many years active in the Mexican Diplomatic Service, at one time being Charge of the Mexican Legation in Warsaw, Poland. Now about 75 and inactive in Government, but does write articles for the newspaper Excelsior (HMMA 3736 5 Dec 55).

6 January 1956: The daughter of General Heriberto JARA spoke with Subject at the Soviet Embassy saying she had been told that he was the person who could inform her of when she should come by to pick up translations of the "clincial documents" relative to herself and her father. Subject said they were having some trouble getting the documents translated because of the medical terms, but said they should be ready in about five days (HMMA 4200).

1 February 1956: Subject called Velia Jara de NIETO, daughter of General JARA, and told her that the translations of her father's clinical history had been made from Russian into Spanish. Mrs. NIETO said she would visit the Embassy the next day and ask LEONOV for the materials (HMMA 4410).

24 February 1956: One Samuel RAMOS contacted Subject who acts as secretary to Soviet Ambassador, Mexico. RAMOS told LEONOV "We are not going to meet at my house this afternoon, but at SALGO's (which is at) Insurgentes 429-51 at the usual hour." Subject replied that he thought he could get to the meeting at 1900 hours and sent greetings "to the boys." RAMOS said "we have some books we want to order through LEONOV" (HMMA 4336).

2 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS left a message for Subject that "if he has time I hope he will come to my house today" (HMMA 4600).

7 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS called Embassy and asked for data on the possibility of staging an international chess match in Mexico. In this conversation it was indicated that RAMOS is in the academic line of work. He stated that he was "back in classes" and that meetings could no longer be held in his home. He told LEONOV that a tournament featuring a person named "POMMARD" would begin Monday (12 March) and invited Subject to see some of it. LEONOV said he would attend if he had time. RAMOS then asked when he could see LEONOV to give him a list of books "we want". LEONOV told him to come to the Embassy at any time, and RAMOS said he would come right away (HMMA 4600).

c. 27 June 1956: Subject's personal calling card found in address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban revolutionary detained in Mexico (MEXI 839 IN 35356 REF: MEXI 825 IN 34161).

22-29 July 1956: Subject served as translator for Eighth International Radiology Congress Soviet delegates (HMMA 1752).

1 October 1956: Subject and wife requested U.S. transit visas to leave Mexico 17 Oct by rail, entering U.S. via Laredo; to depart New York 24 October on Queen Elizabeth (MEXI 231 IN 34833 6 Oct 56).

201-132139

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. · 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM · 8. DATE OF INFO. · 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST · 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN · 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB 22 AUG 28

074-005-102
SX -05555/09
NO DATE

CIT USSR
OCC ?
KGB FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE LATIN AMERICAN
DEPT INPUT 2 NOV 67

711719

R 6803140507

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

CARD 1

(EMPLOYEE)

LEONOV, Nikolai Sergeevich ~~[illegible]~~

Nickname: KOLYA

"Collaborator" = EMPLOYEE

Arrived in Mexico: 11 July 1953—Veracruz
(met by BELYAKOV)

Departing by rail 18 Oct 56 for NY and then on Queen Elizabeth 24 Oct. 56

(FKG — ship manifest: Arrived 19 Jun 53 (11 July believed correct) aboard Andrea Gritti. LEONOV carrying ~~Dip~~ Sv PP #10724 issued Moscow 29 Jan 52. ~~PP # also differs from LIVESTOCK #136693 above)~~ SV VISA (USSR) # ~~[illegible]~~ 136693

* Residence: ~~[illegible]~~
cor Zitacuaro and Juanacatlan a/o 27nov53-Liquation — Juanacatlan 81
(LIPI - 22 Nov 54: [illegible])

Wife: Valeria Ivanovna

*address - 21 Feb 54 - 3221: Cuautla 161-9 or [illegible] 71-4

Description: born 22 AUG 28, RYAZAN
Height: 170 cms Weight: Build: Hair: blond Eyes: blue
other:

Languages: Spanish good (Follicove jan54)
English (13372, 21 Sept. 56)
French (Visa section)

Skills: 6 Feb 54 — seen driving Black Packard (#65) - ess (he was driving up Gutenberg toward Melchor Ocampo - at 6:00 p.m. he was near that corner. a woman was in the back seat.

201-132139

EMK-W-748, dated 1 July 1953: One N. LEONOV was leader of an Agriculture Delegation from Moscow to attend the Asian Regional Conference on Epizootics hels in Karachi on 3 May 52.



201- 132139

АЯ ВИЗА



132139



201-132139

(4) Lemov

P-492

Leonard

201-132139

Nikolay Sergeyevich LEON



201-132139

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 17 Oct 56	ACTION ☒ OPEN	☐ AMEND	☐ CLOSE
FROM RI/AN/FAHY		ROOM NO. 1509 K	TELEPHONE 8265	

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE ☒ NON-SENSITIVE	201 NO. 1. 201- 132139	SOURCE DOCUMENT HMMA 5438

NAME (Last) (Middle) (First) (Title) 3.: LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(Middle)	(First)	(Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4. ☒ YES ☐ NO	BIRTH DATE 5. D 22 M 8 Y 29	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6. USSR	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7. —	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION: SECRETARY TO AMBASSADOR - Soviet Embassy - Mexico

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. Mexico	ACTION DESK 11. WH/3/M	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.

COMMENTS:

201- 132139

PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO	RESTRICTED FILE ☐ YES ☐ NO	SIGNATURE Patricia Fahy

FORM NO. 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 JUL 56

PUNCHED

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

SECRET/KAPOK

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM ____________

FIELD CASE OFFICER Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION.

CS COPY

SECRET/KAPOK

R. SIDE OF ATT. #16 HMMA-26353

50-124-28/1

L SIDE OF ATT. #16 HMMA-26353

SECRET

PROJECT OUTLINE

1. Identification

Mexico City, Mexico. Support for singleton contract agent operating into right-wing political milieu in Mexico for intelligence purposes with some covert action by-product.

2. Objectives

a. Objective The objective of this project is to provide support for a U.S. contract agent who has access to a wide variety of right-wing political elements and organizations in Mexico.

b. Conduct of Project The contract agent, LIHUFF/1, was born in Mexico and has had a long history of business experience in Latin America, as well as, over the past fifteen years, in Mexico. At the present time, he is Executive Director of U.S. Chamber of Commerce of Mexico City, which gives him a great deal of mobility in both American and Mexican business circles. Generally, it is from the Mexican business community that the financing and support for right-wing political movements, organizations, and institutions eminate. Given the general trend of recent Mexican regimes, as well as the present one, toward more governmental regulation and manipulation of the economic life of the country, the Mexican businessmen continue to support right-wing political movements or ostensibly non-profit civic, research, and other types of organizations used by them as front instrumentalities for expounding their philosophy and taking action in the politico-economic fields. LIHUFF/1 has natural access through his present position and past extensive experience in the business community here. Over the years, as a matter of fact, his numerous associations with these elements have earned him their trust and respect. In addition, for the past four years he has funded Lic. Agustin NAVARRO Vasquez (was LIHUFF/2) organization, consisting primarily of Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales y Economicos, A.C. (IISE), "Espejo" (a magazine on politico-economic affairs), and Movimiento Universitario de Renovadora Orientacion (MURO, a student organization). Also, he has handled LICHANT/1 who has a history of, and numerous associations in, the Mexican right-wing political arena. These and many other contacts of this type will provide the basis for his reports on this particular segment of the political spectrum in Mexico.

c. Targets Right-wing political elements and organizations in Mexico. This would include not only Lic. NAVARRO, IISE, "Espejo," and MURO, but Hugo SALINAS Price, Jorge SIEGRIST Clamont and numerous others of political significance on the Mexican scene. In connection with LICHANT/1's present

SECRET

position, it should be possible to obtain information on the Ministry of Education and other aspects of the Mexican education system which, according to the last word received from Headquarters, is somewhat of a priority requirement.

d. RMD. This project is responsive to Priority A3d and f of the Related Mission Directive for Station Mexico City (approved October 1963). This priority reads in part: "obtain information on the stability of the Government ... through high-level penetrations and through surveillances and controlled assets of other powerful political groups such as the Frente Civico... and through continued development and influencing of high-level government contacts." As an ancillary measure, the project could contribute to MHSPAWN objectives of the RMD under certain circumstances where use of right-wing platforms and organizations is merited.

3. Background.

a. Developments Leading up to Project.

(1) Mexico, politically, is a country in which, increasingly, a centrist political concensus is developing based on the impact of education and economic development. On either side though of this growing central political spectrum are extreme left and extreme right wings which are quite active and quite vocal and which have an influence in the form of individuals, organizations, and movements greatly out of proportion to their numbers. Political disturbances and efforts to induce lack of stability eminate in the main from these two extreme wings. As the centrist force grows slowly, it is possible and probable that these two wings will intensify their efforts and become more and more radical. The Station has intelligence coverage of the extreme left-wing, but has neglected the equally important extreme right-wing when, in the final analysis, any threat to Mexican political stability by fomenting unrest and incidents does, and will continue to, eminate from the right-wing as well as the left-wing. Assuming that, as indicated in the present RMD, the long range national policy objectives of the U.S. toward Mexico are to encourage a stable democratic government and political environment, then coverage of the right-wing is required if for no other reason than meeting normal Station responsibilities for political reporting. HBFINCH contacts in this area have been, and probably will continue to be, virtually nil. In fact, at present in this area HBFINCH contacts are non-existent.

(2) LIHUFF/1 was first picked up as a contact by Station Mexico City in 1950 after having been a contract agent for Station Panama City for some three years (while engaged in business in Panama). He has been in a continuing

relationship of one degree or another with this Station ever since then. This relationship developed from "contact" into formal contract status in November 1962. LIHUFF/1 has handled Station contacts and activities with LIHUFF/2 [redacted] as well as LICHANT/1 from 1962 to date. In addition, he has done a good deal of reporting on right-wing activities from other sources and other contacts of his. Subsidy of the LIHUFF activity for MHSPAWN purposes [redacted] will be terminated effective 30 June 1965. Use of LICHANT/1 will be continued in an intelligence reporting capacity and, in a limited way, for covert action efforts.

b. Prior Negotiations. There have been no prior negotiations with the Mexican Government, intelligence or security services, or ODYOKE elements on this project. LIHUFF/1 has been used in the past, prior to his contract with KUBARK, as a source by ODIBEX and ODMARK.

c. Relationship to Other Projects. This project has no relationship to any other Station project.

d. Utilization of Same Operational Assets. LIHUFF/1 has not been utilized on any other project, past or present, except to the extent he was involved with the LIHUFF activity indicated in subparagraph 3a(2) above.

4. Operational Assets.

a. Personnel.

(1) LIHUFF/1 (OA granted on 10 October 1962 with no number forwarded to field) -- Subject was born in Mexico, is fluent in Spanish, and is about 49 years old. Since World War II, he has been in private business in Latin America, first in Panama and then in Mexico from 1950 on. During World War II, he was in Army intelligence in China and, therefore, had an understanding of covert operations prior to his KUBARK experience. While in Panama, he was employed by the Station there for several years " to organize a net directed against a target of high priority interest". This association was terminated by reason of his move to Mexico for business reasons. Although he was in contact with this Station virtually from his time of arrival in Mexico, he was not picked up as a contract agent until November 1962. His cover for his past and proposed activities has been natural: that of a businessman with a conservative political outlook and interested in the economic and political posture of the

Mexican Government. Contact with him is covered by a social relationship between his case officer and himself; this is easily maintained given the large American community in Mexico City. He has had no formal intelligence training other than that he received from the Army during World War II and on the job with KUBARK. Control of Subject is no problem inasmuch as he is an American citizen and has had considerable experience with KUBARK by now. His motivation is that of an attraction to this type of work, being a U.S. citizen in a foreign area, natural concern forhis business interests, and, probably, the compensatory return from KUBARK. He is witting of his KUBARK association and, aside from his World War II intelligence experience with ODIBEX, in 1961 he had an intelligence relationship with ODIBEX which has long since been terminated.

(2) LICHANT/1. (OA granted on 22 April 1963, but no number forwarded to field) -- Subject is a very conservative Mexican educator and intellectual about 49 years of age. He has alternated between working in various capacities for the Government of Mexico and in Mexican universities. At the present time, he is Private Secy. in Min.of Ed., a position which gives him unique access in the government to the general fields of education and politics as well as considerable contact with other influential people in right-wing circles. He was recruited by LIHUFF/1 in August 1962 on the pretext of doing research work and collecting information for LIHUFF/1's general use for business purposes. Subject has natural cover for obtaining information on right-wing activities from others due to his long association with right-wing activities as a student, educator, and government servant. Contact between Subject and LIHUFF/1 is maintained under the guise of private business relationship. Subject has had no intelligence training from KUBARK other than that imparted by LIHUFF/1 in discussing his reports. There has been no problems in control since essentially Subject understands that this is a business relationship with certain requirements involved for it to be sustained. Subject's motivation is that of an intellectually-convinced conservative who has common objectives and outlook with LIHUFF/1 on political and economic matters plus the financial aspect of the LIHUFF/1 relationship. Subject is not witting of KUBARK or ODYOKE interest in his activities and reporting. He has no known contacts with other intelligence or security services, past or present.

b. Mechanisms. There will be no mechanisms involved in this project although LIHUFF/1 will continue to have access to Lic. NAVARRO, and, in turn, to IISE, "Espejo," and MURO for intelligence purposes.

5. Security Evaluation.

In the unlikely event of compromise, LIHUFF/1 could continue to claim that he was not doing anything that hundreds of other businessmen, U.S. and Mexican, aren't doing as commonly-accepted practice: trying to influence the politico-economic climate in Mexico for their own benefit. Whatever the extent of the compromise, there would be no repercussion insofar as other operations or activities *per se* were concerned except that there might be some tightening of the general operational climate for a while. If, somehow, LIHUFF/1's true role were disclosed, he could probably be backstopped with a minimum of publicity through high-level Station contacts with the Government (explaining the Station interest in right-wing circles as attempting to follow what they were up to in case they became a threat to the stability of the present government).

6. Coordination.

No coordination is desirable or required with other ODYOKE or PBPRIME elements, with the Mexican government, or with other governments and intelligence services. It is assumed that normal coordination with various elements within KUBARK Headquarters will take place.

7. Costs.

a. General. It is requested that this project be authorized in the amount of $9,000 per annum effective 1 July 1965.

b. Breakdown of Costs (per annum).

(1)	LIHUFF/1 salary	$3,600.00
(2)	Operational Expenses	3,000.00
(3)	Entertainment and Travel	2,400.00
	Total per annum	$9,000.00

No non-KUBARK funds will be involved in this activity.

c. Foreign Currency. It is anticipated that any forseeable foreign currency requirements will be within the Station's capacity to handle.

d. Commitments. No commitments have been made to LIHUFF/1 other than a salary of $300.00 per month with a thirty day's notice on termination.

e. Funding and Accountability. Since this project will only involve salary for the most part, no unusual requirements are deemed necessary for accountability. In the event that funds are passed for any type of special activity other than salary, normal standards of accountability will be used.

8. Annexes.

a. Administrative Plan or Fiscal Annex. Not applicable.

b. Communications. Not applicable.

c. Technical Support. Not applicable.

d. Logistics. Not applicable.

e. Intelligence. Not applicable.

9. Emergency Conditions.

If an official anti-USA atmosphere of sufficient intensity prevailed in Mexico, LIHUFF/1 very probably would not be able to maintain himself here, particularly if his employment continued in his present capacity. . This, however, is not seen as anything except a very remote contingency due to the Government of Mexico's dependence on the U.S. tourist trade. In a general war, it is probable that LIHUFF/1 would be able to continue in place without too much difficulty and would be willing to continue operating on current objectives or to undertake entirely new operations against new targets. Contact and communications should represent few problems in Mexico.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

ORIG: RHSnowdon:sdb eip
UNIT: SB/CI/KGB
EXT: 6991
DATE: 8 JULY 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	CI	5	EU
2	CI	6	WH
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 3 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, EUR 8, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 11 18 51 Z CITE DIRECTOR (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA) 18944

TO BRUSSELS THE HAGUE

REDBLOCK LCIMPROVE

1. NIKOLAY STEPANOVICH LEONOV, SECOND SECY (PRESS ATTACHE), SOVEMB MEXICO CITY ACCOMPANIED BY DAUGHTER IRINA WAS SCHEDULED DEPART MEXICO CITY 29 JUNE SABENA FLT 556 FOR BRUSSELS. LEONOV KGB OFFICER REPORTEDLY ON WAY MOSCOW FOR 20-DAY TDY. PLS CONFIRM ARRIVAL BRUSSELS AND DEPARTURE, PRESUMABLY NEXT AEROFLOT FLIGHT FOR MOSCOW.

2. SECOND REPORT THAT LEONOV PLANNED TAKE KLM FLT 684 FROM MEXICO CITY 29 JUNE FOR AMSTERDAM APPARENTLY IN ERROR BUT SHOULD BE CHECKED IF BRUSSELS CANNOT CONFIRM PARA ONE INFO.

3. MAY USE LIAISON.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SB/CI/K

C/SB/O/EU

SB/O/WH

C/E/BNL

E/BNL/B

DC/SB/

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-133159

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : RICHARDSON/as
HEITSMAN
UNIT : FE/CMO/CIDI
EXT : 5743/5645
DATE : 20 MAY 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62
ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: FE 8
INFO : WH 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, VR

21 MAY 64 20 45z

C-83492

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR

LCHARVEST

File

22 MAY 1964

22829

REF: MEXI 9468 (IN 83286)*

1. SUBJ DESCRIBED FOR YEARS AS LEFTIST, BUT ANTI-COMMUNIST AND STRONGLY ANTI-AMERICAN. HQS WANTS DEVELOP INFO HIS CURRENT POLITICAL BELIEFS AND WHY SUBJ WANTED VISIT CHINA. HE OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERED MAN OF STATURE BY CHICOMS, COULD PROBABLY SWING NEW INVITATION TO VISIT CHINA. WE WANT EVALUATE ANSWERS PARA 2 AND 3 QUESTIONS TO DETERMINE HIS ABILITY PROVIDE INTEL, WITH VIEW TOWARD RECRUITING HIM FOR BRIEFED MISSION OR RESIDENCE IN CHINA. DO LINLUCK-1, LICOOKY-1 FEEL HE APPROACHABLE UNDER ANY GUISE? IF HE ASSESSED UNWILLING COOPERATE ODYOKE, SUGGEST CONSIDER FALSE FLAG RECRUITMENT.

2. CHICOMS MAY CONSIDER HIM COMMIE; IF SO HE MAY HAVE BEEN ASKED CARRY BACK MESSAGES, MONEY, OR PERFORM OTHER SERVICES IN MEXI. SUGGEST LINLUCK-1 OR LICOOKy-1 TRY QUERY HIM THESE POINTS. ALSO REPORT DATES TRIP, ITINERARY, INSTALLATIONS VISITED, INDOCTRINATION GIVEN, IF ANY, AND LECTURES SUBJECT GAVE.

3. AS OUTLINED PAGE 15, NEW PART IV/A CHINA HANDBOOK, DESIRE SUBSTANCE SUBJ'S CONVERSATIONS WITH ~~CHINESE LEADERS~~ CHINESE LEADERS, DATES

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

-12-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO GUAT INFO CITE DIR

22829

AND CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH HELD. PARTICULAR TOPICS OF INTEREST:

CHINA'S POSITION TOWARD UN ADMISSION AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE.

TRADE WITH AND RECOGNITION FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

MORAL, FINANCIAL, LOGISTICAL, AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR LATIN AMERICAN CP'S AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS--PARTICULARLY IN GUATEMALA.

REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT OF CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION ON VARIOUS ISSUES (INCLUDING NON-ALIGNED AND BANDUNG CONFERENCES) FROM LATIN AMERICAN PRESS, CP'S, GOVERNMENTS.

STATUS AND PLANS FOR ESTABLISHMENT AND EXPANSION NCNA AND TRADE OFFICES MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested rqmts for two Mexi Station assets use in eliciting info from exiled Guatemalan journalist on his recent trip China.

ADCFE(C) Andrew Rosen

C/WH/3

W Hood

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM E. COLBY
C/FE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

414

DATE : 9 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION : WH 8 (WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 1500 9 NOV)

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, BELL 5, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

NOV 9 1933Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 20212

PRITY MEXI INFO PRITY DIR ROUTINE CARA CITE GUAT 1824 CHATEMAN ACTING

REFS: A. GUAT 1822 (IN 19554) (IN 19767)*

B. MEXI 9372 (NOT SENT CARA)

file

1. FURTHER INVESTIGATION SHOWS AMUPAS-1 TRIED LAND GUAT 3 NOV. WHEN DENIED ENTRY DUE LACK TOURIST CARD, CREATED SCENE, TRIED PURCHASE CARD, DELAYED PLANE DEPARTURE SEVERAL MINUTES.

2. A-1 RETURNED GUAT 7 NOV. SUITCASE SEIZED PER REF A PARA 1. A-1 STAYED HOME OF RODRIGO ASTURIAS AMADO, 12 AVENIDA AT 9 CALLE, NO. 12-12, ZONE 1. WAS ARRESTED THERE 0800 8 NOV. BY AGENTS OF GUARDIA JUDICIAL. STATION INFORMED A-1 CARRYING TWO U.S. PASSPORTS, NO. 273304 ISSUED 21 SEPT 1948 AND NO. 12404 ISSUED 28 SEPT 1953, AND THAT A-1 TO BE EXPELLED FROM GUAT 8 NOV ON CHARGE TRANSPORTING COMMIE PROPAGANDA.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE 2

IN 20212 GUAT 1824

3. CONSUL ADVISED BY IMMIGRATION 9 NOV THAT A-1 WAS TAKEN BY ROAD TO MEXI BORDER 8 NOV AND PUT ACROSS IN VICINITY TAPACHULA. THIS CONFIRMED TO STATION BY COLONEL MONZON OF ESTADO MAYOR.

4. ARREST AND EXPULSION GIVEN PROMINENT PRESS PLAY HERE AND AP STRINGER FILING STORY TO STATES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *AMUPAS 1 ARRIVED MEXI 3 NOV. DECIDED CONTINUE MEXI AND NOT PRESS ATTEMPT STOP GUAT.

SECRET

CSMusulin/bm SECRET
2268

ROUTINE

84055

3 SEPT 69 0930 1 1

CONTACTS LOS ANGELES

FROM OSS (MUSULIN)

CLOSED CASE 52,872 - HUGH C. MC DONALD/WORLD ASSOCIATES, INC.

REF: LANG 0223

RE REF JOE TEREK, TSD/ORD, HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MR. MC DONALD ON MATTERS OF INTEREST TO ORD. HOWEVER, THIS INTEREST DOES NOT PRESENTLY HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH MC EE DONALD'S TRIP ABROAD. THERE IS NO OBJECTION WHATEVER TO YOUR BRIEFING OR DEBRIEFING OF MC DONALD ON POSSIBLE FPI POTENTIAL. TEREK PLANS TO BE IN YOUR AREA AGAIN IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS TO DISCUSS ORD MATTERS WITH MC DONALD AND WILL CONTINUE TO MEET WITH HIM AND TO DISCUSS RELATED ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT MC DONALD'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ORD AND POSSIBLY OTHER CS COMPONENTS WILL IN NO WAY CONFLICT WITH YOUR INTENDED USE OF MCDONALD, AS A SOURCE OF FPI. MC DONALD IS NEITHER A CONTRACTOR NOR A CONSULTANT FOR DDS&T,

SEP 3 12 55 PM '69

SECRET

SECRET

AUG 29 3 02 PM '69

S E C R E T 291840Z AUG 69 CITE CONTACTS/LOS ANGELES 0223

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

TO OSS

SUBJECT: CASE 52872 (CLOSED)

I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH HUGH MCDONALD FOR SEPTEMBER 4 TO DISCUSS HIS TRAVEL ABROAD. HE INDICATED HE HAS BEEN DISCUSSING HIS TRIP WITH "PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON". I GOT THE IDEA THAT TSD/ORD ARE THE "PEOPLE" AND THAT THEY MAY HAVE THOUGHTS ABOUT BRIEFING HIM. IF SO I DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR NOT WITTING TO THE DEGREE OF STUPIDITY. PLEASE DETERMINE IF DD/S&T ELEMENTS ARE PLANNING TO TASK MCDONALD IN ANY WAY CONCERNING HIS TRIP FOR I WANT TO DETERMINE IF HIS TRIP OFFERS ANY POTENTIAL FOR FFI. ALSO, PLEASE DETERMINE IF MCDONALD IS A DD/S&T CONSULTANT OR CONTRACTOR.

S E C R E T

Joe - Terek.

X - 2901.

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 20 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, **LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE**

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : Ad Hoc Clearance

93½

REFERENCE : a) DCS - R - 10 - 30

b) Case 52872 -closed.

Re HUGH C. MC DONALD, Security Division has granted ad hoc clearance through "Secret" for Denied Area Briefing.

Favorable National Agency Checks were completed APRIL 1969.

Current FBI Checks were completed, MAY 1969.

CS has no objection to your use of Subject in accordance with the DCI's Memorandum dated 25 November 1961.

Coordination for Denied Area Briefing of Subject, in accordance with DCS R - 10 - 30, must be completed separately by the appropriate Headquarters Division.

Virginia L. Thorne

VIRGINIA L. THORNE
Security Liaison Officer

CC : MUSULIN ✓

VThorne:cak

FILE

9/3/69 4406
DDS&T
Security:
NO CONNECTION.
NEVER HEARD
OF HIM.

SECURITY MESSAGE 7868

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(When Filled In)

FILE.

DATE 27 May 1969

MEMORANDUM TO : CHIEF, LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : AD HOC CLEARANCE

REFERENCE : CASE 52872

Security Division has granted ad hoc clearance thru

SECRET BUT EAC MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE DAB APPROVAL CAN BE GRANTED

on the following:

HUGH C. MC DONALD

Security checks will be completed.

CC: MOSULIN

Virginia L. Thorne

VIRGINIA L. THORNE
Security Liaison Officer

SECURITY MESSAGE # 1260

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

VThorne:grw

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

World Associates Incorporated

GSMusulin/bn
DCS/Operational Support Staff 2268
900 Key Bldg.

Closed Case 52,872

15 May 1969

TSD
Col. West

For your retention.

Attached per your request is copy of current data concerning World Associates, Inc, their products and services.

REF: 00-A(S)-322/12039-69

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(When Filled In)

DATE 6 May 1969

MEMORANDUM TO : CHIEF, LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : AD HOC CLEARANCE

REFERENCE : CASE 52872

Security Division has granted ad hoc clearance thru

CONFIDENTIAL TO BE RAISED TO SECRET AFTER THE FBI CHECK IS COMPLETED

on the following:

HUGH C. MC DONALD C. 52872

Security checks will be completed.

NAC's will be completed at a later date.

CC: **MOBULIE**

Virginia L. Thorne

VIRGINIA L. THORNE
Security Liaison Officer

SECURITY MESSAGE # 7065

VLThorne:grw

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

World Associates, Inc., Hugh C. McDonald, President

Daniel J. Shine for GSMusulin/js
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

2268

DCS Case 52872

5 May 1969

TSD/MPS
Col. West
230 South Building

Attached is copy of 00-A(S) 322/12039-69 for your information.

Financial Inf Sect
& Control for filing

c/s - Lohmann

case closed
on P/S.

SECRET

COUNTRY: - -

MLA 00-A(S) 322/12039-69

SUBJECT: World Associates, Inc.
Hugh C. McDonald, President
406 Wilshire Boulevard
Suite 203
Santa Monica, Calif. 90401

30 April 1969

DCS Case 52872

1. Interviewed 23 Apr 69, Hugh C. McDonald, a cleared DCS source, informed that there appeared to be a misunderstanding in connection with his visiting Washington. First, he does not plan on going to Washington himself; a representative from the Chicago Office is going for the purpose of meeting with the Financial Group Company. Next, McDonald said he has not offered to demonstrate his Voice Ident System. Finally, he does not plan a "world tour". Rather, sometime this Fall he plans on visiting bankers and government security people in various Latin American countries. He will return to the US; then, later on, visit various European countries. Again he will return to the US and then visit various Far Eastern countries. His purpose in making these trips is to sell Hughes helicopters to foreign police departments combined with possible sale of his check cashing security system to banking institutions.

2. McDonald will inform DCS/LAFO of his travel plans when they are firmed up.

3. McDonald is willing to go to Washington, D.C. himself on 8-9 May and meet with TSD/ORD people there to "discuss" his Voice Ident System, but he is not prepared to do so unless TSD/ORD have some specific problems which his system will help solve. He feels otherwise it would be a waste of time. [illegible]

4. The above discussed with DCS/OSS (Musulin) 29 Apr 69. It was decided that since ~~ORD~~ (Carrick) has been in contact with McDonald previously that Carrick discuss the possible meeting on the Voice Ident System directly with McDonald. [illegible]

5. McDonald was informed 29 April to expect a call from Carrick; that DCS/LAFO would follow up later concerning his travels abroad.

- end -

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

28 April - Tony Lohmann says that McDonald will come to D.C. if the agency has some real and honest problems to discuss. He does not have the time to come to Washington for a general discussion on the subject.

Col. West has canvassed one part of TSD and several people are interested in sitting in but the interest is not sufficient to justify bringing McDonald to Washington. Col West approached his D&E people and was told that Joe Terek had asked them some time ago and he had already arranged a meeting.

4/29/69. (Area 213-393-3564.) Talked to Tony about him - We wash this one out: Terek will make his own arrangement to (bring or not to bring) McDonald to D.C. To many indians spoil the sausage.

GSMusulin/bm SECRET
2268

ROUTINE

83050

25 APR 69 1030 1 2

CONTACT LOS ANGELES

FROM OSS (MUSULIN)

CASE 52,872 - HUGH C. MC DONALD, WORLD ASSOCIATES INC.

REFS : WASH-83002 AND LANG-3077

WA-TUX HAS BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM REPRESENTATIVE FROM OED, WHO MAY HAVE OVERESTIMATED MC DONALD'S ENTHUSIASM TO BE OF SERVICE TO HIS FORMER BENEFACTORS. WE ARE POLLING TSD/OED COMPONENTS TO DETERMINE RESPONSE TO HIS OFFER TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON 8 MAY AS INDICATED IN SECOND REF. BELIEVE FIRST WE SHOULD HAVE MEETING OF MINDS ON EXTENT AND SCOPE TO WHICH MC DONALD WOULD AGREE TO DISCUSS OR DEMONSTRATE HIS VOICE IDENT SYSTEM WITH AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES, WHO ARE QUALIFIED TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT. THE XXX ITINERARY OF HIS WORLD TRIP IS IMPORTANT BUT NOT A PRESSING MATTER AT THIS TIME. IF THERE IS SUFFICIENT OPERATIONAL INTEREST, WE CAN SERVE REQUIREMENTS LATER WHEN MORE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE REGARDING HIS SO CALLED WORLD TOUR IN THE FALL. SHOULD MC DONALD BE DISPOSED TO COME TO WASHINGTON, D.C. WE WILL MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND INTRODUCTION TO TSD/OED REPS. HIS POINT OF CONTACT WOULD BE DCS/OsS (MUSULIN) WHOSE OFFICE TELEPHONE CAN BE FURNISHED TO MC DONALD. WHEN WE LEARN NAMES OF THOSE WHO WISH TO ATTEND MEETING WITH MC DONALD, WE WILL BE GLAD TO FURNISH NAMES BUT THE CONTACTING ARRANGEMENTS ABOVE MENTIONED WILL REMAIN INTACT. SHOULD MC DONALD INDICATE SIGNS OF ANY DISPLEASURE WITH THESE ARRANGEMENTS OR SHOW RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS HIS VOICE

83050

IDENT SYSTEM AND/OR OTHER GADGETS WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO CIA, WOULD SUGGEST DISENGAGEMENT. DDS/LOGISTIC SECURITY BRANCH, INFORMED THEY HELD TOP SECRET CLEARANCE ON SUBJECT SINCE 1961.

14-00000

SECRET

APR 24 11 57 AM '69

S E C R E T 241630Z APR 69 CITE CONTACTS/LOS ANGELES 5077

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

TO OSS, MUSULIN

SUBJ: CASE 52872

HUGH C. MCDONALD, WORLD ASSOCIATES INC., INFORMS ME THAT SOMEONE PROVIDED TSD/ORD WITH INCORRECT INFORMATION. HE DID NOT OFFER TO DEMONSTRATE HIS VOICE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM, WHICH HE REGARDS AS A HIGHLY SENSITIVE SYSTEM FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT. HE ALSO DID NOT PLAN TO BE IN WASHINGTON WITHIN THE NEXT THREE WEEKS. HIS SO CALLED WORLD TOUR WILL BEGIN SOMETIME THIS FALL WITH A VISIT FIRST TO LATIN AMERICA, A RETURN TO US, A TRIP TO EUROPE, RETURN US AND A FINAL TRIP TO FAR EAST. THE CHICAGO REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FIRM PLANS ON REPRESENTING THE FIRM AT AN 3 MAY MEETING WITH FINANCIAL GENERAL GROUP CO. IN WASHINGTON. MCDONALD AGREEABLE TO GOING HIMSELF AND TO MEETING WITH AGENCY PEOPLE IF YOU WILL PROVIDE US WITH NAMES, TELEPHONE NUMBERS, ETC. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

4/23/69
FARGO. x3817
Security & Logistics
Inquired about McDonald
and our interest. They
have Top Secret Clearance
Continuing basis since 1961.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

JOE TERER
ORD/ 3901

HUGH C. McDONALD.
WORLD ASSOCIATES
INC.

SANTA MONICA,
CALIF.

STEVE ROCCA + TSD *
Tr.
3635. ED. SUDALL (PROJECT.
MONITOR)

POS VOICE IDENT SYSTEM

IDENT KIT.

VISIT WASH IN 3 WEEKS.

JACK TERESINE

JACK
TERESINE
& Detective
FARGO.
[illegible]/Security

ECIBS
100M

Chief, TSD/MPS 22 April 1969

ATTN : Colonel West

Director, Domestic Contact Service

DCS Case S2872 - Hugh C. McDonald - World Associates, Inc., Santa Monica, California, Offers to Assist Agency

1. Subject is well known to TSD and ORD components as developer of Identi-Kit. More recently he has been involved in developing a positive voice identification system (not to be confused with voice prints). McDonald is willing to demonstrate this system to interested TSD consumers and other components of the Agency. More importantly, subject is planning a world tour or foreign ministries, banking and business institutions, police organizations and friendly intelligence services, to demonstrate his various products. Subject's itinerary has not been firmed up but will be available when plans are completed for the world tour. He plans to be in Washington on other business matters in the next three weeks and would be glad to demonstrate his voice identification system to TSD and ORD representatives and accept any operational requirements which may be generated by appropriate TSD consumers, in connection with his world tour.

2. We would appreciate TSD's reaction to Mr. McDonald's offer and some indication of the number of Agency representatives who would be interested in meeting with Mr. McDonald in Washington, D. C.

3. Further inquiries should be directed to George S. Musulin, DCS, Operational Support Staff, Extension 2268.

JAMES R. MURPHY

GSMusulin/js
cc: Services Div. (Control)

SECRET

14-00000

3268

ROUTINE

21 APR 69 1600 1 1

CONTACTS/LOS ANGELES

83002

FROM OSS (MUSULIN)

NEW CASE 52872 - HUGH ~~CA~~ C. MCDONALD - WORLD ASSOCIATES INC., SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA

OFFERS TO ASSIST AGENCY (Closed Case 34441)

THIS IS NEW CASE OPENED TO YOUR OFFICE.

SUBJECT IS WELL KNOWN TO TSD/ORD COMPONENTS AS THE DEVELOPER OF IDENTI-KIT. MORE RECENTLY INVOLVED IN DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE VOICE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH VOICE PRINTS). SUBJECT PLANNING WORLD TOUR TO DEMONSTRATE HIS PRODUCTS TO FOREIGN BUSINESS AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS, FOREIGN MINISTRY'S POLICE ORGANIZATION AND FRIENDLY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. IN APPRECIATION FOR PAST ASSISTANCE PROVIDED HIM BY TSD/ORD FOR DEVELOPMENT OF IDENTI-KIT, HE IS OFFERING TO DEMONSTRATE HIS VOICE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM TO INTERESTED CS COMPONENTS AND TO SERVICE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO TSD AND OTHER AGENCY COMPONENTS, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS WORLD TOUR. SUBJECT PLANS TO VISIT WASHINGTON, D. C., WITHIN NEXT THREE WEEKS. PLEASE CONTACT SUBJECT, OBTAIN ITINERARY AND ADVISE HIM WE SOLICITING TSD CONSUMERS TO DETERMINE THOSE INTERESTED IN HIS VOICE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM AND OTHERS WHO MAY WISH TO TASK HIM WITH POSSIBLE OPS REQUIREMENTS, SUBJECT HOLDS DCS SECURITY APPROVED (CAUTION) CLEARANCE (DEC 1954) WHICH SHOULD BE UPDATED. PLEASE EXPEDITE.

SECRET

VV

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: McDONALD, Hugh C.
DCD 04-6188

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIA
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(When Filled In)

DATE 6 May 1969

MEMORANDUM TO : CHIEF, **LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE**

F-4-61-88

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : AD HOC CLEARANCE

REFERENCE : **CASE 52872**

Security Division has granted ad hoc clearance thru

CONFIDENTIAL TO BE RAISED TO SECRET AFTER THE FBI CHECK IS COMPLETED

on the following:

HENRI C. MC DONALD

Security checks will be completed.

NAC's will be completed at a later date.

SECURITY

Virginia L. Thorne

CC: **MENDLIN**

VIRGINIA L. THORNE
Security Liaison Officer

SECURITY MESSAGE # 7065

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

VThorne:gw

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(When Filled In)

F-4-61-88

DATE 27 May 1969

MEMORANDUM TO : CHIEF, LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : AD HOC CLEARANCE

REFERENCE : CASE 52872

Security Division has granted ad hoc clearance thru

SECRET BUT NAC MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE DAD APPROVAL CAN BE GRANTED

on the following:

RUTH C. MC DONALD

SECURITY

Security checks will be completed.

Virginia L. Thorne

CC: MOSULLIN

VIRGINIA L. THORNE
Security Liaison Officer

SECURITY MESSAGE # 7260

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

VThorne:grw

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET

F4-61-88

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS 1 June 1970

Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

MC DONALD, Hugh C. — Alleged Shipment of New Missiles to Cuba/Possible
#189 460 Exaggeration

REF : DCS memorandum to OS dated 30 January 1970

1. The information reported in the enclosed copies of MEMORANDA FOR THE RECORD from our Los Angeles Office, concerning our field representative's recent interview and telephone conversation with Subject, may be of interest. The information reported in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 25 March memorandum may be of particular interest.

2. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 2738.

SECURITY

B. FRANK YOUNG

Enclosures: As stated above
Memo-dtd. 25 March 1970
Memo-dtd. 15 April 1970

VThorne:grv

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL F-4-61-88

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS 30 January 1970

Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

MC DONALD, Hugh C. -- Meeting With Proprietor of World Associates, Inc.

1. The information reported in the enclosed self-explanatory memorandum from our Los Angeles Office, concerning Subject's organization and his belief that it will have a real intelligence potential for providing economic, political and other information, is forwarded as of possible interest and future reference.

2. As stated in paragraph 3 of the enclosure, our representative told Subject that the Agency has no interest in his plans since his organization has law enforcement affiliations.

3. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia L. Thorne, Extension 27[illegible].

SECURITY

E. FRANK YOUNG

Enclosure: As Stated Above

VThorne:caa

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

23 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: World Associates (Hugh McDonald, Proprietor)

1. On 13 January 1970, at the request of McDonald, I met with him for lunch. He went into the same routine about his organization anticipating spreading throughout the world in various countries in connection with bank security work. Queried specifically on this security [illegible], he informed me that he hoped to work with the Bank of Ame[illegible] and Inter-Bank of Rochester, New York, in setting up security meas[illegible] would prevent credit card losses in foreign countries. In [illegible] this, he said that he was planning to put law enforcement off[illegible] [illegible] in various countries who would have access to go[illegible] information and who would, in turn, act in liaison for him with [illegible] that might be honoring bank credit cards, or merchants, in various [illegible] in the country. Basically, he said that if a credit ca[illegible] stolen [illegible] fraudulently issued and used, and once his organization [illegible] notified [illegible] his law enforcement employees, he would notify all the [illegible], hotels, etc., in the city to be on the alert and not charge any[illegible] to such card.

SECURITY

2. The trend of the [illegible] that McDonald was again seeking some assistance [illegible] setting up his organization. I asked him whether or not [illegible] off the ground as yet and he said he had not, but th[illegible] a trip to Europe sometime in February 1970 during which [illegible] to sign up law enforcement officers in different cities to work [illegible]. He anticipates that he will put these people on a monthly retainer. He feels he will have a real intelligence organization going in different countries that will provide economic, political, and other types of information. Obviously, McDonald has not yet made any firm arrangements with the Bank of America or Inter-Bank.

3. I told McDonald that I had previously forwarded information concerning his plans to my headquarters and that the reply I had received was that, inasmuch as his organization had law enforcement affiliations that it would be of no interest to the Agency. McDonald then switched the conversation completely and said that he was merely interested in informing us of the existence of his organization abroad. On this basis, I said that I would be glad to make a record of the conversation.

4. After meeting with McDonald on two occasions now I have come to the conclusion that he has some grandiose plans but has nothing to back them up.

R. P. B. [illegible]

RPBL/bas

cc: DCS, Services Division

File: [illegible]/World Associates

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

F-4-61-88

DATE 20 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : Ad Hoc Clearance

REFERENCE : a) DCS - R - 10 - 30

b) Case 52872

Mr. HUGH C. MC DONALD, Security Division has granted ad hoc clearance through "Secret" for Denied Area Briefing.

Favorable National Agency Checks were completed APRIL 1969.

Current FBI Checks were completed, MAY 1969.

OS has no objection to your use of Subject in accordance with the DCI's Memorandum dated 25 November 1951.

Coordination for Denied Area Briefing of Subject, in accordance with DCS R - 10 - 30 may be completed separately by the appropriate Headquarters Division.

SECURITY

Virginia L. Thorne

VIRGINIA L. THORNE
Security Liaison Officer

CC : [illegible]

VLThorne:sak

SECURITY MESSAGE# 7868

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

F-4-61-88

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Los Angeles F.O.

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DENIED AREA
BRIEFING

DATE : 19 August 1969

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT: MC DONALD, Hugh C

FILE NO: 189460

1. Reference is made to your request for security checks on the subject person as a source of intelligence information.

2. This is to inform you that the necessary checks have been completed with the following results:

a. ☐ No additional information has been obtained, except for such biographic information as indicated below or in the attachment.

b. ☒ Information has been received that Subject was investigated with favorable results in 1953

c. ☐ Certain information has been received and appears in the attachment which your Division will wish to consider in determining the extent and level of your use of Subject.

3. It is to be noted that our checks were made on the basis of the identifying information you furnished or in an attachment to this memorandum. Should it be disclosed that this information is erroneous or that Subject is known by a different name, this Division should be notified immediately.

X 4. FBI name check was completed May 1969. Other National Agency checks were completed on 11 August 1969.

X 5. This office has no objection to Subject being used in accordance with the DCI's memorandum dated 25 November 1961.

Chief, Personnel Security Division
for/Charles S. Phalen
RCMcLeod

OS has coordinated with component having prime interest. There is no objection to DCS use.

DENIED AREA
BRIEFING

APPROVED/SECRET

FORM 6-65 1124a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1 [illegible]

(9-47)

28 APR 1969

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NO. EE-10772

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME – FIRST NAME – MIDDLE NAME McDONALD Hugh C.		3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 16 May 1913 - Hopkins, Minn.	
2. ALIASES A-46188		4. SEX M	5. CITIZENSHIP US
6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP			

7. RESIDENCES (Including No., and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	920 Euclid Street, Santa Monica, California
1954		2601 Colonial Avenue, Mar Vista, California

S-46188 ok

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	World Associates Inc.	406 Wilshire Blvd., Santa Monica, California
1936		Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office	211 Temple Street, Los Angeles California

DENIED AFTER BRIEFING

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR
	1945	Stanford University	Military Affairs
	1944	University of Virginia	Military Government
	1943	University of Michigan	Japanese Language
	1935	Univ. of Southern California	Political Science

☑ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

Major in Army Reserve (File 0504248)

01 MAY 1969

DENIED AFTER BRIEFING

28 APR

29 APR 1969

☐ CONTINUED

FORM 180 USE PREVIOUS
9-55 EDITIONS
MFG 11-68

(4-43)

[illegible]

28 APR 1969

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NO. C-52872 [illegible]

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME – FIRST NAME – MIDDLE NAME MC DONALD, Hugh C.	3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 16 May 1913; Hopkins, Minn.
2. ALIASES 13-41197	4. SEX M
	5. CITIZENSHIP US

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No., and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	920 # Euclid Street, Santa Monica, California
1954	?	2601 Colonial Avenue, Mar Vista, California
		[illegible]

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	World Associates Inc.	406 Wilshire Blvd., Santa Monica, California
1936	1967	Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office	211 Temple Street, Los Angeles, California

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR
	1945	Stanford University	Military Affairs
	1944	University of Virginia	Military Government
	1943	University of Michigan	Japanese Language
	1935	Univ. of Southern California	Political Science

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

Major in Army Reserve (File 0504248)

0 1 MAY 1969

DENIED AREA BRIEFING

F: C-52872

5 MAY 1969

☐ CONTINUED

FORM 180 USE PREVIOUS
8-68 EDITIONS
MFG. 1-68

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED (4-43)

CONFIDENTIAL

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, Contact Division, OO **DATE:** 8 November 1954

FROM: Chief, Security Division, SO

SUBJECT: McDONALD, Hugh C.
SE-10772

A-46188 ~~INACTIVE~~

Reference is made to your request for a security check on the Subject person as a potential source of foreign intelligence information.

Based on information available as a result of our checks, Subject has been placed in the designated category:

☐ Approved - Subject may be given information classified up to and including SECRET.

☒ Approved (Caution) - Subject may be given information classified up to and including SECRET provided discretion is exercised in development as a source.

☐ Limited - Subject may be given information classified up to and including CONFIDENTIAL.

☐ Disapproved - Subject may not be furnished any classified information.

Any pertinent information developed on Subject and not set forth in the data sheet furnished by your Division, is set forth below, or in an attachment. This additional information is for your confidential use only and is not to be disseminated outside of CIA.

It is to be noted that our checks were made on the basis of the identifying information you furnished, as outlined below, or in an attachment to this memorandum. Should it be disclosed that this information is erroneous or that Subject is known by a different name, this Division should be notified immediately.

Ermal P. Geiss
Ermal P. Geiss

~~444~~

DEC 6 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

Los Ang

29 July 1954

A-46188

McDONALD Hugh C

16 May 1913 Hopkins, Minn.

W M US

Present 3601 Colonial Ave., Mar Vista, California

1936 Present Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Office (Main Office) 211 Temple Street
Los Angeles, Calif.

1935, Univ. of Southern Calif, Political Science;1943, University of Michigan, Japanese Language;1944, University of Virginia, Military Government;1945, Stanford University, Military Affairs

Major in Army Reserve (File 0584248)

A-04-61-88

HUGH C. McDONALD

NOTE: Prior material on this source was retired to Records Center under Box 17 and Job 60-018, and has subsequently been destroyed in accordance with the disposition instructions authorized in the DCS Records Control Schedule.

BUSINESS:

Subject is with:

A14-98-59 - World Associates, Inc., Santa Monica, California

ACTIVATED

DATE 4-23-64

INITIALS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECRET [illegible]

Memorandum

LA 416-70

TO : Director, DCS
ATTN : OSS (Walker)

DATE: 15 May 70

FROM : Chief, Los Angeles Office

SUBJECT: Case 52722

1. John Purfey passed the attached to me on Saturday, 9 May. FYI I would like to comment as follows.

2. (Item 1) It was Herbert White, not Beske, who reported on the new radical group at Pitzer; source Linda Knolles. We doubt that we can obtain much more in response to CI/SO questions. We will try, but with caution, since we are dealing with a young, obvious liberal female. As for Tom Clark, we think he is back at Cornell. Our report to you covered all we know to date.

3. (Item 2) R. D. Beske will try and determine what he can about Dr. and Mrs. Leo Kuper at UCLA. If everything appears favorable and we can clear we may contact. However, they are unknown to us. Ask CI/SO what they can tell us about them. It will help.

4. (Items 3, 4, 5, 6) These people unknown to us. Who are they? Where did Purfey get their names? What does he know about them? What does he want us to do about them?

5. (Item 7) As I have reported, I will not personally contact John Cole. The FBI regards him as unsuitable to help them and, based upon their assessment, I will not serve any requirements on him. (Sorry my memo on this had an incomplete sentence.)

6. (Item 8) Answer is "no".

7. (Item 9) I have contacted Reid and reported.

8. (Item 10) Joseph Charles' PHS sent in 14 May.

9. (Item 11) I have told Purfey that Hugh McDonald is an opinionated, egotistical ass who refuses to provide any data to support his statements, thereby making it impossible to assess the information he supplies.

10. (Item 12) Beske says the chance of Baum providing anything is questionable.

[illegible]

SECRET/[illegible]

SUBJECT: Case 52722 LA 416-70

- -

11. (Item 13) I have finally figured out Purfey's West Pointer. During one of our initial conversations I facetiously remarked, in response to types he was looking for, that what he wanted was a red, white and blue Negro, a graduate of West Point, who is now in the export-import business dealing with Africa.

12. (Item 14) I told Purfey on Saturday that the local OS people are and have been in contact with the LAPD and the Sheriff's Office on militant matters; that the OS people are known as Agency; that OS is reporting whatever they learn and for us to involve ourselves would be confusing and duplicative. If Purfey wants to know what OS is getting, tell him to contact Ralph True in Headquarters/OS. Purfey might want to consider having his requirements levied on OS.

13. (Item 15) Beske reports nothing new, and not likely to be anything soon on the Connover-Clarke affair. Connover has changed jobs and is too busy to do much.

14. (Item 16) Beske reports Gonzales may have something on V.B. but he doubts it. He will check.

15. (Item 17) I told Purfey that I do not want to get involved in any activity that would put us in the position of being accused of investigating militants. We are on thin ice as it is. Therefore, DeVanon will not be asked to follow up on "Compton" contacts and we will depend on OS police contacts.

R. F. B. LOHMANN

Attachment:
Xerox copy of Purfey's notes

RFBL/vla

File: C-52722

S-E-C-R-E-T

MLA 00-A(S) 322/26389-69

10 September 1969

DCS Case 53199

SUBJECT: Cover Potential of
World Associates, Inc.

1. On 4 September 1969, Chief, LAPO, met with Hugh C. McDonald, President of World Associates Inc. A former law enforcement officer (Chief of Detectives, Los Angeles County Sheriffs' Office, retired) he has an excellent reputation among law enforcement agencies. He has cooperated with the Agency fully in the past. He is a cleared source of LAPO/DCS.

2. Since his retirement McDonald has started World Associates Inc., a company with two divisions, the Security Division and the Aircraft Division.

3. The Security Division provides, as its primary service, a bank security system, designed to provide banking institutions with a means to control and curtail losses from fraud and robbery.

4. The Aircraft Division was set up because of the exclusive contract World Associates has with the Hughes Tool Company (Hughes Aircraft) for the sale of helicopters to law enforcement agencies, to operate a helicopter pilot training school for municipal and other law enforcement agencies and to handle the installation of helicopter patrol systems. This contract applies to all countries except the US. McDonald said he expects to sell the Hughes Model 300 helicopter to foreign law enforcement agencies. None of these has been sold abroad, with the exception of the Philippines. He will have to open up offices in order to demonstrate, sell and arrange for servicing of the helicopters. A helicopter pilot-salesman and a technical representative would be needed at a beginning cost of about $18,000 per year. McDonald said he would have a good, plausible reason for setting up such an office in Hong Kong, not only to sell and service police helicopters in the Crown Colony, but also to use as a base for other Asian country activities. McDonald expects to start exploring the foreign police potential for helicopters in the near future, beginning with a trip to South America.

5. The possibility of using foreign offices to promote the activities of the Security Division of the company also exists.

6. Currently, McDonald is in Hawaii and is exploring the possibility of setting up a police intelligence school in Hawaii to train police officers from Asian countries.

7. Attached are copies of data pertaining to prospectus, products, services, etc.

8. In the event Cover Division has any interest in this matter, Chief, LAPO, will be glad to discuss it further at Headquarters during week of 5-11 October 1969.

- end -

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

14-00000

F-4-61-88

APR 21 5 03 PM '69

S E C R E T 21210[illegible] APR 69 CITE CONTACTS/WASHINGTON [illegible]

CONTACTS/LOS ANGELES

B

FROM DCS [illegible]

NEW CASE 52572 - HUGH C. MCDONALD - WORLD ASSOCIATES INC., SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA OFFERS TO ASSIST AGENCY (CLOSED CASE 34441)

THIS IS NEW CASE OPENED TO YOUR OFFICE.

SUBJECT IS WELL KNOWN TO TSD/ORD COMPONENTS AS THE DEVELOPER OF IDENTI-KIT. MORE RECENTLY INVOLVED IN DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE VOICE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH VOICE PRINTS). SUBJECT PLANNING WORLD TOUR TO DEMONSTRATE HIS PRODUCTS TO FOREIGN BUSINESS AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS, FOREIGN MINISTRY'S, POLICE ORGANIZATION AND FRIENDLY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. IN APPRECIATION FOR PAST ASSISTANCE PROVIDED HIM BY TSD/ORD FOR DEVELOPMENT OF IDENTI-KIT, HE IS OFFERING TO DEMONSTRATE HIS VOICE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM TO INTERESTED CS COMPONENTS AND TO SERVICE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO TSD AND OTHER AGENCY COMPONENTS, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS WORLD TOUR. SUBJECT PLANS TO VISIT WASHINGTON, D.C., WITHIN NEXT THREE WEEKS. PLEASE CONTACT SUBJECT, OBTAIN ITINERARY AND ADVISE HIM WE SOLICITING TSD CONSUMERS TO DETERMINE THOSE INTERESTED IN

PAGE 2 CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 83282 S E C R E T

HIS VOICE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM AND OTHERS WHO MAY WISH TO TASK HIM WITH POSSIBLE OPS REQUIREMENTS. SUBJECT HOLDS DOE SECURITY APPROVED (CAUTION) CLEARANCE (DEC 1954) WHICH SHOULD BE UPDATED. PLEASE EXPEDITE.

S E C R E T

Joe Terek 7901

He has worked for a no of yrs LA police Dept - chief of detectives - Also worked w/ Army intelligence - In touch with underworld - developed method of voice identification used by banks. Knows people throughout world.

last month discussed on business.

Would be more valuable to DD/P than to OCS.

- Hugh McDonald -

BW. & Epidemiological information -

Terek in ORD - Project monitors - He has done work on electronics for TSD - 8 years ago

Who should he talk to -

If we can't direct him he would use own methods -

10/27/70 Called Joe Terek/ORD I know Joe Terek from previous encounters. He has been trying to peddle Hugh Mc Donald to various elements of the Agency without success. TSD has no interest as I checked it again with West/TSD-MPS. I strongly urged Terek to channel him to John Schubert-LANG so that we can establish what he has on his mind and just what he wants. Subject's file contains information of little or no value from previous contacts.

Joe Derek 2701 – ORD –

Talked to Farrell – 3166

14-00000

SECRET

4-61-88

OLC 70-0857

9 December 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

A 46.88

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Hugh C. McDonald, President of World Associates Inc.

A/S A149859

1. In response to a request from Mr. Killgore, on the staff of Senator Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.), I met with Mr. Hugh C. McDonald at the Madison Hotel this afternoon. McDonald explained that he is in the banking and security business, having previously worked in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office. He also said he had a contractual relationship with the Agency some years ago and served as chief of security for Senator Goldwater during his campaign for the presidency in 1963.

2. Mr. McDonald talked this morning with Senator Goldwater about his interest in meeting with someone from the Agency to discuss a report which he has prepared on the subject of highly sensitive Soviet bacteriological warfare activities on the island of Vozrozhdeniya in the Aral Sea. McDonald said he originally became aware of the existence of the secret Soviet activity in this locality while in Europe on a business trip. He decided to follow it up and was referred from one contact to another until he was virtually at the Russian border and decided he had investigated the matter as far as he felt he could without the possibility of personal risk. McDonald pointed out that the information in his report was obtained from sources who spoke freely to him without any remuneration whatsoever. He added that he understood from some of his sources that they had been in touch with the Agency or with U.S. intelligence representatives and had become reluctant to deal further with these representatives because they were not treated properly by them and the sources feared the Agency had been penetrated by Soviet agents.

1C

SECRET

3. The reasons for McDonald's contact with us are threefold:

a. After preparing the 65-page report (a copy of which he gave me) he became concerned that publication of this document might not be in the national interest. He is anxious for our advice on this.

b. He is interested in knowing whether the information is reasonably accurate. He quite naturally does not want to publish a story that contains errors.

c. He is interested in knowing whether the Agency wants to delve further into this matter.

4. With regard to the possible publication of the report, McDonald said he planned to talk in very general terms this afternoon with representatives of Time/Life. He will make no commitments to them and will treat his meeting as strictly exploratory. It is McDonald's opinion that the story would appeal to publishers and would bring approximately $200,000 to $300,000.

5. Mr. McDonald claims he has no real interest in pursuing this subject further unless the Agency feels there is real merit in it. He said his sources are "wide open" and he is confident that further information could be developed although he has no direct contact with them as individuals and would probably have to go through the same laborious process of contacting one person through another as he did before.

6. McDonald plans to leave Washington tomorrow, but said he could stay in town through Friday if this was necessary. He said he came here for the express purpose of discussing this report with us. He said he did not consider Senator Goldwater a personal friend, but indicated he had traveled thousands of miles with the Senator during his presidential campaign and although he argued with him on many subjects had a very high regard for him. It was agreed that I would get the report in the hands of the appropriate Agency people as soon as possible and attemptto give him a preliminary reaction some time tomorrow.

7. The report has been forwarded to Dr. Karl Weber, of OSI, for review. A check with the Domestic Contact Service disclosed that McDonald had been a contact of the California Field Office and, although considered by DCS to be somewhat of a phony and a nuisance, his clearances were verified by them. McDonald does not appear to me to be a crackpot although I have not read his report. He gave no indication at this meeting of making a "pitch." He appeared concerned about the information he has uncovered and seems to want to do what is right under the circumstances. Mr. Killgore, in Senator Goldwater's office, has asked that we give him a followup report on our contact with McDonald.

/s/ GEORGE L. CARY, JR.

GEORGE L. CARY, JR.
Deputy Legislative Counsel

Distribution:
Orig. - Subj.
1 - Dr. Weber (OSI)
1 - Chrono
1 - DCS
OLC/GLC:rw (11 Dec 70)

14-00000

SECRET

R-S/OSS/Stetson 2
F 4-61-88

15 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD B

Subject: Hugh McDonald/Telephone Conversation 13 April 1970

Hugh McDonald telephoned and informed that, "a reliable source" told him that a sum of "several million" dollars had been transferred to the Cathay Bank (Los Angeles) from the Far East for the Commercial Bank of Sweden. He commented that it may be the first substantial payment to militant groups throughout the world from the Red Chinese. The information was about 10-12 days old as of 13 April 1970, he informed me. Because of his refusal to provide any data concerning his sources in the past, I merely thanked him for the information.

R. P. B. LOHMANN

RPBL/bss

File: Case 52722
World Associates, Inc.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

4-61-88

Service Div.

SECRET

A149859

25 March 1970

MEMO FOR THE RECORD -11

B-# A46188

Subject: World Associates, Inc. (Hugh McDonald)

1. McDonald asked me to meet with him on 24 Mar 70. I did. He started the conversation by stating, "We are getting bigger all the time and are on the way of becoming the largest, private intelligence organization in the world. And we are picking up intelligence that I want to pass to someone, anyone in government. I feel you should get it."

2. At this point I commented that I appreciated his feeling but wondered if he could provide some basis for information passed to us that would permit some evaluation, such as type of person who provided him the information, when, where and his evaluation of his source. McDonald "blew his cool". He said if he did so, we would figure out who his source was and contact the source directly and push the source around to get what we wanted. I told McDonald we did not push people around; that I had personally heard the Director comment years ago that he would not permit any pressure on anyone, anytime, anywhere. McDonald replied, "Then he has changed. I know that people have been pushed around by CIA". I asked who, when and where. He replied it happened after WWII in "1947, 48 or 50 in connection with the Katyn Massacre investigation". I told him that to the best of my knowledge we had nothing to do with the Katyn inquiries; that it was a Congressional Commission that looked into the matter.

3. I asked McDonald if he felt he could not trust us then why bother to pass along information to us. He said that he wants the government to have the information that he feels is important; that he trusts me to pass it along; that he keeps a record of what he passes to us in the event it is ever said he had information and failed to pass it along.

4. McDonald then proceeded to tell me that "new, short, fat missiles" have been shipped into Cuba; that they are so-called defensive missiles but are a type that can take a "multi-head offensive warhead". The shipment to Cuba from the USSR took place three-four months ago. These new type missiles can reach targets in the US.

5. Next, McDonald said that there are two sets of people involved in the current bombings of banks, offices, etc. One is a racial group made up of black militants and the other a group of white US and Canadian trained "sappers" who aim at disrupting everything. He stated that he

✓

(2) Copies Given to UT

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

has a list of large companies to be targeted in this area (probably the All Points Bulletin I received 10 days ago which listed four companies).

6. Again, McDonald said he would not reveal his sources or anything about them that would enable us to identify them.

7. McDonald went on to say, "We are spending a lot of money on a lot of campuses to obtain intelligence." When asked for some details he backed off and said they were just starting and had to be careful how much they spent.

8. A little later on he spoke of talking to a 20 year old senior who had been in his office and the attitude expressed by this student about young people and the establishment (this could be one of his impeccable sources of information).

9. McDonald then said his organization had gathered together some "very interesting statistics on student protests." He said there are 25 million college students; one-quarter of these are freshmen who do not involve themselves; one-half of the 25 million are sophomores and juniors. These are the real source of trouble. The seniors are concerned about graduation and a job and inclined to forget protests and lean towards the establishment as of now. However, as time passes and students are promoted by the time they will become students they will remember being part of a protest, their pictures being on file and will feel they will never get a job and will, therefore, become part of the permanent anti-establishment group. (These "statistics" were not supported by any written reports or other data.)

10. During the conversation McDonald said that, "Nixon personally sent 20 Washington people out to me to consult with us on a program." Further remarks revealed that the Washington, DC police department was contacted by one of McDonald's people in an attempt to sell a helicopter-police patrol training program.

11. Obviously, McDonald is overly impressed with himself; is prone to a high degree of exaggeration and truth-stretching; is not inclined to cooperate fully and one should be careful not to be taken in by him.

R. P. B. LOHMANN

RPBL/sg

cc: DCS, International Division (Heller)
DCS, Services Division ✓

File: World Associates, Inc.

SECRET

F-4-61-88

LA-254-70

Director, DCS
for Soviet Bloc Division

18 March 1970

Chief, Los Angeles Office

USSR/China Tension

b

1. Hugh C. McDonald, World Associates, Inc., Santa Monica, a former Deputy Sheriff of Los Angeles County and now in a private detective-security business, telephoned me on 17 March 1970. He said he has learned from "an impeccable source" that, "by August 1970 the USSR will hit China." Also, that the Soviets have solved the problems they have been having with their MIRV system.

2. McDonald refused to provide any information concerning the qualifications of his source to provide reliable data. In fact, he became a bit vexed when the matter was brought up.

3. I regard McDonald as a prima donna, an opportunist and one inclined to exaggerate. However, I pass the above along for the record.

R. P. B. LOHMANN

RPBL/bas

File: World Associates, Inc.
(Hugh C. McDonald)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[illegible]

DCS, Services

4-61-88

23 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 149859

46188

Subject: World Associates (Hugh McDonald, Proprietor)

1. On 13 January 1970, at the request of McDonald, I met with him for lunch. He went into the same routine about his organization anticipating spreading throughout the world in various countries in connection with bank security work. Queried specifically on this security designation, he informed me that he hoped to work with the Bank of America and Inter-Bank of Rochester, New York, in setting up security measures that would prevent credit card losses in foreign countries. In arranging to do this, he said that he was planning to put law enforcement officers on the payroll in various countries who would have access to government information and who would, in turn, act in liaison for him with banks that might be honoring such credit cards, or merchants, in various cities in the country. Basically, he said that if a credit card is stolen or fraudulently issued and used, and once his organization is notified through his law enforcement employees, he would notify all the banks, hotels, etc., in the city to be on the alert and not charge anything to such card.

2. The trend of the conversation indicated that McDonald was again seeking some assistance from the Agency in setting up his organization. I asked him whether or not he had gotten it off the ground as yet and he said he had not, but that he was planning a trip to Europe sometime in February 1970 during which he hoped to sign up law enforcement officers in different cities to work for him. He anticipates that he will put these people on a monthly retainer. He feels he will have a real intelligence organization going in different countries that will provide economic, political, and other types of information. Obviously, McDonald has not yet made any firm arrangements with the Bank of America or Inter-Bank.

3. I told McDonald that I had previously forwarded information concerning his plans to my headquarters and that the reply I had received was that, inasmuch as his organization had law enforcement affiliations that it would be of no interest to the Agency. McDonald then switched the conversation completely and said that he was merely interested in informing us of the existence of his organization abroad. On this basis, I said that I would be glad to make a record of the conversation.

Copy F: 149859

CONFIDENTIAL

4. After meeting with McDonald on two occasions now I have come to the conclusion that he has some grandiose plans but has nothing to back them up.

R. P. B. [illegible]

RPBL/bas

cc: DCS, Services Division

File: GEN/World Associates

14-00000

SECRET

F-4-61-88

Chief, Los Angeles Field Office

15 October 1969

Director, Domestic Contact Service, CSS

Case 53,199 - Cover Possibilities in Hong Kong and Japan

1. The leads which you have forwarded in response to this case have been very much appreciated by Cover Staff. The following comments have been received concerning several of these leads:

B A 118410

a. MIA-CO-A(S)-322/26333-69 and [illegible] LA-716-69, [illegible] and Sons. Cover Staff has received preliminary security reading on Jack Birns and Security has again brought up the derogatory information which you have on file. To get full CSA on Birns to override this former report would require extensive field investigation. Kaylor does not feel that he wants to subject Mr. Birns to this type investigation so Cover will not pursue this lead.

A 119859

b. MIA-CO-A(S)-322/26333-69, World [illegible], Inc. Because of Mr. Hugh C. McDonald's former law enforcement career and his continuing involvement in that field, this lead will not be pursued.

A 46188

A 96903

c. MIA-CO-A(S)-322/26654-69, [illegible] Corp. Cover Staff would be interested in pursuing this lead if we could pinpoint fewer committing officials for Cover's specific interest. A Cover commitment within an organization is on a "need-to-know" basis, to those officials who would be directly concerned in backstopping the commitment. Would you please review this organization and if the committing officials can be limited please identify them and provide biographic data if we do not have the biographic data available in Headquarters files.

d. Memo For The Record, 12 September 1969, [illegible] Sports Clothes. This looks very interesting and Cover Staff is processing clearance of Mr. Ben [illegible].

A 114502

D

e. LA-752-69, Mr. Harold Hutton, Refining Associates (Canada) Ltd. This lead returned to Cover Staff in response to a different requirement (case not open to your office). It was decided that Mr. Hutton would not fit the Cover requirement so this lead has been forwarded to the area desk for consideration.

A 11204

Copy of All [illegible]

SECRET

2. Thank you for your response to this case. We would appreciate any additional data you can provide on (c) above and we will try to keep you advised of further interest in leads which you forward.

JAMES R. MURPHY

LIGrant/bm
cc: Services Div. (Control)

SEP 3 12 55 PM '69

S E C R E T 031533Z SEP 69 CITE CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 84255

CONTACTS/LOS ANGELES

FROM OSS (MUSULIN)

CLOSED CASE 52,872 - HUGH C. MCDONALD/WORLD ASSOCIATES, INC.

REF: LANS 2223

RE REF JOE TEREK, TSD/ORD, HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MR. MCDONALD ON MATTERS OF INTEREST TO ORD. HOWEVER, THIS INTEREST DOES NOT PRESENTLY HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH MCDONALD'S TRIP ABROAD. THERE IS NO OBJECTION WHATEVER TO YOUR BRIEFING OR DEBRIEFING OF MCDONALD ON POSSIBLE FPI POTENTIAL. TEREK PLANS TO BE IN YOUR AREA AGAIN IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS TO DISCUSS ORD MATTERS WITH MCDONALD AND WILL CONTINUE TO MEET WITH HIM AND TO DISCUSS RELATED ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT MCDONALD'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ORD AND POSSIBLY OTHER CS COMPONENTS WILL IN NO WAY CONFLICT WITH YOUR INTENDED USE OF MCDONALD, AS A SOURCE OF FPI. MCDONALD IS NEITHER A CONTRACTOR NOR A CONSULTANT FOR DDS&T.

SECRET

14-00000

F4-61-88

AUG 29 3 02 PM '69

SECRET 291840Z AUG 69 CITE CONTACTS/LOS ANGELES 0223

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

TO OSS

SUBJECT: CASE 52572 (CLOSED)

B

I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH HUGH MCDONALD FOR SEPTEMBER 4 TO DISCUSS HIS TRAVEL ABROAD. HE INDICATED HE HAS BEEN DISCUSSING HIS TRIP WITH "PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON". I GOT THE IDEA THAT TSD/ORD ARE THE "PEOPLE" AND THAT THEY MAY HAVE THOUGHTS ABOUT BRIEFING HIM. IF SO I DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR NOT WITTING TO THE DEGREE OF STUPIDITY. PLEASE DETERMINE IF DD/S&T ELEMENTS ARE PLANNING TO TASK MCDONALD IN ANY WAY CONCERNING HIS TRIP FOR I WANT TO DETERMINE IF HIS TRIP OFFERS ANY POTENTIAL FOR FFI. ALSO, PLEASE DETERMINE IF MCDONALD IS A DD/S&T CONSULTANT OR CONTRACTOR.

SECRET

APR 25 3 09 PM '69

SECRET 251530Z APR 69 CITE CONTACTS/WASHINGTON [illegible]

CONTACTS/LOS ANGELES A-116186

FROM OSS (MUSULIN) B ~~B~~ A-149859

CASE 52,872 - HUGH C. MCDONALD / WORLD ASSOCIATES INC.

REFS: WASH-53082 AND LANG-3577

WA TWX WAS BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM REPRESENTATIVE FROM ORD, WHO MAY HAVE OVERESTIMATED MCDONALD'S ENTHUSIASM TO BE OF SERVICE TO HIS FORMER BENEFACTORS. WE ARE POLLING TSD/ORD COMPONENTS TO DETERMINE RESPONSE TO HIS OFFER TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON 8 MAY AS INDICATED IN SECOND REF. BELIEVE FIRST WE SHOULD HAVE MEETING OF MINDS ON EXTENT AND SCOPE TO WHICH MCDONALD WOULD AGREE TO DISCUSS OR DEMONSTRATE HIS VOICE IDENT SYSTEM WITH AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES, WHO ARE QUALIFIED TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT. THE ITINERARY OF HIS WORLD TRIP IS IMPORTANT BUT NOT A PRESSING MATTER AT THIS TIME. IF THERE IS SUFFICIENT OPERATIONAL INTEREST, WE CAN SERVE REQUIREMENTS LATER WHEN MORE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE REGARDING HIS SO CALLED WORLD TOUR IN THE FALL. SHOULD MCDONALD BE DISPOSED TO COME TO WASHINGTON D.C. WE WILL MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND INTRODUCTION TO TSD/ORD REPS. HIS POINT OF CONTACT WOULD BE DCS/OSS (MUSULIN)

PAGE 2 CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 83058 S E C R E T

WHOSE OFFICE TELEPHONE CAN BE FURNISHED TO MCDONALD. WHEN WE LEARN NAMES OF THOSE WHO WISH TO ATTEND MEETING WITH MCDONALD, WE WILL BE GLAD TO FURNISH NAMES BUT THE CONTACTING ARRANGEMENTS ABOVE MENTIONED WILL REMAIN INTACT. SHOULD MCDONALD INDICATE SIGNS OF ANY DISPLEASURE WITH THESE ARRANGEMENTS OR SHOW RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS HIS VOICE IDENT SYSTEM AND/OR OTHER GADGETS WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO CIA, WOULD SUGGEST DISENGAGEMENT. DDS/LOGISTIC SECURITY BRANCH, INFORMED THEY HOLD TOP SECRET CLEARANCE ON SUBJECT SINCE 1961.

SECRET

1-61-82

F7-61-88

APR 24 11 37 AM '69

S E C R E T 241637Z APR 69 CITE CONTACTS/LOS ANGELES 3777

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

TO OSS, MUSULIN

SUBJ: CASE 52872

HUGH C. MCDONALD, WORLD ASSOCIATES INC., INFORMS ME THAT SOMEONE PROVIDED TSD/ORD WITH INCORRECT INFORMATION. HE DID NOT OFFER TO DEMONSTRATE HIS VOICE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM, WHICH HE REGARDS AS A HIGHLY SENSITIVE SYSTEM FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT. HE ALSO DID NOT PLAN TO BE IN WASHINGTON WITHIN THE NEXT THREE WEEKS. HIS SO CALLED WORLD TOUR WILL BEGIN SOMETIME THIS FALL WITH A VISIT FIRST TO LATIN AMERICA. A RETURN TO US, A TRIP TO EUROPE, RETURN US AND A FINAL TRIP TO FAR EAST. THE CHICAGO REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FIRM PLANS ON REPRESENTING THE FIRM AT AN 8 MAY MEETING WITH FINANCIAL GENERAL GROUP CO. IN WASHINGTON. MCDONALD AGREEABLE TO GOING HIMSELF AND TO MEETING WITH AGENCY PEOPLE IF YOU WILL PROVIDE US WITH NAMES, TELEPHONE NUMBERS, ETC. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

14-00000

SECRET

F-4-61-88

Chief, TSD/MPS

ATTN : Colonel West

22 April 1969

~~Use~~

Director, Domestic Contact Service

A46188 [illegible] (Retired)

~~B-5-46188~~
A-14-98-59

DCS Case 52872 - Hugh C. McDonald - World Associates, Inc., Santa Monica, California, Offers to Assist Agency

1. Subject is well known to TSD and ORD components as developer of Identi-Kit. More recently he has been involved in developing a positive voice identification system (not to be confused with voice prints). McDonald is willing to demonstrate this system to interested TSD consumers and other components of the Agency. More importantly, subject is planning a world tour of foreign ministries, banking and business institutions, police organizations and friendly intelligence services, to demonstrate his various products. Subject's itinerary has not been firmed up but will be available when plans are completed for the world tour. He plans to be in Washington on other business matters in the next three weeks and would be glad to demonstrate his voice identification system to TSD and ORD representatives and accept any operational requirements which may be generated by appropriate TSD consumers, in connection with his world tour.

2. We would appreciate TSD's reaction to Mr. McDonald's offer and some indication of the number of Agency representatives who would be interested in meeting with Mr. McDonald in Washington, D. C.

3. Further inquiries should be directed to George S. Musulin, DCS, Operational Support Staff, Extension 2268.

JAMES R. MURPHY

GSMusulin/js
cc: Services Div. (Control)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

F-46188
Inactive

Chief, Los Angeles Office 19 September [illegible]

Chief, Contact Division, Support

CASE

Case [illegible]

A 37722

1. Attached is a memorandum from the Office of Training requesting contact with the Los Angeles Police Department, purpose to obtain full-length photographs of a total of [illegible] people, as outlined by requester.

A46188 I

2. For your information, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, through Chief Hugh McDonald, has already cooperated with this project by furnishing mug-shots of [illegible] people. The contact with Chief McDonald was made while he was in Washington, D. C. some months back.

3. Please note that requester has set aside a sum of [illegible] to take care of any costs that may be involved in his request to the Los Angeles Police Department. We fully realize this sum is inadequate to pay for the work involved, but it may serve as a stimulus to get the job done for us by a cooperative photographer or identification officer in the Los Angeles Police Department, and this sum may be mentioned to the Chief or other department officials you contact.

4. Many thanks.

R. E. [illegible]

7

Attachments (2)

[illegible]/jrv

cc: Index

2-9-

copy filed in jacket # 37722

CONFIDENTIAL

IC

14-00000

File
HH-6122

Chief, TSD/Security   21 April 1960

Chief, Security Staff, OL

Identi-Kit

REFERENCE: Memo from Chief, TSD/Security, to Chief, SS/OL, dated 21 March 1960, Subject as above.

.10

1. On 5 April 1960 the undersigned interviewed Chief Hugh A. McDonald, Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, in his office, Room 123, New Court House Building, located at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, California. (Telephone: MAdison 5-3614, Extension 61401.)

2. The attached "Face Building" article taken from the February 1960 issue of the "Science and Mechanics" Magazine, was reviewed and discussed. Chief McDonald stated that he was aware of the article and had talked with Mr. Courtney Owens, Sales Manager of Townsend Engineered Products, regarding the indication of "underwritten by an arm of the U. S. intelligence".

3. The article was written by a free lance reporter by the name of Joseph Frank. Writer Joseph Frank was present at a press meeting in Chief McDonald's office at the time the information regarding the Identi-Kit was made public, however, Chief McDonald made it very clear that the sponsor of the program was not mentioned and that a general figure of $60,000 to $65,000 was given as the cost of the project. Chief McDonald thought back and then stated that he had announced the sponsor as being "an Eastern customer".

4. Chief McDonald stated that he was at a complete loss as to how the writer associated the sponsor with any intelligence component of the government. He believed that it was a "shot in the dark" assumption by writer Joseph Frank.

5. Chief McDonald was very much disturbed by this article and stated that if he could uncover any information regarding same he would promptly notify the appropriate Agency persons.

6. On 8 April 1960, the undersigned interviewed Mr. Courtney Elvell Owens, Sales Manager of the Townsend Engineered Products Co., Santa Ana, California. He was granted a Secret contract security authorization on 26 January 1960. Mr. Owens was made witting of the sponsor and a secrecy agreement was taken from him.

OL 0 2440 25 Apr 60
Copy fwd to
L.A. Office

HH-6122

SUBJECT: "Identi-Kit"

7. Mr. Owens stated that he was not aware of the sponsor (until now), but he had assumed that the Agency was involved. Mr. Owens has worked in the government in Washington, D. C., and he stated that this project sounded like it would be of Agency interest.

8. When Mr. Owens came to Los Angeles, he worked as a free lance reporter between April 1957 and December 1957. He stated that all articles written by him were under his true name and that no "pen-name" was ever used. He did not know of a Joseph Frank.

9. Mr. Owens stated that he has a very close contact with Mr. Davonon, Los Angeles OO/C Office, but did not indicate if the subject of the Identi-Kit had ever been discussed. Mr. Owens gave the undersigned the attached press notices that he uses in connection with his publicity program. It is noted that none of the releases reveal Agency interest; however, the newspaper "Independent" quotes Chief McDonald as stating "the pilot model cost more than $67,000".

H. Edward Jones

H. Edward Jones

Security Officer, SS/OL

APPROVED:

JOHN A. CURRAN, CHIEF, SS/OL

Attachment

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/a

1 - Chief, PID,OS (Attn: Mr. Boardman) wo/a

1 - Chief, ES/PhySD/OS wo/a

1 - Mr. Travis, OO/C

1 - Co. file (Townsend) w/a

1 - Chrono

OL/SS:HEJones:bjw/2317 (21 April 60)

HH-6122

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

4-61-88

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.
1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	16 17 18 19 20	21
ML-A-		OO RCC	53199	X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DA. YR.	A	REPORT NO. B / OTHER	I U O
22 23 24 25 26	☒ 27	28 29 30 31 32 33	34 35 36
09109		263896 9	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Cover Potential of World Associates, Inc.

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD	RELEASED MO. DA. YR.
37 38 39	40 41 42 43 44
	11 07

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Hugh C. McDonald, President
World Associates, Inc.
406 Wilshire Blvd.
Santa Monica, California 90401

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45	TYPE OO-E	46	* NOT DISSEMINATED
S	GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER		

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
[✓ 9]	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
[✓ 2]	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

CCS

FIELD COMMENTS

ATTN: OSS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

CCS \ CCB

8-COO

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
RPBLohmann/bas	R. P. B. LOHMANN		~~DCS~~ OSS

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

2

(20-41)

4-61-88

S-E-C-R-E-T

MLA 00-A(S) 322/26389-69

10 September 1969

DCS Case 53199

SUBJECT: Cover Potential of
World Associates, Inc.

1. On 4 September 1969, Chief, LAFO, met with Hugh C. McDonald, President of World Associates Inc. A former law enforcement officer (Chief of Detectives, Los Angeles County Sheriffs' Office, retired) he has an excellent reputation among law enforcement agencies. He has cooperated with the Agency fully in the past. He is a cleared source of LAFO/DCS.

2. Since his retirement McDonald has started World Associates Inc., a company with two divisions, the Security Division and the Aircraft Division.

3. The Security Division provides, as its primary service, a bank security system, designed to provide banking institutions with a means to control and curtail losses from fraud and robbery.

4. The Aircraft Division was set up because of the exclusive contract World Associates has with the Hughes Tool Company (Hughes Aircraft) for the sale of helicopters to law enforcement agencies, to operate a helicopter pilot training school for municipal and other law enforcement agencies and to handle the installation of helicopter patrol systems. This contract applies to all countries except the US. McDonald said he expects to sell the Hughes Model 300 helicopter to foreign law enforcement agencies. None of these has been sold abroad, with the exception of the Philippines. He will have to open up offices in order to demonstrate, sell and arrange for servicing of the helicopters. A helicopter pilot-salesman and a technical representative would be needed at a beginning cost of about $18,000 per year. McDonald said he would have a good, plausible reason for setting up such an office in Hong Kong, not only to sell and service police helicopters in the Crown Colony, but also to use as a base for other Asian country activities. McDonald expects to start exploring the foreign police potential for helicopters in the near future, beginning with a trip to South America.

5. The possibility of using foreign offices to promote the activities of the Security Division of the company also exists.

6. Currently, McDonald is in Hawaii and is exploring the possibility of setting up a police intelligence school in Hawaii to train police officers from Asian countries.

7. Attached are copies of data pertaining to prospectus, products, services, etc.

8. In the event Cover Division has any interest in this matter, Chief, LAFO, will be glad to discuss it further at Headquarters during week of 5-11 October 1969.

- end -

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

4-61-88

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY / FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6 7 8 9 10	C. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15	D. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	E. 21	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT NO. A 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	IUO 34 35 36
HL-A-		UUECC	52872	X	04309	1203969	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Request for Information on World Associates, Inc.

(--)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39	RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44
	050477

45	TYPE OO-E	46	* NOT DISSEMINATED
S	GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER		

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Hugh C. McDonald, President
World Associates, Inc. - Suite 203
406 Wilshire Boulevard
Santa Monica, California 90401

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT	47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O	
1	S	&	T	
2	P	O	L	
3	M	I	L	
4	-	-	-	
5	S	O	C	
6	G	E	O	
7	B	I	O	
8	-	-	-	
[✓ 9]	M	I	S	

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA	51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V	
[✓ 2]	I	N	T	
3				
4				

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM	USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)	RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
	☐ NO ☐ TO USSR ☐ FROM USSR	TSD

FIELD COMMENTS

ATTN: OSS (Musulin)

For background (Services Division) attached are data concerning World Associates and their products/services.

May we close case?

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Copy to TSD/Col West

[illegible] [illegible] packet

Please Close Case

8-000

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
RPBLohmann/sg	R. P. B. LOHMANN	[illegible] GS M[illegible]	OSS

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

2

(20-41)

SECRET

4-61-88

COUNTRY: - -

MLA 00-A(S) 322/12039-69

30 April 1969

DCS Case 52872

SUBJECT: World Associates, Inc.
Hugh C. McDonald, President
406 Wilshire Boulevard
Suite 203
Santa Monica, Calif. 90401

1. Interviewed 23 Apr 69, Hugh C. McDonald, a cleared DCS source, informed that there appeared to be a misunderstanding in connection with his visiting Washington. First, he does not plan on going to Washington himself; a representative from the Chicago Office is going for the purpose of meeting with the Financial Group Company. Next, McDonald said he has not offered to demonstrate his Voice Ident System. Finally, he does not plan a "world tour". Rather, sometime this Fall he plans on visiting bankers and government security people in various Latin American countries. He will return to the US; then, later on, visit various European countries. Again he will return to the US and then visit various Far Eastern countries. His purpose in making these trips is to sell Hughes helicopters to foreign police departments combined with possible sale of his check cashing security system to banking institutions.

2. McDonald will inform DCS/LAFO of his travel plans when they are firmed up.

3. McDonald is willing to go to Washington, D.C. himself on 8-9 May and meet with TSD/ORD people there to "discuss" his Voice Ident System, but he is not prepared to do so unless TSD/ORD have some specific problems which his system will help solve. He feels otherwise it would be a waste of time. [illegible]

4. The above discussed with DCS/OSS (Musulin) 29 Apr 69. It was decided that since ORD (Carrick) has been in contact with McDonald previously that Carrick discuss the possible meeting on the Voice Ident System directly with McDonald.

5. McDonald was informed 29 April to expect a call from Carrick; [illegible] that DCS/LAFO would follow up later concerning his travels abroad.

- end -

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

4-61-88

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4 5): ML-A-

B. REPORT NUMBER (6 7 8 9 10):

C. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15): 00000

D. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20): 52722

E. (21): X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22 23 24 25 26): 04299

REPORT NO. S E K OTHER (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): A 118969

IUO (34 35 36):

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Case 52722

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39):

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44): 05029

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Hugh C. McDonald
World Associates, Inc.
406 Wilshire Blvd.
Santa Monica, California

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

45 TYPE OO-E

S GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT			
47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA			
51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

C1

FIELD COMMENTS

THIS IS A SENSITIVE REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

T: 01/50

8-000

C/S: R.P.B. Lohmann/vla

F.O. Chief: R. P. B. LOHMANN

Case Officer

Division/Staff/Desk

FORM 25 3-66 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

2

(20-41)

Raymond H. [illegible]

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ALVAREZ, Ramon Joseph
201-0119523 Vol III

INCLUSIVE DATES: 21 Feb 1966 - 3 May 1978

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO

ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY: None

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA.

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

7523
VOL III
1965-

14-00000

THIS AGENT IS ACTIVE UNDER PROJECT LIEMPTY

HMM/94 [illegible] LIPSTICK - 20 (201-119523) C-32743

Ramon Joseph ALVAREZ DuRant

RI ck - 27 June 55 (NP11 5 July 55) Part I - HMMA-3165

GL# 54229 - 1 July 55 (NP11 21 July, 55)

To write contract for subj - wait answer to HMMW 2395. answered by HMMA-3394, 4 Aug. 1955

Pseudo: Raymond H. GERENDE

Field advised of contract approval in DIR 44689(OUT-63196), 26 Jan 56 Amt: $3,600.

Copies of contract fwd'd to field in HMM-W-

Married to LIEMPTY-19

[illegible]

classified documents and CS documents without file numbers should be sent to IP/AN for proper processing.

2. Maintain the material in this dossier in chronological order.

3. To transfer the charge for this dossier to another component or individual, call IP/Files, extension 4362.

4. Contact your Division/Staff Records Management Officer if you have any questions concerning the maintenance or disposition of this dossier.

NOTE: This dossier may not be complete. A listing of all CS material processed for this file may be ordered via Form 3414 "Request for File Content List" or by calling IP/Files, extension 4127 or 5831.

FORM 2731 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-71

08/29/ SECRET FPC,

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (444) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (24/M)

78 0650621 PAGE 001 IN 0650621
TOR: 031854Z MAY 78 MEXI 44921

S E C R E T 031745Z MAY 78 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 44921

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 215553
B. MEXICO CITY 44819 0613976

1. STATION APPRECIATES RECEIVING REF A FILE SUMMARY ON RAYMOND H. GERENDE. STATION DOES NOT PLAN MAKE CONTACT NOR USE GERENDE OPERATIONALLY.

2. FILE: 201-119523. E2, IMPDET.

S89

☒

RECORD COPY

3 May 78

201-119523

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

14-00000

/29/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: LA-8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, DDO/DD,
EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (25/P)

78 0645361 PAGE 001
TOT: 021957Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 215553

S E C R E T
STAFF 021953Z DIRECTOR 215553
TO: MEXICO CITY.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME

REF: MEXICO CITY 44819 0613976

1. RAYMOND H. GERENDE, (IDENTITY A) WAS RECRUITED IN MARCH 1955 AS A MEMBER OF A STATION UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE TEAM. GERENDE RECEIVED AN OPERATIONAL APPROVAL ON 28 FEB 55 AND ON 1 OCT 55 WAS CONVERTED TO CONTRACT STATUS WITH AN INITIAL ANNUAL SALARY OF $3600. BY LATE 1956 HE HAD BECOME THE P/A IN CHARGE OF THE SURVEILLANCE TEAM AND ADDITIONALLY WAS IN CHARGE OF PHOTO SURVEILLANCE OF THE SOVIET MISSION, INCLUDING PROCESSING THE FILM. AT THIS TIME HE WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING "CONSCIENTIOUS, LOYAL, HARDWORKING AND DEDICATED." IN 1957 HE WAS GIVEN FIVE WEEKS OF CLANDESTINE OPS TRAINING IN THE HQS AREA, BEING DESCRIBED BY HIS TRAINER AS MORE "PRO-AMERICAN THAN MEXICAN." IN LATE 1958 HE WAS DESCRIBED AS ONE OF THE STATION'S "MOST VALUABLE ASSETS", ETC.

2. ON 12 DEC 58 GERENDE MARRIED LIEMPTY-19 (IDENTITY B), WHO ASSISTED HIM DURING THE NEXT TEN YEARS AS A PART-TIME SUPPORT ASSET. IN GENERAL GERENDE APPEARS TO HAVE PERFORMED A CREDITABLE JOB AS THE P/A FOR THE KDFACTOR ACTIVITY, WHICH PROVIDED SURVEILLANCE AND PHOTO COVERAGE OF THE SOVIET TARGET. AT THE TIME OF TERMINATION, HIS CONTRACT AGENT SALARY HAD INCREASED TO $7000 PER ANNUM. SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEPT FOR GIVING ENGLISH LESSONS AND OTHER MINOR COVER ACTIVITIES, GERENDE WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A FULL-TIME RTACTION EMPLOYEE. HE PERFORMED A NUMBER OF TASKS IN ADDITION TO KDFACTOR, INCLUDING SERVING AS LP KEEPER AND TRANSCRIBER/TRANSLATOR OF AN AUDIO OPERATION, INVOLVEMENT IN OPS AGAINST THE CUBAN MISSION AND CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, GENERAL OPS SUPPORT, AND SPOTTING AND ASSESSMENT. ON 8 OCT 1963, GERENDE SUCCESSFULLY PASSED AN SGSWIRL, ALTHOUGH IT EMERGED THAT HE HAD NOT ACCOUNTED FOR ALL FUNDS PASSED TO HIM (THE STATION DISMISSED THIS PROBLEM) AND FELT THAT HE WAS BEING UNDEREMPLOYED BY RTACTION. CONCERNING THE LATTER CHARGE, THE STATION SEEMS TO HAVE HAD PROBLEMS THROUGHOUT THE 1960'S KEEPING GERENDE FULLY OCCUPIED, SINCE FOR SECURITY REASONS THERE WAS RELUCTANCE TO INTRODUCE HIM TO ANY MORE OPERATIONS THAN THE CONSIDERABLE NUMBER HE WAS ALREADY AWARE OF. (FYI: IN ADDITION TO HIS WIFE, GERENDE'S MOTHER, 201-0262488, AND TWO BROTHER-IN-LAWS (KDFACTOR-1) AND (KDADAGE-14) WERE ALSO STATION ASSETS.

RECORD COPY SECRET

02 May 78

201-119523

3. IN 1969 GERENDE SEPARATED FROM LIEMPTY-19 IN WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE THE BEGINNING OF AN EXTREMELY ACRIMONIOUS DIVORCE PROCEEDING AND FIGHT FOR THE CUSTODY OF THEIR THREE CHILDREN. IN DECEMBER 1969 GERENDE WAS PUT ON HALF PAY AND HAD HIS OPS DUTIES SUSPENDED BY THE STATION BECAUSE OF HIS FULL-TIME INVOLVEMENT IN LEGAL MATTERS SURROUNDING THE DIVORCE. ON 26 JUNE 1970 GERENDE AND LIEMPTY-19 SIGNED QUIT CLAIMS AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS. GERENDE WAS PAID $10,000 AND LIEMPTY-19 $2500 AS TERMINATION BONUSES, AND THE PAYMENTS WERE MADE ON A MONTHLY BASIS SO THAT THE STATION WOULD HAVE SOME CONTROL OVER THE TWO AND THEREBY KEEP THEIR RTACTION STATUS FROM EMERGING DURING THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS. ON 8 JULY 1970 LIEMPTY-19 UNEXPECTEDLY APPEARED AT HQS IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET A LARGER TERMINATION BONUS. SUBSEQUENTLY LIEMPTY-19 AND HER CHILDREN WENT TO RESIDE IN THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS, WHERE SHE WAS PAID THE REST OF HER TERMINATION BONUS VIA MONTHLY CHECKS SENT TO HER BROTHER IN THE HQS AREA. SHE WAS LAST REPORTED TO BE WORKING AS A SECRETARY AT THE U.S. MISSION IN THE HAGUE.

4. ACCORDING TO MEXICO CITY 19452, 10 APRIL 72, THE LAST STATION CONTACT WITH GERENDE WAS IN MAY 1971, WHEN HE RECEIVED THE FINAL INSTALLMENT OF TERMINATION BONUS. CABLE NOTED THAT GERENDE APPEARED FINANCIALLY PRESSED, BUT WAS GIVING DAILY ENGLISH CLASSES AND RENTING HIS HOUSE TO STATION STAFFER JESSE R. GARDALPHE. THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT EITHER GERENDE OR HIS WIFE HAD VIOLATED THEIR SECRECY AGREEMENTS. STATEMENT WAS MADE THAT HE NO LONGER APPEARED TO BE DRINKING EXCESSIVELY.

5. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT GERENDE'S AGENT SERVICE RECORD QUALIFIES RECOMENDATION FOR HIS REUSE BY SAYING THAT HE SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT INCOME TO OBVIATE THE NEED FOR FULL-TIME RTACTION EMPLOYMENT, AND HAVE RESOLVED HIS PERSONAL PROBLEMS. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT EXCEPT FOR A POSSIBLE ROLE IN SERVICING SPECIFIC OPS SUPPORT TASKS, GERENDE OFFERS LITTLE POTENTIAL FOR THE STATION. SUGGEST THAT THE STATION MAY WISH TO DISCUSS GERENDE WITH THEODORE G. KINDOPP (P) UPON HIS ARRIVAL, SINCE GERENDE WAS HIS LANDLORD DURING PREVIOUS STAY IN MEXICO.

6. FILE: 201-119523. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: LA0MGSB (T-CHAMBERLAND); AUTH: AC/LA/MGSB (LEHMAN); REL: DC/LA/NR (DESMOND). CL BY 029163.<

END OF MESSAGE

/30/ SECRET FRP:

STAFF

CONF: LA-8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, DDO/DO, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (25/P)

78 0645456 PAGE 001
TOT: 022016Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 215575

SECRET
STAFF 022016Z DIRECTOR 215575
TO: MEXICO CITY.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME Idens cable to

REF: DIRECTOR 215553

1. IDENTITY A - RAMON JOSEPH ALVAREZ DURANT
DPOB: 7 DECEMBER 1933, NEW YORK CITY
GRADUATED FROM AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL IN MEXICO CITY IN 1952; RECEIVED B.A. IN LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES FROM MEXICO CITY COLLEGE IN 1955; RENOUNCED U.S. CITIZENSHIP IN 1952 TO PARTICIPATE ON MEXICAN OLYMPIC TEAM AND TO AVOID U.S. DRAFT. BILINGUAL IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH.

2. IDENTITY B - HESTER ROOS DE ALVAREZ
DPOB: 24-DECEMBER 1930, BANDUNG, INDONESIA, DUTCH CITIZEN.

3. FILE: 201-119523. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: LA/MGSB/M (CHAMBERLIN); AUTH: AC/LA/MGSB (LEHMAN); REL: DC/LA/NR (DESMOND). CL BY 029163.

RECORD COPY

2 May 78

201-119523

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

14-00000

55/48/ SECRET FRP: STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (149) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (24/A)

78 0613988 PAGE 001 IN 0613988
TOR: 260154Z APR 78 MEXI 44820

S E C R E T 260025Z APR 78 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 44820

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME Iden Cable to

REF: MEXICO CITY 44819 0613976

IDEN A: HARRY MAHONEY

IDEN B: RAYMOND H. GERENDE

E2 IMPDET.

889

26 APR 78

RECORD COPY

201-119523

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

55/48/ SECRET FRP:

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (150) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (24/W)

---

78 0613976 PAGE 001 IN 0613976

TOR: 260153Z APR 78 MEXI 44819

S E C R E T 260025Z APR 78 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 44819

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME

0

1. ON 25 APRIL 1978 RAMON JOSEPH ALVAREZ DURANT (201-119523) WALKED INTO U.S. EMBASSY AND OFFERED HIS SERVICES TO RTACTION. HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY U.S. EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER (NOT STATION OFFICER) AND REPORTED THAT HE WAS RECRUITED BY IDEN A IN 1955 AT UNIVERSITY OF THE AMERICAS AND WORKED FOR RTACTION UNTIL 1969. HIS PSEUDO WAS IDEN B. AFTER READING ARTICLE IN 17 APRIL 1978 ISSUE OF TIME HE DECIDED TO OFFER HIS SERVICES TO RTACTION ONCE AGAIN. ALVAREZ IS CURRENTLY A PARTNER AT LOCAL RESTAURANT.

2. STATION FILE ON ALVAREZ WAS DESTROYED SHORTLY AFTER HIS TERMINATION IN 1970. INDEX CARD INDICATES THAT HE WAS RECOMMENDED FOR RE-USE. REQUEST HQS SUMMARY OF ALVAREZ 201 FILE AND HIS PREVIOUS DUTIES FOR RTACTION.

3. FILE: 201-119523. E2, IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

26 APR 78

201-119523

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

4 Feb 75
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on ALVAREZ (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ Should be closed. (If this category applies, affix Records Officer stamp.)

☐ Unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7.
Explanation: __________

☐ Witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ Potential witting collaborator; date opened: __________
OI Code A2.

☒ Former witting collaborator (relationship terminated).
OI Code A3.

☐ Potential witting collaborator never contacted. OI Code A4.

☐ Counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ All others. OI Code A6.

Signed Barry Glren (name) Ops Officer (title) LA/M/FI (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed NR (initials) 12 Feb 75 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file. 201- 119523

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061475

1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

SECRET

4 Feb 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on ALVAREZ (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ____________ OI Code A2.

☒ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed ____________ (name) IA (title) LA/M (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed NR (initials) 12 Feb 1975 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

SECRET

201-119523

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR IP/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI

APR 10 11 05 PM '72

ACTION COPY

S E C R E T 102318Z APR 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19452

DIRECTOR

KDFACTOR

10 Apr IN 582033

REF: DIRECTOR 252261

1. BRUCE H. FERNALD MET MONTHLY WITH RAYMOND H. GERENDE FROM JULY 1970 TO MAY 1971 TO PAY TEN INSTALLMENTS OF TERMINATION BONUS. LAST MEET WAS 4 MAY 1971. ALL IMPORTANT INFO ON PROBLEMS OF GERENDE AND WIFE (FORMERLY LIEMPTY-19) WAS REPORTED BY CABLE DURING THIS PERIOD, EXCEPT FOR NEWS THAT GERENDE VISITED HOLLAND DURING CHRISTMAS 1970 WHEN HAD AMICABLE VISIT WITH WIFE AND CHILDREN.

2. GERENDE IS OWNER OF HOUSE RENTED AUGUST 1970 BY STATION STAFFER JESSE R. GARDALPHE. HE STILL TEACHING ENGLISH TO EMPLOYEES OF TWO LOCAL FIRMS AND APPEARS FINANCIALLY PRESSED SINCE CLASS SCHEDULE REDUCED RECENTLY FROM SIX TO TWO HOURS PER DAY. STILL DRINKS, BUT APPARENTLY IN MODERATION. HAS INDICATED HE MIGHT VISIT WIFE IN HOLLAND THIS SUMMER. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO INDICATE GERENDE HAS VIOLATED HIS SECRECY AGREEMENT OR PROBED INTO LNLUTE STATUS OF GARDALPHE.

201-119523

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 19452 SECRET

3. FILE: 50-6-74/3. GP-1.

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		
2		
3		
4		

Julie Paulas

ORIG: Julie Paulas
UNIT: WH/1/FI/CI
EXT: 4167
DATE: 6 APRIL 1972

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 29/36 PER ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/3

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE, VR, C/CPS, C/OA, IP/AN

(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) [illegible]
(reference number) CITE DIRECTOR 252261

TO MEXICO CITY

KDFACTOR

REF: A. HMMW-18,773, 23 DECEMBER 71
B. HMMA-41734, 10 MARCH 72

1. IN ORDER COMPLETE REF A KDFACTOR SECURITY REVIEW RE KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF TERMINATED AGENTS AND FAMILIES, STATION REQUESTED FURNISH BRIEF SUMMARY OF RAYMOND H. GERENDE'S ACTIVITIES FROM TERMINATION IN JUNE 1970 TO PRESENT. ABOVE INFO NEEDED PRIOR TO COB 11 APRIL, IN ORDER PROVIDE NEEDED DETAIL TO REF B.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Reference A requested an updated security review of KDFACTOR Operations and knowledgeability of terminated agents and families. Reference B is Station answer to Reference A. Reference B lacks detail regarding GERENDE, who handled KDFACTOR up to late 1970, present activities.

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LAWRENCE C. LASER
AC/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~UNIT NOTIFIED~~	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1	1	5
			6
CE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	3	7
		4	8

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 41 PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO. 295

SECRET 260926Z JAN 71 CITE THE HAGUE 9222

H-ASU

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

26 Jan 71 251867

REF: DIRECTOR 104743

1. DCM, POLITCAL COUNSELOR AND ADMIN OFFICER ALL BRIEFED ON LIEMPTY/19 BACKGROUND PRIOR TO HER EMPLOYMENT. THIS SATISFIES STATION RESPONSIBILITIES TO EMBASSY AND SEE NO NEED RAISE MATTER WITH GPOUGHT AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 201-241621 AND 201-119523. GP-1.

SECRET

MICROFILMED
FEB 12 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

DE
X
~~[illegible]~~
IS
IX 4
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
WH/1

Gerende
B - 201-119523

CS COPY

SECRET

LIEMPTY/19
26 JAN 71
201-241621

ORIG: FRED KRAVCOV:tr
UNIT: WH/1/FI/CI
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 22 Jan 71

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 35 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 23 Jan 71 0 1 2 2 CITE DIRECTOR 047435

TO THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: A. THE HAGUE 9008*

B. ONHW 18507, 13 AUG 70 **

1. SUGGEST GPOUGHT BE BRIEFED ON LIEMPTY-19 PAST JKLANCE STATUS, STRESSING FACT SHE TERMINATED WITHOUT PREJUIDICE 30 JUNE 70, MARITAL PROBLEMS, AND THAT HQS MAINTAINING CORRESPONDENCE WITH HER VIA HER BROTHER FOR PURPOSE OF FORWARDING PAYMENTS DUE HER. NO OTHER CONTACT WITH HER EXPECTED OR DESIRED.

2. REF B. AND ATTACHMENTS CONTAIN SUMMARY LIEMPTY-19 CASE WHICH WOULD BE USEFUL IN BRIEFING.

3. FILE: 201-241621 AND 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: * LIEMPTY-19 assumed position as social secretary and receptionist to GPOUGHT.
**LIEMPTY-19 employment and termination data, Agency service record and quit claim.

JOHN L. HART
CHIEF, EUR

C/WH/1
C/WH/FI
AC/E/BNL Wes Parker (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

201-119523

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

FORM 3020 2-69 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MFG 8-7

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29-1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF, CI, CI/OPS, FI, R/AN,

ACTION NO. 872 EUR 6

S E C R E T 211552Z JAN 71 CITE THE HAGUE 9008

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

21 JAN 71 249123

LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 103241*

* LIEMPTY/19(1) wrote a letter to the Director dated 30 Nov. '70 reviewing her complaints against her ex-husband.

1. ON 1 JAN 71, LIEMPTY[1] ASSUMED POSITION AS SOCIAL SECRETARY AND RECEPTIONIST TO GPOUGHT[2] AND OCCUPIES DESK IN LNCUFF[3]. SO FAR AS WE AWARE, SHE HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION HER PREVIOUS JKLANCE CONNECTION AND HAS DISPLAYED NO INTEREST JKLANCE PERSONNEL. WE SHOULD ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT IN NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS SHE WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME AWARE JKLANCE PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY COS.

2. ON POSITIVE SIDE, THIS JOB PROBABLY SOLVES ANY PERSONAL FINANCIAL PROBLEMS SHE HAS HAD AND AT SAME TIME SHOULD INHIBIT HER FROM TAKING ANY ACTIONS AGAINST JKLANCE THAT WOULD PLACE HER JOB IN JEOPARDY.

3. FILE: 201-241621 AND 201-119523. GP-1

S E C R E T

K

GERENDE Liempty-I

SECRET

19

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

SECRET

AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FRED KRAVCOV:lml
WH/1/FI/CI
4167/1973
25 NOVEMBER 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY 28 PER ______ # ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, E/BN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, FI2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

27 Nov 70 23 15z

CITE DIRECTOR 090057

TO THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: THE HAGUE 8743* (IN 212100)

1. CONCUR STATION SHOULD AVOID INVOLVEMENT WITH LIEMPTY/19. NO NEED INTERFERE WITH LIEMPTY/19 EMPLOYMENT PLANS.

2. HQS WILL CONTINUE HANDLING LIEMPTY/19 VIA IDENTITY D, DIR 057055 WHO IN TURN IS HANDLED BY WOBONE.

3. CURRENT READING WILL BE OBTAINED FROM IDENTITY D, DIR 057055.

4. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
DEC 1 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

*WH Comment: LIEMPTY/19 visited LNCUFF at The Hague attempting to contact JKLANCE.

C/WH/1 John C. Murray
for C/WH/SEC R.B. Wright (in draft)
WH/NOC Ralph Hatrey (in draft)
E/BNL/N

AN
AB X
PS HR
EX 4
~~DES~~ NFD
~~FI~~
WH/1

Liempty-1
27 Nov 70

JOHN L. HART
CHIEF, EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

B-201-241621

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-119523

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

ORIG: HELLER:lml
UNIT: C/WH/1/FI/CI
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 13 NOVEMBER 1970

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	46
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☑ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MICROFILMED
NOV 30 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. ADDAN EUR6 CI CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

13 NOV 70 23 40z

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY INFO THE HAGUE

006682

2P

REF: MEXICO CITY 4801 (IN 204131)

1. GERENDE AND LIEMPTY/19 BOTH WERE TERMINATED MAINLY BECAUSE OF INSOLUBLE MARITAL DIFFICULTIES, AND JKLANCE HAS LESS WARRANT OR DESIRE THAN EVER TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY. WE SPECIFICALLY DESIRE HOLD STATION INVOLVEMENT, EITHER MEXICO CITY OR THE HAGUE, TO ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, AND CERTAINLY DO NOT WISH INVOLVE DUTCH.

2. GERENDE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE ANY HAGUE STATION CONTACT FURNISHED. FILE SHOWS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT LIEMPTY/19 NOT SO COMPLETELY UNSTABLE THAT SHE WOULD CREATE SCANDAL. PRINCIPAL REASON WE INSISTED PAYING HER TERMINATION BONUS OVER PERIOD OF TIME WAS TO RETAIN SOME SEMBLANCE OF CONTROL IN SITUATION SUCH AS THIS. BOTH SHE AND GERENDE SIGNED TERMINATION AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS, AND WE INTEND TRY HOLD THEM BOTH TO THEIR COMMITMENTS.

3. RECOMMEND STATION AVOID GIVING ANY INDICATION OF TAKING SIDES. WHILE THESE MARITAL DIFFICULTIES DEPLORABLE, THEY ARE PURELY PERSONAL AFFAIR NOW AND BEST HANDLED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS. HQS SUGGESTS THAT HINT OF STRONG TONE TAKEN WITH GERENDE NOW MIGHT SAVE

CS COPY

~~CONTINUED~~ CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

13 Nov 70

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

B201-241621

201-119523

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

NOV 30 11 11 AM '70

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION NOV 24 10 43 AM '70

BY _______ PER RECEIVED RID/EDI

☐ INDEX FORWARDED CRID/EDI ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. _______

CONF:

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 026622

TO

PAGE 2

US EMBARRASSMENT LATER.

4. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

E/BNL/N John Dixon - by phone

WH/Security

WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

10-69 EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 559

S E C R E T 101925Z NOV 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4301

DIRECTOR INFO THE HAGUE 10 Nov 70 IN 204131

REF: A. THE HAGUE 8217 (IN 137053) Divorce

B. HMMA 39384

1. 5 NOVEMBER RAYMOND H. GERENDE (P), HUSBAND OF LIEMPTY -19, TOLD US THAT 13 OCT COURT DECISION FOUND NO GROUNDS TO GRANT DIVORCE. THIS SHOCKED BOTH GERENDE AND ATTORNEY VIEW FACT LIEMPTY-19 FAILED APPEAR FOR 5 AND 8 AUGUST HEARINGS (WHICH NORMALLY SHOULD FORFEIT HER CASE BY DEFAULT) AND FACT SHE LEFT MEXICO ILLEGALLY WITH CHILDREN. GERENDE APPEALING DECISION WHICH MAY TAKE YEAR RESOLVE.

2. ON RECENT TRIP TO ARIZONA TO BROTHER OF LIEMPTY-19, GERENDE CONFIRMED HIS SUSPICION THAT WIFE IN NETHERLANDS (WHICH WE HAD AVOIDED TELLING HIM), AND PESUMABLY LEARNED HER ADDRESS. FROM DUTCH EMBASSY MEXICO, HE ALSO LEARNED THAT DUTCH MFA IN ALMOST WEEKLY TOUCH WITH EMBASSY ON LIEMPTY-19 BEHALF, ATTEMPTING HAVE EMBASSY PROCURE ATTORNEY FOR HER.

3. GERENDE DISTRAUGHT OVER COURT DECISION AND PROSPECT LENGTHY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE REGAINING CUSTODY OR EVEN SEEING CHILDREN. CLAIMS HE ABOUT DECIDED GO NETHERLANDS THIS MONTH TO

SI Han
~~IP~~
~~IN~~
FS
RK 4
~~DES~~ HPD
~~FI~~
WH/1

LIEmpty-1

CS COPY

B 201-241621

201-119523
10 Nov 70

SECRET

10-61 EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 4801

MEET WIFE REGARDING CHILDREN AND, IF POSSIBLE, PRSUADE HER GIVE MARRIAGE ANOTHER TRY. THOUGH WE TRYING DISSUADE HIM FROM THIS COURSE, PROBABLY WTHOUT SUCCESS, HAVE ALSO URGED HE ADVISE IF AND WHEN HE PLANS GO FOR CONFRONTATION. SINCE HE MAY GO ON SPUR OF MOMENT WITHOUT ADVISING US, WE WISH ALERT THE HAGUE TO POSSIBILITY OF GERENDE'S UNANNOUNCED ARRIVAL WITH COINCIDENT SCREAMS BY LIEMPTY-19 AT LNCUFF, MEXICAN EMBASSY, DUTCH MFA OR ALL THREE. SHE UNSTABLE TO POINT OF CLAIMING IN PAST THAT GERENDE WANTS KILL HER.

4. DEFER TO HQS AND THE HAGUE ON BEST COURSE TO FOLLOW IF GERENDE MAKES TRIP. ONE POSSIBILITY IS GIVE HIM STAICN CONTACT IN ORDER STAY ON TOP SITUATION AND AVOID UNPLEASANT SURPRISES.

5. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

: J.J. Barry:lml
: C/WH/1/FI/CI
4167/1975
: 2 October 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 30 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

C/WH8 | INFO | FILE, VR. C/[illegible] C/EUR5 C/CI C/SECUR4 C/MPS/BG

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

3 OCT 70 00 15z

CITE DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY INFO THE HAGUE

074223

AN
PS WH/1
AR

28

RYBAT

REFS: A. THE HAGUE 8217 (IN 138093)
B. MEXICO CITY 3880 (IN 137738)
C. DIRECTOR 057054
D. DIRECTOR 057055

MICROFILMED
OCT 30 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. AT REQUEST OF HQS WOBONE REP CONTACTED IDEN D, OF REF D, AND REQUESTED HIS COOPERATION IN FORWARDING TERMINATION PAYMENT CHECKS TO LIEMPTY/19. IDEN D MOST COOPERATIVE AND ACCEPTED STERILE CHECK IN LIEMPTY/19 TRUE NAME FOR FORWARDING ON TO HER VIA INTERNATIONAL MAIL. FIRST CHECK FOR $750 FOR MONTHS JULY, AUG, SEPT PASSED AND FUTURE MONTHLY CHECKS, AT $250/MONTH, WILL BE MAILED TO IDEN D, FOR FORWARDING TO L/19.

2. HQS DOES NOT PLAN CORRESPOND DIRECTLY WITH LIEMPTY/19 ON ABOVE MATTER.

3. FYI THE HAGUE: HQS ASSUMES LIEMPTY/19 WILL NOT APPROACH LNCUFF ONCE CHECKS BEGIN ARRIVING.

Liempty-19 Gerende
201-1195023

EXBXGKXXMKSSAGX

CONTINUED

CS COPY

B201-241621

30 Oct. 1970

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

INFO FILE. VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 767423

PAGE 2

4. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref C advised The Hague and Mexico City that hqs attempting contact LIEMPTY/19 and pay her monthly termination bonus of $250/month for 10 months or total $2500.00. L/19 then resident in The Hague and corresponding with Hqs on matter. Ref C also noted Hqs would attempt use L/19 brother in Hqs area as cut out for funding, and Ref A &B concurred with this approach.

WH/NOC Karin Shatuy

WH/CONTRACTS

E/BNL/N W.H. Eckstein (draft) Eckstein

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

2 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. John F. Lally

SUBJECT : Forwarding of Agent Service Record on LIEMPTY/1 (201-119523)

Per the telephone conversation of 2 October 1970 between Mr. Lally and Mr. Lunsford regarding LIEMPTY/1, attached herewith is a copy of HMMA-39129 and a copy of LIEMPTY/1's Service Record for retention in your records.

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

Attachments:
1 - HMMA-39129
2 - Service Record

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - 201-119523
1 - WH/1 Chrono

WH/1/CLunsford:lml/4167:1973/3E04

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

22 September 1970

Mr. Maurits Roos
4744 Kenmore Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia

Dear Mr. Roos,

As you may be aware, your sister, Hestor Roos de Alvarez was associated with this Agency in Mexico City for a number of years, and due to personal problems with her husband, her services (and those of her husband) with this Agency were formally terminated on 26 June 1970. In the termination agreement, this Agency agreed to pay Mrs. Hestor Roos de Alvarez a bonus payment amounting to $2500 payable in ten montnly installments of $250 beginning 31 July 1970. Since Mrs. Roos departed Mexico City in July 1970 and came to the U.S., she could not be contacted in Mexico City to receive these payments. While in the U.S., Mrs. Roos de Alvarez contacted our Agency on 8 July 1970 and requested we pay her the funds here; and while her request was being considered she departed the U.S. for Mexico, and later went to The Hague where she is residing at Ary Schefferstratt 47, The Hague, Netherlands. Mrs. Roos de Alvarez has written to this Agency from the Hague requesting we forward the payments to her via international mail. If you concur, this Agency would perfer to forward these payments to you directly, and request that you forward them to your sister via the international mails. The initial check for $750 covers payments for the months of July, August, and September 1970; and hereafter, we will forward to you monthly a check (from October 1970 through April 1971) in the amount of $250 in your sister's name so that you can forward them on to her every month. We appreciate your cooperation in this matter and request that these payments not be discussed with anyone except your sister, Mrs. Hestor Roos de Alvarez, since the case is considered to be a sensitive matter by the United States Government.

file GERENDE
201

21 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security/OSD

VIA : Chief, WH/Security

SUBJECT : Mr. Maurits ROOS

1. Mr. Maurits Roos is the brother of Hester Roos de Alvarez, an asset of Mexico City Station, who was terminated without predjudice on 26 June 1970. In the termination agreement, this Agency agreed to pay Mrs. Roos de Alvarez a bonus payment amounting to $2500 (USD) payable in ten monthly installments of $250 (USD) beginning 31 July 1970. Since termination, Mrs. Roos de Alvarez has departed Mexico City and is now resident at: Ary Schefferstraat 47, The Hague, Netherlands. Mrs. Roos de Alvarez has written directly to this Agency requesting that we forward the monthly payments directly to her or via her brother. For security reasons, this office has decided to obtain a cover check in the amount of $750 (USD) made out to Mrs. Hester Roos de Alvarez, to cover payments for July, August, and September (@ $250 (USD) per month); and it is requested that a representative of your office establish contact with Mr. Maurits Roos, her brother, brief him on the background of the case, and request he forward the check on to his sister in The Hague. A brief note for Mr. Roos to read is attached to this Memorandum and will explain how future monthly checks for his sister will be forwarded through him.

2. As the result of any inquiry to your office in August of 1969, the following information was developed on the Subject: Mr. Roos is presently a GS-13 research cryptographer at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia and has been employed by the U.S. Government since May 1952. Employment records further disclosed that Roos is a U.S. citizen, was born 2 January 1927 in Java and was granted a top secret clearance on 3 April 1970 by the U.S. Army. His local telephone number is 931-8132 and he resides at 4744 Kenmore Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3. On 8 July 1970 Mrs. Roos de Alvarez appeared at the main gate of Headquarters building, and subsequently was interviewed by Mr. Paul Leverone, the Security Duty Officer; and a statement was taken from her. Mrs. Roos was given an Agency Security office telephone number for future contact while in the U.S., and on 13 July 1970, her brother, Mr. Maurits Roos, called the Agency and informed us that his sister had returned to Mexico and could be reached there at a certain address, so we are certain that Mr. Roos is aware of the fact that his sister was employed at one time by this Agency in Mexico City.

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

Attachment:
1 - As stated para. 2

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - LIEMPTY/19
① - GERENDE, Raymond H. (P)
1 - WH/FI/NOC
1 - WH/1 Chrono

C/WH/1/FI/CI:JJBarry:lmr:4167/1973:3E04 (21 Sept. 70)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 7 August 1970 JM
TO: WH/1 J. Barry	C NO. 201-119523 C-32743
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please forward Agent Service Record on Subject.
Form #1689 "Termination of Contract Personnel" of 4 August 1970 noted.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (20)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 20

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: : Z

DISSEM BY 9 PER C/EF [illegible]

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION C/WH 8 | FILE, VR C/EUR5, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI2

457

SECRET 071110Z AUG 70 CITE THE HAGUE 8217 (GERNAND ACTING)

Hagu

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR 057054

10

WH/7

138093

T

1. CONCUR HQS LATTER PROPOSAL REF.

2. IF LIEMPTY/19 NOW RESIDENT THE HAGUE AND UNHAPPY WITH JKLANCE TREATMENT ASSUME THAT SOONER OR LATER SHE WILL SHOW UP ON DOORSTEP LNCUFF. PLEASE POUCH ANY ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND, BIO AND PHOTOS, ETC. THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL SHOULD WE EVENTUALLY HAVE TO DEAL WITH HER HERE.

3. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1.

SECRET

MICROFILMED
SEP 18 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS [illegible]

201-119523 WH-1

7-[illegible] 20

B 201-241621
LI Empty-19

[illegible] [illegible], Ramon
LI Empty-1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 35 PER ______ # ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD, C/EUR5, C/CI

ACTION NO. 407

MEXI

SECRET 062054Z AUG 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3880

DIRECTOR INFO THE HAGUE

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 057054

1. CONCUR HQS LATTER PORPOSAL REF.

2. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

SECRET

TSD
WH/1

IP

6 Aug IN 137738
N

MICROFILMED
OCT 2 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

GERENDE
6 Aug 70

B201-241621

SECRET

201-119523

C.M. LOUNDS:dp
AC/WH/1
7375/9354
5 AUG 1970

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 3 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 37

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 2 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ACTION: C/WH/8 | INFO | FILE, VR. [illegible] C/EUR 5 [illegible]

[illegible] DISEC [illegible] DDP [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number) (pica)

[illegible] 3 222 AUG 70

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY

WH/1

057054

RYBAT

3P

1. THE FOLLOWING IS FWDED FOR YOUR INFO:

A. ON 26 JUNE MEXICO CITY STATION TERMINATED LIEMPTY-19, IDEN A. L-19 HAD BEEN UTILIZED INTERMITTENTLY SINCE 1958 AS A SUPPORT ASSET EMPLOYED UNDER MEMO OF ORAL COMMITMENT PRIMARILY IN SUPPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF IDEN B, HER HUSBAND. THE HUSBAND HAD BEEN A CONTRACT AGENT SINCE 1955 AND WAS ALSO TERMINATED ON 26 JUNE. L-19 WAS GIVEN A TERMINATION BONUS PAYMENT OF $2,500 PAYABLE IN TEN MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS.

B. L-19 AND HUSBAND HAVE HAD SERIOUS MARITAL PROBLEMS CULMINATING IN A SEPARATION IN NOV 69 AND DIVORCE ACTIONS WERE INITIATED BY BOTH PARTIES. THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS ARE STILL IN THE COURTS AND BITTER DISPUTES HAVE RESULTED BETWEEN BOTH PARTIES CONCERNING CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN, DIVISION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND MONETARY SETTLEMENTS.

C. ON 3 JULY L-19 APPEARED AT THE MAIN GATE OF JKLANCE HQS. SHE WAS INTERVIEWED BY WOBONE AND MADE THREE SEPARATE REQUESTS; TO BE RELEASED FROM THE STIPULATION OF HER SECRECY

LEREDE
6 Aug 70

CONTINUED....

B 201-241621 CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-119523

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IG:
NIT:
T:
ATE:

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF:
FILE, VR.

PAGE TWO
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 057054

AGREEMENT WHICH PROHIBITED HER FROM REVEALING HER OR HER HUSBAND'S AFFILIATION WITH JKLANCE, OR IF THIS COULD NOT BE DONE, SHE BE AWARDED A HIGHER AMOUNT OF SUPPORT FROM JKLANCE, OR FINALLY IF NEITHER OF THESE COULD BE DONE, SHE BE SENT THE MONEY DUE HER TO AN ADDRESS OF HER OWN CHOOSING.

D. L-19 DEPARTED WASHINGTON WITHOUT FURTHER CONTACT WITH JKLANCE AND MEXICO CITY STATION WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT HER.

2. ON 4 AUG HQS RECEIVED A LETTER FROM L-19 ADDRESSED TO JKLANCE ATTN: DUTY OFFICER, WOBONE. THE RETURN ADDRESS WAS SHOWN AS IDEN C. IN THE LETTER SHE ASKED IF THE PAYMENTS DUE HER COULD BE SENT TO IDEN C ADDRESS. SHE MENTIONED THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE WAS QUITE AWARE OF HER SITUATION AND WAS OFFERING EVERY ASSISTANCE. SHE REQUESTED THAT HER WHEREABOUTS BE KEPT QUITE CONFIDENTIAL, ESPECIALLY THAT HER HUSBAND NOT BE TOLD. SHE ALSO ASKED THAT WE WITHHOLD PAYING HER HUSBAND HIS TERMINATION BONUS UNTIL HE HAD SETTLED HIS DEBTS WITH HER FAMILY.

3. WITH MEXICO CITY AND THE HAGUE CONCURRENCE, HQS PLANS ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT HER LETTER, TELL HER THE ONLY CONDITION THAT

CONTINUED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY______________PER______________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO __________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. __________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 057054

TO

CAN BE MET IS TO FORWARD HER MONEY TO IDEN C ADDRESS AND REMIND HER THAT THE STIPULATIONS IN THE PAPERS SHE SIGNED ON 26 JUNE ARE STILL IN EFFECT. ALTERNATIVELY, HQS CAN REPLY TO L-19 AND FWD HER PAYMENTS TO IDEN D WHO ALREADY HAS BEEN USED AS AN INTERMEDIARY BY L-19. HQS PREFERS LATTER.

4. PLEASE ADVISE.

5. FILE: 201-119523; 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SECUR

C/EUR

WH/FI/NOC

William V. Broe
C/WHD

E/BNL/N. W.H. Eckstein(draft)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

C.H.Bounds:dp
C/WH/1
7375/9354
5 Aug 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 7 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. C/WH/SA C/EUR 5 C/FI 2 C/CI
C/DDP/CA DISEM-4 DDP (elite) (pica)
(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

TO THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY 057055

RYBAT

REF: DIR 057054

to WH

IDEN A - HESTER ROOS, BORN 24 DEC 30, BANDUNG, INDONESIA

IDEN B - RAMON JOSEPH ALVAREZ DURANT

IDEN C - ARY SCHEFFERSTRAAT 47, THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

IDEN D - MAURITS ROOS, BROTHER AND NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZEN WHO EMPLOYED AT FORT BELVOIR, VA.

MICROFILMED
OCT 2 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

GERENDE
5-8-70

WH/SECUR

WH/PI/NOC

E/BNL/N W.H. Eckstein(draft) William V. Broe
C/EUR C/WHD

B201-241621 201-119523

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 6 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
7

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 8\3 PER REF #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, D/OGC, DDP, ADDP, D/SECUR, C/CI ("EYES ONLY")

ACTION NO. 142

S E C R E T 041515Z AUG 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3847 IN 135863

4AUG70

DIRECTOR

REDLEG

REF: MEXICO CITY 3839 (IN 135330)

1. ACCORDING FLIGHT MANIFEST, LIEMPTY-19, ACCOMPANIED BY HER THREE CHILDREN, DEPARTED MEXICO FOR SAN ANTONIO 30 JULY VIA AMERICAN FLIGHT 58.

2. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 23/21 PER

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

INFO FILE, VR D/OGC, DDP, ADDP, D/SECUR, C/CI

ACTION NO. 118

- EYES ONLY -

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

S E C R E T 030001Z AUG 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3839

DIRECTOR

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 051095

4 AUG 70 135330

M

1. FOLLOWING RECEIPT REF, BRUCE H. FERNALD ATTEMPTED CONTACT LIEMPTY-19 BY PHONE AT NETHERLANDS EMBASSY 16 JULY. WAS TOLD SHE NO LONGER THERE AND WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHEN FERNALD ASKED IF IT POSSIBLE SEND LETTER TO HER VIA EMBASSY, WOMAN ON DUTY SAID NOT UNLESS L-19 HAD MADE PLANS FOR MAIL PICKUP, WHICH SHE NOT AWARE OF, AND THAT NO FORWARDING ADDRESS HAD BEEN LEFT.

2. ON 29 JULY, FERNALD WENT TO PREARRANGED SITE AT SPECIFIED HOUR, PREPARED TO PAY TERMINATION INSTALLMENT AND ADVISE L-19 REF TERMS. WAITED ONE HOUR BUT L-19 FAILED SHOW.

3. ON 31 JULY, FERNALD MET WITH GERENDE, PAID TERMINATION INSTALLMENT AND ASKED WHY L-19 HAD FAILED COME TO HER MEETING. GERENDE WAS DESPONDENT, REPLIED THAT L-19 APPARENTLY LEFT COUNTRY WITH CHILDREN AND OFFERED FOLLOWING DETAILS:

A. L-19 FAILED COME TO 1 JULY MEETING WITH GERENDE FOR BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION OF ELDEST CHILD. SINCE PLANS HAS ALSO

GERENDE

AC CWB
~~DC~~
~~C/[illegible]~~ K

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 3839 SECRET

BEEN MADE FOR 4 JULY MEETING WITH CHILDREN, GERENDE ASSUMED L-19 HAD CHANGED MIND ABOUT 1 JULY BUT WOULD COME ON 4 JULY.

B. ON 4 JULY, BRITISH DIVORCEE FRIEND OF L-19 BROUGHT KEYS FOR GERENDE'S CAR TO GERENDE'S SISTER. STATED SHE FOUND KEYS AND INSTRUCTION FOR DELIVERY UNDER DOOR MAT. CLAIMED DID NOT KNOW WHEREABOUTS L-19 BUT APPARENTLY HAD GONE ON TRIP.

C. UPSET AT PROSPECT WIFE AND CHILDREN HAD SKIPPED, GERENDE SCOUTED NEIGHBORHOOD WHERE HE BELIEVED L-19 LIVING. QUERIED CHILDREN PLAYING IN STREETS AND LOCATED HOUSE WHICH OWNED BY BRITISH COUPLE. COUPLE ALLEGED THAT L-19 CHILDREN AND BELONGINGS GONE WHEN COUPLE RETURNED TO HOUSE 30 JUNE, DID NOT KNOW WHERE. GERENDE PAID SMALL AMOUNT BACK RENT BALANCE PLUS SMALL AMOUNT DAMAGES CLAIMED DONE BY CHILDREN.

D. GERENDE PAID CALL ON DUTCH AMBASSADOR 6 JULY AND WAS CORDIALLY RECEIVED. AMBASSADOR DID NOT KNOW WHEREABOUTS L-19 BUT BELIEVED HE HAD SEEN HER 2 JULY DRIVING IN AREA SOUTH OF CITY. AMBASSADOR FEARED SHE HAD GONE TO NETHERLANDS SINCE SHE HAD REPEATEDLY ASKED WHAT HER SITUATION WOULD BE IF SHE WENT. SAID HE HAD TRIED DISSUADE HER ON GROUNDS THAT SHE WOULD BE IN UNFAVORABLE POSITION RE MEXICAN LAW.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT | INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 3839 SECRET

E. FRIEND OF GERENDE EMPLOYED AT LUFTHANSA TOLD GERENDE WIFE AND CHILDREN DEPARTED FOR NEW YORK 3 JULY. (UNKNOWN IF ABOARD LUFTHANSA OR THAT FRIEND HAD SEEN HER BOARDING SOME OTHER LINE'S PLANE.) CHECK OF ALL 3 JULY OUTGOING MANIFESTS NEGATIVE STATION NOW CHECKING ALL OUTGOING MANIFESTS FROM 29 JUNE THROUGHT 4 JULY.

4. GERENDE BELIEVES WIFE GONE FOR GOOD BUT THAT SITUATION WILL BE CLEARER 5 AUGUST WHEN BOTH GERENDE AND L-19 DUE FOR COURT HEARING. WHEN GERENDE'S ATTORNEY CONTACTED L-19'S ATTORNEY, WAS INFORMED HE NO LONGER REPRESENTS L-19. GERENDE'S ATTORNEY SPECULATES IT POSSIBLE L-19 HAS ALREADY OBTAINED CROOKED OR QUICKIE DIVORCE, BUT THIS PURE SPECULATION THUS FAR. WILL ADVISE RESULTS 5 AUGUST HEARING WHEN KNOWN AND RESULTS MANIFESTS CHECK IF POSITIVE.

5. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

17 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (P) and Wife.

1. Raymond H. GERENDE is a Mexican citizen and contract agent who has been employed by the Agency in Mexico City since 18 March 1955 under an NOC, during which time he has served this Agency well. During the past fifteen years GERENDE has been generally engaged in the area of operational support activities in Mexico City. For the past two years he served as a principal agent handler for a sensitive fixed surveillance project, LIEMPTY; was used in unilateral recruitment approaches against the Cuban target; and in special support investigations. Mrs. GERENDE, who is LIEMPTY/19, has been employed off and on since 1958 as a support asset, (transcriber/translator) under NOC, and during the past two years has worked intermittently transcribing unilateral telephone tap tapes.

2. During the past year GERENDE and his wife have had serious marital problems which culminated in a separation in November 1969, and divorce actions were initiated by both parties. The divorce proceedings are still in the courts, and bitter disputes have resulted between both parties concerning custody of the children, division of personal property, and the monetary settlements. The above problem is compounded by the fact that GERENDE's wife knows in some considerable detail of GERENDE's activities on behalf of the Agency and if she exposed him, it could lead to the surfacing of GERENDE's Agency employment and possible compromise of operations LIEMPTY, LIMESA, LIEMBRACE, and LIFEAT, as well as numerous individual Station assets such as LISTERINE, LIRAZOR/1, LIBAND/1, and David M. WILSTED (P). Since late 1969, Mexico City Station has been in touch with both GERENDE and his wife on this problem, and every effort has been made by the Station to have

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FILE: GERENDE (P)

both parties settle the divorce amicably and to protect GERENDE's cover and that of the projects. Because of the above family problems which threatened GERENDE's personal cover and security, he was relieved of all operational responsibilities and placed on half salary in December 1969.

3. In March of 1970, Mexico City Station decided that GERENDE's personal problems were not being resolved, and because of the continuing security threat, plans were made to terminate both GERENDE and his wife by the end of FY 1970. The LIEMPTY Project renewal, approved in May 1970, was amended to include a termination bonus for GERENDE of $10,000 for 15 years of service with the Agency, and in addition approval was received to pay Mrs. GERENDE the sum of $2,500 as a security measure designed to keep her from revealing her husband's Agency affiliation and what she knows about Agency operations in Mexico. This project approval carried the ADDP caveat that the termination bonuses to both GERENDE and his wife be paid on a monthly basis rather than in one lump sum as a security measure to assure at least an element of control over both individuals, since the continued receipt of these monthly payments depended on their loyalty to the Agency. GERENDE and his wife were terminated by Station representatives in Mexico on 26 June 1970 under standard Agency procedures, and separate Quit Claims and Secrecy Agreements were signed by both GERENDE and his wife. Neither GERENDE nor his wife had any objection to the wording of the Quit Claims or the Security agreements, and both appeared to be satisfied with the terms of the settlement, and with the fairness of the Agency's position.

4. On 8 July 1970 at 1115 hours, Mrs. GERENDE appeared at the main gate of the Headquarter's building, and requested to see an official from the Office of Security. During the subsequent interview, Mrs. GERENDE established her identity, and supplied the interviewer with details on her and her husband's past employment with the Agency in Mexico City and the fact that they had terminated said employment in late June 1970. Mrs. GERENDE made three specific requests of the Agency:

"A. That she be released from the stipulation in her secrecy agreement which prohibits her from revealing her or her husband's affiliation with the Agency, in order that she may substantiate her husband's salary to be awarded support payment from her husband.

"B. If her first request cannot be fullfilled, that she be awarded a higher amount of support from the.NCE. Agency.

"C. If neither of the above two can be fullfilled, that she be sent the Agency check (in present amount) either at the address mentioned above or in care of the Embassy of the Netherlands in Mexico City, which is accepting mail for her."

In addition to the above, Mrs. GERENDE stated she feels she must permanently leave Mexico City because of threats made on her life by her husband, and that she cannot meet her AgencyEcontact in Mexico City as specified in her termination, to receive the monthly payments from him. Mrs. GERENDE has been given the phone number of the Agency Security Duty Officer and her local phone number and address, where she is temporarily residing, was obtained. She was advised she would be contacted within the near future with an answer to her requests.

5. Upon receipt of the above information, Mexico City Station was notified by cable of the situation and their comments were requested. The Station, on 10 July, recommended that Headquarters hold Mrs. GERENDE to her secrecy agreement, not grant her any increase beyond the amount agreed upon in her termination, and proposed that she be given her termination payment in one lump sum or that checks be mailed to her monthly.

6. Headquarters, in agreement with the Station's position on the case, attempted to telephone her without success on 13 July 1970. That same afternoon at 1400 hours, Mrs. GERENDE's brother, a naturalized U.S. citizen who resides in Alexandria, Virginia, and works at Fort Belvoir, called the Office of Security, using the number supplied to Mrs. GERENDE, and informed the security official that since Mrs. GERENDE had not received any response, she expects to hear from JKLANCE by letter in care of the Netherlands Embassy, Mexico City.

7. On 14 July 1970, Headquarters cabled Mexico City Station advising them of the above development, and requested they contact Mrs. GERENDE and inform her of the following Headquarters answers to her requests (as outlined in paragraph 4 above):

A. We cannot release her from her from her security agreement.

B. We cannot consider awarding her additional financail benefits beyond the amount stated in the termination agreement, which she accepted.

C. We are willing to forward checks to her by mail, but request an address other than the Netherlands Embassy.

8. Headquarters has also requested that Mexico City Station keep Headquarters advised of developments in the case of Mrs. GERENDE.

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

Distribution:
Original & 1 - C/WHD
1 - 201-119523
1 - 201-241621
1 - WH/1 Chrono

WH/1/J.J.Barry:lmr/3E04/4167:1973 (17-7-70)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	55750	8	

IG: J.J. Barry:lmr
NIT: C/WH/1/FI/CI
XT: 4167/1973
ATE: 14 July 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
3E PER RE Dl/mc

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: C/WH 8 [illegible] D/OCC, DDP, ADDP, D/SEWR, C/CI

- EYES ONLY -

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 14 23 53 Z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 057095 ~~051036~~

TO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 049889

B. MEXICO CITY 3649 (IN 120669)

1. ON 13 JULY 70, HQS ATTEMPTED CONTACT LIEMPTY/19 BY TELEPHONE WITHOUT SUCCESS. AT 1400 HRS 13 JUL 70 IDENTITY TELEPHONED THE WOBONE DUTY OFFICER, USING TELEPHONE NUMBER SUPPLIED TO LIEMPTY/19, AND INFORMED US THAT LIEMPTY/19 WOULD BE EXPECTING A REPLY TO HER SPECIFIC REQUESTS (SEE PARA 2, REF A) VIA LETTER CARE OF THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY, D.F.

2. REQUEST STATION CONTACT LIEMPTY/19 WITHOUT INVOLVING GERENDE AND INFORM HER HQS HAS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED HER REQUESTS OF PARA 2, REF A AND HAS FOLLOWING ANSWERS:

A. WE CANNOT RELEASE HER FROM HER SIGNED SECRECY AGREEMENT.

B. WE CANNOT CONSIDER AWARDING HER ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS BEYOND AMOUNT STATED IN TERMINATION AGREEMENT, WHICH SHE ACCEPTED.

C ✓

GERENDE CONTINUED- ABC ✓

~~REFS~~

5
4
3
2
1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

[illegible] Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Barry
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

INITIAL DISSEMINATION

PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pic (reference number)

SECRET PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 057095
7 057096

C. WE WILLING TO FORWARD CHECKS TO HER VIA MAIL, BUT REQUEST ADDRESS OTHER THAN NETHERLANDS EMBASSY.

3. REQUEST HQS BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

4. FILE: 201-119523, 201-241621

END OF MESSAGE

WH/FI/NOC Ralph Hatry (in draft)
CGC /TELECON Mr. John Greaney
WH/SO [illegible] M. Marucca
C/WH/FI

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 13

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
55/5D

J.J. Barry
C/WH-1 FI/CI
4167/1973
13 Jul 70

MESSAGE DISSEMINATION
35 PER Ref + elmc

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

C/WH 5 D/OGC, DDP, ADDP, D/SECUR/CI, ...
— EYES ONLY —

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 14 23 53Z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 051037

MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 051095

IDENTITY: MR. MAURITS ROOS, BROTHER AND NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZEN WHO EMPLOYED AT FORT BELVOIR, VA.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/FI/XCC ✓
OGC /TELECON Mr. John Greaney/
WH/SO /MR. Greg Maruca/

WILLIAM V. BROZ
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

T NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

NCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: M AT: 2030 Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER REF (Ew)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR DDP ADDP C/CI OGC D/SECUR

ACTION NO. 054

- EYES ONLY -

SECRET 101940Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3649

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT

10 JUL 70 IN 120669

M

REF: DIRECTOR 049889

1. IN STATION OPINION CONCERN EXPRESSED BY LIEMPTY-19 FOR WELFARE HERSELF AND CHILDREN PER PARA 3 REF IS PARTLY PARANOID AND PARTLY CONTINUATION ATTEMPTED BLACKMAIL OF JKLANCE FOR MONEY. HER POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT (A) GERENDE WOULD LIKE TO KILL HER AND HAS EVEN TRIED TO DO SO, AND (B) GERENDE REFUSES PAY ANY MONEY TO SUPPORT HER AND CHILDREN. GERENDE DENIES MURDER THREATS EXCEPT AS RHETORICAL IN HEAT OF PAST ARGUMENTS PRIOR TO SPLIT, BUT ADMITS TO MINIMAL SUPPORT PAYMENTS ON GROUNDS AMOUNT OF SUPPORT MUST BE DECIDED BY COURTS. UNTIL THIS DONE HE REFUSES MAKE ANY COMMITMENT.

2. SINCE LIEMPTY-19 BLACKMAIL HAS ALREADY SUCCEEDED TO EXTENT 2,500 USD, DOUBT THAT ANYTHING BUT LARGE AND UNWARRANTED INCREASE WOULD HAVE DESIRED EFFECT. SUGGEST INSTEAD THAT EITHER SHE BE GIVEN PAYMENT IN ONE LUMP SUM OR PROCEDURE PROPOSED PARA 2 C REF BE FOLLOWED. BELIEVE SHE SHOULD BE WARNED ANY VIOLATION SECRECY AGREEMENT COULD RESULT IN CANCELLATION HER WOLADY VISA.

C/WH

ADC

~~RFTS~~

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 3649 SECRET

3. VICTOR BELLINI IS ALIAS USED BY BRUCE H. FERNALD, WHO HAD HANDLED GERENDE PRIOR TO SUSPENSION AND WAS INTRODUCED TO LIEMPTY-19 AT TERMINATION TO GIVE HER NON-TRUE NAME NON-LNPURE CONTACT FOR MONTHLY TERMINATION PAYMENTS. BILL MILLS IS LNPURE POLITICAL OFFICER WHO IN EARLY JUNE, WHILE HE WAS ACTING CHIEF OF POLITICAL SECTION, WAS APPROACHED BY LIEMPTY-19 WITH HER HARD LUCK ST~~RO~~ORY. (LIEMPTY-19 IS FRIEND OF MILLS' DUTCH WIFE AND WAS AT HIS HOME FOR BRIDGE.) LIEMPTY-19 APPARENTLY ASSUMED MILLS WAS JKLANCE CHIEF. MILLS (WHO CHARACTERIZED LIEMPTY-19 AS HIGHLY UNSTABLE) REPORTED APPROACH TO ACOS, WHO SAID HE HAD NEVER HEARD OF HER AND THAT HER STROY "SIMILAR TO MANY WE HEAR FROM UNSTABLE PEOPLE".

4. FILE: 201-241621; 201-119523. GP-1

SECRET

7

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ORIG: J.J.BARRY:ER
UNIT: WH/1, 3E05
EXT: 3167, R1972
DATE: [illegible] JULY 1979

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

Return to C/WH/1/81/C1

CITE DIRECTOR

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 048632

B. MEXICO-3612 (IN 117477)

1. ON 3 JULY 1979 AT 1115 HRS LIEMPTY/19 APPEARED AT JKLANCE HQS REQUESTING SEE A WODONE OFFICIAL. DURING INTERVIEW BY A WODONE OFFICER SHE SUPPLIED HIM WITH DETAILS HER EMPLOYMENT WITH JKLANCE MEXICO, AND RECENT HISTORY ON TERMINATION OF RAYMOND H. GERENDE AND HERSELF INCLUDING AMOUNT TERMINATION PAYMENTS.

2. LIEMPTY/19 MADE THREE SPECIFIC REQUESTS OF JKLANCE:

A. THAT SHE BE RELEASED FROM STIPULATION IN HER TERMINATION SECRECY AGREEMENT WHICH PROHIBITS HER FROM REVEALING HER OR HUSBANDS AFFILIATION WITH JKLANCE, IN ORDER THAT SHE MAY SUBSTANTIATE HER HUSBAND'S "SALARY" IN ORDER TO BE AWARDED HIGHER SUPPORT PAYMENT IN CURRENT DIVORCE ACTION MEXICO.

B. IF ABOVE NOT POSSIBLE, "THAT SHE BE AWARDED A HIGHER AMOUNT OF SUPPORT FROM JKLANCE."

C. IF NEITHER ABOVE POSSIBLE, REQUESTED THAT JKLANCE FORWARD HER MONTHLY $250.00 CHECK TO EITHER A LOCAL ADDRESS WHERE SHE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

	MESSAGE FORM TOTAL COPIES:
ORIG: UNIT: EXT: DATE:	SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) SECRET (date and time filed) PAGE TWO (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

STAYING OR C/O EMBASSY OF NETHERLANDS, MEXICO CITY, WHERE MAIL BEING ACCEPTED FOR HER.

3. LIEMPTY/19 STATES THAT "SHE CANNOT STAY MEXICO BECAUSE OF HUSBAND'S ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST WELFARE HERSELF AND CHILDREN." BY WAY OF REFERENCE SHE MENTIONED NAMES JMLANCE PERSONNEL WHOM SHE KNOWS MEXICO: "VICTOR BELLINI," "BILL MILLS," AND TRUE NAME VINCENT P. RIZZUTO. PLEASE ADVISE TRUE IDENTITIES OF ALIAS NAMES ABOVE.

4. REQUEST STATION COMMENT ASAP ON SPECIFIC REQUESTS OUTLINED PARA 2 ABOVE, [redacted]. HEADQUARTERS WILL NOT CONTACT LIEMPTY/19 UNTIL STATION COMMENT RECEIVED. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Reference A advised Mexico that LIEMPTY/19 in Washington area requesting contact with "senior representative" JMLANCE, and requested Mexico City Station comment. Reference B from Station advised termination of LIEMPTY/19 and GERENDE had taken place 26 June 1970 and all necessary termination agreements etc. signed. Advised Hqs. not to contact LIEMPTY/19.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:
SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) PAGE THREE
(elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

WH/FI-DOC ________
OGC John Greaney
WH/SS ________

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCIDENT REPORT

FROM:
BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE 8 July 1970

TIME 1330 Hours

NAME Hester Roos de Alverez GRADE N/A OFFICE N/A
Temp. 4744 Kenmore Avenue
Add. Alexandria, Virginia

INCIDENT Request for Assistance TIME 1115 PLACE Headquarters

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: SUBJECT came to the Main entrance of the Headquarters building and asked the guard on duty to place her in touch with someone from the Office of Security. The undersigned responded to the Main entrance and escorted SUBJECT to the Main Reception area where she was interviewed. After displaying some reluctance to speak openly, SUBJECT related that she had been employed on a contract basis by the Agency at the Embassy in Mexico City. She gave in way of biographic data that she is the daughter of a former Dutch embassy official statione in Washington, that she was employed at the Dutch embassy in Mexico City, and it was there that she met her presently estranged husband Ramon Alverez, who at the time of their meeting was employed also on a contract basis with the Agency. She stated that both she and her husband renounced their former citizenships to become citizens of Mexico. After her marriage to Alverez she gained employ with the Agency and stated that her specific duties included but were not restricted to the monitoring and translation of tapes. SUBJECT stated that her husband was terminated from Agency employment for Security reasons within the past year, and received at the time of his termination, six months salary and the promise of $1000.00 per month for 10 months. She stated that inasmuch as she is in the process of filing for divorce from her husband, and could not substantiate her husband's salary in a court of law because of the termination agreement she has signed, the Agency has agreed to and is paying her the sum of $250.00 per month which she is using to support her four children of whom she has been awarded custody. She stated that she is presently employed as a school teacher, but feels that she cannot provide ample support to her children on her salary and the allowance furnished by the Agency.

(Continued.....)

CONFIDENTIAL

INCIDENT REPORT

FROM: BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE ______________

TIME ______________

NAME Alverez (Continued....) GRADE ______________ OFFICE ______________

INCIDENT ______________ TIME ______________ PLACE ______________

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: SUBJECT made three specific requests of the Agency:
A) That she be released from the stipulation in her secrecy agreement which prohibits her from revealing her or her husband's affiliation with the Agency, in order that she may substantiate her husband's salary to be awarded support payment from her husband.
B) If her first request cannot be fullfilled, that she be awarded a higher amount of support from the Agency...
C) If neither of the above two can be fullfilled, that she be sent the Agency check (in present amount) either at the address mentioned above or in care of the embassy of The Netherlands in Mexico City, which is accepting mail for her. She stated she feels she must permanently leave Mexico City because of threats made on her life by her husband, and cannot meet Victor Bellini (allegedly Agency contact) at the specified restaurant location on a monthly basis to receive her check, as is the present requirement.

SUBJECT reiterated her statement that she cannot stay in Mexico City because of her husband's activities directed against the welfare of both herself and her children. By way of reference, SUBJECT mentioned the names of Victor Bellini, Bill Mills, and Don Vogel; all of whom are allegedly Agency personnel in Mexico City.

SUBJECT was advised that the undersigned could not make a decision on any of her requests but that a report of the interview would be made and forwarded to

ACTION TAKEN:

(Continued....)

CONFIDENTIAL

INCIDENT REPORT

FROM: BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE ______

TIME ______

NAME Alverez (Continued....) GRADE ______ OFFICE ______

INCIDENT ______ TIME ______ PLACE ______

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: the appropriate Agency officials. SUBJECT was given the phone number of the Security Duty Office and was requested to contact the undersigned later in the day when perhaps she could be given some concrete information. SUBJECT thanked the undersigned for the interview afforded her and departed the building stating that she would contact the OSDO later in the day. Responded to SR&CD and initiated an indices search which produced records of one covert source on each Mr. and Mrs. Alverez, and one covert reference file on Mr. Alverez. The Covert source files had been retired but will be forwarded to Mr. Kenneth Carroll at his request. Contacted and briefed Ed Duffy and Jack Poirier, PSD/OS, who referred the matter to Messrs. Kenneth Carroll, OS, and Greg Maruca, WH/SO, who requested and will be furnished with a copy of this report, and will initiate further checks within WH Division.

In the opinion of the undersigned, SUBJECT was completely coherent and sincere in her conversation, and seemed completely rational in her conversation and actions.

ACTION TAKEN: As stated above.

PAUL W. LEVERONE
REPORTING OFFICER

CHARLES B. GOOD JR.
CHIEF, BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DISTRIBUTION:
ORIG: DD/SEC (PTOS)
COPY: C/PHY. SD
COPY: C/PSD
FILE: BSB/PHYS. SD
COPY: WH/SO and Kenneth Carroll

201-119523

FORM 1798 [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

7 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: GERENDE's Wife's Visit to Washington

1. On 6 July 1970, Mr. Walt Raymond of the CA Staff advised that GERENDE's wife was in Washington and had been in touch with him. Apparently Mr. Ramond and GERENDE's wife had been acquainted for some time in the past. Neither admits that Mr. Raymond is an Agency employee. GERENDE's wife advised that she wanted to get in touch with someone in Agency Headquarters. Mr. Raymond advised her he would contact his liaison people to see what could be done.

2. DIRECTOR 048632 was sent to the Station outlining this and requesting Station's advice as to whether a Headquarters representative should meet with GERENDE's wife. MEXICO CITY 3612 (IN 117477) outlined details of the termination of GERENDE and his wife and recommended against seeing her.

3. I discussed this matter briefly with Mr. John Green, Legal Counsel's Office, who felt even if Station should recommend seeing GERENDE and his wife, that it would be limited to WH Division representation. On 7 July I advised Mr. Raymond of the Station's answer as contained in MEXICO CITY 3612. He said he would contact GERENDE's wife approximately 8:30 of the evening of 7 July, and tell her that his liaison contact had been unable to find anyone who would see her. Mr. Raymond was uncertain as to what GERENDE's wife might do.

Charles M. Bounds

Charles M. Bounds
ADC/WH/1

secret

group 1:

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/SO		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: DIR 03225 20 MAY 73

DIR 038379 GERENDE

" 048632

Office of General counsel -
How long in Washington?
are children with you
What are your plans - temp hotel accomodations?
Travel -
DDP Dudley or Moore.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/BSB 1-E-20	

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 1-67 Use previous editions (40)

RELEASE AND SECRECY AGREEMENT

I, Hester ROOS de ALVAREZ, do hereby forever release the United States Government from any and all claims and demands of whatever nature which I or any member of my family has against the United States Government.

I agree to keep forever secret the fact of my confidential relationship, and that of other members of my family (specifically my husband, Ramon ALVAREZ Durant), with the United States Government. I also agree to keep forever secret my knowledge of all persons, methods, and equipment which I acquired in the course of my relationship (or that of my husband's) with the United States Government.

I understand that I am to receive a bonus payment amounting to $2,500 (USD) payable in ten monthly installments of $250 (USD) beginning 31 July 1970. I further understand that payment of this sum is contingent upon full compliance with this secrecy agreement, and that the United States Government shall be the sole judge of such compliance. Furthermore, I specifically renounce any claim to any similar bonus or other payment made to any other member of my family, including that made to my husband, Ramon ALVAREZ Durant.

This Release and Secrecy Agreement is effective as of the date it is signed. I acknowledge that I have read it and I fully understand its meaning.

26 June 1970
Date

Hester ROOS de ALVAREZ

WITNESS:

26 June, 1970
Date

Ramon ALVAREZ Durant

26 June 1970
Date

Donald F. VOGEL

June 26, 1970
Date

Victor E. BELLINI

S/C att. #2 to HMMA-39130 CS COPY 201-241621

RELEASE AND SECRECY AGREEMENT

I, Ramon ALVAREZ Durant, do hereby forever release the United States Government from any and all claims and demands of whatever nature which I or any member of my family has against the United States Government.

I agree to keep forever secret the fact of my confidential relationship, and that of other members of my family, with the United States Government. I also agree to keep forever secret my knowledge of all persons, methods, and equipment which I acquired in the course of my relationship with the United States Government.

I understand that I am to receive a bonus payment amounting to $10,000 (USD) payable in ten monthly installments of $1,000 (USD) beginning 31 July 1970. I further understand that payment of this sum is contingent upon full compliance with this secrecy agreement, and that the United States Government shall be the sole judge of such compliance. Furthermore, I specifically renounce any claim to any similar bonus or other payment made to any other member of my family.

This Release and Secrecy Agreement is effective as of the date it is signed. I acknowledge that I have read it and I fully understand its meaning.

26 June 1970
Date

Ramon Alvarez
Ramon ALVAREZ Durant

WITNESS:

26 June 1970
Date

Hester Roos de Alvarez
Hester ROOS de ALVAREZ

26 June 1970
Date

Donald F Vogel
Donald F. VOGEL

June 26, 1970
Date

VEBellini
Victor E. BELLINI

CS COPY

S/C att. #2 to HMMA-39129

201-119523

S E C R E T

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

Pseudonym
1. Agent XXXXXXX: Raymond H. GERENDE

2. Project: LIEMPTY

3. Agent Recruited By: Matthew S. DINGLEY Date: 18 March 1955

4. Capacity in Which Agent Served: LIEMPTY Project principal agent, formerly member of surveillance team, also LIFEAT basehouse keeper.

5. Rate of Pay: $7,000.00 (USD) per annum

6. Other Commitments: Termination payment equal to one month's salary for each full year of service after 18 March 1955.

7. Agent Dismissed By: Vincent P. RIZZUTO Date: 30 June 1970

8. Reason for Dismissal: Subject became involved in a bitter divorce action with his wife (LIEMPTY-19). The protracted legal battle forced the Station to suspend GERENDE from operational activity for six months for security reasons. When it became evident that no early solution was in sight, termination had to be effected.

Security Risks:

See attached sheet

Is the Agent Recommended for Reuse: Yes, assuming that his earlier service has not been exposed, that his marital problems have been resolved, and that he has sufficient outside employment income to obviate the need for full-time employment by JKLANCE.

Manner of Dismissal: Amicable. GERENDE expressed thanks for the generous settlement and swore to preserve security.

Letter of Termination Signed: Yes.

Cost of Termination: $10,000.00 (USD), payable in ten monthly installments.

Station Case Officer: Vincent P. Rizzuto
Vincent P. RIZZUTO
(Signature in Pseudonym)

Acting
Chief of Station: Horace E. Prallett
Horace E. PRALLETT
(Signature in Pseudonym)

CS COPY

1/w att. #1 to HMMA-39129

201-119523

SECRET

Paragraph 9 of Agent Service Record:

Security Risks: GERENDE has known a number of Station officers in true name, although with the PCS departure of RIZZUTO the last of these will have left Mexico. (GERENDE's remaining contact will be Bruce H. FERNALD, whom he knows in alias.) GERENDE knows all agents currently associated with the LIEMPTY operation, as well as LIEMPTY-10 and -11, currently working with the LIEMBRACE team. He also knows LIEMBRACE-1, -2, and -4, and is, of course, aware of the objectives and methods of the LIEMPTY and LIEMBRACE operations. He knows that the Station has access to the entire LIMESA complex, although he does not know of the LIMUST operation. GERENDE knows the true names and JKLANCE status of Oliver G. SCANTLING, David N. WILSTED, and Raymond L. BARCENAS. He knows of the LIFEAT operation through his own former activities as well as those of his mother (LIFEUD-19) and his wife (LIEMPTY-19). The husbands of his two sisters work for the Station. One is LIEMPTY-4, who was handled by GERENDE, and the other is LIBAND-1, whose activity is not supposed to be known to GERENDE. In past years GERENDE was exposed to almost all phases of Station support activity. In recent years he has been more compartmented. GERENDE received five weeks of Headquarters covert training in 1957.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED

C/WH E

BY: M AT: 0220Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER 123 (ED)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/WH 2

INFO FILE, VR DDP, ADDP

ACTION NO. 661

"EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 060047Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3612 (PRALLETT ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

C

ADC C/WH

RYBAT

RPTS

REF: DIRECTOR 048632

file Gerende 201

7 JUL 70 117477

1. GERENDE AND WIFE TERMINATED IN JOINT CEREMONY 26 JUNE. TERMS OF TERMINATION PAYMENTS EXPLAINED TO EACH, AND EACH SIGNED QUIT CLAIMS (AND SIGNED THE OTHER'S AS WITNESS) WHICH SPECIFICALLY RENOUNCED ANY CLAIM TO TERMINATION PAYMENT MADE TO THE OTHER, OR TO ANY OTHER PAYMENT FROM WOLADY. EACH APPEARED SATISFIED WITH SETTLEMENT AND SIGNED WITHOUT PROTEST. DETAILS POUCHED 3 JULY IN HMMA-39129 AND 39130. GERENDE'S WIFE SAID NOTHING ABOUT TRIP TO WASHINGTON AND IN FACT THIS UNLIKELY AS SCHOOL SHE TEACHING AT STILL IN SESSION. ?

2. DIVORCE ACTION STILL BASICALLY AT IMPASSE DESCRIBED IN ATTACHMENTS TO HMMA-38700. IF GERENDE'S WIFE ACTUALLY DOES DESIRE CONTACT PER REF, IT PROBABLY TO SEEK MONEY RATHER THAN HELP OR ADVICE ON DIVORCE ACTION. VIEW ABOVE AND FACT THAT GERENDE'S WIFE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER JKLANCE CONTACT EXCEPT FOR CASE OFFICER HANDLING MONTHLY TERMINATION PAYMENTS, AND THAT SHE ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT ANY VIOLATION OF SECRECY AGREEMENT WOULD RESULT IN CANCELLATION HER TERMINATION PAYMENT, RECOMMEND

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: (6)

SECRET

	UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1	7	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: Charles M. Bounds
UNIT: ADC/WH/1
EXT: 7376/9354
DATE: 6 July 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY DDP/21 PER SOP - 123 (EC)

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH . ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: C/WH 2 * INFO FILE, VR. DDP, ADDP

— EYES ONLY —
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 06 20 02 Z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 048632

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

1. HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY FRIEND OF GERENDE'S WIFE THAT SHE IN WASHINGTON AREA AND DESIRES CONTACT WITH "SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE" JKLANCE. ASSUME THIS IN CONNECTION WITH PENDING DIVORCE ACTION.

2. PLEASE ADVISE BY 1200 WASHINGTON TIME 7 JULY STATUS DIVORCE ACTION BETWEEN GERENDE AND HIS WIFE. ALSO REQUEST STATION ~~ADVISE~~ COMMENT ADVISABILITY HEADQUARTERS DISCUSSION WITH GERENDE'S WIFE AND LINE TO BE TAKEN IF STATION RECOMMENDS DISCUSSION.

3. FILE: 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

C ______
ADC ______
~~RPTS~~ ______
cit Bounds

file

* C/S COMMENT : SUGGEST ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO D/OGC.

WH/FI/NOC ______
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

c: W.R. Hazen
t: WH/1
: 4167/1973
te: 28 May 70

INDEX FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 1

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

~~dot~~ PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

NF: ~~WH8~~ INFO FILE, VR. ~~ADDP~~ ~~MS/BC~~ ~~OCS2~~

(elite) (pica)
(reference number)

(classification) (date and time filed)

S E C R E T 2023 22 MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR 033379

MEXICO CITY

x DIR 032253 PROBABLY INTENDED

LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 03225*

1. LIEMPTY AMENDMENT APPROVED TO PAY MAXIMUM $10,000 TERMINATION BONUS FOR GERENDE AND $2,500 FOR LIEMPTY/19.

2. APPROVAL CARRIED CAVEAT THAT BONUSES BE PAID ON MONTHLY BASIS RATHER THAN IN ONE LUMP SUM. THIS ARRANGEMENT SHOULD GIVE YOU SOME CONTROL OVER FUTURE ACTIONS GERENDE AND LIEMPTY/19 BECAUSE THEY WILL KNOW THAT CONTINUED RECEIPT OF MONTHLY PAYMENTS DEPENDS ON THEIR CONTINUED LOYALTY TO JKLANCE.

3. FILE: 201-119523

END OF MESSAGE

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~FS~~
~~RX~~
~~DES~~ ~~NFD~~
~~FI~~
WH/1

Z

*WH Comment: Ref informed field that Hqs would advise when LIEMPTY ammendment approved to pay GERENDE and wife termination bonuses.

WH/FI ______

WH/B&F THOMPSON/s/
(in draft)

WH/Contracts RENEHAN /s/
(in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

201-119523

28 May 70

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CS COPY

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GERENDE

LIEMPTY/1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

AC/WH/1/FI/8I

JG: W.R. Hazen

IIT: WH/1

T: 4167/1973

TE: 6 May 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION DPP PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, PIAN, LIP?/PG, CCS?

(elite) (pica)

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 17 22 Z 8 MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY 032255

REF: MEXICO CITY 3069 (IN 072365)*

1. WE CURRENTLY PROCESSING PROJECT LIEMPTY AMENDMENT TO COVER COST GERENDE TERMINATION IN FY 70. HOWEVER, UNTIL THIS AMENDMENT APPROVED, WE UNABLE AUTHORIZE TERMINATION PAYMENTS REQUESTED REF. SUGGEST YOU PLAN TERMINATION FOR 30 JUNE 1970 INSTEAD OF 31 MAY 1970. WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS AMENDMENT IS APPROVED.

2. FILE: 201-1195~~26~~3.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Ref. requests concurrence termination GERENDE effective 31 May 1970 and pay $10,000 termination bonus.

AN | AB | IN | PC | BX | DDO/HPD | FI | WH/1

WH/FI

WH/B&F

WH/Contracts

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

Claire M. Sumner
JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

~~201-119526~~
201-119523
07 May 70

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. GERENDE COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR Rilan MPS/BG

ACTION NO. 227

SECRET 282205Z APR 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3069 (MEXI)

DIRECTOR

LIEMPTY 28 APR IN 072365

REF HMMA-38700, PARA 11

1. ~~STATION~~ WISHES GIVE GERENDE TERMINATION NOTICE BY 30 APRIL, TO PERMIT SALARY CUTOFF BY 31 MAY.

2. REQUEST HQS CONCURRENCE AND APPROVAL TERMINATION BONUS AS PROPOSED REF.

3. FILE: 201-119523 ~~UPQAQGOIWEV~~ 50-6-74/3. GP-1.

SECRET

AN	
~~AB~~	
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~BI~~	
~~DES~~	NPD
~~PI~~	
WH	1

EMPTY 4/1

GERENDE (P)

201-119523

28 apr 70

CS COPY

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, SB Division			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chiof of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Progress Report 1 November 1969 - 25 March 1970

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-38119, 18 November 1969 PRIORITY

SUMMARY

1. The LIEMPTY Project has thus far survived the absence from duty of its principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE, as well as the threat to the security of the Project represented by GERENDE's marital problems. Bruce H. FERNALD has been handling all Project personnel since early December 1969, when GERENDE was deactivated and placed on half-pay. No problems have resulted from this, other than a delay in the receipt of photos (FERNALD is unable to meet LIEMPTY personnel as frequently as GERENDE was). The security threat will remain as long as GERENDE's estranged wife has it within her power to expose GERENDE's RYROCK connection and the type of work he was engaged in. She has continually promised not to do this, and thus far she has kept her word.

2. The LIEMPTY product continues to be a valuable one for the Station. It continues to play an important CI role (particularly for LIERGO and LIREAD) but its greatest value, as far as the Station is concerned, is in the positive field. Two recent examples underline this: The early (and thus far only) debriefing of AEMIDRIFF was accomplished almost exclusively by showing her photos of all MEHARSH Embassy personnel and getting from her a character sketch on each individual. These photos were all obtained by LILYRIC and LICALLA. Secondly, LIEMPTY observations (as opposed to

Attachment:
Reports u/s/c

1cc w/atts to SB/[illegible]
Distbituion:
2 - C/WH w/att u/s/c
1 - C/SB w/att u/s/c

3 atts

File: GERENDE

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-38700	25 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓50-6-74/3

photos) played an important role in our total coverage of AESEASICK during the recent operational activity undertaken against AESEASICK. In short, LIEMPTY remains a highly effective and highly useful support asset, whose product is obtained in order to be used operationally, not simply collected for the files.

GERENDE

3. The GERENDE problem is unquestionably a serious one. We are forwarding under separate cover copies of several memoranda prepared by GERENDE. One outlines the history of his marital problems, another describes the current legal situation, and a third outlines proposals for a settlement. There is no hope of reconciliation. The Station's position with GERENDE from the start has been that he must agree to an amicable settlement with his wife in order to insure that she would not feel forced to take steps which would jeopardize the security of Station operations. For this reason, the Station insisted from the beginning that any financial settlement with his wife would have to take into account the fact that he was receiving a certain salary from RVROCK, and that he could not fairly keep this salary out of the settlement on the grounds that his wife could make no legal claim to that salary. GERENDE's wife was made aware of our position on this, and she was grateful, even though she realized that this arrangement was strictly informal. The Station felt that GERENDE could not be allowed to use his RVROCK salary as a weapon in the dispute with his wife, because if he did, she could hardly be expected to refrain from exposing his connections. Indeed, events have shown that GERENDE's wife is a vindictive woman, and if it had not been clear to her that she, as well as GERENDE, would lose money if he loses his job, she might have blown the whistle long ago. GERENDE, for his part, would have preferred to keep his RVROCK salary entirely out of the picture. Eventually, however, he agreed that the Station position was fair, and he said he would conform.

4. The attached memoranda from GERENDE are, in the Station's opinion, basically fair accounts. In the beginning, the Station was inclined to give GERENDE's wife (LIEMPTY-19) the benefit of the doubt, largely because her description of GERENDE's character weaknesses came as no surprise (particularly his tendency to procrastinate, even when his marriage was at stake). Early in the conflict, LIEMPTY-19 contacted RIZZUTO and asked point blank what she could tell her lawyer about GERENDE's salary. She was told she could not mention the RVROCK portion under any circumstances, and that if she told anyone that GERENDE had any connection with LNPURE, the connection would be denied and GERENDE would be terminated. She appeared to accept this gracefully, even though it meant she would have to scale her support demands down to the level of GERENDE's overt income (GERENDE's monthly salary from RVROCK was over 7,000 pesos; he earned an additional 4 to 5,000 pesos teaching English, and he has since rented their house, for which he is receiving slightly less than 7,000 pesos monthly). Subsequently, LIEMPTY-19 was told that the Station would see to it that as long as GERENDE continued to receive an RVROCK salary, he would give her the same proportion of this salary that the courts determined should be paid from his overt income. This, of course, was strictly an informal arrangement, one which would stop the minute GERENDE stopped receiving a salary. Later, as LIEMPTY-19's position hardened and her vindictiveness began to rule her actions, LIEMPTY-19 was reminded by the Station that the longer it took for an amicable solution to be reached, the greater was the chance that GERENDE would lose his job. If she persisted in having him arrested (which she succeeded in doing twice), his job would be jeopardized. While she continued to repeat sweetly that she had no intention of causing his termination, and had never breathed a word to a soul about his RVROCK affiliation, her attitude was in fact jeopardizing his job and if he lost his job, she and the children, as well as GERENDE, would lose income. Her attitude is

doubly disappointing in view of the fact that as she became more and more unreasonable, GERENDE was moving in the other direction.

5. The outcome can still not be predicted. As can be seen from GERENDE's memos, the two sides are still far apart on a number of points, including specifically money. LIEMPTY-19 insists on 10,000 pesos per month. GERENDE is willing to pay 5,000. GERENDE is currently on half-pay, which means that his total (all source) monthly income is around 14,000 pesos. From this, he would not only havo to pay the amount which is finally agreed upon, he must also continue payments of 2500 pesos per month to LIEMPTY-19's father (paying off a loan obtained to build their house). The complicating factor is the uncertainly of GERENDE's future with RVROCK. The Station has maintained for some time that it is impossible to continue to pay GERENDE his full salary solely torun the LICALLA and LILYRIC basehouses. Now that FERNALD has absorbed this duty with only small inconvenience and some loss of timeliness, it makes even less sense to put GERENDE to work only to do this. GERENDE has long been aware of the Station's thinking in this regard, and prior to the current personal crisis he had been told that he would have to work harder at a greater variety of tasks in order to retain his position. As Headquarters is aware, he had been given additional tasks, and, as reported in reference, he had begun to respond very well. There has never been any question of GERENDE's ability. As we have previously stated, he is personable, intelligent, bilingual and binational, and has had good training and experience in certain fields. On the other hand, there has long been doubt about his seriousness of purpose, his initiative, and his ambition. The "reversal of roles" which he describes in one of the attached memos, which took place when he was confined to his home as an LP keeper, did more than cause domestic problems -- it apparently deprived him of the discipline of a daily job. His well-deserved reputation for being lazy was earned years ago.

6. The question which must be answered is whether or not to terminate GERENDE. He can be useful to the Station, but the Station has learned to get along without him. What are the security hazards involved? The general range of his knowledge is described in paragraph 5 of reference. If all of this were blown, the loss to the Station, particularly in terms of support operations against the MHHARSH target, would be considerable. The Station does not believe that GERENDE would deliberately expose any of this, but it is impossible to predict what LIEMPTY-19 might do, particularly since she would feel that she had nothing to lose, having already lost a possible source of income through the termination. GERENDE's termination bonus would probably be in the neighborhood of ten thousand dollars. Presumably LIEMPTY-19 is aware of the fact that he would get such a bonus, although the Station has never discussed this with her and the possible division of such a bonus between the two of them has never been mentioned.

LICALLA

7. The LICALLA basehouse continues to function without changes, except for the fact that Bruce H. FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-9 since 9 December 1969. Brief meetings with LIEMPTY-9 are held once a week at pre-arranged times and places (well away from the MHHARSH area). Occasionally special meetings are called, by phone, by FERNALD, if special coverage is desired (as in the AESEASICK case, for example). There have been no problems, operational or personal, involving the basehouse or LIEMPTY-9 during the reporting period. LIEMPTY-9 provided 1,728 photographs during the reporting period, and in addition to his regular reporting on observed activities of MHHARSH personnel, he provided special coverage as requested. This "special coverage" consists of his observations of a selected individual -- who does he spend his time with, how is he behaving, when was he present (or absent), etc. LIEMPTY-9 spends over 40

hours a week just watching (and photographing) MHHARSH personnel, and over the years he has gotten to know them, and their habits, very well. He can spot unusual or atypical behavior, and when he is asked to put a certain individual under close scrutiny, his comments can be very useful. Newcomers, no matter what their cover, will frequently gravitate to their IS colleagues in the "safety" of the MHHARSH back yard, thereby enabling us to make tentative AEKICK or AEGRIP identifications. TDYers can often be linked up with their internal escort officers. In the case of specific targets, LICALLA special coverage can sometimes give clues to personal relationships which can be exploited. During the reporting period we had special coverage on AESEASICK (to determine any changes in pattern following the AEMIDRIFF defection and following the operation against him -- and in both cases LICALLA did report some change in pattern); 201-305870 (for much the same reason, although here the evidence was not as clear); AEPOLYP (to gather information on his patterns and his associations); AETAKEOFF (for the same reason); and 201-838166 (to find out if he did, in fact work in the "restricted area" and who his associates were, a requirement which was quickly satisfied). Also, LICALLA has been asked to report on the arrival and activities of TDYers such as the AEKICK security inspectors (he is not, of course, told that "security inspectors" are expected -- he is told of the expected arrival of visitors, and he can spot a visitor or newcomer immediately), the possible arrival of 201-314616 and, currently, to attempt to identify, at least by association, the person who went out to meet an LNREAD agent (subject of MEXICO CITY 2741, 17 March 1970). The value of LICALLA to the REDTOP program in Mexico City can scarcely be overstated.

LILYRIC

8. There have been no changes during the reporting period of the operation of the LILYRIC basehouse activity, except that Bruce H. FERNALD took over the handling of the LILYRIC personnel from GERENDE in early December. FERNALD normally meets only LIEMPTY-13, at pre-arranged sites and times (also well away from the MHHARSH area), once a week for pick-up of the films and reports. He occasionally meets LIEMPTY-14 (LIEMPTY-13's wife) when LIEMPTY-13 may be out of town. The LILYRIC coverage is a family enterprise with the work equally divided among LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27, who split up the hours of duty so that there is uninterrupted coverage Mondays through Fridays from 0800 to 1800 hours, and 0800 to 1500 hours Saturdays. (Extra-hour or week-end coverage may be requested as necessary, and the LILYRIC personnel responded to the Station request for such extra coverage during the AEMIDRIFF and AESEASICK cases.) The family has continued to provide reports during the reporting period on all activity centered on the front entrance of the MHHARSH Embassy. Such coverage included, as in the past, daily logs on the comings and goings of MHHARSH officials, up-to-date recording of MHHARSH license numbers, special activities and visitors (particularly Americans, of whom five were spotted and reported on during the reporting period), and some 3,500 photographs. As an example of the value of LILYRIC coverage, within one week of the change of license plates at the MHHARSH Embassy (a biannual change affecting all of Mexico, with new numbers bearing no relation to the old), LILYRIC had provided a complete list of the new numbers (along with the cars to which the plates are assigned). Among other things, this enabled the Station to identify AESEASICK's companions during his last few days in Mexico. Without LILYRIC, identification of the new license plates would have taken months and would have handicapped our operations. LILYRIC has also provided special coverage of the visit of a Latin American CP representative, and is currently watching for the two AEKICK security technicians, 201-314616, and the man who went to meet the LNREAD agent. Also, LILYRIC has reported on visits of Mexican students and the identity of the MHHARSH representatives who deal with them or hand out literature to them. In short, LILYRIC's services, even though the

MHHARSHers undoubtedly assume we have a LILYRIC-like facility, and act accordingly, are another vital element of the REDTOP program.

LIEMPTY-4

9. LIEMPTY-4 has continued to develop and to print all of the LICALLA and LILYRIC photographs. He has been met regularly by Bruce H. FERNALD (taking over for GERENDE) since 26 November 1969. The first few meetings at that time (late November and early December) were arranged by FERNALD by telephone to LIEMPTY-4 and primarily concerned LIEMPTY-4's reports on GERENDE's family problems and related security arrangements. Since mid-December, LIEMPTY-4 resumed a regular schedule (usually weekly) of meetings at pre-arranged sites and times. LIEMPTY-4 has been given a special extension in the Station to which he may call as "Dr. Carlos" to leave a message for "Victor" (FERNALD). FERNALD can change meeting plans by directly calling LIEMPTY-4. The only personal problem directly involving LIEMPTY-4 was surgery on his knee which required his wearing a full cast on his leg for over six weeks. During this period when LIEMPTY-4 has been unable to drive, FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-4, for the exchange of LICALLA/LILYRIC films and prints, at LIEMPTY-4's office, under a suitable pretext and with appropriate security precautions. LIEMPTY-4's services are invaluable since the Station could not, on a continuing basis, process the LIEMPTY material in its own photo lab.

SECURITY

10. Other than the security problems inherent in GERENDE's personal problems, there have been no security problems during the reporting period.

FUTURE PLANS

11. As for GERENDE, the Station has reached the conclusion that he must be terminated. This is not an easy decision to make, nor will it be easy to confront GERENDE with this decision. He has, after all, devoted 15 years of his life to RVROCK. However, as noted above, in spite of his talents the Station has been able to get along without his services. Furthermore, the constant security risk posed by his wife is, frankly, an unacceptable risk. To try to molify her by promising her a portion of his salary is probably unworkable in realistic terms, particularly since her attitude has progressively hardened. The Station, therefore, intends to terminate GERENDE prior to the end of FY 1970. GERENDE's contract calls for a termination bonus of one month's salary per full year. This would come to $8,750 (USD). For various reasons, including the need to preserve the security of the operation by ensuring that the termination is amicable, it will probably be necessary, as stated in paragraph 6, to give GERENDE about $10,000 (USD). Furthermore, it will be necessary to inform LIEMPTY-19 of the termination, and, to keep her from revealing what she knows, she will undoubtedly have to be given some money herself. The Station does not believe that it would be equitable or sound from a security point of view to use the money which GERENDE himself has earned for this purpose. Therefore, while the figure will remain negotiable, the Station believes that the sum of $2,500 (USD) would be a reasonable amount. Total obligations for FY 1970 in the LIEMPTY Project are currently estimated at slightly less than $33,000 (USD). The Project has been approved in the amount of $38,970 (USD) leaving unobligated approximately $6,000 (USD). It is therefore requested that the LIEMPTY Project be amended for FY 1970 to provide an additional $8,000 (USD) to be used in the GERENDE termination. Funds will be available at the Station.

12. Regarding the project renewal for FY 1971, as far as LICALLA, LILYRIC, and LIEMPTY-4 are concerned, no changes in procedure are planned. The product is useful, it is as timely as present circumstances permit, and the personnel involved are doing their jobs well. The only change foreseen is an increase in salary for some, if not all, of these agents. The most recent salary increases took effect in May 1968. LIEMPTY-4 has not had an increase since January 1967, and LIEMPTY-13 since January 1964. Increase in cost of living alone would be sufficient justification to raise salaries, but in the case of these agents their consistently excellent work deserves to be rewarded. These salary increases will probably range between 10 and 20 percent.

13. As for other project expenses, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 will no longer be funded under LIEMPTY, but have been transferred to LIEMBRACE effective 1 July 1970. Real estate expenses should remain fairly constant, with perhaps a slight allowance for inflation. The rent on GERENDE's dark room (MEXI 137) will no longer be paid with his termination. MV-2823 will be sold or otherwise disposed of and should not be included in the project for FY 1971. Equipment and operational expenses should remain constant.

Vincent P.

for/John A. PROBERT

50-6-74/3

SECRET

15 March 1970

TO : Case Officer and Chief of Station

FROM : GERENDE

SUBJECT: GERENDE Background and Status Report of Present Marital Conflict

1. While this is not intended to be a full exposition of my personal and private life over recent years, I would like to make known some of the factors that have, from my point of view, led up to the present situation.

2. I realize that the interests of the organization and the interest of the individuals who may have opportunity to come in contact with my case dictate as little personal involvement as possible in the lives of agents. Indeed, the requirements of security, compartmentation and efficiency prescribe the modus operandi and, to a great extent the modus vivendi, of agency personnel not only in the sense of earning a living but also in manner of living. Ideally, the less said about an agent's private life, the better, but, as the years go by, changes may occur which go unreported or unnoticed and which may bring about unexpected events and repercussions. When a person has been working for the Station, as I have, for fifteen years with little or no personnel handling problems, no security flaps, no obvious problems on the job, and something comes up like the abrupt separation of my wife (LIEMPTY-19) and me with the personal and potential security risks it has entailed, I feel that some explanation is necessary. Should it be in order, I would like this explanation to reach not only my present case officer and Chief of Station but also the former Chief and officers with whom I have had the privilege to work over the years.

3. I would like to give thanks, in advance, for the patience and understanding that have been shown me thus far. Whatever the final outcome, I know that people have been bending over backward to be helpful and patient in hopes of an early solution to the conflict.

4. Back in September 1959, shortly after our wedding in late 1958, my wife and baby girl, were moved, by the agency, into a

SC ATT 1 TO HMMA-38700

SECRET

50-6-74/3

spacious, carpeted, furnished apartment near the DIZTAG Embassy, which served intermittently as a listening post-basehouse for the agency. At the time, LIEMPTY-19 was working as the manager of the bookstore at the University of the Americas and, at the same time, studying for a B.A. in philosophy. Those were happy times. We received a two-month leave, went to Europe, the Rome Olympics and visited LIEMPTY-19's family in Holland. Back in Mexico, when the base was in operation I stayed home a lot (one of the requirements), minded the dial and tape recorders and the baby -- an unfortunate reversal of marital roles. After exactly five years the basehouse was closed down and we lost rent, LIEMPTY-19's salary and my mother's salary which she had been receiving as part-time basehouse keeper. My mother and youngest sister gave considerable help in taking care of the baby while LIEMPTY-19 worked and when we went to Europe and left the baby with them. This was during the first three years at the base until we had our second child, Christopher.

5. We moved to a small apartment in Lomas and, to supplement the loss of salary and rent allowance, the Station began paying 1,000 pesos a month for the use of a dark room I had built on the roof of the building. We had our third child, Madeleine, unplanned, two months after settling in the two-bedroom apartment. The apartment need not have been so small but we had chosen it for its location and style and because it was to be a temporary stop until we could find something better. We missed going to the Olympics in Tokyo which we had planned to do (1964) and instead began negotiating to buy a home building site at Rio Escondido but when the deal fell through, we decided to go on leave to Europe again, this time with the two older children, leaving the baby with my sister. We visited with LIEMPTY-19's parents in Holland (they had moved back to Holland after having lived in Washington, D.C., since 1943) and the two children stayed with them while LIEMPTY-19 and I made side trips. Traveling is LIEMPTY-19's greatest love in life. Upon our return to Mexico (I came back two weeks earlier), LIEMPTY-19 was so depressed at leaving Europe and being back in Mexico she was emotionally and physically inaccessible for about six weeks. She had not fully adjusted to living in Mexico or to settling down and becoming a housewife. Our cramped quarters, way of living, lack of money, my job, my irregular hours and habits, my Friday night poker games, the three children, all these got her down.

6. In the fall of 1965 after our return from Europe I began teaching English to beginners in the adult education program at the American School in the evenings. This started as a two-hour a week moonlighting experiment but by early 1966, through student contacts made at the school, I had branched out to teaching at the offices of Carnation Milk Co., Singer Sewing Machine, and Richardson-Merrell Drug Co. for a total of about twenty hours per week. LIEMPTY-19, meantime, was working part-time at the Hamilton School in Lomas where the two older children were attending. The family finances improved and I was able to convince LIEMPTY-19 that

the best thing to do was to invest in land and build a house big enough for our growing family which by now had a fourth child on the way. With three friends as partners, I entered on a land-buying deal which turned out to be complicated as we bought the land in the form of company stock. The company was liquidated and the assets were distributed, as land, to the four partners. I paid for our share with the proceeds from the sale of a small lot I had been paying for since 1955. LIEMPTY-19 was at first reluctant to tie us down with a house but when we finally got the papers and land deed straightened out, she threw herself wholeheartedly into the project and the building which began in August 1967. While LIEMPTY-19 supervised the construction, I worked during September and October almost full-time for the Olympic Organizing Committee and the group from Czechoslovakia which came to train in the pre-Olympics. My father-in-law deposited money in Mexico to help us with the major part of the financing of the house. We used $286,500 pesos of his money and about $60,000 that LIEMPTY-19 and I had saved and got the house finished enough to move in in March 1968. We were very short on furniture and shortly after moving in bought three bedroom sets, an automatic washer and even a piano. Naturally, cash was scarce, dirt was plentiful. The yard was a pile of rubble, the carpentry work had just begun, there were no closets, the house was unpainted. Thereafter, we did things on the house as the money came in: continued with carpentry, finished the driveway, put in grass, built a fence and front gate.

7. Six months after moving in came time for the Olympics and I worked, unofficially this time, with the water polo team from Australia. LIEMPTY-19 worked for the month with the Dutch and Belgian radio and TV group. LIEMPTY-19 was, once again, caught up in the atmosphere of being among Europeans and doing something exciting and out of the routine of home and children. She fell in love with the Australians as well, and for several months all she could talk of was that we should move to Australia. I gave it some thought but decided that we had neither the money to invest nor the youth and technical training to make it as pioneers "down under" and, on the other hand, family, friends, a house, and job seniority here in Mexico.

8. Toward the end of 1968, LIEMPTY-19 decided it was time for me to move out of the master bedroom as she could no longer face that aspect of our married life. For several months we tried this but it did not work out for me. One night in March 1969 after we returned home from a party, she asked me to help her undress and when she, once again, refused to have anything to do with me, I got rough with her, prompting a decision on her part, which she had already been pondering, to visit her parents in Holland as soon as possible. Her father provided the plane fare and she left in April for the United States to visit her brother and sister and Holland, for what she said would be a five week trip. She stayed away ten weeks. The four children remained with me, the maid, and

my mother who came to help three days a week. Upon her return, LIEMPTY-19 bore an air of resignation rather than of enthusiasm and, again, as on her previous return from Europe, was physically down and mentally unhappy. When asked about her thoughts on Australia she said that if she had wanted to live in Australia, she should have married an Australian. The separation had not improved our intimate relationship.

9. In August I was to take five weeks' leave and go with the children to Astro-World in Houston and visit my mother's family in South Carolina. When I suggested postponing making monthly payments on her father's loan until December when the Christmas Bonus would cover the back debt, in order to make the trip, she was adamant. saying that if I did not have the cash for going, I should not take leave. I borrowed from my life insurance policy and left with the three youngest children. Adriana had a touch of hepatitis and joined us three weeks later. After spending the month in South Carolina, we returned to Mexico to find that LIEMPTY-19 had very much enjoyed her solitude. We had already talked about divorce before her trip to Holland in the spring. I had told her that I would not consider parting with the children and she said she would consider leaving them to me if I would settle the debt to her father as well as give her a substantial share of what she considered was her part of the house. The title of the house was in my name and had been since the buying of the land. LIEMPTY-19 said I could mortgage or sell the house but that the money was what she was mainly interested in. I told her that the sale of the house was not financially wise in its unfinished state and that the house and land are very likely to appreciate sharply over the next three or four years considering the housing developments going on in the area. Added to this was the sentimental attachment to the house and area. A mortgage, on the other hand, for the amount of her father's loan plus what she was asking, was something I could not afford considering the more than 12 percent cost of such a mortgage in Mexico.

10. At the same time, during September 1969, that we were going through the above-mentioned discussions, LIEMPTY-19 was taking a course at Japan Airlines to become a tour guide and group leader for trips to the Orient as early as November 1969 and, certainly, to Expo '70 in Osaka during the spring and summer of 1970. She received a diploma to that effect. I told her that if she wanted out of the marriage and wanted to be free to travel it was all right by me but that the children would stay with me and I would continue to repay her father at the agreed rate ($2500 per month and 5 percent per year). She then sought legal advice from an old friend, Dutch lawyer Guillermo Floris Margadant who, in turn, steered her to a young woman lawyer, Dra. Berta Martinez, who must have advised LIEMPTY-19 that under the local legal system the only way to try for a sizable cash settlement and considerable support was to hang on to the children because LIEMPTY-19 made a radical "about-face" in her attitude concerning them and she now said that she could not

"abandon" the children. I refused to visit her lawyer with her saying I was not interested in getting divorced, whereas she said that her mind was made up and that we would have to split up.

11. Things came to a head on the night of 12 November when I got home around 9 PM and she suggested we have a drink and talk things over. I mixed some martinis and she began laying down the terms under which she thought we should get divorced, i.e. I should move out of the house, mortgage to pay back her father's money, grant her custody of the children and support of 2,000 pesos per month per child ($8,000). I said I would not get divorced under those conditions and we discussed and argued in the kitchen for about three hours, killing a bottle of gin in the process. We went upstairs and when I tried to make up to her she tried to rouse the children, unsuccessfully, and then tried to leave the house which I would not let her do. She got hysterical, phoned a neighbor, Uta de la Hoz, then she went into the front yard and awakened the next door neighbors, Walter Hurley and his wife, and asked to go to their house. A few minutes later, Uta and her husband Guillermo came and LIEMPTY-19 went with them to their home two blocks away. About a half-hour later I walked up to Uta's to ask LIEMPTY-19 to come home but was told that she was busy phoning her lawyer and would not return.

12. The following morning I took the children to school as usual and my sister Marcia (LIEMPTY-4's wife) picked them up and took them to her house where I joined them for lunch. LIEMPTY-19 came by in the late afternoon while my sister was out, picked up the children saying she was taking them home, failed to do so, then disappeared and was not to be found.

13. It was the subsequent action taken by LIEMPTY-19 in dropping her lawyers and taking on the services of Bernabe Jurado, the most notorious penal attorney in Mexico, that led to the potential security hazards that ensued.

SECRET

50-6-74/3

SE[illegible]

9 March 1970

TO : Case Officer

FROM : GERENDE

SUBJECT: GERENDE Status Report

The present situation of the marital conflict between GERENDE and his wife (LIEMPTY-19) is as follows:

1. GERENDE is living at his mother's apartment at 99 Carlos B. Zetina Street, Apartment 9. He has rented a three-bedroom apartment at Tornel 3 corner with Pedro Antonio de los Santos where he has stored the household effects and furniture removed from his former address at Ladera 39, Lomas de Bezares.

2. The house at Ladera 39 is rented to an executive of Chrysler Corporation International, Dr. Leon MARKIEWICZ, his wife, and fifteen-year old daughter, all of Argentine nationality. The monthly rent is 6,700 pesos M/N and the contract is for two years, beginning 1 February 1970.

3. LIEMPTY-19 and the four children are apparently still living at the residence of the Netherlands' Ambassador, Baron Schelto Van Heemstra at Peña 360, Jardines del Pedregal. It seems fairly certain they are at that address from things that the two older children, Adriana and Chris, have said to GERENDE on the last two occasions he has seen them. They have been there since 5 December 1969. LIEMPTY-19 has denied that she has a fixed address and says that she is staying with "friends."

4. LIEMPTY-19 is continuing to use the services of Bernabe Juardo as her lawyer and, through him, is pressing for even more advantageous terms in the divorce than she had asked in November. Please see the attached copy and translation of the latest proposal made by Juardo on 4 March 1970.

5. The charges and accusations made by LIEMPTY-19 against GERENDE are still not completely resolved and are as follows:

a. Insults, threats and attempted homicide -- this charge rests at the 5° Juzgado Penal, 2ª Corte Penal located at

CS COPY

CATT 2 TO HMMA-38700 SECRET

50-6-74/3

Lecumberri. The judge is CRUZ Mellado. These charges have not been pressed since they were originally made on 13 November 1969 by LIEMPTY-19. The ruling on these charges, should the case come to trial, must be made by three judges of the 2^a Corte Penal composed of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Juzgados Penales. The judge of the 6° Juzgado is Lic. QUIRAZCO, an alumnus of GERENDE's lawyer, Jorge Mario MAGALLON. Together they have, on two occasions, been to speak to Judge CRUZ Mellado who agreed not to issue an arrest warrant and who has, finally, called for a hearing on 16 March (subsequently postponed) at 10:00. MAGALLON has given GERENDE assurances that the charges are likely to be dismissed.

b. Fraud -- this charge was made by LIEMPTY-19 and her lawyer on 11 December 1969, the day after GERENDE left the Villa Obregon jail after having spent a week there for disobeying a court order. (The court order had consisted of an unfounded request to have GERENDE expelled from his house and to have LIEMPTY-19 reinstated there with her father, as the temporary custodian of the children. GERENDE refused them admission under those terms, hence disobeying the Villa Obregon judge's order, so the judge's secretary arbitrarily ordered, on the spot, a 10-day detention. Subsequently, the judge, LUCAS del ARENAL, was forced to lift the detention after seven days and dismiss himself from the case and divorce proceedings as incompetent. The judge has had to face charges of collusion from and with the lawyers of both parties, i.e. Magallon and Jurado. The charge of fraud rests at Mesa 31^a of the Procuraduria del Distrito Federal. The Public Ministry Agent in charge of that table is Jorge GUTIERREZ Cruz. LIEMPTY-19 claims that the money lent to her and GERENDE for building the house at Ladera #39 was actually loaned to buy the house and that GERENDE, knowing they were married under the separate property marriage clause had wrongfully placed the property in his name only, thereby committing fraud. Actually, the land was bought by GERENDE before Christmas 1965 in a complicated transaction involving three other partners: Robert Bancroft WHITEHOUSE, John (Dick) RENNA, and James Walter HURLEY, and each of the partners placed the property in their respective names with the complete knowledge of their spouses. Later the land was subdivided and after nineteen months the deeds were issued. LIEMPTY-19 supervised and prodded the notary who made the transaction and she was perfectly aware that the property was in GERENDE's name. In August 1967 when construction of the house began, LIEMPTY-19's father's money was used which he had deposited in Mexico for the purpose. Since January 1969, according to the terms of the loan agreement, GERENDE has been paying it off and has receipts from LIEMPTY-19 to show for it.

GERENDE has presented both the land deed ("escritura") pre-dating the construction of the house and the receipts showing up to date payment of the loan at the "Mesa 31ª." No further action has been taken by LIEMPTY-19 or her lawyer on this matter but the charge has not finally been settled and is still pending. The charge is, of course, unfounded and is awaiting the proper "lubrication" in order to be filed away.

c. Neglect -- this charge was made by LIEMPTY-19 in December 1969 at the 7° Juzgado Mixto de Paz claiming that GERENDE had abandoned LIEMPTY-19 and the children to their fate and that they were utterly destitute. GERENDE was not notified of this charge and on 9 February after attending a hearing at the Villa Obregon juzgado (see below), once out on the sidewalk, Judicial police agents detained GERENDE, took him to the Procuraduria and from there to Lecumberri. This process involved being finger-printed and mugged. The following day GERENDE was out on a 2,000 pesos bond and three days later, 13 February, the justice of the peace (a woman) formally set GERENDE free for lack of evidence. GERENDE and Magallon went back on 5 March to pick up the bond money and see if Jurado had appealed but he had not and, apparently, that matter is closed.

6. On 14 November 1969, one day after LIEMPTY-19 disappeared from home taking the children with her, GERENDE brought charges against her for minor lesions and showed medical proof thereof. The hearing of 9 February after which GERENDE was detained, was called by Villa Obregon judge Bonfilio SEGURA. GERENDE reiterated the charge, LIEMPTY-19 denied it, the judge ruled against her, ordered her to prison but since the injuries were minor, it does not require privation of liberty and she must only go and sign-in once a week.

7. LIEMPTY-19 is at present teaching school at the Edron Academy on Caleri Street in San Angel Inn. The two older children are going to school there. During the latter part of November, all December and half of January, the children did not attend any school. On three occasions GERENDE has been to the school at 13:30 to try to speak to LIEMPTY-19 and see the children. LIEMPTY-19 has objected to this and the meetings have been short and fruitless except for GERENDE learning that they are still staying at the Dutch Ambassador's. GERENDE's last visit there was on 3 March (Tuesday).

8. After the Villa Obregon judge dismissed himself from the divorce proceedings, according to standard procedure, the case went to Coyoacan and Xochimilco respectively where the judges, in turn, excused themselves from the case and it has finally come to reside at the 1st Juzgado Civil in the D.F. The judge is Olda CORREA (woman) and has the reputation of being tough and pretty straight. Since LIEMPTY-19 has not given an address where divorce suit papers can be served her, the suit has not yet been initiated on GERENDE's part. LIEMPTY-19, on the other hand, has not had

GERENDE served with papers though his current address is known, apparently because she is still seeking a voluntary divorce along the lines and terms which are stated in the accompanying set of proposals. GERENDE cannot begin to accept these proposals in their present form as they are patently unfair and hardly a point to beginning bargaining from.

50-6-74/3

8 March 1970

The following proposals were made to GERENDE on 4 March 1970 (Monday) by LIEMPTY-19's lawyer, Bernabe Jurado, through a mutual friend, Licenciado Carlos Heyn, to wit:

TERMS under which the problem of [LIEMPTY-19] and [Raymond H. GERENDE] could be solved.

1. The right (patria potestad) to the minors would be kept by both the mother and father.

2. The guardianship and custody of the four children is entrusted to the mother. The father may visit the children once a week between 10:00 and 19:00 hours; he may take them out once a month and will return them to the mother's address before 19:00.

3. The father is obliged to pay the mother the sum of 10,000 pesos MN, in advance, per month beginning with the month of November 1969, since which time he has not given the mother or children any money at all.

4. This agreement will be raised to the level of a formal public writ the day it is signed by both parties.

5. Both spouses agree to divorce voluntarily under the terms of this agreement.

6. Upon termination of the divorce procedure, by mutual consent, both parties will desist from the civil and penal actions that either might have initiated against the other.

7. Both spouses are obliged to attend punctually the meetings that the legal procedure establishes as well as grant the guarantees demanded by the Public Ministry and acting Judge for the approval of this agreement and granting of the divorce.

8. In order that the father may visit his children and take them out, the mother is obliged to give notice of every change of address.

9. With the exception of the one day a week that the father may visit the children and the one day a month when he may take

1C ATT 3 TO HMMA 38570

SECRET CS COPY

50-6-74/3

them out, the father contracts the obligation of absolutely abstaining from calling on the mother's address, so that she may carry on her life freely without neglecting her children.

10. While the voluntary divorce is being processed, the mother and children will live at ____________________ and, as above stated, to satisfy their needs, the father will make the first monthly payment of $10,000.

11. Neither the father nor the mother may take the children out of Mexican territory without the authorization of the other.

12. Since GERENDE owes the parents of LIEMPTY-19 the sum of $286,500 plus agreed-on interest, minus whatever payments he has been able to make, the said GERENDE is obliged to mortgage the house at 39 Ladera, Lomas de Bezares in this city, precisely during the course of the divorce procedure by mutual consent as established in the antecedent clauses and before the divorce is granted so that LIEMPTY-19's parents are reimbursed on their loan or on the outstanding unpaid balance.

13. The expenses of making this agreement a formal writ as well as the fees of B. Juardo will be paid by GERENDE but these will be fixed in an equitable manner by Carlos Heyn to whose decision both will submit.

14. In case of failure to comply with any of the clauses of this agreement at any time or for just one time, either by GERENDE or LIEMPTY-19, both agree to expressly establish the following sanctions and terms:

15. If GERENDE is the one who violates any clause just one time, he will forfeit the house at Ladera 39 to the mother and children, LIEMPTY-19, Adriana Juliette, Christopher Ramon, Maria Madeleine, and Laurence Fernando, and said property will belong to the above mentioned persons.

16. If LIEMPTY-19 is the one who violates the terms of this agreement for just one itme, she will lose the custody of children in favor of the father or whatever person he designates for the guardianship and custody of the minors.

17. Since LIEMPTY-19 has to establish an appropriate place to live, in the company of her four children, both parties agree that the household effects will be turned over by GERENDE, to LIEMPTY-19 for that purpose, as well as the automobile she has been using throughout the marriage.

Mexico, D.F., 4 March 1970

NOTE: GERENDE's lawyer advised him not to make a counter proposal. His comments on the above terms are as follows (keyed to above):

1. OK

2. Visitation rights everyday at any time; he may take them out overnight once per week.

3. Will pay 5000 pesos per month, to begin with date of settlement (i.e. not retroactive)

4. OK

5. OK, assuming that agreement is reached on terms

6. OK

7. OK

8. OK

9. Revise to agree with GERENDE's version of paragraph 2

10. OK, except payment is to be 5000 pesos.

11. OK

12. No. GERENDE prefers to continue paying off under the terms of the loan agreement with LIEMPTY-19's father. Later, if a mortgage can be obtained at an acceptable interest, GERENDE might consider this.

13. No. GERENDE and LIEMPTY-19 will each pay their own lawyers.

14. See below

15. Not acceptable

16. Not acceptable (in context of paragraphs 14, 15, and 16)

17. She may receive household effects, but not the car.

50-6-74/3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET (When Filled In)　GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		5	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 12/3 PER SOP . 123

ACTION UNIT CWH 2

INFO FILE, VR DDP, ADDP EYES ONLY

ACTION NO. 180

S E C R E T 261809Z NOV 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 2003

DIRECTOR

RYBAT LIEMPTY-1 GERENDE

C [redacted] 26 Nov 69 IN 93191

DC Gw

RPTS CWS

Diary JM 11/28/69

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 1879 (IN 82190)

B. HMMA 38119

1. RAYMOND H. GERENDE PUT ON HALF PAY AND SUSPENDED FROM OPS DUTY FOR MONTH OF DECEMBER. PERSONAL PROBLEM MENTIONED REF A AND SPELLED OUT IN GREATER DETAIL REF B IS DIVORCE ACTION INSTITUTED BY WIFE, WHO CLAIMING MENTAL CRUELTY AND PHYSICAL ABUSE. GERENDE WARNED BY STATION HE OBLIGATED TO HANDLE SITUATION IN MANNER BEST CALCULATED AVOID EXPOSURE HIS RYROCK CONNECTIONS. WIFE PROMISED STATION HER COOPERATION THIS RESPECT AS HAS GERENDE, BUT SITUATION WORSENING DAILY, MAINLY DUE BATTLE OVER EVENTUAL CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.

2. AS GERENDE COMPLETELY PREOCCUPIED BY THIS PROBLEM, TO DETRIMENT HIS OPS ACTIVITIES AND WITHOUT REGARD FOR POSSIBLE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS, STATION DECIDED ON SUSPENSION AND 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD IN WHICH HE TO PULL SELF TOGETHER AND SETTLE PROBLEM IN WAY WHICH WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE SECURITY OF OPS.

3. STATION NOT SANGUINE GERENDE CAN CHANGE ATTITUDE SUFFICIENTLY TO SALVAGE SITUATION. BELIEVE TERMINATION PRIOR TO END FY 70 DISTINCT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ____

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2003 S E C R E T

POSSIBILITY.

4. FILE: 201-119523.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 12 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, OP 2

ACTION NO. 712

S E C R E T 071828Z NOV 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1879 (MEXI)

DIRECTOR

7 Nov 69 IN 82190

LIEMPTY-1

REF DIRECTOR 51804

1. AS DISCUSSED WITH RAULERSON, GERENDE CURRENTLY "ON TRIAL" TO DETERMINE IF HE ABLE AND WILLING ASSUME ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND EARN RETIREMENT BENEFITS WHICH STATION WILL RECOMMEND IF HIS PERFORMANCE WARRANTS. GERENDE RESPONDING WELL TO CHALLENGE BUT HE NOW INVOLVED IN PERSONAL PROBLEMS WHICH MAY AFFECT HIS FUTURE WITH RVROCK. WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS STATUS RESOLVED.

2. FILE: 201-119523.

S E C R E T

AN
AB
~~IH~~
~~PS~~
~~BK~~
DES/RFD
~~FI~~
WH/1

CS COPY

SECRET

201-119523

07Nov69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 1-3

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: Jack Barry
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6754
DATE: 4 November 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY Zf PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH-8 INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN, OP-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pico) (reference number)

S-E-C-R-E-T 04 23 22z Nov 69 CITE DIRECTOR 51804

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR-33808

1. PRIOR TO FURTHER HQS ACTION PER PARA 2, REF, REQUEST STATION ADVISE AS TO FUTURE PLANS UTILIZATION RAYMOND H. GERENDE.

2. FILE: 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Reference advised Hqs reviewing feasibility of self participating commercial annunity in lieu termination/resignation provision for GERENDE.

C/WH/CONTRACTS William Renehan (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1
201-119523
4 Nov 69
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIRAZOR/Progress Report for the Period 1 August-30 September 1969

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : HMMA-37623, 4 August 1969 (Last Progress Report)

1. Although this report might normally be submitted one month from now, the use of Oliver G. SCANTLING has shifted sufficiently to warrant a special report at this time. Our next progress report will be submitted for the period 1 October through 31 December unless exceptional circumstances justify another change.

2. The fundamental change in the use of SCANTLING (who has suffered the past six weeks from paratyphoid) is that he has been divorced from routine cut-out operations and will henceforth be used for priority tasks and targets which will better utilize his proven talents. First, in late September ZARBOCK took over LICASA-1 for direct handling. The LICASA operation offered no particular challenge to SCANTLING and it is doubtful that his intermediary role offered any particular additional security in this case. In fact, if a flap should ever develop in this case SCANTLING would just add one more local who would have to be extricated from the tongs of the GOM. Second, it has been decided that SCANTLING will very soon turn LIANVIL-1 over to Raymond GERENDE. The details are presently being worked out.

3. PLANS: In line with our decision to use SCANTLING for recruitment efforts principally (and less so for routine agent handling) he is presently preparing for a recruitment attempt against Subject of * MEXICO CITY-1502. When that operation is completed he will be targeted against the MHHARSH target both through a commercial outlet of the Bloc and through various clubs and sports centers where he may have access to MHHARSH types. Aside from these responsibilities, he will be used as needed in other recruitment situations especially in support of a new surveillance team.

for/John A. PROBERT

* Luis Castillo Robles
(201-822275) [illegible].

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-37913

DATE
7 October 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
GERENDE 201
~~50-6-130/3~~

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Ray. H. Gerende	9/1/69	
2	(1) WH/Contracts Renahan has		
3	action draft proposal re annuity		
4	system.		
5	(2) Held for review with Wilsted		
6	re relationships.	9/10/69.	

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

* Note: Gerende's wife works for Wilsted as LIEMPTY-19.

Cable drafted to send 11/4/69.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions GPO : 1968 O - 297-542 (40)

SECRET

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 October 1969, said contract is extended for a period of one year and is amended by increasing your basic rate of compensation to $7,000 per annum.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Contracting Officer

SECRET

[illegible]

ORIG: WSReneban
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 28 August 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: ⑫

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ____ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. OP2

(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) 28 22 46Z AUG 69
(elite) (reference number) (pica) CITE DIRECTOR 33808

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS LIEMPTY

REF: MEXICO CITY 1263 (IN 30562)

1. GERENDE CONTRACT AMENDED 1 OCTOBER RAISING COMPENSATION TO $7,000. PER ANNUM.

2. REVIEWING FEASIBILITY OF SELF-PARTICIPATING COMMERCIAL ANNUITY IN LIEU TERMINATION/RESIGNATION PROVISION. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref attached.

COORD: A. F. Barry Jr.
AC/WH/1

AC Eur
ADC [illegible]
Barry

John R. Horton
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

William S. Reneban
C/WH/Contracts
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 21 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT WH-8

INFO FILE, VR OP-2, RI/AN

ACTION NO. 295

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRET 252345Z AUG 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1263 MEXI (PRALLETTT ACTING)

DIRECTOR

LIEMPTY/1

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 21679

B. MEXICO CITY 0967 (IN 05042)

25 Aug 69 IN 30562

1. PLS ADVISE STATUS REF AMENDMENTS TO RAYMOND H. GERENDE CONTRACT. GERENDE RETURNING FROM ANNUAL LEAVE 8 SEPTEMBER AND STATION WISHES USE INCREASED BENEFITS INVOLVED AS PEG TO DISCUSS AND MOTIVATE FUTURE PERFORMANCE.

2. FILE 201-119523.

SECRET

AN	PLU
AB	X
~~LN~~	
~~FS~~	
~~EX~~	
~~DCS~~	~~NPD~~
~~FI~~	
IJH	1

Answered 8/2[illegible]
AC/WH-1 says
see contracts
Speak [illegible]
Bury

CS COPY

SECRET

201-119523
25 Aug 69

14-00000

SECRET 22 JUL 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, Independent Contractor be amended effective 1 October 1969 to extend the term for an additional year and to increase compensation from $6,500. to $7,000. per annum.

2. The Mexico Station recommendation, concurred with by WHD, was based on GERENDE's initiative overall performance, and demonstrated capability to perform assigned duties.

Carroll L. [illegible]

John R. Horton
Acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/Contracts:WSRenehan:atl (18 July 1969)
Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/WH/1
2 - WH/Contracts

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, CCS 2, CSPS, OP 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

#402

SECRET 180035Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0967

05042

18 JUL 69 IN 05042

M

DIRECTOR

ADMIN

REF: DIRECTOR 21679

1. CONCUR SALARY INCREASE FOR GERENDE BUT WOULD PREFER IT BE MADE EFFECTIVE ON CONTRACT ANNIVERSARY DATE, 1 OCTOBER 69.

2. FILE: 201-119523.

SECRET

Jack:
O.K. by me.

AC
ADC CMS
Barry

SECRET

ORIG: J.J. Barry
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 16 July 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE, VR, OPZ

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pick)

SECRET 17 19 50z Jul 69 CITE DIRECTOR 21679

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN

REF: HMMA 36312

1. HQS REQUESTING AMENDMENT RAYMOND H. GERENDE'S CONTRACT AS PROPOSED BY STATION PARA 4 REF.

2. IN PARA 2 REF STATION NOTED "MORE THAN SATISFIED WITH GERENDE'S PERFORMANCE AND ANXIOUS TAKE ADVANTAGE FULL POTENTIAL." IN LIGHT ABOVE, AND SINCE GERENDE'S LAST SALARY INCREASE WAS GRANTED JULY 1965, HQS SUGGESTS A SALARY INCREASE FOR GERENDE FROM $6,500 TO $7,000 PER ANNUM EFFECTIVE 1 AUG 69, SUBJECT TO STATION'S CONCURRENCE. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CONTRACTS
WH/FI

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

ERNEST J. TSIKERDANOS
AC/WH/1

Barry

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/1/J. J. Barry

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 14 July 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. AC/WH/1		14/7	
2.			
3. WH/Contracts	14 JUL 1969	Jul 14	
4.			
5. WH/FI	14 JUL 1969		
6.			
7. WH/EXO	15 JUL 1969		
8.			
9. C/WH/1			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

My comments re the retirement/resignation are contained in my memo of March 25. Contract also provides for Christmas bonus of one month's salary. Also receives $960. per year for use of one of his residence for darkroom and related electricity and water in processing LIEMPTY take.

5 to 7:

Thoroughly reviewed the file, talked to WH/1, believe the proposed contract amendments are proper (and perhaps overdue). RECOMMEND APPROVAL.

(Once this is done, I have suggested that the Branch should go out to the field and discuss salary adjustment as well as appropriateness of an annuity arrangement--as well as closer operational supervision and additional tasking).

15 July 1969

This seems reasonable and proper.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14 July 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, Western Hemisphere Division

VIA : WH/FI
WH/CONTRACTS

SUBJECT : Recommendation to Amend the Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE (Contract Agent) to Include Improved Termination Benefits and a Salary Increase

1. During the past year Mexico City Station has submitted several dispatches recommending that paragraph 11 of Subject's contract be amended to include new benefits in the event of Subject's termination and/or resignation from Agency service. These Station recommendations have been carefully reviewed by C/WH/Contracts and a Memorandum was forwarded to C/WH/1 containing guidance on the suggested contract amendment.

2. The above information has been reviewed again by AC/WH/1, and we are requesting approval for the following amendments to paragraph 11 of Subject's contract:

A) In the event of GERENDE's termination by the Agency he will receive three month's pay plus one month's pay for every full year of service since 18 March 1955, calculated at the rate applicable at the time of termination.

B) In the event of resignation and/or voluntary retirement upon 60 days notice the following schedule would be acceptable to the Agency as being in its best interests and a payment considered as a terminal payment as follows:

(1) Less than 15 years service (prior to March 1970) 20 days pay for each full year of service.

(2) Over 15 years service, but less than 20 years service (prior 18 March 1975) three months salary plus 20 days pay for each full year of service.

(3) Over 20 years service, three months salary plus one month's pay for each full year of service.

(4) All payments above are to be calculated at the rate of pay applicable at the time of retirement and/or resignation.

3. As to the points raised by WH/Contracts in their Memorandum concerning this amendment we would like to note the following:

A) GERENDE is a Mexican citizen, working for the Agency since 18 March 1955 under an MOC, who considers himself to be a "career" employee of the Agency, and whose initial local employment for cover purposes was largely notional under a system of "ghost payrolling". GERENDE received no income or benefits from this "cover" position which terminated due to the demise of the company on 31 December 1967. GERENDE's other "cover" is self generated in that he gives English lessons in his spare time to middle management Mexican nationals employed by American owned companies in Mexico City. His income benefits from this "cover" are minimal, but suffice for satisfying acquaintances as to the source of his income. In conclusion, GERENDE is considered by the Station to be a full time contract agent, on call at all times for operational activity. Any other local benefits which may accrue to him by the virtue of his being a Mexican citizen should not, we feel, be a concern of this Agency given the above circumstances of his employment with us.

4. This Branch is of the belief that the resignation and/or retirement schedule outlined in paragraph 2, B above provides career benefits for GERENDE in the event that he must resign and/or retire in the event of unforseen personal circumstances. It additionally rewards him for his loyalty of service, and at the same time provides him with incentive to remain in Agency service for the additional financial benefits that will accrue to him providing both future security and incentive.

5. During the past two years GERENDE has served as a principal agent handler for a sensitive fixed surveillance project; has carried out unilateral recruitment approaches against the Cuban target; has been used in special support investigations; and is presently being considered for use in special operations of a sensitive nature. A review of the progress reports in GERENDE's operations discloses that the Station has been more than satisfied with GERENDE's performance and is anxious to take advantage of his full potential. GERENDE's last salary increase from $6,000 to $6,500 per annum was granted in July 1965, and there have been no increases since. Since the Field Station/Headquarters negotiation over amendment of paragraph 11 of GERENDE's contract has been in progress for over one year and a half, we are of the belief that the Station wished to finalize this amendment prior to requesting a salary increase for the agent. It is therefore requested, considering the above, that approval be given for a salary increase from $6,500 to $7,000 effective 1 August 1969, and that his contract be so amended. The Field Station will be queried for their approval via cable prior to implementation of the contract amendment.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
Acting Chief, WH/1

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : C/WH/1 DATE: 7 March 1969

FROM : C/WH/Contracts

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE - Severance/Retirement/Resignation Pay

REF : HMMA-35312

1. Reference asks that GERENDE's contract be amended to provide the following:

a. Three months pay for purposes of a termination payment.

b. The following schedule in the event of resignation upon 60 days notice which would be acceptable to the Agency as being in its best interests and a payment considered as a termination or terminal payment as follows:

Less than 15 years service (prior 18 March 1970)--20 days for each full year.

Over 15 years but less than 20 years service (prior 18 March 1975)--three months plus 20 days for each full year.

Over 20 years--three months plus 1 month for each full year.

2. The Station has pointed out that Mexican law requires an employer (presuming that we are being considered as an employer in the sense of Mexican law) to grant an employee who is terminated three months pay plus an additional 20 days pay for each full year of service. In the event of resignation, Mexican law does not make any requirement for payment by the employer to the individual.

3. GERENDE's basic contract was effective 1 October 1955. An amendment, effective 1 July 1959, provides for a terminal payment of one months salary for each year of service since 18 March 1955, and thus bears out the Station's use of the date 18 March 1955 for service computation.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

4. It is to be noted that [illegible], who was born December 7, 1932, will have 20 years service in March 1975, and in December 1975 he will be 43 years of age.

5. The Station did not indicate whether or not [illegible]'s overt employment provides him any termination pay or pension benefits. Mexican law does provide that an individual covered under their "social Security benefit" program is eligible for annuity at age 65. Should he retire between the ages of 60 to 64, he would receive a reduced annuity.

6. I believe the Station's proposal is quite practical except it does, of course, give the individual an option of resigning at any time and thus being eligible to receive a "resignation payment" rather than what should, I believe, be considered as a retirement payment or program. I, therefore, suggest the following:

a. That prior to effecting a contract amendment providing for a resignation payment for acceptable reasons, information be obtained as to whether [illegible] would actually be entitled to receive from his overt employer additional payment(s) for termination and/or retirement. This then could be used as a basic figure on which to build in terms of termination and/or retirement.

b. The proposed schedule certainly appears adequate. As there is no limit on the accumulation, the individual might well reach a point of "temptation" to resign. I believe there should be a maximum limit on accumulation - why encourage the individual to resign?

c. As both the Station and [illegible] want some program for purposes of security and incentive, I believe more emphasis should be given to such a retirement program rather than on "resignation". Similarly, retirement would not be thought of at age 43.

A retirement program could provide for participation by the individual and also take into consideration what the individual would receive from his country's Social Security program. This type of plan would give the individual a vested interest as well as a feeling of security in terms of the future.

7. It is recommended that your dispatch in answer to Reference be coordinated with the appropriate WH Staff and WH/[illegible].

William S. Renchen
C/WH/Contracts

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
C Raymond H. GERENDE's Cover Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. In preparing a recent request for an amendment to Raymond H. GERENDE's contract, it occurred to us that it would probably be useful to bring Headquarters up-to-date on GERENDE's cover status. As a full-time contract agent, GERENDE is on call at all times for operational activity. His cover activity not only provides him with the necessary flexibility, it is also solid enough to provide him with a plausible explanation of his existence and his income.

2. GERENDE has two major cover activities. One is the teaching of English, mainly to middle-management personnel of American-owned firms in Mexico City. This is done on a regular basis for a few hours each day and earns GERENDE an income of about 5000 pesos per month. His second cover activity, and one which is largely a cover and not really activity, is working as a salesman for IDEN A. GERENDE actually earns only about 500 pesos per month from this, but this fact is a closely guarded secret. GERENDE's acquaintances assume that a good part of his income comes from this cover. Previously, GERENDE had been able to "prove" a total income of about 8000 pesos per month, ostensibly from IDEN B. IDEN B was owned by LISTERINE, and for years he had carried GERENDE on his payroll as an independent salesman on commission. He would ostensibly pay GERENDE a certain amount of money, and IDEN B's accountant would duly file income tax returns and social security based on this alleged payment. IDEN B would also pay whatever taxes were called for by the statements filed. This

OSRAM

CENSA

Attachment:
IDENs u/s/c

Distribution:
③ - C/WH w/att u/s/c

S/c att:1

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-36320

DATE
28 January 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 201-119523
[redacted]

system of "ghost payrolling" is quite common in Mexico, as everybody gains: the company because its declared profit is lower than it really is and, therefore, subject to less tax, and the individual because he is ordinarily given a kickback for allowing his name to be used (or in GERENDE's case, because it provided cover).

3. All this ended on 31 December 1967, when LISTERINE sold IDEN B to IDEN A. For a while thereafter, GERENDE paid taxes only on the money he actually earned with IDEN A, which was, as stated, about 500 pesos per month. As of 1 July 1968, however, LISTERINE arranged, at GERENDE's request, to have his accountant (who continued to handle GERENDE's taxes as a favor to LISTERINE) to lump together all of GERENDE's earnings (from teaching as well as IDEN A) as "professional earnings" and to file returns for GERENDE which included the total amount. This is not quite as satisfactory as the old arrangement (among other things GERENDE must now pay his own taxes) but for cover purposes it is entirely adequate. Other than LISTERINE and the accountant, no one knows that GERENDE's ostensible earnings have dropped, and, as far as we know, LISTERINE is the only person who is aware of GERENDE's tie with WOFIRM.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Amendment of Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References:
A. HMMT-8751, 20 February 1968
B. HMMS-5971, 17 June 1968
C. HMMS-6090, 15 August 1968
D. HMMT-9286, 5 September 1968

1. The Station has finally compiled the information necessary to answer the questions raised in Ref B and, in doing so, wishes to repeat the request originally made in Ref A to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a certain amount of job security.

2. First, Ref B raised the point that there had been no efficiency reports written on GERENDE or "evidence of outstanding performance." GERENDE's performance has been evaluated regularly within the context of the regular LIEMPTY Project progress reports, and a review of the past several reports will demonstrate that the Station has been more than satisfied with GERENDE's performance and is anxious to take advantage of his full potential. The Station does not believe, however, that "evidence of outstanding performance" should be a prerequisite for the type of contract amendment being requested. It is perfectly true, as pointed out in Ref B, that the Station had gone on record in 1959 that GERENDE should not be paid a termination bonus if he should resign simply to get the extra money or to pursue another career. By now, however, GERENDE has cast his lot with WOFIRM. He really has no other career, and to try to start one at this point would be extremely difficult. On the other hand, if he should decide to try his hand at something else, the Station would

Distribution:
③ - C/WH

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-36312	DATE 27 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-119523

undoubtedly wish to reward his long years of loyal service with a generous termination payment. He has earned it, and only termination for cause per paragraph 10 (b) of his contract would prevent him from receiving it.

3. Mexican law (it is the law, not custom) says that an employee who is fired must be paid three months' salary plus twenty days' salary for each full year employed by the company at the pay rate existing at the time of separation. GERENDE's current cover company adheres to this formula. Since GERENDE's termination clause has always read that he would be paid a full month's salary for every year of service (in the event of his termination by WOFIRM), we would not want to change that, and in fact we wish to add to it the three months' pay guaranteed by Mexican law. At the same time, we do see some virtue in the suggestion in paragraph 3 of Ref B that full retirement benefits (in the event of GERENDE's resignation) would apply only after 20 years' service, with lesser benefits until then. Our suggestion would be that in the event of his resignation prior to 15 full years of service (i.e. prior to 18 March 1970) he be paid twenty days' salary for each full year, that after 15 years but prior to 20 he be paid this amount plus three full months' salary, and that after 20 years he be paid three months' salary plus one months' salary for every full year. It is true, of course, that Mexican law does not make any provision for payment of a termination bonus to an employee who resigns, but most enlightened companies have some sort of retirement program, and, as Ref B correctly points out, "working for WOFIRM is a very special case and deserves exceptional financial consideration." In the case of GERENDE, we are not attempting to establish any pattern. This is a special case (as are most) and the Station merely wishes to insure that GERENDE, who has made WOFIRM a career without receiving any career benefits in return, is rewarded for his loyalty and is given some incentive for the future. GERENDE is not without his faults, and he is being adequately compensated for the work he performs, but we cannot expect to get more out of him without showing him greater respect.

4. The Station requests, therefore, that the following amendment be made in paragraph 11 of GERENDE's contract:

a. In the event of GERENDE's termination by WOFIRM, he will receive three months' pay plus one month's pay for every full year of service since 18 March 1955, calculated at the rate applicable at the time of termination.

b. GERENDE's resignation upon 60 days' notice will be accepted by WOFIRM as being in its best interest, and GERENDE will be eligible for terminal payment according to the following formula: Prior to 18 March 1970, GERENDE will receive 20 days' pay for every full year of service since 18 March 1955; after 18 March 1970 but prior to 18 March 1975, GERENDE will receive three months' pay plus 20 days for every full year since 18 March 1955; after 18 March 1975 GERENDE will receive three months pay plus one month for every full year of service since 18 March 1955. All payments are to be calculated at the rate applicable at the time of resignation.

5. Paragraph 10 (b) will, of course, remain in force.

6. Ref D asked that GERENDE's contract be extended for another year without change. We assume that this has been done, although we have not been notified.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

CS COPY

SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-36320, 28 JANUARY 1969

IDENTITIES

IDEN A - OSRAM

IDEN B - Cia. Electrica Mexicana S.A. (CEMSA); light bulb manufacturer

CS COPY

s/c att i/
HMMA- 36320

201-119523

SECRET

SECRET

TO Chief, WH Division	XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, SB Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
6 LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 July through 31 December 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-35030, 22 July 1968

SUMMARY

1. There have been no basic changes in the operation of the project during the reporting period. Raymond H. GERENDE continues as principal agent, handling the personnel of the two base houses, LILYRIC and LICALLA, and performing other additional tasks. On 27 December 1968, consistent with our effort to get as much of the support activity as possible handled by outside officers, direct agent-handling responsibility for GERENDE and the LIEMPTY project was turned over to Bruce H. FERNALD. Vincent P. RIZZUTO remains as alternate and as FERNALD's inside contact.

GERENDE

2. Until the introduction of FERNALD, there was no change in the meeting arrangements with GERENDE. Meetings were held on an average of three times per week until October, when LIEMPTY-19 (GERENDE's wife) was relieved of the responsibility of transcribing the Spanish-language portions of LIENVOY coverage of the BEDOX installation. Thereafter meetings averaged twice per week, the main business being the transfer of LIEMPTY base house material and discussion of base house business.

Distribution:
(2) - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2cc -SB/X/WH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-36272	22 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓50-6-74/3

3. GERENDE's agent handling responsibilities within the LIEMPTY project remain as previously reported. He had also handled LITAMIL-3 until the latter's termination in August 1968. He developed a good relationship with LITAMIL-3, and he showed that he is quite capable, with proper case officer guidance, of providing useful service to the Station in the handling of agents beyond the support type to which he had been limited in the past. The Station intends to try to expand this role, with due regard for security and for GERENDE's limited experience. Furthermore, the Station still has every intention of using GERENDE selectively in cultivation and development of operational leads, as outlined in reference. No such leads were found for GERENDE during the reporting period (among other reasons, we have no intention of giving GERENDE a lead simply for the sake of giving him something to do), but as soon as a suitable lead is uncovered, it will be passed to GERENDE.

4. GERENDE was particularly useful during the Olympic period. While he did not get a job with the Olympic Committee as he had hoped, his wife was employed as a translator by the European television networks who had come to cover the games. This, plus other personal contacts, gave GERENDE a certain amount of access to Olympic facilities. Both GERENDE and his wife helped considerably in the distribution of AEEGGHEAD material, and GERENDE performed a number of miscellaneous tasks assisting the Station in various Olympic responsibilities.

5. GERENDE has also been used in support of JMROD operations, such as making mail pick-ups and delivering material and making phone calls to AMBASSOON. Following the Warsaw Pact Powers' invasion of Czechoslovakia, GERENDE was asked to cover a demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy, and he wrote a good report which was used in Embassy briefings. Recently, GERENDE has enrolled at the University of the Americas to work for an M.A. in contemporary Mexican history. The Station will explore the possibility of his getting access to persons or information of interest on the University campus.

LICALLA

6. LIEMPTY-9's work (in the LICALLA base house) was inhibited in July due to the construction of a maid's room near his working quarters. During the reporting period, however, he took a total of 2,217 operational photos. His regular reporting and commentary continued as in the past. LIEMPTY-9 is a steady and dependable performer, and his unique vantage point remains the source of the most interesting and revealing photos as well as often very informative reporting.

LILYRIC

7. LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27 have been able to keep the LILYRIC base house manned on a regular basis from 0800 to 1800 hours weekdays and 0800 to 1500 hours on Saturdays, with other hours coverable upon request. This has proven to be a far better arrangement than depending on LIMITED for some of this coverage. In addition to the 6,763 operational photos taken during the reporting period and the daily fixed surveillance reports, LILYRIC reporting is of considerable help in compiling current vehicle and license plates lists, PCS arrivals and departures, unusual activities such as demonstrations or protests, unusual or lengthy absences of personnel, etc., all of which have obvious CI importance. It was LILYRIC photos which made it possible for LNERGO to identify the Subject of 201-841520, who had been in clandestine contact with AEGRIP officers. LILYRIC also reported on a half dozen other American (or American appearing) visitors, some of whom it was possible to identify through tracing license plates.

Charlie - who was this?

LIMITED

8. As reported in Ref, LIEMPTY-6 has been terminated and the LIMITED base house closed. All equipment has been turned in, and it can truthfully be said that due to the continuing quality performance of LICALLA and LILYRIC, LIMITED has not been missed at all.

PHOTO LAB

9. LIEMPTY-4 continues to process all photos made by the base houses. In addition, 101 enlargements were made during the reporting period, and 210 prints for LIMTRAP. The quality of LIEMPTY-4's work is good, and he rarely misses his routine deadlines.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

9/27/68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for

Raymond H. Gerende

1. Effective 1 October 1968, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955 is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BY
Contracting Officer

notified
TH-274636
30 Sept 68.

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT

JMROD/Jorge Francisco TIMOSSI Corbani

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

LIENVOY of 24 October 1968 reported that Subject was contacted by Felix LUNA Maderos, First Secretary and suspect replacement for Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez, who is believed to be the equivalent of the Cuban COS. TIMOSSI and LUNA agreed to meet that afternoon at the Embassy to take care of the matter which was pending between them. It is not known if this might possibly concern the material passed to TIMOSSI by GERENDE.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD

Gerende 201-

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 35706	28 October 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-

File Gerende 201

SECRET

S/C Attachment #7 to HMMT-9317
dated 23 September 1968

Jorge MARTINEZ Durán:

Department of Defense Advisory Council
Army Liaison Staff

Alias Document available to GERENDE.

SECRET

201 file

16 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Contracts

SUBJECT : Renewal of Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE (P)

Will you please arrange to have the contract of Raymond H. GERENDE extended for one year on the present basis but with one amendment, namely, provision of a termination or resignation bonus of 3 months' salary plus one-month's-salary-for-each-year-worked. His present contract expires on 30 September 1968. He has worked faithfully for the station since 1955 and definitely intends to make a career of his association with the Mexican station.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
AC/WH/1

GROUP 1
[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMS-6090, 19 August 1968

Please extend GERENDE's contract, without amendments, for one year. We had hoped to have answers to HMMS-5971 prepared in time to have amendments included in the annual extension, but GERENDE's "cover company" has recently undergone a change of management, and we have been waiting for GERENDE to provide us with a written statement of his current cover status, as well as a statement of the retirement rights and benefits provided legitimate employees of the cover company. Our intention is to have GERENDE's contract provide, in so far as possible, termination benefits equivalent to those granted by his cover company to a normal employee. As soon as this information is available, a comprehensive reply to HMMS-5971 will be pouched.

for/Bernard A. EGGEBROOK

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-9286	DATE 9 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: GKREEDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 16457 of 12 June 1968

GKREEDE's contract expires on 30 September 1968, so we would appreciate receiving a reply to reference well before that time.

Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-6090	15 August 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-119533

14-00000

DISPATCH | S E C R E T

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH

INFO.: Chief, SB

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 November 1967 through 30 June 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : HMMA-33459, 8 November 1967

Summary

1. During the reporting period, the project's principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE, was assigned additional tasks, aimed at broadening his usefulness to the Station. These tasks included spotting and assessment as well as the handling of a recruited agent, ERFAIN-3.* GERENDE did well, and it is believed that a new dimension has been opened for him, and by the same token, the Station has, in effect, gained a new asset. The LIEMPTY base houses continued to produce at their usual rate and with their usual effective support to Station REDTOP operations. The LIMITED Base House and its operator, LIEMPTY-6, were terminated on 31 May 1968. Termination was decided upon partly to save money and partly because advancing age had measurably decreased the reliability and effectiveness of LIEMPTY-6's work. LIEMPTY-26 was rehired, which permitted the LILYRIC Base House to give us the same total hours of coverage as LILYRIC and LIMITED had together in the past.

.........continued

Distribution:
~~2~~ 1 - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2 cc-SB/6/WH

Alvarez, Durant
Ramon Joseph

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

50-6-74 3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-35080

DATE: 22 July 1968

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/3

This sounds great except that ERFAIN/3 is being terminated, acc. to Marvin Francis!

GERENDE

2. During the reporting period, the case officer has been meeting GERENDE an average of three times per week. Meetings are usually pre-arranged, at various sites and times. Meetings average 20 to 30 minutes. GERENDE turns over to the case officer negatives, prints, logs, and other reports which he has picked up from the base houses since the previous meeting, along with brief contact reports on his meetings with base house representatives. Reports on other operational activities are also turned in and discussed, and GERENDE is given instructions, notes for the base houses, and negatives for any enlargements which may be desired by the Station. Also, LIENVOY tapes and transcripts are exchanged at each meeting. (The departure of LIACUTE-1 at the end of April 1968 left the Station without a BEDOX transcriber. As a temporary solution, pending the return of LIACUTE-1 or the recruitment of another BEDOX transcriber, GERENDE's wife, LIEMPTY-19, has been hired at the rate of 31.50 pesos per hour to transcribe the Spanish language portions of the tapes. She does the work in her home, and GERENDE transports the tapes.)

3. GERENDE has the direct agent-handling responsibility for the following LIEMPTY agents: LIEMPTY-4 (photo-processor; met twice per week); LIEMPTY-6 (LIMITED; met once per week until termination); LIEMPTYs 13, 14, 26, and 27 (LILYRIC; LIEMPTY-13 normally met twice per week -- in his absence LIEMPTY-27 makes meetings); and LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA; met twice per week). He is responsible for directing their work, paying them, and handling all of the administrative problems which may develop. To judge from the results, GERENDE has excellent rapport with these agents and is able to get a consistently high performance rate from them -- particularly LICALLA and LILYRIC personnel.

4. As noted in reference, GERENDE was employed by the Mexican MHRAVEL committee, which we found a useful side benefit. His MHRAVEL activity during the reporting period has been minimal, but we expect it to start picking up again. GERENDE has conducted a few discreet inquiries and investigations for us within the MHRAVEL complex, and we have instructed him to try to get an assignment which will keep him as close to the FJSTEAL delegation as possible.

5. Reference also pointed out that GERENDE had performed nicely in the cultivation and development of an operational lead, and that the Station planned to give GERENDE more of the same. Furthermore, GERENDE's standing assignments (LIEMPTY base houses, MHRAVEL activity, and occasional support of JMROD requirements) were not challenging enough or occupying enough of GERENDE's time. GERENDE is rather firmly committed to WOFIRM by virtue of the fact that he has worked for WOFIRM for over 13 years and has no other outside employment of any consequence. By the same token, he was, through no fault of his own, doing less work for WOFIRM than at any time in his career. GERENDE's operational exposure through the years dictated more and more restrictions on his activity, for sound security reasons. The solution to GERENDE's problem (lack of a promising future) and the Station's (not getting its money's worth) seemed to be to give GERENDE additional tasks which he could handle under suitable cover and with due regard to security precautions. Since most of GERENDE's support activities had been against the FJSTEAL target, particular care would have to be taken in committing him further in this direction. It was decided, therefore, that his principal retooling would be in a non-FJSTEAL field.

CS COPY

6. In line with the above reasoning, GERENDE was introduced to Andrew R. DOSCHER on 17 February 1968. The idea was that GERENDE would be trained to assist DOSCHER in some of his operations against Central American targets. GERENDE's principal duty thus far has been to take over the handling of ERPAIN-3, under DOSCHER's close supervision and guidance. GERENDE has performed quite creditably in this task. He seems interested in the work and has learned quickly. On the other hand, an apparently ingrained habit of procrastination has resulted in dilatory reporting. If GERENDE can overcome this (and both case officers are working hard to teach GERENDE the importance of prompt and complete reporting) there seems to be every reason to believe GERENDE will develop into a competent agent handler.

7. GERENDE was also given the task of locating and developing (in alias) a girl who, per LIENVOY, was being cultivated by AERODENT. Although GERENDE had to be continually reminded of the assignment, he did an excellent job of meeting the girl and gaining her confidence. It is quite likely that he could have recruited the girl as an access agent against AERODENT, but as this point was reached another operation against AERODENT was launched and it was not felt that attempting to recruit the girl would serve any useful purpose, for the time being at least (among other things, there was no indication that she had had any contact with AERODENT for some months). The only flaw in GERENDE's performance was the time it took him to get around to doing the job. It should be mentioned, however, that at the same time GERENDE had a number of pressing personal matters to attend to, including overseeing the completion of his new house, which he finally moved into on 10 March 1968, even though construction is still not entirely completed.

8. Among other assignments completed by GERENDE in the reporting period were the renting of an apartment for use as a listening post; and initiating a relationship with a Russian translator working for the LERAVEL committee.

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Amendment to GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMT 8751

1. Before amending GERENDE's contract in accordance with reference, we would like to clarify a few points about GERENDE and about terminations and resignations in general.

2. We assume from the files that GERENDE's performance has been entirely satisfactory but since there are no efficiency reports or actual evidence of outstanding performance, we would like to have a statement from the station which would justify the requested amendment. Nine years ago the station said, in HMMA 13571 that "station would not want to give GERENDE a terminal payment if he elects to resign just to receive some extra money or to pursue some other career." That was a long time ago, however, and thirteen years of loyal collaboration may very well have changed your mind on this point.

3. Reference says that GERENDE has no intention of resigning, and we hope this is true if you feel that he is still as valuable as he ever was. Assuming, however, for a moment that he might have in the back of his mind the idea of leaving in a few months to take a more secure and productive job while the taking is good - do you feel that if he quits at his own convenience he is entitled to the same benefits that would normally accrue to him if he had worked longer and was released at our convenience? Assuming that he were to quit next week, would you still want to pay him the proposed termination bonus? Or would you want to include in the

...continued

17 June 68

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS-5971

DATE
12 June 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-119523

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	rc	6954

RI
CHRONO

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/Contracts		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	12 June 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-64
(40)

DISPATCH

contract the proviso that full retirement benefits (three months salary plus one month's salary for each year worked) should apply after, say, twenty year's service, with lesser benefits to apply between now and then?

4. Could you recapitulate for us the prevailing Mexican law or custom (which is it?) on termination-at-the-convenience-of-the-employer? A number of months ago you told us that it was three months pay plus 20-days-per-year-worked, but the LIFIRE/4 and 5 MOC's said that "following local custom of termination subject only has to be paid one month's salary for each year of employment". Your proposed GERENDE terminal payment formula, (which may be a special case rather than a pattern and which, as we understand it, makes no distinction between voluntary resignation and termination-at-the-convenience-of-the-employer) is one month's pay for each full year of employment, plus three months pay at the rate applicable at the time of termination. Does this imply that the one month's pay for each year worked is computed at the rate of pay prevailing during each respective year worked? Does Mexican law or custom dictate the payment of terminal bonus to employees who resign voluntarily? (Working for WOFIRM is a very special case, obviously, and deserves exceptional financial consideration, but we do want to understand the background as it applies to commercial work so that we may have a frame of reference or point of departure).

5. We apologize for the long delay in sending this dispatch. It was originally written in March, and mislaid in transit, but we thought it had been pouched.

6. Apart from the foregoing, do you recommend any changes in GERENDE's contract which will be due for renewal on 1 October 1968?

Theresa H. BACHARDY

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Amendment of Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-8281, 2 December 1959

1. It is requested that the following amendments be made to Paragraph 11 "Terminal Payment" of Raymond H. GERENDE's contract (see reference):

a. The amount of terminal payment, in addition to one month's compensation for each full year of employment since 18 March 1955, should also include three months' pay at the rate applicable at the time of termination.

b. GERENDE's resignation upon 60 days' notice will be accepted by the government as being in its best interest, and GERENDE will be eligible for full terminal payment.

2. The revision requested in paragraph 1 a above is for the purpose of having the contract conform to Mexican law, which calls for three months' salary plus one month for each year of service. The second revision is designed to give GERENDE the option of resigning without jeopardizing his terminal payment. He has no intention of resigning, but he feels that the contract, as it stands, leaves him with no security. The terminal payment is his only retirement program, but as written it does not give him the option of retiring. The Station advised GERENDE that any request of his to retire would undoubtedly be accepted as long as there were no adverse security or operational factors, but agrees that in fairness to GERENDE, who has, in effect, chosen a career with WOFIRM, the clause should be rewritten to guarantee him a termination payment. GERENDE understands that paragraph 10 (b) of the contract will remain in force, and if invoked will deprive him of any terminal payment.

for/Bernard A. EDGEBROOK

Distribution:
3 - C/WH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
50-6-74/2	HMMT-8751	20 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

GERENDE - 201

9. "As reported in reference, (HMMA 32721, 7 Aug 67) GERENDE had been developing a possible access agent to LIRING. This eventually culminated in an attempted recruitment of the prospect by GERENDE. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, GERENDE exhibited considerable resourcefulness and operational skill in developing the target to a point where the recruitment attempt was possible. We plan to use GERENDE in similar roles in the future as opportunities arise, and for this reason we plan to document him with a set of false Mexican documentation. GERENDE is collecting exemplars and getting the background information needed and once the necessary data are assembled, headquarters (WOACRE) support will be requested."

HMMA 33459, 8 Nov 67
LIEMPTY progress rpt,
1 Aug thru 31 Oct 67

file GERENDE 201

201-119523

Initial approach IDEN (who previously selected by station for this job) by Raymond H. GERENDE under cover local detective Bureau operator took place 1 July. Will pouch details after G's second meeting wit IDEN. Would appreciate traces IDEN. Local traces Negative. MEXICO CITY 2219, 21 July 67

6 B. At station directive Raymond GERENDE made contact on 18 July with a young Mexican woman* spotted by this Station as a possible candidate to act as LIRING/9's girlfriend. The girl was found to be ideal for our purposes; she is attractive and has a good head on her shoulders. She was, however, unconvinced by GERENDE's story. Further meetings are planned.

HMMA 32957, Activities
Against Cuban targets, Jul 67
31 August 67

The girl* with whom Raymond GERENDE had been in contact as a possible candidate to act as LIRING/9's girlfriend finally decided that she was not interested in working for the intelligence organization he claimed to represent (with the support of false documentation).

HMMA 33425, 3 Nov 67
Ops against Cuba
1 Aug-30 Sept 67

*Silvia TREVIÑO Caspani. 201-821734

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

F 27

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

30

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/COG 1, CCS 3, C/OPS, C/CA, FI, C/IC 2

S E C R E T 071810Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2711

DIRECTOR

IN 47466

PBRIMEN

REF A MEXICO CITY 2514 (IN 34914)

B MEXICO CITY 2643 (IN 42349)

C. DIRECTOR 33547

1. IT OBVIOUSLY NOT POSSIBLE SGSWIRL SUBJECT REFS A AND B WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING HEG COOPERATION. AS PREVIOUSLY POINTED OUT OFFICIAL LOOKING DOCUMENTATION IS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE THIS. AS ALSO MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY, FEEL WE CAN NOT WAIT ANY LONGER (REF A SENT ON 18 AUG) IF WE ARE TO HAVE A CHANCE TO RECRUIT WHAT APPEARS BE EXCELLENT CANDIDATE FOR OUR PURPOSES.

2. IN VIEW ABOVE, STATION ISSUING FALSE U.S.GOVT LNHARP INTEL CREDENTIALS TO GERENDE TO ENABLE HIM PURSUE INITIAL CONTACTS WITH SUBJECT REFS A AND B AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

S E C R E T

BT

WH/1

201-821734

ORIG: J. Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 6 September 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 44/53 PER ____ #____
CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, TSD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, CI/IC 2

SECRET

SEP 6 23 03Z

CITE DIRECTOR 33547

TO MEXICO CITY

PBRUMEN

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 2643 (IN 42349)

B. MEXICO CITY 2514 (IN 34914)

1. SUBJECT'S POA WAS REQUESTED. ~~ON ROUTINE BASIS SINCE STATION'S REQUEST NOT MADE ON PRIORITY BASIS AND HQS UNAWARE TIME ELEMENT MENTIONED REF A.~~ WILL CABLE PROMPTLY UPON RECEIPT. MEANWHILE CAN CONTINUE ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.

2. WE RELUCTANT @ AUTHORIZE REQUESTED DOCUMENTATION IN CASE THIS NATURE AT OUTSET. SUGGEST STATION CONSIDER SGSWIRL, ASSUMING POA BY TIME OF ARRIVAL NEXT OPERATORS LATE SEPTEMBER. IF SGSWIRL SATISFACTORY AND FURTHER BONA FIDES STILL NEEDED, DOCUMENTATION COULD THEN BE INTRODUCED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * Mexico City wishes to actively pursue development to point of recruitment of Sylvia TREVINO Caspari, whom Station wishes to put in orbit of LIRING-9 to elicit info on Cubans and place financial strain on him.

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COG/CICS

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 2Y PER #

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 26 COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐

ADV COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

INFO: FILE. VR, WH/COG 8, TSD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

S E C R E T 310015Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2643

[illegible] 42349

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF MEXICO CITY 2514 (IN 34914)

WOULD LIKE ACTIVELY PURSUE DEVLOPMENT SUBJECT PARA TWO REF TO POINT OF RECRUITMENT. THE LONGER WE WAIT TO PUSH AHEAD THE LESS CHANCES WE WILL HAVE TO RECRUIT THE GIRL. REQUEST HDQS APPROVE ISSUE OF FALSE DOCUMENTATION CITED PARA TWO REF TO GERENDE AND THAT, PENDING RECEIPT OF POA, GERENDE BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED PER REF.

S E C R E T

3T

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

...SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 190110Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2514 19 Aug 67 IN 34914

DIRECTOR

BPRUMEN LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 2219 (IN 16109)

B. MEXICO CITY 2220 (IN 16099)

1. IN LINE WITH STATIONS PLANS TO ATTACK LIRING-9 AS LONG RANGE TARGET (SEE PARA FIVE REF A AND ANALYSIS BEING POUCHED) ACCESS AGENTS ARE BEING SOUGHT. CONSENSUS IS THAT A FEMALE IS PROBABLY BEST AVENUE DESPITE REPORT MEXICO CITY 2490 THAT HE PLANNING MARRIAGE. (LIRING-9 REGULARLY GOES OUT WITH YOUNG MEXICAN BUT HAS HAD TROUBLE WITH HER FAMILY AND IS LOOKING FOR A NEW GIRLFRIEND.)

2. SUBJ REF BAPPEARS BE EXCELLENT CANDIDATE. IN TWO EXPLORATORY MEETINGS AND NUMBER FOLLOWUP TELECONS WITH GERENDE, LATTER BROACHED POSSIBILITY OF HER WORKING FOR HIM PART TIME IN NEW INVESTIGATING FIRM. SUBJ REF A REFUSED COMMIT HERSELF OVER PROPOSAL UNTIL GERENDE COULD PROVE BONAFIDES AND UNLESS HE COULD SATISFY HER THAT THE WORK WAS "SERIOUS", IMPLYING SOMETHING "OFFICIAL" (SHE MENTIONED SHE DIS- APPOINTED GERENDE NOT LNERGO MEMBER). GERENDE ASSESSMENT IS SHE MIGHT BE WILLING COOPERATE IF HE CAN REVEAL LNHARP BANKING. IF APPROVAL GIVEN BY HDQS OWN ISSUE GERENDE FALSE "DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL, ARMY LIAISON STAFF" CREDENTIALS FOR BONA FIDES.

TREVINO

Joan Pil GERENDE 201

SECRET

Attachment D to HMMA-33166 3 Oct 67

AUTHENTICATION

A "Defense Department Advisory Council Card" was issued to Raymond N. GERENDE in the name of Jorge MARTINEZ DURAN. This card was issued for one operation and is to be returned after it has served its purpose.

TSD/Doc says this is U.S. Defense Dept not a translation of an ostensible Mexican card inscription

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief/WHD		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Progress Report for the Period 1 May through 31 July 1967

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference : HMMA-32068, 23 May 1967 (Previous Progress Report)

1. From 1 May through 31 July 1967, 26 operational meetings were held with Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY Project. With the exception of one unscheduled meeting, meetings during this period were prearranged and meeting times and sites were varied. The unscheduled meeting was arranged via telephone using a prearranged open code. During the absence of GERENDE, two operational meetings were held with Oliver G. SCANTLING, alternate Principal Agent for LIEMPTY, and four with LIEMPTY-4, photo lab operator. All of these meetings were prearranged.

2. GERENDE met with LIEMPTY-4, -9, -10 and -13 on a twice a week basis and with LIEMPTY-6 on a once a week basis during this period. GERENDE's meetings with these assets were all prearranged. SCANTLING met with LIEMPTY-9 and -13 on two occasions and with LIEMPTY-6 once during the absence of GERENDE.

continued...

Distribution:

③ Chief/WHD

201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 32721	DATE 7 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

3. All assets involved in the LIEMPTY Project performed in a satisfactory manner during this period. Effective 1 July 1967 LIEMPTY-4 and LIEMPTY-11 were given slight salary increases, because of their increased activity.

4. There were no known security incidents affecting the LIEMPTY Project or the assets involved during the three months under review.

LICALLA

5. This basehouse, the operator of which is LIEMPTY-9, provided 1277 frames of operational photographs covering the patio and garden area of PJSTEAL. LIEMPTY-9 also prepared fixed-surveillance reports, sighting reports and special notes and comments.

LILYRIC

6. The LILYRIC basehouse, which is staffed by LIEMPTY-13, -14 and -27, produced 2854 frames of operational photograph during the period. The LILYRIC basehouse operators continued to prepare fixed-surveillance reports on each member of PJSTEAL and turned these in on a weekly basis. LIEMPTY-27 resumed his duties on 1 July as scheduled and this basehouse has now reverted to its normal hours of coverage. (See reference relative to the absence of LIEMPTY-27.)

LIMITED

7. The LIMITED Basehouse, operated by LIEMPTY-6, produced 279 frames of operational photographs plus weekly fixed surveillance reports on each of the members of PJSTEAL. The LIMITED basehouse was closed from 17 through 22 July because of the illness of LIEMPTY-6. During this period LIEMPTY-6 did very little radio-alerting for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team because of the variation of the surveillance team's activities.

LIENTRAP

8. The LIENTRAP mobile photo vehicle had a decrease in activity during this period because of the dismantling of the old LIENTRAP vehicle and the modification and installation of equipment in the new vehicle. The old LIENTRAP vehicle was used to cover photographically all of the residences of opposition elements in Mexico City. As in the past LIENTRAP provided photographic coverage of addresses of the local Communist parties, residences of members of other Hemisphere parties and several PBRUMEN targets. A total of 332 frames of operational photographs were provided by LIENTRAP.

PHOTO LAB

9. LIEMPTY-4, the operator of the LIEMPTY photo lab, processed all of the operational photographs mentioned above as well as providing from 2 to 6 enlargements of 299 frames of photographs of special interest taken by the basehouses. LIEMPTY-4 does the photo processing on Tuesday and Thursday nights.

10. Raymond H. GERENDE started the development of a possible access agent to LIRING and also continued to provide support for the JMROD operation. These task being aside from his regular LIEMPTY duties. GERENDE was on vacation from 25 May through 4 June 1967.

11. There will be one administrative change during the coming period when Vincent P. RIZZUTO will assume the Case Officer responsibilities for GERENDE/LIEMPTY. No problems are envisioned in this change over. No other significant changes are planned.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Renewal of Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: HMMA - 32229

Effective 1 October 1967, GERENDE's contract will be renewed with no changes for a period of one year.

T.H.B.
Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CS COPY

17 JUL 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-15590	DATE 11 July 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	gas	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	RECEIVED	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	7/13	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for
Raymond H. Gerende

1. Effective 1 October 1967, the contract, as amended, for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955 is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief/WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: As indicated

Reference : HMMW-15530, 2 June 1967

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE be renewed for the coming period without change.

For/Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
③- Chief/WHD

201-119523

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-32229

DATE
13 June 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-119523

14-00000

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WH Division		MICROFILM

SUBJECT O Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Subject's contract expires 30 September 1967. Shall we renew it on the present basis or do you wish to suggest any amendments?

Theresa H. Bachardy
Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201- 119523
LIENVOY-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-15530	DATE 6 JUN 1967 2 June 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT
INDEX
WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	sas N Perkins	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	BE[illegible]ASED	
[illegible] 13		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	6/5	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

DISPA

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM

DISSEM by 25/M

ACTION

WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2,

27 SEP 66 IN 04583

S E C R E T 271910Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8647

DIRECTOR

REF DIRECTOR 38346*

HMMW-14620 ANSWERED BY HMMT-7164, DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1966.

S E C R E T *REQUEST REPLY ON GERENDE'S CONTRACT

BT

SECRET

HMMT-7164 requests extension without change - memo sent forward by Rueben's office. [illegible]

file Gerende 201

18

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

ORIG: C. BUSTOS/nr
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 26 SEP 66

☐ FILE
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-119523

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 31 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, CCS 3 CS/S

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 27 14 33Z CITE DIRECTOR 38346

TO MEXICO CITY

REQUEST CABLE REPLY HMMW-14620 ON GERENDE'S CONTRACT.

END OF MESSAGE

*HMMW-14620 notified the Station that Gerende's contract expires on 30 Sept 1966 and requests Hqs be notified whether any changes are desired and whether it should be extended.

Gerende 201

Thomas Polgar

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

Jane - file

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Acting
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Admin/Personnel - Contract for Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-14977, dated 12 September 1966

Please extend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract for one year.

ROBERT L. EASBY

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-7164	DATE 22 September 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER Pers

14-00000

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WH Division		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
O Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-14620

Please reply immediately to Reference concerning GERENDE's contract since it expires on 30 September 1966.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-14877		DATE 12 September 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

RI
Chrono

AB OKD W #1
ABSTRACT X

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1.	Charlotte Bustos	mr	3654

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	SEP 13 8 PS '66	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	9/12	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City	XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WH Division		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMS-4239

The contract for Raymond H. GERENDE expires on 30 September 1966. Please notify Headquarters whether any changes are desired and whether it should be extended for another year.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

6 June 1966

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-14620	DATE 9 JUN 1966
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

GS COPY

RI
Chrono
WH/Pers/Renehan

AN 2107	FI	
~~PS~~	~~DESK~~	
ABSTRACT X		~~INDEX~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Charlotte ~~Bustos~~ Dieth	nr	3654

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	6/7	J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE
Emergency Contact System

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-15981, dated 23 November 1960 201-119523

1. In compliance with KUBARK regulation, CSI-F 230-60, the following revised and up-dated Emergency Contact System, applicable to Raymond H. GERENDE, is forwarded for Headquarters' records.

2. Insofar as can be determined at the present time, GERENDE could probably be contacted at one of the following places:

a) Present Residence: IDENTITY A
b) Present Cover Employment Address: IDENTITY B

If Subject cannot be located at either of the above addresses, he possibly could be located through LIEMBRACE-3.

3. The following oral recognition dialogue, using the English language, is to be employed as indicated:

CONTACT: "Mr. (GERENDE, true name) Your Aunt and Uncle in the 'States' asked me to look you up."

GERENDE: "Then you are referring to the IDENTITY C"

CONTACT: "No, I meant your other relatives in South Carolina, the IDENTITY D"

GERENDE: "Yes, Auntie is my Mother's sister."

4. For use as physical bona fides, the Station is forwarding herewith the right-hand portion of a one peso note bearing the serial number V997634.

continued...

Attachments:
As stated herewith
Identities u.s.c.

[illegible] FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WH Division

14H

CS Copy

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO 50-6-74/3	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-28333	DATE 21 February 1966
GERENDE Pers	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

GERENDE has been given the left-hand portion bearing the same serial number and has received a briefing on its use and purpose. It has been explained to GERENDE that he is to show his half of the physical bona fides only after the recognition dialogue has been accurately completed and his new contact has requested to see his bona fides. GERENDE has also been instructed to assure himself of his contact's bona fides by asking to see the other portion of the one peso note. (NOTE: These arrangements supersede those contained in reference). After visual identification of his new contact's bona fides, GERENDE will accept the new contact as his Case Officer.

Cornelius L. [illegible]

for/ Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO: HMMA-28333

TO: Chief, WHD

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SECRET


Y997634
SERIE
LD

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: HMMA-28333, dated 13 February 1966

IDENTITIES.

A. Sierra Amatepec 336 - Apt. 3
Lomas/Barrilaco
Mexico, D. F., Mexico
Telephone - 20-31-61

B. Cia. Electrica Mexicana, S. A.
Corner of Victoria and Escape
Fraccion Alce Blanco
San Bartolo Naucalpan
Estado de Mexico
Telephone: 27-52-38

C. "The Pates"
Mr. and Mrs. A.M. PATE
501 Capitol Place
Columbia, S. C.

D. "The Kolbs"
Mr. and Mrs. R. P. KOLB
3111 Grace Hill Rd.
Columbia, S. C.

[illegible] 1 HMMA-28333

CS COPY

201-119523

Date:

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Garende:

Effective 1 Oct 55 all contracts written or oral entered into between you and the United States are hereby terminated and in lieu thereof the following contract is substituted:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $3600 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for authorized operational travel. All expenses insurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with Government regulations.

3. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with Government regulations.

4. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

5. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

6. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

7. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed through instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or Government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the representative of the Government executing this agreement.

stitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement.

8. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

9. Unauthorised Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

10. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 October 1955, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice to you from the Government, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from the Government accepted by you. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Carende

WITNESS:____________________

APPROVED:

____

[illegible]

S E C R E T

Return to [illegible] [illegible] SE/USSR

RESTRICTED HAN

RESTRICTED HANDLING

T 522945 EIA111 PA[illegible] N 23251

TOR1291951Z DEC 75 LNIN 2651

C/SE/USSR
DC/1
DC/2
Tech Ops
ACTION

S E C R E T 291256Z DEC 75 RESTRICTED HANDLING

CITE LENINGRAD 2651

TO: HEADQUARTERS INFO MOSCOW (EYES ONLY COSTILLE).

MHCUFF AYONT

REF: LENINGRAD 12545

1. DURING SMOL'SKIY'S VISIT TO TEMPSFORD'S APARTMENT REPORTED REF, HE TOLD MRS. TEMPSFORD THAT AMERICAN FROM "CULTURED BOSTON FAMILY" WHO DEFECTED TO SOVIET UNION 10 OR 12 YEARS AGO AND LIVING WITH SOVIET WIFE IN LENINGRAD, NOW DESIRES LEAVE USSR AND HAS APPARENTLY MADE FEELERS RE EMIGRATING TO CANADA (NOT CLEAR WHETHER VIA OFFICIAL CANADIAN CHANNELS). PER SMOL'SKIY, BEFORE DEFECTING AMERICAN WORKED ON "BROADCASTING CODES". AMERICAN REPORTEDLY BEING DISCOURAGED BY FRIENDS (PRESUMABLY SOVIET) RE EMIGRATING TO CANADA FOR FEAR HE WILL BE ARRESTED BY "AMERICAN SECRET POLICE".

2. INDIVIDUAL CITED ABOVE UNDOUBTEDLY [illegible](?) VERNON MITCHELL, WHO FORMER NSA DEFECTOR MARRIED TO GALINA YAKOVLEVA, WELL-KNOWN LOCAL MUSICIAN (PIANIST OR SINGER). PER CARDED INFO BASED SX-24455, JANUARY 1975, MITCHELL REPORTEDLY RESIDENT IN LENINGRAD. SINCE MRS. TEMPSFORD UNFAMILIAR WITH MITCHELL'S

S E C R E T

P&L DISSEM

E2 IMPDET

RECORD COPY

165-2720

14-00000

RESTRICTED HAN

T 522946 EIA111 PAGE 22-22 W 03751

TOR:291951Z DEC 75 LNIN 0661

BACKGROUND. SHE DID NOT PRESS SMOL'SKIY FOR DETAILS, BUT CERTAIN SHE ACCURATE ON WHAT HE SAID.

3. TO TEMPSFORD'S KNOWLEDGE, MITCHELL HAS NEVER ATTEMPTED APPROACH CONSULATE, EITHER OFFICIALLY OR UNOFFICIALLY, RE REPATRIATION. SMOL'SKIY RELATED STORY IN CONTEXT OF OWN SITUATION. HE GAVE NO APPEARANCE OF MAKING OVERTURE ON MITCHELL'S BEHALF OR OTHERWISE ATTEMPTING ELICIT OFFICIAL REACTION. IN LIKELY EVENT SMOL'SKIY REAPPEARS AT TEMPSFORD'S APARTMENT, WE WILL ATTEMPT OBTAIN ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

4. DEFER TO HQS WHETHER WE SHOULD BRING ABOVE INFO TO ATTENTION OF CONSUL GENERAL AND ALSO REPORT IN STATE CHANNELS. ADVISE.

E2 IMPDET.

Refer to Bill Camp who has handled Mitchell staff with Attorney.

S E C R E T

PZ

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE CUBAN GOVERNMENT BOOK ON MEXICAN PHASE OF
THE REVOLUTION

FLD INDEX ONLY HMMA 656

Manuel [illegible] Rivero

DOB: 17 December 1923 in [illegible], Oriente Cuba

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

OCCUPATION: Owner and Manager [illegible], S.A. [illegible]

To be used to report on activities of Cuban revolutionaries in [illegible], due to his friendship with Castro and members of the Cuban Government, as a political action asset.

POA granted 8 Jan 60

OA granted 6 June 60 C [illegible]

[illegible], Manuel [illegible]

[illegible] 26 Jul 58	[illegible]
[illegible] 17 Dec 58	Subj. [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] 13 Oct 59	[illegible] Fidel [illegible] Fidel [illegible]
[illegible] 6579 6 Dec 59	Source of [illegible].

[illegible]

Manuel [illegible] Rivero

81 Tampa,

CI #97272, 1 Dec. 59. Info in file, 27 Dec 59.

PRQ/CA req'd 7 Dec 59. Acknowledgement by [illegible], 14 Dec 59.

POA granted 8 January 1960. Field informed [illegible], 21 January 1960.

OA granted 6 June 1960. Field informed [illegible], 9 June 1960.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
Memo Draft	13 Sept (73?)				

DOC. SUBJECT
Results of Our Survey of Cuban Assets

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM

TEXT C

1. COS Lima did well to raise the question as to what will happen, vis a vis our operational security, when the Cubans achieve diplomatic recognition in the various Latin American countries where this is gradually occuring. The responses from the Branches indicate that we do have a considerable amount of operational activity and equity that revolve around our Cuban assets and that we would do well to begin a gradual cut-back in our use of Cubans, given the targetting that we presume will be made on them as the Cuban CI effort begins in the various countries.

2. However, the solution to our problem should be a gradual one and keyed initially to where the official Cuban presence is, and then to those countries where it is coming. Therefore we start with Peru.

b. GICITRON-4, who has been Treasurer of the 26th July movement in the period 1957-58 provides the cover for LITHGOE.

X

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) GICITRON-4	201-

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
8-68

SECRET

(7-46)

GROUP 1

SECRET

15 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/FI

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4

a. GICITRON-4

b. Subject is used by the Bogota Station to provide cover, status and funds for an operation handled by Errol R. LITHGOE, also a Cuban, who is nominally Subject's partner in the business [illegible] enterprise.

c. Cuban

d. Legitimate businessman who was formerly in Mexico and now manages a Mexican business firm in Bogota.

e. Resident alien of Colombia.

f. Subject has received no training in clandestine operations, though he was involved in several clandestine Cuban activities while treasurer of the 26th of July Movement during 1957-58.

g. Since Subject provides cover for LITHGOE, he is not required to utilize any tradecraft. Having his own company provides for adequate cover.

h. Due to his position, Subject is probably well-known in the Cuban community, but he performs no operational tasks.

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG: DON MCCABE:SV
UNIT: WH/3/CO
EXT: 5269/1034
DATE: 7 AUGUST 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ✓ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. LF/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

7 AUG 72 21 17z

CITE DIRECTOR

TO BOGOTA

298135

1. HQS ATTEMPTING ASSESS THREAT GROWING PBRUMEN DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN HEMISPHERE CREATES FOR SKTRUST EMPLOYED PBRUMEN ASSETS.

2. HQS RECORDS SHOW ERROL A. LYTHGOE, REGINALD M. DACIEK, GICITRON-4 AND GICITRON-5 IN BOGOTA. PLS INDICATE IF STATION HAS ADDITIONAL PBRUMEN ASSETS WE UNAWARE OF, OR OTHERS WHOSE FILES SHOULD BE REVIEWED.

3. DOES GICITRON-5 CONTINUE WORK FOR LYTHGOE ANY CAPACITY?

4. FILE 17-120-21. EX-2, APDIR, WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE

HQS COMMENT: BASED ON MEMORANDUM, "SURVEY OF CUBAN EXILE ASSETS," DATED 25 JULY 1972, C/WH/FI.

C/WH/FI ✓

S. V.
Mar-ag

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY GRH
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
APPROVAL OF DIRECTOR
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GARDNER R. HATHAWAY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

TO ief of Station, Bogota

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HLBA-12320, 10 November 1970

Operational Approval was granted on 8 February 1971 for the use of GICITRON-4 as requested in Reference.

Ernest A. PUKALA

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - COS/Bogota

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HLBW-6561	17 FEB 1971 typed 11 February 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267298

1 - RID
1 - WH/3/C (Chrono)

WH/3/C

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	BMerrell	blb (11 FEB 71)	1034R

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C		Calvin M. Smyth Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	12 Feb 71	Alfonso Spera

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 11 69

DISPATCH

SECRET

No. 201-267298

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/C - P. Kaylor

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of GICITRON/4 ____________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows: .

As outlined in Section VI (4) of Part II (undated).

Field Notified
11 Feb 71

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/S/ John E. Howard

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 8 February 1971 lc

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

2 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4 (201-267258)

REFERENCE : Form 889, dated 19 January 1971

The information on GICITRON-4 contained in DBF-9745, 16 September 1958, was located and reviewed. The information is considered non-derogatory by this Desk. It duplicated information already in Subject's 201.

Pattie S. Kaylor
WH/3/Colombia

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 201 File
1 - 1.1 Chrono

PSKaylor:WH/3/C:blb (2 February 1971)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 1 February 1971 lc
TO: C/WH/3/C - P. Kaylor	C NO. 201-267288
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND XX THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review FBI data re Rafael Mario LLERENA Rodriguez, sent to this Agency on 8-21-58, p. 1.

Please forward your analysis as to whether this information is derogatory or non-derogatory.

Answered on 1 Feb 71.

FORM 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
19 January 1971 lc

C NO.
201-267298

TO:
C/WH/3/Col. P. Kaylor

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/S/ John E. Howard

SUBJECT:
GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐ PRQ I
☐ PRQ II
☐ FIELD TRACES
☐ RI TRACES
☐ OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES
☐ RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☐ GREEN LIST

☐ REVIEW OF STAFF'S DOSSIER
☐ REVIEW OF STAFF'S COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
XX OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST XX SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review FBI data re Rafael Mario LLERENA Rodriguez, sent to this Agency on 8-21-58, p. 1.

Please forward your analysis as to whether this information is derogatory or non-derogatory.

Not considered de-rog.

DBF 9745, 16 Sept 58, 100-2-18.

Located in Llerena's 201-215431.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

188 JAN 71

SECRET
(when filled in)

DT- 6

RID CONTROL NO. (Filled in by RID)

KAYLOR PATTI
WH/3/CO
EXT. 5269

GG-196
382627
TUBE BS4

DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST

DATE OF REQUEST

BRANCH
12 Jan 1971

ROOM NO.

PHONE NO.

	TO:	DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	RID/FILES DT-6			
2	REQUESTER			
3	RID/FILES			
4				
5				

SUBJECT
LLERENA Rodriguez, Rafael Mario

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from RID/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

☒ Temporary ☐ Permanent

VERIFIED

4. Indicate source of reference:

☐ Document reference from RID/Index.

☐ Document reference from source other than RID/Index.

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE
100 - 2 -18 →	~~FBI report~~	~~21 August 1958~~
	DBF-9745	16/9/58

NOT FOUND IN RID FILES
If Further Search Desired
Call X7672

Called 14 JAN 1971

FORM 1870 11-64 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38)

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 18 December 1970 lc
TO: C/WH/3/Col - P. Kaylor	C NO. 201-267298
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review FBI data re Rafael Mario LLERENA Rodriguez, sent to this Agency on 8-21-58, p. 1.

Please forward your analysis as to whether this information is derogatory or non-derogatory.

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Bogota KNP

SUBJECT
C GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION: Process for OA

REF : HLBS-2641, 28 October 1970

Forwarded herewith are three copies of Subject's updated PRQ Part II as requested in Reference.

Orrin K. Banasiak
Orrin K. BANASIAK

DISTRIBUTION:
3-Chief, WHD w/att h/w

cc forwarded CI/OA on 25 NOV 1970

CS COPY

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HLBA-12320	10 November 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267298

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM: GICITRON-4 (Originally LITAMIL-1)

2. PSEUDONYM:

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED. First contacted by Mexico Station CO Clyde SHRYOCK (ps) on 21 Oct 59 (MEXI-4554). SHRYOCK visited Subject's business office and presented self as a "friend" of Gustavo ARCOS Bergnes, who at that time was Cuban Ambassador in Brussels, Belgium and a former contact of SHRYOCK while ARCOS was in Mexico prior to 1959. Purpose of meeting was to assess Subject's attitude towards the Castro regime. Subject was subsequently utilized by Mexico City Station to assist in coordinating anti-Castro activities.

Bogota Station contact with Subject established in 1970 through Station Contract Agent under non-official cover, Errol R. LYTHGOE. GICITRON-4 and LYTHGOE are long-time friends and preformed operational tasks for JKLANCE when both werer Mexico City assets.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any Spanish speaking Case Officer.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

None.

CS COPY

FORM 11-58 1050a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4-20)

SECRET

H/watt to HLBA-12320

201-267298

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject became disillusioned with the Castro regime early in 1959 because of the communist infiltration in the Cuban revolution. Subject is strongly anti-communist and anti-Castro and thus willing to lend his services to combat these regimes.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Except/ for long-time relations between Subject and Errol R. LYTHGOE, No actual control exists over Subject.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

NA

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

NA

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Subject presumably knows he is cooperating with JKLANCE

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have worked for any intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

None.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None. However, Subject was involved in several Cuban clandestine movements while treasurer of the 26th of July Movement during 1957-58.

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

None.

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

In 1960 Subject was utilized by the Mexico City Station to assist in the coordination of anti-Castro activities as part of the XX AMWAIL operation. Subject was rated a reliable source by the Mexico City Station.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

NA

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

NA

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is used by the Bogota Station to provide cover for status and funds for an operation handled by Errol R. Lythgoe who is Subject's nominal partner in the enterprise.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

NA

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT; I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is an unpaid field agent of JKLANCE.

SECRET

SECTION IX

QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject has been in Latin America for a number of years during which time he has numerous contacts and friends.

SECTION X

COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject is not paid a salary by the Station.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None

SECTION XI

CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Mexico City Station files have been checked re Subject.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

None.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Operational Approval

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

6 June 1960

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is an exile Cuban businessman with a strong character who is highly respected in the Bogota business community. Subject is an independent thinker and not easily manipulated.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

In 1960 Mexico Station CO Clyde K. SHRYOCK and Subject met several times in his business office. While at the office a Cuban representative, Ricardo VIDAL Dominguels, saw SHRYOCK and on 2 occasions talked with the CO. At the time Subject felt VIDAL would not talk about these contacts to Cuban officials. This occurred ten years ago in Mexico and the Bogota Station does not believe this incident will adversely effect the present operational use of Subj

SECTION XII

SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject not known to have any overt vices.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Boxing enthusiast

SECTION XIV **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject could pass as a native of any Latin American country.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRC PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information obtained through LIFEAT, name checks of Mexico City and Bogota Station files, Mexican Government files, Dun and Bradstreet, and Headquarters.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

NA

SECTION XV **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS (I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE)

Not applicable for the circumstances in which he is being used. Should there be a break between GICITRON-4 and LYTHGOE and this or another Station want to meet with him to assess him for other operational activities in the future it would only be necessary to mention his friendship with SHRYOCK and his activities in conjunction with LYTHGOE.

SECTION XVI **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER Orrin K.

SECRET

201-262298

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, **WH/3/Col - B. Merrell**	NUMBER 201-267298
	SUBJECT GICITRON/4
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 28 October 1970 mss

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

For limited use as requested in your memo of 28 October 1970, the POA is reinstated until 30 January 1971.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/S/ John E. Howard

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	30 October 1970

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(9)

SECRET

28 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

1. We have received your memorandum of 22 October 1970 informing us that GICITRON-4's file has been closed. However, from Bogota Station correspondence we know that GICITRON-4 is still of operational interest and there is a strong probability that the missing PRQ Part II has been delayed by the recent restriction on pouching material to and from the field.

2. It is requested that the file on GICITRON-4 be reopened and his POA be extended for an additional 30 days to allow time for the PRQ Part II to arrive or to be prepared if need be.

Burdell Merrell
WH/3/Colombia

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 1.1 File
X - 201 File

WH/3/C:BMerrell:blb (28 October 1970)

SECRET

14-00000

Acting Chief of Station, Bogota

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Forward PRQ Part II

REFERENCE: HLBS-2626, 15 September 1970

1. We have been notified that the POA for GICITRON-4 was cancelled on 22 October 1970 because we failed to provide a PRQ Part II showing the details of our present relations with him. We made an attempt to complete this Part II here at the desk, but found that there were too many items of information that we do not have.

2. We have requested that GICITRON-4's POA be extended for an additional 30 days to allow time to provide the Part II. We indicated that perhaps the document has been delayed by the recent pouch restrictions.

3. We would appreciate the receipt of the PRQ Part II within the next 30 days. If it has crossed this dispatch in the mail, please disregard this notice.

Ernest A. PUKALA

DISTRIBUTION:
2-ACOS/Bogota

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBS-2641	DATE 30 OCT 1970 typed 28 October 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267298

1 - RI (F201)
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	BMerrell	blb (28 October 1970)	1034R

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	28 Oct 70	Calvin M. Smyth Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	28 Oct 70	Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 11-69

(40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 22 October 1970 lc

Ems

PSR -
what is status?

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/3/C

ATTENTION : C. Roberson, Jr.

201- 267298
C ______________

The file on GICITRON/4 is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Field notified
28 Oct 70

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/S/ John E. Howard

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

FORM 6-65 691a SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(9)

14-00000

DISPATCH | SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Bogota

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Please forward PRQ Part II.

The POA on GICITRON-4 expired on 6 September 1970. Please submit a PRQ Part II based on the current proposed use of GICITRON-4 within 30 days.

Gracia V. TILLING

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - COS/Bogota

1 - RI (F201)
1 - Chrono

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HLBS-2626

DATE
16 SEP 1970
15 Septembe

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-267298

ORIGINATING
OFFICE
OFFICER
TYPIST
EXT.

COORDINATING
OFFICE SYMBOL
DATE
OFFICER'S NAME
Se

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL
C/WH/3
DATE
15 S 70
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
for
Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 7 September 1970 JR
TO: WH/3/C C. Roberson, Jr.	C NO. 201-267298
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Limited POA expired 6 September 1970. Please submit PRQ II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

[illegible] SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Bogota

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Forwarding of PRQ's I and II on GICITRON-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None.

REFERENCE : HLBS-2533, 6 April 1970

Forwarded herewith as Attachment 1 for Station information and the file are two (2) copies of PRQ Part II for GICITRON-4 (formerly LITAMIL-1). Separate Cover Attachment, Number 2, to this dispatch consists of two (2) copies of PRQ Part I.

Gracia V. TILLING

ATTACHMENTS:
1. PRQ Part II, h/w
2. PRQ Part I, u/s/c

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - COS/Bogota (w/atts 1 & 2 /two copies each/, h/w & u/s/c)

20 MAY 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBS-2564	DATE ~~[illegible] MAY 1970~~ 13 May 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267298

1 - RI (201)
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	PSKaylor	ecw (13 May 70)	9494R

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	13 May 70	Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	13 May 70	Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 11-66

DISPATCH

PRO NO.

DIS ATCH NO.

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

DOI-11/27/5 PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. *Write clearly.*
2. *Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"*
3. *Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.*

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Nee)*
Manuel MACHADO Llorens

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*
"Manuelito"

5. DATE OF BIRTH
[illegible] December 1913

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
Auras, Oriente

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)*

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

a. SEX X M F	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT FT. [illegible] IN. [illegible]	e. WEIGHT [illegible] lbs	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE *(Shape)*
h. COLOR OF HAIR black	i. COLOR OF EYES brown		j. TEETH		k. BUILD	l. POSTURE

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 2-61 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(4-20)

SECTION II — **CITIZENSHIP**

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
[illegible]

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*
[illegible]

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*
[illegible]

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*
United States
Cuba - 1959
[illegible]

SECTION III — **OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA**

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION
[illegible] of Printi

17. TITLE
[illegible]

18. SALARY *(Per annum)*

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*
(Well-off financially)

SECTION IV — **ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS**

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Former Treasurer of the 26 of July Movement in Mexico

SECTION V — **EDUCATIONAL DATA**

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	From	To			

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY, INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

26	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
27	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
28	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
36. DATE OF BIRTH	37. PLACE OF BIRTH
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME	42. YEAR OF BIRTH	43. PLACE OF BIRTH	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME	49. YEAR OF BIRTH	50. PLACE OF BIRTH	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			
PABLO MACHADO LLORENS	X				

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM GICILLON-4 (Originally LITAMIL-1)	2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — **CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT**

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case officer, Clyde K. SHRYOCK (ps), made contact with LITAMIL-1 on 21 Oct 59 (MEXI-4554). Case officer went to the business office of Subject as a "friend" of Gustavo ARCOS y Bergnes, who is presently Cuban Ambassador in Brussels, Belgium, and formerly a contact of Case Officer's while ARCOS was in Mexico prior to the downfall of BATISTA. Case Officer made contact with Subject in order to "feel him out" re his attitude toward the CASTRO regime.

Station, through LIFEAT, was able to evaluate Subject well before the approach was made.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any Case Officer with a speaking knowledge of Spanish.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

None

FORM 11-58 1050a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-20)

SECTION II **MOTIVATION AND CONTROL**

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject, a highly respected Cuban businessman in Mexico, supported 26 of July Movement for idealistic reasons, i.e. rid the country of BATISTA & bring democracy again to Cuba. However, Subject has been convinced that the CASTRO regime has been infiltrated by Communists and CASTRO, his former friend, has done nothing about it. Subj, therefore, is motivated by patriotism, i.e., to rid Cuba of the

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Case Officer has little control or no control over Subject, it is more of a cooperative arrangement wherein Subject is willing to assist PBPRIME in its desire to get rid of CASTRO.

SECTION III **COVER**

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Meeting usually at LITAMIL-1's business office, where Case Officer could pass as a client

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, a long time friend of officials of the Cuban Embassy, merely listens to his friends relate their problems & activities.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Subject knows he is cooperating with PBPRIME intelligence agency.

SECTION IV **INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING**

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have worked for any intelligence service, however, his service with the 26 of July Movement during the period 1957-58, has equipped him well for intelligence work.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

LITAMIL-2 knows that Subject is cooperating with PBPRIME.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None. However, Subject was involved in several clandestine movements while treasurer of the 26 of July Movement during 1957-58.

SECTION V **COLLABORATION POTENTIAL**

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Cuban Government.

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE WAS FURNISHED.

During 1958 Subject was aware of Gustavo ARCOS' contact with the Case Officer and on one occasion called the Case Officer to say that ARCOS would not be able to make a meeting

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains his information from officials in the Cuban Embassy as a friend.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject is aware that the information he provides is sent to Washington.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject will assist in coordinating anti-CASTRO activities in Mexico as part of the AMMAIL operation.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

NA

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is an unpaid field agent of KUBARK.

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject owns a printing plant and therefore could if necessary provide printed material clandestinely.

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject will be given gifts at appropriate times during the year.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station Havana and Headquarters files have been checked re Subject.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

A financial check by Dun and Bradstreet was also run on Subject.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Provisional Operational Approval

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

8 January [illegible]

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.
Subj is a liberal Cuban businessman who dedicated time & money to
the Cuban 26 of July Movement in Mexico during 57-58. He is of
strong character & highly thought of by most members of the Cuban
colony in Mexico. He is an independent thinker & cannot be pushed
around

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT. The Case Officer has met LITAMIL-1 on several
occasions during the past year at his business office. While at
the office, Ricardo VIDAL Dominguels, Cuban Chargeas has been
Case Officer at the office and on two occasions talked with Case
Officer. LITAMIL-1 believes that VIDAL will not talk about these
contacts to Cuban officials.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject not known to have any obvious vices.

SECRET

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Boxing enthusiast

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject could pass as a native of any Latin American country.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information obtained through LIFEAT, name checks Station files, Mexican Government files, Dun and Bradstreet, and Headquarters.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 63b, supra)*

NA

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

NA

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

Subject is owner and operator of a print shop employing approximately 50 employees

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

TO Chief of Station, Bogota	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	MICROFILM
SUBJECT GICITRON-4	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HLBT 1475
B. DIRECTOR 006731

Headquarters will prepare PRQs I and II and forward copies to Station Bogota. Reference B was a summary of pertinent information from GICITRON-4's 201 file.

Anita G. POMARLEN

Distribution:
2 - COS/Bogota

APR 8 10 01 AM '70

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBS 2533	DATE 10 APR 1970 6 April 1970
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267288

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	Judy Hoopes	(mac 6 April 1970)	9494

~~1~~ - RI
1 - Chrono

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	7 Apr 70	Calvin M. Smyth Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/3	7 Apr 70	Richard Conolly Richard Conolly

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 11-68

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Bogota

SUBJECT
GICITRON-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HLBS-2503, 16 March 1970

B. BOGOTA 3483, 20 January 1970.

1. The receipt of Reference A Provisional Operational Approval for Subject was much appreciated. We were puzzled, however, by the request for PRQ Parts I and II on GICITRON-4 since all biographic and operational data on him with the exception of References and DIRECTOR 006731 is on record only at Headquarters as far as we are aware unless Mexico City has retained their old file on him. Paragraph 3 of Reference B specifically requested that pertinent material from Subject's 201 be forwarded to Bogotá, but we have never received it.

2. Errol C. Lythgoe, despite his old friendship with Subject, has no present justifiable reason consistent with cover to question him regarding all the biographic details required for preparation of a full PRQ Part I. Nor could Lythgoe logically elicit from Subject the answers to such PRQ Part II items as "How, when, where, why and by whom Subject was first contacted or developed" by RYROCK, "List other case officers who have handled Subject or whom he knows or has known...", and the like.

3. Subject's proposed present operational use is detailed in Reference B, and Headquarters has the rest of the basic data necessary for preparation of both parts of the PRQ. It is therefore suggested that this be done at Headquarters, with copies being forwarded to Bogotá for updating.

Joseph R. KENDON

DISTRIBUTION:
Original and two - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HLBT-4475

DATE
25 March 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-267298

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Bogota

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
GICITRON-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. BOGOTA 3483
B. DIRECTOR 06731

1. On 6 March 1970 a POA was granted GICITRON-4 to permit him to form a corporation to provide funding cover for Errol R. LYTEGOE. No other operational use is authorized.

2. Please submit a PRQ I and II as soon as possible.

Aaita G. POHARLEN

Distribution:
2 - COS/Bogota

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBS 2503	DATE 17 MAR 1970 16 March 1970
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267298

~~1~~ - RI (201-267298)
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	Judy Hoopes	(mc 16 Mar 70)	9494

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	16 Mar 70	Calvin M. Smyth Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	16 Mar	Spera Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 11-66

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/Col - C. Smyth	NUMBER 201-267298
	SUBJECT GICITROE/4
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 22 January 1970 mse

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To form a corporation to provide cover for Bogota Station asset Errol R. LYTHGOE business and funds on a strict need-to-know. No other operational use authorized.

Station notified

13 MAR 1970

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/S/ John B. Howard

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	6 March 1970

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(9)

SECRET

4 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Counter Intelligence/Operational Approval and Support Group

ATTENTION : Mr. Jack Lally

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

A review of the Staff D dossier on Subject reveals no derogatory information.

Joel H. Beyer
WH/3/C

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - CI/OA
~~1~~ - (201-267298)
1 - Memo Chrono
1 - Extra copy file

WH/3/C-JHBeyer:mac/x9494 (4 March 70)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 24 February 1970 mss

C NO.: 201-267298

TO:

WH/3/C - C. Roberson, Jr.

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/S/ John E. Howard

SUBJECT: GICITECH/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRO I	☒	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER to CI/OA
☐	PRO II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☒ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 9 February 1970 mss

TO: WH/3/C - C. Roberson, Jr.

C NO.: 201-267298

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/S/ John E. Howard

SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☒	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER TO CI/CA
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
201-267293
MACHADO Llosa, Manuel

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.
"Manuelito"

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
12 Dec 13, Auras, Oriente, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Manager for Colombia of Galas y Cia., Mexican-headquartered Printing firm, Bogota, Colombia

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Printing

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK

DATE 22 Jan 70

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME C. Roberson, Jr.
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/3/C
ROOM, BUILDING 3B 2627
EXTENSION X-R-9404

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Owner and Manager of "Machado, S.A." (Lithograph Plant)	Tlalpan #710 Mexi City, Mexi	Nov 59
Treasurer, 26th July Movement	Mexico City	'59

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Pablo MACHADO Llosa (Brother)

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
All information

FEB 10 53 AM '70

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

TO: C. Roberson, Jr.

FEB 1970
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. ☒ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG: C. M. Smyth
UNIT: C/WH/3/C
EXT: 9494
DATE: 30 Jan 70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 7 PER #
CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 31 18 02Z JAN 70 CITE DIRECTOR 006731

BOGOTA INFO MEXICO CITY PANAMA CITY

GICITRON TECES

REF: BOGOTA 3483 (IN 010310)*

1. SUBJECT PARA 2 REF ASSIGNED GICITRON-4 AND 201-267298. HE WAS ORIGINAL MEMBER 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT BUT BECAME DISILLUSIONED WITH ADMINISTRATIVE INCOMPETENCE OF CASTRO REGIME (HE INVESTED $50,000 IN REVOLUTION) AND SOVIETIZATION OF CUBA. HE TURNED AGAINST CASTRO IN 1959 AND WITH OTHER ANTI-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARIES SUPPLIED ARMS TO CUBAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES FROM HIS EXILE IN MEXICO. WHILE IN MEXICO HE HAD EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN CUBAN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES AND WITH CUBAN UNITED NATION AND MEXICAN POLICE OFFICIALS. HE WAS RATED RELIABLE SOURCE BY STATION MEXICO CITY. HE WAS GRANTED OA 6 JUNE 60 FOR ASSISTING IN COORDINATION OF ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO AS PART OF AMWAIL OPERATION. BY 1963, HOWEVER, HIS OPERATIONAL CONTACTS HAD BECOME MARGINAL AND THEREAFTER HE WAS NOT USED BY STATION. THERE IS NO INFO AT HQS TO PRECLUDE YOUR PROPOSED USE OF HIM. WE PROCESSING POA.

8

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BY~~
~~DEC~~ NPD
FI
201/3/CD

201-267298
31 JAN 70

CONTINUED . . .

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION FEB 9 9 08 AM '70
BY ____ PER ____ #
COMP: RID/EDI RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO FEB 10 2 24 PM '70 BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
INFO: FILE , VR RID/EDI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 006731

TO PAGE TWO

2. CONCUR IN REF PROPOSAL THAT IMPROVEMENT GICITRON RECEPTION COULD IMPROVE PRODUCT AND, HENCE, WORTH PURSUING. THOUGHT OCCURS TO HQS THAT GISOY-92, BEING AWARE GICITRON OPERATION, WOULD PROBABLY SUSPECT PROPOSED LYTHGOE COVER OFFICE IN GICITRON BUILDING IS NEW LP. DO YOU PLAN MAKF GISOY-92 WITTING OF LYTHGOE ROLE? IF NOT, WOULD HE BE PIQUED IF HE LATER LEARNED OF IT? WHAT REPERCUSSIONS COULD THIS HAVE ON STATION/GISOY RELATIONS? WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS.

3. FILE: 201-267298.

END OF MESSAGE

* Ref proposed renting office space in building where Novosti news agency is located so that Station could acquire clocer LP for monitoring "take" from present tech installation of Novosti.

WH/1
WH/2/P
SB/X/WH
TSD/AOB - Mr. Collyer (by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCT BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE ROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 22 Jan 70

TO:	☒	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
	☐	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
	☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: C. Roberson, Jr.
WH-3-C 3B 2627
X. R-9494

SUBJECT: *(True name)* MACHADO Llosa, Manuel C-80438

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:
LITAMIL-1 (Former Crypt)
"Manuelito"
GICITRON-4

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-267298

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Bogota, Colombia

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE:
To form a corporation to provide cover for Bogota Station asset Errol R. LYTHGOE business and funds.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

JAN 27 3 07 PM '70

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☒	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED Bogota & Mexi Station	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION R-9494	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF Spera

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

27 January 1965 travelled from Mexico City to Venezuela on a tourist visa.

14 April 1964 travelled from Cuba to Mexico on Ppt #696, file # 532/59 issued 19 January 1959. The passport was extended 14 April 1964 for 3 years by the Cuban Consul, Mexico City.

WH/3/C

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MACHADO Llosa, Manuel 201-267298

WH/3/C

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/CA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

FORM 7-58 44 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

2 Feb 70

Indicate The Subject, Project Or
201 File No. In Which This
Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 26 72 98

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

MACHADO, MANUEL

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE CUBAN GOVERNMENT BOOK ON MEXICAN PHASE OF
THE REVOLUTION

050-006-128/03
HMMA-33839
17 JAN 68
050-6-128/4
P2

UFG 050

FLD INDEX ONLY

WH/COG Cards
20 Jan 1970

Llanes.

MACHADO, Manuel

C/S (201-267998)

[illegible]

Subj., Cuban exile in Mexico, has done well financially in own printing establishment, Manuel Machado S.A., located at Violeta 710, Mexico, D.F. — [illegible] / 7 Aug 62

Cuban businessman in Mexico & one of leaders of [illegible]. His business address is Calzada de Tlalpan [illegible], Mexico D.F. [illegible] entitled Circular de Organizacion from [illegible] Antonio [illegible], Cuban exile in Miami. — [illegible]

Subject says the airplane recently seized from Cuban rebels by the Mexi. Govt. will be returned to them. Subject is [illegible] Cuban [illegible] in Mexi. [illegible] and is owner of printing firm [illegible] S.A., [illegible] Mex City. (Files: [illegible]) — [illegible]

Subj. planned to leave Mexico City for Havana 13 June 1959. 13 June he expected to leave for New York. Hopes to be back in Mexico City on Sunday 14 June. Prime purpose in going to Havana was to report to Fidel Castro the excellent work being done by Salvador Massip Valdes, Cuban ambassador in Mexico. Massip is being considered for a position in Castro's cabinet. — [illegible] / 15 June 1959 / Destroyed

---

MACHADO Llanes, Manuel 201-267998

Subj leaving Mexi for Hava 12 Feb and will there meet Raul Roa, Pedro Miret, [illegible], Faustino Perez. Returning Mexi 17 Feb at latest. — [illegible] / 13 Feb 61

Reliably reported that subj was approached, in late Dec 59, by Leopoldo [illegible] while in Mex City. Purpose of contact was to have subj introduce [illegible] to people in Cuba who could provide arms for Alfaro Siqueiros group in Mexico. Alfaro Siqueiros, well-known Mex artist, reported heading group seeking a leftist-Communist overthrow of GOM. — [illegible] / 1 Mar 60 / [illegible]

Sec. inf. available in [illegible], 201-267998.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 16 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

1

ACTION UNIT WH 8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2, TSD 6

ACTION NO. 881

SECRET 261705Z JAN 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2329 (PRALLETT ACTING)
MEXI

BOGOTA INFO DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

GICITRON TECHS

26 JAN IN 013404

REF: BOGOTA 3483 (IN 010310)

1. NO DATA MEXICO CITY STATION WHICH MILITATES AGAINST USING MACHADO PER PARA 2, REF.

2. FILE: 201-267298.

SECRET

AN UG
AB ~~X~~
~~N~~
~~RS~~
~~N~~
~~DDC~~ ~~NFD~~
~~SI~~
WH/1

WH/3, CI

CS COPY

SECRET

201-267298
26 JAN 70

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH/3/C

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: 33 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CI CI/OPS CI/RA FI2 TSD6 CCS2

ACTION NO. 482

S E C R E T 202245Z JAN 70 CITE BOGOTA 3483

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO: PANAMA CITY

20 JAN 70 0 10310

GICITRON TECHS

1. STATION HAS LEARNED OF SPACE BEGGING AVAILABLE IN GICITRON TARGET BUILDING WHICH SHOULD IMPROVE RECEPTION AND THEREFORE TAKE CONSIDERABLY. FOR VARIETY REASONS BELIEVE ERROL R. LYTHGOE (FOR MEXI: FORMERLY LITAINT-1) SHOULD RENT AND SERVICE AND TOLD HIM TO FORM A COMPANY WHICH COULD PROVIDE COVER FOR THIS. HE SAID HE HAD ALREADY FORMED ONE FOR TAX PURPOSES IN CONJUNCTION WITH MANUEL MACHADO LLOSA, 201-267298 CUBAN MANAGER FOR COLOMBIA OF GALAS Y CIA., MEXICAN-HEADQUARTERED PRINTING FIRM. MACHADO IS LONG-TIME FRIEND OF LYTHGOE WHO PERFORMED OPS TASKS FOR RVROCK IN MEXICO AND IS AWARE OF LYTHGOE'S OPERATIONAL HISTORY.

2. IF THERE NO DATA HEADQUARTERS OF MEXICO WHICH MILITATES AGAINST USING MACHADO OPERATIONALLY REQUEST HEADQUARTERS OBTAIN CLEARANCE OF PRIORITY BASIS TO PROVIDE COVER FOR LYTHGOE'S BUSINESS AND FUNDS. ALTHOUGH HE NOT~~NVO~~ TO BE INVOLVED DIRECTLY IN OPERATING IT MUST BE EXPECTED THAT,

AN
AB
PC
BX
FI

CS COPY

SECRET

201-267298

20 JAN 70

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE TWO CITE BOGOTA 3483 SECRET

CUBANS BEING CUBANS, HE WILL BE MORE THAN GENERALLY AWARE OF WHAT IS GOING ON.

ADVISE SOONEST IF ANY HINDRANCE TO USING MACHADO SINCE MUST MOVE FAST TO SECURE THE SPACE.

3. PLEASE FORWARD PETINENT MATERIALS FROM MACHADO 201, CRYPTONYM AND 201 NUMBER.

4. NO INDEX. FILE MACHADO 201.

SECRET

* PORTION GARBLED - BEING SERVICED

08

SECRET

PRQ PART I EQUIVALENT

NAME: MACHADO Llosa, Manuel

DPOB: 12 December 1913, Auras, Oriente, Cuba

OCCUPATION: Manager for Colombia of Galas y Cia., Mexican-Headquarted Printing Firm in Bogota, Colombia

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

BROTHER: Pablo MACHADO Llosa

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE

FROM: Name | OFFICE | ROOM | PHONE | TUBE ADDRESS

1. TYPE ACTION		OPEN	2. FILE RESTRICTED		YES	3. PERMANENT CHARGE		YES
		AMEND			NO			NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) D1

5. 201 NO. E2

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
N2			
N2			
N2			
N2			
N2			

7. SEX F1 M F

8. DATE OF BIRTH F1

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH G1

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH G1

11. CITIZENSHIP H1

12. OCCUPATION (clear text) J1 OCC. CODE J2

13. SWL

14. ORGANIZATION OR INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION OI CODE M1

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER R1 DATE R1

16. RESIDENCE

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

N1

P1

R1

S1

T1

U1

V1

W1

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE B1

19. ACTION DESK CODE B1

20. SECONDARY DESK CODE B1

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES B1 & C1

22. CRYPTONYM 4

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO.

FORM 12-67 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38-51)

EXT. 5126

3B2627
TUBE 854

IDATION REQUEST

DATE: 19 Jan 70

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		21-1-70		ml
REQUESTER					②
RID/FILES	DT-6				
REQUESTER					③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7				
RID/201	GW-6				
RID/INDEX	DT-5				

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

JAN 21 3 07 PM '70

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: MACHADO LLOSA

GIVEN NAMES: MANUEL

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.): CUBAN MANAGER FOR COLOMBIA OF GALAS y CIA, MEXICAN HQS PRINTING FIRM.

SEX: M

DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP

RESIDENCE: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS: C-25 frms [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO BE KEPT: ☐ RID ☐ DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

FORM 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-8-38)

@ 'MANUELITO' CUG
Δ MEXICO
OWNER AND MANAGER OF 'MACHADO, S. A.'
/LITHOGRAPH PLANT/. LEADER OF 26 JULY GROUP,
CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY. /AMEP/

LLOSA, MANUEL B.

Peru- 17 Jun 48

New Minister of Finance.

IN 45700
Lima 387
OUT 64458
From: CIA
To: State

310603

MACHADO, Manuel Vieira

VIEIRA MACHADO, Manuel

61-0-1-407
(HFLA-1558)
(Book I)
(Pg. 94)

9 MAR 55

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX

MACHADO, Manuel Richard
Born: 12 February 1925
Hudson, Massachusetts

The files of SO (Security Office) contains information on the subject of this card.

323127

RES. OCCUPATION

16 JUL 57

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX

013123

MACHADO, Manuel Richard
Born: 12-Feb 1925
Hudson,Mass,

[illegible] (SECO)
[illegible] of this card

[illegible] FILE

013123 IN MAIN INDEX

MACHADO, MANUEL JUAQUIM LOPES (DE) (SA)
201-852461*

SEX M DOB 20 JAN 35
PORTUGAL, MASOUCO
CIT PORTUGAL
OCC DIPLOMAT
REF HBB -1000, 12 MAY 69

TYPE NAME T
OCC CODE DIPT

OI CODE ?

< BRAZIL, BRASILIA
COUNSELLOR IN BRASILIA, BRAZIL
HUSBAND OF (SA) MACHADO, REGINA

010010061HBBHBROPL
6906111271

MACHADO, MANUEL GINESTAL /DR./

061-004-117
CPL -00808 E01
09 JUN 60
P 27

SEX M DOB ?

CIT PORTUGAL
Δ RUA DE S. NICOLAU, 36
MEMBER OF THE SANTAREM DISTRICT COMMISSION OF THE MOVIMENTO DE UNIDADE DEMOCRATICA /MUD/ AS OF 1947.

013123

✓MACHADO, Antonio Mendonca
MENDONCA, Catelina Adelaide
de FREITAS, Maria Alice
✓MACHADO, Celina M. Freitas
MACHADO, Antonio Mendonca Jr.
MACHADO, Jose Mendonca

AZORES

This card filed in
MAIN INDEX 15 Jan 1954

USA
"

2

SPONSORS:

015124

MACHADO, Manuel

Madrid-X-2-Pts-10
Folder M

3

[illegible]

A-1783

REFERENCE CARD

MACHADO, MANUEL

Writes German and Italian propaganda for Legiones y Falange.

S-13 Jan. 2, 1943

3

015121

MACHADO, Manuel Richard

200-[illegible]

THIS CARD FILED
6 MAY 1[illegible]
IN MAIN INDEX

015126

SECRET

Member of the Spanish Academy

3

T [illegible] ED

[illegible]

MACHADO, MANUEL
DOB ?

CIT VENEZUELA

RES: MEXICO

ONE OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA.

201-005839
TMM -02878
09 SEP 52
SER. 16

013113

MACHADO, MANUEL
DOB ?

CIT VENEZUELA

RES: MEXICO

MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

050-004-012
TMM -02758

SER. 245

013114

SECRET

MACHADO, MANUEL

019-009-0008
MEXI-02164
14 AUG 58

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY IN MEXICO.

013120

0

X-2 H-5207

MACHADO, MANUEL

SEE X-2 H-5207 0-15 MARTINS, ANTONIO

3

1001
2/2/44

013122

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 21

SECRET

ACTION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

MEXICO CITY

ACTION

WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

9 JUN 65 IN 86780

S E C R E T 092228Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3735

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

File 201 LITAMIL-1

1. LITAMIL-1 SUBMITTED FLWG NAMES IN RESPONSE SPOTTING RQM. (A) ING. MIGUEL L. PALMER, FORMER CHIEF FERROCARRILES OCCIDENTALES DE CUBA WHO WORKED FOR MANOLO RAY IN SABOTAGING CUBAN RR SYSTEM UNDER BATISTA (B) LUIS ARGIBAY, BORN C. 1930, CURRENTLY IN TOUCH WITH CURBELO OF CUBAN EMB IN ATTEMPT OBTAIN EXIT VISAS FOR ARGIBAY FAMILY. (C) RAUL VIANELLO GARCIA, FORMER CUBAN CONSUL GENL MEXI.

2. REQUEST TRACES ON ALL THREE WHO NOW MEXI. VIANELLO INTENDS PROCEED U.S. MOMENTARILY TO JOIN FRIEND DR. RODRIGO BUSTAMANTE AT V.A. HOSPITAL, WOOD, WISCONSIN (SIC). VIANELLO WAS NOT DEBRIEFED BY LICOMETS. L-3 SUGGESTS USE HIS TRUE NAME (IDEN) AS BONA FIDES IN EVENT FOLLOWUP ON VIANELLO.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

FILE IN 201-267298

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

MACHADO LLOSAS, Manuel

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Mary Theven
WH/3M

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT
OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 80638

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-262298

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

GROUP 1

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	/	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	R

FROM

Mexico City

ACTION

WH 8

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

ACTION

9[illegible] 86782

S E C R E T 292229Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3737

FBRUMEN LITAMIL

REF MEXI 3736 (86783)

IDEN: DR. RICARDO VIDAL ("VIDALITO").

S E C R E T

CFN

201-267298

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MACHADO LLOSAS, MANUEL
201-267298
SEX M DOB ?

019-005-001
UFGA-21693/14
01 JUN 65
P35

CIT ?
OCC ?
BELIEVED IDEN/W MACHADO MANUEL WHO WAS CONTACT OF SUBJ OF 201-754938.

R 6506161148

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201-267298

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
6-57

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA		FROM: (Division) WHD/3 (Case officer) Bustos (Extension) 6026
SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used) LITAMIL-1		NAME SHOWN IS ☐ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☒ CRYPT
CI/OA NO. C-80638	201 NO. 201-267298	PROJECT none
DATE OF BIRTH 12 Dec 1913	PLACE OF BIRTH Auras, Oriente, Cuba	AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD ☒ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

became marginal

DATE 23 August 1963

SIGNATURE

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief, WHD
INFO	
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT	LITAMIL-1 and LITAMIL-5 now Amlcon/1 -201-308134

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

now amlumber/1 - 201-267298

ACTION: FYI

REFERENCES: A. HMMW 11727

B. HMMW 11729

Agent Service Record on Subjects are enclosed as requested in the References.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
3 - Files

MICROFILMED
AUG 16 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

201-267298

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO D-201-308134 (cc filed) Encl-1	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA 21924	DATE 9 August 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

1P

SECRET

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. Agent Cryptonym: LITAMIL - 1
2. Project: LITAMIL
3. Agent Recruited By: Clyde K. SHRYOCK Date: 6 Nov. 1959
4. Capacity in Which Agent Served: Spotter, info Cuban exiles, Cuban Officials, penetration 26 July movement.
5. Rate of Pay: None. Was given $10,000.00MN as a loan, will probably never be repaid.
6. Other Commitments: None.
7. Agent Dismissed By: Not dismissed, but not recontacted after SHRYOCK's departure. Date: June 1963
8. Reason for Dismissal: Became marginal.
9. Security Risks: None.
10. Is the Agent Recommended for Reuse: Yes, depending on circumstances.
11. Manner of Dismissal: No recontact made after SHRYOCK's departure.
12. Letter of Termination Signed: No
13. Cost of Termination: See 5 above.
14. Station Case Officer: Terrence P. MCGEE
(Signature in Pseudonym)
15. Chief of Station: Willard C. CURTIS Willard C. Curtis
(Signature in Pseydonym)

MICROFILMED
AUG 16 1963

SECRET

Encl #1.
to HMMA - 21924

CS COPY

201-267298

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
: **Chief of Station, Mexico City**

INFO.

FROM
: **Chief, WH Division**

SUBJECT
: **PBRUMEN/LITAMIL-1**

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Headquarters files reveal no Station contact with LITAMIL-1 since October 1962. It is requested that the Station report on its current relationship with LITAMIL-1. If this agent has been terminated, please submit an Agent Service Record.

END OF DISPATCH

CS COPY

Distribution:
C&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-267298

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-11727

DATE
11 JUL 1963
2 July 1963

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-267298

ORIGINATING
OFFICE / OFFICER / TYPIST
WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:dd
EXT.
5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3/M	
DESTROY	

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL
C/WHD
DATE
3 JUL 1963
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
for J. C. King

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

081

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

L = LITAMIL-1
" -2
3

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE : 17 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/TFW 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 3, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2*

OCT 17 0508Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 40768

DIR GUAT INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 2221

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

GYROSE/LITAMIL

REF MEXI 2222 Cn 40773)

1. ON 16 OCT 62, LITAMIL-2 REPORTED MTG PRO-UNIDAD "CLANDESTINE UNIT" NIGHT 15 OCT COMPOSED FOL: LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-5, HORACIO WIESZESUK GUERRERO, JOSE MANUEL LOPEZ ALFONSO, TULIO PRIETO RUIZ, FERNANDO OROZCO, AND DR. ALFREDO FERRER.

2. AT MTG LOPEZ TOLD GROUP THAT COL. ENRIQUE PERALTA AZURDIA, GUAT MINDEF, WHO CAME MEXI OFFICIAL VISIT SEPT 62, MADE CONTACT LOPEZ AND OFFERED ARMS, AMMO AND (SLOW) VESSEL. PERALTA LONGTIME FRIEND LOPEZ. LOPEZ SAID THAT COURIER PERALTA ARRIVED MEXI FEW DAYS AGO AND SAID PERALTA OFFER STILL STANDS BUT THAT DIRECT CONTACT MUST BE MADE WITH PERALTA GUAT. GROUP CHOSE LITAMIL-2 OR LITAMIL-3 AS MOST LIKELY PUC COURIERS VIEW FORMER'S BUSINESS INTEREST GUAT AND LATTER'S DIP CONTACTS. ACCORDING LOPEZ CONTACT WITH PERALTA SHOULD BE MADE BEFORE END OCT. PUC PLANS COLLECT FUNDS SEND COURIER GUAT SOONEST. WILL ADVISE. LOPEZ DID NOT IDENTIFY PERALTA COURIER.

3. L-2 REPORTED 16 OCT HE GAINING MORE CONFIDENCE WIESZESUK. DOES GUAT HAVE ANY INFO RE PARA 2?

4. ABOVE NOT BEING DISSEMINATED VIEW OPS INTEREST. (END OF MESSAGE)

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE – file – LITAMIL-1 AMLAW-1

SECRET WD

024

DATE : 7 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/TFW 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 FI
2
3
4
5
6

SEP 8 0248Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 18812

DIR INFO WAVE SJAN CITE MEXI 1889

GYROSE/AMLAW-1/LITAMIL-1

REF A. MEXI 1614 (IN-40150)

B. DIR 28483 (Cont 6355378)

1. ON 5 SEPT 62, AMLAW-1 CALLED LITAMIL-1 AND ARRANGED MTG APARTMENT RAMON SINOBAS AT 1800 THAT EVENING.

2. AM-1 TOLD L-1 HE FELT HAD OBLIGATION MAKE CONTACT AS PROMISED PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR HAVA RE POSSIBLE DISCUSSIONS MEXI. SAID UPON ARRIVAL HAVA SAW RAUL ROA AND FIDEL CASTRO FIRST TWO DAYS THEN DISCUSSED SUBJ MATTER OF INTEREST L-1. HE DID NOT SAY WITH WHOM HE TALKED RE MATTER. AM-1 SAID THAT CUBAN GOV'T IN VIEW THREATS AND AGRESSIVE ACTION INCLUDING SHELLING CUBAN COAST COULD NOT CONSIDER "TALKS" IN MEXI. ANY "TALKS" WOULD DEPEND ON THE U.S. CLEAR DEMONSTRATION THAT IT REALLY INTERESTED IN "TALKS", THAT IS, THAT U.S. STOP ITS AGRESSIVE ACTIONS AND PROVE INTERESTED PEACEFUL APPROACH PROBLEMS. HE ADDED THAT THEY IN CUBA FELT THAT "TALKS" MEXI MERELY STALL FOR TIME

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-267298

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE 2

MEXI 1889 IN 18812

WHILE U.S. PLANNED FURTHER AGRESSION. AM-1 THEN TOLD L-1 HE NOT ABLE UNDERSTAND DUALITY U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, THAT IS, WHILE L-1 MEXI TRYING ARRANGE "TALKS" WITH U.S. REP OTHER AGENCIES PLANNING AGRESSION. L-1 TOLD AM-1 HE DID NOT KNOW REASON THIS, IF TRUE, BUT SUPPOSED DIFFERENT GROUPS INTERESTED CERTAIN ASPECTS PROBLEM AND THAT CAUSING DUALITY.

3. AM-1 ASKED L-1 WHY HE CONSIDERED VULNERABLE "DEFECTION". L-1 TOLD HIM THAT ALL EXILES SURPRISED SEE HIM REMAIN WITH REGIME WHICH THAY FELT NOT TO HIS TASTE. AM-1 SAID THAT WHILE HE HAVA PRESS RELEASE FROM STOCKHOLM REPORTED AM-1 HAD TAKEN ASYLUM.

4. L-1 SAID THAT AM-1 VERY MUCH ALARMED SITUATION. CONVINCED U.S. PLANNING AGGRESSION. TOLD L-1 HE PLANNED BREAK NEWS TO PRESS RE PLANNED AGRESSION TWO OR THREE DAYS. (COMMENT: AM-1 STATEMENTS APPEARED PRESS MORNING 6 SEPT). DOOR "LEFT OPEN" FURTHER CONTACT IF FELT CONVENIENT.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

**RE RECRUITING SUBJ.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] C/WH 5

[illegible], ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2

AUG 14 05[illegible] 2

ROUTINE

IN 44830

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1081

REF DIR 27823 (OUT 63556)

[illegible]/AMLASH-1/LITAMIL-1

1. ON EVENING 9 AUG LITAMIL-1 CALLED AMLASH-1 AT CUBAN EMBASSY (LIENVOY CONFIRMS). L-1 USING TRUE NAME LEFT TEL NUMBER WITH ANA MARIA BLANCO T., AMB'S SECRETARY ORDER AM-1 RETURN CALL. HALF HOUR LATER AM-1 CALLED FROM CUBAN EMB (LIENVOY CONFIRMS) AND WAS TOLD THAT RE "CONVERSATION WE HAD" THAT THOSE MEN ("AQUELLOS SENORES") [illegible] WITH HIM. [illegible] QUESTION WAS WHETHER PERSON SHOULD [illegible] FROM "THERE" ("DE ALLA") OR "HERE" ("AQUI MISMO"). L-1 SAID [illegible] ACCEPTABLE. AM-1 SAID WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE TRIP CUBA FEEL [illegible] THERE ("TANTEAR LA COSA ALLI") AND UPON RETURNING [illegible] SOMETHING MORE CONCRETE. AM-1 ADDED THAT UPON RETURN WOULD CALL L-1 AND LET HIM KNOW.

2. [illegible] REP CURTIS SEES NO PROBLEM EMB/ODACID RELATIONS. [illegible] ODACID CHIEF HERE THAT EITHER LOCAL OR HQS [illegible] CONTACT AM-1. CHOICE [illegible] MORE DIFFICULT AS PERSON [illegible] FIRST CONTACT MUST SPEAK FLUENT SPANISH AND BE FULLY [illegible] INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS CUBAN PROBLEM. SHOULD AM-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

THROUGH L-1 DEMONSTRATE DESIRE DISCUSS PERSONAL SITUATION CURTIS BELIEVES THIS COULD BE HANDLED LOCALLY ON CLANDESTINE BASIS. AT ANY RATE FUTURE ACTION DEPENDS REMARKS AM-1 WHO PLANS RETURN END AUG.

3. ANY DEVELOPMENTS RE HQS PLANNED CONTACT AM-1'S BROTHER-IN-LAW?

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

[illegible]

14-00000

10 Aug 62

[illegible]

[illegible] regular [illegible] reporting has as yet been [illegible] operations have expanded considerably during July, and this report will attempt to give a birds-eye view of the overall activity as a base for future progress reporting. In summary during July 1962 the [illegible] recruited a new penetration of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and a former employee of that Embassy with excellent access to the Embassy circles; they had one [illegible] channel functioning actively during the month; they located a site for their clandestine radio; they have a cover company possibility which is being seriously considered for activation; and they have approximately seven legal traveler operations under development or active. The [illegible] now number 13, practically all of them are [illegible]

10 August 62

ORIG : EDWARD MARELIUS:kk
UNIT : C/TFW/FI
EXT : 6772
DATE : 6 August 1962

1535

1535

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
RYBAT

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 67 19 05 z

TO : MEXICO CITY JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/TFW 5
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2

① FYI
② Muller F

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 63555 OUT 63555

TO MEXI INFO WAVE CITE DIR 28483 28483

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

RYBAT GYROSE LITAMIL-1

REF: A. MEXI 1614 (IN 40150)

B. HMMA-19172, 8 JUNE 1962

1. SUBJECT REF A ASSIGNED CRYPTONYMN AMLAW-1.

2. CONCUR STATION OPINION REASONS AMLAW-1 INTEREST FURTHER MEETS AND DESIRE FOLLOW UP BY INTRODUCTION KUBARK STAFFER AT APPROPRIATE TIME. APPEARS FROM WHAT WE KNOW OF A-1 AND INTIMATIONS REF B, HE MORE INTERESTED IN HONEST BROKER ROLE THAN DEFECTION OR ANY OTHER TYPE ROLE IN PLACE. FEEL THEREFORE WE SHLD APPROACH HIM WITH THIS IN MIND AND PLAY HIM FOR INTEL, PREPARED HOWEVER TO PUT HIM ON PAYROLL OR CATCH HIM IF HE DROPS.

3. ABOVE RAISES PROBLEM OF HANDLING (1) VIS A VIS EMB AND ODACID AND (2) SELECTION APPROPRIATE STAFFER, I.E., SUFFICIENTLY SENIOR SPANISH SPEAKER PREFERABLY, WE ASSUME, FROM OUTSIDE MEXI, WHO AVAILABLE FOR PERIODIC MEETINGS.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET
RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONT.......

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-267298

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
RYBAT

ORIG : EDWARD MARELIUS:kk
UNIT : C/TFW/FI
EXT : 6172
DATE : 6 August 1962

TO : MEXICO CITY JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

8 [illegible] 19 05z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 63555

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 28483

WLD HAVE RENARD AVAILABLE THIS PURPOSE IN ABOUT A MONTH. REQUEST CURTIS COMMENTS ON ALL ABOVE. ESP ODACID/EMB ANGLE.

4. MEANWHILE, SUGGEST LITAMIL-1 RECONTACT A-1 PRIOR LATTER'S DEPARTURE FOR ANOTHER GENERAL TALK ALONG LINES STATION SUGGESTS WITH ADDED FILLIP THAT HE ABLE GUARANTEE CHAT WITH ODYOKE OFFICIAL ON A-1 OSTENSIBLE TERMS AFTER PBRUMEN TRIP.

5. IF IT TURNS OUT THERE IS MORE BEHIND A-1 CALL THAN WE HAVE READ INTO IT, HQS PREPARED AND STATION AUTHORIZED GO ALL OUT MAKE A DEAL WITH HIM.

(END OF MESSAGE)

TFW/SA AK

WH3/MEX

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP
Excluded from a
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
RYBAT

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

264

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 4 AUG 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/TFW 5 (MR MULLOY TFW NOTIFIED & COPY SLOTTED AT 1745, 4 AUG)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1 F1	4
2	5
3	6

AUG 4 2025Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 40150

PRITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1614

REF MEXI 1475 (IN 32730)

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

GYROSE/LITAMIL-1/RYBAT

1. NIGHT 3 AUG, CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, CUBAN AMB MEXI CALLED LILAMIL-1 AND ASKED HIM WHAT HAD DEVELOPED RE CONTACT PARA 4 REF. L-1 SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD BUT SUPPOSED CASE STILL UNDER STUDY.

2. LECHUGA MOVE HIGHLY INTERESTING AS L-1 WAS TO HAVE MADE CONTACT LECHUGA WHEN NEWS RE CONTACT AVAILABLE.

3. MEXI OPINION L-1 SHOULD CONTACT LECHUGA SOONEST ORDER EXPAND DISCUSSION REF AND SEEK COMMON GROUND RE LECHUGA PERSONAL POSITION. IN VIEW LECHUGA SCHEDULED TRIP HAVA 10 AUG REQUEST HQS COMMENTS SOONEST AS TO WHAT L-1 MIGHT SAY. STATION OPINION LECHUGA INTERESTED U.S. CONTACT ORDER DISCUSS CUBAN U.S. RELATIONS OR PERSONAL SITUATION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *LITAMIL 7 TOLD CARDOS LECHUGA THAT LITAMIL 1 INTERESTED TALK TO HIM RE PERSONAL MATTER.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-267298

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

22 MARCH 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT: Transfer of Agent Files to TFW

The following agent files have been permanently transferred to TFW. They will assume all responsibility for these agents effective this date. The area of operations and duties for the agents will not change, therefore, no PRQ II amendments will be submitted and the effective clearances are valid.

LITAMIL-1	C-80638	201-267298
LITAMIL-2	C-82583	201-275992
LITAMIL-4	C-86903	201-275058
LITAMIL-6	C-93632	201-304783

N. P. Holman
C/WH/3

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

25 JAN 1968

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
National Security Agency

SUBJECT : William H. MARTIN

1. On 15 January 1968 this Agency received the following information from our liaison contact in the Canadian Department of State for External Affairs:

a. The Canadian Press Correspondent in Moscow, William BUCKLEY, approached our Embassy informally in the middle of December on behalf of William MARTIN, the ex-employee of NSA who defected to the Soviet Union in 1960.

b. According to BUCKLEY, MARTIN wishes to see his parents for compassionate reasons and wants to know if he would be admitted to Canada without fear of extradition to the United States if he were to arrange a rendez-vous with his parents in Vancouver. We do not know whether MARTIN still has a United States passport or whether he has become a Soviet citizen. In any event MARTIN considers himself inadmissible to the United States.

c. BUCKLEY met MARTIN at the apartment of Howard RAUSCH, the Moscow correspondent for McGraw-Hill Publications. In addition MARTIN later telephoned BUCKLEY to indicate his interest in finding out whether or not he could come to Canada. BUCKLEY assumes, quite rightly I would think, that the manner in which MARTIN has made his request indicates that his Russian hosts are aware of his interest in getting out of the Soviet Union to see his parents.

d. We have informed our Embassy that it should take no action to encourage BUCKLEY or MARTIN to believe that a visa would be granted if MARTIN were to make formal application. Since, however, MARTIN's interest in coming to Canada is already in a newspaperman's hands, we cannot rule out the possibility that BUCKLEY might write about MARTIN's interest. Such a story would probably lead to the need for an expression of the Canadian Government's attitude. In making recommendations on the kind of response that might be made in the event that a question is put to my Minister, it

SECRET

SIG-356

would be most useful to know what MARTIN's status in law is so far as the United States is concerned. If, for example, your Government could not take legal action, the Canadian authorities would be in a position if this matter came to public attention to say that they were not aware of any barrier preventing MARTIN from seeing his parents in the United States. I should be most grateful if through your channels we could be provided informally with an indication of MARTIN's status in law in the United States.

e. BUCKLEY's only other comment on MARTIN was that he didn't really know what to make of MARTIN. MARTIN seemed outspoken in dealing with the shortcomings of life in the Soviet Union. On the other hand he spoke with a slight stammer and seemed nervous. BUCKLEY's view for what it is worth is that MARTIN is not interested in getting into trouble with the Russians or doing anything which they might consider underhanded. I should emphasize that no member of the Canadian Embassy has had any direct contact with MARTIN.

2. On 18 January 1968 the Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised of the foregoing informally, in order to explore the possibility of providing an indication of Subject's status in law, as requested in paragraph 1. d. above.

3. This Agency was advised by the Department of State on 19 January that Subject's parents had written to the Department advising that Subject would like to visit his parents, that he was planning a visit to Canada, and inquiring what Subject's legal position would be if he did indeed visit. The Department indicated that it planned to inquire what the U. S. Embassy in Moscow knew of Subject's travel plans, including a check with the Canadian Embassy to ascertain if Subject had applied for a visa. The Department was apprised of the informal Canadian inquiry as to Subject's status, but indicated that it would refrain from making any reference to this inquiry in seeking information from the U. S. Embassy in Moscow.

4. Our representative in Ottawa was apprised of the developments cited in paragraph 3 above, and requested to pass them on to the liaison contact, on 19 January 1968.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

Signed: James R. Hunt

JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI 316/00326-68
cc: Department of State
Federal Bureau of Investigation

E/BC/CANADA:JMHowley:cs - 23 January 1968

Based on: OCOA-12663 12 January 1968

Distribution:
  Orig. & 1 - Addressee
    1 - C/CI
    1 - CI/Liaison
    1 - CI/R&A
    1 - FID/CSB
    1 - E/BC/Canada
    1 - State
    1 - FBI

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: Anita Potocki
UNIT: FI/D
EXT: 6471
DATE: 17 April 1961

TO: Tokyo
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

Not Sent

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
XX ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

TO TOKY INFO CITE DIR

RYBAT LCIMPROVE ZRPERUSAL ZRGRACE

REF: TOKY-6171 (IN 24886)

1. APPRECIATE REF, WHICH FIRST REPORT MARTIN CONTACT WITH DR JAKOB Y. FISCHER.

2. RE PARA 2B REF, FIND FISCHER QUOTE VOLUNTEERED COMMENTS END QUOTE AND ONI REACTION INTERESTING, ESPECIALLY REPORT QUOTE HE APPEARED INTRIGUED BY IDEA USE HIS PLACE FOR MTGS END QUOTE. THIS OUT OF CHARACTER IN LIGHT HIS KNOWN CONTACTS VARIOUS INTEL OFFICERS, INCLUDING KUBARKERS WHO USED HIS RESTAURANT FOR MTGS. PRESUME REF QUOTE YURI RASTVOROV AMER FEMALE CONTACT END QUOTE REFERS MISS MAUDE L. BURRIS (ALIAS QUOTE MRS. BROWNING END QUOTE), BORN TEXAS, ELDERLY DAC EMPLOYEE OF AEP SCHOOL TOKY, RASTVOROV'S ENGLISH TEACHER 48-END 53 AND CLOSE CONTACT. BURRIS WAS JOINT ODOPAL/KUBARK ASSET THROUGH WHOM ACTUAL DEFECTION CONTACT JAN 54 ESTABLISHED. (CF. JACO-1564

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER S-E-C-R-E-T AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED		
ROUTINE		
PRIORITY	INITIALS	
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE TWO

(IN 12657) 27 JAN 54.) JULY 56 SHE REPORTED CHIEF EDUC ADVISOR HQS FIRST CAVALRY DIV, ASSIGNED TROOP INFO AND EDUC OFFICE TOKY, WHO PRIOR 25 JUL 56 PUBLICATION RASTVOROV ARTICLES IN QUOTE YOMIURI TOKY NEWS END QUOTE WAS PATIENT DR. YEVGENIY AKSENOV, M.D., NAMED BY R. AS KGB AGENT SINCE 47. HOWEVER, SUSPECT COMMENT MAY ALSO BE VEILED REF TO ANTONINA JOHANSSON, CO-OWNER WITH VERA DUNAYEVA OF BEREZKA RESTAURANT, 21, ONE-CHOME, KAMIDORI, SHIBUYA-KU, SUSPECTED AS MTG PLACE AND POSS BASE OF OPS FOR SOV INTEL ORGANIZATION ALLEGEDLY FINANCED BY SOV MISSION TOKY. (CF: FJTA-13051, 18 SEPT 56; FJTA-13786, 30 OCT 56 AND FJBA-8146, ATT. 21 DEC 55 - AEMARBLE REPORT).

3. IN RE ABOVE, NOTE VALENTIN VALKOV, EX-SPOUSE MRS. TWILLEY, FORMER EMPLOYEE JOHANSSON AND DUNAYEVA AS MANAGER BEREZKA, ALLEGEDLY FIRED FOR PRO-SOV REMARKS TO CUSTOMERS. ALSO NOTE DUNAYEV AND WIFE MEMBERS CATHEDRAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE		
☐	DEFERRED	
☐	ROUTINE	
☐	PRIORITY	INITIALS
☐	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE THREE

NICOLAI-DO, AS ARE ANTONIOS E. PAPPADOPOULOS, MUEHLENBERG AND TWILLEY, PER ENCL. FJTA-32421, 26 APR 60. TWO LATTER INDIVIDUALS OF COURSE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FIRST HANDLING RASTVOROV AND PROBABLY KNOWN JOHANSSON. ALSO NOTE AEMARBLE REPORTS 801 AND 807 OF FEB 57 SHOW AKSENOV IN CONTACT U.S. OFFICIALS VISITING BISHOP IRENEY AND SISTERHOOD OF NICOLAI-DO. FYI ONLY: FJTA 32421 INFO ON MEMBERS ADVISORY COMMITTEE CATHEDRAL AMONG INFO ON PAPPADOPOULOS SENT ODINCH, ODIBEX/ACSI AND ODENVY. THIS INFO MAY BE PASSED ONI THROUGH ODEARL/ACSI COMMITTEE AS IN CASE 18 NOV 60 PERIS MEMO.

4. CONCUR VIEWS PARA 4 REF RE LIAISON ONI. IN EFFORT EXPEDITE DIRECT REPORTING, WILL MERELY REQUEST DNI AT HQS LEVEL FURNISH TRACES GEORGE PERIS AND CONTACTS, INCLUDING PAPPADOPOULOS,

5. RECEIVED FIRST ODINCH REPORT DTD 4 JAN 61 INCLUDING FULL REPORT ONI:

INVESTIGATION JAPAN: NO MENTION PERIS ET AL. FOLLOWING

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE FOUR

ITEMS OF INTEREST:

A. JOHN J. CASEY RESIDENT NATICK, MASS, NAMED AS MUTUAL CONTACT AND CO-WORKER MITCHELL AND MARTIN WHILE ON DUTY YOKOSUKA. OCT 60 CASEY, SUSPECTED HOMO, IN LETTER CONTACT GARY A. LONG, USNR ENSIGN STATIONED YOKOSUKA. LONG ADMITTED HOMO UNDER ONI INVESTIGATION.

B. MARTIN REPORTED CLOSE CONTACT AND CO-WORKER AS DAC CIVILIAN TOKY OF JOSEPH W. JASON AKA JOSEPH W. GESUSK, DPOB 6 SEPT 26 WORCESTER, MASS. EMPLOYED AS GS-5 IN TELETYPE SECTION, FEC SIGNAL SERVICE BATTN, PERSHING HTS. JASON APPLIED KUBARK 1951, DECLINED APPOINTMENT TO ACCEPT ANOTHER JOB PRIOR COMPLETION BACKGROUND INVESTIG. AND CLEARANCE. FEB 45-DEC 46 SERVED AS T-5 ODIBEX DENTAL TECHNICIAN AT CAMP CROFT AND OSAKA, JAPAN. FEB 47-NOV 48 GOVT EMPLOYEE DENTAL TECHNICIAN, CONNECTED GRAVES REGIS-

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	
	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE FIVE

TRATION, MANILA AND OKINAWA. EOD TOKY UNKNOWN BUT DEPARTED 1956. AS OF NOV 60 ASSIGNED RUAW STARCOMM (RELAY STATION) ODIBEX, RYUKYU ISLAND, OKIE.

C. MARTIN ALSO CONTACT OF MAJOR PAUL ROCHELLE, DAC EMPLOYEE FEC SIGN BATTN, SUSPECT HOMO, CLOSE FRIEND J. W. JASON. RESIGNED TOKY JOB DEC 55 AND PLANNED RETURN ZI VIA EUROPE. RECORDS SHOW ROCHELLE STOPPED ENROUTE PARI WHERE HIRED AS DAC BY UNIDEN PBPRIME UNIT. LATER LEFT FRANCE ALLEGEDLY RETURNED NY WHERE HIRED AS TELETYPE OPERATOR BY ODUNIT.

D. 10 NOV 60 ONI INTERVIEW ROLAND ORA BELCHER, CT-2, IN HAWAII, SHOWS BELCHER FROM CA DEC 52 THRU JUL 55 MARTIN CO-WORKER KAMISEYA AND LATER TOKY. SHARED MARTIN QUOTE WATCHES END QUOTE. REPORTED PRIOR DISCHARGE, MARTIN OCCASIONALLY VISITED MALE JAPANESE ARTIST-POTTER WHO

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY — INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE SIX

OWNED KILN LOCATED WITHIN 50 MILES KAMISEYA. RECALLED INSTANCE, PRESUMABLY SPRING 55, WHEN MARTIN RELATED HE GUEST AT LARGE PARTY ARRANGED BY ABOVE POTTER WHERE MARTIN MET QUOTE SOME ABOVE AVERAGE PEOPLE END QUOTE. MARTIN VISITED KILN DURING QUOTE TIME ON LIBERTY END QUOTE.

5. CONSIDER ABOVE MARTIN REMARK OF POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE IN LIGHT PRESENCE TOKY SPRING 55 OF AETANKARD 4 WHO INTERESTED ARTS, AND TRIP APR 55 TO TOKY OF AETANKARDS 1 AND 2. KILN OPERATOR COULD BE MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCE OR IN CONTACT SUCH OF MARTIN AND AETANKARD-4. REALIZE THIS EXTREMELY SLIM LEAD BUT SUGGEST BEAR IN MIND AND ATTEMPT THROUGH LIAISON WITH ODENVY AND ONI REPS OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS JAPAN CONTACTS OF AETANKARD-4 AND MARTIN IN EFFORT IDENTIFY POTTER-ARTIST AND PARTY GUESTS.

6. REQUEST STATION TRACES JOHN JOSEPH CASEY, JOSEPH W. JASON AKA GESUSE AND MAJOR PAUL ROCHELLE. ALSO ADVISE IF BURRIS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER **S-E-C-R-E-T** AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

G:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE
- DEFERRED
- ROUTINE
- PRIORITY — INITIALS
- OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE SEVEN

STILL TOKY.

END OF MSG

C/FE/JAO

C/FE
RELEASING OFFICER

C/CI/OPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/FI/D
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ALVAREZ, Ramon Jr.
201-0119523 VOL II

INCLUSIVE DATES: 25 Jul 1956 - 14 Jul 1965
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO
ROOM: 3D57
DELETIONS, IF ANY: None

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

II
57-65

SEE VOL III

1957-65

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/Pers/W.S. Renehan	EXTENSION 6576	NO. DATE 14 July 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/PERS			
2. WH/SI C/WH/SS		8/2 7/15	
3. C/CPD 5E 69	22 JUL 1965		
4. O/F			
5.			
6. CAAS		7/27	
7. WH/Pers/Renehan GH-4404 Headquarters	Clay	3	
8.			
9. WH/1 Mrs. Burton			B
10.			
11.			
12.			
13. [illegible]			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Mr. Renehan.

Per conv. this date with Charlotte B WH/B-1 this man is Foreign Natl No need for us to have.

Thanks J.D.

7-8- The attached for your retention

Copy sent Station under HMMS-4239 - 28 Jul 65

file 201

LIEMPTY-1

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

14 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended for Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Agent, be further amended as follows.

a. Increase compensation to $6500. per year effective 1 July 1965.

b. Extend period of contract for one year from date of expiration.

2. The recommendation of the Mexico City Station, concurred with by WHD, was based on his demonstrated technical ability and professional competence.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1965 said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $6000 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $6500.

Effective 1 October 1965 said contract, as amended, is extended for a period of one (1) year.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Contracting Officer

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE: 2 July 1965

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part I - Request for Action

Raymond H. GERENDE — Contract Agent

Name (Pseudonym) — STATUS (Career Agent, Contract Agent, Contract Employee)

Raise in salary - $500 per annum

PROPOSED ACTION (Include Branch and/or field recommendations; specific operational task performed by individual; views re long and/or short range utility of individual for Branch area and overall Division needs)

The contract for Raymond H. GERENDE expires on 30 September 1965. The Mexico City Station has recommended that the contract be extended for one year, and that GERENDE be granted a salary increase from $6,000 to $6,500 per annum.

GERENDE received his last salary raise on 1 August 1963, from $5,500 to $6,000. He was first placed under contract on 1 October 1955 at $3,600.

There are sufficient funds in the LIEMPTY Project to cover this salary increase, and GERENDE's local cover job can logically cover this additional income.

BOARD ACTION:

DATE: ____________

APPROVED BY: ________________

SECRET

LIEMPTY-1

Gerende

201

201-119523

Date: ____________

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part II - Biographic Data

NAME--True ☐ Pseudo ☒	DOB	CITIZENSHIP	201 Number
Raymond H. GERENDE	New York City 7 Dec 1933	Mexican	201-119523

MARITAL STATUS	DEPENDENTS--RELATIONSHIP--DOB
wife: Hester Roos de Alvarez	2 sons - 4 and 1 1 daughter - 6 yrs old

EDUCATION

Dates	Name of School	Location	Degree	Major Studies
1952	American High School	Mexico City	high school	
1955	Mexico City College	Mexico City	B.A. Latin American Studies	

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES--Indicate Proficiency--R-W-S-U

English - native)
Spanish - native) bilingual
French - poor

NON-AGENCY EXPERIENCE--Include Military Service (5 years prior to Agency connection)

Dates	Name of Employer	Location	Job or Function	Salary/ Grade
	Other than part time jobs which were many:			
May 1953- Dec 1954	Roger McCann & Chas Davis,	Mexico City,	Sales Manager	$40-50/mont

AGENCY EXPERIENCE--Staff ☐ Contract Agent ☒ Career Agent ☐ Contract Employee ☐

Dates	*Cover Employer Name	Location	Basic Salary	Ops Tasks
Mar 1955	Farolitos de Mexico (bona fide) salary offset	Mexico City	$3,600	Member of surveillance team, cutout/P.A to phogographic bashouses, investigator, etc. basehouse operator and processor of tapes

*Indicate also nature of business and whether bona fide or Agency mechanism.

SECRET

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part III

Chronological Narrative Performance Report

NAME/PSEUDONYM:

(Summary of evaluation of past performance /if applicable/ with emphasis and details of current performance for assigned operational tasks)

DATES LOCATION AGENCY TASK

GERENDE was recruited in March 1955, just prior to his graduation from the Mexico City College. He was trained as a member of a surveillance team, and was also used as an investigator to collect operational data on persons and organizations of interest to the Station. He quickly demonstrated a capacity for leadership and at one time was leader of the team.

He was also used as a basehouse keeper in an audio operation and processor of tapes. He excelled in this type of work because of his bilingual Spanish/English facility, and, more importantly, due to his diversified experience in clandestine operations which permited him to spot operational leads.

Since 1958 his primary use has been as main cutout/principal agent to a group of photographic basehouses targeted against the Soviet Embassy, and one mobile photographic truck. He processes the raw photographic take and services the majority of the accomodation addresses used by the Station. He has contributed significantly to the AMROD operation

He performs all his tasks in a professional manner. He is well suited to intelligence work, and plans to make KUBARK his career. The Station depends heavily on him because of his knowledge of Mexico, and his mobility as a Mexican. He works full time for KUBARK; cover company requires very little time.

In case of "New Hire" give a personality assessment in terms of capability, attitude, and projected suitability; state names of Division personnel who have interviewed him; give account of his performance in current non-Agency job.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE/Contract Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-13688, 7 June 1965

1. Reference notified Station Mexico City that the current contract for Raymond H. GERENDE will expire on 30 September 1965. In recognition of GERENDE's increased operational responsibility and the professional manner in which he carries out his operational assignments, it is requested that his contract be amended to provide for a salary increase from $6,000 U. S. per annum to $6,500 per annum.

2. Project LIEMPTY can absorb this additional expense and GERENDE's local cover job can logically cover this additional income.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 C/WHD

CS COPY

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-26449	DATE 24 June 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-24,220

1. The contract for GERENDE expires on 30 September 1965. Please notify Headquarters whether you wish to have the contract extended another year, and whether any changes are desired.

2. Headquarters regrets that the Station inadvertently was not notified last year of the extension of the contract.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

Om'ly

201- 119523
10 JUN 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-13,688 CS COPY	DATE 7 June 65
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

RI
Chrono

WH/1

ABSTRACT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/C.Bustos-Videla:mep	4507

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH0D		Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

MEMORANDUM [illegible]

FROM [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible]

Raymond H. Gerende

1. Effective **1 October 1964** [illegible]

amended, [illegible] **1 October 1955**

is extended [illegible] **one (1) year**

2. All [illegible] terms and conditions [illegible]

remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES [illegible]

BY [illegible]

Contracting Officer

SECRET

[illegible]

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

18mPTY-1

SECRET 2

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

FROM : Renewal of Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE

Please extend for a period of one (1) year without change the contract of Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Agent. The contract expires on 30 September 1964.

W. E. Brooks
Chief WH Support

Distribution:
Orig - Contract Personnel Div.
1 - WH/Pers
✓1 - Subject

SECRET [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XX MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-12844, 21 August 1964

It is requested that Subject's contract be renewed as presently written. No changes are requested at this time.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-24220	1 September 1964
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM
Chief, WH Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

Subject's contract will expire on 30 September 1964. Please advise by return dispatch whether the contract should be renewed and if any changes are desired.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
C&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-12844	DATE 24 AUG 1964 21 August 1964
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER KLL	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/R. L. Lehman:chk			4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/PERS	21 Aug 64	[illegible] for [illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		Desmond FitzGerald

Distribution:
1-Chrono

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	Sel
RID/MIS	✓
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	

~~DESTROY~~

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 20 March 1964 dlr

TO: WH/3/Mexico - Mr. Reichhardt

/s/ Edward P. Brown

C NO. C - 32743

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☒	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss HMMA-22920.

discussed
CI/OA comments
[illegible] [illegible].

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-63 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (20)

Rad

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division jfk

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

Lengthy-1

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMW-12284 dated 24 January 1964

1. Station Mexico City fully agrees with Headquarters evaluation of Subject as a "valuable long term asset with stay behind potential." In order to place the matter of the 2,100 pesos in the apropriate frame of reference it is felt that a few background points should be noted.

In January 1956 the LIEMPTY/LILYRIC basehouse was set up and placed in operation in a site which provided visual coverage of the LIMERICK installation. A deposit of three months rent was made per terms of the rental contract at that time (2,100 pesos.) In April 1961 the building in which LIEMPTY/LILYRIC is located was sold by the owner. Normally the rental deposit would have been transferred to the new owner as part of the sale transaction. However, approximately three months after the transfer of the property to the new owner, the rental deposit was returned to the basehouse operator, LIEMPTY-13. The deposit was then returned to GERENDE. GERENDE did not inform the then LIEMPTY case officer nor the present case officer of the return of the LIEMPTY/LILYRIC deposit. This 2,100 pesos continued to be carried on the Station books as an outstanding operational advance charged to GERENDE. GERENDE used part of this 2,100 pesos to make loans to two sub-agents (LIEMPTY-6 and LIEMPTY-9.) It is probably that he also used some of this on ocassion for his own purposes.

On 16 October 1963 GERENDE returned the 2,100 pesos to the case officer and the Station has adjusted its books to reflect the return of this money. GERENDE noted at the time of the return that he had this money intact but did not know how to go about returning it so long after having received it. This is the same as he stated at the time of the LCFLUTTER interview. GERENDE was obviously impressed with his inability to "beat" the LCFLUTTER. He was sincerely remorseful when talking to the case officer

(Continued)

Distribution:
③ C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-22920

DATE
17 February 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

GROUP 1

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-119523

about the incident and has twice stated that nothing of this nature would happen again. With the reality of future LCFLUTTER tests set firmly in GERENDE's mind, it is believed that he will not attempt any such action again.

As to what can be done of a positive nature (other than periodic re-LCFLUTTER) to prevent recurrence it must be noted that GERENDE kept apart the 2,100 pesos which were really still charged to him and the Station had no way of knowing that the money had been returned to him by the basehousekeeper. Only when the close down of the LIEMPTY/LILYRIC basehouse would be effected would the Station expect to have the rental deposit returned. Until such time the deposit would remain charged to GERENDE. The only way to completely safeguard against this type of action would be for the case officer to meet directly with the basehouse keepers, thereby eliminating GERENDE from the operation and causing unacceptable security risks. It is believed that periodic LCFLUTTER of GERENDE is the best insurance against a similar occurence in the future.

As to GERENDE's regular operational revolving fund, irregularities have never been discovered in his handling of these funds. Cash counts are conducted by the case officer to control the unspent portion of the revolving fund by comparison with accountings (receipts) GERENDE makes every two weeks. GERENDE's revolving fund is kept at the minimum amount consistant with efficient conduct of the operation for which GERENDE is responsible.

The "other false claims" GERENDE admitted making involved occasional use of his QP vehicle for personal driving while entering all receipts for gas on his KUBARK accountings. Station does not consider this a major problem. If GERENDE used his QP car for only operational employment any hostile surveillance of him would be relatively easy (i.e., surveilling only when he is using his QP vehicle) and it is believed that latitude must be allowed in this area for indigenous agents.

2. In the area of GERENDE's morale and his statement that he "is not being utilized to his full potential" the Station is as fully concerned as Headquarters. It should be noted however, that GERENDE has never written the report setting forth what he thinks he can do and when prodded on this has stated that he had been thinking about what additional work he could assume and that he "just does not know". The reason he gives is he does not know what else is being done in the operations area other than that to which he is already exposed. Additional operational work is assigned to GERENDE when this can be done securely and taking into account compartmentation of operations. An example of this was his introduction to the AMROD operation. Station is reluctant to expose GERENDE to additional operations only for the purpose of "improving his morale" since he already has considerable knowledge of many Station past and going operations. The Station appreciates Headquarters comments on the results of GERENDE's LCFLUTTER and will make every effort to determine the best possible utilization of GERENDE in the future.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

[illegible] | SECRET [illegible]

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM
Chief, WH Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMW-12065

1. Reference is made to the results of the LCFLUTTER interview of Raymond H. GERENDE which was held on 8 October 1963. Headquarters would like to have a progress report on what steps have been taken by the Case Officer with regard to the 2,100 pesos which he had kept but belonged to KUBARK. Headquarters is also interested in what has been done about other false claims he admitted making in his accountings, and what precautions are being taken to see that this does not continue in the future.

2. The Station's comments are requested on GERENDE's statement that he is not being utilized to his full potential and that he often has free time. Headquarters would be interested in seeing a copy of the report which the LCFLUTTER examiner suggested he write, setting forth what he (GERENDE) thinks he can do and what he would like to do. Headquarters considers GERENDE a valuable long term asset with staybehind potential, and it is hoped that the Station will do what it can within the limits of security, to raise his morale and see that KUBARK is receiving full benefit of his services.

Oliver G. GALBOND

Distribution:
O&1-COS, Mexico City

Gerende 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-12284

DATE
20 January 1964

21 JAN

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-119523

Distribution:
cc-CI/OA
1-RI
1-Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	C. Bustos	chk	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OA	20 Jan	Lolly (in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	20 Jan 64	J.C. King

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 30 December 1963 dlr

TO: WH/3/Mexico - Mr. Reichaardt

C NO. C - 32743

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☒	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☒ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raymond H. [illegible], Contract Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-3077, 7 August 1963

Attached is executed copy of contract amendment in accordance with reference.

Willard C. Curtis

Attachment
As stated (h/w)

Distribution
3 - WH w/att (h/w)

Gerende
201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-3956	30 August 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 August 1958, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $5500 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation", and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $6000.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

29 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Increase in Compensation,
Raymond H. GERENDE

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended, for Raymond H. GERENDE be further amended to provide increase in compensation from $5,500 per annum to $6,000 per annum.

2. This request, submitted by the Mexico Station and concurred with by WH Division is in recognition of GERENDE's operational responsibilities and the manner in which he carries out his operational assignments.

W. E. BROOKS
Chief, WH Support

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WH Division		MICROFILM
SUBJECT Raymond H. GERENDE/Contract Renewal		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The contract of Raymond H. GERENDE expires on 30 September 1963. It is requested that the Station forward a request for renewal, together with any changes or amendments desired, to arrive at Headquarters by 1 September.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
0 & 1 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-11732	DATE 11 JUL 1963 3 July 1963
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

Distribution:
1 - Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	DM
~~[illegible]~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3/m	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	T. Ward	db	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	5 JUL 1963	for J. C. King

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Salary Increase - Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

In recognition of GERENDE's operational responsibility and the manner in which he carries out his operational assignments, it is requested that his contract be amended to grant him a salary increase from $5,500.00 p.a. to $6,000.00 p.a. effective 1 July 1963.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution
3 - WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [illegible]-3885

DATE: 3 July 1963

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LIEMPTY-3
201-117758
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
BUSINESS ASSOCIATE IN CUNASA OF
GUILLERMO SALAZAR POLANCO 201-239372

201-239372
HMMA-20956 E01
22 MAR 63
P5

1314294

PAZR

```
000000 00000000000000
111 1 11111111 1 1111
222222222222222222 22
33333333333333 33333
4  444444444444444 44
555555555555555555555
666666666666666666666
7777 77777777777777777
88888888888888888888
999999  9999999999 9
```

1 314 294

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 10-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-40)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 20 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI/OA, CS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 21 0310Z 63

ROUTINE

DIR CITE MEXI 3513

JN72031

REF DIR 17796

1. MEXI LCFLUTTER CANDIDATES: RAMOND H. GERENDE (BILINGUAL), OLIVER G. SCANTLING (BILINGUAL), LIEMBRACE-1 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-2 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-3 (BILINGUAL), LIEMBRACE-4 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-5 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-6 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-9 (SPANISH) (NOTE - PLAN USE LIEMBRACE-3, SURVEILLANCE TEAM LEADER, AS INTERPRETER FOR OTHER LIEMBRACE TEAM MEMBERS), AMSPRAWL-2 (BILINGUAL), LIFIRE-4 (SPANISH) AND LIFIRE-5 (SPANISH) (NOTE - NO STATION ASSET AVAILABLE INTERPRET FOR LCFLUTTER OF LIFIRE/4 AND 5. IF LCFLUTTER OPERATORS DO NOT SPEAK SPANISH CAN HQS PROVIDE INTERPRETER TDY THIS PURPOSE?) LIMOTOR-22 (ENGLISH). IF TIME AVAILABLE ALSO DESIRE LCFLUTTER LIMUST-7, LUMUST-5, LIMOTOR-19. ALL THREE SPEAK ENGLISH.

2. HQS EQUIPMENT BE POUCHED MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

16 copies
1 in each 201

C/S COMMENT: *TWO MAN LCFLUTTER TEAM LEAVING HQS ABOUT 10 MAR. NAME CANDIDATES AND SPECIFY CASES FOR WHICH INTERPRETER AVAILABLE.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

201-119523
201-119523

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Charlotte Bus...s:sj
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 4 Dec 62

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : CI/OA, CCS 2, S/C 2

Ri File
No mailing

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

5 DEC 62 15 39z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 03369

03369

REF HMMA-19978*

GERENDE CONTRACT AMENDED 8 NOV TO INCLUDE CHRISTMAS BONUS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *Requested amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (201-119523) contract for a one month's bonus at Christmas.

WHBM Fournier

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/PS~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

WH/PERS/RENAHAN
WH/~~COPS~~

DEC 11 3 23 PM '62

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HMMA-19978

Attached is a copy of the contract amendment providing Subject with a Christmas bonus.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment: 1

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

DATE TYPED: 5 Dec 62

DATE DISPATCHED: 7 DEC 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11145

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

ROUTING	INITIAL
1 - RI RID/AN 1 Chrono	£
RID/MIS	Al
~~RID/FE~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/3/Mexico - OFFICER: Bustos:sj TYPIST EXT: 5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	5 DEC 1962	J. C. King

FORM 8-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

18 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Amendment

1. Effective 18 October 1962, the contract (as amended) for Raymond H. GERENDE dated 1 October 1955 is amended to provide an annual Christmas bonus equal to one month's basic compensation.

2. All other provisions of the contract as amended remain in effect.

SIGNED

WH Contract Approving Officer

APPROVED:

SIGNED

Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

18 October 1962

MEMORANDUM TO: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

1. It is requested that the current contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, be amended to include a Christmas bonus of one month's salary. This amendment should be affective immediately.

2. GERENDE is an indigenous agent, and this Christmas bonus is normal for all employees in Mexico.

Paul E. Arneson
C/WH/Support

O&1 - CPD
1 - WH/Pers
1 - C/WH/Support
1 - Subject

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACTION COMPLETED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

It is requested that Headquarters initiate the appropriate amendment to Subject's contract so that it will include as Christmas bonus one month's salary. This Christmas bonus is normal for all indigenous employees in Mexico, and should be included in Subject's contract.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

201-119523

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
8 Oct. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19978;KAPOK-1991

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-119523

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

045

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 17 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 18 0435Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 23918

DIR CITE MEXI 1957 (OUSLER ACTING)

NYKIS BEDOX

1. DUE LATE WORD THAT LAW SCHOOL STARTS 17 SEPT BETUMBLE DEPARTED MEXI 17 SEPT VIA AMERICAN FLIGHT 58. INSTRUCTED THAT HQS MAY CONTACT ALTHOUGH FINANCES (INCL. SALARY THROUGH 17 SEPT, OPS EXPENSES, TRAVEL AND 50 DOLLARS LIVING EXPENSE AUTHORIZED ORAL AGREEMENT, BUT NOT BONUS) CLEARED MEXI PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE.

2. AT LAST MEET WITH POTASZ 14 SEPT, WHICH AUTHORIZED BY CO, POTASZ INDICATED ALTHOUGH NOT PARTICULARLY SATISFIED WITH LIFE HE LONG AGO HAS CHOSEN POLAND. BETUMBLE ASSESSMENT HE WOULD NOT COOPERATE WITH KUBARK. POTASZ DOES HAVE BETUMBLE ADDRESS WASH.

3. AT DINNER WITH POTASZ 5 SEPT IN RESTAURANT BETUMBLE TOOK ALONG HIS FRIEND RAYMOND H. GERENDE, STATION CONTRACT AGENT. CO NOT

Gerende 201 ([illegible])

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

AWARE GERENDE FRIENDSHIP WITH BETUMBLE OR BETUMBLE PLANS HAVE GERENDE JOIN HIM AND POTASZ FOR DINNER. DUE GERENDE SENSITIVE STATUS AND LACK RAPPORT BETWEEN HIM AND POTASZ DOUBT ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ALONG THESE LINES CAN BE EXPECTED.

4. POUCHING REPORT BETUMBLE TDY EVENTS.

END OF MESSSAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-T-2553

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 9 February 1962

SUBJECT: Contract Amendment - Raymond H. GERENDE

RE "X" - CHECK "X" ONE

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are copies of a contract amendment for Subject effective 1 January 1962.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

8 February 1962

Attachment - as stated

DISTRIBUTION
3-WH Division w/attachment
2-Files

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE Contract Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Attached please find the original and two copies of the above Subject's contract amendment, effective 1 January 1962 and increasing Subject's compensation from $5040 to $5500.

2. The original copy is to be retained in the Field, and a signed carbon copy of the amendment returned to Headquarters.

3. All other terms of the contract remain in full force.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
Per paragraph 1

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City, w/atts.

✓1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry, w/o atts.
1 - WH/3/Mex/Chrono,
w/o atts.

D. K.

DATE TYPED
11 January 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
17 JAN 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-10367

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-119523

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	D. Winters	mrd C/Mexi	3163

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	12 JAN 1962	J. C. KING

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

201-119523

27 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, renewed on October 1961 for a period of two years, be amended to reflect an increase in annual salary from the current $5,040 to $5,500. This increase in salary should be effective 1 January 1962.

(SIGNED) P. E. ARNESON
NED P. HOLMAN
Chief, WH/3

(SIGNED) P. E. ARNESON
CONCUR: C/WH/Support

SECRET

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 January 1962, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $5340 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $5500.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY__________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:____________________

APPROVED:

____

SECRET

27 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, renewed on October 1961 for a period of two years, be amended to reflect an increase in annual salary from the current $5,040 to $5,500. This increase in salary should be effective 1 January 1962.

NED P. HOLMAN
Chief, WH/3

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET/KAPOK

KAPOK-1941

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 11 Dec 1961

SUBJECT LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED Amendment of Subject's contract

REFERENCE(S) HMMW-9364, 29 December 1960

1. By reference Subject's annual salary was increased to its present figure of US $5,040.00.

2. Station hereby requests a further increase in Subject's annual salary to US $5,500.00 based upon Subject's outstanding performance as Principal Agent in the LIEMPTY project. The latest LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request, recently forwarded to Headquarters, detailed GERENDE's duties. In Station's opinion, the noted salary increase is considered justified not only from agent's excellent job performance, but also as an incentive to continued superior work as well as an offset to the inflationary trend of the cost of living in Mexico.

3. It is requested that Headquarters initiate the appropriate amendment to GERENDE's contract increasing his yearly salary to themted figure of US $5,500.00 to be effective 1 January 1962.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

11 December 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD

CS COPY

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Contract Extension for Raymond H. GEHENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-17499, 4 August 1961

Effective 1 October 1961, the contract (as amended) for GEHENDE, effective 1 October 1957, is extended for a period of two (2) years. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
  2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED
25 August 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
29 AUG 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-10039

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-119523

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	D.K.
RI/[illegible]	
RI/[illegible]	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH3/Mexico	C.Bustos-Videla	bj AC/WH3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	25 AUG 1961	J. C. KING

10039

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for Raymond H. GERENDE

1. Effective 1 October 1961, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECRET

15 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)
Request for Contract Extention

1. It is requested that effective 1 October 1961, the contract (as amended) for Raymond H. GERENDE be extended for a period of two years or through 30 September 1963.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract should remain in full force and effect.

Ned P. Holman
C/WH/3

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Subject's 201 file
1 - Chrono file

Basic HMMA-17499, 4 Aug 61.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-17499

TO : Chief, WH Division
INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-119523

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
4 August 1961

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE/Contract Renewal
[illegible]

RE: "43-3" – (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐	MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
- Renew GERENDE's Contract.

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-9873, 5 July 1961

It is requested that Subject's contract, as amended, be renewed for a two year period, 1 October 1961 through 30 September 1963. The Station does not desire to make any changes in Subject's contract at this time.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

2 August 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

201-119523

FORM 10-57 (40) 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CS COPY

14-00000

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Operational/Raymond H. GERENDE/Contract Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Subject's contract will expire on 30 September 1961. The Station is requested to pouch their request for renewal, together with any changes or amendments they may desire, in order that it may reach Headquarters by 1 September 1961.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexico

BF

DATE TYPED: 5 July 1961

DATE DISPATCHED: 7 JUL 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9873

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	J. Brooke/bj	AC/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	5 JUL 1961	J. C. KING

9873

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

TO Chief, WH Division INFO	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE 16 June 1961
SUBJECT Amendment of Contract - Raymond E. GERENDE	RE: "43-I" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED For your information	☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)
HMMW-8281, 2 December 1959

In reviewing GERENDE's personnel file, it was noted that a signed copy of an amendment to his contract, which was forwarded to the Station under reference, had never been forwarded to Headquarters. We therefore, are attaching a signed copy of the contract amendment for your files.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

13 June 1961

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att
2 - Files

FORM 10-57 (40) 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1959, the amendment effective 1 July 1959 to said contract is revised to read as follows:

(a) The figure $4080 is deleted from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted.

(b) The following paragraph is added after paragraph ten (10), entitled "Term":

"11. Terminal Payment. In the event your contractual relationship with the Government hereunder is severed for one of the reasons set forth below, you, or your estate, will be entitled to a terminal payment of one (1) month's compensation for each full year of your utilization by the Government after 18 March 1955. Said amount shall be calculated at the contractual rate of compensation applicable at the time said payment becomes due."

(a) Said contract is terminated by the Government under subparagraph (a) of paragraph ten (10) above, or

(b) Said contract expires and is not renewed by the Government, or

(c) Your resignation hereunder is accepted by the Government as being in its best interests (the Government's determination as to what constitutes its best interests shall be final and conclusive), or

(d) In the event of your death during the period said contract is in effect.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Willard C. Curtis
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:
Raymond H. Gerende
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:

REVIEWED:
Special Contracting Officer

APPROVED:
Vernon C. Fournier

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

PRO-CESSING	ACTION	ACCOMP-LISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, KURIOT

SUBJECT
AQUATIC/Operational
UV Lamp for Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMA-16102, 9 December 1960

1. As requested by reference, KURIOT is herewith forwarding the following: (Confirming documentation charging you for this item will be issued in the near future.)

1 each Mineralight Model SL-3660
Long Wave Ultraviolet Lamp

2. For ordinary F&S work, the difference between long and short wave lamps is very minor and the long wave UV lamp should prove adequate for the needs of Raymond H. GERENDE. Should a special need arise demanding the use of a short wave UV lamp by GERENDE, it will be supplied by KURIOT.

3. Disclosure of the existence, advantages, or uses of short wave UV lamps, or in any way making available such lamps to other than KUBARK personnel requires prior Headquarters approval. A copy of Instruction No. 20-2 containing the basic KURIOT policy governing the use of short wave UV lamps is herewith enclosed for your guidance.

4. Short wave UV lamps embody a definite health hazard and should be used with caution. Short wave UV rays quickly cause sunburn, to which the eyes are particularly susceptible, and should not be used without wearing protective goggles. Ordinary eye glasses cut out most of the harmful rays, but even persons wearing glasses may receive harmful eye burns from UV rays entering at the sides of the glasses. Short wave UV lamps also produce small quantities of ozone so that the lamp should be used in a well ventilated room, which, of course, must also be darkened. For the above reasons, it is advisable to use only a long wave UV lamp whenever possible.

Arthur B. Wielatz
ARTHUR B. WIELATZ

Enclosures: (1 Box and 1 Envl)
1. UV Lamp
2. Instruction No. 20-2

Distribution
3 - COS, Mexico City w/encls

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
5 April 61	10 APR 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-9666

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201- 119523

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

~~1~~ - RI w/o encls
1 - TSD/SBS w/o encls
1 - WH/3/MEX w/o encls
1 - TSD/SAB w/o encls
1 - WH/LOG w/o encls
1 - TSD/LOG w/o encls

	INITIAL
RI/AN	BR
RI/FY	W
RI/FI	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
TSD/SAB	ATejeda	ja	2922

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		COORD. BY PHONE
WH/3/MEX	3 April 61	Stewart Burton (x2555)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/TSD/TA	7 APR 1961	ROBERT K. CRAVEN

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-16378

TO : Chief, WH Division
INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-119523

FROM
: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
1 February 1961

SUBJECT
- Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
- None.

REFERENCE(S)
HMMW-9364, 4 January 1961

As requested in reference, returned herewith is one copy of GERENDE's contract amendment. The original copy has been retained by the Station. The Station and GERENDE appreciate Headquarters prompt action in processing the request for an increase in salary.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

26 January 1961

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - WHD (with one copy of attachment)
2 - Files (with original of attachment)

[illegible] DIVISION
RECEIVED
[illegible]

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 January 1961, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $4560 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $5040.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Raymond H. Gerende
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

Special [illegible] Officer

FINANCE DIVISION
RECEIVED

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

PROCESSED	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Raymond H. [illegible] (ps)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
ACTION: Execute attached contract and return one copy to Headquarters

REFERENCE: HMMA-16065, 30 November 1960

1. The salary raise for Subject which was requested in reference has been approved. The amendment to his contract has been prepared and the approving signature has been executed at Headquarters.

2. It is requested that the Station and Subject sign the attached contract amendment. Since Headquarters has no interest in the funding of Subject, the Station should retain the original of the amendment in their financial files. Please return one signed copy to Headquarters.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Contract Amendment

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City (w/a)

1 - RI
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/3/Mexico

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
29 December 1960	6 JAN 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-9364

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-119523

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	C. Gehrung	new	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/Pers	29 Dec 60	JC Bowers

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. King

REVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 January 1961, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $4560 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $5040.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Field Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:__________________

APPROVED:

____

mmw -

SECRET

13 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Finance Division

VIA : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, effective 1 October 1955, as amended and extended, be further amended, effective 1 January 1961 to raise the yearly compensation to $5,040.

Ned P. Holman
AC/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - Addressee
1 - Subject

WH/3/Mexico/[redacted]ehrung:bk

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET/KAPOK

KAPOK-1850

TO : Chief, WH Division

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
201-119523

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
30 November 1960

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - Amendment to GERENDE's Contract

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-8281, 2 December 1959

1. The referenced dispatch forwarded the most recent contract amendment raising GERENDE's salary to $4,560.00 per year.

2. In the Station's opinion, GERENDE's continued Superior performance of his LIEMPTY Principal Agent duties justifies another salary increase. Headquarters attention is invited to the recent Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY wherein GERENDE's duties were specified.

3. It is requested that Headquarters initiate an appropriate amendment to GERENDE's contract increasing his yearly compensation to $5,040.00. This amendment should be effective 1 January 1961.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

28 November 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

Amend submitted
13 Dec 60

FORM 10-57 (40) 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51 28A AND 51 29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

201-119523

DISPATCH | SECRET/KAPOK | KAPOK-1843

TO : Chief, WH Division
INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
201-119523
50-6-74/1

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
23 November 1960

SUBJECT - Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)/Emergency Contact Arrangments

RE 433 — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - None, for Headquarters information only

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-15979, KAPOK-1842 dated 18 November 1960

1. In compliance with the KUBARK regulation, CSI-F No. 230-60, Annex A, concerning contact arrangments under emergency conditions, the following information, including recognition signals and bona fides, is forwarded for Headquarters records. Due to the sensitivity of the information, it was believed more appropriate to forward it separately rather than to include it with reference (Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY).

2. Insofar as can be determined at the present time, GERENDE could probably be contacted at one of the following places:

a. Present Residence: IDENTITY A

b. Mother's Residence: IDENTITY B

c. Cover Employment Address: IDENTITY C

3. The following oral recognition signals, using the English language, are to be used as indicated:

CONTACT:	"Mr. (GERENDE-true name), I bring the most sincere wishes and greetings from your Aunt and Uncle."
GERENDE:	"Then you are referring to the IDENTITY D."
CONTACT:	"No, I am referring to your other relatives in South Carolina, the IDENTITY E ."
GERENDE:	"Yes, Auntie is my Mother's sister."

4. For use as physical bona fides, the Station is forwarding a one peso note with the serial number T348510 for Headquarters files. GERENDE has been given a one peso note with the next higher serial number, T348511, to keep in a safe place pending his having to show it to some future KUBARK contact. It has been explained to GERENDE that he is to show his half of the physical bona fides only after the recognition signals have been completely and accurately recited and his new contact has requested to see his physical bona fides. GERENDE has also been instructed to assure himself of his contact's bona fides by asking to see the contact's one peso note (T348510).

5. Assuming that adequate time will be available at the beginning of an emergency condition, it may well be possible to instruct GERENDE in Secret Writing so that correspondence could be conducted using IDENTITY D or E addresses.

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO 1

CS COPY

201-119523

6. It is assumed that Headquarters will advise the Station should more detailed or sophisticated contact arrangments be desired.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

17 November 1960

Attachments:
Peso note - attached herewith.
Three copies of Identities - under separate cover.

Distribution:
3 - WHD (with attachments)
3 - Files (with attachments)

201-119523

14-00000

SECRET/KAPOK

IDENTITIES TO HMMA-15981, KAPOK-1843 dated 23 November 1960

IDENTITY A -
Suderman 304 - Apt. 401
Colonia Polanco
Mexico, D.F., Mexico
Telephone: 45-42-06

IDENTITY B -
Ometusco 98
Colonia Hipodromo
Mexico 11, D.F., Mexico
Telephone: 15-32-28

IDENTITY C -
Cia. Electrica Mexicana, S.A.
Victoria y Escape
Fracc. Alce Blanco
San Bartolo Naucalpan
Edo. de Mexico
Telephone: 27-52-38

IDENTITY D -
"The Pates"
Mr. & Mrs. A. M. PATE
2130 Santee Ave.
Columbia, S. C.

IDENTITY E -
"The Kolbs"
Mr. & Mrs. R. F. KOLB
3111 Grace Hill Rd.
Columbia, S.C.

SECRET/KAPOK

CS COPY

201-119523


T348510
T348510
SERIE
HU
MEXICO D.F.
18 III 59
18 III 59
SERIE
HU

14-00000

TO	: Chief, KURIOT Attn: C/KURIOT/Training	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50 - 6 - 61
INFO	: Chief, WH Division	
FROM	: Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE 18 Nov. 60
SUBJECT	: Flaps & Seals Training of Raymond H. GERENDE : AQUATIC/Operational	RE "43" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED	: None	
REFERENCES		

1. In compliance with a Station Request, LIEMPTY principle agent Raymond H. GERENDE, is being given training in basic flaps and seals techniques. It is felt advisable to have a second person outside the Station who can service this type of requirement in case MULFORD is prevented from doing so by the security situation arising from the ALPHCH case.

2. As an aid to this training, a copy of the portion of the MKCHARITY Operations Manual (Section I.D.I.) dealing with basic flaps and seals work has been made and turned over to GERENDE. A second copy is being forwarded herewith to Headquarters. This material was prepared on the basis of the content of the KURIOT training course of mid-1957. If KURIOT training is in possession of newer and improved techniques in this field and will make them available to MULFORD for use here, it would be greatly appreciated.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

14 November 1960

ECMULFORD/LCB

Attachment: 1 MKCHARITY Operations Manual (Section I.D.1.)

Distribution:
3 - HQS (2 - KURIOT) — ~~0~~ 1 w/att. — To TSD
3 - File

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 201-119523

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE 3 DEC 1959

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE (ns)

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED : Execution and Retention of Revised Contract Amendment

REFERENCE(S)

a. HMMT-1056, 9 October 1959
b. HMMA-13571, 21 August 1959
c. HMMW-7959, 12 August 1959
d. HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959

1. Reference (c) forwarded a contract amendment which provided increased compensation and a termination settlement for Raymond H. GERENDE. This dispatch also requested that the Station comment on the provisions of the Terminal Payment clause as written into this amendment.

2. Since the provisions of the original contract amendment were written in general terms and did not specifically cover the circumstances under which GERENDE would be eligible for a terminal settlement as interpreted by the Station and outlined in reference (b), a revised contract amendment was written. The attached contract amendment also shows corrected compensation figures. The original contract amendment was incorrect due to the absence of the amendment, effective 1 September 1957, which increased GERENDE's compensation from $3,600 to $4,080.

3. Since GERENDE's original contract was prepared at Headquarters and forwarded to you for execution and retention, this amendment should follow the same procedure. Therefore, the original and one copy are attached for your action and retention. Return one signed copy.

4. Reference (a) requested Headquarters to comment on a two-year extension for GERENDE's contract, indicating that the extension should be from 1 July 1959, the date of the last amendment, to 1 July 1961. There seems to be some confusion on contract extension procedures which Headquarters would like to clarify at this point. Contract extensions are based on the date of the original contract not the amendments. Accordingly, GERENDE's contract, originally effective 1 October 1955 and extended to 30 September 1959, was further extended for a period of two years from 1 October 1959 to 30 September 1961.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

30 November 1959

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico
~~1~~ 2 - RI

WH/3/Mexico/R.THERRIEN:ngw

CS COPY
3 Dec
201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Extension for Raymond H. [illegible]

1. Effective 1 October 1969, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1959, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

NHMW-8281

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
Room 801, [illegible] 3565, 3909

NO.

DATE 18 November 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH Contract Approving Officer	20 Nov	✓	DCB
2. C/WH/3 Attn: Mary Therrien			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

0 to 1: For approval in pseudo

0 to 2: Terry. Sorry for the delay/hope this is adequate. Hqs. Finance Division has no financial interest in this individual, therefore, please have the field execute and retain the original of this amendment in their Station financial files. The field can then send a signed copy back to WH and you in turn can notify us of its receipt so our records will show that this transaction has been finally completed. Any questions, give me a call.

Dow H. Luetscher
Dow H. Luetscher

1 to 3

Please call me on this since Mr. Arms will not return until 21 Nov.
Bowers

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O-476731

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1959, the amendment effective 1 July 1959 to said contract is revised to read as follows:

(a) The figure $4080 is deleted from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted.

(b) The following paragraph is added after paragraph ten (10), entitled "Term":

"11. Terminal Payment. In the event your contractual relationship with the Government hereunder is severed for one of the reasons set forth below, you, or your estate, will be entitled to a terminal payment of one (1) month's compensation for each full year of your utilization by the Government after 18 March 1955. Said amount shall be calculated at the contractual rate of compensation applicable at the time said payment becomes due."

(a) Said contract is terminated by the Government under subparagraph (a) of paragraph ten (10) above, or

(b) Said contract expires and is not renewed by the Government, or

(c) Your resignation hereunder is accepted by the Government as being in its best interests (the Government's determination as to what constitutes its best interests shall be final and conclusive), or

(d) In the event of your death during the period said contract is in effect.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

HHMW-8281

SECRET

SECRET

22 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

1. It is requested that effective 1 October 1959, the contract (as amended) for Raymond H. GERENDE, effective 1 October 1955 and extended to 30 September 1959, be further extended for a period of two years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract should remain in full force and effect.

R.K. Dahlgren,
C/WH/III

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Subject
1 - Chrono

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

HMMT-1056

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-119523

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 9 October 1959

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE Contract Renewal

RE: "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See below.

REFERENCE(S):

A. HMMA-13571, 21 August 1959

B. HMMW-7959, 12 August 1959

C. HMMA-13063 (RYBAT-1152), 5 June 1959

1. Reference C requested that a new two-year contract (with amendments) be prepared for Raymond H. GERENDE to be effective 1 July 1959. Reference B forwarded the amendment to the contract, but made no mention of the two-year renewal.

2. Therefore, unless we are notified otherwise by Headquarters, we will assume that GERENDE's present contract is due for renewal on 1 July 1961.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

vps
5 October 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

Amendments effective, July 59
Contract " , Oct 59

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-13571

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-119523

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
21 August 1959

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Contract Amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
None, for Headquarters information only.

REFERENCE(S)

A. HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959.

B. HMMW-7959, 12 August 1959.

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment No. One is GERENDE's signed contract amendment. GERENDE is most appreciative for the raise in salary and is delighted with the new Terminal Payment clause.

2. The Station interprets the Terminal Payment clause to mean any termination by the Government or acceptance of GERENDE's resignation in the "best interests of the Government." Examples in connection with the "best interests of the Government" interpretation would involve GERENDE's resignation for health reasons or other logical personal reasons such as a change of residence to some geographical area where his services could not be utilized by KUBARK. Assuming that no security problems are involved in making such a payment, the Station also interprets the clause to be applicable for payment to GERENDE's estate in the event of his death while in the employ of KUBARK.

3. The Station understands clearly why the clause was not written as originally requested and concurs in Headquarters reasoning. Certainly, the Station would not want to give GERENDE a terminal payment, and he has been so informed, if he elects to resign just to receive some extra money or to pursue some other career. The Station hastens to add, however, that to the best of its knowledge, GERENDE has no intention of resigning from his present KUBARK job.

4. As requested in Reference B, enclosed as Attachment No. Two are the original and one copy of the contract amendment dated 1 September 1957. Headquarters will note that the amendment was accepted by GERENDE and approved by the Chief of Station, but was not formally witnessed. It is suggested that Matthew S. DINGLEY (ps), who is presently in Headquarters, be requested to witness the document. DINGLEY was the Case Officer handling GERENDE at the time this amendment became effective.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
20 August 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs w/attachments as stated above

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED
			PAGE NO.

SECRET

13 August 1957

Mr. Raymond H. GERENDE

Dear Mr. GERENDE:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955.

Effective 1 September 1957, said contract is amended by deleting paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the following paragraph:

"1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $4,080.00 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Raymond H. Gerende
Raymond H. GERENDE

WITNESS:____________________

APPROVED:

Willard C. Curtis

SECRET

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1959, said contract, as amended, is further amended the following manner:

a. The figure $3600 is deleted from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted.

b. The following paragraph is added after paragraph ten (10) entitled "Term":

> "11. Terminal Payment. In the event this contract is terminated by the Government under subparagraph (a) of paragraph ten (10) above or in the event of its expiration and nonrenewal by the Government, you will be entitled to a terminal payment of one (1) month's compensation for each full year of your utilization by the Government after 18 March 1955. Said amount shall be calculated at the contractual rate of compensation applicable at the time this payment becomes due."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY______________________
Contracting Officer

Not mailed

ACCEPTED:

Raymond H. Gerende
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

Willard C. Curtis

SECRET

ATTACHMENT NO. ONE
TO
HBCIA- 1357

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE 12 AUG 1959

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY/Contract Amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE 43 I — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - See paragraphs 2,3, and 4.

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959

1. In accordance with your request to amend Subject's contract providing him with an increase in compensation and a termination payment, the attached contract amendment was written.

2. Paragraph (a) of this amendment states that the figure $3600 is deleted from GERENDE's contract and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted. This figure of $3600 is the amount GERENDE was to receive under his original contract, dated 1 October 1955. According to the referenced dispatch, however, Subject's contract was amended on 1 September 1957 to provide him with an increase in compensation, bringing his salary up to $4080. Neither Contract Division nor your area desk has a copy of this amendment. Please forward a copy to Headquarters for our files.

3. Your attention is also directed to the "Terminal Payment" clause. Under the provisions of the attached amendment, GERENDE is not eligible for a termination settlement if he resigns from KUBARK. Only in the event that we give him 30 days' notice of termination or fail to renew his contract is he eligible for this termination payment. Your comments on the stipulations as written into the attached amendment are requested. In the event you feel that GERENDE should be entitled to a termination payment should he resign his position, the clause will be rewritten.

4. The attached amendment should be returned to Headquarters with your comments and a copy of the contract amendment dated 1 September 1957.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

10 August 1959

Attachment:
As described above.

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Mexico Chrono
1 - RI

WH/III/Mexico/MTherrien:jmh

CS COPY

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

RECORD COPY RECORD COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT - Contract for GERENDE

In reviewing the last contract amendment, it came to note that CPD was deleting the original compensation figure of $3600 instead of the figure sent by the Station which was $4080. In checking this out, we find that we have no copy or notification of the amendment dated 1 September 1957 increasing his salary from $3600 to $4080. CPD is rewritting the contract without using a compensation figure for the amount to be deleted.

When we send this to the field, ask them to send us a copy of the contract amendment, dated 1 September 1957. Also inform them that they are to execute and retain the original copy of this new contract amendment. It may be well to point out that Subject's termination clause stipulates that he will received this benefit only if we terminate the contract.

MTherrien

See HMMW-7959

SECRET

22 July 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

1. It is requested that Raymond H. GERENDE's contract, effective 1 October 1955 (as amended), be further amended to provide him with compensation at the annual rate of $4,500, effective 1 July 1959. It is also requested that a termination clause, effective 18 March 1955, be written into his contract stipulating that GERENDE will receive a termination payment of one month's salary, calculated at the prevailing rate of compensation at the time of his termination, for each full year of his employment with the U.S. Government. GERENDE was employed by the Mexico City Station on 18 March 1955 under provisions of an oral agreement. All other provisions of his contract should remain in force.

2. GERENDE is covered by the LIEMPTY Project which was amended to include the above commitments to GERENDE and approved by Chief, FI on 16 July 1959

R. E. Gomes
AC/WHD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Chrono
1 - Subject

SECRET

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523 50-6-74/1

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE 21 JUL

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY Project Amendment Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959

1. On 16 July 1957, an amendment to the LIEMPTY Project was approved granting permission to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he works for KUBARK and to raise his salary effective July 1959 from $4,080 to $4,560 per year. No additional funds were requested for the Project.

2. A request to amend GERENDE's contract to include the benefits listed above has been submitted. You will be notified when the contract has been amended.

3. A copy of the approved Project amendment is attached for your information and records.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

21 July 1959

Attachment:
1 - (RYBAT)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/III/Mexico RYBAT Chrono
1 - Subject

Scaletti

WH/III/Mexico/E.I. SCALETTI:jmh

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

RECORD COPY RECORD COPY

14-00000

DISPATCH | SECRET/RYBAT | HMMA-13003 rybat-1152

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 201-119523

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 5 June 1959

SUBJECT New Contract for Raymond H. GERENDE (p)

RE 43 — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED Headquarters preparation of a new contract.

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-5626, 3 December 1957

1. Raymond H. GERENDE was initially employed by the Station on 18 March 1955 under provisions of an oral agreement. Effective 1 October 1955 GERENDE was placed under a written contract, prepared by Headquarters, with an annual salary of $3,600.00. On 1 September 1957 his contract was amended to increase his salary to $4,080.00 per annum, which is the salary he is presently receiving. It is requested that a new two year contract be prepared, to be effective 1 July 1959, providing an increase in salary to $4,560.00 per annum and including a termination clause which will give GERENDE a termination payment of one month's salary, calculated at the prevailing rate of compensation at the time of termination, for each full year of his KUBARK employment. All other provisions of GERENDE's initial contract should remain in force. (The increase in salary to $4,560.00 per annum is already covered by the LIEMPTY Project.)

2. As pointed out in the attachment to HMMA-11368, 22 October 1958, paragraph three of MEXI-2836, 25 November 1958, and in the LIEMPTY Field Project Outline, GERENDE is a highly valued full-time Station asset who carries a significant work load and who has a great deal of responsibility. He is the LIEMPTY Principal Agent who handles the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA base houses, the LIENTRAP operation, the outside photographic processing and translation service and all the agents participating in these activities. He performs his duties in a conscientious and professional manner and his already excellent abilities are showing continued improvement.

3. Paragraph eight of HMMA-12095, 4 February 1959, indicated that the Station was considering amending GERENDE's contract to provide for some type of retirement benefits. Although it is recognized that indigenous agents are not usually granted such contract provisions, the Station believes that GERENDE should have monetary incentive, in addition to his idealogy, to make a long career with KUBARK. Accordingly, the Station recommends that GERENDE's new contract provide for a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he has worked for KUBARK. In other words, should GERENDE's career with KUBARK last for 24 years and his yearly salary at the end of this period is $8,000.00, then he, or his heirs, would receive a lump sum payment of $16,000.00. After considering different types of insurance plans, an escrow account and several other ideas, the Station considers the above proposal to come closest to meeting the criteria of control, production incentive and creation of the desire to make KUBARK a career. The date, 18 March 1955, should be used as the beginning date for the computation of GERENDE's termination benefits.

Willard C. CURTIS

ONO/vps
3 June 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY Amendment

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name: J. B. Brady
Room: 2114 Barton Hall
Ext.: 2555
Date: 23 June 1959

1. It is requested that approval be granted to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he works for KUBARK and to raise his salary effective July 1959 from $4,080 to $4,560.00 per year. His last salary increase was granted on 1 September 1957. The date, 18 March 1955, has been suggested by the Station as the beginning date for the computation of GERENDE's termination benefits. The Station believes that this benefit will provide GERENDE with the necessary incentive to make KUBARK a career and at the same time will give the Station an additional element of control.

2. As pointed out in the LIEMPTY Project Approval, GERENDE, an indigenous agent, is one of the Station's most valuable assets. He has a responsible full time job as the LIEMPTY Principal Agent who handles the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA base houses, the LIENTRAP operation, the outside photographic processing and translation service and all the agents participating in these activities. He performs his duties in a conscientious and professional manner and his already excellent abilities are showing continued improvement.

3. Money was already allocated in the LIEMPTY Project approval for the salary increase. With the effective date of 13 March 1955, for the termination clause, GERENDE will already have accrued $1,520 (his salary is $4,560 per year) if he should resign today. The LIEMPTY Project, as approved, has sufficient funds to cover this cost if it is necessary to obligate this amount during the present Project year. Therefore, no additional funds are requested.

Attachments:
Folder with past approval
Envelope with true name

R. W. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

Concur: ______________________
Chief, FI/OPS

C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

Approved: ______________________ Approved for Transmittal:
Chief, FI

J. C. King, C/WHD

Date: ______________________

Senior Staff Coordination
For C/FI/OPS -s/R. Bryant
For CI Staff -s/R. Brown

Approved:

J. C. King, C/WHD

____
Date

SECRET

627 ER/OBS/

ORIG : STANLEY J. SHULTZ:mb
UNIT : TSS/ID/FB#4
EXT : 8315
DATE : 26 MARCH 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: TSS 4

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, WH 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	MAR 27 20 59 Z 59 REC'D CABLE SECT.
X	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 87295
OUT 87295

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 19063
19063

TECHS

RE MEXI 3522 (IN 34110)

REFERENCE PARA 3 YES

- End of Message -

RI Comment: Does HQS desire naturalized
Mexican citizen obtain tourist visa?

file
GERENDE

C. V. S. Roosevelt

C. V. S. ROOSEVELT
DC/TSS ING OFFICER

WH/3M (coord by phone w/
Charles W. ANDERSON) ED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CHARLES J. RYAN
AUTH ASSTC/TSS/AUTH CER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

441/SE/FES/

DATE : 19 MAR 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TSS 4

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, WH 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 19 2329Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 34110

TO DIR

INFO GUAL SANJ

CITE MEXI 3522

AQUATIC

RE: DIR 16313 (OUT 82047)*

1. RAYMOND H GERENDE ADVISED BY CUBAN EMB 17 MARCH THAT DOES NOT NEED VISA ENTER CUBA AS TOURIST ON MEXICAN PASSPORT SINCE MEXI PP GOOD FOR 29 DAY STAY AND CAN EASILY BE RENEWED ONCE IN CUBA.

2. CUBAN EMB ADVISED ODACID BY PHONE 18 MARCH THAT TOURIST VISA NOT REQUIRED FOR ANY NATIVE BORN LATIN AMERICAN, U.S. BRITISH, FRENCH OR SWISS CITIZEN. TOURIST VISA IS REQUIRED FOR ANY ABOVE NATURALIZED CITIZEN. TRANSIENT VISA REQUIRED ON ANY NATIONALITY WHO TRAVELS VIA CUBA TO COUNTRY OTHER THAN HIS OWN.

3. DOES HQS DESIRE NATURALIZED MEXI CITIZEN OBTAIN TOURIST VISA?

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED IMMEDIATELY ON LOAN CUBAN TOURIST VISAS IN ORIGINAL PASSPORTS OTHER THAN U.S.

file
GERENDE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

COLITHO - PHOTO. BY MOORE BUSINESS FORMS, INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

DISPATCH SECRET/KAPOK

HMMA-12069
KAPOK-1543

TO: Chief, WH Division	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-74/3
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE: 4 February 1959
SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Progress Report - July thru Dec 1958	RE: "(CHECK "X" ONE) ☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Headquarters information and files only.	☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

SYNOPSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS

1. During the period covered by this report, a new Case Officer, Quinton N. OUSLER, assumed operational direction of several LIPSTICK assets (Oliver G. SCANTLING, Raymond H. GERENDE, LIMITED, LICALLA, LIENTRAP and several support agents), the LIJERSEY surveillance team and the LILYRIC Base. The Station has continued to use SCANTLING, primarily, to follow up LIMESA leads obtained from LIFLAT and the photographic bases; however, no positive returns have been realized from his prodigious efforts except the collection of a considerable amount of operational information. GERENDE performed his principal agent responsibilities for the photographic bases. LIENTRAP, LIJERSEY and until 19 December 1958 handled the LIFEAT/EGMORNING and LIFEAT/Cuban radio operations. The LIJERSEY surveillance team has been used sparingly for press investigations and routine static surveillances; however, a principal agent, [illegible] C. CLACKETT, is currently being trained in Headquarters to assume the full-time direction, control, training and development of the LIJERSEY team. The new project, LIEMPTY, combining all the assets discussed in this report was submitted to Headquarters on 3 October 1958 with requested project year approval period from 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959. An operational security review of Raymond H. GERENDE's activities was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMMA-11368, 22 October 1958.

ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS - OLIVER G. SCANTLING SEGMENT

2. Agent Information - Oliver G. SCANTLING has continued to perform his assigned tasks in an outstanding manner. SCANTLING's poise, common sense, education, ideology and native ability for the pursuit of clandestine activities make him one of the most valuable support assets available to the Mexico City Station. The fact that SCANTLING has full time overt occupation as Chief Engineer and Production Manager for a local manufacturing company adds to his long-range potential as a KUBARK agent. On two occasions during the past six months SCANTLING has indicated to his Case Officer that he would like to resign from his overt position and devote full time to his KUBARK operational duties; however, the Case Officer has discouraged him from doing this on the basis that he has more long-range potential when his cover occupation is legitimate. Of course, SCANTLING would be more valuable if he could work full time for the Station, but not sufficiently so to warrant his resignation from his overt job (his monthly salary in his overt job is in excess of $800.00 U.S.). The only significant limitation that SCANTLING has evidenced to his present Case Officer is his occasional delay in preparing written reports of investigations and other matters requiring reports for the files. However, this limitation gradually is being overcome and it is expected that SCANTLING's reports will continue to be factual, comprehensive and soon will be promptly submitted.

2. Security Developments - SCANTLING is constantly under a considerable amount of exposure and pressure when following up LIMESA leads obtained from LIFLAT and the photographic bases. Since time is always of the essence when using such perishable leads, SCANTLING frequently is directed to make approaches to individuals performing services for the LIPSTICK target after routine, and sometimes only cursory, investigation. Therefore, the possibility always exists of his entanglement in an undesirable security incident. This necessarily

REF [illegible] - (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

[illegible] calculated risk which both SCANTLING and the Station must take if penetration of the primary target is achieved, whether technically or by a recruitment in place. It is to SCANTLING's credit that he has not yet become involved in an incident which [illegible] has compromised him and/or alerted the target of KUBARK's many [illegible] efforts against them. The closest SCANTLING has come to being compromised and to being identified as a PBPRIME agent stems directly from the LIPSTICK installation [illegible] of June 1956. The [illegible] used by the surveillance team was [illegible] by SCANTLING in his true name at the time that he was leader of the team. No [illegible] indication, however, has been uncovered which points to SCANTLING [illegible] of investigation by a local police service. SCANTLING and the Station have [illegible] and will continue to watch closely for any sign of local police and other [illegible] interest in his activities.

4. Operational Success and Effectiveness - Briefly discussed below are some of the many operational activities in which SCANTLING participated during the period covered by this report:

A. Juan *CASTRO (201-) - SCANTLING continued seeing CASTRO through October 1958 following the last [illegible] of [illegible] the original LIMESA / MELIGHTING operation through CASTRO. As late as September 1958 possibilities [illegible], or appeared to exist, that CASTRO would complete his work in the [illegible] LIMERICK office and that it might be possible to install MELIGHTING. While CASTRO, through SCANTLING, was the principal source of this information, portions were also confirmed by LIFEAT. During July, August and September 1958, SCANTLING had approximately eight meetings with CASTRO. In late September 1958 LIFEAT indicated that the LIMERICK target was using [illegible] one of their regular local employees, Antonio *ZAPEDA (201-2[illegible]), to complete some of the work CASTRO was supposed to finish and that other contractors were doing jobs around the target area which CASTRO would normally have been expected to do had he still been in the employ of the target. Also, LIMITED and LIFEAT confirmed that the LIMERICK target had lost interest in CASTRO - he was not seen visiting the target installation nor did the target people attempt to get in touch with him. In view of this, SCANTLING was instructed to cease all contact with CASTRO as of 1 November 1958.

B. Pablo *MON Rosas (201-) - During the period covered by this report SCANTLING had two interviews with MON Rosas. SCANTLING's most recent report was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HKMA-11143, 1 December 1958. Unquestionably the Station has identified MON Rosas as the technician who services LIMERICK [illegible]. SCANTLING will continue his development of MON Rosas (please see HKMA-11711, 19 December 1958).

C. Gerardo *VIDALES (201-) - SCANTLING's activities in connection with the LIMESA /MELIGHTING operation were summarized in HKMA-11097, 20 October 1958, and previous correspondence.

D. HERRERIA GABLICH - This is the firm that made the steel vault door for the LIMERICK installation. SCANTLING made two visits to this firm's work shop and succeeded in obtaining enough information to make an

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

accurate drawing of the type door installed at LIMERICK. This drawing was forwarded to Headquarters via HMMA-11926, 21 January 1959.

E. Casing Report on West German Embassy - During June, July and August 1958, SCANTLING prepared a detailed casing report on the new West German Embassy. SCANTLING's engineering ability enables him to prepare accurate drawings and sketches from a minimum of data. Also, his personality and gregariousness permit him to visit the inside of such establishments, with an appropriate cover story, and retain minute details which later he commits to paper and emerges with a comprehensive floor plan and important construction data.

F. LIMERICK Construction - SCANTLING's long association with this target from the casing standpoint provides the Station with an experienced source of information about LIMERICK construction activities, modifications and reasons for same. All of the LIMERICK casing reports on file in Headquarters are the product of SCANTLING's casing ability and knowledge. Discussions with Station Officers about LIMERICK construction have been of benefit to the Station during this reporting period and they will continue to be of considerable importance.

G. Routine Investigations and Surveillances - Although the Station has several assets capable of performing investigations and surveillances, SCANTLING is still used in situations requiring the utmost in discretion and [illegible]. His activities in this connection are too numerous to list here; suffice it to state that he has contributed materially to the Station's collection of operational information through his investigative efforts. SCANTLING's interview of Paul Frederick [illegible] ([illegible]) of LCMAY-[illegible] interest is an example of SCANTLING's use on investigations (see HMMA-11749, 17 December 1958).

H. ESGEM-15 - SCANTLING served as the contact with ESGEM-15 during the latter's December 1958 trip to Mexico City. In this connection SCANTLING is a support asset which is trustworthy and dependable. SCANTLING never displays undue curiosity in operations such as the ESGEM-15 case; he accepts the minimum amount of information given and performs his duties in a professional and sincere manner.

I. LIEMPTY/3 - SCANTLING handles the administrative matters connected with L/3. Lewis M. KILLGO provides operational direction to L/3. During this reporting period, the Station had hopes of SCANTLING taking over the operational supervision of L/3's activities. However, after a four-month trial period with both SCANTLING and KILLGO meeting with L/3, it was decided that it would be desirable for KILLGO to continue handling L/3. L/3's age and personality and intellect indicated that he could best be directed by a PBPRIME citizen. Therefore, SCANTLING no longer attends KILLGO's and L/3's operational meetings, although he does continue to handle L/3's administrative problems.

J. Raymond H. GERENDE's Duties - During GERENDE's absence from

Mexico City in December 1958 and January 1959, it was considered appropriate for SCANTLING to handle LIMITED, LICALLA and LIENTRAP. Although this procedure defeats some compartmentation principles, it was the only manner in which the Station could maintain continuity with the three operations listed above. SCANTLING has known the agents involved with LIMITED, LICALLA and LIENTRAP for several years. In fact, he was at one time the agent in charge of these three operations.

5. Operational Methods Evolved During the Period - The VIDALES operation [illegible] (L) [illegible] the necessity for thorough briefings and discussions with the agent making an approach to a target. This can hardly be described as a new operational method, but it does serve to illustrate the [illegible] of [illegible] that should be followed. The [illegible] LIENCRIT IV operation whereby SCANTLING must [illegible] the landlord of the target's building [illegible] offering SCANTLING and the Station the opportunity to prepare thoroughly for SCANTLING's recruitment pitch. The excellent documentation prepared by [illegible] and the story being created by SCANTLING and the Station should increase the [illegible] of success on SCANTLING's cold approaches. (See HKMA-11356, 22 October 1958, and HKMW-7000, 21 November 1958, for additional details on this aspect.)

In a general sense, one other conclusion can be made about any Station's support assets - where technical and photographic operations are possible, the utility of the information obtained is enhanced considerably by accurate, comprehensive and timely casing reports. SCANTLING, as previously mentioned, is an excellent asset for this type of support.

6. Administrative - SCANTLING's contract expires on 12 February 1959. As of this date SCANTLING will have received an annual salary of $3,600.00 U.S. for two years. The Station plans to raise his annual compensation to $4,000.00 U.S. No other significant administrative problems exist.

7. Outlook for Future Development - Station plans call for the continued utilization of SCANTLING in the same manner as he is presently being used. The Station will keep SCANTLING as an independent asset and, if he is loyal, resist the temptation to make him a principal agent in charge of numerous sub-agents. It is believed that SCANTLING is the type of support asset that can be worked by the Station for many years to come and that every effort should be made to protect his security and value to KUBARK.

ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS - RAYMOND H. GERENDE SEGMENT

8. Agent Information - Aside from the agent information given in HKMA-11356, 22 October 1958, the only significant development was GERENDE's December 1958 marriage to a U. S. educated girl of Dutch citizenship. The $[illegible].00 U. S. for the purchase of two plane tickets as a wedding gift to GERENDE was designed to impress GERENDE with the fact that KUBARK thinks highly of him as an individual and that KUBARK has a great interest in his intelligence career. GERENDE is at the age and stage in life where he is beginning to wonder just what the future holds for him. In the near future, the Station will propose a salary raise for GERENDE

and request a new contract that provides for some type of retirement benefits - perhaps similar to the Civil Service Retirement program for KUBARK employees.

9. Security Developments - Again, the information on this subject was covered adequately in HMMA-11[illegible]. GERENDE was relieved of his LIFEAT/[illegible] and LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles cases on 10 December 1958. This, of course, was in line with recommendations contained in HMMA-11[illegible] and represents a definite security improvement. GERENDE was told that LIFEAT/[illegible] was being terminated because it had not been productive of enough significant information and that LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles was being terminated because the emphasis of the target community had moved (Note: This was true where the Cubans are concerned.) Additional security improvements will be made when Steve D. CLACKETT returns to Mexico and relieves GERENDE of responsibility for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team.

10. Operational Successes and Accomplishments - Briefly summarized below are the [illegible] operational activities which GERENDE managed during the period covered by this report:

A. LIMITED - This base functioned smoothly, securely and effectively during the period July through December 1958. The base operator, LIEMPTY/6, demonstrated his usual competence and devotion to duty. In addition to the primary objective of taking photographs of individuals of interest, L/6 also prepared detailed daily logs on the arrivals and departures of all target personnel, weekly reports of workers activities at the LIMERICK installation, performed three one-man surveillances of Mexicans working at LIMERICK in an effort to identify them by name and home address, and provided SCANTLING with information on LIMERICK construction. During this six-month period, LIEMPTY/6 took approximately 800 photographs from the LIMITED base.

B. LILYRIC - This base is operated by LIEMPTYs/13 and 14, with LIEMPTY/12 serving as a contact between the team and GERENDE. LIEMPTY/14 does most of the photography and reporting for the base since LIEMPTY/13 has a regular job and is not on the premises during regular daytime working hours. L/14 devotes approximately six hours ([illegible]) each day to photography and the remaining time is spent preparing reports. The base prepares and compiles individual logs on each target personality indicating their arrivals and departures from the LIMERICK installation. These reports are filed in the appropriate target's 201 file and are available to case officers in analyzing a target personality's pattern of daily activity. LILYRIC also prepared a weekly report on workers activity at the Club and reports the license plate numbers of all vehicles discharging or picking up individuals at LIMERICK. (Note: These license plate numbers are then checked out through LIVESTOCK/2 for the owners names and addresses - in case of immediate or later operational interest.) During GERENDE's recent absence from Mexico City, [illegible] met directly with LIEMPTY/12. During this period approximately 2,000 photographs were taken from the LILYRIC base.

C. LICALLA - While LILYRIC and LIMITED are excellent bases for photographing individuals entering and leaving the LIMERICK installation, the LICALLA base is the Station's best source of photographs of LIMERICK employees. LICALLA is so situated that photographs can be made of target personnel in the garden area of LIMERICK. LIEMPTY/9 is the base operator for LICALLA and in the Station's opinion performs his job in an excellent manner. As reported in HMMA-[illegible], LIEMPTY/9 is the brother of former LIPSTICK/27 (the first LIPSTICK surveillance team member arrested in June 1958). No repercussions, or indications of any impending ones, have resulted to this family relationship. This, certainly, is the major security problem faced by L/9 during this reporting period. L/9 and his family [illegible] will have to vacate the LICALLA base for the period of [illegible] required [illegible]. The Station is making sure that L/9 [illegible] that his covert employer owns the LICALLA base and the three adjoining houses and every effort is being made to [illegible] from L/9. (See HMMA-[illegible], 28 January 1959, for a more detailed explanation.) Of course, during the remodeling of LICALLA there will not be any LICALLA reporting or photographs. In addition to taking approximately 2,500 photographs during this six-month period, the LICALLA base also prepared weekly reports on LIMERICK garden activities. These reports indicate which LIMERICK employees are seen together each day, which vehicles different employees are accustomed to using, construction activities and other matters which appear of significance to L/9.

D. LIENTRAP - LIENTRAP continues to be a worthwhile Station asset. Approximately 1,400 clandestine photographs have been made of numerous targets during this reporting period and LIENTRAP type activities will undoubtedly remain one of the Station's best investigative assets. As explained in the [illegible] Project Outline, forwarded to Headquarters on 8 October 1958, the Station is of the opinion that the LIENTRAP vehicle should be replaced as soon as possible. Nearly four months have elapsed without receiving Headquarters authority to replace the vehicle. The necessity [illegible] is even more acute now than at the time of the request. LIEMPTYs 10 and 11 do an excellent job on LIENTRAP operations.

E. LYERSKY - This operation can be characterized as somewhat dormant for the July - December 1958 period. Because of CERENDE's other important activities, he did not have the time to train and work with the surveillance team. Also, the Station considered that it would be stretching security just a bit too far to have CERENDE engaged in surveillance at the same time that he was handling the photographic base houses and performing monitoring chores for LIFEAT/[illegible] and LIFEAT/Cuban Embassy. The expected arrival of [illegible] D. CLACKETT in April and his relieving CERENDE of [illegible] will enable the Station to train, within a year, an effective mobile surveillance team. At present, LIEMPTYs/15, 16 and 17 compose the [illegible] team.

F. LIFEAT - Until 10 December 1958 CERENDE served as monitor in the base houses covering LIFEAT/[illegible] and LIFEAT/Cuban Embassy. In addition to living in the base house, CERENDE also transcribed the majority of the [illegible] and Cuban Embassy tapes. He performed these jobs satisfactorily even though his efficiency was handicapped by numerous other duties. Relieving CERENDE of his LIFEAT duties enables him to devote more time to his other operations with a corresponding increase in the security of all his activities.

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

C. LIEMPTYs/4 and 5 - LIEMPTY/4 does a truly professional job of developing and printing the base house photographs. No significant developments occurred in relation to L/4 except that OALLER met directly with him during the December 1958 period that GEREMDE was away from Mexico City. LIEMPTY/5, L/4's wife, continued doing routine translations in a very competent manner.

11. Administration - Other than the fact that LIENSET and the above-mentioned portions of the LIPSTICK projects were consolidated into this new project, LIEMPTY, there is nothing of significance to report to Headquarters.

12. Outlook for Future Developments - Although not meaning to be repetitious in reiterating upon those recommendations made above, a summary of the Station's outlook on the future of the LIEMPTY GEREMDE Segment is believed to be appropriate. Upon the arrival of CLACKETT in April, GEREMDE will be free to devote full time to photographic base house operations. GEREMDE can do a lot to professionalize these operations by preparing written communications procedures, by thoroughly briefing base house operators on their methods of operation, by preparing detailed security reviews on each base and by supervising the trial of new photographic techniques. GEREMDE will continue to be used on occasional sensitive investigational and operational lead traces and to perform other services for the Station which will not impair the security of his primary responsibilities. It is planned that CLACKETT will put some life into the LIEASLY surveillance team and that the Station will soon have another first class investigative group to support other Station operations.

Willard C. CURTIS

[illegible]/vpe
[illegible] January 1959

Distribution
3 - Hqs

SECRET/KAPOK

KAPOK-1515

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 24 December 1958

SUBJECT Raymond H. GERENDE's Itinerary

RE "433" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED None, for Headquarters information only.

REFERENCE(S)

1. In the event Headquarters desires to contact GERENDE while he is in the U. S., his itinerary is as follows:

24-30 December 1958
% Mr. & Mrs. Peter ARNOTT
1640 Aqua Vista Road
Richmond, California
Tel: BEacon 3-4188

30 December - 12 January 1959
% Colonel & Mrs. R. ROOS
3628 Windom Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Tel: EMerson 2-3543

12-16 January 1959
% Mr. & Mrs. Joseph HANTIN
332 West 88th Street, Apt. B-1
New York, New York
Tel: LYceum 5-0333

16-24 January 1959
% Mr. & Mrs. R. F. KOLB
3531 Yale Avenue
Columbia, South Carolina

2. Reference to Quinton N. OUSLER's true name will be sufficient to establish the bona fides of a Headquarters officer.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
22 December 1958

Distribution
3 Hqs

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH SECRET/KAPOK

[illegible]
KAPOK-1545

TO Chief, WH Division INFO	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-163574 50-6-74/1
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE 4 February 1959
SUBJECT LIEMPTY/20 (formerly LIEARL)	RE 43 3 — (CHECK ✓ ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED Amended Operational Approval	☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

A. HMMA-6321, 15 March 1957
B. HMMA-9307, 2 April 1958
C. HMMW-6572, 12 July 1958

1. Forwarded herewith are the requisite number of copies of a revised PRQ, Part II, on the Subject individual. It is requested that the Operational Approval for the use of Subject be amended to permit his use on LIEMPTY/LIJERSEY.

2. It is also requested that Subject's cryptonym be changed to LIEMPTY/2 and that the necessary Headquarters action be taken to include Subject in the LIEMPTY project.

Willard C. CURTIS

QND/vps
2 February 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs w/attachment in triplicate

per HMMW-7342
see Project action

BASIC DOCUMENT FILED IN 201-163574

Liempty/1
50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

038 ER/JG/JG kwT 8

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3

SECRET

DATE : 8 DECEMBER 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DEC 9 10 15 50

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 35553

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2915

RE: A. MEXI 2781 (IN 26585) *

B. MEXI 2836 (IN 30929)

SINCE GERENDE WEDDING SET FOR 12 DEC, REQUEST ANSWER REFS BY 10 DEC.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: * REQUESTED AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE PLANE TICKETS TO U.S. FOR GERENDE AND BRIDE AS A WEDDING GIFT IN RECOGNITION OF GOOD WORK HE HAS DONE.

Gerende 201

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

538 RLG/SW/ 4

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WH
EXT : 2555
DATE : 8 DECEMBER 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 9 1937Z 58
SERVICE

PRECEDENCE				INITIALS
	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY	
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

DIR 03774

OUT 52222 A

TO INFO CITE DIR

C/S COMMENT: UNDERSCORED ABOVE IS CORRECT DIR NUMBER ORIGINALLY DISSEMINATED AS DIR 30774.

file Guevara 201

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

500 MJ/BM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

500

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WH
EXT : 2555
DATE : 8 DECEMBER 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE

	DEFERRED	DEC 9 13 50z58	
	ROUTINE	REC'[illegible] SECT.	
X	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

[illegible]2
OUT 52222

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR [illegible]
30774

REF: MEXI 2781 (IN 26585)*

GERENDE GIFT AS OUTLINED PARA 2 REF APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT:* CONCERNED PROPOSED KUBARK WEDDING GIFT FOR RAYMOND H. GERENDE.

File Gerende 201
(Kuempty-1)
(" Proj

R E Gomez
R. E. GOMEZ, AC/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, CWH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

441 MM/MCB/jsb

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 25 NOV 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 26 02 10:58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 30929

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2836

REF MEXI 2781 (IN 26585) *

1. STATION INFORMED ORALLY THAT HQS NEEDS KNOW IF GERENDE SALARY RAISE IS DESIRABLE TO PROVIDE FOR $600 WEDDING GIFT.

2. STATION PREFERS GIVE $600 GIFT WITHOUT REF TO SALARY. CONSIDER SALARY RAISE AS RECOGNITION FOR GOOD WORK PERFORMANCE AND NOT AS REWARD FOR MARRIAGE, THEREFORE, GIFT SHOULD NOT BE LINKED TO SALARY.

3. ASSUMING GERENDE CONTINUES GOOD WORK, STATION PLANS REQUEST SALARY RAISE WITHIN NEXT FEW MONTHS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AUTHORITY PURCHASE PLANE TICKETS TO U.S. FOR GERENDE.

Gerende 201

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

17 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Wedding Gift for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps), Contract Agent

1. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be authorized to give Raymond H. GERENDE (ps), as a wedding gift, two airplane tourist class tickets from Mexico City to San Fransisco and Washington D.C. and return to Mexico City. Although this trip may appear to be a generous and unusual wedding gift, the Station considers it is more than justified in view of GERENDE's outstanding performance of his duties for the Station and his future value as a principal agent. GERENDE has been working for the Station since February 1955.

2. The Station estimates that the cost of the plane tickets will be $600.00. The LIPSTICK Project, which covers GERENDE, can absorb this added expense.

R. E. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

WH/3/Mexico/C.Zehrung:ngs

Distribution:
Orig & 1- Addressee
1- WH/Mexico Chrono
1- Subject

SECRET

433 CWT/WG DS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE : 14 NOVEMBER 58

433

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FE 4, OS 2, S/C 2

NOV 15 04 32 '58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

IN 26585

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2781

RE: MEXI 2780* (IN 26525)

1. RAYMOND H. GERENDE PLANNING MARRY SUBJ REF 12 DEC.

2. AS KUBARK WEDDING GIFT REQUEST AUTHORITY PURCHASE PLANE TICKETS FROM MEXI TO SAN FRANCISCO TO WASH TO MEXI. ESTIMATE COST TOURIST CLASS TICKETS $600 U.S. COUPLE PLAN VISIT FRIENDS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND BRIDE'S PARENTS IN WASH.

3. ALTHOUGH TRIP GENEROUS AND UNUSUAL WEDDING GIFT, STATION CONSIDERS IT APPROPRIATE AND MORE THAN JUSTIFIED IN VIEW GERENDE PAST AND FUTURE VALUE AS PRINCIPAL AGENT MEXI SUPPORT OPS.

4. NOTHING HAS BEEN SAID TO GERENDE ABOUT PROPOSED GIFT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED TRACES ON HESTER ROOS.

Gerende 201

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

2[illegible] October 195[illegible]

[illegible] SI/OA

[illegible] : Change of Cryptonyms

1. The following agents, who have been carried under the [illegible] and [illegible] Projects, are/now being transferred to the [illegible] Project which will replace/the [illegible] and [illegible] Projects. Please change your records to reflect the new cryptonyms assigned them as follows.

[illegible] Number	New Crypt	Old Crypt
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-20
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-2	LIPSTICK-19
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-32
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-35
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-5	LIPSTICK-60
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-14
C-[illegible]	LIEMPTY-7	LIPSTICK-27
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-28
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-39
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-2
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-11	LIPSTICK-24
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-12	LIJERSEY-5
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-13	LIJERSEY-2
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-12
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-4
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-8
C-52507	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-13

2. Subjects will continue to be used in the same work as reflected by their present PRQ, Part II's. Therefore, no new PRQ's will be submitted.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible] October 195[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible] have been carried under the [illegible] transferred to the [illegible] and LI[illegible] Projects, [illegible] the new cryptonym assigned [illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
C-27[illegible]	LI[illegible]	LIPSTICK-20
C-[illegible]	L[illegible]	[illegible]TICK-19
C-[illegible]	L[illegible]	LIPSTICK-32
[illegible]	L[illegible]	LI[illegible]-33
C-[illegible]	L[illegible]	[illegible]STICK-30
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]	LIPSTICK-14
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]	LIPSTICK-27
C-[illegible]	L[illegible]	LI[illegible]TICK-28
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]-9	LIPSTICK-39
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]	LIPSTICK-2
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]-11	LI[illegible]STICK-24
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]-12	LIJERSEY-5
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]	LIJERSEY-2
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]-1[illegible]	LIJERSEY-12
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]-1[illegible]	LIJERSEY-4
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]-1[illegible]	LIJERSEY-8
C-72507	LI[illegible]-1[illegible]	LIJERSEY-13

2. Subjects will continue to be used in the same work as reflected in their present [illegible], Part II's. Therefore, no new [illegible] submitted.

[illegible] -1

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 24 Oct 58

ACTION: ☐ OPEN ☒ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

FROM: Charlotte L. Zehrung

ROOM NO: 2120 Barton Hall

TELEPHONE: 2758

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE ☐
NONSENSITIVE ☐

201 NO: 201-119523

1. SOURCE DOCUMENT:

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title) — SEX 3: M ☐ F ☐

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2 — (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

PHOTO 4: YES ☐ NO ☐
BIRTH DATE 5: D M Y
COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6:
CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7:
OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8: 1 2 3

OCCUPATION, POSITION:
OCC. POS. CODE 9:

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY-1 (formerly LIPSTICK-20)

PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.:
ACTION DESK 11: WH/3M
SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.:
THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a:

COMMENTS:

Note change in subject's cryptonym from LIPSTICK-20
to LIEMPTY-1

201- 201-119523

PERMANENT CHARGE: ☒ YES ☐ NO
RESTRICTED FILE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

SIGNATURE: Charlotte Zehrung

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

PUNCHED

(38)

TO Chief, WH Division INFO	50-6-25/3 201-119523
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE 22 October 1958
SUBJECT Review of Raymond H. GERENDE's Operations and Activities	(CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED Headquarters study and comments.	
REFERENCE(S)	

1. The subject paper is attached. It is believed that Headquarters will have a clearer picture of what GERENDE is doing at the present time together with several informative facts concerning the security of GERENDE's operations. Also included in this paper are several recommendations which the Station proposes to implement through Project LIEMPTY. Obviously, some of the recommendations are goals to work for and, because of a lack of personnel and other valid reasons, cannot be immediately adopted.

2. The attached paper should be read in conjunction with the new LIEMPTY field project outline, which was recently forwarded to Headquarters. Please note, however, that the old agent cryptonyms are used in this paper.

3. The attachment has been read and approved by Matthew S. DINGLEY, who recruited this excellent agent (GERENDE) and was his Case Officer until GERENDE was recently assigned to Quinton N. Ousler.

4. GERENDE is one of the most valuable assets of this Station. This review is considered to be a worthwhile exercise; but under the present operational pace and with present assets, security compartmentation, which is desirable, cannot be achieved. The main security precaution (viz getting GERENDE out of Mexico City and well hidden in case of an emergency) will constantly be kept in mind.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

QNO/vpa
21 October 1958

Distribution
3 Hqs (w/attachments)

BASIC [illegible]

Gerende

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

SECRET

OPERATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW OF RAYMOND H. GERENDE'S OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

1. SITUATION

As a result of the June 1958 LIPSTICK flap, it was decided by the Chief of Station on 30 June 1958 that Quinton N. OUSLER would assume direct contact with several of Matthew S. DINGLEY's agents, one of whom was Raymond H. GERENDE. After being introduced to GERENDE by DINGLEY on 1 July 1958, OUSLER assumed contact responsibilities with GERENDE on 2 July 1958. On 18 July 1958, the Chief of Station decided that OUSLER should be assigned permanent responsibility for the management and handling of GERENDE and GERENDE's operations.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this operational security review is threefold:

a. To identify possible security problems and conditions;
b. To establish a framework for recommendations which will result in the Station's submission of a new support project (LIEMPTY) with Raymond H. GERENDE as a principal agent; and
c. To acquaint the new case officer with the operational problems and agent personnel with which he should have a comprehensive knowledge and detailed understanding.

3. PRINCIPAL AGENT - Raymond H. GERENDE

a. Background - GERENDE has been employed by KUBARK since 18 March 1955, which was just prior to his graduation from the Mexico City College. He is now only 24 years of age, but in the Station's opinion, is a mature, experienced and dedicated KUBARK contract agent. During the three and one-half years that he has been working for the Mexico City Station, GERENDE has participated in a varied assortment of support and intelligence operations. Initially, he was trained and used by Matthew S. DINGLEY as a member of the LIPSTICK surveillance team. In addition, to surveillance work, he was used as an investigator to collect operational data on persons and organizations of interest to the Station. He quickly demonstrated a capacity for leadership and at one time was the leader of the LIPSTICK team. He has been used as a LIFEAT Base House operator

SECRET

and processor of tapes; he has excelled in this type of work because of his bi-lingual Spanish/English facility and, more importantly, due to his diversified experience in clandestine operations which permits him to spot operational leads much more readily than the average LIFEAT monitor.

b. Duties - GERENDE is currently serving as the principal agent in charge of LIMITED, LICALIA, LIPSTICK Photo Truck, LIJERSEY Surveillance Team and LILYRIC. In addition, he monitors and processes the BGMORNING and Cuban Exiles LIFEAT taps. He also supervises the photographic processing of LIPSTICK-38 (his brother-in-law) and the translation work of LIPSTICK-40 (his sister). He maintains contact with and provides administrative support to LIMITATIONS 5 and 6, LICOOL-7 Base operators. Quite obviously GERENDE's many duties overlap the bounds of several Station operations, namely LIPSTICK, LIJERSEY, LIFEAT, LICOOL and several activities which are not listed under formal projects such as BGMORNING. It is recognized by the Station that it is not advisable to have one principal agent connected with as many operations as is GERENDE. However, the present scarcity of both staff and contract agents of the principal agent type necessitate such efficiency measures. Every effort is being made to compartment the various segments of GERENDE's operations and to decrease, and to eliminate where possible, all lateral communications between agents.

c. Security Problems - The most serious security situation surrounding GERENDE and his many activities is the fact that LIPSTICKS 12 and 30 (two of the LIPSTICK Team members arrested in the June 1958 flap) know GERENDE by true name, and knew that he also worked for KUBARK. In fact, LIPSTICK-30 is a close personal friend of GERENDE's and was originally recommended for KUBARK employment by GERENDE. The operational security hypothesis that can be constructed from these existing acquaintances are too numerous to list in this brief review; suffice to say that should GERENDE be arrested by one of the local police agencies, most of the remaining support assets would be destroyed or so seriously compromised that the Station would indeed be foolish to continue using them. It is appropriate to state here, however, that neither GERENDE nor the Station believes that GERENDE has yet been named or otherwise identified as a result of the LIPSTICK flap. It is granted though that any future questions by one of the local police agencies to the compromised LIPSTICKERS represents a continuing type of danger for GERENDE. Based on the duties which GERENDE is currently performing, the readers of this review can well imagine what the consequences to several operations would be if GERENDE were arrested by one of the local police agencies and interrogated in detail. Also, the Station must forever be aware that the local police agencies are certainly capable, for only a few dollars, of selling information concerning KUBARK to the Soviets and/or Satellites.

d. Recommendations - It would be unwise to consider terminating GERENDE since he is a highly competent agent and since his termination would not eliminate the fact that he knows a great deal about the Station's support operations. He has been reminded several times, and the Case Officer will continue to remind him, that his tradecraft professionalism must improve and stay ahead of the increasing sophistication of the local police agencies and opposition services operating in Mexico.

It is the opinion of the Station that GERENDE should continue to be used in about the same manner that he is presently being used. It would be advisable, however, to separate him from the two LIFEAT functions he is currently handling, BGMORNING and the Cuban Exile taps. This is suggested not only because of the possible future security ramifications, but also because GERENDE does not have time to run properly his support mechanism and to monitor taps seven days a week.

To provide for a situation whereby one of the local police agencies becomes aware of GERENDE's illegal activities and assuming that either GERENDE or the Station learns of this before the local police agency can take positive action, it is imperative that a warning system of communications be established to facilitate GERENDE's removal from Mexico. Arrangements such as those used for Wilfred O. CLOWER could be set up or local arrangements could be made with ODUNIT or ODOATH for a more expeditious exit from Mexico. The Case Officer will develop this plan in detail.

4. OPERATIONS

a. Limited

(1) Target - Stationary photographic surveillance of persons entering and leaving the LIMERICK installation.

(2) Personnel - LIPSTICK-14 is the agent in charge of the LIMITED Base. According to GERENDE, LIPSTICK-14 is conscientious, security minded, speaks no English, and on occasion is a bit over confident. He performs his operational duties competently and with discretion. In addition to his photographic duties, he is also used occasionally as a one-man

foot surveillance to follow individuals leaving the LIMERICK installation, LIPSTICK-14 receives a monthly salary of $1,800.00 (MN) and free rent and utilities at the LIMITED Base. His wife (LIPSTICK-27) and son (LIPSTICK-28) live with him at the LIMITED Base.

LIPSTICK-28 until 15 July 1958 assisted his father with photographic work at the LIMITED Base. However, on the above date he decided to resign from his LIMITED job and, strange as it may seem, to devote full time to working on a chicken farm. LIPSTICK-28 made this decision on his own and against the wishes of his father. He will continue to live at the LIMITED Base and it is believed that no security problems will result, since any security difficulties could adversely affect his mother and father. Although LIPSTICK-28 has been terminated and a termination report forwarded to Headquarters, it is suggested that we maintain his operational approval since he continues to live in the LIMITED Base.

(3) Communications - At the present time GERENDE meets with LIPSTICK-14 three times a week at contact points away from the Base. They have seven separate contact points which are used for their meetings. Usually the place of contact is pre-arranged at the previous meeting; however, a rapid means of communication exists whereby GERENDE telephones LIPSTICK-14 and through a pre-arranged open code, utilizing insurance policy numbers, sets the time and place of contact. LIPSTICK-14's overt occupation is that of an insurance salesman and adjuster; consequently, there is a cover basis for such a telephonic conversation. A reserve system of communication with LIPSTICK-14 has not yet been arranged. GERENDE has been instructed to do this as soon as possible, thereby giving the Station a means to contact LIPSTICK-14 directly should the need ever arise.

(4) Security - Excluding KUBARK staff personnel, the LIMITED Base is known to LIPSTICKS-2, 14, 27 and 28 and to Oliver G. SCANTLING and Raymond H. GERENDE and possibly to LIPSTICK-12 (GERENDE's opinion). Since LIPSTICK-14 has known LIMEWATER (LIFEAT Project) for many years and since LIMEWATER is LIPSTICK-2's brother, it is important to recognize that the desirable degree of compartmentation between LIPSTICK/LIMITED and LIFEAT probably does not exist. Although LIMEWATER must be aware of LIPSTICK-14's and 2's PBPRIME employment, it has not been possible to ascertain the extent of LIMEWATER's knowledge about their specific activities, and vice versa. LIPSTICK-14

worked with James O. AYCALL (LIMESTONE) during WW-II; however, he claims that the only members of AYCALL's family that he ever met was AYCALL's "alleged wife." Since she saw him only one time many years ago, LIPSTICK-14 does not believe that she would recognize him now.

Neither GERENDE nor LIPSTICK-14 are aware that KUBARK owns the LIMITED Base House. The extent of their knowledge is that LIMOUSINE is the owner and we simply rent from him.

(5) Recommendations - It is recommended that GERENDE continue to meet with LIPSTICK-14 and to supervise his operation. In this connection, GERENDE has been instructed to reorganize his existing communications arrangements with LIPSTICK-14 to include a new regular system, a rapid non-scheduled system and a reserve system. Also, GERENDE is to review with LIPSTICK-14 their cover reasons for meeting and knowing each other and to be prepared to use this cover story should they ever be apprehended together.

LIPSTICK-14 was instructed on 8 August 1958 to cease all social and business contact with LIPSTICK-2. Oliver G. SCANTLING, who has previously handled LIPSTICK-14 and sees him occasionally even now, has been directed to cease all contact with the LIMITED Base and LIPSTICK-14 except when approved by the Case Officer. (NOTE: It is necessary at times for SCANTLING to debrief LIPSTICK-14 for LIMESA leads).

b. LILYRIC

(1) Target - Stationary photographic surveillance of persons entering and leaving the LIMERICK installations.

(2) Personnel - LIJERSEY-5 is personnel manager of a Mexican affiliate of a large PBPRIME company. In addition to serving as a spotter for potential surveillance team members, he also serves as the cutout for the LILYRIC Base. GERENDE manages and directs the LILYRIC Base through LIJERSEY-5. LIJERSEY-5 maintains direct contact with LIJERSEY-2, the Base House operator, and his wife, LIJERSEY-12, who does most of the photographic work. LIJERSEY-5 is a PBPRIME citizen. He is paid a monthly salary of $1,000.00 (MN).

LIJERSEY-2 is the LILYRIC Base operator. He is a Captain in the Mexican Army Reserve and is also employed by Colgate-Palmolive Peet Company as an industrial engineer. He receives a monthly salary of $1,000.00 (MN) and he and his wife live rent and utilities free in the LILYRIC Base.

LIJERSEY-12 is the wife of LIJERSEY-2. She does most of the photographic and reporting work at the LILYRIC Base and has proven herself to be a capable and worthwhile asset. It has been necessary for her to become proficient in the LILYRIC work since her husband works at his regular job during the day. She receives a monthly salary of $800.00 (MN).

(3) Communications - GERENDE contacts LIJERSEY-5 twice weekly at prearranged contact points during the late afternoon hours. LIJERSEY-5 contacts LIJERSEY-2 two to three times weekly at prearranged car contact points and receives the "take" from the LILYRIC Base. On occasion GERENDE has contacted LIJERSEY-2 directly, but this procedure is used only when LIJERSEY-5 is out of town or otherwise not available. GERENDE does not know LIJERSEY-12 or vice versa. No reserve system of communications exists whereby a Station officer could contact LIJERSEY-2 directly should the need arise; however, GERENDE has been instructed to set up such a system of communications. The same will be done with LIJERSEY-5, although he is known to several Station officers and little difficulty would be experienced in contacting him directly.

(4) Security - The security of the LILYRIC Base appears, at least on paper, to be in better shape than the Limited or LICALLA Bases. Insofar as the Case Officer has been able to determine, the only indigenous agents aware of the LILYRIC Base are GERENDE, LIJERSEYS 2, 5 and 12, and LIPSTICKS 38 and 40, and all of these individuals have a close connection with the operation of the Base. The only tie-in the LILYRIC Base has with the LIPSTICK operations is through GERENDE.

(5) Recommendations - GERENDE has been instructed to change his meeting plans with LIJERSEY-5 and to review the communications set-up between LIJERSEY-5 and LIJERSEY-2 (L-5 and L-2 are long-time friends and, consequently, the cover problem is minimized). A staggered schedule of coverage of the LIMERICK target between LILYRIC and LIMITED was initiated on 18 August 1958. Although the operators of these two bases are unaware of the existence of the other, a suitable cover story has been worked out to satisfy any

curiosity that LIPSTICK-14 and LIJERSEYS-2 and 12 may have. This procedure is believed desirable due to the confining nature of the photographic tasks and the lack of additional personnel to assist at each of the bases. Also, this staggered schedule of coverage should reduce some of the duplication presently coming in from the two bases.

c. LICALLA

(1) Target - Stationary photographic surveillance of persons and activities in the garden area of the LIMERICK installation.

(2) Personnel - LIPSTICK-39, his wife and three small children live at the LICALLA Base. He is an accountant for a local bus line and works at his cover job in the evenings. LIPSTICK-39 does an excellent and conscientious job of photographic coverage at the LICALLA Base. In addition to the photos he takes, he writes a narrative description of the events which take place in the target's garden area. He receives a monthly salary of $2,000.00 (MN) and free rent at the LICALLA Base.

(3) Communications - GERENDE meets LIPSTICK-39 twice weekly, usually on Tuesdays and Thursdays. They have four contact points, one of which is selected at each meeting for use for the next meeting. In the event that contact is not established, GERENDE has the initiative in contacting LIPSTICK-39 by phoning him at the bus line office during the evenings. Then, by prearranged open code, a meeting site and time are agreed on. Since Oliver G. SCANTLING is also acquainted with LIPSTICK-39, it would be possible to contact him through SCANTLING should something happen to GERENDE. However, to facilitate proper and secure communications procedures, GERENDE has been directed to establish a reserve system of communications with Lipstick-39, using the customary oral and physical bonafides.

(4) Security - The most serious security problem concerning LICALLA is the fact that LIPSTICK-39 is the brother of LIPSTICK-47 (the first agent arrested by the local police agency during the recent LIPSTICKflap). Although it is generally believed by Station officers that LIPSTICK-39's name was not mentioned by LIPSTICK-47 nor that any indication was given concerning LIPSTICK-39's job, it must be understood that should the local police agency decide later to interrogate LIPSTICK-47, the probability exists of compromising LIPSTICK-39 and LICALLA. The Station sees no way to overcome this possibility.

It is important to note here that LICALLA occupies one of the four LIMUST properties. While it is believed that LIPSTICK-39 does not know that KUBARK owns the Base or has anything to do with the other three houses, it is entirely conceivable that should one of the local police agencies or the LIMERICK personnel become aware of LICALLA activities, they could very easily arrive at some logical conclusions about all of the LIMUST property. This would be detrimental, if not fatal, to our aims. However, another Station viewpoint on this same problem is that if compromised, LICALLA would divert suspicion from, rather than to, LIMUST. Should one of the local police agencies begin an investigation which might involve LIMUST and LICALLA, then LICALLA could be sacrificed to protect the LIMUST Base. These possibilities become somewhat theoretical and perhaps impractical due to the lack of predictibility of the local police agencies, but nevertheless must be weighed one against the other.

In view of the apparent importance of the LIMESA/LIMUST operation a lot of thought and discussion have transpired at the Station about continuing the LICALLA operation in its present location or suspending it for the immediate future and attempting to find another suitable location away from the LIMUST property. A sound argument can be made for terminating the base since such an alternative might have the effect of limiting any knowledge LIPSTICK-39 may have about the LIMESA/LIMUST installation. However, the termination of a productive base such as LICALLA would require an explanation to LIPSTICK-39 which could not help but leave him a bit suspicious. For Headquarters information, the local rental laws are such that LIPSTICK-39 would not be able to comprehend why we did not insist on him maintaining "squatters rights" (as stated previously, LIPSTICK-39 apparently does not know that we own LICALLA or even have an interest in any of the other LIMUST properties) which can easily be done in Mexico. Therefore, any attempt to terminate LICALLA might cause more of a security problem with LIPSTICK-39 than permitting LICALLA to operate as it is now. Another possibility would be terminating LIPSTICK-39 and putting another agent in the present LICALLA Base. If this measure were followed, it would not eliminate the fact that LIPSTICK-39, even if terminated, would still know of the existance of the present LICALLA Base. Still another possibility would be to terminate LIPSTICK-39 and the LICALLA Base; however, since LICALLA and the other LIMUST properties are ostensibly owned by one man, LIMOUSINE, suspicions and investigations could still lead to LIMUST.

(5) Recommendations - The Station is inclined not to "rock the

boat" at this stage of the game and suggests that we maintain LICALLA at its present location and with its present operator, LIPSTICK-39. One alternative appears to be about as good as another in this case, and it is an acknowledged fact that LICALLA, at its present location, is a worthwhile and productive asset. Headquarters ideas and comments on the LICALLA Base would be appreciated.

At the present time it is planned to move LIPSTICK-39 and family to a furnished apartment when the time comes to remodel the LICALLA Base. After completion of the remodeling, LIPSTICK-39 and family will return to the present LICALLA Base.

d. PHOTO TRUCK

(1) Target - Investigative asset used for taking surreptitious photographs of persons, places and things that are from time to time of interest to the Station and Headquarters.

(2) Personnel - LIPSTICK-2, as indicated by the low numerical designation of his cryptonym, has been employed by KUBARK for several years. At the present time LIPSTICK-2 is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the photographic surveillance truck. He is also used occasionally to spot and rent operational apartments. In the past, LIPSTICK-2 has served as team leader of a low level surveillance team (which was compromised and subsequently disbanded), as a LIFEAT line inspector (when he was not busy with the photo truck), and as a static surveillance man (i.e., used as an outside sentry during the March 1958 entry of the LIMUST Base by KUTUBE/D, KURIOT and KUCLUB technicians. (NOTE: LIPSTICK-2 was assigned the task of watching the entire area during the day for any unusual activity on the part of target personnel. He was not told that he was to watch a specific house. He was dismissed from his static surveillance before dusk and the Headquarters technicians did not enter LIMUST until after 2030 hours.) LIPSTICK-2 is the brother of LIMEWATER (LIFEAT Project) and LIPSTICK-34 (LIPSTICK Surveillance team member) is LIPSTICK-2's wife's nephew. LIPSTICK-2's cover is buying and selling cars; however, about the only business he has in this connection is when he buys and sells cars for KUBARK. His cover is quite weak. He receives a monthly salary of $3,200.00 (MN) plus $600.00 (MN) per month for the use of his personal car.

LIPSTICK-24 does not know GERENDE and, presumably, knows only LIPSTICK-2, with whom he works on the photo truck. His cover is as a salesman of electrical appliances; however, he does not pursue his cover job to the desirable extent. LIPSTICK-24 was recruited by LIPSTICK-2 about one year ago and is currently receiving a salary of $1,000.00 (MN) per month. Since he has now worked a year for the Station, and performed satisfactorily, his salary should be raised to $1,200.00 (MN) per month (LIEMPTY will provide for this increase).

(3) Communications - GERENDE meets LIPSTICK-2 two to three times a week. These meetings are arranged by phone and take place at previously selected contact points which can be referred to in telephonic conversations by innocent sounding code names. LIPSTICK-2 also knows GERENDE's true name, where he lives, and his phone number. In the past he has had occasion to telephone GERENDE at the latter's home. LIPSTICK-2 knows DINGLEY, and could, in an emergency situation, contact DINGLEY. However, GERENDE has been instructed to arrange a complete communications plan with LIPSTICK-2, including a reserve means of contact. For security reasons, GERENDE has been instructed to inform LIPSTICK-2 that his only contact is with GERENDE and that in the future he is not to contact anyone else in the organization without GERENDE's permission. Also, that should contact with GERENDE be disrupted, he is to await for the higher echelon to establish contact with him (all agents under GERENDE are being so instructed). This is particularly important in the case of Lipstick-2, since he has by-passed GERENDE in two or three instances in the past.

(4) Security - Probably the most serious security situation involving the photo truck, LIPSTICK-2 and Lipstick-24 is the basic knowledge of the LIPSTICK surveillance team that such an asset exists, even to the point that one of the team members (LIPSTICK-34) is the listed owner of the photo truck. The personal knowledge of LIPSTICK-2 about the LIFEAT operation also represents a security hazard of the first class. For example, if LIPSTICK-2 were compromised and arrested as a result of his activities, there is a possibility that he could compromise his brother, LIMEWATER, the LIMITED Base and LIPSTICK-14, GERENDE and our interest in the highly sensitive LIMESA/LIMUST operation. (NOTE: According to the LIFEAT Case Officer and the former LIPSTICK Case Officer, both LIMEWATER and LIPSTICK-2 have been reminded on several occasions during the past few years that they were not to discuss any aspect of their operations with each other. Also, LIPSTICK-2, to the best of the Station's

knowledge, does not know the location of any of the LIFEAT Base houses).

A new truck should be purchased as soon as possible to replace the present truck. The new truck should be purchased in an assumed name and vehicle papers should list an untraceable address. LIPSTICK-2 has already been informed that he is to have no contact with LIPSTICK-14 or any other operational personnel he may know except, of course, LIPSTICK-24, with whom he works, and GERENDE, who supervises his activities. In addition to the above, the Station should begin thinking about a replacement agent for LIPSTICK-2 and every effort should be made to set up an independent and compartmented photo truck operation. This would permit the eventual termination of LIPSTICK-2, after we have given him several months to reduce his knowledge of current operations.

d. LIJERSEY

(1) Target - Foot surveillance and investigative support of other Station operations.

(2) Personnel - LIJERSEY-4 is of a low social class and lives with his mother in a slum area of Mexico City. He is the sole support for his mother and several younger brothers and sisters. He is described by GERENDE as having a lot of ambition and a strong desire to improve his standard of living and position in life. The Station has found him to be a good observer and, consequently, adequate for static surveillance work. Although he now has his drivers license, he is not a capable driver and probably will never develop into one. GERENDE has been encouraging LIJERSEY-4 to obtain employment as a salesman to supplement his KUBARK income of $1,000.00 (MN) and to establish himself in a cover job. However, LIJERSEY-4 has not yet obtained such employment. It is the Station's opinion that LIJERSEY-4 is definitely an asset of limited value and will never develop into the high-calibre surveillance asset which the Station really needs.

LIJERSEY-8's situation is about the same as LIJERSEY-4's. He lives with his family and is currently taking highschool courses (LIJERSEY-4 is doing the same). He is not an imaginative talker and has difficulty making up cover stories and spur-of-the-moment excuses and explanations - the vital qualifications for a good surveillance man. He is the best driver of the three LIJERSEY team members and with more practice will probably develop into a capable and dependable driver. LIJERSEY-8 has recently shown a commendable amount of initiative where his cover situation is concerned. He has obtained a job as a commission salesman for UNDERWOOD typewriters and, according to GERENDE, is making a substantial amount of "pin" money. However, as in the case of LIJERSEY-4, LIJERSEY-8 is at best an asset of only limited value. LIJERSEY-8 also receives a salary of $1,000.00 (MN) per month.

LIJERSEY-13 does not know LIJERSEYS-4 and 8 and vice versa. LIJERSEY-13 is better dressed than the other two team members and can pass as a better educated and more socially flexible individual. He speaks fairly good English. He performs pretext investigation assignments with facility and imagination and is adept at making up cover stories. In brief, he makes a good impression on the people he interviews. He is not a good driver and is too nervous to develop into one. His salary is $1,000.00 (MN) per month.

(3) Communications - GERENDE has daily contact arrangements with the three LIJERSEYS. Prearranged meeting places are used on designated days of each week and the LIJERSEYS are instructed to go to each meeting. They have standing instructions to continue going to their meeting sites for two weeks; if they have not been contacted during that period of time, they can discontinue their communications plan and await contact by GERENDE or another appropriately selected agent at their respective homes. None of the LIJERSEYS have home telephones; hence, it is impossible to arrange any type of communications using this means. GERENDE is currently in the process of setting up new and more complete communications arrangements with the three LIJERSEYS.

(4) Security - Insofar as knowledge of other operations, personnel and assets is concerned, the LIJERSEYS appear to have the best security of any of the operations handled by GERENDE. New communications plans with the LIJERSEYS will do much toward increasing security and ability to meet contingencies. GERENDE will be instructed to give refresher training to all three LIJERSEYS in operational security, cover and communications. The major danger existing with the LIJERSEY team, and with any surveillance team, is the possibility of compromise and arrest by one of the local police agencies. Should this happen, GERENDE and his other operations would be placed in considerable danger.

For this reason, it is not advisable to have GERENDE connected with a surveillance team and also contacting and directing the sensitive photo base houses. Therefore, until such time as a suitable asset can be developed or acquired to take over the LIJERSEY team, their actual surveillance assignments will be kept at the minimum.

(5) Recommendations - It is suggested that the LIJERSEY framework be used for the recruitment of at least three competent and higher class local nationals for use on surveillance assignments. After the recruitment of such individuals, it may be suggested that LIJERSEYS-4 and 8 be terminated. LIJERSEY-13 should remain as an independent investigative asset to conduct "credit" and other type of inquiries which he can do without help from other agents. LIJERSEY-5 has already been asked to spot prospective candidates of a higher social standing for use on a new surveillance team; however, even under optimum conditions, one and a half years will be required to get such a team functioning. In order to recruit the type of team member that will be most worthwhile to the Station, we must plan to pay a minimum starting salary of $1,600.00 (MN) per month. The cost of living in Mexico is continually on the rise and where $1,000.00 (MN) was a good salary one to two years ago, it really is not adequate today.

f. LIFEAT

(1) Target - Conversations coming from two telephone taps, BGMORNING and Cuban exiles.

(2) Personnel - GERENDE lives in the apartment where these two lines are maintained. He personally processes the take from the lines and passes it to OUSLER for Station dissemination to Robert B. RIGGS (BGMORNING) and Calude K. Shyrock (Cubans). GERENDE, in accordance with LIFEAT procedures, is supposed to remain in this apartment seven days a week. However, this is impossible due to his other operational assignments and activities.

(3) Communications - GERENDE meets daily with OUSLER to pass the LIFEAT "take" and to discuss other operational matters.

(4) Security - It is not a good security practice to have a LIFEAT monitor working on anything except LIFEAT. Other duties, which GERENDE certainly has, limit one's capability for maintaining the required security alertness for telephone

repairmen and others who might accidentally discover one of our LIFEAT taps. Also, should GERENDE be compromised through any of his other operations, it is conceivable that the ECMORNING and Cuban Exiles LIFEAT taps would be discovered by one of the local police agencies.

(5) Recommendations - It is suggested that a replacement be found as soon as possible to relieve GERENDE of his present LIFEAT duties.

g. LICOOL-7

(1) Target - A planned technical installation against a person of interest to the Station and to Headquarters.

(2) Personnel - LIMITATION-5 and his wife, LIMITATION-6, are the LICOOL-7 Base House operators. LIMITATION-5 has been with KUBARK for several years. He was at one time the LIAXIOM Base House operator. He presently works for the DuPont Company. He dresses well, speaks some English and could be described as belonging to the rising middle class of Mexicans. His wife can do photographic work and has had previous experience with KUBARK in the dispatching of car surveillances by radio. LIMITATIONS-5 and 6 are not participating in any active work pending the installation of LICOOL-7 in their apartment. LIMITATION-5 receives a monthly salary of $[illegible]00.00 (MN) and LIMITATION-6 receives $400.00 (MN) monthly.

(3) Communications - A complete communications plan does not exist between GERENDE and LIMITATION-5. At the present time it is only necessary for GERENDE to see LIMITATION-5 on pay day and when Harvey C. MULFORD desires to visit the apartment for technical surveys and other work. Therefore, GERENDE and LIMITATION-5 utilize an open code telephonic means of getting together. So far, this has worked quite well, but it will be necessary later to set up a more sophisticated communications system.

(4) Security - The operational aspects of LICOOL-7 are under the jurisdiction of Matthew S. DINGLEY; therefore, the author of this report is not familiar with the security ramifications, if any, surrounding this technical installation and the agents operating it.

(5) Recommendations - None.

h. MISCELLANEOUS

Also on the payroll as worthwhile assets are GERENDE's brother-in-law, LIPSTICK-38, and his sister, LIPSTICK-40. GERENDE and LIPSTICK-38 process and print all the LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA and truck photos. LIPSTICK-40 does non-sensitive translation work for the Station. Both LIPSTICKS-38 and 40 are handled by GERENDE. They do not have contact with other agents or with station officers. LIPSTICK-38 receives a monthly salary of $1,000.00 (MN). LIPSTICK-40 receives the equivalent or $1.75 U. S. in pesos per hour for her work.

Although it is not adviseable from the security point of view to have any indigenous agent aware of all three of our LIMERICK photographic bases and the photo truck, the load on the Station photographer several months ago resulted in just such a solution to the problem. Previously, GERENDE and LIPSTICK-38 had processed only the photographs from LIMITED, LILYRIC and the truck.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations have been included in several sections of this paper. These same recommendations, excepting those which have already been carried out or are in the process of implementation, are listed below in a composite form to facilitate the readers' overall comprehension.

a. Continue the reorganization of communication arrangements with all agents.

b. Relieve GERENDE of his LIFEAT duties (BGMORNING and Cuban Exiles taps) as soon as possible.

c. Continue to use GERENDE for the time being as the principal agent in charge of LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA, the Photo Truck, LIJERSEY, LIMITATIONS-5 and 6, and LIPSTICKS 38 and 40.

d. Arrange a warning system of communications for removing GERENDE to PBPRIME should he be compromised to one of the local police agencies.

e. Purchase a new photo truck for use by LIPSTICKS 2 and 24.

f. Begin planning for a compartmented photo truck operation which will later permit termination of LIPSTICK-2.

g. Spot and recruit at least three indigenous agents from the middle class social level to form the nucleus of a new LIJERSEY surveillance team.

h. Eventually separate GERENDE from either LIJERSEY surveillance team duties or the three photographic base houses, preferably the former. The two types of activities are not compatible with each other and should not be handled by the same principal agent.

i. Implied, but not specifically stated elsewhere in this paper, is the suggestion that GERENDE be given a "cooling off" and training period of two to three months in PBPRIME. Of course, this will not be possible until other assets are developed to take over GERENDE's present duties. After his return from PBPRIME, GERENDE could be used to develop new support assets which would be completely compartmented from all of his previous operations, personnel and activities.

6. CONCLUSIONS

It would take several weeks of uninterrupted study of files to write a really comprehensive security review of GERENDE's operations and activities. However, based on the facts contained in this paper, it is the Station's opinion that GERENDE probably is not now known to the local police agencies as a KUBARK or PBPRIME agent. It is believed that GERENDE could be identified by the local police agencies at any time they choose to interrogate LIPSTICKS-12 and 30 in detail or when one of the other agent assets formerly or currently associated with GERENDE is compromised. Furthermore, if GERENDE is arrested, he could compromise most of the Station's support assets, plus the BGMORNING and Cuban Exiles portions of LIFEAT.

Given several months time, the slow process of compartmentation can be introduced into GERENDE's operations. Such compartmentation, however, will never reach the truly desirable point, but some improvement over the existing situation can be made. If GERENDE can emerge basically unscathed from the current incidents, then KUBARK will have an extremely valuable long-range support asset.

Quinton N. OUSLER

21 October 1958

SECRET

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF RAMOND H. GERENDE'S ACTIVITIES

SECRET


GERENDE
LICOOL-7
LIMITATION-5
LIMITATION-6
PHOTO PROCESSING & TRANSLATIONS
LIPSTICK-38
LIPSTICK-NC
..LA
-34
LILYRIC
LIJERSEY-2
LIJERSEY-5
LIJERSEY-2
LIMITED
LIPSTICK-14
LIPSTICK-54
LIPSTICK-23
PHOTO TRUCK
LIPSTICK-2
LIPSTICK-24
LIJERSEY
LIJERSEY-4
LIJERSEY-8
LIJERSEY-12
58

SECRET

TO: Chief, WH Division	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. 50-6-23/3
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE 23 July 1958
SUBJECT: Operational, Security Security Review of Project LIPSTICK	RE: "X" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: HQS Comments on proposals in Paragraph 7	

REFERENCES:

A. MEXI 1743
B. MEXI-1765
C. MEXI-1771

1. References outlined the arrest of LIPSTICK-47, the subsequent arrests of LIPSTICKs 12 and 30, their interrogation by the Mexican Secret Service and their eventual release from prison. References truly portrayed the incident with the following exceptions:

a. None of the arrested men was tortured.

b. LIPSTICK-45 was never arrested.

c. Only LIPSTICK 12, 30 and 47 were arrested.

d. LIPSTICK-29 was not taken from his home by force. In fact he was never arrested.

2. While under detention the arrested men told the story as it appears in Attachment A which was written by LIPSTICK-30. It is not believed that the men told anything more because:

a. The substance of the story was told to Station Mexico identically by three (3) separate and compartmented sources, i.e. from the arrested men, from the attorney, Raul F. [illegible], and from the Counselor of Canadian Embassy, Sidney [illegible].

b. Each operation mentioned in Attachment A, which was susceptible to a check by the Secret Service, was investigated by them. However, no operation not mentioned in Attachment A was investigated by the Secret Service.

c. LIPSTICK-47, who had only been with the team about one and a half months and who did most of the talking, did not know any information other than that in Attachment A.

d. LIPSTICK-12 and 30, who knew considerably more about our operations, are both made of sterner stuff than LIPSTICK-47 and have keener minds.

e. The "ring of truth" that Attachment A has. It is not believed that the Secret Service is sufficiently sophisticated to concoct such a believable story.

f. The combined opinion of every Case Officer who has known LIPSTICK-12 and 30 that they did not reveal any information other than that contained in Attachment A.

g. On 10 July 1958 LIPSTICK-12 and 30 were examined by Martin F. REMALEY on LCFLUTTER. REMALEY was satisfied that the results of this examination completely exonerated LIPSTICK-12 and 30 from any cooperation with the Mexican Police. The results of these tests are attached as Attachment B.

3. In order to assess what possible damage might have been done to Station Mexico's operations if the arrested men had told the Secret Service everything they knew, there follows a list of those operations known to the arrested men:

a. LIPSTICK-47 did not know anything more than he told the Secret Service as outlined in Attachment A.

FORM 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

b. LIPSTICK-12:

(1) He was recruited by LIMITATION ~~and knows~~ that he works for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacity LIMITATION is employed.

(2) He knows that LIQUATION, LIMITATION-3 and LIMITATION-6 work for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacities they work.

(3) He knows the true names of Thomas G. [illegible], Edward P. [illegible], Matthew B. DINGLEY, Oliver G. SCANTLING, Wilfred O. CLOWER, Raymond S. GERENDE, Harvey P. DENENHOLTZ, Boyd I. ROLINGER and Clyde K. SERVOCK.

(4) He knows all of the details of the FUSARIC 9 and [illegible] operations.

(5) He participated in the raid on Alfredo Guerra Borges' apartment.

(6) He knows of LIPSTICK Car #4 (photo truck).

(7) He knows all of the present LIPSTICK surveillance team and LIPSTICK-2 and 14 who used to be with the team.

(8) Through surveillance, he knows of the following operations:

LIARONE
LIJAG
LIAXIOM
Roland Abbiate (Francois Rossi)
[illegible]
Alfred Kaufman & Martha Dodd Stern
LIVESTOCK-3
LIVESTOCK-1
Samuel Brooks
Maurice Halperin
9 indigenous employees of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] (Michael ROUX & Jose Maria RIBEIRO Antunes
Surveillance of various officials of the Partido Comunista Mexicano
Surveillance of various Soviet officials. He probably knows of the existence of the LIMITED base since this base dispatched the radio cars on surveillance of Soviet officials.
Samuel RODRIGUEZ Rodriguez - individual who desired to purchase the LIMITED base.

c. LIPSTICK-30:

(1) He was recruited by Raymond S. GERENDE. He knows that GERENDE works for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacity.

(2) He knows the true names of Thomas G. [illegible], Edward P. SECHEN, Matthew B. DINGLEY, Wilfred O. CLOWER, Oliver G. SCANTLING, and Harvey P. DENENHOLTZ.

(3) He participated in the raid on the apartment of Alfredo Guerra Borges.

(4) He knows of the LIPSTICK #4 vehicle (photo truck).

DISPATCH | SECRET/KAPOK | [illegible]

TO

INFO

FROM

SUBJECT

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCES

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.

DATE

(CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

- 3 -

(5) He knows all of the present LIPSTICK team and LIPSTICK-12 and 14.

(6) Through surveillance, he has learned of all the operations as listed in the case of LIPSTICK-2.

4. At the present time the LIPSTICK team is inoperative. The team members are working at their various cover jobs and writing a critique on the surveillance techniques they used which caused these three to be arrested.

Matthew S. DINGLEY has stopped all sensitive contacts and turned them over to Quinton N. CUSLER as a precautionary measure should DINGLEY be under surveillance. DINGLEY continues to see LIPSTICK-30 who now administers the team, and DINGLEY also continues to be the case officer for LIVEROCK.

LIPSTICK-47 has been fired and the LIPSTICK offices have been vacated and the furniture stored in a public warehouse. With the excellent cooperation of Nogales and Monterrey Bases, Wilfred O. GAMER was smuggled out of Mexico.

5. Future planning for the LIPSTICK team will depend upon the results of operational tests and additional defective reassessment based upon the actions of the team and the results obtained. General Miguel MOLINAR Simondi, Chief of the Mexican Secret Service, has agreed to protect the team fully and assume responsibility for their actions for the sum of $240.00 U.S. per month. MOLINAR has also promised to issue the team credentials from the Secret Service, or some other official investigative group, after the presidential inauguration in November of 1958. The future of the LIPSTICK team will depend upon the following factors:

a. It is not believed that the Secret Service demanded, nor even suggested, that the team report future activities to the Secret Service. (Test leads, susceptible of checking, will be given to the LIPSTICK team to determine if they are being reported to the Secret Service).

b. Degree of access to Secret Service files given to the LIPSTICK team.

c. Effectiveness of General MOLINAR's protection.

7. Station Mexico recommends that the LIPSTICK team be allowed to continue operations for a period of three months at which time a reassessment will be made based upon the evidence accumulated over that period of time. The reassessment will be concerned mainly with whether or not the team is really under the control of the Secret Service and the degree of success of their "penetration" of the Secret Service.

Willard C. Curtis

Encls.
MSD/bct
22 July 1958
Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

FORM 10-57 53 | USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. | CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK | ☐ CONTINUED | PAGE NO. 3

6 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Mexico

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE

REFERENCE: HMMA-11368

1. This dispatch represents the type of operational reporting we need. I think any answer to the Station should lead off with an expression of appreciation for a good job. Maybe it will encourage them to write more of this type.

2. GERENDE is very exposed and should be taken off some of his jobs at once. Specifically, my ideas are as follows:

3. Re para. 3 a, agent is very capable and should be retained if secure means can be found. Getting rid of him would not solve the problem. As long as he is in Mexico he is vulnerable. Some thought should be given to how he would be supported in the event of arrest. Personally, I believe the Station would do better to sacrifice a case officer than permit things to drag on to the point where GERENDE might tell all to the police.

Recommendations:

a. GERENDE be briefed so as to be ever ready with an innocuous story to tell the police in the event of arrest.

b. GERENDE be told to contact one of already blown Station officers like HAZLETT in the event of arrest and that the Station officer be ready to appear personally at police station to free GERENDE. If the case officer named for this duty and GERENDE both know the innocuous cover story, there should be little problem. I have done it myself. A good cover story is "looking for draft dodgers" or some such tale which does not have implications of working against Mexican citizens.

c. That if not allowed to communicate directly GERENDE should tell the senior officer present at police station that he works on (cover story) for HAZLETT and insists HAZLETT be sent for.

d. That a second blown case officer's name be given as an alternate for HAZLETT, who is often out of town and unavailable.

e. That GERENDE be taken off LIFEAT at once and all suspicious audio equipment be removed from his home or offices. At present, LIFEAT is the only illegal activity being engaged in by GERENDE; if he is made merely in connection with his physical surveillance activities he is not likely to be hurt by the Mexicans.

f. Concur preparations should be made to hide out GERENDE if it is known he is to be arrested.

4. Re para. 4 a, GERENDE's participation in LIMITED is O. K. I believe no law is being broken. However, LIMITED is probably blown to the Soviets. Here is the more real danger. Station should find out who is the registered owner of the phone at LIMITED. Prior to leaving Mexico I noted to MAHONEY it was still held in the name of LIMESTONE-3 (now fired and hence a possible threat).

5. Re para. 4 b: This is the same situation as LIMITED but not so likely blown to the Soviets. There is no reason why GERENDE should not continue this work.

6. Re para. 4 c, LICALLA is a very special problem and should be taken up at once with Headquarters elements working on LIMESA/LIMUST. I thought LICALLA had been cancelled out when LIMESA began to shape up. I consider it a danger to LIMESA. Has LICALLA produced anything of value? I think we could vacate this in such a way that the agents in LICALLA would have no cause to be suspicious. (Put an obvious tail on the agent, scare him off, etc. This would throw off the Mexican police, too, in the event they are already wise to LICALLA through LIPSTICK 47. We could pretend to believe the Soviets ran the tail and the game is up.)

Recommendation: Get rid of LICALLA unless very productive. Better do this before the remodeling begins.

7. Re para 4 d, photo truck. LIPSTICK-2 does know of the locations of some of the basehouses on LIFEAT since he was a line inspector.

Recommendations:

a. New compartmented truck should be set up. Don't use false names and addresses. It could result in great harm.

b. LIPSTICK-2 be sent off to some small town as "resident agent" for general work and to get him out of the area.

8. Re para. 4 e. I have no particular thoughts on LIJERSEY but think it consistent for GERENDE to handle it.

9. Re para. 4 f: GERENDE should be taken off LIFEAT at once, even if it means losing lines. As of March this year the Station had enough agent personnel to handle bases for 24 lines. They should be able to fill the gap even though LIMESTONE-3 and his tribe were fired. Only 12 lines are now being handled (latest report). The way GERENDE is handling his LIFEAT work seems to be breaking all the rules we set up inseven years of experience.

10. Re para. 4 g, LICOOL-7. I see no harm in GERENDE's handling the operational aspect of this case. But through LIMITATION-5 the police could get back to LIMITATION and the main LIMERICK tap, that is, if they were able to make GERENDE talk before we could save him. The danger to LIMITATION was not brought out in the Station's survey.

11. In re para. 5, recommendations -

a. Approve.

b. Get him off LIFEAT right now.

c. Concur, but liquidate LICALLA.

d. This needs some discussion. What do we do with GERENDE in the U. S.?

e. Concur.

f. Concur with reservation noted above.

g. O. K.

h. I don't see why he can't handle all these jobs since they are physical surveillances.

i. Not a bad idea.

12. Final observations:

a. What is GERENDE's cover?

b. We must be sure he is not overworked. Sloppy work has resulted from people being overworked.

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5760

201-119523

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

24 DEC 57 13 01

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. CLARDE

ACTION REQUESTED: Sign and Return Contract Extension

Attached are original and two copies of an extension of Subject's contract to be signed and witnessed and returned to Headquarters.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

COPY

19 December 1957

Attachment
3, as stated above

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/atts.
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
✓1 - RI
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:jck

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ [✓ SECRET]

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Contract Personnel Division
Room 801 1016 16th St.
O/K

NO.

DATE
10 December 1957

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. FI/OPS/Projects 1709 L Bldg.	12 DEC 1957	13 Dec.	✓	The original of this contract was prepared in headquarters and forwarded to the field for their execution and retention. This amendment should follow the same procedure. **Please let CPD know** when subject has signed his extension so a copy of this document can be forwarded to Finance Division for their records. Contract to field, HMMW-5760
2. WH Division 1405 Barton Hall	[illegible]	1957	P	
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ [✓ SECRET] ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. H[illegible]-5626

201-11[illegible]523

DEC 3 1957

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond M. G[illegible]

1. Effective 1 October 1957, the contract (as amended) for Subject, effective 1 October 1955, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

COPY

JC King
J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

26 November 1957

Distribution:
3- Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - Subject
1 - RI

file

WH/III/Mexico/[illegible]

Charles E. Apple
for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
for
JB

(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

14-00000

LIPSTICK Quarterly [illegible] Report

[illegible] 8713
27 [illegible] 57

c. Raymond H. [illegible], a contract agent, uses cover provided by [illegible] and is responsible for LIPSTICK office number 2. [illegible] supervises the work of [illegible] who processes the film from [illegible], [illegible], and LILYRIC basehouses. [illegible] directs the activities of the [illegible] surveillance team (a separate project discussed in [illegible]-0151). [illegible] is also responsible for the activities of the fixed surveillance basehouse, LILYRIC.

(1) LILYRIC is a second story apartment which affords a view into the right angle of the main gate of the [illegible] installation at an angle which photographs from the top of the heads downward. The equipment is the same as that used in [illegible] and LICALLA and the film is processed in the same way. [illegible]-12 lives in this apartment and is responsible for the photographic and physical surveillance. His reports supplement but do not duplicate those submitted by the [illegible] basehouse. The photographs from LILYRIC are superior in quality to those obtained from either [illegible] or LICALLA. [illegible]-12 is an efficient stenographer and good photographer. Also, this base offers a better position from which to take photographs.

(2) [illegible]'s contacts in private investigative agencies are used to check leads from other operations. During June and July 1957 [illegible] received training at Headquarters and both he and the Case Officer feel this training has been most beneficial.

SECRET

Air Pouch

HMM-A-8700

Chief, WH Division

19 November 1957

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Operational

William Herman BRAGG (201-2008)

Reference: HMM-5262

ACTION REQUESTED: None

1. There is attached for Headquarters retention a translation of a report concerning the Subject. The original report was obtained through a private detective agency in Mexico City which had been contacted by Raymond H. GERENDE. GERENDE posed as a businessman seeking credit and character reports on the commercial firm of Gibbon, Alonson y Cia., S.A. de Mexico. This was a trial assignment for the detective agency in order that Station Mexico could assess the investigative assets of the agency for possible future operational exploitation.

2. The sub-source of HMMA-0021, the former SOTH chief in Mexico, knows the Subject personally. The Case Officer will contact him direct for additional information on the Subject and his activities.

Willard C. Curtis

Encl.

MSD/bct
15 Nov 57

Distribution
3 - Hqs w/atchmt
2 - Files

COPY

SECRET

LIPSTICK/20

4UCVS

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Extension for Raymond H. Gerende

1. Effective 1 October 1957, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ________________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~[illegible]-5261~~

201-119523

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 1 Oct 57 11 52

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GERENDE

The following is the evaluation of Raymond H. GERENDE written by the instructor of foreign trainees on 12 September 1957.

1. Instruction commenced 10 June and was concluded 12 July 1957. It covered tradecraft, observation, description, casing and reporting, principles of CE and CI, elicitation and interviewing, investigative techniques, and briefings in photo and use of recording machines.

2. Trainee was known as "Ray". He was easy to work with. He was always pleasant, courteous, cheerful and seemed genuinely interested in every phase of the training. He can speak, read and write English without any difficulty.

3. Ray seemed well motivated; more Pro-American than Mexican. He possesses a strong interest in clandestine work. He is an avid reader. He demonstrated ability to apply principles he had learned from reading and study. He seemed possessed of initiative although there was a limited opportunity of observing this quality in action.

4. While Ray's duties to date apparently have not given him a wide and varied experience in clandestine activity, he seemed to grasp the material quite readily, and although in the field of CI and CE he stated he had never thought of many of their aspects as applying to him, he seemed glad of the opportunity to learn and absorbed them quite readily. He now possesses a good working knowledge of fundamental principles involved. However, it is felt that if he is to work primarily in this field, it should be under the supervision of a case officer with considerable experience and background in this type of activity.

5. As previously indicated, Ray was an avid reader. In addition to certain case studies, he read the following books:

COPY

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

"Handbook for Spies"
"The Spy Web"
"Out of Bondage"
"London Calling North Pole"
"A Spy Has No Friends"

The following films were exhibited and critiqued:

"House Search"
"Surveillance"
"Body Search"
"Under Cover"

6. It is felt that Kay benefitted considerably from this course of instruction. We feel that his concept and understanding of principles of clandestine activity have been broadened and strengthened. His interest, enthusiasm and production should reflect this in his future work.

J C King
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

25 September 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mjm

Based on: CT/OS/TR memo, 12 September 1957

RI COPY

Charles E. Apple
for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET

23 September 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

1. It is requested that the two-year contract of Raymond H. GERENDE, (LIPSTICK-20), which was executed on 1 October 1955, be extended for a two year period, effective 1 October 1957.

2. Raymond H. GERENDE's principal duties are administration and operational direction of the LIPSTICK team, processing film, contacting agents and acting as cut-out for the Case Officer, conducting individual investigations, and handling cash advances, accountings and property.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/III/Mexico
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mjm

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH/3
ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc

DATE: 12 September 1957

FROM : Instructor, Foreign Trainees

SUBJECT: Evaluation of trainee in Special Project LIPSTICK

1. Instruction in this project commenced 10 June and was concluded 12 July 1957. It covered tradecraft, observation, description, casing and reporting, principles of CE&CI, elicitation and interviewing, investigative techniques, and TSS briefings in photo and the use of recording machines.

2. Trainee was known as "Ray". He was easy to work with. He was always pleasant, courteous, cheerful and seemed genuinely interested in every phase of the training. He can speak, read and write English without any difficulty.

3. Ray seemed well motivated; more Pro-American than Mexican. He possesses a strong interest in clandestine work. He is an avid reader. He demonstrated ability to apply principles he had learned from reading and study. He seemed possessed of initiative although there was a limited opportunity of observing this quality in action.

4. While Ray's duties to date apparently have not given him a wide and varied experience in clandestine activity, he seemed to grasp the material quite readily; and although in the field of CI&CE he stated he had never thought of many of their aspects as applying to him, he seemed glad of the opportunity to learn and absorbed them quite readily. He now possesses a good working knowledge of fundamental principles involved. However, it is felt that if he is to work primarily in this field, it should be under the supervision of a case officer with considerable experience and background in this type of activity.

5. As previously indicated, Ray was an avid reader. In addition to certain case studies, he read the following books:

"Handbook for Spies"
"The Spy Web"
"Out of Bondage"
"London Calling North Pole"
"A Spy Has No Friends"

SECRET

The following films were exhibited and critiqued:

"House Search"
"Surveillance"
"Body Search"
"Under Cover"

6. It is felt that Ray benefitted considerably from this course of instruction. We feel that his concept and understanding of principles of clandestine activity have been broadened and strengthened. His interest, enthusiasm and production should reflect this in his future work.

Oscar H. Sells
OSCAR H. SELLS

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH Division
Attention : Mr. Lawrence R. Sulc, WH/III/Mexico
Room 2114 Barton Hall
FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

DATE: 8 AUG 1957

SUBJECT: COVERT SITE
Apartment D-22
The President Madison
Presidential Gardens
Alexandria, Virginia
#122877

1. Reference is made to your request (Requisition No:57-51) for safehouse facilities. Further reference is made to your subsequent request that a survey be scheduled of the Subject covert site and that you be advised of the results thereof.

2. It is the understanding of this office that the Subject covert site was utilized for the training and housing of an agent of interest to your office in connection with Project LIPSTICK. It is further understood that motion pictures would be used as part of the training program at the site. The Subject apartment was leased in the name of Rufus KING, cleared attorney.

3. This confirms previous verbal advice that a security survey was conducted at the Subject premises with favorable results. You were previously advised of security approval for the use of the Subject premises for the above purposes.

4. In view of the fact that you have completed your use of the Subject covert site, copies of the report of the survey of the site are being retained in this office. Safehouse Branch and the Central Cover Branch are being advised of the confirmation of the security approval for the use of the site by copies of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham
Robert H. Cunningham

cc: Chief, Safehouse Branch
Central Cover Branch

Lipstick (20)

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA ________
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-4930

201-119523

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 2 AUG 57 13 21

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational/LIPSTICK
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GERENDE

Reference: HMM-4554, 21 May 1957.

1. Subject departed from Washington, D.C. on 13 July 1957 to visit his relatives in South Carolina prior to returning to Mexico. He completed five weeks training on 12 July - an evaluation of the Subject by his instructors will be forwarded in the near future.

2. Subject was advanced two weeks per diem at the rate of $12 by Mexico Station. Since his lodgings were provided by Headquarters it was decided to pay him per diem at the rate of $6. Thus Station's payment was extended to cover four weeks and Subject was advanced $42 on 3 July to cover the fifth week (7 July through 13 July).

3. The net amount of Subject's telephone bill was not known at time of Subject's departure. Headquarters has Subject's receipt in the amount of $14.29 to cover the money order made out by him to the telephone company. Some of this amount will probably be returned to Subject whereupon he should be reimbursed for the net amount of the telephone bill.

COPY

J C King
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

25 July 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/ Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
~~1~~ - Subject
✓1 -RI

WH/B&F WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:rms

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

Charles E. Apple
for
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-7427

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 12 July 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Ramon ALVAREZ Durant

Reference: HMM-W-4554

ACTION REQUESTED: None

Attached for Headquarters retention are two copies of the subject's visa application obtained from the Visa Section of the United States Embassy in Mexico City on 6 May 1957.

Willard C. Curtis

Encl.

MSD/bct
11 July 1957

Distribution
3 - Hqs w/atchmt
2 - Files

RI COP

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-117523

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

[redacted]

1.- Nombre como esta en el Pasaporte.

Ramón Alvarez, Durant

2.- Telefono en Mexico

15-65-02

3.- Fecha en que piensa salir para los E. U.

15 MAYO

4.- ¿Como va a viajar? (tren, avion, coche, camion):

AVION

5.- Frontera por donde entrará o primer punto que tocará de los E. U.

MIAMI

6.- Dirección exacta y completa en donde se le pueda localizar en los E. U.

3135 Yale Ave. (Mr & Mrs R.F. Kolb)

Columbia S.C.

[illegible]-31

[redacted]



shall be required to depart from the United States at the expiration of my stay as authorized by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. I hereby agree that if permitted to proceed to or to enter the United States ... and assume all responsibility for losses or damages which may result in the event I ...nited States, or in the event my departure should be delayed. I do ...plication are true to the best of my knowledge and belief

(Signature of Alien)

Subscribed and sworn to, or affirmed before me

APR ... at

Consul of the United States of America

APR

...nimmigrant classification B-2

...CFR 41.5 and Sect. 101 (a) (15), Immigration and Nationality Act. pursuant

...ice Numbers 11923

22

5.00

62.50 ...

Application for Nonimmigrant Visa and Alien Registration

FAMILY NAME GIVEN NAME INITIAL
[illegible], Aaron

2 PLACE AND DATE OF BIRTH
Dec. 7, 193[illegible]
[illegible]

3 V-2322298

4 HOME ADDRESS
[illegible] # 9[illegible], Mexico, D.F. [illegible]

5 ACCOMPANIED BY

6 ADDRESS IN U S
South Carolina

7 NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON TO WHOM DESTINED
Mr. & Mrs. [illegible]
Columbia, S.C.

8 Name and address of nearest relative in home country
Sr. [illegible] de Alvarez
[illegible]

9 TRAVEL DOCUMENTS PRESENTED
[illegible]
FC [illegible]/5[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]/5/[illegible]

10 Hair	11 Eyes	12 Height	13 Weight	14 Nationality	16 Race	18 SEX	19 MARITAL STATUS
Br.	Br.	5 FT 7 IN	1[illegible]7	Mexican	white	M X F	MAR ☐ SGL ☐ WID. ☐ DIV ☐
				15 Complexion	17 Ethnic Classification		
				[illegible]	Mexican		

20 OCCUPATION
[illegible]

21 DISTINGUISHING MARKS
none

22 Have you ever been arrested in, or deported or excluded from any country?

23 DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION TO U. S. (TO BE INSERTED BY IMMIGRATION OFFICER)

PURPOSE AND INTENDED LENGTH OF STAY IN U. S.
Pleasure trip 2 months

ITEMS BELOW HEAVY BLACK LINE TO BE FILLED IN BY IMM. OFFICER

25 ARRIVED BY

26 DATE TO WHICH ADMITTED

27

mem

U. S. IMMIGRATION OFFICER

Except as hereinafter stated, I have never been refused a visa, or deported, removed, or excluded from the United States. I understand that I

FORM FS-257c 9-1-52

S

S-E-C-R-E-T

TSS EVALUATION

NAME Raymond H. GERENDE DIVISION WH/7I

SUBJECT Audio Briefing

DATES TRAINED 3 July 1957 (1330 hours)

On 3 July 1957 an Audio Briefing was given to Raymond H. GERENDE. The major portion of the briefing was on the Revere T-700 tape recorder. When asked if he knew anything about recorders, GERENDE stated that he was quite familiar with the Revere T-700 as he had had some experience with this recorder when he was a disc jockey in a radio station. A step by step operation of the recorder was explained to him, the tape recorder head was explained also how the sound was recorded on the tape. The following were also explained to him: tape speeds, frequency response, footage indicator, dual tracks—how they can be used in the Revere T-700—, the mechanical section of the recorder and the amplifier.

The recorder was removed from the case by the Subject and the possible breakdown points were shown to him, the recorder and amplifier units were taken out of the case by him and the operation of the sections explained. The recorder was then put together by GERENDE.

GERENDE asked many questions relative to microphones and microphone installations. There were explained to him—carbon microphone, crystal microphone, dynamic and controlled reluctance.

He appeared to be intelligent and was interested in the subjects discussed.

EDWARD A. SIVIK
TSS/TRD/Instructor

Please return copies of this form to TSS/TD for overt distribution.
Please return copies of this form to TSS/TD for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - CTR/Registrar
1 - Office of Personnel
1 - TSS/TD File

COVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Operations Officer
1 - TSS/TD
1 - Senior Staff

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

TSS EVALUATION

NAME Raymond H. GERENDE DIVISION WH

SUBJECT Photography Briefing

DATES TRAINED 3 July - 0930-1230

On 3 July 1957 a Photography briefing was given to Raymond H. GERENDE. Mr. GERENDE was briefed on film processing, printing, telephoto lens, fixed and mobile surveillance. He was shown the following equipment: Leica, Exacta, Mikroma, Minox and Robot cameras, the hidden device for Robot Camera, Morse 100 ft. tank and Nikor Multiple tank. The briefing lasted three hours.

GEORGE O. KELLNER
Tss/TED Instructor

Please return ~~four~~ 5 copies of this form to TSS/TD for overt distribution.
Please return two 3 copies of this form to TSS/TD for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - OTR/Registrar
1 - Office of Personnel
1 - TSS/TD File

COVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Operations Officer
1 - TSS/TD
1 - Senior Staff

S-E-C-R-E-T

11 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE (ps) Training

1. At 1000 - 1030 hours, 7 June 1957, I met with Mr. Robert Melberg, Chief Instructor, OTR/Covert Training and Mr. George Orton in the office of Mr. Oscar Sells, C/Covert Training (x2778, x8175).

2. Subject's training was discussed. Mr. Sells will take me to Subject's apartment (safehouse) at 0930 on 10 June to be introduced to Subject. He will be known as Mr. Stoker. At 1000 Mr. Melberg (to be known as Bob Brice) and Mr. Orton (George) will arrive to take over training.

3. At 1100 hours, 7 June 1957, I talked by telephone to Mr. Mexell (safehouse procurement officer). He informed me that a check for four weeks rent had been sent to the apartment firm by Mr. Rufus King's office to cover the cost of the apartment (safehouse).

L. SULC
WH/III/Mexico/I

Distribution:
WH/III/Chrono
✓ Subject

SECRET

4 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LIPSTICK
Raymond H. GERENDE

(home phone. OL 2-9514)

1. On 28 May 1957, Harry Mexell (Safehouse Procurement Officer, X8185), William Lidenheimer (S.C.) and the undersigned met to obtain a safehouse for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps). **The safehouse obtained was the following:**

Apartment D-22, Madison
Presidential Gardens Apartment Hotel
Mount Vernon Avenue and Russell Road
Alexandria, Virginia
Telephone: TEmple 6-4400

2. This apartment was tentatively approved orally by Mr. Lidenheimer from a security standpoint. Registration was made by me in the name of Rufus KING, attorney, Southern Building, Washington, D. C. NAtional 8-3115. GERENDE will be ostensibly a legal client of Mr. King and will be registered in true name upon his arrival. His name was not given upon obtaining the apartment nor was mine. Only Mr. King's name was used.

3. My cover story, if necessary to use one, was to be that of law clerk, Larry HERMAN, in Mr. King's office. Mr. Mexell has cleared this cover with Mr. King's office. Mr. King's office, according to Mr. Mexell, will pay for the apartment by check.

4. The apartment was rented at the rate of $155 a month from 8 June 1957 onward (to be through 13 July 1957).

5. Mr. Frazes of S.C. (SB/2, X547 and X3071) informed me telephonically on 31 May that the safehouse site had been approved.

Lawrence B. Sulc

File
Gerende

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH-3
ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc
FROM : Instructor, Foreign Trainees

DATE: 28 May 1957

SUBJECT: Special Project LIPSTICK

A. The following outlines the Special Project Training Plan for Special Project LIPSTICK:

1. Originator: WH-3 Mexico
2. Approvals: C/WH; C/WH-3, FI/TRO; CI Staff
3. Case Officer: Mr. Larry Sulc, ext. 2555
4. Chief Instructor, CT: Mr. Robert Holberg, ext. 2778
5. Purpose: To provide instruction and training which will assist trainee in carrying out field objectives of obtaining CE and opererational information thru surveillance and other means, working against designated targets.
6. Clearances: Project was approved 2 November 1956. OA amended approval, dated 19 March 1956. Trainee is a contract agent.
7. Number of Trainees: One
8. Nationality: Mexican (formerly U.S. citizen)
9. Biographical Data: Trainee was born 7 Dec. 1933, New York City. He received his education at the American High School, Mexico, D.F., Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies, June, 1955. He speaks English and Spanish. He has received no formalized intelligence training, but some on the job training has been given.
10. Cover; Tourist

SECRET

11. Time Table: Instruction will commence 10 June and be completed on or about 13 July 1957.

12. Training Area: Training will take place in the Washington area in a safehouse secured by the Division.

13. Language of Instruction: English

14. Course of Instruction: See Appendix I

15. Finances: Financial expenses will be handled by the Division.

B. Copies of this memorandum are being distributed as follows:

Original and 1 - Chief, WH-3
Attn: Mr. Larry Sulc
1 - CI Staff
1 - AC/OS/TR; C/OS/TR
1 - Covert Files

Oscar H. Sells
OSCAR H. SELLS

APPENDIX I

PROJECT LIPSTICK

SCHEDULE OF INSTRUCTION

10 June	Security Briefing. Discussion of the program. Review of Intelligence terminology.

11-21 June Tradecraft

(1) Nature and Characteristics of Clandestine Activity
    Clandestine Activity of the Individual and the Group
    Clandestine Activity of the Sovereign State
    Relationship of Overt to Clandestine Activity
    Elements of Clandestine Activity

(2) The Nature of Clandestine Action (By Political Entities)

(3) Principles of Organization for Clandestine Activity
    Concepts of Compartmentation

(4) Concepts of Cover and Concealment
    Requirements of Cover
    The Cover Problem as Applied to Individuals, Groups

(5) Basic Obstacles to Clandestine Activity
    Active Opposition
    Administrative and National Boundaries as a means of Compartmentation

(6) Clandestine Communications
    Introduction and Concepts of Clandestine Communications
    Criteria for Clandestine Communications
    Methods of Clandestine Communications
    Principles in the Use of Codes, Secret Writing, Microphotography and Ciphers
    Cutout Devices: Accommodation Address, Drops, The Courier, The Intermediary or Cutout
    The Personal Meeting
    Signals
    The Safehouse

(7) Agent Personnel
    Introduction
    Agents and Their Functions

SECRET

(8) Spotting
Check and Investigations
Selection of Agents
Recruiting Methods
Training, Briefing, and Debriefing
Handling of Agents
Termination of Agents

Special emphasis will be devoted to agent spotting, acquisition and management.

24-28 June	Observation, description, casing, reporting. The latter will include operational reporting, surveillance reporting, CE type reports and principles of positive intelligence reporting.
1-2 July	Missions, functions, & principles of CE & CI.
3 July	TSS briefings, audio & photo
5-9 July	Continuation of CE & CI.
10-11 July	Principles, procedures, techniques of elicitation, interviewing.
12 July	Seminar on covert investigative techniques.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

495 ES/DM/BO

DATE : 29 MAY 1957 495

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 1-2

INFO : COP 3, C/FI/OPS 4-5, DD/S 6, SSA 7, D/OP 8, S/C 9-10

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 30 17 54 '57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 49174

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 463

RYBAT ADMIN

REF HMMW 4554

SUBJECT REF DEPARTS MEXI 9 JUNE 1100 HOURS PAA FLIGHT 502. DEPART HOUSTON EAL FLIGHT 502 ARRIVE WASH 2140 HOURS 9 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] H. [illegible] (p)

K

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET

Chief, WH-3 29 May 1957

ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc

Instructor, Foreign Trainees

Special Project LIPSTICK

A. The following outlines the Special Project Training Plan for Special Project LIPSTICK:

1. Originator: WH-3 Mexico

2. Approvals: C/WH; C/WH-3, FI/TRO; CI Staff

3. Case Officer: Mr. Larry Sulc, ext. 2555

4. Chief Instructor, CT: Mr. Robert Melberg, ext. 2779

5. Purpose: To provide instruction and training which will assist trainee in carrying out field objectives of obtaining CE and opererational information thru surveillance and other means, working against designated targets.

6. Clearances: Project was approved 2 November 1956. OA amended approval, dated 19 March 1956. Trainee is a contract agent.

7. Number of Trainees: One

8. Nationality: Mexican (formerly U.S. citizen)

9. Biographical Data: Trainee was born 7 Dec. 1933, New York City. He received his education at the American High School, Mexico, D.F., Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies, June, 1955. He speaks English and Spanish. He has received no formalized intelligence training, but some on the job training has been given.

10. Cover: Tourist

File:
GERENDE
(Expediente 20)

RET

11. Time Table: Instruction will commence 10 June and be completed on or about 13 July 1957.

12. Training Area: Training will take place in the Washington area in a safehouse secured by the Division.

13. Language of Instruction: English

14. Course of Instruction: See Appendix I

15. Finances: Financial expenses will be handled by the Division.

B. Copies of this memorandum are being distributed as follows:

Original and 1 - Chief, WH-3
Attn: Mr. Larry Sulc
1 - CI Staff
1 - AC/OS/TR; C/OS/TR
1 - Covert Files

OSCAR H. SELLS

APPENDIX 1

PROJECT LIPSTICK

SCHEDULE OF INSTRUCTION

10 June — Security Briefing. Discussion of the program. Review of Intelligence terminology.

11-21 June — Tradecraft

(1) Nature and Characteristics of Clandestine Activity
    Clandestine Activity of the Individual and the Group
    Clandestine Activity of the Sovereign State
    Relationship of Overt to Clandestine Activity
    Elements of Clandestine Activity

(2) The Nature of Clandestine Action (By Political Entities)

(3) Principles of Organization for Clandestine Activity
    Concepts of Compartmentation

(4) Concepts of Cover and Concealment
    Requirements of Cover
    The Cover Problem as Applied to Individuals, Groups

(5) Basic Obstacles to Clandestine Activity
    Active Opposition
    Administrative and National Boundaries as a means of Compartmentation

(6) Clandestine Communications
    Introduction and Concepts of Clandestine Communications
    Criteria for Clandestine Communications
    Methods of Clandestine Communications
    Principles in the Use of Codes, Secret Writing, Microphotography and Ciphers
    Cutout Devices: Accommodation Address, Drops, The Courier, The Intermediary or Cutout
    The Personal Meeting
    Signals
    The Safehouse

(7) Agent Personnel
    Introduction
    Agents and Their Functions

(8) Spotting
Check and Investigations
Selection of Agents
Recruiting Methods
Training, Briefing, and Debriefing
Handling of Agents
Termination of Agents

Special emphasis will be devoted to agent spotting, acquisition and management.

24-28 June	Observation, description, casing, reporting. The latter will include operational reporting, surveillance reporting, CE type reports and principles of positive intelligence reporting.
1-2 July	Missions, functions, & principles of CE & CI.
3 July	TSS briefings, audio & photo
5-9 July	Continuation of CE & CI.
10-11 July	Principles, procedures, techniques of elicitation, interviewing.
12 July	Seminar on covert investigative techniques.

Basic Training 2 weeks.

Observation, Description, Casings 3 days
Reporting - 1 week

Fundamentals of CI + CE. 1 week

Elicitation, Interviewing
Investigation Techniques } 2 days.
Photo + Audio Brief. 1 day.

Mr. Bellis
201 T-30
OTR

Henry Mixell, 2C54 Quarters Eye
x 8185

Telephone Procurement Engr
Res. 243-1006
Res. 45-1025

GERONIC works for LIPSTICK-19 as purch. agent.

LIPSTICK/LIMITED · (Photo) GERENSE ← LIPSTICK-19

" /LILYRIC · (Photo) "

" /LIAXIOM · (Photo) " ← LIMITATION-5, -6.

LINSTOCK (Radio maintenance & tech) LINSTOCK

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

KAPOK

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HMM-W-4556

201-119523

KAPOK #500

DATE 21 MAY 1957

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

PRIORITY

SUBJECT
GENERAL - Operational Matters/LIPSTICK
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GERENDE/Training

Reference: HMM-W-4410, 26 April 1957 (201-119523)

ACTION REQUESTED: See Paragraph 5.

1. Subject is scheduled for covert training to begin Monday, 10 June 1957, and to last five weeks. Subject should arrive in Washington, if possible, on 8 or 9 June.

2. It is planned that Subject stay in a furnished apartment where he will also be trained on workdays. For food, laundry and incidentals he will be given per diem of $6. Entertainment of Subject will be conservative.

3. It is suggested that Mexico City Station provide Subject with a round-trip ticket by air. From a cover standpoint it might be wise to have Subject visit his mother's relatives in South Carolina on the way to Washington. If feasible he should create the impression that he is visiting New York City or both New York and Washington on this trip.

4. Subject's cover while in the U. S. will be that of tourist.

5. Please cable Subject's time of arrival and flight number. He will be met at the airport by the desk operations officer, "Larry." In the event the meeting is not made he should call the telephone number forwarded under separate cover and ask for "Larry." In the event he is still unable to make contact he should go to the National Hotel,

(Releasing officer) KAPOK (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

KAPOK
SECRET

HMM-W-4554
K-POK # 500
Page Two

1803 Pye Street, N. W., take a room and wait for a call. If unable to get a room he should leave a forwarding address for further contact.

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachment:
1 - As described above, u/s/c

17 May 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/att. u/s/c
1 - WH/III/KAPOK Chrono, w/o/att.
1 - Subject, w/o/att.

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mjm

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

J. H. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

KAPOK
SECRET

SECRET

17 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief/WH/Support

Attn: WH/B & F

SUBJECT : Contract Agent Covert Training
Raymond H. G[illegible] (ps)

1. Subject, Project LIPSTICK contract agent, will arrive in Washington on approximately 8-9 June 1957 for five weeks of covert training. Covert training has been arranged and a safe house obtained.

2. The matter of entertainment of Subject was discussed with Mr. Wattles, C/WH/Support, who said that entertainment of contract agents is authorized under certain conditions and that it would be permissible to entertain Subject conservatively while in Washington. He spoke to Mr. Price of the General Counsel's Office who supported this view.

3. To favorably impress Subject and to maintain his morale while in Washington, it is contemplated that the desk operations office will entertain him with dinner and drinks approximately twice a week during the first and final weeks and once a week during the intervening weeks.

W. GALBRAITH
Chief, WH/III

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
✓1 - Subject - Lipstick 20

WH/III/Mexico/LSalsters

SECRET

SECRET

15 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics

THROUGH : Chief, Central Cover Branch, DD/P

REQUESTING OFFICE : WH/III/Mexico

CASE OFFICER : Lawrence B. Sulo - Extension 2555

PROJECT : LIFSTICE Allotment: 7-3570-83-130

Reference: R 45-1025, 25 June 1956.

Type of safehouse requested: Furnished apartment (efficiency apartment or larger). The apartment should be large enough to show motion pictures to trainee.

Location and Environment: Washington, D. C. Middle class or above type of environment.

Maximum Price Range: $10 per day.

Occupancy from: 8 June 1957 To: 14 July 1957

Intended Use: Safehouse will be occupied by one (1) agent for residence and training. The agent is a Mexican (completely bi-lingual in Spanish and English, was born in the U. S.), aged 23, a college graduate and purchasing agent for a Mexico City firm. He will occupy the safehouse most of the time, both day and night, for five weeks. Three or four other persons (from CTR and possibly the case officer) will spend time in the safehouse during the day. Sensitive material will be in the house during the day.

Cover Arrangement: Subject will be in the U. S. as a tourist from Mexico. He has American relatives in North Carolina. WH Division's memorandum requesting training for Subject, and which included this cover plan, was approved by the FI and CI Staffs on 14 May 1957.

Funds are available:

______________________ ______________________

BUDGET OFFICER

SECRET

WH/III/Mexico/IBSulc:mjm

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CCB/DD/P
1 - WH/III/Chrono
✓2 - Subject

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-6873
(201-119523)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 15 May 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Raymond E. Gerende

Reference: HMM-W-4410

ACTION REQUESTED: Contact with Gerende

1. The Subject has made reservations at the Hotel Emery, 1812 G Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C., Telephone Republic 7-1812, for 9 June 1957. He will wait at this hotel for a telephone call from Malcolm Q. EDELAND sometime before 1200 hours on 10 May 1957. The Subject will meet EDELAND in the lobby of the Statler Hotel at the time stated in the conversation. Should this contact fail the Subject will remain at his hotel from 1300 hours until 1800 hours on 10 May 1957 and the same times on successive days until contact is made.

2. Station Mexico appreciates the efforts of the Headquarters desk in arranging this training.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

MSD/bct
15 May 1957
Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

201-119523

KAPOK
SECRET

AIR

HMM-W-4554

201-119523

KAPOK #500

: Chief of Station, Mexico City

: Chief, WHD PRIORITY

- Operational Matters/LIPSTICK
- Raymond H. GERENDE/Training

Reference: HMM-W-4410, 26 April 1957 (201-119523)

ACTION REQUESTED: See paragraph 5.

1. Subject is scheduled for covert training to begin Monday, 10 June 1957, and to last five weeks. Subject should arrive in Washington, if possible, on 8 or 9 June.

2. It is planned that Subject stay in a furnished apartment where he will also be trained on weekdays. For food, laundry and incidentals he will be given per diem of $6. Entertainment of Subject will be conservative.

3. It is suggested that Mexico City Station provide Subject with a round-trip ticket by air. From a cover standpoint it might be wise to have Subject visit his mother's relatives in South Carolina on the way to Washington. If feasible he should create the impression that he is visiting New York City or both New York and Washington on this trip.

4. Subject's cover while in the U. S. will be that of tourist.

5. Please cable Subject's time of arrival and flight number. He will be met at the airport by the desk operations officer, "Larry." In the event the meeting is not made he should call the telephone number forwarded under separate cover and ask for "Larry." In the event he is still unable to make contact he should go to the National Hotel,

KAPOK
SECRET

KAPOK

SECRET

HMM-W-4554
KAPOK #500
Page Two

1808 Eye Street, N. W., take a room and wait for a call. If unable to get a room he should leave a forwarding address for further contact.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachments:
  1 - As described above, u/s/c

17 May 1957

Distribution:
  3 - Mexico City, w/att. u/s/c
  1 - WH/III/KAPOK Chrono, w/o/att.
  1 - Subject, w/o/att.

WH/III/Mexico/LSulo:mjm

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

KAPOK
SECRET

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HMMW-4410~~

201-119523

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 26 APR 57 14 44Z

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational Matters
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. Gerende

Reference: HMM-A-5661, 19 December 1956 (50-6-4-1316)

1. Plans are underway to bring subject to Headquarters for training as requested in reference. Gerende is tentatively scheduled to begin his training on 10 June 1957.

2. It is anticipated that subject will be trained in Basic Tradecraft, CI/CE matters, Photography and some audio surveillance. He should be able to complete his studies in about five weeks time.

3. It is believed that tourist cover for subject's visit to this country will be satisfactory, inasmuch as he has relatives living in South Carolina.

4. As further and more definite arrangements are made regarding the matters discussed in this dispatch, you will be so advised. Headquarters regrets the delay in answering reference dispatch.

COPY

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

19 April 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom
✓1 - RI
1 - Subject

(Releasing officer)

WH/III/Mexico/MPCondon:elw

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

(Coordinating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

(Authenticating officer)

Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

SECRET

Gerende
(Lip - 20)

22 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/TR

ATTENTION : Assistant Chief For Covert Training, CS/Tr

FROM : WH/3/Mexico

SUBJECT : Request For Covert Training

Project: LIPSTICK

Pseudo : Raymond H. Gerende

1. Initiated by: WH, Branch 3, Mexico - FI

2. Date of Project Approval: 2 November 1956

Type and Date of Clearance: Amended Operational Approval C-32743 effective 19 March 1956. Supersedes OA granted 28 February 1955.

3. Agent Status: Contract Agent

4. Agent Nationality: Born in U.S., but renounced citizenship to become Mexican citizen on 31 July 1952.

5. Operations Officer: Lawrence B. Sule Known to student as: Larry Room 2114, Barton Hall, x-2555

Alternate Operations Officer: John B. Brady Known to student as: Jack Room 2111, Barton Hall, x-3162

6. Training dates: Beginning about 10 June 1957 for approximately 5 weeks.

7. Complete biographic background of trainee: See memorandum attached.

8. Previous intelligence training: Trained in surveillance and related techniques by his field case officer. No formalized training.

9. Project Objective: Physical surveillance in Mexico City area to obtain CE and operational information on Soviet/Satellite and Communist Party personnel, plans and activities. This project supports a technical surveillance project in Mexico. Some of the basehouses under Project LIPSTICK support the physical surveillance aspect of Station operations whereas some of the basehouses support technical surveillances.

SECRET

SECRET

10. Description of agents duties in the field: Under the direct supervision and guidance of the Case Officer, full operational and administrative responsibility and control of the following:

- a. LIPSTICK Team
- b. LIPSTICK Car #4
- c. LIPSTICK/LIMITED basehouse ✓ ✓
- d. LIPSTICK/LILYRIC basehouse
- e. LIPSTICK/LIAXION basehouse
- f. LIPSTICK [illegible]
- g. LIPSTICK office #2
- h. Pretext investigations
- i. Spot assignments

In summary it can be said that the subject's principal duties are administration and operational direction of the LIPSTICK team, processing 35 to 40 rolls of 35 mm film each week, contacting agents and acting as cut-out for the Case Officer, conducting individual investigations, handling cash advances, accountings, and property.

Description of agent's cover in the field: Gerende is perfectly covered working for LIPSTICK 19 as purchasing agent. He spends approximately three to four hours per day working on his cover duties. This cover is believed by all his friends, is durable and allows sufficient freedom for operational activity.

11. Proposed cover to be used during training: It is anticipated that subject will come to the U.S. as a tourist. Inasmuch as Gerendo's mother has six sisters and three brothers living in either Columbia or Sumter, South Carolina, (as of June 1955) tourist cover for him would appear to be appropriate.

12. Student availability for training: full time.

13. Specific problems to be considered in handling trainee: None envisioned at this time. Subject speaks English.

14. Specific training subjects to be covered: Basic Tradecraft, CI/CE course, Photography, and some audio surveillance techniques.

15. Technical training requirements: Photography and audio surveillance techniques.

16. Has student in the past, or does he at present, visit overt installations of the organization? Never in the Washington area. Presumably he has never been in the Station in Mexico City.

17. Special attributes to be evaluated:

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

APPROVALS:

Senior Staff Training Officer

CI Staff

Attachment: Biographic Data

WH/III/Mexico/[illegible]

Distribution:
Orig & 1 Addressee - w/attach
1 WH/III/Chrono - w/attach
1 Subject- w/attach

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO TRAINING MEMO

Name : Ramon Joseph ALVAREZ Du Rant

Born : 7 December 1933 in New York City

Citizenship : Mexican

Father : Fernando ALVAREZ (deceased), Mexican citizen

Mother : Janie Du Rant, vda. de ALVAREZ, U.S. citizen, born 13 December 1906 at Sumter, So. Carolina

Sisters : Marcia and Adria

Official Identity Papers : Mexican passport #41776 issued in Mexico City 19 December 1953; renewed 16 November 1954 #7714, good until 16 November 1956, Mexican draft card #1963865.

Religion : Protestant - non-denominational

Education : American High School, Mexico, D.F., diploma July 1952 Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies, June 1955

Languages : English and Spanish

Military Service : January-December 1953—Mexico City—XV'a Division de Infanteria, 15/a Compania de Transmisiones Corporal

Physical Description :

Age	23
Height	5' 9½"
Eyes	hazel
Face shape	oval
Complexion	fair
Posture	erect
Weight	145 lbs.
Teeth	normal, straight
Hair	dark brown
Scars	½" horizontal on tip of chin
Build	medium

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR COVERT TSS TRAINING

IMPORTANT: a) Approval of Staff Training Officer must be indicated on this form.

b) *Approval of CI Staff must be indicated on this form.*

c) If student is a member of a foreign intelligence or security service, the name of the service must be indicated in the space provided.

d) If student is a contract agent, he must have full operational clearance, must have signed his contract, and project must be an approved project.

e) TSS will provide training site facilities provided that the sites are available on the dates training is requested.

f) Should it be necessary for the student to enter agency buildings (other than safehouses), the requestor will undertake to procure CI staff approval, also building passes or badges when necessary.

1. Name of student: Raymond H. Gerende ☐ True ☒ Pseudo ☐ Crypto

2. Training alias to be employed: "Ray"

3. Name of Operations Officer: Lawrence B. Sulc Division: WH

Senior Staff: Room No. and Bldg.: 2114 R.H. Extension: 2555

4. Name of Approved Project: LIPSTICK Date and Type of Clearance: OA, 19 March 1956

5. Operations Officer known to student as: (Name) "Larry"

6. Nationality of student: Mexican

7. Status of student:

a. Staff agent: ☐ b. Contract agent: ☒

c. Foreign Intell. or Security Service Official (specify name of service): Not applicable

8. Language in which training will be conducted: English

(Note: Requestor agrees to provide interpreter should such be required.)

9. Country or area in which student will operate: Mexico

10. Will agent train others? Yes ☐ No ☒

11. Dates during which student will be available for training: From 10 June 1957 To 12 July 1957

12. Will training take place in:

a. TSS training site: ☐ b. Site provided by Area Division: ☒ (OTR will provide safehouse)

DISTRIBUTION:

Orig. & 1 – For one subject } TSS/TD
1 – For each additional subject }
1 – CI Staff

Page One

SECRET

be given, indicating whether proficiency (development of skill) or familiarization (briefing) is desired.
ning is to take place, if known.

bject	Dates From	Dates To	Briefing	Proficiency	Will agent train others in subject
mass work					
landestine work					
ly)					
			X		
			X		
iques:					
ig			X		
			X		
ue:				*	

ency training in these subjects must be preceded by a discussion with C/TSS/Training Div.

Subject	Dates From	Dates To	Briefing	Proficiency
SECRET WRITING:				*
a. General technique:				
b. Will trainee be issued system: ☐ *Yes* ☐ *No*				
c. Is system now used in the field: ☐ *Yes* ☐ *No*				
d. Other (Specify):				
AUDIO SURVEILLANCE:				
1. Microphone installation				
2. Wireless microphone installation				
3. Telephone tap installation				
4. Detect kits				
5. Other (Specify) Tape Recorders			X	
COVER AUTHENTICATION:				
1. Aspects of document authentication (Specify area)				
2. Use of documentation in CI activities				
3. Use of documentation in PP activities				
4. Document collection (Specify area)				
LOCKS & PICKS:				
All other TSS subjects should be specifically requested using a separate sheet as part two of this form.				

* Requests for proficiency training in these subjects must be preceded by a discussion with C/TSS/Training Div.

APPROVED: ....
Staff Training Officer

....
Requestor's Signature

....
C/CI/OA

SECRET

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 25 July 1956

FROM: WH/III/Mexico

ROOM NO.: 1026 Barton Hall

TELEPHONE: 2555

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name, and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym if assigned. If true name is sensitive, fill in the 201 number and Section II only. If true name is non-sensitive, both Sections I and II must be completed.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

201 NO. 1.	NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title) 3.
119523	ALVAREZ DuRant,	Ramon	Joseph	

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
☐ YES ☒ NO	071233	USA	New York City	

OCCUPATION/POSITION:

OCC/POS. CODE 9.:

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM: Raymond H. GERENDE

☐ SENSITIVE

☒ NON-SENSITIVE

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	2ND CITY INTEREST 12.	3RD CITY INTEREST 12A.
MEX	WH/3M		

COMMENTS:

Permanently charged to WH/III/Mexico

201-119523

OPEN FILE: ☐ YES ☒ NO

RESTRICTED FILE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

SIGNATURE: Kenneth S. Sef. Jr.

FORM NO. 831 TEST
1 NOV 55

SECRET

(38)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

Card

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE	ACTION: ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE	
FROM RI/AN		ROOM NO. 1504K	TELEPHONE 2919

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE ☐ NON-SENSITIVE	201 NO. 1. 119523	SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) (Middle) (First) (Title) 3.

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(Middle)	(First)	(Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4. ☐ YES ☐ NO	BIRTH DATE 5. D M Y	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM GERENDE, RAYMOND H.

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. MEX	ACTION DESK 11. WH/3 M	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS:

PUNCHED

201- 119523

PERMANENT CHARGE: ☒ YES ☐ NO	RESTRICTED FILE: ☒ YES ☐ NO	SIGNATURE

FORM NO. 1 JUL 56 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

SECRET

12 DEC 1975

SE/CI/I

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
National Security Agency

ATTENTION : Mr. Benson Buffham

SUBJECT : William Hamilton Martin 201-282338 and Bernon Ferguson Mitchell 201-282337

1. Attached is a copy of a report recently received through Canadian liaison channels concerning a conversation between Canadian professor Dr. Hans Kunov and Martin in Moscow. The attachment outlines the conversation Kunov had with Martin and indicates that both Martin and Mitchell are attempting to leave the USSR.

2. Also attached is a report on Yuriy Igoryevich Torgov, 201-0862574 Kunov's host at the USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center.

3. The Canadians have advised us that the FBI has received the information contained in the attachments.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

George T. Kalaris
George T. Kalaris

Attachments:
As stated

CIOL-00184-75
DDO/CI/R&A/E:W.Kerbe:dnj (12/12/75)
Distribution:
Arig & 1 - Addee w/att
1 - C/CI w/att
2 - CI/R&A/E 1 w/att
1 - C/DIVD w/att 1 - DIVD/TCB

RECORD COPY

COORDINATION:

Paul L. Rinaldo
C/DIVD/TCB in draft
12 Dec 1975

201-282338

B-201-0862574
B-201-0282337

SECRET

2 ... CL 6198

SECRET

Dr. H[illegible] KUNOV professor, University of Toronto, visited Moscow from September 1-14, 1975 to undertake research at the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the USSR/Canada General Exchange Agreement. The research was carried out at the Academy of Sciences Computer Centre, 40 Vavcoha Street. KUNOV's host was Yuriy I. TORGOV, 2nd in charge of the Computer Centre and on whom a separate personality sketch is attached.

On September 3 while having a coffee break in the Computer Centre KUNOV was approached by a man who identified himself as William MARTIN, an American who defected to the USSR in 1960. MARTIN openly spoke about his past and stated that he now lives in Moscow and that he is a consultant to TURGOV's group at the Computer Centre. He said much of his work is done at home but he does drop into the Centre weekly.

It was at this time that MARTIN told KUNOV that he would like to get out of the USSR even if he has to run certain risks. He also said that (Bernon) MITCHELL feels the same and has voiced his desire to the Soviet authorities.

MARTIN asked KUNOV if he might enquire with the Canadian authorities on his behalf to see what his status would be in this country or if there was any chance of his being allowed in here as a political refugee. KUNOV agreed to contact the Canadian Embassy in Moscow to see what the official view would be and notify MARTIN at a later date. MARTIN seemed most pleased at this and left KUNOV his home telephone number, cautioning him not to say anything over phone that would tip off the Soviet authorities as to his intentions. This first meeting lasted a little over one half hour and took place in the coffee lounge area of the Centre. There were other Soviets present in the lounge, however, TORGOV was not among them. KUNOV does not believe the others were aware of their conversation.

On the 5 September 75 KUNOV called at the Canadian Embassy, Moscow and spoke to a doorman asking him who he might speak to regarding some Americans living in the USSR who would like to immigrate to Canada. The doorman referred KUNOV to the office of a Mrs. Louise O'CONNOR. KUNOV then spoke to a U/M who stated that he was the under secretary to Mrs. O'CONNOR. KUNOV enquired about the Americans living in the USSR and asked could they be allowed to immigrate to Canada. The Embassy official would not commit himself and stated that KUNOV should enquire officially with the nearest office of Manpower and Immigration when he returned to Canada. KUNOV did not give this official MARTIN or MITCHELL's names. KUNOV telephoned MARTIN after the Embassy visit and stated that the reply from the Embassy was negative. MARTIN seemed upset that KUNOV should phone him, then he later stated that it would probably be all right.

MARTIN met KUNOV on at least two occasions after the 5 September, all at the Centre, usually in the coffee lounge and in the general presence of others. They spoke English at all times. MARTIN thanked KUNOV for his trouble in enquiring at the Embassy and cautioned KUNOV not to get personally involved with him in this venture as it would be bad news. KUNOV promised MARTIN that he would check with Canadian Manpower and Immigration authorities on the matter when he returned to Canada.

... /2

The following observations were made by KUNOV regarding MARTIN:

(a) Physical Description

5'7' or 3" tall, fair hair, crewcut, balding at the temples, not bellied.
- may suffer from a nervous condition, and bears the mark of a man who has experienced rough times.
- always dressed with a shirt, tie and jacket.
- spoke perfect English with a slight Russian accent on certain words.

(b) MARTIN provided KUNOV with the following home address and telephone number, cautioning him that his telephone was bugged.
- telephone number - 433-03-81
  117421 Obrucheva Street
  Building 4-1
  Apt. 126
  Moscow, USSR

(c) MARTIN stated that his friend MITCHELL lives in Leningrad and is married to the Dean of the Music Conservatory in Leningrad. MITCHELL is very unhappy and he has openly asked Soviet authorities for permission to leave Russia and return to the USA. Apparently he has never been able to adjust to the Soviet way of life and is now very desperate. MITCHELL is willing to divorce his wife and take any risk to get out of the USSR. To date however he has been met with a wall of silence by the Soviets.

(d) MARTIN is unmarried. He claims to have a comfortable apartment and feels that he has adjusted to the Soviet life and is accepted in the USSR. He does not want to return to the USA but would like to get out of the USSR. He said he would have quite a story to tell about his life in Russia as well as his past and that he would have no compunctions about telling all about the Russians. MARTIN at one point stated that he would not consider attempting to escape from the USSR.

(e) MARTIN claims that he is constantly harrassed by Soviet officials. His apartment has been broken into on several occasions and he refused to use the Soviet mail system. He has also refused to show up for work in the past as a form of protest. MARTIN also indicated that he has had several contacts with Americans in Moscow and that they have not shown any animosity towards him. He actually dated an American woman for some time but did not mention her name.

(f) MARTIN stated that in the past American journalists have tried to contact him many times, asking for interviews but their requests have been refused by Russian authorities. He said he hoped some day that one of these journalists would be able to just knock on his door and talk to him.

SECRET

.../3

TORGOV and KUNOV spoke in general terms about MARTIN after the first meeting. TORGOV does not claim to know MARTIN well. MARTIN has been at the centre for approximately 6 to 8 months assigned to TORGOV's group. Prior to that he worked as a consultant in another area of the Academy of Sciences. TORGOV commented that MARTIN does much of his work at home. He said he felt sorry for MARTIN because he was not accepted by the Russians in the Academy. He also stated that he felt MARTIN was a basically honest man.

KUNOV said his motives for trying to assist MARTIN and MITCHELL are based on huminatarian grounds, only, as he feels they are suffering under the Soviet system. He does not intend to take any further action to assist them in leaving the Soviet Union. KUNOV hopes to return to the Soviet Union next year for a more extended period of study.

This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided on condition that it is for use solely by the intelligence community of the receiving Government and that it not be declassified without the express permission of the Government of Canada.

Le présent document est la propriété du gouvernement du Canada. Il est communiqué sous réserve d'utilisation par les seuls services de renseignements du gouvernement destinataire et à la condition que sa cote de sécurité ne soit pas modifiée sans l'autorisation expresse du gouvernement canadien.

SECRET

Re: [illegible] Igoryevich TORGOV

TORGOV, DOB 6 June, 1932 Vitebsk, USSR, Head of Laboratory, Computer Centre, Academy of Sciences, Moscow, was a visiting professor in Toronto and Ottawa, Canada, for four months - November 1974 to February 1975.

A number of sources were impressed by TORGOV's frankness and his willingness to speak out, at social gatherings, on current problem areas in the Soviet system. For example he discussed dissidents in Soviet society and commented on one occasion that present day Soviet society allowed for far greater freedom of expression than had been allowed previously. He said that things were being said in Moscow that one would never have heard in Stalin's era. Nevertheless, TORGOV argued that a return to "terror tactics" under Soviet rule was always possible. He considered that such tactics were unlikely at this time because of the personal philosophy of Premier Leonid BRESHNEV.

TORGOV is reported to be the son of a scientist and party member and he himself is an admitted party member. He is married with three children. He is considered to be one of the top experts on his field (computers) in the Soviet Union. He mentioned having travelled to other Western countries two or three times. His English is good. He was very friendly towards Canadians during his visit but it was observed that he did not associate with three other Soviet research students at the same institution. On one occasion in Ottawa he was berated quite severely by a Soviet Embassy official for his failure to report periodically, as required, to the Embassy. TORGOV later told a source that this Embassy official "could be a dangerous man to your country".

This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided on condition that it is for use solely by the intelligence community of the receiving Government and that it not be declassified without the express permission of the Government of Canada.

Le présent document est la propriété du gouvernement du Canada. Il est communiqué sous réserve d'utilisation par les seuls services de renseignements du gouvernement destinataire et à la condition que sa cote de sécurité ne soit pas modifiée sans l'autorisation expresse du gouvernement canadien.

SECRET

201-282338

The RCMP Liaison Office
2450 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

(4)

US/75/539

75WLO-11S-38

2 December 1975

SECRET

Mr. George Kalaris
C.I.A.

Dear

Re: William Hamilton MARTIN, and
Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL

Further to your letter of 6 October 1975, we have identified and spoken to the Canadian professor, Dr. Hans KUNOV, referred to in your letter as Harry KERNOV. The attachment outlines the contact between KUNOV and MARTIN and MITCHELL. KUNOV has proven co-operative as a source on previous occasions and we believe he will continue to assist us within limits.

Also attached is a report on Yuriy Igoryevich TORGOV, KUNOV's host at the USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center. In addition to any comments you may wish to make concerning MARTIN's approaches to KUNOV, we would welcome an assessment of TORGOV, if available.

The F.B.I. has received the information contained in the attachments.

Yours truly,

E.R.J. Miller,
Assistant Liaison Officer.

att. (2)

This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It is [illegible] in confidence that it is for use solely by the intelligence community of the receiving Government and [illegible] disseminated without the express permission of the Government of Canada.

SECRET

Re: W.H. MARTIN and B.F. MITCHELL

Dr. Hans KUNOV professor, University of Toronto, visited Moscow from September 1-14, 1975 to undertake research at the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the USSR/Canada General Exchange Agreement. The research was carried out at the Academy of Sciences Computer Centre, 40 Vavcoha Street. KUNOV's host was Yuriy I. TORGOV, 2nd in charge of the Computer Centre and on whom a separate personality sketch is attached.

On September 3 while having a coffee break in the Computer Centre KUNOV was approached by a man who identified himself as William MARTIN, an American who defected to the USSR in 1960. MARTIN openly spoke about his past and stated that he now lives in Moscow and that he is a consultant to TURGOV's group at the Computer Centre. He said much of his work is done at home but he does drop into the Centre weekly.

It was at this time that MARTIN told KUNOV that he would like to get out of the USSR even if he has to run certain risks. He also said that (Bernon) MITCHELL feels the same and has voiced his desire to the Soviet authorities.

MARTIN asked KUNOV if he might enquire with the Canadian authorities on his behalf to see what his status would be in this country or if there was any chance of his being allowed in here as a political refugee. KUNOV agreed to contact the Canadian Embassy in Moscow to see what the official view would be and notify MARTIN at a later date. MARTIN seemed most pleased at this and left KUNOV his home telephone number, cautioning him not to say anything over phone that would tip off the Soviet authorities as to his intentions. This first meeting lasted a little over one half hour and took place in the coffee lounge area of the Centre. There were other Soviets present in the lounge, however, TORGOV was not among them. KUNOV does not believe the others were aware of their conversation.

On the 5 September 75 KUNOV called at the Canadian Embassy, Moscow and spoke to a doorman asking him who he might speak to regarding some Americans living in the USSR who would like to immigrate to Canada. The doorman referred KUNOV to the office of a Mrs. Louise O'CONNOR. KUNOV then spoke to a U/M who stated that he was the under secretary to Mrs. O'CONNOR. KUNOV enquired about the Americans living in the USSR and asked could they be allowed to immigrate to Canada. The Embassy official would not commit himself and stated that, KUNOV should enquire officially with the nearest office of Manpower and Immigration when he returned to Canada. KUNOV did not give this official MARTIN or MITCHELL's names. KUNOV telephoned MARTIN after the Embassy visit and stated that the reply from the Embassy was negative. MARTIN seemed upset that KUNOV should phone him, then he later stated that it would probably be all right.

MARTIN met KUNOV on at least two occasions after the 5 September, all at the Centre, usually in the coffee lounge and in the general presence of others. They spoke English at all times. MARTIN thanked KUNOV for his trouble in enquiring at the Embassy and cautioned KUNOV not to get personally involved with him in this venture as it would be bad news. KUNOV promised MARTIN that he would check with Canadian Manpower and Immigration authorities on the matter when he returned to Canada.

SECRET

/.

The following observations were made by KUNOV regarding MARTIN:

(a) Physical Description

5'7' or 8" tall, fair hair, crewcut, balding at the temples, pot bellied.
- may suffer from a nervous condition, and bears the mark of a man who has experienced rough times.
- always dressed with a shirt, tie and jacket.
- spoke perfect English with a slight Russian accent on certain words.

(b) MARTIN provided KUNOV with the following home address and telephone number, cautioning him that his telephone was bugged.
- telephone number - 433-03-81
  117421 Obrucheva Street
  Building 4-1
  Apt. 126
  Moscow, USSR

(c) MARTIN stated that his friend MITCHELL lives in Leningrad and is married to the Dean of the Music Conservatory in Leningrad. MITCHELL is very unhappy and he has openly asked Soviet authorities for permission to leave Russia and return to the USA. Apparently he has never been able to adjust to the Soviet way of life and is now very desperate. MITCHELL is willing to divorce his wife and take any risk to get out of the USSR. To date however he has been met with a wall of silence by the Soviets.

(d) MARTIN is unmarried. He claims to have a comfortable apartment and feels that he has adjusted to the Soviet life and is accepted in the USSR. He does not want to return to the USA but would like to get out of the USSR. He said he would have quite a story to tell about his life in Russia as well as his past and that he would have no compunctions about telling all about the Russians. MARTIN at one point stated that he would not consider attempting to escape from the USSR.

(e) MARTIN claims that he is constantly harrassed by Soviet officials. His apartment has been broken into on several occasions and he refused to use the Soviet mail system. He has also refused to show up for work in the past as a form of protest. MARTIN also indicated that he has had several contacts with Americans in Moscow and that they have not shown any animosity towards him. He actually dated an American woman for some time but did not mention her name.

(f) MARTIN stated that in the past American journalists have tried to contact him many times, asking for interviews but their requests have been refused by Russian authorities. He said he hoped some day that one of these journalists would be able to just knock on his door and talk to him.

TORGOV and KUNOV spoke in general terms about MARTIN after the first meeting. TORGOV does not claim to know MARTIN well. MARTIN has been at the centre for approximately 6 to 8 months assigned to TORGOV's group. Prior to that he worked as a consultant in another area of the Academy of Sciences. TORGOV commented that MARTIN does much of his work at home. He said he felt sorry for MARTIN because he was not accepted by the Russians in the Academy. He also stated that he felt MARTIN was a basically honest man.

KUNOV said his motives for trying to assist MARTIN and MITCHELL are based on huminatarian grounds, only, as he feels they are suffering under the Soviet system. He does not intend to take any further action to assist them in leaving the Soviet Union. KUNOV hopes to return to the Soviet Union next year for a more extended period of study.

This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided on condition that it is for use solely by the intelligence community of the receiving Government and that it not be declassified without the express permission of the Government of Canada.

Le présent document est la propriété du gouvernement du Canada. Il est communiqué sous réserve d'utilisation par les seuls services de renseignements du gouvernement destinataire et à la condition que sa cote de sécurité ne soit pas modifiée sans l'autorisation expresse du gouvernement canadien.

(d) [illegible]

(e) [illegible]

Re: Yuriy Igoryevich TORGOV

TORGOV, DOB 6 June, 1932 Vitebsk, USSR, Head of Laboratory, Computer Centre, Academy of Sciences, Moscow, was a visiting professor in Toronto and Ottawa, Canada, for four months - November 1974 to February 1975.

A number of sources were impressed by TORGOV's frankness and his willingness to speak out, at social gatherings, on current problem areas in the Soviet system. For example he discussed dissidents in Soviet society and commented on one occasion that present day Soviet society allowed for far greater freedom of expression than had been allowed previously. He said that things were being said in Moscow that one would never have heard in Stalin's era. Nevertheless, TORGOV argued that a return to "terror tactics" under Soviet rule was always possible. He considered that such tactics were unlikely at this time because of the personal philosophy of Premier Leonid BRESHNEV.

TORGOV is reported to be the son of a scientist and party member and he himself is an admitted party member. He is married with three children. He is considered to be one of the top experts on his field (computers) in the Soviet Union. He mentioned having travelled to other Western countries two or three times. His English is good. He was very friendly towards Canadians during his visit but it was observed that he did not associate with three other Soviet research students at the same institution. On one occasion in Ottawa he was berated quite severely by a Soviet Embassy official for his failure to report periodically, as required, to the Embassy. TORGOV later told a source that this Embassy official "could be a dangerous man to your country".

This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided on condition that it is for use solely by the intelligence community of the receiving Government and that it not be declassified without the express permission of the Government of Canada.

Le présent document est la propriété du gouvernement du Canada. Il est communiqué sous réserve d'utilisation par les seuls services de renseignements du gouvernement destinataire et à la condition que sa cote de sécurité ne soit pas modifiée sans l'autorisation expresse du gouvernement canadien.

SECRET

6 OCT 1975

US/75/539

Dear Harry,

We have learned that on the evening of 8 September 1975, James WILKINSON of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow had a conversation of interest with a Canadian Embassy Officer. Wilkinson stated that while attending a social function at the Australian Embassy, he engaged Canadian Consular Officer Geoffrey FARROW in conversation. Farrow advised that he had been recently approached by Dr. Harry KERNOV, an Associate Professor of English at the University of Toronto in Canada, regarding American defectors Bernon F. MITCHELL and William H. MARTIN. Kernov implied that he had had recent personal contact with one or both of the defectors and recommended that the Canadian government give Martin and Mitchell permission to emigrate to Canada. Farrow furnished no further details regarding Kernov's contact.

During the same conversation Farrow asked Wilkinson if he could supply any basic background material on Mitchell and Martin. Wilkinson replied that he would pass Farrow's request on to the Consular Section of the Embassy. Subsequently, Farrow was given an unclassified article concerning the defectors which appeared in the June 1961 issue of True magazine.

We would, of course, be interested in any indications that Martin and Mitchell are attempting to leave the USSR and would be grateful for any information you may be able to provide us in regard to the above.

I am using the CAZAB channel in this instance as this information has been passed to us informally.

Yours,

George T. Kalaris

George T. Kalaris

Mr. Harry Brandes

DDO/CI/R&A/T:LHWigren(2Oct75)

Distribution:
  Orig. & 1 - Addee
  1 - 165-2720 ✓
  1 - Reading File

SECRET

201-252338

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

4 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL,
William Hamilton MARTIN,
Espionage - R

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 17 July 1961, captioned as above, and also to Bureau letter dated 13 June 1961, addressed to the Director, National Security Agency, with copy to this Agency, Subject: "Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL, William Hamilton MARTIN, MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING".

2. The following information supplements the material on Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU aka DAMASKOS aka DAMASCUS, reported in paragraph 4 of our 17 July 1961 memorandum, referenced above.

a. Our representatives in Melbourne advised that Australian Security Service indices reflect that Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCOS, Greek national born 10 March 1911 at Alexandria, Egypt, arrived in Sydney, Australia, for permanent residence on 26 October 1956, aboard the S. S. STRATHNAVER, traveling on Greek Passport No. 2063/1949, issued 8 March 1949 at Alexandria, Egypt. At the time of his arrival in Sydney, DAMASCOU was in possession of Australian Visa No. 6334, issued in Cairo on 18 July 1956. He was described as follows: single, 5 feet 10 inches tall, normal build, brown eyes, black hair, occupation "writer". He departed Australia on 25 May 1960 aboard the S. S. ORONSAY, destination not indicated, and as of 18 July 1961 had not re-entered Australia.

b. Our representatives in Mexico City meanwhile had learned that Anastasia Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, sister of the above, on 8 July 1960 applied at the Mexican Consulate in San Antonio, Texas, for a Mexican Tourist Card to enter Mexico to visit her brother Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS, then residing at the Hotel

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

New York to Mexico City. At the time of her application for an entry permit, she made no mention of any wedding plans. The Mexican Government approved her trip on condition that she deposit with the Consulate a 10,000 Peso bond, as a guarantee of her intention to depart Mexico upon expiration of her tourist card. Mexican Immigration files contain no record of her actual arrival in Mexico following approval of her 8 July 1960 application. The most recent correspondence on this case contained in Mexican files is dated 15 February 1961, reflecting that Anastasie DAMASCOU again requested a Tourist Card on or about the date of the letter, at which time her address in the United States was given as c/o Mexican Consul, San Antonio, Texas. In reply to her second application for an entry permit, Mexican authorities again replied with a request that she post a bond in the amount of 10,000 Pesos, to guarantee departure from Mexico upon expiration of her tourist visa. There is no further information currently available on her further travel plans.

c. With reference to Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU, on basis of the information reported in preceding paragraph, a recheck by our representatives with officials of the United States Embassy in Mexico City revealed that Nicolas Georges DAMASKOU, born 10 March 1931 at Alexandria, Egypt, holder of Greek Passport 1951 issued in Alexandria, Egypt, on 5 March 1949 and valid to 29 April 1961, with address of 2 Elizabeth Bay Road, Elizabeth Bay, Sydney, Australia, was the recipient of a United States Visa on 22 October 1960. On his application, DAMASKOU indicated that he desired to visit the United States for a period of four months, described as a pleasure trip to visit his sister. His visa application did not include any destination address in the United States. It was also noted that the visa card maintained on Nicolas DAMASKOU in the Embassy in Mexico City contains a notation "I-683 to Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, May 29 1961."

d. Through a reliable confidential source our representatives in Egypt had learned in the interim that Nicolas DAMASCOU, who is identical with the individual described in preceding paragraphs, currently resides in Los Angeles, California, at 1690 North Gardner, Apartment 18, and that he advised his mother and younger brother, still residing in Alexandria, that he plans to marry the daughter of an American official, who is not further identified. The same source also advised that Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU, father of Nicolas and Anastasie DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, died during the summer of 1960. Following the demise of the father, Angelika DAMASCOU nee SAVOURAS, widowed mother of Nicolas and Anastasie

DAMASCOU, in company of a younger son not identified by name, had planned to emigrate from Egypt to join her son Nicolas in the United States. However, prior to the realization of these plans, Angelika DAMASCOU suffered a stroke, exact details concerning which are not known, but she is reported as of this writing still to be paralyzed and obviously is unable to travel. No further information was available on the possible future emigration plans of Angelika DAMASCOU nee SAVOURAS and/or of the unidentified younger brother of Nicolas DAMASCOU and of Anastasie DAMASCOU.

c. On basis of the reported filing of an application for a United States Visa in July 1956 at the U.S. Embassy in London by Anastasie DAMASCOU, our representatives in London were requested to initiate a check of British liaison indices in the names of Nicolas DAMASCOU and of Anastasie DAMASCOU. MI-5 advised that as of late July 1961, they hold no traces on Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU aka DAMASKOS aka DAMASCUS, but that although they had no traces on Anastasie DAMASCOU, they were continuing to check her possible residence in London during 1956, based on the reported visa application data. MI-6 advised that they hold no traces on either Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU aka DAMASCUS or on his sister Anastasie Georges DAMASCOU.

3. It is suggested that the indices of the Department of State, Visa Section as well as the indices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, may contain further detailed information on the current immigration status, whereabouts in the United States, and also the contacts in the United States of Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, of Anastasie Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUA, and any other members of the family who may have applied for entry visas from abroad.

4. With regard to Justo SIERRA Casasus, mentioned in above referenced memorandum of 17 July 1961 as a contact of Nicolas DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, it is suggested that the indices of the Department of State may contain additional information on his activities during his service at the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C.

5. The information reported above is for the internal use of

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

addressees only and may not be further disseminated without the prior permission of the originator.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

/S/

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

2 cc: National Security Agency
Attn: Mr. S. Wesley Reynolds

SECRET

NOFORN [illegible]

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

HX-17
17 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL,
William Hamilton MARTIN,
Espionage - R.

1. Reference is made to the following communications, which contain information pertinent to the new information reported in succeeding paragraphs:

a. Memorandum of 14 June 1961 from this Agency addressed to the National Security Agency, a copy of which was forwarded to your Bureau, captioned as above.

b. Bureau letter of 22 June 1961, addressed to the Director, National Security Agency, with copy to this Agency, captioned: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL, William Hamilton MARTIN; MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING.

c. Department of Immigration Name Check Request Form, File A-2, dated 28 June 1961 addressed to your Bureau with copy to this Agency, in the name of Justo SIERRA, born 12 July 1914, Mexico, D. F., who entered the United States at New Orleans, Louisiana, on 18 June 1961 with destination address of Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C. (Not sent information addressees)

d. Various earlier Department of Immigration Name Check Requests on Justo SIERRA covering his previous trips to this country. (Not to NSA)

e. Our memorandum of 29 December 1960, addressed to your Bureau, our reference CSCI-3/769,270 with enclosure, Subject: SIERRA, Justo; Visa - Mexican, and earlier communications forwarding name trace results on this individual. (Not to NSA)

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

c. Further inquiries in Mexico by our officials there revealed that Nicolas DAMASCUS had been ordered to leave Mexico in October 1960 solely because of the expiration of his tourist card, which had been once extended. Mexican Records fail to show that he returned to Mexico, following his entry into the United States at Brownsville, Texas, from Matamoros, Tamaulipas on 24 October 1960. Upon arrival in Mexico on 22 June 1960, he indicated that the purpose of his visit was to attend the wedding of his sister, Anastasie, identified in preceding paragraph, however, as of 21 June 1961, there was no record of Anastasie DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU in official Mexican Files, and there was as yet no identification of the individual she was alleged to have been scheduled to marry. From the same source it was learned that for the period 22 June through 6 September 1960, the only address listed in official indices for Nicolas DAMASCUS is c/o Justo SIERRA, Reforma 95-407, Mexico City, which is the law office maintained by Justo SIERRA Casasus, former Counselor of the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C., and who is further identified in the documents cited in paragraph 1. c. through h. above. DAMASCUS reportedly used SIERRA to attempt to obtain an extension of his tourist permit, although the details of his contacts with and knowledge of SIERRA himself are not known at this time. Neither has it been possible as of this date to verify the reported contact between Nicolas DAMASCUS and Subjects at the Hotel New Yorker, as reported by Mr. Thomas CONLON. Investigation efforts abroad by this Agency are continuing, however, and any further information developed will be forwarded as soon as available.

9. In light of the escape route used by the two NSA defectors, transiting Mexico and presumably Cuba enroute to the USSR, your particular attention is invited to the information concerning the contacts and views of Justo SIERRA Casasus furnished in the reports cited in paragraph 1. e., f., and g. above. It is noted Justo SIERRA Casasus is identical with the Senor Don Justo SIERRA, First Secretary at the Embassy of Mexico, mentioned in Bureau Reports cited in paragraph h. above as a contact of Boris A. KAZANTSEV, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington from 1952-54. It is further noted that Boris KAZANTSEV, after returning to Moscow in 1954 and assuming the post of First Secretary in the Latin American Division of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was next assigned from 1955 to 1957 as First Secretary and subsequently Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and that as of 1960 he was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Havana, Cuba, in the position of Counselor, departing Havana for Mexico, in company of his wife and daughter, on 30 June 1961, and then proceeding to Canada on 2 July 1961.

f. Teletyped Information Report from this Agency, dated 9 April 1959, Report No. TDCS-3/639,947, Subject: Contacts Between Fidel CASTRO Ruz and Lazaro CARDENAS .

g. Intelligence Report of this Agency dated 7 September 1956, Report No. CS-102629, Subject: Marxist Indoctrination of the Partido Popular .

h. Bureau Report dated 17 June 1954, prepared at Washington, D.C. by Special Agent Boyd D. Adsit, captioned: Soviet Cultivation of Latin American Diplomats - Internal Security - R ' and Bureau letter of 21 August 1954, addressed to this Agency, forwarding as Enclosure Washington Field Office Report of 16 August 1954, prepared by Special Agent William C. Cregar on the same subject. Bureau File Reference: 105-22386. (Not to NSA)

2. Since the writing of our memorandum of 14 June 1961, (cf. para 1.a. above), the following supplementary information has been developed concerning Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASKOS, who is a contact and client of Justo SIERRA Casasus, mentioned in the communications referenced in paragraphs 1. c. through h. above.

a. Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS reportedly is officially listed in Egypt under the name of Nicolas George DAMASCOU, born 10 March 1931 at Alexandria, the son of George DAMASCOU and Angelika DAMASCOU nee SAVOURAS. He is a Greek national and holds Greek citizenship. From 1947 through 1957, he resided at 57 Heliopolis Street in Alexandria. [Representatives of this Agency in Alexandria] advise that local available records indicate that as of May 1959, Nicolas DAMASCOU resided at 6 Birtley Place, Elizabeth Bay, Sydney, Australia, and that he listed his occupation as that of Clerk. Our field records indicate that as of May 1959, the United States Consulate in Sydney had some interest in him, and it is suggested that the indices of the Department of State may contain further information concerning this individual.

b. Anastasie (or Anastasia) George DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU, sister of Nicolas DAMASCUS, above, was born March 1933, place of birth not indicated but presumably Egypt, was identified by [our representatives in Alexandria] as having filed application for a United States Visa at London, England in July 1956, listing her occupation as that of entertainer. It is suggested that the Visa Files of the Department of State may contain additional information on this individual.

4. The records of this Agency indicate that Boris A. KAZANTSEV is a known Soviet Intelligence Officer, most probably representing Soviet State Security (KGB). It is requested that any further information which may be reflected in the indices of your Bureau, or those of information addressees, reflecting upon the relationship of Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU and his sister Anastasia Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU with Justo SIERRA Casasus, on the latter's contacts with representatives or agents of the CASTRO government in Cuba, or on SIERRA's continued contacts with KAZANTSEV or other suspect Soviet officials or agents in this country or elsewhere be forwarded to this Agency as quickly as possible. A request along the same lines has already been forwarded to our representatives in Mexico City, and you will be kept advised of any further information which may be developed in this regard.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

2 cc: National Security Agency

DD/P/FI/D/APotocki:mem

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - addressee
1 - CS Copy - 100-6-124/3
2 - OS/SRS
1 - CI/OPS
1 - 201-282337
1 - 201-282338

Based on:
201-24592, SIERRA
ALEX 2793 (IN 37468), 12 Jul 61
MEXI 8266 (IN 28014), 21 Jun 61
DIR 49505 (OUT 79310), 7 Jul 61

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 560
8 AUG 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/BELL 5 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR BELL AT 2140, 8 AUG)

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, C/WH 2, S/C 2

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

AUG 9 0048Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 10213

PRITY DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 8621

JMZIP RYBAT

REFS: A. MEXI 8565 (IN 47539)
B. MEXI 8522 (IN 44276)
C. HMMW 9598

BARBOSA [illegible], [illegible] Jose

1. ON 6 AUG 61, LITAMIL-6 (IDEN A) WENT HAVA VIA MEXICANA ATTEMPT MAKE CONTACT HIS FRIEND LIOOZE-1 AND CARRY OUT INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN HIM BY LITAMIL-5 IN PRESENCE CO RE CONTACT SABOTAGE TEAM STILL INTACT INSIDE CUBA. LITAMIL-6 ALSO CARRIED (IDEN C) WHICH WILL BE USED AS "CODE BOOK" WHEN CUBA/MEXI RADIO COMMO ESTABLISHED. LITAMIL-1 WHO RECRUITED LITAMIL-6 ONLY ONE AWARE HIS ATTEMPT CONTACT LIOOZE-1.

2. L-5 TOLD L-6 GO HAVA MAKE CONTACT WITH ENRIQUE COLLAZO (NOT KNOWN WHETHER SUBJ MEXI 7723) WHO LIVES CALLE "A" 509 VEDADO, HAVA. L-6 CARRIED OTHER HALF MEDICAL FLYSHEET AS "BONA FIDES" WHICH PREVIOUSLY TAKEN TO COLLAZO BY DIETER LAEGENFELDER (NO TRACES) GERMAN DRUGGIST WHO WENT HAVA 30 JULY PER L-5 INSTRUCTIONS. COLLAZO WILL TAKE L-6 TO "JESUS BADAL" (PSEUDO) WHO

E

E

SECRET

201-267298 Litamil

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

IN 10213 MEXI 8621

ACTION MAN SABOTAGE UNIT. L-5 REPORTS THIS GROUP HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH KUBARK PBPRIME BY RADIO. ALSO IN RADIO CONTACT TAMAYO FNU ("INDIO AZUL") IN CARA. L-6 WILL GIVE "BADAL" CODE BOOK AND TELL HIM CLANDESTINE RADIO MEXI USING NAME "RADIO CUBA LIBRE" WILL BE OPERATION SOON. WILL ASK "BADAL" ATTEMPT MAKE RADIO CONTACT MEXI.

3. RADIO TRANSMITTER MEXI RECEIVED THROUGH (IDEN B) AS "GIFT" TO LITAMIL-1. STATION THROUGH LITAMIL-1 PAID TRAVEL EXPENSES LITAMIL-6 AND FAMILY (2) PRESENTLY CUBA WHICH WILL RETURN WITH HIM.

EXPECT RADIO BE IN OPERATION WITHIN TWO WEEKS. PLAN USE L-6 "VOICE" "RADIO CUBA LIBRE". STATION REQUESTS UTMOST SECURITY RE OP CITED ABOVE AS "LEAK" BACK TO MEXI WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE RELATIONS LITAMIL COMPLEX HERE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

(Carrillo)

MACHADO Llosas, Manuel 201-267298 (Mexi desk) JUN 1960

1. Biographical Data: Born 12 December 1913, Auras, Oriente, Cuba. He now lives in Mexico and is owner and manager of a printing establishment, "Manuel MACHADO, S.A.", Tlalpan 710, in Mexico City. He is single and well-off financially.

2. Political Activities: Machado was a member of the 26th of July group of Cuban revolutionaries in Mexico. Now he is in exile in Mexico. He was Treasurer of the Mexican movement and handled operational funds. He was a good friend of Fidel Castro, but became disillusioned with the Castro government some months ago and is ready to fight against it.

3. Security Aspects: Machado is a CIA Agent (LITAMIL-1, POA/OA requested 9 Dec 1959; POA granted 8 January 1960; OA granted 6 June 1960). The Mexico City Station planned to use him to report on the activities of Cuban revolutionaries and possibly, due to his friendship with Fidel Castro and members of the Cuban Government, as a "political action" asset. (Note - the Mexican Desk is interested in any action taken on Machado, since he is their agent. They hold his 201-267298).

4. Contacts: Machado is a friend of Ambassador Arcos y Bergnes. He also has a certain amount of prestige in revolutionary circles.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ORIG: MARY KOURIMBIS
UNIT: E/AS/S
EXT: 7963
DATE: 16 JUNE 1970

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1		5	
2	C/AS	6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-746537

CONF: E/AS/S INFO: FILE, VR, C/FI, CI/OPS, CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 10 22 29 z JUN 70 CITE DIRECTOR 074164

TO BERN INFO BONN FRANKFURT BERLIN MUNICH ZURICH

INK

REF: A. BERN 8708 (IN 102149)
B. FRANKFURT 3270 (IN 103431)

1. NAMES LISTED PARA 3 REF A BONA FIDE.

2. SINCE DOCUMENT TITLE APPEARS TOO GENERAL OR INCOMPLETE CANNOT READILY IDENTIFY AT THIS TIME.

3. NO OBJECTION PASS INFO CONTAINED PARA 3 DIRECTOR 80955 IF BERN FEELS WILL ASSIST INBREED INVESTIGATION.

4. FILE: 201-746537.

END OF MESSAGE

CI/Liaison
James Ludlum

CI/OPS/EUR

E/G

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/E/FI/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/E/AS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT: A/CG INFO FILE, VR CI/HA CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO: 081

S E C R E T 121014Z JUN 70 CITE BERN 8708

12 Jun 70 102149

DIRECTOR, BONN, FRANKFURT, BERLIN INFO ZURICH

INK

15450

REF: ZURICH 1622, 17 MAR 1969, ET. AL. (NOT NEEDED BONN FRANKFURT)

1. INBREED HAS REPORTED THAT RICHARD CASE NAGELL BORN 5 AUGUST 1930, NEW YORK, US CIT, HAS AGAIN COME TO SWISS ATTENTION. IN MID APRIL 1970 HE REGISTERED AT ZURICH HOTEL. ON 15 APRIL 1970 REPORTED TO POLICE THAT HIS RAINCOAT HAD DISAPPEARED. CLAIMED THAT AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT INTENDED FOR THE AMERICAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN BERLIN WAS IN THE POCKET. DOCUMENT WAS ENTITLED "FISCAL YEAR 70 (USAREUR)."

2. RAINCOAT WAS FOUND SHORT WHILE LATER IN HOTEL SANS ALLEGED DOCUMENT. HOTEL TURNED RAINCOAT OVER TO ZURICH POLICE WHERE SUBJ SUBSEQUENTLY PICKED IT UP.

3. WHEN QUESTIONED BY POLICE, SUBJ GAVE AS REFERENCES:

A. COL. FRANCIS H. DILLON, OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGNECE AND SECURITY, DIA, WASHINGTON.

B. FRANCIS X. PLANT, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, OFFICE OF UNDER SECRETARY OF ARMY.

C. BRUCE A. FLATIN, PUBLIC SAFETY SECTION, US MISSION

Z

ANLMA	
~~AD-Y~~	
~~IN~~	
~~FS~~	
~~FK~~	
~~PSS~~	~~NPD~~
FI	

SECRET CS COPY

12 June 70
201-746537

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

JUN 17 19 1 31 PM '70

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO: FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PAGE 2 BERN 8708 SECRET

BERLIN.

4. SUBJ CLAIMED HE NOW LIVING HOTEL STADT DRESDEN, BERLIN-CHARLOTTENBURG, STUTTERTER PLATZ 17.

5. BONN FRANKFURT BERLIN: SUBJ IS FABRICATOR AND MENTAL CASE WHO PERIODICALLY CAUSES TROUBLE FOR SWISS AND LNPURE CONSULATES IN SUISSE.

6. HQS: REQUEST PERMISSION PASS INBREED INFO CONTAINED PARA 3 DIRECTOR 80955, 6 MARCH 1969. OTHER ADDEES: PLEASE ADVISE APPROPRIATE US ARMY AUTHORITIES ON OFF CHANCE THEY ARE MISSING COPY OF "FISCAL YEAR 70 (USAREUR)."

7. FILE 201-746537. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 13

SECRET

261N44Z CIR 215000

CONF C/LA 6 INFO: FILE [illegible] C/CI2 [illegible]
C/PCS, AG/000.

DISSEM BY: PER SOO # 132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R.K. MCHARGUE/GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION. Y

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS Y

CIR-316/03605-77 Y

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF ORLANDO LETELIER; INFORMATION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CORU Y

REFERENCE: FIRCI-312/03290-77, 7 OCTOBER 1977 Y

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PERTAINS TO INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN REFERENCE. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY EUGENE M. PROPPER. Y

2. THIS AGENCY HAS NO INFORMATION ON ROBERTO CARRERAS, AN ARGENTINE NATIONAL WHO WAS IDENTIFIED AS A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE GULF AND WESTERN CORPORATION AT THE FALCONBRIDGE PROJECT, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (SIC) AND WHO IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY "EL ROSARIO" MINE. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN DECEMBER 1976 THE SAME SOURCE WHO PROVIDED PARAGRAPHS 2 - 6 OF REFERENCE REPORTED THAT EULALIO FRANCISCO "FRANK" CASTRO PAZ AND ROLANDO OTERO (HERNANDEZ) TRAVELLED AT LEAST

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-284811
DO NOT DESTROY

E 2 IMPDET

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

SECRET

NOV 16 3 14 PM '77

CIA

115000

CONF INFO FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER

TWICE TO LA ROMANA TO SEE ALVARO CARTA, CUBAN BORN PRESIDENT OF GULF AND WESTERN AMERICAS, TO SEEK ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.) (SANTO DOMINGO STATION COMMENT: CARTA NOW HAS A TOP JOB WITH GULF AND WESTERN IN CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA.)Y

3. RUBEN SOTO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE SOTO PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED TO YOU AS ONE OF THE BEST FRIENDS OF U.S. ARMY MAJOR JUAN ARMAND MONTES. SOTO, THE OWNER OF "LA FRANCESA" BAKERY (PASTRY SHOP) AND A CUBAN EXILE, IS KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA AND FRANK CASTRO.Y

A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED IN LATE 1976 THAT HE WAS TOLD BY A CUBAN EXILE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC THAT A DELEGATION OF LOCAL CUBANS, AMONG THEM RUBEN SOTO, WAS SOLICITING MONEY FOR CUBAN RIGHTIST ACTIVITIES.Y

ONE RUBEN SOTO HAYET, WHO WAS BORN IN ISLA DE PINOS, CUBA, ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1937, WAS A MEMBER OF BRIGADE 2506 AND WAS A CANDIDATE TO RECEIVE PARAMILITARY TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY IN EARLY 1962. THERE HAS BEEN NO AGENCY CONTACT WITH SOTO HAYET SINCE THEN.Y

IN 1963 ONE RUBEN SOTO AULET, POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH RUBEN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 309499

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

SECRET

CIA
115000

CONF INFO FILE

0
0
0 PSP
0

DISSEM BY:

SOTO HAYET, WAS DESCRIBED AS A FORMER 2506 BRIGADE MEMBER WHO WAS AN EXECUTIVE MEMBER OF THE MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY {MRR}.

4. IN DECEMBER 1976 THE SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 2 - 6 OF REFERENCE REPORTED THAT IN JULY OR AUGUST 1976, DURING A MEETING OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES AT THE PIZZA RESTAURANT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ARMANDO CABALLEROS, OWNER OF THE RESTAURANT, SPOKE OPENLY ABOUT PLANS TO ASSASSINATE "UN GRAN FUNCIONARIO AMERICANO" IN COSTA RICA. {HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: PLEASE SEE CIOL-0445-76, 23 DECEMBER 1976, WHICH PROVIDED YOU WITH INFORMATION ON TERRORIST PLOTTING OF CUBAN EXILES AND INFORMATION RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF U.S. ARMY MAJOR MONTES. IN RELATION TO THE PARAGRAPH TWO MEETING, SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER MET IN EITHER MEXICO OR COSTA RICA WITH "AN IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT NAMED HART" {PROBABLY ARMANDO HART DAVALOS}. KISSINGER WAS LABELED A TRAITOR AND PLANS WERE DISCUSSED TO ASSASSINATE HIM IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH COORDINATING THIS ACTION WAS PETER {OR PEDRO}

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 009499

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4

SECRET

CIA
115000

CONF· INFO: FILE

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

MARTINEZ. SOURCE BELIEVED THAT MARTINEZ RESIDED IN MIAMI. THE PLAN WAS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE THE "CIA FOUND OUT" AND "AN IMPORTANT EXILE," IDENTIFIED AS MANOLO REYES, WHO ALSO LIVED IN MIAMI, OBJECTED AND THREATENED TO ADVISE [redacted] A PROMINENT U.S. POLITICIAN [redacted].34 101-294805

ONE ARMANDO CABALLERO PARODI, WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 10 JULY 1941, WAS A FORMER MEMBER OF THE 2506 BRIGADE. HE WAS TERMINATED BY THIS AGENCY IN MAY 1963. IN LATE 1963 THERE WAS INTEREST IN USING CABALLERO IN TEACHING INFILTRATION TECHNIQUES BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS CONTACTED IN THIS REGARD.Y

5. THIS AGENCY HAS NO INFORMATION ON DANILO GONZALEZ, IDENTIFIED AS PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN CLUB IN SANTO DOMINGO, OR ON LOCAL EMPLOYEES OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN SANTO DOMINGO, JOSE RENE ROMAN, JOSE JEREZ OR FRANKLIN POLANCO.Y

No 201 No 201 201-778401 No-201

6. JORBGE ALONSO PUJOLS IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JORGE ALONSO-PUJOL BERMUDEZ WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 20 JULY 1923. HE IS THE SON OF FORMER CUBAN VICE PRESIDENT GUILLERMO ALONSO-PUJOL, WHO SERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF CARLOS PRIO. ALONSO-PUJOL RECEIVED

753235 61063

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: C09499

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES

5

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

CIA

115000

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO. FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY DURING 1961 AND WAS CAPTUREDBAT THE BAY OF PIGS. HIS FATHER PURPOTEDLY PAID $100,000 FOR HIS SON'S RELEASE. HOWEVER, AT THE TIME THE RANSOM WAS EFFECTED, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION AMONG EXILES IN THE MIAMI AREA THAT HIS FATHER DID NOT PAY THE RANSOM BUT HAD MADE A DEAL WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT FOR ALONSO-PUJOL TO UNDERTAKE PRO-CASTRO PROPAGANDA IN LATIN AMERICA IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS FREEDOM. ALONSO-PUJOL WAS ARRESTED IN MIAMI IN JUNE 1970 ON NARCOTICS-RELATED CHARGES. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION ON JORGE ALONSO-PUJOL BERMUDEZ.Y

7. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTBFY ERNESTO HERNANDEZ BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.Y

110-201

201-834598

34-834598

8. PABLO MARTIN IS THE PEN NAME USED BY AVENOL FRANCO, WHO IS ALSO KNOBWN AS FRANCISCO AVENOLL. FRABCO, WHO MAY NOT BE IDENTICAL WITH THE MARTIN MENTIONED IN REFERENCE, WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 26 JUNE 1936. FRANCO HAS SERVED AS PROPAGANDA SECRETARY FOR THE CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION "JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA" AND WAS EDITOR OF THE ANTI-CASTRO

201-834598N

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:009499

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

CIA 115006

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 DISSEM BY:

0

0 RETURN TO PER

0 #

PUBLICATION "AMIGO DEL PUEBLO" AS OF MAY 1968.Y

201-853367

9. FRANK TEIRA IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH FRANCISCO ANTONIO
201-853367
TEIRA ALBBFONSO WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 12 JULY 1934. TEIRA IS A FORMER CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHO JUMPED SHIP IN PANAMA IN JULY 1969 AND REQUESTED ASYLUM. HE HAS APPEARED BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY AND HAS GIVEN TESTIMONY RBELATING TO THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE U.S. VIA THE CARIBBEAN.Y

10. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY LUIS
NON
ROSS BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.Y

201-332287

11. JOSE AGUILA IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH JOSE RAMON FLORENCIO
G 201-332287
AUILA CALIMANO WHO BWAS BORN IN LAS VILAS, CUBA, ON 27 OCTOBER 1932. AGUILA HAS LONG BEEN IDENTIFIED AS AN INFORMANT FOR DOMINICAN INTELLIGENCE.Y

201-298826

12. ONE A. WILFREDO BLANCO (DEL) CASTILLO, BORN IN GUINES, CUBA, ON 6 FEBRUARY 1943, WAS SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE PARAMILITARY TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY IN EARLY 1961. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON A. WILFREDO BLANCO DEL CASTILLO.Y

13. LEVI MARRERO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH LEVI C. MARRERO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 009499

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
7

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA
115000

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

ARTILES WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 5 OCTOBER 1910. MARRERO HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF THE PEOPLE {PRP} SINCE ITS FORMATION IN COSTA RICA IN NOVEMBER 81972.Y

14. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY JOSE LUIS PRADO BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.Y

✓ [illegible]

✓ 201-355380

15. ANDRES SARGEN IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ANDRES NAZARIO SARGEN WHO WAS BORN IN LAS VILAS, CUBA, ON 11 MARCH 1926. NAZARIO IS A LONG TIME ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVIST AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION "ALPHA 66."Y

✓ 201-355380

✓ 201-297817

16. JORGE MAS CANOSA IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JORGE LINCOLN MAS CANOSA WHO WAS BORN IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1939. MAS WAS RECRUITED BY THIS AGENCY IN MARCH 1961 TO PARTICIPATE IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. HE HAS NOT BEEN USED BY THIS AGENCY IN ANY 8OPERATIONAL CAPACITY SINCE THE BAY OF PIGS. MAS HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE {RECE} GROUP. IN JANUARY 1966 HE WAS THE SUBJECT OF A DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INQUIRY REGARDING CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN A HIT-AND-RUN RAID CONDUCTED IN THE HAVANA HARBOR AREA IN NOVEMBER 1965.Y

✓ 201-297817 amended

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 009499

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 8

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

CIA
115000

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

201-285794

17. JUAN PEREZ FRANCO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JUAN EDUARDO 201-285794 PEREZ FRANCO WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 28 JANUARY 1928. PEREZ RECEIVED PARAMILITARY TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY IN LATE 1960 AND WAS ACTIVE IN THE 2506 BRIGADE. AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH PEREZ WAS TERMINATED IN JANUARY 1962.Y

H 110-701

18. FREDDY LUGO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE FREDDY LUGO WHO WAS ARRESTED IN 1976 IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBANA AIRLINER CRASH.Y

N 0701

H 110-701 19. GERMAN LOZANO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH GERMAN RICARDO LOZANO WHO WAS ARRESTED ALONG WITH FREDDY LUGO IN 1976.Y

20. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY N 0701 FERNANDO BUENO BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.Y

201-355001

21. GENERAL JUAN NEPOMUCENO FOLCH PEREZ, AIR ADVISOR TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WAS BORN IN PUERTO PLATA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ON 3 AUGUST 1926. FOLCH HAS SERVED AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE AND MORE RECENTLY AS AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF. IN LATE MAY 1972 USDAO, SANTO DOMINGO, REPORTED THAT FORMER CHIEF 201-106192 OF THE CUBAN NATIONAL POLICE, GENERAL MANUEL BENITEZ VALDEZ, HAD

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: C09499

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA
115000

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

VISITED THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN AN EFFORT TO SELL, TO THE DOMINICANS, ARMAMENT AND SPARE PARTS FROM A U.S.-BASED FIRM WHICH BENITEZ WAS REPRESENTING. BENITEZ HAD CONTACTED TWO DOMINICAN GENERALS, ONE OF THEM BEING FOLCH. USDAO COMMENTED THAT FOLCH'S ASSOCIATION WITH CUBAN EXILES AND ARMS SALESMEN HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE DURING 1972 AND THAT FOLCH WAS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED WITH MILITANT CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, SUCH AS "ALPHA 66," DURING 1962-1963.Y

22. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, IN LATE DECEMBER 1965 ONE VIRGILIO POU (H-400701) WAS IDENTIFIED AS A MEMBER OF A RIGHTIST GROUP WHICH WAS ORGANIZED TO COUNTER THE SPREADING OF INFLUENCE BY FORMER "CONSTITUTIONALISTS" IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE GROUP WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLACING PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE AT THE GRAVESITE OF LT. COLONEL RAFAEL TOMAS FERNANDEZ (H- No201) DOMINGUEZ IN SANTIAGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, IN MID-DECEMBER 1965 IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO MURDER COLONEL FRANCISCO CAAMANO DENO (201-775139), WHO WAS ATTENDING A CEREMONY IN HONOR OF FERNANDEZ. THE GROUP WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN ITS ATTEMPT TO DETONATE THE EXPLOSIVE.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 009499

14-00000

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF. 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE OF PAGES 10

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA

CONF. INFO: FILE .115006

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #201-

✓201-878309

23. FRANK CABRAL IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH DR. FRANK CABRAL CALCAGNO WHO WAS BORN IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ON 6 FEBRUARY 1942. CABRAL SERVED AS CIVILIAN ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER FROM 1970 UNTIL HIS ARREST IN LATE JUNE 1974 AS A RESULT OF THE DISCOVERY OF NUMEROUS WEAPONS AND TELTAP EQUIPMENT IN HIS HOME. CABRAL HAD USED HIS RESIDENCE AS A CENTER OF OPERATIONS WHILE RUNNING HIS OWN INTELLIGENCE NETWORK. CABRAL WAS SENT INTO EXILE AND RETURNED TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM SPAIN IN JULY 1975. HE HAS SERVED AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE DISSIDENT FACTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUISQUEYAN PARTY (PQD).Y

✓201-842677

24. MAJOR JUAN POU CASTRO, MORE COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS JUAN POU, JUNIOR, IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE BROTHER OF MAJOR JOAQUIN ANTONIO POU CASTRO. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON JUAN POU. HOWEVER, HIS BROTHER JOAQUIN, WHO WAS BORN IN SANTO DOMINGO ON 1 MARCH 1935, GAINED NOTORIETY BY "NEUTRALIZING" TERRORISTS WHEN HE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION (J-2) OF THE DOMINICAN ARMED FORCES.Y

✓201-842677

H ✓ ND 71

25. IN APRIL 1966 ONE COLONEL PAULINO REYES DE LEON, WHO IS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 8007499

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA 115000

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE REYES MENTIONED IN REFERENCE, WAS ONE OF ~~W~~THREE DOMINICAN MILITARY OFFICERS WHO WAS CALLED TO SANTO DOMINGO TO BE QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED PLOT TO ASSASSINATE GENERAL JOSE MORILLO. PREVIOUS INFORMATION FROM 1965 INDICATES THAT JOSE PAULINO REYES DE LEON, WHO WAS BORN ON 5 MAY 1932 IN LA VEGA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, WAS COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL POLICE IN SAN FRANCISCO DE MACORIS.Y

26. AN FBIS ITEM FROM JULY 1966 IDENTIFIES ONE CAPTAIN FELIPE E. ROJAS LOPEZ AS AN AIDE WITH THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ROJAS LOPEZ. {SANTO DOMINGO STATION COMMENT: SOURCE WAS NOT POSITIVE THAT ROJAS ATTENDED THE MEETING.}Y

27. ONE MAJOR DARIO L. DIAZ GIL, WHO WAS BORN IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ON 19 DECEMBER 1936, IS A MEMBER OF THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE PARACHUTE BRIGADE.Y

28. ANA MARGARITA (DE) WINDT IS THE WIFE OF EULALIO FRANCISCO {FRANK} CASTRO PAZ.Y

29. IN MAY 1977 OUR MEXICO CITY FIELD STATION IDENTIFIED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 009499

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA 115000

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

H 10701

WINFRED E. HODGEN AS THE PARTNER OF FRANK CASTRO. THE STATION ADVISED THAT IN EARLY 1977 HODGEN GAVE A PHONY CHECK FROM A MIAMI BANK IN THE AMOUNT OF $23,000 TO A DOMINICAN MONEY CHANGER (FNU) SANTANA. SANTANA STATED THAT HE HAD CHANGED "███MANY MANY" DOLLAR CHECKS INTO DOMINICAN PESOS FOR HODGEN/CASTRO AND THIS███ WAS THE FIRST PHONY CHECK. SANTANA ALSO SAID HE BELIEVED HODGEN WAS HIDING IN GUATEMALA.Y

IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE FAA MAY HA~~D~~VE ADDITIONAL PEERTINENT INFORMATION ON WINFRED E. HODGEN.Y

30. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY THIS AGENCY ON EULALIO FRANCISCO CASTRO PAZ, ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA AND GUILLERMO NOVO SAMPOL HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO YOU IN PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE.Y

✓201-142365 ✓201-284811 ✓201-299292 ✓N0161

31. THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS ACQUIRED BY CIA PURSUANT TO ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE ON FOREIGN ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THIS AGENCY.Y

32. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-1,2.H

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 009499

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 13

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE .115000

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #.

"B CODE" TO FOLLOWING: 201-0292411 {SOTO-HAYET}, 201-0284805 {CABALLERO}, 201-0294335 {ALONSO-PUJOL}, 201-0834598 {FRANCO} 201-0653367 {TEIRA}, 201-0332287 {AGUILA}, 201-0298826 {BLANCO}, 201-0355380 {NAZARIO}, 201-0297817 {MAS}, 201-0285794 {PEREZ, 201-0355001 {FOLCH}, 201-0878309 {CABRAL}, 201-0842677 {POU, JOAQUIN}, INDEX: MAJOR DARIO L. DIAZ GIL; WINFRED E. HODGEN, AND ANA MARGARITA DE WINDT, WIFE OF CASTRO PAZ {201-0742365}.

ORIG: LA/AN/CH {BASHAW X1034}; COORD: C/LA/AN {BEARDSLEY}; C/LA/CAR {PALMER}; C/LA/COG {LATRASH}; AGC/DDO {GOLDIN}; C/LA/OPS {DISTEFANO}; SA/C/LA {STURBITTS}; AUTH: C/LAD {WARREN}; REL: C/PCS/LSN/ID {KUHN}.

C/LA/AN Beardsley
C/LA/CBAR
C/LA/COG
AGC/DDO Goldin
C/LA/OPS ✓
SA/C/LA

DATE: 20 OCTOBER 1977
ORIG: ALICE BASHAW
UNIT: LA/AN/CH
EXT: 1034

C/PCS/LSN/ID
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 009499

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 21 JULY 1977

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; EXPLOSION IN CAR
DRIVEN BY ORLANDO LETELIER - VICTIM
(DECEASED) ....

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 21 JULY 1977

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; EXPLOSION IN CAR
DRIVEN BY ORLANDO LETELIER - VICTIM
(DECEASED) ....

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 48 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/LA8

ACTION #

INFO FILE. C/IPDMS, C/C14, [illegible]2

T 122483 EIA382 PAGE 01 IN 385643

TOR:262123Z AUG 77 SAGO 37016

RID ☒

S E C R E T 262109Z AUG 77 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 37016

TO: BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL [redacted] FUDWELL

REF: MEMO OF 4 AUG 77 FROM LEGATT BUENOS AIRES FORWARDED BY TM

1. PLS PASS FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO LEGATT SCHERRER KEYED TO HIS REF MEMO ON DEBRIEFING OF ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ:

1) NO STATION, DAO TRACES ON MAJOR (FNU) TORRES.

2) NO STATION TRACES MARCELO (MARCELLO) ESTOBEL OR ESTROBEL (PH). ONLY NAME CLOSE IS ONE MARIO ESTIBIL (SIC) MAHUIDA, WHO DESCRIBED IN FEB 72 AS A 1ST CLASS DETECTIVE WHO ENTERED THE SERVICE IN 1954.

3) NO STATION TRACES ALFREDO VILLAVACA.

4) THERE ARE SEVERAL PARACHUTE CLUBS IN SANTIAGO, BUT WE HAVE NOT YET IDENTIFIED ONE CALL "LOS SCORPIONES."

5) THIS PROBABLY A REFERENCE TO TOBALABA AIR STRIP, WHICH LOCATED ON SOUTHERN OUTSKIRTS OF SANTIAGO.

6) NO TRACES ON CAPTAINS JUAN WILLIAMS OR ALEJANDRO ROMEAL IN ADDITION TO THOSE PASSED YOU DURING YOUR RECENT VISIT HERE.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-284811
DO NOT DESTROY

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1			
2		5	
3		6	

T 122483 E1A382 PAGE 02-02 IN 385643

TOR:262123Z AUG 77 SAGO 37216

2. STATION CAN QUERY SOURCE FORMERLY IN DINA FOR INFO ABOVE NAMED PERSONS, BUT AT SOME SLIGHT RISK OF ALERTING GOC TO USG INTEREST. PLS ADVISE IF YOU WOULD LIKE US TO MAKE THIS QUERY.

3. FILE: 200-12-20/1. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

2771 ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ

Fecha de Nacimiento: 12 de abril de 1941

Natural: Marianao, Pinar del Rio- Habana.

Fecha integro el grupo: Sept. 1960

Especialista: Oficina y armas cortas, pistola y revolver.

Nombre de sus Sres. Padres: Rolando y Margot.

Nombre de su Sra. Esposa: No.

Otras Observaciones: 1) 1er. ano de Bachillerato, Restaurant 3 meses y bodega de su padre 5 meses, Ayuntamiento de Marianao 2 meses en 1957, Nov. 19 legal a cayo Hueso 2) Catolica; 3) Ninguna; 4) Gobierno que respete el derecho de los ciudadanos y lleve a una economia; 5) Economia desarrollada al maximo; 6) Ejercito, Aviacion Militar.

Directamente Miami.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
Conducted On 22 MAR 77
[illegible]
00077

2791 ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ

Fecha de Nacimiento: 18 de abril de 1941

Natural: Marianao, Pinar del Rio- Soltero.

Fecha integro el grupo: Sept. 1960

Especialista: Oficina y armas cortas, pistola y revolver.

Nombre de sus Sres. Padres: Rolando y Margot.

Nombre de su Sra. Esposa: No.

Otras Observaciones: 1) 1er. ano de Bachillerato, Restaurant 7 meses y bodega de su padre 5 meses. Ayuntamiento de Marianao 2 meses en 1957, Nov. 19 legal a Cayo Hueso 2) Catolico; 3) Ninguno; 4) Gobierno que respete el derecho de los ciudadanos y lleve a [illegible] economica; 5) Economia desarrollada al maximo; 6) Ejercito, Aviacion Militar.

Directamente Miami.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

Conducted On 22 mar 72

CIA [illegible]

600??

TVII [illegible]



No. 2731

Nombre Otero Hernández Rolando Team A

Estatura [illegible]. 8

Peso 150

Color Ojos Castaño Pardos color del Pelo Negro

Cicatrices visibles ninguna

$1 - 2 - \overset{o}{3} - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 - \overset{o}{14} - 15 - 16$

RECORD DENTAL:

$32 - 31 - 30 - 29 - 28 - 27 - 26 - 25 - 24 - 23 - 22 - 21 - 20 - 19 - 18 - 17$

Dedos pulgares:

Izquierdo

Derecho

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 22 MAR 77
E2 IMPDET CL BY 012150
600977

201- 284811

14-00000

NAME : Rolando OTERO Hernandes

TRAINEE [illegible] : 2731

[illegible] 3264

[illegible] : 1

COMPANY : Airborne

STATUS : Captured

[illegible] :

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON: 23 Mar 77
DOWNGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL
E2 IMPDET CL BY 012180
60077

SECRET

201-254511

HOJA DE INDENTIFICACION PERSONAL.

NUMERO 2731

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS Eduardo Otero [illegible]

FECHA Y LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO 1º Abril - 1941 - Marianao - Habana

ESTADO CIVIL ~~[illegible]~~ - SOLTERO

EDUCACION QUE POSEE GRADUADO PARA 10mo GRADO = ALGUNA EXP EN OFICINA MECANOGRAFO

PROFESION ESTUDIANTE

OTRAS APTITUDES EXP - COMERCIO - POCO INGLES - SE MANEJAR CARRO

EXPERIENCIA MILITAR Ninguna

FECHA DE SALIDA DE CUBA Y VIA QUE UTILIZO (Ponga si salio legal o ilegalmente
19 Noviembre - 1959 - Aerovias "Q"
Key West - FLORIDA. - LEGAL

FECHA DE LLEGADA A LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS Y EN QUE CONDICIONES LEGALES VIVIA ALLI
19 Noviembre 1959 - VIA LEGAL KEY WEST - VISA DE ESTUDIANTE

INFORMACION DE UTILIDAD SOBRE COSAS QUE SEPA DE SU PAIS CONOCIMIETOS de la ciudad de Pinar del Rio, y sus puestos MILITARES CARRETERAS ALREDEDORES, PLANTA ELECTRICA etc. en la ciudad de "Marianao" ESTACIONES POLICIACAS etc: ARROYO ARENAS. LA HABANA CENTROS principales EN PARTE

[illegible]
Conducted On 22 mar 77
E2 [illegible] 0.2.50
60047

Eduardo Otero
Firma

ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ

INDENTIFICACION PERSONAL (BASE TRAX)

NUMERO 2721

PELOTOM Y TEAM A

FECHA DE NACIMIENTO 18 Abril 1941

NATURAL Marianao ~~y~~ P del Rio y Habana

FECHA INTEGRO EL GRUPO Sept 1960

ESPECIALISTA Oficina.

NOMBRE SUS SRS. PADRES Rolando y Margot

NOMBRE SU SRA. ESPOSA No

NOMBRE Y EDAD SUS HIJOS No

AQUI SE PONDRA LAS VECES QUE HA SIDO JUZGADO

OTRAS OBSERVACIONES

22 Mar 77

103 0244

60097

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 13 JANUARY 1977

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY
ORGANIZATIONS (CORU)

FBI FILE NO: 2-471 (MIAMI)

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

OTERO, ROLANDO
201-0284811 201-0742365
SEX M SCCM-17911
09 DEC 76

CURRENTLY IN PRISON MBR OF HALCONES DORADOS TEAM
LOC USA, FLA, MIAMI. SUBJ OF 201-0945645 LIST OF CORU MBRS /COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS/ IN TOUCH IN MIAMI.

DATE 13 JAN 77 09466726

201-284811

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
(When Filled In)

14 Dec 76
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on OILRO (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ Should be closed. (If this category applies, affix Records Officer stamp.)

☐ Unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7.
Explanation:

☐ Witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ Potential witting collaborator; date opened:
OI Code A2.

☒ Former witting collaborator (relationship terminated).
OI Code A3.

☐ Potential witting collaborator never contacted. OI Code A4.

☐ Counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ All others. OI Code A6.

Signed [illegible] M. [illegible] (name) Op Research [illegible] Analyst (title) LA/COG/LA (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed JM (initials) 14 Dec 76 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file. 201-

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
(When Filled In)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061475

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

(Please Type)

Supplementary Explanatory Notes For Those Items With An Asterisk (*) Following The Item Number Are Contained On The Reverse Side

TO: IP/DMS Room GA-20 Tube Address: DW-6

DATE [illegible]

FROM: [illegible]

OFFICE DESIGNATION (DDM 9-80)

ROOM [illegible]

PHONE [illegible]

TUBE ADDRESS [illegible]

1.* TYPE OF ACTION (Select Only One)

- OPEN 201 ☐
- AMEND 201 ☐
- ADD CRYPTONYM ☐
- CANCEL CRYPTONYM ☐

2. TYPE OF FILE CONTROL (Select Only One)

- HOLD UNRESTRICTED IN IP/CRU ☐
- HOLD IN IP/CRU BUT RESTRICT TO DESK ☐
- PERMANENTLY CHARGE TO DESK ☐

(IP Use Only)

3.* ENTER CRYPTONYM(S) ONLY IF CRYPTONYM ACTION HAS BEEN INDICATED IN ITEM 1.

SUPERSEDED CRYPTONYM

NEW CRYPTONYM

4. TRUE NAME (L A S T,) (First) (Middle)

[illegible]

5. 201 NUMBER

201- [illegible]

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (For Type, Use A For Alias, V For Variant or AKA, M For Maiden)

TYPE	(L A S T,)	(First)	(Middle)

7. SEX (X ONE) M ☐ F ☐

8. DATE OF BIRTH, IF CIRCA CHECK BOX ☐ DAY MONTH YEAR

9. COUNTRY, PROVINCE, CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH (IP Use Only)

10.* CITIZENSHIP U.S. NATURALIZED (IP Use Only)

11. OCCUPATION (IP Use Only)

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION(S) OR TARGET ORGANIZATION(S)

13. OI CODE(S)

14. ACTION DESK CODE (IP Use Only)

15.* COUNTRY OF LOCATION (IP Use Only)

16. INTEREST DESK CODE (IP Use Only)

17. CITE FIELD ADDRESSEES TO RECEIVE INDEX CARDS:

18.* DOCUMENT SYMBOL, NUMBER DATE DAY MO YR

19.* RESIDENCE GIVEN IN OPENING DOCUMENT

20. SUMMARY TEXT FOR INDEX RECORDS. (Insert additional identifying and descriptive data. Do not include Cryptonyms. If spouse record desired, provide spouse bio data here preceded by "Code B-")

21. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

22. SIGNATURE OF DIV/STAFF COPS, OR HIGHER AUTHORITY IF SUBJECT US CITIZEN

23. 201 NUMBER

FORM 8-78 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL. BY: 000007

(20-01)

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34-3 1

SECRET

STAFF 130056Z DIRECTOR 943114

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, 554, PS/CG, LSN/10, 4OPS, 000/3, OPS/ITG4, 000/00, C14, SS/S4

DISSEM BY: [illegible]

PER 0

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO SAN JOSE, CARACAS. ¥

UNINTEL ¥ [illegible]

1. ON 12 NOVEMBER 1976 THE "WASHINGTON POST" PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE BY JOE CRANKSHAW IN MIAMI WHICH REPORTED THAT FBI HAD BEEN TOLD OF A DINA PLOT TO USE CUBAN EXILES TO KILL LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE AND ANNE MARIE BRUSSIER (SIC - SHOULD BE BEAUSIRE). FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM ARTICLE: ¥

A. RICARDO MORALES, VENEZUELAN INTEL OFFICIAL, REPORTED TO FBI THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD OF A PLOT TO KILL PASCAL AND BRUSSIER BY ROLANDO OTERO. ACCORDING TO OTERO, HE WENT TO SANTIAGO IN EARLY FEBRUARY AND IDENTIFIED HIMSELF TO DINA OFFICIALS AS A FUGITIVE FROM THE U.S. AT DINA HQS, OTERO SAID HE WAS TOLD THAT THE SECRET POLICE SUPPORT THE CUBAN EXILES' CAUSE AND WOULD PROVIDE FUNDS AND ARMS FOR THEM IN RETURN FOR A "FAVOR." THE FAVOR WAS TO KILL PASCAL AND BRUSSIER IN COSTA RICA BEFORE 22 FEBRUARY 1976. OTERO QUOTED DINA SPOKESMEN AS SAYING BOSCH WOULD BE BACKUP IF OTERO FAILED IN THE MISSION. ACCORDING TO OTERO, HE REFUSED TO DO THE "FAVOR," LEFT CHILE AND TOLD MORALES. HE THEN RETURNED TO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-299292

RECORD COPY

13 Nov 76

201-284811

SECRET

REPRODUC N BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR IBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018952

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

943114

SANTIAGO AND WAS ARRESTED TWO WEEKS LATER. Y

B. BOSCH WAS ARRESTED ON 19 FEBRUARY ENTERING COSTA RICA WITH A FALSE PASSPORT AND CHARGED WITH PLOTTING TO KILL SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, PASCAL AND BRUSSIER. NO TRIAL WAS HELD AND BOSCH WAS LATER DEPORTED. HE RETURNED TO SANTIAGO AND APPARENTLY REMAINED THERE UNTIL GOING TO CARIBBEAN TO ORGANIZE CORU. Y

C. INFO ON THIS ALLEGED DINA-CUBAN EXILE CONSPIRACY WAS SUPPRESSED DURING THE SEPTEMBER 76 FEDERAL BOMBING TRIAL OF OTERO IN JACKSONVILLE. WHEN OTERO STARTED TO TESTIFY ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES IN CHILE, GOVT PROSECUTORS OBJECTED THAT INFO WAS IMMATERIAL TO BOMBING CHARGES. OTERO WAS FOUND INNOCENT; HIS TRIAL ON RELATED STATE CHARGES WAS TO BEGIN IN MIAMI ON MONDAY (8 NOV) BUT WAS ORDERED POSTPONED UNTIL EARLY 1977. Y

D. OTERO HAD LIVED IN [redacted]FLORIDA UNTIL LATE DECEMBER 1975 WHEN HE WAS TOLD BY FBI INFORMANT THAT FBI WAS PREPARING TO HAVE HIM INDICTED ON BOMBING CHARGES. OTERO THEN WENT TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WHERE HE WAS ARRESTED AND PAROLED. WHEN MIAMI FEDERAL GRAND JURY RETURNED INDICTMENTS AGAINST OTERO, HE FLEW TO CARACAS WHERE STAYED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

S E C R E T CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF. 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

943114

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

WITH MORALES. INFO IN REPORTS ALLEGES THAT OTERO WAS TOLD THAT IF VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES MOVED TO ARREST HIM, HE COULD RECEIVE ASYLUM WITH NEW CHILEAN AMBASSADOR. WHILE IN CARACAS, OTERO ALLEGEDLY TOLD MORALES THAT HE HAD COMMITTED THE BOMBINGS IN MIAMI AND MORALES PASSED THIS INFO TO FBI.Y

2. MUCH OF INFO ON PLOT TO KILL PASCAL AND BRUSSIER APPARENTLY TAKEN FROM 25 FEBRUARY 1976 FBI REPORT WHICH COULD COME FROM MORALES. MORALES WAS SOURCE OF NUMEROUS SECRET SERVICE REPORTS DURING KISSINGER VISIT TO CARACAS IN FEBRUARY 76 ON REPORTED ATTEMPT BY BOSCH TO KILL KISSINGER. ONE SECRET SERVICE REPORT INDICATED THAT MORALES HAD PROVIDED CARACAS LEGAL ATTACHE WITH RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST.Y

[redacted].

3.A. FILE: 201-284811, 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.d

DATE: 12 NOVEMBER 1976
ORIG: MARY GINN
UNIT: LA/SB/CH/R
EXT: 1471

C/PCS/LC (FOR INFO)
C/LA/COR (FOR INFO)

AC/LA/PNC

201-284811

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/MCA
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018952

SECRET

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

8

222257Z CIA/DDO 446557

CONF: C/LA8 INFO. FILE [illegible]

DISSEM BY: 1

PER 32

TO: PRIORITY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION [illegible] GUS/ GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION. Y

R.K. McHARGUE/
General Investig Division

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

CIR-316/04846-76
3

SUBJECT: D REQUEST FOR INFORMATION WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN OBTAINED BY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DURING INTERROGATION OF ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ IN MAY 1976

1. THIS AGENCY WOULD APPRECIATE ANY PERTINENT INFORMATION REGARDING CONNECTIONS BETWEEN CUBAN EXILES AND THE CHILEAN DIRECTORATE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (DINA) THAT MAY HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED BY YOUR OFFICE IN THE INTERROGATION OF ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ IN MAY 1976. THIS INFORMATION IS NEEDED IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE SANTIAGO FIELD STATION IN THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION POSSIBLY RELATED TO THE SEPTEMBER 1976 BOMBING DEATH OF FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ORLANDO LETELIER.

201-284811

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2. E2 CRSDDE E2 IMPDET.H FILE: 200-12-200/1, 201-851118.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-284811
DO NOT DESTROY

LA/CO G

DATE: 22 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: EL MONTGOMERY:MM E. Montgomery
UNIT: LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

PCS/LSN/IDB - C.ENRIGHT
(IN DRAFT)

C/PCS/LSN

C/LA/SB

C/LA

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 013759

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 1 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 122140Z DIRECTOR 942799

CONF: C/B INFO: FILE IP/AN DS/INT P/ICL

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO. Y

UNINTEL Y

(NC 27841)

REFS: A. EMBASSY TELEGRAM SANTIAGO 9991, 15 OCTOBER 1976

B. DIRECTOR 929297

C. DIRECTOR 941265 Y

1. IN VIEW OF 12 NOVEMBER 1976 ARTICLE IN "WASHINGTON POST" (BEING RELAYED SANTIAGO), DEALING WITH ALLEGED DINA PLOT TO KILL PASCAL ALLENDE, WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO ON DINA-CUBAN EXILE CONTACTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE RELATED TO REFS A AND C. Y

2. FILE: 15-5-1, 201-299292, 201-284811. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: A. ALLEGED ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILE CONTACTS IN CHILEAN GOVT.
B. REQUEST FOR INFO ON REF A.
C. EXTRACT FROM FBI REPORT OF 4 NOV 76 ON VISIT IN EARLY 75 TO CHILE BY CUBAN EXILE AND HIS CONTACT WITH "PATRIA Y LIBERTAD."

DATE: 12 NOV 76
ORIG: MARY GINN:RP
UNIT: LA/SB/CH/R
EXT: 1471

8

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-284811
DO NOT DESTROY

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018952

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 25 PER 5 / 103 TOTAL COPIES 21-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED AT

AGENCY ~~STAFF~~ MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT c/LA8

ACTION #

INFO: RF, FILE, VR, c/i/plan, c/isn/io, c/ops, c/ci 2, c/ops/it G 2, AG c/000, D/oms 2

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T-334663 EIA662 PAGE 01-01 NC 38215

TOR:272158Z OCT 76 IN 051883

P 272142Z OCT 76
FM DIRECTOR, FBI
TO RUEAIIX/DIRECTOR, CIA
BT
SECRET

UNSUBS; BOMBING OF FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S., ORLANDO LETELIER, ET. AL., WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 21, 1976; PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - MURDER.

REURTEL CITE CIA/DDO 932557 AND CIR-316/04346-76.

THE FBI DID NOT DEVELOP ANY INFORMATION DURING THE INTERVIEW OF ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ IN MAY, 1976, THAT WOULD DEVELOP CONNECTIONS BETWEEN CUBAN EXILES AND THE CHILEAN DIRECTORATE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (DINA). FOR YOUR INFORMATION, A POSSIBLE CONNECTION BETWEEN CUBANS AND DINA WAS NOT PURSUED DURING THE INTERVIEWS OF OTERO.

CLASSIFIED BY 6419, XGDS 2, INDEFINITE.

XGDS 2

Mary you asked for this info

SECRET

DISSEM BY XTD PER 7.5 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT

LA 13

ACTION #

INFO FILE, VR, [illegible] PS/EG2, IP/AN, IID, OPS/INT 5, CI 4, SS 4, OSG/IC 2

T 323958 E1A266 PAGE 01 IN 077749

TOR:221444Z OCT 76 SAGO 35326

S E C R E T 221413Z OCT 76 INTEL

TDFIRDB-315/10576-76
HCS-10,772

CITE SANTIAGO 35326

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS. JIVC

WNINTEL

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR HQS REVIEW. PLEASE CALL THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT TO THE ATTENTION OF AMBASSADOR POPPER. SOURCE PARA 3-4 IS FUDOUBLE-49; PARAS 6-7 IS FUBARGAIN TAKEN FROM SANTIAGO 34147* AND 34309.* RELATED TO ODIK1A. NOT PASSED LOCAL LIAISON. INDEX: BOSCH AND OTERO. CL BY 04869. FILE: 15-5-1/1.

FILED : 221413Z XXXXX

IID COMMENT: LIFTER CABLE SENT. SENT ELECTRICALLY TO S&S PER DESK REQUEST.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-294811
DO NOT DESTROY

15 / 1

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 077749

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SOO NIO CRS

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

{SY/T/PTB} SS/ID FPT SECUR

Classified by Exempted Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (2) (3) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB-315/10576-76

DIST 22 OCTOBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/ CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: CHILE

DOI : MID-APRIL TO MID-OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: ( ) CHILEAN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ON CUBAN EXILE
LEADERS ORLANDO BOSCH AND ROLANDO OTERO

ACQ : CHILE, SANTIAGO (21 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HCS-10,772

SOURCE : SEE BELOW.

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 3-4: A MEDIUM LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS TO OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HIS REPORTING IS FAIRLY RELIABLE.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: SANTIAGO EMBASSY TELEGRAM 10107 OF 19 OCTOBER REPORTED THAT THE CHILEAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD BEEN KEEPING AN EYE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH AND WAS NOW REVIEWING ALL ITS INFORMATION, PRESUMABLY IN LIGHT OF HIS RECENT ARREST IN VENEZUELA.)

3. ON 15 OCTOBER, FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ASSEMBLED

SECRET

A FILE ON BOSCH AT THE REQUEST OF ADMIRAL PATRICIO CARVAJAL, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE FILE CONSISTS MAINLY OF EXCHANGES OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CONCERNING BOSCH'S ARREST IN SAN JOSE IN MARCH 1976, AND THE FACT THAT HE HAD CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION.

4. THE DOCUMENTS INCLUDED A BIRTH CERTIFICATE, IDENTITY CARD, TAX IDENTIFICATION CARD AND PASSPORT, ALL IN THE NAME OF RICARDO RAMON DAVANZO CERUTI. THE PASSPORT WAS ISSUED IN CHILE IN 1966, AND HAD NEVER BEEN RENEWED. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHILEAN PASSPORTS NORMALLY REQUIRE RENEWAL EVERY TWO YEARS.) THE PASSPORT CONTAINED ONE CHILEAN EXIT STAMP, DATED 1966, AND NO INDICATION THAT IT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN USED TO ENTER OR EXIT CHILE. IT CONTAINED MANY EXIT AND ENTRY STAMPS INDICATING EXTENSIVE TRAVEL BY ITS BEARER IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND PANAMA, BETWEEN 1966 AND MARCH 1976. THE PASSPORT AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION WAS SHOWN TO CHILEAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN SAN JOSE BY COSTA RICAN OFFICIALS; HOWEVER, THE COSTA RICANS DID NOT GIVE THE DOCUMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

5. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 6-7: AN OFFICIAL CHILEAN SERVICE.

6. IN MID-APRIL 1976, THE DIRECTORATE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (DINA) RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT BOSCH HAD JUST ARRIVED IN CHILE WITH A CONTRACT TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH LEVEL CHILEAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (UNIDENTIFIED). ACCORDING TO DINA, BOSCH EVADED AN ARREST ACTION ON 10 APRIL, ESCAPING BY A MATTER OF MINUTES BUT LEAVING BEHIND ALL HIS CLOTHES AND TWO PASSPORTS.

7. ON 29 APRIL, DINA, HOWEVER, SUCCESSFULLY APPREHENDED ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ, AN ASSOCIATE OF BOSCH, WHO ALONG WITH THE LATTER WAS WANTED AS A FEDERAL FUGITIVE IN THE UNITED STATES. IN EARLY MAY, DINA INFORMED THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) OF OTERO'S ARREST, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TURNED OTERO OVER TO FBI AGENTS FOR RETURN AND PROCESSING IN THE UNITED STATES. (FIELD COMMENT: HVC-7328 (TDFIRDB-315/01696-76) FROM AN UNTESTED SOURCE WITH ACCESS TO CUBAN EXILES REPORTED THAT OTERO WAS PLANNING TO ASSASSINATE CHILEAN MARXIST EXTREMIST ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, AND THAT HE WAS WORKING UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. DINA'S ARREST AND DEPORTATION TO THE U.S. OF

15-5-1

IN 077749

TDFIR DB-315/10576-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

OTERO RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ALLEGATION OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF OTERO AND HIS GROUP.)

8. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT SANTIAGO; SENT TO CARACAS. REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/ CONSULTANTS

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-1, 2.

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SWS NSA SS/ID FBI TREAS CIA/OPSCEN.

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENTS

CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 27 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE: 25 AUGUST 1976
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA
(FLNC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-21892 (MIAMI)

FORM 3020
1-71 MFG 8/75

IP/AN

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 73-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LP BY T AT 2020

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT LA7

ACTION #

INFO RF, FILE, VR IP/AN, SPS/ITG4, CI4, OSG, C/OPS, PS/EG2, LSN/ID

T 901023 EIA323 PAGE 01 IN 913868

TOR:072017Z MAY 76 SAGO 34309

S E C R E T 072003Z MAY 76 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 34309 (JABAUT ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, PRIORITY CARACAS, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN JOSE.

FUBARGAIN MHSPIKE

REF: SANTIAGO 34147 (IN 891569)

1. LIAISON CONTACT (IDEN REF) CONFIDENTIALLY ADVISED STATION 7 MAY THAT DINA (CHILEAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE) ARRESTED ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ 29 APRIL AND HOLDING HIM INCOMMUNICADO PENDING DECISION RE DISPOSITION HIS CASE.

2. DETAILS NOT YET AVAILABLE TO IDEN BUT UNDERSTANDS GOC CHARGES AGAINST OTERO WEAK AND PROSECUTION UNCERTAIN. HE ATTEMPTING OBTAIN THINKING OF SUPERIORS BUT IN INTERIM AUTHORIZED ABOVE BE PASSED FBI.

3. APPRECIATE HQS INSTRUCTIONS ASAP PERCHANCE GOC DECIDES RELEASE OR EXPEL OTERO.

4. FILE: 201-284811. E2 IMPDET

		[illegible]
IP/[illegible]	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
[illegible]		[illegible]
		[illegible]
IP/[illegible]		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
IP/[illegible]		[illegible]

RECORD COPY

201-284811
7 May 76

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 25 PER

TOTAL COPIES 22-1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT LA7

ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR. IPLAN, CI 4, CIOPS, PS/EG2, OSG, OPS/ITG4

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 901640 EIA934 PAGE 01 IN 914029

TOR:0800162 MAY 76 SAGO 34313

SECRET 0800082 MAY 76 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 34313 (JABAUT ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, BUENOS AIRES.

FUBARGAIN MHSPIKE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 050972

B. SANTIAGO 34309 (IN 913868)

C. SANTIAGO 34147 (IN 891569)

1. IDEN REF C ADVISED RE FEDERAL WARRENT AND REQUESTED LEGAL PROCESS BE INITIATED WITH INVESTIGACIONES, IN ORDER DINA NOT APPEAR IN ANY DOCUMENTATION. ALSO REQUESTED THAT INFO OTEROS ARREST NOT BE SOURCED DINA AS HE PROVIDED INFO WITHOUT HIS SERVICES KNOWLEDGE.

2. FOR BUENOS AIRES: SUGGEST LEGATT TOUCH BASE WITH MR. NICHOLAS LEONDIRIS UPON HIS ARRIVAL SANTIAGO FOR BACKGROUND BRIEFING.

3. FILE: 201-284811 E2 IMPDET.

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-284811

8 May 76

14-00000

7-71 MFG. 10/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 3 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 4/1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT LA7

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR IPN CSNED CI4 gcs 05600

T 816222 EIA552 PAGE 01-01 IN 881286

TOR:061926Z APR 76 LMIM 24564

SECRET 061653Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 24564

TO: DIRECTOR.

REAM

1. FBI/MIAMI ASKS FOR CONFIRMATION OF FORMER BKHERALD AFFILIATION OF CUBAN EXILES ROLANDO O /201-284811 OTERO HERNANDEZ AND /201-284498 ARMANDO PABLO LOPEZ-ESTRADA. INCLUDING POSSIBLE EXPLOSIVE/DEMOLITION TRAINING INVOLVED. BOTH ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR RECENT BOMBINGS MIAMI AREA AND BOTH CLAIM BE EX-BKHERALD.

2. FILE DEFER. E2, IMPDET.

pdg

TRAVEL PROGRAM

ABSTRACT

INDEX

[illegible] FOR INDEXING

RECORD COPY

6 Apr 76

SECRET

D201-284498

201-284811

SECRET

20 MAY 1976

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
ATTN: Intelligence Division

FROM: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: ROLANDO OTERO, Hernandez
AKA: OTERO, Rolando
ROLANDO, Papillon

1. Reference is made to your request dated 5 May 1976 for information regarding Subject's employment with this Agency and his involvement with the Bay of Pigs invasion.

2. This Agency had an operational interest in Subject beginning in late 1960. Subject was a participant in the Bay of Pigs invasion and in preparation for this invasion, received commando-type training. Association and contact with Subject by this Agency was terminated in late 1962. For your information, the contents of this paragraph was forwarded to our field station in Miami, Florida, in April 1976 for passage to representatives of your Bureau in Miami.

3. For additional information concerning Subject which may not be known to your Bureau, you are referred to the Department of State and to the United States Secret Service.

CIR-316/01708-76
Encl. 1 name check

IP/EIS: JE/R Martin/dm
BASED ON: DIRECTOR 835967 dated 8 April 1976
FILE IN: 201-284811

Classified by [illegible]
0
10 May 76
201-284811

RECORD COPY

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

LL-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 072253Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 850972

CONF: LA7 INFO: FILE (IPAN) OPS/ITG4 OSG e14 dcas LSN/1A PS/EG2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 43
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO,BB BUENOS AIRES INFO CARACAS, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN JOSE.Y

FUBARGAIN MHSPIKE Y

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 34309 (IN 913868)

B. SANTIAGO 34147 (IN 891569) Y

1. O FBI HAS BEEN ADVISED OF OTERO'S ARREST BY DINA. FBI NOW TRYING ARRANGE HIS EXTRADITION THROUGH BUENOS AIRES LEGATT.

A. BUENOS AIRES: PLS ADVISE LEGATT BUENOS AIRES NAME OF CHILEAN SERVICE HOLDING OTERO SO EXTRADITION CAN BE REQUESTED. Y

B. SANTIAGO: PLS ADVISE IDEN REF B OTERO IS FEDERAL BBBBBBB FUGITIVE AND EXTRADITION BEING REQUESTED. IF OTERO RELEASED REQUEST ADVANCE NOTICE HIS IMMEDIATE DESTINATION AND ONWARD TRAVEL FOR FBI MONITORING. Y

2. FILE: 201-284811. E2 IMPDET.A

2

		TRAFFIC PROGRAM	
[illegible]	☒	RESTRICT	
		[illegible]	
[illegible]		PREPARE [illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]	
		[illegible]	
		CABLE [illegible]	
		[illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]	

DATE: 7 MAY 1976 BT
ORIG: BERNICE TURBEVILLE:MM
UNIT: AC/LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

OPS/ITG -PAUL PLUMB {TELECOORD}
C/LA/CAR/DR -DAN SMITH {TELECOORD}
C/LA/PNC - T.DESMOND {TELECOORD}
AC/LA/M&CAM -J.BECKWITH {TELECOORD}

201-284811
7 May 76

R S Sanger
C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018952

IMMEDIATE TRACES from FBI   5 May 1976

Name: ROLANDO OTERO Hernandez - aka Rolando Otero
Rolando Papillon

DPOB: April 18, 1943
SS Number: 262-68-6839

Claimed CIA employment 1960 - 1962 re Bay of Pigs as explosive - demolition man and intelligence assistant.

Requesting any information

IP/EIS COORDINATION	
DATE 05 MAY 1976	
BRANCH	INITIALS
IP/EIS	
AC/LA/C	
IP/EIS EDIT	

IP/EIS

VIA OPS/LSN

201-284811

FBI DOCUMENT (CROSS-REFERENCE SHEET)

DATE: 25 MARCH 1976

CLASSIFICATION: NOT KNOWN

SUBJECT: NOT KNOWN (RE CUBAN EXILES TO ARRIVE
IN CARACAS BY JULY 75 TO EXPLORE THE
POSSIBILITY OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
AGAINST CASTRO

(DOCUMENT AVAILABLE IN FILE 201-284498, charged
TO SA/DO/O)

OUTGOING MESSAGE 7.1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 082143Z DIRECTOR 635967

CONF: LAS INFO: FILE IP/AN

0 DISSEM BY: 29
0
0 PER SOP
0 # 111

TO: LA/MIAMI.Y

KMSTONE TRACE Y

REF: LA/MIAMI 24564 |IN 881286*| Y

1. FOLLOWING MAY BE PASSED TO FBI/MIAMI:

A. ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ AND ARMANDO PABLO LOPEZ-ESTRADA WERE BOTH RECRUITED BY BKHERALD IN LATE 1960 AND PARTICIPATED IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. BKHERALD CONTACT WIBTH THEM DROPPED IN LATE 1962. BOTH OTERO AND LOPEZ-ESTRADA RECEIVED BKHERALD SPONSORED COMMANDO TYPE TRAINING IN PREPARATION FOR BAY OF PIGS.

OTR
OTS

B. OTBERO IS SUBJECT OF NEMEROUS FBI REPORTS IN 1975 AND 1976 AND SHOULD BE WELL KNOWN TO FBI/MIAMI. Y

2. FILE: 201-284498, 201-284811. E2 IMPDET.A

* FBI/MIAMI ASKED FOR CONFIRMATION OF FORMER BKHERALD AFFILIATION OF ABOVE CUBAN EXILES, INCLUDING POSSIBLE EXPLOSIVE/DEMOLITION TRAINING INVOLVED. BOTH ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR RECENT BOMBINGS MIAMI AREA AND BOTH CLAIMB BE EX-BKHERALD.

DATE: 8 APRIL 1976
ORIG: P. BELLAMY:CG
UNIT: LA/CAR/CARI
EXT: 1497

C/LA/COG

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-284811
DO NOT DESTROY

C/LAD

DC/LA/CAR

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012913

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 3 PER

TOTAL COPIES 8/

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED [illegible] 2035

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA5

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION COPY

ACTION #

T 773171 EIA810 PAGE 01-01 IN 863443

TOR:192025Z MAR 76 SAGO 33948

S E C R E T 192012Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 33948

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI, CARACAS.

TRACE

C/LA/SB
DC/LA/SB
C/LA/SB/AR
C/LA/SB/CH
C/LA/SB/UP
LA/SB Sec'y

1. ON 19 MAR SUBJECT OF 201-826416, WHO IS A STATION LIAISON CONTACT, REQUESTED TRACES ON ORLANDO OTERO. SUBJECT CLAIMED OTERO IS CUBAN MEMBER OF UNKNOWN MIAMI BASED EXILE ORGANIZATION THAT HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN BOMBING INCIDENTS IN MIAMI AREA AND OTERO RUMORED TO BE IN CHILE. SPECIFICALLY WOULD LIKE PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION, ALIASES, TYPE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS OTERO MIGHT BE USING, DATA ON HIS ORGANIZATION AND NAMES ANY POTENTIAL CONTACTS IN CHILE. STATION TRACES INDICATE OTERO MAY BE I/W ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ MENTIONED CARA 29119. NO TRACES ORLANDO.

2. INDEX OTERO. FILE: 201-826416. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 25 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: CUBAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FLNC)

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

OUTGOING MESSAGE 2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

MSG COL ACP TOS TPS WHO DCI

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 230000Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 026765

CONF: C/LAS INFO: FILE c/iplan, c/ops/ITG4,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 29
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SOP
0 IP FILES # 111

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO LA/MIAMI, CARACAS. Y

RYBAT MHSPIKE MHPROSE Y

C/LA/SB
DC/LA/SB
C/LA/SB/AR
C/LA/SB/CH @
C/LA/SB/UP
LA/SB Sec'y

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 33948 (IN 863443)

B. DIRECTOR 806748

C. CARACAS 29049 (IN 822200)

D. DIRECTOR 804531 Y

1. NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES ORLANDO OTERO. Y

2. AGREE SUBJECT REF A INQUIRY MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ (201-284811) WHO SUBJECT REFS B, C, AND D. HE DEPARTED SANTO DOMINGO 22 JANUARY 76 TRAVELLING ON U.S. PASSPORT NO. F-7896536 AND PER REF C HE DEPARTED CARACAS 3 FEBRUARY 76 FOR SANTIAGO ABOARD IBERIA FLIGHT. HOWEVER, HQS HAS NO INFO ON WHAT DOCUMENTATION HE USED ON CARACAS-SANTIAGO LEG OF TRIP. OTERO BORN 18 APRIL 41 IN MARIANAO, HAVANA, CUBA, AND IS DESCRIBED PARA 2 REF C AS WHITE; FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TALL; 150 POUNDS; BROWN EYES; BUSHY DARK BROWN HAIR. PLS NOTE THAT WE CANNOT ~~DO NOT WANT TO~~ PASS DEROGATORY INFO ON OTERO TO LIAISON CONTACTS SINCE HE REPORTEDLY U.S. CITIZEN. Y RR

3. SHOULD THE LIAISON CONTACT ESTABLISH ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ

DATE: 22 MARCH 1976
ORIG: W.A. CANTRELL
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018952

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 826765

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

AS IDENTICAL TO THE REF A INQUIRY, SUGGEST STATION DIRECT ANY FURTHER QUERIES FROM THEM RE OTERO TO APPROPRIATE EMBASSY OFFICER. YOU MAY ALSO UISH TO ADVISE LEGAL ATTACHE OF REF A INQUIRY ON HIS NEXT TRIP TO SANTIAGO, SINCE OTERO IS FEDERAL FUGITIVE. Y

4. FILE: 201-826416; 201-284811. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 22 MRRCH 1976
ORIG: U.A. CANTRELL
UNIT: C/LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

OPS/ITG - OLIVER SILSBY
{TELECORD}
C/LA/NU - T.J. DESMOND
{TELECORD}
DC/LA/CARR- U.L. SMITH
{TELECORD}
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTI Y C R THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO ED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018952

14-00000

U.S. SECRET SERVICE DOCUMENT

CABLE FROM SS HQS INTEL INVISION (PIE) FILE 650.0

USSS 8738

DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLAN TO ASSASSINATE SEC.
KISSINGER IN VENEZUELA

14-00000

DISSEM BY IID PER JCR TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

7-3 SECRET E2, IMPDET CL. BY: 006687

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED 110 SDO LA BY RD AT 2140 Z

ACTION UNIT

LA 27

ACTION #

INFO FILE, VR, DDO, PS/EG2, IP/AN, IID, OPS/INT 5, CI 4, SS 4, SS/SOG 4, LSN/ID, OPS/IT6 4.

T 689952 EIA614 PAGE 01 IN 828992

TOR:172137Z FEB 76 CARA 29119

S E C R E T 172100Z FEB 76 INTEL

TDFIRDB-315/01696-76
HVC-7328

CITE CARACAS 29119

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, ~~LIMA~~, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, GUATEMALA CITY, BUENOS AIRES.

INTEL VWLOFTY

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR SOURCE DESCRIPTION. SOURCE: WKSCARLET/ (IN 828704) WKSCARLET-3 (SEE CARACAS 29109). OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. NOT FOR PASSAGE LIAISON. INDEX: PASCAL, CASTRO, OTERO, BOSCH. FILE DEFERRED. CL. BY 059820.

FILED : 172100Z

(IID COMMENT: LA DIVISION REPORTS OFFICER CHANGED BYLINE BY DELETING: "HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED." AND INSERTION OF ANOTHER RELIABILITY STATEMENT; HE ALSO DELETED "FRANK C A S T R O" FROM PARA 2 AND INSERTION OF "ANOTHER OTHER" THERE. LIFTER CABLE SENT.)

chrono ✓

C-5 ✓

17 FEB 76 19 32

SECRET HVC-7328

SECRET (When Filled In)

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 826992

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO CRS
(SY/I/PIB) SS/ID FBI SECUR OMS

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (2) (1) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB-315/01696-76

DIST 17 FEBRUARY 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASEABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CHILE

DOI : 16 FEBRUARY 1976

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF A RELATIVE OF FORMER PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (17 FEBRUARY 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7328

SOURCE : A BUSINESSMAN WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.

1. ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT EXILES ARE CURRENTLY IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, WITH THE INTENTION OF KILLING LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, A RELATIVE OF FORMER CHILEAN PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE. (SOURCE COMMENT: PASCAL'S EXACT CONNECTION WITH SALVADOR ALLENDE OR HIS CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN CARACAS ARE UNKNOWN.)

2. THE ATTEMPT AGAINST PASCAL IS TO BE CARRIED OUT BY ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, ALTHOUGH IT IS UNCLEAR AS TO WHETHER OTERO HAS ACTUALLY ARRIVED IN CARACAS. HE IS EXPECTED TO BE IN CARACAS BY THE EVENING OF 17 FEBRUARY 1976.

SECRET

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 826992

TDFIR DB-315/01696-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

3. THE CUBAN EXILES CLAIM TO BE WORKING UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. FURTHERMORE, THE ATTEMPT AGAINST PASCAL IS BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE CUBANS IN RETURN FOR UNSPECIFIED AID GIVEN EXILES SUCH AS ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT INDICATING THAT THE CHILEAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (DINA) IS SUPPORTING THE LATIN AMERICAN ANTI-COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (CRAL), A CUBAN EXILE GROUP LED BY BOSCH, SEE HVC-7280, FIR-311/01933-75 OF LATE DECEMBER 1975, FROM A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFATT, SECRET SERVICE AT CARACAS; SENT TO SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, GUATEMALA CITY.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INGELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO: STATE, DIA, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, NSA, SWS, SS/I, FBI, CIA/OPSCEN.

SECRET

OUTGOIN MESSAGE 327

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 · 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

SECRET

STAFF 122310Z DIRECTOR 806748

CONF: LA 15 INFO: FILE OPS/INT SECUR-1 LSN/10 0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 47

OPS/ITG 5 IRAN DDO DDO/DO DIVD 2 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER LA

0 IP FILES # 6 9L

TRAVEL PROGRAM

IP/COI X

IP/CRU

TO: SANTIAGO INFO CARACAS.Y

VWLOFTY Y

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 803889

B. DIRECTOR 804531 (BEING RELAYED SANTIAGO)

C. CARACAS 29049 ■|IN 822200| Y

1. VIEW DR. KISSINGER'S SOUTH AMERICAN TRAVEL CITED REF A AND SECRET SERVICE INTEREST IN WHEREABOUTS OF ROLANDO O OTERO HERNANDEZ, SUGGEST SUBSTANCE REF B AND C BE BROUGHT TO EMBASSY ATTENTION FOR SUCH ACTION THEY DEEM APPROPRIATE. (FYI: SANTIAGO EMBASSY WAS INFO ADDRESSE ON CARACAS LIMDIS EMTEL 1550 DATED 9 FEB WHICH STATES OTERO DEPARTED FOR SANTIAGO BY AIR ON 3 FEB 76.)Y

2. THIS IS PRIMARILY FBI/STATE MATTER AND ACCORDING FBI OTERO IS NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZEN. HOWEVER, PER REF A, SHOULD INFO RE OTERO COME TO STATION'S ATTENTION, ESPECIALLY ANY INDICATION HE MAY TRAVEL TO CITIES LISTED ON KISSINGER INTINERARY, NOTIFY HQS AND APPROPRIATE STATION BY PRIORITY CABLE.Y

3. FILE: 201-284811. E2 IMPDET.N

DATE: 11 FEBRUARY 1976/1605
ORIG: JOE HARTMANN/DJT
UNIT: LA/SB/■CH
EXT: 1471

201-284811
12 Feb 76

C/LA/TFK

RECORD COPY

for R. Connolly
C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/NW
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C. J. Richens
AC/LA/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018952

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 1 PER LA 6 TOTAL COPIES 39-1 RUN BY

SAME AS FIRST

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA BY RDA 1521Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT LA 15

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR IP/AN 05G CI-4

PS/EG-2 OPS/INT SECUR 4 LSN/ID

OPS/ITG 5 DDO DIV D-2

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 675418 EIA485 PAGE 01-01 IN 823200

TOR:111519Z FEB 76 SDOM 17119

SECRET 111505Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17119

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO INFO CARACAS.

REFS: A. CARACAS 29049 (IN 822200)

B. DIRECTOR 804531

1. EMPYREX REPORTS THAT ROLANDO O T E R O HERNANDEZ, BORN 18 APRIL 1943, TRAVELLING ON U.S. PASSPORT NUMBER F-796536, DEPARTED SANTO DOMINGO 22 JANUARY ON VIASA FLIGHT 797.

2. FILE: 201-0284811, 22-8-7, 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET.

IP [illegible] ~~X~~ TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
INDEX
IP CR [illegible] [illegible] FOR FILING
[illegible] NO (2, 3)
IP [illegible] [illegible] REST. CODE
CABLE IDEN (11)
[illegible] (8)
[illegible] FOR FILING

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

D 22-8-7
D 200-6-495/3

11 Feb 76
201-284811

14-00000

ACTION

OUTGOING MESSAGE /6

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C RET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP 111504Z

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 605724

CONF: C/LA7 INFO: FILE C/IR/AN, C/LSN/ID, ~~CIA~~ C/OPS/ITG5, C/OPS

0 MORE
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER 231
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 9

TO: PRIORITY SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

SUBJECT: ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ.

CIR-316/20,024-76.

1. THIS AGENCY QUERIED THE APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVES IN CARACAS AND SANTO DOMINGO REGARDING THE WHEREABOUTS OF ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ, AS REQUESTED BY YOUR SERVICE IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON 6 FEBRUARY 1976. OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN CARACAS RESPONDED THAT ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE OTERO WAS EXPELLED FROM VENEZUELA TO SANTIAGO, CHILE, ON 3 FEBRUARY 1976. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION HAS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT.

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

201-284811

11 Feb 76

~~201-284822~~

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T D200-6-495/14 D22-9-8

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0129183

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
2 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA

805724

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

BASED ON: CARACAS 29049 (IN 822200) 0210 FEB 76
DIRECTOR 604531, 9 FEB 76

PROJECT: UKMAYOR (UKSCARLET-9)

OBJECTIVE: J

CABLE SEC: PLS MAKE COPIES OF THIS CABLE AVAILABLE TO IP/AN FOR 201-284822, [illegible] 200-6-495, 22-9-8

FEB

APR 29 76

C/LA/CAR

C/LA/NW/V ROBERT W. ANDREWS (DRAFT)

DATE: 11 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: GERI DUGGAN
UNIT: LA/CAR
EXT: 1249

C/CPS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012913

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 29 PER L. 6   TOTAL COPIES 33-1

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

4

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA BY CDU AT 2/20 Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA15

ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR OPS/INT, SECUR4, LSN/10, OPS/ITG5, SPLAN, DDO, DDO/DO, DIUO2

T 673268   EIA201   PAGE 01-01   IN [illegible]

TOR:102116Z FEB 76   CARA 29049

S E C R E T 102110Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29049

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO.

VALOFTY

REF: DIRECTOR 804531 (NOT SENT SANTIAGO)

1. ACCORDING WKSCARLET-9 ROLANDO O T E R O HERNANDEZ WAS EVICTED FROM VENEZUELA TO SANTIAGO ON 3 FEB 76. LEGATT CARACAS COMMENTS THAT OTERO ARRIVED VENEZUELA FROM DOMREP 22 JAN 76, WAS "ALLOWED TO LEAVE" VS. "EVICTED" ABOARD IBERIA FLIGHT TO SANTIAGO, AND IT DOUBTFUL HE CAN BE GOTTEN OUT OF CHILE.

2. FILE: 201-0284811, 22-8-7, 200-6-495. E2, IMDPET.

[illegible]		[illegible]
	☒	[illegible]
		[illegible]
P (11)		PREPARE FOR [illegible]
P [illegible]		CODE [illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
P [illegible]		[illegible] FILES

D-22-8-7

D-200-6-495/14

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

201-0284811

10 Feb 76

14-00000

OUTGOIN MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	32-2	1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	092322Z	DIRECTOR	804531

CONF: LA15 INFO: FILE OPSINT SECUR4 CSNID 0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
OPSITGS IPAN ADO 0 NO INDEX 0 RETURN TO PER LA
ADDDO DIUD2 0 IP FILES # 6
Z

IP,TON		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	☒	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP,CR Y		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP,MB		CODE NO (2, 3)
		[illegible]
		CABLE [illegible] (11)
		NB (8)
IP,CRU		FOR FILING

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, SANTO DOMINGO.Y

VWLOFTY Y

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 803889 |*|

B. DIRECTOR 705055 |**|

C. DIRECTOR 704047 |***| Y

1. FOLLOWING IS PER SANTO DOMINGO EMBTEL 325, 22 JAN 76: WARRANT FOR ARREST OF ROLANDO O T E R O HERNANDEZ {201-284811} ISSUED MID-JAN 76 FOR FIVE PIPEBOMB EXPLOSIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN MIAMI 4 DEC 75. MIAMI FBI SOURCES CLAIMED SUBJ FLEW TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 4 JAN 76, AND ON 22 JAN 76 PROMINENT DOMINICAN NEWSPAPER STATED OTERO HAD BEEN ARRESTED 17 JAN ON CHARGE OF VIOLATING PROHIBITION AGAINST HIS ENTRY INTO DOM REP. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH FBI AND US EMB CONSULAR OFFICER, DOMINICAN POLICE OFFICIALS INDICATED DISPOSITION TO EXPEL HIM FROM COUNTRY AND TO DETAIN HIM UNTIL THIS WAS ARRANGED. US EMB CHARGE INFORMED APPROPRIATE DOMINICAN OFFICIALS {FOR PASSAGE OF INFO TO PRESIDENT BALAGUER} OF US INTEREST IN OTERO'S RETURN TO US TO FACE CHABRGES AGAINST HIM. HOWEVER, POLICE CHIEF INFORMED CONSUL GENERAL THAT HE HAD ORDERS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

D-22-8-7
D-200-6-495/14

201-0284811
9 FEB 76

RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

804531

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO RELEASE OTERO AT NOON ON 20 JAN. US EMB REPORTED THAT AS OF 22 JAN IT NOT CLEAR WHERE OTERO LOCATED. ONE SOURCE REPORTEDLY TOLD MIAMI HERALD THAT OTERO HAD LEFT THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, BUT MIAMI HERALD CORRESPONDENT WHO AT THAT TIME (22 JAN) IN SANTO DOMINGO TOLD CONGEN HE HAD DRINKS WITH OTERO THE NIGHT BEFORE. NO INFO SINCE THAT TIME ON OTERO'S WHEREABOUTS. Y

2. BECAUSE OF REF B AND C INFO RE OTERO'S ACTIVITIES IN CARACAS, THERE POSSIBILITY HE MAY BE IN VENEZUELA AGAIN. IN LIGHT OF REF A, PARA TWO, AND AT REQUEST OF SECRET SERVICE, REQUEST ADDRESSEES ATTEMPT TO FIND OUT IF OTERO IS IN EITHER COUNTRY. HQS WILL INFORM SECRET SERVICE OF RESULTS. OTERO DESCRIBED AS WHITE; FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TALL; 150 POUNDS; BUSHY DARK BROWN HAIR; BROWN EYES. Y

3. FILE: 201-284811, 22-8-7, 200-6-495. E2, IMPDET.#

*FBI INFO ON ROLANDO OTERO WHO BELIEVED SENT TO VENEZUELA ON MISSION AGAINST CUBAN DIPLOMATIC CORPS THERE
**ADDITIONAL FBI INFO ON OTERO
***KISSINGER'S LA ITINERARY. PLS ADVISE OF ANY SUBVERSIVE OR DANGEROUS PERSONS IN COUNTRIES TO BE VISITED

DATE: 9 FEB 76 VGB
ORIG: K. BLEVINS/JP
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 1528

Robert Reefi
C/LA

LA/NW

C/LA/CAR

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

S E C R E T CL BY: 012913

STATE DEPT CABLE

FROM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 325

DATE: 22 JANUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: GODR ARREST AND RELEASE OF ROLANDO
OTERO HERNANDEZ WANTED IN THE U.S.
ON CHARGE OF BOMBING FED BUILDING

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 16 JANUARY 1976

CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ

~~CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI~~
~~DATE: [illegible] JANUARY 1976~~

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

SECRET

STAFF

0?1339Z

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 705055

CONF: CA 10 INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 2

TO: CARACAS INFO SANTO DOMINGO.

MHSPIKE

REF: DIRECTOR 704047

1. SOURCE OF REF FURNISHED FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO 3 JUNE 75: ACCORDING TO ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA, ROLANDO OTERO IS IN CARACAS AS A "PATHFINDER" OR ADVANCE MAN FOR GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES WHO ARE TO ARRIVE IN CARACAS BY JULY 1975 TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO RUZ WHO IS EXPECTED TO BE IN CARACAS FOR A CONFERENCE OF LATOIN AMERICAN HEADS OF STATE IN JULY 1975. THIS PLAN MAY BE A JOINT EFFORT BY MEMBERS OF FLNC, ACCION CUBANA (ANTI-CASTRO ORG OF CUBAN EXILES LED BY ORLANDO BOSCH, CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST, WHO IS PAROLE VIOLATOR BELIEVED TO BE IN HIDING IN SOUTH AMERICA), AND BRIDGADE 2506 (ORGANIZATION OF BAY OF PIGS VETERANS) WITH WHOM LOPEZ ESTRADA IS FRIENDLY. OTERO IS TRYING TO OBTAIN INFO REGARDING FIODEL CASTRO'S VISIT AND SECURITY MEASURES PLANNED TO PROTECT HIM. OTERO RECENTLY SPENT SEVERAL DAYS IN COLOMBIA BEFORE RETURNING TO VENEZUELA WHERE HE IS BEING CLOSELY WATCHED BY VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES (UNDER DIRECTION OF ORLANDO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY
201-284811
DO NOT DESTROY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

SECRET

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE 705055

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 FILE #

G ADR C I A VASQUEZ, MINISTER-COUNSELOR OF FOREIGN MINISTRY (SIC) WHO HAS BEEN INFORMED BY SOURCE OF OTERO'S ALLEGED MISSION. Y

2. FILE: 19-300-26, 201-284811. E2, IMPDET. H

*ADDITIONAL INFO ON ROLANDO OTERO AND HIS ACTIVITIES.

DATE: 6 JUNE 1975
ORIG: ELISABETH E VETTER/MVD
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 9151

AC/LA/NW
LA/COG
OPS/ITG

RICHARD S. SAMPSON
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 030316

SECRET

CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 4 JUNE 1975

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN

SIGNAL CENTER USE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 1 OF PAGES

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 061300Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 704047

CONF: LA/10 INFO: FILE RF/AN, LSN/ID, OPS/ITG 5, C/OPS

0 MORE
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 15

TO: CARACAS INFO SANTO DOMINGO.

1. FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM RELIABLE SOURCE OF FBI, MIAMI: ROLANDO OTERO (201-284811) (BORN 18 APRBIL 41, MARIANAO, HAVANA, CUBA), BAY OF PIGS VETERAN, NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZEN LIVING MIAMI, MEMBER OF MIAMI PARACHUTING GROUP KNOWN AS "GOLDEN FALCONS"--COMPRISED MAINLY OF CUBAN EXILES--LED BY CUBAN EXILE NAMED FRANK CASTRO, A LEADER OF THE FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA (FLNC), WHO CURRENTLY LIVING IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, VISITED FRANK CASTRO IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FOR TWO DAYS IN EARLY MAY 75. CASTRO GAVE OTERO $250 AND TOLD HIM TO CONTACT RUBEN MABRTINEZ, A CUBAN LIVING IN CARACAS, WHOM OTERO HAD NEVER MET. OTERO WENT TO CARACAS WHERE MARTINEZ PROVIDED HIM WITH A ROOM AT CAPRI HOTEL AND PROMISED TO ARRANGE FOR AN EXTENSION OF OTERO'S VISA AND FOR PAPERS TO ENABLE OTERO OBTAIN JOB IN CARACAS. THRU INQUIRIES, OTERO LEARNED THAT TWO CUBAN COMMO TECHNICIANS, LIVING AT TAMPA HOTEL INB CARACAS, WERE LOOKING FOR AN APPROPRIATE LOCATION FOR CUBAN EMBASSY TO BE ESTABBBBBLISHED. OTERO FIRST CLAIMED THAT WHILE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, HE DID NOT SEE HUMBERTO LOPEZ, JR., BUT LATER ADMITTED LOPEZ WAS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-284811
DO NOT DESTROY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 010116

14-00000

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | SITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

104047

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 FILE #

THERE. LOPEZ, A LEADER OF FLNC, IS A FEDERAL BOND DEFAULT FUGITIVE AFTER CONVICTION OF VIOLATION OF FEDERAL FIREARMS LAWS AND JUMPED BOND AFTER CONVICTION IN A MIAMI COURT ON CHARGES STEMMING FROM AN ACCIDENTAL BOMBING IN MARCH 75 WHICH SERIOUSLY INJURED LOPEZ AND AN ASSOCIATE. ON 28 MAY 75, LOPEZ ESTRADA (FNU), FORMER ROOMMATE OF OTERO IN MIAMI, SAID OTERO WAS IN CARACAS FOR AN "ACTION" AND WOULD BE JOINED THERE SHORTLY BY HUMBERTO LOPEZ, JR. ON SAME DATE, CIRO ORIZONDO, WHO LIVED WITH OTERO UNTIL OTERO LEFT FOR DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SAID THAT OTERO HAD BEEN SENT TO CARACAS BY FRANK CASTRO AND WAS GOING TO "GET IN TROUBLE DOWN THERE." BASED ON ABOVE, SOURCE BELIEVES OTERO'S MISSION IN CARACAS MAY BE BOMBING ATTEMPT OR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST CUBAN DIPLOMATIC CORPS MEMBERS IN CARACAS. SOURCE ALSO BELIEVES LOPEZ ESTRADA AND ORIZONDO NOT INVOLVED IN ALLEGED PLOT. Y

2. [illegible] LEGAL ATTACHE IN CARACAS HAS ABOVE INFO WHICH HE ~~STATION~~ MAY [illegible] DISCUSS WITH STATION. ~~HIM~~. Y

[redacted]

3. FILE: 19-300-26, 201-284811. E2 IMPDET.

JUN 8 75

DATE: 4 JUNE 1975
ORIG: ELISABETH L. VETTER/MVD
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 9156

LA/NW J. Hennessy
LA/COG Tom Clark
OPS/ITG

RH Connolly
for C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 010116

CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 31 MAY 1975

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Form Approved

(FAMILY NAME) OTERO	(FIRST NAME) ROLANDO	(MIDDLE NAME)	☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE April 18-43	NATIONALITY Cuban	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. A-13 311 318
ALL OTHER NAMES USED			CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH Havana - Cuba			SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 262-68-6839

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
RINEHART	JESSICA	Sept26-45	Miami-Fla.	July 6-1963	Miami-Fla.

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE) None

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	Otero	Rolando	(Unknown)	(Unknown)
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)	Hernandez	Maria	March 19-1919 Pinar del Rio-Cuba	Miami-Florida USA,-

RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	YEAR	TO MONTH	YEAR
1400 University Ave.	New York	New York	USA	April	1966	PRESENT TIME	
61 Hudson St.	Yonkers	New York	"	Aug.	1965	March	1966
2626 S.Sepulveda	L. Angeles	California	"	Jan.	1964	July	1965
11111 National Blvd.	"	"	"	Apr.	1963	Dec.	1963
Cuban Prison	Havana	Havana	Cuba	Apr.	1961	Dec.	1962
(Bay of Pigs)							

WDI 3 May 67 [illegible]

EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS. (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	YEAR	TO MONTH	YEAR
Allstate Investigation 2085 Lexington Ave. NYC.-	Investigator	April	1966	PRESENT TIME	
Betty Lou Inc. 463 West 7th Avenue New York, N.Y.	Clerk	Jan.	1967	Present	
Elite Laundry 333 East 105th St. New York, N.Y.	Clerk	Oct.	1966	Dec.	1966
Consolidated Laundry 48 Eagle Avenue Brooklyn, N.Y.	Clerk	Aug.	1966	Sept.	1966
Phelp Dodge Habirshaw, Point Street Yonkers, N.Y.	Elec.Operat.	Jan.	1966	July	1966
Kiger & Friedman Property 116 West 14th St. NYC.	Superintend.	April	1966	present-time	

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE). CITY / COUNTRY	FROM	TO	LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE): CITY / COUNTRY	FROM	TO
Ave.57 No.10212 Marianao-Havana Cuba	1957	1959	Student-Havana-Cuba	19__	1959

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:

☐ NATURALIZATION ☒ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY) ____________

27 APR 1967

2-13-67
DATE

Rolando Otero
(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

PENALTIES. SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

14-00000

DEPAR...NT OF STATE
FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VISA ACTION REQUEST

TO: March 1, 1965

FROM: Amconsul, VANCOUVER

TO:
☐ Office of Security (SY) - Department of State ☑ Visa Office (VO) - Department of State
☐ Immigration and Naturalization Service at

ACTION REQUESTED (check only one)
☐ Security advisory opinion
☐ 212(d)(3)(A) waiver
☐ Name check only
☐ China background check
☒ "Parakeet" name check

IF 212(d)(3)(A) WAIVER, INDICATE WHETHER
☐ Security - 212(a)(28)
☐ Other - 212(a)
☐ Recommended by consular officer
☐ Submitted at request of alien

1. NAME OF APPLICANT (include aliases, maiden name; previous married name, etc.): OTERO, Rolando

HERNAND

2. DATE OF BIRTH (mo., day, yr.): April 10/ 1943

3. PLACE OF BIRTH (city, province, country): Havana, Cuba

4. PRESENT ADDRESS: 2626 S. Sepulveda Blvd., Los Angeles 64, Calif.

5. DISTINGUISHING MARKS OF IDENTIFICATION: None

6. SEX: Male

7. MARITAL STATUS: married

8. ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (if any):

9. OCCUPATION (present and former, if pertinent; include name and address of present employer): Electronic Assembler - Packard Bell Electronic Corp. 12333 W. Olympic Blvd., Los Angeles, 64, Calif.

10. NATIONALITY (including former, if any): Cuban

11. PASSPORT NO. TYPE regular
ISSUED BY DATE

12. FATHER'S NAME: Rolando Otero

13. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME: Maria A. Hernandez

14. SPOUSE'S NAME (include maiden name): Jessica Rinehart

15. RESIDENCES OF 6 MONTHS OR MORE SINCE REACHING THE AGE OF 16 (years, street addresses, cities, countries)
Jan./64 - present - 2626 S. Sepulveda Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif.
Mar./63 - Jan./64 - 11111 National Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif.
Aug./60 - Mar./63 - Communist Prison, Bay of Pigs.
Apr./59 - Aug./60 - 655 [illegible] St., Miami, Florida
1957 - Apr./59 - Ave. 57, 10212, Marianao, Havana, Cuba.
1955 - 1957 - Private School, America Arias, School
[illegible] Pinar del Rio, Cuba

16. RELATIVES IN U.S. (names, street addresses, cities, states): Mrs. Margot Hernandez, 2626 S. Sepulveda Blvd., Los Angeles, 64, Calif. (Mother)

17. PURPOSE OF ENTRY (give details in narrative statement if pertinent): To reside.

18. ANTICIPATED DATE AND PORT OF ARRIVAL, LENGTH OF STAY AND DESTINATION OR ITINERARY IN U.S.:

19 March

19. TYPE OF VISA CONTEMPLATED (visa symbol, no. of entries and validity period): Immigrant visa (O-1)

20. REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE:

21. APPLICANT TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY (give name, date and place of birth, nationality and relationship): None

22. REMARKS
ND/ 25 March 65

FILE IN 201-284844

(For Use of Office of Security)
☐ No record
☐ No derogatory information
☐ Security info attached
☒ Other (see remarks)

For Name check only, forward original and 6 copies to SY. (Complete items 1 through 18 only)
For China background check, forward original and 1 copy to SY. Attach photo with alien's name in Chinese characters. (Complete items 1 through 18 only)
For "Parakeet" name check, security advisory opinion, or 212(d)(3)(A) waiver action forward original and 8 copies to VO. (See instructions on reverse of last page for preparation of narrative statement to accompany security advisory opinion and 212(d)(3)(A) waiver actions)
For 212(d)(3)(A) waiver actions directed to INS abroad, forward original and 1 copy. (See instructions on reverse of last page for preparation of accompanying narrative statement)
Use additional sheet for any item for which insufficient space is provided.

FORM 3-64 FS-493

NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

17 MAR 1965

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST
NAME CHECK Nº 130946

DATE 5 Oct 1962

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME A. AMORI
OFFICE DESIGNATOR TFW/Ops SS
ROOM, BUILDING GG 14
EXTENSION 7646

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☐ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☒ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
OTERO-HERNANDEZ, Rolando

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
18 April 1941, Marianao, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

201-284811

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

TO: [Al Amort]

16 OCT 1962
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO except ~~[illegible]~~ INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

Previous Green List from WH/4, 21 Sep 60, op, GL #104574, NR

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

TO: Al Amort

16 OCT 1962
DATE

FROM: F I/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN F I/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, F I/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ F I/D HAS NO ~~PERTINENT~~ except INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

Previous Green List from WH/4, 21 Sep 60, op, GL #104574, NR

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO F I/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO F I/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP F I/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: F I/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: 2

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

DISSEM BY 53 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION EUR 6 ☐ RID COPY

#079

INFO FILE VR, RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/ICG2, CI/OPS, CI/RA, SECUR 4, CA/PROP, CA 5 ZURC

S0 E C R E T 151047Z MAR 69 CITE ZURICH 1629

DIRECTOR INFO BERN

17 MAR 69 IN 15450

REF DIRECTOR 83209

1. NAGELL LAST APPEARED AT ZURICH CONSULATE MORNING 7 MARCH AND STATED THAT IF HE RECEIVED NO SATISFACTION BY FIVE O'CLOCK THAT AFTERNOON HE WOULD CARRY OUT HIS THREATS AND EXPOSE US GOVERNMENT ON RADIO, TELEVISION AND IN THE PRESS.

2. HE THEN DISAPPEARED, NOTHING FURTHER HEARD FROM HIM AND, NO PUBLICITY GIVEN. MORNING MONDAY 10 MARCH CONSULATE ZURICH ADVISED BY TELEPHONE FROM US CONSULATE BARCELONA THAT NAGELL HAD APPROACHED THEM AND MADE SIMILAR THREATS.

3. FILE: 201-746537.

S E C R E T

AH	
AB	
IP	
PI	
RI	
DBS	EPD
P	

INPUT TO US DEFECTOR
MACHINE PROGRAM
20 Mar 69 ACS

201-746537

CS COPY

17 MAR 69

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

SECRET

ORIG: MARY ZOUREMBIS
UNIT: E/AS/5
EXT: 7963/9196
DATE: 12 MARCH 1969

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 2+1 PER Sap. 102

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-746537

ORIG: EUR/6 FILE, VR. DDP, ADDP, CI, CA/5, CI/IC-2, CI/RA, SECUR-4, CI, RI/AN, CS/DO, CA/PROP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 23 17 MAR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 83209

~~BERN~~ ZURICH INFO BERN

INK [illegible] WOMUSE

REFS: A. BERN 4908 (IN 07192)
B. DIRECTOR 80955

1. FOR RECORD ON NAGELL PLEASE ADVISE US IF ~~[illegible]~~ HE AIRED GRIEVANCES ON RADIO/TV AS THREATENED.

~~2. BERN: PLEASE [illegible]~~

2. FILE: 201-746537.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB X
CS COPY

201-746537
12 MAR 69

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/E/AS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 29

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: JERRY SEIGEL
UNIT: E/AS/3
EXT: 7063/9108.
DATE: 5 MARCH 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 33 ____ PER SOP # 102

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-746537

CONF: EUR 6 INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, C/SDO, CAS, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/RA, FI2, SECUR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 06 00 03 MAR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 80955

PRIORITY
TO BERN ~~INFO ZURICH~~

INK MHORDER WOMUSE

REFS: A. ZURICH 1610 (IN 03310)
B. BERN 4908 (IN 07192)

1. INFO REF A PASSED LNERGO 28 FEBRUARY 1969. NO INFO SUBJECT'S FILE SUBSEQUENT DIRECTOR 06625 ~~DATED~~ JUNE 1968, EXCEPT FOR PARA 3 BELOW.

2. SUBJECT HAS NEVER HAD ANY WOFIRM CONNECTIONS. NO EVIDENCE ANY CURRENT LNHARP RELATIONSHIPS (ISR HAS NO RECORD). PAST HISTORY INDICATES HE FABRICATOR AND MENTALLY DISTURBED INDIVIDUAL.

3. NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED WAS FACT SUBJECT SERVED JAPAN EARLY 1958 WITH 441ST CIC DETACHMENT. WAS RELIEVED CIC DUTIES IN APRIL 1958 DUE MENTAL INSTABILITY AND CLEARANCES REVOKED. JUNE 1968 LNGOLD REQUESTED WOFIRM TRACES ON SUBJECT AND REFERRED TO LNERGO. PRESUME THIS REQUEST STEMS FROM HIS APPROACH AMCONGEN ZURICH JUNE 1968 AND DETAILED INFO ALREADY KNOWN CONSULATE.

4. BERN PASS ZURICH WHEN COB RETURNS.

~~4.~~ 5. FILE: 201-746537.

CS COPY

END OF MESSAGE

AN	✓
AB	X
IP	
TC	
PR	
FI	

201-746537
6 MAR 69

CI/OPS/EUR B. R. Young
C/CSA
CI/SO

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/E/AS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED EUR ☐ SLOTTED

BY dl AT 1810 Z

DISSEM BY 5 PER

ACTION CHEC

☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE, VR, [illegible] DDP ADDP CI CA2 CI/ICG CI/RA SEC/HR-4 C/PEC CA/PROP CCS2 [illegible]

PRIORITY

420

SECRET 051726Z MAR 69 CITE BERN 4908

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ZURICH

5 MAR 69 IN 07192

INK MHORDER WOMUSE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 06625, 10 JUNE 68

B. ZURICH 1610 (IN 03310)

1. ON 5 MARCH SUBJ AGAIN CONTACTED ZURICH CG AND IN EVEN MORE THREATENING FASHION CLAIMED HE HAS RADIO TV TIME EVENING 6 MARCH AND WILL TELL ALL ABOUT HIS ALLEGED WOFIRM CONTACTS UNLESS HE RECEIVES ASSURANCE THAT PROMISES MADE BY US OFFICIALS WILL BE HONORED. CONSIDER THIS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE BUT REQUEST HQS CONFIRM PRIORITY THAT SUBJ HAS HAD NO WOFIRM OR OTHER LNHARP TIES.

5 - MAR 1969

2. ~~FILE DEFER.~~ 201-746537

SECRET

answered 5 March

SECRET

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Saw Jane Roman at 1615 hours on this cable. Original copy passed her which she will use to prepare blind memo to FBI this topic.

Robert Montgomery

Zurich 1610
(IN 03340)

Std 19 Feb.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67
GPO : 1968 O - 297-543 (40)

DV538

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In) 5 GROUP 1 29

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
CDO

BY T AT 1215 Z

DISSEM BY 46 PER #

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PRECEDENCE

ACTION
EUR6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO
FILE, VR, RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, C/SD, C/CI, C/CI/OA, C/FI, C/EA, CA5, C/[illegible]

#054 SECUR 4, CCS 7

S E C R E T 280751Z CITE ZURICH 1610 ZURC 28 FEB 69 IN 03310

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, BERN T

INK MHORDER WOMUSE

REFS A. DIRECTOR 06625 JUNE 1968

B. ZURICH 1331 (IN 25955)

1. CONSULATE WILL BE REPORTING VIA STATE CHANNELS ON VISIT TO CONSULATE 27 FEB OF RICHARD CASE NAGELL, AKA JOE CRAMER, JOE CRANE, ROBERT C. NOLAN 201-746537. HE WARNED INTERVIEWING CONSUL THAT UNLESS PROMISES MADE TO HIM BY US OFFICIALS WERE HONORED HE WOULD REVEAL TO THE PRESS ENTIRE STORY OF HIS ALLEGED CONTACTS WITH WOFIRM AND WOULD EXPOSE INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM HE HAD DEALT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

2. UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY BASE WILL, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, LEAVE THIS MATTER STRICTLY TO CONSULATE. BERN PLEASE ADVISE LNERGO.

3. MOST RECENT STATE MESSAGE WAS US MISSION BERLIN 2567 OF 26 OCTOBER 68.

SECRET

copy

AN
AB
IH
PT
BY
INDEXED
(I)

201-746537

CS COPY

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: POSADA, LUIS CLEMENTE
C-300985
VOL. II

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/OA

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: OFFICE OF SECURITY MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA.

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

F-71 MPO 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 29 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 20-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO: RF. FILE. VR IPLAN, CI4, C/OPS, PS/EG2, OSG, OSG/OC

T 299644 EIA693 PAGE 01-01 IN 067846

TOR:132220Z OCT 76 CARA 31115

S E C R E T 132216Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31115

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL AKULE

1. FYI, STATION HAS RECEIVED REPORTS FROM SEVERAL SOURCES WHICH INDICATE ALMOST CERTAINLY THAT WKSCARLET-3 WAS ARRESTED BY DISIP 12 OCTOBER AND IS BEING DETAINED UNDER SUSPICION OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE 6 OCTOBER DESTRUCTION OF CUBANA AIRCRAFT NEAR BARBADOS, ALSO, THAT WKSCARLET-3'S OFFICE WAS RAIDED AND ALL FILES CONFISCATED MORNING 13 OCTOBER.

2. FILE: 201-0300985, E2 IMPDET.

~~C/OPS: Please give me the subject's file.~~

S E C R E T

Office of Security
Polygraph Results, 29 June 1973
Subject: 201-300985

ORIG: PHILIP SHARE
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 5 FEB 73

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 21-1

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: SE PER: #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO 300573 BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WHE INFO: FILE, VR, ...

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T [illegible] 73 21 17z CITE DIRECTOR 367030

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO ROME.

UKRALLY UKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21092 (IN 823647)*

1. AFTER CAREFUL RECONSIDERATION, BELIEVE IN VIEW CONSIDERABLE FLAP POTENTIAL THAT UKSCARLET-3 SHOULD NOT BE MET IN ROME. WE REALIZE THAT HE COULD PRODUCE SOME INTERESTING INTEL FROM THIS OP BUT DO NOT FEEL IN THIS INSTANCE THAT TIMELINESS OF REPORTING WORTH RISK INVOLVED.

2. SUGGEST YOU TELL UKSCARLET-3 CONTACT CANCELLED BECAUSE ROME CASE OFFICER [redacted] WHO WOULD HAVE MET HIM EXPECTS TO BE OUT OF TOWN AT TIME OF UKSCARLET-3'S VISIT AND NO OTHER APPROPRIATE CONTACT AVAILABLE.

FEB 7 1973

3. FILE 201-300985, 75-2-16/3. E2 IMPDET

*REPORTED ON UKSCARLET-3 TRIP TO ROME TO BUG COLOMBIAN DELEGATION TO COLOMBIAN-VENEZUELAN BORDER TALKS.

E/I MR. PEAKE (TELECOORD)

C/WH/FI Burecke

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

R L Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

E2 CLASSIFIED BY 057515

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 01 0332

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

(Please Type)

Supplementary Explanatory Notes For Those Items With An Asterisk (*) Following The Item Number Are Contained On The Reverse Side

TO: IP/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address: DK-5

DATE 29 25 Sept 72

FROM: NAME Nancy L. Davis

OFFICE DESIGNATION (CSN 5-50) WH/3/V

ROOM 3R 2627

PHONE 4522

TUBE ADDRESS BS-4

1.* TYPE OF ACTION (Select Only One)

OPEN 201	
AMEND 201	
ADD CRYPTONYM	X
CANCEL CRYPTONYM	0

2. TYPE OF FILE CONTROL (Select Only One)

HOLD UNRESTRICTED IN IP/FILES	
HOLD IN IP/FILES BUT RESTRICT TO DESK	
PERMANENTLY CHANGE TO DESK	

(IP Use Only)

3. ENTER CRYPTONYM(S) ONLY IF CRYPTONYM ACTION HAS BEEN INDICATED IN ITEM 1. USE ONE COPY OF FORM AND COMPLETE ITEMS 5, 14, 15, 16, AND 21. DO NOT INCLUDE TRUE NAME INFORMATION.

SUPERSEDED CRYPTONYM: CIFENCE/4

NEW CRYPTONYM: WKSCARLET/3

4. TRUE NAME (L A S T.) (First) (Middle)

5. 201 NUMBER 0300985

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (For Type, Use A For Alias, V For Variant or AKA, M For Maiden)

TYPE	(L A S T.)	(First)	(Middle)

7. SEX (Circle One) M F

8. DATE OF BIRTH, IF CIRCA CHECK BOX ☐ DAY MONTH YEAR

9. COUNTRY AND CITY/TOWN/PROVINCE OF BIRTH

(IP Use Only)

10. CITIZENSHIP

(IP Use Only)

11. OCCUPATION

(IP Use Only)

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION(S) OR TARGET ORGANIZATION(S)

13. 01 CODE(S)

14. ACTION DESK [redacted] VENE CODE [redacted]

(IP Use Only) VENE

15. COUNTRY OF LOCATION VENE[redacted]

(IP Use Only) VENE

16. INTEREST DESK CODE

(IP Use Only)

17. CITE FIELD ADDRESSEES TO RECEIVE INDEX CARDS:

18. * DOCUMENT SYMBOL, NUMBER DATE DAY MO YR

19. COUNTRY, STATE, CITY/TOWN OF LOCATION

20. SUMMARY TEXT FOR INDEX RECORDS. *(Insert additional identifying and descriptive data. Do not include Cryptonyms. If spouse record desired, provide spouse bio data here preceded by "Code R.")*

21. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER Nancy L. Davis

22. 201 NUMBER 0300985

FORM 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 5-72

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

WARNING - SISAMI

(38-51)

SECRET

No. [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/V [illegible]

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of [illegible], for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows:.

Unilateral penetration of [illegible]

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

Lee C. [illegible]

Acting Chief, CI/OA

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: ____________________

SECRET

GROUP 1

14-00000

SECRET

FILE NO. 300955

NOTICE TO: DIVISION PERSONNEL REVIEWING THIS FILE

Please complete the following steps:

1. NAME OF REVIEWER (please print) NANCY L. DAVIS

2. OFFICE DESIGNATION OF REVIEWER: WH/3/V

3. DATE OF REVIEW 10 JULY 72

4. Do you contemplate dissemination of information reviewed: NO

☐ to field

☐ to another US Government Agency (if so, to whom)

The dissemination of any Office of Security investigative information, including FBI reports, must be coordinated with CI/OA and the Office of Security.

5. Comments:

DO NOT REMOVE THE ATTACHED FOLDER FROM CI/OA

FORM 8-70 3230 SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(13-21-40)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE
TO:	201 NO.
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT:

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☐	PRQ II	☐	U.S. COMINT TRACES
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	NI TRACES *(Incl. COMINT)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES *(Incl. COMINT)*	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

[illegible]

FORM 7-71 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20-38)

Office of Security Investigative Report
26 April 1972
Subject: 319235

300985

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE 19 January 1972 JR

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - 300985 SO - 319235

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: WH/3/V Venezuela

TYPE OF REQUEST

XX	POA	XX	OA		CNC		SI		SRP		

OS INDICES RESULTS BY ~~NNx since 16xAugx1967x~~ (Date) ~~Nothing since 16 Aug. 1967~~ 26 January 72

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT: Informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

IP	DIVISION (include comint)	FIELD	CRS/ISG
NDI	NDI	NDI	NR

ATTACHMENTS		PRQ/PART I		PARTIAL BIO		OTHER	

REMARKS

SO# 319235.

T/N: POSADA Carriles, Luis Clemente
DPOB: 15 February 1928, Cienfuegos, Cuba

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA DATE 20 Jan 72

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☒ 1. OS indices results: OS # 319235 – No info since 11/71

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐

☒ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached: State, FBI.

☒ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, 1 reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS

20 Jan 72
DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY, IOS

FORM 11-71 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

CAUTION- BLANK FORMS REQ
SECURE STORAGE
IN FIELD

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS PROCESSING	
		XX	INDEX NO REQUESTED
TO Chief, Latin America Division			NO INDEXING
INFO. Chief, EUR Division			APERTURE CARD REQUESTED
FROM Chief of Station, Stockholm			
SUBJECT WNINTEL REAM - PCS Arrivals/Departures Cuban Officials			

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See Below

REF: OSSA - 21589

LA [illegible]

1. TIDRUM list dated 1 February 1979 reflects PCS arrival of:

114167

P I N O M A C H A D O, Quintin, DOB: 21 Dec 1931, Ambassador Cuban Embassy, Diplomatic Passport No. 06319, Wife: Selma D I A Z L L E R A, DOB: 7 Dec 1936, Diplomatic Passport No. 06320; DOA: December 1978. Reference reported that List of Diplomatic Corps Stockholm May 1978 showed Abelardo CRESPO-ARIAS AS Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a.i. and that Station had not been advised of Ambassador Oscar Emilio ALCALDE-VALLS' temporary or PCS departure.

P E R E Z, Miquel Robaina, DOB: 29 Dec 1930, OCC: Employee with Cuban Embassy, Wife: Caridad Martinez Espinosa, DOB: 11 Sept 1931; DOA: December 1978.

Station traces negative above. Please index and trace for passage liaison.

2. TIDRUM list reflects following C-ubans have departed Sweden:

A. B A R R O S O - C E R V A N T E S, Eliecer, no 201 number.

B. G O N Z A L E Z - QUEVEDO, Jose, no 201 number.

Wanda F. COLABUFO

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - C/LA DIV
2 - C/EUR DIV

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSSA - 21650	21 February 1979
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-126-118

SECRET

DATE:

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C#
SO# 216052
201# 30[illegible]

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY): [illegible]

CHIEF, CI/OA

FORM 2-65 2813

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(40)

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ No.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. *Write clearly*
2. *Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"*
3. *Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed*

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Rev)*

[illegible]

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

(a) Bamby (nickname), Pasillo

5. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]

6. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)*

[illegible]

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

a. SEX ☐ M ☐ F	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES		j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE	

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS IF OBTAINABLE

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 10.)

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 12.)

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)

[illegible]

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION [illegible]	17. TITLE	18. SALARY (Per annum) [illegible]

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)

[illegible]

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

[illegible]

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO

ATTACHMENT PRQ PART I HVCA-10757

DATE	PLACE	PURPOSE
1956	Miami, Florida	Tourist
1961	Mexico	Political exile
Feb 1961	Miami, Florida	Political exile
April 1961	Guatemala	Invasion (Cuba)
May 1961	Miami, Florida	Invasion (Cuba)
1964	Dominican Republic	Cuban Affairs
1964	Puerto Rico	Cuban Affairs
1964	Dominican Republic	Cuban Affairs
1964	Miami, Florida	
Oct 1967	Venezuela	Work
Oct 1967	Miami, Florida	
Oct 1967	Venezuela	Work
1968	Miami, Florida	Tourist
1969	Miami, Florida	Tourist
Mar 1970	Miami, Florida	Reentry Permit
1970	Trinidad, Tobago	Revolution--business
Jun 1970	Bogota	Business
1970	Bogota	Business
May 1971	Aruba	Business
April 1971	Lima, Peru	Business
April 1971	Argentina	Business
April 1971	Brazil	Business
Oct 1971	Portugal	Business
Oct 1971	Rome	Business
Nov 1971	Vienna	Business
Nov 1971	Rome	Business
Dec 1971	Miami, Florida	Business
Dec 1971	Puerto Rico	Tourist

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

good markesman with small arm

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
[illegible]	[illegible] 19[illegible]	[illegible] 19[illegible]	127 Inf. [illegible]	[illegible]	Ft. Benning, Ga.

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

[illegible]

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

26. a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]
b. EMPLOYER [illegible]
c. ADDRESS San José de las Lajas, Cuba
d. TYPE OF WORK [illegible]
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ [illegible] PER [illegible]
f. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]

27. a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]
b. EMPLOYER [illegible]
c. ADDRESS [illegible], Las Villas, Cuba
d. TYPE OF WORK [illegible]
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ [illegible] PER [illegible]
f. REASON FOR LEAVING

28. a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]
b. EMPLOYER [illegible]
c. ADDRESS [illegible]
d. TYPE OF WORK [illegible]
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER [illegible]
f. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]

29. a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]
b. EMPLOYER [illegible]
c. ADDRESS [illegible]
d. TYPE OF WORK [illegible]
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]

30. a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
b. EMPLOYER
c. ADDRESS
d. TYPE OF WORK
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE:	SINGLE ☐	MARRIED ☐	WIDOWED ☐	SEPARATED ☐	DIVORCED ☐	ANNULLED ☐

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] for divorce [illegible]

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE	(First) [illegible]	(Middle) [illegible]	(Nee) Gonzalez Leyva de	(Last) [illegible]

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE [illegible]	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE [illegible], Ca.
36. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]	37. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible]	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)

[illegible]

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	Caracas, Venezuela	[illegible]

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (*Identify child and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME	42. YEAR OF BIRTH	43. PLACE OF BIRTH	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME	49. YEAR OF BIRTH	50. PLACE OF BIRTH	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII	BROTHERS AND SISTERS				
FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	Cuban
[illegible]			[illegible]	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Maria Concepción Posada		[illegible]	[illegible]	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE; INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Unknown (See previous PRQ I)

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

Concha Marina Posada (aunt)
Margot Carrillo (aunt) address unknown

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE

SIGNATURE

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO:

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is **not** to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM [illegible] ([illegible])	2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

See previous PRQ Part II, HMMA-23180, dated 20 September 1965

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible case officer.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

[illegible] individuals associated [illegible] interest [illegible]

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Subject's present position and physical presence in Venezuela would be untenable if his cooperation with [illegible] became known to the Venezuelan government.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Meetings are clandestine. Plausible denial is basedon contact with CO in his official cover capacity.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject accomplishes this in the course of his actual employment.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

[illegible]

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

[illegible] previous [illegible]. In addition, Subject has been employed in [illegible], [illegible], and [illegible].

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

[illegible] of [illegible]; [illegible] (former [illegible])

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has had no formal training since being in Venezuela (19[illegible]). Records not available here for period when Subject worked for Station [illegible].

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would not likely collaborate with any foreign power [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

SECRET

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

[illegible]

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from [illegible] and its files and informants in the course of his normal work as an official of [illegible].

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject ~~knows~~ from experience that information is disseminated throughout [illegible]

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is a unilateral penetration ([illegible]) of [illegible].

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Subject is an official of [illegible]. He is [illegible] not involved in [illegible]

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT; I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

[illegible]

SECRET

SECTION IX	**QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS**

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

[illegible]

SECTION X	**COMMITMENTS**

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject is paid a regular monthly salary of approximately US$ 335.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None; Subject has been assisted in retaining his permanent resident status.

SECTION XI	**CE AND SECURITY**

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files. Derogatory info resolved.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

[illegible] 3 November 1971. See [illegible] No. 72501 dated 29 November 1971.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED. [illegible] 18 October 1965	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED POA 17 January [illegible]

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

[illegible] Subject continues to demonstrate reliability and [illegible] security [illegible] to be [illegible] best [illegible].

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

All known [illegible] have been previously resolved.

SECTION XII	**SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS**

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is increasingly able to disguise his PERUVIAN accent and pass as a Venezuelan. Among other Latins, the accent would be detected in prolonged contact.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

PRQ-I obtained from Subject. PRQ-II from files and personal observation.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

N.A

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W, WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE, WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject could be contacted by any of former case officers, or in name used by former CO's.

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

See previous PRQ-II.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
[illegible]	

SECRET

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,	**NUMBER**
	SUBJECT
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated

A Provisional ~~Operational Approval~~ Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Penetration of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention in Venezuela.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

Returned file to Mr. Ott CI/OA/WH

FILE NO. 300985

NOTICE TO: DIVISION PERSONNEL REVIEWING THIS FILE

Please complete the following steps:

1. NAME OF REVIEWER (please print) R. TANSING

2. OFFICE DESIGNATION OF REVIEWER: CI/OPS/WH

3. DATE OF REVIEW 14 Jan 72

4. Do you contemplate dissemination of information reviewed: No

☐ to field

☐ to another US Government Agency (if so, to whom)

The dissemination of any Office of Security investigative information, including FBI reports, must be coordinated with CI/OA and the Office of Security.

5. Comments: Re WH/3/V memo 28 Dec 71, C/S should have been considered for an OA years ago. Suggest he now be processed for an OA not POA and Desk can supply updated PRQs I & II at later date when routinely procured from station.

R. Tansing
CI/OPS/WH

I agree!!

DO NOT REMOVE THE ATTACHED FOLDER FROM CI/OA

FORM 8-70 3230

SECRET

GROUP 1

(13-21-40)

14-00000

SECRET

28 December 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT: CIFENCE/4 (201-300985)

1. It is requested that a POA be granted for Subject's use as a penetration of the Directorate for Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP), a Venezuelan Security Service. Since Subject holds a key position in this organization, he will be able to monitor its intelligence operations as well as Venezuelan political matters.

2. All current traces on Subject are non-derogatory. (See attachment to Form 772 for additional information).

3. Request for Approval, COMINT Name Check and PRQ Part I (dated 28 May 68) are attached. Updated PRQ Part I and Part II will be requested from Station.

Nancy L. Davis
WH/3/V

Attachments:
As Stated Above

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 22 December 1971

TO:
- ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: WH/3/V

SUBJECT: *(true name)* Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA, OR ALIASES: CIFENCE-4

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-300985

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SPECIFY)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B
☐	SECURITY AND RELIABILITY DETERMINATION		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Venezuela

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE: penetration DISIP, a Venezuelan Security Service. Will also report on Venezuelan political matters.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.		
F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.		

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ STATUS

- ☒ PRQ I OR BIO DATA IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED
- ☒ PRQ II OR EQUIVALENT WILL BE FORWARDED PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF POA. 1 COPY

6. H.I. TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT (see attached)

☐ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☐ NON-DEROGATORY ☒ DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT

☐ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☒ NON-DEROGATORY ☐ DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

*8. FIELD TRACES **

☐ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☐ NON-DEROGATORY ☒ DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

9. CRS/ISG **

☐ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☒ NON-DEROGATORY ☐ DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

☐ SPECIAL CHECK NSA INDICES — 10. FI/D ** — ☐ CS REFS TO FI/D (BR. FILES)

☒ NO RECORD ☐ WILL FORWARD ☐ NON-DEROGATORY ☐ DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

*LIST AREAS CHECKED — **IF NOT CHECKED - WHY? ☐ NOT APPLICABLE ☐ OTHER *(EXPLAIN)*

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: [illegible] Isenstead

EXTENSION: 7221

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: [illegible]

FORM 3-71 772 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

COMMENTS RE DEROGATORY TRACES
ATTACHMENT TO FORM 772

1. A POA was requested on Subject in January 1968 for his use as a penetration of Venezuelan General Directorate of Police. Cancellation was requested in February 1968 because of indications that Subject was involved in "clandestine sabotage activity and suspicions that Subject failed to report his activities to CIA. Thereafter, Subject was treated as a "hostile". In the ensuing months Subject was described as "an extremely valuable penetration" because of his important and accurate intelligence information and operational reports. Subject was given a polygraph examination to clear up questions about possible affiliation with Cuban intelligence, unreported association with gangster elements, etc. His responses showed no information which would prevent CIA using him for ops purposes. Request for POA was again requested on 7 September 1968. This POA request was turned down on 15 October due to Subject being an "agent of a foreign power."

2. Since that time Subject has continued to provide verbal and written information reports concerning Communist and subversive elements, guerrilla activities, Soviet activities, sabotage, etc. Subject continues to report accurately and often and has a very pro-U.S. attitude. Subject was again polygraphed on 29 November 1971 (a copy of which is contained in Subject's CI/OA folder). His responses indicated no deception concerning truthfulness of reporting to CIA, no compromise of his U.S. Government connections, non-involvement in illegal arms dealings, etc.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly. 2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA". 3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) Luis (Middle) Clemente (Last) Posada Carriles (Age)

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: Same

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.): Same

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use): Bambi (nickname)

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 15 February 1928

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours):

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals): No record

MICROFILMED
JUN 5 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX ☒ M ☐ F	b. AGE 40	c. APPARENT AGE 37	d. HEIGHT ft. 5 in. 10	e. WEIGHT 180	f. COMPLEXION Normal	g. FACE (Shape)
h. COLOR OF HAIR Black	i. COLOR OF EYES Green		j. TEETH All		k. BUILD Strong	l. POSTURE Normal

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: Scar, right-hand palm

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE: Normal

o. PROMINENT FEATURES: None

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES:

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. HW 54214 DocId:32[illegible] [illegible] 14-201

SECTION II

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP Cuban	11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND [illegible]

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, lessee or sub-lessee)
Resd - [illegible], Ave. San Juan Bosco, Caracas, Venezuela

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 12.)
Miami, Florida

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)
1964 - Dominican Republic - working for J.U.R.E organization (exiles ~~affairs~~)

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION Ministry of Internal Relations	17. TITLE	18. SALARY (Per annum) Bs 1800 mo.

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)
None

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
None

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Political - Frente Revolucionario Jose A. Echevarria - 1960 in Cuba
Political - J.U.R.E. - 1963-1964
Political - Reco - 1967

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE RECEIVED
Monserrate Cienfuegos, Cuba	Elementary	1933	1942	Yes
Instituto Cienfuegos, Cuba	S. High School Bachelor	1942	1947	Yes
Padres Dominicos Cienfuegos, Cuba	Sugar Chemist	1947	1950	No
Havana University	Medicine	1950	1953	No

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ YES	READ NO	WRITE YES	WRITE NO	SPEAK YES	SPEAK NO	UNDERSTAND YES	UNDERSTAND NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	
English	X		X		X		X	

None

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Hunting (good shot)

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
USA	1963	1964	197 Brgd 1st Batallion	2nd Lt.	F. Benning, Ga.

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY, INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

None

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

26.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): 1944-1945
b. EMPLOYER: Pastora Sugar Mill
c. ADDRESS: San Jose de Las Lajas Las Villas, Cuba
d. TYPE OF WORK: Chemist
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ 210 per month
f. REASON FOR LEAVING: Transfer

27.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): 1946-1954
b. EMPLOYER: San Agustin Sugar Mill
c. ADDRESS: Cruces, Las Villas - Cuba
d. TYPE OF WORK: Chemist
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ 310 per month
f. REASON FOR LEAVING: Studying

28.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): 1956-1958
b. EMPLOYER: Self -(Fumigadora)
c. ADDRESS: Cienfuegos Las Villas, Cuba
d. TYPE OF WORK: Fumigation
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ 250 per month
f. REASON FOR LEAVING:

29.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): 1960-1963
b. EMPLOYER: Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
c. ADDRESS: Havana, Cuba, and Akron, Ohio
d. TYPE OF WORK: Supervisor
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ 500 per month
f. REASON FOR LEAVING: Army

30.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): 1963-1964
b. EMPLOYER: U.S. Army
c. ADDRESS: Fort Benning, Ga.
d. TYPE OF WORK: 2nd Lt.
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ 380 per month
f. REASON FOR LEAVING: Cuban affairs

14-00000

[illegible]

Married December 1956: Divorced 26 June 1963 from Maria Concepcion Castaneda: Reason - ~~XX~~ Incompatibility.

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Nee) (Last): Nieves Elina ~~XXXXX~~ Gonzalez ita

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 13 Aug 1963

35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Colombus, Ga. - Muscogee County

36. DATE OF BIRTH: DPOB 13 Dec 1935

37. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba   [illegible] wife of subject 201-300985

38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Cuban

39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased): Edf. Mayflower, Apt 24, Avenida San Juan Bosco, Caracas, Venezuela

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Jorge Luis Posada	X		1965	Miami, Florida	American

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

None

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME: Luis Posada

42. YEAR OF BIRTH: Unknown

43. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Cuban

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

46. OCCUPATION: Book Store

47. PRESENT RESIDENCE: 4110 Ave. 56, Cienfuegos, Cuba

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME: Dolores Carriles

49. YEAR OF BIRTH: Unknown

50. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Cuban

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

53. OCCUPATION: Housekeeper

54. PRESENT RESIDENCE: Same as for father

Roberto Posada	X		[illegible]	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Raul Posada	X		[illegible]	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Maria Conchita Posada		X	1932	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban

SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)

None

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE (Indicate name of governments and positions held)

Roberto Posada - Telephone co. - Cuba
Raul Posada - Electric & Power Co. - Cuba

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (Explain relationship)

Augusto Val-Des Miranda (friend)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)

I have aunts (2) and cousins (2) who are American citizens.
I do not know anything of certificates.

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE 23 MAY 68

SIGNATURE Luis Posada

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: PRQ Part I on Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See below.

Forwarded herewith is an up-to-date PRQ Part I which was filled in by Subject on 23 May 1968.

Oscar C. KALBING

ATTACHMENTS:
A As stated (4 copies)

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - CH/WHD (w/4 atts, h/w)

MAY 30 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HVCA-15488

DATE: 28 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

FILE NO. 300985

NOTICE TO: DIVISION PERSONNEL REVIEWING THIS FILE

Please complete the following steps:

1. NAME OF REVIEWER (please print) NANCY L. DAVIS
2. OFFICE DESIGNATION OF REVIEWER: WH/3/C
3. DATE OF REVIEW 12/21/71
4. Do you contemplate dissemination of information reviewed:

☐ to field

☐ to another US Government Agency (if so, to whom)

NO

The dissemination of any Office of Security investigative information, including FBI reports, must be coordinated with CI/OA and the Office of Security.

5. Comments:

DO NOT REMOVE THE ATTACHED FOLDER FROM CI/OA

FORM 8-70 3230 SECRET [illegible] (13-21-40)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE

TO:

201 NO.

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

SUBJECT:

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☐	PRQ II	☐	U.S. COMINT TRACES
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES *(Incl. COMINT)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES *(Incl. COMINT)*	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

[illegible]

[illegible]

FORM 7-71 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20-36)

Office of Security Polygraph
Results, dated 29 November 1971,
Subject: CIFENCE/4

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5 30 09 85

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. 71-284/3 II

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY 30 PER ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR RI/AN FI 2 CI CI/OPS CI/OA SOD6 ~~13 APR 1970~~

ACTION NO. 910 | DDP ADDP CSDO

File

S E C R E T 102143Z APR 70 CITE CARACAS 4890

DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA, WH/MIAMI

10 APR 70 0606 15

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

30 09 85

1. DURING RECENT TRIP TO MIAMI, CIFENCE-4 (IDEN FOR TEGUCIGALPA) WAS TOLD BY SOME CUBAN FRIENDS THAT ADOLFO MENDOZA, WEALTHY CUBAN RANCH OWNER IN HONDURAS WHO WORKED WITH JKLANCE AGAINST CASTRO AND INFILTRATED INTO CUBA FOR JKLANCE PRIOR BAY OF PIGS, IS ATTEMPTING PURCHASE ARMS CLANDESTINELY FOR HONDURAS. CIFENCE-4 FEELS ARMS FOR ACTION AGAINST EL SALVADOR AND NOT FOR ACTION BY CUBAN EXILES AGAINST CASTRO. FRIENDS ASKED CIFENCE-4 RE AVAILABILITY CERTAIN AMMUNITIION IN VENEZUELA AND HE SAID WOULD LOOK INTO MATTER. WILL TAKE NO ACTION UNLESS WE DESIRE AS MEANS MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH MIAMI FRIENDS AND OBTAINING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. CARACAS PREFERS HE TAKE NO ACTION.

NR [illegible]
CI/OH/Trac. U:
per [illegible]
13 April '70

2. IF TEGUCIGALPA AND WH/MIAMI INVESTIGATE, DO NOT ATTRIBUTE INFO TO CIFENCE-4.

3. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

SECRET

SECRET

10-69 EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

V/

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

II

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN 52 CI CI/OPS CI/OA SOD 6

ACTION NO. 916

DDP ADDP CSDO

SECRET 102146Z APR 70 CITE CARACAS 4891

IN 060611

TEGUCIGALPA INFO DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF CARACAS 4890 (IN 060615)

IDEN: PENETRATION OF VENEZUELAN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION.

GP-1.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES N | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

7/ SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1 ____ 5 ____
2 ____ 6 ____
3 ____ 7 ____
4 ____ 8 ____

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ____ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO | FILE, VR E/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/SO, FI2

ACTION NO. 635

S E C R E T 082215Z APR 70CITE CARACAS 4858

DIRECTOR INFO GEORGETOWN, WH/MIAMI

8 APR IN 058848

REFS A. CARACAS 4838 (IN 057022)

B. DIRECTOR 022665

1. CIFENCE-4 DENIES ANY INVOLVEMENT WITH HART AND GARCIA IN SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO VENEZUELA. SAYS HE HAS NEVER MET HART. DURING OCT 69 HE WENT TO MIAMI AT REQUEST OF CIFENCE-1 TO INVESTIGATE STORY THAT HART TRAVELLING TO MIAMI TO PURCHASE *3000,000 DOLLARS WORTH OF WEAPONS. PRIOR TO TRIP HE TOLD CO HIS SEVERAL CONTACTS AMONG CLANDESTINE ARMS DEALERS IN MIAMI WOULD FACILITATE INVESTIGATION. RE GARCIA, CIFENCE-4 SAID HE WAS INTRODUCED TO GARCIA CIRCA MAY 69 AND LAST TALKED TO HIM IN JUNE 69.

2. PERHAPS FBI MIAMI SOURCE IS ONE OF ARMS DEALERS CIVENCE-4 KNOWS AND TALKED TO DURING OCT INVESTIGATION OF HART. IF THIS TRUE, POSSIBILITY EXISTS SOURCE CONNECTED CIFENCE-4 WITH HART. GARCIA 201 FILE SHOWS HE DEALT WITH MIAMI ARMS DEALER IN OCT 63 ON BEHALF OF GOV. CANNOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY THAT GARCIA HAS HAD SUBSEQUENT DEALINGS.

3. FILE 201-300985. GP-1.

S E C R E T

*WILL SVC UPON REQUEST.

SECRET

7

WH 8 FILE, VR [illegible]

951 DDP [illegible]

S E C R E T 121445Z AUG 70 CITE CARACAS 5507 (LAPALUS ACTING)

12 Aug 70 141174

DIRECTOR

CIGRAPE

formerly APIGALVE-15 Dec. 19

1. CIFENCE-4 INFORMED STATION EARLY MORNING 11 AUGUST THAT MEMBER CIFENCE ORGANIZATION WHO RESPONSIBLE FOR ~~TELEPHONE~~ TAPS INFORMED HIM THAT CIFENCE KNOWS THAT CIGRAPE-2 HAS TELEPHONE TAP EQUIPMENT INN HIS APARTMENT AND CIFENCE BELIEVES HE WORKS FOR JKLANCE". CIFENCE-4 SAID THAT CIFENCE INVESTIGATING THE MATTER.

5 OCT 1970

2. STATION HAS CLOSED DOWN CIGRAPE OPERATION, TAKEN OFF ALL TAPS AT CENTRAL SWITCHBOARDS AND HAS REMOVED ALL EQUIPMENT FROM CIGRAPE-2 APARTMENT FOR STORAGE IN SAFE PLACE. ANY CIFENCE OR TELEPHONE INSPECTORS ENTERING CIGRAPE-2 APARTMENT WILL NOW FIND ONLY RUDIMENTARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR LEGITIMATE CIGRAPE-2 TELEPHONE ANSWERING SERVICE.

3. WILL KEEP HEADQUARTERS INFORMED. GP-1.

201-740849

S E C R E T

Finally Pls. card CIGRAPE-2 201-321684

Copy in circle, pls.

6 OCT 1970

CIFLUTE Project

Liaison Project

CIWOOD CICLASS/2	SIFA	Armed Forces Intel Service
CIRASH CIRASH/17	DISIP	Direitorate of Inspection and Prevention
CIFENCE CIFENCE/1	SCD	Central Documentation Service

13

13 APR 1970 — Jim Alicasa, [illegible], said that no request for HQ approval of liaison w/ SCD had ever been submitted or approved.

LIOBETON is the only approved liaison

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION　CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　TOTAL COPIES 25　ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)　GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY Zl PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH-8　FILE, VR RI/AN DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI, CI/OA, SOD-6, FI-2

ACTION NO. 096

SECRET 132319Z APR 70 CITE TEGUCIGALPA 8767　13 APR 061804

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE/CIFENCE

REFS: A. CARACAS-4890 (IN 060615)

B. CARACAS-4891 (IN 060614)

1. SEE NO NEED FOR CARACAS TO TAKE ACTION. MBDOZA KNOWN TO BE ENGAGED ARMS BUYING. PROABLY ANY INFO CIFENCE-4 ABLE TO TURN UP WOULD NOT BE WORTH RISK OR INVOLVING HIM.

300985

2. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

SECRET

File

14 APR 1970

T-8 June

to McNally

SECRET

14-00000

30 09 85

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	
BY: AT: Z	
DISSEM BY 7 PER	
ACTION UNIT WH 8	FILE, VR Rafael a/c/a FI Z
ACTION NO. 674	

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

II

S E C R E T 051410Z MAR 70 CITE CARACAS 4632 5 MAR 70 IN 037053

DIRECTOR

REF HVCA-17339

1. PLEASE FORWARD PERTINENT PORTIONS OF 201 FILE ON RAFAEL (TREMOLS) FRESNEDA. ACCORDING CIFENCE-4 ASSESSMENT TREMOLS HAS EXCELLENT CONTACTS AT UCV, IS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, AND WISHES TO RENEW CONTACT WITH RVROCK. CABLE SOONEST SUMMARY OF 201.

31 33 11

30 09 85

2. FILE: DEFER. GP-1.

S E C R E T

6 MAR 1970

18 MAR 1970

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 2 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 2 PER ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

E

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR c/ans, ci, ci/ops, ci/oa, fi2, mps/as.

ACTION NO. 197

DDP, ADDP

025095

c

S E C R E T 131453Z FEB 70 CITE CARACAS 4467 FEB 13

16 FEB 1970

DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

Copy in [illegible] file

REF HVCA-17103

OVER

1. CIFENCE-5 SUCCESSFULLY SGSWIRLED 11 FEBRUARY BY LEONARD B. VANTZIAN. TO INCREAS TECHNICAL VALIDITY SGSWIRL OFFICER ADVISED LIMITING COVERAGE TO BASIC ISSUES OF ESPIONAGE AND DISCLOSURE OF STATION CLANDESTINE CONTACTS OR OPERATIONS. ACCORDING TO SGSWIRL, CIFENCE HAS NOT INFORMED ANY VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OF HIS CONTACTS WITH RVROCK AND CINOTIF-1 ONLY OTHER INDIVIDUAL WHO AWARE HIS COLLABORATION WITH RVROCK. NO SGSWIRL INDICATION THAT CIFENCE-5 HAS BEEN INVOLVED WITH ANY COMMUNIST OR CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SINCE HIS DEFECTION IN 1961.

2. BASED ON SUCCESSFUL SGSWIRL, REQUEST HEADQUARTERS PROCESS POA TO RECRUIT CIFENCE-5 AS PENETRATION CIFENCE. CIFENCE-5 ADVISES HE NOW CHIEF CIFENCE CONTROL DIVISION WHICH RESPONSIBLE FOR MIR, FALN, AND PCV PENETRATION AND INFORMANT OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, CIFENCE-5 STILL IN CHARGE OF CIFENCE FILES AND ONE OF FOUR IDENTITY PERSONS WHO HAVE UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO IDENTIY FILES AND ARCHIVES. HE IS WILLING USE HIS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4457 S E C R E T

POSITION AND ACCESS HOWEVER RVROCK SUGGESTS.

77 33 27

CIFENCE-5 ACCESS COMPLEMENTS THAT OF CIFENCE-3

30 09 25

AND CIFENCE-4 AND WILL GREATLY EXPAND OUR ACCESSS IN IDENTIY AND CIFENCE. WE CONVINCED HE WILL MAKE A MOST VALUABLE ADDITION TO STATION COVERAGE OF A NUMBER OF TARGETS. PROJECT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE.

3. FILE: 221-287019.

SECRET

16 FEB 1970

M/R — On 22 May 1969, CI/Ops/WH by memo, concurred in the C/A use for Sec. 19 of CSI F 10-5 for contact, recruitment and polygraph. CI/Ops/WH specified that no recruitment would take place until all above actions had taken place and results were provided to Hqs.

This is a Section 19 case — and not a POA/CA.

16 FEB 1970

ORIG: M. BERGER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1335
DATE: 11 FEBRUARY 1970

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE. VR. KILAN, CI/OA, CI/OPS, SECUR/

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 23 24 z FEB 70 12 FEB 1970 CITE DIRECTOR 089340

TO CARACAS WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 3365 (NOT SENT WH/MIAMI)*

(FORMERLY AMCLEVE/15)

Proc. U.,
Pls. make
cryptic change.
SP

1. HQS HAS LEARNED CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE HAVE PRESERVED THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS.

2. IT NOW NECESSARY AS MENTIONED REF FOR COUPLE COME TO U.S. TO FILL OUT APPLICATIONS FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS AND WHERE CIFENCE/4 WILL FILL OUT APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. HQS MUST REVIEW COMPLETED APPLICATIONS BEFORE SUBMITTING THEM TO INS. AFTER APPLICATIONS REVIEWED BY HQS, COUPLE MAY RETURN CARACAS IF THEY HAVE SOME DOCUMENT WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM ENTER VENEZUELA. IF NOT, THEY MUST REMAIN IN U.S. THE TWO OR THREE WEEKS IT WILL TAKE HQS TO PROCESS APPLICATIONS AND OBTAIN NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS.

300985

3. ALTHOUGH THIS CASE MIGHT BE HANDLED MORE RAPIDLY IF COUPLE CAME TO HQS AREA FOR PROCESSING, TRIP TO HQS AREA COULD POSE SECURITY HAZARD FOR CIFENCE/4 AS COUPLE WOULD NORMALLY TRAVEL TO MIAMI FOR THIS PROCESSING. ANY INDICATION COUPLE TRAVELLED

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF:
INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 009340

TO PAGE TWO

TO HQS AREA MIGHT CAUSE CIFENCE/4'S SUPERIORS IN CIFENCE TO SUSPECT HE MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH RVROCK; THEREFORE REQUEST WH/MIAMI MEET WITH CIFENCE/4 AND PROVIDE INS FORMS N-470 (CIFENCE/4 ONLY) AND TWO ORIGINAL I-131 FOR EACH TO FILL OUT. COUPLE MUST PROVIDE TWO PHOTOS EACH SIGNED ON LEFT HAND MARGIN AND ONE CHECK TO INS FOR THIRTY DOLLARS. WHEN FORMS COMPLETED THEY SHOULD BE POUCHED TO HQS. AFTER REVIEW HERE, HQS WILL CABLE WH/MIAMI AND THEN COUPLE CAN EITHER RETURN CARACAS OR WAIT MIAMI FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS.

4. FOR WH/MIAMI. PLS ADVISE IF YOU HAVE CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE NEAR FUTURE WHO COULD MEET WITH CIFENCE/4. IF AFFIRMATIVE, PLS FORWARD CONTACT PLAN TO CARACAS. FYI. CIFENCE/4 (IDEN A) WAS WH/MIAMI ASSET FROM LATE MARCH 1965 to SEPT 1967 WHEN HE MOVED TO CARACAS WHERE HE HAS BEEN SERVING STATION AS PENETRATION OF CIFENCE (IDEN B).

CONT'D

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TE:

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

________ PER ________ # ________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

NF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

PAGE THREE

00 93407

5. FOR CARACAS. IF WH/MIAMI ABLE HANDLE CIFENCE/4, PLS FORWARD COUPLES' ETA.

6. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS - JOHN ROONEY (TELECORD)

C/WH/COG

*Advised steps necessary to preserve permanent alien resident status of CIFENCE/4 and wife and obtain new re-entry permits for them.

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

IO: M. BERGER
IT: WH/3/V
T: 1535
TE: 11 FEBRUARY 1970

DLB SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ✓ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

NF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/CA, CI/OCS, SECURITY

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 23 24z FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR 009341

CARACAS WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 009340

IDEN A - LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES (201-300985)

IDEN B - CENTRAL DOCUMENTATION SERVICE (SCD), A NEWLY ESTABLISHED VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICE SP

END OF MESSAGE

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMI N CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL C S 30 09 85 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 4 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8 I/O FILE, VR RI/AN, SECUR 4, CI/OA

ACTION NO. 727

S E C R E T 231325Z JAN 70 CITE CARACAS 4332 23 JAN IN 012086

dl

DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 003365

1. RE-ENTRY PERMITS REQUESTED PARA TWO REF FORWARDED HEADQUARTERS 23 JANUARY VIA TM 658733 IN POUCH NUMBER 3407.

2. FILE: 201-300985

S E C R E T

26 JAN 1970

6772E

SECRET

30 09 85

M. Berger

IG: M. BERGER
IT: WH/3/V
T: 1535
TE: 15 JANUARY 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

24 SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

33 PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

NF: WH 8 | N/O | FILE, VR. R/AN CI/CA SEL/WR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 17 00 01 z JAN 70 CITE DIRECTOR 0 0 3 3 6 5

19 JAN 1970

CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. CARACAS 4248 (IN 003688)*

B. DIRECTOR 62906**

1. FOLLOWING STEPS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE PERMANENT ALIEN RESIDENT STATUS OF CIPENCE/4 300985 AND WIFE AND OBTAIN NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS FOR THEM:

A. HQS WILL VERIFY THAT REF A PARA TWO INFO IS IN SUBJECTS' IMMIGRATION FILES. THIS ACTION SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN ONE MONTH.

B. AFTER ABOVE ACTION COMPLETED, SUBJECTS MUST COME TO HQS OR MIAMI FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK WHERE THEY WILL FILL OUT APPLICATIONS FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS AND WHERE CIFENCE/4 WILL FILL OUT APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. PROCESSING PROCEDURE NECESSITATES SUBJECTS' PRESENCE IN U.S. AT THAT TIME. FYI. IN WIFE'S CASE ONLY,

0 4 3 2 1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG:
NIT:
XT:
ATE:

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

Y ________ PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____________

ONF: | FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 003365

PAGE TWO

IN ORDER FOR PERIOD SPENT OUTSIDE U.S. TO COUNT TOWARD THE STATUARY PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. WHICH SHE MUST ACCRUE PRIOR TO PETITIONING FOR NATURALIZATION, WIFE WOULD HAVE TO BE EMPLOYED BY OR UNDER CONTRACT WITH RVROCK. IF THIS CLAIM CANNOT BE LEGITIMATELY MADE, WIFE WILL HAVE TO WAIT TWO YEARS AND ONE DAY AFTER HUSBAND RECEIVES HIS NATURALIZATION BEFORE SHE CAN RECEIVE HERS. AN EXCEPTION TO THIS WAITING PERIOD WOULD BE IF HUSBAND RECEIVED CITIZENSHIP, CONTINUED TO BE EMPLOYED BY RVROCK, AND RECEIVED ASSIGNMENT ABROAD TO WHICH WIFE WOULD ACCOMPANY HIM.

C. HQS WILL THEN PROCESS APPLICATIONS THRU INS AND RE-ENTRY PERMITS WILL BE FORWARDED TO SUBJECTS IN CARACAS. THESE PERMITS VALID FOR ONE YEAR AND RENEWABLE FOR ONE ADDITIONAL YEAR. PRIOR TO END OF THIS TWO-YEAR PERIOD, HQS CAN OBTAIN NEW ONE-YEAR RE-ENTRY PERMITS WHICH ALSO

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IG:
NIT:
XT:
ATE:

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

/ ______ PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 003365

PAGE THREE

RENEWABLE FOR ADDITIONAL YEAR. AS THIS ACTION NECESSITATES SPECIAL PERMISSION FROM INS, SUBJECTS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS DETAILS WITH ANYONE.

2. WILL ADVISE WHEN PARA ONE (A) ACTION COMPLETED AND WHETHER SUBJECTS SHOULD COME TO HQS OR MIAMI. PLS ADVISE IF EXPIRED RE-ENTRY PERMITS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SURRENDERED BY SUBJECTS AND IF SO, WHEN AND TO WHOM. IF NOT, PLS FORWARD THEM TO HQS.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS: JOHN ROONEY (telecord)

C/WH/COG James E Flannery

WH Comments *Provided data previously requested concerning names of carriers and flight numbers used by CIFENCE/4 and wife for their travels to and from the U.S. **Requested travel and passport information pertaining to CIFENCE/4 and wife in connection with preserving their U.S. resident alien status and obtaining new re-entry permits.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

30 09 85

DISSEMINATION | SIFIED | SECRET (When Filled In) | GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 180 PER ______ #

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1 C/Ent - WH/Lucky
2
3 8 Apr 70
4
6
8 6 May 70

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT: WH8

INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN, CA2, C/OA

ACTION NO: 692

S E C R E T 082235Z JAN 70 CITE CARACAS 4249

DIRECTOR

CIENCINE

8 JAN IN 003675

REF: DIRECTOR 000084

86 24 89

30 09 85

1. CIFENCE-4 INVESTIGATION REVEALS NESSELHAUF CITY OF BIRTH IS BADEN, GERMANY.

2. FILE: 201-862429.

S E C R E T

9 JAN 1970

Chf. dat. - WH - 9 July

30 09 85

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH CD

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

WH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

PRECEDENCE

BY: M AT: 2230 Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 33 PER ____ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR BIAN SB8 CIOPS CICA FI2

ACTION NO. 415

18 NOV 1969

S E C R E T 172125Z NOV 69 CITE CARACAS 4018

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE AMCLEVE

17 Nov 69 IN 87480

M

30 09 85

1. AMCLEVE-15 CURRENT IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE POSITION IN GOV OF GREAT OPERATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE VALUE TO CARACAS STATION. ANTICIPATE VALUE A-15 WILL INCREASE WITH ARRIVAL OF SOVIETS, AS HE IN CHARGE OPERATIONS AGAINST BLOC COUNTRIED DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. BOTH A-15 AND STATION CONCERNED, HOWEVER, WITH FACT HE NOT VENEZUELAN CITIZEN AND POSSIBILITY SOMEBODY IN GOV WILL ASK WHY FOREIGNER (CUBAN) IN SUCH HIGH AND SENSITIVE POSITION WITHIN GOV. IF THIS HAPPENS, THERE GOOD CHANCE A-15 WOULD BE REMOVED FROM PRESENT JOB. A-15 SAYS CIVISTA-5 PERIODICALLY ASKS IN JOKING MANNER WHEN HE GOING TO BECOME CITIZEN VENEZUELA. A-15 REPLIES HE HAS READY ALL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED FOR APPLYING FOR VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP AND WILL BECOME CITIZEN IN DUE TIME. STATION FEELS PERHAPS GOOD JOB A-15 DOING FOR C-5 REASON C-5 DOES NOT PRESSURE A-15 INTO BECOMING CITIZEN.

74 08 49

2. BOTH STATION AND A-15 FEEL HIS POSITION WILL BE

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4018 S E C R E T

STRENGTHENED CONSIDERABLY IF HE BECOMES CITIZEN VENEZUELA. A-15 PERFECTLY WILLING BECOME VENEZUELAN CITIZEN IF RECEIVES ASSURANCE DOING SO WILL NOT ANNUL HIS AND WIFE'S STATUS AS RESIDENTS UNITED STATES (BOTH HE AND WIFE HAVE FULFILLED REQUIREMENT OF FIVE YEARS CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE IN UNITED STATES) AND DESTROY THEIR CHANCES BECOMING UNITED STATES CITIZENS. HE SAYS FIRST LOVE CUBA AND SECOND LOVE UNITED STATES. SINCE HE CANNOT RETURN CUBA, PREFERS BECOME CITIZEN UNITED STATES. WIFE FEELS SAME WAY.

3. REQUEST HQS ADVISE PRIORITY IF ARRANGEMENT CAN BE MADE WHEREBY A-15 AND WIFE BECOMING CITIZENS VENEZUELA WILL NOT ANNUL UNITED STATES RESIDENCY STATUS AND WRECK CHANCES BECOMING CITIZENS. DURING RECENT TRIP MIAMI THEY APPLIED FOR BUT WERE REFUSED NEW PERMITS TO REENTER UNITED STATES BECAUSE (ACCORDING TO A-15) A-15 IS RESIDING AND WORKING OUTSIDE UNITED STATES AND HAS NO NEED FOR SUCH PERMIT. PERMIT A-15 EXPIRED 25 JULY 1969 AND PERMIT WIFE EXPIRED 13 NOV 1969.

4. STATION STRONGLY URGES HQS DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 4018 SECRET

RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM SOONEST IN FAVOR OF BOTH A-15 AND STATION.

5. FILE: 201-300985.

SECRET

14-00000

30 09 85

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 6 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY 1/2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. 71-284/3

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT WH 8

FILE, VR, RI/AN, CAS, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/CA, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ACTION NO. 171

S E C R E T 222045Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3864

22 OCT 69 IN 71090

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR GEORGETOWN

REF CARACAS 3859 (IN 70765)

1. CIWOOD INTELLIGENCE SECTION CHIEF E2 4/95 ~~WE~~ ASKed/R VROCK TO ASCERTAIN IF THERE IS AN ARREST ORDER ON JAMES HART IN MIAMI AND, IF SO, FOR WHAT REASON. ON QUESTIONING, HE ADVISED HART LEFT FOR MIAMI FROM MATURIN NIGHT OF 21 OCTOBER. WE ADVISING CIWOOD WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ARREST ORDER SINCE HART APPARENTLY HAS BROKEN NO U.S. LAWS BUT, DUE HIS KNOWN INVOLVEMENT IN JANUARY RUPUNUNI INCIDENT, POSSIBLE FBI OR CUSTOMS MAY WISH QUESTION HIM IN MIAMI. REQUEST WH/MIAMI ASCERTAIN IF ARREST ORDER DOES IN FACT EXIST OR IF ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY PLANS TO INTERVIEW.

23 OCT 1969

2. CIWOOD QUERY AND KNOWLEDGE HART'S ACTIVITIES STRONGLY INDICATES HE COOPERATING WITH CIWOOD. REF INFORMATION INDICATES HE BEING INVESTIGATED BY CIVISTA-5 (74 0747) GROUP WHO HAS SENT AMCLEVE-15 (201-) TO MIAMI TO INVESTIGATE ACTIVITIES OF RICHARD HART. COORDINATION BETWEEN VENEZUELAN SERVICES BEING WHAT IT IS, SITUATION LIKE THIS IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

ACTION UNIT | FILE. VR.

ACTION NO.

3. REQUEST PRIORITY REPLY.

4. FILE: DEFER.

SECRET

SECRET

300985

10 SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

CSDO

BY: D AT 0025

DISSEM BY 30 PER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION CAS 412 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. RI/AN CSDO CA/PEG WH8 CI/OA

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 162245Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3820

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

DTDORIC JMDEVEL

16 Oct 69 IN 67171

REF: DIRECTOR 46526

1. FIELD TRACES FIVE NO NEW INFORMATION SAVE FOR LOCAL ADDRESS AND TOUTED MEDIA CONNECTION PER WH/MIAMI 4639 (IN 05005); OTHER GENERAL, NONDEROGATORY TIDBITS.

2. REGRET DELAY DETERMINING AMICE-31 ✓284658 CURRENT STATUS REGARDING CLASC. PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN LOCATING HIM FIRST THROUGH AMCLEVE-15 ✓300985, BOTH BEING MUTUAL FRIENDS, TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ACCESS AND STATUS CLASC AFFAIRS MERITING STATION DIRECT FOLLOW-UP. SUBJECT REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN CHURCH FUND RAISING WORK AND SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME AWAY FROM HOME. WILL ADVISE SOONEST BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES AMCLEVE-15 HAS HAD MERELY IN REACHING SUBJECT SINCE RECEIPT HVCW-8792, HAVE DOUBTS ON PROSPECTS FOR MISSION.

3. FILE: 201-284658, X-REF: 200-124-192/3.

S E C R E T

SECRET

File
201-300975
10 JUN 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training
Attention: Chief, Covert Training OS/TR

SUBJECT : Covert Training Requirement for Station Caracas, Project CIFLUTE

REFERENCE : CSI No. 25-5

1. With regard to previous discussions between WH/3/ Venezuela and Chief, Covert Training Branch, it is hereby requested that two instructors be assigned on TDY status to Station Caracas for the purpose of conducting operational training for selected members of the Directorate General of Police (DIGEPOL) and the Central Documentation Service (SDC). Names of the training candidates are included on a separate sheet attached to this memorandum.

2. This training program has been initiated at the direct request of senior Venezuelan liaison officers associated with Station Caracas. A general description of the situation, subject matter and identification of possible problem areas has been forwarded to you in the form of HVCA-16550, 9 May 1969.

3. Project CIFLUTE, under which this training will be conducted, was approved on 8 March 1968 and covers all liaison conducted by Station Caracas with the Venezuelan security services.

4. In this training program, we hope to attain several objectives. First, through training selected members of DIGEPOL and SDC we wish to present sound operational methods and techniques which will impress the trainees and serve as a guide to them in improving their operations. Secondly, it is desired to improve Station Caracas' liaison relationship with these services by presenting a highly professional training program. Third, we hope that through this good will, the Station will be able to develop potential unilateral agent recruits who will become penetrations of the Venezuelan services.

5. All of the trainee candidates (see attached list) are members of DIGEPOL and SDC. The first four individuals listed have extensive intelligence backgrounds and are experienced

operations personnel. The remaining six trainees may be assumed to have moderate experience - more in the field of law enforcement and police investigations rather than intelligence operations. 201 files are available at the desk on each individual and we will make these files available to the instructors to give them an idea of each individuals background.

6. Trainees will be available on a full time basis. A secure building has been obtained by the liaison services for exclusive use by instructors during the training cycle. Training will have to be conducted in Spanish.

7. Although evaluations on all trainees are desired, the last six individuals listed will require more attention since our relationship with these men is new and less is known about them. Station Caracas will provide guidance in this area. An additional point of interest would be any individual among this group who might have potential as an instructor.

8. Follow-up training and/or technical training will be based on instructor and Station recommendations. At this time we have no information on what, if any, technical skills the trainees have.

John R. Horton
Deputy Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCUR:

____
CI/OA

CONCUR:

____
DDP Training and Qualifications
Review Officer

SECRET

1.AMCLEVE-15 Luis POSADA Carriles (201-300985) OA 18 Oct. 65 Cancelled OA 12 Feb. 68

2.CIHURON-1 Lorenzo Camera MALDONADO (201-791576) OA 6 Sept. 67 ✓

3.CITRUST-13 Gabor GAZSO Klingspor (201-773329) ~~OA 22 May~~ 68* 11 June '66, amended 22 May 1968.

4.CIVISTA-7 Jose GUTTMAN Klein (201-773827) ~~OA 11 Sept 68~~ POA mailed on 4 Dec 1969

(Clearences were due 30 May 1969 - still pending)

5. Arnoldo SANOJA Pena (201-851310)

6. Adolfo ROMERO Gomez (201-851309)

7. Rafael Alfredo RIVERO Munoz (201-851308)

8. Colfredo Rafael MASINI Perez (201-851307)

9. Fermin Jose MARMOL Leon (201-851306)

10. Carlos VAN DEN BUSSCHE Lovera (201-851305)

*See 201 file for training record.

SECRET

300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 7 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RIO COPY

779

INFO FILE, VR, [illegible], EUR [illegible], CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FE 2

S E C R E T 121515Z MAY 69 CITE CARACAS 2539

12 MAY 69 IN 56236

13 MAY 1969

300985

OVER

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

AMCLEVE CIURBAN

1. STATION UNILATERAL LIAISON ASSET AMCLEVE-15 REPORTED MANUEL CELESTINO (MARCANO) CARRASQUEL (201-797282) AND FAMILY LEFT CARACAS 28 APRIL FOR MADRID ABORAD SHIP "FEDERICO C". SUPPOSEDLY, MARCANO TO RESIDE IN MADRID AS RADIO NEWSCASTER FOR "RADIO CONTINENTE" BUT IN REALITY SERVING AS GOV UNDERCOVER AGENT. HOWEVER, DETAILS SPECIFIC INTEL OBJECTIVES UNKNOWN TO AMCLEVE-15. MARCANO UNDER ORDERS NOT TO CARRY OUT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS FOR FIRST SIX MONTHS.

2. SUMMARY MARCANO'S BACKGROUND: BORN 29 NOV 1923, BARCELONA, ANZOATEGUI STATE, VENEZUELA; VEN CIT, PP 148305, ISSUED 11 JAN 1965. MARRIED TO LEONIDES YOLANDA MONTANER GOMEZ. PROFESSION: ACCOUNTANT, NEWSCASTER. MARCANO WAS FORMERLY INTEL CHIEF MOVEMENT REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), A PRO-CASTRO ORIENTED EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION. IN OCT 1965 WAS EXPELLED FROM PARTY FOR DICIPLINARY REASONS. AFTER EXPULSION WAS RECRUITED BY CUBANS AGAINST MIR TARGET. IN NOV 1966 DEFECTED TO GOV AND SUBSEQUENTLY

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

☐ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 CARACAS 2539 S E C R E T

APPEARED BEFORE OAS COMMISSION IN CARACAS INVESTIGATING CASTRO SUBVERSION IN VENEZUELA. OVER PAST YEAR AND HALF MARCANO HAS BEEN EMPLOYED BY GOV (CIVISTA-5 SPECIAL GROUP) AS CONSULTANT ON MIR ACTIVITIES.

740849

3. CAN MADRID CONFIRM MARCANO'S ARRIVAL? WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY INFO COMING TO MADRID'S ATTENTION RE MARCANO'S ACTIVITIES.

4. FILE: 201-797282, 210-300985.

13 MAY 1969

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE

TO:

C NO.

SUBJECT: [illegible] /15

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC., OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Per our conversation, please refer to CSI-F-10-5 Section #11 relative to the [illegible] of the issuance of a Provisional Operational Approval on the agents of a foreign power. We shall, therefore, be unable to process your POA request.

However, we should be glad to conduct a Covert Name Check since it is assumed that the authorization in DIR 71563 still obtains.

18 NOV 1968 – No further [illegible] Case discontinued

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE 1[illegible]

SUBJECT

FILE NUMBER 201-300985

I asked Jack Gower, WH/4, to come down and discuss his request for a POA/OA on AMCLEVE-15.

The caller (A-15) is being handled as "a hostile", under CSI F 10-15 (Sec 19) as authorized by Frank Hughes, CI/Ops/WH, and J. Esterline, AC/WH/[illegible], with the restrictions that there be "no joint operations, nor requirements levied on him" (See [illegible] 71540).

I referred Gower to CSI F 10-5 (Sec 19) in which the [illegible] bars the processing of a POA/OA on such an individual (an agent of a foreign power) as meaningless since the decision is an operational one. Thus, we could not process his request. I called him down so that I could brief him orally and make sure that he understood. He said that he did now. I told him I would confirm this in writing.

I pointed out that the Station already had the approval to use him under Section 19, subject to the Division's (WH) and CI/Ops agreed restrictions. It looks as though the Station wants these restrictions eased; therefore, those who agreed to the original restrictions (WH Division and CI/Ops) should be appealed to.

Subject is being used in place of penetration of the Cuban service.

Gower said that WH/4 had not been in touch with CI/Ops about easing or changing the restrictions since they were agreed on and levied on 1 Feb. 1963.

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

FORM 1-62 1954

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 186829

DATE 7 September 19[illegible]

TO CHIEF, FI/D

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CIC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 15 February 1928; Cienfuegos, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Intelligence officer Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL)

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
[illegible]
Mechanic; paramilitary trainer

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME JP Gower
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/3/Venezuela
ROOM, BUILDING 3 D 2631
EXTENSION [illegible]

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Auto Repair	Miami, Fla.	1965
Trainer JMWAVE activities		April 1965
[illegible] Police Official	Caracas, Venezuela	December 1967

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED
Catholic; Anti-Castro

9. DESCRIPTION	(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
	5:10	170	Green	Black	Cau	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Elina [illegible] Gonzales

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Alberto POSADA, Telephone Co., Cuba
Raul POSADA Electric and Power Co., Cuba half brothers

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

Information on membership in Communist Party or its front groups; connection with any other intelligence service; or other information which would [illegible] subject to blackmail.

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9)

5 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE-15 (201-300985)

1. Subject, a Cuban now living in Caracas, Venezuela, is a Station Caracas penetration of the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police and of the Special Group, a smaller, somewhat autonomous unit within DIGEPOL. A POA was requested on Subject on 25 January 1968, to use Subject as stated above. On 1 February 1967, WH/3/V requested cancellation of the POA request because of indications that Subject was involved in clandestine sabotage activity and there were suspicions that he had failed to report his activities to CIA or DIGEPOL. Station Caracas was directed to handle Subject as a "hostile". The Station was advised that they could maintain contact with Subject as a source of information on activities of DIGEPOL and the Special Group but that no requirements were to be levied on him. The Station was advised that they could make spot payments for information received from Subject. CI/OPS co-ordinated on these directions to Station Caracas.

2. The Station acknowledged their instructions but demurred on Headquarters' interpretation of AMCLEVE-15's activities. The Station stated, in effect, that assets are often unsavory individuals, who are never under complete control and who seldom disclose the complete range of their activities to their supervisors. The Station added that they were interested in Subject because of his position as a "trusted confidant" of certain highly placed Venezuelan security officials.

3. In the ensuing months the Station came to describe Subject as "an extremely valuable penetration" because of the intelligence information and operational reports he furnished. For example, he reported on the involvement of the Venezuelan military in a Cuban exile plan to attack Cuba. And, he also reported on a plan of Cuban exiles to ship arms from Venezuela

as part of an infiltration scheme. He has reported such operational information as a description of the capabilities, layout and equipment of DIGEPOL telephone tap operations. Included in this information was his report that, at least on paper, the U.S. Embassy was a target for tap operations. He has also reported on the personalities and workings of the organizations with which he is associated. At the same time the Station had an independent report that Subject was involved in a scheme to obtain "curare poison for approximately forty hypodermic needles". To avoid exposing the source of their information the Station did not query AMCLEVE-15 about the matter. The Station said that they disapproved of his involvement in wild Cuban exile schemes but that Headquarters restrictions in February 1968 prevented the Station from discussing this involvement with him.

4. In May 1968, the Station informed Headquarters that they believed that Subject was collaborating fully with CIA and, further, they believed that he would not expose, inform, or work against CIA. They added that Subject was still capable of engaging in independent Cuban exile activity without informing his Case Officer. The Station also requested a polygraph examination for Subject. √

5. Subject was given a polygraph examination to resolve specifically his bona fides, possible affiliation with Cuban Intelligence through relatives, unreported association with gangster elements, thefts from WOFIRM and other questions involving possible derogatory information on Subject. Subject's responses, described as substantially truthful by the examiners, appear to contain no information which would prevent CIA's operational use of Subject. On only one question, that involving Subject's association with an alleged racketeer, Lefty Rosenthal, did sensitivity persist. The examiner commented, "...In fairness to Subject this sensitivity is believed generated by genuine uncertainty over the amount of Para military items which he had been instrumental in getting for Rosenthal from Cuban exile arms supplies."

6. Station Caracas has requested that they be allowed to cease treating AMCLEVE-15 as a "hostile" and that he be processed for POA/OA to permit more effective utilization of this well placed penetration agent. WH Division endorses the Station's request.

John P. Gower
WH/3/V

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: [illegible] 1968

TO:

☒	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
☐	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: [illegible]
WH/3/Venezuela
[illegible] 2631:[illegible] /[illegible]

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: AMCLEVE-15

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: [illegible]

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Caracas, Venezuela.

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

As a penetration agent into the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) and as a penetration of the Humberto UZCATEGUI Brazal special group.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☒	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☒	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO. [illegible]	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED [illegible]	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
	1494	

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

300985

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
SN/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 24

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

K

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

BY ____ AT ____ Z

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

DISSEM BY 28 PER ____ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION 186 WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, C/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 071943Z AUG 68 CITE CARACAS 0292

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR

7 Aug 68 IN 66189

REF JMCOBRA 0497 (IN 64681)

300985

STATION HAS HAD COVERAGE FROM AMCLEVE-15 OF HELP GIVEN CUBAN EXILES BY VEN MILITARY. C-82509 AMPAK-2 UNDOUBTEDLY IN TOUCH WITH SAME GROUP. HE MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE BETTER INFO, HOWEVER, AND STATION PLANS CONTACT HIM. REQUEST ALL PERTINENT PARTS HIS 201 BE FORWARDED CARACAS.

S E C R E T

BT

8 AUG 1968

Copy in each.

SECRET

14-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 2J PER

ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

SECRET (When Filled In) 35 GROUP 1 42

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR-6, WH/COG-8, CA, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CI/RA, FI, SB-8, FI/INT-2

300985

S E C R E T 021932Z JUL 68 CITE CARACAS 0030 2 JUL 68 IN 42713

DIRECTOR INFO ROME

CITILT

3 JUL 1968

File

REFS A. CARACAS 9970 (IN 38022)

B. ROME 8295 (IN 37810)

1. AIRLINE MANIFEST 8 JUNE SHOWS ARRIVAL GISELA PROVIDENCIA PASTORA (FALCON) DE OJEDA. AMCLEVE-15 HAS JUST CONFIRMED STATION ASSUMPTION THAT FALCON'S HUSBAND IS JMTIGER ALONSO DOMINGO (OJEDA) OLAECHEA (201-260267), POLITBURO MEMBER AND FORMER ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF PCV.

2. ROME MAY PASS PARA ONE ABOVE TO DEVIGILS IN ADDITION TO INFO THAT OJEDA IN SOVIET UNION UNDERGOING MEDICAL TREATMENT. CAN DEVIGILS PROVIDE INFO ON WHO FALCON SAW IN ROME?

3. EXPECT CIGRAPE BE OPERATIONAL BY END OF JULY AND PLAN TAP TARGET APARTMENT PHONE PER PARA THREE CARACAS 9290. WE ROOTING FOR SOVIET MEDICS CURE OJEDA AND SEND HIM HOME SOONEST.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

DATE: [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C#
SO# [illegible]
201# [illegible]

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY): [illegible]

CHIEF, CI/OA

FORM 2-65 2413

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(40)

300985

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT:

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 3 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	WH/1	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE. VR. ci, ci/ops, ci/oa, ci/ic 2. G. GLINTZ

S E C R E T 121430Z JUN 68 CITE CARACAS 9552

DIRECTOR INFO BOGOTA

12 JUN 68 IN 20009

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 06901

B. CARACAS 9351 (IN 28741)

971746

IDEN OF REF A IS OBVIOUSLY BROTHER OF CIURBAN-1, BUT ACCORDING TO THE PRESS REPORT, AND AS FAR AS WE KNOW, NO ONE WAS ARRESTED IN RAID WHICH NETTED DOCUMENTS. WE DO NOT WANT TO ALERT LIAISON TO OUR SPECIAL INTEREST BY QUERYING RE IDEN. WE USUALLY ARE INFORMED BY LIAISON OF SUBVERSIVE ARRESTEES, BUT THIS NOT CERTAIN THESE DAYS. AS REPORTED REF B WE NOW ALSO GETTING INFO ON CIURBAN-1 FAMILY CASE FROM AMCLEVE-15 AND THEREFORE HOPE BE ABLE MONITOR ANY ARRESTS. NONE OF CIURBAN-1'S FAMILY ARRESTED ACCORDING AMCLEVE-15.

320755

S E C R E T

BT

25 JUN 1968

SECRET

300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT Z

DISSEM BY: PER

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2,

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 00052207Z JUN 68 CITE CARACAS 9808

JMWAVE DIRECTOR

25 JUN 1968

6 Jun 68 IN 25390

m

REFS A. CARACAS 9758 (IN 21750)

B. JMWAVE 2600 (IN 23543)

300985 334359

1. AMCLEVE-15 MET WITH LUGO AND RODRIGUEZ AT CIRASH-4'S DIRECTION AND HIS REPORTS LED TO THEIR ARREST. UNFORTUNATELY CIRASH-4 DID NOT COVER AMCLEVE-15 AND RODRIGUEZ IS CONVINCED HE FINGERED THEM AND HAS SWORN KILL AMCLEVE-15 AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

2. WHILE CARACAS UNDERSTANDS LNERGO WOULD NOT HAVE GREAT INTEREST THIS CASE, IS IT EQUALLY TRUE THAT NEITHER LNERGO NOR LNYUMA COULD ARREST RODRIGUEZ FOR LEAVING COUNTRY ILLEGALLY AND TRAVELLING ON FALSE DOCUMENTS? WE ANXIOUS PROTECT AMCLEVE-15 AND WONDER IF JMWAVE CAN PREVAIL ON LNERGO OR LNYUMA TO ACCEPT RETURN OF LUGO AND RODRIGUEZ FOLLOWED BY IMMEDIATE ARREST AND INTERROGATION.

3. CIRASH-4 PLANS DEPORT THEM TO MIAMI ON 8 JUNE ON VIASA. WILL ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN FLIGHT.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ____ AT: ____

DISSEM BY 7 PER ____

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ____

X-REF TO FILE NO ____

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE, VR. WH/COG 8 C/FI/OPS, C/WH

SECUR 4

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 271613Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 9725 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

19272

REF: JMWAVE-2475 (IN 15683)

27 May 68 IN 19272

300985

1. AMCLEVE-15 PASSED SGSWIRL EXAM 23 MAY WITH SATISFACTORY CLARIFICATION ALL POINTS OF CONCERN TO HQS. POUCH FOLLOWS.

2. WISH THANK JMWAVE FOR REF WHICH MOST USEFUL IN PRE-TEST DISCUSSIONS WITH SGSWIRL OPERATOR.

S E C R E T

BT

28 MAY 1968

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SB/CUE 6

S E C R E T 172050Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 5646 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR

20 MAY 68

17 May 68 IN 13549

REF: DIRECTOR-99409

1. ALLEGATIONS AND SUSPICIONS AGAINST AMCLEVE-15 DISCUSSED WITH HIM BY CASE OFFICER AND HE DENIES THEM ALL AND IS COMPLETELY WILLING, EVEN EAGER, TO TAKE SGSWIRL IN ORDER CLEAR HIS RECORD.

2. THE 201 FILE ON AMCLEVE-15 FORWARDED BY JMWAVE IN SEPT 1967 WAS APPARENTLY STRIPPED DOWN VERSION AND NO PART OF HQ'S EVER RECEIVED; THEREFORE, WE DO NOT HAVE THE FACTS OF HIS FAILURE LIST BROTHER ROBERTO AS GOC EMPLOYEE. THIS POINT DISCUSSED WITH HIM, HOWEVER, AND HE STATES THAT HE DID NOT TRY CONCEAL HIS BROTHER'S STATUS BUT MERELY THOUGHT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AS LOW-LEVEL AND NON-GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ARE TECHNICALLY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. IN ANY CASE, HIS ONLY COMMUNICATION WITH ROBERTO SINCE HIS DEPARTURE FROM CUBA IN FEB 1961 WERE TWO LETTERS SENT IN 1966, AT JMWAVE'S REQUEST, WHICH WERE NEVER ANSWERED. REFERENCE TO SEEING BROTHER IN APRIL 1961 WAS OBVIOUSLY CONFUSION OF EXACT DATES AFTER FIVE AND HALF YEARS. AMCLEVE-15

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9646 SECRET

WAS IN GUATEMALA TRAINING CAMP PREPARING FOR BAY OF PIGS IN APRIL 1961.

3. WE WERE NOT AWARE THAT AMCLEVE-15 WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING STOLEN WOFIRM DEMOLITION AND SABOTAGE ITEMS. WE DID NOT ASSUME FROM HVCA-14975, ON ALLEGED POSSESSION OF SOME SUCH ITEMS BY AMCLEVE-15, THAT HE HAD STOLEN THEM FROM WOFIRM. DID HQS SO ASSUME, OR IS THERE OTHER INFO IN THIS REGARD WHICH CARACAS HAS NOT RECEIVED? WHAT WAS DATE OF ALLEGED THEFT? SUBSEQUENT TO LAST SGSWIRL IN APRIL 1966? AMCLEVE-15 TOLD CASE OFFICER THAT HE BROUGHT TO CARACAS SMALL SUITCASE OF SUCH ITEMS WHICH HE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY RECE ORGANIZATION AND WHICH TO HIS KNOWLEDGE WERE COMMERCIAL ITEMS, NOT WOFIRM.

4. AMCLEVE-15 STATES HAS NOT ENGAGED IN PAST ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND ONLY ASSOCIATIONS WITH GANGSTER ELEMENTS WERE AT SPECIFIC REQUEST JMWAVE (AS CONFIRMED BY JMWAVE-8866) AND WERE ALL FULLY REPORTED TO JMWAVE. AGAIN WE ASK, DOES HQS HAVE SOME INFO IN THIS REGARD WHICH WE DO NOT?

SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY: PER

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 9646 S E C R E T

5. IT APPEARS FROM REF AND REVIEW OF TRAFFIC SINCE START OF CONSIDERATION OF USE AMCLEVE-15 IN CARACAS THAT HQS IN POSSESSION DEROGATORY INFO NOT KNOWN TO CARACAS. WE SUGGESTED THIS IN HVCA-14978 AND REQUESTED THAT WE BE PROVIDED WITH ANY SUCH INFO. DIRECTOR-56598 OF 2 DEC 1967 HINTED AT SUCH INFO HELD BY HQS AND PROMISED DISPATCH "WITH HQS COMMENTS OTHER ASPECTS THIS CASE," BUT DISPATCH NEVER RECEIVED. SGSWIRL OPERATOR STATES IT DIFFICULT TO RUN MEANINGFUL EXAM ON SPECIFIC POINTS OF CONCERN TO HQS WITHOUT ALL FACTS. THEREFORE, REQUEST:

A. DETAILS OF WHAT AMCLEVE-15 DID LIST RE HIS BROTHERS $\overset{N}{\text{OMMPRQ}}$, AND REQUEST BY JMWAVE TO INITIATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROBERTO AND RESULTS.

B. DATE AND DETAILS OF THEFT ON WOFIRM ITEMS.

C. DETAILS OF ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND [illegible] ASSOCIATIONS OTHER THAN THOSE UNDERTAKEN AT SPECIFIC WOFIRM REQUEST

D. ANY OTHER DEROGATORY INFO OR ALLEGATIONS KNOWN TO HQS OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT BEEN APPRISED.

6. PLEASE REPLY IN TIME FOR SGSWIRL, SCHEDULED FOR 22 MAY.

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

300985

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: K. GARDINER
UNIT: C/WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 20 MAY 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 26 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR, WH/COG 8, C/WH, C/CI/OPS

F1

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET Mr 20 19 23 Z CITE DIRECTOR 0131?

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

OVER

REFS: A. CARACAS 9646 (IN 13549)* (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

B. DIRECTOR 99409** (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

C. CARACAS 9588 (IN 08516)*** (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

1. WISH ASSURE STATION THAT HQS DOES NOT HAVE DEROGATORY INFO ON AMCLEVE-15 300985 WHICH HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO STATION. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED IN ORDER FOR STATION OBTAIN PERMISSION LIFT RESTRICTIONS ON AMCLEVE-15 OPERATIONAL USE.

2. RE SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED IN REF A:

A. IN PRQ'S I DATED 1961, 1965 AND 1966 AMCLEVE-15 MENTIONED BOTH BROTHERS IN "BROTHERS AND SISTERS" SECTION BUT ONLY LISTED RAUL AS EMPLOYED BY GOC. RAUL WAS DESCRIBED AS "ADMINISTRATOR FOR AN ELECTRICAL COMPANY" OR "ELECTRICAL ENGINEER BELIEVED TO BE EMPLOYED BY GOC." FOR ADDITIONAL INFO ON BROTHER ROBERTO SEE ATTACHMENT TO HVCW-7776, 4 DECEMBER 1967. HQS HAS NO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ #

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 01313

TO

PAGE TWO

DETAILS ON JMWAVE REQUEST THAT AMCLEVE-15 INITIATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROBERTO. IN ANY CASE BELIEVE POINT OF SGSWIRL IS TO RESOLVE ANY DOUBT THAT CONFUSION OVER BIOGRAPHIC DETAILS ANY MORE THAN NORMAL OVERSIGHT AND THAT AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT COMMUNICATED WITH BROTHERS (OTHER THAN 1966 EPISODE) SINCE DEPARTURE FROM CUBA. 13

B. HQS CONCERN THAT AMCLEVE-15 MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN THEFT OR DISPOSAL OF WOFIRM DEMOLITION OR SABOTAGE GEAR WAS CAUSED BY ATTACHMENT TO HVCA-14975, 5 DECEMBER 1967, WHICH STATED AMCLEVE-15 SHOWED 802569 CIRASH-15 SOME STUFF HE HAD TAKEN FROM MIAMI INCLUDING FUSES, BOOBY-TRAP SWITCHES, DETONATING CORD, INFRARED SIGNAL DEVICES AND TIME PENCILS. HQS HAS NO PROOF THIS GEAR STOLEN FROM WOFIRM BUT BELIEVE NATURE OF EQUIPMENT (PARTICULARLY INFRARED SIGNAL DEVICES) IS SUCH THAT AMCLEVE-15 SHOULD AT LEAST BE QUESTIONED AS TO WHETHER HE HAS EVER STOLEN OR

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______ PER______ #______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 91313

TO

PAGE THREE

KNOWINGLY RECEIVED EQUIPMENT STOLEN FROM WOFIRM.

C. HQS HAS NO DETAILS ON ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND GANGSTER ASSOCIATIONS OF AMCLEVE-15 NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO STATION AND JMWAVE. PURPOSE OF SGSWIRL QUESTION WOULD BE DETERMINE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE HAS BROKEN OFF COMPLETELY WITH LEFTY ROSENTHAL GROUP AND THAT HE NOT CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN ANY ILLEGAL ACTIVITY WITH ERASTO FERNANDEZ AND GUSTAVO ORTIZ GROUP WHICH COULD CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT TO U.S. GOVT, SUCH AS SMUGGLING BETWEEN MIAMI AND CARACAS.

3. REQUEST JMWAVE ADD ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS WHICH COULD USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO AMCLEVE-15 SGSWIRL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/ Paul E. Oberst

WH Comment: *Asked for further details on topics on which Hqs desired AMCLEVE-15 be tested.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY_______ PER_______ #_______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO_______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 01313

TO

PAGE FOUR

WH Comment: **Agreed SGSWIRL for AMCLEVE-15, suggesting he be tested on possible involvement in theft or receipt of stolen WOFIRM equipment and whether past involvement in illegal activities make him vulnerable to blackmail.

***Asked permission SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15. Stated testing would be restricted to whether he had in past or was currently involved in activity hostile to WOFIRM.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

Office of Security
Polygraph Results
Subject: 201-0300985
7 June 1968

SECRET

6 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE-15 (201-300985)

Forwarded herewith are two copies of a current PRQ I on Subject.

John P Gower

John P. Gower
WH/3/Venezuela

SECRET

14-00000

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRO NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. *Write clearly.*
2. *Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA."*
3. *Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.*

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Nee)*

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

5. DATE OF BIRTH

6. PLACE OF BIRTH

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)*

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

a. SEX M ☐ F ☐	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE *(Shape)*
h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH		k. BUILD		l. POSTURE

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION

17. TITLE

18. SALARY *(Per annum)*

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

None

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT*

26	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
27	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
28	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE:	☐	SINGLE	☐	MARRIED	☐	WIDOWED	☐	SEPARATED	☐	DIVORCED	☐	ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

[illegible]
[illegible] incompatibility.

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (*First*) (*Middle*) (*Nee*) (*Last*)

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
36. DATE OF BIRTH	37. PLACE OF BIRTH
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Last residence, if deceased*)

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (*Identify child and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME	42. YEAR OF BIRTH	43. PLACE OF BIRTH	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME	49. YEAR OF BIRTH	50. PLACE OF BIRTH	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY: AT: Z
DISSEM BY 28 PER #
ACTION
WH8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS 300985

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
INFO:
FILE. VR. WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 212253Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2475

22 MAY 68 IN 15683

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE PBUMEN

~~MEN~~ AMCLEVE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 01313

B. CARACAS 9646 (IN 13549)

300985

1. FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS ON AMCLEVE-15:

A. AMCLEVE-15 INSTRUCTED BY JMWAVE TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CORRESPONDENCE WITH BROTHERS RAUL AND ROBERTO. THIS DONE LATE 1966 AFTER IT LEARNED ROBERTO HAD TRAVELLED ENGLAND ON GOC PURCHASING MISSION (JMWAVE 3182, SEPT 66). IN APRIL 1967, STATION ADVISED AMCLEVE-15 THAT ROBERTO WAS SUPERVISOR TELEPHONE COMPANY WHICH INFO OBTAINED FROM RECENTLY ARRIVED REFUGEE (UFGA-27444, APRIL 67.) AMCLEVE-15 TOLD FORMER CO HE LAST SAW BROTHER (ONE OR OTHER) AT HABANA AIRPORT PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR MEXICO FEB 61.

B. AMCLEVE/15 WAS PRIMARILY USED BY STATION TO REPORT ON EXILE ACTIVITIES MIAMI AREA. HAD CONTACTS WITH MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING EX STATION ASSETS, SELF STYLED EXILE LEADERS AND GANGSTERS. DURING ROSENTHAL

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
BY: ______ AT: ______ Z
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______
X-REF TO FILE NO. ______
DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
ACTION ☐ RID COPY
INFO
FILE VR.

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 2475 SECRET

CASE MID-1967, AMCLEVE-15 FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS OF LNERGO AND STATION AT GREAT PERSONAL RISK AND INCONVENIENCE TO SELF AND FAMILY.

2. STATION WILL FORWARD COMPLETE FILES ON AMCLEVE-15 TO CARACAS.

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 40

300985

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM 26

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, CI/OA, SOD 6, CI/PS, CA 5, CA/PEG, CS/SGO

S E C R E T 122233Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 8894

19 FEB 1968

19 FEB 1968

19 FEB 68 ·42300

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

PBRUMEN AMSHADY AMCLEVE

REF: JMWAVE-1213 (IN 48140)

[redacted] Cct AIR-11540 *

IN 48140x
10 Feb.

1. ORIGINAL SOURCE FOR DIGEPOL ON REF INFO RE CUBANS COMING VENEZUELA MAY HAVE BEEN AMCLEVE-15. ON 9 FEBRUARY AMCLEVE-15 INFORMED STATION THAT UNKNOWN NUMBER CUBANS MAY SOON BE INFILTRATED VENEZUELA, AMONG THEM TONY CASTELLS AND FNU CLADERIN. AMCLEVE-15 HAD RECEIVED THIS INFO FROM ROBERTO PARDON DURING AMCLEVE-15'S VISIT MIAMI LAST WEEK ~~XXJULY~~ JANUARY. AMCLEVE-15 DESCRIBED PARDON AS EX-WOFIRM AGENT WHO USED EXFILTRATE PEOPLE FROM CUBA AND STILL ENGAGED THIS ACTIVITY ON OWN. (REQUEST JMWAVE TRACES.) AMCLEVE-15 DID NOT MENTION SUSANA, BUT STATION FILES SUGGEST SHE MAY BE GUIOMAR (YEPEZ) PATINO, BRAVO FALN SUPPORT AGENT AND MEVAER YEPEZ PATINO FAMILY ALMOST ALL OF WHOM ACTIVE SUBVERSIVES.

300985

Mr. Kelley
Cable copies
of [illegible]
[illegible] are attached
KS

2. AMCLEVE-15 HAS REPORTED TO STATION ON BUILD UP OF URBAN TERRORIST GROUPS AND INCREASED USE OF UCV CAMPUS AS HIDE OUT. AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS THAT ON 7 FEBRUARY DIGEPOL AGENTS CRUISING UCV CAMPUS WERE FIRED ON BY TERRORISTS WHO

SECRET

~~AM~~

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 8894 S E C R E T

RECOGNIZED EX-TERRORIST IN CAR WHO NOW INFORMING TO DIGEPOL. CARACAS STATION FEELS THAT IT WOULD DEFINITELY BE ADVANTAGEOUS HAVE AMSHADY-1 ACCEPT DIGEPOL ASSIGNMENT, EVEN IF WOFIRM HAS NO DIRECT ACCESS TO HER. IF WE DO, THAT WOULD BE A BONUS. (WE TRUST THAT HER BEING HIRED BY SHADY CHARACTER SUCH AS GUSTAVO ORTIZ WILL NOT CAUSE CONCERN SIMILAR AMCLEVE-15 CASE.)

C-85197

S E C R E T

SECRET

CIR11SH-6

BT

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

RIG: C.W. COX
NIT: WH/3/V
XT: R-9494
ATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1968

S E C R E T

	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
30 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2
WH/COG 8, DDP, ADDP, CI, CS/DO, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PRIORITY

CITE DIRECTOR 71540

TO CARACAS FEB 2 00 03Z

REF: A. HVCA-14978*

B. HVCA-14975**

C. CARACAS 8748*** (IN 36499)

1. IN VIEW REF B WE NOTE WITH ALARM AMCLEVE-15 CONTINUAL TENDENCY BECOME INVOLVED CLANDESTINE SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES, AND HIS FAILURE REPORT COMPLETE STORY TO WOFIRM OR CIRASH OF HIS ACTIVITIES WHICH HE FEELS HE WANTS WITHHOLD FOR WHATEVER REASON. THEREFORE, REQUEST FOR POA FOR AMCLEVE-15 HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND HE IS TO BE HANDLED AS A HOSTILE PER CSI-F 10-5 UNTIL HIS MOTIVES COMPLETELY ASCERTAINED. WE DOUBLY CONCERNED OVER SAME REPORT WHICH LISTS DEMOLITION ITEMS SMUGGLED INTO CARACAS FROM JMWAVE AREA BY AMCLEVE-15 INCLUDING DEVICES PECULIAR TO WOFIRM AND WHOSE USE COULD TIE WOFIRM THIS TYPE ACTIVITY AND BECOME SOURCE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT TO GOV DURING ELECTION YEAR.

2. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO CONTINUED CONTACT AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF CIRASH AND UZCATEGUI ORGANIZATIONS AVAILABLE TO HIM THRU THE NORMAL COURSE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND NO OBJECTION TO PAYMENTS FOR INFO RECEIVED. HOWEVER, THERE TO BE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER **S E C R E T** GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______ PER______ #______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 71548

TO PAGE 2

NO JOINT OPERATIONS, NOR REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS:

*Explanation of Caracas station reasons for wanting AMCLEVE-15 as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL.

**Transmittal of CIRASH-15 report on meeting with UZCATEGUI after which CIRASH-15 was introduced to AMCLEVE-15 who disclosed at home of Gustavo ORTIZ Faez that he (AMCLEVE-15) had brought sabotage and infra-red signal devices from Miami (seen by CIRASH-15), and was engaged in conspiracy for sabotage with ORTIZ Faez unknown to Chief, DIGEPOL, CIRASH-4.

***Outlined proposed payments to AMCLEVE-15 and requested HQ expedite POA as penetration agent DIGEPOL.

COORD: CI/OPS Frank Hughes (in draft)

[illegible] Polgar
WH/F1

by Jacob W. Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 26

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 5, CA/PEG, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OA, SOD 6, CS/SG 6, CI/PS

S E C R E T 092316Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1213

10FEB68IN48140

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

10 FEB 1968

19 File

PBRUMEN AMSHADY

1. ON 5 FEBRUARY 1968 GUSTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ CONTACTED AMSHADY-1 IN MIAMI. ORTIZ INTRODUCED HIMSELF AS EMPLOYED BY DIGEPOL. HE TOLD AMSHADY-1 THAT INSURGENCY IS NOW BUILDING UP IN URBAN AREAS AND WITHIN THE UNIVERSITIES IN VENEZUELA AND THAT CUBANS ARE INVOLVED. HE SAID THAT DIGEPOL HAS INFORMATION THAT CAPTAIN LESTER RODRIGUEZ AND COMANDANTE TONY CASTELLS, BOTH OF THE CUBAN REBEL ARMY, ARE IN VENEZUELA OR EN ROUTE THERE FROM CUBA. HE ADDED THAT THE PROBABLE COORDINATOR OF THE URBAN TERRORISM IS A VENEZUELAN WOMAN WHO IS USING THE WAR NAME SUSANA BUT THAT DIGEPOL HAS BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY HER FURTHER.

DPICLEVE-15
201-300785

2. ORTIZ SAID THAT HE WAS TO BE IN MIAMI ONLY A SHORT WHILE AND HE WANTED FROM AMSHADY-1 WHATEVER INFO SHE HAD OR COULD GET ON CURRENT CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN INSURGENCY IN VENEZUELA. HE ALSO SAID THAT DIGEPOL WAS PLANNING TO TRAIN SELECTED UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, INCLUDING FEMALES, AS PENETRATION AGENTS AND HE ASKED AMSHADY-1 IF SHE WOULD BE

PAGE-2 JMWAVE 1213 SECRET

INTERESTED IN GOING TO VENEZUELA, TEMPORARILY AT LEAST, AS A TRAINER.

3. AMSHADY-1 MADE IT CLEAR TO THE JMWAVE CASE OFFICER THAT SHE IS WILLING TO COOPERATE IN ANY WAY WITH LEGITIMATE EFFORTS TO THWART CUBAN SPONSORED INSURGENCY INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF TRIPS TO VENEZUELA AND ELSEWHERE ON TRAINING MISSIONS. SHE REPORTED THAT SHE TOLD ORTIZ THAT SHE HAD NO NEW INFORMATION CONCERNING CUBANS IN VENEZUELA AND SAID SHE HAD NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED THE TRAINING OFFER, WHICH SHE FELT TO BE MERELY TENTATIVE. SHE DID AGREE, HOWEVER, TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ORTIZ FOR WHICH PURPOSE HE GAVE AMSHADY-1 A POST OFFICE BOX NUMBER, HIS ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IN CARACAS.

4. JMWAVE REQUEST ADDEES COMMENTS ON THIS DEVELOPMENT AND ANY INDICATION OF OPS INTEREST IN AMSHADY-1 COLLABORATION WITH DIGEPOL ALONG THESE LINES.

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

SUBJECT: 201 -

TYPE OF REQUEST
☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CHC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY
(Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS *(Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)*

CS TRACE RESULTS

RI

DIVISION

FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED
☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS
☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results:

FEB 6 1 35 PM '68

FORM 693

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE [illegible]
TO: [illegible]	C NO. [illegible]
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC., OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

[illegible]

Edward P. Brown

WH

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/3/V cwc C. W. Cox

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/3/V		1/2		
2.				
3.				
4. CI/OA				M/R – See cable traffic on his illegal possession of firearms [illegible] to CIA which he smuggled out of Miami to Venezuela, complicity in [illegible] etc. –
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

1 February 196~~7~~8

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (201-300985)

REFERENCE : Our memorandum of 25 January 1968

Please cancel our request in Reference for a Provisional Operational Approval for Subject.

C. W. Cox
WH/3/Venezuela

FEB 2 9 54 AM '68

SECRET

25 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles 201-300985

1. It is requested that a Provisional Operation Approval be granted for the use of subject as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL and the Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual organization. The Caracas Station has requested that processing be expedited.

2. The Caracas Station has reviewed Subject's file and the documents sent by Headquarters and sees nothing that would preclude the use of Subject as a penetration of DIGEPOL. (copy attached)

3. Significant information in Subject's file concerns his two brothers who are currently in Cuba and his relations with a well known Miami gangster. One brother, Roberto POSADA Carriles, a suspect DSE official, is the Cuban Telephone Company supervisor for Area Norte, including Havana City. Subject has not seen either brother since he left Cuba in 1961. Subject has also been in contact with a well known gangster "Lefty" Rosenthal in the Miami area. Both JMWAVE and the FBI were aware of this contact which was maintained at the latter's request.

E. Tsikerdanos
C/WH/3/Venezuela

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

7

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR WH/COG 8 CI/OA CI/OPS FI FI/INT 2
CI/IC 2 SOD 6 CS/SOD C/RA

S E C R E T 241443Z JAN 68 CITE CARACAS 8748 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. HVCA-14978
B. HVCW-7776
C. DIRECTOR-56598

24 JAN 68 IN 38498

1. AMCLEVE-15 CONTACTED BY STATION OFFICER 22 JANUARY. HE STILL WORKING DIRECTLY WITH CIRASH-4 AND WILL ALSO WORK WITH UZCATEGUI. PRESENTLY INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS ARREST KEY SUBVERSIVES AND HANDLED CASE LEADING TO RECENT ARREST LINO MARTINEZ.

2. IT EVIDENT HE COMPLETELY WILLING WORK WITH STATION AS PENETRATION CIRASH. AT MEETING AMCLEVE-15 TURNED OVER FOR STATION COPYING SEVERAL VALUABLE DOCUMENTS FROM CIRASH PROVIDING OPS LEADS ON KEY TERRORISTS.

3. SALARY NOT DISCUSSED, BUT STATION WOULD PLAN PAY AMCLEVE-15 FROM 1,000 TO 1,500 BS. AMCLEVE-15 LEFT FOR MIAMI MORNING 23 JANUARY. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WILL BE HELD WHEN HE RETURNS CARACAS FOLLOWING WEEK.

4. WE HAVE REVIEWED DOCUMENTS FORWARDED REF B AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 8748 SECRET

SEE NOTHING PRECLUDING AMCLEVE-15'S USE AS PENETRATION CIRASH. REQUEST POA BE EXPEDITED.

SECRET *Section Sent.

SECRET

UPDATED BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NAME : Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles (201-300985)

DPOB : 15 February 1928 Cienfuegos, Cuba

MOC : Effective 26 March 1965 as Training Branch Instructor, JMWAVE

TERMINATION : Effective 11 July 1967 as CI informant, JMWAVE

CURRENT OCCUPATION : DIGEPOL employee, Ministry of Interior, Caracas, Venezuela

PRESENT ADDRESS: Caracas, Venezuela

Contacts : Miami "Lefty" ROSENTHAL, well-known gambler

Brother : Roberto POSADA Carriles, a defected DGI official (Cuban IS), Cuban Telephone Company supervisor for Area Norte including Havana City

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 25 January 1968

TO: ☒	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
☐	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: E. Tsikerdanos
C/WH/3/V
3B2631

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: AMCLEVE-15

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 300985

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Venezuela

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

As a penetration agent into DIGEPOL and the Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual organization.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED		GREEN LIST ATTACHED NO. 181884

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	X	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: C. Cox

EXTENSION: R-9494

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF:

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

7

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8 [illegible] CI/OPS FI FI/INT 2 CI/IC 2 SOD 6 CS/SGO CI/RA

SECRET 241443Z JAN 68 CITE CARACAS 8748 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. HVCA-14978

B. HVCW-7775

C. DIRECTOR-56593

25 JAN 1968 24 JAN 68 IN 35499

300985

1. AMCLEVE-15 CONTACTED BY STATION OFFICER 22 JANUARY. HE STILL WORKING DIRECTLY WITH CIRASH-4 AND WILL ALSO WORK WITH UZCATEGUI. PRESENTLY INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS ARREST KEY SUBVERSIVES AND HANDLED CASE LEADING TO RECENT ARREST LINO MARTINEZ.

324359

2. IT EVIDENT HE COMPLETELY WILLING WORK WITH STATION AS PENETRATION CIRASH. AT MEETING AMCLEVE-15 TURNED OVER FOR STATION COPYING SEVERAL VALUABLE DOCUMENTS FROM CIRASH PROVIDING OPS LEADS ON KEY TERRORISTS.

3. SALARY NOT DISCUSSED, BUT STATION WOULD PLAN PAY AMCLEVE-15 FROM 1,000 TO 1,500 BS. AMCLEVE-15 LEFT FOR MIAMI MORNING 23 JANUARY. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WILL BE HELD WHEN HE RETURNS CARACAS FOLLOWING WEEK.

4. WE HAVE REVIEWED DOCUMENTS FORWARDED REF B AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 3748 SECRET

SEE NOTHING PRECLUDING AMCLEVE-15'S USE AS PENETRATION CIRASH. REQUEST POA BE EXPEDITED.

SECRET *Caution Sent

SECRET

34

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 31 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 084

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/CA 8, C/CI, C/FI, FI, FI/INT 2, C/WH 2, SOD, CS/SCC, C/RD SERVICE

CARACAS 8748

STA & NR

JAN 24

DATE

36499 -A

IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

REF PARA 1 PORTION READS:

"ALSO WORK TITH UZCATEGUI. PRESENTLY INVOLVED IN"

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

CI PROJECTS CARD [illegible]

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

DATE [illegible] OF: 5 April 1965 prc

DATE [illegible] REQ.: 1 April 1965 prc

[illegible] #: 300985

TRUE NAME: POSADA Carriles, Luis Clemente

☒ POA ☒ OA ☐ CNC ☐ SP. IN

VARIATIONS:

CRYPTONYM: [illegible]

PSEUDONYM:

PROJECT: JMATE

DATE OF BIRTH: 15 February 1928

PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

CASE OFFICER: Roy Forslund (ALEX ARMITA)

DIVISION: WH/C/HR/OSOA [illegible]

EXTENSION: 7646

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
P.O.A.	—	[illegible]	[illegible] 65	Records on RIS Agents Checked in CI/SAA, date: 5 April 1965 Results: [illegible]
O.A.	—	[illegible]	15 Oct 65	
CNC				
CASE CANCELLED		[illegible]	AUG 1967	[illegible]
PRO I	biographic data 13 APR 65	RLR	14 APR 65	
PRO II	29 Sept 65	RLR	18 Oct 65	
159988 GREEN LIST	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] 65	
CRI TRACES	NDI			
OPS & DIV TRACES	NDI			
FIELD TRACES	NDI			
S.O. INDICES		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] 5 APR MEMO [illegible] CO, CASE OFFICER [illegible]
FBI INDICES	MIAMI FBI NEGATIVE NF			
FBI CONC. REQUESTED				
FBI CONC. COMPLETED				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION	NP 4 Jun 65	[illegible]	17 Jun 65	
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT	CAREER AGENT 24 Apr 1965 Cleared [illegible]	[illegible]	24 Jun 65 26 Aug 1966	
CI STAFF NOTIFIED				
CCAC COMPLETED				

14-00000

ORIG: C. W. COX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 38 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR WH/COG 8, CI/OA, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

4 DEC 1967

CITE DIRECTOR 8 6 9 2

300985

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 8398 (IN 03338)*

1. ~~UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES,~~ IF YOU REALLY FEEL THIS IS NECESSARY APPROVE STATION CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 FOR ELICITATION INFO ONLY. PLS FORWARD PERIODIC STATUS REPORTS. PROCESSING POA. ADDRESSEES PLS FORWARD UP TO DATE TRACES AND BIO DATA. FOR JMWAVE: FORWARD CONTACT REPORTS SINCE TERMINATION AMCLEVE-15.

FYI OUR CLARIFICATION DOES [illegible] KNOW AMCLEVE-15 [illegible]

2. DOCUMENTS ARE BEING FORWARDED 4 DEC PRIMARILY TO ILLUSTRATE CAUTION TO USE IN DEALING WITH HIM. DISPATCH FOLLOWS WITH HQS COMMENTS OTHER ASPECTS THIS CASE. END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Station reiterates desire have AMCLEVE-15 as agent. Station believes need pay only supplement to DIGEPOL salary. Requested expedite documents and POA.

COORD: C/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

[illegible]
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

G. Tsikerdanos

ORIG: E. TSIKERDANOS
UNIT: WH/3
EXT: 4521
DATE: 27 SEPT 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2	300985	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 30
BY ____ PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG, CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI

FI/INT 2, CI, SEP 27 19 30 Z
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

27 SEP 1967

CITE DIRECTOR 38873

TO

PRIORITY

CARACAS JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 7291 (IN 59861)*

1. IT NOT NECESSARY FOR JMWAVE CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 (300985) PER PARA 4 REF AS THERE SUFFICIENT INFO OUR FILES TO APTLY ILLUSTRATE TYPE INDIVIDUAL FERNANDEZ (324359) IS AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS WOFACT. STILL WISH AVOID ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING ON PART TERMINATED AMCLEVE-15 THAT WOFACT WOULD SUBSIDIZE HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH DIGEPOL.

2. FERNANDEZ BAD REPUTATION BASED ON FOLLOWING:

A. ACCORDING CIRASH-12 (757343) HE TOTALLY IRRESPONSIBLE AS VEN CONSUL MIAMI, WHERE HE DRUNK MOST OF THE TIME, WILL ACQUIRE FURTHER DETAILS FROM CIRASH-12.

B. CIRASH-7 (732206) REPORTED 2 DEC 65 (CARACAS 3159) THAT FERNANDEZ IN TROUBLE WITH GOV BECAUSE OF CONDUCT MIAMI AREA AND THAT HE SIX MONTHS IN ARREARS ON FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING.

C. ON 7 OCT 65 CIARK-1 (C-54359) ASKED BY CIRATAL-1 (C-81436) TO LOOK INTO ACTIVITIES OF FERNANDEZ IN MIAMI: THAT HE NEGLECTING HIS JOB AND DEVOTING HIMSELF TO LIFE OF PLEASURE (HVCA-12834, 15 OCT 65).

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		6
2		7
3		8
4		9
5		10

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ____ PER ____ # ____

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

SEP 1967

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 38873

D. 279604 CIRASH-9 REPORTED THAT FERNANDEZ AS DEPUTY CHIEF, DIGEPOL WAS EXPENDING $550 TO $670 FOR A NIGHTS ENTERTAINMENT. EXTRA SOURCE OF INCOME WAS APPROPRIATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY OF COMMUNISTS, RELEASE OF PRISONERS FOR A PRICE ETC. (HVCA-11693, Sept 64).

E. STATION REPORTED IN HVCA-13182, 25 FEB 66 THAT FERNANDEZ SERIOUS TROUBLE WITH THE GOV. WHILE STATION NOT ANXIOUS PROVOKE QUARREL WITH HIM, HIS RETURN TO ANY POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN VEN WOULD MILITATE AGAINST WOFACT INTERESTS.

F. IN UFGA-24884, 5 APRIL 66 768511 AMHARSH-1 REPORTED ON SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES OF FERNANDEZ IN MIAMI AREA AND THE SHIPPING OF WEAPONS TO VEN.

G. WE CAN ALSO CITE HIS POOR HANDLING OF NR CIURBAN-2 CASE IN WHICH AGENT WAS BLOWN TO MIR WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF TAKEOVER.

H. MONROE B. DIFFENDAL (P) WHO CURRENTLY OUT OF COUNTRY ON TDY TRIP HANDLED FERNANDEZ WHILE LATTER DEP CHIEF DIGEPOL. WHEN HE RETURNS WILL QUERY HIM ON FERNANDEZ. HQS RECOLLECTS ONE PET GRIPE CASE OFFICER WAS THAT FERNANDEZ PASSED STATION INFO TO CIVISTA STATING IT CAME FROM HIS OWN (NON-EXISTENT) AGENT NETS.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ,

PAGE 3 (classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 38873

TO

3. IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR STATION TO WORK WITH FERNANDEZ IF HE APPOINTED CHIEF, DIGEPOL BUT FEEL THAT SENSITIVE OPS SHOULD CONTINUE BE HANDLED WITH CIWOODS OR UNILATERALLY. IT IS TRUE THAT FERNANDEZ COOPERATED WITH STATION DURING HIS PREVIOUS TOUR AND APPEARED NOT BE ANTI-WOFACT BUT HIS GENERAL GREEDINESS AND LACK OF SCRUPLES MAKE HIM AN UNSAVORY PARTNER TO DEAL WITH AT THAT LEVEL.

4. IF STATION DOES NOT HAVE ABOVE DOCUMENTATION HQS WILL FORWARD. WILL DISCUSS FERNANDEZ WITH COS ON HIS ARRIVAL HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *COS, Minit and Erasto Fernandez Betancourt, for DC/Digepol met to discuss colaboration between Station and Digepol. Not clear if Fernandez to be new Chief. While F has bad rep not clear why. Fernandez was cooperative with Station previous time no clear indications he enriched himself by accepting bribes from left. Station would work slowly until full assessment acquired. Asked WAVE to work closely with AMCLEVE-15 during Fernendez stay in Miami to collect info on latter.

COORD: C/WH/COG/MO Robert Ortman (by phone)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~FROM~~ 3

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/INT 2

30 Oct 67 IN 82922

SECRET 302301Z CITE JMWAVE 9996

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE PERUMEN

REF: CARACAS 8190 (IN 81988)

300985

1. JMWAVE RECD LETTER FROM AMCLEVE/15 ON 30 OCT 67. AMCLEVE SAYS HE WILL BEGIN WORK ON 1 NOV. ADDRESS IS AVENIDA JOSE FELIX RIVAS, QUINTA CLARITA, ~~CARACAS.~~

384359

2. ACCORDING AMCLEVE/15 NOMINATION OF CIRASH/4 AS DIRECTOR OF DIGEPOL DELAYED BECAUSE CIRASH/4'S POLITICAL PARTY, ADECO, IS IN TROUBLE.

3. LAWRENCE R. DEROME IS ALIAS OF AMCLEVE/15'S JMWAVE CO.

SECRET

SECRET

300985

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

RIG: C. COX
NIT: WH/3/V
XT: 4521
ATE: 30 OCTOBER 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

ʼ 21 PER _______ # _______

ONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO __________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 47765

CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 8190 (IN 81988)

1. HQ INITIATING PROCESSING OF POA FOR ASSESSMENT ONLY.

2. WE RECOGNIZE YOUR INTEREST IN AMCLEVE-15, BUT SUGGEST YOU REVIEW CAREFULLY DOCUMENTS WHICH WE ARE FORWARDING BY POUCH.

300985

what do they say?

3. PLEASE FORWARD SALARY INFO. HOW MUCH DOES STATION PROPOSE TO PAY HIM AND WHERE IN OPS BUDGET WILL IT COME FROM?

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Station interested possibility pick up Luis POSADA Carriles as unilateral penetration of DIGEPOL if Erasto Fernandez Betancourt named Director. Requested authorization to contact POSADA for assessment as soon as JMWAVE advises permanent address Caracas.

324359

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/WH/COG

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 74

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG-5, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 281910Z CITE CARACAS 8190

28 Oct 67 IN 81988

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. JMWAVE 9802 (IN 74736)

B. DIRECTOR 327.9

1. STATION DEFINITELY INTERESTED IN POSSIBILITY PICKING UP 300985 AMCLEVE-15 AS UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF CIRASH IF AND WHEN 334359 CIRASH-4 IS NAMED DIRECTOR. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IF HE WOULD BE AS CLOSE AS PAST TRAFFIC SUGGESTS TO CIRASH-4, WHOM NEEDLESS TO SAY WE DO NOT COMPLETELY TRUST.

2. REQUEST HQS AUTHORIZATION TO CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 FOR ASSESSMENT AS SOON AS JMWAVE ADVISES OF MORE PERMANENT ADDRESS CARACAS. PER PARA ONE REF B, IF AMCLEVE-15'S OA CANCELLED, PLEASE REINSTATE [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ AT PRESENT. *

3. FOR JMWAVE: WILL APPRECIATE CABLE AS SOON AS AMCLEVE-15 ADVISES PLACE CONTACT CAN BE MADE. IS LAWRENCE R. DEROME TRUE NAME ? OR PSEUDO?

S E C R E T

SECRET

* Svc'd For Confirmation

35

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 3P PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR. WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, CI/ICG 2

SERVICE

CARACAS 8190
STA & NR

29 OCT 67
DATE

81988
IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"PLEASE REINSTATE IT BASED ON INFO IN HIS"

SECRET

-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES [illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

32

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, CI/OPS, CI/OA,

5 DEC 67 IN 65624

S E C R E T 052352Z CITE JMWAVE 0497

DIRECTOR CARACAS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 56598

B. CARACAS 8417 (IN 05744)

1. ALL PERTINENT INFO RE AMCLEVE/15 CONTACTS AVAILABLE IN HIS 201 FILE WHICH FORWARDED TO HQS WXST OCTOBER SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS REPORTED BY CABLE.

300985

2. AMCLEVE/15 DID NOT GIVE ANY OTHER MEANS FOR CONTACT OTHER THAN ADDRESS IN JMWAVE 9996 (IN 82922) WHICH, ACCORDING TO AMCLEVE/15 IS RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESS (VETERINARIAN CLINIC) OF GUSTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ.

S E C R E T

SECRET

File

8 DEC 1967

4-65 JVIU

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES (21)

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

3

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T 242220Z CITE CARACAS 8417

4 Dec 57 IN 05744

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 56598

B. JMWAVE 0422 (IN 02672)

286705

1. FOR REASONS OF COMPARTMENTATION CIGOAL-1 HAS NOT BEEN DIRECTLY QUERIED, BUT HE HAS NEVER MENTIONED

300985

AMCLEVE-15 AND STATION BELIEVES THEY DO NOT KNOW EACH OTHER.

2. CARACAS STATION CAN ADD NO BIO DATA ON AMCLEVE-15 NOT ALREADY AVAILABLE HQS. STATION RECEIVED REPORT FROM CIRASH-15,

802569

334359

HOWEVER, WHICH CONFIRMS THAT AMCLEVE-15 IS WORKING FOR CIRASH-4 AND UZCATEGUI AS STATED IN REF B.

3. FOR JMWAVE: DID AMCLEVE-15 EVER GIVE WAY TO CONTACT HIM IN CARACAS OTHER THAN ADDRESS PROVIDED JMWAVE 9993? WOULD PREFER TELEPHONE HIM IF POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FIRST MEETING.

S E C R E T

SECRET

Who is running anti-CIA operation for Venezuelan Gov'T.

CLASSIFICATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD	DATE [illegible] 1967
SUBJECT	FILE NUMBER 201-300985

C. Cox, WH/3/V, called about status and what was needed to do for an approval.

Was told that last investigations were run in 1965, thus needed updating of all info + traces since 1965 and a POA/OA request.

His previous OA was cancelled in Aug. 1967; yet all negotiations etc. re Venezuela we have been carried on since then.

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

FORM 7-62 1954

CLASSIFICATION

(40)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ? TOTAL COPIES (23)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

~~GROUP~~
3

ACTION
WH/cog 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE , VR, WH8, c/ops, c/ca, MPS/BG2

S E C R E T 301738Z CITE CARACAS 8358 (LYNER ACTING) 30 Nov 67 IN 03338

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 1 DEC 1967

REF: A. JMWAVE 0422 ?(IN 02672)

B. DIRECTOR 47965

300985

1. REF A REINFORCES STATION OPINION AMCLEVE-15 WOULD PROVE VALUABLE AGENT. HIS SALARY OF 700 DOLLARS FROM CIRASH SUGGESTS STATION WOULD NEED PAY ONLY SUPPLEMENTARY AMOUNT.

2. HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED DOCUMENTS ON AMCLEVE-15 MENTIONED REF B. PLEASE EXPEDITE THESE DOCUMENTS AND POA.

S E C R E T

SECRET

300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 4

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO
FILE VR WH/COG 8 CI/OA

1 NOV 1967

31 OCT 67 IN 83566

SECRET 311525Z CITE CARACAS 8213

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: DIRECTOR 47955

300985

1. WILL NOT CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 UNTIL HAVE HAD CHANCE REVIEW DOCUMENTS BEING POUCHED.

2. IMPOSSIBLE KNOW WHAT AMCLEVE-15 SALARY WILL BE, IF ANY, BEFORE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. PREVIOUS HQS RESERVATIONS THIS CASE WERE BUDGETARY (and other items), BUT WE ASSUMED BASIC PROBLEM WAS SOLVED WHEN JMWAVE ADVISED THAT AMCLEVE-15 WOULD BE PAID BY CIRASH THE SALARY HE FELT HE HAD TO HAVE. IT MAY BE THAT STATION WOULD NEED PAY ONLY TOKEN AMOUNT, WHICH COULD BE TAKEN FROM CIRASH BUDGET, BUT ONLY DIRECT TALKS WITH AMCLEVE-15 WILL GIVE US THE ANSWERS.

SECRET

SECRET

300985

DOCKET ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 24

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐

☐

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, ... A, FI

18 Oct 67 IN 74936

S E C R E T 182122Z CITE JMWAVE 9802

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE PBRUMEN

REF CARACAS 7805 (1-51649)
300985

1. AMCLEVE/15 REPORTS TELEPHONE CALL FROM GISTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ ON 18 OCT 67. ORTIZ INFORMED AMCLEVE/15 THE ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) BETABCOURT WILL BE NAMED DIRECTOR OF DIGEPOL LATE OCT 67. ORTIZ ON BEHALF OF FERNANDEZ ASSURED AMCLEVE/15 DIGEPOL EMPLOYMENT AT PROPER LIVABLE SALARY.

324359

2. AMCLEVE/15 PLANS FLY CARACAS 23 OCT 67. WILL STAY TEMPORARILY AT HOME OF ORTIZ. STATION HAS ASKED AMCLEVE/15 TO NOTIFY JMWAVE WHEN HE HAS MORE PERMANENT ADDRESS AND WE WILL ADVISE CARACAS. IF STATION DESIRES CONTACT, PERSON SHOULD IDENTIFY SELF TO AMCLEVE/15 AS FRIEND OF LAWRENCE R. DEROME.

S E C R E T

SECRET

300985
Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 37/21

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, SOD 6, FI

S E C R E T 252203Z CITE JMWAVE 9448 25 SEP 67 IN 59289

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

FYI: AMCLEVE/15 REPORTS TELEPHONE CALL FROM GUSTAVO ORTIZ INFORMING HIM THAT ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) BETANCOURT WILL ARRIVE MIAMI ON TDY 27 SEPT 67. ORTIZ STATED FERNANDEZ WILL SEEK INFO FROM CUBAN EXILES MIAMI WHO MAY KNOW OR HAVE INFO ON CUBAN GUERRILLAS VENEZUELA. ORTIZ ASKED AMCLEVE/15 WORK WITH FERNANDEZ DRUING HIS TDY MIAMI: AMCLEVE/15 AGREED.

300985

324359

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

300985

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

ORIG: K. GARDINER LCC
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 14 SEPT 1967

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 22 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: W48 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR WH/C 68 [illegible]

FI FI/INT 2 [illegible]
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

Sep 15 20 42Z

CITE DIRECTOR 35982

19 SEP 1967

OVER

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REF A: CARACAS 7805 (IN 51649)*

B: DIRECTOR 34096**

1. BELIEVE ANY FURTHER JMWAVE ENCOURAGEMENT AMCLEVE-15 300985 SEEK DIGEPOL JOB MAY BE INTERPRETED BY HIM AS IMPLICIT COMMITMENT OF WOFACT EMPLOYMENT ONCE HE REACHES VENEZUELA. WISH AVOID ANY SUCH MISUNDERSTANDING WITH AMCLEVE-15 SINCE NO ASSURANCE HE WILL BE OF SUFFICIENT OPS POTENTIAL TO MERIT EXPENDITURE STATION TIME AND MONEY. POINTS TO CONSIDER ARE:

A. ACCORDING TO CIRASH-12 757243 DIGEPOL HAS NEITHER PERSONNEL, BUDGET NOR HIGH LEVEL POLICY DIRECTION WHICH WOULD PERMIT IT TO FUNCTION AS EFFECTIVE ANTI-SUBVERSION ORGANIZATION REGARDLESS WHO IS DIRECTOR.

B. APPARENT THAT DIGEPOL (AND, IN VIEW FORMATION OF NEW INTEL ORGANIZATION BY UZCATEGUI, ENTIRE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY) UNDERGOING SHAKEUP. DIFFICULT MEASURE AMCLEVE-15 POTENTIAL AS LOW TO MEDIUM LEVEL PENETRATION DIGEPOL AGAINST POSSIBILITY OBTAINING LOCAL PENETRATION AGENT UNTIL DUST OF

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

300985

LAC

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: [redacted] L.K. Geva
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 13 MAY 1968

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: ~~H4 14 F3 31-2~~ WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, SEWE 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) 09409 (pica)

File

2 IMMEDIATE
TO ~~PRIORITY~~ CARACAS

CITE DIRECTOR

15 MAY 1968

REF: CARACAS 9588 (IN 08516)

300985

1. CONCUR SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15. IN ADDITION AREAS OUTLINED REF BELIEVE AMCLEVE-15 SHOULD BE TESTED ON FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

A. STATUS OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS BROTHERS, IDEN A AND IDEN B. IDEN B IS BELIEVED TO BE A DSE AGENT AND IS TRUSTED BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD. NOTE AMCLEVE-15 CONSISTENTLY FAILED TO LIST IDEN B AS EMPLOYED BY CUBAN GOV IN PRQ'S FILLED OUT IN 1961, 1965, AND 1966 ALTHOUGH IDEN B WAS EMPLOYED BY CUBAN TELEPHONE COMPANY DURING THIS PERIOD. AFTER PHONE CALL FROM FAMILY IN HAVANA IN SEPTEMBER 1966, AMCLEVE-15 TOLD STATION JMWAVE OF IDEN B AND SAID HE HAD LAST SEEN HIM IN APRIL 1961. THIS AT VARIANCE WITH 1961 PRQ I WHICH SAYS AMCLEVE-15 ARRIVED IN U.S. IN FEBRUARY 1961.

B. REALIZE STATION WISHES AVOID QUESTIONS CONCERNING AMCLEVE-15'S EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES WHICH DO NOT DIRECTLY RELATE TO HOSTILE ACTIVITY AGAINST WOFIRM. HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL TO CLARIFY DEGREE TO WHICH AMCLEVE-15 INVOLVED IN

CONT...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

GARDINER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY INFO: FILE, VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 99409

TO

PAGE 2

THEFT AND DISPOSAL OF DEMOLITION AND OTHER SABOTAGE DEVICES UNIQUE TO WOFIRM BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL HARM OF THESE ACTIVITIES TO WOFIRM. ALSO BELIEVE STATION SHOULD ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN WHETHER HE FEELS PAST ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OR ASSOCIATIONS WITH GANGSTER ELEMENTS MAKE HIM VULNERABLE TO BLACKMAIL.

2. HQS PREPARED CONSIDER LESS RESTRICTED USE OF AMCLEVE-15 IF SGSWIRL REVEALS NO DECEPTION. related [illegible] by CI/Ops and "hostile" not in PCA/OA sense.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: CI/OPS/Mr. Hughes F. W. Hughes

OS/IRD/Mr. Bednar J. B. Bednar

WH Comment: Requests permission SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15, restricting test to points designed determine that he has not, is not, and does not plan engage in activities hostile to WOFIRM.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

L Sternfield
LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIG: K, GARDINER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 13 MAY 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 5 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ - FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8 CI/OA, CI/OPS, SECUR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number) 99410

CITE DIRECTOR 99410

TO IMMEDIATE CARACAS

REF: DIRECTOR 99409

IDEN A: RAUL POSADA CARRILLES

IDEN B: ROBERTO POSADA CARRILLES

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 21

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ____ AT: ____

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

DISSEM BY 28 PER ____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, CI/OA

FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 102037Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 9588

10 MAY 68 IN 08516

DIRECTOR

13 MAY 1968

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 71540

B. HVCA-15159

300985

1. AMCLEVE-15 HAS PROVED EXTREMELY PRODUCTIVE AND VERY VALUABLE SOURCE SINCE PICKED UP BY CARACAS STATION FEBRUARY 1968. WE BELIEVE HE COLLABORATING FULLY WITH WOFIRM AND WOULD NOT EXPOSE, INFORM ON OR WORK AGAINST WOFIRM. THIS DOES NOT MEAN HE MIGHT NOT ENGAGE IN SIDE ACTIVITIES OF HIS OWN UNRELATED TO WOFIRM ACTIVITIES WITHOUT INFORMING WOFIRM.

without any operational approval

2. BELIEVE GOOD TRADECRAFT REQUIRES HE UNDERGO SGSWIRL AT THIS TIME. ALSO WE WOULD LIKE REGULARIZE HIS STATUS, REINSTATE HIS CLEARANCE AND REMOVE HIM FROM "HOSTILE" LIST SO WE CAN WORK WITH HIM MORE CLOSELY, LEVY REQUIREMENTS, AND THEREBY REAP FULL BENEFIT HIS POTENTIAL.

3. WE WOULD PROPOSE LIMIT EXAMINATION TO POINTS DESIGNED DETERMINE THAT HE HAS NOT, IS NOT, AND DOES NOT PLAN ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES HOSTILE TO WOFIRM. OUR ONLY REAL CONCERN IS TO BE ASSURED HE NOT WORKING AGAINST US. SINI CE MUCH OF HIS VALUE TO

334359

CIRASH-4 IS BASED ON HIS OTHER ACTIVITIES AND HIS CONTACTS

[illegible] not CI/CA.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR,

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9588 SECRET

IN MIAMI, AS POINTED OUT REF B, AND SINCE WE ARE OBLIGED TO MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH CIRASH-4, WE WOULD PROPOSE NOT CONDUCT DIRECT QUESTIONING ON THIS ASPECT HIS ACTIVITIES.

4. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15, BUT WISH MAKE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT PROPOSE USE EXAMINATION TO PROBE POINTS RAISED REF A; RATHER ONLY TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WORKING FOR AND NOT AGAINST/US.

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 37

300985

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 09

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR. CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, CS/SOD SOD 6

S E C R E T 111509Z APR 68 CITE CARACAS 9364 (LYNER ACTING)

11 APR 68 IN 89759

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY MEXICO CITY

REF: CARACAS 9356 (IN 88953)

300985

1. AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS THAT "MONSIGNOR FROM MEXICO" ARRIVED CARACAS ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO TO DO STUDY ON EXTREMISTS IN VENEZUELA. HE CALLED AT MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TO TELL OF HIS PLANS AND WAS DIRECTED TO CIVISTA-5. MONSIGNOR TOLD CIVISTA-5 HE HAD BEEN IN GUATEMALA RECENTLY CONDUCT SIMILAR STUDY AND HAD SPOKEN TO NUMBER OF GUERRILLA LEADERS THERE. MONSIGNOR'S PLANS CALL FOR INTERVIEWING SUBVERSIVE LEADERS VENEZUELA. HE TOLD CIVISTA-5 THAT HIS OBJECTIVES STRICTLY SCHOLARLY, HENCE HOPED CIVISTA WOULD ABANDON ANY THOUGHTS OF TAILING OR ARRESTING HIM.

NR

12 APR 1968

2. INFO ADDEES: PLS ADVISE WHETHER MONSIGNOR ILLICH HAS BEEN GUATEMALA IN RECENT MONTHS.

S E C R E T

SEC

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 35

300985

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
JR

ACTION
WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR WH 8, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 282243Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 0021 [illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, ROME 29 FEB 1968

TYPIC

REFS: A. JMWAVE 1148 (IN 44547)

B. DIRECTOR 72678
C. JMWAVE 1177 (IN 46301)

1. ON 28 FEB 1968 AUNT OF AMPLOT-1 DENOUNCED AMPLOT-1 TO DIGEPOL VIA AMCLEVE-15 (WHO IS ACQUAINTANCE OF AUNT THROUGH CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY CARACAS). AMCLEVE-15 REPORTED UNILATERALLY TO STAPON. DENUNCIATION WAS THAT AMPLOT-1 IS COMMUNIST WHO INVOLVED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA IN PAST AND WILL BE ENTERING VENEZUELA SOON FROM ITALY TRAVELING UNDER FALSE NAME.

NR

300985

2. WE ASSUME DIGEPOL WILL PICK UP AMPLOT-1 WHEN HE ARRIVES, PRESUMABLY THROUGH TIP FROM AUNT. WE MIGHT BE ABLE APPROACH AMPLOT-1 THROUGH DIGEPOL OR AMCLEVE-15 SHOULD HQS SO DESIRE. AT VERY LEAST MIGHT BE ABLE GUIDE INTERROGATION IF HE ARRESTED. AMCLEVE-15 WILLING RUN INVESTIGATIONS OR OPS THROUGH DIGEPOL FOR STATION BY GIVING DIGEPOL TIPS AND INFO "FROM CUBAN CONTACTS MIAMI" WHICH NEVER QUESTIONED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9021 SECRET

3. PLEASE ADVISE HQS INTEREST AND IF WE SHOULD ADVISE DIGEPOL VIA AMCLEVE-15 OF AMPLOT-1'S ALIAS "JUAN GARCIA" FOR POSSIBLE DETENTION AT AIRPORT OR IF SHOULD MEMRELY MONITOR AMPLOT-1'S ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] [illegible]
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 23 FEBRUARY 1968

SECRET

300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: [illegible] PER: [illegible]

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

REF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: [illegible] WH/COG 3, MPS/BSZ, CI/OPS, CI/CA

(date and time filed) (reference number)

FEB 24 15 21 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 77510

TO CARACAS, JMWAVE

AMSHADY

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 1343 (IN 55999)*

1. HQS GUIDELINES FOR SALARY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN AMSHADY-1 AND CIRASH SIMILAR AMCLEVE-15 CASE. FIRST, SALARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AMSHADY-1 AND PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYER BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT WOFIRM INVOLVEMENT. SECOND, WOFIRM SALARY BE DISCONTINUED UPON AMSHADY-1 ARRIVAL CARACAS. THREE, HQS WILL APPROVE SUPPLEMENT TO AMSHADY-1 CIRASH SALARY ONLY IF AMSHADY-1 BECOMES PRODUCTIVE ASSET OF STATION CARACAS.

2. HQS CONCURRENCE PASSAGE NAME LIST DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE CONTINGENT ON HQS VERIFICATION NAMES WHICH WERE SURFACED BY DIAZ AND PROVIDED THROUGH LIAISON CHANNEL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Requested concurrence in the passage to AMSHADY-1 of names surfaced by [illegible] Diaz in connection with Cuban involvement in guerrilla activities in Venezuela; agreed with Station Caracas assessment of AMSHADY-1 utility in Caracas; suggested AMSHADY-1 initiate contact with individual who tentatively offered her

RELEASING OFFICER [illegible]

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF:
☐ RID COPY

INFO:

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 77516

PAGE 2

position with DIGEPOL.

COORD: D. Phillips C/WH/COG (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

201-300985

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

SECRET

[illegible]

ORIG: C.W. COX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: R-9494
DATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER ______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR, C/OPS, C/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

WH/COG 8, DDP, ADDP, CI, CS/DO, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PRIORITY

CITE DIRECTOR 71540

TO CARACAS

FEB 2 03 03 Z

2 FEB 1968

REF: A. HVCA-14978*

B. HVCA-14975**

C. CARACAS 8748*** (IN 36499)

300985

OVER

1. IN VIEW REF B WE NOTE WITH ALARM AMCLEVE-15 CONTINUAL TENDENCY BECOME INVOLVED CLANDESTINE SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES, AND HIS FAILURE REPORT COMPLETE STORY TO WOFIRM OR CIRASH OF HIS ACTIVITIES WHICH HE FEELS HE WANTS WITHHOLD FOR WHATEVER REASON. THEREFORE, REQUEST FOR POA FOR AMCLEVE-15 HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND HE IS TO BE HANDLED AS A HOSTILE PER CSI-F 10-5 UNTIL HIS MOTIVES COMPLETELY ASCERTAINED. WE DOUBLY CONCERNED OVER SAME REPORT WHICH LISTS DEMOLITION ITEMS SMUGGLED INTO CARACAS FROM JMWAVE AREA BY AMCLEVE-15 INCLUDING DEVICES PECULIAR TO WOFIRM AND WHOSE USE COULD TIE WOFIRM THIS TYPE ACTIVITY AND BECOME SOURCE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT TO GOV DURING ELECTION YEAR.

2. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO CONTINUED CONTACT AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF CIRASH AND UZCATEGUI ORGANIZATIONS AVAILABLE TO HIM THRU THE NORMAL COURSE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND NO OBJECTION TO PAYMENTS FOR INFO RECEIVED. HOWEVER, THERE TO BE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 2 FEB 1968 CITE DIRECTOR 71548

802569

TO PAGE 2

NO JOINT OPERATIONS, NOR REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: *Explanation of Caracas station reasons for wanting AMCLEVE-15 as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL.
**Transmittal of CIRASH-15 report on meeting with UZCATEGUI after which CIRASH-15 was introduced to AMCLEVE-15 who disclosed at home of Gustavo ORTIZ Faez that he (AMCLEVE-15) had brought sabotage and infra-red signal devices from Miami (seen by CIRASH-15), and was engaged in conspiracy for sabotage with ORTIZ Faez unknown to Chief, DIGEPOL, CIRASH-4.
***Outlined proposed payments to AMCLEVE-15 and requested HQ expedite POA as penetration agent DIGEPOL.

324359

COORD: CI/OPS Frank Hughes (in draft)

WH/F1

by Jacob W. Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-300985

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

32

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/IC 2,

S E C R E T 202215Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 8566

20 FEB 68 IN 55134

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

[illegible]

REFS: A. CARACAS-8394 (IN-49508)

B. DIRECTOR 76204

1. CONFESS WE SOMEWHAT CONFUSED BY REF B. OBVIOUSLY, REF A MAY HAVE LACKED CLARITY. WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING AMSHADY-1 TO GOV FOR ANY PURPOSE AS WE DID WITH AMOT-250. ORTIZ CONTACTED AMSHADY-1, NOT VICE VERSA, AND IF HE HIRING HER FOR CIRASH TO DO JOB FOR WHICH SHE HAS NO BACKGROUND, THAT IS CIRASH'S PROBLEM, NOT OURS.

2. IF AMSHADY-1 PRESENTLY INACTIVE (WHICH WE GATHER FROM PARA ONE REF B IS CASE) THERE CERTAINLY NOTHING TO LOSE BY HER COMING CARACAS TO WORK AT CIRASH EXPENSE. FEEL IT SELF-EVIDENT THAT WOULD BE DEFINITELY ADVANTAGEOUS HAVE CONTROLLED [illegible] ASSET INVOLVED IN CIRASH PENETRATION PROGRAM OF PCV AT UCV.

3. WE DID NOT PROPOSE [illegible] SHOULD SPONSOR ARRANGEMENTS IN ANY WAY IN CONTRAST TO AMOT-250 EMPLOYMENT WITH CIVISTA, AND IT OUR ASSUMPTION OUR CONTACTS WITH HER WOULD BE CLANDESTINE, AS IN CASE AMCLEVE-15. WE ONLY INTENDED INDICATE IN REF A THAT WE WOULD WELCOME AMSHADY-1'S PRESENCE CARACAS AS CIRASH EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 8066 S E C R E T

AND THEREFORE, ASSUMING HER WILLINGNESS AND AVAILABILITY AND JMWAVE'S CONCURRENCE, IT OUR SUGGESTION SHE ACCEPT PROPOSITION UNDER CONDITIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

SAL

4. THERE MAY BE SALARY AND CAREER PROBLEMS WE UNAWARE OF. IF SO, PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

FILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

________ PER ________ # ________ ☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE , VR ,

PAGE 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 35782

REORGANIZATION ~~R[illegible]TION~~ SETTLES.

C. HQS STILL BOTHERED BY INHERENT SECURITY PROBLEMS ~~ASPECTS~~ AMCLEVE-15 CASE, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE ~~CONCERNING~~ HIS BROTHER WHO IS ALLEGED TO BE A DSE AGENT. BELIEVE AMCLEVE-15 AS CUBAN IN EMPLOY OF DIGEPOL MIGHT EASILY COME TO ATTENTION OF CUBAN INTELLIGENCE.

2. UNLESS WE HAVE MISSED SOME POINT WHICH MAKES AMCLEVE-15 VITAL TO CARACAS OPS PROGRAM PREFER JMWAVE NOT ENCOURAGE AMCLEVE-15 SEEK DIGEPOL JOB. HOWEVER WE DO NOT OBJECT TO TELEPHONE CALL PER REF A.

324359

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Suggests JMWAVE have AMCLEVE-15 telephone Erasto Fernandez Betancourt, who has been nominated as new head of DIGEPOL, to attempt to firm up previous job offer by Fernandez. AMCLEVE-15 should delay actual departure for Caracas until his position is clarified. Requests Hqs concurrence.

**Hqs believes that, in view unsettled DIGEPOL situation and vague and unsubstantiated nature AMCLEVE-15 job possibilities, not advisable make financial commitment to him to enable him to return to Venezuela. If he returns on his own and Caracas determines he has operational potential, possibility of WOFACT employment can be reconsidered.

C/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

4-65 JUIU

300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

4

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T 132203Z CITE CARACAS 7805

14 SEP 67 IN 51649

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REFS A. JMEAVE 9205 (IN 49694)

B. DIRECTOR 34096

1. 785552 CIGIRO 1 REPORTED EVENING 12 SEPT THAT HE HAD NOMINATED 324337 (T) ERASTO FERNANDEZ BETANCOURT TO BE DIRECTOR DIGEPOL. CIGIRO 1 SAID PRESIDENT RELUCTANT APPROVE APPOINTMENT DUE FERNANDEZ BAD REPUTATION. CIGIRO 1 CONTINUING PRESS FOR APPROVAL APPOINTMENT ON BASIS HE WILL WATCH FERNANDEZ.

2. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, STATION FEELS 300985 AMCLEVE 15 SHOULD PHONE FERNANDEZ TO TRY FIRM UP DIGEPOL JOB; BUT DELAY ACTUAL DEPARTURE TILL HIS POSITION CLARIFIED. THIS BEING SUGGESTED ON ASSUMPTION AMCLEVE 15 MAY NOT IMMEDIATELY LOCATE JOB IN U.S. AND WOULD BE WILLING CONTINUE TRY KEEP VENEZUELAN OPTION OPEN ON CHANCE IT MIGHT WORK OUT.

3. REQUEST HQS CONCURRENCE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

300 985
V

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E ✓ TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 12

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 111655Z CITE CARACAS 7775

11 SEP 67 IN 49565

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. JMWAVE 9177 (W 48495)

B. DIRECTOR 34096

1. IN VIEW REF B, STATION WILL HOLD CONTRACT OFFER IN ABEYANCE UNTIL HE IN PLACE.

2. SUGGEST AMCLEVE-15 (300985) PHONE OR CABLE ERASTO FERNANDEZ AND OBTAIN DEFINITE COMMITTMENT WHERE HE TO WORK AND EOD.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

28

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI, FI/INT 2

SECRET 111851Z CITE JMWAVE 9205 11 SEP 67 IN 49694

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

REF A JMWAVE 9080 (IN [illegible])

B DIRECTOR 34096

300985

1. AMCLEVE-15 HAS DEFINITELY DECIDED NOT RETURN CARACAS FOR DIGEPOL JOB WITHOUT ASSURANCE SIMULTANEOUS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT DUE LOW SALARY MENTIONED REF A.

2. WE READ REF B AS INSTRUCTION TO JMWAVE TO TELL AMCLEVE-15 THIS ASSURANCE WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING AND THAT HE CAN INTENSIFY SEARCH FOR MIAMI EMPLOYMENT. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

ET

SECRET

Jack [illegible]

4-65 JVEM

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES (21)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

E1

ACTION WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, CI/OA, CI/PS

S E C R E T 181600Z CITE CARACAS 7841

18 S[illegible] 67 IN 54359

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: DIRECTOR 35982

IN VIEW HEADQUARTERS STRONG RESERVATIONS HIRING AMCLEVE-15, STATION DEFERS TO HQS VIEWS.

300985

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

19 OCT 1967

ORIG: E. TSIKERDANOS
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 12 SEPT 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 P PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 34915

SEP 12 21 09 Z

TO

JMWAVE, CARACAS

REF: JMWAVE 9205 (IN 49694)*

ABSOLUTELY CORRECT.

300985

18 OCT 1967

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *JMWAVE requested HQ advise them if they have properly interpreted HQ direction to mean that JMWAVE should tell AMCLEVE-15 that there is no assurance of simultaneous Caracas agency employment if he returns Venezuela to take low salary DIGEPOL job.

COORD: WH/COG/MO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

L. Sternfield
LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
25/21

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CC 3,

S E C R E T 082146Z CITE JMWAVE 9177

8 SEP 67 IN 48495

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 7756 (IN 47455)

300985

NOT CLEAR IF JMWAVE SHOULD MAKE AMCLEVE/15 REF OFFER OR WAIT UNTIL CARACAS STATION OFFICER ARRIVES MIAMI MID SEPTEMBER. ALSO WHETHER CONTRACT HINGES ON PRIOR OBTAINING @ JOB WITH DIGEPOL. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES (2)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ROOM 3

ACTION Wh 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/CA, MPS/BKZ, CA, 6, GLINT 2

S E C R E T 071919Z CITE CARACAS 7756 7 SEP 67 IN 47458

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REF: JMWAVE 9138 (IN46714)

300985

1. STATION WILLING ACCEPT AMCLEVA-15 FOR ONA-QAAR CONTRACT AT SALARY $350 PER MONTH PLUS CARACAS AND RETURN AIR FARE FOR ONE. CONTRACT REVIEWABLE AT ANY TIME. ALSO 30-DAY TERMINATION CLAUSE AT STATION OPTION.

2. WOULD HOPE THAT AMCLEVE-15 CAN REESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP WITH ERAETO FERNANDEZ, AS LATTER MAY SOON BE NAMED NEW DIRECTOR DIGEPOL AND IF NOT, HE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN MININT INVESTIGATIVE APPARATUS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM K/7

ACTION WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 051500Z CITE CARACAS 7725

5 SEP 67 IN 45532

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REF: A. JMWAVE 9020 (IN 44174)

B. DIRECTOR 32719

1. STATION CARACAS INTERESTED PROPOSITION CONTAINED REF A.

2. REQUEST JMWAVE FORWARD SOONEST PRQ DATA; EXACT DIVISION IN DIGEPOL FOR WHICH HE WORKING; NAME OF CHIEF AND NATURE OF JOB.

3. STATION OFFICER PLANNING BE IN MIAMI MID MONTH AND WILL INTERVIEW AMCLEVE-15.

300985

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 22

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, C/CA, CI/OPS, FI

6 SEP 67 IN 45714

S E C R E T 062218Z CITE JMWAVE 9138

CARACAS, DIRECTOR

REF A DIRECTOR 32719

B CARACAS 7725 (IN 45532)

OVER

1. FOLL IS AMCLEVE/15 PRQ DATA: 300985

A. BORN 18 FEB 1928, CIENFUEGOS. EDUCATED CIENFUEGOS RECEIVED DEGREE SUGAR CHEMISTRY 1952. EMPL AS CHEMICAL ANALYST, EXTERMINATOR CIENFUEGOS 1946 TO 1958. DEPT MANAGER FIRESTONE TIRE CO. HAVANA MAR 1958 TO MAR 1959. THEN UNEMPLOYED AND BECAME POLITICAL ASYLEE ARGENTINE EMB. ARRIVED US VIA MEXICO 28 FEB 1961. REMAINDER OF FAMILY (FATHER, MOTHER, BROTHERS, SISER) STILL IN CUBA. TRAINEE FOR BRIGADE 2506 BUT DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN INVASION. EMPL FIRESTONE TIRE CO. AKRON OCT 1961 TO MAR 1963. MEMBER US ARMY MAR 1963 TO MAR 1964, DISCHARGED AS 2ND LT. EMPL AS EXTERMINATOR MIAMI SEPT 1964 TO MAR 1965.

B. RECRUITED BY JMWAVE MAR 1965 AND USED AS TRAINING INSTRUCTOR AND SUBSEQUENTLY AS REPORTER ON EXILE ACTIVITIES MIAMI AREA UNTIL TERMINATION JULY 1967.

C. HAS PM/MARITIME EXPERIENCE AND IS EXPERT IN WEAPONS

AND DEMOLITIONS.

D. MARRIED. ONE SON. HAS NATIVE SPANISH AND FLUENT ENGLISH.

2. AMCLEVE/15 DOES NOT KNOW IN WHICH DIVISION OF DIGEPOL HE WOULD BE EMPLOYED, ONLY THAT HE PREVIOUSLY WORKED DIRECTLY UNDER ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) WHO WORKS WITH OR UNDER THE DEFENSE MINISTER. AMCLEVE/15 CLAIMS HE HAS CHOICE OF WORKING FOR FERNANDEZ OR MAJOR NIEVES (CROES) OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE (G-2). NATURE OF DIGEPOL JOB AS DESCRIBED BY AMCLEVE/15 WOULD BE INVESTIGATIVE.

3. AMCLEVE/15 RECEIVED LETTER 5 SEPT 1967 FROM FRIEND RAFAEL TREMOL, DIGEPOL EMPLOYEE, IN WHICH TREMOL TOLD HIM HIS CONTRACT TO WORK IN VENEZUELA HAD BEEN APPROVED BY DEPT OF WORKS AND HE COULD NOW APPLY MIAMI VENEZUELA CONSULATE FOR VISA.

4. JMWAVE'S RESERVATIONS MENTIONED REF A, INCLUDING FACT AMCLEVE/15 WAS NAMED AS WOFACT AGENT ON HAVANA TV DURING LASO CONFERENCE, HAVE NO BEARING ON OPS USE AS DIGEPOL PENETRATION. STATION HAS NO FURTHER INFO INDICATING POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS.

5. POUCHING 201 FILE.

SECRET SECRET

BT

Do we have cards on these?

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: K. GARDINER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 7 SEPT 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ #________
CONF:
☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

10 SEP

SEP 0 20 44Z

CITE DIRECTOR 34096

TO CARACAS INFO JMWAVE

REF A. JMWAVE 9138 (IN 46714)*

B. JMWAVE 9080 (IN 44174)** C. CARACAS 7754 (IN 47463)

1. HQS BELIEVES THAT, IN VIEW UNSETTLED DIGEPOL SITUATION AND VAGUE AND UNSUBSTANTIATED NATURE 300985 AMCLEVE-15 JOB POSSIBILITIES, NOT ADVISABLE MAKE FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO A-15 TO ENABLE HIM RETURN VENEZUELA. SHOULD A-15 RETURN ON HIS OWN AND CARACAS DETERMINES HE HAS OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL, POSSIBILITY OF WOFACT EMPLOYMENT CAN BE RECONSIDERED.

2. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFO PROBABLY NOT AVAILABLE JMWAVE OR CARACAS AS FOLLOWS:

A. A-15 BROTHER ROBERTO CONSIDERED TRUSTWORTHY ENOUGH BY CUBAN GOVT TO TRAVEL OVERSEAS ON GOC MISSION LATE 1966.

B. A-15 CARACAS CONTACT GUSTAVO ORTIZ FAEZ UNSAVORY CHARACTER WHO WAS INVOLVED IN POLITICAL MURDER OF ANTI-COMMUNIST PROFESSOR AT HAVANA UNIVERSITY.

3. WILL POUCH DETAILS.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica

CITE DIRECTOR 34696

TO

WH COMMENT: *REF gave AMCLEVE-15 PRQ data. Stated JMWAVE had no further info indicating possible security problems other than Havana broadcast during recent LASO conference naming A-15 as CIA agent which WAVE claims has no bearing on ops use as DIGEPOL penetration.

**A-15 stated DIGEPOL job paid about 250 dollars per month which he claims too little to live in Caracas. Would be willing work for DIGEPOL or Station in Caracas if had total income approx 600 dollars per month.

COORD: WH/COG/MO ____✓____ (in draft)

WH/3/V ____Llc____

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

201-300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE L COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

30

ACTION WH ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/OPS, C/OA, WH/COG 8, CI

S E C R E T 012138Z CITE JMWAVE 9080

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 7694 (IN 41504)
201-300985

5 SEP 1967

1. AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT DEFINITELY MADE UP MIND TO RETURN TO CARACAS. HIS JOB WITH DIGEPOL (WHICH HE SAYS STILL AVAILABLE TO HIM) PAID ONLY ABOUT 250 DOLLARS PER MONTH WHICH HE CLAIMS TOO LITTLE TO LIVE IN CARACAS. WHILE JOSE VENTURIN MIGHT BE ABLE PROVIDE JOB LATER, HAS NOTHING NOW. THUS AMCLEVE-15 ACTIVELY SEEKING JOB MIAMI.

2. AMCLEVE-15 STATES WOULD BE WILLING GO BACK TO DIGEPOL OR OTHER JOB IN CARACAS TO WORK FOR WOFACT, BUT WOULD REQUIRE TOTAL INCOME APPROX 600 DOLLARS PER MONTH DUE CARACAS COST OF LIVING.

3. WHILE AWARE EXTRA WOFACT INCOME COULD CREATE COVER PROBLEM, PERTINENT TO POINT OUT THAT IN YEARS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT BEEN UNDULY CONCERNED ABOUT MONEY PER SE; THUS DO NOT BELIEVE HE PLAYING HARD TO GET. FURTHER, JMWAVE AGREES THAT WHILE WORKING FOR DIGEPOL HE WOULD BE A GOOD ASSET FOR WOFACT.

SECRET

4. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER CARACAS WISHES PICK UP AMCLEVE-15

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 9080 SECRET

ABOVE BASIS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

ORIG: C. COX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 31 AUG 1967

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 22 PER ______ # ______

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI

SECRET (classification)

SEP 1 22 20Z (date and time filed)

CITE DIRECTOR 32719 (reference number)

TO CARACAS, JMWAVE

REF: A. JMWAVE 8997 (IN 40592)*

B. CARACAS 7694 (IN 41504)**

1. BASED ON INFO CURRENTLY AVAILABLE HQ NO OBJECTION TO STATION CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE-15 PENDING CONFIRMATION FROM OTHER STATION SOURCES HE ACTUALLY WORKING FOR DIGEPOL AND IN WHAT CAPACITY. IF CONTACT DESIRED AMCLEVE-15 STANDARD CLEARANCE PROCEDURES MUST BE INITIATED.

2. CAN CARACAS DISCREETLY CONFIRM DIGEPOL JOB?

3. REQUEST WAVE DUPLICATE FIELD 201 SOONEST AND SEND TO CARACAS AND HQ FOR REVIEW. RE REF. B. DOES WAVE HAVE ADDITIONAL INFO FOR CARACAS SUGGESTING CAUTION IN CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE 15?

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *AMCLEVE-15 reported to Wave he obtained job with Digepol in Caracas and was involved in Digepol operation culminating in capture Espinoza, a Cuban guerrilla, who landed Falcon province July 66 with Luben Petkoff. A-15 stated to Wave he talked with Espinoza day following capture.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______ PER______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 32719

TO

**Caracas believes to station advantage to have contact with A-15. Rejects Wave objections based on Cuban broadcasts. Requested WAVE tell A-15 Caracas wants contact him. Requested info re return A-15 to Caracas and info for contact.

COORD: C/WH/3/V
C/WH/COG

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
22

ACTION
WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, CA/PEG 5126

S E C R E T 292210Z CITE CARACAS 7694

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

30 AUG 67

29 Aug 67 IN 41504

REFS: A. JMWAVE 8866 (IN 34026)
B. CARACAS 7589 (IN 32169)
C. JMWAVE 8997 (IN 40593)

1. IT CLEAR FROM REF C THAT IT TO STATION'S ADVANTAGE HAVE CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE-15 (300935) IN CARACAS AS HE COULD HAVE INFORMED US OF CAPTURE OF CUBAN CONSIDERABLY BEFORE WE HEARD OF IT FROM GOV.

2. STATION DOES NOT FEEL REF A OBJECTIONS TO CONTACT ARE VALID, ESPECIALLY WITH AMCLEVE-15 WORKING FOR DIGEPOL. UNLESS JMWAVE HAS FURTHER OBJECTION NOT PRESENTED REF A, REQUEST AMCLEVE-15 BE TOLD STATION CARACAS DESIRES CONTACT HIM. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN AMCLEVE-15 WILL RETURN CARACAS AND HOW HE CAN BE CONTACTED.

S E C R E T SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

[redacted] 28

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, CI

S E C R E T 282207Z CITE JMWAVE 8997 (STEADMAN ACTING) 28 AUG 67 IN 40592

PRIORITY CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

REF CARACAS 7668 (IN 39526)

1. NO IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES EPINOZA. AMOT TRACES PENDING.

2. AMCLEVE-15, 300985 WHO HAS JUST RETURNED TO MAIMI TO OBTAIN PROPER VISA TO ENABLE HIM WORK IN VENEZUELA, REPORTS HE OBTAINED JOB WITH DIGEPOL THRU RAFAEL TREMOL AND GUSTAVO ORTIZ FAEZ AND WAS INVOLVED IN ESPINOZA CAPTURE.

3. ACCORDING AMCLEVE-15, DIGEPOL RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL ABOUT 0600 HOURS 25 AUGUST FROM INFORMANT WHO REPORTED BLACK CHEVROLET SOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH 24 AUGUST BANK ROBBERY HAD BEEN SEEN IN URDANETA STREET NEAR PERITE BUILDING. ON ARRIVAL POLICE SAW FELIZ FARIAS, ALIA "COMMANDANTE CLAUDIO", WHO WANTED FOR 1965 FIRING SQUAD MURDER OF SEVERAL PEOPLE. FARIAS DREW REVOLVER AND WAS SHOT DOWN, PEOPLE IN APARTMENT 27 OF PERITE BUILDING BEGAN FIRING ON POLICE. POLICE ENTERED APARTMENT AND ARRESTED ESPINOZA AND TWO OTHERS, FOUND 240,000 BOLIVARES FROM BANK ROBBERY, ARMS, AMMUNITION, GRENADES AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 8997 S E C R E T

OTHER ITEMS. (AMCLEVE-15 PROVIDED LIST AND PICTURE).

4. AMCLEVE-15 TALKED WITH ESPINOZA 26 AUGUST. ESPINOZA STATED HE 33 YEARS OLD, BORN PALMA SORIANO, ORIENTE. CAME TO VENEZUELA FROM CUBA JULY 1966 WITH 13 OTHER CUBANS UNDER COMMAND LUBEN PETKOFF AND LANDED AT CHICHIRIVICHE BEACH IN FALCON PROVINCE. HAD APPROX TWO MONTHS TRAINING GUERRILLA WARFARE IN CUBA. AMCLEVE-15 SAID ESPINOZA VERY COOPERATIVE. HAD A NOT TOO SERIOUS WOUND IN THE BACK OF THE HEAD "PROBABLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE INTERROGATION".

5. AMCLEVE-15 SAID SOME OF ARMS LOOKED LIKE THOSE ISSUED BY WOFACT. WILL POUCH FURTHER DETAILS, INCLUDING ARMS WITH SEVERAL NUMBERS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

201-321194

1787

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : P.A. MCBAIN
UNIT : WE/3
EXT : 5798
DATE : 22 JUNE 1962

WCS

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : PARIS MADRID
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WE 6
INFO : DD/P, CI, CI/OPS, TFW 5, S/C 2

DEFERRED
XXX ROUTINE
OUT 97122

TO PARI INFO MADR CITE DIR 18855

KEYWAY PBRUMEN UNRUMBLE

RE PARI 1548 (In 14303)*
REGRET UNABLE IDENTIFY SUBJ. NEED MORE BI.

END OF MESSAGE

* Requested traces Jorge XX FERNANDEZ.

RID (DPL)

TFW/FI Mr. Carwell by phone

WE/5 David Reardon
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas P. Thiele
AC/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

C/WE/3 R. Owen
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO UFGA-1739
TO Chief, WHD INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO Rasco
FROM Chief of Base, JMWAVE		DATE JUN 2[illegible] 1961
SUBJECT [redacted] - Transmittal of Letters Sent to Movimiento Democrata Cristiano Representative in Cuba		RE: "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☒ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED None		
REFERENCES WAVE 6771		

1. Transmitted herewith are photostatic copies of two letters sent to Lucas Moran, representative of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano in Cuba. The original letters, one of which was written by Jose Ignacio RASCO and the other by Rafael AGUIRRE, deal with RASCO's connection with the MDC. They were obtained for duplication by AMULLA-1, who had been charged by the correspondents with getting them into Cuba in the diplomatic pouch carried by a courier of the Italian Embassy.

2. Please see the reference for the restrictions placed on the handling of the attached material.

[redacted]

Enclosures:
Two letters — Given to Translators — will add here when completed.

20 June 1961

Distribution:
3 - Addressees w/enc h/w
2 - Files

3
19 JUN 61

DIRECTOR
JMWAVE
C/BELL 8
COP, ADOP/A, C/WH 2, BELL 3/C

4
5
6

JUN 19 17072 61
Rasco

ROUTINE

IN 3367

BELL CITE WAVE 6771
JMZIP RYBAT
REF A. UFGA 1659
B. UFGA 1739

1. WAVE FORWARDING REF B COPIES TWO LETTERS SENT CUBA IN ITALIAN EMB POUCH 15 JUNE. LETTERS, ONE WRITTEN BY JOSE IGNACIO RASCO AND OTHER BY DR RAFAEL AGUIRRE, WERE ADDRESSED TO LUCAS MORAN AND DEAL WITH OPPOSING VIEWS RASCO'S CONNECTION WITH MDC.

2. AMULLA-1, WHO PROVIDED CO WITH ORIGINAL LETTERS IN ORDER COPY THEM, EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN OVER KUBARK HANDLING HIS PREVIOUS EFFORT THIS FIELD. HE CLAIMS THAT COPIES OF LETTERS SENT TO AMBUD-1 VIA ITALIAN EMB POUCH ON 26 MAY, WHICH WERE SENT HQS IN REF A, WERE SHOWN AMBUD-1 BY ODYOKE OFFICIAL [redacted] OFFICIAL [redacted] DURING AMBUD-1'S RECENT VISIT ZRMETAL. UPON HIS RETURN WAVE AREA AMBUD-1 EXPRESSED GREAT DISMAY AND UNDUE INTEREST IN HOW COPIES OF LETTERS WERE OBTAINED ~~SY~~ SO QUICKLY BY PBPRIMERS. FORTUNATELY, AMBUD-1 INTEREST WANED BEFORE ANY FINGER POINTED TO AMULLA-1.

3. IF AMULLA-1 ASSERTIONS VALID, IT QUITE APPARENT HIS FUTURE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

[illegible] TO SUCH MATERIAL AND PERHAPS POUCH ITSELF MAY BE JEOPARDIZED. THEREFORE, WAVE PLANS TO PLACE SECRET NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL RESTRICTIONS ALL MATERIAL OBTAINED FROM POUCH BY AMULLA-1.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Victor Rico Galan Vol III
201-0336474

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 Sept 1966 - 20 Jul 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO

ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

Victor RICO Galan

JMTIGER

201-336474

Vol. III

66



VICTOR RICO GALAN

FEB. 1965

CE CARDS

RICO, Victor (Galan) 201-336474 **Card #1**

[illegible] 16 Jan 57 Vladimir MASYUKEVICH ; 2nd Secy, Sov Emb, told Enrique BORDES of the BIP (Buro de Investigaciones), that invitations to a reception were personal and that BORDES should tell Sergio NOVELO and Subj. DOI: 7 Nov 56.

HMMA-[illegible]16 2 Apr 58 Forwarded a copy of Al Dia, anti-US mag. (Editor-in-chief is named Victor RICO Galan, prob Subj)

~~HMMW~~-5260 persons in above two dispatches are probably identifiable. No hqs traces on either Victor RICO or Victor RICO Galan.

[illegible] 26 Feb 60 Victor RICO Galan, writer for Siempre, was moderator at 1st mtg of Political Study Circle which has been formed in UNAM & thru which Commie sympathizers hope take part in student council elections. (C-3)

HMM [illegible] 29 Jul 60 CS Victor Rico Galan among those journalists who on 14 July elected to the Mexican preparatory committee for the Second International Congress of Journalists, ~~xxx~~ to be held in Austria during October 1960 (LIFT [illegible] B-2). Comments: He is leftist journalist who [illegible] associated with Politica, new leftist semi-monthly)

HMM-[illegible] 26 Oct 60 CS- Manuel MARCUE Pardinas (dir-gen of Politica, leftist semi-monthly magazine) planned to send Subj (mbr of his reportorial staff) to see Emilio SANCHEZ Piedras (anti-US Deputy fm Tlaxcala) with problem. SANCHEZ said he wld be very happy to receive Subj. and thanked MARCUE for his 15 Sep article praising him. (LIENVOY, B-2

14-00000

HMM-5287 11 Nov 60	Subj is Chief of Information on Pueblo, anti-US and pro-Cuba newspaper.
HMM-[illegible] 6 Jan 61	Cuban Emb instructed Cubana Airlines to issue ticket for Subj to travel to Habana for second anniv celeb of Cuban rev [illegible] Jan 61. (LIFEAT, B-2)
HMM-5444 3 Feb 61 CS-	Subj is accused by Manuel MARCUE Pardinas, dir-gen of Politica, of being in the pay of the Mex Gov and trying to delay the appearance of Politica. (LIENVOY B-2)
HMM 5458 15 Feb 61 CSLL-	another accusation of trying to delay issuance of Politica by MARCUE who wants to get rid of subj; Rosendo GOMEZ Lorenzo cautioned that he has a public following & should not be dismissed. (LIENVOY B-2)
HMM-5607 21 Apr 61 TDCS-3/472,253	Subj was to attend interview of LOPEZ Mateos relative to case of Cuba on 20 Apr 61. Interview was planned on 19 Apr by CEM & Mex Organizing Committee of LAPC. (LIENVOY, B-2)
HMM-5791 28 Jul 61 CS-3/482,611	Subj is a mbr of the Committee for Solidarity w/the Cuban Revolution. (LIFTER, B-2)
HMM-6019 17 Nov 61 CS-3/494,285	31 Oct 61 staff of official pub of Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Front) anti-US, pro-Cuba, Communist-Front, was working overtime in effort to publish first issue newspaper 1 Nov 61. Staff includes Subj., who was unable to collaborate in the work of first iss of pub. Enrique GONZALEZ Pedrero planned to register pub 31 Oct under name Liberacion Nacional. LIENVOY, B-2 SECRET/CONTROL

14-00000

RICO, Victor (Oalan)

Card 2

HMM-5678
31 May 62



Victor RICO Galan

RICO, Victor (Galan)

201-336474

Card 3

HMM-6302 6 Apr 62 CS-3/508, 797	Subj., Marxist journalist who heads MLN Press and Propaganda Committee, among persons who attended round-table discussion held by MLN 2 Apr 62 on subj of prison sentences imposed on David Alfaro Siqueiros, prominent Mex artist, and Filomena MATA, his fellow-prisoner, on 10 March. Subj. among speakers. (LIENVOY-2, B-2, CONTROL)
HMM-6486 19 June62 CS-3/515, 731	14 June 62 Manuel MARCUE Pardinas, prominent Mex Marxist who is dir-genl of Politica Mex Marxist, anti-US, pro-Cuba, semi-monthly magazine, discussed w/Teresa PROENZA Proenza, Cult Att of Cuban Emb in Mex, approaching 26 of July celebration in Habana. MARCUE recommended discreet high-level persons be named to Mex delegation and recommended Subj., among other Marxist and Communist writers for Politica as well-qualified, intelligent persons to send as delegates to Cuba. MARCUE said he hoped Subj wld be invited to attend because he had never visited Cuba and was very anxious to go there. (LIENVOY, B-2) SECRET/NOFORN - CONTD CONTROL
HMM-6770 5 Oct 62 CS-3/525, 084	Subj., Mex Marxist Journalist and head of National Press and Propaganda Committee of MLN, pro-Cuba, anti-US Com front, plans to write political biography on Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Communist Prime Minister of Cuba. Subj., who proposed idea to Cuban Govt and was accepted, will spend 2 mos in Cuba working on project. (LICOOKY-1, B-2) 2 Oct Subj left Mexico for Habana on Cubana Airlines. He carried Mex passport No. 51115, w/Cuban courtesy visa. (LIFIRE, B-2)
FBIS #227 **21 Nov. 62**	**Subj has been in Cuba about six weeks.**

TDCS-3/538,445
25 Feb 63
[illegible] 7050
MEXI 3552

Manuel MARCUE Pardinas, dir genl of **Politica**, Mex Marxist semi-monthly mag., has been suspended fm membership on natl committee of MLN, charged with lack of discipline and having attacked MLN openly in **Politica** in past several months. On 22 Feb Enrique GONZALEZ Pedrero, mbr of MLN natl committee and member of staff of **Politica**, declared MLN mbrs who belong to staff of **Politica** must resign fm magazine. Subj among those who had doubts about resigning fm mag. (LIENVOY,B-2) NO FOREIGN DISSEM

MEXI 4847
IN 52485
[illegible] May 63
LITAMIL-7 C-2

✓ Victor RICO GALAN, Mexican, issued Cuban visa on separate piece of paper on 24 May 63.—

~~MEXI [illegible]~~

Reported his travel to Cuba. [illegible]

[illegible]-7326 [illegible]
MEXI-4721
23 May 63
~~[illegible]~~-2

Victor RICO Galan, Mexi Marxist journalist, agreed to go Cuba to interview Castro on his trip to USSR. On 23 May RICO said did not think necessary [illegible] when Castro returns (sched for 27 May). Rico plans go Cub. 25 or 27 May.

[illegible]
[illegible]
LIENVOY -2
[illegible] 63

Victor RICO Galan, Mexi Marxist journalist & head of Natl Press & Prop Committee of MLN, returned Mexi fm Cuba 22 June 63. Said spent [illegible] w/Castro, & spoke with 6 other Cuban officials (see report for list). Report [illegible] on his interview w/Castro, arr at Mexi City airport (he arr w/the new [illegible]), saw Dr. Enrique [illegible] in Cuba. RICO planned write series of 4 or 5 articles dealing w/subjects of "theoretical interest" & of problems [illegible] having carrying out purposes of the Revolution.

[illegible] May 63 [illegible]

14-00000

RICO, Victor (Galan) 201-330474

Card 4

HMM 7451, H.D. LIENVOY, B-2 June 63	Report on Victor RICO Galan's statements about the [illegible] the Galan intellectual.
A-198, 19 Aug 63 **AmEmb, Mex. C.** **Filed PRI**	**Victor RICO Galan, in the 21 August 63 issue of Sierpre, answered the charges of Romulo Sanchez Mireles, presiding officer of the Chamber of Deputies, which is Mexico's House of Representatives. Sanchez, before a meeting of the PRI, had attacked those who undermine Mexico's institutions, customs, government, and political leaders. Rico answered that he and thousands of other foreign born Mexicans are discriminated against.**
HMM-7666 27 Aug 63 CS-3/558,382 LITEMPO- B-	Evening 21 Aug 63 15 Mex of known Marxist, Communist, or leftist ideology appeared at offices of Gustavo DIAZ Ordaz, Min of Interior, including Subj., prominent leftist journalists. Altho grp had made no attempt make previous appt it demanded audience with DIAZ. Latter informed his aides to inform visitors request for appt with him must be in writing and explain applicant's business, and visitors were to lv immediately. They left peaceably, saying they wld send DIAZ telegram demanding audience. (FO: Subj one of principal organizers and participants in rally in favor of political prisoners held MexC 18 Aug 63. Rally failed to be held as result of police intervention. Subj and other leading participants were arrested and released same day. (HMM-7644, TDCS-3/557,044
A-1291 AmEmb, MexC 9 Apr 63	20 Mar iss of leftist wkly Sierpre published art by Subj., regular contributor to mag., advocating creation of new pol party to reflect ideology of former Pres Lazaro CARDENAS.

RICO, Victor (Galan)

201-336474

Card 5

HMM-8262
MEXI 7695
IN 95254
9 Jan 64
TDCS-3/
561,563

Subj.,Mex Marxist journalist, is making preparations to go to Dominican
Republic fm Mexico in very near future; ostensible purpose to gather info
for preparations of some arts on DR. (LIENVOY,B-2, NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
(FC: Subj.,mbr of Propaganda Committee of MLN, pro-Cuba, anti-US Mex
Communist front, and writer for Siempre, Mex leftist mag.,visited Panama,
Guat.,Nic, Costa Rica Venezuela, and Brazil between mid-October and mid-
Dec.63. Acc several earlier rpts, Subj spent 8 days in Cuba during May and
June 63 interviewing Fidel Castro Rus, Prime Minister of Cuba, on latter's
stay in USSR. During this period Subj given assignment to visit countries
in South and Central America,where he was to persuade leftist parties to
begin immediate acts of sabotage and violence to take pressure off Venes.
He was also instructed to pursue competing leftist factions in countries
he visited to unify so their work would have greater impact.In various
countries he visited, Subj conferred with leading Communists and leftists.

TDCS 3/569,940
[illegible] 9278
16 Jan 64

Rico Galan fm [illegible]
12 Jan. [illegible] Arr Sto Dgo 8 Jan, by air, fm Kingston, Jamaica.

DIR 94930
16 Jan 64
Based on
SDOM-2619,
IN 99172,
15 Jan 64

Ref.is made to TDCA-3/569,940 distributed 14 Jan 64,Subj: Travel of Subj to
DR.
Info has been recd fm Dominican Security Service that Subj left Santo
for Miami,Fla., 15 Jan 64 on Pan American flt 432. Above to FBI & I&NS.

RICO, Victor (Galan)

TDCS 3/570,335 — 10 Jan 64, RICO asked [illegible] [illegible] Justo, sister of Manuel, former pres
HDC-232 — of APCJ (14th June Pol Group) for photos of cadavers of guerrillas
Sta Off fm — killed at Las Manaclas 21 Dec 63. [illegible] unable get them. RICO also
Ramon Lora Espinal, — req photos of Rafael HERRERA, Dir of Listin Diario, but Herrera refused
photog - Z-2 — release them. (See report for details on pictures.)
Jan 64

[illegible] 8339 — 21 Jan 64, Subj asked CubEmb, Mexi re first avail flt to Cuba. Was told 24 Jan.
TDCS-3/570,925 — Subj said wanted to go 23 Jan, but might go on flt of 27 Jan.
[illegible] P-2 — (FC: presumed going to confer w/Castro upon his return fm USSR.)
Jan 64

[illegible]-8366 — RICO left Mexi for Habana by air 23 Jan 64. Visa 56341, courtesy visa. Planning
[illegible] — stay at Hotel Riviera, Habana.
LI[illegible]

[illegible] 8391 — Victor RICO Galan, [illegible] 53641, left Mexi for Cuba by air 23 Jan 64.
LIFIRE B-2
Jan 64

[illegible]/[illegible] — 28 Jan 64 [illegible] ([illegible] [illegible] [illegible], Sec Gen, [illegible]) &
[illegible] 8324 — [illegible] [illegible] told [illegible] [illegible] ([illegible]) that Victor RICO Galan had
[illegible] — asked [illegible] [illegible] to Cuba then [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] to go
Jan 64 — [illegible] 5 Feb, then Mexi en route to Cuba and USSR. RICO will accompany her fm
Mexi to Habana. (See report for details on [illegible]'s activities & travel.)
[illegible]

[illegible] 8968 — Victor RICO Galan, [illegible] 53641, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] by air 26 Feb 64.
Jan 64, LI[illegible]-2

RICO, Victor (Galan)   201-336474   Card 6

CS-3/
HMM 8659
LIENVOY B-2
Mar 64.

(Cover sheet info: Conversation 18 March Prensa Latina Office - RICO and Jorquera)
Carlos Jorquera Tolosa, Chilean, head Prensa Latina in Santiago, Chile, made appointment to meet RICO on 19 Mar 64. J was enroute from Santiago to Cuba. (Arr Mexi 17 Mar, left for Cuba 20 Mar.)

AMBASSADOR FREEMAN ATTACKED BY SIEMPRE   FBIS No. 85, 30 Apr 64

Mexico City Correspondent's Dispatch in Spanish to PRENSA LATINA Havana 1910 GMT 23 April 1964--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpt) Mexico City--In an article in the Mexico City magazine SIEMPRE on 23 April, Victor Rico Galan writes that U.S. Ambassador Fulton Freeman made a statement to the press about Cuba and Brazil. "In a violent style that seems to come from the caverns of the John Birch Society, he (criticized?) the constitutional government of Joao Goulart and the Cuban Revolution. He talked like a soapbox orator, as if issuing a political proclamation, forgetting that Mexico maintains friendly relations with the Cuban Government and did have very close relations with the deposed Brazilian President. Mr. Freeman behaved like a savage guest who spits on his host country.

"This is no great cause for surprise. U.S. ambassadors are constantly interfering in our domestic affairs as if it were the most natural thing. They feel as if they were on conquered ground, and act less like ambassadors than proconsuls who owe no consideration or explanation to anybody, as if this country belonged to them and they enjoyed boundless privileges.

"The surprising thing is that nobody has protested: the insult to Mexico has been passed over in absolute silence. Worse things will obviously come. No sooner does he arrive in Mexico than Mr. Freeman arrogates the right to shout anything he pleases, because Washington has become impatient with Mexico's independent policy, and the Texan style of the Johnson-Mann team (sic) alien to the relative tolerance of the Kennedy 'intellectuals.' Freeman comes to exert pressure violently and announces at the start that he is ready for anything. It is the policy of international gangsterism that requires the conduct of a bully in those who pursue it."

Further on, the writer says: "Either these saloon ruffians are stopped short or nobody will be able to stand them. That is why it is serious that nobody has raised his voice to teach Freeman some manners, and that, on the contrary, General Olachea, secretary of defense, should have paid him honors with all his general staff without daring to point out to him that this is an independent country and that proconsuls and viceroys are not allowed here.

"Every U.S. ambassador who comes to Mexico makes his predecessor look good by comparison, but at least in the beginning all try to make themselves liked. But not Fulton Freeman. He comes with sullen looks, raising his voice so nobody can be mistaken. He shows his hand right at the start and announces that he is not going to try to convince anybody but will give orders. This indicates quite clearly that the State Department thinks it has been too patient and feels circumstances are ripe for acting tough and violently."

RICO, Victor (Galan) 201-336474 Card 7

Commie

NavAtt, Mexi Rpt #5864014065 18 Mar 65	(Angel TORRALA Burgos, Guat/, who exiled to Mexi Jan 65, after he was involved in burning USIA garage in Guat.) The last mission of RICO Galan was the unification of the Guat guerrillas. (Cy of report filed in Arms file)
HMM-9727 4 June 65 LIFTER CS-311/ 07174-65 11 June 65	Leaders of the MLN and the FEP met near the end of March or the beginning of April 1965 to draw up a letter of convocation to the National Congress for the Liberty of the Political Prisoners and the Repeal of the Law of Social Dissolution. Subj. and members of the group will send out the notice of the Congress. Subj. is a member of the FEP and an enemy of the PPS.

RICO, Victor (Galan) 201 336474 7a

HMM 8569 12 Mar 64	LIENVOY: Raul Roa Kuri, Cuban Amb to Brazil said he was kept informed on activities of Mexi pro Commie activities of Fernando Carmona de la Pena through subj.
MEXI 9761 6 June 64	TDCS 3/583,176: Rico Galan prepared for trip to Guat by dealing directly with PGT in order make direct contact with Yon Sosa. However, special interest in the trip originated with the Chinese Commies who it seems had established secret info base in Guat. Subj said Chinese Commies were extremely pleased Yon Sosa was of chinese descent.
CS-311/02559-65 DD-1290 [illegible] D-1 C-2 DOI 11 Jan 65	[illegible] Diaz, editor of [illegible], publication of Dominican Popular Movement (Communist-Dominated), [illegible] for Chile [illegible] Feb 65, where he will [illegible] scholarship. While in Chile, intends get in touch w/Victor RICO Galan, [illegible] Communist (sic) who writes for Siempre. ... PS: RICO arrd in Dom Rep 8 Jan 65 & left 11 Jan. Ostensible purpose was to gather info for articles on the DR.
A-31 AmConsulate Merida 10 Feb65	See doc filed in State - Yucatan :- Subj Victor RICO Galan Again
HMM-9550 CS-311/ 03173-65 LICOZIDE-1	Subj went to Merida during first few days of February o make a personal of situation caused by decrease in price of henoquen. A demonstration led by [illegible] took place in Merida 1 Feb 65, protesting increase in price of henoquen; organized by [illegible] with others was arrested and later released. [illegible] Committee of [illegible] Has Art. Yucatan; [illegible] in issue no.10, dated 3 [illegible], [illegible]

14-00000

201-336074

RICO Galan, Victor MLN P-7354

DPOB 6 FEB 1928, El FERROL SPAIN

Communist Newspaperman

~~Head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of~~
~~the MLN(DOI)~~ Mbr - MLN national Committee 65

Went to Cuba on 25 May 63 returned Mexico 22 June 63.

RES: ~~PROVIDENCIA #33~~ calle Ernestina Larrainzar #14 B
~~Mexico, DF.~~ Mexico 12, DF
Tel 43-24-94 (should live in [illegible])

member of Periodistas Mexicanos Amigos de Cuba - 61

member of Committee of Solidarity with Cuba - 61

founded Mex - Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations in Merida Yuc, in 63.

cit - Mexican

Mex PP 62115

Rico Victor (Galan)

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	CUBA/MEXICO/COSTA RICA/NICARAGUA/ PANAMA/VENEZUELA/BRAZIL	REPORT NO.	TDCS 3/563,671
SUBJECT	TRAVEL AND MISSION OF ALLEGED CUBAN AGENT IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA	DATE DISTR.	31 OCTOBER 63
		PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO.	20-22 OCT 63	REFERENCES	IN 50142
		TDCS 3/563,137	47784
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (24 OCT 63)	TDCS 3/562,990	49213
APPRAISAL		FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY LEADER (F) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN CUBAN-ORIENTED LEFTIST CIRCLES OF PANAMA.

(HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN NEWSPAPERMAN, ARRIVED IN PANAMA FROM COSTA RICA ON 20 OCTOBER AND LEFT PANAMA FOR CARACAS 22 OCTOBER 1963. RICO GALAN IS A MARXIST, A WRITER FOR SIEMPRE AND POLITICA, MEXICAN MAGAZINES, AND IS THE HEAD OF THE PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE FOR THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN), A COMMUNIST-FRONT MOVEMENT HEAVILY INFILTRATED BY MEMBERS OF THE MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. IN OCTOBER 1962 RICO GALAN WENT TO CUBA TO PREPARE A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF FIDEL CASTRO. IN MAY 1963 HE AGAIN WENT TO CUBA, RETURNING TO MEXICO 22 JUNE 1963. DURING THIS LATTER VISIT HE REPORTEDLY INTERVIEWED CASTRO AFTER CASTRO'S RETURN FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND ALSO SPENT A FIVE-DAY SEA-GOING VACATION WITH CASTRO, OF WHOM HE IS SAID TO BE A CLOSE FRIEND. RICO GALAN HAS RECENTLY PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS HE HAD WITH COL. ENRIQUE PERALTA, GUATEMALAN

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[illegible]	OO
STATE/[illegible]	[illegible]	FBI	INS	TREASURY												

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT, AND WITH MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA, GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA LEADER.)

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN NEWSPAPERMAN WHO "RECENTLY" SPENT EIGHT DAYS IN CUBA ON "VACATION" WITH FIDEL CASTRO, WAS GIVEN AN ASSIGNMENT DURING THIS PERIOD TO VISIT COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA, WHERE HE WAS TO PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. RICO GALAN WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO TRY TO PERSUADE COMPETING LEFTIST FACTIONS TO UNIFY SO THAT THEIR [illegible] WILL HAVE GREATER IMPACT. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: RICO GALAN CLEARLY IMPLIED TO THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION THAT THE ASSIGNMENT HE IS NOW FULFILLING WAS GIVEN HIM IN JUNE 63.)

2. RICO GALAN SAID THAT HE HAD GONE FROM MEXICO TO GUATEMALA, WHERE HE MET WITH GOMEZ AYAY (FNU), A GUERRILLA LEADER WHOM HE ENCOURAGED TO BEGIN [illegible] AND VIOLENT ACTION. HE ALSO MADE A SIMILAR APPROACH TO A NICARAGUAN GUERRILLA LEADER. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER RICO GALAN ACTUALLY VISITED NICARAGUA OR WHETHER HE SAW THIS PERSON IN ANOTHER COUNTRY.) IN COSTA RICA HE TALKED WITH ONE OF THE MORA BROTHERS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: EDUARDO MORA IS PRESENTLY IN COSTA RICA. HIS BROTHER, MANUEL MORA, LEFT [illegible] THE USSR, VIA MEXICO, 29 SEPTEMBER 1963. BOTH ARE LEADERS OF THE COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY.) RICO GALAN ARRIVED IN PANAMA 22 OCTOBER FROM COSTA RICA AND LEFT PANAMA FOR CARACAS 23 OCTOBER 1963. IN CARACAS HE INTENDED TO CONTACT ARGELIA LAYA. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: [illegible]

TO THE VENEZUELAN CONGRESS AND WIFE OF RAFAEL E. MARTINEZ, LEADER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (FALN - VENEZUELAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.)

3. IN PANAMA BETWEEN 20 -22 OCTOBER RICO GALAN CONTACTED HUGO VICTOR, PRESIDENT OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO (PDP - PEOPLE'S PARTY - COMMUNIST) AND DAVID TURNER, A LEADER OF THE VANGUARD OF NATIONAL ACTION (VAN - PRO-CUBAN, RADICAL REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION). ON 24 OCTOBER A MEETING WAS HELD TO DISCUSS UNITY OF THE LEFT, COMMENCEMENT OF AGGRESSIVE ACTION, AND A MERGER OF LEFTIST UNITS TO GO TO THE ELECTIONS AS A BLOC SHOULD EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE ELECTIONS FAIL. THIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY VICTOR, CARLOS DEL CID, ALVARO MENENDEZ FRANCO, THELMA KING, RENATO PEREIRA, AND TWO UNIDENTIFIED STUDENTS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: AN INDEPENDENT, USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN THE PDP, REPORTED THE VISIT TO PANAMA OF "A CUBAN WRITER FOR SIEMPRE" WHO WAS ON A MISSION FOR THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY. THE VISITOR WHOM SOURCE DID NOT IDENTIFY BY NAME URGED THE PDP AND THE VAN TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND UNITE. HIS PROPOSAL WAS VIOLENTLY REJECTED BY THE PDP, WHICH INTENDS TO PROTEST THE PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

201-336474

DOMICILIO DEL TITULAR EN MEXICO

DOMICILIO DEL TITULAR EN EL EXTRANJERO

EN CASO DE [illegible] O ACCIDENTE NOTIFIQUESE A:

DOMICILIO

ESTE PASAPORTE DEBE REFRENDARSE CADA DOS AÑOS. LA LIBRETA CADUCA A LOS SEIS AÑOS.

DERECHOS $ 80.00

26 FEB 1964

en Cuba

19 on SABE.

PASAPORTE NUMERO [illegible]

CONTRIBUYO PESOS

PASAPORTE

EXPEDIDO A FAVOR DE

VICTOR RICO GALAN

A QUIEN ACOMPAÑA SU ESPOSA

X X X X

Y X MENORES

Nº 16837

ESTE PASAPORTE ES NULO SI TIENE RASPADURAS, ENMENDATURAS O ENTRERRENGLONADURAS

CE PASSEPORT EST NUL S'IL Y A DES GRATTAGES, CORRECTIONS OU DES INTERLINEATIONS

THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID IF IT IS ERASED, AMENDED OR INTERLINED

1

LA SECRETARIA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES de los ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS concede libre y seguro pasaporte a

VICTOR RICO GALAN

de NACIONALIDAD MEXICANA (Nationalité mexicaine) (Mexican nationality) y suplica a las autoridades civiles y militares de los países por donde transite, que no le pongan obstáculos y le presten ayuda y protección en caso necesario.

Dado en la ciudad de MEXICO, D. F.

a los 9

días del mes de SEPTIEMBRE

del año de mil novecientos SESENTA

Y TRES

P. O. DEL SECRETARIO

EL JEFE DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE PASAPORTES

2

Este pasaporte es válido para dirigirse a: ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA, CANADA, CENTRO Y SUD AMERICA, INGLATERRA, FRANCIA, ITALIA, PORTUGAL, ESPAÑA, SUECIA, DINAMARCA, ALEMANIA, SUIZA, AUSTRIA, COMUNIDAD BRITANICA DE NACIONES,

LA VALIDEZ DE ESTE PASAPORTE EXPIRA EL

8 SEPTIEMBRE 1965

a menos de que sea refrendado por la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores o por alguna oficina diplomática o consular de México en el extranjero.

OBSERVACIONES

El titular es [illegible] por [illegible] según certificado Nº 665

otorgado el 15 MARZO 1960

3



FILIACIONES

	TITULAR	ESPOSA
ESTATURA	1.75 MTS.	
COLOR	BLANCO	
OJOS	CAFES	
PELO	ENTRECANO	
SEÑAS PARTICULARES	NINGUNA	
LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO	EL FERROL, ESPAÑA	
FECHA DE NACIMIENTO	6 FEBRERO 1923	
OCUPACION	PERIODISTA	
ESTADO CIVIL	CASADO	

HIJOS MENORES

NOMBRE	EDAD	SEXO

4

FOTOGRAFIAS

MEXICO

FIRMA DEL TITULAR

FIRMA DE LA ESPOSA

ESTE PASAPORTE NO ES VALIDO SIN LA FIRMA Y HUELLA DIGITAL DEL INTERESADO

5



CONSULADO GENERAL DE [illegible]
[illegible]

NUMERO [illegible]

DERECHOS COBRADOS [illegible]

VISTO en este Consulado General para dirigirse [illegible]

y valido por un periodo de 90 dias

México, D. F. [illegible]

500

MEXICO, D.F.

18

VISAS

CONSULADO GENERAL DE LA [illegible]

ENTRADA [illegible] OCT. 63

VISAS

CONSULADO GENERAL DE EL SALVADOR
EN MEXICO, D. F.

Visa No. 2225 - [illegible]

[illegible] para dirigirse a [illegible]

en calidad de TURISTA [illegible]

Vía [illegible]

Válida por [illegible]

Aut. de RR. EE. del ____ de ____ de ____

Derecho US $ ____

Impuesto de Turismo US $ ____

El interesado queda advertido que por ningún motivo, se le permitirá cambiar su calidad migratoria autorizada por esta visa.

México, D. F. 19 SET. 1963

CONSUL GENERAL
DE EL SALVADOR

VISAS

VISA [illegible] No. [illegible]

[illegible] y válida para dirigirse a
la República Dominicana.

México, D. F., [illegible] de [illegible] de 19 63

Cónsul General

REPUBLICA DOMINICANA

AGENTE No. 7

VISAS

ENTRADA

11 OCT 1963

S[illegible]

13 OCT 1963

[illegible] 1963

VISAS

VISTO EN EL CONSULADO [illegible]

No. [illegible]

[illegible] para dirigirse a [illegible]

Vía: [illegible]

Válida: [illegible]

Derechos [illegible]

México, [illegible]

Cónsul [illegible]



VISAS

BOLIVIA

SALIDA

DIC 20 196

VISAS

SEEN at the British Embassy, Mexico City, Consular Section

Good for a single journey to British Guiana within three months of date hereof if passport remains valid.

VISIT

(Signed)

British Consul

Mexico City

(Date) 27 SEP 1963

FOREIGN SERVICE



VISAS

MIGRACION DE ILOPANGO
SAN SALVADOR
EL SALVADOR, C.A.

Fecha: 8 OCT 1963

MIGRACION DE ILOPANGO
SAN SALVADOR
EL SALVADOR

11 OCT 1963

VISAS

OCT

SALIDA

12 DIC 1963



VISAS

V22632

REPUBLICA DEL PERU
LIMA CALLAO
ADMITIDO
[illegible] 17 [illegible]

VISAS

P. 05102

REPUBLICA DEL PERU
LIMA CALLAO
ADMITIDO
DIC 20 1963

MEXICO, D. F.
SALIO A
[illegible] 23
CUBA

14-00000

"A sus Ordenes, Jefazo-Pagés"

Por LEON GUZMAN

Nuevo Sirviente Oficial: Rico, Galán y con Librea

El señor Víctor Rico Galán, escritor de "Siempre", trata de comprar su libertad haciendo de sirviente cínico al gobierno y a su revista "mater et magister del confusionismo". Bueno que este "mártir" trate de salir y que atiborre a quien lo lea de la bazofia troskista; bueno que utilice la comprobada vía de escritor de "Siempre" para labrarse su salida; bueno que acuse a los remotos imperialismos y a grupos innominados de todas las culpas, escondiendo así la muy presente culpa del gobierno y de la clase dominante mexicana. Bueno para sus muy mezquinos y pequeñitos "objetivos", pues sus desahogos palabreros nada tienen qué ver con la lucha revolucionaria de los trabajadores mexicanos.

Víctor Rico Galán, como otros ex-presos políticos de su calaña, se desenmascaró abiertamente como traidor.



Desde la revista "Siempre", vocero del gobierno, Rico Galán sirve ahora a su "jefazo pagés" y al gobierno.

Desde la crujía "N", Rico Galán había mantenido un silencio meticuloso, hasta que llegó el momento de "hacer cualquier servicio al enemigo" con tal de salir; hasta que llegó el momento de encontrar el camino de volver a escribir en "Siempre" para labrarse su excarcelación, como ya lo hicieron otros antes de él; hasta que llegó el momento de olvidarse de las pillerías del director de "Siempre" quien, cuando al gobierno convino, le dio un [illegible] en [illegible]

sea la parte, y ahora que al gobierno conviene, le abre las puertas de su revistita gubernamental, bien cebada por la clase dominante para pregonar la confusión de una supuesta "izquierda" y defender con toda el alma al gobierno, al presidente en turno y a la clase dominante.

Hasta leer "Siempre" para

3-/12/71

encontrar, desde "siempre", un solo derrotero: el más destacado servilismo a todos los gobiernos, sumado a poses izquierdizantes atribuibles a algunos de sus escritores. Caro han vendido los dueños de la revista "Siempre" este sistema de confusión y apoyo activo a los dueños del poder: mucho papel, muchísimas dádivas, una enorme fortuna para el vanidoso "pepe pagés", el supremo "jefe" de esa pequeña élite de engañadores oficiales, y sueldos, suelditos y sueldotes a sus "redactores" y "escritores", que han ido desde el "maestro Lombardo" hasta el director suplente, Francisco de la Vega, consejero de la Presidencia de la República.

"Siempre" dio lugar a la novela rosa de la "apertura". Desde sus columnas hablan los aperturistas oficiales a voz en cuello. Junto a los artículos de Regis Debray, se mezclan homenajes a todos los virreyes gubernamentales, y al rey-presidente más que a ninguno. Se pelean entre sí las comadres del "jefe Pagés" para dar "idea de libertad de opinión"; pleititos intrascendentes que ocupan páginas y páginas inacabables; al fin que el papel no se paga.

"Siempre" buscó el modo de justificar la matanza del 2 de Octubre y la del 10 de Junio. Hablando vagamente en contra de "quienes quieren torcer la política revolucionaria" de cada gobierno y gobernante, lanzando culpas a desmedrados fantasmas, la revista "Siempre" manipula a sus escritores para apoyar "sesudamente" y desde una aparente "izquierda" al propio gobierno. Por esa labor le pagaban a Lombardo y le han pagado y pagan a Pagés.

Desesperado está el gobierno para hacer creer en su "apertura", en las libertades para crear "nuevos partidos". Vociferan y desesperan los secretarios de Estado, diputados, senadores y el propio Presidente, para hacer creer a los mexicanos en su "democracia" burguesa a la mexicana, perfecta y buena, según ellos mismos. Piden, gimotean y suplican para que se desacredite a los que están luchando por todas las vías (léase otra vez: POR TODAS LAS VIAS) en contra de la situación que vive el país, en detrimento de [illegible] y para beneficio de una ridícula minoría de burócratas y prestanombres intermediarios del capital extranjero.

Toda la propaganda oficial y sus publicitarias "reformas" tienden a lo mismo: desacreditar a los que están luchando como pueden y aprenden a hacerlo en la vida diaria. Llamar "impotentes, idiotas, desesperados y provocadores" a los guerrilleros, como lo hace en su último "artículo" el discípulo de Pagés, Rico Galán ("Siempre" Nº 965, páginas 24 y 25), es hacer exactamente lo que ordena la clase dominante a sus pajes (¿o pagés?).

Un hombre honesto puede y debe cambiar de criterio cuando reconoce un error. Pero tiene que decir y explicar su error, si es que hubo. El "honesto" Galán no se toma molestias, de furibundo "guerrillero" de lengua, saliva y papel, cuando así convenía a sus particulares intereses personales, pasa ahora a detractor de la guerrilla, a llamar "idiotas" e "impotentes" a los que hicieron lo que él fue impotente de hacer o, tal vez, podemos afirmar, simuló hacer.

De insultar a Genaro Vázquez, viperinamente, pues babea confusionismo el discípulo de Pagés, pasa a insultar a los guerrilleros del Brasil, llamándolos "terroristas", y los declara extinguidos, exterminados en unos pocos meses por la dictadura.

¡El Sr. Galán está muy bien informado en su celda de la desaparición de los luchadores revolucionarios del Brasil!; y los brasileños revolucionarios han de estar "sumamente preocupados" por tales calumnias.

Y adelante. Como la revista "Siempre" en su actividad duplex publicó un documento de Regis Debray sobre la lucha guerrillera de los Tupamaros, ¡qué mejor que ahora insultarlo por conducto de un "ente" de la falsa izquierda mexicana y en la misma revista confusionista, para que nadie vaya a creerle. La clase dominante agradece bien tales favores, señores de "Siempre", y los paga al contado.

Tras de todo, antes de todo, sobre todo, el ombligo de estos narcisistas. Porque la "revista" dijo, o porque mandó una cartita un pobre Galán, sólo por eso ocurren las cosas y por eso se lanza a la grandilocuencia ridícula, a hablar de los futuros amaneceres revolucionarios y de la "sangre" y la "vida" de los revolucionarios, atribuyéndose tal calidad el pobre escritor. Tiene que ganarse su paga. Tiene que presentarse como la revolución verdadera, para que nadie crea en los que están combatiendo a la dictadura de aquí y de cualquier allá. Tiene que descargar eructos insultantes sobre la limpieza de los luchadores, que a él, como al gobierno de México, como a nuestros verdugos, como a su "jefe", le interesa ensuciar sobre todas las cosas. Dice en su bazofia: "es preciso, urgente, construir la organización a toda prisa: el partido de la clase obrera y el frente nacional revolucionario antiimperialista". Eso, nada más eso. ¡De prisa, mañana temprano, a las nueve en punto, como el dios de Abraham hizo al mundo! Rápido, como lo quiere y necesita el poder público en México, como lo buscan afanosos las vedetes gubernamentales desde "Siempre", ¿o no Heberto Castillo? Un partidito de pega y paga, útil para su "revolucionista", para el engaño y la trapacería.

Una carta o "artículo" en busca afanosa del premio oficial, es este escrito vergonzante del vergonzante "guerrillero" Galán. De un hombre que no le pide nada a las veletas. Nada más ayer escribió a su "jefe pagés" esta carta-renuncia: "2 de septiembre de 1966. — En relación con mi carta aparecida en el número 689 de su revista, debo decirle que, después de leer el editorial del mismo número, queda retirado lo que a usted se refiere, y en particular mi propósito de seguir colaborando en 'Siempre' con una selección sobre libros. Sin entrar a discutir un editorial en el que, no sólo se me condena cuando no lo ha hecho un juez, sino que se me cuelga un nuevo delito al llamarme 'motinero', me limito a aclarar que de ningún modo puedo admitir la limosna de que se me publique 'por elementales razones humanas'. Buscaré el modo de contribuir desde mi encierro al sostenimiento de mis hijos; pero, en último extremo, prefiero que vivan dignamente

Lo mismo contra Genaro Vázquez, que contra Regis Debray o Mario Menéndez, el nuevo sirviente oficial babea su [illegible] alcoholo impotente.

de la solidaridad revolucionaria y no de la limosna infamante, otorgada por malas conciencias que buscan una precaria tranquilidad. Independientemente de que siga usted encontrando 'elementales razones humanas' o se le hayan agotado las que exhibió, esta carta tiene importancia para mi dignidad personal y por ello esperaré a que la publique hasta el jueves, pero reservándome copia y el derecho de hacerla pública por otros medios en caso necesario. — Atentamente, Víctor Rico Galán".

Eso fue ayer, pero hoy ya todo cambió: la mala conciencia del "jefe Pagés" se volvió buena; el héroe que rechazaba la "limosna" pagesina, se vuelve limosnero; quien se negó a escribir en "Siempre" por elementales razones de dignidad, se ha vuelto indigno. Ese es el camino que enseña el colaborador de "Siempre".

Insulta a Genaro Vázquez desde "Siempre", ¡vaya dignidad!

Escupir rabioso sobre Debray, sobre los guerrilleros brasileños; mentir, desapareciéndolos del mundo de los vivos, es obra de sucios plumíferos, cuando se usa la tribunita confusionista de "Siempre".

Bien informado está el maniquí del "jefe Pagés". No sólo sabe lo que les ha pasado a todos en Brasil; no sólo califica de "idiota histórico" a Debray, sino que puede afirmar que el responsable del asesinato de Pablo Alvarado B., no es "su" general Arcaute, sino que hay más por allí que difaman las culpas. El señor Galán *personalmente* afirma: "Me consta que el Presidente de la República estaba informado". *Sólo él*, que tiene comunicación con tan poderosos sujetos, él, el sabelotodo informado, puede calumniar a cuenta de su patrón con tan ridículas "razones" como las de que si el secuestrado Castrejón es de la Coca-Cola y, por tanto, miembro del Opus Dei, es increíble que Genaro no tenga una choza en Guerrero, por lo que no se puede creer a Castrejón que lo trajeran a salto de mata, siguiendo el paso de los guerrilleros. ¡Vaya lógica ignara!

¿Y cómo trata al extinto Pablo Alvarado Barrera?, así con el nombre escueto, ya que muchas veces lanzó en contra del extinto su venenosa baba de calumniador, acusándolo de agente de la CIA. Lo único grato que dice de Pablo es llamarlo "rehén", para más adelante, en el penúltimo párrafo de su "artículo", citarlo indirectamente y llamarle uno de esos "desesperados, aventureros, terroristas... que se mueren...". Pero ya el revolucionario Pablo Alvarado Barrera no puede responderle, como tampoco puede hacerlo directamente Mario R. Menéndez Rodríguez, desterrado por el gobierno en La Habana, Cuba.

Pero podemos, los que día a día luchamos por sacar esta revista, exigir a este pobre Galán y a sus amos de "Siempre" y a los amos de ambos, a los gobernantes de México y a la clase dominante que los sostiene, lanzarles una exigencia clara y terminante:

Ustedes, bien informados polizontes, bien informados criados con o sin librea, prueben con sus elementos que la Revista POR QUE? está financiada por la CIA o por instrumentos de la CIA. Demuestren, señores gobernantes de México, servil instrumento de todos los gobernantes en turno, "jefe Pagés", demuestren lo que afirma Rico Galán por órdenes de ustedes.

Esperamos sus "pruebas", y nos reímos de la pobre mentalidad de todos ustedes al asignar a nuestra Revista apoyos que ustedes mismos distorsionan, por lo que ha dolido a sus patrones gubernamentales la denuncia presentada por diversos periodistas en todos los instrumentos de las Naciones Unidas y en todas las asociaciones internacionales de periodistas. Ahora, prueben su dicho o queden allí como calumniadores. Y ojalá que pronto liberen a su sirviente los señores que gobiernan a México, para que el "héroe" pueda volver a su basurero.

14-00000

97

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INTERNAL USE ONLY

Date completed: __

SWL PART II: WORKSHEET

1. TRUE NAME: Victor Rico Galan

2. OTHER NAMES:
Alias: Armando Conte

3. DATE OF BIRTH: 6 Feb 1928

4. PLACE OF BIRTH: El Ferrol, Spain.

5. CITIZENSHIP: Spanish at birth, naturalized Mexican 15 Mar 49.

6. OCCUPATION: Writer/Journalist

7. LOCATION: ~~(Residence~~ (As of Aug 65)
~~Providencia #930, Mexico City~~
Ernestina Larrainzar #17-8, Colonia del Valle, Mexico City

DO NOT
TYPE IN THIS
SPACE

10. PHOTOGRA
Date of Photogra
[illegible]

8. POLITICAL AFFILIATION:

Subject has been a well known leftist journalist in Mexico since at least 1957. Since at least 1960 he has been a steady writer for the two leftist periodicals Siempre and Politica. Subject was a founding member of the MLN and subsequently headed that group's Press and Propaganda Committee. He has always been close and sympathetic to the CASTRO revolution and, in 1961, was reported to be a member of "Periodistas Mexicanos Amigos de Cuba" and of the "Committee for Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution". As of June 1965, Subject was reported to be a member of the FEP and an enemy of the PPS.

9. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

Subject was arrested in Aug 63 for participating in a pro-political prisoner demonstration. Subject's pro-CASTRO/Communist writings as well as his contacts with known Soviet, Satellite and Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico during the past few years leave no doubt as to his "CP propaganda" role, under journalistic cover, on behalf of these interests. Subject visited Cuba during May-June 63 ostensibly to interview CASTRO after latter's return from the Soviet Union. During this contact with the Cuban government, however, he was given the mission of traveling through Central & South America to contact local Communist/guerrilla leaders for the purpose of persuading them to begin campaigns of violence and terror to take the pressure off the FALN in Venezuela. A secondary mission was to bring about greater unity among the various Communist and terrorist groups. Subject undertook this assignment during Oct - Dec 63, visited Caribbean and South American countries, and contacted key Communists in each. Subject visited the Dominican Republic in Jan 64, and as a result of the contacts made there with the AFCJ (militant, revolutionary, pro-CASTRO group) was able to serve during the Dominican crisis of May 65 as a relay point for material and instructions from Cuba to the AFCJ and also as a reporting channel from Juan B. MEJIA, an AFCJ leader, to the Cuban Intelligence Service and the AFCJ's CASTRO-Cuban leadership in Cuba. ?

Subject xxxxxxx returned to Mexico from a trip to Cuba on 11 February 1966.

SOURCES OF WORKSHEET DATA

Entry No.(s)	Document Symbol and No.	Document Date	Source Identity (Cryptonym)	Date of Information	Comments
2.	[illegible]	[illegible]	—	1963	[illegible]
3.	[illegible]	[illegible]		—	[illegible]
2.	[illegible]				

14-00000

SOURCES OF WORKSHEET DATA (Continued)

Entry No. (s)	Document Symbol and No.	Document Date	Source Identity (Cryptonym)	Date of Information	Comments
10.	HNMA-3033	31 Oct 63	—	1963	Photo
8.	HMMA-26800	5 Aug 65	Sta files	—	Bio.
	HMM-5791	28 Jul 61	LIFTER	Jul 61	Cuban Solidarity Comm.
	HMM-9727	4 Jun 65	LIFTER	Jun 65	FEP, enemy of PPS.
9.	HMM-2323	16 Jan 57	—	1957	Sov contacts.
	HMMA-26600	5 Aug 65	Sta files	—	Bio.
	PACY-1033	23 Oct 63	—	Oct 63	Panama CP contacts.
	FACY-1058	25 Oct 63	—	Oct 63	Caribbean trip.
	PACY-1054	25 Oct 63	HYSAGE-1	Oct 63	Caribbean trip.
	HMM-7644	21 Aug 63	—	Aug 63	Arrested.
	HMM-26223	28 May 65	LIFEAT	May 65	Sov intell contact.
	HMMA-26286	7 Jun 65	ESLIDE-1	May 65	Yon Sosa contact.
	MEXI-3890	23 Jun 65	LIFEAT	Jun 65	Cuban intell contact.

Summary Instructions for SWL Form Part II: Worksheet

1. Enter only data suitable for release in case of need, without jeopardizing CS sources, methods or operations. Only substantiated, reliable information may be recorded.

2. Use only commonly accepted and readily recognized abbreviations. See Section II, para 8, in the Instructions under Item 8 concerning the abbreviations of organization

3. Sample standardized entries for several items for guideline purposes follow: (1) Jorge RAMIREZ Clauro; (3) 11 January 1917; (4) Bogota, Colombia; (5) Bolivi; (6) Teacher; (7) Residing at 12 Avenida Espana, La Paz, Bolivia, as of Februar, 1965. See Section II, para 8, of Instructions for detailed guidance on completing items 1-10.

4. A precise record of source and documentation data for the information entries must be maintained. The researcher may simply enter the required source data for each item, referencing the appropriate item number under Entry Nos. column. Or, if he prefers, he may place a footnote number, beginning with (1), encircled or in parentheses, after the pertinent entry or bit of information. Record the footnote number under the Entry Nos. column with pertinent source and documentation data. Hence the same footnote number may be used repeatedly after any information entries where source, document, etc. are the same. Warning: In typing the items 1 through 10 data from the SWL Worksheet onto the preprinted ozalid master, the typist must be cautioned not to include the footnote reference numbers.

5. Upon completing the Worksheet, enter the date of completion in the upper right corner of the form. The Worksheet must be fastened and retained inside the left cover of the 201 dossier.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SWL PART III: INVESTIGATIVE SUPPLEMENT---SOURCE SHEET

Summary Instructions for SWL Form Part III: Investigative Supplement

1. Enter only data in items 11-20 suitable for release to other U.S. or foreign security and intelligence services, since this form supplements SWL Part I (items 1-10) with those items of identification data considered of particular value to professional security and intelligence agencies in identifying and locating the SWL individual concerned and in developing reporting sources on him. See Section III, para 5, of Instructions for detailed guidance on completing items 11-20.

2. A precise record must be maintained and recorded below of source and documentation data for the information entries. The column Entry Nos. should correspond with the item numbers. Hence, when source and document are the same for information entered under two or more items, the pertinent item numbers may appear together under the Entry Nos. column with source and documentation data recorded only once.

3. When the completed Investigative Supplement is to be passed to another agency, the white page containing items 11-20 may be xeroxed in the required number of copies. The sensitive blue Source Sheet must not be reproduced.

4. The original of this completed form together with the Source Sheet must be permanently retained inside the left cover of the 201 dossier.

SOURCES OF DATA:

Entry No. (s)	Document Symbol and No.	Document Date	Source Identity (Cryptonym)	Date of Information	Comments
11, 13, 14	Subj's Passport	Sep 63	LIFEMPO	Sep 63	Description. Family
18, —	HMMA-26313	9 Jun 65	LIENVOY-2	—	"
	HMMA-26600	5 Nov 65	STA FILES	—	"
19.	HMM-6770	5 Oct 62	LIFE	Oct 62 ✓	Havana Trip
	HMM-7466	28 Jun 63	LIENVOY	May 63	Havana Trip.
	PACY-10578	25 Oct 63	—	Oct 63	Caribbean Trip
	MANA-4562	31 Oct 63	—	Oct 63	" "
	RIOD-2720	22 Nov. 63	ALACRE/[illegible]	Nov 63	Brazil Trip.
	HMM-8277	10 Jan 64	—	Jan 64	Dominican Trip.
	HMM-8366	Jan 64	LIFIRE	Jan 64	Havana Trip

(Space for additional entries on other side)

10 SEP 61
TEST FORM

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INTERNAL USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SOURCES OF DATA: (Continued)

Entry No. (s)	Document Symbol and No.	Document Date	Source Identity (Cryptonym)	Date of Information	Comments
19. (CONTD)	UFGA-21050/2	23 APR 65	—	MAR 65	Habana trip.
	TDCS-3/567,563	10 JAN 64	LIENVOY	Oct-Dec 63	Caribe & L.A. trip.
	HMMA-26800	5 Aug 65	Sta files	1962-65	Travel data

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

INVESTIGATIVE SUPPLEMENT

TRUE NAME: Victor Rico Galan

11. **ETHNIC ORIGIN:** SPANISH

12. **LANGUAGES:** SPANISH, OTHERS UNKNOWN.

13. **PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:**
(Date(s) of Information: Sep 1963 .)

Sex: MALE **Apparent Age:** — **Color:** WHITE

Height: 5'9" **Weight:** APPROX 160 lbs **Build:** STOCKY

Hair Color: BLACK-GRAYING **Eye Color:** BROWN **Face Shape:** —

Teeth: - **Posture:** ERECT **Other:** —

14. **OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES OR PECULIARITIES:** Mustache, as of Sept 63.

15. **FINGERPRINTS:** None on file.

16. **EDUCATION:** Unknown.

17. **EMPLOYMENT** (last known): 1965, writer.
Employer: Siempre (~~[illegible]~~ weekly news magazine), Politica (bi-weekly [illegible] magazine)
Address. Mexico City

18. **FAMILY** FATHER: Victor Rico Gonzalez (born Spain, 6 Feb 28, arrived Mexico 6 Nov 1939); Mother: Ermelinda Galan Sanchez; Wife: [illegible] DIEHR de Rico Galan (born 11 May 27, Mexico); Brother: Fernando Rico Galan; Sister: Ana Maria Rico Galan.

19. **TRAVEL:**

Passport Number	From	To	Date	Purpose
57115	MEXICO	HABANA	2 OCT 62	VISIT CASTRO BRIG.
57115	MEXICO	HABANA	25 MAY 63	—
53641	MEXICO	[illegible]	OCT-NOV 63	COURIER/C.P. CONTACTS.
—	JAMAICA	DOMINICAN REP	7 JAN 64	
53641	MEXICO	HABANA	22 JAN 64	INTERVIEW CASTRO.
—	MEXICO	HABANA	21 MAR 66	[illegible]

20. **SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES**
Function/Position: Courier between communist/revolutionary groups in Central & South America.
Activities (supplementary resume): Communist/Castro propaganda writer.

SECRET

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SWL PART IV: OPERATIONAL DATA

TRUE NAME: Victor Rico Galan

201 No.: 336174

SOURCES WITH DIRECT OR INDIRECT ACCESS TO SUBJECT:

LIFIRE
LIENVOY
LIONHEART
LIVACATE
LIEMBRACE
LIFTER
[illegible] → [illegible]
ALSEAV/[illegible] [illegible] 1963 [illegible]

RESUME OF OPERATIONALLY SENSITIVE DATA ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY:	Document References, Dates and Source Cryptonyms:

10 SEP 63

Instructions for SWL Form Part IV: Operational Data

1. This form will be used for maintaining a ready reference list of sources with direct or indirect access to subject and for recording operationally sensitive data on subject's subversive activities.

2. Data incorporated into this form are operationally sensitive and are intended to aid the field station responsible for investigative follow-up of an individual, in directing questions and leads promptly to other components with sources in a position to acquire data, or to components best able to evaluate new information.

3. In entering data on sources with direct or indirect access to subject, specify the cryptonym of source (either agent or liaison service). If a liaison service is involved, specify component, officer (by cryptonym), and, if possible, agent sub-source. If other than a professional source is involved, specify location and date of information; nature of contact as well as identity. (e.g., "Family contact-Juan MORELOS, Mexico City, May 1964.")

4. The information entries of operationally sensitive data on subversive activities must be sourced by reference and source cryptonym, to facilitate rapid referral of questions to the responsible desk or field station. Where an entry under this section deals with contact with an intelligence or security service, first give the service designation and name of the officer or known agent with whom contact has been recorded. Then specify succinctly the nature of the relationship or activity involved.

5. The completed form, or a copy thereof, should be affixed to and retained in the left cover of the 201 dossier.

SWL PART V: INVESTIGATIVE ACTION RECORD

TRUE NAME: ____________________

201 No.: ____________

ACTION REQUESTED (Summary)	REFERENCE		RESULTS (Summary)	REFERENCE	
	Document Symbol and Number	Date		Document Symbol and Number	Date

10 SEP 65
TEST FORM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Instructions for SWL Form Part V: Investigative Action Record

1. Intended for overall SWL program management purposes, this form permits the maintenance of an orderly record on a cumulative basis of action requested and results achieved concerning the SWL individual.

2. The form has six columns for entering summary information on action requested, results of action, and for recording reference data. Action requested should be described succinctly (e.g., "Name trace w. liaison;" "Baggage search;" "Check with last employer.").

3. **This form must be incorporated permanently into the 201 dossier, attached inside the left hand cover.**

14-00000

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SWL PART VI: PROGRESS LOG

TRUE NAME: ____________________

201 No.: ____________________

	REFERENCE		ACTION		VALIDATED	
	Document Symbol and Number	Document Date	By	Date	By	Date
1. SWL Nomination						
2. SWL Acceptance						10/1
3. Indicator Assigned						
4. Name Traced						
5. 201 opened or consolidated						
6. Worksheet completed						11/12
7. Notebook Master Typed						
8. Photo Master Prepared						
9. Fingerprints Available						
10.						
11.						
12.						
13. Periodic Review						
#1						
#2						
#3						
#4						
#5						
#6						
#7						
#8						
#9						
#10						
#11						
#12						
#13						
#14						
14. Removed from SWL						

Instructions for SWL Form Part VI: Progress Log

1. Prepared for overall SWL program management purposes, the use of this form will reflect the SWL maintenance operations and periodic reviews concerning the individual in question.

2. This form will be fastened permanently inside the left cover of the 201 dossier when the designation of an individual for inclusion in the country SWL has been approved. Entries will thereafter consist of handwritten references, dates, and officer's initials only, reflecting administrative aspects of the SWL.

3. The form embodies a number of self-evident items against each of which will be recorded the following in appropriate columns:

   a. "Indicator Assigned" (item 3) - action taken via Form [illegible] assigning the OI code "W" for the SWL individual. Preprinted Forms [illegible] are available from the Division SWL Officer for this purpose. All SWL individuals must have a 201 and must bear the OI code "W";

   b. "Reference" - document or cable reference if the action is reflected in a specific dispatch or cable;

   c. "Action" - initials of the analyst or officer responsible for the specific step, together with the date of action completed;

   d. "Validated" - initials of the responsible reviewing officer and date of such review action. Validation must always be recorded for items 6 and 7, which entails the approval of the final clean copy text of a listing for incorporation in the SWL Country Notebook.

   e. Items 10, 11, and 12 are reserved for possible future use.

4. Under the item "Periodic Review", the date when the next periodic review of the SWL listing will be made should appear immediately after the #. It is recommended that the officer responsible for the maintenance of the SWL for a specific country enter this date on the desk copy of the 201 print-out of all SWL personalities to use as a reminder. It is also recommended that the station copy of the SWL 201 print-out list carry, for each name, a "preliminary review" date at least one month earlier than the HQs review date. On the basis of this reminder the station can then undertake a final canvassing of available sources to bring entries on the individual up to date and transmit the results to HQs just prior to the periodic review in HQs.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 170752

DATE 29 August 1966

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME Christopher D. Costanzo

OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/1 Mexico

ROOM, BUILDING Ames 332

EXTENSION 3655

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☒ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☐ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Victor RICO Galan

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.
Armando CONTE
Sebastian KANELL

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
6 Feb 1928, El Ferrol, Spain

4. CITIZENSHIP
Mexican (Naturalized)

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Journalist, Mexico

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Prominent Marxist and radical writer

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
See attachment		

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED
See attachment

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5'9			Greying	Caucasian	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Ingebord DIENER de RICO Galan

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Tilli PICHIER viuda de DIENER , mother in law
Fernando RICO Galan, brother; Ana Maria RICO Galan , sister

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
Travel, biographic, education, subversive activities

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 8-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

SECRET

SECRET

TO: Charlotte Bustos

14 Sept 1966
DATE

FROM: F1/D

76

A. ☒ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN F1/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, F1/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ F1/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO F1/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO F1/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP F1/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: F1/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATION
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Current Biographic Data on Victor RICO Galan as of 19 August 1966 from OCR/BR/Mex

S/NF CS 3/489-625 12 Oct 61 B-2
Elected to Propaganda Commission, MLN Federal District Committee.

S CS 3/482-611 4 Aug 61 B-2
Member Committee for Solidarity with Cuban Revolution.

S/NF CS 3/481-944 28 July 61 B-2
Invited to attend 26 July Celebration in Havana.

S/NF CS 3/489-630 12 Oct 61 B-2
Took part in a round-table discussion held by MLN regarding Lopez Matoes' report to Congress on 1 Sept 61. Rico pointed out that Lopez Matoes was, if not pro-US in his actions, then anti-left; his (Rico's) statements innocuous.

S/NF CS 3/496-988 26 Dec 61
Listed as a staff member of Liberacion Nacional, an MLN publication.

UNCL FBIS #? 22 Apr 62
In "A Third Position in IA?" in Siempre, Rico wrote: "it happens, then, that the Latin American Common Market with its tendency on the exercise of effective economic sovereignty, implies many things, such as trade with the socialist world--which next year will represent 52% of the world production, constituting a 3rd international position--and the defense and exercise of coexistence between nations of different Social regimes....Will there emerge now a 3rd position--Mexico and Brazil--which, basing itself on the IACM will maintain coexistence with an independent policy?"

S/NF CS 3/508-797 26 Apr 62 B-2
"Marxist journalist who heads the MLN Press and Propaganda Committee." (Still head May 31, 63--A-1557)

S/NF CS 3/520-508 23 Aug 62 B-2
Planned meeting to map out a campaign for the release from prison of David ALFARO Sigueiros, "prominent Mexican Communist artist" with Alfaro's wife.

CONF - 3 Oct 62 - ??
On a flight to Cuba on a Cuban plane with "other" Mexican Communists and 2 Soviet diplomatic couriers.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S *See p. 6.	CS 3/525-084 17 Oct 62 B-2 "plans to write a political biography of Castro." Left Mexico on 2 Oct 62 with Mexican passport 51115 with Cuban courtesy visa. Spent 2 months there.
CONF	A 1291 9 Apr 63 In 20 Mar issue of Siempre he "advocated the creation of a new political party which would reflect the ideology of Former President Lazaro Cardenas.."(bio: he is a founding member of the pro-Communist MLN and an ardent supporter of Castro. While in Cuba (Oct-Nov 62) he contributed weekly articles to Siempre in which he sustained the thesis that Cuba is now the center of the world's socialist revolutionary movement. The Left in Mexico needs a "party of L. Cardenas" which....would stand for socialism in internal matters and for independence from any bloc in external affairs.)
S/NF	CS 3/552-990 10 July 63 To Cuba 25 May-22 June 63; spent 8 days with Castro
UNCL	A-6 Merida 6 Aug 63 On 1 August attended the Pro-Castro Mexican-Cuban Institute in Merida accompanied by Luis Albamu the Counselor for Cultural Affairs at the Cuban Embassy.
S	CS 3/558-382 B-2 6 Sep 63 Rico, along with Marcue Pardinas and Carrion Villa was one of the principal organizers and participants in a rally in favor of the political prisoners held in Mexico City on 18 August 63. The rally failed to be held because of police intervention. All arrested and and released same day. On evening of 21 August they demanded, unsuccessfully, to see Diaz Ordaz, then Minister of Interior.
S/NF	CS 3/560-130 25 Sep 63 B-2 "Rico planning trip to Guatemala" plans to interview Col. Enrique PERALTA Azurdia, Chief of Guatemalan Government, also visit Guatemalan guerrillas.
UNCL	A-451 24 Oct 63 Still on MLN National Committee.
S/NF	TDCS 3/565-337 20 Nov 63 B-2 Interviewed YON Sosa in mid-October 63; listed as head of propaganda committee for MLN. TDCS 3/563-671 "reported that Rico had spent 8 days in Cuba with Castro and...was given an assignment to visit countries in Central and South America (Venezula, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala and Brazil) when he was to persuade Leftist parties to begin immediate acts of sabotage and violence to take the pressure off Venezuela."

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S/NF CS 3/566-571 5 Dec 63 F-2
Rico had an interview in late October 63 with David Turner (Leader of the Vanguard of National Action [VAN]--radical pro-Cuban revolutionary group in Panama), Thelma King (pro-Cuban deputy to the National Assembly) and Hugo Victor (president of the Peoples Party, PdP Communist) discussing an armed movement in Panama.

B-2
An Armando Conte, "a writer for Tiempos in Mexico" reported to have come to Panama and talked to Hugo Victor around 5 Nov 63. He said he had come to convince Victor of the need to support the Cuban line of armed revolution. Victor told Conte that the PdP would not be told what to do because it had its own line on the Panamanian revolution. (Field comment: travel records contain no information on the arrival of any person with the name Armando Conte during the period in question and the name is believed to be a pseudonym used by Rico.)

S/NF TDCS 3/569-563 10 Jan 64 B-2
"Making preparations to go to the Dominican Republic in the very near future....ostensibly to gather information for the preparation of some articles on the Dominican Republic."

S/NF TDCS 3/569-940 14 Jan 64 B-2
Reports have identified Rico as an agent of Fidel Castro who in May 63 was assigned by Castro to visit Central and South American countries to confer with leading Communists in order to initiate programs of anti-US violence and sabotage. He reportedly arrived in Santo Domingo by air on 8 Jan 64 from Kingston, Jamaica to stay about a week.

S/NF TDCS 3/570-926 23 Jan 64 B-2
"While in the Dominican Republic he attempted to get photographs of Dominican guerrilla leaders killed at Las Manaclas on 21 Dec 63 for propaganda purposes.

S CS 3/571-822 3 Feb 64 B-2
Left Mexico City for Havana by air on 28 Jan 64 (it might be noted that Castro returned from the USSR around that time).

S/NF CS 311/01556-65 4 Feb 65 C-2
Possibly in Chile. He met with members of the MPD while in the Dominican Republic.

CONF A-31 10 Feb 65 Merida
Visited Merida (had been there 28 Oct 64) and "[it] is quite certain that there will shortly appear in Siempre (Mexican leftist weekly) more articles on the henequen situation. It can be expected that Rico Galan will attempt to attribute all or a large portion of Yucatán's troubles to the 'imperialistic' US."

CONF CS 311/03173-65 15 Mar 65 "reporting so far accurate"
"Rico went to Merida during the first few days of February to make a personal investigation of the situation caused by the decrease in the price of henequen.." Rico wrote "Yucatan: Our leader is Hunger" in Issue #10, 3 Mar 65, of Siempre.

CONF A-1033 from Mexico 1 May 65
Re Dominican Republic: "Rico, writing in the ultra-left Diario de México favored Bosch's return, originally wishing him good luck, and later, after the apparent failure of pro-Bosch forces, complained that "the reactionaries always win out in Latin American coups, being supported by the US, or else the coups fail."

CONF/NF CS 311/07174-65 11 Jun 65
Veteran and trusted PPS member, prolific reporter of reliable information, described Rico as "member of the Peoples Electoral Front (FEP) and National Liberation Movement (MLN) [who] was one of those leaders who met in March or April 65 to draw up a letter of convocation to the National Congress (on the Liberty of the Political Prisoners and the Repeal of the Law of Social Dissolution)."

S/NF CS 311/04619-66 1 April 66 "source believed to have good access to the Guatemalan exile community"
Planning to investigate the disappearance of Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ Garbin, Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico, who returned to Guatemala in late February. Source comment: "Rico could only enter Guatemala illegally since he was declared persona non grata by the Guatemalan Government in 1963 after he visited the country to interview President Peralta. While there, he also managed to talk with Marco Antonio YON Sosa, guerrilla leader. Upon his return to Mexico, Rico Galan wrote articles favorable to the rebels and most unflattering to the Peralta government."

CONF Incoming telegram 15986(?) 5 Apr 66
Alleged to have been one of two leaders (other was Jacinto Lopez UGOCM secgen) planned to lead mass meeting 6 April "to commemorate martyrs of September attack" (?? no further mention).

S/NF CS 311/06825-66 23 May 66 reporting believed reliable
Could not attend an MLN meeting because of illness.

UNCL FPIR 0112/66 23 May 66
In February became involved in a verbal editorial battle on the pages of Granma with Franc BARBIERI of the Yugoslav newspaper Politika. No conclusion reached.

CONF A-727 from Mexico 22 Jan 66
Rico...has been one of the most prolific and ardent apologists for Castro's Cuba in Mexico. In an interview between an Embassy officer

and the writer, Elena Garro de Paz, the latter states: "the Cuban Embassy had severely chided Rico for writing an article favorable to the guerrilla leaders who were killed recently during their assault on the army barracks at Madera, Chihuahua.... Rico had been close to "Che" Guevarra rather than Castro, and that since Guevarra's disappearance he had grown noticeably cooler toward Cuba." She added that although he is a Marxist and is anti-American, Rico is also very hostile to the Mexican Communist Party (PCM).

S/NF TDCS 314/10379-66 17 Aug 66 highly placed police official, reporting believed reliable
"Sufficient legal evidence is available to prove that Rico, Raul Ugalde and others were a part of a conspiracy advocating and teaching the overthrow of the Mexican government by violent means."

CONF/NF TDCS 314/10419-66 18 Aug 66 presumed B-2
12-13 August, Rico arrested with 40 others; the PPS is pleased and will do nothing to help them. "According to Carlos Sanchez Cardenas of the PPS National Executive Directorate, it is almost impossible to believe that a man like Rico could be the leader of an armed rebel movement. He has always been considered a Marxist intellectual belonging to no party who has confined his battles to the pages of magazines like Politica Siempre, and Sucesos. Lombardo Toledano frankly thought of him as incapable of doing anything that involved a mass following."

Additional information
From WH-1/Mexico:

Parents: Victor RICO Gonzalez
Fernanda GALAN Saeiros
(Spanish nationals--no information available, Mexican and Spanish files)

Wife: Ingabord DIENER de Rico
(No information available, Mexican or Scandinavian files.
In German files, there is reference to an Inge Diener; info dated 14 May 1956: born in Guben, 1920; of average intelligence; convinced, fanatical Communist; not liked; dangerous; of proletarian background; trained for administrative work; after 1945 worked for Cadre Department of city administration of Guben; from 1950-1952 studied at Academy for Administration in Forst-Zinna; afterwards obtained position in ministry; at first worked in Cadre Department, was responsible for embassy and trade mission personnel; transferred to present position because of disagreements with Vose (fnu); now responsible for currency matters; takes course during

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SED Party School Year; mediocre qualifications; active in politics; member of Central Party Directorate and SED.

Pen names: Armande Conte--no info Mexican, Cuban, or Guatemalan files.
Sebastian Canell--no info Mexican files.

* CS 3/539-735 11 March 1963 B-2
One of a number of leftists (Terrazas Guerrero another one) who voted to reinstate Marcue Pardinas in the MLN.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C/Att 1

SECRET

Victor RICO Galan

Basic Biographic Data

1. Full Name : Victor RICO Galan, has used pen name Armando CONTE and possibly Sebastian KANELL
2. Place and Date of Birth: El Ferrol (Galicia), Spain, 6 Feb 28
3. Citizenship : Mexican, naturalized 15 March 1949
4. Official Documents: Naturalization Certificate #445, 15 Mar 49
   Mexican Passport #57115
   Mexican Passport #53641, issued 9 Sep 63 and expired 15 March 1965.
5. Father : Victor RICO Gonzales, resident of El Ferrol, Spain, forced to leave Spain on account of Spanish Civil War, arrived Veracruz, Mexico, 6 November 1939.
6. Mother : Fernanda GALAN Sueiras, also a resident of El Ferrol, Spain, where she married RICO Gonzales in September 1922; she and her three children were separated from her husband during the Spanish Civil War and arrived in Mexico to join him in March 1940 as "asilados politicos".
7. Siblings : Fernando RICO Galan; PDOB: El Ferrol, Spain, 9 April 1929.
   Ana Maria RICO Galan; PDOB: El Ferrol, Spain, 14 September 1930.
8. Spouse : Ingebord DIENER de RICO Galan; PDOB: Mexico, 11 May 1929.
9. Other Relatives : Mother-in-law: Tilli PICHIER viuda de DIENER at whose home Subject and wife lived until June 1965: Providencia #930, Mexico, D. F., Tel: 23-07-92.
10. Arrests : Was among leading agitators arrested on 18 August 1963 by Mexican police for participating in demonstrations in favor of political prisoners; was released on same day.
11. Physical Description: Sex: Male, Color: White, Build: Stocky, Height: 5'9" (1.78m), Hair: Greying, Moustache as of Setpember 1963.
12. Present Address : (Since June 1965) Ernestina Lanainzar 19-B, Colonia del Valle, Mexico, D. F., Tel.43-54-94

SECRET

SECRET

13. **Travel:**

In Cuba July 1962

Went to Cuba 2 Oct 62, joined by wife Nov 62, returned Mexico Dec 62

Went to Cuba 25 May 63, returned Mexico 22 Jun 63

Went to Guatemala early Oct 63 for a few days; may have spent short time in Salvador

Entered Honduras 11 Oct 63 and left 13 Oct 63

Entered Nicaragua 13 Oct 63 and left 17 Oct 63

Entered Costa Rica 17 Oct 63 and left 20 Oct 63

Entered Panama 20 Oct 63 and left 22 Oct 63

Entered Venezuela 22 Oct 63 and left 12 Nov 63

Entered Brazil 12 Nov 63; may have traveled to Cuba, perhaps clandestinely and reentered Brazil

Entered Argentina 4 Dec 63 and left 12 Dec 63

Entered Chile 12 Dec 63 and left 16 Dec 63

Entered Peru 17 Dec 63 and left same day

Entered Bolivia 17 Dec 63 and left 20 Dec 63

Entered Peru 20 Dec 63 and returned Mexico possibly on same day

Left Mexico and arrived Jamaica 8 Jan 64 en route to Dominican Republic where he arrived on the same day; he left on 15 Jan 64 and returned Mexico via Jamaica on the same day.

Went to Cuba 28 Jan 64 and returned Mexico 25 Feb 64

Possibly several clandestine trips to Guatemala in middle and late 1964.

Went to Cuba 29 Mar 65 with wife and returned Mexico 12 Apr 65

Went to Cuba in early 66 and returned Mexico 11 Feb 66

SECRET

SECRET

Summary

1. Victor RICO Galan is a prominent pro-Castro Marxist journalist associated with Politica a pro-Communist bi-weekly news magazine and Siempre a Mexico City leftist news weekly. In 1961 he was reported to be a member of the Periodistas Mexicanos Amigos de Cuba and the Committee for Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution. As of June 1965 he was reported to be a member of the Frente Electoral del Pueblo (FEP). He was a founder of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN) of which he was the head of the national press and propaganda committee as of 1962. RICO acted as a Cuban agent in trips to Central and South America in late 1963 and early 1964. His pro-Castro communist writings as well as his contacts with known Soviet and Bloc intelligence personnel in Mexico during the past few years strongly suggest a propaganda role under journalistic cover on behalf of their interests.

2. Little is known of RICO's early life or education beyond what is listed in his basic biographic data. There is a possibility that he was active in communist affairs in Costa Rica and El Salvador in the period 1946-1948 and in Colombia in 1949-1950.

3. RICO Galan's prominence in Mexican leftist circles has been primarily intellectual. In an article in Siempre in March 1963 he advocated the foundation of a new political party reflecting the true ideology of Lazaro CARDENAS. RICO felt that this would provide the Mexican left with a political party truly responsive to the radical tendencies of the 1910 revolution. This was necessary, in RICO's view, because the MLN was an action organization rather than a political party, whose membership covered a political spectrum from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to the Partido Comunista de Mexico (PCM), and was therefore diluted in effectiveness. A new party would represent a "third position": Socialism in internal affairs and independence of any bloc in international affairs. With such a political action arm, wrote RICO, the MLN would develop naturally into a broad national movement such as the FRAP in Chile.

4. Victor RICO Galan is an ardent supporter of Fidel CASTRO and is reported to be a close friend of his. In order to gather material for a biography of CASTRO, RICO, later joined by his wife, visited Cuba in October 1962 for about two months. He visited Cuba again during part of May and most of June 1963 when he spent eight days with CASTRO, five of them at sea in CASTRO's boat, ostensibly to discuss CASTRO's recent trip to the Soviet Union and his talks with KHRUSCHEV. On this visit the Cuban Government gave RICO a mission to travel through Central and South America to contact local communists and guerrilla leaders and persuade them to begin immediately campaigns of violence and terror in order to take the pressure off the FALN in Venezuela. RICO was also charged to try to bring about greater unity among the various leftist groups.

SECRET

5. In the Fall and Winter of 1963 and late 1964 undertook this mission. Even though a known leftist he possibly had some arrangement with the Mexican Government which may have gotten him special privileges and support from Mexican embassies in countries where he visited. In Guatemala RICO interviewed General Enrique PERALTA Azurdia the Chief of Government and then met Raul ALARCON Monsanto, military training leader of the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo (PGT), who took him to meet and interview Marco Antonio YON Sosa an anti regime guerrilla leader; RICO possibly also met a (fnu) GOMEZ Ayau also a guerrilla leader. In Nicaragua he met with Alvaca RAMIREZ Gonzales, Secretary General of the Mobilizacion Republicana (MR) and a member of the Central Committee of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN). In Costa Rica he met with one of the MORA brothers, a guerrilla leader. In Panama he met Hugo VICTOR, president of the Partido del Pueblo (PDP), and David TURNER, leader of the Vanguard of National Action (VAN), and attempted to reconcile them in their dispute for leadership of the revolution in Panama; he also urged an immediate program of sabotage and violence. RICO went on to Venezuela to meet Argelia LAYA; he was probably in contact with the MIR while there. He then went to Brazil where he contacted Paulo SCHILLING, coordinator of the Popular Mobilization Front. During this time he may have gone to Cuba briefly and returned directly to Brazil. After a few days back in Mexico RICO went to the Dominican Republic where he attempted unsuccessfully to obtain photographs of Dominican guerrillas killed the month before, probably to use them for propaganda purposes. As a result of his contact with the Agrupacion Politica Catorce Junio (APCJ) in the Dominican Republic he was able to serve during the Dominican Republic crisis of May 1965 as a relay point for material and instructions from Cuba to the APCJ and also as a reporting channel from Juan B. MEJIA and APCJ leaders to the Cuban Intelligence Service and the APCJ's CASTRO Cuban leadership in Cuba. After his return to Mexico City RICO visited Cuba again ostensibly to interview CASTRO on his most recent trip to the Soviet Union and probably to report on his mission.

6. RICO Galan continued his interest in the guerrilla struggle and was reported to have entered Guatemala clandestinely in August 1964 and possibly several times before then as well, to visit YON Sosa and his guerrillas. In March 1966, after having returned from Cuba the month before, he planned to travel again to Guatemala clandestinely in order to investigate the disappearance of Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, leader of the PGT and of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico, who had recently returned to Guatemala.

7. RICO's writings show an ardent support for the guerrillas in Latin America and for their method in achieving the revolution. In October 1964 the Guatemalan Armed Forces captured a number of tape recorders and tapes from the guerrillas including one by

Victor RICO Galan. This tape consisted mainly of an exhortation for unity between the PGT and the 13 November Group, and counseled against letting doctrine replace action. RICO's talk to the guerrillas under YON Sosa reveals him as an intellectual radical with a pragmatic approach towards current situations. The text of the tapes indicate that they were made between February and mid-October 1964. On 13 January 1966 El Heraldo, a Mexico City newspaper published an article quoting RICO Galan's taped speech as evidence of his efforts to undermine the January 1966 visit of DIAZ Ordaz to Guatemala. The text of the tape was possibly passed to El Heraldo by the Mexican authorities in line with the Government's campaign to neutralize all potential and existing opposition to the impending visit.

Contacts:

Nikolay LEONOV, Soviet Press Attache and KGB officer, with whom RICO may have arranged a meeting in May 1965 with Dr. Emilio CORDERO, Dominican exile in Mexico City.

Jovan MIRIC, a Yugoslavian journalist in Mexico and possible intelligence officer with whom RICO, around the middle 1965, discussed the Dominican situation and OAS intervention in the Dominican Republic.

Branko MILIJANOVIC, an intelligence officer in the Yugoslavian Embassy in Panama who may have had contact with RICO; in Jan 64 MILIJANOVIC told Thelma KING, a prominent Panamanian Communist, that RICO wanted her to go to Mexico and Cuba and arrange a meeting between CASTRO emissaries and three left wing Panamanian political figures Carlos Ivan ZUNIGA, Fabian ECHEVERS, both members of the Panamanian Socialist Party (PSP), and Manuel SOLIS Palma, Panamanian Minister of Education.

Mireya de VAN RABEN, member of the Central Committee of the Trotskyite Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR), with whom RICO had social contact in 1965.

Prof Juan MASCARO Neves, a Spanish national who, with his wife Carmen GARCIA de MASCARO, was active in connection with affairs of the Cuban Consulate in Tampico before he was deported to Venezuela in May 1966 for violating Mexican Immigration Law; he was a key contact of Victor RICO Galan during a visit the latter made to Tampico and Ciudad Monte in April 1966.

SECRET

Addendum

Basic Biographic Data

1. **Education:** Victor RICO Galan may have studied at the School of Philosophy and Letters at the Universidad Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM). One report states that he may have studied philology at UNAM.

2. **Siblings :** In May 1966 his sister Ana Maria RICO Galan was reported married to Guillermo MENDIZABAL, a collaborator with Mexican Trotskyists. An August 1966 article in the Mexican newspaper Excelsior stated that Ana Maria RICO Galan used her ex-husband's name and called herself Carmen MENDIZABAL Lizalde. Another report of August 1966 states that Carmen MENDIZABAL Lizal, Victor RICO Galan's sister, may have travelled frequently to Guatemala and have been the contact between the Partido Comunista de El Salvador (PCES) and the Partido Comunista de Mexico (PCM).

3. **Travel :** A farewell party was given for RICO on 9 September 1961 but there is no record of where he travelled.

SECRET

[illegible]

Summary

1. Victor RICO Galan joined the staff of Al Dia, an anti-U. S. magazine, in January 1956 and was listed as its editor-in-chief in 1958. In February 1957 he was editor-in-chief of a new magazine La Gazeta de Mexico, published by the Buro de Investigaciones Politicas (BIP) headed by a Communist Horacio QUINONES.

2. In 1956, according to an August 1966 article in the Mexico City newspaper El Sol de Mexico, Victor RICO Galan, Fidel CASTRO, and Raul CASTRO, received instruction in Guerrilla tactics from Alberto BAYO, a Spanish Communist, at Rancho San Miguel, Ayotzingo, Mexico. According to the article, on various occasions in 1956 RICO visited the CASTRO brothers at the ranch where they were receiving instruction.

3. In September 1960 Victor RICO Galan was Chief of Information of Pueblo, an anti-U. S. pro-Cuba newspaper and was a member of the preparatory committee for the second International Congress of Journalists to be held in Austria in October 1960. The following year he was reported to be a leader of the intellectual faction of the Mexican committee to give impulse to fight for peace and international cooperation which was making preparations for the Latin American Peace Congress scheduled for Mexico City in March 1961.

4. In November 1965 Victor RICO Galan was reported to have been a militant member of the Trotskyite Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR/T) middle guard headed by Juan POSADAS.

Contacts:

Victor RICO Galan is known to have been in contact with the Soviets as early as November 1956 when he was invited to attend a reception at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Umanislaw RACZKA, employee of the Press and Propaganda Section of the Polish Legation in Mexico City was in contact with RICO in July 1959.

Aleksandr BEKIER, Counselor of the Polish Embassy in Mexico City and known Intelligence Officer. RICO arranged for him to meet Carlo COCCIOLI, a homosexual Italian pro-Communist writer for Siempre magazine.

Mariano GARCIA Perez, Cuban Consul in Merida, who while in Mexico City in July 1966 was in contact with Victor RICO Galan.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible] 10[illegible]

Current Biographic Data on Victor RICO Galan as of
19 August 1966 from OCR/BR/Mex

S/NF	CS 3/489-625 12 Oct 61 B-2 Elected to Propaganda Commission, MLN Federal District Committee.
S	CS 3/482-611 4 Aug 61 B-2 Member Committee for Solidarity with Cuban Revolution.
S/NF	CS 3/481-944 28 July 61 B-2 Invited to attend 26 July Celebration in Havana.
S/NF	CS 3/489-630 12 Oct 61 B-2 Took part in a round-table discussion held by MLN regarding Lopez Matoes' report to Congress on 1 Sept 61. Rico pointed out that Lopez Matoes was, if not pro-US in his actions, then anti-left; his (Rico's) statements innocuous.
S/NF	CS 3/496-988 26 Dec 61 Listed as a staff member of Liberacion Nacional, an MLN publication.
UNCL	FBIS #? 22 Apr 62 In "A Third Position in LA?" in Siempre, Rico wrote: "it happens, then, that the Latin American Common Market with its tendency on the exercise of effective economic sovereignty, implies many things, such as trade with the socialist world--which next year will represent 52% of the world production, constituting a 3rd international position--and the defense and exercise of coexistence between nations of different Social regimes....Will there emerge now a 3rd position--Mexico and Brazil--which, basing itself on the LACM will maintain coexistence with an independent policy?"
S/NF	CS 3/508-797 26 Apr 62 B-2 "Marxist journalist who heads the MLN Press and Propaganda Committee." (Still head May 31, 63--A-1557)
S/NF	CS 3/520-508 23 Aug 62 B-2 Planned meeting to map out a campaign for the release from prison of David ALFARO Sigueiros, "prominent Mexican Communist artist" with Alfaro's wife.
CONF	- 3 Oct 62 - ?? On a flight to Cuba on a Cuban plane with "other" Mexican Communists and 2 Soviet diplomatic couriers.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S CS 3/525-084 17 Oct 62 B-2
"plans to write a political biography of Castro." Left Mexico on 2 Oct 62 with Mexican passport 51115 with Cuban courtesy visa. Spent 2 months there.
*See p. 6.

CONF A 1291 9 Apr 63
In 20 Mar issue of Siempre he "advocated the creation of a new political party which would reflect the ideology of Former President Lazaro Cardenas.."(bio: he is a founding member of the pro-Communist MLN and an ardent supporter of Castro. While in Cuba (Oct-Nov 62) he contributed weekly articles to Siempre in which he sustained the thesis that Cuba is now the center of the world's socialist revolutionary movement. The Left in Mexico needs a "party of L. Cardenas" which....would stand for socialism in internal matters and for independence from any bloc in external affairs.)

S/NF CS 3/552-990 10 July 63
To Cuba 25 May-22 June 63; spent 8 days with Castro

UNCL A-6 Merida 6 Aug 63
On 1 August attended the Pro-Castro Mexican-Cuban Institute in Merida accompanied by Luis Alberu the Counselor for Cultural Affairs at the Cuban Embassy.

S CS 3/558-382 B-2 6 Sep 63
Rico, along with Marcue Pardinas and Carrion Villa was one of the principal organizers and participants in a rally in favor of the political prisoners held in Mexico City on 18 August 63. The rally failed to be held because of police intervention. All arrested and and released same day. On evening of 21 August they demanded, unsuccessfully, to see Diaz Ordaz, then Minister of Interior.

S/NF CS 3/560-130 25 Sep 63 B-2
"Rico planning trip to Guatemala" plans to interview Col. Enrique PERALTA Azurdia, Chief of Guatemalan Government, also visit Guatemalan guerrillas.

UNCL A-451 24 Oct 63
Still on MLN National Committee.

S/NF TDCS 3/565-337 20 Nov 63 B-2
Interviewed YON Sosa in mid-October 63; listed as head of propaganda committee for MLN. TDCS 3/563-671 "reported that Rico had spent 8 days in Cuba with Castro and...was given an assignment to visit countries in Central and South America (Venezula, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala and Brazil) when he was to persuade Leftist parties to begin immediate acts of sabotage and violence to take the pressure off Venezuela."

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S/NF CS 3/566-571 5 Dec 63 F-2
Rico had an interview in late October 63 with David Turner (leader of the Vanguard of National Action [VAN]--radical pro-Cuban revolutionary group in Panama), Thelma King (pro-Cuban deputy to the National Assembly) and Hugo Victor (president of the Peoples Party, PdP Communist) discussing an armed movement in Panama.

B-2
An Armando Conte, "a writer for Tiempos in Mexico" reported to have come to Panama and talked to Hugo Victor around 5 Nov 63. He said he had come to convince Victor of the need to support the Cuban line of armed revolution. Victor told Conte that the PdP would not be told what to do because it had its own line on the Panamanian revolution. (Field comment: travel records contain no information on the arrival of any person with the name Armando Conte during the period in question and the name is believed to be a pseudonym used by Rico.)

S/NF TDCS 3/569-563 10 Jan 64 B-2
"Making preparations to go to the Dominican Republic in the very near future....ostensibly to gather information for the preparation of some articles on the Dominican Republic."

S/NF TDCS 3/569-940 14 Jan 64 B-2
Reports have identified Rico as an agent of Fidel Castro who in May 63 was assigned by Castro to visit Central and South American countries to confer with leading Communists in order to initiate programs of anti-US violence and sabotage. He reportedly arrived in Santo Domingo by air on 8 Jan 64 from Kingston, Jamaica to stay about a week.

S/NF TDCS 3/570-926 23 Jan 64 B-2
"While in the Dominican Republic he attempted to get photographs of Dominican guerrilla leaders killed at Las Manoclas on 21 Dec 63 for propaganda purposes.

S CS 3/571-822 3 Feb 64 B-2
Left Mexico City for Havana by air on 28 Jan 64 (it might be noted that Castro returned from the USSR around that time).

S/NF CS 311/01556-65 4 Feb 65 C-2
Possibly in Chile. He met with members of the MPD while in the Dominican Republic.

CONF A-31 10 Feb 65 Merida
Visited Merida (had been there 28 Oct 64) and "[It] is quite certain that there will shortly appear in Siempre (Mexican leftist weekly) more articles on the henequen situation. It can be expected that Rico Galan will attempt to attribute all or a large portion of Yucatán's troubles to the 'imperialistic' US."

CONF CS 311/03173-65 15 Mar 65 "reporting so far accurate"
"Rico went to Merida during the first few days of February to make a personal investigation of the situation caused by the decrease in the price of henequen.." Rico wrote "Yucatan: Our leader is Hunger" in Issue #10, 3 Mar 65, of Siempre.

CONF A-1033 from Mexico 1 May 65
Re Dominican Republic: "Rico, writing in the ultra-left Diario de México favored Bosch's return, originally wishing him good luck, and later, after the apparent failure of pro-Bosch forces, complained that "the reactionaries always win out in Latin American coups, being supported by the US, or else the coups fail."

CONF/NF CS 311/07174-65 11 Jun 65
Veteran and trusted PPS member, prolific reporter of reliable information, described Rico as "member of the Peoples Electoral Front (FEP) and National Liberation Movement (MLN) [who] was one of those leaders who met in March or April 65 to draw up a letter of convocation to the National Congress (on the Liberty of the Political Prisoners and the Repeal of the Law of Social Dissolution)."

S/NF CS 311/04619-66 1 April 66 "source believed to have good access to the Guatemalan exile community"
Planning to investigate the disappearance of Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ Garcia, Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico, who returned to Guatemala in late February. Source comment: "Rico could only enter Guatemala illegally since he was declared persona non grata by the Guatemalan Government in 1963 after he visited the country to interview President Peralta. While there, he also managed to talk with Marco Antonio YON Sosa, guerrilla leader. Upon his return to Mexico, Rico Galan wrote articles favorable to the rebels and most unflattering to the Peralta government."

CONF Incoming telegram 15986(?) 5 Apr 66
Alleged to have been one of two leaders (other was Jacinto Lopez UGOCM secgen) planned to lead mass meeting 6 April "to commemarate martyrs of September attack" (?? no further mention).

S/NF CS 311/06825-66 23 May 66 reporting believed reliable
Could not attend an MLN meeting because of illness.

UNCL FPIR 0112/66 23 May 66
In February became involved in a verbal editorial battle on the pages of Granma with Frane BARBIERI of the Yugoslav newspaper Politika. No conclusion reached.

CONF A-727 from Mexico 22 Jan 66
Rico...has been one of the most prolific and ardent apologists for Castro's Cuba in Mexico. In an interview between an Embassy officer

and the writer, Elena Garro de Paz, the latter states: "the Cuban Embassy had severely chided Rico for writing an article favorable to the guerrilla leaders who were killed recently during their assault on the army barracks at Madera, Chihuahua.... Rico had been close to "Che" Guevarra rather than Castro, and that since Guevarra's disappearance he had grown noticeably cooler toward Cuba." She added that although he is a Marxist and is anti-American, Rico is also very hostile to the Mexican Communist Party (PCM).

S/NF TDCS 314/10379-66 17 Aug 66 highly placed police official, reporting believed reliable
"Sufficient legal evidence is available to prove that Rico, Raul Ugaldo and others were a part of a conspiracy advocating and teaching the overthrow of the Mexican government by violent means."

CONF/NF TDCS 314/10419-66 18 Aug 66 presumed B-2
12-13 August, Rico arrested with 40 others; the PPS is pleased and will do nothing to help them. "According to Carlos Sanchez Cardenas of the PPS National Executive Directorate, it is almost impossible to believe that a man like Rico could be the leader of an armed rebel movement. He has always been considered a Marxist intellectual belonging to no party who has confined his battles to the pages of magazines like Politica Siempre, and Sucesos. Lombardo Toledano frankly thought of him as incapable of doing anything that involved a mass following."

Additional information
From WH-1/Mexico:
Parents: Victor RICO Gonzalez
Fernando GALAN Sueiros
(Spanish nationals--no information available, Mexican and Spanish files)
Wife: Ingabord DIENER de Rico
(No information available, Mexican or Scandinavian files. In German files, there is reference to an Inge Diener; info dated 14 May 1956: born in Guben, 1920; of average intelligence; convinced, fanatical Communist; not liked; dangerous; of proletarian background; trained for administrative work; after 1945 worked for Cadre Department of city administration of Guben; from 1950-1952 studied at Academy for Administration in Forst-Zinna; afterwards obtained position in ministry; at first worked in Cadre Department, was responsible for embassy and trade mission personnel; transferred to present position because of disagreements with Vose (fnu); now responsible for currency matters; takes course during

SED Party School Year; mediocre qualifications; active in politics; member of Central Party Directorate and SED.

Pen names: Armande Conte--no info Mexican, Cuban, or Guatemalan files.
Sebastian Canelli--no info Mexican files.

* CS 3/539-735 11 March 1963 B-2
One of a number of leftists (Terrazas Guerrero another one) who voted to reinstate Marcue Pardinas in the MLN.

Vol III

Other Agency · 201-0336474

1. U.S Dept. of Justice Form G-135, Oct 24, 1966
2. U.S. AirGram, confidential, From Am Emb. Mexico to Dept. of State - The Rico Galan Case in Perspective, Oct. 9, 1966. A-344
3. U.S. AirGram, From Amembassy ~~Mexico~~ Veracruz to Dept. of State, ~~Rico Galan Case~~ Ocean Shipping: Communist Ships, Nov. 30, 1966. A-28
4. Airgram A-817. From Amembassy Mexico to Dept of State, Further Info on the Rico Galan Case. Feb 8, 1967.
5. FBI Memo., Apr. 29, 1968. Raul Orlando Olmedo Carranza.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY
DIR 95773	20 JAN 64;	PACY 1459(71798), 2 Dec 63

DOC. SUBJECT

DIR 94953 16 JAN 64; SDOM 2619(99172), 15 JAN 64

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
SDOM 2634(02099),	20 JAN 64;	WAVE 0874 (03059), 21 JAN 64

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

HMMA-22801, 24 JAN 64 (201-336474); KNGS 1097 (03663), 22 JAN 64
MEXI-7478 (07726), 29 JAN 64; SDOM 2659 (08142) 29 JAN 64

Additional information on this Subject can be found in:

ZRNICK 200-005-038

File Name and Number ~~RICO - Galan, Victor, 201-330974~~

Job No. 75-752 Box No. 2 Folder No. 15

To ORDER: CONTACT IR/AR x 4598

~~ROUTE THIS FORM TO:~~

1. OP/CPD, ~~5 E 65 HQS~~, if the subject is/was a contract employee.
2. IP/CFS, G C 52 HQS, if the subject has a 201 number (for inclusion in the 201 file).
3. ________________, if the subject (SPECIFY COMPONENT DESK AND ADDRESS) requires a 201 file opening. (This form must be included in the new 201 file when received.)

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 0336474

FORM 867 SECRET E-2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622 (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB 06 FEB 28
MEXICO, EL FERROL
CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
POSS PSEUDO OF SUBJ ARMANDO CONTE. AGENT OF FIDEL CASTRO. INTERVIEW W/VAN AND CP LEADERS IN PANAMA

056-300-001
HZP -06340
21 NOV 63

HMM UEQ

171701

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 0336474			

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
8-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
JMROD/Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 31108, 17 January 1967

1. Referenced dispatch forwarded a memorandum written by Zeno B. LEEHOLD regarding his meeting with Subject on 13 January 1967. LEEHOLD used journalist cover in his meeting with RICO Galan.

2. RICO Galan was released from prison on 2 April 1972.
HMM-13,013 reported that on his release he and two other prisoners
released with him, held a conference for students during which
Subject indicated that conditions for a violent struggle in Mexico
do not exist. Subject indicated he was going to establish a new
political group known as the Socialist Front. On 9 March 1972 a
newspaper article reported that the head of the Popular Socialist
Party of Mexico confirmed that RICO Galan had renounced trotskism.
Since his release from prison he has been very quiet and the
Station has received no reporting on his whereabouts or activity
other than a series of leftist articles he is writing for "Siempre"
magazine.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-42155

DATE
20 July 1972

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-336474

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
		1. RI FILE NO.		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICC GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO ACTED IN REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF VARIOUS MARXIST ORGANIZATIONS IN MEXICO FROM SEPTEMBER 1969 TO JUNE 1970

C50-004-000
DBC -88049
29 JUN 70
FBI
P8

R 7007240193

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(13-40)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO NAMED IN REPORT ON REVITALIZATION OF MEXICAN NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS /CMELEPO/ W/COMMUNIST STIMULUS

C50-009-019
HMM -12186
30 APR 70
P3

R 7005182077

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

ORIG: John D. [illegible]:bw
UNIT: WH/7/DR/CI
EXT: 4537/R9156
DATE: 9 April 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 22 PER 2

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH8 FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 10 00 39 Z APR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 024201

TO MEXICO CITY, SANTO DOMINGO INFO: WH/MIAMI,
BY POUCH: LIMA, CARACAS

JMVERSE EMPARENT

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 2891 (IN 058695)* RELAYED MIAMI, BEING POUCHED LIMA, CARACAS

B. SANTO DOMINGO 9102 (IN 058856)** RELAYED MIAMI, BEING POUCHED LIMA, CARACAS

1. GUSTAVO OMAR SANCHEZ DIAZ (201-867485) LINKED TO EMPARENT-1 THRU NOTATION IN EMPARENT-1 CONFISCATED PAPERS (MAY 67): "MARIO MOLINA AND REBECA DE MOLINA, AVE IQUITOS 1089, LA VICTORIA, LIMA." (SANTO DOMINGO 3526, (IN 72170) 18 MAY 67). LIMA INVESTIGATION DETERMINED MARIO MOLINA MANTILLA AND REBECA FILOMENA CABEZAS DE MOLINA, OF ABOVE ADDRESS, ARE PARENTS OF SANCHEZ' WIFE, MARION REBECA MOLINA CABEZAS.

2. SANCHEZ BORN 27 MAY 37, DR, ENTERED PERU 22 APR 62 ON DOMINICAN PP 57278 ISSUED 16 OCT 61. ATTENDED NATIONAL ENGINEERING UNIV, LIMA, AND LIVED JIRON LINO CORNEJO 287/F. ON 11 JAN 64 LEFT LIMA FOR CARACAS RETURNING LIMA 10 AUG 64.

continued. . . .

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

10 April 70
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FILE: 201-336474

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 5
2 6
3 7
4 8

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF:
INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 024201

TO

PAGE 2

ON 28 AUG 64 SUBJ AND WIFE, MARION REBECA MOLINA CABEZAS, BORN 8 MAR 42, LIMA, LEFT PERU FOR PANAMA, WITH WIFE TRAVELLING ON PERUVIAN PP 150639 ISSUED FOR TRAVEL TO DR. NO FURTHER INFO HER FATHER, MARIO MOLINA MANTILLA. HER MOTHER, REBECA FILOMENA CABEZAS DE MOLINA, BORN 22 NOV 11, LIMA, Peruvian PP 180076 ISSUED 5 NOV 65 FOR TRAVEL TO DR, LEFT LIMA FOR BOGOTA 21 NOV 65 RETURNING FROM OR VIA BOGOTA 19 JAN 66 (SEE HPLA 9268, 6 MAR 66 SENT MEXICO CITY AND SANTO DOMINGO).

3. SUBJECT IS COUSIN OF GUIDO GIL DIAZ (201-789609) PROBABLE CUIS AGENT WHO "DISAPPEARED" FOLLOWING DOMINICAN POLICE ARREST JAN 67 (SANTO DOMINGO 4016, 17 AUG 65).

4. SUBJ POSSIBLY BROTHER OF JULIO ALBERTO SANCHEZ DIAZ (201-770315) BORN 1 AUG 35, SALCEDO; MPD MEMBER AND FORMER EDITOR MPD PUBLICATION, "LIBERTAD". ON 23 FEB 65 JULIO AND WIFE, ALMA DOMINGUEZ M., LEFT DR FOR JAMAICA REPORTEDLY ENROUTE CHILE WHERE JULIO TO STUDY ECONOMIC PLANNING. IN CHILE, JULIO WAS TO CONTACT VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-336474) FOR UNKNOWN PURPOSE. JULIO SANCHEZ

continued.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY________PER________#
CONF:
INFO
FILE, VR.

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 024201

TO

PAGE 3

DIAZ POSSIBLY IDEN WITH JULIO SANCHEZ OF PEDRO HENRIQUEZ URENA 9-ALTOS, SANTO DOMINGO, WHO RECIPIENT CHICOM PROPAGANDA MAY 69 (HDCA 8004); AND/OR JULIO SANCHEZ, PEDRO HENRIQUEZ URENA 8, WHO LISTED ADDRESS BOOK OF ROBERTO HOSTOS POLEO, INTERNATIONAL REP OF VENEZUELAN MIR (HVCA 15329, 3 APR 68).

5. SANTO DOMINGO: CAN YOU PROVIDE DETAILS ON EMPARENT-1'S LIMA ADDRESS NOTATION AS HQS ATTEMPTING LOCATE ATTS TO HDCA 6265. ALSO MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE CONTACT EMWAND-1 REGARDING SANCHEZ DIAZ AND FAMILY, PARTICULARLY RE POSSIBLE BACK CONNECTION WITH EMPARENT-1.

6. MIAMI, LIMA, CARACAS: EMPARENT-1 AMONG DOMINICAN "POLITICAL" PRISONERS CURRENTLY MEXICO.

7. INDEX: MOLINA CABEZAS, MOLINA MANTILLA, CABEZAS DE MOLINA, DOMINGUEZ, HOSTOS.

8. FILE: 200-5-38; 22-8-7; 22-4-15; 201-782812 AND OTHER 201'S NOTED.

END OF MESSAGE

continued. . .

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 024201

TO

PAGE 4

WH COMMENT: *Request traces Gustavo Omar SANCHEZ Diaz who arrived Mexico from Santo Domingo and in frequent contact with Dominican political prisoners, especially EEPARENT-1.

**Furnished Santo Domingo traces.

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

DC/WH/3

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DAVID L. SMOCK
C/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

15 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/SAO

ATTENTION : Mr. Charles Anderson

SUBJECT : JMROD Counterinsurgency Target List

1. Per your request, the following is an updated version of the target listing forwarded to you on 25 September 1967.

a. Herberto CASTILLO Martinez (201-789570)
Subject is a pro-Cuban leader of the MLN - National Liberation Movement. He reportedly was a leading figure in the student movement against the Mexican Government in the fall of 1968. He was president of the Mexican delegation to OLAS. Subject was arrested in May 1969 and as of August 1969 was still in jail.

b. Rafael ESTRADA Villa (201-263844)
A Marxist activist who favors Castro's violent route to revolution, Subject attended the OLAS Conference in Havana in August 1967 as one of Mexico's representatives. He is the former Federal Deputy leader of the now defunct ONAR - National Organization of Revolutionary Action. Subject was arrested in April 1969.

c. Victor RICO Galan (201-336474)
A Spanish-born Mexican Communist journalist, Subject is an agent of the Cuban Government known to have been sent by the Cubans to talk to Guatemalan guerrillas in 1963. He is presently in prison.

2. Those names on the 1967 target list which do not appear above should be deleted.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
Acting Chief, WH/1

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - each 201
1 - Memo Chrono
1 - WH/1/E. Labier

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

WH/1/E. Labier/db/3E04/4167/1973

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______ #

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______ dl

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI2, CA5,

ACTION NO. 349

S E C R E T 030009Z JAN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 2201

DIRECTOR 3 Jan IN 000731

1. LITEMPOS REPORT ATTEMPTED JAILBREAK STAGED BY POLITICAL PRISONERS AT LECUMBERI PENITENTIARY, MEXICO CITY ON 1 JAN 1970, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF HOLIDAY VISIT OF FAMILIES AND FRIENDS.

2. ENTIRE AFFAIR REPORTEDLY PRE-ARRANGED WITH POLITICAL PRISONERS BELIEVING THEY COULD ENLIST SUPPORT OF OTHER PRISONERS. RIOT ERRUPTED WITH OTHER PRISONERS JOINING AUTHORITIES IN PUTTING DOWN DISTURBANCE. UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS WOUNDED, NO DEATHS REPORTED.

3. COMPLAINTS BEING SWORN OUT AGAINST FOLLOWING POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE RING-LEADERS OF ABORTIVE BREAK:

RAMON DANZOS PALOMINO (201-46200)
VICTOR RICO GALAN (WOUNDED) (201-336474)
MANUEL MARCUE PARDINES (201-290811)
RODOLFO ECHEVERRIA MARTINEZ
RAUL ALVAREZ GARIN
FEDERICO EMERY ULLOA (201-822098)
PROF. ERNEST OLVERA SOTRES
RAFAEL JACOBO GARCIA (BADLY WOUNDED)

4. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

5. DEFER. INDEX. FILE 50-9-3.

S E C R E T

SECRET

PRO-CPR MARXISTS SENTENCED FOR SUBVERSION

Paris AFP in English 0006 GMT 25 Jan 69 C (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

[Text] Mexico City, Jan 25 (AFP)--Six pro-Chinese Marxists were jailed for 8 years each here today after being found guilty of trying to organise guerrilla activities in Mexico. Nine others were given less severe sentences.

All 15, who were arrested in 1966 and charged with conspiracy and illegal possession of arms, were preparing to make guerrilla attacks in various places in the interior, according to the authorities.

Among those jailed for 8 years was Marxist theorist Victor Rico Galan, described in the court judgement as one of the most dangerous men in the country.

Names of Accused

Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish 2105 GMT 25 Jan 69 C (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

[Text] Mexico City--Newspaperman and writer Victor Rico Galan was sentenced today to 8 years in prison and a fine of 10,000 pesos. The district judge also sentenced Gilberto Balam Pereira, Gumersindo Gomez Vuevas, Isaias Rojas Delgado, and Doctors Miguel Cruz and Rolf Meiners to similar terms. They were all arrested in 1966 and accused of subversive activities. Ana Maria Rico Galan, sister of Victor, was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months in jail and a fine of 4,000 pesos. Yesterday she was freed on a 10,000-peso bond.

BRIEFS

U.S. BOAT'S SEIZURE--Mexico City--A U.S. shrimp boat was seized for fishing in Mexican territorial waters. The boat, the Pan American, was captured shortly after other U.S. boats paid 30,000 pesos each for fishing illegally in Mexican waters. The captain of the boat and two sailors have confessed to fishing in Mexican territorial waters. (Havana PRENSA LATINA Spanish 1200 GMT 24 Jan 69 C) (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

LOAN REQUEST--Mexico City--Mexican Finance Minister Antonio Ortiz Mena has disclosed that Mexico is seeking a 500-million dollar loan from the World Bank to finance forestry exploitation, hydraulic projects, federal highway building, and rural electrification schemes. The main projects were for a rationalization of exploiting timber resources and improving infrastructure to benefit tourism, a major source of revenue. (Mexico City REUTERS English REUTERS Buenos Aires 1756 GMT 24 Jan 69 P) (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND--Mexico City--Mexican industrialists are studying a plan to come to the aid of the Mexican farmers by contributing part of their profits to a rural development fund, National Manufacturing Industries Chamber President Nazario Ortiz Garza said here. The chamber, with a membership of some 24,000 manufacturers throughout the country, has proposed that they contribute 1 percent of their annual profits to the fund, Ortiz Garza told the chamber's annual general meeting on 23 January. Details would be worked out later. (Mexico City REUTERS English REUTERS Buenos Aires 1756 GMT 24 Jan 69 P) (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?

050-004-110
HMMA-35632A01
16 OCT 68
P3

< MEXICO RE LIST OF THOSE ARRESTED DURING STUDENT RIOTS AND PERSONS VISITING THEM

R 6811050016

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

Mexico City
File 201- Victor RICO
Galan

regalarle a AURORA un reloj, la chica se alegra y sorprende.- Saludos. Se verán el jueves.-

Ad.- 3.1.- EF. CANDELA por TOÑA. La saluda. Asuntos familiares. CANDELA esperando bebé en unos cuantos días.-

LAS 14.00 h. del día 4 de junio de 1968

Ad.- 4.2.- EF. SUAREZ avisa a su mujer que llega a comer. Pregunta si llamó LUISITO.- No, dice PEPITA.-

Ad.- 4.3.- EF. LECHOV pregunta por SUAREZ.- No está, dice MD. PEPITA. Comentarios breves del viaje, les fué bien. LUIS acaba de llamar y llega a comer a casa, descansa pero antes de las 17.00 h. no sale.- volverá a llamarle.-

Sauve-Lieury

Ad.- 4.8.- No contestan.

Sal.- 4.9.- 44-53-22.- MD. SUAREZ (v) pregunta si regresaron los señores.- No.

Sal.- 5.0.- 21-07-33.- MD. SUAREZ por la Sra. ISQUE. La saluda, le pregunta por VICTOR y la salud de todos. Le pregunta SUAREZ cuando la puede ver.- ISQUE le propone ir mañana después de las 18.00 h.- SUAREZ conforme, la esperará.- Deja saludos para VICTOR, espera visitarlo la semana entrante.- Saludos y bienvenida.-

Sal.- 5.3.- 11-77-19.- ocupado dos veces.-

Sal.- 5.4.- 11-77-19.- MD. SUAREZ saluda a EF. Fany PAVEL y hablan de las fotos de FANY, están en un sobre y listas para entregárselas, quizá olvidaron enviarla pues las dejó listas desde antes de su salida.- FANY agradece, en cualquier momento pasará a recogerlas.- Saludos y gracias.-

Ad.- 6.0.- EF. Carlos SOLORZANO. Saluda a MD. PEPITA quien le informa que LUIS descansa, anoche trabajó mucho, llamarle en 45 m.- Saludos.-

LAS 19.15 h. del día 4 de junio de 1968

Ad.- 6.1.- EF. Carlos SOLORZANO, saluda a EF. SUAREZ. Le quiere hacer una pre-

SIEMPRE, 3 [illegible] 65

AQUI, RIUS


SUS PRISIONES
51 PRESOS POLÍTICOS...
DE TODOS COLORES...
ROJOS
COLOR DE ROSA
ROJO FRENESÍ
VIOLETA
..DE 19 AÑOS DE EDAD EN ADELANTE...
¡deje ya de llamarme Papá..!
HABITAN UNA AISLADA CRUJÍA EN EL "PALACIO" DE LECUMBERRI (a) PENITENCIARÍA.
← CRUJÍA A [illegible] de PALACIO
TODOS ELLOS (MARXISTAS, TERRORISTAS, TROSKISTAS, IZQUIERDISTAS) COMPARTEN SU DESTINO -SIN PELEARSE- Y ESPERAN QUE LA JUSTICIA LOS ATIENDA...
Voy a acabar por creer que el único lugar donde los de izquierda no se pelean, es este.
(LAS ÚNICAS BRONCAS QUE TIENEN, ES POR LOS POLICÍAS QUE LES DICEN A TODOS "COMUNISTAS"...)
¡cada vez que me lo diga y me quejo! ¡no soy troskista!
→ EL ENCARGADO DE LIDIAR ESA APARENTE OLLA DE GRILLOS, ES UN VIEJO CONOCIDO DE LOS LECTORES DEL "¡SIEMPRE!"...
¡MAYOR VÍCTOR RICO GALÁN, PRESENTE!
PRESO DESDE AGOSTO DE 1966, ACUSADO DE QUERER TUMBAR AL GOBIERNO CON SEIS ESCOPETAS Y UNA BOMBA DE MEDIO USO...
creo que funcionaban mejor mis artículos que las dichosas escopetas maestro.
..AUNQUE DE HECHO VÍCTOR ESTÁ PRESO POR DEFENDER SU CONVICCIÓN DE QUE:
la miseria del pueblo mexicano..
no se puede curar con parches y curitas.
¡..ni con simples reformas!
..SINO MEDIANTE UN CAMBIO TOTAL DEL SISTEMA, QUE TERMINE DE CUAJO CON LA CORRUPCIÓN QUE NOS "GOBIERNA"...
¿Y para cambiar las cosas qué se necesita?
Pos yo diría que nomás una Revolución
(ESTE MISMO RAZONAMIENTO SE LO HACEN MILES DE MEXICANOS COMO RICO GALÁN. -INCLUIDOS SACERDOTES Y OBISPOS- PERO DE MOMENTO EL QUE ESTÁ BIEN PRESO [illegible] MÁS EL RTE...
PERO, BUENO... LA CUESTIÓN ES QUE VÍCTOR NO SE HA RAJADO DE LO QUE PIENSA, NI DE LO QUE HIZO...
¿Pa qué tantos brincos si el suelo está parejo..?
..NI LE ECHA A NADIE LA CULPA DE SUS ACTOS NI SE DESDICE DE LO QUE DIJO, NI PIDE FRÍAS.
nomás pido que me cumplan la Constitución, maestro.
PERO LOS ENCARGADOS DE JUZGAR A VÍCTOR O SE HACEN PATOS, O NO QUIEREN CUMPLIR CON LO QUE MANDA LA CONSTITUCIÓN:
"los acusados del orden criminal serán juzgados ANTES DE 1 AÑO."
Y V.R.G. YA SE PASÓ CON CRECES DEL PLAZO CONSTITUCIONAL, SIN QUE HAYA TODAVÍA INDICIOS DE QUE SE CIERRE PRONTO SU PROCESO... ¿POR QUÉ, SEÑORES?
¡ingenuos que son algunos caricaturistas!
¿POR QUÉ ALARGAR SIN NINGUNA NECESIDAD LA FARSA DE UN PROCESO, VIOLANDO LA CONSTITUCIÓN, O SEA, HACIENDO LO MISMO DE LO QUE SE ACUSA AL PROCESADO..?
¡nos falta carearlo con la señora que le vendía quesadillas!
(PERO MEJOR ME CALLO: ORA SE USA ACUSARLO A UNO DE VIOLAR LA CONSTITUCIÓN, POR PEDIR QUE SE CUMPLA...)

SECRET

25 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/SAO

ATTENTION : Mr. Anderson

SUBJECT : JMROD Counterinsurgency Target List

There follows a list of Mexican individuals who fall within the Subject categories:

a. Arnoldo MARTINEZ-Verdugo - First Secretary of the PCM Secretariat. He was the CP Mexico contact with the CP Panama in 1963. From 1954 to January 1956 he underwent training in the U.S.S.R. In 1956 he attended the Marx/Lenin Institute in Moscow for four months.

b. Manuel Jesus TERRAZAS-Guerrero - Newly elected Second Secretary of the PCM Secretariat. In 1966, he attended the Cadre School in Moscow for a year. He has made numerous trips to the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Cuba and is reportedly a graduate of a Havana school for agitation.

c. Jose Encarnacion PEREZ-Gaytan - Newly elected Third Secretary of the PCM Secretariat. He was arrested in 1959 for his part in the railroad strike of 1959 and was released in 1963. In 1965 he went to Moscow to attend the 6-month Cadre School.

d. Alejo MENDEZ-Garcia - First Secretary of the Federal District Committee of the PCM. It is noteworthy that he functioned as liaison man between the PCM and the Cuban Embassy since 1962 after having been invited by CASTRO to visit Havana. He took a 2-year CP training course in the U.S.S.R. from 1950 to 1954.

e. Esther CHAPA-Tijerina. Prominent active Mexican Communist who works incessantly in behalf of the Chinese Communists.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

201-336474

f. Heberto CASTILLO-Martinez - Acting head of the MLN and head of the Mexican delegation to the Tricontinent Conference held in Havana in 1966.

g. Rafael ESTRADA-Villa - Politically estranged from Vicente LOMBARDO-Toledano and the PPS - Now head of the newly named (August 1967) National Organization of Revolutionary Action, a PPS faction. In August 1967, he was implicated with a group of 14 would-be guerrillas arrested by the CGI on 19 July 1967 and found to be backed by the Red Chinese.

h. Victor RICO-Galan - Presently in prison.

i. Vicente VILLAMAR-Calderon - A member of the newly elected Executive Central Committee of the JCM. He arrived in Cuba in July 1962 from Moscow, where he reportedly specialized in infiltration. He was carrying instructions from Moscow to CASTRO.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	X	PROCESSING ACTION MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, SB		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO Chief, WH		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
REDTOP MHIGLOO - Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
[illegible] (201-132139)

1. In reviewing Subject's file the Station has come across a surprisingly large number of reference to Guatemala, which are pulled together below. Please note, however, that some of the Guatemalan ties given below are hypothetical and that the Guatemalan side of the picture has been particularly stressed for the purposes of this dispatch.

201-248406

2. Lorenzo CARDENAS Barajas ~~(P-5409)~~. In April-May 1962 a Guatemalan Communist source was dealing with CARDENAS in procuring arms for Guatemala, and CARDENAS told the source that he had a great friend in the Soviet Embassy who was aware of CARDENAS' arms procurement activities (Source: LINLUCK). On 19 April 1963 Subject was observed holding a half-hour meeting in a restaurant under obviously clandestine circumstances with CARDENAS (Source: LIEMBRACE). On 31 May 1963 the Station placed an article in a Mexico City newspaper stating that Subject was working with CARDENAS on smuggling arms to Central American countries. On 21 February 1967 Subject's car was seen passing slowly by CARDENAS, who was standing on a street corner with a friend; Subject's wife was driving the car (Source: LIEMBRACE). On 30 March 1967 Subject, ~~with~~ his wife as passenger, drove twice within a few minutes past CARDENAS, who was sitting at an outdoor cafe with two friends (Source: LIEMBRACE).

.......continued

Distribution:
1~~2~~ - C/SB
2 - C/WH

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-~~[illegible]~~ 33215	DATE 5 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139

ff [illegible] GUATEMALA

3. Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana (201-787308), Guatemalan Communist who received guerrilla training in Cuba February - October 1962. MIRANDA has said that he was in contact with Subject when he was in Mexico in January - February 1962 on his way to Cuba. MIRANDA also said that he had met Subject before when Subject was with Anastas MIKOYAN in Cuba (in February 1960). MIRANDA has said that Subject has been a close friend of Guatemalan Communist leader Bernardo LEMUS Mendoza (P-6023, 201-091575) since 1953 (when Subject first came to Mexico). (Source: captured documents). On 7 December 1966 a "friend from Guatemala" called Subject's office, saying that he already knew Subject but that Subject did not know that he was in Mexico and that he did not want to go to Subject's office or use the telephone. He was told to call back the next day. The next day "MIRANDA" (probably Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana) called Subject's office, and Subject asked him to come to his house (same as office) the following day at 1000 hours. (Source: LIFEAT).

4. Liliam JIMENEZ Consuegra de LEIVA (P-5169, 201-228386), Salvadoran Communist employed at the Imprenta Madero to proofread the Soviet Information Bulletin and paid by the Soviet Press Office. She is married to Raul LEIVA Munoz, a Guatemalan Communist writer. Liliam has been occasionally reported asking for an appointment with Subject in order to discuss unspecified matters. For example, on 22 September 1967 she said she had an urgent matter to discuss with Subject, and Subject agreed to see her at her house at 0900 hours on Monday, 25 September (Source: LIFEAT). [illegible]

5. Jose Maria ALVAREZ Posada (P-4415) is a Spanish Communist employed by the Soviet Press Office as an editor for their Bulletin. He seems to be very active among Spanish Communists in Mexico and also frequently sets up meetings between Subject and Juan REJANO Porras (P-1027, 201-109935). The latter is one of the leaders of the Spanish Communist Party in Mexico but also has close ties to other Communist groups, particularly the Cubans and Czechs as well as the Mexicans, and on at least one occasion he was seen going to the Cuban Embassy with one of the leaders of the Guatemalan Communist Party in Mexico. REJANO is in almost daily contact with ALVAREZ Posada, often says that he needs to see Subject urgently, has several times asked about scholarships to the USSR for unidentified persons. On 21 July 1967 it was reported that Subject had given ALVAREZ Posada a letter that was to be returned to REJANO, but often Subject arranges to see REJANO personally at the latter's house. (Source: LIFEAT).

6. In view of ALVAREZ Posada's apparent acting as a cut-out for Subject, as described above, the following item may also be connected with Subject. On 29 June 1967 "Max" told ALVAREZ Posada that there was a letter "there" from Guatemala that had been there since 22 June but "Max" had not been able to reach ALVAREZ Posada before. ALVAREZ Posada said he would be home after 1600 hours (so that "Max" could bring him the letter). (Source: LIFEAT). Although it is pure guesswork, the Station suggests that "Max" might be Maximiliano SALAZAR Garcia (201-183293), a Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico. SALAZAR has been very quiet recently, but on 14 July 1965 he was reported in contact with Carlos ILLESCAS Aguirre (cf. below) about finding housing and a job for an unidentified boy, and it is entirely possible that he continues to be active behind the scenes in Guatemalan exile affairs.

7. Since June 1965 until as recently as March 1967 Subject has been reported receiving telephone calls from a "Carlos" with a non-Mexican accent. Normally Subject and "Carlos" simply agree to meet, without naming the place. Twice "Senor Jacobo" has been mentioned in an unclear context during their conversations. (Source: LIFEAT). Although "Carlos" as a name is not much of a lead, the Station suggests that he might be identical with Carlos ILLESCAS Aguirre (Hernandez) (P-1901, 201-764855), Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico. Although ILLESCAS has been very quiet since 1964, when the Mexican authorities clamped down on him, he is known to have been used by the Soviets in the past and probably still works with them. In 1953, when ILLESCAS was still working at the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico, he reportedly was very active as a courier for the Soviets (Source: LINLUCK). In 1959 ILLESCAS was reported in contact with Nikolay Vasilyevich
21 AKSENOV (201-106469), suspect KGB officer who was then Assistant Soviet Cultural Attache, a job later taken over by Subject (Source: LIFEAT). In 1961-62 ILLESCAS was reported to be still in contact with the Soviets in regard to guerrilla plans for Guatemala (Source: LINLUCK). On 23 August 1967 it was reported that ILLESCAS passed 22,000 Mexican pesos to one of the Guatemalan Communist leaders in Mexico. This money was described as a monthly subsidy from either the Cubans or the Soviets intended to help the Guatemalan Communists in jail in Mexico. (Source: LIREBEL-2). The above references to "Senor Jacobo" might possibly have meant Jacobo ARBENZ Guzman, former president of Guatemala; unfortunately the tapes of the conversations have been erased and the exact context in which this name was mentioned can no longer be reconstructed.

8. Hava (Eva) (P-11484), wife of Guatemalan Communist Sergio de la PENA, was reported to have met Subject in May 1965. On 29 May 1965 Subject invited Hava to dinner, apparently at the suggestion of Enrique SEMO Calev, Mexican Communist leader. Subject told Hava that he was interested in her contacts with other embassies and particularly asked her to put him in touch with Americans. Hava was subsequently reported having Subject and his wife to dinner on several occasions. (Source: LIFEAT). (It seems obvious that Subject was fishing for leads through Hava; however, Hava's Guatemalan contacts may well have been of no interest to Subject.)

9. Victor RICO Galan (P-7354, 201-336474), Spanish-born Mexican Communist journalist, agent of Cuban government known to have been sent by the Cubans to talk to Guatemalan guerrillas in 1963, in prison since August 1966 for subversive activities allegedly directed against the Mexican government was in frequent contact with Subject in 1965-66. They usually simply arranged to see each other to discuss undisclosed matters, and Subject apparently called RICO from a pay phone rather than from his office. (Source: LIFEAT) (Subject has apparently provided RICO with propaganda for news articles, but they appear to have had other common interests as well, one of which could well have been RICO's guerrilla activities.)

for/Bernard A. EDGEBROOK

CS COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

050-120-022
HMMA-32888
28 AUG 67
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
PROPOSED CANDIDATES FOR INTERNATL COMMUNIST WATCH LIST.

HMV

R 6709260126

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
JMROD Operational/Transmittal of Letter for Rico Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI

REFERENCE: HMMW-15207, dated 30 January 1967

Upon receipt of the letter sent via the reference above, the Mexico City Station officers concerned discussed the best method of delivering the letter to Rico Galan so the operation would appear natural and also to be sure the letter would be received by him. It was decided, finally, to have LIRICE-11 deliver the letter to Rico's wife with a short explanation of its background. Two weeks were spent in trying to locate Inge de Galan and the efforts were fruitless. The Station then decided to have LIRICE-11 deliver the letter to Elena Garro an old friend of Rico's. LIRICE-11 tried for a week and one half to find her at home with negative results. The Station then instructed him to leave the letter at her home with a request that it be passed to Rico. Attached is a copy of the covering letter LIRICE-11 left for Garro.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Letter

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att

CS COPY

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-31546

DATE
9 March 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-336474

México D.F. 7 de marzo de 1967.

Señora
Elena Garro de Paz
Alencaster # 220
Lomas
México 10, D.F.

Muy señora mía,

En vista de que en varias ocasiones he tratado de entrevistarme con usted personalmente sin poder lograrlo, ahora por medio de ésta carta ruego a usted de la manera más atenta hacerle llegar este sobre adjunto al señor Víctor Rico Galán a sabiendas de que usted tiene una buena amistad con él.

Agradeciéndole de antemano el favor que le pido y la atención a estas líneas, quedo de usted como su seguro servidor.

R. Reyes

CS COPY

TRANSMITTAL
OF
TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

#178

SECRET

FROM: C. M. BOUNDS
UNIT: C/WH/1/R
EXT.: 6924
DATE: 6 FEBRUARY 1967

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES
FH 17

TDCS-314/02002-67

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/OPS, CI/ICG, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA/O, CA/PEG, CA 2, DO 2, DO/H 4, CS/DO, FI.
WH/COG 8, SB 8

DATE DISTRIBUTED
6 FEBRUARY 1967

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/R	1	WH/3/V	1
WH/FI	1	WH/COG/I	8
WH/CA	1	WH/MEXI	1
WH/1/R	6	WH/PACY (CINCSO)	1
WH/2/C	2	SB/RR/P	8

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
TX-2110
NO:
(CAG)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

Rico Galan's 201-

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Charles M Bounds
C/WH/1/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/2/C (in draft)
WH/3/V (in draft)
WH/COG (in draft)

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/R

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
GROUP 1
(WHEN FILLED IN)

COPY NO.

FORM 1-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OOO ONE OCR ORR OCS COS CIA/NMC

FBI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S E C R E T

TDCS [illegible]

DIST 6 FEBRUARY 1967

COUNTRY MEXICO/CUBA/LATIN AMERICA

DOI LATE JANUARY 1967

SUBJECT VICTOR RICO GALAN'S VIEWS ON THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND ON FIDEL CASTRO

ACQ 31 JANUARY 1967

FIELD NO.

SOURCE LEFTIST JOURNALIST WHO TALKED WITH VICTOR RICO GALAN IN THE LECUMBERRI PENITENTIARY IN MEXICO CITY. SOURCE IS A RELIABLE REPORTER.

1. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: VICTOR RICO GALAN, PRO-CUBAN JOURNALIST WAS ARRESTED ON 12 AUGUST 1966, TOGETHER WITH SOME FORTY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRP). RICO GALAN WAS CHARGED WITH INCITING REBELLION, CONSPIRACY, AND ACCUMULATION OF ARMS. UNDER THESE CHARGES, HE IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR BAIL.)

2. RICO GALAN BELIEVES THAT VIOLENT REVOLUTION THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA IS "INDISPENSABLE," SINCE THE PEACEFUL ROAD TO CHANGE IS BLOCKED EVERYWHERE. REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS ARE ON THE RISE EVERYWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA, ACCORDING TO RICO GALAN. IN HIS OPINION, THESE MOVEMENTS ARE MARXIST, WITH LIBERAL TENDENCIES, AND ARE NOT AS RIGID AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST [illegible] LINE. RICO GALAN STATED THAT CASTRO HAS THE DOMINANT INFLUENCE WITHIN THE

S E C R E T / NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, COLOMBIA, AND ALL OF CENTRAL AMERICA. THE SOVIETS HAVE DOMINANT INFLUENCE IN CHILE, ARGENTINA, AND MEXICO. IN MEXICO, HOWEVER, CASTRO AND MOSCOW SEE EYE TO EYE, ACCORDING TO RICO GALAN, AND HAVE PARALLEL POLICIES; BUT THE SOVIET UNION IS THE PRIMARY POWER PROMOTING THESE POLICIES.

3. GUATEMALA AND VENEZUELA ARE THE TWO COUNTRIES IN WHICH THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS ARE THE MOST ADVANCED, IN RICO GALAN'S OPINION. HE HAD THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO MAKE ON THE SITUATION IN THESE TWO COUNTRIES:

A. GUATEMALA. IN GUATEMALA, UNLIKE VENEZUELA, THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD NOT INITIATED THE ARMED STRUGGLE. THE TWO GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE ARMED STRUGGLE WERE THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP LED BY MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA AND THE REBEL ARMED FORCES (FAR) LED BY CESAR MONTES, SINCE THE DEATH OF LUIS AUGUSTO TURCIOS. THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP HAS TROTSKYITE INFLUENCE, WHILE THE FAR IS "CASTRISTA INDEPENDENT" WITH TIES TO THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT). NINETY PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE ARE PEASANTS, AND THE MAJORITY OF THEM SYMPATHIZE WITH AND SUPPORT THE ARMED STRUGGLE.

B. VENEZUELA. BOTH THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR) LAUNCHED THE ARMED STRUGGLE, BUT BOTH HAVE NOW ABANDONED IT. BOTH MOVEMENTS CONFINED THEIR EFFORTS MOSTLY TO THE CITIES AND ENGAGED MOSTLY IN TERRORIST ACTS. THESE

TACTICS DID NOT PROMOTE THE REVOLUTIONARY CAUSE AT ALL. THE ARMED STRUGGLE IS NOW DIRECTED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (FALN) LED BY DOUGLAS BRAVO AND WILL NOW SUCCEED. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: RICO GALAN IS ECHOING THE LINE OF DOUGLAS BRAVO, LEADER OF THE DISSIDENT FALN, IN ACCUSING THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA (PCV) AND THE MIR OF ABANDONING THE "ARMED STRUGGLE." BOTH THE PCV AND THE MIR HAVE HAD, AND CONTINUE TO HAVE, RURAL GUERRILLA FORCES AS WELL AS URBAN TERRORIST UNITS. ALTHOUGH A SOFT-LINE FACTION OF THE MIR RENOUNCED VIOLENCE EARLY IN 1964, THE MORE MILITANT WING CONTINUED THIS POLICY, AFTER FIRST OUSTING THE SOFT-LINERS.)

4. RICO GALAN DESCRIBED MEXICO AS AN APPARENT DEMOCRACY BUT A "POLICE STATE, TIGHTLY HELD." HE BELIEVED THAT POPULAR MOVEMENTS IN MEXICO AND ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA WERE ON THE RISE. SINCE THERE WERE NO LEADERS LIKE CASTRO AROUND, RICO GALAN BELIEVED THAT THE LEADERS OF THESE POPULAR MOVEMENTS WOULD COME FROM THE WRITERS, THE INTELLECTUALS, AND THE LAWYERS.

5. REGARDING FIDEL CASTRO, RICO GALAN SAYS THAT NO ONE KNOWS WHETHER CASTRO IS A COMMUNIST OR WHAT KIND OF COMMUNIST HE MIGHT BE. HE IS A GREAT REVOLUTIONARY LEADER AND A GREAT TACTICIAN, BUT HE CANNOT PLAY THE ROLE OF LIBERATOR OF LATIN AMERICA FOR HE IS TOO DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE SOVIET UNION CONTROLS HIM TIGHTLY. REGARDING CUBA-SOVIET CONFLICTS, RICO GALAN SAID THEY WERE MORE APPARENT

THAN REAL.

6. (SOURCE COMMENT: RICO GALAN SPOKE LIKE A CONVINCED, UNREPENTENT, AND FERVENT REVOLUTIONARY. HE BELIEVES THAT HE IS ASSOCIATED WITH A WINNING CAUSE.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: L.A. DESANTI/pap
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 7208
DATE: 30 JANUARY 67

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY Zu PER WH/Cog 2

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO WH/1 BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☑ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

CONF: C/WH/COG ☒ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 4, C/CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

30 1936Z

CITE DIRECTOR 70841

MEXICO CITY

KAPOK JMROD PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 0113 (IN 87331)*

ABSTRACT
INDEX
WH/1

1. REF LETTER POUCHED WITH HMMW-15207 30 JANUARY. COPY INCLUDED FOR STATION AND TRANSLATION FOR LITEMPO/8 IF STATION DESIRES PASS IT.

2. LETTER IS DATED 31 JANUARY ON HOTEL EL CONTINENTAL, PANAMA PAPER. PLEASE ARRANGE FOR DELIVERY TO RICO ANY DAY AFTER 1 FEBRUARY. REQUEST ANDREW F. ~~[illegible]~~ DOSCHER SIGN LETTER IMITATING SIGNATURE IN 13 JANUARY LETTER TO RICO AVAILABLE AT STATION.

3. PLEASE ADVISE DATE LETTER DELIVERED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SAO Comment *Station concurred with proposed follow-up letter to Rico Galan.

WH/1/M

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/SAO

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
S E C R E T
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-336474
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ WH/1
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~FROM~~ FER
DISSEM BY 33/M w/cc DP

ACTION
C/WH/COG-5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH-2, DDP, C/CI

S E C R E T 262300Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0113 MEXI

ABSTRACT INDEX
R.F. 11

DIRECTOR

KAPOK JMROD PBRUMEN

26 JAN 67 IN 87331

REF: DIRECTOR 69248

1. CONCUR LETTER TO RICO FROM LEEHOLD WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS OPERATIONALLY. LITEMPO-8 CAN BE ASKED MAKE DELIVERY.

2. BELIEVE PORTION OF LETTER SHOULD EXPLAIN WHY IT WAS NOT SENT REGULAR MAIL SERVICE. ALSO, SHOULD BE DATED TO COINCIDE WITH LEEHOLD VISIT MEXICO WITH EXPLANATION WHY IT WAS NOT DELIVERED SOONER OR CARRY CURRENT DATE BUT ON HOTEL OR OTHER APPROPRIATE STATIONERY FROM OTHER COUNTRY WITH EXPLANATION IT HAND CARRIED TO MEXICO BY FRIEND.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Rico's so!!?
yes!

ORIG: L.A. DESANTI/pap
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 7208
DATE: 24 JANUARY 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: (12)

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 5 PER WHCOG # 2
CONF: C/WH 2 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO WH/1 BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

INFO: FILE , VR , DDP, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI

(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) 24 21 12 Z
CITE DIRECTOR (elite) (reference number) 69248 (pica)

TO MEXICO CITY

KAPOK JMROD PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 9925 (IN 77985)

ABSTRACT | INDEX WH/1

1. DESIRE TAKE ADVANTAGE LEEHOLD INTERVIEW WITH RICO GALAN IN LIGHT FOLLOWING FACTS.

A. INTERVIEW WAS ENDED ABRUPTLY AND BELIEVE RICO EXPECTED FOLLOW UP SESSION. HOWEVER LEEHOLD WAS UNABLE TO GET IN TO SEE RICO FOR SECOND SESSION.

B. AT END OF INTERVIEW LEEHOLD GAVE RICO COPY OF LINLUCK'S BOOK USEFUL BUT DEAD WHICH RICO WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE. LEEHOLD ALSO BROACHED MATTER OF RICO WRITING ARTICLE FOR HIS PERIODICAL "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA."

2. PROPOSE THAT A LETTER BE DELIVERED TO RICO FROM LEEHOLD (DE MARCHI). LETTER WOULD EXPLAIN INABILITY TO SEE RICO AGAIN AND EXPRESS HOPE TO SEE HIM AGAIN ON WAY BACK FROM LA TOUR. LETTER WOULD ALSO PROPOSE TO RICO THAT MEANWHILE HE WRITE FOR A FEE A REVIEW OF BOOK USEFUL BUT DEAD FOR "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA."

3. PURPOSE IS TO GET RICO TO EXPRESS VIEWS IN WRITING ON CUBAN

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 69248

PAGE TWO

TO

COMMIE SITUATION, CASTRO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND OBTAIN RICO'S ANALYSIS OF BOOK. MIGHT ALSO BEGIN SOFTEN HIM UP TO PROVIDE REAL INFO AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

4. WOULD PREPARE LETTER IN ITALIAN AT HQS AND FORWARD TO STATION. LEAVE TO STATION TO DETERMINE BEST MEANS OF DELIVERY, BUT PRESUMABLY WOULD BE THRU LITEMPO/8.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE STATION COMMENTS AND/OR CONCURRENCE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1
C/WH/COG

William V. Broe
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/SAO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Operational/JMROD
Transmittal of Letter for Rico Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Arrange for Delivery of Letter.

REFERENCE: Mexico City 0113, 26 Jan 67

Transmitted herewith is the letter mentioned in reference. Further instructions will be sent by cable.

ZBL
ZENO B. LEEHOLD

Attachment:
1. Letter, (orig.&copy & translation), h/w

Distribution:
3 - COS/Mexico City, w/att., h/w

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-15207

DATE: 30 Jan

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-336474

Internal Dist.
~~1~~ - RID, w/o/att.
1 - WH/1, w/o/att.
1 - WH/REG, w/o/att.
1 - WH/SAO, w/o/att.

ORIGINATING

WH/SAO Louis A. DeSanti/pap — EXT. 7208

30 Jan 67

COORDINATING

	DATE	
WH/SAO	2 Jan 67	CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/1/M	1/26	

RELEASING

C.WHD — WILLIAM V. BROE

31 gennaio 1967

Egregio Dottore:

Sono il pubblicista italiano Luigi De Marchi che ebbe l'onore di una breve intervista con Lei il 13 gennaio u.s. Ho cercato, finora senza successo, di riunirmi con Lei di nuovo per continuare la nostra conversazione. Mi auguro la presente la trovi in buona salute. La affido ad un amico "de confianza" che si incarichera' di fargliela pervenire.

Sono tuttora in viaggio e faro' tutto il possible rivederla presto. Nel frattempo gradirei moltissimo, Lei consenziente, avere una sua critica sul libro che le lasciai, UTILES DESPUES MUERTOS, per una eventuale pubblicazione sul periodico romano *Corrispondenza Socialista*. Resta inteso che Le rimetteremo prontamente l'onorario stabilito.

Con i miei piu' distinti saluti,

31 January 1967

Dear Sir:

I am the Italian journalist Luigi De Marchi who had the honor of a brief interview with you on the 13th of January. I have tried, up to now without success, to get together with you again to continue our conversation. I trust that this letter finds you in good health. I am entrusting it to a friend "de confianza" who will try to see to it that it reaches you.

I am still traveling and I'll do everything possible to see you again soon. Meanwhile I would be very pleased if you would agree to write a review of the book I left with you, UTILES DESPUES MUERTOS, for eventual publication in the Roman periodical, CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA. Best assured that you would be paid promptly the usual fee.

With best regards,

Luigi De Marchi

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSEM BY 33/M w/Cable

ACTION c/WH/COG-5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, c/WH-2, DDP, c/CI

S E C R E T 252300Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0113

c/WH/COG/CA/PA

DIRECTOR

KAPOK JMROD PBRUMEN

AMROD

26 Jan 67 IN 87331

REF: DIRECTOR 59248

1. CONCUR LETTER TO RICO FROM LEEHOLD WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS OPERATIONALLY. LITEMPO-2 CAN BE ASKED MAKE DELIVERY.

2. BELIEVE PORTION OF LETTER SHOULD EXPLAIN WHY IT WAS NOT SENT REGULAR MAIL SERVICE. ALSO, SHOULD BE DATED TO COINCIDE WITH LEEHOLD VISIT MEXICO WITH EXPLANATION WHY IT WAS NOT DELIVERED SOONER OR CARRY CURRENT DATE BUT ON HOTEL OR OTHER APPROPRIATE STATIONERY FROM OTHER COUNTRY WITH EXPLANATION IT HAND CARRIED TO MEXICO BY FRIEND.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201

VICTOR RICO GALAN

14-00000

ORIG: [illegible]ANTI/pap
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 7208
DATE: 24 JANUARY 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	
2	Steward
3	Art
4	File
5	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

CONF:

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

KAPOK JMROD PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 9025 (IN 77985)

1. DESIRE TAKE ADVANTAGE LEEHOLD INTERVIEW WITH RICO GALAN IN LIGHT FOLLOWING FACTS.

A. INTERVIEW WAS ENDED ABRUPTLY AND BELIEVE RICO EXPECTED FOLLOW UP SESSION. HOWEVER LEEHOLD WAS UNABLE TO GET IN TO SEE RICO FOR SECOND SESSION.

B. AT END OF INTERVIEW LEEHOLD GAVE RICO COPY OF [illegible]'S BOOK USEFUL BUT DEAD WHICH RICO WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE. LEEHOLD ALSO [illegible] ARTICLE FOR [illegible] "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA."

2. PROPOSE THAT A LETTER BE DELIVERED TO RICO FROM LEEHOLD (DE MARCHI). LETTER WOULD EXPLAIN INABILITY TO SEE RICO AGAIN AND EXPRESS HOPE TO SEE HIM AGAIN ON WAY BACK FROM LA TOUR. LETTER WOULD ALSO PROPOSE TO RICO THAT MEANWHILE HE WRITE FOR A FEE A REVIEW OF BOOK USEFUL BUT DEAD FOR CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA."

3. PURPOSE IS TO GET RICO TO EXPRESS VIEWS IN WRITING ON CUBAN

(CONTINUED)

Rico Galan 201

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________ #________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

S E C R E T (classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

COMMIE SITUATION, CASTRO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND OBTAIN RICO'S ANALYSIS OF BOOK. MIGHT ALSO BEGIN SOFTEN HIM UP TO PROVIDE REAL INFO AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

4. WOULD PREPARE LETTER IN ITALIAN AT HQS AND FORWARD TO STATION. LEAVE TO STATION TO DETERMINE BEST MEANS OF DELIVERY, BUT PRESUMABLY WOULD BE THRU LITEMPO/8.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE STATION COMMENTS AND/OR CONCURRENCE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C________

C/WH/COG________

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/SAO

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

175

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

201-798301
MEXI-00019
21 JAN 67

CIT ?
OCC ?
MEXICAN CP HAS DECLARED SUBJECT A TRAITOR
AND HAD RULED HIM OUT OF PARTY

UFG

R 6702270055

FILE IN 201-[illegible]

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: Dissem by 24

ACTION: WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/INT-2, DO-7

SECRET 202340Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0219 21 JAN 67 IN 83217

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9984 (IN 81261)

1. LIRING-3 INFORMED WALLACE B. ROWTON AT MEETING 18 JAN 67 THAT CARMEN MOLINA ENRIQUEZ Y VAZQUEZ GOMEZ, WIFE OF JUAN CARRASCO ZANINI Y ZUBARAN, HAD TOLD HIM PRIVATELY EVENING 17 JAN THAT MEXI COMMIE PARTY HAD DECLARED VICTOR RICO GALAN A TRAITOR AND HAD RULED HIM OUT OF PARTY. CARMEN TOLD L-3 SHE CONSIDERED ACCUSATION A MALICIOUS LIE AND HOPED L-3 WOULD NOT BELIEVE IT. (COMMENT: STATION HAS NO INDICATION RICO EVER PCM MEMBER.)

2. IT POSSIBLE ACCUSATION MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM LETTER SIGNED BY RICO AND CARRIED OUT OF PRISON BY ELENA GARRO DE PAZ.

3. L-3 TOLD ROTOWN HE VERY CLOSE TO DR. CARRASCO AND CARMEN DURING THEIR RESIDENCE IN CUBA FROM 1961 TO 1965 AND THAT THEY FREQUENT VISITORS HIS HOME SINCE THEIR RETURN FROM HAVA TO MEXI CITY IN 1966. L-3 DESCRIBED CARMEN AS NEUROTIC AND HAVING MARITAL TROUBLES WITH CARRASCO AND ABOUT TO BREAK UP. L-3 TOLD TOWTON HE FIRST MET RICO GALAN AT CARRASCO HOME AND THOUGH CARRASCO AND RICO CLOSE FRIENDS CARRASCO HAD COMPLAINED TO L-3 IN PAST THAT RICO WOULD NOT TAKE HIM

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0819 S E C R E T

PAREN CARRASCO END PAREN INTO RICO NETWORK.

4. ROWTON TOOK OCCASION TO REVEAL TO L-3 THAT HE HAD HEARD SOME HIGH LEVEL FRIENDS IN GOVERNACION SAY THAT RICO GALAN HAD WRITTEN A LETTER STATING HE WILLING BETRAY MANY SECRETS CONCERNING FIDEL CASTRO ON CONDITION HE BE RELEASED FROM PRISON. ROWTON ADDED HE UNDERSTOOD WOMAN WHO EX-WIFE OF MEXICAN AMB TO INDIA HAD BEEN INTERMEDIARY. L-3 IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED THAT WOMAN WOULD BE ELENA GARRO DE PAZ WHOM HE KNEW WELL AND CONSIDERED CAPABLE PERFORMING THIS ACT.

5. ROWTON SUGGESTED L-3 ATTEMPT OBTAIN COPY BUT L-3 STATED HE PREFERRED NOT APPROACH GARRO ON THIS MATTER SINCE LAST MEETING HAD BEEN UNFRIENDLY. ROWTON PROMISED HE WOULD ATTEMPT OBTAIN COPY AND L-3 STATED ONCE OBTAINED HE COULD LATER STATE HE GOT IT FROM BARRO OR CARMEN MOLINA. L-3 STATED ONCE LETTER OBTAINED HE WOULD CARRY DIRECTLY TO FIDEL CASTRO ENLISTING AID OF ISMAIL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ, COMMERCIAL REP OF CASTRO NOW IN MEXI, TO SET UP MEETING BETWEEN L-3 AND CASTRO.

6. L-3 HAS NOT YET REPLIED ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS' INVITATION RETURN HAVA FOR ADDITIONAL TALKS WHICH MENTIONED REF. DID NOT MAKE PHONE CALL AS REPORTED BECAUSE HE DISCUSSED SUCH CALL WITH SUAREZ AND LATTER RECOMMENDED AGAINST IT. INSTEAD L-3 WRITING LETTER TO RODRIGUEZ

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 0019 S E C R E T

SUAREZ WILL GET ON NEXT INBOUND PLANE. IN LETTER L-3 WILL TELL RODRIGUEZ HE PREFERS VISIT HAVA AFTER NEXT BUSINESS TRIP TO GUAT UNLESS RODRIGUEZ HAS IMPORTANT REASON SEEING HIM PRIOR TRIP.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: Mexico City-9925

1. Forwarded herewith are three copies of a memorandum written by Zeno B. LEEHOLD regarding his meeting with Victor RICO Galan on 13 January 1967.

2. Also forwarded are three copies of the Spanish translation which was passed to LITEMPO-8 on 16 January 1967.

3. Please call this dispatch and attachments to the attention of Chester D. DAINOLD.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
Memorandum
Translation (Spanish)

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/atts

COPY

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-31108

DATE
17 January 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-336474

SECRET

13 January 1967

SUBJECT: Meeting with Victor RICO Galan

1. The writer had about a one-hour meeting with Victor RICO Galan at the Lecumberri penitentiary on 13 January 1967. The meeting was held at the central reception room with several armed guards present; my civilian escort also remained in the general area, and there were also some other civilians present from time to time (I think waiting to see other prisoners).

2. RICO Galan arrived at the meeting area at about the same time as I did. After an exchange of greetings and a warm handshake, I gave RICO Galan my letter of introduction (a copy is attached). He read it carefully and then told me how glad he was to see me. He inquired about his friend Carlo Coccioli; I replied simply that I had seen him in Rome before he left for Paris and he was fine. (At the end of the meeting, RICO Galan asked me to convey his greetings to Coccioli when I returned to Italy, and of course I said I would.) I also explained to RICO Galan that I had a bottle of whiskey for him, but the guards had refused to let me bring it in. I think he appreciated the thought.

3. Because of my connection with Coccioli, a pro-Communist journalist and a friend of RICO Galan in Mexico for several years, plus the name of my periodical, Corrispondenza Socialista, RICO Galan apparently assumed that I was (and accepted me as) a fellow Marxist. He expressed himself spontaneously and I believe he revealed his true thoughts during the discussion and in answer to questions. A friendly rapport was immediately established between us.

4. I explained at the outset that I was on a tour of Latin America to study conditions and revolutionary movements. If he were agreeable, I said I also wished to write a piece on him for Corrispondenza Socialista. RICO Galan was very agreeable. I also said that if he wished to write an article for my periodical, we would pay him. He also found this idea agreeable; but qualified his approval by saying he first wanted to take a look at the periodical to see its "line" and format.

5. My first substantive question was how he viewed the revolutionary situation in Latin America. I asked whether he thought "violent revolution" a necessary stage in the development of Latin America. He answered quickly and

att to HMMA-31105 CS COPY 201-336474

emphatically that "violent revolution" throughout Latin America was "indispensable" because the peaceful road to necessary change was "blocked everywhere". He saw revolutionary movements on the rise everywhere in Latin America. I asked for the ideological nature and affiliations of these revolutionary movements. He replied that they are Marxist, but with liberal tendencies, not as rigid as the international communist revolutionary line.

6. I asked in which countries the revolutionary movements were most advanced. He named Guatemala and Venezuela in a category by themselves; there the revolutions were certain to win power. Then he gave me a general briefing on these two countries.

a. Guatemala: In Guatemala, unlike Venezuela, the Communist Party had not initiated the armed struggle. The two groups involved in the armed struggle were the "13 November" group led by Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, and the "Fuerza Armada Rebelde (FAR)", led by Cesar Montes, now that Luis Augusto Turcios is dead. The "13 November" group, he said, had Trotskyite influences, while the "FAR" was "Castrista/Independent", and with ties to the Guatemalan CP but also having differences with the CP. He said 90% of the people in Guatemala are peasants and the majority sympathize and support the armed struggle.

b. Venezuela: Both the CP and the MIR launched the armed struggle, but they have now abandoned it. I asked why. He said both movements confined their efforts mostly to the cities and took the form of terroristic acts. These tactics did not get the revolution anywhere. Now the Frente de Liberacion Nacional (FLN) led by Douglas Bravo was directing the armed struggle, and this effort will succeed.

RICO Galan asked me to read a recent article on Venezuela by Mario Menendez Rodriguez, Director of Sucesos, who had recently been to Venezuela and had interviewed the FLN leaders. In answer to my question, RICO Galan described Menendez as a "periodista Castroista".

7. RICO Galan described Mexico as an apparent democracy but "police state, tightly held". Here the "popular movements" are on the rise. In answer to my question as to who was leading these "popular" and revolutionary movements in Mexico and Latin America, RICO Galan replied that there were no leaders like Castro around, and the leaders would come from the writers, intellectuals and lawyers.

8. I asked RICO Galan for his appraisal and total evaluation of Fidel Castro Ruz. He said, first of all, if Castro is a Communist or what kind of a Communist he is, nobody knows. He is a great revolutionary leader and a great tactician, but he can not play the role of liberator of Latin America for he is too dependent upon Russia and Russia controls him tightly. I think RICO Galan meant to imply that Castro has become a tool of the Soviets. He said, Ernesto "Che" Guevara really wanted Cuba to break away from the Soviet chains, but Castro is not able to do this. As to the whereabouts of "Che", RICO Galan said that perhaps not even Fidel Castro knows where he is.

9. Regarding Cuban-Soviet conflicts, RICO Galan said they are more apparent than real. Then I asked him to name countries of primary Cuban or Soviet influence. He said Castro has dominant influence within the revolutionary movements in Venezuela, Guatemala, all of Central America, and Colombia. The Soviets have dominant influence in Chile, Argentina and Mexico. However, he added, in Mexico, Castro and Moscow see "eye to eye" and have parallel policies, but the primary power to push these policies is Russia.

10. RICO Galan said Communist Chinese influence in Latin America is negligible.

11. After about an hour, our meeting ended abruptly for a guard from the office of the prison director came to get RICO Galan; his lawyer was there to see him. I held him back for an extra minute and then we parted, reluctantly, with a warm handshake.

12. The foregoing clearly reveals RICO Galan to be an unrepentant, fervent revolutionary. He believes, on the basis of what he said, that he is associated with a winning cause. He was in high spirits and looked fine.

13. I returned to the Lecumberri Penitentiary at about 5:15 P.M. the same afternoon for another session with RICO Galan. The main door entrance was closed. I knocked and a guard opened a little window. I asked to see the Director, but the guard said he was not there. I explained who I was and what I wanted; when he heard the name of RICO Galan, the guard said it was impossible to see him and closed the window. A moment later I knocked again. I asked the guard if he would deliver a message to RICO Galan from me. He said that also was impossible, only the Director could do that. The guard certainly did his duty.

12 Gennaio 1967

Egregio Signore:

Mi permetta di introdurmi - Luigi De Marchi, italiano, scrittore per il periodico "Corrispondenza Socialista" di Roma.

In breve, stó' facendo un giro d'orizzonte per l'America Latina. Un amico suo, e compagno di lavoro mio, Carlo Coccioli, cui vidi a Roma in dicembre prima della sua partenza per Parigi e della mia per l'America Latina, mi accenno'di Lei e mi prego'di farle una visita. Eccomi qui: Vorrei anche approfittare di questa visita per fare un cambio di punti di vista con Lei.

Prego tenga la gentilezza di darmi un po'del suo tempo.

Rispettosamente,

Luigi De Marchi

ASUNTO: Reunión con VICTOR RICO GALAN

15 enero 1967

1.- El que esto escribe se reunió durante casi una hora con VICTOR RICO GALAN en la Penitenciaría de Lecumberri el trece del actual. [illegible] en el cual en el salón con [illegible] rico, [illegible] varias [illegible] y otros [illegible] y los [illegible] civiles [illegible] particularmente en el [illegible], y había de [illegible] en otras [illegible] civiles presentes y unos que esperaban ver a algunos prisioneros.

2.- RICO GALAN y yo llegamos simultáneamente al lugar de la entrevista. Después de un intercambio de saludos y un entusiasta apretón de manos, le entregué a RICO GALAN mi carta de presentación, una copia de la cual adjunto. El la leyó cuidadosamente y entonces comentó que le daba gusto conocerme. Inquirió sobre su amigo [illegible] II, y simplemente le respondí que lo ví en Roma antes de su salida hacia París y que se encontraba bien. Al terminar nuestra reunión, RICO GALAN me pidió diera saludos a [illegible]I cuando yo regresara a Italia, y desde luego le prometí que así lo haría. También le expliqué a RICO GALAN que le traía una botella de whiskey pero que los guardias no me permitieron introducirla. Creo que él apreció este gesto.

3.- Debido a mi conexión con [illegible]I, que es un periodista pro-comunista y amigo de RICO GALAN desde hace muchos años, además de por el nombre de mi periódico, [illegible], RICO GALAN aparentemente asumió que yo soy un compañero marxista y me aceptó como tal. Se expresó en forma confiada y creo que reveló sus pensamientos verdaderos durante nuestra discusión y al responder a mis preguntas. Inmediatamente se estableció entre nosotros una corriente [illegible].

4.- Yo le expliqué desde luego que estaba efectuando una gira por América Latina para estudiar las condiciones y los [illegible]. Le pedí que si así lo deseaba [illegible] a él para el periódico [illegible]. RICO GALAN aceptó. También le dije que le agradaría si deseaba escribir un artículo para mi periódico. Le pareció buena la idea, pero antes me dijo que quería ver un ejemplar del periódico para saber su línea y formato.

5.- El primer [illegible] importante fué [illegible] cómo miraba la situación revolucionaria en América Latina. Le pregunté si pensaba que era necesaria una revolución violenta para el desarrollo de América Latina. Respondió rápida y enfáticamente que una revolución violenta es indispensable en toda

América Latina debido a que la vía pacífica a todo cambio necesario, está bloqueada. Predijo el surgimiento de movimientos revolucionarios en toda la América Latina. Le pregunté sobre la naturaleza ideológica y afiliaciones de estos movimientos revolucionarios. Me respondió que son marxistas, pero con tendencias liberales, no con la rigidez de la línea revolucionaria comunista internacional.

6.- Le pregunté que en cuales países están más avanzados los movimientos revolucionarios. Nombró en primer término a Guatemala y Venezuela, ya que allí las revoluciones ciertamente se harán del poder. Luego me hizo un resúmen general de esos dos países.

a.- Guatemala: en Guatemala, a diferencia de Venezuela, el Partido Comunista no inició la lucha armada. Los dos grupos involucrados en el levantamiento, fueron el grupo " 13 de Noviembre " dirigido por MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA, y la " Fuerza Armada Rebelde ", dirigida por CESAR MONTES, ahora que LUIS AUGUSTO TURCIOS está muerto. El grupo 13 de Noviembre, según dijo, tenía influencia trotskista, mientras que el F.A.R. era castrista independiente pero con ligas al Partido Comunista Guatemalteco, a la vez que teniendo diferencias con el mismo. Dijo que el noventa por ciento de la población de Guatemala, son campesinos y que la mayoría simpatiza y apoya la lucha armada.

b.- Venezuela : Tanto el Partido Comunista como el MIR iniciaron la lucha armada, pero ahora la han abandonado. Pregunté la razón. RICO GALAN respondió que ambos movimientos confinaron sus esfuerzos principalmente a las ciudades y tomaron la forma de actos terroristas. Estas tácticas no llevaron la revolución a meta alguna. Que ahora el Frente de Liberación Nacional dirigido por DOUGLAS BRAVO está llevando a cabo la lucha armada, y que este esfuerzo sí tendrá éxito.

RICO GALAN me pidió que le leyese un reciente artículo sobre Venezuela escrito por MARIO MENENDEZ RODRIGUEZ, Director de Sucesos, quien hace poco estuvo en Venezuela y entrevistó a los líderes del FLN. Así lo hice, y a una pregunta mía, RICO GALAN describió a MENENDEZ como un periodista castrista.

7.- También hizo una descripción de México como una aparente democracia, siendo más bien un Estado Policíaco férreamente sostenido. Dijo que aquí se están comenzando a iniciar movimientos populares. También a una pregunta mía sobre quién dirije estos movimientos populares y revolucionarios en México y en América Latina, RICO GALAN replicó que ya no hay líderes como CASTRO y que los mismos surgirán de entre los escritores, intelectuales y licenciados.

8.- Pedí a RICO GALAN me diese su concepto y una total evaluación de FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. Dijo, antes que nada, que si CASTRO RUZ es comunista o qué clase de comunista, nadie lo sabe. Que es un gran líder revolucionario y un gran táctico pero que no puede jugar el papel de Libertador de Latinoamérica porque depende demasiado de Rusia y que esta nación lo controla estrechamente. Pienso que RICO GALAN quiso decir que CASTRO se ha convertido en un instrumento de los soviéticos. También dijo que ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA quería realmente que Cuba rompiera las cadenas soviéticas, pero que CASTRO no es capaz de hacerlo. Con respecto al paradero del CHE GUEVARA, dijo que tal vez ni el propio FIDEL CASTRO sabe dónde está.

9.- En relación con los conflictos Cubano-soviéticos, RICO GALAN dijo que son más aparentes que reales. Luego le pedí me nombrase países que principalmente tengan influencia cubana o soviética. Respondió que CASTRO tiene influencia dominante dentro de los movimientos revolucionarios en Venezuela, Guatemala, todo Centroamérica y Colombia. Que los soviéticos tienen influencia dominante en Chile, Argentina y México. Agregó sin embargo que en México CASTRO y Moscú se ven frente a frente y tienen políticas paralelas, pero que la fuerza principal que empuja estas políticas, es Rusia.

10.- RICO GALAN dijo que la influencia Chino-comunista en América Latina es insignificante.

11.- Después de aproximadamente una hora, nuestra entrevista terminó abruptamente, porque un guardia de la oficina del Director de la Prisión vino a llevarse a RICO GALAN pues que su abogado quería verlo. Sólo lo retuve un minuto más y muy a nuestro pesar nos despedimos con un fuerte apretón de manos

12.- Todo lo anterior revela claramente que RICO GALAN es un convencido y ferviente revolucionario. De acuerdo con lo que dijo, creo que está asociado a una causa victoriosa. Tenía muy alta la moral y muy buena apariencia.

13.- Regresé a la Penitenciaría de Lecumberri aproximadamente a las diecisiete quince horas de esa misma tarde para otra charla con RICO GALAN. La puerta principal estaba cerrada. Toqué y un guardia abrió una pequeña mirilla. Pedí ver al Director, pero el guardia me dijo que no se encontraba. Le expliqué quién era yo y qué era lo que deseaba, pero cuando el guardia oyó el nombre de RICO GALAN, dijo que era imposible verlo y cerró la mirilla. Un momento después toqué de nuevo. Le pregunté al guardia que si podía pasarle un mensaje a RICO

GALAN. Me respondió que éso era también imposible; que sólo el Director podía hacerlo. En realidad el guardia estaba cumpliendo con su deber.

LUIGI DE MARCHI.

TRADUCCION DE LA CARTA DE PRESENTACION QUE LUIGI DE MARCHI ENTREGO A VICTOR RICO GALAN.

Estimado señor:

Me permito presentarme ante usted - LUIGI DE MARCHI, italiano, colaborador del periódico " Corrispondenza Socialista ", de Roma.

Estoy efectuando una gira por América Latina. Un amigo suyo y compañero mío de labores, CARLO COCCIOLI, a quien vi en Roma en diciembre antes de su partida para París y de la mía para América Latina, me habló de usted y me pidió hacerle una visita. Por lo tanto quisiera aprovechar esta visita para tener un cambio de puntos de vista con usted.

Le ruego tenga la gentileza de concederme un poco de su tiempo.

Respetuosamente

LUIGI DE MARCHI.

SECRET

10 JAN 1967

TO: The Commissioner
Immigration and Naturalization Service

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: RICO Galan, Ana Maria
aka: MENDIZABAL Lizalde, Carmen
MENDEZ Mendizabal, Ana
MENDIZABAL, Ana

1. Reference is made to your request dated 12 December 1966 concerning Subject (File No. A14 546 455). The files of this office contain the following information pursuant to the request.

2. According to a press release from the Mexico City Police Department on 16 August 1966, Subject was reported to be one of 49 persons arrested for conducting a school of guerrilla warfare, with the purpose of overthrowing the government of Mexico. Victor RICO Galan, Subject's brother and one of the leaders of the group, admitted that the school was operated by the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MRP). Subject was one of nine members of the group indicted on 22 August 1966 for conspiracy, incitement to rebellion, and accumulation of arms.

3. An article published in the Mexican daily newspaper El Dia, dated 23 August 1966, stated that Subject admitted that meetings were held in her home to discuss the activities of the MRP.

4. According to information dated 2 July-28 October 1953 from a source of unknown reliability, one Carmen H. de MENDIZABAL, probably identical with Subject, had acted as a teacher at the Communist Universidad Obrera de Mexico.

Rico-Galan

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

CS COPY FILED IN 100-2-52

SECRET

FILE IN 201-336894

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy filed in 100-2-52

SECRET

5. According to information dated 5 December 1955 from a usually reliable source, one Carmen H. de MENDIZABAL, probably identical with Subject, was listed as a voting member of the Sociedad de la URSS (SAURSS, Society of Friends of the Soviet Union; a Communist front organization).

6. For further information regarding Subject you are referred to TDCS-314/10347-66; subject: Arrest of Subversives Headed by Victor RICO-Galan; Pemex Explosion in Poza Rica, Veracruz. A copy is attached for your retention.

CSCI-316/00191-67

Encl. 1 name check
1 attachment as stated above

RID/CE: JMA/PB/bdt

BASED ON: MEXI-3416
HMMA-30265
HMM-516 (LIQUEUR)
HMM-1394 (LIFTER)
201-336474

FILE IN: 100-2-82

Copy filed in 100-2-82

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FILE IN 201-336474 (RICO-GALAN, Victor)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-336494
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 50

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	SA	5	MD
2		6	EI
3		7	CA
4		8	

FROM Dissem By 24

ACTION C/WH/COG-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CSDO TIME 2045 3

INFO FILE, CSDO, VR, C/CI, C/WH-6, C/EUR-4, C/CA-2, C/DO-7, C/FI-2, C/SB-5, DDP, ADDP, C/FE-8, C/CCS-3, C/CSPS

S E C R E T 132323Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9925

14 JAN 67 IN 77585

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ROME

RYBAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 9893 (IN 7[illegible]) *

1. LEEHOLD HAD SUCCESSFUL ONE HOUR MEETING WITH RICO GALAN AT LECUMBERRI PENITENTIARY MORNING 13 JANUARY. MEETING ENDED ABRUPTLY BY CALL FROM DIRECTOR OF PRISON THAT LAWYER THERE TO SEE RICO.

2. LEEHOLD HAD LETTER INTRODUCING HIMSELF AS ITALIAN WRITER FOR "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA" AND AS ACQUAINTANCE OF CARLO COCCIOLI, ITALIAN PRO-COMMIE JOURNALIST WHO FRIEND OF RICO IN MEXICO AND WHO CURRENTLY IN EUROPE. AS RESULT RICO ASSUMED AND ACCEPTED LEEHOLD AS FELLOW MARXIST AND FRIENDLY RAPPORT ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY. MOST PROBABLE THAT RICO EXPRESSED HIS REAL THOUGHTS IN DISCUSSION AND ANSWER TO QUESTIONS.

3. IN BRIEF, RICO REVEALED HIMSELF AS CONVINCED, UNREPENTANT, FERVENT REVOLUTIONARY SEEING VIOLENT REVOLUTION "INDISPENSABLE" THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA SINCE PEACEFUL ROAD TO NECESSARY CHANGES "BLOCKED EVERYWHERE". DESCRIBED MEXICO AS "APPARENT DEMOCRACY BUT REALLY POLICE STATE TIGHTLY HELD", WHERE STRENGTH OF "POPULAR

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9925 S E C R E T

MOVEMENTS ON THE RISE. EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT REVOLUTION WILL WIN IN GUATEMALA AND VENEZUELA. CHARACTERIZED CASTRO AS GREAT REVOLUTIONARY LEADER AND TACTICIAN BUT NOT ABLE PLAY ROLE AS LIBERATOR OF LATIN AMERICA SINCE HE IS TOO DEPENDENT ON SOVIETS WHO TIGHTLY CONTROL HIM. SIAD CASTRO INFLUENCE DOMINANT WITHIN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, ALL CENTRAL AMERICA, COLOMBIA. SOVIETS DOMINANT IN CHILE, ARGENTINA AND MEXICO. SAID CHICOM GROUPS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA ARE THE SMALLEST AND MOST DISREPUTABLE.

4. COS AND LEEHOLD BRIEFED LIENVOY/2 AFTER MEETING. BELIEVE MEXICANS PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE THAT MEETING CONFIRMED THEIR ASSESSMENT OF RICO AS UNREPENTANT REVOLUTIONARY. LEEHOLD ATTEMPTING SEE RICO AGAIN AFTERNOON 13 JAN.

5. LEEHOLD ETA WASHINGTON 1600 14 JANUARY EASTERN 934. PLEASE ADVISE WIFE.

SECRET SIM Has Put LIENVOY/2 in Contact with Leehold

BT

SECRET

SECRET

Addenda, 17 January 1967, at Headquarters

1. My offer to Rico Galan (para 4) to pay him for an article he might write for CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA was made at the suggestion of LIENVOY/2.

2. The only time Rico asked me not to quote him (in any article I might write) was after he had finished telling me that Castro was too dependent on the Russians (para 8). Of course, I agreed. Also, Rico qualified his comment that Castro was a great leader by saying Castro was unpredictable; he would say one thing one day and do something different the next day.

3. Regarding the abrupt ending of the meeting after just one hour (para 10) I think it is probable that this came about through an order coming down from LITEMPO/8.

4. General Comment: I was given a fairly rough time by the authorities at the Lecumberri penitentiary. The Director told me in no uncertain terms that I could not bring a bottle of whiskey to Rico which I had in my ALITALIA bag. On my way to the main reception area where the interview was held, I had to go through several offices and guards. At one point I was asked for my passport and the guards were quite indignant when I told them that I had left my passport at the hotel. When I showed them my Italian calling card instead, they were not at all satisfied but let me pass on to the next processing point. Then I was taken to a private cell for a body search. I also had to sign in and out, presumably like any other visitor to the penitentiary.

5. The above incidents, though unpleasant for me at the time, indicate that LITEMPO/8 had not made the Lecumberri authorities witting of my true mission.

L.D.S.

L. A. DeSanti
Office of WH/SAO

SECRET

Translation of letter of introduction to Rico Galan

12 January 1967

Dear Sir:

Permit me to introduce myself: Luigi De Marchi, an Italian writer for the periodical "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA" of Rome.

In brief, I am on a tour of Latin America. A friend of yours and a fellow journalist acquaintance of mine, Carlo Coccioli, whom I saw in Rome in December before he left for Paris and I left for Latin America, mentioned your name to me and asked me to pay you a visit. Here I am. I would also like to take advantage of this visit to have an exchange of views with you.

I beg you to have the kindness to give me a little of your time.

Respectfully,

Luigi De Marchi

19 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : LEEHOLD'S Contacts with LIENVOY/2 on Rico Galan case, Mexico City, 11-13 January 67

REFERENCE: Mexico City 9890 (IN 75995), 11 Jan 67

1. Reference reported that the Mexico City Station put LIENVOY/2 in telephone contact with the undersigned on 11 January. Following is a full account of my subsequent contacts with LIENVOY/2 on 12-13 January on the Rico Galan case. L/2 served as cut-out between the Station and LITEMPO/8 in arranging my interview with Rico Galan at the Lecumberri penitentiary on 13 January.

2. The evening of 11 January L/2 phoned me at my hotel and asked to see me the next morning; he suggested having breakfast together at my hotel at 0830. He came on time and we spent about an hour together. He stated that his purpose was to find out for LITEMPO/8 what my cover story and detailed plan were for the interview with Rico. At the outset he wanted to know whether I was an American or Italian citizen. He must also have been curious about my exact relationship with the Agency, but did not probe at all, and of course I refrained from volunteering any info.

3. L/2 seemed satisfied with my cover as an Italian journalist on a tour of Latin America for the Rome periodical, CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA. He approved also of the idea of my mentioning Carlo Coccioli to Rico as a fellow journalist who had asked me in Italy in December to pay Rico a visit during my forthcoming trip to Mexico. L/2 expressed the view, however, that it was rather unlikely that Rico would agree to see me. He said in Mexico prisoners in general and especially Rico, were very suspicious and rarely wanted to see strangers in prison. He then gave me a briefing on

Rico which painted Rico as an extremely evil and clever character, who did not possess one ounce of sincerity, and who would never cease being a Marxist revolutionary, for stripped of his Marxist propaganda weapons Rico was a nobody - and Rico did not want to be a nobody.

4. I told L/2 briefly of my successful experience with a similar case in the Philippines. He commented that it was easier to be successful in the Philippines "for the level of Culture there, perhaps, is not as high as here."

5. We parted with the understanding that L/2 would phone me at the COS's office later that morning after his meeting with LITEMPO/8. When he called, at about 11:00, L/2 said LITEMPO/8 liked the cover story and the plan but he wanted to increase the chances that Rico would see me through the following manouver. LI/8 wanted to send Elena Garro De PAZ (the same woman who had brought out Rico's signed statement of his willingness to tell all in return for his freedom) to Rico carrying my calling card and an issue of my periodical; she would then persuade Rico to see me.

6. During a later phone conversation with L/2 I pointed out the risk involved in bringing Elena Garro into the operation. (The Station's position was definitely against her involvement). Being wealthy, influential, unpredictable and uncontrollable, Elena Garro, I pointed out, might make a phone call to the periodical in Rome and expose our hand. L/2 reported back to LI/8, who agreed with our position. L/8 then came up with the idea of my writing a letter of introduction for Rico and requesting an interview. I agreed to this scheme. Later that evening I received instructions from L/2 that at 11:00 the next morning I should go to the office of the Director of Lecumberri penitentiary and request to see Rico. The previous day L/2 had stated that LITEMPO/8 wanted to go over the "whole agenda" with me before I went to see Rico, but plans apparantly changed and I did not have any contact with LITEMPO/8.

7. At the meeting with Rico I personally handed Rico the letter of introduction, and got it back from him after he had read it. In the middle of our interview Rico asked to have the letter again and I handed it to him. My plan had been not to have the letter end up in Rico's hands if possible, but the abrupt ending of the meeting prevented my getting it back. During the briefing of L/2 by the COS and

me after my meeting with Rico, we asked that LITEMPO/8 try to get this letter back from Rico through the penitentiary authorities. L/2 agreed that it would be a good idea to get the letter back and said he would discuss this matter with LITEMPO/8.

ZBL
Zeno B. LEEHOLD
Office of WH/SAO

Distribution:
1-Rico Galan's 201-336474
1-WH/1 LIENVOY/2
1-WH/SAO
1-WH/COG

SECRET

[illegible] CON VICTOR RICO [illegible]

16 enero 1967

1.- El [illegible] cuando [illegible] una hora en [illegible] Penitenciaría de Lecumberri el [illegible] del [illegible] el cual en el salón [illegible] civiles [illegible] en el [illegible] civiles presentes y creo que [illegible].

2.- RICO GALÁN y yo llegamos simultáneamente al lugar de la entrevista. Después de un intercambio de saludos y un [illegible] en cuestión de [illegible], le entregué a RICO GALÁN mi carta de presentación, una copia de la cual adjunto. Él la leyó cuidadosamente y entonces comentó que le daba gusto conocerme. Inquirió sobre su amigo CARLO COCCIOLI, y simplemente le respondí que lo vi en Roma antes de su salida hacia París y que se encontraba bien. Al terminar nuestra reunión, RICO GALÁN me pidió diera saludos a COCCIOLI cuando yo regresara a Italia, y desde luego le prometí que así lo haría. También le expliqué a RICO GALÁN que le traía una botella de whiskey pero que los guardias no me permitieron introducirla. Creo que él apreció este gesto.

3.- Debido a mi conexión con COCCIOLI, que es un periodista pro-comunista y amigo de RICO GALÁN desde hace muchos años, [illegible] por el nombre de mi periódico, *Correspondencia Socialista*, [illegible] aparentemente que yo soy un [illegible] marxista y me aceptó como tal. Se expresó en forma [illegible] y creo que reveló sus pensamientos verdaderos durante nuestra discusión y al responder a mis preguntas. Inmediatamente se estableció entre nosotros una corriente amistosa.

4.- Yo expliqué desde luego que estaba efectuando una gira por América Latina para estudiar las condiciones y los movimientos revolucionarios. Le pedí que si [illegible] ya podía escribir algo acerca de él para el periódico Correspondencia Socialista. RICO GALÁN aceptó. También le dije que le agradaría si deseaba escribir un artículo para mi periódico. Lo aceptó de buena gana, pero antes me dijo que quería ver un ejemplar del periódico para saber su línea y formato.

5.- La primera pregunta importante fue que cómo miraba la situación revolucionaria en América Latina. Le pregunté si pensaba que era necesaria una revolución violenta para el desarrollo de América Latina. Respondió que sí [illegible] y [illegible] mente que una revolución violenta es indispensable en todo

8.- Pedí a RICO GALAN me diera su concepto y una total evaluación de FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. Dijo, antes que nada, que si CASTRO RUZ es comunista o qué clase de comunista, nadie lo sabe. Que es un gran líder revolucionario y un gran táctico pero que no puede jugar el papel de Libertador de Latinoamérica porque depende demasiado de Rusia y que esta nación lo controla estrechamente. Pienso que RICO GALAN quiso decir que CASTRO se ha convertido en un instrumento de los soviéticos. También dijo que ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA quería que Cuba rompiera las cadenas soviéticas, pero que CASTRO no es capaz de hacerlo. Con respecto al paradero del CHE GUEVARA, dijo que tal vez ni el propio FIDEL CASTRO sabe dónde está.

9.- En relación con los conflictos Cubano-soviéticos, RICO GALAN dijo que son más aparentes que reales. Luego le pedí me nombrase países que principalmente tengan influencia cubana o soviética. Respondió que CASTRO tiene influencia dominante dentro de los movimientos revolucionarios en Venezuela, Guatemala, todo Centroamérica y Colombia. Que los soviéticos tienen influencia dominante en Chile, Argentina y México. Agregó sin embargo que en México CASTRO y Moscú se ven frente a frente y tienen políticas paralelas, pero que la fuerza principal que empuja estas políticas, es Rusia.

10.- RICO GALAN dijo que la influencia Chino-comunista en América Latina es insignificante.

11.- Después de aproximadamente una hora, nuestra entrevista terminó abruptamente, porque un guardia de la oficina del Director de la Prisión vino a llevarse a RICO GALAN pues que su abogado quería verlo. Sólo lo retuvo un minuto más y muy a nuestro pesar nos despedimos con un fuerte apretón de manos.

12.- Todo lo anterior revela claramente que RICO GALAN es un convencido y ferviente revolucionario. De acuerdo con lo que dijo, creo que está asociado a una causa victoriosa. Tenía muy alta la moral y muy buena apariencia.

13.- Regresé a la Penitenciaría de Lecumberri aproximadamente a las diecisiete quince horas de esa misma tarde para otra charla con RICO GALAN. La puerta principal estaba cerrada. Toqué y un guardia abrió una pequeña mirilla. Pedí ver al Director, pero el guardia me dijo que no se encontraba. Le expliqué quién era yo y qué era lo que deseaba, pero cuando el guardia oyó el nombre de RICO GALAN, dijo que era imposible verlo y cerró la mirilla. Un momento después toqué de nuevo. Le pregunté al guardia que si podía pasarle un mensaje a RICO

GALAN. Me respondió que éso era también imposible; que sólo el Director podía hacerlo. En realidad el guardia estaba cumpliendo con su deber.

LUIGI DE MARCHI.

TRADUCCION DE LA CARTA DE PRESENTACION QUE LUIGI DE MARCHI ENTREGO A VICTOR RICO GALAN.

Estimado señor:

Me permito presentarme ante usted - LUIGI DE MARCHI, italiano, colaborador del periódico " Corrispondenza Socialista ", de Roma.

Estoy efectuando una gira por América Latina. Un amigo suyo y compañero mío de labores, CARLO COCCIOLI, a quien vi en Roma en diciembre antes de su partida para París y de la mía para América Latina, me habló de usted y me pidió hacerle una visita. Por lo tanto quisiera aprovechar esta visita para tener un cambio de puntos de vista con usted.

Le ruego tenga la gentileza de concederme un poco de su tiempo.

Respetuosamente

LUIGI DE MARCHI.

Questions to Fr. [illegible] Pric Colm during "interview" [illegible] 6 Jan 67

1. Do you think a violent Communist revolution is a necessary stage in the development of Latin America?

2. Do you agree with the view expressed by Fidel Castro that most Latin America countries are ripe for violent revolution?

3. In your view, which groups and leaders have the biggest potential for leading revolutionary movements in Latin America? Do you think guerrilla warfare can bring Communism to any L.A. Country?

4. In your view which ~~regimes~~ countries are most successful in coping with their internal problems.

5. In your view, what impact is Fidel Castro ~~having~~ ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] revolution ~~on~~ Latin America?

6. Who is doing more to promote Communist revolutions in Latin America, Cuba, the Soviet Union or China. How do you see the role of each country?

7. How do the revolutionary theories of Cuba, Moscow and Peking differ from each other as applied to Latin America.

8. In your view, are the Soviets using Castro as an instrument to promote their revolutionary line and interests, or is Castro's line opposed to the Soviets in Latin America.

9. Is the Alliance for Progress having much effect in promoting economic development and political stability in Latin America?

10. Can Europe play more of a role in Latin America to promote economic development? How?

11. It is said in journalistic circles that the Soviets resent and oppose Castro's tactics in Latin America because they undermine the position of the orthodox Communist Parties loyal to Moscow. It is also said that the Soviets are plotting to eliminate Fidel Castro.
Is this information correct?
If so, do you think Castro is aware of the Soviet plans?
Did Castro ever discuss with you his conflicts with Moscow? What is his solution?

12. In your view how large is the Castro apparatus operating in Latin America to promote guerrilla warfare and revolutions. From what elements of society do the Cubans get their support?

13. Is China an obstacle to the expansion of Cuban and Soviet influence in Latin America?

14. How serious, in your opinion, is the discord between Havana and Moscow regarding revolution in Latin America?

15. The Italian Communist Party is believed to be the "directing" Party" for several Latin America Communist Parties. In your view, how influential is the role of the Italian CP in Latin America.

16. What is the effect in Latin America of the Sino-Soviet split and of the crisis in international Communism?

17. I would be interested in your observations and comments on the Red Guards and the Chinese "Cultural Revolution."

18. You may have heard that the Yougoslav ex-Communist leader, Djilas, was released from prison on New Year's Day. How do ~~do~~ you view Djilas, what do you think of him?

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI ATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WH/1		
2	[illegible]		
3	[illegible]	1/19	[illegible]
4		98	
5	Paula [illegible]		
6			

ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY	☐
APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION	☐
COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN	☐
CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE	☐

Remarks:

The attached memos give a full account of my activities in Mexico City & of my meeting with Pino [illegible].

W.A. De Sant
WH/SAO

[illegible]

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE 19 Jan 67

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

SECRET

19 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : LEEHOLD'S Contacts with LIENVOY/2 on Rico Galan case, Mexico City, 11-13 January 67

REFERENCE: Mexico City 9890 (IN 75995), 11 Jan 67

1. Reference reported that the Mexico City Station put LIENVOY/2 in telephone contact with the undersigned on 11 January. Following is a full account of my subsequent contacts with LIENVOY/2 on 12-13 January on the Rico Galan case. L/2 served as out-out between the Station and LITEMPO/8 in arranging my interview with Rico Galan at the Lecumberri penitentiary on 13 January.

2. The evening of 11 January L/2 phoned me at my hotel and asked to see me the next morning; he suggested having breakfast together at my hotel at 0830. He came on time and we spent about an hour together. He stated that his purpose was to find out for LITEMPO/8 what my cover story and detailed plan were for the interview with Rico. At the outset he wanted to know whether I was an American or Italian citizen. He must also have been curious about my exact relationship with the Agency, but did not probe at all, and of course I refrained from volunteering any info.

3. L/2 seemed satisfied with my cover as an Italian journalist on a tour of Latin America for the Rome periodical, CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA. He approved also of the idea of my mentioning Carlo Coccioli to Rico as a fellow journalist who had asked me in Italy in December to pay Rico a visit during my forthcoming trip to Mexico. L/2 expressed the view, however, that it was rather unlikely that Rico would agree to see me. He said in Mexico prisoners in general and especially Rico, were very suspicious and rarely wanted to see strangers in prison. He then gave me a briefing on

[illegible]

Rico which painted Rico as an extremely evil and clever character, who did not possess one ounce of sincerity, and who would never cease being a Marxist revolutionary, for stripped of his Marxist propaganda weapons Rico was a nobody - and Rico did not want to be a nobody.

4. I told L/2 briefly of my successful experience with a similar case in the Philippines. He commented that it was easier to be successful in the Philippines "for the level of culture there, perhaps, is not as high as here."

5. We parted with the understanding that L/2 would phone me at the COS's office later that morning after his meeting with LITEMPO/8. When he called, at about 11:00, L/2 said LITEMPO/8 liked the cover story and the plan but he wanted to increase the chances that Rico would see me through the following maneuver. LI/8 wanted to send Elena Garro De PAZ (the same woman who had brought out Rico's signed statement of his willingness to tell all in return for his freedom) to Rico carrying my calling card and an issue of my periodical; she would then persuade Rico to see me.

6. During a later phone conversation with L/2 I pointed out the risk involved in bringing Elena Garro into the operation. (The Station's position was definitely against her involvement). Being wealthy, influential, unpredictable and uncontrollable, Elena Garro, I pointed out, might make a phone call to the periodical in Rome and expose our hand. L/2 reported back to LI/8, who agreed with our position. L/8 then came up with the idea of my writing a letter of introduction for Rico and requesting an interview. I agreed to this scheme. Later that evening I received instructions from L/2 that at 11:00 the next morning I should go to the office of the Director of Lecumberri penitentiary and request to see Rico. The previous day L/2 had stated that LITEMPO/8 wanted to go over the "whole agenda" with me before I went to see Rico, but plans apparantly changed and I did not have any contact with LITEMPO/8.

7. At the meeting with Rico I personally handed Rico the letter of introduction, and got it back from him after he had read it. In the middle of our interview Rico asked to have the letter again and I handed it to him. My plan had been not to have the letter end up in Rico's hands if possible, but the abrupt ending of the meeting prevented my getting it back. During the briefing of L/2 by the COS and

me after my meeting with Rico, we asked that LITEMPO/8 try to get this letter back from Rico through the penitentiary authorities. L/2 agreed that it would be a good idea to get the letter back and said he would discuss this matter with LITEMPO/8.

Z.B.L.
Zeno B. LEEHOLD
Office of WH/SAO

Distribution:
1-Rico Galan's 201-336474
1-WH/1 LIENVOY/2
1-WH/SAO
1-WH/COG

SECRET

17 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/COG

SUBJECT : Possible Re-Interview of Victor Rico Galan (201-336474).

REFERENCE : Mexico City 9925 (IN 77986), 14 Jan 67

1. Reference summarized the undersigned's first interview with Rico Galan at the Lecumberri penitentiary on 13 January. At that interview Rico apparently assumed and accepted that I was a fellow Marxist journalist, on a tour of Latin America for the Italian periodical, CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA. He talked freely as a revolutionary in general terms about revolutionary movements and leaders in Latin America, including the Cuba and Soviet roles.

2. My attempt to have a second interview with Rico was not successful, due to circumstances beyond my and Rico's control. The question now is whether we should plan to go through with a second interview. The purpose would be to obtain further information on revolutionary movements and leaders. (The requirements of the Mexican Government were satisfied with the first interview).

3. One possibility might be for me to see Rico in about 10-12 days, ostensibly after a return trip to Mexico from Panama (or Guatemala or some other country). I could mention to Rico the names of one or two Communist leaders of the country visited who had briefed me; I could also reveal some other deception or slanted information; including names of Castroite leaders; then wait for, or elicit, Rico's comments and observations.

4. As noted above, the purpose of a follow-up interview would be to obtain more detailed information from Rico on the Castro and Soviet roles in supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America, not merely to obtain further information on the country visited. The approval of the Mexican Government (LITEMPO/8) would again be necessary for such a follow-up interview.

Louis A. DeSanti
Office of WH/SAO

Distribution:
Orig & ~~1~~ - Addressee
1 - WH/SAO Chrono

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A	TOTAL COPIES 50	
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.	**SECRET**		REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
X-REF TO FILE NO.	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		1 / 5
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐			2 / 6
DESTROY ☐ SIG.			3 / 7
Dissem by 24			4 / 8
ACTION C/WH/COG-5 ☑ RID COPY	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED	UNIT CSDO	TIME 2045Z BY B

INFO FILE, CSDO/VR, C/CI, C/WH-6, C/EKR-4, C/CA-2, C/DO-7, C/FI-2, C/SB-5, DDP, ADDP, C/FE-8, C/CCS-3, C/CSPS

S E C R E T 132323Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9925

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ROME

14 Jan 67 77985

RYBAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 9892 (IN 7?775) *

1. LEEHOLD HAD SUCCESSFUL ONE HOUR MEETING WITH RICO GALAN AT LECUMBERRI PENITENTIARY MORNING 13 JANUARY. MEETING ENDED ABRUPTLY BY CALL FROM DIRECTOR OF PRISON THAT LAWYER THERE TO SEE RICO.

2. LEEHOLD HAD LETTER INTRODUCING HIMSELF AS ITALIAN WRITER FOR "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA" AND AS ACQUAINTANCE OF CARLO COCCIOLI, ITALIAN PRO-COMMIE JOURNALIST WHO FRIEND OF RICO IN MEXICO AND WHO CURRENTLY IN EUROPE. AS RESULT RICO ASSUMED AND ACCEPTED LEEHOLD AS FELLOW MARXIST AND FRIENDLY RAPPORT ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY. MOST PROBABLE THAT RICO EXPRESSED HIS REAL THOUGHTS IN DISCUSSION AND ANSWER TO QUESTIONS.

3. IN BRIEF, RICO REVEALED HIMSELF AS CONVINCED, UNREPENTANT, FERVENT REVOLUTIONARY SEEING VIOLENT REVOLUTION "INDISPENSABLE" THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA SINCE PEACEFUL ROAD TO NECESSARY CHANGES "BLOCKED EVERYWHERE". DESCRIBED MEXICO AS "APPARENT DEMOCRACY BUT REALLY POLICE STATE TIGHTLY HELD", WHERE STRENGTH OF "POPULAR

MOVEMENTS ON THE RISE. EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT REVOLUTION WILL WIN IN GUATEMALA AND VENEZUELA. CHARACTERIZED CASTRO AS GREAT REVOLUTIONARY LEADER AND TACTICIAN BUT NOT ABLE PLAY ROLE AS LIBERATOR OF LATIN AMERICA SINCE HE IS TOO DEPENDENT ON SOVIETS WHO TIGHTLY CONTROL HIM. SIAD CASTRO INFLUENCE DOMINANT WITHIN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, ALL CENTRAL AMERICA, COLOMBIA. SOVIETS DOMINANT IN CHILE, ARGENTINA AND MEXICO. SAID CHICOM GROUPS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA ARE THE SMALLEST AND MOST DISREPUTABLE.

4. COS AND LEEHOLD BRIEFED LIENVOY/2 AFTER MEETING. BELIEVE MEXICANS PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE THAT MEETING CONFIRMED THEIR ASSESSMENT OF RICO AS UNREPENTANT REVOLUTIONARY. LEEHOLD ATTEMPTING SEE RICO AGAIN AFTERNOON 13 JAN.

5. LEEHOLD ETA WASHINGTON 1600 14 JANUARY EASTERN 934. PLEASE ADVISE WIFE.

SECRET STM HQs Put Lienvoy/2 in Contact with LeeHold

SECRET

BT

[illegible]

abo
1a

Lecumberri penitentiary

7. as held

with

armed ;

also

; and there

civilians present from

).

greetings

it

inquired about
Coccioli ;

*

[illegible] The [illegible]

[illegible] of

[illegible] the [illegible] his

[illegible] to [illegible] Cuba

[illegible] to [illegible], and

course I [illegible] and I would).

I also [illegible] to [illegible] that I [illegible]

3. Because of my [illegible] with a [illegible] (a [illegible] Communist

Italian

journalist [illegible] who has lived in Mexico for several years, [illegible] periodical, CORRESPONDENT [illegible])

[illegible] and

[illegible]

Most [illegible] the [illegible] I believe

[illegible] rights

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] for
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible].
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible].
I also said that I'd like another
to write an article for my
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]. He also found this
idea agreeable, but qualified
his approval by saying he first wanted to
take a look at the [illegible] to see
its [illegible] and format.

5. My first [illegible] question
was how he viewed the revolutionary
situation in Latin America;
did he think guerrilla revolution
a necessary stage in the [illegible]
of Latin America. He answered
quickly and emphatically that
guerrilla [illegible] [illegible] throughout
Latin America were "inevitable,"
for the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]!"
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible],
[illegible]

people are peasants and the majority [illegible] and opposed to armed struggle.

e. Venezuela: Both the CP and MIR adhered to armed struggle, but they have now abandoned it. I asked why. He said both movements confined their efforts mostly to the cities and took the form of terrorist acts. Their tactics did not get the [illegible] [illegible] but the Frente de Liberacion Nacional (FALN) by Douglas Bravo does [illegible] the armed struggle, and their effort [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] asked me [illegible] [illegible] a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Ana Maria Menendez Rodriguez, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Venezuela and [illegible] [illegible] FALN [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] a [illegible]

(apparently dismissingly:)

7. Rico described Mexico as an "a-political state, tightly held." Here the "popular movements" are sure to rise. In answer to my question as to who was leading these "popular" and revolutionary movements in Mexico and Latin America, Rico replied that there was no leader like Castro around, ~~[illegible]~~ and the leaders would come from the students, intellectuals and [illegible].

7. I asked Rico for his opinion and total evaluation of Fidel Castro. First, he said, Castro is a Communist and what kind of a Communist he is, nobody knows. He is a great revolutionary leader and a great [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of Latin America [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. I think he [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and a prisoner [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Soviets. He thought Che Guevara really wanted to break away from the Soviet alliance, but Castro is not able to do this. As to the whereabouts of Che, Pico said that probably not even Fidel Castro knows where he is.

9. Regarding Cuban-Soviet conflicts, Pico said they are more apparent than real. Then I asked him to name countries of primary Cuban or Soviet influence. He then said Castro has dominant influence within the revolutionary movements in Venezuela, Guatemala, all of Central America, and Colombia. The Soviets hold dominant influence in Chile, Argentina and Mexico. However, he added, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

8.

(our meeting ended abruptly, he

a. After [illegible] [illegible] him a guard [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] prison [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Paris; [illegible] this [illegible] [illegible] to see him. I held him back for an extra minute, and then we parted, reluctantly, with a warm handshake.

b. The foregoing [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible]

2. I returned [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. I [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] a letter [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Director [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] I [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

the name of [illegible] Cuban, the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] impossible to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] later I knocked again. I asked the guard if he would deliver a message to Rice from me. He said that also was impossible, only the Director could do that. The guard certainly did his duty.

F

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

Dissem by 24

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH/COG-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/CI

S E C R E T 111950Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9890

DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC

11 JAN 67 75995

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 63461

STATION HAS PUT LIENVOY/2 IN CONTACT WITH LEEHOLD. L/2 SERVING AS CUT-OUT IN ARRANGING MEETING WITH RICO. MEETING DELAYED SLIGHTLY SINCE LITEMPO/8 OUT OF CITY.

S E C R E T

Re LeeHold ETA mexi

BT

NNNN

SECRET

14-00000

201-336474

IDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
ASSIFY TO FILE NO.
REF TO FILE NO.
ILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
ESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PA	5	CA
2		6	C
3	SS	7	H-TC
4		8	C

ACTION C/WH/COG

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/CCS

S E C R E T 041946Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9813

4 JAN 67 IN 71102

DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC

REF DIRECTOR 63461

RESERVATIONS CONFIRMED AT HOTEL GENEVE 8 JAN 67 FOR MR. LOUIS DE SANTI.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 4

ORIG : L.A. DESANTI/pap LAS ☐ FILE RID
UNIT : WH/COG/CA/PA ☐ INDEX
EXT : 2975 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 3 JANUARY 1967 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474 ✓

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 4 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 INFO: VR, FILE ☑ RID COPY C/RI/SD C/WH 6 C/CCS 3

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

S E C R E T 3 19 10Z CITE DIRECTOR 63461

TO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: DIR 61904

ZENO B. LEEHOLD ETA MEXICO CITY 8 JANUARY 2317 EASTERN 905. NO NEED MEET. PLEASE RESERVE ROOM AT GENEVE. ADVISE. LEEHOLD WILL CALL STATION MORNING 9 JAN.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CA/PA
C/WH/COG/CA
WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

3-2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THOMAS J. FLOR
for C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

13

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PA—	5	FI
2		6	FE
3	CA	7	
4	CI	8	

FROM HY

ACTION DC/WH/CCG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/CA 6, C/EUR 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CCS 3

S E C R E T 291512 CITE ROME 1666 (FILANDER ACTING)

ACTION

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REF DIRECTOR 62639 *

29 DEC 66 68117

1. COPIES TWO ARTICLES BY DE MARCHI IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER ISSUES CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA AIRMAILED TO REF, PARA 2 ADDRESS.

2. SINCE STATION HAS NO ACCESS TO DE MARCHI, WHO BESIDES NOT PROMINENT, AND DEPLUNGE CANNOT BE QUESTIONED, PER REF, PARA 1, CAN PROVIDE NO RELIABLE INFORMATION RE HIS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS. DE MARCHI RESIDES VIA TOLMINO 5, ROME, IS SECRETARY ITALIAN ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOGRAPHIC EDUCATION, ENGAGED BIRTH CONTROL RESEARCH.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

* RE PLAN TO USE DE MARCHI FOR COVER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG : L. DESANTI:jmg
UNIT : WH/COG/CA/PA
EXT : 2975
DATE : 28 DECEMBER 66

○ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

SECRET

ROUTING

1	PA —	5	C/WH/COG
2		6	
3	CA	7	
4	[illegible]	8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible] INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY [illegible]

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

PRIORITY

28 22 26 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 62639

TO ROME INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: ROME 1650 (IN 66483)

1. PLAN USE DE MARCHI COVER, SUGGESTED PARA 4 REF. DEEM BACKSTOPPING NOT NECESSARY. DO NOT INFORM DEPLUNGE.

2. HAS ANY ARTICLE BY DE MARCHI APPEARED IN LATEST TWO ISSUES OF CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA OR ELSEWHERE? IF SO PLS AIRMAIL TO SAME [redacted] ADDRESS MENTIONED DIRECTOR 61116. ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO CURRENT WHEREABOUTS DE MARCHI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CA L. A. DeSanti

WH/1 [illegible]

EUR/Cuba [illegible]

C/EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER 28-9

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
DISSEM BY 3 PER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	[illegible]	6	
2	CA-PA	7	
3	FI-TC	8	
4	D	9	
5		10	

ACTION C/WH/CAG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, C/WH 6, C/EUR 4, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, DDP, ADDP

SECRET 271105Z CITE ROME 1650 (GILANDER ACTING) 27 DEC 66 IN 66483

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 61614

B. ROME 1645 (IN 65727)

C. DIRECTOR 62160

1. REF B SUGGESTION WAS NOT THAT LEEHOLD POSE AS DEPLUNGE, BUT THAT DEPLUNGE BE REQUESTED PROVIDE NAME OF FICTIONAL ITALIAN JOURNALIST OSTENSIBLY WORKING FOR DEPLUNGE'S JOURNAL WHICH NAME LEEHOLD COULD ADOPT AS ALIAS. THUS IF DEPLUNE SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVES INQUIRY RE THIS JOURNALIST, HE CAN BACKSTOP.

2. IF HEADQUARTERS DESIRES, DEPLUNGE CAN BE ASKED PROVIDE NAME OF ACTUAL ITALIAN JOURNALIST. DISADVANTAGE IS IF LATER SUBSEQUENTLY ACTUALLY TRUCED AND QUERIED COULD DENY INVOLVEMENT.

3. FOR BEST BACKSTOP HOWEVER BELIEVE MOST EFFICIENT ENLIST DEPLUNGE ASSISTANCE AS OUTLINED ABOVESGO AT LEAST SOME INITIAL BACKSTOP PROVIDED BY HIM.

4. IF ONLY NAME OF NON-PROMINENT BUT ACTUAL

SECRET

ITALIAN JOURNALIST DESIRED WITH NO SUBSTANTIVE

BACKSTOP ARRANGEMENT, SUGGEST LUIGI DE MARCHI, PSU, OF CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA, CAMILO BENEVENTO, PSU, OFSLLAVORO ITALIANO, ENRICO LANDOLF, PSU, OF AVANTI AND LAVORO ITALIANO.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CI/CS-	5	C/WH/C06
2		6	PF
3	CA	7	FI
4	PA	8	IS

ACTION C/WH/C08 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, C/EUR 4, C/WH 6, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 231450Z CITE ROME 164[illegible]

23 [illegible] 35727

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REF DIRECTOR 61614

STATION HAS NO OBJECTION REF OPS PLAN, BUT SUGGESTS ACTUAL BACKSTOPPING WITH ITALIAN PUBLICATION BE AFFORDED LEEHOLD. ROME PREPARED, SUBJECT HQS CONCURRENCE, DISCUSS BACKSTOP WITH DEPLUNGE WHO EDITOR SMALL ITALIAN LEFTWING JOURNAL, LOCATED ROME. IN THIS DISCUSSION PROPOSE NOT MENTION LEEHOLD'S NAME. IF HQS AGREES ABOVE PROPOSAL, REQUEST ALIAS FOR LEEHOLD BE PROVIDED ROME.

S E C R E T

BT

BT

IS

RE PLAN TO EXPLOIT IMPRISONMENT VICTOR RICO GALAN

J. FLORES
WH/COG
EXT : 3481
DATE : 23 DEC 66

☐ FILE &
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TOTAL COPIES: 27

SECRET

ROUTING

1	C/WH/COG	5	
2	CA-OK	6	
3	FI-TC	7	
4	D	8	

DISSEM BY 22 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY C/EUR 4 C/WH 5 C/CCS 3
C/MPS/OT C/CA 2 C/CI 2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 62160

TO PRIORITY ROME INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR 61614

REVIEW REQUEST PARA 2A REF SHOWS THAT USE OF COVER AS ITALIAN EX-COMMUNIST POSES CERTAIN BUILT-IN DISADVANTAGES. THEREFORE REQUEST ROME ALSO PROVIDE NAME OF ITALIAN JOURNALIST WHO NOT TOO PROMINENT AND WHO NOT PREVIOUSLY COMMIE, BUT CLEARLY LINKED TO NON-COMMIE LEFT GROUP SUCH AS NENNI SOCIALISTS. BY-LINE SHOULD NOT BE APPEARING CURRENTLY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CA/PA P. L. Johnson

C/WH/1 C. Bustos (by phone)

~~EUR/CUBA~~ ____

C/EUR/

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ORIG : L.A.DESANTI/pap ☐ FILE RID
UNIT : WH/COG/CA/PA ☐ INDEX
EXT : 2075 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 22 DECEMBER 66 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1	FA	5	CI
2		6	C
3	FI-TC	7	D
4	CA	8	✗

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 INFO: VR , FILE ☑ RID COPY ILC C/WH 2 C/CA 3

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 23 18 06 Z CITE DIRECTOR

(REFERENCE NUMBER) 61904

TO MEXICO CITY
KAPOK TYPIC LIRAMA
REF: DIR 61614 *

PENDING COMPLETION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR "COVER" AND NOTIONAL IDENTITY, MR. LOUIS DE SANTI ETA MEXICO PROVISIONALLY SET FOR 6 JANUARY.

END OF MESSAGE

* PROPOSE SEND L. SANTI MEXICO TO INTERVIEW VICTOR RICO GALAN.

C/WH/COG/CA/PA C. [illegible]

~~[illegible]~~

WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

23-2

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

IG : T.J.FLORES
IT : C/WH/COG
T : 2975
TE : 22 DECEMBER 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	C/WH/C	5	RN
2	CA-PA	6	D
3	FI	7	
4	CI	8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY 22 PER ______ # ______

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY C/CA/RA 4 C/WH 6 C/CI C/FI 3
C/CA 3

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 22 18 08 Z CITE DIRECTOR 61614

TO PRIORITY ROME INFO: MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: MEXICO CITY 9716 (IN 64428) (NOT SENT ROME)

1. FYI. VICTOR RICO GALAN, CUBAN AGENT IMPRISONED MEXICO CITY ON CHARGES PLOTTING AGAINST MEXICAN GOVERNMENT, HAS SENT OUT FEELERS INDICATING THAT HE WISHES TO PROVIDE INFORMATION "EXPOSING CASTRO AND HIS AGENTS" IN EXCHANGE FOR RELEASE. STATION MEXICO CITY AND MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICIALS WORKING TOGETHER ON POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION. MATTER REVIEWED BY DAINOLD AND MEXICAN MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT DURING FORMER'S RECENT VISIT MEXICO CITY.

2. FOLLOWING PLAN EVOLVED AS FIRST STEP TO EXPLOIT INHERENT POSSIBILITIES. BEST ESTIMATE RICO'S MOTIVATION IS THAT HE WILL TRY TO TRADE MINIMAL INFORMATION FOR RELEASE:

A. SEND MR LOUIS DESANTI TO MEXICO TO INTERVIEW RICO GALAN USING DISGUISE AND POSING AS ITALIAN EX-COMMUNIST NOW JOURNALIST WITH LIBERAL JOURNAL.

B. ALTHOUGH TAKE FROM INTERVIEW NOT EXPECTED RESULT IN TOTAL REVELATION OF RICO'S ACTIVITY IT WILL PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR STAFFER ASSESSMENT AND MIGHT BE FOLLOWED UP WITH SUFFICIENT

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER 22-2 COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 61614

TO

PRESSURES TO INDUCE HIM TO TALK OR POSSIBLY TO BREAK HIM.

3. NAMES OF ITALIAN JOURNAL AND OF NOT TOO PROMINENT ITALIAN JOURNALIST AS DE SANTI ALIAS NOT YET SELECTED. SINCE ABOVE COVER WILL BE NEEDED ONLY FOR RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD, AND A LIMITED NUMBER OF MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICIALS WILL BE AWARE THAT IT IS A COVER, BELIEVE NO BACKSTOPPING ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE NECESSARY.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE ROME COMMENTS.

5. [illegible] WILL PROVIDE DATA REQUESTED REF BY SEPARATE CABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CA/PA

C/WH/1 J. Kaufman (in draft)

EUR/Cuba L. Raty (in draft)

C/EUR/4

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

14

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSEM BY 38

ACTION C/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, DDP, WH8, C/WH/COG5, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 212330Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9716 22D [illegible] 64428

DIRECTOR

KAPOK LIRAMA

REF: HMMA 30916

1. DURING 17 DECEMBER CONFERENCE WITH DAINOLD, LITEMPO/8 STATED THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN, NOW BEING HELD IN JAIL UNDER CHARGE OF CONSPIRING TO OVERTHROW GOM, HAS PROCLAIMED HIMSELF DISAFFECTED WITH CASTRO RUZ AND WILLING TO DISCUSS HIS PREVIOUS CONNECTION WITH CUBANS IN DETAIL. PRICE, WHICH IS TOO HIGH FOR MEXICANS, IS HIS RELEASE FROM CONFINEMENT. LITEMPO/8 ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD HAD SOME OF HIS BEST INTERROGATORS WORKING ON RICO GALAN, HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO EXTRACT ANY INFORMATION OF SIGNIFICANCE FROM HIM.

2. DAINOLD COMMENTED THAT HE HAD AVAILABLE A LEFTIST ITALIAN JOURNALIST WHOM HE REGARDED HIGHLY AS INTERROGATOR, AND WHO HAD RECENTLY HAD CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN DEBRIEFING A TOP HUK LEADER IN PHILIPPINES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS PERSON MIGHT USEFULLY BE INTRODUCED INTO RICO GALAN INTERROGATION. LITEMPO/8 AGREED, AND NOW EXPECTS HIM NEAR FUTURE.

Rico Galan

3. STATION NEEDS IDEN, COVER DESCRIPTION, PERSONALITY. **SECRET**

3

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9715 SECRET SECRET

BACKGROUND, AND PROBABLE ETA. SUGGEST IF POSSIBLE HE COME DURING CHRISTMAS WEEK. IF THIS NOT POSSIBLE, IMMEDIATELY AFTER 6 JANUARY TWELFTH NIGHT FIESTA.

4. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SENT BY REFERENCE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INS CFIS-1 Nogales 12/16

FBI - Rose

OIA - Col. Carey

CIA - Tenney

5. SUBVERSIVE

The newspaper, EL MEXICANO, published at San Luis, Sonora on November 16, [illegible], carries an article captioned, "The Lot Owners Union Now Does Not Show Signs of Activity." The story indicates that the Mexican Supreme Court had ruled that the expropriation of the lands belonging to the Ejido San Luis was legal. (Reference is made to Nogales, Arizona Intelligence Report of August 5, 1960.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

The Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) has held infrequent meetings about twice a month in San Luis, Sonora recently, according to a reliable source. In February, they plan to hold meetings weekly in connection with stepped-up activities during the coming political campaign. The local committee from San Luis, Sonora, headed by LORENZO-MOLINA-VILLA, recently were successful in forming a bloc or group of the PPS at Camp 57, Sonora. The source states this group has been organized strictly for political purposes and that the membership have not so far been indoctrinated as regular members of the PPS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

This source also reported concerning stories brought back from PPS headquarters at Hermosillo, Sonora recently by LORENZO MOLINA-VILLA. One of these alleges that two Americans with United States

Victor Rico Galan

Communist's credentials (reference is made to Nogales, Arizona Intelligence Report of November 4, [illegible]) had been instrumental in the arrest of RICO-GALAN and associates a few months ago by Mexican authorities. They are said to have gained the confidence of this group, furnished money for arms, and then denounced them to the Mexican government. They are believed to be CIA agents. Another incident was the occasion when two Americans with United States Communist's credentials visited the president of the PPS at Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico, who then communicated with VICENTE LOMBARDO-TOLEDANO, who in turn arranged for photographs of the men to be sent to the United States to be identified to see if they were United States Communists. It was said that they could not be identified and, therefore, were believed to be CIA agents. (CONFIDENTIAL)

A plenum of the PPS was to be held at Hermosillo, Sonora on December 9, [illegible]. (CONFIDENTIAL)

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE

AN FI
PS
ABSTRACT X INDEX X

MEXI

S E C R E T 061945Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9519

6 DEC 66 ... 53386

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

1. ACCORDING TO AMCONSUL VERACRUZ REPORT A-28 DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1966, THE EAST GERMAN CARGO SHIP, J.G. FICHTE LEFT VERACRUZ ON 18 NOV FOR HAVANA, CUBA, WITH THE FOLLOWING PASSENGERS: FERNANDO RICO GALAN, TEACHER, DOB: 1929; HIS WIFE GRACIELA BARRON DE RICO, DOB: 1929 AND THEIR CHILDREN MARIA P. RICO BARRON, DOB: 1963, MONICA RICO BARRON, DOB: 1964 AND GRACIELA RICO BARRON, DOB: 1965. THE RICO FAMILY GAVE THEIR ADDRESS AS CALLE BALBOA 22, COLONIA PORTALES, MEXICO 5, D.F.

TRAVEL TO

WIFE OF BROTHER OF VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-336474)

2. FERNANDO RICO IS THE BROTHER OF VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-336474). THE RICO FAMILY DID NOT SAY HOW LONG THEY PLANNED TO REMAIN IN CUBA.

3. INDEX FERNANDO RICO AND GRACIELA BARRON DE RICO TO P-7354.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MICROFILMED
DEC 30 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-336474
6 DEC 66

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
: COS, Mexico City

SUBJECT
: Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a piece written and signed by Victor RICO Galan (Attachment "A") which he gave to Elena Garro DE PAZ to pass to LNPURE. She handed it to IDENTITY who in turn gave it to Bernard A. Edgebrook. Attached also is a copy of the covering note written by Mrs. DE PAZ (Attachment "B") and rough translations of both pieces.

2. On 1 December COS gave LITEMPO-8 a photostatic copy of Attachment "A". LITEMPO-8 said that he too had received a copy of the piece which he had given to LITEMPO-4 who sent one of his officers to interview RICO. RICO readily admitted that the signature was his, that he and Mrs. DE PAZ had discussed the matter, that Mrs. DE PAZ had typed out the copy and had brought it to him in prison where he had signed it. LITEMPO-8 said also that RICO Galan had said that he was eager to talk to a ODFACT representative. LITEMPO-8 said that he had no objection to such an interview.

3. In the opinion of LITEMPO-8 the RICO Galan statement is merely a maneuver by which RICO Galan hopes to get out of jail by promising to supply information and to oppose Fidel CASTRO.'

ATTACHMENTS
"A" - Copy and translation of a piece written by Victor RICO Galan h/w
"B" - Covering note written by Mrs. DE PAZ. - h/w
"C" - IDENTITY - u/s/c

Distribution:
✓2-C/WHD w/Att A&B h/w, C u/s/c
4-Files

201-336474

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-30780	6 December 1966
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-30780

4. On 5 December, LITEMPO-4 told COS that RICO Galan is "almost crazy" for several reasons; confinement of course; his fear that his "friends" are going to kill him or that the Mexican Government will "arrange his death" and because he has learned that his wife, Inge, is sleeping with Manuel MARCUE Pardinas, editor of POLITICA. (NOTE: According to Mrs. DE PAZ, Rosendo Gomez Lorenzo of SUCESOS is pursuing Mrs. RICO Galan.) LITEMPO-4 commented that right now RICO Galan is willing to do almost anything to get out of jail.

Civia G Raquity

for / Willard C. CURTIS

CS COPY

SECRET

Attachment "A"
HMMA-30780
6 December 1966

(Translantion)

"6 November 1966, Mexico D.F.

"Having taken part in the serious discussions which arose between Fidel Castro and Che Guevara before the Dominican conflict on tactics, policies and agreements to follow in Latin America and which caused the disappearance of Che Guevara, I consider myself authorized to write a political testament to unmask Fidel Castro before the revolutionaries of Latin America as an agent of Stalinism. The fall of Caamano, the murder of the Peruvian leader Uceda, the crime of Turcios, etc., have been carried out by Castro agents, charged with the murder and destruction of everything that differs with Castro's line. (Rolf) Meiners (Huebner), (Miguel) Cruz (Ruiz) and myself have been delivered up by agents such as (Luis) Lizaldo, Menendez, and others to silence the truth that should be known by the Latin Americans. The next victim is Yon Sosa and many more who have hidden themselves for the moment from the assassins. My testimony would be political and ideological since I myself wrote many of Guevara's articles and it would omit nothing of names and details necessary to unmask Fidel Castro and his agents."

signed Victor Rico Galan

SECRET

ATT #1 To HMMA 30780 CS COPY 201-33[illegible]

SECRET

Attachment "A"
HMMA-30780
6 December 1966

(Translantion)

"6 November 1966, Mexico D.F.

"Having taken part in the serious discussions which arose between Fidel Castro and Che Guevara before the Dominican conflict on tactics, policies and agreements to follow in Latin America and which caused the disappearance of Che Guevara, I consider myself authorized to write a political testament to unmask Fidel Castro before the revolutionaries of Latin America as an agent of Stalinism. The fall of Caamano, the murder of the Peruvian leader Uceda, the crime of Turcios, etc., have been carried out by Castro agents, charged with the murder and destruction of everything that differs with Castro's line. (Rolf) Meiners (Huebner), (Miguel) Cruz (Ruiz) and myself have been delivered up by agents such as (Luis) Lizalde, Menendez, and others to silence the truth that should be known by the Latin Americans. The next victim is Yon Sosa and many more who have hidden themselves for the moment from the assassins. My testimony would be political and ideological since I myself wrote many of Guevara's articles and it would omit nothing of names and details necessary to unmask Fidel Castro and his agents."

signed Victor Rico Galan

SECRET

4H A

Noviembre 6 de 1966 Mexico D.F.

Habiendo tomado parte en las graves discusiones surgidas entre Fidel Castro y Che Guevara antes del conflicto de Santo Domingo, a proposito de las tácticas, lineas y pactos a seguir en America Latina y que ocasionaron la desaparición del Che Guevara me considero autorizado a escribir un testimonio politico que desenmascare a Fidel Castro ante los revolucionarios de la America Latina como a un agente del stalinismo. La derrota de Caamaño, el asesinato de Uceda el lfder peruano, el crimen de Turcios etc. han sido ejécutados por agentes castristas, encargados de asesinar y destruir a todo aquel que difiera de la linea castrista. Meiners, Cruz y yo mismo hemos sido entregados por agentes tales como Lizalde, Menendez y otros, para callar una verdad que debe ser conocida por los latinoamericanos. La próxima víctima es Yon Sosa y muchos más que en estos momentos se esconden de los asesinos. Mi testimonio sería politico e ideologico ya que yo mismo escribí muchos de los articulos de Guevara, sin escatimar todos los nombres y detalles necesarios para desenmascarar a Fidel Castro y sus agentes.

14-00000

SECRET

SEPERATE COVER ATTACHMENT

HMMA-30780

6 December 1966

IDENTITY

Second Secretary of the Embassy

Charles Thomas

SECRET

S/C ATT TO HMMA 30780

CS COPY

201-336474

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2/

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, RI WH/CA 8 [illegible] 201

S E C R E T 061945Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9519 6 Dec 66 33980

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

1. ACCORDING TO AMCONSUL VERACRUZ REPORT A-28 DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1966, THE EAST GERMAN CARGO SHIP, J.G. FICHTE LEFT VERACRUZ ON 18 NOV FOR HAVANA, CUBA, WITH THE FOLLOWING PASSENGERS: FERNANDO RICO GALAN, TEACHER, DOB: 1929; HIS WIFE GRACIELA BARRON DE RICO, DOB: 1929 AND THEIR CHILDREN MARIA P. RICO BARRON, DOB: 1963, MONICA RICO BARRON, DOB: 1964 AND GRACIELA RICO BARRON, DOB: 1965. THE RICO FAMILY GAVE THEIR ADDRESS AS CALLE BALBOA 22, COLONIA PORTALES, MEXICO 5, D.F.

2. FERNANDO RICO IS THE BROTHER OF VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-336474). THE RICO FAMILY DID NOT SAY HOW LONG THEY PLANNED TO REMAIN IN CUBA.

3. INDEX FERNANDO RICO AND GRACIELA BARRON DE RICO TO P-7354.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Rico Galan 201

[illegible] de Cuba: [illegible]

[illegible] Nov. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] - [illegible].

[illegible] Entrada 0934.- El Dr. Alberto [illegible] al no encontrar al embajador, queda de volver a llamar. Olga: bien.- 011.-

011. Entrada 1034.- Mercy con Olga para decirle que la señora que está con Delfín Sánchez ahora va para allá para el asunto del pasaporte, la cual lleva el catálogo de Avón para Regla y ésta se lo regrese lo más pronto posible. Olga: bien.- 10.

[illegible] Salida 1040.- El embajador después de enterarse de que la señora Elena [illegible] recibió el periódico Granma y lo leé con mucho interés, pregunta cuándo puede pasar a verla para charlar sobre el Festival de teatro. Elena lo invita para que ésta noche pase a comer a su casa. Armas acepta y queda de ir a las 9.- 064.-

064. Entrada 1105.- Rámirez Pérez con Olga para decirle que quisiera hablar con el embajador, ya que Miravál le acaba de indicar que no ha habido nada hasta el momento. Olga: que el embajador no está, pero ayer le dijo que habían agotado todos los recursos y hasta ahora no han recibido ninguna respuesta sobre sus visas; que tan pronto tengan la autorización, lo llamarán ó si gusta puede volver a llamar cuando guste. Rámirez acepta y aclara que si no viajan a más tardar la semana entrante, tendrán que prescindir del viaje en contra de su voluntad, pero si ésto sucediera de cualquier manera quisieran ver al embajador para darle las gracias. Olga queda de comunicárselo al embajador.- 106.-

File

201- [illegible] RICO

~~Elena [illegible]~~

V9 (50-6-75,4)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Victor RICO Galan (201-336474) Contacts with Communist Officials Stationed in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA 30355, 21 October 1966

1. Attached herewith for Headquarters information and retention is a copy of the translation, done by LIENVOY, for LIRAMA, of Victor RICO Galan's contacts with Communist officials in Mexico, prepared by Station and forwarded to Headquarters on 21 October 1966.

for/ Willard C. CURTIS

ATTACHMENT: Herewith as stated

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - C/WHD w/att h/w
2 - Files

CS COPY

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 30405

DATE
27 October 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
P-7354
201-336474

Informe sobre VICTOR RICO GALAN

22 octubre 1966

Lo presente es una relación de las ocasiones en que el periodista VICTOR RICO GALAN se puso en contacto con conocidos funcionarios de las Embajadas Cubana, Yugoeslava, Soviética, Polaca y Checoeslovaca, a la vez que con chino-comunistas, todos éllos estacionados en México.

Del 16 de enero de 1957 al 12 de agosto de 1966 VICTOR RICO GALAN tuvo:

a.- 256 contactos con funcionarios de la Embajada Cubana, estacionados en México;

b.- 33 contactos con funcionarios yugoeslavos estacionados en México;

c.- 31 contactos con funcionarios soviéticos estacionados en México;

d.- 7 contactos con chino-comunistas estacionados en México;

e.- 6 contactos con funcionarios de la Embajada Polaca, estacionados en México;

f.- 4 contactos con funcionarios checoeslovacos estacionados en México.

Esto representa un total de 337 contactos con elementos de esas instalaciones comunistas, 327 de los cuales fueron hechos por RICO GALAN en un período menor de cuatro años. La mayoría de esos contactos son conocidos elementos del servicio de inteligencia:

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
16 Ene. 57	Embajada Soviética	Aceptó invitación a recepción.
9 Jul. 59	STANISLAW RACZKA Dept. Prensa y Propaganda Emb. Polaca	Reunirse.
22 Jun. 60	ALEKSANDER BEKIER, Consejero Emb. Polaca.	Para presentarlo a CARLO COCCIOLI.
12 Jul. 61	TERESA PROENZA. Agreg. Cult. Emb. Cubana.	Fué invitado a la celebración del 26 de julio.

Note: This is translation (of our memo) by
Lienvoy for Lirama

CC: 50-6-75/2

Attachment h/w
HMMA-30405,
27 Oct. 66

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
12 Sep. 61	FROYLAN C. MANJARREZ Reportero de Prensa Latina.	RICO dio despedida a reporteros izquierdistas que van a Praga y Moscú.
10 Abr. 62	PIOTR WASILUK de Embajada Polaca.	Asistir a comida dada por ALEKSANDER BEKIER.
10 May. 62		RICO recibirá invitación para ir a Cuba.
14 Jun. 62	TERESA PROENZA PROENZA.	RICO fué recomendado por el Embajador CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA para un viaje a Cuba.
4 Jul. 62	PIOTR WASILUK	Enviará a RICO algún material.
14 Jul. 62	HECTOR ANAYA, de Prensa Latina.	RICO solicita material de Cuba para publicar en la Revista Siempre.
11 Sep. 62	YOLANDA PALACIOS, de Prensa Latina.	Discutiendo declaración del Depto. de Estado Norteamericano en el caso de Cuba
12 Sep. 62	FERNANDO REVUELTA, de la Embajada Cubana.	Gestionando reunión con el Embajador CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA.
26 Sep. 62	ANA MARIA BLANCO, de la Embajada Cubana.	RICO solicita que el Embajador LECHUGA le de visa para ir a Cuba.
28 Sep. 62	Habana vía N.York.	Piden a EDMUNDO JARDON, de Prensa Latina, diga cuándo sale RICO a Cuba.
1 Oct. 62	EDMUNDO JARDON, de Prensa Latina.	Discuten el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
4 Oct. 62		RICO recibió visa de cortesía para ir a Cuba.
22 Oct. 62	Prensa Latina.	El hermano de RICO pide a EDMUNDO JARDON información sobre aquél.

24 Oct. 62	Prensa Latina	La mamá de RICO pide a EDMUNDO JARDON informes sobre su hijo.
28 Oct. 62	Prensa Latina	La mamá de RICO pide a EDMUNDO JARDON informes sobre su hijo.
13 Dic. 62	Revista Política	EDMUNDO JARDON, de Prensa Latina, dice el Ing. MANUEL MARQUEZ PARDINAS que RICO regresará la semana próxima.
15 Ene. 63	Embajador Cubano CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA.	RICO se encontró con LECHUGA en el Aeropuerto.
15 Feb. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO, Consejero Emb.Cubana.	Discuten sobre la Revista Siempre.
18 Feb. 63	SAUL ALVAREZ, de Prensa Latina.	Discuten la firma de un documento para el periódico.
20 Feb. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Planean reunirse.
13 Mar. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Planean reunirse.
25 Mar. 63	YURIY K. ALEKSANDROV, 1/er.Srio.Emb.Rusa.	Planean reunirse.
26 Mar. 63	YURIY K. ALEKSANDROV.	Invita a RICO a comer.
29 Mar. 63	JOVAN MIRIC, Rep.Agencia Prensa Yugoeslava TANJUG.	Reunirse.
30 Mar. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse con SINOBAS y JOVAN MIRIC.
24 Abr. 63		Concurrió a una comida en la Embajada Yugoeslava.
26 Abr. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Charla.
29 Abr. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
23 May. 63	EDMUNDO JARDON	Discutiendo el viaje de RICO a Cuba para entrevistarse con FIDEL CASTRO.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
23 May. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
25 May. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Discutiendo el viaje a Cuba.
26 May. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
28 May. 63		RICO recibió visa de cortesía para ir a Cuba.
12 Jun. 63	Embajada Cubana.	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO habla con el Emb. CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA sobre el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
19 Jun. 63	Consulado Cubano.	INGE DE RICO GALAN habla con RAMON SINOBAS CASADO sobre el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
19 Jun. 63	Revista Siempre.	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO habla con JOSE PAGES LLERGO, Director de Siempre, sobre el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
22 Jun. 63	YOLANDA PALACIOS, de Prensa Latina.	RICO trajo material para Prensa Latina.
2 Jul. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
4 Jul. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
7 Jul. 63	JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA, Agreg. de Prensa Embajada Cubana.	Discutiendo el coctel dado por RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.
11 Jul. 63		RICO asistió a una recepción en la Embajada Cubana.
18 Jul. 63		RICO será orador en la celebración del 26 de Julio en Tampico.
29 Jul. 63	JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Discutiendo sobre un coctel en la Embajada Checa.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
26 Jul. 63	LUIS ALBERU SOUTO, Agr. Cult. Emb. Cubana; WILFREDO GONZALEZ, Vicecónsul cubano en Tampico; JOSE LUIS MOLINA, Presidente de la Sociedad José Martí.	Todos son oradores en el presidium junto con RICO, para los discursos del 26 de Julio en el Aeropuerto.
26 Jul. 63		ENRIQUE GONZALEZ PEDRERO, escritor en la revista Política, discute con RICO la ubicación del Instituto Cultural Mexicano-Cubano en Mérida.
1 Agt. 63	RAUL ROA KOURI, diplomático cubano.	Discuten el viaje de RICO a Mérida.
5 Agt. 63	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
12 Agt. 63	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
12 Sep. 63	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
29 Oct. 63	MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA Comdte. del Movimiento 13 de Noviembre - organización de guerrilla guatemalteca.	Entrevista.
15 Nov. 63	JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
23 Dic. 63	JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
16 Ene. 64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Reunirse.
21 Ene. 64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA, de Embajada Cubana.	RICO quiere ir a Cuba.
24 Ene. 64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Charla. FERNANDEZ está enfermo.
26 Ene. 64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Discuten el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
28 Ene. 64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
28 Ene. 64		RICO partió a Cuba con visa de cortesía.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
5 Feb. 64	BRANKO MILIJANOVIC, 1/er.Srio.de la Emb. Yugoeslava.	RICO envía mensajes a los izquierdistas panameños.
11 Feb.64	RAUL PEREYRA, mesero de la Embajada Cubana.	Discuten el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
15 Feb.64	HEBERTO JORRIN MUÑOZ, portero Emb.Cubana.	Avisándole a la esposa de RICO que llegó carta de Cuba.
27 Feb.64	HEBERTO JORRIN MUÑOZ.	Avisándole a la esposa de RICO que llegó carta de Cuba.
29 Feb.64	RAUL ROA KOURI	Reunirse.
18 Mar.64	HEBERTO JORRIN MUÑOZ.	Charla.
19 Mar.64	HEBERTO JORRIN MUÑOZ.	Charla.
20 Mar.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
25 Mar.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
30 Mar.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
2 Abr.64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Discuten noticias de Brasil.
3 Abri.64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Charla.
3 Abr. 64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Planean reunirse.
10 Abri64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
15 Abr.64	JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS, Emb.de Cuba.	Invitación a la comida del Embajador.
22 Abr.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Hablan sobre la borrachera de RICO con un individuo.
27 Abr.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
27 Abr.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
28 Abri64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
4 May.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Charla.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
9 May.64	Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.	Reunirse.
13 May.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Discuten transmisión de Radio-Habana.
14 May.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Charla.
18 May.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Hay carta para RICO en la Embajada.
18 May.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Charla.
19 May.64	HEBERTO JORRIN MUÑOZ.	Charla.
19 May.64	RAUL PEREYRA.	Reunirse.
19 May.64	JACINTO VAZQUEZ DE LA GARZA.-Emb.Cubana.	Reunirse.
21 May.64	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV, 2/o.Srio.de la Embajada Soviética.	Reunirse.
21 May.64	PIEN CHENG, Director de Agencia China de Noticias.	Invitación para que RICO vaya a China.
30 May.64	PIEN CHENG.	Reunirse.
1 Jun.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Gestionando reunión con Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.
10 Jun.64	Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.	Reunirse.
12 Jun.64	BORIS ALEKSANDROVICH KAZANTSEV, Consejero de Embajada Soviética.	Reunirse.
13 Jun.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
16 Jun.64	Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.	Reunirse.
18 Jun.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
3 Jul.64	RAUL APARICIO NOGALES Agregado Cultural Cubano.	Planeando reunirse.
10 Jul.64	JACINTO VAZQUEZ DE LA GARZA.	Reunirse.
13 Jul.64	PIOTR WASILUK.	Discutiendo publicaciones.
21 Jul.64	RAUL APARICIO NOGALES.	Reunirse.
31 Jul.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
31 Jul.64	PIOTR WASILUK.	RICO concurrirá a la despedida de WASILUK en la Embajada Polaca.
3 Agt.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	RICO proporciona dirección y teléfono de los chino-comunistas.
11 Agt.64	IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERIEV.-Embajada Soviética.-Corresponsal de PRAVDA.	Invita a RICO a comer.
17 Agt.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, 2/o.Secretario de Embajada Cubana.	Reunirse.
20 Agt.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
26 Agt.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Charla.
2 Sep.64	OLDRICH NOVICKY 2/o. Srio.y Agreg.Prensa Embajada Checa.	Reunirse.
10 Sep.64	LUBOMIR BLASIK, 2/o. Srio.y Cónsul de la Embajada Checa.	LUIS SUAREZ LOPEZ, de la Revista Siempre, pide a BLAZIK invitar a RICO a la recepción. De acuerdo.
15 Sep.64	ARMANDO HART, Ministro Cubano de Educación.- Emb.Cubana,	Reunirse.
18 Sep.64	Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.	Reunirse,

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
23 Oct.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
31 Oct.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
2 Nov.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
5 Nov.64	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
7 Nov.64	ANTONIO CARAM, de Prensa Latina.	RICO envía mensaje a Cuba.
10 Nov.64	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
11 Nov.64	OLDRICH NOVICKY.	Reunirse.
16 Nov.64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Charla.
22 Nov.64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Charla.
30 Nov.64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Charla.
8 Dic.64	IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV.	Reunirse.
12 Dic.64	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, 3/er.Srio., Agreg.Prensa y Cultura Emb.Cubana.	LOPEZ DIAZ envía a RICO arreglo floral por aniversario su matrimonio.
14 Dic.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
22 Dic.64	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
23 Dic.64	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
28 Dic.64	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
2 Ene.65	MANUEL EUGENIO VEGA PEREZ, 3/er.Srio.Embajada Cubana.	RICO trató de reunirse con él.
6 Ene.65	MANUEL EUGENIO VEGA PEREZ.	RICO trató de reunirse con él.
10 Ene.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	RICO trató de reunirse con él.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
11 Ene.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
17 Ene.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	RICO trató de reunirse con él.
13 Ene.65	KAREL HANUS, Embajador Checo.	Almuerzo en la casa de HANUS.
18 Ene.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
20 Ene.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
21 Ene.65	OLDRICH NOVICKY.	Comer juntos.
27 Ene.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
28 Ene.65	RAMON SIMOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
12 Mar.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Charla.
17 Mar.65	RAMON SIMOBAS CASADO.	Discutiendo becas para Cuba.
25 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
20 Mar.65	Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.	Charla.
26 Mar.65	ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON, 2/o.Srio. y Cónsul Embajada Cubana.	Charla.
27 Mar.65	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Le informa a RICO que están listos sus pasajes para Cuba.
27 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Comer juntos.
27 Mar.65	ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON.	Trató de reunirse con RICO.
12 Abr.65	FELIPE ROJAS MORALES, Depto.Cultural Embajada Cubana.	Reunirse.
13 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
13 Abr.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
13 Abr.65	FROYLAN MANJARREZ.	Reunirse.
13 Abr.65	MARIANO GARCIA, del Consulado Cubano en Mérida.- De visita aquí.	Reunirse.
13 Abr.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	RICO trata de reunirse con él.
14 Abr.65	FROYLAN MANJARREZ.	Charla.
19 Abr.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
20 Abr.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
20 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Comer juntos.
20 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Comer juntos y con RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.
21 Abr.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
23 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
25 Abr.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
26 abr.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
1 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	RICO trata de reunirse.
2 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Desayunar juntos.
4 Feb.65	MANUEL EUGENIO VEGA PEREZ.	CHARLA.
11 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
12 Feb.65	MARIANO GARCIA PEREZ.- Consulado cubano en Mérida.	Charla.
16 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Se pospone la reunión porque RICO está enfermo.
16 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
16 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
18 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
18 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
24 Feb.65	Embajada Soviética.	No identificado.
25 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Comer en casa de RICO.
25 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
26 Feb.65	MANUEL EUGENIO VEGA PEREZ.	RICO trató de reunirse.
27 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
28 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
28 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
1 Mar.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
2 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ, 1/er.Srio.Emb.Cubana.	Reunirse.
2 Mar.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	RICO trató de reunirse.
3 Mar.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA. Consulado Cubano Tampico.	RICO trató de localizar a POSADA.
3 Mar.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
5 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
9 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
9 Mar.65	MANUEL EUGENIO VEGA PEREZ.	Reunirse.
11 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
26 Abr.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
26 Abr.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	RICO trata de reunirse.
28 Abr.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Discusión sobre la República Dominicana.
29 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
29 Abr.65	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Reunirse.
29 Abr.65	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Reunirse.
29 Abr.65	VALENTIN IVANOVICH KUCHEROV.-Corresponsal de TASS en México.	Reunirse.
29 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Conferencia de prensa.
29 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
30 Abr.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
30 Abr.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
30 Abr.65	ORLANDO FUNDORA. Llamada de Cuba - Radio-Habana.	Discusión sobre la República Dominicana.
1 May.65	ORLANDO FUNDORA.- Radio-Habana.	Discutiendo sobre la Republica Dominicana.
2 May.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Charla.
2 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
2 May.65	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Reunirse.
2 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Discutiendo el discurso de FIDEL CASTRO.
2 May. 65	YOLANDA PALACIOS.	Reunirse.
3 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
4 May.65	Cubano MARIO TAMBIO.	Le trajo a RICO un libro de Cuba.
4 May.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
4 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
4 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Comer en el Club de Corresponsales.
6 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
6 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
7 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
7 May.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ y JOVAN MIRIC.	Almorzar juntos.
9 May.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
9 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse en casa de LEONOV.
9 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
10 May.65	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Discusión sobre la República Dominicana.
10 May.65	ANTONIO CARAM, de Prensa Latina.	Discutiendo sobre la República Dominicana.
10 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Invita a RICO a tomar café.
11 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Invita a RICO a tomar café.
15 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
18 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
19 May.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
19 May.65	CHUNG CHIA MAO. Agencia China Noticias.	Charla.
20 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
21 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
21 May.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
21 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
22 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGHYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
25 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
25 May.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO	Reunirse.
25 May.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Tratan de reunirse.
25 May.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Tratan de reunirse.
25 May.65	PIEN CHENG.	Tratan de reunirse.
25 May.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
28 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
29 May.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Tratan de reunirse.
29 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
1 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
2 Jun.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
3 Jun.65	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Reunirse.
3 Jun.65	VLADIMIR AGAFONOVICH DOLGOV. Corresponsal de PRAVDA en México.	Tratan de reunirse.
3 Jun.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
3 Jun.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
4 Jun.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
4 Jun.65	VALENTIN IVANOVICH KUCHEROV.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
14 Jun.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
18 Jun.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Tratan de reunirse.
19 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
20 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
21 Jun.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Tratan de reunirse.
21 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Tratan de reunirse.
22 Jun.65	PIEN CHENG.	Tratan de reunirse.
23 Jun.65	VALENTIN IVANOVICH MICHEROV.	Reunirse.
23 Jun.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
24 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	planean reunirse.
28 Jun.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
29 Jun.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
29 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Visita a RICO en su casa.
30 Jun.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Charla.
30 Jun.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
3 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
5 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
5 Jul.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
5 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
6 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
8 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
9 Jul.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
9 Jul.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
20 Jul.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Planeando reunirse.
21 Jul.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Comer en casa de RICO.
26 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunión en casa de SINOBAS.
30 Jul.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Discuten el viaje de LOPEZ a Mérida.
31 Jul.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Se reunieron 4 veces.
7 Agt.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Invita a RICO a una recepción en la Embajada.
17 Agt.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
24 Agt.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
24 Agt.65	LUIS ABREU.	Tratan de reunirse.
25 Agt.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
31 Agt.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA, Cónsul cubano en Tampico. Estando en México.	Tratan de reunirse.
2 Sep.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
3 Sep.65	MARIANO GARCIA.	Tratan de reunirse.
6 Sep. 65	FELIPE ROJAS MORALES.	Reunirse.
26 Sep.65	FELIPE ROJAS MORALES.	Reunirse.
27 Sep.65	GEORGIY STEPANOVICH VISKO, Consejero Comercial Emb.Soviética.	Tratan de reunirse.
5 Oct.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO y MARIANO GARCIA.	Junto con RICO comerán en casa de SINOBAS.
12 Oct.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Tratan de reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
15 Nov.65	CARLOS BASURTO TREJO, de Agencia China de Noticias.	Tratan de reunirse.
26 Nov.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA, acabando de regresar de Cuba.	Tratan de reunirse.
3 Dic.65	ALFREDO VIÑAS, de Radio-Habana.	Pide la opinión de RICO sobre Congreso Tricontinental.
5 Dic.65	RAMON SIMOBAS CASADO.	Tratan de reunirse.
16 Dic.65	ALFREDO GUEVARA, antes de regresar a Cuba.	Tratan de reunirse.
27 Dic.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
13 Ene.666	JOSEFINA, agente cubano.	Le mostrará a RICO las fotos del mulato contra el gringo.
14 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
24 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO, 1/er.Srio.Emb.Cubana.	LOZANO recibió carta de Cuba, donde esperan a RICO urgentemente.
24 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
27 Ene.66	CARLOS BASURTO TREJO.	Charla del viaje de RICO a Cuba y de artículos en Siempre.
27 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Charla del viaje de RICO a Cuba.
27 Ene.66	BOZA RAFAJLOVIC, Rep. Agencia Noticiosa Yugoeslava TANJUG, que reemplaza a JOVAN MIRIC.	Charla sobre Cuba.
27 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Reunirse.
28 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Llevó a RICO al Aeropuerto.
28 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Visitando la casa de RICO.
11 Feb.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
12 Feb.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Reunirse en casa de RICO.
15 Feb.66	BOZA RAFAJLOVIC.	Comer en casa de RAFAJLOVIC.
16 Feb.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
16 Feb.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
21 Feb.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	RICO solicita visas para tres Doctores que viajarán a Cuba.
1 Mar.66	RAUL PEREYRA.	Charla.
3 Mar.66	BOZA RAFAJLOVIC.	Tratan de reunirse.
7 Mar.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
12 Mar.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Deja libro en casa de RICO.
19 Mar.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
25 Mar.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
9 Abr.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Reunirse en Tampico.
19 Abr.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	RICO va a casa de LOZANO.
30 Abr.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
15 May.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
17 May.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
24 May.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
25 May.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
15 Jun.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
24 Jun.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
4 Jul.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO y MARIANO GARCIA.	Reunirse en casa de RICO.
14 Jul.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
22 Jul.66	MARIANO GARCIA.	RICO invita a GARCIA a desayunar.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
27 Jul.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
4 Agt.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
12 Agt.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Se verán en el Aeropuerto para despedir al hermano de MICO que va a Cuba.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Victor RICO Galan (201-336474) - Contacts with Communist Officials Stationed in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The attached is a listing from Station records of 337 known contacts of Victor RICO Galan with officials of the Cuban (256), Yugoslav (33), Soviet (31), Chinese Communist (7), Polish (6) and Czechoslovakian (4) installations in Mexico City.

2. This list (without sources as listed in the right of each page) was sent to LIRAMA in reply to his personal request. LIENVOY will translate this into Spanish for LIRAMA.

3. A copy of the Cover (blind) Memorandum which will be put into Spanish (by LIENVOY) is also attached.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD w/atts (1 cy ea.)

1 ATT

CS COPY

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-30355

DATE
21 October 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
P-7354
201-336474

ATT TO HMMA 30355

21 October 1966

SUBJECT: Victor RICO Galan

Attached is a listing of known contacts of Victor RICO Galan with offices of the Cuban, Yugoslav, Soviet, Polish and Czech Embassies and with Chinese Communist persons stationed in Mexico.

During the period from 16 January 1957 through 12 August 1966, Victor RICO Galan is known to have had

a) 256 contacts with Cuban Embassy officials stationed in Mexico;

b) 33 contacts with Yugoslav officials stationed in Mexico;

c) 31 contacts with Soviet officials stationed in Mexico;

d) 7 contacts with Chinese Communists stationed in Mexico;

e) 6 contacts with Polish Embassy officials in Mexico;

f) 4 contacts with Czechoslovakian officials in Mexico.

This represents a total of 337 contacts with officials of these (Communist) installations by Victor RICO Galan; 327 of these contacts were made in less than a four (4) year period of time. Most of the persons contacted by Victor RICO Galan as shown on the attached list are known intelligence officers.

Distribution:
Orig - LIRAMA (via LIENVOY/2) w/att
1 - P-7354 w/att
1 - P-3634
1 - 50-6-75/2
1 - HQS

CS COPY

ATT TO HMMA 30355

201-33897

SECRET Att to HMMA 3[illegible]

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
15 Jan. 57	Soviet Embassy	Accepted invitation to Reception	LIFEAT/ LIMERICK
9 July 59	Stanislav RACZKA, employee of Polish Legation (Press and Propaganda Section	Meeting	LITMUS
22 June 60	Aleksander BEKIER, Counselor Polish Embassy	Arranged to introduce BEKIER to Carlo COCCIOLI	HMMA 15203
12 July 61	Teresa PROENZA Proenza (of Cuban Embassy - Cultural Attache	Invited to 26 July 61 celebration	LIENVOY
12 Sept. 61	Froylan C. MANJARREZ Manjarrez (Prensa Latina reporter)	Subject gave despedida for leftist newspaperman going to Prague and Moscow	LIENVOY
10 Apr. 62	Piotr WASILUK (of Polish Embassy)	To attend dinner party given by Aleksander BEKIER	LIENVOY
10 May 62		Subject will receive invitation to Cuba	LIENVOY
14 June 62	Teresa PROENZA Proenza	Subject was recommended to Ambassador Carlos LECHUGA Havia for trip to Cuba	LIENVOY HMM 6486
4 July 62	Piotr WASILUK	Will send Subject some material	LIENVOY
14 July 62	Hector AMAYA (of Prensa Latina)	Subject requests material from Habana for publication in Siempre	LIENVOY
11 Sept. 62	Yolanda PALACIOS (of Prensa Latina)	Discussing statement issued by U. S. Department of State on case of Cuba	LIENVOY
12 Sept. 62	Fernando REVUELTA (of Cuban Embassy)	Arranging meeting with Ambassador Carlos LECHUGA Hevia	LIENVOY
26 Sept. 62	Ana Maria BLANCO (of Cuban Embassy)	Subject requests visa for Cuba from Amb. Carlos LECHUGA Hevia	LIENVOY
28 Sept. 62	Habana via New York	Asks Edmundo JARDON (of Cuban Embassy) when Subject would go to Cuba	LIENVOY
1 Oct. 62	Edmundo JARDON (of Cuban Embassy)	Discuss Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
5 Oct. 62		Subject received courtesy visa to go to Cuba	LITAMIL-7

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Att to HMMA 3[illegible]355

CS COPY

SECRET

201-336474

14-00000

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
22 Oct. 62		Brother of Subject calls Edmundo JARDON asking for info on Subject	LIENVOY
24 Oct. 62		Subject's mother calls Edmundo JARDON for news of Subject	LIENVOY
28 Oct. 62		Subject's mother calls Edmundo JARDON for news of Subject	LIENVOY
13 Dec. 62		Edmundo JARDON tells Manuel MARCUE Pardinas that Subject will return next week	LIENVOY
15 Jan. 63	Amb. Carlos LECHUGA Hevia	Subject met LECHUGA at airport	LITAMIL/9
15 Feb. 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada (Counselor of Cuban Embassy)	Discussing Siempre magazine	LIENVOY
18 Feb. 63	Saul ALVAREZ (of Prensa Latina)	Discussing signing document for newspaper	LIENVOY
28 Feb. 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
13 Mar. 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
25 Mar. 63	Yuriy K. ALEKSANDROV (First Secretary of Soviet Embassy)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
26 Mar. 63	Yuriy K. ALEKSANDROV	ALEKSANDROV invites Subject for dinner	LIENVOY
29 Mar. 63	Jovan MIRIC (Representative of Yugoslav Press Agency TANJUG)	Meeting	LIENVOY
30 Mar. 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting with SINOBAS and Jovan MIRIC	LIENVOY
24 Apr. 63		Attended dinner at Yugoslav Embassy	LIENVOY
26 Apr. 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Chatter	LIENVOY
29 Apr. 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
23 May 63	Edmundo JARDON	Discuss Subject's trip to Cuba; Subject invited to meet with Fidel CASTRO	LIENVOY
23 May 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
25 May 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Discuss trip to Cuba	LIENVOY

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
26 May 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 May 63		Subject received courtesy visa to Cuba	LITAMIL/7
12 June 63		Ramon SINOBAS Casada talks with Amb. Carlos LECHUGA Hevia about Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
19 June 63		Inge RICO (wife of Subject) talks with Ramon SINOBAS Casada about Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
19 June 63		Ramon SINOBAS Casada talks with Jose PAGES Llergo (Director of Siempre magazine) about Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
22 June 63	Yolanda PALACIOS of Prensa Latina (Prela)	Subject brought material for Prela	LIENVOY
2 July 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
July 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
7 July 63	Jose Miguel FERNANDEZ Roa (Press Attaché of Cuban Embassy)	Discussing party given by Ramon SINOBAS Casada	LIENVOY
11 July 63		Subject attended Reception at Cuban Embassy	LIENVOY
8 July 63		Subject will be speaker at 26th of July celebration at Tampico	LITAMIL/9 BARKER
9 July 63	Jose Miguel FERNANDEZ Roa	Discussing party at Czech Embassy	LIENVOY
6 July 63	Luis ALFEU (Cultural Attaché of Cuban Embassy), Wilfredo GONZALEZ (Cuban Vice Consul, Tampico), Jose Luis MOLINA (President of Jose Marti Society)	All on speakers stand, with Subject, for 26 July speeches at airport	LNERGO
5 July 63		Enrique GONZALEZ Pedrero (writer for Politica magazine) discusses with Subject, the new location of Mexican-Cuban Cultural Institute in Merida	LIENVOY
Aug. 63	Raul ROA Kouri (Cuban Diplomat)	Discussing Subject's trip to Merida	LIENVOY

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
5 Aug. 63	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
12 Aug. 63	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
12 Sept. 63	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
29 Oct. 63	Marco Antonio YON Sosa (Commander of 13 November movement - Guatemalan guerrilla organisation)	Interview	MEXI 6725
15 Nov. 63	Jose Miguel FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
23 Dec. 63	Jose Miguel FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
16 Jan. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Meeting	LIENVOY
21 Jan. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa of Cuban Embassy	Subject wants to go to Cuba	LIENVOY
24 Jan. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Chatter (Contact is ill)	LIENVOY
26 Jan. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Discussing Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
28 Jan. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Jan. 64		Subject left for Cuba with Cuban Courtesy visa	LIENVOY
5 Feb. 64	Branko MILIJANOVIC (First Secretary of Yugoslav Embassy)	Subject sends messages to Panamanian leftists	PACY 2324
11 Feb. 64	Raul FERREYRA (waiter at Cuban Embassy)	Discuss Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
15 Feb. 64	Heberto JORRIN Muñoz (Receptionist, Gatekeeper at Cuban Embassy)	Advising Subject's wife letter arrived from Cuba	LIENVOY
27 Feb. 64	Heberto JORRIN Muñoz	Advising Subject's wife letter arrived from Cuba	LIENVOY
29 Feb. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
16 Mar. 64	Heberto JORRIN Muñoz	Chatter	LIENVOY
19 Mar. 64	Heberto JORRIN Muñoz	Chatter	LIENVOY
20 Mar. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
25 Mar. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
30 Mar. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
2 Apr. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Discuss news from Brazil	LIENVOY

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
3 Apr. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Chatter	LIENVOY
3 Apr. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
10 Apr. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
15 Apr. 64	Cuban Ambassador Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Invitation to Ambassador's dinner	LIENVOY
22 Apr. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Discussing Subject getting drunk with unidentified Pole	LIENVOY
27 Apr. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
27 Apr. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Apr. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
4 May 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Chatter	LIENVOY
9 May 64	Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Meeting	LIENVOY
13 May 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Discuss Habana radio broadcast	LIENVOY
14 May 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Chatter	LIENVOY
18 May 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Letter for Subject in Cuban Embassy	LIENVOY
16 May 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Chatter	LIENVOY
19 May 64	Roberto JORRIN Muñoz	Chatter	LIENVOY
19 May 64	Raul FEREYRA	Meeting	LIENVOY
19 May 64	Jacinto VAZQUEZ de la Garza (of the Cuban Embassy)	Meeting	LIENVOY
21 May 64	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (Second Secretary of Soviet Embassy)	Meeting	LIENVOY
21 May 64	PIEH Ch'ang (Director of New China News Agency)	Invited Subject to China	LIMUD
30 May 64	PIEH Ch'ang	Meeting	LIFEAT
1 June 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Arranging meeting with Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	LIENVOY
10 June 64	Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Meeting	LIENVOY

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
12 June 64	Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV (Soviet Minister Counselor)	Meeting	LIENVOY
13 June 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
16 June 64	Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Meeting	LIENVOY
16 June 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
3 July 64	Raul APARICIO Nogales (Cuban Cultural Attaché)	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
10 July 64	Jacinto VAZQUEZ de la Garza	Meeting	LIENVOY
13 July 64	Piotr WASILUK	Discussing publications	LIENVOY
21 July 64	Raul APARICIO Nogales	Meeting	LIENVOY
31 July 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
31 July 64	Piotr WASILUK	Subject will attend WASILUK's despedida party in Polish Embassy	LIENVOY
3 Aug. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Subject gives address and telephone number of Chinese Communists	LIENVOY
11 Aug. 64	Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (of Soviet Embassy - Pravda correspondent)	Invites Subject to dinner	LIENVOY
17 Aug. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (Second Secretary of Cuban Embassy)	Meeting	LIENVOY
20 Aug. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
26 Aug. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Chatter	LIENVOY
2 Sept. 64	Oldrich NOVICKY (Second Secretary and Press Attaché of Czech Embassy)	Meeting	LIENVOY
10 Sept. 64		Luis SUAREZ Lopez (of Siempre magazine) asks Lubomir BLAZIK (Second Secretary and Consul of Czech Embassy) to invite Subject to reception. BLAZIK agrees.	LIENVOY
15 Sept. 64	Armando HART (Minister of Education, Cuban Embassy)	Meeting	LIENVOY
18 Sept. 64	Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Meeting	LIENVOY
23 Oct. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
31 Oct. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
2 Nov. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
5 Nov. 64	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
7 Nov. 64	Antonio CARAM (of Prensa Latina)	Subject sends message to Cuba	LIENVOY
10 Nov. 64	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
11 Nov. 64	Oldrich NOVICKY	Meeting	LIENVOY
16 Nov. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Chatter	LIENVOY
22 Nov. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Chatter	LIENVOY
30 Nov. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Chatter	LIENVOY
8 Dec. 64	Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV	Meeting	LIENVOY
12 Dec. 64	Julian LOPEZ Diaz (Third Secretary, Press and Cultural Attaché of Cuban Embassy)	LOPEZ Diaz sends Subject flower arrangement for wedding anniversary	LIENVOY
14 Dec. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
22 Dec. 64	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
23 Dec. 64	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Dec. 64	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
2 Jan. 65	Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez (Third Secretary Cuban Embassy)	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
6 Jan. 65	Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
10 Jan. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
11 Jan. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
17 Jan. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
18 Jan. 65	Karel HANUS (Czech Ambassador)	Lunch at HANUS' house	LIFEAT
18 Jan. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIENVOY
20 Jan. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LITAMIL /9
21 Jan. 65	Oldrich NOVICKY	Dinner together	LIENVOY
27 Jan. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Jan. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY

CS COPY

ATT TO HMMA 303555

SECRET

201-336474

14-00000

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
12 Mar. 65	Jose Luis POSADA	Chatter	LIENVOY
17 Mar. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Discuss scholarships to Cuba	LIENVOY
25 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 Mar. 65	Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Chatter	LIENVOY
26 Mar. 65	Abelardo CURBELO Padron (Second Secretary, Consul - Cuban Embassy)	Chatter	LIENVOY
27 Mar. 65	Edmundo JARDON	Advising Subject tickets are ready for Cuba	LIENVOY
27 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Eating together	LIENVOY
27 Mar. 65	Abelardo CURBELO Padron	Tried to arrange meeting with Subject	LIENVOY
12 Apr. 65	Felipe ROJAS Morales (Cultural Section, Cuban Embassy)	Meeting	LIFEAT
13 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
13 Apr. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIFEAT
13 Apr. 65	Froylan MANJARRAZ	Meeting	LIFEAT
13 Apr. 65	Mariano GARCIA (of Cuban Consulate in Merida - visiting Mexico City)	Meeting	LIENVOY
13 Apr. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Subject tries to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
14 Apr. 65	Froylan MANJARRAZ	Chatter	LIFEAT
19 Apr. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 Apr. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
20 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Eating together	LIFEAT
20 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Dinner together with Ramon SINOBAS Casada	LIFEAT
21 Apr. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIFEAT
23 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
25 Apr. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
26 Apr. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIENVOY

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
1 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
2 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Breakfast together	LIENVOY
4 Feb. 65	Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez	Chatter	LIENVOY
11 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
12 Feb. 65	Mariano GARCIA Perez (Cuban Consulate, Merida)	Chatter	LIHACK
16 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting called off. Subject ill.	LIFEAT
16 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIFEAT
16 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
18 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIEN-BRACE-3
18 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	"
24 Feb. 65	Soviet Embassy	Unknown	LIENVOY
25 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Dinner in Subject's home	LIENVOY
25 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
26 Feb. 65	Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
27 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
1 Mar. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
2 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez (First Secretary Cuban Embassy)	Meeting	LIENVOY
2 Mar. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
3 Mar. 65	Jose Luis POSADA (Cuban Consulate, Tampico)	Subject tried to call POSADA	LIENVOY
5 Mar. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
5 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIENVOY
9 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIENVOY
9 Mar. 65	Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez	Meeting	LIENVOY
11 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIENVOY

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
26 Apr. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
26 Apr. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Subject tries to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
28 Apr. 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Discussing Dominican Republic	LIENVOY
29 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Edmundo JARDON	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Edmundo JARDON	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Valentin Ivanovich KUCHEROV (TASS Correspondent in Mexico)	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Press conference	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
30 Apr. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIFEAT
30 Apr. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
30 Apr. 65	Orlando FUNDORA (call from Cuba - Radio Habana)	Discussing Dominican Republic	LIFEAT
1 May 65	Orlando FUNDORA - Radio Habana	Discussing Dominican Republic	LIFEAT LIENVOY
2 May 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Chatter	LIENVOY
2 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
2 May 65	Edmundo JARDON	Meeting	LIFEAT
2 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Discussing Fidel CASTRO's speech	LIFEAT
2 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
2 May 65	Yolanda PALACIOS	Meeting	LIFEAT
3 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
4 May 65	Mario TARBIO (Cuban)	Brought book from Cuba for Subject	LIENVOY
4 May 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIFEAT
4 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
4 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Dinner of Press Club	LIFEAT
6 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
6 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
6 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
7 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
7 May 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz and Jovan MIRIC	Luncheon with Subject	LIFEAT
7 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
9 May 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIENVOY
9 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting (in LEONOV's house)	LIFEAT
9 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
10 May 65	Edmundo JARDON	Discussing Dominican Republic	LIENVOY
10 May 65	Antonio CARAM (of Prensa Latina)	Discussing Dominican Republic	LIENVOY
10 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Invites Subject for coffee	LIENVOY
11 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Invites Subject for coffee	LIENVOY
15 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
18 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
19 May 65	Ramon SIBORAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
19 May 65	CHUNG Chia-mao (New China News Agency representative in Mexico)	Chatter	LIENVOY
20 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
21 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
21 May 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIFEAT
21 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
21 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
22 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
25 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
25 May 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casado	Meeting	LIFEAT
25 May 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
25 May 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
25 May 65	PIEN Ch'eng	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
25 May 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIFEAT
28 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 May 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
29 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
1 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
2 June 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
3 June 65	Edmundo JARDON	Meeting	LIFEAT
3 June 65	Vladimir Agafonovich DOLGOV (Pravda correspondent in Mexico)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
3 June 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
3 June 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
4 June 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
4 June 65	Valentin Ivanovich KUCHEROV	Meeting	LIFEAT
14 June 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
18 June 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
19 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
21 June 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
21 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
22 June 65	PIEN Ch'eng	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
23 June 65	Valentin Ivanovich KUCHEROV	Meeting	LIFEAT
23 June 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
24 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
28 June 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 June 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Visited at Subject's house	LIFEAT
30 June 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Chatter	LIENVOY
30 June 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIFEAT
3 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
5 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
5 July 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
5 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
6 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
8 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
9 July 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
9 July 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 July 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
21 July 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Will eat at Subject's house	LIENVOY
26 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting (at SINOBAS's house)	LIFEAT
30 July 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Discuss LOPEZ's trip to Merida	LIENVOY
31 July 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meetings (4 times)	LIFEAT
7 Aug. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Invites Subject to Embassy party	LIFEAT
17 Aug. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
24 Aug. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
24 Aug. 65	Luis ABREU	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
25 Aug. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
31 Aug. 65	Jose POSADA (in Mexico City from Tampico)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
2 Sept. 65	Jose POSADA	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
3 Sept. 65	Mariano GARCIA	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
6 Sept. 65	Felipe ROJAS Morales	Meeting	LIFEAT
26 Sept. 65	Felipe ROJAS Morales	Meeting	LIFEAT
27 Sept. 65	Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (Commercial Counselor of Soviet Embassy)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
5 Oct. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada Mariano GARCIA	With Subject, will eat at SINOBAS' house	LIENVOY
12 Oct. 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
15 Nov. 65	Carlos BASURTO Trejo (of New China News Agency)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
25 Nov. 65	Jose POSADA (just returned from Cuba)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
3 Dec. 65	Alfredo VIÑAS (of Radio Habana)	Requests Subject's opinions on Tricontinental Congress	LIENVOY
5 Dec. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
16 Dec. 65	Alfredo GUEVARA (before returning to Cuba)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
27 Dec. 65	Jose POSADA	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
13 Jan. 66	Josefina (last name unknown - Cuban accent)	Arranging for Subject to see pictures Subject wanted about the mulatto against the gringo	LIENVOY
14 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
24 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO (First Secretary of Cuban Embassy)	Contact received letter from Cuba for Subject to go to Cuba urgently	LIENVOY
24 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
27 Jan. 66	Carlos BASURTO Trejo	Chatter about Subject's trip to Cuba, articles in Siempre	LIENVOY
27 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Chatter about Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
27 Jan. 66	Bosa RAFAJLOVIC (Representative of Yugoslav Press Agency TANJUG, who replaced Jovan MIRIC)	Chatter about Cuba	LIENVOY

CS COPY

ATT TO HMMA 30355

SECRET

201-336479

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
27 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Meeting	LIFEAT
28 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Took Subject to airport	LIFEAT
28 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Visiting in Subject's house	LIENVOY
11 Feb. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
12 Feb. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Meeting in Subject's house	LIENVOY
15 Feb. 66	Boza RAFAJLOVIC	Dinner in RAFAJLOVIC's house	LIENVOY
16 Feb. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
16 Feb. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
16 Feb. 66	Jose POSADA	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
21 Feb. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Subject requests visas for three doctors to travel to Cuba	LIENVOY
1 Mar. 66	Raul PEREYRA	Chatter	LIENVOY
3 Mar. 66	Boza RAFAJLOVIC	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
7 Mar. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
12 Mar. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Leaves book at Subject's house	LIENVOY
19 Mar. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
25 Mar. 66	Jose POSADA	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
5 Apr. 66	Jose POSADA	Meeting in Tampico	LIENVOY
19 Apr. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Going to LOZANO's house	LIENVOY
30 Apr. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Trying to arrange a meeting	LIENVOY
15 May 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
17 May 66	Jose POSADA	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
24 May 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
25 May 66	Jose POSADA	Trying to arrange a meeting	LIENVOY
15 June 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
24 June 66	Jose POSADA	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
4 July 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO Mariano GARCIA	Arranging a meeting in Subject's house	LIENVOY

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
14 July 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
22 July 66	Mariano GARCIA	Subject invites GARCIA to breakfast	LIENVOY
27 July 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
4 August 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
12 August 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arrange to meet at airport to see off Subject's brother who is going to Cuba	LIENVOY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

ATT TO HMMA 30355

SECRET

201-336474

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS-311/14014-66
SUBJECT	Eighth Regional Congress of the Union of Local Societies of Collective Farm Credit 40-66 in Torreon, Coahuila	DATE DISTR.	18 October 1966
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	19-21 August 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Monterrey (7 September 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-1267

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Medium-level member of the Mexican Communist Party in the Laguna area whose Party position requires attendance at policy-making meetings. His reporting on Communist activities has been reliable.

1. On 19-21 August 1966 the Union of Local Societies of Collective Farm Credit 40-66 (USCE 40-66 - Union de Sociedades de Credito Ejidal 40-66), a Mexican Communist Party (PCM - Partido Comunista Mexicano) peasant front, held its 8th Regional Congress at the USCE 40-66 headquarters in Torreon, Coahuila, with an attendance of 800 to 1,000 people. Every state in Mexico was represented. The meeting was presided over by Arturo Orona Gamez, member of the PCM Central Committee and Secretary for Peasant Affairs of the PCM Coahuila State Committee, and Ramon Danzos Palomino, also a member of the PCM Central Committee and head of the Independent Peasants' Central (CCI - Central Campesina Independiente), another PCM controlled group in the Laguna area. In addition to these two who spoke, the speakers were Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, First Secretary of the PCM Central Committee, and Agustin Borrego Gomez, Secretary of Organization of the PCM Coahuila State Committee. Conspicuous by their absence were Antonio Morin Rodriguez, member of the PCM Presidium with special interest in PCM political affairs in the Laguna area, and Juan de los Reyes, member of the PCM Central Committee who lives in the Torreon area. The main theme of the Congreso was the aim of the USCE 40-66 to promote the nationalization of all privately held agricultural land in the Laguna area. It wants to divide all land in the Laguna area into communal farms and completely do away with small private land holding. Martinez said that the Mexican Government was trying to plot against the PCM and gave as an example the 12-13 August 1966 arrest of Victor Rico Galan and some 40 others of the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MRP-Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo). He said that the PCM did not espouse the armed revolutionary policies of Galan, and that the Party was pacifist.[1]

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
	CINCSO #						USIA	I&NS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/R	1	HMM-1267
CI/OIS/WH	1	WH/1	10	LIRULE
CA/INT	1	WH/MATY	1	(LIRULE-1)
CA/PROP	1	WH/MEXI	#	CS-311/14014-66
CA/B4	1	WH/PACY	#	COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOTALS IS 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 3, WH 11 (1), DO/H 1.

LIAISON ●

HK
CMD; POH

2. The Administrative Council for the USCE 40-66 which was elected on 21 August at the above Congress is as follows:

Manager	Arturo Orona Gamez
Assistant Manager, in charge of Commerce and Insurance	Agustin Borroel Gomez
Social Services	Alberto Lecra Juarez
Machinery Manager	Alberto Munoz
Agricultural Livestock	Jesus Cedillo
Organization	Ramon Aguilera Delgado
Fruit Growers	Juan Francisco Espino
Agrarian Organization	J. Cruz Chacon Sifuentes[2]

3. Also present at the USCE 40-66 Congress was Oscar Guajardo Gutierrez, Secretary of Organization of the PCM Nuevo Leon State Committee. He was trying to organize an interchange of ideas between the Nuevo Leon and Coahuila PCM State Committees, especially in the field of organizing new cells. Guajardo said that he had organized various neighborhoods of Monterrey against the police and the government. He was especially interested in contacting Orona and Jose Luna Ortis, First Secretary of the PCM Coahuila State Committee.

1. Source Comment: Martinez Verdugo was trying to get the support of the crowd.

   Headquarters Comment: A report on this Congress and the speech made by Martinez Verdugo on 21 August 1966, the closing day, appears in issues nos. 1845 and 1846, dated 28 August and 4 September 1966, respectively, of La Voz de Mexico, official newspaper of the PCM. The second part of the speech in no. 1846 is extremely interesting in that Martinez Verdugo takes issue with the manner in which General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio, leftist former President of Mexico (1934-1940), proposes to achieve agrarian reform. Further, Martinez Verdugo decries Cardenas' again giving his political support to President Diaz Ordaz, as he did on 11 August at Ciudad Altamirano, Guerrero, when he also expressed his views on agrarian reform (Cf. Airgram no. 161, Joint Weeks no. 32, dated 12 August 1966, from the American Embassy, Mexico City).

2. Field Comment: All of the members of this USCE 40-66 Administrative Council are members of the PCM.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Mexico City.

FROM
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/WOPROP
EMFOE-1/Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
201-336474

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

REFERENCE : HDCW-2268, 26 August 1966

1. EMFOE-1, shown the photographs of Victor RICO Galan, forwarded by reference, affirmed 15 September 1966 that Victor RICO Galan definitely is not the Mexican journalist who attended the July 1966 Second Congress of the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-1J4).

2. Since at least one of the photographs attached to reference appear to be an original clipping, the photographs were reproduced for Station indices and are forwarded herewith for Headquarters' retention.

Could be Jorge Timossi [illegible]

Michael C. CHOADEN

Attachment:
Photographs h/w

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WHD w/att h/w
1 - COS, Mexico City w/o att
2 - Files w/o att

1 att

EKD/kac

CS COPY

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HDCA-5679	11 October 1966
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-336474



att 1 To
HDCA 5679

CS COPY

201-335030

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico/China	REPORT NO.	CS -311/13138-66
SUBJECT	Contact by Fernando Rico Galan With the Mexican Society of Friendship with People's China (SMACP)	DATE DISTR.	28 September 1966
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	5 September 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (6 September 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-10677

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican security officer with access to information derived from investigative activities. His reporting is believed to be reliable.

On 5 September 1966, Fernando Rico Galan, one of those arrested, but later released, in the roundup of a group of subversives headed by his brother, Victor Rico Galan, and Raul Ugalde Alvarez, visited the offices of the Mexican Society of Friendship with People's China (SMACP - Sociedad Mexicana de Amistad con China Popular). Rico held a closed-door meeting with Luis Torres Ordonez and Juan Larios Tolentino, both officers of the SMACP, for an hour and fifteen minutes. The subject matter of the discussion is not known.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI
CINCSO							LEIA	I&NS

Place field distribution indicated by "#".

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/R	1			HMM-10677
CI/OPS/WH	1	DCI				LITEMPO
CA/INT	1	[illegible]	1			(LITEMPO-12)
CA/PROP	1	WH/MPT				CS-311/13138-66
[illegible]	9	WH/FACT				
TOTALS: IS 8, CI 6, FI 1, CA 0, FE 9 [illegible] (1), DO/H 1.				[illegible]		CO/IRISAGIR
						[illegible]

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Mexico

REPORT NO. CS-311/13134-66

SUBJECT Activities of the Mexican Communist Party in Nuevo Leon

DATE DISTR. 28 September 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 17-22 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Monterrey (23 August 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMY-1262

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A ranking member of the Mexican Communist Party in Nuevo Leon who has access to Party plans. He has reported reliable information on the Party for about six years.

1. The plenum of the Central Committee of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM - Partido Comunista Mexicano) will take place in Mexico City on 25, 26, and 27 September 1966.

2. The Campesino Congress of Torreon was attended by Oscar Guajardo Gutierrez of the Nuevo Leon State Committee. Guajardo will remain in Torreon until 24 August to attend the national plenum of the Independent Peasants' Central (CCI - Central Campesina Independiente) which is being held concurrently with the Campesino Congress.

3. Lino Medina Salazar, in his capacity as member of the Central Committee and member of the National Trade Union Commission, was in Monterrey from 17 to 19 August to participate in a meeting of the State Committee to discuss the Party's trade union activities, because so little has been done in this field which the Party has had difficulty in penetrating. It was agreed that the publication of Accion Sindical, which has been dormant for some time, would be resumed as an initial step in planning trade union activity and that a study of the labor situation should be undertaken. Medina, who was not pleased with the outcome of the meeting, promised to return and to personally follow the progress of the trade union program since he is the Central Committee member responsible for supervising the activities of the Party in Nuevo Leon.

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI
#								#3
	CINCSO #						USIA	INS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	CA/B4	1	WH/MEXI	#1	HMY-1262
CI/OPS/WH	1	CA/ES	1	WH/MNTY	1	LIVACATE
CA/INT	1	CA/PEPR	1	WH/FACY	#	(LIVACATE-1)
CA/PROP	1	WH/R	1			CS-311/13134-66
CA/CP	1	CH/1	1			RR

TOTALS IR 2, CI-5, FS-3, CA 5 (1), WH 13 (2), DO/H 1, LIAISON *

CS:PUH(a)

4. A meeting of members of the Independent Central of People's Organizations (CIOP - Central Independiente de Organizaciones del Pueblo) was held on 10 August to discuss plans to carry out agitational activities early in September in support of busdrivers and other unionized groups.

5. The campaign in support of political prisoners has been suspended until 25 September. The situation has become more complicated because of the recent increase in the number of prisoners, although in Nuevo Leon there have been no repercussions because of the roundup of the Ugalde-Rico Galan group.

6. With regard to the national meeting of university students, it cannot be said that it was successful since only three delegations were present - those from Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, and Jalisco. Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, Jose Encarnacion Perez Gaytan and other members of the Party Presidium were present, which suggests that the Party attaches considerable importance to its program for university action. This meeting was considered to be the first stage, to be followed by others. It is assumed within the Party that the Nuevo Leon State Committee is experienced in university matters since it organized the University of Nuevo Leon Union[2] (STUNL - Sindicato de la Universidad de Nuevo Leon).

7. With respect to the PCM's electoral campaign, as yet no candidates have been agreed upon, and it is clear that among those under consideration none is of impressive stature.

8. Of interest are the efforts of Porfirio Diaz, head of the National Youth Institute in Monterrey, who is departing from the Party line in attempting to form a youth group in which the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI - government party) would participate along with the PCM and other leftist organizations. Diaz has held meetings attended by Octavio Leal Moncada of the CIOP, Javier Rojas Sandoval of the PCM, Jose Luis Sustaita of the National Democratic Students' Central (CNED - Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democraticos), other members of the PCM, and representatives of the PRI.

1. Headquarters Comment: Issue No. 1845, dated 28 August 1966, of La Voz de Mexico, official newspaper of the PCM, reported that the Union de Sociedades de Credito Ejidal de la Comarca Lagunera 1940-1966 (USCECL-1940-1966), headed by Arturo Orona Gomiz, held its VIII Ordinary Congress in its headquarters at Torreon, Coahuila. Issue No. 1846, dated 4 September 1966, contained an article dated Torreon, Coahuila, August 1966, saying that the national plenum of the CCI had resolved to disassociate itself from the National Liberation Movement (MLN-Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional), because of the latter's divisionist activities.

2. Source Comment: In fact, the STUNL was not formed by the Party since, when it was organized, there were no Communists among the teachers and other university workers. The union came into being as a result principally of the activities of a group of teachers from Preparatory School N . 1, and it had the support of the then acting Rector, Alfonso Rangel Guerra, who saw in the union possibilities for creating problems for Eduardo Livas Villarreal, the Governor of Nuevo Leon. It was almost a year later that Rolando Guzman, Tomas Gonzalez de Luna, and Horacio Salazar joined the PCM, but their influence in the union cannot be attributed to this fact. The union has continued to exist because it has maintained its activities within legal bounds, demanding minimum wages and improved working conditions. PCM influence in the union is negligible since, in addition to Guzman, Gonzalez, and Salazar, there are only four or five other PCM members. The possibilities of forming a national university union would appear to be remote, and it is doubtful that present plans in this direction will ever materialize.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS-311/12962-66
SUBJECT	Reaction to Siempre! Editorial On Victor Rico Galan	DATE DISTR.	26 September 1966
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	2-6 September 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (7 September 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-10658

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan although they disagree politically. Source has reported infrequently but reliably on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained from Mrs. Rico Galan and from a journalist.

Field Comment: The 7 September 1966 issue of Siempre! magazine, which appeared on the stands on 1 September, carried on pages 10 and 11 a letter written from prison by Victor Rico Galan explaining and defending his position and accusing the Mexican Government of being the real violators of the Constitution. On the following pages an editorial titled "Mexico No Es Una Insula de Gorilas" (Mexico Is Not A Police State), which rejected the points put forth by Rico Galan, defended Mexican institutions and concluded that because of the magazine's devotion to freedom of expression, time and space had been devoted to what should properly be recorded as a minor police incident.

1. Inge de Rico Galan, wife of Siempre! writer Victor Rico Galan, said on 2 September 1966 that her husband was resigning from Siempre! because of the harsh editorial against him and his ideas which appeared in the 7 September issue of the magazine. Mrs. Rico Galan said that the editorial was far harsher than even President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz' comments on the matter which he included in his 1 September State of the Union message.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI 13
	CINCSO 0						USIA	I&NS

(Note field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/1	5	HMM-10658
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/R	1	LIENVOY
CA/INT	1	WH/MEXI	1	(LIENVOY)
CA/PROP	1	WH/MNTY	0	CS-311/12962-66
FI/INT	1	WH/FACY	0	

TOTALS IK 2, CI 4, FI 4, CA 2, WH 6 (1), DO/H 1.

LIAISON

COORDINATING

RELEASING
HK/
POH:BB:k

2. If Siempre! refuses to publish her husband's letter of resignation, and she seemed to feel that this might be the case, Manuel Marcue Pardinas of the leftist newsmagazine Politica, has assured Rico that he will publish it.[1]

3. On 6 September, the journalist Froilan Manjarrez told Antonio Caram, of the Cuban news agency Prensa Latina, that Eduardo de los Rios (Rius), the political cartoonist, had resigned from Siempre! in protest over the magazine's treatment of Rico Galan. Since it was doubtful that Siempre! will publish Rius' letter of resignation, arrangements have already been made with Marcue Pardinas to publish it in Politica.

4. Manjarrez remarked that Siempre! publisher Jose Pages Llergo had blundered badly in his handling of the Rico Galan affair and that people who had never been especially sympathetic to Rico Galan were nonetheless totally disgusted with Pages. Rico is being spoken of as a brave man and Pages as a contemptible one, according to Manjarrez, as a result of the editorial.[2]

---

1. Field Comment: CS-311/12195-66 reported that it was uncertain that Politica would continue to publish after the 15 August 1966 issue.

2. Headquarters Comment: The 14 September 1966 issue of Siempre carried a letter to the editor written by Rico Galan, in which he expressed his intense displeasure with the publication's editorial of the previous week. He asked that Siempre consider withdrawn his intention to continue collaborating with it on a book section, saying that he would seek means of support for his family despite his confinement, that they may live in a manner worthy of revolutionary solidarity, not from alms granted by evil consciences seeking precarious tranquility. In a note of reply Siempre reiterated its disagreement with Rico Galan's viewpoints but added that it claimed neither to qualify nor to judge the personal conduct of a friend with whom the magazine was permanently bound.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
DISSEM BY 33/9

ACTION
WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/CB, CA2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, FI, CI,

SECRET 212004Z CITE SAO PAULO 7146 21 SEP 66 IN 00837

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR, RIO DE JANEIRO

PSYCH RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY

REF MEXICO CITY 8416 (IN 85559)*

ALWALTZ-2 EDITORIAL ON GALAN CASE APPEARED IN 21 SEPTEMBER EDITION "DIARIO DE SAO PAULO." MAILING CLIPS.

SECRET

BT

* SUBVERSION CASE

SECRET

NNNN

Pls. file

201

CA

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico/Guatemala

REPORT NO. CS-311/12488-66

SUBJECT Reaction of Guatemalan Exile Leader in Mexico to the Arrest of Victor Rico Galan

DATE DISTR. 15 September 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 18 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (18 August 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-10629

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE Guatemalan professional man, former member of a guerrilla organization in Guatemala, who is believed to have good access to Guatemalan exiles in Mexico.

VRGalan

1. Rolando Collado Ardon, leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico and a member of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT - Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo), said that the arrest of Victor Rico Galan on charges of subversion was a good thing for the PGT. Collado was referring to Rico Galan's influence on Guatemalan guerrilla leader Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. According to Collado, Rico Galan prevented the PGT from persuading Yon Sosa to join the Party in 1963 because of Rico's Trotskyist interference and the aid he gave to Yon Sosa at the time.[1]

2. Medical doctors Miguel Cruz Ruiz and Rolf Meiner Huebner, two of those arrested with Rico Galan, have been associated with Rico since early 1965. Both were very much involved in the medical doctors' strikes of late 1964 which continued into 1965. When the strikes were finally settled both Cruz Ruiz and Meiner Heubner were dismissed from their jobs at the Social Security Hospital at Cuauhtemoc 330. They went directly to Rico Galan who put them to work, mainly writing medical articles for the magazine Sucesos for which Rico Galan worked.[2]

3. Rico Galan sent both Cruz Ruiz and Meiner Huebner to Cuba in 1965 and both are well indoctrinated Communists.[3] However, neither belongs to any Communist Party or organization. Both, as well as Dr. Jorge Velez Trejo, also very active during the medical strikes, have traveled through Latin America making

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
CINCSO # (ALSO SENT GUATEMALA CITY)							USIA	I&S

(Note: field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/1	5	WH/GUAT	#	HMM-10629 LIREBEL (LIREBEL-1) CS-311/12488-66
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/MEXI	1			
CA/INT	1	WH/MNTY	#			
CA/PROP	1	WH/PACY	#			
WH/R	1	WH/2/O	1			COORDINATING WH/2/C: CB
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 7 (1), DO/H 1.					LIAISON #	RELEASING HK POH:klm

contact with medical groups and attempting to inspire them to anti-government activity in their respective countries.4 Also, while Cruz Ruiz and Meiner Huebner were working for Rico Galan at Sucesos they were giving classes in revolutionary activities to groups organized by Rico Galan.

Field Comments

1. In October-November 1963, Rico Galan, ostensibly as a purely journalistic exercise, went to Guatemala where he interviewed Yon Sosa in the guerrilla leader's camp.

2. CS-311/12133-65, 4 October 1965, presents an over-all picture of the medical strike situation.

3. TDCS-314/02438-66, 22 February 1966, reported that Rico Galan arranged passages for Mexican doctors who attended a medical congress in Havana in February 1966.

   Headquarters Comment: This report, however, does not give the names of Drs. Cruz and Meiner as having been invited to attend the XI Medical Congress and the VII National Stomatology Congress but states that Rico Galan, who was making ticket arrangements, had names of others invited to the Congresses.

4. TDCS-314/02464-66, 22 February 1966, reports on the Central American activities of Drs. Meiner and Velez.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS-311/12430-66
SUBJECT	Mexican Communist Party Views on Recent Arrest Of Subversive Group	DATE DISTR.	13 September 1966
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	24 August 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (26 August 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-10646

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican security officer with access to information derived from investigative activities. His reporting is believed to be reliable.

1. At a meeting of leaders of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM - Partido Comunista Mexicano), attended by Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, Fernando Granados Cortes, Manuel Terrazas Guerrero, Gerardo Unzueta Lorenzana, and Marcos Leonel Posadas Segura, there was some discussion of the status of members of the group, headed by Victor Rico Galan and Raul Ugalde Alvarez, which was recently arrested for engaging in subversive activities. It was revealed at this meeting that Ugalde had submitted an application for membership in the PCM but that he had not been accepted.[1] He is not, therefore, considered to be a member of the Party. The same is true of Guillermo Balam Pereyra.[2] It is true that Venancio Garay Zuniga and Artemio Garay Zuniga are PCM members, but they aligned themselves with the Rico Galan "guerrilla" group on instructions from the Party to serve as spies in order to keep the Party informed on the group's activities.[3]

2. At a meeting of the Permanent Committee of the National Assembly for the Freedom of Political Prisoners, Filomeno Mata Alatorre stated that he was completely removed from the subversive group and that he had had nothing whatsoever to do with it. Guillermo Calderon Ita raised the question of the most recent group of prisoners (the Rico Galan group), and it was agreed that that group had chosen the easy path - that of taking up arms; that such a movement would come about eventually, but that now is not the time; there is no chance for success of an armed movement. It was agreed that even though the Committee

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
	CINCSO #						USIA	INS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/1	6	HMM-10646
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/MEXI	1	LITEMPO
CA/INT	1	WH/MNTY	#	(LITEMPO-12)
CA/PROP	1	WH/PACY	#	CS-311/12430-66
[illegible]	1			

TOTALS IE 2 CI 4 FI 3 CA 2, WH 7 (1), DD/I 1.

LIAISON

COORDINATING

RELEASING
HK
P H:klm

was not in accord with the tactics, or even the ideology, of the Rico Galan group, the latter group should be defended in the same way as are other political prisoners. The Rico Galan group has engaged the same lawyers used by the Committee. In fact, the campaign in behalf of political prisoners must be pursued with even greater vigor because under the present Mexican Government policy the PCM or the Popular Socialist Party (PPS - Partido Popular Socialista) could be accused of operating schools for training of subversives. At the close of the meeting it was reported that a message had been received from the Fourth Latin American Students' Congress (CLAE) in Havana advising that as part of the Campaign for the Release of Political Prisoners, which will be highlighted during the period 25 September to 2 October 1966, telegrams will be sent to the President of Mexico from all countries in Latin America.

Field Comments

1. While there does not appear to be any firm evidence of Ugalde's membership in the PCM, his activities as a leading figure in the People's Electoral Front (FEP-Frente Electoral del Pueblo), which is controlled by the PCM, have been well reported.

2. In a document seized by Mexican police during a raid on PCM headquarters on 12 April 1965, Dr. Balam Pereyra was listed as a member of the Dr. Angel Martinez Villarreal cell, having joined the Party in August 1964.

3. According to the Mexico City daily, El Dia, of 30 August 1966, the office of the Attorney General for the Federal District protested against the action of a Federal District judge in releasing the Garay Zuniga brothers from custody on 22 August.

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

REPORT NO. CS -311/12432-66

SUBJECT Financial Aid to Victor Rico Galan

DATE DISTR. 13 September 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 26 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (29 August 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMCL-10650

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan, although he disagrees with him politically. Source has reported infrequently on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained from his wife.

1. According to Inge de Rico,[1] wife of Victor Rico Galan who was arrested on 12 August and who has been charged with conspiring against the Mexican Government, her husband is quite well. She said that she is allowed to see him every day and to take him food, clothing, books, papers, and other things which he has requested. She also said that friends have been very kind. In fact, her husband has told her that he wants the money which has been offered to him to be shared among the other prisoners who have none and who are trying to get bond.[2]

2. As to her husband's chances for being released on bail, she said that a number of legal experts on this type of case have been consulted and their opinions have been rather pessimistic.

3. Sra. de Rico has been asked to have her husband prepare a message for students at the University and in some of the Preparatory Schools who are urging that he be freed. Many of Rico's readers are young students who greatly admire him.

[1] Headquarters Comment: Her full name is Ingebord Diener de Rico Galan.

[2] Field Comment: An independent, usually reliable source reported that the National Liberation Movement (MLN) had taken $120.00 (U.S.) from its pro-Vietnam fund and given it to Rico Galan. Also, Ramon Zorrilla, teacher at the Ibero-American University, press chief of the National

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI
	CINCSO #						USIA	I&NS

Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/R	1	[illegible]-10650
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/[illegible]	3	LIENVOY
FI/INT	1	WH/MEXI	1	(LIENVOY)
CA/INT	1	WH/CITY	#	CS-311/12432-66
CA/PROP	1	WH/FACY	#	COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible] FI 4 CA 2 WH 4 (1). DO/H 1. LIAISON

[illegible] Pd:Alm

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Institute of Fine Arts, and member of the Movimiento Social Democrata Cristiano (MSDC), has undertaken to collect funds for Rico from among their mutual friends. Sra. de Rico has told Zorrilla that she and her husband do not need money at present, but that he is eager to share any funds they do collect among the needy prisoners.

Headquarters Comment: According to another independent, usually reliable source, the MSDC was formed by the National Action Party (PAN-Partido Accion Nacional), pro-Catholic Party, in April 1963 and took part in the anti-Diaz Ordaz demonstrations in Chihuahua during April 1964 when the President was a candidate for this office.

14-00000

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
	1. RI FILE NO.			
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474 050-006-008
SEX M DOB ? DBA -60121
05 SEP 66
CIT MEXICO [illegible]
OCC ? P0
< MEXICO SEE DOCUMENT FOR SUBJECTS ILLEGAL
ACTIVITIES WITH THE POR, THE MEXICAN SECTION
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, A TROTSKYITE
ORGANIZATION. ALSO ONE OF THE PERSONS
ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATION OF A
SCHOOL PURPORTEDLY SPONSORED BY THE
MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO /MRP-
PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT/

R 6610040379

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 887 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

REPORT NO. CS-311/12196-66

SUBJECT Popular Socialist Party Skepticism Concerning the Arrest of Victor Rico Galan And Others

DATE DISTR. 9 September 1966

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 17 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (30 August 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Veteran and trusted member of the Popular Socialist Party who has close, personal connections with ranking members of the Party. He has been a prolific reporter of reliable information. The reported information was obtained directly from leaders of both the PPS and the General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico. The substance of these persons' comments is believed to be accurately reported; its validity, however, cannot be assessed.

1. (Summary: Popular Socialist Party (PPS) attitudes toward the arrest of Victor Rico Galan and others on charges of conspiring against the Government remain unsympathetic. The Party intends to stay outside the entire matter, although PPS Secretary General Vicente Lombardo Toledano may seize the opportunity to strike back at some of his enemies by issuing a statement condemning the plans attributed to Rico Galan as Trotskyist. Within the Party there is considerable skepticism about the truth of the published charges. While several Party leaders do not doubt that there is some truth to the charges, they are quite convinced that there was no danger of imminent rebellion and that Mexican institutions stood in no peril from Rico Galan and his friends. The suspicion exists that Rico Galan's case is a Government maneuver, successfully used in the past. Also, it is believed in the PPS that police accounts of their role in the matter have been exaggerated to enhance the reputation of the police both with the President and with the public. The rumor that the Guatemalan Government may have asked the Mexican Government to silence Rico Galan because of his violent attacks against the new Guatemalan administration is generally discounted since the complaints of Guatemalan officials are certainly of no concern to Mexico.)

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	[illegible]
	CINCSO #	(ALSO SENT GUATEMALA CITY)					ISTA	[illegible]

(Note: field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]				[illegible]
CI/OPS/WH	1 WH/[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]				[illegible]
CA/[illegible]	1 WH/C/Q	1					([illegible]-3)
[illegible]/PROP	1 [illegible]	1					CS-311/12196-66
[illegible]	1 (L/[illegible])	[illegible]					
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WE 7 (2), DO/H 1.				LIAISON			[illegible]

2. Victor Rico Galan and his associates can expect neither sympathy nor help from the Popular Socialist Party (PPS - Partido Popular Socialista). Although no official decision has yet been made by the Party, PPS leaders who have commented unofficially on the matter have said that for the moment the Party will no doubt stay completely outside the whole affair, thus proving its total lack of interest in this type of revolutionary activity. It is of course possible that PPS Secretary General Vicente Lombardo Toledano will seize the opportunity to issue a statement condemning the entire affair as Trotskyist, criminal, and utopian. Lombardo may decide to use this opportunity to strike back at the National Liberation Movement (MLN - Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional) and others who have attacked him.

3. Among leaders of both the PPS and the General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico (UGOCM - Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico), there is a certain skepticism about the truth of the matter as it has been presented in the press. It is probably true that arms and materials for manufacturing explosives were confiscated. It is probably true that indoctrination sessions on political and revolutionary matters ,were held in the houses where the arrests were made. And probably the group did have some kind of plan for action. But, it is simply not true that there was the slightest danger of immediate and formidable rebellion from Rico Galan and his friends.

4. This latter conclusion is based on the fact that Rico Galan is no guerrilla leader. He is an aggressive intellectual, a radical, but he is not in jail for what he has done but for his ideas. As for Raul Ugalde Alvarez, named with Rico Galan as one of the leaders of the group, he has the reputation of being fuzzy-minded, a leftist adventurer and certainly neither brave nor dedicated. Further, and Rico Galan is well aware of this, popular support is essential to the success of rebellion; it does not exist. The peasants are divided. The workers are controlled by the Government, and the middle class is content with the way things are. Also, there is the formidable precedent of Government action against any kind of rebellion, trade union, armed, and particularly any sort of activity which is Cuban-connected. The Government has always moved with energy, speed, and efficiency to combat such threats as, for example, during the Railway Workers Strike of 1959. Several leaders of that strike are still in jail and likely to remain there. Another example is the September 1965 attack on a military camp at Ciudad Madera, Chihuahua. While the Government did not feel that this incident posed any real threat to it, it did not want the bad international publicity, so vigilance was increased, activities of would-be guerrillas were blocked, some were bought off with money, others with promises, and the matter was promptly and efficiently controlled.

5. There no doubt is a degree of truth to police charges, but the melodramatic, almost childish character given to the Rico Galan movement, the lack of any proven connection between the movement and leftist/Communist organizations, Rico Galan's open and well-known connections with Guatemalan guerrilla leaders and his public support of the Cuban revolution, make it very hard to discount the suspicion that this is simply a Government maneuver. Also, while the police no doubt did confiscate arms and other materials, the suspicion exists that the police have inflated their role in order to make themselves look good both to the President and to public opinion.

6. There is even a rumor that because of Rico Galan's harsh attacks on the new Guatemalan administration, the Guatemalan Government asked the Mexican Government to deal with Rico Galan. This rumor however is regarded as rather ridiculous since the Mexican Government certainly cares nothing for the opinion of Guatemalan officials.[1]

[1] Field Comment: TDCS-314/10419-66, 18 August 1966, reported earlier PPS reaction to the arrests.

Headquarters Comment: In his inaugural address in December 1964, President Diaz Ordaz made a point of stressing his desire for harmonious relations with Mexico's neighbors both to the north and to the south. His Central American trip in mid-January 1966 was, among other things, to promote such relations. Guatemalan friendship has lately been said to be a cardinal objective of Mexican foreign policy (Cf. State telegram no. 1245, dated 30 August 1966, from the American Embassy in Mexico City).

14-00000

ATT TO
DISPATCH RIO
HMMA-30005
Galan 201
8 Sept 66

PBSD #490

JULY 28, 1966

O/B - 9:40 to 18:15 hrs.

From #1 to 3 on ft.counter, voices in distance.

At #39, voices in distance which sounds like a telephone conversation, to #61.

At #104 Basurto and CHUNG are commenting on the Coca-Cola problem in Mexico.

At #137 Basurto is heard saying: But there are people who went to Santo Domingo:
Rico Galan, Luis Suarez, Renato. They earn 1,000 pesos per week. (Adds
something else which not understood).
CHUNG: And where does "Siempre" get all this money?
Basurto: It is a great business. The government gives them money. (Basurto makes
some remark that they make easily 3,000 pesos per month).
CHUNG asks something and mentions a name which sounds like "Victor Alba".
Basurto says no.
CHUNG says: 100 pesos per hour.
Basurto: It varies.

(There is much noise and cannot hear clearly)

Basurto: I think much more than that.
(They talk about some cousin of Basurto's. Basurto says his cousin tells him every-
thing. CHUNG says he is a very special cousin.
BASURTO: I saw him yesterday.
CHUNG: Is he a student?
Bas: I don't know, I don't like to pry into other people's private lives. But he
told me himself that he was going, that he was going to be in Mexico only
two more weeks and that he was going to stay there for good. We won't see
him anymore.
CHUNG: Where is he going?
Bas: To Cuba, he's going to become Cuban by naturalization. He already has work
and everything over there. He's going to be in charge of a magazine.
(Few words not understood, then Basurto continues: I don't like the hot
weather, I prefer the cold weather. Did you see the SIEMPRE photos?
(Pause) Basurto says something that they are going to take them now in 3 hours.
(There is much noise and cannot understand complete conversation)
From #305 to #312 CHUNG and Basurto continue talking but unable to understand.
At #320 Basurto says: He has a big house, a luxurious house in San Angel. His way
of life is very high, he lives like a king. Just the subsidy he gets from the
government -- (few words not understood). That's why they call it "paid opposition".

CHUNG makes some remark and Basurto answers: $5,000 plus compensations.
(There is much noise and cannot hear voices clearly) Basurto mentions the Conference
in Cuba about Marxism and the Cuban Revolution. Also mentions the Mexican political
parties "PRI" and "PPS" but there is much noise and cannot understand complete phrase.

At #390 voices in distance talking in Chinese.

At #393 Basurto mentions the blackouts in Tijuana and Cd.Juarez and how they have
harmed the stores.
At #417 voices in distance talking in Chinese.
At #544 maid answers phone. Maid at telephone from #592 to 600.
At #617 start hearing TV to 883, followed by strange sound like rain.
At #930 TV continues up to #1010.

Sound off at #1129 which is end of recording.

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10658	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	DATE OF REPORT 7 September 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY	PROJECT LIENVOY	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIENVOY	TDCS DISSEMINATION

3P

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
~~3~~ - Hqs. 1 - MNTY HMY 1 - Panama City (for CINCSO) 6 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - CINCSO

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

Reported information taken from LIENVOY of 2 and 6 September 1966.

MICROFILMED
SEP 15 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 1467

CS COPY

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F. Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico
[illegible]
SUBJECT Reaction to Siempre! Editorial On Victor Rico Galan
201-336474

REPORT NO. HMM-10,658
DATE OF REPORT 7 September 1966
NO PAGES 2
REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO 2-6 September 1966
PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (7 September 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan although they disagree politically. Source has reported infrequently but reliably on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained from Mrs. Rico Galan and from a journalist.

Field Comment: The 7 September 1966 issue of Siempre! magazine (which appeared on the stands on 1 September) carried on pages 10 and 11 a letter written from prison by Victor Rico Galan explaining and defending his position and accusing the Mexican Government of being the real violators of the Constitution. On the following pages an editorial titled Mexico No Es Una Insula de Gorilas (Mexico Is Not a Police State) which rejected all of the points put forth by Rico Galan, defended Mexican institutions and concluded with the observation that time and space had been devoted to what history would properly record as a minor incident because of the magazine's devotion to freedom of expression.

1. Inge de Rico Galan, wife of Siempre! writer Victor Rico Galan, said on 2 September 1966, that her husband was resigning from Siempre! because of the harsh editorial against him and his ideas which appeared in the 7 September issue of the magazine. Mrs. Rico Galan said that the editorial was far harsher than even President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz's comments on the matter which he included in his 1 September State of the Union message.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISTRIBUTION

(201-290811)

2. If Siempre! refuses to publish her husband's letter of resignation, and she seemed to feel that this might be the case, Manuel Marcue Pardinas of the Communist newsmagazine Politica has assured Rico that he will publish it in Politica.[1]

[illegible]

3. On 6 September, the journalist Froilan Manjarrez told Antonio Caram of the Cuban news agency Prensa Latina that Eduardo de los Rios (Rius), the political cartoonist, had resigned from Siempre! in protest over the magazine's treatment of Rico Galan. Since it was doubtful that Siempre! will publish Rius' letter of resignation, arrangements have already been made with Marcue Pardinas to publish it in Politica.

4. Manjarrez remarked that Siempre! publisher Jose Pages Llergo had blundered badly in his handling of the Rico Galan affair and that people who had never been especially sympathetic to Rico Galan were none-the-less totally disgusted with Pages. Rico is being spoken of as a brave man and Pages as a contemptible one, according to Manjarrez, as a result of the editorial.

1. Field Comment: HMM-10,625 reported that it was uncertain whether Politica would continue to publish after the 15 August issue.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB 06 FEB 28
SPAIN, EL FERROL
CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO SEE DOCUMENT FOR SHORT SUMMARY ON SUBJECTS ARREST FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND POS- SIBLE COMMUNIST CONNECTIONS.

050-004-136
HMMA-30265A01
06 OCT 66
P3

R 6610170076

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10,650	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	DATE OF REPORT 1 September 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY ocv	PROJECT LIENVOY	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIENVOY	TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
~~3~~ - Hqs. 1 - Panama City (for CINCSO) 3 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - CINCSO

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

LIENVOY of 26 August is the source of the reported information; Ing. Rico Galan and Julieta de Munoz Rosas.

LITEMPO/12 is the source cited in the Field Comment. According to information supplied by LINOODLE/2 on 10 September 1965, Zorrilla is a thinker, fine writer, philosopher, personally and professionally upright and honest, and firmly Christian. According to the LITEMPO/12 report Rico Galan and Zorrilla met daily for coffee and talk at the Cafe Flore and the bond between them is these daily meetings.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20)

201-336474

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A Completely reliable. B Usually reliable. C Fairly reliable. D Not usually reliable. E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2 Probably true. 3 Possibly true. 4 Doubtful. 5 Probably false. 6 Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

REPORT NO. HMM-10,650

SUBJECT Financial Aid to Victor Rico Galan

DATE OF REPORT 1 September 1966

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 26 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (29 August 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan although he disagrees with him politically. Source has reported infrequently on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained from Mrs. Rico Galan.

1. According to Inge Rico Galan, wife of Victor Rico Galan who was arrested on 12 August and who has been charged with conspiring against the Mexican Government, her husband is quite well. She said that she is allowed to see him every day and to take him food, clothing, books, papers, and other things that he has asked for. She said also that friends have been very kind. In fact, her husband has told her that he wants the money which has been offered to him to be shared among the other prisoners who have none and who are trying to get bond.[1]

2. As to her husband's chances for being released on bail, Mrs. Rico Galan said that a number of legal experts on this kind of case have been consulted and their opinions have been rather pessimistic.

3. Mrs. Rico Galan was also asked to have her husband prepare a message for students at the University and in some of the Preparatory Schools who are urging that he be freed. Many of Rico's readers are young students who greatly admire him.

---

[1] Field Comment: An independent, usually reliable source reported that the National Liberation Movement (MLN) had taken $120.00 (U.S.) from its pro-Vietnam fund and given it to Rico Galan. Also, Ramon Zorrilla, teacher at the

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

Ibero-American University, press chief of the National Institute of Bellas Artes, and member of the Movimiento Social Democrata Cristiano (presumably the Christian Democratic Movement) has undertaken to collect funds for Rico from among their mutual friends. Mrs. Rico Galan has told Zorilla that she and her husband do not need money at present but that her husband is eager that any funds they do collect be shared among the other prisoners who are in need.

7. Lecumberri ~~prison~~ penitentiary, Mexico City.

9. RICO was arrested on 12 August 1966 together with some 40 other members of the Popular Revolutionary Movement. They were charged with inciting rebellion, conspiracy, and accumulation of arms, and under these charges are not eligible for bail. ~~Subject is presently~~, As of October 1967, Subject is serving out his sentence in Lecumberri penitentiary.

[illegible]

HOUSE SELECT [illegible]

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Victor Ruiz Galan Vol I
201-336474

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 Oct 1962 - 22 Dec 1964

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO

ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY

MATERIAL FILED IN TH
IS IN CHRONOLOGIC

14-00000

2731

SECRET

Other Agency
2 Docs Enclosed

201-306474
Vol I

3627 PEEL OFF LABEL AND REUSE ENVELOPE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

SUBJECT
Tapes Confiscated by the GOG Military

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

REFERENCE: GUAT-4326

1. GENERAL

Transmitted herewith please find copies of three tapes confiscated by the GOG military from the guerrillas in operations subsequent to the guerrilla attack on the small garrison at Panzos (GUAT-4309, paragraph 4). The tapes were received by the Station from ODIBEX in mid-November. The Station made copies to pass to the Guatemalan Army and to ODIBEX and kept one copy for study. The originals were returned to the Guatemalan Army after a master copy was made.

2. THE TAPES

The original tapes were small and were eight in number and were recorded by the guerrillas at the speed of 1 and 7/8ths. According to information taken from the tapes, the recording was done on a Philips recorder. Judging from the sounds it is felt that the tapes were made indoors by inexperienced personnel. This belief is supported by one of the documents captured which went into detail on the problems the guerrillas were having with the recorder and on how to correct them. The master copy made by the Station (transmitted herewith) was recorded at the same speed on three tapes which total about 16 hours of poor listening.

Attachment:

Tapes, h/w

(CONTINUED)

Distribution:

3 - Hqs, w/att, h/w
2 - Files

AED: wcf

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HCGA-7617

DATE
22 December 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
35-2-8

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HOGA-7617

3. INFORMATION FROM TAPES

A. Tape 1 side 1. A speech made by Victor Rico Galan (Mexican newspaperman who is very leftist) to guerrillas under the command of Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. Generally, he informs the guerrillas that the revolution in Guatemala is the revolution of Latin America. He reports that persons in Latin America and Europe are keenly interested in the Guatemalan revolution and send letters to Galan affirming their support of it. He then goes into the problems of the apparent split between the 13 November Movement and the PGT leadership. He states that the PGT has not given the guerrillas the proper support and has taken too soft a line in the revolutionary struggle. He talked to the PGT leadership and asked that personal feelings be set aside and suggested complete cooperation with the guerrillas to overthrow the present government. At the end of the tape the guerrilla theme song is sung by a group of guerrillas.

B. Tape 1 side 2. This side discusses (voice unidentified) the interview Yon Sosa had with newspapermen in the Sierra de las Minas. The speaker explains how the interview was disseminated throughout Guatemala by Supplement # 1 of the Revolucion Socialista. The interview will soon be translated into German, French and other languages and will be sent to Mexico, Latin America and countries in Europe. The speaker then goes on to explain how the guerrilla publication, Revolucion Socialista, has created great enthusiasm (does not say where) and how it will make people aware of the role the guerrillas play in Guatemala. Its main object is to attack imperialism and the Guatemalan Government.

C. Tape 2 side 1. This side deals with generalities on the revolution going on in Guatemala. It discusses the need for a new government to represent the people. It states that the guerrilla movement is the vanguard of the masses of workers and campesinos. At the end of the tape it salutes the workers of the world.

D. Tape 2 side 2. An unidentified voice discusses, in very general terms, the problems of the guerrillas in shipping various articles (weapons, literature and tapes) to different parts of the country. The major obstacles to smooth movements of the articles throughout the country are police and military check points on the major roads and the fact that large truck shipments cannot be mounted, forcing the guerrillas to hand carry most of the material. Through negligence, many guerrillas have been captured with compromising material in their possession. Pseudonyms are repeatedly mentioned on this side - Rolando, Rudy, Adan, and Mateo - which cannot be identified by the Station.

E. Tape 3 side 1. This side is taken up by an unidentified person reading passages out of Revolucion Socialista and Marxist literature.

F. Tape 3 side 2. On this side there are discussions of the problems faced by the guerrillas The first problem is the trouble the Mando General was having with the Guatemalan Communist Party (the Party tended to isolate itself from the guerrillas). Other problems included communications between guerrilla units throughout the country; problems with the recording machine; and the problem of putting out propaganda which can be understood by the campesinos. All these problems were discussed in very general terms omitting names, places and dates.

4 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM TAPES

The information found on the tapes is of no operational value to the Station since it deals with propaganda and guerrilla problems already known by the Station What is of interest is the apparent effort by the guerrilla leadership to use tapes as a means of operational communications and to reach the illiterate campesinos and workers with spoken instead of written propaganda. The operational use of tapes would obviate the need for printed internal communiques which are bulky and easily compromised. A guerrilla can hide a tape on his person and travel through police and military check points without being detected. Since the people in whom the guerrillas are interested are for the most part illiterate (campesinos and workers) the spoken word would mean much more to them than would printed propaganda. The Station has not based these conclusions solely on the three tapes transmitted with this report. Two days ago, ESDEW-1 informed DOSCHER that the police recently confiscated 24 tapes from the guerrillas (raids on 8 and 9 December, HOGA-7612) and that these tapes consist of operational problems faced by the guerrilla leadership and propaganda. The Station will attempt to make copies of the tapes mentioned by ESDEW-1 if they can be obtained. If the tapes cannot be acquired the Station will receive copies of the scripts taken from the tapes (police are doing this now).

5. Since the tapes are not of operational value the Station feels it is not necessary to retain a copy for the files and is passing to Headquarters the master copy from which reproductions were made for ODIBEX and the Guatemalan Government.

Kenneth A. INWOOD

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

TO	Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO.	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
FROM	Chief of Base, Merida
SUBJECT	[illegible] - Conference Given by Victor RICO Galan in Merida
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	ACTION: FYI

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING.

MICROFILM

REF: HMM 22[illegible]01, 24 Jan. 64

1. Attached are copies of press coverage of a conference given in Merida on 2[illegible] October 1964 by Victor RICO Galan, described in reference as a Mexican Marxist journalist and CASTRO agent. In summary, RICO reportedly sketched the Hispano-American situation briefly and spent an hour or more replying to questions from the audience; his eternal theme was North American imperialism.

2. It will be noted that RICO was invited by the Centro de Renovación Cultural and presented by journalist Mario [illegible] Rodriguez, who said that one might or might not agree with what RICO said but that he had a right to be heard. The Centro is of very recent unknown origin [illegible] is said to be sponsoring the visit each week of a journalist to Merida for similar conferences. Where the money is coming from has not yet been determined. CIACID contacts have said that [illegible] himself paid for RICO's air travel, and that the hotel bill at the Panamericana was paid by the [illegible] tourist agency. However a hotel contact has stated that the bill was paid by the "State Government". LIMUCK indicates that the Cuban Consul in Merida, Mariano GARCIA Perez, is in contact with [illegible], and, when it is recalled that the Cuban-Mexican Institute in Merida sponsored RICO's trip to Merida in 1963, there would seem to be more than one possibility as to the source of funds for the new Centro. If the Centro plans are carried out as reported, annual expenditures might run as high as [illegible],000., a not inconsiderable sum.

3. [illegible] is a close CIACID Merida contact and a personal contact of COB as well. He is a young, crusader-type member of the [illegible] family complex which owns and operates the Yucatan Peninsula's principal daily newspaper Diario de Yucatan. In 1963, he spearheaded an express accusation [illegible] local [illegible] de Agrario officials of fraud. He seems to be on strained terms with his family and to have taken up with the extreme left. Siempre for 26 [illegible] at 1[illegible], carries a letter from him accusing certain federal Ministers and high officials of a new fraud involving some $45 millions of pesos

CS COPY

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[illegible]57	30 October 1964
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	S E C R E T	[illegible]-57

in the purchase of [illegible], the [illegible] owns practically all the [illegible] mills in [illegible]. About 20 August 19[illegible], [illegible], who was [illegible] a [illegible] conference in Mexico City, cabled his wife in [illegible] to [illegible] the local [illegible] that he was cancelling his plans to attend a 30-day seminar of Latin American newspaper editors in [illegible] as a guest of [illegible]. A local Maryknoll priest who commented on the case last week said that he feared Mario had "gone over to the other side".

4. Since MENENDEZ was Number 1 on the list of the ODACID "Coming Young Men" program, the above information is being forwarded on an interim basis until the return of the local ODACID chief, which is expected around 7 November. At that time it is anticipated that he will try to get down to the bottom of the matter, since he considers MENENDEZ as his contact. This dispatch is being forwarded with the knowledge of the acting chief of the local ODACID, who contributed information to it.

5. The Base has no record of Eugenio HERRERO Garcia.

Andrew F. [illegible]

Attachments:
3 newspaper clippings

Distribution:
2-[illegible] w/atts (1)
2-[illegible] w/atts (1)
2-files w/atts (1)

[illegible] oct 64

Anoche, en el Teatro del Seguro Social

Visión de Hispanoamérica

CONFERENCIA DE VICTOR RICO GALAN

[illegible] por el Centro de Renovación Cultural, desarrolló [illegible] interesante conferencia sobre el tema Visión de Hispanoamérica, el dialogado periodista Víctor Rico Galán. La concurrencia —profesionales, estudiantes, hombres de empresa, el público que se interesa en los problemas de mayor proyección— llenó casi literalmente el cupo de la sala del Seguro Social.

Después de breve presentación del conferenciante por el Sr. Mario Menéndez Rodríguez, en que advirtió que se podía estar o no de acuerdo con el Sr. Rico Galán, pero que el Centro defendía el derecho de todos a expresar sus opiniones libremente, inició su disertación el intelectual visitante.

x X x

Más que el desarrollo de una lección literaria, científica o política, que es lo que propiamente se entiende por conferencia, la del Sr. Rico Galán fue en realidad un diálogo ágil, sencillo, fecundo, con el auditorio. Lástima que tan interesante conversación se viera mutilada desde el principio, pues el conferenciante advirtió que debido a cierto artículo del reglamento del Teatro del Seguro Social, en la mencionada sala no podía debatirse el tema de la política mexicana. Esa condición no sólo obligó a presentar una América Latina incompleta, de la cual era [illegible] nuestra patria, sino puso de manifiesto también que el Centro de Renovación Cultural tendrá que procurarse otro local para sus actividades, donde no se ponga ningún tropiezo, dentro de la ley, a la libre manifestación de las ideas.

Luego de una síntesis expositiva de las condiciones que privan en Hispanoamérica, el Sr. Rico Galán subrayó que la amplitud y diversidad del tema lo hacían inasequible para una sola conferencia, por lo que prefería desarrollarlo por medio de preguntas y respuestas. Esta modalidad comunicó insospechada serie de matices a la velada, máxime que el intelectual visitante para enfocar mejor los tópicos, recordó que la suerte y el trato que se dispensaba a Latinoamérica cambiaron radicalmente desde el momento mismo en que Fidel Castro rompe con el tutelaje de los Estados Unidos. Entonces se nos empieza a enamorar de muy diversos modos "hasta con la Alianza para el Progreso".

x X x

A partir de esa delimitación, hábilmente practicada por el conferenciante, la plática giró siempre o casi siempre sobre el mismo eje: el imperialismo de los Estados Unidos como causa fundamental y generadora de todos nuestros males. Las preguntas surgían en ocasiones, por la espontaneidad con que eran formuladas, con el propósito de hallar una esperanza emancipadora en Cuba, en la Argentina, en el Perú, en Venezuela, en Colombia, en Panamá, en algún sitio de "esta América de sangre caliente", pero las respuestas, [illegible] por el Sr. Rico Galán con argumentos de primera mano y a veces hasta con anécdotas personales, [illegible] con el mismo [illegible] el imperialismo norteamericano.

[illegible] llegó a suponer en [illegible] Sr. Rico Galán [illegible] en la terapéutica [illegible] remedio heroico para Hispanoamérica otro imperialismo, por ejemplo, el de la Unión Soviética.

Pero no. Con la misma sencillez, con la misma agilidad, hasta con la misma modestia que fueron los denominadores comunes de su charla, el Sr. Rico Galán sugirió, sin dogmatizar, que la salvación de Hispanoamérica no está en emanciparse del imperialismo de los Estados Unidos por medio del tutelaje de la Unión Soviética o de la Francia del Gral. De Gaulle sino aprovechando inteligentemente todos aquellos recursos o maniobras que se opongan o limiten, o suavicen la influencia material de Norteamérica en Hispanoamérica. "Y desde luego con limpia política de autodeterminación, como lo ha hecho el gobierno de México".

Hubo un instante —sólo un instante— en que el flujo y reflujo de la charla, en que el juego de las preguntas y las respuestas pareció perder agilidad, hacerse [illegible], hasta un punto obscuro y vacilar [illegible] cuando una interrogación puso sobre el tapete el caso del imperialismo ruso en Hungría, el brutal sometimiento de esa pobre víctima del implacable oso moscovita. Pero al Sr. Rico Galán le bastó encender un cigarro y volver a esa actitud de modestia que le es habitual para desenredar el caso y conducir de nuevo la plática al tema inagotable del imperialismo yanqui. Reconoció también que a Rusia se le había ido la mano en el caso de Hungría.

x X x

Maestro del arte conversacional, el periodista visitante supo medir la atención del auditorio. El límite de una conferencia es la hora y cuarto, la hora y media [illegible] el Sr. Rico Galán [illegible]

satisfactoriamente y en medio de los aplausos del [illegible]. Y en efecto [illegible] Menéndez [illegible]

Diario del Sureste
Mérida
29 Oct 64

Conferencia de Rico Galán

Invitado por el Centro de Difusión Cultural, el periodista Víctor Rico Galán habló [illegible] de Latinoamérica, en el "Teatro" del Seguro Social.

En esta forma inició el Centro sus actividades.

Rico Galán hizo un examen de la situación general [illegible] en Latinoamérica y luego [illegible] el peligro a que la Latinoamérica [illegible] por espacio de más de una hora, con sus respectivas [illegible].

Cuba, República Dominicana, Panamá, Guatemala, Perú, etc., pasaron por el criterio analítico de Rico Galán.

Presentó al conferenciante, el periodista Carlos Hernández, [illegible]

14-00000

Diario del Sureste
Sat.
24 oct. 64

Próxima Conferencia del Periodista Victor Rico Galán, en Mérida

El Centro de Renovación Cultural ha estado repartiendo invitaciones para la conferencia que sobre el tema "Visión de Hispanoamérica" sustentará el conocido periodista Víctor Rico Galán, en el teatro del Seguro Social de esta ciudad el próximo miércoles a las 21 horas.

Suscriben las invitaciones los Sres. Eugenio Marrero García y y Mario Menéndez Rodríguez, el presidente y secretario, respectivamente, del mencionado Centro.

July '64



[illegible] DEL TITULAR EN MEXICO

DOMICILIO DEL TITULAR EN EL EXTRANJERO

EN CASO DE MUERTE O ACCIDENTE NOTIFIQUESE A:

DOMICILIO

ESTE PASAPORTE DEBE REFRENDARSE CADA DOS AÑOS. LA LIBRETA CADUCA A LOS SEIS AÑOS.

DERECHOS $ 60.00

PASAPORTE NUMERO 55011

CONTIENE [illegible] PAGINAS

PASAPORTE

EXPEDIDO A FAVOR DE
VICTOR RICO GALAN

A QUIEN ACOMPAÑA SU ESPOSA:
X X X X

Y X MENORES

Nº 16907

ESTE PASAPORTE ES NULO SI TIENE RASPADURAS, ENMENDATURAS O ENTRERRENGLONADURAS.
CE PASSEPORT EST NUL S'IL Y A DES RATURES, CORRECTIONS OU DES INTERLINEATIONS.
THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID IF IT IS ERASED, AMENDED OR INTERLINED.

1

23333

23333

[illegible]
de los ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS
concede libre y seguro pasaje a
VICTOR RICO GALAN

de NACIONALIDAD MEXICANA
(Mexicano por naturalización), y suplica a las autoridades civiles y militares de los países por donde transite, que no le pongan obstáculos y le presten ayuda y protección en caso necesario.

Dado en la ciudad de MEXICO, D.F.
a los 9
días del mes de SEPTIEMBRE
del año de mil novecientos SESENTA
Y TRES

[illegible]

Este pasaporte es válido para dirigirse a los
ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA, CANADA, CENTRO Y SUD AMERICA, INGLATERRA, FRANCIA, ITALIA, PORTUGAL, ESPAÑA, SUECIA, DINAMARCA, ALEMANIA, SUIZA, AUSTRIA, COMUNIDAD BRITANICA DE NACIONES.

LA VALIDEZ DE ESTE PASAPORTE EXPIRA EL
8 SEPTIEMBRE 1965

a menos de que sea refrendado por la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores o por alguna oficina diplomática o consular de México en el extranjero.

OBSERVACIONES

El titular es MEXICANO POR NATURALIZACION, según carta número 146
otorgada el 15 MARZO 1949
[illegible]



FILIACIONES

	TITULAR	ESPOSA
ESTATURA	1.75 MTS.	
COLOR	BLANCO	
OJOS	CAFES	
PELO	ENTRECANO	
SEÑAS PARTICULARES	NINGUNA	
LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO	EL FERROL, ESPAÑA	
FECHA DE NACIMIENTO	6 FEBRERO 1923	
OCUPACIÓN	PERIODISTA	
ESTADO CIVIL	CASADO	

HIJOS MENORES

NOMBRE	EDAD	SEXO

4

FOTOGRAFIAS

FIRMA DEL TITULAR

FIRMA DE LA ESPOSA

ESTE PASAPORTE NO ES VALIDO SIN LA FIRMA Y HUELLA DIGITAL DEL INTERESADO

5



VISAS

CONSULADO GENERAL DE COSTA RICA
MEXICO D. F., MEXICO
VISA DE TURISTA

Buena para ingresar a Costa Rica por [illegible]

[illegible] SET. 1963

CONSULADO GENERAL DE GUATEMALA

[illegible]

18 SET 1963



CONSULADO GENERAL DE HAITI
MEXICO, D.F.

NUMERO [illegible]

DERECHOS COBRADOS [illegible]

VISTO en este Consulado General para dirigirse a [illegible]

y válido por un período de [illegible]

México, D.F. [illegible]

VISAS

CONSULADO GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE [illegible] EN MEXICO, D.F.

[illegible]

14-00000

VISAS

VISADO EN ESTE CONSULADO GENERAL

Bueno para ingresar al Perú

en condición de No Inmigrante

VALIDO por 90 días

México, D. F. 26 de Set. de 196[illegible]

BERNARDO ROCA REY
SEGUNDO SECRETARIO DE LA
EMBAJADA DEL PERU

[illegible] 1508
[illegible] 475
[illegible] .64
[illegible] 2

Tiene pasaje de continuación por Pan American No 026-491-351-425

POR ESTA ACTUACION NO SE HAN PERCIBIDO DERECHOS SUPLEMENTARIOS

14

[illegible]

VISAS

CONSULADO GENERAL DE NICARAGUA
MEXICO, D. F.

Visa No. 2034/63

Bueno para Nicaragua

En viaje de Turismo.

Por 30 días

Vía aérea

Fecha 18 Sept. 1963

15



VISAS
CONSULADO GENERAL DE EL SALVADOR
EN MEXICO, D. F.
Visa No. 2223 — [illegible] Salvador C.A.
Pase para dirigirse a [illegible]
En viaje de TURISTA [illegible]
[illegible]
Valida por [illegible]
Aut. de RR. EE. del ___ de ___ de ___
Derechos US $ ___
Impuesto de Turismo US $ ___
El portador queda advertido que por ningún motivo, se le permitirá cambiar su calidad migratoria autorizada por esta visa.
México, D. F. 19 SET. 1963

CONSUL GENERAL
DE EL SALVADOR

VISAS
VISA CORRIENTE No. 120
Bueno y válido para dirigirse a la República Dominicana.
México, D. F., __ de Sept. de 1963
Derechos gratis
Consul General

ENE 15 1964
AGENTE No. 7

14-00000

VISAS

SECCION CONSULAR DE LA EMBAJADA
DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA
VISTO BUENO:
TURISTA

CERTIFICADO ...
... Victor Rico Galan ...
[illegible]
... Art. 37 ...
... Brasil ...
MEXICO ... 29 SET ...

PAUL A. BOGGERO
Secretario de Embajada
Jefe de la Sección Consular

SECCION CONSULAR 18

VISAS

1963

PARAGUAY
VICTOR RICO GALAN

CORTESIA
25 Setiembre 1963

CONSULADO GENERAL
REPUBLICA DEL PARAGUAY
MEXICO

CHILE
15 OCT. 1963
SALIDO

19

VISAS

[illegible]
ENTRADA
11 OCT 1963

[illegible]
S[illegible]N
13 OCT 1963

13 OCT 1963

VISAS

[illegible] EN EL CONSULADO [illegible]
No. [illegible]
Vis[illegible]
Válid[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Cónsul [illegible] Honduras,

VISAS

No. 2281

SEEN at the British Embassy
Mexico City, Consular Section

Good for a single journey to
TRINIDAD within
three months of date hereof
if passport remains valid.

"VISIT"

(Signed)

BRITISH VICE CONSUL
Mexico City

(Date) 27 SEP 1963

VISAS

No. 2282

SEEN at the British Embassy
Mexico City, Consular Section

Good for a single journey to
JAMAICA within
three months of date hereof
if passport remains valid.

"VISIT"

(Signed)

BRITISH VICE CONSUL
Mexico City

(Date) 27 SEP 1963

SERVICE



VISAS

RESIDENCIA

ENTRADA

[illegible] DE INMIGRACION
BOLIVIA
AEROPUERTO EL ALTO
SALIDA
DIC 20 196[illegible]
ENTRADA

VISAS

22.03

SEEN at the British Embassy
Mexico City. Consular Section

Good for a single journey to British GUIANA within three months of date hereof if passport remains valid.

VISIT

(Signed)

CONSUL
Mexico City

(Date) 27 SEP 1964

FOREIGN SERVICE



VISAS

MIGRACION DE ILOPANGO
SAN SALVADOR
EL SALVADOR C. A.
Fecha -8 OCT 1963

MIGRACION DE ILOPANGO
EL SALVADOR C. A.
Salió para
Fecha 11 OCT 1963

VISAS

SALIDA

CHILE
12 DIC. 1963
ENTRADA

AGENTE No. 4



VISAS

CALLAO
ADMITIDO

24

VISAS

CALLAO
ADMITIDO
DIC 20

MEXICO, D. F.
SALIO A
CUBA

25

VISAS

[illegible] ON CONDITION THAT THE [illegible] One Day [illegible] WITHIN THE ISLAND. [illegible]

Mexico

No 9
15 JAN 1964
LANDED
JAMAICA, W.I.

15/1/64

VISAS

[illegible] DE CORTESIA No. 57

EMBAJADA DE CUBA EN MEXICO

MEXICO, D.F. Enero 2 de 1964

BUENO PARA TRASLADARSE A CUBA

VIA A SU ELECCION.

Secretario [illegible]

EMBAJADA DE CUBA * MEXICO *

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	5. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 6. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
3. ANALYST / 4. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

201-299755
HMM -08569
12 MAR 64

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
Δ MEXICO
SUBJ MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST. RE CONTACT WITH RAUL ROA KURI, 201-299755.

#UFG HBR HMY

1 911 056

1911055

PAFR
00000000 000000000 00
11111_11111111 1 ..111
222222222222 .22222222
3333333333333333333333
4.·44444 .44444444444
5555555555555555555..
666666_66_66666666666
7777_77777 .7777777777
8888888888 .888888888
9999939 99999 9 .99999

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9-60)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief of Station, Panama City; ~~Chief, WHD~~;
Chief of Station, Dominican Republic

FROM
Chief of Base, Merida

SUBJECT
Travel of Victor RICO Galan, Mexican Marxist
Journalist and Agent of Fidel CASTRO hus

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: HMMA-22801

FYI

On 15 January 1964, Subject arrived Merida from Kingston, Jamaica, by Mexicana flight 304 in transit for Mexico City. (Source: airlists).

Andrew F. MERTON

Distribution:
2-Mexi
1-Pacy
1-DR
③-WHD
2-Files

CS COPY

201-3[illegible]174

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
H.A-312

DATE
25 Feb, 64

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET ✓

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ROME

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DOP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/WE, C/SAS, VR

12 FEB 64 IN 17813

S E C R E T 120940Z

DIR SDOM INFO MEXI CITE ROME 1921 (BERGER ACTING)

TYPIC ZRKNICK

REF A. SDOM 2659 (IN 08142)

B. DIR 99499 (ALSO RECEIVED 99494)

NO STATION TRACES SUBJ REF A. IF LOCATION RESIDENCE ITALY CAN BE ESTABLISHED CAN OBTAIN UNILATERAL CHECK POLICE FILES. OTHERWISE CAN RUN LIAISON TRACE IF DESIRED.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT DYVOUR ZRKNICK CABLES.

** RE EMILION PAULON.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

Reconsidered

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION 059 SECRET

ORIG anna mc donnell
UNIT WH/3/panama
EXT. 6312
DATE 7 feb 64

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 7 17 31 '64

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH-15

TDCS DB 3/659,422 SECT.

INFORMATION COPIES
CI, CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW 1, CA 2, CA/PEG, DODS, SAS 12, SR. 4, EE 4.
DCI DDCI DDP ADDP

DATE DISTRIBUTED
7 FEB 64

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD RPT., PROJ.)
PACY 2324 (IN 13930)

NP (HYSAGE#1)
LIAISON#

DISSEMINATION

WH/R	1	SAS/H	12					#WH/CARA	
WH/POA	1	CI/ICG	2					#WH/MEXI	
WH/[illegible]	1	WH/COPS	1						
WH/3/P	4	WH/1/V	2						
SR/[illegible]	2								

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR							

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

RECOMMEND FOR EXO
BASIC DOCUMENT HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO OCI

REQUEST IS ATTACHED FOR RELAY TO CINCLANT.

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER
C. N. Gallary
C/WH/R

COPY NO

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY PANAMA/CUBA/USSR/MEXICO

TDCS DB-3/659,422

DATE OF INFO. 28 JANUARY - 5 FEBRUARY 1964

DISTR. 7 FEBRUARY 1964

SUBJECT

TRAVEL AND ACTIVITIES OF THELMA KINO, PRO-CASTRO DEPUTY TO THE PANAMA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

PLACE & DATE ACQ. PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (6 FEBRUARY 1964)

REF IN 13930

TDCSDB-3/659,136

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: LATIN AMERICAN POLITICIAN (F) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN CENTRAL AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CIRCLES. THE PRIMARY SOURCE HAS PROBABLY REPORTED ACCURATELY BUT THE RELIABILITY OF THE SUBSOURCES CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

[illegible] IN CURACAO

1. THELMA KINO, PRO-CUBAN DEPUTY TO THE PANAMA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE PANAMA ON 5 FEBRUARY FOR CURACAO, FROM WHERE SHE WAS TO GO TO THE SOVIET UNION VIA CUBA. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCSDB-3/659,136, OF 21 JANUARY, REPORTED THAT MRS. KINO WOULD LEAVE FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA ON 24 JANUARY. SHE WAS MAKING THE TRIP TO SEEK FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR PANAMA FROM MOSCOW.)

2. ON 28 JANUARY MRS. KINO MET "BRANKO", WHO TOLD HER THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN HAD ASKED HER TO GO DIRECTLY TO CUBA AND THEN TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO DROP HER PLANS TO GO TO CHINA. "BRANKO" GAVE MRS. KINO $1,[illegible] FOR HER TRIP, AND HE EXPECTS TO MEET HER IN CURACAO. (FIELD COMMENT: BRANKO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO FBI
CINCLANTA TREASURY INS [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In)
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

TDCSDB-3/659,422

IN 13939

IS PROBABLY BRANKO MILIJANOVIC, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN MEXICO AND IDENTIFIED YUGOSLAV INTELLIGENCE AGENT. MILIJANOVIC CAME TO PANAMA ON 23 JANUARY AND LEFT FOR SAN JOSE ON 28 JANUARY. ON 27 JANUARY, ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, MRS. KINO AND MILIJANOVIC HAD LUNCH TOGETHER, AND DURING THE LUNCHEON MILIJANOVIC HAD WARNED MRS. KINO THAT THERE WAS GREAT DANGER OF A U.S.-SUPPORTED COUP AGAINST PRESIDENT CHIARI.)

3. FROM CURACAO MRS. KINO WILL GO TO MEXICO CITY AND THEN TO HABANA. RICO GALAN WILL ACCOMPANY HER FROM MEXICO TO HABANA. (1)

4. ONE REASON FOR THE TRIP IS TO ARRANGE A MEETING IN MEXICO IN THE NEAR FUTURE BETWEEN AN UNIDENTIFIED EMISSARY OF FIDEL CASTRO AND THREE PANAMANIAN LEFT-WING POLITICAL FIGURES: CARLOS IVAN ZUNIGA, FABIAN ECHEVERS, AND MANUEL SOLIS PALMA. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCSDB-3/659,400, OF 6 FEBRUARY, CONTAINED A STATEMENT WHICH INDICATED THAT ZUNIGA CONTEMPLATED VISITING MEXICO. BOTH ZUNIGA AND ECHEVERS ARE PROMINENT IN THE PANAMANIAN SOCIALIST PARTY. MANUEL SOLIS PALMA IS THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT, CINCAFSA.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief of Base, Merida
Chief of Station, Panama City
Chief, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

SUBJECT
10 Travel of Victor Rico Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

REFERENCE: HMMA-22801, 24 January 1964

Subject said at the airport in Santo Domingo on departure that he would travel to Miami. However, he was manifested to Kingston, and per KNGS 1097, traveled there and departed on Mexicana flight 304 to Mexico. WAVE did not have any information on his arrival there, per WAVE 0874. (NOTE: Neither KNGS 1097 dated 23 January nor WAVE 0874 dated 22 January were sent to Panama or Merida.)

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
- 2 - Mexico City
- 1 - Headquarters
- 1 - Merida
- 1 - Panama City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HUCA-2543

DATE
4 February 1964

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

S E C R E T

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : D. M. MCGRATH
UNIT : WH/6/DR&PR
EXT : 4524
DATE : 4 FEB 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 336474

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING
1 [illegible]
2
3
4
5
6

5 FEB 64 23 07z

TO : ROME SANTO DOMINGO MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : **DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, VR

Victor Rico [illegible]

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TO ROME INFO SDOM MEXI CITE DIR 99494

REF SDOM 2659 (BEING RELAYED ROME) [illegible]

DYVOUR ZRKNICK

REQUEST TRACES SUBJECT REF. FYI SUBJECT OBSERVED TRAVELING WITH IDEN WHO IDENTIFIED CUBAN AGENT WORKING WITH LATIN AMERICAN CASTROIST SUBVERSIVE, INTEL AND INSURGENT GROUPS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: SDOM traces on Emilio Paulon.

C/S COMMENT: **DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT DYVOUR ZRKNICK CABLES.

ROUTING	INITIAL

C/WH/6 Robert M. [illegible]
WH/PO/A H B Priest
WH/3 [illegible]
SAS/CI [illegible]
WE/4/CE [illegible]

[illegible]
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

W [illegible]
J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : D. ~~[illegible]~~ MCGRATH
UNIT : WH/6/DR&PR
EXT : 4524
DATE : 4 FEB 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : ROME SANTO DOMINGO MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : *DCF, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, VR

5 FEB 64 23 07z

DEFERRED SIG CEN

X ROUTINE

TO ROME INFO SDOM MEXI CITE DIR 99495

REF 99494

DYVOUR ZRKNICK

IDENTITY VICTOR RICO GALAN 201-336474

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT DYVOUR ZRKNICK CABLES.

C/WH/6
WH/PO/A
WH/3
SAS/CI
WH/4/CE
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/K
RELEASING OFFICER

W Wood
J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MORE ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

21 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

RIP

TDCS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8.

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, SR 7, SAS 8, AD/CI (E.O.) 2, DD/I (E.O.), AD/NE (E.O.), VR.

SECRET 290010Z 29 JAN 01462 64 IN 077240

DIR INFO WAVE PACY LANT CITE MEXI 7976

INTEL

REF MEXI 7890 (IN 03343)

MEXI 7738 (IN 97485)

SUPDATA SOURCE LIENVOY FROM TELCON BETWEEN RICO GALAN AND MARIA DEL CARMEN MARQUEZ, EMPLOYED AT MLN HEADQUARTERS, MEXICO CITY. TRAVEL CONFIRMED BY LIFIRE WHO FURNISHED INFO RE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

FILED 290010Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM 8366 MEXICO CUBA

SUBJ TRAVEL TO CUBA OF VICTOR RICO GALAN DOI 27 AND 28 JAN 64 PADA MEXICO MEXICO CITY 28 JAN 64

APP 2

COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TO PORTIONS ... HAS BEEN MADE OUT... PENDING RELEASE ... UNIT.

ZZ

ZZ PROCESS

11 Feb 64

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	

TDCS

PRECEDENCE

ROUTING

PRIORITY

RELEASING INO

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

38647

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

1339

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO FEB 13 4 17 PM '64

FEB 0 39 PM '64

FROM:

ACTION:

INFO:

PAGE 2 IN 07724

TDCS

SOURCE PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO

IN COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING

DATE DISTRIBUTED

BASED ON

LIAISON

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 07724

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

Victor Rico-Galan 201-336474

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST,, LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR HABANA,CUBA, BY AIR ON 28 JAN 64. HE CARRIED MEXICAN PASSPORT NO 56341 AND HAD A CUBAN COURTESY VISA. RICO'S TRAVL DOCUMENTS SHOWED THAT HE WAS PLANNING TO STAY AT THE HOTEL RIVIERA IN HABANA.

2. FIELD COMMENT. IT IS PRESUMED THAT RICO GALAN WILL INTERVIEW FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA, ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE USSR. IT ALREADY HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT RICO CONFERRED WITH CASTRO IN LATE MAY AND EARLY JUNE 1963 UPON CASTRO'S RETURN FROM HIS PREVIOUS TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION. IT HAS ALSO BEEN

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

201-336474

REPORTED THAT RICO IS AN AGENT OF CASTRO AND HAD BEEN ASSIGNED BY CASTRO TO VISIT VARIOUS LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO CONFER WITH COMMUNIST AND LEFTIST LEADERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF INITIATING PROGRAMS OF ANTI-UNITED STATES VIOLENCE AND SABOTAGE. AMONG LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES VISITED BY RICO GALAN BETWEEN OCTOBER AND DECEMBER 1963 WERE VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, GUATEMALA, BRAZIL, AND PANAMA. RICO GALAN VISITED THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM 8 TO 15 JAN 64).

3. FIELD DISSEM STATE FBI ARMY NAVY AIR I&NS CINCSO CINCLANT

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 76 336
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

Manuel Ray Galain

C/W/1/FK

[illegible]
34535

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : ~~C/SAS 5~~ C/WH
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/O 4, ~~C/WH~~, VR C/SAS-5

0411

S E C R E T 2901132

29 JAN 61 IN 07726

DIR INFO WAVE SDOM KNGS POSN CITE MEXI 7978

TYPIC ZRKNICK

REF KNGS 1097 (IN 03663)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	[illegible]
RID/MIS	[illegible]
~~RID/RE~~	
R~~ID/FI~~	
W/1/3/Mex	
DESTROY	

ES COPY

RI COPY

FORM 1389

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Dominican Republic 1/DC.
Chief of Base, Merida 1/ME

INFO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief of Station, Panama 1/ZP

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Travel of Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist Journalist and Agent of Fidel Castro Rus

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Merida, Santo Domingo: See request in paragraph 2

REFERENCES: MEXI 7890, MEXI 7733, MEXI 7695, SDOM 2626
SDOM 2622, SDOM 2619, (None of which were sent to Merida)

1. MEXI 7695 (DOI 7 January 1964) reported that Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and agent of Fidel Castro Ruz, Prime Minister ofCuba, was making preparations to go to the Dominican Republic. SDOM 2610 reported that Victor Rico arrived in the Dominican Republic from Kingston, Jamaica, on 8 January 1964 aboard Pan American flight 431.

2. SDOM 2619 reported that Victor Rico left the Dominican Republic for Mexico via Miami on 15 January aboard Pan American flight 432. SDOM 2622 reported that Victor Rico left the Dominican Republic for Kingston on 15 January 1964 by Pan American airlines. Station Mexico City does not have the airlist in question. In order to keep an accurate record of Rico Galan's travel, Station Mexico City requests Station Santo Domingo and the Merida Base if possible to furnish specific and accurate information on Rico's return trip from the Dominican Republic to Mexico.

3. For the information of Merida Base, Rico Galan, a member of the propaganda committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement), pro-Cuba, anti-United States Communist front, and a writer for Siempre, Mexican leftist magazine, visited Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Brazil between mid-October and mid-December 1963. According to a number of earlier reports furnished by usually reliable sources in Mexico, Panama, and other Latin American stations, Rico Galan spent eight days in Cuba during late May and early June 1963 interviewing Castro on the latter's stay in the USSR. During this period, Rico Galan was given an assignment to visit countries in Central and South America where he was to confer with Communist leaders and instruct them to begin immediate acts of sabotage and violence to take the pressure off Venezuela. He was also instructed to persuade competing leftist factions in the countries visited to unite so that their work would have greater impact. In all of the countries he visited, Rico Galan conferred with leading Communists and leftists. Rico Galan's trip to the Dominican Republic was ostensibly to collect material for newspaper articles. According to SDOM 2626 during his visit there, Rico Galan attempted to get photographs of Dominican guerrilla leaders killed at Las

CONTINUED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 22301

DATE: 24 January 1964

SECRET

201-

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	[illegible] S E C R E T	[illegible] HMMA - 22801

Manuscles on 21 December 1963, for propaganda purposes. MEXI 7890 reported that Rico Galan was planning to fly to Cuba from Mexico by 27 January 1964. Station presumes that Rico Galan's purpose in going to Cuba is to confer again with Castro upon the latter's return to Cuba from his present visit to the Soviet Union, and receive further instructions from Castro re future anti-United States acts of sabotage and violence in Latin America. The local press of 24 January reported that Castro returned to Cuba from the USSR on 23 January. According to HMP 6340, Rico Galan has been known to use the name Armando Conte. CIT/MEXICO OCC JOURNALIST

AGENT OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ

THIS NAME IS AN AKA FOR VICTOR

RICO GALAN 201-336474

Willard C. CURTIS

2 - Dominican Republic
2 - Merida
1 - Headquarters
1 - Panama

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO 201-
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO 95
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

TO: ~~DIRECTOR~~

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: IW

INFO: DDP, ADDP, DODS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 7, WH 13, SAS 12, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TOCS -3/570,926

SECRET 220037Z 23 JAN 64 0051Z IN 03843

DIR INFO SDOM WAVE PACY LANT CITE MEXI 7890

NTEL

EF MEXI 7738 (IN 97485)
SDOM 2626 (IN 00755)
MEXI 7695 (IN 95245)
SDOM 2622 (IN 00010)

ZZ PROCESSED
29 Jan 64
ZZ T.

SUPDATA SOURCE LIENVOY FROM TELCON BETWEEN RICO GALAN AND FERNANDEZ ROA. AIRLISTS SHOWING RETURN OF RICO TO MEXICO FROM SDOM NOT AVAIL. NO INDEX FILED 220037Z

EPORT.CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM 8339 MEXICO/CUBA SUBJECT ROJECTED TRAVEL TO CUBA OF VICTOR RICO GALAN DOI 21 JAN 64 PADA EXICO MEXICO CITY 22 JAN 64 APR 2 SOURCE PERSON (B) WITH GOOD ONNECTIONS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO.

201-336414

COMMENT:

SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS

CS COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	JM
RID/MIS	
~~[illegible]~~	
RID	

WH/REG	5
WH/3/M	5

TDCS PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO: E. H. M. DELANEY

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 23 JANUARY 64 2125

BASED ON: MEXI 7890 LIENVOY (ZR...)

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1389

RI COPY

☐ YES ☐ NO

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY MEXICO / CUBA

TDCS -3/570,926

DATE OF INFO. ~~21 JANUARY~~ 1964

DISTR. 23 JANUARY 1964

SUBJECT

PROJECTED TRAVEL TO CUBA OF VICTOR RICO GALAN

LACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (22 JANUARY 1964)

REF IN 03843

SOURCE
ND
RAISAL: PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. APPRAISAL; 2.

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-8339

1. ON 21 JAN VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, ASKED JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA, THIRD SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO WHAT THE FIRST AVAIL FLIGHT TO CUBA WOULD BE. FERNANDEZ SAID ON 24 JAN. RICO SAID HE HAD WANTED TO GO TO CUBA ON 23 JAN, BUT INDICATED HE MIGHT GO ON THE FLT OF 27 JAN.

2. FIELD COMMENT. EARLIER REPORTS FROM A NUMBER OF USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCES HAVE IDENTIFIED RICO GALAN AS AN AGENT OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA. IN LATE MAY AND EARLY JUNE 1963 RICO GALAN SPENT EIGHT DAYS IN CUBA INTERVIEWING CASTRO ON THE LATTER'S VISIT TO THE USSR. ON THIS OCCASION CASTRO ORDERED RICO TO VISIT VARIOUS CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

ECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

TE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
TREASURY I&NS FBI

FEB 3 [illegible] '64

INSTRUCT LEADING COMMUNISTS THERE TO INITIATE PROGRAMS OF ANTI-UNITED STATES VIOLENCE AND SABOTAGE. BETWEEN OCTOBER AND DECEMBER 1963 RICO VISITED VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, GUATEMALA, BRAZIL, AND PANAMA AND CONFERRED WITH COMMUNIST LEADERS IN EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES. ON 8 JAN 1964 RICO WENT TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM MEXICO. DURING HIS VISIT THERE, RICO ATTEMPTED TO GET PHOTOGRAPHS OF DOMINICAN GUERRILLA LEADERS KILLED AT LAS MANACLAS ON 21 DEC 1963, FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. ACCCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, RICO WAS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO MEXICO FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BY AIR ON 15 JAN).

3. FIELD COMMENT. IT IS PRESUMED THAT RICO GALAN IS GOING TO CUBA TO AGAIN CONFER WITH CASTRO UPON THE LATTER'S RETURN FROM HIS PRESENT TRIP TO THE USSR. THE EXACT DATE OF CASTRO'S RETURN TO CUBA FROM THE USSR IS NOT KNOWN, HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL PRESS OF 22 JAN, CASTRO LEFT MOSCOW FOR KIEV FOR A FOUR DAY VISIT, THENCE RETURNING TO MOSCOW. IT IS PRESUMED THAT CASTRO WILL THEN RETURN TO HABANA.

4. FIELD DISSEM STATE FBI ARMY NAVY AIR I&NS CINCSO CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : KINGSTON

ACTION : C/SAS 5

INFO : DOP, ADOP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/WH, VR

6

S E C R E T 221830Z

22 JAN 64 IN 03663

DIR INFO MEXI SDOM WAVE PASN CITE KNGS 1097

SANITIZED

RY[illegible]YPIC ZRKNICK

[illegible]F: WAVE 0374 (NOT SENT PBON) (IN 03059)

VICTOR RICO GALAN ARRIVED KNGS FROM SDOM 15 JANUARY 1964 ON PAA FLIGHT 432. HE CONTINUED SAME DATE TO MEXI ON MEXICANA FLIGHT 394. WHEN CHECKING IN FOR LATTER FLIGHT AIRLINE PERSONNEL NOTICED HE ACCOMPANIED BY FOLLOWING WHO TOOK SAME FLIGHT AND WITH WHOM HE APPRARED TO BE TRAVELING, AS IN A GROUP:

A. B. NOBUYUKI NKAIDO (SEE POSN 0371 NOT SENT SDOM MEXI)

B. ADALBERT CORTESI, MEXICAN NATIONAL.

C. EMILIO PAULON, ITALIAN NATIONAL WHO ALSO HAD ARRIVED KNGS FROM SDOM ON PAA 432 WITH RICO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2 Judkins	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: C/SAS 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D, C/WH, VR

S E C R E T 212124Z

DIR INFO MEXI KNGS SDOM CITE WAVE 8874

21 JAN 64 IN 03059

DESENSITIZED

TYPIC ZRKNICK

REFS A. SDOM 2619 (NOT SENT KNGS) (IN 99172)

B. DIR 95773 * (NOT SENT SDOM)

C. DIR 94053

CHECK WITH ODURGE AND ODPOON REVEALED SUBJECT NOT ARRIVED WAVE AREA VIA PANAM 432 FOR PERIOD 14 JAN TO DATE. SUBJ NAME PLACED ON ODURGE AIRPORT WATCHLIST. WILL ADVISE IF SHOWS UP WAVE AREA.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN DISCREET COVERAGE (VICTOR RICO GALAN) ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1
2
3

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, VR

S E C R E T 201800Z

DESENSITIZED

DIR INFO MEXI CITE SDOM 2634

20 JAN 64 IN 02098

RYBAT ZRKNICK

REF: A DIR 94953

B SDOM 2612 (IN 97349)

C SDOM 2626 (IN 00751)

1. EMDAN-1 TOLD 13 JAN BY STATION THAT VICTOR RICO POSSIBLY IN DOMREP, THAT HE MEXICAN LEFTIST WHO BELIEVED BE WORKING FOR CASTRO CAUSE WHO HAD VISITED PANAMA AND OTHER WH COUNTRIES, AND WAS SORT WHO COULD TRY STIMULATE 14 JUNE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY. POINTED OUT THAT AS WRITER HE UNDOUBTEDLY COULD PRINT UNFAVORABLE MATERIAL RE GODR AND SUGGESTED CIRCUMSPECT HANDLING. EMDAN-1 PASSED ABOVE TO EMOTH-13 AND TO EMBLINT-1.

2. DURING RICO'S LAST HOURS HERE, EMDAN-1 SAID HE DISCREETLY SURVEILLED BUT NO INFO ON CONTACTS OBTAINED PROBABLY AS INFO HIS ARRIVAL REACHED THEM SEVERAL DAYS TOO LATE.

3. EMDAN-1 SAID DOMREP VISA SUBJECT ISSUED [illegible] SEPT JUST AFTER BOSCH DEPARTURE FROM MEXI TRIP AND FEW DAYS PRIOR BOSCH OVERTHROW, BUT THERE NO RECORD [illegible] IN DOMREP FOREIGN

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

RELATIONS OFFICE AS WOULD BE NORMAL.

4. GODR DID NOT MOLEST RICO. HE HAD FIVE DAY VISA WHICH OVERSTAYED FEW HOURS BUT MADE NO REQUEST FOR EXTENSION, WHICH GODR PREPARED DENY HAD HE REQUESTED IT. TO DATE ALL INDICATIONS ARE INFO HIS PRESENCE HERE HANDLED DISCREETLY BY GODR.

5. NO INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *INTEL REPORT RE VICTOR RICO ATTEMPT TO PHOTOGRAPH DOMINICAN GUERRILLAS KILLED AT LAS MANACLAS.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : D. B. MCGRATH
UNIT : WH/6/DR
EXT : 4523
DATE : 20 JAN 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

20 JAN 64 21 30z

TO : KINGSTON JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH5

INFO : DDP, C/CI, C/FI/D4, [illegible]

☐ DEFERRED SIG CEN
☒ ROUTINE

TO KNGS INFO WAVE MEXI CITE DIR 95773

DESENSITIZED

ZZWHICK

REF: A. SDCM 2622 (IN 00010)

B. TDCS-3/569,940 (BEING RELAYED KNGS)

C. DIR 94953 (BEING RELAYED KNGS)

D. SDCM 2628 (IN 00755)

1. REFS B AND C CONTAIN BACKGROUND ON VICTOR RICO GALAN. REF C INFO AND INSTRUCTIONS ALSO APPLY JAMAICA VIEW PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES DUCOUDRAY AND OTHER DOMINICAN EXILES.

2. REQUEST YOU PASS CONTENTS REF B TO RUABBE WITH REMARKS EMPHASIZING SENSITIVITY AND IMPORTANCE, REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN DISCREET COVERAGE SUBJECT'S ACTIVITIES. NOTE SUBJECT ALSO REPORTED DEPARTED DOMREP FOR MIAMI 15 JANUARY. HOWEVER HE HAS ALREADY TRANSITTED KNGS EN ROUTE DOMREP (8 JANUARY) AND LIKELY TRANSITTING OR VISITING AGAIN ON RETURN. MAY ALREADY HAVE DEPARTED FOR MEXICO OR OTHER DESTINATION.

3. PLEASE KEEP HQS ADVISED ON DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : DAVID MCGRATH
UNIT : WH/6/DR
EXT : 4523
DATE : 20 JAN 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

PAGE TWO

	DEFERRED
X	ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 05773

WH COMMENT: Refs A, B, and C contain information on Victor RICO Galan and his travel to Dom Rep and advise SDOM concerning the handling of this matter with liaison. Ref D reports RICO's approach to a news photographer in Dom Rep to get photos of bodies of guerrilla leaders (especially M. TAVARES Justo).

C/WH/3 for DDP

C/WHD

C/WH/6/J

C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-336974
X REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☑
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

49 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, SAS 8, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR

S E C R E T 170048Z

SDOM INFO DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 7818

17 JAN 64 IN 00177

DYVOUR

REF SDOM 2619 (IN 99172)*

STATION HAS LOOK OUT CARD ON SUBJECT OF REF ON FILE WITH APPROPRIATE SECTION OF HBFINCH. SUBJ HAS NEVER APPLIED FOR ENTRY TO U.S. THROUGH HBFINCH NOR HAVE THEY RECD ANY QUERY CONCERNING SUBJECTS REQUEST FOR ENTRY. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, LEFT SDOM FOR MIAMI ON 15 JAN 64 VIA PANAM 432.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~[illegible]~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
LUH3/MEX	
~~DESTROY~~	

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

00000019

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MICROFILMED
MAR 16 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: IW

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, DODS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, WH 11, SAS 8, DD/I, AD/CI 2, VR.

Rico Galan

TDCS -3/570,355

HMM UFG HZP

SECRET 171907Z 17 JAN 20362 64 IN 00755

PRIORITY DIR MEXI INFO WAVE PACY LANT KNGS CITE SDOM 2626 3P

INTEL

SUPDATA STATION OFFICER FROM RAMON LORA ESPINAL, A PHOTOGRAPHER FOR LISTIN DIARIO WHO TOOK THE PHOTOGRAPHS. VICTOR RICO GALAN WAS PUT IN TOUCH WITH LORA THROUGH EMMA TAVAREZ, WHO HAD BEEN IN LAS MANACLAS WHEN LORA TOOK THE PHOTOGRAPHS.

FILED 171907Z REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM (COUNTRY) DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SUBJ ATTEMPT BY VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, TO GET PHOTOGRAPHS OF DOMINICAN GUERRILLAS KILLED AT LAS MANACLAS DOI 10 JANUARY 1964 PADA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SANTO DOMINGO (16 JANUARY 1964) APPR 2 (HDC 832) SOURCE DOMINICAN (F) WITH CONTACTS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE AGRUPACION POLITICA CATORCE DE JUNIO

Index F

IW COMMENT: NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

201-336474

WH/REG	8
WH/6/SRH/RE	3

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
[illegible]	
RID/FI	

TDCS PRECEDENCE
x ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO: W. Streeter Bass
W. STREETER BASS

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 18 JANUARY 1964 0020Z

BASED ON: HDC 832
~~NO PROJECT~~
~~[illegible]~~ 1

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

TDCS -3/570,355

DATE OF INFO. 10 JANUARY 1964

DISTR. 18 JANUARY 1964

SUBJECT

ATTEMPT BY RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, TO GET PHOTOGRAPHS OF DOMINICAN GUERILLAS KILLED AT LAS MANACLAS

RI COPY

PLACE & DATE ACQ. SANTO DOMINGO (16 JANUARY 1964)

REF IN 00755

FIELD REPORT NO. HDC 832

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A DOMINICAN (F) WITH CONTACTS AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE AGRUPACION POLITICA CATORCE DE JUNIO.

APPRAISAL: 2

1. ON 10 JANUARY 64, VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, ASKED EMMA TAVAREZ JUSTO (SEX F CIT. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC / DOMINICAN REPUBLIC), SISTER OF MANUEL TAVAREZ JUSTO (#201-325376 Tati), ~~FORMER~~ PRESIDENT OF THE AGRUPACION POLITICA CATORCE DE JUNIO (APCJ ~~- 14TH OF~~ (Pro Castro grp in DR) JUNE POLITICAL GROUP), ~~FOR~~ Re PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE CADAVERS OF THE GUERRILLAS KILLED AT LAS MANACLAS ON 21 DECEMBER 63 for Mexican journalist Victor Rico. 1963. (FIELD COMMENT. RICO, WHOSE TRAVEL THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS REPORTS, ARRIVED IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 8 JANUARY 64 AND DEPARTED 15 JANUARY 64 FOR KINGSTON,

RI COPY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

FORM 1389

RI COPY RI COPY

JAMAICA VIA PAN AMERICAN. TAVAREZ WAS KILLED BY THE DOMINICAN ARMED FORCES ON 21 DECEMBER 63. NO ONE HAS YET BEEN NAMED TO REPLACE HIM). EMMA TAVAREZ, HOWEVER, WAS UNABLE TO GET THEM FOR HIM. RICO ALSO REQUESTED THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF RAFAEL HERRERA, DIRECTOR OF LISTIN DIARIO, BUT HERRERA REFUSED TO RELEASE THEM. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE PHOTOGRAPHS HAD BEEN TAKEN AS THE BODIES WERE REMOVED FROM A COMMON GRAVE, WHERE THEY HAD BEEN STACKED CROSSWISE. ALL THE VICTIMS HAD BEEN SHOT THROUGH THE HEAD. THE BACK OF TAVAREZ' HEAD HAD BEEN TORN AWAY BY GUNFIRE. HE HAD ALSO SUFFERED A KNIFE OR BAYONET WOUND IN THE STOMACH. THE PICTURES, WHICH HAVE NEVER APPEARED IN THE PRESS, ARE BEING HELD IN THE ARCHIVES OF LISTIN DIARIO.)

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO CINCLANT.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 16 Jan 1964

File
201-336474

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

16 JAN 64 19 15z

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM : ~~XXXXXXX~~ DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, [illegible]

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

RI COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR [illegible]

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO THIS AGENCY'S TDCS-3/569,940 DISTRIBUTED ON 14 JANUARY 1964, SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

2. INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM A DOMINICAN SECURITY SERVICE THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN LEFT SANTO DOMINGO FOR MIAMI, FLORIDA, ON 15 JANUARY 1964 ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT 432.

3. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON SDOM-2619 (IN 99172), 15 JAN 1964.

JANE ROMAN
CI/LIA
RELEASING OFFICER

B.L. VETTER/[illegible]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible] WH [illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORM 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

13 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, RI/AN, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 161630Z

MEXI DIR INFO WAVE CITE SDOM 2622 16 JAN 64 IN 00010

REF: SDOM 2619 (IN 99172)*

1. VICTOR RICO, MEXICAN, LEFT SDOM FOR KNGS ON 15 JAN 64 VIA PANAM. (SOURCE: AIRLISTS)

2. INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *VICTOR RICO GALAN LEFT SDOM FOR MIAMI ON 15 JAN.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : D.B.MCGRATH
UNIT : WH/6/DR/PR ☐ INDEX
EXT : 4523 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 16 JAN 1964 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

1242
ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : SANTO DOMINGO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, VR

16 JAN 64 20 04z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO SDOM INFO MEXI, WAVE CITE DIR 94953

DESENSITIZED

ZRKNICK

REFS: A, SDOM 2619 (IN 99172)
B. DIR 79062 (BEING RELAYED SDOM WAVE)
C. TDCS 3/563,671 (BEING RELAYED SDOM WAVE)

1. REFS B AND C GIVE BACKGROUND TO VICTOR RICO GALAN. PURPOSE IN DOMREP PRESUMABLY SIMILAR TO THAT DESCRIBED IN LATTER REFS AND PROBABLY RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO APCJ INSURGENCY.

2. DESIRABLE MAINTAIN GODR INTEREST IN SUBJECT VIEW PROBABLE SIGNIFICANCE HIS ACTIVITIES IN DR AND POSSIBILITY HE MAY GO THERE AGAIN. HOWEVER, OWING SENSITIVITY THIS MATTER, STATION SHOULD PASS NO FURTHER INFO BEYOND CONTENTS MEXI 7738, DRAWING ATTENTION SUBJECT'S PROBABLE CONNECTION WITH APCJ INSURGENCY.

3. PLEASE INFORM HQS DETAILS PASSAGE AND HANDLING BY SECURITY SERVICE AND OTHER GODR OFFICIALS INVOLVED. ALSO ADVISE ANY FURTHER DETAILS STATION ABLE ACQUIRE CONCERNING SUBJECT'S ITINERARY ACTIVITIES, CONTACTS IN DR,

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 94953

4. FOR WAVE: REQUEST EMPLOY LOCAL OFFICIAL ODYOKE LIAISONS FOR COVERAGE SUBJECT'S ACTIVITIES YOUR AREA.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *A. Subject departed DomRep for Miami 15 January 1963.
B. Informed certain field stations of subject's itinerary and mission and specified types coverage required.
C. Gave details Subject's Castro connections and above mission.

SAS/CI Anita Potocki (in draft)

WH/PO/A Helen Priest (in draft)

WH/3 Charlotte Bustos (in draft)

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Robert N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN
C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, RI/AN, SAS 8, DO/1, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR

SECRET 151645Z

15 JAN 64 IN 99172

DIR MEXI INFO WAVE CITE SDOM 2619

REFS: SDOM ~~2407~~ 1610* (NOT SENT WAVE)

MEXI 7738 (NOT SENT WAVE)(IN 97485)**

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, LEFT SDOM FOR MIAMI ON 15 JAN 64 VIA PANAM 432. (SOURCE/ DOMINICAN SECURITY SERVICE). NO FURTHER INFO AVAILABLE.

2. INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE. POSSIBLY SDOM 2610 (IN 97187) INTENDED.

**INTEL RPT RE TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

CS COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET ✓

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, RI/AN, VR

SECRET 131200Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE SDOM 2610

REF: SDOM 2606 (IN 96608)

1. VICTOR RICO, MEXICAN, PROBABLY IDENTICAL SUBJECT REF, ARRIVED SDOM PANAM 431 FROM KINGSTON 8 JAN (SOURCE: FLIGHT MANIFEST.

13 JAN 64 IN 97107

2. INDEX.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

24 SECRET

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : WH 8
INFO : CI/OPS, FI/INT 2, VR

13 J[illegible] IN 57373

SECRET 131651Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7738

REF MEXI 7695 (IN 95254)**

IN VIEW IMPORTANCE PRESENT SITUATION PACY, PERMISSION GRANTED PASS INFO CONTAINED IN REF AS REQUESTED BY SDOM 2686.*

SECRET

CS COMMENT: *IN 96608

**INTEL RPT RE PROJECTED TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO [illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ NO [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, SAS 8, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR.

TDCS 3/569,940

SECRET 131939Z 13 JANUARY 2056Z 64 IN 97485

SDOM INFO DIR PACY CITE MEXI 7738

NTEL

REF MEXI 7695 (IN 95254)
SDOM 2610 (IN 97187)

SUPDATA SOURCE LIENVOY FROM TELCONS BETWEEN WIFE OF RICO GALAN AND TIBOL. WIFE'S NAME UNKNOWN. [illegible] AVAILABLE AIRLISTS DO NOT SHOW TRAVEL OF SUBJECT. ACCORDING HZP-6340, RICO GALAN HAS BEEN KNOWN TO USE NAME ARMANDO CONTE. SDOM HAS PERMISSION PASS INFO BELOW TO HIGH LEVEL GODR MENTIONED SDOM 2606. (IN 96608). VICTOR RICO REPORTED SDOM 2610 (IN 97187) OBVIOUSLY IDENTICAL RICO GALAN. SDOM ASKED, IF POSSIBLE, TO REPORT TO MEXICO SUBJECT'S ACTIVITIES IN DOM REP. FILED 132000Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM 82 [illegible] MEXICO/DOMINICAN

COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINAT[illegible] ATTACHED [illegible] PORTION OF [illegible] HAS BEEN [illegible] OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING [illegible] BY THE ACTION UNIT.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	[illegible]
RID/MIS	[illegible]
~~RID/FI~~	
RID/[illegible]	

TDCS PRECEDENCE
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

~~LIAISON~~

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

21-33647

1389

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

RECEIVED
[illegible]

TO: DIRECTOR

Jan 21 4 31 PM '64

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION:

INFO:

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MEXI 7738 IN 97485

TDCS

PAGE TWO

REPUBLIC. SUBJECT TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOI 10 JAN 64 PADA MEXICO, MEXICO CITY 13 JAN 64 APR 2 SOURCE PERSONS (B) IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH FAMILY OF VICTOR RICO GALAN

IW COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 97485

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. ON 10 JANUARY 1964 THE WIFE OF VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, ADVISED RAQUEL TIBOL, PROMINENT MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST AND MEMBER OF THE STAFF OF POLITICA, MEXICAN COMMUNIST SEMI-MONTHLY MAGAZINE, THAT RICO GALAN WAS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. MRS. RICO GALAN EXPRESSED THE OPINION HER HUSBAND WOULD RETURN TO MEXICO SOMETIME DURING THE WEEK OF 12 JANUARY.

2. FIELD COMMENT. AN EARLIER REPORT SAID RICO GALAN WAS PREPARING TO GO TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FOR THE OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE OF GATHERING MATERIAL FOR NEWSPAPER ARTICLES. OTHER EARLIER REPORTS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

HAVE IDENTIFIED RICO GALAN AS AN AGENT OF FIDEL CASTRO, WHO IN MAY 1963 WAS GIVEN AN ASSIGNMENT BY CASTRO TO VISIT CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO CONFER WITH LEADING COMMUNISTS IN ORDER TO INITIATE PROGRAMS OF ANTI-US VIOLENCE AND SABOTAGE. SINCE OCTOBER 1963 RICO GALAN HAS VISITED VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, GUATEMALA, BRAZIL AND PANAMA.)

3. FIELD DISSEM STATE FBI CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, VR

11 JUN 64 IN 98608

SECRET 111505Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE SDOM 2606

REF: MEXI 7695 (IN 95254)

1. SDOM WOULD LIKE INFORM HIGH LEVEL GODR MEMBER WITH WHOM IN REGULAR CONTACT OF RICO GALAN TRAVEL EARLIEST [illegible] THUS WHEN TRAVEL VERIFIED BY LESS SENSITIVE SOURCE [illegible] CABLE SDOM SO INFO MAY BE PASSED.

2. NO INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *VERIFIED TRAVEL.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

INDEX ☑ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO 30
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH

INFO: ADDP, DDDS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, WH 17, DD/I, AD/CI 2, VR.

TDCS -3/561,563

SECRET 091808Z 9 JAN 64 2054Z IN 95254

DIR SDOM INFO PACY CITE MEXI 7695
(IN 79596) (IN 64180) (IN 50626)
REF RIOD/2898, HZP 6340, TDCS 3/563/671, GUAT/3543, MANA/4562, DIR 79062, HMM 7746, HMM 7466

INTEL

SUPDATA SOURCE LIENVOY FROM TELCON BETWEEN FERNANDO CARMONA AND HEBERTO CASTILLO, BOTH NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE MLN. CARMONA PASSED THE INFO ON RICO GALAN TO CASTILLO.

FILED 091808Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM 8262 MEXICO/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SUBJECT PROJECTED TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOI 7 JANUARY 64 PADA 8 JANUARY 64 APR 2 SOURCE PERSONS (B) IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH RICO GALAN.

COMMENT: NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

201-326474

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/	
RID/	
RID/	

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

WH/RIG	8
WH/3/M	5
WH/O/ORH/RE	3

RELEASING INFO: W. Streeter Bass
W. STREETER BASS

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 10 JANUARY 1964 0055Z

BASED ON: 8262 LIENVOY

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1389

[redacted] CTION BY [redacted] O [redacted] ROHIBITED [redacted]

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY MEXICO / DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

TDCS -3/569,563

DATE OF INFO. 7 JANUARY 1964

DISTR. 10 JANUARY 1964

SUBJECT

PROJECTED TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (8 JANUARY 1964)

REF IN 95254

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 8262

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: PERSONS (B) IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH RICO GALAN.

APPRAISAL: 2

201-336474

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, IS MAKING PREPARATIONS TO GO TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM MEXICO IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. THE PURPOSE OF RICO GALAN'S VISIT IS OSTENSIBLY TO GATHER INFORMATION FOR THE PREPARATION OF SOME ARTICLES ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: RICO GALAN, A MEMBER OF THE PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (MLN- NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT , PRO-CUBA, ANTI UNITED STATES MEXICAN COMMUNIST FRONT, AND A WRITER FOR SIEMPRE, MEXICAN LEFTIST MAGAZINE, VISITED PANAMA, GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA, VENEZUELA, AND BRAZIL BETWEEN MID-OCTOBER AND MID-DECEMBER 1962, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL EARLIER REPORTS.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
FBI I&NS REPCINCLANT

CS COPY

FORM 1389

RI COPY RI COPY

CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM J[illegible]H '64

TDCS -3/569,563

IN 95254

PAGE 2

RICO GALAN SPENT EIGHT DAYS IN CUBA DURING MAY AND JUNE 1963 INTERVIEWING FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA, ON THE LATTER'S STAY IN THE USSR. DURING THIS PERIOD RICO GALAN WAS GIVEN AN ASSIGNMENT TO VISIT COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN, WHERE HE WAS TO PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES TO BEGIN IMMEDIATE ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. HE WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO PURSUE COMPETING LEFTIST FACTIONS IN THE COUNTRIES HE VISITED TO UNIFY SO THEIR WORK WOULD HAVE GREATER IMPACT.([illegible] IN THE [illegible]) VARIOUS COUNTRIES HE VISITED, RICO GALAN CONFERRED WITH LEADING COMMUNISTS AND LEFTISTS.)

3. FIELD DISSEM STATE FBI CINCSO CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

28/30 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : RIO DE JANEIRO
ACTION: WH 8
INFO : DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 8, RI/AN, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 121859Z

DIR POUCH LORE INFO MEXI CITE RIOD 2398 13 Dec 63 IN 79596

REF: DIR-79862*

1. ABOUT 3 DEC ALSLAB-1 MET MEXICAN VICTOR RICO GALAN, EDITOR OF SIEMPRE, WHO SAID CAME DIRECTLY FROM CUBA WITHOUT STOPPING MEXI AND INTENDS RETURN CUBA SAME ROUTE VERY SOON (SIC). RICO WAS CONSIDERING TRAVELING TO PORTO ALEGRE ON 5 OR 6 DEC.

2. LORE. RICO SUSPECTED PBRUMEN AGENT ON SPECIAL MISSION FOR AMTHUG-1. IN BRAZIL WAS TO MEET WITH PRESTES AND JULIAO. DIR REQUESTS ANY INFO HIS TRAVELS AND ON HIS CONTACTS. CABLE ANY INFO PACY. RICO DPOB 6 FEB (also read 1937) 1933, EL FERROL, MEXI. ?

3. INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *RE REPORTS THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN IS TRAVELING THROUGH WH AREA.

CS COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Panama/Cuba/Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS-3/566,571
SUBJECT	Comments of Leaders of the Vanguard of National Action and The Partido Del Pueblo on Visit Of Castro Agent to Panama	DATE DISTR.	5 December 1963
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	23 October - 5 November 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Panama, Panama City (30 October - 7 November 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HZP-6340

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Para. 1: Leader (F) of the Vanguard of National Action who was present when Turner made his remarks.
Para. 2,3: Leaders (B) of the Partido del Pueblo to whom Souza and Thomas made their remarks.
Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. On 23 October 1963 David Turner, leader of the Vanguard of National Action (VAN - radical pro-Cuban revolutionary group), informed members of the VAN directorate that he had received a call from Thelma King, pro-Cuban deputy to the National Assembly, a few days earlier. Turner said that the purpose of the call was to arrange for Turner to meet Victor Rico Galan, a Mexican newspaperman who works for Fidel Castro.[1] Turner said that the interview took place in Rico's room at the Hotel International, and was attended by King, Turner, and Hugo Alejandro Victor, president of the Partido del Pueblo (PDP, People's Party-Communist), with which the VAN is disputing leadership of the revolution in Panama. Turner said that Rico questioned his guests about unity among the leftwing groups in Panama, and Victor oddly informed him only that efforts were being made to reach an understanding. Turner refrained from making any comment at that time. Rico invited his visitors to have lunch with him; however, Victor declined, and King went in search of copies of newspapers which had reproduced statements of Panamanian students warning against plans of the National Guard to stage a coup d'etat in Panama. Rico had specifically asked for those publications. This gave Turner an opportunity to talk alone with Rico, and he informed him of VAN activities and of the steps being taken by the VAN to bring about an armed movement in Panama, since conditions were ripe for such action.

2. Around 26 October 1963 Ruben Dario Souza Batista, national secretary-general of the PDP, said that a Cuban agent had recently visited Panama to urge the VAN and the PDP to resolve their differences and unite. The PDP, however, violently rejected the suggestion. Souza

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY #	NAVY #	AIR #	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI 3
REPCINCLANT		CINCSO #			USIA	I&NS	TREAS	

(Note field distribution indicated by "#")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/CA/P	1	WH/MEXI	#	HZP-6340
CA/PROP	1	WH/FI	1		(HYKIRK-2)	HYAB, HYADIZ
SAS/R	12	WH/3/P	4			CS-3/566,571
SAS/WAVE #	1	WH/7	1			
WH/R	1	WH/3/M	3			LNG AHD; dc
TOTALS	DISSEM SEC 1, IE 3, CI 3, FI 3, CA 1, SAS 11 (1), WH 10 (1), DODS 1.				LIAISON #	

said that PDP leaders planned to ascertain the correct name of the agent and submit a written protest concerning his activities to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

3. Around 5 November 1963 Ruperto Luther Thomas, national secretary of propaganda of the PDP, informed regional-level PDP leaders that Armando Conte, a writer for Tiempos in Mexico, recently came to Panama and spoke with Victor.2 He said that he was an emissary of the Cubans, and had come to Panama to convince Victor of the need to support the Cuban line of armed revolution. Victor told Conte that the PDP would not be told what to do, because it had its own line on the Panamanian Revolution.

Field Comments

1. Rico arrived in Panama from San Jose, Costa Rica, on 20 October 1963, at which time he provided the following personal date on his landing card:

Born on 6 February 1928 at El Ferrol /presumably in Mexico/
Citizen of Mexico, bearer of passport No. 16897
Occupation - newspaperman
Permanent Address - Providencia 930, Mexico, D. F.

Rico left Panama for Venezuela on 22 October 1963.

2. Travel records contain no information on the arrival of any person with the name Armando Conte during the period in question, and the name is believed to be a pseudonym used by Rico. It is interesting to note that two VAN sources identified the visiting Mexican journalist by the name of Rioo or Risco; however, no PDP source has reported that name, and Souza's comments as reported in paragraph 2 tend to indicate that the visitor concealed his identity from the PDP.

Headquarters Comment. TDCS-3/563,671, of 31 October 1963, described Rico Galan's visit to Mexico in the same general terms.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CP C

30 SECRET

ROUTING

1	JS	4	
2		5	
3		6	

WH/3/Mexico
Renshaw

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : RIO DE JANEIRO
ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1735, 22 NOV BP)
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 221415Z

PRIORITY MEXI DIR CARA INFO ROUTINE GUAT MANA SJOS RECI SAOP

22 Nov 63 IN 66750

PACY CITE RIOD 2720

REFS A. DIR 79362 B. CARA 8158 (IN 65022) C. RIOD 2702 (IN 65816)*

ALACME/ALSTAVE 20 AND 21 NOVEMBER INDICATE THAT LEFTIST MEXICAN JOURNALIST NAMED "VICTOR", PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH VICTOR RICO GALAN, IN CONTACT WITH PAULO SCHILLING, COORDINATOR OF POPULAR MOBILIZATION FRONT, WHO ATTEMPTING GET THIS JOURNALIST INTERVIEWS WITH FEDERAL DEPUTIES LEONEL BRIZOLA AND NEIVA MOREIRA. SCHILLING INDICATES THAT THE JOURNALIST HAS TO LEAVE BRAZIL VERY SOON AND THAT THIS JORRNALIST SPENT TWENTY DAYS IN VENEZUELA AND WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE MIR THERE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *AS OF 20 NOV RIOD UNABLE CONFIRM THRU PCB PENETRATIONS ARRIVAL VICTOR RICO GALAN.

[illegible] Jg have 201 + a soft file.
[illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE cp

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : RIO DE JANEIRO

ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1500-21 NOV 63)

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SAS 8, VR

21 Nov 63 IN 65816

SECRET 211708Z

PRIORITY MEXI DIR CARA INFO ROUTINE GUAT MANA SJOS RECI SAOP

PACY CITE RIOD 2702

REF A. DIR 79062

B. CARA 8158 (IN 65022)*

AS OF 20 NOVEMBER RIOD UNABLE CONFIRM THROUGH PCB PENETRATIONS ARRIVAL VICTOR RICO GALAN EVEN THOUGH ALSAC 3 BELIEVES HE WOULD KNOW OF ANY CONTACT WITH PRESTES BY TRAVELER FROM LA. WILL CONTINUE CHECKING STATION TRAVEL, PCB AND OTHER SOURCES AND WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *REFERENCE IS RYBAT.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : CARACAS

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, VR

SECRET 201935Z

20 Nov 63 IN 65022

PRIORITY RIOD INFO DIR PACY CITE CARA 8158

DESENSITIZED

PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 78513 (NOT SENT RIOD).

1. PBRUMEN AGENT VICTOR RICO GALAN. MEXICAN CITIZEN, NEWSPAPERMAN, BORN 6 FEB 1928 AT EL FERROL, MEXICO, PERMANENT ADDRESS PROVIDENCIA 933, MEXICO D.F. DEPARTED CARACAS 12 NOVEMBER VIA PAA FLT NO. 515/12 FOR RIO DE JANEIRO.

2. REF STATES GALAN TRAVELLING THROUGH CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA WITH MISSION PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES IN COUNTRIES HE VISITS BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE AND TRY MAINTAIN THEM IN ORDER TAKE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. POSSIBLE HAS SOME ARRANGEMENT WITH MEXICAN GOVERNMENT WHICH GIVES HIM SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM MEXICAN EMBASSIES IN PLACES HE VISITS.

3. REF REQUESTED CARA DEVELOP ALL POSSIBLE INFO RE GALAN ACTIVITIES. CARA ASSUMES SAME REQUEST APPLIED RIOD.

SECRET

K

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, SAS 8, VR

19 Nov 63 IN 64180

SECRET 19/2039Z

DIR CITE GUAT 3543

REF GUAT 3537 (IN 63391)

DIR 79062*

1. MATERIAL RECEIVED FROM ESMESSAGE-3 19 NOV 63 CONFIRMS VICTOR RICO GALAN INTERVIEWED GUERRILLA LEADER YON SOSA MID OCT 63.

2. RICO GALAN MET BY RAUL ALARCON MONSANTO GUAT CITY AND TAKEN TO INTERVIEW YON SOSA UNKNOWN SITE.

3. ALARCON PGT MILI TRNG LEADER STUDIED IN MEXI AND CUBA.

4. WILL POUCH DOCUMENT RICO GALAN YON SOSA INTERVIEW AND INFO ALARCON.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUSPECTED PERUMEN AGENT VICTOR RICO GALAN MEXI JOURNALIST REPORTLY TRAVELLING CENTRAL, SOUTH AMERICAN ON MISSION FOR AMTHUG 1

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : WH 8
INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI, VR

S E C R E T 011730Z

Priest 1 Nov 63 IN 52518

DIR CITE MEXI 6750

REF MANA 4562 ([illegible]) *

VICTOR RICO GALAN PUBLISHED INTERVIEW WITH EX PRESIDENT VILLEDA MORALES IN CURRENT ISSUE SIEMPRE. STATION WILL BEGIN POUCHING SIEMPRE REGULARLY TO HQ.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

file

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: 093 SECRET

Oct 31 12 27 PM '63

REC[illegible]BLE SECT.

ORIG. anne mc donnell
UNIT wh/3/panama
EXT. 6312
DATE 31 october 63

ROUTING: 1 · 2 · 3 · 4 · 5 · 6

CONFIRMATION COPIES: WH 18

TDCS 3/563,672

INFORMATION COPIES: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DODS 1, SAS 12

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 31 OCTOBER 63

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE [✓ PRIORITY]

BASED ON (Ns. Opt., Proj.):
PACY 1054 (IN 47784)
PACY 1087 (IN 49213)
MEXI 6723 (IN 50142)
NP (KYSAGE-1),
NYAB LIAISON

DISSEMINATION

WH/POA	1	WH/3/M	1	CI/ICG	2
WH/POB	1	WH/C/CR	2		
WH/R	1	WH/1/V	1		
WH/7	1	WH/5	1		
WH/3/R	2	SAS/R	12		

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE · ARMY · NAVY · AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER: J. H. [illegible]
C. WH/3

COPY NO.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET /NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO/COSTA RICA/NICARAGUA/PANAMA/VENEZUELA/BRAZIL

REPORT NO. TDCS 3/563,671

SUBJECT TRAVEL AND MISSION OF ALLEGED CUBAN AGENT IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

DATE DISTR. 31 OCTOBER 63

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 20-22 OCT 63

PLACE & DATE ACQ. PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (24 OCT 63)

REFERENCES

	IN 50142
TDCS 3/563,137	47784
TDCS 3/562,990	49213

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY LEADER (F) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN CUBA-ORIENTED LEFTIST CIRCLES OF PANAMA.

(HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN NEWSPAPERMAN, ARRIVED IN PANAMA FROM COSTA RICA ON 20 OCTOBER AND LEFT PANAMA FOR CARACAS 22 OCTOBER 1963. RICO GALAN IS A MARXIST, A WRITER FOR SIEMPRE AND POLITICA, MEXICAN MAGAZINES, AND IS THE HEAD OF THE PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE FOR THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN), A COMMUNIST-FRONT MOVEMENT HEAVILY INFILTRATED BY MEMBERS OF THE MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. IN OCTOBER 1962 RICO GALAN WENT TO CUBA TO PREPARE A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF FIDEL CASTRO. IN MAY 1963 HE AGAIN WENT TO CUBA, RETURNING TO MEXICO 22 JUNE 1963. DURING THIS LATTER VISIT HE REPORTEDLY INTERVIEWED CASTRO AFTER CASTRO'S RETURN FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND ALSO SPENT A FIVE-DAY SEA-GOING VACATION WITH CASTRO, OF WHOM HE IS SAID TO BE A CLOSE FRIEND. RICO GALAN HAS RECENTLY PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS HE HAD WITH COL ENRIQUE PERALTA, GUATEMALAN

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET /NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[illegible]	OO
STATE/DIR	[illegible]		FBI	I&NS	[illegible]											

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT, AND WITH MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA, GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA LEADER.)

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN NEWSPAPERMAN WHO "RECENTLY" SPENT EIGHT DAYS IN CUBA ON "VACATION" WITH FIDEL CASTRO, WAS GIVEN AN ASSIGNMENT DURING THIS PERIOD TO VISIT COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA, WHERE HE WAS TO PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. RICO GALAN WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO TRY TO PERSUADE COMPETING LEFTIST FACTIONS TO UNIFY SO THAT THEIR WORK WILL HAVE GREATER IMPACT. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: RICO GALAN CLEARLY IMPLIED TO THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION THAT THE ASSIGNMENT HE IS NOW FULFILLING WAS GIVEN HIM IN JUNE 63.)

2. RICO GALAN SAID THAT HE HAD GONE FROM MEXICO TO GUATEMALA, WHERE HE MET WITH GOMEZ AYAY (FNU), A GUERRILLA LEADER WHOM HE ENCOURAGED TO BEGIN SABOTAGE AND VIOLENT ACTION. HE ALSO MADE A SIMILAR APPROACH TO A NICARAGUAN GUERRILLA LEADER. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER RICO GALAN ACTUALLY VISITED NICARAGUA OR WHETHER HE SAW THIS PERSON IN ANOTHER COUNTRY.) IN COSTA RICA HE TALKED WITH ONE OF THE MORA BROTHERS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: EDUARDO MORA IS PRESENTLY IN COSTA RICA. HIS BROTHER, MANUEL MORA, LEFT COSTA RICA FOR THE USSR, VIA MEXICO, 29 SEPTEMBER 1963. BOTH ARE LEADERS OF THE COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY.) RICO GALAN ARRIVED IN PANAMA 22 OCTOBER FROM COSTA RICA AND LEFT PANAMA FOR CARACAS 22 OCTOBER 1963. IN CARACAS HE INTENDED TO CONTACT ARGELIA LAYA. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: PROBABLY ARGELIA LAYA DE MARTINEZ, [illegible]

TO THE VENEZUELAN CONGRESS AND WIFE OF RAFAEL E. MARTINEZ, LEADER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (FALN - VENEZUELAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.)

3. IN PANAMA BETWEEN 20 -22 OCTOBER RICO GALAN CONTACTED HUGO VICTOR, PRESIDENT OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO (PDP - PEOPLE'S PARTY - COMMUNIST) AND DAVID TURNER, A LEADER OF THE VANGUARD OF NATIONAL ACTION (VAN - PRO-CUBAN, RADICAL REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION). ON 24 OCTOBER A MEETING WAS HELD TO DISCUSS UNITY OF THE LEFT, COMMENCEMENT OF AGGRESSIVE ACTION, AND A MERGER OF LEFTIST UNITS TO GO TO THE ELECTIONS AS A BLOC SHOULD EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE ELECTIONS FAIL. THIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY VICTOR, CARLOS DEL CID, ALVARO MENENDEZ FRANCO, THELMA KING, RENATO PEREIRA, AND TWO UNIDENTIFIED STUDENTS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: AN INDEPENDENT, USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN THE PDP, REPORTED THE VISIT TO PANAMA OF "A CUBAN WRITER FOR SIEMPRE" WHO WAS ON A MISSION FOR THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY. THE VISITOR WHOM SOURCE DID NOT IDENTIFY BY NAME URGED THE PDP AND THE VAN TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND UNITE. HIS PROPOSAL WAS VIOLENTLY REJECTED BY THE PDP, WHICH INTENDS TO PROTEST THE PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

28/30 **SECRET**

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 8 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1635 31 OCT BP)

INFO : DDP, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

31 Oct 63

SECRET 312015Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PACY CITE SJOS 6350

IN 51648

REF DIR 79062*

1. SUBJECT REF, TRAVELLING IN TRUE NAME WITH MEXICAN PASSPORT 53641, ARRIVED FROM MANA ON TACA FLIGHT 101, 17 OCTOBER. HE LEFT FOR PACY 20 OCTOBER ON PAA FLIGHT 501.

2. QUERYING HURUM-1 RE LOCAL CONTACTS.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTIVITIES OF VICTOR GALAN.

Priest

CS COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief of Station, Mexico City HMM

FROM
Chief of Station, Managua Ewr

SUBJECT
Victor F RICO Galan (201-336474)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

References: a. DIR - 79062

b. MANA - 4563

MICROFILMED
NOV 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

re:
Attached are newspaper clippings and text of radio interview mentioned in reference b. See doc for add'l info

Peter R. Nalesnik
Peter R. NALESNIK

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - WHD w/att h/w
2 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w

ATTACHMENTS:

2 copies text and newspaper clippings

INDEX-F

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HNMA - 3033

DATE
31 October 1963

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201 -

WHD

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

ENTREVISTA HECHA EL DIA 24 DE OCTUBRE DE 1963 AL DR. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ, [illegible] DEL PARTIDO MOVILIZACION REPUBLICANA, [illegible] CIERTOS CARGOS QUE SE LE HAN FORMULADO A TRAVES DE LA PRENSA Y LA RADIO NACIONAL CON RELACION A ASPECTOS DE LA POLITICA ACTUAL.-

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

P.- Dr. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ, ¿qué hay de cierto con los cargos, graves por cierto, que se le han formulado a través de emisoras y a través de radio Periódico, ciertos elementos políticos ?

R.- Bueno, eh, los cargos son absolutamente falsos, una vez que Ud. me pregunte concretamente acerca de cada uno de ellos, yo iré desvirtuándolos, eh, con dar a conocer la verdad, sin embargo me interesaría, eh, anticipar la opinión de mi Partido acerca de por qué se ha desatado en los últimos días una campaña tan intensa de difamación contra el Partido Movilización Republicana, nosotros entendemos que ésta campaña se debe a la incómoda posición en que ha quedado la reacción nacional por la adopción por parte de los jóvenes de la Universidad Católica de un programa revolucionario, en efecto, tanto la declaración de principios de los jóvenes de la UCA como sus réplicas contundentes a Don PABLO ANTONIO CUADRA, al propio rector de la UCA, al Dr. [illegible] RIVAS, hacen creer en la justeza de su planteamiento.- Ahora bien, el hecho de que esta juventud que ha sido acogida en un alero propiciado por los señores Somoza y los señores de la reacción nacional, esté levantando su voz adoptando un lenguaje revolucionario como el de todos los pueblos de América Latina y el hecho de que esa declaración de principios de los jóvenes de la Católica, tengan alguna similitud real con el programa político del Partido Movilización Republicana, es la causa verdadera para que se haya levantado toda esta tempestad contra el Partido, sin embargo, eh, no podemos nosotros evitar que por una necesidad histórica del desarrollo social de los pueblos Latinoamericanos, como por razones de juventud, los jóvenes de la Católica vayan despreciando lo viejo, lo que ya murió en la sociedad nicaragüense y vayan solidarizando con los Partidos que como Movilización Republicana, representan lo nuevo, lo progresista, el fenómeno moderno y revolucionario dentro de nuestro país.-

P.- Dr. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ, quiero informarle que [illegible] informaciones dió un amplio reportaje sobre lo que ya se ha dado en llamar un grave cisma entre los [illegible] y también una acusación grave contra el [illegible], en primer lugar, ¿qué hay con respecto al caso del jóven [illegible] VILLA ?

R.- Lo que se ha llamado el caso del amigo ALBERTO [illegible] VILLA, no es más que su renuncia de la dirección del semanario MR. así como de la dirección nacional del Partido Movilización Republicana, por causas puramente particulares debido a las ocupaciones personales del Dr. [illegible], jamás ha existido con ALBERTO [illegible] VILLA ni mínima pugna o discusión ideológica dentro del Partido Movilización Republicana, es una especulación totalmente carente de bases ciertas decir que [illegible] VILLA, se vá porque tiene una postura nacionalista porque todo el Partido MR. tiene una postura nacionalista, es absurdo decir que [illegible] VILLA se vá porque suponemos que el MR. se debe sujetarse a Moscú o a Pekín, porque el Partido Movilización Republicana jamás aceptaría sujeciones a ninguna potencia extranjera, el Partido Movilización Republicana traza su política dentro de las fronteras nacionales, nosotros nos dirigimos por nosotros mismos, ahora bien, para demostrar lo absolutamente falsos de las discusiones que según La Prensa tuvo [illegible] VILLA con ciertos miembros del Partido Movilización Republicana en la Asamblea del domingo próximo pasado, un hecho simple, [illegible] VILLA no concurrió, no asistió a esa reunión, de manera que jamás pudo tener esas supuestas discusiones cuando no asistió siquiera a dicha reunión.-

Encl 1 HMMA-3033

201-336474

P.- Paso a hacerle otra pregunta Sr. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ, pero antes quiero decirle, como previsto quiero informarle a Ud. si es que usted está mal informado de que esa información aparecida en Radio Informaciones, la oí yo y la oí en una parte tan cierta como que Ud. se llama Alvaro Ramírez González, de esta cuestión de [illegible] incluso se me dijo los detalles que acerca de la polémica que había sostenido con varios miembros del ... el cual, en el cual existía de que debía de tener el Partido MR. una posición nacionalista sin China Roja y sin Moscú y sin otra influencia, pero Ud. ya explicó esta pregunta y ahora paso a la siguiente.- Se dijo también de que había graves cargos contra los dirigentes del MR. por haber dejado en las montañas abandonados a los jóvenes que habían ido a luchar allí con las armas en las manos, qué hay de estos cargos, graves por cierto ?

R.- El Partido MR. no ha tenido jamás alianza, acuerdos o pactos alguno con el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, autor de las guerrillas en el Norte del País, por manera que no tenemos ningún compromiso con los guerrilleros, mal podría culpársele de haber abandonado a nadie en una empresa por la cual nosotros jamás hemos participado.-

P.- También como la anterior pregunta Sr. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ quiero advertirle de que en entrevista que dió el Lic. [illegible] dijo que muchachos que formaban parte su Movilización Republicana se habían ido con el MR. Ahora también se tuvo conocimiento de que aquí había venido un señor llamado RICO GALAN representante de la revista o de la publicación "SIEMPRE" y la revista también o publicación llamada "POLITICA" considerada eminentemente en México como izquierdista, también se dijo que Ud. se había entrevistado en el cuarto #427
d del Gran Hotel con este señor RICO GALAN, privadamente, le advierto que esta información la obtuvo Radio Informaciones en fuente de tanto crédito como lo merece su palabra.-

R.- Bueno, lo ya, sobre la cuestión anterior que Ud. insiste en vincular al MR. con movimientos guerrilleros, las cosas [illegible] no son, el hecho es que el MR. jamás ha tenido participación en ninguna insurrección en Nicaragua, no la ha tenido eso es un hecho cierto, el hecho de que algunos miembros jóvenes del MR. hayan participado en alguna actividad guerrillera es un hecho que escapa al control oficial del Partido.- En cuanto a la visita del periodista VICTOR RICO GALAN debo decirles que es otra de las truculencias que se han inventado en estos últimos días, VICTOR RICO GALAN es un periodista de envergadura continental muy reconocido en su país, México, él como otros muchos periodistas extranjeros que visitan Nicaragua, llegó a mi oficina a hacerme una entrevista, supe por él mismo que había tratado de entrevistar al presidente Schick, que había logrado entrevistar a los funcionarios de la Secretaría de Información y Prensa, que había recibido un homenaje de parte del embajador de México en Managua y que se había visto finalmente con diversas personalidades políticas que a él le interesaban para oír su opinión y formarse un juicio acerca acerca de la situación política de Nicaragua, por otra parte el mismo diario La Nación le hizo una entrevista a VICTOR RICO GALAN sobre los últimos acontecimientos acaecidos en la República de Honduras, de manera que sus pasos por Nicaragua no tienen nada de clandestino ni de extraordinario, la revista "SIEMPRE" de la cual él es representante es una revista que solo por ignorancia o por mala fé, se puede calificar de un órgano izquierdista, cualquiera persona que haya estado en México y que haya ido ahí, pués con uso de razón, podrá darse cuenta de que "SIEMPRE" es una publicación completamente equilibrada, quiero decir con esto, de que en esa revista se publica tanto tesis de derecha como tesis de izquierda y que frecuentemente en esa revista VICTOR RICO GALAN ha expresado el pensamiento oficial del Gobierno Mexicano, en la revista "POLITICA", en, de la cual tengo aquí un número, puedo mostrarle que aparece precisamente un artículo de VICTOR RICO GALAN en que defiende la política exterior del presidente LOPEZ MATEOS, de manera...

14-00000

R.- [illegible] que a este periodista se le puede calificar [illegible] te extranjero, ahora que él me entrevistó es un hecho que tuvimos intercambio de impresiones acerca de la situación nacional sin que éstas tengan nada de secreto y sin que tengan carácter de un emisario político que venía a pedir cuentas al Partido [illegible] como lo ha dicho algún periódico, esto es un absurdo que no tiene ninguna base cierta.-

P.- Agradecemos Sr. [illegible], pero antes de formularle la última pregunta quisiera que me contestara categóricamente, lo visitó Ud. en el Gran Hotel o no lo visitó, además quiero advertirle que no somos ni Radio Informaciones ni los periodistas nacionales los que hemos dado el [illegible] de extrema izquierda a las publicaciones que hace el Sr. [illegible], sino que son los [illegible] periódicos de México los que han dicho tal cosa, quisiera Ud. que me contestara la pregunta que me acaba de formular.-

R.- Como le dejo, el Sr. este periodista me pidió una entrevista y yo accedí a ella, resulta que él vino, se estuvo [illegible] pero su desconocimiento de la ciudad no podía localizar mi oficina y yo me ofrecí para pasar a buscarlo al Gran Hotel, así, simplemente lo fuí a buscar, él se vino conmigo a mi oficina, aquí estuvo alrededor de una hora y media y eso es todo lo que ha acontecido.-

P.- Es cierto [illegible] no ha confirmado la noticia de que habló con él, por eso no nos da derecho a nosotros de especular en ninguna forma, está claro, pero en esa parte sí fué exacta Radio Informaciones.- Con respecto a la pregunta última, es lo siguiente. En la entrevista del día domingo realizada en algún punto de [illegible], que ignoraron periodistas y la ciudadanía en general, Movilización [illegible], o mejor dicho sus dirigentes políticos, tomaron una serie de acuerdos y resoluciones que no [illegible] del conocimiento público, en esa entrevista yo le ruego a mi estimado caballero, que tenga la gentileza de explicarnos a grosso modo cuales son esas resoluciones ?

R.- La reunión que realizó el Partido Movilización [illegible] en un lugar de [illegible] se realizó en forma privada como ya es sabido por razones que nosotros lamentamos, porque nosotros habíamos pensado primitivamente realizar esa reunión nacional del Partido [illegible] en la misma forma en que se han realizado las anteriores, es decir en forma pública con acceso a los periodistas, esa es nuestra conducta tradicional porque no tenemos nada que ocultar al pueblo [illegible], sin embargo en días pasados, [illegible] de la fecha fijada para esta reunión que se iba a verificar hace poco más de un mes, la noche anterior como digo, a la realización de la reunión [illegible] se había [illegible] punto de reunión [illegible] Sr. [illegible] nosotros interpretamos este hecho como una amenaza de [illegible] del Partido [illegible] dentro del desarrollo de la reunión, como nosotros no disponemos de medios para repeler esa clase de agresiones, decidimos dos cosas, en primer lugar postergar la fecha de la reunión y en segundo lugar realizarla en forma privada por [illegible], no es cierto como se ha dicho de que nosotros [illegible] la magnitud de las decisiones o la forma con que se ha especulado, puesto que en realidad no existe, la reunión obedeció a la necesidad de [illegible] la situación política nacional [illegible] así como examinar la situación crítica por que está [illegible], por la [illegible] de una serie [illegible], en relación con este [illegible] de la situación nacional [illegible] política ya [illegible], es decir que [illegible] frente [illegible] nacional [illegible] de [illegible], se [illegible] a la [illegible]

8.- ...para abrir pláticas en tal sentido con los demás partidos opositores, por otra parte se trataron asuntos rutinarios de organización interna del Partido y de financiamientos de nuestro semanario ... que había pasado dificultades económicas, pero que con el aporte que ofrecieron los Delegados de todos los Departamentos se han solucionado y volverá aparecer el sábado próximo.

FIN

201-336474

Carta del Dr. Alvaro Ramírez sobre la crisis en su Partido

Señor
Don Róger Mendieta Alfaro,
Director del Diario
LA NACION,
Managua, D.N.

Estimado señor Director:

Con pena he leído en el Diario que usted dirige, en la edición de hoy, la información falsa que bajo las ocho columnas de "grave crisis en el MR" ofrece a sus lectores, toda vez que sus reporteros me habían entrevistado y en lugar de publicar la realidad de las cosas tejieron un folletín falso y tendencioso.

Digo con pena, porque hasta la presente ocasión, el Diario LA NACION había mantenido respecto a nuestro Partido actitud de respeto y tolerancia seguramente recíproca a nuestra posición frente al [illegible] y porque para romper tal statu quo no era necesario recurrir a la calumnia y a la injuria.

Mi partido no puede dejar sin respuesta negativa y enfática la aseveración que en dicho escrito hace LA NACION en el sentido de que algunos miembros de "MR" habrían lanzado la acusación contra nuestra dirigencia de ser responsable de la muerte de los guerrilleros en Río Bocay por haberles cortado la ayuda de nuestro Partido. Cuando se sabe muy bien los nombres y apellidos de los actores de esas muertes, resulta una infamia acusar al Partido Movilización Republicana de actos por los cuales no puede responder, ni por acción, ni por omisión. Es lo cierto que "MR" jamás ha prestado ninguna ayuda al movimiento insurreccional q' actualmente se bate desesperadamente en las montañas de Jinotega y otros sectores del Norte", según "LA NACION", debido a que no tenemos ni hemos tenido jamás ningún acuerdo con el "Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional". El MR sostiene una postura muy clara respecto del problema insurreccional, pues considera que como partido político no tiene capacidad actualmente para mezclarse en una lucha de esa naturaleza, y no ve perspectivas de éxito a tal clase de lucha en las actuales circunstancias. Esto no significa que neguemos el derecho de los guerrilleros a emprender la clase de lucha que estimen conveniente, ni mucho menos que no nos duela la muerte de varios estudiantes universitarios y otros jóvenes en circunstancias que habían sido hecho prisioneros, cosa que nos llena de indignación y nos mueve a solidarizarnos con la protesta enérgica de los estudiantes de Nicaragua y otros sectores democráticos del país. En consecuencia, es completamente absurdo suponer, como lo hace LA NACION, que el periodista mexicano Víctor Rico Galán, haya venido a pedirnos rendición de cuentas a nosotros sobre las guerrillas del Norte, pues somos ajenos a tal movimiento y nuestra política la trazamos nosotros mismos y jamás dependemos de ninguna influencia extranjera. Una Revolución no podrá importarse de ninguna parte, y solamente será posible cuando el pueblo nicaragüense decida hacerla; entonces y solamente entonces "MR" ocupará el sitio que le señale su deber patriótico.

El periodista Rico Galán me entrevistó en mi Oficina; es cosa frecuente que hacen numerosos periodistas extranjeros que visitan el país, y las respuestas que di a sus preguntas periodísticas sobre la realidad nacional no tienen nada de secretas ni de clandestinas, bien pudieron ser dichas en una plaza pública. La Revista "Siempre" que él representa no corresponde a la realidad. Cualquiera, que no sea un ignorante sobre el periodismo mexicano podrá saber que "Siempre" es vehículo de información [illegible] izquierda a [illegible] tanto al Lic. Emilio Portes Gil como a Lombardo Toledano. Sí, porque así me lo relató él mismo, [illegible] pasó por Managua Rico Galán trató de entrevistar, sin fortuna, al Presidente Schick y logró entrevistar a varias personalidades políticas cuya opinión le interesa para formarse un criterio sobre la situación de Nicaragua; inclusive recibió alguna atención del Señor Embajador de México, y departió con los funcionarios de la Secretaría de Información [illegible] finalmente la [illegible] LA NACION [illegible] [illegible] sobre los últimos [illegible]

Pasa a la [illegible] Pág. Letra Y

14-00000

[illegible] ceeso de Honduras. ¿Qué de misteriosa tiene el paso por Nicaragua? ¿Y qué, puede hacer creer a LA NACION que ese señor haya venido a regañar al MR?

Todo lo aseverado respecto del "caso" de Everts Vélez no pasa de ser producto de la mente calenturienta de sus reporteros. Jamás ha existido discusión alguna con el amigo Everts sobre la "pugna chino-soviética" pues hemos considerado en MR que tal problema es de la incumbencia exclusiva de los partidos comunistas, y si nos interesa, como a cualquier ser humano, es por el impacto que la política de dichos partidos tiene en todos los países del mundo. La verdad al respecto es que Everts, se ha retirado de la Dirección del semanario MR así como de la Dirección Nacional de nuestro Partido debido a sus ocupaciones personales.

Es lamentable que el diario LA NACION haya tomado parte en la campaña difamatoria levantada en los últimos días contra el Partido Movilización Republicana, pues la causa eficiente de esta campaña que no ha trepidado en utilizar medios vedados por la ética periodística, no es otra que la intolerancia de la reacción ante la posición ideológica adoptada por los jóvenes estudiantes de la Universidad Católica. Tanto la Declaración de Principios de estos jóvenes como sus réplicas al señor Rector de dicha Universidad a don Pablo Antonio Cuadra al Dr. [illegible] Rivas y a cuantos han osado contradecirles han impuesto un silencio tan sepulcral que obliga a reconocer la justeza de su tesis, y como estas tesis revolucionarias de los jóvenes estudiantes de la UCA están emparentadas con los objetivos del Partido Movilización Republicana por coincidencia biológica y por necesidad histórica, la reacción ha creído necesario arremeter contra nuestro partido, sabedora de que las nuevas generaciones le han dado las espaldas definitivamente a lo viejo y caduco de nuestra sociedad, y hacen causa común con los partidos que como "MR" representan lo nuevo y lo progresista. No se escapa a nuestra comprensión que la desmesurada campaña de desprestigio trazada en torno al Partido Movilización Republicana, está vinculada a los esfuerzos de ciertos círculos conservadores, ultraderechistas que deseando opacar al Dr. Agüero y truncar su trayectoria política, desean llevar al Partido Conservador hacia un colaboracionismo servil con el régimen gobernante; ellos se dan cuenta y el pueblo nicaragüense lo sabe, que el Partido Movilización Republicana es un [illegible] contra la política [illegible] y por eso nos agreden.

Suplico a usted la publicación íntegra de la presente en LA NACION periódico de objetividad y espíritu democrático, quisiéramos inalterable.

Agradeciendo de antemano la publicación de la presente me es grato suscribir.

Atto. y S. S.

Dr. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ.
Secretario General del Partido Movilización Republicana.

Golpe contra Villeda Morales fue propinado por la Misión Militar

Declara un periodista mexicano

"El golpe de Estado que dió al traste con el Gobierno del Dr. Villeda Morales en Honduras, no fue producto del Ejército hondureño, sino que fue una acción directa de la Misión Militar Norteamericana residente en Tegucigalpa, obedeciendo órdenes del Pentágono", dijo ayer martes el periodista mexicano Victor Rico Galán, Redactor de la Revista [illegible] pre y quien hace [illegible] do por [illegible] especial escala en la República de Venezuela.

El periodista Rico Galán expresó "recientemente visité la República de Honduras, donde pude observar que el [illegible] golpe dado al Presidente Villeda, el Coronel O[illegible] [illegible] Arellano tuvo una [illegible] en conferencias con los demás Ejércitos Centroamericanos donde se decidieron las medidas militares encaminadas a presionar a los Gobiernos Civiles".

Luego [illegible] la República de El Salvador actualmente no hay necesidad de un golpe de Estado, para el Presidente Coronel Julio A. Rivera [illegible] la presión militar de los Jefes de la Guardia Civil y de Policía.

Pasa a última Pág. Letra A

de los Estados Unidos".

Luego refiriéndose a la política de su patria México, dijo: "Desde luego en México no existe el latifundismo como existe en Centroamérica, ni mucho menos, pero hay grandes problemas fundamentalmente en el campo, sobre todo en lo relativo a la organización adecuada de la explotación, del crédito y de la Comercialización, que una buena parte está en manos de empresas norteamericanas, como las algodoneras y otras".

El periodista Rico Galán manifestó: "El caso de los campesinos en México es, que éstos tienen tierras para trabajar, pero no son dueños de su producción, y las más de las veces tienen que vender sus cosechas por adelantado a precios explotadores".

Sin embargo, el periodista Rico Galán calificó al Presidente López Mateos como perteneciente en política a "centro izquierdismo" descalificándolo de reaccionario, como lo han tildado en otros países".

El señor Victor Rico Galán concluyó diciendo en su entrevista al redactor Cole Chamorro que el "Tapadismo en México consiste esencialmente en la designación de un candidato presidencial, escogido en secreto o totalmente por los [illegible] del único partido actualmente permitido, por lo que la elección presidencial no se efectúa a través de un movimiento electoral popular [illegible]

El periodista Victor Rico Galán, Redactor de la Revista Mexicana "SIEMPRE", quien pasó ayer por Managua rumbo a Venezuela [illegible]

Coronel Eduardo Casanova"

El señor Rico Galán dijo [illegible] [illegible] contecimientos [illegible] tarse [illegible] con la [illegible] del régimen de Villeda Morales [illegible] en Centro América [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MANAGUA

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

SECRET 311625Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE MANA 4562 X

31 Oct 63 IN 51493

~~REF: DIR 79062~~

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN ARRIVED MANA 13 OCT VIA PAN AM FLT 501 FROM MEXI. HE LEFT MANA FOR SAN JOSE ON 17 OCT VIA TACA FLT 101. ACCORDING IMMIGRATION RECORDS, RICO BORN 6 FEB 1928 AT EL FERROL, SPAIN. ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY IS PROVIDENCIA 930. IMMIGRATION RECORDS SHOW HE ENTERED NICARAGUA WITH MEXICAN PASSPORT NUMBER 16897, BUT LEFT USING MEXICAN PP NUMBER 53641, ISSUED 9 SEPT 63. (PROBABLE ONE OF NUMBERS IS PP NUMBER AND OTHER IS REGISTRATION.)

2. RICO STAYED GRAN HOTEL, ROOM NUMBER 407, WHILE MANA. HIS VISIT WIDELY PUBLICIZED AND HE GAVE INTERVIEWS LOCAL PRESS. MET WITH VARIOUS NIC OFFICIALS FROM MINISTRY OF PRESS AND RECEIVED BY MEXICAN AMBASSADOR. HE SOUGHT INTERVIEW WITH PRES SCHICK, BUT LATTER DID NOT GRANT INTERVIEW.

3. UNABLE DEVELOP INFO RE VISIT WITH UNIDENTIFIED GUERRILLA LEADER MENTIONED REF, BUT RICO DID MEET ONE OR MORE TIMES WITH ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF MOVILIZACION REPUBLICANA (MR-COMMIE POLITICAL FRONT) WHO ALSO MEMBER CENTRAL COMMITTEE NIC COMMIE PARTY (PSN). HIS VISIT WITH RAMIREZ GIVEN PUBLICITY PRESS AND RADIO AS SECRET MEETING IN RICO'S HOTEL ROOM. RAMIREZ ANSWERED BY WRITING

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

LETTERS TO PAPERS SAYING HE MET RICO OPENLY IN HIS OFFICE AND THAT RICO HAD CALLED ON HIM BECAUSE HE JOURNALIST SEEKING INTERVIEWS VARIOUS POLITICAL FIGURES. ON 24 OCT RAMIREZ INTERVIEWED ON RADIO AND WHEN PINNED DOWN, ADMITTED THAT HE WENT RICO'S HOTEL ROOM, BUT SAID PURPOSE WAS TO TAKE RICO TO HIS OFFICE.

4. CLIPPINGS RE VISIT RICO BEING POUCHED HQS AND MEXI.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUSPECTED PBRUMEN AGENT VICTOR RICO GALAN TRAVELLING CENTRAL, SOUTH AMERICA ON MISSION AMT HUG-1.

Action Req

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, RF, VR

file

S E C R E T 300108Z

PACY INFO DIR CITE MEXI 6723 [redacted]

DESENSITIZED

[illegible] ZAKNICK HYSAGE

REF: PACY 1033 (IN 46190)

PACY 1087 (IN 49215)

30 Oct 63 IN 50142

VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN OF SPANISH ORIGIN IS MARXIST WRITER FOR SIEMPRE AND POLITICA BOTH BIG CIRCULATION AND EFFECTIVE COMMY LINING MAGAZINES. HEADS PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE FOR MLN WHICH COMMY FRONT MOVEMENT RATHER THAN PARTY AND WHOSE LEADERSHIP IS HEAVILY PCM INFILTRATED. OCT 62 WENT CUBA TO WRITE CASTRO POLITICAL BIOG. JUNE 63 INTERVIEWED CASTRO IN CUBA AFTER RETURN FROM MOSCOW. RECENTLY PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS WITH GEN PERALTA IN GUAT AND WITH YAN SOSA, ANTI-REGIME GUERRILLA LEADER. CHECKING BACK TO EARLY OCT SHOWS NO RECORD HIS TRAVEL TO OR FROM PANAMA. STATION HAS EXTENSIVE FILE ON RICO GALAN.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZRKNICK.

**CUBAN WRITER FOR "SIEMPRE" ARRIVED PACY.

CS COPY

[redacted]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : Anne McDonnell
UNIT : WH/3/CAS ☐ INDEX
EXT : 6312 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 29 Oct 1963 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-3373

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

29 OCT 63 15:

TO : SEE BELOW

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

☐ DEFERRED SIG CEN
☐ ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY MEXI, INFO GUAT, MANA, SJOS, RIOD, RECI, SAOP, PACY

CITE DIR 79062

1. SUSPECTED PBRUMEN AGENT VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN JOURNALIST, DPOB 6 FEB 20, EL FERROL, MEXI, APPARENTLY USING MATRONYMIC, REPORTEDLY TRAVELLING CENTRAL, SOUTH AMERICA ON MISSION FOR AMTHUG-1. RICO GALAN LEFT PACY FOR CARA 22 OCT.

2. FOR MEXI: RICO GALAN REPORTEDLY RECENTLY SPENT EIGHT DAYS PBRUMEN ON "VACATION" WITH AMTHUG-1, DURING WHICH TIME HE RECEIVED OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT ON WHICH HE NOW TRAVELLING THROUGH CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA. ALTHOUGH WELL KNOWN LEFTIST, HE IS ABLE TRAVEL BECAUSE HAS SOME SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH MEXI GOVERNMENT WHICH GIVES HIM SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM MEXI EMBASSIES IN PLACES HE VISITS. GALAN'S MISSION TO PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES IN COUNTRIES HE VISITS TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE AND TO TRY MAINTAIN THESE IN ORDER TAKE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. GALAN HAS ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BRING BETTER UNITY AMONG COMPETING LEFTIST FACTIONS TO ENSURE GREATER IMPACT THEIR WORK. TO CONTACT IN PACY GALAN

Continued

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

15:

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE 2

TO INFO CITE DIR 79062

GAVE FOLLOWING ITINERARY BUT NO DATES: FROM MEXI TO GUAT: GUAT TO MANA: MANA TO SJOS: SJOS TO PACY: PACY TO CARA: CARA TO BRAZIL.

3. FOR GUAT: IN GUAT GALAN MET WITH GUERRILLA LEADER GOMEZ AYAU (FNU).

FOR MANA: GALAN MET WITH UNIDENTIFIED GUERRILLA LEADER.

FOR SJOS: MET WITH ONE OF THE MORA BROTHERS.

~~[illegible]~~

FOR RIOD, SAOP, RECI: GALAN TO MEET WITH PRESTES AND JULIAO. GALAN MENTIONED PRESENCE CUBA WIFE AND FAMILY JULIAO TO JULIAO'S ADVANTAGE.

4. REQUEST, GUAT, MANA, SJOS, ~~CARA~~ CONFIRM DATES ARR AND DEPARTURE GALAN AND ALL POSSIBLE INFO RE CONTACTS. REQUEST BRAZIL CONFIRM DATES ARR AND DEPARTURE AND MONITOR CONTACTS. CABLE REPLY REQUESTED, WITH INFO TO PACY.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/EOB-
AC/WH/3
C/WH/5

T. KARAMESSINES
ADD/P
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

J. C. KING
C/WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

5 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PANAMA CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1410, 28 OCT 63 (P)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

300

SECRET 281531Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 1084

DESENSITIZED PBRUMEN HYSAGE

28 OCT 63 IN 49013

REF PACY 0054 (IN 47784)

FOLLOWING INFO OBTAINED HYSAGE-1 MEETING 24 OCTOBER INADVERTENTLY OMITTED REF:

VICTOR RICO GALAN TOLD HYSAGE THAT BLAS ROCA PLANS MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT CAPTURE CONTROL SINCE HE BELIEVES POSITION AMTHUG-1 HAS WEAKENED TO POINT THAT PROSPECTS PROMISING FOR SUCCESS. HYSAGE DID NOT PROVIDE ORIGINAL SOURCE THIS INFO, BUT INDICATED ~~IT~~ IT SOURCE CONCERN TO RICO GALAN.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

F. COLE
AUC/WH/3
6513
23 OCTOBER 1963

SECRET

25 Oct 63

CARACAS PANAMA CITY

(IMMEDIATE) CARA PACY

DESENSITIZED

PBRUMEN

REF: A. PACY 1938 (IN 47963) NOT SENT CARA

B. PACY 1934 (IN 47796) NOT SENT CARA

1. PBRUMEN AGENT VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN CITIZEN, NEWSPAPERMAN, BORN 6 FEB 1933 AT EL FERROL, MEXICO, PERMANENT ADDRESS PROVIDENCIA 936, MEXICO D.F. DEPARTED PANAMA 23 OCT VIA PAA FLT NO. 519 FOR CARACAS. MANIFEST FOR FLT. NO. 519 LISTED HIM UNDER PATRONYMIC GALAN.

2. REF B. STATED IN PART GALAN TRAVELLING THROUGH CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA WITH MISSION PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES IN COUNTRIES HE VISITS BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE AND TO TRY MAINTAIN THEM IN ORDER TAKE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. POSSIBLY HAS SOME ARRANGEMENT WITH MEXICAN GOVERNMENT WHICH GIVES HIM SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM MEXICAN EMBASSIES IN PLACES HE VISITS. GALAN CONTACT IN VENEZUELA MAY BE ONE ARGELIA LAYA.

3. REQUEST CARA DEVELOP ALL POSSIBLE INFO CONCERNING GALAN ACTIVITIES.

FRED COLE by direction of WM. H. HOOD, C/WH/COPS

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
4
5
6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PANAMA CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (MR COLE , WH NOTIFIED AND TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 1950, 25 OCT DO)

INFO : DOP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, RF, VR

S E C R E T 251956Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE PACY 1058 25 OCT 63 IN 47963

DESENSITIZED

R[illegible]SAGE

REF: PACY 1054 (IN 47784)

1. TRAVEL RECORDS IDENTIFY PBRUMEN AGENT REPORTED REF AS VICTOR RICO GALAN, CITIZEN MEXICO, NEWSPAPERMAN, BORN 6 FEBRUARY 1928 AT EL FERROL, PERMANENT ADDRESS PROVIDENCIA 930, MEXICO, D.F. ARRIVED PACY BY AIR FROM COSTA RICA ON 20 OCTOBER 63, USING PATRONYMIC RICO IN PREPARATION LANDING CARD. MANIFEST FOR PAA FLIGHT 515 LISTED HIM UNDER PATRONYMIC,

GALAN, AS PASSENGER WHO LEFT FOR CARACAS, VENEZUELA, ON 22 OCTOBER.

2. HQS REQUESTED ALERT CARACAS.

S E C R E T

CS COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PANAMA CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5* (WH COPY SLOTTED 1515 25 OCT LMG)

INFO : ADDP, DDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, RF, VR

SECRET 251602Z

25 OCT 63 IN 47784

PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 1054

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT/HYSAGE

REF PACY 1033 (IN 46190) KK

1. DURING MEETING 24 OCTOBER HYSAGE-1 PROVIDED FOLLOWING AMPLIFICATION AND CLARIFICATION ROLE OF MEXICAN JOURNALIST, RICO GALAN:

A. GALAN, CONTRARY TO HYSAGE EARLIER STATEMENTS, RECENTLY SPENT EIGHT DAYS PBRUMEN ON "VACATION" WITH AMTHUR-1, DURING WHICH TIME HE RECEIVED OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT ON WHICH HE NOW TRAVELING THROUGH CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA. ALTHOUGH WELL KNOWN LEFTIST, HE IS ABLE TO TRAVEL BECAUSE HE HAS SOME SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH MEXICAN GOVERNMENT, DETAILS OF WHICH NOT CLEAR TO HYSAGE. ARRANGEMENT GIVES GALAN SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM MEXICAN EMASSIES IN PLACES HE VISITS. HYSAGE COMMENTED THAT MANY MEXICAN AMABASSADORS WILL BE ANGRY WHEN THEY LEARN HOW THEY HAVE BEEN USED GALAN.

B. GALANS MISSION IS TO PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES IN COUNTRIES HE VISITS TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE AND TO TRY MAINTAIN THESE IN ORDER TAKE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. GALAN HAS ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BRING BETTER UNITY AMONG COMPETING LEFTIST FACTIONS TO ENSURE GREATER IMPACT THEIR WORK. IN THE CASE OF PANAMA, IN ADDITION FOREMENTIONED INSTRUCTIONS, GALAN WAS TOLD

SECRET

[illegible]

TO INSTRUCT HYSAGE THAT SHE IS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE NATIONAL COALITION PARTY AND OVERTLY JOIN ONE OF THE LEFTIST PARTIES, OR TRY TO FORM NEW ONE. THE INSTRUCTION IS CLEAR THAT THE LEFT IS TO GET TOGETHER. HYSAGE WAS ALSO AGAIN ENJOINED TO GET HER SON OUT OF PBPRIME. AFTER HEARING THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT GALAN HAD RE UNITY, HYSAGE TOLD GALAN THAT SHE, AS A WOMAN, COULD NOT ACCOMPLISH ALL THIS AND SHE DID IN FACT DECIDE TO BRING TOGETHER HUGO ALEJANDRO VICTOR, HER CLOSEST FRIEND IN PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO (PDP, PEOPLES PARTY COMMUNIST) AND DAVID TURNER, LEADER OF VANGUARD OF NATIONAL ACTION (VAN). (COMMENT: HER REMARKS INDICATED THAT SHE DID NOT INCLUDE JORGE TURNER BECAUSE HE IS APPARENTLY SERIOUSLY ILL). GALAN URGED VICTOR AND TURNER, AS REPRESENTATIVES THEIR RESPECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS, TO MAKE NEW EFFORT TO SETTLE DIFFERENCES TO BRING ABOUT A MORE COORDINATED EFFORT. AS RESULT OF GALANS VISIT, MEETING TOOK PLACE AT NOON ON 24 OCTOBER FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING UNITY, AGGRESSIVE ACTION, AND MERGER OF ALL LEFTIST UNITS TO GO TO ELECTIONS AS A BLOC IF ATTEMPTS TO STOP ELECTIONS SHOULD FAIL. THIS MEETING ATTENDED BY VICTOR, CARLOS DEL CID, RENATO PEREIRA, THELMA KING, ALVARO MENENDEZ, AND TWO UNIDENTIFIED STUDENTS. ALSO DURING MEETING "NEGRO" MARTINEZ, A PROFESSOR OF SPANISH AT UNIVERSITY, WHOM HYSAGE IDENTIFIED AS MEMBER OF COMMUNIST PARTY SECRET APARAT, CALLED VICTOR ASIDE FOR SHORT CONVERSATION. (COMMENT: BELIEVE THIS MAY BE JOSE DE JESUS MARTINEZ, PHILOSOPHY PROFESSOR UNIVERSITY). HYSAGE HEARD PART OF CONVERSATION WHICH WAS TO EFFECT THAT, AS REGARDS COORDINATION AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS, A MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRET APARAT AND CENTRAL

COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE ON 29 OCTOBER AT A PLACE ON THIRTEENTH STREET. HYSAGE SAID THAT, REALIZING IMPORTANCE OF MEETING, SHE TRIED TO GET ADDRESS AND WENT SO FAR AS TO ASK VICTOR IF SHE COULD BE INVITED ATTEND. VICTOR TOLD HER THAT, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE FRIENDS, SHE IS NOT MEMBER OF PARTY AND CANNOT EXPECT ATTEND HIGH LEVEL SECRET SESSIONS THIS SORT.

C. AS RESULT THIS MEETING, DECISION WAS TAKEN, APPARENTLY BY HYSAGE, TO BEGIN ACTS OF VIOLENCE IMMEDIATELY. (COMMENT: THIS WAS EXTRACTED FROM HER AFTER FIVE HOURS OF INTENSIVE INTERROGATION WHICH BROUGHT HER PRACTICALLY TO POINT OF TEARS. LEADING UP TO THIS SHE KEPT SAYING THAT IT WAS TO LATE FOR HER TO DO THE THINGS SHE WANTED FOR POPULAR REFORM. PONCHAY KEPT IT ON THIS POINT AND SHE FINALLY BROKE DOWN AND ADMITTED SHE HAD GIVEN THIS ORDER AND THAT AT THE MOMENT THEY WERE TALKING, MENENDEZ, ONE VICTOR (COMMENT: POSSIBLY VAUGHAN), AND SEVERAL OTHERS WERE ENGAGED IN MAKING MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AND HOMEMADE BOMBS OF SOME SORT. SHE SAID TARGETS STARTING THE NIGHT OF 24 OCTOBER THROUGH THE NEXT WEEK WERE SUPPOSED TO BE PBPRIME EMBASSY, PBPRIME INDUSTRIES, CANAL ZONE, PBPRIME CONSULATE IN COLON, AND THE VENEZUELAN CONSULATE IN COLON. PONCHAY TOLD HER HE ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT SHE WAS REALLY IN CHARGE OF THESE MATTERS BECAUSE OF OTHER THINGS HE KNEW, BUT GAVE HER A SEVERE VERBAL LASHING FOR PERMITTING THIS TO GET THIS FAR WITHOUT TELLING HIM. HE EXTRACTED PROMISE FROM HER THAT SHE WOULD DO EVERYTHING HER POWER TO PREVENT ACTION AGAINST PBPRIME INSTALLATIONS. SHE SAID, AND AGAIN APPEARED TO BE TELLING THE TRUTH BECAUSE SHE WAS UNDER THE MOST INTENSIVE PRESSURE PONCHAY HAS EVER SUBJECTED HER TO, THAT SHE WOULD TRY TO HOLD OFF ACTION AGAINST PBPRIME EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES. SHE SAID SHE WAS CERTAIN SHE COULD NOT STOP THE ACTION AGAINST THE VENEZUELAN CONSULATE WHICH WAS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR NIGHT 24 OCTOBER, AND PONCHAY TOLD HER NOT TO TRY TO STOP THAT ACTION. (COMMENT: THIS PORTION OF INFO RE PLANS FOR VIOLENCE WAS DISSEMINATED VERBALLY TO LOCAL AGENCIES. ODTEST CONFIRMS THAT MOLOTOV COCKTAIL WAS THROWN AT VENEZUELAN CONSULATE COLON AT 0040 ON 25 OCTOBER.)

D. GALAN WAS ALSO TOLD TO GET FROM HYSAGE FOR DELIVERY TO AMTHUG-1 IMMEDIATELY, A STATEMENT IN HER OWN HANDWRITING SIGNED BY HER THAT SHE WILL ACCEPT NO FURTHER ASSISTANCE FROM THE OLIGARCHY.

E. IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH HYSAGE, GALAN GAVE HIS ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS, HOWEVER, HYSAGE DOES NOT KNOW DATES:

FROM MEXICO HE TRAVELED GUATEMALA WHERE HE MET WITH GUERRILLA LEADER GOMEZ AYAU (FNU). HE GAVE HIM THE PITCH FOR ACTION.

HE HAD SIMILAR MEETING WITH NICARAGUAN GUERRILLA LEADER WHOSE NAME HYSAGE TRIED FOR TEN MINUTES RECALL WITHOUT SUCCESS.

GALAN THEN TRAVELED COSTA RICA AND MET WITH ONE OF THE MORA BROTHERS. FROM PANAMA HE INTEDED TRAVEL VENEZUELA WHERE HIS CONTACT WAS TO BE ARGELIA LAYA. HYSAGE DID NOT BELIEVE HE INTENDED GO COLOMBIA, BUT SAID HE WOULD PROCEED BRAZIL WHERE HE PLANNED MEET WITH PRESTES AND JULIAO. HYSAGE COMMENTED THAT GALAN POINTED OUT TO HER JULIAOS PRIME ADVANTAGE IN THE REVOLUTION, I.E., FACT THAT JULIAOS WIFE AND FAMILY IN CUBA WHERE THEY SAVE. GALAN INDICATED THAT HYSAGE WOULD BE WISE DO THE SAME THING. (COMMENT: HYKICK-2 AND HYJADE-1 HAVE BOTH REPORTED ON RECENT [illegible]T VISIT OF UNIDENTIFIED FOREIGNER.)

2. HYSAGE IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PEOPLE AS IMPORTANT IN PANAMA COMMUNIST PARTY APARAT:

CAMILO PEREZ, A LAWYER (COMMENT: PEREZ REPORTED HZP-4384 AS MEMBER SUSPECTED PDP FRONT GROUP. HAS ALSO VISITED PBRUMEN). NU KVZNEZ ZARZAVILLA OF THE FILY LA HORA. (COMMENT: PROBABLY PAS RAUOL NUNEZ ZARAVILLA MENTIONED HZPA-11329 AND HZP-4169).

3. HYSAGE SAID SHE HAD REASON BELIEVE THAT SHE NOW KNEW SUCCESSOR OF DIOGENES ALBERTO PINO. AS IN THE PAST, SHE SAID COULD NOT MENTION HIS NAME BUT WOULD PROVIDE ENOUGH LEADS TO PERMIT PONCHAY FIGURE OUT HIS IDENTIFY. OVER A PERIOD OF AN HOUR, SHE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING LEADS: THAT HE WORKS FOR CHIARI FAMILY, HAD BEEN A CLOSE FRIEND OF PINOS IN HIS YOUTH AND HAD BEEN PHOTOGRAPHED WITH A PROMINENT MEXICAN JOURNALIST WHO HAD BEEN PHOTOGRAPHED LEAVING AIRPORT IN PANAMA SOME MONTHS AGO AFTER MAKING SOME PRO CASTRO STATEMENTS. THINKING THIS OVER, PONCHAY SAID HE THOUGHT SHE MUST BE TALKING ABOUT SOMEONE CONNECTED WITH CHIARI RADIO AND TELEVISION NETWORKS. SHE CONCEEDED THIS WAS CORRECT, AND MENTIONED VARIOUS PEOPLE CONNECTED WITH TELEVISION STATION IN SUCH MANNER THAT IT APPEARS MOST PROBABLY SHE WAS TALKING ABOUT RODOLFO GARCIA DE PAREDES OR LUIS ESTRIBI. STATION IS CHECKING FURTHER.

4. REQUEST HQS RELAY APPROPRIATE PORTIONS OTHER STATIONS AS DESIRED.

SECRET

C/S COMMENTS: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZRKNICK CABLES.

**HYSAGE-1 REPORTED 22 OCT THAT RICO GALAN PBRUMEN AGENT ARRIVED PANAMA FROM BRAZIL OR VENEZUELA.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

201-003373
PACY-01033
23 OCT 63

1771539
PCFR
000 00000000000000000
1 111111111111 11 111
22222222222222222222
33 33 333333333333 3
444444444 4444444444
555555555555555555 55
666666 6666666666666
777 777777777777 7777
888 8888 8888888888888
9999999 999999999999

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
MARXIST JOURNALIST FOR MEXICAN MAGAZINE TIEMPO, POSS IDEN W/A RICO GALAN - WHO ALLEGEDLY HAS COVERT CONNECTION W/CASTRO AND CLANDESTINE MEETINGS W/CP LEADERS IN PANAMA

$HMM

1 771 539

~~03 OCT~~

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

REPORT
1351-7746

FROM
Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT
17 September 1963

REPORTING OFFICER
Jeremy K. HIABCOS

RD. NO.
P-7354

REPORTS OFFICER
Portia L. SPAGNUS

PROJ.
LIFEAT

APPROVING OFFICER
Willard C. CURTIS

S'CE CR.
LIFEAT

2P

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS

The information in the attached was taken from the LIFEAT coverage of Arevalo of 9 September. In conversation between Arevalo and Alfredo Arankowski, Mexican leftist journalist, Arankowski told Arevalo of Rico's plans and that Rico had requested information on the United Fruit Company. Arankowski said that Rico did not know that Arankowski would ask Arevalo for the information. Arevalo agreed to meet Arankowski to give him the information.

RI - Please index: Alfredo Arankowski ~~Mex. Journalist~~ cit Mexico
Leftist - info given by subj

MICROFILMED
SEP 20 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
2 - Headquarters 1 - Guatemala City HCG 3 - Files	1 - Amb, Pol 1 - LA

INDEX F

COUNTRY

NO. OF ENCLOSURES

NO. PAGES

SUBJECT

REFERENCES

PADA

APPR

DOI

FORM 8-60 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

CS COPY

201-338474

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A: Completely reliable B: Usually reliable C: Fairly reliable D: Not usually reliable E: Not reliable (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence) F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources 2: Probably true 3: Possibly true 4: Doubtful 5: Probably false 6: Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico/Guatemala	REPORT NO	[illegible]
SUBJECT	Planned Travel to Guatemala of Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist	DATE OF REPORT	17 September 1963
		NO PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	

DATE OF INFO 9 September 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (9 September 1963)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Person (B) in close personal contact with Rico Galan. Appraisal of Content: 2.

Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and head of the Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement), rabidly anti-United States, pro-Cuba, Communist front organization, is planning a trip to Guatemala. While there Rico plans to interview Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, Chief of the Guatemalan Military Junta. Rico also plans to visit the Guatemalan guerrillas.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	5. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 6. DATE OF INFO. / 7. EVALUATION
8. ANALYST / 9. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

201-007132
HMM -07644
21 AUG 63
MEXI-05855

CIT ?
OCC ?

AMONG LEADING MEXICAN MARXISTS AND COMMUNISTS PARTICIPATING IN THE PRO-POLITICAL PRISONER DEMONSTRATION ON 18 AUGUST 1963 WHO WERE ARRESTED BY MEXICAN POLICE.

PROMINENT LEFTIST JOURNALIST.

#HMY

1 809 310

1809310

PArR

```
0000000000_00000_000_
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
11111_11111111_1111_1
222222222222222222222
333333333333333333_33
4__444444_44444444444
555555555555555555555
888800_666005666666666
7777_7777777777777777
_8883888_8_8888_88888
9990999_999999999_999
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
```

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201 | 336 | 474

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☑
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-3364
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

~~201-336474~~

201-336474

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, RF 2

SECRET 292606Z

29 JUL 63 IN 89232

DIR MRID CITE MEXI 5532

ON 26 JULY LIENVOY REPORTED THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXI LEFTIST JOURNALIST, GOING TO MERIDA 1 AUG IN CONNECTION WITH NEW LOCATION FOR MEXICAN CUBAN CULTURAL INSTITUTE THERE. GALAN SAID INSTITUTE HAD COMPLETED ITS TWO YEAR CONTRACT AND MUST MOVE. RICO PLANNED RETURN MEXI 2 AUG.

SECRET

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

201-336474

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM	REPORT NO. HMM-7481

FROM Mexico City	DATE OF REPORT 2 July 1963
REPORTING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	RD NO. P-7354
REPORTS OFFICER Portia L. SPARKSUS	PROJ. LIENVOY
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	S'CE CR. LIENVOY

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

The information in the attached was taken from a LIENVOY conversation between Rico Galan and Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero, Mexican pro-Communist newspaperman and member of the staff of Politica, Mexican Marxist semi-monthly magazine.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Headquarters 1 - WAVE 3 - Files	1 - Amb, Political, PAO 1 - LA

COUNTRY	NO. OF ENCLOSURES	NO. PAGES
SUBJECT	REFERENCES	
	PADA	
APPR	DOI	

CS COPY

201-336444

FORM 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)
6-60

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A Completely reliable B Usually reliable C Fairly reliable D Not usually reliable E Not reliable Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty regardless of their competence F Reliability cannot be judged Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources 2 Probably true 3 Possibly true 4 Doubtful 5 Probably false 6 Cannot be judged.

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO	HMM-7481
SUBJECT	Comments of Victor Rico Galan on the Morale of the Cuban Intellectual	DATE OF REPORT	2 July 1963
		NO PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO	27 June 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ	Mexico, Mexico City (27 June 1963)		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Persons (B) in close personal contact with Rico Galan. Appraisal of Content: 2.

On 27 June 1963, Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement) rabidly anti-United States, pro-Cuba, Communist front organization, said that during his recent visit to Cuba he noticed the morale among Cuban intellectuals was very low. Rico Galan said that certain Cuban intellectuals do not understand the problems which exist for them, and others are not well informed. Rico Galan further said that although this problem is not openly discussed, there have been certain newspapers and magazines published in Cuba which pointed out lack of curiosity on the party of the Cuban intellectuals and called for a greater realization of the problems confronting them.

1. Field Comment:

   Rico Galan went to Cuba on 25 May 1963 to interview Fidel Castro Ruz, Communist Prime Minister of Cuba, on Castro's trip to the Soviet Union. Rico Galan returned to Mexico on 22 June 1963. (Cf. HMM-7326, HMM-7466)

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

ES COPY

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	REP. NO. HMM-7466

FROM Mexico City	DATE OF REPORT 28 June 1963
REPORTING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	RD. NO. P-7354
REPORTS OFFICER Portia L. SPARESUS	PROJ LIENVOY
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	S'CE CR. LIENVOY

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

The information in the attached was taken from a LIENVOY conversation of 23 June 1963 between Rico Galan and Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero, Mexican pro-Communist newspaperman and member of the Staff of Politica, Mexican Marxist semi-monthly magazine.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4-Headquarters 1-WAVE 5-Files	1-Amb, Polit. Aff. 1-LA

COUNTRY	NO. OF ENCLOSURES None	NO. PAGES
SUBJECT	REFERENCES	
	PADA	
APPR	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	

FORM 4-60 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

CS COPY

-2/- 736474

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A Completely reliable. B Usually reliable. C Fairly reliable. D Not usually reliable. E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2 Probably true. 3 Possibly true. 4 Doubtful. 5 Probably false. 6 Cannot be judged.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

REPORT NO HMM-7356

SUBJECT Comments of Victor Rico Galan on His Recent Trip to Cuba

DATE OF REPORT 28 June 1963

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO 23 June 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (23 June 1963)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE Persons (B) in close personal contact with Rico Galan. Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement), rabidly anti-United States, pro-Cuba, Communist front, returned to Mexico from Cuba on 22 June 1963.1

2. Rico Galan said that while in Cuba he spent eight days with Fidel Castro Ruz, Communist Prime Minister, and also spoke with the following Cuban Government officials:
   - Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, President,
   - Ernesto ("Che") Guevara Serna, Minister of Industries,
   - Raul Roa Garcia, Minister of Foreign Relations,
   - Francisco Wilfredo Blas Roca Calderio, Secretary-general of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP - Cuban Communist Party),
   - Regino Boti Leon, Minister of National Economy,
   - Jose Llanusa Gobel, director of the National Institute of Sports, Physical Education and Recreation.

According to Rico Galan, he spent five of the eight days with Castro at sea and Castro discussed his visit to the Soviet Union and his talks with Nikita Khruchchev, Premier of the Soviet Union. Rico Galan further said that the Cuban Government is now making an effort to improve its relations with the Mexican Government, which, according to Rico Galan have been neglected. These efforts by the Cuban Government will be made not only at the diplomatic level but also "at higher levels." Cuba will also try to improve its relations with Brazil, now that the Brazilian political situation is calmer.

CS COPY

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

3. Rico Galan said that he received the impression upon his arrival at the Mexico City airport, that passengers returning from Cuba were being treated with more courtesy. Rico Galan returned to Mexico on the same flight as Joaquin Hernandez de Armas, new Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. He said that the international room at the airport was opened to Hernandez, and that he was met by Joaquin Bernal, Assistant Chief of Protocol of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations and received certain other considerations which are uncommon for an arriving ambassador.

4. Rico Galan also said that while in Cuba he saw Dr. Enrique Cabrera Cosio, prominent leftist Mexican cardiologist.[2] Rico Galan said that Cabrera was happy in Cuba, that he enjoyed prestige and the esteem of the Cubans, and that he was doing his best with the means available to him.

5. Rico Galan said he planned to write a series of four or five articles. His articles will deal with subjects of "theoretical interest" and of the problems the Cuban Government is having carrying out the purposes of its revolution.

Field Comments:

1. It was reported previously that Rico Galan had agreed to go to Cuba to interview Castro concerning his trip to the Soviet Union. He left Mexico on 25 May. (Cf. HMM-7326).

2. It was also reported previously that Cabrera went to Cuba in October 1962 as a guest of the Cuban Government, Cabrera was dismissed from the Mexican National Cardiological Institute in July 1962 because of his leftist activities. (CF. HMM-6902).

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]



DOMICILIO DEL TITULAR EN MEXICO

DOMICILIO DEL TITULAR EN EL EXTRANJERO

EN CASO DE MUERTE O ACCIDENTE NOTIFIQUESE A:

DOMICILIO

ESTE PASAPORTE DEBE REFRENDARSE CADA DOS AÑOS. LA LIBRETA CADUCA A LOS SEIS AÑOS.

PASAPORTE No. 57115

PASAPORTE

EXPEDIDO A FAVOR DE

VICTOR PICO GALAN

A QUIEN ACOMPAÑA SU ESPOSA

X X X X X X

Y XXX MENORES

Nº 187950

[illegible]


10
11
12
13
8
7
6
5

FILIACIONES

	TITULAR	ESPOSA
ESTATURA	1.75 MTS.	
COLOR	BLANCO	
OJOS	CAFES	
PELO	ENTRECANO	

SEÑAS PARTICULARES NINGUNA

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO EL FERROL, ESPAÑA

FECHA DE NACIMIENTO 6 FEBRERO 1928

OCUPACION ESCRITOR

ESTADO CIVIL CASADO

HIJOS MENORES

NOMBRE	EDAD	SEXO

FOTOGRAFIAS

FIRMA DEL TITULAR

FIRMA DE LA ESPOSA

ESTE PASAPORTE NO ES VALIDO SIN LA FIRMA Y [illegible]


10
11
12
13
9
8
7
6
5

REFRENDOS

NUMERO ________________ DERECHOS $ 20.00

REFRENDADO EN ________________

____

DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS EN ________________

____

HASTA EL ________________

________________ DE 19____

REFRENDOS

NUMERO ________________ DERECHOS $ 20.00

REFRENDADO EN ________________

____

DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS EN ________________

____

HASTA EL ________________

________________ DE 19____



VISAS

VISAS

VISA DE CORTESIA Nº 96[illegible]

EMBAJADA DE CUBA EN MEXICO

MEXICO D.F. Septiembre 27/[illegible]

BUENO PARA TRASLADARSE A CUBA

VIA A SU ELECCION

SECRETARIO DE LA EMBAJADA

Calle Mires Nº 43½



VISA DE CORTESIA No. 323.

EMBAJADA DE CUBA EN MEXICO

MEXICO, D.F. Mayo 24 de 1963

BUENO PARA TRASLADARSE A CUBA

VIA A SU ELECCION

SECRETARIO DE LA [illegible]


10
11
12
13
9
8
7
6
5

VISAS

CUBA

ADVERTENCIAS AL TITULAR

Preséntese este pasaporte al solicitar otro nuevo.

En caso de pérdida o destrucción de este pasaporte, el interesado deberá comunicar inmediatamente el hecho y las circunstancias en que hubiere ocurrido a la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de México o al Consulado mexicano más próximo, y a las autoridades locales de policía.

Es válido para viajar por los países y hasta la fecha que se indican en la página 8 o en los refrendos correspondientes. Las oficinas expedidoras podrán autorizarlo para otros países y refrendarlo por un período de tiempo igual al originalmente concedido.

En beneficio de los mexicanos que se encuentren en el extranjero, la Ley ha facultado a los Cónsules de México para levantar actas del Registro Civil consignando el nacimiento y reconocimiento de hijos, matrimonio y muerte de los mexicanos residentes en sus respectivas jurisdicciones. Este importante servicio es de gran utilidad para quienes necesitan poseer las pruebas de su estado civil y de sus familiares.

Los mexicanos que permanezcan en un lugar fuera del país por un período mayor de seis meses, deberán matricularse en el Consulado Mexicano del lugar en que residan o en el más próximo.

Es también de positiva utilidad [illegible] que los mexicanos [illegible] [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	2. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	3. RI FILE NO.
	4. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 5. DATE
	6. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 7. DATE OF INFO. / 8. EVALUATION
9. ANALYST / 10. DATE PROCESSED	11. DISSEMINATED IN / 12. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

13. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

14. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

15.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
RE POSSIBLE RESIGNATION OF SUBJ FOR
POLITICS, MEXI MARXIST PUB FEB 63.

050-004-117
HMM -07050
25 FEB 63
MEXI-03552
P2

1406909
PAFR -

00000000000000000 00 0
11111 11111111 111111
2222222222222222222222
3333333333333333333333
4 44444444444 44444
5555555555555555555555
666666 6666666666 666
7777 777777777777777
888888888888888888888
9999999 9999999999 9

1 406 909

16. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-62 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

REPORT NO. HMM-6770

FROM: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 5 October 1962

REPORTING OFFICER: Clyde K. SHRYOCK

RD. NO.: P-7354

REPORTS OFFICER: Portia L. SPARESUS

Portia L. Sparesus

PROJ.: LIFIRE

APPROVING OFFICER: Willard C. CURTIS

S'CE CR.: Para. 1: LICOOKY-1
Para. 2: LIFIRE

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

The information in paragraph one of the attached was taken from several small items submitted by LICOOKY-1 since 17 July. The information in paragraph two was taken from the LIFIRE airlists.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4-Headquarters (JMPUCK) 1-WAVE [illegible] 3-Files	1-EMB, PAO, MA, NA, AA, I&NS 1-LA

COUNTRY:

NO. OF ENCLOSURES: None

NO PAGES: 1

SUBJECT:

REFERENCES:

PADA

APPR

DC-I

SECRET

FORM 8-60 1467

CS COPY

201-[illegible]

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE A Completely reliable. B Usually reliable C Fairly reliable D Not usually reliable E Not reliable (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5 Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET

COUNTRY Cuba/Mexico

REPORT NO. HMM-6770

SUBJECT Travel of Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist, to Cuba

DATE OF REPORT 5 October 1962

NO. OF PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 27 July to 2 October 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (27 July to 2 October 1962)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Para. 1: Person (B) in close contact with Rico Galan.
Para. 2: Person (B) with good access to travel information.
Appraisal of Content: 2

1. Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement, rabidly anti-United States, pro-Cuba, Communist front, plans to write a political biography on Fidel Castro Ruz, Communist Prime Minister of Cuba. Rico Galan, who proposed the idea to the Cuban Government and was accepted, will spend two months in Cuba working on the project.

2. On 2 October Rico Galan left Mexico for Habana, Cuba, on Cubana Airlines. He carried Mexican passport No. 51115, with a Cuban courtesy visa.

201 FILE OPENED ON THE BASIS OF THIS DOCUMENT

SECRET 201-336474

DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

[illegible]

CS-3/525,084

October 62

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C. Mexico to Czechoslovakia

There is a good chance that Mexico may participate in the Fifth Industrial Fair in Brno, Czechoslovakia, in September 1963. The announcement was made by Dr Emilio Vera Blanco, president of the National Chamber of Industry of Mexico, upon his arrival in Mexico City from Europe on 30 September 1962. While in Europe, Dr Vera Blanco had interviews with European industrialists and government officials, among them the Assistant Trade Minister of Czechoslovakia, who showed great interest in Mexico. (Mexico City, La Prensa, 1 Oct 62)

D. Mexico -- Contacts with Cuba

1. Soviet Couriers to Cuba

Russian diplomatic couriers Sergey Kulikov and Ivan Filitov left Mexico City for Havana recently in a Cubana de Aviacion airline plane on a special and very secret mission. They were carrying several bulky briefcases, which the Russian diplomats marked diplomatic pouch , and which weighed 120 kilos. Four special guards accompanied the couriers and their briefcases. The arrivals of Cubana de Aviacion airline planes in Mexico heretofore have caused incidents, as their passengers tried to smuggle Communist propaganda which the Mexican federal agents confiscated. Among the other passengers in the flight to Havana, in addition to the Russians, were the Mexican Communists Blas Galindo, a music composer, and Victor Rico Galan, a journalist. (Mexico City, El Universal, 3 Oct 62)

2. Cuban and Communist Propaganda Confiscated

Agents of the Federal Judicial Police at the airport in Mexico City, under the command of Maj Alberto Madrigal Nieto, confiscated Communist propaganda pamphlets from three Argentine citizens who arrived in the city from Havana on their way to Uruguay. The Argentines are Antonio Ricardo [illegible], Jose Ramon Juarez, and Margarita Grotsner Kreimer de Rodriguez. Among the propaganda materials are Fidel Castro's book La Historia me Absolvera (History Will Absolve Me), several Soviet and Cuban periodicals, and Patria o Muerte (Fatherland or Death) emblems. (Mexico City, Excelsior, 3 Oct 62)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

21 APRIL, ~~62~~ 61

Victor RICO Galan

SECRET MEXICO

President Adolfo LOPEZ Mateos of Mexico has promised to grant a group of prominent Mexican leftists, the majority of them journalists an interview relative to the case of Cuba on 20 April 1961. The group of leftists involved includes Alonso AGUILAR Monteverde, Dr. Gonzalo GUZMAN, Jesus SILVA Herzog, Dr Guillermo MONTANO Islas, Janitzio MUGICA, Elvira VARGAS, Rodol DORANTES, RENATO Leduc, Victor RICO Galan, Carlos FUENTES, Jos ALVARDO, Fausto CASTILLO, Ricardo ZERADA and others.

TDCS-3/472/253, 21 April 1961, Mexico City

SECCION A

México, D.F., Jueve

Comunistas Guatemaltecos y sus Enlaces en México Quisieron Sabotear la Visita de DO

GUATEMALA, Guatemala, C. A., (ISADI)—Exclusivo para EL HERALDO DE MEXICO—Mediante plagios y constantes actos de terrorismo, las fuerzas rebeldes que operan en las zonas montañosas del país, tratando de alcanzar sus fines, no importa que a diario sufran terribles reveses. Tanto para poner en entredicho al gobierno de la República, como para evitar que la influencia de México en la América Central supere a la que ellos piensan que tiene Cuba, planearon sabotear la visita del mandatario de la nación vecina, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, a estas tierras de guerrilla.

Para tal objeto contaron, sin duda, con la ayuda de diversos agentes en el mismo México. Uno de ellos es el periodista español Victor Rico Galán, redactor de las revistas mexicanas "Siempre", "Política" y "Sucesos para Todos", que se ufana de haber cruzado varias veces la frontera guatemalteco-mexicana subrepticiamente, con el propósito de estrechar lazos con dichos rebeldes.

Hace poco, en suelo guatemalteco, tras de haber cruzado ilegalmente la línea divisoria, Victor Rico Galán grabó una declaración dirigida al grupo de rebeldes que comanda Yon Sosa.

La grabación cayó en poder de fuerzas leales al gobierno de Guatemala y de la fiel reproducción que se hizo por escrito de la misma se ofrecen en seguida sus párrafos más importantes:

Compañeros, aquí he llegado con el comandante Yon [illegible], después de una serie de vicisitudes y muchos retrasos; yo y [illegible] hemos tenido una serie de razones que él les puede explicar a ustedes mejor que yo.

"Yo he venido [illegible] y su vida, [illegible] tierra [illegible] ustedes se les ocurra. Todo esto se los digo, quizá con cierta prolijidad, pues creo que ustedes, [illegible] aquí en la montaña, no se percatan del papel histórico que están jugando en este momento. Y también quiero decirles que aquí, en Guatemala, he podido ver, pues, el interés, la devoción, el entusiasmo con que se sigue la lucha de guerrillas. Mi opinión es que el movimiento guerrillero en Guatemala ha prendido definitivamente y que sólo terminará con el día del triunfo.

"Quiero decirles, también, que el comandante Guevara piensa exactamente lo mismo. Un compañero del Partido Comunista Mexicano, miembro del Comité Central, Juan [illegible], periodista, jefe de redacción de la revista "Sucesos para Todos", visitó Cuba y, en una entrevista con el "Che" sobre cuestiones económicas, acompañado por otros periodistas mexicanos, el "Che" les hizo una serie de preguntas sobre México y, después, ellos le preguntaron sobre los movimientos de liberación de América Latina. El "Che" les dijo que, en su opinión, los dos países donde el movimiento es más sólido y más firme —a pesar de todas las dificultades—, eran Guatemala y Venezuela.

"Quiero decirles, también, algo: yo nunca he sido partidario de esa actitud, generalizada en América Latina, consiste en decir, bueno, ya ven lo que hizo Fidel, pues esto no lo hizo Fidel, pues esto sí lo hizo Fidel. Creo que esto es un error [illegible], porque, lo que hizo Fidel, lo hizo en circunstancias históricas muy especiales [illegible] y lo que [illegible] es muy distinto y tiene que ser distinto.

"Se [illegible] cuestiones que no tiene objeto discutir aquí, y no es que yo sea un campeón del abandono de la ideología, no; yo creo que ustedes, los dirigentes, las personas del núcleo central, deben estudiar, deben leer, deben leer a los clásicos. Por otra parte, en relación con este mismo tema, no es lo mismo tener el problema de derrotar a una burguesía como la francesa, con ideólogos, con gobernantes de la categoría de un De Gaulle, que tener el problema de derrotar a una burguesía idiota, como la guatemalteca. A [illegible] se le puede tirar casi de una pedrada. Esto, todo esto tiende a indicar, pues, que el exagerar las cuestiones ideológicas ante las masas no nos conduce a nada.

"En este punto, esto lo digo más para el compañero Rolando, ya traduciendo estas ideas un poco teóricamente: habría que releer y estudiar aquel famoso escrito de Mao Tse Tung sobre la contradicción; cuando él explica cómo las contradicciones se van desplazando en la evolución de las sociedades y, particularmente, en una evolución, como la contradicción básica va desplazándose a otras contradicciones que, muchas veces, son las más aparentes y las que más se manifiestan ante las masas."

"Yo, para venir aquí, he sido ayudado por pequeños burgueses de la región, esos pequeños burgueses no son la burguesía nacional de que se habla en el programa del PGT, pero ellos se sienten burgueses. ¿Por qué vamos a enajenarnos esas colaboraciones? [illegible] yo le señalaba [illegible] casos como el de Pancho Villa. [illegible] Kramer; no cabe duda que es un burgués, ideólogo burgués, político burgués, y [illegible] embargo, [illegible] ha prestado [illegible]

[illegible].—En el banquete ofrecido al presidente de México y a su esposa, por el presidente de El Salvador, en la residencia presidencial, el presidente de El Salvador coronel Julio Adalberto Rivera pronunció un conceptuoso discurso de ofrecimiento, que fue contestado con trascendentales palabras por el presidente mexicano licenciado Gustavo Díaz Ordaz.

El texto de los discursos es el siguiente:

PALABRAS DEL LIC. GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ

Hace media centuria, un salvadoreño escribió en frases que tienen la unción de las [illegible]: "Parece que entre los dos pueblos reviven, a través del tiempo y la distancia, los sentimientos solidarios del origen común, que no se destruyen en la historia ni se debilitan [illegible] con la desvinculación política. El Salvador es Tolteca, pertenece a la rama de los pipiles, es decir "los muchachos" de aquella brava raza que descendió de las altas mesetas aztecas para venir a poblar la región occidental de Centroamérica. Hay en las arterias salvadoreñas glóbulos de aquella sangre heroica que asombró al [illegible] y que se agigantó [illegible] al choque con su fiera energía para defender el propio patrimonio y las glorias eternas de la raza".

Evoco respetuosamente los afanes, las glorias y los sacrificios de quienes nos precedieron en nuestros respectivos suelos; los evoco aceptándolos como una ineludible obligación de poner empeñosamente el esfuerzo en el presente para conquistar un futuro mejor.

LAS VIRTUDES SOBREPASAN A LAS FALLAS

Nos sorprende la más extraordinaria revolución tecnológica de todos los tiempos, con el [illegible] paso de lo que somos, con la certeza de que los [illegible] de nues-

[illegible] desplazar a ustedes mejor que yo.

"Yo he venido pasando sucediendole y su visa, porque el compañero [illegible] me parece que no me quería mucho...

"Les aclaro esto porque se ha especulado por ahí [illegible] con la idea de que yo venía enviado por los compañeros cubanos e incluso que esas opiniones no eran mías, sino la expresión de las opiniones de ellos. es más, algunos compañeros me insinuaron la conveniencia de que yo, pues, esto, mencionara esto aquí. Naturalmente, me negué por una razón fundamental: porque no es cierto. Yo no vine aquí en representación de los compañeros cubanos... De modo, pues, que desconozco todas sus opiniones al respecto; lo único que yo puedo hacer son especulaciones respecto de cual pueda ser su pensamiento en la medida que conozco, pues son ideas generales y entonces, como sé lo que piensan de los movimientos de liberación que accionan en la America Latina, me puedo imaginar lo que puedan opinar respecto a este problema; pero eso también se lo pueden imaginar ustedes, que saben también que es lo que ellos piensan. De modo que no tendría ningún sentido mi viaje, si este tuviera por objeto manifestarles algo que ustedes pueden saber perfectamente.

"Lo que yo he expresado aquí ha sido bajo mi exclusiva responsabilidad y producto de mi cerebrito, trabajando solo.

"Yo he visto en el plan internacional la importancia que tiene el Movimiento 13 de Noviembre, como un símbolo de la lucha de liberación nacional, no solo de Guatemala, sino de America Latina, y la importancia que tiene el comandante Adán como jefe, como cabeza de ese nucleo.

"En Mexico, casi, yo les he hecho la broma de que parece que me consideraran el dueño de la revolución guatemalteca, porque cada vez que llega por allá una noticia, en un periódico, algún rumor, pues todas las personas revolucionarias me hablan por teléfono, me van a buscar para ver que es lo que yo opino, como si yo tuviera un hilo directo con la [illegible] de [illegible], para estar enterado de todas las cosas que a ustedes [illegible] país muy especial, y lo que usted está planteando es muy distinto y tiene que ser distinto.

"Se muy bien que el plantear estos problemas cada que estoy medio loco a que no quiero comprometerme [illegible] no es eso. Les voy a [illegible] explicar la idea lo mas claramente que yo pueda. Mi idea es esta: cuando se está luchando en un país altamente desarrollado, muy complicado, muy politizado, con una clase obrera con una gran experiencia, con conocimientos políticos, con militancia, donde incluso los propios campesinos tienen una aguda conciencia de los problemas y sus necesidades, vamos a decir, en Francia; vamos a decir, en Italia, todos esos análisis rigurosos sobre la composición de la burguesía, a los que ustedes son afectos; distinciones entre diversos sectores de la burguesía, análisis sobre las necesidades de la clase obrera, sobre el papel internacional de la lucha de los pueblos semicoloniales o coloniales, etc., son allá necesarias; y son necesarias, porque, para que un partido, para que un grupo tenga autoridad, necesita convencer a masas altamente politizadas.

"En nuestros países, no se nos plantea ese problema, porque las masas nuestras son sumamente inconscientes de nuestro punto de vista político; o mejor dicho, en términos mejores, mas claros, mas exactos: tienen una conciencia muy elemental de sus problemas: la conciencia del campesino es por la tierra, y creo que no va mas allá por el momento. Creo que si al campesino se le ofrece tierra, se le ofrecen escuelas para sus hijos y atención medica, etc., no pide mas explicaciones, porque a el no se le plantean mas problemas. Entonces, cuando yo leo "revolución socialista"; todas esas cosas que [illegible] masas bolivianas, que las milicias armadas, pienso que es una confusión verdaderamente espantosa, y yo lo digo, porque conozco y he estado allá y he visto cuales son los problemas grandes. Cuando veo todo eso sobre [illegible] que las masas [illegible] voluntad [illegible]. Es un país [illegible] [illegible] verdade[illegible] parece [illegible]

[illegible] mo el [illegible] Villagrán Kramer; no cabe duda de que es un burgués, [illegible] burgués, poderoso burgués; y, sin embargo, pues ha prestado colaboración a ustedes y puede volver a prestarla, si es necesario hay que pelearse con el.

"Ahora quisiera decir algunas palabras para el [illegible] de [illegible] en Cuba. No quería irse y me costó bastante trabajo convencerla finalmente, lo logré. Le hice ver que, en todo caso, el compañero Rolando tenía que dedicar algún tiempo a su curación y que, fuera que eso se hiciera en Mexico, en Cuba, o en Checoslovaquia, que ella estaría en condiciones de acompañarlo en el momento en que lo quisiera. Se le avisaría, naturalmente, a La Habana o donde ella pudiera conectarse. Yo quiero, en todo caso, si el compañero Rolando decide salir por Mexico, darle mi numero de teléfono, para que pueda localizarme de inmediato y me pueda hablar, con el mismo nombre de Rolando. A mí me encuentra hasta las diez de la mañana o a eso de las tres y media de la tarde, que es el almuerzo en Mexico.

"Les envío un abrazo cordial, a los que, [illegible], conozco mucho a través de una serie de testimonios orales de cintas grabadas; este sistema de las cintas grabadas es muy útil, podría haberse implantado en Chihuahua. Me horrorizo bastante y veo que se han olvidado algunas cosas: en primer lugar, para Rolando, lo siguiente: el niño, su hijo, está naturalmente con su madre. Fue con ella en el viaje, iba en buenas condiciones. Yo lo vi unos días antes de mi salida de Mexico, con motivo del cumpleaños de mi hija menor.

"Bueno, un saludo muy cordial otra vez, ahora sí ya definitivo, al comandante Herbert. Me divirtió mucho su grabación, y, además la recordé mucho la otra noche cuando venía yo subiendo para acá; aquella frase de el, donde dice que [illegible] no es bajo, pero es una montaña baja de... Supongo que se refería a una montaña mucho mas baja de [illegible] que esta, pero esta, para [illegible] espantosa, porque yo me cansaba arriba de [illegible] a veinte minutos [illegible]

Sigue en la Pág. 12-A

[illegible] LAS FALLAS

Nos ha tocado la mas extraordinaria revolución tecnológica de todos los tiempos, con el [illegible] justo de lo que somos, con la certeza de que las virtudes de nuestros pueblos sobrepujarán las fallas de nuestra política y de nuestra economía, con una [illegible] y los [illegible] que dejará a la gran [illegible] si se hace digna de cumplir con [illegible] que le toca [illegible], comercio internacional [illegible], [illegible] intercambio cultural con todas las naciones del planeta y [illegible] confluencia de todas las ondas del progreso.

[illegible] en lo económico, en lo [illegible], en lo social [illegible] y como confraternidad, como [illegible] y [illegible] de nuestros medios de producción y de consumo.

El mundo actual oscila entre graves temores y vigorosas esperanzas, [illegible] y a la [illegible] de que el hombre muestra ser capaz, no solo en el curso de la historia pasada, sino en las épocas recientes, cuyo recuerdo, [illegible] sido la vida entera del mundo; pero además [illegible] la certidumbre de que el hombre que ha sido capaz de conciliar el [illegible] y la justicia, sabrá [illegible] para resolver los problemas que afectan a todos los pueblos.

El derecho deberá garantizar el [illegible] de cada pueblo para [illegible] la solución de sus problemas a través de sus propias instituciones, de manera que, asegurada la independencia de cada nación, pueda practicarse, para beneficio común, la solidaridad internacional basada en la justicia y [illegible] fuerza creadora por el impulso de la libertad.

BASES PERDURABLES DE LA AMISTAD

En la igualdad jurídica de los Estados y [illegible] recíproco [illegible] las bases perdurables de nuestra amistad y el camino para disminuir desigualdades económicas.

Es muy grato que mi visita a los países hermanos de Centroamérica ocurra en momentos en que la cooperación económica dentro de nuestra región evoluciona en forma satisfactoria.

Nosotros [illegible] crecen mas rápidamente que la [illegible] y esto ha hecho surgir en todo el Continente una [illegible].

Con [illegible] las dos organizaciones [illegible] la región [illegible], sobre todo las del

[illegible]

Dijo que al dar la bienvenida al Presidente mexicano, "lo saludo como símbolo de una democracia auténtica de América, cuya grandeza inspira a cuantos amamos la libertad".

Este viaje, dijo, "entraña el feliz augurio de una acrecentada cooperación constructiva entre nuestros pueblos".

Cordial Abrazo... Viene de la Primera Pág. A

Mexicanos y salvadoreños, han coincidido en su fervor por la libertad y en la lucha por conquistarla. Si hemos coincidido en el pasado con mayor razón debemos estar unidos en el porvenir para acrecentar la solidaridad y la cooperación entre ambos pueblos.

AYUDA EN LO CULTURAL

Solidaridad y cooperación son precisamente nuestras más altas aspiraciones en el desenvolvimiento de nuestras relaciones sociales, políticas, culturales y económicas.

En lo político, queremos una América justa, democrática, humanitaria, donde las personas y las ideas logren desarrollarse cabalmente, sin violencia interna, sin presiones del exterior.

En lo cultural tratamos de ayudarnos crecientemente, sabiendo que el de la cultura es el ámbito en el que los hombres pueden entenderse mejor.

En lo económico podemos hacer mucho más de lo que hasta ahora hemos hecho para fortalecer nuestra necesaria industrialización e intensificar el comercio de nuestros países.

Necesitamos urgentemente elevar el nivel de vida de nuestros pueblos, que con justicia reclaman pan y libertad; cultura y bienestar; salud y seguridad. Disponemos de recursos propios, de tierras generosas, de voluntad dispuesta a labrar un porvenir más justo para todos.

¡Ha llegado la hora del esfuerzo conjunto y de la cooperación honrada!

EL VALOR DE LA AMISTAD

Confío en que mi estancia en este país hermano resulte propicia para afianzar la cordialidad de nuestras Repúblicas y avivar, mediante actos prácticos y fecundos, la fe que depositamos en el valor de nuestra amistad.

Sé que interpreto a todos los mexicanos al desear al intrépido pueblo salvadoreño prosperidad en el trabajo, seguridad en la justicia y paz en la libertad.

Excelentísimo señor Presidente: La señora de Díaz Ordaz y yo, así como los miembros del gobierno mexicano que me acompañan, agradecemos a usted profundamente las palabras tan deferentes y amables que nos ha tributado como bienvenida y cordialidad con que el gobierno y el pueblo de El Salvador nos han ofrecido la hospitalidad que disfrutamos en este momento.

[illegible] Presidente, que en el [illegible]

[illegible] una feliz estancia a [illegible] del pueblo de [illegible] República centroamericana.

25 minutos después inició el Presidente mexicano el recorrido del aeropuerto a la embajada de México, a 13 kilómetros de distancia, donde miles de personas lo saludaron efusivamente.

¡Viva México!... Viene de la Primera Pág. A

te de El Salvador, coronel Julio A. Rivera, durante su discurso de bienvenida.

Momentos antes, al descender el mandatario mexicano del avión que lo puso en suelo salvadoreño, el Presidente Rivera rompió el protocolo y se dirigió hasta la escalerilla del avión para recibir con un abrazo al jefe del gobierno mexicano. La multitud concentrada en el aeropuerto rompió en aclamaciones que fueron apagadas momentáneamente por los honores de ordenanza y 21 salvas en honor del ilustre visitante.

Antes de abandonar el aeropuerto, el mandatario mexicano y sus acompañantes rememoraron el suelo patrio al escuchar las mexicanísimas canciones interpretadas por un grupo de mariachis.

El Presidente Díaz Ordaz había arribado a las 10.00 horas.

Durante su recorrido por las calles salvadoreñas, el pueblo se reunió a lo largo del trayecto para aplaudir al paso de la comitiva. Los dos mandatarios saludaban de pie a bordo de un automóvil negro descubierto. Las serpentinas y el papel picado caían de los edificios en lluvia de simbólica amistad y cariño entre los dos pueblos. El cruce de las calles de esa capital centroamericana, los postes, ventanas y escaparates de los comercios, lucían nuestros colores patrios y grandes y pequeñas fotografías del Presidente Díaz Ordaz y de su señora esposa.

Comunistas... Viene de la Pág. 11-A

lles de una ciudad, y aquí casi me tenía que arrastrar.

"Bueno, ahora sí ya me despido definitivamente. ¡Viva el gran Mao, viva la revolución socialista de América! ¡Hasta luego, compañeros!"

La labor subversiva y de agitación del comunista Víctor Rico Galán se patentizó también en México con agresivos escritos suyos, publicados en las revistas donde trabaja, y en los cuales censuró acremente la visita del Presidente de México, país en el que Rico Galán vive asilado. Reproducciones de sus artículos circularon entre los rebeldes guatemaltecos, con los cuales, mediante el periodista mencionado y otros agentes, mantiene estrecho contacto el Partido Comunista de México.

Por todo esto, el Gobierno de Guatemala creyó pertinente tomar todas las medidas necesarias que garantizaron la seguridad del mandatario mexicano y de los miembros de su comitiva, durante su visita a nuestra nación.

[illegible]

[illegible] gar en el Marco del Risco, casa donada por el internacionalista licenciado Isidro Fabela, en donde se reunieron varios de los más destacados jurisconsultos mexicanos, miembros de la Sociedad de Derecho Internacional, organismo mundial que preside el licenciado Miguel Alemán, por un periodo de dos años.

A nombre del ex presidente de México, hizo uso de la palabra el licenciado Luis G. Sevilla, quien exaltó los méritos profesionales del señor Robert [illegible] en bien de la causa del Derecho mundial, el que ha ejercido con rectitud a través de su vida, como miembro de la Sociedad de Derecho Internacional.

Asistieron a tan importante acto las siguientes personalidades: licenciado Miguel Alemán, senador Ezequiel Padilla, el señor Fulton Freeman, embajador de los Estados Unidos en nuestro país, licenciado Manuel J. Sierra, funcionario de la Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, licenciado Luis G. Sevilla, licenciado Juan González A. Alpuche, licenciado Octavio Trías Aduna, [illegible] mayor del Consejo Nacional de Turismo y otras personas más.

Recibió GDO las Llaves de San Salvador

SAN SALVADOR, enero 12 de 1966.- El Alcalde de San Salvador, ingeniero José Napoleón Duarte, entregó esta mañana al Presidente Díaz Ordaz, las llaves de la ciudad, momentos después de que en el aeropuerto de Ilopango el Presidente Julio Adalberto Rivera le había dado la bienvenida.

Al agradecer esta distinción el Mandatario Mexicano expresó:

"Mi esposa y yo agradecemos como una gran distinción este nuevo honor que la ciudad que nos ha abierto sus puertas nos dispensa, al entregarnos la llave no que abre el afecto, como usted dice señor Alcalde, sino que lo confirma, porque viene de muy hondas raíces y que es amplia, sincera y cordialmente correspondido por los mexicanos para su país. Muchas gracias."

Califican de Histórico el Viaje de GDO

GUATEMALA (AMSI) La prensa guatemalteca señaló que la actual visita a Centroamérica del Presidente mexicano Gustavo Díaz Ordaz afianza una tradicional amistad y abre nuevas posibilidades de desarrollo industrial a los países del mercado común.

El matutino "Impacto" califica de "histórico" el comunicado conjunto sobre la visita de Díaz Ordaz a Guatemala y subraya como punto medular de dicho documento el hecho de que "el convenio comercial entre México y Guatemala será estudiado para corregir el desnivel de la [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

1. The attached passports were obtained from a sensitive photo coverage at the airport in Mexico City of passports of persons arriving on all flights from Havana, Cuba, and Brussels, Belgium. (Many Soviets travel to Mexico via Brussels.) The operation is conducted with the knowledge of a particular office of the Mexican Government but is not a liaison.

2. It is suggested that your desk review the passports of your citizens, and send the copy to the 201 file in RID if there is one, and take whatever other action you wish. There should be no dissemination of the passport and no exploitation thereof without prior coordination with WH/3/Mexico and without due care to protect the source.

3. Copies of these passports and the reels have been furnished TSD/IB therefore you should not send your copies to them.

4. The manifests have been sent to RID/ZZ for processing.

5. Any questions on the above or the attachments should be directed to the LITEMPO case officer, WH/3/Mexico, x6026 or x6110, Room 3B003.

SECRET

3571

The following pages contain a translation of a talk by Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan. The talk was recorded on a small portable tape recorder and was then taken to the hills and played to the Guatemalan guerrillas. This taped talk and seven other small rolls of taped propaganda and discussion were captured in mid October 1964 by the Guatemalan Army in a raid against guerrillas in the Panzos area of Alta Verapaz. The identities of some of the names used in the talk are as follows:

Commandente Adan: Marco Antonio YON Sosa, leader of the "13th of November" guerrilla movement. This is the first time we have heard of YON Sosa referred to by this name.

Companero Enrique: a mockingly respectful reference to Guatemalan Chief of Government Col. Enrique PERALTA.

The arrest of Galvan: Felipe Galvan Bartoluchi, Mexican courier to Guatemala was arrested in Guatemala City in March 1964. He was carrying two suitcases of communist literature and records at the time, and was himself documented as "Isidro Alfaro Ramos".

Sierra de las Minas: Mountain area north west of Zacapa; guerrilla safe area.

PGT: Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, the Guatemalan Communist Party.

Luis Turcios Lima: Second in command of the "13th of November" guerrillas.

Comrade Rolando: Obviously a pseudonym. We have been unable to establish this man's true identity.

Pancho Villagran Kramer: Francisco Villagran Kramer, leftist Guatemalan political leader; head of the URD Party.

Alfredo Guerra Borges: Central Committee member of the PGT.

Phone No. 23 07 92: Mexico City phone directories for 1962 and 1964 list this number as follows: DIENER, Tilli Pichler
Vda de Providencia 930

[illegible]

PUR: A Guatemalan revolutionary party, now rather inactive. A number of PGT members also belong to the PUR.

Compañeros:

I have arrived here together with Comandante Adan after a series of hardships and of many delays owing to a number of reasons which he can explain in detail even better perhaps than I could.

I have been making these trips without a visa because the compañero Enrique seems not be overly fond of me, and motivated by two reasons. One of them is to try to put my shoulder a little to the wonderful struggle you are carrying on, by a reportage on the guerrillas. The other reason was my concern over a number of circumstances, and basically the arrest of Galvan in Guatemala.

So I came with the wish primarily of giving you the items of information I had, and particularly to Comandante Adan. I make this clear because there has been considerable speculation to the effect that I was being sent by the Cuban comrades and even that my opinions were not mine at all but the expression of their opinions. In fact, some comrades suggested to me the advisability that I should mention this here.

I refused, of course, for a basic reason: because it is not so. I did not come here as a representative of the Cuban comrades, whom I have not seen since February 64, when none of these problems had arisen, or if they had arisen they were not acquainted with them, or if they were acquainted with them they did not tell me about them. So, I have no idea what their opinion on the subject may be. Consequently, all I can do is speculate on what might be their thinking to the limit that I am aware of their general ideas; and then, since I know what they think about the liberation movements in Latin America, I can imagine what they might think with regard to these problems.

But you also can imagine that, since you also know what they think. So there would be no sense to my trip here if its purpose were to tell you something that you may know perfectly well. What I have stated here has been on my own exclusive responsibility and as a result of my [word unintelligible] working alone.

I have told the Comandante that in my opinion there have arisen here a number of problems which have objective roots but which have become somewhat complicated and distorted to the extent of leading to a situation that may be dangerous in the future, that may convert the Trece de Noviembre into just another group, another sect, that may therefore isolate slightly from the masses in general or at least from a number of strata of the people whose support in the struggle is important.

On the international plane I have seen the importance of the Trece de Noviembre as a symbol of the struggle for national liberation not only of Guatemala but also of Latin America, and the importance of Comandante Adan as the chief or head of that nucleus. The reportage I wrote on it just a year ago 7.1.63 was successful partly owing to the collaboration of the Cuban comrades and partly because of the natural curiosity aroused by the subject. It was reproduced by newspapers in the United States, in Europe--for instance, *L'Estrelle de Paris* reprinted it; it was reprinted by the *New Statesman* of London; newspapers of a broad but important left wing in Europe--I even have a magazine from New Zealand which reprinted the reportage.

By that I convey to you the importance which was attributed to the movement. I have not mentioned Cuba or China, of course. You know that the interview was published by *Hoy*, the organ of the PURS, and in China it was reprinted by the Party organ, *People's Daily*.

I have also received a series of letters from various countries, and in my travels I have noticed how people would ask me with enormous interest about your struggle. In Mexico I pretty nearly told them in jest that it seems. that they regard me as the owner of the Guatemalan revolution because every time that some news item or rumor reaches them all the revolutionary people come and talk to me on the telephone or send for me to find out what my opinion is, as though I had a direct wire to the Sierra de las Minas there to be informed of every last thing that occurs to you.

I tell you all this in somewhat prolix detail because I am afraid that you, buried to some extent here in the mountains, may not be aware of the historic role you are playing at this moment. And I also want to tell you that here in Guatemala, where I have been for two weeks--although I was here covertly and that, of course, limited my activity--I have nevertheless been able to see the interest, devotion, and enthusiasm with which the guerrilla struggle is being followed.

My opinion is that the guerrilla movement in Guatemala has definitely taken hold and that it will end only on the day of victory. I want to tell you also recently I found out that Comandante Guevara thinks exactly the same. A comrade in the Mexican Communist Party, a member of the Central Committee and newsman, visited Cuba. A close personal friend of mine, he visited Cuba and had an interview with Che mainly on economic matters, together with other Mexican newsmen. They talked for a long time, and when they finished Che asked them a number of questions about Mexico and then they asked him about the liberation movements in Latin America. Che told them that in his opinion the two countries in which the movement was most solid and firm despite every difficulty were Guatemala and Venezuela.

I think for this reason that you must view your problems not as another group carrying on polemics with other groups but to some extent from the height in which you are placed, even physically. You must realize that the difficulties there have been are due basically to the fact that the comrades in the PGT have long delayed turning into deeds their own ideas on the struggle. They have set forth a line to the effect that aspects may not be discussed but that [phrase unintelligible] correct. The 11-point resolution of December which places the armed struggle and especially the guerrilla phase at the core of the revolutionary struggle seems to me to be correct in general. But they have had many difficulties because there have been debates, obscurities, some of them perhaps did not understand that or were opposed--I do not know, I do not have many details. But of course it has not been possible; they have not found it possible or else have lacked the capability to devote their activity to the armed struggle. Consequently their participation, which there has been--we cannot deny it; I think it would be unjust to deny the participation of the PGT--has been the participation of a rearguard, of support. They have lost cadres here in [Ixtabal?] and elsewhere , suffered the consequences of the struggle; some comrades of the PGT are actively persecuted--but always in connection with support activities.

I believe your role is to drag them into a more active participation in the struggle--not to fight them or fight them only to the extent that such a fight may lead them into the battle and not occasion a split. In my opinion this is going to be much easier from now on because, altough what happened with the publication of the newspaper is dangerous in my opinion--and it is dangerous because it poses a number of things which are not understood, you see? and in the second place they cause a state of confusion, especially among a people which is not politically sophisticated, as in Guatemala--, I think that despite those --- those negative things this has been the clang of a bell; has shown the comrades in the PGT the extent to which they had committed errors and abandoned a number of possibilities of struggle.

About that I have talked to them at considerable length and have talked to them in utter loyalty and clarity, and they admit that all that is taking place is not the product of error on the part of the Trece or a bad line of the Trece exclusively but a product of their very own errors also. They do assume their share of responsibility and I think it is important that you know and appreciate that fact--important for this reason, that there might arise in some comrades, and I am referring particularly to Rolando, a certain lowering of morale: that he might think that he erred in some things and might allow himself to be destroyed politically. I think this would be a serious error, do you not? and I think it would be false attitude. We must start from the premise that everybody has committed errors and that these errors have been commonplace everywhere. Let us remember, for instance, that in Cuba there was in the organisation of that famous strike, the one that failed, of April 1959, none other than a David Salvador, who was a Falangista, and there was none other than a [Bill DeWalt?] who was an imperialist agent; and that in Cuba there were public statements of the 26 July movement which Fidel Castro had to disown later, and there was constant misunderstanding between the people who were in the sierras and the militants in the cities; and there were very serious conflicts between the PC? and the 26 July movement; and there were all those parasites from the Escambray Second Front who were good for nothing. In short, a series of problems, which did not prevent attaining victory because the position they always maintained was that the fundamental nucleus of the 26 July organisation was an agent of cohesion of the revolutionaby forces, and they succeeded in polarising those revolutionary forces and succeeded in avoiding problems, and this in the end led the revolutionary forces to victory.

With regard to this, I would like to tell you something else: I have never been in favor of that attitude, very widely generalized in Latin America, which is to say: "Well, you can see what Fidel did. This was not done by Fidel; this was done by Fidel." I think this is abysmal error, because what Fidel did he did under very special historical circumstances, and what you are doing is different and has to be different. You have no reason at all to follow the Cuban or any other experience, but I do think it is advisable to learn from international experience and take advantage of it to the extent that it may be useful.

I say this because it seems to me that there has been here a certain idealistic tendency to take a position above the masses. I am referring to the debates on the character of the revolution, on the participation of the bourgeoisie, whether the Chinese or the Soviets are right, and a number of questions like that. I realise very well that when I say this you may say that I am half out of my mind or that I am unwilling to commit myself to a position. That is not so: I shall try to explain my idea as clearly as I can.

My idea is this: When you are struggling in a country which is highly developed, very complicated, politically very sophisticated, where there is a working class of great experience, politically informed, militant, where even the peasants themselves are acutely aware of their problems, their needs --let us say France, let us say Italy--all those rigorous analyses of the composition of the bourgeoisie, distinctions among various aspects of that bourgeoisie, analyses of the needs of the working class, of the international role of the struggle of semicolonial or colonial peoples, and so forth, are necessary. They are necessary because for a party, for a group to have authority it has to persuade masses which have high political sophistication. In our countries we face no such problems. We do not face such problems because our masses are thoroughly unconcerned from a political standpoint.

In another --- rather, stated in better terms, more clearly and more accurately, they have a very elementary understanding of their problems. The concern of the peasant is for the soil; I do not think it goes beyond that at the moment. I believe that if the peasant is offered land, is offered schooling for his children, medical care, and so forth, he will not demand any more explanations. He sees no other problems.

So, when I read in Revolucion Socialista all these things, about the Bolivian masses, the armed militias, it is a truly shocking confusion. And I say this because I know Bolivia, I have been there, I have seen their real problems. When I see all this about Peru, where the masses are said to be doing their will, with a semifeudal government, it is truly --- it seems to me that we are falling into a number of questions which there is no purpose in discussing here.

And it is not that I champion the abandonment of ideology. No, I think that you, the leaders, the people of the central nucleus, must study, must read, must read the classics. The other day I heard a recording by our comrade [Surcio?] with reference to this, and I think the attitude is very proper. You must have the clearest possible view, but I think it would be mistaken on your part not to realize that if you advance too far ahead you will isolate yourselves from the masses.

Also, and in connection with this same subject, it is not the same thing to face the problem of defeating a bourgeoisie such as the French bourgeoisie, which has ideologists and has rulers of the caliber of a De Gaulle, and to face the problem of defeating an idiotic bourgeoisie such as the Guatemalan bourgeoisie, with a ruler like comrade Enrique, is it? In other words, the weapon needed to shoot down De Gaulle--to state it thus in very simple and personal terms--has to be much more long-range and much more perfect than the weapon required to shoot down Peralta. Peralta can be brought down just about by pitching a rock at him, can he not?

This, all this tends to indicate that to exaggerate ideological questions to the masses will lead us nowhere. I have been able to observe that the following has happened with the newspaper--and I told Comandante Adan yesterday--: that those who understand it do not approve of it. And I am not referring to the people of the PGT but to many well-meaning people: for instance, to Rodrigo Asturias, who is in Mexico, a survivor of the [Cumquat?], a wholesome fellow, studious, concerned, who is very anxious to come here to join the struggle--he was really dumbfounded at the document. The same for honorable people like Carlos [Barquesada]. On the other hand, most of the people, the masses that do not understand it, cannot understand all that complicated terminology, all that obscurity, all those generalisations of concepts that do not stimulate anybody to the struggle, that do not pose actual and concrete objectives.

That is my opinion. I believe that on this point you must establish a very skilful, very intelligent balance between your own political training and your daily contact with the masses, and you will gradually be told [sic] what the masses must be told.

On this point--I say this rather to comrade Rolando--, putting those ideas into slightly theoretical form, it would be necessary to reread and study that famous document by Mao Tse-tung on contradiction, where he explains how contradictions are gradually displaced in the evolution of society and particularly, in a revolution, how the basic contradiction gradually displaces other contradictions which often are the most apparent ones and are most manifest to the masses and which all express the basic or fundamental contradiction but express it in different ways.

So we have no reason to propose the destruction of the bourgeoisie and alienate the support of a number of people who feel bourgeois. I myself, to come here, was helped by petty bourgeois of this area itself. These petty bourgeois, of course, are not the national bourgeoisie to which the program of the PGT refers, but they feel they are bourgeois. They cannot distinguish, when you condemn the national bourgeoisie in the newspaper, they cannot distinguish between themselves and whether they are or are not the national bourgeoisie. They feel affected. Why should we alienate their collaboration?

I even pointed out to the Comandante cases such as that of Pancho Villagran Kramer: there is no doubt that he is bourgeois, a bourgeois ideologist and a bourgeois politician, yet he has given you his collaboration and may give it again. What need is there to have a fight with him? One must maintain the firmness of principles, as Comandante Adan did in the interview, specify clearly the disagreements, but not picture him as an enemy. It seems to me that on this point Comandante Adan expressed the true policy, which consisted not in saying, "Villagran is our enemy because he is bourgeois"--which would be the logical consequence of what has been published in the newspaper--but to say, "He is my friend but I think that he is mistaken; that he is not going to accomplish anything." This seems to me the right thing to do. Also, the movement is at a stage where what it needs is friends.

Well, I think I have talked a good deal and rather haphazardly, but--I wish you had arrived; I was clinging to that hope, although I knew it was very unlikely, since you have already delayed too long. Unfortunately it has not been that way, has it? So I wanted to leave my greeting to you and some of the impressions I have of the situation.

I can add something to what I have already told you. The comrades of the PGT asked me after I had been here for quite a few days and they had shown me a number of things--I even think that they wanted to be sincere because they also showed me tapes in which they were harshly criticized, in which their own cadres criticised them--they arranged interviews for me with persons within the party who are in disagreement with the leadership--in short, I was able to get a considerably more objective picture--they asked me for my observations and criticisms, which I gave them in all loyalty.

The basic criticism I believe continues to be the lack of more active participation in the armed struggle and of the channeling of cadres to the armed struggle.This I think continues to be the main problem; they admit it. In general I must tell you that most of my criticisms were well received by them.

I even asked for a talk with Guerra Borges because I thought that his article in the International [i.e. World Marxist] Review contained some expressions of opinion which were not correct, although in others it was on the right track. We discussed it and he had a receptive attitude, and in the end admitted that there was someerror, owing to the need to make the article too condensed.

On the point, which I think has been posed here rather insistently, of whether the bourgeoisie participates, the famous thesis of the four classes, in other words, they were telling me--I am referring particularly to the comrades of the political commission, with whom I had a lengthy meeting--they have applied it somewhat mechanically, somewhat as convention dictates, as has been done by a majority of the parties in countries such as this one, but without actually having a clear notion on the subject, and among them there were arguments, struggles, and disagreements with regard to the role of the bourgeoisie.

So I think that it is perfectly possible to debate on this point. I do not think that the policy should be to set out a public thesis, and even less a public polemic. I do not think that it is particularly important to the struggle that the theory of the four classes be uphold publicly. I do not think that anyone will be disappointed to see that in this country there is a peasantry or a proletariat so radical and so enlightened that it will refuse to cooperate with the national bourgeoisie. So I think it is a somewhat unproductive polemic.

I am also fully convinced that the national bourgeoisie has no revolutionary role to play at this time in Latin America and much less in Guatemala. And that it does not depend on the theories proposed or the thinking of Guerra Borges, or the thinking of Rubio or the thinking of anyone else. I believe that is a fact, and facts are above all else. And I think that the moment that the struggle grows up, that the revolutionary power grows strong and is established on a free territory, this will be seen still more clearly. But I see no reason why this should be announced a priori; that is, I do not see why we should make the revolution in the newspapers, if it is being carried on in the mountains.

Now I would like to say a few words for our comrade Rolando. They are nothing secret, but they are things which interest him personally.

Isabel is in Cuba. I left 15 days ago today; that is, yesterday, Saturday, it was two weeks. The day after my departure she was to leave for Cuba, by way of Europe, of course, so she would be able to return. The trip had already been set up by Comandante Guevara, and Isabel had been invited, but it had not been made definite because the Cubans move very slowly in some things. Just after the trip of [woman's name] and the letter Rolando sent me, and in view of what he was requesting of me in that letter--and the difficult situation that she was in, obviously, from every viewpoint, including the economic one, and the my difficulties in any attempt to give any help--I of course tried to activate the matter of her trip, went at it in a direct manner, and arrangements were made right away. She did not want to go. First of all she was very interested in knowing how the situation would come out here and what I would propose on my return, etc. In addition she was very concerned about the health and the morale of comrade Rolando. So she did not want to go, and I had a rather hard time persuading her. At last I succeeded; I showed her that in any event Rolando in my opinion would have to devote some time to his treatment. Whether this was done in Cuba, or Mexico, or Czechoslovakia, she would be in a position to accompany him; when he left she of course would be notified in Havana, and [from there] she could get in touch.

In any event, if comrade Rolando decides to go via Mexico, I want to give him my telephone number so he can locate me right away. He can use the name Rolando. My number is 23 07 92. He will find me the up to 1000 or about 1930 hours [several words unintelligible]. So if he goes clandestinely and has any problem he can talk to me, carefully, of course, as the phone is under surveillance. He can use the name Rolando and address me in the familiar form ["tú"], as an old friend who has come in from the provinces. Then I shall look for him and try to find a way to solve the problems he may have.

As to this matter of Rolando's health I think it is very important to discard the "theory" that it is nothing serious, etc., which he himself is spreading about. I do not think this situation can be allowed to remain indefinitely, with him in poor health. I have talked about this to the comrades in the POT here, although it looks as though they are not very fond of him for the time being--and of course that makes sense--and they have promised to take care of the matter. I have also asked Comandante Adan as commander-in-chief to do something about the problem. I think it would be useful, do you not? [phrase blurred].

Well, that is all for the time being. I hope your meeting will be successful. I hope that the difficulties will be overcome, and that this situation will be taken advantage of to reshape all things and to give new drive to the struggle. I think the experiences acquired can be very useful--for instance the experience here of Comandante Adan and the boys with the peasants and the plan to organise them and occupy lands. I think it can be developed into ever more perfect forms. Of course that directive of occupying lands, given here in practice, is a provocation which can result in the peasants' being massacred, but when it is done in a planned manner, in a way that the guerrilla can offer them protection and in which they can be taught to protect themselves, as in the case that has happened here--I think it can be a first-rate revolutionary factor.

I think you ought to give special attention to these things--and above all else is the problem of unity. If on the one hand you do not feel you are in possession of the truth but on the other hand you do not feel you are victims of the possessors of the truth--I say this for comrade Rolando--I think you can accomplish a great change in the outlook and give a great push to the struggle. You have to know, be aware of, have a clear idea that the situation in the PGT is at this time rather good. A number of factors have contributed to this, including, for example, people who are attacked in Revolucion Socialista, such as the PUR. The PUR has had a very clear and well-defined attitude, very positive, consisting in declaring to the PGT that they were for unity at all times, but on the basis of its being real unity; that is, on the basis that they would, in every way possible, continue collaborating with the guerrillas at every moment. I think that in the base organizations of the PGT this attitude has been brought forth.

So, there is nowhere that I can see any real reason for a break nor the desire for a break on the part of anybody. The problems that have come up can be discussed as between equals, clearly, and they can be a positive factor, become a positive factor of impetus for the struggle, eliminating everything that is a burden or an error or a provocation.

I am sending a cordial greeting to both, those I know well as a result of oral expressions and recorded tapes--this employment of tape recorders is extremely useful--and whom I would have liked very much to hug personally. So long.

[Same man who recorded the above continues after a blank space on the tape.] ...in the first place ... Rolando ... said that he is of course ... trip ... Mexico ... in excellent health ... I saw him ... departure from Mexico ... very few days, 3 days ... took some photographs of both but I was unable to bring them because I left for here ... he was afraid I might have difficulties with .... I traveled with a lady who posed as my wife ... photos ... I could not bring them ... Rolando ... also I was delayed seriously the other night when I was coming ... the way is long but it is ... .

There is something else you might like to know ... I have had many contacts with him ... of course his attitude is still ... feels very bad ... also this becomes more serious owing to the situation ... that worries him very much because ... a letter to his wife ... some psychological trouble, nerves ... I have tried ... he did not send greetings because ... I remember all of you ... his attitude on the entire struggle, but I think he is ... it was then advisable ... send him a message by this same means of recorded tape. I have a Phillips tape recorder of standard size, not portable ... if you prepare a tape recording to tell him clearly and definitely ... decision, you can send it to me ... [Voice trails off.]

[Recording is now of conversation among several men.]

... they all sent letters asking that S.O.B. to ....

... in the morning, and that Pirulin was here as resident ...

... are agreed, that there are tactless people ... minimum salary to give the person enough to live on, pay for housing, eat, pay for his children's education ... sliding scale of wages ... money ... if life is inexpensive ... wages of 80 centavos for the peasant ... or 50 ... plantains ... she understands about that ... that BS ... hunger ... children's education...

... sliding wage scale ... minimum wages ... talked about "salario vital minimo," which is what a familiy needs to support itself at today's cost of living levels. That, I can discuss as minimum wage.... Those are slogans for the struggle against capitalism. Capitalism is incapable of solving the problems of the masses. That is the basic problem.

... the worker gets 1.74 a day ... does not pay for housing. That has to be assured because ... workers of the "frutera" [UFCO, United Fruit Company] do not pay for housing, or electricity; that is, the only thing that he pays for is ... they give him food cards ... the only thing that the peasant ... "frutera" ... retirement is ... or else they give him nothing, blackball him ... lost his indemnity ... ... the peasant struggling for better wages ...

[Etc. One man does most of the talking, about the relative situation of the worker with regard to the UFCO, the union, and independent farming as to earnings, benefits, etc. They engage in an argumentative comparison of the treatment of the worker by the UFCO and the railroad company. Toward the end the discussion leads into the potential for revolution among the former and present workers of the UFCO.]

[After a blank space there is a lecture on the Guatemalan situation from its origins, starting with a detailed account of Columbus' voyages, Spain's exploitation, the plunder of the gold and riches of America, and the enslavement of the natives. The lecturer then shifts to present tasks of revolution. The intelligible points to be gleaned on this are as follows:]

"The main function of the guerrilla is to disrupt the regime, the capitalist system of private ownership." [The "disrupt the system" point is made also at the end as the gist of the lecture,] We must keep digging at the roots while shaking the trunk to cause it to fall. The newspapers declare that they are not allowed to publish interviews with guerrilla fighters, etc. Strikes are more frequent. The spirit of rebellion and disregard of law is spreading. We must encourage and exploit it.

Many people still think that the guerrillas are only supposed to kill soldiers. That is mistaken. We must get to the people and encourage their rebelliousness and opposition to the government, which is everywhere evident. The situation is deteriorating. The government of Peralta is not operating well. The guerrillas are playing an important role because they are [feeding] the people. They are not simply fighting; their role also is to solve problems for the people, to solve social difficulties for the people.

We must find out why the peasants do not respond the way they should to the guerrillas. There is strength for us and for the people in a close relationship. Thousands are watching us and what we do. In the villages we are welcomed because they realize we are fighting to solve their problems.

[End tape 1 - begin tape 2]

When the revolution is over, we are all going to solve our problems, the problems of all, not just of a few.

The struggle is going well; the government must be kept sharply conscious of us. Sometimes it seems no progress is being made, but from the standpoint of the revolutionary struggle it is being made. The thing is not to be discouraged but to be steadfast. For every 20 that the enemy kills, 100 will rise up.

[Quality of recording deteriorates so badly for a long stretch after this that summary is not feasible, as all crucial names (if any) and words are unintelligible. Then:] Strikes must be encouraged, because strikes go against the capitalist system, and what we want is to destroy, to replace the capitalist system. We want the means of production to be in the hands of the state controlled by the workers, for the benefit of all. The function of the guerrilla is to disrupt the regime, the social system. The revolution will continue for a long time. There is no way to stop it short of victory. [Occasional comments by the other two or three participants had been heard. More comments follow, all unintelligible as above.]

[A period of silence is followed by a series of recorded greetings, letters, other messages, short speeches, and songs, including mention of names and identities which are unintelligible.* The recording is poor, distorted, full of echoes. Upon the conclusion of this special section, there is a notable improvement in the tape quality, as reflected in the following pages.]

---

* except for Marcantonio or Marco Antonio. Yon

Here ends the tape [recorded] by comrade [Galani]. [We appreciate] the material aid, the songs, the greetings, all of which make us firmer in the struggle and demonstrate that we are going well, that if the struggle was somewhat limited in the beginning it was because of lack of a clear program, of a line and of a program [several words] for which we are fighting. [The] last few words of comrade Rolando refer to [word], ~~as~~ to the takeover of power, although he does not make clear yet, at this time, the power for whom, to do what, but comrade Rolando [has a clearness] which we took to be emotion [toward?] the opening of the struggles for the socialist revolution. I can make no comment in this regard from the content of this tape, but [several words].

Before I say farewell, there are two points I was forgetting. By this courier we are sending No. 29 of [one word] Interno,* containing an article about the false Communism of the Russians and its historic lessons to the world. It is very important that the article be read, studied, and discussed there, because it will be material not only for our meeting but for further strengthening us in this line and in this program. Rich experiences [can] be gotten from it, so that we [words] some of the things pointed out here by the Chinese [words] the decay of the Russian Revolution represented by Khrushchev as the inheritor [continuador] of Stalin's bureaucratic line.

Also, I would like to read this note to you; I do not know whether you have received it. We, after my return from [word] [decided] to call a meeting of the [FAR]. We sent a message to comrade [Erlindo], to [Juan Chacon], and to [Mauricio]. Nobody showed up then. After eight days we again waited at the meeting place and [Mauricio] showed up. Before Mauricio arrived [Dondonita?] took this note to us, which I would like to read. It is dated 21 September 1964. It is a note which [Juan Chacon] sends to comrade Adan, and it reads as follows:

---

* The [illegible] Peking [illegible]

> Compañero Comandante: I reiterate to you and the comrades our fraternal greeting and our wishes that you will [word] in a revolutionary manner for the good of the country. This is to ask you to issue instructions for a meeting of the titular leadership of the [FAR]. For that I shall go the place to which you may call me. I make this request because here the substitute command that had been operating since the event at [Simpa] ceased to operate at all for the last thirty days or longer. Also because since you, comrades of the Trece de Noviembre organization, publicly expressed your [word] toward us Communists, there have arisen problems which must be solved if unity is to continue. At a meeting of the titular command, with you in attendance, it shall be seen whether the problems arisen can be overcome or whether they are going to leave us disjointed [desarticulados], as we are now, with reference to the matters of major importance in our movement. Incidentally, the tasks assigned to the comrades as special responsibilities, are being carried out, so that the [FAR] [has been] operating in practice. However, it is not enough for each to carry his immediate tactical responsibilities. Matters [in prospect, or of perspective] have to be attended to, and these in the last few months, as I have said, have not been attended to with the proper authority and have been completely abandoned during the last month.
>
> Fraternal greeting.
>
> [Abencero Norit Kan?]

Copy to Armando and to Zona 3

That is all we got as their reply. So in effect they refuse to attend the meetings of the substitute command but want a meeting of the titular command. In that regard, the [several words] a meeting to [take up] the points, this note must be answered. The line that we conclude from this is the same line that they have tried to follow, that everything has been done by a small group, which is the group that is in the [city], that is
[it is Rudy] who
directly with [Rudy], and that/has "disjointed", as they put it, all functioning of [words]. But now with the conversation held by comrade Adan the whole thing has been clarified and we are strong once more. In any event we have not failed to [ask them], including [several words] with comrade [Luz], so that in case of a meeting [they] would attend. We are ready to attend any meeting to which we are called; [we have] called them three times, and they have failed to attend in all three cases. Therefore we propose that this remain the way it is until we have met there, since [phrase].

These are the only --- the latest news; this courier has to leave. Before we close I shall save up some of the tape for a message comrade Jenaro has asked to be allowed to record. Since I have been working on this he came over and wants to send a greeting. So we shall listen to comrade Jenaro.

One more thing before Jenaro's message. In the event you wish to reply to the memorandum sent by [Juan Chacon], there will no objection on our part. We are at your service there, although [several words] the concrete statement of opinion that [several words]. What they are trying to do is [leave] us alone to see whether we are capable or incapable of continuing. They imagine that we going to be unable to get out even a bulletin or even less circulate anything, and that we would have to go looking for them. With these tactics of delay and of not attending the meetings they are trying to pressure us, to see --- to make us feel, they think, the need we have of them.

That is not the way the revolution is carried on; that is not the way the process can be advanced. But this we shall discuss up there. However, any decision you up there may want to make after discussion will be acceded to and respected by us.

Again I say farewell, with a fraternal, combative greeting to comrades Adan, Mateo, Marinero, [Sosa], and all the others who are there. Forward, comrades. Good health and good work.. Listen now to comrade [name].

[Another man:]

I greet you warmly, Mateo. I got your affectionate greeting, and we accepted it with love. It is actually [word], the manner, the assurance with which you express yourself, and we are working rather hard here, with great synchronisation and [word] and understanding of comrade [Rudy] and [pushing forward every task]. We are here to give impetus to the process, as you say, and we realise it.

Give my warm greeting to comrade Adan. I got his greeting also on the other recording. Greetings [grandes felicidades; probably congratulations intended] on the ~~ap~~ statement and the interview with the newsmen. Really, the statement and interview reveal great political maturity and demonstrate also the work being done by comrade Mateo with regard to the sharpening up [maduracion] of a team up there among the guerrillas.

To conclude: "abrazos" to both, comrades Mateo and Adan, although I do not have the pleasure of your personal acquaintance, but we are involved in the same enterprise, in the same great task of carrying out the socialist revolution in Guatemala. Forward, comrades. We shall soon see each other.

POR VICTOR RICO GALAN

En un editorial reciente, **Siempre** censuró con energía la conducta de nuestras autoridades policíacas en el aeropuerto, por los malos tratos y las vejaciones a que son sometidos los viajeros procedentes de ciertos países, sobre todo de Cuba y de España. Aceptaba nuestra revista como cosa normal la vigilancia sobre visitantes potencialmente peligrosos, pero acusaba a las innúmeras policías que el mexicano padece de realizar mal esa función o no realizarla en absoluto, a cambio de actuar con una insolencia y una prepotencia intolerables

Como por encargo, los acontecimientos posteriores han venido a darle a nuestro editorial más razón incluso de la que pretendía tener. El pasado día 7, un norteamericano que responde al nombre de Henry Agüeros Garcés, lanzó una granada de mano contra los talleres del periódico **El Día**, con intenciones verdaderamente siniestras: la granada fue lanzada en un lugar tal, que sólo la rápida intervención de los trabajadores del diario pudo evitar una catástrofe de incalculables proporciones, de la que no estaría excluida la pérdida de muchas vidas humanas, tanto en el edificio del periódico, como en la zona aledaña.

No se trataba, por otra parte, de un hecho único ni aislado. En fecha anterior, aunque reciente, el Instituto Mexicano-Ruso de Relaciones Culturales sufrió una agresión análoga, y el arma utilizada resultó ser idéntica —según la policía— a la que explotó en el patio de **El Día**. Casi simultáneamente fue ametrallado el departamento que habitaba el corresponsal de la agencia yugoeslava **Tanjug**, y sólo la circunstancia de encontrarse en un quinto piso salvó la vida de su esposa, que bañaba a su hijita recién nacida, pues varios proyectiles de grueso calibre entraron por las ventanas y se alojaron en el techo de la habitación. En ambos casos, la lenidad y la indiferencia de la policía fueron evidentes. Ni aparecieron los culpables ni se hicieron investigaciones serias.

Además, somos muchos los mexicanos que, por ocuparnos de cuestiones políticas nacionales e internacionales con un criterio opuesto al del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, recibimos un alud de amenazas y anónimos injuriosos, tanto por escrito como telefónicamente. La redacción de los anónimos y el lenguaje utilizado indica con claridad que son extranjeros quienes los hacen, y probablemente cubanos contrarrevolucionarios. Por

son del dominio público, es indiscutible que decir contrarrevolucionarios cubanos equivale a decir Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) de los Estados Unidos.

La ola de violencia, espionaje y amenazas ha llegado a un punto tal, que motivó una carta del director de la revista **Política** a las autoridades responsables, exigiendo que se aplique la ley a los autores de tales hechos delictuosos y denunciando los catastróficos efectos que para el país puede tener el tolerarlos. Sin embargo nada se había hecho hasta que se produjo el atentado contra **El Día** y fue capturado su autor.

Capturado, no como resultado de investigaciones policíacas, sino gracias a la diligencia de un joven obrero de los talleres de **El Día**, que lo persiguió y le dio alcance. Porque Henry Agüeros Garcés entró en México como Pedro por su casa, no fue molestado por policía alguno, no fue fotografiado en frontera ni aeropuerto, y pudo incluso utilizar un nombre falso para obtener alojamiento en un hotel. ¿Y cómo no? Las vejaciones a ciudadanos extranjeros que nos visitan tienen un reverso: el trato obsequioso y hasta abyecto que se da a los ciudadanos norteamericanos. Esos mismos polizontes que tan groseros y bestiales se muestran con quienes vienen de Cuba o de España son la imagen misma de la amabilidad y la obsecuencia cuando el que llega tiene una tarjeta de turista que lo acredita como norteamericano.

Ser norteamericano es, en México, una patente de corso. Y eso, a pesar de que por la frontera norte o en los vuelos internacionales que del norte proceden llega a México la peor gentuza. Hágase una estadística de los delitos cometidos en nuestro país por extranjeros, y se verá que los yanquis se llevan la palma, con cifras imposibles de igualar, y con crímenes cuya degradación moral es también inigualable. Todo lo cual prueba hasta qué punto era justa la censura a la policía que hacía SIEMPRE! en su editorial ya citado: es una policía que injuria, humilla y veja, pero que no investiga los delitos reales y mucho menos es capaz de prevenirlos.

Queda por aclarar hasta dónde esas innumerables policías mexicanas —ilegales y por eso imposibles de controlar legalmente— están penetradas por la CIA, la FBI, y otras agencias extranjeras dedicadas al terrorismo, al espionaje y a sembrar la zozobra en todas partes. Queda por aclarar hasta dónde de ese norte revuelto y brutal que nos desprecia, como decía Martí, es el que verdaderamente dirige a polizontes cuyos sueldos legales difícilmente justifican el derroche y el lujo en el que viven. Quedan por aclarar muchas cosas, si de verdad se quiere cumplir la prome-

RICO-Galan, Victor aka
Armando CONTE

201-336474

As of June 1965, Subject was reported to be a member of the FEP and an enemy of the PPS.

HMMA 28329
19 Feb 66
LITEMPO

Traveled from Cuba to Mexico via Cubana airlines 11 Feb 66.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO : RID/201 Section

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

FROM:

ROOM NO.

PHONE

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO.

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

NAME VARIANT				VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA
10 TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

16. AFFILIATION CODE
P B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION (Clear text)

19. ORG/GROUP CODE

20. OCCUPATION/POSITION (Clear text)

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION

22. ACTION DESK

23. CODE

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

26. CRYPTONYM

27. PSEUDONYM

28. COMMENTS

CS COPY

29. SIGNATURE

30. IDN-

201-

FORM 7-64 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

14-00000
104-10221-10004

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Victor Rico Galan Vol II
201-336474

INCLUSIVE DATES: 15 Jan 1965 - 7 Jan 1970
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO
ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

Vol II   other Agency   201-336974

1. Dept. of State telegram from Mexico to Sec. State. 16 Aug. 1966., Mexico 927.
2. Dept. of State telegram from Mexico to Sec. State; Mexico 878, 13 Aug. 1966.
3. Dept of State telegram from Mexico to Sec. State. Mexico 879, 13 Aug. 1966.
4. Dept. of Justice, File # A 13 139 607 - dated 4/2/65. Subject - Rico-Galan, Victor
5. ~~Dept of State~~ Airgram from Merida to Dept. of State; Subject: Victor Rico Galan Again. A-31, 10 Feb 65

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO-GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

050-009-008
HMM -14143
07 JAN 70

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO TOOK AN OUTSTANDING ROLE IN THE PRISON RIOTS

R 7001220444

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

050-009-008
MEXI-02201
03 JAN 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
MEXICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS

R 7001271816

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Victor RICO Galan (201-336474)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated.

Attached for both addressees are copies of a brief biographic sketch on Victor RICO Galan. As can be seen from the sketch, Headquarters knows something of his activities, but next to nothing about the man himself. During the discussion of the problem of RICO Galan at the recent CP Operations Seminar in Mexico City it was mentioned that both LICOOKY-1 and LITAMIL-9 were personally acquainted with him; perhaps these two sources could provide some impressions of RICO Galan that would flesh out this skeleton sketch.

CHESTER D. DAINOLD

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
2 - Mexi, w/1 cc att h/w
1 - Guat, w/1 cc att h/w

201-13422

DATE TYPED
24 February 65

DATE DISPATCHED
25 FEB 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW - 13422 CS COPY

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-336474

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

10 74

ORIGINATING

OFFICE | OFFICER | TYPIST | EXT
[illegible] | Carley | [illegible] | [illegible]

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL | DATE | OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

ROUTING - INITIAL

SECRET

24 February 1965

VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-336474)

1. DPOB: 6 February 1928; El Ferrol, Spain. Subject, Spanish by birth, became a Mexican citizen by naturalization on 15 March 1949.

2. CIVIL STATUS: Subject is married to Ingeborg DIENER de Rico.

3. ADDRESS: Providencia 930, Mexico City, D. F. Telephone number as of September 1964: 23 07 92. This phone is registered in the name of his mother-in-law, Tilli PICHIER viuda de Diener, whose address is also Providencia 930.

4. OCCUPATION: Writer for Siempre and Politica magazines in Mexico City; both are effective Communist-lining magazines and have large circulation.

5. PHOTOGRAPH: Available in Subject's 201 file (date of photograph October 1963).

6. POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS AND INCLINATIONS: As of 1962 Subject was the head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the National Liberation Movement (MLN) in Mexico City, a rabidly anti-U.S. and pro-Castro organization. Subject is close to Fidel Castro and company, and is considered as a Cuban "agent" (degree of Cuban control unknown). Subject was a founding member of the MLN. In an article in Siempre in March 1963 he advocated the foundation of a new political party reflecting the ideology of General Lazaro Cardenas, leftist former President of Mexico. This would have provided, in his belief, the Mexican left a political organization truly responsive to the radical tendencies of the 1910 revolution. This was necessary because the MLN, whose membership covers the spectrum of Mexican Communist Party to PRI, could not take open political stands without antagonizing some of the membership. The new party would have represented a "third position", socialism in internal affairs and independence of any bloc in international affairs. With a party such as this as its political action arm, the MLN would have developed naturally into a broad national movement such as the FRAP in Chile. (Some specious reasoning here.)

7. TRAVEL:

   A) To Cuba:

      1) July 1962 - return date unknown
      2) 2 October 1962 - returned Mexico December 1962
      3) 25 May 1963 - returned Mexico 22 June 1963
      4) 28 January 1964 - returned Mexico 25 February 1964

SECRET

Att To HMMW 13422

201-13422

B) Other:

1) Arrived Guatemala City 3 (8?) October 1963
2) Arrived Tegucigalpa 11 October 1963; left 13 October 1963
3) Arrived Managua 13 October 1963; left 17 October 1963
4) Arrived San Jose 17 October 1963; left 20 October 1963
5) Arrived Panama City 20 October 1963; left 22 October 1963
6) Arrived Caracas 22 October 1963; left 12 November 1963
7) Arrived Rio de Janeiro 12 November 1963
8) Arrived Buenos Aires 4 December 1963; left 12 December 1963
9) Arrived Santiago 12 December 1963; left 16 December 1963
10) Arrived Lima 17 December 1963
11) Arrived La Paz 17 December 1963; left 20 December 1963
12) Arrived Lima 20 December 1963
13) Departed Merida 8 January 1964
14) Arrived Santo Domingo 8 January 1964 (via Kingston); left 15 January 1964 for Mexico City (via Kingston)

Ingeborg Diener de RICO Galan, Subject's wife, traveled from Mexico to Cuba in November 1962. Subject was at that time in Cuba.

8. PASSPORT: Subject formerly carried Mexican passport number 57115, with Cuban courtesy visas. On 9 September 1963 Subject was issued Mexican passport number 56341 (or 53641).

9. ACTIVITIES: The reason for the October 1962 trip to Cuba was ostensibly to gather material for a political biography of Fidel Castro. The May/June 1963 trip was to interview Fidel Castro after his return from the Soviet Union. Subject claimed that he had spent eight days with Fidel during that visit, five of those aboard ship.

On 24 October 1963 HYSAGE-1 in Panama City reported that Subject had received an operational assignment from Castro (during the May/June 1963 visit to Habana) on which to travel through Central and South America. His mission was to persuade leftist parties to immediately begin acts of sabotage and violence, and to try to maintain these in order to take pressure off Venezuela. Subject was also instructed to bring about better unity among competing leftist factions to ensure greater impact for their work. Subject did, in fact, contact many Communist Party and leftist leaders during his Central and South America travel during the period October 1963 - January 1964. From the (fragmentary) reporting on Subject from October 1963 through January 1964 it appears that he did discuss the question of leftist unity.

10. In October 1964 the Guatemalan authorities captured a number of tape recordings from the guerrillas in operations subsequent to a guerrilla attack on a garrison in Panzos, Alta Verapas. Included in these tapes was one made by RICO Galan for delivery to the guerrillas. It consists mainly of an exhortation for unity (among the PGT and the 13 November Group)

and counsel against letting doctrine replace action. The tape clearly reveals RICO to be at once a very intellectual leftist who also has his feet planted quite firmly on the ground. His approach is pragmatic, not theoretical. The text of the tape indicates that it was made sometime after February and before mid-October 1964.

11. There is little at hand to indicate what manner of man is RICO Galan. His 201 file reflects facts but not impressions. He apparently is known personally by LICOOKY-1 and LITAMIL-9 in Mexico City, and these two sources should be queried.

SECRET

24 February 1965

VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-334174)

1. DPOB: 5 February 1925; El Ferrol, Spain. Subject, Spanish by birth, became a Mexican citizen by naturalization on 15 March 1949.

2. CIVIL STATUS: Subject is married to Ingeborg DIENER de Rico.

3. ADDRESS: Providencia 930, Mexico City, D. F. Telephone number as of September 1964: 23 07 92. This phone is registered in the name of his mother-in-law, Tilli PICHIER viuda de Diener, whose address is also Providencia 930.

4. OCCUPATION: Writer for Siempre and Politica magazines in Mexico City; Both are effective Communist-lining magazines and have large circulation.

5. PHOTOGRAPH: Available in Subject's 201 file (date of photograph October 1963).

6. POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS AND INCLINATIONS: As of 1962 Subject was the head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the National Liberation Movement (MLN) in Mexico City, a rabidly anti-U.S. and pro-Castro organization. Subject is close to Fidel Castro and company, and is considered as a Cuban "agent" (degree of Cuban control unknown). Subject was a founding member of the MLN. In an article in Siempre in March 1963 he advocated the foundation of a new political party reflecting the ideology of General Lazaro Cardenas, leftist former President of Mexico. This would have provided, in his belief, the Mexican left a political organization truly responsive to the radical tendencies of the 1910 revolution. This was necessary because the MLN, whose membership covers the spectrum of Mexican Communist Party to PRI, could not take open political stands without antagonizing some of the membership. The new party would have represented a "third position", socialism in internal affairs and independence of any bloc in international affairs. With a party such as this as its political action arm, the MLN would have developed naturally into a broad national movement such as the FRAP in Chile. (Some specious reasoning here.)

7. TRAVEL:

A) To Cuba:

1) July 1962 - return date unknown
2) 2 October 1962 - returned Mexico December 1962
3) 25 May 1963 - returned Mexico 22 June 1963
4) 28 January 1964 - returned Mexico 25 February 1964

SECRET

B) Other:

1) Arrived Guatemala City 2 (8?) October 1963
2) Arrived Tegucigalpa 11 October 1963; left 13 October 1963
3) Arrived Managua 13 October 1963; left 17 October 1963
4) Arrived San Jose 17 October 1963; left 20 October 1963
5) Arrived Panama City 20 October 1963; left 22 October 1963
6) Arrived Caracas 22 October 1963; left 12 November 1963
7) Arrived Rio de Janeiro 12 November 1963
8) Arrived Buenos Aires 4 December 1963; left 12 December 1963
9) Arrived Santiago 12 December 1963; left 16 December 1963
10) Arrived Lima 17 December 1963
11) Arrived La Paz 17 December 1963; left 20 December 1963
12) Arrived Lima 20 December 1963
13) Departed Merida 8 January 1964
14) Arrived Santo Domingo 8 January 1964 (via Kingston); left 15 January 1964 for Mexico City (via Kingston)

Ingeborg Diener de RICO Galan, Subject's wife, traveled from Mexico to Cuba in November 1962. Subject was at that time in Cuba.

8. PASSPORT: Subject formerly carried Mexican passport number 57115, with Cuban courtesy visas. On 3 September 1963 Subject was issued Mexican passport number 56341 (or 53411).

9. ACTIVITIES: The reason for the October 1962 trip to Cuba was ostensibly to gather material for a political biography of Fidel Castro. The May/June 1963 trip was to interview Fidel Castro after his return from the Soviet Union. Subject claimed that he had spent eight days with Fidel during that visit, five of those aboard ship.

On 24 October 1963 HYGAGE-1 in Panama City reported that Subject had received an operational assignment from Castro (during the May/June 1963 visit to Habana) on which to travel through Central and South America. His mission was to persuade leftist parties to immediately begin acts of sabotage and violence, and to try to maintain these in order to take pressure off Venezuela. Subject was also instructed to bring about better unity among competing leftist factions to ensure greater impact for their work. Subject did, in fact, contact many Communist Party and leftist leaders during his Central and South America travel during the period October 1963 - January 1964. From the (fragmentary) reporting on Subject from October 1963 through January 1964 it appears that he did discuss the question of leftist unity.

10. In October 1964 the Guatemalan authorities captured a number of tape recordings from the guerrillas in operations subsequent to a guerrilla attack on a garrison in Panzos, Alta Verapaz. Included in these tapes was one made by RICO Galan for delivery to the guerrillas. It consists mainly of an exhortation for unity (among the PGT and the 13 November Group)

and counsel against letting doctrine replace action. The tape clearly reveals RICO to be at once a very intellectual leftist who also has his feet planted quite firmly on the ground. His approach is pragmatic, not theoretical. The text of the tape indicates that it was made sometime after February and before mid-October 1964.

11. There is little at hand to indicate what manner of man is RICO Galan. His 201 file reflects facts but not impressions. He apparently is known personally by LICOOKY-1 and LITAMIL-9 in Mexico City, and these two sources should be queried.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
Memo for the Record	28 January 1969	200	-124	-162	/4

DOC. SUBJECT
Prensa Latina Study page 11

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

Please see document for further details.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) RICO Galan, Victor	201-334474

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

050-004-110
HMMA-36225A01
15 JAN 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
< MEXICO AMONG PERSONS BEING DETAINED BY MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CONSISTING OF THOSE INVOLVED IN RECENT STUDENT DISTURBANCES OR WHO HAVE VISITED EACH PRISONER

R 6901280513

FILE IN 201- 336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO RE LIBERATED AND DETAINED PRISONERS

050-004-110
HMMA-36140A02
02 JAN 69
P1

R 6901140772

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

12: sec

↓

OIRW-26723,
dated 17 January 1968
(sensitive document)

201-332414

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

```
RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474                              201-086191
SEX M DOB ?                             DBC -28004
                                        27 AUG 68
CIT ?                                   FBI
OCC ?                                   P3
RE CONNECTION WITH ERNESTO CAPUANO DEL VECCHIO
201-086191/
```

R 6809181114

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE (20) TOTAL COPIES -3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☑ COPY

INDEX ☑ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 19

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH

TIME 0400

INFO VR. FILE, C1, C1/OPS, C1/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, SR 8

AH M	FI
PS hn	~~DEST~~
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX

S E C R E T 120110Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3374

1P

12 MAY 65 IN 64770

NO NIGHT ACTION

1. LIFEAT COVERAGE RICO GALAN FROM 1325 5 MAY TO 0625 6 MAY.

MICROFILMED
JUN 14 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

A. VALENTIN (PRESUMABLY VALENTIN IVANOVICH KUCHEROV) TO RICO, WHO IS NOT IN.

201-281100

B. JOVAN MIRIC AND RICO: MIRIC ASKS RICO HOW SITUATION LOOKS TO HIM. RICO DOES NOT THINK THEY (U.S.) WILL LEAVE THERE (D.R.) MIRIC THINKS WILL BE A LONG TERM THING. RICO ASKS IF OAS WILL APPROVE THE FORCE THERE. MIRIC SAYS YES THEY HAVE THE MAJORITY OF VOTES; SINCE D.R. DOES NOT VOTE NOTHING CAN BE DONE. RICO THINKS DOMINICANS ARE HANDLING THINGS WELL. MIRIC THINKS THIS CEASE FIRE IS DANGEROUS ... THINGS QUIET DOWN ... A COUP D'ETAT COULD TAKE PLACE. MIRIC IS GOING TO BE VERY BUSY WITH CEPAL MEETING STARTING TOMORROW. MIRIC SSYS ONE CAN GET ACCREDITED TO GO INTO SESSIONS. IF HE IS NOT ACCREDITED, CAN GET MATERIALS.

2. DISSEM AT HQS DISCRETION.

S E C R E T

CFN

12 May 65

201-336474

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
MEXICAN COMMUNIST JOURNALIST.
RE COVERAGE OF VICTOR RICO GALAN FROM CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN RICO GALAN AND CORDERO.

022-009-013
MEXI-03312
07 MAY 65
PI

R 6507071571

201-336474

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

[redacted]

Dissem 8/2.

ACTION

WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	C
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH/C 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OA, OPSER

S E C R E T 311545Z CITE SANTIAGO 2683 (THILLEN ACTING) 31 Aug 66 IN 86841

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 8416 (IN 85559)

B. SANTIAGO 2665 (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY) (IN 84645)

C. DIRECTOR 30551

1. IN DICHOTOMY BETWEEN PRESS PLAY AND LIAISON WE WOULD OPT FOR LIAISON THIS CASE WITH SUGGESTION TO FUBRIAR-7 THAT MATERIAL BE PASSED TO FREI AND FURTHER COMMENT THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF GOC WISHED USE FOR PRESS PLAY. THIS WOULD END ANY OPPORTUNITY WE WOULD HAVE FOR EVENTUAL UNILATERAL PRESS PLAY (EXCEPT FOR REPLAY OTHER STATIONS PLACEMENTS). GIVEN PRESENT STATE OF CHILEAN/CUBAN RELATIONS CHANCES FIFTY-FIFTY GOC MAY CHOOSE PLAY SO WE CAN HAVE CAKE AND EAT IT.

2. AS NOTED REF B OUR PLOY IS TO USE MATERIAL TO PERSUADE FUBRIAR-7 OF NEED TO ASSIGN AT LEAST TWO FULL TIME OFFICERS TO NUT GROUP AGENT RECRUITMENT IN LINE WITH OUR AGREED POSITION THAT NUT GROUP COVERAGE MORE ECONOMICALLY AND EFFECTIVELY HANDLED BY FUBRIARS IF CAN BE PERSUADED TAKE MATTER SERIOUSLY. WISH GO ONE ADDITIONAL STEP AND OFFER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO SANTIAGO 2683 SECRET

TRAIN TWO SELECTED OFFICERS (IF FUBRIAR-7 GOES ALONG) IN ZRMETAL AT EARLIEST DATE.

3. REQUEST HQS REACTION ABOVE PROPOSAL SOONEST. IN INTERIM STATION WILL BEGIN PUTTING MATERIAL TOGETHER.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

SIEMPRE
No 688
[illegible] 7 1966

Victor
[illegible]

TODAVIA, LA OSCURIDAD

Rico Galán, incomunicación.

Hasta el sábado 20, la situación fue muy confusa en torno a las detenciones efectuadas por la policía del DF —el viernes 12— bajo los cargos de subversión y acopio de armas, entonces aún no configurados como delitos específicos. El paso del asunto a la Procuraduría General de la República y la consignación de ésta al juez segundo de Distrito del DF en Materia Penal, puso en claro, por ejemplo cuántos y quiénes son exactamente los detenidos. Las versiones atribuían números variables de acusados, quienes por fin, ante el juez, resultaron 46 por lo que se refiere a los que permanecieron más de una semana en los separos de la Jefatura de Policía.

A medida que pasaban los días —cada jornada salpicada por un amplio boletín de prensa de la Jefatura de la Policía— se fueron conociendo detalles, siempre pasados por el tamiz de los órganos policiacos, para quienes su actividad había de fundarse en el mayor acopio de hechos y declaraciones. Se vio entonces que las tendencias y actividades expuestas incluso en las informaciones policiacas no eran igualmente graves ni reprimibles, en el mismo grado desde el momento en que 17 de los apresados quedaron en libertad el sábado 20; otros 20 serían juzgados por el único delito de conspiración, con derecho a obtener inmediatamente la libertad, mediante fianzas variables; y 9, los consignados por tres delitos: conspiración, incitación a la conspiración y acopio de armas, quedarían presos a disposición del juez que dictaría el auto de formal prisión, sin el beneficio de la libertad provisional en ningún caso.

Las informaciones de la Policía resumían las impugnaciones a la existencia de un grupo llamado Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, que, en dos casas alquiladas —llamadas una "escuela Hidalgo", la otra "escuela Morelos"—, en las cuáles —decía— se hablaba de la organización de la lucha armada para el derrocamiento del gobierno de México. Nuestro colaborador Víctor Rico Galán y el Lic. Raúl Ugalde —quien fue dirigente del Frente Electoral del Pueblo— eran señalados como los dirigentes y principales responsables. La policía hablaba también de prácticas de tiro, y con alarde de su eficacia, daba cuenta de que tenía en sus manos el asunto y a los participantes, desde hacía 5 meses. A no pocos de los detenidos se les mencionaba como declarantes contra Rico Galán, al indicárselo por ellos como responsable principal. Incluso se dijo que la hermana de nuestro colaborador, la señora Ana María Rico Galán, había declarado contra éste inculpándolo de ser quien le explicó el manejo de armas.

Un amparo interpuesto por el abogado Juan Manuel Gómez Gutiérrez, mediante el cual un juez dictó la suspensión provisional de los actos, determinando que los detenidos quedaran a su disposición embrolló momentáneamente las cosas desde el punto de vista jurídico, por cuanto los retenía en los separos de la Jefatura, adonde hubieron de acudir los funcionarios y actuarios de la Procuraduría. Sólo el desistimiento del amparo podía encaminar a los 9 consignados sin derecho a libertad provisional, y a los 20 que no hubieran presentado las fianzas, a la cárcel preventiva de la ciudad.

El juez segundo de Distrito, Lic. Rafael Pérez Miravete, con apoyo en la consignación y en las respectivas tipificaciones de delitos hechas por la Procuraduría General, comenzó a despachar la fase de declaraciones preparatorias. La mayoría de los indicados no aceptaron como suyas las declaraciones presentadas por la Policía, aunque estaban calzadas con las respectivas firmas. Habían rendido esas declaraciones en condiciones morales terribles, bajo incomunicación, en diligencias que duraron toda una semana. El Lic. Ugalde aceptó toda la responsabilidad. él era el fundador del Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, su dirigente principal, y había comenzado por elaborar documentos que abordan los problemas económicos y sociales del país. Ugalde había invitado a nuestro colaborador Víctor Rico Galán, a su hermana y a otras personas, a formar parte de esas discusiones que se hacían en las mencionadas "escuelas". Ugalde afirmó que el MRP es "una organización lícita, creada en ejercicio de derechos constitucionales irrenunciables".

Nuestro colega Rico Galán se negó a declarar el sábado 20. No lo haría hasta que no pudiera hablar con su abogado, y le fuera totalmente levantada la incomunicación. Rico dijo: "He estado 8 días incomunicado, salvo algunos minutos en que por un amparo dictado por el juez primero de Distrito, se me permitió hablar con mi esposa, pero con un testigo, un agente de la Jefatura de Policía; por tanto, no estoy en condiciones de declarar hasta poder hablar con mis abogados". Víctor se quejó también de haber estado 36 horas sin comer en un separo sin agua; de haber sido víctima de presiones morales, como la detención de su hermano Fernando —enfermo del corazón— quien, por cierto, estaba ya entre los 17 que habían puesto en libertad. Esta comunicación de Rico Galán con el exterior produjo en él emociones naturales, al conocer, por primera vez, qué otras personas estaban detenidas y por qué. Rico Galán no fue detenido en las "escuelas" donde según la policía había armas y una bomba, sino en el aeropuerto cuando iba a despedir a su hermano Fernando, quien viajaba a Cuba, para residir allí definitivamente.

El lunes 22 de agosto, los consignados debían pasar a la cárcel preventiva. Al entrar el proceso en términos de mayor normalidad, y cauces de ley, la opinión pública esperaba conocer mejor qué había, en realidad, en el fondo de lo que fue considerado como una "conspiración" por la policía, y hasta qué punto se estaban o no violando derechos individuales y constitucionales.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306474

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ WH/1

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

REF WH/1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 49

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/REG, CS/SPO, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/PS, WH/C 8, DO 4, DO/H 3, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 300103Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8416 MEXI

30 Aug 66 85559

CARACAS, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY, SAO PAULO, RIO DE JANEIRO, LA PAZ, PANAMA CITY, SANTIAGO, MONTEVIDEO, BUENOS AIRES,

INFO DIRECTOR

CS/RI ~~DO~~ WH/1
ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~

PSYCH RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY

SECTION ONE ~~OF~~ TWO of 2

REF: DIRECTOR 30551

1. PURSUANT REF, FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN RICO GALAN CASE, FOLLOWING UP BASIC INFO RELAYED PER REF PARA 2.

2. IN 16 AUGUST PRESS RELEASE MEXICO CITY POLICE STATED THAT 6 OF THE 49 PERSONS ARRESTED FOR SUBVERSION HAD ADMITTED CONDUCTING A SCHOOL OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AIMED AT OVERTHROWING THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. IN SEPARATE RELEASE POLICE ISSUED EXTRACTS OF STATEMENTS QUOTED THE SIX AS SAYING THEIR SCHOOL HELD CLASSES IN TERRORISM, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS. RAUL UGALDE ALVAREZ, WHO, TOGETHER WITH VICTOR RICO GALAN, WAS ONE OF TWO LEADERS OF THE CONSPIRATORIAL GROUP, ADMITTED GUERRILLA SCHOOL WAS ORGANIZED AND RUN BY CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION CALLED "MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO," WHOSE TACTICS INCLUDED USE OF VIOLENT MEANS TO PRODUCE A "POPULAR AND DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION" IN MEXICO.

3. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY POLICE RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OF VICTOR RICO GALAN:

SECRET

[illegible]

"TUVO CONOCIMINENTO DE LA INTEGRACION DE LAS ESCUELAS DENOMINADAS HIDALGO Y MORELOS, DONDE VIVIAN DIVERSAS PERSONAS, PRINCIPALMENTE DE ORIGEN CAMPESINO. EL LICENCIADO RAUL UGALDE LO INVITO A LA INAUGURACION DE LAS MIMAS, PERO QUE NO PUDO ASISTIR POR ENFERMEDAD. POSTERIORMENTE, A INSTANCIAS DEL LICENCIADO UGALDE, ACEPTO DAR PLATICAS DIARIAS, EN LAS CITADAS ESCUELAS, SOBRE ECONOMIA POLITICA, SOBRE E M MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO INTERNACIONAL Y SOBRE LA NECESIDAD DE UNA TRANSFORMACION DEL GOBIERNO ACTUAL, RECURRIENDO A LA VIOLENCIA Y A LA LUCHA ARMADA, SIEMPRE Y CUANDO EL GOBIERNO LLEGARA A EJERCER UNA PRESION CONTRA EL PUEBLO DE CARACTER VIOLENTO.

" ACEPTO HABER USADO EL SEUDONIMO DE 'MARIO".

"EN SUS PLATICAS HIZO ALUSION A SUS EXPERIENCIAS EN LA GUERRA DE GUERRILLAS ADQUIRIDA EN SU CALIDAD DE PERIODISTA CUANDO ESTUVO EN GUATEMALA, VENEZUELA, SANTO DOIMNGO Y NICARAGUA.

"LAS EXPLICACIONES QUE EL DIO A LOS ASISTENTES A DICHAS ESCUELAS SOBRE LA INTENSIDAD DESTRUCTIVA DE LA DINAMITA Y EL USO DEL PLASTICO QUE COMO EXPLOSIVO USABAN LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION NACIONAL EN VENEZUELA, FUE DEBIDO A QUE LOS ALUMNOS LO INTERROGARON RESPECTO AL USO DE BOMBAS MOLOTOV Y OTROS EXPLOSIVOS.

INSTRUYO A LOS ALUMNOS SOBRE EL ARME Y DESARME DE LOS MISMOS.

"MANIFESTO ADEMAS QUE DESDE EL PUNTO DE VISTA INMEDIATO ES NECESARIO UNA TRANSFORMACION DEMOCRATICA DEL GOBIERNO MEXICANO Y, DE NO SER ASI, EN FORMA MEDIATA UTILIZANDO LA VIOLENCIA ARMADA."

4. ACCORDING TO OTHER STATEMENTS MADE BY THE CONSPIRATORS, THE RICO GALAN GROUP USED BOOK ON GUERRILLA WARFARE BY CHE GUEVARA IN THEIR CLASS DISCUSSIONS. ALONG WITH THEORETICAL INSTRUCTION THE GROUP WAS GIVEN LESSONS ON DISSASSEMBLING AND ASSEMBLING PISTOLS AND RIFLES, MANUFACTURE AND USE OF MOLOTOV COCKTAILS, TIME BOMBS AND PLASTIC BOMBS OF MURIATIC ACID. REFERENCES TO GUERRILLA EXPERIENCES IN GUATEMALA, VENEZUELA, SANTO DOMINGO AND NICARAGUA WERE MADE DURING THE COURSES. ONE MEMBER OF THE GROUP, A FARMER, TESTIFIED HE HAD BEEN PAID TO ATTEND THE COURSES AND PREVENTED FROM LEAVING THE RESIDENCE WHERE THE CLASSES WERE GIVEN.

⑤ ON 22 AUGUST A MEXICO CITY JUDGE RETURNED INDICTMENTS AGAINST 27 OF THE ACCUSED PLOTTERS. NINE OF THE RINGLEADERS WERE INDICATED ON THREE COUNTS OF CONSPIRACY, INCITEMENT TO REBELLION AND ACCUMULATION OF ARMS. SENTENCES ON THESE COUNTS COULD TOTAL UP TO 18 YEARS IN PRISON FOR EACH OF THE NINE. THE NINE WERE VICTOR RICO GALAN, RAUL UGALDE ALVAREZ, ANA MARIA RICO GALAN (VICTOR'S SISTER), SECRET

CARLOS AGUILERA DELGADILLO, GILBERTO BALAM PEREYRA, DR. MIGUEL CRUZ RUIZ, GUMERSINDO GOMEZ CUEVAS, DR. ROLD MAINERS HUEBNER AND ISAIAS ROJAS DELGADO. IN HANDLING DOWN THESE INDICTMENTS THE JUDGE STATED THAT THE CHARGES AGAINST THESE NINE BY THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE WERE PROVEN BEYOND A DOUBT. FOLLOWING MEXICAN LEGAL PROCEDURES, THE FINAL VERDICT ON THESE NINE WILL BE HANDED DOWN BEFORE THE END OF TWELVE-MONTH PERIOD FOLLOWING THEIR ARREST. OF THE REMAINING 27 ARRESTEES, 18 WERE HELD ON 100,000 PESO BAIL ON CHARGES OF CONSPIRACY AND TWO WERE RELEASED.

6. SUPPLEMENTING ABOVE, POUCHING ADDEES 30 AUGUST FULL TEXT OF COURT STATEMENTS AGAINST RICO GALAN AND CO-CONSPIRATORS.

7. TO HELP ADDEES TAILOR RICO GALAN CASE TO LOCAL SITUATIONS, PER MEXICO CITY 8354 PARA 2-B, STATION ALSO POUCHING WITH PARA 6 TEXT COPIES OF "PORTRAIT OF A CASTRO-COMMUNIST," A SIX-PAGE BIOGRAPHIC HISTORY OF RICO GALAN, AS OF AUGUST 1965, IN WHICH HIS CONNECTIONS WITH CASTRO AND LA GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS ARE DESCRIBED. ADDEES CAN SELECT AND USE THIS MATERIAL FREELY IN PROP PLACEMENT OR VIA LIAISON, BUT IN LATTER CASE VERBATIM PASSAGE SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

8. FOLLOWING ELEMENTS IN RICO GALAN CASE APPEAR PROVIDE GOOD PEGS FOR ADDEE EXPLOITATION GEARED TO "CASTRO EXPORTS REVOLUTION"

PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 8416 SECRET

SECRET

THEME:

A. RICO GALAN HAS BEEN EXPOSED AS ONE OF CASTRO'S MOST IMPORTANT AGENTS AND CHANNELS FOR FORMENTING REVOLUTION AGAINST DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA. HIS PAST ACTIVITIES INDICATE HE REGARDED MEXICO ONLY AS A BASE OF OPS, A SPRINGBOARD, FOR LARGER HEMISPHERE OPERATIONS ON BEHALF CASTRO.

B. ALTHOUGH RICO GALAN AND HIS GROUP HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED VARIOUSLY AS CASTROITE, TROTSKYITE AND PRO-CHICOM, HIS CLOSE AND INTIMATE CONTACTS WITH LOCAL CUBAN EMBASSY AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS INDICATE HIS CONTINUING LOYALTY AND ADHERANCE TO CASTRO IN THIS CONNECTION A CURRENT MEXICAN NEWSPAPER ITEM DISCLOSED THAT RICO GALAN WAS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH CASTRO AS FAR BACK AS 1956, WHEN CASTRO AND HIS FOLLOWERS WERE HIDING OUT IN MEXICO AND UNDERGOING TRAINING IN GUERRILLA TACTICS AT A RANCH NEAR AYOTZINGO IN MEXICO. THIS AYOTZINGO GROUP LATER FORMED THE EXPEDITION THAT SAILED ON THE "GRANMA" FROM TAMPICO, MEXICO, AND ULTIMATELY OVERTHREW THE BATISTA GOVERNMENT.

C. A NEWS REPORT FROM CARACAS REPLAYED LOCALLY STATES THAT THE VENEZUELAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (ASOCIACION VENEZOLANA DE PERIODISTAS) HAS SENT A TELEGRAM TO MEXICAN PRESIDENT GUSTAVO

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

DIAZ ORDAZ, PROTESTING RICO GALAN'S ARREST. THE LOCAL NEWS ITEMS QUOTED "INFORMED PERSONS" IN MEXICO TO EFFECT THAT ELEAZAR DIAZ RANGEL, PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION, IS A MEMBER OF THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY WHO WAS RECENTLY RELEASED FROM SAN CARLOS MILITARY PRISON IN VENEZUELA WHERE HE WAS IMPRISONED ON CHARGES OF CONSPIRING AGAINST THE LEOMI GOVERNMENT. CARACAS STATION MAY BE ABLE TO ELABORATE ON DIAZ RANGEL -- RICO GALAN TIE TO DOCUMENT HEMISPHERIC IMPLICATIONS OF RICO GALAN CASE.

D. COMMON PEG FOR ADDEE EXPLOITATION IS FACT THAT RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY, LIKE OTHER SIMILAR RECENT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN OTHER LA COUNTIRES, WAS APPARENTLY HATCHED AND GUIDED BY TRI-CONTINENT CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS EMANATING FROM HAVANA. FOLLOWING EXCCERPTS FROM LEAD EDITORIAL IN 19 AUGUST EDITION OF PROMINENT MEXICO CITY DAILY NOVEDADES MAY SERVE AS PEG FOR ADDEE TIE-IN WITH LOCAL JMFRACAS ACTIONS. TITLED "ARTIFICO Y FONDO DE UNA CONJURA," EDITORIAL STATES: "LA INFORMACION QUE AYER PROPORCIONO NOVEDADES ACERCA DE QUE LOS TERRORISTAS SINDICADOS -- CON PRUEBAS TAN ABUNDANTES QUE LLEGAN HASTA LA CONFESION -- DE PRETENDER ATENTAR CONTRA LAS INSTITUCIONES Y SERVICIOS OFICIALES Y PRIVADOS, HABIAN SIDO YA PUESTOS A DISPOSICION DE LA PROCURADURIA

GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA, NO CIERRA, SINO APENAS INAUGURA UN NUEVO CAPITULO PROCESAL DE ESTE PROGRAMA EXTREMISTA. NO PUEDE PREVERSE LO QUE SAQUEN A LUZ LAS INVESTIGACIONES JUDICIALES EN CUANTO A CONEXIONES E IMPLICACIONES; PERO LO EVIDENTE ES QUE NO SE PUEDE NI SE DEBE TOMAR COMO UN HECHO SIN IMPORTANCIA, O JOCOSO, O INGENUO, LA ACTIVIDAD DE ESTE GRUPO DE CONJURADOS, PORQUE YA HABIAN LOGRADO ENFOCAR SU INTREPIDA ACCION CONTRA LOS SERVICIOS Y EL ORDEN PUBLICOS, PLANES DE TERRORISMO DIRIGIDOS CONTRA LA TRANQUILIDAD Y EL BIENESTAR DE TODOS LOS MEXICANOS...NO ES EXACTAMENTE CIERTO QUE MEXICO ESTE AL MARGEN DE LOS PROGRAMAS SUBVERSIVOS INTERNACIONALES. LOS CASOS DE VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, PERU Y OTROS, ARROJAN SUFICIENTE CLARIDAD SOBRE LOS LINEAMIENTOS ESTABLECIDOS EN EL EXTERIOR PARA PERTURBA EL ORDEN SOCIAL Y POLITICO Y PONER A LATINOAMERICA ENTERA EN CONDICIONES SUBVERSIVAS. EN EL FONDO SO SE HA DESCUBIERTO NADA EN CONDICIONES SUBVERSIVAS. EN EL FONDO SO SE HA DESCUBIERTO NADA QUE NO SE SUPIERA YA, PORQUE NO SON UN SECRETO, NI MUCHO MENOS, LOS PLANES DE TERROR ADOPTADOS EN LA CELEBRE CONFERENCIA TRICONTINENTAL DE LA HABANA, AUSPICIADA POR CASTRO EN ENERO DE ESTE ANO. CUALQUIERA PUEDE ENTERARSE DE ESAS DIRECTRICES, QUE BUSCAN PESCAR EN EL RIO REVUELTO DEL CAOS, PORQUE HAN TENIDO SUFICIENTE PUBLICIDAD."

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET IN 85559
Page 8 of 9

PAGE 8 MEXICO CITY 8416 SECRET

E. GUATEMALA CITY STATION EMPHASIS ON RICO GALAN'S 1964 TRIP TO GUATEMALA AND CONTACT WITH YON SOSA WOULD BE DESIRABLE AS BASIS OTHER STATION PICK-UP AND REPLAY TO DOCUMENT RICO GALAN'S ACTIVIST ROLE AS CASTRO AGENT USING MEXICO AS BASE OF OPS. SIMILARLY, RICO GALAN TRIPS TO PANAMA, GUATEMALA, COSTA RICA, VENEZUELA, NICARAGUA, BRAZIL (IN 1963) AND HIS INVOLVEMENT IN DOMINICAN REBELLION (BEGINNING JAN 1964) MAY PROVIDE PEGS FOR OTHER STATION FOLLOW-UP AND EXPLOITATION. DETAILS THESE ASPECTS INCLUDED IN PARA 7 "PORTRAIT" OF RICO GALAN BEING POUCHED ADDEES.

F. ADDEE EXPLOTITATION SHOULD INCLUDE CONGRATULATORY COMMENTS ON SWIFT AND EFFICIENT ACTION TAKEN BY MEXICAN AUTHORITIES AGAINST RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY. MANNER IN WHICH MEXICAN GOVERNMENT HAS NIPPED THIS SUBVERSIVE GROUP IN BUD SHOULD SERVE AS EXAMPLE FOR OTHER LA GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WITH DEFENSE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. AT SAME TIME, FACT THAT RICO GALAN GROUP AIMED AT VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF MEXICAN GOVERNMENT SHOWS THAT CASTRO HAS ADDED MEXICO TO LIST OF TRI-CONTINENT TARGETS IN LATIN AMERICA. FACT THAT MEXICO IS ONLY LA COUNTRY MAINTAINING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND IS SERVING CASTRO WELL AS OPEN DOOR TO ENABLE CASTRO TO CHANNEL REVOLUTION TO OTHER CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTIRES DOES NOT

IN 85559
PAGE 9 of 9

PAGE 9 MEXICO CITY 8416 S E C R E T SECRET

APPEAR TO HAVE EXEMPTED MEXICO FROM CUBAN-DIRECTED SUBVERSION AIMED AT EXPORTING CASTRO'S REVOLUTION TO MEXICO ITSELF. IN LIGHT RICO GALAN CASE, MEXICAN GOVERNMENT IS COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED IN TAKING ANOTHER HARD LOOK AT THE SO-CALLED ADVANTAGES OF MAINTAINING RELATIONS WITH CASTRO.

9. WILL ADVISE ADDEES ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS RICO GALAN CASE WHICH MAY PROVIDE BASIS FOLLOW-UP REPLAY AND EXPLOITATION YOUR AREAS. REQUESTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER INFO OR ELABORATION ON ASPECTS OF CASE WHICH MAY BE APPLICABLE SPECIFIC ADDEE SITUATIONS WOULD BE WELCOME. ADVISE ACTIONS TAKEN. RELAY ALL CLIPS LATERALLY AND MEXICO CITY FOR POSSIBLE LOCAL REPLAY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS-311/11736-66
SUBJECT	Treatment of Victor Rico Galan, Imprisoned Leftist Journalist	DATE DISTR.	29 August 1966
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	12-17 August 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (18 August 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-10619

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan, with whom he disagrees politically. Source has reported infrequently on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained both from Mrs. Rico Galan and from Francisco Martinez de la Vega.

1. Francisco Martinez de la Vega, writer for Siempre, Mexican leftist magazine, said that Colonel Eduardo Estrada Ojeda, in the police headquarters where Victor Rico Galan and others were being held after their arrest on charges of subversion, had been instructed to permit Rico Galan to receive packages from his wife.

2. Elena Garro[1] writer, told Mrs. Rico Galan that she was going to speak to Minister of Interior Luis Echeverria to persuade him to ensure that Rico Galan would not be manhandled by the police during the interrogation.

3. She, also, expressed scepticism about the whole affair, saying that it was a farce and that she believed that many of those arrested with Victor had been paid to make the statements attributed to them.

Field Comment: An unsigned article titled "New Conspiracy?" appeared on page 8 of Siempre. It presented briefly an account of the arrest of and charges against Rico Galan; belittled what it termed the periodic paroxysms of patriotism which seize the Mexican police and lead to such arrests; then went on to suggest that Rico Galan, a political journalist accustomed to expressing his ideas in signed articles, could hardly be thought of as a conspirator. The article concluded with a plea for respect both for Rico Galan's constitutional rights and for the rights of a free journalism.

Headquarters Comment: This article appeared in issue no. 687, dated 24 August 1966, of Siempre.

[1] Elena Garro, Mexican playwright and novelist, was formerly married to Octavio Paz Lozano, prominent Mexican poet.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
	CINCSO*						USIA	I&NS

(Note field distribution indicated by "*")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/R	1	HMM-10619
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/1	1	LIENVOY
FI/INT	1	WH/MEXI	1	(LIENVOY)
CA/INT	1	WH/MNTY	*	CS-311/11736-66
CA/PROP	1	WH/PACY	*	COORDINATING / RELEASING HCL
TOTALS	IS 2, CI 4, FI 4, CA 2, WH 5 (1), DO/H 1.	LIAISON *		PSH:klm

Rico Galan

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☒ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 13

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

17

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH/C VIA TTY TIME 4353 BY J.

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, D/COMM 4

SECRET 250833Z CITE JMWAVE 2752

25 AUG 66 IN 84022

DESENSITIZED

TO: DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED

TYPIC AMCOMET SECUR COMMO

REFERENCE DIRECTOR 29747

BC

RICO

1. FOLLOWING WILL BE SENT 27 AUGUST BROADCAST. BEGIN AGENT MESSAGE: "TRES DOS X NUEVO REQUISITOS X MANDENOS REACCION DE SU OFICINA DEL ARRESTO DE VICTOR RICO GALAN X ESTA PEPE TODAVIA SALIENDO CON ANNIE QUENDOZ Y QUE SERIO SON SUS RELACIONES CON ELLA X QUIENES SON LOS OTROS CONTACTOS IMPORTANTES DE ELLA X EN RELACION A SU MENSAJE DOCE X QUIENES SON LOS DIRIGENTES VENEZOLANOS QUE SE REUNIERON CON PEPE EL ANO PASADO Y QUE PLANES DISCUTIERON X ABRAZOS" END AGENT MESSAGE.

2. TRANSLATION: THREE TWO X NEW REQUIREMENTS X SEND US ANY REACTION YOUR OFFICE HAD ON THE ARREST OF VICTOR RICO GALAN X IS PEPE STILL DATING ANNIE QUENDOZ AND HOW SERIOUS IS HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HER X WHO ARE HER OTHER IMPORTANT CONTACTS X RE YOUR MESSAGE TWELVE X WHO WERE THE VENEZUELAN LEADERS THAT PEPE MET LAST YEAR AND WHAT WERE THE PLANS THAT WERE DISCUSSED X EMBRACES X

SECRET Requirements to be transmitted to Amcomet/1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

INFO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Acting Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
EMFOE-1/Victor RICO Galan

//P

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: See below
Reference : HDC-3048 (not sent Mexico)

1. Attached are two pictures of Victor RICO Galan. Headquarters requests that the Station ask EMFOE-1 if this is the same individual as the subject of Paragraph 6 of the Reference.

2. If the pictures are identified as the subject of Paragraph 6 of the Reference, Headquarters requests that EMFOE-1 and other Station sources be queried for all available information concerning the Subject's activities and contacts while in the Dominican Republic as well as all possible travel information.

EPT
Eugene P. TANGUIST

MICROFILMED
SEP 14 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment: (herewith)
2 pictures
Pages 1 & 2 HDC-3048

Distribution:
2 - COS, Santo Domingo w/pictures
1 - COS, Mexico City w/HDC-3048

att / NH

501-336474

5 SEP 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HDCW-2268	DATE 26 August 1966
D 22-4-16	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-336474 22-4-16

2 - RI
1 - WH/1/Chrono
1 - WH/7/DR

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1	Chris Costanzo		3654

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/1		J. Fisher
	SEP 5 15 PM '66	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/7		

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10,629	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Andrew R. DOSCHER	DATE OF REPORT 25 August 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY	PROJECT LIREBEL	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIREBEL/1	TDCS DISSEMINATION

3P

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
3 - Hqs. 1 - Guatemala HGG 1 - Panama City (for CINCSO) 6 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - CINCSO

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA:

LIREBEL/1 obtained the reported information both from Rolando Collado Ardon and from his professional contacts.

MICROFILMED
SEP 1 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 1967

CS COPY

201-336474

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A Completely reliable B Usually reliable C Fairly reliable D Not usually reliable E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty regardless of their competence) F Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources 2 Probably true 3 Possibly true 4 Doubtful 5 Probably false 6 Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico/Guatemala

REPORT NO HMM-10,629

SUBJECT CONCERNING Reaction of Guatemalan Exile Leaders in Mexico to the Arrest of Victor Rico Galan 201-[illegible]

DATE OF REPORT 25 August 1966

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 18 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (18 August 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Guatemalan professional man, former member of a guerrilla organization in Guatemala, who is believed to have good access to Guatemalan exiles in Mexico.

C.I.T: GUATEMALA

(201-195151) 201-336474

1. Rolando Collado Ardon, leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico and a member of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT - Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo) said that the arrest of Victor Rico Galan on charges of subversion was a good thing for the PGT. Collado was referring to Rico Galan's influence on Guatemalan guerrilla leader Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. According to Collado, Rico Galan prevented the PGT from persuading Yon Sosa to join the Party in 1963 because of Rico's Trotskyist interference and the aid he gave to Yon Sosa at the time.[1]

201-733510

OCC: DOCTOR C.I.T. MEXICO NO 201 C.I.T. MEXICO

2. Medical doctors Miguel Cruz Ruiz and Rolf Meiner Huebner, two of those arrested with Rico Galan, have been associated with Rico since early 1965. Both were very much involved in the medical doctors' strikes of late 1964 which continued into 1965. When the strikes were finally settled both Cruz Ruiz and Meiner Heubner were dismissed from their jobs at the Social Security Hospital at Cuauhtemoc 330. They went directly to Rico Galan who put them to work, mainly writing medical articles for the magazine Sucesos for which Rico Galan worked.[2] OCC: Doctor

3. Rico Galan sent both Cruz Ruiz and Meiner Huebner to Cuba in 1965 and both are well indoctrinated Communists.[3] However, neither belongs to any Communist Party or organization. Both, as well as Dr. Jorge Velez Trejo, also very active during the medical strikes, have traveled through Latin America making

(201-788742)

C.I.T. MEXICO

GROUP 1 [illegible]

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

201-336474

contact with medical groups and attempting to inspire them to anti-government activity in their respective countries.[4] Also, while Cruz Ruiz and Meinor Huebner were working for Rico Galan at Sucesos they were giving classes in revolutionary activities to groups organized by Rico Galan.

Field Comments

1. In October-November 1963, Rico Galan, ostensibly as a purely journalistic exercise, went to Guatemala where he interviewed Yon Sosa in the guerrilla leader's camp.
2. HMM-9896 presents an overall picture of the medical strike situation.
3. HMM-10,163 reported that Rico Galan arranged passages for Mexican doctors who attended a medical congress in Havana in February 1966.
4. HMM-10,164 reports on the Central American activities of Drs. Meiner and Velez Trejo.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 51

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/IC 2, RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI/INTL, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3 SB 8, EUR 8, WH/C 8

S E C R E T 251750Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8373

25 AUG 66 IN 83466

DIRECTOR

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR-29474 *

* REQUESTED TRACES ON GALAN

1. IN ADDITION HMMA-26313 AND HMMA-26800, STATION FILES CONTAIN FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES VICTOR RICO GALAN (VRG) PRIOR 1962:

File

A. HMM-1433 REPORTED THAT MARIO EZCURDIA, DIRECTOR OF LEFTIST MAGAZINE AL DIA, TOLD LIFTER/3 THAT VRG WAS ONE OF FOUR MARXISTS ADDED TO STAFF OF AL DIA 1 JANUARY 1956.

B. IN HMM-2323 LIFEAT/LINERICK REPORTED THAT VRG INVITED TO ATTEND RECEPTION AT SOVIET EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY IN NOVEMBER 1956.

C. IN HMM-2454 LIFTER/8 REPORTED THAT IN FEBRUARY 1957 VRG WAS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF LA GAZETA DE MEXICO NEW MAGAZINE PUBLISHED BY THE BURO DE INVESTIGACION POLITICA (BIP), HEADED BY COMMUNIST HORACIO QUINONES.

D. ON 9 JULY 1959 LITMUS REPORTED THAT VRG WAS A CONTACT OF UMANISLAW RACZKA, EMPLOYEE OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA SECTION OF POLISH LEGATION IN MEXICO CITY.

E. HMMA-15203 REPORTED IN JUNE 1950 THAT ALEKSANDR

SECRET

Jone

VRG -
201 - 336974

BEKIER, INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND COUNSELOR POLISH EMBASSY MEXICO CITY, ARRANGED TO MEET CARLO COCCIOLI, ITALIAN PRO-COMMUNIST, HOMOSEXUAL AND WRITER FOR "SIEMPRE", THROUGH VRG.

F. HMM-5075 REPORTED VRG AS MEMBER MEXICAN PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JOURNALISTS TO BE HELD IN BEDEN (BADEN?), AUSTRIA, 18-22 OCTOBER 1960.

G. HMM-5287 REPORTED THAT IN SEPTEMBER 1960 VRG WAS CHIEF OF INFORMATION OF PUEBLO, ANTI-UNITED STATES, PRO-CUBA NEWSPAPER.

H. IN HMM-5403 LIFTER/8 REPORTED VRG AKNMEOHER OF THE INTELLECTUAL FACTION OF THE MEXICAN COMMITTEE TO GIVE IMPULSE TO FIGHT FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WHICH WAS MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN PEACE CONGRESS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN MEXICO CITY IN MARCH 1961.

2. A REPORT FROM A LITEMPO/4 SOURCE IN THE POR/T DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1965 GIVING BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE MEXICAN TROTSKYIST MOVEMENT LISTS VRG AS A MILITANT MEMBER OF THE POR/T MIDDLE GUARD HEADED BY JUAN POSADAS. THIS REPORT IDENTIFIES VRG AS INTIMATE FRIEND OF VIDAL SOLIS, ALSO MILITANT POR/T MEMBER, SINCE THEY WERE SCHOOLMATES AT SCHOOL

OF PHILOSOPHY AND LETTERS AT UNAM. NOTE THAT EKG-37587 IS CATIDE REPORT ON MEXICAN TROTSKYIST MOVEMENT WHICH IS ALMOST IDENTICAL WITH THIS L/4 EXCEPT THAT CATIDE REPORTS SOLIS AND VRG STUDIED PHILOLOGY.

3. LIENVOY OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1961 REPORTS THAT A FAREWELL PARTY WAS GIVEN FOR VRG ON 9 SEPTEMBER BUT NO MENTION MADE OF WHERE HE WAS GOING. FILES HAVE NO SUBSEQUENT REFERENCE TO HIS TRIP OR HIS DESTINATION.

4. AN ARTICLE IN THE 19 AUGUST 1966 EDITION OF EL SOL DE MEXICO, MEXICO CITY NEWSPAPER, REPORTED THAT IN 1956 ALBERTO BAYO, SPANISH COMMUNIST, HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS IN GUERRILLA TACTICS TO FIDEL AND RAUL CASTRO AND VRG AT RANCHO SAN MIGUEL IN AYOTZINGO, STATE OF MEXICO. ARTICLE QUOTED ERASMO RIVERA, OWNER OF RANCHO SAN MIGUEL, AS SAYING THAT ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS IN 1956 VRG HAD VISITED FIDEL AND RAUL AT RANCHO SAN MIGUEL WHERE THEY RECEIVED INSTRUCTION FROM BAYO.

5. STATION FILES GAVE NO OTHER INFOMATION ON VRG WHICH HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN SENT HQS.

6. INDEX SOLIS, BAYO AND RIVERA TO 200-4-56.

S E C R E T

BT

[illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
DISSEM BY 3 PER E/D #1

ACTION
C/E/D 4 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, C/FI, C/WH 2, DC/WH/C 5

SECRET 250015Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8369

DIRECTOR

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 29699 25 AUG [illegible] 2770

RYBAT [illegible]E ZRKNICK

DESENSITIZED

1. LITEMPO-4 GAVE STATION THREE PHOTOS OF CAPTURED ITEMS 24 AUGUST 66. BASED ON PRELIMINARY STATION ANALYSIS, RADIOS APPEAR TO BE COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE, CITIZENS BAND TYPE WALKIE-TALKIE TRANSCEIVERS. TAPE RECORDER APPEARS BE PHILLIPS MAKE WHICH COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE.

2. ONE PHOTO OF "TIME BOMB"; ONE OF FOUR (4) AUTOMATICS, AMMO AND MAGAZINE FOR BOTH HAND-GUNS AND RIFLES AND TWO WALKIE-TALKIE TYPE TRANSMITTERS; AND ONE PHOTO OF THE (SAME) TWO (2) TRANSMITTERS, A TAPE RECORDER THREE SPORTING RIFLES, FIVE M-1 CARBINES AND WHAT APPEARS TO BE A GARAND.

3. FORWARDING COPIES PHOTOS.

4. ATTEMPTING OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO REQUESTED REF AND WILL ADVISE RESULTS OBTAINED.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

ORIG: R. GRAHAM/nr
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 24 AUG 68

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
1 ①
2 3
3 2
4 5
5
6
7 4
8

DISSEM BY 30 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-9 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, WH/C 2, FE, FI/INT 2, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA/PEG

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

[illegible] Z

CITE DIRECTOR 30551

TO MEXICO CITY INFO CARACAS, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY,
SAO PAULO, RIO DE JANEIRO, LA PAZ,
PANAMA CITY, SANTIAGO, MONTEVIDEO, BUENOS AIRES

REF MEXICO CITY 8354 (IN 81989)

1. CONCUR WITH REF PROPOSAL STATION PREPARE CABLE OUTLINE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE POINTS STATION CONSIDERS USEFUL AS HEMISPHERE PEGS. FORWARD THIS MATERIAL DIRECT INFO ADDRESSEES. REQUIREMENTS FOR FOLLOW UP INFO WILL BE DETERMINED BY REACTIONS RECIPIENTS AND THEIR PROPOSALS USE MATERIAL FOR PROP PLACEMENT OR LIAISON PASSAGE.

2. HQS WILL RELAY MEXICO CITY 8241 AND MEXICO CITY 8354 TO ADDRESSEES.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] 201.

WH Comment: Station proposes prepare basic guidance cable re RICO Galan case.

WH/C/CA/PP
WH/2
WH/4
WH/5
WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

REPORT COVER SHEET	CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10,628	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Leo R. MYLECHRAINE	DATE OF REPORT 24 August 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY	PROJECT LIFTER	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C.CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIFTER-8	TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
3 - Hqs. 1 - MNTY 1 - Panama City (for CINCSO) 4 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - SMOTH 1 - CINCSO

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

LIFTER-8 obtained the reported information from Carlos Sanchez Cardenas, Leopoldo Gutierrez Sagardi, and Gustavo Velasquez Hernandez.

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A Completely reliable. B Usually reliable. C Fairly reliable. D Not usually reliable. E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2 Probably true. 3 Possibly true. 4 Doubtful. 5 Probably false. 6 Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

REPORT NO HMM-10,028

SUBJECT Popular Socialist Party Skepticism Concerning the Arrest of Victor Rico Galan And Others

DATE OF REPORT 24 August 1966

NO PAGES 3

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO 17 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (19 August 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE Veteran and trusted member of the Popular Socialist Party who has close personal connections with ranking members of the Party. He has been a prolific reporter of reliable information. The reported information was obtained directly from leaders of both the PPS and the General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico. The substance of these persons' comments are believed to be accurately reported; their validity however cannot be assessed.

1. (Summary: Popular Socialist Party (PPS) attitudes toward the arrest of Victor Rico Galan and others on charges of conspiring against the Government remain unsympathetic and the Party intends to stay outside the entire matter although PPS Secretary General Vicente Lombardo Toledano may seize the opportunity to strike back at some of his enemies by issuing a statement condemning the plans attributed to Rico Galan. Within the Party there is considerable skepticism about the truth of the published charges. While several Party leaders do not doubt that there is some truth to the charges they are quite convinced that there was no danger of imminent rebellion and that Mexican institutions stood in no peril from Rico Galan and his friends. Given the energy and efficiency with which the Mexican Government has dealt with less melodramatic threats in the past, one cannot but suspect that it is merely a tried and true Government maneuver. Also, it is believed in the PPS that police accounts of their role in the matter have been exaggerated to enhance the reputation of the police both with the President and with the public. The rumor that the Guatemalan Government may have asked the Mexican Government to silence Rico Galan because of his violent attacks against the new Guatemalan administration is generally discounted since the complaints of Guatemalan officials are certainly of no concern to Mexico.)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

2. Victor Rico Galan and his associates can expect neither sympathy nor help from the Popular Socialist Party (PPS - Partido Popular Socialista). Although no official decision has yet been made by the Party, PPS leaders who have commented unofficially on the matter have said that for the moment the Party will no doubt stay completely outside the whole affair, thus proving its total lack of interest in this type of revolutionary activity. It is of course possible that PPS Secretary General Vicente Lombardo Toledano will seize the opportunity to issue a statement condemning the entire affair as Trotskyist, criminal, and utopian. Lombardo may decide to use this opportunity to strike back at the National Liberation Movement (MLN - Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional) and others who have attacked him.

3. Among leaders of both the PPS and the General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico (UGOCM - Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico), there is a certain skepticism about the truth of the matter as it has been presented in the press. It is probably true that arms and materials for manufacturing explosives were confiscated. It is probably true that indoctrination sessions on political and revolutionary matters probably were held in the houses where the arrests were made. And probably the group did have some kind of plan for action. But, it is simply not true that there was the slightest danger of immediate and formidable rebellion from Rico Galan and his friends.

201

4. This latter conclusion is based on the fact that Rico Galan is no guerrilla leader. He is an aggressive intellectual, a radical, but he is not in jail for what he has done but for his ideas. As for Raul Ugalde Alvarez, named with Rico Galan as one of the leaders of the group, he has the reputation of being fuzzy-minded, a leftist adventurer and certainly neither brave nor dedicated. Further, and Rico Galan is well aware of this, popular support is essential to the success of rebellion. None exists. The peasants are divided. The workers are controlled by the Government, and the middle-class is content with the way things are. Also, there is the formidable precedent of Government action against any kind of rebellion, trade union, armed, and particularly any sort of activity which is Cuban-connected. The Government has always moved with energy, speed, and efficiency to combat such threats as, for example, during the Railway Workers Strike of 1959. Several leaders of that strike are still in jail and likely to remain there. Another example is the September 1965 attack on a military camp at Ciudad Madera, Chihuahua. While the Government did not feel that his incident posed any real threat to it, it did not want the bad international publicity, so vigilance was increased, activities of would-be guerrillas were blocked, some were bought off with money, others with promises and the matter was promptly and efficiently controlled.

5. There no doubt is a degree of truth to police charges, but the melodramatic, almost childish character given to the Rico Galan movement, the lack of any proven connection between the movement and leftist/Communist organizations, Rico Galan's open and well-known connections with Guatemalan guerrilla leaders and his public support of the Cuban revolution, make it very hard to discount the suspicion that this is simply a Government maneuver. Also, while the police no doubt did confiscate arms and other materials, the suspicion exists that the police have inflated their role in order to make themselves look good both to the President and to public opinion.

6. There is even a rumor that because of Rico Galan's harsh attacks on the new Guatemalan administration, the Guatemalan Government asked the Mexican Government to deal with Rico Galan. This rumor however is regarded as rather ridiculous since the Mexican Government certainly cares nothing for the opinion of Guatemalan officials.

Field Comment: HMM-10,614 reported earlier PPS reaction to the arrests.

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL
OF
TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

ORIG. Helene C. Walls:eb
UNIT WH/C/RR/RE
EXT. 3483
DATE 24 August 1966

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

106

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WHC 11

TDCS -314/10194-66

INFORMATION COPIES
CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 2, DO/H 4, EUR 4, WH 13

DATE DISTRIBUTED
24 August 1966

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
MEXI-8310 (IN-79989)
LIRING (LIRING-3)
Liaison *

DISSEMINATION

WHC/RE	3	WHC/SI	1			E/IB/R	1
WHC/RR	1	WHC/WAVE	1	WH/R	1	E/MADR	1
WHC/FI	2	WHC/CA	1	WH/1/R	2		
WHC/CI	1			WH/MEXI	1		
WHC/MO	1			WH/PACY (CI/CSO)	1		

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

① [illegible]

② Castanzo
pls file VEG's 201

(KPB)

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
Barbara Brown
WH/1/R - Pat O'Hara (in draft)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

RELEASING OFFICER
Flores
C/WH/C/RR

COPY NO.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

•ROUTINE

IN -79989

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXXX SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC
REPCINCLANT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

24 1845 Z

TDCS-314/10194-66

DIST 24 AUGUST 1966

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO

DOI 18 AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT EVIDENCE OF CONFLICT IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CONCERNING THE CASE OF VICTOR RICO GALAN

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (20 AUGUST 1966) **FIELD NO.**

SOURCE A MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WHO IS A NEW, UNWITTING REPORTING ASSET. SOURCE HAS CULTURAL AND FAMILY TIES IN CUBA. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION DURING CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO.

1. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, VICTOR RICO GALAN, A SPANISH-BORN JOURNALIST RESIDING IN MEXICO CITY, WAS ARRESTED BY THE MEXICAN POLICE ON 12 AUGUST WITH 27 MEN AND 5 WOMEN AND CHARGED WITH "CONSPIRACY ON A NATIONAL SCALE". THE GROUP WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE HELD MEETINGS TO PLAN SUBVERSIVE TACTICS AND ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE NATION'S INTERNAL SECURITY. POLICE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE MEMBERS HAD BEEN IN RADIO CONTACT WITH ORGANIZATIONS IN CUBA. THE 17 AUGUST EDITION OF EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO NOTED THAT THE POLICE WERE INVESTIGATING THE POSSIBILITY

OF "FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT" IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT RICO GALAN WAS READY TO BOARD A CUBANA FLIGHT WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED. FURTHER REPORTS CLAIMED THAT 48 PERSONS WERE DETAINED AS A RESULT OF THE ROUNDUP. FOR EARLIER REPORTING ON THIS CASE, SEE TDCS-314/10486-66, 20 AUGUST 1966, TDCS-314/10419-66, 18 AUGUST 1966, AND TDCS-314/10347-66, 15 AUGUST 1966.

2. ON 18 AUGUST ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON, CUBAN CONSUL IN MEXICO CITY, SAID THAT THE SENDING OF AN OLD DC-4 AIRCRAFT TO MEXICO FROM CUBA ON 16 AUGUST WAS OSTENSIBLY A SPECIAL SERVICE PROVIDED FOR JOSEPHINE BAKER TO TRANSPORT HER AND HER 16 CHILDREN !! Orphans TO MEXICO. ACCORDING TO CURBELO, HOWEVER, THIS PLANE ALSO GAVE THE CUBANS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT EVACUATING THE MEXICANS IMPLICATED IN THE RICO GALAN CASE WHO WERE PRESSING THE CUBAN EMBASSY FOR SANCTUARY IN CUBA TO AVOID ARREST. CURBELO INDICATED THAT THE CUBANS WERE VERY FEARFUL FOR CUBAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS IN VIEW OF THE RICO GALAN CASE AND DID NOT WANT TO BE ACCUSED BY THE MEXICANS OF GRANTING ASYLUM TO GUILTY PARTIES.

3. ON 15 AUGUST JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, CUBAN PRESS AND CULTURAL ATTACHÉ, HAD ADVISED A FRIEND NOT TO TAKE THE 16 AUGUST PLANE TO CUBA BECAUSE THERE WERE GOING TO BE SEVERAL MEXICANS ABOARD TO ESCAPE ARREST IN THE RICO GALAN CASE. AS IT TURNED OUT, HOWEVER,

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

ONLY FIVE PERSONS FLEW TO CUBA IN THE DC-4 AND NO MEXICANS WERE AMONG THEM. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS VERY UNUSUAL FOR CUBANA TO CARRY ONLY FIVE PASSENGERS ON ITS MEXICO-TO-HAVANA RUN.) WHEN ASKED WHY HE DID NOT DO MORE IN CULTURAL PRESS WORK FOR CUBA, LOPEZ REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT, BUT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS ASSISTING THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN MEXICO. (SOURCE COMMENT: LOPEZ IS PROBABLY A SECURITY OR INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVE AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY, SINCE HE IS VERY CLOSE TO RICO GALAN AND APPEARED TO FEEL THAT THE MEXICANS CONNECTED WITH THE CASE WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN ARRESTED SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN PASSAGE TO CUBA.)

4. ON 12 AUGUST FERNANDO RICO GALAN, VICTOR'S BROTHER, WAS OBSERVED IN THE CUBANA OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE FOR A FLIGHT TO HAVANA. THE FLIGHT DID NOT COME TO MEXICO CITY THAT DAY AND FERNANDO WAS LATER ARRESTED IN THE ROUNDUP. ALSO ON 12 AUGUST ONE NOEL BARRA ZENIL WAS OBSERVED ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE PASSAGE TO CUBA. (SOURCE COMMENT: BARRA IS A RABID COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY WHO IS CLOSE TO RICO GALAN AND UNTIL RECENTLY WAS A LONG-TIME RESIDENT OF HAVANA.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT IN MAY 1956 ALVAR NOEL BARRA ZENIL WAS LISTED AMONG PERSONS CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE PARTIDO OBRERO-CAMPESINO MEXICANO (POCM, MEXICAN WORKER-PEASANT PARTY), A SMALL MARXIST SPLINTER GROUP. SEE CS-P02909, 18 SEPTEMBER 1956.)

(classification) (dissem controls)

[illegible] CINCLANT.

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
CS

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C8, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2

ACTION

S E C R E T 240110Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8354

24 AUG 66 IN 81989

81989

DIRECTOR

CS COPY

REF: DIRECTOR 29659

1. BELIEVE BEST WAY TO EXPLOIT RICO GALAN CASE PER REF WOULD BE TO TIE IT INTO OTHER EXAMPLES OF CASTRO REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LA COUNTRIES UNDER GENERAL THEME OF "IT CAN EVEN HAPPEN IN MEXICO." MOST FERTILE SURFACING AREAS FOR THIS PURPOSE WOULD APPEAR BE VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA, AND GUATEMALA BUT HQS MAY WISH EXPAND THIS LIST.

2. SUGGEST FOLLOWING PROP CAMPAIGN: (A) ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND OF RICO GALAN CASE BE CABLED ABOVE STATIONS (AND OTHERS AS HQS CONSIDERS APPROPRIATE) AS BASIS MEDIA EXPLOITATION AND OTHER FEASIBLE POLITICAL ACTION (E.G., RE LIAISON) PEGGED TO CURRENT CASTRO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES RESPECTIVE AREAS. BACKGROUND COULD INCLUDE BASIC MEXICO CITY 8241 (IN 76854) INFO PLUS LATER DEVELOPMENTS AS REPORTED LOCAL PRESS ACCOUNTS FORWARDED UNDER HMMA-29305 (LATEST LOCAL EDITORIAL COMMENTARY BEING POUCHED 25 AUGUST). (B) TO TIE THIS TO "CASTRO-EXPORTS-REVOLUTION" THEME IN CONTEXT LOCAL COUNTRY SITUATIONS, ABOVE BACKGROUND MATERIAL SHOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY ALL AVAILABLE INFO ON RICO GALAN AND HIS GROUP WHICH INDICATES CASTRO

SECRET

CS COPY

201

CA

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8354 S E C R E T

INVOLVEMENT. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE NEWS ITEMS ON RICO'S USE OF CHE GUEVARA TEXTS IN HIS CLANDESTINE GROUP, HIS PAST CONNECTIONS WITH CASTRO AND THE CUBAN EMBASSY, HIS TRIPS TO YON SOSA ON BEHALF CASTRO, ETC. BELIEVE WITH SUCH ITEMS CULLED FROM CURRENT MEXICAN PRESS, PLUS RELEVANT MATERIAL TAKEN FROM HMMA-26800, 5 AUGUST 1965 "PORTRAIT" OF RICO GALAN AND TWO MEMOS TO LIRAMA ON RICO FORWARDED MORE RECENTLY UNDER HMMA--29791, STATIONS WOULD HAVE GOOD BASIS FOR LOCAL REPLAY AND EXPLOITATION.

3. AS FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN RICO GALAN CASE UNFOLD HERE, THIS INITIAL GUIDANCE COULD BE SUPPLEMENTED AS APPROPRIATE BY ADDITIONAL CABLE GUIDANCES.

4. IF HQS CONCURS, STATION WILL PREPARE BASIC GUIDANCE CABLE ALONG PARA 2 LINES FOR HQS RELAY TO APPROPRIATE STATIONS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

3. DATE

4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

5. DATE OF INFO.

6. EVALUATION

7. ANALYST

8. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-334474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC NEWSPAPERMAN
CHARGED IN MEXICO WITH INCITEMENT TO REBELLION, ACCUMULATION OF ARMS AND CONSPIRACY HE WAS ARRESTED AUG 12, 66, IN RAIDS ON TWO MEXICAN RESIDENCES AT WHICH CLASSES IN TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE ALLEGEDLY WERE CONDUCTED.

035-004-003
DBB -58014
23 AUG 66
FBI
P4

R 6609190308

FILE IN 201-334474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 6-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 23/3 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

TDCS-314/10568-66
~~HMM-10,642~~

ACTION IW (LMZ)

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME 2205 ✓

BY (R)

INFO VR. FILE. ADDP. CA 2. CA/PEG. CA/PROP. CI/OPS. CI/IC 2. FI. FI/D CS/DO FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO/H 4, DO 4, CI, CI/PS, FI/SPG, TSD 6, CS/SGO, WH/REG 8, WH/1/M 5.

SECRET 232020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8349 23 AUG 66 IN 81913

DIRECTOR INFO MONTERREY (POUCH) PANAMA CITY

INTEL

SUPDATA: LITEMPO/12 WHO WENT TO POZA RICA PERSONALLY TO INVESTIGATE THE EXPLOSION. HMM-10,602 REPORTED LITEMPO/4 CONVICTION POZA RICA EXPLOSION AND VICTOR RICO GALAN ARREST RELATED.

FILED 232020Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

① CA ①

② Costanzo for [illegible]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN -81913

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS COS CIA/NMC

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T 232246Z CITE TDCS -314/10568-66

DIST 23 AUGUST 1966

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 14-20 AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIION OF PEMEX EXPLOSION AT POZA RICA, VERACRUZ

REF: HMM-10,602

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (22 AUG 66) FIELD NO. HMM-10,624

SOURCE: MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICER WITH ACCESS TO INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES. HIS REPORTING IS BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE.

1. PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF AN INVESTIGATION BY MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICIALS OF THE 14 AUGUST EXPLOSION AND FIRE IN THE PEMEX REFINERY AT POZA RICA, VERACRUZ, HAVE REVEALED NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE WHO MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EXPLOSION. INVESTIGATION IS HAMPERED BY THE FACT THAT SECURITY PRECAUTIONS AT THE REFINERY ARE ALMOST NONEXISTENT. AT THE TIME OF THE EXPLOSION ONLY ONE GATE GUARD AND TWO SOLDIERS WERE ON DUTY IN THE ENTIRE PLANT.

IN -81913

TDCS -314/10568-66

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

2. THE CONDITION OF THE SECTION OF THE GAS TRANSMISSION LINE WHERE THE FIRST EXPLOSION OCCURED INDICATES THAT THE LINE WAS RUPTURED BY AN OUTSIDE EXPLOSION SINCE THE EDGES OF THE PIPE AT THE POINT OF RUPTURE WERE TURNED INWARD.

3. THE EXPLOSION OCCURED AT A TIME WHEN MAXIMUM PROPERTY DAMAGE AND MINIMUM LOSS OF LIFE WERE ASSURED. (SOURCE COMMENT: HAD THE BLAST AND FIRE OCCURED DURING THE WORK WEEK IT IS PROBABLE THAT AT LEAST THREE HUNDRED PERSONS WOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED.)

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE CONDITION OF THE PIPE LINE AND THE TIMING OF THE EXPLOSION STRONGLY SUGGEST SABOTAGE. ALSO, THE DAMAGE IS MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE THAN THE PRESS HAS INDICATED AND IT WILL PROBABLY TAKE MUCH LONGER TO GET THE REFINERY BACK IN OPERATION THAN HAS BEEN ESTIMATED. RESERVES ARE BEING USED NOW TO PREVENT A GASOLINE SHORTAGE.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO.

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S-E-C-R-E-T

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

ORIG: Anita Potocki/hm
UNIT: FI/D/CS
EXT: 7349
DATE: 22 August 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 55 PER F/D # 1

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/FI/D 4 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , C/FI, C/WH2, DC/WH/COS

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

22 23 04 Z CITE DIRECTOR 29699

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

RYBAT TYLOTE ZRKNICK

REFS: A. DIR-27990

B. HMM-10602 (IN-76854)

1. REQUEST MEXI ADVISE DETAILS OF CAPTURED EVIDENCE THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN GROUP IN RADIO CONTACT WITH CUBA, INCLUDING MAKE, MODEL NUMBER, POWER OUTPUT, FREQ RANGE, ETC. OF CAPTURED TRANSMITTER, AND WHETHER LATTER CAN BE USED FOR AM/FM AND/OR CW (MORSE) TRANSMISSIONS. ALSO DESIRE DETAILED INFO RE ANY OTHER ASSOCIATED GEAR FOUND AT TRANSMITTER SITE WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH TRANSMITTER, I.E., ANTENNAS, TAPE RECORDER, KEYER, POSSIBLE SPEED OF TRANSMISSIONS WHETHER AUTOMATIC OR MANUAL, ETC. ADVISE AVAILABILITY TRANSMITTER, INCLUDING KEYER, AND CAPTURED MAGNETIC TAPES FOR WOFACT EXAMINATION. CAN MEXI ASCERTAIN ~~NN~~ WHETHER TRANSCRIPT OF CONTENTS CAPTURED TAPES AVAILABLE FOR WOPROP/D AND WODART STUDY AND COMPARISON WITH KNOWN ZRKNICK SKEDS?

/CONTINUED/

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 29699

TO

2. REQUEST STATION DETERMINE WHETHER ANY DOCUMENTS RELATING TO TRANSMITTER OPERATION, INCLUDING POSSIBLE SIGNAL PLAN, CIPHER MATERIALS, ETC. PICKED UP AT TIME OF RAIDS AND CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO WOFACT. OBVIOUSLY THESE OF PRIORITY INTEREST AND SHOULD BE FORWARDED HQS PER CSIF-52-3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1/MEXICO J.Fisher(telecoord)
WH/FICI ✓
CI/OPS/WH
OC-SPS/CMT J.Boone (draft)

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/FI/D/CS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 22

ORIG KITTREDGE:jly
UNIT WH/CA
EXT 5006
DATE 22 AUGUST 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	/	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 52 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: a/HB ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , a/H/C 8, CA2 CA/PROP, a/SOS, C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

S-E-C-R-E-T 22 22 09 Z CITE DIRECTOR 29659

TO MEXICO CITY

RICO GALAN CASE APPEARS PRESENT EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR HEMISPHERIC PROP PLAY AS BLATANT EXAMPLE CONTINUING EFFORT BY CASTRO TO EXPORT REVOLUTION. REQUEST MEXICO CITY SUGGESTIONS RE BEST TIME AND PLACE INITIATE SUCH CAMPAIGN AS WELL AS MATERIAL BEST SUITED TO PLACE CASE IN LIGHT WHICH COMPLEMENTS GOM OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTES TO MAXIMUM LNFORT ADVANTAGE IN HEMISPHERE. REQUEST VIEWS SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

201-

Jacob D. Esterline
JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/Cuba/CA/Swider

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

J. FISHER (B)
JOSIAH FISHER
AC/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-336474
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

Dissem BY 24

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA-2, CA/PROP, DO-4, DO/H-3, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FE-8, WH/C-8

RE... W/1

ABSTRACT X INDEX

S E C R E T 230030Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8339 MEXI **22 Aug 66 IN 81196**

DIRECTOR

REF MEXICO CITY 8289 (IN 78356) 76

1. EXCEPT FOR STRAIGHT NEWS ACCOUNTS OF "DECLARACIONES" AND LEGAL INDICTMENTS OF RICO GALAN AND FILOW-CONSPIRATORS, VERY LITTLE EDITORIAL COMMENTARY HAS BEEN NOTED ON RICO GALAN CASE SINCE REF, INDICATING TIGHT LID IMPOSED BY GOVERNMENT STILL IN EFFECT. WHAT LITTLE EDITORIAL COMMENTARY HAS APPEARED HAS EXPRESSED EITHER MILD CONCERN OVER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ARRESTESS (E.G., 24 AUGUST SIMEPRE EDITORIAL ARTICLE), OR HAS RELATED ALLEGED ~~ALLEGED~~ CONSPIRACY TO LARGER SPECULATION ABOUT MEXICO AS TARGET FOR STEPPED-UP CASTRO AND/OR CHICOM SUBVERSION.

2. DEFENSIVE TYPE COMMENTARY HAS BEEN NOTED FROM LEFTIST QUARTERS BUT HAS BEEN MINIMAL. AT END OF 19 AUGUST ACCOUNT OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN RICO GALAN CASE, EL DIA COUPLED BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT OF PARM PRESIDENT JUAN BARRAGAN CONDEMNATION OF RICO GALAN ATTITUDE WITH "NUEVO COMUNICADO" FROM THE MLN, REITERATING THAT CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (OF ARRESTEES) HAVE BEEN VIOLATED. SAME THEME ELABORATED UPON IN PAID ADVERTISEMENT PLACED BY MLN IN 23 AUGUST EXCELSIOR.

SECRET

201-336474
201-336474
23 Aug 66

SECRET

3. EDITORIAL WARNINGS ON LARGER IMPLICATIONS OF RICO GALAN CASE HAVE BEEN MORE NUMEROUS BUT STILL SCARCE. BARRIOS GOMEZ COLUMN IN EL HERALDO OF 15 AUGUST REVIEWED RICO GALAN'S CONNECTION WITH GUATEMALAN PRO-CHICOM GUERRILLA LEADER YON SOSA, NOTING THAT "PEKINISTA" RICO GALAN IS AN "AGITADOR INFLUIDA POR LAS PREDICAS DE CHINOS AMIGOS SUYOS, DE LA AGENCIA NOTICIOSA SINJUA." LEAD NOVEDADES EDITORIAL ON 19 AUGUST WARNED AGAINST ASSUMPTIONS THAT MEXICO IS IMMUNE TO EXTREMIST "INTERNATIONAL SUBVERSION" LIKE THAT WHICH HAS PLAGUED OTHER LA COUNTRIES LIKE VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, PERU, ETC. OBLIQUELY CITING RICO GALAN CASE IN SENSE THAT "IT CAN HAPPEN HERE," EDITORIAL IMPLIES THAT RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY WAS HATCHED AT TRI-CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE IN HAVANA. TWO CARTOONS, IN EXCELSIOR 18 AUGUST AND NOVEDADES 20 AUGUST, DEAL WITH RICO GALAN ARRESTS. NOVEDADES CARTOON DEPICTS ESSENTIALLY SUPERFICIAL AND HUMOROUS VIEW OF RICO GALAN ARRESTS. EXCELSIOR CARTOON, IN CONTRAST, CARRIES OBVIOUS POLITICAL MESSAGE: CARTOON SHOWS LAZARO CARDENAS ANSWERING PHONE AND REPLYING TO RICO GALAN CALL, SAYING "Y PARA QUE ME ENVIA UN RELOJ, SENOR RICO." CONSERVATIVE EL SOL EDITORIAL TITLED "DIPLOMACIA SUBVERSIVA" MENTIONS RICO GALAN CASE AS PERHAPS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF COMMUNIST EFFORTS USE DIPLOMATIC

SECRET

SECRET

REPRESENTATION IN LA COUNTRIES AS CHANNELS INSPIRE LOCAL SUBVERSION. FINALLY, ENGLISH-LANGUAGE THE NEWS RAN EDITORIAL ARTICLE BY JIM BUDD ON 22 AUGUST DESCRIBING RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY AS PROVIDING SALUTARY LESSON FOR MEXICO, IN THAT IT SHOWS, DESPITE "SCANT CHANCES COMMUNISM TAKING OVER MEXICO," THAT COMMUNIST EXTREMISTS LIKE RICO GALAN GROUP CAN STILL "JOLT MEMORIES" AND REMIND MEXICANS THAT ITS PROBLEMS ARE STILL GRAVE ENOUGH TO BE EXACERBATED AND EXPLOITED BY COMMUNISTS FOLLOWING EXAMPLE OF GUATEMALA AND VENEZUELA.

4. POUCHING CLIPS ABOVE ITEMS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. — 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM — 8. DATE OF INFO. — 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST — 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN — 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO
CHARGED WITH INCITEMENT TO REBELLION WITH INTENT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT BY VIOLENT MEANS.

050-009-008
MEXI-08317
20 AUG 66
HMM -10621
P2

HZPHMY

R 6609070915

FILE IN 201-

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➩

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM [redacted]
TOTAL COPIES: 12

ORIG: C. Costanzo/kaw
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 19 August 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 7 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☑ RETURN TO WH/1 BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8 RID COPY
INFO: VR, FILE CI/OPS

(CLASSIFICATION) S E C R E T (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

22 15 21 Z CITE DIRECTOR 29474

CRH		WH/5
~~PS~~		
ABSTRACT		~~INDEX~~

TO MEXICO CITY

1. RESULTS HQS TRACE VICTOR (RICO) GALAN SHOW LITTLE BIO DATA PRIOR 1961. REQUEST CABLE AS COMPLETE DATA AS POSSIBLE NOT ALREADY FURNISHED HQS HMMA 26313, TO INCLUDE EDUCATION, TRAVEL, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES UP TO 62.

2. APPRECIATE RECENT STATION REPORTING THIS SUBJECT. FYI, THERE CONTINUING HIGH INTEREST THIS CASE OTHER U.S. GOVT ELEMENTS AND CONTINUING NEED FOR INTERPRETIVE COMMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

William V. Broe
C/WHD

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-336474
COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-336474
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 38

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CS 1966

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, CA2, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H3, CI/IC 2

MEXI

S E C R E T 180012Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2220

CS COPY

18 AUG 66 78356

DIRECTOR

1. TO DATE PRESS PLAY ON ARRESTS OF VICTOR RICO GALAN AND FELLOW CONSPIRATORS HAS BEEN CONFINED TO DUTIFUL REPLAY OF POLICE HAND-OUTS. LATEST POLICE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED EVENING 16 AUGUST INCLUDED "STATEMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY" (BY IMPLICATION, CONFESSIONS) MADE BY No 201 RICO GALAN, ING GUMERSINDO GOMEZ No 201 CUEVAS, DOCTOR ROLF MEINERS HUEBNER, PROF. RAMON No 201 SARINANA SARINANA, ANA MARIA No 201 RICO GALAN (RICO'S SISTER), No 201 SERGIO MENDOZA No 201 LOPEZ, JOSE HUMBERTO JUAREZ HERNANDEZ, OLIVARIO JUAN No 201 PEREZ GALICIA, AND EDUARDO No 201 ORTIZ AYALA. NO STATEMENT BY RAUL UGALDE PUBLISHED. NO EDITORIAL COMMENTARY NOTED TO DATE. THIS APPEARS BE RESULT TIGHT LID IMPOSED BY GOBERNACION ON PRESS TREATMENT BEYOND LINE AND FACTS CONTAINED POLICE HAND-OUTS.

2. EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO AFTERNOON 17 AUGUST NOTED IN FRONT PAGE ARTICLE THAT POLICE INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY "FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT" IN CASE, IN VIEW FACT RICO GALAN WAS READY TO BOARD CUBANA FLIGHT WHEN ARRESTED. AFTERNOON ULTIMAS NOTICIAS REPORTED THAT POLICE WERE ABOUT READY TO TURN OVER [illegible] OF DETAINEES TO ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR INDICTMENT.

3. REPORTS OF TWO MOLOTOV COCKTAILS THROWN AT CUBAN EMBASSY FROM

CS COPY

201-336474
18 AUG 66

10(8)

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8289 S E C R E T

PASSING AUTOMOBILE WERE CARRIED AS BRIEF ITEMS IN AFTERNOON PAPERS 16 AUG. NO FURTHER MENTION THIS INCIDENT IN 17 AUG PRESS, POSSIBLY DUE GOVERNMENT DESIRE AVOID GIVING LEFTIST PRESS AMMUNITION WITH WHICH ATTACK GOVERNMENT CRACK DOWN ON RICO GALAN RING.

RID/201

1341

4. MANNER IN WHICH POLITICA AND SIEMPRE HANDLE RICO GALAN CASE IN NEXT ISSUES (DUE NEXT COUPLE DAYS) SHOULD BE HIGHLY INTERESTING AND INDICATIVE OF COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN REACTING TO ARRESTS. WILL ADVISE AS THESE ISSUES APPEAR.

5. POUCHING AVAILABLE STATION BIOG DATA ON ARRESTEES AND PRESS ACCOUNTS APPEARING TO DATE.

S E C R E T

ET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO
CHARGED WITH INCITEMENT TO REBELLION WITH INTENT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT BY VIOLENT MEANS.

050-009-008
MEXI-08317
20 AUG 66
HMM -10621
P2

HZPHMY

R 6609070915

FILE IN 201-

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM [redacted]
TOTAL COPIES: 12

ORIG: C. Costanzo/kaw
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 19 August 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 7 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☑ RETURN TO WH/1 BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , CI/OPS

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

22 15 21 Z CITE DIRECTOR 29474

CKH	WH/1 22 Aug 196
~~RE~~ ~~DATE~~	~~REF~~
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~

TO MEXICO CITY

1. RESULTS HQS TRACE VICTOR (RICO) GALAN SHOW LITTLE BIO DATA PRIOR 1961. REQUEST CABLE AS COMPLETE DATA AS POSSIBLE NOT ALREADY FURNISHED HQS HMMA 26313, TO INCLUDE EDUCATION, TRAVEL, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES UP TO 62.

2. APPRECIATE RECENT STATION REPORTING THIS SUBJECT. FYI, THERE CONTINUING HIGH INTEREST THIS CASE OTHER ~~ODYOKE~~ U.S. GOVT ELEMENTS AND CONTINUING NEED FOR INTERPRETIVE COMMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-336474
COPY NO.
22 Aug 66

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-336474
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
CS

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C8, CA2, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H3, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 180012Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2229 CS COPY

18 AUG 66 78356

DIRECTOR

1. TO DATE PRESS PLAY ON ARRESTS OF VICTOR RICO GALAN AND FELLOW CONSPIRATORS HAS BEEN CONFINED TO DUTIFUL REPLAY OF POLICE HAND-OUTS. LATEST POLICE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED EVENING 16 AUGUST INCLUDED "STATEMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY" (BY IMPLICATION, CONFESSIONS) MADE BY RICO GALAN, ING GUMERSINDO GOMEZ CUEVAS, DOCTOR ROLF MEINERS HUEBNER, PROF. RAMON DARINANA CARINANA, ANA MARIA RICO GALAN (RICO'S SISTER), SERGIO MENDOZA LOPEZ, JOSE HUMBERTO JUAREZ HERNANDEZ, OLIVERIO JUAN PEREZ GALICIA, AND EDUARDO CRUZ AYALA. NO STATEMENT BY RAUL UGALDE PUBLISHED. NO EDITORIAL COMMENTARY NOTED TO DATE. THIS APPEARS BE RESULT TIGHT LID IMPOSED BY GOBERNACION ON PRESS TREATMENT BEYOND LINE AND FACTS CONTAINED POLICE HAND-OUTS.

No 201 No 201 No 201 No 201 No 201 No 201 No 201 No 201

2. EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO AFTERNOON 17 AUGUST NOTED IN FRONT PAGE ARTICLE THAT POLICE INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY "FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT" IN CASE, IN VIEW FACT RICO GALAN WAS READY TO BOARD CUBANA FLIGHT WHEN ARRESTED. AFTERNOON ULTIMAS NOTICIAS REPORTED THAT POLICE WERE ABOUT READY TO TURN OVER [illegible] OF DETAINEES TO ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR INDICTMENT.

3. REPORTS OF TWO MOLOTOV COCKTAILS THROWN AT CUBAN EMBASSY FROM

CS COPY

201-336474
18 AUG 66

p(8)

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8289 S E C R E T

PASSING AUTOMOBILE WERE CARRIED AS BRIEF ITEMS IN AFTERNOON PAPERS 16 AUG. NO FURTHER MENTION THIS INCIDENT IN 17 AUG PRESS, POSSIBLY DUE GOVERNMENT DESIRE AVOID GIVING LEFTIST PRESS AMMUNITION WITH WHICH ATTACK GOVERNMENT CRACK DOWN ON RICO GALAN RING.

RID/201

150 458 1341

4. MANNER IN WHICH POLITICA AND SIEMPRE HANDLE RICO GALAN CASE IN NEXT ISSUES (DUE NEXT COUPLE DAYS) SHOULD BE HIGHLY INTERESTING AND INDICATIVE OF COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN REACTING TO ARRESTS. WILL ADVISE AS THESE ISSUES APPEAR.

5. POUCHING AVAILABLE STATION BIOG DATA ON ARRESTEES AND PRESS ACCOUNTS APPEARING TO DATE.

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?

< MEXICO CONCERNING GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTIONS ON
NEWS COVERAGE OF ARRESTSOFVICTOR
RICOGALANANDOTHERSFORSUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.

050-009-008
MEXI-08287
18 AUG 66
HMM -10615
P2

HZPHMV

R 6609070886

FILE IN 201-[illegible]

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

See Below

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST
JB

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HMMA-29797 | 050-004-136 | 18 AUG 66
IN
TO WH/REG
BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON ARRESTEES FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Jl Victor Rico-Galan

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 8-61 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: 0 Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY-8281

1. Attached for Headquarters information and retention are copies of two memoranda concerning Victor RICO Galan which were passed to LIRAMA on 15 February and 6 April 1965.

2. As stated in Reference, the attached memoranda were at the request of LIRAMA who was investigating the possibility of de-naturalizing and deporting Subject.

Julie A. Rexfall
for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/WH w/att (1 cy ea)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-29791

DATE: 16 August 1966

CLASSIFICATION: 9 SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-336474

14-00000

ATT TO HMMA-24791

SECRET

Victor Rico Galan was born 6 February 1928 at El Ferrol, Spain, and came to Mexico as a Spanish "niño" (year unknown). He became a Mexican citizen and is now a prominent leftist journalist for Siempre and Politica. He lives at Providencia 930, Mexico City. He is head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN). He was a member of the Committee for Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution and of the Periodistas Amigas de Cuba in 1961.

Victor Rico Galan is a close friend of Fidel Castro Ruz. He went to Cuba in October 1962 to write a political biography of Castro. He went to Cuba again in May 1963 and interviewed Castro in June 1963 upon the latter's return from the USSR.

Between mid-October and mid-December 1963, he traveled to Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Brazil and conferred with leading Communists and leftists in each of these countries. In early January 1964 he visited the Dominican Republic and on 28 January 1964 again traveled to Cuba, presumably to interview Fidel Castro who had just returned from another trip to the USSR.

In September 1964, Rico Galan had several contacts with Armando Hart Davalos, Cuban Minister of Education and Antonio Nuñez Jimenez, President of the Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Cuba, who were visiting in Mexico.

In November 1964, he published an interview he had with Guatemalan guerrilla leader Marco Antonio Yon Sosa.

Rico Galan has very frequent contact with Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, Second Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico and identified member of the Cuban Intelligence Service (DGI). He is also in contact with Oldrich Novicky, Second Secretary and Press Attache of the Czech Embassy who is an intelligence officer, and with Ivan Gavrilovich Alferiev, Pravda correspondent in Mexico who is a Soviet intelligence officer.

Rico Galan, according to a number of unimpeachable sources, is a professional paid agent for the Cuban government. He has acted as a courier, carrying large sums of money to pro-Cuban groups in several Latin American countries. He supports the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in its propaganda activities, often using Siempre magazine in this work. His principal assignment, however, is to act as

15 Feb 1965

(P-7354) Victor Rico Galan

R.I. 1

CS COPY

HMMA 24791

201-336474

Fidel Castro's chief political subversion agent in Latin America. During a recent trip to Guatemala, for instance, he attempted to orient politically the split Communist factions striving to overthrow the Guatemalan Government. A tape recording exists of a speech he made which was later distributed to Guatemalan guerrillas. In the speech Rico Galon claimed he was speaking as an individual, rather than as a representative of the Cuban government. In fact, he was acting on behalf of Castro, as he was instructed to do by members of the Cuban intelligence service in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, with whom he has been in very frequent contact for the past several years.

Attached find a copy of the tape recording mentioned above.

Att. to HMMA-29791

SECRET

Victor Rico Galan's membership in the following organizations:

MLN - members subscribe to an active campaign to oust U.S. business interests from Mexico and all Latin America, and to fight against U.S. interests and influence in Mexico and throughout Latin America. Members support the Cuban revolution, the Mexican Government's policy of non-intervention and auto-determination and pledge themselves to participate in activities which will bring greater economic, personal and social freedom to the people of Mexico.

There is no indication (at least in public/official MLN documents) that the MLN or its members owe allegiance to any foreign power. It has, however, until 1965, been controlled and dominated by the Mexican Communist Party which DOES give allegiance to the Soviet Union. The MLN and the other Communist groups with which Rico Galan has been associated, support Soviet foreign policy objectives, usually without any reservations.

The Mexican Journalists Friends of Cuba and the Committee for Solidarity with Cuba follow the same lines as the MLN - with emphasis placed on the distribution of propaganda glorifying the Cuban revolution, and advocating the Cuban Government as the ideal for all Latin American countries.

Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations - emphasizes exchange of cultural and economic information, exhibits materials, artists, etc., always, of course, extolling glorious Cuba and urging Mexico to follow Cuba's lead.

Arnaldo Orfila Reynal

His only known organizational affiliation is his membership in the Argentine Socialist Party.

One source reported that Orfila was a naturalized Mexican citizen - however we have no record of his having been granted Mexican citizenship, and as late as April 19[illegible], he was reported by Cubana Airlines as an Argentine citizen. It is reported that Cubana lists their passengers by-Citizenship.

6 April 1966

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION	
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10,619		COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	DATE OF REPORT 18 August 1966		NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY	PROJECT LIENVOY		CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIENVOY		TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
~~3~~ 2 - Hqs. 1 - Panama City (for CINCSO) 4 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - CINCSO

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

Reported information taken from LIENVOY of 12 through 17 August 1966.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

1657

CS COPY

[illegible]

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A Completely reliable B Usually reliable C Fairly reliable D Not usually reliable E Not reliable (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence) F Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true 3 Possibly true 4 Doubtful 5. Probably false 6 Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico
REPORT NO HMM-10,019
SUBJECT Efforts on Behalf of Victor Rico Galan by Friends
DATE OF REPORT 18 August 1966
NO PAGES 2
REFERENCES
DATE OF INFO 12 - 17 August 1966
PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (18 August 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan, with whom he disagrees politically. Source has reported infrequently on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained both from Mrs. Rico Galan and from Francisco Martinez de la Vega.

1. According to Francisco Martinez de la Vega of the magazine Siempre, Colonel Eduardo Estrada Ojeda at Police Headquarters where Victor Rico Galan and others were being held after their arrest on charges of subversion had been instructed to permit packages from Mrs. Rico Galan to be delivered to her husband.

2. Elena Garro, writer, told Mrs. Rico Galan that she was going to speak to Minister of Interior Luis Echeverria to try to get him to ensure that Rico Galan would not be manhandled by the police during the interrogation.

3. Miss Garro expressed a scepticism about the whole affair, saying that it was a farce and that she believed that many of those arrested with Victor had been paid to make the statements that they had.

Source Comment: On 17 August Francisco Galindo Ochoa, Press Secretary in the Presidencia, complimented Martinez de la Vega on the piece on Rico Galan's arrest which appeared in the most recent issue of Siempre.

Field Comment: A short, unsigned article titled New Conspiracy? appeared on page 8 of Siempre. It presented briefly an account of the arrest of and charges against Rico Galan; took a swipe at what it termed the periodic paroxysms of patriotism which seize the Mexican police; and then went on to suggest that

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

Rico Galan, a political journalist accustomed to expressing his ideas in signed articles, could hardly be thought of as a conspirator, and concluded by pleading for respect both for Rico Galan's constitutional rights and for the rights of a free journalism.

[illegible] 201

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY [illegible] PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

TDCS-314/10419-66

HMM 10,614

CS COPY

ACTION IW (PMB) ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME [illegible]

BY D

INFO VR. FILE. ADDP. CA 2. CA/PEG. CA/PROP. CI/OPS. CI/IC 2. FI. FI/D CS/DO FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO/H 4, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, RI/AN, CS/SGO, SB 8, WH/C 8, WH/REG 8, WH/1/M 5.

S E C R E T 172325Z CITE MEXICO CITY 5255 CS COPY

DIRECTOR INFO MONTERREY (POUCH), PANAMA CITY

INTEL

18 Aug 66 78385

SUPDATA: LIFTER/8. INDEX. ~~PPARAF~~

FILED 17/2325Z S-E-C-R-E-T

[redacted]

CS COPY

[illegible]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 78385

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS COS CIA/NMCC

FBI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

180434 Z CITE TDCS -314/10419-66

DIST 18 AUGUST 1966

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 16 AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT: COMMENT IN THE POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY ON THE ARREST OF VICTOR RICO GALAN AND OTHERS ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (16 AUG 66) FIELD NO. HMM-10,614

SOURCE: VETERAN AND TRUSTED MEMBER OF THE POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY (PPS) WHO HAS CLOSE PERSONAL CONNECTIONS AMONG RANKING MEMBERS OF THE PARTY. HE HAS BEEN A PROLIFIC REPORTER OF RELIABLE INFORMATION. THE REPORTED INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM CARLOS SANCHEZ CARDENAS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE OF THE PPS.

1. THE POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY (PPS) HAS NOT FORMULATED AN OPINION ON THE 12 AND 13 AUGUST 1966 ARRESTS OF VICTOR RICO GALAN AND SOME FORTY OTHER PERSONS ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION. HOWEVER, CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE OF THE PPS HAVE SAID THAT THE PPS WILL DO NOTHING TO HELP THEM

AND IN FACT IS PLEASED TO SEE PEOPLE OF RICO GALAN'S STAMP ARRESTED BECAUSE THUS ARE ELIMINATED ENEMIES OF THE PPS AND OF ITS SECRETARY GENERAL VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO.

2. ACCORDING TO CARLOS SANCHEZ CARDENAS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE OF THE PPS, IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO BELIEVE THAT A MAN LIKE RICO GALAN COULD BE THE LEADER OF AN ARMED REBEL MOVEMENT. HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED A MARXIST INTELLECTUAL BELONGING TO NO PARTY WHO HAS CONFINED HIS BATTLES TO THE PAGES OF MAGAZINES LIKE POLITICA, SIEMPRE, AND SUCESOS. LOMBARDO TOLEDANO FRANKLY THOUGHT OF HIM AS INCAPABLE OF DOING ANYTHING THAT INVOLVED A MASS FOLLOWING.

3. AS FOR RAUL UGALDE ALVAREZ WHO IS ACCUSED TOGETHER WITH RICO GALAN OF BEING A LEADER OF THE GROUP, SANCHEZ CARDENAS SAID THAT HE IS KNOWN TO HAVE ONCE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE YOUTH ORGANIZATION OF THE RIGHTIST NATIONAL ACTION PARTY (PAN) WHO THEN WENT TO THE EXTREME LEFT AND BECAME A MEMBER OF THE PEOPLE'S ELECTORAL FRONT (FEP). HE WAS AN FEP CANDIDATE DURING THE LAST ELECTION, SANCHEZ CARDENAS SAID.

4. THE PPS ASSUMES, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT CERTAIN, THAT THE MAJORITY OF THOSE ARRESTED ARE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERA-

TION MOVEMENT (MLN) AND BELONG TO THE RADICAL SECTOR OF THE MLN WHICH WANTS TO CONVERT THE GROUP INTO A MARXIST-LENINIST PRO-CASTRO POLITICAL PARTY.

5. SANCHEZ CARDENAS OFFERED THE OPINION THAT THOSE ARRESTED ARE OBVIOUSLY MORE IN TUNE WITH THE CHINESE THAN THE SOVIET VERSION OF MARXIST-LENINIST DOCTRINE. RICO GALAN AND POSSIBLY OTHERS HAVE MAINTAINED CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY AS WELL AS WITH THE SOVIET, POLISH, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIAN EMBASSIES. BECAUSE THEIR ALLEGED PROPOSALS FOR ARMED AND IMMEDIATE REBELLION ARE USELESS, PROVOCATIVE AND CRIMINAL THEY SHOULD BE CONDEMNED BY THE LEFT IN MEXICO BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT ONLY IMPERILED OTHER LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS IN MEXICO BUT THEY HAVE ALSO ENDANGERED THE SOCIALIST BLOC EMBASSIES WITH WHOM THEY HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH. CONDITIONS IN MEXICO ARE NOT PROPER FOR LAUNCHING AN ARMED REBELLION. THE PROXIMITY OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD DOOM TO FAILURE ANY SUCH ATTEMPT. IN THE FACE OF SUCH NEGATIVE CONDITIONS ARMED REBELLION SHOULD BE CONDEMNED AS ANTI-MARXIST.

6. HOWEVER, DESPITE THE ABOVE STATEMENTS, SANCHEZ CARDENAS SAID THAT IT WAS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT ARMED REBELLION WAS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

IN FACT PLANNED BY RICO GALAN AND HIS ASSOCIATES. IT IS INCREDIBLE THAT REASONABLY RATIONAL PEOPLE COULD ACTUALLY PLAN SO UNEQUAL A BATTLE WHOSE OUTCOME COULD ONLY BE TOTAL DEFEAT FOR THEM.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO.

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 77639

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA RDO ONE OCR OFN DCS CGS [illegible]

FBI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

170155Z CITE TDCS -314/10379-66

S-E-C-R-E-T

DIST 17 AUGUST 1966

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 16 AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARREST OF SUBVERSIVES

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (16 AUG 66) FIELD NO. HMM-13,612

SOURCE: HIGHLY PLACED POLICE OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON SECURITY MATTERS. HIS REPORTING IS BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE.

1. PRESIDENT GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ HAS ORDERED THAT PUBLICITY ON THE ARRESTS OF VICTOR RICO GALAN AND SOME FORTY OTHER SUBVERSIVES ON 12 AUGUST 1966 BE PLAYED DOWN AND THAT THE PRESS BE INFORMED THAT THE ROUNDUP DEVELOPED FROM INVESTIGATIONS WHICH [illegible] UNDER WAY FOR A LONG TIME. (FIELD COMMENT: THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE [illegible] "THE NEWS" OF 13 AUGUST QUOTED HIGHLY PLACED [illegible] OFFICIALS AS DESCRIBING THE ARRESTS AS [illegible].)

2. [illegible] IS AVAILABLE TO SHOW THAT [illegible] PART OF A CONSPIRACY

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

ADVOCATING AND TEACHING THE OVERTHROW OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT BY VIOLENT MEANS.

3. THE TIMING OF THESE ARRESTS IS VERY FORTUITOUS SINCE IT PAVES THE WAY FOR THE INCLUSION OF A POLICY STATEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATION ON 1 SEPTEMBER. DIAZ ORDAZ WILL CITE THE ARRESTS TO SHOW THAT THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT TOLERATE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OR INTERFERENCE BY EXTREME LEFTISTS.

4. ALTHOUGH PROOF IS STILL LACKING, THERE IS SUSPICION ON THE PART OF OFFICIALS IN THE MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT AND ELSEWHERE THAT THE EXPLOSION IN THE PEMEX REFINERY IN POZA RICA, VERACRUZ, WAS AN ACT OF SABOTAGE AND WAS CONNECTED WITH THE ARRESTS OF RICO GALAN AND HIS GROUP.

5. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS HOPED THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THIS GROUP AND CUBA, PRIMARILY VIA RICO GALAN, CAN BE DISCOVERED TO WARRANT A WARNING FROM DIAZ ORDAZ TO CUBA AND TO THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION TO KEEP HANDS OFF MEXICO.)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO.

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 89 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE H TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

TDCS-314/10[illegible]

HMM-10,610

ACTION IW (UMZ)	☒ RID COPY	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	UNIT	TIME 0115	BY D

INFO VR. FILE. ADDP. CA 2. CA/PEG. CA/PROP. CI/OPS. CI/IC 2. FI. FI/D CS/DO
FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO 4, DO/H 4, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, CS/SGO, WH/REG 8, WH/1/M S.

8262 17 Aug 65 IN 77639

S E C R E T 162310Z CITE MEXICO CITY EEAAAAAAAAA

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, MONTERREY (POUCH)

INTEL

SUPDATA LITEMPO/4 WHO HAD JUST COME FROM MEETING WITH LITEMPO/8. INTERROGATIONS CONTINUE AND STATION HAS BEEN PROMISED RESULTS. REF DIRECTOR 27990.

FILED 162310Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-336474
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 33/3

CS Elect 19 AUG 1966

ACTION		ADVANCE COPY	UNIT	TIME	BY
WH 8	☑ RID COPY	☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED			

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, C/SGO, CA 2, CA/O 4

MEXI

S E C R E T 172245Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3281

CS COPY

DIRECTOR

ANCRH FI
PS
ABSTRACT

17 Aug 66 78342

REFERENCE: A. MEXICO CITY 2533 (IN 82883 FEB 65)

B. MEXICO CITY 2594 (IN 86943 FEB 65)

C. DIRECTOR 87826

D. HMMA 25478

E. MEXICO CITY 3262 (IN 77639)

1. FROM REFS IT WILL BE NOTED LIRAMA HAS LONG BEEN INTERESTED IN VICTOR RICO GALAN AND HAS CONSIDERED WAYS CURTAILING HIS ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING CONSIDERATION AT ONE POINT OF TRYING DENATURALIZE AND DEPORT HIM. DENATURALIZATION, UPON STUDY, APPEARED TOO DIFFICULT AND CUMBERSOME. WHILE RICO GALAN AND GROUP, AS CLAIMED BY PRESS AND AS TOLD TO COS BY LITEMPO-8 ON 16 AUGUST 66, OBVIOUSLY INVOLVED IN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, BELIEVE MEXI GOVT'S KNOWLEDGE THESE ACTIVITIES RESULTED FROM LONG AND TEDIOUS SURVEILLANCE AND INVESTIGATION OF RICO GALAN, PURPOSE OF WHICH WAS DEVELOP INFO ON WHICH ACTION COULD BE TAKEN.

2. FORWARDING COPIES TWO MEMORANDA PASSED TO LIRAMA VIA LIELEGANT IN FEBRUARY AND APRIL 65 CONTAINING INFO ON RICO GALAN. THIS DONE AT REQUEST LIRAMA WHO THEN CONSIDERING

SECRET

RID COPY

201-336474
[illegible]

ECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8281 S E C R E T
ACTION AGAINST HIM.

S E C R E T

BT

AUG 31 9 16 AM '66

ECRET

NNNN

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICC GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
PART OF A CONSPIRACY ADVOCATING AND TEACHING THE OVERTHROW OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT BY VIOLET MEANS.

050-009-008
MEXI-08262
17 AUG 66
HMM -10610
P2

R 6609060856

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

SECRET

ORIG: MILAN HALLA
UNIT: SB/C
EXT: 6165
DATE: 16 AUGUST 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
XX NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

	ROUTING		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO SB/C BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 22 17 12 52 (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 29508

TO MEXICO CITY

REDBLOCK DIZTAG MHSPAWN

RE MEXICO CITY 8241 (IN 76854)

1. PLS AIRMAIL TO HETMANEK ADDRESS COPY 15 AUGUST THE NEWS ARTICLE AND ANY OTHERS SHOWING CZECH INVOLVEMENT.

2. PLANNING PLACE IN PRESS COMMENT FOR REPLAY ELSEWHERE.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/CA

C/SB/C

C/WH

WH/1

DC/SB/BLOC

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

TDCS-314/10347-66
HMM-10,602

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 28 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	E
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION		ADVANCE COPY	UNIT	TIME	BY
IW (EJMD)	CS COPY ☒ RID COPY	IW ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	SDO CS/DC	0200Z	D

INFO VR. FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D CS/DO
FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO/H 4, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, RI/AN, CS/SGO, SB 8, WH/C 8, WH/REG 8
WH/1/M 5

CS COPY

16 AUG 66 IN 70354

SECRET 152226Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8241

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, MONTERREY (POUCH)

INTEL

SUPDATA LITEMPO/1 TO COS 14 AUG. TRACES ON ARRESTEES BEING SENT SEPARATELY. LIENVOY REPORTED BROTHER OF VICTOR RICO GALAN, FERNANDO RICO GALAN SCHEDULED TO GO CUBA 12 AUG, DAY HE ARRESTED. ALTHOUGH LITEMPO/4 REFERS MRP AS TROTSKYISTS PRESS HAS NOT SO FAR DESCRIBED GROUPS OR THOSE ARRESTED AS SUCH. INDEX

FILED 15/2225Z

SECRET

O.K

CS COPY

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

ORIG: J. STEWART/nr
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 15 AUG 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 33/ PER ___ # ___

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/C8, CA2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, DO4, DO/H3

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 15 21 59Z

CITE DIRECTOR

(REFERENCE NUMBER) 27990

TO ~~PRIORITY~~ MEXICO CITY

~~DYVOUR PBRUMEN~~

A. MEXICO EMBTEL 878
B. MEXICO EMBTEL 879

RE ARREST RICO GALAN GROUP 12 AUG 66 REPORTED IN REFS AND REUTERS DISPATCH APPEARING WASHINGTON POST 13 AUG, HQS VERY INTERESTED RECEIVING STATION'S COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATION MEXICAN GOVERNMENT ACTION AGAINST BACKGROUND MEXICAN-CUBAN RELATIONS, AS WELL AS ANY ADDITIONAL PERTINENT STATION DETAILS. NOTE THAT REUTERS ARTICLE MENTIONED MEXICAN POLICE CLAIMS THAT MEMBERS GROUP "HAD BEEN IN RADIO CONTACT WITH ORGANIZATION IN CUBA." ALSO NOTE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT JUAN MASCARO REYES, FORMER EMPLOYEE CUBAN CONSULATE TAMPICO ARRESTED AND DEPORTED TO VENEZUELA ABOUT 26 MAY 66 WAS REPORTED HMM-10415 BY RELIABLE SOURCE B2 KEY CONTACT RICO GALAN.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/FI
WH/C/CICS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

IN 76854

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OOO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

FBI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET 160245 Z CITE TDCS-314/10347-66

DIST 15 AUGUST 1966

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 14 AUG 1966

SUBJECT: ARREST OF SUBVERSIVES HEADED BY VICTOR RICO GALAN: PEMEX EXPLOSION IN POZA RICA, VERACRUZ

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (14 AUG 66) FIELD NO. HMM-10,602

SOURCE: HIGHLY PLACED POLICE OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON SECURITY MATTERS. HIS REPORTING IS BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE.

1. FIELD COMMENT: THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT ANNOUNCED ON 12 AUGUST 1966 THAT INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF SOME GROUPS WHICH HAD BEEN CONDUCTED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS HAD PROVEN THAT THESE GROUPS WERE PLANNING CLEARLY SUBVERSIVE ACTS WHICH THREATENED THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF MEXICO. COORDINATED RAIDS ON THREE HOMES IN MEXICO CITY BY THE MEXICAN JUDICIAL POLICE AND SECRET SERVICE FORCES RESULTED IN THE ARREST OF THIRTY-THREE PERSONS AND THE CONFISCATION OF QUANTITIES OF ARMS, AMMUNITION, RADIO TRANSMITTERS AND MAGNETIC

TAPES. VICTOR RICO GALAN, WELL KNOWN COMMUNIST WRITER WHO HAS BEEN LINKED WITH TROTSKYIST GROUPS IN MEXICO , AND RAUL UGALDE ALVAREZ WERE IDENTIFIED AS THE LEADERS OF THE ORGANIZATION WHOSE NAME IS REPORTED TO BE THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRP - MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO). ALSO INCLUDED AMONG THOSE ARRESTED WERE RICO GALAN'S BROTHER FERNANDO (ALSO REPORTED AS VICENTE RICO GALAN) AND RICO GALAN'S SISTER, ANA MARIA RICO GALAN, WHOSE HOME REPORTEDLY WAS USED BY THE MRP AS A TRAINING CENTER. RICO GALAN AND HIS BROTHER AND SISTER WERE IDENTIFIED AS THE INSTIGATORS AND FINANCIAL BACKERS OF THE MRP'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITES. THE PRESS OF 14 AUGUST REPORTED MORE ARRESTS, RAISING THE TOTAL TO ABOUT FIFTY PERSONS. ACCORDING TO A BULLETIN ISSUED BY THE MEXICAN POLICE MANY OF THE PERSONS ARRESTED HAD BEEN INVITED TO MEXICO CITY BY THE LEADERS OF THE MRP WITH PROMISES THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED FOR HIGHLY PAID JOBS. ONCE IN MEXICO CITY, THEY WERE SUBJECTED TO TRAINING IN SUBVERSIVE TECHNIQUES, WERE HELD VIRTUAL PRISONERS, AND WERE THREATENED WITH DEATH IF THEY ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE THE HOUSES IN WHICH THEY WERE BEING TRAINED. A FURTHER ITEM IN THE POLICE STATEMENT REPORTED THAT GUMERSINDO GOMEZ CUEVAS HAD

BEEN ARRESTED. GOMEZ REPORTEDLY WAS IN CHARGE OF DRAWING UP PLANS OF ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL CENTERS IN MEXICO, INCLUDING RAILHEADS, POWER PLANTS AND PETROLEUM CONCENTRATIONS. GOMEZ CUEVAS WAS ALSO SAID TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF BOMBS AND SIMILAR DEVICES. FINALLY, ON 15 AUGUST THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY THE NEWS REPORTED THAT SEMI-OFFICIAL SOURCES LINKED BOTH THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND CZECH COMMERCIAL COUNSUL AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER EMIL HRADECKY WITH THE MRP'S ACTIVITIES. HRADECKY, WHO EARLIER IN THE YEAR HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF INTERFERING IN THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN NARAYIT STATE AND OF MEDDLING IN THE DISTURBANCES AT THE CERRO DEL MERCADO IRON MINES IN DURANGO STATE, WAS RECALLED BY HIS GOVERNMENT THIS WEEK.

2. FIELD COMMENT CONTINUED: ON 14 AUGUST THE EXPLOSION OF A TANK OF NATURAL GAS LOCATED NEAR THE PETROLEOS MEXICANOS (PEMEX) REFINERY IN POZA RICA, VERACRUZ, TOUCHED OFF TWO EXPLOSIONS OF TANKS OF DIESEL FUEL. SIXTY NINE PERSONS WERE WOUNDED, SIX HOSPITALIZED, FOUR OR FIVE ARE DEAD AND TWO ARE MISSING. DAMAGES WERE ESTIMATED AT SOME SIXTY FIVE MILLION PESOS. CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSIONS IS NOT KNOWN, ACCORDING TO A PEMEX OFFICIAL.

3. THE ARREST OF VICTOR RICO GALAN, RAUL UGALDE ALVAREZ

AND SOME THIRTY FIVE OR FORTY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRP) IS A FOLLOW UP TO THE ARRESTS IN APRIL 1966 OF EIGHT TROTSKYISTS. (FIELD COMMENT. THESE APRIL ARRESTS WERE EXTENSIVELY REPORTED. PLEASE SEE HMM-10,293/ (TDCS-314/05258-66) AND HMM-10,307/) THE ARRESTS WERE TIMED FOR LATE FRIDAY, EARLY SATURDAY TO PREVENT THOSE ARRESTED FROM OBTAINING BONDS OR AMPAROS AT LEAST UNTIL MONDAY, 15 AUGUST.

4. ALSO, AN INVESTIGATIVE GROUP FROM THE FEDERAL SECURITY POLICE IN MEXICO CITY WAS SENT TO INVESTIGATE THE 14 AUGUST EXPLOSION IN THE PEMEX REFINERY IN POZA RICA, VERACRUZ. (SOURCE COMMENT: THERE IS DEFINITELY BELIEVED TO BE A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ARRESTS OF THE MRP MEMBERS AND THE PEMEX EXPLOSION.) (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE REFERRED TO THE MRP GROUP AS TROTSKYISTS AND NOTED THAT MEXICAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN AWARE OF TROTSKYIST ACTIVITY IN POZA RICA FOR SOME TIME. HMM-12,551 OF 27 JULY 1966 REPORTED THAT SENIOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS BELIEVE POZA RICA TO BE OF KEY IMPORTANCE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF MEXICO BECAUSE IT IS THE CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH MEXICO CITY IS SUPPLIED WITH GASOLINE. FOR THIS REASON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS'

76854

TDCS -314/10347-66

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

PARTY/TROTSKYIST (POR/T) ARE BEING CLOSELY MONITORED IN POZA RICA. TROTSKYIST ACTIVITY IN POZA RICA WAS ALSO REPORTED IN HMM-10,316, HMM-10,367, HMM-10,384, AND HMM-10,400).

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO FBI.

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico/Cuba/Venezuela	REPORT NO.	CS -311/08152-66
SUBJECT	Deportation of Juan Mascaro Neves From Mexico to Venezuela	DATE DISTR.	15 June 1966
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	4-6 April and 26 May 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (27-31 May 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-10415

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: See below.

1. Source of paragraphs 2 and 3: Latin American with good contacts among members of the staff of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. He has reported reliably for a number of years.

2. On 26 May 1966 Professor Juan Mascaro Neves, a Spanish national who had acquired "Inmigrado" status in Mexico and who had been active in connection with affairs of the Cuban Consulate in Tampico, was picked up by three unidentified men who requested that he show them his identification documents. There was no information available through official Mexican Government services in Tampico on the detention of Mascaro. Since it seemed possible that the detention was not the work of Mexican officials, the Cuban Embassy protested to the Mexican Foreign Office orally. The Embassy was later informed that Mascaro had been deported to Venezuela for violations of the Mexican immigration law.

3. Mascaro was a key contact of Victor Rico Galan, Spanish-born Mexican Marxist journalist, during the latter's visit to Tampico and Ciudad Mante from 4-6 April 1966. Mascaro's wife, Carmen Garcia de Mascaro, has also been a close contact of the Cubans in Tampico.

4. Source of paragraph 5: Mexican security officer with access to information derived from investigative activities. His reporting is believed to be reliable.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
CINCSO # (ALSO SENT CARACAS)							USIA	I&NS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/R	1	WH/MEXI	1	WH/[illegible]	1		HMM-10415
CA/CIS/WH	1	WH/FI	1	WH/C	3				LIENVOY/LITEMPO
FI/[illegible]	1	WH/CA/P	1	WH/WAVE	1				(LIENVOY/LITEMPO-12)
[illegible]	1	WH/[illegible]	1	WH/PACY	#				CS-311/08152-66
CA/PROP	1	WH/[illegible]	4	WH/[illegible]RA	#				COORDINATING RELEASING
TOTALS IE 3, CI 4, FI 4, CA 2, WH/C 3 (1), DO/H 1, WH 9 (1)						LIAISON			WH/C/RR:[illegible] / WH/3/V:[illegible]:POH:xm

8. Mascaro Neves was picked up on 26 May by agents of the DFS (Direccion Federal de Seguridad) and was brought to Mexico City from Tampico. He was immediately deported to Venezuela. The basic reason for Mascaro's deportation was his close association with Rico Galan.[1]

[1] Source Comment: Mexican security officials are convinced that Rico Galan is a key Communist figure and that he is involved in plans to establish bands of guerrillas in the Mexican countryside.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico/Dominican Republic	REPORT NO.	CS-311/06825-66
SUBJECT	The National Liberation Movement-Observance of Dominican Republic Week; Criticism of Visit to Mexico of President Johnson	DATE DISTR.	23 May 1966
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	25 April 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (27 April 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-10335

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican security officer with access to information derived from investigative activities. His reporting is believed to be reliable.

1. On 25 April 1966 the National Liberation Movement (MLN - Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional) held a meeting in its offices at Republica de El Salvador No. 30-301 in observance of the Week of Solidarity with the Dominican Republic. Only about 35 persons attended the meeting which was chaired by Luis Cordova Ortiz and Guillermo Calderon Ita, in the absence of leftist journalist Victor Rico Galan who could not attend because of illness.

2. Cordova devoted his speech to a denunciation of the United States' "armed invasion" of the Dominican Republic, calling it an act which has aroused the indignation of the entire world. On behalf of the MLN he demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from that country.

3. Guillermo Calderon spoke briefly about the U.S. presence in the Dominican Republic, but devoted the better part of his speech to a criticism of the visit to Mexico of President Johnson on 14 April 1966. He accused the Mexican and United States governments of having kept secret until the very last minute the fact of an official visit which was falsely described as a courtesy visit. The visit was made on the pretext of unveiling the Lincoln statue, he said, but the fact that President Johnson brought with him all the members of his cabinet and his principal advisors, notwithstanding their

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
	CINCSO #						USIA	I&NS

(Note field distribution indicated by "#")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/FI	1	WH/MEXY	#		HMM-10335
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/CA/P	1	WH/PACY	#		LITEMPO
CA/INT	1	WH/6	1	WH/7/DR	2		(LITEMPO-12)
CA/PROP	1	WH/1	7	WH/SDOM	1		CS-311/06825-66
WH/R	1	WH/MEXI	1	WH/SSDR	1		COORDINATING OFFICER

TOTALS IX 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 13 (3), DO/H 1.

LIAISON 3

WH/7/DR/R HK Pc H

BY HB:POH:N

preoccupation with problems in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere, proved that Johnson had come to deal with matters of great importance to him and to Mexican President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. Or, he added, was it that Johnson had come to give instructions, or orders, to continue his policy of oppression of the people, in this instance, Mexico.

4. Calderon criticized sharply the Mexican Government for its methods in organizing the elaborate reception for President Johnson. The system of herding together the populace is accomplished, among other means, through threats made by union leaders to workers that they will lose a day's pay or suffer other losses if they do not participate in welcoming ceremonies. Calderon denounced officials of the Ministry of Foreign Relations for having remained silent in the face of a proposal by Secretary of State Dean Rusk for the creation of an international police force - "the type of security force that has in the past protected countries from North American aggression".

5. Again on 28 April the MLN held a meeting in observance of Dominican Week, this one attended by approximately twenty-five persons. It was announced at the last moment that the journalist Alberto Domingo, who was to have attended the meeting, would not be present because of a more pressing engagement. In his absence Armando Castillejos Ortiz and the poetess Norma Carrasco improvised a program. Castillejos expressed regret that the MLN does not possess adequate publishing facilities to keep the Mexican public informed of the existing situation in the Dominican Republic. He recommended that those present take advantage of every opportunity, in their places of work and at gatherings elsewhere, to disseminate by word of mouth the facts of North American domination over the weaker nations of the world. He noted that ninety percent of the citizens of the United States are not in accord with U.S. foreign policy.

6. Norma Carrasco's contribution to the meeting consisted of the reading of poetry which she had composed depicting the United States' invasion of the Dominican Republic.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT Rico-Galan	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-29417
	4. DATE 27 May 66
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM LITEMPO 12
	8. DATE OF INFO. Mar 66
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED
10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14.



3.11

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

MFG 1-65

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

22 S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION IW ☒ RID COPY (ADVANCE COPY TUBED CS/DO 0200Z B)

INFO DDP,
VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D , FI/INT 6,
CS/DO, DO 4, DO/H 4, CA/O 4, CI, FI/SPG, WH 13, WE 8.

S E C R E T 112327Z

APR 11 0140Z 66 IN 94278

DIR INFO PACY CITE MEXI 6851

INTEL MHFOLIO

SUPDATA LIENVOY: 10 APRIL; CONVERSATION OF JORGE L. TAMAYO AND VICTOR RICO GALAN

FILED 11/2325Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI : 10 APRIL 1966

SUBJECT: LEFTIST HISTORIAN'S PLAN TO REFUTE POPULAR IDEA THAT U.S. AIDED MEXICAN EXPULSION OF FRENCH INVADERS (1861 - 1867)

ACQ : MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (11 APR 1966) FIELD NO. HMM-10,242

IW COMMENT:

WH/REG 2
WH/1/M 5

TDCS-314/04789-66

X ROUTINE PRIORITY

BASED ON: HMM-10,242
LIENVOY (LIENVOY)

LIAISON: N

RELEASING IWO
LAUNIE M. ZIEBELL

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
11 APRIL 1966
0249 Z

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

Rico Galan

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

	ROUTING		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

FROM.

ACTION. ☒ RID COPY

INFO. VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEO, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

IN 94278 PAGE 2

SOURCE : MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN MEXICAN MARXIST CIRCLES. THOUGH NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MARXISTS, SOURCE ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF INDIVUDUAL MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP. HE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY ON MARXIST PERSONALITIES AND ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO.

IW COMMENT.

TDCS

ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

BASED ON.

RELEASING IWO.

DATE DISTRIBUTED.

LIAISON.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

COUNTRY MEXICO

TDCS -314/04789-66

DATE OF INFO. 10 APRIL 1966

DISTR. 11 APRIL 1966

SUBJECT

LEFTIST HISTORIAN'S PLAN TO REFUTE POPULAR IDEA THAT U.S. AIDED MEXICAN EXPULSION OF FRENCH INVADERS (1861 - 1867)

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (11 APRIL 1966)

REF IN 94278

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-10,242

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN MEXICAN MARXIST CIRCLES. THOUGH NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MARXISTS, SOURCE ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP. HE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY ON MARXIST PERSONALITIES AND ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO.

1. JORGE L. TAMAYO CASTILLEJOS, MEXICAN LEFTIST, DISCUSSED WITH THE LEFTIST JOURNALIST VICTOR RICO GALAN HIS FEARS THAT DURING THE CEREMONY ON 15 APRIL AT WHICH MRS. LYNDON JOHNSON WILL PRESENT A STATUE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN TO THE MEXICAN PEOPLE, REMARKS WILL BE MADE ON THE ADMIRATION WHICH THE MEXICAN PATRIOT BENITO JUAREZ FELT FOR LINCOLN AND ALSO THAT IT WILL BE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN FORCING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH TROOPS FROM MEXICO IN THE 1860'S. TAMAYO SAID THAT THE LATTER

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
CIA/NMCC, SECRET SERVICE (PRS), OS 4, FBI

STATEMENT IS UNTRUE EVEN THOUGH BOTH IDEAS ARE VERY CURRENT IN MEXICO.

2. TAMAYO TOLD RICO GALAN THAT SOME YEARS AGO WHEN THEN-PRESIDENT ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS WAS THE GUEST OF THEN-PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AT A DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER PROPOSED A TOAST TO THE HUNDRED YEAR FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES DURING WHICH THE UNITED STATES HELPED MEXICO EXPEL THE FRENCH INVADERS. TAMAYO SAID THAT THE TOAST WAS PUBLISHED AND THAT HE THEN PREPARED A RATHER LONG ARTICLE WHICH INCLUDED THE TEXTS OF LETTERS WRITTEN BY JUAREZ WHICH DENIED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD HELPED MEXICO AGAINST THE FRENCH. THE PIECE WAS PUBLISHED IN THE LEFTIST WEEKLY SIEMPRE. TAMAYO SAID THAT THE MEXICO CITY DAILY EXCELSIOR ALSO PUBLISHED ALMOST THE ENTIRE TEXT OF THIS REBUTTAL.

3. TAMAYO SUGGESTED TO RICO GALAN THAT THIS SUBJECT BE MADE THE THEME OF RICO'S NEXT ARTICLE FOR SIEMPRE. RICO GALAN SAID THAT HIS NEXT ARTICLE HAD ALREADY BEEN TURNED IN BUT THAT THE EDITORIAL HAD NOT YET BEEN WRITTEN AND THAT HE WOULD SUGGEST THE IDEA TO JOSE PAGES LLERGO, SIEMPRE PUBLISHER, BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THAT PAGES WOULD BE INTERESTED. (FIELD COMMENT: SIEMPRE APPEARS ON THURSDAYS.)

4. TAMAYO SUGGESTED THAT THE EDITORIAL TAKE AS ITS THESIS THE STATEMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF NAPOLEON III

BLACKMAILED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY SAYING THAT IF THE UNITED STATES HELPED MEXICO FRANCE WOULD HELP THE CONFEDERATE STATES.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR FBI, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

7

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR CI/OPS FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 042315Z

GUAT INFO DIR CITE MEXI 6753

REF GUAT 5881 (IN 89831)

5 APR 66 89052

INFO REF PASSED ODENVY LOCALLY AND PERMISSION GRANTED 30 MARCH 66 BY ODENVY PASS INFO TO HIGH LEVEL GUAT SOURCE.

S E C R E T

CFN 6753 5881ODENVY 30 66

BT

SECRET

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico/Guatemala	REPORT NO.	CS -311/04619-66
SUBJECT	Possible Travel to Guatemala of Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Leftist Journalist	DATE DISTR.	1 April 1966
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	21 March 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (23 March 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-10014

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Guatemalan professional man, former member of a guerrilla group in Guatemala who is living in exile in Mexico. He is believed to have good access to the Guatemalan exile community.

Victor Rico Galan, leftist journalist who writes for both Siempre and Politica, is planning to visit Guatemala clandestinely to investigate the disappearance of Victor Manuel Gutierrez Garbin, Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico, who returned to Guatemala in late February.

Field Comment: TDCS-314/03186-66 reported that Gutierrez Garbin and three other Guatemalan leftists were arrested and executed by the Guatemalan authorities on 6 March 1966.

Source Comment: Rico Galan could only enter Guatemala illegally since he was declared persona non grata by the Guatemalan Government in 1963 after he visited the country to interview President Peralta. While there, he also managed to talk with Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, guerrilla leader. Upon his return to Mexico, Rico Galan wrote articles favorable to the rebels and most unflattering to the Peralta government. Rico Galan's interview with Yon Sosa was arranged through Adolfo Mijangos Lopez who is now living in exile in Mexico.

5
4
3
2
1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
CINCSO # (ALSO SENT GUATEMALA CITY)							USIA	I&NS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/FI	1	WH/2/Guat	2	HMM-10014 LINSBEL (LINSBEL-1) CS-311/04619-66
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/CA/P	1	WH/GUAT	#	
CA/INT	1	WH/G	1	WH/PACY	#	
CA/PROP	1	WH/1	1			
WH/R	1	WH/MEXI	1			COORDINATING: WH/2/RO: [illegible]
TOTALS	IS 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 9 (1), DO/H 1.			LIAISON #		RELEASING: WH [illegible]:POH:km

RN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-336[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. SC

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CS COPY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Guatemala

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

CS COPY

AR NH

31 MAR 66 IN 88941

S E C R E T 302311Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE GUAT 5904

REF: HMM-10214, 24 MARCH 1966

1. REQUEST PERMISSION PASS TO LIAISON REF INFO PLANS VICTOR RICO GALAN TRAVEL GUATEMALA CLANDESTINELY INVESTIGATE DISSAPPEARANCE VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ.

2. ALSO REQUEST MEXI POUCH PHOTOS OF RICO.

S E C R E T

CFN 302311Z 5904 HMM-10214 24 1966 VICTOR RICO GALAN VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ MEXI RICO

BT

CS COPY

201-3366[illegible]

31 Mar 66

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10,214	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Lee R. MYLECHRAINE	DATE OF REPORT 24 March 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY	PROJECT # LIREBEL	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIREBEL-1	TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
~~5~~ - Hqs. 1 - CUAT 4 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - CINCSO through Panama City

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

LIREBEL-1 received the reported information from LIELEGANT who said that the Mexican Government was aware of Rico's plans.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 7-64 1467

CS COPY

(20)

201-336474

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

SUBJECT Possible Travel to Guatemala of Victor Rico Galan

REPORT NO. HMM-10,214

DATE OF REPORT 24 March 1966

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 21 March 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (23 March 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Guatemalan professional man, former member of a guerrilla group in Guatemala who is living in exile in Mexico. He is believed to have good access to the Guatemalan exile community.

Victor Rico Galan, leftist journalist who writes for both Siempre and Politica, reportedly is planning to visit Guatemala clandestinely to investigate the disappearance of Victor Manuel Gutierrez Garbin, Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico who returned to Guatemala in late February.

Field Comment: HCG-4148 reported that Gutierrez Garbin and three other Guatemalan leftists were arrested and executed by the Guatemalan authorities on 8 March 1966.

Source Comment: Rico Galan could only enter Guatemala illegally since he was declared persona non grata by the Guatemalan Government in 1963 after he visited the country to interview President Peralta. While in Guatemala at that time he also managed to talk with Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, guerrilla leader. Upon his return to Mexico, Rico Galan wrote articles favorable to the rebels and most unflattering to the Peralta government. Rico Galan's interview with Yon Sosa was arranged through Adolfo Mijangos Lopez who is now living in exile in Mexico.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISTRIBUTION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

2. ANALYST

3. DATE PROCESSED

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

4. RI FILE NO.

5. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

6. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SPANISH BORN MARXIST JOURNALIST
ALSO HAS NAMES OF OTHERS INVITED TO
THE CONGRESS.

050-009-001
MEXI-06351
22 FEB 66
HMM -10163
P2

R 6603150503

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(19-00)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET 3P

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XX MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 Press Expose of Victor Rico Galan's Connection with Yon Sosa

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. On 13 January 1966 a Mexico City newspaper, El Heraldo, published an article which cited a taped speech by Victor Rico Galan to Yon Sosa's guerrillas as evidence of Rico Galan's efforts to undermine the January 1966 visit of Mexican President Diaz Ordaz to Guatemala. A copy of this article is attached. The taped speech mentioned in the article is obviously that which Guatemalan authorities captured from Yon Sosa's guerrillas in October 1964 following a guerrilla attack on a Guatemalan military garrison. This tape was subsequently made available to KUBARK and was passed via the Guatemala Station to Mexico City Station for possible exploitation in Mexico. The content of the taped speech was later passed to President Diaz Ordaz by COS, Mexico City, with a view to stimulating pressure toward Rico Galan's expulsion from Mexico as an undesirable alien. How El Heraldo obtained or got word of the taped speech is not known. Since the El Heraldo article was pegged to the current trip to Guatemala of President Diaz Ordaz, it is very probable that the expose was stimulated directly by the Presidency, in line with a GOM campaign to neutralize all existing and potential opposition locally to the Presidential trip.

2. In a sharp rebuttal in the 26 January 1966 issue of the prominent Mexican leftist magazine Siempre, for which he writes regularly, Victor Rico Galan

(continued)

Attachments: NOT MICROFILMED
Articles As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
2 - WHD w/atts hw
1 - Guatemala w/atts hw
2 - Files

NOT MICROFILMED

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-733580

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28237

DATE
9 February 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-336478 FPH: P-7354
201-733580 FPH: P-7867

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-28237

denounces the El Heraldo accusations against him, denies any involvement on his part in subversive activities in Guatemala, attacks Guatemalan President Peralta Azurdia as weak and fearful about his personal safety, and insists (quite correctly) that the speech he taped for delivery to Yon Sosa's guerrillas in October 1964 could not possibly have had anything to do with President Diaz Ordaz' trip in January 1966. A copy of the Rico Galan Siempre article is attached.

3. At this stage the Station has no additional information on the origin or purpose of the El Heraldo attack on Victor Rico Galan. As and if such information develops through Station governmental contacts, the Station will advise addressees accordingly.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

Attachment to NMMA 28237
201-336494
CS Copy

POR VICTOR RICO GALAN

Sr. José Pagés Llergo,
Director de SIEMPRE!
Admirado y [redacted]go:

Tengo ho[redacted]ne a un asunto que me concierne personalmente, y uso por ello el estilo epistolar. Como el asunto involucra cosas que le importan al país, confío en que esta carta será de interés público, aunque para seguir un orden lógico me vea obligado a empezar por el aspecto personal que hay en él.

Como usted sabe, **El Heraldo de México** publicó el pasado día 13 un cintillo que decía "Fracasó la conjura comunista", bajo el cual se afirmaba que los guerrilleros guatemaltecos, en connivencia con malos mexicanos, preparaban una algarada o atentado —esto no se especificaba— contra el Presidente Díaz Ordaz, con motivo de su viaje a Guatemala. Según la nota "informativa", que llevaba las misteriosas siglas SNG (¿Servicio de Noticias de Guatemala?), el principal agente en esa conjura sería yo, y como prueba se ofrecía la supuesta versión taquigráfica de una cinta magnetofónica grabada por mí. Como existió, en efecto, una cinta que yo grabé, y como en el "pastiche" publicado por **El Heraldo** se utilizan frases que pronuncié realmente, creo necesario explicar la historia de todo ello.

Visité por primera vez Guatemala en octubre de 1963. En el número de **SIEMPRE!** del 30 de ese mes y año, apareció publicada una entrevista mía con el coronel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, que se iniciaba con esta descripción de su persona: "El coronel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, "hombre fuerte" de Guatemala, no da de ninguna manera la impresión de ser fuerte. Por el contrario, es oscuro, de hablar premioso, con una constante actitud tímida y sin brillantez alguna. No tiene ese tono decidido de los militares guatemaltecos que, digan cosas inteligentes o tontas, lo hacen con un énfasis de cuestión sancionada. En los pocos minutos de conversación con él, me expliqué muy bien por qué —pese a mi insistencia en contrario— aceptó sólo contestar mis preguntas por escrito. La transacción final consistió en que, una vez satisfecho el cuestionario en esa forma, hablaríamos brevemente en su despacho, sobre todo con el objeto de obtener una fotografía".

Esa discreta sugerencia de su tartamudez mental enfureció al coronel. Y más aun, cuento que en el mismo número de SIEMPRE! apareció otra entrevista, también mía, con el entonces líder del movimiento guerrillero guatemalteco. El coronel Peralta Azurdia le dijo a un colega chileno que lo entrevistó días después que yo, que se vengaría de mí donde quiera que me encontrase. ¡Y me imagino, no sin humor, el coraje que debe haber hecho cuando el colega chileno publicó su propio reportaje... y coincidió conmigo en lo de la tartamudez mental del señor coronel!

Lo cierto es que el hombre intentó en reiteradas ocasiones cumplir su promesa. Con motivo de su informe de gobierno, transmitido por radio y televisión a toda Guatemala, me acusó de haber ido a ese país a organizar "grupos de choque", y la AP y la UPI se encargaron de difundir la noticia, que la patriota, nacionalista y solidaria prensa mexicana publicó profusamente. El coronel "se vengaba", y yo callé por no dar importancia a la irritación de un personaje tan menor, irritación que, por otra parte, me explicaba perfectamente.

Regresé a Guatemala un año después, precisamente en octubre de 1964. Y, efectivamente, grabé un mensaje en cinta magnetofónica, destinados a varios guerrilleros a los que no pude ver. Nada tenía de misterioso ese mensaje. Contenía un saludo, algunas apreciaciones sobre el movimiento guerrillero hechas sobre el terreno por el observador, por el periodista, y noticias para los que tenían familiares en México. Ni una sola palabra que fuera necesario ocultar, ni una sola idea que no haya publicado, no una, sino mil veces. ¿Acaso es un misterio mi solidaridad abierta y pública con quienes luchan por la libertad de su patria? Mucho menos que misterio es delito, y yo me enorgullezco de esa solidaridad.

Lo cierto es, sin embargo, que esa cinta no llegó a sus destinatarios, porque fue capturada por el ejército guatemalteco. Y el coronel Peralta Azurdia encontró en ella la fórmula perfecta para una serie de maniobras que, por un lado, satisfacían su [illegible] y por [illegible] va pero no la única, ni mucho menos. Antes hubo rumores, acusaciones y chantajes contra muchas personas, a las que se acusaba de ser mencionadas en la cinta y de colaborar conmigo en mis tenebrosas conspiraciones. En mayo de 1965, el diario guatemalteco **Prensa Libre** —el de mayor circulación en su país— hizo pública una de esas "versiones". ¿De dónde la había obtenido? De un boletín enviado por la oficina de prensa del coronel Peralta Azurdia. Y esa "versión" tenía por objeto justificar la expulsión —entonces reciente— del distinguido intelectual y político guatemalteco Francisco Villagrán Kramer, mencionado en la cinta, lo cual era "prueba" de que conspiraba conmigo.

¿Y por qué sólo **Prensa Libre** publicó la versión? Pues por la razón simple de que provenía de un boletín oficial, y los otros periódicos de Guatemala se negaron a aceptarlo si no se les permitía oír la famosa cinta. Y claro que no se les permitió. Bajo una dictadura militar, los periódicos guatemaltecos tuvieron más ética profesional que **El Heraldo** en un régimen de libertad de prensa. Pero así son las cosas. Y algo que es también importante hacer notar: **Prensa Libre**, tan oficialista que acogió la sucia calumnia, es el periódico que ha hecho la campaña más grosera y negativa contra la visita del Presidente Díaz Ordaz a Guatemala.

La "versión" de El Heraldo tiene por objeto acusarme, a mí y a otras personas, de conspirar para echar a perder la visita del Presidente Díaz Ordaz a Guatemala. Yo fui a ese país por última vez —repito— en octubre de 1964, cuando el licenciado Díaz Ordaz era Presidente Electo. ¿Cómo iba a saber que se proponía visitar Guatemala? ¿Cómo iba a hablar de los asaltantes del cuartel de Ciudad Madera, en Chihuahua, si eso sucedió a fines de 1965, y en octubre de 1964 nada sucedía en Chihuahua? Eso, para mencionar sólo dos de las más abultadas falsedades de la "versión". Se utilizan unas cuantas frases auténticas, y se adoba una supuesta grabación para cada caso. Sencillo y sin problemas.

Pero, además, el coronel Peralta Azurdia se propone otra cosa con la "versión" de **El Heraldo.** Se propone justificar las extremadas precauciones policiacas que tomó para preservar **su vida** —no la del Presidente Díaz Ordaz— y la mala impresión que eso, y la falta de asistencia popular a la recepción, tuvo que causar al huésped y a su comitiva. Pese a que la tartamudez mental del coronel Peralta Azurdia y la de sus colaboradores mexicanos en el sucio adobo de la cinta no les permitió siquiera relacionar ésta con el viaje presidencial, la noticia termina diciendo: "Por todo esto **(¿por qué?)**, el gobierno de Guatemala creyó pertinente tomar todas las medidas necesarias que garantizaron la seguridad del mandatario mexicano y de los miembros de su comitiva, durante su visita a nuestra nación".

Pero la verdad es que tales precauciones se tomaron para garantizar la seguridad del coronel Peralta Azurdia —esa sí muy amenazada—, y no la del Presidente Díaz Ordaz, contra el cual no tenía nada el pueblo de Guatemala, y al que sólo los periódicos reaccionarios —en particular **Prensa Libre**— atacaron. Tan es así, que si bien en la capital el Presidente mexicano fue encerrado en un automóvil blindado —para proteger a Peralta Azurdia—, y si bien en la capital acudió poco público —para no aplaudir a Peralta Azurdia—, en La Antigua, a donde el licenciado Díaz Ordaz fue solo, sí hubo recepción popular entusiasta y sobraron las precauciones policiacas. ¡Claro, no estaba Peralta Azurdia!

Y, en relación con esto, hay algo que el público mexicano debe saber. La Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala la consideró seriamente la idea de otorgarle al Presidente Díaz Ordaz el grado de doctor **honoris causa.** El asunto se debatió extraoficialmente en el Consejo Universitario, y varios maestros propusieron la idea, porque significaba el reconocimiento a un mandatario civil y universitario, e indirectamente una bofetada a los gorilas de uniforme que gobiernan Guatemala. Y los consejeros alumnos estuvieron de acuerdo en que la tendencia era buena, pero objetaron el propósito por una sola razón: porque, por motivos de protocolo, la Universidad se vería obligada a invitar y recibir en su recinto al coronel Peralta Azurdia. En tal caso —dijeron— los estudiantes no acudirían. Y, ante este peligro, que desvirtuaba el verdadero objetivo político del proyecto, la Universidad no otorgó el grado. Está claro que no lo otorgó por una sola razón: por no recibir a Peralta Azurdia, no obstante las buenas intenciones para el Presidente Díaz Ordaz.

Así son los hechos, esa es la verdad. Y si el coronel Peralta Azurdia cree de verdad que me puede echar a mí la culpa de todo eso... pues [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

RI FILE NO.

DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

DATE

SOURCE CRYPTONYM

DATE OF INFO.

EVALUATION

ANALYST

DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

019-120-032
MEXI-05662
22 DEC 65
P2

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
JOURNALIST, CUBAN AGENT, MBR MLN NATL
COMMITTEE MAY ATTEND TRI-CONT CONF
/HMM -10046/

R 6601130849

HMY

FILE IN 201-336494

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-00)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

30 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
SR 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, NE6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S
E C R E T 082355Z

DIR INFO NEWD CITE MEXI 5556 9DEC65-IN 10793

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF DIR 63266

1. NO MEXI TRACES CARMEN CANO.

2. ANTONIO GONZALEZ DE LEON (SUBJ) CURRENTLY ASSISTANT SUBDIRECTOR GENERAL IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT OF MEXICAN FOREIGN OFFICE, HAS BEEN IN THIS JOB SINCE AT LEAST AUG 64.

3. PER LIFEAT AND LIENVOY SUBJ IN OCCASIONAL OFFICIAL (NOT SOCIAL) CONTACT SOVS, POLES, CZECHS 64-65. AUG 64 SUBJ DESCRIBED AS HANDLING UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS.

4 PER LIFEAT SUBJ INVITED 4 PAR 57 RECEPTION SOV EMB MEXICO, DID NOT ATTEND BECAUSE IN NEW YORK. SUBJ THEY WITH FOREIGN OFFICE.

5. PER LIFEAT ON 7 MAY 65 SUBJ CALLED VICTOR RICO GALAN 201-335474, COMMUNIST JOURNALIST AND KNOWN CUBAN IS AGENT, SAID HE HAD TO TALK TO RICO AND ARRANGED MEET FOR COFFEE. SUBJ ASKED HOW LOCATE GONZALO MARTINEZ. RICO GAVE MARTINEZ HOME PHONE 24-88-84, WHICH UNLISTED. PRETEXT CALL ESTABLISHED THIS PHONE OF GONZALO MARTINEZ CORBABLA, PRI PRESIDENT FOR

SECRET

File:
Rico Galan 201-

MEXICO CITY (FEDERAL DISTRICT) AND PRO COMMUNIST.

SECRET

CFN 5556 63266 NO MEXI CARMEN CANO ANTONIO GONZALEZ DE LEON (SUBJ) AUG 64 LIFEAT LIENVOY NOT SOCIAL SOVS POLES CZECHS 64-65 64 UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 4 APR 57 SOV NOT ATTEND NEW YORK 7 MAY 65 RICO GALAN 201-336474 CUBAN RICO COFFEE GONZALO MARTINEZ RICO 24-SS-84 GONZALO MARTINEZ CORBALA PRI PRO

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

31 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

CS COPY

☒ RID.COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, D/H 3, CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT

7 DEC 65 IN 09866

ACTION

S
E C R E T 072305Z

CS COPY

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 5531

1. LIENVOY OF 3 DEC REPORTED REQUEST BY CUBAN ALFREDO VINAS IN HAVA TO VICTOR RICO GALAN FOR SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH PROMINENT PERSONALITIES RE TRI-CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. RICO GALAN TO SEND TAPE OF INTERVIEWS TO HAVA.

2. NAMES SUGGESTED TO RICO INCLUDED: VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO, PPS SEC GEN; FORMER PRESIDENT LAZARO CARDENAS DEL RIO; DEPUTY ENRIQUE RAMIREZ Y RAMIREZ (ALSO PUBLISHER OF EL DIA); LUIS CARDOZA Y ARAGON, GUAT COMMUNIST IN MEXI; GUILLERMO CARNERO HOKE; JOSE PAGES LLERGO, PUBLISHER OF SIEMPRE; AND OTHERS RICO THINKS SUITABLE. RICO SAID PAGES IMPOSSIBLE BUT WILL CONTACT OTHERS AT ONCE.

S E C R E T

CFN 5531 3 DEC CUBAN ALFREDO VINAS HAVA VICTOR RICO GALAN TRI-CONTINENTAL RICO GALAN HAVA VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO PPS SEC GEN FORMER LAZARO CARDENAS DEL RIO ENRIQUE RAMIREZ Y RAMIREZ EL DIA LUIS CARDOZA Y ARAGON GUILLERMO CARNERO HOKE JOSE PAGES LLERGO RICO

BT

CS COPY

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED TO

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

050-006-034
DBB -21035
28 SEP 65
FBI

CIT ?
OCC ?
ON THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMM.
A MEXICO, MEXICO CITY MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION
NACIONAL /NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ C.P.
FRONT ORG

R 6510180621

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-63 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XX MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 MHSPAWN/Rico Galan Denigration Campaign

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
AUG 11 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REFERENCE: MEXI-4243

1. Attached herewith is a "portrait" of Victor Rico Galan compiled from information available to the Station and tailored to the outline proposed in MEXI-3822 for a phased denigration campaign targeted on Subject. This study has been passed to the contact cited in paragraph 3 of reference with appropriate caveats with regard to sourcing of hitherto unpublished portions as a basis for a projected article on Subject.

2. The "last-ditch" effort by LILISP-E to place an exposé of Rico Galan in a Merida newspaper (as noted in reference) has not yet borne fruit. The special article by the LILISP-E news service has been prepared but last-minute rewriting problems have held up distribution. Copies of the article will be forwarded as soon as they become available.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
3 - WHD w/att hw
3 - Files

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
0-50-126-22/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-26800

DATE
5 August 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-126-22/3

MICROFILMED
AUG 11 1965

Notes for

A Portrait of a Castro-Communist Agent

Victor Rico Galan was born 6 February 1928 in El Ferrol, Spain. He is Spanish by birth, became a Mexican citizen by naturalization in March 1949. He is married to Ingeborg Diener de Rico Galan, born 11 May 1929 in Mexico City. He resides at Ernestina Larrainzar 19-B, Col. del Valle in Mexico City. He writes for both Siempre, Mexico City leftist news-weekly, and Politica, pro-Communist bi-weekly newsmagazine.

VRG reportedly talked to Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in 1961 regarding the formation of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN) in Mexico. With their approval he became one of the founding members of the MLN and later headed the MLN Press and Propaganda Committee. In a speech to the MLN in April 1962 he stated, "The government must be made to understand that only the people have the right to violence." (This was in reference to the Mexican government repression of the Communist Party and its arrest of David Alvaro Siquieros.)

In an article in Siempre in March 1963 VRG advocated the formation of a new political party reflecting the ideology of General Lazaro Cardenas, former President of Mexico. VRG said this new political party was needed to truly represent the radical tendencies of the 1910 revolution. VRG conceived this new party as the political arm of the recently-formed MLN, which could thus develop into a broad national pro-Communist movement like the FRAP in Chile.

VRG has always been very close and sympathetic to the Castro-Cuban revolution. In 1961 he was a member of the Periodistas Mexicanos Amigos de Cuba. Also in 1961 he was reported to be a member of the Committee for Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution. In March 1962 he was reportedly a member of a group of four pro-Castroites who made an abortive physical attack on Emilio Uranga, writer for Siempre who has written anti-Castro items. As the group converged on Uranga other members of the Siempre staff intervened and the matter was settled without violence.

From October to December 1962 VRG was in Cuba, as a correspondent for Siempre and also reportedly to gather material for a political biography of Fidel Castro. In an article written for Siempre while he was in Cuba (Siempre 31 Oct 62) he extols the great Cuban revolution and the advantages Castroism has brought to the lower classes. In a later article (Siempre 14 Nov 62) he attacks the Soviet Union and Khrushchev for their weakness during the Cuban missile crisis. He refers to Fidel Castro as being the vanguard of the revolution against Colonialism.

From late May to mid June 1963 VRG was again in Cuba, this time to interview Fidel Castro following the latter's return from the Soviet Union. VRG reportedly spent 8 days with Fidel Castro, five of them aboard the Cuban leader's yacht, and also interviewed other Cuban leaders, including Blas Roca, Secretary-General of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP - Cuban Communist Party); Ernesto "Che" Guevara Serna, Minister of Industries; Oswaldo Dorticos Torrado, Cuban President; and Raul Roa Garcia, Minister of Foreign Relations.

It was during this May-June 1963 contact with Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders that VRG received a major operational assignment. He was given the mission of traveling through Central and South America to contact local Communist and guerrilla leaders. His job was to persuade these groups to begin campaigns of violence and terror immediately in order to take the pressure off the FALN in Venezuela, whose program of terror, heavily subsidized by Castro, was beginning to run into increased resistance from the Venezuelan government forces. On this trip VRG also had the mission of bringing about greater unity among the various Communist and terroristic groups.

In late 1963 VRG undertook his assigned mission. He traveled to Panama, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Brazil and contacted key Communists in each of these countries.

Among the Communist leaders which VRG contacted on this trip were Hugo Victor, President of the Partido del Pueblo (PDP - People's Party, a Communist group) and David Turner, a leader of the Vanguard of National Action (VAN - a pro-Cuban, radical revolutionary organization) in Panama; Gomez Ayay, a guerrilla leader in Guatemala; and Francisco Juliao, the revolutionary peasant leader, in Brazil.

In Nicaragua VRG met several times with Alvaro Ramirez Gonzalez, Secretary-General of the Movilizacion Republicana (MR - Communist Political Front) who was also a member of the Central Committee of the Partido Socialista in Nicaragua (PSN), the Nicaraguan Communist Party. VRG's visit with

Ramirez was given considerable radio and press publicity in Nicaragua. The press referred to "secret meetings" in VRG's hotel room between Ramirez and VRG. Ramirez answered by writing letters to the newspapers, saying he met VRG quite openly in his office and that VRG had called on him because he (VRG) was a legitimate journalist who was seeking interviews with various political figures. On 24 October Ramirez was interviewed on radio and finally reluctantly admitted that he had gone to VRG's hotel room. He said his purpose in going there was to take VRG to his (Ramirez's) office.

In Panama VRG stayed at the Hotel International. While in Panama he visited US installations and was seen taking many pictures. His talks with Hugo Victor and David Turner were aimed at getting the VAN and the PDP to resolve their differences and to unite. Turner briefed VRG on VAN's preparations to establish an armed movement in Panama. Victor, on the other hand, spurned VRG's to unify the two groups.

Following this trip in late 1963, VRG returned to Cuba (in January 1964) and visited Fidel Castro again and to report on the results of his contacts with Central and Latin American Communist leaders.

In late March 1965 VRG (with his wife) again traveled to Cuba to report to Cuban leaders. He returned to Mexico in early April 1965.

In May 1964 VRG was invited to visit Red China, ostensibly as a guest of the All-China Journalists Association, which indicated it would be willing to pay all costs, including transportation. Because of other pressing work in connection with his assignments on behalf of Castro, VRG did not accept this invitation.

Over the years 1961 to 1965 VRG's contacts with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City have increased steadily. He meets frequently and regularly with various officials of the Cuban Embassy, usually at his home, at the Siempre offices or at the homes of the Cuban officials in Mexico City.

His most frequent contact is with Manuel Eugenio Vega Perez, Third Secretary of the Cuban Embassy and chief representative of the Dirrecion General de Inteligencia (DGI - Cuban Intelligence Service) in Mexico. Obese and outwardly jolly, Vega Perez was the driver of a beer truck in Havana prior to the Cuban Revolution which launched him on his intelligence career.

Another VRG Cuban intelligence contact is Ramon Sinobas Casado, Counselor of the Cuban Embassy. Sinobas is Vega's assistant in"handling" VRG. It is apparent that these contacts are primarily for the purpose of channeling VRG's reports and instructions to and from Cuba. In the course of his work as an agent for Castro and the DGI, VRG is known to have acted as a courier, carrying material and large sums of money to pro-Cuban groups in Central and Latin American countries.

In October 1964 VRG received another important assignment from his Cuban masters. VRG was requested to travel to Guatemala to make a personal survey of the strength and weaknesses of Marco Antonio Yon Sosa's guerrilla forces and to lay the basis for a more energetic implementation in Guatemala of the tactical principles for guerrilla warfare laid down by "Che" Guevara. This was, in effect, a follow-up to his earlier visit to Yon Sosa during his swing through Central American countries in late 1963. At that time, VRG attempted to persuade Yon Sosa to align himself more closely with Castro's objectives in Latin America. The results of this visit to Guatemala were written up by VRG in a special report to Castro. VRG's conclusions at that time were not completely favorable to Castro.

Yon Sosa is known to be a forceful and independent guerrilla leader who prides himself on his ability to maintain himself and his followers independently of ideological guidance from either Havana, Peking or Moscow, although he is quite willing to accept arms and financial support from any of these Communist capitals. In the past Castro's efforts to bring Yon Sosa to heel have been thwarted mainly by the influence the Chinese Communists have been able to exert over the Guatemalan guerrilla leader. In addition to the direct aid provided by Peking to Yon Sosa and his guerrillas in Northeastern Guatemala, there is the fact of Yon Sosa's Chinese background (Yon Sosa's father was Chinese) which has served to tie him emotionally to the Red Chinese.

It was the continuing recalcitrant attitude of Yon Sosa which apparently prompted VRG's second mission to Guatemala in October of 1964. VRG was instructed not only to talk to Yon Sosa but also to try to influence Yon Sosa's guerrilla forces directly in line with Castro's objectives. In addition to prepared material which VRG used for lecturing the guerrillas he brought with him special propaganda films for indoctrination purposes.

In late October 1964 the Guatemalan authorities captured a number of tape recordings from Yon Sosa's guerrillas following a guerrilla attack on a government garrison. Included in these tapes was one made by VRG for delivery to the guerrillas during his early October visit with them. A copy of this tape is attached. The tape consists mainly of an exhortation by VRG for unity (between the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) and the 13 November Group) and a plea not to permit ideological arguments to replace action. In this speech VRG reveals himself to be a hard-headed revolutionary activist, not merely an intellectual leftist. His approach to revolution is completely practical, not theoretical.

To cover his mission as a Castro political action agent to Yon Sosa, VRG later published an "interview" with the latter (in Siempre No. 593, 4 November 1964).

VRG's involvement in the recent Dominican crisis is the latest example of his work on behalf of Castro. In early January 1964 VRG travelled to Santo Domingo, returning a week later to Mexico. Ostensibly this trip was to report on Dominican Republic affairs for Siempre. Actually this was merely a cover for a Communist propaganda assignment. Shortly after VRG left Santo Domingo, thousands of copies of a pro-Castro brochure, entitled "Siempre visita la Dominicana" and signed VRG, were distributed among Communists and Communist sympathizers in the Dominican Republic. A copy of this brochure is attached.

During his January 1964 trip VRG contacted both the Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD), a terroristic revolutionary Marxist-Leninist and strong pro-Chicom group, and the 14th of June Movement, the Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio (APCJ), a militant, revolutionary pro-Castro group. His contact with the MPD resulted in his furnishing material to the subversive MPD publication, Libertad. But his principal contact, one that developed rapidly into a very active relationship in the period preceding the Dominican crisis, was with Juan B. Mejia, leader of the APCJ. These two have maintained close and frequent contact over the past year. During the Dominican crisis VRG served as a relay point for material and instructions from Cuba to the APCJ and also acted as a reporting channel from Mejia to the DGI and the APCJ's Castro-Cuban leadership in Cuba.

As in previous operations of this kind, VRG cloaked his relationship with Mejia under a journalistic cover. An "interview" he conducted with Mejia appeared in the 2 May 1965 issue of the Cuban newspaper Hoy. A copy of the text of that article is attached.

In mid-May 1965 a gaffe by Mejia's and VRG's Cuban superiors exposed the Mejia-VRG-Cuba channel publicly. In an article carried by Porto Alegre (Brasil) newspaper Correio do Povo on 20 May, datelined New York 19 May by Louis Wisniser, a Radio Havana broadcast of 18 May was reported to have mentioned a declaration by Juan Mejia sent from Santo Domingo to VRG in Mexico, who then sent the declaration to Radio Havana. After citing this channel by which it received the Mejia statement, Radio Havana proceeded to broadcast the following excerpts from the declaration: "Numerous leaders of the 14 June Party have disappeared but I (Mejia) know that they are now in the mountains leading guerrillas. The 14 June Party has control of the situation in Santo Domingo." The Correio do Povo noted editorially that the Radio Havana broadcast seems to negate the Castro effort to deny that the 14th June Movement in the Dominican Republic is tied to him. The article concludes by noting that Mejia was one of the 58 Communists listed by the Americans, and that this confession by Havana puts new light on the question of American intervention in the Dominican Republic. Not noted in the article is the fact that VRG's role as an intermediary between Mejia and Castro is clearly exposed by the Radio Havana broadcast. A copy of the Correio do Povo article is attached.

When the Dominican rebellion erupted VRG began to agitate with the Siempre staff for outright and total support to the pro-Castro forces in the rebel camp. These efforts began to bear fruit when VRG was allowed to personally brief and dispatch a Siempre correspondent-photographer team to the Dominican Republic in early May 1965 to report on the crisis. The correspondent was Luis Suarez Lopez; the photographer was Luis Rodrigo Moya Moreno. The resulting articles in Siempre produced by this VRG-Suarez-Moya team were violently anti-US and pro-Castro Communist in their interpretation of the crisis -- so much so that they apparently touched off a bitter dispute between VRG and Jose Pages Llergo, Siempre director, who prefers to stick to the traditional Siempre role of a pseudo-independent outlet for a variety of leftist causes. VRG's efforts to reorient Siempre along more militant pro-Communist lines has long been known in journalistic circles in Mexico and the Suarez-Moya incident appears to have precipitated an open fight between the two. VRG is apparently aiming for a showdown with Pages Llergo over this issue, since several Siempre writers are known to have been individually approached by VRG over the past weeks to enlist their support against the present Siempre editorial policy, which VRG regards as too "opportunistic."

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

24 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH-8 CS COPY ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA-2, CA/PROP, DO-4, DO/H-3, WH/C-8, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CA/PEG

S E C R E T 261937Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4243

LNSPAWN

REF A MEXI 3322 (IN 92168) CS COPY

B DIR 21422 *

1. RICO DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN OUTLINED REF APPEARS STALLED AT MOMENT. FIRST ATTACK ALONG LINES REF A PARA 1-A WAS MADE ON LILISP-E NEWS BROADCAST 26 JUNE (SEE HMMA-26530). SHORTLY AFTER BROADCAST AN OFFICIAL OF MINISTRY OF GOVERNACION CALLED RADIO STATION AND WARNED MANAGEMENT THAT WHILE CRITICISM OF POLITICAL IDEAS AND VIEWS TOLERABLE PERSONAL ATTACKS ON INDIVIDUALS AS IN RICO BROADCAST WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED.

2. AT ABOUT SAME TIME LILISP-E ARTICLE PREPARED PER REF A PARA 1-A WAS REJECTED BY EL UNIVERSAL AS BEING TOO LIBELOUS. POSSIBLY RELATED TO GOBERNACION INTEREST IN LILISP-E RICO BROADCAST, EXCELSIOR ADVISED KALABILE IN 12 JUL LETTER THAT IN FUTURE EXCELSIOR WILL NOT REPLAY LILISP-E ARTICLES THAT INCLUDE PERSONAL ATTACKS ON INDIVIDUALS. IN FOLLOW-UP TALK WITH EXCELSIOR MANAGEMENT LILISP-E ARTICLE ON NCNA AND PABLO FONG INVOLVEMENT IN DRUG SMUGGLING (SEE HMMA-26619) WAS

26 JUL 65 IN 19087

SECRET

[illegible]
201-336474

CS COPY

CS COPY

SECRET IN 19077 PG 2

CITED BY EXCELSIOR EDITOR JULIO SCHERER GARCIA AS EXAMPLE OF LILISP-E ARTICLE WHICH EXCELSIOR UNABLE ACCEPT.

3. IN EFFORT DETOUR ABOVE OBSTRUCTIONS LILISP-E ATTEMPTING PLACE RICO STORY (PHASE I) IN MERIDA NEWSPAPER VIA LILISP-E SPECIAL NEWS SERVICE ARTICLE WHICH CAN THEN BE REPLAYED MEXICO CITY PRESS. MEANTIME, PURSUANT DIR 82482 APPROVAL, STATION IS ALSO PREPARING MATERIAL BASED REF A FOR PASSAGE TO ROBERT STROTHER, ROVING EDITOR FOR READERS DIGEST, WHO HAS TOLD COS THAT HE WOULD WELCOME AND WOULD BE ABLE REPLAY THIS MATERIAL IN SELECCIONES, READERS DIGEST LA EDITION, WHICH WOULD THEN PROVIDE PEG FOR REPLAY LOCALLY AND ELSEWHERE IN WH AREA.

*IF PAPERS REFUSE PRINT ORIGINAL MAYBE CHANCE THEY REPRINT FROM LILISP-E BULLETIN

SECRET

CFN: 4243 3822 21422 RICO DENIGRATION REF REF A PARA 1-A LILISP-E 26 HMMA-26530 GOBERNACION RICO NOT BY LILISP-E PER REF A PARA 1-A EL UNIVERSAL GOBERNACION LILISP-E RICO EXCELSIOR ENLAPILE 12 JUL EXCELSIOR NOT REPLAY LILISP-E EXCELSIOR LILISP-E NOMA PABLO FONG HMMA-26619 EXCELSIOR JULIO SCHERER GARCIA LILISP-E RICO I MERIDA VIA LILISP-E MEXICO CITY DIR 82482 REF A ROBERT STROTHER COS SELECCIONES LA WH

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	4. RI FILE NO.
	5. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 6. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
2. ANALYST / 3. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GALAN, VICTOR RICO
201-332474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
EDITORIAL WRITER FOR THE PUBLICATION SIEMPRE, SOURCE OF GEORGE NOVACK, A NATIONAL COMMITTEE MEMBER OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY /SWP/

019-004-131
DBB -16279
19 JUL 65
FBI
P2

R 6512011453

FILE IN 201-332474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14A-o Use Previous Editions (REVISED 4-65) MFG 1-65

INDEX ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 336474
X REF TO FILE NO 49

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM: MEXICO CITY

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: IW ☒ RID COPY

C0089

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 7, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA/O 4, CI, RI/AN, WH 18, WH/C 8

INDEXED AND CONTROL COPIES MATCHED

SECRET 092340Z 10 JUL 65 IN 06676 02187

3P

MICROFILMED
JUL 20 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

		WH 1

DIR INFO SDOM WAVE PACY LANT CITE MEXI 4092

INTEL

SUPDATA SOURCE LIFIEAT COVERAGE OF VICTOR RICO GALAN

FILED 09/2322Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM-9776 MEXICO/ DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SUBJECT TRAVEL TO MEXICO OF FAMILY OF EMILIO CORDERO MICHEL, DOMINICAN EXILE. DOI 2-3 JULY 1965 PADA MEXICO, MEXICO CITY 7 JULY 1965.

SOURCE MEXICAN LEFTIST WELL ACQUAINTED WITH MANY MEMBERS OF THE MEXICAN LEFT. HIS REPORTING HAS PROVEN RELIABLE. HE ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT FROM VICTOR RICO GALAN.

IW COMMENT:

WH/REG	8						
WH/1/M	5						
WH/2/DR/RE	5						

TDCS -314/09444-65

X ROUTINE PRIORITY

BASED ON: HMM 9776
LIFEAT

LIAISON:

RELEASING IWO: Edward L. Higgins
EDWARD L. HIGGINS

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
10 JULY 1965
0546Z

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-336474

14-00000

FORM 10-61 3000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(20) MFG. 12-64

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY MEXICO/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TDCS -314/09444-65

DATE OF INFO. 2-3 JULY 1965 DISTR. 10 JULY 1965

SUBJECT

TRAVEL TO MEXICO OF FAMILY OF EMILIO CORDERO MICHEL, DOMINICAN EXILE

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (7 JULY 1965) REF IN 05576

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 9776

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A MEXICAN LEFTIST WELL ACQUAINTED WITH MANY MEMBERS OF THE MEXICAN LEFT. HIS REPORTING HAS PROVEN RELIABLE. HE ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT FROM VICTOR RICO GALAN.

201-753070

1. ON 2 JULY 1965 EMILIO CORDERO MICHEL, DOMINICAN EXILE IN MEXICO CITY, TOLD VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN COMMUNIST JOURNALIST, THAT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN WERE DUE TO ARRIVE IN MEXICO CITY ON 11 JULY 1965, AND THAT THEY WOULD BE TRAVELING VIA MIAMI, FLORIDA. CORDERO SAID THAT HE HAD HAD TROUBLE GETTING HIS FAMILY TO MEXICO; THE VISAS WHICH HE HAD OBTAINED FOR THEM HAD BEEN CANCELLED BY THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AFTER THE DOMINICAN CRISIS ERUPTED, BUT HE HAD SPOKEN WITH GENERAL LAZARO CARDENAS, LEFTIST FORMER PRESIDENT OF MEXICO, WHO HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN HAVING THEM REVALIDATED.

2. CORDERO INFORMED RICO GALAN THAT HE WAS LOOKING FOR WORK AND THAT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
AD/CI 2 CIA/NMCC FBI I&NS

RID/MIS

JUL 16 10 22 AM '65

THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY HE MIGHT WORK WITH THE MEXICAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE "WITH LOPEZ MATEOS". CORDERO ADDED THAT THE DIRECTOR OF EL DIA, MEXICO CITY MARXIST DAILY NEWSPAPER, WAS GOING TO RECOMMEND HIM.

3. ON 3 JULY 1965 CORDERO SAID THAT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN WERE DUE TO ARRIVE IN MEXICO ON 7 JULY, AND THAT THEY WERE TRAVELING VIA KINGSTON, JAMAICA, BECAUSE THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT GIVE THEM A VISA FOR MIAMI.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: CORDERO AND HIS WIFE, JOSEFINA PEINADO DE CORDERO, ARE BOTH MEMBERS OF THE 14TH OF JUNE MOVEMENT.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO CINCLANT. (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO).

END OF MESSAGE

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

ORIG: C.R. Halliwell
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4523
DATE: 24 Jun 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

84 SECRET

DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	3
3		7	
4		8	

25 JUN 65 21 25z

TO: MEXICO CITY ROME MILAN CARACAS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 7 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WE6, CI/OPS

SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO ROME MILA CARA

22987

Halliwell

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXI 3880 (IN 96425)*

NO TRACES SARLER ORENGO. PARIS BUSINESS PHONE DIRECTORY LISTS "AGETECO" AS BINDING MACHINERY COMPANY; ADDRESS: NINE RUE DE LA REPUBLIQUE.

END OF MESSAGE

* Ref ZEAEE LIFEAT coverage Rico Galan and CArlos Cocciolo. Sarler Orengo, frenchman, received cable from Achistieri possibly Aget Co. authorizing him go Cuba.

WH/1/Mexis (draft)
[illegible]
[illegible]

Rico Galan
201 -

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 23 7 30 PM '65

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WE 6, WH/C 8, C/IC 2, C/OPS,

ACTION

S E C R E T 221553Z

DIR INFO ROME MILA CARA CITE MEXI 3880 23 Jun 65 IN 96425

REF MEXI 3471 ("95519)

1. FOLLOWING FROM LIFEAT COVERAGE VICTOR RICO GALAN AND CARLO COCCIOLI 16 JUNE 1965:

file RICO Galan 201

A. RICO TO COCCIOLI. LATTER STATED THAT ORENGO (PHONETIC- PRESUMABLY SARLER ORENGO OF REF) RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM ACHIETIERI (POSSIBLY AGET CO.) YESTERDAY AUTHORIZING AND PRESSURING HIM TO GO TO CUBA TO "PRESENT THIS MATTER...IN THIS QUESTION IN WHICH YOU ARE HELPING US, I WOULD LIKE YOU (RICO) TO GET MAXIMUM MORAL BENEFIT. ORENGO NEEDS A VISA; HE IS APOLITICAL, ON NEITHER SIDE. HE WILL NEED A VISA TO GO TO TALK TO WHOMEVER YOU SAY". COCCIOLI WOULD RECOMMEND THAT ORENGO TALK TO ALEJO CARPENTIER BUT "THIS IS SIMPLY A POLITICAL QUESTION". RICO SAYS HE TOOK UP THIS MATTER AND "THEY TOLD ME THAT IN CASE THIS MAN INSISTS IN THIS MATTER I SHOULD PUT HIM IN CONTACT WITH THE AMBASSADOR". HE IS STAYING AT HOTEL MARIA CRISTINA. COCCIOLI SAYS HE IS A VERY GOOD FRIEND, HAS BEEN ONE FOR MANY YEARS. COCCIOLI WANTS TO GIVE HIM (ORENGO) PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS, AS RICO SHOULD INDICATE, ~~[illegible]~~ ALSO THAT THE CASA SCHET (PHONETIC- POSSIBLY AGET) WOULD BE INTERESTED FOR YOU TO MAKE THE BOOK". RICO SAYS

SECRET

Rico Galan 201.
201-336474

SECRET PAGE 2 IN 96095

NO, WOULD PREFER THIS NOT BE DONE, FOR OTHER REASONS WHICH THEY WILL DISCUSS LATER. RICO WILL PHONE EMBASSY AND TRY TO ARRANGE INTERVIEW WITH AMBASSADOR FOR TOMORROW. RICO WILL TAKE HIM TO TALK TO AMBASSADOR WHO SPEAKS FRENCH. COCCIOLI DOES NOT WANT TO GET MIXED UP IN THIS MATTER. HE WOULD ACCOMPANY THIS MAN WITH PLEASURE BECAUSE COCCIOLI COULD EXPLAIN TO AMBASSADOR SINCERELY WHAT IS BEHIND ALL THIS. THIS MAN IS TECHNICAL ATTACHE OF THE DIRECTION GENERAL DE ACHATS (?) AND HE KNOWS ALL ABOUT CASTRO TO DATE. HE WAS SENT PRECISELY FOR ACHATS (PURCHASES ?).

B. RICO TO COCCIOLI: RICO HAD TO GO BY (CUBAN) EMBASSY BECAUSE PHONES WERE BLOCKED. TALKED WITH AMBASSADOR AND WILL EXPECT THEM ON FRIDAY (15 JUNE) AT 1700. RICO AND COCCIOLI DISCUSS CUBANA SCHEDULES AND NEED FOR VISA WHICH RICO EXPLAINS HAS TO BE REQUESTED FROM HAVANA. COCCIOLI SAYS ORENGO HAS LITTLE TIME, WAS TO LEAVE FOR PARIS ON SUNDAY BUT MEANWHILE HAD RECEIVED THIS TELEGRAM TO GO HAVANA. RICO SAYS AMBASSADOR WANTS COCCIOLI AND RICO TO ACCOMPANY ORENGO. THEY PLAN TO MEET AT COCCIOLI'S AT 1630 ON FRIDAY.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CFN + ~~RE [illegible] ARTICLE [illegible]~~ SHOOTING ~~[illegible] PUBLISHED MEXICO CITY~~ LA PRENSA.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

C.R.Halliwell

ORIG: C.R.Halliwell
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4523
DATE: 21 Jun 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

VB/ SECRET

ROUTING			
1	/	5	
2		6	FI
3		7	CA
4		8	

TO: MEXICO CITY

21 Jun 65 22 00 0

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/PEG, WH/CB, SIG CEN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 21420

MHSPAWN

REF: MEXI 3822 (IN 92168)*

1. CONCUR WITH STATTON'S APPROACH. UNDER FIRST PHASE OF DENIGRATION (PARA 1 A) REF COULD TICHBORN MAKE USE OF EMILIO PACHECO WHO ON BOTH PAYROLLS TO ENCOURAGE PAGES LLERGO OUST RICO GALAN FROM SIEMPRE?

2. HOPE THAT IN SECOND PHASE, YOU CAN EXPOSE SUBJ DIRECTLY. IF PAPERS REFUSE PRINT ORIGINAL MAYBE CHANCE THEY REPRINT FROM LILISP-E BULLETIN. MAJOR SECURITY CAUTION IS NOT PLAY DENIGRATION ALL ASSETS SIMULTANEOUSLY.

END OF MESSAGE

*Ref article provides long-awaited peg launch press campaign aimed at exposing Victor Rico Galan as Castro-Communist agent.

C/CA/PROP/Fryerson (in draft) S/Hon

WH/P/B

Rico Galan
201-336474

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, WHD

R.J. Kaufman
C/WHD/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

24 SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: Mexico City

ACTION: WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO: FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI

S E C R E T 102237Z 10 JUN 65 IN 87724

DIR CITE MEXI 3762

1. ON 31 MAY LIFEAT ON VICTOR RICO GALAN (VRG) REPORTED CALL FROM MIREYA DE VAN RABEN, MEMBER CENTRAL COMMITTE PARTIDO OBRERO REVOLUCIONARIO (TROTSKISTA) (POR/T), MEXICAN SECTION FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

WIFE OF JOAQUIN VAN RABEN BRETON, WHO REPORTEDLY TREASURER OF POR/T. MIREYA INVITED VRG TO DINE WITH VAN RABENS AND SOME AMERICAN ECONOMISTS. VRG MET THESE PEOPLE - THE ZINOVAK (PHONETIC). ANOTHER COUPLE ALSO COMING WHOSE NAME MIREYA FORGOT, AN ECONOMIST, INTERESTING, WELL-TRAVELED WHOM VRG MUST ALSO KNOW. THEY ARE AMERICANS, SPEAK SPANISH.

2. ON 4 JUNE LIFEAT ON VRG REPORTED VRG CALL TO OFFICE JOAQUIN VAN RABEN WHO MANAGER OFFSET DIVISION GESTETNER S.A. JOAQUIN SAID VRG WAS TO HAVE PHONED HIM YESTERDAY TO CONFIRM WHETHER THEY WERE GOING TO MEET "THERE AT 1600". VRG SAID NO, APPOINTMENT WAS CONFIRMED HERE AT 1700. JOAQUIN INSISTED IT WAS TENTATIVELY AT 1600 AND ADDED THEY ALSO HAD TO TALK ABOUT "THAT FAMOUS TRIP". WHAT ABOUT TRIP? VRG SAYS "WE ARE GOING TOMORROW (SATURDAY) AT NOON". OR CAN WAIT TILL SUNDAY. JOAQUIN WILL TRY TO ARRANGE THINGS TO LEAVE SUNDAY. VRG SAID IF JOAQUIN CAN'T, O.K. WILL SEE

SECRET

SECRET IN 87724 Pg

EACH OTHER THURSDAY WHEN VRG RETURNS. JOAQUIN CAN CONTACT VRG IN MONTERREY.

3. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, WH Division		MARKED FOR INDEXING
		XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
○ Victor RICO Galan and Arnaldo ORFILA Reynal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Source: LIENVOY/2

1. Attached is microfilm on which were photographed the Gobernacion files of Victor RICO Galan (201-336474) and Arnaldo ORFILA Reynal (201-).

2. These were made available on loan by LIENVOY/2 on 7 June 1965.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Enclosure:
Microfilm

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/encl

1AH

CS COPY

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-26313	DATE 9 June 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-336474 201-

14-00000

VICTOR RICO GO[illegible]
Calle de Madrid 30 .
México D.F.

Lisboa Portugal 15-12-40 2302

Como ampliación a la instancia que elevé el 26 de Enero último al Sr. Director de Inmigración, Secretaría de Gobernación y a fin de cumplir todos los trámites exigidos para que la esposa é hijos del que suscribe Victor Rico González puedan entrar en México, me permito informar a Vd. que mi estancia en esta República tiene estado legal por estar en posesión de la forma 5, nº 118,[illegible] expedida en Veracruz el día de mi llegada 6 de [illegible], de 1939, y de la forma 14, nº [illegible] expedida en México D.F. el 14 de Novbre de 1939.

Mis hijos Victor Rico Galán, Fernando Rico Galán, y Ana María Rico Galán, han nacido en la ciudad del Ferrol – España – el 6 de Febrero de 1928, el 9 de Abril de 1929 y el 14 de Septbre de 1930, respectivamente contando en la actualidad, con 11, 10, y 9 años.

La forma en que por las trágicas vicisitudes de la guerra me ví obligado a abandonar a España, no me han permitido el tener en mi poder la partida de casamiento que acredite oficialmente mi matrimonio con mi esposa Fernanda Galán Guerra ya que además desde el comienzo de la guerra estuve separado de mi familia y del lugar donde me casé – Galicia –. Entre la actual Colonia Española existen muchos compatriotas con quienes me unen antiguos vínculos de amistad y a quienes les consta de manera indudable mi matrimonio, y por ello uno a este escrito una certificación que así lo acredita, ya que es el único medio hábil de que dispongo para probar esta verdad.

También adjunto al presente escrito, una certificación de la razón social "[illegible]", en quienes trabajo por la que se vé que efectivamente dispongo de los medios económicos suficientes para el sostenimiento de mi familia cuando llegue aquí. A mayor abundamiento presento otro documento de garantía suscrito por propietario del restaurant Milagros, Sr. Ramón Prieto.

Espero de su recto proceder que con los informes y documentos que se aportan juntamente con el presente escrito habrá de resolverse mi instancia favorablemente.

México D.F. 30 de Enero de 1940.

V. R[illegible]

CON 3 ANEXO

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION
[illegible] 1 - 21 5
[illegible]NCIA

05[illegible]0

Sr. Director de Inmigración, Secretaría de Gobernación.

Pieza anterior
4727-

que queden sus documentos en Lisboa Portugal

POR. $ 500.00

Recibi de los Sres. Trigueros y Ginard la suma de:— $ 500.00 QUINIENTOS PESOS MONEDA NACIONAL, por condepto de co--------- misiones durante el presente mes por ventas hechas - por mi conducto.

México, D. F. 31 de Enero de 1940.

(V. Ri–)

GLOSADOR
2
ARCHIVO

México D.F. 30 de Enero de 1940.

TRIGUEROS Y GINARD.

Trigueros

GLOSADOR
2
ARCHIVO

TRIGUEROS Y GINARD

CABLE: "GITRI"

AGENTES EN GENERAL

ISABEL LA CATOLICA, 33
DESPACHO 200
MEXICO, D. F.

La razón social "Trigueros y Ginard" con cédula de Empadronamiento nº 12527.

Certificamos:

Que el Sr. Victor Rico González, trabaja como comisionista en esta casa, siendo sus ingresos mensuales de 500.00. pesos.

Lo que hacemos constar a petición del interesado.

México D.F. 30 de Enero de 1940.

TRIGUEROS Y GINARD.

Jaime Ginard

2

extranjero como "la pluma"

RESTAURANT
MILAGROS"
VENUSTIANO CARRANZA 47 ALTOS
TEL. ERICSSON 3-76-08
MEXICO, D. F.

COCINA ESPAÑOLA
Y FRANCESA
CENAS AMERICANAS
SERVICIO A LA CARTA
ESPECIALIDAD EN
BANQUETES

Ramón Rodriguez Prieto, ciudadano español, con residencia en México D. F., copropietario del Restaurant Milagros, en V. Carranza # 47, y con su Fórmula I4 # I284I9, manifiesta:

Que se compromete a la manutención, viajes y traslado de la Sra. Fernanda Galain Sueiras, esposa del Sr. Victor Rico Gonzalez, y sus hijos menores Víctor, Fernando y Ana María Rico Galain.

Y, para los efectos legales oportunos, firmo el presente escrito en México a 30 de Enero de I,940.

RAMON RODRIGUEZ PRIETO

RESTAURANT MILAGROS
MEXICO, D. F.
VENUSTIANO

2

durla y a establecerse en el extranjero como la pluma

DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION.

CLASIFICACION.- 4/361.8"40"/2383

NOMBRE.- Victor Rico Galan, Fernando Rico Galán y Ana María Rico Galán.

ASUNTO.- Victor Rico Galán, solicita la internación de los todos sus hijos.

ooo

2392

201-336117

Att to 7575A 26313

Los que suscriben Señores Marcial Fernández Vazquez, Benito Dopico Ferreiro y Jesús Dopico Ferreiro, con Residencia legal en México, mediante las formas 5a y 14a, números 118226-122504 y 122483 expedidas en Veracruz en 28 de Junio y 7 de Julio de 1.939, respectivamente, profesores del Instituto Hispano Mexicano "Ruiz de Alarcon" de esta capital y con domicilio, el primero en la Avenida de Coyoacan 100-C y los segundos en la Calle de Serapio Rendón Números 96-20 y98-28 respectivamente, certifican ante quien corresponda que desde la infancia conocen y mantienen amistad con el Señor Victor Rico Gonzalez, yá que los cuatro han vivido y nacido en la ciudad de Ferrol (Galicia) y les consta de una manera cierta que el Señor Rico Gonzalez, contrajo matrimonio en Septiembre de 1.922, con Doña Fernanda Galan Sueiras, tambien natural de Ferrol, y de cuyo matrimonio existen tres hijos, llamados Victor, Fernando y Ana Maria, de doce, diez y nueve años respectivamente.

Y para que conste y surta sus efectos ante quien corresponda y a petición del interesado, expedimos la presente que firmamos y rubricamos en esta ciudad de Mexico D.F. a treinta y uno de Enero de mil novecientos cuarenta.

Benito Dopico Ferreiro

Marcial Fernández

Jesús Dopico

GLOSADOR
2
ARCHIVO

-ama y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma"

[illegible]

4/352.8"40"/2392.

[illegible]

Al [illegible] de
Relaciones Exteriores.
[illegible]

Esta Secretaría con apoyo en los artículos 65 de la Ley General de Población y 27 de las Tablas Diferenciales vigentes, ruega a usted se sirva instruir al Consulado que corresponda, para que documente a la señora [illegible] y a sus hijos [illegible] y [illegible], todos de nacionalidad española, quienes probablemente arribarán en [illegible] actualmente, como inmigrantes por un año prorrogable y [illegible] con el carácter de asilados políticos, teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el artículo [illegible] de [illegible] citadas, en la inteligencia de que los mencionados [illegible] entrada y [illegible] de los mismos [illegible] en el país con [illegible].

[illegible] 194 .

FEB 17 1940
MESA DE CORRESPONDENCIA
Y CONTROL

c.c.p. [illegible]
c.c.p. [illegible]
c.c.p. [illegible]
c.c.p. [illegible]
c.c.p. [illegible]
c.c.p. [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] e/e.

ARCHIVO 2

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION

FORMA G G 9

DEPENDENCIA: GOBERNACION.
OFICINA: [illegible] MIGRACION.
MESA: [illegible]
NUMERO DEL OFICIO:
EXPEDIENTE: [illegible] 351.3/405.

ASUNTO: Se comunica que los [illegible] se internaron al país como [illegible]

N. Laredo, [illegible] Marzo 20 de 1.40

Al C.
Secretario de Gobernación
Dirección General de Población
Departamento de Migración
Mexico, D.F.

15730
4/351.3-40/2392

Me es grato comunicar a usted que con fecha [illegible] del actual, previa autorización de la forma 5 número 547/37, expedida por [illegible] Cónsul [illegible] Lisboa [illegible], esta Oficina a mi cargo permitió la internación de la señora Fernanda Galán [illegible], de nacionalidad española, en calidad de de Inmigrante por un año, con características de asilado político, de conformidad con su correspondencia 5913 expediente 4/351.3 "402/-2392, de 15 de febrero último: igualmente se permitió la internación de sus hijos menores Víctor Rico Galán, Fernardo Rico Galán y Ana María Rico Galán, para el exclusivo objeto de que se unan con su esposo y padre el señor Víctor Rico González, de la misma nacionalidad quien se encuentra en territorio nacional en la misma calidad y de quien deberán depender económicamente.- Se les advirtió la obligación que tienen de inscribirse en el Registro de Extranjeros dentro de un plazo que no exceda de 30 días a partir de la fecha de su internación y no se le exigió a la señora [illegible] pago del impuesto de inmigración ni garantía de repatriación en virtud de lo ordenado por el artículo 96 de nuestra Ley General de Población en vigor.

R E S P E T U O S A M E N T E.
SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION.
El Jefe del Servicio de Población.

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION
940 MAR 29 10 59
CORRESPONDENCIA

Correspondencia y Archivo
RECIBIDO
26

durla y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma"

DIR. GRAL. POBL.
DPTO. MIGRACION.

ESTUDIO DE PROMOCIONES.
FAMILIARES Y VARIOS.

4/381.8"40"/7392.

Enterado internación de las personas abajo citadas.

12111

Al C.
Jefe de la Oficina de Población,
NUEVO LAREDO, Tamps.

Ref: Su of. 807 de 20 de marzo último.-

Por su atento oficio citado en antecedentes, ha quedado enterada esta Secretaría, de que con fecha 22 de marzo último, permitió la internación de la Sra. FERNANDA GALAN BUTIRAS e hijos menores VICTOR RICO GALAN, FERNANDO RICO GALAN y ANA MARIA RICO GALAN, todos de nacionalidad española, de acuerdo con correograma 5913 de 15 de febrero último.

Atentamente.

SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION.
México, D.F., a 8 de abril de 1940.
POR AC. DEL C. JEFE DEL DEPTO.
EL JEFE DE LA SECCION.

José C. Uo Leal.

SECRETARIA
ABR 9 1940
Y CONTROL

C.c.p. Revisión y Crítica de Documentos.

obs-ent.-15730.-3/cpa.

GOBERNACION
2
ARCHIVO

duría y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma

PROCURADURIA GENERAL
DE LA REPUBLICA

3518/2392

Forma C-1

DEPENDENCIA DIRECCION GENERAL
DE AVERIGUACIONES PREVIAS

SECCION JEFE
MESA
NUMERO DEL OFICIO 13476
EXPEDIENTE 10-200

R 53032

ASUNTO: Se remite original escrito.

México, D. F., a 5 de octubre de 1959.

C. SECRETARIO DE GOBERNACION
PRESENTE.

Por ser de su competencia, me permito remitir a usted, el escrito de fecha 28 de abril anterior, en el que el Profesor JORGE GUTIERREZ H., Secretario de la Junta de Mejoramiento Moral Cívico y Material de Papantla de Orlarte, Ver., en relación a hechos que se imputan al Sr. VICTOR RICO GALAN, en su calidad de Extranjero.

so: foja útil ori al

A t e n t a m e n t e.
SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION.
EL DIRECTOR.

LIC. MANUEL ROSALES MIRANDA.

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION
OCT 23 1959
OFICIALIA DE PARTES

AJH-rcl

C.-C AL Prof. JORGE GUTIERREZ HERRERA.
Olivo 7.- PAPANTLA de OLARTE. VER.

ANEX

(AÑO DEL PRESIDENTE CARRANZA)

---

expresion de la sabiduría y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma

5-0/

A DE MEJORAMIENTO MORAL, CIVICO Y MATERIAL

OLIVO NUM. 7
PAPANTLA DE OLARTE, VER.

Vol 1402
Doc. 541

5

Víctor Rico Galán es uno de los tantos extranjeros que sobran en el País.

PRESIDENTE
Milo Arellano
VICE-PRESIDENTE
Rafael Caballero
SECRETARIO
f. Jorge Gutiérrez H.
TESORERO
mingo Yorio Lamoglia
VOCALES
Herminio Martínez C.
Ernesto Bauza S.
Pedro Bautista R.
Narciso Jiménez
Angel Pulido Grassi
r. Nieves Martínez
r. Nemorio Martínez P.
irita. Rosa Elvira de la Sierra
irita. Guadalupe Salas García
Sra. [illegible] Collado
Sra. Elvira Blanco de Villa
Sra. Nieves Morgado de G.

13 MAY 1959
CONTR.

28811

C. Lic. Fernando López Arias,
Procurador General de la República
México, D.F.

Ante la magnitud de los problemas nacionales, se ha hecho pesar su serenidad e inteligente política, y ha demostrado que, independiente del ejercicio de su calidad moral, y de su grande condición de amigo, es usted el revolucionario que cumple sus compromisos con el pueblo mexicano y ejerce el poder con la seguridad de su propia responsabilidad, haciendo pesar el Derecho como inviolable principio y como condición irrenunciable de los magníficos preceptos de la Ley.

Usted se debe a México, señor Procurador, y por él trabaja y piensa, desentendiéndose de cobardes artículos que circulan plenos de insultos y comentarios de quienes no creen en la relevancia de su actuación, partiendo esta crítica de los emboscados que por sistema hacen de la murmuración una arma innoble y descastada para volcar sus amarguras.

La ayuda y dinero ajeno y la propaganda habilidosa ha permitido que personas tan descalificadas, moral e intelectualmente, como Víctor Rico Galán y otros tantos [illegible], lleguen a destacar como articulistas de fondo en prestigiadas revistas capitalinas para vergüenza de la intelectualidad mexicana. A pesar de su condición de extranjero Rico Galán ha demostrado su desacato hacia nuestras leyes e instituciones, y su desprecio a la tradicional hospitalidad mexicana, escribe deliberadamente pretendiendo engañar a sus lectores de que lleguen a considerar que el [illegible] del Lic. Adolfo López Mateos, es enemigo de la clase trabajadora. Por lo que se deduce que Víctor es uno de los tantos extranjeros que sobran en el País.

Lo que ha hecho usted es que se respete nuestra soberanía y simultáneamente ha defendido y dejado incólumes todos los derechos de los trabajadores mexicanos, por lo que sería un error imperdonable confundir su digna y patriótica actitud como una claudicación de los ideales y principios que siempre ha sostenido y defendido.

como la maxima expresión de la sabiduría y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma

ATENTAMENTE

Papantla de Olarte, Ver., abril 20 de 1959

El Secretario de la Junta,

Profr. Jorge [illegible] Herrera

C. PRESIDENTE

PAPANTLA DE OLA

dirigido al C.

a esta Dependc

siguientes

los

ha

es

fica

cond.

Usted

l

u.

ha

baj

conf

do lo

dido.

la

nos.

bro

la

en

de 1959

de la Junta,

Herrera

DEPTO. DE MIGRACIÓN.
EST. DE PROTECCIONES.
DILZ.
351.8"40"/2392.

ASUNTO: Relativo persona se cita.

C. PRESIDENTE MUNICIPAL,
PAPANTLA DE OLARTE, VER.

57164

En escrito de 20 de abril del año en curso, dirigido al C. Procurador General de la República y turnado a esta Dependencia el 5 de octubre anterior, se dice lo siguiente:

"Tanto la magnitud de los problemas nacionales, se ha hecho pesar su serenidad e inteligente política, y ha demostrado que, independiente del ejercicio de su calidad moral, y de su grande condición de amigo, es usted el revolucionario que cumple sus compromisos con el pueblo mexicano y ejerce el poder con la seguridad de su propia responsabilidad, haciendo pesar el Derecho como inviolable principio y como condición irrenunciable de los magníficos preceptos de la Ley. Usted se debe a México, señor Procurador y por El Trabajo y Mensa, desentendiéndose de cobardes artículos que circulan llenos de insultos y comentarios de quienes no creen en la relevancia de su actuación, partiendo esta crítica de los escondidos que por sistema hacen de la murmuración una arma innoble y desgastada para volcar sus amarguras.-La ayuda y dinero ajeno y la propaganda habilidosa ha permitido que personas tan descalificadas, moral e intelectualmente, como Víctor Rico Galán y otros tantos más hayan llegado a destacar como articulistas de fondo en prestigiosas revistas capitalinas para vergüenza de la intelectualidad mexicana. No obstante su condición de extranjero Rico Galán ha demostrado su desacato hacia nuestras Leyes e instituciones, y su desprecio a la tradicional hospitalidad mexicana. Escribe deliberadamente pretendiendo engañar a sus lectores de que lleguen a considerar que el Régimen del Sr. Lic. Adolfo López Mateos, es enemigo de la clase trabajadora. Por lo que se deduce que Víctor es uno de los tantos extranjeros que sobran en el País. Lo que ha hecho usted es que se respete nuestra soberanía y simultáneamente ha defendido y dejado incólumes todos los derechos de los trabajadores mexicanos, por lo que sería un error imperdonable confundir su digna y patriótica actitud con una claudicación de los ideales y principios que siempre ha sostenido y defendido."

Lo que me permito transcribir a usted, con la atenta súplica de que se sirva girar sus respetables órdenes, a efecto de que se haga una minuciosa investigación sobre lo anterior, así como la calidad migratoria de que es titular dicho extranjero, su domicilio y las actividades a que se encuentra dedicado, informando oportunamente a este Departamento.

[illegible]

MIGRACIÓN

A T E N T A M E N T E

SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION.
México, D.F., 4 de noviembre de 1959.
EL SUBJEFE DEL DEPARTAMENTO.

LIC. ALEJANDRO ORTEGA SAN VICENTE.

Control.-Edif.
Sr. Lic. Manuel Rosales Miranda.-Dirección General de Averiguaciones Previas.-Procuraduría General de la República.-Ciudad.-Con relación a su oficio número 13476 de 5 de octubre anterior.
LV/mgm.-exp. 53032.(un anexo).

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION
NOV 12 1959
DEPTO. DE MIGRACION

A T E N T A M E N T E

SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION.
México, D.F., 4 de noviembre de 1959.
EL SUBJEFE DEL DEPARTAMENTO.

LIC. ALEJANDRO ORTEGA SAN VICENTE.

Control.-Edif.
Sr. Lic. Manuel Rosales Miranda.-Dirección General de Averiguaciones Previas.-Procuraduría General de la República.-Ciudad.-Con relación a su oficio número 13476 de 5 de octubre anterior.
LA/mmm.-exp. 53032.(un anexo).

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNA
NOV 12 1959
DEPTO. DE MIGRACION

"ABC".- 21 de agosto de 19 .
Pag. 7.

Editorial

RESPETO A MEXICO

La conducta del señor Victor Galán participando en el último alboroto de agitadores extremistas, plantea ante la opinión pública la necesidad de conocer a fondo cuál es y cuál debe ser la actitud de las autoridades con individuos que, si bien poseen la calidad de mexicanos por habérseles concedido la naturalización, su misma situación les impone observar ciertas normas de respeto y consideración hacia su nuevo país y sus instituciones.

Las leyes mexicanas, por su esencia democrática, son de igual aplicación para todos los habitantes del país, y únicamente ciertas esferas de acción se consideran reservadas para los mexicanos. Especialmente en el terreno de la acción política, nuestras leyes señalan discriminaciones en favor de los mexicanos que reúnan ciertos requisitos respecto a su nacimiento y a su ascendencia. No nos corresponde analizar la justificación de estas normas, o desaprobarlas, porque evidentemente responden a necesidades de nuestro desenvolvimiento histórico, aceptadas y puestas en práctica por la nación y sus gobiernos.

El señor Rico Galán y todos los que como él poseen la calidad de mexicanos por naturalización, gozan de todas las prerrogativas y derechos concedidos por las leyes del país, y también poseen todas las obligaciones y deberes por ellas señalados. En cambio a un extranjero como el norteamericanos Barry Bernard Primus, quien tomó parte en el escándalo del domingo último, inmediatamente se le expulsó del país, porque a ningún extranjero se le permite inmiscuirse en nuestros asuntos políticos y no por su parentesco con una respetable familia mexicana como es la del pintor Alfaro Siqueiros.

Pero las garantías y las prerrogativas de que es titular el señor Victor Rico Galán, a pesar de su calidad de auténtico pandillero de la pluma, no quieren significar que las autoridades policiacas y migratorias investiguen a fondo cuáles son sus actividades y cuál su verdadera situación migratoria. No nos refiramos al término gratitud, que debía ser suficiente para quienes como Rico Galán han sido aceptados por México como sus hijos, porque esa palabra es desconocida en el léxico de individuos afectos a considerarse como la máxima expresión de la sabiduría y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma

"ABC
21 Aug 1962
(cont)
pg 7

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Victor RICO Galan 201-[illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached hereto is the information derived from the recently recruited and still untested ESLDME-1, by Gary H. REYMARDER on 18 May 1965. Apologies are made for the quality of the typing, but the LILINK unit, of which REYMARDER is a member, is an outside unit and still without a secretary.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

ATTACHMENT: As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Guatemala, w/att. h/w
~~1~~ - Chief, WHD w/att. h/w
3 - Files

CS COPY

201-[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-26286

DATE
7 June 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-
Field File No. [illegible]

SECRET

Victor Rico Galán

1. ESLIME-1 met Galán in the latter part of August 1964 in Guatemala. He was assigned to help bring Galán to Yon Sosa. He met Galán on Kilometer 17 of the "Highway to the Atlantic", at the village of ~~Sixxhag~~ El Chato, and drove him to Kilometer 189, where others were waiting to guide him from there.

2. Galán told E-1 that he was a reporter ~~x~~and was coming to interview Yon Sosa. He said that he had come before and that he crossed the border clandestinely. ? Someone from the group that met them at Kilometer 189 told E-1 that this was the fifth time that Galán had come to see Yon Sosa and that he carried messages and money to Yon Sosa.

3. After E-1 arrived in Mexico City, Galán asked the party for permission to interview him for an article for Siempre. He wanted to interview E-1 about his arrest, torture by the police, and expulsion from Guatemala. Victor Manuel Gutierrez told E-1 to grant the interview and to give Galán all the details he needed. E-1 talked to Galán, in the offices of Siempre, on three occasiones, twice in March and once in April. However, he did not give him the interview as at that time he had not yet obtained papers permitting him to remain in Mexico and did not want to ~~[illegible]~~ jeopardize his chances of obtaining them. He promised to send Galán a card when his papers were obtained and give him the interview then.

4. E-1 does not like the idea of giving this interview to Galán and has not contacted him even though he now has his papers. He plans to do nothing unless Galán contacts him again. Then he will have to give the interview since Gutierrez told him to and he has no reasonable excuse for refusing.

SECRET

[illegible] 01256 CS COPY

[illegible]-35474

201-336446

5. E-1 said Galán has also made propaganda films which were shown to the guerrillas in Guatemala. They were simple films which could be made in the home, generally just consisting of someone giving a talk or lecture. They were made both in Spanish and in the local Indian language. E-1 said that the last film Galán made was confiscated by the police. He didn't know if it was the Guatemalan or the Mexican police.

The famous reel?
7"

this typed by E-1

SECRET

Victor Rico Galán ha trabajado hasta la fecha como agente deenlace para las guerrillas del 13 de Noviembre.
Lo conoci en Guatemala donde lo ayudamos a pasar para las montañas para una entrevista con Yon Sosa la cual realizó.
Posteriormente en esta ciud ad al enterarse que ne encontraba en esta nos entrevistams piediendome material informatiwo para sus articulos referénte a la situacion de las torturas y condiciones de vida en las carceles de Guatemala y referente a la muerte de Mazariegos.

En Guatemala fue a ultimos dias del mes de agos to y nosotros nos habiamos colocado estrategicamente para turnarnos,a tratar de pasarlo hasta el kilometro 189 de la carretera al Atlantico,para ese proposito.En el Kilometro 17 en la aldea El Chato,de la misma carretera fui comisionado para conducir el vehiculo para su traslado.
En esta ciudad,el solicto al Partido una entrevista,para commigo, para lo cual el Partido dio su aprobacion.Nos vimos personalmente tres veces en el mes de Marzo dos veces y en Abril,una vez.
El Partido me dijo que le proporcionara una informacion detallada dando nombres de los jefes de Policia donde habia estado detenido y a que clases de torturas habia sdo sometido.Todo esta informacion no la pasé anteriormente debido a mi situacion migratoria que en ese entonces no se habia definio totalmente.

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

.SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 8

26/25 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 2

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	4	5	FI-RE
2	6	6	CA
3	①	7	DC
4		8	REG

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WHIC 8, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INTZ, CA 2, CA/PROP

S E C R E T 071745Z

SAGO INFO DIR SDOM WAVE CITE MEXI 3695

REF MEXI 3653 (IN 82261)*

* PER LIENVOY 3 JUN EMILIO CORDERO PRO-CASTRO DOMINICAN COMMIE LIVING MEXI TRYING TO ARRANGE INTERVIEW FOR SUBJS.

7 JUN 65 IN 84808

PER LIENVOY 3 JUN ALONSO AGUILAR MEMBER MLN NATIONAL DIRECTIVE COUNCIL TRIED ARRANGE INTERVIEW FOR SUBJS REF WITH GEN. CARDENAS. SAID SUBJS LEAVING FOR CHILE 4 JUNE. VICTOR RICO GALAN, LEFTIST JOURNALIST, SUSPECTED CUBAN AGENT, ALSO INFORMED ELENA VAZQUEZ GOMEZ, AIDE TO GEN. CARDENAS THAT SUBJS DESIRED INTERVIEW. LATER, RICO INFORMED EDMUNDO JARDON OF PRENSA LATINA THAT SUBJS GIVING PRESS CONFERENCE 4 JUNE.

S E C R E T

CFN

Rico Galan

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HBAA-2072
TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 200-6-263/3
INFO: Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro Chief, WHD		
FROM: Chief of Base, Porto Alegre		DATE 3 June 1965
SUBJECT: MHSPAWN/WUINDIGO Article Published 20 May 1965 in Correio do Povo		(CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: See below		

REFERENCE(S)

A. DIR 12070, 20 May 1965
B. LGRE 0948, 29 May 1965

Attached is a newspaper article which appeared in Correio do Povo in Porto Alegre, Brazil on 20 May 1965. This article was discussed and summarized in Reference B. Reference A requested this article be pouched to Chief of Station, Mexico City for immediate replay.

Terrence P. MOORE

Attachment: a/s

Distribution:
- 2-Mexico w/2 cys att
- 4-Hqs w/att
- 2-Files w/att
- 2-Rio w/att

USE PREVIOUS EDITION | CLASSIFICATION | PAGE NO.

3P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WHD	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Coverage: Victor Rico Galan, 20-23 May 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-336474

1. 19 May 1965: 0625 - 1745 hours:

A. Unidentified caller to Rico Galan: Caller wrote an article on the Dominican situation for SIEMPRE but SIEMPRE director Jose Pages Llergo rejected it saying the magazine was full of things on the Dominican situation and he wanted the writer to produce something about Colombia. Caller wishes to consult with Rico Galan on his assignment.

2. 20 May 1965: 1745 - 2130 hours:

201-132139

A. NIKOLAY LEONOV, Soviet Press Attache and Identified KGB, & contact with to Rico Galan: Rico tells Leonov that "that man" was supposed to call him at noon today. Where can he find him? Nikolay is sure after 1500 hours. Victor asks him to call again at 1530 or 1600 hours. Nikolay will.

B. Manuel Marcue Pardinas to Rico: Rico tells Marcue that the other person will do the piece on the Dominican situation for Politica because he (Rico) is doing the Dominican thing for Siempre.

C. Leonov to Rico: Rico tells Leonov that "that man" hasn't come, what shall they do? He will try to call him later and he promises to call Nikolay afterward. Nikolay says he will be busy between 1630 hours and 1700 hours but that his wife will be in. Victor comments that "that man" was supposed to call him as soon as he arrived.

continued

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

MICROFILMED
JUN 4 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201 - 336471

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 26223	DATE 28 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-7-38/13

D. Rico to Dr. Emilio Cordero, Dominican exile in Mexico City: Rico complains to Cordero that he was supposed to call and that the other (Nikolay) has already called twice. Cordero says that he called yesterday but there was no one in, they told him they had gone out together. Is the friend there? Victor says no, that he said he would be busy between 1630 and 1700 hours and Victor will be busy until 1900 hours. Cordero asks to let it go until tomorrow, as he himself is very busy. He suggests coming to Victor's at 1600 hours. Victor prefers to call before that at 1530 hours. Cordero congratulates him on his article in Siempre. A foolish thing, Victor says. Cordero asks him if he has seen Luis Suarez' article and what did he think of it? Rico says it is written in first person, very superficial, very much a personal adventure. Very journalistic, Cordero comments. Yes, but journalistic like Serer's (Station comment: Probably Julio Sherer Garcia, writer for daily Excelsior) and to Victor it appears to be more...Cordero says that the situation there grows worse. Victor asks if he saw Mayobre's thing. Cordero says yes, very good. Well, comments Victor, that of Mayobre was not expected but it is that the thing is so obvious. Cordero will call tomorrow at 1500 hours.

E. Saul (lnu) to Rico: Saul tells Rico that a friend arrived from New York yesterday. Would he like to talk with him? Rico says of course. They decide on Monday at Rico's home. When Rico says he does not speak English Saul says that since he doesn't either they will have to have another person.

3. May 21: 0615 to 2400 hours:

A. Leonov to Rico: Leonov greets Rico in a very friendly way. Rico says that yesterday he talked with The Man, he had a lot of work and preferred to leave it for today. He asks Leonov to call again at 1600 hours. Leonov will call.

B. Luis Suarez and Rico Galan: Suarez sent a very strong article against the United States on the Dominican situation which was published yesterday. He did not want to lose the chance no matter what they thought and they said that he had abandoned the work, never having had a contact with "them". Suarez and Rico discuss the articles on the Dominican situation published by both Suarez and Sherer Carcia of Excelsior. Rico says that Sherer's article was the first to give the Latin American point of view on the Dominican situation. Suarez agrees but says, "the interview with Caamano, no." Victor comments that Sherer did a good job. Suarez does not known what happened with Sherer. He published one thing that he showed him in Santo Domingo, after he published the thing about the OAS the following day, and no more, he dried up, they have not published him anymore. Suarez comments that the President received him. Why? It seems unbelieveable that they have made this effort in order to publish only two days. Rico terminates the conversation with congratulations to Suarez.

C. Cordaro to Rico: Victor is waiting for a call from The Man (Leonov?) at 1600 hours to make a date at 1700 hours at home. Emilio accepts and will be there at 1700 hours.

D. Leonov to Rico: Victor sets the meeting for 1700 hours at his home. Leonov agrees.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-26223

4. 22 May: 0715 - 1730 hours:

A. Emilio to Rico: Emilio asks pardon for waking Rico who replies, calling Emilio Maestro, that he was already up. Emilio wants to see him today at 1000 hours about something urgent. If it is urgent, Rico will wait for him.

B. Rico to Cordero: Rico tells Cordero that he will be waiting for him between 1530 and 1600 hours and asks him to bring all the data that he has. Cordero asks if he wants economic data or...All that you have, Rico says. Cordero will come.

C. Leonov to Rico: Rico tells Leonov that he has been waiting for "the man" (Cordero?), he was calling him. Leonov says he went for a long walk and has just got back. He'll come in twenty minutes. Victor will be waiting for him.

5. 23 May: 2100 hours 23 May to 0720 hours 24 May:

No items of interest.

Willard C. Curtis

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17 76

SECRET

☒ COPY ☐ RID

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED MAY 22 12 26 PM '65

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH8

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

VR. FILE CA2, CA/PROP, C/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT, WH/C 8

CP

22 MAY 65 IN 73624

S E C R E T 212358Z

DIR INFO SDOM CITE MEXI 3520

1. LIFEAT COVERAGE VICTOR RICO GALAN 0730 - 15 MAY TO 0830 16 MAY.

A. EMILIO CORDERO TO RICO: CORDERO WANTED TO SEE RICO TO TELL HIM SOME THINGS. CORDERO TALKED TO LUIS WITH RODRIGO YESTERDAY. HE WILL COME BY RICO'S HOUSE IN ABOUT 15 OR 30 MINUTES. (STATION COMMENT: LUIS MAY BE LUIS SUAREZ, SIEMPRE CORRESPONDENT.)

B. CORDERO TO RICO: CORDERO ASKS IF RICO HAS SOMETHING URGENT TO DISCUSS WITH HIM. RICO SAYS NO, HE THOUGHT CORDERO WANTED URGENTLY TO TALK TO HIM. NO. HE ONLY WANTED TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT SOME THINGS LUIS TOLD HIM. RICO HAS ONLY TALKED TO LUIS BY PHONE. CORDERO SAYS THAT RICO'S ARTICLE IN SIEMPRE IS VERY GOOD. THE THESIS OF THE PIECE IS THAT A NEW REGULATION HAS BEEN CREATED IN THE OAS ADMITTING THAT INTERVENTION IS VERY GOOD. RICO COMMENTS THE IDEA OF LEAVING THE OAS IS POPULAR. ALBERTO PRESENTED IT AT THE ROUND TABLE AT THE UNIVERSITY (AS A POSSIBILITY). THERE WAS A LOT OF APPLAUSE WHEN IT WAS MENTIONED. ALSO A LOT OF GOOD COMMENTARY

SECRET

73624
P-2

ON RICO'S ARTICLE. THE GENERAL'S ARTICLE WAS WHAT WAS A FAILURE. (STATION COMMENT: POSSIBLY GENERAL ~~LAZARO~~ CARDENAS DEL RIO, LEFTIST EX PRESIDENT OF MEXICO.) AFTER SO MUCH FIGHTING, TO COME OUT WITH WHAT EVEN THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE HAVE SAID. MAX TALKED TO CARRILLO FLORES YESTERDAY. (STATION COMMENT: ANTONIO CARRILLO FLORES, MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER.) MAX SUGGESTED THAT MEXICO WITHDRAW FROM OAS, OR AT LEAST THREATEN TO. SAID THAT MEXICO IS STUDYING THIS. RICO IS A LITTLE DOUBTFUL. BOTH CARRILLO'S AND MAX'S COMMENTS HAVE TO BE TAKEN WITH A GRAIN OF SALT.

C. JOVAN MIRIC, YUGOSLAV CORRESPONDENT IN MEXI TO RICO: MIRIC SAYS THINGS ARE BLACK. RICO AGREES THAT IT LOOKS BAD. BUT MIRIC THINKS THEY HAVE TO WAIT A LITTLE YET. MIRIC WILL SEE RICO AFTER RICO FINISHES WRITING HIS ARTICLE SO THEY CAN TALK. MIRIC ALSO TELLS RICO THAT THE MATTER OF HIS SUCCESSOR IS ARRANGED, HE HAS RECEIVED HIS VISA.

D. MIRIC TO RICO: FIFTEEN MINUTES AGO MIRIC'S APARTMENT WAS MACHINE GUNNED FROM THE STREET. MIRIC CALLED POLICE, HE IS NOT GOING TO SHUT UP ABOUT THIS BUT WILL MAKE IT PUBLIC. NO ONE ANSWERED WHEN HE CALLED GOBERNACION. WHO DID IT?

SECRET

73624
P3

MIRIC DOES NOT KNOW. IT IS SOMETHING FROM CARACAS. THERE WAS A CAR AND THEN MACHINEGUN FIRE. HIS WIFE SOFIA WAS IN THE BEDROOM WITH THE CHILD. THE FIRING BROKE WINDOW PANES, CURTAINS. RICO ASKS IF THIS WAS "LOS GUSANOS?" YES, "THE DOMINICAN WORKS."

E. RICO TO ANTONIO ELIZONDO: RICO CALLING ELIZONDO TO SEE IF THERE ANYTHING THEY CAN DO TO HELP MIRIC. RICO TELLS ELIZONDO HE SHOULD PHONE THEIR BALKAN FRIEND SO HE FEELS THEIR SOLIDARITY. ELIZONDO WILL CALL.

F. RICO TO MIRIC: WHAT IS NEW? NOTHING. NO NEWS. MIRIC ASKS IF RICO HAS HEARD HOW THINGS ARE THERE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. ARE THEY BLACK? THEY'RE VERY BLACK. MIRIC AND RICO WILL TALK TOMORROW.

G. MIRIC TO RICO: HE IS LEAVING MEXICO IN A WEEK WHETHER HIS SUCCESSOR ARRIVES OR NOT. WHY EXPOSE MYSELF FURTHER? IS THERE ANY NEWS ON THE DR? RICO SAYS NOTHING, HE HAS BEEN LISTENING TO THE VOICE OF AMERICA BUT THERE IS NOTHING.

H. RICO TO MIRIC: DISCUSS SHOOTING ABOUT WHICH MIRIC REALLY KNOWS NOTHING, SAYS HE HAS NOT DESERVED THIS AND SUCH A THING HAS NEVER HAPPENED TO ANY OTHER CORRESPONDENT. HE

SECRET

SECRET 73624
p.4

ASKS RICO IF THERE IS ANY NEWS ON THE DR. RICO SAYS NO, GARCIA INZAUZI (PHONETIC) AND GARCIA VALS DINED AT HIS HOME TONIGHT. GARCIA I. ONCE FLEW TO HAVA WITH MIRIC. (STATION COMMENT: PROBABLY MARIO GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI, FORMER CUBAN AMB TO UN, NOW DIR ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CUBAN FORN MINISTRY. IN MEXI FOR CEPAL CONF HAS RETURNED TO CUBBA.) MIRIC REFERS AGAIN TO SHOOTING AND SAYS IS LEAVING IN A WEEK IF THERE IS NO EXPLANATION ON THIS. MIRIC SAYS HE IS GOING TO UNITED STATES (LAUGHES) WELL, OR TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

2. DISSEM AT HQS DISCRETION.

CFN

[illegible]

14-00000

WH/4/a

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

	PROCESSING ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO.
Chief, DO
Chief, WH (Attn: Wallace R. PARLETT); COS, Washington;

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/OPERATIONAL -- WUINDICO/1/ANSA Article

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: NYDO-0695

Attached is an article transmitted by ANSA New York on 17 May 1965. The article was given to the ANSA representative in New York by WUINDICO/1.

Guy W. RUTHERFORD

Attachment:
As Stated

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 -- Buenos Aires w/1 att.
2cc -- WH w/1 att.
2cc -- COS w/1 att.
2cc -- DO w/1 att.

Rico Galan file
201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA-1136	21 1965 20 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-6-263/3

SECRET

Attachment to UNDA-1136,
dated 20 May 1965

"ON FRIDAY, MAY 13, RADIO-HAVANA CITED JUAN B. NEJIA LEADER OF DOMINICAN '14 OF JUNE' PARTY WHO HAD GIVEN AN INTERVIEW TO MEXICAN JOURNALIST VICTOR RICO GALAN IN WHICH HE DECLARED OVER THE TELEPHONE THAT 'MANY OF THE 14 JUNE MOVEMENT HAVE DISAPPEARED BUT AT THE SAME TIME NUMEROUS CONTINGENTS OF INSURGENTS ARE REPORTED IN THE MOUNTAINS OF THE REGION' AND THAT 'THE 14 OF JUNE MOVEMENT HAS MUCH CONTROL OF THE SITUATION.'"

Distribution:
Orig. — Buenos Aires
1 — NH
1 — COS
1 — DO

BACK: [illegible]

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Washington

INFO: ~~Chief, DO~~
Chief, WH (Attn: Wallace R. PARLETT); Chief, SR

FROM: Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT: ISOLOG/OPERATIONAL -- Meeting with WUINDIGO/1, 18 May 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: DO -- See para. 3; WH -- See para. 4.
REFERENCE: NYOO-0695

1. Attached is a Contact Report of a meeting with WUINDIGO/1 on 18 May 1965. As indicated, W/1 approached Mauro LUCENTINI and persuaded him to send a modified version of the 2 May Havana broadcast via ANSA channels to Buenos Aires. In an effort to supplement this coverage, Subject also prepared a longer version for the paper Correio do Povo in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

2. As shown in the Contact Report, Lucentini apparently has at least a social relationship with Gregory KALININ. W/1 stated that Lucentini, a friend, is a conservative and, to his knowledge, does not have any leanings toward communism.

3. For DO: Base would appreciate traces on Lucentini in order to determine his political leanings and connections.

4. The Base should be advised if either of the two stories mentioned in paragraph 1 is published.

Guy W. RUTHERFORD

Attachments:
1. Contact Report
2. Spanish Copy for Porto Alegre Newspaper

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 -- COS w/2 atts. in dup.
2cc -- WH w/2 atts. (single copy)
2cc -- DO w/2 atts. (single copy)
2cc -- SR w/att. 1 only.

201-336474
MAY 21 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UNDA-1135

DATE: 20 May 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 200-6-263/3

Attachment [illegible] o UNNA-[illegible]

19 May 1965

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Meeting with WUINDIGO, 18 May 1965

1. RUTHERFORD met W/1 at the latter's apartment on 18 May 1965.

2. The following information was obtained:

a. Dominican Republic. During the briefing by the WH representative on 14 May, it was agreed that W/1 would attempt to have the Havana broadcast of 2 May replayed through his friend Mauro LUCENTINI of ANSA, New York. It was felt that this approach would be more desirable than using W/1 directly, in view of his efforts to appear as a liberal journalist. During the meeting W/1 attempted to contact Lucentini, but ascertained that he had gone off on a holiday for the weekend. Upon learning that Lucentini would return to New York City during the evening of 16 May, it was agreed that W/1 would contact him at that time in an effort to have the story transmitted on 17 May. In addition to the major capitals in Latin America, W/1 also thought that the story would be sent to Rome.

b. Following a 'phone call from the WH Desk, RUTHERFORD subsequently briefed W/1 on the fact that the same story had been carried in the 2 May edition of Hoy in Havana. (COMMENT: RUTHERFORD pointed out to the Headquarters rep that, in his opinion, it might not be advisable to inform Lucentini of the Hoy article as it might raise an objection in his mind concerning the current value of the news.)

c. Briefed on both the radio broadcast and the Hoy article, W/1 was disinclined to mention the Hoy article to Lucentini for the same objection noted above. He was instructed to use his own discretion.

d. On the evening of 16 May W/1 contacted Lucentini and outlined his request. He explained to Lucentini that this was a good opportunity for a scoop on a hot item. W/1, in order to offset any objections on the part of Lucentini, told him that the radio broadcast had occurred on 13 May. He did not mention the Hoy article. According to W/1, Lucentini was less than enthusiastic about transmitting the story through his facilities, pointing out that it was no longer news. After some persuasion, according to W/1, Lucentini finally agreed to send the following abbreviated story to Buenos Aires either the evening of 16 May or early 17 May:

'On Friday, May 13, Radio-Havana cited Juan B. Mejia leader of Dominican '14 of June' party who had given an interview to Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan in which he declared over the telephone that 'many leaders of the June 14 movement have disappeared, but at the same time numerous contingents of insurgents are reported in the mountains of the region' and that 'the 14 of June movement has much control of the situation.'

e. In order to supplement the Lucentini effort, W/1 prepared a more detailed version of the radio broadcast and cabled it to Correio do Povo in Porto Alegre, Brazil. He paid for the cable in New York ($40.70) and signed it with his first and last initials and "our NY correspondent." The cabled article in Spanish is forwarded herewith as attachment #2.

f. O. Kalinkin. On 17 May W/1 was invited to a cocktail party at the home of Lucentini, 305 East 56th Street, NYC. The reception was on the occasion of the departure of Ricardo Berla, Vice President of Olivetti Underwood in New York. W/1 was surprised to find that Kalinkin, the Soviet employed in the UN Secretariat, was present. It will be recalled that W/1 originally met Kalinkin at the home of Faubion Bowers in Manhattan in June 1964. Lucentini was also present on that occasion. W/1 could not comment on whether Lucentini met Kalinkin for the first time at the Bowers affair. W/1 is not aware of any close relationship between Kalinkin and Lucentini.

3. Finances:

Rutherford paid W/1 the following:

a. Cable to Brazil	$40.70
b. Round-trip cab fare to ANSA	2.00
TOTAL	$42.70

A signed receipt was obtained.

4. Next Meeting: Friday, 21 May, at 1100.

Guy W. RUTHERFORD

Att. 12, UFGA-1135

correiodopovo rua caldas-junior porto-alegre brasil

Acaba de ocorrer um fato curioso.Radio-Havana,numa transmissao de ontem, citou umas declaracoes do senhor juan mejia,lider do partido revolucionario dominicano "14 de junho".Estas declaracoes,segundo radio-havana,foram feitas pelo senhor mejia,de santo-domingo,pelo telefone,ao jornalista mexicano de esquerda victor rico galan.E verdade que a central telefonica esta na mao dos "constitucionalistas" e que por isso podem conversar diretamente com o mexico sem passar pela zona ou pelo controle dos norte-americanos.Por sua vez,victor rico galan transmittiu as declaracoes de juan mejia a radio-havana.Entre outras coisas,mejia,citado por radio-havana,disse "numerosos lideres do partido 14 de junho desapareceram-mas e que eles estao agora nas montanhas encabecando contingentes de guerrilheiros".Mais adiante ele acrescentou "o partido 14 de junho tem o controle da situacao em santo-domingo".Sabe-se que o controle da revolucao dominicana pelos comunistas serviu de pretexto aos norte-americanos para sua intervencao.Os comunistas dominicanos das tres tendencias tudo fizeram para desmentir esta presuncao norte-americana e ficaram,o mais possivel,na obscuridade,nos bastidores.O partido "14 de junho" e diretamente ligado a Fidel Castro e tanto seus chefes quanto Fidel Castro tem interesse,na hora presente,em desmentir a these americana,em demonstrar que em santo-domingo nao ha comunismo,nem guerrilha nem fidelismo.Por isso nao se entende o erro,ou a "gaffe" da radio-havana citando nominalmente juan mejia -que consta na famosa lista norte-americana dos 58 comunistas- cuja lealdade para Fidel castro e conhecida e reconhecendo que seus homens estao encabecando a guerrilha nas sierras dominicanas. Sem justificar nem criticar a intervencao norte-americana,seus alvos e seus metodos, temos que reconhecer que esta "confissao" cubana joga uma luz nova, inesperada,sobre o assunto todo.do nosso enviado especial a novayork

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

2 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☒ ☐

UNIT [illegible] WE

TIME 1910

BY [illegible]

INFO

VR. FILE WE6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

19 MAY 65 IN 71360

S E C R E T 192138Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO ROME MILA CARA CITE MEXI 5471

1. 15 MAY LIFEAT COVERAGE CARLO COCCIOLI REPORTED COCCIOLI GOING NEW YORK 20 MAY VIA EASTERN FLIGHT 900 ARRIVING NEW YORK [illegible] HOURS. COCCIOLI SAID HE ADVISING CERTAIN FRIENDS IN NEW YORK HIS ARRIVAL. LATER TOLD VICTOR RICO GALAN HE RETURNING MEXI 31 MAY.

2. SAME DAY LIFEAT REPORTED COCCIOLI RESERVED ROOM AT UNIDENTIFIED HOTEL FOR 6 JUNE IN NAME MR. SARLER ORENGO (PHONETIC), FRENCHMAN. ORENGO ARRIVING MEXI BY AIR FROM NEW YORK AT 1151 ON 6 JUNE. COCCIOLI TOLD HOTEL ORENGO WOULD DEFINITELY ARRIVE, THAT ORENGO ON OFFICIAL MISSION AND HIS PROGRAM (TRAVEL?) PLANNED FOR SOME TIME.

S E C R E T

CFN

[illegible] — 20 MAY [illegible]

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☑ COPY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

FROM
BUENOS AIRES

ACTION
WH 8

INFO
VR. FILE ~~DO 4 DO/H 3 CA 2 CA/PROP~~

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

19 MAY 65 IN 71410

SECRET 192015Z

MEXI INFO DIR NYDO DOST SDOM CITE BUEN 3635

REF: DIR 10787 *

REGRET TO REPORT THAT AS OF NOON 19 MAY REF STORY HAS NOT APPEARED CLARIN OR OTHER BUEN PAPER. NOW CHECKING TELAM, WHICH BELIEVE IS ANSA SUBSCRIBER, IN EFFORT TO GET STORY PRINTED IF IT ARRIVED. WILL TAKE ACTION PER REF IF IT APPEARS.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

* PLACED STORY ANSA WIRE ON GALAN INTERVIEW.

201

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : C.R.Halliwell
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 17 May 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

3 SECRET

1	1	5	2
2		6	
3		7	D
4	4	8	R

17 May 65 19 25 z
PRIORITY"

TO : BUENOS AIRES MEXICO CITY NEW YORK (DODS) WASHINGTON
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO ADDP, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA 2, CA/PROP, VR, FILE

TO PRTY BUEN INFO MEXI NYDO DOST (R) 5004 CITE DIR 10787

1. ACTING THROUGH WUINDIGO HDQS PLACING STORY ON ANSA WIRE SERVICE 16 MAY ON VICTOR RICO GALAN INTERVIEW WITH JUAN MEJIA, DR LEADER 14 JUNE MOVEMENT, WHICH WAS BROADCAST BY RADIO HABANA 2 MAY.

2. EXPECT STORY APPEAR CLARIN AND/OR OTHER BUEN ANSA SUBSCRIBERS 17 OR 18 MAY. IF NOT OVERLY LONG, PLS CABLE FULL TEXT STORY MEXI INFO DIR FOR IMMEDIATE REPLAY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/4
DO/CF O'Hara (in draft)
WH/2 [illegible]

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, WHD

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

3 SECRET

GROUP 1

BY ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED MAY 18 9 47 AM '65

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, RI, C/OPS, C/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

ACTION

17 MAY 65 IN 69232

SECRET 172032Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3435

REF MEXI 3419 (IN 67829)

LIFEAT COVERAGE VICTOR RICO GALAN REINITIATED 1000 HOURS 15 MAY.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

[illegible] mark for 201 VRG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/LIFEAT
VICTOR RICO GALAN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: For Your Information

REFERENCES: DIR 08156
DIR 08566
DIR 09327

1. Attached are reels 25 and 26 of LIFEAT coverage of Victor Rico Galan, covering period 0700 to 2230 hours on 1 May 1965 and 2230 to 0845 hours on 2 May 1965.

2. Tape 25 contains Rico Galan report on 1 May to Fundora of Radio Habana on his coversation with Juan Bautista Mejia.

3. Tape 26 contains conversation between Emilio Cordero and Rico Galan in which Cordero reports to Rico the substance of his 1 May conversation with Mejia in which Mejia asked Cordero to have Rico tell Radio Habana to avoid any mention of Mejia or the 14th of June Group. (It was erroneously reported in the supdata in intel report HMM-9689, MEXI 3312 of 6 May 1965 that Cordero played a tape of his conversation with Mejia for Rico Galan. Cordero read his notes on his conversation to Rico Galan who recorded the notes.)

Olivia G Rozmity
for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments: h/w
Reels 25 and 26

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD, w/a
3 - Files

Call RID/FILES, EXT. 6867
re attachment. Records
Cont. job no. 67-353
Box No. 5

201- 336074

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26095	14 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	200-7-38/13

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT
Operational/LIFEAT
Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: For Your Information

1. Attached are copies of transcripts of reels 22 through 32, covering periods 29 April through 8 May 1965, of LIFEAT coverage on Victor RICO Galan.

2. The substance of these transcripts was forwarded by cable to Headquarters on 11 May 1965. (MEXI 3370, 3372, 3373, 3374, and 3376).

Olivia G Raquity
for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments: h/w
Transcripts
Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, w/atts

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 26083	DATE 14 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-336476 P-7354

From 0620 to 1210, 29 April (Thursday) 1965

2.0 In. MO asks Inge(bord) Rico (v), who answers, for Victor Rico Galan (VRG). He is asleep. MO is Emilio Cordero, a Dominican. When will he be up? Around 0900 or 0930. MO will phone back

2.2 Out.to 27-13-84. Sra. Diener with Sr. Gonzales, who answers. About a napkin ring she ordered....About her papers...they have lost they ones she left with Sr. Gonzales for his signature. She always leaves one copy at the factory and the third is for jewelery shop while the second one is her copy....She likes to know what her prices are and how much she owes exactly...

3.5 Out to 03. Time is 0921 (29 April).

3.7 In. Camilo (not Emilio) Cordero, Dominican, with VRG, who answers. Jose Luis talked to VRG last night. Yes. They would like to talk to VRG today. Come by in an hour - at 1045. Come by VRG's house. Camilo with come with Max. VRG knows him. Camilo and Max and some others (will come to see him).

4.2 Out to 42-15-65. VRG with WO, who answers. WO has anew car. A new Chvelle. Asks to speak to WO's husband. Will be xxxxxxxxx in "Siempre" offices. Went there about an hour ago.

4.5 Out to 46-43-24. VRG with WO, who answers "Siempre," a for Alberto.

Alberto taken the phone. Has the Director returned? No, will be back until tomorrow. VRG is writing a bombshell on Santo Domingo, "as is natural." VRG says that he has some very useful data in the article, reporting, he did there. Would like Joaquin to look for it and send it to him? This was published in 1963 (in "Siempre") when VRG went to Santo Domingo. Should have come out in January or February of 1964, not 1963. It came out in the Second Division. It has a photo of Tavares and may have one photo of Bosch. But one of funeral of Tavares. Alberto will send it to him.

VRG asks if Alberto has seen the golden road that the PRI is giving. They should keep todays (copy) of "El Dia" because "we can use it for many years."

Some Dominican fridds are coming to visit VRG now. He will prepare some very good article.

6.0 Out to 46-66-93, 3 times. Busy. complete. VRG with Sr. Deschamps (ph). D. has seen the matter of the (U.S.) marines. Yes. VRG is with some Dominican friends who want to give a press conference today at 1600. VRG asked for something like this - when the Guatemalan affair took place - VRG called Julio and Julio gave the matter to the Head of Information. Probably due to the civil war they have there (where Deschamps works). The Head of Information sent Carlos Jimenes who came drunk. This conference will take place at 1600 at the house of Dr. xxxxxx Marcio Mejia Ricart, Ave. Valerio Trujano xxxx 333, Apt. B-3, Colonia Florida. He does not have a phone. MO would like Lopez Azuara to go talk to them so they could publish something ahead of time in the "Extra." They are now with VRG. Perhaps MO can locate Lopez Azuara and have him phone VRG. VRG gives MO his phone.

6.0 contd.
MO can't locate Lopez Azuara until 1300. LA could go to same address around 1430. The Dominicans can go by "Excelsior." That would be fine. Call ~~MO~~ anyway at 1330. MO is Eduardo (Deschamps).

VRG would like to talk to Eduardo. E. is at home sick in bed. VRG can visit him. ED's address is Reforma 10-504. VRG will call before he goes by and will probably go today. VRG hopes that the "beast" (MO's wife) won't be there. No, she has gone to France. Then, there is no problem.

__After 1100, 29 April__

9.2 Out to 25-80-32. MI (Dominican probably) with WO, whom he calls "Chinita." MI identifies himself as Tobias (?). Did Ramon Grullo (ph) phone back again? No. But WO got the message that they should meet at 1200 at "Las Brasas"? Yes. Tell him, if he calls back, that they will be there at 1200. Fine.

9.5 Out to 31-06-06. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Miric. Not there now. Will be there around 1330 or 1400. Ask him to phone VRG urgently.

9.7 Out to 45-91-36. VRG with Toña, who answers, for Luis Suarez. Went to see Sr. Angel Sanchez. Does she have his phone there? Yes, but they were meeting near Cine de las Americas. If he phones in, ask him to phone VRG. In any case VRG will leave a message for him at "Siempre."

10.2 Out to 46-43-24. Busy.

10.5 Out to 35-24-28. VRG with WO, who answers at "Siempre." When Luis Suarez comes in, ask him to phone VRG at home.

11.0 Out to 35-36-52. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks WO, who answers at "Politica," for Sr. Gomez Lorenzo. Not there yet. Is he at home? She thinks so. Asks for his home phone. (During wait - MI tells Emilio to go take (some protest) to the Presidencia while MMR phones...)
Gomez Lorenzo's phone is 39-39-59.

11.5 Out to 39-39-59. Marcio Mejia Ricart with Gomez Lorenzo's daughter, who answers, for GL. Not there. They want to talk to GL. Should be in the office in about an hour. Advise him that a group of Santo Dominicans - leaves address where it is to be. GL should invite someone who works at "Diario de la Tarde" and should select someone who is "adequate" (sympathiser).

13.2 Out to 46-60-15. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers at "Prensa Latina," for Jordan.

Sr. Jordan takes the phone. MMR tells him about the press conference they are planning for today at 1600...giving address... Fine, will go.

14.0 Out to 10-20-30. MI asks WO, who answers, for Mario Gonzales Marquez (of "La Prensa). Phone 12-08-33.

14.2 Out to 12-08-53, three times. No rings, complete. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers, for Mario Gonzales Marquez.
They can't find him. He may be on the 8th floor. Asks for Editor-in-Chief. Not there now either. MMR says he (Mario Gonzales Marques) and MMR are friends. Wants to invite him to press conference... leaves details...

15.5 Out to 45-44-40, twice. Busy.

16.0 Out to 35-61-97. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers, "El Dia," for Eduardo Ramirez. Phone 35-61-97.

16.2 Out to 35-61-97. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers, for Leonardo (not Eduardo) Ramirez. Not there. Asks for ~~[illegible]~~ Muzquiz (ph). Not there. Asks for one of the Directors.
(During wait, MMR tells VRG that the first act of Bosch's govt, and this is in his (Bosch's) book which was just published, and he asked this of President Kennedy - was to take away from Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey the oil refining company. That was the first obstacle he ran into to..)
MO returns to phone and asks who he wants. Fuente, Cuenca, ~~Arrix~~ Arriola or any of them. None ~~x~~ of them is there. Sr. Muzquiz will be will be in around 1300 and Leonardo around 1200. Tell Leonardo that MMR called...leaves details on press conference (on Santo Domingo). A press conference of exiled Dominicans...They want to give him some information. If Leonardo does not come in on time, give info to Muzquiz.

18.0 Out to 35-61-70. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers, if Cuenca is there. No.

18.2 Out to 48-04-40. Marcio Mejia Ricart, asks MO, who answers, for Santos (?) Arriola. Wrong number.

18.5 Out to 48-04-30, twice. No answer (...During out rings... MMR says he has all that was agreed (on between U.S. and Santo Domingo?) not here but in Santo Domingo...even again devaluation, permission for intervention in Santo Domingo...)

19.2 Out to 34-05-06. ~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~ Marcio Mejia Ricart asks for Sanches (not Santos) Arriola...wrong number.
34-63-06.
19.7 Out to ~~[illegible]~~. Wrong number.

20.0 Out to [illegible]-12-11. Busy.

20.2 Out to 13-41-23. Marcio Mejia Ricart for Head of Information of "Universal". Call 21-08-78.

20.5 Out to 21-08-73. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks for Head of Information. Phone 12-08-73. Asks for his name. Sr. Demetrio Bolaños.

21.0 Out to 12-08-73, four times. No rings.

22.0 Out to 18-65-01. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers at

22.0 contd.
"France Presse," for Sr. Katz. His secretary is not in yet, but should be in soon - Sr. Alvarez. MO is Jorge Vasquez, an editor. Would like to invite any one of them to Dominican press conference. MMR explains they are a group of exiles. The Dominican Embassy is also having a conference today (of press). Does MO know what the Amb. has said? No, nothing yet. They made no comments yesterday. What was the last cable from Santo Domingo? That the supporters of Bosch were attacking the airport, San Isidro. Things have changed greatly (in their favor) this morning. Gives MO the details about where the press conference is to be....

23.0 Out to 35-63-99. Marcio Mejia Ricart with MO, who answers, for Sr. Rosenberg. MO answers "Prensa Asociada" (AP). Rosenberg is on another phone. Best call back. Asks if they have had any news from Santo Domingo. Have not heard anything. Asks him to phone back in a few minutes.

23.5 Out to 46-91-88. Marcio Mejia Ricart with MO, who answers (indistinctly), for Head of Information. Wants to invite him to press conference on Dominican affair...

MO takes the phone. MMR says there is a group of exiles here, among whom is the group of 14 de July, the Central Committee, here... They have a lot of information to give..invites him to press conference at 1600....Thanks.

24.2 Out to 45-44-40. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers at "Ovaciones", for Sr. Lopez Antunez (?ph).

LA takes the phone. Victor Rico Galan takes the phone. Greetings. Asks if LA has any info on the Dominican activities. The O.E.A. is now in meeting where the Americans are going to explain why they ~~[illegible]~~ disembarked there. The situation in Santo Domingo appears that Bosch's troops continue in control. VRG was told that there was a France Press cable that they were attacking San Isidro - military and civil men. MO has not seen this yet.

The Dominican exiles here are giving a press conference this afternoon and VRG needs MO's help. This is at the house of Dr. Marcio Mejia Ricart, Ave. Valerio Trujano 325, Apt. E-3, Colonia Florida. MO will send a reporter.

When will they see one another? Does VRG still go to the café of...No. Where does VRG go now? To none. He has coffee at home. MO will call VRG and comeby to see him.

12-08-73.
25.5 Out to ~~[illegible]~~. Busy.
Out to ~~[illegible]~~ 12-08-73, twice. Busy, no rings.

26.0 Out to 12-67-65. Marcio Meji Ricart asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Bolaños. Phone 12-08-73. The phone is always busy. They are using it now. Call back in about 10 or 20 minutes.

26.5 Out to 18-66-01. Hangs up.

26.7 Out to 33-63-99. MI asks MO, who answers "Associated Press," for Sr. Rosenberg.

26.7 contd.

Sr. Rosenberg takes the phone. VRG (v) takes phone. Asks if they want to send a reporter to press conference of exiled Dominicans... gives address of Dr. Marcio Mejia Ricart. MI is Rosenberg. Press conference is at 1600. R. is alone at the office and will be hard to get there. They, the exiles, can go by R's office. That would be fine. They are also going to "Excelsior," so can go easily to see R. R's office is on the same floor that the Editing Office of "Excelsior" is.

27.5 Out to 25-80-32. MI asks WO, who answers, if anyone has phoned ~~[illegible]~~ Tobias Mejia. Cuernavaca called and he should report in for Sr. Ramon Grullon (ph). MI talked to the girl and told ~~him~~ her to tell him to come to Mexico City. WO says the girl went out and she did not know this. MI is Marcio (Mejia Ricart). Sr. Tobias should report in.

28.0 Out to ~~22X~~ 13-15-08 No rings.

28.2 Out to ~~22X22X22~~ 21-04-57. Marcio Mejia Ricart with WO, who answers, for Sr. Mario ~~W~~ Wakuja (ph), Information. Phone 18-50-80. "Novedades."

28.5 Out to 18-50-80. Marcio Mejia Ricart with MO, who answers, for Head of Information, then asks for Sr. Wakuja. Not there right now. MO is Hector ~~Azu~~ Alzuye (ph). A group of exiled and deported Dominicans are here and will give press conference...gives details...Editors have picked up their orders for today. Call tonight. MI says they have information on U.S. marines...He should have phoned early. In case one of the Editors returns, he will send him there. MMR says that he is a friend of Romulo O'Farrill, Jr. Tell him, who must be at Televicentro, in case he is interested. He is at Televicentro in case MMR wants to talk to him because they don't communicate with him there.

Reel off at RF 30.0, 1210, 29 April 1965

From 1210 to 2140, 29 April (Thursday) 1965

2.0 ....conv in progress when recording begins....MI XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX is telling MO about press conference. MO (American) asks who will be there. Marcio, Emilio Cordero, Leandro Guzman and MI. They may locate another Dominican (or two), but there is not much time and they have to edit some declarations. (MI must be Tobias.) MO will be there. They don't have a phone at house of Mejia Ricart.

2.2 Out to 13-15-07. No rings.
Out to 13-15-08. No rings.
13-15-08

2.5 Out to 1XXXXXX. MI asks WO, who answers "El Nacional," for Head of Editing. Phone 18-56-76. He is Sr. Flores.

2.7 Out to 18-56-76. Marcio Mejia Ricart with Sr. Flores, who answers. Says they have here a group of exiled Dominicans here, of different political parties, and would like to invite them to a press conference. MO says they are already going to send a reporter. That must be a conference of the Embassy. Gives details on their (exiles') press conference.

3.3 Out to 23-06-46. Victor Rico Galan asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Valentin Puchero. Not there. Where can VRG find him? Should be at home at 1400 or 1500.

3.7 Out to 15-50-11. No answer.

4.0 XXXXXXXXXXXXXX In. Otomi Llianas (?ph) with VRG, who answers. MO is at "Siempre." VRG could not get there. Come by his house - is about 30 minutes. MO makes note of address.

4.5 Out to 46-60-15. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Jardon. MO is Toñio. Wants phone number of "Cuestion de Minutos" and also the phone of Leonov (of Soviet Embassy).

"Cuestion de Minutos" is locked up. They don't have phone of Leonov but can give him XXXXXX Pucherov's phone. No, XXXXXXXXXXXX and Cucherov and Doldov (?ph) are out and VRG supposes they are with Leonov or Leonov knows where they are. Call the (Soviet) Embassy. VRG had wanted to call the Press Dept. What is the phone of the Embassy? 15-60-55.

Asks if VRG can go to the Press Club tonight at 2030. They are having a meeting of Association in Conference room. Have they given VRG given him tickets to the dinner? No. They will talk there tonight.

5.5 Out to 15-60-55. VRG asks MO, who answers at Soviet Embassy, for Leonov. Not there. Call Press Office, 15-23-04.

5.7 Out to 15-23-04. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Leonov. Not there right now. MO is Posada. Wants to locate Cucherov or Doldov (ph). Call back later - around 1500 or 1530. Ask them to phone VRG because there is a press conference today which will interest them. VRG leaves his phone for them to call.

6.2 Out to 35-36-52. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Gomez Lorenzo. Not there. Ask him to phone VRG when he comes in.

6.5 Out to 35-61-97. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers "El Dia," for Hernandez Ramirez. Not in. And Muzquiz (or Muzquin)? Not there. Tell them about their press conference....

24-23-15
7.0 Out to ~~22X18X20~~. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks WO, who answers, 66r Dr.Bauer (??ph) or where they can locate him. At 20 de Noviembre Hospital. His wife is not there. He will come home around 1400 and then goes to ~~[illegible]~~ Laboratorio Midi (ph).

7.5 Out to 22-18-20. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks for Sr. Arnedo (ph). Won't bethere until in the afternoon.

7.7 In. MO asks Sra. Diener, who answers, for Casta (maid). Casta takes the phone...her boyfriend...about visiting her... where she is working...

After 1235, 29 April

8.5 In. MO with VRG, who answers. MO has sent VRG (his article on Santo Domingo). Did VRG say anything to Renato? Renato did not phone VRG yesterday. They will (their talk) until Saturday. They don't too much discussion. MO thinks they will all get together to collect (money). Can talk tomorrow then.

9.0 In. MO with VRG, who answers. MO tells VRG that he is at Teatro de la Paz arranging an performance of "Historia del Zoologico (?)." Can VRG wait a little more for him to get there. VRG says he is going out now. Can meet tomorrow at 1300 at "Siempre." All right.

9.2 In. Rojas with Inga (Rico), who answers, for VRG. Call back in 30 minutes. Will he be there a while? She thinks so. MO will come by then.

9.5 In. Miric with Inge (Rico), who answers, for VRG, who called him. He just went to corner and will be right back. Is Miric at home? Yes. She will have VRG phone him.

10.0 In. Sr. Suarez asks maid, who answers, for VRG. Will be back in 20 minutes.

10.5 In. MO asks VRG, who answers, for Sra. Rico. Sra. Rico takes the phone. Asks to speak with Casta. MOis her brother...Maid takes the phone...about bringing her clothes... Will go for it now...

11.0 Out to 31-06-06, twice. Busy.

11.5 In. Sr. Miric with VRG, who answers. VRG tells him about the press conference of Dominicans (exiles) at 1600...Miric knows Marcio Mejia Ricart. Will MMR give the press conference alone? No, there "are more serious persons" there (to talk).

11.5 contd.
Miric called VRG last night, about 3 times. From 2000 to 2300. They went out to dinner. Miric wanted VRG's opinion on what happened. VRG thinks this is normal. The disembarkation of the (U.S.) marines "is normal. It is within all the a calcuations, analyses of the reality. You understand that if they can bomb a Socialist country, logically in their backyard, they (U.S.) can do what they want." Will VRG go to conference? No. Miric would like to talk to VRG about 15 minutes. Come by VRG's before the conference. Miric has car problem. Or Miric can come by after the press conference. Thinks he will do that.

12.2 Out to 45-40-4-Incomplete.
Out to 45-40-04. VRG (v) asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Suares. Who is calling? VRG says he has wrong number.

12.5 Out to 45-91-36. VRG with Pepita, who answers. Greetings. Asks if VRG knows where Luis is. No, VRG is calling him. Pepita is waiting for him. Luis called when VRG went to barber shop... She can have him phone VRG. VRG explains about the press conference of Dominican exiles and he should be interested in this...

13.5 In. Luis with VRG, who answers. A group of Dominican exiles came to see VRG - among them Marcio Mejia Ricart, Luis' friend. There are "more serious" people in this (than MMR). They are going to give a press conference today at 1600. Luis is interested. Luis saw VRG's article today in "El Dia" and Luis follows VRG's line (against U.S.). VRG is also writing an article for "Siempre." Gives Luis the address where conference will take place. VRG also called Doidov (ph) or Cuchevov (ph), but not there. Did not find Leonov in either. Left a message for them to call VRG. Because when the conference of Mary Brack (ph), they did not appear either. They came by VRG all one afternoon getting the declarations from VRG. Luis will also go. More than news, what they have is idea to understand the problem.

Has VRG read "Ultimas Noticias" today? No. All are declarations of things going on there "since they have don't been able to dominate (Bosch movement). They say it is a Communist sbuversion, Czech arms and there is an O.E.A. meeting. They don't mention Bosch." VRG is not surprised and would not be surprised if they did not get another Cuban crisis out of this same situation (another pretext, he means, to invade Cuba?), "Ultimas Noticias" only makes mention of Communism and Cuba. VRG says that since 1927 they (American) haven't landed in America. Very grave situation and precedent.

Does Luis have Marcio's phone? No. About where Valerio Trujano is located...

15.2 In. Leonov with VRG, who answers. Greetings. VRG says Leonov has a Catalan accent. VRG looked for TASS and PRAVDA correspondents. Thought they might x be with Leonov...Explains about the press conference. They might be interested. Leonov s just saw them. Gives details about where conference will be...These exiles may have information - to understand the problem. L. says it looks confusing now. VRG won't go. VRG is now working on this, and has already worked with them. VRG has been in Santo Domingo. Luis will also go. Miric will also go. Leonov will advise TASS and PRAVDA correspondents.

When can they have coffee? Tomorrow morning? Best in the afternoon. Call VRG around this same time tomorrow to arrange time. Fine

16.0 In. Luis with VRG, who answers. Asks if he knows about the conference of Dominicans...Of course, they occupied (his house) like the marines and VRG even helped them organize this conference. VRG is not going to conference.

Luis saw VRG's article. Yes, but they did not put on the signature. It is best that way. With a signature it would have been Luis' article. Without signature, it appears more editorial. Luis prefers it this way politically. This was just an error, since VRG talked to Alberto about this. It was an error in the shop. Luis is happier abox this. When Luis sends this to Puerto Rico is carries more weight this way. Luis asks if he charges for this. VRG thinks so, but will ask. Askxx with discretion. What most interested him was that it x came out. VRG will call MO on Saturday or Sunday so they can get together.

After 1440, 29 April

16.7 In. Luis with Inge (Rico), who answers, for VRG.

VRG takes phone. Greetings. Luis saw Noe a while ago. Noe will probably arrange Luis' matter. Good! Sent greetings to VRG. Asks if there is nothing new. No. Hasn't Efrain called VRG? No. Then, there is nothing to be done. Asks VRG to pick up tickets. Yes, he will do this tomorrow.

17.0 Out to 46-60-15. VRG xxxxxxxx with Jardon, who answers. Greetings. What is new in Santo Domingo? Quite a bit. Just a moment.

The last message they received came from San Juan, Puerto Rico. They have obtained complete control of City of Santo Domingo. In xxxxthe morning, they had heard that the insurgents had obtained control of all radio systems (stations) of the capital and started attack on base of San Isidro. France Presse told VRG about the attack of San Isidro. The last heard is that they are in control of Santo Domingo city. They have taken 4 tanks, destroyed another 2 in capital. They will see if they can take over San Isidro. That is the air base. And the (U.S.) marines? VRG heard a radio bulletin that they disembarked another 100 marines. They had said yesterday that, in case it were necessary, they would disembark 1,000 not 100 xxx marines. And reactions? Hasn't anyone protested? No, besides Cuba and USSR, no one. What did USSR say? Doesn't say. MO goes on that the total amount of men fighting for Bosch is 15,000 - civil and military men. The major part is civil because, apart from Camagno (ph) and Montes/ who refused to accept transaction, the rest of the officers backed out (of revolution)...

There is a quite well founded rumor that xxxxxxxx it is not remote that the marines, "are made to feel the need, to protect liberty and democracy, to intervene categorically and to find proofs of the Castro-Communist intervention. There is also speculation that there will be a change of 180° in the Latin American situation and that the O.A.S. meeting may not xx result as planned (to protest against intervention in Santo Domingo)." Jardon says this is possible. Did VRG notice yesterday in Johnson's message, at the end, "the disembarkation of marines will not only take place in Santo Domingo, but this (group) will be lent to citizens of other countries, some of which have already asked for "our" (U.S.) help." VRG says that he is referring to citizens of other countries living in Santo Domingo. Jardon disagrees, then says, yes, it can be interpreted in the x two ways. VRG asks Jardon to send a cable with this rumor. It can be true or false. Jardon will do so. He will include it in the message he sends out at 1800.

VRG asks Jardon to call him if anything important comes up. Yes.

17.0 contd.
Will Jardon have Fidel's speech on Sunday? He is sure he will, but thinks the complete text will be sent on Sudday. Should have it complete around 1800.

18.5 In. Sra. Rico with VRG, who answers. Greetings..VRG has been very busy with the Dominican affair. Some Dominican friends were at his house this morning and phoned a lot. Sra. R. says Bosch won't get in. She read it. The ~~XXx~~ last news is that they (insurgents) have taken the whole capital, Santo Domingo, and the Americans were disembarked. Bosch won't go. That is the agreement made but people did not accept this agreement and fighting has continued...

18.0 In. Edmundo (Jardon) with VRG, who answers. There is some news. The ~~Xxx~~ Peruvian Chancellor criticized the disembarkation of U.S. marines, stating that this was grave blow to inter-American relations...Washington states that Mexico ~~xxxxxxxx~~ criticized the disembarkation of U.S. troops, in the secret session celebrated today in O.E.A. Colombia, Chile, Venezuela and Costa Rica protested that this unilateral action, and requested legal measures so this action would be a combined action. VRG asks for the form in which Mexico criticized this action. Nothing specific in this message. Should have it later. The bombarding of San Isidro has started - an hour ago. Informex should have text of Mexico by now. It would be good to ask for it. Call him if there is anything new. VRG is writing up this for "Siempre."

19.0 In. Miric with VRG, who answers. The marines have entered action Yes. Two civils have been killed. Miric says there is a new element. ...60 marines around the Embassy. They have opened fire against U.S. Embassy. They tried to enter 4 or 5 Embassies. VRG thinks that these are pretexts (for U.S. action). Miric thinks so. But thinks are more grave. Miric says that there are at least 2 Communist groups and one Pro-Castro group, called the 14 de Junio. They don't know whether they are the ones directing the rebellion or whether they just joined it, but there is great insistence that these areCommunists, trained in Cuba and Czech. On the~~x~~ other~~x~~ hand, the 6th fleet of Caribbean is lined along the Dominican coast and a carrier. The Dominican Amb. in Washington continues to insist that this is a Communist attempt to take over Santo Domingo. Does Miric know that this Amb. is not a Dominican? Bonilla Atiles is a U.S. citizen - legally.

Ambs of Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Colombia spoke in O.E.A. meeting - all protesting the intervention and that this is a violation of inter-American rights. Radio Habana only said that Mexico had censured this, VRGsays, but says O.E.A. is trying to cover the intervention. Yes, there is a petition to this effect by Venezuela, that O.E.A. should intervene. Does not say to legalize but means this. The Voice of America says that it is not true that insurgents are not in control the city, that the troops are trying to encircle some points which they hold in Santo Domingo and does not mention the attack of San Isidro. VRG says that UP says that - in cables from San Juan - that insurgents hold the city, attacked San Isidro, destroyed 2 tanks and took 4 tanks. There are marines [illegible] Supposedly defending Embassy and Americm property/ ~~[illegible]~~
U.S. citizens. There is a protest of Red Cross. Marines must be at

19.0 contd.
Hotel Ambassador. There is protest by U.S. Red Cross stating that there are at least 400 dead and about 1,200 wounded. The Americans are distributing milk, etc. Both heard this over Voice of U.S. VRG comments (ironically) that "they are very nice people" (buenas gentes). ~~There is~~ also a declaration of Dept. of Defense that since marines are there, this does not mean U.S. supports one or another side.

VRG asks if Miric has called...No, not yet. Not there yet. It is nearly 1900. Yes, but he goes to work at 1800.

"These young people" brought their bulletin and a copy for Miric. It is long but does not state anything - saying that it is not true that they are Communists, that this a country fighting against oppression. VRG says this is habitual rhetoric of Latin Americans. Keep it for Miric.

Call VRG if Miric finds out anything about Mexico's position or statements in this.

23.2 In. MO asks VRG, who answers, if they took the declarations by (of exiles). How was the conference? It took place during a terrible rain...Reporters from "Excelsior," "Novedades," and "El Dia." Had declarations all written out for President, Cardenas and PRI. Not really a conference, just a few commentaries. MO gave the men the addresses of press agencies which did not appear. They were going to deliver this declaration. VRG says these people are worthwhile. Declarations were good, according to MO.

VRG asks if MO knew that marines have started to kill people. Read in "Ultimas Noticias" that first exchange of fire took place - with 70 marines at the U.S. Embassy. MO just got ~~mm~~ home. Mexico also protested in O.E.A. meeting. Yes, and a lot of countries. Yes, but they wanted to make it a united effort. VRG has not heard the terms in which~~xxx~~ Mexico censured this action of U.S.

Has VRG written this yet? He is preparing material. Wants to write it for tomorrow. VRG says it would be best to give this to "Siempre" on Monday. VRG will phone Pajes tomorrow early. Pajes will arrive on the train around 0900 or 1000. Should be at offi e around 1100. Would like to hand in his article on Monday.

About San Isidro being attacked...There is no foreign correspondent in ~~a~~ Santo Domingo. All information is coming from San Juan. The ones sending out information are Dominican reporters and this is probably being censured. They found out about the marine disembarking through Washington. MO sent a cable in detail when he got home found a cable from Adrede (?) in Berlin - that he wanted info on disembarkation. MO sent info to Berlin.

They will talk tomorrow. MO is Luis (Spanish extraction).

23.5 In. Valentin Cucherov (ph) of TASS with VRG, who answers. It was shame he could not attend the press conference of Dominicans. Would like to see these men. Does VC have the address? Leonov gave it to him. Go to see Mejia Ricart there. VRG can give him the address. C. makes note of Mejia's name...address...He can go tomorrow morning to see Mejia Ricart. They have a bulletin written up and some copies of telegrams they have made up (sent). VC will go by there around 1200 or 1300. Call MR on his University ~~x~~phone. MR is a research man at the University. Phone 48-65-60, ~~xxxx~~ 48-63-00, exts. 100, 432, 162.

Are there a lot of interesting things on this? Some. VC thinks this is

25.5 contd.
confusing situation in Dominican Republic. What does VRG thinks? It is complex (side-steps him). Dominican exiles were going to try the Embassy to find out where they could locate Valentin Cucherov.

When can they meet one another? When VC likes. Perhaps on Monday. Call VRG on Monday to arrange a time. Will phone Monday morning.

After 2120, 29 April

26.5 In. Miric (v) with VRG, who answers. Cucherov just phoned. He just found out about the press conference. Miric says that that correspondents of News Agencies he likes very much (ironic?). Cucherov asked VRG what he thought about the situation. VRG replied that he thought the situation was confusing.

They say that they (Bosch men) have 50,000 men ready to enter the fight. Continue to attack in mass San Isidro. Is this from Informex? Yes.

There is an official declaration (of Mexico) essentially disapproving the marines. President is still very worried about situation in sister Republic and that the govt. thinks it is ~~shameful~~ very sad that U.S. took this action. It is only 20 or 30 lines. Doesn't it mention the O.E.A.? No, but the sense is the same, with an accent of a little more worry. There is news that the Mexican Embassy has also been attacked in Dominican Republic. Have attacked Salvadoran, Peruvian, Mexican, [illegible] Ecuadoran and U.S. Embassies. VRG doubts this. Thinks these may have been provacateurs. Why would they attack~~s~~ the Embassies? The Mexican Amb. is in almost constant communication with Mexico - informing what is going on. And it is not sure yet that there are any victims among the U.S. citizens. But there has been further disembarkation. VRG thinks they will occupy the territory. This will be a repetition of 1916. Miric says it won't be the same exactly. No, it was then to form the empire and it is now to defend.

As to the O.E.A., things are not going well. There was a 5 hour meeting which did not resolve anything. VRG heard about this. They are back in meeting.

VRG is going to ask Pajes to let him turn his story in on Monday. Everything is too contradicaory yet.

Miric has taken his position and is now writing his story. Miric would like to have text (of Fidel). Call Jordon. If VRG has any news, he will phone Miric.

28.5 Out to 45-60-15. VRG asks MO, who anwers, for Jardon (or Pardon)
Jardon takesthe phone. Asks if he has the declaration of Mexico. Yes. Asks him to read it. Reads it - summarizing that President Diaz Ordaz has been fraternally and deeply worried about situation in Dominican Republic...that the Mexican Amb. has been in constant telephone contact with Dept. of Foreign Affairs here. Amb. is Lic. Ramon Ruis Vasconcelos. Amb. has given refuge and asylum to Mexicans and Dominicans. Situation is confusing to norm Mexican conduct with their international principals, especially with respect to American problems. They can state that they deplore the blood being shed, as stated in the O.E.A., and sufferings of Dominican Republic and sorry that U.S. govt. has had to act in such a manner which reminds them of such sad memories of several countries in the hemisphere and hope that marine force occupation will be the shortest time as possible...that Dominican Republic can resolve their problems without any direct or indirect exterior influence. VRG thinks that it is quite good within what can be expected.

28.5 contd.
They are expecting another disembarkation of more marines. VKG has heard that this has already taken place. And also said that they (Bosch) have 30,000 armed civil people and attacking San Isidro. VKG thinks 30,000 is too much. It was said in Santo Domingo that there were 15,000 (pro-Bosch). MO thinks there is not enough arms. Yes, there is enough arms because the army of theirs is bestial.

30.7 Out to 31-06-06. Busy.

After 2130, 29 April

31.0 Out to 31-06-06, twice. Busy, complete. VKG with MO, who answers. MO is Miric.
VKG has the complete text (of Mexico) and summarizes this for [illegible] Reads the text to Miric. (One of two - VKG takes good shorthand, [illegible] it or has received a written copy.) Miric says that this is a positive declaration. No other govt. has declared in this form. Also does not mention the O.E.A. but mentions that hopes that Dominican Republic can resolve its problems without indirect or direct influence (so don't approve of united attacked).
There is a report that a group of General Bening of 1,500 men [illegible] has changed to insurgents. All these items are very different points. Most of them are from San Juan. Bosch probably has the phone in his hand there and perhaps thinks are too optimistic. Miric says that the popular rebellion is winning. They, the marines, are supposed to be forming a cordon - for evacuating of Americans - so this must be several thousands. If this is to airport, the airport is 20 miles from city, the defense line must be quite long.

Reel off at RT 32.2, 2140, 29 April 1965

From 2140, 29 April (Thursday) to 0620, 30 April 1965

2.0 In. Emilio Cordero with Victor Rico Galan (VRG), who answers. EC talked to VRG this afternoon about the attempt(ed coup d'etat) of 8 May 1962. Yes. EC just got a cable..American intervention is covered by Agreement with the U.S. of 1962. That is the Treaty that EC showed VRG.

Did VRG give those persons a copy of bulletin? No, but he read it to them over the phone.

Did EC see that Mexico made a declaration? Yes, but not strong. It's essence is a help. Yes, but in comparison to the one made by De Leon (it is weak). Yes, but De Leon's attaches a proposal that O.E.A. joined (in united effort with U.S.) EC says that Uruguay's declaration is also very good. VRG has not seen it. EC saw it at UP. It was coming in on teletype.

Did VRG read the report? Yes, but it refers to a very special aspect. EC says it refers basically to the death of Trujillo and the counte coup. This is not very necessary to show in the case of Santo Domingo.

From 0620, 30 April (Friday) to 0700, 1 May 1965

After 0915, 30 April

2.5 In. MO, correspondent of PRAVDA, asks Sra. Diener (ph), who answers, for VRG.

VRG takes the phone. MO identifies himself as Vladimir. Greetings. How was VRG's trip? Fine. MO read VRG's article. It was very good.

They told MO about a press conference yesterday, but MO was not at home all day yesterday. Cucherov has the address and everything. MO can't find (Cucherov). C. was going to locate this person (Mejia Ricart).

2.7 Out to 46-51-30. No answer.

3.0 In. Gil asks Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for VRG.

VRG takes the phone. Will they see one another in the afternoon? Yes. Gil will come by (VRG's) at 1730. Fine.

3.2 One extension off the hook...

3.7 Out to 23-02-91. VRG with ...ind..Rosales, who answers. Asks for Pajes. Not back yet. Greetings. Pajes should be in shortly. Must have gotten home late last night, but has a lot of work there pending. VRG wants to submit his article on Monday (instead of today or tomorrow) since he is working on Dominican Republic. VRG thought Pajes was coming in on the train this morning. MO is not sure. VRG wanted to wait on the O.E.A. meeting which is to take place tomorrow and write article on Sunday. VRG has a lot of data, but wanted to turn this in on Monday - to see how things are going. VRG decides to wait to turn this in...

5.0 In. MO with VRG, who answers. Greetings. (VRG recognizes MO.) MOstood VRG up twice. MO invites VRG to lunch. MO is Rojas. VRG is very busy and full of problems with Dominican affair. VRG waited for MO for two hours yesterday. Should at least phone he can't come. Invites VRG to lunch between 1400 and 1500. VRG is preparing an article on Dominican

5.0 contd.
affair. VRG is going to "Siempre" this morning. If Pajes accepts that VRG turn in article on Monday, then VRG can have lunch with MO. But Pajes does not accept this, VRG will have to write all afternoon to deliver it this afternoon. Call VRG at 1230 at "Siempre." Fine. What phone is it? 46-43-24. In case VRG is not there, call VRG here at home.

6.2 Out to 23-48-26. Orders a cab. None now.
Out ?. Orders a cab. None now.

6.7 In. Sra. Lupe asks Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for Sra. (Inge) Rico.
I.Rico takes phone. About a cook..Has one for IR.

7.2 In. Julian with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Greetings. VRG went to "Siempre." If IR see VRG, tell him not to send his brother to him now. Julian has resolved on Reforma (??an apt??)...

7.5 In. Sra. Rico with Sra. Diener, who answers. Greetings. VRG is out. IR went for child....about everyone... their health.

8.2 In. Julian with WI, who answers, for VRG. Not there.

After 1310, 30 April

8.5 In. Deschamps with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Not sure he will be home for lunch. Will be home around 1800. Will he be at "Siempre"? Possibly so, but she thinks not.

8.7 In. WO asks maid, who answers, for Sra. Diener. WO is Sra. de la Vega. Not there right now. Sra. de la V. called to say good-bye.

9.0 In. MO with VRG, who answers. Asks VRG to hold the phone.
MO takes the phone. Asks VRG to leave an article for him today or tomorrow. VRG can't today. Will do so tomorrow. MO is Manuel (Marcue?). There are a lot of things going on. Yes, but will do it tomorrow.

9.5 In. Luis with VRG, who answers. Luis made note of phone number of one of "these engineers", of the Dominicans. Luis put this phone on some copies they were going to distribute. Cocheli (ph) wants to talk to them (Dominicans) and is going to send some things to his newspaper in Italy. VRG does not have this phone at hand. When Cocheli phones VRG, VRG can give it to him.
Carlos (Cocheli) takes the phone. Carlos had a lot of things to talk to VRG. Yes, but he never calls. When can he see VRG today? VRG will be there at 1730. VRG is going out right now. VRG will be there between 1730 and 1800. Fine.

9.9 Out to 25-58-03. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Dr. Balan. Not there.

After 1430, 30 April

10.0 Out to 37-12-84. Sra. Diener asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Gonzales.
Sr. Gonzales takes phone...about napkin ring...

10.5 In. MO (inaudibly identifies himself) with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Will be in around 1730.

10.7 Out to 37-12-84. Sra. Diener asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Gonzalez.
Sr. Gonzalez takes the phone. She asks him to bring her some alcohol...He is going to get some figures from her...(She apparently makes designs for them and they make things for her...~~gifxx~~ gifts...)

11.2 Out to 11-03-71, ~~twicex~~ Wrong number.
Out to 11-03-70. Tillie (Diener) with Elsa (de la Vega), who answers. Elsa is finally leaving on her trip...to visit (a daughter)...

12.5 Out to 03, twice. No rings, complete. Time is 1616 (30 April).

12.7 In. Rodrigo with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings... About maids...VRG is not there. Will be home around 1800. VRG will call R. to see if they can get together on Sunday. The Rico's have an engagement on Saturday, but perhaps can get together on Sunday to chat. R. says they will phone the Rico's. Fine, but best phone tomorrow morning.

After 1715, 30 April

13.2 In. VRG with Inge Rico, who answers. He is on his way home. If "that man" comes, ask him to wait.

13.5 In. MO asks Inge Rico, who answers, for maid, Casta.
Cuts off or someone hangs up...

13.7 In. Samuel asks Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Call back in 30 minutes.

14.0 In. MO asks Inge Rico, who answers, for maid Casta.
Maid takes the phone. About ~~xx~~ where he is...visiting her..

14.5 In. Samuel with VRG, who answers. Greetings. Samuel stood VRG up the last time they arranged to see one another. Samuel will come by VRG's now to see him.

14.7 In. Carmen with VRG, who answers. Greetings. Carmen just came in (to Mexico?). Would like to talk to VRG. Arrange for her to come by tomorrow morning, at 1000.

15.0 Out to 14-57-85. Hangs up.
Out to 14-57-89, twice. No rings, complete. VRG with Ramon (Sinovas?), who answers. Greetings. Asks when they will come over tomorrow. Asks if VRG has a short wave radio (to hear Fidel's speech?). Yes. VRG thought they could come over early and they can chat a little. Suggests they come around 1130. Fine, will come at 1130. Marta and Inge can chat. Has VRG read this afternoon's news? Not yet. "Ultimas Noticias" says a lot of blood is being shed in Dominican Republic. S. has hopes that tomorrow...inaudible. That would be good.

After 1900, 30 April

15.2 In. MO asks VRG, who answers, why he didn't submit his material. He is writing on Dominican affair and will turn it in on Monday. It would be stupid to write this without knowing what O.E.A. says. VRG told him (Pajes) he would turn it on Monday. He (Pajes) said no and if he did turn it in on Monday, it should only be one page. VRG will submit 10 cuartillas on Monday and they can publish this if they like. No one will work tomorrow

13.2 contd.
MO reads VRG Bosch's declarations - announced that the Fortaleza de Ozama, that is, the police! constituted a great victory!...manifested the fact that probably a few Communists are fighting for constitutional rights, but pointed out that these x forces were armed by the Army (?) and traned in the U.S. and not by the Communists. He assured that U.S. govt. and people that the forces were not being directed by "turbas" (Communists?). Bosch stated that it would be impossible to establish in the Dominican Republic a regime similar to the one in Cuba. He pointed out that had the Cubans done what the Dominicans are doing now, Fidel Castro would never have been converted into ...fmd feudal lord (?) of the Cuban revolution... (MO comments - that this is terrible.) VRG asks what did MO expect from Bosch. Nothing from Bosch. He fell for some reason, MO says. VRG comments that least important thing is his stupidity, the worst part is his reactionary attitude.

Julian came by and wanted MO to go (somewhere), but MO told him (Julian) to tell this to Pajes so he would have some permission (to go). But didn't do anything...

MO suggests that VRG attack Bosch.

Pajes was in a bad mood. He did not even say hello to VRG. And turned his back on VRG when talking about Dominican Republic...VRG will write all necessary and Pajes can do what he likes.

After 1900, 30 April

16.7 In. Sra. Rico with VRG, who answers. About how everyone is... VRG fought with Pajes about turning his article in on Dominican Republic...

17.2 In. MO with VRG, who answers. The PRI Convention approved by acclamation a protest against Dominican affair. How good! They are supporting the govt's (President's) attitude. Doesnot mention U.S. but talks about beginnings of PRI, Juarez, etc. xxxxx It was read by Senator M Bolaños Cacho. PRI can't be indifferent to problems, a danger of Dominican Republic's losing its liberty, the internal problem can't be resolved by foreign influence nor armed forces which converts into a factor which is against the will of the country. It is quite well done. A good protest.

Dominican Amb. has resigned his post. Can't consent to the fact that his country has been invaded.

VRG has a lot of things or rather a package for doña Aurora (MO's wife). Will take it by.

VRG went by to see Cocheli. VRG told him (C.) that he did not need to talk to Dominican exiles, that VRG can give him a copy of what they said.

MO would like to give this news to Julian, but doesn't know where to call him.

18.0 In. Inge Rico (v) answers. Operator speaks but she does not hear.

After 2130, 30 April

18.2 In. Wrong number.
In, twice. No answer.
In, 3 times. No answer, complete. VRG (v) answers. Long distance is calling. Habana, Cuba is calling.

22.5 Call goes through. MO identifies himself as Niña. Greetings. MO will send VRG some books on Sunday. However, they want to talk to him about another matter, but one moment.

Sr. Undora (?ph) takes the phone. News there in Habana mention ....Santo Domingo...VRG says nothing is known about this. They have heard that there have been 1,000 killed. There is nothing on cease fire. The PRI protested against the invasion into Santo Domingo today. MO says that they called from Santo Domingo that the people called the Cubans to try to achieve Cease Fire...? VRG will try to phone "him" (?) now. They are sending out special transmission...(Connection poor). VRG will phone now and then call MO back.

23.2 Out to XXX 25-80-32. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Dr. Cordero.

Dr. Cordero takes the phone. Greetings. Habana just phoned and they are sending out a special transmission. They just received the news of Cease Fire and would like to know whether this is true or not. Asked VRG to call Santo Domingo to find out xx whether it is true since they can't. Where can VRG call there? One moment. But give him a number of one that works (that is, a number of a Communist who will give them the picture)...Dr. C. suggests his wife's phone. Couldn't he give him another phone? No, does not have any phone there. Couldn't he let him know where VRG could locate Camagno. Dr. C's wife's phone is 9-66-02. And Tamagno (not Camagno)? Where could he be located? Or any other person who could give him a clear idea of the situation. Mejia would be a good person, but MO does not have his phone. Mejia phoned MO this morning. Doesn't anyone know his phone here? What is C's wife's name? Josefina de Cordero. Josefina Painado de Cordero. Would she know? Yes, she must know phone of Juan B. (Mejia) or the phone of Elsa Justo. VRG knows Elsa. Fine. Radio Habana called VRG and they are going to send out a special program. Would to check on Cease Fire. Bosch talked about this today. They have been working on this. An American Amb. has been dealing about this.

26.0 Out to 09. VRG with Long Distance. Requests a call to Santo Domingo. They have not had communication for 2 or 3 days. VRG says there has been constant communication there. He says he talked to Santo Domingo this afternoon. She checks and says it will be 3 or 4 weeks before there is communication. That is what the N.Y. operator says.

VRG asks to talk to Radio Habana in Cuba. With Orlando XXXXXXXXXXXX Fundora (not Undora). MO says Habana is calling VRG right now. Fine. Call goes through.

VRG with Fundora. VRG called and was told he could talk in 2 or 3 weeks. They can't call Santo Domingo....connection very bad... VRG can't hear...MO comes on line and explains that they can hear him in Habana. VRG repeats the matter of PRI. The PRI is having a National Assembly. They protested the invasion in Dominican Republic. About the call to Santo Domingo, it is via New York and the operator in N.Y. answered that communication has been suspended for 2 or 3 weeks. This is false because two friends of VRG, Dominicans, talked to people in Santo Domingo. VRG is going to call these friends to get them to call back. Then, VRG should report back in when he has news from Santo Domingo.

32.2 Out to 25-80-32. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Cordero.

Sr. Cordero takes the phone. VRG just talked to Habana. Was told he could not talk to Santo Domingo. Habana asked VRG to try to talk to Santo Domingo. If Cordero was able to talk to his wife, VRG

32.2 contd.
would like Cordero to call for him. C. has a call in. He placed his call last Saturday and they gave him his call yesterday. C. placed another call today and he was told they could put his call through on 4 May. There are thousands of calls. Habana has heard about Cease Fire and they want to prove whether this is true or not. Santo Domingo can call here easily. They could send a cable to C's wife and have her call. They could have Radio Habana broadcast for them to call Dr. Cordero here in Mexico. That is dangerous. Or they could say for Santo Domingo to call VRC. The easiest thing would be to send a cable. Yes, but this is very urgent. Could have Radio Habana ask Elsa to phone him. Or just say - anyone to call him. Juan B. could hear this. VRC will do this. MO will phone VRC tomorrow.

33.5 Out to 09, twice. VRG requests a long distance call to Habana, Cuba...reel runs out...

On dial tape, but not recorded:
XXXXXX
In.
Out to 09.
In.

Reel off at RT 33.7, 0700, 30 April 1965

From 0700 to 2330, 1 May (Saturday) 1965

2.0 Out to 23-88-20. Sra. Diener asks Josefina (maid), who answers, if the young girl is up yet. Thinks no.
Out to 23-88-20. Busy.

2.2 In. Rosita with Sra. Diener, who answers. Sra. D. phoned Rosita. Asks if she has heard anything from young man (husband). Yes, he called last night. Had not phoned for a week but he had been in small towns and could not phone. Sra. D. said that phone rang a lot from 2330 to 0100 and she was somewhat worried...Max is Rosita's husband...

3.0 Out to 03. Time is 0940 (1 May).
After 1115, 1 May
3.2 Out to 15-91-27. Victor Rico Galan (VRG) with MO, who answers. Greetings...How did things go there (in Cuba)? Fine. VRG needs to see MO. Arrange to get together tomorrow afternoon. VRG will phone MO tomorrow to set time. May go by MO's. MO has been working with, apple polishing Madrazo. Alberto Domingo reprimanded MO and MO replied that this is just exactly what AD with Alvarez Amezquita.

4.5 Out to 03. Time is 1145, 1 May.

4.7 Out to 39-32-48. VRG asks for Sr. Luis Lizaldi. He does not live there. Will he go by there today? Not sure. If he goes by, what time would he come? Not sure. He may come but since his mother is not there (in town), he may not come.

5.0 Out to 45-40-04. Sra. Rico asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Has gone to market (with wife). Ask him to phone her at his brother's house.

5.2 In. Cordero with VRG, who answers. How did VRG arrange things last night? Nothing, VRG could not talk. VRG cursed the N.Y. operator because she said that the press calls had preference when they originated in U.S. VRG could not talk to Radio Habana because Habana line went out. What did Juan B. say? Didn't C. says that Juan B. talk to Marcio? No, talked to Cordero. Juan B. Mejia, a member of the Party. VRG knows him. He said that the fight was continuing and wanted them to make a campaign of protest against what they are saying- that the Dominican movement is Communist, that they are attacking the Embassies, that there is absolute order in the capital, that is, within combat. They are not sacking house or attacking Embassies. He said there was more order there than in the Trujillo rebellion. MO asked what control they had on the situation and he replied they had a lot.

Marcio talked to Bosch and will put Marcio on with VRG.

There was a Cease Fire, but they have not respected the Cease Fire of O.E.A. There has been combat with the U.S. troops. Who gave this out? UP cable. No, AP cable. There are some Americans dead. VRG says - How good! There are 3 dead, 24 wounded and 3 in coma. VRG says that one should say - as Cocholi said in an article - Blood has run. Yankee blood, but [illegible] blood anyway.

5.2 contd.
VRG asks if Juan B. did not mention about the ones who have left (the group)? No. MO asked for companions and Juan B. said there were a lot of disappeared. Two or three members of the Committee have disappeared. They may be dead or axaxxraitaxax went to the hills (left or really went to the hills). The campaign of UP must be combatted. VRG will call Habana today. The civilian people are patrolling the streets. They are maintaining a order. There is combat, of course, but where there is no combat, everything is in order. The movement wants this campaign that they are using Czech arms to be clarified - that it is not true.

VRG and MO could get together tonight. Dominicans are having a meeting tonight around 2000. VRGand MO could get together a little before. About the matter MO took by to VRG. Yes, and other things which VRG wants to get MO help to establish. Then, about 1700? No, best at 1800. MO will come by at 1800 - with his friends. All right.

Marcio (Mejia Ricart) with VRG. What did Bosch say? Said there was complete calm and there was no doubt of control, that they were still disxxibuting distributing arms. MMR saw that Bosch was more interested in talking than 3 days ago when MMR talked to him. Bosch said that of the 30 tanks, there are 9 only 9 left. They (Bosch people) have 11 and 10 are out of combat. No one has published this, at least MMR has not seen this. Bosch said that yesterday morning they conquered Fortalez Ozama where there were several hundreds of dead, but they had taken it, and there is a cable stating that everyone there was shot. They are still picking up political leaders in city. The National Polic has not come over to Bosch yet. The U.S. troops are now entering into action. Of course, if they disembarked in San Isidro, it was to enter into action. Bosch said that things are being arranged (between them and U.S.) but the conditions right now contain immediate evacuation of the (U.S.) troops.

7.5 Out to 09. VRG with long distance. VRG has a call to report in for Radio Habana, Cuba. The call is from Director or Sub-Director of Radio Habana.

8.0 Out to14-57-89, twice. No rings,complete. Marta Sinoves with maid, Consuelo, who answers. Children will have lunch there. Marta and Ramon will have lunch here and are at 23-07-72. In case they call from theEmbassy or the Cuban woman who visited them last night.
After 1330, 1 May
8.2 Out to 43-40-04. Sra. Rico asks MO, who answers, for el Sr.
MO takes the phone. (MO is Fernando.) Greetings...about Anita's child...children...

10.0 In. Operator tells VRG they will put his call through in a moment.
In. Operator asks if VRG will be in because Sr. is not in. VRG will be at home.

10.5 In. Miric with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings.
VRG takes the phone. Greetings. What is the news? The marines have entered into action. They have killed some (marines) which, VRG comments, is very good. About political aspect, the condition of Bosch is withdrawal of troops. They talked to Bosch yesterday and this was

10.5 contd.
his reply. He appears to be a little more radical than a few days ago, but "this is an observation of your friend, Marcio, which does not inspire much confidence in me. He taked to him (Bosch)." Miric has know him (Marcio Mejia Ricart) a year (and is not inspired much by MMR either).

Will VRG working this afternoon? No, VRG has to go out. They can talk in case there is any news. Before VRG goes out, VRG will call Miric. Fine.

11.0 In. Habana is calling VRG. Inge Rico (v) answers.
VRG takes the phone. Talks to Pundora. One of the National Directors of the Movimiento 14 de Junio called Mexico called Mexico. This is Juan B. Mejia. He said that it is very important that they point out that the calumnies being circulated are lies - that they are attacking embassies. There is absolute order in the city. The ~~xxx~~ armed civilians are patrolling the streets. There is no sacking. They are still distributing arms, that they have absolute control of city and there are 2 or 3 points of enemy resistance. The police is holed up and has not surrended. They don't dare go out of their quarters either and it is now only a matter of time that they surrender. ...calls is interrupted because VRG can't hear...VRG asks operator to check another line. There is only one. Line has apparently gone out (to Habana). Operator will call VRG back.

13.2 Out to 46-60-15. VRG with MO, who answers, for Jardon. Won't be in today. MO is Toñio. Radio Habana called VRG last night to see if VRG could talk to Santo Domingo. VRG got some direct information there. VRG did not talk directly, but indirectly. VRG was trying to give information to Habana, but line is bad and could only send a small part. Asks MO if he could send a message via N.Y., urgent, to Prensa Latina for Radio Habana. The only contact they have now is via Mexico. The teletype of Prensa Latina is out of order. They are calling MO's office so MO can send data via Dept. of Communications. This is time consuming. It does go out today, but not right away. VRG will see if the line gets better. Will call MO later if he needs this way to send information. Habana needs this information urgently.

14.0 In. Operator tells Inge Rico (v) that Habana call is ready.
VRG takes the phone. Call goes through. About the 30 tanks Wessing had, 9 are out of combat, 10 are in the hands of Wessing and 11 in the hands of constitutionalists. There are series of Directors of 14 de Junio Movement that Juan B. Mejia states ~~xxx~~ have disappeared, but there are a lot of people in the hills. Juan Mejia is in Santo Domingo but other Directors are not there..some of the others. Wessing retired to San Isidro but marines have entered into action and there are several dead. Marines have not respected Cease Fire. Have killed some constitutionalists, but also some marines have died. There is a Cease Fire of O.E.A. but has not been respected. VRG tells Pundora to underline the fact that there is complete order in Santo Domingo, that it is a lie that they have attacked Embassies and U.S. Embassy, that they are still distributing arms, that there are 2 or 3 points in city where they are still fighting, but rest of city in power of constitutionalists who are maintaining complete order...Bosch called

14.0 contd.
a Dominican here yesterday and he is insisting on immediate withdrawal of (U.S.) troops (for negotiations). Juan B. also said that it is not true that the Americans have taken in medicine, etc. Absolute lie. VRG will call F. when he knows more news.

After 1535, 1 May 1965

17.2 In. Charo (ph) (woman) with Inge (Rico), who answers. Greetings...about maids...Inge asks how Sandino is. Fine. WO says they were with the Cardoso last night and Lia (Cardoso) had said that Inge was going to call her. Inge got a second maid yesterday.
WO asks about Inge's visa. Nothing, has done nothing. Has her time limit run out? Inge is not sure. She has to go see about this. Perhaps it is possible in October.
Invites them tomorrow afternoon - around 1600 - to have coffee. Fine.

18.2 Out to 25-80-32. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Cordero. Not there.

18.5 In. Cordero with VRG, who answers. VRG has a family problem and has to go out. Leave their appt. for another day. VRG will call him. If Cordero hears anything, let VRG know. VRG has notified the other to Habana. There was a report that some parachute troops went in. Yes, but that was given out by news agencies. No, VRG is referring to direct calls. Cordero is going to call New York and also Washington tonight. If there is anything interesting, let VRG know. VRG will be at home tonight.

18.5 In. Josefina asks VRG, who answers, for Inge.
Inge Rico takes phone. Asks how things went in Cuba. Fine. They were there 2 weeks. About how J-sefina is...chidren...sickness...

19.2 In. Habana is calling VRG.
VRG comes to the phone. MO asks what is new. Nothing. There is a call to go through to Bosch tonight and another one for Santo Domingo, but VRG will call when he has something new. MO is DiRas. When will Fidel talk? Around 1900, Habana time. MO asks VRG to repeat what he said this morning so th. can record it. VRG repeats again - about Juan B. Mejia's call from Santo Domingo...Mejia could not give details on who was in the hills, etc. Could not give names.

After 1755, 1 May

21.5 In. VRG with Inge, who answers. Asks if (something) has begun. One moment, she will see. No, they playing "Mozambique." That means that Fidel will begin (to speak).

Lina
23.0 In. XXXXX with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings...How was party? Fine. Inge rested. It would be good if they could get together Irina says they may go by there or if not, WO will come by tomorrow. Asks how Julian is. Fine. (Cubans...)

23.5 In. WO asks VRG, who answers, for maid, Casta.
Maid takes the phone. WO is Enriqueta...WO was in bed...about how she is...her boyfriend...

After 2135, 1 May
23.7 Out to 25-80-32, ~~txxxx~~ WI ~~xxxxxx~~ Cuban) asks WO, who answers for Sr. Cordero. Not there, then says one moment. But hangs up. WI holds phone.

24.0 Out to 25-80-32. WI asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Cordero. Not there. But he can be located at 39-07-51.

24.7 Out to 39-07-51. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Dr. Cordero. Emilio Cordero.

EC takes the phone. Did EC hear Fidel? Yes, VRG says they ~~XXXXXXXX~~ are in the center of history. How did he like it? Wonderful. The first two hours were dedicated to Dominican situation. He made a correct analysis of Dominican situation, who Bosch is, etc. And at the end, he gave out his philosophy.

VRG talked to Radio Habana twice. EC was just hearing over Radio Habana what Juan B. Mejia stated. And Habana had called Cordero, but there is no line now to Habana. In case EC talks to his wife or Marcio (Mejia Ricart) talks to Bosch, VRG would like to be there. MO thinks Marcio will talk to Bosch. Can VRG talk to him? Yes. And perhaps EC can inform VRG immediately about whatever EC's wife informs him - at whatever time it is. In case anyone calls EC, be it his wife, Juan B., or another member of the Party, he will let VRG know. In case he talks to Juan B., give him VRG's phone so they can phone VRG. Or give VRG's number to any other member (of Party) who calls because VRG is turning over information directly (to Habana). They are very interested.

Marcio Mejia Ricart takes the phone. MMT has not heard all Fidel's speech. Will MMR talk to Bosch? Yes, at 2230, in an hour. Will call from where he is. Could VRG go there so VEG could be there - so MMR can ask him a couple of questions. Fine. Where is MMR? He is at Zempoala 533, between Pilares and Cuicuilco. Explains where this is located. This is a house, not an apartment. VRG will go by there.

Reel off at RT 27.2, 2230, 1 May 1965

From 2230, 1 May (Saturday) to 0845, 2 Masy 1965

2.0 Out to 09. Victor Rico Galan (VRG) with long distance operator. VRG has been reporting in from the phone of a friend's house, but he is now at home. As soon as they have communication to Cuba, call him here. With Sr. Orlando Fundora or with Sr. Viñas, Radio Habana.

3.7 In, from long distance. They still don't have communication with Cuba. Will he continue to wait? Yes.

4.0 In, from long distance. Asks with whom VRG wants to talk to in Cuba? With Fundora or Viñas? Yes. VRG takes the phone. Says there is no one by the name of Fundora or Viñas inRadio Habana. Of course, they are the Director and Sub-Director of Radio Habana.

Finally gets through to Fundora. VRG says that they talked to Bosch last night - at 2330. VRG couldn't call him because line was out to Cuba. Bosch made sensational declarations. MO will record it.

They change phones. They asked Bosch what his opinion was of the O.E.A. Commission. VRG did not talk, but a Dominican friend talked to Bosch. However, theyrecorded the conversation. Bosch said some important things. This friend asked Bosch what he thought of OEA Commision. Bosch said that O.E.A. and nothing are the same thing. Who talked to Bosch. Marcio Mejia Ricart. They then asked Bosch if they the U.S. marines had occupied the city. He said they had and they had gotten as far as Avenida Melia, near downtown area, but that the armed civilians forced them back until Avenida Maximo Gomez, about 3-1/2 kilometers back. Ave. Maximo Gomez is what one might call their combat line since it is the zone where the U.S. Embassy is. So, they made them return to their original pax positions. This took place yesterday afternoon. But the most important thing - they asked Bosch what political solution Bosch saw. He answered "textually - 'It appears that in Washington they are thinking of converting Santo Domingo ina Fideicomiso.' Then he commented ironically, so "we get out of colonialism into independence." VRG says that this is of course very grave. As F. knows there are 2 or 3 left in the world - of Fideicomisos - in Southern Africa. This would be unprecedented case - that they convert an independent country into a country under Fideicomiso (Protectorates). When Mejia Ricart asked if they (U.S.) want to convert "us into a colony." Bosch replied that - Yes, into a colony but with 23,000 armed men. Civilians, of course. Bosch further said that "what the people had done was something extraoddinary and that he had complete faither in the people." B. did not want to say anything to provoke the uprising of the people because he (Bosch) is out of the country "and from outside, this is a comfortable role. If I were inside I would take up the responsibilites."

VRG had to pay the call since Fundora did not call him. VRG will be ruined this, so Fundora should have a call always in for VRG.

VRG will let him know when he has anything new.

F. asks what the situation is inside Dominican Republic. There is nothing new. They are expecting a call from Dominican Republic today. VRG may have something in 2 hours. In this case, VRG will call. F. will then call VRG back at 2300, Habana time, or 2200, Mexico time. (Or 0900, 1000 hours).

From 0845 to 1250, 2 May (Sunday) 1965

13.2 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for VRG.

14-00000

13.2 contd.
VRG takes the phone, but gets no reply.

13.2 In. Operator says that VRG talked 7 minutes to Cuba.

13.5 In. Operator asks Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for VRG. VRG takes the phone. Call goes through. Fundora asks if there is anything new. No, not yet, but expects to have something in about an hour - between 1130 and 1200. All right.

14.0 In. Cordero with VRG, who answers. VRG finally talked to Habana. Cordero talked to Juan Pedro Domingo and C. gave him VRG's phone. He will phone VRG. Fine. C. has the notes written down. Can read them to VRG. Call back in 5 minutes so VRG can have paper and pencil.

14.2 In. Cordero with VRG, who answers. C. tells VRG to put his recorder on to take note of what was said. VRG was doing that.

C. says: At 0915 Juan B. Mejia, member~~s~~ of Provisional Executive Central Committee of the Political Group 14 de Julio called Cordero from Santo Domingo and informed the following:

The Yankees are bombing and machine gunning the city. (VRG asks if they are bombing with airplanes. He did not tell C.) Could be artillery, perhaps naval. They have launched their tanks and marins against the people. A revolutionary order reigns in the entire city. Yesterday, 1 May, the Yankees opened some stores in the downtown and called the people to sack them. The people refused to do so. They then looked for prostitutes and filmed them sacking the stores. The interest is to show to international public opinion that chaos reigns in the country to be able to justify their open-faced and unjustified military intervention. That is, the people refused to enter into this propaganda because they had the cameras ready. They only got prostitutes and trash like that. They will publish this in the newspapers. The armed people are willing to resist the Yankee invasion and to conserve their sovereignty and independence. The struggle between the U.S. forces and constitutionalists has ceased. All the forces of people are concentrating in fighting the Yankee invader. There is a need to awaken the Mexican public opinion. MO wants VRG to help him in this. Of course. So, they (Mexicans) can send cables, etc. to United Nations for their tomorrow meeting on the Dominican Republic. They want pressure so that the United Nations and not the O.E.A. which combats the intervention. The combat with the Yankees is violent in different sectors of the city. The transmission sent out yesterday and today from Radio Habana mention him (Mejia) as member of the group did him a lot of damage. The reaction in Santo Domingo has been taken to point up and to be used as a Communist factor of their fight - as a result of the broadcast of Radio Habana. Mejia told C. that he was going to call VRG to clarify this with VRG because this is very delicate. VRG will communicate this right now to Radio Habana. Mejia further said: They should stop making such indications, like, Juan B. Mejia of 14 de Julio says...The Radio Habana said that this was an interview (of Mejia) with VRG. Another point - Should deny that they have a hideout in the mountains as informed by Radio Habana. This does a lot of damage. MO told Mejia about Bosch's conv - about the U.S. wanting Dominican Rep. in Fideicomiso

14.2 contd.
(Protectorate). Mejia said that they fight to the last man against this. Mejia will phone VRG. It is extremely important that Radio Habana deny that Mejia is involved in this, as well as the name of the group (which is Communist). Can give this as source of someone inMexico. They should not mention names nor 14 de Julio nor Juan B. or anyone. This does a tremendous damage.

Didn't he say anything about the situation inside (country)? No, because their call was limited to 3 minutes.

Did Cordero see "Excelsior"? Yes. Did "that" come out? Yes, came out in headlines and has about 4 columns...reads it to VRG.. that is, the heading. VRGhas not received his paper yet.

VRG thinks they should wdte up a bulletin for the newspapers. The Dominican exiles should sign it. In today's "El Dia," they give a lot of space to them (the exiles here who gave out declarations the other day). They mention all four. "El Dia" published about Bosch, a little mixed up by Marcio, but in general is good. Mentions their bulletin, etc.

VRG is going to call Habana right now. VRG will take the points off recorders and type them up and clarify them (about mentioning names) with Habana. VRG thinks that Mejia should write up a bulletin for newspapers - stating this is information received by relatives etc. over the phone. For Mexico press.

Mejia said that VRG can tell Habana that the only way the people in Dominican Republic now have a way of finding out about international situation is via Voice of America and Radio Habana. The enemies are using this propaganda of Radio Habana. They should deny about Mejia and about fighting outside. Fight is in the city. Don't mention the hills...

VRG is at home writing today. In case VRG has to go out, he will leave phone where he is. Mejia might phone VRG today at noon. Should have his recorder ready in case he calls. VRG has it ready. (MO is Emilio Cordero.)

17.0 In. WO with VRG, who answers..WO operator..inaudible...about his call to Habana (the price?).

17.2 In. WO asks VRG, who answers, for maid, Casta.
Casta takes the phone. WO is Santa...C. will get off today...

17.7 Out to 09. VRG with operator. Says he is reporting in for a call from Fundora of Radio Habana.

18.0 In. Person in Cuba is not in right now. They will call back a little later for VRG.

After 1050, 2 May

18.2 Out to 31-06-06. VRG with Jovan (Miric), who answers. VRG tells Miric about Mejia's call - gives him data...as noted in previous conv....The news given out by Radio Habana (VRG interjects his note) that there are guerrillas in the mountains is not true. This has been denied by 14 de July Group. Radio Habana said that one of the Directors of 14 de July Group talked to VRG and said this and 14 de July Group has denied this.

Miric asks about yesterday's speech (Fidel's speech). Supposes that he should call "Prensa Latina." VRGheard the speech. It was

18.2 contd.
very important, VRG says. Call Jardon for the speech.

About the matter of Bosch, which VRG gave Miric yesterday, it has been published today - textually by Deschamps.

How does VRG see things of O.E.A? Very grave. Did Miric read Chile's position? Yes. That is the correct one. They are proceeding as if there was no occupation. O.E.A. can discuss a lot, (but do nothing). O.E.A. is nothing, as Bosch says.

Call VRG in case Miric hears anything. Miric won't have anything as direct as VRG. Yes, but Miric has more time to listen to the Voice of U.S. Yes, Miric is listening. VRG has a call pending from Habana and is expecting a call from Santo Domingo. Habana is calling for info from VRG. Yes, but they should not do foolish things (mention things). The foolish thing was what VRG did - gave them the names. He gave these to them so they would know them, not to use them. They appear not to have heard Fidel's speech yesterday which was very clear on this.

About the fighting, attacks on U.S. Embassies, public protests, etc. - all public protests. Yes, but Johnson is still spitting on the floor and kicking, VRG says.

Miric is writing a commentary on the political implications, what this signifies in the Dominican Republic and all of America.

Miric says about the other source - the one above (U.S.) - start broadcasting after 1700.

When VRG hears from Dominica Republic, VRG will let Miric know.

22.2 Out to 03. Time is 1111, 2 May.

22.5 Out to 46-60-15. VRG with Edmundo, who answers. Asks if he has Fidel's speech. Yes. Could he send it to VRG? They are typing it now. It is long. When will he have it? Should take all morning and part of the afternoon.

Asks if MO is going to the meeting today. Yes. There is an urgent message from Dominican Republic...VRG gave Radio Habana some information - as he got it from Dominican Republic. However, they transmitted it with names and said that there were guerrillas of 14 de Junio group in the mountains. They said this is doing a lot of harm. Asks MO to send a cable that 14 de Junio Movement denied that there are guerrillas...Say that in enthusiasm this was a mistake. This is very urgent. Also advise Radio Habana to suspend all mention to 14 de Junio, of Juan B. Mejia and Victor Rico Galan. And to call MO.

23.2 In. Long distance operator with VRG who answers. Call goes through. VRG with Fundora. Juan B. Mejia called from Santo Domingo - called another Dominican here and asked them to suspend the transmissions mention of Mejia and Rico Galan. This is doing a lot of damage. Their line is the Constitutionalism and no mention should be made of 14 de Junio (Communist movement). Also 14 de Junio Movement officially denies that there are guerrillas. They have to deny this. Reaction a uses all these things to say that this a Castrist subversion. The xxxGixxax people only get information from Radio Habana and thxxxw these things against them and name of Mejia is dynamite.

VRG gives the information give to him by Cordero to Fundora... as previously set out. MO can say that information came from a Constitutionalist Director to Dominican exiles in Mexico.

23.2 contd.
Juan B. Mejia is going to call VRG later and will give him further information on situation inside Dominican Republic. Calls are limited to 2minutes and this is why info is not complete.

Did MO hear the news that Mexico - Chancellor Carrillo Flores denied the fact that the Mexican Embassy had been attacked in Santo Domingo.. MO should have this from Pensa Latina.

VRG will have more info later, but not sure when.
Asks if they hear Radio Habana well. Yes, they hear it well in Santo Domingo and that is the only information they have from the outside.

Put a call in for VRG so VRG can report in when he has info.

26.7 In. Charo asks VRG, who answers, for Inge(bord) Rico. Asks how Sandino. Fine. They will see one another this afternoon. Sodi is going with Carlos. Fine. When they are with Carlos, Charo will also take her mother. The women can stay in the garden and men can chat. Fine.

27.2 In. BRG (v) answers too late.
After 1200, 2 May 1965
27.5 In. Sra. Rico with VRG, who answers. She called, but he did not get to phone in time...VRG has direct news from Santo Domingo. He tells her about their having called from Santo Domingo - reads what the U.S. is doing there...She says that he has a lot of important news. He said he did not sleep last night. There was a ~~speech~~ call last night from Bosch...It is published today in "Excelsior." VRG heard Fidel's speech. Sra. Rico did not hear it.

28.0 Out to 23-88-20. Sra. Diener (v) with WO, who answers, Asks for Sra. Rosa. Not there...

Reel off at RT 28.2, 1250, 2 May 1965

From 1250, 2 May (Sunday) to 0620, 3 May 1965

Miric

2.0 Out to 31-06-06. Victor Rico Galan (v -VRG) with ~~XXXXXXX XXXXXXX~~, who answers. VRG is not clear about something. VRG heard Fidel's speech yesterday. VRG wants ~~xx~~ to know: "Mexico established that at the latest May 10, ~~xxxxxx~~ asks the Commission to submit to the meeting(members) a report on the progress of its works, includings its conclusions and recommendations which it considers appropriate, at the latest of 10 May of 1965 and decides to celebrate a session of the meeting (?) the 11th (of May)." Was this the plan of resolution? In the plan that Sinovas read there is no date mentioned. VRG says Mexico's proposal is dated, but on the other hand, an AP cable from Washington stated that the O.E.A. suspended ~~xxxx~~ its sessions indefinitely tonight. What VRG wants to know is whether Mexico's proposal was approved? No, it was not approved. It was stated that it would be taken into account and their next session would be scheduled after the Commission submits its report. But if the time limits set by Mexico is not approved, the Commission can extend this and give its report in a year. Yes, in 5 years, if they want. VRG was not clear on this. Everything was left open. There is no time period or any limit on the decision. The decision was to send this Commission, which Miric comments is very strangely made of (the members are strange).. VRG says it is a group of gorillas. Yes. When they submit their report they will see (what happens).

VRG is now writing and wanted to ask Miric about this.

2.2 In. Rosa with VRG, who answers. Sra. (Diener) called Rosa.
Sra. Diener takes the phone. Sra. D. had planned to go by Club to see if Sra. Walther is there. Sra. Walther took the magazine by when Rosa was not at home....It does not matter...They must have gone to club...About sending a machine with Sra. (somewhere)....

2.7 In. Miric (v) withVRG, who answers. Miric just heard the newscast. M. says there are over 9.000 soldiers there (in Dominican Republic) now. Troops continue to disembark. The actions of the civilians is ~~xxxxxx~~ practically finished, that is, that is official text. These troops are supposed to protect the O.E.A. Commission. The U.S. troops have taken over all the combat lines of Wessin, to continue the fight.

3.7 In. WO, calling for Elizondo, asks Inge, who answers, for VRG. Inge asks if this was Caro calling? Yes. Aren't they going over there? VRG said he would go by there at noontime. Did not mention it. Will put VRG on.

VRG takes the phone. Says he can't go because he is waiting on xa call from Santo Domingo. Radio Habana pulled a real boner. They made VRG their correspondent in this mess (of Dominican Republic). VRG has been without sleep for 2 nights. Can't call through the U.S. since they don't put his call through - since it goes through New York, so VRG has to wait on calls from there. Not a boner, but good. Yes, it is good. VRG has to write the editorial and article today too. They will see tomorrow at the office of "Siempre." Fine. WO is Toñio.

4.2 In. MO with VRG, who answers. MO (very faint) with VRG, who answers. MO got a newspaper today from Cuba and there is a complete interview of VRG with Juan B. Mejia (as if he had). It is complete as VRG gave it to Radio Habana. Also a lot of other items. MO may be able to bring it by to VRG and leave it. It would be good since VRG has more news. It ~~wat~~ would be good if MO could come now. Will do. (MO isSinovas?).

4.7 In. Carlos with VRG, who answers. Greetings. Told Carlos to phone VRG on Sunday about that article. VRG has been calling long distace and not been sleeping - since Radio Habana has commissioned him for news on Dominican Republic. VRG is now waiting for an important call and VRG will have the complete info. VRG changed the idea of the article. What he can do is give Carlos a lot of data. He can come and will try not to take up too much of VRG's time. It is not important (his time). VRG is very interested in Carlos's publishing something on this (Dominican Republic) "there" (Italy?). Carlos wants to send his info tomorrow morning and have it come out day after tomorrow. VRG will call Carlos later on - when he has complete info. Will phone Carlos before 1900.

After 1450, 2 May

5.2 In. Irina with Ingeborg Rico, who answers. Greetings... Asks if she can come by today. Yes. But come on time (for a class?). Fine.

5.5 In. Habana is calling VRG. Call goes through. MO (Pundora?) with VRG. MO is very faint. Asks if VRG has anything new. Nothing new yet. The last new was what he gave MO. ...MO is inaudible to monitor...VRG says - That is right. Don't mention Mejia nor 14 de June (not July). Everything is (done by) Constitutionalism. They should follow the lines as set out in Fidel's speech.

6.0 In. Marcio (Mejia Ricart) with VRG, who answers. They would like to come by for a moment since they have the bulletin for the press ready. Fine.

6.2 Out to 23-29-12. VRG with Juanito, who answers, for Sr. Carlos Cocholi (ph). Just went out. CC went by VRG's house - about 5 minutes ago. Should be there soon. Juanito is now in the Escuela de Teatro...gets out late. That is why they have not seen one another. ~~XXXX~~ Will get together one night.

After 1700, 2 May

6.7 Out to 39-07-31. Ramon Emilio Colombo asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Anedo(?ph).

Sr. Anedo takes the phone. REC says that they are all at the house of VRG and asks if A. can come by. A. went by there and he did not see anyone or the car, then returned home. Will come by in 30 minutes because he has to go by the office (first). All right.

7.0 Out to 20-12-38. MI asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Miric. Thinks he is in Apt. 4. Hangs up.

7.2 Out to 31-06-06. Marcio Mejia Ricart with Miric, who answers. Asks Miric to come by VRG's house. Miric lives quite a

7.2 contd.
way from VRG and Miric uses the afternoon to write things. Mejia R. can give him the info on the phone. All right. The last time Miric talked to VRG was around 1130. Then, VRG gave him info on this morning's conv. Yes. Also Mejia R's talk yesterday with Bosch. Yes. Then, he has info. He can pick up their press communiqué at VRG's. It says about the same as VRG told him. Asks for Mejia's phone. Mejia does not have a home phone. The other day Miric could not locate Mejia's house. It is Valeriano Trujano 325. Explains where it is located.

8.2 Out to 25-06-46. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks WO, who answers, for Kouckhorev (? Kouchorov - is way they pronounce it).

K. takes phone. Tells MO that he has a communique which is quite important (to K.). K. would like to see MMR. MMR will call K. later - when he has some free time - so they can get together. At what time? Moment.

Will call later. VRG is going out and MMR is leave VRG's. K. says he is going back home in about 30 minutes. He will be at home at 1800. Fine.

8.7 In. Miric with Inge (Rico), who answers. Greetings.

VRG taken the phone. They (Dominicans) left a communique, but it is the same thing that VRG gave Miric this morning. VRG sent them away because he has to do some writing. They (Dominicans) are making a call - especially to the Third World. It says: "We are calling desperately, in the name of the Dominican people, always willing to sacrifice, to all the peoples and lovers of peace in the world, to instruct their delegates in the United Nations to defend a sister country criminally aggravated. We call especially the non-alineated countries (countries not following U.S. lines) which have so many times have felt in their side the weight of the imperialist boot. We demand the fraternal support of the countries which create their own destiny under socialism - convinced that peace is for all and imperialism the common enemy. Imperialist aggression must be stopped in the agrieved Dominican people. It is signed by: Dr. Emilio Cordero Michel, Dr. Marcio Mejia Ricart, Ing. Leandro Guzman, Dr. Tobias Cabral Mejia and Ramon Emilio Colombo - in the name of the Dominican exiles in Mexico.

Has VRG had news from the North (U.S.)? No, has had people there. There is an evident effort, through the news they are emitting, to pacify Latin American. They are now speaking of naming a Provisional President. Also have said that J se A. Mora has met with Wessin, after talking to rebel chiefs, to seek a formula, apparently they say, based on the proposals of the rebels. Miric comments that this is at least a confession (that they are in the right). Also it is said that an armistice, cease firing, has been achieved - between marines and rebels. They are trying to support the O.E.A. Commission. According to figures, all civilians have been evacuated. They are having a meeting this afternoon with their Ministers and Congress members. It was said that the meeting was not very urgent. Nothing was mentioned about the disembarkation of more marines and soldiers. And...ind. declared that the Dominican people should have opportunity to choose their destiny, political development, liberty, etc. Miric thinks this shows a aim to pacify Latin American.

8.7 contd.

VRG asks if there has been a declaration of the Mexican govt. today. Miric does not know, but will check. VRG has to go out right now and will check on this too late.

Marcio gave VRG some news, but VRG can't check it. The news is that the people of the O.E.A. (Commission) was surrounded by 250,000 people hollering (for rights). Yes, that came over the radio. This took place at the building where the Commission met with the Papal Nuncio. Fine.

23-02-41

11.0 Out to ~~25-06-46~~. HI with WO, who answers, for Sitio...for cab.

11.5 In. Emilio Cordero with VRG, who answers. What is new? No. Did VRG call "our friends of last night." No, VRG did not call them. Which friends? The ones who went there last night. The correspondents? Yes. Marcio said he was going to take them that (communique). VRG called Miric, but had already given him ~~them~~ the information and also gave him the Call (for help). Miric said he would transmit this. EC heard Radio Habana and they transmitted the "other" correctly. They did not deny the other,

EC talked to Armedo. Said a friend of his called from Santo Domingo. They are looking for a provisional President. The Voice of U.S. stated this. They want a Provisional President to have someone with whom to talk. They talked to the Constitutionalist Directors and will now talk to Wessin - proposing the Constitutionalist conditions. Miric says that the Voice of U.S. is trying to calm the opinion of Latin American and Miric is a good observer. VRG thinks they (U.S.) will continue with occupation but they are trying to smooth things over. There should be no great change. Miric thinks there may be a big change but VRG says that MO knows how Yugoslavs think - they think that the words come out true. VRG thinks it may be possible for them to take (in) Bosch, but with occupation - to leave him tied up (by troops).

VRG says they (Here) don't have information on the world reaction (on Dominican Rep), but it must be very hard (against U.S.). VRG is going to call Jardon to find out what there is. Asks VRG to let him know. When he knows anything, will let him know.

46-00-1

12.7 Out to ~~25-06-46~~. VRG with Yolanda, who answers "Prensa Latina." Asks what the world reaction is (on Dominican Republic). Especially on Latin America. Tell VRG the most important.

Not much today but there is quite a lot from yesterday. Did VRG get the bulletin? No. They did not distribute it, she then says. (Protests from) Cuba, Juventud de Cuba, Argentina...No manifestations or popular reactions? Moment.

Have not heard about bombs. Manifestations in ~~Guayana~~ Guiana, Chile, Buenos Aires. Call back later and she will give him more info. VRG is going to try to sleep a little and will see the bulletin tomorrow.

14.2 Out to 31-06-06. VRG with Miric, who answers. VRG has nothing Probably have call from there (Dominican Republic) tomorrow. Miric says there is nothing on official declaration (of Mexico). Still thinks (US) is trying to pacify world...There is a mission of a certain special delegates from Washington in south. Yes, VRG was told that Harriman went to Colombia. There are others out too. And apparently none came

14.2 contd
to Mexico.

Does Miric aa have anything (reaction) from Europe? Nothing press-wise, but M. has the impression that there is reaction - also with Vietnam, perhaps less British press. Miric listend a little to Moscow radio - in Spanish. Say a lot of silly things. Bring out a lot of Socialist Popular Party...silly things. That is most stupid policy. VRG says that Radio Habana committed the same error (by pointing out the Communist Party as being active). Pointed out 14 de June (Party. VRG gave them the complete info but thought they were to filter it. Had to call them today to tell them about this. The U.S. efforts to pacify public opinion in south (South America) and there is a contrast... They say that there are about 58 communists and give their names, origin etc. over the radio. One is a Spaniard, one is a correspondent of "Prensa Latina" there (in Dominican Republic)...but AP says that there are 18,000 armed (people) - military and civilians. They will see the results of the O.E.A. Commission. VRG says they have xnfxxxxxxx to foresee things a little. Miric points out with the visit of this Commission is really an approval of the intervention.

VRG is in bed. Has not slept in 48 hours. Will try to sleep. Has to write early tomorrow.

Miric will hand in about 10 pages of cable text. He is working on this. He is including in this the commentary which Miric mentioned today - on political situations, the results, etc.

When can they talk tomorrow? VRG wants to exchange impressions with Miric. VRG is going to "Siempre" early. Miric has some "second order" things to resolve early tomorrow, butwon't take long.

16.5 Out to 39-07-31. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Dr. (Emilio) Cordero, Not there right now. Nothing urgent.

16.7 Out to 25-80-32. VRG with WO, who answers, for Dr. (Emilio) Cordero.

EC takes the phone. VRG says there is nothing on "Prensa Latina." They are beginning transmission and will have something later, but VRG is going to sleep now. Mostly because this call will probably come in early tomorrow.

VRG also talked to Miric again. He is going to send all his info out by cable (tonight) - 10 pages.

They will talk tomorrow. VRG says the Habana line is not working so can't pass anyx info that EC might give him (in case EC gets a call from Santo Domingo) until tomorrow.

Reel off at RT 18.2, 0620, 3 May 1965

From 0620, 3 May (Monday) to 0620, 4 May 1965

2.0 In. Long distance for Victor Rico Galan(VRG). Ingebord Rico (v) answers.

VRG comes to the phone. Call goes through with Pundora. VRG still has nothing. Expects (he) may call him early today and will call F. when he has something.

2.2 Out to 03. Time is 0821 (3 May).

2.5 Out to 25-80-32. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Dr. (Emilio) Corder.

EC takes the phone. Asks if EC has any news. No. No one phoned him. A friend of his was in contact with person in Santo Domingo - that Miraval's (?ph) were killed. It is said that the Commission does not know what to do. They are looking for Provisional President...But apparently the masses are demanding Bosch. They are still indecisive. There are now 14,000 men (armed) and VRG thinks there are more...(14,000 marines?). EC says they have ordered another 4,000 some odd (to enter). Bosch has given the insurrection as finished and that they should not fire against U.S. and that he (Bosch) did not think that U.S. had bad intentions. There are about 40 hurt among U.S. and about 4 or 5 dead...

VRG will call EC later from magazine office. VRG will also leave office number at home in case Juan B. (Mejia) phones him.

3.5 Out to 23-02-91. VRG (v) orders a cab.

3.7 Out to 34-88-63, three times. No rings, complete. Casta (maid) with MO, who answers, MO's mother.

MO takes the phone...Maid says that Sra. does not give them enough food...also Sra. (Dioner) is very demanding...will leave in 15 days...

4.2 Out to 18-27-27. Maid asks for Antonio. Not there. Maid is Casta...

4.5 Out to 24-92-11. Maid asks for Anita. She is out now.

4.7 In. Wrong number. Maid answers.

5.0 In. Wrong number. Maid answers.

5.2 In. Victor Rico Galan (VRG) asks maid, who answers, for Sra. Out. Has anyone phoned him? No.

After 1100, 3 May 1965

5.5 Out to 47-55-20. Inge Rico orders gas...Contract 20870.

5.7 In. Sra. Rico with Inge Rico, who answers...Greetings... VRG is not there...children.

5.0 Out to 03. Time is 1210, 3 May.

5.2 Out to 11-07-75. Maid with WO, who answers, for Toribia... Not there...

5.5 Out to 24-92-11. Maid asks WO, who answers, for Anita.
Anita takes the phone. Maid inside is Casta...About not seeing her yesterday...what they did....about changing jobs...

After 1325, 3 May

8.0 In. MO asks Maid, who answers, for VRG.
Inge Rico takes the phone. VRG is not in.

8.2 In. MO, (identifying himself indistinctly) with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Will be home for lunch. MO will call back later.

8.5 In. Sra. Rico asks maid, who answers, for VRG.
Inge. XXX takes the phone. About visiting Anita...children...

9.0 In. MO asks Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. MO wants to see him. Will call back around 1700.

9.2 In. Carmen with Inge Rico, who answers. Asks for VRG. Not there. She had expected him for lunch (but did not come).

9.5 In. Irina with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings. Miguelito went out to play with his grandmother...Only Marta (other child) is there...VRG has been very busy.
What does Irina think about that situation (in Dominican Republic)? Terrible.
The speech (of Fidel) was very good. Inge agrees.

9.7 Out to 03. Time is 1608, 3 May.

10.0 In. MO (very faint) with Inge Rico, who answers. VRG has not come back. MO saw him at the magazine but when MO returned, VRG had left. (MO is Luis.) VRG was having coffee with Luis Gutierrez and others of magazine when MO left...He went somewhere to eat but IR does not know. VRG still has not had any news from Dominican Republic... Ask VRG to call MO when he comes in.

After 1710, 3 May

10.2 In. Long Distance (from Habana) is calling VRG. Call back in an hour.

10.5 In, from long distance. VRC is not there, but will be back in an hour. Inge Rico will have him report in.

10.7 Out to 19-93-28. Marcue asks maid, who answers, for XHXX Sra. Not there. Asxxax isxat house of Sra. Aguilar. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXHe has wrong number.

11.0 In. Alberto Domingo asks Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. AD wanted to ask VRG about the t.v. raffle...would like to know if it is going to take place or not. AD is leaving the house now. Has an appt. at 1800. Will phone back later.

3 May 1965

11.2 Out to 42-14-65. Lidly Zahl (??very indistinct) with Alberto Domingo. MI says that the raffle will take place. MO just wanted to know. AD has the money(for some tickets). How many did AD sell? Around 26 - but is not sure. Between 25 and 30.

Marcue takes the phone. Did MO hand in his article? No, AD is not well. They need AD's article anyway. When can he take it? Tomorrow. All right.

12.2 Out to 35-36-52. Marcué with Fausto, who answers. Nothing new. Asks for Sra. (Marcué)? She is there. Asks if Pepe took the engravings (to be done).

Checks and says they took the engravings to shop and some others to "Mercurio." Marcue will be there in a little bit.

After 1750, 3 May

12.5 In. MO asks Inge Rico, who answers, for Casta.
Casta has gone out...will be back in 10 minutes.

12.7 In. MO Miric with Maid, who answers. Miric thinks he has wrong number and hangs up.

13.0 In. Miric with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings. Asks for VRG. Not there. Has not come home. Then, Miric knows where he is. Because he phoned Miric around 1330. If Miric phones him, tell him there is a Habana call. He said that he would be home soon. IR does not know where he is. She told long distance to call back in an hour.

Several persons also came by to see VRG at home. If Miric locates him - Miric says there is no phone there (where VRG is), but VRG promised to call Miric.

13.2 In. Maria with Inge Rico, who answers. Maria is maid type... Asks why she left the way she did...about why she left...

14.2 In, from long distance. Habana is calling VRG. Not back yet. She will have VRG report in when he arrives.

14.5 In, from long distance. Habana is calling VRG. Hangs up after wait.

MO (Carmen?) asks Inge, who answers, for VRG.
15.0 In, [illegible] Not in yet.

15.2 In. MO with Inge Rico, who answers, for GE[illegible].

16.2 In. Miric with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not in yet. Miric is going to look for the phone number and see if he can locate VRG. M. knows where VRG is. VRG has not phoned in.

MO if that person called,
16.7 In. [illegible] with Inge, who answers, [illegible] Not there. Tell VRG that he (MO) will be inside, not outside. All right. Didn't VRG come in? No. And VRG did not go there (with MO)? No. MO will be there until 2230 or 2300. Call Inge back by 2130 because "she should not call later than that." Fine. MO is Luis.

17.2. In. Luis with Inge Rico, who answers. "She" has not phoned. VRG is not home. Luis will call VRG tomorrow. Tell VRG that Luis will be at Biblioteca Mexico in "Ciudadela." They have some things to talk about. Fine.

Reel off at RT 17.5, 3 May 1965

From 0620, 4 May (Tuesday) to 0715, 5 May 1965

2.0 In, from long distance. Habana Cuba is calling. Maid answers. Call back in an hour. Holds the line while waiting for a reply....Finally hangs up.

2.5 In, from long distance. Maid answers. Habana is calling. Victor Rico Galan says for them to call back in an hour.

After 0835, 4 May

3.0 In. MO with Inge Rico, who answers. MO asks when they returned (from Cuba). In Holy Week...They have some cigars. MO says they (family) are leaving tomorrow. Perhaps they can visit them this afternoon for coffee. MO is not sure he can come by their house. Best they visit MO's house. She will have VRG talk to MO about this. MO will be either at home or at Aspa (ph).

Asks if VRG can bring a copy of "Siempre" - the new issue to take on his trip. This issue is not out yet. It comes out on Wednesday so this is not possible.

4.2 In, from long distance. Habana is calling VRG. VRG can't take the call...Call back in an hour. (He is asleep.)

4.5 In. WO, sister-in-law, with maid, who answers, for Inge Rico. Not there. WO is Rosa.

4.7 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for Sra. Rico. Notthere. And VRG? He is asleep.

5.0 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for VRG. He is still asleep.

5.2 In. Carmen with Inge Rico (IR), who answers. Greetings. VRG takes the phone. Asks if there is nothing. Yes, when will they see one another? VRGas should say. At 1200 in "Siempre."

5.3 One extension off...

5.7 In. Sra. Rico with VRG, who answers. Greetings. VRG got home very late yesterday...Anita is ill. Wants to ask VRG for some advice...

6.0 In. MO with VRG, who answers. MO is Julian (Cuban). Puts on Mario with VRG. Greetings. Mario would like to see VRG. Mario is at Embassy, VRG will go by there in a little bit. Mario will wait for him. Mario has some books for VRG - sent by Sr. Viñas of Radio Habana. Fine.

6.2 In. MO, calling for Association of Students of Law School (of Natl. University), with VRG, who answers. They have set up some round tables (there) to explain the Caribbean situation to students. Would like to know if VRG could participate in this on Tuesday or Thursday of next week. All right, Tuesday of next week. MO will call VRG on Saturday to set exact time. Who will participate in these? They had planned VRG to participate with Alberto Domingo and with Enrique Soto Izquierdo. Fine. MO is Pereira.

6.7 In, from long distance. VRG (v) answers, but operator does not speak. VRG hangs up.

In, from long distance. VRG (v) answers. Habana is calling. Call goes through.

VRG with Fundora. VRG has nothing. Has not been able to communicate with these people. That is why he did not phone Fundora. VRG expects some news today. Will call Fundora (when he does). Fine. ...something about bulletins...VRG says no (did not get them). Go to see Jardon (for them). VRG will do so.

7.2 Out to 43-52-81, twice. No rings, complete. Inge Rico asks MO, who answers, for Sra. (Rosa - sister-in-law).

Rosa takes the phone. Rosa phoned in the morning at 0900...

7.7 Out to 46-43-24. VRG with WO, who answers at "Siempre," for Georgina.

G. takes the phone. A Srita. will go by to see VRG at 1200. Ask her to wait for him. VRG will get there a little late, but he will go there.

8.0 Out to 23-02-91. VRG orders a cab.

8.2 Out to 24-92-11, twice. Busy.

After 1240, 4 May 1965

8.5 In. MO with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. He said he would be home for lunch, but late. Had several things to do. MO will call back later.

After 1420, 4 May

8.7 In. Sra. Torres ~~Alta~~ Altamirano asks IR (v), who answers, for Sra. Diener.

Sra. D. takes the phone. MO is mother of Sra. Torres Altamirano...won't take the class...

9.0 In. MO, calling for Ing. Marcue, with Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for VRG. Not there. Tell him that "Politica" called.

9.2 In. Irina asks maid, who answers, for Sra. IR.

IR takes the phone. Greetings. About going to see some dresses...

9.5 In. MO asks IR, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Did she tell VRG about his call this morning. Yes, but some people came by for him and he left in a hurry. She expects him for lunch. MO hopes to see him this afternoon. MO will be at home. She will tell him.

9.7 In. Miric with IR, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Will have VRG phone Miric.

10.0 Out to 24-74-33. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Capt. Tarasone (ph).

MO takes the phone. Greetings. MO says they are preparing to leave tomorrow. Would like to see VRG. VRG has a lot of work.

Asks MO to come by. VRG does not have a car either. VRG has some cigars

10.0 contd.
for him. MO will eat and then go by. Will VRG be there? No, VRG has to go out. Will phone MO and try to get by MO's for 5 minutes.

10.2 In. Carmen with VRG, who answers. Carmen just left when VRG got there. Something uneppected came up and that is why he got there late. Asks her to phone him back because VRG still does not have news. He should have something around 1700. Will call him between 1700 and 1730.

10.7 Out to 25-80-32. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Dr. (Emilio) Cordero.

EC comes to the phone. Greetings. Is there any news? Nothin No one has phoned. Juan B. has not called back. No. They only got 2 cables (? or sent 2 cables).

VRG thinks that it was a very intelligent thing to nominate Camagno as Provisional President. MO commented this last night with some friends (Dominicans) - mentioned that Camagno would be President. He is the only ~~w~~ one who can guarantee the U.S. although he has participated "with great nationalism." But he is a Friend (ind? - to U.S.). He is the only one who can guarantee a basis for the U.S. for negotiations. VRG ~~gxxx~~ agrees. And to resolve that situation (in Dominican Republic) which has world resonance.

There is one ~~xxxx~~ thing that EC does not like "about him" (Camagno) or "the father of his." VRG saw that. "That ~~xxxxxxxx~~ there are communists (there)...under his control." VRG of course does not like him because he is a military man. Yes, but he is only a Provisional President. Bosch does not say when he will return either. He should already be back there. (Wanted Bosch to come back and take over.) MO does not think that he (Camagno) will obtain their proposals. VRG does not think so either. Bosch' people may hand in arms voluntarily but the people of 14 (de Junio) and the E and CE - will have to kill them to take their arms away.

Radio Moscow was also saying a lot of silly things - in its Spanish transmission - that the "glorious PCP heads the ~~AMXXXXXX~~ Dominican masses". A lot of bull. MO says these are "comrades" but no PCP boys there... (That is - are 14 de Junio group). Radio Habana has corrected itself completely (about ~~mxxxxxx~~ mentioning the communists heading this). Yes, and they even have a program for the Dominicans - news program.

Did VRG see "Time" magazine today? No. Buy it. It mentions 3 companions of the Committee of 14 de June. But not as members of the 14 de Junios group, but as Communist Directors - Jaime Duran, ...Johnson of the 14th and...of the 14th...Then, it mentions Grubel, ah, Tomeija (ph). This one is member of PCP. Yes, VRG knows him. T. is one of the Directors. And Grubel also member of PCP who was also in Prague (??ind). VRG also knows him. There is a lot of news on Americans. Also has some photos. It is most reactionary....says some things - that they are sorry ~~xx~~ (that is, someone in Cuba) that the Cubans had crossed from Cuba in boats, etc...a lot of silly things... The pictures, however, are good. It says that there were 110 killed, but not true. VRG says that he is sorry it is not true.

EC is going to talk to Santo Domingo day after tomorrow on radio. MO is going to talk through a cousin of his (who also has short-wave radio)...Just have to know wave length, etc...

10.7 contd.

MO says that Santo Domingo has isolated. Miami refuses to put through calls from Santo Dominicans. They would not give VKG a call through either - that only U.S. press had preference. A Dominican wanted to call there yesterday and theytold him they were sorry, he heard Miami conv - that they could not put through any calls to Santo Domingo from Dominicans. This would be a good thing to inform Radio Habana...that they are not putting through calls.

Calls are coming ~~xthangx~~ through from Dominican Republic to Mexico. Amb.'s call also went through. MO thinks they can't call out unless they are known.

MO went by "Prensa Latina" to get press bulletins. Got the speech of ...(Castro). It is very good.

Dominican Amb. had said he would resign, but has not done so. Due to some "declarations published in 'La Extra'" is against U.S.... perhaps if he does not resign, theymight spread around that - in view of these declarations that this person is non-grata. It would be difficult. It can be done, but has to be handled correctly. When does MO think this can be done? When VKG wants. With his declaration. VKG is now going to write his column for "Diario de Mexico" - 20 Lineas. Could do this there. MOcan read the declaration to VKG. Moment.

Came out "La Extra," 2 May, Sunday, Amb. Dr. Jose Fernandez Caminecos declared the following in relation to Wessin and Wessin - Referred military man is very popular among the people due to the fact that he is anti-Trujillista, the same consideration is held by the leaders of the politcal parties such as PCP (of Bosch) and Partido Liberal Revolucionista. Wessin y Wessin was distinguished in 14 June 1959 during the massacre of the ...and (Pasorgan). He even has a condecoration given to him by Trujillo called "La Orden de Constanza..." for his brilliant military service during these 3 invasions. (So, this s.o.b. says that he is anti-Trujillista.)

VKG says Luis Suarez is going to Dominican Republic. "Siempre" is sending LS and Moya, a photographer. VKG thinks it would be good to hit this sob (the Amb.) tomorrow so they won't deny them their visa. As VKG thinks best. MO would like to see LS before he leaves. VKG is not sure they will go since there is apparently no way to get there. They could go via Kingstown. There are flights to Kingstown, but from Jamaica, one ~~man~~ would have to go in boat. He can rent a small plane in Jamaica for $200 or $300 dollars. They (this group here) had even thought about going this way. VKG will tell Luis about this. Before he goes, he will have to get names of contacts (from MO). Fine.

14.9 Out to 45-91-36. VKG asks WO, who answers, for Luis Suarez. Not there. WO is Pepita. LS ~~was~~ just left. Will he go (to Dominican Republic) or not? Not sure. Did he get the visa? They are doing this now. Tell him to call VKG. VKG has to explain how to get there since there are no normal flights.

15.2 Out to 45-91-36. VKG asks WO, who answers, for Ing. Elizondo. Not back yet.

15.5 Out to 29-22-12. MI, Luis Lisalde (ph), asks WO, who answers, for Ing. Elizondo.

Ing. Elizondo takes phone. Greetings. Did MI get "that"? Yes

15.5 contd.
Luis went to "International". Lic. Casco (ph) took very good care of him. And MO will go to see the apartments...

Puts on VRG with Elizondo. Asks what happened to what he asked E. to do. E. could not see "him." This is something very urgent. MO will see about this. Elisondo will call Monterrey to see if there is a friend who could pass something. No, one loaned from there. No, that is not possible. E. will arrange it if the can.

When will they see one another? VRG wants to go to say hello to Robles Martinez. Elizondo will tell him. Makes note of VRG's phone to let him know.

16.0 In. Miric with VRG, who answers. Greetings. VRG is tired... Is VRG members of Mexican Press Club? No, he is member of the Association of Newspapermen - of Mexican. There is a dinner tonight at club. Yes, but VRG can't go.

Is VRG is contact with Marcio and others? Yes, but there is nothing new. Yugoslavian Govt. made a declaration today - ~~[illegible]~~ condemning the intervention and supporting Bosch's democratic movement. Miric got this on telephone conv...They also congratulated Miric on what he sent in. That this also helped a lot for them to form an attitud The text has been transmitted Tranjuc, but they did not pick it up today May sent it via Informex. In case VRG talks to Dominican exiles, tell them.

They will get together tomorrow.

17.0 In. MO (Carmen) with VRG who answers. Tells her to come by here. All right. She won't take long? No.

17.2 In. MO asks VRG, who answers, for maid, Casta.
Casta takes the phone. About coming to see her today...

17.5 ~~[illegible]~~Out to 25-71-84. Luis Lizalde (ph) with Lupita, who answers. Asks if ~~[illegible]~~ is there. Yes. Wants Auja (??)

WO takes the phone. Asks MO to pay the ticket he owes LL. Where can LL get two beds- very cheap...factories...have to see about this...

18.0 In. MO with Inge Mico, who answers. Greetings.
VRG takes the phone. VRG explains how he should get from Kingstown. There are flights...MO (Luis Suarez) is at Tourist Agency... If there are no flights, rent a private airplane...VRG has to go out right now. Couldn't VRG go by his house? Yes, but later tonight. About hotel there - Stay at Emperador. Everything is expensive in Santo Domingo. VRG will phone MO later.

Emilio wants to see Luis. Luis should ~~g~~ talk to him. Luis is going home now.

About the tickets for raffle...he ~~sells~~ has sold (these). LS wants to talk to VRG and thinks it is not necessary to talk to anyone else. Since VRG has been in Dominican Rep. he can give LS info.

19.2 Out to 23-80-32. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Dr. Cordero.
Emilio Cordero takes the phone. Luis Suares does not want to see Cordero. Did not say why - but VRG thinks he is afraid. VRG thinks he is not interested in contacts. VRG thinks he is going to try

19.2 contd.
to see Camagno. Doesn't want to get mixed up in much. VRG is going to try to get him interested (in seeing Cordero's contacts). Will visit Cordero. C's address is Ixtlacihuatl 6-204. VRG will visit Cordero around 2030. VRG will get the data and then visit Suarez to give them to him. X. C. will make up a list with addresses. Fine, give him all he can.

After 1910, 4 May

20.5 Out to 25-80-32, twice. Busy, complete. VRG asks for Dr. Cordero.

Emilio Cordero takes the phone. VRG has had a problem come up. Has to wait here at home. Won't have time. VRG will go to see photographer whom VRG trusts more (in leftist). Would like EC to come by VRG's house. VRG expects to have a car later on and could EC back home.

21.2 In. Emilio Cordero with VRG, who answers. ~~XXG~~ EC can't go to see VRG because EC has to go to Gobernacion. An Inspector came byand asked EC to go with him - that Sr. Ochoa wanted to see him. Will send this (list) with a friend, but VRG should bring him back, so get a taxi.

21.5 Out to ~~[illegible]~~ 24-74-33. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Capt. Tarazona (ph).

T. takes the phone. VRG is going there now.

~~[illegible]~~ After 2135

From 0715 to 1325, 5 May (Wednesday) 1965

22.0 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for Sra. Pili (Diner).
Inge Rico takes the phone. MO is Sra. Sayev (ph).
Sra. Diener takes the phone. About MO's trip...was ill...

22.7 In. Alan Howard asks Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Call back in 15 minutes.

23.0 In. Alan Howard with VRG, who answers. What is new? Sad and ax little ashamed. Asks if VRG is very busy today. Yes, today. Has VRG heard anything from there? No, not yet, but expects to hear at the end of this week. Fine.

23.2 In. MO with VRG, who answers. Greetings. Asks if VRG is going out now. In a little bit. MO had thought about going by for a moment. Fine. (MO is Julian??)

After 1110, 5 May

23.5 In. Sra. Rico asks maid, for VRG. Not there. Sra. IR is also out.

23.7 Out to 18-27-23. Hangs up.

24.0 Out to 03. Time is 1225, 5 May.

24.2 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for VRG. Not there. MO is Otomi Llanas (ph).

5 May 1965

24.5 In. Sra. Rico with Sra. Diener, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Sra. IR is not there either...about children....

Reel off at RT 25.0, 1325, 5 May 1965

From 1325, 5 May (Wednesday) to 0625, 6 May 1965

2.0 In. Wrong number.

2.2 In. Sra. Rico with Victor Rico Galan (VRG), who answers. Greetings...about how everyone is...

2.5 In. WO asks VRG, who answers, for Sra. Diener. Joyeria Porra (??) is calling.
Inge Rico takes the phone...about price for repairing a clock...

2.7 Out to 23-02-91. VRG (v) orders a cab.

3.0 In. WO with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. WO has the documents, the data, she offered to give VRG. IR will tell him. WO is Carmen.

3.2 In. Sr. Valentin (Soviet) with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there.

3.5 In. Miric (v) with VRG, who answers. Greetings... How does VRG see the problem? VRG does not think they (U.S.) will leave there (Dominican Republic). Miric thinks this is going to be a long-term think. Will O.E.A. approve the force there? Yes, Miric says, they have the majority of votes. Since Dominican Republic does not vote...Nothing can be done. VRG thinks that the Dominicans are handling things well. Miric thinks that this Cease Fire is dangerous. Things quiet down ..a coup d'etat can take place....
Miric is going to be very busy with CEPAL meeting taking place starting tomorrow. Miric will be out nearly all day. They have inauguration tomorrow at Seguro Social and plenary sessions will take place in theater of Banco de Ahorro Nacional on Reforma. One can get accredited to go into sessions. If he is not accredited, can get materials. Perhaps Miric can inform him where this is tomorrow. Where will VRG be at noontime tomorrow? At home. Miric will call VRG after inauguration tomorrow morning at "Siempre." Fine.

Reel off at RT 4.7, 0625, 6 May 1965

From 0625, 6 May(Thursday) to 0620, 7 May 1965

2.0 Out to 03. Time is 0627 (6 May).
or perhaps Gil)

2.2 In. Fil (ph - Phil) with Victor Rico Galan (VRG), who answers. When will they see one another? VRG thinks tomorrow. VRG is very busy "with this matter" (of Dominican Republic).

2.5 In. Sra. Rico asks maid, who answers, for VRG. VRG takes the phone. Greetings..About everyone...Everyone is fine.

2.7 Out to 23-07-16, six times. Busy.

3.0 Out to 23-02-91. VRG (v) orders a cab. None now.
Out to 23-48-26. VRG (v) orders a cab.

3.2 Out to 20-07-77. Josefina, maid, with maid outside, who answers...about one Roma who went to hometown...seeing one another...

6.0 Out to 11-07-75. Maid with WO, who answers, for Toribia. Went out...

6.2 Out to 24-93-11. WI asks WO, who answers, for Anita. Anita takes the phone. About what WO is doing...fixing lunch...WI has finished...about when she gets off...

After 1220, 6 May

7.2 Out to 11-07-75. WI asks WO, who answers, for Toribia. WO is Toribia...maids...about what WO did on Monday...

10.0 Out to 23-07-16. Inge Rico orders some medicine...

10.2 In. Silvio (?) asks maid, who answers, for VRG. Not in. Should be in around 1430 or 1500.

10.5 In. Gabriel Pereira (ph) asks maid, who answers, for VRG. Not there.

10.7 In. Miric with VRG, who answers. Miric could not call VRG. Miric had an appt. at 1300 with his source of the Presidency's office. It was said - by people covering this souce -that (Mexico) was going to break with O.E.A. But this did not come off. VRG hopes that there will be some declaration along these lines today. It is no longer possible. Carrillo Flores said before in Central America - talking about CEPAL, and he (CP) was once member of the Commission of Mexico in United Nations, etc. - but does VRG know what President say? No. The speech was written 48 hours ago. Miric has the text. On the 8th page of the 10 page speech, it says: CEPAL has a specific task: examine the economic problems of Latin American in light of the great postulatiocs of the Letter of United Nations. It is, therefore, not a political conference however, the gravity of the events in the last weeks in the Dominican Republic imposes on me

10.7 contd.
the duty of alluding to these. The Mexican Govt. is united in the conviction that the Dominicans and only the Dominicans are the ones to decide on their form of govt and in general on their future - without any intefference. (With these words there was a tremendous applause.) Direct or indirect, open or hidden (interference) from outside.

VRG says it is good. But ~~what~~ why is Carrillo Flores and de la Colin have been acting like s.o.b.'s. Miric says Carrillo Flores arrived quite some time before the ~~new~~ ceremony began and someone asked what is going to be done. And CF said that the position of Mexico is well-known and firm, and if necessary, there will be an amplification (in sense of declaration). Miric expects something tonight. VRG thinks the only thing to do is to break with the O.E.A. Yes, but President says in his speech - expresses the confidence of Mexico that the present..be overcome and right re-affirmed. But where? He expessed the most fervent desire that the ~~xxxxxxx~~ peace return to the Dominican Repbblic. Miric says, further, that the colleagues who cover this souce (the Presidency) that something will come out today. VRG is expecting a declaration. Pajes asked VRG for his article, but VRG is expecting something. Should be something before 2100.

Miric asks about Pajes - about Victor Alba referred to in the issue...VRG has not seen it. DidVRG see an article in "Excelsior" a few days ago - against Yugoslavia. Yes. This is the same thing. Miric does not understand why Pajes did the same thing, accept this. Of Pedro Pages, the Spaniard. The article was probably already in when the other article was published in "Excelsior," because that man writes 20,000 articles. Don't say anything to Pages, but Miric does not understand for what this reason is...

Perhaps they can get together tomorrow.

Miric got official declaration of his country, but it was very mutiliated by radio from Tanyuc to Informes. Couldn't be used. However, they express their moral support (for Dominican Republic). VRG says this should be expressed in United Nations. Asks if VRG gave this info to the boys (Dominican exiles). Yes.

Miric will leave very early tomorrow...will be busy with CEPAL for next few days...VRG will write his article in the morning and turn it in. M. will phone VRG at "Siempre" around noontime.

13.0 Out to 240-03-71, 5 times. Busy, complete. VRG with WO, who answers, for Rodrigo Asturias.

RA takes the phone. RA is sorry he did not see VRG yesterday morning...VRG asks for the phone number of Trejo. 28-53-47.

13.7 Out to 28-53-47. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Luis Trejo.

LT takes the phone. Greetings. LT said he had "it" ready for tomorrow. Does he know who is calling? Of course. Can VRG come by here ~~xxxxxxx~~ today? Yes. WO had planned to see VRG tomorrow. WO was with Rodrigo yesterday. VRG expects Luis as soon as possible. It is very urgent. Will try to get there as soon as possible - get there in 45 minutes. VRG hopes it will be even sooner.

14.2 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for VRG.

VRG takes the phone. Asks where MO is. At Marcue's house. VRG needs to see MO - with some urgency. Anselmo will have to go to firm "that." Can MO advise him tomorrow? Yes. Anselmo lives a

14.2 contd.
long way off so will advise him tomorrow. All right. That is what VRG needed.

Has VRG seen Roberto? No. MO has not been able to locate him "in that place or his other place." Yes, he goes out sometimes.

Did VRG pick up the tickets? No, VRG will pick them up tomorrow. Alberto did not have them (with him) today.

15.0 In. MO with VRG, who answers. (VRG recognizes MO's voices.) MO asks what is new. Nothing. VRG has lost contact there(Dominican Republic). One can't phone there unless in U.S. Can't they talk with Bosch in San Juan? Yes, but "these people" have not been able to talk to him. MO was phoning about the installation of Caamaño since AP lost the info. MO was trying to locate them (to get info).

How is MO's health? Fine. Much better. When will they talk? When VRG likes. Who is covering CEPAL? A lot of people. VRG says they are expecting a declaration from (Mexican) govt. for tonight - there is a rumor that it will break with O.E.A. VRG thinks it is too beautiful to be true. MO thinks it is possible - at least have it as a rumor. Handle it as an inside rumor so as not to have exterior reactions. The President's declaration in CEPAL was good, but it is late.

When will they see one another? VRG says it is hard this week. Could see one another next Monday. MO will phone VRG at noontime onMonday.

MO says that VRG should advise MO any good contact. Yes. They will publish it.

16.0 In. Marcio (Mejia Ricart) with VRG, who answers. Greetings. VRG is busy writing against the Yankees.

MMR talked to Caamaño yesterday. MMR has some news, but the most ~~xx~~ of them can't be published. Caamaño is also going to call MMR today at 1700. Asks to borrow VRG's recorder so they can record this conv. Sr. Armedo (ph) could come by for it. Of course. If VRG wants to ask any question, let MMR know. What is MMR going to ask? Caamaño is going to phone MMR because - according to what "we talked about yesterday, he will designate probably Emilio Cordero here and me (MMR) as Amb. in the United Nations. Moreover, the things they have pending that they want us to do here." Doesn't MMR have anything which is not published? They would have to talk ~~so~~ because MMR has not read the newspapers. Doesn't know what has been published. MMR should say what Caamaño said and VRG will see. MMR will tell VRG everything after he talks to C. the second time. VRGis going out now. Or VRG could go over there (when conv is to take place). VRG has to go out. It should be in a few minutes. Where will it take place. ~~Sta~~ Heriberto Frias 1421, apt. 10. VRG will go by there. MMR offers to pick him up - since they are going for recorder. Fine. Will be there in 5 minutes.

17.0 In. Irina with VRG, who answers, for Inge (Rico).

IR takes the phone. Greetings...Irina had to go out... can go another day to see about dresses...children...Can see one another today...

17.5 Out to 46-66-93. VRG with Deschamps, who answers. VRG says

6 May 1965

17.2 contd.
they are going to talk to Caamaño today. Apparently ~~they~~ he (Caamaño) named Mejia Ricart as Amb. in United Nations and another one of boys (exiles) as Amb. here. Will talk at 1700. It would be good ~~at~~ for Deschamps to go there. VRG can't go there. They are at Heriberto Frias 1421-10. They took VRG's recorder. Deschamps should go there. If he misses the call, they should have it recorded anyway. They just pick up VRG's recorder.

After 1710, 6 May

18.0 In. Emilio (Cordero) with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Asks Emilio to leave his phone. He is at 24-07-15. Cordero is there with Marcio (Mejia Ricart).

18.5 In. MO with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. MO wants an editorial from VRG about the President's speech before the CEPAL. VRG will be home around 2200. He is out now. He said he was going out to dinner.

After 1910, 6 May

19.0 In. Pablo with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings... Pablo has Rheumatic Fever. Isn't Pablo in bed? No. Pablo can't move his right arm...VRG is not there. VRG is very busy with Dominican affair. IR invites them to ~~Rxx~~ come over at Friday. MO had planned to take out his wife, Lupe, since it was anniversary but also has to go to dentist. Best some other day...If they are at home, and there is no dental problem, they can get together for dinner...

20.0 In. MO asks Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not in. Should be home around 2200.

20.2 In. VRG with Inge Rico, who answers. They (exiles) still have not gotten the long distance. VRG is there waiting on this man and will return "there" in a little bit. Does IR know where? Yes, VRG was there. It is the house of Jose Luis. VRG had the address but he did not have the phone. Didn't Jose Luis phone him? No. IR thinks it was Jose Luis who just phoned. Did VRG just get "there"? Yes. Ask them there if Jose Luis called. No. Besides VRG has an appt. now. VRG left there (exiles) and will return there. Will he be home late? Not sure - when ~~he~~ they get call. He will come home right away to call Habana.

20.7 In. Sr. Leonov with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Leonov wanted to postponed an appt. with VRG. He will be home late today. Call him tomorrow between 0900 and 1000. VRG may be at home all morning since he has to write. Will go to "Siempre" around noontime. Leonov will phone back tomorrow morning.

21.0 In. VRG with IR, who answers. "This stupid man has not come. Hasn't he come by there?" No. It is now 2020. "He" has not phoned either. Leonov phoned VRG. Leonov said something about having an appt. with VRG. VRG does not know about. L. will phone back tomorrow Marcue called saying he wanted an editorial on President's speech this morning. VRG will wait there another 10 minutes (for man to appear at the meeting).

21.5 In. Miric with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. He is out. He will probably have news when he comes home and she will have him phone Miric if it is early.

22.0 In. Miric with Inge Rico, who answers. VRG is not back. VRG is at house of Jose Luis Gonzalez. They are waiting on call from there (Dominican Republic). Miric has had an official communication on this matter and would like to tell VRG. What is the phone where VRG is? Moment.

He is at 24-07-15. Thanks.

22.2 Out to 31-06-06. VRG with Jovan (Miric), who answers. VRG says they were waiting on call from Caamaño, but did not go through. Will be tomorrow. Apparently will name Marcio Mejia Ricart as Amb. in United Nations. VRG did not think it a good. Miric says it is all right for the state they are in. Another man were will be named Amb. in Mexico. Miric comments says that they must make this movement.

Miric has the communique. Deschamps gave it to VRG. The most important part is point out that Harriman is lying. Miric says that "what this man is doing, he is influential, no? ...follows a cause and is doing some foolish things." Does VRG know what happened in China? No. Thousands and thousands against - after Buenos Aires day before yesterday. Miric also has (xxxxxx)(declaration) of the Permanent Commission of Congress - approving the censure of govt. VRG saw it.

What is VRG's idea of panorama? VRG thinks they won't leave. Miric agrees - that this is long-time affair (U.S. occupation).

Miric saw the (inauguration) of Caamaño. He has personality. Is only 33 years old. Does Miric know that Caamaño told Marcio (Mejia) yesterday that he had 50,000 more rifles. Yes, Miric sent in this notice yesterday. They are in the North. They are still in revolution. This is just a breather.

Perhaps can get together tomorrow. Miric has to go out early tomorrow. Could have lunch together - near CEPAL meeting. CEPAL is under the xxxxx shade of Dominican affair. VRG can get all material on speeches. But nothing is important on their decisions... everything is under shade (of this affair). Miric will follow the speeches. Can meet near "Siempre." Can eat at Oreo (?ph). Miric has not been there for years. Can meet there. Best later than 1200. Miric will pick VRG up at "Siempre" at 1300. Fine.

Reel off at RT 23.7, 0620, 7 May 1965

From 0620, 7 May (Friday) to 0730, 8 May 1965

2.0 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for Victor Rico Galan(VRG). Moment.

VRG takes phone. MO is Jose Luis Gonzales. Did VRG find out anything "about that collaboration"? Yes, but "he did not tell me anything." VRG will have to ask cashier (if they will pay JLG for his article). VRG will go today and will ask (at "Siempre"). Will VRG be at "Siempre" tomorrow? Yes. Could MO see VRG there about something else? Of course. Will go there around 1300 (to see VRG).

2.2 In. Leonov, Press Attache (of Soviet Embassy) with maid, who answers, for VRG.

Inge Rico takes phone and asks who is calling.

VRG takes the phone. Greetings. Leonov would like to consult something with VRG - but at the office of "Siempre" or at café (but not over phone). VRG will be at "Siempre" at 1230. Can meet at the café there...

Leonov says next Sunday they are having the reception for the end of the war (World War). L. took the invitations by the offices of "Siempre." Lolita has VRG's invitation. Thanks.

4.2 Out to 03. Time is 1008, 7 May.

4.2 Out to 03. Time is 1038, 7 May.

4.5 In. MO (Marcio Mejia Ricart - v) with VRG, who answers. MMR talked to Santo Domingo but "there are 2 or 3 things they want to arrange and they will phone" MMR back tonight at 1900. The news of today is that "we are willing to resist until the end, more or less the same information" MMR had already given VRG. VRG talked to the minister of Interior, Bjoti 77 Curi (ph). VRG says "he" made some "stupendous declarations," came out in "El Dia." MMR has not seen them. But Emilio told MMR that they were wonderful. VRG thought they were very good. MMR comments that the last time he (MMR) saw him, he (MMR) hit him because he was Viru's man...like Caamaño or even worse. But he is improving. MMR talked to him and he was very cordial. He told MMR that they are working on the letter of credentials, that he thought that the nomination (of MMR as Amb. in U.N.) was certain, but they have not been able to arrange this definitely yet due to MMR's political problem. He is working on this, but still lacks the last approval. Things have to be prepared. If VRG wants, he can go to MMR's at 1900 (to hear conv) and bring his recorder. Fine.

5.0 In. Marcio Mejia Ricart (v) with VRG, who answers. MMR forgot to tell VRG - Due to "my last call, they cancelled the Amb. (of Mexico. Emilio's (Cordero's)2 matter (nomination) is being worked on. It would be good to work on this...find out if they have received the telegram. They have sent a telegram to substitute the (Dominican) Amb. here. It would be interesting to find out about this - perhaps through "Excelsior." VRG will find out if Deschamps can do this and call MMR.

5.7 Out to 23-02-91. Busy.
Out to 23-48-26. VRG (v) orders a cab.

6.0 In, twice. No answer, complete. Sra. Rico asks maid, who answers, for VRG. Hangs up...or cuts off...

After 1325, 7 May

6.2 In. VRG (v) asks maid, who answers, for Sra. (Inge Rico).
IR takes phone. VRG is going to have lunch with Miric. All right. Will he be back early? Yes. Has anyone called? No. Did VRG take "Las 20 lineas"? No, will take them (later).

6.5 In. Sra. Rico (v) with Sra. Diener, who answers, for Inge Rico.
IR takes phone. VRG is not at home. Sra. Rico called this morning, but hung up on her...Everyone is fine...Invites Sra. R. tomorrow...

6.7 In. MO asks Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for VRG. Not there. Won't be home for lunch.

After 1515, 7 May

7.0 In. Marianita with Sra. Diener, who answers. Greetings.. about children...
Inge Rico takes phone...about children...maid,...agency for maids...

9.0 Out to 20-07-77. Maid asks MO, who answers, for Jose(fina).
Josefine (maid) comes to phone...Greetings..how each is... Asks about whether Roma has come to town...

10.7 In. MO with Inge Rico (v), who answers, for Casta (maid).
Casta takes the phone. About whether she is angry...seeing one another...

After 1715, 7 May

11.0 In. VRG (v) with Inge Rico (v), who answers. VRG is with Jovan (Miric) at a restaurant. Julian will go by there at 1730. VRG will go there (home) now, but may be late. Keep Julian there - wait for him. Fine.

11.2 In. VRG (v) with Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for Quiche (ph (nickname for Inge Rico).
IR takes the phone. VRG is coming home now. This young man (Julian) is now here. Yes, but there are no taxis...Just as soon as he gets a cab, he will be home. IR thinks he is not going to be able to wait. Tell him to wait on VRG...Julian says for him to come right away because Julian has another engagement.

12.2 In. MO asks VRG (v), who answers, for his sister, Casta Hernandez.
Maid takes phone. MO is Antonio...about visiting her... about family....MO is going home to visit...

7 May 1965

After 1915, 7 May

18.0 Out to 24-07-15. VRG with Marcio (Mejia Ricart), who answers. Did MMR talk to Santo Domingo? Not yet...Still waiting on call. When will he talk? Not sure, but thinks around 2330? Is Maestro Emilio (Cordero) there? Yes. VRG will go there. (VRG is thick-tongued Slightly drunk...)

18.7 Out to 24-07-15. VRG with MO, who answers, for Jose Luis Gonzalez. Not there yet. Is MO still waiting for that call? Yes. (MO is Mejia Ricart). VRG will go there and take his recorder.

After 1915, 7 May

19.0 Out to XXXXXXXXX 15-17-20. VRG (v) orders a cab. Wrong number.

19.2 Out to 15-50-20, twice. Busy.
Out to 15-91-27. VRG (v) asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Elizondo. Not there now.

19.7 In. Antonio Gonzalez de Leon with VRG, who answers. Greetings...VRG is sick - This Ministery does not react. Did VRG expect it to react? VRG expected that its opinion would be at least Mexican (with respect to Dominican Republic). MO has to talk to VRG.... MO is almost inaudible...MO wants to ask about Gonzalo Martinez Orvañes (??). VRG saw this, but was not impressed. Has VRG seen Gonzalo? XXX Of course. Recently? Yes. Where can MO locate him? Phone him at 24-88-64. Yes, but the phone does not answer. Yes, they do, that is his house. When will they see one another? When MO likes. Can have coffee together tomorrow? Call VRG tomorrow around 1000 at home (to arrange this). Fine.

20.7 In. MO with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings...Asks how MO is...MO went to see dentist...VRG is very drunk and is still drinking He is out too now. VRG had lunch with Miric, came home for an appt., and told IR he had to go out again and must be still in orbit.

21.0 In. No answer.

After 2250, 7 May

From 0730 to 1300, 8 May (Saturday) 1965

22.2 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for VRG. MO is Sr. Leonov.
Call back later...He is asleep. It is now 0930. Call back at 1000.

22.7 In. Leonov with VRG, who answers. Asks if Leonov could pick VRG up at 1045. It is now 1010. L. asks if he can't see VRG in the afternoon because L. is finishing something now. Then, in the afternoon - at VRG's house. L. will pick VRG up and they can go where VRG up. L. will phone VRG at 1500.

After 1030, 8 May

23.0 Out to 23-02-91. VRG (v) orders a cab. None.
Out to 23-48-26. VRG (v) orders a cab. None.

Reel off at RT 24.0, 1300, 8 May 1965

Reel 72-RICO-32 - 3 -

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-316474
X-REF TO FILE NO 201-
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

RI ☑ COPY ☐ BURN
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
Mexico City

ACTION
WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, DDP, WH/C 8, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, DC 4, DC/H 3

ABSTRACT X

RI COPY

S E C R E T 122054Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE MEXI 3381

REF SDOM 4584 (IN 4781)

13 MAY 65 IN 65743

1. FYI ONLY: LIFEAT REPORTS INDICATE LUIS SUAREZ WAS BRIEFED PRIOR TRIP BY VICTOR RICO GALAN, WRITER FOR SIEMPRE, MEXI LEFTIST WEEKLY WHICH HAS PUBLISHED STRONGLY ANTI-US ARTICLES ON DR SITUATION. RICO GALAN IS CASTRO COMMUNIST AGENT, REP FOR RADIO HAVANA IN MEXI RE DR SITUATION AND IS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH EMILIO CORDERO, DOMINICAN EXILE IN MEXI WHO IN CONTACT WITH DR REBEL LEADERS AND WHO, ACCORDING ONE REPORT, MAY BE DESIGNATED AMB TO MEXI BY CAAMANO. RICO ADVISED SUAREZ TO TRAVEL SDOM BY PRIVATE PLANE FROM KINGSTON AND TO STAY AT EMBAJADOR IN SDOM. SUAREZ RELUCTANT TALK TO CORDERO OR USE CORDERO'S CONTACTS IN DR AND RICO HAD IMPRESSION SUAREZ AFRAID OF GETTING MIXED UP IN DR SITUATION.

2. FOR OPS SECURITY REASONS ABOVE INFO CANNOT BE USED PER SE AS BASIS QUESTIONING SUAREZ AND MOYA. INFO DOES HOWEVER INDICATE POSSIBLE ANGLE, VIZ, EXPLOIT POSSIBLE FEAR ON PART SUAREZ RE GETTING INVOLVED. DEFER SDOM ON BEST MEANS [illegible]

SECRET

201-316474
13 MAY 65

SECRET IN 65743 Page 2 of 2

SUAREZ SUFFICIENTLY TO PROMPT HIS DEPARTURE BUT SUGGEST, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, THIS BE DONE WITHOUT INVOLVING PRO-US AUTHORITIES. IF SUAREZ AND/ MOYA OFFICIALLY KICKED OUT, RESULTING SIEMPRE EXPLOITATION MIGHT WELL HAVE GREATER ANTI-US IMPACT AT LEAST IN MEXICO THAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED SUAREZ ARTICLE.

* EMIDAM-1 PLANNED TO ARREST, INTERROGATE, AND DEPORT LUIS SUAREZ.

SECRET

CFN

AC

SECRET

JUN 2 '67

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

43 **SECRET**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH

TIME 0245

BY M

INFO VR. FILE CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 6

S E C R E T 130054Z 13 MAY 65 IN 65826

PRIROTTY DIR CITE MEXI 3394

REF DIR 09327 **

STATION INFORMED AFTERNOON 12 MAY BY LIFEUD-24 THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN TELEPHONE DEAD AS OF 0900 HOURS 12 MAY. E SURFACING OF REF X TELECON; AFTER RESUMPTION OF PHONE SERVICE SOH PLANS MAINTAIN COVERAGE WITH T ME MONITORING ES LONG AS POSSIBLE BUT ZITL HAVE WILSTED END BASEHOUSE KEEPERS MADY DXR IMMEDIATE EMANSATION OF ALL EQUIPMENT AND JUMH LINES.

S E C R E T

CFN S/E NOTE. *CORRECTED COPY TO FOLLOW

** [illegible] WRONG REF.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

```
RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474                                200-007-038/13
SEX M DOB ?                               MEXI-03369
                                          12 MAY 65
CIT ?                                     P1
OCC ?
ADVISING PRESS CONF ON DOMINICAN SITUATION.
RE CONTACT W/KWN KGB.



                                          R 6509130073
```

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

S E C R E T

ORIG: FRANK A. TOTH/kct
UNIT: DO/USOP
EXT: 5885
DATE: 12 MAY 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-244017

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO: IMMEDIATE NYDO, DOST

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DO/H 3

INFO: DO 4, ADDP, WH 7, CA 2, CA/PROP, VR, FILE

TO IMMEDIATE NYDO INFO DOST CITE DIR 09331

1. DYVOUR WISHES UTILIZE WUINDIGO FOR SURFACING BLACK PROPAGANDA OPERATION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM SDOM. WUINDIGO ACTIVITY WILL BE LIMITED PREPARATION ARTICLE FOR PLACEMENT RIO OR CANADIAN PRESS ON BASIS MATERIAL PROVIDED BY HQS AND POSSIBLE PERSONAL INTERVENTION TO INSURE EARLY PUBLICATION.

2. ADVISE EARLIEST TIME DYVOUR REP CAN BRIEF HIM RE THIS OPERATION.

END OF MESSAGE

201—

Frank A. Toth

EUGENE F. O'MEARA
C/DO/OP

WH/2 Mr. Kaufman (in draft)

FRANK A. TOTH
DO/USOP

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

49	**SECRET**	REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
FROM MEXICO CITY	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1 2 3 4
ACTION WH/C 8	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	UNIT WH/C · TIME 0100 · BY

INFO

VR. FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA 2, CA/PROP, WE 6, W 17, SR 8, EE 4, DDP

S E C R E T 120150Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3372

SECTION ONE ~~OF~~ TWO OF 2

NO NIGHT ACTION

111 64711

Pa 1 of 7

1. LIFEAT COVERAGE VICTOR RICO GALAN FROM 2230 HOURS 1 MAY TO 0845 HOURS 2 MAY 65 REPORTED MEXI 3312 6 MAY 65.

2. LIFEAT COVERAGE RICO 1250 HOURS 2 MAY - 0020 HOURS 3 MAY:

A. RICO GALAN AND JOVAN MIRIC, YUGOSLAV CORRESPONDENT IN MEXICO: DISCUSS OAS COMMISSION TO DR WHICH BOTH THINK BADLY CHOSEN. RICO SAYS "THEY'RE A BUNCH OF GORILLAS." RICO MUCH INTERESTED MEXI PROPOSAL, WHICH NOT APPROVED, RE SUBMISSION OF PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH TO BE PRESENTED NO LATER THAN 10 MAY. SINCE OAS MEETINGS SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER COMMISSION SUBMITS REPORT RICO SAYS DECISION CAN BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY.

B. MIRIC AND RICO: MIRIC SAYS MORE THAN 9,000 TROOPS IN DR AND MORE DISEMBARKING TO PROTECT OAS COMMISSION. US TROOPS HAVE TAKEN OVER ALL WESSIN COMBAT LINES TO CONTINUE FIGHT.

C. RICO AND MIRIC: RICO SAYS DOMINICANS LEFT A COMMUNIQUE THAT MORNING, CALL TO THIRD WORLD FOR ITS SUPPORT, SIGNED BY DR EMILIO CORDERO MICHEL, DR MARCIO MEJIA RICART, ING LEANDRO GUZMAN, DR

SECRET

Rico Galan

SECRET

104 64113

Page 249

TOBIAS CABRAL MEJIA AND RAMON EMILIO COLOMBO IN NAME OF DR EXILES IN MEXI. IN SAME CONVERSATION MIRIC AND RICO SAY UNITED STATES OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO PACIFY LATIN AMERICA AND ARE SPEAKING OF PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT. HAVE SAID THAT JOSE E. MORA MET WITH WESSIN, AFTER TALKING TO REBEL CHIEFS, TO SEEK A FORMULA, APPARENTLY THEY (UNITED STATES SOURCES) SAY BASED ON PROPOSALS OF THE REBELS. MIRIC SAYS THIS IS A CONFESSION THAT THE REBELS ARE IN THE RIGHT. REPORTED ARMISTICE, CEASE FIRE ACHIEVED BETWEEN MARINES AND REBELS. ALL CIVILIANS EVACUATED AND THAT A NOT ESPECIALLY URGENT MEETING WAS TO TAKE PLACE THAT AFTERNOON BETWEEN THEIR MINISTERS AND CONGRESS MEMBERS. NO MENTION FURTHER LANDING OF MARINES AND ARMY. ALSO STATED DOMINICANS SHOULD HAVE CHANCE TO ~~SHOSE~~ THEIR DESTINY, POLIT DEVELOPMENT, LIBERTY, ETC. MIRIC SAYS SHOWS A NOTE TO PACIFY LATIN AMERICA.

D. MIRIC AND RICO: IN REPLY RICO QUESTION MIRIC SAYS HAS NO NEWS ON EUROPEAN REACTION TO SITUATION BUT THINKS THERE IS SOME. ALSO ON VIETNAM. PERHAPS LESS WITH BRITISH PRESS. MENTIONS RADIO MOSCOW SPANISH LANGUAGE BROADCAST WHICH FULL OF SILLY THINGS, MENTIONING SOCIALIST POPULAR PARTY IS MOST STUPID POLICY. RICO SAYS RADIO HAVANA DID SAME THING. RICO GAVE THEM COMPLETE INFO

SECRET

IN 64714

PA-13-41

SECRET

RE 14TH OF JUNE PARTY BUT EXPECTED THEM TO ENTER IT. MENTIONS UNITED STATES EFFORT TO PACIFY LATIN AMERICA BY BROADCASTING NAMES OF 58 COMMUNISTS ONE OF WHOM RICO SAYS IS A SPANIARD, ANOTHER A PRENSA LATINA CORRESPONDENT IN THE DR. RICO SAYS 'THEY WILL SEE THE RESULTS OF THE OAS COMMISSION.' RICO SAYS 'THEY HAVE TO FORSEE THINGS A LITTLE." MIRIC POINTS OUT COMMISSION VISIT IS REALLY APPROVAL OF INTERVENTION.

E. RICO TO ING. (FNU) ELIZONDO: 'RICO SAYS RADIO HAVANA PULLED A REAL BONER BY ANNOUNCING THAT HE WAS THEIR CORRESPONDENT IN THE DR SITUATION. IS THEN AWAITING A CALL FROM THE DR.

F. CALLER, POSSIBLY RAMON SINOBAS OF PRENSA LATINA, AND RICO: CALLER TELLS RICO THAT HE HAS READ IN CUBAN PAPER TEXT OF RICO INTERVIEW WITH JUAN BAUTISTA MEJIA, INTERVIEW COMPLETE AS RICO GAVE IT TO RADIO HAVANA. CALLER TO COME TO RICO HOUSE AT ONCE FOR FURTHER NEWS.

G. CARLOS COCCIOLI, ITALIAN COMMUNIST, RESIDENT MEXI, WRITER FOR LEFTIST MAGAZINE SIEMPRE, TO RICO: RICO SAYS VERY BUSY SINCE RADIO HAVANA HAS COMMISSIONED HIM FOR NEWS ON DR. RICO ANXIOUS TO GIVE DATA TO COCCIOLI SO HE CAN PUBLISH IT 'THERE' (ITALY?). COCCIOLI VERY AGREEABLE.

H. RICO TO RADIO HAVANA: RICO SAYS DO NOT MENTION JUAN B. MEJIA

SECRET

OF 14TH OF JUNE MOVEMENT. EVERYTHING IS BEING DONE BY CONSTITUTIONALISM,

RADIO HAVA SHOULD FOLLOW LINES SET OUT IN FIDEL'S SPEECH.

I. MARCIO MEJIA RICART, DOM EXILE IN MEXI, AND MIRIC: MEJIA SAYS TALKED WITH JUAN BOSCH YESTERDA: AND ASKS MIRIC TO COME TO RICO GALAN'S HOUSE TO PICK UP THEIR (DOMINICAN EXILES IN MEXI) PRESS COMMUNIQUE.

J. MEJIA RICART AND VALENTIN IVANOVICH KUCHEROV, TASS CORRESPONDENT IN MEXI, SUSPECT KGB: KUCHEROV TELLS MEJIA THAT HE HAS A COMMUNIQUE WHICH IS IMPORTANT (TO K) AND WANTS TO SEE MEJIA. WILL MEET LATER.

K. EMILIO CORDERO AND RICO: RICO TELLS CORDERO THAT HE GAVE THEIR COMMUNIQUE TO MIRIC WHO WILL TRANSMIT IT. CORDERO SAYS THAT RADIO HAVANA TRANSMITTED THE "OTHER" CORRECTLY. "THEY DID NOT DENY THE OTHER." CORDERO SAYS HE TALKED TO (FNU) ARMEDO WHO HEARD FROM DR THAT VOICE OF AMERICA SAID US SEEKING PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT AND SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM. RICO THINKS UNITED STATES TRYING TO SMOOTH THINGS OVER BUT WILL CONTINUE OCCUPATION. "THERE SHOULD BE NO GREAT CHANGE." SAYS MIRIC THINKS THERE MAY BE A BIG CHANGE BUT YOU KNOW HOW YUGOSLAVS THINK, THEY BELIEVE WHAT THEY HEAR. RICO SAYS IT MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR UNITED STATES TO TAKE IN BOSCH, BUT CONTINUE THE OCCUPATION,

SECRET

IN 64712

pg. 5 of 7

KEEPING HIM TIED UP WITH TROOPS.

3. LIFEAT COVERAGE RICO 0624 3 MAY TO 0623 4 MAY 65:

A. RICO TO FUNDORA OF RADIO HAVANA: RICO SAYS HAS NOTHING. WILL CALL WHEN HAS SOMETHING.

B. EMILIO CORDERO AND RICO: CORDERO SAYS HAS NO NEWS BUT FRIEND IN TOUCH WITH PERSON IN DR SAYS "THAT MIRAVAL'S (PHONETIC) WERE KILLED. THE COMMISSION DOES NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO. ARE LOOKING FOR PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT...BUT MASSES APPARENTLY DEMANDING BOSCH. THEY ARE STILL INDECISIVE. BOSCH HAS GIVEN THE INSURRECTION UP AS FINISHED AND SAID DOMINICANS SHOULD NOT FIRE AGAINST UNITED STATES AND THAT HE (BOSCH) DID NOT THINK THE UNITED STATES HAD BAD INTENTIONS. THERE ARE ABOUT 40 HURT AMONG THE UNITED STATES TROOPS AND 4 OR 5 DEAD...," RICO WILL LEAVE HIS OFFICE NUMBER IN CASE JUAN B. MEJIA CALLS HIM.

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | SECRET | IN [illegible] PAGE [illegible]

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 5372

12 MAY 65 IN 64718

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

NO NIGHT ACTION

SECRET

4. LIFEAT COVERAGE RICO GALAN 0620 4 MAY TO 0715, 5 MAY 65:

A. UNIDENTIFIED CALLER ASKES WHEN RICO GALANS RETURNED FROM CUBA. SRA RICO SAYS DURING HOLD WEEK. CALLER IS LEAVING FOR CUBA 5 MAY. (STATION COMMENT: CALLER MAY BE IDEN WITH CAPT FRANCISCO TARAZONA TORAN (201-306371). SEE HMMA 17961 20 OCT 61.)

B. (FNU PEREIRA, CALLING FOR ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOL STUDENTS AT UNAM TO INVITE RICO TO PARTICIPATE IN SOME ROUND TABLES ON CARIBBEAN SITUATION. ALBERTO DOMINGO AND ENRIQUE SOTO IZQUIERDO ALSO COMING. RICO TO ATTEND ON 11 MAY.

C. RICO TO EMILIO CORDERO: RICO SAYS IT INTELLIGENT TO NAME CAAMANO PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT. CORDERO SAYS DISCUSSED CAAMANO WITH DOMINICAN FRIENDS WHO SAY HE IS ONLY ONE WHO CAN GUARANTEE THE UNITED STATES EVEN THOUGH HE HAS PARTICIPATED WITH "GREAT NATIONALISM". RICO AGREES. CORDERO SAYS THERE ONLY ONE THING HE DOES NOT LIKE ABOUT CAAMANO OR " THAT FATHER OF HIS". "THAT THERE ARE COMMUNISTS UNDER HIS CONTROL". CORDERO SAYS BOSCH SHOULD BE BACK. HE DOES NOT THINK CAAMANO

SECRET

SECRET

1164718
Orig 7047

SECRET

"WILL OBTAIN THEIR PROPOSALS." NOR DOES RICO. BOCH'S PEOPLE MAY HAND IN ARMS VOLUNTARILY BUT THEY WILL HAVE TO SHOOT THE 14TH OF JUNE PEOPLE AND THE "E" AND "CE" (SIC) ONES TO GET THEIR ARMS AWAY. CORDERO ASKS RICO IF HE SAW TIME MAGAZINE TODAY? IT MENTIONS THREE COMPANIONS OF THE 14TH OF JUNE COMMITTEE BUT NOT AS MEMBERS OF THE GROUP, RATHER AS COMMUNIST DIRECTORS: JAMIE DURAN, JOHNSON OF THE 14TH AND THEN "GRUBEL, AH, TOMEIJA" (PHONETIC). CORDERO SAYS " THIS ONE IS MEMBER OF PCP." RICO KNOWS HIM. TOMEIJA IS ONE OF THE DIRECTORS. AND GRUBEL IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE PCP WHO WAS IN PRAGUE. RICO ALSO KNOWS HIM. CORDERO ALSO SAYS THAT MIAMI REFUSES TO ACCEPT CALLS FROM DOMINICANS TO SDOM. ACCEPT ONLY UNITED STATES PRESS CALLS. WOULD BE GOOD TO TELL RADIO HAVANA THAT DOMINICANS CAN'T CALL IN CORDERO MENTIONS THAT DOMINICAN AMBASSADOR SAID WOULD RESIGN BUT HAS NOT. IS AGAINST UNITED STATES DUE SOME "DECLARATIONS PUBLISHED IN LA EXTRA" IF HE DOES NOT RESIGN MAYBE COULD BE SPREAD AROUND THAT IN VIEW THESE DECLARATIONS HE IS PERSONA NON GRATA. IT WOULD BE HARD TO DO BUT POSSIBLE AND HAS TO BE HANDLED CORRECTLY. CAN BE DONE WHEN RICO WISHES COULD DO IT PERHAPS IN THE COPY RICO ISPREPARING NOW FOR DIARIO DE MEXICO. CORDERO READS TO RICO FROM 2 MAY LA EXTRA STATEMENT DR JOSE FERNANDEZ CAMINEROS ABOUT WESSIN Y WESSIN WHICH SAYS WESSIN POPULAR WITH PEOPLE BECAUSE ANTI TRUJILLISTA AND POPULAR WITH BOSCH'S

SECRET

IN 29714

SECRET

Pg 2 of 3

P
CP AND PARTIDO LIBERAL REVOLUCIONISTA FOR SAME REASON. DISTINGUISHED SELF IN 14 JUNE 1959 DURING MASSACRE. RECEIVED LA ORDEN DE CONSTANZA FROM TRUJILLO FOR BRILLANT MILITARY SERVICE DURING THESE THREE INVASIONS. RICO OR CORDERO SAYS, SO, THIS S O.B. SAYS HE IS ANTI-TRUJILLISTA. RICO SAYS SIEMPRE IS SENDING LUIS SUAREZ AND MOYA, A PHOTOGRAPHER TO DR. RICO SAYS MUST GET TO DOMINICAN AMBASSADOR MAKE SURE HE DOES NOT DENY THEM VISAS. TRAVEL ROUTE NOT DEFINITE. PERHAPS VIA KINGSTON FROM WHICH ARE FLIGHTS. FROM JAMAICA WOULD HAVE TO TAKE BOAT. CAN RENT SMALL PLANE IN JAMAICA FOR ABOUT $200 OR $300. RICO WANTS NAMES OF CONTACTS FROM CORDERO FOR SUAREZ. STATION COMMENT: SEE PRIN 3203 AND PREVIOUS REFS ON LUIS RODRIGO MOYA AND LUIS SUAREZ.)

D. RICO TO FNU ELIZONDO: RICO ASKS ELIZONDO IF HE DID AS RICO ASKED? NO, COULD NOT SEE "HIM". ELIZONDO WILL CALL MONTERREY TO SEE IF THERE IS A FRIEND WHO COULD PASS SOMETHING. NO, ONE LOANED FROM THERE. NO, THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE. ELIZONDO WILL ARRANGE IT IF HE CAN.

E. JOVAN MIRIC TO RICO: MIRIC SAYS YUGOSLAV GOV MADE A DECLARATION TODAY CONDEMNING INTERVENTION AND SUPPORTING BOSCH'S DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT THEY TELEPHONED MIRIC AND CONGRATULATED HIM ON HIS COPY.

SECRET

IN 64712
Pg 7 [illegible]

HELPED THEM FORM AN ATTITUDE. TEXT HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TRANJUC BUT NOT PICKED UP TODAY. MAY SEND IT VIA INFORMEX. MIRIC ASKS RICO TO TELL DOM EXILES IF HE SEES THEM.

F. RICO TO LUIS SUAREZ OF SIEMPRE: TELLS SUAREZ TO RENT PRIVATE PLANE IF NO FLIGHTS FROM KINGSTON AND TO STAY AT EMPERADOR IN SDOM. SUAREZ DOES NOT THINK IT NECESSARY TALK TO EMILIO CORDERO. RICO WHO HAS BEEN IN DR CAN GIVE HIM NECESSARY INFO.

G. CORDERO AND RICO: RICO TELLS CORDERO SUAREZ DOESN'T WANT TO SEE HIM. THINKS HE AFRAID AND DOES NOT SEEM INTERESTED IN CONTACTS IN DR. RICO THINKS HE PLANS TRY SEE CAAMANO BUT DOESN'T WANT GET MIXED UP MUCH IN SITUATION. RICO GOING TRY GET SUAREZ INTERESTED IN SEEING CORDERO'S CONTACTS IN DR. RICO WILL VISIT CORDERO TO GET LIST OF ADDRESSES FROM HIM.

H. CORDERO AND RICO: CORDERO SAYS CAN'T COME SEE RICO BECAUSE AN INSPECTOR FROM GOBERNACION VISITED HIM AND HE HAS TO GO WITH HIM TO SEE SR OCHOA. WILL SEND LIST TO RICO.

I. RICO TO ALAN HOWARD: HOWARD WHO SAYS HE SAD AND A LITTLE ASHAMED ASKS RICO IF THERE IS ANY NEWS FROM THERE? RICO SAYS NO BUT EXPECTS SOME SOON.

5. DISSEM AT HQS DISCRETION.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 51

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

43 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

☐ COPY ☑

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

MAY 19 1965

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM

MEXICO CITY

ACTION

C/WH 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH

TIME 0730

BY M

INFO

* VR, FILE, SUSPENSE C/WH, CSDO, ADDP, C/DO 4, C/DO/H 3, C/SOD 4, C/[illegible] 5,

C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, C/FI/INT, C/FI/SPG, C/IW, DDP, C/WH/COG

C/CI/PS, C/EE 3

S E C R E T 120250Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3376

12 MAY 65

[illegible]

4 | FI

ABSTRACT

RI COPY

RI COPY

RI COPY

RI COPY

RI COPY

Vito Rico - Galan

12 May 65

[illegible] — DO NOT [illegible]

201-336474

FORM 1389

RI COPY

RI COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

065

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 6

INFO : VR, FILE, ADDP C/DO 4 C/DO/IH 3 C/SOD 4 C/SR 5 C/CA 2 C/CA/O 2 C/CI C/FI 2 C/FI/D 4 C/FI/INT C/FI/SPG C/IW DDP DO/WH/C 6 C/CI/PS C/EE 3

SERVICE

RI COPY

MEXI 3376	12 MAY 65	64758
STA & NR	DATE	IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

PARA 3H: "ACTION IN SECRET SESSION OAS, THAT COLOMBIA, CHILE VENEZUELA AND COSTA RICA PROTESTED U.S. UNILATERAL ACTION, REQUESTED LEGAL MEASURES TO MAKE IT COMBINED ACTION."

PARA 4J: "HAVE RADIO HABANA BROADCAST FOR THEM TO CALL CORDERO. CORDERO SAYS THAT IS DANGEROUS. OR THEY COULD SAY FOR SDOM TO CALL VRQ. EASIEST THING IS TO CABLE. YES, BUT THIS IS URGENT. HAVE RADIO HABANA SAY FOR ANYONE TO CALL. JUAN B. MEJIA COULD HEAR THIS."

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

34 SECRET

RI ☑ COPY ☐ [illegible]
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 19

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT WH
TIME 2350
BY [illegible]

INFO
VR. FILE SUSPENSE WH, CSDO, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, FI/D 4, FW, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 120102Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3370

AN	~~PF~~	
PSY	~~DEST.~~	
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

(125) 4P

12 MAY 65 IN 64702

MICROFILMED
JUN 28 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

NO NIGHT ACTION

201-281180

1. LIFEAT COVERAGE RICO GALAN FROM 0625 6 MAY TO 0620 7 MAY

A. JOVAN MIRIC AND RICO: MIRIC SAYS HE HAD APPOINTMENT AT 1700 WITH HIS SOURCE IN OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY. IT WAS RUMORED THERE THAT MEXICO WAS GOING TO BREAK WITH OAS, BUT THIS DID NOT HAPPEN. RICO EXPRESSES HOPE THERE WILL BE DECLARATION ALONG THESE LINES TODAY. MIRIC SAYS THIS NO LONGER POSSIBLE. HE HAS COPY OF TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WHICH WAS WRITTEN 48 HOURS AGO. HE QUOTES "MEXICAN GOVT IS UNITED IN THE CONVICTION THAT DOMINICANS AND ONLY DOMINICANS ARE ONES TO DECIDE THEIR FORM OF GOVT AND THEIR FUTURE". RICO SAYS GOOD, BUT WHY ARE CARRILLO FLORES AND DE LA COLIN (PRESUMABLY RAFAEL DE LA COLINA, MEXICAN AMBASSADOR TO OAS) ACTING LIKE S.O.B.'S? RICO THINKS THE ONLY THING TO DO IS BREAK WITH OAS. MIRIC ADVISES HE WILL BE BUSY WITH CEPAL NEXT FEW DAYS.

B. RICO AND RODRIGO ASTURIAS (PRESUMABLY THE GUATEMALAN STUDENT LEADER): LATTER EXPRESSES REGRET HE DID NOT SEE RICO YESTERDAY. RICO REQUESTS PHONE NUMBER OF LUIS TREJO ESQUIVEL, WHOM HE LATER CALLS. TREJO SAYS HE HAS "IT" READY FOR TOMORROW, THAT HE WAS

SECRET

13 May 65
201-336474

SECRET IN 64702

WITH RODRIGO YESTERDAY. RICO SAYS VERY URGENT HE SEE TREJO ASAP.

C. UNIDENTIFIED CALLER AND RICO: RICO SAYS HAS LOST CONTACT WITH DOMINICAN REPUBLIC; ONE CAN'T PHONE THERE UNLESS IN U.S. CALLER ASKS CAN'T THEY TALK WITH BOSCH IN SAN JUAN. RICO REPLIES YES BUT "THESE PEOPLE" HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO TALK TO HIM. CALLER INQUIRED ABOUT INSTALLATION OF CAAMANO SINCE AP LOST THE INFO. RICO STATES IS EXPECTING DECLARATION FROM GOVT TONIGHT; MENTIONS RUMOR OF BREAK WITH OAS; THINKS IT IS TOO BEAUTIFUL BE TRUE. CALLER THINKS IT POSSIBLE. AT LEAST TO HANDLE IT AS INSIDE RUMOR SO AS NOT TO HAVE EXTERIOR REACTIONS. ADDS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECLARATION IN CEPAL WAS GOOD BUT TOO LATE. CALLER WILL PHONE RICO NOONTIME MONDAY (10TH).

D. MARCIO MEJIA RICART AND RICO: RICO SAYS IS BUSY WRITING AGAINST THE YANKEES. MEJIA SAYS HE TALKED TO CAAMANO YESTERDAY, THAT HE (MEJIA) HAS SOME NEWS BUT MOST OF IT CANNOT BE PUBLISHED. CAAMANO TO CALL MEJIA AGAIN ON 6 MAY AND MEJIA OFFERS TO PUT FORWARD ANY QUESTIONS RICO WANTS TO ASK. MEJIA SAYS PURPOSE OF CAAMANO CALL IS PROBABLY "TO DESIGNATE EMILIO CORDERO HERE AND ME AS AMBASSADOR IN THE U.N. MOREOVER THE THINGS WHICH THEY HAVE PENDING THAT THEY WANT US TO DO HERE". MEJIA PROMISES TO TELL RICO EVERYTHING AFTER

Caamano conv. with Marcio Mejia Ricart

SECRET

Cit: Dominican Republic
[illegible]

SECRET

IN 64702
PAGE 3

HE HAS TALKED WITH CAAMANO A SECOND TIME.

E. RICO AND DESCHAMPS (PRESUMABLY EDUARDO DESCHAMPS, WRITER FOR EXCELSIOR, ON WHOM STATION HAS SOME DEROG INFO INCLUDING LIHUFF REPORT THAT HE COMMUNIST): RICO ADVISES DESCHAMPS THEY GOING TALK TO CAAMANO LATER IN DAY, AND SUGGESTS DESCHAMPS BE PRESENT WHEN CALL IS MADE.

a/ Mexico
a Mexico

(201-[illegible])

F. LEONOV (PRESUMABLY NIKOLAY) CALLS FOR RICO AND LEAVES MESSAGE THAT HE WANTS TO POSTPONE APPOINTMENT. WILL CALL AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING.

G. MIRIC TO RICO: IS INFORMED THAT RICO IS AT HOUSE OF JOSE LUIS GONZALEZ, THAT THEY WAITING ON CALL FROM D.R. MIRIC SAYS HE HAS HAD OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION "ON THIS MATTER" AND WOULD LIKE TO TELL RICO.

H. RICO AND MIRIC: RICO SAYS THEY ARE WAITING ON CALL FROM CAAMANO BUT IT DID NOT GO THROUGH; WILL BE TOMORROW. MIRIC SAYS APPARENTLY CAAMANO WILL NAME MEJIA AS AMB TO UN. RICO DOES NOT THI[illegible] [illegible] GOOD. MIRIC SAYS IS ALL RIGHT FOR THE STATE THEY ARE IN. MIRIC HAS THE COMMUNIQUE. DESCHAMPS GAVE IT TO RICO. THE MOST IMPORTANT PART IS TO POINT OUT THAT HARRIMAN IS LYING. MIRIC SAYS "WHAT THIS MAN IS DOING ...FOLLOWS A CAUSE AND IS DOING SOME FOOLISH THINGS.

SECRET

SECRET RECEIVED RID/MIS JUN 18 10 PM '65

IN64702 PAGE 4

DO YOU KNOW WHAT HAPPEND IN CHINA. THOUSANDS AND THOUSANDS AGAINST - AFTER BUENOS AIRES DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY." MIRIC ALSO HAS (DECLARATION) OF THE PERMANENT CMMISSION OF CONGRESS APPROVING THE CENSURE OF GOVT. BOTH RICO AND MIRIC AGREE THAT "THIS" (U.S. OCCUPATION) IS A LONG TIME AFFAIR. MIRIC SAW THE (INAUGURATION) OF CAAMANO. THINKS HE HAS PERSONALITY. RICO ASKS MIRIC IF HE KNOWS THAT CAAMANO TOLD MEJIA YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD 52,000 MORE RIFLES. MIRIC SAYS YES, THAT HE SENT IN THIS [illegible] YESTERDAY.

"THEY ARE IN THE NORTH, THEY ARE STILL IN REVOLUTIONS, THIS IZ JUST A BREATHER". MIRIC SAYS CEPAL IS UNDER THE SHADE OF THE DOMINICAN AFFAIR, THAT NOTHING IN THEIR DECISIONS IS IMPOR[illegible].

3. DISSEM AT HQS DISCRETION. SECRET

4.

INDEX TO 200-7-38/13.

SECRET

CFN

MESSAGE FORM

17 SECRET

ORIG.: W.J. Kaufman:mep
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 11 May 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: MEXICO CITY

[illegible] 19 20Z

PRIORITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: DO4, DO/N3, CA2, CA/PROP, VR, FILE

TO PRTY MEXI INFO: ~~MXDO~~ ~~[illegible]~~ CITE DIR 09328

REF: MEXI 3344 (IN 63771)

1. WE NOW PLANNING PLAY THROUGH WUINDIGO/~~SUBJECT~~ HAVA RADIO STORY OF MAY SECOND/SUPPORTED ~~XXXXXXX~~ BY PARAPHRASED PORTIONS OF MEJIA'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION TO CORD[illegible]. ALLEGED SOURCE OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WILL BE BY WUINDIGO FROM HIS REBEL CONTACTS SDOM. THIS IS TO ALERT YOU IN EVENT YOU MAY WISH TO LIVE MONITOR AT LIFEAT LP PRIOR TO POSSIBLE EVACUATION SHOULD YOU SO DESIRE AS PRECAUTIONARY ACTION.

23. WUINDIGO, KULAMP CLEARED AND WITTING PRESS ASSET WHO PUBLISHES IN CANADIAN AND BRAZ PRESS AND JUST RETURNED FROM SDOM WHERE INTERVIEWED REBELS.

END OF MESSAGE

DDP/S [illegible] O'HARA

WH/2 [illegible]

Des[illegible] FitzGerald
Chief, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 8

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☑ COPY ☐

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 2300 BY DD

INFO

VR. FILE DDP WH/C8 CA2 CA/PROP FI FI/INT2

S E C R E T 102358Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO SDOM WAVE CITE MEXI 3344

11 MAY 65 IN 63771

REFS DIR 38156 ✓

DIR 38566

TAPE UNOBTAINABLE.

S E C R E T

CFN ✓ REF INFO PLACED RADIO HANAVA.

SECRET

3[illegible] 201

MESSAGE FORM 30

SECRET

ORIG: W.J.Kaufman
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 10 May 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO:

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

OPERATIONAL
IMMEDIATE
XXXXXXXX

TO : MEXICO CITY SANTO DOMINGO JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: DDP, WH/C 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, VR, FILE

TO DP. XXXX MEXI INFO SDOM WAVE (R) CITE DIR

REF: DIR 08156 *

08566

1. HAVE LOCATED SUBJECT FBIS BROADCASTS OF 0635 GMT 2 MAY CITING ESSENTIALLY MATERIAL OF PARAS TWO AND THREE MEXI 3312 (IN 61214).

2. ADVISE PRIORITY STATION ESTIMATE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING TAPE PARA TWO REF CORDERO ALLEGEDLY MADE OF HIS TELECON WITH MEJIA.

END OF MESSAGE

*Concerned telecon between Dominican exile CORDERO in Mexico and Mejia one of 14 June party leaders in DR.

F.C. [illegible]
201–

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, WHD

C/WH/2
WH/C Kastetter in draft)

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

☒ COPY ☐ [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, CA 2, WH 7, CA/PROP,

S E C R E T 152351Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3134 EASBY ACTING

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF WAVE 0672 (IN 44349)

DIR 01750

WILL DO THROUGH AMPACA-1.

S E C R E T

~~CFN~~ RE USING QDGLF FOR SURFACING MATERIAL

Dir

16 APR 65 IN 46170

SECRET

R.G. Rincagalon del.

201-336474

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible] 1965

REPORT # CC1182

TO: [redacted]

FROM: ARCHIVES

201-336474

SUBJECT: File traces requested on RICO Galan, Victor.
(PP-20062 Mexico)

FILE DATA

RICO Galan, Victor
Spanish refugee writer, nationalized in Mexico. In Mexico defends Fidel Castro and his revolution.
Source: Newspaper "Hoy", 26 Jan 60, page 7.

Correspodent in Cuba of the Mexican magazine "Siempre" who interviewed the President of the Republic of Cuba.
Source: Newspaper "Revolucion", 6 Dec. 62 page 1.

Mexican PP-57115. Trip Mexico-Havana 5/25/63
Source: Passenger list "amigos".

Trip Mexico-Havana on 23 Jan 64. PP-Mexico 53641-Courtesy
Trip Mexico-Havana on 29 March 65. Flight 465- PP-20062 Mexico.
Tourist.
Source on these two trips: CCA passenger list.

[illegible]

Basic doc filed in 50-9-12
23 apr 65 as
UFGA 21038/12

[redacted]

201-336474

14-00000

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

7/2 SECRET

☑ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 132[illegible]32

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0672

13 APR 65 IN 44349

Dm

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF MEXI 3092 (IN 43674) ✓

HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH QDELF AND CAN HANDLE SURFACING IF MATERIAL COMPATIBLE WITH QDELF KNOWN REPORTING CRITERIA. HOWEVER VIEW FACT SURFACING ALREADY DISCUSSED WITH AMPACA-1 SUGGEST HE HANDLE MATTER IN ORDER PREVENT BLOWING TO AMPACA-1 THAT KUBARK HAS DIRECT LINK WITH QDELF.

S E C R E T ✓ RE QDELF BEST PERSON RE SURFACING.

CFN

SECRET

Rico Galan

201-33647

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

24 SECRET

GROUP 1

APR 14 8 15 AM '65

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☑ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH-8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/C-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 131813Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3309(EASBY ACTING)

PERUMEN

VICTOR RICO GALAN AND WIFE RETURNED [illegible] FROM CUBA 12 APRIL.

S E C R E T

CFN

13 APR 65 IN 44191

ACTION

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

34 **SECRET**

GROUP 1 [illegible]

☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

VR. FILE DDP, WHIC8, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS,

S E C R E T 130030Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3092 (EASBY ACTING) 13 APR 65 IN 43574 DM

MHSPAWN PBRUMEN

REF DIR 98512 (NOT SENT WAVE)

1. FYI: FOR WAVE: REF INDICATED DIR AGREEMENT THAT STORY OF ACTIVITIES OF VICTOR RICO GALAN, SIEMPRE COLUMNIST AND AMTHUG-1 AGENT, BE SURFACED.

2. BELIEVE BEST PERSON FOR REF SURFACING IF QDELF. HE IS FRIEND OF AMPACA-1 AND LATTER ALMOST POSITIVE HE CAN ARRANGE FOR QDELF TO PLAY IN HIS LATAM COLUMN. FIRST HOWEVER WISH DIR AND/OR WAVE COMMENTS AS BELIEVE KUBARK HAS MORE DIRECT CONTACT WITH QDELF. IF EITHER WAVE OR DIR CAN PASS TO HIM MEXI WILL FORWARD ROUGH DRAFT BASED ON KNOWN FACTS FOR QDELF REWRITE AND SURFACING. MEXI COULD THEN EXPOLIT LOCALLY. PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

Victor Rico-Galan

MESSAGE FORM 29

28 SECRET

ORIG : C. HALLIWELL
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 2 APRIL 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474
201-356572

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

2 APR 65 23 04z

TO : MEXI

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO R1/AN, DDP, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IA, VR, FILE, F/INT 2, FI,

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 98512

MHSPAWN PBRUMEN

REF: A. MEXI 2969 (IN 35342)

B. HMMW 12422

Carl Migdail US News & World Rpt staffer

1. TAKING ALL FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT AND IN VIEW PRESENT LIMITATIONS LIOSAGE-1 OA AS OUTLINED REF B, PREFER AVOID REF A INVOLVEMENT.

2. CONCUR TIME RIPE BURN RICO GALAN. DOES STATION HAVE ANY OTHER OUTLET AVAILABLE?

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Refs: A. L-1 on 30 Mar asked for Sta assistance in story for his mag on subversive activities Sov Bloc Cuban Embassies.
B. L-1 OA specifically limits passage classified information to him.

WH/PO/B ✓

CI/OPS (in draft) Hughes

WH/C/CA (in draft)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
CHIEF, WH/1

File Rico Galan
201-356572

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

74 ✓

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

30 SECRET

RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TYPED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT, WHC 8

ADM	FI	
RS	DESK	
ABSTRACT	✓	INDEX

SECRET 301955Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2948

JMGIN LIFIRE

30 Mar 65 IN 34215

1. LAURA MENESES AND JUAN JUARBE JUARBE ARRIVED MEXI FROM CUBA 29 MAR.

2. VICTOR RICO GALAN (MEXICAN) AND WIFE LEFT FOR CUBA 29 MARCH.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

Will be ZZ'd from Manifest

30 Mar 65

201-336474

WH/3

TOTAL COPIES 19 RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mar 4 8 23 AM '65

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	2	5	CA
2		6	C
3	/	7	
4	FI-Re	8	Reg

FROM GUATEMALA

ACTION WH8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 032130Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE GUAT 4617

13 Mar 65 IN 15127

REF: A. DIR 88485

B. GUAT 4600 (71717)

C. GUAT 4614 (71-4333) *

AT LUNCHEON 3 MARCH AT WHICH INWOOD BROUGHT DUNOON AND MINGOV SERRANO TOGETHER, INWOOD ASKED SERRANO WHAT SUPPORT GOG WOULD GIVE STATION IN RICO GALAN CASE IF MEX GOVT WERE TO DEPORT RICO TO GUAT. MINGOV AT FIRST ANSWERED COULD JAIL FOR SEVERAL MONTHS WITHOUT FANFARE, THEN PASS ON TO ANOTHER COUNTRY. LATER AGREED COULD STRETCH THIS TO SIX MONTHS. [illegible] POSSIBLILITY MINUTE OF ANY LONG TERM INCARCERATION.

SECRET

* SUSPENDED PUBLICATION OF RICO GALAN CASE.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM	GUATEMALA CITY
ACTION	WH 8
INFO	VR, FILE, CA-2, CA/PEG, FI, FI/INT [illegible], CI/OPS

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

S E C R E T [illegible]22337Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE GUAT 4614

REF: DIR [illegible]

GUAT 40[illegible] (IN [illegible])

GOG SUSPENDED ACTION ON PUBLICATION OF NICO GALAN CASE [illegible] FAR DUE TO RECENT INCIDENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED ON GUAT MEXI BORDER.

MEXI GOVT NOW INTERESTED IN TAKING [illegible] ACTION AGAINST

S E C R E T

CFN NICO GALAN

3 Mar 65 IN 14333

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 17

8 SECRET

ORIG : JOHN M. WHITTEN
UNIT : C/WH 2
EXT : 5110
DATE : 27 FEBRUARY 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1	2	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

27 FEB 65 15 57 z
PRIORITY
SIG CEN

TO : GUATEMALA CITY MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

38485

TO PRIORITY XX GUAT INFO: MEXI CITE DIR

REF GUAT 460[illegible] (IN 11717) *

1. MEXI GOVERNMENT NOW INTERESTED IN TAKING SOME ACTION AGAINST RICO GALAN, AND GUAT SURFACING OF TAPE AND OTHER CHARGES NOW MAY IMPEDE MEXICAN INVESTIGATION. REQUEST GUAT ATTEMPT DELAY PUBLICATION UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

2. GUAT PLS EXPLORE WITH GUAT AUTHORITIES POSSIBILITY OF PROSECUTING RICO GALAN SHOULD MEXICANS BY ANY CHANCE DEPORT HIM TO GUAT. MEXI PLS ADVISE IF IT FEASIBLE TO ASK MEXI AUTHORITIES TO COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS AGAINST RICO GALAN WITH GUAT GOVT, POSSIBLY THROUGH KUBARK.

END OF MESSAGE

* RE ESLOGIC-1 EFFORTS TO SURFACE RICO GALAN TAPE

WH/1

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH 2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, WH Division			MARKED FOR INDEXING
		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT Mexican Naturalization Law

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. MEXI-2594
B. MEXI-2595

1. Attached is a copy of LIELEGANT's "first draft" of a study (for LIRAMA) of the Mexican Naturalization Law -- with a view to De-Naturalization Proceedings which might be instituted against

201-336474

a. Victor RICO Galan, former Spanish citizen, Communist, who is now a naturalized Mexican citizen.

b. Arnaldo ORFILA Reynal, former Argentine citizen, who was called a Communist by LIRAMA and who is now a naturalized Mexican citizen.

2. The attached is being sent to Headquarters for information only.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Enclosure:
Study

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/encl (1 cy)

16

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-25478	26 February 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER Unknown

A

LEY DE NACIONALIDAD Y NATURALIZACION, publicada en el "Diario Oficial" de 20 de enero de 1934.

"ART. 17.- Por conducto del Juez, el interesado elevará una solicitud a la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores pidiendo su carta de naturalización y renunciando expresamente a su nacionalidad de origen, así como a toda sumisión, obediencia y fidelidad a cualquier gobierno extranjero, especialmente a aquel de quien el solicitante haya sido súbdito; y a toda protección extraña a las leyes y autoridades de México y a todo derecho que los Tratados o la ley internacional concedan a los extranjeros; protestando, además, adhesión, obediencia y sumisión a las leyes y autoridades de la República. Estas renuncias y protestas serán ratificadas en la presencia del Juez, en el caso de naturalización ordinaria.

Cuando se demuestre que el extranjero, al hacer las renuncias y protestas a que este artículo se refiere, lo ha hecho con reservas mentales, en forma fraudulenta o sin la verdadera intención definitiva y permanente de quedar obligado por ellas, quedará sujeto a todas las sanciones legales que esta misma ley o cualquiera otra disposición impongan o puedan imponer en el futuro".

ART. 18.- Si el extranjero que solicita su naturalización tiene algún título de nobleza otorgado por algún gobierno extranjero, deberá renunciar expresamente al derecho que tenga de poseerlo y usarlo.

REGLAMENTO DE LOS ARTICULOS 47 Y 48 DE LA LEY DE NACIONALIDAD Y NATURALIZACION, publicado en el "Diario Oficial" de 6 de septiembre de 1940.

ART. 4o.- La voluntad de renuncia a toda sumisión, obediencia y fidelidad a cualquier gobierno extranjero, así como la voluntad de adhesión, obediencia y sumisión a las leyes y autoridades de la República, que de acuerdo con lo prevenido en el artículo 17 de la ley debe de protestar el solicitante de la carta de naturalización, debe de ser una voluntad real, constante y efectiva.

La simulación, reserva mental o quebrantamiento de dicha voluntad, así como cualquier otro vicio invalidante de la misma, revelados por hechos anteriores o posteriores a su declaración, hacen ésta ineficaz y, en consecuencia, anulan la naturalización concedida.

Son hechos reveladores, para los efectos del párrafo anterior:

a).- La ejecución de actos contrarios a la seguridad interior y exterior del Estado;

A-71 TANMM 25478 CS COPY 201-336474 1

A

b).- La realización, en provecho de un país extranjero, de actos que fueren incompatibles con la calidad de ciudadano mexicano y contrarios a los intereses de México;

c).- El mantenimiento de relaciones de cualquier índole, - que a juicio de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores implique sumisión a un Estado extranjero, con autoridades, agrupaciones o instituciones de carácter político o público que no sean mexicanas, salvo que se trate de empresas industriales o mercantiles y el naturalizado esté dedicado a actividades similares en México;

d).- Cuando el naturalizado ingrese en asociaciones locales o nacionales que directa o indirectamente estén vinculadas a un Estado extranjero o dependan de él. Se excluyen de este precepto las sociedades mercantiles inscritas en el Registro de Comercio que tengan un carácter estrictamente civil, deportivo o cultural, sin lazos de ninguna especie con agentes extranjeros.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

32/2 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

RID ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	1	5	OA
2		6	C
3	2	7	b
4	FI [illegible]	8	[illegible]

FROM GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE CA 2, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 261535Z

26 FEB 65 IN 11717

Wayne Carley

DIR MEXI CITE GUAT 4600

REF: DIR 87826 *

1. ESLOGIC-1 EFFORTS TO SURFACE RICO GALAN TAPE HAD BEEN FRUSTRATED BY MINGOV WHO TOOK POSITION GUAT-MEXI RELATIONS COULD BE DAMAGED. HOWEVER, ON 25 FEB, DURING MEETING OF SECURITY CHIEFS WITH PERALTA, ESLOGIC-1 AGAIN RAISED QUESTION AND RECEIVED PERMISSION FROM PERALTA TO SURFACE STORY THROUGH RAFAEL ESCOBAR ARGUELLO, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION OF GOG. STORY SHOULD APPEAR IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. STATION REASONABLY CERTAIN GUAT GOVT WOULD BE HAPPY ACCEPT AND PROSECUTE RICO GALAN BUT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS SATISFACTORY SOLUTION SINCE EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT IN SUCH CASES PRISONER IS USUALLY DROPPED IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRY AFTER SHORT DETENTION. WE ARE EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES, HOWEVER, AND WILL OFFER DEFINITIVE COMMENTS IN A FEW DAYS.

S E C R E T

* REF RYBAT.

CSN

Wwc

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : WCARLEY - tvo
UNIT : C/WH/2/CICE
EXT : 6026
DATE : 25 FEBRUARY 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

27 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	rw
2		6	VE
3	CA/B	7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO Guatemala City

25 FEB 65 22 32

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 6

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 4, VR, FILE

SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR 87826

DESENSITIZED

AT LIRAMA

REFS: A) MEXI-2594 (IN 86943)

B) MEXI-2595 (IN 10056) (NOT SENT GUAT)

C) DIR-86993

FROM DAINOLD

1. OBVIOUSLY, WE READY AND WILLING ASSIST LIRAMA WHEREVER POSSIBLE AND FEASIBLE IN EFFORTS TO "DENATURALIZE" AND DEPORT INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS RICO GALAN, ARNALDO ORFILA REYNAL (AND PRESUMABLY OTHERS TO COME). HOWEVER, IT IS OUR FEELING THAT WE COULD BE OPENING PANDORAS BOX BY USING OUR INFLUENCE IN ENDEAVORING RELOCATE SUCH UNDESIRABLES IN COUNTRIES AS PERU. IT DOUBTFUL THAT PERU WOULD ACCEDE TO SUCH A REQUEST, AND IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR BEST INTERESTS TO EXILE RICO GALAN TO AN AREA WHERE HE COULD CONCEIVABLY CONTINUE TO CAUSE TROUBLE. BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE LIRAMA EFFORTS, OFFERING OUR ASSISTANCE IN COMPILING MATERIAL THAT COULD BE USED IN DENATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS, BUT POINTING OUT TO LIRAMA THAT DEPORTATION DESTINATION MUST BE WORKED OUT BY MEXI GOVT AND COUNTRY OF INDIVIDUALS BIRTH.

2. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS MIGHT BE PROBLEM SINCE RICO GALAN BORN IN SPAIN. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION, ([illegible]) MIGHT BE TO

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : McCARLEY - tvo
UNIT : C/WH/2/CICS
EXT : 6025
DATE : 25 FEBRUARY 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: INFO

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 87826

--PAGE 2--

EXTRADITE RICO GALAN TO GUAT FOR PROSECUTION ON CHARGE OF AIDING GUERRILLAS (THIS POSSIBLY WOULD BE FACILITATED BY REIMPOSITION OF STATE OF SIEGE IN GUAT 24 FEBRUARY). Feel this solution preferable to our previous suggestion in Ref C. Guat pls comment.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/2
C/WH/C/S
C/WH/CO/A

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

[illegible] KAUFMAN
C/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

2 SECRET

☐ COPY ☑ DES

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1 CA
CA-FI

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
C/WH 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SR 5, C/CA 2, C/DO 4, C/DO/H 3
C/CA/OA 2, C/FI/D 4, C/FI/INT, C/IW, (SUSPENSE 2)

S E C R E T 242010Z

24 FEB 65 IN 10056

DIR CITE MEXI 2595

DESENSITIZED

LIRRAMA LIENVOY

REF A MEXI 2587 (PG219)
B MEXI 2594 (P 6943)

1. FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL TOPICS TAKEN UP WITH LIRAMA BY LIELEGANT AND CURTIS ON NIGHT 19 FEBRUARY.

A. LIRAMA VOLUNTEERED THAT HE HAD CANCELLED THE PEMEX CONTRACT WHICH PASCUAL GUTIERREZ ROLDAN (FORMER DIRECTOR OF PEMEX) HAD SIGNED WITH THE SOVIETS. THIS CONTRACT WAS FOR EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. LIRAMA SAID THE TURBO-DRILLS WHICH HAD ALREADY ARRIVED (HE THOUGHT THREE IN NUMBER) WOULD BE THE ONLY PART OF THE CONTRACT ALLOWED.

B. LIELEGANT GAVE LIRAMA A BRIEF MEMO ON THE FONDO DE CULTURA ECONOMICA AND ITS DIRECTOR ARNALDO ORFILA REYNAL. THIS DISCUSSED BRIEFLY BY DAINOLD AND LIELEGANT ON 4 FEB. MEMO PREPARED BY STATION, TRANSLATED BY LIENVOYS. LIRAMA SAID THIS A "REAL COINCIDENCE" SINCE SOME SIX WEEKS AGO HE HAD ASKED ANTONIO ORTIZ MENA, MINISTRY OF TREASURY, TO GET RID OF ORFILA REYNAL AS DIRECTOR OF FCE "SINCE ORFILA IS A COMMUNIST".

SECRET

HE ASKED LIELEGANT TO INCULDE ORFILA REYNAL ON HIS STUDY OF "DENATURALIZATION POSSIBILITIES" AND SAID IF DENATURALIZED ORFILA REYNAL WOULD BE "RETURNED TO HIS NATIVE ARGENTINA". HE HAD ASKED THAT SALVADOR AZUELA (WHO FAVORABLY KNOWN OF BY STATION) BE PUT IN AS DIRECTOR OF FCE. HE ADDED THAT NOW, HOWEVER, PEOPLE WOULD THINK ORFILA REYNAL FIRED BECAUSE FCE PUBLISHED "THE CHILDREN OF SANCHEZ" BY OSCARR LEWIS WHICH HAS CREATED GREAT DEAL ADVERSE MEXICAN COMMENT.

C. CONCERNING THE NEWSPAPER EXCELSIOR (WHICH LIELEGANT RAISED) LIRAMA SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE FIGHT WAS BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI COMMUNISTS. HE SAID THERE WERE SOME "TOO FAR RIGHT" INCLUDING ONE OR TWO MEMBERS OF "LOS TECOS" RIGHT WING CATHOLIC GROUP. HE BELIEVED THE FIGHT FOR CONTROL OF EXCELSIORS WOULD COME OUT ALL RIGHT.

D. LIRAMA THEN MENTIONED THAT MANUEL ESPINOSA IGLESIAS AND GABRIEL ALARCON, WHO FOUNDING "EL HERALDO" NEW MEXICAN DAILY OF "RIGHT", HAVE CLAIMED THEY HAVE LIRAMA BACKING. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN ADVISED BUT WAS NOT INVOLVED. HE DESCRIBED ALARCON AS "CONTRABANDISTA" AND GANGSTER".

E. SECURITY PROCEDURES IN LIRAMA OFFICE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY.

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

34 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FEB 25 7 38 AM '65

1	1	5	D
2	2 FI	6	Key
3		7	
4	C	8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE ADDP, CI/CI, CIFI 2, DDP, DC/WH/SAS, C/CI/IC 2

SECRET 241905Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2594

RYBAT LIRAMA LIENVOY

DESENSITIZED

REF A DIR 86998

B MEXI 2587 (NOT SENT GUAT) (P6219)

24 FEB 65 IN 86943

ATTENTION DAINOLD

1. ON NIGHT 19 FEB LIELEGANT AND CURTIS MET WITH LIRAMA. LIELEGANT RAISED SUBJECT VICTOR RICO GALAN AND PASSED TO LIRAMA BRIEF BIO MEMO AND COPY OF TAPE (WHICH LIENVOY HAD TRANSCRIBED). TAPE AND MEMO GIVEN AS RESULT DAINOLD AND LIELEGANT DISCUSSION NIGHT 2 FEB AT LIELEGANT HOME. LIRAMA KEPT TAPE, TRANSCRIPT AND MEMO. HE ASKED LIELEGANT TO MAKE IMMEDIATE STUDY OF MEXI NATURALIZATION LAWS TO FIND OUT HOW RICO GALAN COULD BE "DENATURALIZED" AND THEN DEPORTED. LIRAMA ASKED CURTIS IF LATTER COULD ARRANGE FOR COUNTRY SUCH AS PERU TO ACCEPT RICO GALAN AT LEAST TEMPORARILY. LIRAMA SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT RICO GALAN WAS A DRUNKEN PHILANDERER, AND REQUESTED CURTIS INITIATE SURVEILLANCE IN ORDER OBTAIN EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD ASSIST "DE-NATURALIZATION" PROCEDURE. (FYI: STATION HAS HAD SURVEILLANCE RICO GALAN SINCE 17 FEB WITH LIEMBRACES. ALSO FYI LIFEAT OF 28 JAN REPORTS THAT

SECRET

IN 86943
PAGE 2

SECRET

Rico
IZD GALAN REQUESTED EMERGENCY LOAN OF [illegible] THOUSAND MEXICAN PESOS FROM AMRIFT-1, AS RICO GALAN WAS BROKE AFTER DRINKING SPREE AND WIFE EXPECTING SALARY MONEY. AMRIFT-1 AGREED. NOTE. THIS NOT REPEAT NOT PASSED TO MEXICANS).

2. LIRAMA ASKED TO BE ADVISED ANY FUTURE INFORMATION ON RICO GALAN ACTIVITIES. LIRAMA ALSO REMINDED LIELEGANT THAT IN HIS STUDY OF NATURALIZATION LAWS TO REMEMBER THAT RICO GALAN MEMBERSHIP IN ANY GROUP WHICH OWED ALLEGIANCE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY (SUCH AS CP) WOULD MAKE "DE-NATURALIZATION" EASIER.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

[illegible]

23 February 1965

VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-336474)

1. DPOB: 6 February 1928; El Ferrol, Spain. Subject, Spanish by birth, became a Mexican citizen by naturalisation on 15 March 1949.

2. CIVIL STATUS: Subject is married to Ingeborg DIENER de Rico.

3. ADDRESS: Providencia 930, Mexico City, D. F. Telephone number as of September 1964: 23 07 92. This phone is registered in the name of his mother-in-law, Tilli PICHLER viuda de Diener, whose address is also Providencia 930.

4.) ~~6.~~ OCCUPATION: Writer for Siempre and Politica magazines in Mexico City; both are effective Communist-lining magazines and have large circulation.

5.) ~~7.~~ PHOTOGRAPH: Available in Subject's 201 file (date of photograph October 1963). ~~approximately~~ ~~[illegible]~~

6.) ~~8.~~ POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS AND INCLINATIONS: As of 1962 Subject was the head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the National Liberation Movement (MLN) in Mexico City, a rabidly anti-U.S. and pro-Castro organization. Subject is close to Fidel Castro and company, and is ~~highly~~ considered as a Cuban "agent" (degree of Cuban control unknown). ~~[illegible]~~ Subject was a founding member of the MLN. In an article in Siempre in March 1963 he advocated the foundation of a new political party reflecting the ideology of General Lazaro Cardenas, leftist former President of Mexico. This would have provided, in his belief, the Mexican left a political organization truly responsive to the radical tendencies of the 1910 revolution. This was necessary because the MLN, whose membership covers the spectrum of Mexican Communist Party to PRI, could not take open political stands without antagonizing some of the membership. The new party would have represented a "third position", socialism in internal affairs and independence of any bloc in international affairs. With a party such as this as its political action arm, the MLN would have ~~[illegible]~~ developed naturally into a broad national movement such the FRAP in Chile. (Some specious reasoning here).

7) ~~8.~~ TRAVEL:

A) To Cuba:

1) July 1962 ; return date unknown
2) 2 October 1962; returned Mexico December 1962
3) 25 May 1963; returned Mexico 22 June 1963
4) 28 January 1964; returned Mexico 25 February 1964

B) Other:

1) Arrived Guatemala City 3 (8?) October 1963
2) Arrived Tegucigalpa 11 October 1963; left 13 October 1963
3) Arrived Managua 13 October 1963; left 17 October 1963
4) Arrived San Jose 17 October 1963; left 20 October 1963
5) Arrived Panama City 20 October 1963; left 22 October 1963
6) Arrived Caracas 22 October 1963; left 12 November 1963
7) Arrived Rio de Janeiro 12 November 1963
8) Arrived Buenos Aires 4 December 1963; left 12 December 1963
9) Arrived Santiago 12 December 1963; left 16 December 1963
10) Arrived Lima 17 December 1963
11) Arrived La Paz 17 December 1963; left 20 December 1963
12) Arrived Lima 20 December 1963
13) Departed Merida 8 January 1964
14) Arrived Santo Domingo 8 January 1964 (via Kingston); left 15 January 1964 for Mexico City (via Kingston)

Ingeborg Diener de RICO Galan, Subject's wife, traveled from Mexico to Cuba in November 1962. Subject was ~~[illegible]~~ at that time in Cuba. ~~[illegible]~~

8.) ~~10.~~ **PASSPORT:** [redacted], Subject formerly carried [redacted] "xican passport number 57115, with Cuban courtesy visas. On 9 September 1963 Subject was issued Mexican passport number 56341 (or 53641).

9.) ~~11.~~ **ACTIVITIES:** The reason for the October 1962 trip to Cuba was ostensibly to gather material for a political biography of Fidel Castro. The May/June 1963 trip was to interview Fidel Castro after his return from the Soviet Union. [redacted] Subject claimed that he had spent eight days with Fidel during that visit, five of those aboard ship.

On 24 October 1963 HYSAGE-1/ in Panama City reported that Subject had received an operational assignment from Castro (during the May/June 1963 visit to Habana) on which to travel through Central and South America. His [redacted] mission was to persuade leftist parties to immediately begin acts of sabotage and violence, and to try to maintain these in order to take pressure off Venezuela. Subject was also instructed to bring about better unity among competing leftist factions to ensure greater impact for their work. Subject did, in fact, contact many Communist Party and leftist leaders during his Central and South America travel during the period [redacted] October 1963 - January 1964. [redacted] From the (fragmentary) reporting on subject from October 1963 through January 1964 it appears that he did discuss the question of leftist unity.

10. In October 1964 the Guatemalan authorities captured a number of tape recordings from the guerrillas in operations subsequent to a guerrilla attack on a garrison in Panzos, Alta Verapaz. Included in those tapes was one made by RICO Galan for delivery to the guerrillas. It consists mainly of an exhortation for unity (among the PGT and the 13 November group) and counsel against letting doctrine replace action. The tape clearly reveals RICO to be at once a very intellectual leftist who also has his feet planted quite firmly on the ground. His approach is pragmatic, not theoretical. The text of the tape indicates that it was made sometime after February and before mid-October 1964.

11. There is little at hand to indicate what manner of man is RICO Galan. His 201 file reflects facts but not impressions. He apparently is known personally by LICOOKY-1 and LITAMIL-9 in Mexico City, and these two sources should be queried.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 32

SECRET

ORIG : WAYNE H. CARLEY

UNIT : C/WH/2/CI

EXT : 6026

DATE : 18 FEBRUARY 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO 201-336474

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : GUATEMALA CITY MEXICO CITY

☐ DESTROY
☑ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, TSD 6, FI, VR, FILE

TO GUAT INFO MEXI CITE DIR

86998

23 Feb 65

REFS: A. MEXI 2538 (IN 82883)*

B. MEXI 2393 (IN 73062)*

C. GUAT 4537 (IN 70216)*

D. GUAT 4499 (IN 61938)*

AN	FI
PB	DEST

WH/2/C

ABSTRACT X INDEX

FROM DAINOLD

1. WE ARE STILL MOST DESIROUS OF EXPLOITING RICO GALAN TAPE. DESPITE MEXI PBSWING OBJECTIONS TO SURFACING IN MEXICO, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO START BURNING RICO AND THEREFORE URGE GUAT STATION TO MAKE STRONG APPROACH TO GUAT GOVT TO SURFACE LOCALLY. PERHAPS ESPILL ONE OR EVEN PERALTA IF NECESSARY WOULD BE BETTER CHANNEL FOR THIS THAN MINCOV SERRANO. SINCE GUATS RAISED SUBJECT OF TAPE DURING RECENT MINISTERS MEETINGS, THEY PRESUMABLY WOULD BE AMENABLE NOW TO LOCAL SURFACING.

2. ONCE SURFACING ACCOMPLISHED GUAT, WE WILL BE IN POSITION TO EFFECTIVELY EXPLOIT NOT ONLY TAPE ITSELF BUT ALSO OTHER KNOWN INFO ON RICO GALAN ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT HEMISPHERE ON BEHALF CASTRO REGIME.

END OF MESSAGE

(CONTINUED)

201-336474

23 Feb 65

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1-64 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY REPRODUCTION BY OTHER [illegible] IS PROHIBITED

MESSAGE FORM

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

RECEIVED
RID/MIS

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

MAR 2 11 01 AM '65

MAR 2 9 47 PM '65

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF: INFO

TO INFO: CITE DIR

WH COMMENT: *Refs all concerned mechanics of surfacing tape recording made by RICO for message to Guatemalan guerrillas.

WH/1 Spera (in draft)

C/WH/PO/B

C/WH/PO/A

C/WH/SA/CI [illegible] (in draft)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

JOHN C. WHITTEN
C/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM: Chief of Base, Merida

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: FYI

Attached for addressees files on Subject are copies of LIHACK transcripts for 12 Feb. 1965 reporting a telephone contact between Subject and Mariano GARCIA Perez, the Cuban Consul in Merida. The contact resulted in GARCIA arranging to to visit Subject in the Panamerican Hotel in Merida. LITAU-3, the transcriber, noted that Subject appeared to be intoxicated.

Andrew F. MERTON

Attachment:
LIHACK transcripts

Distribution:
3-WHD w/att (1)
2-Mexi w/att (1)
2-Files w/att (1)

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMEA-502

DATE: 18 Feb. 65

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

Continuación día 12 de Enero de 1965.-

Llaman de la calle al Consulado de Cuba, pero se fue la corriente y no gravo nada mas que el final, donde dice ~~XX~~ Dayal a la persona que habla que pueden venir mañana Sabado de ocho y media a doce y media, por que Mariano hoy no esta en la Oficina, y ademas no es hora ya de oficina por la tarde, la persona que habla que es un hombre le dice que el llamo nada mas que para informarse, le da las gracias a Dayal y le dice que le salude a Mariano, Dayal, [illegible] nada Rico y se despiden.-

- - - - - - -

Llama desde la calle Mariano Garcia al Consulado de Cuba, le contesta Tipo, y le dice para alla voy, y le pregunta si ya llego esa persona, Mariano le dice que no ha llegado, y le pregunta si le han cambiado las dos llantas de adelante al carro, Tipo le dice que si, que la ponchada ahora quedo como repuesto y ademas le dice que las llantas que le quedan al carro son repasadas, quiere decir recubiertas, que unicamente tiene buenas buenas las dos que le han puesto, y que le han salido las llantas en mil ~~xxxxx~~ sesenta y ocho pesos, de seis capas las llantas, que esas son muy buenas, se despiden.-

- - - - - - - -

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba para la calle al Telf. 34-00 ó 31-00- es Tipo el que llama para preguntar donde vive el mecanico, el que contesto le dice usted esta hablando al Dpto. Tecnico, Tipo le dice que el mecanico que arregla ahi, no se recuerda el nombre de el, le dice que espere un momentito. Le pregunta el nombre y Tipo dice: Mariano Garcia, Calle [illegible] "A", el que esta tomando nota le dice, es en la Embajada, Tipo dice, efectivamente; y quedan en ~~xx~~ ir al Consulado de Cuba mas tarde.-

- - - - -

Llaman de la calle al Consulado de Cuba y contesta Mariano Garcia el telefono

Bueno.

Con Mariano Garcia por favor.

Si, es el que habla.

Habla Victor Rico Galan, carajo, tienes abandonados a tus amigos.

Ah como andas.

Chingado viene uno a Merida y nadie lo quiere [illegible] dar ni un carajo, se dan tanta importancia que los mando a la chingada, (habla como si estuviera borracho)

Y como andas.

Nada, ya me voy.

Ya hoy se va, vaye hombre, bueno como pudieramos hacer para verle.

Bueno si se diera una desocupadita por aqui, por que ya no tengo tiempo de nada.

Donde esta usted.

Continuacion dia 12 de Febrero de 1965.-

En el Hotel Pan Americano.

Cuanto lujo caray.

Asi somos los Rico y Galanes.

Que bueno esta eso, que bueno y en que habitacion esta.

en la ciento cinco.

En la ciento cinco....deje ver si dentro de un momentico paso por alla a saludarlo hombre.

Bueno muchas gracias.

Como no.

Entonces al ratito paso por alla.

- - - - -

Empieza dia 13 de Febrero de 1965.-

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba a la calle al Telf. 74-85- casa del Dr. Cebalic Milan, es Dayal la que llama, pero se equivoca y sale otra casa.-

- - - - -

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba a la calle al telf. 74-83- es Dayal la que llama otra vez, pero no le contesta nadie el telefono, y dice a Mariano que esta al lado de ella, creo que esa gente se fue de viaje, se oye llorar a la nina Tatiana que hace un [illegible], se cansa y cuelga el telefono.-

- - - - - -

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba a la calle, es la casa Packard Bell y es Dayal la que habla, pidiendo su direccion, le dicen que es la 59 No.517.-

- - - - - - - -

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba a la calle al telf. 75-63- ahora si esta claro pues ella lo repite mientras marca el numero en el telefono, es Dayal la que esta llamando, pero tampoco le contestan y cuelga.-

- - - - - -

Llaman de la calle al Consulado de Cuba y preguntan por Alfonso Cepeda, Mariano le dice a la joven que llama que ahi no hay ningun Alfonso Cepeda y cuelga.-

- - - - - - - - - -

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba al Telf. 25-05 Foto Omega, es Tipo el que pregunta si unas fotos que dejo ya estan, el numero 8154 es el del recibo, le preguntan si son de color o blanco y negro, Tipo le dice que son de color. Le dicen que las estan terminando de revelar, que hasta la una no estan.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible] 74
X REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM [illegible]

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
VR. FILE [illegible]

RI COPY

S E C R E T 172215Z

19 FEB 1965

DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2532

REF A MEXI 2189 (IN 60125)

B MEXI 2413 (IN 74076)

AH | ES | WH/1
REST | INDEX
ABSTRACT

16 FEB 65 IN 92000

1. ON 16 FEB COS PASSED TO LIELEGANT FOR COM COPY OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TAPE, ALONG WITH RICO GALAN BIOGRAPHY.

2. DUE OBJECTIONS DEPUTY CHIEF, [illegible], (REF B) MEXI SUGGEST ANY KUBARK OP FOR EXPLOITING TAPE BE DELAYED UNTIL STORY SPONTANEOUSLY SURFACED GUAT OR THIRD COUNTRY.

S E C R E T

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

RI COPY RI COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 16

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

CP

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

FROM Mexico City

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED FEB 5 7 43 AM '65

ACTION WH 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, CA 2,

fi
201-RICO. Galan

S E C R E T 050337Z

DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI-2413

5 Feb 65 IN 74076

REF DIR 82482

GUAT 4552 (IN 74007)

ACTING CHIEF, PBSWING, DOES NOT APPROVE. LIKES IDEA OF BURNING VICTOR RICO GALAN, BUT FEARS "REGIONAL CONSIDERATION", I.E. POSSIBILITY REF OP MIGHT EVENTUALLY CAUSE STRAIN MEXI-GUAT RELATIONS.

SECRET

CS COPY

SECRET

DD/P 5-0555

4 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Briefing of Reader's Digest Reporter

1. The Mexico City Station has been requested by the Press Office of the Embassy to assist in briefing Mr. Robert Struthers, a roving reporter of the Reader's Digest, who is preparing an article on Cuban/Communist subversion in Latin America and who has expressed displeasure that the Embassy has been unable to provide any briefing on Communist activities in Mexico and Central America.

2. Mexico City Station and WH Division feel that particularly since the Spanish edition of the Reader's Digest has a circulation of over two and one-half million copies, this is an excellent avenue for the otherwise planned surfacing of abundant information (including the existence of a tape recorded speech to Guatemalan guerrillas, recently captured) on Victor RICO Galan, an active Cuban agent and a regular contributor of the weekly leftist magazine, SIEMPRE.

3. A briefing on the activities of Victor RICO Galan and a replay of the tape has already been given officially in Guatemala during the January meeting of the Security Ministers of Central America. No press play has yet been made.

4. CA/Propaganda defers to you for a policy decision. There are no RI traces on Mr. Robert Struthers. Struthers is favorably known to Mr. Paul Chretien's office which has personality and professional data on him.

5. WH Division recommends that you release the attached cable.

Raford W. Herbert
Acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: ADDP

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FEB 5 8 28 AM '65

FROM Guatemala	
ACTION WH8	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED WH
TIME 1825	BY DD
INFO VR, FILE, CCS 2, DDP, ADDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/PEG	FEB 4 23 14 65

S E C R E T 042201Z

4 FEB 65 IN 74009

PRIORITY MEXI INFO PRIORITY DIR CITE GUAT 4552

REF: DIR 82482

CONCUR. ASSUME MEXI CAN PROVIDE ADEQUATELY BACKSTOPPED STORY AS TO HOW AUTHOR OBTAINED STORY OF RICO GALAN TAPES WHICH PLAYED AT SUPPOSEDLY SECRET CABINET LEVEL MULTI-NATIONAL MEETING.

S E C R E T

File 201 RICO

Permission GRANTED BRIEF STRUTHER.

SECRET

27

MESSAGE FORM

8 SECRET

ORIG : A. Spera
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 4 February 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA (bothPRIORITY)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, ~~WH/SA 8~~, CA 2, ~~CA/PROP~~, DO 4, DO/H 3, C/OPS, CCS 3, CI/C 2,

4 Feb 65 18 28z
PRIORITY
SIG CEN

TO MEXI (PRIORITY) INFO GUAT (PRIORITY) CITE DIR 82482

REF: MEXI 2393 (IN 73062)*

201-RICO Galan

SUBJECT TO GUAT CONCURRENCE, AND BECAUSE BRIEFING IS AT EXPRESS REQUEST OF EMBASSY PRESS OFFICE, PERMISSION GRANTED BRIEF STRUTHER PER REF AND ~~IF~~ Sp

Sp ~~[illegible]~~ UNDER EMBASSY COVER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Reference deals with the already planned surfacing of abundant information available on Victor RICO Galan, an active Cuban agent. Station has been requested by the Press Office of the Embassy to assist in briefing Mr. Robert STRUTHERS, reporter for Reader's Digest and believes this to be excellent opportunity.

AC/WH/1 Spera
WH/POB/Kent (draft)
C/WH/2/Whitten (draft)
WH/SA/CI/Swenson (draft)

Richard Helms
Richard Helms
DD/P

T H Karamessines
ADDP

Raford W. Herbert
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FROM

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, [illegible]

S E C R E T 031940Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2595

REF A DIR 74762

B MEXI 2189 (60/25)

C GUAT 4957 [illegible]

IN 73062

1. MR ROBERT STRUTHERS, ROVING REPORTER FOR READER'S DIGEST, PRESENTLY MEXI GATHERING MATERIAL FOR DIGEST ARTICLE ON CASTO-COMMIE SUBVERSION LATAM. HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH PBSWING PRESS OFFICE, AND HAS EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE THAT THEY UNABLE PROVIDE ANY SIGNIFICANT BRIEFING ON CUBAN ACTIVITIES MEXI AND CENTRAL AMERICA. ON MORNING 3 FEB PRESS OFFICE APPEALED TO STATION TO GIVE BRIEFING TO STRUTHERS, "WHO HAS BECOME PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM".

2. ROUTINELY STATION ATTEMPTS AVOID CONTACT WITH NEWSMEN ALREADY IN CONTACT WITH PBSWING. IN THIS INSTANCE, HOWEVER, REQUEST PRIORITY HQS PERMISSION PROVIDE BRIEFING TO STRUTHERS. THIS APPEARS BE PERFECT OPPORTUNITY SURFACE STORY VICTOR RICO GALAN. FOLLOWING APPEARS PERTINENT:

A. TAPE SURFACED GUAT (SEE REF C).

B. AT LEAST SOME SEGMENTS GOM ALREADY AWARE RICO GALAN STATUS AS CASTRO AGENT. [illegible] INFORMED [illegible] CURTIS

SECRET

LIGHT 2 YEA THAT RICO GALAN WAS PAID CASTRO AGENT, AND EXISTENCE OF TAPE KNOWN. SAID HIS SOURCE WAS GUAT COMMIE JORGE FLESH).

C. DIGEST (ESPECIALLY ITS SPANISH EDITION) BEST POSSIBLE PUBLICATION TO SURFACE STORY. ITS STEMENDOUS PRESTIGE MEXI WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY MAKE GOM MOST CONCERNED ANY REVELATIONS IN ITS PAGES.

D. STATION HAS SEVERAL EXCELLENT REPORT FROM LINLUCK ON RICO GALAN, AND LINLUCK PLEADS THAT INFO BE PASSED TO PBPRIME NEWSMAN.

E. STATION CAN BRIEF STRUTHERS EFFECTIVELY THIS INSTANCE WITHOUT SLANTING STORY ANY WAY. AND STATION CAN ASSURE HIM OF AUTHENTICITY OF RICO GALAN STORY.

F. STATION HAS SUFFICIENT INFO IN FILES ON RICO GALAN TO LAUNCH HARD-HITTING CAMPAIGN AGAINST HIM AND "SIEMPRE" MAGAZINE ONCE GENERAL FACTS APPEAR IN DIGEST.

3. IN SUMMARY, BELIEVE THIS EXCELLENT CHANCE CARRY OUT OBJECTIVES OF REF B. PLS ADVISE PRIOR 1800 MEXI TIME 4 FEB, AS STUTHERS PLANS DEPART MEXI SOONEST.

S E C R E T

Rico Galan is key Castro agent

.ASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Guatemala

ACTION WH-8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO. RR. FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CA-2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, DDP, WH/A-?

S E C R E T 292325Z

30 JAN 65 IN 70216

DIR MEXI CITE GUAT 4537

REF: GUAT 4499 (IN 61938) *

FROM CORRIGAN

DURING 29 JAN SESSION OF MIN OF GOVT AND SECURITY MEETING MIN SERRANO OF GUAT ANNOUNCED HE HAD AN INTERESTING RECORDING TO PLAY FOR PARTICIPANTS OF MEETING. PROCEEDED TO PLAY 15 MINUTES OF RICARDO GALAN TAPE. LITTLE REACTION BY MINISTERS EXCEPT TO SAY IT VERY INTERESTING. SERRANO HAS OFFERED TO COPY THE TAPE FOR ANY MINISTER SO DESIRING COPY. NO INDICATION ANY REQUESTED COPY.

S E C R E T

CFN

* IF HQS CONCURS STA CAN CONTACT MINGOV AND REQUEST GOG [illegible] [illegible] LOCALLY

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	J. Halliwell		[illegible]
2	WH/2/GUAT/[illegible]		[illegible]
3	WH/1/LEHMAN		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Re Victor Rico Galan —

Perhaps you can use him in the anti-[illegible] campaign. Did he ghost write this for the Russians? Did we [illegible] him in to Guat? Is [illegible] a pseudo for Rico Galan? I have never heard of [illegible]

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[illegible]	[illegible]

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☑	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-61

months hence. On completing the training course, most of them will work on laying the transmission line or erecting [illegible] stations.

In an interview to the Cairo Al-Akhbar the Minister for the Aswan High Dam, Sidki Soliman, has named four gains which the Aswan project has already brought the country.

The filling of the reservoir has begun, and it now contains over 5,000 million cubic metres of water. By the end of the year this amount will be doubled. This enables new irrigation to be undertaken.

The danger of flood disasters has been permanently removed. Last year showed that the dam can control even the highest Nile waters.

The old Aswan power plant, 4 miles below the High Dam, now operates without seasonal fluctuations.

Valuable forces have been trained on the project, people have been taught skills and responsibility. Many who got their schooling on the High Dam are now doing a good job elsewhere.

Back in Cairo from Aswan, I went to the Ministry of Irrigation to find out just how the water made available by the High Dam will be used. Over the [illegible] years beginning with 1965, [illegible] the cultivated area will be expanded by [illegible] feddans (a feddan is 1.038 acres), making [illegible] feddans of new land by 1972. In addition, 500,000 feddans are going to get perennial [illegible] of the present more primitive irrigation, so that they will produce [illegible] crops a year.

Seeing that the total cultivated area of the U.A.R. is only something over 6 million feddans, Aswan's tremendous importance for Egypt's agriculture stands out very clearly. And while the present construction project will take another five years to complete, the [illegible] will already harvest this summer the first crop from new lands.

SEBASTIAN KANELL

With Guatemala's Guerilla Fighters

"HERE'S a rifle and bullets for you. You'll need them if we encounter the enemy. We probably won't; we're following secret trails known to us alone and, anyway, the soldiers rarely come up into the mountains. Still, you've got to be ready for battle at any moment. Your life depends on it now. Our rule is: every man has to be able to defend himself. That means he has to have a rifle. . . ."

Those were the first words I heard from a patrol of the Edgar Ibarra guerrilla detachment. That was at six o'clock of a November morning last year. To meet the patrol my guide and I had climbed all night [illegible] to the top of the first foothills of the Sierra de las Minas mountains. My guide also considered himself a guerrilla. He is a member of one of the [illegible] in many of the [illegible] on the [illegible]. I met him at an [illegible] and from there he [illegible] to the rendezvous with the guerrillas.

We reached the place ahead of time and met the guerrillas only a few minutes later. I learned afterwards that the patrol had arrived earlier and had been watching to make certain that nobody was following us.

The patrol consisted of five men. There were a doctor, two peasants and a student under the command of a young man who only yesterday had also still been a student. Despite his youth he has already proven himself a staunch revolutionary. All were well outfitted and well armed: tommy guns, rifles, full cartridge belts, pistols, hand grenades—all "gifts" of the enemy, as the guerrillas call their trophies. Looking at their weather-beaten, emaciated faces I could see that their life in the mountains must be pretty rugged.

After a cold breakfast—no fire was made for safety's sake—my guide started back for the village and we went on to join the detachment. It was a three-days' march. We climbed up and down dozens of hills and steep peaks, blazed a trail through virgin forest. Giant trees fifty metres tall and two or three metres in girth such as I'd seen before only in [illegible]. We even saw a quetzal, the rare bird that is the symbol of our freedom and which cannot survive in captivity. We waded across rushing mountain streams, some of them [illegible] because of the rotting trees along their banks.

We kept to a strict regime on the way. Rising with the sun, we rolled up our hammocks, put our kits in order, breakfasted and resumed our trek. At noon we stopped for dinner and then marched on until five or six in the evening, leaving time to choose a camping place, hang up our hammocks and make a meal before dark. Suppers were our time for

27 Jan. 1965

long [illegible] about the detachment, [illegible] situation in the country, memories of "civilian" life, of families and friends. We reached the detachment's camping grounds towards evening of the third day. That day we had a hot meal. It was my first "guerilla" dinner—soup, roast squirrel (very tasty, I must say) and, of course, coffee. I spent several days with the guerillas, learning to know these brave patriots, their habits, aspirations, ideals and plans.

• • •

The commander of the detachment—for understandable reasons I omit his name—is a 23-year-old officer, who after graduating from the Military Academy, attended a Yankee-run "anti-guerilla warfare" training centre. His patriotic feelings moved him to go over to the side of the people and devote himself heart and soul to the struggle for their interests. Before joining the guerillas he was one of the leaders of the Alejandro de Leon November 13th Movement (so named in honour of an armed uprising in November 1960 of a group of democratically-minded officers against the venal Ydigoras Fuentes government; the uprising was suppressed and Alejandro de Leon, one of the insurgent officers who continued the struggle, was later killed by secret police agents). The detachment commander, [illegible], has very energetic and kindly-looking [illegible]. He is well loved and respected both by his comrades-in-arms and by the people of the nearby villages. The "rural commissioners"—the venal military police agents—hate him intensely.

It is more than a year now that the detachment has been in the mountains. Its members come from various parts of the country: from the capital, from Escuintla and other cities, from the Verapaz, Santa Rosa, Zacapa and Izabal provinces. They are workers and peasants, students, craftsmen and small merchants—men of different intellectual levels (some only learned to read and write in the detachment), different walks of life, occupations and political views and different religious faiths. Their ages range from 20 to 50. But whether [illegible] or Protestant, Communist or non-Party, all of them are united by an ardent desire to rid the country of its age-old backwardness and foreign monopoly domination.

The detachment has taken the name of Edgar Ibarra, a popular student leader. Besides being a leader of the United Front of Guatemalan Students, Ibarra was a member of the Communist youth organization and the Union of Patriotic Working Youth. Everywhere, in the university, in street demonstrations, in clashes with the police, he infused a revolutionary spirit into the student struggle. One of the first civilians to join the guerilla forces, he was killed in one of the battles fought by the Alaric Bennett detachment. Now the detachment named after him and the Alaric Bennett have joined with other guerilla groups to form a single whole—the Armed Rebel Forces.

From the first the Edgar Ibarra guerillas combined their military operations with work among the peasants of the neighbouring villages. They began to help them with their hard work and to teach reading and writing to whole families. This has won them the solid support of the peasants. While I was with the guerillas, one of them [illegible] a young peasant [illegible] over the [illegible] and proudly: "Here is the detachment [illegible]. We have a [illegible] station [illegible] in our house—it will come in useful."

• • •

Rio Hondo is a vital populated point in Zacapa department, in the northeast. The railway crossing the country from west to east and running to Santo Tomas and Puerto Barrios, the ports via which all Guatemala's foreign trade is conducted, passes a few kilometres away from it. The Atlantic Route, linking the capital with these ports, also passes it. Just outside it are the dam and the main installations of the Rio Hondo hydroelectric station, which supplies current to the Izabal, Zacapa and Chiquimula departments. Large army and police forces always guard this vital zone. A military unit and a police detachment are permanently quartered in Rio Hondo. Through surveillance and persecution, arrests and torture the government seeks to keep in check the discontent of the people in this part of the country. Nevertheless, it is here, in the east, that the guerilla movement is spreading.



One of the guerilla commanders told me about an operation the detachment carried out in Rio Hondo:

"We based the operation on detailed information gathered by our contacts in the village over many days and then carefully analyzed. It concerned the exact location of our targets, the approaches to the power plant and the village. We drew a detailed map of the locality and a [illegible] of the [illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] plan.

[illegible] was [illegible] the [illegible] several hours and held a meeting [illegible] the struggle to the [illegible]. [illegible] for it wouldn't be [illegible] [illegible] action, [illegible] would have [illegible] something like a rehearsal."

"But the [illegible] day we stopped [illegible] This was [illegible] The two activities were [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] and [illegible] to occupy the village and hold it [illegible]. That would inform the people of the area of the [illegible]."

A [illegible], formerly a small shopkeeper in [illegible], told me how the second part of the plan worked out:

"The lorry [illegible] the village. It was a [illegible] [illegible] one paid any attention when we stopped at the [illegible]. One group of us [illegible] the deputy police chief [illegible] the police-men present [illegible] arms [illegible] [illegible]

patrolled by a [illegible]. Our [illegible] to ask a [illegible] what [illegible]. The idea of [illegible] [illegible] to retreat. In this [illegible] the [illegible] cut the telegraph and telephone lines. And so before leaving the village we rode through it on the lorry and shouted out patriotic slogans.

"Later," continued Pastor, "we learned of the results of our operation. A detachment of 50 soldiers led by another deputy police chief was sent out in pursuit of us. Nearly every inhabitant of Rio Hondo was questioned. But neither these people [illegible] [illegible] weaken the [illegible] [illegible] stationed in this area."

[illegible]

* * *

[illegible]

In next week's NEW TIMES

Economist A. I. Kashkarov discusses the social consequences of automation;

Writer Stefan Heym describes his visit to Cyprus.

north from coffee plantations, runs a highway over which everything from coffee to minerals is transported. From Panzos cargoes are shipped via Polochic and Dulce rivers and Lake Izabal to Santo Tomas and Puerto Barrios, there to be transferred to American ships. Panzos was the site of another operation carried out by the Edgar Ibarra detachment. The guerillas occupied it and then retreated without bearing any losses.

The government was compelled to issue an official announcement that "malefactors" had seized a considerable quantity of arms and that troops had been sent out after them with orders to bring them back "dead or alive." This official announcement was significant. Until then the government had denied the existence of a guerilla movement in Guatemala, now its existence was recognized as a fact.

Much as they wished to, the authorities could not conceal the fact that a battle had been fought in Panzos between guerillas and the local garrison, in which the garrison had suffered losses. Besides, the guerillas captured a group of government soldiers in Panzos and, as in Rio Hondo, explained before releasing them: "It's not you we are fighting. You are poor men like ourselves. You have the same hopes we have. We are fighting the oppressive regime set up in our country by a handful of army colonels in the interests of the Yankees."

Whenever the opportunity offers the guerillas explain the aims of their struggle to the soldiers of the regular army. These aims are set forth in detail in the Manifesto issued by the Armed Rebel Forces in November 1964. Contained in it are these lines: "We want a real revolution, not merely change of government. It is not a matter of replacing one set of rulers by another, for then the people would only continue to be mistreated, as has repeatedly been the case in the history of Guatemala. It is a matter of the fundamental renovation of the republic."

The guerilla propaganda, it must be said, falls on fertile soil.

• • •

When I left the guerillas, I heard in farewell these words from our national anthem: "Win or die." The words are now the battle cry of the Armed Rebel Forces. Back in the city I plunged once again into the activities of the underground resistance movement, but there stayed with me the memory of the men of the Edgar Ibarra detachment, the soldiers of the front of a battle against the oppressors of my people.

Guatemala
December 1964

Answers to Readers' Questions

The Soviet Union's Diplomatic Relations

N. H. Kosilatets of Khodorov, Lvov Region, and other New Times readers have written in to ask what countries the Soviet Union maintains diplomatic relations with.

• • •

By January 1 this year the Soviet Union had established diplomatic relations with 95 countries. Seventy-three of them have diplomatic missions in Moscow. The Soviet Union maintains diplomatic missions in 81.

The following is the list:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia,* Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica,* Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Denmark, Dominican Republic,* Ecuador,* Ethiopia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, German Federal Republic, Ghana, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala*, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korean People's Democratic Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua*, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Rumania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia (diplomatic relations established in 1926 but later not maintained), Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

---

* No diplomatic missions have been exchanged.

ORIG : Alan N. Hall
UNIT : WH/2 Guat
EXT : 5801
DATE : 19 Jan 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM

15

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

19 JAN 65 15z
ROUTINE
SIGNED

TO : GUATEMALA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8 INFO CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, VR, FILE

TO GUAT INFO MEXI CITE DIR 78736

REF: GUAT 4499 (IN 61738)*

CONCUR PARA TWO REF. NO NEED TO USE UNILATERAL ASSETS TO SURFACE RICO GALAN TAPES IN GUAT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Since the Rico Galan tapes were acquired from the Guatemalan Army and permission to release them to the Mexican Government was requested ~~[illegible]~~ by the Station and granted by the Guatemalan Government, the Station points out that it might be insecure to surface them in Guatemala using unilateral Station assets.

WH/SA/CI A. HORN (By Phone)
WH/FI
WH/POA
WH/1

DESMOND FITZGERALD
Chief WH

RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN M. WHITTEN
Chief, WH/2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM GUATEMALA

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

VR. FILE CA 2, CA/PROP, WH/SA 2, VR, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 181622Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE GUAT 4499

18 Jan 65 IN 61938

REF: DIR 78064 *

1. STATION SUGGESTS HQS CONSIDER SECURITY ASPECTS INVOLVED SURFACING STORY RICO GALAN TAPES IN GUAT. ACTING ON HQS INSTRUCTIONS STATION OBTAINED PERMISSION GOG FOR MEXI PASS TAPES AND TRANSCRIPTS TO GOG. GOG, THEREFORE, AWARE NOT ONLY THAT KUBARK HAS TAPES BUT DESIRES EXPLOIT THEM. STATION FEELS STRONGLY THAT LOCAL SURFACING BY STATION ASSETS WOULD IMMEDIATELY EXPOSE KUWOLF MECHANISMS TO GOG.

2. ON OTHER HAND, IF HQS CONCURS, STATION CAN CONTACT MINGOV AND REQUEST GOG SURFACE STORY LOCALLY. DUE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS GOG MAY BE RELUCTANT HENCE STATION CANNOT GUARANTEE SURFACING. ALSO SUGGEST POSSIBILITY GOG WILL BECOME AWARE KUBARK ASSETS OTHER AREAS IF AND WHEN STORY EXPLOITED IN HEMISPHERE.

3. REQUEST HQS ADVISE RE PARA 2.

4. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

CFN * CONCERNED SURFACE TAPES THAT.

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH 2
6110
16 JAN 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

16 JAN 65 11 Z

TO MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF WH 8 INFO VR FILE, DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/PROP

MEXI GUAT INFO CITE DIR 78064

REF MEXI 2139 (IN 60125)

CONCUR MEXI SUGGESTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

In ref, Mexico City suggested that the tapes of Rico Galan addressing Guat guerillas be surfaced in Guatemala City instead of in Mexico as part of the AMHUG material.

WH 1 Mr. Fraenkel in draft
WH/SA/CI Mr. Tausing by phone

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH 2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

24 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 6

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

VR. FILE FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OPS, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H3

S E C R E T 150040Z 15 JAN 65 60125

DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2189

AMMUG LINLUCK

REF DIR 74762

GUAT 4479 (IN 55652)

1. STATION HAS REVIEWED REF TAPE WHICH HANDCARRIED MEXI BY LUND. REQUEST HQS CONCURRENCE THAT TAPE NOT RPT NOT BE PASSED GOM WITH AMMUG REPORT. REQUEST BASED ON FOLLOWING:

A. MEXI STATION IS CERTAIN THAT REPORT ON VICTOR RICO GALAN SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE OF TAPE WILL BE PUT INTO DEEP FREEZE BY GOM. ANY ACTION TAKEN BY GOM WILL BE LIMITED TO INCREASED COVERAGE RICO GALAN ACTIVITIES. GOM WILL CERTAINLY NOT SURFACE ANY INFORMATION WHICH WILL GIVE GOG OPPORTUNITY DESCRIBE MEXI AS BASE FOR ANTI-GOG SUBVERSION.

B. VICTOR RICO GALAN IS TOP WRITER FOR "SIEMPRE", EXCELLENT MEXI MARXIST PUBLICATION WHICH IS PRIME STATION DENIGRATION TARGET. IF KUBARK WOULD SPONSOR THIRD-COUNTRY EXPLOITATION MAGAZINE AS WELL AS RICO GALAN WOULD SUFFER.

C. LINLUCK HAS JUST PASSED TO STATION DETAILED EXPOSE MEXI BASED SUPPORT TO GUAT GUERRILLAS, WHICH SINGLES OUT RICO GALAN

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET 1N60125
PAGE 2

PREACHING FROM "SIEMPRE" PODIUM. THIS PIECE COULD DOVETAIL SMOTHLY IN USE REF RICO GALAN GUAT ACTIVITIES.

D. REF TAPE AS EXAMPLE EXISTING EVIDENCE OF A MEXICAN (RICO GALAN IS SPANISH-BORN BUT NATURALIZED) INTERFERING IN GUAT INTERNAL POLITICS PROVIDES KUBARK ~~W H~~ WITH OPPORTUNITY FOR PSYCH OP WHICH WILL COMPLEMENT AMMUG REPORT AND WHICH GOM CANNOT DUCK, PRESUMING SURFACING IN THIRD COUNTRY.

2. SUGGEST HQS AND GUAT CONSIDER FOLLOWING: THAT REF RICO GALAN ACTIVITIES AGAINST GOG BE SURFACED GUAT, INCLUDING STATEMENT THAT TAPE EXISTS. THAT HQS THEN ARRANGE PASS SPLENDID LINLUCK MATERIAL (WHICH ALREADY PREPARED IN FORM OF NEW STORY) TO PBPRIME JOURNALIST. LATTER WOULD THEN COMBINE TWO STORIES, PAINTING RICO GALAN AS MASTER PBRUMEN AGENT OPERATING FROM MEXICAN SOIL. [illegible] ~~THIS STORY~~ THIS STORY COULD THEN BE EXPLOITED THROUGHOUT HEMISPHERE CAUSING EMBARRASSMENT TO GOM, WHICH WOULD THEN BE ALMOST FORCED TAKE ACTION AGAINST RICO GALAN AND POSSIBLY "SIEMPRE". (AND AT THAT TIME THERE NO REASON STATION COULD NOT PASS REF TAPE TO GOM TO RELIEVE ANY DOUBTS IT MIGHT HAVE CONCERNING RICO GALAN'S COMPLICITY WITH PBRUMEN).

3. IN SUMMARY, SUGGEST THAT PASSED AS PART OF AMMUG REPORT

SECRET

SECRET

IN 60125
PAGE 3

THIS RED HOT RICO GALAN REPORT WILL ONLY BE SWEPT UNDER RUG BY GOM. A PARA TWO TYPE OP HOWEVER WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE INTENSE PSYCH IMPACT IN BOTH MEXI AND GUAT, AND MIGHT WELL FORCE GOM INTO ACTION COMPATIBLE WITH AIMS OF AMMUG SURFACING.

4. REQUEST DIR AND GUAT COMMENTS.

S E C R E T

CFN.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

W4/6-1 [illegible]-64

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
Sato Vazquez, Antonio

5. ANALYST
TS

6. DATE PROCESSED
22 Mar 61

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
2. RI FILE NO.
3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
4. DATE
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
8. DATE OF INFO.
9. EVALUATION
10. DISSEMINATED IN
11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION
14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/CA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER CA# 90192

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-290544

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-38)

14-0000

INS name trace
16 Dec '66
Subject: Soto-Vazquez, Antonio

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA

FROM: (Division) SOD (Case officer) W. Wainwright (Extension) 4475

SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used): SOTO-Vasques, Antonio

NAME SHOWN IS: ☒ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☐ CRYPT

CI/OA NO.: 90193

201 NO.: 294544

PROJECT: WITHRUSH

DATE OF BIRTH: 20 August 1934

PLACE OF BIRTH: Naya, Cuba

AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD: ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

1. It is requested that OA on Subject be canceled as he is of no further operational interest to this office.

   Thank you for your assistance in this case.

2. Green List Name Check canceled as of this date.

DATE: 3 September 1966

SIGNATURE: William E. Wainwright

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-55 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 35

59 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION
SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C8, AF7, DDP/AIR

S E C R E T 190955Z

19 DEC 65 IN 17808

DIR WAVE CITE LEOP 3043

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PERUMEN

FOLL IS ITINERARY OF CECILIO PADRON AND ANTONIO SOTO. BOTH MEN HAVE SAME SCHEDULE UP TO NEW YORK: DEPT LEOP 16 DEC VIA SABENA FOR ATHENS; 17 DEC ATHENS TO MADRID; 17-20 DEC MADRID; ARRIVE NEW YORK 20 DEC. PADRON ARRIVES MIAMI 22 DEC. SOTO ARRIVES MIAMI 20 DEC. NOTE: WITH DEPARTURE OF SOTO WITHRUSH HAS THREE HELICOPTERS BUT ONLY ONE PILOT.

S E C R E T

CFN

3043 CECILIO PADRON ANTONIO SOTO NEW YORK 16 DEC VIA SABENA ATHENS 17 DEC ATHENS MADRID 17-20 DEC MADRID NEW YORK 20 DEC PADRON MIAMI 22 DEC SOTO MIAMI 20 DEC SOTO WITHRUSH

BT

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, KUCURL, Chief, JMWAVE

INFO.
Chief, Africa Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

SUBJECT
WITHRUSH/Antonio SOTO Y VASQUES and Cecelio Juan PADRON SANCHEZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
For your information and such action with ODURGE as you deem appropriate.

1. Attached is a self-explanatory Memorandum for Record concerning the above captioned individuals.

2. On 15 December, Ernesto Despaigne, the administrative officer, confronted these men with the information in the attached memorandum. Both men admitted that they forged the passports themselves for the purpose of obtaining a visitors visa to Spain. They also claim that an unidentified friend in Miami sent these passports to them.

3. Both men have been told that their action in forging these passports was a very serious matter, particularly so since they are not yet PBPRIME citizens. Sufficeth to say both were shaken considerably over the prospect that we might make the attached information available to ODURGE.

4. To the extent possible, JMWAVE is requested to inform future contractees that if they commit such acts while on duty in the Congo they will be relieved of their jobs.

Patrick T. RICANDA

Attachment:
Memo for Record dtd 14 Dec 65

Distribution:
Orig + 1 - C, KUCURL, w/att
1 - C, JMWAVE, w/att
1 - C, AF, w/o att.

ES Copy filed 201-294544 File in 201-287481

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
ACLA-3274

DATE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Antonio SOTO Y VASQUES 201-294544

Cecelio Juan PADRON SANCHEZ 201-287481

1. On the afternoon of 14 December Colonel Touart, Defense Attache, called me to say that the Spanish Embassy Charge, Varella, had called him about SOTO and PADRON who were pilots for F.A.C. and who were applying for visas to Spain. VARELLA questioned the validity of their passports, which were Cuban, and which, according to VARELLA, were renewed 7 June 1965 for SOTO and 26 August 1965 for PADRON. The renewal stamp [illegible] they were renewed in Havana, Cuba. TOUART asked me about this and I told him I knew nothing about it and whether the Spanish Embassy gave them visas or not was of no concern to me.

2. On 14 December TOUART came back to see me saying he had seen both passports because VARELLA had been over to see him about the matter. TOUART said that VARELLA was perturbed about these two and remarked a number of times about the incompetence of KUBARK to permit men in their employ to have such phony documents. (NOTE: I also gathered that TOUART was a little gleeful also at what he thought was poor handling of personnel on our part.) TOUART asked what he should do. I told him not to do anything and deny any knowledge of these men. Also, if VARELLA did not want to issue a visa to these men, we could care less. TOUART, I gather, imagines himself as the great go-between to help out his Spanish brethren. I told TOUART I would look into the matter from our own interests but that was none of VARELLA's business, and the less we become involved the better.

3. TOUART said that VARELLA brought the passports over to him this morning and he copied the following information from the passports:

Antonio SOTO Y VASQUES, Cuban passport number 38126, dated 7 June 1965 at Havana, Cuba

SOTO U.S. address: 379 E. 64th Street, Hialea, Florida
Also has U.S. Immigration Form I-512 dated May 26, 1965

SUBJECT: Antonio SOTO Y VASQUES - Cecelio Juan PADRON SANCHEZ

Cecelio Juan PADRON SANCHEZ - Cuban passport number 46128
issued at Havana, Cuba - 26 August 1965.

U.S. address: 2040 N.W. Flagler Avenue, Apt. 4, Miami
I-512 Form dated March 15, 1965

4. A review of the records of these men revealed the following:

a. SOTO - Arrived Leopoldville from Miami on 31 May 1965. If above information correct, SOTO obtained a Cuban passport after his arrival here because the alleged date of his passport is 7 June 1965, one week after his arrival in Leopoldville.

b. PADRON - Arrived Leopoldville 17 March via Pan Am. His Cuban passport, according to TOUART, was dated 26 August 1965, five months after his arrival here.

5. I will investigate through Ernesto DESPAIGNE because it may be that they have purchased passports after arrival here.

201

SECRET

201 No. 294544

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/AB/OPS/3 -- Larry Murphy

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of __________ SOTO Vasquez, Antonio ____, for the purpose specified in your request dated ___ 8 December 1965 ___.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 14 December 1965 jab

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(9)

FORM 11-64 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

SECRET

21 Dec 65

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

*1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is **not** to be shown to the subject.*

2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 13d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.

3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.

4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.

5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM

Antonio SOTO Vazquez

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I

CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Subject submitted job application to Roberto Mecell (principal agent, WIGRUSH, Miami, Fla.) on 25 March 1965 for job as WIGRUSH pilot.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible case officer. A knowledge of Spanish and aviation would be most helpful.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

George N. Kohl known to Subject as Donald Saunders.

SECRET

SECTION II	**MOTIVATION AND CONTROL**

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Financial, desire to maintain flight status, and to a lesser degree, political (anti-Castro, anti-communist).

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

No real control exists over subject other than financial. His resident alien status could offer a factor of control if authorization were granted for this maneuver.

SECTION III	**COVER**

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS: The principal agent represents himself as an employee of the WAVE case officer, who in turn is documented as an agent of the Gov't of the Republic of the Congo. However, although no [illegible] Govt interest is overtly manifested, it is realistic to assume that subject suspects U.S. Govt collusion in, if not outright sponsorship of the oper[illegible]

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

NA

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

In all probability subject is or will become aware that the GOC [illegible] program is under sponsorship by [illegible]

SECTION IV	**INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING**

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

None known.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Probably wife.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None known.

SECTION V	**COLLABORATION POTENTIAL**

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

None.

SECRET

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

NA

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

NA

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

NA

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

As a pilot only.

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E., TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject under ostensible contract to GDC, although presumably he knows the project is being sponsored by the U.S. Government.

SECRET

SECTION IX	**QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS**

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

He is a qualified fixed-wing and helicopter pilot.

SECTION X	**COMMITMENTS**

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject's contract calls for base pay of $800 per month, $10 per flight hour over sixty hours, $10 per flight hour which is considered hazardous. Contract additionally contains life insurance up to $40,000.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

None Known.

SECTION XI	**CE AND SECURITY**

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

JMWAVE Station, FBI, INS, Credit, Miami Police and Hqs files.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

None.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED. Yes, POA	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED 11 May 1963

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject believed reliable with no known adverse character traits. No known security problems to date.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

None.

SECTION XII	**SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS**

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

No known excessive habits.

SECRET

SECTION XIII — AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

aviation.

SECTION XIV — GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Mainly Central American countries.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

PRQ Part I supplied by subject; Part II by check of files by case officer.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (Also see para. 43b, supra)

None

SECTION XV — EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/WI WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

NA

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

DATE 2 Dec 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 23 November 1965 jab

TO: SOD/AB/OPS/3 -- Larry Murphy

C NO.: 201 - 294544

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
XX	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired on 21 November 1965. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

PRQ II Sent 2 Dec 65

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 75

SECRET

51

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1 2 3 4 5 6

UNIT TIME BY

FROM JMWAVE
ACTION SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
INFO FILE, VR, AF 2, WH/C 8, DDP/AIR,

S E C R E T 122116Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7283

12 Nov 65 IN 93714

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH FBRUMEN

REF LEOP 2232 (IN 93070)

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS

1. AS SOP SINCE NOV 62, ALL PILOTS LICENSES ARE CHECKED FOR

VALIDITY AND CURRENCY. IF NOT CURRENT, THIS IS SUBJECTS

RESPONSIBILITY ENTIREL PREVIOUS KUBARK INTERCESSION TO ASSIST

(R. GARCIA, ROJAS, SOTO, VALLICERGO) CAUSED KUCURL REP TO ADVISE

LORENTZ NOT REPEAT NOT TO PROMISE ANY ASSISTANCE. PIEDRA (P)

CASE WAS SPECIFIC EXAMPLE WHEREBY SUBJECT WAS ADVISED DIRECTLY

THAT NO KUBARK HELP WOULD BE GIVEN. (P) APPARENTLY UNDERSTOOD

AND CLAIMED HE WOULD HANDLE THRU FRIEND IN SAN JUAN.

2. IF LEOP SOP THAT VALID AND APPROPRIATE FAA LICENSE ARE

NOW REPEAT NOW NECESSARY FOR WITHRUSH FLYING, PLS ADVISE.

3. FYI: (P) RECEIVED FAA CLASS I PHYSICAL AT OUR EXPENSE

PRIMARILY FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES NOT FOR LICENSING PURPOSES.

S E C R E T

PIEDRA REQUESTED NO ASSIST HIM RENEW LICENSE

CFN 7283 2232 SOP NOV 62 R GARCIA ROJAS SOTO VALLICERGO LORENTZ NOT TO PIEDRA P P SAN JUAN FAA WITHRUSH P FAA I NOT FOR

DT

SECRET

WITHRUSH PERSONNEL CABLE LOCATOR

NAME **SOTO Vasquez, Antonio** WITHRUSH NUMBER **87**

201 NUMBER **294544** C NUMBER

ACTION TAKEN	CITE NUMBER	IN NUMBER	DATE
NOMINATED FOR WITHRUSH			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
LOCAL I & N TRACES N.D.			
LOCAL POLICE AND CREDIT TRACES N.D.			
LOCAL FBI TRACES N.D.			
CONTRACT SIGNED			
NOTIFICATION OF POA GRANTED			
DEPART U.S.			
ARRIVED LEOPOLDVILLE	LEOP 9923	07557	8 July 1965
CONTRACT TERMINATION			
RETURNED TO MIAMI			
BANKING INSTRUCTIONS	WAVE 2517	81436	2 June 1965
LOFLUTTER			

29 JUN 1965

Dispatch No. UAPA-0101

Date: 22 JUN 1965

TO : Chief, KUCURL

FROM : Chief, IUPAGAN

SUBJECT : WITHRUSH Helicopter Training and Familiarization in 47G3B1

1. The two PBRUMEN pilot trainees arrived in Iden A on 4 May 1965. Helicopter training started on 6 May and terminated 15 May. Iden B arrived at the training area 9 May to receive briefings and familiarization in all aspects WITHRUSH helicopter project. Iden B departed 12 May 1965.

2. The surrounding area of Iden A and Iden C was utilized as the training site with most of the training taking place a few miles south of Iden C. The local cover story was that IUPAGAN was training pilots with view of using them to ferry helicopters to northwestern PBPRIME, where they would be utilized by IUPEAK. Cover story was backstopped through Iden D and Iden E (cleared and KUBARK witting). There were no security problems encountered during the training period. Some of the precautions taken were use of alias identification, first name basis for everyone, payment by cash, luggage tags and tickets secured, and close but subtle supervision of the students by the case officer.

3. Following is a resume of helicopter training and familiarization received by each student. Included are instructor pilot and case officer evaluations:

IDEN F

a. Iden F received training in all normal helicopter maneuvers, pre-flight, post-flight and cockpit procedures. Additional training was as follows:

1) Radio procedures with UHF, VHF, HF and LF ADF.
2) Dead reckoning and cross-country 4+10 hours.
3) Personnel rappelling, personnel parachuting and use of cargo slings 2+00 hours.
4) Ground school:

a) 47G3B1 exams.
b) Navigation and flight planning.
c) Weight and balance.
d) General oral questioning and orientation 9+00.

5) Supplemental reading.

6) Flying time:

Dual	21+55	
Solo	2+30	
Student Dual	1+50	
TOTAL	26+15	Hours

b. Prior to his arrival at the training site Iden F received 12+20 hours of dual flying instruction on pre-flight maneuvers and emergency procedures, which included 4 hours of autorotation.

c. The language barrier between student and instructor retarded the student's progress to some extent. His navigation, flight planning and weight and balance work is limited. It is recommended that he have access to a helicopter each day in order to buildup his time.

d. The student was willing, cooperative and intelligent.

IDEN G

a. Iden G's training schedule included much of the same material as that of Iden F except that his personnel rappelling, parachuting and sling work amounted to 1+35 hours. His cross-country time amounted to approximately 1+50 hours.

1) Flight time:

Dual	10+10	
Solo	4+05	
Student Dual	1+50	
TOTAL	16+05	Hours

b. Prior to his arrival at the training site Iden G received 6+50 hours of flight training, which included 3 hours of autorotation.

c. The instructor pilot reports that Iden G has progressed exceptionally well and that his pilot background is very good. Iden G contributed substantially to Iden F's training.

d. It should be noted that Iden G received instruction and 50 hours flight time in a 47G3B1 helicopter during helicopter training conducted by IUPAGAN 27 March - 15 April 1965.

IDEN B

a. Iden B received training which exposed him to all aspects of Bell 47G3B1 helicopter flight and support requirements.

b. The flight familiarization included almost all of the normal helicopter maneuvers along with radio procedures. His total flight time amounted to 5+30 hours. Both instructor pilots noted that his flying procedures were rough, but were improving steadily. He did not solo inasmuch as both pilots indicated that he was not ready for solo.

c. Iden B wash given approximately 9 hours orientation in helicopter maintenance and from 3-4 hours of orientation with regard to the contents of the support kits and accessory equipment.

d. Complete assessment of this individual is difficult to make, as he was only in the training area for a short period of time. However, the following information may be helpful in making an evaluation:

1) Flying proficiency in 47G3B1 is below par at this time. He requires more dual and emergency procedures.
2) His conversation and experience indicates that he is more knowledgeable of Hughes equipment than he is of Bell equipment.
3) Iden B appears to be a very extroverted type of individual. In any conversation he does most of the talking.
4) The instructor pilots felt that his knowledge of helicopters leaned to the "manual" side rather than the practical side. He seemed, according to the instructor pilot, to have a "shallow" knowledge of helicopter operations.

4. The case officer for the WITHRUSH pilot training was Alfred F. PELANDER. Instructor pilots were Iden H and Alexander V. DECLIPPLE.

Philip L. Musher
Philip L. MUSHER
Chief, IUPAGAN

Attachment:
s/c (Idens)

Distribution:
O & 2-KUCURL
3-IUPAGAN

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment to
Dispatch No. UAPA-0101

Iden A - Albuquerque, New Mexico
Iden B - Mr. Thomas Baldwin
Iden C - Santa Fe, New Mexico
Iden D - Mr. Edward Scholz, Chief Pilot Reg. #3, USFS
Iden E - Mr. Andrew G. Brennus, Chief Fire Control Officer Reg. #3, USFS
Iden F - Mr. Orlando Izquierdo
Iden G - Mr. Antonio Soto Vasquez
Iden H - Mr. Elwood W. Nelson

SECRET

SECRET

29 JUN

Dispatch No. UAPA-0100

Date: 22 JUN 1965

TO : Chief, KUCURL

FROM : Chief, IUPAGAN

SUBJECT : Helicopter Flight Training for WITHRUSH

1. Objectives:

The primary purposes of this program was to prepare two WITHRUSH employees (Iden A and Iden B) to operate a 47G3B1 Bell Helicopter under simulated tactical situations involving rescue and reconnaissance operations. Secondarily, Idens A and B were to be familiarized to the fullest extent with the operational capability of the helicopter and its accessory equipment. Iden A did not prove adaptable to this type of aircraft and failed to complete transition training. Iden B complete transition training. Iden B completed the prescribed training, evidencing consistent performance progress as well as alertness, independence and a cooperative attitude.

2. Period of Training:

Training commenced for Iden A on 15 March and for Iden B on 27 March. Iden B's training was satisfactorily completed on 15 April. A total of 50 ½ hours of training time was logged during the entire course of instruction.

3. Instructors:

The training instructors utilized were Alexander V. DECLIPPEL and Iden C. IUPAGAN PDO's provided training as to cargo sling operation, rappelling and operational capabilities of special equipment.

4. Training Areas Utilized:

Training was conducted entirely within Iden D utilizing suitable terrain in the vicinity of Idens E, F, G, and H. Airports and motel accommodations in or adjacent to these localities were used.

5. Security:

SECRET

Sound operational security practices were employed in the handling of Idens A and B as to relationship with the general public. It was not necessary for either the instructors or the students to refer to IUFLAG in dealings with the general public. A logical cover of training for IUPEAK operations sufficed to handle any local inquiries concerning reasons for the aircraft's being in the vicinity or the purposes of the training. No known breaches of security as to identity of personnel or the true purposes of the training occurred.

6. Training Program:

The following training agenda was covered during the period of Iden B's instruction:

Helicopter Training Program:

- a. Cockpit procedures
- b. Review of supplemental reading, instruction manuals, etc.
- c. Warmup and shutdown procedures
- d. Pre-flight procedures
- e. Basic pre-solo maneuvers:
  - 1) High and low reconnaissance
  - 2) Approach to confined areas
  - 3) Pinnacle operations
  - 4) High altitude landings, hoverings, etc.
  - 5) Slope operations
  - 6) Low-level cross-country
  - 7) Navigation
  - 8) Emergency procedures (very limited)
  - 9) Use of cargo nets, litters, cargo racks
  - 10) Personnel rappelling
  - 11) Personnel parachute jumping
  - 12) Limited and restricted solo

7. Critique:

a. The training program should be formalized to a greater degree. A syllabus of items to be covered has been prepared and reviewed by Alexander V. DECIPPEL. A copy of this syllabus is attached and it is felt will assist in providing a guide to the instructor and permit a more orderly procedure and better utilization of time epended. It can be adapted easily as a statistical report covering training.

b. The training areas utilized from a standpoint of terrain, climate and accessibility for maintenance proved acceptable.

Philip L. MUSHER
Chief, IUPAGAN

Attachments: h/w & s/c
Distribution:
O & 2-KUCURL
3-IUPAGAN

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment to
Dispatch No. UAPA-0100

Iden A - Mr. Carlos Justi
Iden B - Mr. Antonio Soto Vasquez
Iden C - Mr. Elwood Nelson
Iden D - State of New Mexico
Iden E - Albuquerque, New Mexico
Iden F - Santa Fe, New Mexico
Iden G - Deming, New Mexico
Iden H - Silver City, New Mexico

SECRET

ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN

HELICOPTER MASTER TRAINING PRE-SOLO CHECKLIST

ITEMS	DAYS												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	[illegible]
1. PREFLIGHT													
Cockpit													
Exterior													
2. COCKPIT PROCEDURES													
Starting & warmup													
Shutdown Procedures													
Electrical sys. emer. oper.													
3. MANEUVERS													
Helicopter controls (air demon)													
Straight & level flight													
Normal climb													
Normal descent													
Level turns													
Climbing turns													
Descending turns													
Hovering over a fixed spot													
Hovering turns: right													
Hovering turns: left													
Hovering flight: forward													
Hovering flight: sideward													
Takeoff to hover													
Landing from hover													
Quick stops													
Normal takeoff													
Sideward & rearward flight													
Traffic patterns													
Normal approach													
Max. performance takeoff													
Steep approach													
Running takeoff & landings													
Shallow approach													
Approach to confined area													
Confined area takeoff													
S turns on road													
Pinnacle operation													
Slope operation													
High altitude takeoffs/landings													
High reconnaissance													
Low reconnaissance													
Operation over barriers													
Crosswind considerations													
Settling with power													
4. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES													
Auto rotations, general info.													
Straight-in autorotation (dual)													
180° autorotation (dual)													
Tail rotor failure in flight													
Engine fire during starting													
Electrical system emerg. oper.													
Autorotation from hover (dual)													
Hydraulic failure													
5. SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS													
Use of litters/cargo racks													
C. G. limitations													
Personnel rappelling													
[illegible] parachuting													
[illegible]													
6. MISCELLANEOUS													
Helicopter exams													
[illegible] supplemental [illegible]													
Navigation/flight planning													

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

☑ COPY ☐ REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

FROM Leopoldville

ACTION SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE, AF 6, WH/C 8, CI/OA

31 MAR 65 IN 0517

SECRET 311825Z

WAVE FOR LORENTZ ~~INFO DIR~~ CITE LEOP 9200

CHAPPIE PBRUMEN WITRUS

REF WAVE 2392 (IN 79133)*

SUBJECTS REF ATA LEOP 310553Z.

SECRET

CFN

* RE MARIO GINEBRA, ANTONIO SOTO AND ERNESTO PEYNO.

SECRET

4/6 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

FROM Jmwave

ACTION SAD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

DATE

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE AF 6, WH/C 8, WE 6, [illegible]

29 May 65 78133

S E C R E T 300036Z

PRIORITY LEOP INFO BRUS DIR CITE WAVE 2392

CHAPPIE/PBRUMEN/WITHRUSH

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

MARIO GINEBRA, ANTONIO SOTO AND ERNESTO PEYNO DEPARTING NY SABENA 548 ON MAY 29. ARRIVE BRUSSELS 0930 LOCAL MAY 30. LEAVE BRUSSELS SABENA 511 AT 2005 LOCAL ON 30 MAY. ARRIVE LEOP 0600 LOCAL 31 MAY. LEOP PLEASE MEET.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT SOD TIME 2230 BY Dm

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

INFO VR. FILE WH/C 8, WE 6, CI/OA

S E C R E T 290101Z

PRIORITY LEOP INFO PRIORITY BRUS DIR CITE WAVE 2317

29 May 65 IN 78655

CHAPPIE PBRUMEN WITHRUSH

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. SABENA NY NOT IN RECEIPT AUTHORITY BOARD MARIO GINEBRA, ANTONIO SOTO AND ERNESTO PAYNO (ALSO RCVD PAYNO) WITHOUT VISAS. WILL REQUIRE LEOP AGAIN REQUEST SABENA LEOP ADVISE NY BOARD WITHOUT VISAS. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. WILL ADVISE NEW SCHEDULE AS SUBJECTS ON STANDBY NY FOR NEXT AVAILABLE SABENA FLIGHT.

S E C R E T

CFN

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

26 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

INFO W. FILE WH/SA, DDS, WE 6, CI/OA, DDP

28 May 65 IN 78350

S E C R E T 281743Z

LEOP INFO BRUS DIR CITE WAVE 2279

CHAPPIE PBRUMEN DTEARN WITHRUSH

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. MARIO GINEBRA (G), ANTONIO SOTO (S) AND ERNESTO PEYNO (P) SCHEDULED DEPART MIAMI 28 MAY VIA NATIONAL. DEPART NY VIA SABENA 548 AT 0930 LOCAL. LEAVE BRUSSELS 30 MAY SABENA 919 AT 0955 LOCAL. ARRIVE LEOP 30 MAY AT 1755 LOCAL.

2. DATE OF CONTACT ALL PERSONNEL 25 MAY. (G) AND (P) ADVANCED $800 AND (S) ADVANCED $1000 IN REPRESENTING ONE MONTHS ADVANCE SALARY. NO OTHER ADVANCE MADE. EACH SUBJ AUTHORIZED 10 KILOS EXCESS BAGGAGE AND WILL CLAIM UPON ARRIVAL IF USED.

3. (P) AND (G) CARRYING PBPRIME MULTIPLE ENTRY PERMIT. (S) TRAVELING WITH SINGLE ENTRY FORM I-512. NO CONGOLESE VISAS. LEOP PLEASE MEET.

S E C R E T

CFN

SEE 40-400-1 RE USE ACTION INDICATORS

INS Name trace
26 May '65
Subject: Soto-Vazquez, Antonio

#87

PERSONAL EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Name of employee in full: Antonio Soto

Person to be notified in case of emergency:

Name Dolores Soto
Relationship Wife
Address 379 E 64 Street,Hialeah
Telephone 661-8685

Designation of Beneficiary:

Name Same as above
Relationship
Address
Telephone

List all insurance policies:

Date of Policy	Company	Policy No.	Coverage	Beneficiary	Contains War Clause? Yes	No
None						

Have you completed your Last Will and Testament? Yes

Date of Will: May 25/65 Location of original / Copy on file with R Medell

Name and address of person holding Power of Attorney:
No

Date May 25/65

Acc Nr 35[illegible]C Savings
Central Bank and Trust Co
[illegible] St at 1[illegible]th Ave NW, Miami, Fla

#177

May 25,1965

To whom it may concern:

I hereby accept to be employed by the government of the Republic of the Congo or any company or agency that the said Government may designate at a basic salary of $1,000 for sixty hours of flying. The date of my contract is May 25,1965. Any flight time in excess of sixty hours is considered overtime. This is only a provisional statement and should be consider cancelled as soon as I signed my contract.

Antonio Soto

7187

RAMCO FORM 55 2

WILL

In the Name of God. Amen

I, Antonio Soto Vazquez a citizen and resident of Miami Dade County, State of Fla being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my last

Will and Testament

hereby revoking any and all prior wills, codicils and testamentary dispositions.

FIRST: [illegible] I direct my executor to use the proceeds of all insurance proceeds on my life payable to my estate to first pay debts, estate inheritance taxes, claims, charges and expenses of administration and then I give and bequeath all of my estate real, personal or mixed wherever situated to my beloved wife Dolores Soto, 379 East 64th Street, Hialeah, Fla.

I hereby make, constitute and appoint Mr. Roberto Hodell - [illegible] Terr, Miami as executor of this my last Will and Testament.

and direct his to pay all of my lawful debts, if any, and the funeral and burial expenses.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto subscribe my name and affix my seal the 25th day of May A. D. 19 65 in the presence of attesting witnesses.

(SEAL)

The foregoing instrument, part being printed and the residue written, was subscribed, sealed, published and declared by Antonio Soto Vasquez as and for his last Will and Testament, in our presence and in the presence of each of us, and we, at the same time, at his request, in his presence and in the presence of each other, hereunto subscribe our names and addresses as attesting witnesses, this 25 day of May A. D. 19 65

[illegible] Witness [illegible] Residence

[illegible] Witness [illegible] Residence

Witness Residence

RAMCO FORM 55

Will

OF

Executors

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

21 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD-6

INFO RR. FILE, HF-6, WH-8, CI/EA

25 MAY 65 IN 78519

S E C R E T 251652Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 2157

SNAPPIE/WITHRUSH/[illegible]

LORENTZ DIAZ SENDS:

CONFIRM APPROVAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH AIRLINE IF OK FOR OSCAR ALFONSO, TO [illegible], ERNESTO PEYNO AND ANTONIO SOTO DEPART NY O/A 28 MAY WITHOUT VISAS. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 2/ 7

SECRET

ORIG: L. MURPHY:kns
UNIT: SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT: 4475
DATE: 24 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-294544

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

25 MAY 65 20 06z

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6 INFO WH/C 8, AF 6, CI/OA, FI, VR FILE

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR 13284

CHAPPIE AMTHRUSH PBRUMEN

POA GRANTED SUBJ 87, ODURGE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED BY HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/5 T. Baskett/Draft

CI/OA G. Ball/Telecon

SOD/AB/OPS/3 F Daly

5
4
3 DESMOND FITZGERALD
2 C/WH
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
SOD/AB/OPS-3 - Larry Murphy

NUMBER
201-295544

SUBJECT
SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
7 April 1965 prc

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

This will confirm oral granting of the POA.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	**21 MAY 1965**

SECRET

FORM 1.64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SOD 5-656
[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : Antonio SOTO Vazquez

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum of 4 May 1965

1. Attached to the referenced memorandum was a list of eight documents concerning the Subject, with a request that SOD/AB/OPS/3 comment on their significance as they might affect the granting of a POA to the Subject.

2. Six of the eight documents were found to be insignificant. Two of the documents were not found. Attached is a memorandum from Chief, RID/FI stating that the two documents could not be found.

3. The Subject has been a WITHRUSH pilot in the past. He was granted a POA on 9 March 1961, and again on 29 October 1962. It is requested that he be again granted a POA in accordance with Form 772 submitted to Chief, CI/OA on 7 April 1965.

Lawrence Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS/3

Attachment

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Addressee
1 - C/SOD/AB
1 - SOD/SECUR
1 - SOD/AB/OPS/3
1 - 201-294544
1 - SOD/RI
1 - Chrono

SOD/AB/OPS/3:L.MURPHY:kas(21 May 1965)

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

19

SECRET 5/3

ORIG : L. MURPHY:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 20 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

21 MAY 65 18 50z

SIG CEN

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6 INFO AF 6, VR, FILE

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 12355

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

REF: LEOP 8980 (IN 71139)

1. USE OF SOTO AS TACTICAL PILOT DISAPPROVED. IF FUTURE HELICOPTER PILOT COMPLEMENT PERMITS AND SOTO AGREEABLE WILL CONSIDER CHANGE CONTRACT TO FIXED WING TYPE.

2. HQS PLEASED PROGRESS PER PARA 4 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

SOD/AB/OPS/3 F. Daly/Draft

AF/5

E. N. KORN-PATTERSON
AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Bernard J Finan
BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

3 Lud

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, OS

ATTENTION : Mr. Lou Weinckowski

SUBJECT : Project WITHRUSH

1. SOD and AF Division are jointly interested in obtaining the services of the Cuban national(s) identified below for employment in the Congo under Project WITHRUSH.

	Personnel Data	Document Needed
Name	Antonio SOTO Vazquez	Re-entry Document
Status	Unknown	
DOB	20 August 1934	
POB	Marianao, Havana, Cuba	
"A" Number	11263189	
POA Granted	Pending reissuance	
OS Case Number	242369	
Remarks	None.	
Name	Mario A. GINEBRA-GROZZO Perez	Re-entry Document
Status	Unknown	
DOB	26 July 1933	
POB	Camaguey, Cuba	
"A" Number	Unknown	
POA Granted	19 May 1966	
OS Case Number	218019	
Remarks	None.	

2. It is requested that your office facilitate prompt and favorable action by the Miami office, INS, to provide the documentation required.

Robert Gambino
Security Officer
Special Operations Division

Attachment

201-242369
244544

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

Name : Ernesto Jesus PEYNO Inolan

Status : Unknown

DOB : 11 December 1931

POB : Havana, Cuba

"A" Number : 12434942

POA Granted : 19 May 1965

OS Case Number: 225961

Remarks : None.

Re-entry Document

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

20 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTN: George Ball

VIA: Chief, RID/RB

SUBJECT: DBA-48364, dated 8 August 1963
DBA-23559, dated 6 October 1962

A thorough and systematic search for the above documents began on 7 May 1965 and they could not be located. On 18 May 1965 an extensive and repetitive search was conducted to no avail.

Raymond V. Utterback
RAYMOND V. UTTERBACK
Chief, RID/FI

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[illegible] 7/87

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

19 [illegible] 1965

Mr. Roberto Modell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: SOTO, ANTONIO

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Soto was seen by me today for the following injections: Cholera, Typhus, Typh. paratyphoid, and Dipth. tet.

As you requested, a Chest Xray and hemoglobin were also done. The chest Xray was normal and consistant with one done at this office Oct. 8, 1963. The hemoglobin was 16.2 gms. or 104.8%.

He currently holds a Class II Federal Aviation Agency physical examination certificate which was done at my office 26 April 1965.

Thank you for referring this airman.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Piper, MD

William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : F. DALY
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 18 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S/ S E C R E T

18 MAY 65 22 24z

SIG CEN

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SOD 6
INFO : file VP, AF6, CCS 3, TFW, WH/C 8

TO ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY LEOP INFO CITE DIR

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

L1306

REF: A. LEOP 6980 (IN 69928)

B. WAVE 1932 (IN 69321)

1. DO NOT CONCUR USE HOUCKE (H) AS TEST PILOT AND IP AT PRESENT. IMMED RETAINER APPROVED HOWEVER WITH UNDERSTANDING AFTER ALL PILOTS EVALUATED BY BORTHWICK STA MAY DESIGNATE WHOM IT DESIRES AS IP. MEANWHILE WISH CHOPPERS REMAIN ON GROUND UNTIL FIRST QUAL FEPRIMEN ARRIVES.

2. SUGGEST UPON ARRIVAL ORLANDO IZQUIERDO (I) (APPROX 23 MAY PER REF B) USE I IN RIGHT SEAT TEMPORARILY AS CHECK PILOT FOR H, ALSO AS TEMP TEST PILOT FOR CHOPPERS. IF ANTONIO SOTO (S) ARRIVES SAME TIME, HIS EXPERIENCE AND SUPERIOR ENGLISH MAY RECOMMEND HIM AS CHECK PILOT.

3. BORTHWICK SCHEDULED DEPART FEPRIME 23 MAY, STILL TO ACT ONLY IN FLIGHT EXAMINER CAPACITY.

END OF MESSAGE

SOD/AB/OPS/3 F. Daly

4475

E. H. KORN-PATTERSON
AF/COPS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Bernard J. Finan
BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM PHOENIX

ACTION SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO 1 HR FILE, DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6, C/CA, OPSEC, OT

S E C R E T 181719Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE PNIX 2726 ✓

2372

CHAPPIE IUPAGAN WITHRUSH

REF DIR 03920

18 MAY 65 IN 70135

PNIX 2715 (IN 67575)

1. MR ORLANDO IZQUIERDO AND MR ANTONIO SOTO VASQUEZ COMPLETED TRAINING AND FAMILIARIZATION IN THE MODEL 47G-3 B-1 HELICOPTER ON 15 MAY 65. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THEIR TRAINING AND HOURS:

A. IZQUIERDO:

ACTIVITY	TIME
GROUND SCHOOL (EXAMS, NAVIGATION/FLIGHT, WEIGHT & BALANCE, GENERAL ORIENTATION)	9:00 HRS
SUPPLEMENTAL READING	DAILY
RADIO PROCEDURES WITH UHF, VHF & HF	DAILY
DEAD RECKONING AND CROSS-COUNTRY	4:10 HRS
PERSONNEL RAPPELLING, PERSONNEL PARACHUTING	
CARGO RACKS AND CARGO SLINGS	2:00 HRS

TOTAL FLYING TIME:

DUAL	21:55
SOLO	2:30

STUDENT DUAL (SOTO

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

34 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

INFO

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

FILE DDP, WH/C8, AF6, CI/OA

S E C R E T 172204Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1932

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PERUMEN

[illegible] IN 69321

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. ORLANDO IZQUIEDRO (I) AND ANTONIO SOTO (S) COMPLETED DUPAGAN TRAINING IN BELL 47G-38-1. (I) READY FOR IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE. (S) ON STANDBY AWAITING POA ISSUANCE. HAVE THIRD PERUMEN HELICOPTER PILOT FOR CLEARANCE AS BACKUP IF NEEDED.

2. WILL REQUIRE LEOP REQUEST SABENA TO ALLOW (I) BOARD SABENA NY WITHOUT CONGO VISA O/A 21 MAY. PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CFN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION 206

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

RE. FILE AT 5 [illegible] . [illegible]

SECRET 171614Z

DIR CITE WAVE 1916

CHAPPIE LITHRUSH PBRUMEN

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

[illegible] IN 68922

Soto, A.

1. WAVE TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJS 98, 87, 88 AND 97 (ANTONIO GONZALEZ REPEAT GONZALEZ, TORRECILLA). REQUEST POA'S.

2. WAVE, POLICE-CREDIT AND ODENVY TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJS 98 (RAFAEL JUAN CASTILLO REPEAT CASTILLO, LEYVA), 99 (GUILLERMO P. GONZALEZ REPEAT GONZALEZ, MOLINA) AND 95 (ANTONIO ORLANDO SALAS REPEAT SALAS, BARO.)

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : L.MURPHY:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 12 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

84 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SOD 6 INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR 09588

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: A. WAVE 1836 (IN 62164)*

B. DIR 01841**

1. REGRET UNABLE CONCUR INVITATION SUBJ 91. PRESENTLY CONSIDERING SEVERAL EUROPEAN CHOPPER PILOTS. HOWEVER WILL CONTINUE PROCESS POA SUBJ 91.

2. CHOPPER PILOT CONTRACT STILL PENDING. WILL POUCH WHEN FINALIZED. MEANWHILE TERMS OUTLINED REF B TO BE USED IN DISCUSSING CONTRACT WITH SUBJS 87 AND 92.

3. PLS SUBMIT PRQ PART II SUBJ 93 VIA POUCH.

END OF MESSAGE

SOD/AB/OPS/3 F. Daly/Draft

WH/C/MO

*Requested status subj 91 and status helicopter pilot contract.
**Outlined terms of chopper pilot contract.

R. W. Hurley
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

SOD [illegible]

11 May 65

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : SOTO Vasquez, Antonio 201-294544

REFERENCE : Chief, CI/OA Memorandum of 4 May 1965

1. Your referenced memorandum requested SOD/AB comments concerning eight reports which mentioned the Subject. Two of the reports were located, both of which contained no derogatory information concerning the Subject.

2. The remaining six documents were placed on "locate" with RI; however, insofar as all six were written prior to the Subject's recent six-month tour with KUBARK in the Congo (Nov 1963 to May 1964), during which he performed in a highly satisfactory manner, it is requested that a POA be granted the Subject.

Lawrence C. Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Addressee
1 - C/SOD/AB
1 - SOD/SECUR
1 - SOD/AB/OPS/3
X - 201-294544
1 - SOD/RI
1 - Chrono

SOD/AB/OPS/3:L.MURPHY:kas (11 May 1965)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MESSAGE FORM 24

ORIG : LMURPHY:kns
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 4 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

8/ S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ) LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD6 INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6, CI/OA

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO LEOP CITE DIR 07844

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: A. WAVE 1207 (IN 54629)
B. WAVE 1089 (IN 52773)
C. WAVE 1443 (IN 68054)

1. FOLLOWING CURRENT STATUS SUBJS REF A: Sol, A

A. POA'S REQUESTED NO'S 91, 88, 87, 85, 84, 83 AND 82.

B. AWAITING HQ TRACES NO 78.

C. AWAITING WAVE TRACES NO 90.

D. HQS ALSO AWAITING LEOP REPLY TO REF B. ASSUMING LEOP WILL CONCUR ON REASSIGNMENT OF SUBJS 93, 94, 95 AND 96, REQUEST WAVE FORWARD CURRENT EMPLOYMENT DATA AND PRS TO HQ FOR POA PROCESSING.

2. ADVISE SUBJS REF C AWAITING LEOP CONCURRENCE THEIR REASSIGNMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/MO J. Moughan/Phone
WH/C/PM W. Cini/Phone
AP/5
SOD/AB/OPS/3 R. Kloyla/Draft

John T. Flynn
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

[redacted]
SECRET

72514
28 April 1965

Subject: Iden A

Subject was interviewed and tested on 28 April 1965 at a safe site in the Miami area at the request of Edward V. LORENTZ. The interview was conducted in English.

RESULTS

Subject has never taken part in any communist activity and he has never worked for any Castro intelligence or security service. Apart from PBPRIME he has no connection or agreement with the government of any other country.

Unless otherwise noted below Subject is not obligated to any Cuban exile group.

Subject has been essentially truthful in regard to his personal history and he does not feel he is liable to blackmail for any reason. Subject has never been involved in the use or sale of narcotics.

DETAILS

Subject is being recruited for use with WITHRUSH. He has served there before. Like all of the men in the group who have been in the Iden B, Subject assumes that the operation is sponsored by KUBARK.

Subject joined AMWORLD but was never called to go to the training camps.

In connection with blackmail, Subject mentioned that his father is in jail in Cuba. To date no attempts have been made by the Castro government to put any pressure on Subject.

[illegible]

Keith D. WINETT

Basic doc filed in 201-742273

5 May 65
UFGA 21458/03

201-294544

[redacted]
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[redacted]
SECRET

UFGA 21458/03

72514
28 April 1965
IDENS

Iden A Antonio SOTO Vazquez
DPOB: 20 August 1934
Marianao, Habana, Cuba 201-

Iden B Congo.

[redacted]
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, KUSODA

INFO
Deputy Chief, WH/Cuba

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
FJDUST/LCFLUTTER/PBRUMEN
Transmittal of LCFLUTTER Results

UFGA - 21458703

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action: None Required

1. Forwarded herewith (RYBAT) are the following LCFLUTTER reports with below list of IRD numbers and, if available, 201 numbers with cryptonyms:

IRD NUMBERS	201 NUMBERS	CRYPT
(64810)	(742873)	(AMBEGIN/8)
(72512)	(744750)	( )
(72513)	( )	( )
(72514)	(294544) ✓	( )
(72515)	( )	( )
(72516)	(774052)	( )

2. The identities of the above reports are forwarded as a separate cover attachment.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachments:
A. Reports (RYBAT)
B. Identities (RYBAT)

Distribution:
2 - C/KUSODA w/att A/1-6 h/w; B/1-6 u/s/c
7 - DC/WH/Cuba

201-294544

CROSS REFERENCE TO
Copy

DATE TYPED
3 May 65

DATE DISPATCHED
MAY 5 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-21458

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-742873;
744750; 774052;

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 4 May 1965 prc
TO: SOD/AB/OPS-3 - Larry Murphy	C. NO. 201-294544
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	XX	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE **
☐	CHECK LIST	☐	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

** Please advise CI/OA of nature and significance.

FORM 6-62 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (20)

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

71/30 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
SODG

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE AF6, DDC, WH/C8, SiOA, OPSER

S E C R E T 232140Z

PNIX INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1444

3 May 65 IN 58061

CHAPPIE/WITHRUSH/IUPAGAN/PBRUMEN

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS

1. ORLANDO IZQUIERDO (I) AND ANTONIO SOTO (S) ARRIVING 4 MAY ALBUQUERQUE 1750 LOCAL CONTINENTAL 275.

2. BOTH BRIEFED QUARTERS AND RATIONS TO BE FURNISHED.

3. (I) HAD APPROXIMATLY 14 HRS LOCALLY AND (S) 6 HRS. WILL CABLE DETAILS OF LOCAL INFORMAL TRAINING RESULTS.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

Adj. #92

CRESCENT
AIRWAYS, INC.
AIR TAXI AND CHARTER
FLIGHT AND GROUND INSTRUCTION
RENTAL, SALES & SERVICE

May 3,1965

Report on flight evaluation of: Tony Soto & Orlando Izcuerdo

Helicopter Bell 47G.-235 hp Franklin engine.

Maneuvers	Grade		Remarks
	Tony	Orlando	
Preflight	av.	av.	
Cockpit procedures	av.	av.	
Throttle controll	Abav.	av.Ab.	Both very smooth
Starting procedures	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	
Vertical take off to hover	av.	av.	Wind: 10 to 32 MPH
Hovering	av.	av.	" " "
Air Taxi	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	" " "
Transition to forward flight	Ab.av.	av.	
Coordination of flight controls	Ab.av.	Av.	
Forward Flight,slow/fast cruise	av.	av.	
Sideward "	av.	av.	Wind: 10 to 32 MPH
Backward "	av.	av.	" " "
Basic airwork	Ab.av.	av.	
Turns	Ab.av.	av.	
Climbs	av.	av.	
Glides	av.	av.	
Climbing Turns	av.	av.	
Decending turns	av.	av.	
Wave off's	av.	av.	
Normal approach to spot	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	
Precision hover,Down/upwind	av.	av.	Wind: 10 to 20 MPH
Constant heading square	av.	av.	" " "
Parallel " "	av.	av.	" " "
Perpendicular " "	av.	av.	" " "
Turns on spot	av.	av.	" " "
Autorotatics-Power off touchdown	Ab.av.	Ab. av.	Both improved from below/
Autorotations- From hover	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	" " " " av.
Vertical autorotations	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	" " " "
Emergencies: between 10 & 500'	Ab.av.	Ab,av.	" " " "
Run on landings	av.	av.	
Running take offs	Ab.av.	av.	
Precision Approach	Ab.av.	av.	
Rapid deceleration(quick stop)	av.	av.	
Jump take offs	av.	av.	
Maximum load conditions	av.	av.	
External (sling) loads	Ab.av.	av.	--Tony had previous experience.
Water:Landings,taxi,take off.	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	Wind: 10 to 32 Mph.
Rough terrain & Evasive tactics	AB.av.	Ab.av.	
Landings: normal,cross/downwind.	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	" " "



CRESCENT
AIRWAYS, INC.

AIR TAXI AND CHARTER
FLIGHT AND GROUND INSTRUCTION
RENTAL, SALES & SERVICE

May 5,1965

Comments on Helicopter Pilot evaluation and proficiency training:
Tony Soto and Orlando Izquorudo.

Both Pilots displayed great interest in upgrading their Helicopter flight proficiency,Both showed good planning,Jugement,Inititive, and attitude. All grades based on Helicopter Pilots with equivalent flight hours and experience.

	Estimated previous Helicopter experience	Total hours evaluation and proficiency received
Tony Sota	200 hours	6:50
Orlando Izquerdo	150 "	12:20

Rudy Vaingot
Instructor-Pilot

3000 PEMBROKE ROAD, NORTH PERRY AIRPORT, W. HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA 33023, PHONE 987-1900 • MIAMI • 945-0301

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☑ COPY ☐

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ACTION

SOD 6

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

RI FILE

SECRET 282233Z

DIR CITE WAVE 1287

28 APR '65 IN 54629

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. FOLLOWING CURRENT PERSONNEL STATUS OF INDIVIDUAL BEING CONSIDERED AS PILOTS:

A. AVAILABLE AND AWAITING POA NUMBERS 91, 90, 88, 87, 85, 84, 83, 82.

B. POA GRANTED:

74 - UNDERGOING FLIGHT EVALUATION

72 - DEFERRED PENDING CLARIFICATION OF POSSIBLE DEROG INFO

65 - DEFERRED - HOLDING OUT FOR MORE MONEY

67 - DEFERRED - PERSONAL PROBLEMS

63 - CANCELLED - UNAVAILABLE

64 - CANCELLED - UNAVAILABLE

69 - CANCELLED - UNAVAILABLE

71 - CANCELLED - FAILED FLIGHT EVALUATION

73 - CANCELLED - UNAVAILABLE

77 - CANCELLED - FAILED PHYSICAL

C. CANCELLED POA REQUEST:

SECRET

14-00000

Rely 7th 87

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

26 April 1965

Mr. Roberto Modell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: SOTO, ANTONIO
379 E. 64th St.
Hialeah, Fla.

Dear Mr. Modell,

Mr. Soto was examined by me this morning for routine Federal Aviation Agency Class II physical which he successfully completed and was issued a medical certificate with no limitations.

He is to return at a future date for Chest Xray, Hemoglobin and injections.

Thank you for feferring this airman.

Sincerely yours,

William S Piper MD

William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP: BK

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

7 SECRET

☑ COPY ☐ [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP WH/C 8 AF 6 CI/OA CCS 3

S E C R E T 261734Z

PRIORITY PNIX INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1084

26 Apr 65 IN 52504

CHAPPIE IUPAGAN PBRUMEN WITHRUSH

REF DIR 03920

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

ORLANDO IZQUIERDO AND ANTONIO SOTO PREPARED DEPART MIAMI 27 APR. PLEASE CONFIRM IF CAN RECEIVE SUBJ'S THIS DATE IN ALBUQUERQUE OR ADVISE ARRIVAL DATE.

SUBJECTS ABOVE HELICOPTER PILOTS.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☐ RID ☑ COPY ☐ [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

VR. FILE DDP WH/C 8, AF 6, CI/OA, OP 2, OPSER, OS 2

21 [illegible] 65 IN 40522

S E C R E T 212154Z

DIR CITE WAVE 0958

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF DIR 02745

LEOP 7694 C.24656

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. ORLANDO IZQUIERDO (I) WAS CONSIDERED ONE OF INITIAL TWO HELICOPTER CANDIDATES. AT TIME OF IUPAGAN TRAINING WAS UNABLE TO LEAVE MIAMI DUE ILLNESS OF WIFE. NOW INDICATES IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY AND DESIRE FOR TRAINING AND WITHRUSH CONTRACT. FEEL SUBJ SINCERE AND RELIABLE PBRUMEN SOURCES REVEAL SUBJ WELL EXPERIENCED IN PBRUMEN MILITARY HELICOPTER OPS AND RESCUE IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAINE. QUERY IF IUPAGAN TRAINING FACILIIES STILL AVAILABLE AND IF HQS. STILL WISHES TO CONSIDER (I) AS SECOND HELICOPTER PILOT. HOWEVER, CITE VERY PRONOUNCED LANGUAGE BARRIER EXISTS FOR EXACTING TRAINING PURPOSES. CAN PROVIDE INTERPRETER FROM MIAMI OR SEND TONY SOTO WITH SUBJ TO NEW MEXICO IF DEEMED FEASIBLE BY HQS. PLS ADVISE.

2. ANTONIO SOTO NOW MIAMI PREPARED FOR DEPARTURE O/A 1 MAY. AS SUBJ PREVIOUS CONGO PILOT, NOT CLEAR IF POA EVER GRANTED. PLS ADVISE CLEARANCE STATUS AND WILL LCFLUTTER AS MATTER OF POLICY.

SECRET

SECRET

* POA GRANTED [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 167208

DATE 7 April 1965

[redacted]

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LE[TTE]RS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
SOTO Vasquez, Antonio 201-324544

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
20 August 1934 Marianao, Havana, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Warehouse Checker
Eagle, Inc. - 800 NE 2nd Ave., Miami
Nov 61-Present

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Pilot

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME Larry Murphy
OFFICE DESIGNATOR SOD/AB/OPS3
ROOM, BUILDING 2 D 55
EXTENSION 4475

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Pilot - Cuban Air Force -	Stafo Beach, Cuba	Mar 53-Jan 59
Office Clerk - Ramon Lavin	Managua, Nicaragua	Sept 59-Jan 61
Unemployed - 6247 N. Miami Ave.	Miami, Fla.	Jan 59-Sept 59
PM Agent [redacted] - 8270 W. 60 Terr.	Hialeah, Fla.	Jan 61-Oct 63
Pilot - Caribbean Aeromarine Co. & Congolese Government-8270 W. 60 Terr.	Hialeah, Fla.	Oct 63-May 64
Guatemala Training camps - Pilot	Guatemala	Jan 61-Apr 61
Warehouse Checker - Eagle, Inc. - 800 NE 2nd Ave.	Miami, Fla.	Nov 61-Present

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5'4"	152	Brown	Black	White	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Dolores Soto

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Father: Antonio Soto
Mother: Julia Rosa Vazquez

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6.61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

TO: Larry Murphy

20 April 1965
DATE

FROM: FI/D/SX [illegible]

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

* Except

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO ~~XXXXXXX~~ INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

* Previous green list request from TFW/OpsSpt, 29 Oct 1962, GL 131407, Dossier WH/4, op, GL 110518, no record.

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

16

NON-OFFICIAL COVER CONCURRENCE

DATE:

TO BE COMPLETED BY CI/OA ONLY

SUBJECT'S NAME:

C OR 201 NO.:

DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

U.S. RESIDENCE: [illegible]

OVERSEAS RESIDENCE:

EMPLOYER:

PROJECT:

DIVISION OR STAFF:

CASE OFFICER:

ROOM NO.:

EXTENSION:

PROPOSED USE: [illegible]

TO BE COMPLETED BY CCS ONLY

CCS/NC CASE OFFICER *(Extension 5144)*:

CCS FILE NO.:

Central Cover Staff concurs in your proposal to use subject for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon CCS to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise CCS/NC promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated. The pseudonym assigned subject should be provided CCS/NC at the time notification of activation is forwarded. If notification of activation is not received in CCS/NC one year from above date it will be assumed proposed use did not materialize.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject or his employer is in CCS/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCS/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

☐ If check mark appears here the proposed use of subject requires DDP approval under CSI 240-6, para. 5. Please review CSI 240-6 and initiate action as appropriate.

DISTRIBUTION: 1-CCS 1-CI/OA 1-AREA DIVISION

[illegible]

FORM 2-64 2214

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

19-[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

78 SECRET

RID ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO: VR. FILE, DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6, CI/IPS,

S E C R E T 090034Z

DIR CITE WAVE 0509

8 APR 65 IN 41380

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. POLICE AND CREDIT CHECKS NON-DEROG SUBJ'S 87, 88 AND 90.

Del Rio

2. WAVE TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJ 91.

3. ODENVY TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJ 86. Pellon

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 7 April 1965

TO:
- ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM:
Larry Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS3
2 D 55

SUBJECT: (True name) SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

PROJECT: WITHRUSH

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 294544

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Africa, Congo, Leopoldville

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE: Pilot

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	X	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 107208

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY WH		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO. WAVE		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Larry Murphy	4475	Bernard J. Finan, Jr.

FORM 1-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 24

27 SECRET

☑ COPY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

INFO YR. FILE DDP, WH/C8, AF6, C/OPS

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 052022Z

5 APR 65 IN 38544

DIR CITE WAVE 0337

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

LORENTZ SENDS:

WAVE AND ODENVY TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJ'S 88 AND 87. ODENVY TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJ 89. ADDL INFO WILL FOLLOW.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

A

[redacted]

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-294544
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. E.D.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

2 **SECRET**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
VR. FILE DDP WH/C/R SOD 6 CCS 3

ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX

RI COPY

S E C R E T 261546Z

PRIORITY PNIX INFO DIR CITE WAVE 9934

(3)

26 MAR 65 IN 31610

CHAPPIE LOPAGAN PBRUMEN WITHRUSH

LORENTZ SENDS:

REF: DIR 95562

ANTONIO SOTO VAZQUEZ ARRIVING ABQ ON 26 MARCH, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES FLT 263, 2058 LOCAL.

PLEASE MEET.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

201-294544

[redacted]

File 201-194544

PERSONAL INFORMATION

REF.: A-11 63 151

J-3

PIN RECENT PHOTO HERE

NAME: Soto (LAST) Antonio (FIRST) (MIDDLE)

PHONE NUMBER: [illegible] 85

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:

☐ MALE
☐ FEMALE

PRESENT ADDRESS: 374 E. 64th St. (STREET), Hialeah (CITY), Fla. (STATE)

PERMANENT ADDRESS: 374 E. 64th St. Hialeah, Fla.

DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR): [illegible]

PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY): [illegible] Cuba

HEIGHT: [illegible]

COLOR OF HAIR: Black

WEIGHT: [illegible]

COLOR OF EYES: Brown

COMPLEXION:

LIST ANY SPECIAL OR OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OR IDENTIFYING MARKS:

MARITAL STATUS
☐ SINGLE
☐ MARRIED
☐ ENGAGED
☐ WIDOWED
☐ DIVORCED
☐ SEPARATED

LAST

FIRST

MIDDLE

PASSPORT PARTICULARS: ISSUING AUTHORITY
PLACE OF ISSUE
PASSPORT NO.
DATE OF ISSUE
KIND OF PASSPORT
VALIDITY PERIOD

CITIZEN OF U.S.: YES ☐ NO

NATURALIZED: DATE:

NATIONALITY: Cubano

HAS YOUR PASSPORT EVER BEEN CANCELLED? YES NO. IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS:

EDUCATION

	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	DATES ATTENDED	GRADUATE DEGREE	MAJOR SUBJECTS
HIGH SCHOOL	St. Joseph School, [illegible] Cuba		[illegible]	
COLLEGE				
TRADE, BUSINESS OR CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, OTHER STUDY DATA	[illegible] Correspondence School			

U.S. MILITARY SERVICE: [illegible] REASON: [illegible] DATE: [illegible]

TYPE OF DISCHARGE:

PRESENT MEMBER OF NATIONAL GUARD OR RESERVES

PREVIOUS ADDRESSES PAST TEN YEARS

DATE FROM	DATE TO	STREET	CITY/STATE	COUNTRY
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	State Beach	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Miami, Fla.	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		

FIANCE AND/OR MARRIAGE(S) - CHILDREN

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
[illegible]	[illegible]	374 E. 64th St. Hialeah, Fla.	
[illegible]	[illegible] /50		
	[illegible]		

[illegible] in the spaces provided below [illegible] every position which you have held since you [illegible] began to work, including [illegible] [illegible] present position and work back to the first position which you held. Account for any periods of unemployment. USE CONTINUATION SHEET IF NECESSARY.

A. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: Nov/61 TO PRESENT TIME [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: [illegible]
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 70.88 [illegible] FINAL $ [illegible] PER WK.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible], 300 NE 2nd Ave., Miami
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: [illegible]
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU:
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT:

B. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: [illegible]
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ A YR. FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU:
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT:

C. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: [illegible]
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ [illegible] PER YR. FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: [illegible]
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: [illegible]
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☐ YES ☐

HAVE YOU NOW OR EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER? GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☐ YES ☐

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY ANY POLICE OR MILITARY AUTHORITY? IF SO NAME THE ARRESTING AUTHORITY, GIVE TIME, PLACE AND REASON FOR SUCH ARREST OR DETENTION, AND THE DISPOSITION OR COURT ACTION. NO ☐ YES ☐

[illegible] APPLIED FOR: [illegible] MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SALARY: [illegible] PER YR.

REFERENCES: LIST FIVE PERSONS, NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY [illegible] REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY. DO NOT GIVE NAMES OF [illegible]

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]

FATHER'S NAME: [illegible] Soto DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible] Cuba
PRESENT ADDRESS: [illegible] PRESENT OCCUPATION:
NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: [illegible] PRESENT NATIONALITY: Cuban
MOTHER'S FULL [NAME]: [illegible] Lopez DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible] Cuba
PRESENT ADDRESS: [illegible] Miami PRESENT OCCUPATION: [illegible]
NATIONALITY AT [BIRTH]: [illegible] PRESENT NATIONALITY: Cubana
IN CASE OF EMERGENCY NOTIFY: [illegible] Soto, 370 [illegible] St., [illegible] PHONE: [illegible]

IF THE ABOVE SPACE IS NOT SUFFICIENT USE CONTINUATION SHEET.

[illegible] investigation of all statements contained in this application. I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts [illegible] cause for dismissal.

3/25/65
DATE

Continuation of [illegible] Employment

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Office Clerk
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 100/xx PER Month
FINAL $
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: [illegible] Managua
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: [illegible]
REASON FOR LEAVING EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Office Clerk.

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: MAY/56 TO: Sept [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Pilot
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 300/xx PER Month
FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: Dominican Air Force.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Col. Rodriguez Echevarria
REASON FOR LEAVING EMPLOYMENT:
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Pilot

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Pilot
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 200/xx PER Month
FINAL $ 200/xx PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: [illegible]
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: [illegible]
REASON FOR LEAVING EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Pilot

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: TO:
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT:
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU:
REASON FOR LEAVING EMPLOYMENT:

Continuation [illegible]

SUPPLEMENTARY PERSONAL INFORMATION
FLIGHT CREW

Name and Rank: Capt Antonio Soto

I. General Flying Experience:

A. Military Flying: 2400 hrs

B. Airline: 450 hrs

C. Per-Each: Congo: Around 600 hrs.

II. Equipment Types and Flying Times	PILOT (IN HOURS)	CO-PILOT (IN HOURS)	OTHER CREW (IN HOURS)
A. C-	[illegible]		
B.	[illegible]	[illegible]	
C. B-26/C-54			
D.			
E.			
F.			
G. Amphibian (by type)			
H. Flying boat (by type)			
I. Helicopter (by type)			
J.	[illegible]	[illegible]	
K.	[illegible]	[illegible]	
L. AT-	[illegible]	[illegible]	
M.	[illegible]	[illegible]	

III. TOTAL FLYING TIME [illegible]

IV. [illegible]

VII. [illegible]

VIII. Aviation Licenses & Ratings

	Type	Number	Ratings
A.			
B.			
C.			
D.			
E.			

IX. Selection of ... may ... influenced by the type and amount of ground and flight training ... To assist us in rating your overall qualifications it is important that you endeavor to submit documentary ... in a thorough and detailed manner, of all training received during the past three years ... information may be submitted in the form of notarized statements, photostats, etc.

X. Are you willing to be based at any station or location of the Company? Yes ✓ No

I understand that any misrepresentation or omission of facts requested is cause for dismissal.

Date

Signature

ORIG: M.GOMEZ:jg
UNIT: SOD/AB/OPS-3
EXT: 4475
DATE: 24 MAR 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM 23

43 SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO: JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6

INFO: VR, FILE, DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6

24 MAR 65 22 40z

PRIORITY

TO PRITY WAVE INFO CITE DIR 95562

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 9826 (IN 29264)*

1. APPROVED.

2. PLS ADVISE IUPAGAN SUBJ ETA ABQ.

END OF MESSAGE

* REQUESTED HQS APPROVAL DISPATCH SUBJ 26 MAR FOR ALBUQUERQUE

SOD/AB/OPS-3

AF/5 T.Basket (Telecon)

WH/MO B.Mills (Telecon)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-0000

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

51/2 SECRET

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO
VR. FILE AF6, DDP, WH/C 8, CI/OA, DPSER,

S E C R E T 232140Z

DIR CITE WAVE 9826

23 Mar 65 28264

Dm

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 9671 (IN 26089)

LORENTZ SENDS:

SOTO FLEW 2 PLUS 45 LOCAL BELL HELICOPTER TRANSITION 21 MAR. IP GAVE SUBJ VERY HIGH RATING AND SHOULD BE FULLY PREPARED IUPAGAN TRNG. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL DISPATCH SUBJ 26 MAR FOR ALBUQUERQUE.

S E C R E T

CFN & RE CONTACT WITH SOTO

SECRET

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT DATE: 30 June 1972

AGENT: IUSTEER/1 CASE OFFICER: Peter S. JASUTIS

PLACE: Westward Ho Restaurant,
SW 8 St. and 49th Ave.

1. Contact was initiated with IUSTEER/1 to discuss Roberto de Cardenas. Cardenas was previously described by IUSTEER/1 as an individual who once worked for the Agency both in Miami and the Congo. He is a friend of Barker, of the Washington breakin scandal. Cardenas was unemployed until early 1972 but now, suddenly, he is traveling to South America and has become affluent. IUSTEER/1 speculated that Cardenas may be dealing in narcotics.

2. Also note a New York Times article of 28 June concerning the Washington breakin affair. This article states that an individual appeared on the Miami scene about two months ago and recruited the team for the breakin. The recruiter was described as a "pipe smoker" who used a code name during the recruitments. Cardenas smokes a pipe all the time according to IUSTEER/1.

3. IUSTEER/1 is sceptical of the NYT article, as written, because in his opinion no Cuban could be recruited by an unknown individual using a code name. Considering the clandestine/operational mentality of the many Cubans in the Miami area, recruitments could only be made by a known recruiter with adequate bona fides.

4. Information on Cardenas supplied by IUSTEER/1:

a. Cardenas was born about 1919. In 1954 he was a captain with Cubana Airlines. In 1954-55 he was arrested in Havana by a Major Ochoa for smuggling cocaine. Due to political pull Cardenas was not prosecuted but was fired from his position. He retired to his farm in Cuba from 1954-1959.

b. From 1959 to 1960 he was in the Castro airforce. There he met Fiorini, also involved in the Washington breakin scandal. In 1960, in Miami, IUSTEER/1 was visiting in the Fiorini home when Cardenas dropped in. Also present was DIAZ LANZ, former Chief of the Castro airforce. Cardenas was

Barker
Sturgis
[illegible]

SECRET

201-283488

then working closely with Barker in Cuban exile (unity) activity on behalf of Artime. At the time Cardenas met IUSTEER/1 at the Fiorini home, he told IUSTEER/1 to go to a house on Brickell Ave. IUSTEER/1 did and there he met Artime for the first time.

c. (At this time a Case Officer named "Jimmy" was handling both Barker and Cardenas. "Jimmy" spoke excellent Cuban Spanish.)

d. From 1962 to 1965 Cardenas worked with the Agency under the cover firm Consolidated Engineering. (Cardenas' Case Officer during this period was Chris Frederick.)

e. In 1965 the Agency sent Cardenas to IUSTEER/1 for duty in the Congo. In the Congo Cardenas claimed to have a heart attack and was hospitalized. He was later proven medically sound and released from his Congo assignment.

f. During 1967-1968 Cardenas drove a truck in the Miami area. Between 1969 and 1970-71 Cardenas sold mutual funds in South America (GRAMCO and others). This ended when the funds went bankrupt.

g. In 1971 Cardenas was economically down. In early 1972 he started traveling again and became affluent. IUSTEER/1 believes Cardenas is involved in drugs.

SECRET

30 June 1972 Jasutis

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: IUSTEER-1 - Anthony Abraham Chevrolet, Miami

At a meeting on 20 June 1972 IUSTEER-1 made the observation that the offices of Anthony Abraham Chevrolet in Miami was a "a nest" of Cuban rumors and gossip. He usually tries to avoid the area around this business to preclude encountering the Cuban exiles working there. IUSTEER-1 noted that the Chief of Latin American Sales (?) of this firm, Manuel Villamanan, is very much up-to-date on Cuban exile matters. (IUSTEER-1 commented that he ran into Villamanan recently and they engaged in a conversation aboutthe Washington Break-In Scandal. IUSTEER-1 found Villamanan very sympathetic to Barker (one of the individuals involved) and IUSTEER-1 felt he hurt Villamanan's feelings when he (IUSTEER-1) was critical of the affair.) Also employed as a salesman at this firm is Alberto Bequiristain (AMANCHOR-1) who was at one time associated with Eugenio Martinez (of the Washington Break-In affair) in the capacity of a frogman for the Agency under the cover firm Consolidated Engineering. Chief of Security for Anthony Abraham Chevrolet is Tony Iglesias, identified by IUSTEER-1 as the military chief for the Torriente Group.

AMCHALK's best friend.

Peter S. JASUTIS

SECRET

SECRET

f 12.79.00

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS 16 March 1971

Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston, III -- Revocation of DOD Security
#27636 Clearance/Recent Contact --
MIH-056-71

1. The information reported in the enclosed self-explanatory memorandum, regarding Subject's self-initiated contact with our Miami Field Office, may be of interest.

2. The Office of the General Counsel and WH Division have been apprised of Subject's recent activities.

3. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 2738.

SECURITY

WILLIAM J. VAUGHAN

Enclosure: As stated above

VThorne:grw

4.78

[illegible]

SECRET

V. Thome

MIA-056-71

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : John McConnell
John Greany (OGC)
Chief, Miami Field Office

10 March 1971

Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. On 9 Mar 71 we received a long distance call, presumably from Powder Springs, Georgia, from subject, who is an old and unsavory contact of this office dating from 1959. Werbell has been involved in a variety of scrapes, the latest of which concerned an abortive invasion of Haiti which John Greany was very much concerned about a year or so ago.

2. Werbell stated that the Department of Defense had just revoked his security clearance on grounds of Werbell's "frivolous behavior" in the Haitian caper. Werbell stated that he intended to "fight it to the Supreme Court", as he had always kept us and other elements of the US Government informed concerning developments in the Haitian matter.

3. Werbell asked if there was anything that we could do for him in the way of interceding for him with the DOD, and we informed him bluntly and in no uncertain terms that he was strictly on his own, and we could do nothing for him. He then asked if it would be worthwhile to subpoena Bart Gonzales. We informed him that it was up to his attorney to make such recommendations.

4. Werbell seemed to get the message, and then offered to keep us advised regarding an alleged forthcoming attempt on Haiti which is being sponsored by Rolando Masferrer, even though Masferrer is currently incarcerated in a federal prison. We told Werbell that if he wished to pass any information along we would accept it but under no circumstances should he attempt to elicit any information on our behalf. He agreed that he would operate on this basis and said he might be in touch with us again.

5. In view of Werbell's record we felt that this latest contact should be a matter of record and that OGC should be informed of developments.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG/esa

SECRET

[illegible]

448

SECRET

F12-79-00

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS 22 May 1969

Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. — Local OSI Inquiry to DCS Miami Office for
#27686 Information Concerning

MIM-084-69

1. The enclosed copy of memorandum from our Miami Office, regarding the OSI representative's inquiry for information concerning Subject, is forwarded for your records and possible future reference.

2. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 2738.

SECURITY

B. FRANK YOUNG

Enclosure: As stated above

VThorne:grw

4.47

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

~~ATTN [illegible]~~

DATE: 15 May 1969

MIM-084-69

FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

SUBJECT: Local OSI Inquiry Regarding Information on Mitchell L. Werbell

1. On 15 May 1969, Special Agent Dave Ploumen, local OSI representative, USAF, visited the Miami Field Office to solicit any information we might have regarding Mitchell L. Werbell who apparently is undergoing a security clearance check as the result of presently being employed by a company with a government contract.

2. Werbell was an unsolicited contact of this office beginning in 1959 and he reached peak notoriety in November 1967 as a result of his involvement in the Rolando Masferrer trial in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion. John Greaney, OSG was in Miami at the time to oversee Agency interests.

3. Ploumen in contacting other US Government agencies locally including the US Attorney's Office somehow received an indication that CIA had information on Werbell; thus Ploumen's visit to the Miami Field Office.

4. It was indicated to Ploumen, who is known personally by several members of this staff, that we knew of Werbell and that on occasion he had reported unsolicited information. It was suggested, however, that Ploumen direct his request officially through channels via OSI's agency liaison officer in Washington.

5. This is for background and is being forwarded at the suggestion of local CIA Security.

SECURITY

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

EHogan:paw

4.47

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET

Chief, Miami Field Office 22 May 1969

ATT : Mr. E. Hogan
Director, Domestic Contact Service (Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L.

REF : MIM-084-69

Thank you for the information reported in the referent. The suggestion made by your office that OCI direct its request through official security channels is entirely correct. In the future, however, it will be helpful and appreciated if you will forward correspondence pertaining to security matters directly to the Security Liaison Officer, rather than to Support Staff. This saves time in getting the information to the appropriate channel for any action that may be indicated.

SECURITY

JAMES R. MURPHY

VThoms:grw

4.46

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

-12-77-00

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE : 5 July 1967

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT: WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III

FILE NO: #27686 A107900

1. Reference is made to your request for security checks on the subject person as a source of intelligence information.

2. This is to inform you that the necessary checks have been completed with the following results:

a. ☐ No additional information has been obtained, except for such biographic information as indicated below or in the attachment.

b. ☐ Information has been received that Subject was investigated with favorable results in

c. ☒ Certain information has been received and appears in the attachment which your Division will wish to consider in determining the extent and level of your use of Subject.

3. It is to be noted that our checks were made on the basis of the identifying information you furnished or in an attachment to this memorandum. Should it be disclosed that this information is erroneous or that Subject is known by a different name, this Division should be notified immediately.

WILLIAM R. KOTAPISH
Chief, Personnel Security Division

Attachment:
State Passport Report
Summary

RESTRICTED

EYES ONLY
#4227

4.45

FORM 6-65 1124a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

(9-47)

CONFIDENTIAL

WERBELL, Mitchell L.
#27 086

26 April 1967

On 19 April 1967, the current passport file of Mitchell L. WERBELL was reviewed at the Passport Office, Departmentof State. The following is a summary of the information contained therein:

Birth: 8 March 1918 at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
(Verified by birth certificate)

PASSPORT ISSUED: At Miami, Florida, on 29 May 1962, Passport Number C-301433, for a two week trip to England and Germany for the purpose of business.

Residence: RD #1, Powder Springs, Georgia
Occupation: Public Relations and Advertising Executive.

SUBJECT's file also reveals that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has information pertaining to SUBJECT concerning his involvement in Haitian Revolutionary activities.

[illegible]/me

CONFIDENTIAL

4.45

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 31 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, MIAMI FIELD OFFICE

FROM : Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Services Division)

SUBJECT : Security Check Completion -- US Citizen

REFERENCE : (a) DCS-R 10-30, dated 1 July 1965
(b) Operations Memo 88-64

1. Attached is a notice of security check completion on the individual listed below. The OS approved Subject's exploitation as a source of intelligence information, but the level of classified information which may be divulged is left to your discretion.

2. As indicated in the attachment, the OS provided a Summary of derogatory information for you to consider in determining the level of classified disclosure. It will be forwarded by Services Division by an "Eyes Only" memorandum which will bear a number identical to the one marked on the lower left corner of the completion. Please use this number to identify a Summary with an individual.

3. The OS directs that the field chief, after reading the information, will use it to establish the level of classified disclosure, if any, and to provide guidance to the Contact Specialist in his relations with the source. He may, at his discretion disclose the nature of the derogatory information to the Contact Specialist. The field chief, after making an appropriate notation in the open files of the office with respect to the security status of the individual, will then either destroy the information or place in a sealed envelope which will carry the caveat: "To be opened by the Chief or Acting Chief ---- Field Office."

James R. Murphy
JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment:
WERBELL, MITCHELL Livingston, III

Eyes Only # 4227

[illegible]:pat

CLASSIFICATION: "Restricted" -No Classified Info to be revealed. Check with Mr. Gleichauf before contacting.

Justin F. Gleichauf
Justin F. Gleichauf

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4.45

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET

F 12.79-00

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS 21 February 1967

ATT : Mr. Leland Bunn
Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. -- Recent Telephone Call from Chet GRAY of Los Angeles re Possible Assasination in US of Close Relative of Middle East Ruler

A-127900

1. The enclosed copy of teletype from our Miami Field Office is forwarded for your information and immediate transmittal to the FBI.

2. Mr. John McConnell, of this Office, has discussed this matter with Mr. Sam Papich, FBI, who said the FBI will contact Subject and GRAY, and will subsequently advise us of any action they might want us to take.

3. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 2738.

SECURITY

B. FRANK YOUNG

Enclosure: Teletype Contacts/Miami-1710
dated 20 February 1967

VThorne:pat

4.44

SECRET

6857

CC - FBI Via OS

SECRET

Feb 20 11 58 AM '67

SECURITY

S E C R E T 201530Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1710

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

file

ATTN: MCCONNELL

FROM: GLEICHAUF

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED A MOST UNUSUAL PHONE CALL FROM MITCHELL WERBELL, POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, DETAILS OF WHICH FOLLOW.

2. WERBELL IS A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE WHO HAS BEEN IN OCCASIONAL CONTACT WITH THIS OFFICE, OF HIS OWN VOLITION, SINCE 1959. WHILE AN UNSAVORY CHARACTER, MUCH OF THE INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED HAS PROVED TRUE. HE FURNISHED COMPLETE DETAILS ON THE RECENT HAITIAN INVASION PLAN. THE PHONE CALL WAS RECEIVED BY BART GONZALES FROM HIM AT 1100 HOURS ON 18 FEBRUARY. HE STATED THAT HE HAD JUST HAD A TELEPHONE CALL FROM CHET GRAY OF LOS ANGELES, NO ADDRESS (PHONE 274-4922).

3. GRAY STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED REGARDING THE POSSIBLE ASSASSINATION IN THE U.S. OF A CLOSE RELATIVE, POSSIBLY A BROTHER OR SON, OF A MIDDLE-EAST RULER, WITHIN THE NEXT 10 DAYS. HE DID NOT FURNISH THE NAME OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM, NOR BY WHOM HE WAS APPROACHED. GRAY TOLD WERBELL THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT THAT MIGHT CAUSE INTERNATIONAL

4.44

SECURITY

REPERCUSSIONS AND ASKED WERBELL FOR ADVICE. WERBELL ADVISED GRAY TO INFORM THE FBI IN LOS ANGELES, BUT GRAY WAS RELUCTANT TO DO SO. WERBELL THEN ASKED GRAY IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK WITH A MEMBER OF CIA AND GRAY AGREED. WERBELL TOLD GRAY THAT IF A REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA CONTACTED HIM, WERBELL'S NAME WOULD BE USED AS ENTREE.

4. THE ABOVE SOUNDS LIKE SOMETHING OUT OF THE "ARABIAN NIGHTS," BUT I DID MEET A CHET GRAY FROM LOS ANGELES AT A LOCAL CONTACT'S HOUSE IN 1962, SOME DETAILS OF WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN OOA(S)5601 AND OOA(S) 5598 DATED 18 DEC 62. GRAY IS A NOTORIOUS HOODLUM AND MIGHT EASILY HAVE BEEN APPROACHED FOR SUCH PURPOSE.

5a. PLEASE HANDLE THE ABOVE AS YOU SEE FIT.

SECRET

BT

Sam Papich says FBI will Talk To Werbell and Gray – Will advise of any action they want us To Take

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

12-79-00

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS   24 February 1967

ATT : Mr. Leland Bunn
Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. -- Communication from Chet GRAY
re Alleged Assassination Attempt
Against Foreign Diplomat -- FBI
Interest

A127700

REF : DCS memorandum dated 21 February 1967, same subject

1. Please forward a copy of the enclosed self-explanatory Diary Item to Mr. Sam Papich. Mr. Papich was informed of this matter by phone on 23 February 1967.

2. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 2733.

D. FRANK YOUNG

Enclosure: As stated above

CC: Mr. Sam Papich

4.43

VThorne:pat

DIARY, 23 February 1967

SUBJECT: Mitchell Werbell/Chet Gray

Gleichauf called to say that Werbell had heard from Gray both yesterday and the day before expressing concern over the fact that no one had contacted him concerning the alleged assassination attempt against a foreign diplomat. Gray stated that unless he heard from someone immediately he would go to the Governor of California, 23 February. This information was passed to Sam Papich by phone.

cc: Chief, Miami Office

JWMcConnell:mg

SECURITY

4.43

Miami (Gonzales)
(Conant)

24 FEB 1967

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NO. [illegible] 48261

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME WERBELL, Mitchell L.	3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 8 March 1918-Philadelphia, Pa.
2. ALIASES A 127900	4. SEX Male 5. CITIZENSHIP US

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No. and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	Powder Springs, Georgia

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	Leader of Organization to Combat Communism	Powder Springs, Georgia
?	?	Alexis, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia
?	?	Cool Roof of Georgia, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia
?	?	Werbell-South, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

27 FEB 1967

4.42

☐ CONTINUED

FORM 180 USE PREVIOUS
8-60 EDITIONS
MFG. 10-65

SECRET

A-12-79-00

MITCHEL L. WERBELL

Powder Springs, Georgia

BUSINESS:

4.41

EIRS-0422/79
10 Nov 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Maurice A. Sovern
Chief, PPL Group

ATTENTION: Lee E. Carle

FROM: George L. Karling
Chief, Operations Group

SUBJECT: Request for Records Search -- Robert John Morgan, et al. (U)

REFERENCE: OGC 79-08604 dated 20 September 1979

1. An intensive search of the files and indices of the Directorate of Operations has revealed no information concerning Robert John MORGAN, John Duncan LEIBOLT, Hubert Stewart COTTON, John Sylvester CARPENTER, Wayne Ernest DANIEL, or Guy Perilton OWEN. (U)

2. However, this search has revealed the following information concerning Wiley Gilmore SIMS (AKA: William Gilmore SIMMS) and Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III (AKA: Mitch THREE). (U)

A. William Gilmore SIMMS

1) In December 1968 SIMMS contacted the United States Embassy in Port of Spain, Trinidad, and talked to a representative of this Directorate. He requested assistance in retrieving an airplane impounded by authorities in Venezuela which they suspected was used in smuggling operations. SIMMS also stated that he had been in Guatemala looking for air freight business. The files of this Directorate contain no indication that any action was taken regarding this matter. (U)

2) SIMMS was never employed by this Directorate nor has this Directorate ever had any operational interest in him. (U)

B. Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III

1) WERBELL has never been employed by this Agency nor does this Agency have any operational interest in him. WERBELL was a commissioned officer with the OSS during World War II and served in the China-Burma-India

theater. In August of 1959, this Agency considered using WERBELL as a source of information on revolutionary activities in the Caribbean area, particularly Cuba, but terminated its consideration of his possible use in October 1959 when it was determined that his information was of little value and it was suspected that he would use the proposed connection with this Agency to promote his personal interests. (S)

2) In 1973 WERBELL was under investigation by the United States Treasury Department Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and by the United States Customs Service for activities relating to possible mercenary activities on Abaco Island in the Bahamas. In this connection, WERBELL contacted three retired CIA employees during 1974 in an attempt to involve them in a scheme concerning the activites of an organization called the Friends of Abaco (FOA) which advocated the secession of the island from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. All three individuals reported their contact with WERBELL and sought guidance from this Agency. In May and June of 1974 they were advised to break all ties with WERBELL. On 27 June 1974 the Federal Bureau of Investigation was formally apprised of WERBELL'S overtures to the three retired CIA employees. (S)

3. It has been determined that Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III is the subject of PA request number P76-0028. There is no indication that Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III has ever been the subject of an FOIA request or that the remaining individuals listed in reference have ever been the subject of an FOIA or PA request. (U)

George L. Marling

George L. Marling

OG/EIR:DHess/CCreaner/ran:6347 (14Nov79)
BASED ON: 201-259910
FILE IN: 201-259910 Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III
Distribution:
  Orig - Addressee w/ref.
    1 - OG/EIR w/ref.
    1 - OG/EIR Chrono

OGC 79-08601

20 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Administration
Attn: Chief, Security Analysis Group, OS
Associate Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Associate Deputy Director for Operations
Attn: ISA/DIP/IP/EIS
Thru: C/Reference Branch/ISS/IPG

FROM: John K. Greaney
General Counsel

SUBJECT: Request for Records Search --
Robert John Morgan, et al.

1. The Department of Justice is currently engaged in an investigation with state and federal law enforcement agencies concerning importation and distribution of marijuana and cocaine. Attached is a copy of the Department's letter to me requesting verification by CIA of any employment or other involvement with certain of the subjects of this investigation.

2. In order to respond to the Department's request, it would be appreciated if your offices could determine if there are any records on the subjects listed in the attached letter from the Justice Department.

John K. Greaney

John K. Greaney

Attachment

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Address Reply to the
Division Indicated WLM:mas
and Refer to Initials and Number

Organized Crime Strike Force
Richard B. Russell Federal Bldg.
Post Office Box 543
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
September 17, 1979

Mr. John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Greaney:

It was a pleasure to meet with you and Clyde Carter last Monday.

As I explained to you at that time, we are engaged in an investigation with state and federal law enforcement agencies concerning importation and distribution of marijuana and cocaine. During the course of this investigation, allegations (unfounded, I am sure) have been made that certain of the subjects of this investigation are employees of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I believe it is necessary to resolve as much in advance of an indictment any problems which may arise should any of the subjects of the investigation be involved with the Central Intelligence Agency.

The following individuals are among the subjects of this investigation:

Robert John Morgan - DOB: 3/6/36
John Duncan Leibolt - DOB: 1/25/24
Hubert Stewart Cotton - DOB: 11/19/23
John Sylvester Carpenter - DOB: 1/27/35
Wiley Gilmore Sims - DOB: 11/5/18
Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III - DOB: 3/8/18
Wayne Ernest Daniel - DOB: 2/13/40
Guy Perilton Owen - DOB: 11/1/45

Please advise as soon as possible if indictment or continued investigation of these individuals will create problems for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Sincerely,

William L. McCulley
Special Attorney
U. S. Dept. of Justice

cc: Robert L. Keuche
Deputy Asst. Attorney General
Criminal Division

Gerard T. McGuire
Deputy Chief
Organized Crime & Racketeering Section
Criminal Division

"CONFIDENTIAL"

FBI reports extracted from Werbell file (DCD):

① FBI report dated 6 August 1974 from Washington, FBI file (CI-3) 62-108665, SUBJECT: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III, INTERNAL SECRUITY - ABACO, NEUTRALITY MATTERS - ABACO.

② FBI report dated 22 July 1974 from Atlanta, Georgia, no Bureau file, Subject: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III.

"CONFIDENTIAL"

14-00000

[redacted] [redacted]

DCD-112/78
31 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/ISS/IP/EIS

FROM : Ruth Elliff
DCD/FIO/PAO

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Request (OLC 77-5685/4)

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject, 28 December 1977

1. In response to referenced request, I am forwarding the following material from DCD files:

a. Dan Carswell -- one memorandum which may relate to the individual you requested.

b. Louis Posada -- negative.

c. Cesario Diosada -- copies of all material in DCD files.

d. Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III -- file A-12-79-00, containing all DCD material. This file is on loan and should be returned to DCD as soon as possible. PLEASE HAND CARRY.

e. David Atlee Phillips -- negative.

f. Lucien Conein -- one document. (This document was also furnished in response to Conein's request [P 77-0805] under the Privacy Act.)

g. William Stuckey -- negative.

h. Ed Butler -- copies of all material in DCD files.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 386090

[redacted] [redacted]

DCD-112/78
31 January 1978

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA)
Request (OLC 77-5685/4)

i. Priscilla Johnson McMillan -- DCD response to her request (P 76-1861) under the Privacy Act. Full text and sanitized copies of all this material should be available from IPS. Also attached are four intelligence information reports which were not furnished in response to the PA request.

j. Richard Snyder -- one memorandum which may relate to the individual in whom you are interested.

k. Alexis Davison -- negative.

2. I have made no attempt to sanitize this material. I understand that HSCA staff members who will be examining these documents are fully cleared, and will not be allowed to remove any of this material from our Headquarters, make any copies of this material, or make any notes therefrom that would reveal any material that is properly classified and deals with intelligence sources and methods. All of the attached material is for your retention except file A-12-79-00.

3. Please direct further inquiries about this matter to the undersigned on extension 3767.

Ruth Elliff
Ruth Elliff

Attachments a/s

RELLIFF:wfc
Distribution
  Orig & 1 - Addressee, w/atts
    1 - C/DCD, wo/atts
    1 - C/Staff A, wo/atts
    3 - RElliff
    11 - Control

[illegible] - WerBell [illegible]
records from DCD - [illegible]
judge demanded [illegible] on him
available for review by him (judge)

judge stored in Miami -

Bust is suing us - He could be
dragged into lawsuit - Works for
Anderson

WARREN
3136292
27 July

A 8161

[illegible] on 24 Aug

Chief

C O N F I D E N T I A L 092000Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13506

TO: PRIORITY DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

TO: OFFICE OF THE CHIEF (SPILMAN) FROM HENNESSEY

WNINTEL

SUBJ: FIELD OFFICE ASSISTANCE TO OGC

REF : SPILMAN/MAINWARING TELECON, 9 SEPTEMBER 1976, SAME SUBJECT

1541

1. IN RESPONSE TO A TELEPHONE CALL FROM DEPUTY CHIEF, DCD, ON 23 AUGUST 1976, WE MADE HOTEL RESERVATIONS IN CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA, FOR WALTER LLOYD, OGC, FOR THE NIGHT OF 23 AUGUST. THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE WAS HELD OPEN THAT EVENING FOR A MEETING ATTENDED BY MR. LLOYD, SAMUEL SHERES, US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND WILLIAM WARNER, US DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION. JACK HENNESSEY, DCD/MIAMI, ALSO ATTENDED AND PROVIDED A SHORT GENERAL BRIEFING ON DCD OPERATIONS. FOR THE MOST PART, THE MEETING CONSISTED OF A DISCUSSION OF THE PAST RELATIONSHIP OF MITCHELL L. WERBELL III WITH BKHERALD, ESPECIALLY WITH DCD AS REVEALED IN THE DCD MEMORANDUM TO OGC DATED 3 MARCH 1976.

2. WE WERE ADVISED BY TELEPHONE DURING THE EVENING OF 27 AUGUST BY A. THOMANN, DCD DUTY OFFICER, AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY WALTER LLOYD, THAT LLOYD WOULD VISIT MIAMI AGAIN ON 30 AUGUST IN CONNECTION WITH THE WERBELL CASE. LLOYD DID NOT TASK DCD/MIAMI IN ANY WAY DURING THIS VISIT. HOWEVER, HE DID CHECK IN WITH US LOCALLY BY TELEPHONE UPON ARRIVAL IN THE MIAMI AREA. HE CALLED US AGAIN DURING THE EVENING OF 31 AUGUST AFTER HIS RETURN FLIGHT TO WASHINGTON, D.C., AS A COURTESY SINCE HE DID NOT HAVE THE TIME TO CONTACT US PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM MIAMI.

3. MR. LLOYD AGAIN RETURNED TO MIAMI, THIS TIME ONBOARD A USAF JET STAR AIRCRAFT, EARLY ON THE MORNING OF 2 SEPTEMBER. HE CONTACTED US THAT AFTERNOON BY TELEPHONE TO REQUEST THAT WE KEEP OPEN THE FIELD OFFICE SO THAT HE COULD DEPOSIT CLASSIFIED FILES IN OUR VAULT OVERNIGHT. HE APPEARED AT THE FIELD OFFICE AT 1730 HOURS AND BRIEFED

US ON HIS TRAVEL OF THE DAY. HE PLACED TWO FOLDERS OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN OUR VAULT FOR THE NIGHT, AND RECLAIMED THEM ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING, 3 SEPTEMBER. IN ADDITION TO MAKING WORKING SPACE AVAILABLE TO LLOYD FOR A COUPLE OF HOURS DURING THE MORNING OF 3 SEPTEMBER, WE MADE OURSELVES AVAILABLE FOR ANY FURTHER ASSISTANCE THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED THAT DAY. HOWEVER, NOTHING FURTHER WAS REQUESTED OF US. THE LOCAL OS OFFICE PROVIDED AN ESCORT FOR LLOYD'S RETURN COMMERCIAL FLIGHT TO WASHINGTON LATER THAT AFTERNOON. LLOYD ADVISED US IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, THAT THE LOCAL JUDGE HANDLING THE WERBELL CASE ASKED FOR LLOYD TO APPEAR IN MIAMI AGAIN DURING THE FOLLOWING WEEK, WHICH APPARENTLY BECAME UNNECESSARY SINCE WERBELL AND HIS CO-DEFENDANTS WERE ACQUITTED OF ALL CHARGES BY THE JURY ON 3 SEPTEMBER.

4. AFTER RECEIVING TWO OR THREE TELEPHONE CALLS FROM MR. SHERES, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MIAMI, ON 25 AUGUST, DURING WHICH HE ASKED FOR BKHERALD INFORMATION HELD IN BKHERALD HEADQUARTERS FILES, WE SUGGESTED THAT HE CALL LLOYD DIRECTLY AT HIS OGC OFFICE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ATTEMPTED USE OF DCD/MIAMI AS A CHANNEL BY SHERES STEMMED FROM THE SEEMING (TO HIM) EXPEDIENT NATURE OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT AS MUCH AS FROM A BASIC MISUNDERSTANDING OF BKHERALD'S CHAIN OF COMMAND AND INFORMATION FLOW STRUCTURE. NEVERTHELESS, NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTIES DEVELOPED DURING THE VISITS TO DCD/MIAMI BY LLOYD.
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Watts [illegible]

Attached is all the material DCD has on Werbel. He has been the subject of several communications between DCD's FIO/PIC staff and OGC and the FIO staff in the DDO.

Also attached is the microfilm records on [illegible] a Arnold A. Bayard. I don't think he is the Colonel Bayard referred to in the memo, but it is hard to tell since we don't have any bio data on him.

4.54 (DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

OGC 76-0844

24 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOG
Chief, DCD
Chief, LA Division

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston Werbel III

1. I was advised by the Justice Department on 23 February that Werbel has been indicted and the trial is scheduled to begin on 29 March in Miami, Florida. The charges relate to importing and distributing quantities of marijuana. With Werbel's propensity to raise his past affiliations with the Agency, we can anticipate problems during this trial. An additional problem is presented because Werbel is defended by Edwin Marger who was the defense attorney for John Hawk in the B-26 case in Buffalo, New York in 1966. It was Edwin Marger who subpoenaed the CIA General Counsel as a defense witness.

2. The Justice Department has received information that a person either currently or formerly affiliated with the CIA has been participating in Werbel's meetings with his attorney. It would be appreciated if all addressees could review their holdings on Werbel and determine if there is any validity to any recent contacts with him. I would urge that instructions be sent to Miami that no, repeat no, contact with Werbel take place between now and the beginning of the trial.

3. It would be helpful if each addressee could prepare a summary of the various contacts Werbel has had with CIA in the past. Please check to see if you have any information on a Colonel Bayard who was killed in Atlanta, Georgia during the summer of 1975. Bayard, reportedly an associate of Werbel's, had previous contacts with the Agency. It would be appreciated if your responses could be received by close of business 2 March.

John K Greaney

John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

4.54

A097744

ARNOLD A. BAYARD

1175 York Avenue
New York City, New York.

BUSINESS:

Subject is President with:

A097745 - M. L. Bayard Company, Inc., Philadelphia, Penna.

4.54

[illegible]

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

F 92744

31 OCT 1961

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, Contact Division, OO	DATE: 31 October 1961
	FROM: Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS

SUBJECT: [illegible], Arnold A. - ([illegible])

A 92744

1. Reference is made to your request for a security clearance on the subject person as a potential source of intelligence information. The necessary checks have been completed with the following results:

a. ☐ No additional information has been obtained, except for such biographic information as indicated below or in the attachment.

b. ☒ Information has been received that Subject was investigated with favorable results in 1950.

c. ☐ Certain information has been received and appears in the attachment which your Division will wish to consider in determining the extent and level of your use of Subject.

2. It is to be noted that our checks were made on the basis of the identifying information you furnished or as an attachment to this memorandum. Should it be disclosed that this information is erroneous or that Subject is known by a different name, this Division should be notified immediately.

Chief, Personnel Security Division

9 NOV 1961

FORM 1150

CONFIDENTIAL

4.54

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME
BAYNES Arnold A 92744

2. ALIASES

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
27 Nov 19[illegible] - [illegible], N. J.

4. SEX M

5. CITIZENSHIP US

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No. and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
[illegible]	Date	1175 Park Avenue, New York City, N. Y.

CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
[illegible]	Date	E. I. [illegible] Company, Inc. ([illegible])	Philadelphia, Penna.

92745

CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR
[illegible]	[illegible]	Lehigh University	BS in Mechanical Engineering

10. [illegible]

CONTINUED

4 CL

14-00000

Control

CONFIDENTIAL

3 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Washington
Chief, Miami

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston Werbell III

1. The attached memorandum was prepared for John Greaney, OGC, who requested a summary of our records on Mitchell L. Werbell III. Werbell is to be tried in March 1976 in Florida on a charge of importing narcotics. OGC anticipates that Werbell may claim some Agency connection because he has done so in the past. Greaney also asked about DCD connections with Colonel Bayard who is mentioned in paragraph 9 of the attached memorandum.

2. OGC has asked that there be no contact with Werbell at least until the trial is over. In view of Werbell's tendency to become involved in schemes with which the Agency cannot afford to be identified, I wish to extend indefinitely the OGC's injunction against contact with him.

JACKSON R. HORTON
Chief, Domestic Collection Division

Attachment: A/S

Distribution:
2 - Washington
2 - Miami
2 - DCD
1 - C/P&E

DZIEKER/kb

E2 IMPDET CL BY 038352

4.53

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : John K. Greaney

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston Werbell III

REFERENCE : OGC 76-0344 dated 24 February 1976

1. A review of DCD records indicates that Mitchell L. Werbell III was an occasional contact and source of this Division from 24 July 1959, when he first initiated the contact, until March 1971. It appears from our records that all of the contacts were at Werbell's volition and that at no time was he viewed as a particularly useful or reliable source. Werbell did provide unsolicited information which was reported by DCD in seven foreign intelligence information reports. In January 1976 DCD responded to a Freedom of Information inquiry from Werbell. Copies of the documents released to him are available from the DDO/PIC.

2. After meeting with Werbell at his own request in July 1959 the Chief of the Miami Field Office noted in a Memorandum for the Record that little credence could be placed in anything Werbell said. During succeeding contacts Werbell provided information which resulted in the following reports:

a. Photographs of Camarioca Harbor, Cuba (1965)

b. Dope and arms running, Dominican Republic (1965)

c. Planned coup in Guatemala (1966)

d. Political, economic, military situation in Dominican Republic (1966)

e. Planned invasion of Haiti (1966)

f. Planned invasion of Haiti (1966)

g. Venezuelan request for arms (1967)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

CONFIDENTIAL

4.53

12-99-00

FEB 27 10 47 AM '76

CONFIDENTIAL 271454Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/WASHINGTON 13854

TO: PRIORITY DCD/MIAMI

MAINWARING FROM ZEIMER

12-99-00

SUBJECT: MITCHELL L. WERBELL, III

HAS MIAMI FIELD OFFICE HAD ANY CONTACT WITH WERBELL DURING PAST YEAR? WHEN WAS LAST CONTACT? E2 IMPDET CL BY 038552

CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 27 [illegible] 76

C O N F I D E N T I A L 271600Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13136

TO: PRIORITY DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: OFFICE OF THE CHIEF (ZEIMER)

SUBJ: MITCHELL L. WERBELL, III

REF : DCD/WASHINGTON 13834.

WE HAVE HAD NO RECENT CONTACT WHATSOEVER WITH MITCHELL WERBELL, III. THE LAST CONTACT BY THIS OFFICE WAS A TELEPHONE CALL RECEIVED BY JAY GLEICHAUF ON 9 MARCH 1971 AND DISCUSSED IN MIM-056-71.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

C O N F I D E N T I A L

4,52

12-79-00

FEB 26 3 34 PM '76

CONFIDENTIAL 262006Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/WASHINGTON 13925

TO: PRIORITY DCD/MIAMI

FROM ZEIMER

12 79.00

SUBJECT: MITCHELL L. WERBELL III

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT HAS ADVISED OGC THAT SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICTED AND TRIAL WILL BEGIN ON 29 MARCH 1976. THERE MUST BE NO REPEAT NO DCD CONTACT WITH WERBELL EVEN IF HE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO INITIATE THE CONTACT. E2 IMPDET CL BY 038592

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

22 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/PIC

ATTENTION : Hal Matter

SUBJECT : P 76-023 - Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III

1. DCD records reflect that Subject has been in contact with the Agency since 1959. The last record of contact with Subject was in March 1971.

2. The documents in DCD's file which pertain to Subject fit into the following categories:

a. CIA Office of Security namecheck data (OS File Number 27686)

One biographic data sheet is attached for release to Subject provided those portions marked with brackets are deleted from the released version.

b. Eighteen internal documents are attached and may be released to Subject provided those portions marked with brackets are deleted from the released versions. Deletions are based on exemptions (j) (1) (b), (j) (1) (d), (j) (1) (e), (j) (1) (f) and (k) (1).

c. Attached are two newspaper articles which pertain to Subject and which may be released to him.

d. DCD also has a document which reflects that Subject provided DCD with 36 black and white photographs taken of the Camarioca Harbor area of Cuba. DCD has neither the originals nor copies of these photographs although they may be retrievable from NPIC. Should Subject request that these photographs be returned to him, we would make every effort to surface them.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

4,51

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: P 76-023 - Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III

A copy of this document is attached and may be released to Subject provided those portions marked with brackets are deleted from the released version.

e. DCD also has two FR Division cables which pertain to Subject. One is from FR/Atlanta (00349) to Director, dated 11 July 1974. The other is to FR/New York (670514) from NE/ARN/I, dated 17 March 1975.

f. One FBI report (CI-3) 62-108665
DATE: 6 August 1974
TO: Director, CIA
FROM: Director, FBI
Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

g. DCD has reference to a report on the Dominican Republic which Subject provided DCD in September 1966. DCD, however, does not have a copy of this document. A notation in our file indicates that the document was sent to OCI/WH/Dominican Desk. DCD records do not reflect the exact title, only that it is a report on the Dominican Republic.

h. Six internal DCD documents which may not be released to Subject. Copies are attached for your information. Denial is based on exemptions (j) (1) (b), (j) (1) (d) and (k) (1).

i. DCD suggests that in answering Subject's request he be informed that Agency records indicate that he willingly provided information that resulted in seven foreign intelligence information reports. Four of these reports received advance teletype dissemination. We suggest that Subject be informed that the Agency is reluctant to declassify and release the eleven documents via the mail as such an action would put them in the public domain. Should Subject insist on seeing the documents, DCD will consider sanitizing and showing them to him in the presence of an Agency representative.

j. DCD also has one memorandum for the record which concerns an OGC trace on Subject's sons, dated 18 April 1975. A copy of this document is attached

4.51

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: P 76-028 - Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III

for your information. In light of paragraph one of OGC 75-4582, dated 10 December 1975, can we assume that this is not a record?

3. DCD suggests that a statement thanking Subject for his cooperation be included in the Agency's response to his request.

JACKSON R. HORTON
Chief, Domestic Collection Division

Attachments:
As stated

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Control
1 - DCD/Privacy
1 - OC/DCD
ro

4.57

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

NO. [illegible]

24 FEB 1967

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME
WERBELL, Mitchell L.

2. ALIASES
[illegible] 127900

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
8 March 1918-Philadelphia, Pa.

4. SEX
Male

5. CITIZENSHIP
US

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No. and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	Powder Springs, Georgia

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	Leader of Organization to Combat Communism	Powder Springs, Georgia
?	?	Alexis, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia
?	?	Cool Roof of Georgia, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia
?	?	Werbell-South, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

27 FEB 1967

451

☐ CONTINUED

FORM 150 USE PREVIOUS
8-53 EDITIONS
[illegible] 10-63

1

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

E-12-7 9-00

MIM-008-74

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
ATTN : Support Branch/OSS (Ryan/[illegible])

11 January 1974

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell, III

REF : OSS-44-74, Dated 8 January 1974

Thank you for referent. For the record, subject has made no further effort to contact anyone in this office; similarly, we plan no attempts to get in touch with him. Thus the matter rests there at this writing. Should he call again, however, we will keep the advice contained in referent in mind in dealing with him.

BRUCE N. MAINWARING

BCM:mbj

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

4.51

B

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

1-12-79-00

Chief, Miami Field Office
ATTN : Mr. Bruce Mainwaring

033-44-74
8 January 1974

Chief, Domestic Collection Division (Support Branch/033)

Mitchell L. Werbell, III

1. We have reviewed subject's 201 file for additional information. Subject was of interest to this Agency in 1959 and was granted a POA in August of that year. This was cancelled in October 1959 when his information proved to be of little value and because it was suspected he was using Agency funds to promote his personal interests. He has subsequently attempted to pass himself off as an Agency employee. He is characterized by the file as unscrupulous, a "wheeler-dealer" and a promoter of grandiose schemes. The subject has been under investigation in 1973 by both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the United States Customs Service for activities relating to possible mercenary activities in Abaco Island, Bahamas.

2. If the subject should contact your office again, we suggest you accept whatever information he has to offer but make no further commitments concerning Agency contact. Subject is well known to the appropriate desk and is of extremely doubtful character.

3. We trust this memorandum will provide you with useful information concerning this subject. Thank you for bringing his name to our attention.

JACKSON R. HORTON

SPRyan for EBAmes/b
cc: Services Br. (Control)
IP Files

FILE: MM-35819

E-2 IMPDET CL. BY 010830

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

4.51

12-19-00

Chief, Washington Field Office 12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (DCS)

A-168946 A-168762

[illegible] WerBell [illegible] Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : [illegible]/[illegible] telecom

A-127900

1. Attached per recent telephone conversations is copy of [illegible] report of [illegible] Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Powder Springs, Georgia. Please note [illegible] of the Board, is Mitchell [illegible] WerBell, III. WerBell is a former officer of [illegible] (OSS) [illegible] known to this writer during assignments in China during WWII.

2. [illegible] have considerable information on [illegible] [illegible] He is [illegible] [illegible] and perpetual financial difficulties.

3. WerBell was [illegible] in connection with [illegible] [illegible] We do not [illegible] to [illegible] WerBell. [illegible] of FBI and possible information of operational significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
OO/[illegible]/lld
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILED: [illegible]

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON APPROVAL OF DCI

4.57

SECRET

12-79-00

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS   16 March 1971

Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston, III -- Revocation of DOD Security Clearance/Recent Contact --
[illegible]
[illegible]

1. The information reported in the enclosed self-explanatory memorandum, regarding Subject's self-initiated contact with the Miami Field Office, may be of interest.

2. The Office of the General Counsel and WH Division have been apprised of Subject's recent activities.

3. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. [illegible]

SECURITY

WILLIAM J. VAUGHAN

Enclosure: As stated above

VThorne:grv

4.51

SECRET

OCC (John Creany)

F 12-77-00

MIM-056-71

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : John McConnell
John Creany (OCC)
Chief, Miami Field Office

10 March 1971

B

Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. On 9 Mar 71 we received a long distance call, presumably from Powder Springs, Georgia, from subject, who is an old and unsavory contact of this office dating from 1959. Werbell has been involved in a variety of escapades, the latest of which concerned an abortive invasion of Haiti which John Creany was very much concerned about a year or so ago.

2. Werbell stated that the Department of Defense had just revoked his security clearance on grounds of Werbell's "frivolous behavior" in the Haitian caper. Werbell stated that he intended to "fight it to the Supreme Court", as he had always kept us and other elements of the US Government informed concerning developments in the Haitian matter.

3. Werbell asked if there was anything that we could do for him in the way of interceding for him with the DOD, and we informed him bluntly and in no uncertain terms that he was strictly on his own, and we could do nothing for him. He then asked if it would be worthwhile to subpoena Bart Gonzales. We informed him that it was up to his attorney to make such recommendations.

4. Werbell seemed to get the message, and then offered to keep us advised regarding an alleged forthcoming attempt on Haiti which is being sponsored by Rolando Masferrer, even though Masferrer is currently incarcerated in a federal prison. We told Werbell that if he wished to pass any information along we would accept it but under no circumstances should he attempt to elicit any information on our behalf. He agreed that he would operate on this basis and said he might be in touch with us again.

5. In view of Werbell's record we felt that this latest contact should be a matter of record and that OCC should be informed of developments.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG/ces

cc: V Thomas - 3/15

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4.51

Dec 3 [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL 031538Z DEC 69 CITE CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 2447

CONTACTS/MIAMI

FROM MCCONNELL

JOHN GREANEY, OGC, WILL BE COMING TO MIAMI MONDAY, 8 DECEMBER, IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRIAL OF THE EIGHT INDIVIDUALS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF PORT-AU-PRINCE.

D A127700

NEW SUBJECT: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL OF ATLANTA IS MENTIONED IN A (WASHINGTON POST) ARTICLE TODAY IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGED RECEIPT OF GUNS SHIPPED FROM VIETNAM THROUGH EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE. MR. GREANEY SUGGESTS THAT YOU AVOID, IF POSSIBLE, ANY CONTACT WITH WERBELL.

CONFIDENTIAL

4.51

14-00000

F-12-79-00

CONFIDENTIAL

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : John McConnell

31 March 1967
MIM - 028- 67

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell A 127900

Think you will be interested in the attached clippings, which indicate that all charges have been dropped against WerBell. Please pass to John Greaney, Office of General Counsel.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:sb

Enclosure:

4.51

F-12-79-00

Miami [illegible] Herald

24 March 1967

att to Miami 0981
dated 31 Mar 67, Sub:
Mitchell & [illegible]

4.51

CONFIDENTIAL F-12-79-00

Director, Domestic Contact Service 24 March 1967

ATTN : John McConnell

MIM-036-67

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell A 127900

REF : MIM-060-67

1. WerBell called the Miami office on 23 Mar 67 and when told that Bart Gonzalez was not in, advised the secretary that the Federal charges against him had been dropped. We have not confirmed this. We do not intend to renew our contacts with him for the time being at least.

2. Please advise John Greaney of the Office of the General Counsel of this development and give us whatever recommendations he or you may have as to our future relations with WerBell.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:pw

4.51

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL E-12-79-00

Director, Domestic Contact Service

2 March 1967

ATTN : John McConnell

MDI-060-67

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell A-127900

1. You will recall that John Greaney of the Office of General Counsel was in Miami for several days in connection with the federal case pending against subject. WerBell was indicted on federal conspiracy charges growing out of the abortive invasion attempt of Haiti a short time ago.

2. Following the indictment WerBell called us and indicated that he was to be interviewed on "nationwide TV through station WSB-TV in Atlanta." We called Harry McCrea and asked him to monitor local coverage, and we covered the NBC stations for a period of several days. WerBell did not appear on a national hookup, but Harry McCrea informed us that he did appear on a two-minute taped segment on the WSB-TV, 8:25 A.M. telecast only. WerBell said he would, if he could, "make a citizen's arrest of Dwight Eisenhower, John McCone, et al, because he did no more than they did." Harry said that he didn't believe that the station took his statement seriously.

3. WerBell was also interviewed by "The Atlanta Constitution", and we are enclosing a clipping from the "Constitution" of 28 Feb 67 in which WerBell is quoted concerning the indictment.

4. Would you please pass the above to John Greaney. You might inform him that the statement of an undesignated federal official in Miami undoubtedly refers to the Customs agent in charge, with whom WerBell had a conversation prior to calling us. WerBell quoted him in the same fashion in our conversation. We have had no further contact with WerBell.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:pw

Enclosure:
As stated

4.51

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

F-12-79-00

SECRET

S E C R E T 231432Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1714

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: JOHN MCCONNELL

SUBJECT: ALLEGED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

A-12 7900

REF: A. MIAMI 1710

B. MC CONNELL/GLEICHAUF TELCONS OF 21 FEB AND 23 FEB 67

FEB 23

MITCHELL VER BELL CALLED DANT GONZALES YESTERDAY TO ADVISE THAT HE HAD RECEIVED TWO PHONE CALLS FROM CHET GRAY EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT NO ONE HAD CONTACTED HIM FOR DETAILS CONCERNING THE ALLEGED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT REFERRED TO IN MIAMI 1710. GRAY STATED THAT UNLESS HE HEARD FROM SOMEBODY IMMEDIATELY, HE WOULD TAKE HIS INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA ON THE MORNING OF 23 FEB 67. WE CURRENTLY HAVE AN ADDRESS FOR GRAY: 324 NORTH OAKHURST DRIVE, BEVERLY HILLS; TELE: 274-4922.

B-67-54

S E C R E T

SI

Copy F/# B-67-54 (Chet Gray)

1/

4.51

[illegible]

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS   24 February 1967

ATT : Mr. Leland Dunn
Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. -- Communication from [illegible]
re Alleged Assassination [illegible]
Against Foreign Diplomat -- [illegible]
Interest

A1 27100

REF : DCS memorandum dated 21 February 1967, same subject

1. Please forward a copy of the enclosed [illegible] [illegible] to Mr. [illegible] Popich. Mr. Popich was informed of this matter by phone on 23 February 1967.

2. Any questions pertaining to this [illegible] should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. [illegible]

R. FRANK [illegible]

Enclosure: As stated above

CC: Mr. [illegible] Popich

VThorne:pat

4.51

Contact
F-12-79-00

SECRET

DIARY, 23 February 1967

SUBJECT: Mitchell Werbell/Chet Gray

Mitchell A-127900 B-67-54 Cu

Gleichauf called to say that Werbell had heard from Gray both yesterday and the day before expressing concern over the fact that no one had contacted him concerning the alleged assassination attempt against a foreign diplomat. Gray stated that unless he heard from someone immediately he would go to the Governor of California, 23 February. This information was passed to Sam Papich by phone.

B-69-41

cc: Chief, Miami Office

JMcConnell:mg

Copies f/ all jackets!

4.51

SECRET

/127900

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS 21 February 1967

ATT : Mr. Leland Rums

Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. -- Recent Telephone Call from Chet GRAY of Los Angeles re Possible Assassination in US of Close Relative of Middle East Ruler

A-127900

1. The enclosed copy of teletype from our Miami Field Office is forwarded for your information and immediate transmittal to the FBI.

2. Mr. John McConnell, of this Office, has discussed this matter with Mr. Sam Papich, FBI, who said the FBI will contact Subject and GRAY, and will subsequently advise us of any action they might want us to take.

3. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 27[illegible]

SECRET

B. FRANK YOUNG

Enclosure: Teletype Contacts/Miami-1710
dated 20 February 1967

VThorne:pat

4.51

Law Offices
of
Edwin Marger

Edwin Marger (Fla. & Ga.)
Reid Kennedy (Ia. & Ga.)
Richard A. Garcia
Robert O. Davies
Donald B. Walker
Nancy L. Finkel

Allan J. Hall (Fla. & Ga.)
of Counsel

Telephone 256-[illegible]
Area Code (404)

Suite 320
6666 Powers Ferry Road
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

P 76-028 LO 13

December 30, 1975

Gene F. Wilson,
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter of December 18th, 1975 concerning our client, Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III and his request for information under the Freedom of Information Act.

I am enclosing a notarized statement providing you with the address and place of birth of Mr. WerBell.

With regard to your last paragraph asking for clarification as to which records he desires to have searched, we, of course, are not familiar with your files or filing system. Mr. WerBell spent sometime in the United States Army during World War II and has traveled extensively since that time. He was in Cuba at the time of the Castro military operation, in the Dominican Republic during that military operation and in Thailand and Viet Nam during the Viet Nam War. We feel quite confident your office must have extensive files and documentation concerning Mr. WerBell and this request for information is intended to

HH's
21170
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]

4.49
[illegible]

cover all information contained in the files of your agency.

Should any of the matter contained in your files have a security clearance classification that would preclude its dissemination, we would appreciate being notified that the information exists.

We would appreciate your early attention to the foregoing.

Very truly yours,

Reid Kennedy

Reid Kennedy

RK:dcn
Enclosure (1)

4.49

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF GEORGIA:
SS
COUNTY OF FULTON:

I, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III, after first being duly sworn, do hereby, under oath, depose and say that my current address is 4321 MacLand Dallas Road, Powder Springs, Georgia, 37007. Further, that I was born on March 8, 1918, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

I further swear and affirm that I am the same MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III, whose signature appears below and that I am the same person who is making the request for release of information.

MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III

Sworn to and Subscribed before me, Notary Public, on the 31st day of December, 1975.

Notary Public, Georgia State at Large

My Commission expires: [illegible]

4,49

E-12-79-00

SECRET

FEB 20 11 53 AM 73

S E C R E T 201937Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1710

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: MCCONNELL

FROM: GLEICHAUF

A 127900

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED A MOST UNUSUAL PHONE CALL FROM MITCHELL WERBELL, POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, DETAILS OF WHICH FOLLOW:

2. WERBELL IS A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE WHO HAS BEEN IN OCCASIONAL CONTACT WITH THIS OFFICE, OF HIS OWN VOLITION, SINCE 1959. WHILE AN UNSAVORY CHARACTER, MUCH OF THE INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED HAS PROVED TRUE. HE FURNISHED COMPLETE DETAILS ON THE RECENT HAITIAN INVASION PLAN. THE PHONE CALL WAS RECEIVED BY BART GONZALES FROM HIM AT 1122 HOURS ON 19 FEBRUARY. HE STATED THAT HE HAD JUST HAD A TELEPHONE CALL FROM CHET GRAY OF LOS ANGELES, NO ADDRESS (PHONE 274-4922).

Gray B-67-57

3. GRAY STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED REGARDING THE POSSIBLE ASSASSINATION IN THE U.S. OF A CLOSE RELATIVE, POSSIBLY A BROTHER OR SON, OF A MIDDLE-EAST RULER, WITHIN THE NEXT 10 DAYS. HE DID NOT FURNISH THE NAME OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM, NOR BY WHOM HE WAS APPROACHED. GRAY TOLD WERBELL THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT THAT MIGHT CAUSE INTERNATIONAL

F1 # B-67-57 (Chet Gray)

4,57

REPERCUSSIONS AND ASKED WERBELL FOR ADVICE. WER

BELL ADVISED GRAY TO INFORM THE FBI IN LOS ANGELES, BUT GRAY WAS RELUCTANT TO DO SO. WERBELL THEN ASKED GRAY IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK WITH A MEMBER OF CIA AND GRAY AGREED. WERBELL TOLD GRAY THAT IF A REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA CONTACTED HIM, WERBELL'S NAME WOULD BE USED AS ENTREE.

4. THE ABOVE SOUNDS LIKE SOMETHING OUT OF THE "ARABIAN NIGHTS," BUT I DID MEET A CHET GRAY FROM LOS ANGELES AT A LOCAL CONTACT'S HOUSE IN 1962, SOME DETAILS OF WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN OOA(S)5601 AND OOA(S) 5593 DATED 18 DEC 62. GRAY IS A NOTORIOUS HOODLUM AND MIGHT EASILY HAVE BEEN APPROACHED FOR SUCH PURPOSE.

5. PLEASE HANDLE THE ABOVE AS YOU SEE FIT.

S E C R E T

ST

4.51

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

PRIORITY WAVE CITE MIAM 1258.

ATTN: MC CONNELL

SUBJECT: RUMORED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON FIDEL CASTRO

REF: MIA 677-63 OF 17 DEC 63 A 127902

1. MITCHELL WERBELL ADVISED BART GONZALES THAT A GROUP OF SIX MEN IN HIS ORGANIZATION HAS PENETRATED CUBA AND IS CURRENTLY IN THE VARADERO/HAVANA AREA. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE IS ASSASSINATION OF FIDEL CASTRO TO BE ATTEMPTED WITHIN 3-9 JANUARY. IF FOUND NOT POSSIBLE, SECONDARY TARGET WILL BE TO BLOW UP THE ELECTRIC PLANT FURNISHING ELECTRICITY TO HAVANA.

2. THE GROUP IS TO USE AN AIRPLANE MODEL TYPE OF RADIO DETONATOR. THEY WERE UNABLE TO PROCURE CONTROLLED FREQUENCY RADIO DETONATORS WHICH WERE PREFERRED BECAUSE OF HIGHER QUALITY. THE DETONATOR ALLEGEDLY WILL BE THROWN AT CASTRO OR THEY WILL USE SUB-MACHINE GUNS IN THE COURSE OF A PUBLIC APPEARANCE BY CASTRO. NO INDICATION AS TO HOW THEY KNOW WHEN OR WHERE HE WILL APPEAR. GROUP SAID TO KNOW MISSION IS SUICIDAL.

3. ATTEMPT ON THE ELECTRIC PLANT WILL BE TO KILL GUARDS AND PENETRATE AREA FOLLOWING WHICH THEY WILL BLOW UP KEY EQUIPMENT.

4. WERBELL SAID THAT [illegible] ALSO ALLEGEDLY HAS A GROUP IN CUBA AT PRESENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSASSINATING FIDEL CASTRO.

5. PLEASE HANDLE ABOVE AS YOU SEE FIT. FYI: WERBELL IS A NOTORIOUS CON MAN AND A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE. HE IS CONSIDERED UNRELIABLE.

~~S E C R E T [illegible]~~

CFN 1258 MC CONNELL FIDEL CASTRO MIA 677 63 17 DEC 63 MITCHELL WERBELL BART GONZALES 6 CUBA VARADERO HAVANA 3 9 JANUARY NOT POSSIBLE UNABLE TO NO INDICATION [illegible] FYI CON CONSIDERED UNRELIABLE

BT

4.51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Index Branch
Chief, Miami Field Office

27 July 1959

Memorandum of Visit to Mitchell WerBell III
2211 Segovia Circle
Coral Gables, Florida

1. In the evening of 24 July 1959 I received a telephone call from subject, who had been given my name and address by another segment of the intelligence community in connection with the possibility of his passing along late information concerning the rumored impending flight of Batista to the US.

2. Warbell indicated that he spent a great amount of his time in the Dominican Republic and had extremely close association with leaders of the government, and also with General Jose Pedraza. He claimed to have been a former member of the OSS with service in China in WWII. Warbell is a soldier-of-fortune type who wears a monocle, drives a Mercedes-Benz, sports a most attractive blonde girl friend, and is a Big Spender. He also volunteered that he has a wife and six children living in Georgia.

3. Warbell told me that his principle source of income is in dealing with Cuban pesos, and said that he is associated in the business with a John Lipko of Los Angeles, a jazz musician who formerly played with the Jimmy Dorsey and Jan Garber bands.

4. Lipko also claims to have been a member of OSS during WWII, serving in the Rumanian and Eastern European area. Lipko was busily engaged in making long distance phone calls to Mexico City, Guatemala City, and Los Angeles during a part of the time I was with the group.

5. Warbell gave me some information on Batista's plans, which is basically supposition, and furnished some other marginal information which is being forwarded, although in my opinion little credence can be placed in anything he says. It is hard to evaluate what Warbell's motives are in connection with his desire to furnish information regarding Batista to us, but it appeared that he was also attempting to fish for information, throwing out a number of questions concerning the Biltmore Terrace Hotel, reportedly recently to have been purchased by Cuban interests with 9 million Cuban pesos. The penthouse reportedly has been completely redecorated, with heavy steel doors guarding the entrance. This penthouse suite has been rumored to be Batista's intended headquarters once he arrives in the US. All of this has been written about in the gossip columns of the local papers.

6. Inasmuch as Warbell has my name and phone number, probably little can be done to prevent him getting in touch with me from time to time, but contact will not be initiated by me except by direction. The basic purpose of this memo is for the record.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:cm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

The Atlanta Journa
Covers Dixie Like the Dew
Since 1883
James M. Cox, Chairman 1939-1957—James M. Cox Jr., Chair 1957-1974
Jack Tarver, President • Jack Spalding, Editor
22-A ★★★★★ APRIL 9, 197

The Need for MARTOC

THE POSSIBILITIES of MARTA for both good and bad are tremendous. On the good side the area needs a rapid and economical transportation system. The area also needs a big construction project.

When MARTA was established it was apparent that the good it would bring was balanced by the tremendous possibilities for patronage and featherbedding. So a committee was established by the General Assembly to oversee MARTA and it was called MARTOC.

The area needs MARTA but it now needs MARTOC as never before.

Labor contract time is coming up for MARTA and upon its outcome rides the fate of the 15-cent fare. The chairman of MARTA's board is John Wright, a labor man, and [illegible] have faith in Mr. Wright [illegible] ment that he would [illegible] still we're happy that [illegible] be watching. MARTA [illegible] into problems delaying [illegible] tion of its rail system. [illegible] with consummation of [illegible] other with the [illegible] ther is insu[illegible] but [illegible] mean more de[illegible] more [illegible] more wond[illegible] effi- ciency of the operation.

MARTA's board is [illegible] the handling of these [illegible] today's board isn't as [illegible] yesterday's. We're happy [illegible] around to backstop and [illegible] committee is aware of [illegible] duties here.

~~Which Domino Is Ne~~

4.51

C

14-00000

F12-79-00

18 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Werbell

1. On 17 April 1975, Annet, DDO/FIO, called DCD on the green line to relay the following OGC priority request.

Please check Agency records for:

a. Mitchell Werbell, IV
DPOB: 16 November 1949; Atlanta, Georgia

b. Godfrey Werbell
DPOB: 21 June 1951; Atlanta, Georgia

These two have been charged with crimes... alleged they work for CIA.

2. After checking DCD's records I found that DCD has had contact with Subject's father in the past. DCD's records reflect no direct contact with the sons. The only mention of the sons appears in an article published in The Washington Post, 27 December 1970, Section D, page 3 and a cable to FR/NY, 17 March 1975 (Director 670514).

3. DDO/FIO was notified of the above by telephone on 17 April 1975.

Rose O'Toole

Distribution:
Orig. - A 127900
1 - DCD/FOIA
1 - OC/DCD

1.40

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

14-00000

Control

32-9

SIGNAL CENTER USE

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

12-79300

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

191757Z DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

670514

CONF: NE 10 INFO: FILE 11/AN FR5, DCD2 LSN/ID C/OPS LA10

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 30

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: FR/NEW YORK. Y

AJAJA FORRES Y

REF: FR/NEW YORK 30417 (IN 511214) Y

1. NO ADDITIONAL HQS TRACES ON EDGAR LEMMENS AND CO. OTHER THAN CONFIRMATION THAT IT LICENSED DEALER OF ARMS LOCATED IN/TIRLEMONT, BELGIUM AND THAT IT IMPORTED FROM NEW YORK TO BELGIUM A SILENT SUB-MACHINE GUN WHICH LATER SHOWED UP IN SPAIN CONNECTED WITH BASQUE ASSASSINATION. Y

12 7900

2. MICHELL L. WERBELL, III (201-259910) IS PARTNER OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL INC. OF POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, A LICENSED ARMS DEALER. HE BORN 8 MAR 1918, PHILADELPHIA. HQS HAS LENGTHY 201 ON WERBELL WHO HAS LONG HISTORY POPPING UP IN AREAS AND SITUATIONS WHERE CAN MAKE FEW FAST BUCKS. HE CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, WHEELER-DEALER AND PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MID-1959 WHEN BECAME INVOLVED WITH ANTI-CASTRO PLOTTERS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OFFERED PROVIDE BKHERALD WITH INFO ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN CARIBBEAN. HE GRANTED POA IN AUGUST 1959 BUT THIS CANCELLED OCTOBER 1959 WHEN HIS INFO PROVED BE OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

4.39

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	WRO	DEI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

670514

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

LITTLE VALUE AND IT SUSPECTED THAT HE USING BKHERALD@ FUNDS TO PROMOTE PERSONAL INTERESTS. EVER SINCE, BKHERALD HAS BEEN DISCLAIMING WERBELL WHO HAS REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED PROMOTE SELF AS REP OF LNBUZZ AND BKHERALD. SINCE MUCH OF BKHERALD INFO ON WERBELL ORIGINATES LNERGO, WE SUGGEST LNERGO REP/NEW YORK PERFORM TRACE THROUGH HIS OFFICIAL CHANNEL. (ABOVE INFO MAY NOT BE PASSED FOREIGN NATIONALS BECAUSE WERBELL WODUAL CITIZEN.) Y

3. ONLY TRACE ON MITCHELL WERBELL IV IS THAT HE ALSO INVOLVED
FATHER'S
IN/~~BBBBBBB~~ ARMS BUSINESS TRADE. HE HAS HAD NO CONNECTION WITH BKHERALD. Y

4. FILE: 201-918287, E2 IMPDET.#

LA/COPS
NE/SO..
CNE/ARN/I..
CNE/ARN.
FR/B 2...
SA/DCNE/AO

DATE: 17 MARCH 1975
ORIG: WENDY RAHMAN
UNIT: NE/ARN/I
EXT: /R 1386
C/FR/B2

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 025268

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 14/1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

R

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF	
1	4
2	5
3	6

ACTION UNIT C/FR5

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR C/FR/AN C/CSN/CO C/CI/OPS C/DCO C/OPS DDO

F-12-79-00

T 256357 E1A471 PAGE 01 IN 324568

TOR:1120552 JUL 74 ATFR 00349

S E C R E T 112200Z JUL 74 STAFF

CITE FR/ATLANTA 00349

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT ISOLOG

1. GEORGE KENNY, FBI SPECIAL AGENT IN ATLANTA, HAS ADVISED BASE THAT HOWARD GIBSON HEAD OF ATLANTA BASE CENTRAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY OFFICE IN WASHINGTON AND FORMER SUBURBAN ATLANTA (COBB COUNTY) COP ADVISED HIM BY TELEPHONE THAT WASHINGTON OFFICE SUBLEASED BY HIM TO DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY BEING USED BY BKHERALD AS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LP. GIBSON CLAIMS OFFICE IN CHARGE BKHERALD OFFICER WHOSE NAME GARBLED ON PHONE. KENNY BELIEVES NAME MAY BE CONGEN. OFFICE IS LOCATED 4 OR 5 BLOCKS FROM WHITE HOUSE. KENNY WILL ATTEMPT OBTAIN ADDRESS.

2. OWNER CENTRAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY IS ATLANTAN MITCHELL WERBELL, LOCAL GUN RUNNER AND PRIVATE EYE ON WHOM DCD HAS REPORTED. WERBELL AND GIBSON CURRENTLY IN LITIGATION FOR UNKNOWN REASON. FBI AGENT KENNY STATES GIBSON PROBABLY CAPABLE SPREADING PARA 1 STORY WIDELY AS MEANS EMBARRASS WERBELL.

WERBELL

4,38

S E C R E T

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ [illegible] ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Steve Van Cleave

FROM: William D. Pangburn, Atlanta RO	EXTENSION	NO. ATL-78-74	
		DATE 21 June 1974	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Support Branch/OSS Attn: Grant				William: Reference our telecon of 6/21/74. This is the unedited transcript we discussed. The tape has been cleared and this is the only copy. Regards,
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				

437

E 2 [illegible]

FORM 610 [illegible]

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PETERSON AND VAN CLEAVE - Tuesday, 6/18/74, [illegible]

I had heard a rumor that, I thought at the time that these guys, these idiots can't be doing this again, but in the last week I have picked up a great deal of information that I think needs to be known at this location that involves the Werbell group out of Powder Springs. Are you familiar with that name? [No, I'm not. Bill has been handling all of that and I just don't know anything about it, Mr. Van Cleave. You can give me what information you have and I will pass it on or do what we can, but Bill has been handling that entirely and we work different accounts and I'm sorry to say that I am totally unfamiliar with it.] Well, let me put it to you this way. Is there any way at all that you will be in touch with Bill, so that I could get this information to him by phone. [Well, he is up in Tennessee and we can get in touch with him, yes. I could give him a call.] Well let me give you a brief synopsis so that you can at least pass that on to him. And in the process, I'll have to give you a bit of background on this subject. I consider it very important, not from the standpoint of the fact that what these people are involved in now is starting to break, but I think it is extremely important that this location gets something in to indicate that their contact lets them know what is going on. Mitchell Werbel is a gun dealer basically. He has what is called a farm out at Powder Springs, Georgia. Basically, it is a piece of property with a lake and a firing range and a big house and a gun shop below and a vault with about three thousand Ingram submachine guns and other assorted weapons. Now Werbell has been in and out of all kinds of things. He pops up all over. He loves publicity and he loves to imply a relationship with the Agency. Now, about a year ago they were involved with some people from Britain in an attempt to set up a secession of the Island of Abaco, at the time the Bahamas were granted their independence. Now this was a very serious thing; there were people including members of Parliment from London that came over here and they were going to have a small army on Abaco and the local settlers on Abaco were all for this because they were mostly white and the thing never got off the ground at that time. However, it was known, there were newspapers articles written about it. Lynden Pindling, the Prime Minister of the Bahamas was incensed by this whole scheme and basically, if you could think of anything that would be against the best interest of the US and the Agency and everybody, it would be some idiotic scheme like this. Now a few weeks ago, I heard a rumor from a source that this thing had been activated and at the time I called Bill and told him I thought I might [illegible] [illegible] back, [illegible] suddenly grown bigger. And to be more specific about this, when I say that, I can tell you that it is a fact that last Thursday night the new Ambassador from the Bahamas in Washington got Congressman Andrew Young to one side at a reception and they discussed this matter with grave seriousness. OK, now, therefore I am positive that within certain circles in Washington this matter is being discussed at this moment. Now I also learned that last week the whole group of the Werbell's and their associates were in Washington and I'll give you the names that I know of for sure: Mike Oliver, who is a key figure in this. He represents several wealthy Americans and Britishers who have long had a dream of having their own island and establishing their own country. Now this sounds like something right out of cheap fiction; however, it is a fact. I have met Mike Oliver. And there are about six wealthy individuals, one of whom I think lives in the Bahamas, I believe two are in England, one of them I think is Lord Bellhaven who is a member of Parliament. He has been over to the farm recently and in Washington a few weeks ago with them. About three wealthy Americans, all older fellows with many millions. Now this thing came up once before about eight years ago when they bought a boat and Oliver went out into the Pacific and laid claim to the coral reef in the Samoan Islands I think it was and planted a flag on it and established the free soverign state of Menerva. Life Magazine had a spread on this. And that lasted for about a week until the King of Samoa, or somebody, some Tribal King sent [end of side of tape]

putting aside a piece of Nicaraguan soil and giving it extra territorial rights and I know they have money. To make a long story short, Oliver is involved in this. He came in, I understand, two weeks after the Bahamas got their independence and said we've got the money for the Abaco operation. Now I have it on good source from an informant in their organization that a month or so ago a U-Haul truck came up from Fort Lauderdale in the middle of the night and loaded up a bunch of guns and explosives and took them to Fort Lauderdale. The name of the man who drove the truck was Wally Gillis. He is a freelancer soldier of fortune type and [illegible] a boat - you know, a good sized cruiser, can go to the Bahamas or wherever. Supposedly this material went to a [illegible] in Fort Lauderdale but [illegible] being involved down there with a fellow named [illegible]. Bernstine is [illegible] to narcotics people; he is a pilot and has airpl[illegible] and every now and then [illegible] week was Mike Oliver, Mitchell Werbell, III, retired Colonel Robert Bayard, US Army who also lives in this area and is associated with Werbell and a fellow named Chuck Hall who is a resident of the Bahamas in Nassau, who is a key part of this operation. And I don't know who else but they were staying for several days at the Grammercy Inn, Washington. It is my understanding that they made contact there with a former agent of your organization, with an offer of substantial amounts of money for him to recruit covert types, para-military types, technicians - in effect, mercenaries. And I have reason to believe that he is reporting this information. I certainly hope so. So again, what I am showing you is that I think stuff is coming into Washington right fast. Now Werbell has been known to drop Mr. Colby's name to me and to many other people because he wangled - Werbell originally was in the OSS you know. So he has a lot of old friends who are OSS types in those days and I understand one of these old boys did have dinner with Colby and Werbell wangled his way into it a couple of months ago in Washington. So, that is all he needs to start dropping names like mad. He does know some people in and former people. Now I understand that they have also made contacts in Miami recently with two companies who manufacture electronic equipment and used the name of another former Agency man who is now with the DEA in Washington. Again, I have an informant in the organization who is about ready to break with them and he has told me all this. He was in the office when calls were made to these people, talking about buying electronic equipment which is illegal and using the name of this former Agency man in the DEA and indicating that they would like to see the equipment, that he'll probably arrange to buy some, that type of thing. And I know for a fact that that individual knows about this now and he is a good man and in good standing with everybody. But to summarize this, the point is this - the whole thing is idiotic scheme by a bunch of fools. It is financed by some wealthy idiots, you know, who have money and are behind the scenes and these fools - in other words, if someone came [illegible] involved in a scheme like this I wouldn't touch it with a 10 foot pole because it is totally against the interests of both governments involved. Even the slightest leak on it can cause a serious diplomatic problem, you know, regardless of how crazy it is, the fact is an involvement of this type involving Americans, anything that comes out, the first thing that is going to be is an Agency involvement. [illegible] this the Island of [illegible]

[illegible]

is that it?] Yes. You see the Bahamas - I don't know how familiar you are with them, but they don't have an army or anything. They have a small police force and they have some small police boats, little 30 foot jobs that run around the Islands, and they are talking about establishing . . . [Aren't they still under the British protection for foreign troops?] I would certainly think so, but there are no troops stationed there; you follow me? But what I am trying to say is the implications of this thing which I know now are known in Washington by people. When you have the Bahamiam Ambassador, the new Ambassador, getting a black American congressman from Georgia aside - you see these people talk a lot, that is another reason - anybody involved with them is crazy. They have all kinds of these mercenary types and they make calls all over in Miami and all over the world and talk about their schemes and it has broken somewhere, you know, along the line; probably in the Bahamas or Miami. [Well do we know now what the essence of the conversation was between the Ambassador and Young?] I think it expressed grave concern about this situation. I think some names were given of the people. You see they know who Werbell is because Pendling, in fact, one time made a very tough speech about this type of thing with the American intervention in the affairs of the Bahamas and the name Werbell is an international soldier of fortune. I am concerned about one thing: No. 1, I know it isn't going to get off the ground now. I knew it never would. It might have got off the ground but the thing is it's one of these things that could be so messy and opponents, let's say people on the other side would love something like this so they could capitalize on it forever - you know, reports hinting at secret involvement of an American intelligence agency and attempts to establish a base in the Bahamas. A good propagandist could just have a field day with this. So I have a feeling that unless I am really crazy I think people in your organization are aware at this moment of this thing surfacing in Washington. And that is why I am calling this office because I have given information here before on these people and I think that it's important that if somebody says - Hey, have you guys heard anything about them and you fellows say no, we haven't heard anything - you know. [Well you feel in your own mind that this is something that will come about in the very near future, this attempt?] No, I would have to say I have a feeling now the attempt will not come about at all. If enough people in Washington start asking questions and they do know the names of these people and if the former agent up there goes in and gives information to somebody naming the people who came to him and the amount of money they offered him to recruit people for this. That's why they were in Washington last week. This fellow lives up there and he is now in the function of a private investigator but he is a former agent of your organization. So I just want to be sure that you fellows down here, you know, if someone asks a question, or if they don't then at least you throw a report in indicating that an informant here, namely me, and by name, has given you this information. Because there is another factor involved too. Werbell - see Bill knows about my relationship with him. I was forced to take Werbell to Argentina last year for a private client of mine. One of the Board of Directors thought he was the greatest international thing in the world and he was the biggest millstone I have ever had around my neck. I was down there defending against the ERP terrorist group and Werbell was running all over Buenos Aires with smugglers and prostitutes and everybody and dropping our names and getting drunk and hinting that we were big American secret agents. He stayed on after I left and nearly got picked up by the Federal police. They were friends of mine I might add, so I got my situation cleared down there. But he loves to talk to me. I do international security work for corporations and he wanted to get involved with me in business and I refused to have anything to do with him, you know. But he loves to get drunk and call me and brag. And he called me several months ago and told me he was working with a group in Bolivia and I said I hope it is the government. And he said Oh no, it's the other guys. And I said well Mitch, you're crazy. It's not up to any private citizen or private organization to go anywhere in the world and get involved with people against the government. It just is trouble, that's all there is to it. And I forgot about that and he called me the morning after the attempted coup(ph) down there and named his source there as Lt. Colonel Gary Prado and as it turns out Prado was one of the two leaders of the attempted coup and he had shipped guns down there through New Orleans, through an intermediary named Phillips, and here again - well frankly, Bonzaire his General, Hugo Bonzaire, the strong man of Bolivia, and I don't think we have bad relations with them. In fact, he is getting closer to [illegible] strong men down there and it is a known fact that he hates communist and he sends the troops out to kill them so what should anybody be doing trying to overthrow an anti-communist government. I'm an old country boy but that just doesn't make sense to me. Furthermore, a private individual. So because of that [illegible] when they broke up [illegible] all of 15 minutes [illegible] they round up everybody and interrogate them and say where did you get the guns and they find Ingrams and Ingrams only come from Werbell and then you have State Department you know, saying what is this, do you know who, down here trying to overthrow our government. And since Prado, by the way was leader of the troops that captured Che Guevara Shay Dravarro (ph) then once again you get into a good left-wing journalist can really weave a nice little story of that big bad Agency down there doing things again. So he is like a mouquito in that he doesn't accomplish anything but he is very dangerous in my opinion to our relations. Bad enough to mess up good things. [I will pass this on to Bill.] Well tell him this, that I was in Washington last week and let me emphasize again that I would be the most surprised person in the world if Senior Officers at Langley aren't aware as of the Friday, of this situation and through the Washington surfacing there, you follow me? And really I like Bill and what I'm trying to do, I'm putting myself in his position and this is his area and I know that reports, because I have talked to him before about them and I am sure that this has been made a matter of record. And I just think it would be nice for Bill to be able to say yes, my informant has given me information - this information. Because it will all tie in. You might mention too that within the last two months Werbell has visited Vesco in Costa Rica and after that visit a Vesco associate named Marino came up here from Panama and stayed at Werbell's. So he is dealing now with Vesco too and all of this is just nothing but bad. And he is implying, he talks to newspaper people and writers and he does imply and use names that he is not authorized to use and shouldn't use. I know that he is not an official or unofficial or anything else connected with your Agency but this is the way he is surviving. People are dealing with him thinking that really he is - there are enough problems happening as it is but all we need is one good left-wing newspaper man to get hold of this type of thing and get it in Jack Anderson's column or some place like that and have an official blast from the government of the Bahamas and then everybody in the world is going to think that the Agency was behind this and got caught. The reason I appreciate this, I think timing is important. I think the end of next week is going to be a little bit late because there might even be some public surfacing of this. So I think it is important that they know that this office does have access to information. I can be reached at my number here which is 255-7593 or at my home, which is 247-2474.

14-00000

12-77-00

E CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 5 11 25 AM '74

C O N F I D E N T I A L 051345Z MAR 74 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 12494

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: SUPPORT BRANCH/OSS (GRANT) A-182014

SUBJ: STEVEN VAN CLEAVE, INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, LTD., ATLANTA, GEORGIA

REF : GRANT/HENNESSEY TELECON, 25 FEBRUARY, SAME SUBJECT

1. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 21 JANUARY 1974 WE RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM ANSELMO ALLIEGRO, A177650 [illegible] ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA, (A CONTACT OF THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE) WHO ADVISED US THAT AN ACQUAINTANCE OF HIS IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA, STEVEN VAN CLEAVE, WANTED TO SPEAK WITH US IN CONNECTION WITH INTELLIGENCE MATTERS CONCERNING LATIN AMERICA. WE TOLD ALLIEGRO THAT VAN CLEAVE SHOULD CONTACT OUR OFFICE IN ATLANTA; HOWEVER, ALLIEGRO SAID THAT VAN CLEAVE DIDN'T WANT TO DEAL WITH ''RECRUITERS'', RATHER HE WANTED TO SPEAK WITH A CIA OFFICER ''IN THE BUSINESS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION''. WE TOLD ALLIEGRO THAT OUR ATLANTA OFFICE HAS THE SAME STATURE AS THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE, AND THAT HE SHOULD URGE VAN CLEAVE TO CONTACT OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN ATLANTA. ALLIEGRO WOULDN'T ACCEPT THIS RESPONSE ON OUR PART AND INSISTED THAT WE AT LEAST HEAR WHAT VAN CLEAVE HAD TO SAY. FINALLY, WE AGREED TO ACCEPT A CALL FROM VAN CLEAVE SO THAT WE COULD TELL HIM TO CONTACT OUR ATLANTA REPRESENTATIVE.

4.36

2. VAN CLEAVE CALLED US AT HIS EXPENSE FROM ATLANTA ABOUT FIVE MINUTES LATER. WE ADVISED HIM AT THE OUTSET THAT HE SHOULD SPEAK WITH BILL PANGBURN IN THE ATLANTA RESIDENT OFFICE AT HIS EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR WORK FORCE IS DIVIDED GEOGRAPHICALLY RATHER THAN FUNCTIONALLY, AND THAT SINCE HE LIVES IN ATLANTA, HE MUST DEAL WITH THE ATLANTA RO. WE PROVIDED HIM WITH THE TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR THE ATLANTA RO, AND HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD CONTACT PANGBURN THE SAME DAY. WE CALLED PANGBURN TO ADVISE HIM OF VAN CLEAVE'S INTENTION TO CONTACT HIM. WE LATER LEARNED FROM BOTH PANGBURN AND VAN CLEAVE THAT THE CONTACT WAS MADE.

3. WE PRESUMED THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH VAN CLEAVE. HOWEVER, WE WERE MISTAKEN. VAN CLEAVE PLACED AT LEAST TWO MORE TELEPHONE CALLS TO US FROM ATLANTA (AT HIS EXPENSE), AND ONE FROM DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA. EACH TIME WE ADVISED HIM TO CALL PANGBURN RATHER THAN US. HIS RESPONSE ON THESE OCCASIONS WAS THAT HE ALREADY HAD OR INTENDED TO KEEP PANGBURN ADVISED BUT THAT HE WANTED TO KEEP US INFORMED ALSO. THE LOCAL DADE COUNTY CALL WAS MADE TO ADVISE US THAT VAN CLEAVE WAS IN MIAMI IN THE COMPANY OF TWO ARGENTINE POLICE OFFICIALS, WHOM WE COULD DEBRIEF IF WE SO DESIRED. WE AGAIN TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD REPORT TO ATLANTA.

4.36

4. VAN CLEAVE TOLD US DURING ONE OF THE AFOREMENTIONED CONVERSATIONS THAT HE IS ACQUAINTED WITH MITCHELL WERBELL, A127900 POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, AND THAT HE HAD BEEN ''PRESSURED'' INTO TAKING WERBELL TO ARGENTINA WITH HIM IN LATE JANUARY 1974 BY OFFICIALS IN THE COCA COLA COMPANY, CORAL GABLES, A164 FLORIDA, WITH WHICH VAN CLEAVE HAS (OR HAD) A CONSULTING CONTRACT IN CONNECTION WITH COCA COLA'S SECURITY SYSTEM IN ARGENTINA. VAN CLEAVE ADVISED US THAT HE NEVER AGAIN WOULD HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH WERBELL BECAUSE THE LATTER HAD ACTED SO BADLY DURING THIS TRIP. HE TOLD US THAT WERBELL HAD COMMENTED TO ARGENTINE OFFICIALS THAT HE (WERBELL) WAS SOME-HOW CONNECTED WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND ON A FIRST NAME BASIS WITH ''BILL'' COLBY, DCI. VAN CLEAVE TOLD US THAT MATTERS HAD DEGENERATED TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT HE RETURNED TO THE US WITHOUT WERBELL. (OUR MEMORY IS A BIT FUZZY ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS DISCUSSION, BUT WE RECALL SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT WERBELL WAS INVOLVED WITH WINE, WOMEN, AND SONG, AND VAN CLEAVE WAS AFRAID THAT WERBELL MIGHT BE ARRESTED BY ARGENTINE POLICE BEFORE IT WAS OVER.) VAN CLEAVE TOLD US THAT HE PERSONALLY NEVER HAS SO MUCH AS IMPLIED A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AGENCY TO ANY OUTSIDER.

41.36

5. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT MET VAN CLEAVE IN PERSON, BASED UPON OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM HE APPEARED TO BE AN INTELLIGENT AND REASONABLE MAN. WE ARE SORRY THAT WE CANNOT PROVIDE A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH VAN CLEAVE, BUT AS WE MENTIONED IN REFERENCED TELECON WE DID NOT MAKE NOTES DURING THE CONVERSATIONS NOR DID WE FEEL IT NECESSARY AT THE TIME TO WRITE A MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SINCE WE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS A NORMAL, ALBEIT COMPLEX, REFERRAL TO ANOTHER DCD OFFICE. E 2 IMPDET CL BY 013652

CONFIDENTIAL

4.36

1-00000

12-77-00

ATL-30-74
28 February 1974

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
Attn: Support Branch/OSS (Grant)

Chief, Washington Field Office
Atlanta Resident Office

Resume of Contacts with Stephen Van Cleave

A122144 A127900

1. Jack Hennessy, Miami Field Office, called on 21 January 1974 to give us a source lead on Stephen Van Cleave and Mitch Werbell, both from Atlanta, Georgia. Jack briefed us on past Miami contacts with Van Cleave and suggested we might want to contact him concerning his activities in Argentina. At that time we were in the process of moving the office to the present location so did not contact Van Cleave until 25 January 1974. On that date we called, identified ourselves and briefly explained the reason for the call. His first question was, "Do you know Mitch Werbell and does this have anything to do with him?" We assured him we did not know Werbell, and our interest was not related to him. Van Cleave suggested we come to his office at 1:00 that afternoon.

2. We arrived shortly before 1:00 at his office on [illegible] W. Wieuca Rd. N.E., Atlanta, Georgia. Van Cleave has a one room office in a modern building located in a moderate to high rent district of Atlanta. After presenting credentials and a business card we asked if we might tape the interview. He said he preferred we tape it, as well as any future transactions, as he wanted to be absolutely sure any information he gave was reported accurately. Enclosure No. 1 is a rough draft of the first interview. The actual tape has been erased. Some of this information was reported in OO-A(S)-[illegible]/0[illegible]35-74, Secret, CIA Internal Use Only.

3. On 9 February 1974 we received a call from Van Cleave at home. He wanted to report in detail on a recent trip to Oakland, California, where he had supposedly met with police officials and discussed the Hearst kidnapping, the SLA, etc. We told him this was very interesting but not CIA business.

4. Van Cleave called again on 25 February 1974 to fill us in on a visit to the US by Argentine police officials and an operational opportunity in the Bahamas. We prepared this information for dissemination as OO-A(S)'s. In view of recent developments we assume neither report should be disseminated. To complete your record of contacts, both reports are enclosed as Enclosures No.'s 2 and 3 (disregard the Atlanta report numbers, they will be used for future reporting or cancelled).

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

4.35

1C

5. In the meantime the R g Murphy kidnapping came up to occupy his time until 26 February when he called to say he had some sensitive information of definite interest to CIA. When told we could not get into his office the following day due to a lack of transportation, he said he would come to our office. We reluctantly agreed. Late the morning of 27 February he came to our office and presented us with the information in Enclosure No. 4 (rough draft—the tape will be saved in case it is needed at a later date).

6. Not on the transcript but of possible interest, before leaving our office he said he was afraid he might be fired by Coca Cola on 4 March 1974. Briefly, what apparently happened (and this is his story) was:

a. When it was learned Peg Murphy had been kidnapped, Chief John Inman of the Atlanta Police Department called Van Cleave requesting his assistance. He asked Van Cleave to come to headquarters and work with Assistant Chief Mullins (we believe this is the correct name) on the Murphy kidnapping,

b. Van Cleave apparently expressed concern to the Assistant Chief that prominent members of Coca Cola Company residing in the Atlanta area might be targets for the same kidnappers,

c. The Assistant Chief agreed and went along with Van Cleave notifying, by phone, Coke officials,

d. Van Cleave had not cleared this action with his immediate supervisor at the Coca Cola Company.

e. Apparently the phone calls were made very late in the evening.

f. When the Murphy kidnapping was resolved, Van Cleave was called in by his boss to account for his actions. He apparently has not been able to justify the calls and this will be discussed at the meeting on 4 March. We suspect this may be his last official action for the Coca Cola Company.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

4.35

SECRET

ATL-30-74
28 February 1974

7. Since receiving the 27 February 1974 call from OSS, we have checked with Charles Haynes and Bob Perry of the FBI. Both are familiar with Van Cleave and his operations. Perry confirmed that Van Cleave had passed the information contained in Enclosure No. 4 to the FBI. Perry had a few other things to say about Van Cleave that probably do not need to be repeated in this memorandum.

8. Concerning the future, we intend to be hard to reach when Van Cleave calls; if necessary, talk to him on the phone a few times to see if he gets the idea; then if all fails simply tell him we have been told to stay out of this business.

A. B. COLEMAN

WDPengburn:mw

Enclosures
(as stated)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

SECRET

4.35

SECRET

F-12-79-00

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

MIM-008-74

11 January 1974

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
ATTN : Support Branch/OSS (Ryan/Ames)

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell, III

REF : OSS-44-74, Dated 8 January 1974

Thank you for referent. For the record, subject has made no further effort to contact anyone in this office; similarly, we plan no attempts to get in touch with him. Thus the matter rests there at this writing. Should he call again, however, we will keep the advice contained in referent in mind in dealing with him.

BRUCE E. MAINWARING

BEM:mbj

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

4.34

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010550

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

F-12-79-00

OSS-44-74
8 January 1974

Chief, Miami Field Office
ATTN : Mr. Bruce Mainwaring

Chief, Domestic Collection Division (Support Branch/OSS)

Mitchell L. Werbell, III

1. We have reviewed subject's 201 file for additional information. Subject was of interest to this Agency in 1959 and was granted a POA in August of that year. This was cancelled in October 1959 when his information proved to be of little value and because it was suspected he was using Agency funds to promote his personal interests. He has subsequently attempted to pass himself off as an Agency employee. He is characterized by the file as unscrupulous, a "wheeler-dealer" and a promoter of grandiose schemes. The subject has been under investigation in 1973 by both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the United States Customs Service for activities relating to possible mercenary activities in Abaco Island, Bahamas.

2. If the subject should contact your office again, we suggest you accept whatever information he has to offer but make no further commitments concerning Agency contact. Subject is well known to the appropriate Desk and is of extremely doubtful character.

3. We trust this memorandum will provide you with useful information concerning this subject. Thank you for bringing his name to our attention.

JACKSON R. HORTON

SPRyan for EBAmes/b
cc: Services Br. (Control)
    IP Files

FILE: [illegible]-25819

4.33

E-2 IMPDET CL. BY 010850

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

12-79-00

Chief, Washington Field Office

12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (O&S)

A-165546

A-168762

[illegible] Jr., Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : Van Hepper/Musulin telecons

A-127900

1. Attached per referent telephone conversation is copy of [illegible] Corporation, [illegible] Please note that [illegible] Inc. [illegible] known to this [illegible] during WWII.

2. [illegible] He has [illegible]

3. [illegible] in [illegible] Jr. [illegible] of [illegible] in [illegible] of [illegible] significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
C Musulin/lld
cc: [illegible] Division (Control)
FILED: HM 2[illegible]

4.32

[illegible]

SECRET

OGC (John Greany)

F 12 79-00

MIM-056-71

10 March 1971

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : John McConnell
John Greany (OGC)
Chief, Miami Field Office

13

Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. On 9 Mar 71 we received a long distance call, presumably from Powder Springs, Georgia, from subject, who is an old and unsavory contact of this office dating from 1959. Werbell has been involved in a variety of scrapes, the latest of which concerned an abortive invasion of Haiti which John Greany was very much concerned about a year or so ago.

2. Werbell stated that the Department of Defense had just revoked his security clearance on grounds of Werbell's "frivolous behavior" in the Haitian caper. Werbell stated that he intended to "fight it to the Supreme Court", as he had always kept us and other elements of the US Government informed concerning developments in the Haitian matter.

3. Werbell asked if there was anything that we could do for him in the way of interceding for him with the DOD, and we informed him bluntly and in no uncertain terms that he was strictly on his own, and we could do nothing for him. He then asked if it would be worthwhile to subpoena Bart Gonzales. We informed him that it was up to his attorney to make such recommendations.

4. Werbell seemed to get the message, and then offered to keep us advised regarding an alleged forthcoming attempt on Haiti which is being sponsored by Rolando Masferrer, even though Masferrer is currently incarcerated in a federal prison. We told Werbell that if he wished to pass any information along we would accept it but under no circumstances should he attempt to elicit any information on our behalf. He agreed that he would operate on this basis and said he might be in touch with us again.

5. In view of Werbell's record we felt that this latest contact should be a matter of record and that OGC should be informed of developments.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFC/cas

4.31

SECRET

Mitch WerBell: Gunsmith to the 'Right' Si

By Roger Williams

The following is excerpted by permission from Atlantic magazine.

DOWN THE DRIVEWAY that snakes through the country estate came two teenage boys. They were clean-cut and handsome in the traditional college fashion, and they looked at home in the quiet, leafy setting. But one wore a camouflage suit and carried a large pistol in each hand, the other had an M3 "grease gun" tucked under one arm and a silencer equipped sniper rifle under the other.

Behind them, propelling himself vigorously in a wheelchair, came their father, Mitchell Livingston WerBell III of Powder Springs, Ga.—soldier of fortune, militant anticommunist and one of the nation's leading developers of military weapons and accessories.

Mitch IV and Geoff chatted lightly about the weapons they were carrying. Their father, temporarily immobilized by a fractured heel, punctured the conversation with brief bursts of information about the sniper rifle, one of his most choice products. "This weapon had killed 1,900 VC in six months," he said proudly. "Those VC took only 13 rounds per kill. Twenty-seven cents apiece they cost Uncle Sam. That's the greatest cost effectiveness the Army's ever known."

Moments later, young Mitch and Geoff pumped round after round from the weapons into the bullet-shattered hulk of an automobile that serves as the primary target on the WerBell firing range. Then Mitch began firing a pistol, a standard Army .45. The gun kicked upward and the noise echoed across the fields and treetops. He then picked up a strange, smoothly rectangular handgun, an Ingram Model 11, equipped with a "flash and muzzle suppressor," and began firing it. The muzzle barely moved, and the only sound was a metallic click, followed by the [illegible] of the bullet and the pop as it hit the target.

The effect was eerie, almost chilling, especially when young Mitch put the gun on full automatic and whipped off 15 clicking rounds in one second. Geoff provided the same kind of demonstration with the grease gun, a standard military submachine gun and the sniper rifle, which WerBell calls the XM-21 and which is also equipped with a suppressor.

On the way back to the house, WerBell explained why the suppressor, commonly called a silencer, is so effective a firearm accessory. "It hides the muzzle flash and reduces the firing [illegible] to last metal on ni[illegible]. You [illegible]

nir weapons given to him by friendly forces in Vietnam, he said, and they were shipped to the States for display in military museums.

Not surprisingly, WerBell has often been called an operative of the Central Intelligence Agency, a charge that angers him only when it is leveled too vehemently. It is not that he has anything against the CIA. He just doesn't, he says, happen to be one of its boys. His paramilitary work, which consists of advising and sometimes directly assisting foreign governments, is done in the employ of what he calls "an independent group of well-intentioned, patriotic Americans." The Birch Society? The Minutemen? A bunch of far-right Texas millionaires? WerBell won't say, other than to insist that it is not the CIA.

It hardly matters, for according to WerBell, it is all in the service not only of freedom and anti-communism but of the U.S. government; he does not supply or advise or fight for regimes not bearing the State Department seal of approval. A heavy percentage of his merchandise goes directly to the U.S. government, which distributes it to its own forces that need silent or exotic weapons. The balance is sold to friendly governments, either directly or through the good offices of the "independent group." He says he does not sell to individuals, not even if they're certified anticommunists.

WerBell takes pains to point out that he is no ordinary arms broker. That is, he is not one of those shadowy figures who sell weapons to both sides at exorbitant prices or who take possession of contraband shipments on the high seas. "We've always adhered to a basic policy: There is only one friend of the United States in a given area, and we deal only with that friend."

What does WerBell peddle? A range of firearms from machine guns to desk-sized cannons, from the meanest-looking weapons to innocent looking swagger sticks that fire a bullet or even a small rocket; an array of techniques — "systems," he calls them — that will help an American soldier or a foreign army hold off insurgent forces, and occasionally, his personal services.

These services present WerBell at his most shadowy. Serving as a combatant in the armed forces of a foreign nation is against U.S. law, and WerBell is understandably reluctant to admit having done so. He describes himself in such terms as "paramilitary" and "adviser," but acquaintances suspect he has been in the thick of the fighting a number of times. He may even have

In Operational [illegible] and [illegible] Environmental [illegible] in earnest to develop [illegible] hardware [illegible] Mitch IV [illegible] came into [illegible] IV was [illegible] insurgent [illegible] spent [illegible] the Dominican Republic [illegible] in underwater [illegible] sites [illegible] missed out [illegible] father took [illegible] ago, but the plans [illegible]

One day I [illegible] Geoff displayed [illegible] Armament [illegible] brought out [illegible] shaped tube [illegible] ing 2½ [illegible] cartridge [illegible] gun, and [illegible] out, [illegible] gases [illegible] barrel [illegible] to secret [illegible] the goods [illegible] sort," that is, shoot the[illegible]

In the same [illegible] swagger stick [illegible] silver studs [illegible] studs, one [illegible] cial model [illegible] guard of [illegible] Antonio [illegible] to blast [illegible] ace. Then [illegible] cannon [illegible] knack for a [illegible] fires, with one [illegible] ment, a bullet [illegible] visitor. More [illegible] WerBell's special [illegible] outer," a [illegible] millimeter rifle that [illegible] the eye at 200 meters."

The bulk of WerBell's [illegible] sound suppressors and [illegible] submachine guns. Suppres[illegible] used on large as well as [illegible] ons, and in fact have bee[illegible] tively on the [illegible] machine guns [illegible] helicopters in Vietnam [illegible] Army Journal [illegible] Stoner suppressor [illegible] thing [illegible] now possible [illegible] from relatively [illegible] when using [illegible]

WerBell [illegible] Ingram Model [illegible] are two [illegible] cartrid[illegible] eventually [illegible] vidual weap[illegible] Army [illegible]

14-00000

elaborate system, and it's not [illegible] th it. You can't hear the bolt noise [illegible] way in a combat situation, so for all practical purposes the firing is soundless. Often, the loudest noise is when the bullet hits home. If it hits a human, it makes a peculiar, thunking sound, like hitting a watermelon."

'Compulsive Warrior'

MITCH WERBELL sounds completely matter-of-fact when he talks about firearms, and death, and with reason. He has been in the military hardware business for years, and he has either heard or produced—or both—the thunking watermelon sound many times—in Latin America and Southeast Asia, in the U.S. armed forces and as a paramilitary "adviser." He is a compulsive warrior, an armed crusader fighting against "ungodly communism."

WerBell is not alone in this occupation, but he practices it in a unique manner. Most soldiers of fortune are nothing else, and they live from one little war to the next, brawling and boozing their way through a tough and financially unrewarding life.

WerBell, by contrast, is a businessman who dabbles in military adventure only when and as far as it suits him. If combat didn't titillate him, he wouldn't partake of it. His business is supplying weapons, not using them in anger. He specializes in the weapons and techniques of counterinsurgency, which may be roughly defined as the forceful suppression of coups d'etat, rebellions and the like.

The way WerBell operates, this means defending established regimes, some of them dictatorships, against armed revolt. This political posture not only does not trouble WerBell, it pleases him. "I have no objection to dictatorship if it serves the interests of the country," he says. Particularly if the threat to those interests is from the left: "Communism has no place in the Western Hemisphere—or in any hemisphere. I am totally opposed to it, and to the spread of ideological germs and filth that it brings."

and again, WerBell's name the news. The first issue of

Corporate Setup

THE HEADQUARTERS for h[illegible] work, the former Dobbs estate, is on Highway 360 just outside of Powder Springs in a remote section of Cobb County. Actually, corporate headquarters is in Washington, in a firm called Environmental Industries, Inc.—a neat euphemism for a company dedicated to killing people. Environmental Industries, WerBell says, is bankrolled by some of the East's most prominent investment houses; he is its director of international operations. He is also president of a subsidiary called Military Armaments Co., Inc., and because he is in Powder Springs, Military Armaments is there, too. (Behind Environmental Industries, WerBell says, is "a third shadow of which E.I. is a subsidiary"—another tantalizing hint of the CIA.)

Military Armaments may well be a unique American enterprise. Nobody else, WerBell says, is in the business of designing special purpose weapons on such a scale. A good deal of its designing and manufacturing is done under federal license. Silencers, for example, are outlawed by the National Firearms Act, along with sawed-off shotguns, submachine guns and other vestiges of Prohibition era gangland wars.

To manufacture his suppressors, WerBell must pay a special tax of $500 a year, collected by the Treasury Department. The T-men also check periodically to see that his awesome collection of firearms—over 200 individual pieces—is properly registered. Apparently the market for suppressors is not very large because, according to WerBell, his firm is the only one authorized to manufacture them.

WerBell will not discuss the sales or profits of Military Armaments except to say that, after two years of extensive research and development (resulting in "a tax loss of a half million dollars"), the company is now doing very well. It has about 12 employees, including four machinists who work under the direction of Gordon Ingram, who has charge of the design operation and whose name is on the Model 11 subma-

ung Mitch demon-

Mitchell WerBell dresses the part at his private arsenal in Georgia, where he makes specialized light weapons for the U.S. Army and other counterinsurgency forces around the world. Beside him is his son, Geoff. The braces were only temporary, while WerBell recovered from a leg injury.

WerBell six children and put up with his rather unusual way of life. (When he left for the Far East in 1968, he said he'd be gone for a year or more, and he was.)

A Military Profile

MITCHELL WERBELL is a short, wiry man of 52, quick with a quip and quite sensible until he begins talking about communism or other social issues. He has the face and bearing of a Prussian officer, an image he cultivated by wearing a mustache and occasionally a monocle. He often dresses in military clothing of indeterminate origin, and he embellishes the image by talking in slightly clipped sentences peppered with military phrases. There is nothing phony in this. WerBell has a strong attachment to weapons and to warfare, and he has been around them so long that the ideas and styles they foster are an ingrained part of his personality.

He comes by both his militarism and his anticommunism honestly. His father was an officer in the Russian Imperial army, even though he was born in the United States. "It was a tricky situation," says Mitch. "He was a citizen of both the U.S. and Russia. In those days you could do that."

The elder WerBell fought against the Bolsheviks, but before the collapse of the czarist regime he wisely secured an appointment as liaison officer between the Russian and American forces—stationed in the U.S. He lived in this country for the rest of his life, putting his early medical training to use in cancer research.

A legacy from father is Mitch's barely disguised aristocratic sympa-

vertising in a department store. Soon he was head of the department, and soon after that he went on his own.

In the mid-'50s, WerBell pulled out of his agency and then formed his own public relations firm. "I'd already been drifting into international PR," WerBell says, "using my family background. I had tremendous contacts in Europe, and I moved into the Far East, too." How much of this moving in was military, WerBell won't say, but his business took on more and more of what he calls a "geopolitical" flavor.

Before long, he was dabbling in Latin American dictatorships. "Before Fidel took over in Cuba, we were working closely with Batista." He adds with a grin, "Our function was to keep Batista in power, although the U.S. government was looking favorably on Fidel at that point."

From all this, even WerBell doesn't know exactly how, came a passionate concern about communism. "I decided to devote whatever time I could to anticommunist activities," he says. "At first it was sort of a hobby, but then it became my main drive in life. What I'm doing now"—here he gestures at the arsenal on his office walls—"affords me a damned good living. But the living is not why I do it."

The Heart of It

IN 1948, WHILE anticommunism was still a hobby, albeit a paying hobby, WerBell purchased the Dobbs estate. He installed rudimentary design facilities and began experimenting with weapons of counterinsurgency, weapons he believed had the best chance of preventing Communist takeovers in the small, underdeveloped nations of

who had both the savvy and the guts to help preserve them.

His first major paramilitary operation was in the Dominican Republic during the 1965 revolt. He was, of course, on the side of the government, which was fending off allegedly Communist insurgents; the United States was on its side, too. WerBell wound up in the midst of the fighting. He was the second Dominican government man to reach the Ozama River, scene of the major battle.

Ellsworth Bunker, then U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, became highly exercised over WerBell's activities and his hawkish views on the conflict (WerBell opposed a cessation of hostilities and establishment of a coalition government). Bunker considered trying to toss WerBell out of the country, but nothing came of it. WerBell's "independent group"—CIA, Texas millionaires or whatever—saw to that.

WerBell was already active in the anti-Castro movement, and he brought to it a sense of dash and discipline that the ragtag, bickering bunch of Cuban exiles had seldom seen. Perhaps his major anti-Castro exploit was a speedboat foray into Camarioca, on Cuba's southern coast. The mission was to drop a swimmer, apparently a spy, offshore, and to pick up the family of an exile leader. The boat, flying the Confederate flag on the radio antenna, foundered in high seas, and the raiding party was captured. The Cubans, the story goes, did not know what to make of the brash WerBell, and he and his pals wound up stealing a Castro boat and spiriting some 16 anti-Castroites out of the country before they themselves returned to the United States.

fully at the Ingram models wi
toward making them standa
ment of [illegible] merican soldiers; if
pens, th[illegible] financial success o
Armaments will presumabl
sured. According to data pub
the firms, the Ingram mo
shorter, lighter and capable o
ing more firepower than any
the market. They are also,
says, ideal for secret agents
snugly into a dispatch case
Armaments makes the case,
plete with suppresser and
zines.

Business Is Business

DOES WERBELL feel a t
conscience about pro
world with such deadly and
weapons? No. "I see no rea
concerned," he says. "We're
a certain product that is unfo
a part of the civilized world.
people exist, there's going
arms business. I don't see an
ence between our supplying
combatants and a surgica
house supplying gauze to ban
wounds inflicted."

There is his anticommun
ment, too. WerBell is fig
Communist menace; it is a
must be won and weapons a
to win it.

Contrary to cynical opinion
Springs was not named in
WerBell and his enterprise
in fact, stays as aloof from
community as possible. His h
well-stocked, it is practically
cient save for occasional tr
grocery and liquor stores.
been, from time to time, an
feeling in Powder Springs. W
clares, "The hell with it. Wh
tell 'em I'm prepared to purc
property if they don't like th

He does not suffer from
however. There is a steady
visitors and customers, for
well as Americans. A few
WerBell's son-in-law, an Air
tenant colonel, flew in fr
mainly to see what was ne
the shop; he hadn't been by
months, he said, "and thin
awfully quickly around here
I was there, the colonel an
swapped ideas on rubbing the
partment of no-win policy o
on bringing the enemy to t

the next, crawling and ging their way through a tough and ancially unrewarding life.

erBell, by contrast, is a business an who dabbles in military adven e only when and as far as it suits . If combat didn't titillate him, he ldn't partake of it. His business is plying weapons, not using them in bat. He specializes in the weapons techniques of counterinsur cy, which may be roughly defined the forceful suppression of coups tat, rebellions and the like.

The way WerBell operates, this ans defending established regimes, ne of them dictatorships, against ned revolt. This political posture only does not trouble WerBell, it ases him. "I have no objection to tatorship if it serves the interests of country," he says. Particularly if threat to those interests is from left. "Communism has no place in Western Hemisphere—or in any where. I am totally opposed to it, to the spread of ideological germs faith that it brings."

Now and again, WerBell's name ps into the news. The first issue of new muckraking magazine, Scan s, carried an exhaustive story on 's involvement in an abortive inva n of Haiti in 1966, and WerBell was dited with a major, if uncertain, e in the operation. (WerBell was ar sted and indicted after the fiasco, t charges against him were dropped, ile six others arrested were brought trial. Asked by a friend for an ex anation, WerBell replied jauntily, hen you work for the company, y take care of you. I'll never hear other word about it." So far he n't, he maintains.)

st December, WerBell hit the nt page of The Atlanta Constitution en a shipment of captured enemy apons bound from Vietnam was de ned at Eglin Air Force Base, Flor . A national columnist conjectured at WerBell or his friends meant to tribute the weapons to rightwing remist groups in the U.S. WerBell rily denies that. They were souve-

on such a scale. A good deal of its designing and manufacturing is done under federal license. Silencers, for example, are outlawed by the National Firearms Act, along with sawed-off shotguns, submachine guns and other vestiges of Prohibition era gangland wars.

To manufacture his suppressors, WerBell must pay a special tax of $500 a year, collected by the Treasury Department. The T-men also check periodically to see that his awesome collection of firearms—over 200 individual pieces—is properly registered. Apparently the market for suppressors is not very large because, according to WerBell, his firm is the only one authorized to manufacture them.

WerBell will not discuss the sales or profits of Military Armaments except to say that, after two years of extensive research and development (resulting in "a tax loss of a half million dollars"), the company is now doing very well. It has about 12 employees, including four machinists who work under the direction of Gordon Ingram, who has charge of the design operation and whose name is on the Model 11 submachine gun that young Mitch demonstrated on the firing range.

'Cottage Industry'

INGRAM WORKS in a well-equipped machine shop-lab attached to the main house on the estate, which WerBell likes to call "the farm." WerBell's office is next door to the shop. Its walls are so loaded with weapons that it is a wonder they do not collapse. There are knives and spear guns and pistols and rifles and machine guns, dozens and dozens of them, some purchased, some won in combat, some presented by the appreciative recipients of WerBell's counterinsurgency techniques.

WerBell, who has a sense of humor, calls his enterprise a "cottage industry" and likens himself to "a country doctor. . . . I can fall out of the living area upstairs right down to the office." Upstairs is the domain of his German-born wife Hildegard, a pleasant, gray-haired woman who has borne

cultivated by wearing a mustache and occasionally a monocle. He often dresses in military clothing of indeterminate origin, and he embellishes the image by talking in slightly clipped sentences peppered with military phrases. There is nothing phony in this. WerBell has a strong attachment to weapons and to warfare, and he has been around them so long that the ideas and styles they foster are an ingrained part of his personality.

He comes by both his militarism and his anticommunism honestly. His father was an officer in the Russian Imperial army, even though he was born in the United States. "It was a tricky situation," says Mitch. "He was a citizen of both the U.S. and Russia. In those days you could do that."

The elder WerBell fought against the Bolsheviks, but before the collapse of the czarist regime he wisely secured an appointment as liaison officer between the Russian and American forces—stationed in the U.S. He lived in this country for the rest of his life, putting his early medical training to use in cancer research.

A legacy from father is Mitch's barely disguised aristocratic sympathies. He has been quoted as saying, "Communism is a substitution of a peasant dictatorship over the aristocracy—I prefer the aristocracy." He is without question an elitist. Not surprisingly, his elite is composed of superpatriots and military men.

Mitchell WerBell was born in Pennsylvania, shortly after his Russian-American father and his Scottish-born mother arrived in the U.S. at the end of World War I. His parents traveled a good deal, here and abroad, and Mitch traveled with them, picking up his education as he went. He got a degree in journalism from the University of Pennsylvania. In World War II, he joined the OSS, and served with a unit behind Japanese lines in China, rising to the rank of captain and acquiring a taste for guerrilla-type warfare he would never lose.

WerBell moved to Atlanta shortly after the war and went to work in ad-

of what he calls a [illegible] flavor.

Before long, he was dabbling in Latin American dictatorships. "Before Fidel took over in Cuba, we were working closely with Batista." He adds with a grin, "Our function was to keep Batista in power, although the U.S. government was looking favorably on Fidel at that point."

From all this, even WerBell doesn't know exactly how, came a passionate concern about communism. "I decided to devote whatever time I could to anticommunist activities," he says. "At first it was sort of a hobby, but then it became my main drive in life. What I'm doing now"—here he gestures at the arsenal on his office walls—"affords me a damned good living. But the living is not why I do it."

The Heart of It

IN 1948, WHILE anticommunism was still a hobby, albeit a paying hobby, WerBell purchased the Dobbs estate. He installed rudimentary design facilities and began experimenting with weapons of counterinsurgency, weapons he believed had the best chance of preventing Communist takeovers in the small, underdeveloped nations of Asia and Latin America. "I realized that in counterinsurgency, the primary problem was a lack of depth in weaponry. People say, 'Win the hearts of the enemy, and you'll win the fight.' That's a lot of bull. The best way to get their hearts, if they're the enemy, is to shoot 'em and cut the hearts out."

While he experimented with weapons—quietly, to avoid problems with the federals—WerBell proceeded with his personal brand of geopolitics. He made himself available to anticommunist regimes that wanted help in fighting off one band of insurgents or another. In the process, he became friendly with a number of Latin America's political strongmen. They were delighted to discover a Norteamericano who felt as they did about the need for stable, anticommunist regimes, especially their regimes, and

Ellsworth Bunker, then U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, became highly exercised over WerBell's activities and his hawkish views on the conflict (WerBell opposed a cessation of hostilities and establishment of a coalition government). Bunker considered trying to toss WerBell out of the country, but nothing came of it. WerBell's "independent group"—CIA, Texas millionaires or whatever—saw to that.

WerBell was already active in the anti-Castro movement, and he brought to it a sense of dash and discipline that the ragtag, bickering bunch of Cuban exiles had seldom seen. Perhaps his major anti-Castro exploit was a speedboat foray into Camarioca, on Cuba's southern coast. The mission was to drop a swimmer, apparently a spy, offshore, and to pick up the family of an exile leader. The boat, flying the Confederate flag on the radio antenna, foundered in high seas, and the raiding party was captured. The Cubans, the story goes, did not know what to make of the brash WerBell, and he and his pals wound up stealing a Castro boat and spiriting some 10 anti-Castroites out of the country before they themselves returned to the United States.

Vietnam Superhawk

IN THE LATE '60s, WerBell turned his attention to Southeast Asia. He is, of course, a superhawk on Vietnam, and would be happy if the U.S. were also fighting communism in all its neighboring countries. He was in Thailand, "working closely with the supreme command," for months, promoting the sales of his weapons and systems. "I showed them things like surveillance equipment and night vision equipment, stuff that lets you surprise the hell out of the bastards." Did he do any fighting himself? WerBell chuckles. "I ain't supposed to be shooting the stuff, just demonstrating how to shoot it."

Three years ago, WerBell's weapons business became promising enough for him to go into it full time. He organized a firm called Sionics (for Studies

wounds inflicted

There is his [illegible] ment, too. WerBell is fighting Communist menace. It is a fight must be won and weapons are nee to win it.

Contrary to cynical opinion, Pow Springs was not named to hono WerBell and his enterprise. WerB in fact, stays as aloof from the community as possible. His house well stocked, it is practically self cient save for occasional trips to grocery and liquor stores. There been, from time to time, anti-Wer feeling in Powder Springs. WerBell clares, "The hell with it. Who care tell 'em I'm prepared to purchase t property if they don't like the area

He does not suffer from loneli however. There is a steady strea visitors and customers, foreigner well as Americans. A few weeks WerBell's son-in-law, an Air Force tenant colonel, flew in from mainly to see what was new at the shop; he hadn't been by in sev months, he said, "and things ch awfully quickly around here." The I was there, the colonel and Wer swapped ideas on ridding the State partment of no-win policy makers on bringing the enemy to its knee its grave, in Vietnam.

WerBell recalls with relish one ticular visitor. He came from the Department a few years back, and cording to WerBell, he said, "The f tions of the foreign policies of United States are the business of State Department in Washington, of Mitchell WerBell in Pow Springs, Georgia." WerBell's re "You can't print it. It was all in A Saxon words." But that was the swashbuckling WerBell. The new, profile WerBell says with a grin, present policy is that I agree with theory completely. Period."

If actions to the contrary speak loudly, they, like WerBell's weap can always be suppressed by the himself. Meanwhile, Mitch and his dependent group" march on.

©1970, Atlanta Magazine

4.3

F-72-79-0

CONFIDENTIAL 231530Z DEC 69 CITE CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 24675

CONTACTS/MIAMI

FROM MCCONNELL

JOHN GREANEY, OGC, WILL BE COMING TO MIAMI MONDAY, [illegible] DECEMBER, IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRIAL OF THE EIGHT INDIVIDUALS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF PORT-AU-PRINCE.

D A127100

NEW SUBJECT: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL OF ATLANTA IS MENTIONED IN A (WASHINGTON POST) ARTICLE TODAY IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGED RECEIPT OF GUNS SHIPPED FROM VIETNAM THROUGH EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE. MR. GREANEY SUGGESTS THAT YOU AVOID, IF POSSIBLE, ANY CONTACT WITH WERBELL.

CONFIDENTIAL

4.28

SECRET F-12-79-09

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : OSS

15 May 1969

Chief, Miami Field Office

MIM-084-69

Local OSI Inquiry Regarding Information on Mitchell L. Werbell

1. On 15 May 1969, Special Agent Dave Plouman, local OSI representative, USAF, visited the Miami Field Office to solicit any information we might have regarding Mitchell L. Werbell who apparently is undergoing a security clearance check as the result of presently being employed by a company with a government contract.

2. Werbell was an unsolicited contact of this office beginning in 1959 and he reached peak notoriety in November 1967 as a result of his involvement in the Rolando Masferrer trial in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion. John Greaney, OGC was in Miami at the time to oversee Agency interests.

3. Plouman in contacting other US Government agencies locally including the US Attorney's Office somehow received an indication that CIA had information on Werbell; thus Plouman's visit to the Miami Field Office.

4. It was indicated to Plouman, who is known personally by several members of this staff, that we knew of Werbell and that on occasion he had reported unsolicited information. It was suggested, however, that Plouman direct his request officially through channels via OSI's agency liaison officer in Washington.

5. This is for background and is being forwarded at the suggestion of local CIA Security.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

FHogan:pmw

#29

14-00000

Hill

File F-12-79-00

Director, [illegible] Contact Service 24 March 1967
[illegible]: [illegible] [illegible]
Chief, Miami Field Office

Marshall [illegible] A127900
: [illegible]

1. [illegible] called this office on 23 Mar 67 and then told that [illegible] had not [illegible] advised [illegible] that the Federal charges [illegible] had been dropped. [illegible] has not [illegible]. [illegible] not [illegible] to resume our contacts with him for [illegible] being [illegible].

2. Please advise John Greaney of the Office of the General Counsel of this development and [illegible] whatever recommendations as he or you may [illegible] as to our future relations with Marshall.

[illegible]

Answered by phone - Advised Gleichauf no contact - MSC 30/3

Copy sent to Mr. Greany, 28 Mar 67
[illegible] I D
Cntl

4.24

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ F-12-79-00

Director, Domestic Contact Service 24 March 1967

ATTN : John McConnell MIAM-086-67

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell A 127930

REF : MIAM-060-67

1. WerBell called the Miami office on 23 Mar 67 and when told that Bart Gonzales was not in, advised the secretary that the Federal charges against him had been dropped. We have not confirmed this. We do not intend to renew our contacts with him for the time being at least.

2. Please advise John Greaney of the Office of the General Counsel of this development and give us whatever recommendations he or you may have as to our future relations with WerBell.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:yw

4.25

[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

14-00000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ F 12-79-00

Director, Domestic Contact Service 2 March 1967

ATTN : John McConnell

Chief, Miami Field Office MIA-060-67

Mitchell L. WerBell A 127900

1. You will recall that John Greaney of the Office of General Counsel was in Miami for several days in connection with the federal case pending against subject. WerBell was indicted on federal conspiracy charges growing out of the abortive invasion attempt of Haiti a short time ago.

2. Following the indictment WerBell called us and indicated that he was to be interviewed on "nationwide TV through station WSB-TV in Atlanta." We called Harry McCrea and asked him to monitor local coverage, and we covered the NBC stations for a period of several days. WerBell did not appear on a national hookup, but Harry McCrea informed us that he did appear on a two-minute taped segment on the WSB-TV, 3:25 A.M. telecast only. WerBell said he would, if he could, "make a citizen's arrest of Dwight Eisenhower, John McCone, et al, because he did no more than they did." Harry said that he didn't believe that the station took his statement seriously.

3. WerBell was also interviewed by "The Atlanta Constitution", and we are enclosing a clipping from the "Constitution" of 23 Feb 67 in which WerBell is quoted concerning the indictment.

4. Would you please pass the above to John Greaney. You might inform him that the statement of an undesignated federal official in Miami undoubtedly refers to the Customs agent in charge, with whom WerBell had a conversation prior to calling us. WerBell quoted him in the same fashion in our conversation. We have had no further contact with WerBell.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:pw

Enclosure:
As stated

4-22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

14-00000

F-12-79-00

~~SECRET~~

~~S E C R E T~~ 231432Z CITECONTACTS/MIAMI 1714

FEB 23 10 03 AM '67

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: JOHN MCCONNELL

SUBJECT: ALLEGED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

REF: A. MIAMI 1710 A-197900

B. MC CONNELL/OLEICHAUF TELCONS OF 21 FEB AND 23 FEB 67

MITCHELL WER BELL CALLED BART GONZALES YESTERDAY TO ADVISE THAT HE HAD RECEIVED TWO PHONE CALLS FROM CHET GRAY EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT NO ONE HAD CONTACTED HIM FOR DETAILS CONCERNING THE ALLEGED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT REFERRED TO IN MIAMI 1710. GRAY STATED THAT UNLESS HE HEARD FROM SOMEBODY IMMEDIATELY, HE WOULD TAKE HIS INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA ON THE MORNING OF 23 FEB 67. WE CURRENTLY HAVE AN ADDRESS FOR GRAY: 324 NORTH OAKHURST DRIVE, BEVERLY HILLS; TELS: 274-4922.

B-67-54

~~S E C R E T~~

BT

Copy F/# B-67-54 (Chet Gray)

~~SECRET~~

1e/

4.21

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

Central
F-12-79-00

~~SECRET~~

DIARY, 23 February 1967

SUBJECT: Mitchell Werbell/Chet Gray

Mitchell / A-127900
Cul B-67-54

Gleichauf called to say that Werbell had heard from Gray both yesterday and the day before expressing concern over the fact that no one had contacted him concerning the alleged assassination attempt against a foreign diplomat. Gray stated that unless he heard from someone immediately he would go to the Governor of California, 23 February. This information was passed to Sam Papich by phone.

cc: Chief, Miami Office

B-67-41

JMcConnell:mg

Copies F/ all jackets!

4.20

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

14-00000

F 12-77-00

~~SECRET~~

FEB 20 11 53 AM '67

~~S E C R E T~~ 201532Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1710

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: MCCONNELL

FROM: GLEICHAUF

A 127900

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED A MOST UNUSUAL PHONE CALL FROM MITCHELL VERBELL, POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, DETAILS OF WHICH FOLLOW:

2. WERBELL IS A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE WHO HAS BEEN IN OCCASIONAL CONTACT WITH THIS OFFICE, OF HIS OWN VOLITION, SINCE 1959. WHILE AN UNSAVORY CHARACTER, MUCH OF THE INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED HAS PROVED TRUE. HE FURNISHED COMPLETE DETAILS ON THE RECENT HAITIAN INVASION PLAN. THE PHONE CALL WAS RECEIVED BY BART GONZALES FROM HIM AT 1100 HOURS ON 13 FEBRUARY. HE STATED THAT HE HAD JUST HAD A TELEPHONE CALL FROM CHET GRAY OF LOS ANGELES, NO ADDRESS (PHONE 274-4922).

File B-67-54

3. GRAY STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED REGARDING THE POSSIBLE ASSASSINATION IN THE U.S. OF A CLOSE RELATIVE, POSSIBLY A BROTHER OR SON, OF A MIDDLE-EAST RULER, WITHIN THE NEXT 10 DAYS. HE DID NOT FURNISH THE NAME OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM, NOR BY WHOM HE WAS APPROACHED. GRAY TOLD VERBELL THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT THAT MIGHT CAUSE INTERNATIONAL

F/ # B-67-54 (Chet Gray)

4.17

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

REPERCUSSIONS AND ASKED VERBELL FOR ADVICE. WER

BELL ADVISED GRAY TO INFORM THE FBI IN LOS ANGELES, BUT GRAY WAS RELUCTANT TO DO SO. VERBELL THEN ASKED GRAY IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK WITH A MEMBER OF CIA AND GRAY AGREED. VERBELL TOLD GRAY THAT IF A REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA CONTACTED HIM, VERBELL'S NAME WOULD BE USED AS ENTREE.

4. THE ABOVE SOUNDS LIKE SOMETHING OUT OF THE "ARABIAN NIGHTS," BUT I DID MEET A CHET GRAY FROM LOS ANGELES AT A LOCAL CONTACT'S HOUSE IN 1962, SOME DETAILS OF WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN OOA(S)9601 AND OOA(S) 9598 DATED 18 DEC 62. GRAY IS A NOTORIOUS HOODLUM AND MIGHT EASILY HAVE BEEN APPROACHED FOR SUCH PURPOSE.

5. PLEASE HANDLE THE ABOVE AS YOU SEE FIT.

~~SECRET~~

BT

F12-79-00

PRIORITY [illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ 2316[illegible]Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1662

PRIORITY CONTACTS/WASHINGTON INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE DIRECTOR

ATTN: INT DIV (HELLER)

COUNTRY: HAITI

SUBJECT: MIMI 10756 - PROPOSED INVASION CANCELLED

DOI : 23 NOV 66 AND EARLIER

ACQ : ---23 NOV 66

REF : LA CIRL C-DC6-52851

C&S : MITCHELL L. WERBELL A 127900

POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA

U.S. NATIONAL, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE WITH WIDE EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE IS CLOSSELY ASSOCIATED WITH ROLANDO MASFERRER.

NOV 23 12 35 PM '66

(THIS REPORT WAS DEVELOPED BY A NAVY REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF PREPARATION.)

1. DURING THE NIGHT OF 23 NOV 66 A DECISION WAS REACHED TO CALL OFF THE PROPOSED INVASION OF HAITI BY THE GROUP SPONSORED BY ROLANDO (MASFERRER). THE INVASION IS OFF INDEFINITELY.

2. FATHER JEAN BAPTISTE (GEORGES) AND COLONEL RENE (LEON) HAVE BEEN ARGUING WITH MASFERRER WHICH HAS CAUSED CONFUSION AND DISORGANIZATION IN THE MOVEMENT. MANY CUBANS SCHEDULED TO PARTICIPATE HAVE PULLED OUT AND MILITARY CHIEF NAPOLEON (VILLABOISE) (SIC), A CUBAN NATIONAL AND ALLEGED MILITARY EXPERT, HAS RESIGNED BECAUSE OF DISSENSION IN THE GROUP.

3. IT IS BELIEVED THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HAVE INFILTRATED THE MOVEMENT AND THE LEADERS FEAR THAT ALL WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT WOULD BE CONFISCATED IF PLANS FOR THE INVASION PROCEEDED.

END OF REPORT.

4.18

4. C/S: BARTOLO GONZALES. PLEASE PREPARE HARD COPY IN HEADQUARTERS.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

67

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1 12-79-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ 222815Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1658

PRIORITY CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: INT DIV (HELLER)

COUNTRY: HAITI

SUBJECT: MIMI 10706 - FALSE REPORTS OF INVASION/REPORTED CHANGE OF PLANS

DOI : 22 NOV 66

ACC : ---22 NOV 66

~~CS~~ : MITCHELL L. WERBELL

POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA

U.S. NATIONAL, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE WITH WIDE EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH ROLANDO MASFERRER

A-127900

NOV 22 4 22 PM '66

(THIS REPORT WAS DEVELOPED BY A NAVY REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF PREPARATION.)

1. AS OF 22 NOV 66 IN SPITE OF WIDESPREAD PRESS REPORTS, NO INVASION OF HAITI HAS TAKEN PLACE.

2. ROLANDO (MASFERRER) ROJAS WHO IS SPONSORING THE ALLEGED INVASION, HAS BEEN TELLING CUBAN EXILES THAT HIS GROUP HAS SECURED THE AIRPORT AT PORT-DE-PAIX AND THEY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO LEAVE AT ANY TIME.

4.17

3. MASFERRER HAS GIVEN UP THE IDEA OF MOVING HIS GROUP, WHICH CONSISTS OF APPROXIMATELY 500 CUBANS AND 100 HAITIANS, BY BOAT AND IS TRYING TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHARTERING ELEVEN AIRCRAFT,

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

INCLUDINGSOME DC-3'S. ONE OF THE DC-3'S WOULD CARRY COLONEL RENE (LEON), MASFERRER, AND FATHER JEAN BATISTE GEORGES.

4. THE M/V HUDSON IS TO BE USED TO CARRY PART OF THE WEAPONS. THE MASFERRER GROUP IS WELL ARMED AND HAS PLENTY OF WEAPONS. THEY HAVE THREE TONS OF C-3 DYNAMITE, AND ALSO HAVE SOME C-2 AND C-4.

5. THE HENRIETTA II WILL CARRY PHOTOGRAPHERS.

6. IN SPITE OF THE ABOVE I BELIEVE THAT THE "INVASION" IS A FARCE AND IS FALLING APART. MASFERRER IS MERELY TRYING TO COVER UP FOR THE FUNDS HE HAS RECEIVED FOR THE INVASION. IT IS BELIEVED THAT MASFERRER'S LIFE WILL BE IN DANGER IF HE DOES NOT MAKE SOME OSTENSIBLE EFFORT. END OF REPORT.

7. C/S: B. GONZALES. PLEASE PREPARE HARD COPY IN HEADQUARTERS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BT

CC: SUBJECT LINE FIRST PORTION AFTER MIMI NUMBR SHLD READ " FALSE RBPORTSPOF INVASION/"; AND PARA 6 LINE

RT SHLD REA

READ "THAT MASFERRER'S LIFE WILL BE IN DANGER IF"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

F-12-79-00

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ [illegible] CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1642

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: INT DIV (ALTEA)

COUNTRY: HAITI/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC/BAHAMA

SUBJECT: MIMI 10836 - PLANNED INVASION OF HAITI BETWEEN 5-13 NOV 66

NOV 1 12 11 PM '66

DOI : 28 OCT 66

ACQ : ---1 NOV 66

REF : DCS CASE 41539; LA CIRL C-DC6-52851

C&S : MITCHELL L. WERBELL A127900

POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA

U.S. NATIONAL WITH WIDE TRAVEL EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE SPEAKS SOME SPANISH, AND HAS MANY SOCIAL AND BUSINESS CONTACTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

(THIS REPORT WAS DEVELOPED BY A NAVY REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF PREPARATION.)

1. ON 28 OCT 66 I SPOKE WITH ROLANDO (MASFERRER) ROJAS, A CUBAN EXILE, AND HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAS ORGANIZED A MILITARY FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 250 MEN TO INVADE HAITI. THE INVASION FORCE CONSISTS OF CUBAN AND HAITIAN EXILES RESIDING IN THE U.S., THE BAHAMA, AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE INVASION WILL PROBABLY BE LAUNCHED FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SOMETIME BETWEEN 5 AND 13 NOVEMBER AND THE TARGET IS PORT-AU-PRINCE. THE INVASION FORCE WILL STRIKE IN THE EARLY HOURS OF THE MORNING SELECTED. IT IS WELL ARMED, AND WILL HAVE AIR COVER; THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE WILL BE BOMBED.

4.16

2. MASFERRER STATED THAT EUGENE L. (MAXIMILIEN), HAITIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, IS AWARE OF THE INVASION, BUT HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE INVASION DATE. MAXIMILIEN IS PRESENTLY IN HAITI INFORMING PRESIDENT (DUVALIER) THAT THE INVASION CAN BE PREVENTED BY PAYING OFF [illegible] TO MASFERRER. MAXIMILIEN WILL RETURN TO THE U.S. ON 5 NOVEMBER AND HE HAS AGREED WITH MASFERRER THAT IF DUVALIER AGREES TO THE PAY-OFF, MAXIMILIEN WILL RECEIVE

14-00000

3. MASFERRER TOLD ME THAT THE INVASION WILL TAKE PLACE IN ANY EVENT AND THE $150,000, IF RECEIVED, WOULD BE USED TO FURTHER SUPPORT THE INVASION.

4. MASFERRER STATED THAT HE MET WITHIN THE PAST 10 DAYS WITH SEVERAL DISSIDENT HAITIAN ARMY OFFICERS AND HE HAD RECEIVED THEIR SUPPORT. THE HAITIAN ARMY OFFICERS TOLD MASFERRER THAT THEY WOULD REVOLT AS SOON AS INFORMED THAT THE INVASION HAD COMMENCED. THEY DO NOT KNOW THAT THE TARGET WILL BE PORT-AU-PRICNCE; THEY BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE IN THE CAP HAITIEN AREA.

5. MASFERRER STATED THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE INVASION WILL SUCCEED, AND IF SUCCESSFUL, FATHER JEAN BAPTISTE (GEORGES) WOULD BE APPOINTED PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT. MASFERRER STATED THAT COLONEL RENE (LEON), HAITIAN EXILE, WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE INVASION. END OF REPORT.

6. C/S: B. F. GONZALES: PREPARE HARD COPY IN HEADQUARTERS PLEASE.

~~S E C R E T~~

BT

[redacted]

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

Initials

[illegible] 11/1/66

Processed 11/9/66

F-12-79-00

RR 0015
DE 0552/26 0131955
ZNY XXXXX
R131428Z
BT
XXXXX
ZERO THREE SEVEN WA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TDTG 131428Z

WA CITE MIAM 1228
ATTN: INTERNATIONAL DIV (CONANT)
COUNTRY: GUATEMALA
SUBJECT: MIMI DOTIE[illegible] ARMED FORCES COUP D'ETAT PLANNED
DOI: 12 JAN 66
ACQ: --12 JAN 66
REF: CIRL C-005-52874
CAS: MITCHELL L. WERBELL A-127900
POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA

JAN 13 11 29 AM '66

U.S. NATIONAL WITH WIDE TRAVEL EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE SPEAKS SOME SPANISH, AND HAS MANY SOCIAL AND BUSINESS CONTACTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

(THIS REPORT WAS DEVELOPED BY A NAVY REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF PREPARATI[illegible].)

1. ON 12 JAN 66 MIGUELITO (YDIGORAS) LAPARRA, SON OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT OF [illegible] GUATEMALAN ARMED 4.14

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

FORCES WERE PLANNING TO OVERTHROW COLONEL ENRIQUE (PERALTA) ON 15 JAN 66. YDIGORAS TOLD ME THAT IF THE COUP WAS NOT CARRIED OUT ON 15 JANUARY, IT WOULD BE EXECUTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER.

2. YDIGORAS WOULD NOT TELL ME THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS LEADING THE COUP, BUT STATED THAT "ALL OF THE ARMED FORCES WILL BE INVOLVED." END OF REPORT.

3. C/S: B. F. GONZALES. HARD COPY TO BE PREPARED BY HEADQUARTERS.

4.14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CFN 1288 CONANT GUATEMALA MIGUEL [illegible] COUP D'ETAT 12 JAN 66 12 JAN 66 CIRL C DC 5 52574 MITCHELL L WERBELL POWDER SPRINGS GEORGIA U S LATIN AMERICA SPANISH A NAVY 12 JAN 66 MIGUELITO YDIGORAS LAPARRA COLONEL ENRIQUE PERALTA 15 JAN 66 COUP NOT CARRIED 15 JANUARY NOT TELL C S B F GONZALES

BT

Processed 1-19-66 –

12-79-00

PP 215

OL 2552/35 042152

ZNY XXXXX

P 042100Z

BT

XXXXX

ZERO ONE SIX WA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted] DTG 042100Z

PRIORITY WA CITE MIAM 1200

ATTN: MC CONNELL

SUBJECT: RUMORED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON FIDEL CASTRO

REF: AIR 677-59 OF 17 DEC 59 A 27900

1. MITCHELL WERBELL ADVISED BART GONZALES THAT A GROUP OF SIX MEN IN HIS ORGANIZATION HAS PENETRATED CUBA AND IS CURRENTLY IN THE VARADERO/HAVANA AREA. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE IS ASSASSINATION OF FIDEL CASTRO TO BE ATTEMPTED BETWEEN 5-8 JANUARY. IF FOUND NOT POSSIBLE, SECONDARY TARGET WILL BE TO BLOW UP THE ELECTRIC PLANT FURNISHING ELECTRICITY TO HAVANA.

2. THE GROUP IS TO UTILIZE AIRPLANE MODEL TYPE OF RADIO DETONATOR. THEY WERE UNABLE TO PROCURE CONTROLLED FREQUENCY RADIO DETONATORS WHICH WERE PREFERRED BECAUSE OF HIGHER QUALITY. THE DETONATOR

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

ALLEGEDLY WILL BE [illegible] AT [illegible] OR THEY WILL USE SUB-MACHINE GUNS IN THE COURSE OF A PUBLIC APPEARANCE BY CASTRO. NO INDICATION AS TO HOW THEY KNOW WHEN OR WHERE HE WILL APPEAR. GROUP SAID TO KNOW MISSION IS SUICIDAL.

3. ATTEMPT ON THE ELECTRIC PLANT WILL BE TO KILL GUARDS AND PENETRATE AREA FOLLOWING WHICH THEY WILL BLOW UP KEY EQUIPMENT.

4. WERBELL SAID THAT RECE ALSO ALLEGEDLY HAS A GROUP IN CUBA AT PRESENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSASSINATING FIDEL CASTRO.

5. PLEASE HANDLE ABOVE AS YOU SEE FIT. FYI: WERBELL IS A NOTORIOUS CON MAN AND SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE. HE IS CONSIDERED UNRELIABLE.

[redacted]

CFN 1268 RC CORNELL FIDEL CASTRO [illegible] 677 65 17 DEC 65 MITCHELL WERBELL BART GONZALES A CUBA VARADERO HAVANA 4 9 JANUARY NOT POSSIBLE UNABLE TO A NO INDICATION RECE A FYI A CON CONSIDERED UNRELIABLE

BT

4.12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

F-81615

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division

ATTN : Index Branch

FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

DATE: 27 July 1959

A-81615

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Visit to Mitchell Warbell III
[illegible] Segovia Circle
Coral Gables, Florida

1. In the evening of 24 July 1959 I received a telephone call from subject, who had been given my name and address by another segment of the intelligence community in connection with the possibility of his passing along late information concerning the rumored impending flight of Batista to the US.

2. Warbell indicated that he spent a great amount of his time in the Dominican Republic and had extremely close association with leaders of the government, and also with General Jose Pedraza. He claimed to have been a former member of the OSS with service in China in WWII. Warbell is a soldier-of-fortune type who wears a monocle, drives a Mercedes-Benz, sports a most attractive blonde girl friend, and is a Big Spender. He also volunteered that he has a wife and six children living in Georgia.

3. Warbell told me that his principle source of income is in dealing with Cuban pesos, and said that he is associated in the business with a John Lipko of Los Angeles, a jazz musician who formerly played with the Jimmy Dorsey and Jan Garber bands.

4. Lipko also claims to have been a member of OSS during WWII, serving in the Rumanian and Eastern European area. Lipko was busily engaged in making long distance phone calls to Mexico City, Guatemala City, and Los Angeles during a part of the time I was with the group.

5. Warbell gave me some information on Batista's plans, which is basically supposition, and furnished some other marginal information which is being forwarded, although in my opinion little credence can be placed in anything he says. It is hard to evaluate what Warbell's motives are in connection with his desire to furnish information regarding Batista to us, but it appeared that he was also attempting to fish for information, throwing out a number of questions concerning the Biltmore Terrace Hotel, reportedly recently to have been purchased by Cuban interests with 9 million Cuban pesos. The penthouse reportedly has been completely redecorated, with heavy steel doors guarding the entrance. This penthouse suite has been rumored to be Batista's intended headquarters once he arrives in the US. All of this has been written about in the gossip columns of the local papers.

6. Inasmuch as Warbell has my name and phone number, probably little can be done to prevent him getting in touch with me from time to time, but contact will not be initiated by me except by direction. The basic purpose of this memo is for the record.

F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:sm

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED	B	IDO
XMIMI	10756				11236	191266	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Proposed Invasion Cancelled

Haiti

RELEASED: 11 28 6

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Mitchell L. Werbell
Powder Springs, Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO. [illegible]

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SAME

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☐ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE): IN / TO USSR / FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS ✓

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

4.10

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
EGonzales	JGleichauf	RHeller for Alves	LRSaltzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

~~SECRET~~

3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

SUBJECT Proposed Invasion Cancelled

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/19112-66

DATE DISTR. 30 Nov 66

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES This report was previously disseminated as TD-00B-321/19112-66

DATE OF INFO. 23 Nov 66 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. --- 23 Nov 66

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, soldier of fortune type with wide experience in Latin America. He is closely associated with Rolando Masferrer.

[This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. During the night of 22 Nov 66 a decision was reached to call off the proposed invasion of Haiti by the group sponsored by Rolando Masferrer. The invasion is off indefinitely.

2. Father Jean Baptiste Georges and Colonel Rene Leon have been arguing with Masferror which has caused confusion and disorganization in the movement. Many Cubans scheduled to participate have pulled out and military chief Napoleon Villaboise (sic), a Cuban national and alleged military expert, has resigned because of dissension in the group.

3. It is believed that US Government agencies have infiltrated the movement and the leaders fear that all weapons and equipment would be confiscated if plans for the invasion proceeded.

- end -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5
4
3
2
1

S-YES U-YES

5
4
3
2
1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

4.10

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member [illegible]

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

12-29-00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE: XMIMI

B. REPORT NUMBER: 10706

C. REQ CODE:

D. CASE NUMBER:

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED (MO DA YR): 11226

B

1906766

EXTRA DISSEM RECORDS:

RELEASED (MO DA YR): 11236

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
False Reports of Invasion/Reported Change of Plans
(Haiti)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Mitchell L. Werbell
Powder Springs, Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO. A-127900

ORGANIZATION NO.

TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT: 0

AREA: 0

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same as above

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☐ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
NO
TO USSR
FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
D117

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

I don't believe you could have covered the "invasion" better if you had used an umbrella. An excellent job, I think.
heller

4.9

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
BGonzales	JFGleichauf	EHeller	LESaltzer

FORM 66 25 Obsolete previous editions

~~SECRET~~

3

(20-41)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY	Haiti	REPORT NO.	00- B-321/19067-66
SUBJECT	False Reports of Invasion/Reported Change of Plans	DATE DISTR.	28 Nov 66
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	This report was previously disseminated as TD-00-B-321/19067-66
DATE OF INFO.	22 Nov 66		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	--/22 Nov 66		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, soldier of fortune type with wide experience in Latin America. He is closely associated with Rolando Masferrer.

/This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation./

1. As of 22 Nov 66 in spite of widespread press reports, no invasion of Haiti has taken place.

2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas who is sponsoring the alleged invasion, has been telling Cuban exiles that his group has secured the airport at Port-de-Paix and they should be prepared to leave at any time.

3. Masferrer has given up the idea of moving his group, which consists of approximately 300 Cubans and 100 Haitians, by boat and is trying to make arrangements for chartering eleven aircraft, including some DC-3's. One of the DC-3's would carry Colonel Rene Leon, Masferrer, and Father Jean Batiste Georges.

4. The M/V Hudson is to be used to carry part of the weapons. The Masferrer group is well armed and has plenty of weapons. They have three tons of C-3 dynamite, and also have some C-2 and C-4.

5. The Henrietta II will carry photographers.

6. In spite of the above I believe that the "invasion" is a farce and is falling apart. Masferrer is merely trying to cover up for the funds he has received for the invasion. It is believed that Masferrer's life will be in danger if he does not make some ostensible effort.

- end -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S-YES U-YES

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

4.9

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

12-79-00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ. CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22-26)	(27-33)	(34-36)
X M I M I				X	0 4 1 9 7	1 1 4 6 7 6 7	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Request for Arms

(Venezuela)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)

RELEASED MO DA YR (40-44): 04 25 7

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Mitchell L. WERBELL
Powder Springs
Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E: R GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT

AREA

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

JOIC (L. Shoemaker)

08 MAY 1967

4.8

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
JPGleichauf:pw	JPGLEICHAUF		R Sil

FORM 3-66 23 Obsolete previous editions (20-41)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

14-00000

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM ~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Venezuela

SUBJECT Request for Arms

REPORT NO. OO-B-324/11467-67

DATE DISTR. 27 Apr 67

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES LA CIRL C-DC6-53134

DATE OF INFO. Apr 67 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---/Apr 67 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US national, soldier of fortune type, with wide experience in Latin America.

1. In April 1967 I was approached by a prominent Venezuelan whom I prefer not to identify. He asked me to arrange procurement of 150-300 9 mm sub-machine guns, with 1-2000 rounds per gun. Delivery was to be "as soon as possible".

2. He did not identify the group for whom they were being obtained but indicated it was a "right wing operation".

3. I told him I was unable to be of assistance.

-end-

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

08 MAY 1967

-1.8

U YES ~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ S YES

[illegible]

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

12-79.00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REG. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED	
XMIMI	10086		~~[illegible]~~ Closed		11016	X B 1787966

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Planned Invasion of Haiti Between 5-13 Nov 66

Haiti/Dominican Republic/Bahamas

RELEASED 11036

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Mitchell L. Werbell
Powder Springs, Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO. A.127900

ORGANIZATION NO.

TYPE CODE GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

SUBJECT — AREA

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SAME

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
C 35

FIELD COMMENTS

P

pl

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Although these rumored invasions have occurred before, this report was of interest to OCI, and I suspect others: One of these times it will happen

4.7

C/S	F.C.I. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
FGonzales	JJLeichauf	GAlves GEA	LESpitzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

~~SECRET~~

3

(23-41)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

14-00000

12-77-3[illegible]

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM ~~S E C R E T~~ NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti/Dominican Republic/ Bahamas

REPORT NO. OO- B-321/17879-66

SUBJECT Planned Invasion of Haiti between 5-13 Nov 66

DATE DISTR. 7 Nov 66

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES This report was previously disseminated as TD-OOB-321/17879-66

DATE OF INFO. 28 Oct 66

CIRL C-DO6-52851

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---1 Nov 66

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national with wide travel experience in Latin America. He speaks some Spanish, and has many social and business contacts in the Dominican Republic.

[This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. On 28 Oct 66 I spoke with Rolando Masferrer Rojas, a Cuban exile, and he told me that he has organized a military force of approximately 250 men to invade Haiti. The invasion force consists of Cuban and Haitian exiles residing in the US, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic. The invasion will probably be launched from the Dominican Republic sometime between 5 and 13 November and the target is Port-au-Prince. The invasion force will strike in the early hours of the morning selected. It is well armed, and will have air cover; the presidential palace will be bombed.

2. Masferrer stated that Eugene L. Maximilien, Haitian Consul in Miami, Florida, is aware of the invasion, but he has no knowledge of the invasion date. Maximilien is presently in Haiti informing President Duvalier that the invasion can be prevented by paying off $200,000 to Masferrer. Maximilien will return to the US on 3 November and he has agreed with Masferrer that if Duvalier agrees to the pay-off, Maximilien will receive $50,000 and Masferrer $150,000.

3. Masferrer told me that the invasion will take place in any event and the $150,000, if received, would be used to further support the invasion.

4. Masferrer stated that he met within the past 10 days with several dissident Haitian army officers and he had received their support. The Haitian army officers told Masferrer that they would revolt as soon as informed that the invasion had commenced. They do not know that the target will be Port-au-Prince; they believe that it will be in the Cap Haitien area.

5. Masferrer stated that he was confident that the invasion will succeed, and if successful, Father Jean Baptiste Georges would be appointed provisional president. Masferrer stated that Colonel Rene Leon, Haitian exile, will participate in the invasion.

5
4
3
2
1

- end -

5
4
3
2
1

~~S E C R E T~~

S-YES U-YES

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

7 47

The dissemination of this document [illegible] IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS [illegible] U S Government [illegible]

[redacted] Filled In)

12-79-00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOM C CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY					FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY	
A FIELD OFFICE	B REPORT NUMBER	C CODE	D CASE NUMBER	E	RECEIVED	
XMIMI	09166		46267	X	10136	164766

F SUBJECT AND AREA

Report on the Dominican Republic

(Dominican Republic)

RELEASED: 10176

G CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Mitchell L. Werbell
Powder Springs, Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO. A 12 7904

H SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

DOCUMENTARY

I SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

J METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ Interview ☐ Trip Report

☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

Source stated that he received a copy of the attached report from Rolando Masferrer Rojas, former Cuban Senator. Masferrer told source that the report was written by Manuel "Fatty" Garcia, a Cuban exile. The report contains information on the political, military, Communist and economic situation in the Dominican Republic, as well as information on the elections held on 1 Jun 66.

For Retention

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

[illegible]

Ck
[illegible]

4.6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RJGonzales:ab	JFCLEICHAUF

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

012-79-00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

○

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5

B. REPORT NUMBER 6 7 8 9 10

C. FORWARDED MO. 11 12 DA. 13 14 YR. 15

D. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20

E. 21

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. 22 23 DA. 24 25 YR. 26

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

IUO 35

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Armed Forces Coup d'Etat Planned

36

EXTRA DISSEM RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. 40 41 DA. 42 43 YR. 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

[illegible]

INDIVIDUAL NO.
0127900

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47 48 49 50

AREA 51 52 53 54

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ Debriefing ☐ Trip Report

☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

FIELD COMMENTS:

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

CB

28 FEB 1966

Request For Evaluation ☐ Yes ☐ No 4.5

C/3

P.O. Chief

Case Officer

Division / Staff / Desk

FORM 1-63 25 Obsolete previous editions

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

3

13-73-00

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY	Guatemala	REPORT NO.	OO-B-321/00782-66
SUBJECT	Armed Forces Coup d'Etat Planned	DATE DISTR.	20 Jan 66
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	CIRL O-DCS-52374

DATE OF INFO. 12 Jan 66

PLACE & DATE ACQ ---/12 Jan 66

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national with wide travel experience in Latin America. He speaks some Spanish, and has many social and business contacts in Latin America, but his realiability is not of the highest.

/This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation./

1. On 12 Jan 66 Miguelito Ydigoras Laparra, son of the former President of Guatemala, told me that Guatemalan Armed Forces were planning to overthrow Colonel Enrique Peralta on 15 Jan 66. Ydigoras told me that if the coup was not carried out on 15 January, it would be executed as soon as possible thereafter.

2. Ydigoras would not tell me the names of the individuals leading the coup, but stated that "all of the Armed Forces will be involved."

- end -

Lary. 547

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5
6
3
2
1

S-YES 8 FEB 1965 U-YES

5
4
3
2
1

4.5

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

12-29-00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED MO DA YR	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED MO DA YR	REPORT NO.		I U O
1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	16 17 18 19 20	21	22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34	35
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			1 / 1 / 2			

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Possible [illegible] and [illegible]

[illegible]

36	EXTRA DISSEM RECORD 37 38 39	RELEASED MO DA YR 40 41 42 43 44
		1 / 1 / 7

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

[illegible]

INDIVIDUAL NO. D 12 1900

45 TYPE DOC: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER — 46 PHOTO DISSEMINATED

ORGANIZATION NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47 48 49 50 — AREA 51 52 53 54

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ Debriefing ☐ Trip Report

☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

14 JAN 1966

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

Request For Evaluation ☐ Yes ☐ No

4.4

CA	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division / Staff / Desk
			E Colligan

FORM 1-65 ?? Obsolete previous editions

~~SECRET~~

(20-41)

3

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

12-79-00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE: 1 2 3 4 5 — [illegible]
B. REPORT NUMBER: 6 7 8 9 10 — [illegible] 5 4 5
C. FORWARDED MO DA YR: 11 12 13 14 15 — [illegible]
D. CASE NUMBER: 16 17 18 19 20
E. 21

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO DA YR: 22 23 24 25 26
REPORT NO. B [illegible] OTHER: 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34
IUO 35

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
35 Photoprints Taken in [illegible]
Harbor and Immediate Vicinity
(Cuba)

36
EXTRA DISSEM RECORD: 37 38 39
RELEASED MO DA YR: 40 41 42 43 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
[illegible]
[illegible], Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO. New A# 127900

45 TYPE OO,E
46 GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER
*NOT DISSEMINATED

ORGANIZATION NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
[illegible]

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50		AREA 51	52	53	54
O	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE	1	S	O	V
1	S	B	1	2. TOO GENERAL	2	N	O	N
2	P	O	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES	3			
3	M	I	L		4			
4				4. OTHER / MISC				
5	S	O	C	5. COMBINED WITH				
6	G	E	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST				
7	B	I	O					
8								
9	M	I	S					

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☐ Debriefing ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

FIELD COMMENTS

Source travelled to [illegible]
for purpose of [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

[illegible] JAN 1966

4.3

Request For Evaluation ☐ Yes ☐ No

Case Officer

Division [illegible] Date [illegible]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

FORM [illegible] Obsolete previous editions

~~SECRET~~

F-12-79-00

PRESENTATION FORM FOR GRAPHIC MATERIAL

(Submit to HO-OO-C in triplicate with process sheet attached)

DATE: 13 December 1965

DIST: ORIG-GRAPHICS; DUPL-CASE FILE; TRIPL-SOURCE FILE; QUAD-FO RECORD

☒ GIFT ☐ LOAN

AREA: Camarioca, Cuba A-127900 Mitchell L. Werbell

SUBJECT: Photo prints taken in Camarioca Harbor and immediate vicinity

NUMBER OF ITEMS AND CATEGORY (Still photographs, negatives, or slides) 56 B&W prints

DATE OF EXPOSURE 1 to 7 Nov 65

CAMERA OR FOCAL LENGTH

CHECK CLASSIFICATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS WHEN SEPARATED FROM THIS FORM. (The classification need not be the same.)

☐ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ☐ SECRET

☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

BRIEF SOURCE DESCRIPTION

US national with wide travel experience in the Caribbean Islands, especially in the Dominican Republic. He speaks some Spanish.

IS SOURCE APT TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL AVAILABLE? ☒ Yes ☐ No

MAY SOURCE'S NAME BE REVEALED TO GRAPHICS REGISTER, OCR, IF REQUIRED? ☒ Yes ☐ No

DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL

56 Black and white phot prints (3 and 1/2 X 5) taken with a 35mm camera.

IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE BLANK PAPER

4.2

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

OO-E NO. 22507-65	CASE NO.	DATE FORWARDED TO CR BY GMP
GR CONTROL NO.		

[illegible]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

FORM 121 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(47)

14-00000

81615

SECRET
PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

FOR HEADQUARTERS INACTIVE

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED NO. / DAY / YR	D. CASE NUMBER	E. S.	RECEIVED NO. / DAY / YR.	A	B	C	R	OTHER
OO-A [✓ A] OO-B / OTHER	X M I M I	0 0 1 9 3	0 7 2 7 9		X	0130471 6294	X				

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Impending Flight of Batista/Pedraza Expedtionary Force

(CUBA/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC)

I A C	I U O	E D C	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD	RELEASED NO. / DAY / YR.
34	35	36	37 38 39	40 41 42 43 44
				07217

TYPE OO-E 45 GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED 46

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Mitchell Werbell III
2211 Segovia Circle
Coral Gables, Florida

New A# 81615

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Same as above

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
[✓ 2]	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	D	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	E	E	R
2	F	E	P
[✓ 3]	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

J.

EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	✓ 1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	✓ 2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	✓ 3	6	9

FIELD REMARKS

EDITORIAL COMMENT

97

4.1

SECRET

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

CASE OFFICER JFG JFGleichauf:cm

CHIEF JFG JFGleichauf

EDITOR

BRANCH STAFF CHIEF EGrea

FORM 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

12-77-00

SECRET

ATL-30-74
28 February 1974

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
Attn: Support Branch/OSS (Grant)

Chief, Washington Field Office
Atlanta Resident Office

Resume of Contacts with Stephen Van Cleave

#132014 A-127900

1. Jack Hennessy, Miami Field Office, called on 21 January 1974 to give us a source lead on Stephen Van Cleave and Mitch Werbell, both from Atlanta, Georgia. Jack briefed us on past Miami contacts with Van Cleave and suggested we might want to contact him concerning his activities in Argentina. At that time we were in the process of moving the office to the present location so did not contact Van Cleave until 25 January 1974. On that date we called, identified ourselves and briefly explained the reason for the call. His first question was, "Do you know Mitch Werbell and does this have anything to do with him?" We answered him we did not know Werbell, and our interest was not related to him. Van Cleave suggested we come to his office at 1:00 that afternoon.

2. We arrived shortly before 1:00 at his office in 17[illegible] N. [illegible] Rd., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia. Van Cleave has a one room office in a modern building located in a moderate to high rent district of Atlanta. After presenting credentials and a business card we asked if we might tape the interview. He said he preferred we tape this as well as any future transactions as he wanted to be absolutely sure any information he gave was reported accurately. Enclosure No. 1 is a rough draft of the first interview. The actual tape has been erased. Some of this information was reported in OO-A(S)-322/03[illegible]35-74, Secret, CIA Internal Use Only.

3. On 9 February 1974 we received a call from Van Cleave at home. He wanted to report in detail on a recent trip to Oakland, California, where he had supposedly met with police officials and discussed the Hearst kidnapping, the SLA, etc. We told him this was very interesting but not CIA business.

4. Van Cleave called again on 25 February 1974 to fill us in on a visit to the US by Argentine police officials and an operational opportunity in the Bahamas. We prepared this information for dissemination as OO-A(S)'s. In view of recent developments we assume neither report should be disseminated. To complete your record of contacts, both reports are enclosed as Enclosures No.'s 2 and 3 (disregard the Atlanta report numbers, they will be used for future reporting or cancelled).

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

SECRET

4.57

1C

ATL-39-74
28 February 1974

5. In the meantime the Reg Murphy kidnapping came up to occupy his time until 26 February when he called to say he had some sensitive information of definite interest to CIA. When told we could not come into his office the following day due to a lack of transportation, he said he would come to our office. We reluctantly agreed. Late the morning of 27 February he came to our office and presented us with the information in Enclosure No. 4 (rough draft--the tape will be saved in case it is needed at a later date).

6. Not on the transcript, but of possible interest, before leaving our office he said he was afraid he might be fired by Coca Cola on 4 March 1974. Briefly, what apparently happened (and this is his story) was:

a. When it was learned Reg Murphy had been kidnapped, Chief John Inman of the Atlanta Police Department called Van Cleave requesting his assistance. He asked Van Cleave to come to headquarters and work with Assistant Chief Mullins (we believe this is the correct name) on the Murphy kidnapping;

b. Van Cleave apparently expressed concern to the Assistant Chief that prominent members of Coca Cola Company residing in the Atlanta area might be targets for the same kidnappers;

c. The Assistant Chief agreed and went along with Van Cleave notifying, by phone, Coke officials;

d. Van Cleave had not cleared this action with his immediate supervisor at the Coca Cola Company;

e. Apparently the phone calls were made very late in the evening;

f. When the Murphy kidnapping was resolved, Van Cleave was called in by his boss to account for his actions. He apparently has not been able to justify the calls and this will be discussed at the meeting on 4 March. We suspect this may be his last official action for the Coca Cola Company.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

451

SECRET

ATL-30-74
28 February 1974

7. Since receiving the 27 February 1974 call from OSS, we have checked with Charles Haynes and Bob Perry of the FBI. Both are familiar with Van Cleave and his operations. Perry confirmed that Van Cleave had passed the information contained in Enclosure No. 4 to the FBI. Perry had a few other things to say about Van Cleave that probably do not need to be repeated in this memorandum.

8. Concerning the future, we intend to be hard to reach when Van Cleave calls; if necessary, talk to him on the phone a few times to see if he gets the idea; then if all fails simply tell him we have been told to stay out of this business.

A. G. CO[illegible]

WDPangburn:mw

Enclosures
(as stated)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

SECRET

4.51

OSS

SECRET

ATL-4-75
14 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

John R. Peterson
Atlanta Resident Office

Response to Call-in to Agency Headquarters/Initial Contact (Telephone) with John Daniel Williamson, Carrollton, Georgia

1. On 7 January 1975 Albert S. Coleman of the Washington Field Office called us to pass on information that he had just been given by Dale Zeimer, DCD Headquarters, regarding a call received by the Agency duty officer on New Year's Eve from one John Daniel Williamson of Carrollton, Georgia. Williamson identified himself as a Methodist minister and gave his address as Route #2, Box 3546, Carrollton, Georgia, Phone: (404) 854-0443.

2. In his call to Agency Headquarters, Williamson said that he had a friend who had information on the impending overthrow of a foreign government. The information regarded illegal shipment of arms from the US to the foreign country. Williamson said that his friend had wanted to try to sell the information to the foreign country concerned but that when the friend told Williamson about it Williamson prevailed on him to let him (Williamson) bring it to the attention of the proper government agency, resulting in his call to our headquarters on New Year's Eve. Williamson asked that someone from the Agency be put in contact with him.

3. On the afternoon of 7 January 1975, after verifying through the phone operator that Williamson was listed in the Carrollton area (he actually lives at Roopville, Georgia, on True Road, but the Roopville phones are handled under the Carrollton exchange), we called his number. We were informed by a young male voice, apparently his son, that Williamson was indeed a Methodist minister, but that he taught school every day during the week in the high school at Franklin, Georgia, except on Saturdays when he worked all day at a hardware store at Rockmart, Georgia. We were told that he preached on Sunday mornings. We were not told what he does on Sunday afternoons. Since he was not to be at home until after 5 PM, we called him from our own home that same evening.

4. Williamson seemed to be expecting our call although we had not identified ourselves during the earlier call. He gave us essentially the same information furnished during his New Year's Eve call. He said that the friend about whom he called is a 'former parishioner and lives in the Carrollton area." He preferred not to provide us with the friend's name and address. The information, however—that which we were able to ascertain--sounded on the up-and-up, as far as Mr. Williamson's part in it was concerned, for he seemed to be a sincere and well intentioned individual. When we tried to at least learn the name of the foreign country involved, Williamson said that his friend would not give him that information.

4.51

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

SECRET

SECRET

ATL-4-75
14 January 1975

5. We did learn that the friend whom Williamson described as a business consultant, "a kind of a high-finance man involved in setting up corporations," who often travels abroad, had been approached by someone "locally," i.e., in the Carrollton-West Atlanta area (Carrollton is about 40 miles west of Atlanta). The friend was said to be "a good friend, a reliable man, a college graduate, an established man in the community." According to Williamson, the friend was approached because of the nature of his work to perform some sort of task for the group, and he knew that something was wrong. The friend then learned all he could about the planned operation and eventually talked with Williamson about it. The friend told Williamson that the gun-running operation had been going on for about a year.

6. At one point Williamson said that his friend told him that "the people involved in this thing won't hesitate to kill him (the friend) and he knows that he's going to have to leave this part of the country when it comes to light." Williamson told us: "I feel like I've got this man's life in my hands and I don't want to do anything to jeopardize his life, because I know him and his family and all." Williamson suggested that we meet his friend at the Cape and Sword Motel restaurant on I-20, near Six Flags Over Georgia, west of Atlanta, and he said that the two of them had already talked of this as a good meeting place. We told Williamson that we would be glad to meet with his friend but first we would like for his friend to give us a call so that we may talk with him. We gave our office phone number to Williamson. As of the writing of this memorandum, we have had no call.

7. From the information that Williamson provided, e.g., location of people involved, an attempt to meet with an Agency representative (to possibly get us involved merely by association), we believe that much of the substance of the matter could be the same as that which was reported from this office to OSS as related by Stephen Van Cleave regarding Mitch Werbell, et al. (See ATL-39-74, 28 February 1974, Resume of Contacts with Stephen Van Cleave; ATL-53-74, 9 April 1974, Stephen Van Cleave.) Mitch Werbell's operation, which has been described locally as a "machine-gun factory," is located at Powder Springs, Georgia, about ten miles north of the I-20 Cape and Sword Motel. At any rate, Mr. Williamson's friend has been given the opportunity to contact us—and we are awaiting his call.

JOHN R. PETERSON

cc: Office of Chief, DCD (D. Zeimer)
✓OSS
Services

4.51

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

SECRET

12-19-00

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

MAR 5 11 25 AM '74

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L 051345Z MAR 74 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 12494

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: SUPPORT BRANCH/OSS (GRANT) A-182014

SUBJ: STEVEN VAN CLEAVE, INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, LTD., ATLANTA,
GEORGIA

REF: GRANT/HENNESSEY TELECON, 28 FEBRUARY, SAME SUBJECT

1. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 21 JANUARY 1974 WE RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM ANSELMO ALLIEGRO, 3550 ROCKERMAN ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA, (A CONTACT OF THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE) WHO ADVISED US THAT AN ACQUAINTANCE OF HIS IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA, STEVEN VAN CLEAVE, WANTED TO SPEAK WITH US IN CONNECTION WITH INTELLIGENCE MATTERS CONCERNING LATIN AMERICA. WE TOLD ALLIEGRO THAT VAN CLEAVE SHOULD CONTACT OUR OFFICE IN ATLANTA; HOWEVER, ALLIEGRO SAID THAT VAN CLEAVE DIDN'T WANT TO DEAL WITH ''RECRUITERS'', RATHER HE WANTED TO SPEAK WITH A CIA OFFICER ''IN THE BUSINESS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION''. WE TOLD ALLIEGRO THAT OUR ATLANTA OFFICE HAS THE SAME STATURE AS THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE, AND THAT HE SHOULD URGE VAN CLEAVE TO CONTACT OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN ATLANTA. ALLIEGRO WOULDN'T ACCEPT THIS RESPONSE ON OUR PART AND INSISTED THAT WE AT LEAST HEAR WHAT VAN CLEAVE HAD TO SAY. FINALLY, WE AGREED TO ACCEPT A CALL FROM VAN CLEAVE SO THAT WE COULD TELL HIM TO CONTACT OUR ATLANTA REPRESENTATIVE.

A177650

4.51

2. VAN CLEAVE CALLED US AT HIS EXPENSE FROM ATLANTA ABOUT FIVE MINUTES LATER. WE ADVISED HIM AT THE OUTSET THAT HE SHOULD SPEAK WITH BILL PANGBURN IN THE ATLANTA RESIDENT OFFICE AT HIS EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR WORK FORCE IS DIVIDED GEOGRAPHICALLY RATHER THAN FUNCTIONALLY, AND THAT SINCE HE LIVES IN ATLANTA, HE MUST DEAL WITH THE ATLANTA RO. WE PROVIDED HIM WITH THE TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR THE ATLANTA RO, AND HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD CONTACT PANGBURN THE SAME DAY. WE CALLED PANGBURN TO ADVISE HIM OF VAN CLEAVE'S INTENTION TO CONTACT HIM. WE LATER LEARNED FROM BOTH PANGBURN AND VAN CLEAVE THAT THE CONTACT WAS MADE.

3. WE PRESUMED THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH VAN CLEAVE. HOWEVER, WE WERE MISTAKEN. VAN CLEAVE PLACED AT LEAST TWO MORE TELEPHONE CALSS TO US FROM ATLANTA (AT HIS EXPENSE), AND ONE FROM DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA. EACH TIME WE ADVISED HIM TO CALL PANGBURN RATHER THAN US. HIS RESPONSE ON THESE OCCASIONS WAS THAT HE ALREADY HAD OR INTENDED TO KEEP PANGBURN ADVISED BUT THAT HE WANTED TO KEEP US INFORMED ALSO. THE LOCAL DADE COUNTY CALL WAS MADE TO ADVISE US THAT VAN CLEAVE WAS IN MIAMI IN THE COMPANY OF TWO ARGENTINE POLICE OFFICIALS, WHOM WE COULD DEBRIEF IF WE SO DESIRED. WE AGAIN TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD REPORT TO ATLANTA.

4.51

PAGE 3 DCD/MIAMI 12494 C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. VAN CLEAVE TOLD US DURING ONE OF THE AFOREMENTIONED
CONVERSATIONS THAT HE IS ACQUAINTED WITH MITCHELL WERBELL, A1279[illegible]
POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, AND THAT HE HAD BEEN ''PRESSURED''
INTO TAKING WERBELL TO ARGENTINA WITH HIM IN LATE JANUARY
1974 BY OFFICIALS IN THE COCA COLA COMPANY, CORAL GABLES, A164
FLORIDA, WITH WHICH VAN CLEAVE HAD (OR HAS) A CONSULTING
CONTRACT IN CONNECTION WITH COCA COLA'S SECURITY SYSTEM IN
ARGENTINA. VAN CLEAVE ADVISED US THAT HE NEVER AGAIN WOULD
HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH WERBELL BECAUSE THE LATTER HAD ACTED
SO BADLY DURING THIS TRIP. HE TOLD US THAT WERBELL HAD
COMMENTED TO ARGENTINE OFFICIALS THAT HE (WERBELL) WAS SOME-
HOW CONNECTED WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND ON
A FIRST NAME BASIS WITH ''BILL'' COLBY, DCI. VAN CLEAVE TOLD
US THAT MATTERS HAD DEGENERATED TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT HE
RETURNED TO THE US WITHOUT WERBELL. (OUR MEMORY IS A BIT
FUZZY ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS DISCUSSION, BUT WE RECALL
SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT WERBELL WAS INVOLVED WITH WINE,
WOMEN, AND SONG, AND VAN CLEAVE WAS AFRAID THAT WERBELL MIGHT
BE ARRESTED BY ARGENTINE POLICE BEFORE IT WAS OVER.) VAN
CLEAVE TOLD US THAT HE PERSONALLY NEVER HAS SO MUCH AS
IMPLIED A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AGENCY TO ANY OUTSIDER.

~~PAGE 4 DCD/MIAMI 12494 CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~5. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT MET VAN CLEAVE IN PERSON, BASED UPON OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM HE APPEARED TO BE AN INTELLIGENT AND REASONABLE MAN. WE ARE SORRY THAT WE CANNOT PROVIDE A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH VAN CLEAVE, BUT AS WE MENTIONED IN REFERENCED TELECON WE DID NOT MAKE NOTES DURING THE CONVERSATIONS NOR DID WE FEEL IT NECESSARY AT THE TIME TO WRITE A MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SINCE WE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS A NORMAL, ALBEIT COMPLEX, REFERRAL TO ANOTHER DCD OFFICE. E 2 IMPDET CL BY 013652~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4.51

SECRET

E12-79-OC

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS

22 May 1969

Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. -- Local OSI Inquiry to DCS Miami Office for
#27535 Information Concerning

ZZ-ZZ-054-69

1. The enclosed copy of memorandum from our Miami Office, regarding the OSI representative's inquiry for information concerning Subject, is forwarded for your records and possible future reference.

2. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 2733.

SECURITY

[illegible] FRANK YOUNG

Enclosure: As stated above

VThorne:grw

4.51

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

22 May 1962

Chief, Miami Field Office

ATT : Mr. E. Hogan
Director, Domestic Contact Service (Services Division)

[illegible], Mitchell L.

REF : MIA-[illegible]-69

Thank you for the information reported in the reference. The suggestion made by your office that OSI direct the request through official security channels is entirely correct. In the future, however, it will be helpful and appreciated if you will forward correspondence pertaining to security matters directly to the Security Liaison Officer, rather than to Support Staff. This saves time in getting the information to the appropriate channel for any action that may be indicated.

SECURITY

JAMES P. [illegible]

VThoros:CRV

4.51

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

F-12-7

SECRET

Director, Domestic Contact Service 15 May 1969

ATTN : 033 MIM-004-69

Chief, Miami Field Office

Local OSI Inquiry Regarding Information on Mitchell L. Werbell B

1. On 15 May 1969, Special Agent Dave Plouman, local OSI representative, USAF, visited the Miami Field Office to solicit any information we might have regarding Mitchell L. Werbell who apparently is undergoing a security clearance check as the result of presently being employed by a company with a government contract. 1

2. Werbell was an unsolicited contact of this office beginning in 1959 and he reached peak notoriety in November 1967 as a result of his involvement in the Rolando Masferrer trial in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion. John Greaney, OGC was in Miami at the time to oversee Agency interests.

3. Plouman in contacting other US Government agencies locally including the US Attorney's Office somehow received an indication that CIA had information on Werbell; thus Plouman's visit to the Miami Field Office.

4. It was indicated to Plouman, who is known personally by several members of this staff, that we know of Werbell and that on occasion he had reported unsolicited information. It was suggested, however, that Plouman direct his request officially through channels via OSI's agency liaison officer in Washington.

5. This is for background and is being forwarded at the suggestion of local CIA Security.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

EHogan:pmw

① ~~④~~ ~~②~~ ③

SECRET

4.51

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET/RYBAT

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: SOD/SEC/COV
EXT: 5265
DATE: 2 Sept 65

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 8 PER ___ # ___

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/SOD 2 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, DC/WH/C 5, D/SEC/WH 4, C/AF 4, C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET/RYBAT

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 16 18 19Z CITE DIRECTOR

(REFERENCE NUMBER) 32999

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN SECUR

REF: JMWAVE 2812 (IN 86315) *

BASED ON REVIEW OF INFO DEVELOPED BY [illegible] INVESTIGATION, SUBJECT REF NOT CONSIDERED SUITABLE FOR FUTURE USE ON WITHRUSH. ESSWIRL REQUEST NOT DESIRED. OA BEING CANCELLED.

END OF MESSAGE

773056

294544

* Requested Hqrs. reconsider use of Antonio (SOTO) Vazquez on WITHRUSH

SOD/AB/CPS Jim Smith (telecon)

SOD/AB/CPS 3 Larry Murphy (Draft)

CI/OA Dick Ruffner (telecon)

OS/IOS/ID Lou Vasaly (telecon)

R. J. Goodhart
Chief, Support Staff, SOD

Sidney D. Stembridge
Chief, Security/Cover, SOD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET/RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

[ ]-b.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA

FROM: (Division) SOD (Case officer) W. Wainwright (Extension) 4475

SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used): SOTO-Vazquez, Antonio

NAME SHOWN IS: ☒ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☐ CRYPT

CI/OA NO.: 90192

201 NO.: 294544

PROJECT: WITHRUSH

DATE OF BIRTH: 20 August 1934

PLACE OF BIRTH: Hava, Cuba

AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD: ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

1. It is requested that OA on Subject be canceled as he is of no further operational interest to this office.

   Thank you for your assistance in this case.

2. Green List Name Check canceled as of this date.

SEP 6 11 25 AM '66

DATE: 2 September 1966

SIGNATURE: William E. Wainwright

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

SECRET

201 No. 294944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/AB/OPS/3 -- Larry Murphy

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of ____________________ SOTO Vasquez, Antonio, for the purpose specified in your request dated 8 December 1965.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 14 December 1965 jab

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM

T/N Antonio SOTO Vazquez

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Subject submitted job application to Roberto Medell (principal agent, WITHRUSH, Miami, Fla.) on 25 March 1965 for job as WITHRUSH pilot.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible case officer. A knowledge of Spanish and aviation would be most helpful.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

George N. Sohl known to Subject as Gerald Saunders.

FORM 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECTION II **MOTIVATION AND CONTROL**

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock concept such as "anti-communist.")*

Financial, desire to maintain flight status, and to a lesser degree, political (anti-Castro, anti-communist).

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

No real control exists over Subject other than financial. His resident alien status could offer a factor of control if authorization were granted for this maneuver.

SECTION III **COVER**

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS. The principal agent represents himself as an employee of the WAVE case officer, who in turn is documented as an agent of the Gov't of the Republic of the Congo. However, although no U.S. Gov't interest is overtly manifested, it is realistic to assume that Subject suspects U.S. Gov't collusion in, if not outright sponsorship of the operation.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

NA

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

In all probability Subject is or will become aware that the GOC air program is under sponsorship by KUBARK.

SECTION IV **INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING**

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

None known.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Probably wife.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None known.

SECTION V **COLLABORATION POTENTIAL**

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

None.

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

NA

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

NA

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

NA

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

As a pilot only.

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject under ostensible contract to GOC, although presumably he knows the project is being sponsored by the U.S. Government.

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

He is a qualified fixed-wing and helicopter pilot.

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject's contract calls for base pay of $800 per month, $10 per flight hour over sixty hours, $10 per flight hour which is considered hazardous. Contract additionally contains life insurance up to $40,000.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None known.

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

WAVE Station, FBI, INS, Credit, Miami Police and Hqs files.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

None.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED. Yes. POA	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED 21 May 1965

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject believed reliable with no known adverse character traits. No known security problems to date.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

None.

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

No known excessive habits.

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Aviation.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Catain Central American countries.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

PRQ Part I supplied by Subject; Part II by check of files by case officer.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (*Also see para. 43b, supra*)

None.

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W; WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

NA

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

DATE 2 December 1965	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER Laurence C. McLaughlin

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: [illegible]

TO: [illegible]

C. NO.: [illegible]

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
XX	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS: POA expired on [illegible]. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

FORM 9-65 889a SECRET (20)

SECRET

3 0 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : 201 - 294544
#242 369

Reference is made to our previous memorandum furnishing you with National Agency Checks results and confirmation of completion of favorable domestic field investigation conducted in connection with your consideration of Subject for an Operational Approval. As noted in our previous memorandum, written reports on the field investigation were to be furnished to your office at a later date. Attached hereto you will find the above-mentioned reports. No further action is contemplated in this matter.

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

file

Enclosure:
INV. RPT. DTD. 6/29/65

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

FILE NO. 242 369 **DATE** 29 June 1965

SYNOPSIS

Antonio SOTO has been employed periodically by Eagle Incorporated, a steamship company, since 1961. He has been utilized as a warehouse checker. SUBJECT has left his employment to accept short time flying jobs. He left Eagle Incorporated in March 1965 to accept one of these flying jobs. Four developed references favorable regarding habits, morals, reputation, and loyalty to the United States. No credit or police record in the names of SUBJECT or his spouse.

SECRET

REPORT NO.

FORM 7-64 1125 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 1125 AND 1125a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

File #242 369

EMPLOYMENT:

At Miami, Florida

(Eagle Incorporated)

On 22 June 1965 Sam KRATISH, secretary-treasurer, 800 N. E. 2nd Avenue, was interviewed regarding Antonio SOTO. The informant stated that "Tony" has been employed by the firm periodically since 1961. SUBJECT has been utilized as a warehouse checker for the steamship company. He unloaded cargo coming to and from the United States. He was an excellent employee, and although he has left on several occasions, he is always eligible for rehire. The informant stated that SUBJECT is also a pilot and formerly flew in the Cuban Air Force. He has had several part time or temporary flying jobs which offer him good pay. When these jobs arise the firm allows SUBJECT to leave without jeopardizing his standing with the company. SUBJECT left in March 1965 to accept another one of these flying jobs. The informant stated that he did not know where these jobs were located, but believed that they are usually out of the United States.

REFERENCES:

At Miami, Florida

On 22 June 1965 Sam KRATISH, previously identified, was interviewed regarding SUBJECT as a developed reference. The informant stated that he considers "Tony" SOTO to be a reputable and honest individual. He has been associated with him on a professional basis since 1961 and his associations have all been satisfactory. SUBJECT is an excellent worker and is completely honest. The informant stated that he has often left SUBJECT alone with valuable cargo, and that there has never been any dispute over SUBJECT's trustworthiness or integrity. SUBJECT is a Cuban exile who left Cuba because of the CASTRO regime. SUBJECT has never espoused any political ideologies while he has worked at the firm, but the informant stated that he is aware of the fact that the SUBJECT is anti-CASTRO and that he is favorably disposed towards the United States form of government. The informant stated that he knew nothing that he considered to be unfavorable regarding SUBJECT's character.

On 22 June 1965 J. C. WILDER, supervisor, Eagle Incorporated, 800 N. E. 2nd Avenue, was interviewed regarding SUBJECT as a developed reference. The informant stated that he has been acquainted with SUBJECT since 1961 on a professional basis. SUBJECT has been a warehouse checker periodically since 1961. His main line of work is flying, and he was formerly a pilot in the Cuban Air Force. However, after CASTRO took over the island SUBJECT fled and has worked at several different locations flying on a part time basis. When SUBJECT does not have a job flying he always comes to the company, and because of his good work habits he is always hired. The informant stated that SUBJECT left the company in March 1965 to take a job flying at some unknown location. The informant stated that he has found SUBJECT to be pleasant, completely reliable, and a man of integrity. There is no question of his morality or sobriety, and the informant believed that SUBJECT was loyal to the United States.

On 22 June 1965 Carlos MARTINEZ, export manager, Eagle Incorporated, 800 N. E. 2nd Avenue, was interviewed regarding SUBJECT as a developed reference. The informant stated that he has been acquainted with SUBJECT since 1961 on a professional basis. During that time he has never noted anything of an unfavorable nature regarding SUBJECT's character, morality or sobriety. He is a hard working and conscientious individual and is diligent and reliable. He last worked for the company for approximately six months in 1964 and 1965 and left in March 1965 to take a flying job at some unknown location. The informant stated that he has never heard anything to indicate that SUBJECT had any Communistic tendencies whatsoever, and he believed that SUBJECT was favorably disposed towards the United States.

At Hialeah, Florida

On 22 June 1965 Mrs. Marie RODRIGUEZ, 1260 West 60th Terrace, was interviewed regarding SUBJECT as a developed reference. The informant stated that SUBJECT

File #242 369

and his family resided next door to her for two years from 1962 to 1964. She found SUBJECT to be happily married and stated that he was a decent and clean living person. He was formerly a pilot in Cuba, but had to flee Cuba because of the CASTRO regime. The informant believed that SUBJECT was favorably disposed towards the United States government. She added that she could offer no criticism of his personal conduct, morality or sobriety. She added that all of her associations with SUBJECT have been satisfactory.

On 22 June 1965 Mrs. Mary DIENER, 1280 West 60th Terrace, was interviewed regarding SUBJECT as a developed reference. The informant stated that she lived next door to SUBJECT and his family for two years and found them to be good neighbors. They were Cuban refugees who fled Cuba because of the CASTRO regime. SUBJECT was a pilot in Cuba, but could not find work flying here in the United States. As a consequence he worked for a firm on the docks in downtown Miami. SUBJECT's reputation in the community was good, and the informant believed that he was a respectable gentleman. She stated that she believed SUBJECT was appreciative of being able to live in the United States, and she never heard him criticise our form of government.

CREDIT:

At Miami, Florida

On 10 June 1965 records of the Credit Bureau of Miami were reviewed in the names of SUBJECT and his spouse and no record was found.

These files cover Hialeah, Florida.

POLICE:

At Miami, Florida

On 10 June 1965 records of the Dade County Public Safety Department and the Miami Police Department were reviewed in the names of SUBJECT and his spouse and no record was found.

At Hialeah, Florida

File #242 369

On 10 June 1965 records of the Hialeah Police Department were reviewed in the names of SUBJECT and his spouse and no record was found.

AAT/ahh

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 8 July 1965	CASE NO. 201- 294 544

☐	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐	SET UP FOR OA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA	

USE

T	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LEGAL REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below,* or see remarks)	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	✓	OTHER Insert Eyes Only!

☐ POA EXPIRED ________ . PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF ~~[illegible]~~ NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED. Short

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS M/R. This case was discussed with Mr. Brown/C/CI/OA
and F. Farrel/SOD/Case Officer/
Ball also conferred with J. Scanlon/SOD/Sec. It was determined that
who reviewed the Eyes Only data and other information of record. and the type of
in view of the Subject already being in the Field on his second tour would not preclude
operation(PM) involved that the derogatory nature of the information for CI/OA
his continued use. SOD however is to forward a memorandum to this effect
files.

☐ FILE

SECRET

FORM 7-63 707

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE: 14 Apr. 1965 jew

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: WITHRUSH
SOD/AB/OFS/3 Congo

SUBJECT: 201 - 294544; SO#242369

TYPE OF REQUEST: ☒ POA ☒ OA ☐ CSC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date) 20 Apr. 1965

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date) 27 Apr. 1965

USE OF SUBJECT: Pilot WITHRUSH

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS
BY: HDI
DIVISION: HDI: WH
FIELD: HDI: WAVE

APR 15 2 01 PM '65

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ 1, PART 1 ☒ PARTIAL 201 ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

POA

/s/ Edward P. Brown HEB
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

DATE 6/25/65

TO : Chief, CI/OA
FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results: # 242369 (WR) other than pre-clearance [illegible] no [illegible]

☑ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	FR	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

☑ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached FBI ([illegible] 4/21/65), I&N, OSI (Eyes Only)

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS: Additional traces and domestic field coverage has been scheduled, the results of which will be forwarded when completed.

[illegible] 65

[illegible]

[illegible] 6/28/65

SECRET

693

FILE NO. 242 369 DATE 26 May 1965

SYNOPSIS

File at Immigration and Naturalization Service, Miami, Florida shows that one Antonio SOTO (Vazquez), who was born 20 August 1934 in Cuba, arrived in the United States at Daytona Beach, Florida on 1 January 1959 and he departed from the United States at Miami, Florida for the Dominican Republic on 20 June 1959. He again arrived in the United States at San Juan, P. R. on 18 August 1959, using name and passport of one Orlando Pedro RODRIGUEZ (Alvarez), which he explained by saying he could not get visa in own name due to service in Cuban Air Force during BATISTA regime. His foreign departure from Miami, Florida to Guatemala was verified 28 September 1959. Father of SUBJECT said to be in jail in Cuba in 1959 for participating in attempted invasion of Cuba. SUBJECT arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida 11 January 1961; his foreign departure from Miami, Florida was verified 25 February 1961 and he again arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida 24 May 1961. He was granted Re-Entry Permit in October 1963 for travel to Republic of Congo. Background data set forth.

A 168008

REPORT NO.

FORM NO 1 NOV 54 1125

File #242 369

GENERAL:

At Miami, Florida

The records in the District Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 51 S. W. First Avenue, which were checked on 19 and 24 May 1965, were found to contain file # A-11 263 189 pertaining to one Antonio SOTO (Vazquez), AKA, Orlando Pedro RODRIGUEZ (Alvarez), who arrived in the United States at Daytona Beach, Florida on 1 January 1959 in a Cuban Army airplane. He was said to have been born on 20 August 1934 at Havana, Cuba; to be the son of Antonio SOTO (Rodriguez) and Julia Rosa VAZQUEZ (Acosta) and to have resided in January-February 1959 at 1409 South Ridgewood Avenue and at 129 North Halifax Avenue, both Daytona Beach, Florida. In February 1959, his address was given as 35 N. E. 58th Street, Miami, Florida and his foreign departure from Miami, Florida to the Dominican Republic was verified on 20 June 1959.

SOTO again arrived in the United States at San Juan, Puerto Rico on 18 August 1959, at which time he presented Cuban passport #02042 in the name of Orlando Pedro RODRIGUEZ (Alvarez). Upon interrogation under oath by Immigration and Naturalization Service at Miami, Florida on 18 September 1959, SOTO admitted his identity as Antonio SOTO (Vazquez); stated that he could not get a visa in his own name in Cuba because he had been in the BATISTA government as a Captain in the Cuban Air Force and that he would refuse to tell how he obtained the passport in the name of Orlando Pedro RODRIGUEZ (Alvarez). He said that he came to the United States to try to help his father who was then in jail in Cuba. He identified his wife as Dolores Inocenta BECERRA (Garcia) and gave their address as 6711 N. W. 2nd Court, Miami, Florida. He was represented, for Immigration purposes, by Attorney Ralph H. AGUILERA, 608 Dupont Plaza Center, Miami, Florida. A notation in the file in August 1959 set forth that SUBJECT's father, Col. Antonio SOTO, "was the man who had recently piloted the invasion plane from Dominican Republic to Trinidad, Cuba", was shot in the fighting and was in a prison hospital in Cuba. The foreign departure of SUBJECT from Miami, Florida to Guatemala was verified on 28 September 1959, after he had been ordered deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service for fraudulent entry. In December 1959, his address was given as 6th Avenue #1221, 8th Piso, P. O. Box 918, Guatemala City, Guatemala.

Antonio SOTO (Vazquez) again arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida on 11 January 1961. He reported that he had Social Security #265-64-6892; that he had a brother-in-law, Fidel RODRIGUEZ, 440 S. W. 5th Avenue, Miami, Florida and that he (SOTO) intended to reside at 5703 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida. His foreign departure was verified at Miami, Florida on 25 February 1961 and he again arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida on 24 May 1961. In August 1961, his address was 143 N. W. 39th Street, Miami, Florida.

On 18 October 1963, SUBJECT was granted a Re-Entry Permit by the Immigration and Naturalization Service so that he could travel to the Republic of the Congo as an employee of Caribbean Aeromarine Company, P. O. Box 755, Miami, 48, Florida. He again arrived in the United States at New York, N. Y. on 4 May 1964 and in September 1964, his address was listed as 1270 West 60th Terrace, Hialeah, Florida.

In September 1964, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was advised by the U. S. Department of State, Washington, D. C. that SUBJECT had applied to the American Consulate, Toronto, Canada for an immigrant visa. The U. S. Department of State was advised by the Immigration and Naturalization Service on 1 October 1964 that SUBJECT appeared "to still be excludable".

Additional information concerning SUBJECT is said to possibly be contained in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The above records were also found to contain file # A-12 542 006 pertaining to one Dolores Inocenta BECERRA, who arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida on 15 October 1960 and who may be identical with the wife of SUBJECT. This person was said to have been born on 28 December 1939 at Havana, Cuba; to be married to one Antonio SOTO, 5703 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida and to have a brother, Sergio BECERRA, 147 N. W. 58th Street, Miami, Florida.

The above records were also found to contain file #

File #242 369

A-11 881 502 pertaining to one Julia Rosa VAZQUEZ (Acosta), AKA, Edelma Marina SANCHEZ (Izquierdo), who may be identical with the mother of SUBJECT. This person was said to have been born on 16 April 1909 in Matanzas Province, Cuba; to have arrived in the United States at San Juan, Puerto Rico on 18 August 1959 with a Cuban passport issued to one Edelma Marina SANCHEZ (Izquierdo) and that she admitted this passport to be false insofar as she was concerned. In September 1959, her address was 65 N. W. 60th Street, Miami, Florida and her foreign departure from Miami, Florida for Cuba was verified on 2 October 1959. She again arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida on 5 October 1960 and gave her address as c/o her daughter, Cecina SOTO, 4413 N. W. 9th Street, Miami, Florida.

FHH/eph

FILE NO. 242 369 **DATE** 17 June 1965

SYNOPSIS

Developed reference in 100 block North Halifax Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida, advised that the reported former residence of Antonio SOTO (VAZQUEZ) was owned and occupied by Cuban General BATISTA at the time. Informant advised neither she nor others in area would have any knowledge of SUBJECT. Inquiries in 1400 block South Ridgewood Avenue unproductive, incorrect address furnished. Credit and police, no record.

REPORT NO. ________

FORM NO. 1 NOV 58 1125

#242 369

REFERENCES

At Daytona Beach, Florida:

On 11 June 1965, observations revealed that the dwelling at 129 North Halifax Avenue, reportedly the residence of Antonio SOTO (VAZQUEZ) in early 1959, is presently vacant. The building contains a nameplate in the name of St. Demetrios Greek Orthodox Parish.

On 11 June 1965, Mrs. Clayton HARSPER, developed informant at 120 North Halifax Avenue, advised that the dwelling at 129 North Halifax Avenue was owned for many years by former Cuban General BATISTA. During the period in question, BATISTA, family friends, and staff, totaling approximately thirty people, occupied the dwelling. Many individuals of Cuban extraction came and went during the late 1950s, and Mrs. HARSPER stated that neither she nor other present residents of this area would have any knowledge of the SUBJECT. The Cubans kept to themselves and never mingled with the local citizenry.

Mrs. HARSPER added that BATISTA sold the property about a year ago to a church group, but the building is presently unoccupied.

On 11 June 1965, observations in the 1400 block of South Ridgewood Avenue revealed that there is no 1409 South Ridgewood. A Mrs. SHAROG, owner of the Parkway Motel at 1369; and Edward SUMMERS, Humble Oil Station, 1480 South Ridgewood Avenue, both stated that there has never been a 1409 South Ridgewood Avenue. The informants advised that several motels in the area have all undergone several ownership changes over the past five or six years, and the informants know of no one in the area who would be in a position to recall the SUBJECT.

CREDIT

At Daytona Beach, Florida:

On 11 June 1965, the files of the Daytona Beach Credit Bureau were searched in the name of SUBJECT, no record.

#242 369

POLICE (CRIMINAL, TRAFFIC, AND SUBVERSIVE)

At Daytona Beach, Florida:

On 11 June 1965, the files of the Daytona Beach Police Department were searched in the name of SUBJECT, no record.

JKM/jdm

SOTO (VAZQUEZ), Antonio
242 369

4 June 1965

On 27 May 1965, the files of the Immigration and Naturalization Service were searched in the name of SOTO (VAZQUEZ, Antonio, born 20 August 1934, Cuba.

The only information available at the Central Office relating to SUBJECT were I-94 forms, copies of which are attached.

KNW:ja

Name (Last, in Caps) (First) (Middle)
SOTO VAZQUEZ, Antonio

A 11 263 189

Sndx Code

Alias
(DNR)to Rodriguez y Alvarez, Orlando D.
(A 11 882 397)

Type of action
Parolee

Country of Birth	Date of Birth (Month)	(Day)	(Year)
Cuba	08	20	34
Place of Entry	Date of Entry (Month)	(Day)	(Year)
JAO Fla.	01	01	59

FILE LOCATION

F.C.O.	Date	F.C.O.	Date
MIA	3-25-60 J	CORRECTED INDEX CARD	

Form G-361 (Rev. 10-1-57) ORIGINAL INDEX CARD

Name (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle)
SOTO-Vazquez, Antonio

No.

Sndx Code
S 3 00

Alias
[illegible] 2nd Avenue

Entered (Mo.) (Day) (Year) (Port) (Class)

Born: (Country) (Mo.) (Day) (Year)
Cuba 1934

Name of Sponsor

Type of Action
CRIM. INV. A-2741, [illegible] 55, para 38

(Mo.) (Day) (Year) (Section) (Forwarded to Const of.)

Action on VP: (Decision)
[illegible] subversive literature in house
investigated [redacted] [illegible]

Naturalized: (Mo.) (Day) (Year) (Court No.) (Court Location) (Certificate No.)
no further information.

FCO	Date	FCO	Date	FCO	Date
FCO	Date	FCO	Date	FCO	Date

Form G-361 (Rev. 12-1-58) INDEX CARD Central Office Copy

Family Name Given Name Initial
SOTO-VASQUEZ, ANTONIO S 300

Nationality (Citizenship)
CUBA

Passport Number
11 [illegible]

United States Address
6711 NW 2ND COURT

MIAMI, FLA.

*Airline & Flight No. or Vessel of Arrival

*Passenger Boarded At

Permanent Address

Birthdate
AUG. 20, 1934

Birthplace
HAVANA, CUBA

Visa Issued At

Date Visa Issued

Your admission cannot be authorized at this time. You are PAROLED until MAY 24, 1961

Conditions: TO REPORT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

35

MIA 4/25/61

(Date) (Inspector, Officer)

PLEASE PRINT IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

Surname [illegible]
Given Name [illegible]
Passport Number [illegible] 300
Birthdate [illegible]
Nationality (Citizenship) [illegible]
Birthplace [illegible]
United States Address [illegible]
Permanent Address [illegible]
Visa Issued At [illegible]
Date Visa Issued [illegible]
Vessel Name or Airline and Flight No. of Arrival GAM-100
Passenger Boarded At MEXICO D. F.
Form I-94 A (Rev. 7-1-57)
ARRIVAL-DEPARTURE RECORD

ADMITTED
MIAMI, FLA.
11 1961
B-2
UNTIL Feb 10-61

UNDER DOCKET CONTROL
CLEARED

ANY HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES MUST BE IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

A-12 [illegible]

Surname SOTO y Vazquez
Given Name Antonio
Initial
Passport Number S 300
Nationality (Citizenship) Cuba
Birthplace Havana, Cuba
Birthdate 8/20/34
United States Address c/o Celina Soto, 65 N. W. 60th St., Miami, Fla.
Permanent Address
Visa Issued At
Date Visa Issued
Vessel Name or Airline & Flight No. of Arrival PAA 431 - 18 S/U
Passenger Boarded At Ciudad Trujillo, Dom. Rep.
Form I-94 A (Rev. 7-1-57)
ARRIVAL-DEPARTURE RECORD A-11, 263, 182

Your admission cannot be authorized at this time. You are PAROLED
until Sept 3, 1959, 9:30 PM
Conditions [illegible]
[illegible]
RESTRICTED TO DADE COUNTY
MIA 8/20/59 (1)
(Port) (Date) (Immig. Officer)

ANY HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES MUST BE IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

Surname SOTO y Vazquez
Given Name Antonio
Initial
Passport Number None S 30
Nationality (Citizenship) Cuban
Birthplace Marianao, Cuba
Birthdate Aug 20, 1934
United States Address ~~Rancho~~ Motel, Daytona Beach, Fla.
[illegible]
Permanent Address [illegible], Casino de Portillo, Havana, Cuba.
Visa Issued At None
Date Visa Issued None
Vessel Name of Airline & Flight No. of Arrival Camaguey, Cuba Arr. Daytona Beach, Fla.
Passenger Boarded At Cuban Airforce Plane # 913 1/1/59
Form I-94 A (Rev. 7-1-57)
ARRIVAL-DEPARTURE RECORD

Your admission cannot be authorized at this time. You are PAROLED
until further notice
Conditions telephone immigration [illegible] Daytona Beach; not to change address without [illegible]
[illegible] 1/2/59
(Port) (Date) (Immig. Officer)

ANY HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES MUST BE IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

You have been admitted to the United States for the period of time indicated hereon. Remaining in the United States thereafter without obtaining an extension of time from the Immigration authorities is a violation of law. You are required to retain this permit in your possession and to surrender it to the transportation line at the time of your departure unless you depart over the land border of the United States in which case you must surrender it to a Canadian Immigration officer on the Canadian border, or to a United States Immigration officer on the Mexican border.

RECORD OF EXTENSIONS

To ________ Office ________

[illegible]

________ Office ________

DEPARTURE FOREIGN VERIFIED

31

U.S. Immigration Officer

DEPARTURE RECORD

Port:

Date:

Carrier:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Form Approved—Budget Bureau No. 43-R311.4

You have been admitted to the United States for the period of time indicated hereon. Remaining in the United States thereafter without obtaining an extension of time from the Immigration authorities is a violation of law. You are required to retain this permit in your possession and to surrender it to the transportation line at the time of your departure unless you depart over the land border of the United States in which case you must surrender it to a Canadian Immigration officer on the Canadian border, or to a United States Immigration officer on the Mexican border.

RECORD OF EXTENSIONS:

To 9/18/04 Office [illegible]

________ Office [illegible]

________ Office ________

________ Office ________

DEPARTURE RECORD

Port: [illegible]

Date: [illegible]

Carrier: [illegible]

To: [illegible]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Form Approved - Budget Bureau No. 43-R311.4

You have been admitted to the United States for the period of time indicated hereon. Remaining in the United States thereafter without obtaining an extension of time from the immigration authorities is a violation of law. You are required to retain this permit in your possession and to surrender it to the transportation line at the time of your departure unless you depart over the land border of the United States in which case you must surrender it to a Canadian immigration officer on the Canadian border, or to a United States immigration officer on the Mexican border.

RECORD OF EXTENSIONS:

To ________ Office ________

________ Office ________

________ Office ________

________ Office ________

DEPARTURE RECORD

Port: [illegible]

Date: [illegible]

Carrier: [illegible]

To: [illegible]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Form Approved - Budget Bureau No. 43-R311.4

Family name | Given name | Initial | Soundex

SOTO y VAZQUEZ [illegible] | S-[illegible]

Home address and name of relative or friend residing there

Cuba [illegible]

Address in the U.S.

[illegible]

Date and place of birth

7-[illegible]-34

Cuba

Hair	Eyes	Height	Weight	Sex
Bl	Br	5'3	145	☑ M ☐ F

"V" or "A" No.

Passport (No. and Nationality)

Arrived by

[illegible]

Action by Immigration Officer

April 4 58

You are [illegible] to depart from U.S. [illegible] on or before May 2 [illegible]

DEPARTURE VERIFIED

[illegible] RECEIVED

[illegible] IH C. D.

U.S. Immigration Inspector

DEC 23

STATISTICS

Form Approved
Budget Bureau No. [illegible]

Form I-95D (Rev. 1-1-57) Index Copy

ANY HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES MUST BE IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

Family name | Given name | Initial | Soundex

[illegible] | S [illegible]

Home address and name of relative or friend residing there

[illegible]

Address in the U.S.

[illegible]

Date and place of birth

[illegible]

Hair	Eyes	Height	Weight	Sex
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] 2	[illegible]	☒ M ☐ F

"V" or "A" No.

Action by Immigration Officer

Miami, Florida

12-13-[illegible]

You are required [illegible]

[illegible]

be paid [illegible]

[illegible]

Form Approved
Budget Bureau No. 43R 350.1

Passport (No. and Nationality)

[illegible]

Arrived by

[illegible]

U.S. Immigration Officer

Form I-95D (Rev. 1-1-57) Index Copy

ANY HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES MUST BE IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

MESSAGE FORM 2/ 71

ORIG : L.MURPHY:kma
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 24 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-294544

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

25 MAY 65 20 06z

C/O - wH

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6

INFO: WH/C 8, AF 6, CI/OA, FI, VR FILE

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO. CITE DIR 13284

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

POA GRANTED SUBJ 87. ODURGE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED BY HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/5 T. Baskett/Draft

CI/OA G. Ball/Telecon

SOD/AB/OPS/3 T. Daly

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7 6

78 SECRET

☐ COPY REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM PHOENIX

ACTION SO D 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO 1 VR FILE, DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6, ci/ci, ciSEC, OT

S E C R E T 181715Z

CO

2372

DIR INFO WAVE CITE PNIX 2726 ✓

201-294544

CHAPPIE IUPAGAN WITHRUSH

18 MAY 65 IN 70135

REF DIR 03920

PNIX 2715 (IN 67575)

1. MR ORLANDO IZQUIERDO AND MR ANTONIO SOTO VASQUEZ COMPLETED TRAINING AND FAMILIARIZATION IN THE MODEL 47G-3 B-1 HELICOPTER ON 15 MAY 65. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THEIR TRAINING AND HOURS:

A. IZQUIERDO:

ACTIVITY	TIME
GROUND SCHOOL (EXAMS, NAVIGATION/FLIGHT, WEIGHT & BALANCE, GENERAL ORIENTATION)	9:00 HRS
SUPPLEMENTAL READING	DAILY
RADIO PROCEDURES WITH UHF, VHF & HF	DAILY
DEAD RECKONING AND CROSS-COUNTRY	4:10 HRS
PERSONNEL RAPPELLING, PERSONNEL PARACHUTING CARGO RACKS AND CARGO SLINGS	2:00 HRS

TOTAL FLYING TIME:

DUAL	21:55
SOLO	2:30
STUDENT DUAL (SOTO	

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

21 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD-6

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/C-8, AF-6, CI/OA, OPSER

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

4 MAY 65 IN 59001

S E C R E T 041933Z

PRIX INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1480

CHAFFIE WITHRUSH IUPAGAN PERUMEN

REF WAVE 1444 (IN 58061)

file

LORENTZ MIAMI REPS:

ANTONIO SOTO RECEIVED 6 PLUS 50 HRS DUAL TRAINING AND ORLANDO IZQUIERDO 12 PLUS 20 HRS HELICOPTER DUAL TRAINING. TRAINING CONSISTED OF NORMAL HELICOPTER EXERCISES INCLUDING PRE FLIGHT, EMERGENCIES, AUTO-ROTATIONS UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS, WATER LANDINGS AND SLING LOADS. INSTRUCTOR RATED BOTH SUBJS SAFE UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS AND RATED THEM 50 PERCENT ABOVE AVERAGE IN GENERAL TRAINING.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☑ COPY ☐

71/30 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

INFO VR. FILE AF6, DDP, WH/C 8, ci/oa, OPSER

S E C R E T 032140Z

3 MAY 65 IN 58061

PNIX INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1444

CHAPPIE/WITHRUSH/IUPAGAN/PBRUMEN

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS

1. ORLANDO IZQUIERDO (I) AND ANTONIO SOTO (S) ARRIVING 4 MAY ALBUQUERQUE 1750 LOCAL CONTINENTAL 275.

2. BOTH BRIEFED QUARTERS AND RATIONS TO BE FURNISHED.

3. (I) HAD APPROXIMATLY 14 HRS LOCALLY AND (S) 6 HRS. WILL CABLE DETAILS OF LOCAL INFORMAL TRAINING RESULTS.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☑ COPY ☐ DUMP

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM PHOENIX

ACTION SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT SOD TIME 1550 BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP WH/C8 ACG CI/OA OPSER OT

S E C R E T 152010Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) CITE PNIX 2609 (THETFORD ACTG)

15 APR 65 IN 46081

CHAPPIE IUPAGAN PBRUMEN WITHRUSH

1. MR ANTONIO SOTO VAZQUEZ COMPLETED TRAINING 15 APRIL. WILL DEPART ALBUQUERQUE 1245L 16 APRIL, CONTINENTAL FLT 274. ARRIVE MIAMI VIA DALLAS 2204L 16 APRIL, EASTERN FLT 207.

2. DETAILED TRAINING REPORT WILL FOLLOW.

S E C R E T

SECRET

File

SOTO (VAZQUEZ), Antonio
#242 369

15 June 1965

On 14 June 1965, files of Headquarters, Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force, were reviewed in the name of Antonio SOTO (VAZQUEZ), born 20 August 1934 at Marianas, Habana, Cuba, and reflected that OSI conducted a lie detector examination (File #72-90) on SUBJECT on 21 May 1963.

During the course of this examination, the SUBJECT reacted to basic questions concerning homosexuality, and as a result of this reaction, a re-examination was conducted during the morning of 12 June 1963 at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The initial examination was predicated in that SUBJECT was a former member of 2506th Cuban Brigade and was being processed for consideration for appointment as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Air Force.

Prior to re-examination, SUBJECT made an initial statement, the substance of which is as follows:

> SUBJECT indicated he resided at 859 Second Avenue, 474, Santa Fe Beach, Banta, Cuba, from 1948 to 1959. He entered the Cuban Air Force as an Aviation Cadet in March 1953 and in August 1953, he began aviation training, which continued until August 1954. In August 1954, he was sent to the United States where he attended pilot training school until August 1955, at which time he graduated and was given a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Cuban Air Force. During these periods of time, at various unrecalled intervals, SUBJECT stated he would return to his home at Santa Fe Beach. His homosexual acts at Santa Fe Beach occurred during 1949. This homosexual activity consisted of not more than five acts of anal sodomy. SUBJECT stated that he was the active or male partner in these acts. The passive partner was another Cuban boy who lived nearby. SUBJECT could not recall the name of the passive participant. During 1960, while at Managua, Nicaragua, as a Counter-Revolutionist preparing for invasion of Cuba, he became acquainted with a Cuban Catholic priest who was also a revolutionist. SUBJECT further stated that while attending a theatre, this priest made homosexual advances toward SUBJECT, which culminated in the SUBJECT being masturbated by the priest. Approximately one week later, after his

#242 369

group arrived in Costa Rica, the SUBJECT performed an act of anal sodomy upon the person of the priest. The SUBJECT declined to disclose the identity of the priest; however, he stated that if it was determined that the disclosure of the name was essential for a prerequisite to his acceptance into the United States Air Force, he would make such a disclosure.

A lie detector examination, consisting of three parts, was given SUBJECT by a representative of the Office of Special Investigations on 12 June 1963. The second test was in the nature of a control test to determine whether or not the examinee was physically and mentally capable of giving a specific reaction. The results indicated that the examinee was capable of giving a valid reaction. Test number one and test number three consisted of relevant, irrelevant and guilt complex type questions, co-mingled in such a manner as to give the SUBJECT relief between relevant questions. The following are the relevant questions asked during the examination, and the answers as given by the SUBJECT:

TEST #1

Question A: Prior to 1961, did you engage in homosexual acts?

Answer: Yes.

Question B: Since your homosexual acts during 1960 in Costa Rica, have you engaged in any other homosexual acts?

Answer: No.

Question C: Since you have been at Maxwell Air Force Base, have you engaged in homosexual acts?

Answer: No.

Question D: Have you ever engaged in oral copulation, either as active or passive partner?

Answer: No.

#242 369

TEST #3

Question A: Prior to 1961, did you engage in homosexual acts?

Answer: Yes.

Question B: Since your homosexual acts during 1960 in Costa Rica, have you engaged in any other homosexual acts?

Answer: No.

Question C: Since you have been at Maxwell Air Force Base, have you engaged in homosexual acts?

Answer: No.

Question D: Since you have been at Maxwell Air Force Base, have there been any incidents involving homosexuality which you did not tell me about?

Answer: No.

Question E: At any time in the U.S., including the time you were going to flying training school, and later here at Maxwell Air Force Base, have you engaged in any homosexual activity?

Answer: No.

After a careful analysis of the charts pertaining to this examination, the examiner gave the opinion that the SUBJECT was untruthful in his answers Questions B and C, Test #1, and Questions B, C, D and E, Test #2, and that SUBJECT was truthful in answers to Questions A and B, Test #1, and to Question A, Test #2.

Subsequent to the examination, the SUBJECT was re-interrogated concerning his reactions during the above tests. The SUBJECT maintained that he was truthful in his answers. The SUBJECT executed a sworn,

#242 69

signed statement setting forth the information disclosed during the pre-test interrogation, and this information is given in substance above.

OSI Headquarter's files contain a letter dated 14 June 1963, which is a report of the Record of Action of the Military Personnel Security Committee in the case of SUBJECT. The body of this letter is given in the following two paragraphs:

> "1. Pursuant to paragraph 9, Air Force Regulation 35-62, the Military Personnel Security Committee reviewed all the available records relating to the above member of the 2506th Cuban Brigade. Due to the following factors, it is concluded that appointment of the individual is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security:
>
> > SUBJECT admitted homosexual activity to age twenty-six, and additional acts thereafter indicated by result of polygraph examination.
>
> "2. Accordingly, it is recommended that the individual be rejected for military service with the United States Air Force because of questionable moral character."

OSI Headquarter's Investigative Files contain no further pertinent information relating to SUBJECT.

JHM/del

RYBAT
SECRET

72514
28 April 1965

Subject: Iden A

Subject was interviewed and tested on 28 April 1965 at a safe site in the Miami area at the request of Edward W. LORENTZ. The interview was conducted in English.

RESULTS

Subject has never taken part in any communist activity and he has never worked for any Castro intelligence or security service. Apart from PBPRIME he has no connection or agreement with the government of any other country.

Unless otherwise noted below Subject is not obligated to any Cuban exile group.

Subject has been essentially truthful in regard to his personal history and he does not feel he is liable to blackmail for any reason. Subject has never been involved in the use or sale of narcotics.

DETAILS

Subject is being recruited for use with WITHRUSH. He has served there before. Like all of the men in the group who have been in the Iden B, Subject assumes that the operation is sponsored by KUBARK.

Subject joined AMWORLD but was never called to go to the training camps.

In connection with blackmail, Subject mentioned that his father is in jail in Cuba. To date no attempts have been made by the Castro government to put any pressure on Subject.

Keith D. VINETT

RYBAT
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

RYBAT
SECRET

72514
28 April 1965
IDENS

Iden A Antonio SOTO Vazquez 201- 294544
DPOB: 20 August 1934
Mariauao, Habana, Cuba

Iden B Congo.

MAY 26 9 13 AM '65

File

RYBAT
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
BOD/AB/CPS-3 - Larry Murphy

NUMBER
201-294544

SUBJECT
SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
7 April 1965 pro

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

This will confirm oral granting of the POA.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	21 MAY 1965

(9)

SECRET

[illegible]

FORM 1-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SOD 5-646
21 MAY 1965

201 294 344

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : Antonio SOTO Vazquez

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum of 4 May 1965

1. Attached to the referenced memorandum was a list of eight documents concerning the Subject, with a request that SOD/AB/OPS/3 comment on their significance as they might affect the granting of a POA to the Subject.

2. Six of the eight documents were found to be insignificant. Two of the documents were not found. Attached is a memorandum from Chief, RID/FI stating that the two documents could not be found.

3. The Subject has been a WITHRUSH pilot in the past. He was granted a POA on 9 March 1961, and again on 29 October 1962. It is requested that he be again granted a POA in accordance with Form 772 submitted to Chief, CI/OA on 7 April 1965.

Lawrence Murphy

Lawrence Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS/3

Attachment

SECRET

A

SECRET

20 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTN: George Ball

VIA: Chief, RID/RB

SUBJECT: DBA-48364, dated 8 August 1963
DBA-23559, dated 6 October 1962

A thorough and systematic search for the above documents began on 7 May 1965 and they could not be located. On 18 May 1965 an extensive and repetitive search was conducted to no avail.

Raymond V. Utterback
RAYMOND V. UTTERBACK
Chief, RID/FI

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[redacted]

SECRET

SOD [illegible]

11 MAY 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : SOTO Vazquez, Antonio 201-294544

REFERENCE : Chief, CI/OA Memorandum of 4 May 1965

1. Your referenced memorandum requested SOD/AB comments concerning eight reports which mentioned the Subject. Two of the reports were located, both of which contained no derogatory information concerning the Subject.

2. The remaining six documents were placed on "locate" with RI; however, insofar as all six were written prior to the Subject's recent six-month tour with KUBARK in the Congo (Nov 1963 to May 1964), during which he performed in a highly satisfactory manner, it is requested that a POA be granted the Subject.

File
McKittle
[illegible]

Murphy

Lawrence C. Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS/3

M/R — Murphy advised a more (Total 4 now located)
12 May "locate" is not satisfactory in
He was informed - "locate"
view of 1963 submission - require RID document
lost + unable to locate or S.B. will be required
to wait until they are located. If DE[illegible]G
Too late once subject is again in "Congo" without
a POA" backed up by confirmed results.
[illegible]

SECRET

[redacted]

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 4 May 1965 pro

C NO: 201-294544

TO:

SOD/AB/OPS-3 - Larry Murphy

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

SUBJECT: ECIO Vasques, Antonio

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

		☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE [redacted]
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)
☐	GREEN LIST		

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please advise CI/OA of nature and significance.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

(20)

SECRET

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

[illegible]

SUBJECT: 201 - [illegible]

TYPE OF REQUEST

☐ POA ☑ OA ☐ ☐ CHC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY

(Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY

(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

Pilot [illegible]

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS

RI

DIVISION

FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO. ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

DATE 20 APR 1965

TO : Chief, CI/OA
FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☒ 1. OS Indices results: #342369 - (NR) other than prior CI/OA interest 30 Oct 1962 C-90192.

☐ Report Attached

MAY 3 12 24 PM '65

for DDS/IOS
4/27/65

SECRET

(9)

3

FORM 3-64 693

SECRET

NON-OFFICIAL COVER CONCURRENCE

DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY CI/OA ONLY

SUBJECT'S NAME [illegible]

C OR 201 NO. [illegible]

DATE OF BIRTH 30 Aug. 1934

PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP Cuban

U.S. RESIDENCE [illegible]

OVERSEAS RESIDENCE

PROJECT

EMPLOYER [illegible]

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION [illegible]

DIVISION OR STAFF [illegible]

CASE OFFICER [illegible]

PROPOSED USE [illegible]

TO BE COMPLETED BY CCS ONLY

CCS/NC CASE OFFICER (Extension 5144)

CCS FILE NO. [illegible]

Central Cover Staff concurs in your proposal to use subject for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon CCS to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise CCS/NC promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated. The pseudonym assigned subject should be provided CCS/NC at the time notification of activation is forwarded. If notification of activation is not received in CCS/NC one year from above date it will be assumed proposed use did not materialize.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject or his employer is in CCS/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCS/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

☐ If check mark appears here the proposed use of subject requires DDP approval under CSI 240-6, para. 5. Please review CSI 240-6 and initiate action as appropriate.

CHIEF, CCS/NC OR DESIGNEE

13-031

DISTRIBUTION: 1-CCS, 1-CI/OA, 1-AREA DIVISION

SECRET

FORM 2-64 2214

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 13 April 65

CASE NO. 201- 90192

☑ SET UP FOR POA
☑ SET UP FOR OA
☑ EXPEDITE INDICES
☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY

DATE: 20 April

☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

☑ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

DATE: 27 April

AREA: Congo

USE: Pilot WITHKUSH

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)	☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below,* or see remarks)	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES	☐ FILE
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐ TICKLE
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐ OTHER

☐ POA EXPIRED ________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

M/R

Note: Subject already been to the Congo + ~~returned~~ - second tour per PHS. NO PRIOR POA/OA for this assignment

Ball
SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 8-65 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 7 April 1965

TO:
- ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Larry Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS3
2 D 55

PROJECT: WITHRUSH

SUBJECT: (True name) SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

CI/OA FILE NO. C-70193

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

RI 201 FILE NO. 294544 IR

SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

		☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Africa, Congo, Leopoldville

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE:

Pilot

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☒	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED; NO. 16720S

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY WH	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☒	NO DEROGATORY INFO. WAVE	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: Larry Murphy

EXTENSION: 4475

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: Bernard J. Finan, Jr.

(8)

SECRET

FORM 3-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

87

PIN RECENT PHOTO HERE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

REF.# A-11 2-3 131

NAME: SoTo Antonio
LAST FIRST MIDDLE

☐ MALE
☐ FEMALE

PHONE NUMBER: [illegible]
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:

PRESENT ADDRESS: 379 E. 64th ST., Hialeah, Fla.
STREET CITY STATE

PERMANENT ADDRESS: 379 E. 64th ST.

MARITAL STATUS
☐ SINGLE
☐ MARRIED
☐ ENGAGED
☐ WIDOWED
☐ DIVORCED
☐ SEPARATED

DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR): [illegible] /20/ 34
PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY): [illegible], Habana, Cuba

HEIGHT: 5' 2" | COLOR OF HAIR: [illegible]
WEIGHT: [illegible] | COLOR OF EYES: [illegible]
COMPLEXION: [illegible]
DESCRIBE ANY SPECIAL OR OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OR IDENTIFYING MARKS:

PASSPORT PARTICULARS:
ISSUING AUTHORITY
PLACE OF ISSUE
PASSPORT NO.
DATE OF ISSUE
KIND OF PASSPORT
VALIDITY PERIOD [illegible]

CITIZEN OF U.S.A.: YES ☐ NO ☒
NATURALIZED:
DATE:
NATIONALITY: Cubano
HAS YOUR PASSPORT EVER BEEN CANCELLED? YES NO. IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS

EDUCATION	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	DATES ATTENDED	GRADUATE DEGREES	MAJOR SUBJECTS
HIGH SCHOOL	[illegible] Habana Cuba	Four years	Commerce [illegible]	
COLLEGE				

TRADE, BUSINESS OR CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, STATE WITH DATES: [illegible] Commercial Correspondence School

SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL STUDY OR RESEARCH, ETC.: Pilot
VOCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS, LICENSES, CERTIFICATES:

WHAT FOREIGN LANGUAGES DO YOU SPEAK FLUENTLY? Spanish - French   READ Both   WRITE Spanish

U.S. MILITARY SERVICE (BRANCH): FROM: TO:
TYPE OF DISCHARGE:
RANK:
PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN NATIONAL GUARD OR RESERVES:

ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS (CIVIC, ATHLETIC, FRATERNAL, ETC.):

PREVIOUS ADDRESSES DURING PAST TEN YEARS

DATES FROM	DATES TO	STREET	CITY/STATE	COUNTRY
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] Beach	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Miami, Fla.	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	U.S.A.
[illegible]	[illegible]	379 E. 64th St.		

[illegible] (INCLUDE PRESENT AND PRIOR MARRIAGES) - CHILDREN

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
[illegible] Soto	12/ / 36	[illegible] Hialeah, Fla.	[illegible]
[illegible] Soto	/ / 58		
	/ /		

[illegible] every position which you have held since you first began to work, including [illegible] account for any periods of unemployment [illegible]

[illegible] OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible] FROM [illegible]	TO PRESENT TIME [illegible]	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION [illegible]	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ [illegible] PER YR. FINAL $ [illegible] PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible]

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR [illegible]

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU

REASON FOR ENDING EMPLOYMENT

[illegible] OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible] FROM [illegible]	TO: [illegible]	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION [illegible]	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER YR. FINAL $ PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible]

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU

REASON FOR ENDING EMPLOYMENT

[illegible] OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible] FROM [illegible]	TO: [illegible]	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION [illegible]	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ [illegible] PER YR. FINAL $ PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible]

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR [illegible]

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU [illegible]

REASON FOR ENDING EMPLOYMENT [illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? NO ☐ YES ☐
IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS

HAVE YOU NOW OR EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER? NO ☐ YES ☐
GIVE FULL DETAILS

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY ANY POLICE OR MILITARY AUTHORITY? IF SO NAME THE ARRESTING AUTHORITY, GIVE TIME, PLACE AND REASON FOR SUCH ARREST OR DETENTION, AND THE DISPOSITION OR COURT ACTION. NO ☐ YES ☐

JOB APPLIED FOR [illegible] MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SALARY $ [illegible] PER YR.

REFERENCES: [illegible] PERSONS, NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY [illegible] INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY. DO NOT GIVE NAMES OF SUPERVISORS LISTED ABOVE.

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

FATHER [illegible] DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]
PRESENT ADDRESS [illegible] PRESENT OCCUPATION [illegible]
PRESENT NATIONALITY [illegible]
MOTHER [illegible] DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]
MAIDEN NAME [illegible]
PRESENT ADDRESS [illegible] PRESENT OCCUPATION [illegible]
PRESENT NATIONALITY [illegible]
[illegible]
IN CASE OF EMERGENCY NOTIFY [illegible] PHONE [illegible]-5835

IF THE ABOVE SPACE IS NOT SUFFICIENT USE CONTINUATION SHEET.

I CERTIFY THAT [illegible] ALL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THIS [illegible] [illegible] MISREPRESENTATION OR OMISSION OF FACTS [illegible] BASIS FOR [illegible]

[illegible]/25 [illegible]

Continuation Sheet—Employment

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Office Clerk

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ [illegible] / Month PER YR. FINAL $ PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible] Manager

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: [illegible]

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Office Clerk

REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]

E. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: [illegible]

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 300 / Month PER YR. FINAL $ PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: [illegible]

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Clerk

REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT:

F. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: [illegible]

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 300 / Month PER YR. FINAL $ [illegible] PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: [illegible]

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Clerk

REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT:

G. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: TO:

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER YR. FINAL $ PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT:

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:

DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU:

REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT:

Continuation—Sheet

SUPPLEMENTARY PERSONAL INFORMATION

FLIGHT CREW

Name and Rank: CAPT Antonio Soto

I. General Flying Experience:

A. Military Flying: 2400 hrs

B. Airline: 400 hrs

C. Foreign: Congo Around 600 hrs

II. Equipment Types and Flying Times	PILOT (IN HOURS)	CO-PILOT (IN HOURS)	OTHER CREW TITLE	OTHER CREW (IN HOURS)
A. C-46	[illegible]	[illegible]		
B. C-47	[illegible]	[illegible]		
C. DC-4/C-54	[illegible]	[illegible]		
D. DC-6		[illegible]		
E. DC-7	[illegible]	[illegible]		
F. Jet Transport (By Type)		[illegible]		
G. Amphibian (By Type)		[illegible]		
H. Flying Boat (By Type)	[illegible]	[illegible]		
I. Helicopter (By Type)	[illegible]	[illegible]		
J. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
K. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
L. [illegible]				
III. TOTAL FLYING TIME	[illegible]	[illegible]		
IV. Total Instrument Time — Hood	[illegible]			
IV. Total Instrument Time — Actual	[illegible]			
	[illegible]			
V. Total Night Time		[illegible]		
VI. Total Flying Time in Past Six Months		[illegible]		
VII. [illegible]				

VIII. Aviation Licenses & Ratings

	Type	Number	Ratings
A.			
B.			
C.			
D.			
E.			

IX. Selection of an applicant may well be influenced by the type and amount of ground and flight training received. To assist in evaluating your overall qualifications it is important that you endeavor to submit documentary evidence, in a thorough and detailed manner, of all training received during the past three year period. (This information may be submitted in the form of notarized statements, photostats, etc.)

X. Are you willing to be based at any station at the discretion of the Company? Yes ☒ No ☐

I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts requested is cause for dismissal.

3/25/61
DATE

SIGNATURE

FILE NO. 201-242256

TC/ 6&S CS/OLD/ 1/6

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : T. COBB
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 13 JANUARY 1959

TO : SANTIAGO DE CUBA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated 19
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED JAN 13 23 30 Z 59
ROUTINE RECD CABLE SECT.
X PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT61839
OUT 61839

TO SACU INFO. HAVA CITE DIR 08002 08002

REF SACU 337 (IN 44566) *

HQS TRACES INDICATE SUBJ REF HAS BEEN UNDER ODENVY INVESTIGATION (FBI) POSSIBLE REGISTRATION ACT VIOLATIONS. BASE SHOULD DEAL WITH SUBJECT UNDER STRICT CONSULAR COVER AND NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS WHICH MIGHT LATER BE CONSTRUED AS ODYOKE (US Govt.) APPROVAL HIS ACTIVITIES.

(END OF MESSAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED FRANK FIORINI OF NORFOLK, VA. WHO CLAIMED HE WAS CHIEF 26 JULY ARMS BUYER IN MIAMI. SUBJECT WILLING TO COOPERATE 100 PER CENT SUPPLYING INFO ON REBELS.

RI COPY

J. C. King
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/FI
COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. N. Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORM 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

JAN '69 -

201-24225

STURGIS, Frank Anthony

VOL. V

JAN 67 -

V of V

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

OUTGOING MESSAGE

33-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 292339Z

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 103146

CONF: AF9 INFO: FILE 1 Moms, EUR 8, LA 8, CI 4, E/S/E6 2

DISSEM BY: 27

PER

TO: IMMEDIATE GENEVA INFO IMMEDIATE KINSHASA, LISBON, PRETORIA.

WNINTEL ZIBET

REF: GENEVA 35610 (IN 417464) (BEING RELAYED KINSHASA, LISBON, PRETORIA)

1. APPRECIATE REF. STURGIS HAS BEEN PROMOTING A STORY INVOLVING A 2,000-MAN "CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE IN ANGOLA" FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AND WE EXPECT THAT REF IS A VARIATION OF THE SAME THEME. DO NOT ANTICIPATE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL DEBRIEFING BY ZIBET OFFICER OR FURTHER CONTACT WITH SUBJECT REF BY GENEVA.

2. SOLICIT INFO ADDEE COMMENTS.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

ORIG: AF/HC/C (PARKILL X9154); COORD: LA/COG (SPEED), E/IB/P (WILDER), C/AF/HC (KELLY), C/AF/OPS (KANE); AUTH: C/AF (POTTS); REL: C/E/AS (AITKEN).

LA/COG-SPEED (IN DRAFT)

E/IB/P-WILDER (TELECOORD)

C/AF/HC

C/AF/OPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

29SEP77

201-0242256

DATE: 29 SEPTEMBER 1977

ORIG: S. PARKILL/SLS

UNIT: AF/HC/C

EXT: 9154

C/E/AS

RELEASING OFFICER

C/AF

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 035769

FORM

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 27 PER

TOTAL COPIES 46

RUN BY 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED DDO/DO

STAFF PRECEDENC

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT AF 9

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DDO4, Plans, C/4
EPS/EG2, EUR 8, LA 8
SE 8

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 211787 EIA252 PAGE 01 IN 417464

TOR:292015Z SEP 77 GNVA 35610

LA/es/c1 - H. Speed handling with AF Div.

File: Sturgis 201

S E C R E T 291910Z SEP 77 STAFF

CITE GENEVA 35610

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE LONDON.

NIACT DIRECTOR

WNINTEL ZIBET

1. ON 29 SEPT 77 AT 1830 HOURS LOCAL ONE GARY VAN DYK, WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS A BRITISH SUBJECT WHO WAS BORN IN JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA ON 25 MAY 1936 AND WHO SAID HE IS A LITERARY AGENT BY PROFESSION AND RESIDES AT 62 REDKNOLL WALK, CHELSEA, SW-3, LONDON WALKED INTO U.S. MISSION. SUBJECT WHO IS STAYING AT HOTEL AMAT IN GENEVA ORIGINALLY CONTACTED DCM SORENSON WHO ASKED THAT COS INTERVIEW HIM.

2. SUBJECT GAVE THE FOLLOWING STORY WHICH ADMITTEDLY APPEARS DISJOINTED BUT MAY MAKE SENSE TO AFRICA DIVISION. ONE REASON FOR INCOHERENCY IS THAT SUBJECT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE STORY LEAKING TO OUTSIDERS I.E. THE PRESS AND WAS VERY RETICENT ABOUT NAMING NAMES OR DATES:

A. IN JUNE 1977 FRANK STURGIS (PRESUMABLY SAME PERSON OF WATERGATE FAME) COME TO LONDON AND CONTACTED AN UNIDENTIFIED MEMBER OF FNLA. THROUGH LATTER, STURGIS

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TI
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR.

ACTION #

T 211787 EIA052 PAGE 02 IN 417464

TOR:292015Z SEP 77 GNVA 35610

HOPED TO MEET HOLDEN ROBERTO. SUBJECT LEARNED OF THIS APPROACH AND SINCE SUBJECT SAYS HE IS A CLOSE FRIEND AND SUPPORTER OF DANIEL GIPENDA, HE PUT STURGIS IN TOUCH WITH VICTOR FERNANDEZ. SUBJECT SAYS THAT AT THAT TIME HE DID NOT KNOW WHO FRANK STURGIS WAS.

B. VICTOR FERNANDEZ WAS IDENTIFIED AS ONE OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE COUP OF MAY 1977 IN ANGOLA. STURGIS TOLD FERNANDEZ THAT HE REPRESENTED A GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES AND WAS IN A POSITION TO MAKE AVAILABLE 2000 ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS WHO WOULD GO TO ANGOLA TO PARTICIPATE IN ANOTHER COUP TO OVERTHROW THE CURRENT ANGOLAN REGIME.

C. STURGIS AND FERNANDEZ REPORTEDLY SIGNED AN AGREEMENT IN LONDON WHEREBY STURGIS PLEDGED FINANCIAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT (ACCORDING TO SUBJECT FROM SOME LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS) AND AGREED AS TO WHO THE NEW MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN EXILE (I.E. ANGOLA) WOULD BE.

D. GIPENDA, WHO AT THE TIME WAS IN LONDON, WAS SUSPICIOUS OF STURGIS BUT WENT ALONG WITH FERNANDEZ' GETTING HELP FROM STURGIS. GIPENDA THEN WENT TO GENEVA WHERE HE HAS BEEN EVER SINCE IN AMAT HOTEL. GIPENDA HAS BEEN WAITING AROUND, ACCORDING

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	I	RF. FILE. VR.	1	4
	N		2	5
	F		3	6
ACTION #	O			

T 211787 EIA052 PAGE 03 IN 417464

TOR:292015Z SEP 77 GNVA 35610

TO SUBJECT, TO SPEAK TO MOBUTU, WHO AS HQS KNOWS IS CURRENTLY IN SWITZERLAND. SUBJECT SAID THAT THE GIPENDA/MOBUTU TALK WILL TAKE PLACE IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

E. MEANWHILE GIPENDA AND SUBJECT AND POSSIBLY OTHERS HAVE RUN UP A 60,000 FRANC (US$ 25,000) HOTEL BILL AT AMAT HOTEL AND EVIDENTLY THE HOTEL MANAGEMENT PLANS TO CALL THE POLICE IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO IF BILL IS NOT PAID.

F. SUBJECT BROUGHT WITH HIM A FILE OF XEROXED DOCUMENTS IN A LOOSE LEAF NOTEBOOK WHICH HE FLEETINGLY EXHIBITED. THERE WERE SEVERAL PHOTOS OF SUBJECT IN CAMOUFLAGED JUNGLE DRESS IN A JUNGLE, A PHOTO OF A PERSON SIMILARLY DRESSED WHOM SUBJECT IDENTIFIED AS FERNANDEZ AND LISTS OF EQUIPMENT AND OTHER MATERIAL WHICH SUBJECT SAID WAS SENT BY SOVIETS TO CUBAN FORCES IN ANGOLA. ACCORDING TO SUBJECT, THIS INTELLIGENCE WAS SENT OUT BY MPLA MEMBERS STILL IN ANGOLA.

G. SUBJECT SAID THAT ANOTHER COUP AGAINST ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY BEING PLOTTED AND, IF SUCCESSFUL, PLOTTERS WANT GIPENDA TO BE THE NATIONAL LEADER AND NOT HOLDEN ROBERTO. SUBJECT APPEARS STRONGLY ANTI-HOLDEN ROBERTO AND SAVIMBA.

S E C R E T

7-71 MFG. 7/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	1	4
			2	5
			3	6
ACTION #				

T 211787 EIA052 PAGE 04 IN 417464

TOR:292015Z SEP 77 GNVA 35610

H. SUBJECT DID NOT MAKE ANY PITCH FOR MONEY OR ANY OTHER REQUEST BUT SAID HE WOULD LIKE SOMEONE FROM WASHINGTON WHO WAS FAMILIAR WITH ANGOLAN MATTERS TO COME TO GENEVA SOONEST TO SPEAK WITH GIPENDA IF WE WANTED TO LEARN MORE.

3. IN RESPONSE TO COS' QUESTION, SUBJECT SAID HE WAS NOT A MERCENARY BUT HE WANTED AS A FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN TO SEE CURRENT ANGOLAN REGIME THROWN OUT ALONG WITH THE CUBANS. IN SPITE OF SUBJECT'S STATEMENT THAT HE DOES NOT WANT ANY MONEY OR DID HE COME TO MISSION TO SELL INFORMATION, IT IS OBVIOUS SUBJECT AND GIPENDA ARE OUT OF MONEY. SUBJECT WENT TO EXCEPTIONAL LENGTHS TO BE ASSURED THAT ABOVE INFORMATION WOULD NOT LEAK. HE APPEARS TO BE A VERY WELL-EDUCATED, COHERENT, SOFT-SPOKEN INDIVIDUAL IN SPITE OF THE FOREGOING STORY. HE IS ABOUT 6 FEET THREE INCHES TALL, 210 POUNDS, DARK BROWN HAIR WORK STYLISHLY LONG, LONG FACE, CLEAN SHAVEN, SMOKES BRITISH CIGARETTES, AND SPEAKS WITH EITHER A SOUTH AFRICAN OR AUSTRALIAN ACCENT.

4. COS TOLD SUBJECT THAT HE WOULD PASS ALONG SUBJECT'S STORY BUT IT WAS HARDLY LIKELY THAT ANYONE WOULD COME FORWARD TO PAY A $25,000 HOTEL BILL. COS SAID HE HAD HEARD OF FRANK STURGIS BEFORE AND IT APPEARS THAT HE MAY HAVE SOLD FERNANDEZ AND SUBJECT A BILL

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 211787 EIA052 PAGE 05-05 IN 417464

TOR:292215Z SEP 77 GNVA 35618

OF GOODS. NO COMMITMENTS OR ANY PROMISES WERE MADE TO SUBJECT NOR DID SUBJECT ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN COS'S IDENTITY OR NATURE OF HIS WORK.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE ASAP HQS EVALUATION OF SUBJECT'S STORY AS SKETCHY AND DISJOINTED AS IT SOUNDS. IF HQS HAS AF DIVISION OFFICER IN NEARBY COUNTRY WHO FAMILIAR WITH ANGOLA, ADVISE IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEND HIM TO GENEVA FOR FURTHER DEBRIEFING OF SUBJECT.

6. FILE DEFER.

E2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET

14 June 1976

SUBJECT: LORENZ, Llona Marita

1. As the result of an article on Subject in the 13 June 1976 New York Daily News, LA/COG was asked to do a file check to determine whether Subject was ever connected with the Agency. According to a LA/COG Desk check, IP trace, CI/OA and Security Office check, LORENZ has never been employed by the Agency. Of interest, however, is the fact that her sister, Valerie LORENZ, was granted a CSC on 14 July 1955, initiated by Finance Division, as a witting employee. At that time Valerie was an employee of the National Bank of Washington.

2. There are several references, sourced to the FBI and DCD. LORENZ is a self-admitted former girl friend of Fidel CASTRO. She claims that she met Fidel while on a trip to Cuba with her father, Captain of the North German Lloyd Line, in February 1959, became infatuated with Fidel and stayed in Cuba. She served as Fidel's mistress and came to the U.S. with Fidel's party in April 1959. She learned at that time that she was pregnant by him. Marita returned to Havana a short time thereafter and had a miscarriage. She claims that she was drugged and taken to a hospital where an abortion was performed. Because of Fidel's reaction to the pregnancy, she turned against him. LORENZ returned to the U.S. from Cuba on 9 December 1959. Because of the bad abortion operation performed on LORENZ in Cuba in September 1959, LORENZ was operated on by a Dr. Hanniar on 20 January 1960 at the Roosevelt Hospital in New York City.

3. It is said that LORENZ appeared on the Today's Show on 14 June 1976. She reportedly made the statement that she was associated with Frank STURGIS, and that she had placed some poison pills in her face cream for the purpose of assassinating Fidel. A 24 April 1961 FBI document states that on 8 January 1961 LORENZ, STURGIS, Alex RORKE were to meet that evening and attempt a unity meeting of anti-Castro Cubans. The unity meeting was sponsored by Luis CONTE Aguero, one of the leading anti-Castro Cubans. I have uncovered nothing to date concerning an assassination attempt (in this connection.)

Chris Hopkins
LA/COG/CIOS

CC: to Bill Sturbitts for showing to the IG

N.B. COMMENT by OI September 1977: Note recent traces that were sent to the DR on CONTE and allegations that he might have been (might be) a Cuban agent.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIVACY ACT REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Frank Sturgis

REQUEST NUMBER: 76-P-1062.

FROM: C. Cass O/DDO/PIC HT-1

EXTENSION: 1130 ~~9552~~ 2644

DATE SENT: 1 Dec 76

SUSPENSE DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. ~~OSG/DC~~ ~~P. Marine~~ ~~0E95~~			
2. SA/LA/ERC Joe Litt[illegible] ET-3		30 Nov	JL
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/PIC Attn: Cis Tube HT-1 1D4127			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)

Hold til Jan.

Joe

Per our conversation, we must answer this request even though we are in litigation with him. This has already been done in the case of Hansen, Barnes & Camejo with whom we are in court re SWP. Usually we ask IPS to coordinate any outgoing response to the requester with OGC in cases like this.

P.

[ ] No record of subject(s)

[ ] No info identifiable with subject(s)

[ ] See attached memorandum

40 docs for possible release. Subjects 201 file reviewed

PRIVACY ACT REQUEST

FORM 3834 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

2515 N.W. 122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167
7 May 1976

P 76-1062

Lo
P

Mr. Gene Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Pre-freedom of information request
notice of charges

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Before exercising my right to a freedom of information request for copies of any and all available (in accordance with the declassification processes stipulated in Executive Order 11652 and its amendment of January 1974) files of records and documents, both computerized and manual deposits of me and my activities under my present and former names and pseudonyms, I hereby request the complete and final estimate of charges for search and duplication services.

As regards the charges for these services, two matters may be worthy of consideration. The first of these is that, given the proper access codes, the execution of a computer search is neither difficult nor costly. And the second is that in light of the controversial nature of my past, a waiver or reduction of charges may conduce to the furtherance of the public interest. I therefore respectfully request that these factors be considered in the making of a decision as to the cost of services.

In compliance with your request for identity verification (pursuant to provisions of the 1974 Privacy Act, section 552, subsections b and d) I hereby swear before a notary public as to my name and former names, my present address, my date as well as place of birth, and my citizenship. Thanking you for your cooperation, I am

Yours truly,
Frank Sturgis
Frank Sturgis

a.k.a.: Frank Angelo Fiorino
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A. Fiorini
Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Sturgis
Frank Bonnelli
Frank Campbell

MAY 25 10 27 AM '76

code names: Federini
Barbarosa
Samson

born 9 December 1924
in Norfolk, Va.

United States of American citizenship

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared Frank Sturgis to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein expressed.

witness my hand and official seal this 19th day of May, A.D. 1976.

Notary Public, State of Florida
at Large
My commission expires

AT LARGE
1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

14-00000

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF RESIDENCES AND EMPLOYMENT OF: Frank Sturgis
present address:
2515 N.W. 122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167

also known as: Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A. Fiorini
Frank Fiorini
Frank Angelo Fiorino

1924, Dec. 9..born in Norfolk, Va.
1930-1942..resided at [illegible] Street, Germantown, Philadelphia, Pa.
1942-1945..U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Parris Is., S.C.; Pacific theatre)
1945..honorable discharge - Klamath Falls, Ore.
1945..Miami, Florida
c.1945-1948..Norfolk, Va. address: Bank St., etc.
joined Norfolk Police Dept.
attended William and Mary College
also attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute
c.1946-employed as manager of the Virginia Tavern on East Main Street
c.1947-employed as owner and manager of The Whitehorse Tavern on East Main Street
c.1948..enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve at the Norfolk Naval Air Station
c.1949..honorable discharge
c.1949-1950..U.S. Merchant Marine travelling to and fr Europe
c. 1950-1952..U.S. Army - stationed in Germany
c. 1952..honorable discharge
c. 1952-1956..owner-manager of Tophat Nightclub in Virginia Beach, Va.
c. 1956-1961..Cuba (Sierra Maestra); Miami, Florida; Mexico; Venezuela; Costa Rica; Guatemala; Panama; Honduras; Bahama Is.
1958: contact with CIA at US Consulate - Santiago, Cuba
1959: contact with CIA at US Embassy - Havana, Cuba
1959: contact with FBI HQ - Washington, DC
1961-1970: Bay of Pigs
CIA control officer [illegible]

CHRONOLOGICAL SHEET, -- cont'd

contact with FBI and CIA
1962..........................travel and business (operation sword) Mexico and
1963..........................Honduras
mechanic and salesman for the Pan-American Aluminum Co.
19[illegible]-19[illegible]..........................155th St., Miami, Florida
adventurer: Watergate Office Building
June 17, 1972..........................moved to Washington, D.C. jail
June-July 1972..........................Watergate trial: U.S. v. G. Gordon Liddy et al.
January 8, 1973..........................plea of guilty entered
January 15, 1973 ....moved to Federal Prison Inst. in Danbury, Conn.
c. May 1973..........................then moved to Eglin Air Force Base
thence moved to Dade County Jail
released on appeal bond
January 1974..........................salesman for [illegible] Equipment Company, Miami, Florida
1974..........................salesmanager for Dodge Is. Repairs, Miami, Florida
1974-1975..........................salesmanager for Continental [illegible] Corp., Miami, Florida
1975..........................salesmanager for Miami Boat Mfg. Company
1974-1975..........................6440 N.W. 37th Avenue
Miami, Florida

Thank you,

Frank Sturgis
Frank Sturgis

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared Frank Sturgis to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposed therein expressed.

Witness my hand and official seal this 19th day of May, A.D. 1976.

Notary Public, State of Florida
at Large

My commission expires [illegible]

2515 N.W. 122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167
March 13, 1976

MAR 13 [illegible] '76

Office of Public Information
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

Re: Information Request

Dear Sirs:

This letter is a request for any and all available information in your computerized and documented files--in pursuance of the Freedom of Information Act(section 552 of title 5, United States Code), its amendment (Public Law 93-502), as well as the automatic declassification procedures stipulated in Executive Order 11652--appertaining to me and my alleged activities as Frank Sturgis, or Frank Fiorini, or coded references thereto. Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Very truly yours,

Frank Sturgis

--formerly, Frank Fiorini

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

16 AUG

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Intelligence Division

FROM : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Frank STURGIS

REF : CIR-316/01746-77

1. According to a source of the Miami Field Office of the Domestic Collection Division, Subject disclosed to the source the following information concerning plans which allegedly reflect Subject's interest in Africa and Panama in conversations held on or around 5 June 1977. Subject has discussed plans to establish a Cuban Government in exile on Angolan soil with the help of Holden ROBERTO, FNLA. Subject is prepared on receipt of agreement from Roberto to provide food, medical teams and other forms of assistance to the FNLA. Ostensibly, this would be a first step following recognition by Roberto of a Cuban Exile Government. This government would then attempt to raise troops and, among other things, capture as many Castro soldiers as possible in order to use them as an exchange or trade instrument. The funds for such an enterprise ostensibly would come from Cuban Communities in Brazil, Nicaragua, Panama, Mexico, Venezuela and the United States. One aspect of the proposed unconventional war is the use of counterfeit Angolan money. Also allegedly involved is planning to secure Angolan aid for Panamanians who oppose Torrijos.

2. Involved in unspecified ways in these plans are the following:

a. Leonell GOMEZ - International Coordinator, Afro-Cuban Committee (appears to be inactive at present; formerly involved in the Cuban Exile Movement)

b. Dr. Alida REINOSO

c. (FNU) SOTOLONGO

d. Merwin SIGALE - Columnist for an afternoon newspaper

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE S[illegible]

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Date impossible to determi[illegible]
[illegible]

SUBJECT: Frank STURGIS

e. Stanley TAYLOR - Leeds, United Kingdom; allegedly an associate of Roberto

f. Colin TAYLOR - An uncle of Stanley Taylor

3. The source has expressed an extreme fear of physical retribution should his disclosures become known and a disinclination to convey his information directly to other agencies.

CIR-316/02820-77

WARNING NOTICE
[illegible]

SUBJECT: Frank STURGIS

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - PCS/LSN
1 - OS/Redman
1 - Case 65889
1 - Info Control
1 - FBI/LSN
1 - LA Division
2 - OSG Chronos

Gene Lacy - 10 August 1977

S E C R E T 121530Z MAY 77 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 14056

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

TO: CSG (WALKER)

WNINTEL

SUBJ: FRANK STURGIS

REF : MAINWARING/WALKER TELECON OF 11 MAY 1977

MAY 12 1 53 PM '77

1. ROBERT W. MORGAN IS A MIAMI-BASED ADVENTURER AND PRODUCER OF SEMI-DOCUMENTARY MOVIES WHO HAS OCCASIONALLY VOLUNTEERED INFORMATION TO THE MFO. HE IS ACQUAINTED WITH FRANK STURGIS. ON 11 MAY 1977 MORGAN TELEPHONED THE MFO AND IMPARTED THE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING.

2. WITHIN THE PAST FEW DAYS, STURGIS SAID THAT HE (STURGIS) HAD BEEN APPROACHED TO ORGANIZE TRAINING FOR 200 PANAMANIAN DISSIDENTS TO OCCUR IN COSTA RICA. TRAINING WOULD LAST 30 DAYS AND WOULD BE PART OF A LARGER ANTI-TORRIJOS EFFORT. HE PROVIDED NO FURTHER DETAILS.

3. STURGIS ALSO SAID HE WAS NOW ASSOCIATED WITH THE "AFRO-CUBAN COMMITTEE", POSSIBLY A NEW GROUP, WHICH HAS AMONG ITS GOALS, COALESCING CUBAN EXILE OPPOSITION TO CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA. STURGIS SAID THE GROUP INITIALLY IS SEEKING 50 MEN FOR SERVICE OF SOME SORT IN ANGOLA AND ZAIRE. IN THIS RESPECT, STURGIS WILL DEPART SOON FOR LONDON AND BRUSSELS.

4. WE SHOULD NOTE THAT MIAMI AREA ABOUNDS IN STORIES ABOUT FRANK STURGIS, OR PURPORTING TO ORIGINATE WITH STURGIS. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, NO REASON TO DOUBT STURGIS ACTUALLY SAID THESE THINGS TO MORGAN.

5. SOME OF MORGAN'S FILM PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES TAKE HIM

PAGE 2 DCD/MIAMI 14056 SECRET
TO UNUSUAL PLACES OR LEAD TO UNUSUAL PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS.
HE HAS AN OVERRIDING CONCERN THAT HE MIGHT AT SOME POINT
BE IDENTIFIED AS A POLICE INFORMANT AND THEREFORE WILL NOT
TALK TO THE FBI. HE HAS ALSO ASKED US TO REFRAIN FROM DOING
SO IN MATTERS AFFECTING HIM.

6. NONETHELESS, SOME OF THIS SHOULD BE PASSED TO THE
FBI. WE CAN TRY AGAIN TO PERSUADE MORGAN TO DEAL WITH THE
MORE RESPONSIBLE AGENCY. ALTERNATIVELY, WE WOULD RECOMMEND
PASSAGE OF SUBSTANCE AT HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668
SECRET

14-00000

S E C R E T 171500Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13523

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

TO: OPERATIONS SERVICES GROUP/OSB (FRENCH) FROM HENNESSEY

WNINTEL

SUBJ: ALBANIAN CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL

REF : DCD/HEADQUARTERS 16628, 1 SEPTEMBER 1976, SAME SUBJECT

ROBERT MORGAN, OWNER, SAFARI SPORT, P.O. BOX 133, NORTH MIAMI
BEACH, FLORIDA, AND VANGUARD RESEARCH, INC., P.O. BOX 312, MIAMI,
FLORIDA, ADVISED US THAT FRANK STURGIS APPARENTLY DEPARTED MIAMI
FOR WASHINGTON, D.C., WHERE HE INTENDED TO TURN SUBJECT MATERIAL
OVER TO THE STAFF OF SENATOR HOWARD BAKER ON 2 SEPTEMBER 1976.
STURGIS THEN INTENDED TO GO TO NEW YORK CITY. E2 IMPDET CL BY
011668
S E C R E T

SEP 17 [illegible] '76

14-00000

SE/6-1/9

S E C R E T 241830Z AUG 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13477

TO: PRIORITY DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

TO: OPERATIONS SERVICES GROUP/OSB (FRENCH) FROM HENNESSEY

WNINTEL

SUBJ: ALBANIAN CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL

REF : HENNESSEY/FRENCH TELECON, 23 AUGUST 1976, SAME SUBJECT

1. THIS IS TO CONFIRM REFERENCED TELECON. ON 23 AUGUST 1976, WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM ROBERT W. MORGAN, OWNER OF SAFARI SPORTS, P. O. BOX 133, NORTH MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, AND VANGUARD RESEARCH, INC., P. O. BOX 312, MIAMI, FLORIDA, IN WHICH HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HAD A VISIT ON THE SAME DATE BY FRANK STURGIS. STURGIS HAD TOLD MORGAN THAT HE HAD JUST RETURNED TO MIAMI FROM NEW YORK CITY, WHERE HE HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED FOR THE "TOMORROW SHOW" ON NBC. (THIS INTERVIEW WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN TELEVISED AT 0100 HOURS, 24 AUGUST, BUT WAS NOT.)

2. STURGIS SAID THAT WHILE IN NEW YORK HE HAD STAYED THE WEEKEND (PRESUMABLY 21 AND 22 AUGUST) WITH MARITA LORENZ, WHO STURGIS SOMETIME AGO PUBLICLY CLAIMED TO HAVE HIRED TO POISON CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO. LORENZ GAVE STURGIS A BOOK CONTAINING CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL THAT SHE SAID SHE HAD STOLEN FROM THE ALBANIAN MISSION IN NEW YORK. MORGAN WAS SHOWN MACHINE COPIES OF THREE OR FOUR PAGES OF THIS MATERIAL, WHICH CONSISTED OF FIVE DIGIT NUMERICAL GROUPS IN SERIES ACROSS THE PAGES. EACH OF THE GROUPS HAD A SINGLE LINE DRAWN THROUGH AS IF A DECODING OPERATION HAD BEEN PERFORMED. STURGIS TOLD MORGAN THAT HE HAS DISTRIBUTED PAGES OF THE BOOK IN VARIOUS PLACES IN MIAMI FOR SAFEKEEPING UNTIL HE CAN TURN ALL OF IT OVER TO SENATOR HOWARD BAKER. TO THIS END HE ALREADY HAD PLACED A CALL TO BAKER'S STAFF ON 23 AUGUST. STURGIS TOLD MORGAN THAT LORENZ HAD GIVEN HIM THE BOOK BECAUSE ONE OF HER MAFIA CONTACTS IN NEW YORK TRIED TO BLACKMAIL HER (FOR SOME REASON UNKNOWN TO MORGAN OR OURSELVES), AND SUBSEQUENTLY BEAT HER SEVERELY AND THREATENED HER LIFE. AS A RESULT, SHE NO LONGER WANTED ANY PART OF THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL IN QUESTION. STURGIS PROMISED TO GET IT INTO OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT HANDS.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011658

S E C R E T

SECRET

23 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Call from Jon French of DCD Concerning Frank STURGIS

1. The following information was provided to Jon French by his DCD Miami office on 23 August. The information was given to the DCD Miami office by a contact (not identified) on 23 August who obtained it from Oscar FREELY. FREELY is writing a book on Frank STURGIS.

2. STURGIS is to appear on the Tomorrow Show at 2 a.m. on 24 August, which is to be narrated by Tom Schneider. STURGIS just recently returned to Miami from taping the show in New York.

3. While in New York STURGIS saw Marita LORENZ and obtained from her a book which, according to source, appeared to be cryptographic material and seemed to relate to Albania. The DCD source saw a "few copies" of what he described as "mathematical matrix" material.

4. STURGIS currently (today - 23 August) is attempting to contact Senator Baker to turn over the material to him. DCD plans to ask the source to monitor the situation and advise whether the material in fact is turned over to Baker.

file

Chris Hopkins
LA/COG/CIOS

201- 242256 STURGIS

Told Jon French That DCD should alert ADDO & Phil Fendig - he will do. 8/23

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 48 PER [illegible] 132 TOTAL COPIES 21

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STATE MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT: C/LA8

ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR C/IP/AN, DDO, C/CSVID, C/OSINT 2, C/CI/R2, DDCI; C/OSCIC,

T 571886 EIA983 PAGE 01-01 ~~NC 98053~~ IN 45717

TOR:150341Z NOV 74

PRECEDENCE

P 150320Z NOV 74
FM DIRECTOR, FBI
TO RUEHOC/SECRETARY OF STATE
RUEAIIA/DIRECTOR, CIA
RUEHSE/U.S. SECRET SERVICE (PID)
RUEBHJA/ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION
ATTN: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT
AND INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION
AND GENERAL CRIMES SECTION
BT
UNCLAS

1.	C/COU	
2.	DC/COU	~~2~~
3.	[illegible]	
4.	[illegible]	
5.	[illegible]	2
6.	[illegible]	
7.	O/EUR	
8.	O/EA	
9.	O/NEAR	

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES.

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFO IN THE PAST AND IS KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITIES IN MIAMI ADVISED THAT CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, EX-PRESIDENT OF CUBA, AND CAPTAIN EDUARDO SOTOLONGO, DR. F. FESSER, DR. OTIEZA, SUAREZ RIVA, PAUL POZO, DR. PEDRO ROIG, EULALIA ARNESTO, ALL PROMINENT CUBANS IN THE MIAMI AREA, MET WITH WASHINGTON, D.C. COLUMNIST JACK ANDERSON ON NOVEMBER 1, 1974. THE MEETING WAS SET UP BY FRANK STURGIS, WHO SUPPOSEDLY IS A PERSONAL FRIEND OF JACK ANDERSON. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN JACK ANDERSON'S OFFICE AND IT LASTED APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES. JACK ANDERSON WAS FURNISHED WITH A MONOGRAPH WHICH REFLECTED AN ADVERSE ATTITUDE TOWARDS CO-EXISTENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CUBA.

CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS WAS THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE GROUP AND HE ASKED JACK ANDERSON TO HELP THE CUBANS UNITE UNDER ONE COMMON GOAL, THE LIBERATION OF CUBA. JACK ANDERSON REPLIED THAT HE WOULD ASSIST CUBAN UNIFICATION IN THE U.S., BUT WOULD NOT WRITE AGAINST CO-EXISTENCE.

SOURCE ADVISED ABOVE MEETING WAS HELD SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING SUPPORT OF JACK ANDERSON IN UNITING CUBAN EXILES IN THE UNITED STATES. NO DISCUSSION WAS HELD CONCERNING BOMBINGS OR OTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND THESE MATTERS WERE NOT ALLUDED TO DURING THE MEETING.

Ted

Sturgis 201
file watergate
file

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

DD/O [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

MAY 8 12 54 PM '74

C O N F I D E N T I A L 081600Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 12521

PRIORITY DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: DCD/OFFICE OF THE CHIEF (HORTON)

FROM: MIAMI FIELD OFFICE (HENNESSEY)

SUBJ: FRANK STURGIS

REF : HORTON/STARLING/HENNESSEY TELECON, 7 MAY 1974, SAME SUBJECT

1. AT 1655 ON 7 MAY 1974 WE RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL ON THE LISTED LINE FROM FRANK STURGIS, WHO INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO MEET WITH US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER THAT HE MIGHT CONVEY INFORMATION OF EXTREME IMPORTANCE TO THE AGENCY. HE MENTIONED AT THE OUTSET THAT HE HAD ARRANGED TO MEET WITH MATT MACVANE OF THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AT AN EARLIER DATE, BUT MACVANE HAD FAILED TO APPEAR AT THE APPOINTED TIME AND PLACE. WE DID NOT COMMENT ON THE ABORTIVE MACVANE MEETING; HOWEVER, WE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED STURGIS THAT WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO MEET WITH HIM. WE SUGGESTED THAT IF HE REQUIRED AGENCY CONTACT HE SHOULD DO IT AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL. HE ASKED WHO IN WASHINGTON HE MIGHT CALL. WE INDICATED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO SUGGEST A SPECIFIC NAME.

2. STURGIS THEN SAID THAT HE DIDN'T WANT TO PLAY GAMES AND THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE US HIS INFORMATION OVER THE TELEPHONE.

PAGE 2 DCD/MIAMI 12521 CONFIDENTIAL

HE IMMEDIATELY SAID THAT IT CONCERNED NARCOTICS IN MEXICO AND THAT A NUMBER OF VERY HIGH RANKING PEOPLE WERE INVOLVED. WE TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO GO ANY FURTHER BECAUSE THIS WAS A PROBLEM FOR THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, AND SUGGESTED THAT HE CONTACT THEM. HE RESPONDED THAT HE HAS HAD CERTAIN PROBLEMS WITH DEA, BUT HE INDICATED THAT HE MIGHT CALL GEORGE DAVIS, FBI, MIAMI, WHOM HE HAS KNOWN FOR SOME TIME. WE AGREED THAT THIS MIGHT BE AN EXCELLENT IDEA. STURGIS THEN THANKED US AND THE CONVERSATION WAS TERMINATED.

3. STURGIS WAS VERY PERSONABLE, BUT FRANK, During ~~[illegible]~~ THIS BRIEF CONVERSATION. WE BELIEVE THAT HE UNDERSTANDS OUR POSITION, AND WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THAT HE WILL ATTEMPT TO CONTACT US AGAIN.

4. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS MEMORANDUM HAS BEEN PASSED LOCALLY TO THE COS/WH, MIAMI, BY BRUCE MAINWARING.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012658

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

8 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Frank Anthony STURGIS (201-242256)

1. This morning I received a phone call from the COS, Miami who advised me that yesterday Frank Sturgis called the DCD, Miami Office, and expressed a desire to meet with one of the DCD officers. Sturgis claimed to have new information on the movement of narcotics through Mexico and other information which he did not specify.

The DCD Miami Office thanked Sturgis for calling and referred him to the FBI and DEA, who would be the most interested recipients of the information he has. Sturgis was very pleasant on the telephone and the DCD people obviously responded correctly.

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS

cy to DDO/Narc
   Mr. Bolton

RE: CUBANOS UNIDOS
(UNITED CUBANS)
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
NEUTRALITY MATTERS - CUBA

Cubanos Unidos (CU) is a Cuban exile anti-FIDEL CASTRO organization in Miami, Florida. Its purpose is to unite all exile groups into a unity organization and begin military operations against the present Government of Cuba.

WILFREDO NAVARRO BEATO is the head of CU, which organization now maintains office space at 1996 S. W. 1st Street, Miami, telephone 642-8741.

On June 9, 1970, MM T-1, a Cuban exile involved in revolutionary matters for the past six years, advised that CU recently decided to start selling bonds issued in the name of the Republic of Cuba. The money collected would be used to purchase arms for proposed military operations against Cuba.

On June 15, 1970, MM T-1 stated that WILFREDO NAVARRO at that time was claiming that MAURICE FERRE, a member of the Miami City Commission, is assisting him in Cuban revolutionary activities. NAVARRO claimed that about a week previously, a meeting was held in the FERRE Building in Miami, and it was determined that CU had adequate money resources. NAVARRO said that he instructed TOMAS ARENCIBIA, a leading member of CU, to quit his job and NAVARRO would pay his salary. NAVARRO explained that he wanted ARENCIBIA to work on a full-time basis for CU. Also present at this meeting were three unidentified Americans, one of whom reportedly has a quantity of arms stored at his house.

SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DBC - 92155
31 Aug 70
(05.4)100-9-14

RE: CUBANOS UNIDOS
(UNITED CUBANS)

On June 19, 1970, MM T-3, another Government agency which conducts intelligence investigations, advised information had been received that CU recently held a meeting to introduce Americans who are backing their organization. The Americans were FRANK FIORINI and ED KAISER. FIORINI calls himself the "Chief of Intelligence Section of Cubanos Unidos".

On July 1, 1970, WILFREDO NAVARRO BEATO appeared at the Miami Office of the FBI with his brother, ROFRME NAVARRO BEATO, and advised as follows:

FRANK FIORINI, an American citizen who has been involved in Cuban exile revolutionary matters for the past ten years, recently signed a unity agreement with CU. In this agreement, FIORINI, who represents some independent anti-CASTRO organization, agreed that political unity of all exile groups must be established. FIORINI is not a member of CU as such, holds no official position, and is not in charge of intelligence.

NAVARRO said that a few days previously he returned from Washington, D. C., where again he was trying to obtain United States Government support and backing. He was told that no support could be given unless it was personally authorized by President RICHARD M. NIXON.

They stated that JORGE GONZALEZ, also known as "Bombillo", who was formerly associated with another anti-CASTRO organization, was in no way associated with CU. They claimed that CU had no plans to attack a Russian vessel off the coast of Florida. CU had previously said it needed some 57mm recoilless rifles for this purpose but had no intention of attacking a Russian vessel. Announcements that they were going to do so were made for political propaganda and also to stir patriotic Cuban exiles to become more active in Cuban revolutionary matters.

RE: CUBANOS UNIDOS
(UNITED CUBANS)

BOB RAMEY (phonetic), a commentator on Channel 4 TV, Miami, who will travel with WILFREDO NAVARRO.

WILFREDO NAVARRO, leader of CU.

JORGE NAVARRO, brother of WILFREDO and designated Naval Chief of CU.

(First Name Unknown) RODRIGUEZ ALONSO, designated Military Chief of CU.

GORDON DI BATTISTO, an Italian having Mafia connections.

EDWIN KAISER, reportedly with "U.S. French Legion".

MAURICIO FERRE, reportedly provides financial backing to WILFREDO NAVARRO.

PILIN MENDOZA, a friend of JOSE FERRE.

MM T-5 indicated that it was intended that mercenaries from Corsica would be used.

On July 29, 1970, EDWIN BENJAMIN KAISER, JR., 805 West 30th Street, Hialeah, Florida, advised that he knew no one named BOB RAMEY or (First Name Unknown) RODRIGUEZ ALONSO. KAISER said that he had previously been in the French Foreign Legion and knows former legionnaires who now live in all parts of the world. Many of these legionnaires would fight as mercenaries if contacted, but at the present time neither he nor CU has any plans to contact these people and does not have the funds to pay them or the military equipment to issue them. KAISER said that WILFREDO NAVARRO is a long-time friend of Miami City Commissioner, MAURICE FERRE, and the nature of their relationship is business interests.

KAISER advised he continues to be active in CU

14-00000

C/WH 8 FILE, VR, C/CI/SO, DDP, ADDP, C/FI 2, C/CI
172

SECRET 181542Z JUN 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7935 18 JUN IN 106251

DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC

1. FOLLOWING IS UPDATE SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN MILITANT EXILE COMMUNITY.

2. JOSE TORRIENTE HAS TOLD AMCHALK-1 THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE WELL ALONG FOR OBTAINING TWO ISLANDS AS TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL BASES FOR EXILES. ONE IS THE ISLA BEATA OFF THE SOUTH COAST OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. NEGOTIATIONS WITH UNIDENTIFIED DOMINICANS FOR USE OF THIS ISLAND ARE TAKING PLACE THROUGH THE ARGENTINE CONSUL GENERAL IN PUERTO RICO. TORRIENTE WAS IN PUERTO RICO LAST WEEK. THE OTHER ISLAND WHICH IS BEING NEGOTIATED FOR BY EX-PRESIDENT CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS IS ILE A VACHE WHICH IS LOCATED OFF THE SOUTHERN HAITIAN PENINSULA. TRAINING ACTIVITIES AND RECRUITING FOR A MARITIME AND INFILTRATION COURSE IS CURRENTLY TAKING PLACE IN THE MIAMI AREA, HOWEVER THUS FAR ALL TRAINING HAS BEEN CONDUCTED UNDER CLASSROOM CONDITIONS IN PRIVATE HOMES THROUGHOUT THE MIAMI AREA. STATION IN POSSESSION OF MANY OF THE NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS

SECRET

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 7955 S E C R E T

RECRUITED. PLS FORWARD LARGEST SCALE ARMY AND HYDROGRAPHIC MAPS AVAILABLE FOR THESE ISLANDS.

3. THE CUBANOS UNIDOS GROUP CONTINUES TO AT LEAST MAKE APPEARANCES OF ACTIVITY. AMSNAP-3 REPORTS THAT FRANK FIORINI (201-242256) HAS LINKED HIMSELF WITH THE NAVARRO BROTHERS AND GORDON DI BATTISTO. FIORINI CALLS HIMSELF "CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF CUBANOS UNIDOS". RECENTLY A MEETING WAS HELD AT DUPONT PLAZA HOTEL TO INTRODUCE AMERICANS WHO ARE BACKING THE CUBANOS UNIDOS GROUP. THE AMERICANS IN ATTENDENCE WERE FIORINI AND ED KAISER. FIORINI IMPLIED THAT CUBANOS UNIDOS HAS UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SUPPORT. AMSNAP-3 BELIEVES, AS MANY OTHER CUBANS DO, THAT FIORINI AND KAISER MAY BE TIED IN WITH MAFIA. SIX MONTHS AGO, ACCORDING TO AMSNAP-3, THE SAME GROUP FORMED A SUPPOSEDLY NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION IN TALLAHASSEE TO AID CUBANS. BONDS WERE PRINTED UP AND SOLD TO LOCAL COMPANIES AND REFUGEES. IT IS APPARENT THAT A "CON" GAME IS GOING ON. IT IS HIGHLY POSSIBLE THAT ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ELEMENTS ARE INVOLVED WITH CUBANOS UNIDOS FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

SECRET

FILE, VR

PAGE 3 WH/MIAMI 7935 S E C R E T

4. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM AMCRUMP-5 THAT SPECIAL MODIFIED BERTRAM BOATS, 31 FEET WITH 2 EACH MERCRUISER INBOARD ENGINES RATED AT 325 HORSEPOWER EACH HAVE BEEN ORDERED BY HAITIAN GOVERNMENT. THE BOATS ARE ALSO EQUIPPED WITH RADAR AND FORWARD MOUNT AND HEAVY WEAPON. TO DATE, ONLY 2 BOATS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. AMCRUMP-5 LEARNED ABOVE AS RESULT OF HIS CURRENT PROPRIETORSHIP OF A MARINE SERVICES COMPANY, REPORTEDLY, 10 TO 12 BOATS ARE ON ORDER. WHILE NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO CONTRADICT THE FACT THAT THESE ARE BEING ORDERED FOR THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT, WE SPECULATE THAT THIS MAY BE ACTUALLY FOR CUBAN EXILES. THE PURCHASING AGENT IS JAMES BEYER WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN PREVIOUS PURCHASES FOR DAVALIER.

5. FILE: 201-290781, 201-242255, 201-289159. GP-1

S E C R E T

14-00000

71 MIO ?/76 [illegible]

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY 43 PER SP/13) TOTAL COPIES 243 RUN BY 1

RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

~~STAFF~~ MESSAGE

DVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

CTION UNIT c/LA10

CTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR c/[illegible] AAO c/SWHD c/CASLIT63 c/CASINT2 c/CIOPS2 NOSI c/OSGIC

T 966228 EIA243 PAGE 01 ~~NC 44524~~ IW 56/201

TOR:240534Z APR 75

R 240452Z APR 75
FM DIRECTOR, FBI
TO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION
ATTENTION: MR. JERRY D. JENNINGS
RUEBWJA/ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION
AND INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION
AND GENERAL CRIMES SECTION
RUEAIIA/DIRECTOR, CIA
RUEHSE/U.S. SECRET SERVICE (PID)
RUEHOC/SECRETARY OF STATE
BT

FBI DBD-87695

UNCLAS

UNSUB; THREAT TO ASSASSINATE SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER AND THE PRESIDENT OF VENEZUELA.

201 file

ON APRIL 23, 1975, FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE AND CONVICTED WATERGATE DEFENDANT, WAS CONTACTED AT THE LILLY FURNITURE STORE, 1225 N.W. 119 STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA. HE ADVISED THAT ON APRIL 22, 1975, SOURCE OF HIS, WHOM HE DECLINED TO IDENTIFY BUT HAD FORMERLY WORKED FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, HAD FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO STURGIS ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS.

A GROUP CALLING ITSELF THE LATIN-AMERICAN ANTI-COMMUNIST LEAGUE, BASED IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, HAD BEEN ACTIVE IN RECENT WEEKS. THE HEAD MAN OF THIS GROUP WAS AN EX-CUBAN LAWYER NAMED DR. DE CARDENAS. THERE WAS A REVEREND ESPINOSA "INVOLVED WITH THE GROUP." HE WAS SUSPECTED BY THE SOURCE AS BEING A CASTRO AGENT AND WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A FORMER NEW YORK POLICEMAN WHO HAD WORKED FOR G-2 IN CUBA IN FORMER YEARS.

THIS GROUP HAD REPORTEDLY RECRUITED TWO NATIVE BORN AMERICANS FROM THE NEW YORK AREA AND SENT THEM FROM MIAMI TO CUBA SEVERAL WEEKS AGO IN A BOAT ON CLANDESTINE OPERATION. THEY HAVE SINCE RETURNED TO MIAMI, BUT THE REASON FOR THE TRIP WAS UNKNOWN. IT WAS ALSO REPORTED THAT DR. DE CARDENAS HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN U.S. PASSPORTS FOR FOUR NATURALIZED CUBAN AMERICANS, IDENTITIES UNKNOWN. HE WAS ALSO TO TRY TO GET VENEZUELAN VISAS FOR THESE INDIVIDUALS.

DURING EVENING MEETINGS IN RECENT WEEKS, THE GROUP HAS DISCUSSED MANY THINGS. WHEN IT WAS REPORTED THAT HENRY KISSINGER WAS TRAVELING TO VENEZUELA, THE GROUP HAD DISCUSSED VARIOUS PLANS FOR CREATING SOME KIND OF AN INTERNATIONAL INCIDENT DURING

D 200-6-1195/14

ADMI[illegible]NLY

RECORD COPY

24 Apr 75
100-9-14

14-00000

1-71 WG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY FO[illegible] PER [illegible]0SD TOTAL COPIES [illegible] 18

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED [illegible] S ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED APR 24 9 57 AM '75 BY AT [illegible] 16 [illegible] '75

~~STATE MESSAGE~~ STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	1		4	
			2		5	
ACTION #			3		6	

T 966208 EIA243 PAGE 02 ~~IN 44524~~ IN 56120

TOR:240534Z APR 75

9 35 AM '75

KISSINGER'S VISIT IN VENEZUELA WHICH WOULD TEND TO DISCREDIT HIM AND THE PRESIDENT OF VENEZUELA.

AS A RESULT OF THESE REPORTED DISCUSSIONS, THE SOURCE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE THAT POSSIBLY THESE PLANS MIGHT RESULT IN AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON KISSINGER WHEN HE WAS VISITING IN VENEZUELA.

STURGIS EXPLAINED THAT THIS SOURCE WAS UNABLE TO FURNISH ANY OTHER DETAILS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INFORMATION AND NO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WERE IDENTIFIED. STURGIS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SOURCE HAD OBTAINED THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ALLEGED PLANS FOR CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL INCIDENT INVOLVING KISSINGER THIRDHAND. THE WIFE OF A MAN WHO WAS CONNECTED WITH A MEMBER OF THIS GROUP HAD OVERHEARD HER HUSBAND TALKING ON THE TELEPHONE ABOUT KISSINGER'S VISIT TO VENEZUELA AND HAD REPORTED THIS INFORMATION TO THE SOURCE.

STURGIS ADVISED THAT NOW THAT KISSINGER'S VISIT TO VENEZUELA HAD BEEN CANCELLED, HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL PLANS "HAD BEEN ABORTED" AND THAT THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE DANGER OR CONCERN. ALTHOUGH NO DEFINITIVE PLANS OF THE GROUP WERE KNOWN, STURGIS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GROUP HAD ONLY DISCUSSED POSSIBLE PLANS FOR AN INCIDENT INVOLVING BOTH KISSINGER AND THE PRESIDENT OF VENEZUELA DURING SUCH A VISIT IN ORDER TO DISCREDIT UNITED STATES-VENEZUELA RELATIONS.

STURGIS POINTED OUT THAT THE CUBAN EXILES ARE ALWAYS TALKING, CONSPIRING AND PLANNING SOME SORT OF ANTI-CASTRO ACTIONS, BUT IT IS PRIMARILY IDLE AND HOPEFUL GOSSIP AND RUMORS THAT COME TO NOTHING.

STURGIS STATED THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THERE WAS NO IMMINENT DANGER IN THESE ALLEGED THREATS, HE HAD PROMPTLY REPORTED THIS INFORMATION TO AN ACCUAINTANCE OF HIS IN THE U.S. CUSTOMS AGENCY, MIAMI, FLORIDA. THIS U.S. CUSTOMS AGENT HAD ADVISED STURGIS THAT HE WOULD PROMPTLY REPORT THIS INFORMATION TO THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE, MIAMI, WHICH AGENCY HAD PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION FOR U.S. CABINET MEMBERS. ACCORDINGLY, STURGIS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS MATTER WAS BEING APPROPRIATELY HANDLED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

SOURCES FAMILIAR WITH CUBAN GROUPS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE MIAMI, FLORIDA AREA HAVE FURNISHED NO INFO INDF INDICATING THE EXISTENCE OF ANY GROUP CALLING ITSELF THE LATIN AMERICAN ANTI-COMMUNIST LEAGUE.

ON APRIL 7, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO IS FAMILIAR

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

7-71 M.G. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~STATE~~ MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 966208 EIA243 PAGE 03-03 ~~NC 44524~~

IN 56120

TOR:2405342 APR 75

no 201

WITH CUBAN COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES AND HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, REPORTED AS FOLLOWS:

ON MARCH 24, 1975, REVEREND MANUEL ESPINOSA DIAZ, MINISTER OF THE PENTECOSTAL CHURCH, ACCOMPANIED BY FOUR CUBAN EXILES, BOARDED THE BOAT "WAHININI II" AT KEY WEST, FLORIDA, WHICH BOAT WAS PILOTED BY ANOTHER CUBAN NAMED JOSE CARDENAS. THE GROUP CLANDESTINELY WENT TO THE NORTH COAST OF CUBA AND REVEREND ESPINOSA CARRIED A LIST OF OVER THIRTY THOUSAND CUBANS WHO HAD BEEN UNABLE TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES TO JOIN THEIR RELATIVES. REVEREND ESPINOSA HAD AN INTERVIEW WITH FIDEL CASTRO IN AN EFFORT TO ARRANGE THE LEGAL DEPARTURE OF THESE PEOPLE.

SUBSEQUENTLY, ON MARCH 31, 1975, IT WAS LEARNED IN MIAMI THAT THE "WAHININI II" HAD RETURNED TO MARATHON, FLORIDA, ESCORTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD. ON THE SHIP, IN ADDITION TO REVEREND ESPINOSA AND HIS CUBAN EXILE COMPANION, WERE TWO U.S. NEWSMEN AND CAMERAMEN FROM CHANNEL TWO TV, MIAMI, IDENTIFIED AS KY BURTON AND KAPY KAPERMAN.

A COPY OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS BEING FURNISHED TO U.S. SECRET SERVICE, MIAMI.

14-00000

SECRET

WH/COG 362-74

25 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DCD Contact with Frank Sturgis of the Watergate Plumbers Group

Frank Sturgis contacted DCD in Miami recently and requested a meeting. DCD, who apparently did not recognize the name at first, agreed to meet with him. The DCD meeting with Sturgis has been cleared with George Carcy, CIA Legal Counsel, and was cleared with the DDO on 25 January 1974. No specific date for the meeting was given to WH, but it is assumed that the meeting will take place within the next few days.

Orville Bathe
C/WH/COG

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054555

SECRET

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

DBA 3/065

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

Copy to: 1 - INS, Miami, Florida (A11 877 123)(RM)

Report of: EUGENE L. PAYNE
Office: Miami, Florida
Date: DEC 26 1962
Field Office File #: 105-6466
Bureau File #: 201-267043
4 filed

Title: ① FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Synopsis:

Subject, a Cuban refugee, entered the U. S. on 8/9/60, from Colombia. Subject defected from the CASTRO government while employed as Cuban Naval Attache in Caracas, Venezuela. Subject is a former graduate of the Cuban Naval Academy and in exile has been involved in considerable anti-CASTRO clandestine activity against Cuba. Subject has affiliated with various anti-CASTRO organizations in the Miami, Fla., area and in 11/62, was reported to be associated with an individual having contacts with a Guatemala government official.

- C -

DETAILS:

PREDICATION

Investigation in this matter was based upon information from MM T-1, another government agency which conducts security and intelligence-type investigations, who advised on August 8, 1962, that information had been received from a sub-source of unknown reliability, who advised as follows:

SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

④

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FELIPE VIDAL, 2293 N. W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida, an individual who formerly held a responsible position in the Cuban Navy, had accompanied an individual identified as JACK CANNON, a United States citizen, on an anti-CASTRO clandestine trip to Cuba between October 18 and 23, 1961, in which they were purportedly transporting $80,000.00 worth of arms. The boat operated by CANNON, who also uses the name JACK SHEA, and the subject was sunk along the North Coast of Cuba and the arms were lost.

Although CANNON was allegedly engaged in anti-CASTRO activities, MM T-1's sub-source pointed out that after dealing with him in business and learning about his background, he suspected that CANNON was actually involved in clandestine missions for the CASTRO regime with ramifications relating to criminal activity in the Miami area.

BACKGROUND

A. Residence

According to the records of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Miami, Florida, as made available on December 6, 1962, by CHARLES CHALLANDES, Investigator, subject resides at 2293 N. W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida.

B. Birth Data and Alien Status

On June 14, 1961, INS, Miami, Florida, made available to the Miami Office information relating to political refugees entering the United States since January 1, 1959. Included in this list was FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO, born February 3, 1926, at Havana, Cuba.

On December 6, 1962, Investigator CHALLANDES, mentioned above, made available their file Number A11 877 123 relating to the subject, which contained the following information:

VIDAL arrived in the United States on August 9, 1960, from Bogota, Colombia, and applied for a B-2 visa for four months to visit his refugee wife. He pointed out he was a Lieutenant in the Cuban Navy from 1944 to 1956. In 1958 he affiliated himself with FIDEL CASTRO and after January 1, 1959, he was appointed Chief of the Maritime Police by the CASTRO government. On October 16, 1959, he was appointed Naval Attache at Caracas, Venezuela. He defected on March 7, 1960, in Caracas because of the communist infiltration of the Cuban government.

On April 8, 1961, VIDAL applied for political asylum. VIDAL indicated that in the United States he would reside at 708 N. W. 23rd Street, Miami, Florida, and had in his possession a document identifying himself as the coordinator of the anti-CASTRO organization Movimiento de Liberacion Democratico Revolucionario.

On August 10, 1960, INS obtained a sworn signed statement from VIDAL in which he stated he was discharged from the Cuban Navy under the government of FULGENCIO BATISTA because of his opposition to BATISTA.

VIDAL indicated he never joined the July 26th revolutionary organization of FIDEL CASTRO, but was affiliated with all groups of the revolution. In October, 1957, VIDAL was co-ordinator of the Organizacion Accion Resistencia (The Clandestine Resistence Action Organization). He pointed out that in Havana, Cuba, he participated in dissemination of propaganda, sabotage, organized strikes, and meetings in jails, all on behalf of the CASTRO revolution.

VIDAL pointed out that in 1958 a pact was formed in Caracas naming MANUEL URRUTIA as President of the new government, but that CASTRO later usurped the presidency. After URRUTIA was overthrown, VIDAL became disenchanted and began to cooperate with anti-CASTRO organizations. He asked for foreign duty, and after noting continued CASTRO activities against the government of ROMULO BETANCOURT and the movement of Russian agents to Cuba, he removed his family from Cuba, went to Colombia, and defected.

VIDAL emphasized that he had never been a member of the Communist Party in Cuba.

On October 3, 1962, MM T-2, a Cuban refugee familiar with certain phases of anti-CASTRO activity in the Miami area and who has limited information regarding communist activities in Cuba, advised that captioned subject was personally known to him in Cuba, where he had the reputation of being an opportunist and extremely fond of drinking and carousing. He was a Captain in CASTRO's Navy in Cienfuegos, Cuba.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES SINCE DEFECTION FROM CASTRO REGIME

The December 7, 1960, issue of "La Prensa," a daily Spanish language newspaper published in New York, carried an article entitled, "Establish United Cuban Front in Miami." This article stated that the United Front of Liberation in the City of Miami was announced by members of the group, which included Commander FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO of the Movement of Democratic Revolutionary Liberation, among others.

On February 20, 1961, MM T-3, a Cuban familiar with certain Cuban activity in the Miami area, advised SANTIAGO VIDAL and another individual of an anti-CASTRO group are purchasing radio equipment.

On April 4, 1961, CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba, advised an Agent of the FBI that a boat owned by FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO, former Cuban Naval Attache to Caracas, Venezuela, had been dispatched to the coast of Cuba. The boat had been gone approximately ten days and had not yet returned. PRIO advised the purpose of the trip was to bring out of Cuba a close friend of PRIO, identified as JULIO GARCERAN, former magistrate of the Supreme Court of Cuba. GARCERAN was to be brought to the South Florida area in VIDAL's boat.

The July 4, 1961, issue of the "Diario las Americas," a Spanish language newspaper published in Miami, carried an article entitled, "United Front for National Liberation," ating in effect that the Constitution of 1940 would be restored by the liberating army and unify all the Cuban anti-communist forces. The article bore the signature of Commander FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO on behalf of the "Democratic Recovery of Cuba."

The April 27, 1962, issue of the "Miami Herald," a daily newspaper published in Miami, carried an article pertaining to the training of exiles in the Miami area. Subject, on behalf of the United Liberation Front, was listed as one of the participants in this training.

On May 25, 1962, MM T-1 advised that subject would in all probability be included in the military commission of anti-CASTRO Cuban exiles which was being organized by Central American countries to cooperate in action against the CASTRO government.

On August 8, 1962, MM T-1, as previously indicated, advised that JACK CANNON, who claims he is engaged in anti-CASTRO activities and has made 43 clandestine trips to Cuba in various ships, transporting arms and documents and exfiltrating people, advised his ship was ank somewhere along the North Coast of Cuba, but was able to save himself in a small plastic boat with an outboard motor which was on board, and arrived in Cay Sals. He reportedly was accompanied on the trip by FELIPE VIDAL, 2293 N. W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida, who formerly held a responsible position in the Cuban Navy during the CASTRO regime. On this trip, CANNON said they were transporting $80,000.00 worth of arms and these were reportedly lost when the boat sank.

According to the source of MM T-1, JACK CANNON, who is a United States citizen and former CASTRO guerrillaman, is suspected of working for the Cuban government. He resides at 2020 N. E. 135th Street, North Miami, Florida, where he and his Cuban wife, MARIA SUAREZ, are tenants. The source of MM T-1 advised he had had some business relations with CANNON and upon obtaining some information about him, strongly suspects he is involved in some clandestine mission for the CASTRO regime, with ramifications of criminal offenses in Miami. He stated he suspects CANNON is the same man who was known in Cuba by the name of DUVAL and who was MORGAN's adjutant during the executions performed in Cuba.

4 file D
201-242256

MM T-1 advised that on August 27, 1962, FRANK FIORINI, an individual active in anti-CASTRO activity, had indicated that he had participated in discussions for the previous three days with the subject and other members connected with the JULIO GARCERAN group. FIORINI had discussed participation in activity relating to the procurement of crews for a number of B-26 planes, and it was decided that candidates for these crews were not to be members of the anti-CASTRO Cuban Revolutionary Council.

According to MM T-1, the pilots recruited were to be sent to unnamed Central American bases and targets were to be Guantanamo Naval Base and the City of Santiago de Cuba, or some target in that general vicinity. No specific date was set for this operation, but FIORINI was given the date of August 31, 1962, as a time limit to find crews. FIORINI stated he had offered his services to VIDAL, but was told he could not participate.

On October 22, 1962, MM T-4, who has been involved in Cuban revolutionary activities for the past five years, advised that the subject was planning to depart that date for Cuba on a military mission. According to MM T-4, VIDAL was accompanied by the American adventurer ROY HARGRAVES. VIDAL allegedly has 15 men in his group and recently visited New York.

On November 19, 1962, MM T-4 advised that VIDAL's friend, ROY HARGRAVES, is a friend of JOHN BONILLA, Consul General of Guatemala, and that both are mutual friends of an old Nicaraguan revolutionist. This Nicaraguan recently hired HARGRAVES to place a fire bomb in an unidentified boat. He is reported to have stated that the Nicaraguan government did not want to sponsor any action against CASTRO, but would confer with BONILLA, who has knowledge of the establishment of an Inter-American Brigade.

On October 29, 1962, MM T-4 advised that the subject was planning a mission to Cuba. The subject recently returned from Cuba, where he claimed to have been on a mission. VIDAL is reported to have said that when they were 35 miles off the Cuban coast, his boat was followed by a Cuban gunboat, and that when they were ten miles off the coast, another gunboat joined in the surveillance. At this point VIDAL returned to Miami. He was reportedly using a borrowed boat and the purpose of the mission was to drop an agent in the Matanzas Province of Cuba.

On November 13, 1962, MM T-4 advised that approximately three weeks previously the subject had departed from Vaca Key, Marathon, Florida, in a private boat on a trip to Cuba.

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

The following is a physical description of the subject:

Name	FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO
Alias	Felipe Vidal
Race	White
Sex	Male
Date of Birth	February 3, 1926
Place of Birth	Havana, Cuba
Address	2293 N. W. 7th Street Miami, Florida
Height	6'
Build	Slender
Hair	Brown, receding
Peculiarities	Wears mustache
Occupation	Cuban Naval Officer
Marital Status	Married
Wife	RAQUEL GONZALEZ PEAL
Father	HONORATO VIDAL MADRAZO
Mother	MARIA DEL CARMEN SANTIAGO ALVAREZ
Fingerprint Classification	PS 19 L 17 W MIII II S 1 U OCO
Cuban Passport No.	01432
Alien Number	A11 877 523

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING
ACTION
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
Special Activities Report on JMWAVE's Relationship with AMCARDON-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 10

REFERENCES:
A. WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962
B. WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962
C. WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962
D. DIR 40975, dated 6 October 1962
E. UFGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964

1. INTRODUCTION. In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review of the nature of its relationship with AMCARDON-2. This review indicates that the relationship with AMCARDON-2 evolved from that action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the establishment of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT South Campus as a result of security restrictions which were in some way related to JMDUSK. While the relationship with AMCARDON-2 stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the Identity 3 was an objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain. As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made that JMWAVE be given approval to contact the major South Florida news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these news media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity spotlight on those KUBARK activities in South Florida which might come to their attention. Thus, when a relationship was established with AMCARDON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3, which would simultaneously insure the security of JMWAVE's operations and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for surfacing certain select propaganda items. In the period October to

(CONTINUED)

Attachments: USC
A - Five Newspaper Clippings
B - Identities

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SAS, w/atts.

DATE TYPED 19 March 64	DATE DISPATCHED APR 2 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-14781	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
COS	Andrew K. REUTEMAN	vtp	251

1 - RI Chrono
1 - 201 file (O/COS)
1 - COS Chrono

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
ESEC		DUDLEY R. WILLINGS

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
S/JMWAVE	30/3	ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

December 1962, all of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3 was handled via AMCARBON-2. In mid-December 1962, AMCARBON-2 made the suggestion that he introduce REUTEMAN to AMCARBON-1 in order that there be a backup contact, in the event that AMCARBON-2 were out of town or unavailable at such times as REUTEMAN might require assistance from the Identity 3. REUTEMAN agreed to AMCARBON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, AMCARBON-2 hosted a luncheon on 12 December 1962 at the Miami Club in the Hotel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN. As a result of this initial meeting on 12 December 1962, an operational relationship has developed with AMCARBON-1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes to the fulfillment of the over-all JMWAVE mission. In view of this, a special activities report is being submitted to cover the nature of JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

2. FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR JMWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMCARBON-1 When AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN, AMCARBON-2 reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating with REUTEMAN. This review was conducted for AMCARBON-1's benefit, in order that he might clearly understand the frame of reference which should prevail in his relationships with REUTEMAN. In this review, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that it was the policy of the Identity 3 that it would take no action which would purposely embarrass KUBARK or its South Florida operations. As a result, if any embarrassing items relative to KUBARK's operations in South Florida did come to the attention of the Identity 3, this material would be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate attention. AMCARBON-2 made it clear to AMCARBON-1 that such items should be discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner. In addition, AMCARBON-2 made the point that, after an item was discussed, AMCARBON-1 should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative to how any particularly embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, so that it would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the same time, would not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of the Identity 3. In addition, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that, if AMCARBON-1 brought a potentially embarrassing item to REUTEMAN's attention and remedial action on the matter was not taken by REUTEMAN within a reasonable period of time, then the Identity 3 would feel free to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's part. AMCARBON-2 pointed out that in return for this cooperation from the Identity 3, REUTEMAN had agreed that he would be available for contact by telephone or periodic personal meetings at which AMCARBON-1 and AMCARBON-2 could discuss broad trends and developments in Latin American affairs. AMCARBON-2 advised AMCARBON-1 that this arrangement did not mean that AMCARBON-1 could expect to obtain any classified information from REUTEMAN. The point was also made that AMCARBON-1 should not press for the obtaining of classified information, but he should be alert to steering tips which REUTEMAN might furnish him on fast-breaking news stories. AMCARBON-1 indicated that he understood the frame of reference which had been outlined by AMCARBON-2. This frame of reference has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER. AMCARBON-1 originally started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk, and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment which entailed covering major political developments in Florida. At a later date, AMCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the Identity 3. Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant

promotion for AMCARBON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by the Identity 3 management. AMCARBON-1 is by no means an expert on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a long-term Latin American specialist. QUELF has been questioned about AMCARBON-1, and he has indicated that AMCARBON-1 is regarded in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has a keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American affairs. It is QUELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse of time, AMCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles. AMCARBON-1 has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting to improve his language fluency. It is REUTEMAN's opinion that AMCARBON-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist, and he will continue to grow in this field. Thus, he is a contact who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing in mind that he does have long-term potential.

4. AMCARBON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES. In keeping with the traditional pattern of source protection which is common to newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers, AMCARBON-1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his sources. On the other hand, when pressed, AMCARBON-1 has identified some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations could be made of that information which AMCARBON-1 had passed to KUBARK. As a result of these occasional witting identifications of his sources, and, as a result of general conversations with AMCARBON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that AMCARBON-1's sources include the following persons:

a. Luis *FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766), secretary general of the DRE.

b. Manolo *RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE.

c. Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct Havana Times.

d. AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437)

e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-010245), leader of the AAA

f. Edmund *LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau. AMCARBON-1 regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.

g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and adventurer.

h. Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR.

i. Luis *MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico.

j. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201-103272), former president of the Dominican Republic.

k. Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.

l. Jorge *VOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252), an employee of USIA in Miami. AMCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY is a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this does not deter AMCARBON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a source of information.

5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, AMCARBON-1 is used to carry out certain operational support tasks. In such instances, AMCARBON-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The use of AMCARBON-1 for operational support tasks enables JMWAVE to harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3. Several examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been used in operational support tasks are outlined below:

a. Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew ORDONO Camps, DPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived in Miami and was given routine CAC processing. The details of this processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963. After being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and a sensational story was developed. In view of this story, JMWAVE tried to locate ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productive, thus AMCARBON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO. AMCARBON-1 did locate ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for details.

b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group. In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201-309611) of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims relative to his faction invading Cuba. Headquarters' interest in discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-1. As a result of Headquarters' interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had a luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which AMCARBON-1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was less than accurate in its claims relative to its activities in Cuba. In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction might release. AMCARBON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN's comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would ignore the BANDIN faction in the future. Once BANDIN was discredited with AMCARBON-1, the word was soon leaked by AMCARBON-1 to other newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source. As a result of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage in South Florida since September 1963.

6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. In the period February 1963 to February 1964, AMCARBON-1 has furnished JMWAVE with operational intelligence as outlined below:

a. In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that AMBEND-1 was back in Miami and was the object of a great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from a Havana prison. AMCARBON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements. Subsequent developments revealed that AMCARBON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1, and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the publicity stir that was initially anticipated.

b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical situation. In this connection, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was

thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. *CARLSON, residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the Bay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON-1 stated that, if CARLSON were of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would soft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of the opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt of this operational intelligence enabled JMWAVE to brief CARLSON on the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn, enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting with AMCARBON-1. While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish his research.

c. In WAVE 0904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that Mr. Trevor *ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.

d. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1 gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with AMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963. This information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1 was telling the press.

e. In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 with AMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligence was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's representatives were telling the outside world about their operational activities.

f. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK vessels which were located in South Florida waters. This information alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny was going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warning, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicity repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5.

g. In WAVE 7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE, Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was no real operational potential in this lead. This incident did underscore the fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant operational leads to JMWAVE's attention.

h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calls indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected from a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previously been seen in Miami during November or December 1963. At the same time, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who was being used as a means of creating an incident which would embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating

United States territorial waters. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that KUBARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation against the GOC. At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result of this conversation, arrangements were made for JMWAVE to check out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time, AMCARBON-1 was prevailed upon not to write a story which might lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC.

7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET. AMCARBON-1 has been used successfully, during the period covered by this report, as a propaganda outlet through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in the free world press. Examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been harnessed in this field are outlined below:

a. AMCRAB-1. The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally surfaced in the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo. The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-1's information relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers in the Miami area. As a result, it was decided to do a series of feature stories on AMCRAB-1, pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1 was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions of obscurity once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. AMCARBON-1 was briefed in detail on the AMCRAB-1 story, and he was given an opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a JMWAVE safehouse. After completing his debriefing, AMCARBON-1 wrote a series of feature articles on AMCRAB-1. The first article in the series received front page headline play. The series of articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an excellent peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other propaganda assets. AMCARBON-1's story on AMCRAB-1 was picked up by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America. The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated 14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174, dated 21 October 1963.

b. Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story. On 26 February 1964, JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN's sons went to Cuba to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over to them. It was believed that this information would make a good human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items from the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States territorial waters. In view of this opinion, a steering tip was given to AMCARBON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in Key West interview Mr. GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out, and an article outlining the points which were of interest to JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

c. LAYC Story. The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santiago, Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted AMCARBON-1 on 5 March 1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the Identity 3 should pursue. AMCARBON-1 was grateful for this steering tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

(COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through c above are attached for Headquarters information.)

8. __POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE.__ Attempts have been made to obtain disseminable positive intelligence from AMCARDON-1 during the period covered by this report. This attempt has been generally unsuccessful, in that AMCARDON-1 does not have a great number of contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile intelligence appreciably in advance of the information appearing in the overt press. As a result, AMCARDON-1 is usually not aware of inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently, he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence. As a matter of fact, AMCARDON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive intelligence than most journalists. This is attributable solely to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American political scene. It is believed that AMCARDON-1 will ultimately overcome this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him for the collection of positive intelligence.

9. __COMMENT.__ In the period covered by this report, AMCARDON-1 has been found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest, cooperative and who understands the need for security. Our relationship also indicates that AMCARDON-1 is an accurate reporter of that information which he passes to KUBARK. In view of this, JMWAVE plans to continue to harness AMCARDON-1 in the same manner that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our relationship with AMCARDON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our operational mission in a secure manner. In addition, this relationship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have difficulties with the media outlets in the South Florida area. As a result of our continuing relationship with AMCARDON-1, a special activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.

10. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARDON-1 and that JMWAVE be advised of the number.

END OF DISPATCH

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	Separate Cover Attachment B to UFGA-14781

Identities - 1 - The Miami News

2 - Sunland Training Center for Retarded Children

3 - The Miami Herald

4 - Latin American Editor

5 - The LEDA

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - Chief, SAS
1 - RI Chrono
1 - AMCARBON-1 201
1 - COS Chrono

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFICATION	PAGE NO.

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

STANDARD FORM 66
October 1960
ISSUED BY U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Federal Personnel Manual R-1
66-101

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

[redacted]

[illegible]

BROE, WILLIAM V.

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

2 July 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

SUBJECT : Termination of Consultants

This is to advise you that the consultant agreement with the following consultants terminated cob: 30 June 1974.

Bissell, Richard M., Jr.
Bowie, Robert R.
Brandt, Robert
Broe, William V.
Byrnes, Robert F.
Cambel, Ali Bulent
Gilstrap, Lewey O.
Greer, Kenneth E.
Gross, John H.
Hadlock, Clay K.
Hafstad, Lawrence R.
Huber, J. Richard
Jordan, Amos A.
Karamessines, Thomas H.
Naka, Fumio Robert
Pagan, Oliver E.
Raborn, W. F.
*Schroeder, Gertrude E.
Taylor, Rufus L.
White, L. K.

*Terminated 20 May 1974.

Taylor, Rufus L.
security clearances requested to be kept open.

No correspondence was sent to him notifiying him of termination.

/s/ Charles W. Sandman

Charles W. Sandman
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL by: 053837

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 030018164	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BRUE WILLIAM V	PREPARED:07/12/74

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONTRACT EXPIRATION (OHGHL00)	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 06 30 74	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CONSULTANT INDEPEND (N) REEMPL CS ANNUITANT

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA 4212-0010	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DCI DIRECTORATE INSPECTOR GENERAL	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

11 POSITION TITLE ATTORNEY ADVISOR	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (INTRMNT) FEE	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0970.01	16 GRADE AND STEP SR Z	17 SALARY OR RATE DOG: $ 138.48 LEI: 101473

18 REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 082413  SEX: M      MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP:             FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: NONE                   HOSPITILIZATION: N   PLAN:
FEGLI: INELIGIBLE        PREV. GOVT SERV: 4        SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: D             A/L IND: 0                S/L IND: 0
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 070173 EXPIRATION DATE: 063074 DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 070173
REFERRING OFFICER: INSPECTOR GEN   REFR ORG: IG       PHONE: 5527
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N    FED EXMP:           STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: NHN     OPS EXPENSE: N      HOUSING: N           POST/EQUAL: N
HOME LEAVE: 0   DIFFERENTIAL: N     OFFSET CLAUSE: N     STD GOVT: N
LEGISL PAY: N   PREMIUM PAY : N     ALLOWANCE COMM: N    EDUCATION: N
STEP INCRS: N   OTH TAX ENTL: N     OTHER ALLOWNS : N    SEPARATION: N
```

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150S Use Previous Edition
8-72 MFG 9-72

SECRET

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 030016164	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BROE WILLIAM V	PREPARED:10/26/73

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONTRACT AMENDMENT (COMPENSATION)	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 10 DA. 14 YR. 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CONSULTANT INDEPEND (N) REEMPL CS ANNUITANT

					7. FAN AND NSCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	4212-0016	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DCI DIRECTORATE INSPECTOR GENERAL	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE ATTORNEY ADVISOR	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (INTRMNT) FEE	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0905.01	16. GRADE AND STEP SR Z	17 SALARY OR RATE DOC: $* 136.48 DEI:*101473

18 REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 062413  SEX: M      MARITAL ST: MAR    NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP:          FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: NONE                    HOSPITILIZATION: N   PLAN:
FEGLI: INELIGIBLE       PREV. GOVT SERV: 4        SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: D            A/L IND: 0                S/L IND: 0
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 070172 EXPIRATION DATE: 063074 DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 070173
REFERRING OFFICER: INSPECTOR GEN   REF. ORG: IG        PHONE: 5527
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STATE: N      FED EXMP:            STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: NMN       OPS EXPNSE: N        HOUSING: N           POST/EQUAL: N
HOME LEAVE: 0     DIFFERENTIAL: N      OFFSET CLAUSE: N     STD GOVT: N
LEGISL PAY: N     PREMIUM PAY : N      ALLOWANCE COMM: N    EDUCATION: N
STEP INCRS: N     OTH TAX ENTL: N      OTHER ALLOWNS : N    SEPARATION: N
```

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B
8-72 MFG 9-72

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 030018164
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BRCE WILLIAM V — PREPARED: 06/17/73
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INITIAL ENTRY
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 7 DA 1 YR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CONSULTANT INDEPEND (N) REEMPL CS ANNUITANT
6. FUNDS: X V TO V — V TO CF — CF TO V — CF TO CF
7. FAN AND RSCA: 4112-0010
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DCI DIRECTORATE
INSPECTOR GENERAL
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
11. POSITION TITLE: ATTORNEY ADVISOR
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (INTRMNT) FED
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0970.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: SR 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 134.46 DCG: EOD: 070173

18 REMARKS

```
---------- STATUS INFORMATION ----------------------
BIRTH DATE: 082413  SEX: M    MARITAL ST: MAR    NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP:        FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: NONE                HOSPITILIZATION: N   PLAN:
FEGLI: INELIGIBLE       PREV. GOVT SERV: 4     SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: D            A/L IND: 0             S/L IND: 0
-------------- CONTRACT INFORMATION -------------------
EFF DATE: 070173 EXPIRATION DATE: 063074 DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 070173
REFERRING OFFICE: INSPECTOR GEN   REFR ORG: 10      PHONE: 5527
-------- ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES ----------
TAX STATE: N    FED EXMP:          STATE EXMP:         STATE:
TRAVEL: NNN     OPS EXPENSE: N     HOUSING: N          POST/EQUAL: N
HOME LEAVE: 0   DIFFERENTIAL: N    OFFSET CLAUSE: N    STD GOVT: N
LEGISL PAY: N   PREMIUM PAY : N    CLEARANCE COMM: N   EDUCATION: N
STEP INCRS: N   OS TAX ENTIL: N    SIMILAR ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION: N
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150a 8-72 MFG 9-72
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4-51)

PXG 301

Mr. William V. Broe

Dear Mr. Broe:

The United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, hereby contracts with you, as an intermittent consultant, under the following terms and conditions:

1. Fee. For services rendered as an intermittent consultant you will be paid a fee per consultation (regardless of duration) in an amount equal to the daily rate of the top step of a GS-15. No taxes will be withheld therefrom. When required for Federal income tax purposes, an Information Return indicating total fees paid hereunder will be issued by CIA.

2. Expenses. You will be provided funds for travel and such other expenditures as are authorized under this contract. Accountings will be rendered in conformance with Agency regulations.

3. Status. Your legal status under this agreement is that of an independent contractor. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as implying the creation of an employee-employer relationship.

4. Prohibition. You will be prohibited from presenting a paper, writing for publication, or making a speech, statement on radio or television, or other public statement on the subject of intelligence, either factual or fictional, if the subject is related to programs and functions of the Agency or other Intelligence Agencies, without the prior authorization of the Assistant to the Director.

5. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 July 1973 and shall continue thereafter through 30 June 1974 unless sooner terminated (1) by mutual consent of the parties hereto or (2) by seven (7) days' written notice from one party to the other.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY /s/ Robert G. Hicks
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/s/
William V. Broe

030-01-8164
Social Security Number

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONSULTANT
(F.Y. 1975)

1. NAME OF CONSULTANT (Last-First-Middle)
Broe, William V.

2. RATE OF PAY
$138.48 per consultation

3. OFFICE
DCI

4. DIVISION
IG

5. CURRENT F.Y. CONTRACT NO.

6. NUMBER OF DAYS USED DURING CURRENT F.Y. (INCLUDING PROJECTION THROUGH 30 JUNE)
0

7. NUMBER OF DAYS ANTICIPATED USE DURING NEXT FISCAL YEAR

8. DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED DURING NEXT FISCAL YEAR AND JUSTIFICATION FOR RETENTION:

Consultant will not be continued beyond COB 30 June 1974.

Paul H. Hildebrand
Administrative Officer, DCI

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICES REQUESTED ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE OPERATIONS OF THIS OFFICE.

9. THIS DATE

10. TYPED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL

11. DATE APPROVED

12. EXTENSION APPROVED BY DCI

FORM NO. 503 REPLACES FORM NO. 37-189
1 FEB 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

PERS 73-2171

DD/M&S 73-2347

14 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Consultant Appointments

William Broe and Kenneth Greer have been closely involved with preparation and review of documents and other material concerning the Agency's alleged involvement in the Watergate affair. In order that their personal knowledge and assistance may continue to be available, it is requested that they be employed as Consultants to the Director, effective upon their retirement.

Harold L. Brownman

HAROLD L. BROWNMAN
Deputy Director
for
Management and Services

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

August 7, 1973

Mr. William V. Broe
111 Indian Trail
Scituate, Massachusetts 02060

Bill:

This package is for your information and retention. It's a routine part of our educational effort to minimize possible conflict of interest situations. I forgot to bring the papers with me when I met you in the reception room.

Sincerely,

Dow H. Luetscher
Office of Personnel

Enclosure

[illegible]

PRIVILEGED INFORMATION
NOT TO BE RELEASED

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 26 June 1973

YOUR REFERENCE: Request No. 76908

CASE NO. : #35 706

TO : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN :

SUBJECT : BROE, William V.

1. This is to inform you that Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulations 10-3 and 20-5 including access to classified information through TOP SECRET as required in the performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made for entrance on duty within 90 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐ Please advise Chief, Clearance Branch, extension 5620 when Subject enters on duty.

4. Consultant, effective 1 July 1973.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

For Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 1-73 1173 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

EXEMPT FROM
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (b)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-6) 76908

REQUEST DATE (6-11) [illegible]

NAME (Last-First-Middle) (12-28) [illegible] William V.

YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30) 191[illegible]

POSITION TITLE Consultant

RECRUIT. REQN. NO. (31-33)

LOCATION (City, State, Country) Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENT (Office, Division, Branch) DC/AG

SUB-CATEGORY CODE (36)

TYPE OF APPLICANT	☐	REGULAR STAFF	☒	CONSULTANT	☐	SUMMER ONLY	IF OTHER, SPECIFY:
	☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	MILITARY	☐	RE-EMPLOY. MIL.	

OCCUP. CODE (37-42)

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS	☐	HQS	☐	USF	☐	FF	☐	V	☐	CF
ATTACHMENTS	☐	PHS	☐	APPENDIX 1	☐	PHOTO(S)	☐	REPORT OF INTERVIEW	☐	REQUEST FOR WAIVER

GRADE (43-44)

ORGN. CODE (45-48)

VETERANS STATUS	☐	MALE-VETERAN	☐	FEMALE-VETERAN
	☐	MALE-NON-VETERAN	☐	FEMALE-NON-VETERAN

TYPE OF APPLICANT (49)

INVITEE CLEARANCE REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO

HEADQUARTERS (50)

CLEARANCE REQUIRED
☐ PROVISIONAL FOR ☐ IAS ☐ OTHER (Specify):
☒ FULL

CLEARANCE REQUIRED (51)

NAME OF REQUESTER [illegible] Chief, Contract Personnel Division

RECRUITER'S CODE (52-54)

REMARKS:

Former Staff Employee
Retiring on or about 30 June 1973
Consultant status - 1 July 1973

VET PREF. & SEX (55)

BR. MIL. SERVICE (56)

LAST DIGIT ORGN. CODE (57)

REQN. NO. (72-74)

RECRUIT. SOURCE (75-79)

SPACE BELOW TO BE COMPLETED BY OS ONLY

APPROVAL GRANTED

☐ PROVISIONAL ☐ INVITEE

THIS IS NOT A CLEARANCE FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, MATERIAL, OR SECURE AREAS. A BUILDING BADGE OR AGENCY CREDENTIAL IS NOT TO BE ISSUED AT THIS TIME.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

DATE

CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION

(9)

FORM 3-67 377 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: OP/Contract Personnel Division
5E 69 ~ah

EXTENSION: 7841

NO.

DATE: 7 August 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DCI/IG Attn: Jean 2 E 24	7 Aug '73			Attached is the SEFI for: William V. Broe Please obtain Using Official's Certification and forward to OGC.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. Office of General Counsel 7D 07 - B x 5 ~~Ogc 73-1188~~	8/9/73	8/9/73		
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12. OP/Contract Personnel Division/Attn: Nellie 5E 69				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CERTIFICATION OF USING OFFICIAL

I am seeking to acquire the services of the individual named herein as a consultant to me in connection with CIA work for which I have a responsibility. I hereby certify that I have read his Statement of Employment and Financial Interests (SEFI) and that I do not intend to utilize him in any work which, directly or indirectly, involves any company, institution, or entity listed on his SEFI except as noted below. (List below organizations involved. IF NONE, SO STATE.) If subsequent to this certification, this consultant will be required to perform any CIA work which involves any of the organizations listed on his SEFI not noted below, I will forward to the Office of General Counsel a revised certification. I further certify that I have read and understand 18 U.S.C. 208 (P.L. 87-849, § 208)

NAME OF CONSULTANT

William V. Broe

ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED

None

DATE	USING OFFICIAL	COMPONENT
9 Aug 1973	Donald Chamberlain Donald F. Chamberlain Inspector General	O/IG

APPROVAL

DATE	OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
9 August 1973	

FORM 11-65 2552 (5-12)

18 U. S. C. 208 (P. L. 87-849, § 208)

§ 208. Acts affecting a personal financial interest

(a) Except as permitted by subsection (b) hereof, whoever, being an officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, of any independent agency of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, including a special Government employee, participates personally and substantially as a Government officer or employee, through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation, or otherwise, in a judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter in which, to his knowledge, he, his spouse, minor child, partner, organization in which he is serving as officer, director, trustee, partner or employee, or any person or organization with whom he is negotiating or has any arrangement concerning prospective employment, has a financial interest--

Shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

(b) Subsection (a) hereof shall not apply (1) if the officer or employee first advises the Government official responsible for appointment to his position of the nature and circumstances of the judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter and makes full disclosure of the financial interest and receives in advance a written determination made by such official that the interest is not so substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity of the services which the Government may expect from such officer or employee, or (2) if, by general rule or regulation published in the Federal Register, the financial interest has been exempted from the requirements of clause (1) hereof as being too remote or too inconsequential to affect the integrity of Government officers' or employees' services. Added Pub. L. 87-849, § 1(a), Oct. 23, 1962, 76 Stat. 1124.

STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL INTEREST

FOR

William V. Broe

[illegible]

STATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS

I. LIST THE NAMES OF ALL COMPANIES, FIRMS, STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS AND EDUCATIONAL OR OTHER INSTITUTIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE SERVING AS OFFICER, DIRECTOR, TRUSTEE, PARTNER, EMPLOYEE, MEMBER, OWNER, ADVISER OR CONSULTANT. ALSO LIST THE NAME OF ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WITH WHOM YOU ARE NEGOTIATING OR HAVE ANY ARRANGEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT.

None

II. LIST THE NAMES OF ALL FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES FOR WHICH YOU ARE SERVING OR YOU EXPECT TO SERVE AS AN ADVISER OR CONSULTANT.	FROM--TO--	NO. OF DAYS ESTIMATED SERVICE
CIA	July 1973 –	—

III. LIST THE NAMES OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDING COMPANIES, RESEARCH OR OTHER INSTITUTIONS, AND TRUSTS IN WHICH YOU OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE YOUR SPOUSE, MINOR CHILD, PARTNER, ANY ORGANIZATION OR PERSON LISTED UNDER SECTION I ABOVE, OWN SECURITIES OR HAVE OTHER FINANCIAL INTERESTS.

None

IV. I CERTIFY THAT THE STATEMENTS I HAVE MADE ARE TRUE, COMPLETE, AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. I UNDERSTAND THAT IF, DURING THE PERIOD OF MY SERVICE, MY EMPLOYMENT OR FINANCIAL INTERESTS CHANGE FROM THAT STATED ABOVE, I MUST FILE AN AMENDED STATEMENT.

DATE	SIGNATURE
July 30 1973	William V. Broe

FORM 11-65 2553

(12)

OD/Pers

PERS 73-661

2 February 1973

Mr. William V. Broe
4317 Saul Road
Kensington, Maryland 20797

Dear Bill:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your more than thirty-one years of service to your country. The success with which you have met this challenge should be a source of lasting pride to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Dick

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat/3257 (16 February 1973)

Good luck and best wishes!

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 May 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056735
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BROE, William V.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Retirement (~~Optional~~) (Voluntary) CIARDS
[illegible]
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 29 YEAR 73 (CO)
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3212-0010
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643 Section 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DCI
Inspector General
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Inspector General
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0018
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): ~~GS~~ EP Senior Executive Pay Scale
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0000.23
16. GRADE AND STEP: ~~GS~~ Level V
17. SALARY OR RATE: $36,000
18. REMARKS

Subject's last working day will be o/a 20 June 1973

Request for Voluntary Retirement approved by DDM&S on 7 May 1973.

cc: Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Charlotte E. Mesick
Charlotte E. Mesick O/IG
DATE SIGNED: 9 May 73
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CS Career Service Board
DATE SIGNED: 17 May 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 24 YR. 13
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIARDS 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE: 0
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: BJ, 00, D, 0
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 6-11-73
46. OP APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher
DATE APPROVED: 17 May 73

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

1 JUN 1973

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY PERS 73-1207

73-1765

3 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement -
Mr. William V. Broe

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

Grade : **EP-03** Position : **Inspector General**
Career Service : **Operations**
Office/Division : **Office of the Director**
Date Requested for Retirement : **29 June 1973**
Age at that Date : **59**
Years of Creditable Service : **31**
Years of Agency Service : **23**
Years of Qualifying Service : **8**

3. The applicant's Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommended that the request be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

/s/Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

4. The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

/s/ Robert [illegible]
Deputy Director for Management and Services

07 MAY 1973
Date

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

William V. Broe
4317 Saul Road
Kensington, Maryland

Date of Birth : August 24, 1913
Place of Birth: Amesbury, Massachusetts

WORK EXPERIENCE

1949-1973	**Central Intelligence Agency in the Far East and Washington** Inspector General Director of geographical area division at Headquarters, USA Senior CIA Officer in foreign country to which assigned Deputy Director of geographical area division at Headquarters, USA Senior CIA Officer in foreign countries to which assigned
1942-1948	Special Agent, FBI
1939-1942	Firestone Tire & Rubber Company General Motors Acceptance Corporation

EDUCATION

Bowdoin College, BA Degree - 1939

S-E-C-R-E-T

(This notice is NOT to be filed in Agency manuals. Please destroy after reading.)

PERSONNEL

HN 20-502
28 January 1972

ANNOUNCEMENT OF APPOINTMENT TO KEY POSITION

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Effective 31 January 1972, William V. Broe is appointed Inspector General.

Richard Helms
Director

DISTRIBUTION: AB

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 January 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056735

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BROE William V.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: ~~Promotion and Reassignment~~ Reass + Pay adj/

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 01 YEAR 72

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2212 0010 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DCI
Inspector General

57

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Inspector General

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0018

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): Senior Executive Pay Scale

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0000.23

16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 0

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000

18. REMARKS:

X GS to EP

Approved:

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

28 JAN 1972

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE

20 EMPLOY. CODE

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 HQTRS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 08 DA. 24 YR. 13

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIA 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT

36 SERV. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1-31-72 [illegible]

FROM WH

46 OP APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher

DATE APPROVED: 28 Jan '72

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

31 JAN 1972

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

7 July 1971

OD/PER

MEMORANDUM FOR: William V. Broe

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

In 1968 I advised you that you were scheduled for retirement in 1973 and offered to assist you in any way possible in planning for your retirement. We have learned over the years that the counseling we are anxious to provide is most helpful in this planning.

This is to reaffirm that you are scheduled for retirement on 24 August 1973 and to urge you to contact our Retirement Affairs Division, if you have not already done so, where counseling resources and services will be made avialable to you.

Harry B. Fisher

Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

Received and acknowledged: William V Broe
Signature

26 July 1971
Date

Please return this memorandum to: Retirement Affairs Division
Room 212
Magazine Building

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 May 1970

G

32

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056735 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BROE, WILLIAM V. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 31 YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0235 0620

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER - DIV CH (18)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 18 1

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 35,505 ✓

18. REMARKS:

1 - Security
1 - Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
HENRY L. BERTHOLD C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 5-12-70

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Cleveland C. Cram

DATE SIGNED: 5-18-70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOKERS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	51050	WH	75013		1	08 24 13		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.:

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—026M 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE:

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO.:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA YR.

37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 05-21-70 JBR

46 OP APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher

DATE APPROVED: 20 May '70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 May 1970

G
32

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 056735
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): BROE, WILLIAM V.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 30 YEAR 70
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF X
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0135 0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER DIV CH
12 POSITION NUMBER: 0001
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 35,505

18. REMARKS

FROM: FSR-01, Step 3 ($35,505)

* WASH, D.C.

1 - Security
1 - Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BEETHOLD C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED:
18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24. HQOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
56	10	51050	WH	75013		/	08 24 13		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.:
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—OBGN 3—FICA 5—NONE) CODE:
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA. YR:
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT):
36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.:
37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA. YR:
38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RSVY PROV TEMP) CODE:
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED 1—YES) HEALTH INS. CODE:
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)):
42 LEAVE CAT CODE:
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS:
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE:

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 05-21-70
46 O P APPROVAL: H.B. Fuller
DATE APPROVED: 20 May 70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William V. Broe

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. I have determined that you meet the criteria outlined in HR 20-50 for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System. Your designation as a participant was made effective 29 August 1965.

2. You are hereby notified of your right to appeal this action to the Director of Central Intelligence as specified in HR 20-50. Such appeal must be received in the Office of the Director not later than 30 calendar days from the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 Aug 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056735
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BROE, WILLIAM V.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 29 YEAR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / XXX CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135-0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: 1ST SEC POL OFF / OPS OFFICER - DIV CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		02 6	$ 21,470
GS	0136.01	18 1	$ 24,500

21

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY MEMORANDUM FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

1cc to OP/BSD/BCB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED: 8/25/65
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28	10	57050	WH	25013		1	08 24 13	05 09 65	05 09 65

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
		2					

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE: 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE: 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8/31/65
46. O P APPROVAL: for
DATE APPROVED: 27 Aug 65

FORM 5-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	25 JUNE 1965
SERIAL NUMBER	56735
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BROE, WILLIAM V.
NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	07 / 1 / 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
FUNDS	V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V ☐ · CF TO CF XX
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	6135-0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP WH OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE	1ST SEC POL OFF OPS OFFICER DIV CH
12. POSITION NUMBER	0001
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	FSR GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	02 6 18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE	21470 $ 24500

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/FE/COS/TOKYO.

Concurrence from FE per Mary Bolger

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 6/25/65
Clc 7/1/65

Recorded By
CUJ
LSG

7
F

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL R. D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS	DATE SIGNED 6/28/65	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 6/28/65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	37
20. EMPLOY CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC	57050
21. OFFICE CODING — ALPHABETIC	WH
22. STATION CODE	15013
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. MOOTRS CODE	1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	08 24 13
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSR, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) CODE	
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER, 1—YES); HEALTH INS. CODE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	7-1-65 HJ from FE ②
46. O P APPROVAL	Bob Bond for DJlan
DATE APPROVED	30 Jul

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 16 March 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 056735

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): BROE, William V.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 | DAY 9 | YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137-1566-0678

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP FE
FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF STATION

12 POSITION NUMBER: 3002

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 1

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 24,500

18. REMARKS

cc: Payroll

[illegible]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
Sec CSCS Bd

DATE SIGNED: 17 Mar 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY CODE | 21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 HQTRS CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. | 26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR. | 27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR. | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE, CODE | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE, MO. DA. YR. | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE, 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT. | 36 SERV. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR. | 37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR. | 38 CAREER CATEGORY: 1—REG 2—RES/TEMP, CODE | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE, 0—WAIVER 1—YES, HEALTH INS. CODE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPT, STATE CO

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 6 MAY 1

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 June 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 156735

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BROZ, WILLIAM V.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH | DAY | YEAR

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2137-7351-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO - Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE: 1st. Secretary (Political Officer)
Chief of Station

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3002

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP		17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		2	2	$15,255
GS	0136.01	17	1	16,530

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
Chief of Operations, DDP

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
for DD/P

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. EMPLOY. CODE | 21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. HOURS CODE: 3 | 25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 08 24 13 | 26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR. | 27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. DTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR. | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: CODE, MO. DA. YR. | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT. | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR. | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR. | 38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT LCD: 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.) | 42. CLEAR. CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
WA 7-25-61

46. O.P. APPROVAL

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 26 April 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER 156735	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) BROE, William V.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION -- Dept. of State

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 4 | DAY 27 | YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V ☐ | CF TO V ☒ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1137-7351-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS

DDP/FS
FE/JAO - Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE: 1st. Secretary (Political Officer)
Chief of Station

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3002

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP		17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		2	2	$15,255
GS	0136.01	16	2	$15,515

18. REMARKS

All sick and 118 hours annual leave to be transferred to the Dept. of State.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: B Eggleston
B. [illegible], Cover Officer, [illegible]

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPL. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. [illegible]	24. [illegible] CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF [illegible]
55	10	56380	3S	37589		3	08 24 13		

EOD DATA ⇨

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 05/02/61

44. O.P. APPROVAL

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 April 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 156735 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BROE, William V.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to ~~Unvouchered~~ [illegible] Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: 04 16 ~~[illegible]~~ YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1137-7351-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO - Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE: Chief of Station D-

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3002

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 2 ✓

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 15,515

18. REMARKS:
FROM: DDP/FE/Office of Chief/ 0002

259's submitted to Medical Staff
1cc - Office of Security
1cc - Unvouchered Payroll
1c to CCO
Departure Date: o/a ~~9 June 1961~~

Recorded by CSPD

4-16-61 eff. date coordinated with FE/PERS; Central Processing notified.
4-27-61
CSPO

19. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, CFE PERSONNEL

19A. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HEDTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI	
20	10	56390	FE	37587		3	[illegible]			

28. DATE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY RFD. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 YR 2 - 10 YR.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT CODE 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 04/27/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Daniel J. Knapp for D/Pers 25 Apr 61

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET (4)

Personal Information

DO NOT OPEN

14-00000

0-5020

Executive Registry
[illegible]

SECRET

ADE

22 SEP 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Director of Central Intelligence**

VIA: **Deputy Director (Plans)**

SUBJECT: **Appointment of Mr. William V. Broe, Chief of Station, Tokyo, Japan**

1. The appointment of Mr. William V. Broe as Chief of Station, Tokyo, Japan, effective on or about 15 June 1961, is recommended. Mr. Broe would replace Mr. John E. Baker who is scheduled to be reassigned.

2. Mr. Broe has been an employee of the Agency since 21 June 1948, and is presently assigned as Deputy Chief, Far East Division, GS-16. A biographic data sheet, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

1 Attachment
Biographic Information

cc: DDCI (9/30/60)

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Mr. Broe has been interviewed by the ADDP/A, by the Chief of Operations, and by myself, and we are satisfied that he is qualified for this assignment.

Richard M. Bissell Jr.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

22 SEP 1960
Date

SECRET

Subject: Appointment of Mr. William V. Broe, Chief of Station,
Tokyo, Japan

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is approved.

Allen Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence

1 OCT 1960
Date

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

21 September 1960

Name:	**William V. BROE**	
Grade:	**GS-16**	
Service Designation:	**DI**	
Date and Place of Birth:	**24 August 1913, Amesbury, Mass.**	
Marital Status:	**Married**	
Education and Career Outside the Agency:	**1935 - 1939**	**Bowdoin College, Brunswich, Me. AB, Biology, Chemistry**
	1939 - 1941	**Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Quincy, Mass. - Budget Manager**
	1941	**General Motors Acceptance Corp., Boston, Mass. Field Representative**
	1942 - 1948	**FBI, Ohio, Michigan, D.C. - Special Agent**
Languages:	None	
CIA Experience:	June 1948 - Aug 1950	Acting Chief, Philippine Br., OSO/COPS/FBZ. P-5
	Aug 1950 - Apr 1951	Chief, Philippine Br., OSO/FDZ/SEA, GS-13
	Apr 1951 - Aug 1953	COS, Manila, OSO/FDZ/SEA. GS-14 (May-Aug 1953 TDY Hqs)
	Aug 1953 - Aug 1954	Deputy Chief, FRU-FEC, Yokosuka
	Aug 1954 - Apr 1955	DCOM, China Mission, Yokosuka GS-15
	Apr 1955 - Jan 1958	Chief, China Branch, FE/DDP
	Jan 1958 - present	Deputy Chief, FE Division, DD/P
CIA Training:	Admin Procedures, Basic Intell, Advanced Intell Trng, Secret Writing, Crypto Briefing, Basic Ops Photo, Invest Tech, Conceal, Ops Disguise, Furnishings & Equipt	

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice Expires 15 December 1958

CSN NO. 1-209

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
NOTICE NO. 1-209

ORGANIZATION
16 October 1958

PERSONNEL ANNOUNCEMENT

FE DIVISION

Mr. William V. Broe has been designated Acting Chief, Far East Division, during the temporary absence of Mr. Desmond FitzGerald from 15 October through 3 December 1958.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Released by:
Richard Helms
Chief of Operations

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice Expires 25 January 1959

CSN NO. 1-232

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
NOTICE NO. 1-232

ORGANIZATION
16 January 1959

PERSONNEL ANNOUNCEMENT

FE DIVISION

Mr. William V. Broe has been designated Acting Chief, Far East Division, during the temporary absence of Mr. Desmond FitzGerald, from 17 through 24 January 1959.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Released by:
Richard Helms
Chief of Operations

S-E-C-R-E-T

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) BROE, WILLIAM V.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 08 Da 24 Yr 13	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 0	5. Sex M 1
6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Mil Serv. Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations: DDP FE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

Code:

15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.

Station Code:

16. Dept.- Field: Dept - Ustld. - Fran -; Code:

17. Position Title: AREA OPS OFF D DIV CH

18. Position No.: 0002

19. Serv.: GS

20. Occup. Series: 0136.01

21. Grade & Step: 15 3

22. Salary Or Rate: $13,370

23. SD: DI

24. Date Of Grade: Mo 08 Da 01 Yr 54

25. PSI Due: Mo 01 Da 25 Yr 59

26. Appropriation Number: 9 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: PROMOTION (TEMPORARY)*

Code:

28. Eff. Date: Mo Da Yr

29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR

Code:

30. Separation Date:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:

Code:

32. Location Of Official Station:

Station Code:

33. Dept.- Field: Dept - Ustld. - Fran -; Code:

34. Position Title:

35. Position No.:

36. Serv.:

37. Occup. Series:

38. Grade & Step: 16 1

39. Salary Or Rate: $14,190

40. SD:

41. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr

42. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr

43. Appropriation Number:

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title):

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.):

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Chief of Operations, DD/P

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E. Director of Personnel		5 AUG 1958
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

* Promotion to the grade indicated is temporary and for such duration as the Director will determine. Your permanent grade is the grade from which you are temporarily promoted.

FORM 1152a
5-57

(4)

14-00000

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

9 Dec. 1957

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo Da Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
	BROE, William Vincent	08 24 13		1	M	

7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Mil Serv Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code
						1		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE Branch 2 - China Office of the Chief		Washington, D.C.	

16. Dept.- Field Dept.- Unfld.- Fran.-	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
1		Area Ops Off (Br. Ch.)	161	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number
15 3	$12,150.00	DI			8-3700-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Reassignment			Regular		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE Office of the Chief	5112	Washington, D.C.	

33. Dept.- Field Dept.- Unfld.- Fran.-	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1		Area Ops Off (D Div. Ch.)	2		

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number
	$		08 01 54	01 25 59	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
Ronald Gage, Chief, FE/Personnel

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Jimmie Dewberry x 2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
5 [illegible]

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	T. E. Bain, Jr	11 Dec 57
B. Pos. Control		12/11/57	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Shea	11 Dec 1957

Remarks.
[illegible] McCollest PED
12-17-57

FORM 1152a
57

This Notice Expires 1 July 1958

N 20-190-139

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-139

PERSONNEL
2 July 1957

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENTS TO KEY POSITIONS

PANEL OF EXAMINERS OF THE CIA SELECTION BOARD

In accordance with paragraph 5b of Regulation No. 20-105, The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, the following persons are appointed, effective 1 July 1957, to serve as members of the Panel of Examiners for the period ending 30 June 1958:

Name	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Albertsen, C. V.	DP	DDP/WE
Brent, Irl Darcy	IS	DDI/OSI
Broe, William V.	DI	DDP/FE
Bussey, Robert O.	DT	DDP/TSS
Cain, Benjamin B.	OD	DDI/OO/FDD
Caldwell, John J.	SP	DDS/OP
Christ, David L.	DT	DDP/TSS
Connor, Sydney	IB	DDI/OBI
Covell, Louis C.	C	DDI/OCR
Czajkowski, Anthony	OC	DDI/CO/C
Darling, James A.	DM	DDP/NEA
Dean, Warren L.	DI	DDP/WE
Desmond, Daniel H.	SC	DDS/OC
Dillon, Thomas P.	SL	DDS/OL
Flynn, Anthony P.	DI	DDP/CI
Ganley, Frederick W.	SF	DDS/Compt
Gause, William M.	SL	DDS/OL
Gibson, Frank E., Jr.	SM	DDS/Med
Giesecke, Fritz H.	DP	DDP/EE
Gimmell, Kermit V.	IB	DDI/OBI
Godfrey, Francis E.	C	DDI/OCR
Hall, Fred H.	SS	DDS/OS
Heimann, Peter K.	DI	DDP/EE
Henderson, Donald G.	IN	DDI/ONE
Heney, Carlyle F.	SS	DDS/OS
Hines, Samuel M.	D	DDP/PPC

S-E-C-R-E-T

N 20-190-139

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-139

PERSONNEL
2 July 1957

Name	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Ilyin, Boris	DP	DDP/SR
Ingersoll, Harold B.	IC	DDI/OCI
Johnson, Quentin C.	DI	DDP/SR
Karamessines, Thomas H.	DI	DDP/FI
Kaylor, James S.	D	DDP/I&R
Lamberth, Hugh R.	IR	DDI/ORR
Larsen, Boyd N.	SF	DDS/Compt
Lowe, Benton S.	SL	DDS/QL
Little, Harry W., Jr.	DI	DDP/FE
Lyon, N. Harris	SS	DDS/OS
MacDonald, John	SC	DDS/OC
Mathews, Charles W.	IS	DDI/OSI
McPherson, Paul S.	OB	DDI/OO/FBID
Mitchell, Michael G.	DI	DDP/FI
Noel, James A.	DI	DDP/WH
Pearson, Robert W.	SL	DDS/OL
Porter, George A.	SC	DDS/OC
Procaccino, Joseph	DI	DDP/WE
Ranlet, Robert R.	DM	DDP/PP
Reff, Joseph S.	SP	DDS/OP
Schmalbach, Stewart	SC	DDS/OC
Seeley, Jay S.	IR	DDI/ORR
Shallcross, Lawrence B.	ST	DDS/OT
Shattuck, William B.	ST	DDS/OT
Shaw, J. Arnold	SA	Off/DCI
Sherman, Katherine	DP	DDP/FE
Steege, Harold M.	SC	DDS/OC
Tenney, Calvin W.	DI	DDP/CI
Voigt, Frederick A.	IC	DDI/OCI
von Schrader, Atreus	SP	Off/DDI
Wattles, Robert S.	SA	DDP/WH

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

H. GATES LLOYD
Acting Deputy Director
(Support)

DISTRIBUTION: A, plus each member
of the Panel of Examiners

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

6 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant, Intelligence
Department of State

SUBJECT : BROE, William V.
Resignation from the Foreign Service
on Completion of Full Tour of Duty

1. Mr. Broe, Attache at the American Embassy, Manila, Republic of the Philippines, will complete his tour of duty in the Foreign Service in April 1953. He has been instructed by this office to advise the post administrative officer of his intention to resign from the Foreign Service at the completion of his tour. Mr. Broe will submit his written resignation to the post administrative officer, and request that the Department issue travel orders to return him, his dependents, and his effects to the United States on or about 10 May 1953. It is requested that your office arrange for the issuance of appropriate orders on receipt of notice from the post administrative officer.

2. It is requested that Mr. Lambert Hopkins who now occupies position 3, Annex F-10, be advanced to position 1. The vacancy created by Mr. Hopkins' advancement will be filled at a later date.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

BY

FE/FI/PPT/TS;bj 24 April 1953
FI/LCB/BG;kd Retyped 1 May 1953
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - addressee
1 - C/FI
1 - FE
2 - LCB

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

This Notice Expires 1 July 1957

N 20-190-106

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-106

PERSONNEL
7 July 1956

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENTS TO KEY POSITIONS

PANEL OF EXAMINERS OF THE CIA SELECTION BOARD

In accordance with paragraph 5b of Regulation No. 20-105: The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, the following persons are appointed, effective 1 July 1956, to serve as members of the Panel of Examiners for the period ending 30 June 1957:

Name	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Applewhite, Edgar J.	DI	DDP/FI
Bennett, Edwin	SA	DDP/FE
Blackburn, Bruce B., Jr.	SC	DDS/OC
Blackett, Gustav	OD	DDI/OO/FDD
Blake, John F.	SA	DDP/EE
Bower, Philip G.	IB	DDI/OBI
Broe, William V.	DI	DDP/FE
Buckler, James L.	SF	DDS/Compt
Burns, Harmon, Jr.	C	DDI/OCR
Candela, Joseph J.	SC	DDS/OC
Christ, David L.	DT	DDP/TSS
Clark, James P.	OB	DDI/OO/FBID
Clarke, John M.	IR	ODCI
Coolidge, Francis L.	DP	DDP/NF
Dahlgren, Robert N.	DI	DDP/WH
Darling, James A.	DM	DDP/NE
Dean, Warren L.	DI	OFF/DDP
Flynn, Anthony P.	DI	DDP/CI Staff
Fuller, Robert, III	D	OFF/DDP
Garland, Jerome M.	DT	DDP/TSS
Georgia, Willis S., Jr.	SC	DDS/OC
Gibson, Frank E., Jr.	SM	DDS/Med
Gimmel, Kermit V.	IB	DDI/OBI
Gramann, Robert G.	SC	DDS/OC
Hall, Thomas R.	DI	DDP/FI
Harris, Don R.	IM	DDI/ONE
Hayes, Richard P.	DI	DDP/WE
Hines, Samuel M.	D	OFF/DDP
Horan, William T.	SF	DDS/Compt
Huefner, Donald G.	DI	DDP/FI
Ilyin, Boris	DP	DDP/SR
Ingersoll, Harold B.	IC	DDI/OCI
Israelson, Frederick G.	SC	DDS/OC

PERSONNEL
7 July 1956

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-106

Name	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Karamessines, Thomas H.	DI	DDP/FI
Kaylor, James S.	D	OFF/DDP
Knott, William M.	SS	DDS/OS
LaGueux, Conrad E.	DP	DDP/FE
Lexow, Wilton E.	IS	DDI/OSI
Linton, Paige K.	SC	DDS/OC
Marengo, Louis	IR	DDI/ORR
Martin, Carl N., Jr.	CC	DDI/OO/C
Mathews, Charles W.	IS	DDI/OSI
McCarthy, Emmet J.	DI	DDP/FI
McConnell, John W.	CC	DDI/OO/C
McCrea, Harry A.	CC	DDI/OO/C
Meixell, Harry	SL	DDS/OL
Meyer, Gerhard A.	DI	DDP/SR
Mitchell, Micheal G.	DI	DDP/FI
Pillsbury, Walter N.	DP	DDP/FE
Polgar, Thomas	DI	DDP/EE
Pollock, Ralph S.	SP	DDS/OP
Ranlet, Robert R.	PM	DDP/PP
Scherer, Louis C.	DP	DDP/WE
Schmidt, Ervin W.	SA	DDS/OS
Seely, Jay Steward	IR	DDI/ORR
Shallcross, Lawrence B.	ST	DDS/OT
Shattuck, William B.	ST	DDS/OT
Sheridan, Frank J.	CC	DDI/OO/C
Sherman, Katherine	DP	DDP/FE
Snow, Edgar	DI	DDP/SR
Stewart, David M.	C	DDI/OCR
Strickler, Gilbert E.	SL	DDS/OL
Stricklin, Robert A.	SP	DDS/OP
Stutler, Warner	SL	DDS/OL
Tenney, Calvin W.	DI	DDP/CI Staff
Toth, Alexander B.	C	DDI/OCR
Voigt, Frederick A.	IC	DDI/OCI
von Schrader, Atreus	SP	OFF/DDI
Winters, Eugene M.	SS	DDS/OS
Young, Austin H.	SL	DDS/OL

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

C. P. CABELL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

DISTRIBUTION: A, plus each member
of the Panel of Examiners

COPY S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice Expires 1 July 1956

N 20-190-86

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-86

PERSONNEL
6 October 1955

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENTS TO KEY POSITIONS

PANEL OF EXAMINERS OF THE CIA SELECTION BOARD

In accordance with R 20-105, the following persons are appointed, effective immediately, to serve as members of the Panel of Examiners for the period ending 30 June 1956:

Name	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Amshey, Joseph W.	DI	DDP/I&R
Blackburn, Bruce B.	SC	DDS/OC
Boberg, Roy H.	IR	DDI/OBI
Broe, William V.	DI	DDP/FE
Causey, Beverly	IC	DDI/OCI
Chapin, Frank M.	SA	OFF/DCI
Ciesielski, Stanley	OC	DDI/OO/C
Claxon, Charles W.	SP	DDS/OP
Clendenning, Thomas D.	SL	DDP/FE
Coffey, John W.	SC	DDS/OC
Coolidge, Francis	DP	DDP/NE
Corrick, Donald W.	SF	DDS/Compt
Councell, Clara	IS	DDI/OSI
Cunningham, Robert H.	SS	DDS/OS
Cushing, Benjamin H.	DI	DDP/EE
Davis, Walpole	DP	DDP/FE
Delaney, Carroll D.	OC	DDI/OO/C
Dickert, Betty	IR	DDI/ORR
Edwards, William O.	SC	DDS/OC
Eng, Ransom L.	IS	DDP/OSI
Fredsall, Genevieve E.	OC	DDI/OO/C
Galbraith, Willard	D	DDP/WH
Gardon, Don J.	DI	DDP/FI
Garland, Jerome M.	DT	DDP/TSS
Gauvreau, E. C.	SL	DDS/OL
Geiss, Ermal P.	SS	DDS/OS
Gibson, Frank E., Jr.	SM	DDS/Med
Godfrey, Francis E.	C	DDI/OCR
Gramann, Robert G.	SC	DDS/OC
Gries, Robert G.	IR	DDI/ORR
Grigg, Myron C.	SF	DDS/Compt
Harper, Lawrence M.	SC	DDS/OC
Henay, Carlyle F.	SS	DDS/OS
Hines, Samuel M.	D	DDP/PPC
Hubbard, Fred E.	DI	DDP/NE

S-E-C-R-E-T COPY

C O P Y

PERSONNEL
6 October 1955

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-86

Name	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Ilyin, Boris	DP	DDP/SR
Ingersoll, Harold B.	IC	DDI/OCI
James, Harrie A.	C	DDI/OCR
Karamessines, Tom H.	DI	DDP/FI
Kaylor, James S.	D	DDP/I&R
Klima, Waldemar M.	OB	DDI/OO/FBID
Kroegar, John W.	OD	DDI/OO/FDD
Linton, Paige K.	SC	DDS/OC
Mangeng, Frank H.	SF	DDS/Compt
Marolius, Donald C.	DI	DDP/WH
Meixell, Harry	SL	DDS/OL
Morrison, H. G. J.	SA	DDP/NE
Polgar, Thomas	DI	DDP/ES
Preston, Howard J.	SA	DDP/WH
Rady, George A., Jr.	DP	DDP/FE
Riordan, John B.	DP	DDP/CI
Roman, Howard E.	DI	DDP/EE
Ryan, Edward	DI	DDP/WE
Schultheis, Fred D.	DI	DDP/NE
Shaffer, Robert B.	ST	DDS/OT
Smith, Alan B.	IR	DDI/ORR
Smyser, David W.	DP	DDP/WH
Stevens, Lewis E.	ST	DDS/OT
Stricklin, Robert A.	SP	DDS/OP
Statler, Warner	SL	DDS/OL
von Schrader, Atreno	SP	OFF/DDI
Wallon, Victor	DI	DDI/CI
Willard, Edwin A.	DP	DDP/WE
Wilmers, John J.	C	DDI/OCR
Woodruff, Dean A.	DI	DDP/SS

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

L. K. WHITE
Deputy Director
(Support)

DISTRIBUTION: A, Plus each member of
the Panel of Examiners

C O P Y

SECRET
(When Filled In)

IN- AND OUT-CASUAL STATUS RECORD

1	NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) ERCE, William V.	OFFICE OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT (OR LAST ACTION) DDP/FE	TERM OF DESIGNATION CI
2	☐ IDENTIFY AS IN-CASUAL	DATE OF ARRIVAL U.S.	DATE OF ARRIVAL U.S.

CPD WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 2 AND 6 ON ANY EMPLOYEE WHO REPORTS FOR DEPARTMENTAL DUTY ACTION FROM A FOREIGN FIELD STATION ON PCS OR UPON RECEIPT OF AN AMENDED TRAVEL ORDER CHANGING SUBJECT'S DEPARTMENTAL DUTY STATUS FROM TDY TO PCS.

3	XX REMOVE FROM IN-CASUAL STATUS	DATE ACTION EFFECTED 19 June 1955

TPB WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 3 AND 6 WHENEVER THE FOLLOWING ARE EFFECTED:
- (A) PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO A DEPARTMENTAL POSITION.
- B. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO ANOTHER FOREIGN FIELD POSITION.
- C. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO A U.S. FIELD POSITION.
- D. SEPARATION ACTION INVOLVING AN IN-CASUAL.

4	☐ PLACE IN OUT-CASUAL STATUS	DATE ACTION EFFECTED

TPB WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 4 AND 6 WHENEVER THE FOLLOWING ARE EFFECTED:
- A. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO ANOTHER FOREIGN FIELD POSITION.
- B. PERSONNEL ACTION APPOINTING OR REASSIGNING AN EMPLOYEE TO A FOREIGN FIELD POSITION.

5	☐ REMOVE FROM OUT-CASUAL STATUS	DATE ACTION EFFECTED	DATE DEPARTED FROM U.S.

TPB AND/OR CPD WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 5, AND 6 WHENEVER THE FOLLOWING ARE EFFECTED:
- A. WHEN CPD HAS ESTABLISHED A DEFINITE DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES.
- B. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN OUT-CASUAL TO A U.S. FIELD STATION.
- C. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN OUT-CASUAL TO A DEPARTMENTAL POSITION.
- D. SEPARATION ACTION INVOLVING AN OUT-CASUAL.
- E. INFORMATION ACTION INVOLVING AN OUT-CASUAL.
- F. RECEIPT OF AMENDED TRAVEL ORDER CHANGING MOVEMENT TO PCS WHILE SUBJECT IS ON TDY IN FIELD.

REMARKS (ADDITIONAL DATA CONCERNING IN- AND OUT-CASUAL STATUS, IF APPLICABLE):

30 JUN 1955

6	THIS DATE 6-30-55	SIGNATURE S. WELLS	CHECK ONE ☐ CPD XXX TPB

DISTRIBUTION: ☐ (1) FOLDER COPY ☐ (2) [illegible] ☐ (3) FISCAL OR FINANCE DIVISION (AS APPROPRIATE)

FORM NO. 37-200
DEC 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. William V. BROE	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 August 1913	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 21 Apr. '55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP B. APPROVED: Chat. 19 June 1955	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops. Officer BFF 1627-15 (1629) GS-0136.01-15 $10,800 p/a	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	Area Ops. Officer(Br.Ch.) BF 161 GS-0136.01-15 $10,800 p/a
DDP/FE China Mission Office of Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 2, China Office of Chief
Yokosuka, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL "C" slot

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

W-4 Form attached. Please transfer subject from unvouchered to vouchered funds.

Field Fitness Report noted in PI, 5 April 1955.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): Henry P. GILBERT, Personnel Officer, FE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): Anna Paper, Extension 2185

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Approved: CS/CSP 6/1/55
Title: RG Ledford

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE	NONE X	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ I.A. ☐ REAL ☐ SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3715-55-167 TO: 5-3700-20	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Corrected per 6-16-55 1-22-55

[illegible] 6-20-55

new

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	6/20/55
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS: Aws.

F. APPROVED BY [illegible] by John J. Caldwell 6 June 1955

SECRET

10—57329-2

SECRET

William V. BROE

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA:

Firestone Tire and Rubber, Budget Mgr., Aug 39-May 41
General Motors, Auto Financing, May 41-Nov 41
FBI, Mar 42-May 48

AGENCY EXPERIENCE:

Ex. App't June 48, Ops Of, OSO, COPS, GS-12
Prom. Aug 50, GS-13, OSO FE Division
Reassignment Feb 51, OSO, FE, I.O. (Chief), GS-13, Manila
App't , Jul 51, Station Chief, Manila,
Prom., Oct 51, GS-14
Reassignment, June 53, Deputy Chief of Mission, Yokosuka
Prom. GS-15, Area Ops Officer, Yokosuka

SECRET

SECRET

CHANGE IN ALLOTMENT CODE

Date 29 June 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Finance Division

FROM : Far East Division

SUBJECT : Change in Allotment Code - Personal Services of

BROE, William V. (effective 1 July 1954)

OBJECT CLASS as appropriate

1. Request that cost of personal service for subject employee [illegible] be changed, effective the pay period beginning JUL [illegible]

From Allotment Number 3715-55-004

to Allotment Number 5-3715-55-167(Yokosuka)

C. F. [illegible]

C. F. [illegible]

FE Division Budget Officer

CONCUR:

FE/2

SECRET

AIR FJTA-4432

28 May 1954

To: Chief, FE

From: Senior Representative, NA

Administration/Personnel
Recommendation for Promotion - William V. BROE

1. It is requested that consideration be given the promotion of William V. BROE from GS-14 to GS-15. As Deputy Chief of a large, extremely complex mission, BROE carries a heavy responsibility. He has demonstrated excellent judgment, initiative, and executive ability. Subject is an outstanding career officer. He is devoted to his duty and is conscientious. Mr. BROE has a thorough knowledge of CIA problems, techniques and procedures and the ability to use this knowledge in logical and effective ways.

2. Favorable consideration is requested.

/s/ Senior Representative, NA

COURIER FJYA-6055

SECRET

5 April 1954

Senior Representative, North Asia

Chief, China Mission INFO: Chief, FE

Administrative/Personnel

William V. BROE - Recommendation for Promotion.

1. Subject is a superior senior CIA official whose maturity and experience are constantly reflected in his work.

2. He has performed his duties as Deputy Chief, FRU, and later as Deputy Chief, China Mission in an outstanding manner. It is believed that his performance would be equally good in any equivalent position within the DD/P complex.

3. Subject frequently is Acting Chief of Mission in Mr. Horton's absence and on many occasions acts on behalf of him in conferences with NA or elsewhere. His handling at all times is commendatory.

4. Since Mr. BROE is a GS-14 in a GS-16 position and since he has been in grade since 15 October 1951, an early promotion to GS-15 is recommended.

/s/ Chief of Mission

SECRET

Security Information

Date: Dec 26 1953

Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

1. In accordance with the policy of this agency, it is understood and agreed by me that I shall be required to serve a minimum term of two years from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, unless terminated by the Government for its convenience. If the assignment is terminated at my request in less than twenty-four months, the following shall prevail:

(a) If I resign in less than twelve months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses involved in the transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the foreign station, and pay all such expenses for return to the United States.

(b) If I resign between the twelfth and twenty-fourth month from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the United States.

2. Part (a) above shall not apply to employees who have served in a departmental position with CIA or who have served an overseas tour of duty with CIA, and in such case part (b) only shall apply, amended to read: "If I desire to terminate or return to the United States prior to the expiration of twenty-four months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the United States".

William V. Broe

Witness:

SECRET
Security Information

INDIVIDUAL CERTIFICATE SUSP 26 June 1953

DATE 25 June 1953

I Certify that attached order: Ltr C 6 - 128 8727th AAU

1. Will not be used to:

a. Provide basis for reimbursement or funds obligation of any kind.

b. Secure relief from or in connection with any civil obligation.

2. Will not knowingly be compromised by me in any way.

3. Will be used only for the purpose issued, as indicated below:

a. To obtain AGO Identification Card. XXXXX NO

b. To obtain State Department passport. XXXXX NO

c. To provide cover documentation when required enroute to destination indicated.

YES XXXNOXX

d. Other Uses (Specify) NONE OTHER THAN MIL AIRCRAFT OR MIL VEHICLE.******

4. It is understood that if unavoidable circumstances cause any use not authorized above, or other compromise of this order. I will notify CHIEF, Military Personnel Division, C I A, in writing of full extent and circumstances of such compromise by fastest practical means available to me.

WITNESSED:

D Muddiman

NAME WILLIAM V BROE RANK GS-14

SERIAL NUMBER

SIGNATURE William V. Broe

1st Ind

Central Processing Branch, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington 25, DC

TO: Military Personnel Division, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington 25, D. C.

Certificate returned to M P D for individual's 201 File.

FOR THE CHIEF, CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH:

INITIAL

MPD-5 18 May 1953 R

14-00000

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17 APR 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 10603

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP MANILA

ROUTINE

ACTION: FE 6

INFORMATION: FI/OPS, FI/ADMIN, DD/P-ADMIN, CFD 3, CPB, TDS 2, PDC 2
FI/RI 2

MANI 4484

TO: DIR

CITE: SMANI

ADMIN

RE: DIR 42182 (OUT 91080)

BROE, WILLIAM VINCENT

1. [redacted] SUBMITTED RESIGNATION ODACID 13 APRIL, EFFECTIVE ON OR ABOUT 10 MAY.

2. REQUEST APPROVAL FOLLOWING ITINERARY FOR SELF AND DEPENDENTS: DEPART MANI FOR HONG 14 MAY, HONG TO YOKO 19 MAY. TWO WEEKS TDY YOKO WITH CAREW AS HE PLANS DEPART YOKO 30 JUNE, PRIOR [redacted] RETURN YOKO. DEPART YOKO FOR STATES ON OR ABOUT 3 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

(44)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET
Security Information

TO : DD/P-ADMIN **DATE:** 20 March 1953

FROM : Chief, FE

SUBJECT: Assignment of William V. BROE

The assignment of William V. BROE as Deputy Chief of Mission, FRU/FEC, has been concurred in by the Chief of Mission, FRU/FEC, and the Senior Representative at Tokyo.

George E. Aurell
George E. Aurell
Chief, FE

Originator: Bernhard von Ammon

This is in line with field discussions at which I have been present and at which this assignment was explained to the S.R.

Lloyd George
Dep. S.R, NAC

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. z PKW-503

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station
Manila
FROM : Personnel

DATE: 8 October 1951

SUBJECT: GENERAL. Administrative
SPECIFIC. [redacted]

William V. Broe

1. This is to advise that your promotion from GS-13 at $7600 to a GS-14 at $8800, has been approved, effective 14 October 1951.

2. A dispatch from the Payroll Section will follow showing the new breakdown in salary.

COPY

R. B. J. Hopkins
R. B. J. HOPKINS
jlm

RBJH/th

W. LLOYD GEORGE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

R. B. J. Hopkins
R. B. J. HOPKINS jlm
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

Leave - M.R. 4-18-51

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

ROSTER NO. Checked P.R. 5-

NAME: BROE, William V~~[illegible]~~

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: COB 3 Feb 1951 ✓

NATURE OF ACTION: Resignation *

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE: William V. Broe

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Chief, (Intel. Off.) ~~[illegible]~~ GS-13	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-13 $7600.00 pa.	
OFFICE	OSO	
DIVISION	FDZ/SEA	
BRANCH AND SECTION	Branch 4	
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

Please transfer leave to unvouchered funds.

* To accept other employment.

$ 606

RECOMMENDED:

11 January 1951
(DATE)

Wm G. Flary
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE | SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION:

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
1480	1434	9-12-47

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.
		X	

DATE | SIGNATURE

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2115902

ALLOTMENT: 951-108

C. S. C. AUTHORITY:

DATE SIGNATURE: 5-18-51 | SIGNATURE: L.A. Gruin

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE | SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE | SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE | SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—62400-1

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED MR

ENTRANCE ON DUTY RECORD

TO: OSO/FDZ	BUILDING L	ROOM 1050
FROM: PERSONNEL OFFICER	DATE	EOD DATE 4 February 1951

NAME OF EMPLOYEE Froe, William V.

POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer	GRADE GS-13	SALARY $7600.00
PAYROLL Unvouchered	DUTY STATION Manila	
DATE SECURITY CLEARED Concurrence 24 Jan 1951	DATE OATH OF OFFICE ADMINISTERED 5 February 1951	
DATE PERMANENT IDENTIFICATION REQUESTED	DATE FINGERPRINTED	
DATE BRIEFED BY SECURITY	DATE OF PHYSICAL EXAMINATION	

DATE 24 MONTH AGREEMENT SIGNED 5 February 1951

EMPLOYEE'S EMERGENCY ADDRESS
Mrs. Jean B. Broe(Wife)
332 Labella Walk, Falls Church, Va.

EMPLOYEE'S LOCAL ADDRESS
Same

REMARKS:

Subject transferred from Vouchered Funds.

R87

POSTED

J. T. Sampson

SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER
H. C. CLINE ALE

FORM NO. 37-75
DEC 1949

RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

SECRET

SED   3 January 1951

Chief, FDZ

Transfer of Personnel

1. Request is made that Mr. William V. Broe be transferred from Slot #1, Branch IV, FDZ/SEA, to Slot #1, Manila Research Unit. Mr. Broe will replace Mr. Lynn Boyer who is now in Manila.

2. It is requested that Miss Carterette Cheetham, recently transferred to FDZ/SEA from Staff C, be placed in Slot #2, Manila Research Station, to replace Miss Roberta Meyer.

3. Request is made that Mr. John M. Hansell be transferred from Slot #2, Branch IV, FDZ/SEA, to Slot #3, Manila State Station. Mr. Hansell will occupy one of the new slots opened in compliance with FDZ's memorandum of 30 November 1950.

Lloyd George
Chief, FDZ

Originator: ______________________
Virginia Pryor

____
Harry W. Little, Jr.

SECRET

DEC 22 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ATTENTION: Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Subject : Request for Appointment in the Foreign Service as Attaché at Manila for Mr. William Vincent Broe

Enclosure: a. Biographical Sketch, William Vincent Broe

b. Forms DSP-34

1. It is requested that Mr. William Vincent Broe be appointed in the Foreign Service with the title of Attaché, FSS-3, $7,710.00, for duty in the American Embassy at Manila, Republic of the Philippines.

2. Mr. Broe received his B.A. Degree from Bowdoin College. He has had approximately two years and six months of experience as an intelligence officer in Government service. It is believed that he possesses the professional qualifications for the duties planned for him, and, in addition, has the representative qualifications expected of an American official serving abroad. Mr. Broe will receive from CIA a basic salary of $7,600.00 per annum.

3. Mr. Broe will replace Mr. Frank M. Chapin, for whom a request for clearance for return will be submitted at a later date.

4. There is transmitted herewith a biographical sketch on Mr. Broe which sets forth in detail pertinent information on him and on his special qualifications for the duties it is intended that he assume at Manila.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director

SECRET

SECRET

WILLIAM VINCENT BROE

PERSONAL DATA : Date of Birth - 24 August 1913
Place of Birth - Amesbury, Massachusetts
Citizenship - U.S.A., by birth
Legal Residence - 832 Labella Walk,
Falls Church, Virginia

PARENTAGE : Name of Father - John James Broe (Deceased)
Date of Birth - 21 May 1874
Place of Birth - Amesbury, Massachusetts
Citizenship - U.S.A., by birth

: Name of Mother - Agnes Bonython Broe
Date of Birth - 8 November 1884
Place of Birth - Boston, Massachusetts
Citizenship - U.S.A., by birth

MARITAL STATUS : Married

: Name of Wife - Joan Comer Broe
Date of Birth - 4 March 1920
Place of Birth - Winthrop, Massachusetts
Citizenship - U.S.A., by birth

: Name of Daughter - Bonnie Jean Broe
Date of Birth - 17 September 1945
Place of Birth - Youngstown, Ohio
Citizenship - U.S.A., by birth

: Name of Daughter - Susan Carruth Broe
Date of Birth - 28 December 1947
Place of Birth - Washington, D. C.
Citizenship - U.S.A., by birth

: Name of Daughter - Kristine Elizabeth Broe
Date of Birth - 11 April 1950
Place of Birth - Washington, D. C.
Citizenship - U.S.A., by birth

EDUCATION : 1931-1935 - Governor Dummer Academy, South Byfield, Massachusetts
1935-1939 - Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine (B.A. Degree)

OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE : August 1939-May 1941 - Budget Sales Manager, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Boston, Massachusetts
May 1941-November 1941 - Credit Manager, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Boston, Massachusetts
March 1942-May 1948 - Special Agent, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C.; Detroit, Michigan; Cleveland and Youngstown, Ohio

SECRET

SECRET

OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE : June 1948 to Present - Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C.

MILITARY DUTY : None

RESERVE STATUS : None

FOREIGN TRAVEL : None

FOREIGN LANGUAGES : None

SECRET

SECRET

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, I&S Staff

DATE: 19 December 1950

FROM: Employees Division

SUBJECT: **William V. Broe #35706**

1. This is to advise your office that the subject has been granted permission to file application for employment with the Department of State.

2. In the event an offer of employment is made to the subject, this office will interpose no objection to the release.

3. For the convenience of the Department of State, it is requested that the appropriate security certification be prepared and forwarded to the Department of State as soon as possible.

H. C. CLINKSCALE
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

SECRET

file

Date: 1 December 1950

TO : Chief, Inspection & Security

FROM : Chief, Communications, OSO

SUBJECT: Cryptographic Clearance

ATTENTION: George [illegible], Jr.

It is requested that cryptographic clearance be granted to William V. Broe if subject meets the requirements of the pertinent paragraphs of SR 380-160-10.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS

L. Wisner Ray
L. WISNER RAY

STD

SECRET

30 November 1950

TO: OVERSEAS DIVISION, PERSONNEL BRANCH

FROM: FDZ/SEA

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT

It is requested that the Overseas Division, Personnel Branch, take the necessary steps to obtain a Foreign Service appointment for the following employee:

a. Name Mr. William V. Broe

b. Station of Assignment Manila, P. R.

c. Foreign Service title requested Attache

d. Employee is a replacement for Mr. Frank M. Chapin.

who formerly had a Foreign Service title of Attache.

e. If not as a replacement, justification for additional title

____

____.

f. Availability date for departure __________________.

Signature

SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NUMBER 1377

NAME: BROE, William Vincent

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 6 Aug 50

NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)
LAST WORKING DAY:
EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

#2881

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Operations Officer (Intelligence Officer) ~~(Ops)~~ GS-12	Chief GS-13 (Intelligence Officer)
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12 $6800.00 per annum	GS-13 $7600.00 per annum
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDZ/~~[illegible]~~	FDZ/SEA
BRANCH AND SECTION	SEA-4 Branch 4	Branch 4
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS: 130

S-1
Employee EOD withCIA 21 June 1948 as P-5.

RECOMMENDED:

6 July 1950
DATE

Wm. G. [illegible]
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED: DATE TYPE

CLEARANCE APPROVED: DATE TYPE

DATE SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
1480	1834	9/12/47

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		✓	

DATE 7/21/50 SIGNATURE Ainsley J. Thoman

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2115902
ALLOTMENT: 951-108
CSC AUTHORITY: Sch A 6.116(A)

DATE 2 July 50 SIGNATURE R. A. Grim

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE SIGNATURE JE BRD

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE 26 July 50 SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE L. T. Shannon

DATE 22 July 50 SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF Robert [illegible]

FORM NO. 37-9
NOV 1949

SECRET

Date: 24 May 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COVERT PERSONNEL BRANCH:
VIA: ADSO

Subject: Promotion Request --

Name: William V. BROE
Title of Position: Branch Chief
Grade & Salary: GS-12 @ $6800 per annum
Place of Assignment: Wash. D.C.

It is requested that the above-named employee be promoted from the grade and salary above-indicated to: GS-13 @ $7600 per annum

[illegible]

(Originating Officer)

Dep. Ch. FDZ/SEA
(Title)

RECOMMEND APPROVAL:

ADSO

SECRET

Mr. Broe started in the FBI in 1941 as a Special Agent, dealing particularly with German and Russian matters. In 1944 he was promoted to Resident Agent at Youngstown, Ohio, where he handled all categories of Bureau work. Two years later he was selected to be a supervisor. He continued in this capacity, dealing chiefly with security matters, until he came to CIA in 1948. During his term as resident agent he was outstanding in the important and difficult task of winning local police cooperation.

Since he has been with CIA, Mr. Broe has shown exceptional operational understanding and ability. He has a very keen sense of responsibility and a fine devotion to detail as well as to the broad phases of his duties. As a Branch Chief he has been completely reliable and effective. It is planned that he will go to Manila in the spring of 1951, or perhaps earlier, to take over the important and delicate work of the Manila Research Unit.

SECRET

OSO

PROMOTION DATA SHEET

DATE: 24 May 1950

NAME: William V. BROE AGE: 36 OSO UNIT: FDZ/Branch IV

STATION and DUTIES: Staff, Branch Chief

DATE OF PRESENT GRADE: July 1946 - May 1948 FBI
June 1948 to present CIA

PRESENT GRADE: GS-12

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: #1 Br. 4 SEA/FDZ GS-13

PROPOSED GRADE: GS-13

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: Same

IF GRADE OF THE PROPOSED T/O SLOT IS NOT HIGH ENOUGH TO ALLOW FOR THE PROMOTION, DO YOU RECOMMEND DESK ADUIT TO DETERMINE WHETHER PROMOTION IS POSSIBLE:

MOST RECENT REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING and/or STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT: Excellent DATE: April 1950

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS:
Intelligence Officer, Opns.
Branch Chief

MANNER OF PERFORMANCE: Careful and conscientious in every respect.

SUMMARY OF EDUCATION AND QUALIFICATIONS:
A.B. Degree

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
None

RECOMMENDED BY:
Don S. Garden

PREVIOUS GRADES and DATES: In same grade with CIA since 21 June 1948.

CONCURRENCES:

- -

See attached sheet.

SECRET

SECRET

Seen 2/8

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SED
Attn: Harold Ballou
FROM : Chief, FDZ
SUBJECT: Personnel Changes

DATE: 27 January 1950

File

On your roster of FDZ personnel, please transfer:

Aubrey D. Hutcheson from Position #1, Branch 4, to Position #1, Branch 1.

William V. Broe from Position #3, Branch 4, to Position #1, Branch 4.

Lloyd George
Lloyd George
Chief, FDZ

Originator:
Don S. Garden
Don S. Garden
Deputy Chief, FDZ/SEA

no action
necessary
accomplished in P.C.
9 Feb 50 H.B.
Tweedie notified

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible]

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EXAMINATION AND/OR IMMUNIZATION

TO: Medical Division
Attention: Physical Requirements Officer

FROM:
Overseas Branch

NAME OF EMPLOYEE William V. Broe (S.I.)	**AGE**	**TYPE OF DUTY** TDY ☐ PCS ☒
DESTINATION Manila		**DATE BY WHICH IMMUNIZATION SHOULD BE COMPLETED** 15 January 1950

ROUTE AND METHOD OF TRAVEL
Air/Sea

TYPE OF EXAMINATION AND/OR IMMUNIZATION:

OVERSEAS ☒	RETURNEE ☐	ISSUE ROUTINE IMMUNIZATION RECORD ☒
NEW EMPLOYEE ☐	IMMUNIZATION ☒	ISSUE SPECIAL IMMUNIZATION RECORD (*Specify below*) ☐

EMPLOYEE'S DEPENDENTS TO BE IMMUNIZED:

NAME	AGE	NAME	AGE	NAME	AGE

REMARKS:

SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	**DATE** 1 December 1950

FORM NO. 37-72
NOV 1949

SECRET

10—61773-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

PERIODIC PAY INCREASE REPORT

TO Mr. Little	THIS DATE 23 December 1949

In order to determine whether the employee named below is eligible for a periodic pay increase it is necessary that his (or her) immediate supervisor execute the following "Conduct Report" and obtain the signature of the highest supervisor having knowledge of the employee's conduct.

CONDUCT REPORT

NAME OF EMPLOYEE William V. Broe	POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Operations Officer GS-12

☑ This employee's conduct has been satisfactory.

☐ This employee's conduct has been unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

Effective Date - 25 Dec 49
LSI - 21 June 48
Efficiency Rating - Excellent
Dated - 20 June 49
Conduct Report - Satisfactory
Dated - 23 Dec 49

#1818

SIGNATURE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	JAN 16 1950	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Harry W. Little	DATE 16 Jan 50

FORM NO. 37-108
OCT 1949

RETURN TO: PERSONNEL DIVISION
ATT: TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS BRANCH

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

NAME: [illegible], William [illegible]

NATURE OF ACTION: Intra-Agency Transfer ~~[illegible]~~

EFFECTIVE DATE: 3 April 1949

CLASSIFICATION — INITIAL: aj — DATE: 3/23/49

VICE	
IA	✓
VV	
NEW	

Ard # 1799
CSC # 1743
12/19/47 mm

QUALIFICATION & REVIEW ✓ — INITIAL: Hce — DATE: 3/23/49

959-108
Scha 45
Ray 3-31-49

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS
LAST WORKING DAY:

FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

APPROVED:

SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR)

SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE FOR A&M)

George E. Milom 3/23
SIGNATURE (CHIEF, PERSONNEL BRANCH)
Deputy Personnel Officer

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Operations Officer ~~[illegible]~~ P-5 (Intelligence Officer)	Operations Officer ~~[illegible]~~ P-5 (Intell. Officer)
GRADE AND SALARY	P-5, 6471.60 pa	P-5, 6471.60 pa.
OFFICE	OSO-COPS	OSO-COPS
BRANCH	FBZ	FBZ-[illegible]
DIVISION	Division 1	Division 4
SECTION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
DEPT. OR FIELD	Departmental	Departmental -130-

REMARKS:

RECOMMENDED: OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF, OR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
E. M. Tewell

DATE: 22 March 1949

FORM NO. 37-3
OCT 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

(1014)

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

~~CIA~~ 301
Broe, W. V.
3370

July 9, 1948

Mr. William J. Kelly
Chief, Personnel Branch
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, Northwest
Washington 25, D. C.

7/14 OK

Dear Mr. Kelly:

In accordance with your request dated June 21, 1948, there are transmitted herewith the Official Personnel Folder and Leave Record Card, Standard Form #1137, of Mr. William V. Broe, a former employee of this Bureau whose resignation was effective at the close of business May 14, 1948.

Sincerely yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
STAMPS

Enclosures
REGISTERED MAIL

497636

SECRET

ASSIGNMENT DESCRIPTION FORM

(This form fully completed (see note * at bottom of sheet) in duplicate must accompany request for admission of student to Assessment or Training Classes)

Request for:
(a) Assessment ______
(b) Training X

Student's name in full: William Vincent Broe

Cover name if necessary: ---

Date: 28 June 1948

Age 35 Sex Male Marital Status: Married Branch: FBZ Desk: Undetermined

Specific station to which candidate is going: Washington staff. Area interest will be specified prior to 23 August 1948

For consultation call:

Training Liaison Officer	Phone Extension	Bldg	Room No.
Don S. Gardon	2546	Que	2111
Desk Officer Supervising Candidate	Phone Extension	Bldg	Room No.

Has Security Check been completed? Yes

Type of Cover: Govt. Official
(Military; Govt. Official; Professional; Business; etc.)

Title of projected assignment: (a) Intell. Officer (Ops) (b) CE interests

Civil Service classification and salary level of projected position: P-5 ($ 6144.60)

What will be the specific duties of the candidate? (a detailed and concrete description is essential, a general job title is *not* satisfactory):

Subject will be an Intell. Officer (Operations) specialising in CE matters. The specific area in SEA to which he will be assigned will be determined prior to the start of the new class. Until then, it is requested that he be given instruction in general Southeast Asia matters.

What are the promotional opportunities in the *projected* position? ----

What will be the administrative or supervisory *responsibilities* of the candidate? (If none, write "none") Those incident to a staff member who, under his division chief, will have charge of counter-intelligence operations.

Will the candidate work alone or with other people? With others

If the latter, how many and what will be the candidate's actual working relationship to them (e.g., closely cooperative or relatively *independent*)? closely cooperative

Will the candidate be working directly under a supervising officer? Yes

If not, how will his work be directed and reviewed?

What will be the living and working conditions under which the candidate is expected to operate?

---

* For reasons of security, details such as student's true name or specific mission may be omitted in the case of undercover personnel, if so desired by the Desk.

Form 51-1
Sep 1946

SECRET
(over)

What special qualifications do you wish the candidate tested for? ----

What period and type of training is considered necessary for the candidate before placement in the field? **Complete CIA administrative, basic and advanced intelligence courses. No photography or cryptography necessary at this time.**

What special skills or knowledge related to the job does the candidate possess? (Include statement of any previous experience in intelligence work) **FBI - Mar. 30, 1942 - May 14 1948**

Indicate knowledge of foreign languages: ("Slight", "Fair", "Good")

	Read	Speak	Write
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			

Previous background in intelligence work; **Executive and supervision of investigations of a criminal and security nature.**

Foreign residence and foreign education **None**

Occupational history: (only job description and dates)

Entered in Admin. Course #15 - 19-23 July
Will be entered in first available Intelligence Course (August)

B. E.

CONFIDENTIAL

Date 24 June 1948

EOD MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

SUBJECT: **BROE, William Vincent**

1. Subject entered on duty with OSO for assignment as Intelligence Officer FBZ on 21 June 1948. Subject's duty station is Washington, D. C.; salary P-5 $6144.60 base per annum on the Vouchered Funds payroll.

2. Subject was administered an oath of office, request was made for permanent identification, fingerprints were taken, and subject was briefed by Security Office on 21 June 1948. Security was ~~cleared~~ provisionally cleared 16 June 1948. Subject was given a physical examination on 21 June 1948. Subject signed a 12-month overseas agreement on not applicable.

3. Subject's emergency address is:
Mrs. William V. Broe (wife)
2116 Dexter Avenue
Silver Spring, Maryland SHepherd 2825
Subject's local address is:
Same as above address.

Shirley Peterson
for

CC:FBZ

sep

POSTED
OSE 6/25/48

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

CONFIDENTIAL

NAME: William ~~Vincent~~ Broe

NATURE OF ACTION: Elected Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 21 June 1948

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS
LAST WORKING DAY:

FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

CLASSIFICATION INITIAL DATE 6-14-48

VICE ☐
IA ☑
VV ☐
NEW ☐

Bu # 1799
CSC # 1743
12-19-47

QUALIFICATION & REVIEW INITIAL DATE 6-14-48

3185-900
908-101
Sch A-45
Bpm 6-15

APPROVED:

SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR)

SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE FOR A&M)

Jerome [illegible] 14 Jun 48
(ACTING) CHIEF, PERSONNEL BRANCH

	FROM	TO
TITLE		operations officer ~~(Intelligence Officer)~~ P-5
GRADE AND SALARY		P-5 ~~$5905.20~~ 6144.60
OFFICE		OSO - COPS
BRANCH		FBZ
DIVISION		Div. 1 ~~(Afganistan, India & Burma)~~
SECTION		
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
DEPT. or FIELD		Deptl. 13c

REMARKS: Previously employed in the FBI at $6144.60 p.a. Searched 109

Attached are two Form 57's; one Form 57 and one Personal History Statement on file in OSO.
Security investigation has been initiated.
Position #42, Control #932.

Sec. req. 6/10

CONFIDENTIAL

Please process action so that he may e.o.d. on 14 June 1948, if security clearance is given.
E. M. Jewell

RECOMMENDED: OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF, OR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
E. M. Jewell

DATE 4 June 1948

FORM NO. 37-3
OCT 1946

(1514)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

DJ

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Personnel Branch

DATE: 17 June 1948

FROM : Acting Deputy for Security

SUBJECT: BROE, William Vincent

This is to advise that this office concurs with the immediate appointment of the Subject to duties giving him access to classified information.

FOR THE EXECUTIVE FOR INSPECTION AND SECURITY:

R. L. Bannerman

R. L. BANNERMAN
Acting Deputy for Security

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CPD

DATE: June 16, 1948

FROM : CSB

SUBJECT: WILLIAM VINCENT BROE

Reference your memorandum of June 8, Subject as above, requesting security approval on the above named Subject, pending full clearance.

Please be advised that based upon existing records available to the Security Branch, S.O., provisional security is hereby approved, and a full investigation will be instituted immediately.

Robert H. Cunningham
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM
Chief, Security Branch, S.O.

cc: CPD/AM

14-00000

10 June 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, INVESTIGATION DIVISION

SUBJECT: Request for Security Clearance for

Mr. William V. Broe
Intelligence Officer
P-5 $6144.60
OSO - SOFB
FBZ

1. It is requested that the security investigation be initiated on the above named person, who is being considered for a position with the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. Attached hereto are the required copies of the personal History Statement.

3. Please notify this office in writing upon completion of the security investigation.

4. Per Clinkscale, security investigation had been initiated in OSO.

GH

WILLIAM J. KELLY

Chief, Personnel Branch

Attachments **None**

Form No. 37-104
Dec 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADSO

FROM : Chief, Personnel Division, OSO

SUBJECT: William Vincent Broe

Subject is currently being processed for the position of Intelligence Officer, P-5, in FBZ and it is desired that he report for duty on 14 June 1948.

In view of subject's employment with the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1942 to 14 May 1948, it is requested that based upon a review of his FBI file he be approved for employment pending full clearance. When subject reports for duty he will be working on classified material.

E. M. TERRELL

6/14/48
Security, SO, approves above request & will institute full investigation immediately.
(s) J. Burk
Sec. OSO

#00 686

6-15-48
Approved
/s/ Walter C. Ford
Exec. Dir.

CONFIDENTIAL

Required to OSO Security
June 16, 1948
E.M.T.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

4 June 1948

TO: Procurement and Placement Division
CIO Personnel Branch
Room 192 North Building
Attention: Mr. Mulcahy

FROM: OSO Personnel Division

SUBJECT: **BROZ, William Vincent**

Please forward the complete applicant file on **BROE, William Vincent**, who is being processed for a position in this office on unvouchered funds against control number 932.

When the action is completed, you will be notified in order that the control number can be cancelled.

CIO-CPB advised no record of Subject

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

4 June 1948

TO : CPD

VIA: ____________

Name of Candidate William V. Broe

Position Considered for I. O. Office FBZ Interviewer

Personal appearance	Dignified.......		Natural...	✓	Awkward......	
	Well-groomed....		Clean.....	✓	Slovenly.....	
	Wide-Awake......	✓	Stolid....		Apethetic....	
	Impressive......		Ordinary..	✓	Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive......		Responsive	✓	Taciturn.....	
	Imperturbable...		Steady....	✓	Excitable....	
	Cheerful........		Tranquil..	✓	Dejected.....	
	Straight-forward		Reserved..	✓	Evasive......	
	Modest..........	✓	Complacent		Conceited....	
	Dominant........		Confident.	✓	Submissive...	

Is education adequate? Yes (✓) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes( )No(✓)

Area Knowledge none

Previous intelligence or related experience FBI - 6-7 yrs

Salary level requested $ P-5 Lowest salary acceptable $ P-5

- -

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ____________

✓2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: background, experience, motivation

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: I O Branch FBZ Division SEA

Location: Wash.

Salary level: P-5

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: ____________

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

file

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 4 June 1948

TO: Security Division

FROM: OSO, Personnel Division

SUBJECT: **William Vincent Bro**
(Name)

Attached hereto are Personal History Statements in duplicate submitted by subject in applications for a position with **FBZ - Intelligence Officer, P-8 Washington**

Will you please expedite all possible and notify this office of the results.

If at all possible, would like to obtain approval for his entrance on duty on or about June 14.

Atch - 2 PHS

Chloie D. Hudson for
S. M. TERRELL

CONFIDENTIAL

((435)

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

3 June 1948

TO : CPD

RE: ____________________

Name of Candidate BROE, Wm. V.

Position Considered for P-5 Office FB2 Interviewer Terrell

Personal appearance	Dignified.......		Natural...	✓	Awkward......	
	Well-groomed....		Clean.....	✓	Slovenly.....	
	Wide-Awake......	✓	Stolid....		Apathetic....	
	Impressive......	✓	Ordinary..		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive......		Responsive	✓	Taciturn.....	
	Imperturbable...		Steady....	✓	Excitable....	
	Cheerful........	✓	Tranquil..		Dejected.....	
	Straight-forward	✓	Reserved..		Evasive......	
	Modest..........		Complacent		Conceited....	
	Dominant........		Confident.	✓	Submissive...	

Is education adequate? Yes (✓) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes( )No( )

Area Knowledge ____________________

Previous intelligence or related experience FBI - Special Agent

Salary level requested $______ Lowest salary acceptable $ ~~590~~ 5905.20

- -

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ____________________

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: Past experience, personality, interest in our work.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: ____________ Branch ____________ Division ____________

Location: Wash., Dept. — for 18 months to 2 years, then overseas

Salary level: 06144.60

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: ____________________

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

E. M. Terrell

Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3 June 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: William V. Broe

1. After discussion with the Chief, FBZ, the undersigned talked with subject today and informed him of the following:

a. The position which we had to offer was at P-5. Promotion above that classification would come only after experience in the field, and no guarantee could be made of higher rating even after such experience had been gained by subject.

b. The assignment which we offered him would be in Washington for eighteen months, or perhaps for as long as two years; then probably assignment to a field station.

c. Due to his past employment with the FBI, we would attempt to obtain approval for his entrance on duty on or about June 14.

2. Subject stated that the above was acceptable to him and that he accepted our offer of P-5 position. The undersigned informed Chief, FBZ, of this fact. Processing is being initiated immediately.

E. M. Terrell

E. M. TERRELL
Chief, Personnel Division, OSO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

21 May - 1948

TO : CPD

VIA: OSO - P

Name of Candidate BROE, Wm V

Position Considered for - FBR - Office ______ Interviewer ______

Personal appearance	Dignified.......	✓	Natural...	✓	Awkward......	
	Well-groomed....	✓	Clean.....	✓	Slovenly.....	
	Wide-Awake......	✓	Stolid....		Apathetic....	
	Impressive......	✓	Ordinary..		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive......		Responsive	✓	Taciturn.....	
	Imperturbable...		Steady....	✓	Excitable....	
	Cheerful........	✓	Tranquil..		Dejected.....	
	Straight-forward	✓	Reserved..		Evasive......	
	Modest..........		Complacent		Conceited....	
	Dominant........		Confident.	✓	Submissive...	

Is education adequate? Yes (✓) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes( )No(✓)

Area Knowledge —

Previous intelligence or related experience FBI - 6 yrs - Investigator + Special Agent (resigned)

Salary level requested $______ Lowest salary acceptable $ CAF-12, ingrade

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ______

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: Personality - experience -

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: Jo - Opers Branch ______ Division ______

Location: Wash

Salary level: CAF-12

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: FBS - FBZ -

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

French - poor -
To go to N. Bldg - Flynn
Recommended by [illegible] + Muller.- ([illegible])

Maurice L. Goodell
Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

1/6/42

TO: CPD

VIA: ______________________

Name of Candidate William Broe

Position Considered for FBZ Office NEA Interviewer Valliere

Personal appearance	Dignified.......	☐	Natural...	☑	Awkward......	☐
	Well-groomed....	☑	Clean.....	☐	Slovenly.....	☐
	Wide-Awake......	☑	Stolid....	☐	Apathetic....	☐
	Impressive......	☑	Ordinary..	☐	Insignificant	☐
Personality	Persuasive......	☐	Responsive	☑	Taciturn.....	☐
	Imperturbable...	☐	Steady....	☑	Excitable....	☐
	Cheerful........	☐	Tranquil..	☑	Dejected.....	☐
	Straight-forward	☑	Reserved..	☐	nsive......	☐
	Modest..........	☐	Complacent	☑	Conceited....	☐
	Dominant........	☐	Confident.	☑	Submissive...	☐

Is education adequate? Yes(✓) No( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes( ) No(✓)

Area knowledge None - for China

Previous intelligence or related experience 6 years investigator with the Bureau of Investigation

Salary level requested $ CAF 12 Lowest Salary Acceptable $ CAF 12 (P.5)

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ______

✓ 2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: Excellent [illegible]

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: Intell. Officer Branch FBZ Division NEA

Location: Shanghai (ESD-44) in placement for State -

Salary Level: CAF-12

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: ______

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

C.H. Valliere

Signature of Interviewer

Subject has family and does not particularly desire to go to an area where family cannot have adequate living quarters, etc.

Would prefer remain in D.C. for one or two years.

Has no area background or experience — however I feel his investigative experience would adequately compensate for this.

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET
When Filled

BIOGR'

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 21 May 1973

FILE NO.: 943

TO: (Check)

- x CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- x CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) IG

SS NUMBER: 032-01-8164

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 056735

ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: Chief Administrative Officer

REF: Retirement (Abs)

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: BROE, William V.

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TOY ______ OTHER (Specify)

SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HB 240-2-a)

SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HB 240-2-)

EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER, UNBLOCK RECORDS

x EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD

x SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

x SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)

NA EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

x RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

NA SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

Social Security Number

030-01-8164

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY:

Subject will be acknowledged as CIA for entire period of employment and is not to reveal specific places or locations of cover assignments.

FORWARDING ADDRESS:
4317 Saul Road
Kensington, Md 20707

EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS:
None

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD OP CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SR&CD
COPY 4 - OL/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

JJ:88

James

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1-73 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 4 JUNE 1969

FILE NUMBER: 943

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 156735

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- ☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: FORM: 1322 DATED: 26 MAY 1969

OFFICIAL COVER:
- ☐ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
- ☒ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: BROE, WILLIAM V.

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS *(OPM 20-800-11)*	X	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS *(OPM 20-800-11)*
	A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF COB		DATE XXXXXXXX 1 JUNE 1969
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*	NA	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*
	ASCERTAIN THAT ______ W-2 BEING ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*	NA	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR-240-2e)*		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR-240-2e)*		
	SUBMIT FORM 2088 ☒ FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

COVER HISTORY:
JUN 48 - FEB 51 HQ/OVERT
FEB 51 - MAY 53 PHILIPPINES/STATE
MAY 53 - MAY 61 HQ/OVERT
MAY 61 - JUN 65 TOKYO/STATE
JUN 65 - PRESENT HQ/STATE

DISTRIBUTION. COPY 1 - RCD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - CCS - CHRONO
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

RF/gj

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 8-68 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET

19 May 59.
(Date)

File: 943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : William V. BROE

1. Cover arrangements ~~in process~~ have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly reopened to acknowledge Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. Operating component must take necessary action to reopen telephone locator by submitting the Personnel Information Card, "Office File Copy," Form No. 642, to Machine Records Division, Office of the Comptroller, Room 107 Curie Hall, Attention: Miss Wenkenbach.

4. This memorandum confirms an oral request of 19 May 59 by Mr. E. C. Davies, Room 1608, "L" Building, Extension 2420.

Paul P. Stewart
for HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS
Operating Division

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

(4-13-40)

SECRET

25 March 1959
(Date)

File: 943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : **William V. BROE**

1. Cover arrangements xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 30 March 1959, it is requested that your records be properly blocked xxxxxxx to deny xxxxxxxxxx Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. Operating component must take necessary action to block xxxxxx telephone locator by submitting the Personnel Information Card, "Office File Copy," Form No. 642, to Machine Records Division, Office of the Comptroller, Room 107 Curie Hall, Attention: Miss Wenkenbach.

4. This memorandum confirms an oral request of 25 Mar 59 by Mr. E. C. Davies, Room 1608 "L" Building, Extension 2420.

Paul P. Stewart
HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS
Operating Division

THIS MEMO [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] OF FILE

SECRET

FORM 1-58 1580 (4-13-40)

27

SECRET

20 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Personnel Security Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : Mr. William V. Broe

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject. Subject returned from TDY on 12 June 1957.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly re-opened to acknowledge subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

Edward J. Boston
JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

CC: PSD/OS

noted
wR - PCJ

SECRET

SECRET

8 April 1957
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records & Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Personnel Security Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : Mr. William V. BROE

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject. for TDY trip to FE area.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly (blocked) (XXXXXXXXX) to (deny) XXXXXXXXXXXX subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

T.A.S.

JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

CC: PSD/CS

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EBG: 18 JUN 73

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056735
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BROE WILLIAM V
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA 23 YR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3212 0010 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DCI INSPECTOR GENERAL
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INSPECTOR GENERAL
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0018
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): SENIOR EXECUTIVE PAY SCALE
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0000.23
16. GRADE AND STEP: LEVEL V
17. SALARY OR RATE: 36000
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 08 DA 24 YR 13
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 5 NONE — CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0BJ0000
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE — MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE — 0 NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP — CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE — 0 WAIVED, 1 YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE — 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPT — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
AUG 6 1973

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 11-71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

LML

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

OD/Pers

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BROE WILLIAM V	056735	51 050	V	GS 18 1	$36,000

14-00000

F57

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CS [illegible]/31/7[illegible]

1 SERIAL NUMBER 056733	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BROE WILLIAM V		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DELEGATION OF H.S.C.A.	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 06 DA 01 YR 7[illegible]	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 3212 0310 0001	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DCI/INSPEC GEN.	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WAS[illegible] D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE INSPECTOR GENERAL	12 POSITION NUMBER 00[illegible]8	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) EP	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0000.23	16 GRADE AND STEP 05	17. SALARY OR RATE
18 REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE
20. Employ Code
21 - OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE
23 INTEGREE CODE
24 Hdqtrs Code
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE / CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 Correction / Cancellation Data: CODE / MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE / 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP / CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE / 0 WAIVER 1 YES / HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE / 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE / 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE / 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) / 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

wds 10-26-72

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition
Mfg. 10-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

BS: 31 JAN 72

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 056735	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BROE WILLIAM V

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND PAY ADJUSTMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 01 72	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 2212 0010 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DCI INSPECTOR GENERAL	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE INSPECTOR GENERAL	12 POSITION NUMBER 0018	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) SENIOR EXECUTIVE PAY SCALE	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0000.23	16 GRADE AND STEP LEVEL V	17 SALARY OR RATE 36000

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 28	20 Employee Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 04025	ALPHABETIC IG	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Marital Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 08 24 13	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 02 01 72	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 02 01 72

EOD DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

GS TO EP

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 6-73 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

0/10 Pers

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BROE WILLIAM V	056735	51 050	V	GS 18 1	$36,000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BSJ: 1 JUN 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 056735	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BROE WILLIAM V		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 31 70	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No Chargeable 0235 0620 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER DIV CH	12 POSITION NUMBER 0001	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 18 1	17 SALARY OR RATE 35505
18 REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
16	10	51050	WH	75013		1	08 24 13		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 1 NONE 2 5 PT 3 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RES / TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE CODE A WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO		
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06-02-70

FORM 3-66 1150 Use Previous Edition
Mfg 10-67

SECRET

BSJ

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BBG: 28 MAY 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056735	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BROE WILLIAM V		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR COB 05 30 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 0135 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER DIV CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0001	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 35505

18. REMARKS
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hours Class	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
56	10	51050	WH	75013		1	03 24 13		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction, Cancellation Data TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RES. TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05-28-70

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BSJ

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-20)

DB

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BROE WILLIAM V	056735	51 050 CF	GS 18 1	$35,505

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BROE WILLIAM V	056735	51 050 CF	GS 18 1	$33,495

326

1 Serial No.	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
056735	BROE, WILLIAM V.	51 050 CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
S-18	1	$28,000		GS-18	1	$30,239	02-23-69			X

8 Remarks and Authentication

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SUPPLEMENT, TO THE BUDGET FOR 1970, ON EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SALARY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED 15 JANUARY 1969 AS AUTHORIZED BY PL 90-206, THE FEDERAL SALARY ACT OF 1967."

E. S. WATTLES

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Mfg 3-65 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

je

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BROE WILLIAM V	056735	51 050	CF	GS 18 1	$27,055	$28,000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BROE WILLIAM V	056735	51 050	CF	GS 18 1	$25,890	$27,055

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BROE WILLIAM V	056735	51 050	CF	GS 18 1	$25,382	$25,890

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BROE WILLIAM V	056735	51 050	CF	GS 18 1	$24,500	$25,382

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

21 AUG 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056735	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BROE WILLIAM V

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR) 08 29 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		6135 0620 0000	SECTION 203 P.L. 88-643

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE 1ST SEC POL OFF OPS OFFICER DIV CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0001	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 02 6 18 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 21470 24500

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY MEMORANDUM FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	3050 WH	75013	1	1	08 24 13	05 09 65	05 09 65

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
		2					

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 WAIVER, 1 YES); HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9-9.65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

NJM: 2 JULY 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056735	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BROE WILLIAM V

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 02 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6135 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF			

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE 1ST SEC POL OFF OPS OFFICER DIV CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0001	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 02 6 18 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 21470 24500

18. REMARKS
TOKYO, JAPAN

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Mo.drs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	51050	WH	75013	1	1	08 24 13		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. RETIREMENT DATA	30. RETIREMENT DATA 5 - FICA 6 - NONE	31. SEPARATION DATA	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

POSTED
7-6-65 AH

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM FE
2

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 06/16/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 056735	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BROE WILLIAM V		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION SERIES CODE ADJUSTMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 06 DA 07 YR 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐	V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☒	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5137 1566 0000
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY			
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE DIVISION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO, JAPAN		
11 POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF STATION	12 POSITION NUMBER 3002	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0130.05	16 GRADE AND STEP 18	17 SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
wn 6-21-65

Form 1150B 1-63 MFG. 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZR: 5 MAY 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056735	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BROE WILLIAM V

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 05 09 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5137 1566 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 3002	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 18 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 24500

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 45380	ALPHABETIC FE	22. STATION CODE 37587	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 08 24 13	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) 05 09 65

27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR) 05 09 65

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | FOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SFX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR) | 37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE:
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05/13/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

12

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
056735	BROE WILLIAM V	45 380 CF 9F	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 17	3	22,945 ~~$[illegible]~~	10/13/63	GS 17	4	23,695 ~~$[illegible]~~	10/11/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP 03
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 742
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY Edd

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE:

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9.61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,420	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
056738	BROE WILLIAM V	56 380 CF 11	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 17	2	$18,500	10/14/62	GS 17	3	$19,000	10/13/63			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 3 742
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY AC 10/29

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE. EJ 10/9/63

MT 10/1-/63

SIGNATURE: DATE 17 Sept 63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
056735	BROE WILLIAM V	56 380 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-17	1	$18,000	07/23/61	GS-17	2	$18,500	10/1 /62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT EN OF WAITING PERIO
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 3
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY 742

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE. 11/1/62

SIGNATURE: DATE: 2 Nov 62

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 . SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
BROE WILLIAM V	056735	56380	CF	17 1	$16530	17 1	$18000

742

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
156735	BROE WILLIAM V	DDP/FE 11 V-20	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 16	2	$15,515	01/24/60	16	3	$15,775	07/23/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.R.ECHOLS

WK 9/29/61

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(6-51)

ARE: 21 JULY 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056735
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BROE WILLIAM V.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 07 23 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V; V TO CF; CF TO V; X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2137 7351 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP FE
FE/JAO TOKYO STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN
11. POSITION TITLE:
1ST SEC POL OFF
CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 3002
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.):
FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP:
02 0
17 1
17. SALARY OR RATE:
15255
16530
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Region Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	56380	FE	37587	1	3	08 24 13	07 23 61	07 23 61

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC; 2 - FICA; 3 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA. YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT; 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA. YR
38. MIL SERV CREDIT: 1 - YES; 2 - NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; CODE; 0 - WAIVER; 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES; 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES; 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
03/02/61 JK

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

K 7/31/61

SECRET

(4-61)

BWS: 8 MAY 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056735
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BROE WILLIAM V
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION - DEPT. OF STATE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 04 DA. 27 YR. 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☒ | CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1137 7351 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP FE
FE/JAO - TOKYO STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN
11. POSITION TITLE:
1ST SEC POL OFF
CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 3002
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		02 0	15255
GS	0136.01	16 2	15515

18. REMARKS
ALL SICK AND 118 HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPT. OF STATE.
SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $15515 AND FSR SALARY OF $15255 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs. Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA	YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA	YR.
55	10	56380	FE	37587	1	3	08	24	13						

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSR 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR
37 LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR
38 MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05/10/61 WK

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-01)

5/8/61

ARE: 14 APRIL 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056735
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BROE WILLIAM V
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 04 DA. 16 YR. 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1137 7351 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP FE
FE/JAO TOKYO STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN
11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 3002
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 15515
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR
20	10	56380	FE	37537		3	08 24 13		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA. YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR.	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05/05/61 WK

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-61)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	BROE WILLIAM V	156735	51 12	GS-16 2	$14,430	$15,515

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
156735	BROE WILLIAM V	DDP/FE	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 16	1	$14,190	07	27	58	GS 16	2	$14,430	01	24	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 5 AUG 1959

1. Serial No. 156735	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) BROE WILLIAM V	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 08 Da. 24 Yr. 13	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 0	5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 06 Da. 21 Yr. 48
7. SCD Mo. 05 Da. 05 Yr. 42	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 06 Da. 21 Yr. 48	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 5112	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept.-Field Dept.-2 USfld-4 Frgn.-6 Code 2	17. Position Title AREA OPS OFF D DIV CH	18. Position No. 0002	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01
21. Grade & Step 16 1	22. Salary Or Rate $14,190	23. SD D1	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 27 Yr. 58	25. PSI Due Mo. 01 Da. 24 Yr. 60	26. Appropriation Number 9 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action CONVERSION TO PERMANENT SUPERGRADE RANK*	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. 08 Da. 05 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP FE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 5112	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept.-Field Dept.-2 USfld-4 Frgn.-6 Code 2	34. Position Title AREA OPS OFF D DIV CH	35. Position No. 0002	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01
38. Grade & Step 16 1	39. Salary Or Rate $14,190	40. SD D1	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 27 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 01 Da. 24 Yr. 60	43. Appropriation Number 0237 1000 1000

44. Remarks

*THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON 5 AUGUST 1959 APPROVED YOUR PERMANENT GRADE AS GS-16.

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BROE WILLIAM V	156735	GS-15-3	$12,150	$13,370

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VL 22 JULY 58

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
156735	BROE WILLIAM V	08	24	13		0	M	1	06	21	48

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Intl. Serv. Grant. Ldp Yes-1 No-2	Code
05	05	42		1	50 USCA 403						06	21	48		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		WASH., D.C.	

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	AREA OPS OFF D DIV CH	0002	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 3	$13,370	01							8 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION-TEMPORARY*	30	07	27	58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5112	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	AREA OPS OFF D DIV CH	0002	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
16 1	$14,190	01	07	27	58	01	24	60	9 3700 20

44. Remarks

*PROMOTION TO THE GRADE INDICATED IS TEMPORARY AND FOR SUCH DURATION AS THE DIRECTOR WILL DETERMINE. YOUR PERMANENT GRADE IS THE GRADE FROM WHICH YOU ARE TEMPORARILY PROMOTED.

POSTED
5 AUG 1958 B

FORM NO 1 MAR 57 1150

[illegible] 8/4/58

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

LVL

1. Serial No. 156735	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) BROE WILLIAM V	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 08 Da. 24 Yr. 13	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 0	5. Sex M 1
6. CS-EOD Mo. 06 Da. 21 Yr. 48	7. SCD Mo. 05 Da. 05 Yr. 42	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 06 Da. 21 Yr. 48	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code 2		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FE BRANCH 2 CHINA OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code
16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6 Code 2	17. Position Title AREA OPS OFF BR CH	18. Position No. 0161	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.01	21. Grade & Step 15 3	22. Salary Or Rate $12,150	23. SD DI
24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number 8 3700 20	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo. 01 Da. 08 Yr. 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP FE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 5112	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6 Code 2	34. Position Title AREA OPS OFF D DIV CH	35. Position No. 0002	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.01	38. Grade & Step 15 3	39. Salary Or Rate $12,150	40. SD DI
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 08 Da. 01 Yr. 54	42. PSI Due Mo. 01 Da. 25 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 8 3700 20	

44. Remarks

POSTED
10 Jan 58
em

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME					3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.		4. FUNDS		5. ALLOTMENT
156735	BROE WILLIAM V					DDP/FE		V-20		

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
15	2	$11,880	01	29	56	15	3	$12,150	07	28	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
	5 Jun 1957	

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. ~~Miss~~ ~~Mrs.~~ One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. William Vincent BROE 155735
2. DATE OF BIRTH:
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 2 May 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: MAY 20 1956

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER			Area Ops Officer BF 161
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY			GS-0136.01-15 $11,880.00
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Branch 2 - China		DDP/FE Branch 2 Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS			Washington, D.C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL SD:D

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

T/O CHANGE.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Henry P. Gilbert, FE/PT Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Robert J. Sayes, x2957 pch

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	S-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
(					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.

SD:DI AK

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM
TO
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES, NO): 1, >
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

POSTED 14 MAY 1956

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

USED IN LIEU OF SF50 NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	WEA	11 MAY	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	7263		
E.			

E. APPROVED BY

per John J Caldwell 10 May 56
(7263)

10—57329-3

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-O-300090

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Payroll period.

3. Block No. 6-3700-20

4. Slip No. 1

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
BROE, William Vincent

6. Grade and salary
GS-15 $11,610.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
FB 6

12. Prepared by
mes 11-8-55

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
29Jan56	1 Aug 54	$11,610.00	$11,880.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Periods(s)

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126-- Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 24, 1954, General Regulations No. 132

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP —— PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

AL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

FYG

1. NAME (MR. – MISS – MRS. – ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. WILLIAM V. BROE	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug 1913	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 17 June 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT	6. EFFECTIVE DATE E.O.D. 19 June 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer BFF-1629	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops. Officer (Br. Ch) BF-161
GS-0136.01-15 ~~$10,800~~ 11610 .00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 ~~$10,800~~ 11610 .00 per annum EFF. 13 MARCH 1955 SALARY
DDP/FE China Mission Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 2, China Office of Chief
Yokosuka, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-3715-55-167 TO: 5-3700-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

DIRECTIVE

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ISSUED
24 JUN 1955

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

MJ 6/22/55

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 — 248347

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

SECRET

10/5/54

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. William V. DROE	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug 1913	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 7 Sept 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP B. APPROVED: OCT 10 1954	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops Officer BFF1126 -15	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BFF1629
GS-0136.01-15 $10,600 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $10,600 p/a
DDP/FE China Mission Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE China Mission Office of the Chief
Yokosuka, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Yokosuka, Japan
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY: for R. C. CLINKSCALE, Personnel Officer, FE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Mary A. Wickman, x2105

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY: F/CIAO

Signature:

Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
XX					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM 5-3715-55-137 TO Same	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: VA.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 11610.00

POSTED

[illegible] 195[illegible]

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		17 Sept 54
C. CLASSIFICATION	AT	
D. PLACEMENT		22 Sept 53
E.		
F. APPROVED BY	Ralph A. Pollert	

REMARKS:

MELOON

22 Sept 54

SECRET

14-00000

Zl+
6/4
Ban

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.*
If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. William V. BROE
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 24 Aug 1913
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: ~~18~~ June 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): ~~[illegible]~~ Promotion
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: AUG 1 1954
7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
I. O. (Deputy Chief) S-2	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BFF 1126-15/[illegible]
GS-132-14 $9800	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $10,800
DDP/FE FRU/FEC (Field) Office of Chief of Mission	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE China Mission Office of Chief
Yokosuka, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Yokosuka, Japan
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)
Personnel Data Sheet, Recommendation, and Position Description attached.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): H. C. ULTICKSCALE, FE Personnel Officer
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): Mary A. Wickham, Ext. 2185 MJ
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Keith Reid
Title: DFD/Padmin

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
XX					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-3715-55-004
TO: ~~same~~ 5-3715-55-167
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: VA

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED
6 AUG 1954
Am

APPROVED BY FE CAREER SERVICE COMMITTEE
JUN 17 1954

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	Am	15 July 54
C. CLASSIFICATION	[illegible]	7/26
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible] 7/28	
E.		

REMARKS:
APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE JUN 23 1954

F. APPROVED BY Joseph B. Ragan

10—07930-2

7. C. ~~~R
5/19/55

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19— FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. William V. BROE	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug. 1913	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 19 May 1954
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment(Correction)* B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 7 June 1953	7. C. S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
Chief of Station S-176	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I. O.(Deputy Chief) S #2
GS-132-14 $9800.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-14 $9800.00 per annum
DDP/FE FE-4 External Unit A	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE FRU/FEC (Fld) Office of Chief of Mission
Manila, R. P.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Yokosuka, Japan
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

POSTED
20 MAY 1954
Mc

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) Position Control	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Title:
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) Audrey Meadows, Ext. 8657	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 4-3780-55-006 TO 4-3715-55-004	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

*This action corrects Reassignment notification dated 26 Feb. 53, to delete the FSS Status, previously shown. This action also corrects Item's #8 and 10, to show the correct position title previously shown as Chief(Intelligence Officer) and to show the correct breakdown, previously shown as DDP/FE, Manila-Air Attache, External Unit A on the "From" side of the action.

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		
F. APPROVED BY		

REMARKS.

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER 10

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

7 Dec 1953
6/11/53
97 FI

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.* If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): BROE, William V., Mr.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 24 Aug. 1913

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 26 Feb 1953

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:

A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Reassignment

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

A. PROPOSED: 7 June 53

B. APPROVED:

7. C.S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Chief ~~(Intelligence Officer)~~ OF STATION/ATTACHE (POLOFF) (#176)		~~Deputy Chief of Mission (#193)~~ D.O. (Deputy Chief)s #2 SAME 172 ~~(GS-14)~~
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-14 ~~$9600~~ $9800 FSS-3 $7710		GS-14 ~~$9600~~ $9800 SAME
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DD/P/FE ~~EE~~ ~~MANILA AIR ATTACHE~~ FE-4 ~~Branch~~ EXTERNAL UNIT "A"		DD/P/FE ~~EE~~ FRU/FEC (FLD.) Office of Chief of Mission
11. HEADQUARTERS	Manila, P. R.		Yokosuka, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Approved DD/P Career Service Board 21 Apr. 53

Replacement for incumbent who is returning PCS.

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: 19 March 53

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): For Chief, FE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): Bernhard von Ammon, Ext. 2185

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J. Keith Ral[illegible] / Robert B. Powell DD/P admin
Title: FI/PO.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL.

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 3780-55-006
TO: 3715-55-004

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☑ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Virginia

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

MH

POSTED
6/10 [illegible]

Security concurrence
W. A. Osborne 6/3/53
Per MB

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS

CORRIS

F. APPROVED BY
M. L. Strohe 6/5/53

10—67330-8

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

[illegible]
6/26/53
[illegible]

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. William V. Broe	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 August 1913	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 24 June 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
Conversion from FSS Status

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: C.O.B. 16 May 53
B. APPROVED: COB 16 May 1953

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Chief of Station S-176 Attache (POLOFF)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Chief of Station S-176
GS-14 $9800.00 p/a no Same FSS-3 $8721.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-14 $9800.00 p/a no Same
DDP/FE 770 ~~Manila-Air Attache (External Unit A)~~ FE-4 Ext Set A	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE ~~Manila-Air Attache (External Unit~~ A) Same
Manila, R. P.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Manila, R. P.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)
This is a conversion from the Dept. of State cover
Subject's employment with Dept. of State terminated C.O.B. 16 May 1953
Branch 3 - Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand Slot #176

John F. Bell
DDP/ADMIN
25 June 53

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
Clarence E. Witt
Clarence E. Witt, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
D. E. Dustin, Ext. 3472 BD

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Davis B. Powell
Title: FI/CMO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

~~GD FI~~

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM
TO: 3780-55-006

18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Virginia

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible]
30 Jun 53 JM

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: JUN 25 1953

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS.

F. APPROVED BY
Burrows 6/25/53.

SECRET
Security Information

10—57320-8

1. Agency and organizational designations CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	2. Pay period	3. Block No. UV	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) ~~XXXX~~ BROE, William V.	6. Grade and salary GS - 14 $9600		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:	11. Appropriation(s) 24	12. Prepared by bn 4/16/53 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 12 Apr 53	15. Date last equivalent increase 14 [illegible] 51	16. Old salary rate $9600	17. New salary rate $9800	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better. (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s)
(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP
Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—61111-2a * U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 975785

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: William Vincent Broe

DATE: 2 August 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion

EFFECTIVE DATE: 14 October 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	ATTACHE, (Pol Off) Chief (Intelligence Officer)	Attache (Pol Off) Chief (Intelligence Officer)
GRADE AND SALARY	FSS-3 $7710.00 GS-13 $7600.00	FSS-3 $7710.00 GS-14 $8800.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDZ	FDZ
BRANCH	IV Sp Ops Unit	IV Ext Unit A
OFFICIAL STATION	Manila, P. R.	Manila, P. R.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS: 1951

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR:

EXECUTIVE:

CLASSIFICATION: 10-3-51 F64

PERSONNEL OFFICER: 1951

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

132

PURSUANT TO DCI L
OCT
[illegible] TO $ 9600

OSO Slot #176 - GS-14

Effective date of last promotion: 6 August 1950

Difference between $8800.00 and $7710.00 is to be paid by CIA

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16—63306-1 (2)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: BROE, William Vincent

DATE: 31 June 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Transfer

EFFECTIVE DATE: 22 July 51

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Attache (Polit. Off.) (Intelligence Officer - Chief)	Attache (Polit. Off.) (Chief of Station, Man. Res. S.
GRADE AND SALARY *	FSS-3, $7,710.00 (GS-13, $7,600.00)	FSS-3, $7,710.00 (GS-13, $7,600.00)
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDZ/SEA	FDZ/SEA
BRANCH	Branch IV, Slot #1	Branch IV, Slot #179 Sp. Ops/lia
OFFICIAL STATION	Manila, Philippine Islands (R.U.)	Manila, Philippine Islands (R.U.)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION 15 July 51 F.648 Thomas M. Fisher	PERSONNEL OFFICER D Mulcahey 17 1951	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☑

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ______

SECURITY CLEARED ON ______

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ______

ENTERED ON DUTY ______

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS: 150

* Subject integrated into the Department of State as FSS-3 with a salary of $7,710.00. No differential is to be paid since subject's authorized CIA grade and salary is GS-13, $7,600.00.

COPY IN FILE [illegible]
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS [illegible]

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

(2)

Copy to Medical Records [illegible]

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: BROE, William Vincent

DATE: 20 February 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Integration

EFFECTIVE DATE: 21 February 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intell. Off. (Chief) GS-13	Attache (Political Officer)
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-13 $7,600.00	FSS-3 $7,710.00*
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDZ/SFA	FDZ/SEA
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION	Manila (Research Unit)	Manila (Research Unit)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE

CLASSIFICATION

PERSONNEL OFFICER

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

* Subject integrated into the Department of State as FSS-3 with a salary of $7,710.00. No differential is to be paid since subject's authorized CIA grade and salary is GS-13, $7,600.00.

Subject is due a lump sum payment for annual leave to be paid up to 20 February 1951.

POSTED
OK 22 Feb

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1948

SECRET

GPO 83-500339

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: BROE, William Vincent

DATE: 11 January 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 4 February 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intell. Off. (Chief) GS-13
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-13 $7600.00
OFFICE		OCO
DIVISION		FDZ/[illegible]
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION		Manila (Research Unit)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS: H. C. [illegible] 11 Jan 51

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: B. [illegible] Vandervoort

CLASSIFICATION: 17 Jan 51 F-648 Austin J. Thomas per [illegible]

PERSONNEL OFFICER:

EXECUTIVE:

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 5 February 1951

SECURITY CLEARED ON Concurrence 24 Jan 1951

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 5 February 1951

ENTERED ON DUTY 4 February 1951

Eloise D. Hudson
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS: 130

S-1

Please transfer leave from vouchered funds.

Employee is replacement for Thomas Leyer.

Security Concurrence
Ernal P. Geiss 1/24/51
per MB

COPY IN [illegible]
CONFIDENTIAL [illegible]
INITIALS

1/22/51

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

GPO 83-500339

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 50
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 91, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(ml)

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): Mr. William V. Broe
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 24 Aug. 1913
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: #6062
4. DATE: 21 May 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Resignation*
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: cob 3 Feb. 51
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM		TO
Chief, GS-13 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-13-130 $7600.00 per. annum.	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
OSO FDZ/SRA Branch 4	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.
		X	

Bu.#1400
CEC#1434
9/12/47

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2115900 TO: 951-108
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

(*To accept other employment.)

LAL: 2/3/51 O/T worked
LSL: 567 hrs., 2/5/51 thru 7 hrs., 5/15/51
and 1 holiday 2/22/51.

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

Charles W. Claxon
CHARLES W CLAXON
Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

July 3-51

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

log

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. William V. Broe	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8/24/13	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. 8881	4. DATE 28 July 1950

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 6 Aug. 1950	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Operations Officer, GS-12 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Chief GS-13 (Intelligence Officer)
GS-12 $6800.00 per annum (130) Bu.1759 CSC 1743	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-13 $7600.00 per annum (130)
OSO FDZ SEA-Division 4	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO FDZ/SEA Branch 4
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT.	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	T. A.	REAL.
		X	

Bu.~~#XXXX~~ 1480
CSC# 1434
9/12/47

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 2115900
TO: 951-108

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

Robert S. Wattles
ROBERT S. WATTLES
Employees Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950—873042

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (6 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R 1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(mef) 130

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. William V. Broe	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8/24/13	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. #1818	4. DATE 2/2/50

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Pay Increase - (Periodic)*	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 12/25/49	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY CIA Admin. Inst. 20-1 Dated 12/9/49

FROM		TO
Operations Officer, GS-12 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer, GS-12 (Intelligence Officer)
GS-12, $6600.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12, $6800.00 per annum
OSO COPS - FDZ SEA-Division 4	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO COPS - FDZ SEA-Division 4
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
		X		Bu. #1799 CSC #1743 12/19/47

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2105900 TO: 258-108	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY) 	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS. THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

*Last Salary Increase ...... 21 June 1948

Efficiency Rating .... Excellent
Dated 6/20/49

Conduct Report ...... Satisfactory
Dated 12/23/49

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

ROBERT S.
Employe
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (5 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R054

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

EOD 130

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST) Mr. William V. Broe	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8/24/1913	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. #407	4. DATE 10-28-49

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment.

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Conversion-Class. Act of 1949	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 10-30-49	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Letter - DCI - 10-28-49

FROM		TO
Operations Officer P-5 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer GS-12 (Intelligence Officer)
P-5 $6474.60 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12 $6600.00 per annum
OSO COPS-FDZ SEA-Division 4	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO COPS-FDZ SEA-Division 4
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

Acting Chief, Employees Division

14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	W W II	W W I	OTHER
X							

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		X	

Bu.#1799
CSC#1743
12/19/47

17. SFX	18. RACE	19. APPROPRIATION	20. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2185900 TO: 950-108	Yes		Maryland

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED.
BUDGET BUREAU NO 50-R001

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION ~~SF~~ (pl) 130

1 NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS. FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST) Mr. William V. Broe	2 DATE OF BIRTH 8/24/1913	3 JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4 DATE 1 April 1949

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5 NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Intra-Agency Transfer	6 EFFECTIVE DATE 3 April 1949	7 CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-45

FROM		TO
Operations Officer P-5 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer P-5 (Intelligence Officer)
P-5 $6474.60 per annum Bu.#1799 CSC-1743	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	P-5 $6474.60 per annum
OSO - COPS FBZ Division 1	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO - COPS FBZ- SEA Division 4
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12 FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

WILLIAM J. KELLY
Personnel Officer [illegible] 4-1-49
14 SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15 VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT	10 POINT			WWII	WWI	OTHER
		DISAB	WIFE	WIDOW			
X							

16 POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL	
		X		Bu.#1799 CSC#1743 12/19/47

17 SEX M	18 RACE W	19 APPROPRIATION FROM 2195900 959-103 TO	20 SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO) Yes	21 DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22 LEGAL RESIDENCE Maryland

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1948 783384

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (9 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R006

C .NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION CSI (po) 130

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST) Mr. William V. Broe	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8/24/1913	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 21 June 1948

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Excepted Appointment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 21 June 1948	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-45

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer P-5 (Intelligence Officer)
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	P-5 $6144.60 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO - COPS FBZ Division 1
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

No-Strike Affidavit has been properly executed.

Previously employed in the FBI at $6144.60 per annum.

This Excepted Appointment under Schedule A will in no way alter any status which you have previously acquired.

DOG — 10/14/51
CSCDD- 06/21/48 ✓ verified by jam
hcd 06/21/48

Ret. Received 7/12/48

William J. Kelly
i rnsd 6/23/48

WILLIAM J. KELLY
Chief, Personnel Branch
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	10 POINT DISABIL.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
X							

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL	
		X		Bu. 51799 CSC-1743 12/19/47

17. SEX	18. RACE	19. APPROPRIATION	20. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2185900 TO: 908-101	Yes	21 June 1948	Maryland

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1947—

SECRET

19 May 1972

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF ANNUAL FITNESS REPORT FORM

Name:	William V. Broe (056735)
Date of birth:	24 August 1913
Sex:	M
Grade:	GS-18
SD:	D
Official Position Title:	Ops Officer - Division Chief
Current station:	Headquarters
Type of Report:	Reassignment
Reporting period:	1 April 197~~2~~1 - 27 January 1972

From April 1971 to January 1972, Mr. Broe continued to serve as Chief of WH Division. He then was promoted to the role of Inspector General. During the final months of his long service as Chief, WHD, he continued to provide the wise and enlightened leadership that we had come to expect. The Agency is fortunate in having a man of his judgment and ability in a post as important as the Inspector General.

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report.
William V. Broe
William V. Broe, C/WH

6 JUN 1972
VG

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Fully agree.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

30 May 72
Date

20 April 1971

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF ANNUAL FITNESS REPORT FORM

Name:	William V. Broe (056735)
Date of birth:	24 August 1913
Sex:	Male
Grade:	GS-18
SD:	D
Official Position Title:	Ops Officer Division Chief
Current station:	Headquarters
Type of appointment:	Career
Type of report:	Annual
Reporting period:	1 April 1970 - 31 March 1971

During the reporting period, Mr. Broe has continued to serve as Chief of the WH Division. In this period, he has had to cope with the many crises and confrontations that typify his area, the Allende victory in Chile to successive coups in Bolivia, and growing urban terrorism in many countries. It is difficult to fault his performance in the handling of these complex challenges. He has earned the complete respect of his subordinates and, as an acute and humane judge of character, he knows the strengths and weaknesses of his station chiefs and how to extract the best from them.

Under his leadership, high-level penetrations of Communist parties throughout the hemisphere have been maintained and increased, and he has planned ahead effectively to cope with the increasing Soviet diplomatic presence.

12 MAY 1971

SECRET

Under his supervision, the budget, program and project submissions of his Division have been effectively presented and defended before reviewing authorities.

Innumerable crash requests for memoranda on a wide range of topics from the White House have been met promptly and satisfactorily.

On the substantive side, he has kept himself abreast of the rapidly changing Latin American scene and on policy matters, his judgment and advice are relied upon at the Assistant Secretary level in the Department of State and the White House.

The high morale of his Division is a tribute to his ability and, on the whole, his performance remains "Outstanding."

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report.

William V. Broe
C/WH

Comments of reviewing official:

Concur.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

27 APR 1971

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF ANNUAL FITNESS REPORT FORM

25 April 1969

Name:	William V. Broe (056735)
Date of birth:	24 August 1913
Sex:	Male
Grade:	GS-18
SD:	D
Official Position Title:	Ops Officer Division Chief
Current station:	Headquarters
Type of appointment:	Career
Type of report:	Annual
Reporting period:	1 April 1968 to 31 March 1969

During the reporting period, Mr. Broe has continued to serve as Chief of the WH Division. Under his leadership and due to his excellent judgment in the selection of key personnel, the Division has improved its performance both in the collection of significant intelligence and in its conduct of complex covert action operations. Due to high level penetration of the Communist parties throughout the hemisphere, he has kept the Division well ahead of the game in dealing with the diverse subversive movements in the area. This result is due in considerable measure to Mr. Broe's managerial skills. Mr. Broe's judgment has been relied upon by both the White House and the Assistant Secretary level in the State Department in dealing with the policy aspects of successive crises. He has been consistently cost conscious, and his performance on the whole has been outstanding.

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report.

William V Broe
William V. Broe

T H Karamessines
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
13 MAY 1969

Comments of reviewing official:

Concur.

SECRET

[illegible]

22 April 1970

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF ANNUAL FITNESS REPORT FORM

Name:	**William V. Broe (056735)**
Date of birth:	**24 August 1913**
Sex:	**Male**
Grade:	**GS-18**
SD:	**D**
Official Position Title:	**Ops Officer Division Chief**
Current station:	**Headquarters**
Type of appointment:	Career
Type of report:	Annual
Reporting period:	1 April 1969 to 31 March 1970

During the reporting period, Mr. Broe has continued to serve as Chief of the WH Division. It is a tribute to the quality of his management that the Division has continued to perform extremely well in the production of intelligence derived from within the Communist Party throughout the hemisphere. This has resulted not only from the use of long standing assets but also from initiative shown by the Stations in the recruitment of

SECRET

new and well placed agent assets. He has supervised effectively Divisional planning designed to exploit to the maximum the opportunities presented by the increasing Soviet diplomatic presence in the area.

During the year, political shifts in Peru and Bolivia have served to dramatize the danger of too extensive a reliance on liaison and Mr. Broe has moved to reduce the profile of our declared presence.

The high morale in his Division comes from the widespread knowledge that good performance is recognized and that career advancement is based on ability rather than any form of favoritism.

On policy matters, his judgment and advice is sought and relied upon at the Assistant Secretary level in the Department of State and the White House. He is a careful and frugal manager in the allocation of increasingly scarce resources and on the whole his performance has been "Outstanding."

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report.
William V. Broe

Comments of reviewing official:

Concur.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
16 MAY 1970

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FORM

22 April 1968

Name: William V. Broe (056735)

Date of birth: 24 August 1913

Sex: Male

Grade: GS-18

SD: D

Official Position Title: Chief, WH Division, DDP

Current station: Headquarters

Type of appointment: Career

Type of report: Annual

Reporting period: 1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

During the reporting period, Mr. Broe has continued to serve as Chief, WH Division. In that capacity he has a large number of important field stations under his command and he has handled them with excellent judgment. He is a wise judge of men and their differing abilities and knows how to extract the best from those who work for him. He has taken the time to read widely regarding the problems of his area and he has been most effective in his dealings with policy levels at State. His performance has been an outstanding one and is reflected in the steadily improving contribution that his Division has made over the past year.

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report

William V. Broe
William V. Broe

Comments of reviewing official:

Concur.

TH Karamessines
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

R.

SECRET

056735

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

12 April 1967

Name: William V. BROE

Date of birth: 24 August 1913

Sex: Male

Grade: GS-18

SD: D

Official Position Title: Chief, WH Division, DD/P

Current station: Headquarters

Type of appointment: Career

Type of report: Annual

Reporting period: 18 May 1966 - 1 April 1967

1. This is a letter fitness report on Mr. Broe as Chief of the WH Division from 18 May 1966 to date.

2. In the last fitness report on Mr. Broe I commented that "he is easy to work with, exercises the soundest of judgements, maintains excellent relations in the community and will without question turn in a really fine performance as Chief, WH Division." Nothing has happened in the course of the past year to require any change in that comment and prediction. Although the Dominican crisis has subsided since the last report, we are not entirely out of the woods there, and there are several other situations in the Western Hemisphere which have been simmering smartly and which have

MAY 1967

required deft handling. Mr. Broe has handled these excellently, while at the same time he has looked after the normal command and administrative requirements of the Division effectively. He stays in close touch with his key personnel, and keeps himself fully informed of their operations. His community relationships are good and he is held in high esteem by his collaborators in the Clandestine Services. All in all, one must rate Mr. Broe's performance during the last year as outstanding.

THKaram

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe

Comments of reviewing official:

[illegible] 967
Date

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

18 May 1966

Name: William V. BROE 056735

Date of birth: 24 August 1913

Sex: Male

Grade: GS-18

SD: D

Official Position Title: Chief, WH Division, DD/P

Current station: Headquarters

Type of appointment: Career

Type of report: Annual

Reporting period: July 1965 to date

1. This is a letter fitness report on Mr. Broe as Chief of the WH Division from July 1965 to date.

2. Mr. Broe's file is replete with the highest estimates of his capabilities and performance in the several positions of responsibility he has held in the Clandestine Services. Until coming to the WH Division, his entire career with the Clandestine Services, dating back to 1948, had been in the Far East area. He served as Chief of our Manila Station and later of our Tokyo Station in which latter position he distinguished himself. He was brought in to take over the WH Division when the Chief of that Division became the DD/P. That in itself was an eloquent admission of the esteem in which his capabilities are held. His performance in the WH Division has fully lived up to this evaluation. He took over the Division just after the Agency had become immersed in the Dominican Republic crisis. At the same time, a dozen other problems of one kind or another required the most serious attention. He has made several field trips to his area of responsibility and has shown his usual skill in getting the most

31 MAY 1966

SECRET

out of his collaborators. He is easy to work with, exercises the soundest of judgments, maintains excellent relations in the community and will without question turn in a really fine performance as Chief, WH Division.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report.

William V. Broe
William V. Broe

Comments of reviewing official:

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
056735

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last) (First) (Middle)* Broe, William V.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8/24/13	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-17	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*

☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 65

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
1 Apr 64 - 31 Mar 65

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached Memorandum.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

11 MAY 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

27 [illegible] 1965

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: BROE, William V. (1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965)

1. Mr. Broe's performance as Chief of Station, Tokyo during the reporting period is best described as outstanding.

2. For over two years, Mr. Broe has struggled with the problems in Japan of reducing the size of the Agency's mission and of developing appropriate areas of clandestine concentration. During the past year, he has effectively gotten the whole mechanism to work, with a marked increase in foreign intelligence and an unprecedented emergence of the Station, through contacts he and his associates have developed, as a channel for political action. Through his skillful assistance to and cultivation of the Ambassador, Mr. Broe has placed CIA in a position in Japan where the Station Chief and the Agency are accepted by the top levels of the Japanese Government as a useful channel and as a dependable organization for collaboration. This high level connection is of tremendous value in advancing political intelligence objectives as well as an essential tool for indirect and unofficial manipulation of situations of key interest to both the Japanese and the U.S. governments.

3. In the management of the Station, Mr. Broe continues to be his old effective self. He is able to get a good deal of mileage out of the personnel assigned to him and to increase their effectiveness through his own personal leadership. In all this, he has displayed an excellent sense of cost consciousness in the management of the Station.

4. In sum, Mr. Broe has brought Tokyo Station under his tenure to a new role appropriate to the changing times. CIA along with the U.S. Government is now in a better position to deal with an independent Japan which is now looking at Asia through its own eyes.

RJ Myers
Robert J. Myers
Deputy Chief, Far East Division

This fitness report will be shown
to Mr. Broe when he returns to
Headquarters.

________________________ ________
Date

BROE, William V.

Comments of Reviewing Official:

Fully concur with the above. Mr. Broe is obviously one of the top-level officers of our service. He is effective in management, analysis and personal operations.

Signature of Reviewing Official: ______________________ 28 [illegible]
William E. Colby Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 056735

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Broe, William V.	2. DATE OF BIRTH Aug 1913	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-17	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO	8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 12 Feb 63 - 31 Mar 64

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached memorandum.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 13 MAY 1964	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

9 MAY 1964

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: BROE, William V. (12 February 1963 - 31 March 1964)

1. Mr. Broe's performance as Chief of Station, Tokyo for the period 12 February 1963 to 31 March 1964 can be characterized as strong.

2. Mr. Broe has effectively directed the operations of a station with many targets. He has concentrated the potential represented by the personnel under his authority on the most important targets and firmly discarded marginal activities. In his supervision of the work of the sub-units of his station, such as the China section, Soviet section and Korean section, he has been effective in encouraging them to vigorous activity but has also asserted the necessary control and guidance from his level. Mr. Broe has maintained excellent relationships with other American services and his coordination process is a model. He has at the same time maintained personal contacts with leading Japanese, both official and unofficial, and has used these both for intelligence and for action purposes. He has wisely targetted the covert action potential of the station toward critical targets and deliberately eliminated marginal efforts. Mr. Broe has on his own initiative made certain recommendations for the reduction of the personnel and expenditures of his station to help meet crises in other areas. In all of this activity, Mr. Broe has reaffirmed his qualities of leadership and supervisory capacity and has demonstrated a full consciousness of the importance of cost.

W. E. Colby
William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Division

This fitness report will be shown to Mr. Broe when he returns to Headquarters.

William V. Broe   Aug 3 1964
Date

SECRET

SECRET

BROE, William V.

Comments of Reviewing Official:

Concur.

Signature of Reviewing Official: TH Karam
Thomas H. Karamessines

11 May 64
Date

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Mr. William V. Broe 25-11

1. This memorandum in lieu of Fitness Report is submitted on Mr. William V. Broe, Chief of Station, Tokyo to cover the period 1 June 1961 to 11 February 1963.

2. Mr. Broe has directed one of the most complicated and important stations in the Far East area with his accustomed skill, intelligence and delicacy. He has conducted a major reorganization of the Agency's activities in Japan and substantially reduced its total commitment there. At the same time he has kept a firm eye on the need for coverage of important targets and has been particularly severe with non-essential or marginal activities. In the Station itself he has directed a complicated structure, with perhaps the largest number of outside cover cases (with all the difficulties they bring) in the area. He has maintained the Station's relationship and contacts with the Ambassador and the Embassy in an excellent manner, and it is now considered a full partner in Japanese affairs by the Ambassador. He has maintained extensive and important liaison contacts with Japanese agencies and at the same time kept a high degree of effort on the unilateral targets in the area. He has been particularly effective in managing our relationships with the U.S. military intelligence Headquarters covering the Far East which are concentrated in Japan. In all of these he has been firm and intelligent in his approach.

19 MAR 1963

14-00000

3. In sum, Mr. Broe continues the highly efficient performance of his duties, which could be characterized between strong and outstanding.

This Fitness Report will be shown to Mr. Broe upon his return to Headquarters.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Reviewing Official:

Thomas H. Karamessines

11 March 63
Date

The above report has been seen by:

William V. Broe
William V. Broe

[illegible] 63
Date

SECRET

Recorded by CSPD

22 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Mr. William V. Broe

1. This memorandum, in lieu of Fitness Report Form 45, is submitted on Mr. William V. Broe, former Deputy Chief, Far East Division, to cover the period 25 July 1960 through 1 June 1961.

2. An evaluation was prepared by the writer concerning Mr. Broe's performance as Deputy Chief, Far East Division for the period March 1959 to 25 July 1960. Mr. Broe's performance as Deputy Chief, Far East Division during the course of the past year has fully measured up to the statements which I made in the last fitness report and I have no reason to alter my description of his performance in any way.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET

SECRET

Recordac
CSPD

2 6 JUL 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Memorandum in lieu of Fitness Report of Mr. William V. Broe, GS-16, covering period from March 1959 through 25 July 1960.

Subject is Deputy Chief of the Far East Division and has served in that capacity during the entire 23 months of my tenure as Chief of the Division as well as for some months under my predecessor. He also served as my deputy in 1954-1955 at the China Base at Yokosuka, Japan. I have, therefore, had ample opportunity to appraise subject's performance under a great variety of circumstances, both in the field and at Headquarters.

Subject is an outstanding manager in the Clandestine Services field. His operational judgment is wholly reliable, he grasps and retains complex details and produces sound and intelligent solutions to operational problems. He is very strong in administration and is particularly adept at personnel management. He has a deep and encyclopedic knowledge of the people in the Far East Division; his approach is personal and sympathetic but his hand is firm when firmness is required. He has been particularly successful in solving personnel assignment problems by matching capabilities to requirements.

In his present job as Deputy Chief of an area division, I do not believe that subject has an equal. This would entitle him, in my opinion, to a rating of "7" in Section B of the Fitness Report form.

28 Jul 60

824a

SECRET

As I have indicated in previous fitness reports, subject, after long service as a division and field station deputy, deserves, and is fully qualified, to become chief of a major field station. I am in the near future commencing to process such a proposal. My opinion is that his performance in such an assignment should not fall short of "6" on a scale of seven.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

625a

Recorded by: CSPD

22 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Mr. William V. Broe

1. This memorandum, in lieu of Fitness Report Form 45, is submitted on Mr. William V. Broe, former Deputy Chief, Far East Division, to cover the period 25 July 1960 through 1 June 1961.

2. An evaluation was prepared by the writer concerning Mr. Broe's performance as Deputy Chief, Far East Division for the period March 1959 to 25 July 1960. Mr. Broe's performance as Deputy Chief, Far East Division during the course of the past year has fully measured up to the statements which I made in the last fitness report and I have no reason to alter my description of his performance in any way.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

8.2.61

Recorded
CSPD

26 JUL 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Memorandum in lieu of Fitness Report of Mr. William V. Broe, GS-16, covering period from March 1959 through 25 July 1960.

Subject is Deputy Chief of the Far East Division and has served in that capacity during the entire 23 months of my tenure as Chief of the Division as well as for some months under my predecessor. He also served as my deputy in 1954-1955 at the China Base at Yokosuka, Japan. I have, therefore, had ample opportunity to appraise subject's performance under a great variety of circumstances, both in the field and at Headquarters.

Subject is an outstanding manager in the Clandestine Services field. His operational judgment is wholly reliable, he grasps and retains complex details and produces sound and intelligent solutions to operational problems. He is very strong in administration and is particularly adept at personnel management. He has a deep and encyclopedic knowledge of the people in the Far East Division; his approach is personal and sympathetic but his hand is firm when firmness is required. He has been particularly successful in solving personnel assignment problems by matching capabilities to requirements.

In his present job as Deputy Chief of an area division, I do not believe that subject has an equal. This would entitle him, in my opinion, to a rating of "7" in Section B of the Fitness Report form.

As I have indicated in previous fitness reports, subject, after long service as a division and field station deputy, deserves, and is fully qualified, to become chief of a major field station. I am in the near future commencing to process such a proposal. My opinion is that his performance in such an assignment should not fall short of "6" on a scale of seven.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

14-00000

10 APR RECD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
156735

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Broe William V	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 August 1913	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Off (D Div Ch)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/OFF. of CHIEF	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL *(Specify)*

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30/04/59

11. REPORTING PERIOD
From June 1958 To 31/03/59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief, FE Division	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Chief of FE Div. Project Review	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Chief, FE Personnel Board	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with Department of State	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5/6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER *(Specify)*:							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

OFFICE OF PERS[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is so well qualified to meet the requirements of deputy chief of a large area division that there may well be a tendency to lose sight of his ability to run an organization of his own. This capability was amply demonstrated when he was chief of the China Branch of FE Division.

Subject is unusually strong as a supervisor. His flair for warm but impartial relationships with subordinates has enabled him to develop a first-hand understanding of the capabilities, shortcomings and problems of a very large proportion of all FE personnel. His direction ~~of personnel~~ does not lack firmness but is expressed in such a way that feelings are considered and best results are achieved.

Subject's operational judgment is entirely reliable. He has an encyclopedic knowledge and understanding of the Division's operations and a full grasp of political implications throughout the area.

I have noted no weaknesses in Subject which would inhibit his successful assumption of increasing responsibilities.

This report has been prepared in accordance with FE Division standards which [illegible] rating the individual against the group. [illegible] rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE May 11, 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William V. Broe

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 7	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject on extended trip abroad.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

DATE 9 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Far East Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Desmond FitzGerald

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 13 APR 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C FI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Lloyd George

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Broe, William V.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug 1913	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/Office of the Chief	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Off - D Div Ch		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 July 1958	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) June 57 - June 58	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE 23 May 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Alfred C. Ulmer Jr. Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Far East Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
Posted For Control CP 11 JUL 1958
[illegible] CCP 7/16/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 18 JUN 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Richard Helms	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Operations, DD/P

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5/6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: I would rate subject as 5.
RH

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 26 2 02 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief, FE	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with State Department c	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Chief FE Personnel Board	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Review of FE projects	RATING NUMBER 5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject stepped into the Deputy Chief, FE job six months ago and hit full stride within three months. He is an outstanding executive and has fine leadership qualities.

No weaknesses.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6/7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Broe	(First) William	(Middle) V.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug 1913	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/Office of the Chief

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Off - D Div Ch

7. GRADE: GS-15

8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 11 July 1958

9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): June 57 - June 58

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

A. THIS DATE 23 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Alfred C. Ulmer Jr Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Far East Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 18 JUN 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Richard Helms	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Operations, DD/P

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is Yes, indicate below your opinion of each of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER ADEQUATE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

12 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is top calibre for station or division chief.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 26 2 02 PM '5
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. **FUTURE PLANS**

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. **DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL**

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE THE OTHER MAN'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4/5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4/5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BROE, WILLIAM V.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 August 1913	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/Branch 2	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Off

7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 12 July 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) June 1956 to 21 June 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 21 June 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Vernet L. Gresham Vernet L. Gresham	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE DCFE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	[illegible]	7-15-57
Reviewed [illegible]	[illegible]	

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 27 June 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr. Alfred C. Ulmer Jr.	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Far East Division

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 15 2 06 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

2 RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervision of large operational branch	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinates with other offices	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Has and uses area knowledge	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Evaluates significance of data	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops new programs	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3 NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: *Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.*

Subject is an extremely well-rounded, highly capable officer. He has considerable executive and organizational ability. He is mature, reasonable, cooperative, and very highly motivated. He tackles all assignments with energy and tenacity. No significant weaknesses have been observed. I would rank him very near the top of personnel known to me at the same grade level.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: *Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.*

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE.. BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY.

Subject would be equally as effective in other positions, such as chief of a field installation.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BROE, WILLIAM V.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 August 1913	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/Branch 2	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Off		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 12 July 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) June 1956 to 21 June 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 21 June 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Vernet L. Gresham	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief, Far East Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 27 June 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Far East Division

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

24

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has the potential to assume greater responsibility. He is fully capable of heading an important field station and is also qualified for greater responsibility at Headquarters.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

A course in management would be useful at some point in his career. Other specialized training would depend on the nature of his future assignments.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject is married and has four children aged 11, 9, 7, and 18 months. He also has a dependent mother (age 76).

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

5,

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BROE William V.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 August 1913	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD:DI

7

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/Branch 2	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer (Br. Ch.)

7. GRADE 15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 July 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 18 JAN 1956 - 21 June 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 26 June 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Vernet L. Gresham	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief, FE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		18 JUL 1956
Reviewed by		

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 27 June 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr. Alfred C. Ulmer	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, FE

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

5
INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, *e.g.*, combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 **Supervising**	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 **Prepares correspondence**	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 **Has and uses Area knowledge**	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 **Develops new programs**	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 **Coordinates with other offices**	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 **Conducting external liaison**	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is a forceful, energetic officer who is doing an excellent job in a very difficult assignment -- direction of a large and complex operational branch targeted at a denied area. Subject is flexible, cooperative, and a superior "team man." The production and overall efficiency of his branch have improved markedly during his year of supervision and direction.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Subject is an excellent executive and has a thorough knowledge of operations.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) BROE	(First) William	(Middle) V.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 August 1913	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD:DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/[illegible]/Branch 2

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer Br. Ch.

7. GRADE: 15

8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 11 July 1956

9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 18 Jan 1956 - 21 June 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one):

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)		
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE			

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 26 June 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Vernet L. Gresham Vernet L. Gresham	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief, FE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 27 June 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr. Alfred C. Ulmer Jr.	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL CFE

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered in the various levels in his kind of work.

DATE
18 JUL 1956

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☑ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
3		A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

12 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is a very fine career employee with super-grade potential.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject has already had varied and valuable field and headquarters experience. It is planned that he will remain in his present assignment for at least another year. Refresher training prior to another field assignment would be helpful.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject has no unusual personal circumstances at this time which would influence his future assignments.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS PERCEPTIVE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (*To be filled in by Administrative Officer*)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): EROE William Vincent
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 24 Aug 1913
3. SEX: M
4. CAREER DESIGNATION: SD:DI
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY: 21 June 1948
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: DDP
7. DIVISION: FE
8. BRANCH: Br. 2
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT: ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE: GS-15
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE:
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): Special Report April 1955 - ~~December~~ 17 Jan 1956

SECTION II (*To be filled in by Supervisor*)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Chief, FE/2 - Area Ops Officer (BR. CH.)
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 18 April 1955
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (*List in order of frequency*):

Typical duties of a branch chief of a large, complex branch with duties and responsibilities involving administration and operations.

BY mla DATE Sep. 56
Posted For Control
Reviewed by RID R 4/9

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ *has* ☑ *has not been shown to the individual rated.*

THIS DATE: 23 March 1956
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (*Employee's immediate supervisor*): George A. Kady Jr.

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (*Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum*)

THIS DATE: 23 March 1956
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (*Official next higher in line of authority*):

FORM NO. 45 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
1 JAN 55 THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale for each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 3 1 57 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	CATEGORIES												
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.												X		
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.												X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.												X		
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.													X	
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.												X		
11. CALM.													X	
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.													X	
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.												X		
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.													X	
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.												X		
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.												X		

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.												X		
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.												X		
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES, A "SPARK PLUG".													X	
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.												X		
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												X		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.												X		
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.													X	
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.												X		
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													X	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.													X	
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.												X		
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													X	
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.													X	
45. VERSATILE.												X		
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.												X		
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.												X		
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.													X	
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.													X	

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Dependability and ability to accomplish assigned duties with the minimum of supervision and guidance; enthusiasm for his work.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

None observed

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

See Section V - A

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 3 1 57 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

As Required by Agency Regulations

F. OTHER COMMENTS (Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☒ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: 21 June 1954

NAME: William V. Broo

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION

X	PROMOTION		REASSIGNMENT	OTHER (Explain)
	ROTATION		TRAVEL	

FROM: I.O. (Dep.Ch.) GS-14 FE/Japan

TO: Area Ops Off. GS-15 FE/Japan

AOS

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	OTHER TRAINING COURSES	DATE TAKEN
	BIC(CS), ALSO BIC, ALSO SOC, BTP AND BOC	48 ([illegible])			
	BTP II, ALSO OC				
	BTP III, ALSO AIC, AITC, AOC AND CA	48			
	PO, ALSO PM I, II, III AND RAFT				
	ITC ALSO CI				
	TECH	51 ([illegible])			
	ADMIN				
	SIC	48			
	SUP				
	CFA				
	RPTS				
	OB				
X	OSC (CC)				
	S A				
	CPW				
	WPSOC				
	CPO				
	STB				
	CEW				
	IT				
	GW				
	SAN				
	AO				
	MO				
	SUR				
	BFOT	51			
	DOC				
	LOCKS				
	S/W	50			
	F A S				
	SAF				

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.

2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

~~STAFF TRAINING OFFICE COMMENTS:~~

☐ ~~A. THIS~~ ☐ ~~DOES~~ ☐ DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN S. THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY MINIMUM STANDARDS.

☐ ~~C. UNLESS~~ SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE, WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ☐ QUALIFYING ☐ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT. upon return to Hq.

SIGNATURE OF STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer, [illegible]

FROM: Career Management Officer [illegible]

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 1 JAN 54 59-77 PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED REPLACES FORM NO. 59-112 AUG 1953 WHICH MAY BE USED

SECRET (2-4-45)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

37 ✓

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

CODED

T27

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. [illegible] to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he [illegible]

Reviewed 5/18/55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY WILLIAM VINCENT BROE	1. DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug. 1913	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION ~~[illegible]~~ D1 ✓
4. GRADE GS-15	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) China Mission Headquarters (Yokosuka)		
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 November 1954	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 23 June 1954 to 30 November 1954		

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Deputy Chief of Mission 0136.01	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 15 December 1953

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Deputy Chief, China Mission. Subject acts as general manager of the Mission Headquarters and in the absence of the Chief of Mission subject acts as Chief of Mission.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) DESMOND FITZGERALD	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) HARVEY E. OVERESCH.

3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 25 March	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES Mary A. Williams

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 JUL 54

SECRET

(4)

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 14 11 06 AM '58

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have a definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS		CATEGORIES													
		NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.	SAMPLES			☒											
B. PRACTICAL.											☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X		
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.														X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X				
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.														X	
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.													X		
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.															X
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.													X		
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X				
11. CALM.															X
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.															X
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.														X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.														X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.													X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.														X	
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X		
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.														X	
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.														X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.											X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.														X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.															X
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.													X		

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.												X		
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.													X	
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.												X		
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.														X
32. CLEAR THINKING.													X	
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.													X	
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.											X			
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.													X	
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.														X
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.														X
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.													X	
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.														X
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.														X
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.													X	
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.														X
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.													X	
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.														X
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.														X

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject is a superior employee with the highest qualities of leadership and professional attainments. Although imaginative and fully capable of innovation, his assigned role is to act as the balance wheel of the Mission Headquarters and to maintain a smooth continuity in management and operations. Perhaps his outstanding strengths are his reliability, his mature judgment, and his particularly marked ability to deal with people at all levels. A team player.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Subject has no outstanding weaknesses. Although primarily experienced in KUFIRE, he has developed a feel for KUGOWN and KUHOOK. He is capable of assuming the responsibilities of a mission or the equivalent.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 14 11 44 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

See A above

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

On subject's return to Headquarters, it is suggested that he take the Communist Party Organization course.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☒ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR ~~XXXX~~ ADVANCEMENT.
steady

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION
☒ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION.. [illegible]

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

FORM NO. 31-53
Dec. 1947
Replaces Form No. 33-2 which may continue to be used.

CONFIDENTIAL

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE. TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE.

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY
Broe	William	Vincent	GS-14	$8800	5 Feb 1951

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Chief, Field Operations Philippines, in charge of all OSO operations in Philippines;
Chief of Station, Manila Research Unit, Manila, P.I.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. Commo briefing course, 15 [illegible] 51; photography 2 - 6 Jun, 51; Locking devices [illegible]

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
None									

5. OF PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT (S) (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY — LOCATION

Preference unknown, this report prepared in headquarters.

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRAIGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN LAW.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT DATE FROM DATE TO

OCCASION FOR REPORT ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11.

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION?

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK 'NOT OBSERVED' ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						X	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							X
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS							X
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						X	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						X	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION						X	
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.						X	
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION							
M. TACT						X	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)							
O. LEADERSHIP							
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						X	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU - DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

ARO-OSO
OCT 22 1951

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATACH EXTRA SHEET)

DATE

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED

INSTRUCTIONS

GENERAL

1. A STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT COVERING EACH CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE IN THE FIELD WILL BE RENDERED BY SUCH EMPLOYEE AND HIS OR HER IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR ON 1 JUNE OF EACH YEAR ON THIS FORM. EACH EMPLOYEE WILL EXECUTE ITEMS 1 TO 6 INCLUSIVE OF THE FORM AND DELIVER SAME TO HIS REPORTING OFFICER FOR COMPLETION OF THE EFFICIENCY RATING AND FORWARDING TO WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS NOT LESS THAN 10 DAYS AFTER CLOSE OF REPORTING PERIOD.

A. THE REPORTING OFFICER IS DEFINED AS THE EMPLOYEE'S IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR. IN OTHER WORDS THE PERSON WHO IS PRESUMABLY BEST ACQUAINTED WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S WORKING EFFICIENCY. HOWEVER, DEPENDING UPON CIRCUMSTANCES, THE CHIEF OF STATION MAY NOT WISH TO ENTRUST THE IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR WITH THIS RESPONSIBILITY. IN ANY CASE, THE CHIEF OF STATION WILL CHANGE OR MODIFY THE RATING OF THE REPORTING OFFICER WHEN SUCH CHANGES OR MODIFICATIONS ARE CALLED FOR. THE CHIEF OF STATION IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACCURACY OF FACTS AND STATEMENTS WHICH APPEAR ON THE STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT. IN MANY CASES, ESPECIALLY IN A SMALL UNIT, THE CHIEF OF STATION MAY WISH TO FILL OUT ALL THE REPORTS HIMSELF.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT, THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL REPORTS, UTILIZING THE SAME FORM, WILL BE RENDERED:

A. UPON COMPLETION OF FIRST NINETY (90) DAYS OF SERVICE AT A STATION.

B. UPON RELIEF OR REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING SENIOR.

C. UPON DETERMINATION OR RECOMMENDATION THAT AN EMPLOYEE IN A FIELD STATION SHOULD BE REASSIGNED TO ANOTHER STATION OR RETURNED TO U.S. FOR REASSIGNMENT OR OTHER DISPOSITION. SUCH REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED SO AS TO REACH THE WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE AFTER SUCH REASSIGNMENT DETERMINATION IS MADE. IF POSSIBLE, THE REPORT SHOULD BE SENT IN AT LEAST THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT IN ORDER THAT ALL TIME POSSIBLE MAY BE DEVOTED TO APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION. IF CONSIDERATION OF REASSIGNMENT IS BEING GIVEN WITHOUT EMPLOYEE'S KNOWLEDGE, ITEMS 1 TO 6 WILL BE FILLED IN AS FAR AS POSSIBLE BY THE RATING OFFICER WITHOUT REFERRAL TO EMPLOYEE.

3. IN FAIRNESS TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE IMPORTANCE OF CAREFULLY PREPARED AND ACCURATE EFFICIENCY REPORTS CANNOT BE OVERSTRESSED. THE FOLLOWING BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RATING SHOULD ALWAYS BE KEPT IN MIND:

A. ALWAYS BASE YOUR JUDGMENT ON:

(1) WHAT YOU HAVE OBSERVED THE INDIVIDUAL DO OR FAIL TO DO.

(2) TYPICAL PERFORMANCE, NOT ON AN ISOLATED STRIKING INCIDENT.

(3) EXAMPLES RELEVANT TO THE CHARACTERISTIC UNDER CONSIDERATION.

(A) THE EFFICIENCY REPORT IS TO BE USED TO RATE ALL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES. BUT REPORTING OFFICERS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT DIFFERENT STANDARDS PREVAIL IN DIFFERENT ASSIGNMENTS WHEREAS IT IS NECESSARY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER POSSESS INITIATIVE, THIS SAME TRAIT IS NOT ALWAYS DESIRABLE, EXCEPT IN A MINOR WAY, FOR A TYPIST. THE RATINGS AND EVALUATIONS SHOULD BE IN REFERENCE TO THE JOB - THE ACTUAL WORK ASSIGNMENT FOR WHICH THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYEE IS BEING PAID. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO ARRIVE AT A JUST ESTIMATE OF THE QUALITIES OF THE PERSON REPORTED ON FOR THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE REPORT. AVOID EXAGGERATIONS AND SUPERLATIVES. THEY DETRACT FROM THE VALUE OF A REPORT AND ARE UNFAIR TO OTHERS.

B. BIASED OPINIONS BASED ON PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PREPARATION OF EFFICIENCY REPORTS IS AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF ALL SUPERVISORS OF EMPLOYEES, AND THE ACCURATE AND TRUE EVALUATIONS EXPRESSED THEREIN ARE A DIRECT REFLECTION UPON HIS OWN ABILITY AND QUALIFICATION FOR THE POSITION HE HOLDS.

C. NO REPORTS WILL BE RENDERED COVERING PERIODS OF LESS THAN 60 DAYS OBSERVED SERVICE.

4. REPORTS WILL NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL; HOWEVER, THE CLASSIFICATION MAY BE RAISED IF DEEMED ADVISABLE BY RATING OFFICER.

5. REPORTS WILL NEVER BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON.

DISPOSITION OF REPORTS

1. REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH CHIEF IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE REPORTING PERIOD.

2. IF THE REPORTING OFFICER IS THE CHIEF OF STATION, REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED BY HIM TO THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH CHIEF IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS.

3. IF THE REPORTING OFFICER IS NOT THE CHIEF OF STATION, THE REPORT WILL BE REFERRED TO THE NEXT IN COMMAND FOR REVIEW AND FINALLY TO THE CHIEF OF STATION FOR FORWARDING TO WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS.

4. UPON RECEIPT OF REPORT IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS, THEY WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE BRANCH CHIEFS PROMPTLY AND THEN REFERRED TO THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL FOR RETENSION IN THE PERSONNEL FILE OF THE EMPLOYEE.

A. IF A CHANGE OF PERSONAL STATUS IS REPORTED UNDER SECTION 6, ONE COPY OF SUCH REPORT WILL BE DETACHED AND SENT TO THE SECURITY OFFICE.

ANY DESIRED REMARKS OF REVIEWING OFFICER AND/OR CHIEF OF STATION

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

VOUCHERED

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.2.

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIALS
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 31 March 1950 based on performance during period from 3 Oct. '49 to 31 March 1950

PROE, William V.
(Name of employee)

Intelligence Officer GS-12
(Title of position, service, and grade)

OSO, ~~GSP3~~, FDZ, SEA, Div. 4
(Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE ✓ if adequate – if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	CHECK ONE: Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☑ All others ☐

___ (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
___ (2) Mechanical skill.
___ (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
___ (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
+ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
+ (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
+ (7) Accuracy of operations.
___ (8) Accuracy of final results.
+ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
✓ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
___ (11) Industry.
___ (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
___ (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? ______ (Yes or no))
___ (14) Ability to organize his work.
✓ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
+ (16) Cooperativeness.
+ (17) Initiative.
+ (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
___ (20) Physical fitness for the work.

___ (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
✓ (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
___ (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
___ (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
+ (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
✓ (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
___ (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
___ (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
___ (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
+ (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
___ (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

+ (A) Security
___ (B) ______
___ (C) ______

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	Adjective Rating	Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent	Rating official Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good	Reviewing official Excellent
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good	
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair	
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory	

Rated by [illegible] (Signature of rating official) Dep. Ch. FDZ/SEA (Title) 17 April 1950 (Date)

Reviewed by [illegible] (Signature of reviewing official) Act. Chief FDZ (Title) 17 April 50 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee [illegible] (Date) Report to employee [illegible]

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—23177-5

EOD 3 Oct. 49 [illegible]

Standard Form 63
August 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R016.2.

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL EFFICIENCY RATING

REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 3 October 1949 based on performance during period from 3 April '49 to 3 October '49

BROE, William V.
(Name of employee)

Operations Officer (Intelligence Officer) GS-12
(Title of position, service, and grade)

OSO, COPS, FDE, SEA, Division 4
(Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, and station)

Efficiency rating: "EXCELLENT"

(Signature)

4 January 1950
(Date of notification)

Chief, Employees Division
(Title)

Interpretation of Efficiency Rating

Your efficiency rating is an official record of the way you are doing the work of your job.

Excellent (E) means that performance in every important phase of the work was outstanding and there was no weakness in performance in any respect.

Very Good (VG) means that performance in at least half of the important phases of the work was outstanding and there was no weakness in performance in any respect.

Good (G) means that performance met requirements from an over-all point of view.

Fair (F) means that performance did not quite measure up to requirements from an over-all point of view.

Unsatisfactory (U) means that performance in a majority of important phases of the work did not meet job requirements.

Inspection

You are entitled to inspect your efficiency rating sheet (Standard Form 51), or a copy of it, upon request to your supervisor or personnel officer. You are also entitled to inspect the final ratings (not the rating forms) of all employees in your office or station.

Significance of Efficiency Ratings

An efficiency rating of "Good," "Very Good," or "Excellent" is necessary in order to receive a periodic within-grade salary advancement.

An efficiency rating of "Fair" requires a one-step salary reduction if an employee's pay rate is above the middle rate for his grade (the fourth step in six-rate grades).

An efficiency rating of "Unsatisfactory" requires that the employee be dismissed or reassigned to other work in which he could be reasonably expected to render satisfactory service.

Efficiency ratings are a factor in determining the order in which employees are affected by reduction in force.

Appeals

If you believe your rating is wrong, you should first discuss it with your supervisor or personnel officer. You have the right, if your position is subject to the Classification Act, to appeal your rating within certain time limits to a board of review established for your agency. Appeals or requests for additional information concerning appeals should be addressed to the Chairman, Board of Review, care of Civil Service Commission, Washington 25, D. C.

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.3.

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR ( ) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 3 October, 1949 based on performance during period from 3 April, 1949 to 3 October, 1949

BROE, William V. (Name of employee)

Operations Officer (Intelligence Officer) GS-1 (Title of position, service, and grade)

OSO, COPS, FDZ, SEA, Division 4 (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE
- ✓ if adequate
- − if weak
- + if outstanding

1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A.
2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position.
3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position.
   a. Do not rate on *elements in italics* except for employees in administrative, *supervisory, or planning* positions.
   b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.

CHECK ONE:
Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☑
All others ☐

- ____ (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
- ____ (2) Mechanical skill.
- ____ (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
- ____ (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
- + (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
- + (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
- ____ (7) Accuracy of operations.
- ____ (8) Accuracy of final results.
- + (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
- ✓ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
- ____ (11) Industry.
- + (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
- ____ (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? ____ (Yes or no))
- + (14) Ability to organize his work.
- ____ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
- ____ (16) Cooperativeness.
- + (17) Initiative.
- + (18) Resourcefulness.
- + (19) Dependability.
- ____ (20) Physical fitness for the work.
- ____ (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
- ✓ (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
- ____ (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
- ____ (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
- + (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
- ✓ (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
- ____ (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
- ____ (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
- ____ (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
- + (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
- ____ (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

- + (A) SECURITY
- ____ (B)
- ____ (C)

STANDARD
Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form

	Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory

Adjective Rating
Rating official: Ex
Reviewing official: Ex

Rated by ____ (Signature of rating official) Chief Ch. 4 FDZ (Title) NOV 30 1949 (Date)

Reviewed by Lloyd George (Signature of reviewing official) Ch. FDZ (Title) Nov 30 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 12-21-49 (Date) Report to employee Ex (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—20177-5

E20-010-RM 17 1949

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.3.

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 3/31/49 based on performance during period from 12/22/48 to 3/31/49

William V. Broe
(Name of employee)

Intelligence Officer P-5
(Title of position, service, and grade)

OSO, COPS FBZ
(Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE V if adequate − if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on *elements in italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	**CHECK ONE:** Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☐ All others ☐

...... (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
...... (2) Mechanical skill.
...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
+ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
+ (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
...... (7) Accuracy of operations.
✓ (8) Accuracy of final results.
✓ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
✓ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
...... (11) Industry.
✓ (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
...... (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? .... (Yes or no))
+ (14) Ability to organize his work.
...... (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
...... (16) Cooperativeness.
+ (17) Initiative.
+ (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
...... (20) Physical fitness for the work.
...... *(21) Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
✓ *(22) Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
...... *(23) Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
...... *(24) Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
+ *(25) Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
✓ *(26) Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
...... *(27) Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
...... *(28) Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
...... *(29) Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
+ *(30) Ability to make decisions.*
...... *(31) Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

+ (A) Sense of Security
...... (B) ....
...... (C) ....

STANDARD
Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form

	Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory

Adjective Rating
Rating official.. Excellent
Reviewing official..

Rated by Don Jensen (Signature of rating official) Dep. Ch. FBZ/SEA (Title) JUN 17 (Date)

Reviewed by [illegible] (Signature of reviewing official) Ch. FBZ (Title) 17 June 49 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee .... (Date) Report to employee .... (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—23177-3

14-00000

Standard Form No. 51
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50-R042.1

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

FILE COPY

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL File ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR ( ) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 12/21/48 based on performance during period from 6/12/48 to 12/21/48

William V. Broe (Name of employee) — Intelligence Officer P-5 (Title of position, service, and grade)

OSO, COPS (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE
- ✓ if adequate
- − if weak
- + if outstanding

1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 2823A.
2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position.
3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position.
   - a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions.
   - b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.

CHECK ONE:
Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☐
All others ☐

...... (1) Maintenance of *equipment*, tools, instruments.
...... (2) Mechanical skill.
...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
+ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
+ (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
+ (7) Accuracy of operations.
...... (8) Accuracy of final results.
...... (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
+ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
...... (11) Industry.
...... (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
...... (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? ...... (Yes or no))
...... (14) Ability to organize his work.
...... (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
...... (16) Cooperativeness.
✓ (17) Initiative.
+ (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
...... (20) Physical fitness for the work.

...... *(21) Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
...... *(22) Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
...... *(23) Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
...... *(24) Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
...... *(25) Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
...... *(26) Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
...... *(27) Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
...... *(28) Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
...... *(29) Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
...... *(30) Ability to make decisions.*
...... *(31) Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

...... (A) ......
...... (B) ......
...... (C) ......

STANDARD
Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form

	Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory

Adjective Rating
Rating official Excellent
Reviewing official ......

Rated by ...... (Signature of rating official) Dep. Chief FBZ (Title) 11 January 1949 (Date)

Reviewed by George (Signature of reviewing official) Ch FBZ (Title) 11 Jan 1949 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee ...... (Date) Report to employee ...... (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—28177-4

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. In order to arrive at an unprejudiced and independent evaluation, this report was prepared without any knowledge of Appraisal results.

3. This report summarizes the important facts and the relevant observations which have been discovered about the student by the various instructors during the student's course of training. The more complete data on the student are available in the files of the Training Branch, and may be examined by contacting the Chief of the Staff Training Division.

STUDENT'S NAME William V. BROE BRANCH FBZ/SEA
AITC XII
TRAINING PERIOD 13 Sept.-22 Oct. 1948 DATE OF REPORT 16 November 1948

NOTE: The facts, observations, and opinions reported in this evaluation are derived from and restricted to the eight weeks during which the employee was a student in the Staff Training Courses. Mr. Broe was absent from two of the four weeks of the Basic Intelligence Training Course. He was ill during part of the six weeks of the Advanced Intelligence Training Course. The present evaluation is made at the end of the Advanced Course and supersedes the tentative evaluation given for the Basic Course.

- -

PROJECTED JOB ASSIGNMENT: Intelligence Officer, Operations, Philippine Desk at Washington, D. C.

Mr. Broe received the following ratings during the Advanced Intelligence Training Course:

Interviewing and Interrogation	Satisfactory
Operations:	
1. Comprehension of Basic Principles of Operations	Excellent
2. Ability to Analyse and Use Operational Data	Excellent
a. Operational Planning Ability	Excellent
b. Attention to Detail	Superior
3. Ability to Analyse and to Handle Personalities and Situations	Excellent
a. Handling of Personal and Operational Security	Excellent
b. Ability to Establish and Maintain Control Over Others	Satisfactory

Counterespionage Problems:

1.	Processing	Satisfactory
2.	Planning	Satisfactory

Technical Intelligence:

1.	Appreciation of TI Fundamentals and Objectives	Satisfactory
2.	Handling of TI Problem	Excellent

Mr. Broe missed the second and third weeks of the Basic Intelligence Training Course, and during the Advanced Course, illness prevented him from doing the problems in reports writing. For that reason, no rating for reports writing is given for the Advanced Intelligence Training Course.

We strongly recommend that Mr. Broe spend at least four weeks on reports work under supervision of his Branch reports officers before assuming his desk responsibilities.

FOR THE CHIEF, TRS:

By

W. L. T.

cc: COPS
CPD

2

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.
2. In order to arrive at an unprejudiced and independent evaluation, this report was prepared without any knowledge of Appraisal results.
3. This report summarizes the important facts and the relevant observations which have been discovered about the student by the various instructors during the student's course of training. The more complete data on the student are available in the files of the Training Branch, and may be examined by contacting the Chief of the Staff Training Division.

STUDENT'S NAME **William V. BROE** BRANCH **FBZ/SEA**

TRAINING PERIOD **2-13 August 1948** DATE OF REPORT **2 September 1948**

NOTE: Mr. Broe was forced to miss the second and third weeks of the Basic Intelligence Training Course, hence this evaluation is incomplete.

- -

PROJECTED JOB ASSIGNMENT: Intelligence Officer, Operations, Philippines and Australian desk in Washington.

Mr. Broe received the following ratings during the Basic Intelligence Training Course:

Written Examinations - Communism	Satisfactory +
Report on Area Communism	Excellent
Problems:	
Observation and Description	Satisfactory
Interviewing	Excellent +
Basic Information Reporting Test	Mediocre +

It is suggested by Mr. Broe's reports instructor that he complete the Basic Course problems in reporting before attempting those of the Advanced Course. Mr. Broe is recommended for enrollment in the Advanced Intelligence Training Course.

FOR THE CHIEF, TRS:

By WLT

W. L. T.

cc: COPS
CFD

CONFIDENTIAL

2 August 1948

TO : Chief, FBZ/SEA

FROM : Chief Instructor, Administrative Training, TRS

SUBJECT: Rating of William BROE - 19-23 July 1948

1. Mr. William Broe attended Administrative Course #15 in accordance with your request. The following are the Chief Instructor's ratings of this trainee in particular subjects:

Field Supply Procedures - Mediocre
Accounting Procedures - Satisfactory

2. Mr. Broe passed the written examination on the CIA Security Regulations.

3. Since Mr. Broe has a Washington assignment, no tutorial administrative training has been arranged for him by this office

FOR THE CHIEF, TRS:

[illegible]

cc: CAS
CPD

CONFIDENTIAL

DD/M&S 73-3360 DDF

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

Executive Registry
73-3193

DATE
5 June 1973

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO. 056735	NAME (Last-First-Middle) BROE, William V.	BIRTHYEAR 1913	SEX M	TYPE EMPLOYEE Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT O-Director/IG	SD D	SCHEDULE EP	GRADE 05	STATION

BE AWARDED

Distinguished Intelligence Medal

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD **June 1948 - June 1973**

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. William V. Broe is hereby awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal in recognition of his outstanding service to the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 25 years. Serving in senior positions both in Headquarters and abroad, Mr. Broe has earned the respect of his colleagues for his skill, judgment, and strong leadership in responding to numerous crises. In addition, he has been a valuable advisor and consultant to top policy makers of the United States Government as well as to several foreign leaders. Culminating his career as Inspector General, he has demonstrated a wise and enlightened approach to the human aspects of Agency affairs. Mr. Broe has made singular and lasting contributions to the national security effort of our country, reflecting the highest credit on him and the Federal service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by ADD/O on 16 May 1973)

APPROVED

/s/ Vernon A. Walters

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

14 JUN 1973

DATE

SIGNATURE
/s/Harry B. Fisher

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
Harry B. Fisher

SIGNATURE
Signed Original

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
R.L. Austin, Jr.

FORM 8-69 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPP

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A PERSONAL DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.: 056735
2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle): BROE, WILLIAM V.
3. POSITION TITLE: Inspector General
4. GRADE: EP-V
5. SD: D
6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: O/Director/IG
7. OFFICE EXT. (If any): 6565
8. STATION: ☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD (Specify location)
9. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code): 4317 Saul Road, Kensington, Maryland
10. HOME PHONE: 946-1955
11. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED: USA by birth
12. RECOMMENDED AWARD: Distinguished Intelligence Medal
13. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT: 30 June 1973
14. POSTHUMOUS: ☐ YES ☒ NO
15. [illegible] OF KIN: Jean B. Broe
16. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
17. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code): Same
18. HOME PHONE: Same

SECTION B RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF HAZARD

19. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT. ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

20. FULL NAME	21. ORGN. TITLE	22. GRADE	23. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

24. FULL NAME	25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

26. LOCATION	27. INCLUSIVE DATES	28. TIME OF DAY

29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED
31. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO
32. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION C RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT, SERVICE, OR PERFORMANCE

33. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☒ YES ☐ NO
34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: Inspector General; Ops Officer; Chief of Station
35. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location): Office of the Director; Directorate of Operations
36. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSIGNED POSITION

Career Award -- See Section D

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED: June 1948 - June 1973
38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☒ NO
39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL WHO ASSISTED OR CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE

40. FULL NAME	41. ORGN. TITLE	42. GRADE	43. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE PERFORMANCE

44. FULL NAME	45. TYPE OF AWARD

FORM 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
9-68

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

[redacted]

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 013567

SECRET
(When Filled In)

0PP

SECTION D. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act. Enclose unclassified citation.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. (Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C, include dates of assignment and relief.) What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation. Enclose unclassified citation.

See Attachment

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES (Check (X) as applicable) IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR PERFORMANCE, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESSES OR INDIVIDUALS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY William E. Colby	48. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION Deputy Director for Operations	49. DATE 10 MAY 1973

SECTION E RECOMMENDATION FORWARDED THROUGH OFFICIALS CONCERNED FOR THEIR INFORMATION

50. HEAD OF D CAREER SERVICE *(Career service of nominee)*	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Deputy Director for Operations	DATE 1[illegible] MAY 1973
51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	TITLE AND SIGNATURE	DATE
52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	TITLE AND SIGNATURE	DATE

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

06f

Recommendation for Honor or Merit Award
William V. Broe, Distinguished Intelligence Medal

After an active and successful career as a Special Agent in the FBI, Mr. Broe entered the Agency in June 1948 and was assigned as the Southeast Asia Branch Chief in the Far East Division. His ability to make decisions, work effectively with both supervisors and subordinates, plus his dependability, initiative and attention to the broader aspects of his work were soon noted and have continued to characterize his long and productive career in the CIA.

In recognition of his long range potential, Mr. Broe was assigned to Manila in 1951 as the Chief of Station. In 1953 he was transferred to the important post of Deputy Chief of the China Mission in Japan. Here his leadership qualities were fully demonstrated. His skill in directing an imaginative, aggressive, operational program, while at the same time tempering his actions with mature judgment and smooth management talent, marked him as an officer who could assume even greater responsibilities. At this time his outstanding strength of dealing with people became clearly evident. Mr. Broe was assigned to the Chief of the China Branch in FE Headquarters in 1955. He successfully managed the large, complex branch with a high degree of skill. His enthusiasm for his work was an example for his subordinates.

His superior performance of duty was recognized with his being named the Deputy Chief of the FE Division in 1958. The late Desmond FitzGerald in evaluating Mr. Broe's performance of duty in this position, made the following comments which subsequent supervisors continued to agree with:

> "Mr. Broe is an unusually strong supervisor. His flair for warm but impartial relationships with subordinates has enabled him to develop a first hand understanding of the capabilities, shortcomings and problems of a very large proportion of all FE Division personnel. His direction does not lack firmness but is expressed in such a way that feelings are considered and best results are achieved."

Mr. Broe then was assigned in successive and successful tours of duty as Chief of Station, Tokyo, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division and finally as the Inspector General of CIA.

In those diverse assignments, Mr. Broe proved to be a valuable advisor and consultant to top policy makers of the United States Government as well as colleague of foreign governments, including Japanese, British and important Latin American government leaders. His handling of one crisis situation after another whether it was in the Far East, Latin America or in Washington, won Mr. Broe the fullest respect for his wise judgment and effective solutions which resulted for the overall benefit of the US Government. During this time, Mr. Broe continued to display his superior understanding of human relations for those working for him, resulting in a high morale for those associated with him and his missions.

In January 1972, Mr. Broe was promoted to the position of Inspector General, a post which recognized and made the fullest use of his wise and enlightened knowledge of the human side of this organization's affairs.

Based on his 26 years of a professional life which has made singular contributions to the national security and on his unique leadership, it is only fitting that upon his retirement Mr. Broe be recognized with the award of the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING	FILE
TO: Retirement Operations Branch Office of Personnel	DATE [illegible]
RETIREE [illegible]	CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Central Cover Staff, the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT		CIVIL SERVICE		CIARDS	DATE [illegible]			
COVER		OVERT ROUTINE		COVERT *(OFFICIAL COVER)* LOCK-UP		COVERT *(NOC)* SPECIAL	RETENTION OF AWARDS		YES		NO
CORRESPONDENCE		OVERT		COVERT		THRU CCS		

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE		U.S. GOV'T. CHECK				OTHER *(Payment instructions follow)*
TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE		CIA		CSC		OTHER *(MEMO FOLLOWS)*
REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION		YES		NO		INTERNAL TRANSFER

INSURANCE

FEGLI		OVERT		COVERT		MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD:

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE		YES		CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE		YES		NO		OVERT		COVERT

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

________________ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FORM 4-72 3429 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-9-13)

7 - OFF. PERS. FILE ROOM

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.
Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.
If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.
Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
056735	Broe, William V.	Aug 1913	0

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD xx☒ DELETE Bonnie J.	Daughter	17 September 1945	USA	Kensington, Maryland
2. ☐ ADD x☒x DELETE Susan C.	Daughter	28 December 1947	USA	Solon, Ohio

FORM 10-66 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOV 25 2 45 PM '70

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO	2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS	4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT	6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

No change from "Qualifications Supplement to Personal History Statement" submitted in December 1968 except as outlined in Section IV and Agency Overseas Service.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
24 November 1970	William V Broe William V. Broe

SECRET

23 November 1970

William V. Broe -- Addendum - SECTION III; Agency Overseas Service

Panama	TDY	67/05/15	67/05/18
London	TDY	67/11/27	67/12/01
London	TDY	68/10/24	68/10/31
La Paz	TDY	69/07/14	69/07/20
South America area	TDY	69/11/09	69/11/24
Mexico	TDY	69/12/10	69/12/14
Panama	TDY	70/02/09	70/02/12

FILE COPY OF STANDARD FORM 56

"AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS— FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM"

on file with the Retirement Operations Branch,
Office of Personnel (x3257).

14-00000

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) Broe	(first) William	(middle) V.	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) August 24 1913	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 032	 01	 8164
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY 056735			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)			

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
William V. Broe

DATE
13 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

FEB 19 2 25 PM '68
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
BEN[illegible] FILING

SECRET

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-133

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
[illegible]	[illegible]	WILLIAM	V.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 38, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
03	04	71	03	08	71		2			[illegible]	511

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION No.: WH 1-71

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 3/4 - 3/8/71

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
OCO		
C & L DIVISION, CTRS.	DATE [illegible]/71	SIGNATURE
C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-57 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION (4-10)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

745230 FEB 67

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6		7-24		25-26
056735	BROE	William	V.	~~WH~~ KA

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	UNIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	UNIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	✓	12	06	66	12	10	66	WE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☑ TRAVEL VOUCHER

☐ DISPATCH

☐ OTHER (Specify)

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: WH/1/03/64

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 12/6-10/66

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ C & L DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
☒ C & T DIVISION	1/31/67	

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

QUALIFICATIONS CODE SHEET

1-6	7-22	23-24
SERIAL NUMBER	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	OFFICE
156735	BROE, William V	51

25-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37	38	39	40
CURRENT POSITION	SERVICE DESIGNATION	GRADE	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	SEX	MARITAL STATUS NO. OF DEPEND.	EMPLOY. OF SPOUSE
013601	Di	15	13	1	1	0	4

41-42	43	44-45	46-47	48	49-50	51	52-54
FOREIGN RELATIVES	STENO AND TYPING ABILITY	SPECIAL WORK EXPERIENCE	MONTHS OVERSEAS	LICENSES	HOBBIES AND SPORTS	EDUCATION EXTENT	SPOUSE NATIONALITY

55-62			63-70			71-78			80
BACHELOR'S DEGREE			MASTER'S DEGREE			DOCTOR'S DEGREE			CARD NO. 1
MAJOR	COLLEGE	YEAR	MAJOR	COLLEGE	YEAR	MAJOR	COLLEGE	YEAR	

1-6	PRE-CIA EXPERIENCE (Civilian and Military)					COL. 80	
SERIAL NUMBER	7-12	7-12	7-12	7-12	7-12	CIRCLED ITEM	K
	7-12	7-12	7-12	7-12	7-12	NON-CIRCLED	2

1-6	CIA WORK EXPERIENCE					COL. 80	
SERIAL NUMBER	7-12	7-12	7-12	7-12	7-12	CIRCLED ITEM	L
	7-12	7-12	7-12	7-12	7-12	NON-CIRCLED	3

1-6	AREA KNOWLEDGE					COL. 80	
SERIAL NUMBER	7-10	7-10	7-10	7-10	7-10	CIRCLED ITEM	M
	7-10	7-10	7-10	7-10	7-10	NON-CIRCLED	4

REMARKS

FORM 669 REPLACES FORM 659, 1 JUN 55
4-57 AND FORM 659A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET

2 7K 60 31

19 MAY 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Broe
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division/DDP

SUBJECT : WH Participation in the Counterintelligence Operations Course No. 57, 4 - 22 April 1966

1. This is to note the excellent support provided the Operations School in its presentation of the Counterintelligence Operations Course No. 57 in April by Mr. Thomas Polgar and Mr. Joseph Vidal of your Division. Their presentations were of a highly professional calibre and were a major contribution to the success of the course.

2. We trust that we may again call upon your support for the 58th presentation of Counterintelligence Operations in June.

For: A Rodriguez
[illegible]
Director of Training

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

7

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION	1. DATE OF REQUEST 22 March 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer/Ch. WH

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/Chief

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ HQS/TDY Please Re-evaluation

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 20 April - 13 May 1966

STATION: See comment *

TDY OR PCS: TDY

TYPE OF COVER: State

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. [illegible] EVALUATION (One of which must be checked)

☒ YES XX

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Mary C. Wernig

Mary C. Wernig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GE56

EXT.: 6815

10. COMMENTS

*Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, Santiago, Asuncion, Buenos Aires.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFI[illegible] FOR TDY STA[illegible]
UNTIL [illegible]

DATE

[illegible] CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

Executive Registry
65-3993

DD/P 5-3286

Ltr, 6499th Support Group (CR), 11 June 1965, Letter of Commendation

2d Ind (AFNIN)

13 JUL 1965

Headquarters USAF, Washington, D. C. 20330

TO: Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters Building
2430 E Street
Washington, D. C.

1. The attached Letter of Commendation regarding Mr. William V. Broe ✓ is forwarded with pleasure.

2. It is always gratifying to note examples of outstanding cooperation and professionalism so necessary to our national interests.

3. I wish to add my expression of appreciation to Mr. Broe and your organization for this exemplary support.

Jack E Thomas
JACK E. THOMAS
Major General, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

1st Ind.

23 JUL 1965

TO: Chief, FE

The Director has noted these letters of commendation and has asked that his own appreciation for a fine performance be expressed to Mr. Broe.

L. K. White
Executive Director-Comptroller

HEADQUARTERS
6499TH SUPPORT GROUP (PACAF)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96594

11 JUN 1965

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: CR

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation

TO: CINCPACAF (DI)
HQ USAF (AFNIN)
Central Intelligence Agency
(Director of)
IN TURN

1. I wish to commend and make a matter of record the outstanding support and guidance rendered to this organization by Mr. William V. Broe, Special Assistant to the Ambassador, Tokyo, Japan, from the period of July 1963 to date.

2. Mr. Broe's efforts in support of this organization were exemplary. He gave freely of himself and of the resources at his disposal. In those instances where we were contemplating a new approach to obtaining aerospace data of priority national interest Mr. Broe provided for briefings by his specialists in the denied areas under consideration. His every approach was intended to intelligently present the information available concerning the difficulties to be encountered and rewards to be expected. He always left the United States Air Force personnel concerned secure in the knowledge that he fully supported any promising attempt to acquire data of national interest and that he did all in his power to expedite the acquisition of these data. This resulted in a most favorable operating milieu.

3. In all of our dealings with Mr. Broe, we found him to be friendly, highly objective, unswerving in his demands for professionalism, and a person of honor and integrity. We liked, trusted and respected him. Mr. Broe's demonstrated professionalism and ability to advise, stimulate and coordinate the efforts of the many diverse elements engaged in collection of information reflected favorably upon him and the Intelligence Community of the United States.

Walter C. Vitunac
WALTER C. VITUNAC
Colonel, USAF
Commander

Ltr, 6499th Support Group (CR), 11 Jun 65, Letter of Commendation

1st Ind (DI)

1 JUL 196

Headquarters PACAF, APO San Francisco 96553

TO: Headquarters USAF (AFNIN)
Central Intelligence Agency (Director of)
IN TURN

The assistance and cooperation given by Mr. William V. Broe have been noteworthy. His professional guidance and constant support have been distinct assets to the 6499th Support Group and its activities. It is a pleasure to add my appreciation for the invaluable contributions made by Mr. Broe.

DONALD C. SHULTIS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Intelligence

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6		7-24		25-26
56735	BROE	WILLIAM	V	56

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		
	1				06	14	61	JAPAN	375

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
IN 24579	6/14/61

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓ FINANCE DIVISION (M)	6/28/61	M. Marrie

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

R 3

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

143209 MAY 461

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	7-24			25-26
56735	BROE	WILLIAM	V.	FE 56

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39	FE (JAPAN)	
	2	03	10	61	03	20	61		802

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER - FE-421-61		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: T.O. FE-421-61

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 10-20 March 61

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓	FINANCE DIVISION	2 May 61	

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5	*(Print)*	6-23		24-25
56735	Broe	William	V.	51

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		39-41
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		39-41
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		
	2 ~~022~~	03	30	59	05	07	59	FE	802

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
952290 JUN 30 59	

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION ✓ FINANCE DIVISION	☐	DATE 7-7-59	SIGNATURE M. Hommel X-3958

FORM 6-58 1451a

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of William V. Broe

Effective 27 April 1961

The purpose of this memorandum is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are integrated and to set forth certain rights and obligations which are incident to your status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS-16 $15,515 per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of 27 April 1961. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected at FSR-2 and salary of $15,255 per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of twenty four months from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

Form 1535 Obsolete Previous Edition
9-60

SECRET

(4-12)

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and (except as provided in paragraph three (3) above) allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they are less than or equal to the salary and allowance payments due on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due, the difference will be credited to your payroll account with this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due, the overage will be remitted to this organization at designated intervals, presently _________________________. Computations hereunder will be made on the basis of the aggregate gross due and received provided, however, that in computing remittances for overage Federal and, if applicable, District of Columbia income taxes withheld by your cover facility against the overage may be deducted. To assure timely accuracy in your payroll account with this organization you are expected to immediately report cover facility payroll changes.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integration into your cover facility, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and at your personal expense you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half per cent) on the basis of your cover salary or your salary from this organization, whichever is the greater.

b. If you receive taxable income from both your cover facility and this organization, necessary adjustments for Federal, and if applicable, District of Columbia income tax purposes will be made in conformance with instructions received from this organization.

c. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with the rules and regulations of this organization.

d. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with your cover facility of any status with your cover based on your services performed with that organization at the request of this organization.

SECRET

5. A portion of your annual leave and all the sick leave which has accrued to your credit at the time of your integration shall be transferred to your cover facility. The remainder of your leave will be held by this organization in escrow pending the completion of your integration. If the sum of your accumulated annual leave with your cover facility and this organization exceeds the maximum accumulation entitlement afforded you under the regulations of this organization, the excess will be forfeited. If possible, such forfeiture will be accomplished by reducing the leave credit in your escrow account with this organization. While integrated, you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon completion of your integration, your accrued annual and sick leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lumpsum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization including income taxes withheld by your cover facility.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

William V. Broe

T&R

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) Broe,	(First) William	(Middle) V.	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER None

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED Silver Spring, Maryland	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE 4317 Saul Road, Kensington, Md.	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE South Weymouth, Mass.	DATE OF MARRIAGE 21 Nov. 42
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Jean Barbara Broe	4317 Saul Road, Kensington, Md.	Whitehall 2-3106	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Bonnie	same	F	17 Sept 45
Susan	same	F	28 Dec 47
Kristine	same	F	11 Apr 50
Barbara	same	F	31 Oct 55
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
Deceased			
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
Agnes M. Broe	4317 Saul Road, Kensington, Md.	Whitehall 2-3106	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY, IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
wife and mother

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) BROE, Mrs. Jean Barbara	RELATIONSHIP wife
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 4317 Saul Drive, Kensington, Maryland	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER Whitehall 2-3106
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE None	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION n. a.

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES X NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES X NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) YES X NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Filled In)

5.	VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Agency Credit Union (My name Only)
Kensington Bank, Kensington, Md., (Joint account) William V and Jean Barbara Broe

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

cy with Mrs. Jean Barbara Broe - 4317 Saul Drive, Kensington, Maryland

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

Mr. and Mrs. Philip Causer - Cohassett, Mass.

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

My wife)Mrs. Jean Barbara Broe

6.	ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington, D. C.	16 Feb. 1961	William V. Broe

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE

SUBJECT: Receipt of Gifts from Foreign Official

REFERENCE: Memo for D/Pers from C/FE, dtd. 28 Oct. 59
(DD/P 4-9032), same subject

1. Reference reports [illegible] receipt of one silk necktie and one lady's scarf by each of the following officials:

Mr. Robert A. Amory
Mr. William V. Broe
Mr. Norman Horton
Mr. Lothar Metal
Mr. Edward B. Kora
Mr. Kinloch Bull

2. Considering the circumstances under which these gifts were tendered and their insignificant intrinsic value, we concur in your recommendation that they be retained by the recipients for whatever use these officers may desire.

Gordon M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
2 & 1 - Addressee
1 - DD/I
1 - Asst. to DD/P
1 - D/Security
1 - D/Pers Subject file
1 - D/Pers Reader Chrono
6 - Subjects' files
OD/Pers/EHBond:sjc (3 Nov. 59)

FE 4455

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Broe

SUBJECT: Appreciation of Participation in the Personnel Officer Training Course

1. I wish to express my appreciation for your participation in the recent running of the Personnel Officer Training Course. We believe the course was successful in achieving the objectives set for it.

2. The major factor in the success of our course was the contribution of many like yourself who willingly undertook the preparation and presentation of their lectures. We think the opportunity to hear these represented a most valuable experience for the students.

3. It is my hope that we may continue to call upon you in connection with subsequent presentations of the course.

GORDON M. STEWART
Director of Personnel

SECRET

13 OCT 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT: Report of Gifts

REFERENCE: Memo for D/Pers from C/FE dtd 29 Sept 58, Subject: Gifts to Agency Personnel

Referenced memorandum reports the receipt of gifts by several Agency employees from recent visitors. These gifts are determined to be of insignificant intrinsic value and may be retained by the recipients for whatever use they desire.

/s/ Gordon M. Stewart

Gordon M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - Ex O-DD/P
1 - Recorder, HAB
1 - D/Sec
1 - D/Pers Subject File
1 - D/Pers Number Chrono
1 - Subjects' Files
Satoshi Nagase
William V. Broe
Robert P. Wheeler
William E. Carter
Nageeb C. Trabulsi

OD/Pers/EMBond:sm (10 Oct 58)

SECRET

4-2108

CONFIDENTIAL

25 SEP 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA: Director of Security
Attn: Chief, Policy Staff

SUBJECT: Gifts to Agency Personnel

REFERENCE: Field Regulation 20-644

The following Agency personnel received gifts as noted from three Cabinet Research Chamber visitors during their recent visit to Washington:

	Approx. value
Satoshi Nagase	
Box of nori	$2.00
Set of chopsticks (laquered)	.75
William V. Broe	
1 woodblock print	1.50
Robert P. Wheeler	
Box of nori	2.00
William N. Center	
1 woodblock prints	3.00
Nageeb O. Trabulsi	
Woodblock print	1.50
1 jar Japanese sauce	.50

Signed Robert P. Wheeler

DESMOND FITZGERALD
Chief, Far East Division

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : PDC DATE: 23 June 1953

FROM : Chief, FE

SUBJECT: BROE, William V.
Letter of Commendation

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of the following letters which are to be included in the personnel file of Mr. William V. Broe:

Letter of transmittal to Mr. Allen Dulles from Colonel A. G. Gabriel

Letter to Mr. Broe from President Elpidio Quirino

Letter to Colonel Gabriel from Lucas V. Madamba, Assistant Executive Secretary

2. The originals of these letters have been retained in FE/3/FI.

George E. Aurell
Chief, FE

Originator: Roberta J. Meyer

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

May 7, 1953

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence
Agency, Washington D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a letter of His Excellency, Elpidio Quirino, President of the Republic of the Philippines in appreciation of the services of Mr. William Vincent Broe, who has been working with the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, in an advisory capacity since April 1951 and whose tour of duty is ending very shortly.

Very respectfully,

A. G. GABRIEL
Colonel, [illegible], AFP
Coordinator, National
Intelligence

Manila, March 25, 1953

Dear Colonel Gabriel:

In connection with your letter of February 27, 1953, I am sending you herewith a letter of appreciation, addressed to Mr. William Vincent Broe, Civil Affairs Attache of the Embassy of the United States.

Sincerely yours,

LUCAS V. MADAMBA
Assistant Executive Secretary

IR/smg

Encl.

Col. A. G. Gabriel
Coordinator, National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency
Manila

MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA

March 24, 1953

My dear Mr. Broe:

Your forthcoming departure on account of the termination of your present tour of duty in this country has come to my attention. Permit me, in this connection, to express to you my sincere appreciation for the unselfish cooperation and valuable assistance which you have given the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency. Your untiring efforts have contributed much towards maintaining harmonious relations between your country and mine.

With warmest personal regards to you and Mrs. Broe, I am

Sincerely,

ELPIDIO QUIRINO
President of the Philippines

William Vincent Broe, Esquire
Civil Affairs Attaché
Embassy of the United States
Manila

SECRET

UV

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE	DIVISION
NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE)	BRANCH 050
	SECTION FDZ

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
		DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
Dept. of Justice, FBI		30	Mar	1942 ✓	14	May	1948 ✓	16	1	6
Organization		21	Jun	1948 ✓	31	12	51	11	6	3
Total Civilian Service								27	7	9

SCD-05/05/42
Verified 5/24/57
B. [illegible]

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
Total Military Service									

III CERTIFICATION

[illegible] - William Vincent Broe

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

11 March 1952
DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE		
DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
27	7	9

as of 12/31/51

AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT made this 20th day of February, 1951, effective the 21st day of February, 1951, by and between the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the Government), as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, and William Vincent Broe (hereinafter referred to as the Employee).

RECITALS

A. The Government desires the services of the Employee for CIA under circumstances requiring the Employee to receive a Foreign Service Staff Corps designation from the Department of State and proposes to send the Employee overseas to Manila, Republic of the Philippines for operations in the general area of ____________.

B. The Employee desires as an employee of the Government to serve CIA abroad under the supervision and control of the Assistant Director for Special Operations, CIA, (ADSO) and is willing to accept a designation in the Foreign Service Staff Corps with the obligations thereof.

In consideration of the premises, the mutual covenants and promises herein contained, and for other good and valuable considerations, the parties hereto agree as follows:

ARTICLE I. Relationship of Employee to the Department of State. The Employee, in so far as possible, shall abide by all the rules, regulations, and customs of the Foreign Service of the United States which affect personnel of the Foreign Service Staff Corps in order to appear as a normal member of the Foreign Service establishment.

1. The Employee shall rigidly comply with the provisions of Title X, Part A of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, prohibiting officers and employees of the Foreign Service from:

(a) Wearing uniforms;
(b) Accepting presents from foreign governments;
(c) Engaging in business abroad;
(d) Correspondence on affairs of foreign governments;
(e) Political, racial, religious, or color discrimination.

2. The Chief of the Foreign Service establishment and certain other key members of his staff will know about the Employee's status and relationship under the terms of the TOP SECRET agreement between the Department of State and CIA. Other personnel may discover that there are certain irregularities in travel orders, position numbers, pay accounts, and other internal administrative procedures of the Foreign Service. Nevertheless, the Employee shall not divulge his relationship to CIA except with the expressed approval of the ADSO. While serving abroad, he shall for normal administration be under the control of the Chief of the Foreign Service establishment to which he is attached, but for operations, including travel as specified below, he shall be under the control of CIA.

3. The travel of the Employee shall be governed as follows:

(a) For temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States within or beyond the Employee's stipulated area, he shall perform CIA operational travel as directed by the ADSO or his designee with the consent of the Chiefs of the Foreign Service establishment involved. TD travel customary and necessary in the performance of routine Foreign Service Staff functions may be performed without clearance from the ADSO.

(b) For any travel to the United States, either temporary duty or permanent change of station, the Employee shall travel only at the direction of the ADSO after clearance has been arranged through the State Department in Washington.

(c) All travel will be directed and performed in accordance with Foreign Service rules and regulations.

4. Although the Employee's Foreign Service Staff Corps title, location, appointment, Foreign Service class, and other pertinent information may be published in the Foreign Service list and other publications of the Department of State, such listings shall not affect his employment and the obligations and duties stipulated in this contract.

5. All payments to be made under this contract, including reimbursement for travel expenses, shall be made to the Employee by the Department of State except payments referred to in ARTICLE II, Section 4.

ARTICLE II. Relationship of Employee to CIA. Although for all intents and purposes it will appear as though the Employee is employed by the Department of State as indicated in ARTICLE I above, he shall in fact be employed by and under the operational control of CIA. In so far as possible, he will be expected to abide by the rules, regulations, customary practices, and courtesies of the Foreign Service, but his ultimate responsibility will be to CIA. In the event of any conflict of authority in the field between the Department of State and CIA, the matter shall be referred to the ADSO for resolution.

1. The line of authority for the Employee shall be as follows:

(a) Senior Representative of OSO at Foreign Service establishment.
(b) OSO Foreign Branch Chief in Washington.
(c) Chief of Operations, OSO.
(d) ADSO
(e) Director of CIA.

2. All travel shall be directed by the ADSO in accordance with ARTICLE I, Section 3. The Employee shall request appropriate Foreign Service clearance for travel through the Senior OSO Representative at the Foreign Service establishment, who shall be responsible for arranging such clearance.

3. It is understood and agreed that the Employee's overseas assignment is to be for a minimum period of two years from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, unless terminated by the Government for its convenience. If the assignment is terminated in less than twenty-four months at the Employee's request, the following shall prevail:

(a) If the Employee resigns in less than twelve months from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, he shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses involved in the transportation of himself, his immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the foreign station, and pay all such expenses for return to the United States. Such expenses for return to the United States and amounts expended by the Government on account of such travel and transportation shall be considered a debt due by the Employee to the United States.

(b) If the Employee desires to terminate between the twelfth and twenty-fourth month from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, he shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of himself, his immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the United States.

4. If deemed necessary by CIA, the Employee may be reimbursed or advanced funds for operational expenses. Such amounts must be advanced or reimbursement made in accordance with CIA regulations, which require a full accounting of the amounts expended by the Employee. Therefore, the Employee will be required to account fully for any such funds advanced or reimbursed in accordance with CIA regulations.

ARTICLE III. Overseas Allowances and Transportation Expenses. When specifically authorized by the ADSO, the expenses of travel and transportation of the Employee, his immediate family, household goods and effects, including personally owned automobile and other allowances, will be paid the Employee in accordance with the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and regulations issued thereunder by the Department of State. When authorized by the ADSO, the Employee shall be paid a quarters allowance, cost of living allowance, or special foreign living allowance in accordance with the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and regulations issued thereunder. The amount of quarters and cost of living allowances and the special foreign living allowance is set forth in Bureau of the Budget Circular A-8, which is amended periodically to reflect adjustments in [illegible]

ARTICLE IV. Annual and Sick Leave. The Employee shall be permitted annual leave, sick leave, and leave of absence in accordance with Title IX, Part D of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Under such Act, the Employee may be granted not to exceed sixty calendar days annual leave of absence with pay in each year. Annual leave which the Employee may receive and which is not used in any one year shall be accumulated for succeeding years until it totals 180 days. Sick leave with pay may be granted to the Employee at the rate of fifteen calendar days each calendar year and may be accumulated for succeeding years until it totals 1[illegible] days.

1. If the Employee is transferred from another Government agency to this position, any annual or sick leave standing to his credit in such Agency, may be transferred, if appropriate, in accordance with E. O. [illegible], 27 March 1947 issued pursuant to Section 9[illegible] of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

ARTICLE V. Return to the United States. The Employee shall be ordered to the United States on leave of absence or permanent change of station upon completion of two years continuous service abroad or as soon as possible thereafter.

SECRET

ARTICLE VI. Retirement. The Employee occupies a position within the purview of the Civil Service Retirement Act. Accordingly, deductions shall be made at the rate provided by law (presently [illegible]) from the Employee's basic salary and placed in the Civil Service Retirement Fund. The Employee may not avail himself of the provisions of the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System, provided for in Title VIII of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

ARTICLE VII. Medical Care and Hospitalization. In the event of illness or injury to the Employee requiring hospitalization not the result of vicious habit, intemperance, or misconduct on his part, and incurred in the line of duty while assigned abroad, the expenses of treatment of such illness or injury at a suitable hospital or clinic, and transportation expenses to such hospital or clinic may be paid by the Government in accordance with Title IX, Part E of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Under appropriate regulations, a physical examination of the Employee will be made, together with necessary inoculations, or vaccinations, or the expense thereof will be paid to the Employee.

1. In the event of the death or disability of the Employee, the Employee or his dependents shall be afforded the benefits of the United States Employees' Compensation Act of 7 September 1916, as amended

ARTICLE VIII. Equipment. The Employee may be furnished technical equipment and supplies to assist in the rendition of services hereunder, including an automobile where necessary. The Employee shall be responsible for such equipment and supplies issued to him by CIA in accordance with CIA Property Regulations. All such material shall remain the property of the Government regardless of any apparently conflicting ownership or the manner of registrations.

ARTICLE IX. Salary. The Employee shall receive a basic salary of $7,710.00 FSS-3 per year in accordance with Section 415 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. In-class promotions shall be granted to the Employee in accordance with regulations established by the Department of State pursuant to Title VI, Part [illegible], Section [illegible] of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Other than within [illegible] will be made only [illegible] specifically authorized by the ADDO.

ARTICLE X. Continuance of Pay and Allowances. If the Employee is determined by CIA to be absent in a status of "Missing", "Missing in Action", "Interned in a Neutral Country", "Captured by an Enemy", "Beleaguered", or "Besieged" he shall for the period he is determined to be in any such status be entitled to receive or to have credited to his account the same pay and allowances to which he was entitled at the beginning of such period of absence. Continuance of pay and allowances as specified above shall be as prescribed in the Missing Persons Act of 1942 (50 U.S.C.A. App 1001-1015, 7 March 1942).

ARTICLE XI. General. The Employee shall comply with the following provisions, and violation thereof by the Employee shall be deemed a breach of this contract.

1. In participating in the programs and activities of any private organization, the Employee shall make it clear that the Department of State has no official connection with such organization and that it does not sponsor or sanction the viewpoints which he may express. In general, his relations with private organizations shall be governed by applicable Foreign Service Regulations.

2. Neither the Employee nor the members of his family shall act as correspondents for American or foreign newspapers, press syndicates, or associations unless special authorization has been obtained in advance from the ADSO. He shall not write for publication any article or other manuscript on political or controversial subjects. Articles or manuscripts on nonpolitical or noncontroversial subjects shall be submitted to the ADSO for review and approval prior to their submission to a publisher.

3. Neither the Employee nor members of his family shall correspond privately on personnel or other official matters with members of Congress, or officers in the Department of State, CIA, or other Governmental agencies.

4. Members of the Employee's family shall not be employed in the same Foreign Service office except during grave emergencies or when special authorization has been obtained in advance of employment from both the Department of State and CIA.

5. Before contracting marriage with a person of foreign nationality, the Employee shall request and obtain permission from the appropriate officials in both the Department of State and CIA. Any such marriage with an alien without obtaining advance permission shall be deemed a breach of this contract and shall result in termination of service with the Government.

6. In the event the Employee desires to resign from the service overseas, he shall submit a written resignation addressed to the ADSO, who will take appropriate steps to clear the matter with the Department of State.

ARTICLE XII. Security. This contract contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act (50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as amended). Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Violation of this ARTICLE or any security agreement signed by the Employee with the Government shall result in immediate disciplinary action, which may include suspension, separation from Government service, and may subject the Employee to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act.

1. The termination of this contract will not release the Employee from the provisions of any security oaths which he may be required to take by CIA.

2. The Employee shall not publish, transmit, or divulge in any manner, information received by him as the result of his employment by the Government under this contract without specific written authority from the Director, CIA.

ARTICLE XIII. Orders and Directives. Orders and directives received by the Employee from competent authority, including instructions received in briefing and training, shall be complied with by the Employee. No promises or commitments to the Employee of any nature whatsoever, beyond and in addition to the terms hereof, shall be binding on the Government unless and until such promise or commitment is reduced to writing and approved by an authorized official of CIA, and such writing placed with this contract thereby becoming an amendment hereto.

ARTICLE XIV. Amendments. The Government may at any time amend this contract and may terminate this contract upon thirty day prior notice to the Employee. If the Government proposes to amend this contract by reducing the salary provided for in ARTICLE IX (including class promotions, or other authorized increases, if any) and such reduction is unacceptable to the Employee, resignation by the Employee for such reason shall be considered as a termination of this contract for the convenience of the Government. Where the Employee is directed to proceed to a new post on a permanent change of station by the ATSO, this contract will be deemed to have been amended to the extent of such change.

SECRET

ARTICLE XV. Special Provisions. The following special provisions shall apply to the Employee under this contract:

Part (a) of Section 3 of ARTICLE II shall not apply to employees who have served in a departmental position with CIA or who have served an overseas tour of duty with CIA, and in such case, part (b) of Section 3 of ARTICLE II shall be deemed amended to read as follows: "(b) If the Employee desires to terminate or return to the United States prior to the expiration of twenty-four months from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, he shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of himself, his immediate family, household goods and personal effects to the United States."

A lump sum payment for annual leave is to be paid up to 20 February 1951. Sick leave is to be held in escrow until such time as subject reverts to GS-Status, at which time, accrued sick leave will be credited.

In the event any of the provisions in this Article are inconsistent with the provisions of any other Article in this contract, the provisions of this Article XV, shall govern and be determinative of the rights and obligations under this contract.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY

CHIEF, PERSONNEL DIVISION

William V. Barr

(Employee)

WITNESS:

Harold H Pfeefe

CHIEF, OVERSEAS BRANCH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Date 5 February 1951

Dear Mr. William V. Broe:

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective 4 February 1951.

Position: Intelligence Officer (Chief)

Base Salary: GS-13 $7600.00

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave in accordance with Civil Service Commission rules and regulations, or such other provisions of law or regulations as may be established in lieu thereof.

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with CIA Regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside continental United States, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by CIA Regulations.

3. As a condition of your employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the continental United States. Each time you are so assigned, unless otherwise specified in advance by CIA, you will be required to remain at the post to which assigned for a period of 24 months from the date of arrival thereat, unless sooner transferred, reassigned or separated for reasons beyond your control. If you wish to return to the United States for personal reasons during that period, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

4. If this employment is for assignment to an overseas post, it is understood and agreed that, unless earlier separated for reasons beyond your control, you will remain in Government service for 12 months after your arrival at your first overseas post, and if you violate this agreement, any money expended by the United States on account of your travel and the transportation of your immediate family and household goods will be considered a debt due to the United States.

5. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of six months from date of employment. In the event

either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

6. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of CIA. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by Civil Service rules and regulations.

Official authorized to sign letters of appointment.

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by CIA.

William V. Broe
Employee

15 February 1951
Date

Form No. 51-104
June 1948

Standard Form No. 61a
Approved January 28 1943
U S Civil Service Commission
C. S. C. Dept. Cir No 409

OATH OF OFFICE, AFFIDAVIT, AND DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or Establishment) (Bureau or Division) WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of Employment)

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I, WILLIAM VINCENT BROE Do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT

Do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence; and that during such time as I am an employee of the Federal Government, I will not advocate nor become a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence.

C. DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

Do further certify that (1) I have not paid or offered or promised to pay any money or other thing of value to any person, firm, or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment; (2) I will inform myself of and observe the provisions of the Civil Service law and rules and Executive orders concerning political activity, political assessments, etc., as quoted on the attached Information for Appointee, and [strike out either (3) or (4)]

(3) the answers given by me in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this sheet are true and correct;

~~(4) the answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. ...., dated ...., 19...... filed with the above-named department or establishment, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date, except for the following (if necessary, use additional sheet; if no exceptions write "none"; if (4) is executed, the reverse of this sheet need not be used):~~

William V. Broe
(Signature of Appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 21st day of June A. D., 19 48

at Washington (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL] Chapter 145, Title II, Sec. [illegible]
Act of June 26, 1943

Elizabeth Morrison
(Signature of Officer)

Appointment Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown

16—32884-2

21 June 1948 (Date of Entrance on Duty)

Operations Officer, P-5 $6144.60 (Position to which appointed)

8-24-13 (Date of Birth)

AFFIDAVIT

STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(DEPT. OR ESTAB.)
(BUREAU OR OFFICE)

WASHINGTON, D. C.
(PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT)

I, WILLIAM VINCENT BROE, DO HEREBY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I AM NOT ENGAGED IN ANY STRIKE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT I WILL NOT SO ENGAGE WHILE AN EMPLOYEE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; THAT I AM NOT A MEMBER OF AN ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES THAT ASSERTS THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT I WILL NOT WHILE A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE BECOME A MEMBER OF SUCH AN ORGANIZATION.

William V. Broe
(SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE OR APPOINTEE)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 21st DAY OF June, 1948 AT Washington, STATE OF D. C.

Elizabeth Morrison
Appointment Clerk
Chapter 145, Title II, Sec. 206
Act of June 26, 1943.

FORM NO. 57-24
SEP 1946

(1590)

FORM DSP-34
7-1-48
FORMERLY FS-372

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

BUDGET BUREAU NO. 47-R271.1
APPROVAL EXPIRES AUGUST 31, 1950

THIS SPACE FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

INSTRUCTIONS—Answers to all questions must be typed or printed. All questions must be answered fully. If sufficient space has not been provided for your answer to any question, complete your answer under item # 37.

—— PREVIOUS —— CARDED —— ACKNOWLEDGED
—— INDEXED —— INVESTIGATED —— ACTION
CODE —— OTHER ——

DATE OF APPLICATION: 7 December 1950

POSITION APPLIED FOR: Foreign Service Staff Officer

THIS SPACE FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden, if any): BROE, William Vincent

2. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN KNOWN BY ANY OTHER NAME? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

3a. PERMANENT ADDRESS (Place from which transportation will be authorized if appointed. Street number and name): 832 Labella Walk

3b. CITY, POSTAL ZONE, STATE: Falls Church, Virginia

4. STATE OF WHICH YOU ARE A LEGAL RESIDENT: Virginia

5. PRESENT ADDRESS IF DIFFERENT FROM ABOVE:

PRESENT BUSINESS PHONE: ——

PRESENT HOME PHONE: JE 3-7983

6. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 24 August 1913

7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, state, or country): Amesbury, Massachusetts, U.S.A.

8a. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED? N. A.

8b. IF A NATURALIZED CITIZEN, PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: N. A.

9. SEX ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

10. HEIGHT 6 FT. 0 IN.

11. WEIGHT 185 LBS.

12. MARITAL STATUS ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ SEPARATED

13. WHAT IS THE LOWEST BASE SALARY, EXCLUSIVE OF ALLOWANCES YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ PER ANNUM

14. WHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE IF ANY ON YOUR IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY FOR DUTY IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD?

15. FULL NAME OF HUSBAND/WIFE (If wife, maiden name): Joan Barbara Causey

b. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 March 1920

c. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, state, or country): Winthrop, Massachusetts

d. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED? N. A.

e. IF NATURALIZED, PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE. N. A.

16. DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH
Mrs. William V. Broe	Wife	4 March 1920
Mrs. Agnes N. Broe	Mother	8 November 1883
Bonnie Joan Broe	Daughter	17 September 1945
Susan Carruth Broe	Daughter	29 December 1947
Kristine Elizabeth Broe	Daughter	11 April 1950

17. WHICH DEPENDENTS WOULD YOU WISH TO ACCOMPANY YOU ABROAD?
All

18a. FATHER'S NAME: John Jones Broe

b. PLACE OF BIRTH: Amesbury, Massachusetts

c. OCCUPATION: Deceased

d. PRESENT ADDRESS: N. A.

e. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DID FATHER EVER OBTAIN U.S. CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO N. A.

19a. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME: Agnes Nora Forsythe

b. PLACE OF BIRTH: Boston, Massachusetts

c. OCCUPATION IF ANY: None

d. PRESENT ADDRESS: 832 Labella Walk, Falls Church, Virginia

e. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DID MOTHER EVER OBTAIN U.S. CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO N. A.

20a. CAN YOU TAKE DICTATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO W.P.M.

b. ARE YOU A STENOTYPIST? ☐ YES ☒ NO W.P.M.

c. CAN YOU TYPE BY TOUCH SYSTEM? ☐ YES ☒ NO. W.P.M.

d. NAME OTHER OFFICE MACHINES YOU OPERATE: ——

21. MILITARY STATUS

a. IF YOU HAVE BEEN IN THE ARMED FORCES OR THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE IN WHAT SERVICE AND BRANCH DID YOU SERVE? *(e.g. U.S. Army: Field Artillery)* N. A.		b. SERVICE OR SERIAL NUMBER
c. DATE OF ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY	d. RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF ENTRY	e. DATE OF HONORABLE DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION
f. RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION		g. PRESENT RATE OR RANK IF ON ACTIVE DUTY

22a. WHAT PERTINENT FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS HAVE YOU TAKEN? *(Give year, title, and grade received)*

b. DO YOU HAVE A PERMANENT CIVIL SERVICE STATUS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

c. IF NOW EMPLOYED IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GIVE PRESENT GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE GS-13, July 1950

23. HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR A POSITION UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR TAKEN AN EXAMINATION FOR A POSITION UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE?
☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE PARTICULARS UNDER ITEM #37.

24. HAVE YOU EVER HELD A POSITION UNDER A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? *(Including service in the Armed Services of a foreign power)*
☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

25. OUTLINE YOUR TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE ABROAD GIVING DATES, PURPOSE, AND PLACES. *(If not while in the Armed Forces give number, date, and place of issuance of American passport.)*

None

26. FOREIGN LANGUAGES *(Name and indicate the extent of your competence, i.e. Excellent, Good, Fair).*

a. LANGUAGE	b. READ	c. WRITE	d. SPEAK	e. UNDERSTAND
None				

27. EDUCATION

a. GRADE SCHOOL — CIRCLE HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [✓ 8]

	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED		DEGREES CONFERRED	MAJOR SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
b. HIGH SCHOOLS OR PREPARATORY SCHOOLS	Amesbury High School Amesbury, Massachusetts	1927	1931	4				
	Governor Dummer Academy ~~South Byfield, Mass.~~	1934	1935	1				
c. COLLEGES OR UNIVERSITIES	Bowdoin College Brunswick, Maine	1935	1939			A.B.	Biology Chemistry	
d. OTHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OR TRAINING SCHOOLS								

28. EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS. *(In the spaces provided below describe every position which you have held since you first began to work. Start with present position and work back to the first position which you held. Account for all periods of unemployment and state reasons of any unemployment indicated). Use continuation sheet if more space is required.*

PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(Month, year)* 20 Feb 1951
FROM: 21 June 1948 TO: present

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION (5)
Analyst

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $6400 PER YR.
PRESENT $7600 PER YR.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(City, state)*
Washington, D. C.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
Central Intelligence Agency

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
5 men, 3 stenographers, 3 clerks

NAME AND TITLE OF YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Walter Bedell Smith

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK Supervision of personnel processing and collating intelligence received from various government agencies.

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT
Desire to enter foreign service

IF CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, [illegible] WE APPROACH PRESENT EMPLOYER?
☒ [illegible] ☐ NO

14-00000

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year)
FROM May 30, 1942 TO: May [illegible] 1948

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state)
Cleveland, Ohio; Youngstown, Ohio; Detroit, Mich. Washington, D. C.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
Federal Bureau of Investigation

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
D. A. Ladd, Assistant Director

REASON FOR LEAVING Desire to enter international intelligence field.

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Special Agent
Supervisor

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ 3200 PER YR.
FINAL $ 6400 PER YR.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Investigations of violations of laws within the jurisdiction of the FBI in the field.

Supervising such investigations at Headquarters, Washington, D. C.

④

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year)
FROM May 1941 TO: November 1941

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state)
Boston, Massachusetts

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
General Motors Acceptance Corporation

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
4 field representatives

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

REASON FOR LEAVING Reduction in forces due to curtailment of automobile production.

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Credit Manager

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $1800 PER YR.
FINAL $1800 PER YR.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Processing credit applications and supervising collections.

⑤

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year)
FROM: August 1939 TO: May 1941

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state)
Portland, Maine; Quincy, Massachusetts

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company
Brookline Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
1 assistant; 1 clerk

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
S. B. Eaves, Store Manager

REASON FOR LEAVING
To advance myself.

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Budget Sales Manager

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $1200 PER YR.
FINAL $1200 PER YR.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Directing the retail budget sales in a Firestone Sales and Service store. Handling credit applications and collections.

⑥

[illegible] POSITIONS HELD FOR LESS THAN THREE MONTHS AND PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT (List—beginning with most recent)

DURATION FROM	DURATION TO	POSITION	NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER OR REASON FOR UNEMPLOYMENT	STARTING AND FINAL SALARY PER ANNUM
Nov 1941	Mar 1942	Unemployed	Awaiting appointment to F. B. I.	

[illegible]. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION?
☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

[illegible]. HAVE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER?
☐ YES ☒ NO

B. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER TREATMENT FOR A MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISORDER?
☐ YES ☒ NO

C. WITHIN THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS, HAVE YOU FREQUENTLY USED INTOXICATING BEVERAGES TO EXCESS?
☐ YES ☒ NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER HAD TUBERCULOSIS?
☐ YES ☒ NO

E. WERE YOU EVER MEDICALLY DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED FORCES?
☐ YES ☒ NO

IF ANY OF YOUR ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES" GIVE FULL PARTICULARS UNDER ITEM #37.

32. DOES YOUR FINANCIAL POSITION PERMIT DISCHARGE OF ALL DEBTS INCURRED? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "NO" STATE UNDER ITEM #37 THE NAMES OF CREDITORS, AMOUNTS DUE TO EACH, AND DATES ON WHICH THE OBLIGATIONS WERE CONTRACTED.	D. IF NOW RESIDING ABROAD HAVE YOU EVER PAID A U.S. INCOME TAX? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE YEAR AND OFFICE OF LAST PAYMENT. N.A.

33. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION THAT ADVOCATES THE *OVERTHROW* OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE?

☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

34. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY CIVIL OR MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN THE UNITED STATES OR IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY ***(other than for minor traffic violations where the fine did not exceed $25?)*** ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF SO, STATE UNDER ITEM #37 THE NAME AND LOCATION OF THE COURT, DATES AND DETAILS OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION.

35. LIST THREE COMPETENT AND RESPONSIBLE PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE AND ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY DEFINITE INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY ***(do not give names of supervisors listed in answer to questions no. 28 or 29).***

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
E. W. Causer	42 Ralph Talbot Street South Weymouth, Massachusetts	Engineer
E. E. Riley	2108 Dexter Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland	F. B. I.
C. D. DeLoach	Morningside Drive, Alexandria, Virginia	F. B. I.

36. MENTION HERE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS OR ACHIEVEMENTS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN THIS APPLICATION. INCLUDE SUCH ITEMS AS ANY BOOKS OR ARTICLES YOU HAVE WRITTEN, SPECIAL RESEARCH WORK, TECHNICAL SKILLS, HONORARY OR PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY MEMBERSHIPS, AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION YOU CONSIDER PERTINENT. YOU MAY INCLUDE ANY PERTINENT RELIGIOUS, CIVIC, WELFARE, OR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY WHICH YOU HAVE PERFORMED EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, SHOWING THE NUMBER OF HOURS PER WEEK AND NUMBER OF WEEKS PER YEAR IN WHICH YOU WERE ENGAGED IN SUCH ACTIVITY.

37. USE THIS SPACE FOR COMPLETING ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE FOREGOING QUESTIONS, NUMBERING ANSWER TO CORRESPOND WITH QUESTIONS. USE EXTRA SHEETS OF PAPER IF NECESSARY.

CERTIFICATION

False Statement on this application is Cause for Dismissal.

I DO SOLEMNLY AFFIRM THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.

12 Oct. 1950
DATE

William V. Broe
NAME AS USUALLY WRITTEN AND WILL BE USED AS OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

GPO 050 2-288

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 7 April 1970

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE: Chief, WHD (Ops Off)

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/Chief

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ TDY STANDBY Latin America

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Judy Kassler

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D 3102 Hqs

EXT.: 5671

10. COMMENTS

Mr. Broe's clearance for TDY standby expires May 1970.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified for tdy standby until May 1971.

DATE: 31 July 1970

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Don Farley PRO/OMS

FORM 2-69 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 18 Oct 1968

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/Chief

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☒ TDY STANDBY Latin America
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER: State
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)
☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: Mary C. Wernig
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D5309
EXT.: 1516

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR TDY STANDBY [illegible]
UNTIL May 70

DONALD FARLEY

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: [illegible]

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

SECRET

FORM 10-63 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 17 Oct 1968

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops. Officer

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/Chief

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 24 Oct - 31 Oct 68
STATION: London
TDY OR PCS: TDY
TYPE OF COVER: State
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (this block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Mary C. Wernig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 305309

EXT.: 1516

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED
TDY

DONALD FARLEY

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 10 22 68

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 15 Nov 1967

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE: C/WH (Ops. Off.)

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/ Chief

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 27 Nov - 1 Dec. 1967

STATION: London, England

TDY OR PCS: TDY

TYPE OF COVER: State

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED TDY
REX HART

9 68

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: M. C. Wernig
Mary C. Wernig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D5313

EXT.: 4516

10. COMMENTS

Mr. Broe has just had executive medical.

(already scheduled.)

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 2 November 67

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Broe, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer/WH/Chief

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/Chief

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL (Executive)

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES
REX HART

1 5 9 68

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

ROOM NO. & BUILDING:

EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

Scheduled for laboratory screening 0930 · 17 Nov 67
P.E. 1015 22 Nov 67

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
4 May 1967

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
BROE, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE
Ops Officer/WH Chief

4. GRADE
GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH
DDP/WH/

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.
5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
15 - 18 May 1967

STATION
Panama City

TDY OR PCS
TDY

TYPE OF COVER
State

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA

STATION

NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One box must be checked)
☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE
Mary C. Wernig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING
3D5313

EXT.
6815

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED TDY

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

REX HART

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(29)

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 9 January 1967

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/Chief

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 29 Jan - 25 February 1967
STATION: See comments *
TDY OR PCS: TDY
TYPE OF COVER: State
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Mary C. Wernig
Mary C. Wernig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 305313

EXT.: 6815

10. COMMENTS

* Panama City, San Jose, Managua, Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, San Salvador, Guatemala City.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED TDY
REX HART

DATE: [illegible] 2 67

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-58 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(28)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST	23 November 1966
2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)	[illegible], William V.
3. POSITION TITLE	Ops Off/[illegible]/Chief
4. GRADE	GS-18
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH	DDP/[illegible]
6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.	5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	5 Dec - 16 Dec
STATION	London, England
TDY OR PCS	TDY
TYPE OF COVER	Tourist
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLACEMENT EVALUATION REQUESTED?

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE
Mary C. Wernig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING	2D3107
EXT.	4835

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT
DUTIES

REX HART

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED
TDY [illegible]

DATE
11-25-66

REX HART

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-57 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(25)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 28 Sep 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer/Br. Chief

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/Chief

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 69 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 9 Oct - 20 Oct 1966

STATION: Mexico City, Mexico

TDY OR PCS: TDY

TYPE OF COVER: Tourist

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION [illegible]

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Mary C. Hernig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D3107

EXT.: 6815

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED
TDY Mexico
REX HART

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 11 21 66

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(25)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 23 August 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Broe, William Vincent

3. POSITION TITLE: C/WH Operations Off.

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: C/WH/D

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 7 Sept. 1965

STATION: Santo Domingo, Dom. Rep.

TDY OR PCS: TDY

TYPE OF COVER: State

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLACEMENT EVALUATION (One box must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: John M. Long

John M. Long

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GH-56 Hq.

EXT.: 6576

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED
TDY

JOE H. CLINE

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 19 8 65

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 12 Sept. 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Broe, William V.	3. POSITION TITLE	4. GRADE GS-18
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH WH		6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT. 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION — Room 3B 4403

- ☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- ☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- ☒ TDY STANDBY
- ☒ SPECIAL TRAINING
- ☒ ANNUAL - Executive
- ☐ RETURN TO DUTY
- ☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
- ☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

- ☐ HQS/TDY
- ☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT
  - ETD
  - STATION
  - TDY OR PCS
  - TYPE OF COVER
  - NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
  - NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED
- ☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS
  - RTA
  - STATION
  - NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

- ☐ YES
- ☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

ROOM NO. & BUILDING

EXT.

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

REX HART

DATE: 11 21 66

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 15 December 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer/WH/Chief

4. GRADE: GS-17

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/Chief

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 13 Jan - 3 Feb 1966

STATION: See comments*

TDY OR PCS: TDY

TYPE OF COVER: State

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Harry C. Wernig

Harry C. Wernig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GH-56

EXT.: 6815

10. COMMENTS

*Caracas, Venezuela; Quito, Ecuador; Bogota, Columbia; La Paz, Bolivia and Lima, Peru.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR TDY STAND BY
UNTIL

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

REX HART

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 7 October 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/Chief of Division

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5103

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☑ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 23 - 26 October 65
STATION: Panama City, Panama
TDY OR PCS: TDY
TYPE OF COVER: State
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Mary C. Warnig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GH-56

EXT.: 6015

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR TDY STAND BY
UNTIL Feb 67
REX HART

DATE: 10 12 65

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 19 AUGUST 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, WILLIAM VINCENT

3. POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH:

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

ROOM NO. & BUILDING:

EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR TDY STAN[illegible]
UNTIL Feb 67
JOHN V. [illegible]

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 19 8 65

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 14 Feb 1961

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, William V.

3. POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer

4. GRADE: GS-16

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH:

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY TDY

☒ OVERSEAS XXXXXXXX

ETD: 1 March 1961

STATION: Tokyo

TDY OR PCS: TDY

TYPE OF COVER: State Depart.

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 0

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED: 0

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: E.K.O'Malley, CPC/PE/PCS-PIA

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 2303 J

EXT.: 4002

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION: QUALIFIED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DUTIES AND PROPOSED TDY O/S ASSIGNMENT

DATE: 1 MAR 1961

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST 6 Dec 1960		
2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) BROE, William V. (STATE INT)	3. POSITION TITLE COS, Tokyo	4. GRADE GS-16
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH DDP/FE/JAO		6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT. 3941

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ OVERSEAS RETURN
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	1 June 1961
STATION	Tokyo
TDY OR PCS	PCS
TYPE OF COVER	State
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

EDWARD M. [illegible], C/FE/JAO

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 2313 J

EXT.: [illegible]

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED PCS O/S ASSIGNMENT

DATE: 15 DEC 1960

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF, MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(48)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BROE, William Vincent

3. POSITION TITLE: DCFE

4. GRADE: GS-16

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/FE/Office of Chief

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 3941

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ OVERSEAS RETURN

☐ TDY-STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	
STATION	
TDY OR PCS	
TYPE OF COVER	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED.	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

ROOM NO. & BUILDING

EXT.

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DEPARTMENTAL DUTIES

DATE: 14 JUL 1960

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Roland C. [illegible]

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(25)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. NAME (LAST) BROE	(FIRST) William	(MIDDLE) V.	2. DATE OF REQUEST 24 February 1959
3. POSITION TITLE DCFE	4. OFFICE, DIVISION AND BRANCH DDP/FE/Office of Chief		5. GRADE GS-16
6. REQUESTING OFFICER Frank T. Driscoll	7. BUILDING AND ROOM NO. 2303J		8. EXTENSION 4009

TYPE OF EVALUATION AND REPORT

9. TYPE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ OVERSEAS

ETD	
STATION	
TDY-PCS	

☐ OVERSEAS RETURN

☒ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL Scheduled for March 3, 1959 0830

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

10. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION DESIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH R 15-200

☐ YES ☐ NO

[illegible]

9A. REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☑ QUALIFIED

☐ DISQUALIFIED

10A. REPORT OF OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED

☐ DISQUALIFIED

11. COMMENTS

DATE OF EVALUATION [illegible]

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF, MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 3-58 259 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) BROE,	(First) WILLIAM	(Middle) VINCENT	2. DATE 15 February 1956
3. TO POSITION	4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH FE		5. GRADE GS-15

6. TYPE OF POSITION

☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR

☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☒ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Subject is qualified for proposed 4-weeks TDY overseas assignment (2/27/56).

C. O. Ozard
MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) BROE,	(First) William	(Middle) V.	2. DATE 22 April 1957
3. TO POSITION Staff Employee	4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH DDP/FE-2		5. GRADE GS-15

6. TYPE OF POSITION

☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☒ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR

☐ EOD
☒ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

Please evaluate for TDY to Tokyo, Taipei, Djakarta, Hong Kong.

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: QUALIFIED FOR [illegible]ENTAL DUTIES 1 MAY 1957
AND PROCESSED for O/S ASSIGNMENT

MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) [illegible] (First) William (Middle) Vincent
2. DATE 29 April 1955
3. TO POSITION
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH FE
5. GRADE GS-15

6. TYPE OF POSITION
- ☐ Departmental
- ☐ U.S. Field
- ☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
- ☐ EOD
- ☐ Overseas
- ☐ Returnee
- ☐ Pre-Employment
- ☒ Annual
- ☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

- ☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
- ☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
- ☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
- ☐ Disqualified

Remarks: D.P. (5/11/55)

C. O. Gozard
MEDICAL OFFICER

SECRET

BROE, WILLIAM V. WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR

☒ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS #1 Overseas ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED:

None

JOHN R. TIETJEN, M.D.

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME BROE, WILLIAM V.	NATURE OF ACTION E.O.D.
TITLE OF POSITION Operations Officer	GRADE P-5
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Departmental	

Subject was found physically [XX] fit [ ] unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position 21 June 1948

RECOMMENDATIONS:

28 December 1948

DATE

John R. Tietjen MD

SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO. 056735	NAME (Last-First-Middle) BROE, William V.	DATE OF BIRTH 08-24-13

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM -- TO --			
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER	
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONNEL
JAN 17 9 17 AM '69
MAIL ROOM

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3			

SECTION X REMARKS

No change from "Qualifications Supplement to Personal History Statement" submitted 13 April 1967.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27 December 1968	William V. Broe William V. Broe

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE GRADE/STEP
056735	BROE WILLIAM V		08/24/13	GS-18-01

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (City, Country)
D	OPS OFFICER DIV CH	WH	WASH., D.C.

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	PCS VV	51/02/04	53/05/14
JAPAN	PCS CC	53/08/01	55/04/01
ASIA AREA	TDY CC	56/03/01	56/04/01
ASIA AREA	TDY CC	57/05/01	57/06/01
ASIA AREA	TDY CC	59/03/30	59/05/07
ASIA AREA	TDY CC	61/03/10	61/03/20 *
JAPAN	PCS VV	61/06/14	65/06/28
~~EUROPEAN AREA~~	~~TDY RR~~	~~66/12/06~~	~~66/12/10~~
Lima, Peru	TDY/	65/07/05	65/07/09
Central Amer area	TDY/	65/07/22	65/07/28
Dominican Republic	TDY/	65/09/07	65/09/12
Panama, R.P.	TDY/	65/10/23	65/10/28
South Amer area	TDY/	66/01/11	66/02/02
South Amer area	TDY/	66/04/20	66/05/14
European area	TDY/RR	66/12/06	66/12/10
Central Amer area & Mexico	TDY/	67/01/29	67/02/24

* 65/06/28

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 19 MAY 67 INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE, GENERAL	BOWDOIN COL ME	39

FORM 1-67 444j
Mrg 2-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

IN ERID

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK "X")			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Philippines		Feb '51 - May '53.		X			X
Japan		Aug '53 - Apr '55.		X			X
Japan		June '61 - ~~June~~ '65.		X			X

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK "X" APPROPRIATE ITEM. ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY PROFESSION OR TRADE SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number, if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest, scholarly, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	**MARITAL STATUS**	
1 PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY		
2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden) No change.		
3 DATE OF BIRTH	4 PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
5 OCCUPATION	6 PRESENT EMPLOYER	
7 CITIZENSHIP	8 FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9 DATE U. S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Bonnie J.	Dau	17 Sept 45	USA	4317 Saul Rd, Kensington, Md.
Susan C.	Dau	28 Dec 47	USA	"
Kristine	Dau	11 Apr 50	USA	"
Barbara	Dau	31 Oct 55	USA	"

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
13 APR 1967	William V Broe

SECRET

14 MAR 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

SUBJECT : BROE, William Vincent
Request for Appointment in the Foreign Service
and Assignment at Tokyo, Japan

REFERENCE : Annex F-3 to Memorandum dated 23 November 1951,
Subject, Representation in Foreign Service
Missions

1. It is requested that Mr. Broe, GS-16, $15,515, be appointed in the Foreign Service with the title First Secretary, FSR-2, $13,255 for duty in the Political Section of the American Embassy at Tokyo, Japan. Mr. Broe will occupy position number 1 of Annex F-3.

2. It is requested that Mr. Broe arrive at his destination on or about 1 July 1961.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, [illegible]:

HUGH E. MOORHOUSE

9 March 1961
Distribution:
2 - Addressee
1 - CPB
2 - OCL
1 2 - FE/PE/JAO
FE/PE/JAO/[illegible]/md
Enclosures:
1. Application Forms 57 and DBP-34
2. Occupational History Supplement
3. Proposed biography

PROPOSED BIOGRAPHY

BROE, William V., - b. Mass., August 24, 1913; Bowdoin College, A. B., 1939; budget sales manager, retail store, 1939-41; credit manager, finance company, 1941; special agent, FBI, 1942-48; area operations officer, Department of Defense, 1948-51; app. FSS-3, attache, Manila, Feb. 21, 1951; resigned May 13, 1953; area plans officer, Department of Defense, 1953-61; married.

Form DSP-34
7-19-55

Form Approved
Budget Bureau No. 47-R071.7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPLEMENT TO STANDARD FORM 57

If more space is required, use additional sheets of paper. Write on each sheet your name, address and date of birth. Identify each item, and attach to this application.

1. A. NAME (PRINT): William V. Broe
B. DATE OF BIRTH: August 24, 1913
C. ADDRESS: 4327 Saul Rd., Kensington, Md.

2. USE OF APPLICATION. CHECK BELOW TO INDICATE TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WHICH YOU WISH TO BE CONSIDERED
☒ FOREIGN SERVICE ONLY ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ONLY ☐ FOREIGN SERVICE AND DEPARTMENTAL

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (PLACE FROM WHICH YOU WILL EXPECT TRANSPORTATION OF SELF AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS, IF ANY, IF APPOINTED TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE)
4327 Saul Road, Kensington, Md.

4. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED? IF A NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE (SECTION 6 ON STANDARD FORM 57)

5. A. ARE YOU NOW INVOLVED IN ANY LITIGATION OR SEPARATION AGREEMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. DO YOU KNOW OF ANY PROSPECTIVE LITIGATION IN WHICH YOU MAY BE INVOLVED? (GIVE DETAILS, IF ANSWER IS "YES" TO A. OR B.) ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. IF DIVORCED, GIVE NAME OF COURT, LOCATION, DECREE, AND DATE FINAL DECREE GRANTED

6. IF APPLYING FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? (EXCLUSIVE OF OVERSEAS ALLOWANCES)
$ PER YEAR

7. IF OFFERED APPOINTMENT IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE WHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE ON YOUR AVAILABILITY FOR DUTY IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD?
None

8. A. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME): Jean Barbara Conner
B. DATE OF BIRTH: March 4, 1920
C. PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, STATE OR PROVINCE, AND COUNTRY): Winthrop, Mass.
D. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED?
E. IF NATURALIZED, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NO. OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE

9.

NAME OF DEPENDENTS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH	WILL RESIDE WITH YOU OVERSEAS	
			YES	NO
~~Jean B. Broe~~	~~Wife~~	~~March 4, 1920~~	X	
~~[illegible]~~	~~Daughter~~	~~Sept 17, 19[illegible]~~	X	
~~[illegible]~~	~~Daughter~~	~~Dec. 20, 1947~~	X	
~~[illegible]~~ Barbara	~~Daughter~~ Daughter	~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]	X X	

10. A. FATHER'S NAME: John James Broe
B. PRESENT ADDRESS (IF DECEASED, SO STATE): Deceased
C. PLACE OF BIRTH: Roxbury, Mass.

11. A. MOTHER'S NAME: Agnes M. Broe
B. PRESENT ADDRESS (IF DECEASED, SO STATE): 4327 Saul Rd., Kensington, Md.
C. PLACE OF BIRTH: Boston, Mass.

12. IF PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, DID THEY EVER OBTAIN UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP? (CHECK BELOW)
FATHER ☐ YES ☐ NO
MOTHER ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR A POSITION WITH DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR TAKEN AN EXAMINATION FOR A POSITION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE? ☒ YES ☐ NO
(IF YES, GIVE DATE, NATURE OF POSITION APPLIED FOR, AND NAME OF EXAMINATION TAKEN (IF ANY))
I was employed as a [illegible] and assigned to the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines from March 1951 to May 1953.

14-00000

FORM DSP-34 7-15-55 PAGE 2

14. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE NOW RESIDING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS

15. LIST PRESENT OR FORMER FOREIGN CONNECTIONS:

A. BUSINESS

B. EMPLOYMENT

16. DOES YOUR PRESENT FINANCIAL POSITION PERMIT DISCHARGE OF ALL CURRENT DEBTS? ☒ YES ☐ NO
IF "NO", STATE INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW:

NAMES OF CREDITORS	AMOUNTS DUE	DATES ON WHICH OBLIGATIONS WERE CONTRACTED

17. A. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN MEDICALLY DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER TREATMENT FOR A MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISORDER? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF "YES", GIVE DETAILS IN ITEM 34 OF STANDARD FORM 57

18. PRESENT MILITARY STATUS

A. ARE YOU REGISTERED WITH A SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES", STATE BELOW THE NUMBER AND ADDRESS OF THE BOARD, AND YOUR CLASSIFICATION:

B. DO YOU HAVE A MILITARY RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES", STATE BELOW, THE BRANCH OF SERVICE; YOUR SERIAL NUMBER, YOUR ORGANIZATION UNIT AND HEADQUARTERS:

C. LIST DECORATIONS (EXCLUSIVE OF SERVICE RIBBONS), CITATIONS, AND OFFICIAL LETTERS OF COMMENDATION RECEIVED FOR SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES:

19. LIST OTHER NAMES, IF ANY, BY WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN KNOWN INCLUDING MARRIED NAMES. IF MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, GIVE DATES DURING WHICH NAMES WERE USED

20. REFERENCES. LIST FIVE PERSONS, EXCLUSIVE OF SUPERVISORS, LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO YOU AND WHO HAVE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR QUALIFICATIONS AND FITNESS FOR THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING (REPEAT NAMES LISTED IN ITEM 27 STANDARD FORM 57 AND ADD TWO ADDITIONAL REFERENCES)

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (GIVE COMPLETE CURRENT ADDRESS, INCLUDING STREET AND NUMBER)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Mr. Lawrence Hubbard	4322 Glenridge, Kensington, Md.	Int. Monetary Fund
Mr. C. DeLoach	107 Morningside Dr., Alex., Va.	FBI
Mr. J. D. Zoll	2500 Q St., N.W. Washington, D.C.	Dept. of State
General Edward Lansdale	4703 MacArthur Blvd., Wash., D.C.	USAF
Mr. R. T. Carpenter	4401 Saul Road, Kensington, Md.	OCD

21. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM? ☒ YES ☐ NO

22. SOCIAL SECURITY NO., IF ANY

23. DO YOU HAVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ DO NOT KNOW IF ANSWER IS "YES", STATE NAME OF AGENCY AND DATE ACQUIRED

24. If you believe the information you have supplied on this application does not fully show your qualifications for Departmental or Foreign Service employment, state in Item 34 of Standard Form 57 or on a separate sheet, any additional appropriate data that you wish to be considered.

DATE 7 March 1961

SIGNATURE William V. Br

STANDARD FORM 57
REVISED MAY 1954
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. Kind of position applied for or name of examination

2. Option(s) *(If mentioned in examination announcement)*

3. Place of employment applied for *(city and State)* [illegible]

4. *(First name)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden, if any)* *(Last)*
Mr.
Mrs. [illegible] [illegible]
Miss

5. Street and number or R. D. number [illegible]

City or post office (including postal zone) and State [illegible]

6. Place of birth
City [illegible]
State or foreign country [illegible]

7. Date of birth *(month, day, year)* [illegible]

8. ☐ Male ☐ Female

9. Height without shoes 5 feet .... inches
Weight 135 pounds

10. ☒ Married ☐ Single

11. Home phone
Office phone

12. Legal or voting residence *(State)* Maryland

13. If you have ever been employed by the Federal Government, indicate last grade GS-15
Dates of service in that grade
From Aug 1950 To Present

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of
Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Appor. ☐ Nonappor.	Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned	Entered Register:

Notations:

App. Review:

Approved:

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Augm. Rating
			☐ 5 Points (Tent.)	
			☐ 10 Point Comp. Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Point	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being Investigated	
Initials and Date				

14. AVAILABILITY INFORMATION. A. Indicate the lowest salary you will accept $ .... per ....
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

B. If you are now a Federal employee, indicate the lowest grade you will accept

C. Will you accept appointment for ☐ 1 to 3 months? ☐ 3 to 6 months? ☐ 6 to 12 months?
Acceptance or refusal of a short-term appointment will not affect your consideration for another appointment.

D. Are you willing to travel ☐ Occasionally? ☒ Frequently? ☐ Constantly?

E. Will you accept appointment ☐ In Washington, D. C.? ☐ Anywhere in United States? ☒ Outside U. S.?

F. If you will accept appointment only in certain locations, list them:
No preference

15. VETERAN PREFERENCE. A. If you claim 5-point preference based on wartime military service, indicate:

Date(s) of entry into active service	Date(s) of separation	Branch of service *(Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.)*	Serial number. If none, give grade or rating at separation

B. Do you claim 5-point preference as a peacetime campaign veteran? ☐ Yes ☒ No

C. Do you claim 10-point preference? ☐ Yes ☒ No

D. Have you ever been granted 10-point veteran preference or 5-point preference as a peacetime campaign veteran by the U. S. Civil Service Commission? ☐ Yes ☐ No If so, indicate below the office which granted this preference to you. Attach your notice of preference allowance if available. It will be returned to you.

Name of U. S. Civil Service Commission office or name of Board of U. S. Civil Service Examiners

Address of Commission office or Board of Examiners
City
State

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY. The information contained in answer to question 15A has been verified with the discharge certificate, which shows that the separation was under honorable conditions.

Signature .... Agency ....

Title .... Date ....

(Continued on next page)

14-00000

16. EXPERIENCE. *(Start with your present position and work back)*

① Dates of employment *(month, year)*
From 14 May 1953 To present time

Exact title of your position: Area [illegible] Officer

Salary or earnings
Starting $ [illegible] per annum
Final $ [illegible] per annum

Classification Grade *(if in Federal service)*: GS-16

Place of employment
City: Washington, D.C.
State: [illegible]

Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: U.S. Government

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*: Department of Defense, Joint Operations, Washington, D.C.

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Robert D. [illegible]

Reason for wanting to leave: Desire foreign service [illegible] with [illegible] of operation

Description of work: As Area [illegible] Officer responsible for directing the preparation of area studies [illegible] of the various areas of defense. [illegible] and [illegible] proposals from the different services relative to national defense. Prepare policy proposals related to joint defense [illegible] for review by higher echelon.

② Dates of employment *(month, year)*
From 21 Feb 1951 To 13 May 1953

Exact title of your position: Attache

Salary or earnings
Starting $ [illegible] per annum
Final $ [illegible] per annum

Classification Grade *(if in Federal service)*: FSS-[illegible]

Place of employment
City: Washington, D.C.
State: [illegible]

Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: U.S. Government

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*: Department of State, Foreign Service

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Raymond A. [illegible], Amb.

Reason for leaving: [illegible]

Description of work: [illegible] in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy directives, collect information concerning the political trends of various groups and individuals for submission to the Department.

③ Dates of employment *(month, year)*
From 21 June [illegible] To 20 Feb 1951

Exact title of your position: Area Operations Officer

Salary or earnings
Starting $ [illegible] per annum
Final $ [illegible] per annum

Classification Grade *(if in Federal service)*: GS-[illegible]

Place of employment
City: Washington, D.C.
State:

Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: U.S. Government

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*: Department of Defense, Joint Operations

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Robert D. [illegible]

Reason for leaving: To [illegible] foreign service [illegible]

Description of work: [illegible] to national defense.

ATTACH SUPPLEMENTAL SHEETS OR FORMS HERE

Dates of employment (month, year) From 30 [illegible] to 14 [illegible] 1940

Exact title of your position: Special Agent

Salary or earnings: Starting $ [illegible] per annum; Final $ 6100 per annum

Classification-Grade (if in Federal service): [illegible]

Place of employment: City Washington, D.C. State

Kind of business or organization (manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.): U. S. Government

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, etc.): Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C.

Name and title of immediate supervisor: D. M. Ladd, Asst. Director

Reason for leaving: [illegible]

Description of work: [illegible]

If you need additional experience blocks, use supplemental sheets. SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET.

17. SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND SKILLS.

(A) Licenses and Certificates.—Indicate the kind of license or certificate and the State or other licensing authority which granted it, for example, pilot, teacher, electrician, lawyer, radio operator, C. P. A., etc.

Kind of License .... Licensing Authority ....

(B) List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key-punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices.

(C) Approximate number of words per minute in: Typing .... Shorthand ....

(D) Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application, such as:
(1) Your more important publications. (Do not submit copies unless requested.)
(2) Your patents or inventions.
(3) Public speaking and public relations experience.
(4) Membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.
(5) Honors and fellowships received.

18. EDUCATION.

A. Give the highest elementary or high-school grade completed 12th

If you completed high school, give date June 1935

B. Name and location of last high school attended:
Amesbury High School, Amesbury, Mass.
Governor Dummer Acad., So. Byfield, Mass.

C. Name and location of college or university:	Dates attended From	To	Years completed Day	Night	Credit hours Semester	or Quarter	Degrees received
Bowdoin College	1935	1939	4				A. B.

D. Chief undergraduate college subjects	Credit hours Semester	or Quarter
Chemistry	6	
Biology	8	

E. Chief graduate college subjects	Credit hours Semester	or Quarter

F. Other schools or training, such as trade, vocational, Armed Forces, or business. Give for each name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, certificates and any other pertinent data:

19. Have you lived or traveled in any foreign countries?

☒ Yes ☐ No

If answer is "Yes," give in Item 34 names of countries, dates, and length of time spent there and reason or purpose (military service, business, education, or vacation).

20. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.	Reading EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	Speaking EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	Understanding EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	Writing EXC.	GOOD	FAIR

14-00000

21. REFERENCES.—List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT RELATED TO YOU AND WHO HAVE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16, EXPERIENCE

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
2. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
3. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
22. (a) Are you a citizen of the United States of America, or (b) as a native of American Samoa do you owe allegiance to the United States of America?	X	
23. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party, U. S. A., or any Communist organization?		X
24. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of a Fascist organization?		X
25. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means? *If your answer to question 23, 24, or 25 above is "Yes," state on a separate sheet to be attached to and made a part of this application the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein, and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities. (See instruction sheet)*		
26. Does the United States Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 34 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) department or agency by which employed; and (5) kind of appointment.*		
27. A. Have you any physical handicap, chronic disease, or other disability?		
B. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown?		
C. Have you ever had tuberculosis?		
If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 34.		

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
28. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.?	X	
29. Do you receive or have you applied for an annuity from the United States or District of Columbia Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 34.*		X
30. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 34.*		X
31. Have you ever been barred by the U. S. Civil Service Commission from taking examinations or accepting civil-service appointments? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 34.*		
32. A. Have you ever been discharged from employment because: (1) Your conduct was not satisfactory?		
(2) Your work was not satisfactory?		X
B. Have you ever resigned after official notification that: (1) Your conduct was not satisfactory?		
(2) Your work was not satisfactory?		
C. Have you ever been discharged from the Armed Services under other than honorable conditions? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 34 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.*		
33. Have you ever been arrested, charged, or held by Federal, State, or other law-enforcement authorities for any violation of any Federal law, State law, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance? Do not include anything that happened before your 16th birthday. Do not include traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed. All other charges must be included even if they were dismissed. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 34 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		

34. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS. Indicate item [illegible]

Item No.		Item No.	
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

ATTENTION: If you are appointed, all facts you give will be subject to investigation including a check of your fingerprints. Before signing this application, go back over it to make sure you have answered all questions correctly and fully, so that your eligibility can be decided on the basis of all the facts. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for cancellation of your application or your dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date [illegible]

Signature of applicant William V. Broe

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

14-00000

51

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
156735	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Broe, William Vincent	August	24	1913

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
000	1	22	58	☒ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND. A
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 22 9 00 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.
2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.
3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.
4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.
5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.
3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING – CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.
2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.
3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.
4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED —	SIGNATURE William V. Broe William V. Broe
(46)	(47)

Standard Form 57—June 1949
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R046.

INSTRUCTIONS.—Answer every question fully and completely. Type, or print in ink. If you are applying for a regular United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement [illegible] Mail this application to the office named in the announcement. [illegible] any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION No.

ANNOUNCEMENT

SELECTION No.

1. Name of examination, or kind of position applied for.

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement):

3. Place of employment applied for:

4. ~~Mr.~~ (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
William Vincent Broe

5. Street and number or R. D. number:
2116 Dexter Avenue

City or post office (including postal zone), and State:
Silver Spring, Maryland

6. Legal or voting residence (State): Maryland.

7. Office phone No.: XXXXXXXX Home phone: SH 2825

8. Place of birth (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country):
Amesbury, Mass.

9. Date of birth (month, day, year): Aug. 24, 1913

10. Age last birthday:

11. ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. ☒ Married ☐ Single

13. Height without shoes: 6 feet ..... inches Weight: 180 pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No

If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade.
CAF-12 June. 1, 1946

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Appor. ☐ Non-appor.	Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned	Entered register:
Notations:	App. Review: Approved:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disab.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
16. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		
4 to 6 months?		
7 to 12 months?		
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— in Washington, D. C.?	X	
anywhere in the United States?		
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations:

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept: $.............. per year.
You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify:
☒ Occasionally ☐ Frequently ☐ Constantly



[illegible] information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission [illegible] which you performed in each position. Describe your ex- [illegible]
[illegible] is different from that shown in Item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for [illegible]
[illegible] are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

To present time	Exact title of your present position:	Salary or earnings: Starting, $ per Present, $ per
[illegible] organization, or period, [illegible] of establishment, and [illegible] [illegible] etc., insurance [illegible] [illegible] you:	Description of your work:	

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

18. CONTINUED

Dates of employment (Month, year) From 5-30-42 To 5-14-43
Place of employment (city and State): Constant travel status
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Investigation
Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
Name and title of immediate supervisor:
Reason for leaving: Resigned to obtain more preferable work
Exact title of your position: Special Agent CAF-9 to 12
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 3200 per yr Final $ 6140 per yr
Description of your work: Execution & supervision of investigations of violations of Federal Statutes

Dates of employment (Month, year) From 5-41 To: 11-41
Place of employment (city and State): Boston, Massachusetts
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: General Motors Accp't. Corp. Boston, Mass.
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): automobile financing
Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
Name and title of immediate supervisor: F. A. Miller - Credit Man.
Reason for leaving: Reduction in personnel
Exact title of your position: Field Representative
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 1800 per yr. Final $ 1800 per yr.
Description of your work: Contacting dealers & the supervision of collection accounts

Dates of employment (Month, year) From 8-39 To: 5-41
Place of employment (city and State): Quincy, Mass.
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Retail sales & service in automotive line
Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
Name and title of immediate supervisor: C. A. Saves - Man.
Reason for leaving: Resigned to obtain more preferable work
Exact title of your position: Budget Manager
Salary or earnings: Starting $1500 per yr. Final $1500 per yr.
Description of your work: Supervision of Budget Retail Sales & Collections.

Dates of employment (Month, year) From To
Place of employment (city and State):
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division:
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.):
Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
Name and title of immediate supervisor:
Reason for leaving:
Exact title of your position:
Salary or earnings: Starting $ per Final $ per
Description of your work:

If more space is required, use a continuation [illegible] Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size [illegible]. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to [illegible] application.

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE.—In order to make the most effective placements of war veterans, detailed information is needed about the training and experience they have acquired in the Armed Services. Fill in [illegible] space for each service school you have attended. If you attended no special or technical schools while in the service, write in Item (a) "No [illegible] service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all [illegible] changes in duty assignment, showing dates of each assignment.

(a) First Special Service School attended:

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From. To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(b) What were you taught in First Special Service School?

(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School):

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From To:

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?

(e) Second Special Service School attended:

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(f) What were you taught in Second Special Service School?

(g) Duty assignment after this training:

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From. To:

(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION.—Circle highest grade completed: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of:

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(a) Give name and location of last high school attended:

Governor Dummer Acac. - So. Byfield Mass.

Amesbury High School - Amesbury, Mass.

(b) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired:

(c) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended		Years Completed		Degrees Conferred		Semester Hours Credit
		From—	To—	Day	Night	Title	Date	
Bowdoin College	Biology	1935	1939			A.B.	6-39	

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
Biology, Chem., Anatomy, French, English			

(e) Other training, such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school), or "inservice training" in a Federal agency:

FBI Acad., Quantico, Va.

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended		Years Completed	
	From—	To—	Day	Night

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries indicate (1) names of countries, (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e. g., business, education, recreation):

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key-punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices.

Approximate number of words per minute in typing .... shorthand ....

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)

☐ Yes ☒ No. Give kind of license and State:

First license or certificate (year):

Latest license or certificate (year):

22. Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application such as
(1) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(2) your patents or inventions
(3) public speaking and public relations experience
(4) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

PROPOSED BIOGRAPHY

BROE, William V.—b. Amesbury, Mass., Aug. 24, 1913; Amesbury High Sch., grad.; Governor Dummer Acad.; Bowdoin Coll., A.B. 1939; rubber co. 1939-41; U. S. Gov't 1942-51; app. For. Ser. Staff officer of class three and assigned as att. at Manila Feb. 21, 1941; married

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DATE: 15 August 1957

PROT: 7-213

TO : Chief, FE
Director of Security
Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Division

SUBJECT : Revocation of Cryptographic Clearance - Broe, William Vincent

1. The cryptographic clearance held by Subject has been revoked under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Revocation is effective 31 July 1957.

2. Subject is not authorized to have continued custody of, access to, or otherwise gain further knowledge of staff cryptographic material or information. Subject has been informed of this revocation, has been debriefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Debriefing Statement acknowledging continuing responsibility for the protection of all cryptographic information obtained during the tenure of his cryptographic clearance.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

fr Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
1 - FE
1 - Security Office (Debriefing Statement Attached)
1 - Personnel Office (Wing 1-H Curie Hall)
1 - OC-S/PROT File

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JUN

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE

CODED

[illegible]

DATE 27 FEB 1958

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
Broe, William Vincent

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
4317 Saul Road, Kensington, Maryland

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
4317 Saul Road, Kensington, Maryland

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
OLympia 7-8921

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
Maryland

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
Jean B. Broe

2. RELATIONSHIP
Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
4317 Saul Road, Kensington, Maryland

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
none

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
OLympia 7-8921

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
NA

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
NA

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Mr. James B. Broe, 40 Greenwood Street, Amesbury, Mass.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
none

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME
(First) Jean
(Middle) Barbara
(Maiden) Causer
(Last) Broe

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
21 November 1942

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)
South Weymouth, Mass. U.S.A.

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)
42 Ralph Talbot Street, South Weymouth, Mass.

7. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)
4317 Saul Road, Kensington, Maryland

11. DATE OF BIRTH
4 March 1920

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
Winthrop, Mass. U.S.A.

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY
NA

14. PLACE OF ENTRY
NA

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
U.S.

16. DATE ACQUIRED
birth

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
NA

18. OCCUPATION
Housewife

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)
NA

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
NA

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (*From- and To- *) BY MONTH AND YEAR
none

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
NA

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
NA

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
NA

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*): Causer, Horbert
2. RELATIONSHIP: Spouse's grandfather
3. AGE: 96
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: 225 Pleasant Street, South Weymouth, Mass. U.S.A.
5. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*): Great Britain
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: Once a year
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: summer of 1956

2

1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*): Causer, Evelyn Jesse
2. RELATIONSHIP: Spouse's grandmother
3. AGE: 90
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: 225 Pleasant Street, South Weymouth, Mass. U.S.A.
5. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*): Great Britain
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: Once a year
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: summer of 1956

3

1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
nons

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Kensington Bank	Montgomery Road, Kensington, Md.

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
U.S.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE:
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS
NA

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me.	biol.	chem.	Sep '35	June '39	AB	Jun '39	

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	
none				

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	
none				

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE
none

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HDQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING
Philippine Islands	Area knowledge	March 51 - May 53	x	x	
China	"	Aug 53 - April 55	x	x	
Japan	"	Aug 53 - April 55		x	

SECTION IX — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)

2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)

3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

SECTION X — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.). INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) June 1948 to January 1951
2. GRADE GS-12/13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DD/P FBZ Philippine Branch
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 6
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Acting Chief, Philippine Branch
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) January 1951 to May 1953
2. GRADE GS-14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DD/P FBZ Philippine Islands
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 10
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station, Philippines
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) May 1953 to April 1955
2. GRADE GS-15
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DD/P FE China Branch
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 125
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief, FRU, Yokosuka
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) April 1955 to present
2. GRADE GS-15
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DD/P FE China Branch
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 100
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Branch
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII	CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS		
1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN *(Including stepchildren and adopted children)* WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	4	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS *(Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.)* WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	2

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Bonnie J.	daughter	1945		x	U.S.	1317 Saul Road Kensington, Md.
Susan C.	"	1948		x	"	"
Kristine E.	"	1950		x	"	"
Barbara A.	"	1955		x	"	"
Mrs. Jean B.	wife	1920		x	"	"
Mrs. Agnes N.	mother	1882		x	"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED 17 January 1958

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William V. Broe

SECRET

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS COMPLETELY. IF QUESTION DOES NOT APPLY WRITE "NOT APPLICABLE". WRITE "UNKNOWN" ONLY IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER AND CANNOT OBTAIN THE ANSWER FROM PERSONAL RECORDS. USE A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER FOR EXTRA DETAILS ON ANY QUESTION OR QUESTIONS FOR WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ROOM. ATTACH TWO RECENT PASSPORT SIZE PICTURES TO THIS FORM. DATE TAKEN WRITTEN ON THE BACK OF EACH. TYPE, PRINT OR WRITE CAREFULLY; ILLEGIBLE OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL NOT RECEIVE CONSIDERATION.

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS? YES ☒ NO ☐

SECTION 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	LAST	TELEPHONE
MR. ☒ MISS ☐ MRS. ☐	William	Vincent	Broe	SH 2825

	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
PRESENT ADDRESS	2116 Dexter Avenue,	Silver Springs,	Maryland	USA
LEGAL RESIDENCE	2116 Dexter Avenue,	Silver Spring,	Maryland	

NICKNAMES	OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES?	HOW LONG?

IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (WHERE, WHEN AND BY WHAT AUTHORITY)

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
August 24, 1915	Amesbury	Massachusetts	

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP	ACQUIRED BY:
U.S.A.	BIRTH ☒ MARRIAGE ☐ NATURALIZATION ☐

NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE	NUMBER	DATE ISSUED	NAME OF COURT
	Not Applicable		

LOCATION OF COURT	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

PREVIOUS CITIZENSHIP	DATE HELD	FROM:	TO:

OTHER CITIZENSHIPS (GIVE PARTICULARS)

STEPS TAKEN TO CHANGE PRESENT NATIONALITY (GIVE PARTICULARS)

LAST U.S. PASSPORT	NUMBER	DATE	PLACE OF ISSUE

ALL OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS YOU HAVE HAD (GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES)

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	DATE OF ARRIVAL IN THIS COUNTRY	PORT OF ENTRY	PASSPORT OF COUNTRY

LAST U.S. VISA	NUMBER	TYPE	DATE	PLACE OF ISSUE

SECTION 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR
54	Male	6'	180	brown	brown

COMPLEXION	SCARS	BUILD
medium	none	athletic

OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES wear glasses

FORM NO. 38.1
SEP 1946

SECTION 3. MARITAL STATUS

MARRIED ☒ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DATE OF SEPARATION OR DIVORCE PLACE
SINGLE ☐ DIVORCED ☐

REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE: Not applicable

NOTE: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

NAME OF WIFE OR HUSBAND: FIRST Jean MIDDLE (FOR WIFE, MAIDEN) Barbara LAST Broe
DATE OF MARRIAGE: Nov. 21, 1942

PLACE OF MARRIAGE: So. Weymouth, Mass.
(HIS OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE: STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY: 42 Ralph Talbot St. So. Weymouth Mass.

LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐ DATE OF DECEASE: Not applicable CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER 2116 Dexter Avenue CITY Silver Springs, STATE Maryland COUNTRY USA

DATE OF BIRTH: Mar. 4, 1920
PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY Winthrop, STATE Massachusetts COUNTRY

CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.
DATE ACQUIRED: Not applicable
WHERE ACQUIRED: CITY STATE COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: housewife
LAST EMPLOYER: Norfolk County, Massachusetts

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER Not employed CITY STATE COUNTRY

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE: FROM: not applicable TO: BRANCH OF SERVICE COUNTRY

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): Special Agent - FBI - 8-30-42 -- 5-14-43

SECTION 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (INCLUDE PARTIAL DEPENDENTS)

NAME: Bonnie Jean Broe RELATIONSHIP: daughter AGE: 2 yr. 8 mo.
CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A. ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY: 2116 Dexter Avenue, Silver Springs, Maryland

NAME: Susan Carruth Broe RELATIONSHIP: daughter AGE: 5 mo.
CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A. ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY: 2116 Dexter Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland

NAME: Agnes H. Broe RELATIONSHIP: mother AGE: 63
CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A. ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY: 2116 Dexter Avenue, Silver Spring, Md.

SECTION 5. PARENTS

NOTE: FOR STEPFATHER, STEPMOTHER AND/OR GUARDIAN, GIVE THE SAME INFORMATION AS REQUIRED BELOW ON SEPARATE SHEET

NAME OF FATHER: FIRST John MIDDLE James LAST Broe LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☒

DATE OF DECEASE: March 20, 1931 CAUSE: heart attack

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

DATE OF BIRTH: May 21, 1874
PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY STATE COUNTRY: Amesbury, Massachusetts

CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A. DATE ACQUIRED WHERE ACQUIRED CITY STATE COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: Haberdasher LAST EMPLOYER: self

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED [illegible])

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2)

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE FROM: not applicable TO: BRANCH OF SERVICE COUNTRY

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS)

NAME OF MOTHER FIRST Agnes MAIDEN Bonython LAST Boro LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE not CAUSE applicable

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY 2116 Dexter Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland

DATE OF BIRTH Nov. 8, 1884 PLACE OF BIRTH CITY STATE COUNTRY Boston, Massachusetts

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. DATE ACQUIRED not applicable WHERE ACQUIRED CITY STATE COUNTRY

OCCUPATION unemployed LAST EMPLOYER not applicable

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS)

SECTION 6. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (INCLUDING HALF-, STEP-, AND ADOPTED BROTHERS AND SISTERS)

NAME FIRST James MIDDLE Bonyton LAST Broe

PRESENT ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER 40 Greenwood Street CITY STATE COUNTRY Amesbury, Massachusetts

NAME FIRST John MIDDLE Joseph LAST Broe

PRESENT ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER 1805 East 75th CITY STATE COUNTRY Cleveland, Ohio

NAME FIRST MIDDLE LAST

PRESENT ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

SECTION 7. PARENTS-IN-LAW

NAME OF FATHER-IN-LAW FIRST Herbert MIDDLE William LAST Causer LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE not CAUSE applicable

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY 42 Ralph Talbot Street So. Weymouth, Mass.

DATE OF BIRTH Sept. 11, 1890 PLACE OF BIRTH CITY STATE COUNTRY Birmingham, England

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. DATE ACQUIRED unknown WHERE ACQUIRED CITY unknown STATE COUNTRY

OCCUPATION engineer LAST EMPLOYER Associated Factory Mutuals, Boston, Mass.

NAME OF MOTHER-IN-LAW FIRST Evelyn MAIDEN Carruthers LAST Causer LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE not CAUSE applicable

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY 42 Ralph Talbot Street So. Weymouth, Mass.

DATE OF BIRTH April 5, 1895 PLACE OF BIRTH CITY STATE COUNTRY Belfast, Ireland

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. DATE ACQUIRED WHERE ACQUIRED CITY STATE COUNTRY

OCCUPATION housewife LAST EMPLOYER not applicable

SECTION 8. RELATIVES

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO LIVE ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A FOREIGN POWER, ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS.

NAME: Herbert Causer
RELATIONSHIP: Wife's grandfather
AGE: 87
CITIZENSHIP: English
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: 41 Oakdale Avenue, CITY: So. Weymouth, STATE: Mass. COUNTRY:
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION:

NAME: RELATIONSHIP: AGE:
CITIZENSHIP: ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION:

NAME: RELATIONSHIP: AGE:
CITIZENSHIP: ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION:

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE (UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN)

NAME: RELATIONSHIP: AGE:
CITIZENSHIP: ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN):

NAME: RELATIONSHIP: AGE:
CITIZENSHIP: ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN):

NAME: RELATIONSHIP: AGE:
CITIZENSHIP: ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN):

SECTION 9. EDUCATION

SCHOOL: Amesbury Jr. H. S.
ADDRESS: CITY: Main St. STATE: Amesbury, Mass. COUNTRY:
DATES ATTENDED FROM: Sept. 1926 TO: June 1928 DEGREE: ----

SCHOOL: Amesbury H. S.
ADDRESS: Main Street, CITY: Amesbury, STATE: Mass. COUNTRY:
DATES ATTENDED FROM: Sept. 1928 TO: June 1931 DEGREE: -------

COLLEGE: Gov. Dummer Prep. Sch.
ADDRESS: CITY: So. Byfiedl STATE: Mass. COUNTRY:
DATES ATTENDED FROM: Sept. 1934 TO: June 1935 DEGREE: -------

COLLEGE: Bowdoin College
ADDRESS: CITY: Brunswick, STATE: Maine COUNTRY:
DATES ATTENDED FROM: Sept. 1935 TO: June 1939 DEGREE: A. B. Degree

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE [illegible] (CONTINUED TO PAGE 5)

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS

CLASSIFICATION	ORDER NUMBER	APPROXIMATE INDUCTION DATE	BOARD NUMBER

ADDRESS OF BOARD	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE

IF DEFERRED, STATE REASON

SECTION 11. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE - UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN

COUNTRY U.S.A.	SERVICE F.B.I.	SERVICE DATES	FROM March 30, 1942	TO May 14, 1948

GRADE CAF-12	SERIAL NUMBER ----	TYPE OF DISCHARGE voluntary resignation

LAST STATION Chicago, Ill.	COMMANDING OFFICER ---

REMARKS:

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (USE ADDITIONAL SHEET IF NECESSARY)

NOTE: INCLUDE BELOW PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 15 YEARS.

EMPLOYER Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.				JOB TITLE Budget manager
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Washington Street, Quincy, Massachusetts				KIND OF BUSINESS automobile - sales & service
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY In charge of budget sales and collections				NAME OF SUPERVISOR C. A. Haves
DATES COVERED	FROM: Aug. 1939	TO: May 1941	SALARY $125.00	PER month
REASONS FOR LEAVING For more preferable employment				

EMPLOYER General Motors Acceptance Corp.				JOB TITLE field representative
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Boston, Massachusetts				KIND OF BUSINESS automobile financing
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY Contacting dealers & supervising collections				NAME OF SUPERVISOR F. A. Miller
DATES COVERED	FROM: May 1941	TO: Nov. 1941	SALARY $150.00	PER month
REASONS FOR LEAVING Reduction of personnel				

EMPLOYER Federal Bureau of Investigation				JOB TITLE (supervisor) Special Agent
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.				KIND OF BUSINESS Investigation
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY Investigation & Supervision of Inv.				NAME OF SUPERVISOR R. N. Wall
DATES COVERED	FROM: March 30, 1942	TO: May 14, 1948	SALARY $6140	PER year
REASONS FOR LEAVING To obtain more preferable employment				

EMPLOYER	JOB TITLE
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE	KIND OF BUSINESS

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 4,

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY			NAME OF SUPERVISOR	
DATES COVERED	FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
REASONS FOR LEAVING				
EMPLOYER			JOB TITLE	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE			KIND OF BUSINESS	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY			NAME OF SUPERVISOR	
DATES COVERED	FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
REASONS FOR LEAVING				
EMPLOYER			JOB TITLE	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE			KIND OF BUSINESS	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY			NAME OF SUPERVISOR	
DATES COVERED	FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
REASONS FOR LEAVING				

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW GIVE DETAILS CONCERNING ANY POSITION FROM WHICH YOU MAY HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED OR WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE.

DETAILS:

NONE

SECTION 13. CHARACTER REFERENCES-FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE
Cartha D. DeLoach	2104 Dexter Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland
Herbert W. Causer	42 Ralph Talbot Street, So. Weymouth, Mass.
Phillip H. Causer	RFD #1, Norwell, Mass.
Thomas Galpin	103 W. Philadelphia, Youngstown, Ohio
Edward L. Zimmerman	FBI, Post Office Building, Youngstown, Ohio

SECTION 14. SOCIAL ACQUAINTENCES-FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE
~~James Bresnahan~~	~~81 Galveston, Washington, D. C.~~
~~Nathaniel Johnson~~	~~Hildarose Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland~~
~~Alfred Eddy~~	~~2104 Dexter Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland~~
~~Edward Fitch~~	~~8510 Northampton, Washington, D. C.~~
~~Dana Carson~~	~~8528 Groveton Rd., Alexandria, Virginia~~

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 7)

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

NAME | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER | CITY | STATE

NAME | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER | CITY | STATE

NAME | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER | CITY | STATE

SECTION 16. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? YES ☐ NO ☒
IF ANSWER IS "YES" EXPLAIN BELOW:

DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS?
Yes

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENCE, AND DISPOSITION OF CASE.
No

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? YES ☐ NO ☐
IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS BELOW:
Not applicable

SECTION 17. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES ☒ NO ☐ IF ANSWER IS "NO", STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME.

NAMES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
City Bank - Washington, D. C.

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? YES ☐ NO ☒ IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE PARTICULARS:

SECTION 18. CREDIT REFERENCES-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE
Hecht Co.	Washington, D. C.
G. M. McKelvey Co.	Federal Street, Youngstown, Ohio
Strouss-Hirshberg Co.	Federal Street, Youngstown, Ohio

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS

FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY
birth	1939	40 Greenwood Street, Amesbury, Massachusetts
1939	1941	
May 1941	Mar. 1942	40 Greenwood Street, Amesbury, Massachusetts

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 8)

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7)

FROM: June 1942	TO: Oct. 1942	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY 812 Taylor Street, Detroit, Michigan
FROM: Oct. 1942	TO: Nov. 1944	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY 12053 Lake Cleveland, Ohio
FROM: Nov. 1944	TO: Nov. 1947	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY 102 W. Phil. Avenue, Youngstown, Ohio
FROM: Nov. 1947	TO: ----	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY 2118 Dexter Silver Springs, Maryland
FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

SECTION 20. RESIDENCES OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE

SECTION 21. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ALL KINDS TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS. INCLUDE ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR A BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OR TO WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT.

NAME Sigma Nu Fraternity	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY Brunswick, Maine
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

SECTION 22. LANGUAGES—FOREIGN (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT", "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE

SECTION 23. GENERAL QUALIFICAT

INDICATE ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING YOU HAVE, ALSO, SET FORTH ANY QUALIFICATIONS AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION.

As a Special Agent, with the F.B.I. I have had experience in the execution & supervision of investigations of a criminal & security nature.

SECTION 24. SPORTS AND HOBBIES

I played Varsity Football in college & am interested in all sports.

SECTION 25. EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE

NAME Mrs. William V. Broe

RELATIONSHIP wife

ADDRESS (STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY) 2116 Daxter Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland

TELEPHONE SH 2825

SECTION 26. INFORMATION AND FINAL COMMENTS

NOTE: YOU ARE INFORMED THAT CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION, IF SO, DESCRIBE, IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO".

NO

SECTION 27. CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR MY IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT ______ City ______ State

DATE May 13, 1948

______ Witness

/s/ William V. Broe
Signature of Applicant

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief, Communications Division

6 December 1950

Chief, Personnel Security Branch

BROE, William Vincent - 35706

In reply to your memorandum dated 1 December 1950, this is to advise that Subject meets the current requirements for cryptographic clearance and is approved for such duties as of this date.

ERMAL P. GEISS

SED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECURITY APPROVAL

CONFIDENTIAL

To : ~~Chief, Personnel Branch~~ Deputy Personnel Officer Date: 17 May 1949

From : Executive for Inspection and Security Number: 35,706

Subject: REOE, William Vincent

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4p Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

☒ Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Your memorandum dated 4 June 1948 stated Subject is an applicant for OSO-FBZ.

Chief, Personnel Security Division

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
JUL 1948

SECRET

Leo CHERNE

MASTROCOLA, Bruce G.
consolidated file #21

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTRACT PERSONNEL

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

RETURN FILE TO SE-05 HQS

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: T. Cobb

DIVISION: WH/III/Carib

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2056

DATE: 1 June 59

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Bruce G. MASTROCOLA

2. PROJECT
Headquarters Support

3. ALLOTMENT NO.
9-3500-10-200

4. SLOT NO.

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES
None

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)
His business firm furnished cover for a CIA agent.
Personal friend and confidant of DCI

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date)
PCA C-11118, 28 May 59

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.)
Contract Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP
USA

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☒ NO

13. AGE
46

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
8 September 1912

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country)
New York, N.Y.

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country)
New York, N.Y.

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP:
wife 1
daughter 1
2

(no others known)

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE
Not Known

21. VETERAN
Not Known

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE

24. RANK OR GRADE

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

or any fraction of a day

27. BASIC SALARY
$50.00 per day
(not to exceed $265 per wk.)

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL
WAE

29. COVER (Bus/Journ, if any)
Natural

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS
NA

32. POST
NA

33. OTHER
NA

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any)
NA

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☒ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☒ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION
Yes

43. ENTERTAINMENT
Yes

44. OTHER
Operational Expenses
~~Representation allowance~~

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

FORM NO. 204 REPLACES FORMS 204 AND 204a, 1 SEP 55

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED) NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.	CASE OFFICER T. Cobb TELEPHONE EXTENSION 2056	DIVISION WH/III/Carib DATE 1 June 59

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R.15-230 or successor regulations.)

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check) ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check) ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

NA ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) ☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS — MONTHS — 1 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 5 June 59

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 30

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (FI, PP; other)

PP

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

High level contacts with Cuban Government officials for political action purposes (subsidiary FI-type reporting also expected from Subject).

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Eminent authority on government, business, taxes, foreign trade.
High-level contacts in Cuban Government.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained) Unknown

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency) Unknown

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Frequent travel into target area.

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

Executive secretary of a research institute (current employment)
Member of International Rescue Committee

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF DIVISION OFFICER	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF SENIOR STAFF OFFICER
	Robert N Dahlgren R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III		P. E. ARNESON, C/WH/Support

SECRET

Mr. Bruce C. Mastrocola

Dear Mr. Mastrocola:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and services you will be paid a fee of $50 for any day or fraction thereof during which you are utilized under this agreement, not to exceed $265 per week. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. No taxes will be withheld therefrom, but it will be your responsibility to report such income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations. An appropriate Form 1099 will be furnished by the Government in furtherance of its tax reporting requirement.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government. This may include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel and while on temporary duty away from your domestic permanent post of assignment. Payment and accounting for such expenses will be in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

3. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to accounting in substantial compliance with Government regulations.

4. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

5. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

7. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

8. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

9. Term. This contract is effective as of 5 June 1959, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY____________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Bruce G. Mastrocola

WITNESS:________________________

APPROVED:

____

RHL/ac - 4 June 59
WH/PP/Support
C.A.
c.o. Jim Cobb x2056

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CHRIST, DAVID L.
OPP

INCLUSIVE DATES: 23 Aug 1950 — 19 Feb 1974
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

CHRIST, DAVID - TERMINATED [illegible]

CIA RESUME - DAVID L. CHRIST

October 1950 - January 1958

Deputy Chief, Applied Physics Branch.

Recruitment, development and supervision of up to 20 professionals - electronic engineers and physicists - in research, development and engineering.

Technical areas covered - electronics, acoustics, optics, electro-optics, magnetics, electromagnetics, solid-state physics.

Typical Programs: (Communications, etc.) RF systems, microphones, recorders, transmitters, receivers, amplifiers, control systems, signal processing and enhancement, radar systems, audio and video circuitry and devices.

January 1958 - August 1963

Chief, Technical Applications Group.

Supervised 30 engineers and technicians.

Engineered, produced, tested and evaluated components, devices and systems such as listed above. Developed administrative, logistics, supply and training programs, and reliability procedures and programs to implement their effective application.

August 1963 - November 1970

Chief, Applied Physics Division

Recruited, developed and supervised professionals - scientists and engineers, GS-12 to GS-15, one SPS-4, in advanced R&D programs.

Primary emphases were on new advanced components, devices, systems and concepts for intelligence support activities. Basic orientation -- advanced systems concepts based on microtechnology.

Technical areas -- Microelectronics (particularly micropower), solid-state physics, acoustics, electro-optics, electromechanics, avionics, stability and control, navigation, communications (analogue and digital), radar systems.

Typical programs -- Solid-state components and devices; communication systems--audio, video, telemetry; sensors--acoustic, optical, nuclear, RF, etc.; avionic subsystems; data processing; power sources; electronic equipments, dc to microwave; antennas; systems study and analysis.

21 December 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David L. Christ

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Science and Technology

THROUGH : Director of Research and Development

SUBJECT : Intelligence Medal of Merit

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the award named above will be conferred on you in recognition of the excellent service you have rendered this Agency. Security considerations relevant to the award are explained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security.

2. The award will be presented to you at a ceremony to be held in the near future. Members of your family, Agency associates, and intimate friends who are aware of your Agency affiliation may attend the ceremony.

3. Invitations to the ceremony will be extended by the Secretariat, Honor and Merit Awards Board, Office of Personnel, extension 3645. Please send to that office the names and phone numbers of the guests you would like to have invited, and indicate any dates on which you would not be available for such a ceremony.

/Sgd/ Robert M. Gaynor

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
- Orig - Addressee
  - 1 - D/ORD
  - ~~1~~ - D/Pers Reader Chrono/OPF
  - 1 - Sec't, HMAB
  - 1 - Recorder, HMAB

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

Executive Registry
70-5969

DATE: 17 November 1970

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle) CHRIST, David L.	BIRTHYEAR 1918	SEX M	TYPE EMPLOYEE
OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDS&T/ORD	SD	SCHEDULE	GRADE GS-16	STATION

BE AWARDED

Intelligence Medal of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD Nov 1950-Nov 1970

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. David L. Christ is hereby awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit in recognition of his outstanding career and his many contributions to the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency. His imaginative, innovative thinking and his tireless efforts, marked by a thorough knowledge of intelligence operations, have been instrumental in developing programs of significance. His devotion to superior standards of performance at home and abroad has been an inspiration to his colleagues and brings great credit upon him and the Federal Service.

(Recommendation originated by D/ORD on 2 November 1970)

REMARKS

APPROVED

/s/ Richard Helms

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

16 DEC 1970

DATE

SIGNATURE: /s/ Robert S. Wattles

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD: ROBERT S. WATTLES

SIGNATURE: Signed Original

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER: ROBERT M. GAYNOR

FORM 8-69 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(4)

B9J# 27 NOV 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CHRIST DAVID L

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT-VOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 11 30 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1262 2200 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 23

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE: PHYS SCIEN RES CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0088

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: R

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.11

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 8

17. SALARY OR RATE: 32742

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 22 October 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Christ, David L.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

E
44

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 30 | YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1262-2200

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sect. 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DD/S&T
ORD
Applied Physics Div.

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Phys Scien-Res-CH (16)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0088

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: R

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.11

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: 32,712 ✓ $31,857

18. REMARKS

Last working day: 30 November 1970

Carl Batchelder
DD547/Pers
30 Oct 70

cc: Payroll
Security

Recommended for the Reserve List per J.J. Connolly 11/4/70

1152 telecord w/Carl Geisel, ROB, 11/3/70.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: James J. Connolly
James J. Connolly, DD/ORD

DATE SIGNED: 23 Oct 70

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Stephen L. Aldrich, M. D.

DATE SIGNED: 11/2/70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE:

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOOURS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 | DA. 20 | YR. 12

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-ORGN 3-FICA 5-NONE; CODE:

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0, DJ, CO, 0, 0.

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO | DA | YR

FOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVER 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-30-70

46. O P APPROVAL: Robert S. Wattles

DATE APPROVED: 30 Oct 70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 October 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): CHRIST, DAVID L.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 | DAY 18 | YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

E
HH

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1262 2200

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DD/S&T/ORD

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: R

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16

17. SALARY OR RATE: $

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE

20. EMPLOY. CODE

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. ROSTER CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 6 | DA 20 | YR 15

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA. | YR

27. DATE OF LEI: MO | DA. | YR

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE 2

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO | DA | YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO | DA. | YR

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAT. RESV. PROV. TEMP; CODE

39. FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-16-70

46. O P APPROVAL: Robert L. [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 16 Oct 70

FORM 3-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

OP-1 7-70

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 April 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Christ, David L. 4-25-67				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassign ment		4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH / DAY / YEAR ASAP		5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	
6. FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 7262-1000		8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DD/S&T ORD Applied Physics Division			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE Phys Scien-Res-Ch			12. POSITION NUMBER 0088		13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION R
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1301.11		16. GRADE AND STEP 16 5		17. SALARY OR RATE $ 22,755

E 41

18. REMARKS

cc: Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Charles W. Sandman Charles W. Sandman	DATE SIGNED 18 Apr 67	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Charles W. Sandman for Robert F. Zunzel	DATE SIGNED 18 Apr 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 88370 ALPHABETIC ORD
22 STATION CODE: 25013
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HOURS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 18
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAS RESV PROV, TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46 O P APPROVAL: Bill Bond
DATE APPROVED: 21 Apr 67

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

①

SECRET

ORD 4331-67 16

26 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Training Registrar

THROUGH : TO/ORD

SUBJECT : Evaluation of Contract Management Institute Course

1. I attended the Contract Management Institute on 28 to 31 March 1967. Immediately after that course I submitted extensive comments to Mr. Arthur Leach, DD/S&T coordinator for the course, and I understand that those comments were included in the overall recommendations for future changes.

2. Since three and one-half months have transpired since completion of that course, details such as the names of speakers and subject material are a bit hazy but I will repeat my overall reaction to it for whatever benefit it might afford. The course material was good although it could have been oriented much more toward technical project managers rather than administrative officers, to the ultimate benefit of DD/S&T. Two of the speakers were excellent; however, the third, who also was apparently Director of the Institute was very poor both with respect to his understanding of the material and his presentation. Dr. Kennedy of Notre Dame and the lawyer, whose name I do not recall, were excellent.

3. This was primarily a sales pitch for CPIF contracts. My personal impression was that U.S. Government contracting agencies have just about completed the circle of a great procurement fiasco. In departing from fixed-price and CPFF contracts to CPIF's with various award arrangements, the contract negotiators were unable to really ever define cost and ended up invariably in giving away additional fees to the contractors for nothing received. Definitive costs were always a function of experienced and sound

SECRET

[illegible]

Subject: Evaluation of Contract Management Institute
Course

technical investigation and management of a contract and whenever costs followed a nonlinear curve, most estimates became almost completely unpredictable. NASA and the DoD generally have, therefore, gone from CPIF types to CPAF-type contracts; the CPAF type ends up being simply another CPFF but with the contractor having the advantage in the establishment of an award fee and with the Government having no recourse to redetermination. My reaction was simply that the DoD experience simply reaffirms my own -- that for R&D there appears to be no good substitute for a well-managed CPFF-type arrangement.

DAVID L. CHRIST
C/AP/ORD/DD/S&T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: David L. Christ

VIA : Chief, TSS

1. The problem of effective management of the operational records of the Clandestine Services is one of our most important responsibilities. In this connection, you have been selected by your Division, and authorized by the Clandestine Services Records Committee, to act as Records Officer for your component. Your selection is based on your professional qualifications to carry out an assignment requiring experience, judgment, and a knowledge of the objectives of the Clandestine Services. A copy of this memorandum will be placed in your official personnel folder to record your appointment as Records Officer.

2. You are to act on behalf of your Division or Staff element in authorizing the destruction of material of no value to the Clandestine Services in accordance with criteria established for this purpose. You are empowered to authorize the destruction of documents and index cards recommended for destruction by other members of your Branch, and to desensitize KAPOK and RYBAT material which is no longer sensitive or which has been restricted in error. Your signature will be recognized by RID as that of an officially appointed Records Officer.

3. At the meeting of 26 August 1958 , you were briefed on the details of your duties as Records Officer. It is now considered that you will be able fully to execute your duties as Records Officer and thus make a real contribution to the CS Records Management Program.

WENDELL E. LITTLE
DDP/RMO

cc: Personnel Jacket of Addressee

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 September 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): CHRIST, David L. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment, Change of SD and Transfer to Vouchered Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 29 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4262-1000-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
3 DD/S&T
Office of Research and Development
Analysis Division
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: IO Physical Scien

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0061

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: R

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16-3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 17,000 ✓

18. REMARKS:
~~Personal Rank Assignment under the provisions of HR 21c(5) for a period not to exceed 18 months.~~

1 copy - Payroll Branch
1 copy - Office of Security

CONCUR: for CSCS

CSPD

Note: Per telecon w/ Mr Olmstead 23 Sep 63. Mr Christ is knowledgeable and accepts change in SD to R.
B Bond

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/SB 5/16/63

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Charles W. Sandman
DATE SIGNED: 19 Sept 63

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Jasper L. Olmstead
DATE SIGNED: 20 Sept 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VOUCHER CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	10	22400	ORD	75013		1	01 20 18		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR. — 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR. — EOD DATA — 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. — 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR. — 37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR. — 38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/DESIG PROV/TEMP CODE — 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERV. OF MORE THAN 3 YRS) — 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS — 44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Security Concurrence from TSD
25 SEP 1963

46. O.P. APPROVAL: D. W. Tonne for DD Pers
DATE APPROVED: 24 Sept 63

FORM 1152 4-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 April 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER	059090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	CHRIST, DAVID L.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT & CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	04 / 22 / 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	3125-1990-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSD Development Complement
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE	PHYSICAL SCIENtist
12. POSITION NUMBER	9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	1301.07
16. GRADE AND STEP	16 (3)
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 17,000

18. REMARKS

FROM: IAS Foreign Field Undetermined.

Career . [illegible]
See FA/C

cc: Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	JAMES R. SHIELDS
DATE SIGNED	
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	James R. Shields JAMES R. SHIELDS, TSD/CMO
DATE SIGNED	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	37
20. EMPLOY. CODE	16
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	46997 / TS
22. STATION CODE	75012
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. VOTERS CODE	1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	[illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) CODE	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) CODE / HEALTH INS. CODE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)) CODE	
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	
46. C.P. APPROVAL	R. [illegible] R. W. Bond [illegible] 30 Apr 63
DATE APPROVED	30 Apr 63

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
9-61

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 November 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SRB SPECIAL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 25 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: SRB SPECIAL

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3176-1062-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
IAS
FOREIGN FIELD
SPECIAL DETAIL FOREIGN

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: OVERSEAS UNDETERMINED

11. POSITION TITLE: GENERAL POSITION

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0803

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: UD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16-3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $17,000

18. REMARKS

This action taken in compliance with oral instructions from DDCI (Gen. Carter) to DDS (Col. White) on 21 Nov. 62

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: B. DeFelice
AC/Benefits & Services Division

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 27
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 52
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 20990 ALPHABETIC 145
22. STATION CODE: 99999
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOOTRS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 18
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. DATE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 2 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 21 Nov 1962

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITI AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 June 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SRB SPECIAL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE OF CAREER SERVICE Designation

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 7 | DAY 1 | YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: SRB SPECIAL

6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2165-1062-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
IAS
FOREIGN FIELD
SPECIAL DETAIL FOREIGN

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: OVERSEAS UNDETERMINED

11. POSITION TITLE: GENERAL POSITION

12. POSITION NUMBER: 803

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: UD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 14,380

18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
John E. Bischoff
Chief, Benefits and Services Division

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
Director of Personnel

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. OCCUPAT. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
37	52	29994	IAS	99999		5	01 20 18	

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT CO: 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46. O.P. APPROVAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 Oct 1960

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 59090

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): CHRIST, David L.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 | DAY 02 | YEAR 60

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1125-1007-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/TSD
Technical Aids
Audio Support Branch
Office of the Chief

4

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL-SCIEN-CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 609

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 03

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 14,380

18. REMARKS

Recorded by
CSPD
10-5-60

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES R. SHIELDS

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: James R. Shields JAMES R. SHIELDS TSD/CMO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 20

20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC [illegible] | ALPHABETIC [illegible]

22. STATION CODE: [illegible]

23. INTEGRATION CODE

24. POSITION CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 06 | 30 | 18

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR. 06 | 29 | 58

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR. 06 | 23 | 61

28. NTE EXP. RES.: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 4 - NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: CODE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED: 1 - YES 2 - NO

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-5-60 [illegible]

46. O.P. APPROVAL

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED
23 June 1958

1. Serial No. 159090	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) CHRIST DAVID L	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 20 Yr. 18	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 11 Da. 16 Yr. 50	
7. SCD Mo. 05 Da. 13 Yr. 47	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 11 Da. 16 Yr. 50	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Lco Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP TSS TECHNICAL AIDS AUDIO SUPPORT DIV OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 4448	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code 2	17. Position Title PHY SCI CH	18. Position No. 0609	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1301.07

21. Grade & Step 14 6	22. Salary Or Rate $ ~~11395~~ 12,???	23. SD DT	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 28 Yr. 54	25. PSI Due Mo. XX Da. XX Yr. XX	26. Appropriation Number 8 2507 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. ~~07 13 58~~ ~~29 JUN 1958~~ 06 29 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 4448	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No. 66 2955 12-21-57	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step 15 ~~3~~ 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ ~~12600~~ 13075	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade ~~Mo. Da. Yr.~~	42. PSI Due ~~XX XX XX~~	43. Appropriation Number 9

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) JAMES R. SHIELDS Career Management Officer, TSS
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Dave Richards Ext. 3031	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

SECRET

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

14-00000

Classify According To Content.

24feb58

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo	Da	Yr
	CHRIST, DAVID L.	01	20	18		1	M			

7. SCD Mo	Da	Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo	Da	Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	12. LCD Mo	Da	Yr	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2	Code

8

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		WASHINGTON, D.C.	

16. Dept.- Field Dept - Ustld- Fran -	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
X		ELEC ENGR D CH	140	GS	0855.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	25. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	26. Appropriation Number
14 6	$ 11,395	DT							8-2509-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	2 MAR 1958	REGULAR	01	

4

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS TECHNICAL AIDS AUDIO SUPPORT DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	4448		

33. Dept.- Field Dept - Ustld- Fran -	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
		PHYSICAL SCIEN CH	609 XXX	GS	1301.07

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	42. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	43. Appropriation Number
	$		[illegible]	[illegible]	57	XX	XX	XX	8-2507-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
DAVE RICHARDS EXT XXXX 2021

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
JAMES R. SHIELDS CMO TSS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]		E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Sheay	4 MAR 1958

Remarks

DIVISION D CLEARANCE VERIFIED 25 NOV 57.

TWO COPIES THIS ACTION SENT TO SECURITY.

FORM 1152a
5-57 (4)

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.* If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. DAVID L. CHRIST	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 4 Oct 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) REASSIGNMENT B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 4 Nov	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
PHY SCI ADM (D CH) BY 140	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	ELECTRONIC ENG (D CH) BY 140
GS-1301.06-14 $10,535 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0855.01-14 $10,535 per annum
DDP/TSS Research & Development Applied Physics Division Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Research & Development Applied Physics Division Office of the Chief
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

T/O CHANGE

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Dave Richards Ext. 3031

9. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: JASPER L. OLMSTEAD
Title: Career Management Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	XX		XX		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 7-2509-10
TO: 7-2509-10
18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

SECRET

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	[illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION	[illegible]	[illegible]
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	[illegible]
E.		

REMARKS.

F. APPROVED BY: per F. Bear, Jr. 16 Oct 56

14-673-9-2

14-00000

SECRET

Standard Form 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. – Miss – Mrs. – One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. DAVID L. CHRIST
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1918
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 14 Jul 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 29 Jul. 56

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY 10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 11. HEADQUARTERS 12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	TO—
PHY SCI ADM(D CH) BY-140 GS-1301.~~07~~14 .06 $10,535.00 DDP/TSS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		PHY SCI ADM(D CH) BY-140 GS-1301.~~07~~-14 .06 $10,535.00 DDP/TSS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

~~[illegible]~~

T/O

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title):

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): DAVE RICHARDS X-3031

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: JASPER L. OLMSTEAD
Title: CMO/TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	✓		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

SD: DP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM
TO 7-2509-10
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (FSS-80): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Md.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		7/25/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCO	7/26/56
E.		

SECRET

F. APPROVED BY per Fitz Bearge 25 July 56

PERSONN ACTION REQUEST

FGISTER NO.

NAME CHRIST, David L.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE Cap ~~10~~ 24 November 1951
NATURE OF ACTION Resignation	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: 20 November 1951 EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

FROM	TO
TITLE Electronics Research Engineer, GS-11	
GRADE AND SALARY GS-11-1312-~~$5400.00~~ per annum. 5940.00	
OFFICE Policy Coordination	
DIVISION Staff II	
BRANCH AND SECTION Research & Development Branch	
OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.	
DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

Transfer leave & UV Funds

#125

To accept other employment

RECOMMENDED:

10 November 1951
(DATE)

Byron C Dawes
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED	TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS APPROPRIATION: 2123700 ALLOTMENT: 1913 C. S. C. AUTHORITY:
CLEARANCE REQUESTED: DATE / TYPE CLEARANCE APPROVED: DATE / TYPE	DATE SIGNATURE 1-24-52 SIGNATURE
DATE / SIGNATURE	PERSONNEL RELATIONS DATE / SIGNATURE
CLASSIFICATION BUREAU NO. / C. S. C. NO. / DATE APPROVED	APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE DATE / SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE
NEW / VICE / I. A. / REAL	
DATE / SIGNATURE	DATE / SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
EFFECTIVE DATE	

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—63153-1

DOCA - Date of Current Appointment P/R - Permanent Residence

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

AIR FORCE RESERVE ORDERS
NO. 93 EXTRACT 15 May 1951

* * *

69. Eff 11 Apr 51 SMOP 39 AFRO 74 cs pertaining to
SMITH NEILSON H A0282987 COL P/R Apt 526 2800 Quebec St NW Wash,DC
CLARK ROBERT W A01647601 CPT P/R 22 34 Savannah Terrace SE Wash,DC
WILLIAMS OGDEN A0501923 CPT P/R 455 E 57th St New York 22 NY
CHRIST DAVID L A0877943 1 LT P/R Apt 2 5405 Hamilton St Rogers Heights Hyattsville, Md
MUENSTER ROBERT W A01799172 1 LT P/R 65233 Clarendon Rd,Bethesda Md
REIFSNYDER DONALD D A0706901 1 LT P/R 1313 Queen St Pottstown, Pa
SPOEHEL EDWIN H JR A02079516 2 LT P/R 405 59th St West New York,NJ and
VANDER LINDEN WILBER A A01860542 2 LT P/R 19 Elm Ave Takoma Park,Md as reads: "asgd Vol Tng Flt "A" (Int) (USAFR) 9463rd VART Sq 9110th VART Gp 403 10th St NW Washington,DC" is amnd to read: "asgd 9463rd VART Sq 9110th VART Gp 403 10th St NW Washington,DC".

* * *

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HODGES:

J. A. BULGER
Colonel,USAF
Vice Commander

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Robert W. Kinney
ROBERT W. KINNEY

2 LT USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

John A. Owens
JOHN A. OWENS
1 LT USAF
Adj.

DOCA - Date of Current Appointment P/R - Permanent Residence

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

AIR FORCE RESERVE ORDERS
NO. 74 EXTRACT 11 April 1951

* * *

39. SMITH NELSON H A0282987 COL (W) YOB 05 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 8-50 P/R Apt 526 2800 Quebec St NW Washington DC PSSN 2260 Dy SSN Unk DPG 8-50
CLARK ROBERT W A01647601 CPT (W) YOB 20 Aero Rating Unk Fly Status Unk DOCA 1-51 P/R 22 34 Savannah Terrace SE Washington DC PSSN Unk Dy SSN Unk DPG 1-5
WILLIAMS OGDEN A0501923 CPT (W) YOB 20 Acft Obsr (Nav) Fly Status Unk DOCA 10-45 P/R 455 E 57th St New York 22 NY PSSN 1034 Dy SSN Unk DPG Unk
CHRIST DAVID L A0277943 1LT (W) YOB 18 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 4-46 P/R Apt 2 5405 Hamilton St Rogers Heights Hyattsville Md PSSN 0224 Dy SSN Unk DPG 4-46
MUENSTER ROBERT W A01799172 1LT (W) YOB 15 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 2-46 P/R 6523 Clarendon Rd Bethesda Md PSSN 9307 Dy SSN Unk DPG Unk
REIFSNYDER DONALD D A0706901 1LT (W) YOB 21 Acft Obsr (Bmbdr) Fly Status Unk DOCA 10-45 P/R 1313 Queen St Pottstown Pa PSSN 1035 Dy SSN Unk DPG 9-44
SPOERREL EDWIN H JR A02079516 2LT (W) YOB 25 Acft Obsr (Nav) Fly Status Unk DOCA 2-46 P/R 408 59th St West New York NJ PSSN 1034 Dy SSN Unk DPG 12-44
VANDER LINDEN WALTER A A01860542 2LT (W) YOB 25 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 12-50 P/R 19 Elm Ave Takoma Park Md PSSN 0001 Dy SSN Unk DPG 12-50
Above offs reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd Vol Tng Flt "A" (Int) (USAFR) 9463d VART Sq 9110th VART Gp 403 10th St NW Washington DC EDCSA 17 Apr 51.

40. PETERSON SVEN R A0325966 2LT (W) YOB 21 Plt not-on-fly-status DOCA 11-45 P/R Math Department University of New Hampshire Durham NH PSSN 1051 Dy SSN Unk DPG 3-44
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY and atchmt to 9234th VART Sq 9051st VART Gp 3 Capitol St Concord NH asgd Flt "A" 9234th VART Sq 9051st VART Gp 3 Capitol St Concord NH EDCSA 17 Apr 51.

41. McLAUGHLIN EDWARD F A0728900 MAJ (W) YOB 18 Plt on-fly-status DOCA 12-48 P/R 16 Grandview St Huntington NY PSSN 1024 Dy SSN 1024 DPG 12-48
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd 9296th VART Sq 9068th VART Gp PO Bldg Huntington NY EDCSA 16 Apr 51.

42. RHEINFRANK GEORGE E A0376670 MAJ (W) YOB 16 Plt not-on-fly-status DOCA 7-46 P/R 228 E Front St Perrysburg Ohio PSSN 7050 Dy SSN Unk DPG 10-45
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd Flt "D" 9522d VART Sq 9103d VART Gp Room 26 4th Floor Central Station Bldg Madison & St Clair Toledo Ohio EDCSA 18 Apr 51.

43. JAMES WILLIAM J A01237357 CPT (W) YOB 06 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 10-45 P/R 217 E Railroad St Nesquehoning Pa PSSN 9301 Dy SSN Unk DPG 5-45
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd 9543d VART Sq 9101st VART Gp 261 S Washington St Wilkes-Barre Pa EDCSA 17 Apr 51.

AFRO 74 EXTRACT (Contd) 11 April 1951

44. REIDY JOSEPH A A0706501 1LT (A) YOB 11 Plt Fly Status Unk DOCA 10-45 P/R 4710 S Lawndale Chicago 32 Ill PSSN 1055 Dy SSN Unk DPG Unk
Above off reld res asgmt Vol Tng Flt "A" (Int) 9463d VART Sq 9110th VART Gp Washington DC asgd Hq & Hq Sq 10AF (VRS) Selfridge AFB Mich EDCSA 19 Apr 51.

45. LEXAL GUS J A0743981 1LT (A) YOB 16 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 3-46 P/R 522 Breaux Bridge Ave Lafayette La PSSN 4110 Dy SSN Unk DPG 6-44
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd Hq & Hq Sq 14AF (VRS) Robins AFB Ga EDCSA 19 Apr 51.

46. GALLMAN FREDERICK D JR A0565434 CPT (A) YOB 17 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 1-46 P/R 121 Winsor Ave Watertown Mass PSSN 2260, Dy SSN Unk DPG 1-46
Above off reld res asgmt 9229th VART Sq 9054th VART Gp asgd Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY EDCSA 17 Apr 51.

47. MANTORANS JOSEPH F A0658067 CPT (A) YOB 20 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 3-46 P/R 221 Bay Ridge Ave Brooklyn 20 NY PSSN 4822 Dy SSN Unk DPG Unk
Above off reld res asgmt 9217th VART Sq 9059th VART Gp 67 Broad St New York NY asgd Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY EDCSA 16 Apr 51.

48. MORSE MURIEL AN751638 CPT (A) YOB 19 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 8-47 P/R Brewster Mass PSSN 3449 Dy SSN Unk DPG 8-47
Above off trfd OAR to VAR reld res asgmt 33d Med Gp 33d Ftr-Intcp Wg Otis AFB Falmouth Mass asgd Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY EDCSA 17 Apr 51. (Auth: AFR 45-5 16 Mar 49).

49. MALONEY JACK C A0569280 MAJ (A) YOB 10 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 10-45 P/R 2 Corliss Terrace Wheeling W Va PSSN 4823 Dy SSN Unk DPG 11-46
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd 9489th VART Sq 9102d VART Gp 215 Wheeling Steel Bldg Wheeling W Va and designated Tng and Opns Off thereof EDCSA 17 Apr 51.

* * *

BY ORDER OF COLONEL DUIGAN:

OFFICIAL:

Robert W. Kinney

ROBERT W. KINNEY
2LT, USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

ROBERT W. KINNEY
2LT, USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

PERSONNE. TION REQUEST

GISTER NUMBER 172

NAME: DAVID L. CHRIST

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: ~~As soon as possible~~ 16 Nov 1950

NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)
LAST WORKING DAY:
EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE: #3753

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Research Electronics Engineer GS-11
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-11 ~~$5,000.00~~ $5400.00 / PR CHS
OFFICE		Policy Coordination
DIVISION		Staff II
BRANCH AND SECTION		Research & Development Branch
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

9 Nov 1950 W

REMARKS: 5-9 1312

Mr. Christ will occupy the GS-11 slot of Electronics Engineer in OPC/II/RD.

Entire file on subject in SED's possession, including 57's & PNS's.
D.R.

RECOMMENDED:

23 August 1950
DATE

Deputy Chief, Staff II
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT
DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: 7 Sept 50

CLEARANCE REQUESTED

DATE	TYPE

CLEARANCE APPROVED

DATE	TYPE

DATE
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
5889	—	8/4/50

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		✓	

DATE: 6 Sept. 50
SIGNATURE: Austin J. Thomas 9/5/50

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS
APPROPRIATION: $115900
ALLOTMENT: 831-101
CSC AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(E)

DATE SIGNATURE: 11-21-50
SIGNATURE: M. D. Stephenson

PERSONNEL RELATIONS
DATE
SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE
DATE
SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE: 8 Sept 50
SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF: Robert K. Waters

FORM NO. 37-3
NOV 1949

RESTRICTED

31 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: SED/SSS

SUBJECT: David L. Christ

II/RD was advised by Mr. Christ on 30 October that he has changed his address. He can now be reached at -

5405 Hamilton Street, N. E.
Apt. #2 - Elmar Gardens
Rodgers Heights, Maryland

Telephone: UNion 8236

L. H. Dailey

L. H. DAILEY
Deputy Chief
Research & Development

RESTRICTED

SECRET

I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency, by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures. I agree to honor the requests of CIA relative to my application whether it be accepted or rejected. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in CIA. If questioned directly, I will say that I have applied for positions in various government agencies, and if pressed for an answer will acknowledge that CIA is one of them but will attach no particular significance to such application. I agree not to disclose personnel procedures I have observed in CIA. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application to CIA.

Signed: David L. Christ

Date: Aug 23, 1950

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

23 Aug 1950

Name of Candidate CHRIST, D.L.

Position Considered for ____________ Office ____________ Interviewer ____________

Personal Appearance	Dignified.....		Natural.....	x	Awkward.....	
	Well-groomed...	x	Clean		Slovenly....	
	Wide-Awake.....		Stolid.....		Apathetic...	
	Impressive.....		Ordinary....		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive.....		Responsive..	x	Taciturn....	
	Imperturbable..		Steady......	x	Excitable...	
	Cheerful.......		Tranquil ...		Dejected....	
	Straight-forward		Reserved....		Evasive.....	
	Modest.........		Complacent..		Conceited...	
	Dominant.......		Confident...	x	Submissive...	

Is education adequate? Yes (X) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes ( ) No ( )

Area Knowledge ____________

Previous intelligence or related experience ELECTONIC ENGINEER

Salary level requested $ GS-10 Lowest salary acceptable $ GS-

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ____________
2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: OK WITH R+D AND THEY HAVE NEED FOR SAME.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: ____________ Branch ____________ Division ____________

Location: ____________

Salary level: ____________

No 10-2
WANTS D.C.

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: ____________

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

Signature of Interviewer

FORM NO. 20-1
MAY 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

RESERVE STATUS INFORMATION

NAME: David L. Christ

RANK: 1st Lt.

SERIAL NUMBER: 0-877943

BRANCH OF SERVICE: Air Force -- AACS

ACTIVE OR INACTIVE RESERVE: Presume active

IF KNOWN, PRESENT LOCATION OF RECORDS: Hq. AACS, Washington D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

23 August 1950

Name of Candidate CHRIST, David L.

Position Considered for Electronics Engineer Office ________ Interviewer John M deffries

Personal Appearance	Dignified	Yes	Natural	Yes	Awkward	No
	Well-groomed	Yes	Clean	Yes	Slovenly	No
	Wide-Awake	Yes	Stolid	Yes	Apathetic	No
	Impressive	Yes	Ordinary	No	Insignificant	No
Personality	Persuasive	Yes	Responsive	Yes	Taciturn	No
	Imperturbable	Yes	Steady	Yes	Excitable	No
	Cheerful	Fairly	Tranquil	Yes	Dejected	No
	Straight-forward	Yes	Reserved	Yes	Evasive	No
	Modest	Yes	Complacent	No	Conceited	No
	Dominant	No	Confident	Yes	Submissive	No

Is education adequate? Yes (✓) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes (✓) No( )

Area Knowledge Satisfactory Washington

Previous intelligence or related experience Cryptography and Commun Offices in Army

Salary level requested $5000 00 Lowest salary acceptable $5000 00

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ________

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: TRD needs Electronics Engineer immediately

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: Electronics Engineer Branch TRDOPC Division ________

Location: Washington

Salary level: 5000 00

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: Of value as Electrical Engr and in General Engineering

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

Signature of Interviewer

FORM NO. 28-1
MAY 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

2 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR : CLANDESTINE SERVICES CAREER SERVICE BOARD

SUBJECT : Mr. David L. CHRIST - Promotion

1. Mr. Christ, an electronics engineer, age 40, has been with the Technical Services Staff since his entrance on duty with the Agency in 1950. He received his B. E. E. from Pennsylvania State. He served as the Assistant Chief of the Applied Physics Division for approximately five years. In that capacity he demonstrated both a high technical competence and the ability to administer the many research programs initiated by the Applied Physics Division.

2. Mr. Christ was selected this past December to be the Chief of the Audio Support Division. It is believed that his technical ability and leadership will enhance the audio program in its world-wide activity. He is currently on an extended TDY in Europe and the Near East surveying audio needs and our capabilities to fulfill them.

Willis A Gibbons

WILLIS A. GIBBONS
Chief, DD/P/TSS

SECRET

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

[illegible]

BIOGRAPHY

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

SCD: 13 May 1947

1. EMPL. SERIAL NO 050093				
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) CHRIST, David Lamar	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] Jun 1918	5. EOD DATE 16 Nov 1950	
MARITAL STATUS Married	DEPENDENTS (Excluded, exc. spouse) 5	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1921 '50'53'57'59	US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA	SPOUSE NA
CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP Jul 1958	OTHER STATUS	LAST MED. EXAM. Jun 1968	QUAL. FOR TDY Standby
				QUAL. FOR TDY Standby
CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA
ASSESSMENT DATE None	PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None		

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1937-42; 1946-48 Atlas Powder Co, Reynolds, Pa - Powder Helper (part-time)
1942-46 Military Service, USAAF, Pvt to 1st Lt - Communications Officer Crypto Sec (!
1950 Penn State College Extension, Wilkes-Barre, Pa - Instr, Industrial Electronics & Electricity (9 mos)

NON-CIA EDUCATION

1943 Radio Ops Mech Sch, USAF, Chicago, Ill - Radio Operator & Mechanics (4 mos)
1944 San Antonio, Tex - Aviation Cadet (Ground) Pre-Tech (4 mos)
1944 Yale Univ, New Haven, Conn - Communications (5 mos)
1945 Chanute Field, Ill - Cryptography (1 mo)
1946-50 Penn State College - BS, Electrical Engr, Electronics, Math

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French - R Inter; W,P,U Slight; S,T None - Feb 1964 - discl Apr 1968
Spanish - R,U Elem; P,S Slight (Jun 1966) W Inter; T None - Feb 1964

AGENCY-SPONSORED TRAINING

1950 Staff Indoct; CS Rev
1950 Security Briefing
1951 CIA Orient
1953 Ops Orient & Refresher
1954 Tech Devices Famil
1966 Lock Picking
1963-64 Electr Engr/GWU
1963-64 MathEngrs&Physicists/GWU
1964 Conf for FedSci Exec/Brookings
1964 Sr Mgmt Sem
1967 Contr Mgmt Inc

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (if any)	LOCATION
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Nov 1962	" " 1301.07	16	UD	" " " " " " "	" "
Apr 1963	" " 1301.07	16	D	DDP/OS Dev_Comp/TSD	Hq
Sep 1963	R.O. Phys Sci [illegible] 1301.01	16	R	ORD/[illegible] Div/CC	
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

DATE REVIEWED 24 Jun 1970	PROFILE REVIEWED BY hms/	ITEMS [illegible] REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE 20 Nov 1969

SECRET

1950 - 1958 Material
1967 - 1970 Material

Orig. of sanitized material

SECRET

SECRET

David L. CHRIST

SECRET

Documents dated Prior To 1959 (Dec)
" " after 1965

Originals of sanitized documents

SECRET

David L. CHRIST

SECRET 3-39 B 11

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 19 February 74

FILE NO. RC-12034

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) OER

SS NUMBER: 181-01-6133

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 059090

ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: Chief/OER Support Staff

REF: Verbal Request

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: CHRIST, David L.

UNIT: Department of Army (JOG)

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS
	☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ____
	☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)
	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ (HHB 20-7)
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ____ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)
	EAA, CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	SUBMIT FORM 2668 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

X	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE: From EOD
X	SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
na	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ (HHB 20-7)
na	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
X	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
X	SUBMIT FORM 2668 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Subject will be acknowledged as CIA for the entire period of employment and is not to reveal specific places or locations of cover assignments.

NOTE: Subject retired Nov 1970

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SR&CD
COPY 4 - OC-DO/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

JLN:km

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF

FORM 1-74 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY 007622

(13-20-43)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 21 January 1964

TO (Check): ☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION

☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, ORD, DD/S&T

ESTABLISHED FOR: CHRIST, David L.

ATTN: Admin Staff

FILE NO.: K-2077

REF: Form 1322 Requesting Cover, 27 Sept 1963

ID CARD NO.: 1452

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element, Joint Operations Group

☒ BLOCK RECORDS: OPERATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
(OPMEMO 20-800-12)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________.

X b. X CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin

JAZ/sl CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (13-20, 43)

SECRET

22 January 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : David L. Christ

1. Cover arrangements ~~are in process, and/or~~, have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~released~~ to deny ~~acknowledge~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. This memorandum confirms an ~~oral~~ request of 12 Jan 1959 RA Leigh 1608 L Bldg X4571.

for HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS

SECRET

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

A7

S E C R E T

1 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Personnel Security Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : **David L. CHRIST**

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly ([illegible]) (re-opened) to ([illegible]) (acknowledge) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

3/ [illegible]

Edward J. Boston
for JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

cc: PSD/OS

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

SECRET

26 February 1958
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records & Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Personnel Security Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : Mr David L. Christ, CS-14

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject.

2. Effective 7 March 1958, it is requested that your records be properly (blocked) ~~(re-opened)~~ to (deny) ~~([illegible])~~ subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

~~3. This notification confirms an oral request.~~

Edward Q. Boston
for JOSEPH W. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

cc: PSD/CS

THIS [illegible] REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

14-00000

BSJJ 27 NOV 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CHRIST DAVID L

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT-VOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 30 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1262 2200 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 23
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS&T/ORD APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE PHYS SCIEN RES CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0088	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION R

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1301.11	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 32742

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 45	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 20 18	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE 05J0000	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	FED TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12-1-70
gQ

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

059090 CHRIST DAVID L 82 140 V

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 16	7	$31,857	11/19/67	GS 16	8	$32,742	11/19/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ~~ABOVE NAMED~~ EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman DATE 9/2/70

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS [illegible] AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

EOD: 21 OCT 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CHRIST DAVID L
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM -
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 10 12 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1262 2200 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: [illegible] RD
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [illegible]
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE; 20 Employ Code; 21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC); 22 STATION CODE; 23 INTEGREE CODE; 24 Hdqtrs Code; 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR); 26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR); 27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR); 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE; 30 RETIREMENT DATA (CODE); 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE; 32 Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR); EOD DATA; 33 SECURITY REQ NO; 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT); 36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR); 37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR); 38 CAREER CATEGORY; 39 FEGLI; HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE, WAIVER, YES; HEALTH INS CODE); 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)); 42 LEAVE CAT CODE; 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: YES, NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS); 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 YES, 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10-21-70

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and

F=44

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ICS 07/27/68

1 SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CHRIST DAVID L		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 01 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6. FUNDS ☒ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 9267 2200 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS&T/OHD	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE PHYS SCIEN RES CH	12 POSITION NUMBER 0088	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION R	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1301.11	16 GRADE AND STEP 16	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8-6-68 [illegible]

Form 7-66 1150B MFG. 9-66 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AH: 25 APRIL 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	059090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	CHRIST DAVID L
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA YR)	04 25 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	7262 1000 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS&T ORD APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	PHYS SCIEN RES CH
12. POSITION NUMBER	0088
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	R
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	1301.11
16. GRADE AND STEP	16 5
17. SALARY OR RATE	22755
18. REMARKS	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	37
20. Employ Code	10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC	82340
21. OFFICE CODING — ALPHABETIC	ORD
22. STATION CODE	75013
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. Hdqtrs. Code	1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	01 20 18
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA YR.)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA YR)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - LIA, 3 - FICA, 9 - NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA YR)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ NO	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	
HEALTH INS. CODE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	
44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
Apr 11/26/67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 250	V	GS 16 5	$22,331	$22,755

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 998	V	GS 16 4	$20,900	$21,653

H 36

Nov 24 11 23 PM '65

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059090	CHRIST DAVID L	82 400 V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 16	4	21653 ~~$20,900~~	11/24/63	GS 16	5	22331 ~~[illegible]~~	11/21/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/X/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS Gcy AUDITED BY WHD

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE Sept 24 1965

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9 61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DCS 11/06/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) CHRIST DAVID L						
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT					4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 01 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6262 1000 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF			
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS&T/ORD AUDIO PHYSICS DIVISION					10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE PHYS SCIEN RES CH					12 POSITION NUMBER 0088	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION R	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS			15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1301.11		16 GRADE AND STEP 16	17. SALARY OR RATE	
18 REMARKS							

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

[illegible]

Form 1-63 1150B MFG. 6-65 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-51)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLS: 27 SEPT 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CHRIST DAVID L
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT, CHG OF SERVICE DESIGNATION AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 09 | 29 | 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4262 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS & T
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ANALYSIS DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: IO PHYSICAL SCIEN
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0061
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: R
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 17000
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	82400	ORD	75013		1	01 20 18		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP)	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (2 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS., 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
27 SEP 1963

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

27 SEP 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
59090	CHRIST DAVID L	DP/TS 4 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
S 15	3	$14,380	12/27/59	15	4	$14,705	06/25/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

---

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059090	CHRIST, DAVID L	H 56 82 400 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS-16	3	$17,000	11/25/63	GS-16	4	$17,500	11/24/63	X		

9. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS-- AUDITED BY:

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE: [illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZR: 30 APR 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CHRIST DAVID L

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 22 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		3125 1990 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/TSD CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE PHYSICAL SCIENTIST	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1301.07	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 17000

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 18	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 45997	ALPHABETIC TS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 20 18	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
2 MAY 1963

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

2 MAY 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

ABM: 23 NOV 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): SRB SPECIAL
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 11 DA. 25 YR. 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: SRB SPECIAL
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3176 1062 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: IAS
FOREIGN FIELD
SPECIAL DETAIL FOREIGN
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: O S UNDETERMINED
11. POSITION TITLE: GENERAL POSITION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0803
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: UD
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 17000
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ Code: 52
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 29994 ALPHABETIC IAS
22. STATION CODE: 99999
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 18
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 11 DA. 25 YR. 62
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 11 DA. 25 YR. 62
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

11/23/62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR_ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR_ST	NEW SALARY
SRB SPECIAL	039090	29994	CF	15 4	$14705	15 4	$16005

ARE: 12 JULY 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ORF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): SRB SPECIAL
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 01 YR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: SRB SPECIAL
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2165 1062 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
IAS
FOREIGN FIELD
SPECIAL DETAIL FOREIGN
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: OVERSEAS UNDETERMINED
11. POSITION TITLE: GENERAL POSITION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0803
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: UD
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 14705
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 58
20. Employ Code: 52
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 29994 ALPHABETIC IAS
22. STATION CODE: 99999
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Nagris Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA 20 YR 18
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. HTC EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 37 MO 07 DA 01 YR 61
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED CODE 1 - YES 2 - NO NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
MRW 07-12-61

E. D. ECHOLS

Form 8-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-51)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
159090	CHRIST DAVID L	DDP/TSS -4	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 15	2	$13,070	06	29	58	GS 15	3	$13,370	12	27	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP None

10. INITIALS OF CLERK JW

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

JW

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b. **SECRET** **OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER** (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	159090	GS-14-6	$11,395	$12,555

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DT	CHRIST DAVID L	159090	44 48	GS-15 3	$13,370	$14,380

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

27 JUNE 58 LVL

1. Serial No. 159090	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) CHRIST DAVID L	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 20 Yr. 18	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1	5. Sex M 1
6. CS - EOD Mo. 11 Da. 16 Yr. 50	7. SCD Mo. 05 Da. 13 Yr. 47	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. 11 Da. 16 Yr. 50	13. Mil. Serv. Credit (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP TSS TECHNICAL AIDS AUDIO SUPPORT DIV OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 4448	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code 2	17. Position Title PHY SCI CH	18. Position No. 0609	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 1301.07	21. Grade & Step 14 6	22. Salary Or Rate $12,555	23. SD DT
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 28 Yr. 54	25. PSI Due Mo. XX Da. XX Yr. XX	26. Appropriation Number 8 2507 20	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. 06 Da. 29 Yr. 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP TSS TECHNICAL AIDS AUDIO SUPPORT DIV OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 4448	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code 2	34. Position Title PHY SCI CH	35. Position No. 0609	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 1301.07	38. Grade & Step 15 2	39. Salary Or Rate $13,070	40. SD DT
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 29 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 27 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 9 2507 20	

44. Remarks

POSTED
7-23-58

mm 7/11/5

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 7 MARCH 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)			3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
159090	CHRIST DAVID L			01	20	18		1	M 1		11	16	50	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 / Code
05	13	47		1	50 USCA 403 J						11	16	50	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APPLIED PHYSICS DIV OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		WASH., D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	ELEC ENGR D CH	0140	GS	0855.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
14 6	$11395	DT							8 2509 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	03	09	58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS TECHNICAL AIDS AUDIO SUPPORT DIV OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	4448	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	PHY SCI CH	0609	GS	1301.07

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
14 6	$ 11395	DT	03	28	54	XX	XX	XX	8 2507 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
13 [illegible]

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

a E 3/12/58

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1 EMP SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4 FUNDS	5 ALLOTMENT
159090	CHRIST, DAVID	DDP/TSS 8	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR				MO	DA.	YR
14	3	$10,750	03	24	57	14	6	$11,395	12	29	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10 INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA	YR.

13. REMARKS

ok

14. AUTHENTICATION

THIS ACTION IS USED IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 TO EFFECT THE CHANGE IN YOUR SALARY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC LAW 763, 83RD CONGRESS; UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DEPARTMENTAL CIRCULAR NO. 793, SUPPLEMENT NO. 33; AND OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MEMORANDUM NO. 20-605-8.

G.M. STEWART

GORDON M. STEWART
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
159090	CHRIST DAVID L	DDP/TSS -8	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	09	25	55	14	3	$10,750	03	~~23~~ 24	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
HENRY C. KNUTSON	Feb. 7, 1957	Henry C. Knutson

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER P1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONFIDENTIAL

1v1

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. David L. Christ 159090	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 27 Dec 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment 01	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 30 Dec 1956 BCB	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Electronic Eng (D Ch) BY-140
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0855.01-14 $10,535.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Research & Development Applied Physics Division Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WW II	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				ED/DT

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 7-2509-10
TO: 7-2509-20 750-13

2

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 11/16/50

[illegible] 2 [illegible]

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

CONFIDENTIAL

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956-373647

[illegible] 12/31/56

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

mjW

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. DAVID L. CHRIST 559090	20 Jan 1918		24 Oct 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment 56	4 Nov 1956	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Phy Sci Adm (D Ch) BY-140	8. POSITION TITLE	Electronic Eng (D Ch) BY-140
GS-1301.06-14 $10,535.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0855.01-14 $10,535.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 445451	DDP/TSS Research & Development Applied Physics Division Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS 1	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DP

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 7-2509-10 TO: Same 750-13	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

21. REMARKS:

3 MOD 11/16/50

POSTED
10/26/56

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

Ep 10/24/56

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV APRIL 1961
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. DAVID L. CHRIST 559090	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 26 July 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT 56	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 29 Jul 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Phy Sci Adm (D Ch) BY-140	8. POSITION TITLE	Phy Sci Adm (D Ch) BY-140
GS-1301.06-14 $10,535.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1301.06-14 $10,535.00 per annum
DDP/TSS Research and Development Applied Physics Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 445451	DDP/TSS Research and Development Applied Physics Division Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS 1	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE							14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION				
NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT			NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				DISAB.	OTHER						
1	X		X								SD-DT

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
1 M	W	FROM: 7-2509-10 750-13 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS:

3 EOD 11/16/50

POSTED

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. ~~EMPLOYEE COPY~~

Recd 7/27/56

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-320050

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Payroll period	3. Block No. UV	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) CHRIST, DAVID L.	6. Grade and salary GS-14 $10,320		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks	11. Appropriation(s) TSS Tray 8	12. Prepared by JAB 4 Aug 55 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 25 Sep 55	15. Date last equivalent increase 28 Mar 54	16. Old salary rate $10,320	17. New salary rate $10,535	The performance rating is satisfactory or better. SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY Thomas O. Cline (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☐ No excess LWOP, Total excess LWOP ____ JAB Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

SECRET

7d 9 m R
5/31/55

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.- Miss- Mrs -One given name, initial(s), and surname*) MR. DAVID L. CHRIST	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 18 May 55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
REASSIGNMENT

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: MAY 22 1955

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
PHYS SCIENCE ADMIN BY 140 GS-1301.06-14 $9600.00 p/a	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	PHYS SCI ADM (D CH) BY 140 GS-1301.~~07~~-14 ~~$9650~~.00 p/a Ca $10320
DDP/TSS Applied Physics Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Research & Development Applied Physics Division
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

DUE TO NEW T/O

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
POSITION CONTROL X 4507

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	P.A.	REAL.	
				SD:DT

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 5-2523-10 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

JAB 27 Jul 55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

10—37330-3

7D4 WC
3/24/54
[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. David L. CHRIST
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan '12
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 18 Feb 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP /10
B. APPROVED: MAR 8 1954
7. C.S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—	TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	PHYS SCIENCE ADMIN BY 154-13	PHYS SCIENCE ADMIN BY ~~[illegible]~~ 140
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1301-13 $8360	GS-1301-14 .06 ~~$[illegible]~~ 10320
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Applied Physics Division	Same Same
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington D. C.	Same
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

This action reassigns subject to the new TSS T/O.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Harold O. Jenkins, Acting Pers Off/TSS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Tom Clines 8305

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: C M Burrows.
Title: DD/P Admin 3/4/54

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
	/		/		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-TS

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-2523-10 TO: 4-2523-10
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible]

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
[illegible] 1955
[illegible] $10,320

POSTED
DL 23 Mar 54

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	DE	9 Mar	
C. CLASSIFICATION	[illegible]	[illegible]	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY Ralph L. [illegible]
23 MAR 1954

11—57139-3

14-00000

SECRET

1/18/53 ~~[illegible]~~

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: CHRIST, David L.

DATE: 22 October 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion

EFFECTIVE DATE: JAN 18 1953

	FROM	TO
TITLE	PHYS SCIENCE ADM Y 101-12	PHYS SCIENCE ADM ~~Y 101~~ BY 154
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-1301-12 $7040	GS-1301-13 $8360
OFFICE	Technical Services Staff	Technical Services Staff
DIVISION	Research & Development	~~Research & Development~~
BRANCH	Applied Physics Branch	Applied Physics ~~Branch~~ DIVISION
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington D. C.	Washington D. C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS: R. E. Tedford

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: Byron C. Sarvis
BYRON C. SARVIS

EXECUTIVE:

CLASSIFICATION: [illegible]

PERSONNEL OFFICER: D. Mulcahy 1-12-53

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ______

SECURITY CLEARED ON ______

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ______

ENTERED ON DUTY ______

______
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

99/

NO CORRIS

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION

Page 31 of 35 pages

(1) Staff or Division TSS (2) Date T/O Approved 7 Nov 52 (3) Effective date of Action 7 Dec 5

FROM					TO		
(4) NAME	(5) ORG. INF. & POS TITLE	(6) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(7) SLOT NO Y	(8) ACTION	(9) ORG. INF. & POS TITLE	(10) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(11) SLOT NO BY
DIVISION - [illegible] Applied Physics Branch					APPLIED PHISICS DIV.		
Driscoll, Walter G.	Phys Science Adm	GS-14	179	B	Phys Science Adm	GS-1301-14	153
Christ, David L	Phys Science Adm	GS-12	181	B	Phys Science Adm	GS-1301-12	154
St[illegible]es, Thom C.	Electrical Engr	GS-7	184	D	Physicist	GS-1310-7	157
[illegible]y, Geraldine	Secretary-Steno	GS-4	186	B	Secretary-Steno	GS-318-4	159
Technical Presentation Branch							
Creson, Pauline M. * Candidate in Process	Secretary-Steno	GS-3	188	C	ADMIN STAFF Secretary-Steno	GS-318-3	41

(12) APPROVED BY: W Muenster
fo. Staff or Division Chief

(13) APPROVED BY:
Class. & Wage Div.

(14) APPROVED BY:
Personnel Division

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME CHRIST, David L.		DATE 7 January 1952
NATURE OF ACTION Re-assignment and Promotion		EFFECTIVE DATE 17 February 1952
	FROM	TO
TITLE	Electrical Engineer	Physical Science Administrator (Physicist)
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-11 $ 5940	GS-12 $ 7040
OFFICE	Technical Services Staff	Technical Services Staff
DIVISION	Research & Development	Research & Development
BRANCH	Applied Physics Branch	Applied Physics Branch
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT W. MUENSTER	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION 9659 2/5/52	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____________________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____________________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____________________

ENTERED ON DUTY ____________________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

From TSS Slot No. 177 to Slot No. 176.
Position description has been submitted.

1301

COPY TO PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

MODIFICATION OF POSITION ALIGNMENT IN TECHNICAL SERVICES STAFF TO CONFORM WITH NEW T/O APPROVED 18 APRIL 1952. NO CHANGE IN GRADE OR SALARY INVOLVED.
This form in lieu of 37-1.

FROM			TO	JUN 22 1952	"Y"
Research and Development Division					
[illegible]TON, THORNTON J.	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-9	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-830-9	174
[illegible]LYON, WILLIAM B.	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-9	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-830-9	174.01
[illegible], EDWIN H.	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-7	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-830-7	175
[illegible]LOUGHBY, ALTA G.	SECRETARY (STENO)	GS-5	SECRETARY (STENO)	GS-318-5	177
[illegible]ENT, LAURA L.	CLERK TYPIST	GS-3	CLERK TYPIST	GS-322-3	178
[illegible], PAUL H.	PHYSICAL SCIENCE ADMIN.	GS-14	PHYSICAL SCIENCE ADMIN.	GS-1301-14	179-14
[illegible]ST, DAVID L.	PHY. SCIENCE ADMIN. PHYS.	GS-12	PHYSICAL SCIENCE ADMIN.	GS-1301-12	181-12
[illegible]E, THOM. C.	ELECTRICAL ENGINEER	GS-7	ELECTRICAL ENGINEER	GS-850-7	184-7
[illegible]DS, ALFRED J.	INFO. EDIT. SPECIALIST	GS-12	INFO. SPECIALIST	GS-010-12	187

R W Muenster
Operating Office

Henry P. Gilbert
Classification & Wage Division

D Mulcahy
Personnel Office

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

mrc & FD - 18 Feb

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: CHRIST, David I.

DATE: 7 January 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: Re-assignment and Promotion

EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 February 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Electrical Engineer	Physical Science Administrator (Physicist)
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-11 $ 5940	GS-12 $ 7040
OFFICE	Technical Services Staff	Technical Services Staff
DIVISION	Research & Development	Research & Development
BRANCH	Applied Physics Branch	Applied Physics Branch
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT W. MUENSTER	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

From TSS Slot No. 177, to Slot No. 176.

Position description has been submitted.

POSTED
JM 25 Feb

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME CHRIST, David L.

DATE NOV 20 1951

NATURE OF ACTION Excepted Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE 25 NOV 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Electrical Engineer
GRADE AND SALARY		850-GS-11, $5940
OFFICE		Technical Services Staff
DIVISION		Research & Development Division
BRANCH		Applied Physics Branch
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Byron C. Sarvis BYRON C. SARVIS	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION D-6171 Thomas M. Fisher / Job	PERSONNEL OFFICER DEC 10 1951	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON NA

SECURITY CLEARED ON 11 December 51

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED NA

ENTERED ON DUTY 25 November 51

See comments 23 Nov 1951 W.A. Osborne.

EOD - 03/29/50
RSCD - 11/10/50
LOE - 11/10/50

Pauline C. Brown
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

8:55

TSS Slot No. 177. (Slot No. 4, Applied Physics Branch, Research & Development Division).

Transfer [illegible] V Funds

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

Tax info T-5 (W-4 form on file in Vouchered Fund Payroll)

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
Promulgated by
Chapter R 1, Federal Personnel Manual
U. S. Civil Service Commission

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION (bar)

1. (MR. – MISS – MRS. – ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. David L. Christ
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jun. 1918
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: 158
4. DATE: 24 Jan. 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Resignation*
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: COB 24 Nov. 51
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM		TO
	Electronics Research Engineer	8. POSITION TITLE	
	GS-11-1312 $5940.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
	Policy Coordination Staff II Research & Development Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
	Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	S.A.	REAL
		X	

Ru. #5639
C.C
8/4/50

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM 8150900 TO 1933
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT: yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE Md.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS

*To accept other employment.

Statement of accrued annual leave to your credit will be furnished with your final salary check.

L. V. MOLONEY
Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 11950-899875

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 21, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

W-9 Nov. 1950
(afs)

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. David L. Christ	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. #3753	4. DATE 16 Nov. 1950

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Excepted Appointment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 16 Nov. 1950	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Electronics Research Engineer, GS-11
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-11-1312-$5400.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Policy Coordination Staff II Research & Development Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		X	

Du.#5889
CSC#
8/4/50

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2115900 TO: 821-101	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY) 16 Nov. 1950	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Appointment is subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.

DOS - 03/29/54
CSCA - 11/16/50
LCD - 11/16/50

5940

SERVICE DATES VERIFIED
BY [illegible] DATE 2/15/55

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

[illegible] S. WATTLES
~~Personnel Director~~
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1949

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET
ASW TACTICAL SCHOOL

This is to certify that

MR. DAVID C. CHRISTIAN

has successfully completed the

ASW *Operations course* (J-2G-554)

On **14 May 1971.**

A. F. Blair
A. F. BLAIR
Commanding Officer/Director
U.S. Atlantic Fleet ASW
Tactical School
Norfolk, Va.

TRAINING COMPLETED
Request No. 32461
Date 3 JUN 1971

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Christ, David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 16	5. SD R
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Phys Scien Res CH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T/ORD/AP	8. CURRENT STATION Hqtrs.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	*Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.*
M—Marginal	*Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.*
P—Proficient	*Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.*
S—Strong	*Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.*
O—Outstanding	*Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.*

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Initiates and develops complex intelligence program concepts.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops inter-division, inter-office, and inter-agency programs for producing fundamental technology and new intelligence system concepts.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Acquires, develops and integrates scientific and technical personnel into an effective Division.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Provides advanced planning, programming and budgetary reports	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conduct senior level internal and external liaison	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepares and gives technical program briefings and presentations.	S

6 NOV 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-63 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Nov 5

Mr. Christ continues to lead the Applied Physics Division in a progressive, responsive and aggressive manner. Some turbulence is occasionally generated by this vigorous leadership; however, the record of solid and potential accomplishments by his group continues to be impressive. On balance, his creative, forward-looking leadership ~~continues to~~ be a talent suited for the goals and missions of this Office.

The technological innovations established in his Division are continuing to lead to a variety of items of great potential value to the Intelligence Community. His aggressive search for and application of other-agency funds has directly saved this Agency many hundreds of thousands of dollars.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4/24/70	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 78	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 20 APR 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Director of Research and Development	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Christ will be retiring 30 November 1970. Prior to 1970 he has generally been considered a capable officer and the list of his accomplishments during his Agency career is not unimpressive. Christ's performance, particularly in the last six months, however, has revealed critical weakness in judgment, discretion and self-evaluation. These flaws have been called to Christ's attention by me personally, and I deem them sufficiently serious that were it not for his proposed retirement I would be constrained to seek other means to separate him from Agency employment.

DATE 29 October 70	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Director for Science and Technology	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Carl E. Duckett Carl E. Duckett

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Christ	(First) David	(Middle) L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1/20/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 16 | 5. SD R
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Phys Scien Res CH			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T/ORD/AP		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1968 to 31 March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - **Weak**	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - **Adequate**	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - **Proficient**	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - **Strong**	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - **Outstanding**	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Initiates and develops complex intelligence program areas.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Acquires, Develops, and integrates scientific and technical personnel into an effective Division.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides advanced planning, programming and budgetary reports.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares and gives technical program briefings and presentations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conducts senior level internal and external liaison.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-60 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

APR 18 9 19 AM '69

Mr. Christ continues to lead the Applied Physics Division in a progressive, responsive, and aggressive manner. The record of solid accomplishments by the group of which he is the leader continues to be impressive and his creative, forward-looking leadership is a talent well suited for the goals and missions of this Office.

The technological base established in his Division through many of its prior projects is expected to lead to a variety of items of great value to the Intelligence Community and the Nation. His aggressive search for and application of other-agency funds has directly saved this Agency many hundreds of thousands of dollars.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE April 14, 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David L. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 66	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 14 APR 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Director of Research and Development	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur in Rating Officer's comments. Mr. Christ is a solid Division Chief.

DATE 29 April 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Director for Science and Technology	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Carl E. Duckett Carl E. Duckett

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Christ	(First) David	(Middle) L	2. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 16	5. SD R
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Phys Scien Res CH			7. OFF/DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T ORD		8. CURRENT STATION Hqts.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):					SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Initiates and develops complex intelligence program areas.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Acquires, develops, and integrates scientific and technical personnel into an effective Division.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides advanced planning, programming and budgetary reports.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares and gives technical program briefings and presentations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conducts senior level internal and external liaison.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the past year Mr. Christ has attempted to consolidate the large areas of responsibility in his Applied Physics Division which now encompasses effort in positive audio surveillance, countermeasures, micropower and micro-technology, and emplacement. He continues to be conscientious, responsive, and aggressive in the management and development of these technical programs. Further, during the past year giant strides have been taken in the coordination of many of these efforts with their eventual consumers. This coordination has been above and beyond that required by existing Agency regulations.

His managerial talents encompass a wide range of activities and it must be acknowledged that they are responsible in large measure for many of the forward-looking, highly productive programs under his direction. On occasion his enthusiasm for some of the Division efforts tends to lead to over-acceleration in some cases where perhaps careful reassessment would be in order. However, his generally cooperative and thoughtful exercise of initiative has resulted in truly large steps forward in technical areas where the cost effectiveness cannot yet be determined. His judicious application of other-agency funds has directly saved this Agency many hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Mr. Christ received a QSI for his efforts during this reporting period.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE April 29, '68	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David A. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 54	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 29 April 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Director of Research and Development	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

No appropriate reviewing official

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059090 ✓

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Christ	David	L.	01/20/18	M	GS-16	R

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Phys Scien Res Ch	DD/S&T/ORD	Hqs

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY	☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)	☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):	☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 April 1967	1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Initiates and develops complex intelligence program areas.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Acquires, develops, and integrates scientific and technical personnel into an effective Division.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides advanced planning, programming and budgetary reports.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares and gives technical program briefings and presentations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conducts senior level internal and external liaison.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
4-28

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

MAY 3 1 54 PM '67

During the past year, Mr. Christ has expanded his responsibilities for his Applied Physics Division, which now encompasses effort in positive audiosurveillance, countermeasures, micropower-microtechnology, and emplacement problems. He continues to be conscientious, responsive, and aggressive in the management and development of the technical programs under his direction and supervision.

His managerial talents encompass a wide range of activities, and it must be acknowledged that they are responsible, in large measure, for the forward-looking, highly productive programs under his direction.

His cost consciousness is best exemplified by his detailed planning and charting of cost, time, and technical details in a variety of complex areas. He has taken the lead in solving many involved, detailed and intricate interface and coordination problems with virtually all other technical groups within the Agency.

I expect a high degree of intelligence pay-off as a result of programs under his supervision.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4/24/67	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David F Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 42	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 24 APR 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Director of Research and Development	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

No appropriate Reviewing Official.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 055090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Christ David L	2. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD R
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Phys Scientist Res Ch	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T/ORD	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1965 - 31 March 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	*Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.*
A - Adequate	*Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.*
P - Proficient	*Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.*
S - Strong	*Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.*
O - Outstanding	*Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.*

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Initiates and promotes new intelligence collection program areas	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops and advances fundamental technological projects in support of intelligence collection	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Recruits, manages and develops technical personnel	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Establishes and maintains high level inter and intra agency liaison	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Generates major technical, fiscal, and budgetary planning reports	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Provides consultation on specialized electronic techniques	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

7 JUN 1966

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give [illegible] for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in [illegible] to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 6 3 25 PM '66

Mr. Christ has been under my direct supervision for 2-1/2 years during the continuing period of growth and expansion in the Office of Research and Development, in which he played a major role. During the past year, Mr. Christ has given up his responsibilities in the Radio-Physics area and has devoted himself to expansion and growth problems of the Audio-Physics Division, which encompasses effort in positive audiosurveillance, countermeasures, and emplacement problems.

Mr. Christ continues to be conscientious, responsive, and alert to the needs of the Agency in terms of the substantive content of technical programs under his direction and supervision. He couples this with a vigorous managerial attitude that encompasses the recruiting, programming, coordination, and other factors necessary to implement these programs in an effective manner. His cost-consciousness is a continuing effort throughout the year and is best exemplified by his careful over-all planning and charting of total program efforts in order that projects lead directly to productive intelligence efforts.

Mr. Christ has had an unusually difficult position in one respect, in that his technical surveillance effort was a major interface area with the DD/P in a realm where political and bureaucratic considerations could have deleteriously affected the content of his programs. He handled these problems in a manner that was favorable for the over-all good of the Agency in terms of technical progress in numerous areas and which far exceeded what might be called "par" for the course.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
5/3/66	David J. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
30		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
5.3.66	Director of Research and Development	Robert M. Chapman Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Christ has done an extremely good job in developing a truly exciting program and capable staff focused on advanced audio and counteraudio techniques, in the face of a difficult environment. I would hope that during the coming year he could develop a tighter managerial control over the many small diverse elements of the large program.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 June 1966	DD/Science & Technology	

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST, David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD R
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Physical Scien	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T/ORD		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 March 64 - 31 March 65

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Develops advanced technical program areas	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Performs administrative planning - budget, finance, etc.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Recruits, develops and supervises scientific personnel	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts internal and external liaison	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares technical and administrative reports	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

12 MAY 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Christ has been under my direct supervision for about eighteen months, during a continuing period of growth and expansion in the Office of Research and Development. During most of the past year Mr. Christ has doubled as group leader of the Radio-Physics area and has had responsibility for the tremendous growth of a separate Audio-Physics group, both of which continue to comprise about 40% of the effort of the Physical Sciences portion of the Office. Mr. Christ has performed these duties in a mangerial capacity in an extremely effective manner, so that both groups are well developed and capable of continuing growth on a self-sustaining basis.

Mr. Christ is extremely conscientious, receptive, and alert to the needs of the Agency in terms of the substantive content of technical programs under his direction and supervision. His cost consciousness is a continuing effort throughout the year, and is best demonstrated by the manner in which he has reprogrammed funds internally and reduced the costs of a number of contracts. Also, he is not one to "rubber-stamp" approval of contractor efforts, and has called several of them to task this year for what he considered efforts below what he felt their capabilities should be.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 27 APR [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Harold J. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 18	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 27 APR [illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Assistant Director ORD/DD/S&T	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

From my own knowledge of Mr. Christ's work, I endorse the favorable comments of his supervisor. He has performed beyond call and stimulated important new areas of research and development for ORD.

DATE 5 May 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DD/S&T	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 059000

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST, David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 18	3. SEX W	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD R
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Physical Scientist	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T/ORD	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT				
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE	
	SPECIAL (Specify):					SPECIAL (Specify):			

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1964	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 29 Sept 63 - 31 Mar 64

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Plans, develops and administers broad divisional technical programs in Radio-Physics and Audio-Physics.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Manages manpower and financial resources of scientific teams in these areas.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Initiates and evaluates research and development concepts in response to intelligence operations requirements.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Establishes and maintains administrative and management procedures, including appropriate liaison and coordination with appropriate elements of the intelligence and scientific community.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Establishes and maintains high level scientific relationships with industry, universities, and other Government agencies.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

30 APR 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Christ has been under my direct supervision for about six months, during a difficult period of growth, expansion, and change in the Office of Research and Development. During the process of reorganization of the Office, Mr. Christ has emerged as acting group leader of both the Radio-Physics and Audio-Physics areas of effort, which comprise about 40% of the effort in the Physical Sciences portion of the Office.

Considering his geographical location for the previous three years, Mr. Christ has done a remarkable job in organizing the Radio-Physics effort and in developing a new effort in Audio-Physics which promises to be one of the major programs in the Office. All of this required that he exercise considerable initiative and judgment in the delegation of responsibility for existing projects and in the formulation and organization of new projects with an extremely under-manned staff.

Mr. Christ was extremely imaginative, vigorous, enthusiastic, and responsive in the performance of these difficult assignments, and demonstrated very clear ability to manage programs and develop teamwork against these continuing and new objectives. In the development of the organizations necessary to implement these programs, Mr. Christ has demonstrated a high degree of cost consciousness by organizing personnel of the two groups so that with a limited staff they could operate in both programs, and by vigorously combing the country to locate the best contractors to implement the program and to seek advice as to appropriate sources for such procurement.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE April 23, 64	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David T. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION six	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 APR 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Assistant Director ORD/DD/S&T	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I am quite familiar with Mr. Christ's performance during the rating period and am in complete agreement with the supervisor's rating and analysis. He has done the tremendous job of organizing our research in the brand new area of audio physics. This program has a very high priority, and he has done a superior job of launching it in a very short time and with very modest resources.

MAIL ROOM
APR 30 2 02 PM '64

DATE [illegible] 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Acting AD/ORD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward B. Giller Edward B. Giller

SECRET

Recorded
CSPD

22 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: **Fitness Report for David L. CHRIST,**

There was no significant change in subject's performance during the two months between the last report and his departure.

RKCraven
ROBERT K. CRAVEN
AC/TSD/TA

Reviewed by:

CVS Roosevelt
C.V.S. ROOSEVELT
Chief, DD/P/TSD

[illegible]

SECRET 50

SECRET

TSS EVALUATION

NAME **DAVID L. CHRIST** DIVISION **TSS/ASD**

SUBJECT **BASIC LOCK PICKING COURSE**

DATES TRAINED **4-8 January 1960**

EVALUATION:

1.	Comprehension of Principles	EXCELLENT
2.	Alertness and Interest	EXCELLENT
3.	Operational Appreciation of Subject	EXCELLENT
4.	Manual Dexterity	GOOD
5.	Care in Work	VERY GOOD
6.	Aptitude	VERY GOOD
7.	Technician Potential	VERY GOOD

NOTE: "Technician Potential" is an estimate of the technical ability the student *might* acquire after advanced instruction and practice--it is *not* an estimate of his current level of technique.

VERY GOOD

RATINGS: Poor, Average, Good, Excellent

OVERT DISTRIBUTION

1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - OTR/AS
1 - Records & Service Division/OP
1 - TSS/ATB

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 159090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST, David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHY SCI CH		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSD/TA/ASB

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1960

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: Mar 59 - Mar '60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Directing activities of Audio Branch in TDY support from Hqs.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Directing establishment of proper performance levels and higher professional qualifications.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supporting Field technicians and coordinating branch activities with area desks.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Coordinating requirements for guidance of TSD research group.	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintaining Earwort supply program	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - *Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.*
2 - *Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.*
3 - *Performance clearly meets basic requirements.*
4 - *Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.*
5 - *Performance in every important respect is superior.*
6 - *Performance in every respect is outstanding.*

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Sep 16

Subject is a technical man who combines a taste for action with professional competence, producing excellent leadership for the specialized branch he heads. His treatment of personnel is direct, frank, unusually honest and just. He helps the men and their families in times of trouble and personal difficulties and has earned their respect for his technical competence. He is imaginative and bold in his approach to the responsibilities of his branch and is a fertile source of ideas. He has driven hard towards raising professional standards.

Although he is a good innovator, he sometimes pushes harder on new approaches than on completion of programs in being, and on occasion his devotion to a program leads him to heavy emphasis on it and too little on other aspects equally as important. However, this was in the earlier part of the rated period rather than recently. I believe he will continue to grow with his job and that he can undertake more responsible and broader assignments.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 8 Aug 60	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David F. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	☐	REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE 22 July 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR AC/TSD/TA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert K. Craven R K Craven

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

XX	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Christ contributed very substantially to the conception and establishment of EARWORT, the program under which TSD procures and supplies audio equipment for field use. He is learning how to convert the intense enthusiasm which he has at the start of a project to the steady continuous push required to carry the work through to completion.

DATE 17 August 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, TSD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE C. V. S. Roosevelt CVS Roosevelt

SECRET

AUG 1959

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	159090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	CHRIST David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH	20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	DT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	PHY SCI CH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	DDP/TSS/TA/ASD

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To Dec 1957 to Apr 1959

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, ASD, TSS World wide audio requirements	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Lecturer for OTR courses	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Liaison --CIA, Foreign Intell. Services, Army, Air Force	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Monitors and guides audio supply program	7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Levies audio requirements on R&D	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 5-55 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Christ is an excellent Chief of our Audio Support Division. He is a leader of men, is loyal to his superiors, and is technically professional in his work.

Mr. Christ has one short coming, which is not of his own making--he lacks field experience--only because his superiors have felt his services were more needed at Headquarters. It is some times hard for him to understand the operational aspects of things as outlined by his assistants. To his credit it must be said he realizes this lack of field experience and uses the advice of his men to best advantage.

As soon as feasable he should be assigned to a responsible position at one of our overseas bases.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 5-7-59	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David L. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 6 May 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR AC/TSS/TA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward P. Foster, Jr.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: In giving Mr. Christ a higher evaluation, I refer particularly to his outstanding technical training and unusual competence as an electronics engineer which, in addition to his other characteristics (such as his willingness to undertake any assigned responsibilities and his ability to work well with fellow employees), make him a particularly valuable employee.

DATE 7 May 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, TSS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE C. V. S. Roosevelt

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/R&D/Applied Physics Division	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE ELEC ENGR D CH		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 10 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* 25 November 1956 to 10 December 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK *(X)* APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE *(Specify)*:

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		17 JAN ~~1958~~
Reviewed by PUD		21 JAN 1958

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 12/31/57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 16 9 20 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).*
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Administration as Deputy Chief	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of major summary reports	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Survey of field equipment requirements	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Coordinates with other offices	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Technical Program planning	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conducts external liaison	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Christ applies himself conscientiously with mature judgment to all problems large or small. He has unbounded initiative, enthusiasm and Agency loyalty. Though occasionally inclined to be intolerant of obstacles, he is amenable to others viewpoints and will compromise when it is to the best interest of all concerned. He is respected and well liked by both his superiors and those who work for him.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Mr. Christ is ideally suited for his present assignment but he is also qualified for any other position requiring combined administrative and technical qualifications.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* CHRIST	*(First)* David	*(Middle)* L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/TSS/R&D/Applied Physics Division
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: ELEC ENGR D CH
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 10 December 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)*: 25 November 1956 to 10 December 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*: ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
27 Dec. 1957	Henry C. Knutson HENRY C. KNUTSON	C/TSS/APD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
12/31/57	Randley Hazell RANDLEY HAZELL	AC/TSS/R&D

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL.
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential 21 JAN 1958

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 16 9 24 AM '80
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

34 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Christ's greatest potential is in a combined administrative [illegible] technical supervisory position.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Some specific training courses might be useful as his scope of activities increases. In general because of his ability to quickly master situations, occasional TDY's to the field should suffice.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Mr. Christ is presently being reassigned as C/TSS/ASD. This will be a serious loss to TSS/APD but has been concurred in because it is to the best advantage of TSS.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20 COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
159090

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)		2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)		
		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Christ, David Lamar		Jan	20	'18
3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)			5.
	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
French 265	Apr	16	57	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

[✓ 4.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 17 April 57	SIGNATURE David L. Christ
(46) C	(47) E

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/APD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHY SCI ADM (D CH)		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 16 November 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 5 November 1955 to 16 November 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
XX	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 17 Dec. 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Henry C. Knutson Henry C. Knutson	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/TSS/APD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Recorded	R	11 JAN 1957
Reviewed	JDM	1-14-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 12/19/56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Bardley Hazell	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AC/TSS/APD-

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

7. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE O[illegible]
JAN 13 1 54 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Administration as Deputy Chief	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinates with other offices	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans technical programs	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conducts external liaison	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares Summary reports on programs	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Correlates technical proposals with requirements	RATING NUMBER 5

8. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Christ's greatest strength is his conscientious and wholehearted approach to any problem whether it be of major proportions or involves time consuming details. A minor weakness would be that he can be carried away by his enthusiasm. By experience and training, he is ideally suited for technical, administrative duties.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "F" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) CHRIST (First) David (Middle) L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/APD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHY SCI ADM (D CH)		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 16 November 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 5 November 1955 to 16 November 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)
XX ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 17 Dec. 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Henry C. Knutson Henry C. Knutson	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/TSS/APD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 12/19/56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Eardley Hazell Eardley Hazell	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AC/TSS/APD

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

22 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Christ's greatest potential is in a supervisory field, particularly if technical problems are involved. He should be considered as a potential candidate to take charge of an overseas technical component.

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

In view of his potential ability, it is planned to assign him from time to time to training in the broader aspects of intelligence work.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

A reassignment of Mr. Christ at this time would be a serious loss to the growing Research and Development program in TSS/APD.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for ev[illegible] his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If th[illegible] has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to [illegible] sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

CODED

A new Report due 5 Nov 56

BY DATE
JWB 12 Dec 55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (*To be filled in by Administrative Officer*)

13 Dec 1955

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. CAREER DESIGNATION DT	
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 16 Nov 1950	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO DDP/TSS	7. DIVISION APD	8. BRANCH	
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:		11. GRADE GS-14	
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 5 Nov 1955	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (*Inclusive dates*) 31 Mar 1955 to 5 Nov 1955			

SECTION II (*To be filled in by Supervisor*)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Deputy Chief, ~~TSS~~/APD — Phy Sci Adm 1301.07

2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION:

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (*List in order of frequency*): During this period Mr. Christ has continued as Deputy Chief, Applied Physics Division/TSS. This has entailed both administrative and technical duties. As an administrator he has assisted and acted for the Chief, APD/TSS in such matters as; personnel, budget, security, office procedures, contractual arrangements, etc. His technical duties have involved the analysis of technical programs to fulfill operational requirements, supervision of the work and progress of other project engineers, technical liaison with government and commercial R&D activities, preparation of status and progress reports, etc. In the absence of Chief, TSS/APD Mr. Christ has had full responsibility for the functioning of the Division.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report, and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ has ☐ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE Dec 5 1955	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (*Employee's immediate supervisor*) Henry C Knutson

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE 12/6/55	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (*Official next higher in line of authority*) Bradley Hazell

FORM NO. 45 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
1 JAN 55 THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

DEC 8 2 12 PM '6
MAIL ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. Each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS		NOT OBSERVED	CATEGORIES												
			DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.	SAMPLES			X								X			
B. PRACTICAL.											X	X			
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.														X	
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X				
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.											X				
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.												X			
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X			
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.												X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.													X		
11. CALM.												X			
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.														X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.													X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.													X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X		
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.													X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.														X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.													X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION														X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION												X			
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.														X	

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.												X		
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												X		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.											X			
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.												X		
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.													X	
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.												X		
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													X	
43. HAS DRIVE.													X	
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.												X		
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.												X		
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.												X		
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.													X	
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.													X	

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

He has demonstrated a tremendous capability for meticulously handling all the details connected with his duties as Deputy Chief. He has been extremely conscientious, cooperative and dependable. He has consistently exhibited leadership and good judgment.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Mr. Christ has no outstanding weaknesses.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

His conscientious attention to his duties outweighs all other considerations.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 9 2 12 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL? None for his present assignment at this time. Eventually Mr. Christ and the Agency would benefit by encouraging him to further his technical education.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

None

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TSS-7

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

CODED

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

SD:DT next Rept Due
S 16 Nov 55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I *(To be filled in by Administrative Officer)*

1. NAME (Last) CHRIST (First) David (Middle) L.
2. DATE OF BIRTH
3. SEX M
4. CAREER DESIGNATION TS
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO TSS
7. DIVISION APD
8. BRANCH
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE GS-14
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 31 March 1955
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 16 Nov. 54 - 31 March 1955

SECTION II *(To be filled in by Supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION Phy Sci Adm ~~Deputy Chief APD~~ 1301.06
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 28 March 1954
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*:

a. Deputy Chief of the Applied Physics Division.
b. Acting Chief of Physics Branch of the Division.
c. Direct and perform many of the administrative functions of the Division.
d. Supervise activities of Division project engineers and in particular direct project performance of seven or eight project engineers in the Physics Branch.
e. Receive and evaluate operational requirements, request and organize new technical project proposals and contracts, monitor projects, test and evaluate equipment developed, and provide training as needed.

	BY	DATE
Por	EH	4/14/55
r	OCD	4/21/55

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☑ has ☐ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE March 7 1955 — NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) Walter J. Driscoll

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE 3/10/55 — NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) Bradley Haskell

FORM NO. 45 REPLACES FORM 37-189, 1 MAY 54
1 OCT 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

CATEGORIES

STATEMENTS	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.										X				
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.										X				
4. HAS INITIATIVE.									X					
5. UNEMOTIONAL.							X							
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.								X						
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.								X						
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.									X					
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM									X					
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.									X					
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14 GETS THINGS DONE.									X					
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.										X				
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.								X						
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HIS STAMINA: CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.									X					
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.								X						
20 SHOWS ORIGINALITY.										X				
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.										X				
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23 RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.										X				
24 EVEN DISPOSITION.									X					
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT										X				

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.									X					
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.									X					
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".								X						
29. TOUGH MINDED.	X													
30. OBSERVANT.										X				
31. CAPABLE.										X				
32. CLEAR THINKING.									X					
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.									X					
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.								X						
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.									X					
36. DELIBERATE.									X					
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.									X					
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.								X						
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.											X			
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.								X						
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.									X					
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.								X						
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.										X				
45. VERSATILE.								X						
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.									X					
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.									X					
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.									X					
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.										X				

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Mr. Christ is a particularly cooperative and competent employee. He understands clearly the purposes and functions of his position and administers his technical duties and liaison responsibilities in a highly satisfactory manner. He is well qualified to carry on the administration and operation of his Division in the absence of the Chief.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

None

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

7

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A SD-TS next due 11/55

5 12/21

60 12/23/54

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): CHRIST, David L.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1918
3. SEX: M
4. CAREER DESIGNATION: TS
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY: 16 Nov 1950
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: DDP
7. DIVISION: TSS
8. BRANCH: MD
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT: ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE: GS-14 1301.06
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE: ~~29 October 1954~~ 12 Nov 54
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 16 Nov 53 to 16 Nov 54

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Deputy Chief of the Applied Physics Division B/140
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: August, 1952
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

a. Acting Chief of the Physics Branch - seven men supervised.

b. Personally monitors numerous commercial contracts and coordinates the monitoring activities of the project engineers working under his direction.

c. Carries on liaison with several government agencies and monitors and guides projects being done at such facilities in our behalf.

d. Participates in the evaluation of operational requirements and research and development proposals.

e. Provides training and briefing for agency and indigenous people.

f. Acts in the capacity of the Chief of the Division in his absence.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ has ☒ has not been shown to the individual rated, but it will be discussed when he returns to headquarters.

THIS DATE: 12 November 1954

SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor): Walter G. Driscoll

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE: 23 Nov. 1954

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority):

FORM NO. 37-189 1 MAY 54 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 18 8 19 AM '54
MAIL ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degr[illegible] that [illegible] On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the [illegible] that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.										X				
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.									X					
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X				
5. UNEMOTIONAL.							X							
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.									X					
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.							X							
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X						
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.							X							
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.										X				
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.	X													
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.							X							
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.							X							
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.							X							
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.							X							
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.										X				
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.										X				
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.									X					
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.										X				

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.									X					
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.								X						
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES: A "SPARK PLUG".								X						
29. TOUGH MINDED.	X													
30. OBSERVANT.									X					
31. CAPABLE.									X					
32. CLEAR THINKING.									X					
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.									X					
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.								X						
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.										X				
36. DELIBERATE.										X				
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.									X					
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.							X							
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.									X					
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.							X							
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.								X						
45. VERSATILE.							X							
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.							X							
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.								X						
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.								X						
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.										X				

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Mr. Christ is particularily cooperative and dependable. He can accurately report events observed or reproduce, in writing, the facts associated with monitored contracts, Agency briefings, general liaison, etc. He has been very helpful in organizing the administrative procedures, the files and the engineering project procedures for the division.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Mr. Christ's outstanding weakness results from his limited formal technical training which in several cases is not as extensive as is the training of men that he is supervising. He has off-set this short-coming to some extent by experience, good judgement, and his interest in and his response to the opinions of others.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Mr. Christ's cooperative and dependable nature, coupled with his generally acceptable technical competence, makes him particularily suited to the Deputy Chief's position that he now fills.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 1 9 19 AM '54
MAIL ROOM

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None at present.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☒ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☒ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☒ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

DE

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer.

1. NAME (Last) CHRIST (First) David (Middle) L.
2. GRADE GS-13
3. POSITION TITLE Physical Science Admin TS
4. OFFICE DDP
STAFF OR DIVISION TSS
BRANCH Applied Physics Di
☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From ~~16 Nov '52~~ 3-16-53 To 15 Nov '53
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

Assistant Chief, Applied Physics Division/TSS - Combined administrator and project engineer. As administrator: Assist and act for the chief in general administrative details: personnel, budget, security, contractual arrangements, etc.; assist in organizing procedures and administrative mechanisms for accomplishing aims of technical projects. As project engineer: Examine operational problems, suggesting devices and techniques for implementing the operations; recommend and organize projects to provide devices and techniques; supervise and/or prepare original designs, drawings, specifications and instructions; supervise work and progress of younger project engineers; conduct technical liaison with government and commercial R&D activities; prepare and conduct field and laboratory tests and reports, and periodic status and progress reports; serve as technical consultant on APD activities to CIA operational groups.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
		None	

9. The technical examination and evaluation of operations as regards applicable devices and techniques, and the subsequent organization, direction, and close association with research and development projects in the broad field of Applied Physics. It is, I believe, a work fundamental to clandestine agency operations, in which a person can grow to high levels of achievement and responsibility.

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

(Above)

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

The above statement describes in broad terms what I am, and have been doing with the agency since 1950. My individual function has grown with expanding agency requirements and organization. I was originally accepted for this position on the basis of previous ~~knowledge and experience. I believe I have demonstrated the ability to continue to~~

10. **grow in and with the organization.**

16 Nov. 1953
DATE

David L. Christ
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Christ has performed all of the activities (see Item 7) described in an excellent and cooperative manner.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over)

(4)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Christ is extremely thorough in the performance of his assigned duties. In a like fashion he is reliable, cooperative and continually offers technical guidance and inspirational "drive" to the project engineers in the division.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

It is recommended that Mr. Christ spend some time in the coming year or two visiting foreign areas in order that he may become familiar with on-the-spot field problems and in order that he may apply first hand information acquired as a result of these trips to the research and development program of APD.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Christ has continually been given greater responsibility, particularly with regard to the administration of the division and it is my opinion that he can assume these and other responsibilities very readily in the future.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

None

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

22 Dec '53
DATE

Walter G. Driscoll
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

23 Dec. 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

6

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) CHRIST, (First) David (Middle) L
2. GRADE GS-13
3. POSITION TITLE Physical Science Admin
4. OFFICE DD/P
STAFF OR DIVISION TSS
BRANCH Applied Physics Div
☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 3-16-52 To 3-16-53
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

Assistant Chief, Applied Physics Division/TSS - Combined administrator and project engineer. As administrator: Assist and act for the chief in general administrative details-personnel, budget, security, contractual arrangements, etc., assist in organizing procedures and administrative mechanisms for accomplishing aims of technical projects. As project engineer: Examine operational problems, suggesting devices and techniques for implementing the operations; recommend and organize projects to provide devices and techniques; supervise and/or prepare original designs, drawings, specifications and instructions, supervise work and progress of younger project engineers; conduct technical liaison with government and commercial R&D activities; prepare and conduct field and laboratory tests and reports, and periodic status and progress reports; serve as technical consultant on APD activities to CIA operational groups.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
		None	

9. The technical examination and evaluation of operations as regards applicable devices and techniques, and the subsequent organization, direction, and close association with research and development projects in the broad field of Applied Physics. It is, I believe, a work fundamental to clandestine agency operations, in which a person can grow to high levels of achievement and responsibility.

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

(Above)

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

The above statement describes in broad terms what I am, and have been doing with the agency since 1950. My individual function has grown with expanding agency requirements and organization. I was originally accepted for this position on the basis of previous knowledge and experience. I believe I have demonstrated the ability to continue to

10. grow in and with the organization.

16 March 1953
DATE

David L. Christ
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Christ has been exceptionally cooperative and dependable and he has exhibited leadership and good judgement in the administration of his duties. He has consistently been effective in handling unusually sensitive liaison problems and in offering guidance to the young project engineers of the Applied Physics Division.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over)

(4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Christ is particularily thorough and conscientious about the manner in which he handles his assignments.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Mr. Christ should be given an opportunity to further his own education through personal study and course opportunities for in this manner he can best develope and adequately offer additional assistance to his divisional associates.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He has in my opinion, the ability to handle further responsibility and this aptitude will develope in proportion to the operational and technical experience that he may acquire.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Not at this time.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

I recommend that he take additional technical and operational courses as they become available.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

23 March 1953
DATE

Peter F. Driscoll
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

[illegible]
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

Noted 21 May 53
KBW/gr

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" *carefully* before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (*please print or type*):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) Christ David Lamar	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) Jan 20 1918	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 181 01 6133
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY [redacted]	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (*do NOT mark more than one*):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
David L. Christ

DATE
2/19/68

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

[illegible]
FEB 21 2 06 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only after April 14, 1968)
176-111

SECRET

29 FEB 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - David L. Christ

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. As this award is designed to encourage excellence by recognizing and rewarding the employee, may I ask that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF - CHRIST
1 - D/Pers Chrono
1 - C/PD

OP/DD/Pers/R&P/PD/JJCaldwell:sh (29 February 1968)

SECRET

DD/S&T# 461-68

ORD 0683-68

31 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Quality Step Increase - David L. Christ

1. It is recommended that Mr. David L. Christ, Chief of the Applied Physics Division, Office of Research and Development, be granted a Quality Step Increase from GS-16, step 6, to GS-16, step 7.

2. Mr. Christ entered on duty with the Agency on 16 November 1950. He transferred to ORD from the DD/P as a GS-16 in September, 1963. During the past four and one-half years he has assumed increasing responsibilities and has expertly implemented and fulfilled the objectives for which his Division was formed in the early growth period of the Office. Although he has performed equally as well, and perhaps better than, many of his equivalent Division chiefs within the Office, the supergrade T.O. limitation within the Office has prevented a raise other than the Legislative pay raises.

3. Mr. Christ is considered to be a key individual in ORD. His energy, initiative, and enthusiasm in developing concepts and applying managerial talents make his services to this Office invaluable. In particular, his development of audio surveillance, micropower-

microtechnology, audio countermeasures, and emanations intelligence areas of effort within his Division make this Quality Step Increase long overdue, in my opinion.

Robert M. Chapman
Robert M. Chapman
Director of Research and Development
DD/S&T

CONCUR:

Carl E. Duckett
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

date

The recommendation contained in paragraph 1 is approved.

Director of Personnel
25 FEB 68

TR

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) Christ (First) David (Middle) L.

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: Rt. 2, Mountain Top, Penna.

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 6212 Maiden Lane, Bethesda 14, Md.

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE: New Haven, Conn.
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 17 Aug 44

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:

IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED:
DATE SPOUSE DIED:

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
Wilma M. Christ	6212 Maiden Lane, Bethesda, Md	OL 6-2127	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**AGE**
Thomas W.	Same as above	M	12
Elaine M	" "	F	10
Linda L.	" "	F	7
Susan M	" "	F	5
Stewart H.	" "	M	1
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
Deceased			
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
Mrs Mildred L. Christ	8 Greenwood St, Tamaqua, Pa.	Unk.	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES?
Wife + Mother

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (~~Mr.~~, Mrs., ~~Miss~~) (Last-First-Middle): Wilma M. Christ
RELATIONSHIP: Wife

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Same as above
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: OL 6-2127

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: " " "
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION: OL 6-2127

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☒ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☒ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☒ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 7 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
Suburban Trust Co, Bethesda Br.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JAN 57

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

27 APR 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: David L. Christ

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 1 July 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:
David L. Christ

Date: June 14, 1955

Career Service Staff
Office of Personnel

[illegible] JUN 1955

FORM NO. 511, 1 APR 55

(4)

SECRET
Security Information

CHRIST	DAVID	LAMAR
Name: Last,	First	Middle

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 23 July 52

TO: All C. I. A. Personnel

FROM: Personnel Director

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The Agency is currently revising the system for machine coding employee qualifications, thereby permitting more complete and accurate data on all personnel. The new system will aid in implementing Agency policies on promotion from within by facilitating the selection of personnel with desired education and experience for vacancies which may occur. It is also expected that the new system will provide readily accessible statistics for planning and management purposes.

2. The attached questionnaire is designed to cover adequately those factors in which the Agency is interested. Although the information is, in a large measure, already reflected in previous forms submitted by you, it is felt that your time within the organization may enable you to emphasize those qualifications pertinent to its needs. The questionnaire also serves to bring your education and qualifications record up to date.

3. Your cooperation is requested in completing the questionnaire as thoroughly and accurately as possible and returning it to your Administrative Officer within the time allotted.

George E. Meloon
George E. Meloon
Personnel Director

SECRET
Security Information

FORM NO. 37-152
MAY 1952

14-131

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry) 9090 *	2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) CHRIST DAVID LAMAR	3. Office Technical Services

4. Date of Birth January 20, 1918	5. Sex: x male (1) __ female (2)	Martial Status M Nr. Dependents 4	6. CIA Entry Date: November 16, 1950

7. Citizenship: x U.S. __ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) x Birth (2) __ Marriage (3) __ Naturalization (4) __ Other(specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ______

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

- 1. Less than high school
- 2. High school graduate
- 3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
- 4. Two years college, or less
- 5. Over two years, no degree
- [✓ 6. Bachelor degree]
- 7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
- 8. Masters degree
- 9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd From	Dates att'd To	Yrs Compl Day	Yrs Compl Night	Degree Recd Title	Degree Recd Date	Sem Hrs
Penna. State College State College, Pa.	Elec.	Engr.	Sept. 46	Feb. 50	4 years		B.S. in E.E.	Feb. 50	147 credits

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates From	Attendance Dates To	Attendance Dates Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization
None				

4. Military or Intelligence Training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, command & staff, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates From	Attendance Dates To	Attendance Dates Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization
Radio Op. Mech. School, USAF, Chicago, Ill.	Jan. '43	May '43	4	Radio Operator & mechanics
San Antonio, Texas Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn.	Apr. 44 Jul 44	Jul 44 Dec 44	4 5	Aviation Cadet(Ground) Pre-Tech. Communications
Chanute Field, Ill.	Mar '45	Apr '45	1	Cryptography

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. CIA Experience: State the specific nature of duties performed with CIA and CIG, starting with your present position. Take position titles from your official personnel papers, if you have personal copies. Please do not request your Official Personnel Folder. Include geographic area and subject matter dealt with, if applicable. Position Title is your classification title such as Geographer, Intelligence Officer, etc. Duty Title indicates your organization position such as - Section Chief, Branch Chief, Administrative Assistant, etc, and is to be filled in only if different to the Position Title. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From Feb. 52 To — Tot. mos. 7 Grade GS-12 Salary $7040. Office Technical Services Position Title: Physical Science Adm. Duty Title: Ass't. Chief, Applied Physics Branch	Description of Duties: Supervising and assisting junior project engineers in the planning and accomplishment of research and development projects. Assisting the Branch Chief in the administrative planning and programming of the Applied Physics Branch. Creative thinking and planning of devices and techniques for operations. Technical liaison. Duty Station, if overseas: —
From Nov. 50 To Feb. 52 Tot. mos. 15 Grade GS-11 Salary $5400 - $5940 Office Policy Coordination & Tech. Ser Position Title: Electronics Engineer Duty Title: Ass't. Chief, Physics Section	Description of Duties: Planning and pursuing research and development of devices and techniques. Development of technical and administrative procedures peculiar to the individual projects. Preparation of specifications drawings and reports. Technical liaison with other services and commercial organisation. Duty Station, if overseas: ----
From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____ Grade ____ Salary ____ Office ____ Position Title: ____ Duty Title: ____	Description of Duties: ____ Duty Station, if overseas:
From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____ Grade ____ Salary ____ Office ____ Position Title: ____ Duty Title: ____	Description of Duties: ____ Duty Station, if overseas:

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.)

From Feb. 50 To Nov 50 Tot. mo's 10 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) ______ Salary $340/mo. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 30 - 40 students Employer Pa. State College Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) College Extension	Exact Title of your position Instructor, Industrial Electronics Description of Duties: Instructor - laboratory and classroom - in Industrial Electricity and Industrial Electronics Duty Station if overseas:
From Sept 46 To Feb 50 Tot. mo's 41 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) ______ Salary --- Number and Class of Employees Supervised: ---- Employer Student Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Pa. State College	Exact Title of your position Student, Electrical Engineering. Description of Duties: I was a full time student in E.E., majoring in Electronics. Worked 4 hrs. per night at explosives plant during 1st. three semesters. I worked full time at this plant during vacations and 4 months prior to entering college. Duty Station if overseas:
From Dec. 44 To May 46 Tot. mo's 18 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) 1st. Lt Salary $180/mo. base Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 20 - 40 technicians Employer Air Force Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Army Airway Comm. System	Exact Title of your position Communications Officer, Cryptographic Security Officer Description of Duties: I was a Communications Officer, Radio Station Officer, and Cryptographic Security in various Detachments of AACS, Air Force. Duty Station if overseas: Pacific Theater
From Oct. 42 To Dec. 44 Tot. mo's 26 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Cpl. Av. Cadet Salary $75.00/mo. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 0 - 20 students Employer Air Force Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Pvt., Pfc., Cpl., Av. Cadet, Instructor Description of Duties: Oct. '42 - May '43 - Basic training & [illegible] training. May '43 - Apr '44 - Radio Mechanics Instructor. Apr '44 - Dec '44 - Aviation Cadet (Ground) studying communications Engineering. Duty Station if overseas: ----
From 1937 To Oct. 42 Tot. mo's 65 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) ______ Salary $55.00/wk. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 4 - 5 technicians Employer Atlas Powder Company Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Explosives.	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: Powder helper, [illegible] Foreman - part-time - supervising and accomplishing processing and packing of various kinds of dynamite and gelatin explosives. Duty Station if overseas: ----

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 ___ Civil Police
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 ___ FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 ___ Office of Strategic Services
24 ___ Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 ___ Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 ___ Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study (Inc. CIA training)
French					x					x

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ___________

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ________
Morse Coded - 20-25 wpm, Seand Radio-telegraphy experience.

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
Oahu, T.H.	June '45 to Aug. '45	x		
Phillipine Islands	Aug. '45 to Sept '45	x		
Japan-Kyushu, Honshu	Sept '45 to Apr '46	x		

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specalized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained
Same as above	General knowledge of	Gained as a result of military assignment from
	people and terrain.	June 1945 to April 1946.

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1.	2. x	30	1. Yes 2. x No
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc. None, although I've spent 11 months as	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.
a Radio Mechanics Instructor and 11 months as	Fishing, bowling, golf, technical
an Industrial Electronics Instructor.	writing.

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership. Eta Kappa Nu, Sigma Sigma Sigma (local), Former AIEE,
Contemplating IRE membership.

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

Did technical writing and preparation of Maintenance and Operating Instructions for Navy Radar gear.

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented	
None	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No

SEC. X. CIA TESTS

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken in CIA:

Type of Test	Date Taken
Polygraph	August 1952

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

None

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas? Only 1 or 2 months at most.

(1) 2 year Tour ___ (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested ___.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment in CIA do you think you are best qualified?

I believe I am currently assigned to a position which suits my general qualifications, since it is a position in a growing organization with which I can continuously grow.

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status

Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ___ Yes [✓ No].

If yes, indicate your present draft classification ______

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status

Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status [✓ Yes] ___ No.

If yes, complete the following.

1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. [✓] Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service **Air Force** Grade **1st Lt.** Location **Washington, D.C.**

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated **9463rd VARTU SQ, 9110TH VARTG**

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any **None**

Location of Service Records, if known **9110th VARTU Group, 1337 E St., N.W. Washington, D.C.**

SEC. XV. CIA TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken while in the CIA.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours
Security Lectures	Nov. '50	4
Staff Indoctrination Course	Jan. '51	20
Staff Orientation Course	Aug. '51	40

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

During 1952 I prepared maintenance and operations instruction manuals on Navy rader equipment. This was outside my CIA activities. Currently I am serving as a consultant to the Atlas Powder Company on problem of quality control and production processes in the manufacture of blasting caps.

DATE 19 September 1952

SIGNATURE David L. Christ

SECRET
Security Information

Christ, David L. UV X

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE DD/P/TSS
DIVISION RDD
BRANCH APB
SECTION

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
CIA	Wash. D.C.	16	Nov.	1950	31	12	51	16	1	1
							Total Civilian Service	16	1	1

[illegible] 5/1/27 [illegible] verified [illegible]

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Army Air Force,	26	Oct	'42	28	Apr	'46	2	6	3
						Total Military Service	3	6	3

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

14 December '51
DATE

David L. Christ
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

as of 12/31/51
JK

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
19	7	4

cab6

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1949)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A4 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Central Intelligence Agency (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) Washington, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, David L. Christ, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. 57, dated July [illegible], 19[illegible], filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

David L. Christ
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 16 day of November, A. D. 1950,

at Washington (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

Chloie W. Hudson
(Signature of officer)

(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS *(street and number, city and State)*
5705 Hamilton St, Apt 2, Rogers Heights, Md.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH
20 Jun '18

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH *(city or town and State or country)*
Tamaqua, P.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY
Mrs. Wilma M. Christ

(B) RELATIONSHIP
Wife

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE
5705 Hamilton St, Apt 2
Rogers Heights, Md

(D) TELEPHONE NO.
AP 3605

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☐ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS *(Give street number, if any)*	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED *(Check one)*	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?		
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating, if retired from military or naval service*		
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*		

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

OPC

NAME CHRIST, DAVID L.	NATURE OF ACTION EOD
TITLE OF POSITION Engineer	GRADE GS-11
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Dept.	

Subject was found physically ☒ fit ☐ unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Approved 6 months temporary asignment, departmental

MAY BE REEVALUATED AT THAT TIME
FOR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT, BUT CHANCES
ARE NOT FAVORABLE.

16 November 1950

DATE

SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-57
NOV 1948

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
059090	Christ, David L.	01/20/18	R

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*	YEARS ATTENDED *(From-To)*	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. *(Specify)*
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried)* SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden)*

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-68

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-5) (3)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
			AIR 7	RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.				23 rr	'70		
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. WAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

No changes since last report

DATE: Mar 31, 197-

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: David J. Chris

SECRET

LLC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GC-15 R

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
059090	CHRIST, David L.	01/20/18	R

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*	YEARS ATTENDED *(From-To)*	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. *(Specify)*
		MAJOR	MINOR				
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried)* SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden)*

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-68 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

6 9 AUG ENTD (2)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V	GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL						
NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX	PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS		
NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

No change from previous submission

DATE 4/18/64

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David F. Christ

SECRET

10

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

AD INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

ow that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
059090	Christ, David L.	01/20/18

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-151)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 15 1 22 PM '68
MAIL ROOM

SECTION V	GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL						
NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

No additions to previous report

ATE 4/11/68	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David F. Christ

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 059090	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) CHRIST DAVID L	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/18	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS -16-05
6. SD R	7. POSITION TITLE PHYS SCIEN RES CH	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT ORD	9. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH., D. C.	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	TDY 46	56/04/01	56/05/01
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 46	57/06/01	57/07/01
SOUTH AMERICA	TDY 46	57/09/01	57/10/01
AROUND THE WORLD	TDY 46	58/03/01	58/04/01
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 46	59/01/25	59/02/15
MEXICO	TDY 44	60/01/21	60/01/27
ASIA AREA	TDY 44	60/03/13	60/04/23
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 44	60/04/23	60/04/30
[redacted] WH Area	TDY	60/8/13	60/8/30
" "	PCS	60/9/08	63/4/21

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: INITIALS:
1 Jun 67

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING, GENERAL	PA ST UNIV	50

FORM
1 67 444J
Aug 2 67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Cuba	General	[illegible]		✓			
Other countries listed in Section I for days or weeks at a time							
general knowledge.							

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4 - SECTION V - LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE, CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

General technical reports & studies, and program presentations

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

Basic R&D project concepts & ideas

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

Internal Agency training & program lectures. Church

SECRET

SECTION VII — **MILITARY SERVICE**

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☑ NO	2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION 4
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS	4. IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify)	2. BRANCH OR CORPS	3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty) FROM TO
4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify)	5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation if past service)	6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
1.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
2.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
3.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
4.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
5.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII

AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- To- by month & year) Sept 60 -	2. LOCATION (Country, City) TDY/WH	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH DD/P/TSD/AOB
4. TITLE OF JOB Chief, Audio Ops Branch		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS13-16
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES same as below		

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- To- by month & year) Jan '57 – Sept 60	2. LOCATION (Country, City) U.SA, Wash D.C.	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH DD/P/TSD/AOB
4. TITLE OF JOB Chief, Audio Operations Branch		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-15
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Developing and managing domestic and overseas organization, equipment, logistics, etc. for worldwide audio intelligence collection operations.		

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- To- by month & year) ~~Feb~~ Oct 50 - Jan '57	2. LOCATION (Country, City) USA, Wash DC	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH DD/P/TSD/APB
4. TITLE OF JOB Deputy Chief, Applied Physics Branch		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS 11-15
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Technical administrator, supervisor of physicists, electronics engineers in R&D of intelligence collection devices and systems		

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION 9 MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS Single Married Widowed Separated Divorced Annulled Remarried (Specify) No Change

2. NAME OF SPOUSE Last First Middle Maiden

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION 10 DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Elaine M. Christ	Dghtr	2/47 Tamaqua, Pa.	Yes	6212 Maiden Lane Bethesda, Md
Linda L. Christ	"	8/50 Mountain Top, Pa.	"	same as above
Susan M. Christ	"	10/52 Hyattsville, Md	"	" " "
Stewart H. Christ	Son	12/56 Bethesda, Md	"	" " "
Roger L. Christ	Son	9/60 Bethesda, Md	"	" " "

SECTION 11 PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO
None			

DATE 3/21/67

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David F Christ

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOV

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

159090

THIS DATE
25 March 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
Christ, David Lamar

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
6212 Maiden Lane
Bethesda 14, Maryland

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
6212 Maiden Lane
Bethesda 14, Maryland

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
Oliver 6-2127

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
Maryland, U.S.A.

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
Mrs. Christ, Wilma Margaret

2. RELATIONSHIP
wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
6212 Maiden Lane, Bethesda 14, Maryland, U.S.A.

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country) INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
Same as above

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
Oliver 6-2127

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
NA

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
NA

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Mother - Mrs. David A. Christ, 8 Greenwood St., Tamaqua, Pa.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
NA

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First) Wilma (Middle) Margaret (Maiden) Zimmermann (Last) Christ

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
Aug. 17, 1944

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)
New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.

6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)
Route #5, Wausau, Wisconsin, U.S.A.

7. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH
NA

9. CAUSE OF DEATH
NA

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)
6212 Maiden Lane, Bethesda 14, Maryland

11. DATE OF BIRTH
Aug. 1, 1921

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
Wausau, Wisconsin, U.S.A.

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY
NA

14. PLACE OF ENTRY
NA

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
U.S.A.

16. DATE ACQUIRED
NA

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
NA

18. OCCUPATION
Housewife

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)
NA

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
NA

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
Oct. 1942 - May 1946

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
USAF

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
U.S.A.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
CIA - Nov. 1950 to present

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 8 1 41 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

None

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES
NA

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME
NA

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Suburban Trust Co., Bethesda Branch	Bethesda, Md., U.S.A.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)
NA

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS
NA

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*
U.S.A.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES NA NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS
NA

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First papers, etc.)*
NA

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE		OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	X	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE		GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS		MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Penn. State University	Elec. Eng.		Sept. 1946	Feb. 1950	B.S. in E.E.	Feb. 1950	

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING *(Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)*

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
AAF ROM School Chicago, Ill	Radio Oper. & Mechanics	Jan. 1943	May 1943	4
AAF Comm. Cadet (Yak)	Communications Engring.	Apr. 1944	Dec. 1944	8
AAF Sch., Chanute Field	Cryptography	Feb. 1945	Mar. 1945	1

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 8 1 43 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION VIII FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED (R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK)															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
French										X	X	X							X
Japanese															X		X		

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

High School French

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD

Insufficient ability to do specialized language work

SECTION IX GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE", INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Hawaii	General	June '45 -Aug. '45	X			X
Phillipine Isles.	General	Aug. '45 - Oct. '45	X			X
Japan	General	Oct. '45 - Apr. '46 Apr. '56 -May '56	X			X

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

June '45 - Apr. '46 - Residence, result of military assignment
Apr. '56 - May '56 - was Agency duty assignment

SECTION X TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
25	--	☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

SECTION XI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH Fishing, golf, bowling - fair & good. Reading, church and community activities.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK Electronic Engineer - with 6 years experience assisting in administration and direction of research and development work

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

Hand tools, machine tools of various kinds, professional electronic instruments.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN. Served as radio operator in Service, teacher at Penn. State College, experienced electronics engineer - but no licenses

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)	6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)
NA	NA

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.) Prepared maintenance, overhaul & instruction manuals on radar equip. for Navy. Variety of significant reports and publications prepared in normal course of job performance.

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED
No patents, contributed original technical ideas on devices in normal course of job performance.

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE Military Service instructor, college instructor, many talks, lectures, briefings during past 13 years in normal job performance.

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED. Phalanx fraternity, Eta Kappa Nu, A.I.E.E.

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) 1952 - Present
2. GRADE GS-14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT TSS/APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 20
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief, TSS/APD
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Assist & act for the chief in general administrative details - personnel, budget, security, contractual arrangements, etc.; assist and/or accomplish organizing procedures & administrative mechanisms for accomplishing technical projects. Examine operational problems, suggesting devices & techniques for implementing the operations; recommend & organize technical projects & programs; supervise work & progress of project engineers; conduct liaison; provide consultation.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 8 1 41 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION XIII

CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN *(Including stepchildren and adopted children)* WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 5

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS *(Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.)* WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Thomas W. Christ	Son	1944	X		U.S.A.	6212 Maiden Lane Bethesda, Md.
Elaine M. Christ	Daughter	1947		X	"	"
Linda L. Christ	"	1950		X	"	"
Susan M. Christ	"	1953		X	"	"
Stewart H. Christ	Son	1957	X		"	"
Wilma M. Christ	Wife	1921		X	"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED Mar 26 1957

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David J. Christ

SECRET

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions:
1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office: None
Ext. None
Home: 2299

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) Miss Mr. Mrs. David (First) Lamar (Middle) Christ (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS R.D. #2, (St. & No.) Mountain Top, (City) Pa., (State) U.S.A. (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS Same as above (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

B. NICKNAME None WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? Not Applicable

HOW LONG? — IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS Not Applicable (Where? / By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 1/20/19 PLACE OF BIRTH Tamaqua, (City) Pa., (State) U.S.A. (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. (Country) BY BIRTH? yes BY MARRIAGE?

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # Not Applicable ISSUED (Date) BY (Court)

AT (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? TO ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? GIVE PARTICULARS:

FORM NO. 38-1
SEP 1948

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ________

PORT OF ENTRY? ________ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ________

LAST U.S. VISA ________ Number ________ Type ________ Place of Issue ________ Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 32 SEX Male HEIGHT 6'0" WEIGHT 185

EYES Gray HAIR Brown COMPLEXION Fair SCARS Above left eye. On Right forearm. On left foot + ankle.

BUILD Medium OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ________

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE ________ MARRIED ✓ DIVORCED ________ WIDOWED ________

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ________

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDE ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Wilma (First) Margaret (Middle) Zimmerman (Maiden) Christ (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE Aug. 12, 1944, New Haven, Conn.

~~HIS~~ (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE Route #2 (St. & No.), Wausau (City), Wis. (State), U.S.A. (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS R.D. #2 (St. & No.), Mountain Top (City), Pa. (State), U.S.A. (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 7/1/21 PLACE OF BIRTH Wausau (City), Wis. (State), U.S.A. (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY Not Applicable

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________ City State Country

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Cook's Restaurant

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS College Ave (St. & No.), State College (City), Pa (State), U.S.A. (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM Not Applicable (Date) (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ________

COUNTRY ________ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN ________

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME *Thomas Warren Christ* RELATIONSHIP *Son* AGE *5*

CITIZENSHIP *U.S.A.* ADDRESS *R.D. #2, Mountain Top, Pa., U.S.A.*
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME *Elaine Margaret Christ* RELATIONSHIP *Daughter* AGE *3*

CITIZENSHIP *U.S.A.* ADDRESS *R.D. #2, Mountain Top, Pa., U.S.A.*
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME *David* *Albert* *Christ*
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED *Deceased* DATE OF DECEASE *3/15/50* CAUSE *Kidney Failure*

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS *620 Arlington St, Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.*
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH *2/14/'98* PLACE OF BIRTH *Ashland, Pa., U.S.A.*
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY *Not Applicable*

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION *Breaker Employee* LAST EMPLOYER *Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co.*

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS *No 14 Colliery, Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.*
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM *Not* TO *Applicable* BRANCH OF SERVICE ______
Date Date

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME *Mildred Lenore Nahf Christ*
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED *Living* DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS *620 Arlington St., Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.*
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH *2/17/'98* PLACE OF BIRTH *Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.*

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY *Not Applicable*

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER None

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS Not Applicable
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM Not Applicable BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME Lawrence Henry Christ AGE 31
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS 1903 S. Queb.. St, Arlington, Va., U.S.A., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

2. FULL NAME Warren Albert Christ AGE 29
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS 620 Arlington St, Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

3. FULL NAME Robert Lerene Christ AGE 28
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS 1721A Pallon Drive, Phila, Pa., U.S.A., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

4. FULL NAME Elizabeth Irene Christ AGE 23
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS Nurses Home, Presbyterian Hosp, Phila, Pa, U.S.A, U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

5. FULL NAME Charles Emanuel Christ AGE 20
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS 4901 Market St, Phila. 4, Pa., U.S.A., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Herbert Robert Zimmerman
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Route # 2, Wausau, Wis., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 9/11/'90 PLACE OF BIRTH Town of Easton, Wis.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY Not Applicable

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE?
City State Country

OCCUPATION Farmer LAST EMPLOYER Self

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Esther Bertha Boettcher Zimmerman
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Route #2, Wausau, Wis., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 11/12/98 PLACE OF BIRTH Town of Hewitt, Wis.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY Not Applicable

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER None

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES: None

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State Country
2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State Country
3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. None

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______
2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______
3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

SEC. 12. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ______ ADDRESS Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A. (City State Country)

DATES ATTENDED Sept, '23 to June, '31 GRADUATE? Yes

HIGH SCHOOL Tamaqua H.S. ADDRESS Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A. (City State Country)

DATES ATTENDED Sept. '31 to June, '35 GRADUATE? Yes

COLLEGE Penna. State College ADDRESS State College, Pa. U.S.A. (City State Country)

DATES ATTENDED Sept. '46 to Feb, '50 DEGREE B.S. in Elec. Eng.

COLLEGE ______ ADDRESS ______ (City State Country)

DATES ATTENDED ______ DEGREE ______

SEC. 13 MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

U.S.A. (Country) Army Air Force (Service) 1st Lt. (Rank) Oct '42 to May '46 (Dates of Service)

Det. 113, 150th AACS Sq., Kanoya, Japan (Last Station) 0-977343 (Serial No.) Separation from Service (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: Communications Officer, Cryptographic Security Officer.

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 1 ADDRESS Tamaqua, Pa.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON Not Applicable

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS Asst. Operations Officer, 1912th AACS Sq., Olmsted AFB, Middletown, Pa.

SEC. 14 CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

1. FROM Feb 1, 1950 TO Present

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Penna. State College Extension

ADDRESS 75 E. Union St, Wilkes-Barre, Pa., U.S.A. (St. & No. City State Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Tech. Institute NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. George Bierly

TITLE OF JOB Instructor SALARY $ 370.00 PER Month

YOUR DUTIES Instruction in Industrial Electricity, Electronics

REASONS FOR LEAVING ______

2. FROM Sept, 1946 TO Feb, 1950

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY None. Penna. State College

ADDRESS 1 (St. & No) State College (City), Pa. (State), U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS College NAME OF SUPERVISOR Prof. E.T. Hall, Jr.

TITLE OF JOB Student SALARY $ — PER —

YOUR DUTIES Student in Electrical Engineering

REASONS FOR LEAVING Graduation

3. FROM June, 1946 TO Feb, 1948

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Atlas Powder Company

ADDRESS (St. & No.) Reynolds (City), Pa. (State), U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Explosives NAME OF SUPERVISOR Wm. E. Moore

TITLE OF JOB Powder Helper SALARY $ 1.35 PER hr.

YOUR DUTIES Packing powder in Gelatin Boxpack

REASONS FOR LEAVING Attend Pa. State College on campus, worked part-time from Sept '46 to Feb '48.

4. FROM Oct '42 TO May '46

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. Army Air Force

ADDRESS Det 118, 150th AACS Sq. (St. & No.), Kanoya (City), Japan (State) ~~U.S.A.~~ (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Communications NAME OF SUPERVISOR Capt James Purdy

TITLE OF JOB 1st Lt. SALARY $ 175 PER month

YOUR DUTIES Communications Officer, Cryptographic Sec. O.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Separation from service

5. FROM 1937 TO Oct, 1942

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Atlas Powder Company

ADDRESS (St. & No.) Reynolds (City), Pa. (State), U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Explosives NAME OF SUPERVISOR Wm. E. Moore

TITLE OF JOB Powder Helper SALARY $ 0.88 PER hr.

YOUR DUTIES Bomb Plant, Gelatin Box-Pack

REASONS FOR LEAVING Enter military service

Note: Continued on Page 13.

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS: Not Applicable

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	Dr. M.S. Hermany	BUS. ADD.	E. Broad St	Tamaqua	Pa.
		RES. ADD.	Arlington St,	Tamaqua	Pa.
2.	Mr. Paul R. Beattie	BUS. ADD.	Park Super,	Cook Forest State Park,	
		RES. ADD.		Cooksburg, Pa.	
3.	Mr. William E. Moore	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.		Reynolds	Pa.
4.	Rev. R. H. Kriebel	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	E. Broad St,	Tamaqua,	Pa.
5.	Mr. Charles H. Carter	BUS. ADD.	Research Division,	Atlas Powder Co.,	
		RES. ADD.		Wilmington, Del.	

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	Mr. Emil J. Pittner	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	[illegible]	State College,	Pa.
2.	Mr. Francis Burdick	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	Arlington St,	Tamaqua,	Pa.
3.	Miss Pearl F. Young	BUS. ADD.	Dept. of Physics,	P.S.C. Undergraduate Cent.,	
		RES. ADD.		Pottsville, Pa.	
4.	Mr. Edwin Glasgow	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.		Darlington,	Pa.
5.	Prof. E. B. [illegible]	BUS. ADD.	Elec. Eng. Dept,	[illegible],	
		RES. ADD.		[illegible], Pa.	

SEC. 18. **GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)**

Street and Number — City — State

1. Mr. Robert Cooper BUS. ADD. ______ ______ ______
RES. ADD. R.D. #2 Mountain Top, Pa.

2. Mrs. Daniel Fine BUS. ADD. ______ ______ ______
RES. ADD. R.D. #2 Mountain Top, Pa.

3. Mr. Edwin Henry BUS. ADD. ______ ______ ______
RES. ADD. R.D. #2 Mountain Top, Pa.

SEC. 19. **FINANCIAL BACKGROUND**

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME ______

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS None at present

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: Not Applicable

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

1. NAME United Furniture Co. ADDRESS Public Square, Wilkes-Barre, Pa. (St. & No. — City — State)
2. NAME Sears Roebuck & Co. ADDRESS S. Main St., Wilkes-Barre, Pa. (St. & No. — City — State)
3. NAME Wilkes-Barre Savings & Dep Bank ADDRESS Public Square, Wilkes-Barre, Pa. (St. & No. — City — State)

SEC. 20. **RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS**

FROM	TO	St. No.	City	State	Country
Feb '50	Present	R.D. #2	Mountain Top	Pa.	U.S.A.
Feb '49	Feb '50	422 Windcrest	State College	Pa.	U.S.A.
June '46	Feb '49	620 Arlington St	Tamaqua	Pa.	U.S.A.
Oct '42	June '46	Military Service - Home address same as above			
1939	1942	207 Lehigh St	Tamaqua	Pa.	U.S.A.
1926?	1939	104 Lehigh St	Tamaqua	Pa.	U.S.A.

SEC. 21. **RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES**

FROM	TO	City or Section	Country	Purpose
A. June '45	Aug '45	Oahu	Hawaiian Islands	Military Service
Aug '45	Oct '45	Around Manila, Luzon	P.I.	" "
Oct '45	Apr '46	Nagoya	Japan	" "

FROM ________ TO ________ ________________________
City or Section Country Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________________________
City or Section Country Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________________________
City or Section Country Purpose

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT—NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: Not Applicable

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? ________ **GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES:** ________

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: ________

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. Phalanx Fraternity, Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: From about 1931 to about 1933.

2. Eta Kappa Nu, Epsilon Chapter, Pa. State College, State College, Pa.
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: Nov, 1949 to Present

3. A.I.E.E. 33 W. 39th St, New York 18, N.Y., U.S.A.
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: Student member from Oct '42 to present

4. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

5. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

6. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

7. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE French SPEAK None READ Slight WRITE Slight

LANGUAGE ______ SPEAK ______ READ ______ WRITE ______

LANGUAGE ______ SPEAK ______ READ ______ WRITE ______

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Fishing, Golf, Bowling - Average Proficiency

Radio - Average Proficiency

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

I have been an instructor upon two occasions - military & civilian.

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

None

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

I was a Cryptographic Security Officer, Army Air Force, investigated and given loyalty clearance about March, 1945

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? No

IF "YES", EXPLAIN:

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? Yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Very Moderately

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

Not Applicable

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

Not Applicable

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Mrs. Wilma M. Christ RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS R.D. #2, Mountain Top, Pa., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No.

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Mountain Top, Pa. (City and State) DATE July 24, 1950

Robert Cooper (Witness)

(Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

Sec. 14 (cont'd.)

1935 to 1937 – During this period of time I was employed by Allison's Esso Service, Tamaqua, Pa., operating a gas station for Mr. William G. Allison. I left this position to obtain better-paying employment with Atlas Powder Company, Tamaqua Reynolds, Pa. I also worked as a small Machine Molder for Tamaqua Manufacturing Company, Tamaqua, Pa, making and pouring gray cast iron molds. My wages were $.35 per hour. I left when the company went out of business. I was also employed by the A&P Tea. Co, Tamaqua, Pa. for a short period of time. I left this company for better employment with the Tamaqua Mfg. Company.

NDARD FORM 57 - NOV. 1947
S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: Application for Electronics position
2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement):
3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State):
4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: 7/24/50
5. MR. ~~MRS.~~ ~~MISS~~ (First name) David (Middle) Lamar (Maiden, if any) (Last) Christ
6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: R.D. #2, Mountain Top, Pa.
(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Mountain Top, Pa.

ANNOUNCEMENT

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): Pennsylvania
8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: —
(B) HOME PHONE: 2299 (Nuangola
9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): Jan 20, 1918
10. ☑ MARRIED ☐ SINGLE
11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Tamaqua, Pa.
12. ☑ MALE ☐ FEMALE
13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 6 FEET 0 INCHES (B) WEIGHT: 185 POUNDS
14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO
(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE: GS-10

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPD. ☐ INELIGIBLE	MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED	ENTERED REGISTER
NOTATIONS:	APP. REVIEW: APPROVED:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $4500.00 PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.
(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT TERM APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED, FOR: ☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS
NOTE. Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.
(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: ☑ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY
(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: ☑ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☑ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① **PRESENT POSITION**

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year): FROM Feb. 1950 TO PRESENT TIME
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Instructor, Ind. Electricity
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service): None
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $340.00 PER Mo. PRESENT $340.00 PER Mo.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. George Bierly
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Pa. State College Extension, 75 E. Union St., Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Technical Institute
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 20-25 students per class.
REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT: To embark on a career of Electrical Engineering
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: I am an instructor, teaching basic electricity, industrial electricity (including industrial electronics), and radio communications on a Technical Institute level. These are one-year courses purported to be on a college level

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM ~~Sept~~ June, 1946 TO Feb, 1948
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Powder Helper
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 1.27 PER hr. FINAL $ 1.35 PER hr.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Reynolds, Pa.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Max Colson
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Atlas Powder Company Reynolds, Pa.
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Explosives
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: Variable (see below)
REASON FOR LEAVING: Attend Pa. State College.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: From June '46 to Sept. '46, I worked full-time, preparing and packing gelatin for shipment in the Gelatin Boxpack on the Powder Line. From Sept '46 to Feb '48, I worked four hours nightly, full-time during vacations, while attending Pa. State College Undergraduate Center, Pottsville, Pa., in a full-time Electrical Engineering Curriculum. From Feb '48 until Feb '52, I attended the main campus of the college at State College, Pa.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Oct '42 TO May '46
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: 1st Lt., Air Corps
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 50.00 PER mo. FINAL $ 175.00 PER mo.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Kanoya, Japan - APO 929
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Capt. James Purdy
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Det. 118, 139th AACS Squadron APO 929
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Airway Communications
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 30-40 {Radio Station
Crypto. Section
REASON FOR LEAVING: Separation from Service

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: As an enlisted man, from Oct '42 to Dec '44, I attended a Radio Op. Mech. School, 4 months, served as Radio Mchs. Instructor, 11mo., attended Aviation Cadets (Communications), 9 months. Upon being commissioned Dec '44, I became a Communications Officer and Cryptographic Security Officer. With Det. 118, 139th AACS Sq., I was Radio Station Officer, Communications Security Officer, and Personnel and Finance Officer.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM 1937 TO Oct '42
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Powder Helper
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 0.65 PER hr FINAL $ 0.88 PER hr } Approx.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Reynolds, Pa.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Robert Arner
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Atlas Powder Company Reynolds, Pa.
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Explosives
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: Varied (see below)
REASON FOR LEAVING: Enter Armed Service

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: For approximately one year, worked at Bomb Plant, main position being that of tending tank for melting TNT. Balance of time employed on Powder Line, preparing and packing sticks of gelatin for shipment. Part of time was night shift foreman of Boxpack (2 to 5 men)

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM 1935 TO 1937

T TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

CLASSIFICA GRADE (If in Fed Servi SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK During this period of time I was employed by Allison's Esso Service Tamaqua Pa, operating gas station for Mr Wm G Allison. I left position to obtain better-paying employment with Atlas Powder Co I also worked as a small machine molder for Tamaqua Mfg Co, Tamaqua Pa. making and pouring gray cast iron molds. I was paid .35 per hr. I left when the company went out of business. I was also employed by the A&P Company, as a clerk for a short period of time, leaving the company for better employment with the Tamaqua, Mfg. Co. I do not know the dates for these periods.

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
Jan '43	May '43	Chicago, Ill	Radio Op & Mechs - Total hours - 540
Mar '44	July '44	San Antonio, Tex	Aviation Cadet Pre-Tech Course (OCS) 20 wks.
July '44	Dec '44	Yale U, New Haven, Conn	Communications Course - 700 hours

18 EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF: ☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☑ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED Tamaqua H.S., Tamaqua, Pa.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED Mathematics, Physics

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Pa. State College, State College, Pa.	Elec Eng Electronic	Sept '46	Feb '50	4		B.S	2/1/50	161

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF ~~GRADUATE~~ COLLEGE SUBJECTS (Electives)	SEMESTER HOURS
Mathematics	22	Applied Electronics & Ind Electronics	6
Required Basic Electrical Courses	36	Radio Eng. & U.H.F. Techniques	6
Electronics (Basic)	4	Engineering Analysis, Pulse Techniques	6

(E) OTHER TRAINING SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN-SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

SUBJECTS STUDIED None

DATES ATTENDED FROM TO YEARS COMPLETED DAY NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERST'NG EXC.	UNDERST'NG GOOD	UNDERST'NG FAIR
French			✓						✓

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)? ☐ YES ☑ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE.

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

Hawaii, Philippine Islands, Japan, June '45 to April '46, military service

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

Student Member A.I.E.E
National Honorary Frat. - Eta Kappa Nu.

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ..... SHORTHAND .....

24 REFERENCES: List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE)

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1 Mr. Charles H. Carter	Manager, Process Development Research Div, Atlas Powder Co, Wilmington, Del.	Research Chemist
2 Prof F. T. Hall, Jr	Electrical Engineering Dept, Pa State College, State College, Pa.	Prof, Elec. Eng.
3 Miss Pearl I. Young	Dept. of Physics, P.S.C. Undergraduate Center, ~~Pottsville~~ Pottsville, Pa.	Prof, Physics

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25 MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	✓	
26 ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
27 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		✓
28 ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		✓
29 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		✓
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein		
30 SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*		✓
31 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		✓
32 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		✓
33 HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		✓
34 DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39*		✓

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35 ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39*		✓
36 DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address, (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment*		✓

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a **PEACETIME VETERAN** who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a **DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN**, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a **WAR-TIME VETERAN** not claiming disability preference, you should **NOT** submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37 (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	✓	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	✓	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	✓	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
Oct 29, 1942	May 29, 1946
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	**SERIAL NO** (*If none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).
Army Air Force	0-877993

	YES	NO
38 (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?	✓	
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		✓
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		✓
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		✓

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19.....

Agency:
Title:

39 SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO		ITEM NO	
	None Applicable		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT David F. Christ

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initials, and surname) If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Employees Division, Special Support Staff DATE: 9 November 1950

FROM : Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

SUBJECT: CHRIST, David Lamar - 43872

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 August 1950, which requested that Subject be granted provisional clearance to permit his immediate entry on duty. Subject is an applicant for a position as Electronics Engineer, GS-10, in OPC.

This is to advise that this office interposes no objection from a security standpoint to a temporary appointment of Subject to work on unclassified duties for the training staff, upon the condition that Subject (1) not have access to classified material, (2) not have access to CIA secure areas, (3) not be issued a CIA badge or credential, and (4) that he not represent himself in any official capacity as a CIA employee. The Subject may not be assigned to duty in any CIA staff or office without further authority from the Chief, Inspection and Security Staff.

FOR THE CHIEF, INSPECTION AND SECURITY STAFF:

C. V. Broadley

C. V. BROADLEY
Chief, Security Division

ER

[illegible]

NOV 9 4 31 PM '50

CONFIDENTIAL

E 44

1. SERIAL NO.	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
059090	CHRIST DAVID L	82 340	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	5	$22,755	11/21/66	GS 16	6	$23,425	11/19/67		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman DATE 9/13/67

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP
☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS E.J.ECHOLS AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-61)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 340	V	GS 16 7	$31,857

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 340	V	GS 16 7	$30,054

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 340 V	GS 16 7	$25,176	$27,401

---

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059090	CHRIST DAVID L	82 340 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 16	6	$24,477	11/19/67	GS 16	7	$25,176	02/25/68			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ R S WATTLES 25 FEBRUARY 1968

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-61 560 Mlg 3 65 Obsolete Previous Edition (4 51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 340 V	GS 16 5	$22,755	$23,778

OPC 3

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

To : Chief, Employees Division, Special Support Staff
Date: 24 November 1950

From : Chief of Inspection and Security Staff
Number: 43872

Subject: CHRIST, David L.

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

☒ Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Subject is currently on duty with this Agency.

Miss Tellier notified 11/27 pm

Ermal P. Geiss
ERMAL P. GEISS
Chief, Personnel Security Branch

on duty

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
MAY 1949

STANDARD FORM 66
January 1972
PRESCRIBED BY U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Federal Personnel Manual Ch. 293
66–104

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

73 Nov Eod 71 Nov Contd (F) 70 Jul Eod

Reviewed
9-Sep 1966

KEENAN THOMAS J
SSN 395-26-2591
DOB 06/29/30

CODED
for
QUALIFICATIONS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

National Personnel Records Center
(Civilian Personnel Records)
111 Winnebago Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63118

DATE: 4-17-78

REPLY TO ATTN OF: NCPCR-CA

SUBJECT: STATEMENT CONCERNING CHRISTMAS ASSISTANT EMPLOYMENT

Division of Adjudication
Bureau of Personnel Investigations
U S Civil Service Commission
Washington, D.C. 20415
attn. L. Shipp

(Last, first, middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Keenan, Thomas J	6-29-30	395-11-2491

☐ The enclosed request is forwarded for your reply since the payroll records for the period(s) involved have not been received. Please furnish the requester information as to the number of hours worked and rate of pay for the period(s) involved.

☒ Official personnel folders are not established for Christmas assistants. Payroll records show the number of hours worked but not the actual appointment and separation dates. The payroll records show the following information for the above-named employee:

PERIOD	HOURS WORKED	RATE OF PAY	POST OFFICE
1-51 to 12-51	NO SERVICE		
12-1-52 to 12-15-52	62	$1.515 PH	Milwaukee, Wisc
12-16-52 to 12-31-52	NO SERVICE		

☐ The above verifies only a portion of the service shown in your request. The payroll records for the other employment periods are held by the Payroll Section, Postal Data Center, Post Office Department

for E. L. PRICE
Chief, Civ. Ref. Br.

RECD. [illegible] IRA APR 24 1978

GSA FORM 6094 MAY 68

APR 6 1978

Standard Form 127
July 1967 edition
General Services Administration
FPMR [illegible] (41 CFR) 101-11.6

REQUEST FOR OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER
(SEPARATED EMPLOYEE)

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 23 February 1978

Section I—TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTING AGENCY

2. CURRENT NAME (Last, first, middle): KEENAN, THOMAS

2a. NAME UNDER WHICH FORMERLY EMPLOYED FEDERALLY (if different from 2.): C4F

3. DATE OF BIRTH: 05 29 30

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 395 26 2991

NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECORDS CENTER, GSA
(Civilian Personnel Records)
111 WINNEBAGO STREET
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63118

SUBMIT IN DUPLICATE FOR EACH FOLDER REQUESTED. Original will be used to send folder or reply to your agency. Duplicate will be used as charge-out record by the Records Center.

5. PREVIOUS FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

AGENCY AND BUREAU	LOCATION	FROM	TO
United States Post Office	Milwaukee, Wis	11/52	12/52
United States Post Office	Milwaukee, Wis	11/51	12/51

6. REASON FOR REQUEST (Check appropriate box)

☐ a. Currently employed. ☒ b. Temporary use. ☐ c. Pre-employment consideration. Will retain folder if hired.

7. REMARKS

If no records may be found, please do a payroll search. Thank you.

Section II—FOR USE BY RECORDS CENTER

8.
☐ a. Folder enclosed.
☐ b. Folder was sent to your agency on ______
☐ c. Folder forwarded in place of information requested. Retain if person is rehired.
☐ d. Folder not received. Suggest you contact last employing office.
☐ e. Folder not located. Suggest further search of your agency. If still unlocated, verify correctness of name, and furnish date forwarded and several names of other folders in same shipment.
☐ f. Folder believed in custody of following agency. Original of your request sent to that agency for action.

A pay transcript is furnished on the attached GSA Form 6994

Date: 4-17-78 Initials: BD

Section III—TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTING AGENCY

Division of Adjudication
Bureau of Personnel Investigations
U.S. Civil Service Commission
Washington, D.C. 20415

Enter complete address to which folder or reply is to be mailed. Include ZIP Code.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Request for Personnel Records from the Federal Records Center or former employer.

FROM:
OP/CD/TRB
Files Section
5 E 13 HQS

EXTENSION: 6141

NO.

DATE: 23 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CCS/CSB 6H 44 HQS Attn: Mr. MacKinnon	1/28/78		
2.			
3.			
4.			
5. OS/CSD/EAB 4 E 33 HQS Attn: Mr. Daly			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10. OS/CSD/EAB 4 E 33 HQS Attn: Mr. Daly			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. OP/CD/TRB Files Section 5 E 13 HQS			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

It is requested that your office obtain the Official Records indicated on the attached Form IN - 502 and forward them to the OP FILES SECTION. For further information or if the request cannot be honored, please contact C/TRB on extension 7165.

SUBJECT:

Mr. Thomas Keenan

DOB:

COVER: (circle one)

[✓ YES] NO IN PROCESS

CCS/CSB - Request the Official Personnel Folder from:

FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER X

LAST EMPLOYING AGENCY ____

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Standard Form 127
July 1967 edition
General Services Administration
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.4

REQUEST FOR OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER
(SEPARATED EMPLOYEE)

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 23 February 1978

Section I—TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTING AGENCY

2. CURRENT NAME (Last, first, middle): [illegible], THOMAS

2a. NAME UNDER WHICH FORMERLY EMPLOYED FEDERALLY (If different than item 2):

3. DATE OF BIRTH: 06 29 30

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [illegible]

NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECORDS CENTER, GSA
(Civilian Personnel Records)
111 WINNEBAGO STREET
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63118

SUBMIT IN DUPLICATE FOR EACH FOLDER REQUESTED. *Original will be used to send folder or reply to your agency. Duplicate will be used as charge-out record by the Records Center.*

5. PREVIOUS FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

AGENCY AND BUREAU	LOCATION	FROM	TO
United States Post Office	Milwaukee, Wis	11/52	12/52
United States Post Office	Milwaukee, Wis	11/51	12/51

6. REASON FOR REQUEST (Check appropriate box)

☐ a. Currently employed. ☒ b. Temporary use. ☐ c. Pre-employment consideration. Will retain folder if hired.

7. REMARKS

If no records may be found, please do a payroll search. Thank you.

Section II—FOR USE BY RECORDS CENTER

8.

☐ a. Folder enclosed.

☐ b. Folder was sent to your agency on

☐ c. Folder forwarded in place of information requested. Retain if person is rehired.

☐ d. Folder not received. Suggest you contact last employing office.

☐ e. Folder not located. Suggest further search of your agency. If still unlocated, verify correctness of name, and furnish date forwarded and several names of other folders in same shipment.

☐ f. Folder believed in custody of following agency. Original of your request sent to that agency for action.

Date:

Initials:

Section III—TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTING AGENCY

← *Enter complete address to which folder or reply is to be mailed. Include ZIP Code.*

127-107

14-00000

18 March 1977

Thomas Keenan (LA)

Dear Tom,

Please accept my appreciation for an assignment well done as a member of the FY 1977 GS-13 Evaluation Board.

Your full-time service with the Board represents a major contribution to the Directorate's program of personnel assessment and management. Your recommendations for promotion, career development, and other matters have been very helpful.

I believe you will find on return to your regular duties that this time spent with the Board has broadened and sharpened your own focus on the personnel aspects of Agency management. I think it will make you appreciate more than ever our need for carefully and candidly written appraisals of employees.

Sincerely,

William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF CREDITABLE SERVICE
[FOR LEAVE PURPOSES]

☐ VOUCHERED
☐ UNVOUCHERED

NAME (Last, First, Middle): Keoran, Thomas J.
SERIAL NO.: 026090
OFFICE (and Division): DDO/LA

☐ ORIGINAL
XX CORRECTION

THIS DATE: October 25, 1977
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (Mo. - Da. - Yr.): January 19, 1954
SIGNATURE (Office of Personnel): /s/ [illegible]
Kont M. Cargile

FORM 11-73 171 [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

E2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622

14-00000

x18/77.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 February 1977

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Keenan, Thomas J.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and change of NSCA

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 | DAY 08 | YEAR 77

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | X CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 7135 4525 | 0002

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/LA Division
Operations Staff

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer (15)

12. POSITION NUMBER: CNSS

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: ~~D~~B DYB

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 37167.

18. REMARKS L

From: DDO/LA/MCA #3 c's per Dian/LA 2.17.77

~~Limited Duration~~
~~already filled~~ } incl: Dan Winters

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: John T. Halpin, C/LA/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 8 Feb 77

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 2/15/77

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51665 | ALPHABETIC LA

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. MOOTFS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 DA. 29 YR. 30

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OASDI 3—FICA 4—NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. | CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—REG. 2—REG/OPT. 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 2.16.77

46. OP APPROVAL: 28 FEB 77

DATE APPROVED: 2.28.77

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
5-72

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

. C-NO money
AB 5/4/85 -

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

ØCF

DATE PREPARED: 22 June 1976

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 026090

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Keenan, Thomas J.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Delegation of NSCA

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 | DAY 21 | YEAR 76

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: V to V | V to C | C to V | X C to C

7 CAN AND NSCA: 135 4528 0001

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/LA Division, Mexico/Central America Branch

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: ~~O[illegible]~~ OPS Officer, Ch (15)

12 POSITION NUMBER: CP25

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQB

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 34,441

18 REMARKS:

DDO Memo attached

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: H.L. Berthold, C/LA/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 22 Jun 76

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: A. B[illegible] NM/CS

DATE SIGNED: 6/25/76

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51300 | ALPHABETIC LA

22 STATION CODE: 75013

24 CODES: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: 06 25 56

EOD DATA

43 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

29 JUN 1976

44 [illegible] APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 29 Jun [illegible]

1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

[illegible] 76-1842

19 MAR 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. Thomas J. Keenan as Chief, Mexico and Central America Branch

1. The appointment of Mr. Thomas J. Keenan as Chief of our Mexico and Central America Branch, a GS-15 position, effective in June 1976 is recommended. Mr. Keenan would replace Mr. Jack F. Mathews who is presently Chief, Mexico Branch.

2. Mr. Keenan has been an employee of the Agency since May 1957, and is currently attending the Army War College. His biographic profile and two most recent fitness reports are attached.

R. S. Sampson
Richard S. Sampson
Chief
Latin America Division

Attachments
  Biographic Profile
  Fitness Reports
  Photograph

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is ( )APPROVED

David H. Blee
Acting
Deputy Director for Operations

22 March 1976
Date

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055762

14-00000

CH 1-3-75 D - NO STATE (S)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

DATE PREPARED: 30 December 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Keenan, Thomas J. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment - Change of Functional Category

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 02 YEAR 75

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 5135 0984 C001

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/LA Division
Foreign Field
Kingston, Jamaica Station

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Kingston, Jamaica

G 59

11. POSITION TITLE: Attache Political Officer
Chief of Station (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0660

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQB

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05

16. GRADE AND STEP:
04 1
15 2

17. SALARY OR RATE:
21,816. ✓
$ 30,812. ✓

18. REMARKS:
*Kingston, Jamaica

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: H. L. Bernhold, C/LA/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 30 Dec 74

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 12/31/74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51315 ALPHABETIC LA
22. STATION CODE: 37043
23. INTEGREE CODE: 5
24. CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. [illegible] DA. 29 YR. 50
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 9-1
30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39. FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible]
46. C/P APPROVAL: [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 3 Jan 75

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 22 May 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Keenan, Thomas J[illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 26 YEAR 74

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 4135-0984 0001

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/WH Division
Foreign Field
Branch 7- Kingston, Jamaica Station

5G
6

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Kingston, Jamaica

11. POSITION TITLE: attache Political Affairs
Chief of Station (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0660

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 1
15 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: 20677
29,205

18. REMARKS

Home Base: WH

From: GS - 14/4

PRA in accordance with HR 20-17c (1) (d)
NTE two years Kingston Jamaica

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: H. L. Berthold, C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 22 May 74

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul B Breitmeier
DATE SIGNED: 22 MAY 1974

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. OCCUP. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	51875	WH	37043	5	3	06 29 30	05 26 74	05 26 74

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
05 25 76	2Y								

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	WAIVED / REG / REG/OPT / INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5-23-74 [illegible]

46. O.P. APPROVAL: R H Trina

DATE APPROVED: 24 May 74

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 0-0132

E2 IMPDET

SECRET
EYES ONLY

13 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15
Thomas J. Keenan

1. WH Division recommends that Mr. Thomas J. Keenan be promoted to GS-15.

2. Mr. Keenan has been serving as COS, Kingston since October 1973. He was selected for this important position as a result of the high level of performance turned in by him in his previous field tour as Deputy Chief of Station, Lima. In Kingston he has inherited a Station in which, because of circumstances beyond control of Agency personnel, the incumbent faces enormous operational and circumstantial difficulties. The Ambassador was declared persona-non-grata last summer and concomitantly both the attitude of the local security services with which we conduct liaison and the attitude of Jamaican personalities of import has become increasingly hostile. Mr. Keenan thus faces a great challenge in rebuilding operational activities practically from scratch. In spite of the short time in which he has been in place he is off to a promising start and has already demonstrated the qualities of leadership and imagination which we expected of him. He has shown soundness in directing his two subordinate officers and in counseling them on how to achieve desired objectives in specific operational situations. He has likewise maintained excellent relations with the acting principal officer who in turn has shown himself to be a strong supporter of the Station's efforts.

3. It is noteworthy that Mr. Keenan has been able to maintain the Station's morale at an acceptable level in the face of the extremely difficult law and order situation in Kingston where personnel must live in constant daily fear for the well-being of their dependents.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET

EYES ONLY

6. This Division believes that the performance of Mr. Keenan in this initial period of his first experience as Chief of Station amply justifies the confidence and trust placed in him when he was chosen to occupy that position.

David A. Phillips
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

EYES ONLY

d

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 31 July 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) KEENAN, THOMAS JOHN

G
59

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 09 DAY 15 YEAR 73		5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NOCA 4135 0984 000		8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 7-KINGSTON, JAMAICA STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION KINGSTON, JAMAICA		
11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF STATION (14)	12. POSITION NUMBER [redacted] 0660		13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 ~~3~~ 4	17. SALARY OR RATE $ ~~24628~~ 26,671

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDO/WH/BR-3/DCOS, PERU STATION

HOME BASE: WH

* Salary Blunt

1 - Security
1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL H.L. BERTHOLD, C/WH/PERS	DATE SIGNED 24 Oct 73	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 10-30-73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	5155	WH	57043		3	06 189 130		

G
53

EOD DATA

DATE APPROVED
ACB 10-31-73

SECRET

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
, Thomas J.

2. DATE OF BIRTH
29 June 1930

3. GRADE
GS-14

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment)
WH/ Lima

5. PRESENT POSITION

6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION
6815

7. PROPOSED STATION
WH/ Kingston, Jamaica

8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade)
COS 0660 GS 14

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION
State- Integree

10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE
1 Sept 1973

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
Seven

12. COMMENTS

Paul

13. DATE OF REQUEST
26 July 1973

14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
J. Torres

15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING
3D5317

16. EXTENSION
6815

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

26 OCT 1973

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS

Chairman, Overseas Candidate Review Panel

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-68 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Executive Registry
73-4252

73-4177

26 JUL 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. Thomas J. Keenan as Chief of Station, Kingston, Jamaica

1. The appointment of Mr. Thomas J. Keenan, GS-14, as Chief of Station, Kingston, Jamaica, a GS-14 position, effective on or about 1 September 1973, is recommended.

2. Mr. Keenan has been an employee of the Agency since May 1957, and is presently assigned as Deputy Chief of Station, Lima, Peru, a GS-15 position. He has also served overseas in Mexico City and Bogota. A biographic profile, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, and the two most recent fitness reports are attached. There is no foreign language requirement for assignment to Kingston.

James E. Flannery
for
David A. Phillips
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachments
Biographic Profile (Parts 1 & 2)
Fitness Reports
Photograph

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. Thomas J. Keenan as Chief of Station, Kingston, Jamaica

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is (✓)APPROVED ()DISAPPROVED

William E Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

31 July 1973
Date

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is ()APPROVED ()DISAPPROVED:

Vernon A Walters
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

3 Aug 1973
Date

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Keenan, Thomas J.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM LUDLUM

SUBJECT: COURTESIES EXTENDED BY CIA PERSONNEL DURING MY RECENT TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA

I want to thank you most sincerely for the courtesies extended by your Station Chiefs and other personnel during my recent visit to Latin America.

Without exception, your people were most gracious and helpful.

They were also forthright with respect to both their activities and their problems in dealing with the narcotics target.

It was quite apparent that you and Ted Shackley have succeeded in conveying to the field the message about what the Agency is supposed to be doing in the drug field.

If the appropriate occasion should arise, I would appreciate your conveying my appreciation to Messrs. Horton, Kiyonaga, Reife, Keenan, Thayer, Dickens and Millian.

Walter C. Minnick

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: ~~XX~~ 4 Nov 71

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS J.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT (CORRECTION)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 30 YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2135 1084
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
GS
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3 - LIMA, PERU STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: LIMA, PERU

11. POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE POLITICAL OFFICER
OPS OFFICER/DCOS

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0135
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		04 1	17761
GS	0136.01	14 2	$ 21509

18. REMARKS

HB WH

This action to correct Item 11 to Read Ops Officer/DCOS

~~1-Payroll~~
~~2-Security~~

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
for Henry L. Berthold	5 Nov 71	Gregory W. Amick	11 Nov 71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
58	10	5176	[illegible]	[illegible]	S	3	06 29 30		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CS 2—OBCH 3—FICA 4—NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
				31	09 30 71			

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE: 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV/TEMP, CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG. 2—REG/OPT. 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. OP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
11-12-71		11/12/71

FORM 8-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 October 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS J. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 30 YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2135 1084
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3 - LIMA, PERU STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: LIMA, PERU
11. POSITION TITLE: ATTACHE, POLITICAL OFFICER
OPS OFFICER (14)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0135
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 04 1
14 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 17,761
$21,509

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/WH/FF/Bogota, Colombia Station *HB WH

Approved 259a attached *Bogota, Colombia

Vice Charles Dickens

Remarks regarding language requirements on 259a

2 Security 1 Payroll Ops Officer occupying an Ops. Officer DCOS position

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold
DATE SIGNED: 13 Oct 71
19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 15 Oct 71

6
53

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODES NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. NOOTES CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
37	10	051760	WH	57135	S	3	06	29	30						

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OASI 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—REG. 2—REG/OPT. 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Jud 10-15-71
46. O P APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 10/15/71

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

P

14-00000

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) 395-26-2991 Keenan, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Jun 30	3. GRADE GS-14
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/WH/Bogota State	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Officer	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 7431
7. PROPOSED STATION Lima, Peru	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Ops Off DCOS/0135/GS-14	

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE Oct 71	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY seven (7)

12. COMMENTS

Vice: Charles Dickens

Physical will be taken in the field and results forwardod to Hqs.

Mr. Keenan's tested Spanish language proficiency of Intermediate Reading and Elementary Speaking meets the general language requirements of the Station.

Gregory W. [illegible]
C/SPS/SCIS [illegible] '71

13. DATE OF REQUEST 19 Mar 71	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Joan Wright Joan Wright	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3D 5309 Hqs	16. EXTENSION 7431

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

17 MAY [illegible]

QUALIFIED FOR [illegible] OVERSEAS

Fred E. [illegible]

Chairman

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 January 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS J.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 07 YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135 0834
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
11. POSITION TITLE: POL OFF ATTACHE / OPS OFFICER (14)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1792
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 04 1 / 14 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 17,761 / $ 20,815
18. REMARKS:

* Bogota (Colombia)

FROM: #0327

Language requirements for Mr. K have been met.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold
DATE SIGNED: 25 Jan 71
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 1-27-71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 31
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51710 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 15005
23. INTEGREE CODE: 5
24. HOURS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 DA. 29 YR. 30
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. DTE EXPIRES: MO. XX DA. XX YR. XX
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: CSC / OPEN / FICA / NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11 [illegible] 71
46. O.P. APPROVAL: C. B
DATE APPROVED: 1-28-71

FORM 1152 3-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

1-0963

23 FEB 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. Thomas J. Keenan, GS-14, as Deputy Chief of Station, Lima, Peru

1. The appointment of Mr. Thomas J. Keenan, GS-14, as Deputy Chief of Station, Lima, Peru, effective on or about 15 October 1971, is recommended. Mr. Keenan would replace Mr. Charles B. Dickens.

2. Mr. Keenan has been an employee of the Agency since May 1957. He is currently assigned as an operations officer in Bogota. Mr. Keenan has also served a tour in Mexico City. He has an excellent command of the Spanish language.

3. A biographic profile, including information concerning his Agency experience and training, is attached.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

1 Attachment
Biographic Profile (Parts 1 & 2)

The recommendation in paragraph is APPROVED:

Deputy Director for Plans

26 Feb 71
Date

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 July 1970

G
53

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Keenan, Thomas J.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 26 YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-0834

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

11. POSITION TITLE:
Pol Off Attaché
OPS OFFICER (13)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0327

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP:
04 1
14 1

17. SALARY OR RATE:
$16,760
$ 19,643

18. REMARKS:

HB WH

FROM: GS-13 step 4 $18,437

* FRA in accordance with HR20-17e(1)a
Bogota, Colombia

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD C/WH/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 7/23/70

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 7-24

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROOTES CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	1A	51700	WH	15665	S	3	06 29 30	07 26 70	07 26 70

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	30. CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32. MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
07 25 72	81	1—CSC 2—CIARDS 3—FICA 4—NONE							

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY	CODE	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVED 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 0724-70 JBR

46. O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 24 Jul 70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T
(when filled in)

17 JUL 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Control Division

FROM : Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT : **Custody of Honor Award presented to Mr. Thomas J. Keenan**

Because of security restrictions, the Honor and Merit Awards Board is acting as custodian of the subject's Honor Award and related papers listed below: **Certificate of Merit**

When security restrictions no longer prevail, the Awardee may obtain his award by calling the Executive Secretary.

Ellin B. Glenn
ELLIN B. GLENN

Distribution:
Original - Subject's OP File
1 - C/Support Staff/WH
1 - HMAB Case File
1 - HMAB Custody File

S-E-C-R-E-T
(when filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-26	
026090	KeeNAN	THomas	J

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 90, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 2 - CORRECTION 3 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
23-24	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
06	28	67					1			ColomBiA	150

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	4 - TDY (Basic) 5 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☑	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: IN 02253

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 30 June 1967

REMARKS

PREPARED BY				
☐	OCO	☑	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	C S L DIVISION, CTSO	DATE		SIGNATURE
☑	C S P DIVISION	9/20/67		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 JUNE 67

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS J.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION (CORRECTION)

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MO. 05 DAY 21 YEAR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | XX CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7135-0834

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

11. POSITION TITLE:
POLITICAL OFFICER ATTACHER
OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0327

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP:
06 6
13 1

17. SALARY OR RATE:
10363
$ ~~11885~~ 12873

18. REMARKS:

FROM: SAME. ADDITION OF INTEGRATED INFO.

2 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert D. Cashman C/WH/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 14 June

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 14 June 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:
20. EMPLOY. CODE:
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. ROUTES CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 DA. 29 YR. 30
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION OR CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5-PT 2—10-PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 3—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 06-16-67 N
46. C/P APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 06-16-67

B

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

C Morey

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 May 67

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) KEENAN, THOMAS J.	MJF
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 05 DAY 21 YEAR 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 7135 0834	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3 BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION BOGOTA, COLOMBIA	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER (13)	12. POSITION NUMBER 0327	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	
16. GRADE AND STEP 13 1	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 12,873	

G
13

18. REMARKS

FROM: GS-12 Step 3 at $11,685 to GS-13 Step 1 at $12,873.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Robert D. Cashman Robert D. Cashman C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 11 May	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. EMPLOY CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51700	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 15005	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOKUPS CODE 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 06 29 30	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR. 05 21 67	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR. 05 21 67
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.	CODE	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0-WAIVED 1-YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 05-16-67	46. O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 5/16/67

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of Mr. Thomas J. Keenan

Effective May 3, 1967

The purpose of this memorandum is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are integrated and to set forth certain rights and obligations which are incident to your status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS-12 & $11,685 , per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of MAY 3, 1967. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected at FSR-6 and salary of $11,358 per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of two years from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and (except as provided in paragraph three (3) above) allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they are less than or equal to the salary and allowance payments due on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due, the difference will be credited to your payroll account with this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due, the overage will be remitted to this organization at designated intervals, presently ______________________. Computations hereunder will be made on the basis of the aggregate gross due and received provided, however, that in computing remittances for overage Federal and, if applicable, District of Columbia income taxes withheld by your cover facility against the overage may be deducted. To assure timely accuracy in your payroll account with this organization you are expected to immediately report cover facility payroll changes.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integration into your cover facility, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and at your personal expense you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half per cent) on the basis of your cover salary or your salary from this organization, whichever is the greater.

b. If you receive taxable income from both your cover facility and this organization, necessary adjustments for Federal, and if applicable, District of Columbia income tax purposes will be made in conformance with instructions received from this organization.

c. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with the rules and regulations of this organization.

d. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with your cover facility of any status with your cover based on your services performed with that organization at the request of this organization.

14-00000

5. All annual and sick leave which is accrued to your credit at the time of integration will be transferred to your cover facility. While integrated you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon completion of your integration your accrued annual and sick leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization including any income taxes withheld by your cover facility.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

D NO

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 MAY 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 020090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS J.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION - DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH MAY DAY 03 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7135 0834
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
11. POSITION TITLE: POLITICAL OFFICER, ATTACHE
~~OPERATIONS~~ DEP OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0327
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 06 6 / 12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 10,363 / $11,685
18. REMARKS:

All SICK AND All HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED

DAU DOB 6 OCT 57 DAU DOB 11 SEP 62
DAU DOB 16 SEP 58 DAU DOB 7 MAY 63
SON DOB 19 MAY 60
DAU DOB 19 AUG 61

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: for Ullery
DANISH COV ... OFFICER, X7013

DATE SIGNED:

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTIS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE
55	10	51700	WH	15005		3	06 25 30	

EOD DATA

43 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: CS-MMAN

44 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 5/1/67

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Keenan, Thomas John

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 June 1930

3. GRADE: GS-12

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment): DDP/WH/CA

5. PRESENT POSITION: Ops Officer

6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION: 6815

7. PROPOSED STATION: Bogota, Colombia

8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade): Ops Officer/0327/GS-13

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION: State

10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE: May 1967

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: Seven (7)

12. COMMENTS: Form 89 is attached.

J. Albert Haeser

13. DATE OF REQUEST: 13 February 67

14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Kenneth L. Wambold

15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING: 3 D 5309

16. EXTENSION: 6815

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

[illegible]

Chairman, [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 2590 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

141

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 APRIL 67

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) KEENAN, THOMAS J.	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED 04-23-67 MONTH ~~05~~ DAY ~~07~~ YEAR ~~67~~	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / V TO CF XX / CF TO V ☐ / CF TO CF ☐	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 7135-0834	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3 BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION BOGOTA, COLOMBIA	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0327	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 3
		17. SALARY OR RATE $ 11,685

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF/SECTION A/WASH.D.C./OPS OFFICER/
0641/7235-0620

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Edward E. Crowley Robert D. Cashman C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 25 April	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 26 Apr 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VET CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
20	10	5763	WH	[illegible]		3	06 29 30		

28. DIE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVED 1-REG. HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. OP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
E42 MAN		

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

EYES ONLY
SECRET

[illegible]
12 MAY 1967

1 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Panel, Section A

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion:
Thomas J. Keenan

1. The promotion of Mr. Thomas J. Keenan to GS-13 is strongly recommended. Mr. Keenan embodies the principal qualities of the all-around operations officer. He is intelligent, perceptive and analytical. He quickly grasps the essentials of a problem. He is aggressive, very industrious, and always works effectively. His field experience consists of two tours of duty in Mexico where he began as a junior case officer and developed rapidly to the point where he was handling an extremely heavy load of important and complex cases. He operated against Soviet Bloc and related targets, ran support projects, surveillance teams, and technical operations. The experience he gained was broad in nature. Also involved was the supervision of up to 30 people, including other officers and indigenous personnel and agents. Mr. Keenan himself responds extremely well to enlightened supervision and is quick to profit from the guidance of his supervisors.

2. For the past two years Mr. Keenan has worked on the FI Staff of the WH Division providing supervision and guidance for FI/CI activities of the Division. He has been most effective in this role which requires dealing on a day-to-day basis with officers, many of whom are senior to him.

3. He participated as the Number 2 man on a Headquarters Task Force supporting the President's visit to Mexico last year. His work was highly effective. Mr. Keenan demonstrated a thorough knowledge of Headquarters' procedures and an ability to get things done. Mr. Keenan will shortly be assigned as

EYES ONLY
SECRET

Operations Officer to Bogota, Colombia where there are targets of an increasingly serious nature requiring highly professional operational approaches.

4. Based on his experience and proven ability demonstrated by sound accomplishments as a case officer and as a Headquarters staff assistant, Mr. Keenan is regarded as having superior potential. It is recommended that he be promoted to GS-13.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

G 27

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 August 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS J.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 | DAY 11 | YEAR 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7235-0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12
17. SALARY OR RATE: $
18. REMARKS:

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED OF YOUR RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS ACTION TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-50. SUCH APPEAL MUST BE RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACTION.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED | 18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. EMPLOY CODE | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. HQCOTES CODE | 25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) | 26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) CODE 2 | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CODE) | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0—WAIVED, 1—REG; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES, 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES, 2—NO; CODE 05; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

MC 50 29

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 05-16-66 N

46. O.P. APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 22 Aug 66

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 2-64 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

TO : Thomas Keenan

SUBJECT: TDY in the Dominican Republic

Most of you who went down to the Dominican Republic departed with so much speed and so little ceremony that there was no time to explain the importance and urgency of your assignments. Now that you have served there during the crisis, the importance of the task needs no embellishment from us, but you should know that the contribution of the augmented Station was decisive in shaping the policies and actions of the government and in avoiding several major mistakes. For weeks after the April revolution, our Station reporting was literally the only source of information that the United States had on the role of Communism among the rebel forces and on conditions outside the capital.

Many fine things were done in the Station and in the hinterland by all of you. Manning the check-points under fire, flying to remote and hostile villages, moving tons of supplies through the gauntlet of the communications line, toiling over midnight reports, and keeping open our country's only commo link -- all these things were commonplace. The dedication, discipline, and routine of our personnel placed them in a class apart.

To the sense of pride and accomplishment you must already feel, I want to add the gratitude and admiration of the DDP and of the Agency.

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 DECEMBER 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS J.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSS STATUS (CORRECTION) COB
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 10 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5135-0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0489
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12. 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $10,250
18. REMARKS: CHANGE EFFECTIVE DATE TO READ: 10 OCTOBER 1964.

Mexico City, Mexico

Recorded by CSPD
CC

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 12/3/64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 8 Dec 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: [illegible]
20. EMPLOY. CODE:
21. OFFICE CODES: NUMERIC [illegible] ALPHABETIC [illegible]
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. ROUTES CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 06 24 30
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. VCD EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSR 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RSVR. PROV. TEMP.; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 12/ /64
46. O P APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 8 Dec 64

USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 OCTOBER 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS J.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 22 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5235-0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
37 DDP WH
PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF
G SECTION A
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0641
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (22)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 10,250
18. REMARKS:
FROM: DDP/WH/3/0489/MEXICO CITY Trans 470

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 10/30/64
Oez 11/4/64

Recorded By
CSPD
SNP

1-SECURITY

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: R. D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 11/4/64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: A. Busby
DATE SIGNED: 11-6-64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51075 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 2013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. ROUTES CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 DA. 29 YR. 30
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR./RESV. PROV./TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T. Kearns 11/09/64
46. O P APPROVAL: A. Busby
DATE APPROVED: 11-6-64

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 OCTOBER 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS J.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 25 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO O ☐ O TO V ☒ O TO O
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5135-0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
47 DDP WH
BRANCH 3
6 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0489
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $10,250
18. REMARKS:

Recorded By
CSPD
SmB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 10/9/64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: L. S. Corbit
DATE SIGNED: 22 Oct 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
32	10	51700	WH	45275		3	06 29 30	

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Kearney 10/23/64
46. O P APPROVAL: L. S. Corbit
DATE APPROVED: 22 Oct 64

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 SEPTEMBER 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER	026090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	KEENAN, THOMAS J.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	CONVERSION FROM FSS STATUS COB
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	10 / 12 / 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	5135-0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	47 DDP WH BRANCH 3 G MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0489
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE	$9,210

18. REMARKS

FROM: FSS-06.7/$8,105/POL ASST

Mr. Keenan has submitted his resignation to the Department of State to be effective at close of business 12 October 1964

Recorded By
CSPD
JMB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	for ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED	25 Sept 64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	L. Cribbet
DATE SIGNED	28 Sep 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROUTES CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
56	11	51700	WXL	45075		3	06 29 30		

28. MIL EXPIRES — 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) CODE — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — EOD DATA — 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. — 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE — 37. LONG. COMP. DATE — 38. CAREER CATEGORY — 39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES) HEALTH INS. CODE — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) — 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) — 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	T. Keaney 09/29/64
46. O P APPROVAL	L. J. Cribbet
DATE APPROVED	28 Sep 64

FORM 6-62 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

[illegible]

30 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Panel (Section B)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-12
Mr. Thomas J. Keenan

1. It is recommended that Thomas J. Keenan be promoted to GS-12.

2. Mr. Keenan is thirty-four years old and has been with the Agency since 1957. While in grade as GS-11 only for the past year or so, he has been performing at a level even higher than the proposed GS-12 for more than three years, supervising the activities of up to twenty-five agents including a GS-13 contract agent.

3. The following quotation from the latest annual fitness report represents the best justification for this request:

> "Subject's duties and responsibilities involve management and supervision of some of this Station's most successful and most sensitive operations. The fact that Subject has responsibilities comparable to any officer up to four grades higher than his speaks for the trust COS has in him and for his continued exceptionally proficient performance."

R. W. Herbert
Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Approved
Oct [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) Keenan, Thomas John	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* Daughter	CLAIM NUMBER 65-067

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on ____7 May 1964 - Premature birth

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 14 AUG 1964	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Dependent Daughter -

Thomas J. Keenan

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

This is to announce the premature birth of Carol Jane on 7 May 1964. Mother and daughter are doing well.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-4581

DATE
19 May 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 APRIL 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]26090

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, Thomas J.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH DAY YEAR): 4 14 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF X

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135 5700 1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE:
POL ASST
OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]-489

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSS
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP:
~~D7~~ 7 0
11 8 2

17. SALARY OR RATE:
$ ~~8,000~~ 6560
~~8,045~~ 8,310

18. REMARKS:

FROM: SAME

Recorded by
CSPD
SM

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert D. Cashman
ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 4/8/63

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul P. Wilson

DATE SIGNED: 9 Ap 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC): 64700 / WH
22. STATION CODE: 45015
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 06 29 30
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. ... EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LTD. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. ... SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T. Keeney 4/14/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Paul P. Wilson

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM ...

SECRET

GROUP 1

141

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 October 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 626090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS J.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 | DAY 29 | YEAR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2135-5700-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

8

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: POL ASST
OPS OFFICER D
12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]-489
12a. PCR CONTROL NO.:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSS
GS 12
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 -
10 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $6,260.
$7,160.
18. REMARKS: FROM: SAME

Coordinated by:
CSPD.
VS

19a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: D O Bowers
P. O. BOWERS C/WH/PERSONNEL

19b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Kelly

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

3 06 29 30

EOD DATA

41. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Kearns 11/02/61

42. C.P. APPROVAL: Kelly

SECRET

SECRET

29 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section C)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-10
Mr. Thomas J. Keenan

1. Thomas J. Keenan entered on duty with CIA on 20 May 1957 as a Junior Officer Trainee. He was assigned to WH Division for a one year tour effective 6 January 1958 and was changed to staff employee on 25 January 1959. He served ably as operations officer on the Nicaraguan and Costa Rican desk. Since 3 February 1960 he has been an Operations Officer at the Mexico City Station.

2. Keenan is equipped intellectually and emotionally to do fine work, and his potential for a good career is high. He is alert and conscientious. He takes on new tasks readily and accomplishes his objectives with thoroughness and dispatch. He is enthusiastic and imaginative. He gets on well with his co-workers and is highly motivated. Keenan always makes a good impression and works diligently. He is a very pleasant individual, interested and cooperative, and gives promise of being a sound intelligence officer.

3. The above recommendation has been submitted previously under the dates of 12 August 1959, 5 January 1960 and 30 June 1960. An efficiency report from the Mexico City Station dated 12 December 1960 states that Mr. Keenan is an unusually effective case officer and is making an outstanding contribution to CIA operations in that area. This report further indicates that Keenan has been assigned duties which would normally be performed by a much senior officer and has carried them out in a most commendable manner.

4. On the basis of his qualifications and past performance, it is recommended that Mr. Keenan be promoted to Grade GS-10.

R. W. Herbert
J. C. KING for
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE CAREER STAFF

To the Chief, KUBARK

Sir:

I submit herewith my application for membership in the Career Staff defined below:

> "The Career Staff is a group of carefully selected and trained individuals who accept an obligation to devote themselves to the needs of the Organization, and who intend to make a career with the Organization."

In accordance with this definition, I desire to devote myself to the faithful performance of duty in the Organization, and I accept the obligations and conditions of that service which are determined to be essential to the furtherance of its mission.

I am aware of the many restrictions necessarily placed upon me by virtue of the security requirements inherent in my employment by the Organization. I am also aware that as a member of the Career Staff, it will be my obligation to serve anywhere and at any time and for any kind of duty as determined by the needs of the Organization and I have been assured that in order to carry out this policy, full consideration will be given to my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances. By virtue of this application for membership and upon my acceptance in the Career Staff, I am assured that, with continuing satisfactory work performance and conduct on my part, just and equitable attention will be accorded my personal progress during my tenure in the Career Staff. I am also assured that, on my satisfactory completion of any assignments, I will be offered reassignments which are compatible insofar as possible with my abilities and career interests, and that I shall be entitled to the benefits now available or to be made available in the future to members of the Career Staff of the Organization.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CAREER STAFF
APPROVED, TO TAKE EFFECT 2 0 [illegible]

FOR THE CHIEF, KUBARK:
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
KUBARK SELECTION BOARD

Daniel C. [illegible]

Thomas J. Keenan SD;D 5-46
(Signature)

Eligibility Date: 20 May 1960

(Date)

16 Jun 60

SECRET

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

55293

☒ FS ☐ DPTL

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s) and surname) Mr. Thomas J. Keenan	2. DATE OF BIRTH 6-29-30	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. FSA-4	4. DATE 12-11-59

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology) FSS Appointment - Regular	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 1/6/60	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 724 79th as amended

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE Diplomatic or Consular Title	Political Assistant
	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	FSS-10 $5540
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS Post	Mexico, D.F. (1)-K
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ Regular ☐ Reserve ☐ Non-FS	12. CS CATEGORY FS Category	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☒ Regular ☐ Reserve ☐ Non-FS

13. VETERANS PREFERENCE				14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION				
NONE	5-PT	10-POINT Disab.	Other	NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.	
	X			X				1-1012-333

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM TO 9A-4011	17. RETIREMENT LEG. ☒ CSRA 030 ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ NONE	18. DATE OF LOYALTY OATH / APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (Accessions Only) 1/6/60	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Virginia

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department.

Marital Status - Married - Two.

Appointed at FSS-10, $5540, in accordance with I FSM IV 233. Previous Federal Government salary $6135, GS-9, earned with Department of Army.

SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY NOTIFIED

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

EMPLOYEE COPY

SECRET

30 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section C)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS -10
Mr. Thomas J. Keenan

1. Thomas J. Keenan entered on duty with CIA on 20 May 1957 as a Junior Officer Trainee. He was assigned to WH Division for a one year tour effective 6 January 1958 and was changed to staff employee on 25 January 1959. He served ably as Operations Officer on the Nicaragua and Costa Rica Desk. Since 3 February 1960 he has been an Operations Officer at the Mexico City Station.

2. Keenan is equipped intellectually and emotionally to do fine work, and his potential for a good career is high. He is alert and conscientious. He takes on new tasks readily and accomplishes his objectives with thoroughness and dispatch. He is enthusiastic and imaginative. He gets on well with his co-workers and is highly motivated. Keenan always makes a good impression and works diligently. He is a very pleasant individual, interested and cooperative, and gives promise of being a sound intelligence officer.

3. The above recommendation has been submitted previously under the dates 12 August 1959 and 5 January 1960. The memorandum of 5 January 1960 added that since 12 August 1959 Mr. Keenan's performance continued to be of a high caliber. Although Subject's personnel file contains no evaluation yet of his work at the Mexico City Station, the Headquarters Section Chief, who visited the Station in April 1960 observed that Subject was doing excellent work.

4. On the basis of his qualifications and past performance, it is recommended that Mr. Keenan be promoted to grade GS-10.

for

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

5 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section C)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-10
Mr. Thomas J. Keenan

1. Thomas J. Keenan entered on duty with CIA on 20 May 1957 as a Junior Officer Trainee. He was assigned to WH Division for a one year tour effective 6 January 1958 and was changed to staff employee on 25 January 1959. He has recently been assigned as Operations Officer on the Nicaragua and Costa Rica Desk.

2. Keenan is equipped intellectually and emotionally to do fine work, and his potential for a good career is high. He is alert and conscientious. He takes on new tasks readily and accomplishes his objectives with thoroughness and dispatch. He is enthusiastic and imaginative. He gets on well with his co-workers and is highly motivated. Keenan always makes a good impression and works diligently. He is a very pleasant individual, interested and cooperative, and gives promise of being a sound intelligence officer.

3. The above recommendation was previously submitted under date of 12 August 1959. Since that date Mr. Keenan's performance has continued to be of a high caliber. He is now undergoing additional training for his assignment to the Mexico City Station in February 1960.

4. On the basis of his qualifications and past performance, it is recommended that Mr. Keenan be promoted to grade GS-10.

for R. C. Gomez
J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

V to V	V to UV	REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED Mo Da Yr
UV to V	UV to UV		

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo Da Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
	K[illegible], Thomas J.	6 20 30	1	M	

7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Code LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

8

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/WH Branch III Mexico City Mexico Station		Mexico City, Mexico	

16. Dept.-Field Dept.-Uslid-Fran.-X Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	Operations Officer	420	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number
9-2	$ 6135	D	6 15 58	6 12 60	0135-5700-3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
Integration Department of State		1 6 60			

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

33. Dept.-Field Dept.-Uslid-Fran.-X Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
5	Pol. Assistant		FSS	

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number
10-4	$ 5540				

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): OPSER/CCD/OSL

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): M. Rorey, x810

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): Marguerite D. Rorey

Date Approved:

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	ASH	1-12-60	E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks:

All sick and All annual leave to be transferred to Department of State.

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 1152a USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 526090	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) KEENAN THOMAS J	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 06 Da. 29 Yr. 30	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt.-1, 10 Pt.-2) Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CS EOD Mo. 05 Da. 20 Yr. 57	7. SCD Mo. 01 Da. 29 Yr. 53	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. 05 Da. 20 Yr. 57
13. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT DDP WH	Code 4688	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept.-Field (Dept. USfld Frgn) Code 1	17. Position Title OPS OFF	18. Position No. 090659	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.01	21. Grade & Step 09 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6135	23. SD D
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 15 Yr. 58	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 12 Yr. 60	26. Appropriation Number 0320 1998	

D.C.

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 67	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. 12 27 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01
30. Separation Date				

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH III MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	Code 1653	32. Location Of Official Station MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	Station Code 45075
33. Dept.-Field (Dept. USfld Frgn. - X) Code 5	34. Position Title OPS OFFICER	35. Position No. [illegible]-489 D-12	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.01	38. Grade & Step 09 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6135	40. SD D
41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number 0135-5700-3000	

8

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
R. C. BOGERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
John Washinko X8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		12/7/57	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control					
C. Classification		12-7-59	E. Approved By		12-11-59

Remarks

2 copies to Security Office.

12/16/59

12/17/59

—* subject previously [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

12 August 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section C)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion - Thomas J. KEENAN

1. Thomas J. Keenan entered on duty with CIA on 20 May 1957 as a Junior Officer Trainee at GS-7. He was assigned to WH Division for a one year tour effective 6 January 1958 and was changed to staff employee on 25 January 1959. At present he is assigned as Operations Officer on the Nicaragua and Costa Rica Desk.

2. Keenan is equipped intellectually and emotionally to do fine work, and his potential for a good career is high. He is alert and conscientious. He takes on new tasks readily and accomplishes his objectives with thoroughness and dispatch. He is enthusiastic and imaginative. He gets on well with his co-workers and is highly motivated. Keenan always makes a good impression and works diligently. He is a very pleasant individual, interested and cooperative, and gives promise of being a sound intelligence officer.

3. On the basis of his qualifications and past performance, it is recommended that Keenan be promoted to grade GS-10.

R. Gomez
Rudolph E. Gomez
AC/WHD

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

X	V to V		V to UV
	UV to V		UV to UV

DATE PREPARED: Mo 8 Da 20 Yr 59

1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS J.
3. Date Of Birth: Mo 6 Da 29 Yr 30
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt.-1, 10 Pt.-2) Code: 1
5. Sex: N 1
6. CS - EOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code: 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code: /
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. (Yes-1, No-2) Code:

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

3

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP WH
BRANCH III
CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION

Code:
15. Location Of Official Station: WASHINGTON, D. C.
Station Code:
16. Dept.-Field (Dept.-Ukld.-Fran.) Code: 2
17. Position Title: OPS OFF.
18. Position No.: [illegible]70
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0136.01
21. Grade & Step: 9 2
22. Salary Or Rate: $6135
23. SD: D
24. Date Of Grade: Mo 6 Da 15 Yr 58
25. PSI Due: Mo 6 Da 12 Yr 60
26. Appropriation Number: 0235-1000-1000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT T & [illegible]
Code: 05
28. Eff. Date: Mo 09 Da 6 Yr 59
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR
Code: 22
30. Separation Date:

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
DDP WH

Code: 4688
32. Location Of Official Station: WASHINGTON, D. C.
Station Code: 75013
33. Dept.-Field (Dept.-Ukld.-Fran.) Code: 1
34. Position Title:
35. Position No.: 90659
36. Serv.:
37. Occup. Series:
38. Grade & Step:
39. Salary Or Rate: $
40. SD:
41. Date Of Grade: Mo 6 Da 15 Yr 58
42. PSI Due: Mo 6 Da 12 Yr 60
43. Appropriation Number: 1380 0420-1998

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): John Washinko X8242
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):
Date Approved:

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks:
EXTENDED TRAINING. [illegible]

2 copies to Security Office. [illegible]

Continued on reverse side

FORM 4-58 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

[illegible]

KEENAN

REPORT TO SUBSTANTIATE PROMOTION RECOMMENDATION - Date: 5/58

Desk Reporting: WH/MEXICO

JOT's Specific Duties Now: Presently in training

GS Level of the Work to Which He is Assigned: Prior to present training assignment his work assignments on the Mexican desk varied from a GS-3 to a GS-7 level

GS Level of His Performance: GS-7 For How Long: Approximately two months

The Quality of the Work He Performs: During his short period on the Mexican desk Mr. Keenan's performance was excellent.

Attitudes:

(a) Toward His Work: Excellent

(b) Toward his Associates (Does He Get Along Well with People?): Excellent, he gets along extremely weel with his associates.

(c) Toward the Agency (Career): Excellent

Supervisory Ability (if demonstrated): NA

What do You Estimate His Growth Potential To Be? On what he demonstrated in a short period of time Mr Keenan should rapidly developpe into a valuable employee with a high potential.

Plans for Him: Upon completion of his preant training he will be reassigned to WH/Mexico for approximately one year of desk training.

Would You Concur in a Recommendation That He Be Promoted? Yes

JOT Keenan, Thomas

Supervisor

Concur John B. Brady, WH/Mexico

Title

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.: 126090
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 06 Da. 23 Yr. 20
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code: 1
5. Sex: M 1
6. CS EOD: Mo. 05 Da. 20 Yr. 57
7. SCD: Mo. 01 Da. 29 Yr. 53
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code: 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA 403 J
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code:
12. LCD: Mo. 05 Da. 20 Yr. 57
13. Ser. Ltr. (Yes-1, No-2) Code: 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations: DDS OTR JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINEE CORPS
Code: 2810
15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D.C.
Station Code: 75013
16. Dept.-Field (Dept.-USfld.-Frgn.) Code: 2
17. Position Title: JOT
18. Position No.: 0748.16
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0090.01 21
21. Grade & Step: 09 1
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 5985 ~~[illegible]~~
23. SD: ST
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. 06 Da. 15 Yr. 58
25. PSI Due: Mo. 06 Da. 14 Yr. 59
26. Appropriation Number: 8 7507 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT & Chg of Basic Designation
Code: 57
28. Eff. Date: Mo. 1 Da. 25 Yr. 59
29. Type Of Employee: Regular
Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations: DDP WH Branch III Central America Section
Code: 4413
32. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D. C.
Station Code:
33. Dept.-Field (Dept.-X, USfld.-, Frgn.-) Code: 2
34. Position Title: Ops Off PP
35. Position No.: ~~BA~~-70 13
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 0136.31
38. Grade & Step: 9-1
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 5985
40. SD: D
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. Da. Yr.
42. PSI Due: Mo. Da. Yr.
43. Appropriation Number: 9-3500-20-001 3

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): P. C. BOWERS, WH/PERSONNEL OFCR
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): JOHN WASHINKO, X-8242
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		1-7-59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		12 JAN 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		9 JAN 1959

Remarks:

2 copies Security Classified by CS/PD 9 JAN 1959

VICE: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ vacancy

CONCUR: Willet L. Eccles

Willet L. Eccles, Chief/JOTP/TR

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

Processed by CSPD

SECRET

Security Approval ... 1/8 - 59

(4)

1126

14-00000

SECRET

4 June 1958

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): KEENAN, Thomas J.
3. Date Of Birth: Mo 06 Da 29 Yr 30
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS - EOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt (Yes-1, No-2): Code
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority
10. Appt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. (Yes-1, No-2): Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations: DDS/OTR .
Junior Officer Trainee Corps
Code
15. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D.C.
Station Code
16. Dept. - Field (Dept.-Unlid-Fran): Code
17. Position Title: JOT
18. Position No.: U 748.16
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0090.01
21. Grade & Step: 7 2
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 4660
23. SD: ST
24. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr
25. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr
26. Appropriation Number: 8-7507-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: PROMOTION*
Code
28. Eff. Date: Mo 06 Da 15 Yr 58
29. Type Of Employee
Code
30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations: DDS/OTR
Junior Officer Trainee Corps
Code: 5 3 0
32. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D.C.
Station Code
33. Dept. - Field (Dept.-Unlid-Fran): Code
34. Position Title: JOT
35. Position No.: U 748.16
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 0090.01
38. Grade & Step: 9 1
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 5440
40. SD: ST
41. Date Of Grade: Mo 06 Da 15 Yr 58
42. PSI Due: Mo 06 Da 14 Yr 59
43. Appropriation Number: 8-7507-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Willet L. Eccles C/JOTP
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Henry L. Berthold x4331
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks:
*This action was considered and approved by the OTR/CSB on 3 June 1958.

FORM 5-57 1152a

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME (Last) KEENAN	(Middle) JOHN	(First) THOMAS	DATE 15 May 1958
DATE OF BIRTH 24 June 1930	UNIT JOTP/TR	MONTHS IN PRESENT POSITION 12	SERVICE DESIGNATION ST

PRESENT GRADE GS-7	EFFECTIVE DATE 20 May 1957	PRESENT T/O SLOT U 748.16	POSITION TITLE JOT
PROPOSED GRADE GS-9	PROPOSED T/O SLOT U 748.16	POSITION TITLE JOT	

CIA TRAINING

See "Chronological Summary of Experience with CIA and Its Antecedents"

EDUCATION

BS	Marquette University	1953	English and History

EXPERIENCE OTHER THAN WITH CIA AND ITS ANTECEDENTS

1953-1956	Lt(jg)	Commo Officer	U.S. Navy

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF EXPERIENCE WITH CIA AND ITS ANTECEDENTS

20 May 57	EOD	
27 May-21 June 57	IOC	2 Excellents
24-28 June 57	Interim assignment, FBID	
1-26 July 57	IT	3 Excellents
29 July-23 August 57	Interim assignment, WE/Spain	
26 Aug-27 September 57	TSS Training	12 Good, 1 Aver, 1 Sat, 1 Fair, 16 Ex.
30 Sept 57-7 Jan 58	Interim assignment, CI Staff	
8 Jan 58	Temporary attachment to WH/3 for on-the-desk training	
3 Mar 58 - present	OC #6	

CAREER DEVELOPMENT PLAN

RECOMMENDED BY

~~[illegible] Chief/JOTP/TR~~

CONCURRENCES

RECOMMENDATION OF SENIOR STAFF (JOT) OR APPROPRIATE PANEL

DATE OF ACTION

FORM NO. 289 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.
1 NOV 54

SECRET

(4-45)

S E C R E T

15 May 1958

NARRATIVE STATEMENT FOR THE PROMOTION OF THOMAS J. KEENAN

1. After attending IOC and IT, in which he made excellent grades, Keenan was placed on an interim basis with WE/Spain for four weeks. He then entered TS3 Training, where he again did excellent work. He then was placed for three months with the CI/ICD -- he had evinced interest in CE work -- before he was assigned for on-the-desk training with WH/3. On 3 March he entered OC and will return to WH/3 upon the completion of this course. Interim evaluation from OC shows that Keenan has four satisfactory grades. Throughout his training, formal and on-the-desk, Keenan has been commended: "alert with definite potential for CE work - thorough and industrious - on the Mexican desk performance was excellent - gets along extremely well with associates - attitude toward Agency excellent - should rapidly develop into a valuable employee with high potential - a very pleasant young man, interested and cooperative - gives promise of being a sound intelligence officer."

2. There is one other JOT under the supervisor. He is GS-9 and replaced subject, doing the same work, when subject left for OC. Subject's Spanish is not so well developed as that of the GS-9 JOT; otherwise there is little difference in their production.

3. On the CI Staff subject's performance was equal to that of other JOT's under the supervisor. During his time on the desk with WH/3, Keenan's performance was at a level comparable to that of one other JOT of higher grade.

4. Keenan came to the JOTP with a good college record and excellent experience as officer-in-charge of sixty officers and enlisted men in a Navy communications center. His rank was Lt(jg). He has a fair working knowledge of Spanish. To date he has shown high motivation, adaptability, and an intelligent approach to his job.

5. Keenan has had no opportunity to demonstrate supervisory ability.

6. WH concurs in this promotion.

7. It is recommended that Keenan be promoted from GS-7 to GS-9.

Walter L. Eccles/eo
[illegible] L. ECCLES

S E C R E T

C/WH
Attn : C/WH/1

14 January 1958

C/Junior Officer Training Program/TR

Attachment of Junior Officer Trainee THOMAS J. KEENAN

1. As agreed by Mr. Brady of your Division and Mr. O'Gara of the JOT Program, JOT Thomas J. Keenan is attached to WH/1 for a one-year tour effective 6 January 1958. Administrative instructions are attached. At the conclusion of this tour, we will decide mutually whether or not to continue this attachment.

2. The purpose of this on-the-job tour is to train Keenan in Headquarters procedures and the duties of a Headquarters case officer, the ultimate objective being to prepare him for an overseas assignment.

3. It is understood that after a JOT has been attached to the desk for six months as a trainee, the supervisor will provide C/JOTP with a critical evaluation of the subject's performance in those elements listed in paragraph 2.

4. Keenan has attended IOC and ETC. It is understood that he will attend the Operations Course beginning 3 March. The JOTP will consider supporting any additional training necessary for Keenan's anticipated assignment.

5. Please send to the C/JOTP as quickly as convenient an outline of the activities the JOT will pursue as suggested by the appended sample. It is understood that the program for the JOT is flexible and may be altered from time to time to meet your operating needs, after consultation with the JOT Program.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Attachments: 3

WILLET L. ECCLES

MAIL ROOM
JAN 17 1 20 PM '58
OFFICE OF TRAINING

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

FC 19
C 7673

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Thomas J~~ohn~~ Keenan 125090

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 June 1930

3. REQUEST NO.: C-7673

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 8 Feb 57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Excepted Appointment (13)
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: 21 May 57

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J.

FROM—

TO—

8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER: JOT ~~I.C. (Gen)~~ U748.16*

9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY: 0090.01 ~~GS-0132.06-7~~ $4525

10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/OTR
~~Junior Officer Trainee Program~~
Junior Officer Trainee Corps

11. HEADQUARTERS: Washington, D.C.

12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL: ☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary):

*Subject is quintuple slotted for recruiting purposes.

Temporary action subject to confirmation by DTR.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Dr. Willet L. Eccles C/JOTP

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Henry L. Berthold x4331

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: for MATTHEW BAIRD
Title: Director of Training

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			✓		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL

10 C.
SD-ST.

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO: 7-7507-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 20 May 57

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Wisconsin

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Rc-078

~~D~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~be~~ ~~[illegible]~~

1. Subject to trial period and medical.

DOG: [illegible]/57
CSEOD: 05/21/57
LCD: 05/21/57
SCD: 01/29/53

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	WHP	15 FEB 1957
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

OFFICE/DIVISION WITHIN [illegible]: 26/6/53

10 MAY 1957
Date

Position Con. Clk.

F. APPROVED BY

Ref C [illegible] / [illegible] 12 Feb 57

2 May 1957

Mr. Thomas J. Keenan
42 East Follett Street
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin

Dear Mr. Keenan:

This will confirm your entrance-on-duty date of 20 May 1957 with this Agency at Grade GS-7, salary $4525.00 per annum.

Your permanent employment will depend upon the completion of the following processing at the time of entering on duty: taking the oath of office, signing a loyalty affidavit, participating in a final security interview and completing a medical examination which will include determination of physical health and emotional stability. Should anything of an unfavorable nature arise during this period, your employment will not result in a permanent appointment.

Please report to the Receptionist at Curie Hall at 8:15 a.m. and ask for Mrs. Anna L. Phillips on 20 May 1957. Curie Hall is located at the intersection of 23rd Street, Independence Avenue, and Ohio Drive, S. W., with entrance on Ohio Drive.

Under existing Agency regulations we are not authorized to bear the expense of moving yourself, your dependents or your household goods from your present address to Washington, D. C.

The gross salary quoted will be subject to deductions for Federal income tax and 6½ percent for the United States Civil Service Retirement Fund. In addition, the benefits of low-cost group life insurance are available to Federal civilian employees. The enclosed pamphlet outlines the features of the program and lists the amount which will be deducted from your salary each pay period for this term insurance. This insurance is not obligatory. However, if you do not wish coverage, which is automatic, you should sign a Waiver of Life Insurance Coverage form at the time you enter on duty.

You will not receive a pay check for approximately four weeks after your entrance on duty. However, arrangements may be made for a temporary loan with a financial institution if necessary.

Very truly yours,

G. M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

Enclosures (2)
Life Insurance Pamphlet
Map

OP/CORRES/dm(Phillips)

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CALL

PERSON CALLED: Keenan, Thomas John

DATE OF CALL:

LOCATION: Fond du Lac, Wisc

NUMBER:

THE FOLLOWING WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE ABOVE PERSON:

✓ GRADE GS-7 SALARY $4525 ~~pa~~ TITLE ____

___ The appointment is approved subject to the following conditions at the time of entrance on duty.

✓ Taking oath of office and signing loyalty affidavit.

✓ Completing a satisfactory physical examination at our medical center.

FULL CLEARANCE:

✓ Participation in a final security interview.

[illegible]

Pay [illegible] [illegible] of which [illegible] security interview.

✓ Probationary [illegible] subject [illegible] [illegible]

✓ [illegible] first salary check [illegible] after [illegible] duty.

___ Arrangements [illegible] for a [illegible] [illegible] (GS-[illegible] and above.)

[illegible]

___ Verification letter will be [illegible] of [illegible]

✓ If [illegible] Please visit [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible]

Ideas [illegible]

✓ [illegible]

[illegible]

___ Yes

[illegible]

[illegible] abt. 4/26/57
Ulf

EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION

______ Are you now employed by the Federal or District Government?
(a) If so we have to arrange a release date with the agency.
(b) If so ask about lump sum payment made for annual leave due.
(c) Bring a S.F. 50 or pay-roll change slip with you the day you enter on duty if you now receive a higher salary than what we are offering you.

RESULTS OF CALL:

______ Subject will EOD 20 May 1957

______ Subject will write and advise us of date of EOD.

______ Subject declined offer of Appointment.
REASON FOR DECLINATION:

______ Subject advised to send letter of declination.

OTHER:

Explain other questions raised, committments made, etc.

4/56
DATE

APPOINTMENT CLERK

WESTERN UNION
SENDING BLANK

CALL LETTERS QDB CHARGE TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25 APRIL 1957

MR. THOMAS JOHN KEEHAN
42 EAST FOLLETT STREET
FOND du LAC, WISCONSIN

APPOINTMENT APPROVED AT GS-7, $4525.00 PER ANNUM. PLEASE CALL MRS. PHILLIPS, COLLECT, EXECUTIVE 3-6115, EXTENSION 2781 IMMEDIATELY TO ARRANGE ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE.

G. M. Stewart
G. M. STEWART

Send the above message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

PLEASE TYPE OR WRITE PLAINLY WITHIN BORDER—DO NOT FOLD

8 April 1957

Mr. Thomas John Keenan
42 East Follett Street
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin

Dear Mr. Keenan:

We are pleased to inform you that your application for employment with this Agency has been reviewed with interest by appropriate officials and that actual processing has been initiated for a position at Grade GS-7, salary $4525.00 per annum.

Your final appointment is dependent upon a number of factors including character and reference investigations, and other processing procedures. You may be sure that this processing is being accomplished as rapidly as possible.

Please notify us of any changes in your present status such as change of address, employment, marital status, etc. If it should develop that you cannot accept the position, please let us know immediately. If you have any questions concerning your application, please do not hesitate to get in touch with us. Your future correspondence or inquiries should be directed to the attention of Mrs. Anna L. Phillips.

Members of this Agency are entitled to the regular United States Government leave and retirement benefits. Our salaries conform to the rates prescribed by Congress for United States Government agencies.

Thank you for your cooperation and patience during this waiting period.

Very truly yours,

G. M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

OP/CORRES/bjs(Phillips)

4 March 1957

Mr. Thomas John Keenan
42 East Follett Street
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin

Dear Mr. Keenan:

This will confirm your recent telephone conversation with a member of my staff.

We have scheduled the necessary interviews and pre-employment medical examination, which will include determination of physical health and emotional stability, for you on Wednesday and Thursday, 13 and 14 March. We ask that you call Mr. Henry Berthold on EXecutive 3-6115, extension 4331, on the morning of 13 March to arrange an interview for that afternoon. Please report to our Medical Office which is located on Central Building, 2430 E Street, N. W., at 8:30 a.m. on 14 March.

This is not an offer of employment, but your transportation expenses from Fond du Lac to Washington, D. C., and return will be borne by the Government. You will also be paid a per diem allowance in lieu of subsistence during the time you are in travel status. First-class travel is authorized. If you so choose, travel is authorized by privately-owned automobile, the total cost not to exceed the cost of travel by common carrier. If you travel by air or rail, it is requested that you retain the ticket stubs to support the reimbursement voucher. You will not be reimbursed for expenses incurred for several weeks after your visit.

Thank you for your interest and cooperation.

Very truly yours,

G. M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

OP/CORRES/bjs(Berthold)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

PERSONNEL ACTION ROUTING SHEET

✓	NEW HIRE
	PROMOTION
	TRANSFER OF FUNDS
	REASSIGNMENT
	SEPARATION
	OTHER

NAME (Last-First-Middle): Kenny, Thomas J.
OFFICE: OTR
TRAY:

	ACTION OFFICE	DATE RECEIVED	DATE DISPATCHED	INITIALS	REMARKS
	FILES SECTION	2/13/57	2/13/57	L.L.	
	POSITION CONTROL	18 FEB 1957	18 FEB 1957	WM	
✓	Affto				
	PAD				
	POSITION CONTROL				
	STATUS				
	POSITION CONTROL				
	FILES SECTION				

	HOLD FOR FITNESS REPORT		
	SLOT NOW BLOCKED		HOLD FOR SECURITY CONCURRENCE
	HOLD FOR D.A.		HOLD - OFFICE OVER CEILING

REMARKS CONTINUED

FORM NO. 798 REPLACES FORMS 37-... AND
1 SEP 56 37-135 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-8): C-7673 OTR
REQUEST DATE (9-11): 13 Feb. 1957
YEAR OF BIRTH (28-30): 1930
GRADE (43-44): GS-07
ORGN. CODE (45-49):
TYPE OF APPL. (49): 1
HDQTRS & FUND (50): 2
CLEARANCE (51): 3
RECRUIT. CODE (52-54): 078
VET. PREF. & SEX (55): 1

NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) (12 - 29): KEEHAN, THOMAS JOHN
POSITION TITLE: JOT
POSITION NUMBER (31 - 36): U-748.16
OCCUP. CODE (37 - 42): 0070.01
LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): Washington, D. C.
ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH): DDS/OTR/JOTC
TYPE OF APPLICANT: ☒ REGULAR ☐ CONTRACT ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ MILITARY
CONVERSION ACTION:
IF OTHER, SPECIFY:
NAME OF REQUESTER (OR OFFICIAL): O. V. Stewart alp
TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS: ☒ HQS ☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible] ☐ PP ☒ V ☐ UV
CLEARANCE REQUIRED: PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP): ☐ SECRET ☒ FULL
ATTACHMENTS: ☒ PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT; 2 PHOTOGRAPH(S); ☒ APPENDIX I; ☐ APPENDIX II; ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER; ☒ REPORT OF INTERVIEW
VETERANS STATUS: ☒ MALE - VETERAN ☐ MALE - NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - NON-VETERAN

REMARKS:

JOT CASE PLEASE EXPEDITE

1 (SO); 1(OTR)

SPACE BELOW FOR SO USE ONLY

Form No. 377 Replaces Form 37-184
1 Dec 54 which is obsolete.

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
IO/JOTP D

JOT

NO.

DATE
11 February 1957

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief/JOTP				
2. IO/JOTP		2/12	D	1. & 2. For signature.
3. IPS				
4. Anna	2/18	2/18	Cy	3. For processing.
5. Berthold	2/19			
6. JOT PS	2/20	2/21	80	5. FP tests. 16 Feb
7. JOT/PO				6 Please bring to DC at govt expense for PEM interview
8. Corres.	4 Mar	4 Mar	lys	
9. Berthold	3/5	3/1		
10. Anna Phillips Ease	3/6	4/4	Cy	8. Please confirm telecon re he is to call Berthold EX...x4331 on morning of Wednes. 13 March to arrange interviews for that afternoon PEM: Thurs., 14 March Travel at govt exp (per Jot EX ...)
11.				
12.				9. HP interview.
13. Corres	5 Apr	8 Apr	lys	(13) Invitation letter (excl CC)
14. Phillips	4/8	4/16	Cy	
15.				

E9

JOT

A3

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

4 February 1957

Mr. Thomas John Keenan
42 East Follett Street
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin

Dear Mr. Keenan:

Your application for employment with this Agency is presently under active review. Appropriate members of our staff will determine whether we have a position available for a person of your qualifications. Although we cannot predict the length of time needed for this review, we will make every effort to expedite a determination. Should there be unavoidable delays in reaching a decision, we shall do our best to keep you as fully informed as possible regarding the status of your case.

In the meantime, if you should have any questions, feel free to get in touch with us by mail. We ask your patience and assure you of our desire to make the review period as short as is compatible with the careful evaluation to which we feel each case is entitled.

Very truly yours,

G. M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

OP/CORRES/lap(Hogan)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

1. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 13, 26 Jan 1957

2. PLACE: Madison, Wis.

3. PREVIOUS APPLICATION: ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. INTERVIEWER: L H Gage

5. REFERRED BY: Marquette Univ. Placement

6. TYPE OR PRINT IN CAPS: LAST NAME: KEENAN FIRST NAME: THOMAS MIDDLE NAME: JOHN

7. PERMANENT ADDRESS:
TELEPHONE:

8. BUSINESS ADDRESS:
TELEPHONE:

9. TEMPORARY ADDRESS: 42 East Follett st., Fond du Lac, Wis.
TELEPHONE: 3527

10. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 June 1930

11. PLACE OF BIRTH: Fond du Lac, Wis.

12. CITIZENSHIP: ☒ U.S. ☐ OTHER (Specify country)
U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☒ BIRTH ☐ NATURALIZATION
IF NATURALIZED INDICATE DATE:

13. ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOW(ER) ☐ DIVORCED

14. NO. OF DEPEND. (Excluding wife) 0

15. FOREIGN RELATIVES, INCLUDING WIFE (Ref. 10-B)
none

16. EDUCATION (Schools, degrees, dates, majors, thesis title, grade average or class standing, extra-curricular activities, etc.)

Marquette Univ., Milwaukee, Wis., 1953. BS, Liberal Arts (English and History)
Active in intermural sports. Part-time employment.

17. MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Employers, positions, duties, salaries, reasons for leaving)

Summer jobs cited in PHS.

18. MILITARY EXPERIENCE (Branch, serial no., stations, training duties, command responsibilities, rank held, reserve status, current proficiency and interests). INCLUDE ALSO DRAFT, ACTIVE MILITARY OR RETIRED STATUS.

Affiliation with USNR began May 1953. Accepted for Navy OCS. AD commenced July 1953. Commissioned Nov 1953. 2 months at HQ Eastern Sea Frontier. Dec 1953, assigned to radar facility, radio station, Beaver Tail Point, Jamestown, R. I. Duty as commo watch officer, commo officer, commo and electronics officer. Asst. officer in charge and officer in charge. Temp. promotion to Lt(jg) 20 Jan 1955. Just received permanent rank as Lt(jg). USNR, inactive. Separated Nov 1956.

FORM 1 SEP 56 182 REPLACES [illegible] WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

18. AREA KNOWLEDGE (Areas, type of knowledge, how acquired, etc.)

19. LANGUAGE FACILITY (Give tests when skill warrants and rate below)

LANGUAGE	NATIVE FLUENCY	FLUENT BUT FOREIGN	ADEQUATE FOR TRANSLATION	ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH	ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL	LIMITED	ACQUIRED BY

21. SALARY REQUESTED GS-7

22. ACCEPTABLE STATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ☒ YES ☐ NO
ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☒ YES ☐ NO
OVERSEAS ☒ YES ☐ NO

23. POOL INTEREST ☐ YES ☒ NO

PREFERENCE LIMITATIONS

24. HEALTH
Good

25. FORMS GIVEN ☒ PHS ☒ APP. I ☒ MED. ☒ SEC. AGRE. ☐ L/A (If required)

26. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION (Appearance, manners, personality, maturity, motivation, flexibility, intelligence, emotional stability, qualifications for intelligence work, career planning, over-all impression, pertinent unfavorable factors)

Keenan is a really impressive fellow in all respects. His appearance is immaculate,
there is a youthful charm about him, his discourse is articulate and nicely paced, and
he has a very congenial disposition. He has reached a satisfactory level of
maturity and discretion, I have no doubt. He has humility and poise. He is now at a
critical juncture in his life--just out of service, with an optimistic outlook on life,
and anxious to enter into career employment. His attitude toward govt. and CIA in
particular is entirely favorable. After our initial interview he wanted some time to
think it over, and to have other interviews. He called me within a matter of days, say-
ing he was ready to make formal application. Both he and his wife are enthusiastic over
the JOT program. She is an attractive young lass who has lived most of her life in S.
America where her father is an engineer for GMC. She is bi-lingual.
Keenan asked searching but discreet questions about conditions of employment, career
development, and the like. He is familiar with the security environment, and anticipates
no difficulty adapting himself to our requirements. Note his steady progress in the Navy
He appears to be a natural for career training. He is a likeable fellow, full of curio-
sity and ambition, and I believe he has a good mind. Participation in the mission of
the agency appeals to him very strongly. Presently not employed, he is prepared to seek
temporary work if available, or simply to wait out the processing period. His interest
is centered wholly in this application. In fairness to him an early decision on
eligibility is advised.
I regard him as a wholesome, disciplined, energetic fellow, with real potential for us.

Self-administered tests will be forwarded soon.

27. RECOMMENDED FOR
OTR/JOT

28. SERIAL NUMBERS

29. TESTS
To be tested in Madison 16 Feb 1957

30.
SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER
DATE 23 Jan 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

1500 Sunday Jan 13

42 East Follett St.
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin
January 3, 1957

Mr. L. H. Gage
Box 201
Madison, Wisconsin

Dear Sir:

I have been recently released from active duty with the U. S. Navy, and am interested in obtaining information as to my qualifications for a career position with CIA. Although I do not hold a Master's Degree, I feel that my experience and interest make your consideration of my qualifications worthwhile. Any arrangements you may care to make regarding a personal interview will be acceptable to me.

Sincerely,

Thomas J. Keenan
Thomas J. Keenan

TJK:mk

Acknowledged 1-7 with
suggestion he come to Mdn.

Age: 26 Married: no children Height: 5'11" Weight: 175

Job Interest	Career position with the Central Intelligence Agency.
Education	Public High School. Graduate of Marquette University, Class of 1953 with B. S. Degree in Liberal Arts. Majors in English and History. Grade transcript furnished upon request.
Military status	Veteran. U. S. Navy 3 years, 4 months. Graduate of Officer Candidate School. Duty generally in Communication and administration billets. Background Investigation completed 31 August 1954 by DIO Third Naval District. Last billet held was that of Officer in Charge, U. S. Naval Radio Station, Beavertail Point, Rhode Island. Released from active duty, November, 1956, as Lieutenant Junior Grade.
Hobbies and Interests	Sports: tennis and golf; reading, and informal discussions.
References	Furnished upon request.
Interview	At your convenience.

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Applicant Information
Sheet No. 1

To all persons applying for employment
with the Central Intelligence Agency:

This paper is the first step in applying for employment or consultant status with the Central Intelligence Agency. No application may proceed beyond this first step if the applicant is not in agreement with the conditions stated below:

General Considerations:

1. The National Security Act of 26 July 1947 (Public Law 253, 80th Congress) which created the Central Intelligence Agency places upon the Agency the responsibility:

a. "to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security;

b. "to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

c. "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government . . . ;

d. "to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

e. "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

The special character of this national responsibility requires the Agency to maintain correspondingly special employment criteria which may be different from the routine or normal employment standards of other Government departments and agencies which do not have the highly sensitive responsibility borne by the Central Intelligence Agency. It follows that the investigation of applicants prerequisite to their acceptance is a time-consuming process which, in addition to loyalty and security checks, includes evaluation of competence, physical and emotional fitness, and availability of a suitable position at such time as employment may be offered. This is called "clearance" of an applicant.

2. Investigation of an applicant may reveal something which prevents his clearance - perhaps something of which the applicant is genuinely unaware, perhaps something which only the special employment criteria of the Agency make unacceptable. In any event, adverse findings by the Agency are conclusive and final so far as the Agency is concerned, and no statement of specific reasons is made to the applicant.

3. Employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is not a right upon which an applicant can insist. Offer of employment which is subject to full clearance does not constitute a commitment on the Agency's part giving an unsuccessful applicant grounds for any claim against the Agency. Acceptance of employment upon the condition of clearance is at the applicant's risk, taken with the knowledge that a very substantial percentage of applicants are not cleared.

Statement of Understanding and Agreement

I have read, understand, and agree to the foregoing General Considerations. If not accepted for employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, I will make no claim or demand in conflict with those considerations.

I have also seen and read Applicant Information Sheet No. 2.

(Signature of Applicant)

14-00000

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

14-00000


KEENAN, Travers J
73572 1930

A11

L48 100 020

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12010 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 09 OCTOBER 1977

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	0026090	LA	GS 15 4	$39,789

8561

---

1. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
026090	KEENAN THOMAS J	51 CES		

6. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	7. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	8. TYPE ACTION WGI	QSI	ADJ
GS 15	4	$39,789	05/23/76	GS 15	5	$40,995	05/21/78			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE [illegible]

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK'S INITIALS

FORM 10-73 550E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ICS 01/[illegible]9/77

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KEENAN THOMAS J		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 01 01 77	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 7135 4528 0001	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA DIVISION		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH		12. POSITION NUMBER CP25	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DYB
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0130.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION FROM DDB TO DYB

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

14-00000

A 0:22 FEB 77

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 020090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KEENAN THOMAS J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE OF NSCA	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 08 77	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. CAN AND NSCA 7135 4525 0002	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA DIVISION OPERATIONS STAFF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPERATIONS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER CN55	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DYB

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) CS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0135.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 37167

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51065	LA	75013		1	06 29 30		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1976

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	020050	51 300	CF	GS 15 4	$37,147

DLM: 6 JUL 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KEENAN THOMAS J.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION OF NSCA	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 06 21 76	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA T135 4528 0001	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA DIVISION MEXICO/CENTRAL AMERICA BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER CP25	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DQB

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 34441

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51300	ALPHABETIC LA	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREES CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 06 29 30	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT. 2 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RSV. PROV. TEMP.	CODE	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
9-73 Mfg 8-73

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

1. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
026090	KEENAN THOMAS J	51 557	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ.
GS 15	3	$33.397	05/25/75	GS 15	4	$34.441	05/23/76			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE R. S. Sawyer

DATE [illegible] 76

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

JRS

CLERKS INITIALS JRS

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

SENT 15 JAN 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 26393
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 01 DA 19 YR 76
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 0135 0623 1111
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/LA DIVISION DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: DCOF
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D03
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 33397
18. REMARKS: TRAINING

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 13
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51237 ALPHABETIC LA
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA 29 YR 32
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO XX DA XX YR XX
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV EMPY TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

20 RDS

FORM 1150 5-74 Mfg 10/74 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY

JWM

14-00000

MP: 04 AUG 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KEENAN THOMAS J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE CCG 08 02 75	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▷ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA 6135 0984 0001	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD KINGSTON, JAMAICA STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION KINGSTON, JAMAICA

11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER CT28	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DQB

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 31806

18. REMARKS
KINGSTON, JAMAICA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 56	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING 51875 LA	22. STATION CODE 37043	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Modern Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH 06 29 30	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 84	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA ⇨	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RSV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1 - WAIVED 2 - YES HEALTH INS CODE		40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150
0-73 ...
Use Previous Edition

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11883 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 12 OCTOBER 1975

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	026090	51 875	CF	GS 15 3	$33,397

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible] THOMAS J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible] - CHANGE OF [illegible] CATEGORY

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO DA YR [illegible] 1 [illegible] 2 7

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF X

7. FAN AND NSCA: [illegible]

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: [illegible]

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/LA DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
KINGSTON, JAMAICA STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: KINGSTON, JAMAICA

11. POSITION TITLE: ATTACHE/POLITICAL OFFICE/
CHIEF OF STATION

12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]0

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [illegible]

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: [illegible] 1
15 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: 21615
[illegible]

18. REMARKS: KINGSTON, JAMAICA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Means Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	[illegible]1673	LA	37047	[illegible]	3	0[illegible] 21 [illegible]		

28. NTE EXPIRES:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 64
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CSA 3 FICA 4 NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAT; REGN; FROM; TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVED 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 0 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 0 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06 1/25

FORM 1152 9-73
SECRET
E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

14-00000

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

KEENAN THOMAS J 026090 41350984

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
620C5C	KEENAN THOMAS J	51 875	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ
GS 15	2	$30,812	05/26/74	GS 15	3	$31,600	05/25/75		☒	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE 5/7/75

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS BB

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	026090	51 875	CF	GS 15 2	$30,812

CS: 30 MAY 74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

KDF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025190
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 | DA 20 | YR 74
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 4135 0934 0001
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/WH DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 7-KINGSTON, JAMAICA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: KINGSTON, JAMAICA
11. POSITION TITLE: ATTACHE POLITICAL OFFICER
CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 2660
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05
16. GRADE AND STEP: 04 1
15 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 20677
29205
18. REMARKS:

KINGSTON, JAMAICA

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hours Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
22	10	51275	WH	37043	S	3	06 23 30	05 26 74	05 26 74

28 DATE EXPIRES	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data		33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
05 25 76	84				EOD DATA		

35 VET PREFERENCE / 36 SERV COMP DATE / 37 LONG COMP DATE / 38 CAREER CATEGORY / 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE / 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE / 42 LEAVE CAT CODE / 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA / 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150
Use Previous Edition

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	026090	51 760	CF	GS 14 4	$26,671

KHN: 7 DEC 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS JOHN
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 09 DA 15 YR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NBCA: 4135 0984 0001
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/WH DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 7 - KINGSTON, JAMAICA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: KINGSTON, JAMAICA
11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0660
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 26671
18. REMARKS:

THIS ACTION REFLECTS NEW LEGISLATIVE PAY INCREASE EFFECTIVE 14 OCT. 1973.

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51875 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 37043
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 06 DA 29 YR 30
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction /Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RSV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVED 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
uub 12-11-73

FORM 1150 5-72 Use Previous Edition SECRET KHN E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(6)

G-55

COMPENS[illegible]
& TAX DIVISION
JUL 10

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
026090	KEENAN THOMAS J	51 760	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 14	3	$24,628	07/23/72	GS 14	4	$25,398	07/22/73	.	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Richard L. Connolly DATE 15 May 1973

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CS- 06/31/72

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KEENAN THOMAS J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DELEGATION OF M.S.C.R.	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 06 DA. 01 YR. 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3135 1064 0001

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH DIVISION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: LIMA, PERU

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER DCOS	12. POSITION NUMBER 0145	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ. Code
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC — ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH — MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE — MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI — MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES — MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA — 1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 4-NONE — CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data — TYPE — MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE — CODE — 0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE — MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE — MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY — CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP — CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — CODE — 0-WAIVER 1-YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE — CODE — 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP. — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

H.R. FISHER

11 20 72

FORM 5-70 1150 Mrg 11-71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

C 53

JUL 19 [illegible] '71

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
026090	KE_NAN THOMAS J	91 700	CP	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADA
GS 14	1	$20,815	07/26/70	GS 14	2	$21,509	07/25/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Richard L. Conolly

DATE 6 May 1971

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

537

CLERKS INITIALS H.E.FISHER

AUDITED BY

FORM 3-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

14-00000

BBC: 16 NOV 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OKF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT - CORRECTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 09 DA 30 YR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 2135 1084 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3 - LIMA, PERU STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: LIMA, PERU
11. POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE POLITICAL OFFICER
OPS OFFICER DCOS
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0135
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP:
04 1
14 2
17. SALARY OR RATE:
17761
21509
18. REMARKS:
THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150, EFFECTIVE DATE 09/30/71 AS FOLLOWS: ITEM NUMBER 11, POSITION TITLE WHICH READ OPS OFFICER TO READ OPS OFFICER DCOS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hiring Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
58	10	51760	WH	57085	S	3	06 29 30		

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1. CSC 2. CIA 3. FICA 4. NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction-Cancellation Data: TYPE 37; MO DA YR 09 30 71
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 1 - WAIVED 2 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11 11 17 71

FORM 1-64 1150 Mfg 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

BBG: 01 NOV 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OUF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KEENAN THOMAS J				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 30 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶	V TO V	CF TO V ☒	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 2135 1084 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3 - LIMA, PERU STATION			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION LIMA, PERU		
11. POSITION TITLE ATTACHE POLITICAL OFFICER OPS OFFICER			12. POSITION NUMBER 0135	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16. GRADE AND STEP 04 1 14 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 17761 21509	

18. REMARKS
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
OPS OFFICER OCCUPYING OPS OFFICES DCOS POSITION.

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51760 ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 57085	23. INTEGREE CODE S	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 06 29 30	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1. CSC 2. CIA 3. FICA 5. NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction /Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR		EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0. NONE 1. 5 PT. 2. 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. NON TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0. WAIVED 1. YES HEALTH INS. CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0. NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1. NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2. BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3. BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1. YES 2. NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1. YES 2. NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

H.B. FISHER

IO3.1.D

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-69 Mfg. 6-73

SECRET

BBG

(When Filled In)

14-00000

[illegible] 10 MAR 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OOF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 02 | DA 07 | YR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | CF TO V ☒ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1135 0834 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
11. POSITION TITLE:
POL OFF ATTACHE
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1792
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP:
04 1
14 1
17. SALARY OR RATE:
17761
20815
18. REMARKS: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 16
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51700 | ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 15005
23. INTEGREE CODE: S
24. Mission Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 | DA 23 | YR 30
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA | YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO | DA | YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO XX | DA XX | YR XX
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RET. DATA: 1 CS, 2 FICA, 3 FSRA, 4 NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE | MO | DA | YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO | DA | YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO | DA | YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR | RESV | PROV | TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 1 WAIVER, 2 YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. [illegible] CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES, 2 NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES, 2 NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible] FISHER

POSTED
3.11.71
G.

Form 1150
Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	026090	51 700	CF	GS 14 1	$20,815

14-00000

EVD: 5 AUG 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026050
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 26 YR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1135 0834 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
11. POSITION TITLE:
POL OFF ATTACHE
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0327
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP:
04 1
14 1
17. SALARY OR RATE:
16760
19543
18. REMARKS:
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51700 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 15665
23. INTEGEE CODE: S
24. Hdqtrs Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 03 DA 29 YR 30
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO 07 DA 26 YR 70
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 07 DA 26 YR 70
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO 07 DA 25 YR 72
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 81
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET DSJ

POSTED
05-06-70

(When Filled In)

653

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
026090	KEE'AN THOMAS J	51 700	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	3	$17,878	05/18/69	GS 13	4	$18,437	05/17/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1/537

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

P

(4-51)

COMPENSATION
MAY 11 1970

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	026090	51 700	CF	GS 13 3	$17,878

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	026090	51 700	CF	GS 13 3	$16,866

G53

Lo-3

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
026090	KEENAN THOMAS J	51 700	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ
GS 13	2	$14,889	03/19/68	GS 13	3	$15,369	03/18/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1537

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-21)

COMPENSATION

'69

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962".

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	026090	51 700	CF	GS 13 2	$13,737	$14,889

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	26090	51 700	CF	GS 13 1	$12,873	$13,507

14-00000

PLW: 26 JUN 67

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OKF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION CORRECTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 DA 21 YR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7135 0834 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
11. POSITION TITLE: POLITICAL OF ATTACHER
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0327
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 06 6
13 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 10363
14873
18. REMARKS:
THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 05/21/67 AS FOLLOWS:
TO ADD INTEGRATED [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 58
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51700 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 15005
23. INTEGREE CODE: 1
24. Hours Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 06 DA 29 YR 30
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO 05 DA 21 YR 67
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 05 DA 21 YR 67
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 22 MO 05 DA 21 YR 67
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES PERM TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: WAIVER YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FED. TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODES NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06 26 67

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

P.I.W. 10 MAY 67

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 05 DA. 21 YR. 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7135 0834 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0327
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12873
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51700 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 15005
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Region Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 DA. 29 YR. 30
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 05 DA. 21 YR. 67
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 05 DA. 21 YR. 67
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
060267N

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PIW

14-00000

KJM: 17 MAY 67

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 05 | 03 | 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO CF X
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7135 0834 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
11. POSITION TITLE: POLITICAL OFFICER ATTACHE
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0327
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 06 6
12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 10363
11685
18. REMARKS:

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $11685 AND FSR SALARY OF $10363 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH. ALL SICK AND ALL HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED DAU DOB 6 OCT 57 DAU DOB 11 SEP 62
DAU DOB 19 AUG 61 DAU DOB 16 SEP 58 DAU DOB 7 MAY 63
SON DOB 19 MAY 60

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 55
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51700 | ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 15005
23. INTEGREE CODE: S
24. Mgmt. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 06 | 29 | 30
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. / RESV / PROV. / TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

POSTED

BJT: 12 MAY 67

SECRET
(When Filled In)

UNF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS - CORRECTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 04 | 23 | 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / ☒ V TO CF / CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7135 0834 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0327
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 11685
18. REMARKS:

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 TO CHANGE EFFECTIVE DATE WHICH READ 05/07/67 TO READ 04/23/67.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 58
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51700 | ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 15005
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Majors Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 06 | 29 | 30
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 20 | MO. DA. YR. 05 | 07 | 67
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, DESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED, CODE 1 - YES, 2 - NO; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05-15-67

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-00000

C/WH/3

6-55

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
026090	KEENAN THOMAS J	51 700	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	1	$13,507	05/21/67	GS 13	2	$13,957	05/19/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 11 May 68

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1

5-37

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

MAY 14 8 37 AM '68
COMPENSATION & TAX DIVISION

14-00000

~~BJT: 3 MAY 67~~

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KEENAN THOMAS J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 23 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ · CF TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☒ · CF TO CF ☐	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7135 0834 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3 BOGOTA, COLOMBIA STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0327	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 11685

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 20	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51700	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 15005	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 06 29 30	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE · CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE · MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RES. PROV TEMP · CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES · HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO · CODE · NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO · CODE · NO. TAX EXEMP. · STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
052367

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	026090	51 075	V	GS 12 2	$10,987	$11,306

G27

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
026090	KEENAN THOMAS J	51 075 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	2	$11,306	10/24/65	GS 12	3	$11,665	10/23/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP
☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS WV AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

OCT 21 12 32

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560E (4-31)

RJH: 19 SEP 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 09 DA. 11 YR. 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V; CF TO V; V TO CF; CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS: YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED OF YOUR RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS ACTION TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-50. SUCH APPEAL MUST BE RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACTION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:
20. Employ. Code:
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE): CODE 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES); HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
09 20 66 /J

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	026090	51 075	V	GS 12 1	$10,250	$10,619

6-27

OCT 23 3 08 AM '65

1. Serial No.	2. Name			3. Cost Center Number				4. LWOP Hours		
026090	KEENAN THOMAS J			51 075 V						
5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	1	$10,250	10/25/64	GS 12	2	10987 ~~$10,[illegible]~~	10/24/65			

9. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS D.Y. AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE [illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 360 Obsolete Previous Editions

(4-31)

L1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NUM: 16 DEC 64

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KEENAN THOMAS J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION (CORRECTION/ CONVERSION FROM FSS STATUS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. EOD 10 10 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5135 0990 0000	8. LSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0489	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 10250

18. REMARKS
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 TO CHANGE THE EFFECTIVE DATE, WHICH READ, 10/12/64, TO READ 10/10/64.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 57	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51700	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 06 29 30	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE 56	MO. DA. YR. 10 10 64	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12/16/64 TK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,560
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

14-00000

DLB: 20 NOV 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 626090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KEENAN THOMAS J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 11 22 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF SECTION A	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0641	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 10250

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 16	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51075	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 06 29 30	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. VCS EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 3 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RESV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11/24/64

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

TJgd

RZR: 23 OCT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KEENAN THOMAS J		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 10 25 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V X / V TO CF / CF TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5135 0930 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0489	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 10250

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	22
20. Employ. Code	10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	51700 / WH
22. STATION CODE	45075
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. Nego. Code	3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	0[illegible] 20 30
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	10 25 64
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	10 25 64
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP) CODE	
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES), HEALTH INS. CODE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/28/64 ZK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET Jgd

(When Filled In)

DLB: 13 OCT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 026090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KEENAN THOMAS J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSS STATUS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. DA. YR. 10 12 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO CF X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5135 0990 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0489
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 9240
18. REMARKS: STATE: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 56
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51700 | ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 45075
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 DA. 29 YR. 30
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 4; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/15/64

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

14-00000

1 Serial No.	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
026090	KEENAN THOM'S J	51 700 45G CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 11	2	$ 8,690	04/14/63	GS 11	3	$ 8,970	04/12/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

557

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY EH 5/12/64

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-61)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	026090	51 700 CF	GS 11 2	$ 8,313	$ 8,690

BAB: 12 APR 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
026090	KEENAN THOMAS J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	04 14 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS					7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	V TO V		V TO CF			
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		3135 5700 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
POL ASST OPS OFFICER	0489	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSS		07 0	6560
GS	0136.01	11 2	8310

18. REMARKS
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
22	10	64700	WH	45075	1	3	06 29 30	04 14 63	04 14 63

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
04/23/63 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 17

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

1. Serial No.	2. Name			3. Cost Center Number				4. LWOP Hours		
026090	KEENAN THOMAS J			64 700 CP						
5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PR Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	QSI	ADJ
GS-10	2	$ 7,535	10/29/61	GS-10	3	$ 7,780	10/28/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 559

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY AG 11/7/62

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Ned P. Holman DATE: 26-X-62

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1954, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	026090	64700	CF	10 2	$ 7160	10 2	$ 7535

14-00000

AES: 27 OCT 61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CDF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KEENAN THOMAS J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 29 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2135 5700 1000
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE POL ASST OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0489	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSS GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 0 10 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 6260 7160

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Macro Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	64700	WH	45075	1	3	06 29 30	10 29 61	10 29 61

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA ⇨
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 MOS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

- 11/14/61

Form 8-60 1150 (Temporary Printing) SECRET

1.	2.	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
[illegible]	KEENAN THOMAS J	[illegible]/WH	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR
GS 09	2	$ 6,135	06	14	59	GS 09	3	$ 6,285	06	12	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	KEENAN THOMAS J	526090	46 52	GS-09 3	$ 6,285	$ 6,765

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number		4. LWOP Hours
526090	KEENAN THOMAS J	[illegible]/WH	UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 09	3	$ 6,765	06/12/60	09	4	$ 6,930	06/11/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 13 JAN 1960

1. Serial No. 526090	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) KEENAN THOMAS J	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr. 06 29 30	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CSC EOD Mo. Da. Yr. 05 20 57	7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr. 01 29 53	8. CSC Retmt (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr. 05 20 57
13. Fed. Tax (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH III MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	Code 4652	15. Location Of Official Station MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	Station Code 45075
16. Dept.-Field (Dept.-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5) Code 5	17. Position Title OPS OFFICER	18. Position No. 0489	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.01	21. Grade & Step 09 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6135	23. SD D
24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 06 15 58	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 06 12 60	26. Appropriation Number 0135 5700 3000	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action INTEGRATION DEPARTMENT OF STATE	Code 58	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. 01 06 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code OM	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH III MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	Code 4652	32. Location Of Official Station MEXICO CITY, MEX.	Station Code 45075
33. Dept.-Field (Dept.-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5) Code 5	34. Position Title POL ASST OPS OFFICER	35. Position No. 0489	36. Serv. FSS GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.01	38. Grade & Step 10 4 09 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 5540 6135	40. SD D
41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 06 15 58	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 06 12 60	43. Appropriation Number 0135 5700 3000	

44. Remarks

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $6135 AND FSS SALARY OF $5540 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH. ALL SICK AND 80 HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

Posted
PCS

FORM NO. 1150e
1 MAR 57

1-14-60

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ALS: 12 DEC 1959

1. Serial No. 526090	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) KEENAN THOMAS J	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 06 Da. 29 Yr. 30	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt.-1 10 Pt.-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 05 Da. 20 Yr. 57
7. SCD Mo. 01 Da. 29 Yr. 53	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 05 Da. 20 Yr. 57
13. [illegible] Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT DDP WH	Code 4688	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013		
16. Dept. - Field Dept. - 1 Ufild - 3 Frgn. - 5 Code 1	17. Position Title OPS OFF	18. Position No. 090659	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01	
21. Grade & Step 09 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6135	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 15 Yr. 58	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 12 Yr. 60	26. Appropriation Number 0320 1998

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 67	28. Eff. Date Mo. 12 Da. 27 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH III MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	Code 4652	32. Location Of Official Station MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	Station Code 45075		
33. Dept. - Field Dept. - 1 Ufild - 3 Frgn. - 5 Code 5	34. Position Title OPS OFFICER	35. Position No. 0489	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01	
38. Grade & Step 09 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6135	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 15 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 12 Yr. 60	43. Appropriation Number 0135 5700 3000

44. Remarks

1-6-60
RJH

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

12-18-57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DEC: 4 SEPT 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth	4. Vet. Pref.	5. Sex	6. CS. EOD
526090	KEENAN THOMAS J	Mo. 06 Da. 29 Yr. 30	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	M 1	Mo. 05 Da. 20 Yr. 57

7. SCD	8. CSC Retmt.	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav.	11. FEGLI	12. LCD	13. [illegible]
Mo. 01 Da. 29 Yr. 53	Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	50 USCA 403 J	Mo. Da. Yr.	Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	Mo. 05 Da. 20 Yr. 57	Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION	4613	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept. - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	2	OPS OFF PP	0070	GS	0136.31

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
09 2	$ 6135	D	Mo. 06 Da. 15 Yr. 58	Mo. 06 Da. 14 Yr. 59	9 3500 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	05	Mo. 09 Da. 06 Yr. 59	REGULAR	22	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT DDP WH	4688	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept. - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	1	OPS OFF	090659	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
09 2	$ 6135	D	Mo. 06 Da. 15 Yr. 58	Mo. 06 Da. 12 Yr. 60	0320 1998

44. Remarks
EXTENDED TRAINING.

FO[illegible]ED
15 [illegible]

Form No. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 THIS NOTIFICATION EFFECTS RESLOTTING RESULTING FROM R-20-250

SER #	NAME	SD	OLD SLOT	NEW SLOT	DATE
126090	KEENAN THOMAS J	D	0070	486	04/28/59

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO. 126090	2. NAME KEENAN THOMAS J	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN. DDP/WH 3	4. FUNDS V-20	5. ALLOTMENT [illegible]

6. OLD SALARY RATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 9	1	$ 5,985	06	15	50

7. NEW SALARY RATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 9	2	6 135	06	14	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 5600

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER 161

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 23 JAN 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
126090	KEENAN THOMAS J	06 29 30	1	M 1	05 20 57

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code
01 29 53	1	50 USCA 403 J			05 20 57	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OTR JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINEE CORPS	2810	WASH., D.C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	JOT	0748.16	GS	0090.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	ST	06 15 58	06 14 59	8 7507 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION	57	01 25 59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION	4613	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	OPS OFF PP	0070	GS	0136.31

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	D	06 15 58	06 14 59	9 3500 20 001

44. Remarks

POSTED
11 Feb 1959

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

adj/ 2/8/59

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
KEENAN THOMAS J	126090	GS-09-1	$ 5,440	$ 5,985

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

EVL 11 JUNE 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
126090	KEENAN THOMAS J	06	29	30		1	M 1	05	20	57

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
01	29	53		1	50 USCA 403 J						05	20	57		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OTR JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINEE CORPS		WASH., D.C.	

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	JOT	0748.16	GS	0090.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 2	$ 4660	ST							8 7507 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	06	15	58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OTR JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINEE CORPS	2810	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	JOT	0748.16	GS	0090.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5440	ST	06	15	58	06	14	59	8 7507 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
17 JUN 1958
Cf

C.H. STEWART

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

CS 6/12/58

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
126090	KEENAN THOMAS J	DDS/JOTC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 7	1	$ 4,525				GS 7	2	$ 4,660	06	01	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

PAYROLL BRANCH
MAY 27 11 05 AM '58

M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560b

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
126090	KEENAN THOMAS J	DDS/JOTC 3A	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 7	1	$ 4,525				GS 7	2	$ 4,660	06	01	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Willis Eccles	23 Mar 58	

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

STANDARD FORM 50 (B PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

F.C. 19 Apr 57
1v1 C-7673

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. THOMAS J. KEENAN 126090

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 Jun 1930

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 20 May 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT 13

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 20 May 1957

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

	FROM		TO
		8. POSITION TITLE	JOT U-748.16
		9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0090.01-7 $4525.00 per annum
		10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 281000	DDS/OTR Junior Officer Trainee Corps
		11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.		
				ICC	SD/ST

15. SEX: M

1

16. APPROPRIATION: FROM: TO: 7-7504-20 750-13

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES, NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 20 May 1957

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

EC-078
2 EOD 05/20/57
Subject to the satisfactory completion of a medical examination.
Subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.

DOG: 05/20/57
CHEOD: 05/20/57
LCD: 05/20/57
SCD: 01/29/53

PSI due 06/01/58

POSTED
23 MAY 1957

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950-372667

MJ 5/21/57

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Keenan, Thomas J.		3. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Jun 30	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer, DChief		8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/LA/OPS	9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	10. CHECK (X) ONE ☒ HQS.	☐ OS

6. SD: DQB

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CONTRACT	☐ SPECIAL	☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL	☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT	☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO): 1 Jun 77 - 3 Dec 77

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: January 1978

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES; AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

FORM 45 7-75 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

E2, IMPDET CL BY 19512

DQB
00176

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 4 January 1978	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, LA Southern Region	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Joseph Di Stefano Joseph Di Stefano

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☑ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 11 January 1978	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject is an especially able staff officer, one of the best around. Intelligent, possessing a quick retentive mind, excellent with detail, able to rapidly identify problem areas, a quick, accurate and clear drafter, having a mind of his own and willing and able to express his opinions firmly and articulately, but always pleasant, conservative by nature, he thinks his problems through but gets things done accurately and quickly. Whenever I had a staff problem, I knew I could count on Mr. Keenan to get the necessary done.

(continued)

DATE 17 Jan 1978	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, Latin America Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE George V. Lauder

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☐ HAVE NOT ☑ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 17 Jan 78	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

4 JAN 1978

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Thomas J. Keenan

1. During the first six weeks of the reviewing period, Mr. Keenan continued as Chief of the Mexico and Central America Branch, the Division's most demanding geographic unit. His performance during this period continued at the same Strong level detailed in the last Fitness Report.

2. During February, as part of a determined effort to strengthen the Division's Operations Staff, Mr. Keenan was moved up to fill one of the two Deputy Chief slots in that unit. As of 1 July, he was the sole Deputy of the Staff. As set up in Latin America Division, the Operations Staff had both staff and line functions. It had broad coordinating responsibilities with all elements outside the Division, served as the focal point for all senior staff requests for studies and reports, stimulated and coordinated Division operational activities and reviewed the effectiveness of Division programs. All Division operational traffic flowed through the Ops Staff where better than 80 per cent of the traffic was released.

3. Mr. Keenan was assigned primary responsibility for close review and staff action relating to the northern area (Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean plus Guyana and Surinam in South America). In addition, he served as the staff referent for narcotics operations throughout the Division and for Cuba operations worldwide.

4. I consider myself singularly fortunate to have had Mr. Keenan as my Deputy. I assumed the Chief/Ops responsibility in April 1977 and immediately discovered that ground rules were different, legal strictures impinged on many operational decisions, and the almost constant senior staff requests affected one's ability to concentrate on operations. Mr. Keenan was extremely helpful in providing substantive briefings, guiding me through the legal and policy complications and pointing out the shoals. He made many valuable suggestions on how to handle the work load without drowning in paper.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 19812

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Mr. Keenan has an agile and retentive mind. He is quick at distinguishing the wheat from the chaff. He does his homework and I have never known him to go off half cocked. In making operational judgments, his initiative is tempered by a healthy dose of prudence. Mr. Keenan's writing is first rate; his prose is lean, often elegant, and always precise. I have admired his talents as a briefer. His presentations are balanced and detailed, often spiced with his engaging humor.

6. Mr. Keenan's tenure with the Ops Staff was a very intensive period. He normally worked an eleven-hour day and Saturdays as well. I take some pride in the fact that there never developed an antagonist relationship between the operating branches and the Ops Staff. Mr. Keenan deserves much of the credit for this. While often taking issue with branch positions and written work, he was unfailingly courteous, good humored, and helpful. His counsel was often sought on difficult problems.

7. A significant and time-consuming aspect of the Ops Staff's work concerned screening operational traffic for compliance with E.O. 11905 and ensuring that U.S. person strictures were scrupulously observed. I found Mr. Keenan's general knowledge in these areas unmatched among the non-lawyers of the Agency.

8. Mr. Keenan shared with me the responsibility for supervising the work of two operations officers and one secretary. He is an excellent supervisor who manages (despite the belief of some that it is not possible) to be both exigent and pleasant. He cares about people, and as noted in the previous Fitness Report, takes special interest in developing younger officers.

9. In addition to his Operations Staff responsibilities, Mr. Keenan served as the Division EEO Officer. He also served for nine months on a time-consuming DDO task force concerned with a threat against President Carter's life. He performed these responsibilities with the same thoughtfulness and effectiveness he applies to everything else.

10. The Operations Staff was disbanded in early November as part of the Latin America Division reorganization. In recognition of his splendid performance on the Ops Staff, Mr. Keenan was made Chief of a combined Coordination/Plans Staff with a T/O of six. This staff will retain most of the coordination functions of the Ops Staff but not the line functions.

11. This is a splendid officer, certainly one of the most promising GS-15's in the Division. He clearly earned an Outstanding rating for the period under review.

Joseph Di Stefano

Joseph Di Stefano
Deputy Chief,
LA Southern Region

Thomas J. Keenan
Thomas J. Keenan

4 January 1978
Date

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL continued

While I personally handled the first week or so of the myriad problems associated with a wide-spread investigation of an alleged plot against President Carter, I subsequently turned the responsibility for it over to Mr. Keenan and he represented the Division with the DDO, CI Staff and Secret Service on this important and seemingly never ending problem area. This involved a lot of extra hours work and had to be handled meticulously. He performed these responsibilities impeccably.

During the past year he made many contributions to the smooth functioning of the division. Not least among them was the fact that having fully familiarized himself with US laws, Executive Orders, regulations, notices, etc., which have increasingly affected our operations programs, he ensured that our operational business was always in meticulous compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of these seemingly myriad "don'ts." Similarly, we had to produce staff papers in a hurry, often synthesizing a great deal of detail or alternatively presenting a great deal of detail. Mr. Keenan saw that the job was accomplished on time and with good style.

Although he was the junior member of the three-man Operations Staff, on occasion he served as the Acting Chief. He handled the COPS function with his usual dedication and good judgment.

As the rating officer has mentioned, when the division was reorganized in November, we decided to combine the Operations Staff's staff, but not command, functions with those of the Plans Staff. Mr. Keenan was the obvious choice for this important and challenging assignment which will tax his abilities and broaden his experience. He is one of our best GS-15 officers and has additional growth potential in the Clandestine Service. He is a good operations officer as well as a good staff officer and is qualified to manage one of our medium-size Latin America Division Stations.

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Jun 30	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD DQB
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer, Ch	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/LA/MCA	9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	10. CODE (CS-1) X MOS.		OF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CONTRACT	☐ SPECIAL	☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL	X ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT	☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO): 1 Jan 76-31 Dec 1976

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: January 1977

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

E2 IMPDET CL BY 056552

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SEE MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 8

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 31 March 1977

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Deputy Chief, Latin America Division

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: George V. Lauder

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☒ OR HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.

DATE: 4 April 77

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This is an exceptionally well-written and informative report on Mr. Keenan. I agree with all that is said about him. He is indeed one of our better GS-15 officers--alert, conscientious, well-balanced, articulate. He also has excellent judgement and good command presence. He has a good future in the Agency.

DATE: 7 APR 77

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, Latin America Division

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Raymond A. Warren

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☐ HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Branch Chief's attention, the other Stations, particularly Costa Rica, which has an active operational program, and the Guatemala Station, which also covers El Salvador, required regular attention and the lesser posts could not be neglected. The Branch performed well in these regards too. In short, I was pleased by the rapidity with which Mr. Keenan got on top of his responsibilities and by the intelligence, thoughtfulness, energy and professional skills he displayed in carrying them out.

Mr. Keenan is an intense, thorough, common sense, sound officer who while quick witted, thinks problems through, sees the holes and takes steps to fill them. He does his home work and doesn't go off half-cocked; yet he gets the job done quickly. He tends toward the conservative side in making judgments. While he has a pleasant way with people, he has firm convictions, and he is articulate, very forthright but not offensive in expressing what is on his mind. A strong supervisor, he is on top of the activities of his unit, demands results, isn't afraid to be firm with his subordinates but is thoughtful and concerned about their welfare. He cares a lot about people and is interested in developing younger officers assigned to him. Because of these qualities, he was selected to be the Division's EEO officer when we needed a new one a few months ago. He has performed this role in his usual thoughtful and efficient fashion. He writes quickly and well. No one is more conscientious than he. He really cares about his job and tries to produce the best possible product. All in all, he was one of our best Branch Chiefs and deserves a solid "Strong" for his efforts.

In February 1977, one of the Deputy Chiefs of Operations jobs in the Division came open. Because of his demonstrated all around ability, personal qualifications and potential, he was selected from among the Branch Chiefs in the Division to fill that position. The job will broaden him and equip him for even more responsible posts in the field as either a Station Chief or for more senior positions at Headquarters. He is clearly one of our promising GS-15 officers.

George V. Lauder
Deputy Chief
Latin America Division

Thomas J. Keenan

4/[illegible]/77
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Jun 30	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/LA/CAR	9. CURRENT STATION Kingston	10. CHECK (X) ONE ☐ NCO ☐ OP		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
1 January 1975 - 31 December 1975

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
January 1976

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached memorandum	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER
S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY 007634

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 20 April 1976	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR D/C/LA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Raymond A. Warren

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 1 July 1976	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/Thomas J. Keenan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached

DATE 20 April 1976	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/LA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Richard S. Sampson

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE 1 July 1976	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/Thomas J. Keenan

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

SECRET

20 April 1976

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Thomas J. Keenan
1 January - 31 December 1975

From January to July of this reporting period Mr. Keenan finished his tour as Chief of Station, Kingston. In addition to himself there were two other case officers at the Station. Its total complement was 7 persons. Mr. Keenan entered the Army War College in July 1975.

During the last six months of his tour, the Station had three things going for it; a good access agent operation against the PRC target, a one-on-one relationship between a Station officer and a Cuban Embassy officer, and further development and exploitation of a member of the ruling political party. Of these the latter turned out to be the most worthwhile. This agent provided useful information on key political developments in the Jamaican government and the government party relating to its growing relationship with the Cuban government. The relationship with the Cuban officer turned out badly since the Cuban pitched the Station officer rather than vice versa. During this period the PRC access agent was most promising and was the best operation of its kind against the PRC that the Division had.

Mr. Keenan's relations with the Embassy during this period were good. No problems of any kind were noted. The operational environment continued bad due to the high incidence of crime.

Mr. Keenan is an able, experienced officer with good personal presence. He is measured in his operational approach and in his management style. He is a man of good judgment, has an agreeable personality and inspires confidence; he can be counted on to do a creditable job without a lot of fanfare.

In the last six months of his tour as Chief of Station, Kingston, I would rate his overall performance as "Strong."

Raymond A. Warren
Deputy Chief
Latin America Division

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009560

SECRET

Subject: Thomas J. Keenan, Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Keenan ~~had~~ departed Station Kingston/~~by the time~~ shortly after I assumed charge of Latin America Division in May 1975. Therefore, I am not able to comment on his performance as Chief of Station, Kingston during the first five months of 1975. I would like to note, however, that Mr. Keenan served under me when I was Chief of Station, Bogota from 1965-1968 and I am acquainted with his personality and operational proficiency. On this basis, while I did not observe his performance as Chief of Station first hand, I generally concur with the Rating Officer's comments and overall performance evaluation of "Strong."

As a person, Mr. Keenan is a mature, dedicated officer with a pleasing personality. He gets along well with his peers and subordinates and is respected by them. I have selected him to be Chief of the Mexican and Central American Branch which is one indicator of the confidence I have in his ability. This will be an excellent test of Mr. Keenan's administrative and managerial ability since this branch is one of our largest in Latin America Division.

R. S. Sampson
Richard S. Sampson
Chief
Latin America Division

I certify that I have seen all entries in this report.

Thomas J. Keenan

Aug 1976
Date

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Jun 30	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/LA/CAR	9. CURRENT STATION Kingston	10. CODE (check one) ☐ HQS. ☐ OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 July 1974 - 31 December 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1975

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See Attached MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 5-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

(4)

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

See Attached MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT .

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attached MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

13 January 1975

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Thomas J. Keenan
1 July 1974 - 31 December 1974

Mr. Keenan took over as COS Kingston in September 1974. This is his first COS assignment. The Kingston Station is composed of 6 staff employees (including 2 communicators) and 1 contract employee for a total complement of 7.

As one of the principal Caribbean sources of bauxite, Jamaica is of importance to the U.S. The arbitrary taxes levied on the U.S. bauxite company in Jamaica has been a source of conflict between the two governments. There is a Cuban and Chinese presence in Jamaica. Perhaps the single most important factor affecting the environment and personal lives of our Station members is the very high level of crime in Kingston, especially rape.

In reviewing the past fitness reports none has yet been written specifically commenting on his performance as COS in Kingston. I will attempt to fill that gap with this one.

The Station has been changed from basically a liaison Station to a unilateral Station. Liaison has never been overly cooperative, but the present COS has continued to develop the liaison, and at the same time has moved out unilaterally. During the past year two access agents to the Chinese target have been recruited (one being among the best in the Division) and two access agents to the Cuban target. It has also acquired a penetration of the local service who is especially useful against the Chinese target. In addition, a surveillance team which was recruited in 1973 was developed and used to the extent possible. The Station has become more active than perhaps ever before in its history, with emphasis on the PRC and Cuban targets.

From the past we know that Mr. Keenan is an excellent officer with good operational instincts. After a year in Kingston as COS we now also see that he can perform as a manager. Upon his return from Kingston this year Mr. Keenan will attend the Army War College to continue his career development. I rate his overall performance as COS in Kingston as "Strong."

Raymond A. Warren
Deputy Chief
Latin America Division

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009560

SECRET

Subject: Thomas J. Keenan, Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

COMMENTS BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

I concur in the evaluation of strong. It should be pointed out that Mr. Keenan has been operating under very difficult circumstances for which I am responsible. It was on my recommendation that he was pulled out of Lima for Kingston. I remembered this as a Caribbean paradise, but later found out that it was a most difficult situation--especially for someone like Mr. Keenan with a large family of small girls. Given this personal problem, it is understandable that Mr. Keenan did not perform in a more dramatic manner. He did quite well and will, I think, benefit from his upcoming war college stint.

David A. Phillips, Chief, LA Division

14 January 1975
Date

I certify that I have seen all entries in all sections of this report.

/s/Thomas J. Keenan
Thomas J. Keenan

HJKT-1902, 24 Jan 75
24 January 1975
Date

Copy sent to subject via HJKS-1120, 15 Jan 1975

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 026090	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 30	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-14	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	8. OFF/DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/WH/7	9. CURRENT STATION Kingston	10. CODE (X one) ☐ HQS. ☐ OF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT X SPECIAL Retirement supervisor

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
October 1973 - 30 June 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT.

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Station, Kingston	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

[illegible] JUN 1974

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-73

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2, IMPDET CL BY

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT	NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
026090	Keenan, Thomas J.	29 Jun 30	M	GS-14	D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer, DCOS	DDO/WH/3	Lima, Peru

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ CAREER PROVISIONAL ☐ RESERVE
☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT
☒ ANNUAL ☐ 21-MONTH ☐ 30-MONTH ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-) 1 Nov 1972 - 14 Sept 73

13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 DCOS	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 ACOS	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Senior Station Case Officer	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 18 Dec 73	S

FORM 3-73 45N

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This report is occasioned by Subject's early departure from Lima, before end of tour, to assume the duties of COS in Kingston, Jamaica. That fact alone attests the esteem in which he has been held by Hqs and, when the proposal for that assignment was made, also expressed once again by the rater.

Subject had not yet completed his first two years as a DCOS and this was his first crack at that level of responsibility. So his rise of late has been rapid, although of course it is based on abilities and experience developed and polished in the course of a number of tours overseas prior to his coming to Lima. These have all been spent in the Latin environment so the Caribbean will be for him a completely new world. This will be a healthy change for him and is managerially sound as well for the Station to which he is going.

As DCOS in Lima, Subject has shown a high order of operational soundness, administrative good sense, and a conscientiousness about his work that permitted COS to delegate without hesitation both specific problems in any area or even whole sections of Station activity (e.g. narcotics) for him to carry out or to supervise. Subject is a prudent man who thinks things through before acting. He weighs the pros and cons carefully, is quite CI-minded (an indispensible attribute in this semi-hostile climate), and then acts promptly. His judgment, while it tends to come down on the conservative side, is invariably soundly based. His periods of serving as Acting COS have been competently handled as well, always within his understanding of what the COS would want done if he were here.

As a supervisor, Subject has the right combination of patience and firmness when dealing with younger case officers who want to be off and running. He encourages their

/CONTINUED/

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE Not Dated o/a 10 Sep 1973	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Thomas J. Keenan

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 15	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE Not Dated o/a 10 Sep 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Richard S. Welch

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

There is little more that can be added to this eloquent report. Mr. Keenan's exceptional characteristics and abilities and his fine performance as DCOS, Lima, an unusually active, busy station, have led to his present assignment as COS, Kingston. The rating officer has stated that Mr. Keenan's rise of late has been rapid and this is true. However, all that he has achieved he has worked very hard for and certainly earned; and despite the fact he has a youthful face and a somewhat boyish manner, he is not all that young in years, so the present grade and position are hardly inconsistent with his age. Viewing the record and this man's potential, there is every reason to expect that he will continue to progress up the managerial ladder at essentially the same pace we have seen in the last three or four years.

DATE 12 November 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH/Branch 3	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Richard L. Conolly Richard L. Conolly

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C continued....

aggressiveness but at the same time enlightens them on the virtue of looking over their shoulder at who may be after them as well as on the advantages of doing their homework first. Usually the upshot has proved him right.

In running his own cases, Subject is meticulous and very thorough, preparing himself for eventualities as well as maximum disseminable information. He has personally handled two difficult cases while here and has gotten what there was to be had out of both. Each also had serious flap potential but there has been not a whiff of suspicion or of leakage.

Subject, as noted before, has a cherry exterior that covers a deeply serious person within. His easy and forthright manner has earned him friends in the official Embassy community and in the larger society as well. All respect his judgment, his seriousness about his work and the issues of our time, and his eminently decent family life. All of these qualities should go far to make his upcoming tour as a COS a success. We wish him well and expect in future to hear only good about him and his work.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
026090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Jun 1930	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3		8. CURRENT STATION Lima	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 December 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
19 May 1972 - 31 October 1972

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of Station	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Acting Chief of Station	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Senior Station Case Officer	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 16 NOV 1972	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

Reviewed by OP/SPD/EPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This fine officer has been DCOS in Lima for nearly a year now, his first crack at this level of responsibility. And for nearly two months of that he was Acting COS during an interregnum which was made easier for Hqs to accept at the time because of Subject's already acknowledged ability and operational judgment.

This officer has many laudable qualities. He was an established, painstaking professional with solid operational background. He has now demonstrated that he is also good at management, at keeping things moving, and at finding time for the little details that so often make the difference. He has a healthy respect for the opposition services (international and local) and weighs his operational decisions carefully in the light of their capabilities. In his present DCOS (and ACOS) responsibilities, he also shows excellent political judgment, knowing what will wash and what probably won't, what is acceptable risk (all things considered) and what is probably asking for trouble. A prudent officer, he looks before he leaps—or asks officers to.

This officer also has an amiable personality, warm and forthcoming with all the people he deals with - and deals with the more effectively as a result. This amiability (and the obvious decency and quiet integrity of the man) does not for a minute, however, get in the way of a good mind getting quickly to the bottom of whatever subject or problem may be before him. He is especially effective working with junior officers and subordinates, explaining the background /CONTINUED/

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
20 October 1972	/s/ Thomas J. Keenan

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
20 October 1972		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
4	Chief of Station	/s/ Richard S. Welch

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully concur in the comments and ratings given in the basic report. There is little to add to what has been said above or previously about this officer.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 November 1972	Deputy Chief, WH Division	James E. Flannery

SECRET

Section C continued......

of his decisions or analysis of the problem succinctly and tactfully.

Subject deserves the highest marks for his handling of several of the Station's problem cases, one a high level Government penetration considerably nervous about being an agent at all, another a foot-dragging egotist. Both of these important cases require quick thinking, gentle persuasion, and an adroit persistence in pushing BKCROWN's interests (offensive and defensive) in the midst of a welter of competing factors. Where a light but firm touch is needed, this officer cannot have many equals.

Subject is, as would be expected, held in high regard by his LNFALL colleagues and also by his Peruvian acquaintances. He is also (if the above does not say it) held in very high regard by the rater, who finds his advice on operational and political issues sound and finds him a person to whom any problem can be delegated in full confidence it will be handled fast and well. It is a pleasure to work with him.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 026090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Jun 1930	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3		8. CURRENT STATION Lima, Peru	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL XX REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1972 - 18 May 1972

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of Station and Acting Chief of Station in absence of the COS	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervision of Project covering penetration of government military services and principal political party of the opposition. Case officer for some of the agents in the project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

15 NOV

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The narrative statement in the last Fitness Report on Subject (HPLT-6074, 10 Jan 72) is still largely valid. This individual has in all ways proven himself as a keen, mature operations officer, supervisor and Deputy Chief of Station. Upon my departure (18 May 1972) he will be in charge for approximately six weeks until the new COS arrives. I have every reason to believe that during this period his actions and decisions will reflect credit on the Station and the organization in general. He enjoys the complete confidence and support of all Station personnel and is well-prepared to successfully meet the challenges which lie ahead.

It has been a special pleasure knowing and serving with such an officer.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 16 May 1972	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Thomas J. Keenan

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 7	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 May 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Stewart Burton

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The above represents the COS' end-of-tour rating of Mr. Keenan, and following fairly close on the heels of the previous fitness report, it adds little to the previous narrative.

Since the COS in Lima is physically located outside the Station area, Mr. Keenan's normal function is to serve as *de facto* chief of operations and office manager. With the COS' departure in May, Mr. Keenan was serving as Acting Chief of Station. He maintained the tempo of Station operations and activity under what have been for some time a rather hostile operational climate in Peru.

continued

DATE 13 November 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, WH Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE James E. Flannery James E. Flannery

SECRET

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT, Reviewing Official's Comments - continued:

As probably is apparent from past fitness reports and other indicators, Mr. Keenan is considered one of the Division's officers who thus far has shown the drive and ability to move ahead of most of his age/class peers. His potential remains to be established.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 026090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 June 1930	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer DCOS	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3		8. CURRENT STATION Lima, Peru	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- XX CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- XX ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 29 Feb 72

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1971 - 31 December 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of Station and Acting Chief of Station in absence of the COS	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervision of Project covering the penetration of government military services and principal political party of the opposition. Case officer for some of the agents in the project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

23 FEB 1972

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In the brief three months Subject has been at the Station, he has moved rapidly not only to thoroughly acquaint himself with his specific responsibilities but also with all aspects of the Station's activities. His equable nature, ability to deal successfully with people of all descriptions and dispositions and solid operational background make him a most welcome member of the Station staff. As COS, I am particularly grateful for his services.

Among his duties is that of supervising closely the activities of two junior officers - which he does extremely well. Being one who readily commands respect, they readily seek him out for advise and consultation and are learning much under his masterly tutelage.

Subject is also coordinating Station efforts to penetrate the military and is already achieving some positive results. A recent military recruitment was made by another officer closely assisted and encouraged by Subject. The latter is now handling this new source, which could well become one of the Station's most productive.

Subject has clearly demonstrated his managerial talent and acuity in the handling of funds and other resources. I would predict a most successful tour of duty for this fine officer in Lima and foresee marked progress toward Station operational objectives as a result of his presence.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
7 January 1972	/s/ Thomas Keenan

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
3	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
7 Jan 72	COS	/s/ Stewart Burton

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above ratings and comments. While it is indeed a little early to make truly valid and perceptive remarks, we have also noticed from our vantage point back here the steadying influence Mr. Keenan has exerted on two highly imaginative and active but relatively inexperienced Station members to which the COS alludes in his commentary. We too foresee a very successful tour for this talented officer and agree that the Station is indeed fortunate to have him present at this important time when operational prospects in Peru are so rapidly improving.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
14 February 1972	Deputy Chief, WH/3	Richard L. Conolly Richard L. Conolly

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	026090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Jan 30	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS 14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3	8. CURRENT STATION Bogota, Colombia		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1971 to 13 July 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conduct Station REDTOP operations	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Agent handling	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Development of new contacts and recruitment	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Operational reporting and project management	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervise one case officer and intel assistant	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Liaison with other LNPURE components	S

3 Aug 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PP

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 026090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Jun 1930	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH		8. CURRENT STATION Bogota	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Jan 70 - 31 March 7[illegible]

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	Conduct Station REDTOP operations DE34	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	Agent handling DE62	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	Development of new contacts and recruitment DE15	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	Operational reporting and project management	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	Supervise one case officer and intel assistant	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	Liaison with other LNPURE components DE40 28 APR 1971	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 1-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper. This officer has continued to give a uniformly strong or better performance during the rating period. Comments in his previous fitness report continue to apply. He has received slightly lower ratings for some specific duties in Section B only because he received a well-deserved promotion last year and now must be evaluated in comparison with other GS-14's. As can be seen from the rating, even at this new level we feel he is giving a fine performance in comparison with his new peers.

Although the Station cannot claim any breakthrough in the REDTOP field during the rating period, this officer's work continued high in quality and quantity. He added three new members to our stable of REDTOP access agents, developed an intensive target analysis program and improved our REDTOP reporting in general to the point where it has been commended by Headquartets. The most recent Hdqs evaluation stated: "The efforts against PTL Soviets show imagination and sound analysis, and reporting has improved greatly. The changes in the PTL are reasonable and the Station's support operations are well-tailored to provide information of use in programming human access to the Soviets on the PTL. Lastly, plans fr the next half-year are realistic. We are encouraged by the Station's unmistakable positive attitude about the prospects of the effort against this difficult target." Working against this frustrating and difficult target, this officer has retained his (cont.)

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT and reviewing official's comments

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
12 April 1971	/s/ Thomas Keenan

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 April 1971	DCOS	/s/ Wallace Mills

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL I concur with the rating officer's evaluation and comment and would like to stress that the only reason his letter rating has dropped from outstanding to a solid strong is that he is now being rated as a GS-14 and not as a GS-13. A comment is also in order in regard to his possible cautiousness which is mentioned in the narrative portion of the report. Subject is a truly professional officer and especially adept at CI/FI. He is therefore able to quickly spot some weaknesses in proposed operations and quite properly and always accurately, points these out. On the other hand, in the Latin American environment some risks are acceptable which would not be tolerable in a situation where a higher degree of professionalism is mandatory. At times I have been in the anomalous position of approving an operation which Subject, perceptibly (cont)

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 April 1971	COS	/s/ /Dino J. Pionzio

SECRET

SECRET

Continuation of Section C of Fitness Report on NIARCOS

enthusiasm, imagination and drive. He has built good photo and audio programs and a support mechanism which give us excellent coverage of the target. He has then gone further into analyses of individual targets. The groundwork has been laid methodically; what we lack is luck to recruit that most elusive of sources--a Soviet.

I have no doubt this officer has additional growth potential. He has unusual drive and motivation; he shows imagination with good judgment. He combines this with a broad background of experience in FI, CI and operational support work and excellent tradecraft. He should guard against a tendency to be over-cautious, but is intelligent, ambitious, perceptive, and has all the attributes necessary to do a good job in his next assignment as DCOS at a moderate-sized station. This will give him an opportunity to show adaptability in a major supervisory position.

This officer has high personal standards. One of his strongest characteristics is his decisiveness and ability to organize his time, recognizing priorities and accomplishing his work quickly. He never misses a deadline. His work is thorough but cuts through verbiage to the essentials. He accepts responsibility well and once an assignment is made can be depended upon to take care of it without further follow-up by the supervisor. He is mature in his attitude toward JKLANCE and both he and his family observe the highest standards of personal conduct. His wife, who is bi-lingual, adds considerably to his contact work. They are popular in the community. In sum, this employee is a proven case officer who is about to take on managerial responsibility; he has every qualification to do equally well in this field.

* * *

Continuation of Section D., Item 3. (Comments by Reviewing Official)

and correctly, has indicated as having some rather strong weaknesses. However, this comment should not be construed as indicating lack of aggressiveness in Subject. He is, in fact, very aggressive in developing operational contacts and in making recruitments. In sum, Subject is one of our best all-around officers with a great breadth of experience, a fine potential for growth, and a sharp intelligence coupled with unusual discipline. We shall miss him and his wife and are certain he will do well in his new post.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 020090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 06/29/30	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3	8. CURRENT STATION Bogota		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conduct Station REDTOP Operations	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Agent Handling	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Development of New Contacts and Recruitment	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Operational Reporting and Project Management	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervise one case officer and intel assistant	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Liaison with other LNPURE components	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

FORM 7-60 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer continues to make an outstanding contribution to the Station. The narrative comments of the previous fitness report continue to apply to this employee who, despite the well-known frustrations of work in the REDTOP field, has maintained his drive and enthusiasm and made considerable progress in developing our REDTOP program to the point where we are promptly aware of the movements and activities of MHHARSH personnel and now have a stable of access agents who are contributing regularly to our files of personality and vulnerability data on selected MHHARSH targets. The files which he has set up are a model of organization and thoroughness. He has drawn on all aspects of the Station's work and potential to build his program.

During the year this officer has either personally, or through his agents, recruited five new access agents. He located, staffed and organized a new observation post. He completed work on a complicated prospective audio installation which finally aborted, due to uncontrollable factors. Meanwhile he continued to improve the production of his existing agents and the organization and smooth operation of his small section. He has done a good job of guiding another officer in his first attempts at FI work. His reporting is exceptional, always timely and complete.

Of special note was the officer's progress in entertaining and developing a wide range of contacts in both the Colombian (continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
13 February 1970	/s/ Thomas J. Keenan

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
13 February 1970	Ops Officer	/s/Wallace A. Mills

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully concur with the rater's evaluation. Subject is the strongest officer at this Station and is one of the best operations officers I have encountered in my 19 years with the organization. We call your attention to HLBT-4028, dated 25 February 1969, in which we strongly recommended that he be promoted promptly to GS-14. We reiterate this recommendation with some urgency. He will now be 40 years old in June and if we expect to keep officers of this caliber we must move them along. I am not aware that we are so rich in talent that we can afford the luxury of slighting officers who have the potential of Subject.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
bruary 1970	COS	/s/ Dino J. Pionzio

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/PD/EAB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 026090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 06/29/30	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. DPP/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3		8. CURRENT STATION Bogota	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1968 -31 March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conduct Station REDTOP Operations	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assists COS as DeFacto Ops Chief	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervise one Intel Assistant	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Agent Handling	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Development of new contacts and Recruitment	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Operational Reporting	- O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

FORM 6-68 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

It is a pleasure to write a Fitness Report on this officer. Always a strong performer, Subject has continued to mature and improve during the reporting period. Early in the year he took over the Station's operational support team for several months, handling them extremely well, while developing a new team on the outside. In July he assumed primary responsibility for the Station's new REDTOP program and has done an outstanding job, of keeping abreast of REDTOP activities here and exploiting those opportunities which have occurred, despite a seriously understaffed section. At the same time he is continuing to direct one outside contract agent, service an audio operation and still found time to develop another particularly important new audio operation up to its final stages of implementation. These tasks reflect the Station's confidence in and reliance on Subject who is giving an overall outstanding performance.

Subject's greatest strengths are good judgement, enthusiasm, dynamism and an ability to grasp the major elements of any task and handle them quickly and intelligently. He is personable and mixes well. During the year he has made excellent progress in expanding his contacts throughout the Colombian community and selecting and developing those that can be ofuse to the Station. He is aided in this by his wife who is attractive, has excellent Spanish and is a great addition to his work.

Cont'd.....

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 Feb. 1969	/s/ Thomas J. Keenan

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 Feb. 1969	Ops Officer, DCOS	/s/ Wallace A. Mills

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COS fully concurs with above appraisal. Subject definitely falls into the category of potential Chief of Station material. He has uncommon operational judgment, broad professional experience, a keen sense of priorities, handles people well and combines the unusual traits of being well liked yet firm. Devoted to his job he works long hours without diminishing his efficiency. Although respectful to his superiors he is decisive. An excellent family man he has no bad habits. His wife is of great assistance to him in his work. COS intends to recommend subject for promotion to GS-14 in the next cycle in the belief that men of subject's ability and potential should be brought along rapidly. He will be 39 years old next June and it is essential that he be made to feel that

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 Feb. 1969	Chief of Station	/s/ Dino J. Pionzio

SECRET

Continuation of Fitness Report - Section C......

Subject accepts new responsibilities readily; he shows initiative and has imagination; he displays reasonable cost-consciousness, and reacts well to supervision. Above all, Subject is energetic, recognizes priorities, and gets things done.

This man is an outstanding officer who is enthusiastic concerning WOFIRM work, and should continue to be given additional responsibilities and the grades and titles that go with such responsibilities. Director of the REDTOP program in Bogota is a major step forward, but we have just completed the preparation stage. With the success we expect him to have during the remainder of his tour, Subject should be ready to assume a position as deputy chief of an equivalant Station. At this time there are no apparent limitations to Subject's prospects. In recognition of his outstanding performance and solid potential subject is strongly recommended for early promotion from GS-13 to GS-14.

Continuation of Fitness Report - Comments by Reviewing Official

he is progressing with our other outstanding officers in the same age group.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
026090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH June 1930	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3		8. CURRENT STATION Bogota, Colombia	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January - 20 May 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Agent handling and exploitation	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Management of and guidance to two unilateral surveillance teams	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operational management of project activities	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Operational (including contact) reporting	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Contact and Cultivation Activities	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-63 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUN 3 11 37 AM '68

MAIL ROOM

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
14 May 68	/s/ Thomas J. Keenan

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
11 months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
14 May 68	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ Paul VanMarx

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the letter rating of the rating officer.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
14 May 68	Chief of Station	/s/ Richard Sampson

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 026090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH June 1930	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT WH		8. CURRENT STATION Bogota	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- XX CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- XX ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 July-31 December 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Agent handling and exploitation	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Direction of Covert Action (propaganda) activities	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operational management of project activities	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Operational, including contact, reporting	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Contact and cultivation activities	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 10 FEB	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This employee has been at this station since June MAY 1967 and has been assigned the following operational duties: he has started from scratch the organization of a second, unilateral surveillance team consisting of one principal agent and three foot surveillants and investigators; he is giving guidance and direction to one WOLADY contract agent who, in turn, handles Station's WOLIME programs in the press and student fields; he also gives guidance and additional on-the-job training to a contract agent of Venezuelan nationality who is used in recruitment approaches, the handling of out-of-town penetrations of subversive groups, and in a support capacity.

This employee carries out the above cited tasks with initiative, alacrity and with common sense. He requires the absolute minimum of supervision. His extensive experience in his previous assignment abroad has helped greatly in getting the new surveillance and investigative team organized quickly. The direction he has given in the WOLIME field, where a reorganization was called for and is being carried out under his supervision and guidance, has been excellent, especially considering the fact that this is his first experience in the WOLIME field. The Venezuelan contract agent has carried out a number of recruitment pitches (including false flag ones) under the close supervision of this employee, who demonstrated a fine knowledge of technique and a good sense of counter intelligence procedures.

This employee is an extremely hard worker, writes well and has a well organized mind. His operational reporting is extensive and invariably on time.

(Continued on annex)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
5 February 1968	/s/ Thomas J. Keenan

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
7	XXXXXXXXXXXX

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
5 February 1968	Deputy Chief of Station	Paul Van Marx

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the narrative comments and numerical ratings given by the Rating Officer. I have found this employee to be a particularly mature case officer who possesses an excellent knowledge of tradecraft and requires little or no supervision to carry out his assignments. His work is of an excellent quality and he has proved to be a definite asset to this station. His only area of weakness is that he must be more assertive and aggressive in developing operational contacts of use to the Station. This has been discussed with him and he is planning to devote more effort in the future to correct this weakness.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
5 February 1968	Chief of Station, Bogota	Richard Sampson

Annex to Fitness Report

Section C, continued

He has demonstrated an excellent sense of cost consciousness.

This employee has a cheerful disposition and gets along well with his colleagues. His willingness to help out others certainly contributes to the smooth functioning and pleasant atmosphere at the Station. The only criticism, and a minor one indeed, is that this employee, with the many positive assets he has (including his wife who speaks fluent Spanish), could be more forceful in the field of developing new assets of operational interest to the Station.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 026090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Keenan, Thomas J.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: June 1930
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-12
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/FI
8. CURRENT STATION: HQ

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- XX CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- XX ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1967
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1/66 - 12/66

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists C/WH/FI in providing day-to-day staff supervision and guidance to FI/CI activities in the WH area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reviews and analyzes CI/FI projects in WH Division and prepares comments, based on his findings, for the senior officers of the Division.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 On basis of continuing review of operational traffic, calls attention to actual or potential difficulties and makes recommendations for improvements.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Drafts guidances and other correspondence.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Represents C/WH/FI in meetings and on committees.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-0000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

FEB 15 11 05 AM '67

This officer's duties remained the same as during the previous rating period and he has continued to discharge with the same high degree of effectiveness, industriousness and cheerfulness. Now that he has been under my supervision for 16 months, I find my first impressions - reflected in last year's fitness report - confirmed to the effect that subject is a strong officer possessing all the necessary qualifications for exceptional growth potential.

In dealing with Branch personnel, who often are senior to him in grade, age and experience, subject conducted himself with great tact and discretion, yet with sufficient firmness to achieve the desired results. In reviewing the FI projects of the Division he has demonstrated that he has a good sense for values, an appreciation of counter-intelligence and security factors and a proper degree of cost consciousness.

Subject did an excellent job at the staff level and has kept well on top of a very heavy paper flow. He is well-disciplined in his personal and working habits without losing his sense of humor, inquisitiveness and enthusiasm. All in all, a very fine fellow to have next to you.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
31 January 1967	Thomas

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
16		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
31 January 1967	C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This has my full concurrence. This officer has considerable potential.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 February 1967	WH/EXO	D. C. Marelius

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
026090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
KEENAN, Thomas J.

2. DATE OF BIRTH
29 Jun 30

3. SEX
M

4. GRADE
GS-12

5. SD
D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Ops Officer

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
DDP/WH/[redacted] FI

8. CURRENT STATION
Headquarters

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 Jan - 31 December 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists C/WH/FI in providing day-to-day staff supervision and guidance to FI/CI activities in the WH area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reviews and analyzes FI/CI projects in WH Division and prepares comments, based on his findings, for the senior officers of the Division.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 On basis of continuing review of operational traffic, calls attention to actual or potential difficulties and makes recommendations for improvements.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Drafts guidances and other correspondence.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Represents C/WH/FI in meetings and on committees.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

21 DEC 1965

FORM 6-63 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
[illegible]
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain rating given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

While Subject has been under my supervision only for the past three months, the following comments reflect also the opinion of the previous supervisor.

Mr. Keenan is an exceptionally strong officer. Following a successful tour in Mexico, he was assigned to the WH Division Staff in a capacity which required not only intelligence and a knowledge of operational procedures, but also a good measure of tact and perception in dealing with Branch personnel senior to him in rank and experience. Mr. Keenan adapted himself to the requirements of this assignment to our complete satisfaction.

Subject is industrious, fast in his work, and enthusiastic. Despite the inevitable demands of a large, young family, he has not permitted his domestic responsibilities to interfere with his official duties. His performance on temporary duty in the Dominican Republic merits special recognition.

The nature of a Headquarters staff assignment precludes spectacular achievements. The excitement and glamor which make field assignments challenging and rewarding are absent here. Instead, there is a routine and sometimes almost overwhelming flow of paper which has to be massaged and managed, dull as it may be. Many a young officer's motivation did not measure up to this test. Those officers who work on a desk or a staff as effectively and cheerfully as they do in the field are the ones who are likely to possess and develop the qualities needed for senior positions. Mr. Keenan is in this category. He has considerable growth potential.

IFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
16 Dec 65	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
3		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
16 Dec '65	C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar Thomas Polgar

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I am not personally acquainted with this Officer's work. However, inquiries have borne out the rater's high regard for his work and prospects. I concur in full with this report.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 December 1965	WH/Executive Officer /or/ DC/WHD	Donald C. Marelius /or/ Jacob D. Esterline

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: --026090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KEENAN, Thomas J,	2. DATE OF BIRTH June 1930	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/P&O/A		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 30 November-31 December 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Reading in to CI work in WH and reading in to operational support (audio, surveillance, intercept) work in WH.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

22 JAN 1965

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping [illegible] relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. [illegible] training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Keenan has been only a month on the job but has pitched in so vigorously that he has made a more definite impression than would ordinarily be given one in a month's time. The work here and the cases he has been dealing with are unfamiliar to him but I have found him very quick to absorb a briefing, able to ask the right and most searching questions, and fast at absorbing the key elements of a case and defining the "problem" from reading of a case file.

He is in the process of learning his present job but he is learning quickly and I have developed a feeling of confidence in passing things to him to "look at" or to do. I have not seen enough of his writing to ~~make a~~ judgment of his analytical ability or of the clarity with which he can put ideas forward.

He has a good manner, is energetic, responsive, and bright, and his attitude is thoughtful and perceptive. I would assume that he would be a year or so in his present position and his assignment after that should be tied to his next overseas post. I feel he shows the qualities and interest (and has the experience from his time in Mexico) to work against our hard and serious targets: the Soviet and their collaborators of the bloc, and I suggest his future be pointed in that direction. He can learn a great deal about work against these targets in his current position.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 31 December 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Thomas J. Keenan

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 1	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 31 December 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/PO/A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John Horton

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 15 January 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, WHD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Keenan, Thomas J.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 June 1930
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-10
5. SD:
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH 3
8. CURRENT STATION: Mexico

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Oct. 1961 to 30 September 1962

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Complete responsibility for a highly sensitive, unilateral technical operation which involves supervision of twenty-five agents, including one senior (GS-13) career agent.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervisory responsibility for a technical and investigating operation targeted primarily against the local Soviet official delegation. (Supervision of 11 agents.)	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsibility for sensitive double agent operation targeted against the Soviets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responsibility in Mexico for an operation involving a singleton agent operating as a third national. This operation includes responsibility for maintaining an SW link with the agent during those periods he is not in Mexico.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Alternate (to COS) Case Officer for a LAURICLE project of continuing importance; also alternate Case Officer (to DCOS) for two important support projects.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Preparation of necessary memoranda, dispatches, project actions, and other correspondence attendant to the operations assigned.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject's duties and responsibilities as an Operations Officer are characterized by managerial and supervisory responsibility for several important operations. Although subject's grade (GS-10) is considerably below that of all other Station Operations Officers, it is noted that his duties, responsibilities and authority are comparable to those possessed by officers with two to four grades higher rank.

Subject is a mature, competent, conscientious and thoroughly dependable officer who always performs his assignments in an excellent manner and willingly assumes responsibilities which are usually associated with officers of higher rank.

Subject does not have any significant weaknesses. His command of the Spanish language is entirely adequate for most operational needs and is continually improving.

Based on subject's personal qualifications, his past performance and his very weighty and important operational responsibilities, it is strongly and urgently recommended that subject be promoted to at least GS-11 and that serious consideration be given to a double promotion to GS-12.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	**BY EMPLOYEE**	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 15 Nov 62	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ Thomas J. Keenan	
2.	**BY SUPERVISOR**	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 Nov 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Winston M. Scott
3.	**BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records & Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT: State Department Promotion of Thomas J. Keenan

1. The Department has informed this office that effective 5 August 1962 subject employee was promoted from FSS-10, $6450 to FSS-9, $6695.

2. Request this notice be placed in the official folder of the employee concerned.

Chief, Central Cover Group

cc: Operating Component Compensation
and Tax Accounts Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 26090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KE[illegible]AN Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 June 1930	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-9
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION FI (Career)	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT WH/III/MEXI	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 November 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 1 Dec 60 - 30 Sept 61

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assistant Case Officer in supervision of sensitive technical operation involving approximately 30 persons	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Alternate Case Officer for surveillance operation	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case Officer for operation covering instructing and directing a REDCAP candidate	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Alternate Case Officer for technical project supporting overall Station operations	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Alternate Case Officer for LAURICLE Project	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Case Officer for double agent operation	7

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 6

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							X
							X

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
8-59

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM
Oct 25 2 32 PM '61

Subject, a Case Officer at this Station since 3 February 1960, continues his outstanding performance in assignments normally handled by a Case Officer of a considerably higher grade.

Subject carries out his assignments with a minimum of supervision and is very willing to accept responsibilities of any type assignment to him.

Subject is rated very highly in Section B of this Fitness Report and this has been done because Subject has earned these ratings in his own right and in comparison with the work done by other Case Officers at this Station.

It is strongly recommended that Subject be given special consideration for promotion. It would be unfortunate for KUBARK to lose a man of this calibre through neglect of his career promotions. In addition to this superior work, Subject is the head of a family of six (6). As a result of his low salary, he is relegated to an inferior standing in the local society, based upon what a man can acquire through his earnings. Subject's contacts and currently high standard operations require that he spend and appear to be making considerably more than he is currently paid by KUBARK. It would seem unreasonable for KUBARK to expect a man of this calibre to make high level contacts and yet not be able to represent himself as a man in the economic level which his responsibilities represent.

SECTION F — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10 October 1961	/s/ Thomas J. Keenan

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
20 Months	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	☐	REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 October 1961	Case Officer	/s/ Frank R. Estancona

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

XX	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I would strongly recommend that this officer be given an immediate promotion.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 October 1961	WH Division ~~Chief of Station~~	/s/ J C King

SECRET

247

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3 Jan 1961 ✓

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER ✓

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Keenan (First) Thomas (Middle) J.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 June 1930	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-9
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION F1 (Career)	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT WHD/3	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From Feb. 1960 - To Dec. 1960

SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Asst. Case Officer in Supervision of sensitive technical operation involving approx. 30 persons	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Alternate Case officer for surveillance operation	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer for operation covering, instructing and directing a REDCAP candidate.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Alternate Case officer for technical project supporting overall Station operations.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Alternate Case officer for LAURICLE Project	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee.

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							X

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 3 11 25 AM '61
MAIL ROOM

SECTION E — **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is a young, aggressive Case Officer assigned to this Station since 3 February 1960. Prior to his assignment to this post, he was a JOT. Subject's greatest strength lies in the fact that he is extremely willing to undertake any task assigned to him regardless of its desireability, difficulty or the project;s time consuming properties. Once given an assignment, Subject requires a minimum of supervision. Subject is especially suited to new assignments because of his adaptability to new circumstances. Subject's worst handicap is his youth coupled with his low grade in respect to the supervisory responsibilities assigned him. It is believed this person is a good candidate for advancement in view of his outstanding performance at this Station.

It will be noted that Subject is rated very highly in Sections B, C and D. These ratings are well earned by Subject in his own right and are even more pronounced when considered in respect to the performance of other more senior officers at this Station.

SECTION F — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 19 December 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Thomas J. Keenan

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 months.	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (*Specify*):

DATE 19 December 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR IO/FI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Frank R. Estancona

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 19 December 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Winston M. SCOTT

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REPORT
ACHIEVEMENT RATING

NAME: KEENAN, Thomas J.

AGENCY: Army | GRADE: GS-9

PLACE: FSI, Washington, D.C. | DATE: 1-10-60

LANGUAGE COURSE: Spoken Spanish

DATES COVERED BY COURSE: FROM 9-21-59 TO 1-5-60

CLASS HOURS PER WEEK	LENGTH OF COURSE	AMOUNT COMPLETED	NO. OF CLASS HOURS COMPLETED	NO. OF LAB HOURS COMPLETED
30	16 WEEKS MONTHS	15 1/2 WEEKS MONTHS	408	

COURSE MATERIAL	NO. OF UNITS TO COURSE	NO. OF UNITS COMPLETED
FSI Spanish - Basic Course	60	45

OTHER MATERIALS COMPLETED: Special Program

EVALUATION: A EXCELLENT B VERY GOOD C GOOD D FAIR E POOR

SPOKEN LANGUAGE

PRONUNCIATION	A	B	[✓ C]	D	E	VERSATILITY	A	[✓ B]	C	D	E
GRAMMATICAL ACCURACY	A	B-	C	D	E	COMPREHENSION	A	[✓ B]	C	D	E
ASSIMILATION OF VOCABULARY	A	B	[✓ C]	D	E	OVERALL FLUENCY	A	B-	C	D	E
CONTROL OF FIXED UTTERANCES	A	[✓ B]	C	D	E						

WRITING SYSTEM

SIGHT READING OF MATERIAL COVERED	A	B	C	D	E	AIDED READING OF NEW MATERIAL ON NEXT LEVEL	A	B	C	D	E
SIGHT READING OF NEW MATERIAL ON SAME LEVEL	A	B	C	D	E	GENERAL COMPREHENSION	A	B	C	D	E

GENERAL ACHIEVEMENT RATING

NATURAL LANGUAGE APTITUDE	A	B	[✓ C]	D	E	APPLICATION	[✓ A]	B	C	D	E
MOTIVATION	[✓ A]	B	C	D	E	OVERALL ACHIEVEMENT	A	B-	C	D	E

NO. OF STUDENTS IN CLASS	STANDING OF STUDENT IN CLASS	ATTENDENCE OF STUDENT
11	lower third	☒ REGULAR ☐ IRREGULAR

REASON(S) FOR IRREGULAR ATTENDENCE

TO ACHIEVE MINIMUM ABSOLUTE RATING OF S-3 AND R-3 (SEE REVERSE SIDE) THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE IS NEEDED

REVIEWED BY	RATED BY
Frank A. Rice Head, Language Testing Unit	David A. Griffin David A. Griffin Linguistic Scientist

(See reverse side)

14-00000

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REPORT
ABSOLUTE RATING

[illegible], Thomas [illegible]

Washington, D.C.

REMARKS

*Rating based on classroom performance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

ABSOLUTE CATEGORIES

[illegible]

Frank A. [illegible]
Head, [illegible] Testing Unit

[illegible]
Linguistic Scientist

8 OCT 1959

OCT 1959

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KEENAN, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 June 1930	3. SEX ~~Fe~~male	4. GRADE GS-9
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/III/C-A/DO	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 October 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 25 Jan 59 To 30 Sep 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Prepare draft replies for Stations' operational guidance.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Contact other Headquarters components in assisting the Stations operations.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Process project renewals.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Process FCA's and OA's for Costa Rica and Nicaragua and make necessary followups.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Lend Stations operational support.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee.

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):						X	

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-53 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(41)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM
OCT 2 17 PM '59

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This individual is alert, conscientious and readily takes [illegible] and accomplished his objectives with thoroughness and dispatch. He is a valuable asset and gets on well with his co-workers. He gives promise of being a sound intelligence officer. He shows no weaknesses.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION This employee has been in training since 21 September 1959.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 30 September 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer-[illegible], Con A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Walter Frantz Walter Frantz

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 1 Oct 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/ADI/TST	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert H. Dahlgren

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

FOREIGN LANGUAGE APTITUDE AND EXPERIENCE REPORT

DATE OF TESTING

NAME

OFFICE

☐ MALE
☐ FEMALE

The category checked below is an interpretation of the scores made by the person named above on a battery of foreign language aptitude tests. The relationships between test performance and subsequent training performance of trainees in Agency language training courses are indicated by the graphs next to the aptitude categories. The graphs to the left are for women and the graphs to the right are for men. From these graphs you can read for each aptitude category the probability that a person in that category will perform in an Agency foreign language training course at an average or better-than-average level. For example, 22 percent of the women who obtain an aptitude rating of "8" can be expected to be average or better in course performance, while 5 percent of the men with ratings of "8" can be expected to be average or better in course performance. A man needs an aptitude rating of "6" to have about the same expectation of success in language training as a woman with a rating of "8." At the other end of the scale, 80 percent of either men or women who obtain aptitude ratings of "2" can be expected to do average or better-than-average work in training. The differences in relationship are due to differences between men and women in both training performance, and test scores. On the average women are somewhat higher on both.



Since many things other than aptitudes enter into the determination of training course performance, in any class of students there will usually be some whose performance will be better than would be expected from their test scores, just as there will likely be some whose performance is poorer than expected. STRENGTH OF MOTIVATION, PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH A FOREIGN LANGUAGE, and other factors should be considered in selecting people for language training and in interpreting language training results. For example, the number of languages previously studied or learned and the amount of academic and nonacademic language-learning experience are factors not measured by the tests but are indicative of probable success in learning a foreign language. Whether such experience was in the same language as the one to be studied or in a different one is, of course, an additional relevant factor.

NUMBER OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES STUDIED OR LEARNED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL -

MONTHS OF ACADEMIC TRAINING			NONACADEMIC EXPERIENCE (1 year or more)	
HIGH SCHOOL	COLLEGE	OTHER	READING OR WRITING	SPEAKING

DATE

SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, A & E STAFF
/s/ CHARLES A. [illegible]

NOTE: This report may be shown to the individual concerned.

FORM 1674

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director of Personnel

DATE: 3 MAR 1959

FROM : Director of Training

SUBJECT: Summary of JOT Career of Thomas J. Keenan

1. Statement of Transfer

Junior Officer Trainee Thomas J. Keenan has been reassigned from the T/O of the JOT Program to the T/O of WH Division effective 25 January 1959. Following is a summary of the accomplishments of Mr. Keenan while he was a Junior Officer Trainee.

2. Basis for Selection by JOTP

Keenan came to the Agency on the JOT Program at GS-7 on 20 May 1957. He received his B.A. in History from Marquette in 1953. He spent four years in the Navy as a Lieutenant. He was a Commo officer, having supervision of thirty men. His high motivation - he turned down an 18 month training program with IBM - coupled with his fine personal attributes, made him appear to be a good JOT candidate.

3. Formal Training

After EOD Keenan attended IOC from 27 May to 21 June 1957, receiving two Excellent evaluations. From 24 to 28 June he was on interim assignment in FBID. He attended ITC from 1 to 28 July where he earned three Excellent grades. From 28 July to 23 August he was assigned on an interim basis to WE/Spain. From 26 August to 27 September he was registered in a special TSS course. He gained good ratings. After an interim assignment to the CI Staff for one month Keenan was attached for on-the-desk training to WH/1 on 8 January 1958. In March he entered the Operations Course, where he continued until 7 June. In this course he received four high satisfactory and two medium satisfactory grades.

4. On-the-Desk Training

On-the-desk training for Keenan in WH/1 was largely as assistant to the desk CS and FI Officer. In January 1959 he took over as Chief of the Costa Rican desk.

5. Evaluation of the Subject's Training

Keenan's evaluations in formal training have been uniformly commendatory. The ITC instructors found that "although he was a bit slow in adjusting to the requirements of the course, during the last two weeks he showed definite progress...his final briefing was excellent...pleasant young man, interested and cooperative...gives promise of being a sound intelligence officer". In the OC his work was good - "performance was highly satisfactory...in face-to-face practical exercises he was effective...acquired a highly satisfactory understanding of the various kinds of Agency operations, revealing a particularly thorough knowledge of CI concepts and methods".

On the desk he proved to be "intelligent, alert, conscientious...enthusiastic and imaginative...gets on well with his co-workers and takes a healthy point of view toward his assignments. His motivation is high".

6. JOTP Opinion of the subject.

Keenan has always made a good impression. He has worked diligently, has made for the smooth operation of the Program, and has received commendation from his supervisors on the desk. It will be very surprising if Keenan does not prove to be a solid, effective officer who will make good progress in the Clandestine Services.

Matthew Baird

MATTHEW BAIRD

59-1-7K-3660

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KEENAN, Thomas J.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 June 1930
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: ST
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OTR/JOTP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: JOT
7. GRADE: GS-7
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 20 February 1958
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 20 May 1957 - 20 February 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one):
☒ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1, OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS BEEN SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 3 Feb 1958
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Willet L. Eccles Willet L. Eccles
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: C/JOTP/TR

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Con.		
Reviewed by		2/20/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 2/10/58
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Robert B. Freeman R. B. Freeman
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: DDTR

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 13 3 08 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Training Courses	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Research on Communist Party Activities	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has proved to be intelligent, alert, conscientious. He takes on new tasks readily and accomplishes his objectives with minimum supervision. He is enthusiastic and imaginative. He gets on well with his co-workers and takes a healthy viewpoint toward his assignments. His motivation is high.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work at about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY ... WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE ... BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KEENAN, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 June 1930	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION ST	
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OTR/JOTP	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE JOT			
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 20 February 1958	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 20 May 1957 - 20 February 1958		

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☒ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 3 Feb 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Willet L. Eccles Willet L. Eccles	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/JOTP/TR

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 2/10/58	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Robert B. Freeman R. B. Freeman	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DDTR

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

BY DATE
2/15

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER:
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
0	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
0	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
0	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
0	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
0	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
0	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
0		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

FEB 13 3 08 PM '58

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

eight

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is at present highly motivated and will undoubtedly remain so if he is given challenging work to do. He is equipped intellectually and emotionally to do fine work if his motivation remains. His potential for a good Agency career is high.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject is at present attached to WH/3 for on-the-desk training for approximately a year prior to an overseas tour.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL.
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	3	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	3	18. IS PERSISTENT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

OFFICE OF TRAINING

FUNCTIONAL TRAINING DIVISION

This certifies that Thomas J. Keenan (026000) **has completed the two day Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Seminar for Supervisors held** 28 - 29 March 1977**. At the conclusion of this two-day session, each participant will be able to describe the following:**

a) The EEO Program and reasons for its existence;

b) A supervisor's responsibility in implementing the program;

c) The procedures for processing EEO complaints;

d) The Agency's past record and the Agency's Affirmative Action Plans; and

e) The significance of Upward Mobility, Federal Women's, and Hispanic Programs in the overall EEO Program.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Donald R. Heady
DONALD R. HEADY
Course Administrator

14-00000

KEENAN, THOMAS L

[illegible] Rhode Island

[illegible] COMMITTMENT

	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
EFFECTIVE DATE	11	[illegible]	[illegible]

NOT AVAILABLE

Commandant [illegible] Naval District

☒ OTHER: Commissioned [illegible]

42 [illegible] Follett St., Fond du Lac, Wis.

STATEMENT OF SERVICE		YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
CREDITABLE FOR BASIC PAY PURPOSES	(1) NET SERVICE THIS PERIOD	3	0	0
	(2) OTHER SERVICE	0	5	13
	(3) TOTAL (Line (1) + line (2))	3	5	13
TOTAL ACTIVE SERVICE		3	4	3
FOREIGN AND/OR SEA SERVICE		0	0	0

National Defense Service Ribbon

Register's Office, Fond du Lac County, Wis.
Received for record [illegible] 16 day of [illegible] A.D. 19[illegible] at 10:30 o'clock A M and recorded in Vol. [illegible] of [illegible] on page 57
[illegible] Register of Deeds

NONE

NONE

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

[illegible], UCMJ
Leadership
Shipboard Comm.
Gen. Communication
Security Classified Matter

☐ Yes ☐ No $10,000 (Free)

N/A

N/A

C [illegible] N/A

"I certify that the information entered in item [illegible] is correct to the best of my knowledge and belief."

PR 209 [illegible] LTR #165 11/7/55.

[illegible] LT SG [illegible]

[illegible] Fond du Lac, Wis.

DD [illegible] 214

For convenience, a Certificate of Eligibility No. [illegible] has been issued by the Veterans Administration to be used for the future request of any Guaranty or Insurance Benefit under Title 38, United States Code that may be available to the person to whom this separation paper was issued.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
026090	KEENAN	THOMAS	J.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 56, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION					

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION					
10	29	76	11	11	76		2			WESTERN HEMISPHERE	911

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. LA 21-77

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 10/29- 11/11/76

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ OCO
☒ C & L DIVISION, CTDR.
☐ C & F DIVISION

☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 1/17/77

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE Mike Manango

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-101

10

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
026090	KEENAN	THOMAS	J

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 38, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
11	04	76					1			GUATEMALA	300

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
✓	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: GUAT 19966 IN090210

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 4 NOV 76

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
OCO		
C & L DIVISION, CTWR.	DATE 11-5-76	SIGNATURE X2007
C & ? DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

☒	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

ROUTING SHEET

TO:

	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIALS
1 DDO				
2 ADDO				
3 C/PLANS				
4 C/OPS				
5 C/SS				
6 C/CCS				
7 C/CI				
8 C/AF				
9 C/DCD				
10 C/DIVD				
11 C/EA				
12 C/EUR				
13 C/FR				
14 C/NE				
15 C/[illegible]				
16 C/LA CT-3	X		13 JUL 1976	
C/LA/MCA				
Tom Keenan				
C/PERS —	Cy filed			

SUSPENSE DATE Cy sent OTR

REMARKS:

The attached compliments, including a "thank you" from DDCI, are for Mr Keenan. Pls. see that they get into his file.

Congratulations!

Thanks,

Ray

SIGNATURE	DATE
EA/DDO	13 Jul 76

FORM 3671 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
4-75 (40)

14-00000

DCI/DDCI   DDO

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T			14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	Ex/Sec		
[✓ 7]	DDO	X		17	D/Pers(for OPF)		x
8	D/DCI/IC			18			
9	D/DCI/NIO			19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE ______________
Date

Remarks:

Please add my thanks to Mr. Keenan for a job well done.

EHKnoche
~~DCI~~/DDCI

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

IN REPLY REFER TO:
Office of the Commandant

Executive Registry
76-2746

76 4568

15 JUN 76

Mr. George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Bush:

I am pleased to report that Mr. Keenan, Central Intelligence Agency Civilian, was among those who successfully completed the course of instruction at the US Army War College during Academic Year 1976 and was awarded a diploma.

This report is my evaluation of Mr. Thomas J. Keenan during his attendance at the US Army War College from 4 August 1975 to 7 June 1976. Attendance at the US Army War College is based on a highly selective process, and only a very small percentage of all those eligible is chosen. The evaluations herein are made in relation to this outstanding group of individuals. No attempt is made to distinguish between graduates on a rank order basis.

Mr. Keenan was one of eight civilians (three from the foreign affairs community) in a class of 227. This total includes 187 Army, 16 Air Force, ten Navy, and six Marine officers of colonel or lieutenant colonel or equivalent Navy rank.

In a class structure such as that outlined above, the task of the civilian student at the USAWC is an especially challenging one. Working in an area outside his normal milieu, his was a dual responsibility. On the one hand, he had to acquaint himself in considerable detail with the military aspects of national security with which, in most instances, he has had relatively little, if any, previous experience. To accomplish this requirement, he did extensive background research in the areas of military policy, military strategy, and defense management to keep abreast of his professional military colleagues. On the other hand, his foreign policy expertise was in heavy demand by his military colleagues. In consequence, his contribution to various international relations aspects of seminar group efforts tended to be disproportionately large. Moreover, as the sole civilian voice in a seminar group of fourteen highly experienced military officers, he also ensured that adequate weight was given to civilian viewpoints in the group's discussions. Much, therefore, depended on his ability to develop rapport with his military colleagues and on his intelligence, knowledge, skill and persuasiveness. In a very real sense he was a teacher as well as a student.

Among the objectives of the curriculum is enhancing the competence of selected officers to assume command and leadership responsibilities and to function in key staff assignments in major Army, joint, and combined headquarters and in planning and policymaking positions at the seat of government. To achieve this and related objectives, the curriculum consists of three major segments: The Common Overview, the Electives Phase, and the Military Studies Program. The Common Overview segment includes four courses: The United States and the World Environment, Command and Management, Strategic Military Studies, and the Military Strategy Seminar. In the Elective Phase, students take at least four elective courses out of an offering of 54 courses. The large number of selections provides an opportunity for students to tailor the curriculum to meet professional needs. Participation in the Military Studies Program is optional and can be substituted for one or more electives, depending on the scope of the research subject selected. In addition, the ten-month curriculum includes voluntary programs and field trips.

Mr. Keenan acted as assistant seminar group chairman in the core curriculum course entitled, "The United States and the World Environment." He and one other student edited the final seminar report, and he wrote that part of the report dealing with US policies in the Western Hemisphere, including an excellent treatment of the Panama Canal negotiations. Mr. Keenan was also assistant seminar group chairman during the "Strategic Military Studies" course, and again his facile pen was put to good use on the editorial subgroup. His calm, steadying approach to issues won the respect of his military colleagues, and his extensive knowledge of Latin America was particularly valuable to the group's deliberations. In the "Military Strategy Seminar," Mr. Keenan proved himself an excellent student of strategy and an articulate, well-prepared debater in the seminar discussions.

In the electives phase Mr. Keenan took four courses (the required number): "The Power Potential of Developing Nations," "Contemporary Issues in US Foreign Policy," "Strategic Issues of World War II," and "Third World: Dynamics of Social Change"; he audited "Latin America: Power Structures and the Current Scene." Mr. Keenan prepared carefully for his elective courses and contributed his views in a concise, orderly manner.

Since the vast majority of the Army War College student body live together on the post, a very important part of the overall War College experience is the social and extracurricular interaction which takes place outside the lecture hall and the seminar rooms. Some civilian students at the Army War College need considerable time to adjust to the military subculture, but Mr. Keenan enjoyed a relaxed camaraderie with his military colleagues from the beginning. Somewhat quiet and reticent by nature, Mr. Keenan nonetheless was enthusiastic about the College's many offerings in his own low-keyed way. This soft-spoken demeanor masked a tough competitor, whether it was in seminar discussions or on the tennis courts, where he was a member of the Army War College team. Clearly, he was popular with his classmates and respected by them for his professional attainments and his personal qualities.

In the Army War College classes with which I have been personally familiar, Mr. Keenan is the first of his agency's representatives who had regional, as contrasted with functional, expertise. Mr. Keenan's thorough knowledge of Latin America made him a valued member of the class and a distinct contributor.

Mr. Keenan's demonstrated capacity to work effectively and cooperatively with officers of the military services and other civilian agencies would, I hope, be factored into the consideration of his onward assignments.

A statement specifically regarding estimated "general officer or equivalent civilian supergrade" potential has been intentionally omitted from this and all AY 76 reports. The evaluation system for USAWC students is designed principally to portray the student's aptitudes, capabilities, accomplishments, and progress within an academic environment. This does not provide an adequate basis for rendering a finite evaluation on general officer or equivalent potential, although it does not preclude making tentative judgments as to the abilities of the "whole man."

Sincerely,

Dewitt C. Smith Jr

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR
Major General, USA
Commandant

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Executive Registry
76-7246

#43716 76 456

Office of the Commandant

28 JUN 76

Mr. George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Bush:

I am pleased to report that Mr. Keenan, Central Intelligence Agency Civilian, was among those who successfully completed the course of instruction at the US Army War College during Academic Year 1976 and was awarded a diploma.

This report is my evaluation of Mr. Thomas J. Keenan during his attendance at the US Army War College from 4 August 1975 to 7 June 1976. Attendance at the US Army War College is based on a highly selective process, and only a very small percentage of all those eligible is chosen. The evaluations herein are made in relation to this outstanding group of individuals. No attempt is made to distinguish between graduates on a rank order basis.

Mr. Keenan was one of eight civilians (three from the foreign affairs community) in a class of 227. This total includes 187 Army, 16 Air Force, ten Navy, and six Marine officers of colonel or lieutenant colonel or equivalent Navy rank.

In a class structure such as that outlined above, the task of the civilian student at the USAWC is an especially challenging one. Working in an area outside his normal milieu, his was a dual responsibility. On the one hand, he had to acquaint himself in considerable detail with the military aspects of national security with which, in most instances, he has had relatively little, if any, previous experience. To accomplish this requirement, he did extensive background research in the areas of military policy, military strategy, and defense management to keep abreast of his professional military colleagues. On the other hand, his foreign policy expertise was in heavy demand by his military colleagues. In consequence, his contribution to various international relations aspects of seminar group efforts tended to be disproportionately large. Moreover, as the sole civilian voice in a seminar group of fourteen highly experienced military officers, he also ensured that adequate weight was given

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

to civilian viewpoints in the group's discussions. Much, therefore, depended on his ability to develop rapport with his military colleagues and on his intelligence, knowledge, skill and persuasiveness. In a very real sense he was a teacher as well as a student.

Among the objectives of the curriculum is enhancing the competence of selected officers to assume command and leadership responsibilities and to function in key staff assignments in major Army, joint, and combined headquarters and in planning and policymaking positions at the seat of government. To achieve this and related objectives, the curriculum consists of three major segments: The Common Overview, the Electives Phase, and the Military Studies Program. The Common Overview segment includes four courses: The United States and the World Environment, Command and Management, Strategic Military Studies, and the Military Strategy Seminar. In the Elective Phase, students take at least four elective courses out of an offering of 54 courses. The large number of selections provides an opportunity for students to tailor the curriculum to meet professional needs. Participation in the Military Studies Program is optional and can be substituted for one or more electives, depending on the scope of the research subject selected. In addition, the ten-month curriculum includes voluntary programs and field trips.

Mr. Keenan acted as assistant seminar group chairman in the core curriculum course entitled, "The United States and the World Environment." He and one other student edited the final seminar report, and he wrote that part of the report dealing with US policies in the Western Hemisphere, including an excellent treatment of the Panama Canal negotiations. Mr. Keenan was also assistant seminar group chairman during the "Strategic Military Studies" course, and again his facile pen was put to good use on the editorial subgroup. His calm, steadying approach to issues won the respect of his military colleagues, and his extensive knowledge of Latin America was particularly valuable to the group's deliberations. In the "Military Strategy Seminar," Mr. Keenan proved himself an excellent student of strategy and an articulate, well-prepared debater in the seminar discussions.

In the electives phase Mr. Keenan took four courses (the required number): "The Power Potential of Developing Nations," "Contemporary Issues in US Foreign Policy," "Strategic Issues of World War II," and "Third World: Dynamics of Social Change"; he audited "Latin America: Power Structures and the Current Scene." Mr. Keenan prepared carefully for his elective courses and contributed his views in a concise, orderly manner.

Since the vast majority of the Army War College student body live together on the post, a very important part of the overall War College experience is the social and extracurricular interaction which takes place outside the lecture hall and the seminar rooms. Some civilian students at the Army War College need considerable time to adjust to the military subculture, but Mr. Keenan enjoyed a relaxed camaraderie with his military colleagues from the beginning. Somewhat quiet and reticent by nature, Mr. Keenan nonetheless was enthusiastic about the College's many offerings in his own low-keyed way. This soft-spoken demeanor masked a tough competitor, whether it was in seminar discussions or on the tennis courts, where he was a member of the Army War College team. Clearly, he was popular with his classmates and respected by them for his professional attainments and his personal qualities.

In the Army War College classes with which I have been personally familiar, Mr. Keenan is the first of his agency's representatives who had regional, as contrasted with functional, expertise. Mr. Keenan's thorough knowledge of Latin America made him a valued member of the class and a distinct contributor.

Mr. Keenan's demonstrated capacity to work effectively and cooperatively with officers of the military services and other civilian agencies would, I hope, be factored into the consideration of his onward assignments.

A statement specifically regarding estimated "general officer or equivalent civilian supergrade" potential has been intentionally omitted from this and all AY 76 reports. The evaluation system for USAWC students is designed principally to portray the student's aptitudes, capabilities, accomplishments, and progress within an academic environment. This does not provide an adequate basis for rendering a finite evaluation on general officer or equivalent potential, although it does not preclude making tentative judgments as to the abilities of the "whole man."

Sincerely,

Dewitt C. Smith Jr

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR
Major General, USA
Commandant

CONFIDENTIAL

SE TRAINING REPORT	SOVIET/EAST EUROPEAN OPERATIONS COURSE No.

STUDENT	YEAR OF BIRTH	GRADE
Keenan, Thomas J.	1930	GS-15

EOD DATE	OFFICE	SERVICE DESIGNATION	NO. OF STUDENTS
May 1957	DDO/LA	D	28

COURSE OBJECTIVES

To orient the student on the special nature of the Directorate of Operation's Soviet/East European target and to train him in the application of clandestine methods for collecting information on assessing and preparing recruitment operations against Soviet/East European personalities.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No evaluation is made of individual performance in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

SE Plans & Training

FORM 12-74 3687 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2. IMPDET CL. BY: 006687 (04.49)

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE
026090	Kee[illegible]	James	J

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 2 - CORRECTION 3 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			07	04	75		1			Jamaica	370

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
✓	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: IN 625200

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 7 July 1975

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	SCO		
	C & L DIVISION, [illegible]	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓	C & T DIVISION	7/15/75	

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a [illegible]

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

14-[illegible]

SECRET - ROGER CHANNEL
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (When Completed)

00

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency; retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED Chief, SRF Thomas J. Keenan	POST Kingston, Jamaica	
POSITION Special Assistant to the Ambassador	GRADE FSR-5	AGENCY
RATING PERIOD July 3, 1975	DATE OF REPORT August 15, 1975	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER Sumner Gerard	TITLE Ambassador	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

II. Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☐ Yes ☒ No Officer left the post before preparation.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

III. The incumbent is a quiet, low-key, but highly energetic and competent professional officer in his chosen field. He has discharged the responsibilities of his first more or less independent command in an outstanding way. His manner is always crisp and efficient, and as nearly as I can determine, he runs a tight ship while at the same time commanding both the affection and respect of his staff. His manner towards me has invariably been responsive and supportive. Given the inherent difficulties of the relationship, I have deliberately put pressure on him from time to time to determine his reactions. As a result, I am confident he has been fully candid with me and has shared any information which might be relative to my concerns and activities. We have been passing through a particularly difficult phase in Jamaican-US relations, in which the slightest misstep by any US Government agency, but particularly by the incumbent and his people, could have been seized upon to possibly embarrass this mission and the US Government. The incumbent has been sensitive to these dangers, has consulted with me at every turn and has taken whatever steps are possible to reduce the risk while still meeting basic requirements.

Beyond his professional specialty, the incumbent has been an important part of our Embassy family. As a member of the Country Team, he has always offered his views when asked if he felt he had a contribution to make, and I have often found them to be most helpful. He has also served as the mission's representative on the Board of the Priory School which most mission children attend. As such, he has made an important contribution to the morale and well-being of the Embassy family and American community. Both he and his family have invariably been forthcoming with regard to community projects, and they will be sorely missed.

I expect that the incumbent will benefit from his year at the Army War College, and anticipate that he will be ready for assignments of substantially greater responsibility thereafter. I would hope he would be given serious consideration for promotion to the next higher grade as an early opportunity, and I have little doubt that he will eventually rise to the highest professional levels of his agency. It would give me pleasure to work with him again.

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE Thomas J. Keenan	DATE (from item 5-1) 26 Aug 74	NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE (from item 5-2)
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 10 September 1974	DISPATCH NUMBER: HJKT-1801	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	HOME BASE COMPONENT WH

DATE OF BIRTH 29 June 30	SERVICE DESIGN D	CURRENT POSITION AND GRADE COS, Kingston GS-15	STATION OR BASE Kingston	CURRENT COVER

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 14 Sep 73	1B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 14 Sep 75	1C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 15 Sep 75	1D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 1 Nov 75

2. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

7 Dependents (39, 17, 16, 15, 14, 13, 11)

3. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

I will have served continually in the field for over eight years upon completion of my present tour. In addition, I had a direct transfer to my present post after two years at my previous Station. Therefore, my family has had little exposure to the U.S. for some time. I would appreciate a tour in the U.S. in order to reorient my children to the educational environment and general lifestyle of their native land during their formative teen-age years.

4. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form):

Chief of Station with responsibility for liaison with senior level of local service, as well as with Country Team and other representatives of U.S. Government agencies. Direction of Station's operations and administrative functions. Running of unilateral operations particularly against Chinese, Cuban, and local government targets.

5. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

It has been a long time since I have had any kind of extensive BKHERALD sponsored training. I would like a senior seminar type exposure in order to broaden my professional knowledge of current challenges facing BKHERALD and the nation.

FORM 3-73 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4)

SECRET

6. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

6A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT.

Operations supervisory position in Headquarters or training assignment as noted in item 5 above. A rotational assignment which would broaden my professional experience would be welcomed at Headquarters.

6B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, 3 OR 4 (for 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th choice) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

[3] EXTEND TOUR ________ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ________ (DATE).

[1] BE ASSIGNED TO HQS. FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE WH 3RD CHOICE EUR

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION.
1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE WH 3RD CHOICE WH

[4] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION.

PREPARE UPDATING OF PERSONAL SECURITY INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOI-F 240-8 AND FORWARD UNDER SEPARATE COVER. INDICATE DATE FORWARDED OR TO BE FORWARDED.

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

7. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

8. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Subject has been approved to attend the Army War College from August 1975 to June 1976.

DATE 19Feb75 TITLE C/LA/Pers SIGNATURE Henry L. Berthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

9. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

10. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. HJKS 1096 DATED 1 Oct 1974

CABLE NO. ________ DATED ________

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE ________ DATE ________

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print) 7-24		
026090	KEENAN	THOMAS	J

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		U/P USE ONLY	COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE			CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38 39		40-42
09	14	73					1		JAMAICA	370

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY	AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE			CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38 39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)	

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. KN45 18650

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 9/15/73

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
OCO		
C & L DIVISION, CTRD.	DATE 11/6/73	SIGNATURE Thomas E
✓ C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 8-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(6-40)

1971

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Thomas J. Keenan	DATE (from item S-1) 9 Oct. 70	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Wallace A. Mills	DATE (from item S-2) 9 Oct. 70
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 15 Oct. 1970	DISPATCH NUMBER: HLBT 4677	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE: 5 MAR 1971	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 29/6/30	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Ops Officer, GS-14	4. STATION OR BASE Bogota	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER LNCUFF

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 30 July 1969	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 20 Aug 1971	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 28 Aug 1971	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 29 October 1971

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Total, 7 dependents: Ages 36,13,12,10,9,8,6

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

[illegible]

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Soviet operations, support operations

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Clandestine services review, Mid-career, short reports writing courses

FORM 8-62 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

For career development based on my age, grade and experience I would prefer that my next assignment be that of a Deputy Chief of Station.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ________ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ________ (DATE).

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY; INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE WH 3RD CHOICE WH

[1] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION; INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Buenos Aires 2ND CHOICE Lima 3RD CHOICE San Jose

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION.

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

The Station heartily endorses this employee's preference statement in .tion 11 above. This man is an experienced, professional and highly motivated officer who has now proven his ability many times over. In the interest of his own continued development as well as that of the organization he merits consideration for assignment as a DCOS at a moderate-sized station or a very senior executive position in a large one.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Mr. Keenan has been approved per DDP 26 Feb 1971 for assignment as Deputy Chief of Station, Lima.

DATE 4 Mar 71 TITLE C/WH/Pers SIGNATURE H. L Berthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ________ DATED: ________
CABLE NO. ________ DATED: ________

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ________ (signature) DATE: ________

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME – LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
026090	KEENAN	Thomas	J

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA: 1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION — CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
			09	14	73	1			PERU	570

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA: 2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION — CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☒	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. HPLT-6764

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 9/14/73

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCO	DATE	SIGNATURE
☐	C & L DIVISION, CTBS.	10/3/73	
☒	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SERVICE ABROAD AGREEMENT

I. GENERAL

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU AGREE TO SERVE THE PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION II BELOW AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS OBLIGATED TO RETURN YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS UPON THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF THIS PERIOD. YOUR ALLOWABLE EXPENSES WILL BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS.

IF YOU TERMINATE YOUR PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BEFORE YOU COMPLETE 12 MONTHS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE FOLLOWING THE DATE OF YOUR ARRIVAL ABROAD, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO REIMBURSE THE GOVERNMENT FOR ALL EXPENSES IT INCURS IN THE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS, YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO YOUR POST. IF YOU FAIL TO COMPLETE YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD YOU WILL NOT BE ENTITLED TO THE RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOURSELF, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO THE UNITED STATES. IF, HOWEVER, AGENCY OFFICIALS DETERMINE THAT YOUR EARLY DEPARTURE IS NECESSARY FOR OFFICIAL REASONS, OR FOR PERSONAL REASONS OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST TO THE GOVERNMENT, THEY MAY WAIVE THE REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES ALREADY INCURRED, OR AUTHORIZE YOUR RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION, WHICHEVER IS APPLICABLE.

IF ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF HR 20-30, YOU WILL BE GRANTED HOME LEAVE AS SOON AS IT CAN BE ARRANGED AT GOVERNMENT CONVENIENCE AFTER COMPLETION OF YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY, PROVIDED YOU HAVE SERVED AT LEAST 18 MONTHS OF CONTINUOUS CREDITABLE SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. HOME LEAVE AND HOME LEAVE TRAVEL ARE CONTINGENT UPON YOUR WILLINGNESS TO RETURN, AND CONTEMPLATION BY AGENCY OFFICIALS THAT YOU WILL RETURN TO SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY AFTER HOME LEAVE OR UPON COMPLETION OF AN ASSIGNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

YOU ARE ADVISED THAT ANY MONIES DUE YOU FROM THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE APPLIED IN LIQUIDATION OF ANY INDEBTEDNESS ARISING FROM VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT. YOU WILL BE AFFORDED ALL NORMAL RECOURSE IN APPEALING DECISIONS MADE PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE Thomas J Keenan GS-14	SD D

II. TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD

1. NAME OF POST OF ASSIGNMENT
KINGSTON, JAMAICA

2. PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD AS PRESCRIBED IN A, B, OR C BELOW

A. STANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF 24 MONTHS X

B. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ______ MONTHS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PER HR 20-18.

OPERATING OFFICIAL
Jane Way AC/WH/[illegible]

C. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ______ MONTHS FOR THIS TOUR ONLY FOR THE EMPLOYEE SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT. (See HR 20-18)

REQUESTED (Memo attached)

OPERATING OFFICIAL

CONCUR

CAREER SERVICE	DEPUTY DIRECTOR

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

III. PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE

3. YOUR "PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE" IS A PLACE TO WHICH ALLOWABLE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES MAY BE AUTHORIZED IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES PURSUANT TO HR 22. ITS DESIGNATION WILL BE KEPT IN YOUR OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

4. IN REQUESTING YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN ITEM 5 ON THE REVERSE SIDE, YOU WILL (as prescribed in HR 22-3) NORMALLY INDICATE THE PLACE WHERE YOU PHYSICALLY DWELLED IN THE UNITED STATES, ITS POSSESSIONS OR THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO AT THE TIME OF YOUR PCS TRANSFER TO A POST ABROAD. YOU MAY REQUEST IN ITEM 6 THE DESIGNATION OF ANOTHER PLACE AS YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE IF YOU CAN ESTABLISH THAT YOUR PHYSICAL DWELLING PLACE IS (OR WAS) TRANSITORY AND THAT SUCH OTHER PLACE IS YOUR DOMICILE OR HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN USED BY YOU AS A PHYSICAL DWELLING. INFORMATION THAT CAN BE PRESENTED IN AN ATTACHED STATEMENT AS EVIDENCE INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO: STATE VOTING REGISTRATION, PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND PLACE WHERE INCOME OR PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID.

FORM 3154 REPLACES FORM 0118, (2-66)
6-70 WHICH IS OBSOLETE

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(12-21-37)

CONTINUED ON THE REVERSE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

5. PHYSICAL DWELLING PLACE (Permanent Place of Residence unless address in item 6 is approved in lieu thereof)

FULL ADDRESS

Mr. Keenan is TDY in the Washington, D. C. Area between tours. He is presently staying at the Holiday Inn at Tysons Corner →

6. OTHER PLACE REQUESTED (Requested Permanent Place of Residence if different from item 5)

FULL ADDRESS

Voting registration
42 E. FOLLETTE ST.
FOND du LAC, WISCONSIN

CONCUR

for DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DATE 10/3/73

APPROVED

DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DATE

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL
DATE

IV. HOME LEAVE POINT

7. AMONG THE PLACES YOU MAY REQUEST AS A HOME LEAVE POINT ARE: YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE SHOWN ABOVE, HEADQUARTERS AREA, AND WHERE YOUR CHILDREN, PARENTS, PARENTS-IN-LAW, BROTHERS, SISTERS, BROTHERS-IN-LAW, OR SISTERS-IN-LAW RESIDE.

8. YOU MAY REQUEST FOR APPROVAL SOME OTHER POINT SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-30B(3)(C). THE REQUEST MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A MEMORANDUM EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 7 ABOVE

FULL ADDRESS

42 E. Follette St.
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin

RELATIONSHIP OF RELATIVE AT HOME LEAVE POINT

FATHER AND MOTHER

APPROVED

for DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DATE 10-2-73

10. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 8 ABOVE.

FULL ADDRESS

CONCUR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DATE

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL
DATE

EMPLOYEE CERTIFICATION

I have read and understand my service obligations and travel entitlements as described in this agreement.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

DATE Sept 21, 73

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Thomas J. Keenan	DATE (from item 5-1) 1 Feb 1973	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Richard S. Welch	DATE (from item 5-2) 1 Feb 1973
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 9 February 1973	DISPATCH NUMBER: HPLT-6460	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Jun 30	2. SERVICE DESIGN D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE DCOS, GS-14	4. STATION OR BASE Lima, Peru	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER LNBUZZ

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ~~XX~~ 30 Sept 71	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 1 Aug 1974	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 20 Sept 1974	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 20 Sept 1974

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Total 7: Ages 38, 16, 15, 13, 12, 11, 9

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

DCOS and senior ops officer

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

FORM 5-67 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT.

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

In Field: DCOS at large Station or COS at smaller Station.

At Hqs : Rotational assignment to another component or Deputy Branch Chief in WHD

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 *(for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice)* IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

1 EXTEND TOUR 10 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO 1 August 1974.
(DATE)

2 BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY; INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE WHD 2ND CHOICE EUR 3RD CHOICE AF

3 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION; INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Buenos Aires 2ND CHOICE Caracas 3RD CHOICE Rio de Janeiro

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Concur in Subject's extension here as DCOS until August 1974. He is doing an effective job at this level and the extra time at it will be good for both his growing capabilities and for the Station's operational program.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

WH Division concurs in Mr. Keenan's request for a ten month extension of his current tour to 1 August 1974. He was notified of this approval by HPLS-3216.

DATE 29 Mar 73 TITLE C/WH/Pers. SIGNATURE

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. HPLS-3216 DATED: 14 Feb 73

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ DATE: ______
(SIGNATURE)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print) 7-24	FIRST	MIDDLE
026090	Kiernan	Thomas	J

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
09	30	71					1			Peru	570

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
✓	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 435675	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 30 Sept 1971

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OCR		
	C & L DIVISION, CTRD.	DATE 1/31/72	SIGNATURE
✓	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(6-10)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) LAST	FIRST 7-26	MIDDLE
026090	Keenan	Thomas	J

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA 1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
			07	30	71		1			Columbia	150

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA 2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☑	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 16741

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 21 July 1971

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		
☐ RID ☐ C & L DIVISION, CTRS. ☐ C & T DIVISION	☑ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED.
	DATE 8/12/71	SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TRAINING REPORT

Chiefs of Station Seminar No. 3-71

Participant: Keenan, Thomas **Office:** WH

Grade : 14

COURSE OBJECTIVES, CONTENT AND METHODS

The purpose of the COS Seminar is to assist newly designated Chiefs of Station, Deputy Chiefs of Station and Chiefs of Base to prepare themselves for their field assignment.

The Seminar is conducted as a series of open discussions with senior officers drawn from the offices, staffs and operating elements of all Directorates of the Agency. The intent is to provoke an exchange of views and sharing of experiences as well as to provide information on current policies, procedures, services and operational goals.

A folder of selected reading material is provided to each pariticpant in advance of the Seminar, which is designated as related reading in preparation for specific sessions in the schedule.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No further assessment of individual capacity or performance is made in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

6 JUL 1971

ALAN P. WHITE DATE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SERVICE ABROAD AGREEMENT

I. GENERAL

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU AGREE TO SERVE THE PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION II BELOW AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS OBLIGATED TO RETURN YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS UPON THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF THIS PERIOD. YOUR ALLOWABLE EXPENSES WILL BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS.

IF YOU TERMINATE YOUR PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BEFORE YOU COMPLETE 12 MONTHS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE FOLLOWING THE DATE OF YOUR ARRIVAL ABROAD, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO REIMBURSE THE GOVERNMENT FOR ALL EXPENSES IT INCURS IN THE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS, YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO YOUR POST. IF YOU FAIL TO COMPLETE YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD YOU WILL NOT BE ENTITLED TO THE RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOURSELF, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO THE UNITED STATES. IF, HOWEVER, AGENCY OFFICIALS DETERMINE THAT YOUR EARLY DEPARTURE IS NECESSARY FOR OFFICIAL REASONS, OR FOR PERSONAL REASONS OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST TO THE GOVERNMENT, THEY MAY WAIVE THE REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES ALREADY INCURRED, OR AUTHORIZE YOUR RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION, WHICHEVER IS APPLICABLE.

IF ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF HR 20-30, YOU WILL BE GRANTED HOME LEAVE AS SOON AS IT CAN BE ARRANGED AT GOVERNMENT CONVENIENCE AFTER COMPLETION OF YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY, PROVIDED YOU HAVE SERVED AT LEAST 18 MONTHS OF CONTINUOUS CREDITABLE SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. HOME LEAVE AND HOME LEAVE TRAVEL ARE CONTINGENT UPON YOUR WILLINGNESS TO RETURN, AND CONTEMPLATION BY AGENCY OFFICIALS THAT YOU WILL RETURN TO SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY AFTER HOME LEAVE OR UPON COMPLETION OF AN ASSIGNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

YOU ARE ADVISED THAT ANY MONIES DUE YOU FROM THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE APPLIED IN LIQUIDATION OF ANY INDEBTEDNESS ARISING FROM VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT. YOU WILL BE AFFORDED ALL NORMAL RECOURSE IN APPEALING DECISIONS MADE PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE	SD
Thomas J. Keenan	D

II. TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD

1. NAME OF POST OF ASSIGNMENT
Lima, Peru

2. PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD AS PRESCRIBED IN A, B, OR C BELOW

A. STANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF 24 MONTHS X

B. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ______ MONTHS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PER HR 20-10.

OPERATING OFFICIAL

C. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ______ MONTHS FOR THIS TOUR ONLY FOR THE EMPLOYEE SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT. *(See HR 20-13)*

REQUESTED *(Memo attached)*

OPERATING OFFICIAL

CONCUR

CAREER SERVICE	DEPUTY DIRECTOR

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

III. PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE

3. YOUR "PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE" IS A PLACE TO WHICH ALLOWABLE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES MAY BE AUTHORIZED IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES PURSUANT TO HR 22. ITS DESIGNATION WILL BE KEPT IN YOUR OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

4. IN REQUESTING YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN ITEM 5 ON THE REVERSE SIDE, YOU WILL *(as prescribed in HR 22-3)* NORMALLY INDICATE THE PLACE WHERE YOU PHYSICALLY DWELLED IN THE UNITED STATES, ITS POSSESSIONS OR THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO AT THE TIME OF YOUR PCS TRANSFER TO A POST ABROAD. YOU MAY REQUEST IN ITEM 6 THE DESIGNATION OF ANOTHER PLACE AS YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE IF YOU CAN ESTABLISH THAT YOUR PHYSICAL DWELLING PLACE IS *(or was)* TRANSITORY AND THAT SUCH OTHER PLACE IS YOUR DOMICILE OR HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN USED BY YOU AS A PHYSICAL DWELLING. INFORMATION THAT CAN BE PRESENTED IN AN ATTACHED STATEMENT AS EVIDENCE INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, STATE VOTING REGISTRATION, PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND PLACE WHERE INCOME OR PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID.

FORM 3154 REPLACES FORM [illegible]
6-70 WHICH IS OBSOLETE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONTINUE ON THE REVERSE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

5. PHYSICAL DWELLING PLACE (Permanent Place of Residence unless address in item 6 is approved in lieu thereof)

FULL ADDRESS

2125 Greenwich Street
Falls Church, Virginia

6. OTHER PLACE REQUESTED (Requested Permanent Place of Residence if different from item 5)

FULL ADDRESS

CONCUR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	DATE

for

APPROVED

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE
	6-24-71

IV. HOME LEAVE POINT

7. AMONG THE PLACES YOU MAY REQUEST AS A HOME LEAVE POINT ARE: YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE SHOWN ABOVE, HEADQUARTERS AREA, AND WHERE YOUR CHILDREN, PARENTS, PARENTS-IN-LAW, BROTHERS, SISTERS, BROTHERS-IN-LAW, OR SISTERS-IN-LAW RESIDE.

8. YOU MAY REQUEST FOR APPROVAL SOME OTHER POINT SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-30B(3)(C). THE REQUEST MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A MEMORANDUM EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 7 ABOVE

FULL ADDRESS

42 E. Follette Street
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin

RELATIONSHIP OF RELATIVE AT HOME LEAVE POINT: Father

10. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 8 ABOVE.

FULL ADDRESS

CONCUR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	DATE

for

APPROVED

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE
	6-24-71

EMPLOYEE CERTIFICATION

I have read and understand my service obligations and travel entitlements as described in this agreement.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	DATE
	6/22/71

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

AN ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE EXECUTED BY EACH EMPLOYEE AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AND WHEN A CHANGE OCCURS IN THE INFORMATION SHOWN BELOW. ITEMS OF CHANGE MAY BE REPORTED IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCKS WITHOUT COMPLETING THE REMAINDER OF THE FORM EXCEPT THE EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AND DATE. WHEN EXECUTING ITEM 4 ALSO COMPLY WITH HHB 20-7, PERSONNEL EMERGENCY AND LOCATOR RECORDS. THIS FORM WILL BE COMPLETED ONLY BY HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL AND NOT SENT TO THE FIELD. FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

GENERAL

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(Last)* Keenan	*(First)* Thomas	*(Middle)* John	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 395-26-2991

1. MARITAL STATUS *(Check one)*

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Jamestown, Rhode Island	DATE OF MARRIAGE 23 June 1956
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE

2. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)*	TELEPHONE NO.
Margaret Jane		

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Mary Margaret		F	6 Oct 57
Kathleen Ann		F	16 Sep 58
Thomas John Jr.		M	19 May 60
Sheila Elizabeth		F	19 Aug 61
Patricia Jean		F	11 Sep 62
Carol Jane		F	7 May 63

NAME OF FATHER *(or male guardian)* Francis William Keenan	ADDRESS 42 East Follette St, Fond du Lac, Wisc. 54935	TELEPHONE NO. 414 921-4483
NAME OF MOTHER, INCLUDING MAIDEN NAME *(or female guardian)* Rosella Veronica Keenan (McGway)	ADDRESS Same as father	TELEPHONE NO.

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
Father and Mother

3. OTHER RELATIVES WHO ARE DEPENDENT UPON ME FOR AT LEAST 51% OF THEIR SUPPORT AND MEET OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN TRAVEL REGULATIONS *(HR 23-15)*. SPECIFY NAMES AND RELATIONSHIPS.

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP
NA		

4. PERSON RESIDING IN U.S. TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME *(Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle)* Mr. Francis William KEENAN	RELATIONSHIP Father
HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)* AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE Same as above	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)* AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE None	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? *(If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)*	YES	X
	NO	
IS THE INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? *(If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)* My wife, Margaret Jane Keenan	YES	
	NO	X
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? *(If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)*	YES	X
	NO	

The persons named in item 2 or 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

FORM 8-70 61 [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

State Department Credit Union, Thomas J. Koonan
First Virginia Bank, Joint with Margaret J. Koonan

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Note: My brother-in-law, John Walsh has been named executor in both the will of my wife and my will. He is in possession of one copy of our latest wills. He is witting of my agency affiliation.

7. RESIDENCE DATA - TO BE COMPLETED ONLY BY EMPLOYEES ENTERING ON DUTY
(No Approval Required)

RESIDENCE WHEN EMPLOYED *(Full Address)*	PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE AS DEFINED IN HR 22-3 *(Full Address)*

8. CHANGE IN PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE *(See HR 22-3)*
(To Be Completed by Employee Desiring Such Change While Assigned to Headquarters)

FULL ADDRESS	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OR DESIGNEE	DATE
	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL (When applicable per HR 22-3)	DATE
SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

1070

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) KEENAN	(First) THOMAS	(Middle) JOHN	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 395-26-2991

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY 42 E. Follette St, Fond du Lac, Wisc	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Falls Church (Fairfax County), Virginia	HOME-LEAVE RESIDENCE Fond du Lac, Wisconsin

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE JAMESTOWN, RHODE ISLAND	DATE OF MARRIAGE 23 June 1956
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
MARGARET JANE (WALSH) KEENAN	2125 GREENWICH ST, FALLS CHURCH, VA.	532-1738	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**DATE OF BIRTH**
MARY MARGARET	SAME	F	6 OCT '57
KATHLEEN ANN	SAME	F	16 [illegible]
THOMAS JOHN, JR.	SAME	M	19 MAY '60
SHEILA ELIZABETH	SAME	F	17 AUG '61
PATRICIA JEAN	SAME	F	11 SEPT '62
CAROL JANE	SAME	F	7 MAY '64
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
FRANCIS W. KEENAN	42 E. Follett St, Fond du Lac, Wisc.	WA 1-4483	
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
Rosella V. McGRAY	42 E. Follett St, Fond du Lac, Wisc.	WA 1-4483	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
WIFE, FATHER, MOTHER.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (~~Mr.~~, Mrs., ~~Miss~~) (Last-First-Middle) KEENAN MARGARET JANE	RELATIONSHIP Wife
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) 2125 GREENWICH ST., Falls Church, VA	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER 532-1738
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE NONE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)	YES	X
	NO	
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)	YES	X
	NO	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	X
	NO	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 61 USE PREVIOUS
1-67 EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(41)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

9.

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

FALLS CHURCH BANK, FALLS PLAZA BRANCH, FALLS CHURCH, VA
SAVINGS & CHECKING ACCTS
JOINT WITH WIFE.

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☑ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☑ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6.

ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
WASHINGTON	14 MAR 67	

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Thomas J. Keenan	DATE (from item 9-L) 25 Nov. 1968	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Dino Pionzio	DATE (from item 9-2) 25 Nov. 1968
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS:	DISPATCH NUMBER: HLBT-3912	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE: 10 Dec 68	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 29 June 1930	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Ops Officer, GS-13	4. STATION OR BASE Bogota	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER LNPURE

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 28 June 1967	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Total 7 dependents: Ages- 34, 11, 10, 8, 7, 6, 4

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Soviet, Communist Party, Audio and Support type operations.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Clandestine Services Review, Short report writing review course

FORM 202 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I would prefer to continue Operation Officer work but with opportunity of acquiring greater experience in a supervisory capacity.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 *(for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice)* IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

2 EXTEND TOUR twelve MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO 1 July 1969 (DATE)

4 BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE WH 3RD CHOICE WH

3 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Buenos Aires 2ND CHOICE Montevideo 3RD CHOICE Quito

1 RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Fully concur in subjects request to return to station for a second tour. He is the most valuable officer in the station and is laying the ground work for operations that will require an additional tour to bring to full fruition. His wish to acquire greater supervisory responsibilities is not only entirely reasonable but desirable from the WOFIRM point of view. He has already (contd on attached sheet)

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

WH recommends Mr. Keenan be approved for home leave in June 1969 followed by a second tour in Bogota.

DATE 10 Dec 68 TITLE C/WH/Personnel SIGNATURE Henry L. Berthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT: Advised [illegible] DATED:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. [illegible] DATED:

CABLE NO. DATED:

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: (SIGNATURE) DATE:

SECRET

Continuation of FRQ - Jeremy L. NIARCOS - (Section 12)

demonstrated considerable planning and leadership ability which the station has tried to develop by placing him in charge of Soviet and Bloc operations and using him as our informal Chief of Ops. His excellent judgement and professionalism has already earned him the respect and confidence of his colleagues as well as that of COS who values subject's advice greatly.

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:
- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) KEENAN	(first) Thomas	(middle) John	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) June 29, 1930	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 395 36 2991
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY 026090			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

DATE February 15, 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

[illegible]

See Table of Effective Dates on Back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
[illegible]
176-121

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

IMPORTANT

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility (CPN. 20-6-1 dated October 1961) for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the field have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checked out for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 30 July 1962.

Thomas J. Kee
Signature

14 March 67
Date

THOMAS J. KEENAN

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

27 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. Thomas J. Keenan**

THROUGH : **Chief, WH Division**

THROUGH : **Deputy Director for Plans**

SUBJECT : **Certificate of Merit**

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the award named above will be conferred on you in recognition of the excellent service you have rendered this Agency. Security considerations relevant to the award are explained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security.

2. The award will be presented to you at a ceremony to be held in the near future. Members of your family Agency associates and intimate friends who are aware of your Agency affiliation may attend the ceremony, although space may limit the number of guests to be invited.

3. A list of guests whom you would like to have attend the presentation ceremony and an indication of any specific time when you could not be present at such a ceremony should be forwarded through your Deputy Director to the Secretariat, Honor and Merit Awards Board, Office of Personnel.

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
- Orig - Addressee
  - 1 - C/WH
  - 1 - D/Pers Reader Chrono/OPF
  - 1 - Sec't, HMAB
  - 1 - Recorder, HMAB

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

66 [illegible]

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

DATE: 19 April 1966

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

NAME: (LAST) KEENAN,	(FIRST) Thomas	(MIDDLE) John	POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer
PRESENT GRADE: GS-12	OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: DDP/WH		STATION: Santo Domingo, Dominican Rep.

BE AWARDED: Certificate of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION, ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE DURING THE PERIOD

☒ APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION ☐ DISAPPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION

☐ APPROVES, BUT IN LIEU THEREOF, RECOMMENDS THE AWARD OF:

CITATION **UNCLASSIFIED**

Mr. Thomas J. Keenan is hereby awarded the Certificate of Merit to recognize his sustained superior performance as assistant to the principal officer in handling matters of great complexity in an over overseas area. In the face of overwhelming pressures, Mr. Keenan demonstrated uncommonly good judgment and decisiveness in channeling resources toward the accomplishment of operational assignments, thereby helping to attain Agency objectives during a period of turmoil.

(Recommendation approved by DD/P on 16 March 1966)

REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF RECOMMENDED AWARD

APPROVED:

/s/ Richard Helms

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

24 MAY 1966

DATE

SIGNATURE: /s/ Robert S. Wattles

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD: ROBERT S. WATTLES

SIGNATURE: /s/ Robert M. Gaynor

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER: ROBERT M. GAYNOR

FORM 8-62 382 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE	CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST
02,090	Keenan, Thomas John			

4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST

LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST

LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR

6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
08/04/65	06/29/30	12	WH

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN SPANISH (NEW WORLD) BL18 (NAME OF LANGUAGE) AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
+	+	E	E	I

TEST RATINGS
0 = ZERO
S = SLIGHT
E = ELEMENTARY
I = INTERMEDIATE
H = HIGH
N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

11/26/65

12. SIGNATURE

13. LD NUMBER 10674

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45) **SECRET**

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1 - OP/QAB

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
<• 2	6-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR •	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
			BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 3	•	3-LETTERS •	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR •	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	> WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NON-LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST						
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 5	• 026090	• KEE	• C	• BL18	i	E	E	i	H	4	62

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST		
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR
• BL18	i	E	E	E	i	4	65	• 08	04	65

> DATA FOR ITEMS 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME	ENTER UNDER "TYPE" - A - ADDITION TO RECORD C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD.
<• 4	•	3-LETTERS •	

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

567307 JUN 7 65

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
026090	Keenan	Thomas	J.	WH 51

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE 27	MONTH 28-29	DAY 30-31	YEAR 32-33	MONTH 34-35	DAY 36-37	YEAR 38-39		40-42
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION									

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE 27	MONTH 28-29	DAY 30-31	YEAR 32-33	MONTH 34-35	DAY 36-37	YEAR 38-39		40-42
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	2	04	30	65	05	28	65	WH	211

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☒	C.A.S. DIVISION	DATE 4 June 65	SIGNATURE
☐	C.A.T. DIVISION		

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
1-6				
26090	KEENAN	THOMAS	J	51

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	02	03	60	10	05	64	MEXICO	450

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

TRAVEL VOUCHER	DISPATCH
CABLE	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
✓ OTHER (Specify) Retiree Payroll Information	
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 1400 C	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 30 Nov. 1964

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
C & L DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
C & T DIVISION		

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-101

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 7 October 1963, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

Thomas J Kee

Signature

THOMAS J. KEENE

30 [illegible] 1964

Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-26		25-26
26090	KEENAN	THOMAS	J	51

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	07	31	62	MEXICO	450

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-...

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☒	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
HMM-T- 3009	8/24/62

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
☒ FINANCE DIVISION	8/24/62	

FORM 4-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8-19)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6): 2000
2. I.D NO.: 9228
3. NAME (7-24) LAST / FIRST / MIDDLE: Keenan, Thomas J.
4. OFFICE OR DIVISION: WH
5. LANGUAGE: Spanish
6. LANG. CODE (25-27): 120
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51: June 13, 1952
8. ANNIVERSARY DATE: --
9. GRADE: 10
10. DATE OF BIRTH: June 29, 1920

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST

XX	APPLY FOR AWARD
	ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
I	I	I	I	II

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)

X	A
	M
	NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
A	I-I		D

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ 37.50 (40-45)
SIGNATURE
DATE

REMARKS

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REG. NO.
CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
SIGNATURE

FORM 1273
5-60
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

MRD COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HSCI-2320 - RYBAT #1766

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 13 October 1961

SUBJECT: Annual Fitness Report - [redacted]

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2 below

Palma, [illegible]

REFERENCE(S)

RE: "413" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

1. Forwarded herewith is Subject's Annual Fitness Report.

2. It is strongly recommended that this outstanding young officer be promoted immediately as suggested in Section E of the attached report.

Willard C. CURTIS

12 October 1961

Attachment:
  As stated

Distribution:
  3 - WHD, w/att
  2 - Files

315

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

OCT 25 2 32 PM '61

MAIL ROOM

SECRET/RYBAT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	7-24			25-26
26090	KEENAN,	THOMAS	J.	46

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	02	03	60				MEXICO	450

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☑	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS:

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
[illegible]		DATE	SIGNATURE
[illegible]		9-20-60	

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER 1-5 F.P.M.
6 GAO 3000

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

400

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ballpoint pen.)

CERTIFICATE NUMBER: ~~077723~~

PART A
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): KEENAN Thomas J.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers): MONTH 6 DAY 29 YEAR 30

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE) ☐

5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☐ NO ☒

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1 $4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2 $6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3 $10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from back cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
Association Benefit Plan	High	4 2 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first; then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband Margaret J.	12-20-34	1			6
Mary Margaret	10-6-57	2			7
Kathleen Ann	9-16-58	3			8
Thomas J., Jr.	5-19-60	4			9
		5			10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU ARE NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3.

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
(c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan.

2. Number of event which permits change. (See table on back of last page for proper number.)

3. Date of event which permits change MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

(SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) 13 May 1960 (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F
TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 12/ /

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 7/ /

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS (FOR USE ONLY BY AGENCY)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

1073

SECRET

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel
Action for Integration of Thomas J. Keenan
Effective 6 January 1960

The purpose of this memorandum is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are integrated and to set forth certain rights and obligations which are incident to your status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS-9- $6135 per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of 6 January 1960. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected at FSS-10 and salary of $5540 per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of two (2) years from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

SECRET

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and (except as provided in paragraph three (3) above) allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they are less than or equal to the salary and allowance payments due on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due, the difference will be credited to your payroll account with this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due, the overage will be remitted to this organization at designated intervals, presently____________________. Computations hereunder will be made on the basis of the aggregate gross due and received provided, however, that in computing remittances for overage Federal and, if applicable, District of Columbia income taxes withheld by your cover facility against the overage may be deducted. To assure timely accuracy in your payroll account with this organization you are expected to immediately report cover facility payroll changes.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integration into your cover facility, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and at your personal expense you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half percent) on the basis of your cover salary or your salary from this organization, whichever is the greater.

b. If you receive taxable income from both your cover facility and this organization, necessary adjustments for Federal, and if applicable, District of Columbia income tax purposes will be made in conformance with instructions received from this organization.

c. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with the rules and regulations of this organization.

d. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with your cover facility of any status with your cover based on your services performed with that organization at the request of this organization.

e. A portion of your annual and all of your sick leave which has accrued to your credit at the time of your integration shall be transferred to your cover facility. The remainder of your annual leave will be held by this organization in escrow pending the completion of your integration. If the sum of your accumulated annual leave with your cover facility and this organization exceeds the maximum accumulation entitlement afforded you under the regulations of this organization, the excess will be forfeited. If possible, such forfeiture will be accomplished by reducing the leave credit in your escrow account with this organization. While integrated, you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon completion of your integration, your accrued annual and sick leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization including income taxes withheld by your cover facility.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

Thomas J. Keenan

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
126090

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)		2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)		
		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
KEENAN, Thomas John		June	29	1930

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)		5.
	MONTH / DAY / YEAR		
000	March 27 1958		☒ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

23

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-69)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.
2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.
3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.
4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.
5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.
3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.
2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.
3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.
4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. [illegible], PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 27 March 1958	SIGNATURE
(44)	(47)

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

Operations Course No. 6

I. IDENTIFYING INFORMATION:

Name: KE[illegible], Thomas John		Sex M	Dates of Course: 3 Mar. - 27 June 58	No. of Students 27
Date of Birth: 24 June 1930	EOD Date: 20 May 1957		Grade or Rank: GS-7	Office: OTR/JOTP
Projected or Present Position (from Request for Training dated 16/10/57 Junior Officer Trainee				

II. DESCRIPTION OF COURSE:

The Operations Course runs for sixteen weeks and is designed as an introduction to the basic fundamentals of clandestine operations in the field. The course objective is to help the student learn and apply the principles and skills demanded of the field case officer. Emphasis is, therefore, placed on a practical work approach to clandestine tradecraft, agent handling, reporting and project management. The course also provides the student familiarity with the operational programs; i.e., FI, CI and PP, as well as with organizational support services.

III. PERFORMANCE RECORD:

The student's evaluation in the Operations Course is based on his understanding of clandestine operations as well as on his ability to perform field case officer tasks as observed by the staff over a period of sixteen weeks.

The standards set by the Staff for Satisfactory performance are high. Moreover, each Operations Course class is a carefully selected group of mature, intelligent, and able persons. Thus, it should be recognized that a grade of Satisfactory indicates that in the training situation the student understood or applied that subject of instruction in a competent manner.

The preponderance of grades fall within the Satisfactory range.

The performance of this student in each category of grading is indicated on the following page by the stamped X's.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

	FAIL	POOR	LOW SAT	MID SAT	HIGH SAT	EXC	SUP
1. Agent Acquisition and Management	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
2. Interviewing	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
3. Cover	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
4. Clandestine Communications	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
5. Reporting	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
6. Project Management	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
7. Clandestine Service Operations FI/CI/PP	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐

Mr. Keenan's performance in the course was highly satisfactory. His performance in Clandestine Communications, Project Management and Clandestine Services Operations were just short of excellent. In face-to-face practical exercises he was effective, and was one of the best students of the class in a ZOMBIE agent-recruitment exercise. In simpler, controlled interviewing and debriefing sessions he was more effective than in exercises requiring more subtle directing and control of the agent. He developed a good understanding of field procedures, more particularly of project management, where he ranked in the upper one-third of the class. His operational reporting was better than his information reporting which was acceptable, but he made little improvement in it during the course. Mr. Keenan acquired a highly satisfactory understanding of the various kinds of Agency operations, revealing a particularly thorough knowledge of CI concepts and methods. He tied with one other student for the top grade on the CI examination.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

Chief Instructor, Operations Course

Spencer L. Taggart

Chief/Field Training

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

CI FAMILIARIZATION COURSE No. 1

NAME KEENAN, Thomas J.	DATES OF COURSE 18 - 22 November 1957
STAFF OR DIVISION OTR JOTP	PRESENT POSITION JOT

I. Course Objectives: increase awareness of the CI mission in relation to the Clandestine Services and the national security; provide an introduction to foreign intelligence services and to CI operations; give theory and practice in CI methods.

II. Course Characteristics: The course is intended for junior personnel in the CI field, supervisory personnel who direct the work of CE officers, and all other personnel who need orientation in CI. The material is presented by means of lectures, seminars, directed reading, and practical exercises. Emphasis is on methods. Course content is as follows:

A. Introduction: definition of terms, history and legal authority; CI responsibilities and relationships of DD/P to the intelligence community, the CI Staff

B. Foreign intelligence services: includes brief treatment of liaison

C. Methods: the means of investigating and verifying; includes sources, reporting, records and records exploitation, analysis and assessment, etc.

D. CI operations: types, basic principles, examples

E. Panel discussion (questions and summary)

III. Certification of Course Completion

Mr. Keenan was present throughout the course and submitted all papers required for the practical exercises. These showed commendable effort and a good beginning for one with little or no actual experience. He was an attentive listener and seemed to gain a good deal from the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor
CI Familiarization Course

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

TSS/PB/TRAINING DIVISION EVALUATION

DARKROOM ____

BASIC PHOTOGRAPHY No. 1

NAME [illegible], THOMAS JOHN DIV. J/TP BR. [illegible] DATES TRAINED: from 9/24/57 to 9/26/57

This course is primarily designed to develop the following skills: Use of 35 mm cameras with accessories, document copy, processing and printing.

	None	Unsat	Fair	Good	Excellent	Superior
I. Manipulation of camera.						
a. Leica					X	
b. Retina II C	X					
c. Recordak			X			
II. Processing and printing.						
a. Film loading				X		
b. Film processing				X		
c. Enlarging					X	
d. Reflex and contact printing			X			
III. Use of accessory equipment.						
a. Exposure meter				X		
b. Filters	X					
c. Telephoto and wide angle lenses				X		
IV. Document copy and small objects.						
a. Available light					X	
b. Accessory illumination					X	
c. BOOWU, portra lens, focus slide					X	
V. Ground photography.						
a. Coverage					X	
b. Report					X	
VI. Casing.						
a. Coverage					X	

S-E-C-R-E-T

TSS EVALUATION

NAME Thomas J. [illegible] DIVISION [illegible]

SUBJECT Audio Surveillance (Basic)

DATES TRAINED 3-13 September 1957

EVALUATION:

1.	Comprehension of Principles	Good
2.	Alertness and Interest	Good
3.	Operational Appreciation of Subject	Good
4.	Manual Dexterity	Good
5.	Care in Work	Good
6.	Aptitude	Good
7.	Technician Potential	Average

NOTE: "Technician Potential" is an estimate of the technical ability the student _might_ acquire after advanced instruction and practice--it is not an estimate of his current level of technique.

Ratings: Poor, Average, Good, Excellent

Edward Sivik
Instructor

Please return five copies of this form to TSS/TRD for overt distribution.
Please return three copies of this form to TSS/TRD for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - OTR Registrar
1 - Officer of Personnel
1 - TSS/TRD

COVERT DISTRIBUTION
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - TSS/TRD

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

TSS EVALUATION

NAME Thomas J. Keenan DIVISION JOT

SUBJECT Basic Secret Writing

DATES TRAINED 26 - 30 August 1957

In this course an effort was made to acquaint the student with all aspects of the subject, stressing the managerial point of view, and, at the same time, to have the student acquire an operational degree of proficiency in the three basic techniques of secret writing - liquid writing, carbon-sheet writing and stain development.

The broad coverage given in this course allowed little time for systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the performance of each student. For this reason evaluations have been made only in terms of SATISFACTORY and UNSATISFACTORY.

The performance of Mr. Keenan was SATISFACTORY.

INSTRUCTOR:
J. V. YATES

Please return ~~four~~ 5 copies of this form to TSS/TD for overt distribution.
Please return ~~one~~ 3 copies of this form to TSS/TD for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - OTR/Registrar
1 - Office of Personnel
1 - TSS/TD File

~~COVERT DISTRIBUTION:~~
~~1 - Operations Officer~~
~~1 - TSS/TD~~
~~1 - Senior Staff~~

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

[illegible]

[illegible] 6

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME	SEX	DATES OF COURSE	[illegible]
Keenan, Thomas J.	M	1 - 26 July 1957	13
DATE OF BIRTH	EOD DATE	GRADE [illegible]	OFFICE
24 June 1930	May 1957	GS-7	OTR/JOTP

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR [illegible] POSITION

Junior Officer Trainee

SECTION II: OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE

1. To introduce students to the skills and techniques involved in the processing of intelligence materials.

2. To give practice in the oral written presentation of intelligence.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

Intelligence Techniques is a four weeks [illegible] course designed for Junior Officer trainees but available to personnel who are or will be engaged in the production of intelligence. Emphasis is on "learning by doing." [illegible] a series of integrated written exercises which require [illegible] of actual intelligence documents. [illegible] is also gained in the oral presentation of intelligence through a series of briefings before the [illegible]. [illegible] student is assigned a special research problem [illegible] hours are allotted in the course schedule. The results are presented [illegible] and instructors in an oral briefing at the end of the course. [illegible] student also prepares an annotated bibliography and writes a [illegible] of his research.

[illegible] adjectivally on the basis of how well the student [illegible] the requirements of objectivity, organization, [illegible] [illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

2

[illegible]

[illegible] in an extremely effective manner in this area.

SATISFACTORY: The student met this objective in a competent and adequate manner. He demonstrated a good understanding and grasp of the information presented, or, if skills are involved, he demonstrated sufficient competence to operate effectively in this area.

WEAK: Although the student may have met some of the standards set for minimum achievement of this course goal or objective, he demonstrated serious gaps in knowledge or sufficient lack of skill to be of doubtful competence.

SECTION VI REPORT OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

Figures show grade distribution. The asterisk indicates grade this student received.

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Oral Briefing	0	0	13*	0
Written [illegible]	0	2	11*	0
[illegible]	0	1	8*	4

SECTION VII [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Satisfactory [illegible] [illegible]

1 1 3 *2 1 1 2 2

6 [illegible]

2 7 13 12 19 6 17 12

[illegible]

Mr. Keenan was a bit slow in adjusting to the requirements of the course, but during the last two weeks he showed definite progress in his grasp of the production problems. His oral presentations improved steadily, and his final briefing was excellent, both in substance and in presentation. Mr. Keenan is a very pleasant young man, interested and cooperative, and gives promise of being a sound intelligence officer.

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION -- INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION	COURSE NO. 10

SECTION I — IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME OF STUDENT Keenan, Thomas J.	SEX ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	DATES OF COURSE 27 May - 21 June 1957	NO. OF STUDENTS 65 I.I. 58 C.P.
DATE OF BIRTH 24 June 1930	EOD DATE May '57	GRADE OR RANK GS-7	OFFICE OTR/JOTP

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION
Junior Officer Trainee

SECTION II — CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

This course is presented primarily by lecture and reading; it also includes seminars and discussion periods. Each phase of the course is rated by a single multiple choice test.

SECTION III — OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Introduction to Intelligence phase are:

1. To develop understanding of the mission and organization of CIA and its role in the intelligence community and the national security effort.
2. To develop understanding of the functions of CIA components with responsibilities for intelligence, support and other activities.

The objective of the Introduction to Communism phase is to provide a basic understanding of the Communist ideology and of the background, organization, activities and capabilities of the International Communist Movement and the USSR.

SECTION IV — STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT RATINGS

The numbers placed in the columns below show how many students received each rating. An asterisk(*) shows the rating this student received.

SUBJECT	HOURS	RATING		
		UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	EXCELLENT
INTRODUCTION TO INTELLIGENCE	80	0	37	28*
INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNISM	80	1	23	34*

SECTION V — COMMENTS

INDICATE ANY STRONG AND WEAK POINTS OF THE STUDENT, OR ANYTHING THAT MAY HAVE INFLUENCED HIS PERFORMANCE IN THE COURSE

CONTINUE COMMENTS ON REVERSE SIDE ☐ HERE

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF INSTRUCTOR/INTELLIGENCE PHASE J. G. Hazelton Jr. SIGNATURE OF CHIEF INSTRUCTOR/COMMUNISM PHASE Henry M. Schreiber

FORM NO. 450 REPLACES FORMS 450 AND 450A
1 FEB 57 1 SEP 56 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

May

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry)	2. NAME: (last) KEENAN (first) THOMAS (middle) JOHN	3. Office
4. Date of Birth 30 Jun 1930	5. Sex: ✓ male (1) ___ female (2)	Marital Status M Nr. Dependents 1
6. Employment Date: 30 MAY 1957		
7. Citizenship: ✓ U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) ✓ Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other(specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ______	

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

- 1. Less than high school
- 2. High school graduate
- 3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
- 4. Two years college, or less
- 5. Over two years, no degree
- [✓ 6.] Bachelor degree
- 7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
- 8. Masters degree
- 9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	
Univ. of Wisc. Ext. at Fond du Lac, Wisc	Hist	Ecol.	1948	'50	2	-	TRANSFERRED		63
Marquette Univ.	Hist. & Pol.	—	1950	'53	3	-	BS	June 1953	79
								Total	142

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
—				

4. Military, Intelligence or Investigative training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
NAVAL OFFICER CANDIDATE	July 1953	Nov 1953	4	GENERAL LINE OFFICERS [illegible]

CODED FOR QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 22 APR 1957

Form No. 275
1 Oct 64

OFFICE OF PE

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. State the nature of duties performed with this organization, starting with your present position. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From ______ To ______ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties: ______
Grade ______ Salary ______	
Office ______	
Position Title: ______	
Duty Title: ______	Duty Station, if overseas: ______
From ______ To ______ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties: ______
Grade ______ Salary ______	
Office ______	
Position Title: ______	
Duty Title: ______	Duty Station, if overseas: ______
From ______ To ______ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties: ______
Grade ______ Salary ______	
Office ______	
Position Title: ______	
Duty Title: ______	Duty Station, if overseas: ______
From ______ To ______ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties: ______
Grade ______ Salary ______	
Office ______	
Position Title: ______	
Duty Title: ______	Duty Station, if overseas: ______
From ______ To ______ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties: ______
Grade ______ Salary ______	
Office ______	
Position Title: ______	
Duty Title:	Duty Station, if overseas:

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Previous Employment: Describe your previous work experience in sufficient detail to permit full recognition of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.

From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary 3845 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer U.S. Navy Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position [illegible] U.S. Naval Radio Station [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] administrative and operational [illegible] of the [illegible] Duty Station if overseas: —
From [illegible] '56 To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary 3845 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] officers Employer U.S. Navy Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Ass't officer in charge & communication officer Description of Duties: Responsible to OIC for [illegible] operational [illegible] of radio equipment & personnel Duty Station if overseas: —
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's 25 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary 3193 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer U.S. Navy Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Communication officer & [illegible] watch officer Description of Duties: Responsible for [illegible] of radio [illegible] & [illegible] Duty Station if overseas: —
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer U.S. Navy Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] watch officer at [illegible] N.Y. [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:

OFFICE OF PRO

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01___U.S. Secret Service
02___Civil Police
03___Military Police
04___U.S. Border Patrol
05___U.S. Narcotics Squad
06___FBI
07___Criminal Investigation Div.
21___Office of Naval Intelligence
22___Office of War Information
23___Army G-2
20___Office of Strategic Services

24___Air Force A-2
25___Foreign Economic Admin.
26___Counter Intelligence Corps
27___Immigration & Naturalization
28___Strategic Services Unit
29___Foreign Service, State Dept.
30___Central Intelligence Group
31___Armed Forces Security Agency
32___Coordinator of Information
33___Office of Facts & Figures
34___Board of Economic Warfare
35___Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

	COMPETENCE					HOW ACQUIRED			
LANGUAGE	Equivalent to Native Fluency	Fluent: but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge	Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study
French					✓				✓
Spanish					✓			✓	

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ______

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ______

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specialized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1. 5	2.	20 - 30	1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc.	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership:

OFFICE OF

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented	
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No

SEC. X. TESTS (Within present organization)

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken.

Type of Test	Date Taken

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

None

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour ✓ (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested ___

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment do you think you are best qualified?

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status

Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ✓ Yes ___ No.

If yes, indicate your present draft classification 4-A

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status

Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ✓ Yes ___ No.

If yes, complete the following.

1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ✓ Inactive Reserve Status

Service U.S. Naval Reserve Grade LTJG Serial Number 574838

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated Admin Duty - [illegible]

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ___

Location of Service Records, if known 1) US Naval Reserve Officer Center, Omaha, Neb. 2) H.Q. Commandant 9th Naval District, Gt. Lakes, Ill.

SEC. XV. TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken in this organization.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

DATE 24 May 1952

SIGNATURE

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED MARCH [illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A8

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

.....CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.. Washington, D.C.
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, ...THOMAS J. KEENAN.. do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

....20 May 1957..................
(Date of entrance on duty)

....
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this ....20th.... day of ....May.................. A. D. 19 57,

at ....Washington, D.C. ....
(City) (State)

[SEAL.] ....
(Signature of officer)

....
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

10—53160-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State)
5006 COLUMBIA PIKE, APT. 3, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 29 June 1930
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State or city and foreign country): Fond du Lac, Wisconsin

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, PLEASE NOTIFY: MRS. MARGARET KEENAN
(B) RELATIONSHIP: WIFE
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 5006 Columbia Pike, Apt 3, Arlington, Va.
(D) TELEPHONE NO.: JA 5-0223

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blank below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MAR-RIED (Check one)	SIN-GLE (Check one)
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*		✓
7. DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*		✓
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, CHARGED, OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES, FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 12 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		✓
9. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN BARRED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 12.*		✓

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10. (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		✓
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		
11. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT;		
A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE:		
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT:		
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.*		✓

12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
			✓

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER.—You must determine that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment. This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, any record of recent discharge or arrest, age, citizenship and members of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should particularly check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and/or other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1954
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1, R5 AND S1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL ' ILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF ..OMPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): KEENAN, THOMAS J.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 June 1930

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
—							

SCD 1954 Jan. 19, Jh 11/27/57

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
U. S. NAVY	1953	July	12	1956	Nov	11	HON.

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TOTAL YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☐ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

20 May 1957
(DATE)

Thomas J. Keenan
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 20th day of May 19 57 at Washington, D.C.
(MONTH) (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

Martha Shegetalis

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
56	~~11~~ 10	32
53	7	12
3	3	20/1/21
DD	214	Active Time
3	04	01

12. TOTAL SERVICE 3 3 21

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

INSTRUCTIONS. File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

(OVER)

16—C1430-8

Part III.—DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS. *(Complete for noncompetitive hires based on competitive status as required by instructions in FPM Chapter S1.)* Employee has a competitive status. This determination is based upon the following evidence:

NAME OF AGENCY	SIGNATURE AND OFFICIAL TITLE	DATE

PART IV.—DETERMINATION OF CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	TOTAL SERVICE (Item 12)	NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (Item 13)	CREDITABLE SERVICE (Leave Purposes)	ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (Present Agency)	LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (Leave Purposes)	SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (Leave Purposes)
Years				56 39	3	53
Months				11 5	3	1
Days				50 20	24	29

PART V.—DETERMINATION OF CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES. *(Complete only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes.)*

	TOTAL SERVICE (Item 12)	NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (Item 14)	CREDITABLE SERVICE (RIF Purposes)	ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (Present Agency)	LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (RIF Purposes)	SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE* (RIF Purposes)
Years						
Months						
Days						

* Enter as the "Service Computation Date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF 7

REMARKS:

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: THOMAS J. KEENAN

SUBJECT : Credit Reference

1. You are advised that the position for which you have been hired is of a sensitive nature and that YOU ARE NOT TO IDENTIFY YOURSELF WITH THIS AGENCY for credit reference or for any other purpose.

2. You are to disregard that portion of the Monday morning Personnel EOD Orientation and the Thursday afternoon Security Introduction which authorizes certain personnel to identify themselves with this Agency, when necessary, for credit, rental agreement, and like purposes.

3. You will be advised by your Placement Officer as to the cover information necessary for proper job identification. If at any time cover difficulties are encountered you may arrange an appointment through your Placement Officer to see the Security Officer responsible for your activity.

G. M. Stewart

G. M. STEWART
Director of Personnel

I have read the above and understand that I am not to associate myself with the Central Intelligence Agency for credit reference or for any other purpose.

20 May 1952
Date

Thomas J. Keenan
Signature of Employee

S-E-C-R-E-T

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Testing Secrecy Agreement

I shall be participating in a testing program administered by the National Security Agency (NSA). I understand that other government agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), are associated with the NSA testing program and that this information is not for public use. Therefore, I agree to the following conditions with regard to this testing:

1. I will not divulge or reveal under any circumstances whatsoever any information with respect to testing procedures of CIA. Such information will include, but will not be limited to, the types and contents of tests and questionnaires, and information disclosed by examiners.

2. I will not reveal the fact that CIA is associated with the NSA testing program. I will not mention the name of the Central Intelligence Agency or any part of its program to the examiner or to any other person, including those participating in the testing. (The examiner is not a CIA official.)

3. If I am asked by a CIA official whether I have been tested, I will indicate only the date and purpose of the testing.

4. If inquiry is made by anyone other than a CIA official, I will give no information whatsoever about testing procedures. I will not even mention the fact that I signed this agreement.

5. If I am asked what government agencies I am being tested for, I will reveal only that I took the NSA tests.

6. This agreement is perpetually binding whether or not I am employed by CIA.

Signature of Agreement

26 January 1957
Date

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRECY AGREEMENT

13 January 1956
Date

1. I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures.

2. I agree to honor the requests of the Central Intelligence Agency relative to my application for employment or rendition of services whether it be accepted or rejected.

3. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in the Central Intelligence Agency, unless specifically authorized by a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

4. I agree not to disclose processing procedures I have observed in the Central Intelligence Agency.

5. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application for employment to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Thomas J. Keenan
Signature

J.H. Gage
Witness

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 21 June 1976

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Koenan, Thomas J. 29 Jan 30

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDO/LA/M&CAM

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 7375

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ XX TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Kathy Hill

Kathy Hill, LA/Trng

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D3113 Hqs

EXT.: 5270

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified for TDY Standby until 1 July 1978.

DATE: 6 August 1976

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Harry C. Gordon, OMS/Registrar

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Keenan, Thomas J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 June 1930	3. GRADE GS 14
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) WH/ Lima	5. PRESENT POSITION	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 6810
7. PROPOSED STATION WH/ Kingston, Jamaica	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) COS 066[illegible] GS 14	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State- Integree 295-26-3991	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 1 Sept 1973	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY Seven

12. COMMENTS

13. DATE OF REQUEST 28 July 1973	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Jo Torres	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3D5317	16. EXTENSION 6815

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

Qualified overseas PCS.

23 October 1973 William T. Golder, OMS/pro

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 259a [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) 395-36-2991
Keenan, Thomas J.

2. DATE OF BIRTH
29 Jun 30

3. GRADE
GS-14

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment)
DDP/WH/Bogota State

5. PRESENT POSITION
Ops Officer

6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION
7431

7. PROPOSED STATION
Lima, Peru

8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade)
Ops Off DCOS/0138/GS-14

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION
State

10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE
Oct 71

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
seven (7)

12. COMMENTS

Vice: Charles Dickens

Physical will be taken in the field and results forwarded to Hqs.

Mr. Keenan's tested Spanish language proficiency of Intermediate Reading and Elementary Speaking meets the general language requirement of the Station.

13. DATE OF REQUEST
19 Mar 71

14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
Joan Wright

15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING
3D 5309 Hqs

16. EXTENSION
7431

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION
Qualified Overseas PCS

12 May 1971

Peter Zrowka, OMS/pro

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 8 May 1969

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) KEENAN, Thomas J.	3. POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	4. GRADE GS-13	
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH DDP/WH/3/Bogota		6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT. 6815	

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION: Bogota
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: State
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA: 9 June 1969
STATION: Bogota
NO. OF DEP.'S:

MEDICALLY QUALIFIED FOR
PROPOSED OS PCS.
DONALD FARL

6 13 69

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: PPMacDougall

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D5309 Hqs.
EXT.: 6815

10. COMMENTS

Mr. Keenan will be in Washington TDY during the week of 9 June. He is then scheduled for home leave and return to Bogota for another two year tour. It is requested that arrangements be made for a physical examination at Hqs. during the week of 9 June 1969. His family will have their physicals in Bogota.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE:
SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-58 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 13 February 67

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Keenan, Thomas John (Dependents of)

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-12

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/CA

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6315

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: May 1967
STATION: Bogota, Colombia
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: State
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: Seven (7)
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (Form 39) ATTACHED: Seven (7)

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Kenneth L. Wambold

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3 D 3309

EXT.: 6315

10. COMMENTS

Forms 39 are attached. Please schedule during April 1967.

Margaret Jane	Wife			
Mary Margaret	Dau 6 Oct 57	Sheila Elizabeth	Dau	19 Aug 61
Kathleen Ann	Dau 16 Sep 58	Patricia Jean	Dau	11 Sep 62
Thomas John, Jr.	Son 19 May 60	Carol Jane	Dau	7 May 63

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE:

PROPOSED

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Keenan, Thomas John	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 June 1930	3. GRADE GS-12
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/WH/CA	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Officer	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 6815
7. PROPOSED STATION Bogota, Colombia	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Ops Officer/0327/GS-13	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE May 1967	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY Seven (7)

12. COMMENTS

Form 89 is attached.

13. DATE OF REQUEST 13 February 67	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Kenneth L. Wambold	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3 D 5393	16. EXTENSION 6815

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

PROPOSED [illegible]

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

2 15 67

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-64 259a [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): KEENAN, Thomas

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-12

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ TDY STANDBY Latin America

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	
STATION	
TDY OR PCS	TDY
TYPE OF COVER	State
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: H.C.Hornig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D5313

EXT.: 6615

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR TDY STANDBY
UNTIL Nov. 67

DATE

SIGNATURE, CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF
REX HART

FORM 10-63 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 6 April 66

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): KEENAN, Thomas J.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-12

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/PO

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 7811

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ TDY STANDBY Latin America

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ MODS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS: TDY

TYPE OF COVER: Lt. State

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Mary C. Wernig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4-56

EXT.: 6815

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR TDY STANDBY
UNTIL

PETER ZROWKA

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 259

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

KEENAN

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
30 NOVEMBER 1964

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
KEENAN, THOMAS J.

3. POSITION TITLE
OPS OFFICER

4. GRADE
GS-12

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH
DDP/WH/3

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
NO. OF DEPTS

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)
☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER
SIGNATURE
ROOM NO. & BUILDING
EXT.

10. COMMENTS

18 AND 21 DEC. 0900 1245

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES
[illegible]

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE
12-29-64

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 1-58 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(39)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 8 April 65

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): KEENAN, Thomas John

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-10

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/F&O

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6576

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Please re-valuate

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS: TDY

TYPE OF COVER: Light State

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Mary C. Wornig

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GH-44

EXT.: 6576

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR TDY STAND BY
UNTIL
JOE W. CLINE

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 4 13 65

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-33 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(24)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. NAME (LAST) KEENAN	(FIRST) Thomas	(MIDDLE) J.	2. DATE OF REQUEST 15 September 1959
3. POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	4. OFFICE, DIVISION AND BRANCH DDP/WH/III		5. GRADE GS-9
6. REQUESTING OFFICER J. Weshinko, WH/Pers	7. BUILDING AND ROOM NO. 1404 Barton		8. EXTENSION 8242

TYPE OF EVALUATION AND REPORT

9. TYPE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ OVERSEAS

ETD: o/a 15 February 1959
STATION: Mexico City, Mexico
TDY-PCS: PCS

☐ OVERSEAS RETURN

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

10. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION DESIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH R 15-200

☐ YES ☐ NO

Subject will be a State Integratee.

9A. REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☑ QUALIFIED

☐ DISQUALIFIED

10A. REPORT OF OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED

☐ DISQUALIFIED

11. COMMENTS

Dependents to Accompany

Wife - Margaret J.
Daughter - Mary M.
Daughter - Kathleen A.

Subject's and dependent 89's attached.

DATE OF EVALUATION: 9 - 2 - [illegible]

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF, MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 3-55 259 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(34)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) KEENAN (First) THOMAS (Middle) JOHN
2. DATE 21 Jan 1958
3. TO POSITION JOT
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH JOTP/TR
5. GRADE GS-7
6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas
7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
Re-evaluation
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)
Training at ISOLATION ~~beginning 3 March 1958~~

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks:

Send reports to JOTP/TR, 2518 Q. Eye
Make appointments with JOTP/TR, Extension 3514

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED TRAINING

JAN 2 3 1958

MEDICAL OFFICER

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) KEENAN THOMAS (Middle) JOHN
2. DATE 9 October 1957
3. Junior Officer Trainee
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH CTR/JOTP
5. GRADE GS-7
6. TYPE OF POSITION
☒ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas
7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)
Training - Ops Fam Course #11 beginning 4 November 1957

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks:

Send reports to JOTP/TR, 2513 Quarters Eye
Make appointments with JOTP/TR, Extension 3514.

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED TRAINING OCT 11 1957

MEDICAL OFFICER

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

SEP 16 12 05 PM '57
OFFICE OF [illegible]

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) KEENAN (First) Thomas (Middle) John
2. DATE
3. TO POSITION JOT
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH OTR/JOTP
5. GRADE GS-7

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☒ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☒ Special (Specify)
Re-evaluated for ISO Trng - 9/30/57 - OC

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks:

Send reports to JOTP/TR, 2413 Alcott.

Make appointments with JOTP/TR, X3514.

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED TRAINING

SEP 13 1957

Martin J. [illegible]
MEDICAL OFFICER

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C/Records & Services Division/OP **DATE:** 2 APR 1957

ATTN : Mrs. Anna Phillips

FROM : Director of Training

SUBJECT: KEENAN, Thomas John - Confirmation of Request for Action at GS-7

The Medical Office has granted Thomas J. Keenan Full Duty/General status. Please confirm the request dated 8 February 1957 to initiate action on Mr. Keenan.

M Baird

MATTHEW BAIRD

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I. REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS JOHN
2. DATE: 14 March 1957
3. TO POSITION: JOT
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: CTR/JOTP
5. GRADE:

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II. REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

SECRET

Remarks:

FULL DUTY/GENERAL ~~26MAR 1957~~

Please send copy to JOTP, 2413 Alcott.

Vincent J. Ford
MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I. REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KEENAN, THOMAS JOHN
2. DATE: 14 March 1957
3. TO POSITION: JOT
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: CTR/JOTP
5. GRADE:

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II. REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

SECRET

Remarks:

FULL DUTY/GENERAL ~~26MAR 1957~~

Please send copy to JOTP, 2413 Alcott.

Vincent J. Ford
MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: **19 April 1957**

TO: **Chief, Records & Services Division**

Your Reference: **C-7673 OTR**

FROM: Chief, **Personnel Office** ~~Security Division~~ **Personnel**

Case Number: **131718**

SUBJECT: **KEENAN, Thomas John**

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. **Subject is to be polygraphed as part of EOD procedures.**

W. M. Knott

W. H. Knott

Phoned 4/22/57
[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 30-101
FEB. 1959

101

[illegible]

PUBLIC [illegible]

[illegible]EOPEANS

LATVIAN [illegible]

PHILOSOPHY OF [illegible]

[illegible] 1949

ELEMENTARY

THE RENAISSANCE

THE [illegible]

AMERICAN LITERATURE

[illegible] LIT [illegible]

METAPHYSICS

[illegible]

INTERMEDIATE

[illegible] STATE

CATHOLIC MARRIAGE

THEORY OF ETHICS

[illegible]

[illegible] OF [illegible]

JOT

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

[illegible]

11. OTHER IDENTIFYING PHYSICAL FEATURES
None

12 East Follett Street
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, U.S.A.

12 East Follett Street,
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, U.S.A.

14. HOME TELEPHONE NO.
3527

15. OFFICE TELEPHONE NO.
NA

LEGAL RESIDENCE
Wisconsin, U.S.A.

17. NICKNAMES
NA

OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED
NA

NA

NA

SECTION II — POSITION DATA

Agency

THOMAS J [illegible]MAN
MAY 57

CONFIDENTIAL

15 September 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Services Staff

FROM : Charles A. Briggs
DDO Information Review Officer

SUBJECT : Appreciation

13.11.

1. As you know well, on September 19th, I turn over responsibility for release or denial of DDO documents under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. The experience has been both frustrating and challenging, epitomizing the issues in transition from a totally classified past to a new intelligence environment yet to be defined. The tension in law between protection of sources and methods and more open government was apparent, daily, to those involved; good case law was made as we sought to adhere to both principles and to regain, through this process, some credibility for the Agency.

2. I've tried in the past to convey my appreciation for the truly magnificent support I got from what is now the Privacy and Information Action Group, through recommendations for the Unit Citation subsequently awarded by the DCI, through QSI's and promotions, and through personal comment. All have worked long hard hours and all, those now in PIAG and those who have left, deserve credit for their professional efforts in this arena; I want to express my thanks to you for the assistance your people gave to me as the DDO Information Review Officer.

3. At the risk of being unfair to some who are more recent arrivals, I want to express particular and very personal thanks to Win Brown, Cis Cass, Lou Dube, Mary Felton, Doris LeBaron, Fred McCann, Karen Rice, Helen Stilson, Jon Wolfe and Mack Wood.

4. My debt to Fred Randall and Andy Addona has been made a matter of record on several occasions. Let me just note here that any supervisor who has had the kind of qualitative backing that those two gentlemen gave me is fortunate indeed.

For OPF, Randall, Frederick

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. In addition to the PIAG crowd, Paul Haefner's people have had the endless and repetitive job of searching the CHAOS files and helping me deal with that most sensitive aspect of past history. Please express my thanks to them and, most particularly, to Paul himself.

6. Finally, let me make special note of the contributions from Joe Gigliotti and the retired officers handling the OSS records requests. Their particular expertise was a welcome addition to the staff support received.

7. I'm sure all will give Bob Owen, in his new role, the same high quality support that they gave to me. To state the obvious, although the win record is quite good, the race is still on.

Charlie

Charles A. Briggs

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. Mong

dCF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 MAY 1976

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 012170
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): RANDALL, FREDERICK G.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION ~~and~~ Change of Functional Category
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 23 YEAR 76
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7 FAN AND NSCA: 6226 2196 0001
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/SERVICES STAFF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, SERVICES STAFF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS ~~[illegible]~~ OFFICER SAS (15)
12 POSITION NUMBER: EV 27
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAW

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 6
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~[illegible]~~ 36529

18 REMARKS:
psi due same date
DAC to DAW

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Alec T. Monroe
Alec T. Monroe
C/SS/Personnel
DATE SIGNED: 17 May 76

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: DDO/CMPE
DATE SIGNED: 5/18/76

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 MDOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	53050	SS	75013		1	10 25 26	05 23 76	05 23 76

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—FES 2—CSRS 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA. YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR
37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV REGT/TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI-HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 05-19-76 [illegible]
21 MAY 1976
46 C.P. APPROVAL: Robert H
DATE APPROVED: 05/21/76

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

CONFIDENTIAL

12 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DDO Evaluation Board

THROUGH: C/CMG

SUBJECT: Promotion Recommendation - Frederick C. Randall to GS-15

1. This memorandum constitutes a formal recommendation that Fred Randall, GS-14/8, now Chief of the DDO Privacy Information (DDO/PIC) unit in Services Staff, be promoted to GS-15. The position calls for that grade.

2. Mr. Randall is 49 years of age; entered on duty in CIA in September 1951 as a GS-7 assigned to OSO/FDZ. He is married; has four children, served briefly in the Air Force (1945-46); has an AB in Government, an AM in Foreign Affairs, and was a PhD candidate in International Relations. His Agency service was in FE from 1953 to 1965, including overseas tours in Djakarta and Tokyo; in DOD/FRD from 1965 to March 1975, including 2 years in the DC field office; his current assignment dates from 16 March 75. His date of grade is June 1967.

3. The specifics of Mr. Randall's current assignment and all the superlatives about it I have just recounted in a fitness report which I prepared today, as well as in a QSI recommendation (approved) of October 1975 and an out-of-cycle promotion recommendation dated 8 August 1975. I rate his performance Outstanding and refer the reader(s) to the reports cited for details. I would note here that Mr. Randall changed his home base and functional category in November of 1975 and was rated number 1 of 4 Category C nominees from this Staff by all four members of the SS Panel. I would note further that when I submitted my August 75 out-of-cycle promotion recommendation, Mr. Randall's career designation was B/OG; given his personal circumstances the DDO suggested that Randall change his career designation to become more competitive "and have an excellent chance on the next go round." The QSI suggestion then resulted.

4. As the individual responsible for releasing or denying thousands of DDO documents in response to FOIA requests, and subsequently answering for DDO decisions in affidavits and court depositions, I know how well Fred does his work and how richly he deserves this promotion to GS-15.

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY 011078 E2 IMPDET

EYES ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO	DATE 15 September 1975 LETTER NO.
TO : DDO ATTN:	FROM: Chief, Services Staff	

SUBJECT: One-Time Reclama - Requested Randall Promotion

As you know, OB is not reticent about expressing his views, and in the informal career development world, Fred had had it in FRD. I've known OB fairly well and respect his candor and professionalism; we just worked very well together on the GS-16/17 Panel, with an interestingly identical philosophy. Fred's performance did not satisfy OB, and his Fitness Reports reflect that fact. It does not surprise me, since Fred had been in FR from 1970-1975, that his Fitness Reports for the past years would put him in a neutral middle, or even low middle, ranking among B/OS officers. But that's yesterday.

Today, as I tried to say strongly in my 8 August memo, my view of his work is that it is Outstanding--and I don't so rate many officers. I would hope his present work could stand on its own merit, and project forward, expecting FOIA to be a way of life in the DDO with all the management challenge, and headache, that poses. His present and future peer competition should be with the A/C crowd, not the B/OS group--if that hurdle is determining.

At the risk of being irritating, I feel bound to state his case in what I consider the appropriate competitive environment, to avoid an out-of-cycle suggestion doing mischief to the system. Any hope?

REPLY	DATE

EYES ONLY

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 1831

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 7 January 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012170

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Randall, Frederick

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment - Correction

6
38

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 21 | YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 4229-0249-0001

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/FR Division
Branch III

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash DC

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer - CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0516

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 29095

18. REMARKS

This action corrects the original action where Item 7, Fan and NSCA was listed incorrectly.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Paul S. Hatchford, C/FR/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 7 Jan 73

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul

DATE SIGNED: 8 Jan 74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 56

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 43060 | ALPHABETIC FRD

22. STATION CODE: 15013

23. [illegible] CODE:

24. [illegible] CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. [illegible] DA. [illegible] YR. 26

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. [illegible] EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 37 | MO. 11 DA. 21 YR. 73

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. [illegible]

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE

36. [illegible] COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. [illegible] COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE

39. FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA

44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

SECRET

13-3712

S-E-C-R-E-T

FR 73-228
6 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Appointment of Mr. Frederick C. Randall as Chief, Branch III, Foreign Resources Division

1. The appointment of Mr. Frederick C. Randall as Chief, Branch III, Foreign Resources Division, effective on or about 11 June 1973, is recommended.

2. Mr. Randall has been an employee of the Agency since September 1951 and is presently assigned to Branch II, Foreign Resources Division, as the Desk Officer in support of Los Angeles and San Francisco Bases. A copy of his biographic profile and the last two fitness reports are attached.

WL O'Brien

Walter L. O'Brien
Chief
Foreign Resources Division

Attachments:
1. Biographic Profile (Parts 1 and 2)
2. Fitness Reports (2)

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

Deputy Director for Operations

13 July 1973
Date

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 057223

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONFIDENTIAL

8 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Out-of-Sequence Promotion Recommendation: Fred Randall

1. We've spoken of the need to look further at both Agency and DDO implications of the Freedom of Information Act and, now, the Privacy Act, including the increased number of appeals and litigation cases, and of the logic of collecting a coterie of deponents or affiants to take some of the load off of both you and me. The grade level of the appeals officers and the deponents must include 14's and 15's, to incorporate the necessary clout with the divisions and judgment vis-a-vis release of information to the outside world.

2. Fred is a GS-14/7. He had just come to me at the time of the last GS-15 panel exercise and had not been recommended for promotion by FRD. I consider his performance over the past 6 months to have been Outstanding. He is head and shoulders above the other directorates' FIOs; I have considerable laudatory testimony from OGC, OLC, O/DDA and within the DDO as to his professionalism, tact, persuasiveness, analytic skills and realistic, while tough-minded, protection of DDO sources and methods. This includes occasional arm-wrestling with DDO branch/division/staff chiefs, OGC and OLC lawyers, FBI contacts and others above his current grade level.

3. I have discussed this proposed out-of-cycle promotion recommendation to GS-15 with Ev, who, in turn, has mentioned it to Gordon. The return signals I got sounded positive.

4. I do, therefore, recommend that you approve Fred's promotion to GS-15, effective as soon as the action can be cut.

/s/ Charles A. Briggs

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

17 NOV 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Frederick Randall

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase

1. My congratulations on the award to you of a Quality Step Increase. This award is in recognition of superior sustained performance and reflects great credit on you and the job you have been doing.

2. I am confident that your future performance will be of continuing high quality.

With personal best wishes,

William E. Nelson

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

My congratulations too. I know how well deserved this is. It is also symbolic of the excellence of your group as a whole and your leadership of them.

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

CSR 12-3-75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED 9 October 1975

1. SERIAL NUMBER 012170

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) RANDALL FREDERICK

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT - CHANGE OF HOME BASE AND ~~CAREER~~ FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 12 DAY 01 YEAR 75

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NBCA 6226 2196 0001

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDO/~~SERVICES STAFF~~ SS
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF/SERVICES STAFF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE ~~OPERATIONS~~ OPS OFFICER SAS (15)

12. POSITION NUMBER EV27

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DAC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP 14 ~~7~~ 8

17. SALARY OR RATE $ ~~[illegible]~~ 33126

18. REMARKS

I agree to change my home base and career category from "MG" to "AC"

CONCUR: R. E. O'Brien 11/28/75 — EA/PERS — DATE
Frederick Randall 9 Oct 75
Frederick Randall — Date

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Lynda J. Bohannon
Lynda J. Bohannon
AC/SS/PERS

DATE SIGNED 12/01/75

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DDO/CSS/14

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 OCCUP. CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	53050	SS	25013		1	10 28 26		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR — 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—CSCA 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE — 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR — EOD DATA — 33 SECURITY REQ. NO. — 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT — 36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR — 37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR — 38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR. DIST. PROV. TEMP CODE — 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE — 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS — 42 LEAVE CAT CODE — 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS — 44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 12-1-75 JR 01 DEC 1975

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
8-72

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

Confidential

ATTACHMENT B

MEMORANDUM FOR: Frederick Randall

SUBJECT : Acknowledgment of Evaluation Board
Career Category

REFERENCE : Evaluation Board Precepts for Your Grade

1. Based upon an examination of your assignments and duties, and after considering likely future assignments, you have been placed in the following career category for Evaluation Board purposes. Precise definitions of the categories are contained in the Evaluation Board precepts for your grade.

CATEGORY C

2. If you believe that you have not been placed in the correct category because the substantive content of your job more closely approximates another category or because you have made a permanent change of career track; please take the matter up through your command channel to secure the concurrence of your Home Base component to a change of your category. Previously assigned and acknowledged categories will remain in effect until a fully executed acknowledgment of change is received by the Career Management Group.

3. A category change should not be initiated for the period of a temporary, training or rotational assignment unless a permanent change of career track will follow.

4. Please sign and date this notification in the space provided and return it to your Home Base component through command channels.

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Frederick P. Randall
Signature of Addressee

9 Oct 1975
Date

Confidential

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

0-M

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

0CC		DATE PREPARED 7 May 1975
1. SERIAL NUMBER 012170 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) RANDALL FREDERICK ✓	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHANGE OF FAN ~~ACCOUNT NUMBER~~	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 05 DAY 08 YEAR 75	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V; V TO CF; CF TO V; CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 5226 2196 0001	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/SERVICES STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, SERVICES STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER SAS (15)	12. POSITION NUMBER EV27	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DMG
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 7
17. SALARY OR RATE $ 30699		

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Alec T. Monroe Alec T. Monroe C/SS/PERS	DATE SIGNED 8 May 75	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER K.	DATE SIGNED 5/8/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL OV/14

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC [illegible]	ALPHABETIC [illegible]	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROSTER CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 28 96	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR	28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO		
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; STATE CODE					

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION OK 5/12/75 12 MAY 1975	46. C.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 5/12/75

SECRET

pa
3-18-45

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 March 1975

1. SERIAL NUMBER 012170	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) RANDALL FREDERICK B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 03 / DAY 16 / YEAR 75	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS				
	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 5226 2193 0008

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDO/SERVICES STAFF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, SERVICES STAFF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPERATIONS OFFICER SAS (15) ✓	12. POSITION NUMBER EV27	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DMG

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 7	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 30,699

18. REMARKS

FROM:DDO/FR DIVISION/BRANCH III

CONCUR Bob Conners (telecon/4 Mar 75) EA Division

CONCUR Henry Walton (telecon 4/3/75) FR Division

cc to payroll
security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Alec T. Monroe Alec T. Monroe C/SS/SE/PERS	DATE SIGNED 5 Mar 75	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Jon K. Beal	DATE SIGNED 3/7/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 52050	ALPHABETIC SS	22. STATION CODE 76013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH ✓ MO DA YR 10 [illegible] [illegible]	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR

27. DATE OF LEI

EOD DATA

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 November 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012170

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Randall, Frederick

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 21 YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

G
28

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 4229-0269-0001

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/FR Division
Branch III

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer Ch (15)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0516

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 29,095

18. REMARKS:

From: DDO/FRD/Br II/0393

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Paul S. Latchford, C/FR/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 20 Nov 73

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul Buttner

DATE SIGNED: 20 Nov 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OBJECT CODES NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 OCCUPS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE
30	10	1320	FRD	10013		1	10 13 36	

ECD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

43 [illegible]

SECRET

6/11/73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 June 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012170
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Randall, Frederick
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Delegation of NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 13 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 3229-0249-0001
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/FR Division
Branch II
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer, Ch (15)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0393
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 27,708

18. REMARKS:

HOMEBASE: EA

Replacing: Curtis Glenn, to be reassigned

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Paul S. Latchford, C/FR/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 6/13/73

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 6-13-73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 43275 ALPHABETIC FLD
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. [illegible] CODE:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. [illegible] YR. [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

6
23

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 6-13-73

DATE APPROVED: 6/[illegible]/73

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

00 1432

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 16 DECEMBER 1969

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012170 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): RANDALL, FREDERICK C. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: ~~TRANSFER OF FUNDS AND~~ REASSIGNMENT + transfer to Vouchered Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 11 YEAR ~~69~~ 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF XX CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

D

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0229-0249

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/DOD
~~[illegible]~~
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP
Branch I

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0395

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 (5)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 21,003 ✓

18. REMARKS:
FROM DO POSITION NO. 0415

*HB-FE

Security Approval Granted By Cable 12/10/69
SFX 12/29/69

cc: Security
cc: Finance

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO/Pers. & Trng.
DATE SIGNED: 16 Dec 69

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 12/23

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 16
20 EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 4124 ALPHABETIC DDD
22 STATION CODE: 7-012
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HOURS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 31 YR. 26
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28 [illegible]: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OTHER CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39 FEDL. HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
42 STATE TAX CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46 O P APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 OCTOBER 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012170
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): RANDALL FREDERICK
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 | DAY 08 | YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	XX	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8129-0109
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
D DDP/DOD
US FIELD
24 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP
WASHINGTON BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER GS-14
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0415
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 16675

18. REMARKS

T/O change

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia G. Lynch, C/DO Pers. & Training
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 NOOTES CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	43532	DOD	75313		2	10 28 26		

28 [illegible] EXPIRES MO DA YR | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE CODE | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE | 36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR | 37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE | 42 SERVICE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10/11/67
46 CS APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 10/13/67

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 May 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)
012170	RANDALL FREDERICK

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION [redacted]	MONTH 06 DAY 04 YEAR 67	REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
		CF TO V	XX	CF TO CF	7129-0109	

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS

DDP/DOD
US FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
ORBIT OPERATIONS GROUP

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

WASH., D.C.

D

11. POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER [redacted] SAT (15)	0199	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE	AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	14	4	$ 16675

18 REMARKS

From: DOD/Non-Orbit Ops Group/position no. 0218.

Gerard J. Hahn pending out.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO Pers. & Training	25 May 67		31 May 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
22	10	13620	DOD	25013		4	10 08 26	

27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 3-10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVED 1-YES HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

6-1-67

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

16 MAR 1967

Approved by CS Career
Service Panel
24 MAY 1967 /s

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Clandestine Services
Career Service, Section A

SUBJECT : Frederick C. RANDALL, Recommendation for
Promotion to GS-14

1. It is recommended that Frederick C. Randall be promoted from GS-13 to GS-14. Subject is 40 years old and began his Agency career in 1951. He has been a GS-13 since 1958. He entered on duty at the Washington Base (then Washington Station) in August 1965.

2. Subject is responsible for Washington Base operational activity directed against FE Division targets. He replaced one GS-14 officer and one GS-13 officer who shared this responsibility before Subject's arrival. Since Subject's EOD at the Base, the tempo and quality of operations against FE targets has increased greatly. During the period before Sukarno's overthrow in October 1966, positive intelligence reporting from two agents handled by Subject (WUSHARK and WUFLY) made significant contributions to WOFACT assessments of Indonesian events. Reporting in recent months continues to be useful to Djakarta and, in the case of WUSHARK, Subject has brought an agent to the point of being willing to request posting to Peking to cover FE targets there. Subject has an encyclopedic knowledge of Asian history and current events, and his handling of Asian agents has shown excellent sophistication, perception and maturity. He has been systematic in his exploitation of the total capabilities of his agents and contacts and has not been content to limit himself to procurement of positive or operational intelligence from their own embassies or countries. At the request of the local FBI office, Subject has guided one of his agents (WUFLY) into a close relationship with a Soviet Bloc intelligence officer and the FBI has expressed its appreciation for Subject's professional handling of this and other cases in which he has

been involved on its behalf. Subject has an excellent CE mind and a healthy scepticism at all stages of any operational situation. His analysis and handling of the WUAPEX case is cited by way of demonstration of his willingness and ability to probe in painstaking fashion before committing the Agency; his careful debriefing and interrogation of WUAPEX were key factors in the ultimate decision not to plunge ahead on this controversial case. His poise and tact in the development of the sensitive WUTHAL operation has resulted in Agency acquisition of a well-placed agent within the Burmese Embassy at a time when contacts with official Burmese are extremely difficult. Subject is officially registered in the American University Graduate School and makes excellent use of the academic cover thus acquired to supplement his official cover when such is deemed advisable (as in the WUTHAL case).

DE 12

3. An examination of Subject's file shows that he has been recommended for promotion to GS-14 a total of seven times (four by FE Division and, with this request, three times by DO Division). Aside from the fact that he is definitely performing at the GS-14 level, we believe this to be an important factor to be considered in the present promotion request.

Rudolph E. Gomez
RUDOLPH E. GOMEZ
COB, WASHINGTON

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED

CHIEF, DO DIVISION

SECRET

14 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Frederick Randall

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

Recent correspondence on the above subject informed you that I had determined that you met the criteria specified in the applicable regulation for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System. On the basis of this determination and your recently executed election to remain in the System, you designation as a participant was made effective 12 March 1967.

/s/
Director of Personnel

SECRET

0-24 SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 February 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 012170

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): RANDALL, FREDERICK

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 | DAY 12 | YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 7129-0109

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/DOD

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED | 18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY. CODE | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 HOOTIS CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) | 26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA. YR.) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSR, 2—FICA, 3—NONE; CODE 2 | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ. NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR) | 37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. TEST, PROV. TEMP; CODE) | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 1—WAIVED, 2—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS, 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46 O P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 20 [illegible]

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

Not approved 5 DEC 1966

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Clandestine Services
Career Service, Section A

SUBJECT : Frederick C. RANDALL, Recommendation for Promotion to GS-14

1. It is recommended that Frederick C. Randall be promoted from GS-13 to GS-14. Subject is in Step 6 of his grade and has been a GS-13 since 1958. He entered on duty at the US Station in August 1965. A current Fitness Report is attached.

2. Subject's file indicates that he has been recommended for promotion five times: four times by his superiors in FE Division when he served in Japan, and once by the US Station in February 1966. While realizing that the 13 to 14 jump is traditionally difficult we feel that Subject's performance over the past year, when coupled with a consistently high calibre of work in previous years, deserves much-belated recognition in the form of a promotion. He continues to be responsible for the US Station's efforts to exploit the Far Eastern target, and his years of overseas experience against this target have been reflected in a realistic and imaginative approach to operations in the United States. His operational activity has required the handling of persons of varied nationality and stature, close contact with Headquarters representatives, liaison with the Washington Field Office of the FBI, and liaison with the US Air Force. His performance has been uniformly "Strong" and his handling of the HASHARK case has been outstanding. HASHARK, an Indonesian diplomat, has been a contact of the Agency for years, but it was not until his arrival in Washington and his handling by Subject that he began to produce solid intelligence on his own country. Subject's work on this case has received a well-deserved commendation from Headquarters.

SECRET

Subject's excellent relations with colleagues in FE Division have been of considerable value in helping the US Station to adjust its operational activity in the FE field to current and changing requirements. He has clearly been performing at the GS-14 level for some time and we urge that this promotion request be favorably considered at the earliest possible meeting of your panel.

Joseph J. Bulik
JOSEPH BULIK
ACOS/US

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED

Thos. P. Schnyer
Chief, DO Division

SECRET

Not approved 26 May 66

14 FEB 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Clandestine Services Career Service, Section A.

SUBJECT : Frederick C. RANDALL - Recommendation for Promotion to GS-14

1. It is recommended that Frederick C. Randall be promoted from GS-13 to GS-14. Subject is 39 years old and began his Agency career in 1951 as a GS-7. He has been a GS-13 since 1958. He entered on duty at the US Station in August 1965. A current Fitness Report is attached.

2. As the attached Fitness Report indicates, Subject is a real plus for the US Station's efforts to exploit the Far Eastern target locally. His years of experience in the handling of a variety of Oriental nationals abroad has already resulted in a much more realistic approach to local FE targets than was the case before his arrival. In addition to the professional competence and area knowledge which Subject brings to his present position, he has an imaginative approach to operational problems and a high enthusiasm for his work. His excellent relations with colleagues within FE Division have been of considerable value in helping the US Station adjust its operational activity in the FE field to current requirements. One final--and strong--factor arguing for his promotion to GS-14 at this time: he has been in grade eight years and has been recommended for promotion four times by previous supervisors when he was on FE Division rolls.

Harry Rositzke

Harry A. Rositzke
Chief of Station, US.

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

C. Tracy Barnes

C. Tracy Barnes, Chief, DO Division

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 July 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 012170

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): RANDALL FREDERICK G

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF ☒

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: [illegible]-6129-0109

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
U.S. FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
NON-ORBIT OPERATIONS GROUP

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (13)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0218

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS-13

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~13,755~~ 14175

18. REMARKS

Subject is replacement for William Donnett who transferred to FE

X Per Telecon w/ Virginia Lynch DD/Pers

cc: Finance

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 6/21/65

Ulc 7/26/65

Coordinate: Mary Bolger (telecon)
FE Personnel

Recorded By
CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch, DD/Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 7/20/65

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Kenneth J.

DATE SIGNED: 22 JUL 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 43620 ALPHABETIC DCR

22 STATION CODE: 75013

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 [illegible] CODE: 2

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA 28 YR 20

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO.

34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS

42 SERVICE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Ann FE 3 [illegible]/65

46 CS APPROVAL: L. S.

DATE APPROVED: 22 JUL 1965

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

S E C R E T

22 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Career Management Committee

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion of Mr. Frederick C. Randall from GS-13 to GS-14

1. Since Mr. Frederick C. Randall joined the Agency in September 1951, he has served in Headquarters and the Field, where he worked primarily on Indonesian and Japanese affairs. He is currently assigned to Tokyo Station. Mr. Randall has been in grade as a GS-13 since September 1958. He has been recommended three times for promotion to GS-14 since September 1963. Mr. Randall is 38 years old.

2. Mr. Randall's primary duty at the Tokyo Station is Station PBRAMPART responsibilities. These responsibilities are broad and highly important to all PBRAMPART relations throughout the Far East. Through Mr. Randall's intensive effort to strengthen and increase the Agency's role in the coordination of clandestine collection activities, he has been able to set a positive pattern of effective procedures for coordination of the military services' clandestine collection operations. These procedures are now emulated wherever possible throughout the Far East. Mr. Randall's tenacity and patience, based on solid operational Field and Headquarters' experience, have worked to a distinct advantage for the Agency in the PBRAMPART field. Chief of Station, Tokyo, has stated that the vast improvement in the local coordination business has been in large part due to Mr. Randall's good work. Further, as a supervisor and a manager Mr. Randall has quite successfully handled from ten to fifteen subordinates in such diverse functions as Central Registry, local [illegible] establishment, Agency participation in a multi-agency CI Repository, and the Agency-run multi-agency Central Carding facility.

3. During Mr. Randall's [illegible] service at the Tokyo Station, he has [illegible] and capability to carry on a variety of tasks [illegible] Chief of Station [illegible] Mr. [illegible] capable of assuming greater

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

responsibilities. In the most recent recommendation, Chief of Station, Tokyo emphasized that Mr. Randall's performance was characterized by exceptional proficiency in all respects of his assigned duties, and, therefore, endorsed his previous recommendation and strongly recommended Mr. Randall's promotion to GS-14 at an early date.

4. In the most recent fitness report on Mr. Randall, he was rated over-all "Strong" and was given "Outstanding" for the Specific Duty Number One, "PBRAMPART Officer." In the narrative comment on Mr. Randall's performance the rating officer characterized Mr. Randall as capable, versatile, and as having a fine career potential. Further, the rating officer stated that "because of his sound operational background, presence of mind, forceful reasoning, and the consideration the military therefore holds for him, Mr. Randall has been able to play a prime part in our excellent PBRAMPART posture." The Chief of Station, in commenting on the rating officer's fitness report on Mr. Randall, heartily concurred with the rating officer's description of Mr. Randall's performance and described Mr. Randall's contribution to the Station as being of the highest caliber.

5. In endorsing the recommendation of Chief of Station, Tokyo, I wish to add that, from my personal knowledge of Mr. Randall's performance, he is a thoroughly reliable and competent case officer. In watching the PBRAMPART activities during the past year, I strongly commend Tokyo Station and Mr. Randall for effecting certain improvements of what was already a rather efficient coordination process. Mr. Randall's job is not always a happy one because he would rather be more active in clandestine operational activities; however, if Tokyo Station had a less experienced and less competent officer handling the PBRAMPART coordination activities, this particularly important area of our responsibilities would certainly suffer. For this and the reasons set forth above, Mr. Randall's performance deserves recognition by a promotion to GS-14 at this time.

Clarence W. Edwards
Chief, FE/IKO

SECRET

23 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Career Management Committee

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion
of Mr. Frederick C. Randall
from GS-13 to GS-14

1. Since Mr. Frederick C. Randall joined the Agency in September 1951, he has served in Headquarters and the Field, where he worked primarily on Indonesian and Japanese affairs. He is currently assigned to Tokyo Station. Mr. Randall has been in grade as a GS-13 since September 1958. He has twice been recommended for promotion to GS-14, once in September 1963 and again in February 1964. Mr. Randall is 37 years old.

2. Mr. Randall's primary duty at the Tokyo Station is Station PBRAMPART responsibilities. These responsibilities are broad and highly important to all PBRAMPART relations throughout the Far East. Through Mr. Randall's intensive effort to strengthen and increase the Agency's role in the coordination of clandestine collection activities, he has been able to set a positive pattern of effective procedures for coordination of the military services' clandestine collection operations. These procedures are now being emulated wherever possible throughout the Far East. Mr. Randall's tenacity and patience, based on solid operational Field and Headquarters experience, have worked to a distinct advantage for the Agency in the PBRAMPART field. Chief of Station, Tokyo, has stated that the vast improvement in the local coordination business has been in large part due to Mr. Randall's good work. Further, as a supervisor and a manager Mr. Randall has quite successfully handled from 10 to 15 subordinates in such diverse functions as Central Registry, local TSO establishment, Agency participation in a multi-agency CI Repository, and an Agency-run multi-agency Central Carding facility.

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3. During Mr. Randall's total service at the Tokyo Station, he has demonstrated his adaptability and capability to carry out a variety of tasks in an exemplary manner. In a previous recommendation, Chief of Station, Tokyo, described Mr. Randall as an officer capable of assuming greater responsibilities. In the most recent recommendation, Chief of Station, Tokyo, emphasized that Mr. Randall's performance was characterized by exceptional proficiency in all respects of his assigned duties and, therefore, endorsed his previous recommendation, and strongly recommended Mr. Randall's promotion to GS-14 at an early date.

4. In endorsing the recommendation of Chief of Station, Tokyo, I wish to add that, from my personal knowledge of Mr. Randall's performance, he is a thoroughly reliable and competent case officer. In watching the PBRAMPART activities during the past year, I strongly commend Tokyo Station and Mr. Randall for effecting certain improvements of what was already a rather efficient coordination process. Mr. Randall's job is not always a happy one because he would rather be more active in clandestine operational activities; however, if Tokyo Station had a less experienced and competent officer handling the PBRAMPART coordination activities, this particularly important area of our responsibilities would certainly suffer. For this and the reasons set forth above, Mr. Randall's performance deserves recognition by a promotion to GS-14 at this time.

Clarence W. Edwards

Clarence W. Edwards
Chief, FE/JKO

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING		
FOR INDEXING	ACTION	ACTION PLANNED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Far East Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT
Promotion Recommendation - Hugh W. FILDERMAN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

A. FJTT-10798, dated 30 August 1963
B. FJTT-11268, dated 15 January 1964

1. I wish to endorse my earlier recommendation that Hugh W. FILDERMAN be promoted from GS-13 to GS-14. Reference A discusses in detail FILDERMAN's responsibilities at the Tokyo Station and little more can be added to what has already been said.

2. FILDERMAN's Fitness Report for the reporting period ending 31 December 1963 which was forwarded with reference B, emphasises that his performance is characterised by exceptional proficiency in all aspects of his assigned duties. I therefore strongly recommend his promotion to GS-14 at an early date.

ERNEST A. LIEBY

Distribution
2 - C/FE

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
24 Feb 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
FJTT-11674

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

19 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Career Management Committee

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion
of Mr. Frederick C. Randall
from GS-13 to GS-14

1. Mr. Frederick C. Randall joined the Agency in September 1951 and has served in Headquarters and the Field on Indonesian and Japan affairs. He is currently assigned to Tokyo where he is chief of a section concerned with PBRAMPART and operational support activities. Mr. Randall has been in grade since September 1958 and was recently recommended for promotion to GS-14 by Tokyo Chief of Station.

2. In handling his primary duty, Station PBRAMPART responsibilities, Mr. Randall has set a pattern and established procedures which have been copied throughout FE Division. His work with his military colleague in Tokyo is excellent and his unassuming patience based on solid experience continues to be a distinct advantage for the Agency in the PBRAMPART field in Japan. The vast improvement in the local coordination business has been in large part due to his good work. As a supervisor and manager he has quite successfully handled from ten to fifteen subordinates in such diverse functions as Station Central Registry, local TSD establishment, Agency participation in a multi-agency CI repository, and an Agency run multi-agency central carding facility.

3. In his two years at the Tokyo Station, Mr. Randall has shown himself to be an adaptable officer and has carried out a variety of tasks in an exemplary manner. In his recommendation, Tokyo Chief of Station said Mr. Randall has demonstrated that he is ready to assume greater responsibilities and that a commensurate increase in GS grade is in order.

Approved by CS Career
Service Panel

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

4. In view of his performance in Tokyo and demonstrated maturity, motivation, and capacity to serve at the next grade level, I recommend that Mr. Randall be promoted to GS-14.

Robert Chin
Robert Chin
Acting Chief, FE/JKO

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

APO 94 SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA
TELEPHONES TOKYO 263 2711 2271, 2471

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

April 1, 1963

Mr. Frederick C. Randall
Box E,
APO 94.

Dear Mr. Randall:

We are pleased to inform you that the processing of your application has been completed, and that the Head of the Department of Government and Politics has approved your application to teach G&P 101, 102, 106, and 108 on a part-time basis in the Far East Division.

Since you have taught and are familiar with our procedures, we will spare you a repetition of the details. If we can be of assistance to you, please write and we will do our best to fulfill your requests.

Many good wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph E. Della
Associate Director

JED:rl.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 August 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 112170
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): RANDALL, Frederick G.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and transfer to confidential funds
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 03 YEAR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2137-7351-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO - Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Tokyo, Japan
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer ~~D-14~~
12. POSITION NUMBER: 3885
12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 ~~02~~ 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~10,895~~ 11155

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/FE/Plans & Ops Staff/FI/CI Sec/Off of Chief/2948

1cc - Security
Departure Date: 5 Sep 1961
259s submitted to Medical Staff

ETD - 5 Sept 61

PSI due 9-3-61 to $11,155

Security Approval [illegible] Pers. SO/OS 9/5/61
[illegible] 9/11/61

[illegible] by CSPD 9/5/61 VS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
ROBERT D. CASHMAN, CFE PERSONNEL

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
Walter Potts

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

3
13 12 26

FOR DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
9-11-61

44. O.P. APPROVAL
Walter Potts

SECRET

FORM 1152

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
512170	RANDALL FREDERICK	10	[illegible]	26	1	M 1	07	10	51

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit Yes-1 No-2 Code
12	27	50	1	50 USCA 403 J				7	07	10	51	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

a' few [illegible] 9

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE MIA INDONESIA,MAL,AUST,NEW ZEA. INDONESIA SECTION	5175	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
1	AREA OPS OFF CH	3876	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
13 1	$ 9890	01	07	07	58	03	06	60	0137 1000 1201 ~~[illegible]~~

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Reassignment / T to VE	61	08	09	59	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE Plans and Operations Staff FI/CI Section Office of the Chief	5126		

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	Ops Officer	2948		

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
	$								0237 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
Robert D. Cashman, CFE/Personnel

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Mozelle Little, X2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
William V. Broe, DCFE

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[illegible]	[illegible]	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	7-30-59	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved B.	[illegible]	7-31-59

Remarks
Please transfer from Unvouchered to Vouchered funds.

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 512170	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) RANDALL FREDERICK	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 10 Da. 28 Yr. 26	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 09 Da. 10 Yr. 51		
7. SCD Mo. 12 Da. 27 Yr. 50	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 09 Da. 10 Yr. 51	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code 2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE MIA INDONESIA, MAL., AUST., NEW ZEA. INDONESIA SECTION	5175	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept. - USfld - Frgn - Code 1	CONSULAR OFF AREA OPS OFF CH	3876	FSR GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
06 13 1	7150 $ 9890	DI	Mo. 09 Da. 07 Yr. 58	Mo. 03 Da. 06 Yr. 60	9 3700 10 201

9

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. LD Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Conversion From FSR Status	30	~~OCB~~ 03 12 59	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept. - USfld - Frgn - Code 1	Area Ops Off (CH)		GS	

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
13 1	$ 9890		Mo. Da. Yr.	Mo. Da. Yr.	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
Joseph W. Smith, CFE/PIA

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Mozelle Little, X2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
M. L. Shoba, CFE/Personnel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks
Subject resigned from FSR Status COB 20 March 1959.

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

Frederick O. Randall **28** **23 May 1955**

Washington, D. C.
Intell Off (FI) **FE/5** **SD:FI**

GS-11
GS-12

Basic Orientation, Operations 30, Grp A, Interim Study Course, Staff Indoctrination, Covert Activities CE, Language Training, Audio Surveillance(6 June - 24 55)

University of Omaha - BA
George Washington University MA

Spanish, slight

1944 - 1946 USAF Message Center Chief
1946 - 1950 Processed Foods Manufacturers Manufacturers' Representative

EOD CIA Oct 1951 - Jan 1953 Counterespionage Officer (GS-9 - Jan 1953)
Jan 1953 - Dec. 1953 Intell Officer(CE) GS-11
Dec 1953 - June 1954 " " (FI) GS-11
June 1954 to present " " " GS-11
Promoted to GS-11 - 20 December 1953. Intell. Officer (CE)

F. G. Goodell
Chief, FE/5

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 512170	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) RANDALL FREDERICK	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 10 Da. 28 Yr. 26	4. Vet Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1	5. Sex M 1
6. CS-EOD Mo. 09 Da. 10 Yr. 51	7. SCD Mo. 12 Da. 27 Yr. 50	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. 09 Da. 10 Yr. 51	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Elo (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FE FE M IA INDONESIA-MAL.-AUST.-NEW ZEA. INDONESIA SECTION	Code 5175	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code 1	17. Position Title CONSULAR OFF I.O. FI	18. Position No. 3873	19. Serv. FSR GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.51	21. Grade & Step 06 13 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 7150 9890	23. SD 01
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 09 Da. 07 Yr. 58	25. PSI Due Mo. 03 Da. 06 Yr. 60	26. Appropriation Number 9 3700 10 201	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 0	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 5775	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
33. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code 1	34. Position Title Consular Off Area Ops Off (Ch)	35. Position No. 3876	36. Serv. FSR GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.01	38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 09 Da. 07 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 03 Da. 06 Yr. 60	43. Appropriation Number	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Request By (Name And Title)
M. L. Shobe, CFE/Personnel

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Mozelle Little, x2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks
T/O Change

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo 07 Da 10 Yr 58		V to V		V to UV
		UV to V		UV to UV

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
	RANDALL, Frederick C.	10	28	26	1	M	

7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT. LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code
	/					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE Branch 5 - Indonesia-Djakarta Station FI/CI Branch		Djakarta, Indonesia	

16. Dept.-Field Dept.-Valle.-Frgn. Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	(Consular Officer) I.O. (FI)	908	FSR GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number
12 ~~3~~	$ ~~8570~~ 8810.	DI	08 14 55	~~08 10 58~~	9-3730-55-170

34

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Promotion	18	09 07 58	Regular	om	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE ~~Branch 5~~ FE/MEA - Indonesia, Malaya, Australia, New Zealand Indonesia Section ~~FI Unit~~	5725	Washington, D.C.	75013

9

33. Dept.-Field Dept.-Valle.-Frgn. Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1		3873 10/1 ~~2526~~		

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
13-1	$ 9890		09 07 58 ~~08 14 55~~	3 60 ~~08 10 58~~	9-3700 ~~22~~ 10 - 201

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
~~L. D. Poole, C/Personnel~~

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Mozella Little, x-2257

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		8/11/58	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks Present incumbent of slot to be reassigned.
2 copies to Security.

8-10-58

SSO.

FORM 58-07 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: Mo 27 Da 08 Yr 58

V to V | V to UV | UV to V | UV to UV

1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): RANDALL, Frederick C.
3. Date of Birth: Mo 10 Da 28 Yr 26
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS - EOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT, LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP/FE
Branch 5
Indonesia Section
FI Unit

Code:

15. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D.C.

Station Code:

16. Dept.-Field (Dept.-Usfld-Frgn-): Code
17. Position Title: (Consular Officer) I.O. (FI)
18. Position No.: 3873 ~~2[illegible]~~
19. Serv.: ~~GS~~ FSR
20. Occup. Series: 0136.51
21. Grade & Step: (5) 3 ~~12. 2~~
22. Salary Or Rate: (6,360) $ ~~8570~~ 8810
23. SD: DI
24. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr
25. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr
26. Appropriation Number: 10-701 ~~0-3700-20-101~~

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: Promotion
Code:
28. Eff. Date: Mo 09 Da 07 Yr 58
29. Type Of Employee: Regular
Code:
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDP/FE
FE/IMA - Indonesia-Malaya-Australia-New Zeland
Indonesia Section

Code:
32. Location Of Official Station:
Station Code:
33. Dept.-Field (Dept.-Usfld-Frgn-): Code
34. Position Title:
35. Position No.:
36. Serv.:
37. Occup. Series:
38. Grade & Step: 13 1
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 9890
40. SD:
41. Date Of Grade: Mo 09 Da 07 Yr 58
42. PSI Due: Mo 03 Da 06 Yr 60
43. Appropriation Number:

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): M. L. Stobe, DDP/Personnel
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): [illegible] Little, x 2057
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		9/3/58	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		5 SEP 1958	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		5 SEP 1958

Remarks:

u/o file

FORM 12-57 1152a USE PREVIOUS EDITIO

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY [illegible]—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs — One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Frederick C. RANDALL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct. 1926	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 26 Oct. 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Integration - Department of State B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 27 Oct. 1955	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intell Officer (FI) BFF 908	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Vice Consul (when confirmed) Consular Officer BFF 908
GS-0136.51-12 $7570	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	FSR-5 $6360
DDP/FE Branch 5 Indonesia, Djakarta Station	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 5 Indonesia, Djakarta Station
Djakarta, Indonesia	11. HEADQUARTERS	Djakarta, Indonesia
☒ XX FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ XX FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Subject is to be paid the difference between CIA salary of $7570 and FSS salary of $6360, to be paid by the Department of State and allowances in accordance therewith

Sick and annual leave are to be held in escrow until subject reverts to GS status

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
FI/OPS/OCL

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
B. Eggleston 8810[illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: Cover Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 3130-55-120 TO:			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM-50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		10/31/55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

IN- AND OUT-CASUAL STATUS RECORD

1	NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* RANDALL, Frederick C.	OFFICE OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT *(By last action)* FE	SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
2	☐ IDENTIFY AS IN-CASUAL	DATE OF ARRIVAL CPD	DATE OF ARRIVAL U.S.

CPD WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 2 AND 6 FOR ANY EMPLOYEE WHO:

- A. REPORTS FOR DEBRIEFING UPON RETURN FROM A FOREIGN FIELD STATION ON PCS.
- B. HAS AMENDED TRAVEL ORDER CHANGING DEPARTMENTAL DUTY STATUS FROM TDY TO PCS.

3	☐ REMOVE FROM IN-CASUAL STATUS	DATE ACTION EFFECTED

TRB WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 3 AND 6 WHENEVER THE FOLLOWING ARE EFFECTED:

- A. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO A DEPARTMENTAL POSITION.
- B. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO ANOTHER FOREIGN FIELD POSITION.
- C. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO A U.S. FIELD POSITION.
- D. SEPARATION ACTION INVOLVING AN IN-CASUAL.

4	☐ PLACE IN OUT-CASUAL STATUS	DATE ACTION EFFECTED

TRB WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 4 AND 6 WHENEVER THE FOLLOWING ARE EFFECTED:

- A. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO ANOTHER FOREIGN FIELD POSITION, PCS.
- B. PERSONNEL ACTION APPOINTING OR REASSIGNING AN EMPLOYEE TO A FOREIGN FIELD POSITION WHEN INCUMBENT PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN U.S.

5	☒ XX REMOVE FROM OUT-CASUAL STATUS	DATE ACTION EFFECTED 27 October 1955	DATE DEPARTED FROM U.S.

TRB AND/OR CPD WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 5, AND 6 WHENEVER THE FOLLOWING ARE EFFECTED:

- A. WHEN CPD HAS ESTABLISHED A DEFINITE DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, PCS.
- B. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN OUT-CASUAL TO A U.S. FIELD STATION.
- C. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN OUT-CASUAL TO A DEPARTMENTAL POSITION.
- D. SEPARATION ACTION INVOLVING AN OUT-CASUAL.
- [✓ E.] INTEGRATION ACTION INVOLVING AN OUT-CASUAL.
- F. RECEIPT OF AMENDED TRAVEL ORDER CHANGING MOVEMENT TO PCS WHILE SUBJECT IS ON TDY IN FIELD.

REMARKS *(Additional data concerning in- and out-casual status, if applicable)*:

POSTED
1 [illegible] 1956

6	THIS DATE 28 October 1955	SIGNATURE T C Chase man	CHECK ONE XX ☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible]

FORM NO. 603 [illegible]
1 JUN 55 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

SEP 2 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant, Intelligence
Department of State

SUBJECT: RANDALL, Frederick C.
Travel Authorization for Temporary Duty

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, from this office, subject, RANDALL, Frederick C., Request for Appointment in the Foreign Service and Assignment at Djakarta, Indonesia dated 2 August 1955

It is requested that Mr. Randall be authorized approximately four days temporary duty at Manila, P.I. enroute to his post of duty at Djakarta, for the purpose of consultation desired by this Agency.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

GORDON M. STEWART

Rewritten CCL-bo
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CFI
1 - PS/PE
2 - CCL
1 - PI
1 - CPN

SECRET

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP in the CAREER STAFF of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

To the Director of Central Intelligence

Sir:

I submit herewith my application for membership in the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency as defined below:

> "The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency is a group of carefully selected and trained individuals who accept an obligation to devote themselves to the needs of the Agency, and who intend to make a career with the Agency."

In accordance with this definition, I desire to devote myself to the faithful performance of duty in the Central Intelligence Agency, and I accept the obligations and conditions of that service which are determined to be essential to the furtherance of its mission.

I am aware of the many restrictions necessarily placed upon me by virtue of the security requirements inherent in my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency. I am also aware that as a member of the Career Staff, it will be my obligation to serve anywhere and at any time and for any kind of duty as determined by the needs of the Agency, and I have been assured that in order to carry out this policy, full consideration will be given to my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances. By virtue of this application for membership and upon my acceptance in the Career Staff, I am assured that, with continuing satisfactory work performance and conduct on my part, just and equitable attention will be accorded my personal progress during my tenure in the Career Staff. I am also assured that, on my satisfactory completion of any assignments, I will be offered reassignments which are compatible insofar as possible with my abilities and career interests, and that I shall be entitled to the benefits now available or to be made available in the future to members of the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Frederick C Randall
(Signature)

4 November 1954
(Date)

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CAREER STAFF OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
APPROVED, TO TAKE EFFECT 10 SEP 1954
FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
THE CIA SELECTION BOARD

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Frederick C. Randall	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 1926	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 3 Aug 55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED

A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
Reassigment

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

A. PROPOSED: As soon as possible

B. APPROVED:

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM	TO
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer(FI)BF-298-12	Intelligence Officer(FI)BFF-908-~~12~~
9. SERVICE, GRADE AND SALARY	GS-0136.5~~1~~-12 $7570.00 P/A	GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 P/A
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 5 Indonesian Field Activity Unit	DDP/FE Branch 5 Indonesia Djakarta STATION
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.	Djakarta, Indonesia
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL [redacted]	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL 30:01

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

W-4 and Fitness Report attached. 2 copies of SF-52 forwarded to Security.
Transfer unused leave from Vouchered Funds to Unvouchered Funds

Subject to leave for the field on or about 15 Oct. 1955

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
Henry F. Gilbert FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Dorothy Tusadia x3780

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: James P. [illegible] (with)
Title: C/FE/CMO 19 Sept '55

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

SD:FE DI

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3700-20
TO: 6-3730-55-170

18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

NOT W

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		9/1/55
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS.

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

IN- AND OUT-CASUAL STATUS RECORD

1	NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RANDALL, Frederick C.	OFFICE OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT (BY LAST ACTION) FE	SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
2	☐ IDENTIFY AS IN-CASUAL	DATE OF ARRIVAL CPB	DATE OF ARRIVAL U.S.

CPB WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 2 AND 6 FOR ANY EMPLOYEE WHO:
1. REPORTS FOR DEBRIEFING UPON RETURN FROM A FOREIGN FIELD STATION ON PCS.
2. HAS TRAVEL ORDER AMENDED CHANGING DEPARTMENTAL DUTY STATUS FROM TDY TO PCS.

3	☐ REMOVE FROM IN-CASUAL STATUS	DATE ACTION EFFECTED

TPB WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 3 AND 6 WHENEVER THE FOLLOWING ARE EFFECTED:
A. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO A DEPARTMENTAL POSITION.
B. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO ANOTHER FOREIGN FIELD POSITION.
C. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO A U.S. FIELD POSITION.
D. SEPARATION ACTION INVOLVING AN IN-CASUAL.

4	☒ PLACE IN OUT-CASUAL STATUS	DATE ACTION EFFECTED 25 Sep 55

TPB WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 4 AND 6 WHENEVER THE FOLLOWING ARE EFFECTED:
A. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN IN-CASUAL TO ANOTHER FOREIGN FIELD POSITION, PCS.
(.) PERSONNEL ACTION APPOINTING OR REASSIGNING AN EMPLOYEE TO A FOREIGN FIELD POSITION, when incumbent physically located in U.S.

5	☐ REMOVE FROM OUT-CASUAL STATUS	DATE ACTION EFFECTED	DATE DEPARTED FROM U.S.

TPB AND/OR CPB WILL COMPLETE ITEMS 1, 5, AND 6 WHENEVER THE FOLLOWING ARE EFFECTED:
A. WHEN TPB HAS ESTABLISHED A DEFINITE DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, PCS.
B. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN OUT-CASUAL TO A U.S. FIELD STATION
C. PERSONNEL ACTION ASSIGNING AN OUT-CASUAL TO A DEPARTMENTAL POSITION.
D. SEPARATION ACTION INVOLVING AN OUT-CASUAL.
E. INTEGRATION ACTION INVOLVING AN OUT-CASUAL.
F. RECEIPT OF AMENDED TRAVEL ORDER CHANGING MOVEMENT TO PCS WHILE SUBJECT IS ON TDY IN FIELD.

REMARKS (ADDITIONAL DATA CONCERNING IN- AND OUT-CASUAL STATUS, IF APPLICABLE):

10/3/55

6	DATE 3 Oct 1955	SIGNATURE S. F. WELLS	☐ ☐

SECRET

22 June 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE/Personnel

SUBJECT: Promotion of RANDALL, Frederick C.

1. Mr. Randall assumed his present duties as FI operations officer for Indonesia on 26 May 1954. Prior to that time he served as Chief, CE Unit, FE/5.

2. Mr. Randall has performed his duties as FI officer for Indonesia in an extremely satisfactory manner. The monthly letter of the Senior Representative to the Director has, without exception, stated that Headquarters' support of the Djakarta Station has been efficient. Mr. Randall's performance is characterized by a high degree of industry and thoroughness. He has been described as one of those individuals to whom a supervisor can assign a task, and then turn to other matters with sure confidence that the job will be completed, to the last detail, and on time.

3. Mr. Randall has demonstrated clearly his growing ability to handle larger responsibilities. His transition from a CE Unit Chief's job to that of FI operations officer for the Indonesian Unit has been smooth. Once he learns a new technique or procedural method, Mr. Randall can put it into operation without further supervision.

4. Mr. Randall is strongly recommended for promotion to GS-12.

V. O. Goodell
V. O. GOODELL
Chief, FE/5

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Frederick C. Randall
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Oct. 1926
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 23 May 1955

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 14 Aug 55

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Off.(FI) BF-298-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Off.(FI) BF-298-12
GS-0136.51-11 $5940.00 P/A ~~6140.~~ 6605.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-12 $7040.00 P/A 7570.
DDP/FE Branch 5 Indonesia Field Activity Unit	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 5 Indonesia Field Activity Unit
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL SD:DI

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Data Sheet & Recommendation attached.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): for Henry P. Gilbert, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Dorothy Tweedle x3780

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY: [redacted]
Signature: (c.m.)
Title: 26 July 55

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE		

SD:DI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-3700-20
TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

12 JUL 1955

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CLASSIFICATION OR POS. CONTROL		7/27/55
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		7/27/55
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY: 7/29/55

SECRET

SECRET
(When filled in)

DD/P

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: Frederick C. Randall AGE: 28 DATE: 23 May 1955

STATION AND DUTIES: Washington, D. C. Intell Off (FI)
DD/P UNIT: FE/5
PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: SD:FI

PRESENT GRADE: GS-11
PROPOSED GRADE: GS-12
PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE:
PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE:

CIA TRAINING:
Basic Orientation, Operations 30, Grp A, Interim Study Course, Staff Indoctrination, Covert Activities CE, Language Training, Audio Surveillance (6 June - 24 55)

EDUCATION:
University of Omaha - BA
George Washington University MA

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Spanish, slight

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):

1944 - 1946 USAF Message Center Chief
1948 - 1950 Processed Foods Manufacturers Manufacturers' Representative

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
EOD CIA Oct 1951 - Jan 1953 Counterespionage Officer (GS-9 - Jan 1953)
Jan 1953 - Dec. 1953 Intell Officer (CE) GS-11
Dec 1953 - June 1954 " " (FI) GS-11
June 1954 to present " " " GS-11
Promoted to GS-11 - 20 Dedember 1953. Intell. Officer (CE)

APPROVED BY FE CAREER SERVICE COMMITTEE
12 JUL 1955

RECOMMENDED BY: T. O. Goodell
Chief, FE/5

CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. Frederick C. Randall
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Oct 1926
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 11 May 1954
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Reassigment
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE:
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 6 JUN 1954
7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Ops Officer (CE) BF-311-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I. O. (FI) BF-298-11
GS-0136.52-11 $5940.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	~~Same~~ GS-0136.51-11 $5940.00 p/a
DDP/FE Br. 5 ~~Indo, Malaya, Aust, New Zealand~~ CE Unit	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Indonesian Field Activity Unit
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

~~Slot presently occupied by Joseph F. Richards for whom a resignation action has been submitted.~~

B. REQUESTED BY [illegible]
H. C. Clinkscale FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): C. Collins 3363

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT: DISAB	10 POINT: OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD:FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-3700-20
TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CTRL OF POS CONTROL	[illegible]	[illegible]	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	26 May	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY [illegible]

[illegible]

10

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Frederick C. Randall	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 1926	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 5 Feb 1954
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: FEB 14 1954 B. APPROVED:	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intel.Officer (CE) BF-321-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer (CE) BF-311-11
GS-132-11 $5940 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.52-11 $5940 p/a
~~DDP/FE~~ Br. 5- Indonesia & Malaya ~~Counterespionage Unit~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Br. 5 - ~~Indo,Malaya,Aust.,N.Z.~~ Counterespionage Unit
~~Washington,D.C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington,D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Christine Collins X-3363

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: FE Personnel Officer
H.C.Clinkscale

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD:FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-3700-20 TO: same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CTL. OR FTE CONTROL	JH	11Feb54	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY 2/10/54

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL, CHAPTER 9

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) RANDALL, Frederick Crawford	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct. 1926	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 2 Jan. 1953

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Excepted Appointment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
2 Jan. 1953
B. APPROVED:
5 Jan 53

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer (CE) BF-322-9
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-9 132 $5,060.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DD/P FE/5 Counterespionage Unit
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

~~Slot No. 322 (53-12)~~

Transfer leave from Unvouchered to Vouchered

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
for C/FE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
M. O. Goodall, extension 3363

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: David B. Powell
Title: FI/PO.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

15. SEX
16. RACE
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	CT		
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
C. Taylor

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19— FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCH RED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Frederick C. RANDALL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 1926	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 15 Oct 1953

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Promotion

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 20 DEC 1953

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
~~Intelligence Officer~~ (CE) ~~F-3~~	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer (CE) FE-321-~~11~~
13✓ GS-9 $5,060.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	11✓ GS-11 $5,940.00 p/a
FE-5 ~~DDP/FE~~ ~~Counterespionage Unit~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 5 - Indonesia and Malaya Counterespionage Unit
~~Washington, D. C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Form 59-44 attached.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
for Clarence E. Witt, FE Personnel off.

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Christine Collins X-3363

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Davis B. Powell
Title: FI/CMO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL

CD: FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3700-20 TO: same	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible] 1953

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		4 Dec 53	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

DD/P

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: Frederick C. RANDALL AGE: 28 Oct 1926 DATE: 15 October 1953

STATION AND DUTIES: Washington, D. C. Intel Officer CE

DD/P UNIT: FE

PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: FI

PRESENT GRADE: GS-9
PROPOSED GRADE: GS-11
CIA TRAINING: Phase 1,2 and 3; SIC CE

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: 322 GS-12

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: 321 GS-13

EDUCATION: BA - University of Omaha
MA - George Washington University

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY: Spanish slight

ASSESSED:	DATE:	TYPE OF POSITION:	RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):

1944-1946	USAF	Message Center Chief	
1948-1950	Processed Foods Manufacturers		Manufacturers' Representative

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
Oct 1951 to present - Counterespionage Officer (GS-9 - Jan 1953)

RECOMMENDED BY:

V.O. Goodell
V. O. GOODELL
CFE/5

CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DEC 4 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ENTRANCE ON DUTY NOTICE

10 Sept 51

Date 10 September 1951

TO: OSO FDZ

FROM: Personnel Officer

Processing for entrance on duty of Frederick Crawford Randall
(Name)

Intelligence assistant GS-7 $3325.00
(title, grade, and entrance salary)

has been completed and the applicant meets all standards for full employment with CIA. Signed clearance for entrance on duty has been received from Inspection and Security and made a part of the personnel file of this individual. Effective this date he/she is assigned to duty with your office.

POSTED

(Signed)
FRANK G. JAREMA

FORM NO. 37-114
FEB 1951

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

10 August 1951

Mr. Frederick e. Randall
7000 Greig Street, Apt. 25-J
Seat Pleasant, Maryland

Dear Mr. Randall:

This is to advise that processing is continuing on your application for employment with this organization.

We regret to inform you that the processing is taking longer than originally anticipated, but as soon as final processing is completed, you will be notified immediately.

Thank you for your continued interest and patience.

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH F. REPP
Personnel Division

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

28 June 1951.

Mr. Frederick C. Randell
7000 Greig Street, Apt. 25-J,
Seat Plasant, Maryland

Dear Mr. Randell:

In reference to your application for employment, this letter is to assure you that the processing of your papers as a GS GS-7, $ $3825.00 per annum is being continued by this agency. A definite offer of employment cannot be made, however, until such time as all processing has been completed.

The processing is a rather lengthy one; but when further information is available, we shall get in touch with you immediately.

In the meantime, it would be appreciated if you would advise us of any change in your present status, such as change of address, etc.

Your continued interest and patience are appreciated.

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH S. REFF
Personnel Division

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

29 May 1951
In reply refer to ED-4

Mr. Frederick C. Randall
7000 Greig Street, Apt. 25-J,
Seat Pleasant, Md.

Dear Mr. Randell:

This is to advise that actual processing of your application for employment with this Agency has been initiated. Specific details as to the type of appointment and salary will be contained in subsequent correspondence. Please direct all future correspondence to the undersigned.

If applicable, the attached form should be completed and returned within two weeks. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH S. KEFF
Personnel Division

Enclosure 2 37-82

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

1 May 1954

Name of Candidate Fredrick Randall

Position Considered for I.D.-Ops Office 051 Interviewer [illegible]

Personal appearance	Dignified		Natural	✓	Awkward	
	Well-groomed	✓	Clean	✓	Slovenly	
	Wide-Awake	✓	Stolid		Apathetic ...	
	Impressive		Ordinary		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive		Responsive ..	✓	Taciturn	
	Imperturbable ...	✓	Steady		Excitable ...	
	Cheerful	✓	Tranquil		Dejected	
	Straight-forward.	✓	Reserved		Evasive	
	Modest	✓	Complacent ..		Conceited ...	
	Dominant		Confident ...	✓	Submissive ..	

Is education adequate? Yes (✓) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes ( ) No( )

Area Knowledge Adequate

Previous intelligence or related experience Nil

Salary level requested $ GS-7 Lowest salary acceptable $

- -

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons:
2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: [illegible] of better than average [illegible], suitable for I.D. [illegible]

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: I.D.-Ops Branch III Division Z

Location: S.E.A.

Salary level: GS-7

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: [illegible] suitable for any [illegible]

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

FORM NO. 38-1
JAN 1953

I.O. [illegible]
Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

26 April 195[illegible]

Name of Candidate FRED. RANDAU

Position Considered for I.O. Office 80 Interviewer TWINING

Personal Appearance	Dignified......		Natural.....	✓	Awkward....	
	Well-groomed..	✓	Clean.......	✓	Slovenly...	
	Wide-Awake....	✓	Stolid......		Apathetic..	
	Impressive....		Ordinary....		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive....		Responsive..	✓	Taciturn....	
	Imperturbable..		Steady......		Excitable...	
	Cheerful......	✓	Tranquil....		Defeated....	
	Straight-forward	✓	Reserved....		Evasive.....	
	Modest.........	✓	Complacent..		Conceited...	
	Dominant.......		Confident...	✓	Submissive..	

Is education adequate? Yes (✓) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes( ) No( )

Area Knowledge adequate

Previous intelligence or related experience Nil

Salary level requested $ GS-7 Lowest salary acceptable $

General Recommendation:

1. Candidate is ~~not~~ recommended for employment. Remarks: Appears to be good I.O. material.
2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification:

Specific Recommendation for employment:

Position: I.O. Branch III Division Z

Location: SEA

Salary level: GS-7

Recommendation as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration:

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse, if any.)

Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency, by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures. I agree to honor the requests of CIA relative to my application whether it be accepted or rejected. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in CIA. If questioned directly, I will say that I have applied for positions in various government agencies, and if pressed for an answer will acknowledge that CIA is one of them but will attach no particular significance to such application. I agree not to disclose personnel procedures I have observed in CIA. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application to CIA.

Signed: Frederick P Randall

Date: April 26, 1951

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON INTERVIEW

4/26 1950

Name of Candidate Endall, Frederick C

Position Considered for ________ Office __________ Interviewer ________

Personal Appearance	Dignified......	✓	Natural.....	✓	Awkward....	
	Well-groomed..	✓	Clean.......		Slovenly...	
	Wide-Awake....	✓	Stolid......		Apathetic..	
	Impressive....	X	Ordinary....		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive....		Responsive..	✓	Taciturn....	
	Imperturbable..		Steady......	✓	Excitable...	
	Cheerful......	✓	Tranquil....		Defeated....	
	Straight-forward	✓	Reserved....		Evasive.....	
	Modest........	✓	Complacent...		Conceited...	
	Dominant......	✓	Confident...	✓	Submissive..	

Very good impression

Is education adequate? Yes [✓] No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes( ) No( )

Area Knowledge ______________________________

Previous intelligence or related experience ______________________________

Salary/level requested $ ________ Lowest salary acceptable $ GS-7

General Recommendation:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Specify: ____________
2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: [illegible]
[illegible]

Specific Recommendation for employment:

Position: ? Branch ? Division FI

Location: ?

Salary level: GS-7

Recommendation as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: ______

(Enter any additional remark on reverse side.)

Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

THIS DATE
MAR 29 1951

NAME [illegible]	REFERRED BY	
HOME ADDRESS		TELEPHONE
BUSINESS ADDRESS		TELEPHONE
DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED)
NAME OF SPOUSE		
DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED)
SALARY REQUESTED	NO. OF DEPENDENTS	INTERVIEWER

EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES)

MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION, SPECIAL SKILLS, SALARY LEVELS)

MILITARY OCCUPATION (RANK, SERIAL NO., DATES OF SERVICE, DUTIES AND AREAS)

FORM NO. 37-117
JAN 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AREA KNOWLEDGE (RESIDENCE OR STUDY)

LANGUAGE FACILITY

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS (BE COMPLETE AND JUSTIFY DECISIONS, NOTE ANY UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.)

Clean - cut, above average
Majoring in S.E. Asia & P.T.
Taking [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] ☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHI

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

FNMA

Federal National Mortgage Association

REQUEST FOR VERIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS LENDER: Complete items 1 thru 7. Have applicant complete item 8. Forward directly to employer named in item 1.
EMPLOYER: Please complete either Part II or Part III as applicable. Sign and return directly to lender named in item 2.

PART I - REQUEST

1. TO *(Name and address of employer)*
CIA
Langley, Virginia

2. FROM *(Name and address of lender)*
STANDARD FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
401 North Frederick Avenue
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760

3. SIGNATURE OF LENDER: Pat Burton
4. TITLE: MORTGAGE LOAN DEPARTMENT
5. DATE: 9/21/79
6. LENDER'S NUMBER *(optional)*:

I have applied for a mortgage loan and stated that I am now or was formerly employed by you. My signature below authorizes verification of this information.

7. NAME AND ADDRESS OF APPLICANT *(Include employee or badge number)*
Frederick C. Randall
1823 Deer Drive, McLean, Virginia 22101

8. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT: Frederick C Randall

PART II - VERIFICATION OF PRESENT EMPLOYMENT

EMPLOYMENT DATA

9. APPLICANT'S DATE OF EMPLOYMENT: 9/10/51
10. PRESENT POSITION: Intelligence Officer
11. PROBABILITY OF CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT: Good
13. IF OVERTIME OR BONUS IS APPLICABLE, IS ITS CONTINUANCE LIKELY?
OVERTIME ☐ YES ☐ NO
BONUS ☐ YES ☐ NO

PAY DATA

12A. BASE PAY ☒ ANNUAL ☐ MONTHLY ☐ WEEKLY ☐ HOURLY ☐ OTHER *(specify)*
$18955.00

12B. EARNINGS

TYPE	YEAR TO DATE	PAST YEAR
BASE PAY	$	$15792.00
OVERTIME	$	$
COMMISSIONS	$	$
BONUS	$	$

12C. FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL ONLY

PAY GRADE

TYPE	MONTHLY AMOUNT
BASE PAY	$
RATIONS	$
FLIGHT OR HAZARD	$
CLOTHING	$
QUARTERS	$
PRO PAY	$
OVERSEAS OR COMBAT	$

14. REMARKS *(If paid hourly, please indicate average hours worked each week during current and past year)*

PART III - VERIFICATION OF PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT

15. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT
16. SALARY/WAGE AT TERMINATION PER (Year) (Month) (Week)
BASE ______ OVERTIME ______ COMMISSIONS ______ BONUS ______
17. REASON FOR LEAVING
18. POSITION HELD

[illegible]

19. SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYER: Abraham Schwartz
20. TITLE: Office of Personnel, Chief, Central Division
21. DATE: 19 October 19[illegible]

[illegible]

FNMA [illegible]

14-00000

THIS OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER IS ESTABLISHED, MAINTAINED AND CONTROLLED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL PURSUANT TO REGULATION 20-800.

The following instructions have been established to govern use of this Official Personnel Folder:

1. **Folder will be HAND-CARRIED or transmitted by SPECIAL MESSENGER only.**
2. **Folder is security classified SECRET. In addition, the folder must be treated with strict regard for the PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL material concerning the employee.**
3. **Folder may be shown to employee covered ONLY UPON REQUEST TO and UNDER SUPERVISION of the Director of Personnel.**
4. **Material will be ADDED TO FOLDER ONLY by the Office of Personnel. Place any material to be incorporated in an envelope and attach to inside of folder (left-hand side).**
5. **Folder will be loaned only to AUTHORIZED Officials.**
6. **Folder MUST be returned to the Office of Personnel as soon as the need for it has been served. However, in no case will an individual loan of longer than 10 working days be authorized.**

TO TRANSFER FOLDER TO ANOTHER AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL'S CUSTODY

Remove from this envelope ONE copy of Form 198a, Certified Report of Transfer, COMPLETE and FORWARD in a SEALED envelope to Personnel Files, Wing 1-H, Curie Hall. Folder remains charged to YOU unless a valid Form 198a is forwarded. ANY questions concerning the loan, release and transfer of this folder will be referred to Extension 4321.

FORM NO. 198b
1 AUG 55

(4-7)



SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP	DATE 17 August 65
TO: (Check) ☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) DOD	ESTABLISHED FOR RANDALL, Frederick C.
ATTN: Mr. Bullock	FILE NO. 3617
REF: Verbal request for cover	ID CARD NO. B-7476
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED Technical Services Group, Provisional	EMPLOYEE NO.

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ **Block Records:** (OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______

b. Continuing, effective EOD

☒ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category. (HHB 20-7)

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued. (HB 20-661-1)

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover. (R 240-250)

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility. (R 240-250)

☐ Remarks:

☒ Cover History

1951-1955 overt/Hdqs
1955-1959 State Integree/Indonesia
1959-1961 overt/Hdqs
1961-1965 DAFC/Japan

Franklin

CD/a1 CHIEF, MILITARY COVER [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-[illegible], Copy 4 [illegible], Copy 5-[illegible], Copy 6 File

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
012176	RANDALL FREDERICK	55 776		

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ
GS 15	6	$42,201	05/23/76	GS 15	7	$43,407	05/21/78			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE ✓ | DATE [illegible]

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS TP F.W.M. JOHNEY APPROVED BY

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

A11

L52 121 015

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12087 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 5 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 08 OCTOBER 1978

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012176	185	GS 15 7	$45,792

11926

A11 L52 121 015

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12010 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 09 OCTOBER 1977

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	0012170	ISS	GS 15 6	$42,201

12294

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

IJCS 01/15/77

1 SERIAL NUMBER 012170	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) RANDALL FREDERICK				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 01 DA 02 YR 77	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	
7 FAN AND NSCA 7226 2196 0001	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY				
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/ISS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.				
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER SAS	12 POSITION NUMBER FV27	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DYW			
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0135.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15	17 SALARY OR RATE		

18 REMARKS

CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION FROM DAW TO DYW

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1976

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	53 050	V	GS 15 6	$35,415

---

1 SERIAL NO.	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
012170	RANDALL FREDERICK	53 050	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ.
GS 14	8	$33,126	05/27/73	GS 14	9	$34,021	05/23/76			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE: Ob...

DATE: 3/11/76

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1550E

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CF

1 SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RANDALL FREDERICK

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION-CHANGE OF FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR [illegible] 77	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA [illegible]	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/SERVICES STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, SERVICES STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER SAS	12 POSITION NUMBER [illegible]	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DAW

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15 [illegible]	17 SALARY OR RATE 36520

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE / CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction /Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	SOO DATA	33 SECURITY REG NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP / CUTS	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1 WAIVED 2 YES / HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JUN
1976

FORM 1150 Use Previous

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11883 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 12 OCTOBER 1975

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	53 050	V	GS 14 7	$32,231

RDJ: 8 DEC 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 012170	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RANDALL FREDERICK		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT-CHANGE OF HOME BASE AND FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 12 01 75	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	☒ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 6226 2196 0001
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J			
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/SS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, SERVICES STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER SAS	12. POSITION NUMBER EV27	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DAC	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 33126

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 53050	ALPHABETIC SS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 28 26	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR	28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX	35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
DEC 1975
FR

FORM 1150 Use Previous
5-74 Mfg 10-74 Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

88-D

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
012170	RANDALL, FREDERICK	53 050	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EII Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS-14	7	$32231	05-27-73	GS-14	8	$33126	11-09-75		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: /s/ F. W. M. JANNEY - QUALITY STEP INCREASE

DATE: 11-04-75

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS: F.W.M.JANNEY

...BY

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	43 300	V	GS 14 7	$30,699

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

RANDALL FREDERICK 012170 42290249

DLM: 12 MAY 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

0CF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 012170	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RANDALL FREDERICK

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHANGE OF FAN	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 08 75	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 5226 2196 0001	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/SERVICES STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, SERVICES STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER SAS	12. POSITION NUMBER EV27	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DMG

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 30699

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	53050	SS	75013		1	10 23 26		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV STAV TEMP.	CODE	39. FEGLI CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JK 5/13/75

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74 Mfg 10-74

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

LMP: 20 MAR 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 012170	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RANDALL FREDERICK

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 03 DA 16 YR 75	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 5220 2193 0001	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/SERVICES STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, SERVICES STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER SAS	12. POSITION NUMBER EV27	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DMG

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 30699

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 53050	ALPHABETIC SS	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 28 26	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: FRD

POSTED
3/24/75

FORM 1150 9-73 Mfg 9-73 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007577

14-00000

RCS: 10 DEC 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 012170	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RANDALL FREDERICK		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 21 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS: X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA 4229 0269 0001	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/FR DIVISION BRANCH III	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12 POSITION NUMBER 0516	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 14 7	17 SALARY OR RATE 29095

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 43300 ALPHABETIC FRD	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Majors Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 28 26	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	IDD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX	
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE / HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	42 LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

LJCS 07/31/74

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 012170

2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): RANDALL FREDERICK

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 01 YR 74

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 FAN AND VGCA: 5229 5000 0001

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/FRD

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: CPS OFFICER CH

12 POSITION NUMBER: C516

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DMG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 14

17 SALARY OR RATE:

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
AUG 9 1974

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RCS: 14 JAN 74

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JKF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012170
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): RANDALL FREDERICK
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT - CORRECTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 11 21 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4229 0249 0001
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/FR DIVISION BRANCH III
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0516
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: 29095

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 11/21/73 AS FOLLOWS: ITEM NO. 7, FAN NUMBER, WHICH READ 4229 0269 0001 TO READ 4229 0249 0001.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING		22 STATION CODE	23 [illegible] CODE	24 [illegible] CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)
58	10	4330	FRD	75015		1	10 28 26

32 Correction/Cancellation Data: 37 11 21 73

EOD DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	43 275	V	GS 14 7	$29,095

G-28

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
012170	RANDALL FREDERICK	43 250	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 14	6	$26,938	05/30/71	GS 14	7	$27,708	05/27/73		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 5 Mar 1973

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

COMPENSATION & TAX DIVISION
MAY 21 1973

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DMS: 18 JUNE 73

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 012170
2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): RANDALL FREDERICK
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION OF NSCA
4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 06 | 13 | 73
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS ▶ ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF
☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3229 0249 0001
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/FR DIVISION
BRANCH II
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12 POSITION NUMBER: 0393
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 14 7
17 SALARY OR RATE: 27708
18. REMARKS:

HOME BASE: EA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37
20 Employ Code: 10
21 OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC: 43275 ALPHABETIC: FRD
22 STATION CODE: 75013
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 Hours Code: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 10 | 28 | 26
26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27 DATE OF [illegible] (MO DA YR):
28 [illegible] EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA — 1 CSC 2 CA 3 FICA 4 NONE — CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 Correction / Cancellation Data — TYPE — MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE — CODE — 1 NONE 2 5 PT 3 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
38 CAREER CATEGORY
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — CODE — 0 WAIVED 1 YES — HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE — CODE — 0 NO PREV GOV SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO TAX EXEMPS — STATE CODE

SIGNATORY OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
with 6-19-[illegible]

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	43 250	V	GS 14 6	$25,620

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM
7 JAN 197[illegible] [illegible] EXECUTIVE ORDER
11777, DA[illegible]

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	43 250	V	GS 14 6	$26,938

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM
7 JAN 1973 TO 1 OCT [illegible] UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
11777, DATED [illegible] APR 1974.

D-23

1 SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
012170	RANDALL FREDERICK	43 300	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 14	5	$23,591	06/01/69	GS 14	6	$24,265	05/30/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Joseph J. Dulik DATE 11 March 1971

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS BPB. H.E.FISHER AUDITED BY

MAY 24 [illegible] '71

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	43 300	V	GS 14 5	$23,591

SSJ: 16 JAN 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 012170

2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): RANDALL FREDERICK

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 01 DA 11 YR 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 0229 0249 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP
BRANCH 1

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0305

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 14 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: 21603

18 REMARKS:

HOME BASE: FE

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21 OFFICE CODING Numeric	21 OFFICE CODING Alphabetic	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Mil. Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
15	10	43036	DOD	75013		1	10 21 25		

28 NTE EXPIRES
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 Correction/Cancellation Data
IOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35 VET. PREFERENCE
36 SERV. COMP. DATE
37 LONG COMP. DATE
38 CAREER CATEGORY
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA
44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

SECRET

FVD

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	43 300	V	GS 14 5	$22,263

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	43 300	CF	GS 14 5	$21,003

D24

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
012170	RANDALL FREDERICK	43 500	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 14	4	$18,641	06/04/67	GS 14	5	$19,206	06/01/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

2
800

CLERKS INITIALS DH

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions — PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	43 500	CF	GS 14 4	$17,425	$18,641

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAH: 17 OCT 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 012173	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) RANDALL FREDERICK

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 10 08 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 8123 0109 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD U. S. FIELD INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP WASHINGTON BASE	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0415	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 16675

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGRATE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	43500	DOD	75013		2	10 28 26		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
RS
10/18/67

FORM 5-64 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET MAH

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	43 500	CF	GS 14-4	$16,675	$17,425

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAH: 7 JUNE 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 012170	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RANDALL FREDERICK		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 06 04 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7129 0109 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD U.S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION ORBIT OPERATIONS GROUP	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER SAT	12. POSITION NUMBER 0199	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 16675

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Major Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	43620	DOD	75013		2	10 28 26	06 04 67	06 04 67

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES / HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 DAYS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 DAYS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-9-67

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

PJH: 9 MAR 67

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 012170	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RANDALL FREDERICK			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 03 12 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR		
6. FUNDS	V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF X CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7129 0109 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.			
11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D		
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE	

18. REMARKS
EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE 2	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR REST COND TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
3/10 67 [illegible]

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZF: 27 JUL 65

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 012170	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RANDALL FREDERICK		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 07 DA 27 YR 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO V ☒ / CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6129 0109 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD US FIELD UNITED STATES STATION NON-ORBIT OPERATIONS GROUP	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0218	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 14175
18. REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	43620	DOD	75013		2	10 28 26		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RES EMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: FE - 2

7/30/65

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

2 4

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
012170	RANDALL FREDERICK	43 620 CF	—

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 13	6	$15,113	10/11/64	GS 13	7	$15,501	10/09/66			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ X / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS .AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [redacted] DATE 5 Aug 1966

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg 3-65 (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962,"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	43 620 CF	GS 13 6	$14,655	$15,113

29

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
012170	RANDALL FREDERICK	45 380 CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 13	5	$13755	10/11/64	GS 13	6	$14175	07/04/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

SIGNATURE: E. D. ECHOLS DATE: 28 JUNE 1965

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 961 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	47 621 CF	GS 13 6	$14,175	$14,685

13
½

1. Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
012170	RANDALL FREDERICK	45 389 CF 55G	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	4	$ 13,335	10/14/62	GS 13	5	13,755	10/11/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

04 742

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [redacted] DATE 14 Oct 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AUPD 09/18/64

1 SERIAL NUMBER 012170	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) RANDALL FREDERICK						
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT					4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 09 DA 18 YR 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE 5137 1566 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF			
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE DIVISION JKO TOKYO OPS SUPPORT					10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO JAPAN		
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER					12 POSITION NUMBER 4464	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS			15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 13	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

9/24/64 MCG

Form 1150s 1-63 MFG 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LA. 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	45 380	CF	GS 13 4	$12,245	$12,890

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LA 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	012170	56380	CF	13 3	$11155	13 3	$11880

1 C

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
012170	RANDALL FREDERICK	56 38 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS-13	3	$11,880	09/03/61	S-13	4	$12,245	10/14/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP ✓
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 742
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

MB 11/1/62

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE: 24 October 1962

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition **SECRET** (4-61)

L 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
12170	RANDALL FREDERICK	DDP/FE 11 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	2	$10,895	03/06/60	13	3	$11,155	09/03/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ ✓ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition **SECRET** (4-61)

L 1

AES: 1 SEPT 61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012170
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): RANDALL FREDERICK
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS*
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 03 DA. 03 YR. 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | X V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2137 7351 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP FE
FE/JAO TOKYO STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO JAPAN
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 3885
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 11155
18. REMARKS:
*SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
20	10	56380	FE	37587		3	10 28 26		

28. SCD EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 NONE — CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE — MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE — 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 YES 2 NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE — CODE — 0 WAIVER 1 YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE — 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 90 DAYS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 90 DAYS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO TAX EXEMP. — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

09/14/61 WK

Form 5-65 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	RANDALL FREDERICK	112170	51 26	GS-13 2	$10,130	$10,895

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO:	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5 ALLOTMENT
112170	RANDALL FREDERICK	DDP/FE	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO.	DA	YR
GS 13	1	$ 9,890	09	07	58	GS 13	2	$10,130	03	06	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING.
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ PSI ☐ [illegible] ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 31 JULY 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth			4. Vet. Pref.		5. Sex		6. CS-EOD				
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code			Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
112170	RANDALL FREDERICK	10	28	26		1	M	1	09	10	51		

7. SCD			8. CSC Retmt.		9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav.			11. FEGLI		12. LCD			13. Mil. Serv. Credit	
Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes-1 No-2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes-1 No-2	Code	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes-1 No-2	Code
12	27	50		1	50 USCA 403 J					1	09	10	51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE MIA INDONESIA,MAL,AUST,NEW ZEA. INDONESIA SECTION	5175	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field		17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code 1	AREA OPS OFF CH	3876	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade			25. PSI Due			26. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
13 1	$ 9890	D1	09	07	58	03	06	60	9 3700 10 201

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date			29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	01	08	09	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE PLANS AND OPERATIONS STAFF FI/CI SECTION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5126	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field		34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code 2	OPS OFFICER	2948	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade			42. PSI Due			43. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
13 1	$ 9890	D1	09	07	58	03	06	60	0237 1000 1000

44. Remarks

[illegible]
8/1/59

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

[illegible] 1/3/5 1

SECRET

(5)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MCM 10 APRIL 59

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
512170	RANDALL FREDERICK	10	28	26		1	M	1	09	10	51

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2	Code
12	27	50		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	10	51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE MIA INDONESIA,MAL.,AUST.,NEW ZEA. INDONESIA SECTION	5175	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	1	CONSULAR OFF AREA OPS OFF CH	3876	FSR GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
06 13 1	7150 $ 9890	D1	09	07	58	03	06	60	9 3700 10 201

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	60	808 03	21	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE MIA INDONESIA,MAL,AUST,NEW ZEA. INDONESIA SECTION	5175	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	AREA OPS OFF CH	3876	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
13 1	$ 9890	D1	09	07	58	03	06	60	9 3700 10 201

44. Remarks

C. M. STEWART

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE:10 NOV 1958

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
512170	RANDALL FREDERICK	10	28	26		1	M	1	09	10	51

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code
12	27	50		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	10	51	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE M IA INDONESIA-MAL.-AUST.-NEW ZEA. INDONESIA SECTION	5175	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	1	CONSULAR OFF I.O. FI	3873	FSR GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
06 13 1	$ 7150 9890	DI	09	07	58	03	06	60	9 3700 10 201

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	11	10	58	REGULAR	OM	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE MIA INDONESIA,MAL.,AUST.,NEW ZEA. INDONESIA SECTION	5175	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	CONSULAR OFF AREA OPS OFF CH	3876	FSR GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
06 13 1	$ 7150 9890	DI	09	07	58	03	06	60	9 3700 10 201

44. Remarks

FORM NO. 1153a SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MCM 29 SEPT 58

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt.-1 10 Pt.-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
512170	RANDALL FREDERICK	10	28	26	1	M 1	09	10	51		
7. SCD Mo. | Da. | Yr.	8. CSC Rqmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. ECD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code	
12 | 27 | 50	1	50 USCA 403 J					09	10	51	2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BRANCH 5 INDONESIA DJAKARTA STATION FI CI BRANCH		DJAKARTA, INDONESIA	

16. Dept. - Field Dept.-1 USfld.-3 Fran.-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	CONSULAR OFF I.O. FI	0908	FSR GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
06 12 3	$ 7150 8810	DI			9 3730 55 170

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
CORRECTION* PROMOTION	67	09	07	58	REGULAR	OM	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE MIA INDONESIA-MAL.-AUST.-NEW ZEA. INDONESIA SECTION	5175	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept.-1 USfld.-3 Fran.-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	CONSULAR OFF I.O. FI	3873	FSR GS	0136.51

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
06 13 1	$ 7150 9890	DI	09 07 58	03 06 60	9 3700 10 201

44. Remarks

*THIS ACTION CORRECTS SF-1150 EFF DATE 7 SEPT 58, ITEM #31 THE ORGANIZATIONAL DESIG. THE SECOND LINE WHICH READ, FE MCA INDONESIA-MAL.-AUST.-NEW ZEA., TO READ FE MIA INDONESIA-MAL.-AUST.-NEW ZEA.

10/11/58 J. B.

Form No. 1150

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 5 SEPT 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
512170	RANDALL FREDERICK	10 28 26		1	M 1	09 10 51

7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Svc. Type Yes-1 No-2	Code
12 27 50		1	50 USCA 403 J				09 10 51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BRANCH 5 INDONESIA DJAKARTA STATION FI CI BRANCH		DJAKARTA, INDONESIA	

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	CONSULAR OFF I.O. FI	0908	FSR GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
06 12 3	7150 $ 8810	DI			9 3730 55 170

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
PROMOTION	67	09 07 58	REGULAR	OM	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE MCA INDONESIA-MAL.-AUST.-NEW ZEA. INDONESIA SECTION	5175	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	CONSULAR OFF I.O. FI	3873	FSR GS	0136.51

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
06 13 1	7150 $ 9890	DI	09 07 58	03 06 60	9 3700 10 201

44. Remarks

10/1/58

Form No. 1150a

SECRET

5

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

21

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
512170	RANDALL FREDERICK	DDP/FE -49	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO	DA	YR
GS 12	2	$ 8,570	02	10	57	GS 12	3	$ 8,816	08	10	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Joseph W. Smith	17 July 1958	

N.B.

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 54

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

S E C R E T

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
RANDALL FREDERICK	512170	GS-12-2	$ 7,788	$ 8,570

GORDON M. STEWART
[illegible] DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

S E C R E T

14-00000

[illegible]

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FE15

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME					3. ASSIGNED ORGAN			4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT	
512170	RANDALL FREDERICK					DDP/FE 38			UV		
6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
12	1	$ 7,570	08	14	55	12	2	$ 7,785	02	10	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
ROBERT H LINN	19 Mar 57	

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

560 SECRET PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

RAN L, FREDERICK C.

Foreign Service Officer and Foreign Service Reserve
Officer Schedule
Revised by 1956 Pay Act

Randall, Frederick C.

BASIC PAY RATES

FSO-1 & FSR-1	$13,760 14,600	$14,190 15,000	$14,620 15,400	$14,800 15,800	$14,800 16,200	16,600	17,000
FSO-2 & FSR-2	$11,965 12,600	$11,990 12,900	$12,365 13,200	$12,740 13,500	$13,115 13,800	$13,495 14,100	$13,655 14,400
FSO-3 & FSR-3	$ 9,815 10,600	$10,140 10,900	$10,460 11,200	$10,785 11,500	$11,105 11,800	$11,430 12,100	$11,750 12,400
FSO-4 & FSR-4	$ 7,490 9,000	$ 7,810 9,250	$ 8,135 9,500	$ 8,455 9,750	$ 8,780 10,000	$ 9,100 10,250	$ 9,425 10,500
FSO-5 & FSR-5	$ 5,715 7,400	$ 5,930 7,650	$ 6,145 7,900	$ 6,360 8,150	$ 6,575 8,400	$ 6,790 8,650	$ 7,005 8,900
FSO-6 & FSR-6	$ 4,295 6,100	$ 4,510 6,300	$ 4,725 6,500	$ 4,940 6,700	$ 5,155 6,900	$ 5,370 7,100	$ 5,475 7,300
FSR-7	$ 5,100	$ 5,250	$ 5,400	$ 5,550	$ 5,700	$ 5,850	$ 6,000
FSR-8	$ 4,300	$ 4,450	$ 4,600	$ 4,750	$ 4,900	$ 5,050	$ 5,200

The above basic pay rates are effective 29 July 1956.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. Frederick C. Randall 572170
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Oct 1926
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 12 June 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Reassignment
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: JUL 1 1956
7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
11. HEADQUARTERS
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL

FROM—
Intell Officer(FI) BFF-908
Consular Officer
GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 P/A
FSR-5 $6360.00 P/A
DDP/FE
Branch 5 - *Indonesia*
Djakarta Station
Djakarta Indonesia
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

TO—
Intell Officer(FI) BFF-908
Consular Officer
GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 P/A
FSR-5 $6360.00 P/A
DDP/FE
Branch 5
Indonesia-Djakarta Station
FI/CI Branch
Djakarta, Indonesia
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL DI

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

T/O Change

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): Henry P. Gilbert, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): Dorothy Tweedie x3780

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Robert A. Sheals (cmw)
Title: Acmo 18 June 56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:DI

POSTED
21 JUN 1956
WPR

15. SEX
16. APPROPRIATION FROM TO
17. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

USED IN LIEU OF SF50 NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	WPR	21 JUN 1956
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	DR	6/19/56
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

6/19/56

PCS

Department of State
Personnel Action

Mr. Frederick C. Randall 10/28/26 FSA 10/13/55

Limited Appointment 1-/27/55 Section 522.1
PL 724 79th Congress

Consular Officer

FSR-5 $ 6360

Djakarta

5pt veterans preference

New 3-3011-060

Male 6A-9013 Civil Service Retirement Deductions

10/27/55 Maryland

Submit 61A

Married--Two

No Reserve Status

8

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

IVS

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. FREDERICK C. RANDALL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 1926	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 3 Nov. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) INTEGRATION - DEPARTMENT OF STATE	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 27 Oct 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Intell Officer (FI) BFF-908	8. POSITION TITLE	Vice Consul (When confirmed) Consular Officer BFF-908
GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	FSR-5 $6360.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 5 Indonesia, Djakarta Station
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Djakarta, Indonesia
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-3730-55-170 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☑ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS:

Subject is to be paid the difference between CIA salary of $7570 and FSS salary of $6360, to be paid by the Department of State and allowances in accordance therewith

Sick and annual leave are to be held in escrow until subject reverts to GS status

RECORD
4 NOV 1955

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. ~~EMPLOYEE COPY~~

[illegible] 11/5/55

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

lvr

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Frederick C. Randall	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 1926	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION No.	4. DATE 23 Sep 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE EOD 25 Sep 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Intelligence Off. (FI) BF298-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer (FI) BFF908
GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 per annum
DDP/FE Branch 5 Indonesian Field Activity Unit	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 5 Indonesia Djakarta Station
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Djakarta, Indonesia
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-3700-20 TO: 6-3730-55-170	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

[illegible]
30 SEP 1955

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

CONFIDENTIAL

Director of Personnel

(SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION)

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953—[illegible]

MJ 9/27/55

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

dah

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Frederick C. Randall
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Oct 1926
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 5 Aug 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 14 Aug 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Intelligence Off. (FI) BF-298-11	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Off. (FI) BF-298-12
GS-0136.51-11 $6605.00 Per Annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-12 $7570.00 Per Annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 5 Indonesia Field Activity Unit
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL XXX

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-3700-20 TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: SD/DI

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

GRADE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

d. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

8/8/55

14-00000

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 - 297374

1. Agency and organizational designation	2. Pay roll	3. Block No. 5-3700-20	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) RANDALL, Frederick C.	6. Grade and salary GS-11 $5940.00		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks	11. Appropriation(s) FB 10	12. Prepared by afu 5/5 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 19 Jun 55	15. Date last equivalent increase 20 Jun 54	16. Old salary rate $5940.00	17. New salary rate $6140.00 6605.00	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better. (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ [illegible]
☐ [illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. FREDERICK C. RANDALL	28 Oct. 1926		26 May 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
REASSIGNMENT	6 June 1954	50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Ops Officer (CE) BF-311-11	8. POSITION TITLE	I. O. (FI) BF-298-11
GS-0136.52-11	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $5940.00 per annum
CE Unit	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Br. 5 Indonesian Field Activity Unit
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

SDPI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
M	W	FROM: 4-3700-20 TO: Same	Yes		STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

[illegible] TO [illegible]
[illegible]
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: $6390.00

22. PERFORMANCE RATING

Assistant Director for Personnel [illegible]

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

alh

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Frederick C. Randall	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 Oct 26	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 12 Feb 54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 14 Feb. 54	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Intel. Officer (CE) EF-321-11	8. POSITION TITLE	Ops Officer (CE) EF 311-11
GS-132-11 $5940 p/a	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.52-11 $5940 p/a
Br. 5-Indonesia & Malaya	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Br. 5- Counterespionage Unit
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD:FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-37 0-20 TO: 8877	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

22. [illegible]

23. [illegible] SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

2/2/57

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952 310795

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Frederick C. Randall

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 28 Oct. 1926

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 5 January 1953

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Excepted Appointment

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 5 Jan. 1953

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116 (b)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer (CE) EF-322-9
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-9 $5060.00
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DD/P FE/5 Counterespionage Unit
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	S. A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2377-00 TO: 2377-00

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT: Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 2 Jan. 1953

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE Maryland

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

SF # 61 affidavit has been executed subject to satisfactory trial period of 12 months and a medical examination.

Chief, Personnel Division

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

JOHN W. [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF APPOINTING OFFICER

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER 01

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

1/14/53

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
RANDALL, Frederick Crawford	28 Oct. 1926		2 Jan 1953

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Resignation

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 3 Jan. 1953
B. APPROVED: 4 Jan 1953

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Assistant	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	
GS-7 $4,330.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	
OCO FDZ Branch III	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Djakarta, Indonesia	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Slot #145

Resigning to accept other employment

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
P G Brockish for C/IT

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
L. C. Goodell, extension 3363

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Davis B. Powell
Title: FI/PO.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION-CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX
16. RACE
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

✓

00838

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
C. Taylor 8 Jan 53

1. Agency and organizational designations CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	2. Pay period	3. Block No. DV	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) RANDALL, Frederick C.	6. Grade and salary GS - 7 $4205		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks	11. Appropriation(s) 31A-65 080/78	12. Prepared by 13. Audited by

☑ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
14 Sep 52	10 Sep 51	$4205	$4330	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period
Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

16—61111-2a U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: RANDALL, Frederick Crawford

DATE: 18 May 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 10 September 51

	FROM	JR TO
TITLE		Intelligence Assistant
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-7 $3825 p.a.
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		FDZ
BRANCH		Branch III
OFFICIAL STATION		DJAKARTA Indonesia

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS S M Garrett	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION JUN 11 1951 F598	PERSONNEL OFFICER D Mulcahey	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON JR 10 September 51

SECURITY CLEARED ON 16 August 51

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 11 September 51

ENTERED ON DUTY 10 September 51 JR

Pauline C. Browne
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Slot #145

DOG - 12/20/53
CSFOD - 03/18/51
LCD - 09/10/51

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

C O N F I D E N T I A L

MEMORANDUM FOR: Frederick C. Randall

SUBJECT : Acknowledgment of Evaluation Board Functional Category

REFERENCE : Evaluation Board Precepts for Your Grade

1. Based upon an examination of your past assignments and duties, and after considering likely future assignments, you have been placed (subject to your signature below) in the functional category W for Evaluation Board purposes. Precise definitions of this category are contained in the Evaluation Board precepts for your grade. This placement is made in order that your performance, growth potential, and career planning may be judged against officers similarly placed professionally. YOU ARE URGED TO STUDY THE PRECEPTS AND CONSIDER YOUR OWN CASE CAREFULLY.

2. In general, you should consider the following;

a. Categories are sharply defined. Competition is within categories, not between them. Thus, a weak B/OG performance is not strengthened by reclassifying it as B/OS.

b. A change in category after sustained performance in a different category may cause a temporary loss of momentum in your career advancement until you have demonstrated proficiency in your new assignment.

c. A category change should not be initiated for the period of a temporary, training or rotational assignment unless a permanent change of career track will follow.

3. If you believe that this is not the correct category for you because the substantive nature of your job more closely approximates another category or because you have made a permanent change of career track, please take the matter up through your command channel to secure the concurrence of your component of assignment or of your home base component, as appropriate, to a change of your category. Previously assigned and acknowledged categories will remain in effect until a fully executed acknowledgment of change is received by the Career Management Staff.

4. Please sign and date this notification in the space provided and return it to your Personnel Evaluation and Management Officer or to your Personnel Officer.

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Frederick C. Randall

Signature of Addressee

February 15, 1974

Date

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

505-20-4069

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (Last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
012170	Randall, Frederick C.	28 Oct 26	M	15	D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION	10. CHECK (X) TYPE
Ops Officer	DO/IMS/C/FPG	Headquarters	X HQS. ☐ OF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CONTRACT	☐	SPECIAL	☐	OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	XX	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT	☐	SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO) 6 Mar - 30 Nov 1978

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Manages and coordinates review of all DO records subject to disclosure via FOIA, Privacy Act and E.O. 12065. Supervises 24 full- and part-time personnel.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As one of six senior IMS officers, serves as voting member of IMS PMC (for 550 people) and on thrice-weekly general planning meetings with Chief, IMS.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supplies factual and legal advice to the DDO, Chief IMS, DDO/IRO, IRC, and OGC on trends and implications pertinent to release of DO information via statute or regulation.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Generates policy initiatives to protect DO sources and methods from disclosure via statute or executive order.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

DERIVATIVE CL BY [illegible]

FORM 45 [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

REVW ON [illegible]

DERIVED FROM [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

I rate Mr. Randall "outstanding" for Duty Number 1 (his principal responsibility) for this period. He has done an exceptional job of supervising, motivating, training and guiding his group in a remorseless and pressure-laden atmosphere, requiring both close attention to detail and constant alertness to broad operational and policy implications. The workload is larger and more complicated than anything I know of handled by any line opera~~tional~~ officer with equivalent grade and responsibility. The preceding two fitness reports describe well the nature of the job. It remains only to be noted that Mr. Randall is the perfect man for the job, combining a remarkable match of leadership, operational savvy, legal and policy awareness and, perhaps most important, negotiating ability with both the Agency lawyers and legislative counsels, and the operating divisions in a bizarre situation that completely transcends the DO's need-to-know practices (Top Secret and compartmented, bigotted information must be reviewed) and yet requires the protection of our sources and methods. Dedicated, discreet, smart, and honest, Mr. Randall is very likely one of very few DO officers of his grade who could have handled this job from scratch, done so with virtually flawless output, and created a body of judgments and advice that is trusted, proven and amounts to de facto DO policy on how to protect our secrets.

Mr. Randall also has major planning obligations within IMS, serving as a voting member of the PMC and three times a week with Chief, IMS and other (continued)

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION [illegible] Profile	
DATE 18 December 1978	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, IMS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE James B. Fletcher, Jr.

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 18/Dec/1978	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frederick C. Randall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the letter ratings and the narrative comments above, particularly those in paragraph 1 of the narrative.

Mr. Randall is a dedicated, forceful, purposeful, dependable, disciplined officer. Although his personal preference would have been to do something else, he effectively manages and leads the Freedom of Information and Privacy Group of IMS--demonstrating a self reliant style which has brought great credit to work in this area in the DO and to himself. Mr. Randall's past several fitness reports attested to his talents and growth in this assignment.

As was observed in Mr. Randall's last fitness report, a new assignment must be found

DATE 30 January 1979	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, IMS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William F. Donnelly William F. Donnelly

4. BY EMPLOYEE

[illegible]	1/1/79	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frederick C. Randall

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

41

NARRATIVE COMMENTS - continued

Randall, Frederick

Group chiefs in a broad review of disparate IMS operations: computers, information management planning for the DO and its current services. He is articulate and effective in presenting views from the IMS/FPG vantage, but at this level, I want to see more concern about the people and activities of companion IMS elements, more brainstorming of common problems. He is the least active of the four group chiefs in this area, although he has the inquisitiveness and intellect to contribute importantly in cross-discipline problems. I find no weakness here, but Mr. Randall's contributions here do not measure up comparatively to his exceptional performance in all other areas.

In these other areas, covering duties 3 and 4, Mr. Randall and his group stimulated, staffed out and justified three remarkably successful policy changes: a Presidential statement that sources and methods information need not be classified to be protected; a DCI policy that DO records ipso facto are not releasable (despite an OGC opinion to the contrary), and a policy allowing employees access to their files without going through the FOIA or Privacy Act folderol. While not individual accomplishments by Mr. Randall, they bespeak ~~from~~ the leadership and guidance he gave, and they are typical of the kind of case officer professionalism he has and we have needed to help protect agents, operations and officers from exposure. I do think it is sad to have to divert good DO talent to disclosure law problems; but if we must, then Mr. Randall's experience and abilities have counted a great deal in such successes we have had in keeping our secrets.

Mr. Randall's fitness reporting is accurate and fair. Per HR 20-20, it is noted for the record that Mr. Randall displays appropriate concern in equal employment opportunity areas: women comprise more than half of his group. He has three minority officers. Levels of responsibility here are above Agency norm.

REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS - continued

for this experienced supervisor. He has demonstrated his versatility and commitment by doing a job for four years that probably few other DO ops officers/managers would or could do as well as he has. For the good of his morale, the interest of his further development and in the interest of the Directorate, he has earned a change.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 012180	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Randall, Frederick Crawford	3. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 26	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT ISS/Chief, PIAG	9. CURRENT STATION Hqs	10. CODE (Ck. I) XX HQS. ☐ OF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY ☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL XX ANNUAL XX REASSIGNMENT of supervisor ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO): 1 January 1977-31 December 1977

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Privacy Information Action Group	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45

CLASSIFICATION

E2 IMPDET CL BY

01178

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The merger of units which created the Information Services Staff brought Mr. Randall and his staff under my supervision for the first time. Prior to that we had been colleagues in Services Staff, whose chief wrote Mr. Randall's Fitness Report. No change in function accompanied the change in organization, however, and the praise contained in those earlier reports could be ~~echoed here~~.

During 1977, Mr. Randall and his group have continued to render this Directorate outstanding service in an arena where there is little glory but the constant threat of disaster. In the preparation of materials for release under FOIA, the Privacy Act or E.O. 11652, the researcher treads a fine, barely visible line between protection of operational secrets and revelation of material properly releasable under the law. He is denied the easy choice of over-protection because each decision is subject to the scrutiny of the courts, and the Agency's credibility is on the line each time a judge challenges a deletion or the denial of a document. (That credibility is apparently quite high in the courts. We have yet to be reversed in appeals cases on information denied by PIAG on grounds of classification or sources/methods.) The research on which we rely is almost autonomous; reviews of finished cases are necessarily limited and (cont'd)

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 January 1978	Deputy Chief, ISS	Bruce Johnson Bruce T. Johnson

2. BY EMPLOYEE

	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☑ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	13/1/78	Frederick C. Randall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I think it is important first to echo the remarks in the last paragraph of the narrative above. Mr. Randall is an exceptionally proficient performer in a position that few other DO officers want to occupy. The DO is fortunate to have a person of his caliber handling FOIA and related matters.

As I see his performance, Mr. Randall has made a significant effort in advancing national intelligence objectives by doing everything possible to protect DO "sources and methods." He has represented us exceedingly well in this area and as a result, to his credit, little has gotten away through the FOIA channel. The way things are organized,

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 January 1978	Chief, Information Services Staff	William F. Donnelly William F. Donnelly

4. BY EMPLOYEE

	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
[illegible]	17/1/78	Frederick C. Randall

CLASSIFICATION

NARRATIVE COMMENTS - cont'd

cursory, and from the beginning there has been a high premium on both technical accuracy and sound substantive judgment. As Mr. Randall himself noted in a report on his deputy, we have an enviable record as far as "flaps" are concerned; in a situation fraught with danger of inappropriate release of information we have had only five cases where release has led to embarrassment -- out of 7,000 "possibles." Mr. Randall, with typical modesty, uses the statistic in praise of others; I choose to use it to praise him. The Group's record to date is nothing short of astonishing, and Mr. Randall can take great pride in his team's accomplishments.

He has built an extremely able and dedicated team, and he is as quick as anyone I know to ascribe to individual members of that team credit for actions, ideas or progress. They respond to his fairness with loyalty and affection, and their morale in the face of constant harrassment and frustration is testimony to his leadership.

New responsibilities for support to the Office of General Counsel were added to PIAG's burdens this year. Mr. Randall opposed the move and argues (and lobbied) intelligently to preclude it, to no avail. It is to his credit that, having urged a different course of action, he set about to ensure that the unpopular new function received the same careful attention which has been the hallmark of PIAG's other work. As a consequence, our OGC-related efforts, which are very demanding and time-consuming, have the PIAG stamp of excellence on them.

Mr. Randall created the system he manages, and continues to seek ways to improve upon it. Our move to an automated index of reviewed and released documents was urged and supported by Mr. Randall, and he has been equally supportive of a new branch chief's efforts to restructure our Initial Review process. He is also quick to see and to comment on the way our efforts affect larger Agency and government equities, and vice versa.

During this year his responsibilities were broadened by the addition of our Declassification Review Branch to his Group, a reflection of our recognition of the inevitable relationship between scheduled declassification and selective declassification and release under FOIA/PA/E.O. 11652. This Branch will shortly be absorbed by the new Records Review Branch of the DDA, but PIAG will continue to be the focal point for policy formulation on declassification of DO records.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS - cont'd

Mr. Randall has expressed to me his concern about what may be viewed as a drop in his rating from my predecessor's "O" to my "S." I have assured him, and assure the reader, that this change signals no diminution in his performance or effectiveness, but rather a personal inclination to use "Outstanding" very rarely. The narrative comments above should clearly attest to that fact that I view Mr. Randall's performance as very strong, bordering on Outstanding. The Agency and the DO have been fortunate to have a man of this caliber in charge of PIAG.

REVIEWING COMMENTS - cont'd

Mr. Randall is one of the key policy makers in this area. His policies have stood the test up to now as our excellent record in the courts attests.

Having said this, it should be noted that Mr. Randall's numerous accomplishments are partly because the job was there to be created. Within the DO he cut the path which is now followed when handling FOIA matters. He has corrected and improved upon that path several times over. Thus, the time is coming for him to be given a change in assignment; an opportunity to use his managerial and supervisory skills elsewhere. He will have been in his present assignment three years in March 1978. One grows stale reviewing, sanitizing and making judgment calls in the FOIA arena day after day. Mr. Randall isn't stale yet but we should not wait until he reaches that stage to give him a new area in which to work.

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 012170	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) RANDALL, Frederick Crawford	3. DATE OF BIRTH 28Oct26	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DO/ISS/PICG	9. CURRENT STATION	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS. ☐ DR

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ CONTRACT	☐ OTHER (Spec.)	☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

X ANNUAL	X REASSIGNMENT	☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) 1 November 1975-31 December 1976	14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Policy & Information Coordination Group (DDO/ISS/PICG)	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-73

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

My qualitative assessment and comments in Fred's February 1976 Fitness Report apply equally today; in fact, they fall short, in view of the quantitative and administrative changes of the past year.

The news headlines, the new oversight demands, an increasingly sophisticated FOIA requester group and judiciary, plus a highly organized hostile element, epitomized by the Center for National Security Studies, has made the PICG function all the more significant. Cases in litigation involving DDO materials now number 58 and the appeal pattern is now running 1:2 (i.e., one appeal for two initial requests, with subsequent litigation--anticipating deep analysis and Deputy Director-level review) compared to 1:3 last year. Appeal-level analysis is much more time-consuming, hence the backlog reduction process suffers; hence, overtime and fire-fighting remain the norm. Double-encumbered personnel detailing has raised the on-board PICG total from the 18 stated in last year's FR to 25. The managerial task of motivating workers in this continuously grinding and frustrating environment was harder this year, yet was met by Fred with the same qualities as those which led his people to write

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS (over)

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 3/17/77	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DDO Information Review Off	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Charles A. Briggs

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 11/3/77	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

No appropriate reviewing official.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT - Frederick C. Randall
Section D - Narrative Comments

me an unsolicited letter of appreciation for his efforts as their supervisor. We have all felt that one burns out in this kind of thing after about a year and a half; Fred and some of the first people to come aboard are a bit ground down, but, if anything, the quality has improved--witness the fact that we have yet to lose a case in court or to be forced to release a document we thought should be denied.

Adding to the complexity of Fred's life during this period, was increasing involvement in non-FOIA litigation support, (e.g., ITT/Chile, the Socialist Workers Party case, etc.) both to me and to SA/DDO/O. Additional administrative complexity results from my having changed staffs, while being asked to retain the DDO Information Review Officer function. Hence, split daily support to me as well as periodic support to SA/DDO/O, poses a potentially ticklish situation with Fred's organizational supervisor who is Chief, ISS. In fact, Fred walks this tightrope quite well.

Finally, Fred has persistently tried to convince others that there is a critical need for a centralized capability to assess the total Agency impact of decentralized information release, whether to FOIA, congressional, judicial, news media or other non-intelligence requesters. His efforts are about to bear fruit, since this will be an EAG agenda item next month.

Whether it's bringing his professional overseas background to bear on the analysis for release process; protecting sources and methods in the now "open sunshine" context; trying to save resources and ensure efficient procedures; deal effectively and impressively with senior officers in this Agency and others; or supervise a collection of dedicated and hardworking people, firmly but with good humor and understanding, Fred has done an Outstanding job. He will be very hard to replace, and yet, he should move on.

Charles A. Briggs

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 012170	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Randall, Frederick C.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 26	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-14	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/SS/PIC	9. CURRENT STATION Hqs.	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS. ☐ DF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: XX CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY ☐

12. TYPE OF REPORT: XX ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL ☐

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 November 1974 - 30 October 1975

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: November 1975

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M–Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P–Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S–Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O–Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Privacy and Information Coordination Staff (DDO/PIC)	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

1 MAR 1976

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Randall supervises the unit responsible for developing the DDO answer to Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act requests, both at the initial request level and, increasingly, at the appeal and litigation levels. His organization is still less than one year old but has gone through several growth surges as the public reacted to the past year's publicity about CIA, demanding great amounts of information. Last March, Randall and his secretary played the role, then the T/O went from 6 to 12 to its current level of 18. In this period, initial requests received by the Agency reached nearly 10,000; appeals number about 300, and there are currently 31 cases in litigation, the DDO being involved in 27. Much overtime is the norm, in a backlogged, firefighting environment.

This has been uncharted sailing. Years of conditioning in sources and methods protection made analysis of DDO materials for release agonizing. The Watergate and Congressional investigation experience produced over-reaction tendencies in the Agency. As the individual responsible for releasing or denying DDO materials in the first instance, and subsequently defending DDO decisions in affidavits and adversarial oral depositions, I not only attest to the excellence of Mr. Randall's analysis and recommendations, but gratefully thank those who brought him to the job in the first instance. Frustrating and often demoralizing as his job is, he does it with real

(cont'd)

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 Feb 76	Chief, Services Staff	Charles A. Briggs

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☑ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	[illegible]	Frederick C Randall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the overall rating of "Outstanding". Mr. Randall is the right man in the right job at the right time. Not many would want his job, but it is an extremely important one to CIA at this period. His performance could not reasonably be improved upon.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 FEB 1976	Associate Deputy Director for Operations	David H. Blee

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	27 Feb 1976	Frederick C Randall

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT - Frederick C. Randall
Section D - Narrative Comments (Cont'd)

professionalism and seems to have been made for it. As I said in a memo last October which resulted in a QSI for him, in spite of the ambiguity of the guidelines, constant pressure of short deadlines, very large volume of work and cultural trauma generated by the Acts, his performance has been Outstanding.

Earlier fitness reports, in a different context, stated or implied some reservation about his energy or initiative or independent action. I can't imagine that we're talking about the same man. Close to 95% of the mass of Agency FOIA receipts have involved the DDO. I know all of the persons involved in other directorates and said, only 6 months into this year, that Fred was head and shoulders above the others, combining professionalism, tact, persuasiveness, analytic skills, tough-mindedness and pragmatism in sources and methods protection. He suggested policy, strongly influenced implementation, and debated, usually successfully, with the lawyers, with DDO branch, division and staff chiefs, with other Agency contacts and others above his current grade level--all with a sustaining sense of humor.

As to management of his unit: he has consistently resisted empire-building opportunities, trying to keep his staff small. When growth was inevitable, he concentrated on quality in personnel selected for this atypical DDO work rather than accepting the short fix to the statistical backlog problem because routine or "passable" effort is not good enough in litigation. The best reflection of his managerial ability can be seen in an unsolicited testimony from his staff which I have attached to this report to make it a part of the official record; it is the first of its kind to come to my attention in my 23 plus years in the Agency. (If some jaded cynics in these days of non-credibility doubt the spontaneity and true feeling of Mr. Randall's staff in this action, and one or two of my staff have, I can only feel sad for them. This is a breath of fresh air to me.)

Randall has made a singularly impressive shift in direction, has changed career category and, in my judgment, has unqualifiedly demonstrated his command of the position he holds. I have recommended recognition of that fact.

Charles A. Briggs
C/SS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Services Staff

SUBJECT: Fred Randall, C/DDO/PIC

1. This memorandum is intended to state what we, the staff of DDO/PIC, think of our Chief, Mr. Fred Randall. Mr. Randall is not aware of this memorandum.

2. We believe he is outstanding as a manager and fellow worker! His sensitive understanding of human relationships is balanced by a no-nonsense firmness to get the job done. Using extraordinary patience, brains, tact, and diplomacy, along with long hours and weekend time, he has set an example for his entire staff. Mr. Randall's deep knowledge of operations, his grasp of the implications of past operations on current activity, his determination to protect the Agency and the DDO from the devastating impact of unwarranted and unauthorized release of information, and his judgement of the fine line between what should and should not be released under appropriate law and policy, have formed a major line of protection for the USG and the Agency.

3. He has not hesitated to make decisions, nor to disagree when he felt disagreement warranted. A strong aversion to pyramid building has underlined his cost-consciousness to get the most done with the least amount of expenditures. Yet, his determination and firmness are based upon an open, objective mind, willing to listen to different views, and to change his position if he is convinced of the need for change.

4. His strong desire to aid employees in career development is re-inforced by concrete actions, positive suggestions, defined tasks, and frequent checks to assess the quality and quantity of work product.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. The nature of the task assigned to DDO/PIC includes the word by word review of thousands of pages of documents. The impact on the Agency, and the USG, of unauthorized disclosure of secrets, adds to the weight of constant decision making, and to the strain and tension of defending a crucial perimeter. And this perimeter is under an almost daily attack of erupting crises. Mr. Randall's dedication and superior ability in handling an onerous, difficult, and complex job, filled with frustrations that would dismay and discourage others, has been truly outstanding.

6. Mr. Randall has had his finger in the dike for an incredibly long time. He has been operating in a hazardous, high pressure environment, fraught with penalties if he does not make the right decisions, and little recognized when he does. Yet, his common sense decisions have been accepted, and have become policy--policy that ordinarily is made by very senior super-grade officers of the Agency. An assignment in DDO/PIC can burn out rapidly many competent individuals. Fred Randall is still going strong, and continuing to do an outstanding job!

Andy Addona
Anna J. Langford
Jon E. Wolfe
Annette B. Snider

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 12170	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Randall, Frederick C.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct. 26	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-14	6. SD DAC
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer Chief	8. OFF/DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/SS/PIC	9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS. ☐ OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) 3 February 1975 to 10 October 1975	14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 November 1975

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER ()

45

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

12. REPORT CL BY ____________

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

There is no reviewing official for this report.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

10 October 1975

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Mr. Frederick C. Randall, GS-14/7

1. This report is submitted as part of a package suggesting that Mr. Randall be awarded a QSI for his performance since becoming the DDO Freedom of Information Officer in February of this year. In this context, it is not appropriate that he see and sign this memorandum, since I want this to be a surprise. Nor, it seems, is it necessary to have a Reviewing Official for this interim report; the DDO has suggested, in commenting on my out-of-cycle recommendation of 8 August 75 for Mr. Randall's promotion, that a memorandum be submitted recommending a QSI at this time.

2. I consider Mr. Randall's performance as DDO/FIO (now DDO/PIC, for Privacy Act and FOIA Coordinator) to be Outstanding. As I have said elsewhere, he is, in my view, the most impressive of all the Agency FIO's combining DDO professionalism, tact, persuasiveness, analytic skills and an informed, tough-minded approach toward sources and methods protection. I have received considerable laudatory comment about his work from OGC, OLC, O/DDA and within the DO.

3. From a one-man operation with secretary, the FOIA activity expanded in four months to an approved T/O of 7, with a pending request for 5 more, and the possibility of further increases depending on public reaction to the Privacy Act and the amount of litigation that develops. Fred has done an excellent job of selecting his staff for what is an often frantic, frustrating and long-houred environment; he also manages them well, with humor and compassion and with high analysis and output standards. He is conscious of cost, particularly in human effort, in this exercise and of the need for balance in the application of secrecy criteria in today's environment. I am, obviously, impressed and pleased with his assistance, and feel comfortably supported by his group's efforts in avoiding or preparing for litigation actions in FOIA and Privacy Act cases.

Charles A. Briggs

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

I certify that I have read the above report.

Frederick C Randall

CONFIDENTIAL CL BY 011078 E2 IMPDET

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 012170	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Randall, Frederick C.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 26	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-14	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/FRD/III	9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	10. CODE (X one) ☐ HOS ☐ DP		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: XX CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: XX ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 November 1973 - 31 October 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 November 1974

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 — RATING LETTER

See attached memorandum.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 — RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

NAME:	**Frederick C. Randall**
DATE OF BIRTH:	**28 October 1926**
SEX:	**Male**
GRADE:	**GS-14**
SD:	**D**
POSITION TITLE:	Chief, FR Division, Branch III
OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT:	DDO/FR Division
CURRENT STATION:	Headquarters
TYPE OF APPOINTMENT:	Career
TYPE OF REPORT:	Annual
DATE REPORT DUE:	30 November 1974
REPORTING PERIOD:	1 November 1973 - 31 October 1974
EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	012170

Mr. Randall has now functioned as a Branch Chief under my supervision for a period of about sixteen months and we have had ample time to observe him in action in this position. I rate him as an overall "Strong" and give him good marks for a steadily improved performance

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 056030

CONFIDENTIAL

(Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report - Frederick C. Randall)

during the rating period. Whereas I had indicated in his last fitness report a need for him to be more demanding in challenging faulty proposals or resolving problems which come to him at his Branch Chief level, he now exerts a good degree of initiative in independent action and offers good completed staff work to the Division Chief level for scrutiny. Mr. Randall's branch encompasses four (4) busy Bases (Atlanta, Boston, Los Angeles and San Francisco). He keeps effectively abreast of the operational developments coming out of each Base and represents this Division very persuasively in obtaining good guidance messages going back out to the Bases. He has also kept himself well informed on the Management by Objectives targets assigned to each of his Bases where a total of about forty (40) personnel are assigned, and has been strong in supporting his Bases' efforts to achieve these objectives.

Mr. Randall has matured nicely as a manager these past months and is on top of the many administrative, personnel and operational support problems which are of a frequently recurring nature in our type operational activity. He is also a good team player, has the best interests of this Division at heart, and gives thoroughly of himself in his job. He has worked hard in bringing himself up to his present level of performance which I appraise as an unqualified "Strong".

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. By Employee: I certify that I have seen this report.

Frederick C Randall — Nov 20, 1974
Frederick C. Randall — Date

2. By Supervisor: Employee has been under my supervision 16 months

Russell F Miller — 20 Nov 74
Russell F. Miller DC/FR — Date

CONFIDENTIAL

/3/

REVIEWING OFFICIALS COMMENTS (Frederick C. Randall)

I concur generally with the comments of the rating officer. I believe Mr. Randall has shown improvement in his handling of his Branch Chief responsibilities. I agree that he has shown greater initiative in this reporting period than in the previous ones, however, I would still like to see a somewhat greater and quicker recognition on Mr. Randall's part of operational problem areas. Granted that this is a talent that is frequently hard to develop, it is nonetheless, essential for all Branch Chiefs in this Division to achieve a high degree of operational perspicacity. Mr. Randall has the ability and needs only additional experience to improve his focus on the operational targeting efforts of his respective Bases. He is a thoughtful and considerate supervisor, respected by his subordinates and he represents the Division very well indeed. Mr. Randall's career would be enhanced were he in a position to accept a field assignment which would get him into direct operational contact, i.e., recruiting and handling agents. Unfortunately, for family medical reasons he will apparently be confined to the Headquarters area for an indefinite period. On balance, I consider him to be a good Branch Chief who willingly works long hours and does his job well.

WLO'Brien — 4 Dec 74

Walter L. O'Brien
Chief, FR Division
Date

I certify that I have seen the above Reviewing Officials comments.

Frederick C Randall — 5 Dec 1974

Frederick C. Randall
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

NAME:	**Frederick Randall** 012170
DATE OF BIRTH:	**28 October 1926**
SEX:	**Male**
GRADE:	**GS-14**
SD:	**D**
POSITION TITLE:	**Chief, FR Division, Branch III**
OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT:	DDO/FR Division
CURRENT STATION:	Headquarters
TYPE OF APPOINTMENT:	Career
TYPE OF REPORT:	Annual
DATE REPORT DUE:	30 November 1973
REPORTING PERIOD:	16 June 1973 - 31 October 1973
EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	012170

Mr. Randall has served under me for slightly more than three months and had just taken over his new position duties when I arrived for duty in this Division. During this brief period, however, he has displayed considerable dedication and interest in applying himself to his newly assigned tasks as Chief of one of our three operating branches. This branch which comprises Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston and Atlanta Bases, is shaping up nicely thus far under this supervision, and appears well organized to support the four bases in the months ahead. He could at times be a bit more demanding in challenging some aspects of proposals or problems at the Branch level instead of allowing them to pass on up to the Division Chief level for decision, but it is hoped that he will gradually develop his style in this direction as he becomes more accustomed to his expanded responsibilities as

S E C R E T

26 DEC 1973

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 056030

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT - Frederick Randall

Page 2

Branch Chief. The thorough test of his managerial skills, however, will occur in this upcoming period when all the Bases in his Branch become operationally active on a broad front and will require a continuing high quality of supervision, guidance and support from the Branch Chief's office. I would rate his performance to date as an overall "Strong".

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. By Employee: I certify that I have seen this report.

Frederick Randall 23/11/73
Frederick Randall Date

2. By Supervisor: Employee has been under my supervision 3 months

Russell F. Miller 23 November 73
Russell F. Miller Date

3. Reviewing Official's Comments:

I concur generally with the above rating. I also observed in the early days of Mr. Randall's assignment as Branch Chief, that his performance could certainly have been stronger. It took him somewhat longer than I had anticipated to really take charge of his Branch. However, I feel that as he has continued in this assignment he has made very definite progress. He is now generally well informed on the operational activities taking place in his area and has begun to exercise a greater degree of initiative and aggressiveness in handling the operational matters that cross his desk. Had I been the rating officer I probably would have given Mr. Randall a somewhat lower, more qualified "Strong" rating. If he continues to improve in the months ahead as he has in the past several, I believe he can earn an unqualified "Strong" rating for this performance.

WL O'Brien 13/12/73
Walter L. O'Brien C/FR Date

SECRET

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 012170	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Randall, Frederick C.		3. DATE OF BIRTH 10/28/26	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-14	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/FRD/Br. I		9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters			10. HQ CO

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) 1 November 1972 - 15 June 1973

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. Supervisor

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Provides primary direction and support to the San Francisco and Los Angeles Bases on the running of clandestine operations in their geographic areas.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Provides guidance and support to the San Francisco and Los Angeles Bases on the management of their Bases.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains continuing relations with all elements of the Directorate of Operations necessary to support and direct the operational activities of the San Francisco and Los Angeles Bases.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises one Intelligence Analyst.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

Form 8-72 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E2. IMPDET CL BY 057516

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In the less than six months since my preparation of the previous report on Mr. Randall, his overall performance has continued strong. He has effectively continued to provide the day-to-day operational support for the FR Bases in Los Angeles and San Francisco and the two (soon to be three) singleton officers in the Northwest, Colorado and Arizona. The level and complexity of the operational support and guidance which he has provided with skill, sensitivity and humanness has continued uniformly high.

Mr. Randall has again effectively trained a new Intelligence Analyst with no loss of efficiency or responsiveness to the ever-increasing field requirements.

Mr. Randall has been under my supervision for 28 months as the San Francisco/Los Angeles Desk officer and has continued successfully to meet the challenges of increased responsibility. It is now planned to appoint him as Branch Chief to be responsible for the Bases in Boston and Atlanta as well as Los Angeles and San Francisco. The increase in complexity of this new assignment for him will be heightened by the assignment of additional operational personnel in three of his four Bases, which will materially add to the demanding workload of his Branch. We are confident he will be able to meet the challenge of these added responsibilities.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, C, AND D OF THIS REPORT

DATE 6 June 1973	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Russell Randall

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 6 JUN 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, FR Branch I	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Maurice A. Sovern

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

There is little for me to add to the above comments. I fully concur with the remarks contained above and as stated, based on Mr. Randall's fine performance we have appointed him as Branch Chief who will be responsible for four FR Bases. We have every reason to believe that he will handle this new assignment with skill and look forward to our continuing close association.

DATE 7 June 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, FR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Walter L. O'Brien

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012170

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Randall, Frederick C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/28/26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FRD/Br. I	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 November 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1972 - 31 October 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Provides primary direction and support to the San Francisco and Los Angeles Bases on the running of clandestine operations in their geographic areas.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Provides guidance and support to the San Francisco and Los Angeles Bases on the management of their Bases.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains continuing relations with all elements of the Clandestine Service necessary to support and direct the operational activities of the San Francisco and Los Angeles Bases.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises one Intelligence Analyst.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER 20 DEC 1972 S

FORM 5-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SP[illegible]TAC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Randall continues to exercise the responsibility of providing the day-to-day operational support for the FR Bases in Los Angeles and San Francisco. The comments that were made in the previous fitness report bear repetition. In any other Division the backstopping of two Bases, which are Stations in all but name, would involve at least an entire branch and all the supervisory responsibility that such support entails rather than a single officer with an Intelligence Analyst. Mr. Randall does all of this and has continued to do it well. During the year both Bases have increased substantially in size and in degree and complexity of the operational activities there. He has supported both Bases exceptionally well.

In addition to carrying on the full-time responsibility for both Bases he has continued to demonstrate a willingness and a sensitivity to increase the effectiveness of his Intelligence Analyst, who has now gone on to a sensitive SB position with additional responsibility, by careful tutorial training and guidance. He has then been called upon to train a second Intelligence Analyst quickly and did so while maintaining a high degree of responsiveness to the continued demands of the two Bases.

Mr. Randall continued to turn in a "Strong" performance and is held in high

/Continued/

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 13 December 1972	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frederick C. Randall Frederick C. Randall

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 20	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 13 DEC 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, FR Branch I	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Maurice A. Sovern Maurice A. Sovern

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully concur in the overall "Strong" rating given to Mr. Randall. During this reporting period he has certainly performed in an extremely able manner. When Mr. Randall was first assigned to our Division Headquarters component, it was my distinct impression that he was very definitely lacking in energy. However, as time has progressed and he has become more experienced in our mode of operations, I am pleased to note that he pursues his operational objectives with very commendable energy and vigor. Mr. Randall writes well and quickly. I think his operational judgment is good. I also believe that his strengths lie in the Headquarters or Staff end of the Clandestine Service rather than in direct agent recruiting and

/Continued/

DATE 19 DEC 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, FR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Walter L. O'Brien

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT: Frederick C. Randall (1 January 1972 - 31 October 1972)

NARRATIVE COMMENTS (Continued)

regard by the Chiefs and officers of the Bases with whom he deals on a regular basis.

To an individual of Mr. Randall's intellectual depth and basically sound operational approach to Division problems the challenge of even more responsibility is warranted. He is now programmed to assume the operational support responsibility for the New York Base sometime next summer.

REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS (Cont.)

handling activities. I think he is ideally situated in his present assignment and we are most happy with his performance in our Division.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 012170

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Randall, Frederick	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/28/26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 5. SD GS-14 D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DOD/IOG/Br. 1		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1971 - 31 December 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Provides primary operational support for the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bases of the FR (formerly DO) Division.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts liaison with other area divisions and staffs as concerns the operational activity of the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bases.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares operational correspondence. Contributes to DDP quarterly and FI operational report including the preparation of operational memoranda for recruitments requiring DDP or ADDP approval.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises one intelligence assistant.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 16 FEB 72	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 3-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Randall has the responsibility of providing the day to day operational support to FR Bases in Los Angeles and San Francisco. Both bases have increased substantially in size during the past year to where there are presently six senior case officers and an intelligence assistant in Los Angeles and ten senior case officers and an intelligence analyst in San Francisco all generating significant operational activity requiring substantive guidance, management and organizational initiative of the highest order. In any other Division the backstopping of an element of this size and complexity would involve an entire branch and all the supervisory responsibility that goes with it rather than a single officer and an intelligence analyst. In the FR Division the decision was made to keep the Headquarters complement small and to do a job with carefully selected experienced and skilled senior operations officers who, based on their own field and personal experience, are able to press the right buttons to evoke appropriate responses from the various area divisions and staffs and to provide practical guidance on their own.

In exercising this function, Mr. Randall has continued to demonstrate those critical qualities of energy, loyalty and dedication. He cares. He is concerned with end results as well as the means by which the end is reached. He is

Continued

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 9/2/72	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frederick C Randall

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 11	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 9 February 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, FR/B1	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I think the narrative portion of the above rating is a thoughtful and accurate account of a conscientious officer's performance. However, I believe the letter grades are a little on the high side as I feel a precise letter description would be in the overall "S-" or "P+" category. Since I have great confidence in the rating officer, I am prepared to defer to his judgment as stated above. I think it might be noted that Mr. Randall has indeed come along very nicely in his present assignment. I believe he is eminently well qualified to perform his current job. I believe that his talents and experience are better utilized in his current assignment then they would be in a more direct operational, i.e., agent handling and

DATE 10 February 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, FR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Walter L. O'Brien

Section C - NARRATIVE COMMENTS continued

intellectually honest and has developed his organizational imagination to where he is able to identify the potential operational advantages and disadvantages on which he bases his recommendations for appropriate action.

Mr. Randall is a humanist, careful and considerate in his dealings with others, firm when necessary, scrupulously fair, with a down-to-earth approach and a sensitiveness to the nuances of the interrelations of major headquarters components all of which contribute to his Strong performance.

Mr. Randall unfailingly demonstrates a wide ranging intellectual awareness and curiosity, and is able to refine and use these in his approach to problem solving.

Mr. Randall writes well and succintly. He continues to turn in a Strong performance and is held in high regard by the Base officers with whom he regularly deals.

Section D - REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS continued

recruiting situation. On balance, I have been pleased with Mr. Randall's performance and feel that he is doing a good job.

As a final statement, it is my opinion that Mr. Randall does not have the requisite GS-14 convertibility from his present desk assignment to that of an active field case officer charged with the recruitment of agents. This is not stated in denigration of Mr. Randall for there is clearly a need and a place for the type of talents he possesses. I think we have found that place in the job that he is now performing.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012170

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Randall, Frederick	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/28/26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DOD/IOG	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1970 - 31 March 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Provides primary operational support for DO Division Bases in Los Angeles and San Francisco, including processing of special ADDP operational clearances for recruitment of individuals in the academic world.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts liaison with other area divisions and staffs as concerns the operational activity of the two Bases.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares operational correspondence; contributes to Quarterly Reports and FI Operational Reports.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises one Intelligence Assistant and partially supervises one clerk-typist.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

15 MAY 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Randall continues to view his responsibilities with enthusiasm and serious concern. Given the complexities of dealing with every area division and staff within DDP on cover matters, academic approvals, targetting against foreign nationals, recruitment of support assets, secure operational approaches, etc.--I would characterize his overall performance as evincing exceptional proficiency. This was accomplished in a period which saw both Bases increase their striking power numerically rather significantly. In the ultimate, the real test of performance is in recruitment of foreign nationals. While recruitment is not part of Mr. Randall's duties there is no doubt that his support of the two Bases contributed to the highest record of recruitment that these Bases had as compared to any other year. At the same time, he consciously maintained an excellent balance in the outgo of funds for operational purposes. He is held in high regard by both Base Chiefs. Since much of the routine desk work is done by his Intel Assistant, it is a tribute to his supervisory capability that this service maintains a high rate of efficiency despite the significant increase in work, and the fact that during this period there were three different intel assistants. Since the supervisor began phasing out of his job for several months prior to 31 March, a rather conscious decision was made to have Mr. Randall in fact assume some of the responsibility of the Branch Chief. Not only has he taken these added tasks willingly and with the confidence of DO's management, but he has performed superbly.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27/4/71	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 April 1971	C/DOI/1	Joseph J. Bulik

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur, generally, with the narrative portion of this report. However, I feel that it is somewhat overstated. Specifically, I would not rate his performance of Duty No. 1 as "outstanding", rather I would rate it "strong". I consider Mr. Randall a capable officer, but feel his overall performance falls somewhere on the border of a "low strong" and a "high proficient". Let me hasten to add that I am fully satisfied with Mr. Randall's performance in his present assignment, and I have every confidence that he will continue to do a completely satisfactory job.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
22 May 1971	Acting Chief, DO Division	Walter L. O'Brien

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 012170

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL, Frederick C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/28/26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DO/I	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
13 December 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Provides primary operational support for DO Division Bases in San Francisco and Los Angeles, including processing of special ADDP operational clearances for academic support assets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Prepares operational correspondence: cables, dispatches, projects and special memoranda.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Effects liaison with other area divisions and staffs, as appropriate, in support of the two California bases as concerns operations involving these components of the DDP.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises one Intelligence Assistant and partially supervises one clerk-typist.	RATING LETTER P-
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Contributes to Monthly FI Operational Reports and Quarterly Reports for DDP on matters concerning the two California bases.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 24 APR 1970	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

APR 22 11 42 AM '70

This is Mr. Randall's first fitness report for a Headquarters assignment following nearly 9 years in the field, of which over 4 years were at the Washington Base. Even with this field background of operational activity in the USA, Subject finds himself faced with a different kind of target situation than he had at the Washington Base. Since the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bases have little in terms of a large PCS diplomatic community (as compared with Washington), their targetting for the most part is aimed at those foreign nationals, designated as important targets by the area divisions, who are graduate students in US universities.

The reporting period (of 3 1/2 months) is too short a time to give a fair evaluation of Subject's performance. This much can be said. Subject has undertaken his responsibilities with enthusiasm and a willingness to learn. He has made mistakes but these were "par for the course" and none that were not retriyable and correctable. Given the way he has jumped into the fray, I would characterize his overall performance as evincing exceptional proficiency. He is conscious of and maintains a good balance in the outgo of funds for field operational purposes. He is a good supervisor. He has more to absorb and digest in terms of the myriad problems facing an officer giving total support to two Bases. He has to date made an auspicious beginning. As a desk officer, agent recruitment is not part of his duties.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
3 1/2	Subject is on TDY outside of the USA.	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
8 April 1970	C/DOI/1	Joseph J. Bulik

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I think the above rating is an eminently fair and accurate rating of Mr. Randall. He has caught on quickly and has performed well. I look forward to a continuing good performance from this officer.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 April 1970	DCDO/1	Walter L. O'Brien

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012170

SECTION A	**GENERAL**			
1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Randall, Frederick C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/28/26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DO	8. CURRENT STATION Washington Base		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY	☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):	☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 18 January 1969 - 12 December 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Spotting, developing and assessing new agent assets.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Recruitment of agent assets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Handling (and exploiting) agent assets.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Handling the Base's periodic operational summary reports.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 45 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

MAR 13 3 28 PM '70

This case officer is intelligent and articulate, and is capable of dealing with equanimity with intellectuals, particularly academicians. He has had sufficient experience in field assignments to have developed an area of expertise. His operational and intelligence reporting is organized, coherent and thorough.

He was one of the few officers within the Base who made agent recruitments during the period. One of these was essentially routine, through no fault of the rated officer, but in another case the officer skillfully used an imaginative cover, as he also did in a third recruitment case which had the additional complexity of WODISH involvement. In all these cases the officer illustrated his ability to plan, organize and carry through an operation to a successful conclusion.

If I were to fault this officer I would say that he is not essentially an activist, and that he lacks the force to be a notable recruiter. Conversely he does possess the sense of caution which slows down recruitment but also saves mistakes.

(continued on separate sheet)

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 3 February 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frederick C. Randall (Signed in Pseudo on Form 45a)	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 3 February 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Base	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John G. Shaffer, Jr. (Signed in Psuedo on Form 45a)
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I am somewhat surprised that the rater gives an overall rating of "P" for Subject's performance when in the rater's own words "he was one of the few officers within the Base who made agent recruitments." In another recent fitness report on another officer who has since been transferred and whose activities for the year have been rather minimal, i.e., no recruitments and rather marginal agent handling, the rater gave him the overall rating of "S". Apparently the rater prefers a "social animal." The fact remains that Subject, while giving the outward impression of being low-key was indeed an active and thorough case officer and was given special assignments because of his dependability and capabilities. I would have given Subject a higher rating.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
6 March 1970	C/DOI/1	Joseph J. Hub[illegible]

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS (Continued)

I would rate this officer higher in any job which puts greater emphasis on orderly analytical production.

Officer is adequately cost-conscious. I had no opportunity to observe his capability as a supervisor.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 012170

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Randall Frederick	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10 /28/26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DOD	8. CURRENT STATION Washington Base		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1968 - 17 January 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Contact and development of US nationals for purposes of operational and/or intelligence exploitation.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Contact and development of foreign nationals for operational and/or intelligence exploitation.	RATING LETTER P ✓
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Recruitment of foreign nationals.	RATING LETTER P ✓
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Exploitation of recruited foreign and US nationals.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Preparation of operational and intelligence reports.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervision of one secretary.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-56 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JAN 27 9 11 AM '69

Subject is the FE referent for the Base and, as such, has the responsibility for coordinating all work against the FE targets as well as himself handling the bulk of operational activity in this category. In addition, as is true of all officers at the Base, he is responsible for contacting and developing American and foreign nationals in the Washington area with the capability of producing intelligence and operational information of interest to WOFIRM. His forte continues to be the exploitation of existing assets rather than the recruitment of new agents, particularly among foreign nationals. However, the lack of a good access cover has hampered his recruitment activity against foreign nationals to some extent. He performs his supervisory functions well. He has asked for transfer to WCROMP and the rating officer endorses this request, feeling that Subject's high degree of expertise in the FE area would well qualify him for work of a substantive nature in the WOROMP. Subject is cost conscious and his accounting for official funds is prompt and accurate. No training is contemplated or recommended at this time.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 16 Jan. 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Signed in pseudo on Form 45a

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 49	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 Jan. 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOB, Washington	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (Signed in pseudo on Form 45a) Robert E. Boies

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As Reviewing Official, I am in complete accord with the performance evaluation given this employee as outlined above.

DATE 16 January 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Base, Washington	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Rudolph E. Gomez Rudolph E. Gomez

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

NUMBER 012170

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL, Frederick C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/28/26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DOD/Wash.	8. CURRENT STATION Washington		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
25 April 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action tak
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory c deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Contact and development of US nationals for purposes of operational and/or intelligence exploitation	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Contact and development of foreign nationals for operational and/or intelligence exploitation	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Recruitment of foreign nationals	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Exploitation of recruited foreign and US nationals	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Preparation of operational and intelligence reports	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervision of one secretary	RATING LETTER P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign-language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

25 [illegible]

Subject is the FE "referent" for the Washington Base and, as such, has the responsibility for coordinating all work against the FE targets as well as himself handling the bulk of operational activity in this category. In addition, as is true of all officers at the Base, he is responsible for contacting and developing American and foreign nationals in the Washington area with the capability of producing operational and intelligence information on other areas of priority interest to WOFIRM. His forte continues to be the exploitation of existing assets rather than the recruitment of new agents, particularly among foreign nationals. He writes well and is orderly and professional in his approach to operations. His work on the highly involved and sensitive WUWORTHY case is cited in this regard. Although he continues to feel a bit unsure of himself in operational areas other than FE (to a degree not warranted by his performance, as the WUWORTHY case shows) he is improving in this regard and is on his way to bringing his operational activity in other areas up to the level of his performance on Asian targets. He performs his supervisory functions well. He is very cost conscious and his accounting for official funds is prompt and accurate. No particular training is contemplated or recommended at this time.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY

DATE: 25/4/68

SIGNATURE: Signed in pseudo on Form 45a)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 40

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE: 25 April 1968

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, NOG

(Signed in Pseudo on Form 45a)
Robert E. Boies

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As Reviewing Official I am in full concurrence with the evaluation given this employee, as outlined above.

DATE: 1 May 1968

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: COB, Washington

(Signed in pseudo on Form 45a)
Rudolph E. Gomez

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

China Operations Course No. 1-68
40 hours, full time 4 - 8 March 1968

Student	: Randall, Frederick C.	**Office**	: DO
Year of Birth	: 1926	**Service Designation**	: D
Grade	: GS-14	**No. of Students**	: 25
EOD Date	: Sept. 1951		

COURSE OBJECTIVE

To prepare Clandestine Services officers to conduct operations against Communist China from the point of view of Human Source Collection; to present material directed toward the updating of officers in the operational realities inside and outside China today; and specifically to train officers in providing political, political-military, advanced weapons and other coverage of the priority China target which cannot be obtained by technical means.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No record is made of individual performance in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

15 MAR 1968

Henry C. Barringer
Chief Instructor

Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 012170

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) RANDALL (First) Frederick (Middle) C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct. 1926	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/[illegible] DOD		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)						ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):					X	SPECIAL (Specify): Recommendation		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) November 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operational and intelligence exploitation of foreign and American contacts in the FE Division area of interest.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Liaison with Washington Field Office of the FBI and with the Chief, Foreign Liaison Division, U.S.Air Force.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Preparation of operational, intelligence and administrative correspondence.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervision of one secretary/stenographer.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 30 MAR 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject has Washington Base responsibility for operations directed against FE Division targets. He continues to do an excellent job of exploiting his foreign and domestic contacts for operational and intelligence purposes. His patience, skill and sophistication in the handling of sensitive oriental agents and agent candidates has meant a continual increase in the calibre of Base operations against these targets. He has developed a Burmese official (WUTHAL) to the point of giving useful information on his Embassy and his Government's intentions at a time when it is difficult to have any contact with Burmese at all. The intelligence reporting from his other agents--particularly WUFLY and WUSHARK--has been impressive and he has talked WUSHARK into attempting to get a posting to Peking.

He has, on his own, developed a solid academic cover and has used it to advantage on occasions when his official cover was not appropriate. He is very cost conscious and his handling of confidential funds is characterized by good judgement and prompt accountings. He has excellent working relations with his colleagues at the Base and in Headquarters.

(Continued on supplement sheet)

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 13/3/67	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 13/3/67	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, US/NOG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert E. Boies

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Undersigned is in complete accord with the narrative comments of Subject's immediate supervisor.

DATE 17/3/67	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COB, WASHINGTON	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Rudolph E. Gomez

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT FOR: Frederick C. RANDALL

SUPPLEMENT SHEET

Continuation of Section C:

Subject's liaison contacts with the FBI and Pentagon officials have been handled in a superior manner reflecting credit on the Agency; both the FBI and the Air Force officers concerned have praised Subject's work.

He supervises one secretary/stenographer.

No training is contemplated at this time.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 012170

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL Frederick C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct. 1926	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT US/FE		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Recommendation for Promotion		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): February 1966 to September 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operational exploitation of foreign and American contacts.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of operational and administrative correspondence involving domestic operations in the FE field.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervision of one secretary/stenographer.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with Washington Field Office of the FBI and with US Air Force Foreign Liaison Branch.	RATING LETTER ~~S~~ O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

DE 35

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

21 SEP

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SEP 10 27 AM '66

Subject has US Station responsibility for Far Eastern operations. He continues to do an excellent job of exploiting his foreign and American contacts for operational and intelligence objectives. His handling of a difficult penetration agent in the Indonesian Embassy (HASHARK) has received high praise in formal traffic from Headquarters. A previously unproductive Station agent (WUALLOY/1) has improved his reporting and his access since Subject has taken him over, and was the Station's only agent at the Havana Tri-Continent Conference. Subject's handling of a potential penetration operation against the Indonesian Embassy showed balanced judgment and a good appreciation of the CE and FI factors involved. His knowledge of Far Eastern politics, geography and contemporary history is encyclopedic, and his handling of orientals in the USA confirms the high marks given him by FE supervisors in earlier reports. He has begun to use his cover in initiating new contacts within the diplomatic community, as well as continuing to assess several WUENVOY candidates within the academic community. His handling of confidential funds is characterised by good judgment and prompt accountings. He has excellent working relations with his colleagues at the Station and in Headquarters.

(Continued on attachment)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 September 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Not shown to employee because of promotion request,	
DATE 15 September 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, US/NOG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert E. Boios

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Randall is an experienced, calm and sober individual who has raised the level of the quality of operational work in this Station. I concur in the above evaluation.

DATE 16 September 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ACOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Joseph J. Biliu

SECRET

SECRET

Continuation of Section C   Fitness Report   F. C. Randall

His contacts with FBI and Pentagon officials have been handled in a manner reflecting credit on this Agency, and both the FBI and the Air Force officers concerned have praised Subject's ability to the undersigned.

No training is contemplated at this time.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 012170

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL, Frederick C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct. 1926	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT US/FE		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Recommendation for Promotion		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) January 1966 - 14 February 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operational exploitation of domestic contacts--foreign and American.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of operational and administrative correspondence involving domestic operations in the FE field.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervision of one secretary/stenographer.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

21 FEB 1965

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has U.S. Station responsibility for Far Eastern operations. Since submission of the "Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report" at the end of 1965, Subject has worked well into the local operational environment and is doing an excellent job of initiating exploitable contacts. A previously unproductive Station agent (WUALLOY/1) has improved his reporting and his access since Subject has taken him over and was the Station's only agent at the Havana Tri-Continent Conference. Subject's handling of a potential penetration operation against the Indonesian Embassy showed balanced judgement and a good appreciation of the CE and FI factors involved. His knowledge of Far Eastern politics, geography and contemporary history is encyclopedic and his handling of orientals in the USA confirms the high marks given him by FE supervisors in earlier reports. He has begun to use his cover in initiating new contacts within the diplomatic community as well as continuing to assess several WUENVOY candidates within the academic community. His handling of confidential funds is characterized by good judgement and prompt accountings. He has excellent working relations with his colleagues at the Station and in Headquarters.

No training is contemplated at this time beyond the Clandestine Services Review Course which Subject will take in March 1966.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 14 February 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Judad C Randall

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 14 February 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, US/NOG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert E. Boies

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur. An active, hard-working and well-motivated case officer.

DATE 14 February 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station, U. S.	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harry A. Rositzke

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

NAME : Frederick Randall 012170
REPORTING PERIOD: 21 June 1965 - 31 December 1965
DATE OF BIRTH : 28 October 1926
SEX : Male
GRADE : GS-13
SD : D
OFFICIAL TITLE : Operations Officer
ASSIGNMENT : DDP/DOD/USS
CURRENT STATION : Washington, D. C.
APPOINTMENT : Career
TYPE OF REPORT : Annual

Subject returned to the U.S. in August 1965, but did not begin substantive work in the Non-Orbit Group at the Station until late September 1965. Much of the time since his arrival has been spent on becoming acquainted with the work of the Station and in casing the operational possibilities among the FE Division targets in Washington. We, accordingly, prefer to delay until April 1966 submission of a formal Fitness Report which, hopefully, will give a more precise and meaningful evaluation of his performance than is now possible.

Subject's predecessor left him with only one "agent" - and an unproductive one at that - plus one or two equally unproductive "contacts". Subject is thus starting essentially from scratch. He is making commendable inroads into the Indonesian student community and we hope that he will also soon get in some solid work on the Indonesian and Burmese diplomatic targets.

We note that Fitness Reports submitted on Subject just before his departure from Tokyo gave him high marks for his operational support work in Japan and regretted that the situation in Tokyo did not permit him to be given as much active operational work as he wished. He will certainly

6 JAN 1966

SECRET

RANDALL, Frederick C.

have the opportunity for aggressive agent operations in Washington, and is aware that this activity will not be limited to targets of interest to FE Division, but will give him the chance to participate actively in the planning and execution of operations directed at the recruitment and/or handling of other priority targets as well.

No training is recommended at this time beyond the Clandestine Service Review Course which Subject will take in March 1966.

Subject exercises good judgement in his handling of official funds and his accountings are prompt.

He gets along well with his colleagues at the Station and in Headquarters.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

Date
3 January 1966

Signature of Employee
Frederick Randall

BY SUPERVISOR

Months Employee Has Been Under My Supervision
4

Date
29 December 1965

Chief, US/HOO

Signature

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur

Date
- 4 JAN 1966

COS, Washington

Signature

SECRET

Attachment No. __ to FJTT 13826

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012170

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Randall, Frederick C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF. DIV/OR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January - 20 June 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station Agreed Activities Officer	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervisor of persons handling Registry and KURIOT matters.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervisor of Area Central Source File.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case Officer as required.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Commanding Officer of Station's principal cover unit.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

DC 52
DA 11

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

29 JUN 1965

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 29 1 55 PM '65
MAIL ROOM

There is little I can add to the comments made in the annual report prepared earlier this year. I would like to reiterate, however, at this time of Subject's departure, the Station's continued support for his promotion to GS-14 as first recommended in August 1963.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 15 Jun 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Frederick Randall	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 21 Jun 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Horace Z. Feldman
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL I Concur.		
DATE 15 Jun 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ William V. Broe

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
01.170

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Randall, Frederick C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
28 February 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January - 31 December 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station Agreed Activities Officer DB/10	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervisor of persons handling Registry and KURIOT matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervisor of Area Central Source File.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer as required.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Commanding officer of Station's principal cover unit.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 10 3 52 PM '65

Subject performs his principal duty -- handling Agreed Activities -- in outstanding fashion. In this field he represents not only this Station but other FE Stations and KUBARK in general to the U.S. military. Because of his sound operational background, presence of mind, forceful reasoning, and the consideration the military therefore holds for him, Subject has been able to play a prime part in our excellent Agreed Activities posture out here. As a result much valuable time -- and therefore money -- that would otherwise have had to be spent in negotiations with the U.S. military has been saved both by this Station and other KUBARK elements. For this reason the Station is recommending by separate correspondence that Subject be awarded a Quality Step Increase.

Subject also performs his other duties in strong fashion. He is capable, versatile, and continues to show fine career potential.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 28 January 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Frederick C. Randall

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 28 January 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Horace Z. Feldman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I heartily concur with the statement made in Section C above. This employee's contribution to this Station has been of the highest caliber.

DATE 23 January 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/William Bro

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
(When Filled In)

'TT TO FJTT-11286

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 012170

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Randall Frederick C	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO	8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: Feb 64

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January to 31 December 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station PBRAMPART officer DB/D	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervisor of Central Registry (5 persons)	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervisor of Central Control File, Japan	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer for important exiled former Chief of State	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Officer in charge for Station's primary military cover unit	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Staff supervision of Station's KURIOT activities	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

28 JAN 1964

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This officer has continued the strong performance indicated in his last report. During the rating period he has continued to grow with the job and is certainly ready for broader responsibilities. Our outstanding recommendation for his promotion to the next higher grade demonstrates how we value his services and evaluate his performance.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 12/19/63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Frederick Randall

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 12/19/63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert Wheeler

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Tokyo Station has made exceptional strides and has an excellent record in the difficult field of coordination of operations with the various military elements. A very high degree of the credit for this situation can be attributed to the excellent work of this employee.

DATE 19 December 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ William Broe

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 012172

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Randall, Frederick	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Jan 62 - 31 Dec 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station PBRAMPART officer	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervisor of central registry (5 persons)	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervisor of Central Control File, Japan (see Section C)	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer for important exiled former Chief of State	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Officer in Charge for Station's primary military cover unit	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Staff supervision of Station's KURIOT activities	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

14 FEB 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This officer has brought to bear on his current assignment his varied organization experiences in a manner which brings credit to himself as well as to the organization. His unstinting giving of himself is an outstanding attribute. The trials and tribulations of PERAMPART in an area traditionally hostile to the whole concept have made his assignment particularly challenging, always difficult, and infrequently satisfying; but he sticks to it with firm determination. His supervisory role of our Central Registry frequently catches him in the cross currents of opposing interests and priorities but he successfully calms such troubled waters. While a part of his PERAMPART activities this officer's supervision of the CCFJ, an intelligence community pooled activity for agent checks, has been excellent. Finally, his task under SD 4 is largely a handholding one but one which requires large amounts of tact, patience, and goodwill. There is no other Station officer performing comparable duties with whom this officer can be compared.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 January 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frederick Randull (Signed)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 11 January 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert P. Wheeler

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

DATE 11 January 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William V. Broe

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FEB 1962

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
CORD

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Randall, Frederick	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/Tokyo, Japan	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☒	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
17 Sep 61-31 Dec 61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Initial responsibility for Station [illegible] activities	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervision of station TSD activity involving one TSD officer	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervision of local intel community central carding facility	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1.	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							
THINKS CLEARLY							
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

FEB 16 12 04 PM '62
MAIL ROOM

In the three months subject has been in place he has demonstrated his capacity to adapt to new conditions and situations in the face of trying to settle difficult problems of establishing his household in a country new to him. He has pitched, with zeal and enthusiasm into fields of organization activity relatively new to him. Three months in such a situation is too short a time to judge actions with great validity, but it is my considered opinion that in subject we have found the right officer in the right place at the right time and the future looks bright.

~~[illegible] has been prepared in accord[illegible] Division standards, which [illegible] ple of rating. The indiv[illegible] has an 'average' rating [illegible] adequately satisfactory performance.~~

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 15 Jan. 62	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frederick Randall (Signed)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 15 Jan. 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert P. Wheeler

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 15 Jan. 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William V. Broe (Signed)

NOV 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
112170

CSPD

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL, FREDERICK C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 October 1926	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/PIA

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 61

11. REPORTING PERIOD
From Dec 59 - Sept 61 To

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy to Division KUTUBE Staff Chief	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with Special Staffs and external agencies on KUTUBE matters.	RATING NO. 5/6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Coordination within Division of KUTUBE matters	RATING NO. 5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Preparation ~~an~~ and release of periodic reports, dispatches, and other correspondence	RATING NO. 5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
19 JAN '61
MAIL ROOM

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This is Mr. Randall's first experience in a staff position. During the period under review he took firm control of his job and showed substantial improvement over his previous competent performance. His operational background and good sense have combined to make ~~and made~~ him an excellent officer, deserving of further responsibility in a field position. It should also be noted that Mr. Randall performed in excellent fashion in replacing the rater during the latter's 7-week TDY in the Fall of 1960.

This report has been prepared [illegible] star[illegible] against the g[illegible] satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject departed for ~~to the~~ field prior to completion of Fitness Rpt.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/FE/PO/C	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Horace E. Feldman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DCFE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

30 MAR 1960 31 MAR RECD

18 1960

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	112170

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL, Frederick C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct. 1926	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify)		

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 Jan. 1960	11. REPORTING PERIOD From 12/58 - To 31/12/59

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Review of projects, cables, dispatches, and memoranda.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Replacement of supervisor in latter's absence and acting as general deputy.	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Coordination with FE Branches and with Special Staffs.	RATING NO. 4/5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares periodic reports and other correspondence.	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Handling of certain specific FI activities such as Agreed Activities.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - *Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.*
2 - *Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.*
3 - *Performance clearly meets basic requirements.*
4 - *Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.*
5 - *Performance in every important respect is superior.*
6 - *Performance in every respect is outstanding.*

RATING NO. 4

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Randall is an intelligent, hardworking senior officer with considerable operational background. This is his first staff assignment after long experience in one action area. He has adjusted well to this new assignment and has proved particularly effective in dealings with the Special Staffs on a variety of matters.

I would recommend that Mr. Randall be assigned to a responsible job in a field station after this tour on the FE Staff.

This rep[illegible] in accordance with [illegible] standard [illegible] rating the [illegible] against the group [illegible] "average" rating reflects an [illegible] satisfactory performance

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 21/3/60	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frederick C Randall

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 7	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 16 March 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, FE/PO/FI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Horace Z. Feldman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 30 MAR 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, FE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William V. Broe

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
512170

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL Frederick C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Oct 1926	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE ~~I. O. (FI)~~ [illegible]	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/NIA	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31/01/59

11. REPORTING PERIOD
From 06/58 - To 31/12/58

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsibility for supervision of the 15 members of the Indonesian Desk. These individuals range in grade from GS-5 through GS-13.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responsibility for the continual evaluation of the Indonesian political-military-economic scene.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsibility for the operation of the Indonesian country Desk.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervising on the job training of personnel scheduled to be assigned to Indonesian field stations.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Continually assessing Indonesian field station activities and providing guidance and support where needed.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Preparation of special reports and briefing papers for high Agency officials and for the OCB working group.	4

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
4/5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING				
			1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in **SECTIONS B, C, and D** *to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.*

During the period under review, Mr. Randall returned from the field and took up the responsibilities of chief of an active and important desk. This initial period has of necessity been one of orientation to Headquarters problems and procedures. Mr. Randall appears to be developing well and has evidenced the capacity for handling his job in a highly competent manner.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 29 December 1958	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frederick C Randall

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 29 December 1958	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, FE/MTA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Clarence W. Edwards Clarence W. Edwards

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 29 December 1958	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, FE/MTA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Joseph W. Smith

SECRET

39

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL Frederick C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 October 1926	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD/DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Djakarta		6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (FI)	
7. GRADE GS-12	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) June 1957 - June 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT

Individual has returned to ZI

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☒	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify) Has left this post
☐	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 8 July 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Valentine O. Goodell	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

DATE
6 AUG 1958
AUG 21 1958

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has carried out his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

B. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES [illegible]

DIRECTIONS
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCEEDS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
Directs intelligence agents	6	Prepares ops reports	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5**	**RATING NUMBER**
Developes new intel sources	5	Has and uses area knowledge	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6**	**RATING NUMBER**
Prepares intel reports	5	Debriefs sources	6

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

NA

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual, productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents, and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

[illegible]

6

[illegible]

☐ YES ☒ NO

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) **RANDALL Frederick C.**	2. DATE OF BIRTH **28 October 1926**	3. SEX **M**	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION **SD/DI**
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT **Djakarta**	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE **Intelligence Officer**		
7. GRADE **GS-12**	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) **June 1957 - June 1958**	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☒ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
8 July 1958	**Valentine O. Goodall**	**Chief of Station**

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: **6**

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
A - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTION OF SITUATION
	3	[illegible]
	3	[illegible]
	3	[illegible]
	3	[illegible]
	3	[illegible]
	3	[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

80

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject combines tenacity with dependability. He is most conscientious, and displays an outstanding grasp of the intelligence profession.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

NA

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject hopes to be able to continue his work toward a PhD degree, by outside study, therefore, it is recommended that he be assigned to headquarters for his next tour.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBERS
0 - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	[illegible]	4	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
5	[illegible]	3	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	5	[illegible]	3	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	3	[illegible]	3	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	4	[illegible]	5	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	3	[illegible]	3	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	4	[illegible]	3	[illegible]
5	[illegible]	3	[illegible]	3	[illegible]
5	[illegible]	3	[illegible]	3	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	4	[illegible]	4	[illegible]

4-39

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible] RANDALL, FREDERICK	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 October 1926	3. SEX Male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION ~~[illegible]~~ DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Djakarta	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (FI)		
7. GRADE GS-12-2	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP June 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) September 1956--June 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR	X	SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "U" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS BEEN SENT TO HIM AND A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 26 July 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR VALENTINE O. GOODELL	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Station, Djakarta

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted [illegible]	Ho	9 Jan 58
Reviewed by [illegible]		

☐ COMMENTS ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

RATING NUMBER
4

1 - [illegible]
2 - [illegible]
3 - [illegible]
4 - [illegible]
5 - [illegible]
6 - [illegible]

COMMENTS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 23 10 27 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS.

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
Debriefs intel sources	5	Analyzes Indonesian political situation	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5**	**RATING NUMBER**
Develops new intel sources	5	Prepares operational reports	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6**	**RATING NUMBER**
Prepares information reports	6	Has and uses area knowledge	5

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

N. A.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual — productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents,...and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - [illegible]
2 - [illegible]
3 - [illegible]
4 - [illegible]
5 - [illegible]
6 - [illegible]
7 - [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL, FREDERICK	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 Oct 1926	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION ~~KUTUBE~~ DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Djakarta	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (FI)		
7. GRADE GS-12-2	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP June 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) September 1956 - June 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 26 July 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR VALENTINE O. GOODELL	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Station, Djakarta

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question. Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	3	A GROUP THAT DOES THE BASIC JOB (Clerks, drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS REGULAR (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP [illegible] (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH [illegible] IS NOT REGULAR
	3	WHEN [illegible] ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN [illegible]
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

70

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is a most conscientious, dependable and competent officer. His outstanding characteristics are patience and tenaciousness, which are admirable and necessary in the makeup of a successful operations officer.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 23 10 27 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

N. A.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

N. A.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS. This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
5	6. [illegible] ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS COOPERATIVE	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. HAS NOT REQUIRED STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff, and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

DATE 26 Oct 1956
Posted Pos. Control [illegible]
Reviewed by [illegible] 12/2

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY **Frederick C. Randall**	1. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 1926	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION KUTUBE

4. GRADE GS-12	5. STATION DESIGNATION (*Current*) Djakarta, Indonesia
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT September 1956	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (*Inclusive dates*) June--September 1956

SECTION II (*To be completed by field supervisor*)

1. CURRENT POSITION ~~Field Case Officer~~ IO (FI)	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 9 December 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (*List in order of frequency*)

1. Responsible field case officer for following [illegible] projects:
   - A. [illegible]-1.
   - B. [illegible].
   - C. [illegible]
   - D. [illegible]-3 (developmental).
   - E. [illegible] (developmental)

2. Responsible field case officer for following [illegible] projects:
   - A. Moslem university students (developmental).

3. Ad hoc assignments:
   - A. Responsible field case officer for [illegible] ([illegible]).
   - B. Processing officer for project [illegible] audio operation including assignment of Russian language officer to Djakarta Station.

SECTION III (*To be completed at headquarters only*)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (*Type*) Robert C. Pierson	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (*Type*) Robert C. Pierson

3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 24 Oct. 1956	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORTS AND SIGNATURES R. H. Linn, Chief, FE/5

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 25 2 55 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. T[illegible] category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.										X				
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.											X			
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.									X					
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X				
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.											X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.									X					
11. CALM.									X					
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.										X				
14. GETS THINGS DONE.											X			
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.									X					
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.								X						
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.										X				
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.										X				
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.									X					
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION									X					
24. EVEN DISPOSITION								X						
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT										X				

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.									X					
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.										X				
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".								X						
29. TOUGH MINDED.									X					
30. OBSERVANT.										X				
31. CAPABLE.											X			
32. CLEAR THINKING.									X					
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.								X						
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.										X				
36. DELIBERATE.									X					
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.											X			
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.								X						
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										X				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.									X					
43. HAS DRIVE.								X						
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.										X				
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.									X					
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.									X					
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.											X			
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.									X					

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

He is able to handle fine detail without over-looking broader policy or project objectives. He is a good CE officer and by the end of his present tour will be a first class KUTUBE [redacted] ops officer.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

A bit slow to get started; but when he does, performs thorough job.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 25 2 55 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

He is a good CE/ops asset to a wholly operative station such as Djaka[illegible]

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

More practical field operational experience.
Learn Indonesian language.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):

He is doing an excellent job in this station.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

CODED

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. [illegible] provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A- Annual due
10 Sept. 1956

BY DATE
Pos Control 9/21/55
[illegible] d by FOD 10/5/56

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL, FREDERICK C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct, 1926	3. SEX Male	4. CAREER DESIGNATION SD:FI
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO DDP/FE-5	7. DIVISION FE	8. BRANCH 5
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:		11. GRADE GS-12
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE ~~5 August 1955~~ 10 Sep 55	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) August 1954 to Present		

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Intelligence Officer(FI) GS-0136.51-12	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 14 August 55

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency): Preparing cables and dispatches to Indonesian Field Stations, Day-to-day supervision of Indonesian FE Project activity, preparing drafts for Branch and Division Chief signature on FI matters, conducting liaison with other Area Divisions and Branches, preparing fiscal and budgetary data, expediting untold quantities of routine administrative matters involving housing problems, logistical problems, financial problems, etc.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ has ☐ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE 4 August 1955	SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) [illegible] R. [illegible]

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE 4 Aug 55	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) V.D. Goodell

FORM NO. 37-189 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.
1 MAY 54

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 20 10 48 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE	APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE
SAMPLES						
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X	X		
B. PRACTICAL.					X	
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.					X	
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.					X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.					X	
4. HAS INITIATIVE.					X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.				X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.					X	
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.				X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.					X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.					X	
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.					X	
11. CALM.				X		
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.					X	
13. HUNGRY FOR FACTS.				X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.						X
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.	X					
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.					X	
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.					X	
18. HAS STAMINA, CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME					X	
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION				X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.				X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS				X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION					X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION					X	
25. [illegible]					X	

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.							X							
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.										X				
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES, A "SPARK PLUG".										X				
29. TOUGH MINDED.	X													
30. OBSERVANT.							X							
31. CAPABLE.										X				
32. CLEAR THINKING.							X							
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.													X	
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.	X													
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.							X							
36. DELIBERATE.							X							
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.							X							
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										X				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.							X							
43. HAS DRIVE.										X				
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.													X	
45. VERSATILE.							X							
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.							X							
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.							X							
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.										X				
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.							X							

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS? Tenacity and determination in following a task through to a successful conclusion, ability to organize

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES? Has a tendency to adhere too closely to "the book" (most supervisors would probably not consider this trait a "weakness")

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 28 10 43 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Not applicable

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Language and area of Indonesia
For purposes of rounding out general knowledge, some formal training in clandestine psychological warefare would be helpful

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

not applicable

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☒ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☒ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ...WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE OUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. ***DIRECTIONS.*** *Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS..
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Fr 12/11/54
12/16

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL, Fredrick C.	2. GRADE GS-11	3. POSITION TITLE I.O. ([illegible])		[illegible]
4. OFFICE [illegible]	STAFF OR DIVISION Branch 5	BRANCH Indo [illegible]	☐ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From [illegible] To 9 Sept 54	6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor			

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

In June 1954 transferred as Chief FE/5/CE Section to Indonesia FI Desk Officer. As of June 1954 major duties include:

1. Responsibility to initiate and act as Washington case officer for all FI operations operating from the Djakarta station.
2. In cooperation with the Chief FE/5 Reports, to insure that all intelligence reports are properly disseminated to customer agencies and foreign friendly intelligence services.
3. To share in the planning of the FI program for Indonesia.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Dutch reading	CIA Language Lab.	2 months	Approx. January 1954

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

Desire and plan to continue as a FI desk officer until opportunity for a field assignment arises. At that time desire to do both FI and PP case officer work in the field.

10. 20 September 1954 — DATE

Frederick P. Randall — SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Subject has performed his duties as listed in Section (7) in a very creditable manner. The monthly letter of the Senior Representative to the Director has, without exception, stated that Headquarters support of the Djakarta Station has been more than adequate. Since Subject is a relative newcomer to his present position and has had no field experience, he occasionally is hesitant to initiate action. However, he is clearly willing to assume responsibility when he is sure of his footing, and it will be only a question of time before he is willing and able to act in full capacity in all situations.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Subject's performance is characterized by a high degree of industriousness and thoroughness. He is one of those supremely useful individuals to whom a supervisor can assign a task, and then turn to other matters with sure confidence that the job will be completed, to the last detail and on time.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Subject's command of written English can stand improvement. His writing is by no means deficient in basic requirements, but practice will be needed to insure consistent production of clear and well constructed prose.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Subject demonstrates clearly his growing ability to handle larger responsibilities. His transistion from a CE Unit Chiefs' job, to that of the Indonesia Desk FI Chief, has been a markedly smooth one. Once a new technique or procedural method is learned, subject can put it into operation when required. He is definitely potential material for a COS slot in the field.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Recommended training includes Communist Party Operations and Anti Communist Party Operations. Recommend rotation to an Indonesian field slot. Subject has now, and is increasing his knowledge of Headquarters tasks and procedures. In approximately a year, he should put such knowledge and training into effect in the field. There is every reason to believe that he will make an excellent field case officer.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

Sept 28, 1954
DATE

William H. Decker
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

28/9/54
DATE

J. Q. Goodell
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION
Course on World Communism No. ____

NAME	SEX	DATES OF COURSE	NO. STUDENTS
DATE OF [illegible], Frederick [illegible]	M	[illegible] August-[illegible] Sept [illegible]	30
PR[illegible] October 1923 [illegible]T OR [illegible] September 1951		GS-11	FE/[illegible]

FE Case Officer

OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE

The Course on World Communism is a four week's course designed to provide adequate background and understanding of the World Communist Movement, and to increase the effectiveness of staff personnel in their ability to interpret and analyze Communist Party and Front organizational structures and the strategy and tactics of the World Communist Movement.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

The material in this course is presented by lecture and in seminar discussion. Students are required to prepare written assignments, which are designed to measure the student's ability to apply the knowledge acquired in the course to his special field of activity.

RATING OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

Students are rated according to the five-point adjectival rating scale (Superior, Excellent, Satisfactory, Weak, Failure) in indicating the degree to which they have achieved the course objectives. The meaning of these adjectival ratings are as follows:

SUPERIOR: The student demonstrated outstanding ability or proficiency in meeting this course goal or objective; he indicated an unusually thorough knowledge of the material presented; or, if skills are involved, he demonstrated that he is one of the most effective individuals in this area.

EXCELLENT: The student showed unusual competence, skill, or ability in meeting this objective or goal; he demonstrated a thorough grasp of the presented material, or, if skills are involved, he demonstrated that he can perform in an extremely effective manner in this area.

SATISFACTORY: The student met this objective in a competent and adequate manner; he demonstrated a good understanding and grasp of the information presented, or, if skills are involved, he demonstrated sufficient competence to operate effectively in this area.

WEAK: Although the student may have met some of the standards set for minimum achievement of this course goal or objective, he demonstrated serious gaps in knowledge or sufficient lack of skill to be of doubtful competence.

FAILURE: The student was unable to grasp the concepts or information presented, or demonstrated that he had not acquired the necessary information and skills to operate at even a minimum capacity in this area.

STUDENT'S PERFORMANCE IN THE COURSE

	FAIL	WEAK	SAT	EXC	SUP
I. Current Communist Ideology					
Ratings in this class			6	12	9*
Ratings in 2 classes			12	24	27
II. CP Structure & Functions	FAIL	WEAK	SAT	EXC	SUP
Ratings in this class			3	16	8*
Ratings in 2 classes			9	32	13
III. Communist Methods & Techniques	FAIL	WEAK	SAT	EXC	SUP
Ratings in this class			2	14	11*
Ratings in 2 classes			3	34	16

(An asterisk * indicates this student's ratings.)

INSTRUCTORS' OVER-ALL COMMENT:

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor, CWC

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

Audio-Surveillance Seminar # 2

SECTION I IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

Name	Sex	Dates of Seminar	No. Students
RANDALL, Frederick C.	Male	6-24 June 1955	12
Date of Birth	EOD Date	Grade or Rank	Office
28 October 1926	10 September 1951	GS-11	DDP/FE/5
Projected Assignment or Present Position			
FI case officer for Indonesian field unit			

SECTION II COMMENT

Subject has completed a three-week Seminar which covered the operational and technical aspects of audio-surveillance.

1. Subject is qualified to plan telephone tap and microphone operations. (He, himself, planted microphones during the Seminar and familiarized himself with telephone tapping procedures.)

2. Subject is qualified to install a microphone under controlled conditions, that is, in a safehouse. However, he himself is not authorized to make an installation against a proper denied area target without specific Headquarters concurrence.

3. Subject is qualified to process the product in accordance with procedures outlined in the ZONAR Manual and OA 52-51, and to supervise the processing installation, that is, translators, carders and the like.

George Carroll

Assistant Chief for Field Training

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

FOR FI William E. Balge

FOR TSD [illegible]

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

LANGUAGE ACHIEVEMENT REPORT

NAME (LAST) RANDALL	(FIRST) Frederick	(MIDDLE INITIAL) C.	DATE 17 February 1954
DIVISION FE/5		OFFICE	
LANGUAGE Dutch		LEVEL OF INSTRUCTION Elementary Reading	
LENGTH OF COURSE 32 weeks	NUMBER OF HOURS PER WEEK 3	INSTITUTION ELTD/OTR	

PRESENT PROFICIENCY IN THE LANGUAGE

SPEAKS ---------- NA --	FLUENTLY ☐	AVERAGE ☐	SLOWLY ☐
WRITES ---------- NA --	WELL ☐	POORLY ☐	NIL ☐
READS ----------	FLUENTLY ☐	FAIR ☐	POORLY ☒
UNDERSTANDS ---------- NA --	EASILY ☐	AVERAGE ☐	POORLY ☐
TRANSLATES INTO ENGLISH ----------	WELL ☐	FAIR ☒	NIL ☐

RATINGS	SUPERIOR	NORMAL	LOW
1. INTEREST IN LANGUAGE STUDY		X	
2. ACHIEVEMENT IN LEARNING SPOKEN LANGUAGE NA			
3. ACHIEVEMENT IN LEARNING WRITTEN LANGUAGE			X
4. ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND GRAMMATICAL EXPLANATION			X
5. ABILITY TO LEARN AND RETAIN VOCABULARY FORMS AND STRUCTURE			X
6. ABILITY TO SPEAK SPONTANEOUSLY AND NATURALLY NA			
7. DEGREE OF APPLICATION AND EFFORT		X	

SKILL DESIRED IN LANGUAGE TRAINING REQUEST Elementary Reading

FURTHER LANGUAGE TRAINING NECESSARY ----- ☐

FURTHER LANGUAGE TRAINING RECOMMENDED ---- ☐

FURTHER LANGUAGE TRAINING NOT RECOMMENDED -- ☒

THERE ARE 6 STUDENTS IN THIS COURSE. THIS STUDENT RANKS (CIRCLE ONE)

1 2 3 4 5 [✓ 6] 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Roy F. Fallis, Jr.
ROY F. FALLIS, JR.

FORM NO. 36-590
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Ht.

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RANDALL Frederick C.	2. GRADE GS-9	3. POSITION TITLE Intel. Officer (CZ) CD-F1		
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION FE	BRANCH 5 (Indon & Malaya)	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 2-10-53 To 9-10-53	6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor			

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

Same as listed in previous report.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
A.M. Degree (Foreign Affairs)	George Wash Un.		May 1953
C. E. Briefing	T-30	Approx 8 days	June 1953

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Same as listed in previous report.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

25 August 1953
DATE

Frederick C Randall
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Same as listed in previous report.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1951

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Same as listed in previous report.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Same as listed in previous report.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Same as listed in previous report.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Recommend immediate assignment to Indonesian field ~~assignment~~ station.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Same as listed in previous report.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

25 August 1953
DATE

Robert Pinson
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

NOV [illegible], 1953
DATE

J. Q. Goodell
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) RANDALL,	(First) Fredrick	(Middle) C.	2. GRADE GS-9	3. POSITION TITLE Intel Off (DE)
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION FE	BRANCH 5	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 2-10-52 To 2-10-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

As Chief of CE Section of Branch 5, supervise and perform the following:

a. Promulgate and coordinate espionage and counter espionage operations designed to obtain adequate coverage of the host and all other foreign intelligence services operating in Indonesia and Malaya.

b. Maintain CE card and index file, personality and subject dossiers, notebooks, etc.

c. Disseminate counter espionage information to interested customer agencies and appropriate sections of CIA.

d. Formulate research studies on host intelligence services, and plan and conduct operational analyses, etc.

e. Conduct correspondence on CE and personality cases with other government agencies and with field stations.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Counter Espionage	CIA Washington	1 week (first week of two-week course taken in 1951)	9 May 1952
Thesis (AM)	George Washington University	Indefinite	To complete May 1953

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

I am interested in my present job as a Washington Counter Espionage Officer, but desire to broaden my knowledge of intelligence through future field tours as an intelligence and counter intelligence officer in the Far East.

10.

2/23/53
DATE

Frederick C Randall
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Subject's performance is best described as excellent. He is doing competent work and is laying a good foundation for a career in intelligence.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Subject is very thorough and industrious. He exhibits marked initiative and a very high degree of interest.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Subject will profit by a continuing effort to relate his work to all aspects of the Agency's intelligence function.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Subject has proven himself able to supervise the work of others and has handled well the increasing responsibilities of his job.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No change is recommended at this time. His easy, affable manner in dealing with others make subject well qualified for duties requiring more contact with others than his present assignment demands.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Further training is planned to include specialized courses given by the Agency.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

30 March 1953
DATE

John Mac Gammell
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

15 April 1953
DATE

V. O. Goodell
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

Q.J.RD.

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TRAINING EVALUATION

OPERATIONS

IMPORTANT: The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. He may show it to other members of his staff or to the student concerned if such action is considered necessary and advisable.

This report summarizes the test results. Observations and opinions of the various instructors for the course listed only. More complete data are available in the files of the office of Training (Covert), and may be examined after contacting the Training and Evaluation Officer. Any questions as regards the evaluation of this student should be referred to the Chief, Training and Evaluation, TR(C).

NAME OF STUDENT (LAST) RANDALL,	(FIRST) Frederick	(MIDDLE) C.	AGE 25	GRADE (GS OR RANK) GS-7	DATE OF REPORT 21 December 1951
DIVISION OSO/FDZ-3			PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Intelligence Officer		COURSE NO. OC 30

PERFORMANCE RECORD

THE FOLLOWING GRADES SHOW THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE STUDENT IN THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE COURSE. TWO GRADES ARE ASSIGNED IN EACH AREA. ONE FOR COMPREHENSION AND ONE FOR IMPLEMENTATION. A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF EACH OF THESE TERMS, AS WELL AS OF THE ADJECTIVAL RATINGS EMPLOYED, IS GIVEN ON THE BACK OF THIS EVALUATION FORM.

MAJOR ELEMENTS	ADJECTIVAL RATINGS									
	FAILURE		POOR		SATISFACTORY		EXCELLENT		SUPERIOR	
	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.
1. Organization of Clandestine Operations					X	X				
2. Cover				X	X					
3. Communications					X	X				
4. Target Analysis				X	X					
5. Criteria For Agent Selection					X	X				
6. Agent Recruitment					X	X				
7. Agent Handling					X	X				
8. Agent Direction				X	X					
9. Assessment and Reassessment				X	X					
10. Special Operational Problems					X	X				

TRAIT RECORD

THE FOLLOWING INDICATES THE VARIOUS TRAITS AS OBSERVED BY THE INSTRUCTORS DURING THE TRAINING PERIOD. THE OBSERVATIONS INCLUDE THE STUDENT'S PARTICIPATION AND CONDUCT IN TRAINING AS WELL AS HIS REACTIONS TO VARIOUS PROBLEMS AND SITUATIONS.

A. Constructive Imagination (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Devoid of constructive imagination or inventiveness in approach to problems.	Showed only a very limited degree of constructive imagination.	Showed sufficient constructive imagination to meet most school situations adequately.	Demonstrated the possession of creative ability to a greater than average degree	Outstandingly creative, inventive, or original.

B. Astuteness (NOT OBSERVED ☐).

1	2	3	4	5
Appeared gullible and naive.	Exhibited below average skepticism and discernment.	Displayed adequate judgment and perspicacity.	Displayed above average perspicacity and skepticism.	Displayed exceptional shrewdness and perspicacity.

C. Industry (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Did not show sufficient application of time and effort.	Applied only the minimum amount of time and effort necessary.	Showed adequate compliance as regards time and effort necessary.	Volunteered greater time and effort than is normally expected in this course.	Was unusually industrious, giving generously of time and effort.

D. Initiative (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Consistently failed to act without being specifically instructed to do so.	Generally exhibited a low level of enterprise but occasionally acted on his own.	Normally took steps to implement ideas without external prompting.	Usually displayed enthusiasm and aggressiveness in carrying out projects.	Displayed unusual energy, enthusiasm, and aggressiveness.

− +

1	2	3	4	5
			X	
		X		
		X		
		X		

E. Ability to Write (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5	
Seemed unable to express thoughts clearly in written form.	Was weak in expressing thoughts clearly in written form.	Written work showed no significant weakness.	Displayed ability to express thoughts thoroughly in written form.	Was outstanding in ability to express ideas in clear, correct, coherent, manner.	X

F. Facility of oral expression (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5	
Unable to express self clearly. Presented ideas in groping and incoherent fashion.	Lacked fluency or ease in his speech, but meaning usually clear.	Displayed reasonable facility in oral expression.	Spoke confidently, conveying ideas clearly and readily.	Outstanding in fluency and clarity of oral expression.	X

G. Ability to Get Along With Associates. (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5	
Frequently alienated his associates.	Failed to win social acceptance but did not actively antagonize others.	Reasonably effective in his social relations.	Displayed definite ability to achieve harmonious relationships with his associates.	Unusually effective in his ability to win acceptance from others	X

H. Ability to Influence His Associates (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5	
Withdrew from group activities to a marked degree, failing to influence the thinking and actions of others.	Normally socially retiring, opinions rarely affected his associates.	Usually participated in group activities, was fairly successful in selling a point or himself.	Was excellent at influencing others by his own personality and thinking.	Was outstanding in ability to command respect and attention through his personality and thinking.	X

I. Tact (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5	
Markedly blunt and indiscreet.	Frequently said or did something which induced an unfavorable reaction.	Reasonably discreet and tactful.	Had good discernment for the appropriate thing to say or do.	Consistently demonstrated keen perception for fitting speech or	X

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TRAINING EVALUATION

OPERATIONS

IMPORTANT: The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. He may show it to other members of his staff or to the student concerned if such action is considered necessary and advisable.

This report summarizes the test results. Observations and opinions of the various instructors for the course listed only. More complete data are available in the files of the office of Training (Covert), and may be examined after contacting the Training and Evaluation Officer. Any questions as regards the evaluation of this student should be referred to the Chief, Training and Evaluation, TR(C).

NAME OF STUDENT (LAST) RANDALL,	(FIRST) Frederick	(MIDDLE) C.	AGE 25	GRADE (GS OR RANK) GS-7	DATE OF REPORT 21 December 1951
DIVISION OSO/FDE-1			PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Intelligence Officer		COURSE NO. OC 30

PERFORMANCE RECORD

THE FOLLOWING GRADES SHOW THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE STUDENT IN THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE COURSE. TWO GRADES ARE ASSIGNED IN EACH AREA. ONE FOR COMPREHENSION AND ONE FOR IMPLEMENTATION. A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF EACH OF THESE TERMS, AS WELL AS OF THE ADJECTIVAL RATINGS EMPLOYED, IS GIVEN ON THE BACK OF THIS EVALUATION FORM.

MAJOR ELEMENTS	ADJECTIVAL RATINGS									
	FAILURE		POOR		SATISFACTORY		EXCELLENT		SUPERIOR	
	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.
1. Organization of Clandestine Operations					X	X				
2. Cover				X	X					
3. Communications					X	X				
4. [illegible] Analysis				X	X					

conduct.

J. Adaptation to Training (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Displayed no interest or enthusiasm for training and failed to adapt himself to the demands made upon him.	Accepted training program reluctantly and had difficulty adapting himself to the training requirements.	Displayed average interest in and acceptance of training.	Exhibited an excellent acceptance of training and readily adapted to demands made upon him.	Outstanding in his acceptance of training and display of enthusiasm and interest.

X

COMMENTS

Ernest J. Wendel
SIGNATURE OF CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED	REVIEWED
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY FOR STAFF TRAINING Lawrence B Prallonan	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, TRAINING AND EVALUATION H G Wood

FORM NO. 51-86
OCT 1951

SECRET

(OVER)
(45)

SECURITY INFORMATION

TRAINING EVALUATION

BASIC ORIENTATION

IMPORTANT: The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. He may show it to other members of his staff or to the student concerned if such action is considered necessary and advisable.

This report summarizes the test results, observations and opinions of the various instructors for the course listed only. More complete data are available in the files of the Office of Training (Covert), and may be examined after contacting the Training and Evaluation Officer. Any question as regards the evaluation of this student should be referred to the Chief, Training and Evaluation, TR (C).

NAME OF STUDENT (LAST)	(FIRST)	(INITIAL)	AGE	GRADE (GS OR RANK)	DATE OF REPORT
Randall	Frederick	C.	24	GS-7	3 November 1951

DIVISION	PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT	CLASS NO.
CSO/FDZ	Intelligence Officer	BOC-34

PERFORMANCE RECORD

THE FOLLOWING GRADES SHOW THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE STUDENT IN THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE COURSE. A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF EACH OF THE ADJECTIVAL RATING, IN TERMS OF COURSE OBJECTIVES, IS GIVEN ON THE BACK OF THIS EVALUATION FORM.

MAJOR ELEMENTS	ADJECTIVAL RATING				
	FAILURE	POOR	SATISFACTORY	EXCELLENT	SUPERIOR
1. Security			x		
2. Intelligence Requirements			x		
3. Mapping			x		
4. Reporting of Information				x	
5. Interviewing				x	
6. Communism and the USSR					x

TRAIT RECORD

THE FOLLOWING INDICATES THE VARIOUS TRAITS AS OBSERVED BY THE INSTRUCTORS DURING THE TRAINING PERIOD. THE OBSERVATIONS INCLUDE STUDENT'S PARTICIPATION AND CONDUCT IN TRAINING AND HIS REACTIONS TO VARIOUS PROBLEMS AND SITUATIONS.

A. Planning Work (NOT OBSERVED) ☐

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Consistently displayed unsystematic approach to problems, inability to organize data, and careless handling of details.	Planning frequently unsystematic and disorganized.	Average planning ability; was capable of planning satisfactorily on relatively uncomplicated problems.	Carefully analyzed most problems and planned accordingly.	Planned logically, analytically and thoroughly, anticipating and preparing for all difficulties.

B. Attention to Details (NOT OBSERVED) ☐

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Work suffered seriously from constant inattention to details.	Work frequently marred by careless or imprecise treatment of significant detail.	Work showed acceptable attention to significant detail, but contained a number of minor errors.	Careful handling of significant details, with occasional lapses of a minor nature.	Work was outstanding for precise, accurate handling of detail at all times.

C. Social Effectiveness (NOT OBSERVED) ☐

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Unable to inspire confidence and respect in others.	Demonstrated little ability to affect his associates' ideas or opinions.	Showed satisfactory ability to affect the thoughts and actions of the people with whom he was working.	Displayed a well developed capacity for influencing the thoughts and actions of his associates.	Outstanding in his ability to influence the attitudes and thinking of his associates.

D. Facility of Oral Expression (NOT OBSERVED) ☐

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Unable to express himself clearly. Presented ideas in a groping and incoherent fashion.	Lacked fluency or ease in his speech, but meaning usually clear.	Displayed reasonable facility in oral expression.	Spoke confidently conveying ideas clearly and readily.	Outstanding in fluency and clarity of oral expression.

E. Adaptation to Training (NOT OBSERVED) ☐

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Displayed no interest or enthusiasm for training and failed to adapt himself to the demands made upon him.	Accepted training program reluctantly and had difficulty adapting himself to the training requirements.	Displayed average interest in and acceptance of training.	Exhibited an excellent acceptance of training and readily adapted to demands made upon him.	Outstanding in his acceptance of training and display of interest and enthusiasm.

SECURITY INFORMATION

(OVER)

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

Charles L. Booker

SIGNATURE OF CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED	**REVIEWED**
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY FOR STAFF TRAINING Lawrence R. Shallcross	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, TRAINING AND EVALUATION H. G. WOOD

DEFINITION OF ADJECTIVAL RATINGS

SUPERIOR:	All primary and secondary objectives have been achieved with a degree of proficiency significantly above the level required for successful operation in this area or doing more advanced work in training.
EXCELLENT:	All primary objectives have been achieved and most of the secondary ones at a level which would permit the individual to perform satisfactorily in this field or to complete successfully more advanced training.
SATISFACTORY:	All of the primary objectives have been met but many of the secondary goals have not. This grade range represents the level of proficiency of the average student with medium potentiality, or less, for actual operations or future training at a higher level.
POOR:	A few of the major objectives have been achieved but the student's performance is so limited that he would have difficulty in performing satisfactory work in this area or successfully completing training at a more advanced level.
FAILURE:	The individual failed to meet either the primary or the secondary objectives and represents an extremely poor risk for performing work in this area or doing advanced training.

SECRET

21 MAY 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Frederick Randall

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation

I have been advised that in connection with the Westinghouse FOIA litigation case you were a member of a team of employees who worked the weekend of 21-22 April to meet a court-imposed deadline. Your devotion to duty as demonstrated by giving of your time to process material for this case is most praiseworthy. I know this is not the first time that you have worked overtime to keep our good record. Thanks.

John N. McMahon

1 6 APR 1979

Frederick C. Randall

Dear Frederick,

Please accept my appreciation for an assignment well done as a member of the FY 1979 GS-13 Personnel Evaluation Board.

Your full-time service with the Board represents a major contribution to the Directorate's program of personnel assessment and management. Your recommendations for promotion, career development, and other matters have been very helpful.

I believe you will find on return to your regular duties that this time spent with the Board has broadened and sharpened your own focus on the personnel aspects of Agency management. I think it will make you appreciate more than ever our needs for carefully and candidly written appraisals of employees.

First rate [illegible] — Thank you

Sincerely,

John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

DO/ISS 78-112

16 MAR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of DO Staffs and Divisions

FROM: William F. Donnelly
Chief, Information Services Staff

SUBJECT: Commendation

1. On 9 March 1978, the CIA Information Review Committee took note of the excellent work done by the Directorate of Operations in processing requests under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. The Deputy Director for Operations was present, as were other Deputy Directors.

2. I would like to add my endorsement to that of the CIA/IRC and to commend all those who were/are involved in the processing of FOIA and PA requests. Although complex and time consuming, these tasks are obligatory by federal laws. In meeting the intent of the law, a difficult balance must be achieved. On the one hand, the rights of our citizens must be respected. On the other, the obligation of the Agency to protect its sources and methods must be honored. In meeting these rights and obligations, the Directorate of Operations has handled some 16,000 requests to date. In all instances where a requester has gone to the federal courts, the DO has never lost a case based upon our exemptions for sources and methods or classification.

3. This outstanding result stems directly from the very high quality of professionalism, dedication, excellent judgements by those involved, and close cooperation within the DO. These characteristics have contributed substantially to establishing legal and administrative foundations of considerable value to the U.S. Intelligence Community. As such, I request that this commendation be placed in the official files of the individuals involved for a job well done!

William F. Donnelly
William F. Donnelly

FILE - Frederick C. Randall

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

Department of Defense Computer Institute

The Department of Defense Computer Institute

has conferred upon

MR. FREDERICK C. RANDALL

this certificate denoting satisfactory completion of the

Computer Orientation for Intermediate Executives Course

granted at the City of Washington, District of Columbia.

P. G. CHAREST, CAPTAIN, U. S. NAVY
DIRECTOR

22 APRIL 1977
DATE

CONFIDENTIAL

POLICY AND COORDINATION STAFF
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

TRAINING REPORT

EXECUTIVE WRITING SEMINAR NO. (1-6)

PARTICIPANT -	RANDALL, Frederick	GRADE -	15
OFFICE -	ISS	CAREER DESIGNATION -	D

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS - 20

The Executive Writing Seminar is a part-time course consisting of one hour of class daily for two weeks, plus one half-hour private counseling session. It is designed for middle and upper level executives of the Directorate.

The objective of the Seminar is to improve the quality of written presentations to senior echelons of the Agency and the U.S. Government. It is an intensive writing-training course concentrating on clarity, brevity, and accuracy of expression.

This is a certificate of attendance only, and no attempt is made to evaluate student achievement.

FOR THE CHIEF, POLICY AND COORDINATION STAFF =

Kinloch Bull, Jr. — 1 August 71

Kinloch Bull, Jr.
Seminar Chairman

Date

CONFIDENTIAL

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

TRAINING REPORT

MANAGEMENT SEMINAR

Participant: Randall, Frederick **Date:** 31 May - 10 June 77

Employee Number: 012170 **Office:** DDO/ISS

Service Designation: D

Course Objectives:

At the conclusion of the Seminar, participants should:

1. Be more aware of themselves as managers and the organizational environment in which they function;
2. Be able to recognize specific ways in which personal and organizational effectiveness can be improved;
3. Be able to draw on a backround in management theory and apply team skills in solving a wide range of Agency problems; and
4. Have sufficient grasp of selected Agency administrative management systems so that they can apply them to their present and future management positions.

The Management Seminar explores pertinent management functions and processes, such as communication, decision-making, motivation, managing time and change, group involvement, and organizational behavior. The use of lecturettes, guest speakers, case studies, role playing, situational analyses, films, videotapes, and other exercises are involved.

Achievement Record:

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate participant achievement in this Seminar.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Lawrence L. Newhouse 14 JUL 1977
Instructor Date

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR TRAINING AT NON-AGENCY FACILITY

1 TYPE	E
2 REQUEST NO (OTR use only)	[illegible]

3 EMP SER NO	4 NAME (Last First Middle Initial)	5 SEX	6 YOB	7 EOD	8 OFFICE	9 GRADE	10 SD	11 COURSE DATES FROM	12 TO
012170	Randall, Frederick	M	26	51	DDO SS	14	DAC	7 May 76	(1-day)

13 TYPE OF INSTRUCTION (REG 1 TUT 2 SPEC 3 CORR 4 OTHER 5)	CODE	14 EVAL	15 COMB	16 COURSE CODE	17 PURGE DATE	18	19 CV	19a AC	20 FACILITY CODE	21 LOC	22 TOTAL HOURS
			11				3				005

23 TITLE OF COURSE

A Freedom of Information and Personal Privacy Briefing Conference

24 TRAINING FACILITY	25 LOCATION OF TRAINING
U. S. Civil Service Commission Bureau of Training	1900 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.

26 DESCRIPTION OF COURSE

Participants will develop a working knowledge of the Freedom of Information Act of 1967 and Privacy Act of 1974 and Amendments; will "walk through" the more significant components of Privacy and FOI guidelines; will be briefed on techniques of forecasting costs and determining resources needed to handle work loads created to comply with legislative requirements; and they will review related legislation now before Congress.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES AND LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY TO BE ATTAINED

Mr. Randall is Chief of a branch responsible for handling of requests under the FOI and Privacy Acts.

If you did not receive a certificate for the above training, please submit a critique or fill out the certification of attendance below.

27 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (Social Security No., unclassified job title, home address, etc.)

508-20-4068
1323 Deer Drive
McLean, Va.

REMARKS

TRAINING VERIFIED ________
(Date)

In order that my training record be completed, I certify I attended the above course but did not receive a completion document from the facility sponsoring the training.

F. C. Randall   7 Sept 76
NAME   DATE

20 APR 1976

TRAINING COMPLETED ✓ A

Request No [illegible]
Date 22 SEP 1976

CONFIDENTIAL

0P

17 FEB 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meritorious Unit Citation -- DDO/Privacy and Information Coordinator Group

On 12 February 1976 the Acting Director of Central Intelligence approved award of the Meritorious Unit Citation in recognition of the achievements of the DDO/Privacy and Information Coordinator Group since February 1975. The following employees are cited for their contributions to the Group:

Frederick C. Randall
Angelo F. Addona
Anna J. Langford
Harold E. Matter
Helen H. Stilson
Annette B. Swider

Cicely B. Cass
Ellen Lowman
Mary Linda Vecellio
Jerrie Stauffer
Robert C. Newton
Graeme Elberg
Donna C. Price

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
1 - Each OPF
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

E2 Impdet Cl By 0140[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

17 NOV 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Frederick Randall

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase

1. My congratulations on the award to you of a Quality Step Increase. This award is in recognition of superior sustained performance and reflects great credit on you and the job you have been doing.

2. I am confident that your future performance will be of continuing high quality.

With personal best wishes,

/s/ William E. Nelson

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

OPF

REQUEST FOR TRAINING AT NON-AGENCY FACILITY

TYPE: 8
REQUEST NO.: 2 5? 2 ~~?~~1

EMP SER NO	NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	SEX	AGE		OFFICE	GRADE	SD	COURSE DATES FROM	THROUGH
012170	Randall, Frederick	M	26	51	DDO S3	14	DAC	7 May 76	(1-day)

TYPE OF INSTRUCTION REG 1 TUT 2 SPEC 3 CORR 4 OTHER 5	CODE	EVAL		COURSE	PURGE DATE		CY		FACILITY CODE	LOC.	TOTAL HOURS
			1 1				3				005

TITLE OF COURSE
A Freedom of Information and Personal Privacy Briefing Conference

TRAINING FACILITY	LOCATION OF TRAINING
U. S. Civil Service Commission Bureau of Training	1900 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.

DESCRIPTION OF COURSE
Participants will develop a working knowledge of the Freedom of Information Act of 1967 and Privacy Act of 1974 and Amendments; will "walk through" the more significant components of Privacy and FOI guidelines; will be briefed on techniques of forecasting costs and determining resources needed to handle work loads created to comply with legislative requirements; and they will review related legislation now before Congress.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES AND LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY TO BE ATTAINED
Mr. Randall is Chief of a branch responsible for handling of requests under the FOI and Privacy Acts.

If you did not re[illegible] for the above training, please submit a critique or fill out the certification of attendance below.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
509-20-4068
1923 Dear Drive
McLean, Va.

REMARKS:

In order that my training record be completed, I certify I attended the above course but did not receive a completion document from the facility sponsoring the training.

F. C. Randall 1 Sept 76
NAME DATE

TRAINING VERIFIED ____________
(Date)

20 APR 1976

I-A

CONFIDENTIAL

10 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, EA/PEMS

SUBJECT: Change of Home Base and Functional Category
Frederick C. Randall

1. The Services Staff recently forwarded to your office a personnel action requesting a change of home-base and functional category for Mr. Frederick C. Randall. This memorandum is intended to provide additional information regarding this change as requested by EA Personnel.

2. Mr. Randall was assigned to the Services Staff in February 1975 to serve as the Freedom of Information Officer for the DDO. This assignment followed approximately ten years of service with FR Division. Mr. Randall's performance since reporting to this Staff has been outstanding. He is currently responsible for a staff of 12 employees and with the increasing responsibilities as a result of the enactment of the Privacy Act it is anticipated that additional personnel will be required in order to handle the workload.

3. Mr. Randall has been responsive in the handling of FOI requests and is noted for his professionalism, tact, persuasiveness, and analytic skills. He has done an excellent job of establishing realistic manpower requirements for the Privacy and Information Coordinator Staff, keeping up with a heavy workload while training new employees and making constant adjustments as further experience is gained in the administration of the FOI and Privacy Acts.

4. It is my opinion, and also CMG's, that Mr. Randall's strengths are in a staff assignment such as his current one. Therefore, following discussions with Mr. Randall, it was agreed that his home-base and functional category should be changed from DMC to DAC.

5. If there are any additional questions concerning this change, I will be glad to discuss it further.

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

CONFIDENTIAL [illegible]

SECRET

5 August 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE Personnel

SUBJECT : Frederick Randall, GS-14 - Rotational Assignment - DO Division

1. The Personnel Management Committee of DO Division reviewed the assignment of Mr. Frederick Randall to DO Division in view of his request for a two year extension of his tour in DO and FE Division's request that DO Division consider changing his Home Base to DO.

2. The Acting Chief, DO Division has approved the committee's recommendation that (a) Mr. Randall remain in DO Division for an additional two years until July 1973, (b) Subject's Home Base not be changed to DO Division since DO does not normally Home Base personnel assigned to us on a rotational assignment, and in view of Mr. Randall's expressed desire for an overseas assignment following his two year extension in DO. Mr. Randall feels that his personal circumstances would permit him to accept an overseas assignment at that time.

Paul S. Latchford
Chief, DO Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

10 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Chairman, DDO QSI and Honor and Merit Awards Panel

SUBJECT : Request for a Quality Step Increase for Mr. Frederick C. Randall, GS-14

1. On the basis of the information presented below, it is recommended that a Quality Step Increase be approved for Mr. Frederick C. Randall.

2. Mr. Randall has been employed by the Agency since September 1951. He has spent his Agency career in the Operations Directorate serving with East Asia and Foreign Resources Divisions. He has had field assignments in Jakarta and Tokyo and spent four years at FR Base, Washington.

3. In early 1975, Mr. Randall was assigned to the Services Staff to serve as the Freedom of Information Officer for the DDO. In spite of the ambiguity of evolving guidelines, constant pressure of short deadlines, a very large volume of work and the cultural trauma the Act and its implementation generated, Mr. Randall's performance has been outstanding. He is noted for his professionalism, tact, persuasiveness, analytic skills, and realistic, while tough-minded, protection of DDO sources and methods. In addition to his FOI responsibilities, Mr. Randall was just designated the Privacy Act Coordinator for the DDO. It is still too early to predict the actual work requirements as a result of this Act, but it is anticipated that Mr. Randall will meet these added responsibilities in the same exceptional manner as he has fulfilled his FOI duties.

4. Consideration has been given to the granting of an Honor and Merit Award. However, it is felt that a Quality Step Increase will provide more appropriate recognition of Mr. Randall's outstanding performance during the past seven months in a very challenging and demanding assignment.

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

Attachments
  Bio Profile
  Fitness Reports
  LOI

10/14/75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Request for a Quality Step Increase for Mr. Frederick C. Randall, GS-14

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Friedrich K. Schilling
DDO QSI and Honor and Merit Awards Panel

29 Oct 1975
Date

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel

4 Nov 75
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Frederick C. Randall

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction

REFERENCE: DOI 1-1289 dated 3 February 1975

1. The purpose of this Letter of Instruction is to fulfill my responsibility to provide you with a statement of your responsibilities as the Freedom of Information Officer for the Directorate of Operations, to assist you in focusing your efforts and activities, and to assist me in judging and evaluating your performance and potential.

2. Your primary responsibility is to fulfill the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act that pertain to the Directorate of Operations on behalf of the Deputy Director for Operations. To accomplish this, you will be the central point of contact for all FOI matters within the DDO. You will develop procedures designed to ensure that FOIA requests for information are fulfilled or legitimately denied, taking into account both the provisions of the FOIA and existing laws that require the Central Intelligence Agency to protect that information necessary to the continuation of its mission. You will suggest and promote courses of action which should be implemented to fulfill your responsibilities and carry out policies levied upon you by higher authority, including preparation of appropriate rationale and/or options for those cases requiring denial of release by me as the DDO official so authorized.

3. You will develop a staff of personnel to assist you in the performance to your mission, and provide effective guidance to them.

4. You will be directly responsible to me as the Chief, Services Staff and receive direction and support from me, serving as my Special Assistant. You are encouraged to take maximum initiatives on FOI matters with principal components of the DDO and concerned elements of CIA outside the DDO, keeping me generally informed of your activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY 011078
E2 IMPDET

5. You will fulfill any further responsibilities or assignments that may be levied by higher authority.

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

I have read and understand this
Letter of Instruction:

Frederick C Randall 7 May 1975
Frederick C. Randall Date

QSI RECOMMENDATION REVIEW

SUBJECT : FREDERICK C. RANDALL OFFICE: DDO/TFR

GRADE : 14/7 DATE OF GRADE: 04/01/67 POSITION GRADE: 15

LAST QSI: 07/04/65 REMARKS:

RECOMMEND APPROVAL: (Signature of PPB/Officer) DATE: 10/31/75

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

TRAINING COMPLETED
Request No. 046246
Date 29 JUL 1975

~~Certification of Attendance~~

In order that my training record may be completed, I certify that I attended the following course but did not receive a completion document from the facility sponsoring the training.

EMPLOYEE: Frederick C. Randall

FACILITY: Civil Service Commission

COURSE TITLE: A Symposium on Freedom of Information and Privacy Legislation

DATES OF TRAINING: May 30, 1975

TRAINING REQUEST NUMBER: 046246

F.C. Randall
Signature

11/1/75
Date

NOTE: This form is to be used only when the facility attended does not issue official completion information.

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Randall, Frederick

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
	6-DIGITS	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS
● 2	●	●

4. DATE OF BIRTH			5. DATE CODED		
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR
●			●		

THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1362, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
● 3	●	●	●							

5. DATE SUBMITTED			6. DATE OF BIRTH		
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR
●			●		

WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS).

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
● 5	● 012170	● RAN	● C	● BL54	1	3	3	3	3	4	59

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST		
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR
● BL54	0	7	7	7	7	4	71	● 06	18	71

DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME
		3-LETTERS
● 4	●	●

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
A - ADDITION TO RECORD
C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				

FORM 1062a

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOD

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
012170	Randall, Frederick Crawford	28 October 1926

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-69 444n

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

FEB 24 9 08 AM '70
MAIL GIL..

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY):

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE: 17 February 1970

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE PUNCHED BY

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print) 7-24		
012170	Randall, Frederick G.		

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 98, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42
03	31	70	04	30	70		2			WH	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

XX	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: WH 352-70, Amt 1

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 31 Mar 70 - 30 Apr 70

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ [illegible]
XX [illegible] DIVISION, ETC.
☐ [illegible] DIVISION

XX REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE: 8 May 70

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-62 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(6-10)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) RANDALL (First) Frederick (Middle) Crawford
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 508-20-4068

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY: Seat Pleasant, Md.
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 1823 Deer Drive, McLean, Va
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: 1823 Deer Drive, McLean, Va

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Omaha, Nebraska
DATE OF MARRIAGE: June 3, 1950
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE: N.A.
DATE OF DECREE:
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED: N.A.
DATE SPOUSE DIED:
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S): N.A.

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE: Jean Fedel Randall
ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code): 1823 Deer Drive, McLean, Va 22101
TELEPHONE NO.: 356-8204

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Kirk F Randall	" "	M	10/6/51
Thomas V Randall		M	2/12/52
Jean E Randall		F	4/10/56
Barbara J Randall		F	25/11/58

NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian): Clifford E Randall
ADDRESS: Dec.
TELEPHONE NO.:
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian): Bernice Randall
ADDRESS: Dec.
TELEPHONE NO.:

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. Wife and two sons

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Mrs. Randall, Jean Fedel
RELATIONSHIP: Wife
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code): 1823 Deer Drive, McLean, Va 22101
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 356-8204
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER IF APPLICABLE: Great Falls Elementary School, Great Falls Va
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION: EL 9-2221

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES ☑ NO ☐

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES ☑ NO ☐

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 5.) YES ☑ NO ☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 5 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

61

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

9. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

United Va. Bank of Fairfax
McLean Branch
Frederick C & Jean F Randall

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

10. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
	25/2/70	Frederick C Randall

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Frederick Randall	DATE (from item 5-D) 23 Sept. 1968	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Rudolph E. Gomez	DATE (from item 3-2) 23 Sept. 1968
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 23 October 1968	DISPATCH NUMBER: UWCT-517 15 Oct. 1968	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 10/28/26	2. SERVICE DESIGN D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Ops. Officer, GS-14	4. STATION OR BASE Washington, D.C.	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER LNPACK

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD Sept. 1965	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE June 1969	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ June 1969	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE June 1969

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

N.A.

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

I have two handicapped children who require special schooling not available overseas.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Case Officer handling mainly, but not exclusively, operations concerned with the Far East.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

I would like to attend a War College. If assigned overseas I desire language training.

FORM 202 [illegible]
9-63

SECRET

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

After completing three years as a case officer in the Washington Base I feel that a change of assignment would be beneficial both to myself and WOFIRM. In past assignments I have served as a field case officer in several field stations and as a desk chief and staff officer at Headquarters. My personal/professional interests lie in the field of international relations in the Far East (I have taught international politics at the college level and currently am completing a Ph. D. degree as a part-time after-hour student). I would like to be assigned to a position in which I could utilize my past operational experience as well as my substantive interests. My first choice would be a tour with WOHORN, or if a position there is unavailable at this time, a similar position within WOMACE.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ________ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ________ (DATE).

☒ BE ASSIGNED TO HQDTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY; INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE WOHORN 2ND CHOICE see above 3RD CHOICE ________

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION; INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE ________ 2ND CHOICE ________ 3RD CHOICE ________

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Subject is highly qualified for a senior staff job requiring analytical ability in the geographical area of the Far East. As noted above, Subject has expressed a desire to be assigned to a position of this type in WOHORN. In view of Subject's professional interest in the field of International Relations in the Far East, it is recommended he be assigned to WOHORN, or if a position there is not open at this time, a similar position within WOMACE.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

I concur in the recommendation of the Base Chief stated in paragraph 12.

DATE 30 Oct 68 TITLE C/DO/I SIGNATURE Stanley H. Gaines

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:
DO/[illegible] [illegible]

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ________ DATED ________
CABLE NO. ________ DATED ________

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE ________ DATE ________
TELEPHONE

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
RANDALL	Frederick	Crawford	10/28/26	508 20 4068
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

Frederick Randall

DATE

11 March 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

[illegible]

[illegible]

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

Clandestine Services Review Course No. 49 (29 March - 7 April 1966)
(64 hours, full-time)

Student: RANDALL, Frederick C. **Office:** DDP/DG

Year of Birth: 1926 **Service Designation:** D

Grade: GS-13 **No. of Students:** 22

EOD Date: Sept 1951

COURSE OBJECTIVES — CONTENT AND METHODS

This course aims to develop in the Clandestine Services officers and others recently returned from the field an up-to-date awareness of the role of CIA in the United States intelligence community, the relations of the DDI and DDS&T areas with the CS, the support available from the offices of the DDS, and the current organization and functions of the Clandestine Services.

The course is presented by lectures given by CIA officials who are directly responsible for the missions, functions, programs, and services discussed. Each lecture is usually followed by a short question period. Approximately 10 per cent of the students' time is scheduled for reading pertinent up-to-date regulations and background summaries.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only; no attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Anthony F. Niccoli
Chief Instructor

14 April 1966
Date

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST *(Print)*	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6		7-24		25-26
012170	RANDALL	FREDRICK		43

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1				06	21	1965	TOKYO	345

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)* Transfer and Clearance Sheet (Form 495)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
Form 495	22 June 1965

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		X REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	[illegible] DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓	[illegible] DIVISION	July 9, 1965	

FORM 5-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14.101

[illegible]

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 7 October 1963, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

Frederick C. Randall — 2 August 1965

Signature — Date

FREDERICK C. RANDALL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECRET

Executive Registry
65-4007

DD/P 5-3494

Ltr, 6499th Support Group (CR), 11 June 1965, Letter of Commendation

2d Ind (AFNIN)

Headquarters USAF, Washington, D. C. 20330 — 13 JUL 1965

TO: Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters Building
2430 E Street
Washington, D. C.

1. The attached correspondence regarding Mr. Frederick Randall is noted and forwarded with great pleasure.

2. The exemplary cooperation and professional support provided by Mr. Randall have contributed to the overall success of the 6499th Support Group and the national collection program.

3. This indorsement is UNCLASSIFIED when standing alone.

JACK E. THOMAS
Major General, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

1st Ind.

TO: Chief, FE Division — 23 [illegible] 1965

The Director has noted these letters of commendation and has asked that his own appreciation for a fine performance be expressed to Mr. Randall.

L. K. White
Executive Director-Comptroller

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
6499TH SUPPORT GROUP (PACAF)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96594

11 JUN 1965

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: CR

SUBJECT: (U) Letter of Commendation

TO: CINCPACAF (DI)
HQ USAF (AFNIN)
Central Intelligence Agency
(Director of)
IN TURN

1. (S) I wish to commend and make a matter of record the outstanding support rendered to this organization by Mr. Frederick Randall, Area Liaison Coordinating Detachment, Tokyo, Japan, from the period of July 1963 to date. Mr. Randall served as the focal point for 6499th Support Group coordination of various collection operations in consonance with national and service directives. He was at all times most tactful and helpful, and all who came in contact with him left with the feeling that they had met a true professional.

2. (S) Mr. Randall contributed greatly to the overall morale and esprit de corps of those persons charged with the responsibility of planning for and initiating new operations to gather data of priority national aerospace interest. He handled potentially embarrassing situations with humor, dignity and aplomb. He gave freely of himself and spent many hours in assisting us in coordinating various operations, discussing the strengths and weaknesses of proposed approaches to collecting information, and in serving as a most effective go-between this headquarters and various station chiefs in other areas when operations under way were multi-national in area. We liked, trusted, and respected him.

3. (S) Mr. Randall's outstanding effectiveness as a coordinator of intelligence collections was exemplary in nature and reflected great credit upon him and his parent organization.

WALTER C. VITUNAC
Colonel, USAF
Commander

COPY 1 OF 6 COPIES

6499 SPT GP CONTROL
NUMBER 153-65

[illegible]

SECRET

Ltr, 6499th Support Group (CR), 11 June 1965, Letter of Commendation

1st Ind (DI) 1 JUL 1965

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), APO San Francisco 96553

TO: Headquarters USAF (AFNIN)
Central Intelligence Agency (Director of)
IN TURN

1. It is a pleasure to forward this letter commending Mr. Frederick Randall. The knowledge and guidance he has imparted to the 6499th Support Group have greatly contributed to the overall efficiency and productivity of our intelligence collection operations.

2. This indorsement in itself does not contain classified information.

DONALD C. SHULTIS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

12 JUL 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Frederick G. Randall

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase

1. I was pleased to learn that you have been granted a Quality Step Increase. Such a recognition is proof of the high esteem in which you are held by your supervisors in the Clandestine Services.

2. Please accept my personal best wishes. I am confident that your future performance will be of a continuing high quality.

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans

Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - C/FE
2 - PEP
1 - Subj. File
1 - CSPO/A
1 - OPF
C/CSPO/EEMeay/jir/12 Jul '65

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9 JUL 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Head, Clandestine Services Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - Frederick Randall

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. The salary increase accomplished by the award of a Quality Step Increase is important and tangible evidence of the esteem in which the employee so recognized is held. However, I believe the commendatory and incentive benefits of this award will be partially lost unless it is presented in an appropriate ceremony which will afford the individual recognition among co-workers and supervisory officials. Also, I believe such recognition serves to inspire other employees to aspire to earning such recognition.

3. May I ask, therefore, that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles
Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/FE Div w/atts
1 - C/CSPD
1 - C/POD/OP
1 - D/Pers Chrono
1 - OPF - Randall

OP/POD/JLOlmstead:dbw/6693 (8 Jul 65)

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

OP-555

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Request for Quality Step Increase - Frederick C. Randall

FROM: C/FE Division	EXTENSION	NO. DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. ~~DDP/OP~~	~~18 JUN 1965~~		
2.			
3. C6PD	21 JUN 1965	23 June	RG
4. DDP/OP 3C.29	24 JUN	24 JUN 1965	GW
5. D/Dir/Pers		24 JUN 1965	AC
6. C/POD	6/24/65		
7. [illegible]			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

3 to 4:
Recommend you concur in this proposal. Upon his return to HQ, Mr. Randall will go to DO Division to replace Mr. Donnet who was yanked out for assignment to Rangoon. In DO, Randall will be one of two FE representatives.
R. Gage

QS1

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

16 JUN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

ATTENTION: DDP/OP

SUBJECT: Request for Quality Step Increase - Frederick C. Randall

1. On the basis of the information presented below, it is recommended that a quality step increase be approved for Frederick C. Randall.

2. Mr. Randall has been affiliated with this Agency since September 1951, and has been assigned to the Operational Support Staff at Tokyo since 1961. Mr. Randall's duties are: liaison with the military clandestine intelligence community; commanding officer of a principal Agency military cover unit; supervisor of the Central Registry; supervisor of the local TSD establishment; and Agency participation in a multi-agency CI Repository and an Agency-run multi-agency Central Carding facility. Mr. Randall's primary duty at the Tokyo Station is Station PBRAMPART responsibilities. These responsibilities are broad and highly important to all RAMPART relations throughout the Far East. Through Mr. Randall's intensive effort to strengthern and increase the Agency's role in the coordination of clandestine-collection activities, he has been able to set a positive pattern of effective procedures for coordination of the military services' clandestine collection operations. These procedures are now being emulated wherever possible throughout the Far East. Mr. Randall's tenacity and patience, based on solid operational field and Headquarters experience, have worked to a distinct advantage for the Agency in the RAMPART field. The Chief of Station, Tokyo has stated that the vast improvement in the local coordination business has been in large part due to Mr. Randall's exceptional ability to do a good job. Further, as a supervisor and a manager, he has quite successfully handled from 10 to 15 subordinates in the diversified functions listed above.

3. During Mr. Randall's total service at the Tokyo Station, he has demonstrated his ability and capability to carry out a variety of tasks in an exemplary manner. Mr. Randall has been in grade as a GS-13 since September 1958. He has been recommended three times for promotion to GS-14 since 1963. Due to the limited number of promotions made in this grade category, he was not selected. The Chief of Station and Chief, Far East Division request that Mr. Randall be granted a quality step increase for a long tenure of strong performance and as recognition of an outstanding job well done in his present assignment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. As stated above, Mr. Randall has continued to perform in an exceptionally strong manner and is expected to continue for the remainder of his present and future assignments. We have considered the presentation of an Honor or Merit Award; but the Division feels that a quality step increase appears to be more appropriate in this particular case due to his extended period of time in grade without promotion. Mr. Randall is scheduled for reassignment in June 1965 and we feel the granting of a quality step increase at this time will indicate our appreciation and recognition of his excellent performance.

W E Colby
William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Division

CONCUR:

Gerald Miller 24 June 65
DDP/OP Date

APPROVE:

APPROVED
6/24/65

Deputy Director for Plans Date

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

S/C ATT TO TM 303047

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

MAR 26 1965

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in duplicate when ordered overseas or whenever designated place of residence, marital or dependency status changes. This information is important in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or member of family.

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) RANDALL (First) Frederick (Middle) Crawford

2. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (if appointed abroad)

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED PERMANENT OR LEGAL RESIDENCE
1823 Deer Drive, McLean, Virginia

3. MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED	PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE OF MARRIAGE
☐ DIVORCED	PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE
☐ WIDOWED	PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

4. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	SEX	AGE
NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE	
NAME OF MOTHER (or female guardian)	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE	

5. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME

RELATIONSHIP

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)

TELEPHONE

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 4 ABOVE WILL ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, DUE TO HEALTH OR OTHER PERTINENT REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE UNDER "REMARKS."

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

THE FOLLOWING AGENCY ENDORSED LIFE AND HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE POLICIES ARE IN FORCE IN MY NAME: THE "POLICY NO." SHOULD BE ENTERED IF POSSIBLE, SINCE THIS INFORMATION WILL ASSIST IN EXPEDITING ACTION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD A CLAIM BECOME PAYABLE.

6. FULL NAME OF COMPANY	ADDRESS OF HOME OFFICE	POLICY NO.

7. I HAVE COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING: WILL ☐ YES ☐ NO   POWER OF ATTORNEY ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. REMARKS:

The purpose of this is to officially state that the State of Virginia has renumbered my legal address from 4225 Deer Drive, McLean, Virginia to the new address listed above.

SIGNED AT Tokyo, Japan

DATE March 25, 1965

SIGNATURE Frederick Randall

FORM NO. 61 REPLACES FORM 37-78
1 JUL 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Randell, Frederick C.	Barbara J. - daughter	65-815

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 14 March 1965.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
9 APR 1965	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(true)* Frederick Randall	DATE *(from item 5.1)* 20 Oct 64	NAME OF SUPERVISOR *(true)* William V. Broe	DATE *(from item 5.2)* 30 Oct 64
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:	Jay R. Newman		DATE 27 Nov 64

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 28 Oct 26	2. GRADE GS-13	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE Ops Off GS-13	7a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR 17 Sep 1961
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION *(if known)* D	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Tokyo		7b. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD Jun 65
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7c. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS Aug 65

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

Chief of the Operational Support Section of the Station. This includes responsibility for a) contact with all Japan based military clandestine intelligence organizations to carry out the provisions of DCID 5, b) Chief of the main military cover unit, c) general supervision of the Central Registry consisting of 7 employees, d) general supervision of the Station name and source check unit consisting of 3 employees, e) general supervision of the Tokyo KURIOT officer, f) one regular operational contact and others on an ad hoc basis.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

[redacted]

Be reassigned PCS to Headquarters. I am interested in an operational position, preferably in FE Division, which will allow for advancement.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*:

I would like to take an operational refresher course such as the Clandestine Services Review.

FORM 3-59 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[2] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[1] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE FE 2ND. CHOICE ____ 3RD. CHOICE ____

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:

1ST. CHOICE Germany 2ND. CHOICE Mexico 3RD. CHOICE England

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS? 40 days

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 40

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife age 38	Daughter age 8
Son age 13	Daughter age 6
Son age 12	

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

None

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING: [redacted] has shown definite supervisory capability. He has done an outstanding job in the time-consuming function of coordinating operations with the military members of the Intelligence Community in Japan. Unfortunately, this function has been so time-consuming that it has not allowed us to assign him as much operational work as we desired. However, in his discussions with the military he has often been called upon to give operational advice and guidance and in this regard his operational judgment has been excellent and respected by them.

Continued on attached sheet.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

FE Division Requests that Mr. Randall be assigned to China Operations in Headquarters upon his return from Tokyo, Japan.

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER
Robert L. Staten, CFE/PERS
DATE 24 February 1965

SIGNATURE M. T. Boulger

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT

18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. [illegible] CABLE NO. ____

19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME

20. SIGNATURE Ronald Gage

21. TITLE

22. DATE 3/1/65

23. COMMENTS

To FE/China Ops
[illegible]

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Section 13. Continuation.
Frederick Randall

[redacted] has a medical problem with two of his children calling for special schooling facilities. It has reached a point that during the next two years they should be in the Washington area where these special facilities are available. I fully endorse his request in Section 9, above, and recommend he be placed in charge of an area desk.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

S/C ATT TO FJTT-12144

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in duplicate when ordered overseas or whenever designated place of residence, marital or dependency status changes. This information is important in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or member of family.

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) RANDALL (First) Frederick (Middle) Crawford

2. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: Omaha, Nebraska

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED PERMANENT OR LEGAL RESIDENCE: 4225 Deer Drive, McLean, Virginia

3. MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED	PLACE OF MARRIAGE Omaha, Nebraska	DATE OF MARRIAGE June 3, 1950
☐ DIVORCED	PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE
☐ WIDOWED	PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

4. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE	
Jean Fedel Randall	ALCD APO 925 San Francisco, Calif.		
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)**	**SEX**	**AGE**
Kirk Frederick Randall	ALCD APO 925 San Francisco, Calif.	Male	13
Thomas Vincent Randall	" " "	"	11
Joan Ellen Randall	" " "	Female	7
Barbara Jean Randall	" " "	"	5
NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	**ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)**	**TELEPHONE**	
Clifford E Randall	2727 Wyoming Street, Omaha, Nebraska		
NAME OF MOTHER (or female guardian)	**ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)**	**TELEPHONE**	
Bernice Randall	" " " "		

5. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME: Jean Fedel Randall — RELATIONSHIP: Wife

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): ALCD APO 925 San Francisco, California — TELEPHONE:

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 4 ABOVE WILL ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, DUE TO HEALTH OR OTHER PERTINENT REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE UNDER "REMARKS."

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

THE FOLLOWING AGENCY ENDORSED LIFE AND HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE POLICIES ARE IN FORCE IN MY NAME: THE "POLICY NO." SHOULD BE ENTERED IF POSSIBLE, SINCE THIS INFORMATION WILL ASSIST IN EXPEDITING ACTION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD A CLAIM BECOME PAYABLE.

6. FULL NAME OF COMPANY	ADDRESS OF HOME OFFICE	POLICY NO.
FEGLI WAEPA UFLIC [illegible]		

7. I HAVE COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING: WILL ☐ YES ☒ NO POWER OF ATTORNEY ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. REMARKS:

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Tokyo, Japan	June [illegible]	Frederick C. Randall

FORM NO. 81 REPLACES FORM 37-28
1 JUL 54 WHICH MAY BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~ ATT 2 TO FJTT-10179

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true) Frederick Randall	DATE (from item 9-B) 13 Sept 1963	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Robert Prentiss Wheeler	DATE (from item 9-B) 19 Sept 1963
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:	Howard E. Eissner		DATE 1 Nov 1963

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 28 October 1926	2. GRADE GS-13	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Operations Officer
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known)	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Tokyo	
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None		7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE August 1964

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

Chief of the Operational Support Section of the Station. This includes responsibilities for:

a. liaison with military intelligence units including the DCID 5 function
b. acting chief of the main military cover unit
c. general supervision of the Central Registry consisting of 7 employees
d. general supervision of the Station name and source check unit consisting of 3 employees
e. general supervision of KURIOT activities including one outside officer and one inside technician
f. one operational contact on a regular basis

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES:

I would like to extend at my present post until June 1965.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

None

FORM NO. 202
1 SEP 60

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

14-00000

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION [2] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION:

1ST CHOICE: __________

2ND CHOICE: __________

3RD CHOICE: __________

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

none INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS ________

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Not applicable

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 9-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Approval of Subject's requested one year extension is clearly in the interest of the Station and of KUBARK. His growth in this assignment has been mutually profitable and the added year of service here will stand all of us in good stead. No training during this period is recommended.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 9-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

FE CMC recommends Subject's tour be extended to June 1965 per his request.

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Leo Austin	SIGNATURE
TITLE: CFE/PERS	DATE: 5 December 1963

17. REMARKS (additional comment)

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

Rec'd CSPD
4 Feb. 63

SECRET

ELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY — DO NOT COMPLETE — DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true)	DATE (from item 8-1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 8-2)
Frederick Randall		Robert P. Wheeler	

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW: Howard E. Eissner

DATE:

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 28 October 1926	2. GRADE GS-13	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Operations Officer
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known)	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Tokyo	
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None		7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE September 1963

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

Chief of the Operational Support Section of the Station. This includes responsibility for a) liaison with military intelligence units including the DCID 5 function; b) acting chief of the main military cover unit; c) general supervision of the Central Registry consisting of 6 employees; d) general supervision of the Station name and source check unit consisting of 3 employees; e) general supervision of KURIOT activities including one outside officer and one inside technician; f) two operational contacts on a regular basis and others on an ad hoc basis.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT: extend for one year in present assignment

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

I would like to extend for one year in my present assignment, until August 1964.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

None

FORM 59 202
4 SEP 56

SECRET

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

5. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

☒ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION
☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY
☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION: see number 9

1ST CHOICE:
2ND CHOICE:
3RD CHOICE:

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS? see number 9
INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife-36; son-11; son-10; daughter-6; daughter-4.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 9-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

We are glad to have Subject extend for one year.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 9-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Concur in this [illegible] suggestion [illegible]
extension.

Approved by Chairman, CS Personnel Management
Committee 26 Feb 63. J. W. [illegible], CSPD/13
FJTS-6858 (2 Mar 63) 7 March 1963
New ERG requested in Jan 64

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR: C. W. EDWARDS
SIGNATURE: C. W. Edwards
TITLE: CFE/JAC
DATE: 9 JAN 1963

17. REMARKS (additional comment)

One year extension until August 64 approved CMC 25 January 63.

C Wallace 25 Jan 63

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CS

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) 7-24 LAST / FIRST / MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
12170	Randall, Frederick	56

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
[✓ 1 . PCS (Basic)] 3 . CORRECTION 5 . CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	09	17	61				JAPAN	375

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 . TDY (Basic) 4 . CORRECTION 6 . CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE	✓	DUTY STATUS [illegible]
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
	9/7 - 9/30/61

REMARKS

12-29-61

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓	FINANCE DIVISION	10/16/61	

FORM 9-66 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

RECEIPT

No. 45716

DATE 12 Sept 64

THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF $31.26

Thirty One ——— 26/100 DOLLARS

FROM 13 RANDALL, FREDERICK C. 39 | 51 01 52 | 54 G.L. 57 1010

FOR FE-83/62

13 DESCRIPTION Excess Cost 27

OFFICIAL SIGNATURE RHPerry

28 33	34 39	40 42	45 46	47 52	53	54 57	59	62 67	68 70	71 80
						1441				

FORM 8-58 102 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(33)

TR

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle): Randall Frederick Crawford
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: Unk.

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED: Mt. Ranier, Maryland
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 4325 Deer Drive, McLean, Va.
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: Omaha, Nebraska

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Omaha, Nebraska
DATE OF MARRIAGE: June 3, 1950
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED:
DATE SPOUSE DIED:
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S):

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Irma Jean Fedel Randall	4325 Deer Drive McLean, Va	EL 6-4698	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**DATE OF BIRTH**
Kirk Frederick Randall	" " " " "	M	June 19, 1951
Thomas Vincent Randall	" " " " "	M	Dec. 2, 1952
Joan Ellen Randall	" " " " "	F	Oct 4, 1956
Barbara Jean Randall	" " " " "	F	Nov 25, 1958
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
Clifford E Randall	2727 Wyoming St. Omaha Nebraska	Unk.	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
Bernice C Randall	"	Unk.	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. father, mother

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Mr. Randall, Clifford Edgar
RELATIONSHIP: father
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 2727 Wyoming ST Omaha, Nebraska
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Unk.
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: none (retired)
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION: None

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) Yes
YES ✓ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)
YES ✓ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)
YES ✓ NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-53 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Vienna Trust Company, McLean Branch
McLean, Va
Frederick C and Jean F Randall

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington, D.C.	August 23, 1961	Frederick C. Randall

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

Frederick C Randall
(Employee)
Frederick C. Randall

WITNESS:

Lorene E Norbeck
Office of Personnel
Lorene E. Norbeck

Date: 23 Aug. 1961

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER [illegible] F.P.M.
[illegible]

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM 3400

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read [illegible] on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ballpoint pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. ~~094432~~

PART A
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): RANDALL Frederick C.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers): MONTH Oct DAY 28 YEAR 26

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE): 4225 Deer Drive McLean, Virginia ☐

5. SEX: MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☐ NO ☒

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1 $4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2 $6,000 TO $9,999 ☐ 3 $10,000 OR OVER ☒ 4

PART B
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer Item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer Item 2 and Item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
ASSOCIATION BENEFIT PLAN	HIGH	4 2 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband	Irma Jean Randall	Nov 20, 26	1			6
	Kirk Frederick Randall	June 19, 51	2			7
	Thomas J. Randall	Dec 2, 52	3			8
	Joan Ellen Randall	Oct 4, 56	4			9
	Barbara Jean Randall	Nov 25, 58	5			10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐
2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐
3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box).
   - (a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
   - (b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
   - (c) Any other reason ☐ 3

PART D
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan.
2. Number of event which permits change (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)
3. Date of event which permits change. MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART

Frederick C. Randall [illegible]
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001)

PART F
TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: [illegible]-20-60
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 1-10-60
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL

REMARKS
FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.

FE

118170

APRIL 1959

Triplicate—To Employing Office

4924

F6/5

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

3 APR 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Frederick Randall

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 10 September 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted: Frederick P. Randall

Date: June 26, 1958

8 JUL 1958
Selection Staff
Office of Personnel

SECRET

INTEGREE AGREEMENT

27 October, 1955
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Frederick C. Randall:

This is a memorandum of agreement between you and the United States Government in regard to your employment by CIA. It is hereby mutually agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of CIA, at the present grade and salary of GS-12 $ 7570 per annum, you will accept cover employment in the Foreign Service effective as of 27 Oct '55. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to CIA, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of the Foreign Service in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to the Foreign Service is being effected at the class of FSR-5 and salary of $ 6300 per annum.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of Two (2) years from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of CIA, and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by CIA in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of the Foreign Service. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by the Agency to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause either by the Foreign Service or CIA before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by the Agency to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause either by the Foreign Service or CIA before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent

with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of the Foreign Service. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of the Foreign Service except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with CIA regulations.

4. You are entitled by this agreement to the payment of a post differential and allowances, based upon your CIA or Foreign Service salary rate, whichever is greater. Payment of your salary, post differential and allowances by the Foreign Service will be full compensation for your services when the total amount is equal to or greater than that payable by CIA. Otherwise, the balance will be paid directly to you by CIA in a manner designated by you in writing and acceptable to CIA. The schedule of allowances applicable to your grade (CIA and Foreign Service) and post of duty are subject to unilateral adjustment by the Government.

5. Your status as a CIA employee will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with the Foreign Service, and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits, and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. All annual and sick leave which will have accrued to your credit at the time of integration into the Foreign Service will be held by CIA pending your transfer from the Foreign Service to CIA. While assigned to the Foreign Service you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, statutory leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of that organization. Upon completion of your integration in the Foreign Service your accrued leave will normally be transferred to your credit with CIA. If security conditions require that you be given a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount of any such lump-sum payment to the CIA at the time of your reinstatement including any withholding tax deducted by the Foreign Service.

b. Upon your integration in the Foreign Service, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six percent).

6. If the CIA considers it undesirable for you to continue the use of your Foreign Service cover, your services will be utilized whenever possible in some other appropriate capacity as designated by CIA, unless the circumstances are such as to warrant your termination for cause.

7. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with CIA rules and regulations.

8. Authorized instructions which you receive from CIA in briefing, training, or in any other way are a part of this memorandum of agreement and are incorporated herein to the extent that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

9. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with the Foreign Service of any status with the Foreign Service based on your services performed with that organization at the request of CIA.

10. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by CIA from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage law, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with CIA will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

11. For your information, a schedule of the allowances currently applicable for an employee of your grade (CIA and Foreign Service) and post of duty is enclosed.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Helen W. Adams
Personnel Office

Date: 27 Oct 1955

ACCEPTED:

Frederick C Campbell

Date: 27 Oct. 1955

APPROVED:
HARRISON G. REYNOLDS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL
BY

Date: 27 Oct. 1955

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in duplicate when ordered overseas or whenever designated place of residence, marital or dependency status changes. This information is important in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or member of family.

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) RANDALL (First) FREDERICK (Middle) CRAWFORD

2. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: Seat Pleasant, Md.

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (if appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED PERMANENT OR LEGAL RESIDENCE: 2727 Wyoming St. Omaha, Nebraska

3. MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE
☑ MARRIED — PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Omaha, Nebraska — DATE OF MARRIAGE: 3 June 1950
☐ DIVORCED — PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE: — DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
☐ WIDOWED — PLACE SPOUSE DIED: — DATE SPOUSE DIED:

4. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE: Irma Jean Randall	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): Will accompany	TELEPHONE:	
NAMES OF CHILDREN: Kirk Frederick Randall Thomas Vincent Randall	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): Will accompany	SEX: M M	AGE: 4 2½
NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian): Clifford E. Randall	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): 2727 Wyoming St Omaha, Nebr.	TELEPHONE:	
NAME OF MOTHER (or female guardian): Bernice Randall	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): " " " "	TELEPHONE:	

5. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME: Clifford E. Randall — RELATIONSHIP: Father

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): 2727 Wyoming St Omaha Nebraska — TELEPHONE:

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 4 ABOVE WILL ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, DUE TO HEALTH OR OTHER PERTINENT REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE UNDER "REMARKS."

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

THE FOLLOWING AGENCY ENDORSED LIFE AND HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE POLICIES ARE IN FORCE IN MY NAME. THE "POLICY NO." SHOULD BE ENTERED IF POSSIBLE, SINCE THIS INFORMATION WILL ASSIST IN EXPEDITING ACTION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD A CLAIM BECOME PAYABLE.

6. FULL NAME OF COMPANY	ADDRESS OF HOME OFFICE	POLICY NO.
Fed. ins. G. H.I. Specified Diseases		

7. I HAVE COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING: WILL ☐ YES ☑ NO POWER OF ATTORNEY ☐ YES ☑ NO

8. REMARKS:

SIGNED AT Washington D.C. DATE 26 Aug. 1955 SIGNATURE Frederick C Randall

FORM NO. 61 REPLACES FORM 37-19 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 JUL 54

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CAREER SERVICE QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION I *(To be completed by employee)*

NAME (Last) Randall	(First) Frederick	(Middle) Crawford	AGE 27	GRADE GS-11	NO. OF MOS. IN GRADE 7	CAREER DESIGNATION FI

STAFF OR DIVISION FE	BRANCH 5	POSITION TITLE I. O. (FI) Indonesian FI Desk Officer

NO. OF MOS. IN PRESENT POSITION 1	NO. OF MOS. IN OSS 0	NO. OF MOS. IN CIG 0	NO. OF MOS. IN CIA 34

DATA ON ALL PERMANENT DUTY OVERSEAS OR IN U.S. FIELD *(Include any TDY during last two years)*

APPROXIMATE DATES OF SERVICE		LOCATION		TDY	PCS	COMMENTS
FROM	TO	COUNTRY	STATION			
None						

INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SERVE TOUR OF DUTY OVERSEAS PCS

A ☐ YES B ☒ ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS C ☐ NO

INDICATE ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE IF PRECEDING ANSWER IS "A" OR "B"

PREFERENCE	COUNTRY	STATION	TYPE OF POSITION
1ST	Indonesia	Djakarta	FI and PP Operations Officer
2ND	Philippines	Manila	FI and PP Operations Officer
3RD	Latin America		FI and PP Operations Officer

IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "B," STATE CONDITIONS; IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "C," EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS

Desire to take wife and children to any overseas post assigned. Desire to have adequate housing provided for family.

INDICATE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OVERSEAS IN WHICH YOU WILL NOT SERVE AND EXPLAIN REASONS

Do not desire to take family into excessively unhealthy conditions.

INDICATE RELATIONSHIP AND AGE OF EACH DEPENDENT TO BE MOVED OVERSEAS

Wife--27
Son--3
Son--18 mos.

INDICATE KNOWN MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH THE AGENCY HAS IMPOSED ON YOUR SERVICE

None

FORM NO. 59-179
1 JUN 54

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS ON REVERSE SIDE.

14-00000

SECRET

INDICATE ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING DEPENDENTS (*old age, chronic illness, need for special educational facilities, etc.*) OR ANY UNUSUAL PERSONAL SITUATION WHICH WOULD AFFECT YOUR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

If possible, desire have adequate schools for children when they reach school age.

DESCRIBE TYPES OF HEADQUARTERS AND U.S. FIELD POSITIONS FOR WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE CONSIDERED AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO SERVE

Desire to remain in a DD/P Branch in headquarters as an operations officer doing both FI and PP work. Desire to continue FI and PP work in a fairly small DD/P field station.

REMARKS

Desire to have overseas assignment by mid-1955.

DATE 16 July 1954	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frederick C Randall

SECTION II (*To be completed by employee's supervisor*)

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (*months*) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE 15 mos.	INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (*months*) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER HEADQUARTERS OR U.S. FIELD ASSIGNMENT Not prior to completion of field tour.

COMMENTS ON AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYEE'S PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Branch fully concurs in employees preferences as listed above.

DATE 16 July 1954	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William M. Decker

PERSONNEL OFFICER WILL FORWARD ORIGINAL TO OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND FIRST COPY TO APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE BOARD

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS

SECRET
Security Information

RANDALL	FREDERICK	CRAWFORD
Name: Last,	First	Middle

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 1 DEC 1952

TO: All C. I. A. Personnel

FROM: Personnel Director

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The Agency is currently revising the system for machine coding employee qualifications, thereby permitting more complete and accurate data on all personnel. The new system will aid in implementing Agency policies on promotion from within by facilitating the selection of personnel with desired education and experience for vacancies which may occur. It is also expected that the new system will provide readily accessible statistics for planning and management purposes.

2. The attached questionnaire is designed to cover adequately those factors in which the Agency is interested. Although the information is, in a large measure, already reflected in previous forms submitted by you, it is felt that your time within the organization may enable you to emphasize those qualifications pertinent to its needs. The questionnaire also serves to bring your education and qualifications record up to date.

3. Your cooperation is requested in completing the questionnaire as thoroughly and accurately as possible and returning it to your Administrative Officer within the time allotted.

George E. Meloon

George E. Meloon
Personnel Director

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry) 8219*	2. NAME: (last) RANDALL (first) FREDERICK (middle) CRAWFORD	3. Office FI/FR
4. Date of Birth 28 Oct 26	5. Sex: 1 male (1) ___ female (2) / Martial Status md. Nr. Dependents 1	6. CIA Entry Date: 10 September 1951
7. Citizenship: x U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) x Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other(specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ___	

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school	4. Two years college, or less	8. Masters degree
2. High school graduate	5. Over two years, no degree	9. Doctors degree
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate	6. Bachelor degree	
	[✓ 7.] Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)	

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	
Washington Un. St Louis, Mo.	Engr.		June 44	Dec 44	1				About 34
So. Dak. State Col. Brookings, . . Dak.	Engr.		Dec 44	Feb 45	½				About 14
Un. of Omaha Omaha, Nebraska	Govt.		Jan 47	Aug 48	2½		AB	Aug 48	About 80
George Washington Un. Washington, D. C.	For Affrs		Sept 50	Pres.	1		AM (To be recd June 1953)		51

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

4. Military or Intelligence Training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, command & staff, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1 CIA Experience: State the specific nature of duties performed with CIA and CIG, starting with your present position. Take position titles from your official personnel papers, if you have personal copies. Please do not request your Official Personnel Folder. Include geographic area and subject matter dealt with, if applicable. Position Title is your classification title such as Geographer, Intelligence Officer, etc. Duty Title indicates your organization position such as - Section Chief, Branch Chief, Administrative Assistant, etc. and is to be filled in only if different to the Position Title. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From 10/9/51 To Pres. Tot. mos. 16 Grade GS-7 Salary $4205 Office FI Position Title: Intelligence Officer (CE) Duty Title: Chief CE Sec., Br. 5, FE Div	Description of Duties: Counter-Espionage Officer for Branch of FE Division dealing with Indonesia and Malaya. At present Head of the CE Section which is charged with the responsibility for CE coverage of Indonesia and Malaya. Duty Station, if overseas:
From To Tot. mos. Grade Salary Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From To Tot. mos. Grade Salary Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From To Tot. mos. Grade Salary Office Position Title: Duty Title.	Description of Duties. Duty Station, if overseas.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.)

From Aug. 48 To Aug 50 Tot. mo's 24 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary $3600 & Exp. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: None Employer C. A. Swanson & Sons Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Food Processor	Exact Title of your position Manufacturer's Representative Description of Duties: Acted as travelling representative of Swansons. Contacted other food processors, U. S. Govt. agencies, and commercial outlets. Represented company at conventions, trade fairs, etc. Duty Station if overseas:
From Dec 45 To Nov 46 Tot. mo's 11 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Pfc. Salary U.S. Air Force Number and Class of Employees Supervised: About 3 or 4. Employer U. S. Air Force Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Message Center Chief MOS 667 Description of Duties: Acted as chief of message center for Communications Section of Headquarters, Far Eastern Air Force (later called Pacific Air Service Command) at Manila, Philippine Islands. Supervised the handling and preparation of all types of communications. Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 ___ Civil Police
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 ___ FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 ___ Office of Strategic Services
24 ___ Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 ___ Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 ___ Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
LANGUAGE	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study (Inc. CIA training)
Spanish					x					x

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ______

** Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ______

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
Philippine Is.	1946	x		
Indonesia	1951-1952			x
Malaya	1951-1952			x

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specalized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained
Indonesia	Political History	1951-1952 research & study on Indonesia desk.

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1. 15	2.	35	1. Yes 2. [✓ No]
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc.	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.
	Music (collection of recordings
	and study of subject)

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership.

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No

SEC. X. CIA TESTS

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken in CIA:

Type of Test	Date Taken

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour x (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested ___.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment in CIA do you think you are best qualified?

Feel qualified in present status which allows for normal growth and advancement. After completion of field assignment will reassess status. Do not desire to continue specialization in CI work, but desire to gradually work into straight covert operations work both in the field and at Washington headquarters.

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status

Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? x Yes ___ No.

If yes, indicate your present draft classification IV A

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status

Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___ Yes x No.

If yes, complete the following.

1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service ___ Grade ___ Location ___

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated ___

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ___

Location of Service Records, if known ___

SEC. XV. CIA TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken while in the CIA.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours
Basic Orientation Course	October 1951	
Operations Course	November-December 1951	
Covert Activities Instruction	Jan-Feb 52	
Counter Espionage	May 52	
Staff Indoctrination	Dec 1951	

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

DATE 14 November 1952

SIGNATURE Frederick C Randall

RANDALL, Frederick C.

UV ✓

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE 050
DIVISION FDZ
BRANCH III
SECTION

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
CIA	Wash. D. C. ✓	10	9	1951	31	12	51	22	3	0
Total Civilian Service								22	3	0

51 · 09 · 10
50 · 12 · 27
0 · 8 · 13
12 · 27 · 49
completed

SCD: 12-27-50

Verified 5-16-57

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Army Air Corps	16	Mar.	1945	28	Nov.	1946	13	8	1
Total Military Service							12	8	1

46-11-28
45-3-16
1-8-13

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

12 December 1951
DATE

Frederick C Randall
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
5	0	2

Cat 4

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

Sept. 19, 1951

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in triplicate when ordered overseas and whenever designated place of residence or marital or dependency status changes. IMPORTANT in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or member of family.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE Frederick Crawford Randall

RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED TO SERVICE 7000 Greig Seat Pleasant, Md.

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (IF APPOINTED ABROAD) 7000 Greig Seat Pleasant, Md.

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED PERMANENT OR LEGAL RESIDENCE 2727 Wyoming St, Omaha, Nebraska

MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED	PLACE OF MARRIAGE Omaha, Nebraska	DATE OF MARRIAGE June 3, 1950
☐ DIVORCED	PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE
☐ WIDOWED	PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

MEMBERS OF FAMILY (DEPENDENTS ONLY)

IDENTIFICATION OF MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH
Mrs Irma Jean Randall	Wife	November 20, 1926
Kirk Frederick Randall	Son	June 19, 1951

Sept 11, 1951
DATE

Frederick C Randall
SIGNATURE

FORM NO. 37-79
MAY 1950

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST [illegible])
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Central Intelligence Agency
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, Frederick Crawford Randall, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

September 10, 1951
(Date of entrance on duty)

Frederick C. Randall
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 10 day of September, A. D. 1951,

at Washington, D. C.
(City) (State)

[SEAL]

Paulina C. Brown
(Signature of officer)

(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

10—[illegible]

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State) 7000 Greig St - #25J - Seat Pleasant, Md.

2. (a) DATE OF BIRTH 10/28/26 | (b) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country) Omaha Nebraska

3. (a) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY Mrs Jean Randall | (b) RELATIONSHIP Wife | (c) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE 7000 Greig St Seat Pleasant, Md | (d) TELEPHONE NO. JO-9-8126

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☑ YES ☐ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (Check one)	SINGLE (Check one)
Mrs Jean Randall	7000 Greig, Seat Pleasant, Md	1. Personnel Clerk 2. Temporary 3. O.P.S	Wife	✓	
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.* The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

14-00000

DEC 1946

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR DUTY

20 Sept 1951 194

Randall, Frederick WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL

EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR

[illegible]

☒ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED:

None

JOHN R. [illegible], M.D.

FORM NO. 37-22
DEC 1946

14-00000

REPORT OF QUALIFICATIONS

Dewosin

NOTE: THIS REPORT MUST NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (OR APPLICANT)	THIS DATE
RANDALL, Frederick C.	2 April 1951

TEST RECORD

NOTE: PRINTED LINE REPRESENTS AVERAGE RANKINGS FOR PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. COLORED LINE REPRESENTS SUBJECT'S RANKS.

TYPING

GROSS	NET	ERRORS
1.		
2.		
3.		

FOREIGN LANGUAGE READING TESTS

LANGUAGE	MEAN SCORE	SUBJECT'S SCORE
FRENCH LL	40	
FRENCH UL	38	
GERMAN	30	
ITALIAN	37	
SPANISH	35	

MEAN PROFILE



EVALUATION OF EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE

TYPE OF POSITION		OUTSTANDING	SUPERIOR	ADEQUATE	WEAK	INADEQUATE
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

QUALIFICATIONS TECHNICIAN

FORM NO. 37-700
FEB 1950

14-00000

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY B ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

OMS DATE	1. REQUEST DATE (DA MO YR) 09/03/78	2. APPLICANT; HAS APPLICANT PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN BY OMS ☐ YES ☐ NO; DEPENDENT(S) X; EMPLOYEE

3. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Randall, Frederick	4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 508-20-4063	[redacted]	6. DOB (DA MO YR) 28/10/26	7. SEX M

8. GRADE GS-15	9. AFFILIATION CD All	10. DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIVISION DDO/ISS	11. EMP. SER 4571	12. POSITION TITLE Ops Officer SAS

COMPLETE 13-18 FOR EACH DEPENDENT TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN WITH EMPLOYEE ONLY IF 2 IS CHECKED "DEPENDENT(S)"

13. DEPENDENT NAME (L-F-M)	14. SOC SEC NO		15. DOB (DMY)	17. SEX	18. RELATIONSHIP	19. DEPENDENT PREVIOUSLY SEEN BY OMS (yes - no)
		[redacted]				

20. REQUESTED ACTION (more than one action is acceptable)

APPLICANT		PRE-EMPLOYMENT		EOD		
ASSIGNMENTS		O/S PCS	STATION	STD/STA (DA MO YR)	NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN	
		O/S TDY	TYPE COVER	POSITION		
		O/S RETURNEE		FITNESS FOR DUTY		OTHER (specify)
	X	O/S TDY STANDBY		RETURN TO DUTY		
		O/S PLANNING		SPECIAL TRAINING		
SEPARATION		RETIREMENT		MDR/CIARDS		MDR/CSC
ROUTINE		REGULAR ANNUAL		EXECUTIVE ANNUAL		MPT/PHE

21. COMMENTS

22. REQUESTING DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIV DCS/CSS/[illegible]	23. ROOM/BLDG 1C4135 Hqs	24. EXTENSION 7335	25. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER Joan A. Sanders

FOR OMS USE ONLY

FOR APPLICANTS	
☐	APPROVE PROCESSING FOR EOD
☐	HOLD PENDING RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL MEDICAL INFORMATION (If so, state needed)
☐	REQUEST PRE EMP. MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐	OTHER (see comments)

COMMENTS

DATE OMS SIGNATURE

FOR OTHER ACTIONS

REQUESTED ACTION	QUAL	COND QUAL	DEFER	DISQUAL
TDY STDBY	X			

OMS ACCOUNTABILITY CODE

EXAMINATION FACILITY

COMMENTS

Qualified TDY STDBY until May '80

8 May 1978
Harry C. Gordon, OMS/PEO

DATE OMS SIGNATURE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET (2) IMPOSED BY

FORM 2598 REPLACES FORMS 777 ... WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

3 - OMS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 14 March 1973

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Randall, Frederick C.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDO/FRD/Branch I

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 7661

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ TDY STANDBY WF

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☒ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Paul S. Latchford

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1 A 30 Hqs.

EXT.: 7661

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified TDY Standby until 1 September 1974.

DATE: 17 April 1973

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: William T. Colder OMS/PRO

FORM 2-00 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) Randall (First) Frederick (Middle) C.

2. DATE 13 July 1955

3. TO POSITION Indonesia

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH DDP FE 5

5. GRADE GS-11

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☒ Overseas

E.T.D. OCT 1955 PCS

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☒ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Qualified for proposed PCS o/s assignment. (7-21-55)

SECRET

C. O.

7/21/55

14-00000

EBG

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
012170	RANDALL, Frederick	10/28/26	D

SECTION II EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 444n USE PREVIOUS
10-68 EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1		JAN 11 9:23 AM '72					
2							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER. SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
6/1/72	Frederick C Randall

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444l, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
012170	RANDALL, Frederick	10/28/26	D

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-811)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.	MAR 29	9 1976 '71					
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

file

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO. 012170	NAME (Last-First-Middle) Randall, Frederick	DATE OF BIRTH 10/28/26

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - TO			
1. American Un., Washington, D. C.	Int. Relations		'66-present	none		27 sem hrs.
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER	
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 444a
1-68

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

APR 29 3 11 '69

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. WAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: March 19, 1969

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Ple

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP
012170	RANDALL FREDERICK	M	10/28/26	GS-14-04

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
D	OPS OFFICER	DDO	WASH., D.C.

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
INDONESIA	PCS-56	55/12/01	58/05/01
JAPAN	PCS-43	61/09/17	65/06/21

OVERSEAS DATA
C[illegible]
DATE: [illegible]
27 MAR 1968
F.G.

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, GENERAL	OMAHA MUN UNIV NEB	48
MSTR	INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS	GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV DC	53

FORM
1-67 444j
[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

6 8 APR ENTD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM./QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - TO			
1							
2							
3							
4	[illegible]						

5 IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

Currently PhD candidate at American University, Washington, D.C.

[illegible]

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) 25	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED — CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known).

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VII	**MILITARY SERVICE**

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1 ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2 SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3 LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4 IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD *(Active Duty Only)*

1 MILITARY ORGANIZATION *(Army, Navy, etc. - specify)*

2 BRANCH OR CORPS

3 DATES OF SERVICE *(extended active duty)* FROM TO

4 STATUS *(Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify)*

5 RANK, GRADE OR RATE *(at separation if past service)*

6 SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER *(Specify)*

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES *(record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)*

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3 EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY *(active)* ☐ STANDBY *(inactive)* ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES *(record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service).*

6 IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS.

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)*

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED		
1.					RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
2.					RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
3.					RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
4.					RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
5.					RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPO

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	MARITAL STATUS		
1 PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY No Change			
2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Maiden)
3 DATE OF BIRTH	4 PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)		
5 OCCUPATION	6 PRESENT EMPLOYER		
7 CITIZENSHIP	8 FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9 DATE U. S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED	

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Kirk Randall	son	6/19/51 Washington	U.S	1823 Dary Drive, McLea
Thomas Randall	son	12/2/52 "	"	" " " "
Joan Randall	dau.	10/4/56 Djakarta	"	" " " "
Barbara Randall	"	11/25/58 Alexandria	"	" " "

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO
American Society of International Law	Washington, D.C.	1967	Present

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
January 30, 1968	Frederick C Randall

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
5/2-170

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
RANDALL Frederick C.	October	28	1926

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
Indonesian 367	April	17	1959	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 21 11 01 AM '59

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

[✓ 3.] I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115 PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 17 April 1959	SIGNATURE Frederich Randall
(46) C	(47) I

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C 5 AUG

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE
4 February 1959

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Randall, Frederick Crawford
2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 2961 Sycamore Street, Alexandria, Va.
3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Same as 2.
4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: TE 6-0118
5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Virginia

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: Randall, Jean Fedel
2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 2961 Sycamore St., Alexandria, Va.
4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: None
5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: TE 6-0118
6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: None
7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: None
8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE. No

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED
2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS: None

SPOUSE: *If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.*

3. NAME: (First) Irma (Middle) Jean (Maiden) Fedel (Last) Randall
4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 3 June 1950
5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Omaha, Nebraska
6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): (Forgotten)
7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
8. DATE OF DEATH: --
9. CAUSE OF DEATH: --
10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 2961 Sycamore St., Alexandria, Va.
11. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Nov. 1926
12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Rock Springs, Wyoming
13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY: --
14. PLACE OF ENTRY: --
15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.
16. DATE ACQUIRED: --
17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): --
18. OCCUPATION: Housewife
19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers): --
20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): --

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM 444b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
4-57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
None

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) None
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.
--

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
None

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

9. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Riggs National Bank	Washington, D.C.

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

--

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP U.S.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS --

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

--

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREES
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	XX	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
University of Omaha	Govt	--	1946	1948	BA	1948	
George Washington University	Forn. Affairs	--	1950	1953	MA	1953	

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	
--	--			
--	--			

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	
--	--			
--	--			

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HQOTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING
Indonesia	Political life	1955-1958		x	

SECTION IX TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
25	--	☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)
--

SECTION X SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH
--

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK
--

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION A, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.
--

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.
--

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)	6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

--

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

--

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

--

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

--

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) Dec 1955 - May 1958
2. GRADE GS-12
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/MIA/Djakarta
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION None
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE FI Field Case Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Field Case Officer for six FI Operations

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) July 1958 - Present
2. GRADE GS-13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT ~~XXXX~~ DDP/FE/PIA/I
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 15
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Indonesian Desk Chief
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

In charge of Indonesian Desk.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) --
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT --
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION --
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE --
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES --

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) --
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT --
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION --
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE --
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES --

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) --
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT --
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION --
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE --
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES --

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 3 2 48 PM '59
MAIL ROOM

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	4	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Jean Randall	Wife	1926		x	U.S.	2961 Sycamore St. Alex., Va.
Kirk Randall	Son	1951	x		U.S.	Same as above
Thomas Randall	Son	1952	x		U.S.	Same as above
Joan Randall	Daughter	1956		x	U.S.	Same as above
Brbara Randall	Daughter	1958		x	U.S.	Same as above

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED 1 February 1959

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frederick C Randall

SECRET

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes (Yes or No)

Sec. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Mrs.~~ Mr. ~~Miss~~ Frederick (First) Crawford (Middle) Randall (Last)

Telephone: Office none Ext. Home JO-9-8126

PRESENT ADDRESS Apt. 25-J, 7000 Craig St. (St. and Number), Seat Pleasant (City), Md. (State), USA (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS Same (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME Fred WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NA

HOW LONG? NA IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS NA

(Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH Oct. 28, '26 PLACE OF BIRTH Omaha (City) Nebraska (State) USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? Yes BY MARRIAGE? NA

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. NA ISSUED (Date) BY (Court)

AT NA (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? NA TO ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS:

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? .... ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ....

LAST U. S. VISA NA (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 24 SEX Male HEIGHT 5' 10" WEIGHT 160 lbs.

EYES Blue HAIR Brown COMPLEXION Fair SCARS None

BUILD Medium OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES None

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE .... MARRIED Yes DIVORCED .... WIDOWED ....

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS NA

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Irma Jean Fedel Randall (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE June 3, 1950, Omaha, Nebraska

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 121 S. 58th Ave., Omaha, Nebr., USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Apt. 25-J, 7000 Craig St., Seat Pleasant, Md., USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Nov. 20, '26 PLACE OF BIRTH Rock Springs, Wyoming, USA (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Personnel clerk LAST EMPLOYER US Govt., Office of Price Stab.

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS 6th & Jefferson Dr., S.W., Washington, D. C. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM None (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

None

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME None (Expecting June, 1951) RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Clifford Edgar Randall (First) (Middle) (Last)
LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE ____
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 2727 Wyoming St., Omaha, Nebraska USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATE OF BIRTH 5-31-89 PLACE OF BIRTH South Haven, Michigan, USA (City) (State) (Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA
CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? ____ (City) (State) (Country)
OCCUPATION Wire Chief LAST EMPLOYER Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS Omaha, Nebraska (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
MILITARY SERVICE FROM None (Date) TO ____ (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ____
COUNTRY ____ DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN
None

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Bernice Crawford Randall (First) (Middle) (Last)
LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE ____
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 2727 Wyoming St., Omaha, Nebraska USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATE OF BIRTH 5-17-69 PLACE OF BIRTH Plano, Texas
CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? ____ (City) (State) (Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER NA

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM None TO BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME Clifford Edgar Randall, Jr. (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE 58
   PRESENT ADDRESS 4419 Spaulding, Omaha, Nebraska, USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) USA (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME Mary Margaret Randall Gliessmann (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE 52
   PRESENT ADDRESS 2886 Martin Ave., Omaha, Nebraska, USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) USA (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Ernest Serafino Fedel (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 701 Connecticut Ave., Rock Springs, Wyo., USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 4-26-99 PLACE OF BIRTH New York, New York

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Blacksmith LAST EMPLOYER Union Pacific Railroad

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Mabel Dorothy Potter House Zodel (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 701 Connecticut Ave., Rock Springs, Wyo., USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 5-5-1900 PLACE OF BIRTH Rock Springs, Wyoming

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER ....

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME None RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME None RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 5825
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY Yes

FREQUENTLY No CONSTANTLY No

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. Yes

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES No, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES Yes

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

Either in the greater Washington area, or in some foreign areas.

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL Clifton Hill ADDRESS Omaha, (City) Nebraska (State) USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1930-1939 GRADUATE? Yes

HIGH SCHOOL Benson High ADDRESS Omaha, (City) Nebraska (State) USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1940-1944 GRADUATE? Yes

COLLEGE Washington University ADDRESS St. Louis, Missouri USA
South Dakota State Coll. Brookings, (City) South Dakota (State) USA (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Pre-engineering YEARS COMPLETED One
One-half

DATES ATTENDED January 1944-Dec., 1944 DEGREE None,
Dec., 1944-March, 1945 None

COLLEGE University of Omaha ADDRESS Omaha, Nebraska USA
George Washington U. Washington, (City) D. C. (State) USA (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Government YEARS COMPLETED Two and one-half
Foreign Affairs One and one-half

DATES ATTENDED January 1947-Aug. 1948 DEGREE AB
October 1950-Sept. 1951 AM (complete requirements Sept. '51)

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS Government, History, Mathematics, Chemistry, Political Science, Economics

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS International Politics, International Organization, Latin American Politics, International Law

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

USA (Country) Army Air Forces (Service) PFC (Rank) 5/16/45-11/28/46 (Dates of Service)

Pacific Air Service Command, Manila, P. I., (Last Station) 17149257 (Serial Number) Honorable (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS:

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 50 ADDRESS Omaha, Nebraska

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON Veteran

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS None

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM Oct. 1950 TO Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) None

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Student, George Washington University

ADDRESS Washington, (St. and Number) D. C. (City) (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Student NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB NA SALARY $ 105 PER Mo. subsist.

YOUR DUTIES Graduate student

REASONS FOR LEAVING Desire position in my field of knowledge.

FROM Oct. 1948 TO Sept. 1950 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) None

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY C. A. Swanson & Sons

ADDRESS 1202 Douglas St., (St. and Number) Omaha, (City) Nebraska (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Food Manufacture NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Clarke Swanson

TITLE OF JOB Manufacturer's Rep. SALARY $ 275 plus expenses PER Mo.

YOUR DUTIES I represented my firm to various wholesalers and retailers handling Swanson merchandise, promoting and facilitating the distribution of the firm's products, and aided in the enlargement and development of the sales and distribution department of the firm.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Desired to obtain AM degree

FROM Jan. 1947 TO August 1948 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) None

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Student, University of Omaha

ADDRESS Omaha, Nebraska, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Student NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB Student SALARY $ 75 PER Mo. subsist.

YOUR DUTIES NA

REASONS FOR LEAVING Graduated with AB degree

FROM March, 1945 TO November, 1946 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) None

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Served in U. S. Army Air Forces

ADDRESS Washington, D. C., USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR Capt. Harold Royce

TITLE OF JOB Communications Chief SALARY $ 63 PER Mo.

YOUR DUTIES I was responsible for all incoming and outgoing communications in the Communications Section, Pacific Air Service Command, Manila, P.I. I supervised three civilian clerks in the performance of my duties.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Discharged from service.

FROM Dec. 1944 TO March 1945 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) None

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Student, South Dakota State College

ADDRESS Brookings, South Dakota, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Student NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB Student SALARY $ None PER

YOUR DUTIES Attended the University under the ASTRP program.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Entered Air Forces

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No.

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Spanish SPEAK Slight READ Fair WRITE Slight

LANGUAGE French SPEAK Slight READ Slight WRITE Slight

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Music - collecting recordings

Golf - fair

Swimming - good

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

None that are not previously listed

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

None

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 35 SHORTHAND none

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC.

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE No

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) .... LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ....

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

Honor Roll three times - University of Omaha

Rotary Selection - Boy Most Likely to Succeed

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

No

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. Mr. William J. Enderabee BUS. ADD. Dept. of Interior, Washington, D. C.
   RES. ADD. 3814 Albemarle, N.W. Washington, D. C.
2. Mr. James H. Ross, Sr. BUS. ADD. Unk.
   RES. ADD. 5034 Bedford Ave., Omaha, Nebraska
3. Mr. J. E. Arner BUS. ADD. Unk.
   RES. ADD. 5013 Western Ave., Omaha, Nebr.
4. Mr. F. Oscar Ellison BUS. ADD. 5804 Nicholas St., Omaha, Nebr.
   RES. ADD. Unk.
5. Mr. Frank J. Sabatka BUS. ADD. Unk.
   RES. ADD. 4124 Wirt St., Omaha, Nebraska

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. Mr. Gene Balaz BUS. ADD. Unk.
   RES. ADD. 5025 Bedford Ave., Omaha, Nebr.
2. Mr. Douglas Arner BUS. ADD. University of Mich., Ann Arbor, Mich.
   RES. ADD. 204 N. Ingalls, Ann Arbor, Michigan
3. Mr. Oscar Ellison BUS. ADD. Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa
   RES. ADD. 2928 Lincoln Way, Ames, Iowa
4. Mr. Edward Sabatka BUS. ADD. Unk.
   RES. ADD. 1920 C Street, Lincoln, Nebraska
5. Mr. James H. Ross, Jr BUS. ADD. Brandeis, Inc., Omaha, Nebraska
   RES. ADD. 5034 Bedford Avenue, Omaha, Nebraska

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. Mr. and Mrs. J. F. Stark BUS. ADD. Unk.
   RES. ADD. 4277 Wirt St. Omaha, Nebraska
2. Mr. and Mrs. J. A. MacCloud BUS. ADD. 4262 Wirt St. Omaha, Nebraska
   RES. ADD. " "
3. Mr. and Mrs. D. A. Baxter BUS. ADD. 4283 Wirt St. Omaha, Nebraska
   RES. ADD. " "

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME None

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS Hamilton National, Penna. Ave. Branch, Washington, D. C.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No

GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.

1. NAME Hamilton National Bank ADDRESS Penna. Ave. Branch, (St. and Number) Wash., (City) D.C. (State)
2. NAME C. A. Swanson & Sons ADDRESS 1202 Douglas, (St. and Number) Omaha, (City) Nebraska (State)
3. NAME Nebraska Clothing Co. ADDRESS 15th & Douglas Sts., (St. and Number) Omaha, (City) Nebr. (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM May 1951 TO Present Apt. 25-J, 7000 Greig St., (St. and number) Seat Pleasant, (City) Md. (State) USA (Country)

FROM Feb 1951 TO May 1951 1521 N. Abingdon, Apt 204 (St. and number) Arlington, (City) Va., (State) USA (Country)

FROM Sept 1950 TO Feb 1951 103 Missouri Ave., N.W., (St. and number) Washington, (City) D.C., (State) USA (Country)

FROM June 1950 TO Sept 1950 5014 Izard St., (St. and number) Omaha, (City) Nebraska, (State) USA (Country)

FROM 1949 TO June 1950 2727 Wyoming St., (St. and number) Omaha, (City) Nebraska, (State) USA (Country)

FROM 1926 TO 1949 4279 Wirt Street, (St. and number) Omaha, (City) Nebraska, (State) USA (Country)

FROM TO (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM TO (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM Nov '45 TO Sept '46 Manila, (City or section) Philippine Islands, (Country) Air Force duty (Purpose)

FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. Omaha Post #1, The American Legion, (Name and Chapter) 20th & Dodge Sts., (St. and Number) Omaha, (City) Nebraska (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1947-1950

2. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

3. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

4. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

5. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

6. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

7. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES," EXPLAIN: No

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? Yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Mild

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

None

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

None

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Mrs. Jean Randall RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS Apt 25-J, 7000 Greig St., Seat Pleasant, Md. USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Seat Pleasant, Maryland DATE May 4, 1951
(City and State)

Jean Randall Frederick C. Randall
(Witness) (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16 [illegible]

STANDARD FORM 66
[illegible]
PRESCRIBED BY U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 72-727 BOX 26

SECRET

73 JUN ENTD

(F)

TERMINATED

PIVALL, Vincent C.

Consolidated file
#48

NOTICE: This is an Office of Personnel File and subject to 10 day limitation period. This file has been charged to Messin/ 70T.A; and is due to be returned to CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, 5E-67 Hqs., x7841, as of ________.

~~RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER~~
~~IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE~~
~~JOB [illegible] BOX [illegible]~~

204536

SECRET

Documents dated 1953-1955
- 1973

David S. MORALES

SECRET

SECRET – SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTRACT PERSONNEL

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

RETURN FILE TO 5E65

NOTICE: This is an Office of Personnel File and subject to 10 day limitation period. This file has been charged to [illegible] / [illegible]; and is due to be returned to CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, 5E-67 Hqs., x7841, as of ________.

JOB [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

JOB [illegible] BOX # 14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. EMPL. SERIAL NO. 063385

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

EOD: 16 Apr 1946

2. NAME: MORALES, David Sanchez

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Aug 1925

5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE: 5 May 1952

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married

7. DEPENDENTS (Exclud. employee): NO. 9 YEARS: 1926, 1952, 1953, 1955, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1962, 1963

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA SPOUSE: ?

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS: MEMBERSHIP Dec 1955 OTHER STATUS

10. LAST MED. EXAM.: Dec 1973

QUAL. FOR: THIS TDY ONLY

QUAL. FOR: TDY Standby

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NONE X SERVICE GRADE ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. TO BE DEFERRED CAT. RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT
1944 Morrison Knutson Co, LA, Calif - Carpenter (summer)
1944-45 Immaculate Heart School, Phoenix, Ariz - Physical Ed Instr (7 mos, part-time)
1945-46 Soledad Catholic Grammar School, Los Angeles - Physical Ed Instr (4 mos, part-time)
1946-53 Military Service, US Army, Sgt (1951-53, detailed to CIA) [redacted]

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION
1944-45 Arizona State College - Law
1945 Univ of California, Los Angeles - Law (summer)
1945-46 Univ of Southern California, Los Angeles - Law
1946 Ft Benning, Ga - Parachutist (2 mos)
1947 CIC, Camp Holabird, Baltimore, Md - Special Agent (5 mos)
1949-53 Univ of Maryland, Germany - Political Science (night)

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)
German - R,W,U Slight; P,S, Inter; T, None - May 1957
Spanish - R,P,S, High; W, Inter; U, Native; T, None - May 1957 -- [redacted] Prof Apr 1973

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING
1955 [redacted] 1955 [redacted] 1973 [redacted]
1954 [redacted] 1955 [redacted] 1955 [redacted]
1954 1955 1965
1954 1955 1965
1954 1955

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	" "
May 1958	" "	0136.51	13	D	DDP/WH-3/Cuba Station	Havana
Jun 1960	" "	0136.51	14	D	DDP/WH-4/Cuba Station	"
Oct 1960	Ops Off.	0136.01	14	D	DDP/WH/Br-4/Ch, CI	JMWAVE
May 1961	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/WH-4/USF/DCh, FOS/Ch, Ops	"
May 1962	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/TFW/US/FOS/Ch, Spec Ops	"
Feb 1963	" "	0136.01	13	D	DDP/WH/SAS/US/FOS/Ch, FI	"
	Jan-Mar 1962 - Special Assignment [redacted]				JMWAVE	
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I - Continued)	
163305		
NAME (Last-First-Middle)		DATE OF BIRTH
MORALES, David Sanchez		26 Aug 1925

[illegible]

10. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Oct 1971	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Feb 1972	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Jul 1973	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Aug 1973	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

DATE REVIEWED	PROFILE REVIEWED BY
[illegible]	[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
063385	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
MORALES, David Sanchez	26 Aug 1925

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE, OUTLINE, AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

SEE COVER HISTORY ATTACHED.

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1959 from Chief of Station, Havana, for superior performance of duty. Endorsed by Chief, WH Division.

Commendation from DCI for [redacted] 76

Expression of Commendation 1961 from COB, JMWAVE for Subject's contribution to the JMATE project.

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
[illegible]	[illegible]

SECRET

Documents Dated 1954
" " 1975

Copy of Bio - Sanitized for HSCA

David S. Morales

SECRET

14-00000

X X B

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED 23 January 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER 034959	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [redacted] Morales David S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 02 DAY 03 YEAR 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3132-2001-1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/~~Task Force W~~ SAS U. S. Field Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE Paramilitary Section	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER (05)	12. POSITION NUMBER 0739	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS (10)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 (1)	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 14,565

18. REMARKS

Recorded by
CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/Pers.	DATE SIGNED 23 Jan 63	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 23 Jan. 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGRATE CODE	24. HOSPITAL CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	61730	SAS	99999		2	08 26 25	02 03 63	02 03 63

28. MIL. EXP. RES. MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 32
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 = CSC 2 = FICA 3 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRESPONDENCE ... DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAREER/PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES HEALTH INSURANCE CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERV. LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. FAIT CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XXB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 August 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 024959

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 19 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3132-2072-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/Task Force W   U. S. Field
Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE
Paramilitary Section

3
A

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (PP)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0739

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (GS)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 (2)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 12,470

18. REMARKS
From: DDP/TFW/JMWAVE, Off.Chief, #721. Tray 3

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Louis W. Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/FEB.
DATE SIGNED: 20 Aug 62

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: D. McCollum
DATE SIGNED: 22 Aug 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 31
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 21230 ALPHABETIC FFW
22. STATION CODE: 09947
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOSPITAL CODE: 2
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 08 DA. 26 YR. 25
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. DATE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPEC. REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
FOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT 2 = 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. FEGLI
39. FED. & HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 12 MOS. 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 12 MOS.
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 08/23/62

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. Ragan
DATE APPROVED: 8/29/62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 August 1961

XXB [illegible]

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 034359

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 20 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2135 [illegible]-5000-8021

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

3A

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH ~~[illegible]~~ US FIELD
Branch 4
Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER-{DCOS} (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0721

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (CO)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 (1)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $12,210 ✓

18. REMARKS

1 copy to Security

[illegible] 67
[illegible]
V9

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Herbert V. Juel
HERBERT V. JUEL, C/WH/4/Pers.

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Louis W. Armstrong

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 13	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64530 / ALPHABETIC 10H	STATION CODE 99409	[illegible]	[illegible] CODE 2	25. DATE OF BIRTH 08 26 25	DATE OF GRADE 06 26 60	DATE OF [illegible] 06 26 60
[illegible]	SPECIAL REFERENCE	RETIREMENT DATA CODE 1	SEPARATION DATA CODE	CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	[illegible] NO. [illegible]	SEX M	
VET. PREFERENCE CODE 1	SERV. COMP. DATE 0-11 16 46	LONG. COMP. DATE 05 05 52	[illegible] CODE 2	FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE 1	HEALTH INS. CODE	[illegible] —		
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 1	[illegible] 8	FEDERAL TAX DATA C	[illegible] C	STATE TAX DATA —	—	—	STATE CODE —	

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kiernan 8/15/61

46. C.P. APPROVAL: Joseph E. Hagan/J[illegible]

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 August 1961

XXF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 063385 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MORALES, David S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 19 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2535-5000-8021 ✓

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH Divn.
Branch 4

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000 *

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 (1)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 12,210 ✓

18. REMARKS:

* WH/pln assigned

1 copy to Security

BY CSPD
V?

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Herbert V. Juul
HERBERT V. JUUL, C/WH/4/Pers.

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGRATION CODE:
24. [illegible] CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 08 DA. 26 YR. 25
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. [illegible] EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 4 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 120,009,1
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT, 2 = 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. [illegible] CODE: 1 = YES, 2 = NO
39. FEGL / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPT.
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8/1/61
46. O.P. APPROVAL: 8/21

FORM 8-60 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 October 1960

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 563385 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MORALES, David S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT (TEMPORARY)*

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: 11 23 60 ~~20 30 60~~

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1535-5000-0021

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH Division Branch 4

4617

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS. OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: XXXXX 0060

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14(1)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $12,210

18. REMARKS

DDP/WH/4/Havana BAF 116.81 trav 9

*UPON TERMINATION OF THIS TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT YOU WILL BE REASSIGNED AS THE HEAD OF YOUR CAREER SERVICE DIRECTS.

DOG: 06-26-60
PSI: 12-24-61 O.C. Davis

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Herbert Juul
HERBERT V. JUUL, C/WH/4/Pers.

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

20. ACTION CODE: 37

21. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

22. CHARGE CODE: NUMERIC 64450 ALPHABETIC WH

23. STATION CODE: 25013

24. REQ. CODE

25. DATE OF BIRTH: 06 26 25

26. DATE OF GRADE

27. DATE OF LEI

28. NTE EXPIRES

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 2 = FICA 3 = NONE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT 2 = 10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE

37. LONG. COMP. DATE

38. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 12 MOS 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 12 MOS

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA

44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W Kearney 11/2/60

46. O.P. APPROVAL

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 October 1960

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 063385
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MORALES, DAVID S.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: 8OB MO. 10 DAY ~~COB~~ ~~14~~ 15 YEAR 60
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135 5450 3000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 4
HAVANA, CUBA STATION 4653

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HAVANA, CUBA
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: BAF-116
12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 12,210

18. REMARKS

Subject resigned from the Department of State effective COB 14 October 1960.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

POG: 06-26-60
PSI: 12-24-61

[illegible] by
CCPD
10-18-60

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JC Bowers

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: AC Ryan

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: [illegible]
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 01
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 642[illegible] ALPHABETIC WH4
22. STATION CODE: 17085
23. INTEGRATE CODE:
24. HONORS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. RTI EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/CODE: 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. CLEARANCE CERT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPT. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible]
46. O.P. APPROVAL: AC Ryan

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 63385	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) ROHALEY, DAVID C	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 12 Da. 06 Yr. 54		
7. SCD Mo. 04 Da. 16 Yr. 46	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority [illegible]	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 05 Da. 05 Yr. 52	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code 2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH ~~III~~ 4 HAVANA, CUBA STATION	Code 4652	15. Location Of Official Station HAVANA, CUBA	Station Code 17085
16. Dept.-Field Dept.- USfld.- Frgn.- Code 5	17. Position Title ASST ATT POL OF 10 FI	18. Position No. 0116 73-10	19. Serv. FSR GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.51			
21. Grade & Step ~~XX~~ 05 ~~X~~, ~~X~~ 13 3	22. Salary Or Rate $ ~~XXXX~~ 8140 ~~XXXX~~ ~~10970~~ 10,130	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 07 08 57
25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. ~~[illegible]~~ 09 04 60	26. Appropriation Number 0135 5450 3000 ~~XXXXXXXXXXX~~		

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code 31	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. 06 26 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code -93	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code 17085
33. Dept.-Field Dept.- USfld.- Frgn.- Code 5	34. Position Title	35. Position No. 0116.51	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series			
38. Grade & Step 14 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 11355	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 06 26 60
42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 12 27 61	43. Appropriation Number		

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) B. C. Bowers
B. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
JOHN WASHINKO X8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[illegible]	6/28/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	WK	6-28-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		[illegible]/60

Remarks This Personal Rank assignment is in accordance with R 20-580, Para. 3.e. (1), and will be for an approximate period of 2 years.
GS-13 is maximum [illegible] for [illegible]
[illegible]

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1152

SECRET

(4)

5/31/60

EPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

Pre 1960 documents - removed

Post 1963 documents - removed

Copies of Sanitized documents

SECRET

David S. MORALES

SECRET

N.B. ITEMS ORIGINAL BELOW THIS PAPER MARKED WITH GREASE PENCIL WERE RECEIVED THAT WAY BY CUBA DESK - AUG 78 -

SECRET

SECRET

S-1340

19 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : **David S. Morales**

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/or have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly blocked XXXXXXX to deny XXXXXXXXXX Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of Mr. Biladeau

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
for Chief, Central Cover XXXXXXX Group

cc: SSD/OS

SECRET

FORM 1-58 1580a (4-13-60)

XXB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 06/04/64

1 SERIAL NUMBER 063385	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) Morales, Carlos [redacted]		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 02 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO CF ☒	7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE 4132 2001 1000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS DDP SAS US FLD FOS JMWAVE	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION JMWAVE		
11 POSITION TITLE PARAMIL OFF CH	12 POSITION NUMBER 1039	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB etc) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.11	16 GRADE AND STEP 15	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

POSTED ON
OF-4b

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

06/12/64 WK

Form [illegible] 1150b [illegible] 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

1 [illegible] JUL 1965

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

595

1 Serial No.	2 Name			3 Cost Center Number				4 LWOP Hours		
063389	Morales, Raul S. [redacted]			49 730 CF						
5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	1	$15,665	02/03/63	GS 15	2	$16,180	02/02/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY 23
SALARY CONTINGENT ON CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL Joseph B. Ray

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Orville C. Dunn DATE 10 Jan 64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

595

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS. EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN FUNDS		GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Morales, Raul S. [redacted]	063389	49 730	CF	GS 15 1	$14,565	$15,665

POSTED ON
OF-4b

BAB: 11 FEB 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 034959	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted] Morales, David S.		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 02 DA. 03 YR. 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3132 2001 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP SAS U S FIELD FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION-JMWAVE PARAMILITARY SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION JMWAVE		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0739	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 14565

18. REMARKS

POSTED [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERICAL	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	61730	SAS	99999		2	08 26 25	02 03 63	02 03 63

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
	80						

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR | 37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP) CODE | 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS CODE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE, NO TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

538

SECRET

(14-51) (When Filled In)

034959	[redacted]		61 730	C0

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS-14	2	$13,270	12/24/61	GS-14	3	$13,695	12/23/62			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Charles W Matt DATE: 13 Nov 62

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

ARM: 29 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCE

1. SERIAL NUMBER 034959	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) [redacted] Morales, David S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR [illegible] 12 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	3132 2041 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP TASK FORCE "W" US FIELD FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION JMWAVE PARAMILITARY SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1730	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 13270

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON [illegible] 1962
glu [illegible] 6 SEP

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Budget Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
32	10	51730	JFW	[illegible]		2	[illegible] 23 25		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION OR CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR PERM PROV TEMP	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 1 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 2 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 4 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954 O-500080

1. Designation
4
[redacted]

2. Payroll [illegible]
3. Block No.
4. Slip No.

Grade and salary
GS-14 $12,210

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
jlv 7 Dec 1961

13. Audited by

ay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

16. Old salary rate
$12,210

17. New salary rate
$12,470

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better
Joseph B. Ragan
(Signature or other authentication)

apses covering LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

se LWOP ______ Initials of Clerk

ised
. 8.
tions No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 . SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
Morales, David S. [redacted]	034959	41730	CF	14 2	$12470	14 2	$13270

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AES: 29 AUG 61

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 034959

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] Morales, David S. [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 08 DA 20 YR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2535 5000 8021

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH US FIELD
BRANCH 4
FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION JMWAVE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER DCOS

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0721

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 1

17. SALARY OR RATE: 12210

18. REMARKS

9/4-13 Sep 61

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
13	10	64530	WH	99999		2	08 25 25	06 26 60	06 26 60

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32. MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY BLO NO	34. SEX
		1					00000	M1

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
1	04 16 46	05 05 52	2	1		

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERV (E) MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
1	8	0	0				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ECHOL

09/05/61 2K

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ARE:29 AUG 1961

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 063385	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MORALES DAVID S		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 08 19 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS V TO V ; V TO CF CF TO V ; X CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2535 5000 8021	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 4	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0000	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 12210

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 45	20 Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 08 26 25	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE 1800091	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX	
35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

08/31/61 WK

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-81)

8/31/61

23 NOV 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 063385
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MORALES DAVID S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT (TEMPORARY)*
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 11 | 23 | 60
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1535 5000 0021
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH DIVISION
BRANCH 4
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12210
18. REMARKS:

* UPON TERMINATION OF THIS TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT YOU WILL BE REASSIGNED AS THE HEAD OF YOUR CAREER SERVICE DIRECTS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64450 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 08 | 26 | 25
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
38. MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

12/01/60 WK

L

Form 1150 23NOV Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-61)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCT 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 3385
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): MORALES DAVID S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 10 DA 15 YR 60 (EOD)
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135 5450 3000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH BRANCH 4 HAVANA CUBA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HAVANA CUBA
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0116
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12210
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 56
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64750 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 17085
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Region Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 08 DA 26 YR 25
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. LTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY RFQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. MIL. SERV CREDIT/LEO: 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/25/60 WK

L I

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	MORALES DAVID S	563385	46 53	GS-14 1	$11,355	$12,210

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 24 JUNE 1960

1. Serial No. 563385	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MORALES DAVID S	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 08 Da. 26 Yr. 25	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 12 Da. 06 Yr. 54
7. SCD Mo. 04 Da. 16 Yr. 46	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Anmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 05 Da. 05 Yr. 52
13. [illegible] Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH III HAVANA, CUBA STATION	Code 4652	15. Location Of Official Station HAVANA, CUBA	Station Code 17085
16. Dept. - Field Dept. - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 5	17. Position Title ASST ATT POL OF 10 FI	18. Position No. 0116	19. Serv. FSR GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.51	21. Grade & Step 05 13 2	22. Salary Or Rate 8140 $ 10130	23. SD D
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 09 Da. 08 Yr. 57	25. PSI Due Mo. 03 Da. 08 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 8 3545 55 055	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code OM	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 4 HAVANA, CUBA STATION	Code 4653	32. Location Of Official Station HAVANA, CUBA	Station Code 17085
33. Dept. - Field Dept. - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 5	34. Position Title ASST ATT POL OF 10 FI	35. Position No. 0116.81	36. Serv. FSR GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.51	38. Grade & Step 05 14 1	39. Salary Or Rate 8140 $ 11355	40. SD D
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 60	42. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 24 Yr. 61	43. Appropriation Number 0135 5450 3000	

44. Remarks

POSTED

06-30-60 JK

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

A S 6/30/60

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1 EMP SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ASSIGNED ORGAN	4 FUNDS	5 ALLOTMENT
563385	MORALES DAVID S	DDP/WH — 7	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR
GS 13	1	$ 9,890	09	08	57	GS 13	2	$10,130	03	08	59

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY:

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
ROBERT N. DAHLGREN	24 Feb. 1959	Robert N. Dahlgren

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MORALES DAVID S	563385	GS-13-1	$ 8,990	$ 9,890

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
063385

SECTION A MORALES, DAVID S. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 08-26-25	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Paramil Off Ch.	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
X CAREER
☐ RESERVE
☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL
X ANNUAL
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
01 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Branch Chief in charge of JMWAVE's paramilitary operations. The PM Branch employs 35 people and is charged with the responsibility of mounting UDT, commando, cache, infiltration and exfiltration operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spots, assesses, and recruits PM agents.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Established plans and programs for a counter-insurgency operation in [redacted] [illegible] Country	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops concepts for contingency plans which can be used if a popular uprising takes place in PBRUMEN.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Special Assistant to COS and available for trouble-shooting tasks in Central America.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

15 JUN 1965

FORM 45 SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

FILE OF PERSONNEL

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

MAY 21 5 17 PM '65

In the period April to December 1964, Subject was the Chief of JMWAVE's Paramilitary Branch. In this capacity he was charged with the responsibility of mounting successful paramilitary operations into a denied area. Subject met his responsibilities in an exemplary manner and his Branch did mount successful operations into PBRUMEN in which intelligence was collected, resistance nuclei were establised in the rural areas of PBRUMEN, and in- and exfiltration routes were developed whereby supplies and men could be moved in and out of PBRUMEN. In addition, his Branch maintained a UDT and a Commando unit in a high state of combat readiness. The UDT and Commando units were not used operationally in their specialties because of policy prohibitions against committing them against the PBRUMEN target; however, they were available to meet contingency situations. Subject's performance as a Branch Chief was characterized by drive, dedication, reliability, imagination, and the use of sound first-echelon management techniques. Subject is realistic and effective in delegating authority and responsibility to his subordinates. Subject has the ability to weld into a cohesive unit a diverse group of men who are Staff agents, Career Agents, Contract Employees, and military personnel on detail to KUBARK. This quality of leadership developed sound principles of team work in the PM Branch and made it easy for the Branch to coordinate its activities with the programs of the other Branches in a Station that has over 300 employees and is engaged in (continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
22 May 65	/s/ ZAMKA, Stanley R. at Station

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
35		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
22 May 65	Chief of Station	/s/ REUTEMAN, Andrew K. /s/ pseudo on Fld Tr.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur in Supervisor's evaluation of this employee.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 June 1965	ADC/WH/C	John T. Flynn

SECRET

SECTION C - Narrative Comments (Continued)

sensitive

FI, CI, PW, PM, Maritime, Air, and [redacted] operations. Subject is cost-conscious and effective in the use of space and equipment.

In the period January to March 1965, Subject filled the role of Special Assistant to the Chief of Station JMWAVE and, as such, was the operational supervisor for the establishment of a frame of reference in which a counter-insurgency program could be developed and implemented in Peru. In this phase of his activities, Subject's work had the hallmark of sound professionalism and reflected favorably on Subject's judgment, Spanish language fluency, area knowledge, and dedication to duty.

The totality of the information outlined above leads the Rating Officer to conclude that Subject's over-all performance warrants an evaluation of Strong.

Subject is a flexible, broad-gauged officer who has experience in depth in FI, CI, PW, PM and Maritime operations. In addition, he has a proven record of sustained performance whereby he has established that he can be counted on to do the job in less than allowable time limits. In view of these factors, it is believed that Subject is a valuable asset to his career service and, as such, can meet the long-term needs of his service in Latin America or other Spanish-speaking areas.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
03355

SECTION A [illegible] GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 08-26-25	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Paramil. Officer (Ch)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
01 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 - Supervises the Paramilitary Branch which employs 35 people and is charged with the responsibility of mounting UDT, commando raider, caching, resistance, and ratline operations at a Station which has 306 employees.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spots, assesses, and recruits selected PM agents.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 - Targets resistance and ratline operations against geographic areas which are of priority interest due to their intelligence and resistance potential.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Senior Case Officer for a long-range, sensitive Central American operation which has PM, PW and FI ramifications.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Develops concepts and plans for commando raids.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Develops concepts for contingency and war plans for a denied area. These concepts relate to the use of existing PM assets.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

9 JUL 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

- See Attached Continuation Sheet -

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 13 June 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted] (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 13 June 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed in pseudo on Field Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Having on numerous occasions had the opportunity to observe closely [redacted]'s work, I heartily concur in the supervisor's remarks and ratings.

DATE 1 July 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, WH (SA)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Bruce B. Cheever

SECRET

Continuation Sheet/FITNESS REPORT - Section C:

Subject is a dedicated officer who has proven by performance that he can be counted on to get the job done in less than allowable time limits. Subject is a sound first-echelon supervisor of a group doing a basic paramilitary job. Subject has the ability to develop a sense of teamwork in a diverse group of employees. It is believed that this leadership trait is particularly significant in that Subject has judiciously blended the talents of staff agents, career agents, contract employees, Army officers and Navy personnel into a cohesive, effective group which has been able to mount successful resistance, ratline, cache, UDT, and commando operations against an insular denied area target. Subject is cost conscious and effective in the use of space, equipment, and funds. Subject has been able to keep his agent assets in a high state of combat readiness despite shifts in policy which have placed the UDT, sabotage and commando raider operations in a high state of flux. This ability to manage agent assets under conditions of severe frustration is a tribute to Subject's area knowledge and an understanding of the psychology and mores of his agent material. Subject delegates authority and has control over the paper flow in his Branch. Subject has a fine appreciation for positive intelligence collection techniques and he has been able to relate those techniques to his PM operations so that an intelligence product of quality has been developed on the rural areas of the target country. As a result of the totality of Subject's performance during the period covered by this report, his over-all performance warrants an evaluation of Strong.

Subject has Spanish language fluency, operational experience, area knowledge and drive. Armed with those tools, Subject is capable of meeting the long-term needs of his career service in Spanish-speaking operational areas where there is a need for first-echelon supervisors. Subject is at his best in agent handling situations and in view of this in the future, it is believed that he should be used in Latin America under commercial cover to run and/or manage appropriate FI, CI, or PM projects.

At the completion of his current assignment, Subject should attend an advanced management course.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 034959

SECTION A — GENERAL

[illegible]

1. NAME (Last) [redacted] (First) [redacted] (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 Aug. 1925	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY	
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					
SPECIAL (Specify):					

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1962 thru 31 March 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for the supervision and management of the PM Branch which has 25 employees.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spots, selects and recruits selected PM agent candidates.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops concepts and plans for PM infiltration operations which have an intelligence collection mission as well as a resistance mission.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops concepts and plans for Commando/Raider operations.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Serves as a senior case officer on a sensitive long range operation which has PM, FI and PW ramifications.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Targets PM operations against priority intelligence and resistance targets.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

POSTED ON
-OF-A[illegible]

28 JUN 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject is a hard working, dedicated officer who has an unusual amount of drive. Subject is a distinct asset to the Station. In the period covered by this Fitness Report, Subject has worked in a persevering manner toward the goal of making the Station's PM operations responsive to the realities of a target area which moved in twelve months time from a soft free world operational climate to a classical hard Soviet Bloc-denied area climate. Subject has had to accomplish his PM mission under the adverse circumstances of having to do a current job in response to strong pressures for immediate production while simultaneously cleaning up an operational backlog which was inherited from predecessor projects. Additionally Subject had to project his PM plans into the future against a predictable operational climate in which only the most rigid application of sound PM techniques would enable the Station to continue operations against the target with either PM infiltration teams or commando raider units. Subject accomplished these multiple tasks despite the reluctance of the agent material from the target area to accept the rigid discipline and dedication which was required.

Subject was able to accomplish his PM mission by the use of sound operational concepts and principles, the delegation of authority, and the proper use of management techniques. Subject has an appreciation for intelligence and has harnessed his PM assets to provide valuable bread and butter type coverage on the rural areas of the target.

(See continuation sheet attached)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE MAY 11 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/[redacted] (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE [illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject is one of the "mainstays" of the WAVE Station. I concur in the evaluation of the supervisor.

DATE 28 June 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, SAS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Bruce B. Cheever Bruce B. Cheever

SECRET

Fitness Report - Section C - NARRATIVE COMMENTS (Continued)

Subject is at his best in agent handling situations. He uses his Spanish language fluency, experience, and area knowledge to the maximum extent possible in order to develop assets for KUBARK operational exploitation. On balance, therefore, it is believed that Subject's overall performance over the period covered by this Fitness Report warrants an evaluation of "Strong".

At the completion of his current assignment Subject might benefit from participation in an advanced management course.

In the future Subject should be used in unofficial cover positions in Latin America. Subject is a natural for this type of an assignment due to his drive, self discipline, experience, language fluency, and skin color.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 034959

SECTION A [redacted] GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 Aug. 1925	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TFW, JMWAVE	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1962

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1June61 To 31March62

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Spotting, developing recruiting, & handling FI agent assets in the field.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintaining contact with PBRUMEN exile community in WAVE area, and reporting information gleaned.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting, developing & recruiting small PM reconnaissance teams.	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 provides background, continuity and guidance on PBRUMEN matters to all station officers.	7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Spotting & assessing senior political PBRUMENS for hqs.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5/6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

[redacted]

Although designated as Chief of Operations, WAVE, during the entire period that Mr [redacted] has been under my supervision he has been occupied with a highly sensitive special operation controlled by Hqs, and has not been able to execute his normal duties. I have been able to closely observe his work, and can more than attest to tremendous drive and energy and this all-around professional capability, attested to in previous fitness reports. Mr. [redacted] is a truly exceptional operations officer and is best utilized in that role, rather than in an administrative or supervisory capacity, although his own administrative responsibilities are always well handled. Perhaps his greatest contribution to the Station during the reporting period has been his vast background and knowledge of the complex PBRUMEN picture which he cheerfully and unstintingly makes available to all Station officers, many of whom are without previous WHD experience.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 5 May 1962

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: [redacted] (signed in true name)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 4

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS

☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 9 May 1962

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: COS, JMWAVE

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Alfred D. Cox

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE:

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, TFW

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: William K. Harvey

SECRET

69   **SECRET**   4

(When Filled In)

16

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 062335 CSPD

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MORALES David S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 August 1925	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH, Br. 4, D.C.

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD From: 1Apr60 To: 31March61

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Spotting, developing, recruiting and handling FI agent assets in the field	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting, developing, recruiting and handling PM assets in the field as well as directing PM action	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Drafting of intel and operational reports	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5/6

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 5-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.   **SECRET**   (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

12 21 PH '61

Subject is the finest all-around ops officer I have ever known. Primarily he is a man of action who knows what has to be done, and goes about doing it. He is a tireless, dedicated worker who puts duty before any personal considerations. He has imagination coupled with good common sense and sound operational judgment. He is steady and cool during emergency situations. He has worked under constant strain and pressure over periods of several months without cracking or losing his sense of humor. He has strong leadership qualities, inspires confidence and loyalty in those he works for and with. He is especially effective in getting the most out of indigenous agents. He has exhibited great personal courage. He was respected by the Embassy officers and representatives of other agencies with whom he was in contact. He speaks Spanish fluently and is thoroughly conversant with Latin psychology. His operational and intelligence reporting, though not always polished products, are complete and lucid. He has a great capacity for work. He has the potential for assuming greater responsibility and for advancement in the Agency.

During the period under review Subject was in charge of PM activities at the Havana Station, and his performance of duties during this critical, tense period was outstanding.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 3 May 1961
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 24 months
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON:
☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 5 May 1961
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief of Station
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: James [illegible] Noel

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE: 1 June 61
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/OPS/WHD
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Jacob D. Esterline

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

10 ...

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 063385

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* MORALES	*(First)* David	*(Middle)* Sanchez	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 Aug 25	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH, Br. 4, D.C.	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS						9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED	☐	INITIAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED	☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

11. REPORTING PERIOD *From* 28 Oct 60 thru *To* 31 May 61

SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1 Responsible for organizing, training and direction of an intelligence and counterintelligence group.	7	NO. 4	
NO. 2 Responsible for providing intelligence and counterintelligence support to all sections of a Base	6	NO. 5	
NO. 3 Direction of a Counterintelligence Section for a Base.	6	NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 6

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER *(Specify)*: Handling and accounting for official funds							X

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-53 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Speaking operationally, Mr. Morales is a one-man gang. His work is of the highest order, quantitatively and qualitatively. The JMWAVE operation being what it is, all officers should be versatile. This Mr. Morales is. His titles -- first, Chief, CI, and more recently Chief of the combined CI-FI Section -- do not even suggest the breadth of his activities. They take in denied area intelligence collection operations, the organization, training and management of a counter-intelligence apparatus and allied groups totalling over 300 people, sabotage and resistance ops, maritime ops, political action, propaganda and a great number of miscellaneous activities that defy classification, e.g., taking over and running a fast-moving PM recruitment program without loss of tempo when politics caused the breakdown of the normal recruitment machinery, setting up a Red Cross type service for queries from the trainees in camp.

For sustained effort, Mr. Morales has few peers. With his drive, imagination and good judgment he sets a fine example for the people who work with him, whether they find themselves under, alongside or above him in the organizational hierarchy.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 12 July 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Nine	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 12 July 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Base, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert Reynolds

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 31 JUL 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH/4	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE R. K. DAVIS

SECRET

SECRET

11 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Agent Panel

SUBJECT : [redacted] - Promotion

Morales, David S,

1. [redacted] has been in the vortex of Cuban field operations for the past four and one-half years and has developed into a senior operations officer with outstanding abilities, experience and professional stature.

2. During the past two major operational efforts against Cuba he has proven himself to be a superior agent handler with ready access to members of the exile community and ability to start and run operations which produced valuable intelligence. His background knowledge of the area has been invaluable to the JMWAVE Station operators and his tireless efforts and willingness to devote long hours to his work have set an example which others have been compelled to follow.

3. Regardless of [redacted]'s time in grade he is of that senior officer caliber fully deserving of and ready to assume the responsibilities of the next higher grade. [redacted] has displayed outstanding performance in FI, CI and PM operations and has the potential to fill a wide variety of senior operational assignments.

4. In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend the promotion of [redacted] from GS-14 to GS-15. I have discussed this action with the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and he endorses my view that [redacted] fully merits advancement to the next higher grade at this time.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Finance Division

THROUGH : Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Designation of Officers Eligible for Premium Pay

REFERENCES : A. Memorandum to ADCI from General Counsel, dated 29 May 1962, Subject: Delegation of Authority (OGC 62-1131)

B. Memorandum to Deputy Director (Support) from SSA-DD/S, dated 7 February 1962, Subject: Emergency Allowance

C. Memorandum to Deputy Director (Support) from Chief, Task Force W, dated 28 May 1962, Subject: Allowances and Emoluments for Personnel assigned to JMWAVE, JMBAR and Supporting Agency Components at the same Geographic Area

1. The following individuals assigned PCS at JMWAVE qualify for premium pay in accordance with reference memoranda:

STAFF AGENTS - JMWAVE [redacted] AND ABOVE

NAME (P)	GS
[redacted]	[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible]

2. Authority to make this payment is contained in reference memoranda and no amendment to the supplement to their staff agent personnel action is required. The effective day of such premium pay will be the beginning of the first pay period following 1 June 1962.

William K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

/s/ Harry W. Little, Jr.

APPROVED: Director of Personnel

Date

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - Director of Personnel
1 - Office of Communications
1 - Office of Logistics
1 - Chief, TFW
1 - TFW/Personnel

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT/SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO UFG-T-495

TO Chief, WHD

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO

FROM Chief of Base, JMWAVE

DATE [illegible]

SUBJECT Commendation [redacted] DAVID S. MORALES

ACTION REQUIRED Please place in personnel file

RE: "43.3" – (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

1. For the information of Headquarters and for [redacted] personnel file, WAVE wishes to express commendation of [redacted]s contribution to the JMATE project. Beginning with his arrival in the WAVE area in October 1960, [redacted] initiated an operational program directed to the establishment of a Cuban intelligence service, both for positive collection of intelligence and to establish protective security on JMATE operations. In a remarkably short time, [redacted] was able to recruit, train, and organize such a service which has effectively responded to intelligence and counter intelligence operational tasks, and has shown willingness and ability to ably perform a number of support functions for other types of substantive operations, principally para-military. In addition, the Cuban service which [redacted] organized is likely to be the nucleus of a post-Castro Cuban Government service which will serve KUBARK ends, not only on the basis of liaison, but by means of penetrations of this service already established.

2. In the swift accomplishment of so many objectives, [redacted] has shown executive ability, diplomacy, energy and imagination commensurate with a grade level well in excess of his own.

[redacted]

ROBERT REYNOLDS

PJM/asp

12 April 1961

Distribution:
~~3~~ - Headquarters
2 - Files

DISPATCH

RYBAT/SECRET

[illegible]-495

Chief, WHD

Chief of Base, JMWAVE

Commendation - [redacted]

Please place in personnel file

INDEXING - CHECK "X" ONE
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

Morales, [illegible] S.

1. For the information of Headquarters and for [redacted] personnel file, WAVE wishes to express commendation of [redacted]'s contribution to the JMATE project. Beginning with his arrival in the WAVE area in October 1960, [redacted] initiated an operational program directed to the establishment of a Cuban intelligence service, both for positive collection of intelligence and to establish protective security on JMATE operations. In a remarkably short time, [redacted] was able to recruit, train, and organize such a service which has effectively responded to intelligence and counter intelligence operational tasks, and has shown willingness and ability to ably perform a number of support functions for other types of substantive operations, principally para-military. In addition, the Cuban service which [redacted] organized is likely to be the nucleus of a post-Castro Cuban Government service which will serve KUBARK ends, not only on the basis of liaison, but by means of penetrations of this service already established.

2. In the swift accomplishment of so many objectives, [redacted] has shown executive ability, diplomacy, energy and imagination commensurate with a grade level well in excess of his own.

[redacted]
ROBERT REYNOLDS

File

PGM/avp

12 April 1961

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

[redacted] [illegible] 20 August 1961

[redacted] Morales, David S.

Dear Mr. [redacted]

In view of your contemplated covert assignment you have been designated a Staff Agent. The purpose of this Supplement is to call your attention to certain of the items which are particularly pertinent to you while you are so designated and to set forth certain rights and obligations incident to your status as an appointed employee.

1. Payroll Administration. As indicated in your Staff Agent Personnel Action, your present salary and grade are $ 12,210.00 per annum and GS-14[1] respectively. As an appointed employee of the Government you are entitled to receive and retain only the salary, allowances and other benefits applicable to that status. However, certain procedural variations will be followed to preserve the security of your cover position:

(a) The gross emoluments that you receive from your cover activities will be retained by you as an offset against the gross emoluments due you from this organization. If cover emoluments ever exceed those due you from this organization, the overage is to be remitted to this organization on a monthly basis, unless a different period is specified.

(b) Your Federal income taxes will be withheld and reported in conformance with R 20-661 or any subsequent regulations or procedures promulgated by this organization. For your information, this organization shall withhold from the gross payments due you Federal income taxes in an amount which, when added to the income taxes withheld by your cover facility, will equal the tax withholdings normally made from your gross taxable compensation with this organization. Taxes will be withheld from the differential due you by this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make tax remittances in conformance with HB 20-661-1.

(c) This organization will deduct from the gross payments due you an amount equivalent to six and one-half per cent (6 1/2%) of your gross salary for contribution to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. This amount will be deducted from the differential due you by this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make direct remittances to this organization in satisfaction of the required contributions. The Agency will not reimburse you for mandatory social security deductions required by virtue of your cover employment.

2. Place of Assignment. This Supplement is predicated upon a current PCS assignment under non-Governmental cover. Any deviation therefrom will require a new Supplement or an amendment hereto.

3. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this Supplement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the U. S. Government from such obligation) with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, [illegible] 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE — LAST / FIRST / MIDDLE	OFFICE COMPONENT
1-6	(Print) 7-24	25-26
3385	MORALES, DAVID S.	~~26~~ 64

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	81				09	30	60	CUBA	170

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☐ DISPATCH
☐ CABLE
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT

OTHER (*Specify*)
[illegible]

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.:

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 19 Oct 60

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BY CHECK OF ABOVE DOCUMENT(S)
FISCAL DIV. DATE	DATE 10/20/60	SIGNATURE

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

(2)

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE [illegible] [redacted]	DATE (from item 5) [illegible]	NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]	DATE (from item 5) [illegible]
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS [illegible]	DISPATCH NUMBER [illegible]-2227	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 26 August 1925	2. SERVICE DESIGN D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Chief, ~~PM~~ GS-15	4. STATION OR BASE JMWAVE	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER no crypt [redacted]

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD October 1960	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 8 June 1965	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 9 June 1965	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 1 July 1965

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Wife, 38; Daughter, 12; Daughter, 10; Son, 8; Son, 7; Son, 6; Son, 5; Daughter, 3; Daughter, 1.

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

None

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI F 240-8)

Major duties during this tour have been as follows:

Chief, CI (Oct. 60 - May 61)
Acting DCOS and Chief, OPS (May 61 - Nov 61)
Chief, Special Ops (Nov 61 - Apr 62)
Chief, PM (May 62 - Present)

During this four year tour subject has been responsible for the supervision from 4 to 30 Case Officers and secretaries involved in across the board (CI/PM/FI/PW) operations including black infiltration operations into a denied area. In addition to his supervisory duties, subject officer has personally spotted, developed, recruited and directed up to as many as 300 indigenous agents who were used in FI/PM/CI/PW operations.

10. TRAINING DESIRED
(State what training you believe you should have during the next several years)

Course in Management.

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT
A. STATE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF [illegible] YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT [illegible] DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU [illegible] MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE 1ST [illegible] CHOICE.

Preferably commercial cover assignment to any Latin American country where my services may be required. Second choice would be Chief of Station in any Latin American Country as deemed appropriate by my superiors.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE)

2 BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE WE (Spain) 3RD CHOICE FE

1 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Peru 2ND CHOICE Santiago de Chile 3RD CHOICE Cali, Colombia

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION
3 None

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

See Continuation Sheet

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

It is planned that Subject will head up a new police training unit in Peru.

DATE 3Dec.'64 TITLE C/WH/Peru. SIGNATURE Robert D. CASHMAN

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT: [redacted] To [illegible]

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. [illegible] DATED [illegible]
CABLE NO ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: Donald [illegible] (SIGNATURE) DATE [illegible]

SECRET

Continuation Sheet

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE/Section 12:

Subject is an experienced senior operations officer who has sufficient scope to be able to manage FI, CI, PW, or PM operations. He has a high degree of fluency in Spanish and has extensive area knowledge of Latin America. Subject is a hard-driving, dedicated officer who has turned in a consistently Strong performance during his tour at JMWAVE. Subject has additional growth potential both as a senior intelligence officer and as a first or second echelon supervisor of intelligence officers engaged in FI, CI, PW or PM operations. In view of Subject's experience, performance while at JMWAVE, his growth potential, fluency in Spanish, and his preference for a future assignment as outlined in paragraph 11, it is recommended that he be given a lateral field transfer to a WH Station where he can be used in an unofficial cover capacity in order to mount operations as appropriate for that Station's RMD. If Subject is given a lateral field transfer, he should attend the Clandestine Services Review Course, the Audio Surveillance Management Course, and an advanced course in management.

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE TRANSMITTAL

INSTRUCTIONS

A. This questionnaire is designed to provide information for consideration by headquarters in planning your next assignment.

B. Each supervisor in the field will ensure that this questionnaire is completed for each employee under his immediate supervision and forwarded to headquarters eight (8) months prior to the individual's planned date of departure from the station.

C. The questionnaire will be completed and forwarded through normal channels to headquarters in triplicate.

D. The questionnaires of Staff Agents should include cover duties and discussion of cover factors where appropriate.

SPECIAL NOTE

This form must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information or method of operations, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of major duties may be reporte in Item No. 8. However, the nature, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included On the other hand, the description of the major duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security in should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases a general statement of duties will be indicated i Item No. 8 so as to show the level of responsibilities involved and enable reviewers at headquarters to under stand the nature of your position. No names, operational techniques, objectives or purposes of the operatio should be included.

5.1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (in pseudonym, if any) [redacted] Ziegler, Carl S. DATE: 30 September 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (in pseudonym, if any) [redacted]
5.2. NAME OF SUPERVISOR (in pseudonym, if any) ANDREW K. REUTEMAN DATE 15 October 1964	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (in pseudonym, if any) Andrew K. Reuteman

FORM 5-61 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

Above was greased out prior to coming to Cuba Desk for review for HSCA. C4

S E C R E T

11 January 1961

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, WH

SUBJECT: Additional Compensation in Lieu of Overtime Payment

REF: Memo dated 11 January 1961 from [illegible] to DD/S, approved by DD/S, Subject: "Employee Benefits for JMATE Personnel"; and Memo dated 22 December 1960 from ADD(P) to Deputy Director (Plans), Subject: "Employee Benefits for Personnel Assigned to JMATE".

In accordance with referenced memoranda, it is requested that the personnel listed below be authorized to receive additional compensation effective 8 January 1961, at the rate of 15% of their respective rates of basic annual compensation (but not to exceed the ~~[illegible]~~ rate for a [illegible] GS-[illegible]) in lieu of payment of the regular overtime rates for irregular, unscheduled and frequent overtime.

NAME	EMPLOYEE Serial No.	TITLE	GRADE
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[illegible], [illegible]	(33[illegible])	[illegible] Officer	[illegible]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

All the above employees are on Allotment [illegible].

[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
Chief, WHD

SECRET

1 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM : Chief, WH/4/Support

SUBJECT : Premium Pay

Due to the recent reduction in heavy workload requirements, the following employees are no longer entitled to Premium Pay. It is requested that this entitlement be discontinued effective c.o.b. 10 June 1961. The salaries are chargeable to Allotment #535-5000-8021:

[redacted]

[redacted]
✓MORALES, David S.
[redacted]

[redacted]

William E. Eisemann /fo

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
Chief, WH/4/Support

Distribution:
2 - Chief, Finance Division (ea. employee)
2 - Director of Personnel (ea. employee)

E.D. NICHOLS
SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

12 SEP 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/BR/CPD

ATTENTION : Dot Kreinheder

FROM : **Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)**

SUBJECT : [redacted]

Morales, David S.

1. Reference is made to the memorandum dated 23 August 1961 in which a Covert Security Clearance was requested to cover Subject's conversion from Staff Employee to Staff Agent, GS-14, Operations Officer at JMWAVE, with WH/4.

2. This is to advise that a Covert Security Clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of Covert Security Clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Covert Security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

for Louis W. Casaly
Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

SECRET

Documents dated from 1951 to 1975
(EXCLUSIVE OF THOSE FROM 1960-64)
WHICH ARE IN FOLDER FOR REVIEW BY
HSCA.)

SANITIZED COPIES OF THOSE FOR
REVIEW BY HSCA ARE ENCLOSED HEREWITH

SECRET

David S. MORALES

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: (TICHBORN)
LOPEZ, HENRY W.

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

17 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment
Edward G. TICHBORN

Transmitted herewith is original and one copy of amendment to subject's contract which was terminated 31 August 1968, signed by subject acknowledging a one-time lump sum taxable payment in the amount of $3,311, which serves as a "quit claim".

Virginia C. Lynch
Chief, DO Personnel & Training

Attachments: 2

cc: Mr. George Powell w/o att's

SECRET

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, effective 19 May 1961, as amended.

Effective 15 August 1968 you are authorized a one-time lump sum taxable payment in the amount of $3, 511.

In full and final consideration for authorization and payment of the above sum, you herein release and forever discharge the United States Government and any Agency, Department or Instrumentality thereof and its agents, officers, employees and representatives from any and all claims, demands and liabilities in any form or by any party whatsoever throughout the world arising from services performed by you for the United States Government under said contract.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward G. Tichborn

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

ab/ks
15 Aug 68

[illegible]

7

SECRET

12 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Chief, Contract Personnel Division**

THROUGH: **Assistant for Non-Staff Personnel**

SUBJECT: **Edward G. TICHBORN (P) - Contract Agent**

1. Subject has been given 30 days notice as provided in his contract, to the effect that his contract will be terminated 31 August 1968.

2. Subject was initially employed in 1959 and was transferred to DO Division in July of 1967 from the WH Division. In the course of discussing the termination of his services, subject stated that during his tenure with the WH Division, he had been promised certain bonuses upon termination of his Agency service. The WH Division has agreed to a termination payment of $3,310.72 which represents two months' salary of a per annum salary of $17,000 plus $477.38 in settlement of his accounting which is nontaxable.

3. In addition it is requested that the following statement be included in the amendment:

> You release and forever discharge the United States Government and any Agency, Department or Instrumentality thereof and its agents, officers, employees and representatives from any and all claims, demands and liabilities in any form or by any party whatsoever throughout the World arising from services performed by you for the United States Government under said contract.

4. Attached is signed Notice of Termination in duplicate.

APPROVED:

Special Contracting Officer

W. T. Montgomery

W. T. MONTGOMERY
Chief, DO Support Group

Attachment:
as stated

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OF CONTRACT

Mr. Henry P. Lopez

Dear Mr. Lopez:

You are hereby notified that your services under a contract with the U. S. Government, effective 19 May 1961, are to be terminated for the convenience of the U. S. Government pursuant to paragraph 10 of said contract, and that the thirty (30) days notice required by the contract begins 2 August 1968.

You are reminded of the contents of paragraph 9 of said contract which reads as follows:

> "9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

Your signature in the space provided below is acknowledgement of the contents hereof.

U. S. GOVERNMENT

BY /s/ Dow E. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Henry P. Lopez

[illegible] 7, 1968
(date)

WITNESS

[illegible] 1968
(date)

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

24 November 1967

Edward G. Tichborn

1 October 1967

19 May 1961

one (1) year

24 Nov. 67
DGL/MD

16 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. [illegible] (P)

It is requested that subject's contract which expired 30 September 1967 be extended for one year.

Virginia C. Lynch
Chief, D. Personnel & Training

APPROVED:

W. T. Montgomery

W. T. MONTGOMERY, C/[illegible]/SS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : OF/C&TD/CAAS DATE: July 5, 1967
VIA :Contract Personnel Division
FROM :WH/Contracts

SUBJECT: **Edward G. TICHBORN, Reassignment**

1. Effective 1 July 1967, Edward G. TICHBORN, Independent Contractor, has been reassigned to DO. Effective the same date all costs incident to contract services are chargeable to DO.

2. Miss Virginia Lynch, C/DO/Pers may be contacted for further information.

WM. S. Renehan

cc: C/WH/B&F
C/DO/Pers

APPROVED:
/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

SECRET

DATE: 7 [illegible]

CTC No. [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for [illegible] (b)

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee as indicated below. An acknowledged letter of tax instruction ☐ is ☐ will be forwarded.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
Zero (00.0) per cent	[illegible]

2. Other payroll factors pertinent to this Covert Tax Committee tax assessment action are as follows:

Approval Chief, CPD

Secretary, Covert Tax Committee

FORM 5-66 2643

SECRET

3 - CPD

18 Oct 66

C/CPD:

Attached is a draft of an amendment on TICHBORN. Note memo of request asks for an increase in basic fee from $12,000 to $17,000 based on TICHBORN's "overall performance and full time services". ~~This~~

Additional memoranda in file reflect the following:

(1) 19 May 1961 contract (still in effect) provided a basic fee of $8000 with no mention of amount of time subject worked to earn such.

(2) WH memo of 18 June 63 asked a pay increase from $8000 to $9,000 based upon, "manner of TICHBORN's performance and the increase amt. of time which he devotes to Agency requirements".

(3) WH dispatch of 9 Nov 64 said that, "Hqs agrees that present expiring contract called for about 2/3rds subject's time---TICHBORN pointed out.... he now engaged 90% of his time for Agency".

(4) WH memo of 24 Nov 64 requested an increase from $9000 to $12,000 based upon TICHBORN's increased value plus "using TICHBORN's service on substantially a full time basis".

(5) As cited above, current WH memo of 7 Oct 66 asks for an increase of [illegible] from $12,000 to $17,000 based on subject's "overall performance and full time services".

I pointed out the above chrono with respect to the ever increasing usage of subject's time to Henehan who apparently feels the last memo is OK unless CPD desires to make a formal objection and return it.

Paul

Paul — OK to prepare — I will hold pending receipt of supplementary →

Note — Per C/CPD WH (Cameron) will submit a new memo to justify the current request.

SECRET

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 May 1961, as amended.

Effective 1 October 1966, said contract, as amended, is further amended by:

(a) Deleting the figure $12,000 from paragraph one (1) (a) and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $17,000;

(b) Deleting paragraph one (1) (b) in its entirety; and

(c) Adding the following paragraph:

"13. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions."

In addition, said contract is further amended by extending its term through 30 September 1967.

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward G. Tichborn

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

Pulask
20 Oct. 66

SECRET

SECRET

31 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM : WH/Pers/Contracts

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Compensation

1. Reference is made to your recent oral request concerning the increase in compensation for Edward G. TICHBORN, Independent Contractor.

2. The recommendation for the increase was based on C/WHD's review of TICHBORN's performance, availability of full time services and direct negotiation. It is to be noted that the basic recommendation also provided for the amendment to offset cover earnings.

William S. Renehan

SECRET

SECRET

7 OCT 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended, for Edward G. TICHBORN, Independent Contractor, be further amended effective 1 October 1966 as follows:

   a. Increase basic compensation to $17,000. per annum.

   b. Delete para. 1.b. The provision is not applicable due to reassignment to a domestic location.

   c. Provide offset provision of basic contract compensation as TICHBORN will be paid through a DODS proprietary (WUSALINE).

   d. CPD may determine whether it is necessary to modify the amendments relating to Social Security and Income Taxes as deductions will be handled by the cover organization.

   e. Extend contract through 30 September 1967.

   f. Provide for TICHBORN's acceptance and signature on the amendment.

2. The increase in basic compensation is based on TICHBORN's overall performance and full time services.

for
William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

Contract Service — Edward G. Tichborn (P)

Date	Action	Compensation
15 Oct 59	Hired as an Independent Contractor	$50 Per day
13 Jan 60	Pay adjustment	See Contract
23 Feb 61	" "	" "
18 May 61	Contract Terminated	
19 May 61	Hired as an Independent Contractor	$8,000 P.A.
19 ~~May~~ 63	Pay increase	9,000
1 Dec 64	" "	12,000
1 Dec 64	As an Independent Contractor, authorized Social Security	

SECRET

Mr. Edward O. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn

Reference is made to your current contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective 27 May 1966, said contract is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"12. Taxes As an independent contractor, monies paid you under paragraph one (1) above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

DATE: [illegible]

CTC No. [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for Edward O. [illegible]

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee as indicated below. An acknowledged letter of tax instruction ☐ is ☐ will be forwarded.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
Ten and eight-tenths per cent (10.8)	1 [illegible] 196[illegible]
Eleven and nine-tenths per cent (11.[illegible])	1 [illegible] 196[illegible]

2. Other payroll factors pertinent to this Covert Tax Committee tax assessment action are as follows:

a. [illegible]

[illegible]

b. [illegible]

/s/ [illegible]
Approval Chief, CPD

Secretary, Covert Tax Committee

[illegible]

FORM 5-64 2643 SECRET (1-4-21) 3 - CPD

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for
Edward G. TICHBORN

1. Effective 19 November 1965, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 19 May 1961 is extended for a period of one (1) year

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

DHL/bk/21 April '66
Reg in Darriotis files

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]:

Reference is made to your current contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Arrangements have been recently completed allowing certain independent contractors of this organization to obtain social security credits by covering such individuals under the social security tax provisions applicable to employees. These arrangements also include a provision for retroactive applicability to the beginning of the 1965 tax year. This can be done only for reasons of security since the procedure results in reducing the social security tax from the self-employed rate to the employee rate. For example, in January of 1965 the tax rates were 5.4% and 3-5/8% respectively.

As a consequence thereof, said contract is amended by deleting all reference to social security and by adding the following paragraph:

"Effective 1 December 1964, social security taxes will be covertly deducted by this organization from your compensation in the same manner and to the same extent as would be done if you were a Government employee. Security reasons make this procedure necessary. Its implementation does not imply in any manner the actual creation of an employee-employer relationship. Your legal status under this agreement continues to be that of an independent contractor."

If you receive or expect to receive full or partial social security credits from overt sources you will so notify this organization and an adjustment will be made or covert deductions discontinued, depending upon the circumstances. Further, if you should subsequently receive overt social security credits, evidence thereof will be submitted to this organization. In such event your covert credits will be erased and your covert deductions returned.

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

PW/sd/9 Sept. 65
wk/[illegible]

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 May 1961, as amended.

Effective 15 November 1964 said contract is amended by enlarging the scope of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" to authorize a one time payment of additional taxable compensation in the amount of $1500.

Effective 1 December 1964 the figure $9,000 is deleted from paragraph one (1) (a) and in lieu thereof the figure $12,000 is substituted.

Effective 19 November 1964 said contract, as amended, is extended for a period of one (1) year.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

E H[illegible]
2[illegible] Nov 64

[illegible]

24 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended for Edward G. TICHBORN, be further amended as follows:

a. Effective 15 November 1964 a one-time payment of additional compensation in the amount of $1,500 for full time services rendered during a TDY assignment from June through August 1964. Payment will be made by the Station.

b. Increase in basic compensation from $9,000 to $12,000 per annum effective 1 December 1964.

c. Extend period of contract for an additional one year.

2. The Mexico Station recommendation as concurred with by WHD is based on increased operational activities which required having available and using TICHBORN's services on substantially a full time basis. TICHBORN has agreed to fulfill the assignments including TDY assignments in other countries from time to time. In view of the level of the work involved and of TICHBORN's demonstrated ability, the basic recommendations are considered fully warranted.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

APPROVED:

Special Contracting Chief

CRHalliwell

ORIG : C.R.Halliwell
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 9 NOVEMBER 1964

MESSAGE FORM
27 SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-116/2
201-253203

22 ROUTING RI

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

11 Nov 64 10 10z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 INFO RI/AN, CA/O 4, CA2, (OPS), OF3, VR, FILE SOGEH

TO MEXI INFO. CITE DIR 63360

LICOLIC

REF: HMMA 24353

1. EDWARD G. TICHBORN (C.A) DISCUSSED TERMS HIS KUBARK CONTRACT DURING VISIT HQS EARLY NOVEMBER. HQS AGREES PRESENT ~~XXRIRR~~ EXPIRING CONTRACT CALLED FOR ABOUT TWO THIRDS SUBJ'S TIME. TICHBORN POINTED OUT PER REFERENCE HE NOW ENGAGED NINETY PERCENT TIME FOR KUBARK.

2. SUBJECT STATION CONCURRENCE HQS RECOMMENDS NEW ONE-YEAR ~~XXXIXXXXX~~ CONTRACT PROVIDE RAISE FROM $9000 TO $13000 PLUS $3000 QUARTERS PER ANNUM. ALSO LUMP SUM PAYMENT 1500 DOLLARS FOR COMPENSATION HIS RECENT FULL TIME SERVICE FUASPEN. ADVISE IF YOU CONCUR EXTEND HIS CONTRACT ONE YEAR EFFECTIVE 19 NOVEMBER.

3. HQS TOLD TICHBORN WE CONSIDERED HIS SERVICES VALUABLE AS WELL AS HIS EVER-WILLINGNESS DEPART ON SHORT ~~N~~ NOTICE ASSIGNMENTS OTHER DIVISION AREAS. OBVIOUSLY THIS PROPOSED RAISE WITH WHICH SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST HAPPY SINCE STILL IMPOSES NO RESTRICTIONS ON HIS SOMETIME OUTSIDE LEGAL WORK, WILL BE WITH UNDERSTANDING HE CONTINUE DEVOTE NEAR FULL-TIME MANAGEMENT AND HANDLING QRMINE AND QRMANTLE PLUS other ~~MISCELLANEOUS~~ STATION or Hqs ~~XX~~ ASSIGNMENTS.

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. [illegible] 12 8 47 AM '64

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : OF PERSONNEL

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO PAGE TWO

TO INFO: CITE DIR 63360

4. DISPATCH FOLLOWS ON QRMINE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/POB
WH/PERS
WH/B&F

5
4
3
2
1

R. W. Herbert
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

N. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for

Edward G. TICHBORN

1. Effective 19 May 1964, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 19 May 1961 is extended for a period of six (6) months.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

SPK/JT 22 May 64
WH Div

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

13 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN

Please extend for a period of six (6) months the present contract of Edward G. TICHBORN which was due to expire on 18 May 1964.

for W. E. Brooks
C/WH/Support

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 May 1961, as amended.

Effective 30 September 1963, said contract, as amended, is further amended by adding the following paragraph after paragraph ten (10) of said contract:

> "11. Health Insurance. You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected contract individuals of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization will bear that portion of your total premium cost which it is authorized to bear for the original group of contract participants in said program. you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY____________________________
Contracting Officer

DHL-ald 4 Oct 63
WH Div

This amend based on oral notification from Insurance Branch that application for insurance was approved by Board.

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 May 1961, as amended.

Effective 19 May 1963 said contract is extended for a period of one (1) year. Effective 1 June 1963 said contract, as amended, is further amended by the deletion in its entirety of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and by substituting in lieu thereof the following:

"1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and services you will be compensated as follows:

(a) Basic compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $9000 per annum.

(b) Additional compensation for quarters procurement in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum, effective upon your arrival and applicable only to your initial permanent post of assignment overseas. Quarters will not be furnished you nor will you accept quarters provided by your cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement."

Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. You herein authorize this organization to withhold taxes on said income if it determines such requirements so necessitate.

All other terms and conditions of the contract as amended remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

[illegible]
7 July 63
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

19 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (p), Amendment of Contract

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended for Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Agent, be further amended effective 1 June 1962 as follows:

a. Increase basic compensation from $8,000 to $9,000 per annum.

b. Provide additional compensation for quarters procurement at the rate of $3,000 per annum for self and dependents.

c. Extend the period of the contract for an additional year.

d. All other provisions of the contract remain in effect.

2. The increase in compensation is recommended by the [illegible] City [illegible] on the [illegible] of TICHBORN's performance and the increased amount of time which he devotes to Agency requirements.

3. The [illegible] concurs with the [illegible] recommendation. TICHBORN has become an increasingly [illegible] and productive covert [illegible].

W. W. [illegible]
Chief, [illegible] Support

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

17 SECRET

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

SECRET 212325Z

IN43671

DIR CITE MEXI 4670

22 MAY 1963

REF HMMW-11562

IN 43671

CA

1. STATION AGREES HQS EVALUATION TICHBORN AND CONCURS SALARY INCREASE AND HOUSING ALLOWANCE AMENDMENT. ALSO AGREE INSURANCE RIGHTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED CONTRACT.

2. BELIEVE RAISE SHOULD BE $1,000 PER ANNUM WITH HOUSING AT $3,000, WHICH TOTAL MEETS TICHBORN'S OWN REQUEST. THESE FIGURES PROPOSED TO TICHBORN (WITHOUT COMMITMENT) 21 MAY AND ACCEPTABLE TO HIM.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 May 1961.

To rectify an administrative oversight said contract is amended as of its effective date by revising paragraph two (2) entitled "Travel and Operational Expenses" to read as follows:

> "2. Travel and Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds on an actual, reasonable and necessary expense basis for those expenses incurred by you in connection with such travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government and while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. In addition, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by the Government. Payment and accounting for all expenses incurred hereunder will be in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

DHL-ald 25 Mar 63
WH Div

SECRET

SECRET

20 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (p), Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract for Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Agent, be amended to delete the current paragraph 2. Travel and Operational Expenses and insert:

> "2. Travel and Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds on an actual, reasonable and necessary expense basis for those expenses incurred by you in connection with such travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government and while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. In addition, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by the Government. Payment and accounting for all expenses incurred hereunder will be in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

The effective date of the amendment should be as of the effective date of the contract, 19 May 1961.

2. The above request is corrective in nature as it was not intended to change the travel expense provision which had been in effect during his previous contract.

W E Brooks

W. E. BROOKS
Chief, WH Support

Note: Per WH/B&F no travel and operational expense accountings have as yet been forwarded to FD. Both Division and subject intended subject's old travel and operational expense clause to be a part of the 19 May 1961 agreement. Check List was in error on this point.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

13 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division
Attention: Contract Agent Section

VIA: Central Cover Division
Attention: Mr. Mullen

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (p): Method of Payment

1. It is requested that Finance Division pay Contract Agent Edward G. TICHBORN (p) through Central Cover Division's mechanism Ashmead, Hanniford Associates. TICHBORN's new contract became effective 19 May 1961.

2. It is requested that salary due TICHBORN since the effective date of his contract be paid as soon as possible.

3. Attached hereto are forms 281 and 313a (top section). The bottom section of 313a is distributed separately.

J. C. King
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

EMPLOYEE'S WITHHOLDING EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE AND QUESTIONNAIRE

PRINT NAME (Pseudonym)

TICHBORN, Edward O.

WITHHOLDING EXEMPTIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

1. **NUMBER OF EXEMPTIONS.**--Do not claim more than the correct number of exemptions. However, if you expect to owe more income tax for the year than will be withheld if you claim every exemption to which you are entitled, you may increase the withholding by claiming a smaller number of exemptions.

2. **CHANGES IN EXEMPTIONS.**--You may file a new certificate at any time if the number of your exemptions INCREASES.

You must file a new certificate within 10 days if the number of exemptions previously claimed by you DECREASES for any of the following reasons:

(a) Your wife (or husband) for whom you have been claiming exemption is divorced or legally separated, or claims her (or his) own exemption on a separate certificate.

(b) The support of a dependent for whom you claimed exemption is taken over by someone else, so that you no longer expect to furnish more than half the support for the year.

(c) You find that a dependent for whom you claimed exemption will receive $600 or more of income of his own during the year (except your child who is a student or who is under 19 years of age).

OTHER DECREASES in exemption, such as the death of a wife or a dependent, do not affect your withholding until the next year, but require the filing of a new certificate by December 1 of the year in which they occur.

For further information about changes in exemption status resulting from marriage, divorce, legal separation, birth, death, new dependents, multiple-support agreements, old age, blindness, etc., consult your local District Director of Internal Revenue or your employer.

3. **DEPENDENTS.**--To qualify as your dependent (line 4 below), a person (a) must receive more than one-half of his or her support from you for the year, and (b) must have less than $600 gross income during the year (except your child who is a student or who is under 19 years of age), and (c) must not be claimed as an exemption by such person's husband or wife, and (d) must be a citizen or resident of the United States or a resident of Canada, Mexico, the Republic of Panama or the Canal Zone, and (e) must (1) have your home as his principal residence and be a member of your household for the entire year, or (2) be related to you as follows:

Your son or daughter (including legally adopted children), grandchild, stepson, stepdaughter, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law;
Your father, mother, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, father-in-law, or mother-in-law;
Your brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, half brother, half sister, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law;
Your uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece (but only if related by blood).

4. **PENALTIES.**--Penalties are imposed for willfully supplying false information or willful failure to supply information which would reduce the withholding exemption.

1. If SINGLE, and you claim an exemption, write the figure "1" . . . . ____

2. If MARRIED, one exemption each for husband and wife if not claimed on another certificate.
   (a) If you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2"
   (b) If you claim one of these exemptions, write the figure "1" 2
   (c) If you claim neither of these exemptions, write "0"

3. Exemptions for age and blindness (applicable only to you and your wife but not to dependents):
   (a) If you or your wife will be 65 years of age or older at the end of the year, and you claim this exemption, write the figure "1"; if both will be 65 or older, and you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2". ____
   (b) If you or your wife are blind, and you claim this exemption, write the figure "1"; if both are blind, and you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2" . . . . ____

4. If you claim exemptions for one or more dependents, write the number of such exemptions. (Do not claim exemption for a dependent unless you are qualified under instruction 3 above.) 3

5. Add the number of exemptions which you have claimed above and write the total. 5

SOURCES OF INCOME

INDICATE SOURCE(S) OF INCOME ☐ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☒ COVER FACILITY

IF COVER FACILITY INDICATE HOW MUCH PER YEAR $ [illegible],000

TAXES WITHHELD FROM ABOVE COVER INCOME ☐ YES ☒ NO

INDICATE TYPE(S) OF TAXES AND AMOUNT(S) WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD [illegible]
U.S. TAXES $
FOREIGN TAXES $

INDICATE COVER PAY PERIOD ☐ WEEKLY ☐ BIWEEKLY ☐ SEMIMONTHLY ☒ MONTHLY

DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX FILED ☒ YES ☐ NO

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that the number of withholding exemptions claimed on this form does not exceed the number to which I am entitled, and that the information relative to sources of income shown hereon is correct.

DATE

SIGNED (Pseudonym)

FORM NO. 313
1 OCT 54

SECRET

(30)

14-00000

SECRET

COVERT AGREEMENT SUPPL ENT - INCOME AND FEDERAL TAX DA.

TYPE OF PRINT: ☐ ORIGINAL ☐ CORRECTION

1. PSEUDONYM: TICHBORN, Edward G.

2. 3723

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS *(Check as appropriate)*

☐ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☒ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY

TOTAL AMOUNT *(Per annum)* $ 8,000	AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX $	EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED *(Allowances, etc.)*.	PAYMENTS TO BEGIN *(Date)*

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY

☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☒ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID

INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD: ☒ NONE THIS COUNTRY $ FOREIGN $

IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD: ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☐ YES ☐ NO NAME OF COUNTRY

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS *(See Item 16 below)*

☐ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

COVER FACILITY *(Cryptonym)*

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS *(See Item 16 below)*

☒ COVERT *(If covert only, omit rest of this item.)* ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX *(Check one)*

☒ HAS BEEN FILED ☐ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☐ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY. N.A.

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 *(Or equivalent)* ATTACHED

13. MARITAL STATUS *(Complete as appropriate)*

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 5 April 1954

DATE OF DEATH

DATE OF DECREE

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE

RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE *(Country)*

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE *(Omit self and spouse)*

RELATIONSHIP *(No names)*	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
Son	1952	U.S.	Mexico
Son	1955	U.S.	Mexico
Daughter	1957	U.S.	Mexico

15. REMARKS

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

The employer's names and methods for reporting compensation shown in Items 8, and/or 9, above are approved.

DATE SIGNATURE AND TITLE

17. FORM PREPARED BY WLS ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☐ OFFICIAL

PART I CERTIFIED CORRECT

DATE: 13 July '61 SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL: W. Lehman Smith

PART II CERTIFIED CORRECT *(Explain when not signed)*

DATE SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL *(Pseudonym)*: (not available)

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG AND COPY - TO FINANCE: COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER: COPY - TO FILE

FORM 5-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(30)

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMT-2092
TO Chief, WHD INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 7 July 1961
SUBJECT Signed Contract for Edward G. TICHBORN		RI 413 — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED None; for information.		

REFERENCE(S)

HMMS-1921, 6 June 1961

1. Returned herewith is one copy of Edward G. TICHBORN's contract.

2. Regarding paragraph 1 of the contract, TICHBORN states that he has already arranged with Headquarters to mail his salary check from a foundation in Philadelphia to his bank.

3. TICHBORN further states that under his previous contract he did not file a covert tax return and taxes were not withheld. According to TICHBORN he was told in Headquarters that KUBARK would depend on him to report his KUBARK income as coming from the Philadelphia client and it would be incorporated in his overt return. TICHBORN does not wish to give a copy of his overt return to KUBARK.

Willard C. Curtis

Attachment: TICHBORN Contract (1 copy), h/w

5 July 1961

Distribution:
- 3 - Hqs, w/att
- 2 - Files

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 15 October 1959, as amended. Effective 18 May 1961, said contract is hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties hereto and in lieu thereof the following is substituted.

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $8000 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. You herein authorize this organization to withhold taxes on said income if it determines such requirements so necessitate.

2. Travel and Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government. This may include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel and while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. In addition, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by the Government. Payment and accounting for all expenses incurred hereunder will be in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

3. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

4. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangement, monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner. It is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment by the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

5. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

6. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

7. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

8. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

10. Term. This contract is effective as of 19 May 1961, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward G. Tichborn

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

RC Cfm2/29 May 61
WH/[illegible]
C A.

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: Smith, Lee

DIVISION: WHD

TELEPHONE EXTENSION:

DATE:

INSTRUCTIONS: See R 20-1003 and HB 20-1003-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

SECTION I GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
TICHBORN, Edward G.
C-77119

2A. PROJECT: JMPOPLAR-10

2B. PERMANENT STATION:

3. ALLOTMENT NO.:

3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☐ UV

4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES:

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Contract Agent (Independent Contractor) Contract signed 15 Oct 1959. Basic salary $50.00 per day.

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date):

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE ☐ OBTAINED ☐ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Contract Agent ✓

SECTION II PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: United States

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN NA ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 41

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 28 May 1920

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): 6505 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, California

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country):

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
2 Sons - Sven 9, and Gregory 6 years old;
1 Daughter - Drusilla 3 years old.

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE:

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army, Medical Corps

24. RANK OR GRADE: Staff Sergeant

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA NA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $8,000.00 per yr.

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: N.A.

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): N.A.

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER	CIA
YES	☐	☐
NO	☒	☒

SECTION V ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: N.A.

32. POST: N.A.

33. OTHER:

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): Commercial

SECTION VI TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☐ YES ☒ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES N.A. ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH:

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION:

43. ENTERTAINMENT:

44. OTHER: Subject will be reimbursed for operational expenses (travel & per diem, including mileage for travel by private vehicle), when making KUBARK-directed trips outside Mexico City.

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER	DIVISION
TELEPHONE EXTENSION	DATE

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)*

N.A.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)*	☐	PROPOSED	48. TYPE *(Check)*	☐	PROPRIETARY	☐	CULTURAL	☒	COMMERCIAL	☐	TOURIST
	☐	ESTABLISHED		☐	SUBSIDIZED	☐	EDUCATIONAL	☐	MILITARY	☐	OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

N.A. ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)* ☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION ✓: DAYS | MONTHS | 2 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 May 1961

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*: 30 days ✓

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(CI, FI, PP, other)*

C.A.

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Subject will spot and assess student leaders in relation to ZREAGER Program. Subject will travel throughout the Hemisphere in political action missions as directed by WHD.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Subject has carried out several high-level political action assignments for KUBARK in Latin America and other areas. He is particularly experienced in advising on political techniques.

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐	GRADE SCHOOL	☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE						
☐	BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE								
☐	COLLEGE *(No degree)*	☐	COLLEGE DEGREE	X	POST GRADUATE LLB	☐	MA	☐	PHD		

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	x			x			x		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: United States

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE: Mexico; Latin America.

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Subject is in private law practice.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

Subject will be authorised to audit courses of instruction in universities in Mexico City on a reimbursable basis, in fulfillment of objectives under the ZREAGER Program.

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
23 May 1961	Charles P. Penney Fenney, Charles P., WH/CA/Prop	23 May 61	Paul E. Arneson. C/WH/Support

SECRET

22 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Payroll Division

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. Please cancel Edward G. TICHBORN's present contract effective as of ~~[illegible]~~ c.ob 18 May 1961.

2. A new contract for Subject will be requested by the WH Division in the immediate future.

Thomas F. McCoy
Acting Chief
Political Action Group
Covert Action Staff

APPROVED:

SECRET

SECRET

22 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : New Contract for Edward G. TICHBORN (p)
C-77119

Preparation of a new contract for Subject is requested, to be drawn up on the basis of the attached Contract Information Check List.

R. W. Herbert
J. C. KING /br
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : C.C.PRENEY
UNIT : WH/PO/B
EXT : 3503
DATE : ~~20~~ 22 MAY 1961 1667

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

22 MAY 61 23 04z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CA 2, CA/PRG, CI/OA, OP 2, S/C 2

~~910 CEM~~ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 58552
OUT58552

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 41303
41303

1. RICHARD G. TICHBORN IDEN A DEPARTED WASH 20 MAY FOR MEXI WHERE HE WILL BE EMPLOYED AS LEGAL COUNSEL TO IDEN B.

2. TICHBORN HAS BEEN USED BY KUBARK AS POLITICAL ADVISOR ON ELECTION OPS. PRIOR DEPARTURE HQS DISCUSSED CONTRACT POSSIBILITIES WITH HIM AND AGREED PREPARE CONTRACT WHICH WILL BE SENT MEXI NEAR FUTURE FOR SIGNATURE.

3. HQS ANTICIPATES USING TICHBORN AS ROVING POLITICAL ADVISOR PROVIDING VARIOUS FIELD STATIONS WITH GUIDANCE ON ELECTION OPS. WILL ALSO USE HIM TO DEVELOP ZREAGER CANDIDATES VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND MAY APPOINT HIM FIELD REP FOR DTEHBARGO.

4. TICHBORN WILL HAVE NO OPS RESPONSIBILITIES MEXI UNLESS STATION SO DESIRES. HOWEVER HE WOULD REQUIRE SOME COMMO AND ADMIN SUPPORT WHEN OVERT CHANNELS UNSUITABLE.

5. POUCHING PROPOSED CONTRACT AND MORE DETAILS RE POSSIBLE USE IN NEAR FUTURE. REQUEST STATION OFFICER USING NAME "FRANK NELSON" CALL TICHBORN AT HOTEL MONTEJO, REFORMA ON 29 MAY TO ESTABLISH INITIAL CONTACT. ATTEMPTING HAVE CONTRACT MEXI BY THAT TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/PO/B
COORDINATING OFFICERS

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 15 October 1959, as amended.

Effective 23 February 1961, the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," is suspended and in lieu thereof is substituted the following:

> "In full consideration for your undertaking a task, the subject matter and scope of which have been made known to you, you will be paid a fee in the amount of $ 1000.00. Payment of said fee will be made you upon the successful completion of the task, after which the suspended portion of paragraph one (1) shall once again assume full force and effect."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward G. Tichborn

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

201/8 - std 8 Mar 60
CA/OAC Sylvia Deal
CA,
Co (Acc Michael x4911

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

3 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Amendment #2 for Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. Contract amendment #2 is requested for Edward G. TICHBORN using the same general format as used in the first amendment excepting that Subject will receive the entire fee upon completion of the task. It is requested that the amount of the fee be left blank. Your office will be notified as to the correct figure as soon as it is determined.

2. The amendment is to be effective as of 23 February 1961.

Horace W. Davis
Chief
Political Action Group
Covert Action Staff

The figure $1000 is per Bill
Michael 8 Mar 61

eH

SECRET

Bishop
Clapan
Hornberger
Ragan

9 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Edward G. Tichborn (P) - Hernia

1. On 1 February Edward G. Tichborn advised me that in lifting his bag out of a taxi on his return trip from Cuba, he suddenly felt a pain in the groin and was afraid that he had a hernia.

2. On the way to the airport he asked me if there would be any chance of the Government picking up his medical expenses in the event that he actually had a hernia which required any substantial treatment. I told him at that time that I did not know what the Government's position would be, but that I would check into the matter and let him know.

3. On 2 February, I contacted Mr. Vernon Turner, SIA/DDS, and explained the circumstances to him. At that time, I also pointed out that as far as the provisions of his contract were concerned, it was stated that he was not an employee of the U. S. Government and while it did not make specific reference to medical payments while he was working for us, it did not specifically preclude such payments. Mr. Turner opined that although the contract stated he was not an employee of the U. S. Government, in actual fact during the period he was doing our bidding, he was. I went on further to explain to Mr. Turner that in all probability we will call on Tichborn to do future services for us and that while he was being paid, it was doubtful that this reimbursement from us equaled what he would make in his regular law practice. Mr. Turner stated that there were a number of ways that we could alleviate his situation should it become necessary.

Misunderstanding. I said the facts of a case - not the words in a paper would probably be the basis for determination of employee status. If we wish to pay in this case a contractual payment - not necessarily related to medical problem - would probably be best solution. V.T.

4. The conclusion reached between me and Mr. Turner was that I should point out to Tichborn that we were under no obligation to recompense him for his injury; however, that upon the completion of treatment if he would submit a claim, we should be glad to review it sympathetically.

5. I passed the gist of the above on to Tichborn on 3 February.

Horace W. Davis
Chief
Political Action Division

HWD:bjl
Distribution:
Orig. - subj. file
1 - BSA/DDB
1 - chrono

Mr. Edward C. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to an agreement by and between yourself and the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 13 October 1959.

Effective 13 January 1960, the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," is suspended and in lieu thereof is substituted the following:

> "In full consideration for the undertaking by you of a task, the subject matter and scope of which has or will be made known to you, you will be paid a fee of $1300. It is understood and agreed that said fee is based upon the fact that the completion of the specified task can be achieved within a 21-day period. One-half of said fee may be advanced you as of the effective date of this amendment. Upon the successful completion of the task, you will be paid the remaining one-half, after which the suspended portion of paragraph one (1) shall once again assume full force and effect."

All other terms and conditions of the agreement, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward C. Tichborn

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

Not taken - 12 Jan 60
PB/TAD/Splacted
C.A.
C.O. Horace Alamine 2017

SECRET

8 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Miller

SUBJECT: Contract Amendment for Edward G. Tichborn (P)

To confirm your telephone conversation of this date with Barna Sprague, we wish to have the amendment for Subject's contract effective as of 13 January and to provide for basic compensation in the amount of $1300. for a period of approximately 21 days. We wish, further, to pay Subject one-half of this fee upon the date the contract amendment becomes effective. Should Subject complete his assignment in less than 21 days, he is still to be entitled to a payment of $1300. for his services.

Horace W. Davis
Acting Chief
Political Action Division

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

The United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and services you will be compensated, on a fee basis, at the rate of $50.00 per day or any fraction thereof during which your services are utilized hereunder, not to exceed $265 per week. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to CIA. No taxes will be withheld therefrom, but it will be your responsibility to report such income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations. An appropriate Form 1099 will be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency in furtherance of the tax reporting requirement.

2. Travel and Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds on an actual, reasonable and necessary expense basis for those expenses incurred by you in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government and while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. In addition, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by CIA. Payment and accounting for all expenses incurred hereunder will be in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

3. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle CIA to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

4. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

5. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

$13

SECRET

7. Instructions. Instructions received by you from CIA in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

8. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

9. Term. This contract is effective as of 15 October 1959, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by CIA, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from CIA. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY ______________________
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward C. Tichborn

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

RH/Baker – 14 Oct 59
PP/PPD/Sylvestre
C.A.
c.c. Horace Davis x 2017

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: Horace W. Davis
OFFICE: AC/PP/PAD

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2017
DATE: 7 October 1959

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE: Edward G. Tichborn
2a. PROJECT: SGLACTEAL
2b. PERMANENT STATION:
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 9-2100-91-599
4. SLOT NO.:
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: NA
6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): POA, 11 May 1959 - OA pending
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☐ YES ☒ NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☐ NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Contract agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: US
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN: NA ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. AGE: 39
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 28 May 1920
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Los Angeles, California
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Los Angeles, California
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
2 sons, 7 and 4 years old.
1 daughter, 1 year old.
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE:
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army Med. Corps
24. RANK OR GRADE: Staff Sgt.
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $50.00 per day
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: ———
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): ———
30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY: ☐ COVER ☐ CIA ☒ NOT WITHHELD

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: NA
32. POST: NA
33. OTHER:
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any):

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☒ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO
37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☒ NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ [illegible]

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION:
43. ENTERTAINMENT:
44. OTHER: Subject will be reimbursed for all expenses and in addition will receive $50.00 per day when working, not to exceed $265.00 per week.

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☐ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ [illegible]

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER	DIVISION
TELEPHONE EXTENSION	DATE

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-330 or successor regulations.)

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check)	X	PROPOSED	48. TYPE (Check)	☐	PROPRIETARY	☐	CULTURAL	X	COMMERCIAL	☐	TOURIST
	☐	ESTABLISHED		☐	SUBSIDIZED	☐	EDUCATIONAL	☐	MILITARY	☐	OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

NA ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) ☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION						52. EFFECTIVE DATE	53. RENEWABLE
	DAYS		MONTHS		YEARS	15 October 1959	☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 30 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☐ YES ☐ NO NA

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (FI, PP, other): PP

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Subject will consult and advise on political techniques.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Active in Southern California politics, particularly Los Angeles area.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐	GRADE SCHOOL	☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐	BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE		
☐	COLLEGE (No degree)	☐	COLLEGE DEGREE	X	POST GRADUATE LLB ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	X			X			X		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Mexico; Latin America

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

Subject is in private law practice.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

NA

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE
8/1/59	Horace W. Davis PP/AC/TAD	9.24.59	Charles J. Francis

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Zambernardi, Robert M.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 July 1956 - 15 Sept 1965

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

ORIGINAL Biographic Profile

— see sanitized copy in slot

Personnel Actions covering
Period After Mexico City
Assignment

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED 15 June 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER 022592	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) ZAMBERNARDI, Robert

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS & REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 07 DAY 05 YEAR 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5225-0079 1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/TSD OPERATIONAL AIDS PHOTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS BRANCH AREA DESKS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D. C.

4
2

11. POSITION TITLE PHOTO GEN	12. POSITION NUMBER 0113	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS ~~(011)~~	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1060.02	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 (3)	17. SALARY OR RATE $8200

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/TSD
FOREIGN FIELD
MEXICO CITY

40

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 6/23/64
Cly 7/1/64

Recorded by
CSPD
DW

CC: Security & Vouchered Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL H. LEE OLSON	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER H Lee Olson H. LEE OLSON, TSD/CMO	DATE SIGNED 6/25/64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	41300	TSD	25013		1	05 09 35		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 6/30/64

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION
1-62 AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) Zembernardi, Robert M.	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* Philip Edward - son	CLAIM NUMBER 64-184

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on Leg burn - 28 December 1963

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 20 FEB 1964	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-53 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 April 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 022592
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): ZAMBERNARDI, ROBERT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 14 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3125-5700-3007
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/TSD
Foreign Field
Western Hemisphere
Mexico
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Mexico City, Mexico
11. POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0575
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.~~01~~ 63
16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 (2)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $7535
18. REMARKS:
FROM: GS-9 (2)

P.A

Recorded by
CSPD

10

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES R. SHIELDS
DATE SIGNED:
19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL: JAMES R. SHIELDS, TSD/CMO
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 46575 ALPHABETIC TS
22. STATION CODE: 45015
23. INTEGRATE CODE:
24. CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 69 YR. 35
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. DATE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 98
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED: 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5 APR 1963
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Paul C Wilson
DATE APPROVED: 5 Apr 63

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Zambernardi, Robert M	Paul - SON	63-460

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 22 February 63 [illegible]

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
8 July 1963	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED 16 January 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER 022592 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) ZAMBERNARDI, Robert

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 01 DAY 21 YEAR 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR ~~XXXXXXX~~
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X= CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2125-5700-3007	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/TSD — Foreign Field Western Hemisphere Mexico	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Mexico City, Mexico

10

11. POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS	12. POSITION NUMBER 0575	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.63	16. GRADE AND STEP 9 (1)	17. SALARY OR RATE $6435 ✓

18. REMARKS

FROM: GS-8 (1)

CSPD
18

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL JAMES R. SHIELDS	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER JAMES R. SHIELDS TSD/CMC	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. OCCUP. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	42575	75	45025		3	05 19 35	1 21 62	1 21 62

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA CODE MO. DA. YR.		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
						FOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT 2 = 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. MIL. SERV. CRED. 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEM	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. C.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
1-19 62		1/ /62

FORM 9-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) ZAMBERNARDI, Robert	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* Wife - Martha Cecilia	CLAIM NUMBER 61-286

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 3 March 1961 - Leiomyoma of Uterus

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-56 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Zambernardi, Robert M.	~~XXXXXXXXX~~ Dependent Wife Martha	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER 56-226

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 16 February 1960.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 8 April 1960	SIGNATURE OF [illegible] REPRESENTATIVE B. DeFelice

NOTICE C OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLA FILE

FORM NO. 1 SEP 59 1076

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 Dec 1960

1. SERIAL NUMBER	522592
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	ZAMBERNARDI, Robert
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	12 / 25 / 60
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	1125-5700-3007
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSD Western Hemisphere MEXICO,
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Mexico, City, Mexico
11. POSITION TITLE	IO TECH AIDS [redacted]
12. POSITION NUMBER	575
12a. PCR CONTROL NO.	
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS-8
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.63
16. GRADE AND STEP	08 01
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 5885

18. REMARKS

[illegible]
CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
JAMES R. SHIELDS

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
James R. Shields
JAMES R. SHIELDS TSD/CMO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

21. OFFICE CODING
46575
4U 55
75
3
05 09 35

POD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
12-21-60

46. O.P. APPROVAL

FORM 8-60 1152 [illegible] AND FORM 1152a

SECRET

Personnel Actions covering period
prior to assignment Mexico City

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 19 August 1965

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) TSD

ESTABLISHED FOR: ZAMBERNARDI, Robert M.

ATTN: Personnel

FILE NO. 4954

REF: Resignee Backstop debriefing

ID CARD NO.

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: Technical Services Group, Provisional

EMPLOYEE NO.

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ **Block Records:** *(OPMEMO 20-800-11)* Resignation effective 20 Aug 65

a. Temporarily for ____ days, effective ____________.

b. Continuing, effective EOD Jul 56.

NA Submit Form 642 to change limitation category. *(HHB 20-7)*

NA Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued. *(HB 20-561-1)*

NA Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover. *(R 240-310)*

NA Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility. *(R 240-350)*

☒ Remarks: 1. Will use DAFC for entire period, with detail to State for use in Mexico City. 2. Will use CIA for entire period if in US. 3. Will check with Station for guidance.

☒ Cover History
Jul56-Nov56 overt
Nov56-Jun57 DAFC/Japan
Jun57-Jul59 DAC/Washington
Jul59-May64 Lt State/Mexico C
May64-May65 DAFC/Washingto

Forwarding Address:
c/o American Embassy
Mexico City, Mexico

Employment Address:
Unknown

NM/al

CHIEF, MILITARY COVER SEC

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D OS, Copy 4-[illegible], Copy 5-PSD/CS, Copy 6 File

FORM 6-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-30-43)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NJM: 25 AUG 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 022592	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 08 20 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6125 0079 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/TSD OPERATIONAL AIDS PHOTO OPERATIONS BRANCH AREA DESKS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE PHOTOG GEN	12. POSITION NUMBER 0113	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1060.02	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 9240

18. REMARKS

COMMUNICATIONS - C/O AMERICAN EMBASSY MEXICO D.F. MEXICO
CHECKS, BONDS - UNION TRUST COMPANY, 1500 H ST. NW
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 05 09 35	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. MPA EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 3AC0041	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED CODE 1 - YES 2 - NO	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

cel 8/26/65

FORM 11-63 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
022592	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	H45 41 575 CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 10	2	$ 7,945	04/14/63	GS 10	3	$ 8,200	04/12/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP 54

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 559

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

JL
Price 7/29/64

SIGNATURE: E.D.ECHOLS DATE: 6 March 1964

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ARM: 15 APR 63

OKF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 022502

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION (CORRECTION)*

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 04 DA. 14 YR. 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶

V TO V		V TO CF
CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3125 5700 3007

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP TSD
FOREIGN FIELD
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
MEXICO

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0575

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.63

16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: 7535

18. REMARKS
*THIS CORRECTS FORM 1150, EFFECTIVE 04/14/63, ITEM #15, OCCUPATIONAL SERIES, WHICH READ "0136.01" TO READ "0136.63."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 DA 09 YR 35
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; HEALTH INS CODE; 1 YES
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: 1 YES 2 NO
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
15 APR 1963

FORM 1150
ilq 25 APR 1963
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

APM: 11 APR 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 022592	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 14 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / CF TO CF ☒		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3125 5700 3007	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP TSD FOREIGN FIELD WESTERN HEMISPHERE MEXICO		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	
11. POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS		12. POSITION NUMBER 0575	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0130.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 7535

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 48575	ALPHABETIC TS	22. STATION CODE 48075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 05	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 04 14 63	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 04 14 63
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE -0	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR DEV CAND TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (3 YRS OR MORE)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. BORN

15 APR 1963

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

11 APR 1963

SECRET

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1966, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 9 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	022592	41 575 CF	GS 10 2	$ 7,535	$ 7,945

BWS: 19 JAN 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 022592
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 01 DA 21 YR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2125 5700 3007
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP TSD
FOREIGN FIELD
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
MEXICO
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0575
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 6435
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Emp. Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	45575	TS	45075		3	05 09 35	01 21 62	01 21 62

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PRIOR GOV SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1/25/62 JM

Form 1150 861 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

1/24/62

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1955, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	022592	46575	CF	09 1	$ 6435	09 1	$ 6675

---

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
022592	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	46 575 CF 10	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 09	1	$ 6,675	01/21/62	GS 09	2	$ 6,900	01/20/63		✓	

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
22592	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	P/TSD 10 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 08	1	$ 5,885	12/25/60	08	2	$ 6,050	12/24/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

BLT: ~~28~~ 23 DEC 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 022592	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 12 DA 25 YR 60	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	1125 5700 3007	50 USC 403 j

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP. TSD WESTERN HEMISPHERE MEXICO	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS	12. POSITION NUMBER 0575	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.63	16. GRADE AND STEP 08 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 5885

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 46575	ALPHABETIC TS	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO 05 DA 09 YR 35	26. DATE OF GRADE MO 12 DA 25 YR 60

27. DATE OF LEI MO 12 DA 25 YR 60

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE NO. DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

OSTED

01-2-61

Form 1150 6-60 | Obsolete Previous Editions | SECRET | (4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 17 APRIL 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - FOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
522592	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	05	05	35		1	M	1	07	30	56	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. TCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13 Mil. Serv. Credit Yes-1 No-2	Code
08	02	54		1	50 USCA 403 J					1	07	30	56		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS TECHNICAL AIDS PHOTOGRAPHIC DIV OPERATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHY BR	4448	WASH.D.C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	PHOTOG GEN	0513	GS	1060.02

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ 4980	DT	12	28	58	12	27	59	9 2500 25 007

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT & TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS*	05	04	19	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS FOREIGN FIELD WESTERN HEMISPHERE MEXICO	4455	MEXICO	45000

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	IO TECH AIDS	0575	GS	0136.63

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ 4980	DT	12	28	58	12	27	59	9 2508 75 007

44. Remarks

*SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

POSTED

24

4/20/59

SECRET

NOV 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
USID
22592

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZAMBERNARDI, Robert M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-8
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION KURIOT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT WH/III/MEXI

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS						9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED	☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED	☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 August 1961	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 7/1/60 - 6/30/61	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 KURIOT support for COs in ops, particularly photo work - concealed, telephoto, movies and documentary	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 S/W - writing and developing S/W communications in direct support of COs	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Routine lab work, microfilming documents, printing & reproduction of photos - montaje etc.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Surveillances, caseing and selection of meeting sites, security stake outs and other ops duties as directed	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Opening, processing, photographing re-sealing operational mail	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 6-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
2 01 PM '61

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This officer is willing, and has become much more effective and sure of himself during the past year. He is an excellent photographer and this with his increasing resourcefulness in support of operations, has resulted in some unusually good work of the ops support type.

This officer has a pleasant personality, is well liked, gets along well with his fellow employees, works overtime without question, and is well adjusted to overseas life in Mexico. The Station is very pleased to have him for another tour as he is most definitely a part of our operational capabilities.

[redacted] was commended by COS, Mexico in January 1961 and a review of this file should include a review of HMMT-1798 dated 12 January 1961.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
13 September 1961	/s/ Robert M. Zambernardi

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
12 months	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 September 1961	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ in pseudo

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 September 1961	Chief of Station	/s/ in pseudo

SECRET

Fitness Reports for period [illegible], and
Personnel Actions for period prior to
assignment Mexico City

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

29 DEC 1960

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 22592

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZAMBERNARDI Ro bert	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION KURIOT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT KURIOT/Mexico	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

11. REPORTING PERIOD From: To:

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Duties levied upon KURIOT by Station CO's in support of their ops and info. This constitutes using concealment devices, telephoto lens.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 S/W (two systems). Writing S/W for CO's. Rec'g messages for development.	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Routine lab work. Micro-filming docs, printing docs, reprod. photos, maintenance of Photo Lab.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Stake out surveillance, agent mtgs and other duties that may be requested.	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Opening, photographing and resealing operational mail of Station CO's.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Purchasing all photo supplies which can be procured on local market. Supplying some basehouses with supplies.	RATING NO. 6

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 4

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
5-54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

DEC 20 11 04 AM '60
MAIL ROOM

This young officer is conscientious and willing. He is an excellent photographer and fulfills duties related to photography (which is his principal duty) in completely satisfactory fashion.

He is willing to take on any assignments given him; is willing to put in any amount of overtime needed to get assignments completed within the prescribed time.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 27 Oct 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Subject signed form 45a in pseudo.

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 27 Oct 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston Scott

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

13 AUG 1959

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 122592

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZAMBERNARDI Robert M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHOTOG GEN	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/TA/PSD	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☒	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 June 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD: From Dec 1958 to Jun 1959

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 USING ENLARGERS, CONTACT PRINTERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT TO MAKE PHOTOGRAPHIC PRINTS.	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 MIXING ALL STANDARD CHEMICALS & SPECIAL FORMULAE FOR THE PROPER DEVELOPMENT OF VARIOUS FILM AND PAPERS - FOREIGN & DOMESTIC	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 PROCESSING OF BLACK & WHITE AND COLOR FILM, BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, RANGING FROM 8MM TO 20"x24"	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 WASHING, DRYING AND SORTING OF PHOTOGRAPHIC PRINTS	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 DOCUMENT PHOTOGRAPHY USING 20"x24" PROCESS CAMERA, MOD. D AND E RECORDAKS AND VARIOUS PORTABLE COPYING EQUIPMENT	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 USES STILL AND MP CAMERAS RANGING FROM 8MM SUB-MINIATURE TO 8 x 10.	3

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 4

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					XX		
RESOURCEFUL					XX		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						XX	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					XX		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					XX		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					XX		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY	XX						
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						XX	
THINKS CLEARLY					XX		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS	XX						
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

SUBJECT'S KNOWLEDGE OF PHOTOGRAPHY IS INCREASING AT A STEADY PACE. HE IS VERY ATTENTIVE TO HIS ON-THE-JOB TRAINING AND APPLIES IT VERY WELL. CONSIDERABLE INITIATIVE HAS BEEN SHOWN BY LEARNING NEW METHODS AND TECHNIQUES. THIS IS PARTLY DUE TO THE CORRESPONDENCE COURSE, IN PHOTOGRAPHY, IN WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED.

SUBJECT LACKS SOME CONFIDENCE IN HIS ABILITY TO PRODUCE PHOTOGRAPHIC PRINTS, HOWEVER, IT IS FELT BY THE RATER THAT THIS IS DUE TO HIS LIMITED EXPERIENCE IN DARKROOM TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES. THE RATER FEELS CONFIDENT THAT SUBJECT WILL OVERCOME THIS LACK OF CONFIDENCE SOON.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION SUBJECT LEFT PCS, MEXICO CITY JUNE 20, 1959.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 JUNE 1959	C/TSS/PSD/OSL	Harold M. Sprague HAROLD M. SPRAGUE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 JUNE 1959	I. O. TECH. AIDS	Ralph W. Harris RALPH W. HARRIS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
122592

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZAMBERNARDI Robert	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Sept 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-5
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHOTOG GEN	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/TA/PD	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☒ NOT ELIGIBLE	☐ MEMBER	☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING	☐ DECLINED	☐ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. December 1958	11. REPORTING PERIOD From Dec 1957 to Dec 1958	SPECIAL (Specify) Also Promotion

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 PHOTOGRAPHIC DARKROOM TECHNICIAN. USE ENLARGERS, CONTACT PRINTERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT TO MAKE PHOTOGRAPHIC PRINTS.	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 MIXING OF PHOTOGRAPHIC SOLUTIONS FROM BULK AND PREPARED CHEMICALS.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 DOCUMENT PHOTOGRAPHY USING CONSOLIDATED PROCESS CAMERA, "E" & "D" RECORDAK, AND OTHER 35MM CAMERAS	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 WASHING, DRYING AND SORTING PRINTS.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 FILM PROCESSING, BOTH BLACK & WHITE AND COLOR.	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					X		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY		X					
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS		X					
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 9-55 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Zambernardi joined the Photographic Support Division in January 1958 with no photographic experience. Mr. Zambernardi has progressed very rapidly in his newly chosen field during the past year by taking an active interest in his on the job training and by displaying considerable initiative in learning new methods and techniques. Mr. Zambernardi is supplementing his agency training by completing a correspondence course in photography given by the New York Institute of Photography. In relatively short time, Mr. Zambernardi has developed into a valued asset to this division.

Because of his brief background in photography, Mr. Zambernardi lacks some confidence in performing his duties. The undersigned feels confident that this will remedy itself as more experience is gained.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
8	Subject on leave, will be shown to him later

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23/12/58	C/TSS/PSD/CSC	Harold M. Sprague HAROLD M. SPRAGUE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Zambernardi is presently performing the duties of a GS-7 photographer with this division in a most competent manner. It is recommended that he be favorably considered for an increase from GS-5 to GS-7.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 December 1958	DC/TSS/PSD	John DeMarco JOHN DEMARCO

SECRET

Fitness Reports and other
Personnel Documents During Period
prior His Assignment to Mexico City

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: BAGLEY, TENNENT H. "PETE"

INCLUSIVE DATES: 29 AUG 1949 - 21 June 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: Office of Personnel

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

Reviewed 3 Mar

BAGLEY, TENNENT H. [illegible] 5604[illegible] D

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 JUNE 72

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056043 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BAGLEY, TENNENT H. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT - CIARDS INVOLUNTARY + Conversion from ESR Status

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 | DAY 30 | YEAR 72

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF XX

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2136-1187

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sec 235(a)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
BENELUX AREA
BRUSSELS STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF STATION (16)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0296

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 ~~5~~ 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~XXXXX~~ ~~33634~~ 34623 ✓

18. REMARKS: 1 cc PAYROLL

C/SPS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLIAM C. COOLEY C/E/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 6/15/72

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 6/16

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROOTES CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)
45	10				3	11 11 25	

27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OTHER, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) CODE:

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0, 60,000, 0.

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT.)

36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):

37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP. CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE (0—WAIVED, 1—REG, 2—REG/OPT, 3—INELIGIBLE) HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 6.28.72

46. C/OP APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher

DATE APPROVED: 28 June 72

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

Executive Registry
72-3246

28 JUN 1972

Mr. Tennent H. Bagley
2721 Glenwick Place
LaJolla, California 92037

Dear Pete:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your more than twenty-five years of service to your country. The success with which you have met this challenge should be a source of lasting pride to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

/s/Harry B. Fisher
26 JUN 1972
Originator: ______________________
Director of Personnel

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat/3257 (21 June 1972)

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

30 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Retirement - **Tennent H. Bagley**

1. The retirement of Subject, effected as a result of a memorandum from the Head of his Career Service stating that he is surplus to the needs of the Service and that his retirement will be recommended to the Director under the provisions of the CIA Retirement and Disability System pertaining to involuntary retirement, in no way implies an adverse action. Subject signed an application for retirement of his own volition in order to qualify for an immediate retirement annuity. The liberalized criteria for such separations was established by the Agency to parallel similar actions under the Civil Service Retirement System in accordance with FPM Letter No. 831-23, dated 10 December 1969.

2. Any inquiry received concerning the nature of the separation of Subject from the Agency should be confirmed simply as a retirement.

Ronald Gage

Ronald Gage
Chief
Retirement Affairs Division

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

[illegible] 72-2155

12 MAY 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR : Tennent H. Bagley

SUBJECT : Involuntary Retirement Under the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. This will confirm a previous discussion with you concerning the problem of a surplus in your career service of on-duty strength in relation to new reduced ceiling and the consequent need to effect a reduction in personnel. At that time you indicated your willingness to assist your career service in reaching its reduced personnel ceiling by accepting involuntary retirement.

2. Accordingly, and in order to establish the necessary conditions for involuntary retirement under CIARDS, I have determined that you are surplus to the needs of your career service and will recommend your retirement to the Director, effective 30 June 1972.

3. I urge you to contact the Retirement Affairs Division, Office of Personnel, where every effort will be made to provide whatever information and assistance you may need in preparing for your proposed retirement.

Cord Meyer (for)
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

NOTED: 19 June 1972

Tennent H. Bagley
Employee Signature

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

Executive Registry
72-3506

CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Request for Retirement

I. Name of Applicant : Tennent H. Bagley DOB : 11 November 1925
Grade : GS-16 Position : Chief of Station, Brussels
Office/Division : European Division
Career Service : Clandestine Service

II. Date Requested for Retirement : 30 June 1972 (Involuntary)
Age at that Date : 46
Years of Creditable Service : 25
Years of Agency Service : 21
Years of Qualifying Service : 13

III. Applicant's Career Service
Recommends : X Approval ___ Disapproval
Reasons for recommending disapproval ______

IV. Retirement Board
Recommends : X Approval ___ Disapproval
Reasons for recommending disapproval ______

V. Director of Personnel
Recommends : X Approval ___ Disapproval
Reasons for recommending disapproval ______

/s/Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

20 JUN 1972
Date

VI. Action by Director of Central Intelligence : ✓ Approved ___ Disapproved

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY

5 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Board

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to GS-17 - Mr. Tennent H. Bagley

1. It is recommended that Mr. Tennent H. Bagley be promoted to GS-17. He has been in grade as GS-16 since June 1965 and has served as COS in Brussels since August 1967. His previous assignment was as Deputy Chief, SB Division.

2. The reasons for this promotion are amply covered in my fitness report of this same date. I have just returned from an extensive trip through the European area, during which I had a chance to see and talk with a very large number of officers under both official and non-official cover. Pete Bagley is one of two whom I am recommending for promotion as a result. He is one of our very finest station chiefs, possessed of imagination, intellect and ability personally to handle operations which very few of his colleagues can match. He is one of those on whom the future of the Organization is going to depend, and I believe that the promotion is more than justified.

/s/
John L. Hart
Chief
European Division

13 August 1970

Acting Chief, EUR Division, confirmed this nomination for the Fall 1970 Review.

Robert W. Sheay
Secretary, Clandestine Service
Career Service Bd

Not Promoted by
CSCS Board
Sep 70

EYES ONLY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 AUG 67

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 056043 L

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): BAGLEY, TENNENT H

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT -1

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 27 | YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	XX	CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 8136 1187

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
NORTHERN REGION
BRUSSELS STATION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

11 POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE
CHIEF OF STATION

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0296

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR		03 2	16,391 ✓
GS	0136.05	16 3	$ 21,415 ✓

18. REMARKS

FROM DDP/SB #0002

SB CONCURS PER E.C. Johnson (phone 8-10-67)

X Wash., D.C.

DCI Approval 27 Jan 67

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
WCTaylor WILFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/PERS	8/14/67		8/16/67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	44550	EUR	46543	5	3	11 11 25		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA. YR.	37 LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR TEMP FROM TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVER 1—YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
Fsm: SB: 8-18-67 AMW	R.H. Bond	1 Sep 67

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

Fi
9
D
4

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) BAGLEY, Tennent H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH Nov. 11 1925	3. GRADE GS-16
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/SB	5. PRESENT POSITION DC/SB	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 7438
7. PROPOSED STATION Brussels	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) COS 0296	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION Integree	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 25 Aug 67	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY four

12. COMMENTS

89's attached to OMS copies 259 a forwarded direct. Subject on TDY standby until November 1967. Request evaluation for above PCS.

13. DATE OF REQUEST 28 July 1967	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Marge Grostephan Marge Grostephan	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 4B-01 Hqs.	16. EXTENSION 6913

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS

Chairman, Overseas Candidate Review Panel

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

COP [illegible]

19 JAN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. Tennent H. Bagley as Chief of Station, Brussels, Belgium

1. The appointment of Mr. Tennent H. Bagley as Chief of Station, Brussels, Belgium, effective on or about 15 June 1967, is recommended. Mr. Bagley would replace Mr. William D. O'Ryan.

2. Mr. Bagley has been an employee of the Agency since July 1950, and is presently assigned as an Operations Officer, Deputy Chief, Soviet Bloc Division, GS-16. A biographic profile, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

Rolfe Kingsley
Chief
European Division

1 Attachment
Biographic Profile (Parts 1 & 2)

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Deputy Director for Plans — 25 Jan 6 — Date

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence — 27 JAN 1967 — Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

3 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert W. Sheay
Secretary
Clandestine Services
Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Mr. Tennent H. Bagley
Promotion to GS-17

1. Mr. Bagley was promoted to GS-16 on 6 June 1965. At that time he was Chief, CI Group, SR Division. On 1 September 1965 he was appointed Deputy Division Chief, SR Division. As his fitness reports attest, his performance in that position was outstanding and when in May 1966 the Soviet Bloc Division was created he was named Deputy Division Chief of the new Division.

2. There is little that need be added to previous fitness reports in my evaluation of Mr. Bagley's current performance. It continues to be that of a dedicated and gifted officer whose energies and extensive substantive knowledge make a vital contribution to one of the top priority programs of the Clandestine Services. Much more important, in considering Mr. Bagley for promotion to the next level of the supergrades, is his potential for additional growth and responsibility. He would be capable now of taking charge of a field station, particularly one with special opportunities for work against the Soviet Bloc and the Chinese targets. With time (he is forty-one) he will be capable of assuming the senior position in any division or staff in the CS. He is clearly one of the outstanding officers in our service.

David E. Murphy
David E. Murphy
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

Not Approved by
CSCS Board

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 December 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056043
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BAGLEY, TENNENT H.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY YEAR 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	XXX	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7134 0573 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP SB DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

D
47

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE:
POL OFFICER 2ND SEC
OPS OFFICER - D DIV CH (SG)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0002
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSS
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP:
01 1
16 2
17. SALARY OR RATE:
15,841
$ 20,745

18. REMARKS

D
51

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: E. C. JOHNSON, C/SB/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 12/27/66
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	42140 SB 15C13			1	11 11 25		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE
36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE / HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-29-66 US
46 O.P. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 30 DEC 1966

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

D 48

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 June 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 056043

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): BAGLEY, TENNENT H.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 03 YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☒

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6134-0573

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/SR

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY CODE | 21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 ADD'L CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) | 26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28 VET. SERVICES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) CODE 2 | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY CQ NO. | 34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 37 LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.) | 39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE, 0—WAIVED, 1—YES, HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS) | 42 LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPT, STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 4/5/66

46 O P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 17 Jun 1966

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

OP 2
3-64

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DD/P 6-1089
16 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Staff and Division Chiefs

SUBJECT : Appointment of a Clandestine Services Career Trainee Selection Board

1. A Clandestine Services Career Trainee Selection Board (hereafter called The Board) is hereby appointed, composed of the following officers:

Robert Anderson - Member
Tennant Bagley - Member
Bruce Cheever - Chairman
Lewis Lapham - Member
Edward Ryan - Member

2. The Board will review all files and assessments of CTs who have finished the Operational Familiarization Course, and who are candidates for admission to the Clandestine Services. The Board will interview each candidate and, after due deliberation, will either accept or reject the CT for service in the Clandestine Services. Rejection by The Board will preclude the attendance by the CT at the Operations Course. CT's so rejected will be turned back to the CIA Office of Personnel for disposition.

3. In interviewing the CT candidate The Board will:

a. Attempt to determine the CT's motivation and suitability for service in the CS.

b. Evaluate the CT's training to date based on his record in the Introduction to Communism, Agency Orientation, Introduction to Intelligence Techniques and the Operational Familiarization Course. If the CT has served in an attached capacity with one of the Staffs or Divisions upon completion of the OFC, the assessment of that Staff or Division on the CT's performance and potential will be taken into consideration on his overall evaluation.

c. Review the CT's assessment by the A & E Staff.

SECRET

d. Attempt to determine the following:

(1) The CT's willingness to serve overseas as directed by the CS.

(2) The mobility and suitability of the CT's family, if any, ~~for~~ overseas service.

(3) What future does the CT foresee for himself in the CS. Where does he want to go; where does he think he is going.

(4) Any reservation the CT may express or imply as to his participation in the Special Operations Course.

(5) Such other items as The Board may consider relevant in the interview of specific candidates.

e. Prepare a Memorandum of Record expressing the opinion of The Board and any observations or recommendations The Board may wish to record on its interview of the CT. Such M/R will become a part of the permanent file of the CT.

4. The Board will meet beginning on April 13, 1966, in Room 3-C-28, for half days, and will continue until all CT's are interviewed. The Chairman may call for such additional sessions as are necessary to complete The Board's work.

5. DDP/TRO will act as Secretary to The Board and will be responsible for coordination with OTR to ensure the presence of the CT's for the interview and that appropriate assessment records in the hands of OTR are available to The Board.

6. CSPS will provide administrative support to The Board, and will ensure that CT's now attached to the Staffs and Divisions are present for the interview and

that the assessment by the Staffs and Divisions is available to The Board.

7. The method of CT selection outlined above supersedes previous selection procedures employed by the CS in determining CT acceptance into the CS.

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans

Distribution:
2 - each Staff & Division Chief
1 - each DDP Training Officer
1 - each DDP Senior Training Officer
1 - DC/FI (Mr. Anderson)
1 - DC/SR (Mr. Bagley)
1 - C/SOD (Mr. Cheever)
1 - DC/CA (Mr. Lapham)
1 - DC/WE (Mr. Ryan)
5 - C/CSPS (for file)
1 - Director of Training
1 - Deputy Director of Training
1 - Chief, Career Trainee Program
1 - COS/Isolation

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tennent H. Bagley

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

My recent memorandum on the above subject informed you that I had determined that you met the criteria specified in HR 20-50 for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System. On the basis of this determination and your recently executed election to remain in the System, your designation as a participant was made effective 3 July 1966.

Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	1 SEPTEMBER 1965		
1 SERIAL NUMBER	056043	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BAGLEY, TENNENT H.
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH DAY YEAR)	09 65
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR		
6 FUNDS	V TO V CF TO V: XX V TO CF CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	6134-0573
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)			
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP SR DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASHINGTON, D.C.
11 POSITION TITLE	POL OFFICER 2nd SEC OPS OFFICER -D DIV CH	12 POSITION NUMBER	0002
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D		
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP	04 2 16 1	17 SALARY OR RATE	12,495 $18,935

18. REMARKS

REPLACING MR. SIDNEY A. STEIN who is transferring to WE/Ottawa.

FROM: SR, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GROUP
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF POSITION NO. 0985

Record [illegible]

D51

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	E C JOHNSON C/SR/PERS	DATE SIGNED	9/1/65
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER		DATE SIGNED	9/2/65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	
20 EMPLOY CODE	
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	
22 STATION CODE	
23 INTEGEE CODE	
24 HQGTRS CODE	1
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	11 1 25
26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28 NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE)	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE; MO DA YR)	
EOD DATA	
33 SECURITY REQ NO	
34 SEX	
35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE: 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT)	
36 SERV. COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR)	
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV PROV TEMP; CODE)	
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE	
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)	
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	9/8/65
46 O P APPROVAL	Bishop for [illegible]
DATE APPROVED	7 Sept

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 16 March 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 056043

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): BAGLEY, Tennent H.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 6 | DAY 6 | YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5134-0573-6000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP SR DIVISION
~~SR-CI-SR~~ COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GROUP
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Pol Officer and Sec
OPS OFFICER ~~DC~~ CH

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0985

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (G.S., L.B., etc.): FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 07 2
16 1

17 SALARY OR RATE: 17 495
$ 15,935

18 REMARKS
cc: Payroll

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert W. Sheary
Sec CSCS Bd.

DATE SIGNED: 17 Mar 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE

20 EMPLOY CODE

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 HOURS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 | DA. 11 | YR. 25

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR./RESV. PROV./TEMP. | CODE

39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

43 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

45 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 1 June 65

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

27 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert W. Sheay
Secretary
Clandestine Services
Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Tennent H. Bagley
Promotion to GS-16

1. Mr. Bagley is without question among the best qualified of the senior officers in SR Division and is also one of the most competent counterespionage officers in the Clandestine Services as a whole. Few have had his preparation or his experience in the Soviet Bloc aspects of this field. After entering on duty in 1950 he was assigned to the Vienna Station where for five years he worked directly on operations against the Soviet intelligence elements concentrated there. When he returned to Headquarters, he supervised the CE Section of the Polish Branch, EE Division when a combination of defectors and penetrations of the Polish services made this job one of the most demanding of any in the Clandestine Services. In his next overseas assignment in Switzerland, he evolved techniques of operational analysis of Soviet intelligence residencies which form the backbone of the system we are using today. While in this post he participated in an operation involving a major penetration of the Polish intelligence service which also had enormous significance for our efforts against the Soviets. Just prior to his departure from Switzerland, he handled one of the most complex and challenging Soviet CE operations ever encountered by our service.

2. In 1962 he was appointed Chief of SR Division's CE element. Under his direction the CE effort of the Division took on entirely new dimensions. Because of Mr. Bagley's marvelous combination of CS experience, substantive knowledge and enthusiasm, the SR/CI Group has become one of the most effective and highly motivated units in the Division. The Group has developed a high level of substantive specialization which it applies to CS coverage of the Soviet intelligence services throughout the world. At the same time, a large percentage of the Group's best officers have been committed full time to a special operation of great value and significance. The ability of

SR/CI to absorb this workload stems not only from Mr. Bagley's capacity for professional guidance but his effectiveness in leading and inspiring those under him.

3. Mr. Bagley's record to date reveals a high degree of specialization in counterespionage yet it would be misleading indeed to conclude that his professional interests and potential are confined to this field. His contributions to the broader problems of Soviet operations have been invaluable particularly in the way in which he has suggested new techniques for attacking the Soviet target abroad.

4. I consider Mr. Bagley an outstanding officer to whom the Clandestine Services will turn for the exercise of still greater responsibilities in the future. He is fully qualified for promotion to GS-16. I urge that he be promoted now in recognition of the work he has done so far and the potential he possesses for a productive career at the top level of Clandestine Services officers.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Bagley, James H.	Marie, wife	63-11 6

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 23 March 61. [illegible].

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF [illegible] REPRESENTATIVE
[illegible] MAR [illegible]	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 12-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Bagley, Tennent H.	Maria, wife	63-116

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 10 March 1961. Flu, etc.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF OSD REPRESENTATIVE
13 February 1963	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Jencks, David	Sarah - daughter	63-119

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 8 January 1963. Tonsillectomy.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
13 February 1963	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

24

SECRET

DODS 63-397

10 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tennent H. Bagley
Chief, CI Branch, SR Division

SUBJECT: DODS-Sponsored Orientation Program for Contact Division Field Officers

I wish to express my appreciation for your participation in our training program at Warrenton from 23-27 September 1963. On balance, this program, which was designed to familiarize OO/CD personnel with the general mission of the Clandestine Services and the particular problems of DODS, went very well.

Your presentation stood out as one of the highlights of the program and received unanimous commendation from the OO/CD officer-trainees. Your able exposition on a most important subject contributed heavily to the success of the program and is indeed much appreciated.

C Tracy Barnes

C. TRACY BARNES
Chief, DODS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 October 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056013
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BAGLEY, TENNENT H.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | x CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3134 1000 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR
Chief, Operations and Plans
Counterintelligence Branch
Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
~~Pol Officer 2nd Sec~~
Ops Officer (Br Ch) D
12. POSITION NUMBER: 578
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS 15
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP:
05 0
15 1
17. SALARY OR RATE:
$ ~~9055~~ 9620
~~13730~~ 14,565
18. REMARKS:
From DDP/EE/Switzerland Sta/slot 1586.

Copy to Office of Security.

Due to report to SR o/a 10/22/62.

Recorded by
CSPD
DM

Concur Richard P. Wa[illegible]
EE Pers

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: McKissin
DATE SIGNED: 29 Oct 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	10[illegible]5	SR	75013		1	11 11 25		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP.; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVER, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 10-31-62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: McKissin
DATE APPROVED: 29 Oct 62

FORM 1-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 SEPTEMBER 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056043
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BAGLEY, Tennent H.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 16 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF: X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3139 5600 1065
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: 2
DDP/EE
Switzerland Station
Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Bern, Switzerland
11. POSITION TITLE: pol officer (2nd Secty)
OPS Officer (D)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1586
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS (15)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 ② / 15 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 9055 / 13730
18. REMARKS: PRA - 20-21 - C (1) in order to complete a two year tour of duty

Recorded by CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: M McKenney
Margaret E. McKenney, C/EE/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 9-13-62
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED: 9/14/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 32
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 1C
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 54600 ALPHABETIC EE
22. STATION CODE: 69007
23. INTEGOFF. CODE:
24. ROTATION CODE: 3
25. MO. DA. YR.: 11 11 25
26.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. DATE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 80
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 11 15
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: ED 11 Sep 62
46. O.P. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 9/14/62

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

28 FEB 1961

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : BAGLEY, Tennent H.
Foreign Service Cover Promotion

According to information received from the Department of State, Subject has been promoted from FSR-6, $8,655, to FSR-5, $8,755, effective 5 February 1961.

Joseph M. Adams
JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief,
~~Official Cover & Liaison, CCG~~
Official Cover Branch, CCG

cc: Compensation & Tax Accounts Branch
~~RID Files, Curtis Hall~~

SECRET

VIA: ______________________
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

L ATCH NO. EAVA-7068

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
Attn: Kenneth M. Wilbanks
FROM : Chief of Mission, Austria

DATE: 12 May 1954

K A P O K

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative

TENNENT H. BAGLEY

SPECIFIC— Recommendation for Promotion - [redacted]

1. Subject joined KUBARK in July 1950. He was given the Staff Orientation, and the Basic and Advanced Operations courses prior to his arrival at VOB in June 1951. After a period of agent handling and technical work in the operations support field, Subject was made Chief of the Counter Espionage Section for the Mission in November 1952, a position which he has held until his very recent reassignment to the Soviet Section. Following Home Leave, he began his second tour here in September 1953. Subject joined the Mission as a GS-9, was promoted to GS-11 on 26 April 1953.

2. Subject was given a rather long apprenticeship in Vienna before he was called upon to set up the CE Section. During this orientation period he was exposed to a variety of intelligence problems, including technical surveillance, photography, secret writing, and documentation, the handling of two American deep cover agents, the training and mounting of an Hungarian border crosser, and the direction of an Austrian double agent. As Chief of the Counter Espionage Section, Subject's responsibilities included the supervision and training of its personnel, the direction and coordination of its activities, and the setting up of procedures for namechecking, carding, file research, and the maintenance of CE and central personality files. Subject was personally responsible for CE analysis as directed by the Chief of Operations. Subject's activity has been restricted to the Soviet CE picture, which we consider a major operational effort of this Mission.

3. Subject's interest and enthusiasm in his work, his attention to duty, and his ability to obtain results have been outstanding attributes in his performance here, and have resulted in his becoming thoroughly familiar with the CE problem in Austria. He has done exceptionally well on a variety of operations, giving each of his cases a maximum amount of planning, and demonstrating an unusual grasp for details. He has read widely in case files, and now possesses a better than average counter-intelligence background. Subject has a good working knowledge of German, which he has learned from scratch here, and he has built up a remarkable knowledge of this area. He was quick to learn the techniques of basic tradecraft, which had enabled him to teach junior case officers and to instruct in the tradecraft seminars held at VOB. His staff guidance in certain double agent cases has increased considerably their value to this Mission. Written reports turned in by Subject have been excellent, displaying forcefulness, fluency, and lucidity, as well as the essential brevity. He has a forceful personality and is unusually successful in agent handling.

4. A mature appearance,

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET

EAVA-7068
page 2

4. A mature appearance, an especially mature manner, and an excellent social presence have enabled Subject to move freely in the local scene. We consider him an extremely valuable senior case officer, and recommended unanimously that he be promoted to GS-12 at a recent meeting of the Promotion Board.

Morton A. Woolley

John H. Paley

John H. Paley

Distribution
3 - FE
1 - OCM
1 - Admin
1 - File

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
556043	BAGLEY TENNENT H	11	11	25		1	M 1	07	24	50

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
04	08	17		1	50 USCA 403 j						07	24	50		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE SWITZERLAND STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5288	BERN, SWITZERLAND	69907

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld. - Frgn. -	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	POL OFF 2ND SECTY AREA OPS OFF	1585 D	FSR GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
06 13 # 2	$ 7100 ~~8990~~ 9205	D1	11	04	56	05	04	58	8 3160 55 065

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	6 15 58	REGULAR	01	M

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
	5288		

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld. - Frgn. -	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
14 1	$ 10,320		6 15 58	12 31 59	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
C/EE/PER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
L. Palmer x388

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	Ronald Gage	JUN 1958	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		13 JUN	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		13 1958

Remarks

L 1

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) BAGLEY, Tennent H.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 11 Da 11 Yr 25	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/EE Switzerland Station Office of the Chief	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Bern, Switzerland	Station Code
16. Dept. - Field Dept. - Usild. - Fran. - x Code	17. Position Title Area Ops. Officer	18. Position No. 1585	19. Serv. GS 20. Occup. Series 0136.01
21. Grade & Step 13 - 1	22. Salary Or Rate $8990	23. SD D1	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr 25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr 26. Appropriation Number 8-3160-55-065

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Integration Department of State	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo 2 Da 21 Yr 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Date	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 5288	32. Location Of Official Station Bern, Switzerland	Station Code 69007
33. Dept. - Field Dept. - Usild. - Fran. - x Code 5	34. Position Title Pol~~itical~~ Officer, 2nd Secty (When)	35. Position No. 1585	36. Serv. FSR 37. Occup. Series 0136.01
38. Grade & Step 6 —	39. Salary Or Rate $7100 ✓	40. SD D1	41. Date Of Grade Mo 11 Da 04 Yr 56 42. PSI Due Mo 05 Da 04 Yr 58 43. Appropriation Number 8-3160-55-065

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
FI/OPS/CCB/GCL

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
B. Eggleston x8104

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
B. Eggleston
Cover Officer

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	JB	3/6/58	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

Standard Remarks

FORM 3-57 1152a

Form DS-1037
Approved by the
Bureau of the Budget

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SERVICE
☒ FS ☐ DPTL

1. NAME (Mr. Miss-Mrs.-first given name, initial(s) and surname) Mr. Tennent H. Dagley	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11-11-25	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. PSA 1	4. DATE 2-13-58

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology) Limited Appointment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 2/21/58	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Section 522.1 PL 724 79th As Amended

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE Diplomatic or Consular Title	Political Officer
	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-6 $7100
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS Post	Bern
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ Regular ☐ Resident ☐ Non-US	12. DS CATEGORY FS Category	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☒ Regular ☐ Resident ☐ Non-US

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE
NONE:
5 PT: X
10 POINT: Disab: Other:

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION
NEW: X
VICE:
C.A.:
REAL:
1-1011-093

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM
TO 8A-8012

17. RETIREMENT COV.
☒ CSC ☐ FS
☐ FICA ☐ NONE

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (Accessions Only) 2/21/58

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE Calif.

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department.

Execute SF-61a.

Marital Status - Married - One

Reserve Status - U.S.M.C.R., 5th Marine Corps Reserve District,
Serial No. 047506

No Reserve Status - Resigned effective 10/31/57

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

EMPLOYEE COPY

U.S. G.P.O. 1957-490165

14-00000

SEC [illegible]

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED to UNVOUCHERED
18 October 1957

1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): BAGLEY, TENNENT H.
3. Date Of Birth: Mo 11 Da 11 Yr 25
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS - EOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt (Yes-1, No-2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Apmt Affidav: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code 1
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. Mil. Serv. Credit LED (Yes-1, No-2): Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP/EE
Poland Branch
FI Operations Section

Code:

15. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D.C.

Station Code:

16. Dept.-Field (Dept.-XX, Unfld.-Fran.): Code 5
17. Position Title: I.O. (FI)
18. Position No.: 118
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0136.51
21. Grade & Step: 13 1
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 8990.00
23. SD: DI
24. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr
25. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr
26. Appropriation Number: 8-3100-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT * V to UV
Code:
28. Eff. Date: Mo 12 Da 15 Yr 57
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR
Code:
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDP/EE
Switzerland Station
Office of the Chief

Code: 5277

32. Location Of Official Station: Bern, Switzerland

Station Code: 69007

33. Dept.-Field (Dept.-, Unfld.-Fran.-XX): Code
34. Position Title: Area Ops Off.
35. Position No.: 1585 *14 10
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 0136.01
38. Grade & Step: 13
39. Salary Or Rate: $
40. SD:
41. Date Of Grade: Mo 11 Da 04 Yr 56
42. PSI Due: Mo 05 Da 04 Yr 58
43. Appropriation Number: 8-3160-55-065

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): C/EE/PER
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): E. MacLure, 3884
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): Approved by CS Career Service Panel 8 NOV 1957

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		12 [illegible] 1957	E.		
C. Classification		[illegible]	F. Approved By	Robert W. Shoay	[illegible]

Remarks: Transfer from VOUCHERED to UNVOUCHERED. W-4 & D-4-2 Forms attached.
Two copies of action sent to Security.

* New established position.

Sec Conc by [illegible] 10/28/57

FORM 1152a
5-57

SECRET

11/18

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO: Registrar, Office of Training

I certify that I completed the Cable Writing Refresher No. 4
on MAY 2 1956.

T.H. BAGLEY ✓ EE
Name (Please Print) Staff or Division

S-E-C-R-E-T

STANDARD FORM 127
APRIL 1953
PRESCRIBED BY GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
REG 3 IV 107

REQUEST FOR OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER
(SEPARATED EMPLOYEE)

Submit in duplicate to the Federal Records Center, St. Louis, Mo.

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 7/17/57

SECTION I—TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTING OFFICE

General Services Administration
Records Management Service, Region 6
Federal Records Center
1724 Locust Street
St. Louis 3, Mo.

2. NAME (*Last, first, middle*) BAGLEY, TENNENT H.	3. NAME UNDER WHICH FORMERLY EMPLOYED FEDERALLY (*If other than item 2*)	4. DATE OF BIRTH 11/11/25

5. FORMER FEDERAL EMPLOYING OFFICE (*Agency, bureau or equivalent, address, and dates of employment*)

Dept. of State 4/15/48 to 11/30/48

(If formerly employed by agencies in addition to above, list under item 7)

6. PERSONNEL FOLDER ACTION (*Check appropriate box*)

☒ a. CURRENTLY EMPLOYED: REQUEST TRANSMISSION OF FOLDER COVERING PREVIOUS FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT FOR PERMANENT RETENTION

☐ b. REQUEST TRANSMISSION OF FOLDER FOR TEMPORARY USE

☐ c. CONSOLIDATE ATTACHED PAPERS WITH OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER PREVIOUSLY FORWARDED

7. REMARKS

SECTION II—FOR USE BY FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER, ST. LOUIS, MO.

8\.

☐ a. CONSOLIDATE ATTACHED PAPERS WITH FOLDER PREVIOUSLY FORWARDED

☐ b. FOLDER ENCLOSED

☐ c. FOLDER NOT LOCATED

☐ d. FLAGGED, FOLDER TO BE FORWARDED WHEN LOCATED

☐ e. FOLDER PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED IS ENCLOSED

☐ f. FOLDER FORWARDED ON A LOAN BASIS IN LIEU OF INFORMATION REQUESTED. IF EMPLOYEE IS REHIRED, FOLDER SHOULD BE RETAINED BY YOUR AGENCY

9. REMARKS

NOTE.—Original will be used as charge-out by Federal Records Center. Duplicate will be returned as transmittal sheet when appropriate.

TO:
ADDRESS:

ATTN:

Requesting agency will type name and address of office submitting request in address box. To be used to mail folder or reply.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]-1

SECRET

ARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY [illegible] — FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. TENNENT H. BAGLEY	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1925	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 26 Apr 57
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) REASSIGNMENT B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
I.O. (CI) BO-216	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BO-118-13
GS-0136.53-13 $8990.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-13 $8990.00
DDP/EE Poland Branch CE Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 6213,0	DDP/EE Poland Branch FI Operations Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ XX DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ XX DEPARTMENTAL 14 (DI)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Vice Norbert A.Shepanek being reassigned.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) EE/PER	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: RVW Adams
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) E. MacLure/3884	Title: CS/CAO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM 7-3100-20 W TO Same	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	WH	5/2/57	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	RWT	1 May	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

Max C. Weiss Jr.   RVW Adams   1 May 57

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: 2 Oct 56

NAME: Mr. Tennent H. Bagley

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION: ☒ PROMOTION ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ ROTATION ☐ TRAVEL ☐ OTHER (Explain)

FROM: I.O. GS-12, EE, Washington

TO: I.O. GS-13, EE, Washington

AOS.

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	OTHER TRAINING COURSES	DATE TAKEN
	BIC(CS), ALSO BIC, BITC, BOC	8/53			
	BTP AND BOC				
	BTP II, ALSO OC	11/50			
	BTP III, ALSO AIC, AITC, AOC AND CAI	10/50			
	PO, ALSO FM I, II, III AND RAFT				
	ITC ALSO CI				
	TECH				
	ADMIN				
	SIC				
	SUP				
	CFA				
	RPTS				
	OB				
	OSC (CS)				
	E & E				
	CPM				
	WPSOC				
	CPO				
	STA				
	CEW				
	IT				
	GW				
	SAO				
	AO				
	MO				
	SUR				
	BFOT				
	DOC				
	LOCKS				
	S/W				
	F A S				
	SAF				

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.

2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

STAFF TRAINING OFFICE COMMENTS:

☐ A. THIS ☑ DOES ☐ DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN S, THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY MINIMUM STANDARDS.

☐ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE, WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ☐ QUALIFYING ☐ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT.

[illegible]

SIGNATURE OF STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,
C. Danish

FROM: Career Management Officer
ROBERT A. SHEELS

FI

The above projected personnel action has been ☑ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE: 24 Oct 5

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER: Robert A. Sheels

FORM NO. 59-77 PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED
1 JAN 54 REPLACES FORM NO. 59-112
AUG 1953 WHICH MAY BE USED

SECRET (2-4-45)

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. - Miss - Mrs. - One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. TENNENT H. BAGLEY

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Nov. 1925

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 11 Aug. 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION & (NAME CHANGE) #

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (CI)	BG-216-12	I.O. (CI)	BG-216
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.53-12	$7785.00	GS-0136.53-13	$8990.00
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/EE Poland Branch CE Section		DDP/EE Poland Branch CE Section	
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.		Washington, D.C.	
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	

(02)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary):

# Subject has been receiving his checks under the ~~xx~~ ~~[illegible]~~ given name of Tennett. Please change to the corrected spelling as shown above.

R.O.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): C/EE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): 3884/C. Danish

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature:

Title:

23 Oct 56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-CI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM 7-3100-20
TO Same

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		[illegible]	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		19 Oct 56	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

per 7 [illegible] 26 Oct 57

SECRET

6 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: EE/Personnel

SUBJECT: Promotion Recommendation - Tennent E. Bagley

1. We recommend herewith that Tennent E. Bagley, incumbent of slot BC-216 on the T/O of EE/P be promoted from GS-12 to GS-13.

2. Mr. Bagley is one of the best all around operations officers the undersigned has ever worked with, and evinces in all matters he has been concerned with a deep and mature understanding of intelligence operations and a deep sense of responsibility and integrity. He has, since joining EE/P, been Chief of the CE Section, supervising the work of a staff of five, some of whom are of equal rank with Subject and have been concerned with Agency Polish matters for many years. Mr. Bagley organized his section in a most efficient and tactful manner and succeeded in turning the work of his subordinates into channels of real value to the Branch, a job requiring no mean diplomacy and patience.

3. As a supervisor and as an operations officer Mr. Bagley has distinguished himself while at this Branch in a manner which clearly calls for his advancement to a grade which would only be commensurate with the extent of his responsibilities and his singular abilities to carry them out.

HR

HOWARD E. ROMAN
Chief, EE/P

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 295 — FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL, CHAPTER 25

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

TRANSFER FROM UNVOUCHERED TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. TANNETT H. BAGLEY

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Nov. 1925

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 27 Apr. 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT 01
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: 20 MAY 1956

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops. Off. GS-0136.01-12 DDP/EE Austrian Station Operations Staff Vienna, Austria	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O.(CI) GS-0136.53-12 DDP/EE Poland Branch CE Section Washington, D.C.
BO(F)-657 ~~$7570.00~~ 7715	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	BO-216-12 ~~$7570.00~~ 7715
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 5213 50	
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL (DI)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

TRANSFER FROM UNVOUCHERED TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Carl T Taylor EE/Per.

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): 3884/C.Danish

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Robert A. Shields (UMN)
Title: EE/CMO 4 May 56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL

SD-DI

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3110-55-016
TO: 6-3100-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Calif.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

NOIW

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		5/7/56
E		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

K Reedy 5/7/56

SECRET

Chief of Operations, DD/P   25 May 1955

Director of Security

BAGLEY, Tennent Harrington - #38638

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 7 April recommending to the Director of Central Intelligence approval of the request made by Mr. Bagley for permission to remain in the employ of the Agency following his marriage to Miss Maria Lonyay.

2. This is to report that the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence has approved Mr. Bagley's request subject to the conditions contained in a MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD dated 18 May 1955, a copy of which is attached.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Ernal P. Geiss
Chief, Personnel Security Division

Attachment:
DDCI Memo dated 18 May 1955

cc: Director of Personnel

SECRET

COPY SECRET

18 May 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The request of Tennant Harrington Bagley for permission to remain employed by this Agency after marriage is approved subject to the following:

1. Subject's immediate supervisor will be notified by cable to counsel with subject regarding the serious effect the marriage will have in impairing what otherwise appears to be an outstanding career with this Agency. Subject, although young, has demonstrated exceptional ability and great promise and has been promoted well ahead of others of his age bracket. Based upon his actions to date, it would appear subject might ultimately expect to attain a position of considerable importance and responsibility in this Agency, if no inherent limitations develop. The proposed marriage places such a limitation on the use of subject, not only in particular parts of Europe, but in Headquarters as well. Certain clearances required of high level employees of the Agency will be difficult to obtain if this marriage is contracted, and the limitations on the type of assignments which will be available to him will not enhance his career development.

2. After receiving this counsel and giving it consideration, if subject continues in his desire to marry and contracts the marriage, he will be removed from Austria as soon as he can conveniently arrange for his spouse's visa. Following the marriage, he shall be withdrawn from the more sensitive elements of the Station's business.

/s/

C. P. CABELL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Director

C
O
P
Y

SECRET

SECRET

D/Pers

APR 7 55 1-5901

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Director of Personnel
Director of Security

SUBJECT : BAGLEY, Tennent H. (#37637), Area Operations Officer, GS-13, EE Division, Request for Permission to Remain in the Employ of the Agency After Marriage to an Alien

1. It is recommended that Mr. Bagley's request to remain in the employ of the Agency after his marriage to Maria Lengyel, an Austrian citizen, be approved.

2. This recommendation is based on the following factors after consideration of this request by the Clandestine Services Career Service Panel:

a. Mr. Bagley has served effectively with the Agency since July 1950. He has demonstrated unusual ability in his field assignments and is regarded as an extremely valuable career officer.

b. The limitation which this proposed marriage would place on Mr. Bagley's use in his current assignment would be minimal since his normal tour of duty in Austria will expire in September of this year.

3. The security aspects of this proposed marriage have been referred to the Office of Security for its separate recommendation.

RICHARD HELMS
Chief of Operations, DD/P

CONCURRENCE:

SIGNED 11 APR 1955

Harrison G. Reynolds
Director of Personnel

SECRET

AIR SECRET FAVA-8235

2 September 1954

Chief, EE
  Attn: Norman R. Petersill
Chief of Mission, Austria

Administrative/Personnel

Promotion Recommendations **K A P O K**

Kindly advise us of the status of the following recommendations for promotion submitted by this Mission:

[redacted] (Eava-6376, 19 March 1954) - ED Grainge
[redacted] (EAVA-6661, 15 April 1954) Julian Snock
[redacted] (EAVA-7068, 14 May 1954) Kenneth Bage

Hector A. Fairfield

Distribution
3 - EE
1 - COM
1 - Admin
1 - File

SECRET

231

SECRET

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE CAREER STAFF

To the Chief, KUBARK

Sir:

I submit herewith my application for membership in the Career Staff defined below:

> "The Career Staff is a group of carefully selected and trained individuals who accept an obligation to devote themselves to the needs of the Organization, and who intend to make a career with the Organization."

In accordance with this definition, I desire to devote myself to the faithful performance of duty in the Organization, and I accept the obligations and conditions of that service which are determined to be essential to the furtherance of its mission.

I am aware of the many restrictions necessarily placed upon me by virtue of the security requirements inherent in my employment by the Organization. I am also aware that as a member of the Career Staff, it will be my obligation to serve anywhere and at any time and for any kind of duty as determined by the needs of the Organization and I have been assured that in order to carry out this policy, full consideration will be given to my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances. By virtue of this application for membership and upon my acceptance in the Career Staff, I am assured that, with continuing satisfactory work performance and conduct on my part, just and equitable attention will be accorded my personal progress during my tenure in the Career Staff. I am also assured that, on my satisfactory completion of any assignments, I will be offered reassignments which are compatible insofar as possible with my abilities and career interests, and that I shall be entitled to the benefits now available or to be made available in the future to members of the Career Staff of the Organization.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CAREER STAFF
APPROVED, TO TAKE EFFECT 1 JUL 1954

FOR THE CHIEF, KUBARK:
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
KUBARK SELECTION BOARD

Tennett H. Bagley 5-52
(Signature)

19 Nov 54
(Date)

JAN 4 1955

SECRET

SECRET

EAVA-7068

Chief, FE
Attn: Kenneth F. Wilbanks
Chief of Mission, Austria

12 May 1954

K A P O K

Administrative

TENNENT H. BAGLEY

Recommendation for Promotion - [redacted]

1. Subject joined KUBARK in July 1950. He was given the Staff Orientation, and the Basic and Advanced Operations courses prior to his arrival at VOB in June 1951. After a period of agent handling and technical work in the operations support field, Subject was made Chief of the Counter Espionage Section for the Mission in November 1952, a position which he has held until his very recent reassignment to the Soviet Section. Following Home Leave, he began his second tour here in September 1953. Subject joined the Mission as a GS-9, was promoted to GS-11 on 26 April 1953.

2. Subject was given a rather long apprenticeship in Vienna before he was called upon to set up the CE Section. During this orientation period he was exposed to a variety of intelligence problems, including technical surveillance, photography, secret writing, and documentation, the handling of two American deep cover agents, the training and mounting of an Hungarian border crosser, and the direction of an Austrian double agent. As Chief of the Counter Espionage Section, Subject's responsibilities included the supervision and training of its personnel, the direction and coordination of its activities, and the setting up of procedures for namechecking, carding, file research, and the maintenance of CE and central personality files. Subject was personally responsible for CE analysis as directed by the Chief of Operations. Subject's activity has been restricted to the Soviet CE picture, which we consider a major operational effort of this Mission.

3. Subject's interest and enthusiasm in his work, his attention to duty, and his ability to obtain results have been outstanding attributes in his performance here, and have resulted in his becoming thoroughly familiar with the CE problem in Austria. He has done exceptionally well on a variety of operations, giving [illegible] amount of planning, and demonstrating an unusual grasp for details. He has read widely in case files, and now possesses a better than average counter-intelligence background. Subject has a good working knowledge of German, which he has learned from scratch here, and he has built up a remarkable knowledge of this area. He was quick to learn the techniques of basic tradecraft, which had enabled him to teach junior case officers and to instruct in the tradecraft seminars held at VOB. His staff guidance in certain double agent cases has increased considerably their value to this Mission. Written reports turned in by Subject have been excellent, displaying forcefulness, fluency, and lucidity, as well as the essential brevity. He has a forceful personality and is unusually successful in agent handling.

4. A mature appearance,

SECRET

4. A mature appearance, an especially mature manner, and an excellent social presence have enabled Subject to move freely in the local scene. We consider him an extremely valuable senior case officer, and recommended unanimously that he be promoted to GS-12 at a recent meeting of the Promotion Board.

Horton A. Woolley

John H. Paley

Distribution
3 - FE
1 - OCH
1 - Admin
1 - File

FORM NO. NOV 1951 35-85

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 SEP 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 18835

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP VIENNA

ACTION: EE 6

ROUTINE

1557Z 16 SEP 53

INFORMATION: FI/ADMIN, PP 2, DD/P-ADMIN, FD 3, LO/TD 2, PERS 2, FI/RI 2

VIEN 0858

TO: DIR

CITE: SVIEN

ADMIN Tennent H. Bagley

[redacted] ARRIVED 15 SEPTEMBER 53.

END OF MESSAGE

SEP 21 1953

GEORGE E. BALL

J2

[illegible]

SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

(44)

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

FORM NO 35
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 SEP 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 18835

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP VIENNA

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

1557Z 16 SEP 53

INFORMATION: FI/ADMIN, PP 2, DD/P-ADMIN, FD 3, LO/TD 2, PERS 2, FI/RI 2

VIEN 0858

TO: DIR

CITE: SVIEN

ADMIN

Tennent H. Bagley

[redacted] ARRIVED 15 SEPTEMBER 53.

END OF MESSAGE

SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

(44)

GPO 16-63203-1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

file

SECRET

Security Information

Date: 2 Sept 53

Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

1. In accordance with the policy of this agency, it is understood and agreed by me that I shall be required to serve a minimum term of two years from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, unless terminated by the Government for its convenience. If the assignment is terminated at my request in less than twenty-four months, the following shall prevail:

(a) If I resign in less than twelve months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses involved in the transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the foreign station, and pay all such expenses for return to the United States.

(b) If I resign between the twelfth and twenty-fourth month from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the United States.

2. Part (a) above shall not apply to employees who have served in a departmental position with CIA or who have served an overseas tour of duty with CIA, and in such case part (b) only shall apply, amended to read: "If I desire to terminate or return to the United States prior to the expiration of twenty-four months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the United States".

Tennent H. Bagley

Witness:

Jeanette Brown

SECRET
Security Information

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

RECORD OF TRANSPORTATION FURNISHED

DATE 20 August 1953

NAME Tennent H. Bagley

DIVISION EE

TRAVEL ORDER NO. EE-870/53

DEPARTURE DATE 3 September 1953

☒ PCS
☐ TDY

EXCESS COST, IF ANY $ None

☐ PAID BY EMPLOYEE
☐ CHARGE TO EMPLOYEE

TICKET NO.	COST	HOW PURCHASED	ROUTE & CARRIER
			Payee: United States Lines
[illegible]	$ 373.00	[illegible]	S.S. United States - from New York Room S-31 to Havre

REMARKS: (Dependent's name with age and sex for children, indicate concurrent travel)

It is requested that a cashiers check be rendered.

POSTED

DEa 10 Sep 53

Jay R. [illegible]
Passenger traffic officer

I CERTIFY that the services represented by this form constitute the lowest first class transportation available at the time the reservation was made. (If foreign ship has been reserved, the appropriate certification has been affixed to the invoice.)

Date

Authorized approving officer

I CERTIFY that this voucher has been examined by me; that receipts or other substantiating data have been furnished me, or a satisfactory explanation made for the failure to furnish same; that it appears from such data that the itemized materials, services and/or expenditures were for necessary official purposes, reimbursement or payment for which is allowable under existing regulations; and that such expenditures are properly chargeable to available appropriations as indicated below.

Date

Appropriation

Allotment

Authorized certifying officer

FORM NO. 36-154
MAR 1953

SECRET

(44)

NAME Tennent H. Bagley DATE 13 Aug 53

ORDERS:

TDY ✓

PCS

MODE OF TRAVEL Air

RETURNED FROM Vienna

DATE DEPARTED 19 June 53

DATE ARRIVED U.S. 20 June 53

DATE REPORTED WASH 12 Aug 53

FUTURE PLANS On TDY & return to post

VIA. Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. FAVA- 1939
ADM/ 2519

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
ATTN: Thomas D. Mullally
FROM : Chief of Mission, Austria *40*

DATE: 27 February 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative

SPECIFIC— Promotion for [redacted]

Indexing [illegible]
Hq Action Sec. [illegible]
Ser [illegible] 4 [illegible] ✓
Hq Comments Sec. [illegible]
Ser [illegible]
for [illegible]

GROOVY/ORBOUNCE BAGLEY, TENNENT H.

1. [redacted] joined KUBARK in July 1950 and arrived at this Mission on the 15th of June 1951 as a GS-9.

2. Since his arrival [redacted] has continually showed himself as a great asset to the Mission. After a period of technical work and agent handling, [redacted] was made chief of the Counter Espionage Section for the Mission in November 1952. He has done an excellent job in organizing this section and in handling and training the four persons whom he supervises.

3. Upon his arrival in Vienna, [redacted] knew little German. He has now mastered the language to such a degree that he can handle German speaking agents. His handling of Grabysm 1 and Leland D. Slaughter has been outstanding in that by carefully training these agents he increased considerably their value to this Mission. In addition, [redacted] has an excellent grasp of basic tradecraft which enables him to perform his functions with great efficiency and to teach these tradecrafts to the junior members of his section. [redacted] is one of the regular instructors in the Vienna Operations Base tradecraft seminars. [redacted] has shown an unusual social ability in Vienna, a quality which has done much to help him move freely in the local scene. His duties frequently call for large quantities of written work, and he has proven himself able to handle this speedily and with clarity of expression.

4. [redacted] is a very promising case officer, and at a meeting of the Mission Promotion Board was unanimously recommended for promotion to GS-11. It is with great confidence that I submit his name to Headquarters for this action.

Morton A. Woolley
Morton A. Woolley

Henry P. Dagenham
Recommended and Approved
Henry P. Dagenham

Attachment - Job Descrip.

Distribution: 2 EE - 1 [illegible]wer
1 Gratl[illegible]
1 Admin - 1 File

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

VIA: ______
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. [illegible] 1638

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
Attn: Thomas D. Mullally

DATE: 30 January 1953

FROM : Chief of Mission, Austria SBH/MPD

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative
SPECIFIC- Transferred Leave - Tennent H. Bagley

GROUP

1. Form 1150 concerning subject was forwarded [redacted] for action. It is forwarded to Headquarters for appropriate action.

2. Subject had no break in service.

Stephen B Hancock / TRK
Stephen B. Hancock

Attachment as noted

Distribution:
- 2 EE
- 1 Grower
- 1 Cratlas
- 1 Admin
- 1 File 201

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

14-00000

Form No. 35-8
April 1950

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

From:	VIENNA	ROUTINE
To:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	19 JUN 51
Action:	FDM (1-2-3)	IN 48599
Information:	IID (4), AD/SO (5), ADMIN (6), PDC (7), CFD (8-9-10), S/C (11-12-13)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 80A AR-380-5

VIEN 5632

TO: WASHF CITE: VIENF

[redacted] [redacted] ARRIVED VIENNA PCS 15 JUNE 51.

Tennent H. Bagley

TOR: 1257Z 19 JUN 51

SECRET

Copy No.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—62322-3

file

May 25, 1951

28

BAGLEY, Tennent Harrington Nov. 11, 1925 PL 724 79th

FSS

INDEFINITE APPOINTMENT EO 10180 5-25-51 5-25-51

Political Officer

Assistant Attache

Vienna

FSS-9 $4290.00

1AL-2092120

VA-138-a

INDEF X

Sec. Sec. X X

X
USA

Male Single California

Items a, b, c, d, i, (61)

Inactive US Marine Corps Reserves, 1st. Lt., 047506

Standard Forms 84 and 87 5-25-51

Social Security No. 570 38 7705

Pfeifer File

SECRET

21 May 1951

TO: Personnel Director, CIA

VIA: ADMIN and FDC

FROM: FDM

SUBJECT: Tennent H. Bagley

1. It is requested that permission be procured from the Marine Corps and the Selective Service for subject to leave the country on a two-year assignment with this Agency in Austria.

2. Below is the information on subject's draft and reserve unit:

A) Selective Service:

Board: Local Board No. 1
1729 New York Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Classification: 4-A

Selective Service Number: 49 1 25 488

Home Address: 2168 Florida Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C.

B) Marine Reserve:

Rank and Serial Number: First Lieutenant - 047506

Marine Reserve Unit: 11th Marine Corps Reserve District

3. Subject has been in the Agency since 24 July 1950 and is unusually well qualified for intelligence work in Austria. If the above permissions are granted, subject will be sent immediately to his assignment.

4 June 51
Permission received from
Draft Board & Reserve.
Picked up by E. [illegible]

Hugh T. Cunningham
Acting Chief, FDM

APPROVED:

SECRET

For the Assistant Director, Special Operations

14-00000

Bag

Form No. 35-8
(Dec. 1947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

To:	VIENNA	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	15 MAY 51
Confirmation:	PDC (1)	OUT 51984
Information:	AD/SO (2), FDM (3), S/C (4-5-6), DDP (7)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 41779

TO: VIENF CITE: WASHF

RE: MAV-W 3292

SUBJECT OF REFERENCE IS MR. TENNETT H. BAGLEY.

H. LITTLE	JSR	B. TWEEDY
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 1954Z 15 MAY 51

SECRET

Copy No. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

MAR 2 8 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ATTENTION: Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Subject : Request for Appointment in the Foreign Service as Vice Consul at Vienna for Mr. Tennent Harrington Bagley.

Enclosures: a. Form DSP-34

b. Standard Forms 28 and 89

c. Proposed Biography

1. It is requested that Mr. Tennent H. Bagley be appointed in the Foreign Service with the title of Vice Consul, FSS-9, $4,670.00, for duty in the American Legation at Vienna, Austria.

2. Mr. Bagley received his A.B. Degree from the University of Southern California and his M.A. and Ph.D. Degrees from the University of Geneva. He has had nearly a year's experience as an intelligence officer in Government service and it is believed, possesses the professional qualifications necessary for his duties as well as the qualifications expected of an American official serving abroad. He will receive from CIA a basic salary of $4,600.00 per annum.

3. Mr. Bagley will replace Mr. Jack J. Fieldhouse who will be reassigned shortly after Mr. Bagley's arrival.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

W. G. WYMAN
Assistant Director

cc - DD/P [illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

TENNETT HARRINGTON BAGLEY

OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE: July 1950 to Present - Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C.

SECRET

PROPOSED BIOGRAPHY

BAGLEY, Tennett Harrington.—b. Annapolis, Md., Nov. 11, 1925; Princeton U., 1942-43; U. of S. Calif., A.B. 1947; U. of Geneva, M.A. and Ph.D. 1950; single.

5 March 1951

TO: Mr. Harold Pfeifer

FROM: FDM

SUBJECT: Request for Designation - Mr. Tennent H. Bagley

It is requested that necessary steps be taken to obtain a Foreign Service designation for the following employee:

a. Name: Tennent H. Bagley

b. Station of Assignment: Vienna, Austria

c. Foreign Service title requested: Vice Consul

d. Employee is not a replacement.

e. Availability date for departure: 15 March 1951

E.C. Dunlevy

Elizabeth C. Dunlevy
For: Chief, FDM

1

(5)

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

No. #970 Grade: 70 M (~~ADD~~)

Name Bagley, Tennent H. Station Vienna ~~[illegible]~~ Sponsor

Title ~~[illegible]~~ Officer (Ops) Grade & Salary GS-9 $4600.00

Request for Title from Division

Title Requested Vice Consul FS-9 $4470.00

Replacement for

Request to DFSS 19 March 1951

Memo to DFS 16 Feb. 51 #3638

Dispatch sent 19 March 1951

True Name Cable sent 12 May

Physical & Inoculations 88 & 89 recd.

R. & D Report OK

Contract signed

Form DSP-34 to individual

Form DSP-34 received 5 March 51

Misc.

Physical (State)

Clearance 23 May '51

Identification 25 May

[illegible] Asst Attache (Political

Report to Miss Carlile

Misc.

Form 37-1 prepared

Briefing

International Certificate

[illegible] Info.

Form FS-[illegible]

Application Form Info. (DSP-34)

Form FS-319 Info.

Finance Division

Badge Picked up

STATE CLEARANCE

FOR

DATE

[illegible]

[illegible] ORDERS

Dependents

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]
2/16

5 March 1951

TO: CPD

FROM: FDM

SUBJECT: Transfer of Tennent H. Bagley

It is requested that subject be transferred from the German T/O to Slot No. 6 of the External Section "A" (Vienna). This is a temporary move. Adjustment will be made when the new Vienna T/O is approved.

E. C. Dunlevy
Elizabeth C. Dunlevy
For: Chief, FDM

SECRET

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, IAS Staff

DATE: 16 February 1951

FROM: Overseas Branch, CPD

SUBJECT: Tennent Bagley #38638

For the convenience of the Department of State, it is requested that the appropriate security certification be prepared and forwarded to the Department of State as soon as possible. The subject is to be assigned to Vienna, Austria.

JOSEPH S. P[illegible]

SECRET

(5)

File
MN

6 February 1951

TO: Overseas Branch

FROM: FDM

SUBJECT: Cancellation of Transportation - Tennent H. Bagley

It is requested that all travel arrangements on Mr. Bagley be cancelled. The Division is changing his assignment and he will not be sent to Karlsruhe, Germany.

Elizabeth C. Dunlevy
For: Chief, FDM

22 January 1951

TO: Overseas Branch, HD

VIA: Assistant Director, Special Operations

FROM: FDM

SUBJECT: Foreign Travel Request

1. It is requested that appropriate travel orders be issued for Mr. Tennent H. Bagley to proceed to Karlsruhe, Germany on PCS.

2. The following information is submitted for the preparation of the Foreign Travel Order:

a. Justification: Mr. Bagley is being sent to Germany as an Intelligence Officer, GS-9, against POS/DAD Slot No. 53.

b. Availability date to commence travel: 14 March 1951.

c. Mode of travel: Sea

d. Requested deviation from most direct route and justification therefor: Subject has requested and the Division has no objection, six (6) days' annual leave in Switzerland enroute to Station.

e. Dependents to be authorized to travel: No

f. Household effects to be authorized: Yes

g. Shipment of personal automobile to be authorized: Yes

h. Special provisions: None.

i. Travel advance of $800.00 is requested.

Elizabeth C. Dunlevy
For: Chief, FDM

APPROVED:

For the Assistant Director, SO

[illegible]

X2138

1. Name **BAGLEY, Tennent H.** Station **Karlsruhe** Sponsor **FDM** Dunbury

Title **Intelligence Officer** Grade & Salary **GS-9 $4600.** Eff. Trans. Date

Washington, D. C. to Karlsruhe, Germany for PCS.

2. Availability Date ~~**15**~~ 13 **March 1951** Type of Transfer

Mode of Travel **Sea**

Stopovers, Duration, & Purpose

Dependents

Effects & Baggage

Travel Advance Special Provisions

3. Contract 31 Jan. 51 Residence & Dependency Report OK

Automobile Agreement Clearance Sheet **22 January 1951**

Reserve Release [illegible] **USMCR** **1st. Lt. 047506 papers either in Los Angeles or Wash.** [illegible]

Passport Letter Date Passport Obtained

PP No. Type Date of Issue

Visas

Physical Requested **22 Jan. 51** Med. Cert. Rec'd. Inoculations

TCA Requested Cable No. TCA Rec'd Cable No.

Military or Naval Orders Requested Orders Rec'd.

AGO Card Requested AGO Card Received

Directors Appointment Scheduled for Appointment Completed

Departure Notice Departure Cable

Baggage Cable Authorization of effects sent to [illegible]

Date Effects Shipped [illegible]

SECRET

PERSONNEL TRANSFER LETTER

(THIS IS NOT A TRAVEL ORDER)

6 January 1951

TO: Mr. Tennent H. Bagley

1. Pursuant to authority vested in me, your official station is hereby established as Karlsruhe, Germany, effective 7 January 1951. Upon receipt of proper Travel Orders you will proceed from Washington, D. C. to such station, xxx

2. The travel to your new station is to be accomplished as soon as practicable after receipt of proper Travel Orders. This transfer is not for your convenience or benefit, or at your request, but in the best interests of the Government.

3. In accordance with the provisions of applicable agency regulations, and subject to the availability of funds, the shipment at Government expense of your household goods and personal effects, including packing, crating, unpacking, uncrating, drayage, and temporary storage not to exceed ninety days, within the prescribed weight allowance, is authorized.

4. Subject to the availability of funds, the movement of your immediate family at Government expense is authorized in accordance with agency regulations.

5. Authorization for the shipment of a personally owned automobile at Government expense, when consistent with agency regulations, is hereby authorized.

S. C. Clinkscales

CHIEF, EMPLOYEES DIVISION

FORM NO. 37-110
FEB 1950

SECRET

File

①

14 November 1950

TO: Employees Division

VIA: EXO

FROM: FDM

SUBJECT: Tennent H. Bagley

Mr. Bagley has been recalled to active duty as a First Lieutenant in the Marine Corps with effective date 11 December 1950. The order is by letter MC-1243761 of Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., dated 3 November 1950 and addressed to his home in La Jolla, California (copy attached). Since Mr. Bagley is on duty in Washington, he did not receive the order until 13 November 1950.

Mr. Bagley was employed by this Agency on 24 July 1950 as a Research Analyst assigned to the Advisory Council. Since reporting for duty, he has been in the Training Courses and will complete the Advanced Operations Course on 1 December 1950. During this period, however, it has been agreed that his qualifications could best be utilized as an Intelligence Officer in Germany, and the papers are now in requesting his transfer to FDM for that purpose.

Request that Mr. Bagley's deferment from recall to active duty with the Marine Corps be arranged on the grounds that his work in the Training Courses has shown him to be unusually well qualified for intelligence work in Germany and that men of his caliber and background are still badly needed by the German Station. If this deferment can be arranged, he will be sent to Germany as a GS-9 Intelligence Officer at the earliest opportunity.

Richard Helms
Chief, FDM

Attachment

APPROVED ______________________
EXO

6 November 1950

TO: SSD

FROM: FDM

SUBJECT: Transfer of Mr. Tennent H. Bagley

As indicated in the attached memorandum from Mr. Horace S. Craig, Jr., Chief, Advisory Council, Mr. Bagley is released for transfer to this Division. At the present time, Mr. Bagley is a student in the Advanced Operations Course. It is planned to have him report to FDM upon completion of the above-mentioned Course which will be 1 December 1950.

It is requested that action be initiated to have him transferred to FDM as soon as possible: Intelligence Officer, GS-9, FOS/DAD Slot No. 53.

Elizabeth C Dunlevy
Elizabeth C. Dunlevy
For: Chief, FDM

Attachment

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

24 July 1950
(date)

I, Tennent Harrington Bagley, hereby certify the information appearing on my Personal History Statement dated 11 May 1950 is still accurate and correct, except as follows: Terminated residence in Ferney-Voltaire (Ain), France, 15 July 1950. Present address 2168 Florida Ave. NW, Washington, D.C.

Tennent H Bagley
(Signature)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

ENTRANCE ON DUTY RECORD

ENTRANCE ON DUTY RECORD		DATE 24 July 1950	
TO: Advisory Council		BUILDING South	ROOM 132
FROM: PERSONNEL OFFICER		EOD DATE 24 July 1950	
NAME OF EMPLOYEE BAGLEY, Tennent Harrington			
POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer	GRADE GS-9	SALARY $4600.00 per annum	
PAYROLL unvouchered funds	DUTY STATION Washington, D. C.		
DATE SECURITY CLEARED 29 August 49 Extended 29 May 1950	DATE OATH OF OFFICE ADMINISTERED 24 July 1950		
DATE PERMANENT IDENTIFICATION REQUESTED 24 July 1950	DATE FINGERPRINTED 24 July 1950		
DATE BRIEFED BY SECURITY 24 July 1950	DATE OF PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 24 July 1950		
DATE 24 MONTH AGREEMENT SIGNED Not Applicable			
EMPLOYEE'S EMERGENCY ADDRESS	Mrs. David W. Bagley (Mother) 2005 Soledad Ave. La Jolla, California		
EMPLOYEE'S LOCAL ADDRESS	2168 Florida Ave., N. W. Washington, D. C.		

REMARKS:

POSTED
25 Jul 50

Faye Zelter for

SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER
ROBE . HATTLES

FORM NO. 37-73
DEC 1949

RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Bannerman 17 February 1950

Employees Division

Tennent Harrington Bagley - 38638

Attached is a copy of letter from subject which was written to Capt. Finnegan. It is requested that the security clearance effective 29 August 1949 be extended. It is hoped that subject will enter on duty on or about 12 March 1950.

ROBERT S. WATTLES

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Employees Division, Special Support Staff DATE: 23 February 1950

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Branch

SUBJECT: BAGLEY, Tennent Harrington - 38638

3-Ae

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 17 February 1950 requesting an extension of the security approval granted for subject.

This is to advise that the security clearance granted on 29 August 1949 is still in effect, provided subject enters on duty within 60 days from this date.

Abr. Council notified 27 Feb. 4:05 pm. C.H.

Ermal P. Geiss

ERMAL P. GEISS mew

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

24 August 1949

TO : I&S

ATT : Mr. Westrell

FROM : CPB

SUBJECT: Bagley, Tennent H.
Frank, John J.

1. The above-named subjects were being processed for employment with the Advisory Council on vouchered funds. These positions are now on unvouchered funds. The security clearances should be granted on this basis and should be forwarded to this office.

FRANK G. JAREMA

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

file

TO : Deputy Personnel Officer

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Division

DATE: 15 September 1949

SUBJECT: BAGLEY, Tennent H.

38638

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 24 August 1949 relative to Subject.

This is to advise that this office interposes no objection to the contemplated transfer of Subject from Vouchered to Unvouchered Funds in the Advisory Council.

ERROL P. GEISS

SECRET

Olson 5-17

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

4-5

NAME: BAGLEY, TENNENT HARRINGTON	CLASSIFICATION VICE ✓ IA VV NEW Bu # 1785 CS # 1694 12-22-47 canc.	INITIAL JWS	DATE 7-18-49
NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment ~~to fill vacancy caused by transfer of Lawrence N. Olson, Jr.~~	QUALIFICATION REVIEW	INITIAL BCA	DATE 7-25-49
EFFECTIVE DATE: As soon as possible	2105 99 14-19 6.116(c) Lay 7-27-49		
FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS LAST WORKING DAY:	APPROVED: SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR)		
FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:	SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE FOR ADM) 7/26/49 SIGNATURE (CHIEF, PERSONNEL BRANCH)		

Cancel

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Research Analyst P-3 ~~Intelligence Officer,~~ [redacted]
GRADE AND SALARY		P-3 ~~[illegible]~~ $4479.60
OFFICE		Advisory Council
BRANCH		
DIVISION		
SECTION		
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
DEPT. OR FIELD		Dept. 130

REMARKS:

Searched 10/25/49
MS

See reg.-64

RECOMMENDED: OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF, OR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER	DATE
Admin. Asst., Advisory Council	17 May 1949

FORM NO. 37-3
OCT 1946

(1514)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION [illegible] ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP	21 June 1972	FILE NO. 970

TO: (Check)	x	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION	SS NUMBER 570-38-7705
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION	EMPLOYEE NUMBER 056043
	x	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) EUR XH	ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: Chief Support Staff	OFFICIAL COVER	x	ESTABLISHED
REF: Retirement Debriefing			DISCONTINUED
SUBJECT BAGLEY, Tennent H.	UNIT Department of State		

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

x	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS
☒	BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE EOD
☐	OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)
x	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
x	SUBMIT FORM 3254 State W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
x	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)
x	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)
NA	EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
NA	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY.

Subject will be denied for entire period of employment except for US Government employment applications.

Forwarding address: 56, Chemin du
Gros Tienne
1328-Ohain,
Belgium

Subject will be self-employed

	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ____ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - CL/TESSVC
COPY 5 - OF
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

RF:ss

James H.

RH

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 12-71 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ES: 28 JUN 72

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056043	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BAGLEY TENNENT H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONV FROM FSR STATUS & RETIREMENT-INVOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR COB 06 30 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 2136 1187 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SEC 235A

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
BENELUX AREA
BRUSSELS STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BRUSSELS, BELGIUM



11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0296	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 34623

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 11 11 25	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 0GU0000	32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

H.B.F.

POSTED
6 29 72

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 11-71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MLH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted]

1 LAST NAME FIRST NAME INITIAL(S)
BARLEY, [illegible]

4 DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
RETIREMENT COB EFF 6/30/72

2 APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty F/T P/T
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act
Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d)
on ______ Annual Leave Bal ______

3 TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE
(as of date of separation)
Years Months Days
☐ More than 15 years

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	Annual	Sick
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1/8 19 72	360	1297
6 Current leave year accrual through 6/24 19 72	96	48
7 Total	[illegible]	[illegible]
8 Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	40	–
9. Total leave taken	56	72
10. Balance	360	[illegible]

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 360 hrs & 2 Holidays
12. Salary rate(s) $34,623.00
13. Lump sum leave dates: From 7/1/72 to 9/5/72 1700 (Hours)

26 Certified correct by Gene Baker (Signature) 9-14-72 (Date)
For Chief Payroll (Title) ______ (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14 Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______
15 Current balance as of 6/30 19 72 59 Days
16 12 month accrual rate ______
17 Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______
18 Monthly accrual date ______
19 Calendar days credit for next accrual date 13 Days
20 Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21 Dates during current calendar yr ______ to ______
22 Dates during preceding calendar yr ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23 During leave year in which separated	–	
24 During step-increase waiting period which began on ______	–	
25 During 12-month HL accrual period (dates) ______		

REMARKS
1042 S/L "Sent to CIARD

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

[redacted]

1. LAST NAME FIRST NAME INITIAL(S)
Barlow, Vincent F

4 DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
Retirement COB Eff 6/30/72

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty F/T P/T
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act
Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d)
on ______ Annual Leave Bal ______

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE
(as of date of separation)
Years Months Days
☐ More than 15 years

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	Annual	Sick
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1/6 19 72	360	1297
6 Current leave year accrual through 6/24 19 72	96	48
7. Total	456	1339
8 Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	40	–
9 Total leave taken	56	72
10 Balance	360	~~1267~~

11 Total hours paid in lump sum 360 hrs & 2 Holidays
12 Salary rate(s) $34,623.00
13 Lump sum leave dates: From 7/1/72 to 9/5/72 1700 (Hours)

26 Certified correct by Gene Baker (Signature) 9-11-72 (Date)
For Chief Payroll (Title) ______ (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______
15 Current balance as of 6/30 19 72 59 Days
16 12 month accrual rate ______
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______
18 Monthly accrual date ______
19 Calendar days credit for next accrual date 13 Days
20 Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr ______ to ______
22 Dates during preceding calendar yr ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23 During leave year in which separated	–	
24 During step increase waiting period which began on ______	–	
25 During 12 month HL accrual period (dates) ______		

REMARKS
#1267 S/L Trf'd to CIARD

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

14-00000

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING	FILE
TO: Retirement Operations Branch Office of Personnel	DATE
RETIREE	CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Central Cover Staff, the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT		CIVIL SERVICE		CIARDS	DATE			
COVER		OVERT ROUTINE		COVERT (OFFICIAL COVER) LOCK-UP		COVERT (NOC) SPECIAL	RETENTION OF AWARDS		YES		NO
CORRESPONDENCE		OVERT		COVERT		THRU CCS		

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE		U.S. GOV'T. CHECK			OTHER (Payment instructions follow)	
TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE		CIA		CSC		OTHER (MEMO FOLLOWS)
REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION		YES		NO		INTERNAL TRANSFER

INSURANCE

FEGLI		OVERT		COVERT		MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD: [illegible]

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE		YES		CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE		YES		NO		OVERT		COVERT

REMARKS

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

______________________________ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, [illegible] OF SECURITY

Off

FORM 3429 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
4-72

SECRET

(4-8-13)

7 ~~OFF. PERS. FILE ROOM~~

6 30 72 rm CONFIDENTIAL OPF

26 JUN 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. Tennent H. Bagley**

THROUGH : **Deputy Director for Plans**

THROUGH : **Chief, EUR**

SUBJECT : **Intelligence Medal of Merit**

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the award named above will be conferred on you in recognition of the excellent service you have rendered this Agency. Security considerations relevant to the award are explained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security.

2. The award will be presented to you at a ceremony to be held in the near future. Members of your family, Agency associates, and intimate friends who are aware of your Agency affiliation may attend the ceremony.

3. Invitations to the ceremony will be extended by the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, Office of Personnel, extension 3645, room 412, Magazine Building. Please send to that office the names and phone numbers of the guests you would like to have invited, and indicate any dates on which you would not be available for such a ceremony.

/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.
R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Att

Distribution:
O - Addressee
1 - C/EUR
~~1~~ - D/Pers -- OPF w/forms 382 & 600
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
[illegible]

14-00000

OPF

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD	Executive Registry 72-3412	DATE 6 June 1972

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BIRTHYEAR	SEX	TYPE EMPLOYEE
056043	BAGLEY, Tennent H.	1925	M	Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	SD	SCHEDULE	GRADE	STATION
CS/EUR	D	GS	16	

BE AWARDED

Intelligence Medal of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD **July 1950 - June 1972**

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. Tennent H. Bagley is hereby awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit in recognition of his especially meritorious service throughout his Agency career. Since 1950, he has served with distinction in increasingly responsible operational assignments both at home and abroad. His skill and expertise in accomplishing a variety of delicate and vital tasks attest to his versatility and professionalism. Mr. Bagley's outstanding contributions to the mission of the Agency reflect great credit on him and the Federal Service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by ADD/P on 26 May 1972)

APPROVED Richard Helms DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	SIGNATURE /s/Harry B. Fisher
	TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD Harry B. Fisher
22 JUN 1972 DATE	SIGNATURE Signed Original
	TYPED NAME OF RECORDER R. L. Austin, Jr.

FORM 8-69 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

off

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD
(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A PERSONAL DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 056043	2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle) Bagley, Tonnent Harrington	3. POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D

6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR	7. OFFICE EXT. (If Hqs)	8. STATION ☐ HEADQUARTERS ☒ FIELD (Specify location) Brussels

9. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code) 80, Chausee d'Alsemberg, Linkebeek, Belgium	10. HOME PHONE	11. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED U.S. by birth

12. RECOMMENDED AWARD Intelligence Medal of Merit	13. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT 30 June 1972	14. POSTHUMOUS ☐ YES ☒ NO

15. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN Maria L. Bagley	16. RELATIONSHIP Wife	17. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code) Same as Number Nine (9)	18. HOME PHONE

SECTION B RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF HAZARD

19. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

20. FULL NAME	21. ORGN. TITLE	22. GRADE	23. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

24. FULL NAME	25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

26. LOCATION	27. INCLUSIVE DATES	28. TIME OF DAY

29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED	31. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO	32. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION C RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT, SERVICE, OR PERFORMANCE

33. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☒ YES ☐ NO

34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE
Chief of Station

35. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location)
DDP/European Division/Brussels, Belgium Station

36. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSIGNED POSITION

Direct supervision of the Brussels Station consisting of 18 Staff personnel and nine Contract personnel.

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED July 1952 to June 1972	38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☒ YES ☐ NO	39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL WHO ASSISTED OR CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE

40. FULL NAME	41. ORGN. TITLE	42. GRADE	43. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE PERFORMANCE

44. FULL NAME	45. TYPE OF AWARD

FORM 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
9-66

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION D.	NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. E[illegible], why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act. Enclose unclassified citation.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. (Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.) What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production, records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation. Enclose unclassified citation.

Mr. Tennent H. Bagley, currently Chief of Station, Brussels, is recommended for the Intelligence Medal of Merit in recognition of his outstanding service of 22 years as a Clandestine Services officer.

For personal reasons Mr. Bagley has elected to retire effective June 1972.

From the beginning of his CS career, Mr. Bagley's exceptional abilities were clearly recognized and he received assignments of ever increasing responsibility in the Soviet operations field. Following a highly successful tour as a senior operations officer in Switzerland, Mr. Bagley was assigned to Headquarters as Chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch of the SR Division. In this key and demanding post, Mr. Bagley showed managerial skill combined with knowledge in depth of the complexities of counter intelligence work. His outstanding performance resulted in his promotion to GS-16 in June 1965 and his subsequent appointment as Deputy Chief of SR Division in September 1965 the comparatively young age of 39.

In addition to the full duties as Deputy Chief of an active division, Mr. Bagley continued to carry heavy responsibilities throughout this period in the field of counter intelligence. He was one of

☒ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES (List individually) IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR PERFORMANCE, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESS OR INDIVIDUALS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY	48. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION	49. DATE
Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr. Chief European Division	A Roosevelt	15 May 72

SECTION E RECOMMENDATION FORWARDED THROUGH OFFICIALS CONCERNED FOR THEIR INFORMATION

	TITLE AND SIGNATURE	DATE
50. HEAD OF D CAREER SERVICE (Career service of nominee)	See Item 52	
51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	See Item 52	
52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	Cord Meyer Jr. Deputy Director for Plans	26 May 72

SECRET

the key officers responsible for the direction and control of some of the most sensitive operations then being conducted by the Clandestine Services. He carried out his responsibilities with skill and discretion, and the ability to stand up under repeated periods of heavy pressure.

In recognition of his excellent service as Deputy Chief SR, Mr. Bagley in March 1967 was assigned as Chief of Station, Brussels, a major target area of Soviet espionage due to the presence of NATO and European Community Headquarters.

In the past five years as Chief of Station, Brussels, Mr. Bagley has been an effective Station Chief who has been particularly successful in the field of liaison. He established a unique relationship with the Chief of the Belgian Internal Security Service which has greatly facilitated the over-all operational activities of the Brussels Station. This relationship successfully underwent its strongest test at the time of the defection of a GRU officer in Brussels in October 1971 and the subsequent worldwide propaganda exploitation of his disclosures.

Under Mr. Bagley's direction Brussels Station has concentrated heavily on the Soviet target and has been a major test area for the non-official cover concept for operations.

Mr. Bagley's entire career has been characterized by the consistent excellence of his performance in each assignment of increasing responsibilities that he has undertaken. He is recognized as one of the top Soviet operations specialists in the Clandestine Service and has spent the bulk of his twenty-two year career working in the most sensitive and complex areas of intelligence work. We regret his decision to retire for personal reasons and the loss of his experience and expertise to the Clandestine Service. It is strongly recommended that in recognition of his outstanding service to the Clandestine Service in positions of critical and demanding responsibility Mr. Tennent H. Bagley be awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit.

ARoosevelt

Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr.
Chief
European Division

A 9

retired 6/30/72

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
056043	BAGLEY TENNENT H	44 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	5	$33,634	05/31/70	GS 16	6	$34,623	05/28/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Patterson

DATE 20 May 72

MAY 23

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1/36
603

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BAGLEY TENNENT H	056043	44 620	CF	GS 16 5	$33,634

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BAGLEY TENNENT H	056043	44 575 CF	GS 16 5	$31,881

A9

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
056043	BAGLEY TENNENT H	44 575	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	4	29202 ~~[illegible]~~	06/02/68	GS 16	5	30087 ~~[illegible]~~	05/31/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 2/4/72

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BAGLEY TENNENT H	056043	44 575 CF	GS 16 4	$29,202

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1954, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
BAGLEY TENNENT H	056043	54600	CF	15 1	$13730	15 1	$14565

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BAGLEY TENNENT H	056043	44 550 CF	GS 16 4	$27,549

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BAGLEY TENNENT H	056043	44 550 CF	GS 16 4	$23,079	$25,118

A-9

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
056043	BAGLEY TENNENT H	44 550	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last c.I. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 16	3	$22,380	06/04/67	GS 16	4	$23,079	06/02/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE DC/CI JR

DATE 25 May 1968

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1

463

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

May 31

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BAGLEY TENNENT H	056043	44 550	CF	GS 16 3	$21,415	$22,380

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SF: 30 AUG. 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056043
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BAGLEY TENNENT H
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 08 DA 27 YR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 8136 1187 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
NORTHERN REGION
BURSSELS STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BURSSELS, BELGIUM
11. POSITION TITLE: ATTACHE
CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0296
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05
16. GRADE AND STEP: 03 2
16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 16391
21415
18. REMARKS: WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 44550 ALPHABETIC EUR
22. STATION CODE: 06543
23. INTEGREE CODE: S
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 11 DA 11 YR 25
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA. YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. HTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR PROV; PERM TEMP.; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: SB

POSTED
9-5-67 mh

SF FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET SF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
056043	BAGLEY TENNENT H	48 040 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PI Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PI	LSI	ADJ
GS 16	2	$20,745	06/05/66	GS 16	3	$21,415	06/04/67			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 13 Apr 67

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZF: 3 JAN 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
056043	BAGLEY TENNENT H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	12 30 66	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	7134 0573 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SB DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
POL OFFICER 2ND SEC OPS OFFICER D DIV CH	0002	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSS GS	0136.01	01 1 16 2	15841 20745

18. REMARKS
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Adgrts Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	10	48040 SB	75013	1	1	11 11 25		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1-4-67 RS

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BAGLEY TENNENT H	056043	48 040	CF	GS 16 2	$20,297	$20,745

R7F: 11 JUL 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056043
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BAGLEY TENNENT H
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 07 03 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7134 0573 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/SR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS: EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32. MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
		2						

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JUL 7 1966

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 16	1	$19,619	06/06/65	GS 16	2	$20,247	06/05/66			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 12 Apr 66

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

---

9 SEPT 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056043	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BAGLEY TENNENT H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR) 09 09 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	☐	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6134 0573 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	CF TO V	☒	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE POL OFFICER 2ND SEC OPS OFFICER D DIV CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0002	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 04 2 16 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 12495 18935

18. REMARKS
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 48040	ALPHABETIC SR	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE 1	24. Hqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 11 11 25	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 11 62 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BAGLEY TENNENT H	056043	48 040	CF	GS 16 1	$18,935	$19,619

---

5 JUN65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
6043	BAGLEY TENNENT H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION - CORRECTION	06 06 65	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5134 0573 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GROUP OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
POL OFFICER 2ND SEC OPS OFFICER CH	0985	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	04 2 16 1	12495 18935

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE 06/06/65 AS FOLLOWS:
TO ADD INTEGRATED INFORMATION.
ITEM #11 WHICH READ OPS OFFICER BR CH TO READ OPS OFFICER CH.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR.)
						11 11 25		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZR: 28 MAY 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056043	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BAGLEY TENNENT H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 06 DA. 06 YR. 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5134 0573 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GROUP OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER BR CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0985	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 18935

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	48200	SR	75013		1	11 11 25	06 06 65	06 06 65

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 6 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6/9/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

[illegible]

(4-31)

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

14-00000

096043 | BAGLEY TENNENT H | 48 200 CF

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	2	11030 ~~$10,180~~	09/15/63	GS 15	3	11600 ~~$10,695~~	09/13/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

01

000

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY EH

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE DATE 15/7/64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 660 Obsolete Previous (4-51)

18 Sept 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 04/23/64

1 SERIAL NUMBER 056043	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BAGLEY TENNENT H			
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 12 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT		
6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4134 1000 1000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR DIVISION DDP SR CI GR OFF OF THE CH	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.			
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER BR CH	12 POSITION NUMBER 0985	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D		
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
27 APR

FORM 1150B 7 AUG 1963 Use Previous Edition SECRET 27 APR (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND OCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956; SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BAGLEY TENNENT H	056043	48 080	CF	GS 15 2	$15,045	$16,180

LLG: 31 OCT. 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056043
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BAGLEY TENNENT H
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 10 DA. 31 YR. 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | x CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3134 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP SR
CHIEF, OPERATIONS AND PLANS
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
POL OFFICER 2ND SEC
OPS OFFICER BR CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0578
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		05 0	9620
GS	0136.01	15 1	14565

18. REMARKS: SWITZERLAND

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	60080	SR	75013	1	1	11 11 25		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RESV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
MC 11-7-62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

10/31/62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] AU 080 CF

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	1	$14,565	09/16/62	GS 15	2	$15,045	09/15/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 00 0
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY
[illegible] 9/11/63

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE DATE 9/13/63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

mnH

Form 6-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-61)

ABM: 14 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056043	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BAGLEY TENNENT H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 09 16 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3139 9600 1065	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP EE SWITZERLAND STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION BERN, SWITZERLAND

11. POSITION TITLE POL OFFICER 2ND SEC OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1586	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 05 0 15 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 9055 13730

18. REMARKS
BERN, SWITZERLAND.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	54600	EE	69007	1	3	11 11 25	09 16 62	09 16 62

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX
	80								

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RESV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

1 C [illegible]
20 SEP 1962

Bat 9/18/62

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition SECRET (4-61)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

556043	BAGLEY TENNENT H			DDP/EE 32	UV					
5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LBI	ADJ.
GS 14	2	$12,470	12/13/59	14	3	$12,730	06/11/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1/101

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	BAGLEY TENNENT H	556043	52 27	GS-14 2	$11,595	$12,470

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME					3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.		4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT	
556043	BAGLEY TENNENT H					DDP/EE 32		UV		
6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE				
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	1	$11,355	06	15	58	GS 14	2	$11,595	12	13	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.B.E. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS 1/161

14. AUTHENTICATION

C.M.STEWART

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-60 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 THIS NOTIFICATION EFFECTS RESLOTTING RESULTING FROM R-20-250

SER #	NAME	SD	OLD SLOT	NEW SLOT	DATE
556043	BAGLEY TENNENT H	DI	1585	1586	05/01/59

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BAGLEY TENNENT H	556043	GS-14-1	$10,320	$11,355

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 13 JUNE 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
556043	BAGLEY TENNENT H	11	11	25		1	M	1	07	24	50		
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
04	08	47		1	50 USCA 403						07	24	50

13. [illegible] Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE SWITZERLAND STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		BERN, SWITZERLAND	

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	POL OFF 2ND SECTY AREA OPS OFF	1585	FSR GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
06 13 2	$ 7100 9205	DI							8 3160 55 065

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	06	15	58	REGULAR	OM	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE SWITZERLAND STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5288	BERN, SWITZERLAND	69007

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	POL OFF 2ND SECTY AREA OPS OFF	1585	FSR GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
06 14 1	$ 7100 10320	DI	06	15	58	12	13	59	8 3160 55 065

44. Remarks

FOSD
24 JUN 1958
20

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a

SECRET

(4)

5/28

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
556043	BAGLEY TENNENT H [illegible]	DDP/EE 22	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 13	1	$ 8,990				GS 13	2	$ 9,205	05	04	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
P. HEIMANN C/EE/P	10 Ap. '58	P. Heimann

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 7 MAR 1958

1. Serial No	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-1 5 Pt.-2 10 Pt.-3	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
556043	BAGLEY TENNENT H	11	11	25		1	M	1	07	24	50	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code
04	08	47		1	50 USCA 403 J					07	24	50	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations		Code	15. Location Of Official Station		Station Code	
DDP EE SWITZERLAND STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		5288	BERN, SWITZERLAND		69007	
16. Dept.-Field Dept.-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series	
	5	AREA OPS OFF	1585	GS	0136.01	
21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number	
13 1	$ 8990	DI	11 04 56	05 04 58	8 3160 55 065	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
INTEGRATION DEPARTMENT OF STATE	58	02 21 58	REGULAR	OH	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations		Code	32. Location Of Official Station		Station Code	
DDP EE SWITZERLAND STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		5288	BERN, SWITZERLAND		69007	
33. Dept.-Field Dept.-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series	
	5	POL OFF 2ND SECTY AREA OPS OFF	1585	FSR GS	0136.01	
38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number	
06 13 1	$ 7100 8990	DI	11 04 56	05 04 58	8 3160 55 065	

44. Remarks

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $8990 AND FSR SALARY OF $7100 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.
SICK AND ANNUAL LEAVE ARE TO BE HELD IN ESCROW UNTIL SUBJECT REVERTS TO GS STATUS.

POSTED
14 MAR 1958

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCO

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
556043	BAGLEY TENNENT H	11	11	25		1	M 1		07	24	50	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.
04	08	47		1	50 USCA 403 J					1	07	24

12. LCD Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code		
50		2		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE POLAND BRANCH FI OPERATIONS SECTION		WASH. D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	I.O. (FI)	0118	GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
13 1	$ 8990	01							8 3100 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data	
REASSIGNMENT (TRANSFER TO UNVOUCHERED FUNDS)	05	12	15	57	REGULAR	01		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE SWITZERLAND STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5288	BERN, SWITZERLAND	69007

33. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	AREA OPS OFF	1585	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
13 1	$ 8990	01	11	04	56	05	04	58	8 3160 55 065

44. Remarks

SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

POSTED
26 DEC 1957

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

arc

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME) MR. TENNENT H. BAGLEY 156043	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1925	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 10 May 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT 56	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 5 May 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
I.O. (CI) BO-216	8. POSITION TITLE	I.O. (FI) BO-118-13
GS-0136.53-13 $8990.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-13 $8990.00 per annum
CE Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 527310	DDP/EE Poland Branch FI Operations Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION W FROM: 7-3100-20 750-13 TO: Same	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 07/24/50

POSTED
5/13/57
WP

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

MJ 5/10/57

STANDARD FORM 50 (5 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

afo

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. TENNENT H. BAGLEY 156043
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Nov 1925
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 2 November 56

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION* 30
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 4 Nov 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
BG-216-12	8. POSITION TITLE	I. O. (CI) BG-216
GS-0136.53-12 $7785.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.53-13 $8990.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 527320	DDP/EE Poland Branch CE Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT SIZE	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ I. A. ☐ REAL ☐ SD-DI

15. SEX: M 1
16. APPROPRIATION: W FROM: 7-3100-20 750-13 TO: Same
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

*This also corrects Item #1, First Name, on SF-52 effective 28 Feb 1954 and SF-52 effective 26 Sep 1954; also, SF-50 effective 20 May 1956 which read "Tennett" to read "Tennent."

3 EOD 07/24/50

POSTED

Mar 7 Nov 12

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

MJ 11/7/56

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950-373047

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1v1

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME) Mr. Tennett H. Bagley	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1925	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 11 May 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment 01	6. EFFECTIVE DATE EOD 20 May 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Area Ops. Off. BGF-857	8. POSITION TITLE	I. O. (CI) BO-216-12
GS-0136.01-12 $7785.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.53-12 $7785.00 per annum
DDP/EE Austrian Station Operations Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 527320	DDP/EE Poland Branch CE Section
Vienna, Austria	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12 FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DI

1 15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3110-55-016
TO: 6-3100-20 750-13

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Calif.

20 REMARKS:

Hire 16 May 56

3 EOD

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

CONFIDENTIAL

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 - 350809

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

Rm 5/14/56

14-00000

ODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-320080

1. Agency and organizational designation	2. Payroll period	3. Block No. UV	4. Slip No.
5. [illegible] BAGLEY, TENNENT HARRINGTON	6. Grade and salary GS- 12 $7570.00		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay file period													

10. Remarks	11. Appropriation(s) EE/AS 3	12. Prepared by JPJ 6 FEB 56 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 25MAR56	15. Date last equivalent increase 26 SEP 54	16. Old salary rate $7570.00	17. New salary rate $7785.00	18. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] — FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL, CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET

UNVOUCHERED

9/21/54

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Tennett H. Bagley	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1925	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 19 Aug 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Promotion

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: SEP 26 1954

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Ops Off.(CE) BG(F) 869-11 GS-0136.52-11 $5940.00 DDP/EE Austria Mission Counter Espionage Staff Vienna, Austria	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY 10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 11. HEADQUARTERS	Area Ops. Off. BG(F) 857 GS-0136.01-12 $7040.00 DDP/EE Austrian Mission Operations Staff Vienna, Austria
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 13 FEB. 1955
SALARY ADJUSTED TO 7570

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE DUE 24 Oct 54
TO SALARY $ 6140

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) EE/Per.

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) 3884/C.Danish

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: FI/CMO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

FI/SD

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3110-55-016 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE:

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS.
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	RB	9/17	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C Taylor	16 Sept 54	
E.			

POSTED
9/21/54

F. APPROVED BY Ralph S. Pollock

SECRET

C Taylor 16 Sept 54

14-00000

3/1/54

AM 52

SECRET

UNVOUCHERED

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Tennett H. Bagley
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Nov. 1925
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 25 Feb. 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: A. PROPOSED: 28 Feb; 1954
B. APPROVED: FEB 28 1954
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Off.(CI) BG(F)86-11	8. POSITION TITLES AND NUMBER	Ops Officer (CE) BG(F) 869-11
GS-132-11 $5940.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.52-11 $5940.00
DDP/EE Austrian Mission CE Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/EE Austria Mission Counter Espionage Staff
Vienna, Austria	11. HEADQUARTERS	Vienna, Austria
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary):

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): EE/PER

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): 3883 415

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-3110-55p016
TO: 4-3110-55-016
18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED
2 Mar 54

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		27 Feb
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C Taylor	1 Mar 54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

C Taylor 1 Mar 54

SECRET

16—47330-8

[redacted] [redacted]

STANDARD FORM 52
FORM RATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, CHAPTER 13

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

4/24/53
QP

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) BAGLEY, Tennent H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 3/19/53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Promotion		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		B. APPROVED: APR 26 1953	

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Officer	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Off-(Counterintel) IG (F) 06-11
GS-132-9 ~~$[illegible]~~ 5310	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-11 $5940 p/a
DDP EE Operations Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/EE Austrian Mission CE Section
Vienna, Austria	11. HEADQUARTERS	Veinna, Austria
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) EE/PER

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edwin B. Powell
Title: FI/PO.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX
16. RACE
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 3100-55-016
TO: 3100-55-026
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINT-MENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED
4/25

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
4/21/53

Security Information

10—67230-8

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER 51

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

1/14/53 p

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) BAGLEY, Tennent H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov. 1925	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 6 Dec. 195
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Conversion B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: COB 6 Dec. 52 B. APPROVED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Assistant Attache Intell. Officer (Ops.) [redacted] FSS-9 $4290 p/a GS-9 [redacted] $5310. OSO FDM Operations Section Vienna, Austria	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer [redacted]
	9. SERVICE, GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9 [redacted] $5310.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	[redacted] DDP [redacted] EE Operations Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Vienna, Austria
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) EE/P&R

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Davis B. Powell
Title: FI/PO.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION:

NEW	WCS	I. A.	REAL

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION	E C Hutson	6 Jan 53	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY 1/10/53

16—47330-2

1. Agency and organizational designations
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2. Pay roll [illegible]

3. Block No. 07

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
BAGLEY, Tennent H.

6. Grade and salary
GS-9 $5185

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period			✓		[illegible]	[illegible] ✓					

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
VDH 37

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date: 3 Aug 52

15. Date last equivalent increase: 4 [illegible] 51

16. Old salary rate: $5185

17. New salary rate: $5310

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s)
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP
(Check applicable box in case of LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ LWOP status end of waiting period.
Initials of Clerk

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1930, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—61111-3 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

14-00000

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME	Tennent H. Bagley	DATE 12 December 1951
NATURE OF ACTION	Reassignment	EFFECTIVE DATE 23 December 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Asst Attache (Political Off) Intell. Officer	Asst. Attache Intell. Officer (Ops) SL-9
GRADE AND SALARY	FSS-9 $4290. GS-9, ~~$5165.~~ ~~4725.00~~ $5185	FSS-9 $4290. GS-9, $5165.
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDM	FDM
BRANCH	External Section "A"	Operations Section ~~[illegible]~~
OFFICIAL STATION	Vienna, Austria	Vienna, Austria (3110-00)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Grace L. Greaves	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION F-594 18 Dec.	PERSONNEL OFFICER Mulcahy 19 1951	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ________

ENTERED ON DUTY ________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

182

From Slot No. 9 to Slot No. 8 replacing Young

COPY [illegible]
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: BAGLEY, Tennent H.

DATE: 22 August 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Periodic Pay Increase

EFFECTIVE DATE: 5 August 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Asst. Attache (Political Off) Intelligence Officer	Asst. Attache (Politicaloff) Intelligence Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	FSS-9 $4290.00 GS-9 $4600.00	FSS-9 $4290.00 GS-9 $4725.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDM	FDM
BRANCH	External Section "A"	External Section "A"
OFFICIAL STATION	Vienna	Vienna

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

L.S.I. 24 July 1950

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 24 OCT. 1951
SALARY ADJUSTED TO $ 5185.00

This is to certify that the conduct and services of the employee during this period have been satisfactory in all respects.

Difference between Dept of State salary and CIA salary to be paid by CIA.

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANC

B Tweedy
Division Chief

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16—63260-1

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME	BAGLEY, Tennent H.	DATE 23 May 1951
NATURE OF ACTION	Integration	EFFECTIVE DATE 25 May 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops) GS-9	Asst. Attache (Political Off.) FSS-9
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9 $4,600.00	FSS-9 $4,290.00*
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDM	FDM
BRANCH	External Section "A"	External Section "A"
OFFICIAL STATION	Vienna	Vienna

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER Charles W. Claxon	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

* Subject integrated into the Department of State as FSS-9, with a salary of $4,290.00. Subject is to be paid the difference between CIA salary of $4,600.00 and salary of $4,290.00 to be paid by the Department of State and allowances in accordance therewith.

Subject is due a lump sum payment for annual leave to be paid up to 24 May 1951.

POSTED
25 May

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME BAGLEY, Tennent H.	DATE 4 April 1951
NATURE OF ACTION Transfer	EFFECTIVE DATE 15 April 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops) GS-9	Intelligence Off. (Ops) GS-9
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9 $4600.00	GS-9 $4600.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDM/BAD	FDM
BRANCH	I.O. Branch - FOS	External Section "A"
OFFICIAL STATION	Karlsruhe	Vienna

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION 11 Apr F-594 Thomas M. Fisher	PERSONNEL OFFICER 4/5/51 Goodhart	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ______

SECURITY CLEARED ON ______

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ______

ENTERED ON DUTY ______

______
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Slot 6.

130

Concurrence date
11 April 1951
W.A. Osborne/ldb

JK
ER 5 Apr 51

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 83-900339

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME BAGLEY, Tennett H.		DATE 13 December 1950
NATURE OF ACTION Intra Agency Transfer		EFFECTIVE DATE 7 January 1951
	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intell. Officer GS-9	Intell. Officer (Ops) GS-9
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9 $4600.00	GS-9 $4600.00
OFFICE	Advisory Council	OSO
DIVISION	Office of Chief	FDM/DAD
BRANCH		Intell. Operations Branch FOS
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Karlsruhe

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS F G Lauria	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION 19 Dec 50 F.599 Austin J Thompson/pet	PERSONNEL OFFICER F C Richards 21 Dec 50	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH
INITIALS

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

32

S-53

Employee is replacement for Raymond Downing.

Concurrence date 12/26/50
W.H. Osborne/ldd

BH 64 12/15/?

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO DSO 50-234

SECRET

File

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME
[illegible]GLEY
[illegible]

DATE
15 November 1950

NATURE OF ACTION
Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer (Ops)
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-9 [illegible]00.00
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		[illegible]/DAD
BRANCH		I O Branch - P. O. S.
OFFICIAL STATION		[illegible]

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Slot - 53

Please transfer leave from V Corps. Replacement for Domin[illegible], Raymond.

This party prior to departure overseas report to the Advisory Council for debriefing

DATE Dec 6-50

CONCUR FOR THE CHIEF OF INSPECTION AND SECURITY STAFF

GEORGE P. LOKER, JR.
CHIEF, SPECIAL SECURITY BRANCH

FORM NO. 37-2
NOV 1949

GPO 83-500339

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME Bagley, Tennent Harrington

DATE 24 August 1949

NATURE Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE 24 July 1950

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer GS-9
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-9 $4600.00 ~~P-3, $4479.60~~
OFFICE		Advisory Council
BRANCH		O/C
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION Cn #1775 Austin J. Thomas	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 24 July 1950

SECURITY CLEARED ON 29 August 49 Extended 29 May 1950

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED Not Applicable

ENTERED ON DUTY 24 July 1950

Frank G. Jarema
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

DOG - 04/26/53
CSEOD - 07/24/50
LCD - 07/24/50

Please transfer accrued leave from Vouchered Funds.
Security concurrence requested 24 August 1949.

Frank F. Scheri
Authorized Certifying Officer

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
AUG 1949

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : Tennent H. Bagley, GS-16, Employee Number 056043, DOB: 11 November 1925; Chief of Station; Career; Service Designation: D.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW : 1 April 1970 - 31 March 1971

MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 42 months

OVER-ALL RATING : Strong

1. As Mr. Bagley completes approximately 42 months as Chief of Station, Brussels, progress in Brussels remains uneven. An aggressive attack against the Soviet target has been undertaken by a portion of the Station. Liaison has been exploited to a degree unparalleled in other European Stations. However, there has been a rather frustrating lack of major progress on the part of the NOC component of the Station. While a number of factors have contributed to these results, Mr. Bagley's style of leadership has undoubtedly been a major one.

2. Mr. Bagley has few peers in his ability to investigate and define a Soviet target, and to design mechanisms capable of assaulting this target. The research of this target under his close supervision has been impressive, and the mechanisms designed to support contemplated operations and to keep the target under constant review have been functionally designed. Some impressive achievements have resulted from these efforts but, at the same time, overall progress has been disappointing:

A. The non-official cover component of Brussels Station, consisting of 10 operations officers, 2 support officers and 4 other personnel, is only now taking a form which would permit its effective deployment, but its gains in organizational readiness are threatened by the possible loss of leadership which, in turn, stems at least in part from failure of Mr. Bagley clearly to delegate both responsibility and authority to the key individuals involved in this unit.

MAY 1971

B. The physical divisions within the official component of the Station have separated personnel and files in a manner which makes close teamwork against the target difficult. These divisions could and should have been corrected.

C. Mr. Bagley has not always seen eye-to-eye with Headquarters on matters of method and emphasis, a phenomenon which has impaired operational progress. We accept that each Station Chief has the right -- indeed, the duty -- to hold independent views and to express them with integrity (as Mr. Bagley has done), but believe that differing views could have been resolved more easily had Station reporting to Headquarters been less parsimonious.

3. To sum up, Mr. Bagley's abilities to conceptualize and to build viable models is truly outstanding, as is the exhaustively thorough manner of his staff work; his capability to translate his concepts into productive human endeavor has been less impressive. In spite of his considerable social and diplomatic skills, Mr. Bagley is essentially a reserved person who finds some difficulty in communicating with his subordinates.

4. In spite of the problems noted, problems which we perhaps overstress as a result of our high expectations, Brussels Station has made good progress during this period and Mr. Bagley's performance has been STRONG.

John L Hart

John L. Hart
Chief,
European Division

REVIEWING OFFICER'S COMMENTS: Concur

Date: 1 May 71

Cord Meyer Jr.

Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

RYBAT SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO OBBS 3697
ATTACHMENT TO OBBT 5300

TO : Tennent H. Bagley

SUBJECT: Annual Fitness Report

1. In accordance with the fitness report procedure for EUR Division, a copy of the fitness report on the Chief of Station is forwarded to him upon completion by the Rating Officer. Depending upon the grades of the Chiefs of Station concerned, the fitness reports are prepared either by the Chief or Deputy Chief of EUR, and those written by Chief, EUR go to Deputy Chief CS for review.

2. It should be borne in mind that this fitness report has been prepared in accordance with the EUR Division policy for such reporting as established in Field Notice 41.

3. Please sign at the bottom of this letter of transmittal on the line indicated, to certify that you have seen the fitness report. The transmittal letter should then be returned to Headquarters for inclusion in your personnel file.

/s/ John L. Hart

I certify that I have seen my fitness report for the period 1 April 70 - 31 March 71, and have attached my comments for the record.

/s/ Tennent H. Bagley
SIGNATURE

27 April 1971
DATE

RYBAT SECRET

—TACHMENT TO OBBT 5300

27 April 1971

COMMENTS on Fitness Report on Tennent H. Bagley
1 April 1970 - 31 March 1971

I agree with the fitness report's own suggestion that the "problems" it noted were overstressed: its negative content outweighs the positive by nearly three to one and is emphasized by its format and sentence structure. Because its overall effect belies the "Strong" rating, I believe that it creates a misleading picture, and therefore think it necessary to comment. Moreover, the report leaves the impression of a general failing in two specific areas which I am sure it did not intend to, since these are two areas which, during the two years since the preceding fitness report, have been repeatedly praised by Division management: 1) the level of operational activity at this Station ("his capability to translate his concepts into productive human endeavor has been less impressive") and 2) the development of a NOC facility ("frustrating lack of major progress on the part of the NOC component").

The report could usefully have made more precise its implication that I have not created a satisfactory amount of productive human endeavor by my concepts and plans. When I took over this Station I inherited about 10 valid unilateral assets. We have since added at least 80 new ones, of whom about 40 remain particularly productive and promising and at least 25 more continue to be useful, sometimes necessary, informants or action types. Most if not all of these new assets were spotted and recruited in direct response to my planning and concepts. I have thus more than quintupled the Station's assets and its capability to respond to the varied directives and requests it receives. The high rate of acquisition of new assets has remained generally constant throughout the period since the preceding fitness report. Perhaps the current fitness report questions the "productivity" of those assets; this is of course debatable, but can be properly judged only in terms of our designated objectives. We were directed to establish contact with Soviets and assess them, with a view to their eventual recruitment. When I took over, this Station had access of one sort or another to perhaps four Soviet officials; we have built to the point where we now have contact and are providing assessments through unilateral assets alone on nearly 40 Soviets currently here (more, I would suspect, than any other station in the world) not to mention some 20 other Soviets covered by liaison operations at least partly stimulated by us, and not counting the many who have left PCS during this period. Going beyond assessment, we have taken concrete steps toward recruitment of a number of Soviet and Bloc officials (offers, hints, pressures, etc., directed through our assets), we have recruited several employees of Soviet installations in Brussels and Antwerp, and we have made at least one significant Bloc recruitment.

The assessments provided by our numerous assets on a large proportion of the local Soviets have permitted us to find and to focus more realistically (i.e., with some degree of hope) on the few promising targets. We have so focussed, although, as the report says, in this there have been differences with Headquarters on method and emphasis. But these differences were largely a matter of semantics, and they have not impaired operational progress: I cannot think, nor have I been told at any time, of a single specific thing left undone against any target Soviet because of the Station's method and emphasis.

In addition to our steady progress in the Soviet field, we have so built up our local capabilities that we can and do respond (to what I am told is an unusual degree) to requests of other components of the CS, and in doing so we are using largely agents recruited during my tenure and according to my plans. We provide and backstop cover for FE operations in the Far East; we recruit participants for LCPIPIT organizations; we provide live addresses for other divisions' operations; we actively support, by action and propaganda, worldwide psych programs; we send agents, sometimes in response to book-cable requests, to fulfill organization missions in (for example) Biafra, Saigon, the South Sudan, Paris and Tokyo; we recruit support agents for the use of other stations in their areas; we handle agents in other areas on behalf of other stations; we use our assets to spot and introduce people useful for other stations. We do this without diminishing the rate of acquisition of new assets directed at our primary objectives. This human endeavor does not seem unproductive.

The second general area in which the fitness report leaves the impression of general inadequacy concerns our NOC activity. The NOC structure I created (and whose strengths, like the shortcomings referred to in the report, are due largely to my "style") has repeatedly been called an innovative ground-breaking experiment. During the past year the Division has sent COS's and officers from other stations to Brussels to study and, presumably, to emulate applicable parts of it. This structure was created since the preceding fitness report, but the present one mentions only a "lack of progress" (which is moreover not defined and is not clear even to me: What is "progress on the part of a NOC component"?) If progress or lack of it is represented by the number of cases turned over to NOC handling, then it is worth noting that this Station works on the principle, not accepted everywhere, that all cases will be handled by NOC officers unless there are overriding reasons to the contrary. So far we have turned over some 35, another 15 turnovers are imminent, and others are delayed only because turnover to NOC now would be premature and potentially damaging. Since we have had to spot and recruit every source which could be turned over to NOC handling, it might be forgiven that we have not yet provided full case loads to ten active NOC officers, most of whom arrived at about the same time a year and a half ago. We are trying hard to produce new sources, while at the same time reducing the excessive number of NOC officers. If "lack of progress" means that our experimentation with different modes of communication, command, and administration of NOC units has not yet developed a final form or doctrine, the comment is valid, but our very active experimentation continues to identify false avenues as well as to reveal promising perspectives; in this we have been encouraged by the Division. We have, also, managed to keep our NOC officers' morale quite high (more so than elsewhere, I am told by LPGLOBE people), have kept them busy and productive, and have integrated them into the Station, without loss of security, to a degree I think unmatched elsewhere. Among the ways we have done this are by grouping them together and delegating authority to a NOC unit chief (although the report says that I have failed to delegate authority properly), and by assigning them their own areas of operational responsibility and having them do the Station's operational planning in those areas. This has been productive: it has identified promising areas of possible action which have led to recruitments, and has eliminated less promising areas, thereby avoiding waste motion on the part of the Station as a whole.

The last six lines of paragraph 2A of the fitness report are unclear to me. If the "possible loss of leadership" of the NOC component refers to the impending retirement of its chief, this is manifestly not due to any failure to delegate to him responsibility and authority; he never in his long career had nearly as much of either as he did during my tenure here; he retired because he reached the age of 50, beset by family problems and facing a change ~~in his~~ cover job, and this in the face of repeated and recent failures to be promoted despite having spent more than 10 years in grade.

The report states 1), that physical divisions within the official Station made close teamwork difficult; 2), that I could and should have corrected them. This is erroneous on both counts. The Station, under my direction and that of fifteen years of my predecessors, had to occupy this allotted space, divided because there were two different cover organizations and not enough space in the Embassy. I am not aware that this division has significantly affected the performance of any Station officers or programs as long as I have been here. As to what space assignments would best promote teamwork (i.e., who should sit where), I have given thought to this since my first week at this Station, and am convinced (despite musings about this or that alternative) that we have had no choice better than the present arrangement. Most recently, however, I have approved our part of a general shifting of Embassy space allocations which will finally reunify the Station after its long separation.

/s/ Tennent H. Bagley

5 May 1970

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT	: Tennent H. Bagley, GS-16, Employee Number 056043, DOB: 11 November 1925; Chief of Station; Career; Service Designation: D.
PERIOD UNDER REVIEW	: 1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970
MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION	: 24
OVERALL RATING	: Outstanding

1. For this reporting period Mr. Bagley must be rated as Outstanding for the achievements of his Station, achievements in very considerable measure due to his personal vision of how to mount a broad attack against the Soviet target. This vision is an unconventional one, not duplicated anywhere else in Europe, but it is undeniably producing results in terms of an understanding in depth of the activities of the Soviet representation in Belgium and of the character of a number of its individual members.

2. Mr. Bagley has developed a relationship with the chief of the principal liaison service in Belgium of such nature that this service is for practical purposes an arm of Brussels Station. Through this relationship, the Station is able to exercise a large measure of control over that service's requirements, selection of targets and mode of operation. Needless to say, this has been of very great help in pursuing Agency's goals in Belgium.

3. Although Mr. Bagley has not yet been completely successful in the organization of his complement of non-official cover personnel, his innovative approach has resulted in enormous progress over the past year, and I have good reason to believe that, with the implementation of certain measures which he and I recently discussed, he will be getting much more out of his NOC people than any other station chief in Europe.

4. I was also impressed on my most recent visit, during the last part of April 1970, with what seemed to be an improved

13 MAY 1970

communication between Mr. Bagley and his subordinates, both inside and outside of the official cover installation. Pete Bagley's intellectual capabilities tend to outstrip those of most of his colleagues, but it does seem to me that he has dealt with this problem well and has thus been able to engender loyalty and cohesion among the members of his Station.

John L. Hart
Chief
European Division

REVIEWING OFFICER'S COMMENTS: Concur -

Date: 5 May '70

Cord Meyer Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

EYES ONLY

5 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Board

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to GS-17 - Mr. Tennent H. Bagley

1. It is recommended that Mr. Tennent H. Bagley be promoted to GS-17. He has been in grade as GS-16 since June 1965 and has served as COS in Brussels since August 1967. His previous assignment was as Deputy Chief, SB Division.

2. The reasons for this promotion are amply covered in my fitness report of this same date. I have just returned from an extensive trip through the European area, during which I had a chance to see and talk with a very large number of officers under both official and non-official cover. Pete Bagley is one of two whom I am recommending for promotion as a result. He is one of our very finest station chiefs, possessed of imagination, intellect and ability personally to handle operations which very few of his colleagues can match. He is one of those on whom the future of the Organization is going to depend, and I believe that the promotion is more than justified.

John L. Hart
Chief
European Division

EYES ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

[redacted]

9 May 1969

TO : BAGLEY, Tennent H. Chief of Station, Brussels

SUBJECT: Annual Fitness Report

1. Effective with this fitness report cycle, KEYWAY is initiating a procedure by which a copy of the fitness report on a Chief of Station is forwarded to him upon completion by the Rating Officer. Depending upon the grades of the Chiefs of Station concerned, the fitness reports are drafted either by the Chief or Deputy Chief of KEYWAY, and those drafted by Chief, KEYWAY go to Deputy Chief WOMACE for review.

2. Please sign at the bottom of this letter of transmittal on the line indicated, to certify that you have seen the fitness report. The transmittal letter should then be returned to Headquarters for inclusion in your personnel file.

/s/ John L. Hart

I certify that I have seen my fitness report for the period 10 March 1968 - 31 March 1969.

Tennent H. Bagley /s/
SIGNATURE

21 May 1969
DATE

[redacted]

SECRET

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)

Ret 6/30/76

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

75-89
13-3

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED Chief of Station	POST BRUSSELS	
POSITION	GRADE	AGENCY
RATING PERIOD May 13, 1969 - Dec. 29, 1969	DATE OF REPORT December 29, 1969	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER John S D Eisenhower	TITLE Ambassador	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☐ Yes ☐ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

This officer is undoubtedly one of extremely high professional competence. In addition I have complete confidence in his discretion.

This officer is presentable, tactful, and enthusiastic. He constitutes an outstanding asset to this mission.

FORM 4-65 FS-572

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)

14-00000

SECRET

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)~~

62

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency; retains one copy.)

I. OFFICER BEING RATED J. Bagley	POST Brussels, Belgium
POSITION Chief CAS	GRADE -- AGENCY
RATING PERIOD November 15, 1967-Nov. 15, 1968	DATE OF REPORT February 24, 1969
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER Ridgway Knight	TITLE Ridgway B. Knight Ambassador
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE

II. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☑ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☑ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☑ Yes ☐ No

III. NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

I cannot of course comment on the professional aspects of the Chief CAS's performance because of the highly specialized nature of his responsibilities.

However as a member of the Country Team I give him the highest marks for his cooperative spirit, courtesy and willingness to contribute to the success of our common efforts and undertakings.

Likewise I am satisfied that he maintains exceptionally close and effective relations with the appropriate Belgian officials.

Endowed with an unusually frank and attractive personality, the Chief CAS is a respected and well liked member of our official American group in Belgium, both in American and local circles, where his fluent and excellent French is much appreciated.

His wife is a refined, quiet and attractive lady of Austrian birth. Both have gone through an agonizingly long and grave health problem with a young son of theirs and deserve extraordinary credit for the courage and dignity which they constantly displayed during their ordeal.

In every respect, I consider him to be an outstanding CAS Station Chief.

Incl. in memo to DCI dated 14 Mar 1969.

FORM 4-55 FS-572

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)~~

SECRET

14-00000

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED Chief of Station [illegible]	POST Brussels	
POSITION	GRADE	AGENCY
RATING PERIOD December 30, 1969 - November 4, 1970	DATE OF REPORT November 4, 1970	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER John S D Eisenhower	TITLE Ambassador	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☐ Yes ☒ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

This officer is undoubtedly one of extremely high professional competence. In addition I have complete confidence in his discretion.

This officer is presentable, tactful, and enthusiastic. He constitutes an outstanding asset to this mission.

FORM 4-65 FS-572

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)

SECRET

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)~~

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED: Chief of Station

POST: Brussels

POSITION:

GRADE:

AGENCY:

RATING PERIOD: November 4, 1970 - September 22, 1971

DATE OF REPORT: September 22, 1971

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER: John S D Eisenhower

TITLE: Ambassador

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER:

TITLE:

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☐ Yes ☒ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

This officer is one of the few who was already here upon my arrival at this post. [From careful observation over nearly two and one half years, with contacts several times a week, I am confirmed in my opinion of his extremely high professional competence. ~~Quite naturally, I avoid delving into the details of his day-to-day operations. However,~~ In the area with which I am most concerned--that of his political discretion--I have absolute confidence.]

This officer is presentable, tactful, and enthusiastic. He fits in harmoniously with the other members of the mission, therefore constituting an outstanding asset thereto.

FORM 4-65 FS-572

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ (When Completed)

SECRET

SECRET

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED - Tennent Bagley	POST Brussels, Belgium	
POSITION Chief CAS	GRADE -	AGENCY -
RATING PERIOD (see III below)	DATE OF REPORT November 15, 1967	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER Ridgway Knight Ridgway B. Knight	TITLE Ambassador	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

II. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☐ Outstanding X ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory X (see III below)

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☒ Yes ☐ No

III. NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

Since the Chief CAS reported to post in September of this year, sufficient time has not elapsed to make a definite evaluation of his performance. A performance evaluation covering his full period at post will be made at the time of the next annual assessment period on November 1, 1968. Having said this, I might add that his approach to his job and performance to date in addition to his obvious ability and experience have confirmed my earlier, most favorable impressions of him.

FORM 4-65 FS-572

SECRET

28 April 1969

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : Tennent H. Bagley, GS-16, Employee Serial Number 056043; DOB: November 11, 1925; Chief of Station; Career; Service Designation: D.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW : 10 March 1968 - 31 March 1969

MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 12

OVERALL RATING : Strong

1. Mr. Bagley assumed his duties as Chief of Station on 13 September 1967. It is too early to assess the results of his stewardship; he established in advance a timetable for building up a structure of unilateral agent assets, and it is not yet clear to what extent these assets are going to be productive against major targets. However, there is no doubt that Bagley has tackled his job with originality, energy, and enthusiasm. A good indication of these qualities is that, alone among our European Chiefs of Station, Bagley has himself recruited at least half a dozen new agent assets in less than two years.

2. Bagley's accomplishments must be measured in light of the fact that he has had a weak Deputy Chief of Station, and that several of the officers in his small Station have been of quite modest calibre. The restaffing of the Station which is taking place this summer should result in a considerable leap forward.

3. On the personal side, Bagley has all the qualities which we could ask for in a Chief of Station. He is totally dedicated, incisive and articulate, a pleasant companion and a gracious host. I rate his overall performance as Strong.

John L. Hart
Chief,
European Division

13 MAY 1969

REVIEWING OFFICER'S COMMENTS

Concur

Cord Meyer Jr.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

30 April 69

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Chiefs of Station Seminar No. 11 — 19 - 30 June 1967
80 hours, full time

Participant : BAGLEY, Tennent H.
Office : DDP/EUR
Year of Birth: 1925
Service Designation: D
Grade : GS-16
No. of Students : 12
EOD Date : July 1950

COURSE OBJECTIVES, CONTENT AND METHODS

The COS Seminar is aimed to prepare prospective Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Station and Chiefs of Base for field assignments. Emphasis was upon the difficulties confronting Chiefs of small or medium-sized installations, since they must handle a peculiarly wide range of problems. Included were case studies serving to remind outgoing chiefs of various operational approaches and techniques, but more time was devoted to policy, coordination, management, reporting, and administrative responsibilities of the Chief of Station, both within CIA and in the government at large, at home and abroad. Special attention was given to counterinsurgency.

The bulk of the course is given in lectures and question periods conducted by officials responsible for the missions, functions, programs, and services discussed. A few key items of suggested reading are included, and bibliographies of suggested reading tailored to the individual's assignment are offered for those who want them.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No further assessment of individual capacity or performance is made in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

19 July 1967
Charles B. Wheeler — Date
Acting Chief,
Operations School

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 056043

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BAGLEY, Tennent H	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11/11/25	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer D Div Ch	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SB	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 9 MAY 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 4-60 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

25 April 1967

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT - 1 April 1966 -
31 March 1967

SUBJECT: BAGLEY, Tennent H.
Deputy Chief, SB Division, DDP
DOB 11-11-25, GS-16, SD:D
Employee Serial Number - 056043

Mr. Bagley's performance over the period continued to be outstanding. This was his first full year as general deputy during which he still retained responsibility for a major, sensitive counterintelligence complex. Nevertheless, during my frequent absences, Mr. Bagley was called upon to act for me and he did so most effectively. Those aspects of his work involving decisions on expenditures of both funds and manpower show him to be sufficiently cost conscious yet this is tempered by a better than average awareness of the operational value to the Agency (or lack thereof) of such expenditures. Mr. Bagley has been selected to become COS of a large European station with excellent potential for Soviet Bloc operations. In my view, this appointment is additional testimony of the high regard in which he is held by his professional colleagues. In recognition of his outstanding work in SB Division, Mr. Bagley has been recommended for promotion to GS-17.

David E. Murphy
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

TH Bagley
Tennent H. Bagley

Date 2 May 1967

Reviewing Official:

Crum.
TH Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

Date 2 May 67

SECRET

8 July 1966

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT - 1 April 1965 -
31 March 1966

SUBJECT: BAGLEY, Tennent H.
Deputy Chief, SB Division, DDP
DOB 11-11-25, GS-16, SD:D
Employee Serial Number - 056043

From the beginning of the reporting period until 9 September 1965, Mr. Bagley continued as Chief, Counterintelligence Group, SR Division. Mr. Bagley was then appointed Deputy Chief, SR Division and has remained in that position. He has served as Acting Division Chief on several occasions including a period of two months in 1965 when I made an extensive visit to FE Division stations.

In Mr. Bagley's previous position as Chief, Counterintelligence Group, he completed the establishment of this group as an effective mechanism for providing support and direction to CS operations against the Soviet Intelligence Services. His imprint can be seen in the functional organization of the various branches of the group which now enables us to concentrate on those aspects of KGB and GRU operations which are essential to the comprehensive and aggressive program we have underway to penetrate these key Soviet targets. I have been particularly impressed by Mr. Bagley's ability to relate the goals of these operational programs to the capabilities of his subordinates. In fact, his appreciation of their strengths and weaknesses enabled him to place the very best of his officers in key positions in the CI Group where for the most part they remain today. Their performance is still characterized by the high sense of discipline and professionalism imbued in them by Mr. Bagley during his service as their chief. I have also been struck by the spirit of loyalty permeating this group even though Mr. Bagley's associates were often driven at a pace which would have severely tested the supervisor/subordinate relationship in most other units. At the same time, he afforded the senior officers of the CI Group every opportunity for the exercise of initiative and imaginative leadership at their own levels. On the other hand, he has little patience with the "time server" who is not prepared to exert himself either to acquire by self study the background he should have to do his job properly or if he has the background to use it effectively in his work.

Moving into the responsibilities of deputy division chief, Mr. Bagley has demonstrated to my satisfaction that he was the best possible choice for this position. He has easily mastered those substantive areas of the division's work with which he had no previous association or encountered only occasionally as Chief, CI Group. This is especially true of the reports and requirements area and of certain collection activities.

Mr. Bagley's performance in the position of deputy chief has indeed been outstanding. I would accord him particularly high marks for the energy and enthusiasm he has displayed in shaping and expanding the training and orientation programs conducted by the division as one means of conveying to CS officers outside the division some understanding of the Soviet target and our methods of operating against it. Mr. Bagley continues to be sensitive to costs whether one is speaking of funds or man-hours. He does not lightly undertake the expenditure of either. My very positive evaluation of Mr. Bagley's potential for senior leadership in the Clandestine Service has not changed. He is a magnificent intelligence officer whose keen intellect and rapidly growing appreciation of the "art of the possible" mark him as one of the best officers in our service. It is my intention to recommend him for promotion at an early opportunity.

David E. Murphy
David E. Murphy
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

TH Bagley
Tennent H. Bagley
Date 8 July 1966

22 JUL 1966

Reviewing Official:

W. Lloyd George
W. Lloyd George
Acting Assistant Deputy Director
for Plans
Date 8 JUL 1966

12 March 1965

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT - 1 April 1964 -
31 March 1965

SUBJECT: BAGLEY, Tennent H. 056043
Operations Officer
Branch Chief
DDP/SR/CI
DOB 11-11-25, GS-15, SD:D

Mr. Bagley still occupies the position described in his last fitness report of 30 April 1964. The quality of his performance continues to be outstanding in all respects including cost consciousness. He has been recommended for promotion to GS-16. This recommendation should receive early consideration. There are certainly very few officers in the GS-15 level who are more deserving in terms of their executive potential and their contributions to the mission of the Clandestine Services.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

T H Bagley
Tennent H. Bagley

11 March 1965
Date

Reviewing Official:

T H Karamessines
Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

20 March 1965
Date

26 MAR 1965

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 056043

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BAGLEY Tennent H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11-11-25	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer - Chief	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR/CI	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Advise the Chief, SR Division on all matters pertaining to the Soviet intelligence services and their activities.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Direct the operational program of the SR Division against the Soviet intelligence services to include the development of operational policy, goals and targets.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Establish procedures within the SR Division Counterintelligence Group, the division as a whole and with regard to other area divisions for carrying out the operational program against the Soviet intelligence services.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervise the personnel and activities of the Counterintelligence Group, SR Division	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conduct personally the analysis and direction of certain sensitive counterintelligence operations.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

24 APR 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 24

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described if applicable.

Although I have known and worked closely with Mr. Bagley many times over the past ten years, this is the first time he has served directly under me. This experience has confirmed my belief that he is without question one of the most gifted counterintelligence officers in the Clandestine Services. The past several months have seen many changes in the organization of the SR Division and in its operational responsibilities. It should be noted that Mr. Bagley perhaps more than any other officer in the division contributed heavily to the broad concepts and ideas which took final form in the new organization and the operating instructions which were accepted in the Clandestine Services as a basis for an expanded effort against the overall Soviet target. At the same time he produced a number of specific plans and directives pertaining to the conduct of our operations against the Soviet intelligence services. These directives are representative of the depth of his experience in this field for they cover problems ranging from the often neglected but absolutely essential problem of collecting and recording data on Soviet intelligence officers to a highly imaginative program for increasing our level of contacts with such officers. In whatever he has undertaken in this regard, the quality of imagination is probably the most outstanding but his work would not be as effective as it is were it not for his amazing fund of knowledge concerning the Soviet intelligence services, their personnel, organization and operations, and just as important, awareness of the level and nature of the western counter intelligence effort.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
21 Apr 64	Tennent H. Bagley

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
8		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 Apr 64	Chief, SR Division	David E. Murphy

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur heartily.
THK

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
22 April 64	ADDP	TH Karamessines Thomas H. Karamessine

SECRET

BAGLEY, Tennent H.

SECTION C (Continued)

This substantive background lends a quality of toughness and realism to his work as a planner and supervisor which is matched by very few others in the Clandestine Services.

As a supervisor, Mr. Bagley distinguishes himself by the ability he has to be immensely interested in the details of his subordinates' operations while at the same time leaving to them sufficient freedom of decision and action to carry out their programs without undue interference. He retains control over a large element (there are four branches and 53 employees in the group) and several first class senior subordinates by virtue of their respect for his competence and substance. More important, he infuses them with the same sense of dedication and deep enthusiasm for his work he himself possesses.

In his position Mr. Bagley also handles certain sensitive operations directly. All of the qualities of imagination, penetrating insight, energy and professional knowledge which can be seen in his work as a supervisor are present in his case work. He has also demonstrated that he is a superb agent handler with a fresh, common sense approach to tradecraft problems. I have also seen him display a constant readiness to sacrifice his own comfort, leisure and private affairs to the demands of the operational situation. He is not long discouraged in the most difficult circumstances and his natural optimism, alert mind and special kind of clan work constantly to discover new avenues of approach to whatever operational problems he faces.

I would describe his cost consciousness by noting that it is simply foreign to his nature in both a personal and professional sense to use funds thoughtlessly. He has demonstrated that he considers the expenditure of operational funds must be related to a commensurate gain in terms of our operational objectives.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
056043

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BAGLEY, Tennent H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1925	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer - Branch Chief	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR/CI Branch	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ TEMPORARY	
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):			

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 October 1962 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises SR Division CE activities including both research and operations.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Organizes and manages Branch consisting of 58 people.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Recommends Division policy on CE matters.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Represents SR Division to other elements of the Agency on CE matters.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Briefs foreign intelligence service officers on CE and RIS matters.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S-

10 APR 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS APR 1

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Bagley is an exceptionally skilled officer in the CE field. His knowledge of the Soviet intelligence services is almost unique in the Agency. After accomplishing the assigned task of reorganizing his Branch into a streamlined and operationally active unit, Mr. Bagley is now in the process of actively directing the planning and implementation of an aggressive effort on a world-wide basis against the Soviet intelligence services. Although in his present position only four months he has shown considerable imagination and initiative. He carries out his managerial duties in a proficient manner. He does however tend to avoid necessary but perhaps unpromising tasks. Inclined to be intolerant of those who do not meet the high standards he sets for himself, Mr. Bagley can be uncompromising in professional matters to the detriment of his relationships with others.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 10 APR 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Tennent H. Bagley Tennent H. Bagley

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 10 APR 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Operations and Plans SR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward D. Goloway

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This employee is a dedicated and hard-driving operational specialist whose performance in the field on his last tour is well known and respected in the highest Clandestine Services levels. His services were sought after by this Division as Chief of its CI Branch. He was instructed to reorganize and redirect the Division's CI effort and to reorganize the Branch into an aggressive operational unit. He has tackled this with his characteristic aggressiveness and competence and has done extremely well in this undertaking. He has perhaps not paid as much attention to "channels and chains of command" as he should but I believe he understands the importance of a little more tolerance along these

DATE 10 April 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, SR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Howard J. Osborn Howard J. Osborn

SECRET

lines and will align himself accordingly as his branch shakes down and he becomes a little more experienced in headquarters operation at the branch chief level.

With specific reference to the performance ratings, I would rate this employee as "S" on Specific Duty #1, "S" on Specific Duty #2, and "S" on Specific Duty #5. I would assign this employee an overall rating of "S".

28 August 1962

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, EE

ATTN: David E. Murphy

FROM: Chief of Station, Bern

SUBJECT: Memorandum in Lieu of Final Fitness Report on Tennent Bagley

1. will be leaving Bern Station permanently, with reassignment to Headquarters on 5 September 1962. During his four and a half years here his performance has been highly professional and consistently outstanding. His absence will be keenly felt by the Station.

2. Endowed with a high degree of intelligence, judgment, imagination and operational skill, and with fluent French, German and useful Russian, he has worked in every aspect of Station endeavor, ranging from the proper organization of Station records and the planning of operations to the assessing and successful recruiting and running of agents.

3. In his primary responsibility as Station CE and Sovsat referent, has made unique contributions to KUBARK's approach to and knowledge of the field of Soviet and Polish CE, including the detection and monitoring of RIS illegal networks, and he has played a significant role in almost every major operation conducted by the Station over the last four years. His work has been repeatedly commended by Headquarters.

4. Though ' natural bent is in the field of CE, in which he excels, he has acquitted himself equally well in other areas of Station activity. He is particularly adroit at the analysis, planning and management of operations and, from time to time, has supervised all Station operational activity with superior executive ability. His contribution to the development of Station liaison, through inquiries, follow-ups and special studies prepared to stimulate the local service to action in KUBARK's behalf, has been indispensable and unquestionably an important factor in the growth of Swiss-KUBARK liaison.

RYBAT/SECRET

Bagley

5. Ideally suited to the particular requirements and operational climate of Switzerland, is highly regarded and respected by his KUBARK and ODACID associates, and we all have learnt much from him professionally. Exceptionally mature and knowledgeable, he is a natural for a command position. The most outstanding all-around officer in the Station, has been producing consistently at a level above his present grade. He has been recommended for promotion repeatedly, the last time on 6 October 1961. It is hoped that in his new assignment he will soon be granted this concrete recognition of his superb performance and high potential.

/s/ Burton Lifschultz

RYBAT/SECRET

14-00000

7-28-61
658-2752

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

CSPD

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BAGLEY, Tennent H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1925	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EE/Bern, Switz.	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐ NOT ELIGIBLE ☐ MEMBER ☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING ☐ DECLINED ☐ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 2 Dec 60 To 13 Sept 61

SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Plans, supervises and carries out certain positive and CE ops: SovSat referent for Station	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Organizes files, collates and analyses information	7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spots, recruits and handles agents	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 In the absence of DCOS, supervises Station operational activity	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Researches and supports liaison activity	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2 MAR 1961

8 MAR 1961

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BAGLEY, Tennent	2. DATE OF BIRTH Nov. 11, 1925	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION FI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EE/BERN

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 1 June 1960	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 4/11/59 - 12/1/60	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Plans and supervises certain positive and CE ops; Sovsat referent for Sta.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Researches and supports liaison (Bern and Paris)	RATING NO. 7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spots, recruits and handles agents.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Organizes files, collates and analyses info.	RATING NO. 7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Plans, directs and carries out operations (not necessarily connected with agent handling)	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Cultivates and develops own contacts for KUBARK purposes	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAR 7 3 12 PM '61
MAIL ROOM

Subject is a thoroughly professional intelligence officer endowed with a high degree of intelligence and ability to concentrate. He is imaginative and skilled. A rapid, accurate and purposeful worker, he is a good writer and an articulate speaker. Though his natural bent is in the CE field, in which he excels, he has also demonstrated ability and accomplishments in other areas of Station activity. He is particularly adroit at the analysis, planning and management of his operations. His contribution to the Station liaison take (through inquiries, follow-up and special studies he has prepared to stimulate liaison to action in KUBARK's behalf) has been outstanding and has been a vital factor in stepping up the pace of Swiss-KUBARK liaison. Subject tends at times to avoid necessary but unpromising Station chores and at times is intolerant of those who do not meet the very high standards he sets for himself. These are minor flaws in an otherwise superior officer with outstanding potential.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 9 December 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Tennent BAGLEY

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 9 December 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Philo DIBBLE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur completely in the supervisor's estimate and would state that Subject is the most outstanding all around officer in the Station. Further, he is ideally suited to the peculiar requirements and operational situation of Switzerland. In my opinion he has been performing consistently at a level above his present grade and all members of the Station, including myself, have learned much from him professionally.

DATE 9 December 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Burton R. LIFSCHULTZ

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 034790

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BAGLEY TENNENT H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov. 1925	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION FI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/P - EE - Bern

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☒	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 3/10/58 - 3/31/59 To

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Target Research(Soviet,Polish)	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case Officer (Soviet, Polish)	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3		SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-55 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

SEP 10 11 12 AM '59

1. Subject is an exceptionally strong Case Officer in terms of initiative, imagination and skill. His greatest assets are a thorough understanding of intelligence techniques, native intelligence and the ability to apply both to operational situations. He is a rapid, accurate and purposeful worker with unusual powers of concentration, a good writer and articulate speaker. Although reasonably versatile, he has become a specialist in the CE field, for which he seems particularly well suited by natural talent and personality. Most of his work in his current position has required analysis, coordination and "desk" management of operations rather than actual agent handling and his performance in dealing with some fairly complex operational situations has been superior in every respect. He has used his [redacted] cover intelligently.
State Dept

2. By virtue of his intellectual capacity and intense interest in his work, Subject's potential for further development must be rated high. However, he should attempt to bring more flexibility and understanding into his relations with others. His views tend to be very positive and sometimes are argued with more vigor than tact. These are minor weaknesses in an otherwise exceptionally promising officer.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 30 April 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ TENNENT H. BAGLEY

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 28 April	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ JOHN GOSSER

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 30 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station, Bern	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ BURTON R. LIFSCHULTZ

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY Tennent Bagley	1. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1925	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION Kufire

4. GRADE GS-12	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) Vienna, Austria

6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 November 1954	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 July through 15 November 1954

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Kufire Case Officer/Soviet Branch	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 14 June 1951

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Case officer in the Soviet Branch. Responsible for the developmental activity, general guidance and directing, reporting and administering, and the file research of Kufire projects directed against the Soviet targets in Austria. Plans especially CE operational activity against the RIS. Maintains liaison with CIC. Referent for CE matters.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) William Hood	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) Bronson Tweedy

3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☑ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. DEC 29 1954	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 JUL 54

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.											X			
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.										X				
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.													X	
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.							X							
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.									X					
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.										X				
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.									X					
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.										X				
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.								X						
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.								X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.										X				
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.								X						
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.										X				

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.												X		
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".											X			
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.											X			
31. CAPABLE.												X		
32. CLEAR THINKING.												X		
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.										X				
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.										X				
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.											X			
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.	X													
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.								X						
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.											X			
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.	X													
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.									X					
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.											X			
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.											X			
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.											X			
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.									X					

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS? Basic brain power, ambition, determination, organizational ability, education, area knowledge, language ability, social poise, experience, agressiveness. Writes extremely well, effectively presenting complicated material. Deeply interested in his work, anxious to learn more about it. Has unusually thorough grounding in tradecraft. Understands "policy" aspect of operations--relationships with other agencies, etc--to much greater degree than others his grade and experience.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES? Subj accepts responsibility, but sometimes fails to carry on with it; he has great charm when interested in using it, but has had increasing difficulties in relationships with office staff because of impression he gives of own importance. Tends to blame circumstance for personal failure to follow through on assignments effected by personal relations. Wants to be in "inner circle" and tends to sulk when he feels he is not, or when things do not go entirely to his satisfaction.

SECRET

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Mental ability, motivation, enthusiasm, experience, far outweigh all other considerations which would not have been remarked in an officer of less outstanding ability.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

Only that in the sense that an outstanding employee should be exposed to good supervision at all times to see that his career develops as fully as can be expected.

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Any advanced operations training which he may not have had.

F. OTHER COMMENTS *(Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):*

Subject is an outstanding young officer.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☒ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating, skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

5

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BAGLEY Tennet Harrington	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 November 1925	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EE/Poland	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I.O. (FI)		
7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 24 July 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) July 1956 - July 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 16 Jul 57	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Peter K. Heimann	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, EE/P

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		5 AUG 1957
[illegible]		7/16/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 17 Jul 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Howard E. Roman	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ACOP/EE

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 1 NOV 55 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 2 12 21 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this [illegible] period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do [illegible] rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing [illegible] duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY.
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises conduct of Branch operations.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Acts as deputy to Branch Chief.	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Provides over-all operational guidance to field stations.	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Performs function of senior Branch CE officer.	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS. Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

The high ratings given Mr. Bagley are given in full consciousness of their uniqueness in this Division. Mr. Bagley's all-around competence, his professional integrity, devotion to duty, his thorough grasp of clandestine operations and particularly his comprehension of CE matters and Soviet and Satellite intelligence services are of the highest order and, in my opinion, therefore deserve this type of recognition.

Mr. Bagley can be impatient with the less gifted, intolerant of bureaucratic necessities, or uncompromising in professional matters. These traits are listed here not to detract from his professional competence or personal qualities, but to indicate that his supervisory talents are not yet fully developed. Mr. Bagley speaks fluent French and German.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BAGLEY Tennet Harrington	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 November 1925	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EE/Poland	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I.O. (FI)		
7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 24 July 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) July 1956 - July 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)	
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 16 Jul 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Peter K. Heimann	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, EE/P

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 17 Jul 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Howard E. Roman	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ACOP/EE

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 2 12 31 PM '57
AUG 2 12 31 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
Ten

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL
Mr. Bagley's potential as a Clandestine Services operations officer is limited only by his relative youth and symptoms such as occasional impatience and doggedness. His intellectual gifts and professional competence are beyond question and qualify him for any operational job within DD/P in due course.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
Mr. Bagley would probably profit from a short exposure to high-level staff work by increasing his knowledge of the U.S. intelligence community.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: *This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.*

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section A below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BAGLEY Tennent H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1923	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EE/P	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I.O.(CI)		
7. GRADE GS-12	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 24 July 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) October 1955 - 24 July 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one) ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 6 Aug 56	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Howard E. Roman Howard E. Roman	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, EE/P

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	[illegible]	[illegible]
Reviewed by FUD	[illegible]	

☐ ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 29 Aug 56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL William Hood W Hood	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL EE/COP

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

6

INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 6 4 25 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:
   - *ORAL BRIEFING*
   - *GIVING LECTURES*
   - *CONDUCTING SEMINARS*
   - *WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS*
   - *CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON*
   - *TYPING*
   - *TAKING DICTATION*
   - *SUPERVISING*
   - *HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*
   - *DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*
   - *ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*
   - *MANAGES FILES*
   - *OPERATES RADIO*
   - *COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*
   - *WRITES REGULATIONS*
   - *PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*
   - *CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
   - *PREPARES SUMMARIES*
   - *TRANSLATES GERMAN*
   - *DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
   - *KEEPS BOOKS*
   - *DRIVES TRUCK*
   - *MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
   - *EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*
g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of CE Section, Supervisor	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts CE operations and analysis	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares historical CE Study	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Outstanding intelligence, insight and personal stability combined with devotion to the job make subject an exceptional officer who would probably perform with distinction in almost any area of the Agency. However, the specific professional knowledge which he acquired as a field case officer in Eastern European operations equips him most appropriately for his present specialization with EE/P.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BAGLEY Tennent H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1923	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EE/P	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I.O. (CI)		
7. GRADE GS-12	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 24 July 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* October 1955 - 24 July 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*: ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 6 Aug 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Howard E. Roman	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, EE/P

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 29 Aug 56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL William Hood W Hood	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL EE/COP

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
20

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

While Subject in his present job has shown excellent supervisory abilities, it may be that his own personal inclinations would tend to make him feel happier in a more active operational function in his next assignment, rather than in a widening of his supervisory responsibilities.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 6 4 35 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None at present

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Foreign born wife [redacted]

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS, HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS [illegible]	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	-	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

Aust [illegible]

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

1955 OCT 21 AM 10 29

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day performance. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 90 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

CODED

DATE 20 OCT 1955
Field Pers. Control
RAJ 21 Oct 55

File

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY Tennent Bagley	1. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1925	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION [redacted] DI

4. GRADE GS-12	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) Vienna Operations Base
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 16 Aug 55 (final VOB)	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 16 November 1954 thru 15 August 1955

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Case Ops. Off. [redacted] ~~Case Officer~~/Soviet ~~Branch~~ 0136.01	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 14 June 1951

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Case officer in the Soviet Branch. Responsible for the developmental activity, general guidance and directing, reporting and administering, and the file research of [redacted] projects directed against the Soviet target in Austria. Plans especially CE operational activity against the RIS. Maintains liaison with CIC. Referent for CE matters.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Peter [illegible]	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) Bronson Tweedy
3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☒ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.	
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. SEP 29 1955	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES W. Taylor

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 SEP 54

SECRET

(4)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. Each column within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion as to whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 12 2 23 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X	
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.											X			
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.										X				
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.										X				
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.												X		
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.											X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X						
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.											X			
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.								X						
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.										X				
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.											X			
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.									X					
24. EVEN DISPOSITION									X					
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.												X		

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X		
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.										X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".									X					
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.												X		
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.											X			
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.													X	
36. DELIBERATE.									X					
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.											X			
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.								X						
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.								X						
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X			
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										X				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.									X					
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.									X					
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.											X			
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.								X						

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS? A brilliant young man, devoted to his work. A superior reporter with outstanding memory and analytic facilities. A perceptive and alert case officer. Works hard, writes well and easily. Keeps on top of his work and reporting to an unusual degree. Adapts easily to overseas life and has considerable charm and social presence. Speaks very useful German and fluent French.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?
Lack of team spirit. Impatience with the less gifted. Difficulty delegating responsibility. These weaknesses add up to a certain intellectual and social snobbery which could, if continued, unnecessarily restrict Subj's horizons in the broadest aspects of possible future assignments. They will have little effect on his operational brillianc but will not enhance his ability to pass on his experience to others, or to supervise and guide them. Experience over the last couple of years indicates that he will need assistance in this and his failings, minor tho they may be, should regularly be brought

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.
An exceptionally bright person whose strengths outweigh by far his weaknesses. With greater maturity, should outgrow his weaknesses.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 12 2 26 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?
General desk and Headquarters training.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☒ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION...WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

15 JUL 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Tennent H. Bagley

SUBJECT: **Notification of Membership in the Career Staff**

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 1 July 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:
THBagley
Date: 8 Dec 1955

Career Service Staff
Office of Personnel
3 JAN 1956

SECRET

FORM NO. 511, 1 APR 55

(4)

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true)	DATE (from item 9-1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 9-2)
Bagley, Tennent	1 Mar 55	Tweedy, Bronson	
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:			DATE

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 11 November 1925	2. GRADE GS-12	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known) Kufire	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Vienna Operations Base	
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None		7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 15 September 1955

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

Establishment and direction, under the Chief of Operations, of counterespionage effort of VOB, initially against all opposition services and subsequently Soviet intelligence only. This included organization and maintenance of files, establishment of necessary procedures (namechecking, carding, filing, reporting) and the supervision and handling of CE operations: double agents against Soviet and Hungarian IS; surveillance operations; interrogations and debriefings of personalities of CE interest (including staff officer defectors from RIS and HIS); planning and execution of recruitment/defection approaches to Soviet officials; collation and exploitation of CE information obtained from VOB operations, Hqs, and other station correspondence and from liaison with other U. S. agencies. Personal handling of agents operating against following targets: double agents against Soviet and Hungarian services, penetration of Soviet element in Austria, Austrian government, economic intelligence, Satellite installations in Vienna and legal and illegal border crossing into Satellites. Maintenance of liaison with other U. S. agencies in Vienna. Technical functions including photography and audio surveillance.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

Headquarters or United States field assignment in the counterespionage field.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

Advanced Counterespionage Course

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[3] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[1] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION:

1ST CHOICE: Southern Europe

2ND CHOICE: Western Europe

3RD CHOICE: Japan

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 30

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

None

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

This Mission concurs strongly in Subject's request for assignment in Washington. Subject is an outstanding young case officer, an excellent career prospect who we feel will advance rapidly in the organization. He is extremely intelligent, very well motivated, ambitious and determined. Despite his comparative youth, he is already an experienced intelligence officer. Careful attention should be given to his career planning.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

SIGNATURE:

TITLE:

DATE:

17. REMARKS (additional comment)

EE will be able to place subject on his return. C/Per -
J - 7/7/55

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AM
000CU

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current [illegible] be assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

BY DATE
RS7 2-7-55
Reviewed [illegible] 2/11/55

5

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY Tennant Bagley	1. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1925	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION Kufire F1
4. GRADE GS-12	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) Vienna, Austria		
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 November 1954	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 July through 15 November 1954		

SECTION II *(To be completed by field supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION Area Ops Off. Kufire Case Officer/Soviet Branch 0136.01	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 14 June 1951

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*

Case officer in the Soviet Branch. Responsible for the developmental activity, general guidance and directing, reporting and administering, and the file research of Kufire projects directed against the Soviet targets in Austria. Plans especially CE operational activity against the RIS. Maintains liaison with CIC. Referent for CE matters.

SECTION III *(To be completed at headquarters only)*

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER *(True)* William Hood	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD *(True)* Bronson Tweedy
3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☒ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.	
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. DEC 29 1954	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES Gilbert Colbert

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 JUL 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 13 4 07 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at a statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have a definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS		CATEGORIES													
		NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.	SAMPLES			X											
B. PRACTICAL.											X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X		
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X			
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X				
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.									X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.														X	
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.														X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X							
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X					
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X				
11. CALM.											X				
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.										X					
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.														X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.											X				
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.													X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.													X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.									X						
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.									X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.											X				
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.									X						
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.											X				

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.												X		
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".											X			
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.											X			
31. CAPABLE.												X		
32. CLEAR THINKING.												X		
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.										X				
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.										X				
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.											X			
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.	X													
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.								X						
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.											X			
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.	X													
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.									X					
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.											X			
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.											X			
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.											X			
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.									X					

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS? Basic brain power, ambition, determination, organizational ability, education, area knowledge, language ability, social poise, experience, agressiveness. Writes extremely well, effectively presenting complicated material. Deeply interested in his work, anxious to learn more about it. Has unusually thorough grounding in tradecraft. Understands "policy" aspect of operations--relationships with other agencies, etc--to much greater degree than others his grade and experience.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES? Subj accepts responsibility, but sometimes fails to carry on with it; he has great charm when interested in using it, but has had increasing difficulties in relationships with office staff because of impression he gives of own importance. Tends to blame circumstance for personal failure to follow through on assignments effected by personal relations. Wants to be in "inner circle" and tends to sulk when he feels he is not, or when things do not go entirely to his satisfaction.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 17 4 07 PM '55

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

Mental ability, motivation, enthusiasm, experience, far outweigh all other considerations which would not have been remarked in an officer of less outstanding ability.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

Only that in the sense that an outstanding employee should be exposed to good supervision at all times to see that his career develops as fully as can be expected.

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Any advanced operations training which he may not have had.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):

Subject is an outstanding young officer.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☒ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

14-00000

(2050)

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

TENNENT BAGLEY

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE — TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE

NAME (PRINTED) LAST FIRST MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY
[redacted]	GS-11		15 June 1951

DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Chief of CE section, planning, coordinating and directing CE activity [illegible] of VOB under Chief of Operations. Case officer, handling primary CE cases.

IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED None.

PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
French	X			X			X		
German	X				X		X		
Italian		X				X		X	

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Intelligence officer	U.S.
"	Europe

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO — NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO — EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO — LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

27 May 1954
DATE

[redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT: DATE FROM 1/7/53 DATE TO 30/6/54

OCCASION FOR REPORT: ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO — IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEE'S DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO — IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND/OR WHAT POSITION? See EAVA-7058

FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK NOT OBSERVED ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE					X		
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							X
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							X
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						X	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION							X
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE						X	
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT					X		
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP						X	
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA					X		

INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU: DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

1. Subject is a brilliant young intelligence officer. He is unusually intelligent, quick and perceptive. He writes forcefully, organizes his material well and has an excellent manner and presence. He is vitally interested in his work and has made a systematic study of it, particularly of the counter espionage aspect. He is well read and has an unusually good grasp of politics and has an excellent background in history. He has travelled in Europe considerably and has lived abroad (on his own hook) much of his adult life. In Vienna, he has learned German well.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED AT ATTACH EXTRA SHEET)

1 July 1954
DATE

Morton C. Woolley
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF.)

John R. Daley
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed by F. Sailer Wien IX, Wasagasse 43

2. Subject's weaknesses, which because of his outstanding ability and promise are rather magnified in this assessment, lie mainly in his occasionally faulty human relations. Subject rejects much of the social life which is customarily associated (although not necessarily for the best) with Kubark field posts. His interests, aside from his work, are primarily intellectual and artistic. These interests, coupled with his at best pro forma fulfilling of the customary Kubark social protocols, definitely weaken his relationship with the rest of the staff.

3. Subject comes from a service environment and was himself a Marine officer when very young. This early environment and training has, probably without Subject's being aware of it, caused him to expect of others a devotion to duty and self discipline which is rarely to be found. These high standards have caused Subject to discount to some degree the abilities of the clerical staff and, to a lesser degree, other junior personnel.

4. A second weakness probably results from Subject's consistently successful career. He has, without any effort on his own part, frequently if not invariably found himself closely associated with "management" and regarded by the "management" as being unusually talented. This has caused him to expect his work to receive special attention which is not always warranted. When this does not happen, he tends to pout.

5. There is no question in the writer's mind but what Subject would be an outstanding addition to any office in the Agency. He has, as far as can be seen now, an unlimited growth potential. His minor faults will correct themselves with maturity and increasing experience.

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

BAGLEY TENNETT H

(INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE. TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST FIRST MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY
[redacted]	GS-11	$5910.00	12 June 1951

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)
CE officer for Vienna Operations Base. Chief of CE Section. Case officer handling CE cases. Supervision and training of personnel of CE section, carrying out functions of CE analysis, namechecking, carding and maintenance of CE files.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED none

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	Good	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
French	X			X			X		
German	X				X		X		
Italian		X				X		X	

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Intell.Off.	USA
	Western Europe

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

17 September 1953
DATE

Tennett H Bagley
[redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 TROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM June 52 DATE TO June 53

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCOUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION?

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK NOT OBSERVED ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE							X
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							X
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							X
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE							X
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION						X	
I. INITIATIVE							X
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE						X	
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT							X
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP						X	
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						X	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

COMMENT ATTACHED

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATACH EXTRA SHEET)

8 Sept 53
DATE

Morton A Woolley
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

Druck: F. SAILER, Wien IX, Porzellangasse 41

SECU[illegible]

Attachment to EAVA-4351

K A P O K

23 September 1953

1. Subject has completed a two-year tour at VOB and after home leave has returned here for another two years. Initially assigned to VOB under Embassy cover, Subject has now transferred to D/A civilian cover. Since his arrival in Vienna, Subject has come through a rather long apprenticeship wherein he was exposed to a variety of intelligence problems, including the organization of counter-intelligence files, the handling of two American deep cover agents, the training and mounting of an Hungarian border crosser, and the direction of an Austrian double agent. At this time, Subject is head of the Mission CE section. He has organized that section efficiently and has arranged the expeditious handling of routine CI problems. He is now prepared to undertake more creative CE work.

2. Subject has a notably orderly mind, unusual intelligence, and a remarkable interest in his work. He is able to handle a variety of tasks at one time. Although Subject has had a variety of agent-handling experience, unfortunately, he has not had the opportunity to handle many agents. We intend to correct this in the next few months by having him handle a series of operations during the developmental stages. We believe this will give him the experience and depth necessary to support his already good theoretical knowledge. Subject is extremely well disciplined personally. Unfortunately and unrealistically, he sometimes expects other persons to have similar self-discipline. He also tends in other ways to disregard the human elements ever present in intelligence operations. However, there is no question in my mind but that additional experience will cure both of these very minor faults.

3. I have every reason to believe that Subject will be ready for important operational assignments either in Washington or in the field after another two years of field experience.

Morton A. Woolley

Morton A. Woolley

SECU[illegible]

FORM NO. 55-2
APR 1947

(2151)

CONFIDENTIAL
STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE — TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST FIRST MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY
[redacted]	GS-9	$ 5135.	June 1951

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)
(1) Handling agents in operations involving illegal border crossing, penetration of Satellites and Satellite Installations in Vienna, and coverage of East-West trade. (2) Special reports and analyses as requested by the Chief of Operations. (3) Liaison with other American offices (I.&E. and L.204). (4) Technical support (technical surveillance, photography, S/W, documentation).

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	Good	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
French	X			X			X		
German		X				X		X	
Italian			X			X			X

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS. (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Case Officer	Vienna/Western Europe

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO — NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO — EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO — LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

BAGLEY, TENNENT H.

5 June 1952
DATE

[redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT: DATE FROM June '51 DATE TO June '52

OCCASION FOR REPORT: ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO — IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO — IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCOUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO — DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO — IF SO TO WHAT GRADE AND TYPE OF POSITION? GS-11

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK NOT OBSERVED ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						X	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							X
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							X
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE							X
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE							X
H. DISCRETION						X	
I. INITIATIVE							X
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE						X	
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)							X
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT						X	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP						X	
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						X	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU: DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT

At the close of one year in the field, Subj has shown every indication of becoming an outstanding case officer. Subj gives each of his operations a maximum amount of fxx planning and pays unusual attention to details. If Subj continues to develop as he has in the past, and after additional experience in agent handling, he will be ready for increased executive responsibilities, along the line of Deputy Operations chief, within a year.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATACH EXTRA SHEET)

11 June '52
DATE

Morton A. Woolley
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

H. P. Kogohn
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

E.B.O.
30 '52
HPE/

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

Druck: F. SAILER, Wien IX

14-00000

FORM NO. 38-2
APR 1947

[redacted]

CONFIDENTI .
STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE — TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY
MOIR	Douglas	M.	GS-9	$4600.	15 June 1951

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Case officer; general operational functions; photography, reproduction, S/W, and technical surveillance; document intelligence.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED None.

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	Good	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
French	x			x			x		
German			x			x			x
Italian			x			x			x

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Case officer.	Vienna

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO — NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO — EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO — LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

17 Seppember 1951
DATE

Douglas M. Moir
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM 16 Jun '51 DATE TO 18 Spet '51

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☒

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO
IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO
IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES Time could be better used as an ops analyst than doing routine photo work. This will be taken care of when T/O filled.

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEE'S DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11
HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO
DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE, AND FOR WHAT POSITION?

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK NOT OBSERVED ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						X	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						X	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						X	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION						X	
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)					X		
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION					X		
M. TACT						X	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP	X						
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA	X						

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU:
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

Subject appears to be an excellent prospect for operational work. He is intelligent, quick to ~~learnx~~ learn and hard working. He approaches problems systematically and with forethought. He has an excallent background in history and is well up on current events. The lack of fluency in German is the only liability noted in his first 90 days here. At present Subject is working hard on German.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATACH EXTRA SHEET)

18 September 1951
DATE

Morton A. Woolley
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

10/4/51

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON.

CONFIDENTIAL

Druck F. SAILER, Wien IX Porzellangasse 43

14-00000

FILE COPY OF STANDARD FORM 56
"AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS— FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM"

on file with the Retirement Operations Branch,

Office of Personnel (x3257).

1-6-72

United States Marine Corps

Certificate of Honorable and Satisfactory Service in World War II

This is to Certify that

Tennent Harrington Bagley

has satisfactorily completed active service and is this date

Discharged

Entered the United States Marine Corps

11 March 43

Began Active Service

11 March 43

Upon relief from Active Duty held Rank of

Second Lieutenant

given at MB, Washington, D. C.

dated 26 June, 1946

Signature

ROBERT R. SEDGWICK, Capt., USMCR

Rank

U. S. MARINE CORPS REPORT OF SEPARATION

[illegible] SS# - - -

1. LAST NAME: BAGLEY
FIRST NAME: Tennent
MIDDLE NAMES: Harrington
2. RANK: Pl Sgt
3. PAY GRADE: 3rd
4. SERIAL NUMBER: 5[illegible]

5. PERMANENT ADDRESS FOR MAILING PURPOSES: 2129 Florida Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C.
6. RACE: W
7. SEX: M
8. CITIZEN: YES X NO
9. DATE OF BIRTH: 11Nov25

10. ADDRESS FROM WHICH PERSON WILL SEEK EMPLOYMENT: 2129 Florida Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C.
11. MARRIED: YES NO X
12. NO. OF DEP.: none
13. PLACE OF BIRTH: Annapolis, Md.

RECORD OF MARINE CORPS SERVICE

SELECTIVE SERVICE DATA
14. REGISTERED: YES NO X
15. ADDRESS AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO SERVICE: Washington, D. C.
16. SEL. SER. BD. NO: - - - - - -
17. COUNTY & STATE: - - - - - -

18. MEANS OF ENTRY: ENLISTED 3 INDUCTED COMMISSIONED 2
19. PLACE OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE: Los Angeles, California
20. DATE OF ENTRY: 1Jul43
21. COMPONENT: REG. III-b

22. PENSION CLAIM FILED: YES NO X
23. PLACE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE SERVICE: MB, Washington, D.C.
24. DATE OF SEPARATION: 26Jun46
25. [illegible] AT SEPARATION: BksDet

26. TYPE OF DISCHARGE CERT.: Honorable
27. LENGTH OF FOREIGN AND/OR SEA SERVICE → YEARS - - - MOS. 7 DAYS - - -

28. MILITARY SPECIALTIES: Sea Duty Officer (1950)

29. SERVICE SCHOOLS ATTENDED

	COURSES	WEEKS
PCS, Quantico, Va.	PCS OCS —	16
Sea School, San Diego, Cal.	Sea School	5

30. PRINCIPAL MILITARY DUTY: Sea Duty Officer (1950)

EMPLOYMENT AND NON-SERVICE EDUCATIONAL DATA

31. CIVILIAN OCCUPATION (TITLE): Student
D.O.T. NUMBER: 0-X
NO. YRS.: - - -
LAST EMPLOYED: - - - - -

JOB SUMMARY: Majored in International Relations and Foreign Trade

32. SECONDARY OCCUPATION (TITLE): - - - - - - - -
D.O.T. NUMBER: - - - -
NO. YRS.: - - -
LAST EMPLOYED: - - - - -

33. LAST EMPLOYER BEFORE ENTRY INTO SERVICE: - - - - - - - -
DATE LEFT: - - - -
34. [illegible]: YES X NO

35. EDUCATION IN YEARS: GRAMMAR 8 HIGH SCHOOL 4 COLLEGE 3 DEGREES 0
36. MAJOR COURSES: International Relations and Foreign Trade

37. TRADE COURSES: None.
38. COURSES OF GREATEST INTEREST: International Relations
39. LAST SCHOOL ATTENDED: Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.

PREFERENCES

40. PREFERENCE FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING: Going back to school

41. JOB PREFERENCE: Foreign Trade
REASON: Will be trained for

42. LOCALITY PREFERENCE: Undecided
REASON: - - - - - - - -

I certify that all information on this form pertaining to the Naval Service of the above named individual is in accordance with the records of the U. S. Marine Corps and that a copy of this form has been delivered to him in person.

43. SIGNATURE OF C.O. OR PERS. O.

ROBERT R. [illegible], Capt., USMCR
TYPE IN NAME OF OFF., RANK

SIGNATURE OF DISCHARGEE
DATE 26Jun46

MARINE'S COPY

Honorable Discharge

from the

United States Marine Corps

This is to certify that

James Harrison Bagley a Platoon Sergeant

is Honorably Discharged from the Marine Barracks

Washington, D.C. and from the United States Marine Corps

this [illegible] day of [illegible]

This certificate is awarded as a Testimonial of Fidelity and Obedience.

Geo. [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible] Duty Office

[illegible] (Foreign) Atlantic Area [illegible]

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

056047

NAME (last) (first) (middle) BAGLEY, Tennent H.	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) Nov. 11, 1925	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 570 38 7705
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

Tennent H. Bagley

DATE

20 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1963
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
056043	BAGLEY	TENNENT	N.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
09	12	67					1			BELGIUM	065

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 5115

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 9/13/67

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ OCO		
☐ C & L DIVISION, CTRO.	DATE 9/15/67	SIGNATURE W. Zureick
☒ C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 7 July 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): BAGLEY, Tennent H.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Off Ch

4. GRADE: GS-16

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/SR

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 4496

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☒ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

(PRESENT TDY STANDBY EXPIRES SEP 65)

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

Lorenzo E. Norbeck

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 5B4804

EXT.: 5923

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR TDY STA
UNTIL

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

JOE [illegible]. CLINE

DATE: 7 29 65

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(24)

14-00000

RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

BAGLEY TENNENT H — 56043 — 52F8

NAME OF EMPLOYEE: BAGLEY TENNENT H

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.: 56043

COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

TELEPHONE EXT.:

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE, SPINDLE, OR MUTILATE

INSTRUCTIONS

THIS FORM MUST BE RETURNED WHETHER YOU HAVE HAD OVERSEAS SERVICE OR NOT.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCOMPANYING CARD; THEN FILL OUT THIS FORM AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE.

DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 29-31	WHERE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED	PCS - 1 TDY - 2 (ENTER NO.) 32	DATES FROM MO 33-34	DATES FROM YR 35-36	DATES TO MO 37-38	DATES TO YR 39-40	SERVICE AS CIVILIAN - 1 MILITARY - 2 (ENTER NO.) 41	RESPONSIBLE U.S. GOVT. DEPT. OR AGENCY	DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 42-44
050	AUSTRIA	1	05	51	10	55	1	CIA	100
801	EUROPE	2	[illegible]	[illegible]	03	56	1		100
801	EUROPE	2	[illegible]	[illegible]	06	56	1		100
805	SCANDINAVIA	2	12	57	12	57	1		100
640	SWITZERLAND	1	03	58	06	58	1		100
807	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	2	U S ARMY	620

IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED CHECK HERE ☐ AND ASK YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CARDS

SECRET

FORM 1451

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 29 August 1961.

Tennent H. Bagley
Signature
TENNENT BAGLEY

24 Oct 62
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE

This Outline, when completed, is a documented description of the individual's career interests and proposed career activities together with the comments of his supervisor and his Career Service. The original will be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder and will serve as a guide for future personnel actions affecting him. Implementation of career preferences must depend upon the needs of the Organization.

- CONSULT ATTACHED INSTRUCTION SHEET PRIOR TO COMPLETING THIS OUTLINE -

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(Last-First-Middle)* BAGLEY, Tennent H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov 1925	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	4. GRADE GS-13
5. ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE	6. POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer(CI)	7. OCCUPATIONAL CODE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT EE/Poland

SECTION B. CAREER INTERESTS

9. GENERAL TYPE OF ACTIVITY

FI Operations (including planning and supervision)

10. SPECIFIC TYPE OF ACTIVITY *(Including assignments)*

A. IMMEDIATE *(Within next 1 to 2 years)*

Remain in EE Division plus training and rotation in order to prepare for field assignment.
Overseas tour - EE area - FI Operations

B. LONG-RANGE *(Within next 3 to 5 years)*

Return to field station, followed by PCS, Headquarters, EE Division

SECTION C. TRAINING

11. ORGANIZATIONAL, EXTERNAL, AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

A. IMMEDIATE *(Within next 1 to 2 years)*

Clandestine Services Review, C.10
Audio Surveillance Management, C.24
Communist Party Organization and Operations, C.2

B. LONG-RANGE *(Within next 3 to 5 years)*

12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

I RECOGNIZE THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MY CAREER PREFERENCES MUST DEPEND UPON THE NEEDS OF THE ORGANIZATION. I UNDERSTAND THAT MY PERFORMANCE, CAPABILITIES AND INTERESTS WILL BE GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION.	13. DATE COMPLETED 7 Feb 57	14. SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE See Item 21

FORM NO. 1 AUG 56 1030 SECRET Career Outline (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION D.	COMMENTS BY SUPERVISOR

15. RELATIVE TO CAREER INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEE

See Item 21

16. RELATIVE TO TRAINING FOR EMPLOYEE

17. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR	18. SIGNATURE
19. TITLE	20. DATE

SECTION E.	FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

21. COMMENTS

Detailed Individual Career Plan approved by FI Panel
on file in FI Career Management Office, 2018 L

22. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME Robert A. Skeels	23. SIGNATURE Robert A. Skeels
24. TITLE FI Career Management Officer	25. DATE 21 FEB 1957

LEAVE BLANK

SECRET

T&R

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Bagley Tennent H.

2. THIS DATE: 1 June 56

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME

☑ WAR AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA)
☑ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED (GHI)
☑ MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA - HOSPITALIZATION
☑ UNITED LIFE INSURANCE (UBLIC)
☑ AIR TRIP INSURANCE
☑ DREAD DISEASES *
☑ INCOME REPLACEMENT *
Dis. Ins.

* CASH PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS AT THE TIME EMPLOYEE APPLIES FOR INSURANCE MUST COVER THE PERIOD OF TIME HE WILL BE AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS.

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance)

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INSURANCE PROGRAMS LISTED BELOW.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Tennent H Bagley

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
Ind Dis: Mutual		✓		already being deducted	

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY:

CPB (Signature): SR Armstrong

ICD (Signature):

8. REMARKS

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to TARB for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPB files.

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

FORM NO. 797 REPLACES FORM 37-190
1 SEP 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

1/R

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

1. NAME (Last) Bagley (First) Tennant (Middle) H

2. THIS DATE 21 Mar 56

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME

☑ WAR AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA)

☑ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED (GHI)

☑ MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA - HOSPITALIZATION

☑ UNITED LIFE INSURANCE (UBLIC)

☑ AIR TRIP INSURANCE

☑ DREAD DISEASES *

☑ INCOME REPLACEMENT *

* CASH PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS AT THE TIME EMPLOYEE APPLIES FOR INSURANCE MUST COVER THE PERIOD OF TIME HE WILL BE AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS.

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance)

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INSURANCE PROGRAMS LISTED BELOW.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Tennant H Bagley

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
GHI.		✓		empd	
Fed Empl L		✓			

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY

CPD (Signature) E. Joki

ICD (Signature)

8. REMARKS

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to T&RB for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPB files.

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

FORM NO. 797 REPLACES FORM 37-190
1 SEP 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

14-00000

U ✓

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE

DIVISION

BRANCH

SECTION

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Organization		24	7	1950	31	12	51	8	5	1
Department of State	Geneva, Switzerld.							28	3	
	(part time; see remarks, below)									
Total Civilian Service								2	9	1

SED: 4/8/47
verified 7/31/51
J. Gibb[illegible]

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Marine Corps	11	3	1943	26	6	1946	16	3	3
" " NC	10	1	1949	21	1	1949	12	—	—
" " NC	25	8	1949	26	8	1949	12		
Total Military Service							10	4	3

III CERTIFICATION

Tennent H. Bagley

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

28 February 1952
DATE

[redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

Part-time work (four hours per day) for Department of State, Geneva, Switzerland: 15 April 1948-30 November 1948.

as of 31 Dec 51

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
12	1	5

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT made this 24th day of May, 1951, effective the 25th day of May, 1951, by and between the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the Government), as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, and Tennent H. Bagley (hereinafter referred to as the Employee).

RECITALS

A. The Government desires the services of the Employee for CIA under circumstances requiring the Employee to receive a Foreign Service Staff Corps designation from the Department of State and proposes to send the Employee overseas to Vienna, Austria for operations in the general area of ______________.

B. The Employee desires as an employee of the Government to serve CIA abroad under the supervision and control of the Assistant Director for Special Operations, CIA, (ADSO) and is willing to accept a designation in the Foreign Service Staff Corps with the obligations thereof.

In consideration of the premises, the mutual covenants and promises herein contained, and for other good and valuable considerations, the parties hereto agree as follows:

ARTICLE I. Relationship of Employee to the Department of State. The Employee, in so far as possible, shall abide by all the rules, regulations, and customs of the Foreign Service of the United States which affect personnel of the Foreign Service Staff Corps in order to appear as a normal member of the Foreign Service establishment.

1. The Employee shall rigidly comply with the provisions of Title X, Part A of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, prohibiting officers and employees of the Foreign Service from:

(a) Wearing uniforms;
(b) Accepting presents from foreign governments;
(c) Engaging in business abroad;
(d) Correspondence on affairs of foreign governments;
(e) Political, racial, religious, or color discrimination.

2. The Chief of the Foreign Service establishment and certain other key members of his staff will know about the employee's status and relationship under the terms of the TOP SECRET agreement between the Department of State and CIA. Other personnel may discover that there are certain irregularities in travel orders, position numbers, pay accounts, and other internal administrative procedures of the Foreign Service. Nevertheless, the Employee shall not divulge his relationship to CIA except with the expressed approval of the ADSO. While serving abroad, he shall for normal administration be under the control of the Chief of the Foreign Service establishment to which he is attached, but for operations, including travel as specified below, he shall be under the control of CIA.

3. The travel of the Employee shall be governed as follows:

(a) For temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States within or beyond the Employee's stipulated area, he shall perform CIA operational travel as directed by the ADSO or his designee with the consent of the Chiefs of the Foreign Service establishment involved. TDY travel customary and necessary in the performance of routine Foreign Service Staff functions may be performed without clearance from the ADSO.

(b) For any travel to the United States, either temporary duty or permanent change of station, the Employee shall travel only at the direction of the ADSO after clearance has been arranged through the State Department in Washington.

(c) All travel will be directed and performed in accordance with Foreign Service rules and regulations.

4. Although the Employee's Foreign Service Staff Corps title, location, appointment, Foreign Service class, and other pertinent information may be published in the Foreign Service list and other publications of the Department of State, such listings shall not affect his employment and the obligations and duties stipulated in this contract.

5. All payments to be made under this contract, including reimbursement for travel expenses, shall be made to the Employee by the Department of State except payments referred to in ARTICLE II, Section 4.

ARTICLE II. *Relationship of Employee to CIA.* Although for all intents and purposes it will appear as though the Employee is employed by the Department of State as indicated in ARTICLE I above, he shall in fact be employed by and under the operational control of CIA. In so far as possible, he will be expected to abide by the rules, regulations, customary practices, and courtesies of the Foreign Service, but his ultimate responsibility will be to CIA. In the event of any conflict of authority in the field between the Department of State and CIA, the matter shall be referred to the ADSO for resolution.

1. The line of authority for the Employee shall be as follows:

(a) Senior Representative of OSO at Foreign Service establishment.
(b) OSO Foreign Branch Chief in Washington.
(c) Chief of Operations, OSO.
(d) ADSO
(e) Director of CIA.

2. All travel shall be directed by the ADSO in accordance with ARTICLE I, Section 3. The Employee shall request appropriate Foreign Service clearance for travel through the Senior OSO Representative at the Foreign Service establishment, who shall be responsible for arranging such clearance.

3. It is understood and agreed that the Employee's overseas assignment is to be for a minimum period of two years from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, unless terminated by the Government for its convenience. If the assignment is terminated in less than twenty-four months at the Employee's request, the following shall prevail:

(a) If the Employee resigns in less than twelve months from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, he shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses involved in the transportation of himself, his immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the foreign station, and pay all such expenses for return to the United States. Such expenses for return to the United States and amounts expended by the Government on account of such travel and transportation shall be considered a debt due by the Employee to the United States.

(b) If the Employee desires to terminate between the twelfth and twenty-fourth month from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, he shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of himself, his immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the United States.

4. If deemed necessary by CIA, the Employee may be reimbursed or advanced funds for operational expenses. Such amounts must be advanced or reimbursement made in accordance with CIA regulations, which require a full accounting of the amounts expended by the Employee. Therefore, the Employee will be required to account fully for any such funds advanced or reimbursed in accordance with CIA regulations.

ARTICLE III. Overseas Allowances and Transportation Expenses. When specifically authorized by the ADSO, the expenses of travel and transportation of the Employee, his immediate family, household goods and effects, including personally owned automobile and other allowances, will be paid the Employee in accordance with the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and regulations issued thereunder by the Department of State. When authorized by the ADSO, the Employee shall be paid a quarters allowance, cost of living allowance, or special foreign living allowance in accordance with the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and regulations issued thereunder. The amount of quarters and cost of living allowances and the special foreign living allowance is set forth in Bureau of the Budget Circular A-8, which is amended periodically to reflect adjustments in price indexes. Therefore, such allowances will be subject to change, and the amounts paid will vary according to Budget Circular A-8.

ARTICLE IV. Annual and Sick Leave. The Employee shall be permitted annual leave, sick leave, and leave of absence in accordance with Title IX, Part D of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Under such Act, the Employee may be granted not to exceed sixty calendar days annual leave of absence with pay in each year. Annual leave which the Employee may receive and which is not used in any one year shall be accumulated for succeeding years until it totals 180 days. Sick leave with pay may be granted to the Employee at the rate of fifteen calendar days each calendar year and may be accumulated for succeeding years until it totals 120 days.

1. If the Employee is transferred from another Government Agency to this position, any annual or sick leave standing to his credit in such Agency, may be transferred, if appropriate, in accordance with E.O. 9837, 27 March 1947 issued pursuant to Section 935 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

ARTICLE V. Return to the United States. The Employee shall be ordered to the United States on leave of absence or permanent change of station upon completion of two years continuous service abroad or as soon as possible thereafter.

ARTICLE VI. Retirement: The Employee occupies a position within the purview of the Civil Service Retirement Act. Accordingly, deductions shall be made at the rate provided by law (presently 6%) from the Employee's basic salary and placed in the Civil Service Retirement Fund. The Employee may not avail himself of the provisions of the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System, provided for in Title VIII of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

ARTICLE VII. Medical Care and Hospitalization. In the event of illness or injury to the Employee requiring hospitalization not the result of vicious habits, intemperance, or misconduct on his part, and incurred in the line of duty while assigned abroad, the expenses of treatment of such illness or injury at a suitable hospital or clinic, and transportation expenses to such hospital or clinic may be paid by the Government in accordance with Title IX, Part E of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Under appropriate regulations, a physical examination of the Employee will be made, together with necessary inoculations, or vaccinations, or the expense thereof will be paid to the Employee.

1. In the event of the death or disability of the Employee, the Employee or his dependents shall be afforded the benefits of the United States Employees' Compensation Act of 7 September 1916, as amended.

ARTICLE VIII. Equipment. The Employee may be furnished technical equipment and supplies to assist in the rendition of services hereunder, including an automobile where necessary. The Employee shall be responsible for such equipment and supplies issued to him by CIA in accordance with CIA Property Regulations. All such material shall remain the property of the Government regardless of any apparently conflicting ownership or the manner of registrations.

ARTICLE IX. Salary. The Employee shall receive a basic salary of $4,290.00 FSS-9 per year in accordance with Section 415 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. In-class promotions shall be granted to the Employee in accordance with regulations established in the Department of State pursuant to Title VI, Part E, Section 642 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Other changes in status will be made only as specifically authorized by the ADSO.

ARTICLE X. Continuance of Pay and Allowances. If the Employee is determined by CIA to be absent in a status of "Missing", "Missing in Action", "Interned in a Neutral Country", "Captured by an Enemy", "Beleaguered", or "Besieged" he shall for the period he is determined to be in any such status be entitled to receive or to have credited to his account the same pay and allowances to which he was entitled at the beginning of such period of absence. Continuance of pay and allowances as specified above shall be as prescribed in the Missing Persons Act of 1942 (50 U.S.C.A. App 1001-1015, 7 March 1942).

SECRET

ARTICLE XI. General. The Employee shall comply with the following provisions, and violation thereof by the Employee shall be deemed a breach of this contract.

1. In participating in the programs and activities of any private organization, the Employee shall make it clear that the Department of State has no official connection with such organization and that it does not sponsor or sanction the viewpoints which he may express. In general, his relations with private organizations shall be governed by applicable Foreign Service Regulations.

2. Neither the Employee nor the members of his family shall act as correspondents for American or foreign newspapers, press syndicates, or associations unless special authorization has been obtained in advance from the ADSO. He shall not write for publication any article or other manuscript on political or controversial subjects. Articles of manuscripts on nonpolitical or noncontroversial subjects shall be submitted to the ADSO for review and approval prior to their submission to a publisher.

3. Neither the Employee nor members of his family shall correspond privately on personnel or other official matters with members of Congress, or officers in the Department of State, CIA, or other Governmental agencies.

4. Members of the Employees' family shall not be employed in the same Foreign Service office except during grave emergencies or when special authorization has been obtained in advance of employment from both the Department of State and CIA.

5. Before contracting marriage with a person of foreign nationality, the Employee shall request and obtain permission from the appropriate officials in both the Department of State and CIA. Any such marriage with an alien without obtaining advance permission shall be deemed a breach of this contract and shall result in termination of service with the Government.

6. In the event the Employee desires to resign from the service overseas, he shall submit a written resignation addressed to the ADSO, who will take appropriate steps to clear the matter with the Department of State.

ARTICLE XII. Security. This contract contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act (50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as amended). Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Violation of this ARTICLE or any security agreement signed by the Employee with the Government shall result in immediate desciplinary action, which may include suspension separation from Government service, and may subject the Employee to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act.

1. The termination of this contract will not release the Employee from the provisions of any security oaths which he may be required to take by CIA.

2. The Employee shall not publish, transmit, or divulge in any manner, information received by him as the result of his employment by the Government under this contract without specific written authority from the Director, CIA.

SECRET

ARTICLE XIII. Orders and Directives. Orders and Directives received by the Employee from competent authority, including instructions received in briefing and training, shall be complied with by the Employee. No promises or commitments to the Employee of any nature whatsoever, beyond and in addition to the terms hereof, shall be binding on the Government unless and until such promise or commitment is reduced to writing and approved by an authorized official of CIA, and such writing placed with this contract thereby becoming an amendment hereto.

ARTICLE XIV. Amendments. The Government may at any time amend this contract and may terminate this contract upon thirty day prior notice to the Employee. If the Government proposes to amend this contract by reducing the salary provided for in ARTICLE II (including class promotions, or other authorized increases, if any) and such reduction is unacceptable to the Employee, resignation by the Employee for such reason shall be considered as a termination of this contract for the convenience of the Government. Where the Employee is directed to proceed to a new post on a permanent change of station by the ADSO, this contract will be deemed to have been amended to the extent of such change.

SECRET

ARTICLE XV. Special provisions. The following special provisions shall apply to the Employee under this contract.

Part (a) of Section 3 of ARTICLE II shall not apply to employees who have served in a departmental position with CIA or who have served an overseas tour of duty with CIA, and in such case, part (b) of Section 3 of ARTICLE II shall be deemed amended to read as follows: "(b) If the Employee desires to terminate or return to the United States prior to the expiration of twenty-four months from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, he shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of himself, his immediate family, household goods and personal effects to the United States".

ARTICLE IX does not apply. The employee shall receive an annual salary of $4,600.00 (GS-9), and, during the period of official duty overseas shall receive allowances based on such annual salary (including subsequent increases) computed in accordance with applicable Foreign Service Regulations. Initially, the sum of $4,290.00 per annum (FSS-9) (Plus in-class or class promotions) plus appropriate allowances based on this amount will be paid to employee directly by the Department of State. The difference between the authorized CIA salary and the salary paid by the Department of State, plus the difference, if any, between allowances based on the authorized CIA salary and the allowances based on salary payments by the Department of State and paid by them, shall be paid to the employee in accordance with his written instructions.

A lump sum payment for annual leave is to be paid up to 24 May 1951. Sick leave is to be held in escrow until such time as subject reverts back to GS-Status, at which time, accrued sick leave will be credited.

In the event any of the provisions in this Article are inconsistent with the provisions of any other Article in this contract, the provisions of this Article XV, shall govern and be determinative of the rights and obligations under this contract.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY: Charles W. Clayton
Assistant Chief, Personnel Division, C.

Tennent H. Bagley
Employee

WITNESS:

Chief, Overseas Branch

14-00000

FORM DSP-34
9-1-48
FORMERLY FS-372

DEPARTMEN STATE

APPLICATION F.. EMPLOYMENT IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

BU BUREAU NO. 47-R071.1
APPR L EXPIRES AUGUST 31, 1950

THIS SPACE FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

INSTRUCTIONS—Answers to all questions must be typed or printed. All questions must be answered fully. If sufficient space has not been provided for your answer to any question, complete your answer under item # 37.

—— PREVIOUS —— CARDED —— ACKNOWLEDGED
—— INDEXED —— INVESTIGATED —— ACTION
CODE —— OTHER ——

DATE OF APPLICATION
Social Security No. 570-[illegible]-7735

POSITION APPLIED FOR

THIS SPACE FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden, if any): BAGLEY, Tennent Harrington

2. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN KNOWN BY ANY OTHER NAME? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

3a. PERMANENT ADDRESS (Place from which transportation will be authorized if appointed. Street number and name): 2005 Soledad Avenue

3b. CITY, POSTAL ZONE, STATE: La Jolla, California

4. STATE OF WHICH YOU ARE A LEGAL RESIDENT: California

5. PRESENT ADDRESS IF DIFFERENT FROM ABOVE: 2168 Florida Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

PRESENT BUSINESS PHONE:

PRESENT HOME PHONE: Adams 7619

6. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): 11 November 1925

7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, state, or country): Annapolis, Maryland

8a. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED?

8b. IF A NATURALIZED CITIZEN, PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE

9. SEX ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

10. HEIGHT 5 FT. 11½ IN.

11. WEIGHT 170 LBS.

12. MARITAL STATUS ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ SEPARATED

13. WHAT IS THE LOWEST BASE SALARY, EXCLUSIVE OF ALLOWANCES YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ PER ANNUM

14. WHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE IF ANY ON YOUR IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY FOR DUTY IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD?
None

15. FULL NAME OF HUSBAND/WIFE (If wife, maiden name)

b. DATE OF BIRTH

c. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, state, or country)

d. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED?

e. IF NATURALIZED, PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE.

16. DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH
None		

17. WHICH DEPENDENTS WOULD YOU WISH TO ACCOMPANY YOU ABROAD?

18a. FATHER'S NAME: David Worth Bagley

b. PLACE OF BIRTH: Raleigh, North Carolina

c. OCCUPATION: Retired

d. PRESENT ADDRESS: 2005 Soledad Avenue, La Jolla, California

e. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DID FATHER EVER OBTAIN U.S. CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO

19a. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME: Marie Louise Harrington

b. PLACE OF BIRTH: Colusa, California

c. OCCUPATION IF ANY: None

d. PRESENT ADDRESS: 2005 Soledad Avenue, La Jolla, California

e. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DID MOTHER EVER OBTAIN U.S. CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO

20a. CAN YOU TAKE DICTATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO W.P.M.

b. ARE YOU A STENOTYPIST? ☐ YES ☒ NO W.P.M.

c. CAN YOU TYPE BY TOUCH SYSTEM? ☒ YES ☐ NO 40 W.P.M.

d. NAME OTHER OFFICE MACHINES YOU OPERATE: None

21. MILITARY STATUS

a. IF YOU HAVE BEEN IN THE ARMED FORCES OR IN THE MERCHANT MARINE IN WHAT SERVICE AND BRANCH DID YOU SERVE? *(e.g. U.S. Army: Field Artillery)* U. S. Marine Corps

b. SERVICE OR SERIAL NUMBER 047506

c. DATE OF ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY 1 July 1943

d. RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF ENTRY Private

e. DATE OF HONORABLE DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION 26 June 1946

f. RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION Second Lieutenant

g. PRESENT RATE OR RANK IF ON ACTIVE DUTY First Lieutenant, USMCR, inactive

22a. WHAT PERTINENT FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS HAVE YOU TAKEN? *(Give year, title, and grade received)* None

b. DO YOU HAVE A PERMANENT CIVIL SERVICE STATUS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

c. IF NOW EMPLOYED IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GIVE PRESENT GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE

23. HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR A POSITION UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR TAKEN AN EXAMINATION FOR A POSITION UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE?

☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE PARTICULARS UNDER ITEM #37.

24. HAVE YOU EVER HELD A POSITION UNDER A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? *(Including service in the Armed Services of a Foreign power)*

☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

25. OUTLINE YOUR TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE ABROAD GIVING DATES, PURPOSE, AND PLACES. *(If not while in the Armed Forces give number, date, and place of issuance of American passport.)*

1945 - 1946 - U. S. Marine Corps overseas
July 1947 - July 1950 - studies in Geneva, Switzerland; tourist in France,
Switzerland, England, Belgium, and Italy.

26. FOREIGN LANGUAGES *(Name and indicate the extent of your competence, i.e. Excellent, Good, Fair).*

a. LANGUAGE	b. READ	c. WRITE	d. SPEAK	e. UNDERSTAND
French	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
German	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair

27. EDUCATION

a. GRADE SCHOOL — CIRCLE HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED		DEGREES CONFERRED	MAJOR SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
b. HIGH SCHOOLS OR PREPARATORY SCHOOLS	Menlo School Menlo Park California	Graduated June 1942						
c. COLLEGES OR UNIVERSITIES	Princeton University, N. J. U. of So. California, L.A.	Sept42-Jun43 Jun43-Oct 44 Sept46-Jun47			1 3	AB	Int. Rels.	
d. OTHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OR TRAINING SCHOOLS	University of Geneva Switzerland	Jul47-Jul50			2½	MA PhD	" " " "	

28. EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS. *(In the spaces provided below describe every position which you have held since you first began to work. Start with present position and work back to the first position which you held. Account for all periods of unemployment and state reasons of any unemployment indicated). Use continuation sheet if more space is required.*

PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(Month, year)* FROM: July 1950 TO: Present

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER YR.
PRESENT $ PER YR.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(City, state)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Unemployed

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

NAME AND TITLE OF YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

IF CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, MAY WE APPROACH PRESENT EMPLOYER? ☐ [illegible] ☐ NO

14-00000

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(Month, year)*
FROM: TO:
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR P[illegible]ON
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(City, state)*
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
REASON FOR LEAVING

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(Month, year)*
FROM: TO:
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(City, state)*
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
REASON FOR LEAVING

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(Month, year)*
FROM: TO:
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(City, state)*
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
REASON FOR LEAVING

29. OTHER POSITIONS HELD FOR LESS THAN THREE MONTHS AND PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. *(List—Beginning with most recent)*

DURATION		POSITION	NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER OR REASON FOR UNEMPLOYMENT	STARTING AND FINAL SALARY PER ANNUM	
FROM	TO				
July 1948	Dec. 1948	Administrative Ass't.	U.S. Delegation, International Admin. Aeronaut. Radio Conference	Part time	approx. $1 hr.
June 1948	July 1948	Administrative Ass't.	U. S. Delegation, Int. Telecom. Union, Admin. Council, Geneva	"	"
Apr. 1948	June 1948	Administrative Ass't.	U.S. Delegation, Provisional Frequency Board, Geneva	"	"

30. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION?
☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

31a. HAVE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER?
☐ YES ☒ NO

b. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER TREATMENT FOR A MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISORDER?
☐ YES ☒ NO

c. WITHIN THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS, HAVE YOU FREQUENTLY USED INTOXICATING BEVERAGES TO EXCESS?
☐ YES ☒ NO

d. HAVE YOU EVER HAD TUBERCULOSIS?
☐ YES ☒ NO

e. WERE YOU EVER MEDICALLY DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED FORCES?
☐ YES ☒ NO

IF ANY OF YOUR ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES" GIVE FULL PARTICULARS UNDER ITEM #37.

14-00000

32a. DOES YOUR FINANCIAL POSITION PERMIT DISCHARGE OF ALL DEBTS INCURRED? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF ANSWER IS "NO" STATE UNDER ITEM #37 THE NAMES OF CREDITORS, AMOUNTS DUE TO EACH, AND DATES ON WHICH THE OBLIGATIONS WERE CONTRACTED.

b. IF NOW RESIDING ABROAD HAVE YOU EVER PAID A U.S. INCOME TAX? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE YEAR AND OFFICE OF LAST PAYMENT.

33. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION THAT ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE?

☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

34. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY CIVIL OR MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN THE UNITED STATES OR IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY *(other than for minor traffic violations where the fine did not exceed $25?)* ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF SO, STATE UNDER ITEM #37 THE NAME AND LOCATION OF THE COURT, DATES AND DETAILS OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION.

35. LIST THREE COMPETENT AND RESPONSIBLE PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY DEFINITE INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY *(do not give names of supervisors listed in answer to questions no. 28 or 29)*.

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
Paul T. Torian	Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, California	Major, U.S.M.C.
Ernest V. Summers	U. S. Motors Los Angeles, California	Engineer
Louis A. Hopkins	Hopkins Pharmacy Long Beach, California	Druggist

36. MENTION HERE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS OR ACHIEVEMENTS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN THIS APPLICATION. INCLUDE SUCH ITEMS AS ANY BOOKS OR ARTICLES YOU HAVE WRITTEN, SPECIAL RESEARCH WORK, TECHNICAL SKILLS, HONORARY OR PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY MEMBERSHIPS, AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION YOU CONSIDER PERTINENT. YOU MAY INCLUDE ANY PERTINENT RELIGIOUS, CIVIC, WELFARE, OR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY WHICH YOU HAVE PERFORMED EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, SHOWING THE NUMBER OF HOURS PER WEEK AND NUMBER OF WEEKS PER YEAR IN WHICH YOU WERE ENGAGED IN SUCH ACTIVITY.

37. USE THIS SPACE FOR COMPLETING ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE FOREGOING QUESTIONS, NUMBERING ANSWER TO CORRESPOND WITH QUESTIONS. USE EXTRA SHEETS OF PAPER IF NECESSARY.

Reserve status: U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, inactive (1st Lt., 047506)

Draft Classification: 4-A (Local Board #1, Washington, D. C.)

Presently serving under the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act.

CERTIFICATION

False Statement on this Application is Cause for Dismissal.

I DO SOLEMNLY AFFIRM THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.

27 February 1957

DATE

NAME AS USUALLY WRITTEN AND W WILL BE USED AS OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may within his discretion show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations, and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

STUDENT'S NAME Tennent Harrington Pagley

DATE OF REPORT 8 December 1950

TRAINING COURSE Advanced Operations - XI

DIVISION 020/FDM

Age 25

GRADE GS-9

TRAINING PERIOD 30 October - 1 December 1950

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Intelligence Officer Germany

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

			Possible Score	Achieved Score
FACTS	(1)	Comprehension of mission of OSO	(40)	36
	(2)	Comprehension of mission of OPC	(40)	36
	(3)	Comprehension of operational procedures	(25)	22
	(4)	Comprehension of operational policy	(25)	24
	(5)	USSR and Communism (clandestine aspects)	(20)	18
SKILLS	(6)	Evaluation of operational data	(30)	27
	(7)	Operational planning	(30)	26
	(8)	Operational mechanics	(30)	28
	(9)	Personality analysis	(30)	27
	(10)	Personality manipulation	(30)	29
		TOTAL	(300)	273

Overall adjectival rating . . . . Superior (91%)

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait has not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, and the higher indicating above average.

		Rating
(1)	Ability to get along and work with people	9
(2)	Ability to grasp instructions	9
(3)	Enthusiasm and interest in work	9
(4)	Industriousness	10
(5)	Practical intelligence	8
(6)	Astuteness	7
(7)	Adaptability	7
(8)	Effectiveness	9
(9)	Stability	8
(10)	Initiative	9
(11)	Imagination	8
(12)	Ability to handle and direct people	8

3. COMMENTS - (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths or weaknesses)

(See back of page)

CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

Dist:
ADSO
Chief, FDM
STB
CAU
Files

APPROVED. CHIEF, STD

REVIEWED. CHIEF, ~~XXX~~ RES

FORM NO. 51-88
JAN 1950

COMMENT:

It is worthy of note that Mr. Tagley is the third student to be rated Superior since the initiation of the AOC.

SECRET

12 December 1950

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, FDM

FROM : Chief, TRD

SUBJECT : Mr. Tennent Harrington Bagley

1. It is with pleasure that the instructors and staff of TRD commend Mr. Tennent Harrington Bagley on his outstanding performance throughout the period of his training.

2. It is felt by the above mentioned officers that he is the type of individual which can contribute greatly to the mission of CIA.

W. R. PEERS
Chief, TRD

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, [illegible])
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A6 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA	ADVISORY COUNCIL	WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Department or agency)	(Bureau or division)	(Place of employment)

I, Tennent Harrington Bagley, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. SF-57, dated 11 May 1950, 19...., filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

Tennent H. Bagley
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 24th day of July, A. D. 1950,

at Washington, (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

Frank G. [illegible]
(Signature of officer)

(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—64100-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. ***Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.*** **Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.**

1. PRESENT ADDRESS *(street and number, city and State)*
2161 FLORIDA AVE. NW, WASHINGTON, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH *(city or town and State or country)*

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY	(B) RELATIONSHIP	(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE	(D) TELEPHONE NO.
MRS. David W. Bagley	mother	2005 SOLEDAD AVE LA JOLLA, CALIFORNIA	GLENCOE 5-4423

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS *(Give street number, if any)*	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED *(Check one)*	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF, OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—55100-1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Date 24 July 1950

Dear Mr. Tennent H. Bagley:

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective. 24 July 1950.

Position: Intelligence Officer GS-9

Base Salary: GS-9,, $4600.00 per annum

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave in accordance with Civil Service Commission rules and regulations, or such other provisions of law or regulations as may be established in lieu thereof.

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with CIA Regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside continental United States, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by CIA Regulations.

3. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of six months from date of employment. In the event either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

4. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of CIA. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by Civil Service rules and regulations.

Official authorized to sign letters of appointment

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by CIA.

Tennent H Bagley
Employee

24 July 1950
Date

Form No. 51-105
June 1948

FORM NO. 37-42
FEB 1949

TEST RECORD

A. EVALUATION OF TEST RESULTS

57-3 On basis of these scores, subject appears well qualified for P-3 Intelligence Officer utilising academic background and pertinent experience. Good knowledge of French indicated by reading test.

R. F. McClellan

DATE
7-20-49

PSYCHOGRAPH

T	L	1	2	3	4	A	6	7	8	9	N

CONFIDENTIAL - Not to be Discussed with Applicant or Employee

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)
BAGLEY, TENNENT, H.

SERVICE, GRADE, POSITION
P-3 Research Analyst

B. PERSONAL DATA

AGE: 23
SEX: MALE ☒ FEMALE ☐
STATUS: NEW ☒ EMPL. ☐
EDUCATION: ELEM. ☐ H.SCH. ☐ COLLEGE ☐ DEGREE ☐
MAJOR:

C. RAW TEST DATA

DATE	TYPING GROSS NET ERRORS	SHORTHAND 1 2 3 TOT. TIME

TYPE OF TEST	RAW SCORE	PERCENTILE	TYPE OF TEST	RAW SCORE	PERCENTILE
DIRECTIONS			DIRECTIONS A	25	9[illegible]
DAT: CLERICAL			LA-5		
SPELLING			GEN. TEST I		
SENTENCES			FRENCH LL 46		
NUMERICAL AB.			FRENCH UL		
ABSTR. REAS.			GERMAN LL		
SPACE ROL.			ITALIAN LL		
VERB. REAS.			SPANISH LL		
MECH. REAS.			Otis-Higher A	74	99
SUPV. TEST: FORM					

TYPE OF TEST	RAW SCORE	PERCENTILE
AREA INFO (AFFAIRS)		
AREA INFO (PEOPLE)		
BENNETT LIBRARY INFO		
CIA CLASSIF. I		
CIA CLASSIF. II		
CORR. AND EFF. OF EXP.		
CSU TEST: FORM		
TECHNICAL READING		
WATSON-GLASER:		
GENERALIZATIONS	20	99
INFERENCES	39	93
DISC. ARGUMENTS	74	65
RECOG. ASSUMPTIONS	19	99
GEN. LOG. REAS.	25	99
CONSISTENCY	25	95
APPL. LOG. REAS.	24	98

OSD

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR DUTY

24 July 1950 194

BAGLEY, Tennent H. WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL

EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR
#1 & New Employee

☒ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED:

None

JOHN R. TIETJEN, M. D.

FORM NO. 37-32
DEC 1948

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR DUTY

OSO

26 Jan 51 194

Bagley, Tennent WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL

EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR

#1 Overseas
☒ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED:

None

JOHN R. TIETJEN, M.D.

FORM NO. 37-32
DEC 1948

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE	CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST: LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR
	BAGLEY, TENNENT H.	A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE									

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST: LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
								09/22/66	11/11/25	16	SB

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN ITALIAN (TUSCAN) BK87 (NAME OF LANGUAGE) AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
I	r	I	CODED	I

TEST RATINGS O = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE S = SLIGHT H = HIGH E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

FOR QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 21 OCT

12. SIGNATURE
Flo

13. LD NUMBER
12622

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45) SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION 1 - OP/QAB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6)	2. LD NO.
156043	6046

3. NAME (7-24)	4. COMPONENT	5. GRADE	6. DATE OF BIRTH
Bagley, Tennent H.	EE	14	Nov. 11, 1925

7. LANGUAGE	8. CODE (25-27)	9. DATE OF TEST	10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33)
French	305	June 16, 1960	June 17, 1961

11. TEST PURPOSE	12. TEST SCORES READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)	13. ELIGIBILITY (39) AWARDABLE	NOT AWARDABLE
AWARD SKILL	I	I	H	H	H	A Y M	

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD

SIGNATURE	DATE

15. TYPE OF AWARD A-M	E-I-N	C	R-W-S	D-V
3 JTS M	H		S	

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD $ 300.00

18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION $

19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION $

21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD $

23. FORWARD CHECK TO

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.	SIGNATURE

20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.	DATE

22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.

24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT

25. CHECK NO.	DATE

FORM 4-58 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (10-45) MRD COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) 156043

2. L D NO. 6079

3. NAME (7-24) Bagley, Tennent H.

4. COMPONENT SR

5. GRADE 14

6. DATE OF BIRTH Nov. 11, 1925

7. LANGUAGE Russian

8. CODE (23-27) 654

9. DATE OF TEST June 17, 1960

10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33) June 17, 1961

11. TEST PURPOSE

☐ AWARD

☐ SKILL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
I	-	I	I	-

13 ELIGIBILITY (39)

AWARDABLE A M

NOT AWARDABLE

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD

SIGNATURE

DATE

15. TYPE OF AWARD

A - M	E - I - H	C	R - W - S	D - V
A	O-I		R	V

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD $ 200.00

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

SIGNATURE

18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION $

19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION $

20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

DATE

21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD $

22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.

23. FORWARD CHECK TO

24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT

25. CHECK NO.

DATE

FORM 4.58 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45) MRD COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) 156043

2. L D NO. 6027

3. NAME (7-24) Bagley, Tennent H.

4. COMPONENT SR

5. GRADE 14

6. DATE OF BIRTH Nov. 11, 1925

7. LANGUAGE German

8. CODE (23-27) 283

9. DATE OF TEST June 15, 1960

10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33) June 17, 1962

11. TEST PURPOSE

☐ AWARD

☐ SKILL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
H	I	H	H	H

13 ELIGIBILITY (39)

AWARDABLE A M

NOT AWARDABLE

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD

SIGNATURE

DATE

15. TYPE OF AWARD

A - M	E - I - H	C	R - W - S	D - V
3 3-2 M	I	C		

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD $ 300.00

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

SIGNATURE

18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION $

19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION $

20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

DATE

21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD $

22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.

23. FORWARD CHECK TO

24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT

25. CHECK NO.

DATE

FORM 4.58 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45) MRD COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE: 30 July 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*): BAGLEY, Tennent Harrington

18 SEP 1957

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State*): Route 4, Box 365, Vienna, Virginia
3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State*): 2721 Glenwick ~~Place~~, La Jolla, California
4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: DUnkirk 5-9713
5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Virginia

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (*Last-First-Middle*) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: Maria L. Bagley
2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
3. HOME ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*): Route 4, Box 365, Vienna, Virginia
4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: NA
5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: DUnkirk 5-9713
6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: NA
7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: NA
8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (*Spouse, Mother, Father*) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE: NA

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED
2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS:

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (*First*): Maria (*Middle*): (*Maiden*): Lonyay (*Last*): BAGLEY
4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 16 June 1955
5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (*City, State, Country*): Vienna, Austria
6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (*No., Street, City, State, Country*): Linke Wienzeile 18, Vienna VI, Austria
7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
8. DATE OF DEATH: NA
9. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA
10. CURRENT ADDRESS (*Give last address, if deceased*): Route 4, Box 365, Vienna, Virginia
11. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 September 1930
12. PLACE OF BIRTH (*City, State, Country*): Baden near Vienna, Austria
13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY: 11 October 1955
14. PLACE OF ENTRY: New York, N.Y.
15. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*): Austrian
16. DATE ACQUIRED: January 1947
17. WHERE ACQUIRED (*City, State, Country*): Vienna, Austria
18. OCCUPATION: Housewife
19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (*Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers*): NA
20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, State, Country*): NA

CARDED FOR QUALIFICATIONS
DATE [illegible] JUN 1958

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
NA

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
NA

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
NONE

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): LONYAY, Ernst Leopold
2. RELATIONSHIP: wife's father
3. AGE: 59
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Austria, Vienna (Linke Weinzeile 18, Vienna VI, Austria)
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country): Austrian
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: wife's letter only - weekly
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: July 1957

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): LONYAY, Charlotte
2. RELATIONSHIP: wife's mother
3. AGE: ?
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Austria, Vienna
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country): Austrian
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: wife's letter's - weekly
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: July 1957

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): LONYAY, Ludwig (Lajos)
2. RELATIONSHIP: wife's brother
3. AGE: 19
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Austria, Vienna
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country): Austrian
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: infrequent letter contact
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: July 1957

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): LONYAY, Alexander
2. RELATIONSHIP: wife's brother
3. AGE: 3
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Austria, Vienna
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country): Austrian
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: None except through mother
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: NA

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

There is also an uncle, an aunt, and a grandmother of my wife living respectively in Rome, Paris and Vienna. All have been reported on in the past.

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.
NA

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
NA

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
National Savings and Trust Company	Washington, D.C.

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)
NA

SECTION VI — CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP: USA

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS: NA

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)
NA

SECTION VII — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE
		☒	DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Princeton University			1942	spr.43			2 sem.
University of Southern California	Int. Rels.	Hist. PolSci	1943-44	46-47	AB	Jan 47	also 1 sem.grad
University of Geneva, Switzerland (Graduate Institute of International Studies)	Pol. Sci.		1947	1948	licence es sci. pol.	Jul	48
Same	"		1948	1950	doctorate in pol.sci.	Jul 50	

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	
None				

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	
Officer Candidate School, U.S. Marine Corps/ Quantico, Va. (also boot camp, other infantry training)	(Infantry)	early 45	summer 45	16
Sea School, San Diego	Sea duty, anti-aircraft artillery	Aug 45	Sept. 45	5

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
France, Switzerland	political affairs, history, geography	1926-28, 47-50	X	X	X	
Rest of Western Europe and Central Europe	"	1947-50		X	X	

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

Residence with family in 20's; graduate study and tourist travel in other areas, 1947-50.

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING
Austria	political, economic, other	1951-55		X	
Germany, Switzerland	"	1951-56	X	X	
Poland	"	1955-57 (Hqs only)	X		
Hungary, Czechoslovakia	"	study and operational activity 1951-57	X	X	

SECTION IX TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.) 40

2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)

3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING *(Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)* None

SECTION X SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH tennis (good), golf (fair), swimming (good), Chess (fair), skiing (fair) hunting (fair), fishing (fair)

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

None

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION *(Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.)*, INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

No

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of issue)*

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of issue)*

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

International Protection of National Minorities, 1950 (book written/and published as doctoral dissertation)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

None.

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

None.

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

None.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) July 1950-June 1951
2. GRADE GS-9
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Advisory Council and FDM German and Austrian Branches.
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 0
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE -
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

desk case officer and undergoing training and integration into State Dept.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) July 1951 to September 1955
2. GRADE GS-12
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FDM and EE Division, Austrian Station
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 4-5
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Case Officer and Chief, CE Austria
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Handling of Agents against Soviet, Satellite and Austrian targets; organizing and supervising CE activity in Vienna; handling double agents; debriefing defectors from intelligence services; temporary work in audio and photographic support work.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) November 55 to date
2. GRADE GS-13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Chief of Operations, Polish Branch
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION about 20
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE ~~Chief, CE Poland~~ EE/Polish Branch
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Organization, planning and supervision of world-wide operational activity against the Polish target. Lecturing to CE course in TRD. Organized tutorial course for EE Division.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 1

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 0

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Christine Bagley	daughter	1957		X	US	Rt. 4 Box 365, Vienna, Va.

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6) 156043

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24): BAGLEY, Tennent Harrington

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30): MONTH Nov. DAY 11 YEAR 1925

3. LANGUAGE (31-33): ITALIAN 373

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39): MONTH JUNE DAY 17 YEAR 1957

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

[✓ 4.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 52

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II–LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING – CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III–EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV–CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE-PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 17 June 1957	SIGNATURE Tennent H. Bagley
(46)	(47) I

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6) 151043

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24): BAGLEY, TENNENT HARRINGTON

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30): MONTH Nov. DAY 11 YEAR 1925

3. LANGUAGE (31-33): German 983

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39): MONTH June DAY 17 YEAR 1957

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

[✓ 1.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

[✓ 2.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 2.] I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

[✓ 1.] I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 17 June 1957	SIGNATURE Tennent H Bagley
(46) C	(47) T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
156043

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
BAGLEY, Tennent Harrington	Nov.	11	1925

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
FRENCH 265	JUNE	17	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

[✓ 1.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

[✓ 2.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

[✓ 1.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

[✓ 1.] I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

[✓ 1.] I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

[✓ 1.] I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 17 June 1957	SIGNATURE Tennent H Bagley
(46) C	(47) A

14-00000

36447

STANDARD FORM 57 NOV 1947
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

PLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYM T

INSTRUCTIONS: In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR

2. OPTION(S) *(if mentioned in examination announcement)*

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR *(City and State)*

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: 11 May 1950

5. MR. ~~MRS.~~ ~~MISS~~ *(First name)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden, if any)* *(Last)*: TENNENT HARRINGTON BAGLEY

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 2005 SOLEDAD AVENUE

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE *(including postal zone)* AND STATE: LA JOLLA, CALIFORNIA

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE *(State)*: CALIFORNIA

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: —

(B) HOME PHONE

9. DATE OF BIRTH *(month, day, year)*: Nov. 11, 1925

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH *(city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country)*: Annapolis, Md.

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 11 INCHES

(B) WEIGHT: 165 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE:

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON APPOR.

MATERIAL: ☐ SUBMITTED. ☐ RETURNED

ENTERED REGISTER:

NOTATIONS:

APP. REVIEW:

APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ .... PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR: ☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: ☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: ☐ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS:

16. EXPERIENCE: It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the space below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)* FROM: TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: None in period covered — Dec. 1948 - June 1950

CLASSIFICATION GRADE *(if in Federal Service)*

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING, $ PER PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(city and State)*

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)*

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)*

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16—55514-2

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)*
FROM: TO
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
CLASSIFICATION GRADE *(if in Federal service)*
SALARY OR EARNINGS:
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(city and State)*

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)*

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)*

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)*
FROM: TO:
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
CLASSIFICATION GRADE *(if in Federal service)*
SALARY OR EARNINGS:
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(city and State)*

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)*

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)*

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)*
FROM: TO:
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
CLASSIFICATION GRADE *(if in Federal service)*
SALARY OR EARNINGS:
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(city and State)*

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)*

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)*

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM: TO:

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

CLASSIF. & GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS:
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 38) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING

18. EDUCATION. (Circle highest grade completed):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF:
☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☐ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED		DEGREES CONFERRED		SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
		FROM	TO	DAY	NIGHT	TITLE	DATE	
University of Geneva and Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland	internat'l relations	Oct1949	June1950			Ph.D.	1950 (near completion)	

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS

(E) OTHER TRAINING SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERST'NG EXC.	UNDERST'NG GOOD	UNDERST'NG FAIR
French	X			X			X		
German, Italian			X			X			X

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

France, Switzerland - Oct '49 - June 1950 - education

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ..... SHORTHAND .....

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☑ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

(A) General Principles & Problems in the International Protection of Minorities - a Political Study

24. REFERENCES: List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.		
2.		
3.		

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?		
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A. OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DEFECT, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a **PEACETIME VETERAN** who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a **DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN**, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a **WAR-TIME VETERAN** not claiming disability preference, you should **NOT** submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D)

DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
11 Mar. 1943	26 June 1946
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	**SERIAL NO.** (*If none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).
Marine Corps.	047506

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19.....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Tennent H. Bagley

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname) If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

36447

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office: ______
Ext. ______
Home: ______

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) Miss / Mr. / Mrs. TENNENT (First) HARRINGTON (Middle) BAGLEY (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS - after 20 June: 2168 Florida ave. N.W., Washington, D.C.
- until 20 June: Hotel de la Truite, Ferney-Voltaire (Ain) France (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 2005 Soledad ave, La Jolla, California, USA (St. & No / City / State / Country)

B. NICKNAME Peter WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? ______

______ UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ______

HOW LONG? ______ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ______ (Where? / By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Nov. 1925 PLACE OF BIRTH Annapolis, Maryland, USA (City / State / Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. (Country) BY BIRTH? ______ BY MARRIAGE? ______

ATION CERTIFICATE # ______ ISSUED ______ (Date) BY ______ (Court)

______ (State) ______ (Country)

A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? ______ (Yes or No) ______ (Country)

WHAT DATES? ______ TO ______ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ______ (Country)

ARS ______

______

N STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS:

______

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ________

PORT OF ENTRY? ________ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ________

LAST U.S. VISA ________ Number ________ Type ________ Place of Issue ________ Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 24 SEX male HEIGHT 5'11" WEIGHT 165

EYES ________ HAIR ________ COMPLEXION ________ SCARS ________

BUILD ________ OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ________

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE ✓ MARRIED ________ DIVORCED ________ WIDOWED ________

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ________

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE — INCLUDE ANNULMENTS — USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE ________ First ________ Middle ________ Maiden ________ Last

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ________

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________ City ________ State ________ Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________ City ________ State ________ Country

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ________ Date TO ________ Date BRANCH OF SERVICE ________

COUNTRY ________ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

____

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ____
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ____ DATE OF DECEASE ____ CAUSE ____

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS ____
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ____ PLACE OF BIRTH ____
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ____

CITIZENSHIP ____ WHEN ACQUIRED? ____ WHERE? ____
City State Country

OCCUPATION ____ LAST EMPLOYER ____

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS ____
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ____ TO ____ BRANCH OF SERVICE ____
Date Date

COUNTRY ____ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

____

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ____
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ____ DATE OF DECEASE ____ CAUSE ____

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ____
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ____ PLACE OF BIRTH ____

CITIZENSHIP ____ WHEN ACQUIRED? ____ WHERE? ____
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ____

SEC. 12. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ____________ ADDRESS ____________ City State Country

DATES ATTENDED ____________ GRADUATE? ____________

HIGH SCHOOL ____________ ADDRESS ____________ City State Country

DATES ATTENDED ____________ GRADUATE? ____________

COLLEGE ____________ ADDRESS ____________ City State Country

DATES ATTENDED ____________ DEGREE ____________

COLLEGE University of Geneva and Graduate Institute of International Studies ADDRESS Geneva, Switzerland City State Country

DATES ATTENDED Oct. 1949 - June 1950 DEGREE Ph.D. (doctorat ès sciences politiques) – near completion –

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE—U.S. OR FOREIGN

Country	Service	Rank	Dates of Service
Last Station	Serial No.		Type of Discharge

REMARKS: ____________

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER ____________ ADDRESS ____________

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON ____________

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS ____________

____

SEC. 14. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

— no employment in period May 1949 - May 1950 —

1. FROM ____________ TO ____________

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY ____________

ADDRESS ____________ St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS ____________ NAME OF SUPERVISOR ____________

TITLE OF JOB ____________ SALARY $ ________ PER ________

YOUR DUTIES ____________

REASONS FOR LEAVING ____________

____

2. FROM ____________ TO ____________

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY ____________

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
2.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
3.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 19. **FINANCIAL BACKGROUND**

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ________ IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME ________

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS ________
National Savings and Trust Co., Washington, D.C. - Credit Suisse, Geneva, Switzerland

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ________
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: ________

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

			St. & No.	City	State
1. NAME		ADDRESS			
2. NAME		ADDRESS			
3. NAME		ADDRESS			

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

				St. No.	City	State	Country
FROM	Oct, 1949	TO	June 1950	Hotel de la Truite,	Ferney-Voltaire	(Ain)	France
FROM	May 1949	TO	Oct. 1949	2168 Florida Ave. N.W.,	Washington,	D.C.	USA
FROM		TO					
FROM		TO					
FROM		TO					
FROM		TO					
FROM		TO					
FROM		TO					

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

					City or Section	Country	Purpose
A.	FROM	Oct, 1949	TO	June 1950	Ferney-Voltaire (Ain)	France	- education in Geneva, Switzerland
	FROM		TO				
	FROM		TO				

FROM ______ **TO** ______ City or Section ______ Country ______ Purpose

FROM ______ **TO** ______ City or Section ______ Country ______ Purpose

FROM ______ **TO** ______ City or Section ______ Country ______ Purpose

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT — NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: 53005, 2 May 1947 (renewed 12 May 1949) - Washington, D.C.

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? none **GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES:** ______

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: none

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

— none in period covered - May '49 - May '50 —

1. ______ Name and Chapter ______ St. & No. ______ City ______ State ______ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______
2. ______ Name and Chapter ______ St. & No. ______ City ______ State ______ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______
3. ______ Name and Chapter ______ St. & No. ______ City ______ State ______ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______
4. ______ Name and Chapter ______ St. & No. ______ City ______ State ______ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______
5. ______ Name and Chapter ______ St. & No. ______ City ______ State ______ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______
6. ______ Name and Chapter ______ St. & No. ______ City ______ State ______ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______
7. ______ Name and Chapter ______ St. & No. ______ City ______ State ______ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE French SPEAK fluent READ fluent WRITE fluent

LANGUAGE German SPEAK fair READ fair WRITE fair

LANGUAGE Italian SPEAK slight READ fair WRITE slight

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1938:

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: No.

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? moderately

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Mrs. David W. Bagley RELATIONSHIP mother

ADDRESS 2005 Soledad Ave., La Jolla, CALIFORNIA, USA
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No.

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Ferney-Voltaire (Ain), France DATE 11 May 1950
City and State

Witness

Tennent H. Bagley
Signature of Applicant

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

(1) DATE OF CLEARANCE

(2) DATE OF REVOCATION

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF GRANTING OR OF REVOCATION OF STAFF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE (HR 90-4)

1. AN ENTRY IN ITEM (1) DENOTES THAT THE ABOVE NAMED INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN GRANTED A STAFF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE. AN ENTRY IN ITEM (2) DENOTES THAT THE STAFF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE HELD BY THIS INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN REVOKED. THE CLEARANCE, OR REVOCATION, IS EFFECTIVE AS OF THE MONTH AND YEAR IMPRINTED ABOVE. SUBJECT HAS BEEN BRIEFED OR DEBRIEFED, AS APPROPRIATE, CONCERNING CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND RELATED COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MATTERS AND HAS SIGNED A BRIEFING/DEBRIEFING STATEMENT, AS APPROPRIATE, ACKNOWLEDGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION. UPON REVOCATION OF THE CLEARANCE SUBJECT IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO HAVE FURTHER CUSTODY OF, ACCESS TO, OR OTHERWISE GAIN FUTURE KNOWLEDGE OF STAFF CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL OR INFORMATION.

2. WHEN EMPLOYEE NO LONGER REQUIRES THE CLEARANCE IN ORDER TO PERFORM HIS/HER ASSIGNED DUTIES, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY STAFF, OC, BE NOTIFIED SO THAT THE CLEARANCE MAY BE REVOKED.

DISTRIBUTION:
1—EMPLOYEE'S COMPONENT
1—OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY STAFF

Donald F. Beckett

CHIEF, DOCTRINES BRANCH, OC-S

FORM 1-66 1597A OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

File

U. S. MARINE CORPS REPORT OF SEPARATION

NAVMC 70-PR SS∅ - - -

1. LAST NAME: BAGLEY — FIRST NAME: Tennent — MIDDLE NAMES: Harrington

RANK: Pl Sgt — PAY GRADE: 3rd — SERIAL NUMBER: 542428

PERMANENT ADDRESS FOR MAILING PURPOSES: 2129 Florida Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C.

RACE: W — SEX: M — CITIZEN: YES X — DATE OF BIRTH: 11Nov25

10. ADDRESS FROM WHICH PERSON WILL SEEK EMPLOYMENT: 2129 Florida Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C.

11. MARRIED: NO X — none — PLACE OF BIRTH: Annapolis, Md.

RECORD OF MARINE CORPS SERVICE

SELECTIVE SERVICE DATA — REGISTERED: NO X — ADDRESS AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO SERVICE: Washington, D. C. — - - - - - - - — - - - - - - -

MEANS OF ENTRY: ENLISTED X 3 — INDUCTED — 2 — PLACE OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE: Los Angeles, California — DATE OF ENTRY: 1Jul43 — COMPONENT: III-b

PENSION CLAIM FILED: NO X — PLACE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE SERVICE: MB, Washington, D.C. — DATE OF SEPARATION: 26Jun46 — BksDet

TYPE OF DISCHARGE CERT.: Honorable — YEARS - - - — MOS 7 — DAYS - - -

MILITARY SPECIALTIES: Sea Duty Officer (1950)

SERVICE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: PCS, Quantico, Va. / Sea School, San Diego, Cal. — COURSES: PCS / Sea School — WEEKS: 16 / 6

30. PRINCIPAL MILITARY DUTY: Sea Duty Officer (1950)

EMPLOYMENT AND NON SERVICE EDUCATIONAL DATA

31. CIVILIAN OCCUPATION (TITLE): Student — D O T NUMBER: 0-X — NO YRS: - - - — LAST EMPLOYED: - - - - -

JOB SUMMARY: Majored in International Relations and Foreign Trade

32. SECONDARY OCCUPATION (TITLE): - - - - - - - - — D O T NUMBER: - - - - — NO YRS: - - - — LAST EMPLOYED: - - - - -

33. LAST EMPLOYED BEFORE ENTRY INTO SERVICE: - - - - - - - - — DATE LEFT: - - - - — YES X

EDUCATION IN YEARS: GRAMMAR 8 — HIGH SCHOOL 4 — COLLEGE 3 — DEGREES 0 — MAJOR COURSES: Internation Relations and Foreign Trade

37. TRADE COURSES: None — COURSES OF GREATEST INTEREST: International Relations — LAST SCHOOL ATTENDED: Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.

PREFERENCES

40. PREFERENCE FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING: Going back to school

41. JOB PREFERENCE: Foreign Trade — REASON: Will be trained for

42. LOCALITY PREFERENCE: Undecided — REASON: - - - - - - -

I certify that all information on this form pertaining to the Naval Service of the above named individual is in accordance with the records of the U. S. Marine Corps and that a copy of this form has been delivered to him in person.

SIGNATURE OF C O OR OFFICER

ROBERT E. SZDWICK, Capt., USMCR
TYPE IN NAME OF OFFICER

Tennent H. Bagley 25Jun46
SIGNATURE OF DISCHARGEE — DATE

MARINE'S COPY

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Employees Division, Special Support Staff DATE: 29 May 1950

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Branch

SUBJECT: BAGLEY, Tennent Harrington - 38638

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 25 May 1950 requesting an extension of the security approval granted for subject.

This is to advise that the security clearance granted on 29 August 1949 is still in effect, provided subject enters on duty within 60 days from this date.

Ermal P. Geiss

ERMAL P. GEISS mw

CONFIDENTIAL

Case 8/23

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

To : Personnel Officer

From : Chief of Inspection and Security

Subject: BAGLEY, Tennent Harrington

Date: 29 August 1949

Number: 38638

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

☒ Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Your memorandum dated 1 June 1949 stated Subject is an applicant for the Advisory Council.

~~[illegible]~~

Chief, Personnel Security Division

Rec'd 8/31

FORM NO. 38.101
MAY 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

ARD.

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE Aug 1, 1974

1 June 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION

SUBJECT: Request for Security Clearance for

Tennent H. Bagley
Intelligence Officer
P-5 $4479.60
Advisory Council

1. It is requested that the security investigation be initiated on the above named person, who is being considered for a position with the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. Attached hereto are the required copies of the Personal History Statement.

3. Please notify this office in writing upon completion of the security investigation.

WILLIAM J. KELLY

Chief, Personnel Branch

Attachments: 2 Forms 38-1

Form No. 37-104
Sep 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

Budi 1/10

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PERSONNEL BRANCH
REFERRAL SHEET

TO: OFFICE OR BRANCH PB/A&M
ATTENTION Mr. Flynn
DATE 10 May 1949

APPLICANT'S NAME BAGLEY, Tennent Harrington
☐ FOR INTERVIEW
☐ PAPERS ONLY

☐ FORM 57 ☐ FORM 38-1 ☐ FILE

RECOMMENDED FOR

REQUISITION CONTROL NO.

LB
(SIGNATURE (FOR THE PERSONNEL OFFICER))

ACTION (FOR ROUTING WITHIN OFFICE OR BRANCH)

TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

REPORT BACK (NOTE DEADLINE)

INDICATE ACCEPTABILITY OF SUBJECT BELOW AND RETURN TO THE PERSONNEL BRANCH, PROCUREMENT AND PLACEMENT DIV.
ROOM NO. BUILDING. BY

☐ ACCEPTABLE FOR (OFFICE OR BRANCH) JOB TITLE AND GRADE

SUBJECT REQUESTED TO COMPLETE ☐ FORM 57 ☐ FORMS 38-1 & FORWARD TO PERSONNEL BRANCH, PROCUREMENT & PL. DIV.

☐ NOT ACCEPTABLE (STATE REASONS UNDER REMARKS)

REMARKS

PB/A&M Mr. Flynn 10 May 1949

Per our conversation.

G B Brinbocker
SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

TITLE

FORM NO. 37-9
SEP 1947

SECRET

Recommend approval J. Reff 24 May 51 Please Expedite

24 May 1951

TO: Personnel Director, CIA

VIA: ADSO and FDS

FROM: FDM

SUBJECT: Tennent H. Bagley

1. It is requested that permission [illegible] procured from the Marine Corps and the Selective Service for subject to leave the country on a two-year assignment with this Agency in Austria.

2. Below is the information on subject's draft and reserve unit:

A) Selective Service:

Board: Local Board [illegible]
1729 New York Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Classification: 4-A

Selective Service Number: 4 49 25 488

Home Address: 21[illegible] Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C.

B) Marine Reserve:

Rank and Serial Number: First Lieutenant - 047506

Marine Reserve Unit: 11th Marine Corps Reserve District

3. Subject has been with this Agency since 24 July 1950 and is unusually well qualified for intelligence work in Austria. If the above permissions are granted, subject will be sent immediately to his assignment.

passed on to Clary 5/25/51 Z.

H. T. Cunningham
Hugh T. Cunningham
Acting Chief, FDM

Form 300 & letter from Marine Corps sent to Nat'l 6/1/51

APPROVED:

Harry W. [illegible]
For the Assistant Director, Special Operations

SECRET

14-00000

17

14 November 1950

TO: Employees Division

VIA: EXO

FROM: FDM

SUBJECT: Tennent H. Bagley

Mr. Bagley has been recalled to active duty as a First Lieutenant in the Marine Corps with effective date 11 December 1950. The order is by letter MC-1243761 of Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., dated 3 November 1950 and addressed to his home in La Jolla, California (copy attached). Since Mr. Bagley is on duty in Washington, he did not receive the order until 13 November 1950.

Mr. Bagley was employed by this Agency on 24 July 1950 as a Research Analyst assigned to the Advisory Council. Since reporting for duty, he has been in the Training Courses and will complete the Advanced Operations Course on 1 December 1950. During this period, however, it has been agreed that his qualifications could best be utilized as an Intelligence Officer in Germany, and the papers are now in requesting his transfer to FDM for that purpose.

Request that Mr. Bagley's deferment from recall to active duty with the Marine Corps be arranged on the grounds that his work in the Training Courses has shown him to be unusually well qualified for intelligence work in Germany and that men of his caliber and background are still badly needed by the German Station. If this deferment can be arranged, he will be sent to Germany as a GS-9 Intelligence Officer at the earliest opportunity.

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Chief, FDM

Attachment

APPROVED W. G. Thayer
EXO/CSC

S E C R E T

SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE OF: Tennent H. Bagley

FROM: Office of the Personnel Director

1. On 24 May 1951 this office arranged with U. S. Marine Corps Reserve to have the above-named subject's active duty orders cancelled. This action was taken because, due to his training and experience, it was felt that the subject would be of more service to the United States as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency than he would be as a member of the Armed Forces.

2. Should the subject resign or otherwise be separated from CIA, please notify this office immediately in order that this cancellation action may be revoked and the subject will be made a free agent.

George E. Meloon

GEORGE E. MELOON
Acting Personnel Director

For the Use of PD(C) or PD(O)

Office of the Personnel Director notified on ____________________ that the subject has resigned or otherwise been separated from CIA.

____
(Signature)

S E C R E T

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE OF: Tennent H. Bagley

FROM: Office of the Personnel Director

1. On 25 May 51 this office arranged with National Headquarters of Selective Service that the above-named subject be deferred until further notice. This action was taken because it was felt that the subject would be of more service to the United States as an overseas employee with the Central Intelligence Agency than he would be as a member of the Armed Forces.

2. Should the subject be transferred to a departmental position, or should he resign or be otherwise separated from CIA, please notify this office immediately in order that his deferment may be cancelled.

George E Meloon
GEORGE E. MELOON
Acting Personnel Director

For the Use of PD(C) or PD(O)

Office of the Personnel Director notified on ____________________ of the following action on the subject:

____ Transfer to a departmental position within CIA
____ Resignation or other type of separation from CIA

CANCELLED PER MEMO DATED 25 July 53.

____
(Signature)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

STANDARD FORM 66
October 1960
[illegible] OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

EOD: 2 Sep 1946

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: 055505

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SHAW, Robert Tyler

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 18 Jun 1925

5. CONTINUITY COMP. DATE: 8 Mar 1948

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married

7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee): NO. 3; YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 1927 1955 1959

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA; SPOUSE: NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS: MEMBERSHIP: Jul 1954; OTHER STATUS:

10. LAST M.S. APP.: [illegible]; QUAL. FOR: [illegible]; EVAL. FOR: [illegible]

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NON SERVICE: X; GRADE:; ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-I:; RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-II:; TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-III:; RETIRED:

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: Jul 1947

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT
1942 FAD, Patterson Fld, Ohio - Messenger (summer)
1943-45 Military Service, US Army, Pfc - Military and Combat Intelligence
1947-48 Proctor & Gamble, Cincinnati, Ohio - Editor, Personnel Research Dept

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION
1943; 1945 Ohio State Univ - Engineering, Liberal Arts
1944-45 Camp Ritchie, Md - Aerial Photos Interpr
1945-47 Univ of Arizona - BA Spanish, Political Science, History
965-66 USDA (Corresp) Mod Supv Practice (See #18 below)

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)
Spanish - R, S, U Native; W, P High (May 1960); Translate - May 1957

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING
1948 Admin Proc
1948 Intel Orient
1949 Photo
1949 Intel Orient
1949 CI Ops
1956 CI Ops
1962 Photo Ops
1966 COS Sem
1968 Chall of WW Comm
1965-66 Mod Supv Pract/USDA
1971 WpnsTrng/DefensiveDriving
1972 Short Range Agent Contact
1973 Senior Seminar
1973 CA Ops Seminar
(Continued)

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Mar 1948	I.O. (Trainee)	0132.06	5		OSO/Trainee Pool	Hq
May 1948	" "	0132.06	7		" " "	"
Nov 1948	Reports Off	0132.53	7		OSO/Ops	"
Dec 1949	I.O. Reports	0132.53	7		OSO/FDT/Venezuela Sta	Caracas
Aug 1950	I.O. (Ops)	0132.06	9		" " " "	"
Jun 1952	Ops Off	0136.01	11		OSO/WH-1/Ecuador Sta/COB	Guayaquil
Apr 1954	Area Ops Off	0136.01	12		DDP/WH-1/Ecuador Sta/COB	"
Aug 1954	I.O. (FI)	0136.51	12	DI	DDP/WH-3/Ch, Mexico Desk	Hq
May 1956	Area Ops Off	0136.01	12	DI	DDP/WH-3/Mexico Sta/COB	Nogales
Feb 1957	" " "	0136.01	13	DI	" " " " "	"
Aug 1959	Instructor Ops	1711.50	13	DI	OTR/Ops Sch/Fld Trng/Faculty	Isolation
Dec 1961	" "	1711.50	14	D	OTR/US Field/Trng Stf/Faculty	"
Jan 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	DDP/TFW/FI-CI Sec	Hq
Apr 1963	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/WH-3/Mexico Sta	Mexico City
Sep 1966	Chief of Station	0136.05	14	D	DDP/WH-2/Nicaragua Sta	Managua
Sep 1968	" "	0136.05	15	D	" " " "	"
Jul 1970 departed						
Sep 1970	" "	0136.05	15	D	DDP/WH-2/ HondurasSta/COS	Tegucigalpa
Oct 1972	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/WH/Ch, Br-2 (Cen Amer)	Hq
Mar 1973	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDO/WH/Ch, Br-2(CenAmer)	"
Dec 1973	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDO/WH/Ch, Plans Staff	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: 20 Jan 1976

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: hms'enl 2 DEC [illegible]

22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: 31 Aug 1959

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (Continuation Sheet)	
[illegible]		
NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible], [illegible] Tyler		DATE OF BIRTH 1[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] of Capture

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT. 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details) (Cont'd.)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Apr 1975	Ops Off Ch	0136.01	16	DYB	DDO/IA/Ch,Plans&ProgramsStf	Hq
Aug 1975	Ops Officer	0136.01	16	DYB	DDO/IA/DevComp(Training)	"

DATE REVIEWED	PROFILE REVIEWED BY
20 [illegible] 1976	[illegible]/[illegible]

FORM 10-72 1200-1c USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY: [illegible]

PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
055495	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
SHAW, Robert Tyler	18 Jun 1925

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

SEE COVER HISTORY ATTACHED

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appreciation 1953 from the US Ambassador, Mexico City for invaluable services rendered during trip to Nogales, Mexicali and Tijuana.

Appreciation 1953 from R.F.Cartwright for assistance on survey trip along the California Gulf Coast.

Commendation 1959 from the US Ambassador, Mexico City for outstanding performance of duty while stationed in Mexico.

Award 1965 Outstanding Prepared Speaker's Trophy by the Mexican Chapter of Toastmaster International as a result of a speech entitled "Stop Kicking the Foreign Service."

Award 1974 of a Quality Step Increase in recognition of Subject's sustained excellent performance since 1972.

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY	
20 Jan 1976	hm/cal	E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE 143

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 19 March 1973
FILE NO.: 734

x TO: (Check)	x	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP	SS NUMBER 268-28-0199
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP	EMPLOYEE NUMBER 055495
	x	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH	ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: Chief Support STaff
REF: Form 1322 dated 12 Mar 73
OFFICIAL COVER: ☒ ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED
SUBJECT: SHAW, Robert T.
UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

x	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS
	☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE EOD
	☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)
x	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
x	SUBMIT FORM 3254 State W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
x	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)
x	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)
x	EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☒
x	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AOE HOSPITALIZATION CARD

	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ____ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY
MAR 48-OCT 49-HQS/OVERT
OCT 49-FEB 52-VENEZUELA/STATENOM
FEB 52-MAY 52-HQS/OVERT
MAY 52-JUL 54-ECUADOR/STATE NOM
JUL 54-MAY 56-HQS/OVERT
17 MAY 56-MAY 59-MEXICO/STATE INT
MAY 59-MAY 61-HQS/STATE INT
MAY 61-MAR 63-HQS/OVERT
MAR 63-JUL 66-MEXICO/STATE INT
JUL 66-JUL 70-NICARAGUA/STATE INT
JUL 70-AUG 72-HONDURAS/
STATE INT/AUG 72-
17 MAR 73-
HQS/STATE INT
18 MAR 73-HQS/STATE NOM

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CO or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SRACD
COPY 4 - OL/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 9-71 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 037522

SECRET

OGRAPHIC PROF

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

left

Pre 1963 Requests
for Personnel Action

Left

Post 1966 Requests for ~~Notifications~~
of Personnel Action.
and other memos



[redacted] Sanitized
bio profile and
Cover Summary

Robert T SHAW

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 19 March 1973

FILE NO.: 734

SS NUMBER: 263-23-[illegible]199

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 055495

ID CARD NUMBER:

x TO: (check)

x	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP	
	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP	
x	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)	WH

ATTN: Chief Support STaff

REF: Form 1322 dated 12 Mar 73

OFFICIAL COVER: ☒ ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: SHAW, Robert T.

UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

x	**ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS**
	☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE EOD
	☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)
x	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
x	SUBMIT FORM 3254 State W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
x	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)
x	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)
x	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☒
x	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD

	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

[redacted]

MAR 63-JUL 66-MEXICO/STATE INT

[redacted]

DISTRIBUTION: [redacted]

COPY 1 - CD OR CPD [redacted]

COPY 2 - OPERATING [redacted]

COPY 3 - OS/SRBCD [redacted]

COPY 4 - OL/TFB [redacted]

COPY 5 - CCS-FILE [redacted]

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

SECRET

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: [illegible]

SCD: 2 Sep 1946

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SHAW, Robert Tyler

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 18 Jun 1925

5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE: 3 Mar 1948

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married

7. DEPENDENTS (Exclude employee): NO. 3 | YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 1927 1955 1955

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA | SPOUSE: NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS: MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954 | OTHER STATUS:

10. LAST MED. RPT.: Jul 1975 | QUAL. FOR: Prep TDY | EVAL. FOR: TDY

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NONE X | SERVICE: | GRADE: | ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1 | RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2 | TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3 | RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: Jul 1947

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1942 FAD, Patterson Fld, Ohio - Messenger (summer)
1943-45 Military Service, US ~~Army,~~ Pfc - Military and Combat Intelligence
1947-48 Proctor & Gamble, Cincinnati, Ohio - Editor, Personnel Research Dept

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1943; 1945 Ohio State Univ - Engineering, Liberal Arts
1944-45 Camp Ritchie, Md - Aerial Photog Interpr
[illegible]-47 Univ of Arizona - BA Spanish, Political Science, History
1965-66 USDA (Corresp) Mod Supv Practice (See #18 below)

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): Spanish - R, S, U Native; W, P High (May 1960); Translate - May 1957

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING [redacted] 1965-66 Mod Supv Pract/USDA
[redacted]
1966 COS Sem [redacted]
(Continued)

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Jan 1963	Ops Off 0136.01	14	D	DDP/TFW/FI-CI Sec	Hq
Apr 1963	" " 0136.01	14	D	DDP/WH-3/Mexico Sta	Mexico City
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

20. DATE REVIEWED: 20 Jun 197[illegible]

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: [illegible]

ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: 31 Aug 1959

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (Continuation Sheet)

PERS. SERIAL NO. [illegible]	DATE OF BIRTH 18 Jun [illegible]
NAME (Last-First-Middle) SHAW, Robert Tyler	

[illegible] AFFAIRS [illegible]

[redacted]

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT. 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details) (Cont'd.)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Apr 1975 Aug 1975	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	

DATE REVIEWED 20 Jun 1976	PROFILE REVIEWED BY [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible] PROFILE [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 055595	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle) SHAW, Robert Tyler	DATE OF BIRTH 18 Jun 1925

33.



34. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

35. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

SEE COVER HISTORY ATTACHED

36. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

[redacted]

Award 1955 Outstanding Prepared Speaker's Trophy by the Mexican Chapter of Toastmaster International as a result of a speech entitled "Stop Kicking the Foreign Service."

[redacted]

37. DATE REVIEWED 20 Jan 1976	38. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hmr/cal	E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

FORM NO. 1 FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1080 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

Date: [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible], ROB

SUBJECT : Request for Estimate of Annuities

1. Please provide estimate of annuities for:

Name: ROBERT T. SHAW

Grade: GS-16

Component: E

DOB: 06 18 25

SCD: 09 02 46

System: [illegible]

ETR: [illegible]

2. Remarks: [illegible]

RE SINCE [illegible] COULD NOT [illegible]

[illegible] FILE

John [illegible]
Counselor, ROB/RAD

CONFIDENTIAL (when filled in)

14-00000

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 18 OCT 78

FILE NO.: 734

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- X CHIEF, (OPERATING COMPONENT FOR ACTION) ATTN: IG

SS NUMBER: 268-28-0199

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 055495

ID CARD NUMBER:

REF.: FORM 1322 DATED 5 SEP 78

STATUS: X STAFF ☐ CONTRACT

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED X CANCELLED ☐ CONTINUED

SUBJECT: SHAW, ROBERT T.

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER (BLOCK RECORDS)	X CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER (UNBLOCK RECORDS)
☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______ ☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER *(Specify)*	X EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD X FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED *(HHB 20-7)*
☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ *(HHB 20-7)*	X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 1 *(HHB 20-7)*
☐ FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*	X EAA: CATEGORY I X CATEGORY II ☐ X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD.
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR 240-2e)*	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR 240-2e)*	THIS [illegible]O MUST REMAIN [illegible] OF FILE
EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐	
SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY:

MAR 48 - OCT 49 - HQS - OVERT
OCT 49 - FEB 52 - VENEZUELA, CARACAS - STATE DESIGNEE
FEB 52 - MAY 52 - HQS - OVERT
MAY 52 - JULY 54 - ECUADOR - STATE DESIGNEE
JULY 54 - MAY 56 - HQS - OVERT
17 MAY 56 - MAY 59 - MEXICO - STATE - INT.
MAY 59 - MAY 61 - HQS - STATE - INT.
MAY 61 - MAR 63 - HQS - OVERT
MAR 63 - JULY 66 - MEXICO, MEXICO CITY - STATE - INT.
JULY 66 - JULY 70 - NICARAGUA - STATE - INT.
JUL 70-AUG 72-HONDURAS-STATE-INT.
AUG 72-17 MAR 73-HQS-STATE-INT.
18 MAR 73-12 OCT 78-HQS-STATE NON
13 OCT 78- -HQS- OVERT BACK TO EOD

DISTRIBUTION
COPY 1 - CD/TRB OR CPD CONTROL
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SRD
COPY 4 - OC/CO/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

/SM/DM

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 4-77 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET WN-SISM

E 2, IMPDET CL. BY. 021964

(13-20-43)

Not in file at time of review by HSCA Staff

14-00000

SECRET

IFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

x	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP	DATE: 19 March 1973
		FILE NO.: 734
		SS NUMBER: 268-28-0199
	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP	EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 055495
x	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH	ID CARD NUMBER:

THRU: Chief Support STaff

REF: Form 1322 dated 12 Mar 73

OFFICIAL COVER: ☒ ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: SHAW, Robert T.

UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS
x	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS
	☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE EOD ☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)
x	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
x	SUBMIT FORM 3254 State W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
x	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)
x	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)
x	EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☒
x	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD

	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS
	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ____ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

MAR 48-OCT 49-HQS/OVERT
OCT 49-~~FEB~~ 52-VENEZUELA/STATENOM
FEB 52-MAY 52-HQS/OVERT
MAY 52-JUL 54-ECUADOR/STATE NOM
JUL 54-MAY 56-HQS/OVERT
17 MAY 56-MAY 59-MEXICO/STATE INT
MAY 59-MAY 61-HQS/STATE INT
MAY 61-MAR 63-HQS/OVERT
MAR 63-JUL 66-MEXICO/STATE INT
JUL 66-JUL 70-NICARAGUA/STATE INT
JUL 70-AUG 72-HONDURAS/STATE INT/AUG 72-17 MAR 73-HQS/STATE INT
18 MAR 73-HQS/STATE NOM

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - CS/SRBCD
COPY 4 - SL/TFD
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

O

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1-73 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY 007622

(13-20-43)

Post 1966 Notifications of Personnel action

1. SERIAL NUMBER 035495	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) SHAW ROBERT T		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 1 1 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE [illegible]	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 2 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MANAGUA, NICARAGUA		
11. POSITION TITLE CONSULAR OF CONSUL W C CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER [illegible]	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP GS 2 14 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 16391 16675

18. REMARKS
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Reqmt. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	51650	WH	52073	1	S	06 18 25		

28. NTE EXPIRES · 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE · 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE · 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE · 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO, DA, YR) · EOD DATA · 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. · 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) · 36. SERV. COMP. DATE · 37. LONG COMP. DATE · 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE) · 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE) · 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS., 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.) · 42. LEAVE CAT CODE · 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) · 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
68-7866

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When

C/WH/2

G47

1. Serial No. 035495	2. Name SHAW ROBERT T	3. Cost Center Number 51 690 CF	4. LWOP Hours

5. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Lst Eff. Date	6. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	7. TYPE ACTION PSI	QSI	ADJ.
GS 14	4	$16,675	12/06/64	GS 14	5	$17,178	12/04/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 055495
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): SHAW ROBERT T

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 07 | 03 | 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7135 0990 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14
17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS: EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ. Code
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Mogrn. Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE; CODE: 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7-14-66 QLS

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SHAW ROBERT T	055495	51 420	CF	GS 14 4	$16,300	$16,879

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 4 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SHAW ROBERT T	055495	51 620	CF	GS 14 4	$15,640	$16,204

14

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
055495	SHAW ROBERT T	51 700 478 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 14	3	$15,150	12/08/63	GS 14	4	$15,640	12/06/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD /
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY 559

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 13 Oct 64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SHAW ROBERT T	095495	51 700	CF	GS 14 3	$13,695	$14,515

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
SHAW ROBERT T	055495	26720	V	14 1	$12210	14 1	$12845

---

273 234

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
055495	SHAW ROBERT T	26 720 V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS-14	1	$12,845	12/10/61	GS-14	2	$13,370	12/09/62			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS fw AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE: 8 Nov. 62

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	Per Annum Rates and Steps									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PI Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PI	19	ADJ
GS 14	2	$13,270	12/09/62	GS 14	3	$13,695	12/08/63	/		

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

10/1/63

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 29 October 63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ABM: 30 APR 63

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
055495	SHAW ROBERT T

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	04 30 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
V TO V / CF TO V / X / CF TO CF	3135 5700 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
CONSULAR OF CONSUL WC OPS OFFICER	0340	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	04 0 14 2	11880 13270

18. REMARKS
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Regis Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	64700 WH	45075	1	3	06 18 25		

28	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA		33 SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
					EOD DATA		

35 VET PREFERENCE	36 SERV COMP DATE	37 LONG COMP DATE	38 CAREER CATEGORY	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA	44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
5/1/63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-00000

RZR: 29 MAR 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OOF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 055495
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): SHAW ROBERT T
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION--DEPT OF STATE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 03 DA 27 YR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V; CF TO V; X V TO CF; CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135 5700 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: CONSULAR OF, CONSUL WC
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0418
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		04 0	11880
GS	0136.01	14 2	13270

18. REMARKS

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $13270 AND FSR SALARY OF $11880 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.

ALL SICK AND ALL HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPT OF STATE.

MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED DAUGHTER - DOB: 7/27/52, SONS- DOB: 9/10/55 (TWINS)

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
55	10	64700	WH	45075	1	3	06	18	25		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO, DA, YR) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES), HEALTH INS CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
4/1/63 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

29 MAR 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

BAB: 15 FEB 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 055495	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) SHAW ROBERT T

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 02 17 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V	X	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3135 5700 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0418	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 13270

18. REMARKS

SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 20	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC 64700 WH	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 06 18 25	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 80	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
02/26/63 WK

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

21 FEB 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLG: 4 JAN. 63

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 055495	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) SHAW ROBERT T

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 01 04 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3232 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP TASK FORCE W FI/CI BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0678	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 13270

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 61300	ALPHABETIC TFW	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 06 18 25	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
01/15/63 WK

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

JAN 1963

SECRET

(When Filled In)

Pre 1963 Notification
of Personnel Action

Post 1966
Fitness Rpts

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 055495

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) SHAW, Robert T.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 18 Jun 1925	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City WH/[illegible]	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 June 64 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Agent handling and exploitation. The management, direction and training of existing agent assets. Attention to full operational exploitation of such assets. Dr 62	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Development and handling of new operations: target studies, spotting, assessment and recruitment of new agent assets and potentials. Dc 14/15	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operational management and administration. Maintenance of project records, preparation of contact reports, memoranda, dispatches and cables as required. DA 12	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 General operational support. Liaison with PBSWING, servicing of third country requirements, management of safe houses, etc. D912 DI60	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 DB41 Intelligence reporting.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervision of personnel. Dc 51	RATING LETTER P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 16 JUN 1965	RATING LETTER O

FORM 4-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUN 16 11 15 AM '65

During the past year, this officer has continued to demonstrate his dedication and highly developed professional skills.

Subject has been called upon to meet a variety of requirements. The spectrum of his activity has been so broad that it has run from the exploitation of his manual dexterity (in installing technical devices) to the most sophisticated and demanding agent handling. Throughout the year, Subject has demonstrated his awareness of the value of KUBARK funds, which he spends as needed but always conscientiously. His reporting on his activities has been especially commendable, and his mastery of tradecraft has been continually in evidence.

Subject has now become Chief of PBRUMEN operations for Station Mexico. This slot was formerly held by a GS-15 officer. It is requested that Subject be promoted to the grade of GS-15, not only because of his present assignment, but in recognition of his fine past performance.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
3 June 65	Robert T. Shaw /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 June 65	Operations Officer	David A. Phillips /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Para 2 of covering dispatch HMMT 5493 in its entirety:

"COS is in complete agreement with this excellent report on Shaw and recommends that Shaw be promoted to GS-15.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 June 65	COS	Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

No Record

6 September 1966

SUBJECT: Memorandum in Lieu of Final Fitness Report on [redacted] Robert T. Shaw

Robert T. Shaw

1. [redacted] is under (PCS) transfer to the position of COS, Managua, and is scheduled to depart Mexico City on or about 17 September 1966.

Shaw

2. This memorandum is to report that [redacted] has continued to perform duties assigned to him at the Mexico City Station in the same exceptional manner reported in HMMT-6516 in which he was rated as outstanding for the year April 1965-April 1966. His duties have been the same as reported in HMMT-6516 and a detailed report on his performance would be a repetition of his previous report.

Shaw

3. It is again recommended that [redacted] be promoted to GS-15 in view of his performance and qualifications.

RATING OFFICER [redacted]eptember 1966)
Winston M. Scott/s/

EMPLOYEE: [redacted] (6 September 1966)
Robert T. Shaw /s/

Employee Number: 055495

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
055495

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) SHAW	(First) Robert	(Middle) T.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 18 Jun 1925	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD 0	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1965 - 30 April 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Manage Station PBRUMEN Operations Section. Supervise 3 other staff personnel (incl one GS-14) inside and one (GS-16) staff agent and contract personnel outside. Assign work responsibilities, provide operational guidances, review intelligence production and reporting, evaluate performances, etc.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Agent handling and exploitation. Manage agents and other operational assets working against the PBRUMEN target with particular attention to full exploitation of such assets.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Planning and implementation of new operations, including technical operations, against the PBRUMEN target. Spotting, assessment, development, recruiting, training, and handling new agent assets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Operational management and administration. Preparation of FIR's, dispatches (including operational progress reports), cables, memoranda, contact reports, file reviews, etc., as required.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 DC 50	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 25 MAY 1966	O

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 24 3 27 PM '66
MAIL ROOM

This officer possesses highly developed professional skills. He is dedicated; his work is always well done and his reports are well written.

Subject has repeatedly demonstrated that he is aware of the value of government funds which he spends as necessary but always conscientiously.

This officer is articulate in speech and in his writing. He has excellent Spanish, an essential in the position he has occupied.

This officer is an asset to KUBARK and his family are excellent representatives abroad.

Subject could assume command of a station and he would make an excellent Chief of Station in the opinion of the rating officer.

It is again recommended that this officer be promoted to GS-15.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 21 April 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Robert T. Shaw

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 21 April 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Winston M. Scott

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur generally with the assessment made of Mr. Shaw and agree that Shaw has turned in a highly commendable job and is an excellent operations officer. From here and not having the advantage of on-scene observation I would have rated Shaw with straight S' and overall rating of 'Strong' as compared to 'Outstanding.' Nevertheless, I strong endorse the COS' recommendation for promotion for Shaw.

DATE 10 MA[illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WR/1	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE W.J. Kaufman

SECRET

Section C (Continued)

Overall, this officer is still turning in a performance of high quality under difficult conditions and is a distinct asset to the Station.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EYES ONLY

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 055495

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) SHAW Robert T.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 18 Jun 1925	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Instructor Operations	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OTR	8. CURRENT STATION ISOLATION		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					
☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 21 July 1962 - 25 January 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a group of instructors as departmental chairman in the Operations Branch	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Instructs clandestine operations by lecture, seminar and practical exercises.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Instructs by role-playing as agent or operations officer opposite student case officers	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Counsels and guides students individually.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Participates in course planning and contributes to course substance.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepares instructional presentations and materials for use in clandestine operations courses.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Shaw did an excellent job of course planning and personal supervision as a supervisor of instruction in the field of operational tradecraft. He is a first-rate spark plug and idea man, with good talent as a speaker, teacher and student counselor. His field experience, enthusiasm and loyalty have made him a particularly valuable member of the Operations Branch Staff

In addition to his duties in the Operations Branch, Mr. Shaw also participated in the training of infiltration teams for Task Force W, using the Spanish language.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 30 January 1963

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: D R Shaw

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 6

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 28 January 1963

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, Operations Branch

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Harrington Littell HARRINGTON LITTELL

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

In general I agree with Mr. Littell's evaluation of Mr. Shaw's performance. I would have given him a higher rating, however, on Specific Duty No. 2, which covers his over-all performance as an instructor. I think that Mr. Shaw has been one of our best seminar leaders and lecturers. I would, therefore, rate him as "Strong."

DATE: 31 January 1963

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Deputy for Training, ISOLATION

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Kenneth P. Miller KENNETH P. MILLER

SECRET

Pre 1963 Fitness Rpts

14-00000

Post 1966 Training
of insurance class.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON

June 28, 1966

Dear Mr. Shaw:

Friday we received your grade from the United States Department of Agriculture Graduate School in Modern Supervisory Practice.

✓ We wish to congratulate you on making an A+ in the course. To my knowledge, this is the first A+ received in any correspondence study course to be taken by Department personnel.

We trust that the course will be useful to you--and again congratulations.

Sincerely,

Evert T. Little
Chief
Extension Training Division

Mr. Robert T. Shaw
American Embassy
MEXICO

For inclusion in Robert T. Shaw's official folder.

10/16/66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
055495	Shaw	Robert	T.	51

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	09	20	66				Nicaragua	520

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
IN 99956	9/20/66

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ C & L DIVISION ☒ C & T DIVISION	DATE 9/22/66	SIGNATURE Jackie E Pinninger

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) SHAW, ROBERT T.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 AUGUST 1925	3. GRADE GS-14 4
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/WH/MEXICO CITY STATION (ODACID)	5. PRESENT POSITION OPS OFFICER/340	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION FIELD
7. PROPOSED STATION MANAGUA, NICARAGUA	8. PROPOSED POSITION (title, number, grade) COS, OPS OFFICER/0141/GS-00	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION DEPARTMENT OF STATE	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 1 JULY 1966	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 4

12. NAME OF DEPENDENT TO ACCOMPANY	13. RELATIONSHIP	14. DATE OF BIRTH		15. REPORT OF MED. HIST. (SF 89) ATT.	
		MONTH	YEAR	YES	NO
JANET L.	WIFE	APR	27		XX
BARBARA L.	DAUG	JUL	52		XX
RICHARD W.	SON	AUG	55		XX
THOMAS R.	SON	AUG	55		XX

16. COMMENTS

SUBJECT AND DEPENDENTS WILL TAKE PHYSICALS IN THE FIELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE REGULATIONS.

17. DATE OF REQUEST 9 MAY 1966	18. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Frank A. Lane Frank A. Lane WH/PERS	19. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING GH-56, Hqs.	20. EXTENSION 6815

21. EVALUATION AND SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICIAL

5 July 66

7564T

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 259a

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
GRADUATE SCHOOL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250

Information Record

To whom it may concern: Robert T. Shaw
c/o American Embassy
Mexico City, Mexico

has taken the following courses in the Graduate School and has received the grades shown.

This is an information record and not an official transcript. The student was admitted on the basis of his own statement of previous education and experience, subject to the approval of the instructor.

For certification of academic credit, an official transcript should be requested. Students desiring academic credit must meet qualifications for admission to any standard college on the level of the courses for which they are registering.

COURSE NO.	COURSE TITLE	SEMESTER	GRADE	NO. CREDITS
205 c	Modern Supervisory Practice	6/7/66	A+	2

Correspondence Program

A — 90-100 EXCELLENT
B — 80-89 GOOD
C — 70-79 FAIR
D — 60-69 PASSABLE
F — BELOW 60 FAILURE
7 — AUDITOR
8 — INCOMPLETE
9 — WITHDRAWN

Helen Kempfer
Helen Kempfer, Head
Correspondence Program

AMERICAN EMBASSY
MEXICO, D. F.

June 3, 1965

EMBASSY MEMORANDUM

TO : All FSOs, FSSs and FSRs in Mexico City

FROM : Ralph Scarritt, Administrative Officer

SUBJECT: FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE: Correspondence Course in Modern Supervisory Practice, Number 205C

REF. : CA-12771 dated May 28, 1965

Following is the text of the referenced communication:

The Extension Training Division of the Foreign Service Institute is offering for the first time a correspondence course MODERN SUPERVISORY PRACTICE.

The course is recommended for supervisors at all levels. It has been developed by W. R. Van Dersal, N.A. Berg and J. B. Rogers of the United States Department of Agriculture Graduate School. Dr. Van Dersal is a regular lecturer and discussion leader for management classes at the Foreign Service Institute and is highly recommended by FSI as a valued contributor to their programs and [illegible] in his field.

The authors have conducted supervisory training all over the United States for thousands of employees. They are experienced with the Correspondence method.

The average student will devote a total of 160 hours to the course, which consists of 16 units and for which 2 credits are given. The course should be completed within twelve months of receipt of the first lesson.

The following is quoted from the course brochure, giving brief contents of each unit:

"1. WORKING WITH PEOPLE. Basic Principles.
2. ORGANIZATION. The organization chart. Supervisory ratios. Span of control. Line and staff. Handling rapid expansion. Basic principles. How to judge a good organization.
3. COMMUNICATIONS I. Conferences: Planning and uses. Effective use of speakers and discussion. Making one's own talks more persuasive. Problem solving. Efficient listening.

4. COMMUNICATIONS

4. COMMUNICATIONS 2. Formal and informal communication channels. The grapevine. How to read better and faster. How to write more effectively. Testing your own writing.

5. MOTIVATION. Basic principles. Drives, motives, and incentives. Selecting responses to reinforce. The pattern of successful motivation. Testing effectiveness of programs.

6. SUPERVISION--BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR LINE OPERATORS AND MANAGERS. Inducting new employees. Seven principles of supervision. The Scanlon Plan. Using authority constructively. Praise versus punishment.

7. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR STAFF OPERATORS. Staff functions. Line-staff relationships. Gaining acceptance. Getting the most value from staff officers. Effective consulting.

8. SUPERVISORY TECHNIQUES. Handling problem employees. What to do when personal problems affect work.

9. TRAINING. Training responsibilities of supervisors. How to plan training programs. Training new employees. The supervisor's own career development program. Handling training during rapid expansion. Justifying training time.

10. PARTICIPATION. When and how to use participation in planning and decision making. Setting guideposts and limits.

11. THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. Eight steps to better decisions. Decisions making as a learned skill. How to train yourself to make better decisions.

12. WORKLOAD AND ITS RELATION TO STAFFING. Workload analyses. Work plans. Short and long term schedules. Work-improvement studies. Staffing patterns and workload.

13. PLANNING, SCHEDULING, ORGANIZING. Basic principles. Steps in planning. Making and using schedules. Evaluation for better time-use.

14. QUALITY AND QUANTITY CONTROL--INCLUDING INSPECTIONS. Purpose and importance. Theories. How standards control function. Constructive inspection.

15. BOOK REVIEW AND ANALYSIS. To help student integrate thinking and develop an independent approach.

16. SOLVING

16. SOLVING PROBLEM CASES. Student pulls together all he has learned in the course and uses it in solving a job problem.

The course will be offered on a first come, first served basis. It is hoped that a number of applications will be received in time for enrollment during June.

Students who fail, receive an incomplete, or withdraw from this course for other than officially approved reasons will be expected to reimburse FSI for the course cost of $58.00. If a student fails to complete the course for official reasons, no record is sent to his Personnel File. If he fails to complete the course for other than official and approved reasons and reimburses FSI for the costs of his course, no record is sent to his Personnel File. However a record of "incomplete" or "failure" is sent to his file if he drops or fails the course for reasons not approved and fails to reimburse FSI. This record is then taken into consideration if training is requested at a later date.

All interested officers are requested to submit their applications to the Department on form DS-1131 Field Training Application in accordance with the instructions set forth in 2 FAM 551, 552.

Further information on the course may be obtained by writing to the Extension Training Division, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, Washington, D. C. 20520.

NOTE: Application forms may be obtained in the Personnel Office.

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
GRADUATE SCHOOL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250

Information Record

To whom it may concern: Robert T. Shaw
c/o American Embassy
Mexico City, Mexico

has taken the following courses in the Graduate School and has received the grades shown.

This is an information record and not an official transcript. The student was admitted on the basis of his own statement of previous education and experience, subject to the approval of the instructor.

For certification of academic credit, an official transcript should be requested. Students desiring academic credit must meet qualifications for admission to any standard college on the level of the courses for which they are registering.

COURSE NO.	COURSE TITLE	SEMESTER	GRADE	NO. CREDITS
205 c	Modern Supervisory Practice	6/7/66	A+	2

Correspondence Program

A — 90-100 EXCELLENT
B — 80-89 GOOD
C — 70-79 FAIR
D — 60-69 PASSABLE
F — BELOW 60 FAILURE
7 — AUDITOR
8 — INCOMPLETE
9 — WITHDRAWN

Registrar

Helen Kempfer, Head
Correspondence Program

AMERICAN EMBASSY
MEXICO, D. F.

June 3, 1965

EMBASSY MEMORANDUM

TO : All FSOs, FSSs and FSRs in Mexico City

FROM : Ralph Scarritt, Administrative Officer

SUBJECT: FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE: Correspondence Course in Modern Supervisory Practice, Number 205C

REF. : CA-12771 dated May 28, 1965

Following is the text of the referenced communication:

The Extension Training Division of the Foreign Service Institute is offering for the first time a correspondence course MODERN SUPERVISORY PRACTICE.

The course is recommended for supervisors at all levels. It has been developed by W. R. Van Dersal, N.A. Berg and J. B. Rogers of the United States Department of Agriculture Graduate School. Dr. Van Dersal is a regular lecturer and discussion leader for management classes at the Foreign Service Institute and is highly recommended by FSI as a valued contributor to their programs and [illegible] his field.

The authors have conducted supervisory training all over the United States for thousands of employees. They are experienced with the Correspondence method.

The average student will devote a total of 160 hours to the course, which consists of 16 units and for which 2 credits are given. The course should be completed within twelve months of receipt of the first lesson.

The following is quoted from the course brochure, giving brief contents of each unit:

"1. WORKING WITH PEOPLE. Basic Principles.
2. ORGANIZATION. The organization chart. Supervisory ratios. Span of control. Line and staff. Handling rapid expansion. Basic principles. How to judge a good organization.
3. COMMUNICATIONS I. Conferences: Planning and uses. Effective use of speakers and discussion. Making one's own talk more persuasive. Problem solving. Efficient listening.

4. COMMUNICATIONS

4. COMMUNICATIONS 2. Formal and informal communication channels. The grapevine. How to read better and faster. How to write more effectively. Testing your own writing.

5. MOTIVATION. Basic principles. Drives, motives, and incentives. Selecting responses to reinforce. The pattern of successful motivation. Testing effectiveness of programs.

6. SUPERVISION--BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR LINE OPERATORS AND MANAGERS. Inducting new employees. Seven principles of supervision. The Scanlon Plan. Using authority constructively. Praise versus punishment.

7. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR STAFF OPERATORS. Staff functions. Line-staff relationships. Gaining acceptance. Getting the most value from staff officers. Effective consulting.

8. SUPERVISORY TECHNIQUES. Handling problem employees. What to do when personal problems affect work.

9. TRAINING. Training responsibilities of supervisors. How to plan training programs. Training new employees. The supervisor's own career development program. Handling training during rapid expansion. Justifying training time.

10. PARTICIPATION. When and how to use participation in planning and decision making. Setting guideposts and limits.

11. THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. Eight steps to better decisions. Decisions making as a learned skill. How to train yourself to make better decisions.

12. WORKLOAD AND ITS RELATION TO STAFFING. Workload analyses. Work plans. Short and long term schedules. Work-improvement studies. Staffing patterns and workload.

13. PLANNING, SCHEDULING, ORGANIZING. Basic principles. Steps in planning. Making and using schedules. Evaluation for better time-use.

14. QUALITY AND QUANTITY CONTROL--INCLUDING INSPECTIONS. Purpose and importance. Theories. How standards control function. Constructive inspection.

15. BOOK REVIEW AND ANALYSIS. To help student integrate thinking and develop an independent approach.

16. SOLVING PROBLEM CASES. Student pulls together all he has learned in the course and uses it in solving a job problem.

The course will be offered on a first come, first served basis. It is hoped that a number of applications will be received in time for enrollment during June.

Students who fail, receive an incomplete, or withdraw from this course for other than officially approved reasons will be expected to reimburse FSI for the course cost of $58.00. If a student fails to complete the course for official reasons, no record is sent to his Personnel File. If he fails to complete the course for other than official and approved reasons and reimburses FSI for the costs of his course, no record is sent to his Personnel File. However a record of "incomplete" or "failure" is sent to his file if he drops or fails the course for reasons not approved and fails to reimburse FSI. This record is then taken into consideration if training is requested at a later date.

All interested officers are requested to submit their applications to the Department on form DS-1131 Field Training Application in accordance with the instructions set forth in 2 FAM 551, 552.

Further information on the course may be obtained by writing to the Extension Training Division, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, Washington, D. C. 20520.

NOTE: Application forms may be obtained in the Personnel Office.

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7. BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(true)* Robert Shaw	DATE *(from item 5.1)* 14 Aug 1964	NAME OF SUPERVISOR *(true)* Winston M. Scott	DATE *(from item 5.2)* 14 Aug 1964
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7. BELOW:	Murray Benthall Murray Benthall WH/PERS		DATE 2 Sept 1964

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 18 June 25	2. GRADE GS-14	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE Operations Officer GS-14	7A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR 24 April 1963
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION *(if known)* D	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Mexico City		7B. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD On leave - Summer 65
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7C. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

Conduct of operations aimed at the PBRUMEN target.
Acquisition and management of agents; operational and intelligence reporting.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

If my request for reassignment to current Station (first preference) is approved, I would expect to continue to operate primarily against the PBRUMEN target in view of the priority assigned to that effort in the current RMD for Mexico. I would like to have an opportunity to do some work in other lines, however, expecially in host government penetration and possibly in Soviet/Satellite penetration. If I am to be assigned elsewhere, I would prefer not to work on PBRUMEN operations to the exclusion of other operations. I would prefer to retain ODACID cover which I have been using since 1948.

If transferred elsewhere, would prefer assignment as Chief of a field installation - have twice been COB in WHD.

I do not wish a HQS assignment at this time. I have already had three HQS tours.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*.

In 1963 I completed a four-year stint as an instructor at ISOLATION -- do not believe further training is in order at this time.

FORM 3-59 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT *(continued)*

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 *(for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice)* IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION THIS IS BY FAR FIRST CHOICE

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE DOD/Field 2ND. CHOICE OTR/ISO 3RD. CHOICE DCI/Staff

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:

1ST. CHOICE Barcelona (COB) 2ND. CHOICE Madrid (DCOS) 3RD. CHOICE Sao Paulo (COB)

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 45

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife 37
Daughter 12 **Total dependents - 4**
Twin sons 9

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Children are all of school age. In case of transfer, would prefer assignment to Station having good schools.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

✓ It is urged that this officer be allowed to return to Mexico City Station for a second tour. He has excellent Spanish; he has many worthwhile contacts with Mexican governmental, political and business figures not known to other Station personnel. He has excellent contacts with ODURGE (border) officials.

His unique (for this Station) ODACID cover enables him to meet persons of interest.

He knows and likes Mexico; he is in the midst of a long-range program which can best be done by continuity.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

WH Division recommends that Mr. Shaw return for a second tour of duty in Mexico City following home leave in the summer of 1965.

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS

DATE

SIGNATURE R. D. Cashman

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT

18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. HMMS 3759 CABLE NO.

19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME Ronald D. Gage

20. SIGNATURE Ronald Gage

21. TITLE [illegible]

22. DATE 11/16/64

23. COMMENTS

Next tour after home leave
in summer 65
[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) LAST	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
55495	SHAW	ROBERT	T.	51

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	ARRIVAL MONTH 28-29	ARRIVAL DAY 30-31	ARRIVAL YEAR 32-33	DEPARTURE MONTH 34-35	DEPARTURE DAY 36-37	DEPARTURE YEAR 38-39	COUNTRY	CWIT 40-42
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	1	04	23	63				MEXICO	450

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	DEPARTURE MONTH 28-29	DEPARTURE DAY 30-31	DEPARTURE YEAR 32-33	RETURN MONTH 34-35	RETURN DAY 36-37	RETURN YEAR 38-39	AREA(S)	CWIT 40-42
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION									

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER	XX	DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: HMMT - 3681

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 4/25/63

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION		DATE	SIGNATURE
XX PERSONNEL DIVISION	N.A.	5/31/63	

SECRET

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

33[illegible]33 JAN 25 63

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5		6-23		24-25
55A95	Shaw	Robert	T	51

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41
	2	11	09	62	12	19	62	10 #	811

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☒	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION		DATE	SIGNATURE
☒ FINANCE DIVISION		[illegible]	[illegible]

FORM 1451a
4-59

SECRET

(4-191)

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

IMPORTANT

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility (OPM 20-6-1 dated 12 October 1961) for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the field have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checked out for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 30 July 1962.

R Shaw
Signature

14 February 1963
Date

ROBERT SHAW

1R

CONFIDENTIAL
[illegible]

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) SHAW (First) ROBERT (Middle) TYLER

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED: FT. THOMAS, KENTUCKY

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: ~~FALLS CHURCH, VA~~ TUCSON, ARIZONA

HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: TUCSON, ARIZONA

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 2 SEP 1946

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE

DATE OF DECREE

IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED

DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE: JANET LEE SHAW

ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 415 LINDEN LANE, FALLS CHURCH

TELEPHONE NO.: JE 2-0199

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
BARBARA	SAME	F	27 JUL 195
RICHARD		M	10 SEP 1955
THOMAS		M	10 SEP 1955

NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian): GEN. F. P. SHAW

ADDRESS: 415 LINDEN LANE, FALLS CHURCH

TELEPHONE NO.: JE 2-0199

NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian): INEZ S. SHAW

ADDRESS: SAME

TELEPHONE NO.

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. FATHER

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): MAJ. GEN FRANKLIN P. SHAW

RELATIONSHIP: FATHER

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 415 LINDEN LANE, FALLS CHURCH, VA.

HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: JE 2-0199

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: RETIRED

BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES ✓ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES ✓ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) YES ✓ NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-56 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

AMERICAN SECURITY & TRUST CO., WASH 13, D.C. —
ROBERT T. & JANET LEE SHAW
ACCT. # 606-10-247

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

AMONG PERSONAL EFFECTS

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
HQS.	14 Feb 1963	R Shaw

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

PSD

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of Robert T. Shaw

Effective 27 March 1963

The purpose of this memorandum is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are integrated and to set forth certain rights and obligations which are incident to your status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS-14 $13,270. per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of 27 March 1963. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected at FSR-4 and salary of $11,800. per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of Two Years from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and (except as provided in paragraph three (3) above) allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they are less than or equal to the salary and allowance payments due on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due, the difference will be credited to your payroll account with this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due, the overage will be remitted to this organization at designated intervals, presently NA. Computations hereunder will be made on the basis of the aggregate gross due and received provided, however, that in computing remittances for overage Federal and, if applicable, District of Columbia income taxes withheld by your cover facility against the overage may be deducted. To assure timely accuracy in your payroll account with this organization you are expected to immediately report cover facility payroll changes.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integration into your cover facility, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and at your personal expense you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half per cent) on the basis of your cover salary or your salary from this organization, whichever is the greater.

b. If you receive taxable income from both your cover facility and this organization, necessary adjustments for Federal, and if applicable, District of Columbia income tax purposes will be made in conformance with instructions received from this organization.

c. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with the rules and regulations of this organization.

d. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with your cover facility of any status with your cover based on your services performed with that organization at the request of this organization.

e. All annual and sick leave which is accrued to your credit at the time of integration will be transferred to your cover facility. While integrated you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon completion of your integration your accrued annual and sick leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization including any income taxes withheld by your cover facility.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Rose Marie Cernuto
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

R T Shaw
Robert T. Shaw

Pre 1963 Training &
related docs.

Medical clearances

Pre 1963 Documents
(application forms,
awards, PHS supplements)

14-00000

TELEPHONE REQUEST FOR RECORDS OR INFORMATION

NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECORDS CENTER, (CPR)
111 Winnebago Street
St. Louis, MO 63118

CHF

CAUTION: Complete all items

___ Former Federal Employee informed of Privacy Act Compliance requirements per instructions in NPRC-1667.45.

DATE OF REQUEST: 6-9-78

CLERK'S INITIALS:

DATE OF BIRTH: MONTH 6 DAY 18 YEAR 25

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 2 6 8 2 8 0 1 9 9

CURRENT NAME (Last, first, middle): SHAW, Robert T.

NAME UNDER WHICH FORMERLY EMPLOYED FEDERALLY (If different than current name)

PREVIOUS FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

AGENCY AND BUREAU	LOCATION	FROM	TO
War Dept	Patterson AFB	Summ	8-6-42 1941
STATE DEPT		1952	3-17-73

RECORDS OR INFORMATION REQUESTED

- ☑ OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER
  - ☑ Forward to requesting agency.
  - ☐ Deliver to information desk for review by Federal Agent.
  - ☐ Deliver to the appropriate Correspondence Unit Supervisor for review by employee.
- ☐ STATEMENT OF SERVICE
  - ☐ Mail to requestor.
  - ☐ Deliver to information desk.
- ☐ FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE
  - ☐ Prepare and furnish duplicate original SF-56.
  - ☐ Furnish SF-54.
- ☐ CALL BACK (Specify information wanted below).

RECORDS OR INFORMATION SENT

- ☑ Folder enclosed. 6-13-78 R
- ☐ Folder was sent to your agency on ____
- ☐ Folder forwarded in place of information requested. Retain if person is rehired.
- ☐ Folder not received. Suggest you contact last employing office.
- ☐ Folder not located. Suggest further search in your agency. If still unlocated, verify correctness of name, and furnish date forwarded and several names of other folders in same shipment.
- ☐ Folder believed in custody of following agency. Original of your request sent to that agency for action.

TELEPHONE: ☐ FTS ☒ COMMERCIAL/HOME [redacted]-351-6144

NAME OF CALLER: MR. Hendricks

REMARKS:

CIA
Personnel Office
Washington, D.C.
20505

Enter complete address to which folder or reply is to be mailed. Include ZIP Code.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 6895 (REV. 2/77)

SHAW, ROBERT T. 06-18-25
268-28-0199

PERSONNEL FILES SECTION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

Date: 1/23/79

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chf, Ops, ROB

SUBJECT : Request for Estimate of Annuities

JB

1. Please provide estimate of annuities for:

Name: ROBERT T SHAW

Grade: GS-16

Component: IG

DOB: 06 18 25

SCD: 09 02 46

System: CIARDS

ETR: 11 Jan. 1980

2. Remarks: OP FILE ATTACHED ROSENKRAN
COULD NOT FIND CIARDS FILE

John McBride
Counselor, ROB/RAD

CONFIDENTIAL (when filled in)

FORM DS 1032
11-63

PERSONAL NUMBER

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION.

SERVICE
FS

1 NAME (CAPS) LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE — MR MISS MRS: SHAW ROBERT T — MR

2 EMP. FILE NO. & SEX: 539700 M

3 BIRTH DATE: 06-12-25

4 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 268-28-0199

5 VETERANS PREFERENCE: 2

6 TENURE: (3) — CODE: 06

7 SERVICE COMP. DATE: 08-28-48

8 PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE: 00

9 FEGLI: 1 — 1 COVERED 2 INELIGIBLE 3 WAIVED

10 RETIREMENT: 1

10A MO. & YR. OF GRADE: 05-65

11

12 NATURE OF ACTION: 317 RESIGNATION — CODE

13 EFFECTIVE DATE: 03-17-73

14 CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

15 FROM POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER: S-00000-00 REASSIGIMENT DE -

16 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE: FR-97072

17 GRADE: 03

18 SALARY: PA$29,462.00

19 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE — DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520
MISCELLANEOUS ASSIGNMENTS

20 TO POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER

21 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE

22 GRADE

23 SALARY — WORK SCHED

24 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE — DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520

25 DUTY STATION: WASHINGTON DC

26 LOCATION CODE: 110010001

27 APPROPRIATION: 0113.0-1097-293600-000

28 POSITION OCCUPIED: 2 — 2 EXCEPTED SERVICE

29 APPORTIONED POSITION — FROM ☐ TO ☐ — STATE: AZ

30 REMARKS

☐ A.

☐ B.

SEPARATIONS: SHOW REASON BELOW AS REQUIRED. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ C. DURING PROBATION ☐ D. FROM APPOINTMENT OF 6 MONTHS OR LESS

REASON: PERSONAL - NO OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE
FINAL PAYMENT TO BE MADE BY THE DEPARTMENT
FEGLI COVERAGE-REGULAR ONLY

MR. ROBERT T. SHAW
3715 ACOSTA ROAD
FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA 22030

31 DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVIT

32 OFFICE MAINTAINING PERSONNEL FOLDER

33 CODE EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: XXXX DEPARTMENT OF STATE

34 SIGNATURE AND TITLE: R.C.BREWSTER
DIRECTOR GENERAL

35 DATE: 03-21-73

SUBMITTING OFFICE NO 2951

ST00

2 PERSONNEL FOLDER

Form DS 1031
1-65

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1 1 05

FM/FO
APPROVED

PART I. REQUESTING OFFICE

A DATE OF REQUEST: 3/14/73
B PROPOSED EFFECTIVE DATE:
C REQUEST NUMBER:
D SERVICE: FS
E: ~~MGT/CMG~~ MGT/PS/RET
MGT/PS/TRANS

1 NAME (CAPS) Last-First-Middle, MR. MISS MRS.: SHAW, ROBERT T. MR.
2 EMPLOYEE NO.: 539700 M
3 BIRTH DATE:
4 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 268-28-0199

F KIND OF ACTION REQUESTED (1) PERSONNEL:
RIF CODE
G POSITION SKILL CODES
(2) POSITION:
H POSITION VACATED: 1 Remain funded 2 Unfund 3 Abolish

5 VETERAN PREFERENCE: 1 - NO 2 - 5 PT 3 - 10 PT DISAB 4 - 10 PT COMP 5 - 10 PT OTHER
6 TENURE CODE:
7 SERVICE COMP DATE:
8 PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE:
9 FEGLI: 1 - COVERED 2 - INELIGIBLE 3 - WAIVED
10 RETIREMENT: 1 - CS 2 - FICA 3 - FS 4 - NONE 5 - OTHER
10A MO & YR OF GRADE:
11 (For CS use):

12 NATURE OF ACTION: 317 RESIGNATION
13 EFFECTIVE DATE: 03-17-73
14 CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

15 FROM POS NO.: S-00000-00
POSITION TITLE: FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE OFFICER
16 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE: FR-7072
17 GRADE OR LEVEL: 03
18 SALARY: pa$ 21 4—
19 ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION: MISCELLANEOUS ASSIGNMENTS

20 TO POS NO.:
POSITION TITLE:
21 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE:
22 GRADE STEP:
23 SALARY: NEXT PSI DUE
WORK SCHED
24 ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION:

25 DUTY STATION (City-State): WASHINGTON, D. C.
26 LOCATION CODE:
27 APPROPRIATION CODE: 0113.0-1097-298600-000
28 POSITION OCCUPIED: 1 - COMPETITIVE SERVICE 2 - EXCEPTED SERVICE
29 APPORTIONED POSITION: FROM TO STATE 1 - PROVED - 1 2 - WAIVED - 2

I REMARKS:

REASON: PERSONAL - No additional information available.

ADDRESS: 3715 Acosta Road
Fairfax, Virginia 22030.

814
93.0

MAR 1 5 1973

J REQUESTED BY
SIGNATURE: Barbara B. Prather
TITLE: CA/FS/EUR - Barbara B. Prather

K REQUEST APPROVED BY
SIGNATURE: Charles R. Stout
TITLE: CA/FS/EUR - Charles R. Stout, Chief

PART II. TO BE COMPLETED BY PERSONNEL OFFICE

1 CLEARANCES	INITIALS OR SIGNATURE	DATE
(1)		
(2) CEIL OR POS CONTROL	LAR	MAR 1 5 1973
(3) CLASSIFICATION		
(4) EMPLOYMENT		
(5)		
(6) APPROVED BY		

☐ ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING SATISFACTORY ☐ IA ☐ NEW ☐ VICE ☐ REGRADED
☐ SUBJECT TO COMPLETION OF 1 YEAR PROBATIONARY PERIOD COMMENCING
☐ SERVICE COUNTING TOWARD CAREER TENURE FROM
☐ SUCCESSOR POSITION / EMPLOYEE RETAINED IN THE COMPETITIVE SERVICE
SEPARATIONS: SHOW REASON BELOW. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ DURING PROBATION ☐

PART III. TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

RESIGNATION [illegible]

I RESIGN FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS

RECEIVED

MAR [illegible] AM 8 49

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF MY RESIGNATION WILL BE

(Signature)

PART IV. SEPARATION DATA

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS

(Street) (City) (Zone) (State)

PART I. (Continued)

REMARKS BY REQUESTING OFFICE

3/19/73

xhaxyx

SHAW, ROBERT T

RESIGNATION COB 3/17/73; FINAL SALARY PAYMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT.

NOT ENROLLED IN HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN

ADDRESS:

3715 ACOSTA ROAD
FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA 22030

E Kathryn Mallow

E. Kathryn Mallow
Chief, Retirement Branch
Personnel Services Division

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

March 9, 1973

The Honorable William P. Rogers
The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is with regret that I find it necessary to submit my resignation from the Foreign Service effective March 17, 1973.

I have enjoyed my years with the Foreign Service and hope that it will be possible for me to serve again in the future should circumstances permit.

Sincerely,

Robert T Shaw

Robert T. Shaw

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
SHAW	ROBERT	TYLER	JUNE 18, 25	268 28 0199
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	
STATE - FOREIGN SERVICE			EMBASSY, MANAGUA	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

Robert T. Shaw

DATE

February 9, 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

February 9, 1968

James J. Young, Actg Admin Officer
American Embassy
Managua, Nicaragua

See Table of Effective Dates on Back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
[illegible]
176-101

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER 1-8 F.P.M.
[illegible]

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959

[illegible]

TO EMPLOYING OFFICE: SHOW OLD CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. ONLY IF ELECTION IS TO CANCEL ENROLLMENT OR TO CHANGE OPTIONS OR TYPE OF ENROLLMENT IN THE SAME PLAN

New Carrier's Control No. 6438716

Old Carrier's Control No.

PART A

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) SHAW (FIRST) ROBERT (MIDDLE INITIAL) T.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH 6 DAY 18 YEAR 25

3. ARE YOU NOW MARRIED? YES ☑ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE)

5. SEX MALE ☐ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

IMPORTANT

IT IS ILLEGAL FOR AN EMPLOYEE OR A MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY TO BE COVERED UNDER MORE THAN ONE ENROLLMENT. IF YOU ARE ALREADY COVERED THROUGH THE ENROLLMENT OF ANOTHER FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEE OR ANNUITANT YOU MUST ELECT NOT TO ENROLL OR THE OTHER ENROLLMENT MUST BE CANCELED. SIMILARLY, IF A FAMILY MEMBER LISTED BY YOU IN PART B IS COVERED THROUGH HIS (OR HER) OWN ENROLLMENT, YOU CANNOT ELECT A FAMILY ENROLLMENT UNLESS THE FAMILY MEMBER CANCELS HIS (OR HER) ENROLLMENT.

PART B

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL OR CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer Item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer Item 2 and Item 3 if it applies.

IF YOU ARE CHANGING YOUR ENROLLMENT, ALSO FILL IN PART D.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions from my salary, compensation or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN

OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)

ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19. Include [illegible] adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over, if one is not already on file.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband		1			6
		2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

3. If you are a female employee or annuitant, does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate, if one is not already on file.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES

1. I ELECT NOT TO ENROLL IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT ☒

2. I ELECT TO CANCEL MY PRESENT ENROLLMENT UNDER THE CODE NUMBER SHOWN BELOW ☐

Present Enrollment Code Number

PART D

FILL IN THIS PART, AS WELL AS PART B, TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

[illegible]

1. ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER OF PRESENT PLAN

2. [illegible]

3. DATE OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

Robert T Shaw May 27, 1963

WARNING: Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001)

PART F

TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.
Personnel Operations Division
John Ordway

DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE 3/28/63

3/31/63 ✓

19-00-0001

REMARKS (FOR USE ONLY BY EMPLOYING OFFICE)

[illegible] 27-63

Standard Form No. 54
Revised April 1954
U. S. Civil Service Commission
F. P. M. Chapter 21
54-108

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT OF 1954

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INSURED:

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
SHAW	ROBERT	TYLER	JUNE 18, 1925

PLACE AN "X" IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW TO SHOW WHETHER YOU ARE:

☒ AN EMPLOYEE ☐ RETIRED OR AN APPLICANT FOR RETIREMENT ☐ RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION BENEFITS OR AN APPLICANT FOR SUCH BENEFITS

IF YOU ARE RETIRED OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION GIVE YOUR "CSA," "CSI," or "X" NUMBER

(CSA or CSI or X number)

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH LAST EMPLOYED (If retired, former department or agency):

(Department or agency)	(Bureau)	(Division)	(Location—City and State)
DEPT. OF STATE	ARA		WASH 25, D.C.

I, the individual identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any amount of GROUP LIFE INSURANCE and GROUP ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE due and payable at my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, with respect to any amount payable, unless or until canceled by me in writing, or until such time as it is automatically canceled (see regulation "f" on reverse side of duplicate copy).

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES:

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
JANET LEE SHAW	909 N. CAMPBELL AVE. TUCSON, ARIZONA	WIFE	ALL

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change any Designation of Beneficiary at any time without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

Mar 27, 1963
(Date of execution—month, day, year)

Robert T Shaw
(Signature of insured)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE *(A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary)*:

(Signature of witness)	(Number and street)	(City, zone number, and State)
[illegible]	1114 Ellen Ave	Falls Church, Va
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS OF INSURED

Robert T Shaw
909 Cambell Ave.
Tucson, Ariz.

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING AGENCY

PER/EMD
MAR 27 1963

(Indicate date and be above received)

SEE REVERSE SIDE OF DUPLICATE COPY FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON WHERE TO FILE THESE FORMS.
DO NOT FILE WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE.

IMPORTANT.—The filing of this form will completely cancel any Designation of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act you may have previously filed. Be sure to name in this form all persons you wish to designate as beneficiaries of any group life and accidental death insurance payable under that act at your death.

EXAMPLES OF DESIGNATIONS

How To Designate One Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Mary E. Brown*	214 Central Avenue, Muncie, Ind.	Niece	All

How To Designate More Than One Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary**
Alice M. Long	509 Canal Street, Red Bank, N. J.	Aunt	One-fourth
Joseph P. Brady	360 Williams Street, Red Bank, N. J.	Nephew	One-fourth
Catherine L. Rowe	792 Broadway, Whiting, Ind.	Mother	One-half

How To Designate a Contingent Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
John M. Parrish, if living	810 West 180th Street, New York, N. Y.	Father	All
Otherwise to: Susan A. Parrish	810 West 180th Street, New York, N. Y.	Sister	All

How To Cancel a Designation of Beneficiary so That Amount Due Will Be Payable as Provided in the Law

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Cancel prior designations			

*Do not use initials only, as M. E. Brown or as Mrs. John H. Brown.
**Be sure that the shares to be paid to the several beneficiaries add up to 100 percent.

Standard Form No. 1152

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

UNPAID COMPENSATION OF DECEASED CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EMPLOYEE:

NAME— (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
SHAW	Robert	Tyler	6-18-25

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED

(Department or agency)	(Bureau)	(Division)
Department of State	Foreign Service	Mexico City

I, the employee identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any UNPAID COMPENSATION *due and payable under existing law after my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary relates solely to Unpaid Compensation as defined in section 2 of the act of August 3, 1950, Public Law 636, and in nowise will affect the disposition of any benefit which may become payable under the Retirement Act applicable to my Government service. I further understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, unless or until canceled by me in writing, so long as I am continuously employed in the above department or agency.*

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES:

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
JANET LEE SHAW	909 N. CAMPBELL AVE. TUCSON, ARIZONA	WIFE	ALL

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change any designation of beneficiary at any time in the manner and form prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States, and without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

3-27-63
(Date of execution—month, day, year)

Robert T Shaw
(Signature of employee)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE:

(Signature of witness) — 1114 Ellen Ave. (Number and street) — Falls Church, Va. (City, zone number, and State)

(Signature of witness) — 206 F St NW (Number and street) — Wash 7 DC (City, zone number, and State)

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYEE

Robert T Shaw
909 Cambell Ave
Tucson, Arizona

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING DATA OF EMPLOYING AGENCY

PER/EMO
MAR 27 1963
(Include date and by whom received)

DELIVER BOTH COPIES TO THE PROPER OFFICER OF YOUR AGENCY—DUPLICATE WILL BE NOTED AND RETURNED

IMPORTANT—The filing of this form will completely cancel any designation you may have previously filed. Be sure to name in this form all persons you wish to designate as beneficiaries of any unpaid compensation payable at your death.

EXAMPLES OF DESIGNATIONS

How To Designate One Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Catherine M. Jackson*	2808 Southern Avenue, Williams, Ind.	Sister	All

How To Designate More Than One Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Susan L. Brown**	110 Prince Street, Anniston, N. Y.	Aunt	One-fourth
Mary Joe Carson	230 Duke Street, Anniston, N. Y.	Niece	One-fourth
Elizabeth H. Howard	2301 State Street, Weaver, Ohio	Mother	One-half

How To Designate a Contingent Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
William J. Johnson, if living	244 South Ann Street, Olney, Co.	Father	All
Otherwise to: Sarah L. Johnson	244 South Ann Street, Olney, Ga.	Sister	All

How To Cancel a Designation of Beneficiary so That Amount Due Will Be Payable as Provided in the Law

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Cancel prior designations			

*Do not write name as C. M. Jackson or as Mrs. John H. Jackson.

**Be sure that the shares to be paid to the several beneficiaries add up to 100 percent.

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER 1-5 FPM
5 GAO 3009

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959

(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ink.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO.
153281

PART A
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): SHAW ROBERT T.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers): MONTH 6 DAY 18 YEAR 25

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE): BOX 1447, WILLIAMSBURG, VA. ☐

5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant? YES ☐ NO ☒

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1
$4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2
$6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3
$10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN
OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)
ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES, AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☒

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☒ 2
(c) Any other reason ☐ 3

PART D
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan
2. Code of event which permits change (See table on back of duplicate for proper number)
3. Date of event which permits change: MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

Robert T. Shaw June 20, 1960
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F
TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

REMARKS
FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.

APRIL 1960

Triplicate—To Employing Office

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER I-5 FPM
6 GAO 5 [illegible]

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or [illegible] pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. 153281

PART A ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): SHAW ROBERT T.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (This numbers): MONTH 6 DAY 18 YEAR 25

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE): BOX 1147, WILLIAMSBURG, VA. ☐

5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☐ NO ☒

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1
$4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2
$6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3
$10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN
OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)
ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and [illegible] who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☒

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

3. The reason for my action is (Place an "X" in proper box):
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☒ 2
(c) Any other reason ☐ 3

PART D FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the [illegible] in Part B

1. Enrollment code number of present plan.
2. Number of event which permits change (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)
3. Date of event which permits change MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

Robert T. Shaw June 20, 19[illegible]
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
[illegible]

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.

Triplicate—To Payroll Office

APRIL 1960

Standard Form No. 54
September 1954
U. S. Civil Service Commission
F. P. M. Chapter 21

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT OF 1954

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INSURED:

Name (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	Date of Birth (Month, day, year)
SHAW	ROBERT	TYLER	JUNE 18, 1925

Department or Agency in Which Employed (*If retired, so state and give "CSA" or "CSI" number*):

(Department or agency)	(Bureau)	(Division)
Dept. of State	FS	PER/POD

I, the employee or annuitant identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any amount of GROUP LIFE INSURANCE and GROUP ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE due and payable at my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, with respect to any amount payable, unless or until canceled by me in writing, or until such time as I become insured in a department or agency other than the above, or until such time as I become insured as a retired employee, in which event this Designation of Beneficiary shall terminate.

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES:

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
JANET LEE RUGGLES SHAW	3000 N. OAKLAND, ARLINGTON, VA.	WIFE	100%

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change any Designation of Beneficiary at any time without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

MAY 17, 1956
(Date of execution—Month, day, year)

R. Shaw
(Signature of insured)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE (*A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary*):

(Signature of witness)	(Number and street)	(City, zone number, and State)
[illegible]	823 - 22 [illegible]	[illegible] D.C.
[illegible]	2150 Penn. Ave, N.W.	D.C. 7

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS OF INSURED

ROBERT T. SHAW
3000 N. OAKLAND ST.
ARLINGTON 7, VA.

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING AGENCY

5-17-56

PER/POD
(Indicate date and by whom received)

IF INSURED AS AN EMPLOYEE, DELIVER BOTH COPIES TO THE PERSONNEL OFFICER OF YOUR AGENCY. DUPLICATE WILL BE NOTED AND RETURNED. 16—70019-1
IF INSURED AS AN ANNUITANT, SEND BOTH COPIES TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.—DUPLICATE WILL BE NOTED AND RETURNED.

IMPORTANT.—The filing of this form will completely cancel any Designation of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act you may have previously filed. Be sure to name in this form all persons you wish to designate as beneficiaries of any group life and accidental death insurance payable under that act at your death.

EXAMPLES OF DESIGNATIONS

HOW TO DESIGNATE ONE BENEFICIARY

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Mary E. Brown*	214 Central Avenue, Muncie, Ind.	Niece	All

HOW TO DESIGNATE MORE THAN ONE BENEFICIARY

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Alice M. Long	509 Canal Street, Red Bank, N. J.	Aunt	** One-fourth
Joseph P. Brady	360 Williams Street, Red Bank, N. J.	Nephew	One-fourth
Catherine L. Rowe	792 Broadway, Whiting, Ind.	Mother	One-half

HOW TO DESIGNATE A CONTINGENT BENEFICIARY

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
John M. Parrish, if living	810 West 180th Street, New York, N. Y.	Father	All
Otherwise to: Susan A. Parrish	810 West 180th Street, New York, N. Y.	Sister	All

HOW TO CANCEL A DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY SO THAT AMOUNT DUE WILL BE PAYABLE AS PROVIDED IN THE LAW

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Cancel prior designations			

*Do not write name as M. E. Brown or as Mrs. John H. Brown.

**Be sure that the shares to be paid to the several beneficiaries add up to 100 percent.

PAGE 9616

FEDERAL PAY ADJ.EX.ORDER 11691 DEC.15,1972 EFF. JAN.7,1973

PREPARED ON 01/17/73
DATA AS OF 01/07/73

NEW NAME	SOC SEC NUMBER	NEW ORG-CD	N PP	N GR	PAY STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SHAW ROBERT T	268280199	298600	FR	03	07	2802200	2946200

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PERSONNEL ACTION AND AUTHORIZATION OF OFFICIAL TRAVEL

Applicable Regulations: 6 FAM 100 & FM-1 510.4

You are hereby authorized to perform official travel at Government expense as indicated herein. Unless otherwise noted, all expenses and the maximum per diem under the regulations are authorized. Unless otherwise noted, shipment of effects is authorized from station of origin to station of destination & allowances are shown in Item 15.

1. NAME, ADDRESS AND DIPLOMATIC TITLE

SHAW, ROBERT T
AMERICAN EMBASSY
TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS

2. EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 539700

3. AUTHORIZATION NUMBER: 3-60799

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 268-28-0193

5. CLASS: R-03

6. AUTHORIZATION DATE: JULY 18, 1972

7. NEW POSITION TITLE, NUMBER AND OCCUPATION CODE: FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE OFFICER 7072 ( ) S-00000-00(P)

8. DO NOT START TRAVEL PRIOR TO

9. ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION: The coding A through E must be shown on all documents issued under this authority and must appear on all vouchers, invoices, TRs, GBL's, etc.

A. FUND	B. ALLOTMENT	C. OBLIGATION NUMBER	D. ORGANIZATION CODE	E. FUNCTION
1930113	2025	360799	298600	52-23

10A. STATION OF ORIGIN: TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS 0113.0-2081

10B. LOCATION CODE: 312601

11. OBJECT: 2099

12. STATION OF DESTINATION: WASHINGTON, D.C. (CA)

13. AMOUNT

14. QUARTERS AVAILABILITY: 2
1 UNKNOWN
2 UNFURNISHED
3 FURNISHED

15. ALLOWANCES FOR SHIPMENT AND/OR STORAGE OF HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS - NET WEIGHT
A. LIMITED SHIPMENT: 00000
B. TOTAL ALLOWANCE: 13000

16. FOREIGN MOTOR VEHICLE
A. SHIPMENT AUTHORIZED: 2
1 YES
2 NO
B. MEETS CRITERIA OF 6 FAM 165.8, SUBSECTION

17. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS
A. ADULTS: 4
CHILDREN
B. 2 to 12: 0
C. Under 2: 0

18. EXCESS BAGGAGE (For air travel): 000

19. TOTAL NUMBER OF NON-TRAVEL DAYS AUTHORIZED BELOW INCLUDING THOSE WITHOUT PER DIEM UNDER THIS AUTHORIZATION AND AMENDMENTS
A. CONSULTATION (WORKDAYS): 00
B. TRAINING (CALENDAR DAYS): 000
C. TDY (CALENDAR DAYS): 000

THIS SECTION FOR PERSONNEL ACTION ONLY. When completed for permanent change of station, this document constitutes a valid personnel action for transfer between Posts. **DO NOT USE FOR R. T. HOME LEAVE OR FIELD AMENDMENTS.**

20. SALARY: R? $ 28,022

21. SALARY APPROPRIATION AND ALLOTMENT: 0113.21027

22. NATURE OF ACTION AND EFFECTIVE DATE: 728 10-15-72

23. DPL CODE: DE

107CXXXX

24. ITINERARY, SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS, SPECIAL AUTHORIZATIONS AND REMARKS

LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE AT TUCSON, ARIZONA AND TRANSFER.
THE PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS OF THIS EMPLOYEE AND MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY ARE ELIGIBLE FOR DUTY-FREE ENTRY UNDER ITEM 817.00 OF THE TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE U S.
REMOVAL OF EFFECTS FROM STORAGE AT BALTIMORE, MARYLAND WHERE STORED UNDER T.A. 2-19903-0252 AND SHIPMENT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AUTHORIZED.
REMOVAL OF EFFECTS FROM STORAGE AT MEXICO CITY, MEXICO WHERE STORED UNDER T.A. 2-95952-00[illegible] AND SHIPMENT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AUTHORIZED.
AUTHORITY FOR STORAGE OF EFFECTS AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE ISSUED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THIS AUTHORIZATION WILL TERMINATE THREE MONTHS AFTER YOUR ARRIVAL AT STATION OF DESTINATION.
TOUR OF DUTY OF FOUR YEARS (SUBJECT TO THE NEEDS OF SERVICE).
DEPENDENTS: W/JANET; D/BARBARA 7/27/52; S/RICHARD 9/10/55; S/THOMAS 9/10/55

25. EST. DEPARTURE DATE: 08/72

26. EST. ARRIVAL DATE: 10/72

27. AUTHORIZING OFFICER

28. AUTHORIZED ITINERARY FOR TRAVEL: TEGUCIGALPA/TUCSON, ARIZONA/WASHINGTON, D.C.

29. TRAVEL ORDER ISSUED BY
A. OFFICE: CA/FS/EUR
B. OFFICER: CRSTOUT/BB BEATHER

07/17/72
GBS

FED-PAY-ACT OF 1970,PL92-210,DEC.22,1971,EX.OR11637 EFF 1-9-72

PREPARED ON 01/10/72
DATA AS OF 01/09/72

NEW NAME	SOC SEC NUMBER	N PP	N GR	PSI	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SHARPE THOMAS J	053376442	FS	07	162	1003300	1058300
SHAUGHNESSY THOMAS H	157037254	GS	11	124	1514100	1597300
SHAVER EILEEN G	437747849	GS	05	022	693930	731900
SHAW BASIL	087039063	GS	13	102	1835300	1936200
SHAW C GRANT	387746036	FR	02	002	3257300	3438700
SHAW CHARLES H	543346550	FS	05	042	1247200	1315900
SHAW DAVID G	115246671	FO	04	002	1776130	1873700
SHAW ELLEN J	362093790	GS	09	154	1291300	1362200
SHAW JOHN H	267469829	FS	05	042	1140400	1203100
SHAW OLIVER C	487348679	FS	06	162	1086700	1146400
SHAW ROBERT T	269280199	FR	03	002	2656300	2802200
SHAW SUSAN BETH	476600437	GS	06	162	772700	815300
SHAY GERTRUDE E	313348828	FS	05	153	1282400	1353500
SHAY SHARON K	166365892	FS	08	262	874000	922100
SHEA DIANNE E	218505259	FS	08	202	822600	867900
SHEA JAMES F	045141085	FO	04	000	2131100	2248700
SHEA JAMES R	123267050	ST	00	000	2817900	2967800
SHEA JOHN J	126164630	FR	03	002	2434900	2568800
SHEA LAUREL M	021366236	GG	09	152	1081900	1141400
SHEA MARIE T	578762530	GS	03	132	552400	582800
SHEA TERENCE J	037180477	RU	03	002	2582500	2724400

14-00000

FORM DS-1042
3-69

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP

S268280199

P.L. TEGUCIGLPA	ORG. CODE 3126	POSITION NO.	ALLOT. & ACTIVITY & PURPOSE 01130 2101	EFFECTIVE DATE 07-01-71	DATE OF LAST EQUIV. INCREASE
EMPLOYEE'S NAME SHAW ROBERT T	EMPLOYEE NO. 539700	CATG. & CLASS SERV. & GRADE FSR 03	NEW SALARY RATE $26,563	OLD SALARY RATE $25,825	☒ Periodic Step-increase

LWOP DATA (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Periods:

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP. TOTAL EXCESS LWOP ____________
(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.
Initials of Clerk ____________

☐ Other Step-Increase ____________

☐ Pay Adjustment

REMARKS

Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

JOHN H BURNS
(Signature or other authentication)

PERSONNEL COPY

PAGE 8894
FEDERAL PAY COMPATABILITY ACT OF 1970, PL 91-656
PREPARED ON 02/05/71
DATA AS OF 01/31/71

NAME	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	SOC SEC NUMBER	PAY PLAN	GRADE	NEXT PSI	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SHAW ROBERT T	539700	268280199	FR	03	001	24368	25825
						24368	25825

RECORD COUNT = 1

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED DECEMBER 1964
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F.P.M. CHAPTER 295
61-105

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing or affirming to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

First Secretary and Consul (Position to which appointed) — November 20, 1970 (Date of appointment)

Department of State (Department or agency) — Foreign Service of the U. S. (Bureau or division) — Tegucigalpa, Honduras (Place of employment)

I, Robert T. Shaw, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing this appointment.

Robert T Shaw
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn (or affirmed) before me this 12th day of May A.D. 19 71,

at Tegucigalpa (City) Honduras (State)

[SEAL]

Allan F. McLean, Jr.
(Signature of officer)

Commission expires ....
(If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown)

Consul of the United States of America
(Title)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U.S.C. 3903. The words "SO HELP ME GOD" in the oath and the word "swear" wherever it appears above should be stricken out when the appointee elects to affirm rather than swear to the affidavits; only these words may be stricken and only when the appointee elects to affirm the affidavits.*

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : [illegible]

FORM DS 1032

JOURNAL NUMBER

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SERVICE

FS

1 NAME	2 EMPLOYEE NO.	3 BIRTH DATE	4 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
SHAW, ROBERT T. MR.	539700M	06-18-25	268-28-0199
2	(3) 06	08-28-48	0
9 LEGAL A	1	10A	11
		05-65	

12 NATURE OF ACTION	13 EFFECTIVE DATE	14 CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
980B APPOINTMENT AS SECRETARY IN THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE OF THE USA	11-20-70	SEC. 524 OF THE F.S. ACT

15 FROM: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	16 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE	17 GRADE	18 SALARY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OFFICER GENERAL - CONSUL			

19 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520

20 TO: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE	22 GRADE	23 SALARY
00-068 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OFFICER GENERAL D2 1ST SECRETARY-CONSUL	(FR-5510) ( )	03 001	(pa$24,368) F

24 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520

TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS		26 LOCATION CODE 918000430
27 APPROPRIATION 0113.0-2081-312601-000 09720972	28 POSITION OCCUPIED 2	29 APPORTIONED POSITION

30 REMARKS

NOMINATED: 09-28-70. CONFIRMED: 11-20-70. ATTESTED: 11-20-70.

APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AS SECRETARY IN THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE OF THE U.S.A., 11-20-70.

FEGLI COVERAGE REGULAR AND OPTIONAL.

EXECUTE SF 61.

31 DATE OF APPOINTMENT

AND TITLE

JOHN H. BURNS

ST 01 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBMITTING OFFICE NO. 2951

2 PERSONNEL FOLDER

11 20 70

14-00000

Form DS-1032
(Exception to SF 52 approved by CSC and B of B July 1962)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

22

PART I. REQUESTING OFFICE (Fill in items except those in heavy lines)

PAS/PC 11-24-70, [illegible]

A. DATE OF REQUEST: 6/22/70
B. [illegible] EFFECTIVE DATE:
C. REQUEST NUMBER:
D. SERVICE (FS or CSI): FS
E. ROUTING: ARA
1. T & RL 6/23/70
2. WHC
3. TRANS
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

1. NAME (CAPS) Last-First-Middle: SHAW, ROBERT T.
MR. MISS MRS: MR.
2. EMPLOYEE NO. & SEX: 539700 M
3. BIRTH DATE (Mo. Da. Yr.): 06/18/25
4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

F. KIND OF ACTION REQUESTED (1) PERSONNEL (Specify appointment, reassignment, resignation etc.)
G. POSITION: PAY CODE / SKILL CODES
(2) POSITION (Specify establish, review, abolish etc.)
H. POSITION VACATED: 1 - Remain funded 2 - Unfund 3 - Abolish

5. VETERAN PREFERENCE: 1 - NO; 2 - 5 PT; 3 - 10 PT. DISAB.; 4 - 10 PT. COMP.; 5 - 10 PT. OTHER
6. TENURE / CODE
7. SERVICE COMP. DATE
8. PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE
9. FEGLI: 1 - COVERED; 2 - INELIGIBLE; 3 - WAIVED
(4)
10. RETIREMENT: 1 - CS; 2 - FICA; 3 - FS; 4 - NONE; 5 - OTHER
10A. MO. & YR. OF GRADE.
11. (For CSC use)

12. NATURE OF ACTION: 980B ~~REQUEST FOR~~ APPOINTMENT AS SECRETARY IN THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE of U.S.A.
13. EFFECTIVE DATE (M-D-Y): 11-20-70
14. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Sec. 524 of the F.S. Act

15. FROM: POS. NO.: ~~1-025~~
POSITION TITLE: International Relations Officer General ~~POLITICAL OFFICER~~ CONSUL
16. [illegible] AND OCCUPATIONAL CODE: ~~FR-5550~~
17. GRADE OR LEVEL: ~~03~~
18. SALARY: ~~$22,332~~
19. ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION: ~~V. CINI~~

20. TO: POS. NO.: ~~10~~ 00-068 ~~[illegible]~~
21. POSITION TITLE: International Relations Officer General ~~POLITICAL OFFICER~~
D2 1ST SECRETARY — CONSUL
OCCUPATIONAL CODE: FR-~~5550~~ 5510 (P-S-F) (Pers)
22. GRADE: 03
STEP: 001
23. SALARY: $24,368 ~~$22,332~~ NEXT PR DUE
WORK SCHED.: F
24. ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION: ~~TEGUCIGALPA~~

25. DUTY STATION (City State): TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS
26. LOCATION CODE: 918000430
27. APPROPRIATION CODE: 0113.0 — 2081 — 312601-660
28. POSITION OCCUPIED: 1. COMPETITIVE SERVICE 2. EXCEPTED: 2
29. APPORTIONED POSITION: FROM / STATE / TO / STATE

I. REMARKS (Show if applicable, any known additional modified reason for resignation) 04720972

EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSFER: 9/6/70

(H)

J. REQUESTED BY:
SIGNATURE
TITLE: MEAshe, ARA-LA:POD

K. REQUEST APPROVED BY (The position is fully justifiable under Sec. 1007, P.L. 87-793)
SIGNATURE
TITLE: JCLARK

PART II. TO BE COMPLETED BY PERSONNEL OFFICE (Items inside heavy lines in PART I above also to be Completed)

L. CLEARANCES	INITIALS OR SIGNATURE	DATE
(1)		
(2) CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
(3) CLASSIFICATION		
(4) EMPLOYMENT		
(5)		

☐ ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING SATISFACTORY ☐ ☐ NEW ☐ [illegible] ☐ REGRADED
☐ SUBJECT TO COMPLETION OF 1 YEAR PROBATIONARY PERIOD COMMENCING
☐ SERVICE COUNTING TOWARD CAREER TENURE FROM
☐ SUCCESSOR POSITION - EMPLOYEE RETAINED IN THE COMPETITIVE SERVICE
[illegible] ☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible]

(6) APPROVED BY
TITLE & RANK - BLGROVES Biz 6/23/70

11/25

ARA:LA:POD:MEAshe 6/22/70

PART III. TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

RESIGNATION (IMPORTANT—NOTE TO EMPLOYEE: Give specific reasons for your resignation. Avoid generalized reasons, such as "ill health," "personal reasons.")

I RESIGN FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

(Date resignation is written)

THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF MY RESIGNATION WILL BE

(Signature)

PART IV. SEPARATION DATA

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS:

(Street) (City) (Zone) (State)

PART I. (Continued)

I. REMARKS BY REQUESTING OFFICE:

Rec'd FSC 6-23-70

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PERSONNEL ACTION
AND
AUTHORIZATION OF OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Applicable Regulations: 6 FAM 100 & FM-1 510.4

You are hereby authorized to perform official travel at Government expense as indicated herein. Unless otherwise noted all expenses and the maximum per diem under the regulations are authorized. Unless otherwise noted, shipment of effects is authorized from station of origin to station of destination if allowances are shown in item 15.

1. NAME, ADDRESS AND DIPLOMATIC TITLE
SHAW, ROBERT T.
AMERICAN EMBASSY
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA
CONSUL *1ST SECRETARY (WHEN CONFIRMED)

2. EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 539700
3. AUTHORIZATION NUMBER: 0-64968
4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 268-28-0199
5. CLASS: R-03
6. AUTHORIZATION DATE: JUN. 24, 1970
7. NEW POSITION TITLE NUMBER AND OCCUPATION CODE: POLITICAL OFFICER 5550 ( ) 10-025 (P)
8. DO NOT START TRAVEL PRIOR TO: JUL. 9, 1970

9. ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION The coding (A through E) must be shown on all documents issued under this authority and must appear on all vouchers, invoices, TR's, GB/L's, etc.

A. FUND	B. ALLOTMENT	C. OBLIGATION NUMBER	D. ORGANIZATION CODE	E. FUNCTION
1900113	2025	064968	312601	51-24

10A STATION OF ORIGIN: MANAGUA, NICARAGUA
10B LOCATION CODE: 313001
11. OBJECT: 2099
12. STATION OF DESTINATION: TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS
13. AMOUNT:

14. QUARTERS AVAILABILITY (1. UNKNOWN 2. UNFURNISHED 3. FURNISHED): 1
15. ALLOWANCES FOR SHIPMENT AND/OR STORAGE OF HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS—NET WEIGHT
A. LIMITED SHIPMENT: 04500
B. TOTAL ALLOWANCE: 13000
16. FOREIGN MOTOR VEHICLE
A. SHIPMENT AUTHORIZED (1. YES 2. NO): 2
B. MEETS CRITERIA OF 6 FAM 165.8 SUBSECTION:

17. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS
A. ADULTS: 4
CHILDREN B. 2 to 12: 0
C. Under 2: 0
18. EXCESS BAGGAGE (For air travel): 000
19. TOTAL NUMBER OF NON TRAVEL DAYS AUTHORIZED BELOW, INCLUDING THOSE WITHOUT PER DIEM UNDER THIS AUTHORIZATION (AND AMENDMENTS)
A. CONSULTATION (WORKDAYS): 05
B. TRAINING (CALENDAR DAYS): 000
C. TDY (CALENDAR DAYS): 000

THIS SECTION FOR PERSONNEL ACTION ONLY. When completed for permanent change of station, this document constitutes a valid personnel action for Transfer between Posts. DO NOT USE FOR R. T. HOME LEAVE OR FIELD AMENDMENTS.

20. SALARY: pa $ 24,368
21. SALARY APPROPRIATION AND ALLOTMENT: 0113.0-2081
22. NATURE OF ACTION AND EFFECTIVE DATE: 727 09/06/70 09720972
23. DPL. CODE: DA 06250

24. ITINERARY, SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS, SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION AND REMARKS

Leave at Government expense at Tucson, Arizona and transfer.
Approximately five (05) workdays consultation authorized in the Department after home leave.
Tour of duty of two years followed by home leave and transfer (subject to needs of the service).
"*ONLY AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION FROM THE DEPARTMENT THAT OFFICER HAS BEEN COMMISSIONED AS A SECRETARY IN THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE (3 FAM 015.3)".

DEPENDENTS:

WIFE	JANET	
DAU	BARBARA LEE	07/27/52
SON	RICHARD W.	09/10/55
SON	THOMAS R.	09/10/55

25. ETD (Old post):
26. ETA (New post): 09/70
27. AUTHORIZING OFFICER:
28. AUTHORIZED ITINERARY FOR DEPENDENTS: MANAGUA/TUCSON/TEGUCIGALPA
29. TRAVEL REQUESTED BY
A. OFFICE: ARA/LA/PCD
B. OFFICER: NEASHE CAR/32

FORM DS 1428
4-66

FORM DS-1042
3-3-69

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP

S660200199

POST	ORG CODE	POSITION NO.	ALLOT & ACTIVITY & PURPOSE	EFFECTIVE DATE	DATE OF LAST EQUIV. INCREASE
MANAGUA	3130		01130 2.81	07-01-70	

EMPLOYEE'S NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	CATG & CLASS SERV. & GRADE	NEW SALARY RATE	OLD SALARY RATE	
SHAW ROBERT T	539700	FSR 03	$24,368	$23,672	☒ Periodic Step-Increase

LWOP DATA (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP. TOTAL EXCESS LWOP ____________
(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.

____________ Initials of Clerk

☐ Other Step-Increase ____________

☐ Pay Adjustment

REMARKS

Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

JOHN M BURNS
____
(Signature or other authentication)

PERSONNEL COPY

PAGE [illegible]

FEDERAL SALARY ACT-1970, PL 90-206, DEC 27,1967

PREPARED ON 05/01/70
DATA AS OF 04/24/70

NAME	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	SOC SEC NUMBER	PAY PLAN	GRADE	NEXT PSI	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SHARP MAY P	539037	227185192	GS	11	052	13103	13890
SHARP PAULA ANN	539048	479502701	FS	09	190	7094	7519
SHARPE RICHARD G	539125	185242276	FS	05	051	10785	11432
SHARPE THOMAS J	539132	053326442	FS	08	252	8239	8734
SHAUGHNESSY THOMAS H	539200	157032254	GS	11	131	13103	13890
SHAW CHARLES W	539300	543346550	FS	05	051	10785	11432
SHAW C GRANT	539319	387244034	FR	02	000	27354	28995
SHAW DAVID G	539325	115244671	FO	05	000	14132	14980
SHAW ELLEN J	539400	362093790	GS	09	161	11186	11855
SHAW JEAN ANN	539438	045406165	FS	09	120	6568	6961
SHAW JOHN R	539445	267467823	FS	06	170	9388	9951
SHAW JOHN E	539500	577165966	FO	02	CCC	29841	31632
SHAW JOHN P	539525	579207044	FO	01	001	31705	33609
SHAW LAURENA ANN	539535	577303868	GS	04	CCC	5522	5853
SHAW OLIVER E	539615	489348679	FS	06	170	9104	9649
SHAW ROBERT T	539700	268280193	FR	03	000	22332	23672
SHAY GERTRUDE E	539800	313348828	FS	05	163	11419	12104
SHAY SHARON K	539806	166365892	FS	09	029	6865	7276
SHEA DIANNE E	539848	218505250	FS	08	210	6865	7276
SHEA JAMES F	540000	054141035	FO	04	000	18447	19555
SHEA JOHN J	540100	126164639	FR	03	000	20361	21584
SHEA LAUREL M	540103	021366235	GS	07	160	7894	8368
SHEA TIMOTHY F	540106	022305456	FS	08	110	7552	8005
SHEA TERENCE J	540107	[illegible]	GS	14	071	20385	21608
SHEAFFER MELVIN H	540108	204305089	FS	05	041	10469	11096
SHEAGREN BARBARA J	540109	388288173	FS	04	041	11316	11995

```
                         PERSONNEL TRANSACTION REGISTER
     EMPLOYEE
                                                          PREPARED ON    07/23/69
  SHAW ROBERT T                      S 268-28-0199        PERIOD ENDING 07/18/69
  ACTION          DATA NAME                DATA ELEMENTS
                SECTION 01
                    EMPLOYEE NUMBER       539700
                    SSN ID CODE           S
                    SOC SEC NUMBER        268-28-0199
                    NEW PAY PLAN          FR
                    NEW GRADE             03
                    NEW SALARY            22332
                    PSI PAY PERIOD        000
  * ERROR           FORM CTL CODE
                    NAT ACTION CODE       902
                                          PUBLIC LAW PAY INCREASE

                    EFFECTIVE DATE        07/13/69
```

14-00000

FORM DS-1042
3-1-60

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP

52082PH199

POST	ORG. CODE	POSITION NO.	ALLOT. & ACTIVITY & PURPOSE	EFFECTIVE DATE	DATE OF LAST EQUIV. INCREASE
MANAGUA	3130		01130 2481	07-01-69	

EMPLOYEE'S NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	CATG. & CLASS SERV. & GRADE	NEW SALARY RATE	OLD SALARY RATE	
SPAN ROBERT T	939700	FSR 03	$20,335	$19,737	☒ Periodic Step Increase

LWOP DATA (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP. TOTAL EXCESS LWOP ____________
(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.

Initials of Clerk

☐ Other Step-Increase ____________

☐ Pay Adjustment

REMARKS

Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

JOHN H STEEVES

(Signature or other authentication)

PERSONNEL COPY

FORM DS-1042
7-15-60

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP

POST	ORG. CODE	POSITION NO.	ALLOT. & ACTIVITY & PURPOSE	EFFECTIVE DATE	DATE OF LAST EQUIV. INCREASE
MANAGUA	3130		01130 6081	7-01-68	

EMPLOYEE'S NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	CATG. & CLASS SERV. & GRADE	NEW SALARY RATE	OLD SALARY RATE	
SPAN ROBERT T	939700	FSR 03	$18,270	$17,729	☒ Periodic Step Increase

LWOP DATA (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP. TOTAL EXCESS LWOP ____________
(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.

Initials of Clerk

☐ Other Step Increase ____________

☐ Pay Adjustment

REMARKS

Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

JOHN H. STEEVES

(Signature or other authentication)

PERSONNEL COPY

```
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES SALARY ACT OF 1967
PUB. LAW 90-206
JULY 14 1968

5397C0   SHAW ROBERT T            FR 03-04   $18,278   $19,737   313001
```

FORM FS 1932
11-63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JOURNAL NUMBER

SERVICE
FS

1 NAME (CAPS) LAST FIRST MIDDLE SHAW, ROBERT T. MR.	2 EMPLOYEE NO. & SEX 539700M	3 BIRTH DATE 06-18-25	4 SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 268-28-0199
5 VETERAN PREFERENCE 2	6 TENURE (3) CODE 06	7 SERVICE COMP. DATE 08-28-48	8 PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE 0
9 FEGLI 1	10 RETIREMENT 1	10A MO. & YR. OF GRADE 05-65	11
12 NATURE OF ACTION 760 EXTENSION OF LIMITED APPOINTMENT	13 EFFECTIVE DATE 03-27-68	14 CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY SEC. 522.3, P.L. 724 79TH CONGRESS AS AMENDED	

15 FROM: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	16 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE	17 GRADE	18 SALARY
19 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520			

20 TO: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 1-067 POLITICAL OFFICER ATTACHE CONSUL Q	21 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE (FR-5550) ( )	22 GRADE 03 138	23 SALARY WORK SCHED. (pa$17,724) 1
24 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520			

25 DUTY STATION MANAGUA, NICARAGUA		26 LOCATION CODE 917000665
27 APPROPRIATION 0113.0-2081-313001-000.10700768	28 POSITION OCCUPIED 2	29 APPORTIONED POSITION

30 REMARKS ☐ A. SUBJECT TO COMPLETION OF 1 YEAR PROBATIONARY (OR TRIAL) PERIOD COMMENCING
☐ B. SERVICE COUNTING TOWARD CAREER (OR PERMANENT) TENURE FROM

SEPARATIONS: SHOW REASON BELOW, AS REQUIRED. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ C. DURING PROBATION ☐ D. FROM APPOINTMENT OF 6 MONTHS OR LESS

LIMITED APPOINTMENT EFFECTIVE 3-27-63 IS HEREBY EXTENDED FOR ~~[illegible]~~ A PERIO
NOT TO EXCEED FIVE YEARS OR NEEDS OF EMPLOYER, SERVICE, WHICHEVER IS LESS.
NTE 3-26-73.

31 DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVIT

32 OFFICE MAINTAINING PERSONNEL FOLDER

33 CODE EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY

34 SIGNATURE AND TITLE

35 DATE

37 01 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBMITTING OFFICE NO. 2051

MI 3-5
P

2 PERSONNEL FOLDER

Form 1091

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

PART I. REQUESTING OFFICE (Fill in items except those in heavy lines)

A DATE OF REQUEST: 2/23/68

B

C REQUEST NUMBER

D SERVICE: FS

ARA	TRANS	6
FM/FC 2/26		7
LEAVE & RET 3/27		8

APPROVED

1 NAME (CAPS) Last First Middle — MR MISS MRS: SHAW, ROBERT T. MR.

2 EMPLOYEE NO & SEX: 539700 M

3 BIRTH DATE: 6/18/25

4 SOCIAL SECURITY

F KIND OF ACTION REQUESTED (1) PERSONNEL

RIF CODE

G POSITION — SKILL CODES

(2) POSITION

H POSITION VACATED

5 VETERAN PREFERENCE: 1 - NO 2 - 5 PT 3 - 10 PT DISAB 4 - 10 PT COMP 5 - 10 PT OTHER

6 TENURE — CODE

7 SERVICE COMP DATE

8 PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE

9 FEGLI: 1 - COVERED 2 - INELIGIBLE 3 - WAIVED

10 RETIREMENT: 1 - CS 2 - FICA 3 - FS 4 - NONE 5 - OTHER

10A MO & YR OF GRADE

11

12 NATURE OF ACTION: 760 EXTENSION ~~FOR~~ of LIMITED APPOINTMENT

13 EFFECTIVE DATE: 3/27/68

14 CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Sec. 522.3, P.L. 724-79th Congress as amended

15 FROM POS NO: 1-067

POSITION TITLE: POLITICAL OFFICER

16 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE: FR-5550

17 GRADE OR LEVEL: 03

18 SALARY: $16,941

19 ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION: MANAGUA

20 TO POS NO: 1-067

POSITION TITLE: POLITICAL OFFICER ATTACHE - CONSUL

21 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE: FR-5550

22 GRADE: 03

STEP

23 SALARY: $17,724 ~~$16,941~~

WORK SCHED

Level 3

138

24 ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION: Managua

25 DUTY STATION: MANAGUA, Nicaragua

26 LOCATION CODE: 9117000465

27 APPROPRIATION: 0113.0 — 2021 — 313001

REMARKS: Limited appointment effective 3-27-63 is hereby extended for a period not to exceed five years or needs of employees services ~~xxx~~ whichever is less. NTE 3-26-73

100168

APPOINTMENT NTE FIVE YEARS OR NEEDS WHICHEVER IS LESS. NTE 3/26/73.

CTIVE 3/27/63

SIGNATURE: Meashe

TITLE: MEASHE, ARA:MGT:SOP

REQUEST APPROVED BY

SIGNATURE

TITLE: RCBREWIN, ARA:MGT:SOP

PART II. TO BE COMPLETED BY PERSONNEL OFFICE

1 CLEARANCES 3/5	INITIALS OR SIGNATURE	DATE
(1)		
(2) CEIL OR POS CONTROL		
(3) CLASSIFICATION		
(4) EMPLOYMENT		
(5)		

(6) APPROVED BY

☐ ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING SATISFACTORY ☐ ☐ NEW ☐ ☐ REGRADED

☐ SUBJECT TO COMPLETION OF 1 YEAR PROBATIONARY PERIOD COMMENCING

☐ SERVICE COUNTING TOWARD CAREER TENURE FROM

☐ SUCCESSOR POSITION. EMPLOYEE RETAINED IN THE COMPETITIVE SERVICE

SEPARATIONS: SHOW REASON BELOW. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ ☐

2-28

ARA:MGT:SOP:MEashe 2/23/68

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES SALARY ACT OF 1967

PUB. LAW 90-206

OCTOBER 8 1967

339700 SHAW ROBERT T FR 03-03 $16,941 $17,724 313001

~~FEDERAL EMPLOYEES SALARY ACT OF 1966~~

PUB. LAW 89-504

~~1 JULY 1966~~

~~339700 SHAW ROBERT T FR 03-02 $15,929 $16,391 312801~~

FORM DS-1042
7-15-60

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP

POST MANAGUA	ORG. CODE 3130	POSITION NO.	ALLOT. & ACTIVITY & PURPOSE 01130 2081	EFFECTIVE DATE 7-01-67	DATE OF LAST EQUIV. INCREASE
EMPLOYEE'S NAME SHAW ROBERT T	EMPLOYEE NO. 339700	CATG & CLASS SERV. & GRADE FSR 03	NEW SALARY RATE $16,941	OLD SALARY RATE $16,391	☒ Periodic Step-Increase

LWOP DATA (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)

Periods

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP. TOTAL EXCESS LWOP ______

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.

Initials of Clerk ______

☐ Other Step Increase ______

☐ Pay Adjustment

REMARKS

Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

JOHN H. STEEVES

______
Signature of other Documentation

PERSONNEL COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PERSONNEL ACTION AND AUTHORIZATION OF OFFICIAL TRAVEL

Applicable Regulations: 6 FAM 100 & FM-1 510.4

You are hereby authorized to perform official travel at Government expense as indicated herein. Unless otherwise noted, all expenses and the maximum per diem under the regulations are authorized. Unless otherwise noted, shipment of effects is authorized from station of origin to station of destination if allowances are shown in item 15

1 NAME, ADDRESS AND DIPLOMATIC TITLE
SHAW, ROBERT T.
AMERICAN EMBASSY
MEXICO, D. F., MEXICO
CONSUL
ATTACHE

2 EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 539700
3 AUTHORIZATION NUMBER: 7-60514
4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 268-28-0199
5 CLASS: R-03
6. AUTHORIZATION DATE: JULY 6, 1966
7. NEW POSITION TITLE, NUMBER AND OCCUPATION CODE: POLITICAL OFFICER 1011 1-067(P)
8 DO NOT START TRAVEL PRIOR TO:

9. ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION. The coding "A through E" must be shown on all documents issued under this authority and must appear on all vouchers, invoices, TR's, GBL's, etc.

A. FUND	B. ALLOTMENT	C. OBLIGATION NUMBER	D. ORGANIZATION CODE	E. FUNCTION
1970113	2025	760514	313001	50-05

10A STATION OF ORIGIN: MEXICO, D.F., MEXICO
10B LOCATION CODE: 312901
11 OBJECT: 2099
12 STATION OF DESTINATION: MANAGUA, NICARAGUA
13. AMOUNT:

14 QUARTERS AVAILABILITY: 1 (1 UNKNOWN, 2 UNFURNISHED, 3 FURNISHED)

15. ALLOWANCES FOR SHIPMENT AND/OR STORAGE OF HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS - NET WEIGHT
A. LIMITED SHIPMENT: 03900
B. TOTAL ALLOWANCE: 13000

16 FOREIGN MOTOR VEHICLE
A. SHIPMENT AUTHORIZED: 2 (1 YES, 2. NO)
B. MEETS CRITERIA OF 6 FAM 165.2, SUBSECTION:

17 NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS
A. ADULTS: 2
CHILDREN B. 2 to 12: 2
C. Under 2: 0

18 EXCESS BAGGAGE (For air travel): 000

19 TOTAL NUMBER OF NONTRAVEL DAYS AUTHORIZED BELOW, INCLUDING THOSE WITHOUT PER DIEM UNDER THIS AUTHORIZATION (AND AMENDMENTS)
A. CONSULTATION (WORKDAYS): 00
B. TRAINING (CALENDAR DAYS): 000
C. TDY (CALENDAR DAYS): 000

THIS SECTION FOR PERSONNEL ACTION ONLY. When completed for permanent change of station, this document constitutes a valid personnel action for Transfer between Posts. **DO NOT USE FOR R. T. HOME LEAVE OR FIELD AMENDMENTS.**

20 SALARY: pa $ 16,391
21 SALARY APPROPRIATION AND ALLOTMENT: 01130 2081
22 NATURE OF ACTION AND EFFECTIVE DATE: 727 07-17-66 10700766
23 DPL CODE: Q 08036

24 ITINERARY, SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS, SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION AND REMARKS

Transfer.

Tour of duty of four years with home leave after two years (Subject to the needs of the Service).

25 ETD (Old post):
26 ETA (New post):
27 AUTHORIZING OFFICER: JOHN M. STEEVES

28 AUTHORIZED ITINERARY FOR DEPENDENTS: MEXICO/MANAGUA

29 TRAVEL REQUESTED BY
A. OFFICE: ARA/EX
B. OFFICER: JONES

6

FORM DS 1038
12-65

RBB

14-00000

Form DS-1031
1-63

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

PART I. REQUESTING OFFICE

A DATE OF REQUEST: 7/5/66
B PROPOSED EFFECTIVE DATE:
C REQUEST NUMBER:
D SERVICE: FS
E ROUTING: 7/11/66 ; 7/5 ; 3 CS/CS ; 7/5/66

1 NAME (CAPS) Last First Middle: SHAW, Robert T.
MR MISS MRS: Mr.
2 EMPLOYEE NO & SEX: ~~XXXX~~ 539700
3 BIRTH DATE: 06/18/25
4 SOCIAL SECURITY NO: 268-28-0199

F KIND OF ACTION REQUESTED (1) PERSONNEL
RIF CODE
G POSITION SKILL CODES
(2) POSITION
H POSITION VACATED

5 VETERAN PREFERENCE 1-NO 2-5 PT 3-10 PT DISAB 4-10 PT COMP 5-10 PT OTHER
6 TENURE CODE
7 SERVICE COMP DATE
8 PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE
9 FEGLI 1-COVERED 2-INELIGIBLE 3-WAIVED
10 RETIREMENT 1-CS 2-FICA 3-FS 4-NONE 5-OTHER
10A MO & YR OF GRADE
11

12 NATURE OF ACTION CODE: 727 Transfer
13 EFFECTIVE DATE: 7/17/66
14 CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

15 FROM: POS NO: 3-229
POSITION TITLE: Consul Consular Officer
16 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE: FR-3011
17 GRADE OR LEVEL: 03
18 SALARY: ~~pa$15,395~~ 16,391
19 ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION: Mexico, D.F. Mexico

20 TO: POS NO: 1-067
OPL CODE: 9
POSITION TITLE: Political Officer Consul — Attache
21 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE: FR-1011
22 GRADE: 03
STEP
23 SALARY: 16,391 ~~pa, 15,395~~
NEXT PSI DUE: ~~15,727~~
WORK SCHED
24 ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION: MANAGUA (V.PATTON)

1070
[redacted] 0268

25 DUTY STATION (City State): Managua, Nicaragua
26 LOCATION CODE
27 APPROPRIATION CODE: 01130 ~~8?~~-2081 313001 C-CC
28 POSITION OCCUPIED 1-COMPETITIVE SERVICE 2-EXCEPTED SERVICE: 2
29 APPORTIONED POSITION FROM TO STATE

I REMARKS

Tour of duty four years with home leave after two years (subject to the needs of the Service).

ETA: 7/15/66.

J REQUESTED BY
SIGNATURE: Jones
TITLE: ARA:SCP:E.Jones

K REQUEST APPROVED BY
SIGNATURE: W.W. Wiechert
TITLE: ARA:SCP:W.Wiechert

PART II. TO BE COMPLETED BY PERSONNEL OFFICE

CLEARANCES	INITIALS OR SIGNATURE	DATE
(1)		
(2) CEIL OR POS CONTROL		
(3) CLASSIFICATION		
(4) EMPLOYMENT		
(5)		
APPROVED BY M.S.Gould	MSGould	7/5/66

☐ ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING SATISFACTORY ☐ ☐ NEW ☐ ☐ REGRADED
☐ SUBJECT TO COMPLETION OF 1 YEAR PROBATIONARY PERIOD COMMENCING
☐ SERVICE COUNTING TOWARD CAREER TENURE FROM
☐ SUCCESSOR POSITION EMPLOYEE RETAINED IN THE COMPETITIVE SERVICE
SEPARATIONS SHOW REASON BELOW CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ ☐

14-00000

FORM DS-1042
7-15-60

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP

POST MEXICO D.F	ORG CODE 3128	POSITION NO.	ALLOT & ACTIVITY & PURPOSE 01130 2081	EFFECTIVE DATE 7-01-66	DATE OF LAST EQUIV. INCREASE
EMPLOYEE'S NAME SHAW ROBERT T	EMPLOYEE NO. 539700	CATG. & CLASS SERV. & GRADE FSR 03	NEW SALARY RATE $15,929	OLD SALARY RATE $15,395	☒ Periodic Step-Increase

LWOP DATA (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP. TOTAL EXCESS LWOP ____________
(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.

____________ Initials of Clerk

☐ Other Step-Increase ____________

☐ Pay Adjustment

REMARKS

Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

JAMES E. HOOFNAGLE
(Signature or other authentication)

PERSONNEL COPY

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES SALARY ACT OF 1965
PUB. LAW 89-301
15 NOVEMBER 1965

539700 SHAW ROBERT T FR 03-01 $14,860 $15,395 312801

FORM DS 1032

JOURNAL NUMBER

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SERVICE
FS

1 NAME (CAPS) LAST FIRST MIDDLE MR MISS MRS SHAW, ROBERT T. MR.	2 EMPLOYEE NO & SEX 539700M	3 BIRTH DATE 06-18-25	4 SOCIAL SECURITY NO 268-28-0199
5 VETERAN PREFERENCE 1-NO 2-5 PT 3-10 PT DISAB 4-10 PT COMP 5-10 PT OTHER 2	6 TENURE (3) CODE 06	7 SERVICE COMP DATE 08-28-48	8 PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE 0
9 FEGLI 1-COVERED 2-INELIGIBLE 3-WAIVED 1	10 RETIREMENT 1	10A MO & YR OF GRADE 05-65	11
12 NATURE OF ACTION 702 PROMOTION CODE	13 EFFECTIVE DATE 05-26-65	14 CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	

15 FROM POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	16 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE FR-	17 GRADE 04	18 SALARY (pa$13,335)
19 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520			

20 TO POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 3-229 CONSULAR OFFICER V CONSUL	21 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE (FR-03011) 007	22 GRADE 03	23 SALARY WORK SCHED (pa$14,860) 1
24 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520			

25 DUTY STATION MEXICO,D.F.,MEXICO			26 LOCATION CODE 915300595
27 APPROPRIATION 0868 0113.0-2081-312801-000 08680965	28 POSITION OCCUPIED 1-COMPETITIVE 2-EXCEPTED SERVICE 2	29 APPORTIONED POSITION FROM 1-PROVED 2-WAIVED	TO STATE

30 REMARKS ☐ A. SUBJECT TO COMPLETION OF 1 YEAR PROBATIONARY (OR TRIAL) PERIOD COMMENCING

☐ B. SERVICE COUNTING TOWARD CAREER (OR PERMANENT) TENURE FROM

The grade of the position to which you are officially assigned may be reviewed and corrected by the Department or by the Civil Service Commission.

31 DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVIT

32 OFFICE MAINTAINING PERSONNEL FOLDER

33 CODE EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY

34 SIGNATURE AND TITLE
ROBERT DONHAUSER

35 DATE

ST 01 | DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBMITTING OFFICE NO 2951

2 PERSONNEL FOLDER

JL

05 26 65

14-00000

PAY INC. EFF. 7-5-64 PL 88-426

NAME	PAY PLAN	CLASS	FROM SALARY	TO SALARY	STEP	ORGAN
SHAW ROBERT T	FR	4	12,880	13,335	4	312801

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FORM DS-1042
7-15-60

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP

POST	ORG CODE	POSITION NO.	ALLOT & ACTIVITY & PURPOSE	EFFECTIVE DATE	DATE OF LAST EQUITY INCREASE
MEXICO CITY AJ	3128		NO CHANGE	7-01-64	

EMPLOYEE'S NAME	EMPLOYEE NO	CATG & CLASS SERV & GRADE	NEW SALARY RATE	OLD SALARY RATE	
SHAW ROBERT T	830760	FSR 4	$ 12,880	$ 12,490	☒ Periodic Step-Increase

LWOP DATA (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s).
☐ NO EXCESS LWOP TOTAL EXCESS LWOP ____________
(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP,
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
Initials of Clerk

☐ Other Step-Increase ____________

☐ Pay Adjustment

REMARKS

Performance rating is satisfactory or better

EARL D. SOHM

(Signature or other authorization)

PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

NAME	PAY PLAN	CLASS	FROM SALARY	TO SALARY	STEP	ORGN
SHAW ROBERT T	FR	04	$ 11,880	$ 12,495	03	312801

STANDARD FORM NO. 61a
REVISED JUNE [illegible]
APPROVED BY:
COMP. GEN., U. S.
MARCH [illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A8

CIVIL OFFICER APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

(As defined in 5 USC 21a and 21b)

United Mexican States
Federal District
City of México
Embassy of the United
States of America
} SS:

PER file

I, Robert T. Shaw (Name in full) Arizona (State)

do solemnly swear (or affirm) that

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

Robert T. Shaw (Type name of appointee)

Robert T. Shaw (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 15th day of October, A. D. 19 63,

at Mexico, D. F., Mexico (City) (State)

(Signature of officer)

[SEAL]

C. L. REEVES
Consul of the United States of America
(Title)

Department of State (Department or agency)

Foreign Service of the U.S. (Bureau or division)

Mexico D.F., Mexico (Place of employment)

Consul (Position to which appointed)

September 10, 1963 (Date of entrance on duty)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U. S. C. 18, or by a person designated to administer oaths under Section 206, Act of June 26, 1943, 5 U. S. C. 16a. If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

[illegible] U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

14-00000

FORM DS-1032
1-63

JOURNAL NUMBER

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SERVICE: FS

1 NAME (CAPS) LAST FIRST MIDDLE — MR MISS MRS: SHAW, ROBERT T. MR.
2 EMPLOYEE NO.: 539700M
3 BIRTH DATE: 06-18-25
4 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 268-28-0199
5 VETERAN PREFERENCE (1 NO, 2 5 PT, 3 10 PT DISAB, 4 10 PT COMP, 5 10 PT OTHER): 2
6 TENURE: (3) CODE: 0
7 SERVICE COMP DATE: 08-28-48
8 PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE: 0
9 FEGLI (1 COVERED, 2 INELIGIBLE, 3 WAIVED):
10 RETIREMENT (1 CS, 2 FICA, 3 FS, 4 NONE, 5 OTHER): 1
10A MO & YR OF GRADE: 03-63
11:
12 NATURE OF ACTION: 980 GRANTING OF CONSULAR TITLE
CODE
13 EFFECTIVE DATE: 09-10-63
14 CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

15 FROM POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER: CONSULAR OFFICER
16 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE:
17 GRADE:
18 SALARY:
19 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

20 TO: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER: 3-229 CONSULAR OFFICER
OFF. CODE: V CONSUL
21 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE: (FR-3011) FO
22 GRADE: (04) 06
STEP
23 SALARY: (pa$11,880) 1 15
NEXT PAY DUE
24 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

25 DUTY STATION: MEXICO CITY, D.F., MEXICO
26 LOCATION CODE: 915300595
27 APPROPRIATION: AJ -A-2081- 312801-32 A78
28 POSITION OCCUPIED (1 COMPETITIVE, 2 EXCEPTED SERVICE): 2
29 APPORTIONED POSITION (1 PROVED, 2 WAIVED): FROM TO STATE

30 REMARKS:

This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department. This action may be corrected or cancelled if not in accordance with all requirements.
The grade of the position to which you are officially assigned may be reviewed and corrected by the Department or by the Civil Service Commission.

NOMINATED: 08-26-63.
CONFIRMED: 09-09-63.
ATTESTED: 09-10-63.

EXECUTE SF-61A.
APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AS CONSUL OF THE USA 09-10-63.

31 DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVIT:
32 OFFICE MAINTAINING PERSONNEL FOLDER:
33 CODE EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: ST 01 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
34 SIGNATURE AND TITLE:
35 DATE:
SUBMITTING OFFICE NO 2951

CHP 2 PERSONNEL FOLDER

14-00000

Form DS-1031

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

PCS

PART I. REQUESTING OFFICE

A. DATE OF REQUEST: 2/26/63
B. PROPOSED EFFECTIVE DATE: ASAP
D. SERVICE: FS
E. ROUTING: PER:EMD 7/24 / POD:TR 7/18
POD:ARA
PER:POD
AAR
PHP/PS 770

F. NAME (CAPS) (Last-First-Middle): SHAW, ROBERT T.
MR.
2. EMPLOYEE NO.: 539700 M
3. BIRTH DATE: 06/18/25
4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 268-28-0199

RIF CODE
POSITION

5. VETERAN PREFERENCE: 2
1 - NO; 2 - 5 PT; 3 - 10 PT DISAB; 4 - 10 PT COMP; 5 - 10 PT OTHER

6. TENURE CODE: 3 G
7. SERVICE COMP DATE: 08-28-48
8. PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE
9. FEGLI: 1
1 - COVERED; 2 - INELIGIBLE; 3 - WAIVED
10. RETIREMENT: 1
1 - CS; 2 - FICA; 3 - FS; 4 - NONE; 5 - OTHER
10A. MO & YR OF GRADE: 03-63

12. NATURE OF ACTION: CODE 980 . Granting of Consular Title
13. EFFECTIVE DATE: 09-10-63
14. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Section ~~522, P. L. 724 - 79th. Congress as amended~~

15. FROM POS NO / POSITION TITLE: Consular Officer
16. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE
17. GRADE OR LEVEL
18. SALARY
19. ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION

20. TO POS NO: 3-229
POSITION TITLE: Consular Officer
Consul
OPL CODE: V
21. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE: FSR -3011 FO
22. GRADE: 04 0-6
STEP
23. SALARY: (p.a.$11,880). 15
WORK SCHED: 1
24. ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION

25. DUTY STATION: D.F. Mexico City, Mexico 312801-32-
26. LOCATION CODE: 915300595
27. APPROPRIATION: CODE 1J A-2081 ~~PROGRAM~~ ~~2160-2~~ 077
28. POSITION OCCUPIED: 2
29. APPORTIONED POSITION

[illegible] required.
Presidential Commission required.

~~APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AS CONSUL OF THE U. S. A. 09-10-63.~~

NOMINATED: 08-26-63
CONFIRMED: 09-09-63
ATTESTED : 09-10-63

EXECUTE SF 61a

APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AS ~~THE~~ CONSUL OF THE U. S. A. 09-10-63.

STANDARD FORM NO. 61a
REVISED JUNE 1950
APPROVED BY
COMP. GEN., U. S.
MARCH 28 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A4

CIVIL OFFICER APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

(As defined in 5 USC 21a and 21b)

I, Robert Tyler Shaw (Name in full) Arizona (State)

do solemnly swear (or affirm) that

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

Robert Tyler Shaw (Typed name of appointee) Robert T. Shaw (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 27th day of March, A. D. 1963,

at Washington, D. C. (City) (State)

Ronald C. Smith (Signature of officer)

[SEAL]

Sec. 206, Act of June 26, 1943 (Title)

Department of State (Department or agency) Foreign Service (Bureau or division) Mexico City (Place of employment)

Consular Officer - FSR-4 (Position to which appointed) EOD 3-27-63 (Date of entrance on duty)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U. S. C. 16, or by a person designated to administer oaths under Section 206, Act of June 26, 1943, 5 U. S. C. 16a. If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

Form DS-1032
[illegible] approved by
[illegible] Jun 1962)

Submitting office No. [illegible]
SERIAL NUMBER

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	SERVICE FS		
1 NAME (CAPS) LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE MR-MISS-MRS SHAW, ROBERT T. MR.	2 EMPLOYEE NO & SEX 539700M	3 BIRTH DATE 06-18-25	4 SOCIAL SECURITY NO 268-28-0199
2 — 5 VETERAN PREFERENCE: 1-NO, 2-5 PT, 3-10 PT DISAB, 4-10 PT COMP, 5-10 PT OTHER	6 TENURE GROUP (3) 0	7 SERVICE COMP DATE 12-17-48 ~~00-00-00~~	8 PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE 0
9 FEGLI: 1-COVERED, 2-INELIGIBLE, 3-WAIVED	10 RETIREMENT 1	10A MO & YR OF GRADE 03-63	11
12 NATURE OF ACTION 171 LIMITED APPOINTMENT CODE	13 EFFECTIVE DATE 03-27-63	14 CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY SEC. 522.1 PL 724-79TH AS AMENDED	
15 FROM: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	16 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE	17 GRADE	18 SALARY pa$
19 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE — DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.			
20 TO: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 3-229 CONSULAR OFFICER OPL CODE Z	21 PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE (FR-3011) FO	22 GRADE STEP (04) 06	23 SALARY WORK SCHED (pa$11,880) 1 15 NEXT PSI DUE
24 NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE — DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.			
25 DUTY STATION MEXICO D.F., MEXICO			26 LOCATION CODE 915300595
27 APPROPRIATION ORG OR POST CODE CITY CODE AJ -A-2081-3128-32 12801 A78	28 POSITION OCCUPIED 1-COMPETITIVE 2-EXCEPTED SERVICE 2	29 APPORTIONED POSITION FROM 1-PROVED 2-WAIVED	TO STATE

30 REMARKS
☐ A. SUBJECT TO COMPLETION OF 1 YEAR PROBATIONARY (OR TRIAL) PERIOD COMMENCING
☐ B. SERVICE COUNTING TOWARD CAREER (OR PERMANENT) TENURE FROM

SEPARATIONS: SHOW REASON BELOW, AS REQUIRED. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ C. DURING PROBATION ☐ D. FROM APPOINTMENT OF 6 MONTHS OR LESS

[illegible]

APPOINTMENT LIMITED TO FIVE YEARS OR NEED FOR EMPLOYEE'S SERVICES, WHICHEVER IS LESS.

TOUR OF DUTY OF FIVE YEARS WITH HOME LEAVE AFTER THREE YEARS SUBJECT TO THE NEEDS OF THE SERVICE).

31 DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVIT

32 OFFICE MAINTAINING PERSONNEL FOLDER

33 CODE EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY
ST 01 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

34 SIGNATURE AND TITLE
D. C. JELINEK

CHP

2 PERSONNEL [illegible]

14-00000

Form DS-1031

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

PART I. REQUESTING OFFICE

A. DATE OF REQUEST: 2/26/63
B. PROPOSED EFFECTIVE DATE: ASAP
C. REQUEST NUMBER:
D. SERVICE: FS
E. FOR: TRANS/NP 2/26 ~~TRANSFER~~ 3/4
FOD:TR 2/27/63 KAF

1. NAME (CAPS) Last First Middle: SHAW, ROBERT T.
MR. MISS MRS.: MR.
2. EMPLOYEE NO. & SEX: 537700 M
3. BIRTH DATE: 06/18/25
4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 260-28-0199

RIF CODE
POSITION SKILL CODES

12. POSITION
H. POSITION VACATED

5. VETERAN PREFERENCE: 2
1 - NO
2 - 5 PT
3 - 10 PT DISAB
4 - 10 PT COMP
5 - 10 PT OTHER

6. TENURE CODE: 3 G
7. SERVICE COMP DATE
8. PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE: 0

9. FEGLI
1 - COVERED
2 - INELIGIBLE
3 - WAIVED

10. RETIREMENT: 7
1 - CS
2 - FICA
3 - FS
4 - NONE
5 - OTHER

10A. MO & YR OF GRADE: 03-63
11.

12. NATURE OF ACTION: 171 ~~FSR~~ Appointment - ~~Limited~~ Limited
13. EFFECTIVE DATE: 3-27-63
14. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Section 522.1 - P. L. 724 - 79th. Congress as amended

15. FROM POS NO
POSITION TITLE
16. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE
17. GRADE OR LEVEL
18. SALARY
19. ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION

20. TO POS NO: 3-229
POSITION TITLE: Consular Officer ~~*Consul (when confirmed)~~
2
21. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE: FR- ~~FSR~~ 3011 F6
22. GRADE: 04 6-6
STEP
23. SALARY: (p.a. $11,880) 15
WORK SCHED.: 1

24. ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION: vice: Stewart

25. DUTY STATION: Mexico ~~City,~~ D.F., Mexico
LOCATION CODE: 9/5300595

AS A-2031 12301
PROGRAM 3128-32 A73
a 2
Alig

REMARKS: Authorize travel of appointee and dependents from Falls Church, Virginia to Mexico City. Authorize shipment of effects from Falls Church, Virginia and Williamsburg, Virginia to Mexico City. Authorize shipment of unaccompanied baggage from Falls Church, Virginia and/or Williamsburg, Virginia to Mexico City. Appointment limited to 5 years, or need of employee's services, whichever is less.
*See separate DS 1031 for Granting of Consular Title.
Tour of duty (a)

REQUESTED BY: FCD:ARA - Pierre R. Graham, Chief
SIGNATURE: Pierre R. Graham

REQUESTED BY: PER:FMO - David C. Jelinek
David C Jelinek

PART II. TO BE COMPLETED BY PERSONNEL OFFICE

Jules Bassin
Bassin
PSD-V Control 3/4/63

PER/CD:ARA:MEAshe 2/28/63 Appt CH

NOTIFICATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCE UNDER E.O. 10450

TO: Director, Office of Personnel
Attn: Mr. John Ordway

DATE: February 1, 1963

SUBJECT: SHAW, Robert Tyler
(DOB: 6/18/25)

☒ APPLICANT. If subject is not appointed within 90 days of the date of this notification, this clearance must be revalidated by the Office of Security.

☐ EMPLOYEE.

The case of above-named person has been reviewed in the Office of Security.

Investigative requirements of Executive Order 10450 have been complied with.

It has been determined that the employment or retention in employment of subject is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.

On the basis of this determination clearance is hereby granted. This clearance shall remain in effect for all purposes until further notice except that prior approval must continue to be requested from the Office of Security in the event of marriage to an alien, Presidential appointment, any appointment requiring Senate confirmation, and transfers or assignments to the Office of Security, R Area Special Projects Staff, and cryptographic duties. (This determination shall not eliminate or modify any other determination on security which may be required by law).

REMARKS:

☐ Investigative reports are attached. Please return these reports to the Office of Security within 10 days together with the names of the individuals who have reviewed them listed on the extra copy of this form herewith furnished.

☐

John F. Reilly

~~Director, Office of Security~~
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security

ATTACHMENTS

O/SY:JFReilly:ec

This memorandum may be considered as OFFICIAL USE ONLY upon removal of attachments.

UNCLASSIFIED/Mexico City

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1954
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS [illegible] AND [illegible]

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete **Part I** and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): SHAW, Robert T.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 6-18-25

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
FOREIGN SERVICE DEPT OF STATE	49	10		52	2		
" "	52	5		54	7		
DEPT OF DEFENSE	54	7		56	5		
FOREIGN SERVICE	56	6		61	5		
DEPT OF STATE	61	5		63	3		

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE"

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	DISCHARGE (Hon. or dishon.?)
ARMY	43	9	11	45	3	8	HON.

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☐ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar)	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	TOTAL YEARS	TOTAL MONTHS	TOTAL DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(If answer is "Yes," in what agency [illegible])

7. ARE YOU:
a. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
b. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
c. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

NA

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

EOD 3-27-63
(DATE)

Robert T Shaw
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 27th day of March (MONTH) 19 63 at Washington (CITY) D. C. (STATE)

SEAL

Ronald C. Smith

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date [illegible] Commission [illegible] should be shown.

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

12. TOTAL SERVICE

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*)

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*)

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. [illegible]
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF [illegible]TION RIGHTS

(OVER)

14-00000

FORM DSP-34
9-1-53

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPLEMENT TO STANDARD FORM 57

If more space is required, use additional sheets of paper. Write on each sheet your name, address and date of birth. Identify each item, and attach to this application.

Budget Bureau No. 47-R071.4
Approval Expires June 30, 1955

1.a. NAME (Print)
Robert Tyler Shaw

b. ADDRESS
3000 N. Oakland Street
Arlington 7, Virginia

2. USE OF APPLICATION - CHECK BELOW TO INDICATE TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WHICH YOU WISH TO BE CONSIDERED:

☒ Foreign Service Only ☐ Departmental Only ☐ Foreign Service and Departmental

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(Place from which you will expect transportation of self and household effects, if any, if appointed to the Foreign Service)*
3000 N. Oakland Street, Arlington 7, Virginia

4. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED? IF A NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE. *(Section 11 on Form 57)*

5.a. ARE YOU NOW INVOLVED IN ANY LITIGATION OR SEPARATION AGREEMENT? ☐ Yes ☒ No
b. DO YOU KNOW OF ANY PROSPECTIVE LITIGATION IN WHICH YOU MAY BE INVOLVED? ☐ Yes ☒ No
(Give details, if answer is yes to a. or b.)

c. IF DIVORCED GIVE NAME OF COURT, LOCATION, AND DECREE.

6. IF APPLYING FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? *(Exclusive of overseas allowances)*
$ Per Year

7. IF OFFERED APPOINTMENT IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE WHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE ON YOUR AVAILABILITY FOR DUTY IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD?
None

8.a. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE *(If wife, give maiden name)*
Janet Lee Ruggles Shaw

b. DATE OF BIRTH
12 April 1927

c. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State or Province, and Country)*
Three Rivers, Michigan

d. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED?

e. IF NATURALIZED, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NO. OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE

9.

NAMES OF DEPENDENTS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH	WILL RESIDE WITH YOU OVERSEAS	
			YES	NO
Janet Lee Ruggles Shaw	Wife	12 April 1927	x	
Barbara Lee Shaw	Daughter	27 July 1952	x	
Richard Wilson Shaw	Son	10 September 1955	x	
Thomas Ruggles Shaw	Son	10 September 1955	x	

10.a. FATHER'S NAME
Maj. Gen. Franklin P. Shaw

b. PRESENT ADDRESS
Ewell & Battle Sts, Manassas, Va.

c. PLACE OF BIRTH
Newport, Kentucky

11.a. MOTHER'S NAME
Mary Ines Skees Shaw

b. PRESENT ADDRESS
D

c. PLACE OF BIRTH
Elizabethtown, Ky.

12. IF PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, DID THEY EVER OBTAIN UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP? (Check below)
FATHER ☐ Yes ☐ No
MOTHER ☐ Yes ☐ No

13. HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR A POSITION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR TAKEN AN EXAMINATION FOR A POSITION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE? ☒ Yes ☐ No
If "Yes" give date, nature of position applied for, and kind of examination taken, if any.
Asst. Attache, FSS-9, Caracas, Venezuela, 1949-52
Vice Consul, FSS-9, Guayaquil, Ecuador, 1952-54.

14-00000

FORM DSP-34 5-1-53

14. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE NOW RESIDING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS
Maj. F. P. Shaw, Jr.	Brother	Tokyo, Japan

15. LIST PRESENT OR FORMER FOREIGN CONNECTIONS:

A. BUSINESS

B. EMPLOYMENT

16. DOES YOUR FINANCIAL POSITION PERMIT DISCHARGE OF ALL DEBTS INCURRED? ☒ YES ☐ NO
IF "NO," STATE INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW:

NAMES OF CREDITORS	AMOUNTS DUE	DATES ON WHICH OBLIGATIONS WERE CONTRACTED

17a. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN MEDICALLY DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

b. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER TREATMENT FOR A MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISORDER? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS IN ITEM 39 OF FORM 57.

18. PRESENT MILITARY STATUS

A. ARE YOU REGISTERED WITH A SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," STATE BELOW THE NUMBER AND ADDRESS OF THE BOARD, AND YOUR CLASSIFICATION:

B. DO YOU HAVE A MILITARY RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," STATE BELOW, THE BRANCH OF SERVICE; YOUR SERIAL NUMBER; YOUR ORGANIZATION UNIT AND HEADQUARTERS:

LIST DECORATIONS *(Exclusive of service ribbons)*, CITATIONS, AND OFFICIAL LETTERS OF COMMENDATION RECEIVED FOR SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES:

19. LIST OTHER NAMES, IF ANY, BY WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN KNOWN INCLUDING MARRIED NAMES, IF MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, GIVE DATES DURING WHICH NAMES WERE USED.

20. REFERENCES: LIST FIVE PERSONS, EXCLUSIVE OF SUPERVISORS, LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO YOU AND WHO HAVE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR QUALIFICATIONS AND FITNESS FOR THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING. *(Repeat names listed in Item 34, Form 57 and add two additional references.)*

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS *(Give complete current address, including street and number)*	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Norman Armour	c/o Dept. of State	Retired, FSO
Paul C. Hutton	c/p Dept. of State	FSO/Dept.
Raymond C. Leddy	c/o Dept. of State	FSO/Dept.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur	Remington Rand, N.Y.C.	Corp. President
Maj.Gen. R. C. Harmon	Dept. of AirForce	Judge Advocate

21. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Yes

23. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, IF ANY:
268-28-0199

22. If you believe the information you have supplied on this application does not fully show your qualifications for Departmental or Foreign Service Employment, state in Item 33 of Form 57 or on a separate sheet, any additional appropriate data that you wish to be considered.

DATE
10 February 1956

SIGNATURE
Robert Shaw

STATE -CS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 57
REVISED MARCH 1961
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

8-10-63

57-101

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT NO.

1. Kind of position applied for, or name of examination: FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE
Announcement No.

2. Options for which you wish to be considered (if listed in examination announcement)

3. Primary place(s) of employment applied for (City and State): FOREIGN SERVICE

4. Name (First, middle, maiden, if any, last): Mr. ROBERT TYLER SHAW

5. Address (Number, Street, City, Zone, State):
415 LINDEN LANE
FALLS CHURCH, VA.

6. Home phone: JE 2-0199

7. Office phone

8. Legal or voting residence (State): ARIZONA

9. Height without shoes: 5 feet 7 inches

10. Weight: 135

11. Sex: ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. Marital status: ☒ Married ☐ Single (Incl. widowed, divorced)

13. Birthplace (City and State, or foreign country): Washington, D. C.

14. Birth date (Month, day, year): June 18, 1925

15. Social Security Number: 268 28 0199

16. If you have ever been employed by the Federal Government, indicate last grade and job title: Presently employed by Dept. of State (GS-14)
Dates of service in that grade From May 1961 To Present

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Examining Office Only

☐ Appt. ☐ Nonappt.
Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned
Entered Register:

Notations:

App. Reviewed:

App. Approved:

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Augm. Rating
			☐ 5 points (Tent.)	
			☐ 10 points Comp. Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Points	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being Investigated	
Initials and date				

17. AVAILABILITY INFORMATION

A. Lowest grade or pay you will accept $ per or grade FSR-4

B. Will you accept temporary appointment? (Acceptance or refusal of temporary employment will not affect your consideration for other appointments.) ☒ Yes ☐ No If "Yes," indicate by "X" in appropriate box or boxes.
☐ 1 month or less ☐ 1 to 4 months ☐ 4 to 12 months

C. Will you accept less than full-time employment (less than 40 hours per week)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

D. Are you willing to travel? ☐ Not at all ☐ Occasionally ☒ Frequently

E. Will you accept employment: In Washington, D.C.? ☐ Yes ☒ No Outside U.S.? ☒ Yes ☐ No

F. Will you accept appointment only in certain locations? ☐ Yes ☒ No
If "Yes," list locations

18. ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE AND VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. List Dates, Branch, and Serial or Service Number of All Active Service

From	To	Branch of Service	Serial or Service Number
September 11, 1943	March 8, 1945	Army	35228658

B. Have you ever been discharged from the armed forces under other than honorable conditions? ☐ Yes (Give details in Item 31) ☒ No

C. Do you claim 5-point preference based on wartime military service? ☒ Yes ☐ No

D. Do you claim 5-point preference based on service during peacetime campaign? ☐ Yes (Complete and attach Standard Form 15) ☒ No

E. Do you claim 10-point preference? ☐ Yes ☒ No If "Yes," check type of preference claimed and complete and attach Standard Form 15, "Veteran Preference Claim." TYPE ☐ Compensable disability ☐ Disability ☐ Wife ☐ Widow ☐ Mother

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information given in answer to Question 18 has been verified with the discharge certificate and/or other proof which shows that the separation was under honorable conditions.

VETERAN PREFERENCE ALLOWED ☐ 5-point ☐ 10-point Comp. Disab. ☐ Other 10-point ☐ None

Signature and title

Agency

Date

PLEASE BE SURE TO READ ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING ITEM 19

19. EXPERIENCE *(Start with your PRESENT position and work back)*

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

1

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From May 1961 To present time

Exact title of position: Political Officer

Number and kind of employees you supervise: 8 - 10

Salary or earnings: Starting $12,210 per yr; Present $13,270 per yr

Classification Grade *(If in Federal service)*: GS-14

Place of employment *(City & State)*: Washington, D. C.

Kind of business or organization *(Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: U.S. Govt

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*: Department of State

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor: Thomas Linthicum

Reason for wanting to leave: Desire to re-enter Foreign Service

Description of work: Analysis of political and economic reporting from Embassies and Consulates in Latin American countries; preparation of special studies based on these reports; conduct of official business with representatives of Latin American Governments in Washington.

2

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From June 1956 To May 1961

Exact title of position: Vice Consul & Consul

Number and kind of employees you supervised: 1 (Secretary)

Salary or earnings: Starting $7490 per annum; Final $9900 per annum

Classification Grade *(If in Federal service)*: FSR-4

Place of employment *(City & State)*: Nogales, Mexico & Dept of State

Kind of business or organization *(Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: U.S. Govt

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*: Dept of State, Washington, D.C.

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor:
Consul Gen Robert Martindale
Consul Gen Terrence Leonhardy

Reason for leaving: Accept employment in the Department

Description of work: General duties of a Foreign Service Reserve Officer at the American Consulate in Nogales. Handled a considerable number of protection cases, maintained extensive contacts in the state and national governments, handled political reporting for the consulate. Transferred to Department in July 1959

3

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From July 1954 to May 1956

Exact title of position: Foreign Affairs Ofcr

Number and kind of employees you supervised: 2 (Secretary & Clerk)

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $7785 per annum

Classification Grade *(If in Federal service)*: GS-12

Place of employment *(City & State)*: Washington, D.C.

Kind of business or organization *(Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: U.S. Govt

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*:
Dept of Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor: Oliver W. Anthony

Reason for leaving: Re-enter Foreign Service

Description of work: Preparation of studies and reports for the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Inter-American Defense matters.

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 57-A OR BLANK SHEETS
SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 57A
MAY 1954—U. S. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR STANDARD FORM 57
"Application for Federal Employment"

57-202

INSTRUCTIONS.—Fill out this form only when necessary for completion of Item 16, "EXPERIENCE," on Standard Form 57. Enclose with your application. Typewrite or write clearly in dark ink

1. NAME (First, Middle, Maiden (if any), Last): ROBERT TYLER SHAW
2. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): JUNE 18, 1925
3. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR OR NAME OF EXAMINATION: FOREIGN SERVICE
4. DATE OF THIS CONTINUATION SHEET:

○ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM May 1952 TO July 1954
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Vice Consul
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER / FINAL $ PER
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service): FSS-9
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT: CITY Guayaquil, STATE Ecuador
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.): U.S. Govt
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, etc.): Dept of State
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Consul Gen Paul W. Meyer
REASON FOR LEAVING: Position with Dept of Defense
DESCRIPTION OF WORK: General duties of a Foreign Service Staff Officer in the Economic and commercial section of the consulate general in Guayaquil. Also performed political reporting functions and assisted in visa and citizenship matters.

○ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Oct 1949 TO Feb 1952
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Asst Attache
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ FSS-10 PER / FINAL $ FSS-9 PER
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service): FSS-9
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT: CITY Washington & STATE Caracas, Ven
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.): Government
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, etc.): Dept of State
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Ambassadors Donnally, Sparks, Armour
REASON FOR LEAVING:
DESCRIPTION OF WORK: General duties of a Foreign Service Staff officer in the Political Section, Embassy Caracas. Preparation of reports for the Department and memoranda for the Ambassador, consultation with officials of the local government and American companies (esp of the petroleum industry operating in Venezuela). Assistance in the Consular Section with visa affairs

○ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Nov 1947 TO Oct 1949
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Editor
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $2400 PER annum / FINAL $3600 PER "
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service):
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT: CITY Cincinnati STATE Ohio
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.): Soap & Chemical manufacture
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, etc.): Procter & Gamble
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Carl Frantz
Chief, Personnel Relations
REASON FOR LEAVING: Desire for Foreign Service
DESCRIPTION OF WORK: Supervision of preparation (compilation through final printing & finding) of sales manuals for entire company sales force. Preparation of aptitude tests and general qualifications questionnaires used by company in recruitment of salesman and administrative employees. Preparation of material for company house magazine. Maintenance of close liaison with other personnel dept. Work with company print shop and private printing establishments.

ATTACH SUPPLEMENTAL SHEETS OR FORMS HERE

● ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS CORRECTLY AND FULLY

20. SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND SKILLS

A. Kind of License or Certificate *(For example, pilot, teacher, registered nurse, lawyer, radio operator, C.P.A., etc.)* Private Pilot (Blue Seal, Sel)	B. State or other licensing authority FAA	C. Year of first license or certificate 1958	D. Year of latest license or certificate Current
E. Special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use. *(For example, short wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key punch, turret lathe, transcribing machine, scientific or professional devices)*		F. Approximate number of words per minute: Typing	Shorthand

G. Special qualifications not covered in application. *(For example, your most important publications (do not submit copies unless requested): your patents or inventions, public speaking and publications experience, membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.; and honors and fellowships received)*

Writing - Occasional articles on sporting & aviation subjects.
Honors - PHI BETA KAPPA (1948)

21. EDUCATION

A. Place "X" in column indicating highest grade completed

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

B. If you graduated from high school, give date: 1943

C. Name and location of last high school attended:
Bath High School
Fairborn, Ohio

D. Name and location of college or university	Dates attended		Years completed		Credit hours		Degree received	Year received
	From	To	Day	Night	Semester	Quarter		
The Ohio State Univ	1943	1943	2/3					
The Ohio State Univ	1945	1945	2/3		49	-		
University of Arizona	1945	1947	3		132		BA	1947

E. Chief undergraduate college subjects	Semester Hours Credit	Quarter Hours Credit	F. Chief graduate college subjects	Semester Hours Credit	Quarter Hours Credit
Spanish	35				
History & Poli Sci	26				

G. State major field of study at highest level of college work

Spanish

H. Other schools or training *(for example, trade, vocational, Armed Forces, or business)*. Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, certificates, and any other pertinent data.

Jan - May 1944, Camp Callan, Calif. Basic anti-aircraft schooling in fire control, specialization in anti-armor use of AA weapons

22. FOREIGN TRAVEL

Have you lived or traveled in any foreign countries?

☒ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes," give in Item 33 names of countries, dates and length of time spent there and reason or purpose (military service, business, education, or vacation)

23. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Enter foreign language and indicate your knowledge of each by placing "X" in proper column	Reading			Speaking			Understanding			Writing		
	Exc	Good	Fair	Exc	Good	Fair	Exc	Good	Fair	Exc	Good	Fair
Spanish	X			X			X			X		
Portuguese		X						X	X			
French			X									

24. REFERENCES

List three persons living in the United States or territories of the United States who are NOT RELATED TO YOU AND WHO HAVE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 19.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, Zone, and State)*	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Robert C. Hill	Littleton, Vermont	Former Ambassador to Mexico
Norman Armour	825 5th Ave New York 21, N.Y.	Former Ambassador to Venezuela
Chester H. Kimrey	Beatus Estates Nogales, Arizona	Former Consul at Nogales

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States of America? If "No," give country of which you are a citizen:	X	
26. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., the Communist Political Association, the Young Communist League, or any Communist organization?		X
27. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means?		X
If your answer to 26 and/or 27 above is "Yes," state on a separate sheet attached to and made a part of this application the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities. (See Instruction Sheet.)		
28. Have you any physical handicap, chronic disease, or other disability?		X
29. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown?		X
30. Have you ever had tuberculosis?		X
If your answer to 28, 29, or 30 above is "Yes," give details in Item 39.		
31. Have you ever been barred by the U.S. Civil Service Commission from taking examinations or accepting civil service appointment? *(If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.)*		X
32. Does the United States Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X
33. Do you receive or have you applied for an annuity from the United States or District of Columbia Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
34. Are you an official or employee of any State, territory, county, or municipality? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
35. Have you ever been discharged (fired) from employment for any reason?		X
36. Have you ever resigned (quit) after being informed that your employer intended to discharge (fire) you for any reason?		X
If your answer to 35 or 36 above is "Yes," give details in Item 39. Show the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case. This information should agree with statements made in Item 19—Experience.		
37. Have you ever been arrested, taken into custody, held for investigation or questioning, or charged by any law enforcement authority? (You may omit: (1) Traffic violations for which you paid a fine of $30.00 or less, and (2) anything that happened before your 16th birthday. All other incidents must be included, even though they were dismissed or you merely forfeited collateral.)		X
38. While in the military service were you ever arrested for an offense which resulted in a trial by deck court or by summary, special, or general court martial?		X
If your answer to 37 or 38 is "Yes," give details in Item 39, showing for each incident, (1) date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) law enforcing authority or type of court or court-martial, and (5) action taken.		

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS. Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.

Item No.		Item No.	
22	China - Reside w/parents 1931-34		Venezuela/Asst Att/1949-52
	Mexico - Travel since 45, vice consul & consul at Nogales 1956-59		Ecuador/Vice Consul/Guayaquil/1952-54
			Visits to Colombia, Panama, Trinidad, Barbados, Brazil, Hawaii, Philippines Hong Kong

If more space is required, use full sheets of paper approximately the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, date of birth, and examination title. Attach on inside of this application.

ATTENTION: READ THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING THIS APPLICATION

A false or dishonest answer to any question in this application may be grounds for rating you ineligible for Federal employment, or for dismissing you after appointment, and may be punishable by fine or imprisonment (U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 1001). All statements made in the application are subject to investigation, including a check of your fingerprints, police records, and former employers. All information will be considered in determining your present fitness for Federal employment.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and are made in good faith.

Signature of applicant Robert J Shaw (Sign in ink) Date 11 Jany 63

FORM DS-1032
(Exception to SF 50
approved by CSC and
B. of B. April 22, 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JOURNAL NUMBER 16

SERVICE - DEPARTMENT

F.S. X

DATE 05-25-61

1 NAME MR. ROBERT T. SHAW SHAW ROBERT T	539700 2 EMPL NUMBER	3 E O D DATE 05-28-52	4 VET PREF I M V.
5 DATE OF BIRTH 06-18-25	6 S C D 04-28-48	DATE APPT AFFID 05-28-52	8 SOCIAL SECURITY NO 268-28-0199
9 LEGAL RESIDENCE BU VA	10 STATE OF BIRTH AI D.C.	11 MODE ENTRY FSO & STATUS PRIOR 20 20	
2 MARRIED	CHILDREN 02 ADULTS 1	14 1	15 HHP 009 16 25

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE OF THE PERSONNEL ACTION DESCRIBED BELOW, WHICH AFFECTS YOUR EMPLOYMENT

17 NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) RESIGNATION FOR PERSONAL REASONS WITHOUT PREJUDICE COB	18 EFFECTIVE DATE OF ACTION MONTH DAY YEAR 05-12-61	19 N A CODE S2	20 APPORTIONED POSITION ☐ 1 - YES 2 - NO 3 - WAIVED

21 LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM -

FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE OFFICER

2333

FSR-04-44-$10,945-0-0000-000

DEPARTMENT GROUP I-C

22 POSITION TITLE	21 FULL-STAFFING 2 1-YES 2-NO
26 OPL-CONS TITLE	Z 26A TITLE CODE
24 POSITION IS IN THE 1-COMPETITIVE 2-EXCEPTED SERVICE ☐	25 CODE PAY BASIS
27 PAYROLL CODE	28 DATE ASSIGNED [illegible]
29 SCHEDULE - SERIES - GRADE - SALARY - POSITION NUMBER	7-26-59
30. ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION OR POST	31 POS VACATED 1-REMOVE, 2-REMAINS
32 ORG POST CODE 9-99-03	33 TENURE 0 L PT

34 CTGY & CLASS	35 MO YR GRADE 02-59	36 ALLOTMENT AQ -1A-7026	37. RETIREMENT I 1 CSC & FICA 2 FS 4 NONE	38 EXCEPTED SCHED Z F S REASONS FOR TRANSFER	39 PSI 12	40 CITY CODE ☐	41 FSR - FSS CATEGORY 5
42 DATE ASSIGNED.		43 CTGY & CLASS		44 F S SALARY $		45 MONTH AND YR OF GRADE	

TO -

22 POSITION TITLE	23 FULL-STAFFING ☐ 1-YES 2-NO
26 OPL-CONS TITLE ☐	26A TITLE CODE
24 POSITION IS IN THE 1-COMPETITIVE 2-EXCEPTED SERVICE ☐	25 CODE PAY BASIS
27 PAYROLL CODE	28 DATE ASSIGNED
29 SCHEDULE - SERIES - GRADE - SALARY - POSITION NUMBER	
30 ORGANIZATION DESIGNATIONS OR POST	32 ORG POST CODE
	33 TENURE ☐

34 CTGY & CLASS	35 MO YR GRADE	36 ALLOTMENT ☐	37 RETIREMENT ☐ 1 CSC & FICA 2 FS 4 NONE	38 EXCEPTED SCHED ☐ F S REASON FOR TRANSFER	39 PSI	40 CITY CODE ☐	41 FSR / FSS CATEGORY ☐
42 DATE ASSIGNED		43 CTGY & CLASS		44 F S SALARY $		45 MONTH AND YR OF GRADE	

This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department. This action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

The grade of the position to which you are officially assigned may be reviewed and corrected by the Department or by the Civil Service Commission.

☐ a. Subject to completion of 1 year probationary (or trial) period commencing

☐ b. [illegible]

[illegible] ☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible] of 6 months or less

REASON - TO ACCEPT OTHER EMPLOYMENT.

NO LUMP SUM PAYMENT AUTHORIZED FOR LEAVE.

ADDRESS: C/o FOREIGN SERVICE MAIL ROOM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. J. JOVA

SIGNATURE, [illegible] AND TITLE

Employing Department or Agency
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ALL PERSONNEL FOLDERS ON AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ARE MAINTAINED IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL — WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM DS-1031 (Exception to SF-52 approved by CSC and B of B April 22, 1960)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUEST NO

DATE OF REQUEST 04/21/61

SERVICE: ☒ EX FS ☐ OP

ROUTING: 1 WF 2 LV 3 TRANS

1 NAME Mr. Robert T. SHAW

2 EMPL NUMBER 539700

3 E O D DATE [illegible]-5[illegible]

4 VET PREF 2V

5 DATE OF BIRTH 06-18-25

6 S C D 04-22-45

7 APPT AFF DATE 05-[illegible]-52

8 SOCIAL SECURITY NO [illegible]

9 LEGAL RESIDENCE FU VA

10 STATE OF BIRTH ATL D[illegible]

11 MOST ENTRY ENG STATUS PRICE [illegible]

12 MARITAL STATUS ACCESSIONS ONLY 2 [illegible]

13 NO OF DEPENDENTS ACCESSIONS ONLY CHILDREN 2 ADULTS 1

14 UNGL 1

15 NBR [illegible]

16 25

17 NATURE OF ACTION Resignation for Personal Reasons Without Prejudice C.O.B.

18 EFFECTIVE DATE OF ACTION MONTH DAY-YEAR ~~CEB~~ 05-12-61

19 N A CODE S

19A PROP EFF DATE

20 APPORTIONED POSITION 1-YES 2-NO 3-WAIVED

21 LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM -

Foreign Service Reserve Officer

2333

FSR-04-44-$10,945-0-0000-000

Department - Group I-C

22 POSITION TITLE

23 FULL-STAFFING 1-YES 2-NO 2

24 POSITION IS IN THE 1-COMPETITIVE 2-EXCEPTED SERVICE

25 CODE PAY BASIS

26 DPL-CONS TITLE Z

26A TITLE CODE

27 PAYROLL CODE

28 DATE ASSIGNED 05-12-61

29 SCHEDULE - SERIES - GRADE - SALARY - POSITION NUMBER

30 ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION OR POST

31 POS VACATED - 1-REMOVE, 2-REMAINS

32 ORG-POST CODE 9-99-03

33 TENURE G 2-FT

34 CITY & CLASS

35 MO YR GRADE 02-59

36 ALLOTMENT AG-1A-7026

37 RETIREMENT 1-CSC 3-FICA 2-FS 4-NONE 1

38 EXCEPTED SCHED F S REASON FOR TRANSFER Z

39 FS 12

40 CITY CODE

41 FSR-FSS CATEGORY 5

42 DATE ASSIGNED

43 C&C CODE

44 F S SALARY $

45 MONTH & YEAR OF GRADE

TO -

22 POSITION TITLE

23 FULL-STAFFING 1-YES 2-NO

24 POSITION IS IN THE 1-COMPETITIVE 2-EXCEPTED SERVICE

25 CODE PAY BASIS

26 DPL-CONS TITLE

26A TITLE CODE

27 PAYROLL CODE

28 DATE ASSIGNED

29 SCHEDULE - SERIES - GRADE - SALARY - POSITION NUMBER

30 ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION OR POST

32 ORG POST CODE

33 TENURE

34 CITY & CLASS

35 MO YR GRADE

36 ALLOTMENT

37 RETIREMENT 1-CSC 3-FICA 2-FS 4-NONE

38 EXCEPTED SCHED F S REASON FOR TRANSFER

39 FS

40 CITY CODE

41 FSR-FSS CATEGORY

42 DATE ASSIGNED

43 C&C CODE

44 F S SALARY $

45 MONTH & YEAR OF GRADE

POS DATA: 46 REMOVE 47 ADD ☐ NO CHANGE ☐ 48 VICE ☐ REAL ☐ NEW ☐ TA ☐ 49 RIF CODE 50 SKILL CODES

51 REQUESTED BY (NAME & TITLE) EJRichey EJRichey, Chief, POD/WES

52 REQUEST APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE & TITLE) JJJova, Chief, FER/POD

53 CLEARANCES | INITIALS OR SIGNATURE | DATE | CLEARANCES | INITIALS OR SIGNATURE | DATE

A

B

C CLASSIFICATION

E APPROVED BY

TRAVEL REQUEST	FUNDS AVAILABLE			TOTAL COST	T O NO
APPR -	OBLIG -	02	$	$	
ALLOT -	DATE -	03	$	$	

DEPENDENTS - NAME, RELATIONSHIP, AGE IF UNDER 21

SIGNATURE

T O DATE

Ref: Letter of resignation dated 4/20/61 attached.

Reasons: ~~XXXXXXXX~~ To accept other employment.

FROM - TO - VIA DETAILS EFFECTS LBS EXCESS FIL

No travel requested

MAY 12 1961

PER:POD:WES:bth

Robert T. Shaw

Resignation COD 5/12/61

No lump sum payment authorized for leave.

E. Kathryn Mallow

E. Kathryn Mallow, Chief
Leave and Retirement Section

Address:
c/o Foreign Service Mail Room,
Washington 25, D. C.

5333

Washington, D.C.
April 20, 1961

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is with great regret that I submit my resignation from The Foreign Service to accept other employment.

I have enjoyed my years with the Service and the fine people comprising it and hope that at some future time I may be able to return to the Service.

Respectfully,

RTShaw
Robert T. Shaw
Foreign Service Reserve Officer

5-15-61

A1950 SHAW ROBERT T   FSR- 4 FROM 10175 TO 10965 PAY RAISE [illegible] PL568

DS-1042a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP

POST DEPARTMENT	ORG. CODE 9013	POSITION NO.	APPR. & ALLOT. 1A-7025	EFFECTIVE DATE 7-1-65	DATE OF LAST EQUIV. INCREASE 2-59
EMPLOYEE'S NAME SHAW ROBERT T	EMPLOYEE NO. A1950	CATG. & CLASS SERV. & GRADE FSR-4	NEW SALARY RATE $10,175	OLD SALARY RATE $ [illegible]	☒ [illegible] 2133

LWOP DATA [illegible]

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP   TOTAL EXCESS LWOP ______
(Check appropriate box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

Initials of Clerk

☐ Oil or Step-Increase ______

☐ Pay Adjustment

REMARKS

Performance rating is satisfactory or better

J.J. [illegible]

(Signature of other authorization)

[illegible] COPY

14-00000

Form DS 1032
Exception to SF 50
Approved by the
Bureau of the Budget
May 1951

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SERVICE
☒ FS ☐ DEPT.

A1950

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.) (One given name, initial(s) and surname) Mr. Robert T. Shaw	2. DATE OF BIRTH 6-18-25	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. FS-54	4. DATE 7-21-59

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology) Transfer	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 7-26-59	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM:		TO:
Political Officer 1-1011-009 Consul	8. POSITION TITLE *Diplomatic or Consular Title*	Foreign Service Reserve Officer
FSR-4 $9900	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-4 $9900
Nogales	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS *Post*	Department
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ *Regular* ☐ *Resident* ☐ *Non-US*	12. DS CATEGORY *FS Category*	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ *Regular* ☐ *Resident* ☐ *Non-US*

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT	10-POINT Disab.	10-POINT Other

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	T. A.	REAL.

Group I-c

15. SEX
M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM OA-4011
TO OA-3025

17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE
☒ CSC ☐ FS
☐ FICA ☐ NONE

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS *(Accession Only)*

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department

W.W. STUART

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

PERSONNEL FOLDER

2.

Form DS-1031 Exception to SF-52
Approved by the Bureau of the Budget
May 1954

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

ROUTING			SERVICE
1 WROS 3-26	4 T 4/2/59	8	☒ F.
2 ARA 3/26	5 . 3	9	☐ DPTL
3 AAB 3/31	6 TRANS	10	
	7	11	

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial (s), and surname) Mr. Robert T. SHAW
2. DATE OF BIRTH 6-18-25
3. REQUEST NO.
4. DATE OF REQUEST 3-26-59

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Direct Transfer to the Department (DT-#11)
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A PROPOSED: ~~TBR~~
B APPROVED: 7-26-59

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

DS-1032 Journalized
Date 7/20/9
By

FROM—		TO—
Political Officer 1-1011-009 Consul	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER Diplomatic or Consular Title	Foreign Service Reserve Officer
FSR-4 $9900	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-4 $9900
Nogales	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS Post	Department
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ REGULAR ☐ RESIDENT	12. DS CATEGORY FSS Category	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ REGULAR ☐ RESIDENT

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE / 5-PT. / 10-PT. DISAB / OTHER

14. FULL STAFFING ALLOTMENT ☐ YES ☒ NO FROM: TO:
DT

14A. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION ☐ NEW ☐ VICE ☐ I.A. ☐ REAL
Group I-e

15. SEX M

16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 9A-4011 TO: 9A-3025

17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE ☒ CSC ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ NONE

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (Accessions only)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. RESERVE STATUS ☐ ACTIVE ☐ INACTIVE

21. MARITAL STATUS ☒ MARRIED ☐ SINGLE ☐ WIDOWED ☐ WIDOW ☐ DIVORCED ☐ SEPARATED

22. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) TJudd, Chief, WROS

23. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature and title DPDowns, Asst. Chief, PER/POD

331

24. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.			D. REPLACEMENT OR EMPL		
B. CEIL. OF POS. CONTROL			E.		
C. CLASSIFICATION			F. APPROVED BY	AAE	3/31/59

REMARKS

REQUEST FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

EFFECT CLASS	ESTIMATED COST	PER/TC ENCUMBRANCE FUNDS AVAILABLE	NAMES OF DEPENDENTS AND DATES OF BIRTH OF CHILDREN UNDER 21
		APPR.	W:Janet
		ALLOT.	D:Barbara 7/52
		OBLIG NO.	S:Richard 9/55
		DATE	S:Thomas 9/55
TOTAL		SIGNATURE	
T. O. DATE		T. O. NO.	

FROM Nogales
TO Washington, DC
VIA
DETAILS ENROUTE
NO. LBS. EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTH

SHIPMENT OF EFFECTS
FROM: Nogales
TO: Washington, DC

REMARKS Authorize travel and full shipment of effects as indicated.

ETD 5/30
EOD 7/15/59

PER:POD:WROS:ma

T4OM

DT

14-00000

Form DS-1032
Exception to SF-50
Approved by the
Bureau of the Budget
May 1954

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

A1950

SERVICE
☒ FS ☐ DPTL

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s) and surname) Mr. Robert T. Shaw	2. DATE OF BIRTH 6-18-25	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. FS -107	4. DATE 2-19-59

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 2-22-59	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM:		TO:
	8. POSITION TITLE	Political Officer
	Diplomatic or Consular Title	Consul
FSR-5 $8965	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-4 $9900
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS *Post*	Nogales
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ *Regular* ☐ *Resident* ☐ *Non-US*	12. DS CATEGORY *FS Category*	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ *Regular* ☐ *Resident* ☐ *Non-US*

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT	10-POINT	
		Disab.	Other

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM TO 9A-4011	17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE CSC ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ NONE	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS *(Accessions Only)*	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department.

W.W. STUART

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

2.

PERSONNEL FOLDER

Form DS-1031 Exception to SF-52
Approved by the Bureau of the Budget
May 1954

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

ROUTING			SERVICE
1 ~~WRGS~~	4 T 4/3/59	8	☒ FS
2 ARA	5 8	9	☐ DPTL
3 AAB	6 TRANS	10	
	7	11	

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial (s), and surname): Mr. Robert T. SHAW
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 6-18-25
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 3-26-59

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Direct Transfer to the Department (DT-#11)
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ~~TBR~~
B. APPROVED: 7-26-59

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Political Officer 1-1011-009 Consul	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER *Diplomatic or Consular Title*	Foreign Service Reserve Officer
FSR-4 $9900	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-4 $9900
Nogales	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS *Post*	Department
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ REGULAR ☐ RESIDENT	12. DS CATEGORY *FSS Category*	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ REGULAR ☐ RESIDENT

DS-1032 Journalized
Date 7/29/9
By M. M.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE | 5-PT. | 10-PT. DISAB. | OTHER

14. FULL STAFFING ALLOTMENT: ☐ YES ☒ NO FROM: TO:
D1

14A. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: ☐ NEW ☐ VICE ☐ I.A. ☐ REAL — Group I-c

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 9A-4011
TO: 9A-3025

17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE: ☒ SC ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ NONE

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (Accessions only)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. RESERVE STATUS: ☐ ACTIVE ☐ INACTIVE

21. MARITAL STATUS: ☒ MARRIED ☐ SINGLE ☐ WIDOWED ☐ WIDOW ☐ DIVORCED ☐ SEPARATED

22. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): TJudd, Chief, WROS

23. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature and title: DPDowns, Asst. Chief, PER/POD

331

24. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.			D. REPLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			E.		
C. CLASSIFICATION			F. APPROVED BY	AAB	3/31/59

REMARKS

REQUEST FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

OBJECT CLASS	ESTIMATED COST	PER/TC ENCUMBRANCE FUNDS AVAILABLE	NAMES OF DEPENDENTS AND DATES OF BIRTH OF CHILDREN UNDER 21
		APPR.	W:Janet
		ALLOT.	D:Barbara 7/52
		OBLIG. NO.	S:Richard 9/55
		DATE	S:Thomas 9/55
		SIGNATURE	
TOTAL			
T. O. DATE		T. O. NO.	

FROM: Nogales
TO: Washington, DC
VIA:
DETAILS ENROUTE:
NO. LBS. EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTH.:
SHIPMENT OF EFFECTS
FROM: Nogales
TO: Washington, DC

REMARKS Authorize travel and full shipment of effects as indicated.

ETD 5/30
EOD

PER:POD:WROS:mm

TMOOI

Form DS-1032
Exception to SF-50
Approved by the
Bureau of the Budget
May 1954

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

A1950

SERVICE
☒ FS ☐ DPTL

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s) and surname) Mr. Robert T. Shaw	2. DATE OF BIRTH 6-18-25	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. FS -107	4. DATE 2-19-59

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 2-22-59	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM:		TO:
	8. POSITION TITLE	Political Officer
	Diplomatic or Consular Title	Consul
FSR-5 $8965	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-4 $9900
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS *Post*	Nogales
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ *Regular* ☐ *Resident* ☐ *Non-US*	12. DS CATEGORY *FS Category*	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ *Regular* ☐ *Resident* ☐ *Non-US*

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT	10-POINT	
		Disab.	Other

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM TO 9A-4011	17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE CSO ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ NONE	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS *(Accessions Only)*	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department

W.W. STUART

[illegible]

[illegible]

2.

PERSONNEL FOLDER

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOGALES	AL 250	Organization Code 9	Pay Roll Period	Block No.	Slip No.
Employee's Name SHAW ROBERT T		Grade and Salary FSR 5 8965	Prepared		Audited by

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	A. Base Non-Fica	C. Prem. Non-Fica	B. Base Fica	D. Prem. Fica	F. C.S.R.	U. F.S.R.	T. F.S.V.	G. Fed. Tax	BOND H. Ded. J. Ret	P. State Tax	E. Fica	V. Other	S. Life Insurance	Net Pay
P. N.														
N. N.														
P. T. P.														
App														
All														

REMARKS:

☐ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

Effective date	Date last equivalent increase	Old salary rate	New salary rate	Performance rating is satisfactory or better
7-1-58	7-57	8690	8965	W W STUART (Signature of authorizing officer)

LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

DS—1042e
Form approved by Comp. Gen., U.S., June 29, 1954

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

SHAW ROBERT T FSR 5 FROM 7900 TO [illegible]
PAY RAISE 85TH CONGRESS PL [illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO 61a
REVISED MARCH 1956
APPROVED BY
COMP. GEN. U.S.
FEB 10, 1956
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F.P.M. CHAPTER A6

CIVIL OFFICER APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

(As defined in 5 USC 21a and 21b)

I, Robert Tyler Shaw (Name in full) ~~(Arizona)~~ Virginia (State)

do solemnly swear (or affirm) that

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

Robert Tyler Shaw
(Type name of appointee)

(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 19th day of August, A. D. 1957,

at Nogales, Sonora, Mexico (City) (State)

Service No. 22863
Item No. 58
Fee: Nil
[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)
Chester H. Kimrey
American Consul
(Title)
Consul of The United States of America

Department of State (Department or agency)
Foreign Service of the U.S. (Bureau or Division)
Nogales, Sonora, Mexico (Place of employment)

Consul of the United States of America (Position to which appointed)
August 5, 1957. (Date of entrance on duty)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

Form DS-1032
Exception to SF-50
Approved by the
Bureau of the Budget
May 1954

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SERVICE
☒ FS ☐ DPTL

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s) and surname) Mr. Robert T. Shaw	2. DATE OF BIRTH 6-18-95	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. FS -49	4. DATE 8-12-57

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology) Change of Consular Title	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 8-5-57	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM:		TO:
Political Officer	8. POSITION TITLE	Political Officer
Vice Consul	Diplomatic or Consular Title	Consul
	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-5 $7900 8465
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS Post	Nogales
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ Regular ☐ Resident ☐ Non-US	12. DS CATEGORY FS Category	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ Regular ☐ Resident ☐ Non-US

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT	10-POINT. Disab.	10-POINT. Other

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.	
				1-1011-009

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM TO 8A-8011	17. RETIREMENT CLASS ☒ CSC ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ NONE	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (Accessions Only)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE Va.

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department.

Nominated: 7-3-57
Confirmed: 8-5-57
Attested : 8-5-57

Execute SF-61a as Consul of the USA in accordance with 1 FSM-IV 134.

L. L. COWLES

[illegible]

[illegible]

1

PERSONNEL FOLDER

14-00000

Form DS-1031 Exception to SF-52
Approved by the Bureau of the Budget
May 1954

DEPARTMENT OF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

ROUTING
1 [illegible]
2 XXXXXX
3 AAB
4 ~~AMS~~
5 [illegible]
6

SERVICE ☐ FS ☐ DFTL

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Robert T. SHAW
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 6-13-25
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 5-29-57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) ~~Promotion of Consular Commission~~
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 8·5·57

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Political Officer Vice Consul	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER *Diplomatic or Consular Title*	Political Officer Consul
FSR-~~4~~ 5 ~~$7650~~ $7900	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES, NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-~~4~~ 5 ~~$7650~~ 7900
Nogales	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS *Post*	Nogales
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ REGULAR ☐ RESIDENT	12. DS CATEGORY *FSS Category*	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ REGULAR ☐ RESIDENT

MBCheek 6/3/57
EB
[illegible] 8·12·57

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE | 5-PT | 10-PT DISAB | OTHER
14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I.A. | REAL
NO 1-1011-009
15. SEX
16. APPROPRIATION
FROM
TO $A-3011
17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE: CSC ☐ CSC ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ NONE
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (Accessions only)
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va
20. RESERVE STATUS ☐ ACTIVE ☐ INACTIVE
21. MARITAL STATUS ☐ MARRIED ☐ SINGLE ☐ WIDOWED ☐ WIDOW ☐ DIVORCED ☐ SEPARATED
22. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Paul L. [illegible]
PLGuest:Reg.Oper.Off.ARA
23. REQUEST APPROVED BY S. K. Lafoon
Signature and title SKLafoon:Asst.Chief,PER:PO

24. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.			D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			E. [illegible]-Trees	MBCheek	6/5/57
C. CLASSIFICATION			F. APPROVED BY		

REMARKS:

[illegible]

Nominated 7-3-57
Confirmed [illegible]
Attested [illegible]

Appointment by the President [illegible] 8-5-57 [illegible]
FSM-[illegible]

REQUEST FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

FROM
TO
VIA
TYPE QUARTERS TO BE OCCUPIED [ ] UNFURNISHED [ ] FURNISHED [ ] UNKNOWN
REMARKS

[illegible]

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOGALES 8.86

Organization Code

Pay Roll Period

Block No.

Slip No.

Employee's Name: ROBERT T. SHAW 89918

Grade and Salary: FSR-5 $7,900

Prepared by

Audited by

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	A Base Non-Fee	C Prem. Non-Fee	B Base Fee	D Prem. Fee	CSR	FSR	FSV	G Tax	Ret. Fed. & Pol.	State Tax	Fica	Other	Life Insurance	Net Pay
P N														
N N														
P T P														
App														
All														

REMARKS:

D P
PUNCHED

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

Effective date	Date last equivalent increase	Old salary rate	New salary rate	Performance rating satisfactory or better
7/1/57	3/27/56	$7,650	$7,900	L.L. COMLES

(Signature or other authentication)

LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period Initials of Clerk

DS-1032
Form approved by Comp. Gen., U.S., June 29, 1954

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP - EMPLOYEE'S COPY

SALARY ADJ EFF 7-28-56 PL828 CA 1166 9-7-56
SHAW ROBERT T FSR 4 7490 FSR 5 7650

STANDARD FORM 61a
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
FORM APPROVED BY THE COMP. GEN., U.S.
JUNE 15, 1950
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F.P.M. CHAPTER A4

CIVIL OFFICER
APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

(As defined in 5 USC 21a and 21b)

RECEIVED
1956 AUG 21 AM 10 25
PERSONNEL FILES

I, ROBERT TYLER SHAW (Name in full) WASHINGTON D.C. (State)

do solemnly swear (or affirm) that

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or a Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means, or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

Robert Tyler Shaw (Type name of appointee) RTShaw (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 14th day of August A. D. 1956.

at Nogales, Sonora, Mexico (City) (State)

Chester H Kimrey (Signature of officer)

[SEAL]

Chester H. Kimrey
Consul of the United States of America (Title)

Service No. [illegible]
Item 3d, No Fee Prescribed.

Department of State (Department or agency) Foreign Service (Bureau or division) Nogales, Sonora, Mexico (Place of employment)

Vice Consul (Position to which appointed) July 21, 1956 (Date of entrance on duty)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

Form DS-1032
Exception to SF-50
Approved by the
Bureau of the Budget
May 1954

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SERVICE
☒ FS ☐ DPTL

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s) and surname) Mr. Robert T. Shaw	2. DATE OF BIRTH 6-18-25	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. FS 148	4. DATE 7-27-56

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology) Granting of Consular Title	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 7-21-56	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM:		TO:
Political Officer	8. POSITION TITLE	Political Officer
	Diplomatic or Consular Title	Vice Consul
	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-4 $7,490
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS Post	Nogales
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ Regular ☐ Resident ☐ Non-US	12. DS CATEGORY FS Category	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☒ Regular ☐ Resident ☐ Non-US

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT	10-POINT Disab.	10-POINT Other
	X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
X				1-1011-009

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 19A-3011

17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE: ☒ CSC ☐ FS ☐ NONE — CSC

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (Accessions Only)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Va

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval of the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department.

FICE OF PERSONNEL
RECEIVED
AUG 2 AM 10
ERSONNEL FILES

Nominated: 7-17-56.
Confirmed: 7-21-56.
Attested : 7-21-56.

Execute SF-61a in accordance with 1 FSM IV 124 as Vice Consul of the USA.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

2.

PERSONNEL FOLDER

14-00000

Form DS-1032 Exemption to SF 52
Approved by the Bureau of the Budget
May 1950

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

PER/EM 4/27
ARA 4/30
PER-Green 5/1
AAB 5-31
TRANS

SERVICE: XXX ☐ DEPT.

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.) (Give given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Robert T. SHAW

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 6-18-25

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: ~~4-27-56~~ 7-56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Granting of Consular Title

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

A. PROPOSED: ASAP

B. APPROVED: 7-21-56

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Political Officer ~~(Vice Consul when confirmed)~~	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER Diplomatic or Consular Title	Political Officer Vice Consul ✓ approved as an exception 5/1/56
	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-4 $7490
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS Post	
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Nogales
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ REGULAR ☐ RESIDENT	12. DS CATEGORY FSS Category	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL XX REGULAR ☐ RESIDENT

DS-1032 Journalized
Date 7-22-56
By

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE / 5-PT / 10-PT (Disab. / Other): Yes

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW X / VICE / I. A. / REAL — NO 1-1011-009

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION FROM: NO. 7A-3013

17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE: XX CSC ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ NONE

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (Accessions only):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

20. RESERVE STATUS: None ☐ ACTIVE ☐ INACTIVE

21. MARITAL STATUS: XX MARRIED ☐ SINGLE ☐ WIDOWED ☐ WIDOW ☐ DIVORCED ☐ SEPARATED

22. REQUESTED BY (Signature and title): Rallier, Acting Pers. Officer, ARA

23. REQUEST APPROVED BY (Signature and title): Charles W. Bass PER/EM Charles W. Bass

24. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.			D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
B. CIVIL OR POS. CONTROL			E.	AAB 5-31-56	
C. CLASSIFICATION			F. APPROVED BY	PER/TX- MBGreen 5/1/56	

REMARKS:
nominated 7-17-56
Confirmed 7-21-56
Ott Slated 7-21-56
Execute SF-61 in accordance with I FSM-IV 124 as Vice Consul of the USA
Presidential Commission Necessary.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
RECEIVED
[illegible] 2 [illegible] 53
PERSONNEL FILES

REQUEST FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

SPACE CLASS	EST. RATE & COST	FIN. IC PRELIMINARY FUNDS AVAILABLE	NAMES OF DEPENDENTS AND DATES OF BIRTH OF CHILDREN UNDER 21	FROM
		APPR.		VIA
		ALLOT		
		OBLIG. NO.		NO. LBS EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTH.
		DATE		
		SIGNATURE		SHIPMENT OF EFFECTS
TOTAL				FROM:
T. O. DATE		T. O. NO.		TO:

REMARKS

No travel involved.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61a
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
FORM APPROVED BY THE COMP GEN. U S.
JUNE 15 1953
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A6

CIVIL OFFICER
APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

(As defined in 5 USC 21a and 21b)

I, Robert T. Shaw, (Name in full) Virginia (State)

do solemnly swear (or affirm) that

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or a Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means, or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States; and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

Robert T. Shaw (Typed name of appointee) RTShaw (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 17th day of May, A. D. 19 56.,

at Washington, (City) D.C. (State)

Edna C. Fuller (Signature of officer)

[SEAL]

Sec. 206, Act June 26, 1943 (Title)

Department of State (Department or agency) Foreign Service (Bureau or division) Washington, D.C. (Place of employment)

Political Officer,
Foreign Service Reserve Officer of Class-4 (Position to which appointed) May 17, 1956 (Date of entrance on duty)

NOTE.—If the oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.

Form DS-1032
Exception to SF-50
Approved by the
Bureau of the Budget
May 1956

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SERVICE: ☒ FS ☐ DPTL

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s) and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Robert T. Shaw	6-18-25	FSA 9	5-3-56

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Limited Appointment	5/17/56	Section 522.1 PL 724 ~~a~~ 79th

FROM:		TO:
	8. POSITION TITLE Diplomatic or Consular Title	Political Officer
	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-4 $7490
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS Post	Nogales
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ Regular ☐ Resident ☐ Non-US	12. DS CATEGORY FS Category	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ Regular ☐ Resident ☐ Non-US

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT	10-POINT Disab.	10-POINT Other
	X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				1-1011-009

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (Accessions Only)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	FROM TO 6A-8011	XX CSC ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ NONE	5/17/56	☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department.

Execute SF-61a

Marital status - Married - Three

Reserve status - None

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

2. PERSONNEL FOLDER

14-00000

Form DS-1031 Exception to SF-52
Approved by the Bureau of the Budget
May 1954

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

PER/EM 4/30
ARA 4/30
PER-Green 5/4
AAB 5-3
TRANS

SERVICE
☒ FS. ☐ DPTL

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Robert T. SHAW
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 6-18-25
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 4-27-56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Limited Appointment Section 522.1
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL
☐ REGULAR ☐ RESIDENT

8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER
Diplomatic or Consular Title
9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
Post
11. HEADQUARTERS
12. DS CATEGORY
FSS Category

TO Political Officer
*(Vice Consul when confirmed)
FSR-4 $7490 Approved as an exception - 5/1/56 -
NOGALES
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL
☐ REGULAR ☐ RESIDENT

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE ☐ 5-PT ☐ 10-PT DISAB ☐ OTHER ☐ Yes

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW X VICE ☐ I. A. ☐ REAL ☐ NO 1-1011-009

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO: 6A-8011

17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE: ☒ CSC ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ NONE

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (Accessions only)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

20. RESERVE STATUS: None ☐ ACTIVE ☐ INACTIVE

21. MARITAL STATUS: ☒ MARRIED ☐ SINGLE ☐ WIDOWED ☐ WIDOW ☐ DIVORCED ☐ SEPARATED

22. REQUESTED BY (Signature and title): RSMILLER Acting Reg Pers Off

23. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature and title: Charles W Bass PER/EM Charles W. Bass

24. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.			D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			E. PER/TR	M.B. Green	5/1/56
C. CLASSIFICATION	D. Westcott	5/1/56	F. APPROVED BY	[illegible] 5-1-56	

REMARKS:

* See separate DS-1031 for Commissioning for Vice Consul

REQUEST FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

OBJECT CLASS	ESTIMATED COST	PER TC ENCUMBRANCE FUNDS AVAILABLE	NAMES OF DEPENDENTS AND DATES OF BIRTH OF CHILDREN UNDER 21
		APPR.	W-Janet L.
		ALLOT.	D-Barbara L.
		OBLIG. NO.	7-27-52
		DATE	S-Richard W.
		SIGNATURE	9-10-55
TOTAL			S-Thomas R.
T. O. DATE		T. O. NO.	9-10-55

FROM: Arlington, Va.
TO: Nogales
VIA
DETAILS ENROUTE
NO. LBS. EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTH.
SHIPMENT OF EFFECTS
FROM: Arlington, Va.
TO: Nogales

REMARKS

Authorize travel of appointee and dependents from Arlington, Va. to Nogales, Mexico.

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 19[illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1, R1, AND S1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): Shaw, Robert T.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 6/18/25

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
FOREIGN SERVICE	49	OCT	19	52	FEB	6	
FOREIGN SERVICE	52	MAY	28	54	JULY	30	
DEPT. OF DEFENSE, WASH.	54	JUL	31	56	APR	6	
NO SICK OR ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE PICKED UP.							

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U.S. ARMY	43	SEP	11	45	MAR	8	HON.

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☐ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

PART II—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
2	3	18
2	2	3
1	8	6
1	5	28

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 7 7 25

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

EOD May 17, 1956
(DATE)

RTShaw
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 17th day of May (MONTH) 19 55 at Washington, D.C. (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

Ellen C. Fuller

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

(OVER)

14-00000

NOTIFICATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCE UNDER E.O. 10450

TO: Director, Office of Personnel
Attention: Mr. Howard P. Mace

DATE: May 7, 1956

SUBJECT: SHAW, Robert Tyler
(DOB 6/18/25)

☒ APPLICANT. If subject is not appointed within 90 days of the date of this notification, this clearance must be revalidated by the Office of Security.

☐ EMPLOYEE.

The case of above-named person has been reviewed in the Office of Security.

Investigative requirements of Executive Order 10450 have been complied with.

It has been determined that the employment or retention in employment of subject is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.

On the basis of this determination clearance is hereby granted. This clearance shall remain in effect for all purposes until further notice except that prior approval must continue to be requested from the Office of Security in the event of marriage to an alien, Presidential appointment, any appointment requiring Senate confirmation, and transfers or assignments to the Office of Security, R Area Special Projects Staff, and cryptographic duties. (This determination shall not eliminate or modify any other determination on security which may be required by law).

REMARKS:

☐ Investigative reports are attached. Please return these reports to the Office of Security within 10 days together with the names of the individuals who have reviewed them listed on the extra copy of this form herewith furnished.

☐

Dennis A. Flinn
Director, Office of Security
Dennis A. Flinn

ATTACHMENTS

SCA:SY:WBdeGrace:abw

UNCLASSIFIED
Authorized by William O. Hall
Director General of the
1973

This memorandum may be considered as OFFICIAL USE ONLY upon removal of attachments.

a-219

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 57
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

CWB 4-27-56

APPLICATION NO.

1. Kind of position applied for or name of examination

2. Option(s) *(if mentioned in examination announcement)*

3. Place of employment applied for *(city and State)* Foreign Service

4. *(First name)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden, if any)* *(Last)*
Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ ~~Miss~~ Robert Tyler Shaw

5. Street and number or R. D. number 3000 N. Oakland St., ~~Arlington 7, Va.~~

City or post office *(including postal zone)* and State Arlington 7, Virginia

6. Place of birth
City Washington
State or foreign country D.C.

7. Date of birth *(month, day, year)* 18 June 1925

8. ☒ Male ☐ Female

9. Height without shoes 5 feet 7 inches
Weight 140 pounds

10. ☒ Married ☐ Single

11. Home phone JA 7-1586
Office phone

12. Legal or voting residence *(State)* Virginia

13. If you have ever been employed by the Federal Government, indicate last grade GS-12
Dates of service in that grade From July 1954 To present

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of
Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Appear. ☐ Nonappear.	Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned	Entered Register:
Notations:	App. Review: Approved:	

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Augm. Rating
			☐ 5 Points (Tent.)	
			☐ 10 Point Comp. Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Point	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being Investigated	
Initials and Date				

14. AVAILABILITY INFORMATION. A. Indicate the lowest salary you will accept $ per
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

B. If you are now a Federal employee, indicate the lowest grade you will accept

C. Will you accept appointment for ☐ 1 to 3 months? ☐ 3 to 6 months? ☐ 6 to 12 months?
Acceptance or refusal of a short term appointment will not affect your consideration for another appointment.

D. Are you willing to travel ☐ Occasionally? ☒ Frequently? ☐ Constantly?

E. Will you accept appointment ☐ In Washington, D. C.? ☐ Anywhere in United States? ☒ Outside U. S.?

F. If you will accept appointment only in certain locations, list them.

15. VETERAN PREFERENCE. A. If you claim 5-point preference based on war or military service, indicate:

Date(s) of entrance into active service	Date(s) of separation	Branch of service (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.)	Serial number. If officer, give grade or rating at separation
September 1943	March 1945	Army	35228658

B. Do you claim 5-point preference as a peacetime campaign veteran? ☐ Yes ☐ No

C. Do you claim 10-point preference? ☐ Yes ☐ No

D. Have you ever been granted 10-point veteran preference or 5-point preference as a peacetime campaign veteran by the U. S. Civil Service Commission? Yes X No If so, indicate below the office which granted this preference to you. Attach your notice of preference adjudication if available. It will be returned to you.

Name of U. S. Civil Service Commission office or name of Board of U. S. Civil Service Examiners

Address of Commission office or Board of Examiners
City
State

THIS SPACE IS FOR USE OF THE APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY. The information on the record of service in question 15A has been verified with the discharge record and which shows that the separation was under honorable conditions.

Signature Agency

Title Date

(Continued on next page)

16. EXPERIENCE (Start with your present position and work back)

(1) Dates of employment (month, year)
From July 1954 To present time
Exact title of your position: Foreign Affairs Officer
Salary or earnings
Starting $ per
Final $7785 per annum
Classification Grade (if in Federal service): GS-12
Place of employment
City: Washington
State: D.C.
Kind of business or organization (manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.): U.S. Government
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, etc.): Dept. of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Name and title of immediate supervisor: Oliver W. Anthony
Reason for wanting to leave: Re-enter Foreign Service
Description of work: Preparation of studies and reports for the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Inter-American Defense matters.

(2) Dates of employment (month, year)
From May 1952 To July 1954
Exact title of your position: Vice Consul
Salary or earnings
Starting $ per
Final $ per
Classification Grade (if in Federal service): FSS-9
Place of employment
City: Guayaquil
State: Ecuador
Kind of business or organization (manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.): Government
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, etc.): Dept. of State
Name and title of immediate supervisor: Consul General Paul W. Meyer
Reason for leaving: Position with Dept. of Defense
Description of work: General duties of a Foreign Service Staff Officer in the Economic and Commercial Section of the Consulate General in Guayaquil. Also performed political reporting functions and assisted in visa and citizenship matters.

October 1949 February 1952
Asst. Attache
$ FSS-10 per
$ FSS-9 per
FSS-9
Washington &
Caracas, Venez.
Government
Department of State
Ambassadors Donnally, Sparks
Accompany wife to U.S. for medical attention
General duties of a Foreign Service Staff Officer in the Political Section, Embassy Caracas. Preparation of reports for the Department and memoranda for the Ambassador, consultation with officials of the local government and American companies (esp. of the petroleum industry operating in Venezuela). Assistance in the Consular Section with visa affairs.

Robert T. Shaw
18 June 1925
3000 N. Oakland St.
Arlington 7, Virginia

STANDARD FORM 57 - continuation
#16
5.

September 1943 - March 1945
Pfc
U. S. Army
United States
Honorable Discharge

Anti-Aircraft

ATTACH SUPPLEMENTAL SHEETS OR FORMS HERE

Dates of employment (month, year) From November 1947 To October 1949

Exact title of your position: Editor

Salary or earnings: Starting $ 2400 per year; Final $ 3600 per year

Classification Grade (if in Federal service):

Place of employment: City Cincinnati; State Ohio

Kind of business or organization (manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.): Soap and chemical manufacture

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, etc.): Proctor & Gamble

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Carl Frantz, Chief

Reason for leaving: Desire for Foreign Service

Description of work: Supervision of preparation (compilation through final printing and binding) of sales manuals for entire company sales force. Preparation of aptitude tests and general qualifications questionnaires used by company in recruitment of salesmen and administrative employees. Preparation of material for Company "house magazine". Maintenance of close liaison with other personnel departments. Work with company print shop and private printing establishments.

If you need additional experience blocks, use supplemental sheets. SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET.

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND SKILLS.

(A) Licenses and Certificates: List the kind of license or certificate and the State or other licensing authority which granted it, for example, pilot, teacher, electrician, lawyer, radio operator, C. P. A., etc.

Kind of License .... Licensing Authority ....

(B) List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as short wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key-punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices.

(C) Approximate number of words per minute in: Typing .... Shorthand ....

(D) Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in this application, such as:
(1) Your more important publications. (Do not submit copies unless requested)
(2) Your patents or inventions.
(3) Public speaking and public relations experience.
(4) Membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.
(5) Honors and fellowships received.

(5) Phi Beta Kappa

EDUCATION.

A. Circle the highest elementary or high school grade completed 12

If you completed high school, give date 1943

B. Name and location of last high school attended: Bath High School, Osborn, Ohio

C. Name and location of college or university	Dates attended From	Dates attended To	Years completed Day	Years completed Night	Credit hours Semester or Quarter		Degrees received
~~The Ohio State University~~							
The Ohio State University	Mar 43	Sept 43					
" "	Mar 45	Sept 45	1½				
University of Arizona	Sep 45	[illegible] 47	2				[illegible]

D. Chief undergraduate college subjects	Credit hours Semester or Quarter		E. Chief graduate college subjects	Credit hours Semester or Quarter	
Spanish Political Science					

F. Other schools or training, such as trade, vocational, Armed Forces, or business. Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, certificates, and any other pertinent data.

Jan. '44-May '44 (Camp Callan, California): Basic anti-aircraft schooling in fire control, specialization in anti-armor use of AA weapons.

Have you any knowledge of a foreign language? x Yes No

Name of language	Reading		Speaking		Understanding		Writing	
Spanish	x		x		x		x	
French		x						

14-00000

21. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT RELATED TO YOU AND WHO HAVE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 19, EXPERIENCE.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Norman Armour	c/o Dept. of State	Former Ambassador to Venezuela
2. P. C. Sutton	c/o Dept. of State	FSO
3. R. G. Leddy	c/o Dept. of State	FSO

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
22. (a) Are you a citizen of the United States of America, or (b) as a native of American Samoa do you owe allegiance to the United States of America?	X	
23. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party, U. S. A., or any Communist organization?		X
24. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of a Fascist organization?		X
25. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means?		X
If your answer to question 23, 24, or 25 above is "Yes," state on a separate sheet to be attached to and made a part of this application the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities. (See instruction sheet)		
26. Does the United States Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 34 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X
27. A. Have you any physical handicap, chronic disease, or other disability?		X
B. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown?		X
C. Have you ever had tuberculosis?		X
If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 34.		

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
28. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.?	X	
29. Do you receive or have you applied for an annuity from the United States or District of Columbia Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 34.*		X
30. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 34.*		X
31. Have you ever been barred by the U. S. Civil Service Commission from taking examinations or accepting civil service appointments? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 34.*		X
32. A. Have you ever been discharged from employment because (1) Your conduct was not satisfactory?		X
(2) Your work was not satisfactory?		X
B. Have you ever resigned after official notification that (1) Your conduct was not satisfactory?		X
(2) Your work was not satisfactory?		X
C. Have you ever been discharged from the Armed Services under other than honorable conditions? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 34 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reason in each case.*		X
33. Have you ever been arrested, charged, or held by Federal, State, or other law enforcement authorities for any violation of any Federal law, State law, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance? Do not include anything that happened before your 16th birthday. Do not include traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed. All other charges must be included even if they were dismissed. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 34 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		X

34. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS. Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.

Item No.	
17	China, 193[illegible]-3[illegible]: residing with family.
	Venezuela, 1949-52: Foreign Service
	Ecuador, 1952-54: Foreign Service

If more space is needed, use sheets of the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, [illegible]

ATTENTION: [illegible]

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date 10 February 1956

Signature of applicant Gilbert T Shaw

Exception to SF-50
Approved by the
Bureau of the Budget

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SERVICE
☒ FS ☐ DPTL

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s) and surname) Mr. Robert T. [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 6/18/25	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. FS 20	4. DATE 12/9/54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology) Resignation for Personal Reasons without Prejudice	6. EFFECTIVE DATE COB 7/30/54	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM:		TO:
Economic Officer OC-11 Vice Consul	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER *Diplomatic or Consular Title*	
FSS-9 $5079	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	
Guayaquil	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS *Post*	
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ *Regular* ☐ *Resident* ☐ *Non-US*	12. OS CATEGORY *FS Category*	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ *Regular* ☐ *Resident* ☐ *Non-US*

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT	10-POINT Disab.	10-POINT Other

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM 5A-4011 TO	17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE ☒ CSC ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ NONE	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS *(Accessions Only)*	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department.

Employment status-Indefinite

All leave transferred.

Address: Robert T. [illegible]
1714 Huntington St,
Arlington, Va.

R. J. RYAN

EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE RATING

2.

PERSONNEL FOLDER

4?4

FORM FS-353 (Rev.)
8-8-52

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOREIGN SERVICE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PERSONNEL ACTION WORK SHEET

DATE OF REQUEST: 7-20-54

EFFECTIVE DATE
PROPOSED:
ACTUAL: COB 7/20/54

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SEX
SHAW	Robert	T.	6-12-25	M

NATURE OF ACTION: ~~[illegible]~~ - RESIGNATION WITHOUT / PREJUDICE

DEC 9 1954

	PRESENT STATUS (From)	RECOMMENDED STATUS (To)
FUNCTIONAL TITLE	Economic Officer	
DIP.-CONS. OR OTHER TITLE	Vice Consul	
POST	Guayaquil	
CLASS AND SALARY	FSS-9 $4899 upgrade?	(5074)
APPROPRIATION ALLOTMENT	5A-4011	
POSITION NUMBER	G-11	
NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT	☒ FULL TIME ☐ PART TIME	☒ FULL TIME ☐ PART TIME

ACTION CONTROL

NO.	ROUTING	DATE
	R-CON	
	CL. BR.	
	R-CON	
2	LVE	
	FOR-AAB	
1	TVL-CON	7/28
3	TRANS.	

STATE OF LEGAL RESIDENCE:

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS: ☐ CSC ☐ SOC. SEC.
SOC. SEC. NO.:

☐ VETERAN ☐ NON-VETERAN

RESERVE STATUS: ☐ ACTIVE ☐ INACTIVE

BRANCH OF SERVICE (Specify):

SERIAL NO.:

PRESENT MARITAL STATUS: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOW ☐ WIDOWER ☐ SEPARATED

DATE AAB APPROVED:

NATURE OF POSITION (Check applicable box): ☐ NEW ☐ COMPLEMENT REPLACEMENT (Name) ☐ VICE

STATE LIMITATION:

CONCURRENCE BY (Initials)

REGIONAL BUREAUS	OTHER AGENCIES	OTHER OFFICES

APPOINTED TO: ☒ REGULAR STAFF ☐ RESIDENT U.S. STAFF ☐ LOCAL NON-U.S.

LOYALTY FORMS SUBMITTED: ☐ SF 85 ☐ SF 87
CLEARED UNDER P.L. NO.:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS (Subject to A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J and K)

Please accept Mr. Shaw's resignation in accordance with his letter of 7-19-54 (attached). Reason: Continue post-graduate studies.
EOD: 5-26-52 Arrival at post: 6-19-52

SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER: [illegible], Area Operations Officer, ARA

SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF APPROVING OFFICER:

REQUEST FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

OBJECT CLASS	ESTIMATED COST	PER/FP/TC ENCUMBRANCE FUNDS AVAILABLE	NAMES OF DEPENDENTS AND DATES OF BIRTH OF CHILDREN UNDER 21
0202	1500	APPR.	
		ALLOT. ~~[illegible]~~	
		OBLIG. NO.	
0206	3000	DATE	
		SIGNATURE	
TOTAL	4500		
TO DATE	TRAVEL ORDER NUMBER		

FROM: Guayaquil
TO: Arlington, Va.
VIA:
DETAIL ENROUTE: approx 5 days' cons w/per diem
NO. LBS. EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTH.:
SHIPMENT OF EFFECTS FROM: Guayaquil to Arlington, Va.

REMARKS: OS/T: Mr. Shaw has completed 5 days consultation in the Department and is now taking leave in Arlington, Va. Please cancel that part of TO A-21223 dated June 11, 1954 which authorized transportation from [illegible] to Tucson, Arizona and thence to Guayaquil. Authorize instead shipment of effects from Guayaquil to Arlington, Va. (place of residence on service separation listed on latest FS-416 dated 4-1-54).

Also cancel Of 3/223

All leave transferred. 1150 forwarded. CCB 7/20/54

E Kathryn Mallow fu
E. Kathryn Mallow, Chief
Leave and Retirement Section

Robert T Shaw
~~[illegible] Campbell Ave~~ fh
~~Tucson, Arizona~~
1714 HUNTINGTON ST N.
ARLINGTON, Va

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Washington, D.C.
July 19, 1954

Division of Personnel Operations
Department of State
Washington 25, D.C.

Attn: Mr. Leap

Gentlemen:

I hereby submit my resignation from the Foreign Service Staff Corps in which I hold the grade of Foreign Service Staff Officer Class 9. This resignation is submitted in order that I may devote full time to post-graduate studies.

It is requested that this resignation take effect as of the close of business July 19, 1954.

It is also requested that the Administrative Officer at my former post of duty, Guayaquil, Ecuador, be authorized to ship a lift van containing furnishings and personal effects to the Security Storage Company, Washington, D.C.

It has been a great pleasure serving with the Foreign Service and I shall always remember with pleasure my association with the many fine officers and clerical personnel of both the Service and the Department.

Yours very truly,

Robert T. Shaw

NOTIFICATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCE UNDER E.O. 10450

TO: Director, Office of Personnel **DATE:** 6 July 1954
Attention: Mr. Robert Ryan

SUBJECT: SHAW, Robert Tyler
Date of Birth: June 18, 1925

☐ **APPLICANT. If subject is not appointed within 90 days of the date of this notification, this clearance must be revalidated by the Office of Security.**

☒ **EMPLOYEE.**

The case of above-named person has been reviewed in the Office of Security.

Investigative requirements of Executive Order 10450 have been complied with.

It has been determined that the employment or retention in employment of subject is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.

On the basis of this determination clearance is hereby granted. This clearance shall remain in effect for all purposes until further notice except that prior approval must continue to be requested from the Office of Security in the event of marriage to an alien, Presidential appointment, any appointment requiring Senate confirmation, and transfers or assignments to the Office of Security, R Area Special Projects Staff, and cryptographic duties. (This determination shall not eliminate or modify any other determination on security which may be required by law).

REMARKS:

☐ Investigative reports are attached. Please return these reports to the Office of Security within 10 days together with the names of the individuals who have reviewed them listed on the extra copy of this form herewith furnished.

☐

Director, Office of Security

ATTACHMENTS

[illegible]
[illegible] O. Hall
[illegible]

SY: W. L. FRANKLIN
This memorandum may be considered as OFFICIAL USE ONLY upon removal of attachments.

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OF ~~[illegible]~~ PERSONNEL Operation'

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE July 16, 1954

JOURNAL NO. 82

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Shaw Robert T.	DATE OF BIRTH	SEX	LEGAL AUTHORITY
NATURE OF ACTION Periodic Step Increase	EFFECTIVE DATE June 20, 1954		DATE OF OATH

	FROM	TO
FUNCTIONAL TITLE		Same
DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR TITLE		
POST		Guayaquil
CLASS AND SALARY	FSS-9 $4899	FSS-9 $5079
APPROPRIATION ALLOTMENT		5A-4011
POSITION NUMBER		
NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT	PERM. INDEF. LIM. TEMP. FULL PART	PERM. INDEF. LIM. TEMP. FULL PART

REGULAR STAFF		LEGAL RESIDENCE	CITY	RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS	FS	
RESIDENT U.S. STAFF			STATE		C.S.	
LOCAL NON-U.S.					FICA	
VETERAN		BRANCH OF SERVICE		MARITAL STATUS		
NON-VETERAN		MILITARY RESERVE STATUS	READY	CHILDREN		
			STAND-BY	DEPENDENTS		

ABOVE ACTION AND CONTINUANCE OF STATUS EFFECTED THEREBY ARE SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

REMARKS:

(Signature)

(Title)

mtw

FORM FS-349
11-4-49

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL
PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE June 5, 1953
JOURNAL NO. 147

NAME (last) Shaw (first) Robert (middle) T.

DATE OF BIRTH

LEGAL AUTHORITY

SERVICE FSS

This is to notify you of the following action concerning your employment

NATURE OF ACTION PERIODIC STEP INCREASE

EFFECTIVE DATE June 7,1953

DATE OF OATH

	FROM	TO
FUNCTIONAL TITLE		
DIP., CONSULAR OR OTHER TITLE		same
POST		Guayaquil
CLASS AND SALARY	FSS-9 $4719	FSS-9 $4899
APPROPRIATION ALLOTMENT		3A 2011
POSITION NUMBER		same

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	OTHER	FULL PART	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	OTHER	FULL PART

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS	YES NO	REGULAR STAFF LOCAL STAFF	NATURE OF POSITION NEW ADDITIONAL REALLOCATION VICE (name)
VETERAN NON-VETERAN		NON-US	
SEX	MARITAL STATUS, CHILDREN, AND DEPENDENTS		LEGAL RESIDENCE

Conditions and requirements. Above action and continuance of status effected thereby are subject to such conditions and requirements listed on reverse of this page as are cited herewith.

REMARKS:

Last salary increase May 28,1952.

Performance rating meets required standards.

2

(Signature)

TITLE

FOLDER

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 520534

FORM FS-349
11-4-49

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL
28
PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE	Dec. 5, 1952	JOURNAL NO.	21

	(last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	LEGAL AUTHORITY
NAME	SHAW	Robert	T.	Apr. 12, 1927	

SERVICE FSS

This is to notify you of the following action concerning your employment

NATURE OF ACTION	EFFECTIVE DATE	DATE OF OATH
Change in Title	Dec. 5, 1952	

	FROM	TO
FUNCTIONAL TITLE	Consular Officer	Economic Officer
DIP., CONSULAR OR OTHER TITLE	Vice Consul	Vice Consul
POST	Guayaquil	Guayaquil
CLASS AND SALARY	FSS-9 $4719	FSS-9 $4719
APPROPRIATION ALLOTMENT	3A 2011	3A 2011
POSITION NUMBER	GQ-9	GQ-11

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT	PERMANENT		TEMPORARY		OTHER Indef	FULL PART	X	PERMANENT		TEMPORARY		OTHER Indef	FULL PART	X

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS	YES X	REGULAR STAFF	X	NATURE OF POSITION
	NO	LOCAL STAFF		NEW ☐ ADDITIONAL ☐ REALLOCATION ☐ VICE (name)
VETERAN NON-VETERAN		NON-US		
SEX Male	MARITAL STATUS, CHILDREN, AND DEPENDENTS Married-1			LEGAL RESIDENCE

Conditions and requirements: Above action and continuance of status effected thereby are subject to such conditions and requirements listed on reverse of this page as are cited herewith.

REMARKS:

2.

(Signature)

TITLE

FOLDER

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952 999704

[illegible] Revised 1-9-46

Division of Foreign Service Personnel
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Request for Personnel Action and Travel Authorization

1 - Post: Guayaquil, Ecuador

2 - Date: Nov. 21, 1952

3 - Name (last) SHAW (first) Robert (initial) T

4 - Date of Birth: June 18, 1925

5 - Civil Service or Other Legal Authority:

6 - Service:

THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ACTION IS REQUESTED

7 - Nature of Action: Change of Title
[illegible]

8 - Effective Date* ☐ Proposed, or ☐ Actual

9 - Effective Date Approved by Department:

	PRESENT STATUS	RECOMMENDED STATUS	FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
Position Title	10 A Consular Officer	10 B Economic ~~Reporting~~ Officer	
Grade and Salary	11 A FSS-9 $4719	11 B FSS-9 $4719	
Post	12 A Guayaquil, Ecuador	12 B Guayaquil, Ecuador	
Basic Salary	13 A $4719	13 B $4719	
Amount of Temporary Increase	14 A --	14 B --	
Salary Appropriation	15 A 193[illegible]3	15 B 1930113	
Position Number	16 A GQ-11 (GQ-9) #	16 B GQ-11	
Permanent or Temporary	17 A Permanent	17 B Permanent	
Full or Part Time	18 A Full	18 B Full	

349 drafted
12/5/52
J.S.

19 - Marital Status: Married - 1 c

20 - Dates of Birth of Children Under 21: 4 months old

21 - Special Instructions or Explanation:-
PA & SA reallocated position Economic Officer on November 26, 1952. [illegible] #Position number prior to recent reallocation was G -9.

22 - Title of Requesting Officer: American Consul General

23 - Signature of Requesting Officer: Paul W. Meyer

REQUEST FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION (To be filled out only by Division of Foreign Service Personnel in Washington)

FROM:

TO:

Via:

Special Instructions: NO TRAVEL INVOLVED

FISCAL DATA	OBJECT CLASS COST (ESTIMATED)			
				Via Washington For Consultation En Route
Transportation Foreign Service	023			Via Any Pass. Route & Means Incl. Aircraft
Foreign Service (Auxiliary) N. O	029			Wire Notifn. To Post in 12A
Allotment Number	030			Excess Baggage Pounds
	Total			Air Exp. Shipment Pounds

Proceed Upon Arrival of:

☐ Proceed as Soon as Possible

Signature of Officer FP: J. B. Sonine, Regional Operations Officer, American Republics Area.

Date:

Authorization No. (To be Inserted by DC/T):

*If Actual Effective Date, explain under "Special Instructions"

G P O - 600341

DEC 4 1952

vnw

FORM FS-349
11-4-47

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL
PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE: May 19, 1952
JOURNAL NO 18

NAME	(last) Shaw,	(first) Robert	(middle) T.	DATE OF BIRTH June 18,1925

LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 724 79th
SERVICE: FSS

This is to notify you of the following action concerning your employment

NATURE OF ACTION: Indefinite Appointment EO 10180
EFFECTIVE DATE: 5/28/52
DATE OF OATH: 5/28/52

	FROM	TO
FUNCTIONAL TITLE		Consular Officer
DIP., CONSULAR OR OTHER TITLE		Vice Consul
POST		Guayaquil
CLASS AND SALARY		FSS-9 $4719
APPROPRIATION ALLOTMENT		2A 5011
POSITION NUMBER		GQ-9

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	OTHER	FULL / PART	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	Indef.	FULL X	PART

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS	YES X NO	REGULAR STAFF X LOCAL STAFF NON-US	NATURE OF POSITION: NEW / ADDITIONAL / REALLOCATION; VICE (name)
VETERAN NON-VETERAN	X Army		
SEX Male	MARITAL STATUS, CHILDREN, AND DEPENDENTS Married		LEGAL RESIDENCE Arizona

Conditions and requirements: Above action and continuance of status effected thereby are subject to such conditions and requirements listed on reverse of this page as are cited herewith.

REMARKS: Items: a, b, c, d, g, i(61g) m.
No military reserve status.
Forms 85 and 87 submitted to SY.
Position description requested from Post in quadruplicate
within 30 days after employee reports at Post.

93/T: Authorize travel of appointee from Arlington, Va. via
Washington, D.C. to Guayaquil.
Wife: From Arlington, Va. to Guayaquil.
Shipment of effects: From Arlington, Va. and/Tucson, Arizona
to Guayaquil.
Janet Lee Ruggles-wife.

2

(Signature)

TITLE

U.S. GPO 1951 24(?)

FOLDER

STANDARD FORM 61a
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
FORM APPROVED BY THE COMP. GEN., U.S.
JUNE 13, 1951
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F.P.M. CHAPTER A6

CIVIL OFFICER
APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

(As defined in 5 USC 21a and 21b)

I, Robert T. Shaw (Name in full) Arizona (State)
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or a Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means, or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

Robert T. Shaw (Typed name of appointee)
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 28th day of May, A. D. 1952,

at Washington, D.C. (City) (State)

(Signature of officer)

[SEAL]

My commission expires December 14, 1953

Notary Public (Title)

Department of State (Department or agency)
Foreign Service (Bureau or division)
Washington, D.C. (Place of employment)

Foreign Service Staff Officer, Class9
Vice Consul; Consular Officer (Position to which appointed)
May 28, 1952 (Date of entrance on duty)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—61312-1 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS LI AND R3

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*) SHAW, ROBERT T.

2. DATE OF BIRTH 18 JUNE 25

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*) ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN	11. SERVICE		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY		YEAR	MONTH	DAY
U.S. GOVERNMENT	49	10	24	52	2	15	—	2	3	22
FOREIGN SERVICE	52	5	28	54	7	30		2	2	3

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)	11. SERVICE		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY		YEAR	MONTH	DAY
U.S. ARMY	43	9	11	45	3	8	HON	1	5	27

12. TOTAL SERVICE 6 6 23

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*)

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

7. ARE YOU.

A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Sept 28, 1954
(DATE)

Robert T. Shaw
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ 1952 at ______
(MONTH) (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

(OVER)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FP - Mr. Howard Mace DATE: April 29, 1952

FROM : SY - Mr. Donald L. Nicholson

SUBJECT: SHAW, Robert Tyler

Investigation of subject has been conducted with results as indicated below.

SECURITY:

(X) Security clearance is given for appointment or continued employment.

( ) Security clearance of subject is not given.

( ) This is an ALIEN CASE. The usual restrictions are applicable.

REMARKS:

( ) Investigation reveals personnel information which you may desire to review prior to appointment.

(x) Investigation discloses that the subject has been cleared under E. O. 9835.

( ) Investigation has verified subject's satisfactory service with armed forces.

( ) Investigation has been completed as required by Public Law , Congress.

( ) Investigation does not include FBI check. If an unfavorable report should be received at a later date from the FBI which would necessitate concelling of this security clearance, you will be so advised.

( ) Please return the attached file to this office upon the completion of personnel action.

ATTACHMENTS:

CC:SY:HFLinneman:cfs

FORM DSP-34
3-26-51

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPLICATION FOR FOREIGN SERVICE AND DEPARTMENTAL EMPLOYMENT

(Use with Standard Form 57)

If more space is required, use additional sheets of paper. Write on each sheet your name, address and date of birth. Identify each item, and attach to this application.

BUDGET BUREAU NO. 47-R071.3
APPROVAL EXPIRES August 31, 1956

1. a. NAME *(Print)* Robert Tyler SHAW

b. ADDRESS
1714 Huntington
Arlington, Va.

2. USE OF APPLICATION - Check one box below to indicate whether you wish this application to be considered for Foreign Service employment only, or for both Foreign Service and Departmental employment. Completion of this form is not required for Department employment only. Standard Form 57 must be filled out in any case.

☒ FOREIGN SERVICE ONLY ☐ FOREIGN SERVICE AND DEPARTMENTAL

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(Place from which you will expect transportation of self and household effects, if any, if appointed to the Foreign Service)*

909 North Campbell Ave., Tucson, Arizona

4. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED? IF A NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE. *(Section 11 on Form 57)*.

5. a. ARE YOU NOW INVOLVED IN ANY LITIGATION OR SEPARATION AGREEMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

b. DO YOU KNOW OF ANY PROSPECTIVE LITIGATION IN WHICH YOU MAY BE INVOLVED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(Give details, if answer is yes to a. or b.)

6. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT? *(Exclusive of allowances)* $ PER YEAR

7. WHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE, IF ANY, ON YOUR IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY FOR DUTY IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD?

None

8. a. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE *(If wife, give maiden name)* Janet Lee Ruggles SHAW (wife)	b. DATE OF BIRTH 12 April 1927	c. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State or Province, and Country)* Three Rivers, Mich.
d. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED?	e. IF NATURALIZED, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NO. OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE.	

9.

NAMES OF DEPENDENTS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH	WILL RESIDE WITH YOU OVERSEAS YES	NO
Janet Lee Ruggles SHAW	wife	12 April 1927	X	

10. a. FATHER'S NAME Maj. Gen. Franklin E. Shaw	b. PRESENT ADDRESS Dept. of Defense, Wash.	c. PLACE OF BIRTH Newport, Ky.
11. a. MOTHER'S NAME (Maiden) Mary Inez Skees Shaw	b. PRESENT ADDRESS 1714 Juntington, Arlinton, Virginia	c. PLACE OF BIRTH Elizabethtown, Ky.

12. IF PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, DID THEY EVER OBTAIN UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP? (Check below)

FATHER ☐ YES ☐ NO MOTHER ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR A POSITION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR TAKEN AN EXAMINATION FOR A POSITION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

If "Yes" give date, nature of position applied for, and kind of examination taken, if any.

FORM DSP-34 [illegible]

14. RELATIVES NOW RESIDING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS
NONE		

15. FOREIGN LANGUAGES *(Replaces item 14 on Form 57)*

Name and indicate the extent of your competence, i.e. Excellent, Good, Fair

A. LANGUAGE	B. READ	C. WRITE	D. SPEAK	E. UNDERSTAND
Spanish	Ex	Ex	Ex	Ex
French	Good			Fair
Russian	Slight			

16. LIST PRESENT OR FORMER FOREIGN CONNECTIONS:

A. BUSINESS
B. EMPLOYMENT
C. MILITARY

17. DATES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE FOR LAST 10 YEARS

DATES	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE OR COUNTRY
1949-1952	American Embassy	Caracas	Venezuela
1947-1949	40 Henry Ave.,	Fort Thomas	Kentucky
1945-1947	1734 E. 2nd	Tucson	Arizona
1943-1945	US Army		
1942-1943	702 D. St.	Wright Field	Ohio

18. DOES YOUR FINANCIAL POSITION PERMIT DISCHARGE OF ALL DEBTS INCURRED? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF "NO," STATE INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW:

NAMES OF CREDITORS	AMOUNTS DUE	DATES ON WHICH OBLIGATIONS WERE CONTRACTED

19. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN MEDICALLY DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS IN ITEM 39 OF FORM 57.

20. PRESENT MILITARY STATUS

A. ARE YOU REGISTERED WITH A SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," STATE BELOW THE NUMBER AND ADDRESS OF THE BOARD, AND YOUR CLASSIFICATION:

B. DO YOU HAVE A MILITARY RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," STATE BELOW, THE BRANCH OF SERVICE; YOUR SERIAL NUMBER; YOUR ORGANIZATION UNIT AND HEADQUARTERS.

21. LIST OTHER NAMES, IF ANY, BY WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN KNOWN INCLUDING MARRIED NAMES, IF MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, GIVING DATE DURING WHICH NAMES WERE USED. DO NOT DUPLICATE INFORMATION SUPPLIED IN ITEM 16 ON FORM 57.

22. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM? Yes

23. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, IF ANY.

24. If you believe the information you have supplied on this application does not fully show your qualifications for Foreign Service Employment, state in Item 39 of Form 57 or on a separate sheet, any additional appropriate data that you wish to have considered.

DATE

SIGNATURE

STANDARD FORM 57 NOV 194?
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

PLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOY .T

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type, write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO

1 NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR

2 OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3 PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State)

4 DATE OF THIS APPLICATION

5 MR. MRS. MISS (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
Robert Tyler SHAW

6 (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER
1714 Huntington St., Arlington, Va.
(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE

ANNOUNCEMENT

7 LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State)
Arizona

8 (A) OFFICE PHONE

(B) HOME PHONE
JA-8-3772

9 DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)
18 June 1925

10 ☒ MARRIED ☐ SINGLE

11 PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State, if born outside U. S., name city and country)
Washington, D.C.

12 ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13 (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES 5 FEET 9 INCHES

(B) WEIGHT 135 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO
(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPROVED ☐ NON-APPROVED	MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED	ENTERED REGISTER
NOTATIONS	APP. REVIEW APPROVED:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15 (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED.
☐ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

16 EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position [illegible] religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed [illegible] Present Position [illegible]

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER
PRESENT $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (Firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Unemployed. Desire to resume career in Foreign Service. (Consultation with physicians establishes fact that wife's condition completely cured and her health will not be impaired by residence abroad)

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

15 CONTINUED

②

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Oct. 1949 TO Feb. 1952

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Assistant Attache

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service): FSS-9

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ FSS-10 PER

FINAL $ FSS-9 PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Wash., D.C. and Caracas, Venezuela

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Ambassador

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Department of State

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Government

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 3 clerks

REASON FOR LEAVING: To accompany wife to U.S. for immediate medical attention

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

General duties of a Foreign Service Staff Officer in the Political Section, Embassy Caracas. Preparation of reports for the Department and memoranda for the Ambassador, consultation with officials of the local government and American companies (esp. of the petroleum industry operating in Venezuela) Assistance in the consular section with visa affairs.

③

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Nov 1947 TO Oct 1949

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Editor

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service): -

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 2,400 PER Yr.

FINAL $ 3,600 PER Yr.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Cincinnati, Ohio

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Carl Frantz, Chief

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Procter & Gamble

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Soap and chemical manufacture

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 2 clerks, various printshop employees

REASON FOR LEAVING: Desire for Foreign Service

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Supervision of preparation (compilation through final printing and binding) of sales manuals for entire company sales force. Preparation of aptitude tests and general qualifications questionnaires used by company in recruitment of salesmen and administrative employees. Preparation of material for company "house magazine". Maintenance of close liaison with other personnel departments. Work with company printshop and private printing establishments.

④

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER

FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

⑤ [illegible]TS OF EMPLOYMENT (*month, year*) FROM- TO	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFI[illegible] GRADE (*if in [illegible] service*)	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (*city and State*)	NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (*firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division*)	KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (*e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.*)
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU	REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
Jan 1944	May 1944	Camp Callan, Calif.	Basic anti-aircraft schooling in fire control, specialization in anti- armor use of AA weapons.

18. EDUCATION (*Circle highest grade completed*):

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF

☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☐ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED

Bath High School, Osborn, Ohio

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

Languages, History, Geography

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
The Ohio State University	LA	Mar 1943	Sept 1943					
" " " "	LA	Mar 1945	Sept 1945	1½				
University of Arizona	LA	Sept1945	July 1947	2½		BA	July 1947	

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
Spanish			
Political Science			

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (*show name and location of school*) OR IN SERVICE TRAINING IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
Spanish	X			X			X		
French		X							X

20. [illegible] (c) REASON FOR [illegible] (*e. g., military service, business, education, recreation*)

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS [illegible]

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (*such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.*)?

☐ YES ☐ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

23. [illegible] (e) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

Phi Beta Kappa

24. REFERENCES: List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 18 (EXPERIENCE)

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Norman Armour	c/o Dept. of State	Former Ambassador to Venezuela
2. Edward Sparks	c/o Dept. of State	Ambassador to Bolivia
3. Walter J. Donnelly	c/o Dept. of State	Ambassador to Austria

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. [illegible] DISEASE OR OTHER DISABILITY [illegible] *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39* [illegible]		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR A PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address, (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a *PEACETIME VETERAN* who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a *WAR-TIME VETERAN* not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
Sept. 1943	March 1945
BRANCH OF SERVICE *(Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.)*	SERIAL NO. *(If none, give grade or rating at time of separation)*
Army	35228658

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below*		
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		
(D) ARE YOU [illegible]		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information entered in the answers to question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (Indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

[illegible]

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80)

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 57 - NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLO[illegible]NT

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR

2. OPTION(S) *(if mentioned in examination announcement)*

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR *(City and State)*: Foreign Service

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: 25 February 52

5. MR. MRS. MISS *(First name)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden, if any)* *(Last)*: Robert Tyler SHAW

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 1714 Huntington, Arlington, Virginia

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE *(including postal zone)* AND STATE

ANNOUNCEMENT NO.

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE *(State)*: ARIZONA

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE

(B) HOME PHONE

9. DATE OF BIRTH *(month, day, year)*: 18 June 1925

10. ☒ MARRIED ☐ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH *(city and State, if born outside U. S., name city and country)*: Washington, D.C.

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES 5 FEET 7 INCHES (B) WEIGHT 135 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE: FSS-9 1949

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR.
☐ NON APPOR.
MATERIAL
☐ SUBMITTED
☐ RETURNED
ENTERED REGISTER

NOTATIONS:
APP. REVIEW:
APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ .... PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED, FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 4 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 7 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY.
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED.
☐ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the examining boards of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

(i)

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year): FROM January 1951 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Personnel Procurement

GRADE (in Federal Service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 5,000 PER yr; PRESENT $ 6,000 PER yr

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Cincinnati, Ohio

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: William H. Reardon, Chief

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Proctor and Gamble

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Soap and Chemical manufacture

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 11 filing clerks, typists, interviewers

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT: Desire to resume career in Foreign/ Service

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:
Coordinate interviewing of applicants for employment, supervise administration of aptitude tests, arrange for recruitment trips to principal colleges and universities throughout the country, maintain close liaison with Personnel Research and Personnel Relations Departments, assist in relief of unfit employees. Translation of personnel forms into Spanish.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Oct. 1949 TO Dec. 1951

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Assistant Attache

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service): FSS-9

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER; FINAL $ 4290 PER yr

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Washington, D.C. and Caracas, Venezuela

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Ambassador

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Department of State

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Government

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 3 clerks

REASON FOR LEAVING: Better opportunity in private industry

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

General duties of Foreign Service Staff Officer (Embassy - political section.) Preparation of reports for the Department and memoranda for the Ambassador. Consultation with officials of the local government and American companies (especially petroleum industry) operating in Venezuela. Assistance in visa affairs (consular section.)

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Nov 1947 TO Oct 1949

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Editor

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER; FINAL $3,600 PER yr

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Cincinnati, Ohio

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Carl Frantz, Chief

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Procter and Gamble

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Soap and Chemical Manufacture

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 2 clerks

REASON FOR LEAVING: Desire to enter Foreign Service

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Supervision of preparation (from compilation through printing) of sales manuals for company sales force. Preparation of aptitude tests and general qualifications questionnaires used by company in recruitment of salesmen. Preparation of material for company "house magazine." Liaison with other Personnel Departments. Close work with company printing plant and private establishments.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER; FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR LEAVING:

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM TO

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
Jan 1944	May 1944	Camp Callan, California	Basic anti-aircraft training, schooling in fire control, specialization in anti-armor use of AA weapons.

18. EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF
☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED
Bath High School, Osborn, Ohio

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED
Languages, History, Geography

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Ohio State University	LA	Mar 1943	Sept 1943					
" " "	LA	Mar 1945	Sept 1945	1½				
University of Arizona	LA	Sept 1945	July 1947	2½		BA	July 1947	

Spanish
Political Science and History

(E) OTHER TRAINING SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, SCHOOLS, ETC. GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR IN SERVICE TRAINING IN FEDERAL OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

SUBJECTS STUDIED | DATES ATTENDED FROM | TO | YEARS COMPLETED DAY | NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

	READING		SPEAKING		UNDERSTANDING	
Spanish	X		X		X	
French		X				X

☐ YES ☐ NO

Phi Beta Kappa

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Norman Armour	c/o Dept. of State, Washington	Diplomat - former Amb. in Caracas
2. Edward Sparks	c/o Dept. of State, Washington	Diplomat - assigned Amb. in La Paz
3. William S. Rice	130 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y.	Businessman - Procter & Gamble

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	✓	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY U. S. A. OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE [illegible] IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 [illegible] to your physical fitness for [illegible]*		X
34. [illegible] DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D)

DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
September 1943	March 1945
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO. (*if none, give grade or rating at time of separation*)
Army	35228658

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below*		
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR A CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The [illegible] Question 37 above has been ver[illegible]

and by comparison with the [illegible] certificate on ....

Agency .... Title ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS. (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use sheets the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. [illegible] of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Robert T. Shaw

(Sign your name in INK (name, initial or initials, and surname). If female [illegible] Miss or Mrs. and if [illegible] sign your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe.")

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

GPO-WF-4-16-42-500M sets of 6

CHANGES IN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY AIR FORCES AT LARGE

Secret

Patterson Field, Fairfield, O.
(Headquarters)

August 6, 1942
(Date)

9. Report No. T 42-306

10. Civil Service or other legal authority A.C.Cir. 40-8

11. Appropriation A.C.A. 1942-43 (C)

12. Date of Birth June 18, 1925

13. Legal Residence Ohio

14. Subject to Retirement Act? No

15. Oath Taken

1. Name Robert T. Shaw

2. Nature of Action Termination

3. Effective Date August 6, 1942

	FROM	TO
4. Position	Asst. Messenger, CU-2	
5. Salary	$1080 per annum	
6. Org'n Unit	Air Service Command	
7. Headquarters	Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio.	
8. Dept'l or Field	FIELD	FIELD

16. Remarks By resignation (Vol.) due to ill health.

Civil Service Authority: Letter of Resignation

Under authority delegated by the Secretary of War in Orders N, dated December 23, 1941, and the directive of the Chief of the Air Corps dated January 17, 1942, you are notified of the above action concerning your employment.

CHARLES S. MARSH, Captain, A. C.
Commanding Officer
[illegible] Civilian Personnel

dsm

14-00000

FORM NO. C. P.-- 50
8-41

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

4

T

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Office: Wright Field, Ohio

Date: August 4, 1942

jfw/blt

Journal No.

12-55285-42

Name ROBERT T. SHAW

5-000

Nature of Action: Confirmation of War Service Appointment (Temporary)

Civil Service or other Legal Authority

W. P. S. R.
L-CSC
~~XXXXX~~ 5/25/42

Effective Date: June 8, 1942

	From	To
Position		Assistant Messenger
Grade & Salary		CU-2 at $1080 per annum
Bureau		Army Air Forces
Org. Unit		Air Service Command
Station		Fairfield Air Depot, Ohio
Departmental or Field	FIELD	FIELD

Appropriation

Regular

Date of Birth

6/10/25

NATURE OF POSITION

NEW	ADDNL. IDEN.
X	
VICE	VICE VACANCY

REFERENCE (Name, No. etc.)

Remarks: Appointment made under War Service Regulation V, Section 2.
This action does not confer a classified civil service status.
Appointment made for 90 days.
Position No. 4001.

Code-21

By order of the Secretary of War

John H. Martyn

Administrative Assistant

C. S. C. REPORT (Form 50)
TEMPORARY SERIES, DISTRICT MANAGER - PERMANENT SERIES, C. S. COMMISSION

14-00000

FHM/cb

(Form LE-100)

BOARD OF U. S. CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINERS
WRIGHT FIELD - FAIRFIELD AIR DEPOT
GARFIELD BUILDING, 4TH AND JEFFERSON STS.,
DAYTON, OHIO

Sixth CIVIL SERVICE DISTRICT

June 26, 1942
(Date)

THE COMMISSION

Attention: Service Record Division

The following appointment has been authorized under Executive Order No. 9063 through competitive examination.

-000

Shaw, Robert T.
(Name)

Assistant Messenger, Cu-2, $1080 per annum
(Position and Salary)

War Department, Army Air Forces
(Department or Agency)

Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio
(Location)

James W. Hanley
JAMES W. HANLEY, Secretary
Board of U. S. Civil Service Examiners

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Conein, Lucien

INCLUSIVE DATES: 11 Dec 53 — 13 Jan 76

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

KRATH, Arthur R.

Contract Service — Arthur R. Schickrath (P)

Date	Action	Compensation	GS Equivalent
	Former Military Detailee to Agency.		
	Retired Reserve Officer		
12 Nov 61	Hired as a ~~Career Agent~~ Contract Employee with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs,	11,415	GS-13/4
14 Oct 62	LPA	12,245	GS-13/4
28 Apr 63	Pay increase	13,270	GS-14/2
5 Jan 64	LPA	14,065	GS-14/2
26 Apr 64	PSI	14,515	GS-14/3
5 July 64	LPA	15,150	GS-14/3
25 Apr 64	PSI	15,640	GS-14/4
10 Oct 65	LPA	16,204	GS-14/4
3 July 66	LPA	16,675	GS-14/4
8 Oct 67	LPA	17,425	GS-14/4
9 Jan 68	Contract Terminated	17,425	GS-14/4
10 Jan 68	Contract Employee with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs,	17,425	GS-14/4
14 Jul 68	LPA	18,641	GS-14/4
15 Jul 68	Contract Terminated	18,641	GS-14/4

SECRET [illegible]

[illegible], ARTHUR R
Job 69 731 box 10

13 JAN 1976 Filing

CI 055-76

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Compromise of Cover

1. As a result of information obtained from reliable sources who served in Vietnam, we have established that the former Staff personnel listed on the attachment should be presumed to have been compromised as CIA employees to the North Vietnam Intelligence Service as of April 1975. We presume also that the identifications of these individuals as CIA employees were passed by the North Vietnamese to the Soviets.

2. Although the personnel listed in the attachment are no longer employed by CIA, nevertheless, I suggest that their official personnel records should be documented concerning the possible past compromise of their cover.

3. Please coordinate any action connected with this memorandum with Chief, CCS; Chief, CMG; and Chief, CI Staff.

George T. Kalaris
Chief
Counterintelligence Staff

Attachment: a/s

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

25 January 1974

Drug Enforcement Agency
Office of Personnel
Technical Support Section
1405 I Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20537

Attention: Ms. Mary Elliott

Dear Ms. Elliott:

In response to the request from your office of 16 January, the following is a transcript of the employment of LUCIEN E. CONEIN:

Date	Action	Salary
12 Nov 61	Contract Employee with Civil Service Retirement, Legislative Pay Adjustments and Periodic Step Increases	$11, 415 (GS-13/4 eq.)
14 Oct 62	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$12, 245 (GS-13/4 eq.)
28 Apr 63	Pay Increase	$13, 270 (GS-14/2 eq.)
5 Jan 64	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$14, 065 (GS-14/2 eq.)
26 Apr 64	Periodic Step Increase	$14, 515 (GS-14/3 eq.)
5 July 64	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$15, 150 (GS-14/3 eq.)
25 Apr 64	Periodic Step Increase	$15, 640 (GS-14/4 eq.)
10 Oct 65	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$16, 204 (GS-14/4 eq.)
3 July 66	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$15, 675 (GS-14/4 eq.)
8 Oct 67	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$17, 425 (GS-14/4 eq.)
14 July 68	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$18, 641 (GS-14/4 eq.)
15 July 68	Contract Terminated	$18, 641 (GS-14/4 eq.)

Attached is Standard Forms 176 and 1150. There is no record of Standard Forms 2809 and 2810. Perhaps his military retirement ~~obliviated~~ the need for health insurance.

Sincerely,

Roger Fowler
Personnel Officer

Attachments

Rec 74 - 229

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D.C. 20537

Jan. 16, 1974

Mr. John F. Blake
Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Lucien E. Conein, SSN: 513-05-0926
DOB: 11-29-19

Dear Mr. Blake:

An official transcript of service is requested for Mr. Conein, an employee with this agency. Mr. Conein was employed with your agency from November [illegible] 1961 to July 15, 1968. Request Standard Form 176, 1150, 2809 and 2810 be forwarded to Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Personnel, Technical Support Section, Att: Mary Elliott, 1405 I Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20537.

Enclosed is a Standard Form 50 showing Mr. Conein's employment with this Agency.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

James R. Ballard
Personnel Director

Enclosure
AS

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

United States Department

EMPLOYEE: Keep this document for your records. It is your copy of the official record of a personnel action affecting your employment. Promptly call any errors to the attention of your supervisor or your personnel office. See information on reverse.

1. NAME (CAPS) LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE CONEIN LUCIEN EMILE	MR-MISS-MRS MR	2.	3.	4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
5. VETERAN PREFERENCE 1 - NO 2 - 5 PT 3 - 10 PT DISABILITY 4 - 10 PT COMP 5 - 10 PT OTHER	6. TENURE GROUP	7. SERVICE COMP. DATE		8. HANDICAP CODE
9. FEGLI 1 REG ONLY 2 WAIVED 3 W/O 4 REG & OPT	10. RETIREMENT 1 - CS 3 - FS 5 - OTHER 2 - FICA 4 - NONE		11. (For CSC use)	
12. NATURE OF ACTION CODE		13. EFFECTIVE DATE	14. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	

15. FROM: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER		16. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE	17. GRADE OR LEVEL AND RATE	18. SALARY
19. NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE				
20. TO: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER		21. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE	22. GRADE OR LEVEL AND RATE	23. SALARY
24. NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE				
25. DUTY STATION (City, County, State)			26. LOCATION CODE	
27. APPROPRIATION	28. POSITION OCCUPIED	29. APPORTIONED POSITION	1 - PROVED 2 - WAIVED	STATE

30. REMARKS

Please Forward Official ~~Personnel~~ TRANSCRIPT
~~Folder~~ and S.F. 1150 to:
Drug Enforcement Administration
Personnel Management Division
1405 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20537
ATT MARY ELLIOTT Room 801

9 OCT 1973

Mr. James Ballard
Acting Director of Personnel
Drug Enforcement Agency
1405 I Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20537

Dear Mr. Ballard:

This is to certify that Mr. Lucien E. Conein was employed by this Agency in a civilian capacity from 12 November 1961 to 15 July 1968, at which time he retired on disability under the Civil Service Retirement Act. He left under honorable circumstances.

Sincerely,

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
  O & 1 - Addressee
    1 - D/Pers
    1 - EEAB Subject File
    1 - EEAB Chrono

OP/RAD/EEAB/FGJarema:kr (4 October 1973)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/RAD		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

DRes would like you to verify service. ~~He~~ Man obviously has more time than indicated, why aren't we certifying to all of it. Are we aware of what he has told D&A?

B

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
DD/[illegible] 5-E-57 [illegible]	03 OCT 1973

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/RAD		W
2			
3	DD/Pers/SP	05 OCT 1973	B
4	D/Pers -	[illegible] 73 14	
5	See Gaza's note ~~[illegible]~~ attached.		
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Ben -

Attached is a rewrite of the Conein memo. Also an explanatory note re his prior service.

Jerry

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/EEAB 202 Magazine x3295	

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

4 October 1973

Ron -

Conein was in U.S. military from September 1941 through September 1961, and on detail to OSS, SSU, CIG, and CIA to time of military retirement.

He was picked up as a civilian and as a career agent on 12 November 1961 and retired on disability on 15 July 1968.

Archenhold advised that subject claims military service as indicated above and that the only period to be certified is the period as a civilian, November '61 to July '68. This all we know about what Conein told DEA.

Frank G. Jarema

Distribution:
- 0 - C/RAD
- 1 - EEAB Memos file
- 1 - EEAB Chrono

OP/RAD/EEAB/FGJarema:pig (4 October 1973)

~~Mr Janney~~ J 1 OCT 1973 OCT 1973

Mr Blake

Because of the publicity this man has recieved I suggest you touch base on the phone with Howard Osborn.

RDK

Verify service + what he has told DEA

[illegible]

VIP.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/Pers/SP	01 OCT 1973	B
2	D/Pers		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Luke Conein has applied for employment with the Drug Enforcement Agency. The Acting D/Pers asked for the attached info from CIA.

Sent to D/Pers for signature. Conein was very controversial, much in the news about the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem and has been mentioned by Howard Hunt in Hunt's recent hearing before "Watergate" committee. Dick Biladeau, Central Cover, affirms that Conein is "opened up".

RG

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/RAD, 212 Magazine Bldg. x3328	9/28/73

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

28 September 1973

Ben -

Stan Archenhold, x 7264, one of the Agency's drug coordinators with DEA, called me yesterday afternoon. DEA had requested a memo verifying employment of Mr. Lucien E. Conein, whose name has appeared frequently during the Watergate hearings. The attached memorandum is what Archenhold wants.

Conein's service was verified with ROB; his "honorable service" was cleared with SAS. Since he was under cover as contract, I discussed the case with Dick Biladeau of Central Cover. CCS had opened up Conein last year and Biladeau approved release of the information to DEA. We had verified this service to a Justice Department investigator approximately one year ago when Conein was being considered as a consultant for BNDD.

Archenhold offered to carry the memorandum to DEA.

Frank G. Jarema

1. LAST NAME [illegible] FIRST NAME [illegible] INITIAL(S) [illegible]

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Effective date [illegible] | XX |
Subject to Sec. 203(d) 1951 Leave Act
Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ______ Annual Leave Act

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
Years | Months | Days
☐ More than 15 years

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
[illegible] DISABILITY 1500 7/15/68

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	Annual	Sick
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1/13 19 68	360	210
6 Current leave year accrual through 7/13 19 68	104	52
7 Total	464	262
8 Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9 Total leave taken	104	262
10 Balance	360	0

11 Total hours paid in lump sum 360 hr plus 1 Holiday
12 Salary rate(s) 18,641
13 Lump sum leave dates:
From 1500 7/15/68 to 9/17/68 1500 (Hours)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14 Date arrival abroad for HL purposes 7/29/65
15. Current balance as of 9/29 19 67 0
16 12 month accrual rate 15 days
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______
18 Monthly accrual date ______
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date 10
20 Date basic service period completed 7/29/67

MILITARY LEAVE

21 Dates during current calendar yr ______ to ______
22 Dates during preceding calendar yr ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	AWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension
23 During leave year in which separated	0	
24. During step increase waiting period which began on ______	0	

25. During 12 month HL accrual period (dates) ______

REMARKS
SCD 11/2/41

26 Certified correct by:
(Signature) 7/25/68 (Date)
AUTH. CERT. OFFICER (Title) ______ (Telephone)

Standard Form 1150
November 1963
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

14-00000

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) [illegible]	**DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)** [illegible]	**SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER** [illegible]
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	**LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)**	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

DATE

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

RETIREMENT BRANCH

MAY 23 11 [illegible] AM '68

OF PERSONNEL

See Table of Effective Dates on Back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
[illegible]
(To be used only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

SECRET

25 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

SUBJECT: Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH (P)

REFS: A. UWCT-701, 18 November 1971
B. UWCS-705, 29 November 1971

1. This memorandum will record a series of conversations with Chief of Base, Washington concerning the proposed use of Subject as a re-hired annuitant or alternatively the proposed use of Subject's wife as a contract agent as a spotter and access agent for the Washington Base.

2. Based on several conversations with representatives of the Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services we have been advised that a request for approval to employ Subject or his wife would not receive either OMS or Office of Security concurrence.

3. Based on the above, Chief of Base, Washington has agreed to withdraw his request in Reference A and this memorandum will serve in lieu of a dispatch reply.

Maurice A. Sovern
C/DOI/B-1

SECRET

SECRET

NON-STAFF PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

DATE 12/13/71

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. SUBMIT FOR:
A. CONTRACT EMPLOYEES *(TYPE A, B AND CAREER)*
B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT OR NOC *(US CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS ONLY)*
2. THIS FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR OPERATIONAL OR FIELD AGENTS
3. COPIES OF THE FORM WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ORIGINATING COMPONENT *(NUMBER OF COPIES AT ITS DISCRETION)* AND BY CSPS/AGENT BRANCH *(1 COPY ONLY)*

NAME *(LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)*	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
SCHWICKRATH, Arthur R. (P)	Male	11/29/19

MARITAL STATUS	NO. DEPENDENTS	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY	LAST MEDICAL EXAM
Married	4	1929, 1950, 1958, 1959	Nat. U. S. A. 8/11/42	11/67

DATE OF LATEST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	JOB TITLE	COMPONENT
CSA, 10/12/61	Agent	DO

CONTRACT CATEGORY	EFFECTIVE DATE	EXPIRATION DATE	SALARY	GRADE EQUIVALENT	PROJECT OR FAN #
NOC			$50.00 per task		

BENEFITS N/A	YES	NO
SOCIAL SECURITY		
FECA DEATH AND DISABILITY		
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE		
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT		
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERCIAL CIA ANNUITY		
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS		
OTHER *(EXPLAIN)*		

NON-CIA EDUCATION

University of Maryland, 77 credit hours on Bachelor of Military Science Degree
U. S. Army Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, 1943
British Special Intelligence School, 1943-1944
U. S. Psychological Warfare Training, 1959
Fluent in French

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

DATES FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
9/41-9/61	U. S. Army	France Germany Indochina		

CIA TRAINING

Paramilitary Training - 1951

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY *(BEGINNING WITH EOD)*

DATES FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR. CAT.	LOCATION	PROJECT	SALARY	GRADE EQUIV.
11/12/61	Ops Officer (PM)	CA	Hqs	SOD		GS-13
01/ /62	"	"	Saigon	FE		GS-13
04/28/63	"	"	"	FE		GS-14/2
07/15/68	Disability Retirement	"	Hqs	FE		GS-14/4

FORM 3195
8-70

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY

FACTORS AFFECTING SUBJECT (PUBLIC EXPOSURE - PRESS, RADIO, TV), KNOWN OR SUSPECTED IDENTIFICATION TO OTHER THAN CIA STAFF PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE, OR SECURITY SERVICES.

When Subject retired he was told to indicate CIA as his place of employment for the entire period - November 1951 through July 1968.

COVER

A. PRESENT COVER IS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☐ NON-OFFICIAL

DIVISION EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY:

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE:

ADAPTABILITY *(SUBJECT AND FAMILY)* TOWARDS DUAL LIFE

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☐ NON-OFFICIAL *(GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)*

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, DC Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Base, Washington

SUBJECT ISOLOG/Administrative
DO Base/Washington's Proposed Use of Retired Annuitant - Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH (P)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 1.

REFERENCE : None

1. Headquarters approval is requested for DO Base/ Washington's operational use of retired annuitant, Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH, a former Career Agent contract employee who was retired on a medical disability 15 July 1968.

2. The Base would like to employ SCHWICKRATH for use against Vietnamese, French and other target individuals in this area. SCHWICKRATH is already acquainted with some of these people and both he and his wife have access to other potential target individuals in the foreign diplomatic community here.

3. We propose to reimburse SCHWICKRATH for expenses incurred in our behalf and to compensate him for specific operational efforts undertaken and production rendered. We do not propose that he be placed on any continuing monthly or annual salary basis.

Lanks
JEROME J. LANKS

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/DO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UWCT-761

DATE 20 NOV 1971
17 November 1971

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

B1

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH
DISP NO - UWCS-705
FILE NO - NONE
DATE - 29 NOVEMBER 1971
INDEX - NONE
FILM - NONE
TO - CHIEF OF BASE, WASHINGTON
INFO - NONE
FROM - CHIEF, DO DIVISION
SUBJECT - ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH
REFS - UWCT-701, 16 NOV 71

1. PLEASE CONFIRM THAT BASE PLANS TO USE SUBJECT REF AS A CONTRACT AGENT ON A MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT. IF SO ADVISE AMOUNT AND METHOD OF PAYMENT /E.G. $50.00 PER ASSESSMENT ETC./ AND ESTIMATE OF MAXIMUM ANNUAL COMPENSATION.

2. SINCE SUBJECT IS A RETIRED ANNUITANT THE APPROVAL OF THE D/PERSONNEL OR HIGHER WILL BE REQUIRED PRIOR EMPLOYMENT.

GLENN F. SHAMPINE

DISTRIBUTION
VIA TELEPOUCH
2-COB, WASHINGTON

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH UWCS-705 END OF MESSAGE

ORIGINATED BY DO/PER
COORDINATION BY DO/I/SI
RELEASING BY C/DO/SS

SECRET

DO 71 - 353

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

Not Sent

VIA : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Lt. Col. Lucien E. Conein

1. A recommendation for the approval of the Director of Personnel is contained in paragraph three (3).

2. Lt. Col. Lucien Conein served as a military detailee to the Agency and predecessor organizations until his retirement from the U. S. Army Reserves on 30 September 1961. He became a Career Agent in November 1961 and served primarily in Saigon as the senior advisor to the Chief of Station on major counter insurgency programs until his retirement for disability in July 1968. He is an expert on Vietnamese affairs and was awarded the Intelligence Star for his performance during the November 1963 coup in Saigon. Because of his extensive overseas experience with the Military and the Agency, especially in Vietnam, he has access to many Vietnamese, French and other target individuals in the Washington area. He is already acquainted with many of these people and both he and his wife have access to other potential target individuals in the foreign diplomatic community.

3. Approval is requested to employ Lt. Col. Conein for use against the Vietnamese, French and other targets as a reemployed annuitant under a Memorandum of Oral Committment. He will be paid $50.00 for each specific task assigned to him, such as developing contacts or assessing individuals of operational interest to the Base, as stipulated by the Base in advance. His total compensation will not exceed $2,400.00 per annum. This annual payment, coupled with his annuity of approximately $4,700 per annum will not exceed ninety per cent of his salary as a GS-14/4 at the time of his retirement. A Non-Staff Personnel Data Sheet is attached for your information.

SEYMOUR RUSSELL
Chief, DO Division

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

CONCURRENCE SHEET

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Plans

Date

APPROVAL:

Director of Personnel

Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

WASH POST
22 DEC 71

NBC Claims Diem Death Inside Story

Seventeen generals and colonels of the South Vietnamese Army voted unanimously to kill President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, and were not particularly discouraged by a high-ranking U.S. CIA official, an NBC report scheduled to be telecast tonight discloses.

The report is Part 2 of "An NBC News White Paper: Vietnam Hindsight," and deals with the origins of America's involvement in that Southeast Asia country.

The report presents the first supposed inside account of Diem's assassination, disguised as a political coup, and includes statements by Alvin Davis, associate producer of the program, and Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, the key CIA man in South Vietnam during the time of the coup.

It is "quite inconceivable" to Conein that Gen. Maxwell Taylor and others were not aware of the timing of the coup, Conein says on the program, which depicts Diem's death as a Diem maneuver that backfired.

The decision to kill Diem is reported to have developed over a series of eight meetings and arguments, and, finally, a vote. Three who would have voted to save Diem were assassinated before the vote was taken. Four others including the present Prime Minister, Khiem, were deliberately excluded from the vote.

Minh among the 17, however, wanted him killed from the start, and the only overheard phrase spoken in French rather than in Vietnamese was by Big Minh, might have been presidential contender in the October 1971 election, who said, "The dog must be killed."

After that, the vote went like this: Big Minh: kill; Gen. Don: kill; Gen. Xuan, kill, Col. Nghia, kill. At the end there was total unanimity, and a vow of silence was taken. The silence is to be broken tonight, Davis says.

Diem had asked for full honors, and a "graceful" exit from Vienam to exile in another country, but refused to ask Big Minh—who in turn was furious at the slight.

Between 6 and 9 p.m. Nov. 2, the day of Diem's death, he refused again to speak to Minh, then finally spoke to him on the telephone, but Minh, outraged, hung up. On the third try, Diem gave in, asking only for safe conduct.

At this point Col. Conein said he was told by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge not to instigate, encourage or discourage a coup, which was in the planning stages throughout October, 1963. But Diem, Conein said, had his own plans for a phony coup, after which he and his family would be brought in honors, by popular acclaim, back to Saigon from their place of exile, Pleiku.

What happened, apparently, is that both the phony coup and the real one came off at the same time, fooling Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.

Conein, in an attempt to get Diem out of the country says he asked his embassy for a plane, but was told that he would have to wait 24 hours for it.

"I spoke for the U.S. government and I was authorized, and I informed the junta (Diem's organization) that I had an aircraft, but it would take me 24 hours to have that aircraft on the ground."

"Instead?" Davis asked.

"Instead, he was shot by a major in the Vietnamese army," Conein says on the telecast.

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTA[illegible]SHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 8 February 1968

FILE NUMBER: 9321

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: ~~XXX~~ 750559

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- ☐ ~~CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION~~ [illegible]
- ☒ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) FE

ATTN: Chief Support Staff

REF: Resignation Debriefing

SUBJECT: [redacted]

[illegible]

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED X DISCONTINUED

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (opmemo 20-800-11)

A. TEMPORARILY FOR ____________ DAYS.
EFFECTIVE DATE COB ____________

B. CONTINUING AS OF COB

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ____________ #-2 BEING ISSUED. (HB 20-681-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HB-240-2•)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY (HB-240-2•)

CONCUR IN ISSUANCE: ☐ AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD ☐ NACS HOSPITALIZATION CARD

X CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (opmemo 20-800-11)

DATE (as of COB): 12 Nov 61

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)

OK RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Nov 61 - Jan 62 Washington, D.C./DAC
Jan 62 - Nov 64 Saigon/DAC
Jan 65 - Aug 65 Washington, D.C./DAC
Aug 65 - Aug 67 Saigon/DAC
Aug 67 - Feb 68 Washington, D.C./Overt

Subject is to indicate CIA as place of employment for entire period, and not to reveal specific places or locations of cover assignments.

Forwarding Address: Unknown
Employment Address: Unknown

EDT/nch

DISTRIBUTION: [illegible]

SIGNATURE [illegible] CHIEF, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 [illegible]

SECRET

4 March 195[illegible]

[illegible] Security Division

[illegible] Investigation

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Executive Registry
65-4611/a

Schwickrath

17 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT : Detail of CIA Personnel to the Department of State

1. We concur in the detail to the Department of State of the four persons identified in your letter of August 9, 1965.

2. Arrangements are now being made between Mr. Wendt of the Department and representatives of our Far East Division for their assignment to Vietnam. In the absence of unforeseen difficulties, all of the persons named will proceed to Saigon as soon as possible. One of those named, Mr. Joseph F. Baker, is now serving in Europe, but this should not delay his assignment to Vietnam.

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Deputy Director

EO-DD/S:VRT:maq (16 Aug 65)
Rewritten:O-ExDir:JSE:sbo (17 Aug 65)
Distribution:
0 & 1 - Adse
1 - Signing Official
1 - ER w/basic
1 - DD/S subject w/cy basic
1 - DD/S chrono
1 - DD/P w/cy basic
1 - C/FE w/cy basic
1 - D/Pers w/cy basic
1 - D/Finance w/cy

Secondary Distribution:
5 - OPP [redacted]
4 - FE/Pers
2 - Contract Personnel
4 - OS/PSD
1 - C/CSPD
1 - C/TAR
1 - Manpower Office
8 - O/Finance

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

DD/S 65-3882

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT : Detail of CIA Personnel to DOS

REFERENCE : Your ltr to DCI dtd August 9, 1965

1. I agree in principle with the detail to your Department of the four persons identified in reference letter.

2. Arrangements are now being made between Mr. Wen't of the Department and representatives of our Far East Division for their assignment to Vietnam. In the absence of unforeseen difficulties you may assume that all of the persons named will proceed without delay. One of those named, Mr. Joseph F. Baker, is now serving in Europe, but I do not anticipate this will delay his assignment to Vietnam.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director

CONCUR:

s/Joseph Smith for
Chief, Far East Division

16 Aug 65
Date

s/Alan M. Warfield
A Deputy Director for Support

16 Aug 65
Date

s/Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel
16 Aug 65

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

AUG 9 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Admiral Raborn:

The purpose of this letter is to request your concurrence in the reimbursable detail to the Department of State of the following persons:

[redacted]
x Joseph F. Baker
Jos[illegible] TSR - Form by State.
x Napoleon [illegible] Valeriano

x Processing by FC div

These officers will serve in Viet-Nam for a tour of duty of 18 months. Their detail to the Department will be for a period not to exceed 24 months. During this period the Department will reimburse the Agency, upon presentation of appropriate billing, at the officer's rate of salary, plus retirement and insurance costs, and such differentials and allowances to which they may be entitled. In addition, the Department will reimburse the Agency for travel, per diem, and other expenses incident to their travel and transportation.

In view of the high priority of the program in which these men will participate, it would be appreciated if the Agency could arrange for their travel to Saigon within the next 30 days. Upon arrival in Saigon, they should report to [illegible] at the American [illegible]

If you concur in the above arrangements, please so indicate by signing and returning the enclosed copy of this letter. We appreciate your cooperation in making the services of these officers available to us.

Sincerely yours,

Leonard Unger

Leonard Unger
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Far Eastern Affairs

Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr.,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: RICHARD WELCH
UNIT: DC/WH/3
EXT: 6337
DATE: 24 JUNE 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

56 SECRET

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4			

24 JUN 65 22 ...

TO: CARACAS
FROM: DIRECTOR
SIG CEN

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY CCS 3, FI, FI/SPG, SOD 6, CI/OPS, OP 2

TO CARA INFO CITE DIR 22557

REF: DIR 19806

1. COS-HICKS CONCEPT FOR SCHWICKWRATH ASSIGNMENT CARA, WHILE SEEMINGLY ADMIRABLY DESIGNED FOR SECURE PERFORMANCE ON SPOT FOR DUTIES ENVISAGED, HAS REGRETTABLY SHORT-CIRCUITED ODIBEX COVER SYSTEM. ESSENCE OF CONFUSION IS THAT IF SCHWICKWRATH IS TO OCCUPY GENUINE SLOT THIS WOULD REQUIRE HIS ACTUAL RECALL TO ACTIVE DUTY, SUSPENSION OF KUBARK STATUS AND SALARY, INCEPTION OF LESSER LT. COL'S SALARY AND SUNDRY BENEFITS WITH KUBARK LEGALLY NOT ABLE TO PAY DIFFERENTIAL, OBLIGATE~~S~~ SCHWICKWRATH TO COMMAND OF IMMEDIATE MILITARY SUPERIOR IN ANY DISAGREEMENT WITH COS, [illegible] FOR TWO YEAR STRETCH WHETHER OR NOT CARA TOUR ACTUALLY COMPLETED, AND INVOLVES KUBARK WITH RELUCTANT ODIBEX OFFICIALS IN PROTRACTED DISCUSSION OVER WISDOM AND LEGALITIES THIS PRECEDENT-BREAKING PROPOSAL.

2. EVEN IF COMMAND LINE CAN BE STRAIGHTENED OUT (WHICH PROBLEMATICAL VIEW FACT ODIBEX WOULD HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH CINCSOUTH, WHERE STIFF WORDING REF ORIGINATED, PRESUMABLY FROM COL. CHAVES), THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS DESCRIBED ABOVE ARE OBVIOUSLY TO BE AVOIDED, TO SAY NOTHING

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM ☐ ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : PAGE #2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 22557

[illegible]

OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SCHWICKWRATH'S OWN VIEWS. APPEARS BEST TO FACE UP TO FACT THAT UNDER THIS SCHEME SCHWICKWRATH WOULD NEVER MAKE IT TO CARA.

3. CONSEQUENTLY HQS INTENDS TO SCALE DOWN REQUEST TO ODEARL TO INCLUDE:

A. THAT SCHWICKWRATH BE DETAILED TO WASH MIL UNIT, WHICH WILL THEN DETAIL HIM TO ODIBEX CARA AS SUPERNUMERARY. WILL TAKE CARE OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES HERE.

B. THAT SCHWICKWRATH ARRIVE IN CARA DOCUMENTED AND SUPPORTED DIFFERENTLY THAN OTHER ODIBEX MISSION OFFICERS BUT AT LEAST IN UNIFORM. WILL ENTAIL CAREFUL BRIEFING BY HICKS OF HIS OFFICERS AS TO THEIR NEED TO COOPERATE IN "NATURAL" INCORPORATION OF SCHWICKWRATH INTO ODIBEX MISSION.

C. THAT SCHWICKWRATH STILL DO EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY JOB IN ODIBEX VIA ORAL AGREEMENT WITH HICKS, EITHER AS OFFICER RESPONSIBLE AND SO PRESENTED TO VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES, OR AS SECOND MAN. HE CANNOT HOWEVER FORMALLY FILL SLOT SO DESIGNATED. UP TO HICKS AND ODIBEX WHETHER SLOT SHOULD REMAIN VACANT OR BE FILLED BY GENUINE

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS **SECRET** AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

TO :

PAGE #3

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 22557

OFFICER NEWLY ASSIGNED WITH WHOM SCHWICKWRATH CAN WORK, EITHER AS ASSISTANT OR IN CHARGE OR JUST AS PEER INFORMALLY.

4. MUCH REGRET THAT ORIGINAL PROPOSAL NOT PRACTICABLE IN TERMS LONG ESTABLISHED SERVICE PROCEDURES AND RISK OF SERIOUS PERSONAL INCONVENIENCE TO SCHWICKWRATH. ALSO REGRET TIME LOST IN NEED TO FLESH OUT FULLY THESE CONSEQUENCES IN EFFORT PUSH YOUR PROPOSAL THROUGH.

5. PLS ADVISE SOONEST IF PARA 3 ACCEPTABLE, OR PROPOSE VARIATION THEREOF WHICH WILL NOT ENTAIL PARA 1 TYPE DIFFICULTIES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Wish to prevent possibility that agreements between all parties vis a vis Schwickwrath-KUBARK role is not diminished.

CCS/ocm

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

HERSCHEL F. PEAK
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY No.

10-21-56

☐ UNCLASSIFIED [redacted] ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] Arthur R Schwickrath

FROM: C. E. Post, C/EEAB
211 Magazine

EXTENSION: 3292

NO. 9321

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. FE/Pers	APR 1968			1. Not for filing. For approval and transmittal to Cover. Please initial Copy # 1. Copy # 4 for your retention.
2.				
3. Cover G H 44 Hqs.	29 APR 1968			3. Not for filing. For approval and transmittal to Security. Please initial Copy # 1; Copy # 3 for your retention.
4.				
5. Security 3 E 49 Hqs.	1 May 68			5. Please initial Copy # 1; Copy # 2 for your retention.
6.				
7. G. E. Post 211 Magazine		5/3/68		7. Please go to Press 30 Copies
8.				
9.		5/3		Send to PSD 10-min
10. G.E. POST 211 Mag.	[illegible]	[illegible]		
11. OP/Files 5E13				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

29

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible] #1

PPC

8 APR

Date

03/EAB
1 May 68

R E S U M E

(Arthur R. [illegible]

[redacted]
1111 Ingleside Avenue
McLean, Virginia 22101
Home Telephone: 356-9086

EMPLOYMENT OBJECTIVE:

Management position of responsibility where I can materially contribute to the growth and effectiveness of the organization, by utilizing my background and experience in:

1. Excellent and extensive personal and political relations with high foreign government officials in Southeast Asia.
2. Management, administration, supervision, organization and operations of internal and physical security of plants and installations.
3. Public Relations dealing with foreign government, commercial and industrial representatives to further the interest of the organization.

Available: After 1 May 1968

Salary Requirements: $12,000 - $15,000 per annum - could be negotiated depending on the position.

EXPERIENCE:

1. U. S. Central Intelligence Agency

   December 1961 - Present

   Intelligence/Operations Officer

   Since joining CIA in 1961 have spent the major portion of this period overseas in Southeast Asia. Duties have included: Complete responsibility for the operation of a field intelligence station. Functions included collection, analysis, evaluation, and reporting of intelligence data; the management of the base (Personnel, Security, Finance, and Logistics); liaison with other U. S. officials (up to the Ambassadorial level) and officials of other governments up to the Prime Minister; also directed such operations as civic and political action, police and intelligence office training in counter-insurgency and the general field of intelligence.

2. U. S. Army

September 1941 - September 1961

Starting as a recruit in September of 1941 was advanced to Non-Commissioned Officer in 1942 and later chosen for Officers Candidate School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, February 1943. Graduated and commissioned 2nd Lieutenant (O.S.S.), 26 July 1943. Served European Theatre of Operations October 1943 to December 1944. Parachuted behind enemy lines in civilian clothes, France, August 1944. Transferred China/Burma/India Theatre, February 1945. Parachuted into French-Indo-China, June 1945. Assigned German occupation February 1947 to August 1953, as an intelligence officer. 1953 - 1956 served as U. S. Military advisory group, Vietnam as intelligence and operations officer. 1957 - 1959 assigned as battalion commander U. S. Special Forces. Commanded an airborne battalion, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. August 1959 - September 1961 Chief Foreign Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Mission in Teheran, Iran.

EDUCATION:

University of Maryland, 77 credit hours on Bachelor of Military Science Degree

SPECIALIZED TRAINING:

U. S. Army Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, 1943
British Special Intelligence School - 1943-44
U. S. Psychological Warfare Training, 1959.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE:

French - fluent
Spanish - Trained but have never used.

HONORS (CITATIONS):

Silver Star
Bronze Star
European Theatre (3 Bronze Stars)
Pacific Theatre (2 Bronze Stars)

Legion of Honor (Chevalier)
Croix de Guerre (Palm and 2 Bronze Stars)
Mention in Despathches (Palm)
National Order of Vietnam (Officer)
Cross of Valor (Palm)

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: 29 November 1919, Paris, France
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 175 pounds
Eyes: Blue
Hair: Grey brown
Marital Status: Married, two sons, 1 daughter (9, 7, 4, respectively)
Health: Excellent

REFERENCES:

Ambassador Henry Cabot-Lodge
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Major General Edward G. Lansdale
Senior Liaison Officer
U. S. Embassy, APO San Francisco 96243

Mr. Michael Deutch
Transportation Building
815 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Mr. Rufus Phillips
Airways Engineering Corporation
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

NOTICE OF TERMINATION FOR RETIREMENT
ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH

You are hereby notified that your resignation as a Contract Employee of the United States Government is accepted pursuant to your Retirement for Medical Disability effective 15 July 1968, and that the effective date of your voluntary termination is 15 hours 15 July 1968.

You are reminded of the contents of paragraph thirteen (13) of said contract which reads as follows:

> "(13) You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations."

Your signature in the space provided below indicates acknowledgement and understanding of the contents hereof.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BY /s/ Dow H. Luetscher
CONTRACTING OFFICER

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Arthur Schwickrath

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

SECRET

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN DUPLICATE

DATE: 21 May 1968

PERSONAL DATA

NAME (Last, First, Middle - true or pseudonym) Arthur R. Schwickrath	OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNO
LOCAL ADDRESS	PERMANENT ADDRESS 1111 Ingleside Ave, McLean, Va. 22101
PERMANENT STATION OR BASE Washington, D.C.	POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE Ops Officer

CONTRACT DATA

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
12 November 1961	10 January 1968	indefinite	15 July 1968 (1500 hours)

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

Subject is retiring under medical disability under the Civil Service Retirement System.

INTERNAL STAFF OR DIVISION CLEARANCES *(Add or delete as applicable)*

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE			
LOGISTICS			
PERSONNEL			

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER	CLEARED BY (Signature)	DATE

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES

(OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE)

OFFICE	SCHEDULE			INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL
	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	
CENTRAL COVER STAFF			Ed Fitzgerald contacted on 20 May 68 (CCS/OCB/M) and stated that he does not need to see again.	CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY PSD	23 May 68	1430	3E-49	CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE 23 May 68
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CPD			Not seen in CPD	CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE 5/24/68

REMARKS *(Please initial)*

STAFF OR DIVISION AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	SIGNATURE OF STAFF OR DIVISION RESPONSIBLE OFFICER	DATE

STANDARD FORM 56
FEBRUARY 1968
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENT 870-1 - S4-108

AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS
Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): CONEIN, Lucien E.

2(a) DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year): November 29, 1919

2(b) SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 513 | 05 | 0926

3. CHECK THE REASON FOR TERMINATING INSURANCE

(a). ☐ SEPARATED

(b) ☒ RETIRED

(c). ☐ DIED
HAD EMPLOYEE AT TIME OF DEATH APPLIED FOR CIVIL SERVICE ANNUITY? ☐ YES ☐ NO

(d). ☐ 12 MONTHS NON-PAY STATUS

(e). ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX CONCERNING SF 54, DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

(a). ☐ CURRENT SF 54 ATTACHED

(b). ☒ A CURRENT SF 54 IS NOT ON FILE WITH THIS AGENCY

(c). ☐ A CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (OR EQUIVALENT)

NOTE: IF EMPLOYEE (A) DIED OR (B) IS RETIRING OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION UNDER CONDITIONS ENTITLING HIM TO RETAIN HIS LIFE INSURANCE, ATTACH CURRENT SF 54, IF ANY, TO ORIGINAL SF 56 AND CHECK BOX 4 (a) ON ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF SF 56; IF NO CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE, CHECK BOX 4 (b). IN ALL OTHER CASES, SHOW WHETHER OR NOT CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE BY CHECKING BOX 4 (b) OR (c). A CURRENT SF 54 IS ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN CANCELED BY EMPLOYEE OR AUTOMATICALLY BY TRANSFER OR PRIOR TERMINATION OF INSURANCE.

5. DATE OF EVENT CHECKED IN ITEM 3 (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)	6. ANNUAL BASIC PAY RATE (NOT AMOUNT OF INSURANCE) ON DATE IN ITEM 5 (CONVERT DAILY, HOURLY, PIECEWORK, ETC. RATE TO ANNUAL RATE)	7. DID EMPLOYEE HAVE OPTIONAL INSURANCE ON DATE IN ITEM 5? NO ☒ YES ☐ IF YES, GIVE RECEIPT DATE OF ELECTION OF OPTIONAL INSURANCE (SF 176 or 176 T).	8. DATE OF NOTICE OF CONVERSION PRIVILEGE (SF 55) TO EMPLOYEE (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)
July 15, 1968	$ 18,641 PER ANNUM		

9. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM, AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS, OFFICIAL RECORDS AND THAT THE EMPLOYEE NAMED WAS COVERED BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 5.

(Personal signature of authorized agency official)

17 JUL 1968
(Date)

R. L. Austin
(Typed name of authorized agency official)

Insurance Officer, Alternate
(Title)

Central Intelligence Agency
(Name of agency)

Washington, D. C. 20505
(Mailing address, including ZIP code of agency)

SEE OTHER SIDE
FOR
INSTRUCTIONS TO EMPLOYING AGENCY

PART 3 — FILE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

20 MAY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Termination - Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH

1. Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH has been notified by the Civil Service Commission that his Disability Retirement has been approved.

2. In view of the above information, it is requested that Subject's contract be terminated effective 1500 hours on 15 July 1968. Termination of Subject's contract on this date is requested to allow him to use all of his accrued sick leave as well as his excess annual leave.

William E. Nelson

William E. Nelson
Chief, Far East Division

Distribution
    Orig & 1 - Addressee
    1 - OP/CPD
    1 - FE/BS&C
    1 - FE/PERS/VNO

FE/PERS/VNO DEWallace/sam X5459 20 May 1968

SECRET

DATE: 7 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/OP
Benefits and Services Division

This is to advise you that Arthur R. Schwickrath has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 10 January 1968. The Contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/FE.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

Lucien Conein

Mr. Arthur R. Schwickrath

Dear Mr. Schwickrath:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer of this organization, hereby contracts with you, as a ~~contract~~ career agent ~~employee~~ under the terms and conditions set forth below:

1. New Benefits. By virtue of your employment relationship under this agreement you are:

(a) Covered under the Civil Service Retirement Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. From the basic compensation paid you hereunder there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6-1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Social Security deductions required by virtue of your cover activities will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

(b) Covered under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization unless you execute a written waiver of such coverage. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder.

(c) Eligible for coverage under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Because of your eligibility under this Act (whether or not you choose to enroll), your coverage under the contract employees health program shall cease thirty-one (31) days after the effective date of this agreement.

2. Your previous contract with the United States Government, effective 12 November 196[illegible], is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto.

3. All provisions of said previous contract not in conflict with this agreement are incorporated by reference into and made a part of this agreement.

TR. SMITTAL SLIP

DATE 14 Feb 1968

TO: RECORD

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Per Larry Clarity, Subject's PSI which was due 23 April 1967 will continue to be held pending Disability Retirement in very near future.

FROM: Jo Ann Varney

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

SECRET

4. This agreement is effective as of 16 January 1968 and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated as set forth in your previous contract. If this agreement becomes effective during an overseas assignment nothing contained herein shall be construed as extending that assignment beyond its originally contemplated duration or invalidating your entitlement to return travel expenses (if applicable) upon completion of that assignment.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:
Arthur R. Schwickrath
Arthur R. Schwickrath

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

14-00000

SECRET

1967 LEAVE STATEMENT

[illegible]	[illegible]
Annual leave balance as of 1 January 1967 [illegible]	[illegible]
Annual leave balance as of 11 March 1967 [illegible]	[illegible]
Sick leave as of 11 March 1967 [illegible]	[illegible]
Compensatory leave balance as of 11 March 1967 [illegible]	[illegible]
Home leave carried forward from prior tour [illegible] Days	

[illegible]

1756 SECRET

14-00000

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 08 August 1967

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Conlen, Lucien E.

3. POSITION TITLE: Career Agent

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/FE/VNO

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS and complete evaluation

ETA: Mid August 1967
STATION: Vietnam
NO. OF DEP'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (this block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

Donald [illegible], FE/PERS/VNO | 6450
3E-22 HQS

10. COMMENTS

REF: SAIGON 0669 (IN 17446)
Please schedule Physical on 14th and 15th of August 1967

"SPECIAL HANDLING"

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified for departmental duty only for a minimum of one year. Must be medically evaluated prior to any processing.

DATE: 15 November 1967

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Max Hurt

SECRET

FORM 1-64 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 13 Oct 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): [redacted] (DEPENDENTS OF)

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: CA

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/FE/VSO

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5459

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

[redacted] (Mother)	6 June 1893	
[redacted] (Wife)	4 Sept 1929	
[redacted] (Son)	19 Apr 1958	
[redacted] (Son)	16 Nov 1959	
[redacted] (Dau)	13 Jul 1963	

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION: Hong Kong

TDY OR PCS: PCS

TYPE OF COVER: Tourist

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: [redacted] Five

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

Barbara J. Cooper FE/Pers/VSO

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 5D - 56

EXT.: 5459

10. COMMENTS

SPONSOR IS PCS [illegible].

SF 89's will be forwarded as soon as received.

Appointments, Mother and wife - 5 Nov at 9 a.m.; Children - 5 Nov at 1 p.m.

PROCESSED

REX HART

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-63 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 11 23 62

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Conein Lucien

3. POSITION TITLE

4. GRADE

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH CA Staff

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD 1 NOV 1961

STATION FE Area

TDY OR PCS PCS

TYPE OF COVER

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA

STATION

NO. OF DEP'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE Helen Ingraham

ROOM NO. & BUILDING 1410 K

EXT.

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION [illegible] O/S PCS

DATE 15 NOV 1961

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 1-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(44)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 08 August 1967

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Conlen, Lucien E.

3. POSITION TITLE: Career Agent

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. EMPLOYEE'S [illegible]

6. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/FE/VNO

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☒ XX RETURN FROM OVERSEAS and complete evaluation

ETA: Mid August 1967
STATION: Vietnam
NO. OF DEP'S

8. [illegible]

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

Donald E. Wallace, [illegible]

5L-22 [illegible] 5136

10. COMMENTS

REF: SAIGON 9663 (IN 17446)
Please schedule Physical on 14th and 15th of August 1967

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

SIGNATURE FOR [illegible] MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 259 [illegible]

SECRET

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION (☐ OVERT ☐ COVERT) (☐ ISN ☐ CPR)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): CONEIN, LUCIEN EMILE

2. DATE:

3. TO POSITION: I.O.

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/FE 4

5. 5-12-54

MAJOR Major

6. TYPE OF POSITION
- ☐ Departmental
- ☐ U.S. Field
- ☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
- ☐ EOD
- ☐ Overseas
- ☐ Returnee
- ☐ Pre-Employment
- ☐ Annual
- ☒ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
- ☒ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
- ☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
- ☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
- ☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Full duty/General (5-27-54)

SECRET

Joseph J. Mackin

MEDICAL OFFICE

pondal

ABM

D. Poland Notified 2 June [illegible]

D.

[illegible]

SECRET

WITHIN-GRADE PROMOTION FOR CONTRACT EMPLOYEES
(IF provided for in Contract)

CONEIN, LUCIEN E.	FE	13 Mar 67
EMPLOYEE'S NAME	COMPONENT	DATE

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVAL OF COMPETENCE.

RATER

NOTED:

Contact Personnel Division

Present Compensation Rate $16,675, GS-14/4 Equiv Effective Date 25 Apr 65
New Compensation Rate $17,198, GS-14/5 Equiv Effective Date 23 Apr 67

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-552645

1. Agency and organizational designations: /FE

2. Payroll period:

3. Block No.:

4. Slip No.:

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): SCHWICKRATH, Arthur R. (P) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary: $16,675

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s):

12. Prepared by: jlv 11 Jan 67

13. Audited by:

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
23Apr67	25 Apr. 65	$16,675	$17,198	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☒ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126
6 GAO 8000 1126-109

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP—PAYROLL COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

# TRAINING REPORT - LANGUAGE	COURSE TITLE Spanish Basic - RSW
INSTRUCTOR Mr. P. Vazquez	PROGRAM Daytime - Full-time
NO. OF STUDENTS 2 / NO. OF HOURS 800	DATE OF COURSE 01/04/65 - 03/11/65

STUDENT

NAME	YOB	EOD DATE	OFFICE	GS	SD
[redacted]	19		WH	1[illegible]	D

(See reverse side for definitions of proficiency levels)

LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY AT **ENTRY** INTO TRAINING ☒ INSTRUCTORS ESTIMATE ☐ OFFICIAL TEST

BEFORE	NO PROFICIENCY	SLIGHT	ELEMENTARY	INTERMEDIATE	HIGH
READING	X				
WRITING	X				
PRONUNCIATION	X				
SPEAKING	X				
UNDERSTANDING	X				

LANGUAGE TRAINING OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

The general aims of language training are attainment of proficiency in speaking, understanding, reading and writing. The specific objectives are (1) ability to produce and distinguish the sounds of the language; (2) ability to use a stock of basic sentences and expressions; (3) ability to recombine the elements of basic sentences and expressions and to apply them to new situations; (4) ability to comprehend the language spoken at normal speed in various situations; (5) ability to write and read the language commensurate with ability to speak.

Methods used in all courses stress oral drills and free conversation based at first on memorized material and, at a later stage, on varied reading materials. Written and oral tests are given at intervals. Listening to and recording on tapes in the Language Lab is essential for class preparation.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	EXCELLENT
ACHIEVEMENT		X	
ATTITUDE		X	
ATTENDANCE	X		

LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY AT **COMPLETION** OF TRAINING ☒ INSTRUCTORS ESTIMATE ☐ OFFICIAL TEST

AFTER	NO PROFICIENCY	SLIGHT	ELEMENTARY	INTERMEDIATE	HIGH
READING		X			
WRITING		X			
PRONUNCIATION			X		
SPEAKING		X			
UNDERSTANDING			X		

Foreign Language Aptitude Test: None.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: W. Ray Rackley
SIGNATURE, HEAD OF DEPARTMENT, LT/LAS/OTR

[illegible]
DATE

FORM 5-55 2222 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(45)

SECRET

[illegible]

Mr. Arthur R. Schwickrath

Dear **Mr. Schwickrath**:

Reference is made to your current contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective **1 August 1965**, said contract is amended by adding the following paragraph thereto:

> "Your eligibility and participation in this organization's Rest and Recuperation Program is herein authorized in accordance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

25 [illegible]

17 NOVEMBER 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division,
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : R & R for Contract Employees

Please amend the contracts of the following SOD Contract Personnel to provide for participation in the Saigon Station Rest and Recuperation Program. This amendment should be made effective as of 1 August 1965.

Anderson, Dorsey
Ashby, Holmes
[redacted]
Gau, Claude
Lambert, Ross
Mandich, Benedict
McGuire, Robert J.
Miller, William D.
Morris, James
Norwood, Thomas L.
Robertson, William
Schmid, Carl
Scott, John M., Jr.

William E. Colby,
Chief, Far East Division

Coordination:

FED/PER

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM K/3

ACTION FE 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2, OF 2

Con Cot

S E C R E T 270916Z CITE SAIGON 9831

27 Jul 67 IN 19891

PRIORITY HONG KONG INFO DIRECTOR

Schwickrath, Arthur

MR. [redacted] DEPARTING SAIGON PCS TO HQS ON 27 JULY. PLEASE ADVANCE FUNDS FOR TRAVEL OF DEPENDENTS AND SHIPMENT OF EFFECTS TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AND T/A TO HQS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

5 OCT 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division/OP

SUBJECT : SCHWICKRATH, Arthur R.
Transfer to FE Division

Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH, Career Agent, transferred from WH Division to FE Division effective 20 August 1965. Please change subject's allotment number to 6137-1487, Saigon Station.

/s/ Harold E. Padgett
Joseph W. Smith
AC/FE Division

Concur:

C/WH/Pers

Date

SCHWICKRATH, Arthur E. (P) CAREER AGENT

$15,150

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

12. Prepared by: JLV 8 Jan 65

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
25Apr65	2?Apr63	$15,150	$15,610	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods): Period(s):

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP ______

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

______ Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 8000 1126-508

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

Joseph B. Ragan

---

4 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

SUBJECT : Arthur E. SCHWICKRATH, Reassignment

In conjunction with the reassignment of Arthur E. SCHWICKRATH, Career Agent, from FE Division to WH Division, all salary and allowances are to be charged to Allotment 3135-1141 effective 17 January 1965.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCUR:

______
SOD

______
FE Division

______
CS Agent Panel

______
Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

25 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Personnel Operations Division

FROM : Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT : Custody of the Honor Award presented to Mr. [redacted]

Arthur R. Schmiedbrath

Due to security restrictions, the Honor and Merit Awards Board is acting as custodian of the Honor Award and related papers listed below: Intelligence Star
Intelligence Star Certificate

When security restrictions no longer prevail, the awardee may obtain his award by calling the Secretariat.

Jeanne L Baker
JEANNE L. BAKER

Distribution:
- Orig. - Subject's OPF
- 1 - Subject's Division Chief
- 1 - HMAB Case File

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CONEIN, LUCIEN E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNC	8. CURRENT STATION Saigon		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1964 - 10 September 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains, under supervision of the COS, discreet liaison with the Prime Minister.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Senior advisor in the selection, training, maintenance and operation of the Prime Minister's personal security force.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Under COS direction maintains contact for intelligence and political action purposes with a variety of senior indigenous officers, including Chief of State, senior staff officers, Corps commanders, Foreign Minister, province chiefs, and lesser officers.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Has, and uses operationally, area and language knowledge.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This officer is personally acquainted with almost every senior official or officer in the Vietnamese Government and armed forces, and with a significant number of these this acquaintenceship amounts to close personal friendships extending back over a number of years. These associations have given this officer truly unique access to senior echelons of Vietnamese leadership, and he has exploited this access effectively and to great value to the Station. He has had long experience in this area, and uses his understanding of it to great effect. He works very well independently and has shown considerable initiative. He balks at no assignment, and carries out all assignments without regard for his personal convenience, safety, or well being. In the field of written expression this officer's performance falls somewhat short, but he has made strenuous efforts to improve in this sector with some success. All in all, he is an imaginative and dedicated officer who can be counted on to discharge his duties with high effectiveness and total personal commitment. It has been a pleasure to have had him at the Station.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ Lucien E. Conein

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: [illegible]

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 10 September 64

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: COS

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Peer deSilva

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE:

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]
2. DATE OF BIRTH
3. SEX M
4. GRADE GS-14
5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNC
8. CURRENT STATION Saigon

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 63 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains, under supervision of the COS, discreet liaison with the Prime Minister.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Senior advisor in the selection, training, maintenance and operation of the Prime Minister's personal security force.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Under COS direction maintains contact for intelligence and political action purposes with a variety of senior indigenous officers, including Chief of State, senior staff officers, Corps commanders, Foreign Minister, province chiefs, and lesser officers.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Has, and uses operationally, area and language knowledge.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

27 VII 64

Subject is a virtual walking encylopedia on the history, customs and senior personalities of Vietnam. He has been associated with this area on and off over the period of the last 10 years. During this time he has developed lasting friendships with many individuals who are now in high positions of power within the government. These contacts are of considerable importance to the Station in its intelligence appreciation of the situation and in the coordination of operational activities on a discreet basis with these high personalities. At the personal request of the Prime Minister he has become senior advisor to the Prime Minister's personal protection force and has, in fact, formed and trained this force from scratch. He is a highly motivated and dedicated officer to whom considerations of personal convenience and safety are always second to his determination to achieve whatever mission is given to him.

On the negative side, his written and oral presentation, while showing some improvement over the previous report, still needs additional improvement. He has no supervisory responsibilities at the present time and therefore is not rated on that score. He exhibits a good sense of cost consciousness in utilization of man power, materiel and funds.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David R. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Only his difficulty in expressing himself in writing prevents this officer from being rated "Outstanding". He is a calm and detached professional who at the same time is intimately caught up in his work and in the many important contacts he has on the local scene. His very valuable role could not be performed by anyone else at this Station, nor to my knowledge, by anyone else in the organization at the present time. He is a highly valued member of the Station.

[redacted]

DATE

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Peer de Silva

SECRET

14-00000

Transmitted VIA FVST by [illegible]
Dated 27 February 1963

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted] Schwidrmn, [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Nov 19	3. SEX M	4. GRADE Equiv GS-13	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT		8. CURRENT STATION S.igon Station	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Career agent				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 3 January 1962-31 December 1962

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station paramilitary staff officer, advises COS and DCOS on major counterinsurgency programs, affects coordination among these programs and conducts on site inspection on behalf of COS.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts ministerial level liaison with Minister of Interior to accomplish coordination of Station programs with that ministry and to derive positive and counter intelligence information from Minister and his staff.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with senior GVN military officials many of whom are general officers, long term friends and former subordinates.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Represents COS on Country Team committees and serves as member of Joint Unconventional Warfare Committee.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Station senior area and language expert deriving from approximately seventeen years residence in and study of Indochina.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conducts liaison with U.S. Special Forces and acts as honorary Executive Officer, Special Forces Command, Vietnam.	RATING LETTER P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject is one of the outstanding American experts on current day Vietnam. He has lived and traveled in the area for a number of years and has continued a study of the area while absent from it. Many of the current senior officers up to the general staff level were formerly Subject's subordinates and regard him as a friend and colleague whom they trust and in whom they will confide. This relationship of trust and friendship fortunately also exists with the Minister of Interior who is the forth or fifth leading personality in the government. Subject was formerly a senior officer in the U.S. Special Forces and by virtue of his qualifications and experience in this field has been of considerable value to this Station in the extensive programs it has undertaken in concert with that command. He is additionally a skilled clandestine operator with a thorough grounding in technique and a wide and colorful background of experience. Subject's ability to express himself in writing, while adequate, can stand improvement. He is evidently sincerely attempting to remedy this and some progress is noticeable. Overall, Subject is a distinct asset to the Station and we are particularly pleased to have him. Subject is a career agent and an amendment of his contract to reflect a promotion to the next higher equivalent grade is recommended. It is likewise recommended that he be promoted from the USAR reserve rank of Lt. Col. to Col. in order to increase his prestige in negotiations on behalf of the COS.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 February 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ Lucien E. Conein

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 February 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ David R. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL I concur in the rating given above to Subject who has proved himself invaluable to the Station and to the front office in terms of his thorough knowledge of the Vietnamese scene, of Vietnamese personalities, and of the many issues involved here. I have personally leaned heavily on his judgment and advice. Our high appraisal of Subject is shared by the Ambassador and by the Deputy Chief of Mission. I have found that Subject works in a discipline manner and functions cooperatively with other members of the Station. He has made very definite progress as a Staff officer and in applying himself to the paper work which goes with that responsibility. I personally initiated the recommendation that Subject be promoted in Agency grade as well as in U.S.Army rank, mentioned in Section C, above.

DATE 25 February 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ John H. Richardson

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-585848

1. Agency and organizational designations DDP/FE	2. Payroll period	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) SCHWICKRATH, Arthur R. (P) CAREER AGENT	6. Grade and salary $14,065		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks: I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE ANMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.	11. Appropriation(s)	12. Prepared by jlv 15 Jan 64 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better
26Apr64	28 Apr 63	$14,065	$14,515	Joseph B [illegible] (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.
Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
& GAO 8000 1126-508

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

SECRET

Mr. Arthur R. Schwickrath

Dear Mr. Schwickrath:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 12 November 1961.

Effective 28 April 1963 said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph three (3) entitled "Compensation and Taxes" to read as follows:

> "For your services as a Career Agent you will be compensated at a basic salary of $13,270 per annum, the equivalent of a GS-14^{2}."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY__________________________
Contracting Officer

1 HL/St 10 May 63
CA/PMD
C.A.

SECRET

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

25 APR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CSPO/Career Agent Panel

SUBJECT : [redacted], Salary Increase
Schwiekrath, Arthur R

1. It is requested that Mr. [redacted]'s contract with this Agency as a Career Agent be amended to reflect a salary increase to the equivalent of a GS-14. His present salary is equal to a GS-13(4), $12,245; the increase is computed to be the equivalent of GS-14(2), $13,270.

2. Mr. [redacted] who is contracted by the Agency under the ZRJEWEL program, is presently assigned to the Saigon Station where he functions as the Station paramilitary staff officer, senior advisor on the major counterinsurgency programs. His extensive background and experience in Vietnam has made him a particularly valuable officer and asset to the Station. His overall performance is evaluated in his Fitness Report as strong. The Chief of Station, Saigon, has recommended that Mr. [redacted] be given a promotion to the GS-14 equivalent and the Acting Chief, SOD, concurs.

3. The amendment should be effective with the next pay period.

W.E. Colby
William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Division

Approved by CS/CA Agent Panel
(Date): 9 May 1963
Don Collins
Secretary, C [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

17 NOV 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH

1. Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH, Career Agent with project ZRJEWEL is hereby assigned to the Far East Division for PCS Saigon, Vietnam. Therefore, FE Division is responsible for completing the final details of his processing:

- a. Arranging cover.
- b. Completing Form 313a and financial briefing.
- c. Arranging for insurance (health and if desired, life insurance).
- d. All processing for PCS assignment.

2. SCHWICKRATH will be paid by FE Division, allotment number 2137-7251-1000, and FE Division will be administratively responsible for SCHWICKRATH's welfare during his tour of duty with that division. It is requested that regular annual fitness reports be forwarded to CA Staff for SCHWICKRATH. It is further requested that CA Staff be advised of any action taken which will affect SCHWICKRATH's career with the Agency as a member of project ZRJEWEL , including any amendments to the present contract.

3. After SCHWICKRATH completes his tour of duty with FE Division he will return to project ZRJEWEL , and all administrative responsibility will then be transferred from FE back to CA Staff.

4. SCHWICKRATH received a full security clearance on 12 October 1961, and medical approval for PCS Saigon, 15 November 1961.

Charles J Francis
CHARLES J. FRANCIS
Chief, Support Group, CA Staff

CONCUR:

William T. Vance 22 Nov '61
Chief, FE Support (Date)

SECRET

Mr. Arthur R. Schwickrath

Dear Mr. Schwickrath:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. Your status is that of a Government employee under contract and, as such, your rights and benefits are governed by the provisions of this agreement. It is specifically understood that you are not entitled to rights and benefits pertaining to appointed staff status, except as provided herein.

2. Cover. In the performance of your services hereunder, you will act under cover suitable to conceal your relationship with the Government. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

3. Compensation and Taxes. For your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at a basic salary of $11,415 per annum. You will be entitled to a post differential in conformance with applicable Government regulations. In addition, you will be entitled to within-grade promotions and Legislative pay adjustments in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed personnel. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. Unless precluded by such requirements, taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

4. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be provided quarters by your cover facility or the Government and, in such event, you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost of living allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations including, but not limited to, a post allowance or an equalization allowance in lieu thereof, a supplementary post allowance, a transfer allowance, a home service transfer allowance, an education allowance and a separation allowance.

5. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped

in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You will be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder, and when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. In addition, you will be entitled to reimbursement in accordance with standardized Government rates for the authorized official use of your private automobile. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

6. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

7. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

8. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U. S. C. A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick, annual and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives.

(d) From the salary paid pursuant to this contract there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6 1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. When circumstances of your cover warrant or require contributions to social security, such contributions will be at your expense and you will not be reimbursed therefor by the Government.

(e) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the U. S. citizen full-time Career Agent in the line of duty while permanently assigned abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a U. S. citizen full-time Career Agent permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

(f) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Career Agents in this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

9. Offset. Any and all compensation, allowances or other benefits (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover acitivites will be used to offset amounts due you under this contract and will reduce accordingly the Government's direct payment obligation hereunder. Sums so offset are payment by the Government under this contract and for purposes of Federal income taxation. You will report every four (4) months during the term of this agreement all benefits received from or through your cover acitivities and, if such benefits exceed those due you under this contract, the report will be accompanied by said excess amount, which you hereby agree is the sole property of the Government. Failure to submit timely reports and, as appropriate, excess payments, may result in suspension of any payments due you hereunder. As an alternative to the above, the Government may at any time exercise its basic right to require payment over to it of the emoluments received by you from or through your cover acitivities which would otherwise be offset as described above. In such cases the Government will pay directly to you the emoluments called for by this contract.

10. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

11. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

12. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

13. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

SECRET

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 12 Dec 61, and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon ninety (90) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expense to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Arthur R. Schwickrath

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

[illegible] 61
[illegible]

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: (See R 20-1000 and HB 20-1000-1 for guidance) Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and two copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: Ernest F. Fox
DIVISION: CA IMO
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 4611
DATE: 16 October 1961

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Arthur R. Schwickrath

2A. PROJECT: ZRJEWEL

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Unknown

3. ALLOTMENT NO.:

3A. FUNDS ☐ V ☒ UV

4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES
Morton F. Sewell
Virgil M. Derkum

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Military detailee - Maj. USA - July 1943 - 15 Oct. 1946

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date)
~~Type "A" - requested 21 Sept.~~ '61

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE ☐ OBTAINED ☒ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.)
Career Agent ✓

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 41

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 29 Nov. 1919

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Kansas City, Kansas

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): McLean, Virginia

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate) ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife - Elyette B. - 32
Son - Laurent P. - 3 1/2
Son - Philippe J. - 2
Son - Charles - 11 (with former wife)

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: Retired Reserve

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)
Retired Reserve - 30 Sept. 1961

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army

24. RANK OR GRADE: Lt. Col.

25. ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY ✓
$11,415

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL
Yes ✓

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any)
To be established

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER	CIA
YES	☒	☒
NO	☐	☐

✓

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: Yes ✓

32. POST: Yes ✓

33. OTHER: Transfer, home service transfer, ~~education, separation when applicable.~~

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any)
To be established

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☒ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
Wife - US - 32 - 4 Sept. 1929
Son - US - 3 1/2 - 19 Apr. 1958
Son - US - 2 - 16 Nov. 1959

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION
Where applicable

43. ENTERTAINMENT
Where applicable

44. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS OR

FORM 8-58 204 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE: 15 Nov 61
TO: Mr. [illegible]
ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS
Mr. Armstrong requests
you go ahead on clearance
in advance of final approval
(which he is working on)
A Staff wants to bring up
subject to here.
Security approval [illegible]
[illegible]

FROM: [illegible]

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET

CASE OFFICER: Ernest F. Fox	DIVISION: CA/PMG
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 4611	DATE: 16 October 1961

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

- ✓ FECA
- ✓ Missing Persons Act
- Sick and Annual Leave
- ✓ Civil Service Retirement
- ✓ Life & Hospitalization Insurance
- Overtime [illegible]
- Periodic Step Increases [illegible]

✓ Legislative Pay Adjustments.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check)	☒ PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED	48. TYPE (Check)	☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED	☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL	☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY

☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS ☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) ☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS MONTHS X YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE:

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 90 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other): Paramilitary Operations

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED: Paramilitary Specialist

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Sept.41-1 Oct. 1961 - US Army - Parachute; infantry - c/Mil.Liaison Group ARMISH/MAAG, Teheran; Asst.Chief of Staff for Intelligence - Special Forces Btn. Cdr. - 3 years

(July 1943 - Oct.1956 - CIA and predecessor organisations - had all Agency PM training)

59. EDUCATION (Check highest level attained): X COLLEGE (No degree)

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK: FLUENT	SPEAK: AVERAGE	SPEAK: POOR	WRITE: FLUENT	WRITE: AVERAGE	WRITE: POOR	READ: FLUENT	READ: AVERAGE	READ: POOR
French	X			X			X		

61. NATIVE CITY, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Paris, France

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE: France, China, Indochina, Germany, Iran

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

22 Sept. 1941 - 1 Oct. 1961 - US Army Pvt. - Lt. Col.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING CASE OFFICER	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
	Ernest F. Fox	7 Nov 61	Charles J. Francis

14-00000

TRAINING EVALUATION REPORT 1435

NAME: [illegible] Lucien E. DATE: [illegible]

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible] Personnel

FROM: D.O. Major USA. SE [illegible]

TO: T.O. Major USA. SE Washington

COURSE	EVAL.	
FIC(CS)		also BIC, BITC, SOC, BTP, BOC/
BTP. II	'51	also OC
BTP III	'51	also AIC, AITC, AOC, CAI
BTP IV		
RO		also PM I, II, III; RAFT/
ITC		also CI Tech/
Admin		
BIC	'51	
SUP		
CFA		
Rpts		
OB		
OSC(CE)		
EAE		
CPW		
CPA		
CPO		
STB		
CEW		
IT		
GW		
SAB		
AO		
MO		
SUR		
BFOT		
DOC		
LOCKS		
S/W		
F&S		
SAF		

REMARKS

Subject ~~has~~ completed training as shown at the left. FI/OPS training comments that:

☑ a. this (does-~~does not~~) meet minimum training standards re qualification for the projected action.

☐ b. Subject currently enrolled in courses shown in red, the completion of which will satisfy minimum standards.

☑ c. Subject, ~~unless (he-she) has had eq. field of other experience which can be accepted in lieu of training,~~ should be required to take the following (~~qualifying~~-refresher) training.

Phase III

PMR

☐ d. Subject's division advised of these recommendations. (Agree-Disagree)

FORM NO. 59-77
APR 1953

SECRET

(45)

---

12 November 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Personnel Officer, ~~[illegible]~~ Training Officer

FROM : FI Career Management Officer

SUBJECT : Personnel Action On CONEIN, Lucien E.

1. The FI Career Service Board has (approved - ~~disapproved~~) the personnel action of (~~promotion~~ - reassignment -) of subject. The FI Training Officer has recommended that subject be scheduled for additional training in order to satisfy the requirements of the proposed personnel action. The following training program has been recommended.

2. Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the FI Training Officer.

Phase III

FORM NO.
AUG 1953 59-112

(45)

Lucien Emile Conein 36 11 May 1954

Saigon Indochina FD. Saigon military (Indochina)
~~[illegible]~~ Area Ops.
Officer

Major Utility ED-45

Ops. Group "A" (equivalent to Phase #2) EPF-[illegible] [illegible]
SIG, CAI
om

British Airborne School Nov 1943 - Mar 1944, TIS (Fort Benning Inf Sch. OCS
Wyandotte H. S. 1934 - 1936, University of Maryland (European Branch) Apr-Jul/1953

French Speak, Read Write Excellent

1935 - 1940 Printing - Pressman and Typesetter - F. R. [illegible] Employer
1940 U.S. Army Captain, Infantry Duties Intelligence

Jul 43 to Nov 43 OSS Platoon Leader Ops Co. 2nd Lt. Overseas
Nov 43 to Dec 45 OSS JEDBURGH (Special Mission to France) 1st Lt. Overseas
Dec 45 to Dec 45 OSS Special Mission France-Indochina Captain Overseas
Jan 46 to Jun 51 CIG/CIA Mission to Germany, [illegible] Major Overseas
Nov 51 to May 52 CIA Chief of Nuernberg Operations Base Major Overseas
May 52 to Oct 53 Operations Officer Nurnberg Ops Base Major Overseas
Oct 53 to present Intel Officer - FI SE/1 Albanian Br. Washington, DC.

FRANCIS [illegible]
FE-4 Indochina Desk

RYAN J. [illegible] JR.
Chief FE-4

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

D. M.

1 June 1954

NAME
Lucien E. Conein

FROM: I.O. Maj. USA SE/Wash.

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION
☐ PROMOTION ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ OTHER (Explain)
☐ ROTATION ☐ TRAVEL

TO: Area Ops Off. Maj. USA/FE/ Indochina

AOS

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	OTHER TRAINING COURSES	DATE TAKEN
	OIC(CS), ALSO				
	BIC, BITC, SOC,				
	BTP AND BSS				
	BTP II, ALSO [✓ OC]	51			
	BTP III, ALSO				
	AIC, AITC, AOC				
	AND [✓ CAT]	51			
	PO, ALSO PW I,				
	II, III AND BAFT				
	ITC ALSO CI				
	TECH				
	ADMIN				
	SIC	51			
	SUP				
	CFA				
	APIS				
	OO				
	OSC (CS)				
	E & E				
	CPW				
	WPSOC				
	CPO				
	STA				
	CIW				
	[illegible]				
	CW				
	SAD				
	AO				
	[illegible]				
	SUB				
	BIGT				
	SSC				
	LOCKS				
	I/S				
	P S I				
	[illegible]				

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.

2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

STAFF TRAINING OFFICE COMMENTS:

☑ A. THIS ☑ DOES ☐ DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN S. THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY MINIMUM STANDARDS.

☑ C. ~~UNLESS~~ SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE, WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING. ~~SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE~~ ☐ ~~QUALIFYING~~ ☐ REFRESHER TRAINING ~~AS~~ CHECKED AT THE LEFT.

SIGNATURE OF STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,

LEE [illegible]

FROM: Career Management Officer

JAMES P. HUMPHRIES

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 59-77 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Conein, Lucien E.	DATE (from item 5-D) 6 Jan 67	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Robert E. Porter	DATE (from item 5-2) 21 Jan 67
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 8 February 1967	DISPATCH NUMBER: FVST-14709	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Nov 19	2. SERVICE DESIGN C/A	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE ROIC, Bien Hoa GS-14.	4. STATION OR BASE Vietnam	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 29 Sept 1965	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE July 1968	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 15 Aug 1968.	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 1 Sept 1968

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Mother	- 76	Sons	- 8 and 9
Wife	- 38	Daughter	- 5

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

Desire serve in a Post with family.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Special assignment to Lansdale group, U.S. Embassy, Vietnam. COD Provincial Officer, Bien Hoa. Advised, financed, supplied Revolutionary Development Cadres, Census Grievance, and Provincial Reconnaissance Units. ROIC, Bien Hoa Region, consisting of eleven Provinces. Supervise 27 U.S. personnel assigned to OB and COD duties in the Provinces. Admin supervision of finance, supplies, and commo. Supervise the intel collection activities of all programs in the Region. Reporting significant information to the appropriate Divisions of the Vietnam Station. Maintaining liaison with key U.S. and Vietnamese officials in the Region.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Language training - desire short course in the local language of next assignment.

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

Desire assignment commensurate with past training and experience.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 *(for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice)* IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

[1] EXTEND TOUR 16 months MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO July 1968 (DATE).

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HQOTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE. 1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION 1ST CHOICE North Africa 2ND CHOICE South America 3RD CHOICE Europe

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Strongly concur in this officer's request for extension.

COS personally suggested such action to him.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

FE Division concurs in Mr. Conein's 16-month extension to July 1968. FE is notifying Subject by dispatch, subject to SOD concurrence.

DATE 16 Feb 67 TITLE CFE/PERSONNEL SIGNATURE for Mary T. Boulger

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ______ DATED: ______

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE TRANSMITTAL

INSTRUCTIONS

A. This questionnaire is designed to provide information for consideration by headquarters in planning your next assignment.

B. Each supervisor in the field will ensure that this questionnaire is completed for each employee under his immediate supervision and forwarded to headquarters eight (8) months prior to the individual's planned date of departure from the station.

C. The questionnaire will be completed and forwarded through normal channels to headquarters in triplicate.

D. The questionnaires of Staff Agents should include cover duties and discussion of cover factors where appropriate.

SPECIAL NOTE

This form must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information or methods of operations, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of major duties may be reported in Item No. 8. However, the nature, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the description of the major duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases a general statement of duties will be indicated in Item No. 8 so as to show the level of responsibilities involved and enable reviewers at headquarters to understand the nature of your position. No names, operational techniques, objectives or purposes of the operation should be included.

9.1 NAME OF EMPLOYEE (in pseudonym, if any) [illegible] DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (in pseudonym, if any)
9.2 NAME OF SUPERVISOR (in pseudonym, if any) Jeremy B. HATLGAN DATE 23 January 1967	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (in pseudonym, if any) Jeremy B. Hatgan

FORM 202 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, Far East Division
ATTN: PARDEE

FROM Chief of Station, Vietnam

SUBJECT Commendation of Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a commendation from General Langdale for SCHWICKRATH.

2. I though you would be interested in seeing it since it is a good indicator of how much of the General's reporting can be believed. Notice particularly the paragraph on page 2 concerning SCHWICKRATH's "services to my staff...in an applied field of philology, particularly in Vietnamese oral linguistics and the working of official documents..." When this paragraph was shown to SCHWICKRATH, he gave vent to some very soldierly language, pointing out that he doesn't speak a word of Vietnamese nor can he read it.

Sabetay
Edward D. SABETAY

[illegible]

Attachment:
  Commendation u.s.c.

Distribution:
  3 - C/FE w/att u.s.c.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER 13129
FVST-

DATE

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Saigon

INFO

FROM Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT Approval of Home Leave and New Tour - Arthur R. [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FVSP 6061, 20 August 1963

1. Headquarters is pleased to advise [illegible] has been approved for home leave and return to Saigon for a second tour.

2. For your information, [illegible]'s contract, effective 12 November 1961, is written for an indefinite period, and will continue in effect, as amended, until such time as it is terminated in accordance with the provisions contained therein.

JOSEPH C. [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee

Departs Saig 3 Jan - Between 3 & 15 H/L
[illegible] (5 days).
15 Jan Wash DC for 10 days TDY
W/O dependents
Returns via Europe.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
FVSW 2264

DATE
12 September 1963

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

HQS FILE NUMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAVEL ORDER

24 August 1967

NAME Mr. Lucien E. Conein DAC Contract Agent	X	GRADE GS-14	EMPLOYEE NO. 750558
OFFICIAL STATION Vietnam		OFFICE PHONE	5150

TRAVEL ORDER NO.
Amend # 1 to FE 366-66

TRAVEL DURATION

BEGINNING ABOUT	ENDING ABOUT
01 Aug 1967	01 Oct 1967

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE, ACCOMMODATION AND PURPOSE

Amendment # 1 to change ITINERARY to read: Saigon, Vietnam to Hong Kong, B.C.C. (5 days TDY without per diem) to Washington, D.C. (10 days TDY for consultations) to Kansas City (H/L) to Washington, D.C. PCS.

All other provisions of original Travel Order to remain in effect.

AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE

CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER

CENTS PER MILE, AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF:

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

ACCOMPANY TRAVELER

FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS

ADVANCE RETURN

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY

TRANSPORTATION REQUEST

CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION

SHIPMENT

NONTEMPORARY STORAGE

SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED

FOREIGN: POUNDS AND MODE

ACCOMPANIED	UNACCOMPANIED

DOMESTIC: INDICATE UNDER "SPECIAL PROVISIONS" ABOVE WHETHER ACCOMPANIED OR NOT, SIZE OF EACH PIECE, AND TOTAL WEIGHT.

ADVANCE OF FUNDS AUTHORIZED

YES

NO

ACCOUNTING DUE DATE

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.

OBLIGATION LIQUIDATION CODE

CAN NO.

DATE 8137-1487 AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	COMPONENT
DOUGLAS S. BLAUFARB	C/VNO

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	COMPONENT
WILLIAM E. COLBY	C/FE

FORM 540

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAVEL ORDER

X

NAME

Lucien E. Conein   Contract Agent   DDP

OFFICIAL STATION

Vietnam   5459   GS-14

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Authorized: Saigon - Hong Kong (5 days TDY-no per diem) - Washington, D.C. (PCS)
Mode : Air
Purpose : PCS
Subject will proceed directly without delays from Hong Kong to Washington, D.C.

TRAVEL DURATION

O/A 1 Aug 67   O/A 1 Oct 67

PER DIEM ALLOWANCE

$ 16.00

X

AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

Shipment of effects authorized from Saigon and Hong Kong.

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME		
Elyette B.		Wife
Phillip J.	1960	Son
Laurent P.	1958	Son
Caroline R.	1963	Dau

X

X

$2,500 - Tvl.
3,000 - HHE

Per Regs   Per Regs

X   Fr Hong Kong

X

Air Hop.

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
	FE LOG	

Gail Doherty AC/FE   Vietnam

Bruce Johnson AC/5459   Vietnam

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

INDEX ☐ ☐

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE

WR

7 Aug 67 IN 25799

S E C R E T 070900Z CITE HONG KONG 9287

DIRECTOR

MR. LOUIS CONEIN WILL DEPART HONG KONG ON 7 AUGUST 1967 VIA PAN AM FLIGHT #2 AT 17:30, ARRIVING HEADQUARTERS 8 AUGUST 1967 AT 0530.

SECRET

S E C R E T

ET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM K/3

ACTION FE 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2, OF 2

27 JUL 68 IN 19891

ACTION

S E C R E T 270916Z CITE SAIGON 9831

PRIORITY HONG KONG INFO DIRECTOR

MR. LUCIEN CONEIN DEPARTING SAIGON PCS TO HQS ON 27 JULY. PLEASE ADVANCE FUNDS FOR TRAVEL OF DEPENDENTS AND SHIPMENT OF EFFECTS TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AND T/A TO HQS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

July 26

Keep track of his movements [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

SECRET

15 NOV 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CSCS

ATTENTION: Agent Panel

SUBJECT: Appointment of Career Agent
Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH

1. It is requested that Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH be approved for contract as Career Agent in furtherance of the long term objective of Project ZRJEWEL, this objective being to provide the Clandestine Services with an improved standby paramilitary manpower capability to assist the Operating Divisions in emergency situations.

2. Mr. SCHWICKRATH has, over a long period of time, well demonstrated his operational value to this Agency, and thus is more than amply qualified under the terms of R 20-1000 which defines this category of personnel.

E F Fox
for Alfred T. Fox
Chief
Paramilitary Group, CA

Attachment:
PHS

CA/PMG/EFFox:rah
15 November 1961
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CA/SG/PERS
1 - CA/C/PMG
2 - CA/PMG
1 - Chrono

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Personnel Division

ATTENTION : Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Deletion of Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH from Project IUJEWEL roster.

1. Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH has been employed as a Career Agent in Project IUJEWEL since 16 October 1961. During that period he was assigned to the Saigon Station as a Staff Advisor on Paramilitary matters to the Chief of Station.

2. When at the termination of that assignment, SCHWICKRATH returned to Headquarters, it was assumed by SOD that he would return to SOD and be again covered by Project IUJEWEL. However, I now understand that SCHWICKRATH is being processed for an assignment in WH Division and is, in fact, engaged in language training for that assignment.

3. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that the name of Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH be removed from the Project IUJEWEL personnel assets.

L. A. Walsh, Jr.
Major General, USA
Chief, Special Operations Division

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (*true*) Lucien C. Conein	DATE (*from item 8.1*) June 1963	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (*true*) John H. Richardson	DATE (*from item 8.2*) June 1963
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:	Darold D. Aldridge		DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Nov 19	2. GRADE GS-13	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE C/PM GS-13	7a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR 3 January 1962
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (*if known*)	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Saigon, Vietnam		7b. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD 3 January 1964
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7c. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS 30 January 1964

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (*see special note on transmittal form*):

Staff advisor in paramilitary matters to the Chief of Station. Station liaison officer to GVN Ministry of Interior, Hqs US Special Forces and Army of Vietnam Corps Commanders.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

Would prefer to have an operational assignment.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (*refer to catalog of courses, if available*):

FORM 3-59 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

1 RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

3 BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE ______ 2ND. CHOICE ______ 3RD. CHOICE ______

2 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS.

1ST. CHOICE NE 2ND. CHOICE N. Africa 3RD. CHOICE WH

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 30

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife - 34
Son - 5
Son - 3½

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Child due 1 July

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

I strongly endorse Subject's request for return on another tour to the Saigon Station. His rich experience in the paramilitary field, detailed knowledge of Indo-China and the leading personalities in the area, and his fluent French make him an invaluable asset of the Station.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER DATE	SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED ~~[illegible]~~ H/L & New Tour	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. [illegible] CABLE NO.
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME [illegible]	20. SIGNATURE
21. TITLE FE/PF/SE	22. DATE

23. COMMENTS
CMC Approved by William E Colby 12 Sept. 1963
Concurred by H. [illegible] SOD p/cs 11 Sept 1963

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FITNESS REPORT- LUCIEN E. CONEIN- CAREER AGENT- ZRJEWEL

FROM:

SOD/Plans/EFFox

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. SOD/Pers.	[illegible]	[illegible]		1-2: Fitness Report and E. Fox comments forwarded FYI. FE Division advises that they will take no action re a promotion unless the field comes in with a specific recommendation by dispatch.
2. D/C SOD Mr. Jorgenson		20 [illegible]		To: Mr Fox Concur with promotion to GS 14. also with recommendation that FE leave such promotion alone. Pls ask Mr [illegible] to check [illegible] the best [illegible] with MPD & give me result of that consultation 20 Dec 63
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

19 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: SOD/Personnel Schwickrath

SUBJECT: Promotion - [redacted]

REFERENCE: Fitness Report dated 25 Feb. 1963

1. In view of present and past Fitness Reports, and by comparison with other ZRJEWEL personnel, I believe that the promotion of [redacted] to GS-14 equivalent is justified, and that it would be in order to convey this view to FE/Personnel. Technically, however, the administration of (and decision to promote) [redacted] is a responsibility of FE Division until [redacted] reverts to SOD under ZRJEWEL.

2. I would strongly recommend against any move to request Army to advance [redacted]'s retired status from Lt. Col. to Col.; although, for operational purposes while he is at Saigon it might be possible to give him notional or "assimilated" rank.

E. F. Fox

E. F. FOX
SOD/Plans

SECRET

[illegible]

18 March 1963

Schwickrath

[redacted]

1. FE/Pers will not honor promotion recommendation to GS-14 equiv. until field sends in a specific recommendation. This is the way FE Operates. FE Division feels [redacted] is their employee until his tour in Saigon is completed. If SOD wants to take action re the fitness report recommendation, Mr. Jorgenson should discuss this with Paul Breitwiser.

2. FE/Per advised the field by ~~[illegible]~~ "Personal note" from Mary Boulger that promotion ~~[illegible] from~~ Lt. Col. to Col. is not possible. SOD/Pers advised by FE/Pers that Department of Defense turned down active duty status, [redacted] for cover purposes because in addition to being a retired reservist, [redacted] departed for the field under Department of Army Civilian cover and was assigned to Saigon in that capacity. After his arrival it was determined [redacted] in the field that he would represent himself as military. This was never sanctioned by headquarters.

SOD 2-512

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE/VCL

Admin Draft

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion of [redacted] to GS-14 Equivalent

REFERENCE : Fitness Report for Subject dated 25 February 1963

1. In reference Fitness Report, the Deputy Chief of Station and the Chief of Station, Saigon, recommend the promotion of [redacted] to the next higher GS equivalency. I concur in this recommendation.

2. As you are aware, [redacted] is a member of Special Operations Division Project ZRJEWEL. In comparison with other employees of ZRJEWEL, taking into consideration the assigned duties and manner of performance, I feel that [redacted] promotion is appropriate, and concur in the recommendation of the Station.

3. It is requested that a contract amendment be initiated by FE Division to increase [redacted]'s compensation from GS-13 (4) equivalent, $12,245, to GS-14 (4) equivalent, $14,277.

15,277

GORDON L. JORGENSEN
Acting Chief
Special Operations Division

Att:
Reference Fitness Report

SOD/PERS/GLJ/RDI:mkh

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Add w/att.
1 - AC/SOD/w/o/att.
~~1~~ - SOD/Pers/w/o/att.
1 - RI/SOD/w/o/att. - dummy

TT/8-564/DIR/ DISPATCH FOLLOWS
VIA TELETAPE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION

INFO

FROM
CHIEF OF STATION, SAIGON

SUBJECT
ZRJEWEL - FITNESS REPORT ON ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
FVSS-2216

1. A FORMAL FITNESS REPORT ON ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH WILL BE DISPATCHED SHORTLY. AD INTERIM, THOSE QUESTIONS RAISED IN REFERENCE ARE ANSWERED BELOW.

2. ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH, ZRJEWEL CAREER AGENT, IS ASSIGNED AS CHIEF OF THE PARAMILITARY STAFF REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE CHIEF OF STATION. AS SUCH, HIS DUTIES ENCOMPASS PLANNING, OPERATIONAL COORDINATION, FIELD INSPECTION, AND LIAISON WITH VERY SENIOR GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM OFFICIALS IN THE INITIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, SCHWICKRATH IS THEXPRIMARY STATION CONTACT WITH THEMMINISTER OF INTERIOR, WHO IS A PROLIFIC SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCEMAND A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE STATION'S POLITICAL ACTION PROGRAM. SCHWICKRATH ALSO REPRESENTS THE STATION ON THE ODYOKE COMMITTEE FOR PROVINCE REHABILITATION /THE SO-CALLED TRUE-HEART COMMITTEE/.

3. SCHWICKRATH IS NOT DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN AGENT OPERATIONS, BUT AS THE STATION SENIOR PARAMILITARY STAFF OFFICER, HE INDIRECTLY SUPERVISES A NUMBER OF SUCH OPERATIONS /E.G., STGALLY/, AND HIS ADVICE IS OFTEN SOUGHT ON MANY OTHER STATION AGENT OPERATIONS BECAUSE OF HIS LONG SERVICE IN VIETNAM AND HIS INTIMATE FAMILIARITY WITH MANY KEY MILITARY AND POLITICAL FIGURES IN VIETNAM.

4. SCHWICKRATH'S DUTIES MAY BE CONSIDERED AS HAZARDOUS WITHIN THE NORMAL MEANING OF THE TERM AS UTILIZED BY KUBARK. SCHWICKRATH IS FREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN OVERFLIGHTS ON FIXED AND ROTARY WINGED AIRCRAFT OF AREAS KNOWN TO BE CONTROLLED BY THE VIET CONG. HE HAS, IN ADDITION, PARTICIPATED IN INITIAL PHASES OF CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS AND IS A FREQUENT VISITOR TO STATION FIELD INSTALLATIONS IN AREAS WHICH ARE OFTEN UNDER ARMED ATTACK OF VARYING INTENSITY BY VIET CONG FORCES.

/CONTINUED/

DISTRIBUTION
BY TELETAPE
2-CFE
BY POUCH
1-CFE

TOT/ 20 /AUG 62/0500

DATE TYPED
TOR-20 AUG 1965
DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
FVST-3064

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

VIA TELETAPE

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER FVST-3344 PAGE-2

5. IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN STRICT PERSONAL SECURITY FOR SCHWICKRATH. HE IS KNOWN TO MANY VIETNAMESE BOTH IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH AS HAVING BEEN ENGAGED IN VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM SINCE 1945. IN ADDITION, THE STATION HAS JUDGED THAT HIS BEST UTILIZATION HAS BEEN AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CHIEF OF STATION IN VARIOUS COMMITTEE MEETINGS AND LIAISONS WHERE IT WAS NECESSARY HE BE IDENTIFIED AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COS. IT WOULD BE BOTH IMPOSSIBLE AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN SCHWICKRATH'S CASE TO ATTEMPT TO HIDE COMPLETELY HIS AFFILIATION WITH KUBARK.

6. DURING HIS CURRENT TOUR, SCHWICKRATH HAS ACQUIRED INCREASING SKILL AND FAMILIARITY IN THE INTRICACIES OF KUBARK STAFF WORK, BOTH AT THE INTER-STATION LEVEL AND THE INTGA-MISSION LEVEL. THIS IS A NEW CAPACITY FOR SCHWICKRATH WHO HAS HERETOFORE BEEN KNOWN AS A VERY AGGRESSIVE ACTION OFFICER. SCHWICKRATH HAS PERFORMED THESE NEW DUTIES WITH CONSIDERABLE FINESSE DESPITE A VERY RAPID BUILDUP OF PARAMILITARY ASSETS WITHIN VIETNAM AND AN EXTREMELY FLUID COMMAND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMMANDER OF THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT SCHWICKRATH WAS THE ONLY STATION REPRESENTATIVE IN A RECENT CONFERENCE CONVOKED BY CINCPAC IN HAWAII TO RECOMMEND PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A TEN MILLION DOLLAR PROJECT INVOLVING A YEAR-LONG TURNOVER OF CIVILIAN IRREGULAR ASSETS IN VIETNAM FROM THE STATION TO MACV. SCHWICKRATH'S PERFORMANCE AT THAT CONFERENCE RESULTED IN THE CONFERENCE'S ADOPTING ALL STJIVON RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPECT TO ITS FUTURE ROLE IN CIVILIAN IRREGULAR ACTIVITIES. AT THE SAME TIME SCHWICKRATH'S PERFORMANCE WAS SUCH AS TO MAINTAIN CLOSE, HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN KUBARK, CINCPAC AND MACV.

7. I HAVE PERSONALLY FOUND SCHWICKRATH TO BE AN INVALUABLE MEMBER OF OUR STAFF WITH AN INDISPENSABLE DEPTH OF KNOWLEDGE AND BACKGROUND ON SOUTH VIETNAM AND ON ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO GUERRILLA WARFARE. IT IS A DISTINCT PLEASURE TO HAVE HIM WORKING HERE AS A MEMBER OF THE STATION.

STEPHEN P. SHORDEN

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

12 OCT 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/PMG

ATTENTION : Ernest F. Fox

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : COMEIN, Lucien
#5025

1. Reference is made to the memorandum dated 21 September 1961 in which a Covert Security Clearance was requested to permit utilization of Subject as a Career Agent to provide paramilitary skills in any area where they are needed under Project ZRJEWEL.

2. This is to advise that a Covert Security Clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of Covert Security Clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Covert Security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

for Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

28 SEP 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/PMG

ATTENTION: Ernest F. Fox

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : CONEIN, Lucien
#5025

1. Reference is made to the memorandum dated 21 September 1961 in which a Provisional Covert Security Clearance was requested to permit contact and assessment of Subject, as a career agent, in providing paramilitary skills in any area where they are needed under Project ZRJEWEL.

2. This is to advise that a Provisional Covert Security Clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request, as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of Provisional Covert Security Clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Provisional Covert Security Clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 90 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

For Louis W. Vasaly
Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

№ SD 39264 A DATE

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE) Lucien E. Conein

Lucien E. Conein
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

WITNESS:

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

SECRET

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

№ SD 39264 B DATE

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) Arthur R. Schwickrath

ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

WITNESS: Ernest F. Fox

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

TO:		CI/Operational Approval and Support Division	DATE ~~21 September 1961~~
	X	Security Support Division/Office of Security	FROM: CA/PMG/Ernest F. Fox x4611; 2405 K. Bldg.

SUBJECT: (True name) CONEIN, Lou

PROJECT: ZRJEWEL

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES

(1) Morton F. Sewell (being cancelled if it has not already been done)

(2) Virgil M. Dorkus (being cancelled as are requesting new psuedo)

CI/OA FILE NO.

RI 201 FILE NO.

SO FILE NO.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
X	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
X	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

~~In any area in which is needed~~

FULL DETAILS OF USE

To provide Paramilitary Skills in any area they are needed.

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	YES	☐	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	YES	☐	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION

Normal Procedure; Priority on PCSA and CSA per conversation ~~with CA/SG/PERS~~

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	X	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER SIGNED Walter E. Crego for Ernest F.Fox	EXTENSION 4611	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF Signed Alfred T. Cox, CA.C/PM ~~TOP SECRET~~

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(3)

SECRET

8 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE Division

SUBJECT: Employment of Lou Conein

1. At my request, General Lansdale has quietly checked on the status of Lou Conein's retirement from the Army. He is presently in Iran and is slated for return home and retirement in August. He has made an effort to return sooner but the Iranian Government protested that it would be an act of bad faith (apparently, he is doing a good job with them).

2. At the moment, Conein belongs to ACSI and Lansdale feels that any move on our part to accelerate his return would be misinterpreted, or perhaps I should say correctly interpreted, by ACSI. I am getting his address and will establish contact with him by personal letter. Lansdale feels that Conein is very anxious to come back to work for the Agency.

Alfred T. Cox
Chief, Paramilitary Group
Covert Action Staff

cc: C/FE/VCL

SECRET

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT	THIS DATE *(Fill In)*
ISSUED BY		25 September 1961

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* CONEIN, Lucien Emile			2. AGE 41 yrs	3. SEX ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	
4. HEIGHT 5' 11"	5. WEIGHT 175 lbs	6. COLOR OF EYES Blue	7. COLOR OF HAIR Brown	8. TYPE COMPLEXION Fair	9. TYPE BUILD

10. SCARS *(Type and Location)* appendectomy, hernia, rt. side of body

11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES [illegible] rt. index and middle finger amputated

12. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)* 5011 Hanes Street McLean, Virginia Elmwood 6-4811	13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)* AND PHONE NO. 1905 North 10th Street Kansas City, Kansas
14. CURRENT PHONE NO. Elmwood 6-4811 — 15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT. OXford 57742	16. LEGAL RESIDENCE *(State, Territory or Country)* Kansas
17. NICKNAMES Luigi	18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED

19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including Length of Time)* UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES. NA

20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by What Authority)* NA

SECTION II — POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING

Position commensurate with past training and experience

2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT *(You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary).* $ 11,500.00 [illegible]	3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT 1 October 1961

4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL

☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS *(Check (X) each item applicable)*

☐ WASHINGTON D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY *(Specify).*

☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

NONE

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 22 Nov 1919
2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Paris, France
3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.
4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☒ OTHER (Specify)
5. DATE NATURALIZED: 11 Aug 19[illegible]
6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.: [illegible]
7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: District Court
8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country): Tacoma, Washington
9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☒ YES ☐ NO
10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY: France, (see above)
11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

Born France 1919, emmigrated U.S. 1925

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☒ NO
13. GIVE PARTICULARS: NA
14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)? NA
15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.: Sept 1925
16. PORT OF ENTRY: New York City, New York
17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY: France
18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue): Unknown
19. DATE VISA ISSUED: Unknown

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: [illegible]
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): [illegible]
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 19[illegible] - 19[illegible]
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: Wyandotte H.S.
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Kansas City, Kansas
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1932 - 1934
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☒ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To):
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
University of Maryland	Pol Sc		1940	19[illegible]			[illegible]

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 6 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

NA

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
NA				

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
OCS, TIS, Ft Benning, Ga.	OCS	Mar 1943	July 1943	4
Special Warfare Ft. Bragg	Special Forces.	Nov 1956	Dec 1956	1

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

OSS and Agency Schools

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R Read, W Write, S Speak															HOW ACQUIRED			
(List below each language in [illegible] of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es))	[illegible] TO NATIVE FLUENCY			[illegible]			[illegible] FOR RESEARCH			[illegible] FOR TRAVEL			[illegible]			NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
French				X	X	X										X			

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

None

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

X YES NO

SECTION VI GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
France	Military	1944					OSS
China	Military	1945					OSS
Indochina	Military-polit	1945&56-59					OSS
Germany	Intelligence	1946-1953					SSU CIA
Iran	Intelligence	1959-1961					ACSI

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

Military Assignments

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.

SP 207111 27 July 1959 exp 27 July 1963

SECTION VII TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM			
		☐ GREGG	☐ SPEEDWRITING	☐ STENOTYPE	☐ OTHER (Specify):
NA	NA				

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (*Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.*).

NA

SECTION VIII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Hunting - Good

Fishing - Good

Free Fall Parachuting - Good

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

OSS and Agency trained
Special Forces Battalion Commander 3 yrs
Chief Military Liaison Group, ACSI intel (FI) team Teheran Iran

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (*Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving*), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

None

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE *(Provide License Registry Number, if known).*

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)*

7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)*

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(Do NOT submit copies unless requested).* INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).*

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*: U.S. Army Sept 19[illegible] to present

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY: U.S. Army

3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: Washington 25, D.C.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS: Military

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR: [illegible]

6. TITLE OF JOB: Lt. Colonel

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ [illegible] per annum

8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*: Lt. Col.

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: U. S. Army Officer assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING: Retiring after [illegible] yrs [illegible] mos [illegible] dys service

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

SECTION X **MILITARY SERVICE**

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 *(As amended)* — YES / NO: X NO
2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION: NA
3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.:
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON: USAR Ret Reserves
5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS: NA

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE *(Specify)*:
HAVE SERVED →									
NOW SERVING →	X								

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S): Parachute infantry
3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY *(Past service)*: NA
4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES *(Past and current service)*: over 20 years
5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY → PAST SERVICE: 22 Sept 1941 — CURRENT SERVICE: NA
6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 18 mos
7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE → PAST SERVICE: pvt — CURRENT SERVICE: Lt. Col
8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER *(If now serving, provide current number)*: 01-322760
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: 71542 — CURRENT SERVICE: 31542
10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: 93000 — CURRENT SERVICE: 39300
11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES *(Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)*

Chief of Military Liaison Group, ARMISH/MAAG, APO 205 NY, NY

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☐	HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☐	RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐	UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐	RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐	RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	☐	OTHER: NA
☐	RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐	RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY		

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

X REGULAR X RESERVE *(Including the National and Air National Guard)* X OTHER *(Including AUS)* AUS

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? X YES / NO
2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L GUARD OR AIR NAT'L GUARD? YES / X NO
3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? YES / X NO
4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

X	ARMY	☐	MARINE CORPS	☐	NATIONAL GUARD	☐	COAST GUARD	☐	NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER	
☐	NAVY	☐	AIR FORCE	☐	AIR NAT'L GUARD	☐	ARMY ROTC	☐	AIR FORCE ROTC		

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE: LT Col
6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK: 8 July 1958
7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION: 1 Oct 1961
8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY *(Active)* ☐ STANDBY *(Inactive)* X RETIRED
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE: NA
10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE: NA
11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

NA

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT: YES / X NO
13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS: NA
14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? YES / X NO
15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS: NA
16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY — YEARS: 24 — MONTHS: 3
17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT? ACSI

SECTION XI FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

Not Applicable

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
The Riggs Nat'l Bank, Lincoln Br.	17 & H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY. ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

NA

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
S.W. Rice Co.	1342 G. St. N.W., Washington, D.C.
The First City Bank & Trust	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
The Guaranty State Bank	1000 Minn Ave., Kansas City, Kansas

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

NA

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☒ NO (If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled) SPECIFY: MARRIED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

Divorced from Monique Pierre Veber, 23 December 1947, Paris, France. Divorce by mutual agreement. Divorced from Carmen O1., 26 Mar 1957, Wyandotte County, Kansas

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance

3. NAME	(First)	(Middle)	(Maiden)	(Last)
	Elyette	BROCHOT	BROCHOT	CONEIN

4. STATE ANY OTHER NAMES EVER USED: NA

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH ANY OF THESE NAMES WERE USED. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 10 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

5. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 30 March 1958

6. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Dillon, South Carolina

7. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 7 rue Docteur Charcot, Champigny sur Marne, Seine, France

8. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. DATE OF DEATH: NA

10. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

11. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 5011 Hanes Street, McLean, Virginia

12. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Sept 1929

13. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Vinh Vietnam

14. CITIZENSHIP: USA

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY 23 December 1956	15. PLACE OF ENTRY New York City, New York

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)) French	17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP 14 July 1959	18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) U.S. Dist. Court for Dist of Col.

19. OCCUPATION Housewife	20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers) NONE
21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) NA	
22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.) NA	
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE NA	24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED NA
25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN NA	

SECTION XIII **CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS**

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Charles M. Conein	son	Frankfurt 30 March '50 Ger	USA	4854 Kenmore Alexandria, Va
Laurent P. Conein	son	Fayetteville 19 April '58 N.C.	USA	5011 Lanes St. McLean, Virginia
Philippe J. Conein	son	Teheran 16 Nov '59 Iran	USA	" " "

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	3	3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, step-parents, siblings, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	0

SECTION XIV **FATHER** (Give same information for Stepfather and/or Guardian on separate sheet)

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Conein, Lucien Xavier	2. LIVING YES X NO	3. DATE OF DEATH 1924	4. CAUSE OF DEATH heart attack

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED None	INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 18 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.
6. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country) NA	

7. DATE OF BIRTH 19 March 1872	8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Meaux, Seine et Marne, France	9. CITIZENSHIP French

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY NA	11. PLACE OF ENTRY NA

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)) NA	13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED NA	14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) NA

15. OCCUPATION NA	16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed) NA
17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED NA	

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To) 1914 - 1919	19. BRANCH OF SERVICE unk	20. COUNTRY France

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
NNA

SECTION XV MOTHER *(Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)*

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: Estelle Leotine Cousin

2. LIVING: X YES ☐ NO ☐

3. DATE OF DEATH: NA

4. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: Estelle Leontine Elin (maiden)

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: 150 Monterey Street, Brisbane, California

7. DATE OF BIRTH: 6 June 1893

8. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*: Soengei, Dutch East Indies

9. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: 22 May 1948

11. PLACE OF ENTRY: New York City, New York

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *(Country(ies))*: French

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: 10 November 1959

14. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)*: Dist. Court, San Francisco, Cal.

15. OCCUPATION: None

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed)*: NA

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED: NA

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE *(From-and-To)*: NA

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: NA

20. COUNTRY: NA

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: NA

SECTION XVI BROTHERS AND SISTERS *(Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)*

	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	4. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*	5. LIVING	6. AGE
1	Cousin, Maurice Rene	Brother	French	Unknown Champigny sur Marne, Seine, France	X YES ☐ NO ☐	39
2					YES ☐ NO ☐	
3					YES ☐ NO ☐	
4					YES ☐ NO ☐	
5					YES ☐ NO ☐	
6					YES ☐ NO ☐	
7					YES ☐ NO ☐	
8					YES ☐ NO ☐	

SECTION XVII — **FATHER-IN-LAW**

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): John James Jones BROCHOT
2. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH:
4. CAUSE OF DEATH:
5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: Unknown
INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.
6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Noumea, New Caledonia
7. DATE OF BIRTH: Unknown
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Noumea, New Caledonia
9. CITIZENSHIP: French
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA
15. OCCUPATION: self employed
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): self employed

SECTION XVIII — **MOTHER-IN-LAW**

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Marie Brochot
2. LIVING: ☐ YES ☒ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: 1947
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Cancer
5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: NA
INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.
6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): NA
7. DATE OF BIRTH: NA
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): NA
9. CITIZENSHIP: French
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): AH
15. OCCUPATION: NA
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): NA

SECTION XIX — **RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT**

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): CONEIN, Maurice Rene
2. RELATIONSHIP: Brother
3. AGE: 39
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Champigny sur Marne, Seine France
5. EMPLOYED BY: Unknown
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country): French
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: Seldom
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: 16 Sept 1961

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): BROCHOT, John James Jones
2. RELATIONSHIP: Father-in-law
3. AGE: Unk
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Noumea, New Caledonia
5. EMPLOYED BY: Self employed
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country): French
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: have never seen
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: never contacted

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

SECTIONS ARE CONTINUED TO PAGE 13

SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
2	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
3	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S., WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
B/Gen Edw. G. Lansdale	Of Ass't Sec Def,	4503 MacArthur Blvd Washington, D.C.
Mr. Lucius O. Rucker	CIA	5011 Nance Street McLean, Virginia
Hon. Errett P. Scrivner	Congress	2331 Cathedral Av. N.W. Washington, D.C.
Mr. Alfred T. Cox	CIA	Arlington Towers Arlington, Virginia
Mr. John Foster	CIA	U.S. Embassy Teheran, Iran

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS, IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY, NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)

Since I have been in the military Service since September 1951 and since the majority of my military service has been in overseas areas, specifically since1959, 1961, and since I have just returned from Teheran, Iran, my social contacts are not in the United States.

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)

Same as above applies. In the military service people are being continuously transferred to new duty stations therefore at this time it is impossible to adequately answer this question.

SECTION XXII CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind (Include membership in, or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country) to which you belong or have belonged.

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
Airborne Association	Ft. Bragg, North Carolina	1956	Pres
Reserve Officers Association	Washington, D.C.	1957	Pres
Assoc of U.S. Army	Washington, D.C.	1958	Pres

SECTION XXIII RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	INCLUSIVE DATES	
	FROM	TO
Agency mission to Germany	1946	1953
1512 Ellison Street, Falls Church, Virginia	Aug '53	June '54
Agency mission to Vietnam	June '54	Oct '56
13 Mess Drive, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina	Nov '56	Aug '59
No 5 [illegible] Safa, Teheran, Iran ([illegible] Liaison Gp. APO 205 NY)	Sep '59	Sept '61

SECTION XXIV ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF; OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, EXPLAIN

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Occasionally

5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

Military Liaison to J-2 SCS, Imp Iranian Army 1959 to 1961

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940

U.S. Army

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

OSS 1943
SSU 1946
CIG 1947
CIA 1948-49

U.S. Army 1956-57
ACSI D of A 1959

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A *MINOR* TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE.

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XXV PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(First-Middle-Last)* Elyette Brochot Conein	2. RELATIONSHIP Wife
3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*	4. HOME PHONE NO. Elmwood 6-6811
5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE Dept of Army	6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT. OX 57742

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

Mrs. Estelle Conein 150 Monterey St. Brisbane, Calif. Mother

SECTION XXVI **CERTIFICATION**

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES 25 September 1961	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Lucien Conein
3. SIGNED AT (City and State) Washington D.C.	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS L. O. Rucker, Jr.

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates, sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGPO-SR 201 Conein, Lucien E.
01 322 769

22 September 1961

SUBJECT: Retirement

TO: Lieutenant Colonel Lucien E. Conein, 01322769, Infantry

Lieutenant Colonel Lucien E. Conein, 01322769, Army of the United States, (Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, United States Army Reserve) upon his application is retired from active service under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3911, after more than 20 years of active Federal service. He is relieved from assignment and duty Washington, D. C., effective date of change of strength accountability: 30 September 1961 and placed on Army of the United States Retired List 1 October 1961. On 1 October 1961 he is transferred to United States Army (Retired Reserve) and assigned to United States Army Control Group (Retired) at appropriate United States Army Corps. Home of selection and completion of travel within one year is authorized. Permanent change of station. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. Pamphlet--"Personal Property Shipping Information" is applicable. 2122010 01-1731-1732-1733 P 1517 S99-999. Separation program number 567.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

The Adjutant General

ICER EFFICIENCY REPORT

(AR 600-185 and SR 600-185-1)

SECTION I

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL	2. SERVICE NO.	3. GRADE	4. BRANCH	5. COMPONENT
CONEIN, Lucien E.	0 1 322 769	Major	Inf	USAR

6. UNIT, ORGANIZATION, AND STATION OF RATED OFFICER
Support Group (8706)
Washington 25, D. C.

7. PERIOD OF REPORT

FROM (Da,mo,yr)	TO (Da,mo,yr)	DUTY DAYS	OTHER DAYS
1 May 56	17 Oct 56	126	44

8. REASON FOR REPORT
☐ Annual
☐ Change duty rated officer
☒ PCS rated officer
☐ Change duty rating officer
☐ PCS rating officer
☐ Other (Specify)

9. BASIS FOR RATING OFFICER'S ENTRIES
☐ Close daily contact
☐ Infrequent observation
☐ Frequent observation
☐ Reports and records

10. DUTIES ACTUALLY PERFORMED ON PRESENT JOB ASSIGNMENT (Give his duty MOS 9300, job assignment, and briefly describe major additional duties).

11. OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS

	RATER			INDORSER		
	UNKNOWN	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	UNKNOWN	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY
a. How effective is this officer in the maintenance of supply discipline?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒
b. How effective is this officer in utilization of personnel?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒

	UNKNOWN	NO	YES	
c. FOR RATER ONLY - Does this officer possess the physical, mental, and moral qualities expected for his grade, branch, and length of commissioned service?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.
d. FOR RATER ONLY - Could this officer be expected to serve adequately in any normal branch assignment commensurate with his grade?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.

12. DESCRIPTION OF RATED OFFICER AND COMMENTS. Remarks should cover any special strengths or weaknesses affecting performance of duty or ability to perform other types of assignments. If officer served in combat during period, state number of days (days) and discuss strengths and weaknesses exhibited in combat.

a. Comments of rating officer

An animated imaginative officer. Impetuous, verbose in talk, he is more realistic in action. He has an agile mind which does not take well to discipline. Speaks French fluently. Is able to develop and work with foreign personnel at all levels. Extremely adaptable.

b. Comments of indorsing officer
☐ I do not know the rated officer well enough to complete the reverse side of this report.

This Officer is particularly well suited for unconventional warfare operations.

13. RATING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT	14. INDORSING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT
Under My Supervision: John G. ANDERTON, Chief of Station, GS-15	Under My Jurisdiction: Evan J. PARKER, JR., Branch Chief, GS-15
I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1	I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1.

DATE	SIGNATURE	DATE	SIGNATURE
31 Oct			Evan Parker

15. THIS REPORT HAS INCLOSURES. (Insert "0" if appropriate).

16. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 66 17 Oct 56
PERSONNEL OFFICER'S INITIALS

DA FORM 1 OCT 53 67-3 REPLACES DA AGO FORM 67-2, 1 SEP 50, WHICH WILL BE OBSOLETE 31 OCT 53.

14-00000

RATED OFFICER'S NAME AND SERVICE NUMBER
CONEIN, Lucien E., O 1 22.769

SECTION II ESTIMATED DESIRABILITY IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES

Indicate the extent to which you would desire the rated officer to serve under you in each type of duty described below. Place an X in the proper box. Consider each item in terms appropriate to rated officer's grade and branch. Use the UNKNOWN column only if the nature of your contacts makes it impracticable for you to make an estimate of his probable usefulness in a particular assignment. Marking UNKNOWN does not penalize the rated officer.

RATER UNKNOWN	RATER 1 NOT WANT HIM	RATER 2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	RATER 3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	RATER 4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	RATER 5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM			INDORSER UNKNOWN	INDORSER 1 NOT WANT HIM	INDORSER 2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	INDORSER 3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	INDORSER 4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	INDORSER 5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	A	Command* a unit.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	B	Serve as a staff officer. Specify: UW or Guerrilla Warfare Ops	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	C	Work as a specialist, professional person, or technician. Specify: Sabotage, GW, Special Forces	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	D	Conduct military instruction.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	E	Serve in a capacity involving contacts with other services, allied forces, or civilians - e.g., joint boards, contract negotiations, reserve components, etc.	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	F	Carry out an assignment involving mostly administrative duties.	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	G	Represent your viewpoint in liaison activities.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	H	Make decisions and take action in your name during your absence - e.g., act as your deputy.	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	I	Be responsible in an emergency requiring forceful leadership.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	J	Other. Specify: Research & Development, Special Force Techniques	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒

Comment on and/or clarify above ratings if necessary

Subject's forte is not administration; he is a specialist in airborne and similar types of special operations demanding a high degree of initiative, energy, and perseverance.

*For technical and administrative services, or staff, interpret this to mean managerial responsibilities commensurate with command.

SECTION III PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

Considering only officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, rate the officer on performance of his duty assignment. Read all descriptions and place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
7. Excels any other officer I know in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
6. Outstanding performance of this duty found in very few officers.	☐	☐
5. Very fine performance of such a nature that this officer is a distinct asset to the service.	☐	☒
4. Performs this duty in a competent, dependable manner.	☒	☐
3. Performs this duty acceptably.	☐	☐
2. Barely adequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
1. Inadequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐

SECTION IV PROMOTION POTENTIAL

Considering officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, what is your opinion of this officer's promotion potential? Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
6. One of the few exceptional officers who should be considered for more rapid promotion than his contemporaries.	☐	☐
5. Should give an outstanding performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☐	☐
4. Should give a competent and dependable performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☒	☒
3. Should give a fairly adequate performance of duty when promoted to next higher grade.	☐	☐
2. Has not yet demonstrated potential for promotion to next higher grade. Needs more time in present grade.	☐	☐
1. Has reached the highest grade level at which satisfactory performance should be expected. Should not be promoted.	☐	☐

SECTION V OVER-ALL VALUE

What is your estimate of the rated officer's over-all value to the service? Compare him with officers of the same grade, branch, and about the same time in grade. Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
8. The most outstanding officer I know.	☐	☐
7. One of the few highly outstanding officers I know.	☐	☐
6. A very fine officer who is a great asset to the service.	☐	☐
5. A competent, dependable officer of distinct value to the service.	☒	☒
4. A typically effective officer.	☐	☐
3. An acceptable officer whose value is limited in some respects.	☐	☐
2. An officer who performs acceptably in a limited range of assignments, but who could easily be replaced.	☐	☐
1. An officer who is not of the caliber that one should reasonably expect in an officer.	☐	☐

OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORT

(AR 600-185 and SR 600-185-1)

SECTION I

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL CONEIN, Lucien E.	2. SERVICE NO. 0 1 322 769	3. GRADE Maj	4. BRANCH Inf	5. COMPONENT USAR

6. UNIT, ORGANIZATION, AND STATION OF RATED OFFICER
Spt. Gp. 8706th DU
Washington 25, D. C.

7. PERIOD OF REPORT

FROM (Da,mo,yr)	TO (Da,mo,yr)	DUTY DAYS	OTHER DAYS
	31 Apr '56		

8. REASON FOR REPORT
☒ Annual
☐ Change duty rated officer
☐ PCS rated officer
☐ Change duty rating officer
☐ PCS rating officer
☐ Other (Specify)

9. BASIS FOR RATING OFFICER'S ENTRIES
☒ Close daily contact
☐ Infrequent observation
☐ Frequent observation
☐ Reports and records

10. DUTIES ACTUALLY PERFORMED ON PRESENT JOB ASSIGNMENT (Give his duty MOS , job assignment, and briefly describe major additional duties).

Classified duties comparable to a Special Forces troop Commander on an isolated mission.

11. OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS

	RATER			INDORSER		
	UNKNOWN	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	UNKNOWN	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY
a. How effective is this officer in the maintenance of supply discipline?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒
b. How effective is this officer in utilization of personnel?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒
	UNKNOWN	NO	YES			
c. FOR RATER ONLY - Does this officer possess the physical, mental, and moral qualities expected for his grade, branch, and length of commissioned service?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.		
d. FOR RATER ONLY - Could this officer be expected to serve adequately in any normal branch assignment commensurate with his grade?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.		

12. DESCRIPTION OF RATED OFFICER AND COMMENTS. Remarks should cover any special strengths or weaknesses affecting performance of duty or ability to perform other types of assignments. If officer served in combat during period, state number of days (days) and discuss strengths and weaknesses exhibited in combat.

a. Comments of rating officer

Has demonstrated outstanding leadership, including the ability to assess a situation correctly, make proper decisions on his own initiative, and cope with emergencies skillfully. Much of his duties were performed in territory in which enemy agents were active; some were performed under enemy fire.

b. Comments of indorsing officer

☐ I do not know the rated officer well enough to complete the reverse side of this report.

An outstanding officer, thoroughly qualified technically in his field, practical, energetic and bold. Undertook difficult missions under most trying conditions and carried them out successfully.

13. RATING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT
Edmund P. [illegible], Lt.Col., 0522927, Inf.
MAAG - Vietnam

I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1.

DATE
SIGNATURE

14. INDORSING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT
Edward G. LANSDALE, Colonel, 2534A,
USAF, MAAG - Vietnam

I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1.

DATE
SIGNATURE EG Lansdale

15. THIS REPORT HAS INCLOSURES. (Insert "O" if appropriate).

16. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 66
PERSONNEL OFFICER'S INITIALS

DA FORM 1 OCT 53 67-3

REPLACES DA AGO FORM 67-2, 1 SEP 52,
WHICH WILL BE OBSOLETE 31 OCT 53.

RATED OFFICER'S NAME AND SERVICE NUMBER

SECTION II ESTIMATED DESIRABILITY IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES

Indicate the extent to which you would desire the rated officer to serve under you in each type of duty described below. Place an X in the proper box. Consider each item in terms appropriate to rated officer's grade and branch. Use the *UNKNOWN* column only if the nature of your contacts makes it impracticable for you to make an estimate of his probable usefulness in a particular assignment. Marking *UNKNOWN* does not penalize the rated officer.

RATER: UNKNOWN	1 NOT WANT HIM	2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM			INDORSER: UNKNOWN	1 NOT WANT HIM	2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	A	Command* a unit.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	B	Serve as a staff officer. Specify:	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	C	Work as a specialist, professional person, or technician. Specify:	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	D	Conduct military instruction.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	E	Serve in a capacity involving contacts with other services, allied forces, or civilians - e.g., joint boards, contract negotiations, reserve components, etc.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	F	Carry out an assignment involving mostly administrative duties.	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	G	Represent your viewpoint in liaison activities.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	H	Make decisions and take action in your name during your absence - e.g., act as your deputy.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	I	Be responsible in an emergency requiring forceful leadership.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	J	Other. Specify:	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Comment on and/or clarify above ratings if necessary

**For technical and administrative services, or staff, interpret this to mean managerial responsibilities commensurate with command.*

SECTION III PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

Considering only officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, rate the officer on performance of his duty assignment. Read all descriptions and place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
7. Excels any other officer I know in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
6. Outstanding performance of this duty found in very few officers.	☒	☒
5. Very fine performance of such a nature that this officer is a distinct asset to the service.	☐	☐
4. Performs this duty in a competent, dependable manner.	☐	☐
3. Performs this duty acceptably.	☐	☐
2. Barely adequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
1. Inadequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐

SECTION IV PROMOTION POTENTIAL

Considering officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, what is your opinion of this officer's promotion potential? Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
6. One of the few exceptional officers who should be considered for more rapid promotion than his contemporaries.	☐	☐
5. Should give an outstanding performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☒	☒
4. Should give a competent and dependable performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☐	☐
3. Should give a fairly adequate performance of duty when promoted to next higher grade.	☐	☐
2. Has not yet demonstrated potential for promotion to next higher grade. Needs more time in present grade.	☐	☐
1. Has reached the highest grade level at which satisfactory performance should be expected. Should not be promoted.	☐	☐

SECTION V OVER-ALL VALUE

What is your estimate of the rated officer's over-all value to the service? Compare him with officers of the same grade, branch, and about the same time in grade. Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
8. The most outstanding officer I know.	☐	☐
7. One of the few highly outstanding officers I know.	☒	☒
6. A very fine officer who is a great asset to the service.	☐	☐
5. A competent, dependable officer of distinct value to the service.	☐	☐
4. A typically effective officer.	☐	☐
3. An acceptable officer whose value is limited in some respects.	☐	☐
2. An officer who performs acceptably in a limited range of assignments, but who could easily be replaced.	☐	☐
1. An officer who is not of the caliber that one should reasonably expect in an officer.	☐	☐

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

Please Type

OFFICERS EFFICIENCY REPORT
WORK SHEET
SECTION 1

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL: CONEIN Lucien E
2. SERVICE NO.: 0 1 [illegible] 769
3. GRADE: [illegible]
4. BRANCH: INF
5. COMPONENT: USAR
6. UNIT, ORGANIZATION, AND STATION OF RATED OFFICER:
7. PERIOD OF REPORT — FROM (Da, mo, yr): — TO (Da, mo, yr): [illegible] Apr 54 — DUTY DAYS: — OTHER DAYS:

8. REASON FOR REPORT
☐ Change duty rated officer
☐ Change duty rating officer
☐ Other (Specify)
☒ Annual
☐ PCS rated officer
☐ PCS rating officer

9. BASIS FOR RATING OFFICER'S ENTRIES
☒ Close daily contact
☐ Frequent observation
☐ Infrequent observation
☐ Reports and records

10. DUTIES ACTUALLY PERFORMED ON PRESENT JOB ASSIGNMENT (Give his duty MOS, job assignment, and briefly describe major additional duties).

Classified duties comparable to a Special Forces troop commander on an isolated mission

11. OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS

	RATER			INDORSER		
	UNKNOWN	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	UNKNOWN	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY
a. How effective is this officer in the maintenance of supply discipline?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒
b. How effective is this officer in utilization of personnel?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒
	UNKNOWN	NO	YES			
c. FOR RATER ONLY - Does this officer possess the physical, mental, and moral qualities expected for his grade, branch, and length of commissioned service?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.		
d. FOR RATER ONLY - Could this officer be expected to serve adequately in any normal branch assignment commensurate with his grade?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.		

12. DESCRIPTION OF RATED OFFICER AND COMMENTS. Remarks should cover any special strengths or weaknesses affecting performance of duty or ability to perform other types of assignments. If officer served in combat during period, state number of days (days) and discuss strengths and weaknesses exhibited in combat.

a. Comments of rating officer

Has demonstrated outstanding leadership, including the ability to assess a situation correctly, make proper decisions on his own initiative, and perform [illegible] skillfully. Much of his duties were performed in territory in which ~~[illegible]~~ enemy agents were active; some were performed under enemy fire.

b. Comments of indorsing officer

☐ I do not know the rated officer well enough to complete the reverse side of this report

An outstanding officer, thoroughly qualified technically in his field, practical, energetic and bold. Undertook difficult missions under most trying conditions and carried them out successfully.

13. RATING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT
Edward R. Guereau [illegible]
0-[illegible] INF, MAAG-VIETNAM

I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR [illegible] AND [illegible]

DATE — SIGNATURE

14. INDORSING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT
EDWARD G. LANSDALE, COLONEL,
2534A, USAF, MAAG-VIETNAM

I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR [illegible] AND [illegible]

DATE — SIGNATURE

15. THIS REPORT HAS   INCLOSURES. (Leave blank if applicable)

16. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 66
PERSONNEL OFFICER'S INITIALS

FILE COPY

WORK SHEET FOR DA FORM 67-3

14-00000

RATED OFFICER'S NAME AND SERVICE NUMBER

SECTION II ESTIMATED DESIRABILITY IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES

Indicate the extent to which you would desire the rated officer to serve under you in each type of duty described below. Place an X in the proper box. Consider each item in terms appropriate to rated officer's grade and branch. Use the UNKNOWN column only if the nature of your contacts makes it impracticable for you to make an estimate of his probable usefulness in a particular assignment. Marking UNKNOWN does not penalize the rated officer.

RATER UNKNOWN	RATER 1 NOT WANT HIM	RATER 2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	RATER 3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	RATER 4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	RATER 5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM		INDORSER UNKNOWN	INDORSER 1 NOT WANT HIM	INDORSER 2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	INDORSER 3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	INDORSER 4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	INDORSER 5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	A Command* a unit.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	B Serve as a staff officer, Specify : Special Forces	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	C Work as a specialist, professional person, or technician, Specify : Special Forces	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	D Conduct military instruction.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	E Serve in a capacity involving contacts with other services, allied forces, or civilians - e. g., joint boards, contract negotiations, reserve components, etc	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	F Carry out an assignment involving mostly administrative duties.	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	G Represent your viewpoint in liaison activities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	H Make decisions and take action in your name during your absence - e. g., act as your deputy.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	I Be responsible in an emergency requiring forceful leadership	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	J Other, Specify :	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Comment on and/or clarify above ratings if necessary

* For technical and administrative services, or staff, interpret this to mean managerial responsibilities commensurate with command.

SECTION III PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

Considering only officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, rate the officer on performance of his duty assignment. Read all descriptions and place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
7. Excels any other officer I know in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
6. Outstanding performance of this duty found in very few officers	☒	☒
5. Very fine performance of such a nature that this officer is a distinct asset to the service.	☐	☐
4. Performs this duty in a competent, dependable manner.	☐	☐
3. Performs this duty acceptably.	☐	☐
2. Barely adequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
1. Inadequate in performance of this duty	☐	☐

SECTION IV PROMOTION POTENTIAL

Considering officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, what is your opinion of this officer's promotion potential? Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
6. One of the few exceptional officers who should be considered for more rapid promotion than his contemporaries.	☐	☐
5. Should give an outstanding performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☒	☒
4. Should give a competent and dependable performance when promoted to next higher grade	☐	☐
3. Should give a fairly adequate performance of duty when promoted to next higher grade	☐	☐
2. Has not yet demonstrated potential for promotion to next higher grade. Needs more time in present grade.	☐	☐
1. Has reached the highest grade level at which satisfactory performance should be expected. Should not be promoted.	☐	☐

SECTION V OVER-ALL VALUE

What is your estimate of the rated officer's over-all value to the service? Compare him with officer's of the same grade, branch, and about the same time in grade. Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
8. The most outstanding officer I know	☐	☐
7. One of the few highly outstanding officers I know.	☒	☒
6. A very fine officer who is a great asset to the service.	☐	☐
5. A competent, dependable officer of distinct value to the service.	☐	☐
4. A typically effective officer.	☐	☐
3. An acceptable officer whose value is limited in some respects.	☐	☐
2. An officer who performs acceptably in a limited range of assignments but who could easily be replaced.	☐	☐
1. An officer who is not of the caliber that one should reasonably expect in an officer	☐	☐

SECRET

13 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION

SUBJECT : Major Lucien E. CONEIN

Major Lucien E. CONEIN is released by this Division for return to his parent military service effective 15 October 1956. Major CONEIN plans to take military leave from 18 August through 30 September 1956. The period 1-15 October will be occupied with operational debriefings and final clearance processing.

ALFRED C. ULMER,
Chief, Far East Division

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL, CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Major Lucien E. CONEIN

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 Nov. 1919

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 4 May 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED.
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Reassignment

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: JUL 29 1956

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Ops Officer PP BFF-2100	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	R IO (FI) BFF-2775
Major, USA	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	Major, USA
DDP/FE Branch 4 - Indochina Saigon Military Station Field Team "B"	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 4 - Vietnam Saigon Military Station CI/FI Section
Saigon Vietnam	11. HEADQUARTERS	Saigon, Vietnam
☐ FIELD XX ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD XX ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

DI

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

T/O change - no change in supervisor

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): [illegible]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): [illegible] 330

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM 6-3725-55-039
TO: Same

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

USED IN LIEU OF SF50 NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS

F. APPROVED BY

14-00000

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR AWARD

(REGULATIONS 4-20-635 & AFR 20-535)

		DATE 19 July 19[illegible]
TO: Honor Awards Board	THROUGH: DCI	FROM: Chief of Station, Saigon (Militar

SECTION I — PERSONAL DATA

NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last) (First) (Middle) CONEIN, Lucien E.	POSITION TITLE Paramilitary Officer	GRADE Major, USAR
OFFICE ASSIGNED TO DDP/FE-[illegible]	STATION ☐ Headquarters ☒ Field (Specify location) Saigon, Vietnam	
LEGAL RESIDENCE (number, street, city, zone, state) 1925 E. Tenth St., Kansas City, Kansas	CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED U.S. (Naturalized)	

IF ANY OF THE ABOVE ITEMS WERE DIFFERENT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDED AT THE TIME OF THE ACT OR SERVICE, INDICATE SUCH DIFFERENCES.
NA

RECOMMENDED AWARD Distinguished Intelligence Medal	POSTHUMOUS ☐ Yes ☒ No

NAME OF NEXT OF KIN Carmen CONEIN	RELATIONSHIP Wife	ADDRESS (number, street, city, zone, state) 1517 [illegible] St., Falls Church, Va.

IF PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS WERE SUBMITTED FOR THIS ACT OR SERVICE, INDICATE TYPE OF AWARD RECOMMENDED, BY WHOM, DATE, ORIGINATING OFFICE, AND ACTION TAKEN.
NA

SECTION II — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION

WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT? ☐ Yes ☐ No

IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OR CERTIFICATES OF EYEWITNESSES OR INDIVIDUAL HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

FULL NAME	POSITION TITLE	GRADE	OFFICE ASSIGNED TO

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

FULL NAME	TYPE OF AWARD

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED.

LOCATION	INCLUSIVE DATES	TIME OF DAY

PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

SECTION III — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE

OFFICE, COMPONENT, [illegible] (location)

INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED	ASSIGNMENT [illegible]	NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ Yes ☐ No

FORM NO. 37-173
SEP 1953

JCI file

SECTION IV	TO BE USED FOR ALL RECOMMENDATIONS
NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ☐ DEED (OR ACT) ☐ ACHIEVEMENT PERFORMED (OR SERVICE RENDERED)	

AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION: WAS ACT VOLUNTARY? DESCRIBE WHY ACT WAS OUTSTANDING AND IF IT WAS MORE THAN NORMALLY EXPECTED. EXPLAIN RISK. IF IN AERIAL FLIGHT, DESCRIBE TYPE AND POSITION OF AIRPLANE, CREW POSITION OF INDIVIDUAL, AND ALL UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES. INDICATE RESULTS OF ACT.

AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE: TITLE AND DUTIES OF ASSIGNMENT, INCLUDING CHARACTER OF SERVICE DURING PERIOD FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED (GIVE COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF TECHNICAL OR SPECIALIZED POSITIONS, INCLUDING DATES OF ASSIGNMENT AND SERVICE). WHAT DID THE INDIVIDUAL DO THAT MERITS THE AWARD? WHY WAS THIS OUTSTANDING WHEN COMPARED TO OTHERS OF LIKE GRADE AND EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR POSITIONS? INDICATE RESULTS OF ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE.

See attachment

RELATIONSHIP (POSITION) OF PERSON INITIATING RECOMMENDATION TO PERSON BEING RECOMMENDED [illegible]	NAME, POSITION TITLE, AND GRADE OF PERSON MAKING RECOMMENDATION [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
LIST OF INCLOSURES (Include proposed citation) 1. Narrative Description	SIGNATURE
	DATE

15 June 1956

LUCIEN CONEIN

1. Served with the Saigon Military Mission from 1 July 1954 to 20 April 1955; although he has served in Saigon at another station from September 1955 to date, he has voluntarily supported SMM activities in his spare time. Conein's major duties have been in the paramilitary field, with contributions and support to a wide variety of other activities

2. In July and early August 1954, Conein served as assistant to the Chief of SMM. As such, he helped in making contact with Vietnamese political underground groups in Tonkin and Cochin China, assisted in the initial survey of the Vietnamese resistance potential in Tonkin, aided in SMM political efforts to stop the assassination of French military by Vietnamese revolutionaries and participated in developing SMM's contacts with the Vietnamese government.

3. In August 1954, additional paramilitary personnel reported for duty with SMM and it was decided to place a separate SMM team in Tonkin to attempt to recruit, train, and place Vietnamese stay-behind forces there prior to the turn-over of the area to the Communist Vietminh under the Geneva Agreement deadline. [illegible] sabotage targets were [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] credit on Conein's ability. Two complete stay-behind organizations were in place when the Vietminh took over the North, despite the [illegible] of [illegible] and Vietnamese [illegible] in the [illegible] of [illegible], Tonkin. Important sabotage, within U.S. imposed limits, was successfully carried out.

4. One stay-behind organization was developed by Conein personally. This team successfully cached adequate operational equipment in Tonkin, recruited secretly exfiltrated, supervised overseas training, and secretly infiltrated the stay-behind organization into Tonkin successfully prior to the last phase of the Vietminh take-over of Haiphong occurring [illegible] April 1955. All equipment was in place, for future use, by 14 January 1955, which was no small feat of [illegible], since it had to be done under the increasing surveillance of Vietminh [illegible] security forces who [illegible] into [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] in the final days. Covert infiltration of personnel was accomplished over a [illegible]-day period in March 1955.

5. Sabotage efforts included the contamination of the oil supply of the [illegible] Bus Company and of coal used by the Tonkin rail-road. Both contaminants were [illegible] in Japan by the technical [illegible] which were [illegible] into Tonkin by SMM. Contamination had to be accomplished at the last minute, to insure that it would damage the Vietminh rather than French commercial interests. The

Bus Company was accomplished with the witting help of its French manager, whose friendship was developed by Conein; the coal operation was a unilateral operation by SMM.

6. The oil contamination took place just prior to the Vietminh takeover of Hanoi on 9 October 1954. Conein, assisted by Frank Carvers, gained entry to stored drums of the Bus Company's lubricating oil, opened the drums, and started pouring in the contaminant. Fumes from the contaminant overcame them in the enclosed storage space. Upon reviving, the two placed handkerchiefs over their faces and completed the task.

7. Surveys and plans also were made for other sabotage missions, which were later cancelled by U.S. decisions. The team was in place and capable of carrying out the missions.

8. On 11 January 1955, SMM had so multiple and complex a mission that personnel were reorganized into separate teams by operational duties rather than by geography. Conein was appointed Chief of the White Team, which was responsible for all paramilitary and support operations. The latter included a skilled smuggling operation which successfully eluded Vietminh security agents and the International Commission (Poles, Indians, Canadians). Conein's close friendship with the French Foreign Legion and with Corsican underworld elements was of assistance.

9. In April 1955, Corsican contacts started developing a liaison between SMM and the Binh Xuyen (police, opium, prostitution, and gambling) through Conein. This was a delicate operation, since another covert liaison was being [illegible] with the [illegible] or French [illegible] between the Vietnamese National Army and the Binh Xuyen. It was a [illegible] game, since the Chief of SMM had been [illegible] the Binh Xuyen [illegible] publicly by the Binh Xuyen and Conein's connections were known by them. After several cloak-and-dagger contacts, in which negotiations progressed towards a covert solution of the Binh Xuyen problem, the final contact was broken on [illegible] April by orders of the chief, SMM. Conein was at the contact point when open fighting broke out in Saigon in the afternoon; it was feared that Conein would be taken and held as a hostage. (During the fighting an American [illegible] in a [illegible] commercial aircraft was shot down by the Binh Xuyen, who [illegible] his death as an agent of the chief of SMM - his close social friendship with Conein was the only connection; SMM's [illegible], the Chief of Staff of the Binh Xuyen, [illegible] on the floor of a taxi, [illegible] from a beating, after he had arranged the defection of his [illegible] battalion finally fought its way through the Binh Xuyen and joined the National Army; these side [illegible] are [illegible] only to [illegible] the [illegible] Conein ran as a member of SMM in dealing with the Binh Xuyen; SMM psychological action against the Binh Xuyen remained [illegible] by them).

10. Conein's practical solutions to problems, great resourcefulness, skill and knowledge of equipment as well as all phases of paramilitary operations, contributed materially to the success of the Saigon Military Mission in advancing U.S. objectives. Conein is a good, strong right-hand man in a tight spot and proved it in a number of tense situations during this assignment.

EDWARD G. LANSDALE
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Saigon Military Mission

SECRET

26 June 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION

SUBJECT : Request for Orders -
Major Lucien E. CONEIN

REFERENCE : IN 33577, dated 22 June 1956

1. It is requested that cover military orders assigning Major Lucien E. Conein to MAAG, Vietnam TDY be amended to include the period from October 1955 to 24 July 1956. The amended orders should also authorize Major Conein to proceed from Saigon to Washington o/a 24 July 1956 via Paris, Frankfurt, and Geneva. Subject will report to Washington 1 August.

2. It is further requested that these orders be sent registered airmail to subject at the following address:

MAAG Box "S"
APO 74
San Francisco, Calif.

ALFRED C. ULMER, JR.
Chief, Far East Division

24 May 56.

Lucien E. Conein

Date of Rank: 27 Dec 50 (Promoted to major in inactive reserve effective 17 June 47).

As of 20 May 56 Army considering 26 Oct 50 dates for LTC. No promotions yet but due momentarily. No 5% for CIA. DA Controlled. Conein probably be considered after May 57.

Above per
LTC R.W. Allison
C/MPD/Personnel
Branch.

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO

LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION FOR [redacted]

Reference is made to your Letter of Authorization, effective ~~27 October~~ 12 APRIL ~~1955~~ 1956, which defines your relationship with the United States Government while you are on detail to this organization.

Effective 27 October 1955, said Letter is amended by adding subparagraph three (3) (c) which reads as follows:

> "(c) It is anticipated that by virtue of your duties on this particular mission, you will be required to fulfill the minimum Department of the Army requirements necessary for the receipt of extra-hazardous duty pay. If such extra-hazardous duty payments are not made to you by the Army, you will receive from the Government the sum of $110.00 per month in lieu of an identical amount you would have received for such extra-hazardous duty had you been on overt military duty abroad. You will be required to certify to the Government that you have actually fulfilled such requirements. If, upon completion of this present assignment, you have received one or more such monthly payments for which you have not fulfilled said monthly minimum requirements, you will return such payments to the Government. You will be required to pay income taxes on this amount."

All other terms and conditions of the Letter remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

REVIEWED:

SECRET

SECRET

LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION FOR [redacted] (S)

12 APRIL 1956

EFFECTIVE ~~27 October~~ 1955

1. Your parent military service has detailed you to another Governmental organization (hereinafter called "this organization") and considers you permanently assigned to Washington, D. C., for temporary duty abroad for an indeterminate period. In recognition of the special mission to which you have been assigned, it is hereby agreed that the following rights, restrictions and obligations will be in force during the period you are performing this particular mission for this organization.

2. You will be required to keep forever secret this Letter and all information which you may obtain in the course of your association with this organization (unless released in writing by this organization from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

3. It is specifically understood and agreed that you are a member of the Armed Forces of the United States and that you are entitled to retain from either the United States Army or this organization, only the military salary, allowances and other benefits which are commensurate with your military grade and post of assignment. You will continue to receive from the United States Army the base pay and longevity applicable to a married officer of your rank and length of service. Due to the cover and security considerations involved, you may be precluded from receiving certain of your military entitlements from your parent military service and upon appropriate certification thereto, this organization shall make such payments directly to you, as follows:

(a) In accordance with the Joint Travel Regulations, any overseas military station allowance authorized for your post of assignment (for Viet-nam the present per diem rate $2.20 for subsistence and $[illegible] for quarters, without dependents). If you are furnished quarters, you will not be entitled to receive the rental portion of the overseas military station allowances.

(b) Effective 1 March 1956, if applicable, a military family separation allowance in conformance with paragraph 4304 of the Joint Travel Regulations (presently $1.15 per day). It is to be noted that this allowance is not payable for any period Government quarters are available to you.

If this organization makes the above payments, you will receive from your parent military service the allowances applicable to a married officer of your rank permanently assigned to Washington, D. C. However, if during your overseas assignment with this organization, you and/or your dependents are furnished quarters, certification of that fact must be made to your parent military service, and you will be required to certify every six (6) months to this organization that you have not received your basic quarters allowance from your parent military service. If this organization does not make the above payments, you will receive from your parent military service the allowances applicable to the designated unit to which you will be assigned.

SECRET

4. If, as a direct result of your detail to this organization, you are precluded from utilizing available military travel, transportation or storage facilities, this organization will advance or reimburse you funds to insure that you are not deprived of your military entitlements as set forth and limited in the Joint Travel Regulations and the regulations of your parent military service. Therefore, authority is hereby granted to advance or reimburse you funds for the following expenses:

(a) Personal Travel. Travel expenses incurred by you (as defined in the Joint Travel Regulations) between permanent posts of duty. Such expenses shall be either the actual cost of transportation (as directed by this organization) and military per diem or the applicable mileage allowance as set forth in the Joint Travel Regulations, in conformance with the criteria established therein.

(b) Personal Baggage. Transportation (including priority baggage by surface transportation) and related expenses incurred in the course of permanent change of station and temporary duty travel, subject to the limitations set forth in applicable regulations of your parent military service and the Joint Travel Regulations, provided that if air travel is authorized and performed for permanent change of station travel, you will be entitled to ship unaccompanied 100 pounds of such baggage by air.

(c) Temporary Duty. Travel expenses incurred by you for authorized temporary duty travel. In addition to military per diem and in lieu of transportation, you may be reimbursed the applicable mileage allowance as set forth in the Joint Travel Regulations in conformance with the criteria established therein. You will be paid per diem in accordance with the Joint Travel Regulations.

All travel and transportation performed hereunder must be directed by appropriate authorities. Expenses payable by this organization hereunder are explicitly limited in kind and quantity to those expressly authorized above. Accounting and payment therefor will be made to and by this organization under applicable regulations.

5. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by this organization. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with the regulations of this organization.

6. You will be entitled to leave in accordance with the policies of your parent military service. Upon the completion of your present assignment, you will be required to certify to your parent military service the number of days annual leave you have taken during your assignment with this organization.

7. If in the performance of services under this Letter you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the United States Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by this organization to evidence this relationship.

SECRET

8. The conditions of this Authorization are predicated upon the assumption that you will be assigned to Viet-Nam under nominal military cover, and that you will continue under such cover for the duration of your overseas assignment with this organization. Any deviations from these facts will require a new Letter of Authorization or amendment thereto.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACKNOWLEDGED:

[redacted]

REVIEWED:

Caw
Chief, Military Personnel Division

SECRET

SECRET

10 April 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CONEIN, Lucien - Major

On 27 June 1955, Major Conein returned to Washington, D. C., after serving one year PCS at Saigon, Vietnam, where he was with the Saigon Military Mission under MAAG cover as Major, U.S.Army. Upon Major Conein's return it was decided that since no replacement had been found for him it would be necessary for him to return to Saigon under the same cover arrangements he used for his PCS, for a period of TDY. Major Conein was informed by CFE/4/Support and VN/Support Officer that CIA travel orders were being prepared authorizing him only 90 days TDY in Saigon. These orders were signed by C.V.Hulick, DDP/EXO, CFE, LCB, MPD, FE/CFI, CFI, and FE/BF. At the conclusion of the 90 days TDY no replacement had been found for Major Conein and he remained in Saigon. No amendment to his travel order was submitted however, no extension by cable from Headquarters was sent to indicate that Major Conein was either TDY or PCS.

Upon checking with MPD it was found that Major Conein, if he remained in the field for even one year's TDY, would receive the maximum per diem rate as prescribed by FTR's ($20 per day less 1/5 for quarters which were being furnished) and that this per diem rate could not be reduced. ACFE/4, ACFE/4/VN, and VN/Support Officer discussed the entire case and since Major Conein had been informed prior to his departure that he would remain in Saigon on TDY for 90 days only, a Form-52 was submitted reassinging Major Conein to a PCS status in Sagon, Vietnam effective 27 October 1955 (90 days after his TDY started). An amendment to the original travel order was submitted to show the change from TDY to PCS effective 27 Oct.

Major Conein has been informed of the fact that he was made PCS effective 27 Oct. 1955, per DIR , dated .

Bryna K. Nadler, FE/4/Support/VN

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible]

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Major Lucien E. Conein

2. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] Nov. [illegible]

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 8 April 1956

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 27 OCT 55
B. APPROVED: ~~[illegible]~~ 6 Nov 55

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops Officer BPT-2160 [illegible], USA	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer (PP) BPT-2100 [illegible], USA
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	
DDP FE Branch 4 - Indochina Vietnam - Haiphong Base	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 4 - Indochina Saigon Military Station Field Team E
Haiphong, Vietnam	11. HEADQUARTERS	Saigon, Vietnam
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL SD/PP

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

*Subject cont'd PCS Saigon on 27 Oct 55 (was TDY for 90 days prior to this date)
REQUEST EFFECTIVE DATE BE 27 OCTOBER 1955.

To be corrected 6 Nov 56

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): [illegible]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY:
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE | WWII | OTHER | 5 PT | 10 POINT DISAD | OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I A | REAL

[illegible]

15. SEX: [illegible]

16. RACE:

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: [illegible]
TO: [illegible]

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

27

16—37399-8

SECRET

16 SEP 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation - Major Lucien E. Conein

1. Request that the attached letter from the Secretary of the General Staff, with letter of commendation attached, be forwarded through official channels to Major Lucien E. Conein.

2. It will be noted that General Westmoreland has sent a copy of General Cabell's letter of commendation both to Major Conein's official 201 file and to his career branch, where it will be incorporated with his efficiency reports for consideration in selection for promotion or schooling.

3. This commendation in his official records should be of considerable assistance to Major Conein in his military career and we take pleasure in forwarding it to him.

J. A. [illegible]
Colonel, AGC
Chief, Military Personnel Division

Attachment - Ltr from Sec of GS
dtd 11 Sep 55.

Ltr to S/A from
Lt Gen Cabell, dtd
27 Aug 55.

SECRET

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~FVL~~ [illegible]

R1
18 Aug

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Senior Representative, Indochina

DATE

FROM Chief, FE

SUBJECT GENERAL Administrative - Personnel
SPECIFIC Assignment of [redacted] and VILLIERS

REF: a. SAIG 2922
b. DIR 49205

1. Headquarters appreciates SLADE's reply to Ref b, and will make it a matter for the record. For SLADE's (and VILLIER's) information [redacted] has, in the course of his duties in Europe, come to the attention of the French, probably including the UNION organization. Naturally, his former KUTWIN record is well-known to UNION and he is personally acquainted, we have since learned, with TUTOR himself.

2. Headquarters appreciates, too, the probable reaction of TUTOR to the advent in the Indochina scene of VILLIERS, [redacted] and possibly other with similar histories. This is unavoidable and unfortunate; however, under the circumstances Headquarters considers their assignment a necessary risk.

3. In a [illegible] of the [illegible] it can [illegible] firmly stated that, in the case of [redacted] -- yes, he was assigned to KUBARK by ODIBEX as a reserve officer on extended active duty. Further [redacted] actually had been released back to ODIBEX, and had already been reassigned by ODIBEX. As this dispatch is being written, those ODIBEX orders are in process of being rescinded and new orders are being initiated assigning [redacted] to [illegible].

4. In the case of VILLIERS, whose orders have just been received transferring him to Saigon, if indeed his previous KUBARK connection is known to TUTOR, it can only be stated that he, too, has been released back to ODUNIT, at their or ODEARL's request, in response to their urgent need for an experienced senior officer with his qualifications for a special mission in Indochina.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

5. This movement of personnel from one agency to another is by no means an unheard-of thing. As you are aware, as in the case of French service officers assigned to the to the TUTOR ORG, so are selected military personnel assigned to KUBARK. Very recently two senior ODIBEX officers on the KUHOOK Senior Staff were released at ODIBEX request by KUBARK and subsequently transferred to ODTOWN, Thailand, with no further KUBARK connection.

6. In spite of sincere protestations and denials on your part, we realize of course that at least some bit of suspicion will linger on in TUTOR's mind and that these suspicions will not be allayed by even the most circumspect of routine contacts between persons in VILLIER's group and members of the SIM Staff. Such contacts are bound to occur, particularly if the VILLIERS group does indeed succeed in getting an HTARCADE program of any sort in motion. However, as we have stated, this is an accepted risk, and we have to play the game out, even though we cannot assess the possible damage to the SIM liaison.

William H. Dyer
CHARLES F. WYNNICK

For the record, now!

6 July 1954

15 May 1954

Distribution:
Addressee - Orig & 2

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: 3 August 1955

NAME: Lucien E. Conein (Major)

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION:
☐ PROMOTION ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ OTHER (Explain)
☐ ROTATION ☐ TRAVEL

FROM: Area Ops Off FE/Saigon, Major

TO: Area Ops Off FE/Haiphong Maj.

EOD

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN
	BASIC ORIENT. ALSO BIC. BITC. SOC. BIP. PH I			AIR OPS. 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. M & T ALSO OC. PH II	August 51		MAR. OPS 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. OPS. ALSO AIC. AITC. AOC. CAI PH III	September 51		CL. [illegible] FLD. ACT. 1 2 3 4 5 6	
	[illegible] OPS ALSO PM. I-II-III PAFT			SUPP. PAL 1 2 3 4 5 6	
Z	CLAND. SERV. REV			BASIC PHOTO	
Z	WORLD COMMUNISM			DOC. [illegible]ATION	
	ADV. COMM. OPS.			LOCKS	
	ADMIN PROCEDURES			SECRET WRITING	
	OPS. SUPPORT			FLAPS & SEALS	
	TRADECRAFT PHASE			SMALL ARMS FAM.	
	ADMIN PHASE			OTHER TRAINING	
	REPORTS			OIC	September 51
	ORDER OF BATTLE		x	MIG	
Z	COUNTERESPIONAGE				
	ADV. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE				
	OPS. SECURITY				
	[illegible]				
	[illegible]				
	[illegible] OPS.				
	TECH. [illegible]				
	[illegible] TECH				
	[illegible]				
	[illegible] OPS				
	INTEL. TECH. ALSO [illegible] TECH.				
	[illegible] REFRESHER				
	[illegible] IMPROVE.				
	[illegible]				
	[illegible] MGMT			PRE-TEST	
	[illegible]			[illegible]	

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.
2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

TRAINING OFFICER COMMENTS:

☐ A. THIS DOES (NOT) MEET TRAINING STANDARDS OF QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.
☐ NO FURTHER TRAINING RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN "S". THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY BASIC QUALIFYING STANDARDS.

☐ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE
☐ QUALIFYING ☒ REFRESHER [illegible]
TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT
☐ SOONEST
☒ UPON RETURN TO HQ.

☒ D. WAIVER AND CC. SHOULD BE REQUESTED FOR THOSE COURSES MARKED WITH A "W".

☐ E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING WERE MADE ________ (DATE). THESE RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MET.

DIVISION TRAINING OFFICER

STAFF TRAINING OFFICER
[illegible] C. [illegible], C/[illegible]/ER

TO: Personnel Officer,

FROM: Career Management Officer

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 427 [illegible]

SECRET

276

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

TU SPUN-A

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
2	VN/[illegible]	5	[illegible]
3	VN/[illegible]	6	PM-PP

DATE : 29 JUL 55

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAIGON

JUL 30 1955

ACTION: FE 7

INFO : FI/RI 2, SSA, FD 3, OL/TD 2, OP 2, S/C 2

CFE/4/VN

VN/FP

VN/PM

VN/FI

SAIG 7807 (IN 30141) 1657Z 29 JUL 55 ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: SAIG

TUSPUN ADMIN

FE/4/S

[redacted] ARRIVED SAIG 29 JULY 55.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

304

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Tuspun/1 VS

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	5	[illegible]
3	Smiley	6	PP

DATE : 19 JUNE 1955

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAIGON

ACTION: FE 7

JUN 20 1955

INFO : FI/ADMIN, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, SSA, FD 4, OL/TD 2, OP 3, S/C 2

C/VN
PM
PP
FE/4/S

SAIG 7344 (IN 15400) 0308Z 20 JUN '55 ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR CITE: SAIG

TUSPUN MILPERS

1. [redacted] DEPARTED SAIG FOR WASH 19 JUNE.

2. DELOE RETURNED SAIG 17 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

Concur

201

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER 1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

U N V O U C H E R E D

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Major Lucien E. CONEIN	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Nov. 1919	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 1 Dec. 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: JAN 2 1955	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
BFY-839 Area Ops. Officer Major USA DDP/FE Branch 4 Saigon Liaison Mission Saigon, Indochina ☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY 10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 11. HEADQUARTERS 12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	(PP) Area Ops. Officer BFY-2078 Major USA DDP/FE Branch 4 - Indochina Saigon Military Mission Office of the Chief Ops Staff Saigon, Indochina ☐ FIELD XX ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

No fitness report necessary as subject's supervisor remains the same.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL

Signature

Title

13. VETERANS PREFERENCE							14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION				
NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER		NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION FROM TO: 5-3789-55-039	18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL OR POS CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

J. A. LUS
Col, AGS

SECRET Conein

LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION FOR [redacted] (P)

1. *Effective* [illegible] 1954, this Letter of Authorization will define your relationship with the United States Government while you are on detail from the United States Army to another Governmental organization (hereinafter called "this organization").

2. In recognition of the special mission to which you have been assigned, it is hereby agreed that the following rights, restrictions, and obligations will be in force during the period you are performing this particular mission for this organization:

(a) It is specifically understood and agreed that you are a member of the Armed Forces of the United States and that you are entitled to retain from either the U. S. Army or this organization, only the salary, allowances and other benefits which are commensurate with your military grade and post of assignment.

(b) As you will be assigned by the United States Army on bona fide military PCS orders to Indo-China, you will receive from your parent military service your base pay and longevity, and the allowances applicable to the designated unit to which you will be assigned.

(c) It is contemplated that you may be furnished transportation to and from your permanent post of duty overseas by your parent military service. In the event that such transportation is not so furnished, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds by this organization for said travel and transportation expenses and for authorized travel within your operational area. You will be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of this travel in accordance with applicable Government civilian travel regulations. All travel, transportation and per diem provided you under this paragraph by this organization must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with the regulations of this organization.

(d) In conformance with the Joint Travel Regulations, this organization will advance or reimburse you funds for the travel and transportation expenses of your dependents and your household effects from your present area of assignment to any place in the United States which you may designate. If authority is granted for your dependents to join you at your permanent post of duty overseas, this organization will advance or reimburse you funds for the travel and transportation expenses of your dependents and your household effects subject to the emergency restrictions of your parent military service; from the place so designated by you to your permanent post of duty overseas, and, upon completion of your assignment with this organisation, from your permanent post of duty overseas to Washington, D. C. Your dependents will be entitled to per diem in the course of such overseas travel in accordance with applicable Government civilian travel regulations. The expenses incurred in the movement of your dependents and your household effects from said designated place in the United States to your permanent post of duty overseas shall include transportation as indicated above and storage of such household effects as are not moved, provided that the total amount of household effects moved plus the total amount of household effects stored shall not exceed the total weight allowance prescribed (by the Joint Travel Regulations) for a major in the U. S. Army. All travel transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with the organization's regulations and, where applicable, the Joint Travel Regulations.

(e) You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by this organization. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with the regulations of this organization.

(f) It is anticipated that by virtue of your duties on this particular assignment for this organization you may be required to fulfill the minimum Department of the Army requirements necessary for the receipt of extra-hazardous duty pay (demolition pay). If such requirements are met and proper certification is made thereto, and if for security or operational reasons such payments cannot be made to you by your parent military organization, then, this organization will pay to you the sum of $100.00 per month in lieu of an identical amount you would have received from the United States Army had you been on overt military duty abroad. Your mission chief, or a responsible senior mission official will be required to certify to this organization that the handling and exploding of demolitions is a requirement of your duty with this organization, that you have fulfilled the minimum Department of the Army regulations necessary for the receipt of such extra-hazardous duty pay, and that no payment therefor has been received by you from your parent military service.

(g) You will be entitled to leave in accordance with the policies of your parent military service. Upon the completion of your present assignment, you will be required to certify to your parent military service the number of days annual leave you have taken during your assignment with this organization.

(h) If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by this organization to evidence this relationship.

3. You will be required to keep forever secret this Letter and all information which you may obtain in the course of your association with this organization (unless released in writing by this organization from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

SECRET

4. The conditions of this authorization are predicated upon the assumption that you will be assigned to Saigon, Indo-China under bona fide military cover, and that you will continue under such cover for the duration of your overseas assignment with this organization. Any deviation from those facts will require a new Letter of Authorization or amendment thereto.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

ACKNOWLEDGED:

[redacted]

REVIEWED:

____
Chief of Military Personnel

SECRET

C/SE SE/1

11 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John H. Richardson

FROM: Major Lucien E. Conein

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter I am forwarding to Dick Helms. The letter in itself is self-explanatory.

I want you to know that my decision is in no way intended to reflect on you or the SE Division.

Lucien Conein

Attachment.

11 December 1953

Dear Dick,

You will recall that it was my intention in 1951 to civilianise and assume a staff position upon my return from Germany. Since my return last August, however, I have decided to return to the Army and, accordingly, I signed a statement of category to this effect on 1 December 1953.

This decision is in no way a reflection on you or members of your staff but rather recognition that I cannot afford to civilianize due to my personal obligations. I intend to inform John Richardson of my action at the same time you receive this letter.

Since I am at present holding a slot, I think it is only fair to all concerned to have it filled by a qualified person before my departure.

I want to thank you and Gordon for the trust you have given me in the past. You may rest assured that I will always be glad to be of service to the Agency in the military if the need should ever arise.

Yours truly,

Geographic Area Knoledge:

	Country or Region	General or Specialist(Specify)	How Knoledge was acquired	When Acquired
1	France [illegible]	Military	OSS WWII	1944-45
2	Indo China - Viet Nam	Mil - Pol	OSS - CIA	1945 [illegible] 58
3	Germany Iran	[illegible]	SSU - CIA US Army ACSI	1946-53 [illegible] 61

Language Ability: Competence(R-Read;W-Write;S-Speak) How Acquired(Reside, Native,Contact,Study)

	Language	Native	Fluent	Research	Travel	Limited	How Acquired(Reside, Native,Contact,Study)
1	French		S.R.W.				Native
2							
3							

Employment History(Major Time Periods Only)

	Employer or Firm	Location	Job Description or Duties	Inclusive Dates
1	[illegible]		[illegible] Press Man, Type Setting	1935-1940
2				
3				
4				
5				

Martial Status Married (Divorced [illegible]) Date of Marrage 22 Mar [illegible] Place of Marrage Dillon, S.C.

	Dependents Name	Date of Birth	Relationship	Citizenship	Present Address
1	Elystie R	1 Sept 21	Wife	USA (NAT)	
2	Laurent P	11 Apr 55	Son	USA	
3	Phillippe	16 Nov 59	Son	USA	
4	Divorced Monique Pierre Veber Dec 47, Paris, France				
5	Divorced Carmen [illegible], 26 Mar 57 Wyandotte County, Kansas				
6	Charles M Conein	30 Mar 50	Son	USA	4854 [illegible] Alex, VA.
7					

Permanent Address & Phone 1905 N 10th St Kansas City, Kansas

Alternate Address & Phone Mrs Estelle Conein 150 Monterey St. [illegible] Calif - [illegible]

Name (P) SCHWICKRATH, ARTHER R True Name CONEIN, LUCIEN E.

Special Qualifications(Pilot, Code radio operator, SCUBA Diver, etc.)

	Skill or Hobby	Proficiency		Skill or Hobby	Proficiency
1	Free Fall Parat	Good	2		
3			4		

Operational or Combat Experience (W.W.II, Korea, Laos, Viet Nam, Other)

	Theater, Region, or Country	Time period	Assignments or Duties (Plat Ldr; Case Off; etc)
1	France [illegible]	WW II 44-45	[illegible]
2	Germany	1945 [illegible]	[illegible]
3	Viet Nam	[illegible]	[illegible]

Military Service: Component US Army Branch [illegible] Date entry on Active Duty 22 Sept 41

Total Period Active Duty 20 years Rank when separated Lt Col Current Status Retired

Major Military Schools attended / Major Military Assignments

	Type School & Name & Length	Date Completed		Duties(orPosition) & Time Period	Country
1	OCS Ft Benning (4 Mo)	Jul 43	1	Detailed OSS [illegible]	[illegible]
2	Special Warfare (6 week)	Dec 56	2	Special Forces [illegible]	USA
3			3	Mil. Liaison - ACSI Sept 59 - Oct 61	Iran
4			4		

Agency Service: Date entry active duty Sept 61 Type employment [illegible] Agent - [illegible]

Agency Training / Agency Assignments

	Type Training	Period	Date completed		Duties	Time Period	Country(s)
1	FI Ops		Oct 53	1	PM & FI Ops	1946 - 1953	Germany
2	[illegible]	[illegible]	Aug & Sept [illegible]	2	[illegible]	[illegible] 55	Viet Nam
3				3	PM	[illegible]	[illegible]
4				4			
5				5			

Education: Highest level & date attained 22 [illegible] Citizenship U.S. Nat. [illegible]

Date of Birth 29 Nov 19 Place of Birth Paris, France

Date Available for re-assignment Special Clearances [illegible]

Name (P) SCHWICKRATH, ARTHER R. Current Assignment [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Concin, Lucien E.
3. SEX: M
4. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 Nov 1919
5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE:
6. MARITAL STATUS: Married
7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee): NO. 4 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 29,50,58,59
8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): SPOUSE
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS: MEMBERSHIP: OTHER STATUS: contract nt
10. LAST MED. RPT.: QUAL. FOR: EVAL. FOR:
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NONE SERVICE GRADE ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1 RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2 TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3 RETIRED
12. ASSESSMENT DATE:
13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE:
14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE:

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

Sep 1941-Sep 1961, U.S. Army, Lt. Col. Retirement mili
1943-1956, Military detail to CIA

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

High School, did not graduate
1949-53, Univ of Maryland, 77 sem hours

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): French - fluent

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1951 - Operations training

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Nov 1961	Career agent PMOPS	13		DDP/SOD	Hqs
Jan 1962	" " "	13		DDP/FE	Saigon
Apr 1963	" " "	14		" "	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: Dec 1966
21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: SOD/Pers/MTC
22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Conein, Lucien E.

DOB: 29 November 1919
Married: Three sons, born 1950, 1958, 1959
Naturalized U.S. Citizen, 11 Aug 1942 (Formerly French Citizen)

EOD: 12 November 1961

Current Reserve Status: U.S. Army Retired Reserves

Non-CIA Employment:
1935-1940 - Printing, Pressman and Typesetter, F.R. Buckley
Sept 1941 - Sept 1961 - U.S. Army, Lt./Col., Infantry

Non-CIA Education and Training
Mar-April 1943 - OCS, Ft. Benning, Ga.
Nov 1943 - Mar 1944 - British Airborne School
1949-1953 - University of Maryland, Mil. Science 77 Sem/hrs.
1956 - Special Warfare School, Ft. Bragg, N.C.

Foreign Languages:
French-Fluent-Native of Country

Agency Sponsored Training:
Paramilitary Training

CIA Employment:
July 43-Dec 1945 - OSS-Special Mission to France and Indochina
Jan 46-Jan 1951 - CIA Mission to Germany
Nov 51-May 1952 - CIA-Chief of Nuernberg Operations Base
1954-1956 - Detailed to CIA-Saigon Military Mission
12 Nov 1961 - EOD as Career Agent
19 Mar 1963 - Promoted to GS-14 step two equivalent

Special Qualifications:
Served as Military Liaison to J-2 SCS, Iranian Army 1959-1961

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Bustos-Videla, C. Z.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 14 Feb 1950 – 16 JAN 1978

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: Office of Personnel

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

BUSTOSVIDELA C Z
SSN 069-24-3136
01/17/29

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 31 July 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Bustos-Videla, C~~harlotte~~ Z.			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 08 DAY 03 YEAR 73		5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	
6. FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 4235-4525 0000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH Division FI Staff		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS Officer (13)		12. POSITION NUMBER 0640	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 7	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 23642	

G 32

18. REMARKS

Home Base: WH

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL H. L. Berthold C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 31 Jul 73	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 8-2-73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR.
39	10	51100	WH	75013		1	01 12 29		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	1—WAIVED 2—REG 3—REG/OPT 4—INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
[illegible] 8-3-73 [illegible] 1973		8.6.73

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]-0312

E2 IMPDET

(4)

SECRET
EYES ONLY

17 JAN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, GS-13 Evaluation Board

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to GS-14
Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. It is recommended that Charlotte Bustos-Videla be promoted from GS-13 to GS-14.

2. The performance of this officer has been characterized for many years by all of her supervisors as consistently strong to outstanding. She has been able to establish herself as indispensable in each Headquarters Branch or Field Station assignment, usually functioning as the backbone of the unit to which assigned. Since return to Headquarters in September 1972 from her field assignment in Mexico, her performance has been entirely congruent with the thrust of the Field Station's enthusiasm over her ability, performance, attitude and growth potential. She is currently chief of the Cuban and CA Section of her branch, and has established once again her mastery over her assigned duties. She is the kind of sound, dependable, yet imaginative officer greatly appreciated by her supervisors. In short, she is a true professional who performs beyond her grade level.

3. In regard to her potential, she has served in the Agency since 1951, starting as a secretary/stenographer, and advancing brilliantly with each new challenge offered. She achieved professional status in 1953 and has spent the bulk of her time since then specializing in Latin American affairs, demonstrating total flexibility in assignments, a voracious appetite for work and a penchant for exceptionally precise and thorough production. A review of her career to date can lead to the conclusion that she has always risen successfully to each new professional challenge, and is still far from reaching her maximum capacities. While she has had little supervisory experience in the field, her supervisor was of the opinion that she is a "natural leader". This has been borne out in her performance in her current capacity as a Branch Section Chief, in which she has demonstrated exemplary supervisory ability. Notwithstanding her drive, aggressiveness and professional aplomb, she is a popular co-worker, is receptive to guidance and sensitive and responsive to the needs of her subordinates.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

[illegible]

4. This employee has utilized her fluency in the Spanish language to maximum advantage in her work. Formal testing recently confirmed her high proficiency in that language. Coupled with a comprehensive training record and her invaluable experiences over a twenty year period, she has become particularly effective in Latin American operations and operational support, demonstrating excellence in each of several recognized specializations, including CI operations, functional support, reports and requirements, area support and varied covert action activities.

5. The officer's adaptability, high intelligence and mastery over her trade was of inestimable value to Mexico City Station, and over a five year period from 1967 to 1972, she functioned as the Station's internal troubleshooter. Her duties included the maintenance of watchlists, screening of travel documents, processing of raw technical take, target analysis, reports writing, operational support, handling of outside contract agents, and special assignments as the Chief of Station's Executive Assistant.

6. The employee is occasionally called upon by the Office of Training to administer specialized training, and she was chosen recently to attend the Mid-Career Course ending in December 1972. Meanwhile, her absence from her new job is felt sorely by the Branch. It is expected that her current assignment will last about two years.

7. In summary, we have here an exceptional officer who has been performing at the level of a GS-14 for some years; it is now time to promote her to that grade commensurate with her performance and which she so justly deserves.

Theodore Shackley
Theodore G. Shackley
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, QSI - Honor and Merit Awards Panel

SUBJECT : Request for Quality Step Increase (HR 20-37)
Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. On the basis of the information presented below, it is recommended that a Quality Step Increase be approved for Charlotte Bustos-Videla.

2. As noted in the attached fitness report, Subject's performance of her duties has been uniformly outstanding. In addition to her responsibilities in the Cuban section of the Mexico City Station, she has recently been made the executive assistant to the Chief of Station at Mexico City. In this job, she screens all incoming material for matters of interest to the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station. She also continues performing her past functions in the Cuban section for the Station.

3. Subject's present high quality of performance is typical of her performance since she entered the Agency in 1951. It is fully expected that this level of performance will be maintained.

4. Although the present Chief of Station was not the reviewing official on the attached fitness report, he has commented that he considered Subject an outstanding officer and has recommended that she be considered for a Quality Step Increase.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

16 MAR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Panel (Section A)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-13
Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla

1. The promotion of Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla from GS-12 to GS-13 is hereby recommended.

2. This exceptional officer has now been performing at a senior level for several years and, while recognition through a Quality Step Increase was granted her last year, her sustained performance clearly exceeding the requirements of a GS-13 qualifies her for a promotion at this time. Subject is one of the outstanding women who have demonstrated their capacity for even further advancement within the Agency and will probably continue to advance in the future. The present recommendation is based on already demonstrated ability to operate at a senior level.

3. Subject is 36 years old and has been in grade as a GS-12 for the past five and one-half years.

R. W. Herbert
Desmond FitzGerald
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

EYES ONLY
SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 August 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Bustosvidela, C/ Z.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment and Transfer to Vouchered Funds	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 09 DAY 17 YEAR 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular
6. FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 3235-0620 CCOJ wh	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH Division Branch 1 CA Section	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Wash., D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE Ops Officer (D-13)	12. POSITION NUMBER 1294	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

G
34

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 7	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 22,487

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/BR 1/MEXICO CITY STATION/0418 *HOME BASE: WH

2 - Security
1 - Finance

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 15 Sept 72

Issue *Army W-2 (Concur: CCS) 25 SEP 1972

22 SEP 1972

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 007034

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 8 Sept 72	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 15 Sep 1972

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

G
51

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
16	10	51300	WH	45013		1	01 12 27		

28 NTE EXPIRES · 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE · 30 RETIREMENT DATA · 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE · 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA · EOD DATA · 33 SECURITY REQ. NO. · 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE · 36 SERV. COMP. DATE · 37 LONG. COMP. DATE · 38 CAREER CATEGORY · 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE · 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE · 42 LEAVE CAT. CODE · 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA · 44 STATE TAX DATA

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION · 46 OP APPROVAL · DATE APPROVED

1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

25 SEP 1972

SECRET

18 DEC 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Charlotte Bustos-Videla
THROUGH : Chief, WH Division
SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase

1. I was pleased to learn that you have been granted a Quality Step Increase. Such recognition is proof of the high esteem in which you are held by your supervisors in the Clandestine Service.

2. Please accept my personal best wishes. I am confident that your future performance will be of a continuing high quality.

[illegible]

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

[illegible]

SECRET

12 DEC 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Head, Clandestine Service
Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of
Quality Step Increase -
Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of a second Quality Step Increase to be awarded to this employee. The previous Quality Step Increase was effective March 1964.

2. May I again ask that you arrange an appropriate ceremony for the presentation of this Quality Step Increase which is in recognition of her continuing excellent performance.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

SECRET

SUBJECT: Request for Quality Step Increase (HR 20-37)
Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Chairman, DDP QSI Panel — 9 Dec 69
Date

APPROVED:

for John J Caldwell
Director of Personnel — 12 Dec 1969

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 OCTOBER 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) BUSTOS-VIDELA, [redacted] Z.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 11 DAY 03 YEAR 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6 FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE 9135 0990	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER (13)	12 POSITION NUMBER 0418	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13 4	17 SALARY OR RATE $ 15849

18 REMARKS

STAFF EMPLOYEE SPECIAL

FROM: POSTION # 1528

1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Henry L. Berthold C/WH/Personnel	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 25 OCT 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51620	ALPHABETIC WH	22 STATION CODE 45075	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 CODE 3	25 DATE OF BIRTH [redacted]	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 LWE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—CIA 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE · NO. TAX EXEMPT · STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 10-24-68	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 10-24-68

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 OCTOBER 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOS-VIDELA, CHARLOTTE Z. 07-17-67

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH ~~07~~ DAY ~~15~~ YEAR ~~67~~

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR*

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 8135 0990

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

6
51

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1528

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: XX 13 3

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,769

18 REMARKS

OPS OFFICER OCCUPYING INTEL ANALYST.

* STAFF EMPLOYEE ~~XXXX~~ SPECIAL.

No objection
Joyce Mayelin
CSPS/ Agent Branch

~~EH~~ CONCUR:
CCS

1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold
C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 17 Oct 67

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul M. [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
[illegible]	[illegible]	51 21	[illegible]	[illegible]		3	[illegible]		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OREN 3—FICA 4—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY RIG NO	34 SEX
	22								

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37 LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46 O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

28 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Group

SUBJECT : Cover for Charlotte E. Bustos-Videla

1. Mrs. Charlotte E. Bustos-Videla is being transferred PCS to Mexico City in staff capacity. She will fill slot 1523.

2. Mrs. Bustos-Videla is traveling under Travel Order No. 39-68. (See copy attached) Her cover will be that of a dependent wife entering Mexico on the Visitante visa of her husband, Dr. Cesar Bustos-Videla, who is receiving a Visitante visa in connection with a teaching contract he has with the Las Americas University, Mexico City. The University is paying for the travel of Dr. Bustos-Videla only and for all documentation. The University also will provide no quarters or quarters allowance. Under the travel order Mrs. Bustos-Videla will receive mileage and single perdiem for the trip to Mexico City. Limited household effects will be sent, the remaining items (also limited) will be stored at Government expense.

3. The cover story to be used by Mrs. Bustos-Videla is [illegible] the Army, [illegible] Operations Group effective 15 July 1967. She will travel to Mexico with her husband, where she will meet friends and obtain local employment with the U.S. Embassy.

4. Actually, Mrs. Bustos-Videla will remain in pay status as a Staff Employee.

5. Due to the change in cover stories, it is requested that CCG/NC take appropriate steps to see that the salary received through 15 July 1967 be covered by an Army W-2, and that effective 15 July 1967, D.C. Income tax no longer be withheld, and all subsequent salary be covered by a notional Department of State W-2. Her salary government checks should continue to be deposited to the National Bank of Washington, Dupont Circle Branch, Account No. 3 305 36 6. She will receive no field allotment.

Robert D. Cashman
Chief, WH Personnel

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 JULY 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOS VIDELA, ~~CHARLOTTE~~ Z.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 16 YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ XXX V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8135 0990

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

G
51

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (11)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1528

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 3

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,769

18 REMARKS
X OPS OFFICER occupying Intel Analyst Position

FROM: DDP/WH/1/Pos. No. 1201

PRA IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR20-17d(b), NOT TO EXCEED TWO YEARS.

G
34

Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: C/WH/Personnel Robert D. Cashman

DATE SIGNED: 10 July

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 13 July 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 20

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51626 ALPHABETIC COII

22 STATION CODE: 45075

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HOURS CODE: 3

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 12 YR. 29

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. 07 DA. 15 YR. 69

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE: 82

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. REST. PROV. TEMP. CODE

39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT.: CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: C7-14671

46 O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

C. Nobl

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 OCTOBER 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 007667 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOSVIDELA, C.Z. ✓

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 | DAY 23 | YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 1
FI SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (13)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1201

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 3

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,769 ✓

18. REMARKS:
FROM: GS-12/6 ($12,822)

6
29

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Edward [illegible] O'Malley
Robert D. Cashman C/WH/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 21 Oct 66

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: John P. Brown

DATE SIGNED: 10/21/66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE ✓	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
22	10	51300	WH	25013		1	01	12	29	10	23	66	10	23	66

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV-TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS: OCT 21

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-21-66 N

46 O P APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 10/[illegible]/66

FORM 2-64 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

1 SEP 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CSPS/B

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion of Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. The promotion recommendation to GS-13 of Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla is hereby submitted. Mrs. Bustos-Videla entered the Agency in August 1951 as a GS-5 and rapidly and deservedly rose to a GS-12 by 1959. She has now been almost seven years in grade and has been recommended for promotion to the CSPS/B by WH Division five times previously.

2. This outstanding officer has continued to perform at the exceptional level which has by now become her standard of performance. Her past four annual Fitness Reports have each given her an overall rating of outstanding. In this connection it is noteworthy that no two Fitness Reports were written by the same rating officer. She continues to occupy a GS-12 officer slot and her performance clearly continues to exceed the requirements for that position. She is considered to be one of the outstanding women who have demonstrated their capacity for further advancement within the Agency.

3. Mrs. Bustos-Videla not only continues to bring continuity to the Mexican Branch through her long experience on Mexican affairs, but consistently contributes to the smooth functioning of the Branch through her highly efficient organizational capabilities. She has been called upon to handle all manner of difficult desk problems. She invariably responds quickly, cheerfully, and effectively. She has been instrumental in on-the-job training of a number of officers, both for desk assignments and in preparation for field assignments. She has excellent rapport with innumerable persons in other areas and staffs, thus adding to the efficiency and speed with which she accomplishes her daily tasks. Her promotion at this time is urged.

William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

Approved by CS Career
[illegible]
13 OCT 1966

SECRET
(When Filled In)

11 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Charlott Z. Bustos-Videla

THROUGH : Head of CI Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current ~~career~~ field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the System, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the System may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you do not have sufficient time prior to completing 15 years of service with the Agency in which you could complete a minimum of 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees."

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 205, Magazine Building (extension 2847). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the CIA Retirement Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

1 MAR 1966

no

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section A)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-13, Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla

1. The promotion request from GS-12 to GS-13 on Mrs. Bustos-Videla is hereby submitted.

2. This outstanding officer has continued to perform at the exceptional level which has by now become for her a standard of performance. She now formally occupies a senior (GS-13) FI Officer slot in the Mexican Branch and her performance clearly continues to exceed the requirement for that position. She is still considered to be one of the outstanding women who have demonstrated their capacity for further advancement within the Agency, independently, of the experience on Mexican affairs acquired through continuity in her present assignment.

3. The comments made in connection with the four previous promotion recommendations continue to be entirely applicable.

4. Subject is 37 years old and has been in grade as a GS-12 for the past six years.

fr William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

EYES ONLY
SECRET

[illegible] ONLY
SECRET

9 SEP 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section A)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-13, Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla

1. The promotion request from GS-12 to GS-13 on Mrs. Bustos-Videla is hereby resubmitted.

2. This outstanding officer has continued to perform at the exceptional level which has by now become for her a standard of performance. She now formally occupies a senior (GS-13) FI Officer slot in the Mexican Branch and her performance clearly continues to exceed the requirement for that position. She is still considered to be one of the outstanding women who have demonstrated their capacity for further advancement within the Agency, independently of the expertise on Mexican affairs acquired through continuity in her present assignment.

3. The comments made in connection with the three previous promotion recommendations continue to be entirely applicable.

4. Subject is 36 years old and has been in grade as a GS-12 for the past six years.

by [illegible]
William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

not approved
8-8

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 JULY 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOS-VIDELA, C[redacted] Z.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH AUG DAY 1 YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS

XX	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 1
~~MEXICO SECTION~~ 3-1 Section

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (13)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1201

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 ~~4~~ 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~11,915~~ 11670

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/MEXICO SECTION/1202/

MRS. BUSTOS-VIDELA WILL REPLACE MR. RICHARD SCUTT WHO WILL BE REASSIGNED TO DDP/EE.
TO BE EFFECTIVE 1 AUGUST 1965

Recorded By
CSB
[illegible]

1-Security
1-Finance

19A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert D. Cashman
ROBERT D. CASHMAN
C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 30 July

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 8/4/65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

20 ACTION CODE: 30

20 EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 5130 ALPHABETIC WH

22 STATION CODE: 15013

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24 HOOKERS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 12 YR. 29

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 VFE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CS 2-FICA 3-NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 1-NONE 2-5 PT 3-10 PT

36 SERV. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV./TEMP. CODE

39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0-WAIVED 1-YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7/10/65 [illegible]

46 O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 8/4/65

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
6-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14

4 SEP 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS (Panel A)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to GS-13
Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla.

1. The promotion to GS-13 of Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla is recommended. Mrs. Bustos-Videla entered the Agency in August 1951 as a GS-5 and rapidly and deservedly rose to a GS-12 grade by 1959.

2. This recommendation is based on Mrs. Bustos-Videla's performance during the past three years as the senior assistant to the various chiefs of the Mexican desk/branch, who unanimously have found her to be extremely competent and reliable both in her routine assignments and special tasks occasionally levied on her, such as country studies, compilation of programs, requirement reviews, etc.

3. Mrs. Bustos-Videla has consistently responded with intelligence and clarity and has materially contributed to orderly imaginative administration of Headquarters support to a most active station. In the process, she has been instrumental in training on-the-job innumerable officers both for desk assignments and in preparation for field assignments.

4. For her outstanding performance she received a quality step increase in April 1964. This deserved recognition should now be followed up at this time by a promotion to the next grade in accordance with the consistently good performance at the GS-13 level over a prolonged period of time.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

CONFIDENTIAL

14 APR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Head, Clandestine Services Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. The salary increase accomplished by the award of a Quality Step Increase is important and tangible evidence of the esteem in which the employee so recognized is held. However, I believe the commendatory and incentive benefits of this award will be partially lost unless it is presented in an appropriate ceremony which will afford the individual recognition among co-workers and supervisory officials. Also, I believe such recognition serves to inspire other employees to aspire to earning such recognition.

3. May I ask, therefore, that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

Presented in
a ceremony
4/24/64

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

20 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/OP

THROUGH : Chief, Clandestine Services Personnel Office

SUBJECT : Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla -- Request for Quality Step Increase

1. It is recommended that a Quality Step Increase for Mrs. Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla be endorsed by you for the reasons presented in the attached memorandum prepared by the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division.

2. A review of Mrs. Bustos-Videla's Official Personnel File [illegible] supports the statements of [illegible]. Without exception, the performance of this officer during [illegible] Agency employment has been identified by various and all supervisors as "Superior" and "Outstanding." Likewise, nothing in other records maintained by the Office of Personnel contradicts or modifies the impressive record made by Mrs. Bustos-Videla.

3. Testimony to the high regard which officials of WH Division view this officer's work is furnished by noting that Mrs. Bustos-Videla is the first female officer to be proposed for a QSI by WH and one of a total of but three officers nominated by that Division for the award since the QSI provision of the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962 became effective in CIA approximately fifteen months ago.

[illegible]
[illegible]
Clandestine Services
Personnel Office

SECRET
[illegible]

[illegible]

6 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Plans

ATTENTION : DDP/OP

SUBJECT : Request for Quality Step Increase for Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. On the basis of the information presented below, it is recommended that a quality step increase be approved for Charlotte Bustos-Videla.

2. As stated in the accompanying Fitness Report, Subject's performance of her duties has been uniformly outstanding. In addition to her responsibilities as the desk officer for Mexico FI and Operational Support Projects, she carries a heavy burden in the areas of administration, preparation of special reports and training of personnel. She frequently represents the Mexico Section in dealings with other elements of the Agency and acts for the Chief of Section in his absence. Subject's performance clearly exceeds the normal requirements of the assignment and of her present GS grade level.

3. Subject's present high quality of performance typifies her performance over a period of several years and it is fully expected that this level will be maintained.

4. Consideration was given to the granting of a Merit Award but the quality step increase seems more appropriate in this case. Subject has been passed over for promotion in the past and due to limitations as to

area of assignment, it is unlikely that a promotion to grade GS-13 can be obtained. The salary increase is therefore thought to be the most fitting reward for her outstanding service.

J C King
J. C. KING
C/WHD

CONCUR:

DDP/OP ______ 25 March 64
Date

APPROVED:

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel ______ 24 MAR 64
Date

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 November 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOSVIDELA, C Z
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4235 1000 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0321
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $10,420
18. REMARKS:
FROM: DDP/WH/3/607/Mexico Sec/Hqs

Recorded by
CSPD

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 11/19/63
19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

37	1C	51460	[illegible]	73013		1	31 12 29

FOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1-21-63

SECRET

SECRET

15 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section A)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-13
Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla entered on duty with WH Division in August of 1951. She has served on a variety of desks covering South American as well as Mexican and Central American affairs. In each of her assignments she has demonstrated exceptional competence and devotion to duty.

2. Since December 1957 Mrs. Bustos has been assigned to the Mexican Desk and at present is Acting Chief. She is the soul and motor of that desk, managing many of its operations and supervising its staff, many of whom she has trained. She is past mistress of administrative procedures and the ease with which she obtains clearances, maintains files and secures necessary approvals while handling the most complicated operational aspects of projects is phenomenal. Her work output is enormous and yet everything is done simply and modestly with a minimum of excess motion. She is an outstanding employee and should be deserving of recognition.

3. It is recommended that Mrs. Bustos be promoted to grade GS-13.

J. C. KING
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

Not Approved
June 63

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 1 June 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 107667

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOS-VIDELA, C. Z.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: NAME CHANGE FROM-CHARLOTTE L. ZEHRUNG

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 13 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1235 1000 1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO SECTION

3

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER D

12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~BA~~-607

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LD, etc.): GS 12

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 ~~1~~ 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~8955~~ 9215

18. REMARKS: By Marriage.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: J. C. Bowen

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: O. C. Dixon

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODE NO. NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGRITY CODE
24. HOSTING CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 1 DA. 12 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSR 2 = FICA 3 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: CODE MO. DA. YR.
FOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. [illegible]: 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE
39. [illegible]
40. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 90 DAYS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 90 DAYS)
41. LEAVE CATEGORY CODE
42. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
43. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: WA 6-?-61

46. O.P. APPROVAL: O. C. Dixon

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A

SECRET

2[illegible] May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Personnel

SUBJECT: Change of Name

It is requested that all records in the Agency, including the section which issues payroll checks, be changed to reflect my married name: Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla. This change is effective immediately.

Charlotte Z Bustos-Videla
Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla
WH/3/Mexico

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
07667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	01	12	29		0	F	2	08	27	51	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.
04	02	51		1	50 USCA 403 J						08	27

12. LCD Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit Yes-1 No-2	Code	
51		2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO SECTION	4613	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld - Frgn -	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19 Serv.	20. Occup. Series	
	2	XXXXXXXXX OPS OFCR	XXX BA-321	GS	0136.51	

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
11 X 4	$ XXXX 9510 7750	DI	04	10	55	04	06	58	0235-1000-1000 ~~8 2500 20~~

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	12	13	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
	4613	per mage WH	

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld - Frgn -	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	OPS OFCR	607 ~~BA-321~~	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	DI	12	13	59	5	12	61	0235-1000-1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
P. C. Bowers WH Personnel Officer

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
John Washtako 8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		11 Dec 57	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	RJH	12-11-59	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1152

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

16 July 1959

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section B)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion -
Miss Charlotte L. Zehrung

1. Miss Charlotte L. Zehrung entered on duty with CIA on 27 August 1951. She was assigned to the Mexican Section of WH Division, Branch III, in June 1957. During the past two years she has been the responsible Case Officer for several FI and CE Projects.

2. Miss Zehrung is a loyal and dedicated employee. She has displayed considerable initiative and has been able to carry out her duties with a minimum amount of support. She readily accepts responsibility and is a highly efficient worker who thinks clearly and logically. Her knowledge of Headquarters and Field procedures in addition to her ability to organize her work greatly facilitates the smooth functioning of the Mexican Desk. She has demonstrated a superior comprehension of the numerous and varied projects of the Mexico City Station which has contributed to the overall Headquarters support of the stations performance. Because of her sound understanding of operations and her outstanding capacity for work, Miss Zehrung has an excellent potential for assuming greater responsibilities.

3. In recognition of her outstanding performance it is recommended that Miss Zehrung be promoted to grade GS-12.

JCKing
J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

S-E-C-R-E-T

17 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Charlotte Zehrung**

VIA : Chief, **WH/3/Mexico**

1. You have been selected by your division, and authorized by the Clandestine Services Records Committee, to act as Records Officer for your component. Your appointment is based on your professional qualifications to carry out an assignment requiring experience, judgment, and a knowledge of the Clandestine Services objectives for your component.

2. You are to act on behalf of your Division or Staff element in authorizing the destruction of material of no value to the Clandestine Services in accordance with criteria established for this purpose. You are empowered to authorize the destruction of documents and index cards recommended for destruction by other members of your branch, and to desensitize KAPOK and RYBAT material which is no longer sensitive or which has been restricted in error. Your signature will be recognized by RI as that of an officially appointed Records Officer.

3. A series of meetings will be held in Room 1802, I Building to brief you and your colleagues on the details of your duties as Records Officer. You have been scheduled to attend the meeting to be held on **Wednesday, 2 April 1958, 1300 - 1645 hours** ; if it is not possible for you to attend on the date designated, please call Extension 8325 to arrange for an alternate date. Please review the attached materials prior to this meeting.

HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
DDP Records Policy Officer

Attachment
As stated

cc: Personnel Jacket of Addressee

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 1 Da 12 Yr 29	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt.-1, 10 Pt.-2) Code 0
5. Sex F	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. Mil Serv Credit LCD (Yes-1, No-2) Code			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch III Mexico Section	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code
16. Dept.-Field Dept.- X Usfld- Fran.- Code	17. Position Title Reports Officer	18. Position No. BA-0072.01	19. Serv. GS 20. Occup. Series 0132.44
21. Grade & Step 11-~~2~~ 3	22. Salary Or Rate $ ~~6605~~ 6820	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo 04 Da 10 Yr 55 25. PSI Due Mo 04 Da 06 Yr 58
26. Appropriation Number 8-3500-20			

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo 4 Da 3 Yr 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch III Mexico Section	Code 4613	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code 15013
33. Dept.-Field Dept.- X Usfld- Fran.- Code	34. Position Title I.O. (FI)	35. Position No. BA-521-~~22~~	36. Serv. GS 37. Occup. Series 0136.51
38. Grade & Step 11-~~2~~ 3	39. Salary Or Rate $ ~~6605~~ 6820	40. SD DI	41. Date Of Grade Mo 4 Da 10 Yr 55 42. PSI Due Mo 07 Da 05 Yr 57
43. Appropriation Number 8-3500-20			

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) P.C. BOWERS WH/Personnel Officer

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) JOHN WASHINKO X 8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		4/1/58	D. Placement		4/1/58
B. Pos. Control		[illegible]	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	1 APR 1958

Remarks

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE 6/9/57

[illegible] $ 6820

SECRET

FORM 1152a
5-57

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

8 Nov 1957

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 1 Da 12 Yr 29	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt.-1 10 Pt.-2 Code 0	5. Sex F	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Mil Serv Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

VOUCHERED

14. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch II Argentina Section	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - X Usfld. Fran. - Code	17. Position Title Reports Officer	18. Position No. BA-313	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0132.44

21. Grade & Step GS-11-2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6605.00	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 8-3500-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo 12 Da 01 Yr 57	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

VOUCHERED

31. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch III Mexico Section	Code 4613	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code 11 DC 74613

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - X Usfld. Fran. - Code 2	34. Position Title Reports Officer	35. Position No. BA-72.01	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0132.44

38. Grade & Step GS-11-2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6605.00	40. SD DI	41. Date Of Grade Mo 04 Da 10 Yr 55	42. PSI Due Mo 04 Da 06 Yr 58	43. Appropriation Number 8-3500-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) P.C. BOWERS WH/Personnel Officer	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) H.C. MONTAGUE X 8242	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		11/22/57	D. Placement		11/22/57
B. Pos. Control	KAL		E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Sneay	

Remarks

SECRET

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

Charlotte BUSTONS-VIDELA

LEFT HAND SIDE

(numbered top to bottom)

1. Admin and finance documents - March 1974 - Jan 1978
2. Admin and finance documents - May 1951 - April 1956
3. Bio profile (sanitized form in file)

Charlotte BUSTOS-VIDELA

RIGHT HAND SIDE FILE

(numbered top to bottom)

1. Personnel/cover - after 1973
2. "Actions" - Personnel actions - after 1973
3. "Actions" - Personnel Actions - Before 1957
4. "Fitness Reports" - May 1973 - Nov 1977
5. "Fitness Reports" prior to 1957
6. "Other" - admin material - after 1973
7. "Other"-admin material-prior to 1957
8. "Medical" - all medical material related to clearances
9. "PHS-SEC" - document related to cover legend

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY ITSU

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 11 Sep 72

FILE NO.: 3190

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH

SS NUMBER: 069-24-3138

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 007667

ID CARD NUMBER: 2040

ATTN: Edmond A. Sullivan

REF: Form 1322 dated 5 May 72

OFFICIAL COVER: X ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte Z

UNIT: Joint Operations Group

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

XX BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE Aug 62

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER *(Specify)*

X SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*

X SUBMIT FORM 3254 ARMY W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*

X SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR 240-2*)*

X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR 240-2*)*

X EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II XX

X SUBMIT FORM 2683 FOR AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:

☐ SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______________ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*

☐ EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

☐ RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

☐ SUBMIT FORM 2683 FOR ______________ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Aug 51 - Aug 62		Hqs/OVERT
Aug 62 - Jul 67		Hqs/DAC
Jul 67 - Aug 72		Mexico/State
Sep 72 - Present		Hqs/DAC

CD/kas

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - [illegible]
COPY 4 - [illegible]
COPY 5 - [illegible]
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 2-72 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

WARNING - [illegible]

(13-30-41)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 7 August 1962

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, WH

ESTABLISHED FOR: (NEE: ZEHRUNG) BUSTOSVIDELA, Charlotte Z.

ATTN: WH/SS Mr. Mullane

FILE NO.: 3190

REF: Verbal Request for Cover, Form 1322 Dated 31 Jul 62

ID CARD NO.:

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: U.S.Army Element, Joint Operations Group (8739)

☒ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________.

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE 7 August 1962.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-3)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM [illegible] FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240 250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

[illegible]

☐ COPY TO CPO/OP

43688

C/SI

CHIEF, MILITARY COVER CCS

DISTRIBUTION 1 OSD [illegible] -PSD OS, 1 ADPD CONT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(19-20-44)

THIS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS
A C.I.A. EMPLOYEE FOR PURPOSES OF
WITHOLDING STATE AND FEDERAL TAXES

DATE DESIGNATED JANUARY 03 1961

07667 CHARLOTTE L ZEHRUNG 235100010

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OJCS 07/21/73

1 SERIAL NUMBER 0C7657	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z			
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 01 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA 4235 4525 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH DIVISION			10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER			12 POSITION NUMBER 1294	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 13	17 SALARY OR RATE
18 REMARKS				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM 7 JAN 1973 TO 1 OCT 1972 UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11777, DATED 12 APR 1974.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 300	V	GS 13 7	$23,642

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MDP: 26 SEPT 72

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BUSTOSVIDELA C Z
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 09 DA 17 YR 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH DIVISION
BRANCH 1
CA SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1258
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: [illegible]
18. REMARKS:

W2 INFO: DEPT OF ARMY

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

16 | 10 | 51300 | WH | 75013 | 01 | 12 29

ADP DATA

MLH

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620	CF	GS 13 7	$22,487

1 SERIAL NO.	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	51 620	CF	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 13	6	$20,721	10/19/69	GS 13	7	$21,313	10/17/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP 0 9

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

16/135
1/559

CLERICAL INITIALS

[illegible] FISHER

AUDITED BY

FORM 560 E USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620 CF	GS 13 6	$20,721

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620 CF	GS 13 6	$19,555

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 100	V	GS 13 7	$24,811

---

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. [illegible]	4. [illegible]
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	51 620 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 13	5	$17,920	10/19/69	GS 13	6	$18,447	12/14/69			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ R S HATTLES 12 DECEMBER 1969

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 [illegible] Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

14-00000

G51

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	51 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	4	$17,393	10/22/67	GS 13	5	$17,920	10/19/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 8/16/69 /6/35

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

COMPENSATION

OCT 13 [illegible] '69

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620	CF	GS 13 4	$17,393

14-00000

FVD: 31 OCT 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 03 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9135 0990 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0418	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 15843

18. REMARKS
STAFF EMPLOYEE SPECIAL

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51620 ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 12 28	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. [illegible] EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 2 WAIVER YES HEALTH INS. CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-6-68

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620	CF	GS 13 4	$14,857	$15,849

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BUSTOSVIDELA C Z
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 17 YR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V | CF TO V | X CF TO CF | V TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 6135 [illegible] 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: [illegible]
12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 1370[illegible]

18. REMARKS: STAFF EMPLOYEE [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 07
20. Employ Code: [illegible]
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51 620 ALPHABETIC [illegible]
22. STATION CODE: [illegible]075
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR [illegible] 12
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. MIL EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 02
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE 3 BREAK IN SERVICE
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

G 51

1 SERIAL NO.	2. NAME			3 ORGANIZATION		4 FUNDS		5. LWOP HOURS	
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z			51 620		CF			
6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ
GS 13	3	$13,769	10/23/66	GS 13	4	$14,217	10/22/67		

9 CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 8/18/67

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS E.D.ECHOLS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620	CF	GS 13 3	$13,769	$14,407

MAH: 18 JULY 67

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BUSTOSVIDELA C Z

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 16 YR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 8135 0390 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1528

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: 13769

18. REMARKS: OPS OFFICER OCCUPYING INTEL ANALYST POSITION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 20

20. Employ Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51620 ALPHABETIC WH

22. STATION CODE: 45075

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. Major Code: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA 12 YR 29

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO 07 DA 15 YR 69

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 82

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

F. O. ECHOLS

POSTED
07-26-67 N

FORM 5-64 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 0[illegible]7837	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) L[illegible]STOSVIDOLA C		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 1[illegible] 23 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 723[illegible] 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP, WH BRANCH 1 FI SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1001	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 13760

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 20	20. EMPLOY. CODE 1[illegible]	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC [illegible]	22. STATION CODE [illegible]	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. [illegible]	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR. 10 22 60	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR. [illegible] 60
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA ⇨	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAREER / RESERVE / PROV. / TEMP / CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES / HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BUSTOS-VIDELA C Z	007667	51 300	V	GS 12 6	$12,025	$12,459

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BUSTOS-VIDELA C Z	007667	51 300	V	GS 12 6	$12,459	$12,822

OCT 14 11 22

007667 BUSTOSVIDELA C Z

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LU	ADJ
GS 12	5	$11,670	10/13/63	GS 12	6	$12,075	10/10/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS D.Y. AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 23 Aug 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NJM: 11 AUG 65

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR) 08 01 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS X	V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 1 FI SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1201
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 5
17. SALARY OR RATE 11670	18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	10	51300	WH	75013		1	01 12 29		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REG NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

llc 8/12/65

Form 11-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/27/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z					
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT				4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 05 31 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 0620 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION				10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER				12 POSITION NUMBER 1202	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS		15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 12	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

POSTED
6-9-65 HT

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150a Use Previous
1-63 MFG 1-63 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(When Filled In)

14-511

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

007667 BUSTOS-VIDELA, C. Z. 51 400 V

OLD SALARY RATE				NEW SALARY RATE				TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EP Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LD	ADA
GS 12	4	$10,970	10/23/63	GS 12	5	$11,300	03/29/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE.

SIGNED: E. D. ECHOLS DATE: MARCH 24, 1964

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MHC:5 DEC 63

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST MIDDLE): BUSTOSVIDELA C Z
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 12 DA. 05 YR. 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4235 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH / BRANCH 3 / MEXICO SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0321
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 10420
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOYEE CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Region Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51400	WH	75013		1	01 12 29		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10 [illegible]

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND OCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 400	V	GS 12 4	$10,420	$10,970

---

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	64 400 V 2B	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PH. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	3	$10,195	10/14/62	GS 12	4	$10,420	10/13/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: ED ECHOLS DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1954 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	64400	V	12 2	$ 9215	12 2	$ 9790

3235-000-1000

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	64 400 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	(S)	ADJ
GS-12	2	$ 9,790	06/11/61	GS-12	3	$10,105	10/14/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Ned P. Holman DATE: 26-X-62

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

10740

~~AEC, 11 AUG 61~~

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BUSTOS-VIDELA C Z
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: NAME CHANGE FROM* CHARLOTTE L. ZEBRUNG - CORRECTION**

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 06 12 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X | V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235 1000 1000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0607

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: 9215

18. REMARKS

* BY MARRIAGE ON 18 MARCH 61.
** THIS ACTION CORRECTS SF 1150 EFF 12 JUNE 61 ITEM # 2, NAME, WHICH READ BUSTOSVIDELA C Z TO READ BUSTOS-VIDELA C Z, FOR PAYROLL PURPOSE ONLY.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ. Code
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 01 12 29
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES, 2 - NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | CODE | 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES | HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
08/22/61 VK

L I

Form 1150 8-59 | Obsolete Previous Editions | SECRET

AES: 12 JUNE 61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION NAME CHANGE FROM* CHARLOTTE L. ZEHRUNG	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA YR 06 12 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 1235 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0607	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D.

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 9215

18. REMARKS
*BY MARRIAGE. 18 MARCH 1961

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 53	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 12 29	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. STE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LEO 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06/14/61 WK

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-61)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
107667	[illegible] ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	DSP/WH 3 V-20	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	1	$ 8,955	12/13/59	12	2	$ 9,215	06/11/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

Je

/X/ NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ E.D.ECHOLS WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition
7-60

SECRET (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	107667	46 13	GS-12 1	$ 8,330	$ 8,955

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 11 DEC 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt.-1 10 Pt.-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
107667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	01	12	29		0	F 2	08	27	51	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
04	02	51		1	50 USCA 403 J						08	27	51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO SECTION	4613	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	I.O. FI	0521	GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
11 4	$ 7750	D1	04	10	55	04	06	58	8 3500 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	12	13	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO SECTION	4613	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	OPS OFCR	0607	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	D1	12	13	59	06	11	61	0235 1000 1000

44. Remarks

ISSUED
1-7-60

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

12-15-59

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4 FUNDS	5 ALLOTMENT
107667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	DDP/WH 3	V-20	[illegible]

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR.				MO	DA	YR
GS 11	3	$ 7,510	04	06	58	GS 11	4	$ 7,750	10	04	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

C. M. STEWART

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. **SECRET** **OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER** (4)

IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 THIS NOTIFICATION EFFECTS RESLOTTING RESULTING FROM R-20-250

SER #	NAME	SD	OLD SLOT	NEW SLOT	DATE
107667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	DI	0521	321	04/28/59

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	107667	GS-11-3	$ 6,820	$ 7,510

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
107667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	DDP/WH	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 11	2	$ 6,605	10	07	56	GS 11	3	$ 6,820	04	06	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA	YR

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 58

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

HCH 3 APRIL 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth			4. Vet. Pref.		5. Sex	6. CS - EOD				
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
107667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	01	12	29		0	F 2	08	27	51		

7. SCD			8. CSC Retmt.		9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav.			11. FEGLI		12. LCD			13. [illegible]	
Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes - 1 No - 2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes-1 No-2	Code	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
04	02	51		1	50 USCA 403 J						08	27	51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO SECTION	4613	WASH D C	75013

16. Dept. - Field		17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code				
	2	REPORTS OFF	0072.01	GS	0132.44

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade			25. PSI Due			26. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
11 2	$ 6605	01	04	10	55	04	06	58	8 3500 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date			29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
REASSIGNMENT	56	04	03	58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO SECTION	4613	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field		34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code				
	2	I.O. FI	0521	GS	0136.51

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade			42. PSI Due			43. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
11 2	$ 6605	01	04	10	55	04	06	58	8 3500 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
JP 5/1/58

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MYL

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
107667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	01	12	29		0	F	2	08	27	51	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.
04	02	51		1	50 USCA 403 J						08	27

12. LCD Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Leg. Yes-1 No-2	Code
51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 11 ARGENTINA SECTION		WASH D C	

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series	
	2	REPORTS OFFICER	313	GS	0132.44	
21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number	
11 2	$ 6605	DI			8 3500 20	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data	
REASSIGNMENT	56	12 01 57	REGULAR	01		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO SECTION	4613	WASH D C	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series	
	2	REPORTS OFF	0072.01	GS	0132.44	
38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number	
11 2	$ 6605	DI	04 10 55	04 06 58	8 3500 20	

44. Remarks

POSTED
10 DEC 1957

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte Z.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	4. SEX F	5. GRADE GS-13	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/WH/1	9. CURRENT STATION	10. HQ CD		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				12. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐ CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ CONTRACT	☐ OTHER (Spec.)	☐ TEMPORARY	☐ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT	☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) XXXX 1 August 1972 - 30 April 1973

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Functions as Chief of the WH/1/SA and Cuba Section, supervising one case officer, one IA and one secretary.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analyzes all traffic pertaining to Branch and Station SA and Cuban Operations, performs all operational support, project actions, correspondence, coordination, memoranda and file maintenance.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares studies, file analyses and special reports such as budget and program call and correspondence with the White House.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

Form 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

22. IMPDET CL BY 055272

3 MAY 1973

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In the 8 months during which she was under my supervision, Mrs. Bustos has performed in that same hard-working, highly-productive style which has become her trademark over the years. She understands the intelligence process from start to finish and is personally experienced with each step along the way, save the agent handling aspects. She excels in each phase of the work.

As chief of the Branch SA and Cuban activities section, she has once again demonstrated her mastery over her assigned duties. She is a sound, dependable, yet imaginative and energetic operations officer, whose performance leaves little to be desired. While she had had little previous supervisory experience, she has in this assignment demonstrated exemplary supervisory ability. Notwithstanding her drive, tenacity and attention to detail, she is a popular co-worker, is receptive to guidance and is sensitive to, and responsive to the needs of her subordinates.

In her performance of specific duty No. 2, she has brought to bear upon her daily duties her broad experience, high intelligence and good operational sense, functioning with practically no need of close supervision. It is comforting to know that an assignment given to this employee is always done promptly, professionally and cheerfully.

Her adaptability was demonstrated in her specific duty No. 3. Despite the press of normal daily activity, she was often called upon to produce "crash"

(continued)

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, C AND D OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
21 May 1973	[illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
8	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 May 1973	DC/WH/1	Raymond J. Swider

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL The rater has written an accurate and thorough evaluation of Mrs. Bustos. I concur without reservation in the ratings provided subject. She is an exceptional officer. Her ability to perform a variety of assignments in Headquarters and the Field has measured up to an outstanding record. Her work with subordinates clearly indicate she is a good supervisor. Mrs. Bustos performs all facets of her work in an exemplary manner and in my judgement rates in the upper percentile in the A Category.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 May 1973	C/WH/1	John C. Murray

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Narrative Comments (continued): (Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla)

papers for the Branch because of her innate talents and established reliability. She never failed to impress her supervisor with her production, writing ability and energy. Her overall performance is clearly in excess of her grade level.

In terms of true cost and security-consciousness, she must also be considered very strong because she has a positive and aggressive attitude towards these subjects. It is with deep regret that the Branch parts with this employee who now moves up to the Division front office staff.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Covert Action Operations Seminar No. 2-73
35 hours, full time

Participant : Bustos-Videla, Charlotte

Office : WH

Year of Birth: 1929

Service Designation: D

Grade : GS-13

No. of Students : 20

EOD Date : 08/51

COURSE OBJECTIVES, CONTENT AND METHODS

The objective of the Seminar is to give the participant a familiarization with the major fields of covert action. These are viewed as:

Political Operations, including Propaganda;

Operations Against Priority Targets and Denied Areas.

("Priority targets" is taken to include Soviet Bloc, Chinese Communist, Cuban, and North Vietnamese officials and other personnel in third countries, and other designated targets)

The Seminar includes a discussion of the "political animal" and an analytical look at the political personality.

The technique of instruction is one of talks by Operations Officers experienced in various specific kinds of operation, followed by questions and discussion. Participants are encouraged and expected to ask questions and engage in the discussions, drawing upon and relating their experience to that under discussion. One of the important values to be gained from the Seminar is this exchange of experience.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No further assessment of individual capacity or performance is made in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Richard A. Fuller
Chief Instructor

2/23/73
Date

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAINING REPORT

Midcareer Course No. 34

Student : Bustos-Videla, Charlotte

Date : 11/5-12/22/72

Year of Birth: 1929

Office : WH/1

Grade : 13

Service Designation: D

No. of Students : 30

COURSE OBJECTIVES -- CONTENT AND METHODS

The Midcareer Course is designed to enable potential executive officers to develop and widen their understanding of management practices, of the Agency and the Intelligence Community, and of the Government's involvement in international affairs.

The Course consists of three major segments of varying lengths. The topics covered through lectures, seminars, group discussions and field trips are:

1. Effective managerial behavior as derived through study of the Managerial Grid.
2. The functions, relationships and problems of various Agency components and of members of the Intelligence Community.
3. Selected elements of national power and current developments in key international affairs.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

No evaluation of the student is made during the Course, and no final grade is given upon course completion.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

22 DEC 1972

John C. Murfit Date
Midcareer Course Chairman

Classified by: 17-1626
EX-2, APDCI,
WSISM

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 007667

SECTION A **GENERAL**

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
XX CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):		
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.			12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January - 31 July 1972		

SECTION B **PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Prepares operational target studies on PBRUMEN officials and assists in the planning of operations against those targets.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens all agent and technical reports dealing with PBRUMEN targets for operational and positive information and puts in retrievable form.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assists Case Officers in preparation of operational reports by doing all basic research such as tracing and file reviews and presents the results in exploitable form.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares draft intelligence reports from raw agent reports, technical operations and defector debriefings.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 GOA/DT&O Project Officer	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Management of the PBRUMEN section files. 12 OCT 1972	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In reviewing my previous fitness report and those of my predecessors, on this fine officer, I find myself hard put not to repeat what has been said so often before. She has been the backbone of this section and of those where she has worked previously. Her work has always shown excellent judgement and ingenuity. A self-starter with tremendous drive and discipline, the amount of work she has produced has been prodigious. An excellent team worker, she has never shirked when - as so often happens - she is asked to take on additional work or work on a matter outside of her regular field. While forceful, she is diplomatic and tactful and is able to present suggestions and criticisms in a pleasant manner. She is one of the most dedicated persons I have met in the Organization, and exceptionally dependable. While, as a woman and a Specialist, she has had little opportunity to handle agents she has done very well with those we have given her to handle. She has showed great ability in the training of two transcribers and in the debriefing of two female agents and their husbands. This is in large part due to her in-depth knowledge of the targets this section is working on. The past few months have been difficult, requiring the complete reorganization of this Section and the termination of the majority of our assets. Under this stress, she has performed in her usual outstanding manner. Perhaps, even a little better. Her handling of a great deal of file work has been excellent, probably in part because she was the one who set it up and has maintained it in its present very good state. (continued)

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
7 Aug 1972	/s/ Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
7 August 1972	Operations Officer	/s/ John M. Burke

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Without any hesitation I concur with the outstanding ratings above. Subject is now up for rotation and we will miss her immensely. For years she has dedicated her entire time to her job which she has done so well. She has been creative, thorough and accurate. Although she has not had supervisory experience at this station, she has performed in a manner which clearly reflects that she would have no problem with supervising. A truly outstanding employee with growth potential.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
7 Aug 1972	DCOS	/s/ George A. Fill [redacted]

SECRET

(CONTINUED)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

The one criticism of this Officer's work that I and others have made in the past still stands. She tries to do everything and somethings in this business just don't deserve the attention she gives them.

I have no personal knowledge of her supervisor abilities, but believe she is a natural leader.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): January 1971 - December 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Prepares operational target studies on PBRUMEN officials and assists in the planning of operations against these targets.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens all raw reports dealing with PBRUMEN targets for operational and positive intelligence.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts name checks, file reviews, prepares finished memos, cables, and dispatches. Assists Case Officers in preparation of operational reports.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares draft intelligence reports from raw agent reports, technical operations and defector debriefings.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Handles miscellaneous special projects for the Station: screening and routing to all sections daily audio take; operational reporting and project responsibility for COA/D&TO project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

DEC 27 8 55 AM '71

This supervisor has worked with a variety of Intelligence Assistants. Many were good, but none compared with this Subject. She is the most thorough and fastest working IA I have met. Her capacity for hard work and long hours is prodigious. Her knowledge of operational matters is equal to that of most case officers. She has an operationally creative mind and has made many excellent suggestions for the improvement of the section's work. Additionally, her command of the Spanish language enhances all of the above abilities. This officer has found her very pleasant to work with. She has a unique ability to make constructive criticism in a tactful manner.

If this Subject has a weakness, it was pointed out by the reviewing officer in the last fitness report when he said, "in her voracious appetite for all kinds of facts (she) can at times put undue emphasis on them, including factual minutiae as against equally important but more elusive subjective factors.

Because of her outstanding performance and abilities the Subject will be given some activity handling agent personnel, during the forthcoming year.

The Subject's continued fine performance since her last promotion merits special consideration by the Promotion Board.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 December 1971	/s/ Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 December 1971	Ops Officer	/s/ John M. Burke

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the above ratings and comments. Subject performs all the tasks outlined above in a very professional and methodical manner. One does not even sense that the work is going on until the finished product is produced. It is always excellent. We count heavily on her thoughts and ideas in all operational studies and considerations. She is ops oriented and has an excellent bank of information to call on when necessary. She is pleasant and has the respect of her co-workers as well as her supervisors. Her abilities are varied and she can be counted on to perform extremely well regardless of assignment or target. We will be losing this fine officer soon and we will be hard put to find someone who will be able to replace her.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 December 1971	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ George A. Fill

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BUGTOS-VIDELA, CHARLOTTE Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan.29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Br 1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January - 31 December 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Prepares operational target studies on PBRUMEN officials of interest and helps in the preparation of operational planning re target personnel. [illegible]	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens the raw reports from technical operations and agents for operationally useful information.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides operational and administrative support for station PBRUMEN activities. This includes name checks, file reviews, preparation of memos, cables and dispatches, and helps in the preparation of project reports, outlines, and renewals.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises the handling of the station PBRUMEN watch-list and in general monitors travel of interest to and from PBRUMEN for our station, Headquarters and other stations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Helps the station intelligence chief in the preparation of finished intelligence reports from a PBRUMEN refugee debriefing center (only part of the reporting period).	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Handles miscellaneous special projects for the station in addition to her PBRUMEN duties (examples: organization of station watchlists during a presidential visit, screening certain raw reports for whole station, preparation of OOA/DTO project renewal).	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

APR 12 9 32 AM '71

Subject worked most of the year in the station PBRUMEN section. She was clearly outstanding in collating information from all sources during a recent intensified "PBRUMEN" month, determining as a result the overall pattern of the PBRUMEN mission here, spotting operational leads and updating target studies on all PBRUMEN officials as a result. Her final writeup regarding both new information obtained and the gaps that remain was thorough and useful.

Subject is extraordinarily rapid and efficient in researching for info, organizing files and other material and writing up any kind of resulting memo or dispatch. The same might be said perhaps of some other real pros in the IA field. However, in addition, Subject has a good, tough, operations-oriented mind and positively contributes ideas and suggestions re new operational techniques which the station has used profitably. Subject has natural managerial abilities as recently demonstrated in her organizing TDY help in a station-wide file and watchlist effort in connection with a presidential visit. Her Spanish is more than adequate for reading reports, and handling operational messages in that language. In sum, Subject is a tremendous station asset and would be extremely hard to replace without noting a serious loss in station efficiency.

-continued

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 5 March 1971	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Charlotte P. Bustos-Videla

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 5 March 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ John Issminger

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Although in my opinion there is an excessive use of "outstanding" by the rating officer, I am in accord with his narrative comments. Subject is definitely more than an IA and has performed as such when the station has required an individual with in-depth knowledge of station procedures, operational awareness combined with an ability to prepare studies in a short period of time. She's thorough, concise and rapid. One of our hardest workers and most dependable employees.

DATE 25 March 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ George A. Fill

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS -continued

Three rather personalized comments might add meaning to this fitness report. Anyone, particularly a female, fitting the above description of efficiency and achievement can be, and often is a little overbearing and difficult to work with as a person. Subject, withall, is a pleasant personality who knows how to make her contributions and comments in a forthright but tactful manner. Secondly, and this one is a little hard to say, Subject in her voracious appetite for all kinds of facts can at times put undue emphasis on them including factual minutiae as against equally important but more elusive subjective factors. Thirdly, this rating officer has personally observed Subject only working on station premises at an office job, and frankly has no idea how she might function in outside operational work (cultivating people, working under outside cover).

Reviewed by CP SPD/ZPB

SECRET/RYBAT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

CHARLOTTE BUSTOS VIDELA

SUBJECT: Overall Outstanding Rating on [redacted]:
Method of Recognition

1. This memo is being written in accordance with paragraph three of Book Dispatch 5273 of 12 April 1966.

2. [redacted] was last granted a Quality Step Increase about a year ago in recognition of her very fine performance. It is a little early to repeat that kind of recognition even though it is a most logical and meaningful means to show recognition of her outstanding work.

3. Consideration should be given to an appropriate occasion in the fairly near future to grant another QSI to [redacted].

SECRET/RYBAT

Reviewed by OP.SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BustoeVidela Charlotte Z	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Branch 1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
28 February 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 August 1939 - 31 December 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Complete reorganization of Station files, including development of new procedures, revision of file categories, consolidation, purging and destruction.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Provides overall guidance to Station and TDY personnel engaged in reorganization of Station files. Supervision of Secretary-Receptionist.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Special assistance to COS/DCOS in revamping the paper flow within the Station and between the Station and other Government agencies.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of special studies for the COS/DCOS concerning the effectiveness of Station paper handling procedures, personnel economies related thereto and the improvement of Station	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 utilization of manpower, space and funds as a result of the reorganization of Station Registry functions and personnel.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-68 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In July 1969 Subject was transferred from the Cuba Section to the Station front office to serve as an executive assistant to the COS with special responsibility for ensuring that the paper flow of the Station remained under effective control during the period of transition resulting from the assignment here of several senior officers. This transition period necessitated or gave rise to a number of changes in the management and administrative areas of the Station. Subject's performance in this assignment under these circumstances was clearly outstanding. Her sound judgement, imagination and responsiveness to guidance not only contributed to maintaining the stability and momentum of the Station but also made possible an early effort to come to grips with many of the problems which an inflated Registry and a highly distinctive records system created for the new Station management team.

During the ensuing six month period, Subject has recommended and implemented a number of changes which have produced a more effective and less costly records system. Paper holdings have been reduced substantially, input has been reduced and now conforms to basic CS procedures and requirements. Personnel savings have been effected and supervisory responsibilities more clearly delineated.

To sum up, Subject has made and continues to make a major contribution in a singularly unsensational area of Station activity. Her advice is sought and appreciated not only by the COS and myself, but by other

(CONTINUED)

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 January 1970	/s/ Charlotte Bustos-Videla

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
6 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 January 1970	DCOS	/s/ Paul V. Harwood

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: It would be difficult to overstate the contribution made by Subject to this Station during the past six month period, and I concur fully in the ratings and comments of the Rating Officer. I might add that Subject is one of the more versatile, conscientious and productive employees with whom I have worked in this organization, and that in addition to the administrative/management role outlined above, continued to provide valuable operational/analytical assistance to the Cuban and other operational sections of the Station. The initiative and imagination shown by Subject in the very complicated administrative management assignment have been particularly commendable and her complete familiarity with the country, the language, and the background of the Station has been invaluable during this period of change.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 January 1970	COS	/s/ James B. Noland

SECRET

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS** **CONTINUED**

personnel who appreciate her personal and professional qualities.

Subject is aware that her current assignment is an unusual one and that she soon may have worked herself out of her current job. Since she speaks fluent Spanish, has a unique ability to get along with people and to get things done, there will be no problem in assigning her back into a position more closely supporting operations. Our operations are certain to benefit thereby.

14-00000

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BUSTOSVIDELA, Charlotte Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE 13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/FF/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- XX CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: October 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): March to August 1969.

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Until she was called to other duties in the front office of the Station, did analysis on PBRUMEN targets of Station interest, collated information and prepared studies. DC40	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screened the raw product of several technical operations and processed intelligence and operational information in close cooperation with two full time senior outside transcribers whom she handled completely.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Handled the Station PBRUMEN watchlist and travel program, and reported travel information to WOFIRM Stations and other customers.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Provided operational support (file checks, operational reviews, liaison memoranda, etc.) for various Station activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Contributed to the preparation of monthly summaries and project reporting (outlines, renewals, etc.)	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Handled special projects for the Station in addition to her PBRUMEN duties.	O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject's performance continued during the period under review to deserve high praise. Her enormous appetite for work, her attention to detail, her ability to absorb and digest enormous files and complicated cases, her professionalism and devotion to the duties entrusted to her really deserve the rating of outstanding. Subject speaks good Spanish, has considerable initiative, much experience in analytic work and a genuine talent for administrative work.

In view of her past performance, her record at the Station and her potential, Subject who was recommended for promotion to the GS-14 level should be promoted as soon as possible.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 August 1969	Charlotte Z. Bustosvidela (signed)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 August 1969	Ops. Officer	Francis Sherry (signed)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject is indeed an exceptional officer who is highly deserving of the foregoing ratings and related accolades. In her new role as executive assistant to the COS she has been invaluable during the difficult and complicated transition from the old regime to the new, and the related reorganization of the Station. Her organizational abilities are unsurpassed by anyone known to the undersigned, and she certainly merits consideration for early promotion.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 August 1969	Chief of Station	James B. Noland

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/PD/EAB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
January 1968 - March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counselling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handles Station PBRUMEN watchlist and travel program and reports travel information to WOFIRM stations and other custumers	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens the raw product of several technical operations and processes intelligence and operational information in close cooperation with two full time senior transcribers whom she handles completely	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Does analysis on targets of Station interest, collates information and prepares studies	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Contributes to the preparation of monthly summaries and project reporting (outlines, renewals, etc.)	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Provides operational support (file, checks, operational reviews, liaison memoranda, etc. for various Station activities	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject's performance during the period of over one year under review continued to deserve the rating of Outstanding. Her major contributions during that period were in the fields of operational research and exploitation of information obtained through technical means. She was, during this period, given full responsibility for the handling of two full time senior transcribers including administrative matters. In view of the difficulty of recruiting target personnel the task of fully exploiting information obtained from technical sources is of great importance. Subject handled this task with her usual enormous capability for work, displaying initiative and great professionalism. She continued, in addition, to handle the other tasks listed in this report together with sensative reporting sent by a separate channel, altogether a much heavier workload than is usually carried by one person. She was helped in this by her good knowledge of Spanish, a talent for administrative work, considerable analytic experience and great devotion to her work. Subject should be considered for promotion to the grade of GS-14 at the first opportune moment.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
3 April 69	Charlotte Bustos-Videla /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
19 months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 April 69	Ops Officer	Francis Sherry /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer fully agrees with the ratings and comments of the rating officer. Subject consistently performs her duties in an outstanding manner, bringing to her job truly exceptional qualities of intelligence, reliability, and good humor. She is one of the most valuable employees in the Station, and the recommendation for her promotion from GS-13 to GS-14 is fully and enthusiastically endorsed.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 April 69	COS,	Winston Scott /s/

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Soviet Bloc Operations Course No. 3 5 - 16 June 1967
80 hours, full time

Student : BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte **Office** : DDP/WH

Year of Birth: 1929 **Service Designation:** D

Grade : GS-13 **No. of Students** : 34

EOD Date : August, 1951

COURSE OBJECTIVES

To orient the student on the special nature of the Clandestine Services' Soviet Bloc target and to train him in the application of clandestine methods for collecting information on, assessing, and preparing recruitment operations against Soviet Bloc personalities.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No evaluation is made of individual performance in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

[illegible]
Russell A. Langelle Date
Instructor, OTR

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- XXX ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 29 February 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): August 1967 through January 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handles Station PBRUMEN program (maintains a watchlist, screens travel documents and reports travel information to WOFIRM stations and other interested customers).	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens the raw product of technical operations and processes the intelligence and operational information.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Does analysis on targets of Station interest, pulling documents together, collating information and preparing studies.	O
Helps with the preparation of monthly summaries and project reporting (outlines, renewals etc.).	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Provides operational support (file checks, operational reviews, liaison memoranda etc.) for various Station activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. Reviewed by C[illegible]	O

FORM 6-64 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Since her arrival at this Station, Subject's performance has truly been outstanding. She has, on her own initiative, reorganized many of the operational files and procedures of the PBRUMEN Section. She has made particularly useful exhaustive analyses of the documents concerning a number of Station targets not only per request of this Station but also on her own initiative. She has revamped the Section's travel program, curtailing the watchlist to more manageable size and expediting the reporting of travel information to the many customers for such information. Her thorough review of the take of several technical operations has increased their usefulness as well as emphasized their weaknesses.

Subject's [illegible] talent for administration, her initiative, sharp analytic mind and good knowledge of Spanish have greatly facilitated the operation of the PBRUMEN Section of this Station at a time of almost complete personnel change. She has not been directly involved with the actual running of operations both because she appears much better suited for the support type work intrusted to her and because she frankly would not have the time under present circumstances to do so. Subject is carrying the workload usually handled by more than one person.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
16 Jan. 1968	/s/ Charlotte Bustos-Videla

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
5 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 Jan. 1968	Ops Officer	Francis Sherry

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer fully concurs in the evaluation of Subject by the Rating Officer. Subject consistently turns in a superior performance, whatever her task, and for a Station Chief the only problem she presents is to determine where best to assign her. She is a source of strength to her Section, has the knack of making herself irreplaceable.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 January 1968	Chief of Station	Winston D. Miller

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustosvidela, C.Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION HQS		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 Jan 67

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1/66 - 12/66

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handles all aspects of 22 FI/CE/Support projects including project actions, logistical and financial support, requirements, guidance and review.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles all matters concerning the agents belonging to these projects including field agents, Contract, Career, and Staff Agents. This includes OA/CSA's, contracts, training, travel, cover and funding.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares, or helps prepare, miscellaneous memoranda and studies, such as monthly FI achievements, operational program, budget exercises, responses to requests on operations or background info regarding Mexico.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Routes correspondence, supervises tickler system, maintains project, agent, and subject 201 files.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Branch records officer.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

20 MAR 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

[illegible]

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 6-64 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

14-00000

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 16 10 33 AM '67
MAIL ROOM

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has continued to perform during the period under review in the same highly competent manner which all who know her have come to expect of her. She continues to put forth her best efforts at all times. She is particularly to be commended for the manner in which she cheerfully accepts onerous tasks, usually with very short deadlines, and invariably comes up with a thoroughly prepared answer within the time allotted. She is efficient, she is fully knowledgeable and capable in her job, she has a friendly, warm, and pleasant personality, and is always ready to respond to her fellow workers with a helping hand. She has no supervisory responsibility per se, but is frequently called upon for guidance to new secretaries and case officers alike and is of real help in such cases. Subject is one of the strongest Headquarters case officers known to rater, and her overall performance certainly borders very closely on being evaluated Outstanding.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 18	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 30 January 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/WH/1	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE J.H.V. Fisher

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur. An outstanding officer recognized as such and appreciated by all.

DATE 31 January 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/1	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE W.J. Kaufman

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BUSTOSVIDELA, C. Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January - 31 December 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handles all aspects of 22 FI/CE/Support projects including project actions, logistical and financial support, requirements, guidance and review.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles all matters concerning the agents belonging to these projects including field agents, Contract, Career, and Staff Agents. This includes OA/CSA's, contracts, training, travel, cover and funding.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares, or helps prepare, miscellaneous memoranda and studies, such as monthly FI achievements, operational program, budget exercises, responses to requests on operations or background info regarding Mexico.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Routes correspondence, supervises tickler system, maintains project, agent, and subject 201 files.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Branch records officer.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

25 JAN 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 25 12 33 PM '66
MAIL ROOM

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to render a superior performance. She is efficient, thoroughly knowledgeable, rapid in her work, well organized, and greatly facilitates the smooth functioning of the office. The quality of Subject's work has been recognized fully in previous fitness reports and in previous recommendations for promotion from GS-12 to 13. This high quality of work has continued throughout the period of this fitness report and Subject continues to merit promotion.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Four	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 20 Jan. 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/WH/1	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE J.H.V. Fisher

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Reviewing Officer agrees with above report and endorses Subject's fitness for promotion.

DATE [illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/1	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE W.J. Kaufman

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F.	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1964 - 31 December 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handles all aspects of 21 FI/CE/Support projects including project actions, logistical support, requirements, guidance, reviews.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handle all matters concerning the agents belonging to these projects, including field agents, Contract, Career and Staff Agents. This includes OA/CSA's, contracts, training, PCS arrangements, cover, funding.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepare, or help prepare, miscellaneous memoranda and studies, such as monthly FI achievements, Operational Program, responses to requests from the Senior Staffs on operations and on Mexico itself.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervise one Intelligence Assistant in the maintenance of a desk tickler system and the agent and subject 201 files at the desk.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

23 MAR 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This exceptionally competent and productive officer continued to perform at a level well above that of the GS-13 slot she occupies. While a good deal of her tremendous effectiveness stems from experience, continuity on the job and her natural retentive memory, during the period under review she also demonstrated a flair for, and applied her talents to, the solution of relatively major and complex planning and managerial problems in the area of operational support to Mexico Station activities.

To the list of her previously abudantly acknowledged capacity for hard, effective work, talent for training on the job younger officers, diligence, and versatile ability, this rater would like to add a note of appreciation for her everpresent tactfullness and discretion. No weaknesses affecting her present assignment have been noted; she is very careful and realistic in planning for expenditure of funds.

This officer is separately being recommended for promotion to GS-13.

WH will review this fitness report with others during a special meeting scheduled periodically to consider suitable recommendation for outstanding performance.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 3-17-65

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: DC/WH/1

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: A. Spera Alfonso Spera

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur

DATE: 3-17-65

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WH/1

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: W. J. Kaufman

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH 3	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1963 - 31 December 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handle Project action, operational correspondence, support for 19 FI and OPs Support type projects, effecting proper coordination with senior staffs, other divisions, and offices.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handle clearance actions, contracts, and administrative matters for agents falling under these projects, and for the entire Desk in the absence of the Intell Analyst.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepare miscellaneous memoranda, budgets, and reports requested by Senior Staffs and Division officers from the Mexican desk on Mexican matters in general.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervise the clerical and administrative personnel on the desk (averaging 4) and in general see to the smooth functioning of the desk and the flow of paper.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer for WH/3/M	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Assume the responsibilities of C/WH/3/M when the Chief of the desk is absent, signing dispatches and cables, coordinating, and supervising 2 Reports Officers and 5 Case Officers.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 14 FEB 1964	O

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject's performance during the rating period has been marked by general excellence. As indicated in Section B her supervision and direction of the Section's work relating to intel support, administration, preparation of special reports, training personnel, etc. is uniformly outstanding. The fact that these functions are handled in addition to her duties as the desk officer for the FI and Ops Support projects, which she performs with unusual competence, serves to illustrate her value to this Section. She has an exceptional ability independently to determine proper courses of action and to initiate action to carry them out. She has a profound understanding of the area operational program and contributions to it are imaginative and constructive.

In the opinion of the rater Subject's performance compares favorably with any GS-13 desk officer within his experience and she performs occasionally at the GS-14 level. Moreover, she carries out her duties cheerfully, loyally and in close and amicable cooperation with her fellow employees at all levels.

In those aspects of her duties which involve cost e.g. the review of operational projects, she has given close attention to the budgetary matters and has frequently suggested ways in which economies an the operations might be effected.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 28 January 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 1-28-64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/3/Mexico	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Bernard C. Reichhardt Bernard Reichhardt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the high rating given this employee. She is undoubtedly the ablest employee in this branch in the performance of her particular job.

DATE 29 Jan 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/3	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John M. Whitten

SECRET

C O N F I D E N T I A L
(When Filled In)

REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE APTITUDE AND EXPERIENCE

~~[illegible]~~ (Name) ______ (Office) ~~Female~~ (Sex) ~~27 September [illegible]~~ (Date of testing)

The category checked below is an interpretation of the scores made by the person named above on a battery of foreign language aptitude tests. The relationships between test performance and subsequent training performance of trainees in Agency language training courses are indicated by the graphs next to the aptitude categories. The graphs to the left are for women and the graphs to the right are for men. From these graphs you can read for each aptitude category the probability that a person in that category will perform in an Agency foreign language training course at an average or better-than-average level. For example, 22 per cent of the women who obtain an aptitude rating of "8" can be expected to be average or better in course performance, while 5 per cent of the men with ratings of "8" can be expected to be average or better in course performance. A man needs an aptitude rating of "6" to have about the same expectation of success in language training as a woman with a rating of "8". At the other end of the scale, 80 per cent of either men or women who obtain aptitude ratings of "2" can be expected to do average or better-than-average work in training. The differences in relationship are due to differences between men and women in both training performance and test scores. On the average women are somewhat higher on both.

Percent of Women Whose Language Training Performance Is Expected to Be Average or Better than Average

Aptitude Category

Percent of Men Whose Language Training Performance Is Expected to Be Average or Better than Average



Since many things other than aptitudes enter into the determination of training course performance, in any class of students there will usually be some whose performance will be better than would be expected from their test scores, just as there will likely be some whose performance is poorer than expected. STRENGTH OF MOTIVATION, PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH A FOREIGN LANGUAGE, and other factors should be considered in selecting people for language training and in interpreting language training results. For example, the number of languages previously studied or learned and the amount of academic and non-academic language-learning experience are factors not measured by the tests but are indicative of probable success in learning a foreign language. Whether such experience was in the same language as the one to be studied or in a different one is, of course, an additional relevant factor.

___1___ foreign languages have been studied or learned by this individual.

Months of Academic Training			Non-Academic Experience (1 year or more)	
High School	College	Other	Reading or Writing	Speaking
18	54	32	no	no

This report may be shown to the individual concerned.

/s/ EDWARD A. RUNDQUIST
EDWARD A. RUNDQUIST

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

RECORDS OFFICERS COURSE 30 April - 4 May 1962

Student : Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla Office : WH/3
Year of Birth: 1929 Service Designation: D
Grade : GS-12 Number of Students : 34
EOD Date : Aug 1951

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

This course, designed for present and prospective Records Officers, has four principal objectives.

1. To give an appreciation for the Agency's CS mission.
2. To describe the role that records play in the discharge by the Agency of the responsibilities inherent in the mission.
3. To emphasize the importance of records and proper records management in the successful performance of the stated mission.
4. To increase awareness of the inter-relationships between the CS mission and records; to sharpen judgement in the handling and disposition of records; and to improve performance of Records Officers.

The student is instructed through the media of lectures, directed reading, practical exercises and discussions.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only; no attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Augustus F. Schermerhorn 24 July 1962
Chief Instructor Date

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH 3		8. CURRENT STATION	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 Jan - 30 Dec 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises office staff of Mexico Desk in preparing correspondence, keeping files, carding, and training new personnel.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Desk intelligence officer for important satellite and FI operations in Mexico, processing projects, handling operational correspondence, conducting liaison with other divisions.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Routing cables, dispatches for the entire Desk, supervising distribution of work.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Personally handling large number of clearances, project approvals, cable coordinations, and official negotiations on matters touching all aspects of the Desk's work.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Preparation of budget, special papers, surveys, and briefings.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

28 FEB 1963

FORM 5-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This officer is the person chiefly responsible for the Mexico Desk's deserved reputation for excellence and efficiency. The complicated and never-ending tasks of project processing, clearances, tracing, and coordination are handled by her with blinding speed and unerring perfection. Procedural problems are there to be solved, and the solutions come with amazing rapidity. Operational problems are worked out thoroughly and conscientiously. No corners are cut and no principles are compromised.

Never at a loss for an answer, this officer never shrinks from any assignment and instinctively wants to take over any vexing problem which is holding up progress. She is complete mistress of file and record resources and answers all queries within minutes. The most complex budgetary and planning projects are handled by her with deceptive ease.

These qualities of rare efficiency and speed are coupled with an even rarer degree of amiability and cooperativeness. The work which proceeds under her at such a break-neck pace nonetheless goes on in an air of placidity and good humor. The large office staff is run without a trace of tension, jealousy, or friction. All of this is traceable to this officer's fine example and catalytic effect on her colleagues.

Finely-educated, handling the Spanish language with fluency, and keeping up with current events in her area, this officer is a unique asset to our organization.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 26 February 1963
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 26 February 1963
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/WH/3/MEXICO
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: John M. Whitten
John. M. Whitten

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE: 26 February 1963
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: AC/WH/3
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Forrest Shivers

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE 1962	**FITNESS REPORT**	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER CSFD 0076[illegible]7

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BUSTOS-VIDELA Charlotte Z	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 January 1929	3. SEX Female	4. GRADE 12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3/D. C.	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1962	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 1 Jan 61 - 31 Dec 61	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for Project renewals and other correspondence and action on 12 support type projects for Mexico City and Monterrey	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assist the Chief of the desk in administration of office to assure the smooth functioning of the desk. Includes distribution of work,	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handle miscellaneous adm and support matters (requests for tech equip, studies, training guides, etc) for Mexico and Monterrey	RATING NO. 7	~~SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5~~ routing of pouches and cables, supervision of clerical staff of 4.	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervise maintenance of records at the desk and represent Desk as Records Officer in discussions with [illegible] on Hs and field records problems	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							
THINKS CLEARLY							
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-54 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

FEB 12 11 43 AM '62

This outstanding employee has maintained the high standard of performance set forth in the report of this supervisor [illegible]go. Where possible, she has exceeded her earlier performance record. During the past year this office acquired considerable new personnel, which Subject trained in a highly capable manner to guarantee the smooth-functioning of the office. The undersigned hopes this employee will continue to serve this organization indefinitely notwithstanding her marriage during the past year.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 23 January 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Christine

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 24	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 23 January 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Desk	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John G. Hoyn John G. Hoyn

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 6 Feb 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/7	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Fred

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

13 JAN 1961

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Zehrung Charlotte	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan. 1929	3. SEX Female	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3/Mexi/DC	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1961	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 30 Sep 59 - 31 Dec 60	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for Project renewals and other correspondence and action on 12 supporttype projects for Mexico City and Monterrey	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assist the Chief of the Desk in administration of office to assure the smooth functioning of the desk. Includes distribution of work, routing ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ of pouches and cables, supervision of clerical staff of 4.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handle miscellaneous admin and support matters (requests for tech equip, studies, training guides, etc) for Mexico and Monterrey	RATING NO. 7		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervise maintenance of records at the desk and represent Desk as Records Officer in discussions with RID on Hqs and field records problems.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

MAIL ROOM

This is a truly outstanding employee with capabilities far beyond those required for her present position. She has an unusually keen mind, makes decisions that are correct without hesitation and carries out all actions promptly and efficiently. She is the supervisor of the office staff, who respect and admire her ability. In addition to her skill, she is possessed of a most pleasing disposition which ingratiates her with the other members of the staff. The years of experience she has had at the various jobs to be done at a country desk make her invaluable as a trainer and supervisor for new personnel. Her knowledge of Spanish has also been especially helpful at the Mexican Desk. This supervisor would be most pleased to have her serve with him on any future assignment.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 31 December 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 31 December 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Desk Chief, WH/3/Mexico	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John G. Heyn

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 5 Jan 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/3	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14 1959

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZEHRUNG, Charlotte	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan. 1929	3. SEX Female	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I.O. (FI)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/III/Mexi/DC	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 October 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 31 May 59 To 30 Sep 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible Case Officer for several FI and CE/CI Projects	RATING NO. 5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Consults and coordinates with various Hqs components re Station's Projects and Operations	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles large volume of correspondence with Station in support of Operations	RATING NO. 6/7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares, reviews and coordinates memoranda	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises maintenance of desk records and project files	RATING NO. 6/7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5/6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-56 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
2 40 PM '59
MAIL ROOM

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Please see previous fitness report. This employee was rated four months ago. There is no change in the rating; she has continued to give an outstanding performance.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 2 Oct 59

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: [illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 26 months

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS

☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 12 Oct 1959

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/WH/III/Mexico

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: John E. Brady

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE:

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WH/III

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Robert R. Dahlgren
Robert R. Dahlgren

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2 JUL 1959

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. GRADE 11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I.O. (FI)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/III/Mexico/DC	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 August 1958

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 28 August 1957- To 31 May 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible Case Officer for several FI and CE/CI Projects	5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Consults and coordinates with various Hqs components regarding Station's Projects and Operations	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles large volume of correspondence with Station in support of Operations	6/7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares, reviews and coordinates memoranda	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises maintenance of desk records and project files	6/7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5/6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 2-55 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OF PERSONNEL
JUL 21 2 51 PM '59
MAIL ROOM

This employee is intelligent, loyal and dedicated to duty. She has an outstanding ability in getting her job assignments accomplished effectively and with a minimum of time and support. She readily accepts responsibility, is a highly efficient worker who thinks clearly and logically. Her knowledge of Headquarters and Field procedures plus her ability to organize her work greatly facilitates the smooth functioning of the Mexican Desk. She has demonstrated a superior comprehension of the numerous and varied projects of the Mexico City Station which has contributed to the overall Headquarters support of the Station's operations. Because of her sound understanding of operations and her outstanding capacity for work, Miss Zehrung has an excellent potential for assuming greater responsibilities. Additional training is dependent upon her future assignments.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
[illegible] '59	[illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
22 months	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
11 June 1959	C/WH/III/Mexico	John B. Brady

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
[illegible] July 1959	C/WH/III	R.H. Dahlgren

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/II/DC/Argentina/MEXICO	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Reports Officer		
7. GRADE GS-11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 4 Nov 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 28 August 1956 - 27 August 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL HE RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
☐	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 20 January 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR John B. Brady John B. Brady	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/WH/III/Mexico

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
Posted Pos Cont'l 21 JAN 1958
JAN 30 1958

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 21 January 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL R. N. Dahlgren	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/III

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

6
INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF ... JAN 24 2 09 PM '58 MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises maintenance of desk records and project files.	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Extracts pertinent information from reports and statistics for the preparation of studies	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reviews and coordinates memoranda	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares cables and dispatches for the field	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Processes for dissemination reports from field stations	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises maintenance of country desk files	RATING NUMBER 6

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

This employee is a highly efficient worker who in accomplishing her job assignments has performed in a very outstanding manner. She has the ability to think clearly and logically and at all times exercises extreme good judgment. Her knowledge of Hqs and field procedures constitutes a great asset and she has the facility for picking up loose ends and keeping an office smoothly running. She is willing to undertake any assignment that facilitates getting the job done and is entirely capable of seeing that the job is properly done. Her contribution to the job reflects conscientiousness, loyalty and devotion to duty far above the average.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY... WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE... BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZEHRUNG, Charlotte	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/II/DC/~~Argentina~~/MEXICO	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Reports Officer		
7. GRADE GS-11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 4 Nov 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 28 August 1956 - 27 August 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 20 January 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR John B. Brady John B. Brady	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/WH/III/Mexico

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 21 January 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL R. N. Dahlgren	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/III

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MAIL ROOM
JAN 24 2 09 PM '58

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

7 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Her potential has a wide range. She has the ability to organize and direct a sizeable office of reports writers and to supervise the administrative operations for a large office. She has a distinct aptitude for operations and her potential in the field of operational support work as well as in the direct handling of operations is a good one.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None recommended at this time.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

NOTE TO PCS RETURNEES

Personnel processing in from a PCS foreign field assignment through Central Processing Branch are required to review the Employee Conduct Handbook and the information for PCS returnees. This information is contained in a notebook provided by the CPB receptionist.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 9 July 1970 and the information for returnees dated 1 February 1972.

CHARLOTTE Z. BUSTOS-VIDELA
NAME
(Please Print)

Charlotte J. Bustos-Videla
Signature

5 February 1972
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

Group 1 - Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification.

1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
007667	Bustosvidela	Charlotte	Z

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 38, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			08	10	72		1			Mexico	450

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
✓	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. FN 680799

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 8/10/72

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		✓ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	CCO	DATE 8/11/72	SIGNATURE
☐	C & L DIVISION, CTRD.		
✓	E & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET

OFF

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla	DATE (from item S-1) 8 Sep 1971	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) John R. Horton	DATE (from item S-2) 8 Sep 1971
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 15 September 1971	DISPATCH NUMBER: HMMT 11,086, 8 Sep 1971	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Cuba/CI; GS-13	4. STATION OR BASE Mexico City	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER Nominal LNGOLD

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 28 July 1967	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 9 Sept. 1972	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ ------	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 16 October (3 weeks H/L) (2 weeks A/L)

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

None

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

My husband is currently a professor in New York City, and I would very much appreciate an assignment in New York City so I may join him there. I would ~~x~~be agreeable to changing somewhat my departure date from Mexico if it would help in my accepting an opening in New York City. (My reason for requesting the two month extension is to insure my 5 years overseas duty so as to qualify for the organization's retirement plan.)

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

1. Analysis of personality and target data from raw and finished reports, preparation of target studies, and finished intelligence dissems.
2. Operational reporting: cables, dispatches, projects, progress reports, etc.
3. Handling of outside transcribers. (off and on).
4. Records control and purge of Station files.
5. Preparation of memos for other components of LNCUFF.
6. General Ops support IA type work.

10. TRAINING DESIRED: INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

FORM 5-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT.

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☒ EXTEND TOUR 2 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO 9 September (DATE).

2 ☒ BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE DOD 2ND CHOICE EUR 3RD CHOICE WHD

1 ☒ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE New York 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

3 ☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Those of you who know her realize that I would hardly give up SCALETTI, even after five years on the job, without a fight, did not other reasons intervene. Her husband is working in New York now and so her remaining here any longer than needed for her to qualify for her retirement time, as she explains, is a needless hardship. (It would help us if you would confirm that time: is that the date needed for her to remain in order to qualify?) Please do your best to arrange

-continued

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Subject will be assigned as chief of the CA Section, WH/Branch One. She is being notified via HMMS 7580.

DATE 9Jun72 TITLE DC/WH/Pers SIGNATURE Jane Wurz

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ______ DATED: ______
CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

12. **CONTINUED**

an assignment in New York for her. She is such a valuable person that anyone who has worked with her would be glad to have her on the premises: so there is no need to try to "sell" her: it's just the question of whether the timing would be right, I should think.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) BUSTOS-VIDELA	(First) Charlotte	(Middle) Z	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 069-24-3138

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY Washington, D.C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) Washington, D.C.
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Dayton, Ohio	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE Dayton, Ohio

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Dayton, Ohio	DATE OF MARRIAGE March 18, 1961
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE NA	DATE OF DECREE NA
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED NA	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
NA

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE Cesar Bustos-Videla	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) Apartado Postal 6-940, Mexico 6, D.F. MEXICO		TELEPHONE NO. MEXICO CITY 525-42-36
NAMES OF CHILDREN NA	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian) Samuel D. Zehrung m	ADDRESS 425 Dayton Towers Dr, Dayton, Ohio		TELEPHONE NO. 513-222-2550
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian) Hazel Zehrung	ADDRESS Same		TELEPHONE NO. Same

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY, IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Cesar Bustos-Videla	RELATIONSHIP husband
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) see above	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER see above
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE Universidad de las Americas, Puebla, MEXICO	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)
yes
YES ☒ NO ☐

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)
YES ☒ NO ☐

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)
YES ☒ NO ☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 61 USE PREVIOUS
5-57 EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

JUN 22 11 00 AM '78
CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. **VOLUNTARY ENTRIES**

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

All financial information is on file with our lawyer

Mr. John DAHLGREN
DAHLGREN DARRAGH & CLOSE
1000 Conn. Ave., N.W., Washington D.C.

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

On file with lawyer listed above

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

NA

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

Believe the lawyer has this also

6. **ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS**

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Hqs.	22 June 1970	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 7 October 1963, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

Signature

22 June 1970
Date

BUSTOS Videla, Charlotte

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA)	DATE (from item S-1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item S-2)
Charlotte Bustos-Videla	26 Jan. 70	James B. Noland	26 Jan. 19,0

DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS:	DISPATCH NUMBER:	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:
2 Feb. 1970	HMMT-10102	10 APR 1970

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE	4. STATION OR BASE	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER
12 Jan 29		Exec Assistant, GS-13	MEXICO CITY Station	Tourist

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE
28 July 1967	16 Aug 1970	Will not go Hdqs unless requested	26 Oct 1970

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

none

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

Subject wishes to remain overseas for a minimum of two more years to complete her 5 years overseas requirement.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (*see special note on transmittal form*). (*also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8*)

1. During most of Subject's tour in Mexico she has been the Cuban IA. In this job she also handled some Cuban operational matters including two outside contract employees.

2. During this period she also handled some sensitive projects for the COS.

3. During the last six months Subject has been Exec Asst to the COS/DCOS concentrating on file and administrative reorganization of the Station.

4. Subject has had supervisory responsibility over one to three clerical/TDY staff for short periods.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

None

FORM 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I enjoy both Administrative and Ops/IA work.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

3 ☐ EXTEND TOUR: 12 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO Aug 1971 (DATE).

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HQDTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

1 ☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Paris 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

2 ☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION for 2nd tour.

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Would not stand in Subject's way, were she to be fortunate enough to get a Paris assignment. However with her long Mexico background (both Hdqs and field) and her multiple talents she has been invaluable in the reorganization of this highly complicated Station under changed circumstances, will continue to be so during the next several years and to lose her would be like losing one's right arm. Therefore we strongly endorse either a second tour or an extension.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

WH Division recommends that subject return to Mexico City for a second tour.

DATE 11 Mar 70 TITLE C/WH/Pers SIGNATURE Henry L. Berthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

New tour in Mexico City

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. HMMA [illegible] DATED: [illegible] 70

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) BUSTOS-VIDELA	(First) [illegible]	(Middle) Z	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 669-21-5138

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY WASHINGTON DC.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) N.A
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE WASHINGTON DC.	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE ~~CLEVELAND~~, OHIO DAYTON, approved by D/Pers on 4 June 7

DIRECTOR OVIC 69

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE DAYTON, OHIO	DATE OF MARRIAGE March 18, 1961
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE NA	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED NA	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
NA.

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE CESAR BUSTOS-VIDELA	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) Bustos LAS AMERICAS UNIV., MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	TELEPHONE NO.	
NAMES OF CHILDREN —	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian) SAMUEL D. ZEHRUNG	ADDRESS APT. 9 F, DAYTON TOWERS [illegible] DAYTON TOWERS ROAD DAYTON, OHIO	TELEPHONE NO. ?	
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian) HAZEL J. ZEHRUNG	ADDRESS SAME	TELEPHONE NO. ?	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
am telling all my family I am resigning 15 July 67.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) MRS. PFLAUMER, Mary Elizabeth (Mrs. DALE)	RELATIONSHIP SISTER
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) 576 LAKE FOREST DRIVE, BAY VILLAGE, OHIO 44140	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER 216-871-0689
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE —	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) only witting I used to work for govt.	YES	
	NO	X
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) lawyer is executor [illegible]. Mrs. Dale Pflaumer may make personal decisions.	YES	X
	NO	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	X
	NO	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

8. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

The National Bank of Washington, Dupont Circle Branch, Washington D.C.
joint account with husband
Columbia Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. 5301 Wisc Ave. N.W. D.C.
joint account with husband.

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

Lawyer: Mr John O. Dahlgren
Dahlgren, Darragh & Close
1000 Conn Ave, NW

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

for accepting checks: The National Bank of Washington

9. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
	June 28 1967	

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		
Bustos-Videla	Charlotte	Louise	January 12, 1929	069	24	3138
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY 0071667			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)			

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
Charlotte L. Bustos-Videla

DATE
15 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

[illegible]

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	*(Print)*	7-24	
007667	BUSTOS VIDELA	CHARLOTTE	Z

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
0 7	2 8	6 7					1			MEXICO	5 0

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☒	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: FORM 764

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 2 - 29 JULY 1967

REMARKS
ARRIVAL DATE REPORTED UNDER "OTHER REMARKS" ON DUTY STATUS REPORT.

PREPARED BY				
☐	OCD	☒	REPORT ANNOTATED AS CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	C & L DIVISION, CTSS.	DATE		SIGNATURE
☒	C & T DIVISION	16 APR 1968		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO 007667	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	3. SEX F	4. DATE OF BIRTH 01/12/29	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS-13-06
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WH	9. LOCATION (Country, City) MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
~~NO OVERSEAS SERVICE~~			
MEXICO CITY STATION 1st tour		27 JULY 1967	10 JUNE 1970
2nd tour		1970	—

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: INITIALS: S
26 JUN

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	ECONOMICS, GENERAL	SYRACUSE UNIV NY	50

FORM 1-67 444J
Mfg 2-67

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried. SPECIFY)

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) BUSTOS VIDELA (First) Cesar (Middle) — (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH: Feb 27, 1922

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): SAN JUAN ARGENTINA

5. OCCUPATION: PROFESSOR

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER: UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS AMERICAS, ~~Pue~~ Cholula, MEXICO

7. CITIZENSHIP: USA (naturalized)

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (COUNTRY(IES)): Argentine

9. DATE U. S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: 1956

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

DATE: 22 June 1970

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Charlotte J. Bustos Videla

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE	CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR
	BUSTOS-VIDELA, CHARLOTTE										

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
								10/17/72	01/12/29	13	WH

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN SPANISH (NEW WORLD) BL18 (NAME OF LANGUAGE) AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
N	+	+	I+	H

TEST RATINGS
0 = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE
S = SLIGHT H = HIGH
E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

"4" indicates not tested [illegible] Speaking grade.

CL BY 017470
EX-2 IMPDET
WISMI

12. SIGNATURE

RLF

13. LD NUMBER

20723

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45)

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION~~

1 - OP/QAB

<• 2	• ~~9-DIGITS~~	• ~~MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS~~

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR	
•	•	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	
•	•	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. CODE C-A-D	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 5	• 007667	• Bus	• C	• BL18	i	i	H	i	i	4	67

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	7. DATE OF TEST MO	DA	YR	
• BL18	N	i	H	i	H	4	72	• 10	17	72	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273. LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO	3. NAME 3-LETTERS
<• 4	•	•

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
A - ADDITION TO RECORD
C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1 BASE	1	2	3	YR	CODE # 2 BASE	1	2	3	YR
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				

FORM 10-58 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO. 117667	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOS-VIDELA, CHARLOTTE Z.	3. TYPE CHANGE A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE / CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST: LAN. CODE / R / W / P / S / U / I/T / YEAR

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST: LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
								06/22/67	01/12/29	13	WH

N O T I C E T O P E R S O N T E S T E D

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN SPANISH (NEW WORLD) BL18 (NAME OF LANGUAGE) AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
I		H	I	I

TEST RATINGS
0 = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE
S = SLIGHT H = HIGH
E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 25 AUG 1967

12. SIGNATURE

13. LD NUMBER 14168

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45) **SECRET** GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION 1 - OP/QAB

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. CODE C-A-D	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<5	407667	BUS	C	BL18	H	I	H	H	N	4	60

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	7. DATE OF TEST MO	DA	YR
BL18	I	I	H	I	I	4	67	06	22	67

DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273 LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA. 2 OCT 1967

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS
<4		

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
A - ADDITION TO RECORD
C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1 BASE	1	2	3	YR	CODE # 2 BASE	1	2	3	YR

FORM 1962a **SECRET** GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO (1-6) [illegible]	LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA	2. ID NO [illegible]

3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE [illegible], Charlotte	4. OFFICE OR DIVISION [illegible]	5. LANGUAGE [illegible]	6. LANG. CODE (25-27) 720
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51 Oct. [illegible], 1960	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE Oct. 11, 1961	9. GRADE 12	10. DATE OF BIRTH Jan. [illegible], 1920

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST		12. TEST SCORES				
		READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
XX	APPLY FOR AWARD	H	I	H	I	H
	ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL					

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)		14. TYPE OF AWARD			
XX	A	ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
	M				
	NA	A	E-I	C	V

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ 100.00 (40-45)

SIGNATURE

DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(13-45)

MRD COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE
10 September 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
3817 Davis Place, N. W., Washington

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
5536 South Dixie Highway, Dayton 9, Ohio

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
Em 2-1618

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
Ohio

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
ZEHRUNG, Samuel Danford

2. RELATIONSHIP
Father

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5536 South Dixie Highway, Dayton 9, Ohio

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
5536 South Dixie Highway, Dayton 9, Ohio. San Rae Gardens

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
MO 3-3511

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
MO 3-3511

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
None

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiancé.

3. NAME (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)

7. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)

11. DATE OF BIRTH

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY

14. PLACE OF ENTRY

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

16. DATE ACQUIRED

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)

18. OCCUPATION

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

[illegible]
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 11 JUL 1958
11 JUL 1958

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM 444b [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Assn.	Dayton, Ohio
Riggs National Bank	Washington, D. C.

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
US

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY (Check (X) one)
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*) INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) 27 Aug 51 - 27 Apr 52
2. GRADE 5
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/II (Hqs)
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 0
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Secretary (Steno)
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) 27 Apr 52 - 27 Sept 53
2. GRADE 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/II (Hqs)
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intell Officer (Rpts)
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

All duties of Reports Officer

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) 27 Sept 53 - 10 Apr 55
2. GRADE 9
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/II (Hqs)
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION one to two
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Reports Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Duties of Chief reports officer ~~mx~~

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) 10 Apr 55 - June 1957
2. GRADE 11
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/II (Hqs)
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION one - two
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief Reports Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) June 1957 - present
2. GRADE 11
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/III (Hqs)
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Reports Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 12 3 42 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION XII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED 10 Sept 57

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) [illegible]

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

2. L D NO. [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) [illegible], [illegible]
4. COMPONENT [illegible]
5. GRADE [illegible]
6. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]
7. LANGUAGE [illegible]
8. CODE (25-27) [illegible]
9. DATE OF TEST [illegible]
10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33) [illegible]
11. TEST PURPOSE ☐ AWARD ☐ SKILL

12. TEST SCORES READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

13. ELIGIBILITY (39) AWARDABLE ☐ A ☐ M ☐ NOT AWARDABLE

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD
SIGNATURE
DATE

15. TYPE OF AWARD A-M	S-I-N	C	R-W-S	D-V
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD $100.00
17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE OBLIGATION REF. NO. SIGNATURE
18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION $
19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION $
20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO. DATE
21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD $
22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.
23. FORWARD CHECK TO
24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT
25. CHECK NO. DATE

FORM 4-58 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (10-48) MRD COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) [illegible]

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

2. L D NO. [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) [illegible], Charlotte
4. COMPONENT [illegible]
5. GRADE [illegible]
6. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]
7. LANGUAGE Spanish
8. CODE (25-27) [illegible]
9. DATE OF TEST [illegible]
10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33) [illegible]
11. TEST PURPOSE ☐ AWARD ☐ SKILL

12. TEST SCORES READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]

13. ELIGIBILITY (39) AWARDABLE ☐ A ☐ M ☐ NOT AWARDABLE

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD
SIGNATURE
DATE

15. TYPE OF AWARD A-M	S-I-N	C	R-W-S	D-V
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD $[illegible]
17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE OBLIGATION REF. NO. SIGNATURE
18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION $
19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION $
20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO. DATE
21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD $
22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.
23. FORWARD CHECK TO [illegible]
[illegible]
24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT
25. CHECK NO. DATE

FORM 4-52 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (10-48) MRD COPY

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
107667

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
ZEHRUNG, Charlotte Louise	January	12	1929

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
Spanish 720	April	2	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

[✓ 2.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY *(newspapers, reference materials, etc.)*, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-43)

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

[✓ 3.] I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 2 April 1957	SIGNATURE Charlotte L.
(46) C	(47)

14-00000

DEADLINE: 29 Sept. 1952

SECRET
Security Information

ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.
Name: Last, First Middle

CODED
FOR
[illegible]
DATE 10-8-52

TO: All C. I. A. Personnel

FROM: Personnel Director

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The Agency is currently revising the system for machine coding employee qualifications, thereby permitting more complete and accurate data on all personnel. The new system will aid in implementing Agency policies on promotion from within by facilitating the selection of personnel with desired education and experience for vacancies which may occur. It is also expected that the new system will provide readily accessible statistics for planning and management purposes.

2. The attached questionnaire is designed to cover adequately those factors in which the Agency is interested. Although the information is, in a large measure, already reflected in previous forms submitted by you, it is felt that your time within the organization may enable you to emphasize those qualifications pertinent to its needs. The questionnaire also serves to bring your education and qualifications record up to date.

3. Your cooperation is requested in completing the questionnaire as thoroughly and accurately as possible and returning it to your Administrative Officer within the time allotted.

George E. Meloon
George E. Meloon
Personnel Director

SECRET
Security Information

FORM NO. 37-132
MAY 1952

14-132

SECRET
Security Information

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry) 7667	2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) ZEHRUNG , Charlotte Luise		3. Office FI
4. Date of Birth 12 Jan. 1929	5. Sex: ___ male (1) x female (2)	Martial Status s Nr. Dependents 0	6. CIA Entry Date: August 1951
7. Citizenship: x U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) x Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other (specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ___		

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

- 1. Less than high school
- 2. High school graduate
- 3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
- 4. Two years college, or less
- 5. Over two years, no degree
- [✓ 6.] Bachelor degree
- 7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
- 8. Masters degree
- 9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	
Syracuse University	Econ.	Span.	9/46	1/5	4	-	B. A.	1/50	115
San Carlos University	Span.		7/48	8/4					5

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
Miami Jacobs Business College	5/50	12/50	7	typing and shorthand

4. Military or Intelligence Training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, command & staff, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. **CIA Experience: State the specific nature of duties performed with CIA and CIG, starting with your present position. Take position titles from your official personnel papers, if you have personal copies. Please do not request your Official Personnel Folder. Include geographic area and subject matter dealt with, if applicable. Position Title is your classification title such as Geographer, Intelligence Officer, etc. Duty Title indicates your organization position such as - Section Chief, Branch Chief, Administrative Assistant, etc., and is to be filled in only if different to the Position Title. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.**

From 4/52 To ____ Tot. mos. ____ Grade 7 Salary $4205.00 Office FI/WH/Brazil Position Title: Intelligence Officer Duty Title: Reports Officer	Description of Duties: I have the responsibility of disseminating and routing all reports received from our Station, take appropriate action on reports received from other agencies by forwarding this information to the field or supplying requested data. I inform the field of additional info at Headquarters on individuals and organizations as requested or as deemed necessary. I also maintain two CE notebooks. Duty Station, if overseas:
From 12/51 To 4/52 Tot. mos. 5 Grade 5 Salary $3410.00 Office FI/WH/Brazil Position Title: Intelligence Officer Duty Title: Reports Officer	Description of Duties: Same as above with a Sub-station. I had less individual responsibility. Duty Station, if overseas:
From 11/51 To ____ Tot. mos. 1 Grade 5 Salary $3410.00 Office FI/EE/II Position Title: Secretary (Stenography) Duty Title:	Description of Duties: As a casual I typed dispatches, memoranda, and disseminations for Branch II. I took a limited amount of shorthand. Duty Station, if overseas:
From 9/51 To ____ Tot. mos. 1 Grade 5 Salary $3410.00 Office RC Position Title: Secretary (Stenography) Duty Title:	Description of Duties: I assembled disseminated reports. Duty Station, if overseas:

Two months in the pool attending classes and setting up filing system for Russian Index cards.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.)

From 4/51 To 8/51 Tot. mo's 4 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) 3 Salary $2650.00 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: none Employer Department of Interior Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Statistical Draftsman Description of Duties: I did statistical drafting, cartography, [illegible] er, [illegible]. Duty Station if overseas:
From 5/50 To 3/51 Tot. mo's 11 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary 1.10 /hr. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 2 - 6 clerks Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Nursery and Gift Shoppe	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: As an assistant to the executives I was responsible for purchasing stock for the gift shoppe and instructing clerks and greenhouse employees. I had full responsibility of the books and cash. I made reports on the business and acted as sales clerk for the shoppe Duty Station if overseas: and the landscaping bus
From 2/50 To 5/50 Tot. mo's 4 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary $200 / mo. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer National Peanut Council Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) trade association	Exact Title of your position Assistant Bookkeeper Description of Duties: I made monthly financial reports, had the responsibility of the books, did typing and other general office work. Duty Station if overseas:
From 6/47 To 8/47 Tot. mo's 3 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Frigidaire Co., Gen. Motors. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: I worked one month in the office of the Chemical Laboratory and two months in the factory. Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 ___ Civil Police
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 ___ FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 ___ Office of Strategic Services
24 ___ Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 ___ Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 ___ Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study (Inc. CIA training)
Spanish		x						x		x
French				x						x
Portuguese			x							x

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ______

______

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ______

______

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
South America	1 sem econ and geog.			x
Guatemala	7/48 to 8/48	x		
Mexico	7/46		x	

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specalized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1. drafts	2.	60	1. Yes 2. x No
Shorthand	1. none	2.	70	1. Yes 2. x No

Shorthand System: 1. x Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc.	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications. painting, skiing

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership.

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No

SEC. X. CIA TESTS

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken in CIA:

Type of Test	Date Taken
typing, shorthand, general intelligence exam	8/1951
exam for reports officer	2/1952

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour ___ (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested ___.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment in CIA do you think you are best qualified?

I feel I am best qualified for a reports or research position.

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status
Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ___Yes ___No.
If yes, indicate your present draft classification ______________

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status
Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___Yes ___No.
If yes, complete the following.
1. ___National Guard
2. ___Air National Guard
3. ___Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___Inactive Reserve Status

Service ______________ Grade ______________ Location ______________

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated ______________

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ______________

Location of Service Records, if known ______________

SEC. XV. CIA TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken while in the CIA.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours
Orientation course	8-11 Jan 1952	9-12 am

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

DATE 18 September 1952

SIGNATURE

SECRET
Security Information

STANDARD FORM 57—NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

PLICATION FOR FEDERA. .MPLOY! :T

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR

2. OPTIONS (*if mentioned in examination announcement*)

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (*City and State*) Washington, D. C.

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION

5. MR. MRS. MISS (*First name*) Charlotte (*Middle*) L. (*Maiden, if any*) (*Last*) Zehrung

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER 1401 - 16th St., N. W.

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (*including postal zone*) AND STATE Washington, D. C.

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State) Ohio

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE RE 1820 X 732

(B) HOME PHONE NO 5450

9. DATE OF BIRTH (*month, day, year*) 1-12-29

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (*city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country*) Dayton, Ohio

12. ☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES 5 FEET 8 INCHES (B) WEIGHT 125 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON-APPOR.

MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED

ENTERED REGISTER:

NOTATIONS

APP. REVIEW:

APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ .... PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR:
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED:
☐ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in each activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: 4-51 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION Statistical Draftsman

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service) 3

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING, $ 2650 PER yr. PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City and State) Washington, D. C.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Mrs. Mildred Moorman

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) Board of Geographical Names Department of Interior

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU none

REASON FOR WISHING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

statistical drafting
typing
marking diacritics

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② **DATES OF EMPLOYMENT** (month, year) FROM 5/50 TO 3/51

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Bookkeeper-Clerk

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 1.00 PER hr FINAL $ 1.10 PER hr

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Dayton, Ohio

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Mr. Ray F. McKechnie

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) San Rae Gardens, R. R. 11 Dayton 9, Ohio

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Nursery and Gift Shoppe

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU 2 - 6 clerks

REASON FOR LEAVING New Job

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Bookkeeper
Clerk
Made reports on stock and ordered wholesale
Made reports for the executives on the business, finances, etc.

③ **DATES OF EMPLOYMENT** (month, year) FROM 2/50 TO 5/50

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Ast. Bookkeeper

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ 200 PER mo

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Washington, D. C.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Mr. William F. Seals, Pres.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
National Peanut Council
1111 Dupont Circle Bldg. Washington, D. C.

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Trade Association

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU none

REASON FOR LEAVING New Job

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Bookkeeping
Filing
General office work
Financial reports

④ **DATES OF EMPLOYMENT** (month, year) FROM 6/47 TO 8/47

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Dayton, Ohio

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Mr. Herbert Hauldorman Personnel

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) Frigidaire, Plant 2 Dayton 9, O

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Manuf. of Frigidaires

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU none

REASON FOR LEAVING return to college

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Secretary in Chemical Labs.
Worked in factory

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT ([illegible]th, year) FROM TO	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in [illegible]al service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)	NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)	KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU	REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING: In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING

18. EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed):

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF

☒ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☒ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Syracuse Univ, Syracuse, N.Y.	Econ.	9-46	1-50	4		BA	1-50	115
San Carles Univ, Guatemala City	Span	7-48	8-48					5
Miami Jacobs Business College Dayton, O.	Steno.	5-50	12-50	3 mo	4mo			

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
Economics	30		
Spanish	23		

(E) OTHER TRAINING SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR IN-SERVICE TRAINING IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
Spanish	X				X		X		
French		X				X			X

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

Guatemala 7/48-8/48 Education
Mexico 7/46 Travel

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

Calculator

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 60 SHORTHAND 70

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE.

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS (A) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested) (B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS (C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE (D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC. (E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

24. REFERENCES: List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Mr. John Lewis	Oakwood High School, Dayton 9, O.	Principal
2. Miss Theadosia Moran	Cazenovia R. D. 2, N. Y.	Teacher
3. Mr. Harry Schwartz	Univ. of Syracuse, Syracuse, N. Y.	Professor

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes" give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a **PEACETIME VETERAN** who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a **DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN**, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a **WAR-TIME VETERAN** not claiming disability preference you should **NOT** submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?		X
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?		
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?		

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO. (*if none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE IN PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU ACTUALLY TAKE PART IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		X
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19.....

Agency: .... Title. ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80)

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Miss Charlotte L. [illegible]

(Sign your name in INK (use given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, give Miss or Mrs. and if married your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

As of 5 July, 1951, Subject's
Washington address is

3817 Davis place, N.W.
phone - ORdway 1618

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA". Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office RE 1820
Ext. 4691
Home NO 5450

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) Miss Charlotte (First) Louise (Middle) Zehrung (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 1401-16th St., N. W. (St. and Number) Washington, (City) D. C. (State) USA (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, (St. and Number) Dayton 9, (City) Ohio RR 11 (State) USA (Country)

B. NICKNAME Sherri WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? none

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? started to use it at school

HOW LONG? 5 yrs IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

(Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 1/12/29 PLACE OF BIRTH Dayton (City) Ohio (State) USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? yes BY MARRIAGE? no

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. no ISSUED (Date) BY (Court)

AT (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? no (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? TO ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? no GIVE PARTICULARS:

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ....

PORT OF ENTRY? .... ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ....

LAST U. S. VISA .... (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 22 SEX F HEIGHT 5' 8" WEIGHT 125

EYES blue HAIR brown COMPLEXION med. SCARS none

BUILD slender OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ....

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE x MARRIED .... DIVORCED .... WIDOWED ....

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ....

....

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE .... (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ....

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED .... DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH .... PLACE OF BIRTH .... (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ....

CITIZENSHIP .... WHEN ACQUIRED? .... WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION .... LAST EMPLOYER ....

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM .... (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents): none

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Samuel (First) Danford (Middle) Zehrung (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, (St. and Number) Dayton (City) 9, Ohio (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1/23/1892 PLACE OF BIRTH Roseville, (City) Ohio (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? birth WHERE? ______ (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Landscape Architect LAST EMPLOYER own employer - over 20 yrs.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, (St. and Number) Dayton (City) 9, Ohio (State) USA (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ---- (Date) TO ----- (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

______

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Hazel (First) Charlotte Jackson (Middle) Zehrung (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, (St. and Number) Dayton (City) 9, Ohio (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 10/17/1896 PLACE OF BIRTH Montague, Michigan USA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? birth WHERE? ______ (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

OCCUPATION housewife LAST EMPLOYER Detroit Board of Education 1927

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ---- TO ---- BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME Nancy (First) (Middle) Zehrung (Last) AGE 21
   PRESENT ADDRESS Verity Hall, Middletown Hospital, Middletown, Ohio, USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship) USA
2. FULL NAME Dorothy (First) Jon (Middle) Zehrung (Last) AGE 17
   PRESENT ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio USA USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME Mary (First) Elizabeth (Middle) Zehrung (Last) AGE 16
   PRESENT ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio USA USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION LAST EMPLOYER

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME .... (First) .... (Middle) .... (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED .... DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH .... PLACE OF BIRTH ....

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ....

CITIZENSHIP .... WHEN ACQUIRED? .... WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION .... LAST EMPLOYER ....

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME Col. Paul Zehrung RELATIONSHIP cousin AGE 38
   CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS HI USA FE, APO 633 %Post Master N.Y., N.Y. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME distant relatives in Sweden RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....
   Grandparents on Mother's side came from Sweden
   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....
   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME Col. Paul Zehrung RELATIONSHIP cousin AGE 38
   CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS HI USA FE, APO 633 %Post Master, N.Y., N.Y. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) Director of Maintenance HI USA FE
2. NAME Major Jack Macklin RELATIONSHIP cousin AGE 31
   CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS Washington, D. C. USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) Pentagon, Washington, D. C.
3. NAME Mrs. Elsie Dickert RELATIONSHIP Aunt AGE 55
   CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS 314 N 29th St. Billings, Mont. USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) Social work - Dept. of Interior -located in Montana

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR Administrative position with Latin America, Economist, Statistician, or temporarily as a Stenographer

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 3,100
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY X

FREQUENTLY ...., CONSTANTLY ....

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. X

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ...., OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES X

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

....

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL West Carrollton ADDRESS West Carrollton (City), O. (State), USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1933 - 1944 GRADUATE? yes

HIGH SCHOOL Oakwood High School ADDRESS Dayton 9 (City), Ohio (State), USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1944 - 1946 GRADUATE? yes

COLLEGE Syracuse University ADDRESS Syracuse (City), New York (State), USA (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Economics & Spanish YEARS COMPLETED 4

DATES ATTENDED 1946 - 1950 DEGREE BA

COLLEGE Universidad de San Carlos ADDRESS Guatemala City (City), Guatemala (State), C.A. (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Spanish YEARS COMPLETED 5 credits

DATES ATTENDED summer 1948 DEGREE none given

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS economics - statistics

Spanish grammar and literature

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ....

....

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE none

(Country) (Service) (Rank) (Dates of Service)

(Last Station) (Serial Number) (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS:

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER .... **ADDRESS**

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM 4/51 TO .... CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) 3

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Board of Geographic Names

ADDRESS Interior Bldg. C & 18th Sts., N. W. Washington, D. C. USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS .... NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mrs. Mildred Moorman

TITLE OF JOB Statistical Draftsman SALARY $ 2,650 PER yr.

YOUR DUTIES drawing diacritics, drafting, typing

REASONS FOR LEAVING better position more in my interests

FROM 5/50 TO 4/51 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY San Mac Gardens, Inc.

ADDRESS Box 240 Dayton 9, R. R. 11 Ohio USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS nursery NAME OF SUPERVISOR Ray McKechnie

TITLE OF JOB clerk SALARY $ 1.10 PER hr.

YOUR DUTIES bookkeeping, typing, clerking, making financial reports, ordering wholesale, making floral arrangements

REASONS FOR LEAVING to take a job more in line with my training

FROM 2/50 TO 5/50 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY National Peanut Council

ADDRESS 1111 Dupont Circle Building, Washington, D. C. USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Trade Assoc. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. William F. Seals

TITLE OF JOB Asst. Bookkeeper SALARY $ 200 PER mo.

YOUR DUTIES bookkeeping, filing, general office work, financial reports

REASONS FOR LEAVING return home to help my father in his business

FROM 6/47 TO 8/47 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Frigidaire, General Motors

ADDRESS Plant # 2 Dayton 9, Ohio USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS manuf. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Herbert Halderman

TITLE OF JOB SALARY $ PER

YOUR DUTIES office work in the chemical laboratories
work in the factory proper

REASONS FOR LEAVING return to college

FROM 4-48 TO 5-48 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Grants 5/10 Store

ADDRESS Syracuse, New York USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS stores NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB clerk SALARY $ PER

YOUR DUTIES waited on customers in the flower department

REASONS FOR LEAVING just a part-time temporary position for Easter

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NO

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Spanish	SPEAK fluent	READ fluent	WRITE fluent
LANGUAGE French	SPEAK slight	READ fair	WRITE fair
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU; INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Art-drawing, painting, crafts, studied at school - good
Swimming, good; Reading; Knitting, good; Basketball, fair;
tennis, fair

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

I have spent a summer in Guatemala, living with a Guatemalan family, learning the life and ways of a Spanish family and city. I have quite a complete knowledge of the florist business from helping my father over a period of about 8 years.

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

calculator

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 60 SHORTHAND 70

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC. NO

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ....

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) .... LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ....

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

3-I did a lot of extempt and declamation work in public speaking contests in high school. I am a member of the National Forensic League.

4-I received a partial scholarship from Chapel at Syracuse University

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

NO

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLOMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

NO

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. Mr. John Lewis BUS. ADD. Oakwood High School, Dayton, Ohio
RES. ADD. NA

2. Mr. Herbert Holderman BUS. ADD. Frigidaire, Plant 2, Dayton 9, Ohio
RES. ADD. 11 Winding Way, Dayton 9, Ohio

3. Mr. Albert F. Kuhl, M.D. BUS. ADD. Harries Bldg. Dayton Ohio
RES. ADD. NA

4. Mr. George Pohlmeyer BUS. ADD. NA
RES. ADD. 96 Winding Way, Dayton, Ohio

5. Miss Katherine Smith BUS. ADD. NA
RES. ADD. 59 Wiltshire Dayton 9, Ohio

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. Miss Theadosia Moran BUS. ADD. NA
RES. ADD. R. R. 2 Cazanovia N. Y.

2. Mrs. Ed Eastin BUS. ADD. San Rae Gardens Dayton 9, Ohio
RES. ADD. Pease Ave., West Carrollton, Ohio

3. Miss Betty Hollis BUS. ADD. Arlington Annex, Arlington, Va.
RES. ADD. 1401-16th St., N. W. Washington DC

4. Mr. Harry Schwartz BUS. ADD. Univ. of Syracuse, Syracuse, N.Y.
RES. ADD. NA

5. Mr. Walter Bohm BUS. ADD. Winter's National bank, Dayton, O.
RES. ADD. 259 Greenmont blvd. Dayton 9, O.

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. Mr. Ray F. McKechnie BUS. ADD. San Rae Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio
RES. ADD. same R. R. 11

School neighbors {
2. Miss Sheila Dewey BUS. ADD. NA
RES. ADD. Box 303 Spencer, N. Y.

3. Miss Marilyn Morris BUS. ADD. NA
RES. ADD. 811 Abbott St., Highland Park N. J.

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
West Carrollton Bank-West Carrollton, Ohio
Washington Loan and Trust Co., Washington, D. C.

16—[illegible]

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? no
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.
1. NAME Meredian Hill Hotel ADDRESS 2601-16th St. NW Washington DC
(St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME Mrs. Blick ADDRESS 1401-16th St. NW Washington DC
(St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME Delta Gamma Sorority ADDRESS 901 Walnut Ave., Syracuse NY.
(St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM 4-1-51 TO Present 1401-16th St., N.W. Washington, D.C. USA
FROM 5-50 TO 4-51 San Rae Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio USA
FROM 2-50 TO 5-50 2601-16th St., NW Washington, D.C. USA
FROM 9-48 TO 2-50 901 Walnut Ave., Syracuse, N. Y. USA
FROM 9-46 TO 9-48 two cottages of Syracuse Univ, Syracuse USA
FROM 7-48 TO 8-48 9 C.P. # 30 Guatemala City, Guatemala
FROM time before this San Rae Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio USA TO
FROM TO
(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM 7-46 TO --- Mexico City Mexico tourist
FROM 7-48 TO 8-48 Guatemala City Guatemala student
FROM TO
FROM TO
FROM TO
(City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. Delta Gamma - Rho 901 Walnut Ave., Syracuse, N. Y. USA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1947-50 active - 1950 to present inactive

2. Spanish Club Syracuse Univ., Syracuse, N. Y. USA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1947 - 8 - 9

3. Economics Club Syracuse Univ., Syracuse, N. Y. USA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1948 - 9 - 50

4. Westminster Presbyterian Church - Dayton 9, Ohio USA

5. Brownies - Grade School - West Carrollton, Ohio USA

10. Girl Scouts - High School - West Carrollton, Ohio USA

11. Hommadon [illegible] - Westminster Presbyter[illegible] Church - Dayton 9, O. USA
1943-4

12. Alumni Association of Syracuse Univ, Syracuse, N. Y. USA
1950-

4. International Relations Club - Syracuse Univ, Syracuse N.Y. USA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1946-7-8-9

5. 2nd & 1st Cabinet - Chapel - Syracuse Univ., Syracuse, N.Y. USA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1948-9

6. National Forensic League - Oakwood High School, Dayton 9, O. USA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1945-6 active

7. Sigma Theta Phi - Dayton 9, Ohio USA high school sorority
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1945-6

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

NO

IF "YES," EXPLAIN:

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? YES IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? an occasional drink at dinners and parties

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

NPA & DPA; Atomic Energy Commission; Council of Economic Advisors; Board of Geographic Names

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

Board of Geographic Names 4-1-51

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Samuel D. Zehrung RELATIONSHIP father

ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, R. R. 11 (St. and Number) Dayton 9, (City) Ohio (State) USA (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

NO

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Washington D.C. (City and State) DATE May 25, 1951

Betty L. Hollis (Witness) Charlotte L. Zehrung (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

Soo. 11 - Mr. Jim Zohrung, Sr. Uncle 61

USA 1210 Wilson Dr., Dayton, Ohio USA

Mechanical Engineer - Wright Air Field,

Dayton, Ohio

File

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 16 Oct. 1951

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division

Your Reference: L2419

FROM: Chief, Security Division

Case Number: 56840

SUBJECT: ZEHRUNG, Charlotte Louise

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the EOD procedures.

Pool not. 10/18

25 Oct 1000

Bu. not. 10/18

C V Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO.
[illegible] 1951 38-101

14-00000

1DT-73

CONFIDENTIAL

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 4 August 1951

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division

FROM: Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: ZEHRUNG, Charlotte Louise 56840

1. Reference is made to your request for security clearance of the subject person who is being considered for employment in the following position:

2. This is to advise you of the following security action:

a. ☒ Provisional security clearance is granted to permit subject's employment on a temporary basis in the following area or in the following capacity: D Street Pool

This clearance is granted upon the condition that subject: 1. not have access to classified material; 2. not have access to secure areas; 3. not be issued a badge or credential; 4. not represent himself as a CIA employee; and 5. not be assigned to any unclassified duties other than indicated above.

b. ☐ Name-checks have been completed on this person. Arrangements should now be made by your office for an interview in this Division. Upon completion of this interview further consideration will be given to the requested Limited clearance for access to information classified no higher than Secret. If subject has not entered on duty under a previously granted provisional clearance the interview should be arranged after entrance on duty.

c. ☐ Subject is security approved for temporary appointment to a position requiring access to information classified no higher than Secret.

Officials of the employing office should be advised of this security limitation and should be instructed to supply future supervisors with advice as to the limitation so as to insure continued compliance.

Security action to effect full approval is continuing and your office will receive advice of full clearance upon completion of this action. Upon receipt of full security clearance, the present limitation will be rescinded and supervisors should be advised accordingly.

3.

B. Notified 8 Aug

C. V. Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-106
JUL 1951

DEPARTMENT
OF
INTERIOR

I-708

UNITED STATES ~~~RTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
DIVISION OF PERSO... ...ERVISION AND MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Date of Action

Journal

Re: Miss Charlotte L. Zehrung
San Rae Gardens, R.R. 11
Dayton 9, Ohio

INDEFINITE APPOINTMENT

Effective Date: April 2, 1951 ~~(Vice Vacancy)~~

	From	To
Position		Statistical Draftsman
Grade and Salary		GS-5, $2650.00 per annum (GS-1533-5-504)
Bureau		Office of the Secretary
Branch		Division of Geography
Headquarters		Washington, D. C.
Departmental or Field		Departmental

V. I. - Martha E. Reid

This appointment is subject to a trial period of one year.

Subject to investigation.

Under this appointment you will be covered by the National Social Security System.

(SGD) THOMAS P. TELLIER

Mathilda C. Heuser
Chief, Administrative Branch

Personnel Officer
Signed, [illegible]
Office of the Secretary

Appropriation Title: [illegible] Working Fund, Interior, Board on Geographic Names, Sundry, 1951.

JUSTIFICATION (Confine justification to essential reasons for the action recommended)

Miss Zehrung has been selected for appointment from Civil Service Certificate B-2580.

Her Civil Service papers, medical certificate, and Form 85 for preappointment loyalty check are attached.

Attachments.

Social Security No. 069-24-3138

Permanent

CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
CS Certificate No. B-2580 dated 1/16/51.
C.S. Reg. 2.115

Appropriation
Regular

Date of Birth 1/12/29
Legal Residence Ohio
Sex F
Race W

VETERANS PREFERENCE
Yes ___ No X

LAST STATUS CHANGE OR APPOINTMENT
From
To
Effective
Last Eff. Rating

NATURE OF POSITION
Vice X Add. Identical ___
Name Martha E. Reid
GS-1533-5-504

SUBJECT TO RETIREMENT
Yes X

DATE THIS ACTION INITIATED
2/14/51

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACTION
Recommended by Officers

Personnel
Organization
Position
Fiscal
CSC

ALLOCATION APPROVAL

BUREAU NOTIFICATION COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (1 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

UNITED STATES
RTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST): Miss Charlotte L. Zehrung
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1/12/29
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION No.:
4. DATE:

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Separation (To accept Excepted Appt. with Central Intelligence Agency)
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 8/26/51
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM		TO
Statistical Draftsman (GS-1853-3-603)	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-3, $2650.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	
Office of the Secretary Division of Geography Research Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

Any leave remaining to your credit will be transferred.

Separated without reemployment rights.

Thomas H. [illegible], Personnel Officer
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WAR	SWI	DTR
X							

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

17. SEX:
18. RACE:
19. APPROPRIATION: 1485901.053 Working Fund, Interior, Office of the Secretary, 1952
FROM
TO
20. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): No
21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
22. LEGAL RESIDENCE: Ohio (claimed)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1947

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

323718.

Give this card to the APPOINTMENT CLERK at the PHS OUTPATIENT CLINIC 4th and C Streets SW. EX. 8300 Ext. 8228 (or Code 1/6)

1. FIRST Charlotte | INITIAL L. | LAST NAME Zehrung

2. POSITION TITLE Statistical Draftsman

3. DATE OF BIRTH 1/29/29 HAS AN APPOINTMENT ON ______ (Date) AT ______ (Time) A.M. P.M.

AT THE SERVICE CHECKED BELOW.

4. ☐ PHOTOFLUOROGRAM
5. ☐ MEDICAL EXAMINATION
6. ☐ LABORATORY
7. ☐ MEDICAL
8. ☐ OB-GYN
9. ☐ PHYS MED.
10. ☐ SURGICAL
11. ☐ PEDIATRIC
12. ☐ RADIOLOGY
13. ☐ IMMUNO-VAC.
14. ☐ DENTAL
15. ☐ ENT.
16. ☐ NUTRITION
17. ☐ MENTAL HEALTH
18. ☐ DERMATOLOGY
19. ☐ OTHER (Specify)

20. CLINIC REGISTER NO

21. NAME OF DOCTOR

STANDARD FORM 78 JULY 1947
[illegible]
F. P. M. CHAPTER [illegible]

MEDICAL APPOINTMENT AND REPORT

2 15 [illegible]

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A4 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Interior (Department or agency) Office of Secretary Geography (Bureau or division) Washington D.C. (Place of employment)

I, Charlotte L. Zehrung, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. 57, dated February, 1950, filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

Charlotte L. Zehrung
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 2 day of April, A. D. 1951

at Washington (City) D.C. (State)

Notic

[SEAL]

act of June 26, 1943
Sec. 206

Ethel S. Covell
(Signature of officer)

Clerk, Division of Geography
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—63160-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS *(street and number, city and State)*
1401 16th St., N.W. Washington D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH 1/12/29
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH *(city or town and State or country)* Dayton, O. U.S.A

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY	(B) RELATIONSHIP	(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE	(D) TELEPHONE NO.
Samuel D. Zehrung	Father	Sun Ree Gardens- RR 11 Dayton, O.	WA 5831

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS *(Give street number, if any)*	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED *(Check one)*	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $30 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that the appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—55100-1

I-209

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
DIVISION OF PERSONNEL SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Date of Action

Journal

Re: Miss Charlotte L. Zehrung
San Rae Gardens, R.R. 11
Dayton 9, Ohio

INDEFINITE APPOINTMENT

Effective Date:

	From	To
Position		Statistical Draftsman
Grade and Salary		GS-3, $2650.00 per annum (GS-1533-3-504)
Bureau		Office of the Secretary
Branch		Division of Geography Research Branch
Headquarters		Washington, D. C.
Departmental or Field		Departmental

O. I. - Martha E. Reid

This appointment is subject to a trial period of one year.

Subject to investigation.

Under this appointment you will be covered by the National Social Security System.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

FEB 15 1951

(SGD) THOMAS H. TELLIER

Signed,

Appropriation Title: 1415965.001 Working Fund, Interior, Board on Geographic Names, Sundry, 1951.

JUSTIFICATION (Confine this space to essential reasons for the action recommended)

Miss Zehrung has been selected for appointment from Civil Service Certificate H-2580.

Her Civil Service papers, medical certificate, and Form 85 for pre-appointment loyalty check are attached.

Attachments.

14 mod. 3/5/51
Pre appt. loyalty check
OK'd.

DEPARTMENTAL ACTION COPY

Permanent

CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
CS Certificate No. H-2580 dated 1/16/51. C.S. Reg. 2.115

Appropriation
Regular

Date of Birth	Legal Residence
1/12/29	Ohio

Sex	Race
F	W

VETERAN'S PREFERENCE
Yes ___ No X

LAST STATUS CHANGE OR APPOINTMENT
From
To
Effective
Last Eff'cy Rating

NATURE OF POSITION
Vice X Add. Identical ___
Name Martha E. Reid
GS-1533-3-504
Reallocation ___ New ___
Other Changes ___

SUBJECT TO RETIREMENT
Yes ___ No X

DATE THIS ACTION INITIATED
2/14/51

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACTION
Recommending Officers
Burrill

Director of Personnel
Organization Service
3/13 Recruitment Branch
Training and Placement
Employee Relations
CSC Liaison
Appointments Records & Statistics
7/15 ALLOCATION-APPROVAL Hereford
GS-1533-3-504

STANDARD FORM 85
Promulgated
August 4, 1947, by
Civil Service Commission
(Chapter I 2, F. P. M.)

REQUEST FC 'ORT OF LOYALTY DATA ON AI .CANTS AND APPOINTEES

THIS FORM TO BE USED ONLY FOR APPLICANTS AND APPOINTEES WHOSE RECORD CHECKS AND INQUIRIES ARE CONDUCTED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(PART I—EXECUTIVE ORDER 9835)

CASE SERIAL NO. (CSC use only)

TO:

The following information is furnished for identification purposes on the person named below. Kindly furnish a report on any loyalty information contained in your files. (The fingerprints of this person are attached.)

1. FULL NAME (Initials and abridgments of full name are not acceptable).
(Surname) Zehrung (Given name) Charlotte (Middle or other names) Louise

2. ALIASES AND NICKNAMES Sherri

3. DATE OF THIS REQUEST 2/14/51

4. SPECIAL NUMBERS KNOWN TO REQUESTING AGENCY (FBI number or FBI file number, passport number, Army or Navy serial number, seaman's certificate of identification, alien registration number, Social Security number, etc. Specify which)
Social Security No. 069-24-3138

5. PLACE OF BIRTH Dayton, Ohio

6. DATE OF BIRTH Jan. 12, 1929

7. TITLE OF POSITION Statistical Draftsman SENS (Division of Geography)

8. SEX ☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE

9. MARITAL STATUS ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED

10. IF MARRIED, GIVE SPOUSE'S FULL NAME, AND DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH None

11. DATE OF APPOINTMENT APPL

12. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT ☒ COMPETITIVE (Cite Civil Service or other legal authority) ☐ EXCEPTED ☐ TEMPORARY Reg. 2.115

13. ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH AFFILIATED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS OR THOSE WHICH SHOW RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Delta Gamma Sorority

14. DATES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE FOR THE LAST 10 YEARS

From	To	Street	City	State
9/41	9/46	San Mas Gardens R. R. 11	Dayton	Ohio
9/46	6/47	901 Walnut Ave.	Syracuse	N. Y.
6/47	9/47	San Mas Gardens	Dayton	Ohio
9/47	6/48	901 Walnut Ave.	Syracuse	N. Y.
7/48	8/48	30 Novena Calle Poniente	Guatemala City	Guatemala C.A.
9/48	6/49	901 Walnut Ave.	Syracuse	N. Y.
6/49	9/49	San Mas Gardens	Dayton	Ohio
9/49	1/50	901 Walnut Ave.	Syracuse	N. Y.
2/50	5/50	2001 - 16th St., N. W.	Washington	D. C.

5/50 - pres. - San Mas Gardens, Dayton, Ohio

15. DATES, NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF EMPLOYERS FOR THE LAST 10 YEARS

Unemployed prior to 6/47

Date	Employer	Address
6/47 - 9/47	Frigidaire Plant #2	Dayton 9, Ohio
9/47 - 4/48	Unemployed	
4/48 - 5/48	Grants Dime Store (part-time)	Syracuse, N. Y.
5/48 - 6/49	Unemployed	
6/49 - 9/49	San Mas Gardens, R. R. 11	Dayton, Ohio
9/49 - 2/50	Unemployed	
2/50 - 5/50	National Peanut Council	1111 Dupont Circle Bldg., Washington, D. C.
5/50 - pres.	San Mas Gardens	Dayton, Ohio

16. THIS AGENCY HAS LOYALTY INFORMATION OR REPORTS FURNISHED BY THE AGENCIES INDICATED BELOW

AGENCY WHICH MADE THE LOYALTY REPORT	DATE OF REPORT	REMARKS
None		

17. THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RETURN REPORT TO AGENCY WHERE NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION IS DEVELOPED

18. NAME AND ADDRESS OF REQUESTING AGENCY
Personnel Officer
Office of the Secretary
Department of the Interior
Washington 25, D. C.

SEE REVERSE FOR REPORT ON CASES WHERE DEROGATORY INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED

UNITED STATES C[illegible] SERVICE COMMISSION
DIRECTOR
FOURTH U. S. CIVIL SERVICE REGION
TEMPORARY BUILDING "R"
3RD & JEFFERSON DRIVE, S. W.
WASHINGTON [illegible], D. C.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAR 15 1951

PREAPPOINTMENT LOYALTY CHECK
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF CLEARANCE ON INITIAL CHECKS

1. CASE SERIAL [illegible]: 4-51-[illegible] S[illegible]
2. DATE OF THIS REPORT: 3/14/51
3. PROPOSED ACTION: APPL
4. COMPETITIVE
5. EXCEPTED 4/5/51

Personnel Officer
Office of the Sec'y
Dept. of the Interior
Wash. 25, D.C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

6. NAME (Last, first, middle): Z[illegible], Charlotte Louise (Aka: Sherri)
7. DATE OF BIRTH: 1/12/29

8. PROPOSED POSITION, ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATION, AND PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT: Statistical Draftsman, Dept. of Int. Off. of Sec'y, DC

Preappointment loyalty check has been made on the above applicant for a 'sensitive' position, pursuant to Chapter 12 of the Federal Personnel Manual. This check revealed no derogatory information regarding this person's loyalty.

No further papers are required if the proposed action is the *appointment of a person employed by another agency* and you have determined from the losing agency that the appointee or incumbent check has been completed.

For any other type of appointment action, please submit to this office within three working days after the appointee enters on duty (1) application, (2) file covering any investigation or inquiry conducted by your agency on a *preappointment* basis, and (3) Standard Form 87 (fingerprint chart) unless fingerprint search has already been made as shown by item 9A below.

	9A. FINGERPRINT SEARCH HAS BEEN COMPLETED AS PART OF THE PREAPPOINTMENT LOYALTY CHECK.
XX	B. FINGERPRINTS WERE NOT SUBMITTED AS PART OF THE PREAPPOINTMENT LOYALTY CHECK.
	C. FINGERPRINTS WERE UNCLASSIFIABLE. YOU MAY EITHER (1) MAKE THE APPOINTMENT AT ONCE AND SUBMIT REPRINTS WITH THE OTHER REQUIRED PAPERS, OR (2) WITHHOLD APPOINTMENT AND SUBMIT REPRINTS SEPARATELY FOR COMPLETION OF FINGERPRINT SEARCH BEFORE YOU DECIDE WHETHER TO APPOINT.

UNCLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS ☐ ARE ATTACHED.
☐ WILL BE FORWARDED ON RECEIPT FROM OUR CENTRAL OFFICE.

Please use the copy of this notice for your transmittal or reply. Space has been provided on the back for your convenience. *A reply is required*, even though it may not be necessary to transmit forms in this case.

REGIONAL DIRECTOR

[illegible] Form 186
[illegible]

14-00000

TO: DIRECTOR, U. S. CIVIL SERVICE REGION

☐ 1. Forms attached as requested. Proposed personnel action effected April 9, 1951

☐ 2. Forms not submitted because proposed personnel action dropped from consideration.

☐ 3. Forms not submitted because this is an appointment without break in service of a person who was employed by another agency and it has been determined from the Official Personnel Folder of the losing agency that the appointee or incumbent check has been completed.

☐ 4. Reprints on Standard Form 87 attached. Decision regarding appointment will not be made until the results of the FBI fingerprint search have been received.

REMARKS:

Forms 57 and 87 attached.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPOINTING OFFICER	OFFICIAL TITLE
April 9, 1951	(SGD.) F. T. SMITH	Personnel Officer, Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Interior.

USCSC--WASHINGTON D C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 5
DECEMBER 1947
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(SUPERSEDES CSC FORM 1902)

INQUIRY AS TO AVAILABILITY

Return this form to →

AGENCY AND ADDRESS (Street, city, and State)
Miss Mathilda C. Heuser
Chief, Administrative Branch
Division of Geography
Dept. of the Interior
Washington 25, D.C.

Miss Charlotte L. Zehrung
San Rae Gardens, RR11
Dayton 9, Ohio

(Please correct address if different from above)

DATE: Jan. 30, 1951

CERTIFICATE: H-2580

POSITION: Statistical Draftsman, GS-3

SALARY: $2650 p.a.

LOCATION: Washington, D. C.

TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: Indefinite

☐ PROBATIONAL

☐ TEMPORARY FOR ....

This office is considering you among others for the employment described. Please fill out the "Availability Statement" below, indicating whether you would accept this position if offered, and return the entire sheet to this office. Appointment would be subject to the Civil Service requirements described on the back of this letter. Whether you are available or not, please reply within ....3.......... days in order that one of those who are available may be selected as promptly as possible to fill the vacancy.

Failure to reply to this inquiry will result in the removal of your name from the register of eligibles until such time as you request restoration and furnish the information asked for in the statement below.

THIS IS A LETTER OF INQUIRY AND *NOT AN OFFER* OF EMPLOYMENT. *If selected, you will be notified and given further instructions.*

Other information:

Sincerely yours,

Mathilda C. Heuser

Chief, Admin. Branch

AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

(Check one) (Check one)

☑ I am available and wish to be considered for the position described above. I can report for duty within 10 days after notification. I am now employed by San Rae Gardens at Dayton 9, Ohio RR11

☐ I do not wish to be considered for the position described above. *I am giving my reasons on the other side of this form.*

☐ I request that my name be removed from the active list of eligibles until I report that I am available for appointment.

☑ Consider me available for other appointments, subject to the following conditions:

The position must pay at least $ 2,650 per year (year, month, day, or hour).

I am willing to work: ☑ In Washington, D. C.; ☐ Anywhere in the U. S.; ☐ Outside the U. S.

I will accept appointment in the following locations only: ....

I will accept short-term appointment for: ☐ 1 to 3 months; ☐ 3 to 6 months; ☑ 6 to 12 months.

Feb - 2 - 1951
(Date)

Charlotte L Zehrung
(Signature)

STANDARD FORM 78
JULY 1949
FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER M1

ED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CERTIFICATE OF MEDICAL EXAMINATION

(Applicant must supply information below to heavy line)
(Typewrite, or Print in Ink)

1. MR. MRS. MISS (FIRST NAME) Charlotte (MIDDLE INITIAL) L. (LAST) Zehrung
2. DATE OF BIRTH January 18, 1889
3. ☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE
4. ADDRESS Sun Rise Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio
5. TITLE OF POSITION Statistical Draftsman
6. DEPARTMENT OR BUREAU IN WHICH YOU ARE TO BE EMPLOYED Interior - Office of the Secretary Division of Geography
7. LOCATION Washington, D. C.
8. ARE YOU NOW EMPLOYED IN THE POSITION SHOWN IN ITEM 5? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE THE DATE OF YOUR ORIGINAL APPOINTMENT TO THIS POSITION:
9. (A) HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL DEFECT OR DISABILITY WHATSOEVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS:

(B) DOES THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION RECOGNIZE SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY IN YOUR CASE? ☐ YES ☒ NO
(C) HAVE YOU EVER RECEIVED DISABILITY RETIREMENT FROM THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION? ☐ YES ☒ NO

Sign your name in INK as it appears on your application in the presence of the physician for purpose of identification.

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Charlotte L. Zehrung

DOCTOR: All questions on both sides of this certificate and on the lower half of the attached Health Qualification Placement Record must be answered. Before beginning the examination refer to items 9 and 10 on the Health Qualification Placement Record so that you will have knowledge of the physical requirements of the position to which the applicant is to be appointed. Sign both this certificate and the Health Qualification Placement Record.

1. HEIGHT: 6 FEET 8 INCHES WEIGHT [illegible] POUNDS

2. EYES:
(A) DISTANT VISION (SNELLEN): WITHOUT GLASSES: RIGHT 20/[illegible] LEFT 20/[illegible] WITH GLASSES, IF WORN: RIGHT 20/25 LEFT 20/30
(B) WHAT IS THE LONGEST AND SHORTEST DISTANCE AT WHICH THE FOLLOWING SPECIMEN OF JAEGER NO. 2 TYPE CAN BE READ BY THE APPLICANT? TEST EACH EYE SEPARATELY.

employees in the Federal classified service as may be requested by the Civil Service Commission or its authorized representative. This order will supplement the Executive Orders of May 29 and June 18, 1923 (Executive Order, September 4, 1924).

WITHOUT GLASSES:
R. 4 IN. TO 26 IN.
L. 4 IN. TO 22 IN.

WITH GLASSES, IF USED:
R. 4 IN. TO 28 IN.
L. 7 IN. TO 22 IN.

(C) EVIDENCE OF DISEASE OR INJURY: RIGHT [illegible] LEFT [illegible]
(D) COLOR VISION: IS COLOR VISION NORMAL WHEN ISHIHARA OR OTHER COLOR PLATE TEST IS USED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
IF NOT, CAN APPLICANT PASS LANTERN, YARN OR OTHER COMPARABLE TEST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. EARS: (CONSIDER DENOMINATORS INDICATED HERE AS NORMAL. RECORD AS NUMERATORS THE GREATEST DISTANCE HEARD) ORDINARY CONVERSATION:
RIGHT EAR 20/20 FT. LEFT EAR 20/20 FT. EVIDENCE OF DISEASE OR INJURY: RIGHT EAR none LEFT EAR none

4. NOSE normal
5. PARA NASAL SINUSES normal
6. MOUTH AND THROAT normal.

7. GASTRO-INTESTINAL normal
(A) HISTORY OF PEPTIC ULCER: ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES," IS ULCER: ☐ ACTIVE ☐ QUIESCENT ☐ HEALED
HOW LONG? DATE OF LAST X-RAY
SYMPTOMS PRESENT, IF ANY (*Severity, frequency, etc.*):
TREATMENT (*Use space under "Remarks" if needed*):

8. METABOLIC DISORDERS (INDICATE ANY ABNORMALITY OF THE FOLLOWING GLANDS BY A CHECK IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX, AND EXPLAIN UNDER "REMARKS."):
☐ THYROID ☐ PANCREAS ☐ PITUITARY ☐ OVARIAN

9. HEART AND BLOOD VESSELS normal

(A) BLOOD PRESSURE: MM. HG SYSTOLIC [illegible] DIASTOLIC 78

(B) IS ORGANIC HEART DISEASE PRESENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(C) IF ORGANIC HEART DISEASE IS PRESENT, IS IT FULLY COMPENSATED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

(D) PULSE RATE.
SITTING [illegible] IMMEDIATELY AFTER EXERCISE (UNLESS CONTRAINDICATED) [illegible]
TWO MINUTES AFTER EXERCISE [illegible] CARDIAC RESERVE Good. (GOOD, FAIR, OR POOR)

10. LUNGS:
RIGHT normal LEFT normal.
HISTORY OF TUBERCULOSIS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES," HOW LONG HAS THE DISEASE BEEN ARRESTED?
IF THERE IS HISTORY OF TUBERCULOSIS, IS ANY TYPE OF COLLAPSE THERAPY BEING RECEIVED AT PRESENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES," GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER "REMARKS." IS MEDICAL SUPERVISION NECESSARY? ☐ YES ☐ NO
(IF X-RAY IS MADE, GIVE REPORT UNDER "REMARKS.")

11. HERNIA: ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES," NAME VARIETY: INGUINAL, VENTRAL, FEMORAL, POST-OPERATIVE, ETC.;
IF PRESENT, IS IT SUPPORTED BY A WELL-FITTING TRUSS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

12. VARICOSE VEINS: ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES," STATE LOCATION AND DEGREE

13. FEET: IS FLAT FOOT PRESENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES," STATE DEGREE OF IMPAIRMENT OF FUNCTION (NONE, SLIGHT, MODERATE, SEVERE)

14. DEFORMITIES, ATROPHIES, AND OTHER ABNORMALITIES, DISEASE NOT INCLUDED ABOVE
None

15. SCARS OF SERIOUS INJURY OR DISEASE None

16. NERVOUS SYSTEM: (A) INCLUDE SYMPTOMS AND FULL HISTORY OF ANY MENTAL, NERVOUS, OR EMOTIONAL ABNORMALITY (USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF NECESSARY): none

(B) HAS APPLICANT EVER BEEN HOSPITALIZED OR TREATED FOR A MENTAL ILLNESS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(C) WHERE (NAME AND LOCATION OF HOSPITAL):

(D) DATE OR DATES OF HOSPITALIZATION:

(E) DESCRIBE ANY RESIDUALS OF PREVIOUS MENTAL OR NERVOUS ILLNESS:

(F) ANY HISTORY OF EPILEPSY OR FAINTING SPELLS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF SO, GIVE DETAILS UNDER "REMARKS" BELOW

17. EVIDENCE OR HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE. IF BLOOD SEROLOGY OR OTHER LABORATORY EXAMINATIONS ARE MADE, GIVE DETAILS UNDER "REMARKS."
None.

18. URINALYSIS (IF INDICATED):
SP. GR ALBUMEN SUGAR
CASTS BLOOD PUS

I HAVE FOUND THE APPLICANT ABNORMAL UNDER THE FOLLOWING HEADINGS:

REMARKS:
Good physical condition. Normal state of health.

19. SIGNATURE OF PHYSICIAN OR EXAMINER Albert F. Kuhl

NAME TYPED OR PRINTED Albert F. Kuhl, M.D.

DATE 2/8/51

20. ADDRESS OF EXAMINING PHYSICIAN (Typed or printed)
916 Harries Bldg. Dayton 2, Ohio

21. DO YOU HAVE FEDERAL DESIGNATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF YES, SPECIFY
☐ FULL TIME ☐ PART TIME ☐ FEE BASIS

HEALTH QUALIFICATION PLACEMENT RECORD

(This section is comparable to Standard Form 90 promulgated March 1945 by Bureau of the Budget Circular A-24)

1. MR. MRS. MISS (FIRST NAME) (MIDDLE INITIAL) (LAST) Charlotte L. [illegible]
2. DATE OF BIRTH January 18, 1929
3. ☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE
4. ADDRESS San [illegible] Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio
5. TITLE OF POSITION Statistical Draftsman
6. DEPARTMENT OR BUREAU IN WHICH YOU ARE TO BE EMPLOYED Interior - Office of the Secretary Division of Geography
7. LOCATION Washington, D. C.
8. ARE YOU NOW EMPLOYED IN THE POSITION SHOWN IN ITEM 5? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE THE DATE OF YOUR ORIGINAL APPOINTMENT TO THIS POSITION:

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPOINTING OFFICER: Sections 9 and 10

(A) BRIEF OUTLINE OF WHAT WORKER DOES	(B) PHYSICAL DEMANDS OF THE POSITION
For the physician's use, set down in brief and simple terms what the employee does on this job, including environmental details such as stairs to climb, distance to rest-room facilities, cafeteria, work-shift, etc. (*Use Section 9 below.*)	In Section 10 below encircle the number of those factors which are essential to the duties of the position for which this applicant is being considered. The blank spaces may be used for special factors not listed.

9. TITLE OF POSITION AND OUTLINE OF WHAT WORKER DOES IN THIS POSITION (*Advise use of dictionary of occupational titles as guide, as applicable*)

Statistical Draftsman - To assist in the performance of drafting, lettering and incidental statistical clerical work in the preparation and revision of index maps, showing the location of approved and disapproved names and the extent of features to which names apply; charts, graphs and other illustrative materials in connection with the functions of the Research Branch and for administrative purposes.

TO BE COMPLETED BY EXAMINING PHYSICIAN: Sections 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15

INSTRUCTIONS The items circled below indicate the physical requirements of the position for which this individual is being considered. Indicate the individual's physical capacities for this position by placing an X in the appropriate column opposite the numbers encircled. If the individual has any other physical limitations relating to physical requirements not encircled or not covered by this form, indicate these under "Remarks" on the reverse side. Whenever PARTIAL capacity has been indicated, explain under "Remarks," giving specific quantities.

10. PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

	CAPACITY				CAPACITY		
	FULL	PARTIAL	NONE		FULL	PARTIAL	NONE
1. OUTSIDE				18. WORKING AROUND MACHINERY WITH MOVING PARTS			
2. OUTSIDE AND INSIDE				19. MOVING OBJECTS OR VEHICLES			
3. EXCESSIVE HEAT				20. WORKING ON LADDERS OR SCAFFOLDING			
4. EXCESSIVE COLD				21. WORKING BELOW GROUND			
5. EXCESSIVE HUMIDITY				22. UNUSUAL FATIGUE FACTORS (*Specify*)			
6. EXCESSIVE DAMPNESS OR CHILLING							
7. DRY ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS				23. WORKING WITH HANDS IN WATER			
8. EXCESSIVE NOISE, INTERMITTENT				24. EXPLOSIVES			
9. CONSTANT NOISE				25. VIBRATION			
10. DUST				26. WORKING CLOSELY WITH OTHERS			
11. SILICA, ASBESTOS, ETC.				27. WORKS ALONE			
12. FUMES, SMOKE, OR GASES				28. PROTRACTED OR IRREGULAR HOURS OF WORK			
13. SOLVENTS (*Degreasing agents*)				29. SPECIAL FACTORS (*Specify*)			
14. GREASES AND OILS							
15. RADIANT ENERGY				30.			
16. ELECTRICAL ENERGY				31.			
17. SLIPPERY OR UNEVEN WALKING SURFACES				32.			

16—64051-1

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 57—NOV 1947
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

AP..LICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYME..

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO 306603

ANNOUNCEMENT U180

1 NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR
Statistical Draftsman

2 OPTION(S) *(if mentioned in examination announcement)*

3 PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR *(City and State)*
Washington, D.C.

4 DATE OF THIS APPLICATION
Feb. 16, 1950

5 ~~MR.~~ MRS MISS *(First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)*
Charlotte Louise Zehrung

6 (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER
San Roe Gardens RR11

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE *(including postal zone)* AND STATE
Dayton 9, Ohio

7 LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State)
Ohio

8 (A) OFFICE PHONE

(B) HOME PHONE

9 DATE OF BIRTH *(month, day, year)*
January 12, 1929

10. ☐ MARRIED ☑ SINGLE

11 PLACE OF BIRTH *(city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country)*
Dayton, Ohio

12 ☐ MALE ☑ FEMALE

13 (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 8 INCHES

(B) WEIGHT: 132 POUNDS

14 (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR
☐ NON APPOR

MATERIAL
☐ SUBMITTED
☐ RETURNED

ENTERED REGISTER.

NOTATIONS:

APP. REVIEW.

APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
G5-1232	3	87	☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
〃	2	94	☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE 5-18-50				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ .... PER YEAR.
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☑ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)*
FROM TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION

CLASSIFICATION GRADE *(if in Federal Service)*

SALARY OR EARNINGS.
STARTING, $ PER
PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(city and State)*

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)*

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)*

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM June '44 TO Sept '44	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION clerk	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Dayton Ohio - San Rae Gardens		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Co-owner - Ray F McKechnie	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) Ray F McKechnie San Rae Gardens - Dayton O		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Gift shop	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU none		REASON FOR LEAVING return to school	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

clerked in store
in charge of books

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM June '42 TO Sept. '42	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Dayton Ohio Frigidaire		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) Frigidaire - Dayton O.		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) manufacture of Frigidaires	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU none		REASON FOR LEAVING return to school	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

worked on assembly line
worked in office of chemical laboratory

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU		REASON FOR LEAVING	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

00023 MAY 10 50

RECEIVED
MAY 10 1950
U.S.C.S.
[illegible]

2601-16th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
May 9, 1950.

U.S. Civil Service Commission
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I sent in material for the unassembled exam for a Statistical Draftsman, the announcement number of which is 130.

I have moved since the date I sent in my papers. Would you please make the necessary changes so I will receive notice of my rating at my new address.

My old address was:
#722
2601 - 16th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Ch. address

My new address is:
San Rae Gardens
Dayton 7, Ohio R.R. #11

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,
Charlotte L. Zehrung

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
RATING SHEET—RATING PROCEDURE NO. III.
(Handbook X-105)

NAME OF APPLICANT Charlotte L. Zabruno	**PREFERENCE** ☐ 5-PT. ☐ 10-PT. ☐ NONE	**APPLICATION NO.**

POSITION TITLE GS-1533 Statistical Draftsman		**POSITION TITLE** do	
ANNOUNCEMENT NO. U-130	**QUALIFYING EXPERIENCE** **GRADE** GS-3	**ANNOUNCEMENT NO.**	**QUALIFYING EXPERIENCE** **GRADE** GS-2
BASIC RATING	85	**BASIC RATING**	90
ADDITIONAL POINTS	2	**ADDITIONAL POINTS**	4
EARNED RATING	87	**EARNED RATING**	94
VETERANS' PREFERENCE		**VETERANS' PREFERENCE**	
FINAL RATING		**FINAL RATING**	
EXAMINER RMK	**DATE** 5-18-50	**EXAMINER** RMK	**DATE** 5-18-50
REVIEWER	**DATE**	**REVIEWER**	**DATE**

COMMENTS:

POSITION TITLE		**POSITION TITLE**	
ANNOUNCEMENT NO.	**QUALIFYING EXPERIENCE** **GRADE**	**ANNOUNCEMENT NO.**	**QUALIFYING EXPERIENCE** **GRADE**
BASIC RATING		**BASIC RATING**	
ADDITIONAL POINTS		**ADDITIONAL POINTS**	
EARNED RATING		**EARNED RATING**	
VETERANS' PREFERENCE		**VETERANS' PREFERENCE**	
FINAL RATING		**FINAL RATING**	
EXAMINER	**DATE**	**EXAMINER**	**DATE**
REVIEWER	**DATE**	**REVIEWER**	**DATE**

COMMENTS

14-[illegible]

CSC FORM 4909
MAY [illegible]

Education to be Substituted for Experience

High School

2 years	Mechanical Drawing
2 years	Art
1½ years	Algebra
1 year	Geometry
½ year	Trigonometry

College

1 year	4 credit hrs. from [illegible] Expression in (Art)
1 year	6 credit hrs. Statistics 3 hrs./week lecture 1½ hrs./week laboratory

Form 12
February 1946

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PROOF OF RESIDENCE

Form approved
Budget Bureau Number 50-R050

Applications for appointment in the apportioned departmental service must be accompanied by a certificate showing legal or voting residence in the State or Territory claimed for at least one year next preceding the date of making application. Therefore, if you desire employment in the apportioned departmental service the following questions must be answered, and the Jurat and Officer's Certificate of Residence below must be executed. Failure to submit this form, properly executed, with your application may result in loss of consideration for appointment in the apportioned service. Applicants who now hold permanent positions in the apportioned departmental service are not required to have the Officer's Certificate of Residence executed but should write on it "Am in the apportioned service."

1. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
Mr. Mrs. Miss Zehrung Charlotte L.

2. Name of examination: Statistical Draftsman

3. Street and number, or if Rural, R. D. number: 2601 16th St. N.W. #725

4. Option (if any):

Post office (including postal zone) and State: Washington, D.C.

5. Place and date of written examination (if any):

6. (a) In what State or Territory do you have— Legal residence ..Ohio........ or Voting residence ....

(b) Length of such residence in State or Territory: From Jan 19 29 to Feb. 19 50 (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.)

(c) In what county do you have— Legal residence Montgomery or Voting residence ....

(d) Length of such residence in county: From Jan 19 29 to Feb. 19 50 (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.)

7. If during the past year you have not resided continuously in the State or Territory in which you claim legal or voting residence, or are not now actually living in such State or Territory, indicate in the following blanks the dates of absences, and locations and occupations during such absences:

(a) Date left (Month, Year)	(b) Date returned (Month, Year)	(c) Location during absence (City and State)	(d) Occupation
Sept. '49	Dec. '49	Syracuse, N.Y.	Student
Jan. '50		Washington, D.C.	Typist bookkeeper

8. If you are under 21 years of age, fill in the following blanks:

(a) Legal residence of parent or guardian
State ....
Is he a voter in that State? ☐ Yes ☐ No
County ....

(b) Length of such residence
From .... 19.... to .... 19.... (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.)
From .... 19.... to .... 19.... (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.)

(c) Present post office address of parent or guardian
City or town ....
County .... State ....

9. If you are a married woman, fill in the following blanks:

(a) Date of marriage

(b) Legal residence of husband
State ....
Is he a voter in that State? ☐ Yes ☐ No
County ....

(c) Length of such residence
From .... 19.... to .... 19.... (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.)
From .... 19.... to .... 19.... (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.)

JURAT (OR OATH)

This jurat (or oath) must be executed before a notary public, the secretary of a United States civil service board of examiners, or other officer authorized to administer oaths for general purposes before whom the applicant must appear in person.

I, the undersigned, DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) that the statements made by me in answer to the foregoing questions are full and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

If female, prefix "Miss" or "Mrs." and if married, use your own given name, as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe."

Signature of applicant Charlotte L. Zehrung
(Sign your name in full—given name, initial, or initials, and surname)

Subscribed and sworn to before me according to law by the above-named applicant this 13th day of Feb 1950

at .... county of .... and State (or Territory) of ....

NOTARY PUBLIC
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES MARCH 31, 1954

(Signature of officer)

(Official title)

OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE OF RESIDENCE

Instructions.—If the applicant's claim is based on legal residence, the certificate must be executed by a notary public, county, municipal, or police court clerk, mayor, justice of the peace, or other officer in the county or city in which the applicant claims residence. If the claim is based on voting residence alone, the certificate must be executed by the registrar of voters or other officer of the Board of Elections. In either case the officer must be an actual resident and officer in the city or county claimed by the applicant, and the certificate must bear his official seal, or, in lieu thereof, certification of his official character by the proper officer under official seal.

The applicant is not required to appear in person before the officer who executes this certificate, but the officer should satisfy himself from credible and competent evidence as to facts to which he certifies.

I, a ....Notary.......... (Official designation of Officer) of the county of ..Montgomery........ and State (or Territory) of ....Ohio....

do hereby certify that ...Charlotte L. Zehrung....... (Write name to agree exactly with applicant's name as given above) the applicant who executed the above in connection with a civil service examination,

is now a ....Legal........ (Specify whether "legal," "voting," or "legal and voting") resident of the county of ..Montgomery.................. and State (or Territory)

of ....Ohio.................. and has been such resident for .21...... years .1....... months next preceding the date hereof.

Dated at ....West Carrollton.............. county of ..Montgomery........................ and State (or Territory)

of ....Ohio.............................. this .14th. day of ....February 19 50

[OFFICIAL SEAL]

My commission expires July-19-1952

Clarence H. Bloss,
(Signature of officer)

The Official seal must not be omitted. If erasure or correction is made in the "Officer's Certificate," certification must be made on margin by the officer who executes the certificate, showing such correction.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—351-2

Index Numbers of Retail Cost of all Foods and of Four Selected Commodities 1923 - 1940

FORM 1



Charlotte L. Fekrany
2401 16th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Jan 12th 1939
Statistical Draftsman
#130

FIGURE I

Charlotte L. [illegible]
2601 16th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Jan. 12, 1941

Statistical Draftsman
#130

INDEX OF WEEKLY EARNINGS BEFORE AND AFTER ADJUSTMENT FOR COST OF LIVING





[illegible]
2601 [illegible] St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Jan 1[illegible], 1924
[illegible]
#150

x = 6 mo.
origin 1929-1930.

Change in Population of United States and Rhode Island - 1790-1940



Scatter Diagram [illegible] Relationship Between Value of Land X and Y

FORM 1



[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 19[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Frequency Distribution of Batting Records of 157 Regular American and National Leagues, 19[illegible]



[illegible]

14-00000

Cumulative Distribution of Hourly Rates of Wages of %'s of Union Motor Truck Drivers - June 1, 1940

FORM I

A Less than Cumulative Distribution



Charlotte F. [illegible]
2601 16th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Jan 10, 1924
Statistical [illegible]
#130

Cumulative Distribution of Batting Averages 1940 of American and National Leagues - 151 Regular Players Receiving Stated Average or Less Than.



Charlotte L. [illegible]
2601-16th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Jan 12, 1929
Statistical Draftsman
130

Population of Continental United States and Rhode Island
( ), 1790-1940



⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM — TO	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU		REASON FOR LEAVING	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING

18 EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF

☑ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☑ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☑ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Syracuse University Syracuse, N.Y.	Economics	Sept '46	Jan '50			BA	Jan '50	112
Univ. of Guatemala	Span.	June '49	July '49					5

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19 INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
Spanish		✓			✓			✓	
French			✓						

20 IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e.g., military service, business, education, recreation)

Mexico - 1 mo - recreation
Guatemala - 2 mo - education

21 LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

calculator

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 55 SHORTHAND

22 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☐ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

23 GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(1) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) YOUR PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(5) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

	FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.	Mr Harry Schwartz	113 Ramsey Ave Syracuse	teacher
2.	Miss Theodosia Moran	Cazanovia N.Y. RD #2	teacher
3.	Mr. Herbert Hauldeman	11 Winding Way, Dayton, O	Personnel Frigidaire

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?		
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		✓
28. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		✓
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		✓
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		✓
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		✓
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		✓
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		✓
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		✓

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		✓
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address, (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		✓

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a **PEACETIME VETERAN** who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a **DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN**; attach *Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14*, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a **WAR-TIME VETERAN** not claiming disability preference, you should **NOT** submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?		✓
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?		
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL TIME BASIS WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?		

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO. (*If none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		✓
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		✓
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		✓

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19.....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT ....

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—O—69297 15

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KARTY, FLORYAN R.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 10 July 1951 - 9 Feb 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

KARTY, FLORYAN R. 009274

Personnel Actions
After Mexico City Assignment

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XXF

DATE PREPARED: 11 SEPTEMBER 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009274 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [redacted] ✓ CHRTYI F R.		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 09 / DAY 15 / YEAR 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 1135-5700-1000 JW	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO, MEXICO STATION CITY		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO, city MEXICO	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 418	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 2	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 9790 ✓

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/400/MEXICO STATION

Recorded by
CSPD
EK

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS	DATE SIGNED 9/12/63	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Charles Moz... Dwight M. Collins	DATE SIGNED 13 Sep 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	3140C	WH	45075		3	01 06 12		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION T. Kearney 9/18/63	46. O.P. APPROVAL Edward B. Hogan	DATE APPROVED 17 Sep 63

FORM 4.62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a. SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

716

XXB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 JULY 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009274
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] CARTY, F R.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 09 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4135-5700-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO City, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO City, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 400
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~9475~~ 9790

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/FE/2120/BANGKOK STATION/OPERATIONS BRANCH Tray 27

1 COPY TO FINANCE DIVISION AND OFFICE OF SECURITY

Recorded by
CSPD
EJP

[redacted]:

[redacted]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 7/8/63

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: D M Collins — DATE SIGNED: 23 July 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. REGISTRY CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	64707	WH	45015		3	01 06 12		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAREER-PROV/TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE
				3	02				

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: D. Keenan 07/25/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. Fagan

DATE APPROVED: 22 July 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

To Cem

Jiv

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Kartz, Floryan	Wife - Germaine	63-097

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 23 Nov 62. Ruptured muscle.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
3 MAY 1963	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-63 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-31)

Personnel Actions
prior to Mexico City
Assignment

SECRET

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF CREDITABLE SERVICE

[FOR LEAVE PURPOSES]

PREPARE IN ORIGINAL FROM STANDARD FORM NO. 144 AND FORWARD TO FINANCE OFFICE.

NAME (Last First, Middle)

[redacted] (P)

Dik 2 mar 53

P[illegible] ON
Gr-4b

OFFICE (and Division)

DDP/WH

SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE:

24 Dec 1948

2 Marvh 1953 — SIGNATURE DA[illegible]

JOHN L. BISCHOFF, Chief/SCAPS — CHIEF, TRANSACTIONS AN[illegible] RE[illegible] BRANCH

FORM NO. 1 MAR 54 37-157

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

ORIGINAL Biographic Profile

(sanitized version in file)

29

Personnel Actions After
Mexico City Assignment

wH

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] KARTY, FLORYAN R.	009274	51 700	CF	GS 12 3	$10,105	$10,640

POSTED ON
0F-40

8 JAN 1964

WH-

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
009274	KARTY, FLORYAN R. [redacted]	64 700 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	2	$ 9,790	11/25/62	GS 12	3	$10,105	11/24/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

POSTED ON ... NOV

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 7 Oct 1963

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 961 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLS: ~~XX~~ 13 SEPT 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009274	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted] KARTY, FLORYAN R.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 09 15 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4135 5700 1000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY , MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0418	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 9790

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
CF-45

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51400	WH	45075		3	01 06 12		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RESV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9/24/63 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

19 SEP 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-01)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MHC: 31 JULY 63

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009274	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) [redacted] KARTY, ELERYNN R.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 09 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4135 5700 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	☒	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0400	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 9790

18. REMARKS

AUG 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	64700	WH	45075		3	01 06 12		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 4 - NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

C. D. ECHOLS

POSTED
08/02/63

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

31 JUL 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

A. Fitness Reports covering period after Mexico City Assignment

B. Personnel Actions for period prior to Mexico City Assignment

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

pm

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
009274

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted] [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1912	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL XX REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
December 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 Jan 1964 - 22 November 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Case Officer for Soviet access agents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analyst work, preparing Soviet personality reports. ✓	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Transcription into English of Russian technical product, and preparation of interpretative renditions of same when necessary.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
5 Jan 65

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S ✓

7 JAN 1965

FORM 8-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

As explained in the previous fitness report, Subject was assigned to the Station for the purpose of taking charge of the Station's joint telephone tap center, a position for which he was and is eminently qualified by reason of extensive experience and outstanding language qualifications. However, this position did not materialize because of circumstances beyond the control of Subject and the Station.

It was therefore subsequently decided to train Subject locally, and have him gradually assume case officer and analyst responsibilities in certain simpler aspects of the Station's Soviet program.

Given the circumstances that Subject had not had prior case officer or analytical experience (or even any substantial past exposure to operations to give him vicarious experience) he progressed more than adequately in absorbing the training offered, in assuming responsibility for two Soviet operations and in the preparation of analytical studies on the Soviet complement. Given the further circumstances that the Station did not have the time to train him more than superficially, and that the operations he handled were basically uncomplicated, it must be stated that Subject cannot now be considered to be a case officer.

This conscientious and intelligent officer has high interest and enthusiasm for operations, but it is believed that his forte and future lies in the management of technical operations. This has been recognized also by Headquarters in the assignment presently planned for him.

As a staff agent under tourist cover, he and his family adapted themselves remarkably well to the deep cover situation and to all other environmental factors.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
23 November 1964	[redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 November 1964	Ops Officer	s/ Herbert Manell

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 November 1964	COS	s/ Winston M. Scott

SECRET

98

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
009274

SECTION A EARTHY, [illegible] R. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 6 Jan 1912	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH 3	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):					SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 28 February 1964	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 6 August 1963 - 31 December 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian and Spanish materials.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
[illegible]

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

14 FEB 1964

FORM 6-63 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

OFFICE OF ... MAIL ROOM FEB 13 1 26 PM '64

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

From the time of Subject's arrival in Mexico and through 31 December 1963, he was utilized principally in translation work and was held on tap for the position of heading up the Station's joint telephone tap center. Circumstances beyond the control of the Station and Subject are responsible for the fact that the incumbent in charge of the center will continue these duties and Subject will be given other responsibilities.

Primarily, Subject will be trained to handle analyst and case officer responsibilities in the Soviet field. The level and range of the responsibilities will depend on the progress Subject makes in handling these duties in a manner satisfactory to the Station.

Subject is most conscientious and effective in every assignment given him to date, and the Station is extremely pleased to have him available as an outside Station asset. He is enthusiastic about all his work, including certain part-time routine and arduous duties, and he looks forward with confidence to the prospect of becoming a case officer. Although it is premature to state positively that Subject will succeed as a case officer, the supervisor believes that Subject will undoubtedly progress adequately.

Subject and his family have acclimated themselves excellently to the deep cover situation, faster than most of the Station's other staff agents, and certainly with fewer problems and requests for guidance from the Station's staff.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 29 [illegible] 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 29 January 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Herbert Manell

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 29 January 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Winston M. Scott

SECRET

Pre 1961 Fitness Reports
and other personnel
documents

OLC 78-1069/1

15 mar 78

DEVUONO, Irving C.

10 September 1971 (file in 1972)

SECRET

/NUMBER/VOLUME: Lynch, Grayston L.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 17 Nov 1960 - 5 Aug 1971
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP
ROOM: 5E13
DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

This is an Office of Personnel File and subject to 10 day limitation period. This file has been charged to Doris FOIA / and is due to be returned to CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, 5E-63 Hqs., x7941, as of 4-4-78.

[illegible]

NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)

Lynch, Grayston L.

Male 14 Jan 23

MARITAL STATUS	NO. DEPENDENTS	[illegible]	NATIONALITY	[illegible]
Married	2	1938, 19[illegible]	U.S.	April 71

DATE OF LATEST SECURITY OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

14 Feb 1961

PM Ops Officer

CONTRACT CATEGORY	EFFECTIVE DATE	EXPIRATION DATE	SALARY	GRADE EQUIVALENT
Career Agent	1 Jun 1961	Indefinite	$23,591	GS 14/5 RJESEL

BENEFITS

SOCIAL SECURITY	X
FECA-DEATH AND DISABILITY	X
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE	X
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT	X
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERCIAL CIA ANNUITY	X
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE	X
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE	X
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS	X
OTHER (EXPLAIN) Home Leave, R&R	

EDUCATION

USAFI 2 year College equivalent

PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

DATES FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
Oct 38 - Oct 60	U.S. Army	World wide	Special Forces, Captain	

CIA TRAINING

1970 Secret writing 101 & 102	1970 Police Orient.
1970 CI Survey	1970 IDENTIKIT
1970 CS Radio 101	1970 CS Records I
1970 Intro to Intell	1970 Photo 101
1970 IRRR	
1979 Audio 101	

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BEGINNING WITH 1961

DATES FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR. CAT.	LOCATION	PROJECT	[illegible]	GRADE EQUIV.
Feb 1961	PM Ops Officer	A	Hqs	JMARC	[illegible]	
Jun 1961	"	CA	JMWAVE	JMATE	[illegible]	13
1967	"	CA	"		[illegible]	14
Jul 1969	Maritime Ops Off	CA	Hqs	HJESEL	[illegible]	14

SECRET

ROHO

COVER

A. PRESENT COVER IS ☒ OFFICIAL ☐ NONOFFICIAL

CURRENT EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY

good

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

ADAPTABILITY (SUBJECT AND FAMILY) TOWARDS COVER LIFE

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NONOFFICIAL (GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)

JMWAVE

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

Currently under medical hold and not qualified for overseas PCS or TDY

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

To remain at Headquarters until medical problem corrected

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

SCD: ? 10/

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): DEVUONO, Irvine C. (P)

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: Jun 1923

5. [illegible] DATE: ?

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married

7. DEPENDENTS (Excluding employee): 3

YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 1938 1949 1956

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA

SPOUSE: ?

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS

MEMBERSHIP

OTHER STATUS: Ineligible

10. LAST [illegible] APP: May 1961

QUAL. FOR: Prop Assign

EVAL. FOR: Prop Assign

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS

NONE | SERVICE

GRADE

ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA (CAT. I)

RELEASE TO MIL. SER. (CAT. 2)

TO BE DEFERRED (CAT. 3)

RETIRED: XX

12. ASSESSMENT DATE

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1938-60 Military Service, US Army, Capt - Special forces operations;
Instructor at 7th Army NCO School for 3 years
1956-60 Commanded & Trained an SF team in guerilla warfare

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

German - S Slight
French - S Slight
Laotian - S Slight

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE - OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	TO	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (IF ANY)	LOCATION
Feb 1961	ParaMil (Contr Employee)	$ 9500		DDP/WH/JMARC	Hq
Jun 1961	PM Off (Career Agent)	11155	GS13	DDP/CA/PMG/Proj ZRJEWEL	JMWAVE
Aug 1967	" " " "	16152	14	" " " " "	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: 19 Sep 1967

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: hc

22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: No

FORM 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible], Irving C. (P)	DATE OF BIRTH Jun 1923

23.
No Photo Available.

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Award 1964 Intelligence Star and Intelligence Star Certificate for meritorious duty and heroism under hazardous conditions performed in Spring 1961.

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
19 Sep 1967	hc

FORM NO. 1 FEB 67 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1080 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET

PROFILE (4)

SECRET

15 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report for Mr. Grayston L. Lynch, 1 April 1970 - 31 March 1971

Although Mr. Lynch is assigned to the Maritime Branch for administrative purposes, he was in training during the entire period covered by subject fitness report. Therefore, an evaluation of his performance by Maritime Branch would be unrealistic.

D. Strauch, Jr.
Chief, Maritime Branch
Special Operations Division

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 Jun 23

3. SEX M

4. GRADE Equiv GS-14

5. SD Career Agent

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG

8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 11 July 1957 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Section Supervisor of one of the four sections within Special Operations Branch. Section consists of two officers and one secretary.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for the supervision of a 25 man indigenous commando group. Group consists of 2 operational intelligence collection teams, 4 infiltration team boat crews and an 8 man alert/contingency, commando team.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for the recruiting, training, administration and operational matters for 25 agents involved in infiltration/exfiltration operations into a denied area.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administrative duties for Section operations to include financial support, supplies and equipment, clearances, cover, real estate and intra-Station coordination.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reporting to include operational, contact, quarterly/monthly reports and other required correspondence, preparation of operational plans and training schedules/syllabuses.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Uses Agents assigned him for collection of information on illegal activities of local Cuban refugees.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
4-66

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During most of the period reported on, Subject was concerned with administrative problems associated with the phase-out of the Station. Despite the consequent operational lull, Subject continued to maintain a satisfactory degree of morale in agents assigned him, worked up and implemented realistic training programs, and continued to develop excellent targets studies against the possibility of a policy change. In addition, important information collected locally by Subject on illegal activities of Cuban refugees was of great interest to other agencies offices in the area. Subject was the only Station source of such information which was acquired only because of Subject's ability to maintain rapport with agents, terminated during the period because of the cutback in infiltration operations.

It could also be noted as Subject finishes his long tour at this Station and prepares for his next assignment, that he is a thoroughly professional intelligence officer and is, in many ways, an outstanding one. Technically, he is an expert on infiltration tactics and, through his Special Forces experience, an expert on anti-guerrilla warfare as well. Just as important, is his ability to gain respect and rapport with foreign agents. He has an imaginative approach to operations, is resourceful in devising tactics, and determined in carrying out his assignments. He is a definite asset to WOFIRM.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 24 April 68	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 24 April 68	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Branch Chief, Special Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.) John Hannon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs with the Rating Officer's comments and overall evaluation of Subject's performance. Please see Subject's previous Fitness Reports for additional remarks on Subject's performance by this Reviewing Officer.

DATE 24 April 68	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station/ Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [illegible] Robert Moore

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): DEVUONO, Irving C.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 14 June 23
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-13
5. SD: Career Agent
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Career Agent
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/COG
8. CURRENT STATION:
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1967 - 10 July 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Section Supervisor of one of the four sections within Special Operations Branch. Section consists of two officers and one secretary.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for the supervision of a 25 man indigenous commando group. Group consists of 2 operational intelligence collection teams, 4 infiltration team boat crews and an 8 man alert/contingency commando team.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for the recruiting, training, administration and operational matters for the 25 agents involved in infiltration/exfiltration operations into a denied area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administrative duties for Section operations to include financial support, supplies and equipment, clearances, cover, real estate and intra-Station coordination.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reporting to include operational, contact, quarterly/monthly reports and other required correspondence, preparation of operational plans and training schedules/syllabuses.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 8-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review, Subject has continued to produce at his previous high level and he has planned and executed three intelligence collection operations against a denied area with the two teams under his supervision and direction. His leadership qualities have, to a large degree, enabled him to maintain his commando group morale at a high level under the difficult circumstances of enforced inactivity. Subject's indigenous agents respect him and are willing to follow his instructions to the letter. Subject's seemingly limitless resourcefulness, drive and initiative coupled with his demonstrated proficiency for this type of work mark him as one of the few persons known to the Rater who is ideally suited to this particular type of agent handling on a day-to-day, face-to-face basis.

During the reporting period Subject has committed his four infiltration boat teams on a total of seven operations and excellent results have been realized. He has conducted extensive testing of equipment and techniques in support of Station requirements and Headquarters requests. His reporting after these field tests has shown that his reporting ability has improved to such a degree to warrant a rating of strong in this duty.

He is cost and security conscious and has demonstrated his effectiveness in the use of personnel, equipment and operational funds. Subject has not had the benefit of formal language training and does not have a definitive language capability. In view of his long tenure of field assignments during his career with WOFACT, it is recommended he be given

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 June 1967	Irving C. DEVUONO signed in pseudo on fld. transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
6 Months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 June 1967	Deputy Chief, SO Branch	signed in pseud John F. Murzancon fld. trans.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject continues to show professional ability in handling the Commando Group. In addition he has been deeply involved in planning and executing intelligence gathering operations. He has adapted to this new field and is performing overall in an outstanding manner.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
July 3, 1967	Chief, Special Operations Branch	signed in Pse. George D. Frenchan fld. trans.

SECRET

SECRET

Continuation of Section C/Narrative Comments

serious consideration for formal training and orientation prior to his next assignment within WOFACT.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
~~Contract~~ Career Agent

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) DEVUONO Irving C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 June 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Career Agent	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/[illegible]/COG		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1966 - 31 December 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises 25 Field Agents and two WOFACT personnel engaged in Special Operations missions. The Agents comprise crews of 4 SO Infiltration Craft, 2 SO Infiltration Teams, and a Special Alert Team. These Agents perform overwater infiltration, exfiltration, and caching operations into a denied area (PBRUMEN).	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises the training of 25 Field Agents in operation of small craft and all related activities, PM operational techniques and tradecraft.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops operational plans and programs for specific SO Operations. Tests and evaluates new equipment and techniques for possible use by SO Branch or other Station activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administers all personnel and administrative matters for 25 Field Agents. Handles real estate, subsistence and logistics for 25 Field Agents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period of this report Subject has continued to show an outstanding proficiency in the supervision of the Field Agents under his control. He has continued to maintain the morale of his agents and to keep them at a high level of proficiency by a strong training schedule and by planning and executing outstanding operations in the field of reconnaissance, deception, and Special Operations Teams. During the last four months he has also had the responsibility of forming and training three additional Infiltration Craft Crews. Subject formed two Special Operations Infiltration/Exfiltration Teams and conducted one infil/exfil operation into PBRUMEN. Subject has remained active in testing new equipment and techniques for possible use by the Station. Subject has an excellent concept of Special Operations-PM techniques and acts as advisor to Chief of Special Operations Branch on PM type activities in Special Operations. Subject continues to provide reports on exile activities in all areas and is constantly pushing his Agents in this field. He is a hard worker and is a capable administrator and supervisor. He knows his job, does not need close supervision and has shown ability to branch out into other fields of WOFACT activities. He is cost and security conscious and has shown that he is effective in the use of personnel, space, equipment and operational funds.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 1 Dec. 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Irving C. DEVUONO (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 18 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 1 December 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Special Operations Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ George D. French, Jr. (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer has been closely associated with Subject during the entire period of his assignment to this Station and concurs in the Rating Officer's evaluation of Subject's handling of specific duties as well as the narrative comments. As a result of this close personal contact with Subject and observation of his day-to-day handling of operational situations, the Reviewing Officer considers Subject to be one of the most capable and well qualified senior special operations officers at this Station. Please see Subject's three previous Fitness Reports for additional comments on Subject's performance at this Station.

DATE 17 March 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert B. Moore (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: Career Agent

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) DEVUCHC (First) Irving (Middle) C.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 14 Jun 1923
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: Equiv. GS-13
5. SD:
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE:
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT:
8. CURRENT STATION: JMWAVE
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 01 July 1965 - 31 Dec 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a 30-man Indigenous Commando Group.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains the training of the group at a proficient level in weapons, tactics, pre-strike rehearsals and related activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops operational concepts for infiltrations/exfiltrations, raids, caching and rescue operations and prepares operational plans for same.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Reporting to include operational, contact and monthly reports, and other required correspondence.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Case Officer for one FI Reporting Agent to include handling, reporting and guidance of Agent.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-64 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject has been under my supervision for approximately 6 months. During this period he has shown an outstanding proficiency in the supervision of his Commando Group. He is responsible for the logistical support, maintenance, planning and operations of the group and must also maintain their motivation and moral. As a result of the stand-down in PM activities at this Station, one of his major duties has been keeping his group motivated and happy. Subject has performed these tasks in a very professional manner; he has shown strong leadership qualities and a definite ability to adapt to difficult and frustrating changes in the operational climate. Subject has had the additional duty of handling an FI Agent for the Station. He has spent long hours on this activity and has shown that he is fully capable of broadening his scope of activities to other fields besides the supervision of a commando group. He is cost and security conscious and has shown that he is effective in the use of personnel, space, equipment and operational funds.

SECTION D

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
17 February 1966	/s/ Irving C. DEVONO (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
6 Months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
17 Feb. 1966	Chief, Special Operations Branch	/s/ Hugh R. DENDY (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attachment.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
19 February 1966	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ Frederick J. INGHURST (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment

Section D., 3.

This is the third Fitness Report prepared on Subject since his assignment to this Station. The comments set forth on the two previous Fitness Reports by the Reviewing Officer and the Chief of Station are in the main still applicable. The Reviewing Officer has been most favorably impressed with Subject's performance in his present position. Subject has continued to perform his job in his usual competent, dependable and professional manner. The Reviewing Officer shares the Rating Officer's high opinion of Subject's performance and there is no doubt that Subject has contributed significantly to the Station's activities. Subject's over-all performance continues to warrant an evaluation of Strong.

Deputy Chief of Station

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) DEVUONO, Irving C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 08-14-23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify): Career Agent

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 01 October 1963 - 30 June 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a 40 man Indigenous Commando Group	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops operational concepts for in/exfiltration, raids, caching and rescue operations and prepares operational plans for same.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Real Estate, Materiel, and Subsistence Support relating to the group.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. _Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable._

Subject continues to demonstrate a decided proficiency in the supervision of the type of unit for which he has responsibility. His men respect him and follow his orders readily. Subject officer is loyal and security minded. He is resourceful, acts with initiative and delegates responsibility. He is cost conscious. Subject is capable of handling larger units of indigenous commandos. He thinks clearly and is a versatile individual in the PM field.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	Irving C. DEVUONO /S/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
		Stanley R. ZAMKA

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attachment.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
JUN 23 1965	Deputy Chief of Station	Frederick J. [illegible]HURST

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment

Section D., 3.

The Reviewing Officer is familiar with Subject's performance based primarily on discussions with Subject and Subject's supervisor, detailed examination of Subject's operational plans, general observation of Subject during the past four years and a first hand knowledge of the results of operations conducted under Subject's guidance. Subject is a hard-working, dedicated officer who has a knack for getting things done in the operational field. Subject is exceptionally well qualified for the job he is doing. Additionally, Subject has a flair for getting along with the members of the Commando Group without losing objectivity. Subject's operational planning is sound and complete in all details. Subject is completely self-sufficient in operational command and agent relationship situations. Subject's performance at this Station clearly warrants an over-all evaluation of Strong.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) DZ7JOHO (First) Irving (Middle) G.
2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 June 1923
3. SEX M
4. GRADE Contract
5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.
8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Career Agent		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
X	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 May 1962 to 30 September 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a 30-man Commando Group and supervises the Group's implementation of operations which includes pre-strike rehearsals and briefings and organization of logistical support.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains the training of the Group at a proficient level in all weapons, tactics, and related PM activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops operational concepts for raids and caching operations and prepares operational plans and operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises Real Estate, Materiel, and Subsistence Support relating to the Group.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has shown a decided proficiency in the supervision of the type of unit for which he has responsibility. His men respect him and follow his orders readily. He is resourceful, acts with initiative, and delegates responsibility. In his field he thinks clearly and is decisive and versatile in his actions. He is capable of handling larger units of personnel and assuming greater responsibility in the PM field. If he were required to accept duties of a broader nature in the intelligence field involving less supervision of his own activities, he would need to improve in the areas of written and oral expression and in his understanding of KUBARK requirements and responsibilities. In this regard he would need additional training and exposure to more extensive KUBARK fields as he has not had the opportunity for participating in such KUBARK activities. Subject does not have the proficiency of the language used.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
26 Nov. 1963	/s/ Irving G. DEMUNO (signed in pseudo on Fld. Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
17		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 Nov. 1963	C/PM Br., JMWAVE	/s/ Stanley R. ZAMKA (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attached Sheet

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 Nov. 1963	Chief of Station	/s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

Continuation of FITNESS REPORT, Section D:

Subject is a well-qualified para-military specialist, who has fully mastered the tools of his trade. Subject applies all of his para-military knowledge in the performance of his current duties as the senior outside case officer for a thirty-man commando group, which is capable of carrying out a variety of different missions. These missions include caching operations, sabotage raids, tactical intelligence reconnaissance activities and contingency missions related to war plans. Subject is at his best in dealing with men and military equipment. Subject's major weakness is in records management and reports writing. Despite this minor weakness, Subject's over-all performance warrants an evaluation of Proficient.

Subject has the potential to train and operationally exploit para-military forces in units which have a T/O strength of not more than 60 men. Subject could command a conventional military formation at the battalion level. Subject is capable of mounting counter-insurgency operations with the use of forces up to battalion strength.

Subject's work comes to the attention of the Reviewing Officer on a bi-weekly basis.

Subject's future assignments should be in the para-military field. If Subject is to remain in operations in Latin America, he must be given an opportunity to study Spanish on a formal basis.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) DEVUONO (P) IRVING C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX M	4. GRADE
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT JMWAVE	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	STAFFED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	[illegible]

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify) At the request of C/CA/PM per UFGW-783

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From Aug 61 - To April 62

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Develop and control a 22-man commando team.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plan and mount commando operations.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Administer and provide records for the support of a 22-man commando team.	RATING NO. 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 3-4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (✓) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS				X			
THINKS CLEARLY				X			
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):				X			
	[redacted]						

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

As a former military officer, Subject is hard working and abundantly sincere in his efforts to fight Communism. His performance since Aug 1961 has not been at the top level of his capabilities for several reasons, not all of which are within his ability to overcome. Subject has had little clandestine training, and is therefore not always able to comprehend the intangible factors which prevent, delay and cancel operations. A further reason is the absence of military law as a basis for discipline for his men. Still another reason is the directive for only limited action with which he has had to live since August. This is merely to say that in a period of policy formation when the action forces have had to be held in limbo, he has not been at his best.

Subject's dealings with his agents have in turn been affected by his own frustrations. His inability to rationalize situations has resulted in obtuse explanations to them which have made them harder to handle. His reluctance to put things on paper has detracted from his performance and denied him the clarifying process which reporting provides. His security consciousness has been similarly affected by his frustrations.

Subject is in need of training in tradecraft and PM operations. His basic qualifications for PM Case Officer work are such that he can, with training, do a much better job. This combined with a program of concentrated action would undoubtedly bring out the best in him, which should be of real value to the Agency.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 MAY 62	[illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 MAY 62	DC/PM	Norman D. Kiggins NORMAN D. KIGGINS

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 May 62	COS/JMWAVE	[illegible]

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

Date 16 August 1962

Career Agent Biographic Data

a. Pseudonym of agent: [illegible], Irving C. Staff or Division: [illegible]
Last First MI

b. Date and place of birth: 14 June 1923 Galveston, Texas

c. Marital status: Married

d. Relationship and years of birth of dependents:

Wife	39
Daughter	15
Son	11
Son	8

e. Citizenship of agent: U.S.A.
(1) If naturalized, when?

(2) If naturalized, where?

g. Non-CIA education to include name and location of college, degrees, dates, and major:

h. Military service
(1) Country served and years: U.S.A. 22

(2) Branch of service and rank: U. S. Army Captain

i. Non-CIA employment: kinds of business or profession, positions, salaries, locations, and dates:

See (h)

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 2)

j. Dates of psychological assessment, professional and language aptitude tests, if applicable:

k. Languages, including English, using the following terms: Elementary, Intermediate, High, Native

Language	Reading	Writing	Speaking
English	Native	Native	Native
German	Elementary	Elementary	Elementary
French	Elementary	Elementary	Elementary

l. Agency training:

Subject Covered	Duration of Course	Years Taken

m. Alias or pseudonym used for psychological assessment, testing or training, if applicable:

n. Security clearance number: 189184

o. Date of last LCFLUTTER: 10 Feb. 1961

p. Contract provisions: (Underline One)

(1) Provision for periodic step increases [✓ Yes] No
(2) Provision for legislative pay increases [✓ Yes] No
(3) Provision for total offset of cover income [✓ Yes] No
(4) Provision for civil service retirement [✓ Yes] No
(5) Any unusual provisions (please specify)

No unusual provisions

S-E-C-R-E-T

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 3)

q. Date of beginning of current tour: 1 June 1961

r. Previous CIA employment:

Years	Type of Cover	CIA Duties	Project	City	Salary
4 mos.	Commercial	FI Training	[illegible]		$9500 pa

S-E-C-R-E-T

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISSUED BY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE (Fill In)

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last First Middle): LYNCH, Grayson L
2. AGE: 37
3. SEX: ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE
4. HEIGHT: 6'½"
5. WEIGHT: 194
6. COLOR OF EYES:
7. COLOR OF HAIR:
8. TYPE COMPLEXION:
9. TYPE BUILD:
10. SCARS (Type and Location):
11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES:
12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country):
533 Circle Terrace
Fayetteville, N. C.
13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO.: Victoria, Texas
14. CURRENT PHONE NO.:
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.:
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country): Victoria, Texas
17. NICKNAMES:
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED:
19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.
20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority).

SECTION II — POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING
2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary). $
3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT
4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:
5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (Check (X) each item applicable)
☐ WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify):
☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.
6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 14 Jan. 1923
2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Gilmer, Texas
3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): U. S.

4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: XX BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):
5. DATE NATURALIZED:
6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.
7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE:
8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country):

9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☐ YES XX NO
10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY:
11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY:

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. GIVE PARTICULARS:
14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)?
15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.
16. PORT OF ENTRY
17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY
18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue)
19. DATE VISA ISSUED

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE		OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
X	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE		BACHELOR'S DEGREE
	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE		GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
X	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS		MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL:
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To):
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: USAFI
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1946
4. GRADUATE: X YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To):
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
USAFI			1947	1948			2 yrs

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
The Armored School, Ft. Knox, Ky.		1952	1953	
Special Warfare School, Ft. Bragg, N. C.,	Spec. Forces Off. Trng		1956	

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE *(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).*	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
French													X	X	X				
German													X	X	X				
Lao															X				

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

YES NO

SECTION VI GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
England							
France							
Germany							
Belgium							
Japan, Korea, & South East Asia							

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

Military Service

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.

SECTION VII TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)

2. SHORTHAND (wpm)

3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.).

SECTION VIII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

Radio Operator, CW   10 wpm

Parachutist

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE (Provide License Registry Number, if known).

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of Issue)

7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of Issue)

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

Public Speaking USIA- Germany 1954 - 1956.
U. S. Army 1956-60

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.): Sept. 56 - 31 Oct. 60

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY: U. S. Army

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Ft. Bragg, N. C. 7th Special Forces Group (Abn)

4. KIND OF BUSINESS: Special Forces Operations

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR:

6. TITLE OF JOB: Air Ops Off & Team leader

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service):

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Trained team in all subjects of unconventional warfare including trng in all weapons, american and foreing; demolation & sabotage, Escape *&evasion, Guerill & anit guerilla tacticts, Sply and adm, medical. Intensive study of selected target areas including language, Political & Economic & military situations. One yr. study of So East Asia with particular attn paid guerilla warfare ops. Conducted trng in radio commo work, air re supply & infiltration of denied areas 25% or trng classified Team leader on 6 month classified mission in So. East Asia

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING
REASON FOR LEAVING: Retirement

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Sept. 53 - Sept. 56
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. ARMY
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) 7th Army [illegible]CO Acadamy, Munich Germany
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB Instructor
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Instructed in tactics, weapons, leadership & engineering equip.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Oct. 51-Sept. 53
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U. S. Army
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Ft. Huston Texas, Reception Center
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Company Commander
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Sept. 50 - Oct. 51
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. Army
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Korea, 2nd Reconnaissance Troop, 2nd Infantry Div.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB 2nd Lt.- Platoon Leader
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) June 48 - Sept. 50
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U. S. Army
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Ft. Hood Texas, 2nd Armored Div.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Platoon Sgt.
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
Sept. 47 - June 48

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
XXXXXXXXXX

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
Huston, Texas

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB
Ins. Agent & Mgr of Naval Off. Club

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
May 45 - Sept. 47

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Patient in U. S. Army Hospital

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

3. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☐ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

SECTION X

MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 (As amended) ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE (Specify):
HAVE SERVED →	XX								
NOW SERVING →									

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S)
7th Special Forces Group (Abn)

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (Past service)
31 Oct. 1960

4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES (Past and current service)
22 yrs

5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY → PAST SERVICE Oct 1938 CURRENT SERVICE

6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE → PAST SERVICE Sgt. CURRENT SERVICE Capt.

8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER (If now serving, provide current number) 46126

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE PAST SERVICE CURRENT SERVICE

10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE PAST SERVICE CURRENT SERVICE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☐	HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☒	RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐	UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐	RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐	RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	☐	OTHER:
☐	RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐	RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY		

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

☐ REGULAR ☐ RESERVE (Including the National and Air National Guard) ☐ OTHER (Including AUS)

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☐	ARMY	☐	MARINE CORPS	NATIONAL GUARD	☐	COAST GUARD	☐	NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
☐	NAVY	☐	AIR FORCE	AIR NAT'L GUARD	☐	ARMY ROTC	☐	AIR FORCE ROTC	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE

10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY YEARS MONTHS

17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT?

SECTION XI FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☐ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled)* SPECIFY.

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS.

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME (First)	(Middle)	(Maiden)	(Last)
			LYNCH

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)*

6. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*

7. LIVING	8. DATE OF DEATH	9. CAUSE OF DEATH
☐ YES ☐ NO		

10. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address if deceased)*

11. DATE OF BIRTH	12. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*	13. CITIZENSHIP

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY

15. PLACE OF ENTRY

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *(Countries)*

17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

18. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)*

19. OCCUPATION

20. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers)*

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE *(From and to - Give Mo. and Yr.)*

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE

24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
LYNCH	daughter			
"	son			
"	son			

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN *(Including step-children and adopted children)* WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS *(Including spouse, parents, step-parents, sister, etc.)* WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

SECTION XIV FATHER *(Give same information for Stepfather and/or Guardian on a separate sheet)*

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*

2. LIVING: YES NO

3. DATE OF DEATH

4. CAUSE OF DEATH

5. CURRENT ADDRESS - *Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country)*

6. DATE OF BIRTH

7. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*

8. CITIZENSHIP

9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY

10. PLACE OF ENTRY

11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *(Country(ies))*

12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

13. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)*

14. OCCUPATION

15. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Give last employer if Father is deceased or unemployed)*

16. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED

17. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE *(From and To)*

18. BRANCH OF SERVICE

19. COUNTRY

20. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION XV MOTHER (Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH
4. CAUSE OF DEATH
5. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased) (No., Street, City, State, Country)
6. DATE OF BIRTH
7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
8. CITIZENSHIP
9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY
10. PLACE OF ENTRY
11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies))
12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED
13. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
14. OCCUPATION
15. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed)
16. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED
17. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To)
18. BRANCH OF SERVICE
19. COUNTRY
20. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION XVI BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)

1	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
	4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO	6. AGE
2	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
	4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO	6. AGE
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
	4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO	6. AGE
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
	4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO	6. AGE
5	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
	4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO	6. AGE
6	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
	4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO	6. AGE
7	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
	4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO	6. AGE
8	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
	4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO	6. AGE
9	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
	4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO	6. AGE

SECTION XXVI

CERTIFICATION

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES

2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Grayston L. Lynch

3. SIGNED AT (City and State)

4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates, sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

Sec. IX cont (Employment)

Dec. 41 - May 45	U. S. Army- Platoon Sgt, 2nd Infantry Div., 2nd Reconnaissance Troop, Wounded in Belgium.
Oct. 38 - Oct. 41	U. S. Army 2nd Infantry Div., 23rd Infantry regiment & 2nd Reconnaissance Troop.

14-00000

SECRET

2 JUL 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : CIARDS Retirement of Mr. Grayston L. Lynch, GS-14, SOD, on the Basis of Qualifying Domestic Service

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 4.

2. After more than twenty years of active military service, Mr. Lynch joined CIA in February 1961 to assist in operations against the Cuban target. He was awarded the Intelligence Star for his participation in the Bay of Pigs and related activities in the spring of 1961. Because of the sensitivity of his duties in behalf of CIA, his periods of foreign service were not recorded in the usual manner. From August 1961 until June 1968 he was intensively involved in the recruitment, training, administration and operational direction of a large number of agents as well as the planning and direction of operations into Cuba.

3. After reviewing his application for admission to CIARDS and corroborating statements from Clandestine Service officers acquainted with his work, the Clandestine Service Career Service Board concluded that Mr. Lynch's case merits a recommendation for approval. It is our view that the demands placed upon him were at least on a par with those borne by operations officers assigned overseas.

4. It is, therefore, recommended that Mr. Lynch be designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System on the basis of qualifying domestic service. If he is accepted for CIARDS, Mr. Lynch will apply for disability retirement.

/s/ Thomas H.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

Attachments:

Tab A - Mr. Lynch's request and 3 endorsements

Tab B - Forms 3100 and 3101

Tab C - Biographic Profile

CSPS/GLMott/lrk (1 July 1971)

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee w/atts
- 2 - DDP
- 1 - CSPS/Mott
- 1 - CSPS/Soft file
- 1 - C/FE/Personnel

SECRET

28 June 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Grayston L. Lynch

REFERENCE: Mr. Lynch's memorandum to Director of Personnel, dated 22 June 1971.

1. On the basis of what I can recall from the time I was connected with the Bay of Pigs activity and my years with WH Division thereafter, Mr. Lynch has stated his tasks correctly.

2. Since the issue is whether Mr. Lynch's service in Miami could be considered equivalent to that of an Operations Officer overseas, the following might be considered:

Mr. Lynch had to operate clandestinely.

He used pseudonyms, safesites for meetings, non-official cover.

He handled, trained and dispatched agents. He debriefed them. He worked with them side by side.

He worked long, irregular hours (days and nights) under unusual pressures and at personally inconvenient and unappealing sites.

Mr. Lynch was, during the Bay of Pigs period at least, in real personal danger. (Our case officers abroad do not often face such situations nor do they have to display such courage.)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3. In summary, Mr. Lynch's tasks were professionally and personally more demanding than those of many of our Operations Officers abroad. He had to apply clandestine techniques and concepts in a highly volatile and difficult operational climate. To admit him to the CIA Retirement System seems justified.

Gerard Droller

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Inclusion in CIARDS - Grayson L. Lynch

1. Mr. Lynch's memorandum dated 22 June 1971 requesting that service at JMWAVE be considered as qualifying service under CIARDS has been reviewed by individuals familiar with his activities during the period noted. They state that his memorandum is factual and accurately represents the situation as it existed at JMWAVE.

2. The service described is considered comparable to that performed overseas. WH Division concurs in favorable action on his request should that be the recommendation of the Board.

(Signed) [illegible]

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Original & 1 - D/Pers
1 - CSPS
1 - C/WHD
1 - WH/Pers

Originated by: J. Ferguson:jab WH/Personnel 28 June 71 X7431

SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded from [illegible]

[illegible]

24 JUN 197[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Approval of
Mr. Grayston L. Lynch as a Participant
in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : HR 20-50

1. It is strongly recommended that Mr. Grayston L. Lynch be approved as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.

2. It is the opinion of the Special Operations Division that the duties performed by Mr. Lynch from the time he entered on duty in February 1961 until early 1968 meet the spirit and intent of the criteria for "qualifying service" as defined in HR 20-50b. The lone exception to these criteria is that Mr. Lynch was not "abroad" during the time involved except on a sporadic basis. This exception, however, was due completely to the geographical location of the area of operations. This location made it uniquely propitious to have Mr. Lynch assigned to and work out of a domestic base. There is no question, however, that Mr. Lynch's service was in the conduct and support of covert operations which required continuing practice of security and tradecraft procedures and which included, from time to time, hazards to his life and health. It is also believed that Mr. Lynch would be at a disadvantage in obtaining other employment because of the sensitivity of his past service as well as the dearth of requirements for his peculiar background, skills and knowledge.

3. On the basis of the above and Mr. Lynch's unique personal record, it is believed that his service during the described period is certainly equivalent to if not in excess of the requirements for "creditable service abroad" and that if it had not been for a geographical accident, this service would have been performed as

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

part of an assignment abroad within the fullest meaning of the definition contained in the referent regulation. Therefore, approval of Mr. Lynch's request for designation as a participant in the CIARDS on the basis of service performed between 1961 and 1968 is not only strongly recommended but is requested as the grant of an entitlement fully earned by a very deserving employee.

Evan J. Parker, Jr.
Acting Chief
Special Operations Division

22 JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Request for Designation as a Participant in CIARDS--Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

1. It is requested that domestic service reflected in the following paragraphs be approved as qualifying service for the CIARDS and that I be designated as a participant in the system.

2. I entered on duty with the Agency on 10 February 1961. I was sent TDY immediately to New Orleans, Louisiana and from there to Key West, Florida to prepare WH Division agent assets for operational missions. On 28 March 1961 I departed Key West, Florida aboard a covert Agency ship bound for Nicaragua where I engaged in the preparation of Agency vessels and assets scheduled for operations into Cuba. On 13 April 1961 I departed Nicaragua via an Agency vessel for the 17 April 1961 landing operation in the Bay of Pigs, Cuba. I was assigned as the Case Officer for the Agency command ship, Cuban Brigade Headquarters, and the Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) element. I participated in armed action both at sea and on shore during the four days of the invasion attempt and, per direct instructions from the DCI, engaged in a series of covert landings and operations into Cuba for several days following the invasion landing. I returned to Headquarters on 29 April 1961.

3. In August 1961 I was assigned PCS to JMWAVE at Miami, Florida as a Paramilitary Operations Officer. From my arrival in August 1961 until July 1965 I served under commercial cover outside the station, intermittently using my home and various safehouses as "ad hoc" offices. All contact with the station was by telephone and/or personal meetings prearranged with station personnel. These personal contacts were either at my home, in safehouses, or at other meeting places deemed appropriate. During this period I was responsible for the recruitment, training, administration and operational direction of a very large group of Agents. This entailed numerous clandestine meetings, both day and night, with these Agents. Since they were in various stages of training, assessment or preparation for an operation and were located throughout Dade and Monroe counties in

Florida, I was required to drive an average of 5000 miles per month to provide the necessary handling and support. The major training exercises were as follows:

a. Three black flights to ISOLATION for periods of one to three weeks duration during which time I was required to remain in the black training areas as handler for the Agents.

b. One three day trip to Lake Worth, Florida during which I conducted the ground phase of parachute training for 26 Agents and arranged for civilian instructors and planes for two parachute jumps per man.

c. Two black flights to Camp McKall, North Carolina to conduct parachute training for 36 Agents, during which time, as Chief Instructor, I made two parachute jumps.

d. Two black flights to the Ranger Training Center at Eglin AFB, Florida for additional parachute, commando and guerilla warfare training for 38 Agents. Both trips were of two weeks duration each and again, I made two parachute jumps.

e. Four black flights to Fort Stewart, Georgia for training in weapons and tactics for 38 Agents. Training was conducted with all weapons from the .45 calibre pistol up to and including the 4.2 inch mortar. Demolition and sabotage training including night and day tactical exercises using live ammunition and explosives were also conducted. Each exercise lasted from five to 15 days.

f. Eight training exercises from three to seven days duration each were conducted in and around the Everglades National Park and the Marquesas Keys in Florida.

g. Over 70 mission rehearsals of two or three days duration conducted in the Florida Keys.

4. In addition to the above training exercises I planned and directed 115 actual operations into Cuba during this period. This involved the isolation of a five to 25 man team in a safehouse for three days to two weeks preparing for an operation and remaining with them day and night until they were launched. It also involved receiving the team at the conclusion of the mission and again holding them in a safehouse for a two day debriefing period.

5. In 1965 I set up an office in Perrine, Florida, under commercial cover, to administer the Agent group. I remained in this office conducting operations and training as before until April 1966. My office was moved into the JMWAVE Station at that time, but I remained under commercial cover and my duties continued to be the same.

6. During the time I was assigned to JMWAVE I was required to participate in numerous voyages aboard Agency ships into international waters. Many of these were near to and into denied waters. I was also required to participate in several search and rescue aircraft flights of long duration over international water, near and into denied areas.

7. It is my belief that my activities and duties from August 1961 to June 1968 were of the types normally found only in overseas clandestine activities for which the five year CIARDS "creditable service abroad" requirement was intended. I am available for further explanation or clarification if any of the above information is required, or if confirmation of my service by other Agency personnel is needed, I submit the following names of knowledgeable individuals:

a. Gerald Droller, DDP/NSP
b. Robert Ortman, WH/COG
c. George French, SOD/CB
d. William Broe, C/WH

8. In view of the facts presented above, I request to be designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and will apply for disability retirement when my participation is approved.

SIGNED

Grayston L. Lynch

1. DEVUONO received an annuity of $4,272 per year ($356. per month) from the military for 21 years of service.

2. This military annuity will be cancelled.

3. His 21 years of military service will be combined with 10 plus years of CIA service and these 31 plus years will give him a total of $13,428 per year.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

DCI
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

(1)

Mr. Grayston L. Lynch is a Career Agent who entered on duty into the Agency in February 1961 and served in New Orleans, Louisiana and Key West, Florida preparing WH Agent assets for operational assignments. In March 1961 he left Key West, Florida aboard a covert Agency vessel for Nicaragua where he assisted in the preparation of Agency vessels and assets scheduled for operations into Cuba. In April 1961, he left Nicaragua on a Agency vessel to participate in the landing operations in the Bay of Pigs, Cuba. He was [redacted] involved in armed action both at sea and at shore during the four days of the invasion attempt and, from direct instructions from the DCI, engaged in series of covert landings and operations into Cuba for several days following the invasion landing. For this action Mr. Lynch [redacted] received the Intelligence Star. Mr. Lynch subsequently served as a paramilitary operations officer at Miami, Florida until approximately June 1968. During this period he participated in numerous clandestine activities including agent training, parachute training, weapons training, [redacted] He also planned and directed 115 actual operations into Cuba.

In the course of these earlier operational assignments, Mr. Lynch [redacted] developed a psychosis which will not permit him to travel by air at all nor by overland means for any lengthy period of time.

This has resulted in a medical hold being placed on Mr. Lynch for any overseas assignment PCS or TDY. Since he is uniquely a field special operations officer there are literally no departmental duties to which he can be assigned. Since there is no suitable assignment available for Mr. Lynch it is necessary to terminate Mr. Lynch's contract as a Career Agent. Since he is eligible for Involuntary Retirement under CIARDS, Mr. Lynch has made application for retirement effective 10 September 1971. In view of Mr. Lynch's age, specialized skills, long service in a uniquely sensitive area, and peculiar contribution to the Agency's mission it is believed that a termination bonus at the time of his retirement is fully warranted.

Mr. Lynch is currently the equivalent of a GS-14, step 5 with an annual salary of $23,591. The proposed $10,000 termination bonus represents, therefore, less than 42% of his annual salary or approximately 5 months pay. In connection with this, it should be noted that if he were being terminated rather than retiring, he would be entitled by virtue of the provisions of his contract to 90 days notice which would equal approximately $6,000 at his current rate of pay in salary alone. Additional fringe benefits would increase this figure.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

Eyes Only
Personal Info

24 AUG 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/SS/Personnel

SUBJECT : Mr. Grayston Lynch

1. Assuming no interruptions or changes of assignment or status in the interim, Mr. Lynch will complete his currently scheduled Spanish language training in mid-April 1971. Between now and then it is understood that he will--on his own initiative and with whatever assistance and encouragement we can properly provide--make an effort to overcome his phobia of flying and thereby, in due course, qualify medically for TDY or PCS overseas field duty.

2. In view of Mr. Lynch's past history, however, we cannot assume that he will be successful or will even actively press to overcome his problem. In spite of his career agent status and his operational performance (Intelligence Star), we cannot, in all conscience, carry him on SOD contract rolls indefinitely in an unproductive capacity. He has completed all of the advanced and refresher operations training necessary to qualify for assignment now. He has not adapted well nor has he been receptive to the kinds of headquarters duty assignments open to him. He is a field paramilitary officer.

3. It is prudent, therefore, to begin contingency planning now for his appropriate retirement and outplacement into a job which will offer him both security and personal satisfaction. His Spanish language training should enlarge his horizons and opportunities. We can predict he will not, at least at first, take at all kindly to the idea of retirement and relinquishing his Agency association. He is emotionally involved, and identifies himself as an Agency career field operations officer.

4. Please acquaint C/CSPS and DDP/JO with the background of this case, and together with them begin now to plan for this contingency.

Evan J. Parker, Jr.
Deputy Chief
Special Operations Division

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

SECRET

2 NOV 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Retirement Annuity
Mr. Grayston Lynch

1. Retirement Operations Division of the Office of Personnel (Linda Birch) provided the following computations for a proposed annuity for Mr. Grayston Lynch if he retired on the dates indicated. These figures were computed on 30 October 1970 and were based on the following:

		31 Dec 1970	30 April 1971
AGE (DOB: 14 June 1923)		47 years, 6 mts.	47 years, 10 mts.
CREDITABLE SERVICE (Including S/L)		31 years, 8 mts.	32 years
HIGH AVERAGE (3 Years)		$19.655	$20.261
BASIC ANNUITY:	Per Annum	$ 9.979	10.478
	Per Month	832	873
BASIC ANNUITY REDUCED FOR SURVIVOR:			
	Per Annum	9.251	9.700
	Per Month	771	808
SURVIVOR ANNUITY:	Per Annum	5,488	5.763
	Per Month	457	480

2. The above annuity would be recomputed when Mr Lynch becomes 62 years old. This recomputation is required to drop off post 1956 military service which applies to Social Security eligibility. Subject has no choice in this matter if he is eligible for Social Security benefits. If he is NOT eligible for Social Security benefits then the military service will remain creditable toward his Civil Service retirement annuity. The recomputed annuity would be as follows:

BASIC ANNUITY:	Per Annum	$ 8.695	$ 9.145
	Per Month	725	762
BASIC ANNUITY REDUCED FOR SURVIVOR:			
	Per Annum	8,096	8.502
	Per Month	675	708

EYES ONLY

SECRET

SURVIVOR ANNUITY:	Per Annum	$ 4,782	$ 5,030
	Per Month	399	419

3. It should be noted that the entire annuity at either time is reduced 2 % per year for each year Mr. Lynch is under 55 years of age. This amounts to a total reduction of approximately 15%.

Darold D. Aldridge
Deputy Chief, Personnel
Special Operations Division

EYES ONLY

SECRET

Egon [illegible]
Personal Info

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Grayson Lynch

Mr. Holcomb called at 4:30 on 1 July asking what were the procedures to get Mr. Lynch assigned to a Hqs position in SOD. Advised Mr. Holcomb that we would check with Cover and the Chairman, Agent Panel.

Mr. Strange approved Subject's assignment to Military cover at Hqs Building. Mr. Gresham, as Chairman of the Agent Panel, approved Subject's reassignment from Miami to SOD/Hqs.

Mr. Holcomb was advised at 4:45 p.m. of the above ~~division~~ decision.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

0 6 DEC 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Grayston Lynch

1. Mr. Lynch reported to C/SOD/Pers for interview on 5 December 1968. JMWAVE officials had notified him of the medical decision and the purpose of this visit to arrange for a six month interim assignment period while he undergoes appropriate treatment in Miami. We discussed the terms of the agreement which was made part of memorandum of agreement and was signed by Mr. Lynch and C/SOD/Pers. -(attached)

2. Mr. Lynch visited WH Division for discussions regarding the interim assignment with Dave Philips, Cuba Desk. According to Lynch there was some difference of opinion about the job at this point as to whether he'd be working for JMCOBRA or for Cuba Desk. He discussed this again with WH officials who he says agreed that he would work on a project for Mr. Philips unless Mr. Esterline had something specific he needed him to do. A message was to be sent out to this effect by WH Division.

3. Mr. Redmond of Agent Panel and Mr. Pollock SAS/OP were advised of status of this case but did not need to see Mr. Lynch unless he wished an interview. Pete Gaughan and Dr. Robinson of OMS were contacted and Dr. Robinson provided the names of three cleared consultants in Miami area for Mr. Lynch's referral. Mr. Lynch had a brief interview with Mr. Holcomb to let him know that arrangements for the six month interim assignment had gone well, he understood the terms of the agreement, and hoped to return in six months qualified for full duty including overseas and flying. He then took care of his accountings in SOD/E&F and departed for the drive back to Florida.

4. Mr. Lynch appeared to be in good spirits on this visit. He seemed to understand fully the terms of the six month agreement and expressed appreciation for being given this period of time to prove himself qualified for continued employment. However, he was left with no doubt of our intentions to terminate his contract at the end of the six month

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Grayston Lynch

period if he is not found to be fully qualified to perform the duties expected of him under the IUJEWEL Program.

JFHalpin
John F. Halpin
Chief, Personnel
Special Operations Division

0 5 DEC 1968

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

SUBJECT: Temporary Assignment -
Mr. Grayston Lynch

1. As a result of his recent fitness for duty physical examination, it was determined that Mr. Lynch is qualified only for domestic assignments not involving flying. This decision means that Mr. Lynch is not currently qualified to perform the duties required of him under the IUJEWEL Program. These duties involve primarily overseas assignments and require flying both as the normal means of transportation to and from areas of assignment and as an integral part of his job concerned with training and conduct of airborne operations.

2. Since Mr. Lynch is not qualified to perform the duties required of his position at this time or for the indefinite future, three courses of action have been considered as follows:

a. Termination of contract under the 90-days notice clause of his contract.

b. Initiation of action for disability retirement.

c. Approval of a 6-month domestic (temporary) assignment while Mr. Lynch pursues appropriate treatment to determine whether his current disability is temporary.

3. In recognition of Mr. Lynch's long period of dedicated service to the Federal Government and this Agency, it has been agreed to offer him the 6-month interim assignment as per paragraph 2.(c) above under the following conditions:

a. That an appropriate domestic assignment is available.

b. That he pursues appropriate treatment during the 6-month assignment period.

c. That Mr. Lynch report for another medical evaluation at the end of the 6-month assignment to determine whether he is qualified for full duty including overseas assignments involving flying.

4. It is further agreed that if, at the end of the 6-month period, Mr. Lynch is not found qualified for full duty including overseas assignments involving flying, action will be initiated to terminate his contract employment as in paragraph 2.(a) or (b) above.

SIGNED

John F. Halpin
Chief, Personnel, SOD

I understand and agree to the provisions of this Memorandum:

SIGNED

Grayston Lynch

Eyes Only
Personal

[redacted]

[redacted]

1. LAST NAME Lynch FIRST NAME Grayston INITIAL(S)

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ______ Annual leave Bal ______

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)

Years	Months	Days

☐ More than 15 years

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
Retirement 10 September 1971

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	Annual	Sick
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1/9 19 71	296	300
6. Current leave year accrual through 10/4 19 71	136	68
7. Total	432	368
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	-0-	-0-
9. Total leave taken	104	-0-
10. Balance	328	368

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 296 plus 2 Holidays
12. Salary rate(s) $23,501.00 per annum
13. Lump sum leave dates From 0830 9/11/71 to 1700 11/4/71 (Hours)

26. Certified correct by 9/10/71
(Signature) (Date)
For Chief Payroll 2125
(Title) (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______
15. Current balance as of ______ 19__ ______
16. 12-month accrual rate ______
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______
18. Monthly accrual date ______
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date ______
20. Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr -0- to -0-
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr -0- to -0-

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23. During leave year in which separated	None	
24. During step-increase waiting period which began on ______	None	

25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates) ______

REMARKS

SCD: 10/1/38
MAX: 296

"Unused Sick Leave 368 Hours per 5 U.S.C. Ch. 63"

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

Contract Service – Irving C. Dercono (P)

Date	Action	Compensation	GS Equivalent
	– Retired (Longevity) USA(R) Captain		
10 Feb 61	Hired as a Contract Employee with Social Security, No LPAs or PSIs.	$9,500	
31 May 61	Contract Terminated	9,500	
1 June 61	Hired as a Career Agent with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs.	11,155	GS-13/3
14 Oct 62	LPI	11,880	GS-13/3
14 Oct 62	PSI	12,245	GS-13/4
5 Jan 64	LPI	12,880	GS-13/4
5 July 64	LPI	13,335	GS-13/4
11 Oct 64	PSI	13,755	GS-13/5
10 Oct 65	LPI	14,250	GS-13/5
3 July 66	LPI	14,665	GS-13/5
9 Oct 66	PSI	15,113	GS-13/6
13 Aug 67	Pay increase	16,152	GS-14/3
8 Oct 67	LPI	16,897	GS-14/3
31 Oct 67	Contract terminated	16,897	GS-14/3
1 Nov 67	Career agent with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs.	16,897	GS-14/3
14 Jul 68	LPI	18,076	GS-14/3
11 Aug 68	PSI	18,641	GS-14/4
13 Jul 69	LPI	20,385	"
28 Dec 69	LPI	21,608	"
9 Aug 70	PSI	22,263	GS-14/5
10 Jan 71	LPI	23,591	"
8 Aug 71	Designated participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.		
10 Sep 71	Contract terminated	23,591	"

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employers' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks).
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee	Date Signed
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) [illegible]	Correspondence ☐ Overt ☐ Covert

SECRET

RESUME OF EMPLOYMENT

NAME: Grayston L. Lynch

EMPLOYED: Central Intelligence Agency
10 Feb 1961 to ~~31 August 1971~~ 10 Sept 1971

POSITION: Special Project Manager, GS 14

DUTIES & RESPONSIBILITIES: Position of Special Project Manager consisted of supervising 4 Agency employees and 46 foreign nationals. Employed in the collection of foreign intelligence and other operations as directed in the national interest of the United States Government.

Organized personnel for special project to include interviewing and assessing prospective employees, selection of and hiring of personnel, initiating security and background investigations of personnel, and initial training of personnel in their special duties and security aspects of the project.

Planned operations and budgeting, aquiring and managing of all real estate buildings and installations required for the project.

Established physical security procedures and recruited security personnel for all installations involved in project.

Planned and directed all operations of project. Coordinated activities with other projects and other departments of U.S. and local governments and other interested officials.

REFERENCE: Central Intelligence Agency
Director of Personnel
Attn: O.C. Dawson
Washington, D.C. 20505
phone - (703) 351-3295

[illegible]
[illegible] Blvd.
[illegible], Florida [illegible]
17 [illegible] 19[illegible]

Mr. Donald [illegible]
Post Office Box [illegible]
Brookland Station
Washington, D. C. 2001[illegible]

Dear Don:

In answer to your letter of 15 March regarding the cassette tape recorder that I used in language training. This was turned into the language lab at the language school the last day of school.

This was cleared [illegible] the man there in [illegible] and he [illegible] signed [illegible] paper and [illegible] turned in all the material [illegible] leaving. [illegible] the gentleman that signed for the return of this recorder was named Cortez.

I am sure this will clarify this matter but should there be any further problems please let me know.

Sincerely,

[illegible] L. Lynch

P.O. Box 4426
Brookland Station
Washington, D.C. 20017
13 March 1972

Mr. Grayston Lynch
Key West Towers
Apt. 411A
South Roosevelt Blvd.
Key West, Florida 33040

Dear Gray,

We have received a call from Training about a tape recorder which they believe you still may have - a small cassette type which was issued to you while you were in language training.

If you still have the recorder, would you please ship it to Betty Weyland at the above address. If you turned it in, would you let me know when and where so I can pass on the information to Training?

Hope you are enjoying life and lots of sunshine.

Sincerely,

Darold Aldridge

12 Oct 71

Betty:

I Enclosed are receipts + expenses for my move + also a letter requesting a change in the mailing of my retirement checks. Will you please send the letter over to Paul Sidel of the Retirement Section so that my Oct check will come here.

Thanks for everything

Grayston Lynch

FOR [illegible] RECORD File

Request that my retirement checks be mailed to me at: KEY WEST TOWERS, APT. 411A South Roosevelt Blvd, Key West, FLA - 33040

Grayston L. Lynch

Original sent to Paul Seidel in RAD/ROB

No street number, per Gray

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

[illegible] File in inactive file

TO : Record

DATE: 27 September 1971

FROM : DDAldridge
DC/SOD/Pers

SUBJECT: Mr. Grayston L. Lynch
Contact Report

1. Mr. Lynch called to advise that he was still in the local area and ask if he could pick up his annuity check and change his forwarding address and banking instructions as he was no longer going to go to Tampa, Florida. He said he was buying part interest in a boat and had rented an apartment in Key West, Florida and would be living and working there. In this respect he wanted to know if he should not have a change in his cover status from "open" to "under cover" because of his "new" location.

2. Mr. Frank Stewart was advised of the change of Mr. Lynch's plans and his inquiry regarding a change in cover status. Mr. Stewart (SOD/Security) subsequently advised that Mr. Lynch would remain "open" and that he, Mr. Stewart would call Mr. Lynch and brief him on the subject.

3. Inquiry on Mr. Lynch's behalf into the other questions led to the following:

(over)

a. Mr. Paul Seidol, OP/Retirement Division, the officer who processed Mr. Lynch's retirement, is the appropriate local contact for Mr. Lynch to have to handle any problem with his retirement or his annuity payment. In this respect Mr. Seidol suggested that his telephone number be given to Mr. Lynch for this and future inquiries, so long as Mr. Lynch was in the local area. Otherwise, Mr. Lynch has been given correspondence instructions. Mr. Seidol's telephone number was then given telephonically to Mr. Lynch with instructions to call for arrangements regarding his annuity check, banking instructions, change of address, etc. Mr. Lynch acknowledged this instruction.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-103

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Record DATE: 8 March 1972

FROM : Betty R. Weyland

SUBJECT: Grayston Lynch

We received a call from Mr. Sutherland, x 3066, who is on the Language Training staff, asking how he could get in touch with Gray Lynch. He said he believes [illegible] Gray did not return a small cassette tape recorder when he left. It is the type of recorder that is issued to each student but is to be returned. I told Mr. Sutherland I would try to get in touch with Gray and would let him know something.

14-00000

SECRET

SOD # 71-975

08 SEP 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : DDP/NSP

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract of
Irving C. DEVUONO

1. The contract of Irving C. DEVUONO will be terminated at the close of business 10 September 1971 as the result of approval of Subject's involuntary retirement on that date.

2. The following documents are forwarded in connection with Subject's termination:

a. Amendment to Subject's contract providing for a terminal payment.

b. Termination clearance sheet, form 1689.

Richard F. Westerman
Richard F. Westerman
Chief, Personnel
Special Operations Division

Attachments:
a. h/w
b. u/s/c/

CONCUR:

Philip L Donaldson
SOD Contracting Officer

APPROVE:

DDP/NSP

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Irving C. Devuono

Dear Mr. Devuono:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 November 1967.

It has been mutually agreed by both parties that said contract will be terminated on or about 10 September 1971, at which time you will be involuntarily retired, due to the absence of any immediate or foreseeable work assignment for which you qualify.

You are herein authorized a taxable terminal payment of $10,000 to assist you in resettling and retraining for another occupation. Said payment will be payable as of the effective date of your retirement.

You are aware that said terminal payment was not an original part of your contract but has been authorized solely because of the unique circumstances associated with your past service, coupled with the circumstances associated with your premature retirement.

You are reminded of the contents of paragraph thirteen (13) of said contract which read as follows:

> "You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations."

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Contracting Officer

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Irving C. Devuono

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

/s/ Willis L. Donaldson

SECRET

SECRET

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN DUPLICATE

DATE: 8 September 197

PERSONAL DATA

NAME (Last, First, Middle - True or Pseudonym) Lynch, Grayston, L.	OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SOD/MB
LOCAL ADDRESS	PERMANENT ADDRESS 5228 Picador Apt-5 Tampa,
PERMANENT STATION OR BASE Headquarters	POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE Ops Officer

CONTRACT DATA

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
01 June 1961			10 September

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

Involuntary Retirement

INTERNAL STAFF OR DIVISION CLEARANCES (Add or delete as applicable)

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE	[illegible]	8 Sept 71	
LOGISTICS	[illegible]	8 Sept '71	
PERSONNEL	[illegible]	8 Sept 71	
DDP/NSP		9 Sept 71	Appointment with [illegible]
C/SOD			
SOD/SEC&COVER	T J Stewart	8 Sept 71	

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER : CLEARED BY (Signature)

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES
(OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE)

OFFICE	SCHEDULE DATE	SCHEDULE TIME	SCHEDULE LOCATION	INTERVIEWING OFFICER
CENTRAL COVER STAFF			OK	CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY PSD	Appointment made by PAB			CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE
SOD PERSONNEL				CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE 9 Sept

REMARKS (Please Initial)

OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	SIGNATURE OF STAFF OR DIVISION RESPONSIBLE OFFICER
C/SOD/MB	

1659 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CLEARANCE [illegible] TO: OFFICE OF [illegible]

EMPLOYEE [illegible] 216070	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) LYNCH, Grayston L.	[illegible] [illegible]
OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT SOD	LAST WORK DAY	[illegible] 20 Sept 71

REASON FOR CLEARANCE ☐ RESIGNATION ☐ CSC RETIREMENT ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)
☐ EXTENDED LEAVE ☒ CIA RETIREMENT

VERIFICATION OR CERTIFICATION OF OFFICIALS

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE REVIEWED THE RECORDS OF THIS COMPONENT AND EXCEPT AS INDICATED THE EMPLOYEE NAMED ABOVE HAS SATISFACTORILY DISCHARGED HIS OBLIGATION TO THIS COMPONENT.

	ROOM NO. & BLDG.	CLEARED BY	[illegible]
OFFICE OF LOGISTICS		SHARON CALDRONE	
CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH, OP		PAT POLAND	
MAP LIBRARY DIVISION, OBGI		OLIVIA JOHNSON	
LIBRARY, CRS		MARGARET MANNING	
REGISTRAR, OTR		ANNE DELANEY	
OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES	1 D 4040	MR. GAUGHAN	
COMMO SECURITY	1 B 16	MR. BEKE	
RECORDS, RID	1 D 4135	CAROL THOMAS	
SPECIAL CLEARANCES, OS	3 E 47	MR. WAGGONER	
CREDIT UNION, OP	1 J 33	ANNIS MORAN	
INSURANCE BRANCH, OP	1 J 27 5 E 60	BETTE HARDING MARY CAMPBELL	
CENTRAL COVER STAFF OVERT	G H 47 5 E 60	KAY SUITER MISCHEL MANGOLD	
OFFICE OF SECURITY	3 E 49	K. BENNETT	
OFFICE OF FINANCE	~~6 E 62~~ 5 712 x2636 Reg.	DOROTHYE SERVAIS	
✓ PERSONAL AFFAIRS BR OP	5 E 11	MR. DEWALD	
Badge Clear		A 1511	

CERTIFICATION AND FORWARDING ADDRESS OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE

FORWARDING ADDRESS ▷ NUMBER, STREET, CITY, STATE, ZIP CODE
5125 MEADOR - APT-5, [illegible]

I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, ALL GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND RECORDS ISSUED TO ME HAVE BEEN RETURNED OR HAVE BEEN PROPERLY ACCOUNTED FOR AND THAT I AM NOT INDEBTED TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AS A RESULT OF MY CONNECTION WITH THE AGENCY.

DATE 1 Sep 71	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

[illegible] ABOVE INITIALED COMPONENTS HAVE GIVEN POSITIVE VERIFICATION OF THE FINAL CLEARANCE FOR [illegible]

[illegible] APPROVAL OFFICE OF PERSONNEL APPROVAL

14-00000

SECRET

DUTY STATUS REPORT

NOTE - See instructions on reverse side.

CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Career Agent

NAME (Type or print): Grayston L. Lynch

PAYROLL NO.: 216670

STATION/BASE: Hqs.

PAYROLL PERIOD: 8/23 - 9/10/71

TOUR OF DUTY: FROM 0830 TO 1700

THIS SPACE FOR PAYROLL OFFICE USE ONLY: COST CENTER NO. | ROLL NO. | PAY PERIOD NO. | REF. NO. | TYPE

PERIOD		PAY STATUS			OVERTIME		HOURS OF DUTY		ABSENCE FROM DUTY						INITIALS
MONTHLY	WEEKLY	R/T	N/D	H/T	O/T	C/T	FROM	TO	A/L	S/L	LWOP	C/T	H/L	OTHER	
1	SUN														
2	MON	8					0830								
3	TUE	8													
4	WED	8													
5	THU	8													
6	FRI	8						1700							
7	SAT														
8	SUN														
9	MON	8					0830								
10	TUE	8													
11	WED	8						1700							
12	THU	8													
13	FRI	8													
14	SAT														
15	▨														
BIWEEKLY TOTALS		80					AUTHORIZED OVERTIME ** (1)								▨
16	SUN														
17	MON	8													
18	TUE	8													
19	WED	8													
20	THU	8													
21	FRI	8													
22	SAT														
23	SUN														
24	MON														
25	TUE														
26	WED														
27	THU														
28	FRI														
29	SAT														
30	▨														
31	▨														
BIWEEKLY (OR MONTHLY) TOTALS		40					AUTHORIZED OVERTIME ** (2)								▨

REMARKS: *(Include irregular tours of duty, also other details necessary to support payments of salary, salary differentials and allowances such as arrivals, departures, changes in quarters or dependents, etc.)*

Subject terminates effective COB 10 Sept 71 as result of approval of involuntary retirement. ☐ SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR TDY TRAVEL, ETC.

* I CERTIFY THAT THIS ABSENCE WAS DUE TO ILLNESS WHICH INCAPACITATED ME FOR DUTY.

THIS SPACE FOR PAYROLL OFFICE USE ONLY

	TAX	TAX	OTHER	GRADE	RATE
(1)					
(2)					

CERTIFICATIONS

A CERTIFIED CORRECT
(SIGNATURE - SEE INSTRUCTIONS)

B CERTIFIED CORRECT AND OVERTIME AS RECORDED ABOVE ** AUTHORIZED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT AS COMPENSATORY TIME.
(SIGNATURE - SEE INSTRUCTIONS)

FORM 8-61 764 REPLACES FORM 764 OF 4-61 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

09 September 1971

Lynch, Grayston L. GS-14 Ops Officer

10 September 1971 Involuntary Retirement CARDS

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
C/MB		William Strauch	9/9/71
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]	F.J. Stewart	98/71
	[illegible]	F.J. Stewart	9/8/71
	[illegible]	Jan Wilson	9/8/71
	[illegible]	Hank Donis	9/8/71
	[illegible]	Robert Kogola	9/9/71
	[illegible]		
[illegible]	[illegible]		
CCS	GH-47	J. McKinnon	9/9/71
CPD	5E-69	Mr. Lanning	9/8/71

N/A

N/A

SECRET

8 SEP

Rec'd 10 Sep '71
Grayston L. Lynch

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Retirement

1. This is to inform you that the Director of Central Intelligence has approved the recommendation of your Career Service that you be retired under the CIA Retirement and Disability System.

2. Your retirement will become effective 10 September 1971. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative details necessary to process your retirement.

3. You will receive a lump-sum payment for your accrued annual leave up to 30 days or for whatever amount of leave credit you carried over from the last leave year if that amount is more than 30 days.

Harry B. Fisher

Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

[illegible] # [illegible]

10 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : CS Agent Branch
Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Mr. Grayston L. Lynch - Request for Involuntary Retirement

1. By mutual agreement between Mr. Grayston L. Lynch and this Agency, it has been determined that Mr. Lynch's services are no longer required. Accordingly it is proposed that Mr. Lynch's contract, effective 1 June 1961, as amended, be terminated as of the close of business 10 September 1971.

2. In view of the foregoing, Mr. Lynch, who is a career agent under the Agency's retirement system, has requested that approval be granted for his retirement under the provisions of the Agency's system pertaining to involuntary retirement.

3. Mr. Lynch entered on duty with the Agency on 10 February 1961 and has served continuously to date. He meets all the conditions of eligibility for involuntary retirement.

/s/ Evan J. Parker, Jr.
For
F. P. Holcomb
Chief
Special Operations Division

CONCUR:

/s/ Gerard Droller
Chairman, CS Agent Panel

APPROVED:

/s/ Dow H. [illegible]
Special Contracting Officer

APPROVE:

(signed) Edward Ryan
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

13 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Acting Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Request for Contract Amendment - Irving C. DEVUONO

1. Irving C. DEVUONO has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and has applied for Involuntary Retirement on 10 September 1971.

2. It is requested that the current contract for Irving C. DEVUONO be amended to provide for a one-time, taxable, lump-sum payment of $10,000, payable as of the effective date of his termination or retirement. This sum will enable DEVUONO to resettle and retrain for another occupation.

F. P. Holcomb

F. P. Holcomb
Chief
Special Operations Division

CONCUR:

Cord Meyer Jr. 13 Aug 71
Acting Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

12 August 1971

Sir:

This is to advise you that I will be retiring from the U.S. Civil Service on 10 September 1971 and am combining my military service with Civil Service for a higher retirement. Therefore, I waive my entire Army retirement pay effective 10 September 1971.

Grayston L. Lynch
Capt - USAR Ret.
0966311 - 451-18-7989

Copy sent to Retirement, Attn. Paul Seidel on 12 Aug.

SECRET

12 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

SUBJECT : Request for Advance of Salary
Employee Number - 451187989

I am retiring from the Agency on 10 September 1971 and am taking annual leave from 13 August to 07 September in order to lease an apartment in Florida. It is requested that I be allowed to draw $800 advanced pay to finance this trip.

SIGNED

Grayston L. Lynch

CONCUR:

/s/ Philip L. Donaldson
Chief, Support Staff, SOD

SECRET

SECRET

SOD # 71-168

10 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : CS Agent Branch

SUBJECT : Mr. Grayston L. Lynch - Request for Involuntary Retirement

1. By mutual agreement between Mr. Grayston L. Lynch and this Agency, it has been determined that Mr. Lynch's services are no longer required. Accordingly it is proposed that Mr. Lynch's contract, effective 1 June 1961, as amended, be terminated as of the close of business 10 September 1971.

2. In view of the foregoing, Mr. Lynch, who is a career agent under the Agency's retirement system, has requested that approval be granted for his retirement under the provisions of the Agency's system pertaining to involuntary retirement.

3. Mr. Lynch entered on duty with the Agency on 10 February 1961 and has served continuously to date. He meets all the conditions of eligibility for involuntary retirement.

F. P. Holcomb

F. P. Holcomb
Chief
Special Operations Division

APPROVED:

Chairman, CS Agent

Acc to Ed Sawyer - this memo should not be necessary. The application for involuntary retirement should be made & when approved we should then do a memo to CPD requesting that his contract be terminated 10 Sept

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRANSMITTAL OF APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT
CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) Lynch, Grayston L.	2. TYPE OF RETIREMENT APPLIED FOR Involuntary	3. EFFECTIVE RETIREMENT DATE 10 September 1971

SECTION A — RECOMMENDATION OF PARENT OFFICE

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT ☒ APPROVAL ☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE F. P. Holcomb Chief, Special Operations Div	3. SIGNATURE OF OFFICE HEAD FP Holcomb	4. DATE Aug 9 71

SECTION B — RECOMMENDATION OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT ☐ APPROVAL ☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE	4. DATE

SECTION C — RECOMMENDATION OF CIA [illegible]

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT ☐ APPROVAL ☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

	2. TYPED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	3. DATE

FORM 5-65 3102a

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT

CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

To avoid delay—1. Read information carefully. 2. Complete application in full. 3. Typewrite or print in ink

A. PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month) (Day) (Year)	3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Lynch, Grayston L.	Jun 14, 1923	451-18-7989

4. ADDRESS (Number and street) (City and State) (Zip Code)

7901 S. W. 120th Street, Miami, Florida 33156

5. (A) ARE YOU MARRIED?	5. (B) IF "YES" GIVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: WIFE'S OR HUSBAND'S NAME (First) (Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (Month) (Day) (Year)	DATE OF MARRIAGE (Month) (Day) (Year)	ADDRESS OF SPOUSE IF DIFFERENT FROM ITEM 4
☒ YES ☐ NO	Janette K.	Jul 26, 1922	Apr 26, 1945	

B. CIVILIAN SERVICE

1. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	2. SERVICE DESIGNATION	3. LOCATION OF EMPLOYMENT (City and State)
DDP/SOD	D	Washington, D. C.

4. TITLE OF LAST POSITION	5. DATE OF FINAL SEPARATION (Month) (Day) (Year)	6. APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF YEARS OF CIVILIAN SERVICE
Career Agent	September 10, 1971	10

7. DO YOU HAVE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE? ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. ARE YOU ENROLLED IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM? ☐ YES ☒ NO

C. MILITARY SERVICE

1. COMPLETE THE SCHEDULE BELOW IF YOU HAVE PERFORMED ACTIVE SERVICE ... SERVICE AFTER JUNE 30 1960 ... AS A COMMISSIONED OFFICER OF THE COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY AFTER JUNE 30 1961. IF AVAILABLE ATTACH A COPY OF YOUR DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE

BRANCH OF SERVICE	SERIAL NUMBER	DATE OF ENTRANCE ON ACTIVE DUTY	DATE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY	LAST GRADE OR RANK	ORGANIZATION AT DISCHARGE (Div., Regt., Co., etc.)
U. S. Army	6288758	Oct 38	Sep 47	M/Sgt	
U. S. Army	0966311	Jun 48	Oct 60	Captain	7th Spec ~~Fco Gr~~

2. (A) ARE YOU A MILITARY RETIREE (EITHER ACTIVE OR INACTIVE)? Retired

2. (B) ARE YOU IN RECEIPT OF OR HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR MILITARY RETIRED PAY (RETIRED PAY DOES NOT INCLUDE V.A. PENSION OR COMPENSATION)? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. (C) IF RETIRED FROM A RESERVE COMPONENT UNDER CHAPTER 67 OF TITLE 10 USC (FORMERLY TITLE III, PUBLIC LAW 80-810) ☐ YES ☒ NO

D. DISABILITY INFORMATION

Only applicants for total disability retirement will complete Part D.

1. WHEN DID YOU BECOME TOTALLY DISABLED? (Month, year)

2. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR DISABILITIES. STATE WHEN INCURRED AND HOW THEY INTERFERE WITH PERFORMANCE OF THE DUTIES OF YOUR POSITION. (ATTACH ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON PLAIN SHEET OF PAPER IF NECESSARY.)

E. OTHER CLAIM INFORMATION

1. (A) HAVE YOU EVER RECEIVED OR MADE APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ACT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

1. (B) IF "YES" STATE THE NUMBER OF YOUR COMPENSATION CLAIM AND THE PERIOD FOR WHICH YOU RECEIVED COMPENSATION

CLAIM NUMBER	FROM (Month) (Day) (Year)	TO (Month) (Day) (Year)

2. (A) HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED ANY APPLICATION UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM INCLUDING APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT, REFUND, DEPOSIT OR REDEPOSIT, OR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. (B) IF "YES" INDICATE THE TYPE(S) OF APPLICATION AND GIVE THE CLAIM NUMBER(S) IF KNOWN ☐ RETIREMENT ☐ DEPOSIT OR REDEPOSIT ☐ REFUND ☐ VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS CLAIM NUMBER(S)

3. (A) HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED ANY APPLICATION UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT & DISABILITY SYSTEM INCLUDING APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT, REFUND, PURCHASE OF SERVICE CREDIT, OR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

3. (B) IF "YES" INDICATE THE TYPE(S) OF APPLICATION ☐ RETIREMENT ☐ PURCHASE OF SERVICE CREDIT ☐ REFUND ☐ VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS

4. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED UNDER ANOTHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEES? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. (B) IF "YES" GIVE THE NAME OF THE OTHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM: Civil Service System

FORM 3102 4-65

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INDICATE, BY SIGNING YOUR INITIALS IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW, THE TYPE OF ANNUITY YOU WANT TO RECEIVE. READ THE EXPLANATIONS AND CONSIDER THE MATTER CAREFULLY. NO CHANGE WILL BE PERMITTED AFTER AN ANNUITY HAS BEEN GRANTED. IF YOU WANT AN ANNUITY WITH A SURVIVOR BENEFIT, BE SURE TO GIVE THE OTHER INFORMATION CALLED FOR.

F. TYPES OF ANNUITY: MARRIED APPLICANTS ONLY

1. INITIALS ☐ **ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO WIDOW OR WIDOWER.**

SPECIFY THE PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU WANT USED AS THE BASE FOR YOUR WIDOW'S (OR WIDOWER'S) SURVIVOR ANNUITY

If you want all your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the word "all" in the box below. If you want only part of your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the yearly amount of your annuity you want used.

$

THE SURVIVOR'S ANNUITY WILL BE 55% OF ALL OR WHATEVER PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU SPECIFY AS THE BASE FOR HER (OR HIS) BENEFIT

- If you are married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in F. 2.
- The annuity payable to you during your lifetime will be reduced by [illegible] of any amount up to $[illegible] a year used as the base for the survivor benefit, plus 10% of any amount over $[illegible] so used.
- If you retire for total disability before age 60 and get a guaranteed minimum disability annuity, you may use all or any part of your "earned" annuity as the base for the survivor benefit. You cannot use any extra annuity which may be payable to make up the guaranteed minimum annuity.
- If your wife (or husband) should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies or remarries.

2. INITIALS ✓ **ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT**

(I do not desire my wife (or husband) to receive a survivor annuity benefit after my death.)

- If you choose this type, your wife (or husband) cannot be paid a survivor annuity after your death.
- This type provides annuity payments to you only.

G. TYPES OF ANNUITY: UNMARRIED APPLICANTS ONLY (Including Widowed and Divorced)

1. INITIALS ☐ **ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT**

- If you are not married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in G. 2.
- This type provides annuity payments to you only.

2. INITIALS ☐ **ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO NAMED PERSON HAVING AN INSURABLE INTEREST**

SPECIFY THE NAME, RELATIONSHIP AND DATE OF BIRTH OF THE PERSON YOU WISH TO RECEIVE THE SURVIVOR ANNUITY

NAME OF PERSON (*First, middle, last*)

RELATIONSHIP

DATE OF BIRTH (*Mo., day, yr.*)

SEE UNMARRIED EMPLOYEE'S QUERY INFORMATION REGARDING SURVIVOR ANNUITIES ON THE ATTACHED INFORMATION SHEET FOR EXPLANATION OF REDUCTION IN YOUR ANNUITY

- This type is available to all retiring *unmarried* employees who are *in good health*.
- It provides a reduced annuity to you and a survivor annuity to the person named as having an insurable interest.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies.
- The survivor's annuity will be 55% of the reduced annuity you receive.
- If you choose this type, you will have to undergo a medical examination which will be arranged by the Director of Personnel at no cost to you.
- If the person named as having an insurable interest should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.

H. CERTIFICATION OF APPLICANT

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both (18 U.S.C. 1001).

I hereby certify that all statements made in this application are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

May 21 [illegible]
DATE

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

I. FOR OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Mr. Irving C. Devuono

Dear Mr. Devuono:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 November 1967 as amended.

The purpose of this amendment is to formally record your official designation as a participant in the Retirement and Disability System of this organization, effective 8 August 1971. Your contributions into the Retirement and Disability Fund will be deducted by this organization as of that date. The regulations governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interest. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, you are hereby notified of your right to appeal. An appeal with reasons therefor must be received in this organization within thirty (30) days from the date of your acknowledgment of this contract amendment.

Effective close of business 7 August 1971 all contractual reference to Civil Service Retirement and your contributions thereto is deleted.

Social Security contributions required by virtue of your cover employment will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

/s/ Don E. [illegible]

BY ______________________

Contracting Officer, [illegible]

ACCEPTED:

____

Irving C. Devuono

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

8 AUG 1971

9 Aug 71
[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans
Chief, Special Operations Division

SUBJECT : Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

This is to inform you that a determination has been made that you have performed 60 months of qualifying service and that you have been approved for participation in the CIA Retirement and Disability System. Your designation as a participant will become effective on 8 August 1971.

Harry B. Fisher
Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

2 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Designation of ~~Grayston L.~~ Irving [illegible] Davidson Lynch as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

It is requested that the contract of Grayston L. Lynch be amended to officially record his designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System effective 8 August 1971.

Harry B. Fisher
Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Record

DATE: 15 July 1971

FROM : DDAldridge

SUBJECT: Mr. Grayston L. Lynch File

Mr. Lynch telephoned today and advised that he did not want his termination bonus to be held for payment in Calendar Year 1972 as agreed upon, but would like to have it payed at the time of his retirement. I pointed out that this would result in a good tax bite, but Gray stated that he would need the money at the/ time of retirement and would just have to sustain the additional tax.

Mr. Lynch also asked if he could obtain an advance on his salary of about $500 as his salary checks were mailed to a bank in Florida and he had exhausted his supply of checks because he had thought he would have left the area by now. He was advised that this could be done but that it would take a memo from him to the Director of Finance. He stated that he would come to the office on 16 July to prepare the memo. He should be sent to C/SOD/R&F to initiate the memo and the action to obtain the advance on his salary.

SECRET

SOD # 71 [illegible]

22 JUL 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION: Chief, Language School, OTR

SUBJECT: Language Training for Mr. Grayston Lynch

1. Mr. Grayston Lynch, an SOD Career Agent, has recently completed an extended course of Spanish language training covering over 1,000 hours of instruction. Due to Mr. Lynch's particular background, his instruction required special effort and arrangements by the Language School and his instructor.

2. We are most grateful indeed for this special attention, and wish especially to commend the instructor, Mrs. Gladys G. Snare, for her patience and understanding, as well as for her professional competence and conscientious devotion to duty as a language instructor.

(Signed) F. P. Holcomb

F. P. Holcomb
Chief
Special Operations Division

DC/SOD/EJParker:yb(22Jul71)
Distribution:
2 - Addee
1 - C/SOD
1 - DC/SOD
1 - SOD/PERS
1 - SOD/RI

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : CIARDS Retirement of Mr. Grayston L. Lynch, GS-14, SOD, on the basis of Qualifying Domestic Service

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 4.

2. After more than twenty years of active military service, Mr. Lynch joined CIA in February 1961 to assist in operations against the Cuban target. He was awarded the Intelligence Star for his participation in the Bay of Pigs and related activities in the spring of 1961. Because of the sensitivity of his duties in behalf of CIA, his periods of foreign service were not recorded in the usual manner. From August 1961 until June 1968 he was intensively involved in the recruitment, training, administration and operational direction of a large number of agents as well as the planning and direction of operations into Cuba.

3. After reviewing his application for admission to CIARDS and corroborating statements from Clandestine Service officers acquainted with his work, the Clandestine Service Career Service Board concluded that Mr. Lynch's case merits a recommendation for approval. It is our view that the demands placed upon him were at least on a par with those borne by operations officers assigned overseas.

4. It is, therefore, recommended that Mr. Lynch be designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System on the basis of qualifying domestic service. If he is accepted for CIARDS, Mr. Lynch will apply for disability retirement.

[illegible]
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

Attachments:

Tab A - Mr. Lynch's request and 3 endorsements

Tab B - Forms 3100 and 3101

Tab C - Biographic Profile

CSPS/GLMott/lrk (1 July 1971)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/atts
2 - DDP
1 - CSPS/Mott
1 - CSPS/Soft file
1 - C/BR/Personnel

SECRET

SOD # [illegible]

24 JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Approval of Mr. Grayston L. Lynch as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : HR 20-50

1. It is strongly recommended that Mr. Grayston L. Lynch be approved as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.

2. It is the opinion of the Special Operations Division that the duties performed by Mr. Lynch from the time he entered on duty in February 1961 until early 1968 meet the spirit and intent of the criteria for "qualifying service" as defined in HR 20-50b. The lone exception to these criteria is that Mr. Lynch was not "abroad" during the time involved except on a sporadic basis. This exception, however, was due completely to the geographical location of the area of operations. This location made it uniquely propitious to have Mr. Lynch assigned to and work out of a domestic base. There is no question, however, that Mr. Lynch's service was in the conduct and support of covert operations which required continuing practice of security and tradecraft procedures and which included, from time to time, hazards to his life and health. It is also believed that Mr. Lynch would be at a disadvantage in obtaining other employment because of the sensitivity of his past service as well as the dearth of requirements for his peculiar background, skills and knowledge.

3. On the basis of the above and Mr. Lynch's unique personal record, it is believed that his service during the described period is certainly equivalent to if not in excess of the requirements for "creditable service abroad" and that if it had not been for a geographical accident, this service would have been performed as

SECRET

part of an assignment abroad within the fullest meaning of the definition contained in the referent regulation. Therefore, approval of Mr. Lynch's request for designation as a participant in the CIARDS on the basis of service performed between 1961 and 1968 is not only strongly recommended but is requested as the grant of an entitlement fully earned by a very deserving employee.

(signed) Evan J. Parker, Jr.

Evan J. Parker, Jr.
Acting Chief
Special Operations Division

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - C/SOD
1 - SOD/SS
1 - SOD/Pers
1 - SOD/RI
SOD/Pers:DAldridge:bah (24 June 1971)

14-00000

SECRET

2[illegible] JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Request for Designation as a Participant in CIARDS--Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

1. It is requested that domestic service reflected in the following paragraphs be approved as qualifying service for the CIARDS and that I be designated as a participant in the system.

2. I entered on duty with the Agency on 10 February 1961. I was sent TDY immediately to New Orleans, Louisiana and from there to Key West, Florida to prepare WH Division agent assets for operational missions. On 28 March 1961 I departed Key West, Florida aboard a covert Agency ship bound for Nicaragua where I engaged in the preparation of Agency vessels and assets scheduled for operations into Cuba. On 13 April 1961 I departed Nicaragua via an Agency vessel for the 17 April 1961 landing operation in the Bay of Pigs, Cuba. I was assigned as the Case Officer for the Agency command ship, Cuban Brigade Headquarters, and the Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) element. I participated in armed action both at sea and on shore during the four days of the invasion attempt and, per direct instructions from the DCI, engaged in a series of covert landings and operations into Cuba for several days following the invasion landing. I returned to Headquarters on 29 April 1961.

3. In August 1961 I was assigned PCS to JMWAVE at Miami, Florida as a Paramilitary Operations Officer. From my arrival in August 1961 until July 1965 I served under commercial cover outside the station, intermittently using my home and various safehouses as "ad hoc" offices. All contact with the station was by telephone and/or personal meetings prearranged with station personnel. These personal contacts were either at my home, in safehouses, or at other meeting places deemed appropriate. During this period I was responsible for the recruitment, training, administration and operational direction of a very large group of Agents. This entailed numerous clandestine meetings, both day and night, with these Agents. Since they were in various stages of training, assessment or preparation for an operation and were located throughout Dade and Monroe counties in

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Florida, I was required to drive an average of 3000 miles per month to provide the necessary handling and support. The major training exercises were as follows:

a. Three black flights to ISOLATION for periods of one to three weeks duration during which time I was required to remain in the black training areas as handler for the Agents.

b. One three day trip to Lake Worth, Florida during which I conducted the ground phase of parachute training for 26 Agents and arranged for civilian instructors and planes for two parachute jumps per man.

c. Two black flights to Camp McKall, North Carolina to conduct parachute training for 36 Agents, during which time, as Chief Instructor, I made two parachute jumps.

d. Two black flights to the Ranger Training Center at Eglin AFB, Florida for additional parachute, commando and guerilla warfare training for 38 Agents. Both trips were of two weeks duration each and again, I made two parachute jumps.

e. Four black flights to Fort Stewart, Georgia for training in weapons and tactics for 38 Agents. Training was conducted with all weapons from the .45 calibre pistol up to and including the 4.2 inch mortar. Demolition and sabotage training including night and day tactical exercises using live ammunition and explosives were also conducted. Each exercise lasted from five to 15 days.

f. Eight training exercises from three to seven days duration each were conducted in and around the Everglades National Park and the Marquesas Keys in Florida.

g. Over 70 mission rehearsals of two or three days duration conducted in the Florida Keys.

4. In addition to the above training exercises I planned and directed 115 actual operations into Cuba during this period. This involved the isolation of a five to 25 man team in a safehouse for three days to two weeks preparing for an operation and remaining with them day and night until they were launched. It also involved receiving the team at the conclusion of the mission and again holding them in a safehouse for a two day debriefing period.

5. In 1965 I set up an office in Perrine, Florida, under commercial cover, to administer the Agent group. I remained in this office conducting operations and training as before until April 1966. My office was moved into the JMWAVE station at that time, but I remained under commercial cover and my duties continued to be the same.

6. During the time I was assigned to JMWAVE I was required to participate in numerous voyages aboard Agency ships into international waters. Many of these were near to and into denied waters. I was also required to participate in several search and rescue aircraft flights of long duration over international water, near and into denied areas.

7. It is my belief that my activities and duties from August 1961 to June 1968 were of the types normally found only in overseas clandestine activities for which the five year CIARDS "creditable service abroad" requirement was intended. I am available for further explanation or clarification if any of the above information is required, or if confirmation of my service by other Agency personnel is needed, I submit the following names of knowledgeable individuals:

a. Gerald Droller, DDP/NSP
b. Robert Ortman, WH/COG
c. George French, SOD/GB
d. William Broe, C/WH

8. In view of the facts presented above, I request to be designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and will apply for disability retirement when my participation is approved.

SIGNED

Grayston L. Lynch

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOMINATION AND DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPANT
CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SECTION A

STATUS OF EMPLOYEE

1. SERIAL NUMBER 216670	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Lynch, Grayston Leroy	3. DATE OF BIRTH 6/14/23	4. SD	5. EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY (Refer to R 20-2) Career Agent
6. CURRENT OCCUPATIONAL TITLE Maritime Ops Off	7. GRADE GS-14	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SOD/MB		
9. ASSIGNMENT LOCATION → ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ U.S. FIELD ☐ FGN. FIELD	10. LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE 02/10/61	11. SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE 10/01/38		

SECTION B

PERFORMANCE OF QUALIFYING SERVICE

1. Has this employee completed any qualifying service? ☐ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", list periods of such service below

INCLUSIVE DATES (From- To-)		OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED (City-Country or State)	CHECK ONE		TOTAL TIME	
MONTH/DAY/YR	MONTH/DAY/YR			PCS	TDY	MONTH	DAYS

2. Is this employee currently performing qualifying service? ☐ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", complete the following:

BEGIN DATE	END DATE	OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION	PCS	TDY	MONTHS	DAYS

3. If employee was assigned in the United States during any period of qualifying service listed above, describe his duties below, pointing out those conditions which meet the requirements of QUALIFYING SERVICE.

See attached memorandum.

4. Is this employee currently on official orders for a PCS assignment requiring the performance of qualifying service? ☐ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", attach a certification to this effect.

5. CERTIFICATION - The information furnished above has been verified against official Agency records. Where no official record was available, a supporting statement is attached.

6. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL	7. SIGNATURE	8. DATE

Continued on Reverse Side

FORM 8-65 3100

SECRET

[illegible]

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — STATUS OF SERVICE AGREEMENT

(TO BE COMPLETED BY CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL)

☐ Form 3101, Service Agreement, is attached.

☐ Because of temporary absence of the nominee, Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be forwarded at a later date.

☐ (1) Nominee has over 15 years of Agency service or (2) nominee cannot be readily contacted to sign a Service Agreement. The signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" on file in the nominee's Official Personnel Folder should be accepted in lieu of Form 3101, Service Agreement.

☐ Nominee is overseas and a signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" is NOT filed in his Official Personnel Folder. Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be requested from the field upon notification that the CIA Retirement Board has recommended approval of his nomination.

SECTION D — RECOMMENDATION OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE

1. Based on his career assignment and past and prospective performance of qualifying service, this employee is recommended for designation as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM. He is serving in a career field which normally requires the performance of qualifying service as an integral part of a career in that field.

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE	4. DATE

SECTION E — RECOMMENDATION OF CIA RETIREMENT BOARD

1. The record of this employee has been reviewed and the CIA RETIREMENT BOARD has recommended on ______ (DATE) that this employee:

☐ be designated as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
☐ NOT be designated as a participant

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE	4. DATE

SECTION F — DETERMINATION BY DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

1. In accordance with Regulation 20-50, this employee is ☐ DESIGNATED ☐ NOT designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.	2. SIGNATURE OF DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	3. DATE

SECTION G — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

I c[illegible] information in
Section [illegible] the best
of my kn[illegible]
Grayston Lynch
[illegible]ature

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SERVICE AGREEMENT

The Director of Central Intelligence has determined that in order to qualify for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System, an employee must have signed a written obligation to serve anywhere and at any time according to the needs of the Agency in addition to meeting other specified criteria.

I hereby declare my intent to comply with this requirement as a condition to my being considered for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.

In making this declaration, it is understood that the Agency will consider my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances.

Grayston L. Lynch
SIGNATURE

22 June 71
DATE

FORM 4-65 3101

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

15 June 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT : Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

As of 29 May 1971 Mr Lynch was accredited with the following leave balances:

Annual Leave - 376 hours

Sick Leave - 340 hours

If Mr. Lynch's application for CIARDS and his application for Disability Retirement under CIARDS were all processed and awaiting approval, he could go on sick leave as of close of business 2 July to exhaust all sick leave and then all excess annual leave prior to retirement. He would retire under these circumstances, if approved as of COB 6 October 1971. (This date was computed by payroll based on the following assumptions; 1). He would take no leave between now and 2 July, 2). He earned 26 days leave per year, 3). He had a leave ceiling of 360 hours.

Darold D. Aldridge
AC/SOD/Personnel

17 June 1971
1st Indorsement

Mr. Lynch will not be permitted to process all the paperwork for his pending retirement and then depart the area. Retirement Operations Division/OP will not accept his application for CIARDS retirement until he has actually been accepted into CIARDS, nor will they initiate a request to the OMS for a medical survey until an application has been submitted for Disability retirement, nor will they submit a request for medical survey under Civil Service and then convert to CIARDS. Concurrently, OMS will not review their requirements on Mr. Lynch prior to receiving a request from ROD/OP. Since neither Retirement Ops Div/OP nor OMS will take action pending resolution of Mr. Lynch's participation in CIARDS I advised him we would be unable to hit the 2 July target date for him to commence his leave in preparation for retirement. He stated that

SECRET

this was all right with him. Therefore, I am scheduling the following procedure:

As of 25 June 1971, Mr. Lynch's signed application for participation in CIARDS, form 3100 and Service Agreement accompanied by AC/SOD' recommendation was hand carried to CSIS for Board action. AC/SOD also added a note on the routing sheet requesting that the request receive every consideration on an expedite basis.

When the above application is approval, Mr. Lynch should be scheduled for a retirement interview with Mr. Paul Seidel to make application for Disability retirement and be scheduled for any physical examination or medical interview required.

Following the above, Mr. Lynch could commence his leave and proceed to Florida pending the outcome of his application for Disability Retirement. When approved he would continue to utilize his sick leave and excess annual leave until it was expired. The retirement would then become effective.

In an interview with Mr. Lynch on 15 June 1971, the C/SOD/SS and the AC/SOD/Pers discussed the possibility of obtaining a Termination Bonus in the amount of $10,000 payable on retirement with Mr. Lynch. This was because of Mr. Lynch's unique situation regarding his service and career with the Agency. It was pointed out that this was definitely not the normal ~~prosedure~~ procedure, but was bases purely on Mr. Gray's status as a Career Agent and the unusual aspects of his termination. It was agreed that although Mr. Gray would become eligible for this bonus, if we were able to get it approved, as of the date of his retirement, we would not make payment until Calendar Year 1972 in order to give Mr. Gray benefit of the tax break resulting from the delayed payment. Mr. Gray agreed to all of the above provisions without equivication.

Mr. Gray was instructed to maintain constant contact with Maritime Branch — at least check with them twice a day to ascertain if there were messages or requirements for his presence or appointments scheduled for him. He agreed to this as he does not have a phone at home and there is no other positive means to contact him. SOD/Personnel is to leave any message necessary for him with the Secretary/Maritime Branch for delivery. (If no other contact possible, try informally through Jerry Sohl.)

DAROLD D. ALDRIDGE
AC/SOD/PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET

14 JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

The undersigned talked with Subject on 14 June in regards to his future. I told him Mr. Droller did not have the authority to authorize "absence from duty for up to a year" as was stated to Mr. Lynch. I told him SOD will take the proper action through the Agent Panel to try and find "a retirement assignment" for him in the Miami area. This action will probably take a few weeks and he will be kept informed of the progress. He was quite understanding and accepted the above with little comment.

Philip L. Donaldson
Philip L. Donaldson
Chief, Support Staff
Special Operations Division

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

23 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT : Retirement Annuity - Mr. Grayston Lynch

REFERENCE : Memo for the record dated 2 November; same subject

The attached information updates the referenced data and adds additional estimates for Mr. Lynch's retirement annuity under CS Disability Retirement, CIARDS Involuntary Retirement and CIARDS Disability Retirement. These estimates are based on an unconfirmed amount of military service and assume that Mr. Lynch will be granted sick leave credit when his retirement becomes effective on 30 April 1971. Firm estimates will be provided when Mr. Lynch's military service is confirmed. The projected 4.2% Cost-of-Living Increase which MAY become effective 1 June 1971 is not included.

Darold D. Aldridge

Darold D. Aldridge
Deputy Chief, Personnel
Special Operations Division

Attachment
As Stated

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNUITY ESTIMATES

EFFECTIVE 30 April 1971 (Plus Sick Leave Credit)

	Civil Service		CIARDS	
	Discontinued Service *	Disability Retirement	Involuntary Retirement	Disability Retirement

AGE (DOB: 14 June 1923): 47 Years, 10 Months

CREDITABLE SERVICE
(Including sick leave credit) : 32 Years, 1 Month

HIGH AVERAGE: $20,398 (3 Years)

	Discontinued Service *	Disability Retirement	Involuntary Retirement	Disability Retirement
BASIC ANNUITY:				
Per Annum	$10,432	$12,154	$12,919	
Per Month	869	1,013	1,077	
BASIC ANNUITY REDUCED FOR SURVIVOR BENEFITS:				
Per Annum	$ 9,659	$11,208	$11,897	
Per Month	805	934	991	
SURVIVOR ANNUITY:				
Per Annum	$ 5,738	$ 6,685	$ 7,105	
Per Month	478	557	592	

At 62 years of age, if Mr. Lynch becomes eligible for Social Security, his annuity will be recomputed and it will result in the following estimates

	Discontinued Service *	Disability Retirement	Involuntary Retirement	Disability Retirement
BASIC ANNUITY:				
Per Annum	$ 9,090	$10,590	$11,355	
Per Month	758	882	946	
BASIC ANNUITY REDUCED FOR SURVIVOR BENEFITS:				
Per Annum	$ 8,451	$ 9,801	$10,489	
Per Month	704	817	874	
SURVIVOR ANNUITY:				
Per Annum	$ 4,999	$ 5,824	$ 6,245	
Per Month	417	485	520	

*Reduced for Age

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE		4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST							
		A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE	CODE	LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR				

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN ______________________ AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS: (NAME OF LANGUAGE)

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING

TEST RATINGS
0 = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE
S = SLIGHT H = HIGH
E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

"+" indicates not tested or Pronunciation included in Speaking grade.

12. SIGNATURE

13. LD NUMBER

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45) **SECRET**

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2 - ~~Employee (thru~~ Training Officer)

SECRET

LANGUAGE TRAINING REPORT

Office of Training

DATE OF REPORT	
STUDENT NAME	OFFICE
COURSE ☐ FULL-TIME ☐ PART-TIME	INCLUSIVE DATES

PROFICIENCY LEVEL BEFORE AND AFTER TRAINING

	BEFORE	AFTER
SPEAKING		
AURAL COMPREHENSION		
READ COMPREHENSION		

*INSTRUCTOR'S ESTIMATE (NOT OFFICIAL TEST)

HOURS OF INSTRUCTION

SCHEDULED	ACTUAL

LANGUAGE TRAINING AIMS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

The aim of this course of study was to provide the student with the foreign language competence desired by the sponsoring office. Except as noted below, the instruction emphasized speaking, aural comprehension and reading, as required.

This student's evaluation is based on (1) instructor and Department Chief observations; and (2) regularly administered achievement tests. Fluency and accuracy, as appropriate to each skill, were given due consideration in evaluating the student. The achievement rating and performance evaluation below reflect performance and achievement in this course only, and are conditioned by the student's motivation and aptitude for language learning. This rating should not be confused with the Proficiency Rating (Form 1273) "Certification of Language Proficiency" which is submitted separately. The degree of progress achieved by the student while in language training is shown in the box in the upper right corner of this report.

PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING COURSE AIMS

(Overall achievement in the course is shown as unsatisfactory, marginal, satisfactory, above average, or superior when compared against established standards for such training.)

SPEAKING	AURAL COMPREHENSION	READING COMPREHENSION
	[illegible]	[illegible]

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

[illegible] had [illegible] and 6 months of instruction in Spanish. However [illegible] the normal course.

[illegible] of all, he had been using a sort of bastardized Spanish for [illegible] years and was able to communicate quite well in it, albeit very ungrammatically. Also, he was able to understand most of what was said and [illegible] a fairly [illegible] extent. This gave him an unwarranted feeling of confidence in his abilities, for when it came to grammar, he had great difficulty, and to such an extent that his slow rate of progress was a hindrance to the rest of the class. For this reason, he was dropped back after 4 months to a beginning class. After 2 or 3 months in this class, the same thing happened again, and in order to [illegible] this class, he was removed from it and given special help [illegible] last month or so. He was persistent in his rather unsuccessful effort to learn [illegible] a very active part in social functions and at [illegible], taking every opportunity to use the language. However, his old habits were too firmly [illegible] and a lack of grammar and [illegible] to his nature [illegible] to what [illegible]. However, he [illegible] understand [illegible] made himself understood [illegible]

☐ *See reverse side for additional comment*

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

INSTRUCTOR

DEPARTMENT CHIEF, LANGUAGE SCHOOL/SITE

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC [illegible]

SECRET

FORM 8-70 3207 (17-45)

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
TAMPA, FLORIDA 33601

TO: Central Intelligence Agency DATE: August 19, 1976

SUBJECT: Employment Reference

Your name was given to us by: Grayston Leroy Lynch

______Above candidate (as an employer X ; associate______; reference______; school______).

______Another reference whom we have contacted regarding above candidate.

In connection with our examination for Deputy Sheriff we are making an investigation of the qualifications of the above-named candidate. It is of great importance to us to obtain objective and valid statements from persons who have some knowledge of this candidate's ability and characteristics. In our appraisal of each candidate's fitness for this position significant weight will be given to statements obtained by us through this investigation.

The early return of this form will be appreciated as it will expedite the processing of this candidate's application. Any information which you may give us will be regarded as highly confidential.

Very truly yours,

J. N. Dempsey, Major
Administration Division

During what periods and in what manner were you closely associated with candidate?

Employed from February, 1961 to October, 1971

(Enclosure: Release of Record letter from Mr. Lynch)

To assist us in making a thorough investigation, we should appreciate your listing below the names and addresses of persons who are well acquainted with the candidate's work habits or abilities.

(over)

Please place an "X" next to those items which in your judgment describe or aptly apply to this person. It is not necessary to check any given number of items. You may be able to check ten or more items or have difficulty in finding four or five that are completely pertinent.

- (✓) Good personal appearance
- ( ) Sometimes careless of grooming
- ( ) Sometimes makes poor impression on first contact
- (✓) Has a pleasing manner
- ( ) Is reserved and distant in manner
- ( ) Is at times undiplomatic in dealing with others
- (✓) Is tactful
- (✓) Highly cooperative in staff and public contacts
- ( ) Lacks self confidence
- ( ) Likely to be overconfident at times
- ( ) May lack sufficient poise to deal effectively with the public
- ( ) Could be more cooperative in public contacts
- ( ) Sometimes is antagonistic toward others
- (✓) Gets along well with superiors and co-workers
- ( ) Exhibits too much self-importance
- ( ) Is too positive in views
- ( ) At times appears to be emotionally immature
- (✓) Appears to have emotional stability
- ( ) Has a tendency to drink immoderately
- ( ) Is frequently absent from work
- ( ) Does not give enough attention to essential details
- ( ) Likely to procrastinate
- (✓) Grasps new ideas quickly and clearly
- (✓) Works well under pressure
- (✓) Makes quick and logical decisions
- ( ) May not plan work effectively
- ( ) Lacks vigor
- ( ) Practically always uses good judgment
- ( ) At times does not use good judgment
- ( ) Not always reliable and dependable
- ( ) May not be able to fill this position in a completely satisfactory manner
- (✓) Accepts responsibility
- ( ) May not possess sufficient initiative for this position
- ( ) Tends to resist suggestions and ideas of others
- ( ) Is not a good team worker
- (✓) Is well liked by subordinates
- (✓) Has outstanding leadership ability
- ( ) Has not been successful as a supervisor
- ( ) Is a willing worker but not a leader
- (✓) Is adept at identifying organizational needs and weaknesses
- ( ) May lack sufficient leadership ability to be successful in this position
- (✓) Stimulates others to progress
- (✓) Writes excellent reports
- ( ) Report-writing ability is only fair
- ( ) Is a good public speaker
- ( ) Needs to improve in self-expression
- ( ) Professional reputation may not be completely satisfactory
- ( ) May not have sufficient professional training for this position
- (✓) Has excellent professional reputation
- (✓) Has broad professional knowledge and interest.

For each of the following fields in which you have knowledge of the candidate's experience, reputation and demonstrated ability, please evaluate him by placing an "X" in the appropriate space:

FIELD	I STRONGLY ENDORSE	I ENDORSE	I DO NOT ENDORSE	I DO NOT KNOW

To some extent all individuals possess some virtues and some faults. Describe below those traits which you consider are the candidate's chief strengths and weaknesses.

Ability to work with others at all levels. Limitless resourcefulness.
Drive and initiative. Leadership.

To your knowledge has the candidate or his work ever been seriously criticized by responsible persons. If so, please explain below.

Please add any other comments which will further describe the candidate or which might be indicative of his probable performance if he were appointed to this position.

Subject was an excellent employee in all respects.

Would you employ or re-employ this candidate? No
(YES OR NO)

If not, please explain: Subject is a retiree from this Agency

9-2-76
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REFERENCE

[illegible]
OCCUPATION OR TITLE

Central Intelligence Agency
FIRM NAME

Tampa, Fla
16 June 1976

Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
Post Office Box 1925
Washington, D.C. 20013

Sir:

This is to authorize the release of my record of employment with the Central Intelligence Agency to the Sheriffs Department of Hillsborough County Florida. This confirmation is needed for use in an employment application. I retired on 10 Sep 71.

Thank you

Grayston L. Lynch
8709 Bay Pointe Dr
Tampa, Fla 33615

3 March 1976

Mr. Jeffrey M. Pearson
Chief Investigator
Consolidated Security Services, Inc.
5310 Central Avenue
Tampa, Florida 33603

Dear Mr. Pearson:

Reference is made to your inquiry dated 13 February 1976 concerning Mr. Grayston L. Lynch.

Mr. Lynch was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency from February 1961 until his retirement in September 1971. He was a loyal and dedicated officer whose performance was considered exceptional. His character and general reputation while with CIA were above reproach.

Sincerely,

Robert D. Cashman
Personnel Officer

Dist:
0 - Addressee
1 - CPD
1 - CEAB Chrono
OP/PAD/CEAB/RDCashman:djw(3March 1976)

CONSOLIDATED
SECURITY
SERVICES, INC.

5310 CENTRAL AVENUE • TAMPA, FLORIDA 33603 • 813/238-8876

February 13, 1976

Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Sir:

I'd appreciate your assistance in verifying employment of a former CIA Agent, Grayston L. Lynch. Mr. Lynch has applied for a position with my firm and is being considered for an administrative position.

Information obtained from the appicant's employment summary indicates Date of Birth, 6-14-23, Social Security No., 451-18-7989, employed with the CIA from 1960 to 1971. Information relative to character and general reputation would also be beneficial.

Included with this request is the applicant's signed authorization.

My sincerest appreciation of your kind attention.

Regards,

CONSOLIDATED SECURITY SERVICES, INC.

Jeffrey M. Pearson,
Chief Investigator

JP/vm

NR

Tampa,Fla.
12 Feb 1976

Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington,D.C. 20505

Sir:

I hereby request that confirmation of my Agency employment be released to the Consolidated Security Services of Tampa,Florida.

Grayston L Lynch
Grayston L Lynch
8709 Bay Pointe Dr.
Tampa,Fla.33615

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible] Y	[illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION [illegible] ([illegible])	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR [illegible]	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible] (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE [illegible]	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS [illegible] SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV [illegible]	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION [illegible], USA

11. POSITION TITLE [illegible]	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) ([illegible]) [illegible]	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.11	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 5	17. SALARY OR RATE [illegible] $ [illegible]

18. REMARKS - - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: [illegible] SEX: M MARITAL ST: [illegible] NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 021061 [illegible] SERVICE COMP: [illegible]
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA/FICA HOSPITALIZ [illegible]: [illegible] PLAN:
REGIST: Y-S/[illegible] PREV. GOVT SERV: 0 [illegible] LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L ING: [illegible] S/L ING: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110161 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: ABRAHAM HELEN [illegible] ORG: [illegible] PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITY/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STATUS: N FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: [illegible] OPS EXPENSE: Y HOUSING: [illegible] STATE/ CODE:
HOME LEAVE: [illegible] [illegible]-ENTITLE: Y OFFSET CLAUS : Y STD GOVT: Y
SPECIAL PAY: Y [illegible] PAY : N ALLOWANCE COMP: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRE: Y WITH TAX [illegible]: N OTHER ALLOWANC : N SEPARATION:

NOTATIONS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT [illegible]

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous
7-66 MFG. 11-70 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4 51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 451187939
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED: 08/20/71

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA 06 YR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2126-0195
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
IUJEWEL

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 23591 DOG: 081367 LEI: 080970

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423  SEX: M      MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP: 100138
TYPE RETIREMENT:*CIA/FICA               HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN          PREV. GOVT SERV: 0       SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A             A/L IND: 6               S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN  REFR ORG: SOD       PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N    FED EXMP:            STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI     OPS EXPNSE: Y        HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0   DIFFERENTIAL: Y      OFFSET CLAUSE: Y     STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y   PREMIUM PAY : E      ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y   OTH TAX ENTL: N      OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:
```

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous
7-66 MFG. 11-69 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 451 87959
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED: 01/22/71

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR.: 1 | 1[illegible] | 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: *1139-0195
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
IUJEWEL

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 23591 DCG: 081367 LSI: 08[illegible]

18. REMARKS

---------- STATUS INFORMATION ----------
BIRTH DATE: 061423 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 021061 FED SERVICE COMP: 1[illegible]0138
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: 0 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4
---------- CONTRACT INFORMATION ----------
EFF DATE: 11[illegible]167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN REFR ORG: SOD PHONE: 4321
---------- ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES ----------

TAX STAFF: N	FED EXMP:	STATE EXMP:	STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI	OPS EXPNSE: Y	HOUSING: A	POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0	DIFFERENTIAL: Y	OFFSET CLAUSE: Y	STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y	PREMIUM PAY : E	ALLOWANCE COMM: N	EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y	OTH TAX ENTL: N	OTHER ALLOWNS : N	SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous
7-68 MFG 10-68 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 451167595
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED:01/22/71.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 1 DA. 1 YR. 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-5363
8. CS OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP DIRECTORATE
   SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
   IUJEWEL
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $* 29591 DOG: 081367 LEI: 08[illegible]
18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423  SEX: M       MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP: 100136
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC                       HOSPITILIZATION: F    PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN             PREV. GOVT SERV: 0          SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A                A/L IND: 8                  S/L INC: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 11[illegible]67 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN  REFR ORG: SOD     PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: A     FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI      OPS EXPNSE: Y          HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0    DIFFERENTIAL: Y        OFFSET CLAUSE: Y     STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : E        ALLOWANCE COMM: N    EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y    OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N    SEPARATION:

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150b Use Previous
7-68 MFO 10-68 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible]

PREPARED: [illegible]/23/7[illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: [illegible]
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / CF TO V
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: [illegible]
8. CE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
[illegible]
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: *DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: [illegible]
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 22253 DOG: [illegible]1367 LEI: [illegible]

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: [illegible] SEX: [illegible] MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: [illegible]2
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: [illegible] FED SERVICE COMP: [illegible]
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC HOSPITILIZATION: [illegible] PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/[illegible] PREV. GVT SERV: [illegible] SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: [illegible] A/L IND: [illegible] S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: [illegible] EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: [illegible]
REFERRING OFFICER: [illegible] REFR ORG: [illegible] PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPENSE: Y HOUSING: [illegible] POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: [illegible] DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY: [illegible] ALLOWANCE COMP: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX FRTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS: N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150e 7-68 MFG 7-69 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 451167569	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY PREPARED: 5/25/76
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 21 76 · 5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)
6. FUNDS V TO V · V TO CF · CF TO V · X CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 1135-3765 · 8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV IUJEWEL	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION *MARYLAND, USA
11. POSITION TITLE PARAMIL OF	12. POSITION NUMBER · 13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS · 15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.11	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 5 · 17. SALARY OR RATE $ 22263 DOG: 081367 LEI: 080976

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - -  STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423  SEX: M      MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP: 100138
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC                    HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN          PREV. GOVT SERV: 0          SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A             A/L IND: 2                  S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN  PERS ORG: SOD       PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N     FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI      OPS EXPNSE: Y          HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0    DIFFERENTIAL: Y        OFFSET CLAUSE: Y  STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : E        ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y    OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:
```

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150b 7-64 MFG. 10-68 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 451187989
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED: 09/18/7

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 08 DA 11 YR 7
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-3369
8. CS OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
*IUJEWEL
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: *DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 22263 DOG: 081367 LEI: 080970

18. REMARKS
- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 2
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: (2) 61 FED SERVICE COMP: 15-136
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: 0 SAL. TAX LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L INC: 8 S/L INC: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021161
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN REFR ORG: SOD PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUS INC: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : E ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

(4-51)

Form 1150B
7-66 MFG. 11-69
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 451167989
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY
PREPARED: 08/14/70

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: STEP INCREASE
4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 05 70
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF
7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-3369
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
JMCOBRA

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: FLORIDA, USA

11 POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12 POSITION NUMBER:
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16 GRADE AND STEP: 14 *5
17 SALARY OR RATE: $* 22263 OLD: 081367 NEW:*080970

18 REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 021061 FED SERVICE COMP: 100135
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC HOSPITALIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: C SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L INC: 8 S/L INC: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN REFR ORG: SOD PHONE: 4221
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: 2 POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : E ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 7-66 MFG 11-69 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 451187989
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED:05/08/70

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 12 DA. 28 YR. 69
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO U
		U TO V	X	U TO U

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0135-3369
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
JMCOBRA

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: FLORIDA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12 POSITION NUMBER:
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16 GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17 SALARY OR RATE: $* 21608 DOG: 081361 LEI: 081168

18 REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423  SEX: M      MARITAL ST: MAR    NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP: 100138
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC                          HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN             PREV. GOVT SERV: 0       SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A                A/L IND: 8               S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN  REFR ORG: SOD      PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N     FED EXMP:               STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI      OPS EXPNSE: Y           HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0    DIFFERENTIAL: Y         OFFSET CLAUSE: Y     STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : E         ALLOWANCE COMM: N    EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y    OTH TAX ENTL: N         OTHER ALLOWNS : N    SEPARATION:
```

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 7-66 1150B MFG. 10-68 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 451187989	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY	PREPARED:08/22/69
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 07 DA. 25 YR. 69	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V ☐ · CF TO CF ☒	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 0135-3365	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV JMCOBRA	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION FLORIDA, USA	
11. POSITION TITLE PARAMIL OF	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.11	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 4
17. SALARY OR RATE $ 20385	DCG: 081367 LEI: 081168	

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 021061 FED SERVICE COMP:*100138
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: 0 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN REFR ORG: SCD PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : E ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous
7-66 MFG. 6-69 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-37)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

37

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 451187989
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED:07/18/69

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 | DA 13 | YR 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0135-3369
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
JMCOBRA
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: FLORIDA, USA
11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $* 20385 DOG: 061367 LEI: 061168

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

BIRTH DATE: 061423 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 021061 FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: 0 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4

- - - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN REFR ORG: SOD PHONE: 4321

- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -

TAX STAFF: N FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : E ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition
7-66 MFG. 6-69

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible]

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 451187969
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED:06/06/69

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: NAME CORRECTION FROM (LYNCH GRAYSON LEROY)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 | DA 02 | YR 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

FUNDS		
		V TO V
		CF TO V
		V TO CF
	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 5135-3369
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP DIRECTORATE
   SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
   JMCOBRA
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: FLORIDA, USA
11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 18641 DOG: 081367 LEI: 081168

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - -  STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423  SEX: M      MARITAL ST: MAR    NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC
FEGLI: YES/OPTN                            HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
PAY BASIS: A         PREV. GOVT SERV: 0         SAL. TASK LIMIT:
                     A/L IND: 8                 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - -  CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN  REFR ORG: SOD      PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N     FED EXMP:
TRAVEL: CHI      OPS EXPNSE: Y         STATE EXMP:             STATE:
HOME LEAVE: 0    DIFFERENTIAL: Y       HOUSING: A              POST/EQUAL:
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : E       OFFSET CLAUSE: Y        STD GOVT: Y
STEP INCRS: Y    OTH TAX ENTL: N       ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
                                       OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 7-66 1150B MFG 2-69 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 451137299	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) LYNCH GRAYSON L[illegible]Y	PREPARED:12/31/68

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION INITIAL ENTRY	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 01 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE 9135-3369	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	-Y	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV JMCOBRA	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION FLORIDA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE PARAMIL OF	12. POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.11	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 4	17 SALARY OR RATE $ 18c41 DOG: 081367 LEI: 081168

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423  SEX: M       MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC                     HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN          PREV. GOVT SERV: 0       SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A             A/L IND: 8               S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN  REFR ORG: SOD      PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N    FED EXMP:                STATE EXMP:         STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI     OPS EXPNSE: Y            HOUSING: A          POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0   DIFFERENTIAL: Y          OFFSET CLAUSE: Y  STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y   PREMIUM PAY : E          ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y   OTH TAX ENTL: N          OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 7-66 1150B MFG. 10-58 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

Verification
of Service on
this side of
File

SECRET

30 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

71-4511

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Involuntary Retirement - Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

REFERENCE : Memorandum for Contract Personnel Division from Chief, Special Operations Division, dated 19 August 1971, same subject

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. Grayston L. Lynch, GS-14 Equivalent, Career Agent, Special Operations Division, Clandestine Service, has been recommended by his Career Service for involuntary retirement. By mutual agreement between Mr. Lynch and the Agency, it has been determined that his services are no longer required. It is recommended that Mr. Lynch's contract be terminated and that he be involuntarily retired under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50m. If such retirement is approved, Mr. Lynch requests an effective date of 10 September 1971.

3. Mr. Lynch has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for involuntary retirement under the System. He is 48 years old with over 31 years of Federal service. This service includes over 10 years with the Agency of which 5 years were in qualifying service. The Head of the Clandestine Service Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board have recommended that his involuntary retirement be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

4. It is recommended that you approve the involuntary retirement of Mr. Grayston L. Lynch under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50m.

/s/Harry B. Fisher

[illegible]

Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

[illegible]
[illegible]

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

31 AUG 1971
Date

SECRET

30 JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance/C&TD

SUBJECT: Verification of Contract Service for
Irving C. DEVUONO (P), Current Career Agent

1. As the result of the recent enactment of Public Law 91-639 subject's full-time contract service with the Agency from **10 February 1961** through **31 May 1961** is creditable for both leave and Civil Service Retirement purposes. Civil Service Retirement deductions were not withheld during this period.

2. Subject has been a participating member of the Civil Service Retirement System since **1 June 1951**

3. Action Required:

a. Office of Finance: Please post the above applicable information to subject's retirement records.

b. **DDP/SOD/Personnel**: Please advise subject of the contents of this memorandum.

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/SOD/Personnel
1 - DDP/CSPS/Agent Panel
1 - OP/RAD/ROB
1 - CPD Subject's file
1 - CPD Chrono

DDS/OP/CPD/NTH (30 June 1971) CRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from
automatic downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) EOD: ?

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): DEVUONO, Irving C. (P)

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: Jun 1923

5. SERVICE COMP. DATE: ?

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married

7. DEPENDENTS (Children, etc.) NO.: 3 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 1939 1949 1954

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA SPOUSE: ?

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS ▶ MEMBERSHIP

OTHER STATUS: Ineligible

10. LAST MED. RPT.: May 1961 QUAL. FOR: Prop Version EVAL. FOR: Prop Assign

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS ▶ NONE SERVICE GRADE ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1 RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2 TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3 RETIRED: XX

12. ASSESSMENT DATE

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1938-60 Military Service, US Army, Capt - Special forces operations;
Instructor at 7th Army NCO School for 3 years
1956-60 Commanded & Trained an SF team in guerilla warfare

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

German - S Slight
French - S Slight
Laotian - S Slight

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Feb 1961	ParaMil (Contr Employee) $	9500		DDP/WH/JMARC	Hq
Jun 1961	PM Off (Career Agent)	11155	0813	DDP/CA/PMG/Proj ZRJEWEL	JMWAVE
Aug 1967	" " " "	16152	14	" " " " "	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: 19 Sep 1967

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: hc

22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE ▶ No

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
[illegible], Ir[illegible] (P)	Jun 1923

53.

No Photo Available.

54. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

55. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

56. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Award 1964 Intelligence Star and Intelligence Star Certificate for meritorious duty and heroism under hazardous conditions performed in Spring 1961.

57. DATE REVIEWED	58. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
19-[illegible]-1967	hc

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) 1 FEB 67 REPLACES FORM 1200 (PART 1) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET

PROFILE (4)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 5 AUG 1971

TO: (Check)	☐ CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION	FILE NUMBER 16402
	☒ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION	EMPLOYEE NUMBER CONTRACT
	☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) SOD	ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: RETIREMENT

SUBJECT: LYNCH, Grayston L.

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	☒ CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF	DATE EOD
☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X ASCERTAIN THAT CIA W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	OK RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HB 240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY.
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HB 240-2e)	
☐ SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

FORWARDING ADDRESS: Tampa, Florida
EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS: NONE

Subject is to indicate CIA as place of employment for entire period of time and not to reveal any specific places of cover assignments or cover locations.

[illegible]/OH

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - [illegible]
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
[illegible]

James

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

15 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report for Mr. Grayston L. Lynch, 1 April 1970 - 31 March 1971

Although Mr. Lynch is assigned to the Maritime Branch for administrative purposes, he was in training during the entire period covered by subject fitness report. Therefore, an evaluation of his performance by Maritime Branch would be unrealistic.

W. D. Strauch, Jr.
Chief, Maritime Branch
Special Operations Division

SECRET

NR

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN LANGUAGE APTITUDE TESTING RESULTS

NAME Lynch, Grayston DeVecchio

DATE 13 August 62 Irving

Since many things other than aptitudes enter into the determination of training course performance, in any class of students there will usually be some whose performance will be better than would be expected from their test scores, just as there will likely be some whose performance is poorer than expected. STRENGTH OF MOTIVATION, PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH A FOREIGN LANGUAGE, and other factors should be considered in selecting people for language training and in interpreting language training results. For example, the number of languages previously studied or learned and the amount of academic and non-academic language-learning experience are factors not measured by the tests but are indicative of probable success in learning a foreign language. Whether such experience was in the same language as the one to be studied or in a different one is, of course, an additional relevant factor.

The rating received by the above individual is circled below:

ADJECTIVAL RATING	APPROXIMATE %* RECEIVING RATING
Superior	10%
Above Average	20%
[✓ Average]	40%
Below Average	20%
Poor	10%

* Based on a sample of 1709 Agency employees -- men and women -- tested with this battery between July 1962 and September 1963

FORM 1-64 2998

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

Irving A. Diamond

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
	LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY	SOD	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
14	4	20285	081168	14	5	22263	080970	X	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 3 June 1970

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY Dow H Kuehacker

FORM 7-00 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

31 Jul 70

SECRET

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION -- TECHNICAL SCHOOL

IDENTI-KIT COURSE (X-101)

TRAINING EVALUATION

Irving C. DiNuovo

Name : Grayston Lynch

Office : SOD

Course Dates: 19 - 22 May 1970

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course teaches the student to become more aware of the value in proper facial observations -- the method of mentally recording the observations -- and finally -- the mechanical manipulation of the Identikit to provide a permanent record.

EVALUATION

	BELOW CLASS STANDARD	AVERAGE LOW	AVERAGE HIGH	EXCELLENT
1. Student understands the principles of Identikit.		X		
2. Student understands the manipulation of the Identikit.		X		
3. Ability to construct composites from photographs.		X		
4. Ability to construct composites from live observation.	Not applicable to this meeting of the course			
5. Ability to construct composites by debriefing.		X		
6. Ability to use composites to identify people in a. photographs.		X		
b. live situations.	Not aplicable to this meeting of the course			
7. Ability to derive composite code for transmission.			X	
8. Ability to reconstruct composite from Identikit code.			X	
9. Student's attitude, cooperation and productivity.	X			

E Marilyn Clark

TSD/Technical School
Instructor

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) LYNCH, GRAYSTON LEROY	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) June 14, 1923	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 451 18 7989
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ **(A)**

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ **(B)**

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ **(C)**

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
Grayston L. Lynch

DATE
26 Feb 68

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

MAR 28 10 52 AM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

DUPLICATE COPY—For Agency Use

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

NOTE FOR FILE

SUBJECT: Irving K. Devuono (P)

Paul Seidel (ROB) called Mr. Brooks on 7 September 1971 to advise him that the DCI had approved the recommendation for Mr. Devu0no's Involuntary Retirement and that it was alright to release the separation amendment providing for $10,000 terminal payment that we had been holding.

Amendment released to div for subject's sign on 7 Sept 71.

OP/CPD Rita

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE	CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR	

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN ____________________ (NAME OF LANGUAGE) AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING	TEST RATINGS
					0 = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE S = SLIGHT H = HIGH E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS	12. SIGNATURE
	13. LD NUMBER

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45) **SECRET**

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2 - Employee (thru Training Officer)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 29 March 1971

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Lynch, Creyston

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/SOD

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 4321

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☒ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Betty B. Wayland

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GS-60

EXT.: 4321

10. COMMENTS:

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION:

"Disqualified for O/S Planning. Subject is qualified for Headquarters Duty only."

DATE: 20 May 1971

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Glenn E. Steele

FORM 2-69 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

14 DEC 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Mr. Grayston Lynch

It was determined that no action would be taken on this case until after the first of the year (1971) at which time Mr. Lynch will be advised by C/SOD/Personnel that he will be made available for a suitable operational assignment, most likely overseas, unless he opts to apply for disability retirement.

If Mr. Lynch opts to apply for disability retirement he will be continued in his present assignment pending approval of his retirement.

If Mr. Lynch chooses to be shopped for a field assignment, SOD will initiate action to locate such a position. When found, Mr. Lynch will be processed for the assignment. Should he fail to be medically approved, action will be taken to obtain his retirement for medical reasons. Should an assignment not be forthcoming by April 1971, a medical disposition for overseas planning purposes (General) will be requested.

The purpose of the above scheduled action is to either find a suitable assignment for Mr. Lynch or to effect his disability retirement on either a voluntary or involuntary basis.

Darold D. Aldridge

Darold D. Aldridge
Deputy Chief, Personnel
Special Operations Division

SECRET

[illegible]

1. UONO received an annunity of $4,272 per year ($356. per month) from the military for 21 years of service.

2. This military annuity will be cancelled.

3. His 21 years of military service will be combined with 10 plus years of CIA service and these 31 plus years will give him a total of $13,428 per year.

① D. receives an annuity of $4,272 per yr ($356 - per mo) from the military for 21 yrs of service.

② This military annuity will be cancelled.
~~He will receive~~
~~NOTHING FROM~~

③ His 21 yrs of Mil service will be combined with 10+ yrs of CIA service and these 31+ yrs will give him a total of 13,428. per year

CIA

$1117.– X12 = ? [illegible]

CIA + HIL

$ 1119.12 [illegible]

[illegible]

13,428 ✓ [illegible]

HIL

556.12

712

$ 4272 ✓

21 YRS HIL

+

10.5(?) CIA

31.5 YRS

Copy file letter [illegible]

for [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 1 JULY 1970

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Lynch, Grayston L.

3. POSITION TITLE: Senior Spec Ops. CA

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/SOD

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT: 4321

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQOS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	ASAP
STATION	VIETNAM
TDY OR PCS	PCS
TYPE OF COVER	DAC
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	NONE
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED	NONE

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

1 JUL 1970

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: John A. Strassberger

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GH-62 HQS.

EXT.: 4321

10. COMMENTS

Subject is scheduled for medicals on 23 July and 27 July.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

No Medical Disposition. Processing Cancelled.

DATE: 23 July 1970

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Don Farley HRO/OMS

FORM 1-68 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(28)

25 JUN 1970

S-E-C-R-E-T

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION - THE TECHNICAL SCHOOL

PHOTOGRAPHIC FUNDAMENTALS & DOCUMENT COPY P-101

TRAINING EVALUATION

NAME : Grayston Lynch

OFFICE : SOD

COURSE DATES: 15 - 23 June 1970

The student is taught fundamental understanding of the photographic processes, manipulation of typical 35mm cameras and film processing. The student is instructed how to use two different types of 35mm camera copy systems for document photography - the LEICA M-3 Range-Finder, and the PENTAX single lens reflex camera. Documents are photographed under available light and artificial light with the camera hand-held and other unconventional means. Students' results of various assignments demonstrated the following abilities.

A - OUTSTANDING
B - PROFICIENT
C - BELOW CLASS STANDARD

		A	B	C	POTENTIAL GOOD	POTENTIAL POOR
1.	Manipulate a range-finder camera.		x			
2.	Manipulate a single lens-reflex camera.		x			
3.	Manipulate a light meter.		x			
4.	Manipulate film processing equipment.		x			
5.	Satisfactory exposure using a light meter.		x			
6.	Develop films.		x			
7.	Critique and evaluate negatives.		x			
8.	Manipulate 3M Reader/Printer and produce [illegible] prints.		x			
*9.	Understand basic photographic theory.		x			
*10.	Over-all results obtained on assignments.		x			
11.	Determine camera malfunctions by analyzing negative defects.		x			
12.	Photograph documents using artificial light.		x			
13.	Photograph documents using available light.		x			
14.	Photograph documents using a handheld camera.		x			
15.	Photograph documents using unconventional [illegible] support (Tripod, Clamps, etc.)		x			
16.	[illegible] raised or engraved surfaces.		x			
17.	[illegible] on the document copy problems.		x			
18.	[illegible] toward assignments, direction [illegible]	x				
19.	[illegible] over-all ability to photograph most [illegible] material under any type of lighting [illegible]		x			
20.	[illegible] cleanliness.		x			

* Results checked in this category are a fairly reliable indication of how well the skill will be retained.

Ronald James
TSD/Training/Instr.

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 19 JUNE 1970

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): LYNCH, GRAYSTON

3. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFF (CAREER A)

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/SOD/MB

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 4321

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☒ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQOS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES
☐ NO

24 JUN 1970

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Joan E. Rice
JOAN E. RICE

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GH-62 HQS.

EXT.: 4321

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

NO MEDICAL DISPOSITION. PROCESSING CANCELLED.

~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~

26 JUN 1970

DATE: 28 July 1970

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Don Farley PEO/OMS

FORM 2-69 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(28)

File

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

Clandestine Service Records I - Course No. 7-70
(21 hours - part time) 8 - 11 June 1970

Student : Lynch, Grayston
Office : SOD
Year of Birth: 1923
Service Designation: Contract
Grade : 14
EOD Date : Feb '61
Number of Students Enrolled: 21

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

CS Records I (Introduction to Records) is intended for Operations Officers and intelligence and clerical assistants who support operations through any form of records activity. It reviews the records mission of the CS and examines the logic and structure of the system itself. The responsibilities of CS personnel to the system, and the services provided by the different elements of the system, provide the central theme of the course. Students are familiarized with methods of input, maintenance and retrieval of information, and in disposition, disposal and destruction of the records themselves. The course includes an introduction to the various machine programs associated with the records system, and outlines the management cycle by which the system is controlled and modified.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORDS

This is a certificate of attendance only. Student evaluations are not given in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Charles Schafer
23 JUN 1970
Date

SECRET

14-00000

S E C R E T

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION -- TECHNICAL SCHOOL

IDENTI-KIT COURSE ([illegible])

TRAINING EVALUATION

Name : Grayston Lynch

Office : SOD

Course Dates: 19 - 22 May 1970

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course teaches the student to become more aware of the value in proper facial observations -- the method of mentally recording the observations -- and finally -- the mechanical manipulation of the Identikit to provide a permanent record.

EVALUATION

HARDEST

	BELOW CLASS STANDARD	AVERAGE LOW	AVERAGE HIGH	EXCELLENT
1. Student understands the principles of Identikit.		X		
2. Student understands the manipulation of the Identikit.		X		
3. Ability to construct composites from photographs.		X		
4. Ability to construct composites from live observation.	Not applicable to this meeting of the course			
5. Ability to construct composites by debriefing.		X		
6. Ability to use composites to identify people in a. photographs.		X		
b. live situations.	Not aplicable to this meeting of the course			
7. Ability to derive composite code for transmission.			X	
8. Ability to reconstruct composite from Identikit code.			X	
9. Student's attitude, cooperation and productivity.	X			

EASY

[illegible]

TSD/Technical School Instructor

SEE BACK FOR

S E C R E T COMMENTS

16 June 1970

Per the instructor, the low grade in section 9 was due to a lack of motivation and interest on the part of Mr. Signele. She said he appeared to have an attitude that the course content would come automatically and it wasn't necessary to study. ~~Even after was~~ Basic facts of the course must be learned early to successfully complete the course and even after ~~was~~ these points were repeated each day, Mr. Signele ~~failed~~ was unable to answer questions concerning them.

John Strasburger

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

CI Survey Course 3-70
40 hours, Full-time

STUDENT : Lynch, Grayston
OFFICE : SOD
YEAR OF BIRTH: 1923
SERVICE DESIGNATION: Contract
GRADE : 14
NO. OF STUDENTS : 12
EOD DATE : Feb 61

COURSE OBJECTIVES - Content and Methods

The course aims to provide a description of counterintelligence in the covert and clandestine warfare of today in both friendly and enemy areas. To do so, a brief description of the intent, purpose, and dynamics of espionage, subversion and counterintelligence as practiced by the major enemy forces is provided and this is contrasted to the spectrum of counterintelligence activities of the United States of America and of allied countries. To support counterintelligence missions levied upon the Agency, a review of the cooperation and coordination and exchange of information and services between cooperating services is provided. Counterintelligence is then related to all other Clandestine Service operations and its place as a part thereof is demonstrated. To provide the student with a framework within which to work, the organization of the Agency for counterintelligence is also provided.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. Since this course is a survey course, it does not attempt to qualify the student as a counterintelligence operations officer and no evaluation is made of individual performance.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Stewart H. Vance
Chief Instructor

Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION - TECHNICAL SCHOOL

THE MANAGEMENT OF AUDIO SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS

A-100

TRAINING EVALUATION

file

NAME : Grayston Lynch

OFFICE : SOD

DATES OF COURSE: 30 March - 10 April 1970

A. COURSE OBJECTIVES

1. This course is designed primarily for either a case officer who expects to stage and manage an audio surveillance operation, or for those who have related responsibilities, i.e., desk officer and physical security officers.

2. Although the course provides a basic familiarization with audio devices the primary emphasis is on the collection of target data, planning the operation, locating a listening post, supporting the entry, exploiting "the take", and the orderly termination of the operation once it has outlived its usefulness. In short, managing an audio operation from inception to termination.

3. The course provides a basic knowledge of "quick plant" devices to permit the exploitation of certain targets of opportunity. The same devices could be concealed and used for "Carry In" devices.

4. Finally, the course provides instruction in the first echelon maintenance of listening post equipment, so that an operation can continue without the constant presence of an audio technician.

B. EVALUATION

1. The student met ___xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx___ the objectives of the course.

2. Remarks:

[illegible]
TSD/Technical School

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Information Reporting, Reports and Requirements Course No. 5-70
120 hours, full time 9-27 March 1970

Student	: Lynch, Grayston	Office	: SOD
Year of Birth	: 1923	Service Designation:	Contract
Grade	: GS-14	No. of Students	: 10
EOD Date	: February 1961		

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The over-all objectives of the course are: to show the requirements function as it develops; to describe information evaluation, appraisal, and dissemination; to present fundamental principles of collection and communication of information; to demonstrate how, through Headquarters guidance, reporters can be directed and developed; and to prepare intelligence officers in the field to put information into finished report form. Supervised practice to develop skills is given in the production of finished reports; in reporting on area guidance patterns; in tailoring requirements into specific assignments; and in observing, collecting, organizing, and communicating information.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student achievement is judged from each student's observed performance during laboratory practice in the areas of instruction indicated. An asterisk (*) indicated this student's ratings. The ratings are _weak_, _adequate_, _proficient_, _strong_, and _outstanding_.

A. Qualitative and Quantitative Production of Reports:

Weak	Adequate	Proficient	Strong	Outstanding
	*			

COMMENT:

Qualitatively and quantitatively, Mr. Lynch's work was only fair.

B. Requirements Performance:

Weak	Adequate	Proficient	Strong	Outstanding
	*			

COMMENT:

His paper on this subject lacked detail.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

C. Editorial Performance:

Weak [✓ Adequate] Proficient Strong Outstanding

COMMENT:

The papers that Mr. Lynch wrote reflected only a fair understanding of the principles of editorial organization.

D. Reporting Performance:

Weak [✓ Adequate] Proficient Strong Outstanding

COMMENT:

The quality of his outside reporting assignment was only passable.

INSTRUCTOR'S OVER-ALL COMMENT:

Mr. Lynch worked to full capacity throughout the course. However, his performance was only satisfactory. It should be taken into consideration that Mr. Lynch does not type well.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

2 April 1970
Date

H. B
H. Benchea
Chief Instructor

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION #5-70
INTRODUCTION TO INTELLIGENCE

Introduction to Intelligence
(80 hours - full-time)

24 February - 6 March 1970

Student: LYNCH, Grayston

Grade : GS-14

Office : SOD

Year of Birth : 1923

EOD : Feb. 1961

Service Designation: Contract

The objectives of Introduction to Intelligence are:

Introduce you to the fundamentals of intelligence and to relate the intelligence process to United States foreign policy and national security.

Provide an overview of CIA and relate the Agency's organization and function to United States intelligence activities.

Explore intelligence problems related to analysis of foreign countries and conduct of overseas operations.

Methods for meeting the objectives are through lectures given by the Intelligence School faculty and guest speakers, seminars, reading, review exercises, training panels, and films.

This is to certify satisfactory completion of Introduction to Intelligence (Intelligence Orientation - First Phase).

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

Course Chairman, Intelligence School, OTR

Date: 11 March 1970

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET (When Filled In)

OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

TRAINING REPORT

Student : Lynch, Grayston

Date(s): 16 - 20 February 1970

Grade : GS-14

Office : SOD

Subject(s) : Clandestine Radio Familiarization Course

Title : Operations Officer

Number of Hours: 36

This presentation was in the form of a seminar designed to brief the student on the Communications subject(s) listed and is a certificate of attendance only.

Charles J Castillo
for Joseph J. Candela
Chief, Career Management & Training Staff, OC

MCE Form #12
2[illegible] October 1968

SECRET (When Filled In)

SECRET

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION -- TECHNICAL SCHOOL
CARBON AND NOTE-TAKING TECHNIQUES (SW-102)
TRAINING EVALUATION

Name: Grayston Lynch Office: SOD

Course Dates: 3 - 5 February 1970

COURSE DESCRIPTION -- The Student is:

1. taught the operational considerations and requirements for two secret writing techniques.
2. trained in the proper techniques to be used in preparing carbon secret texts to pass general censorship inspection in mail channels.

COMMENT

1. The carbon and note-taking direct writing device techniques are perishable skills which can be lost without use or frequent practice. Any appreciable lapse of time between training and use normally requires refresher training.
2. No specifics as to particular systems or chemical reactions were discussed.

EVALUATION: 1. EXCELLENT 2. AVERAGE 3. WEAK 4. BELOW CLASS STANDARD *

The student's evaluation is indicated by his performance in the following areas:

a. attitude toward assignments, direction and cooperation. 2
b. comprehends the techniques employed in writing with a carbon secret writing system and its application in operational support. 2
c. successfully demonstrated the proper technique in writing a carbon. 2
d. satisfactorily demonstrated proper techniques when writing with a direct writing note-taking device. 2
e. satisfactorily demonstrated the ability to follow directions in developing both carbon and direct writing device messages. 2

RECOMMENDATIONS -- Student should undertake practice exercises to:

a. retain or improve dexterity. x
b. improve printing techniques. ____
c. acquire more even printing pressure. ____
d. other. ____

*Recommend student receive refresher training in carbon writing techniques before using SW operationally.

TSD/Technical School
Instructor

SECRET

SECRET

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION -- TECHNICAL SCHOOL

INTRODUCTION TO SECRET WRITING (SW-101)

RECORD OF ATTENDANCE

Name : Grayston Lynch

Office : SOD

Course Date : 2 February 1970

1. COURSE OBJECTIVES

To present to the officer who needs an overall appreciation of the secret writing process, and who should be aware of its place in the scheme of clandestine communications, but who does not anticipate an immediate need for this technical skill.

2. COURSE CONTENT

a. It compares S/W to other forms of clandestine communications and delineates both its advantages and limitations. It discusses the major forms of secret writing - carbon systems, microdots and latent image photography and provides a demonstration of each.

b. It concludes with an examination of the operational factors surrounding the utilization of S/W - paper selection, carriers, accommodation addresses, censorship, indicators, cover letters, supplies and postal intelligence.

3. EVALUATION

No practical work is included or individual evaluation given.

4. REMARKS

INSTRUCTOR
TSD/TECHNICAL SCHOOL

SECRET

6 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Operations Division

SUBJECT : Maritime Branch Nominee for the Special Operations Division's Historical Program

REFERENCE : Chief, Special Operations Division Memorandum dated 24 December 1969. Subject: Historical Program

1. Considering the current manpower shortages and relative inexperience in the Maritime Branch, I recommend that only one quarter man year be devoted to the Historical Program in calendar years 1970-71. If and when officers report on board who have the unique or special knowledge required to write histories, then these personnel will be assigned this task and a subsequent increase in man years available will be made.

2. I nominate Mr. Grayston L. Lynch to write histories in CY 1970-71. This officer combines the unique knowledge of first hand operational experience with the qualities of a good narrative writer.

W.D. Strauch, Jr.
Chief, Maritime Branch
Special Operations Division

Distribution:
Orig & 1-Add.
1-Subject's file ✓
1-Chrono
SOD/MB:W.D.Strauch:jr (6 Jan 70)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

17 JULY 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Lynch officially checked in to SOD/Maritime Branch effective this date.

Shirley

SECRET

Date 2 July 69

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

Check-In Sheet

Name Grayston L. Lynch

Branch SOD

Title

Empl. Ser. #

1. Personnel

☒ SOD Questionnaire

☐ Locator Card

☐ Fitness Report Card

☒ Briefing

☐ TDY Standby (Form 259)

☐ Immunization (Form 2476)

☐ Action

② Budget & Fiscal
7/2/69

③ Registry

④ Logistics

⑤ Security

⑥ Cover

Type & Unit:
9775 Composite, OSS GR

7. Branch Chief

8. Personnel

REMARKS:

SECRET

SECRET

SOD Personnel Questionnaire

Date: 2 July 61

Full Name GRAYSTON LEROY LYNCH

Grade GS-14 DOB 14 Jun 23

*Local Permanent Address NONE - AS YET

Home Telephone No. ____ If no phone, Nearest Contact ____

Office Ext. ____ Red Line ____ Office Room No. ____

Are you a natural born U.S. citizen? Yes ✓ No ____

Name of Emergency Addressee JANETTE K. LYNCH

Address 7901 SW 120 ST, MIAMI, FLA Tel. No. 235-8730

Witting? Yes ✓ No ____ Relation WIFE

Alternate Emergency Addressee MRS. RUBY LYNCH

Address RT 1 BOX 46A [illegible], TEX

Tel. No. ____

Witting? Yes ____ No ✓ Relation STEP-MOTHER

Name of Spouse JANETTE K. LYNCH DOB 21 JUL 22

Name & Initials of Children JEFFREY K LYNCH DOB 4 APR 49

SHARON ANN SYKES DOB 5 SEP 46

ROBERT T LYNCH DOB 11 JAN 54

DOB ____

DOB ____

DOB ____

Please notify your friendly Personnel Office in the future of any changes, new births, etc. Thank You.

*Temporary Local Address HOWARD JOHNSON MOTEL

SPRINGFIELD, VA

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

2. DATE OF REQUEST: 13 June 1969

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle): LYNCH, Grayston

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Off (Career Agent)

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: FOD

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 4321

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☒ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETR:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

QUALIFIED FOR OS MUST BE
SEEN IN OMS PRIOR OS PCS OR TDY

DONALD FAR

4-30-69

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: HELEN D. MCGRAHAM

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GH 62

EXT.: 4321

10. COMMENTS

Mr. Lynch has been receiving medical therapy in Florida since December 1968. Medical evaluation is requested at this time for duties as stated in the request for medical evaluation dated 10 October 1968, to include flying in aircraft.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CL[illegible]IED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY zcf PER ______ #

ACTION SOD-6 ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO FILE, VR. CI/P-2, WH-8, WH/COG-8, CCS-2, CSPS, CI/OF-2, RI/AN

S E C R E T 071601Z OCT 68 CITE JMWAVE 3212

DIRECTOR

7 OCT 68 IN 07474

CHAPPIE PERS

REF: DIRECTOR 38564

Cm ay

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO DEPARTED BY POV MORNING OF 6 OCTOBER. MAY BE EXPECTED 8 OCTOBER.

2. JMWAVE ADVANCED $250 AND ADVISED THAT TRAVEL REIMBURSEMENT WOULD BE COMPUTED ON BASIS TRAIN TRAVEL.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST 8 October 1966		
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) LYNCH, Grayston L.	3. POSITION TITLE PM OPS OFF	4. GRADE GS-14 Career Agent
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH SOD		6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☒ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD

STATION

TDY OR PCS

TYPE OF COVER

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA

STATION

NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

ROOM NO. & BUILDING

EXT.

10. COMMENTS Evaluation is requested for the performance of Paramilitary duties including ground and airborne operations and the training of personnel in these activities. Assignments may be domestic, but the primary requirement would be for overseas duty either TDY or most likely, PCS. As an employee of project IUJEWEL, a contingency program, Mr. Lynch should be available for duty with short notice, on a world-wide basis.
(Continued)

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

Assignments either domestic or abroad will require that Mr. Lynch fly in aircraft. This requirement to fly may be not only for transportation purposes but could be a requirement of his assignment in connection with his PM work.

In addition to the technical aspects of any PM assignment, Mr. Lynch would be required to perform his duties using leadership ability, ~~[illegible]~~ and good judgement in line with the covert aspect of his position.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY zt PER ________ #

ACTION SOD-6 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR. OP-2, WH-8, WH/COG-8, CCS-2, CSPS, OF-2, RI/AN

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 071601Z OCT 68 CITE JMWAVE 3212

DIRECTOR

7 Oct 68 IN 07474

CHAPPIE PERS

REF: DIRECTOR 38564

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO DEPARTED BY POV MORNING OF 6 OCTOBER. MAY BE EXPECTED 8 OCTOBER.

2. JMWAVE ADVANCED $250 AND ADVISED THAT TRAVEL REIMBURSEMENT WOULD BE COMPUTED ON BASIS TRAIN TRAVEL.

SECRET

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

ORIG: H. INGRAHAM:ps
UNIT: SOD/PERS
EXT: 4321
DATE: 02 OCTOBER 68

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 48 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: SOD 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR, R/AN, WH/COG 8, WH 8, CSPS, CCS 2, OP 2, D/MS 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

0321 02 Oct 68

CITE DIRECTOR 38564

TO JMWAVE

CHAPPIE PERS

REFERENCES: A. UFGT-22428

B. WAL-0176

1. VOTACK AND HQS DIVISION OFFICIALS REVIEWED REF A PROPOSAL BUT DETERMINED ANOTHER CONTINGENCY GROUP OF THIS TYPE WILL SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE.

2. HQS PURSUING ASSIGNMENT POSSIBILITIES FOR DEVUONO BUT BECAUSE OF MEDICAL LIMITATIONS NOT YET ABLE IDENTIFY SUITABLE POSITION. DEVUONO MEDICAL DISPOSITION STATES HE DISQUALIFIED FOR PCS OVERSEAS; QUALIFIED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DUTIES ONLY IN NONFLYING STATUS.

3. IN VIEW REF B, AND DOUBTFUL ASSIGNMENT SITUATION REQUEST DEVUONO REPORT HQS TDY FOR CONSULTATION O/A 09 OCT. ADVISE ETA.

END OF MESSAGE

CSPS/AGENT PANEL
WH/SS
C/C06

William V. Broe
WILLIAM BROE
C/WH

RAYMOND J. GOODHART
C/SOD/SS

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

FORM 1304 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ORIG: C/JMWAVE-BATHRICK/bcp

EXT:

CONF:

INFO:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

Instructions: Include precedence in address line. All messages routine unless indicated otherwise.

DATE: 9 SEPTEMBER 68

FILE CLASS:

OUT:

TO INFO CITE

S E C R E T [illegible] SEP 68 CITE JMWAVE [illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

REF: A. JMCOBRA 0688

B. DIRECTOR 29436

1. DISCUSSED CONTENTS OF REF. A. WITH IRVING C. DEVUONO WITHOUT REVEALING IDENS A. AND C. DEVUONO STATED THAT HE KNEW THE SOURCE OF THE REPORT AND THAT THE REPORT WAS A FABRICATION. DEVUONO AND IDENS A. AND C. WERE PROFESSIONALLY ACQUAINTED WHEN DEVUONO ACTIVELY OPERATING. IDENS VISITED SAFESITE AND KNEW DEVUONO AS WOFIRM.

2. DEVUONO PRESENTLY WORKING 200 YARDS FROM LOCATION OF BOAT OPERATED BY IDENS A. AND C. BOAT RECOGNIZED BY DEVUONO AS THE SEACRAFT THAT WAS UNDER DEVUONO'S CONTROL BEFORE DONATION. HE REMARKED TO IDENS A. AND C. THAT HE RECOGNIZED HIS OLD BOAT. NOTHING MORE WAS DISCUSSED OTHER THAN TO REPLY TO DIRECT QUESTIONING ON RANGE OF BOAT, WILLINGNESS TO HELP UNRAVEL ELECTRICAL SYSTEM, AND WHAT DEVUONO WAS DOING. REPLY TO LAST WAS THAT HE HAD RETIRED.

3. BELIEVE DEVUONO SUFFICIENTLY WARNED ABOUT FUTURE CONVERSATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

Kenneth W. B. Bathrick

KENNETH W. BATHRICK
RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

REF: [illegible]

1. UNDERSTAND SUBJECT, ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF [illegible], IS STILL IN CONTACT WITH [illegible] STATION. THEREFORE, RATHER THAN INTRODUCE [illegible] DIFFERENT COVER TO [illegible] A AND C [illegible]

2. FOR [illegible]: PLEASE CONTACT [illegible] OF PERTINENT POINTS [illegible] AND [illegible] OF [illegible] SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

PERS FILE

235-8730

Will be in Monday

06
45[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

4-00000

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
	DEVUONO, Irving C. (P) Career Agent	DDP/WH	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS-14	3	$16,897	08/14/67 ~~[illegible]~~	GS-14	4	$18,641	08/11/68 ~~[illegible]~~	X	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE	DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS	AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

RET

SOD [illegible]

2 JUL 1968

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance,
Agent Payroll Branch

SUBJECT : Transfer of Responsibility for
Administration of Career Agent
Employee-Irving C. DEVUONO (P)

Responsibility for the administration of the contract of Irving C. DEVUONO is hereby transferred from Western Hemisphere Division to Special Operations Division effective 02 June 1968. Effective the same date, Subject's cost center number is transferred from WH Cost Center Number 8135-1164 to SOD Cost Center Number 8128-0183.

R.J. Goodhart
Chief, Support Staff, SOD

CONCUR:

Career Agent Panel

Chief, Support Staff, WH

SOD/PERS:ps
O & 1-Add.
1-SOD/PERS
1-WH/PERS
1-SOD/RI
1-CPD (Career Agent)

SECRET

File

[illegible]

[illegible]

REF: [illegible] *

SUBJECT MAY STATE THAT HE HAS APPLIED FOR A ~~[illegible]~~ FOLLOWING 1961 AND ACCEPTED FOR POSITION OF [illegible] OFFICER, GS-14, AT $16,[illegible]37 P/A. ENTRY ON DUTY DATE NOT YET ESTABLISHED BUT SHOULD BE PRIOR TO 1 AUG 68:

U.S. ARMY [illegible]

THE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, D.C. [illegible]

PHONE - OXFORD 779[illegible]

PERSONNEL OFFICER: 1ST LT. FELIX G. [illegible]

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

GH

Subject briefed on this 1 July 1968

* Station forced to backstop credit query for DEVUONO. Request provide subj with cover soonest as he no longer on WAVE payroll.

D/S
55

FORM 10-64 1304 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ORIG: DCOS/S/BATHRICK/bmk

OUTGOING MESSAGE

EXT: 251

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE: 21 JUNE 1968

CONF:

INFO: SS

Instructions: Include precedence in address line. All messages routine unless indicated otherwise.

FILE CLASS:

OUT: [illegible] 67

TO

INFO

CITE

S E C R E T

DIRECTOR

CITE JMWAVE [illegible]

WOTACK/WOGAME

1. STATION FORCED TO BACKSTOP CREDIT QUERY FOR IRVING C. DEVUONO WITH COVER COMPANY WHICH HAS BEEN DISSOLVED. QUERY WAS FROM CENTRAL CREDIT BUREAU FOR SMALL CAR LOAN. ANTICIPATE NO TROUBLE.

2. REQUEST WOTACK PROVIDE DEVUONO WITH COVER SOONEST AS HE NO LONGER ON JMWAVE PAYROLL.

END OF MESSAGE

G. Lynch

5
4
3
2
1

KENNETH W. BATHRICK
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

RELEASING OFFICER
XXXXXXXXXXXXX

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

MARK F. EFFIELD
RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

5
4
3
2
1

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIG: C. DAMMINGER:AM
UNIT: FE/PERS/TBL
EXT: 6588
DATE: 6 JUNE 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: FE 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR , WH 8, CCS 2, CSPS, OP 2, D/MS 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

CONFIDENTIAL 07 22 42z [illegible] CITE DIRECTOR 06569

TO VIENTIANE [redacted]

REF: VIENTIANE 8130 [IN 98745] [illegible]

REGRET ADVISE IRVING C. DEVUONO NO LONGER AVAILABLE VIENTIANE ASSIGNMENT DUE MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION. ATTEMPTING IDENTIFY NEW CANDIDATE THIS POSITION. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Pers Renneman (phone)

Jun 10 [illegible]

CFE/TBL L. B. Dickin

JOSEPH W. SMITH
ACFE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

MARY T. BOULGER
CFE/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
LYNCH, Grayston

3. POSITION TITLE
PM Ops Off

4. GRADE
GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH
SOD

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.
4321

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)
☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER
SIGNATURE
HELEN D. INGRAHAM
ROOM NO. & BUILDING
3H 62
EXT.
4321

10. COMMENTS
Subject qualified for assignment to Laos on 17 April. However, subsequent to this qualification he was seen by Dr. Robinson on 24 May 68. SOD will appreciate (in addition to overseas planning eval) advice re Hqs assignments recognizing that such assignment, if available, may require flying. If OMS considers that Medical retirement is a possibility, would appreciate advice in this regard also.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION
Disqualified for O/S PCS

DATE
21 June 1968

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF
Rex Hart

FORM 10-60 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

CHECK-OUT FORM

Departing personnel will carry this form from office to office during the last few days at the Station in order to obtain complete assurance that all obligations and commitments have been satisfied. The form will be turned in to the Personnel Office when initialed and dated by responsible personnel. Only when this is complete may the individual depart from the Station.

****

PCS/#φ.

NAME: Grayston Lynch DEPARTURE DATE: CoB: 31 May 1968

ELEMENT	TOPIC	INITIALS OF PERSON APPROVING CLEARANCE	DATE
PERSONNEL	Fitness Report yes Service Agreement N/A		
FINANCE ✓	Accounts /Credit Union Loans:	Sto	6/4/68
	Payroll **	Sto	6/4/68
	Housing	Sto	6/4/68
LOG ✓	Transportation Equipment Return	JMG JMG	8/26/68
COVER ✓	Debriefing	[illegible]	3 June 68
TSB ✓	Documents Ed Weimer Photo	[illegible]	3 June 68
REGISTRY N/A	Top Secret Control		
SWITCHBOARD ✓	Telephone No.	FWZ	6/3/68
SECURITY ✓	Debriefing	JHD	6/3/68
MEDICAL N/A	Shot Record		
* ~~[illegible]~~	~~Debriefing & Equipment Return~~		
~~SI~~ IS BRANCH	SI Clearance Bill Burke	BB	3/6/68
DCOS/O BRANCH ✓	Branch Chief	[illegible]	
D/SUP ✓			
~~[illegible]~~			
~~[illegible]~~C			
COS ✓		[illegible]	[illegible]
PERSONNEL ✓	~~Insurance Card & Return form~~		

* OPS Officers of SO, FI, CI, and MA Branches only.

** T&A must be turned in to Payroll at check-out time.

Eyes Only
Personal Info

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

BY AT

DISSEM BY 7/1/21

ACTION ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE. C/WH6, C/SOD3, C/CCS2, C/CS25, D/DP, D/MS2

S E C R E T 282107Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2554

DIRECTOR

R
ZYBAT

28 MAY 68 IN 20289

REFS: A. JMWAVE 2454 (IN 14872)

B. DIRECTOR 01889

SOD action

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO REPORTED IN TO THE STATION TODAY. HE TELLS US HE HAS BEEN RELEASED BY AKULE AND ASSIGNED TO WOTACK.

2. HE TELLS US ALSO THAT WOTACK ADVISED HIM TO RETURN HERE, CHECK OUT OF THE STATION AND THEN TAKE TWO MONTHS SICK LEAVE. IF THIS IS WHAT IS DESIRED BY HQS, STATION WILLL PROCESS HIM OUT AND PUT HIM ON SICK LEAVE STATUS AS OF 3 JUNE.

3. PLEASE CONFIRM AND ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

May 29

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
☐ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER #

ACTION
SOD6 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE. VR. WH8, WH/COG 8, CCS 2
CSPS, OP2,

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 132154Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2326

ACTION

13 MAY 68 IN 09929

DIRECTOR

CHAPPIE PERS

REF DIRECTOR 92845

Crumpton-Lynch

DEPARTURE DEVUONO FOR DEST ORIENTATION HEADQUARTERS DELAYED BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING SON. WILL ADVISE ETD WHEN KNOWN.

SECRET

BT

Helen - Notify FE

SECRET

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
LYNCH, GRAYSTON L.

2. DATE OF BIRTH
14 Jan 23

3. GRADE
GS-14 equiv

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment)
DDP, FE, TBL

5. PRESENT POSITION
Ops Off/C/A/ Miami

6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION
6508

7. PROPOSED STATION
Savannakhet, Laos

8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade)
Career Agent/Ops Officer

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION
Nominal AID

10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE
6 May 63

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
0

12. COMMENTS
Request re-evaluation of current medical taken in Miami and results forwarded H.Q.

13. DATE OF REQUEST
12 Apr 63

14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
[illegible]
FE/PERS/TBL

15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING
5 E 22

16. EXTENSION
6508

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

MEDICALLY QUALIFIED FOR
PROPOSED OS PCS
REX HART

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

4 17 63

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(4)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

☒ RID COPY

TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ADVANCE COPY / INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

C/DDP, SOD 6, CCS 3, CSPS
OP 3

S E C R E T 261051Z APR 68 CITE VIENTIANE 8130

26 APR 68 IN 98745

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO UDORN

ADMIN PERS

REF DIRECTOR 88672 (NOT SENT UDORN)

1. IN VIEW FAMILY NOT ACCOMPANYING, STATION PLANS ASSIGN IRVING C. DEVUONO NORTH LAOS VICE SAVANNAKHET. STATION NEEDS MATURE, EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL SUCH AS DEVUONO IN N. LAOS AND ESPECIALLY IN CYMOMENTUM.

2. DEVUONO WILL BE BODY FOR BODY REPLACEMENT FOR WALLACE J. BERNHAGEN BUT WILL HAVE DIFFERENT, MORE RESPONSIBLE POSITION AS OFFICER IN CHARGE ALL OPS IN ONE [illegible] PROVINCE, PROBABLY SAM NEUA. REASSIGN IDEN B FOVS [illegible] SAVANNAKHET REPLACE MONROE A. HALLWASS.

3. UNLESS HQS HAS INFO WHICH PRECLUDES IULANCE [illegible] PLS PROCESS SUBJ IULANCE AND SAVE LAST NOM ENOUGH [illegible] FOR PERSON WITH [illegible] SPECIAL COVER PROBLEM.

SECRET

BT

Alias File

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG: JON L. MATTSON:JB
UNIT: FE/PERS/TBL
EXT: 6588
DATE: 18 APRIL 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 28 PER ______ # ______

CONF: FE8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR SOD6, CCS3, CSPS, OP2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

CONFIDENTIAL 19 21 20 Z

TO VIENTIANE CITE DIRECTOR 92881

ADMIN PERS CHAPPIE

REF: DIRECTOR 88672

Houghton Lynch

DUE TO PERSONAL MATTERS CONCERNING SETTLEMENT OF FAMILY IRVING C. DEVUONO NOW PROGRAMMED TO ARRIVE HQS 13 MAY FOR TWO WEEKS TDY WITH ESTIMATED ARRIVAL FIELD MID JUNE. WILL ADVISE FIRM ETA WHEN KNOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

CFE/TBL L. R. Deskin
SOD/PERS Jack Halpin (Phone)

WILLIAM E. NELSON
CFE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CONFIDENTIAL

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MARY T. BOULGER
CFE/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

4-00000

38.

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: [illegible] 1963

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 27

CONF: FE8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, WH8, WH/COG 8, SOD6, CCS3, CSPS, OP2

CONFIDENTIAL

19 20 10 Z

TO JMWAVE CITE DIRECTOR 92845

ADMIN PERS CHAPPIE

REF: JMWAVE 2080 (IN 93091)

PER REF REQUEST HQS CONCURS IN NEW REPORTING DATE OF 13 MAY.

END OF MESSAGE

CFE/TBL J. D. Haase (in draft)

SOD/PERS [illegible] (by phone)

WH/CONTR [illegible]

WILLIAM V. [illegible]
C/FE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CONFIDENTIAL

MARY [illegible]
CFE/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 27/ 21 PER ______

ACTION SCD 1   ☒ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR. WH 8, WH/COG 8, CCS 2, CSPS, OP 2

SECRET 172326Z APR 68 SITE JMWAVE 2080

17 APR 68 IN 93091

ACTION

DIRECTOR

CHAPPIE PERS

REF JMWAVE 1888 (IN 83242)

Frampton Lynch

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO HAS JUST PURCHASED A HOUSE FOR HIS FAMILY TO OCCUPY WHILE HE IS IN LAOS. SEVERAL PROBLEMS OF SETTLEMENT HAVE OCCURRED REQUIRING MORE TIME AND ATTENTION THAN ANTICIPATED.

2. DEVUONO REQUESTS PERMISSION TO TAKE ANNUAL LEAVE WITH A HQS EOD DATE OF 13 MAY. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

Action transferred
Mary Please transfer
Action to Dale Storgaard
FE/TBL/Pers X6533.
Make copy the cable +
send to Dale -

Alice Dele

SECRET

14-00000

7

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 35 PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

SOD 6

☒ RID COPY

INFO.
FILE VR FE 8

ACTION

64

ACTION CHANGE

SAIGON 1360
(STATION & NUMBER)

IN 93316-A
(IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM FE
(DIVISION)

TO SOD
(DIVISION)

BY William Baight FE
(NAME DIVISION AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH Helen Ingram SOD
(NAME DIVISION AND EXTENSION)

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: 7705
DATE: 11 APRIL 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	5
2	7
3	8
4	9
6	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 26 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR, WH 8, FE 8, FZ

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 12 00 15 Z

CITE DIRECTOR (elite) (reference number) (pica) 90842

TO JMWAVE

REF: JMWAVE 1982 (IN 89105)

1. REGRET THAT DEVUONO REACTED STRONGLY TO REQUEST OF HQS (CHAIRMAN BOARD OF REVIEW SHORTAGES AND LOSSES) FOR DISCUSSION IN SETTLEMENT DEVUONO LOSS OF OFFICIAL FUNDS.

2. CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF REVIEW SHORTAGES AND LOSSES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE DURING PERIOD 12-21 APRIL FOR DISCUSSION WITH DEVUONO OF RESOLUTION LOSS OF OFFICIAL FUNDS.

3. AGREE THIS MATTER MUST BE RESOLVED PRIOR DEVUONO PCS LAOS. AS HE IS NOW DUE IN HQS 24 APRIL, DEVUONO HAS APPOINTMENT WITH CHAIRMAN ON 25 APRIL AT 11:00 A.M.

END OF MESSAGE

2541
513 Key Bldg.

OP MR. STRICKLAND (TELECON)
C/WH/COG Paul E. Christ

George R. Rowan
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH/D

Elliott Ellert
ELLIOTT C. [illegible]
C/WH/SSS

Apr 17

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES (21)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

3

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG8 OF 2

S E C R E T 102156Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1982

10 Apr 68 IN 58105

DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 89799

1. CONTENTS OF REF DISCUSSED WITH DEVUONO WHO REACTED VERY STRONGLY. ALTHOUGH INFORMED THAT CABLE DID NOT REJECT CLAIM, DEVUONO CLEARLY ANTICIPATES THAT REJECTION WOULD COME FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS AT HEADQUARTERS. DEVUONO STATED THAT THE BOARD HAD ALL THE FACTS, THAT HE COULD ADD NOTHING TO WHAT HAD BEEN WRITTEN AND THAT "HQS DISCUSSIONS" WAS EUPHEMISM FOR REJECTION.

2. DEVUONO HAS SUFFERED LOSS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY BEFORE AND DOES NOT FEEL THAT HE WAS PROPERLY CONPENSATED. HE CITES MANY OF THE DIFFICULTIES THAT HE ENCOUNTERED DURING AND AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS WHEN MANY OFFICERS MADE EXTENSIVE PROMISES WITHOUT AUTHORITY OR ABILITY TO FOLLOW-THROUGH. AT PRESENT DEVUONO SCHEDULED TO GO TO LAOS LEAVING HIS FAMILY IN THE JMWAVE AREA. IT DESIRABLE THAT DECISION THIS CLAIM BE MADE SOONEST.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 1922 SECRET

3. JMWAVE SUGGESTS THAT HQS REQUEST DEVUONO TDY FOR DISCUSSION AND DEFINITIVE SOLUTION HIS CLAIM REQUESTS BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR LAOS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 35

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DISSEM BY 3 PER #

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO

FILE. VR. WH8, FE8, CCS3, OPS, cf 2 of 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ACTION

OPS

OS

REG

S E C R E T 052309Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1948

6 APR 68 IN 86248

DIRECTOR

REFS: A. UFGT 20371, 6 OCT 67

B. UFGS 9844, 7 SEPT 67

C. UFGT 20022, 9 AUG 67 Lynch

IRVING C. DEVUONO WILL BE DEPARTING JMWAVE IN MAY FOR AN OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT IN FE DIVISION. IT IS REQUESTED THAT ANSWERS TO REFERENCES A AND B BE SENT TO THE STATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

S E C R E T

BT

~~Ray~~

Gm 4/17/68

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 30 PER ______

ACTION
SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

SIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE. VR. WH 8, WH/COG 8, CCS 3, CSPS, FE 8, D/MS 2, OP 2

ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 021608Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1880

2 Apr 68 IN 83242

DIRECTOR

CHAPPIE PERS

REFS A. DIRECTOR 87647

B. UFGT 21553

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO WILL REPORT HQS 0900 24 APRIL. Ca-07

2. DEVUONO'S DEPENDENTS WILL NOT ACCOMPANY HIM TO LAOS.

3. MEDICAL EXAM ON DEVUONO FORWARDED TO HQS VIA REF B.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL TELEPOUCH

DISP. NO - FVSS-11752
DATE - 19 MARCH 1968
TO - CHIEF OF STATION, VIETNAM
INFO - NONE
FROM - ACTING CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION
SUBJ - NOMINATION OF CAREER AGENT - - IDEN
ACTION - SEE BELOW
REFS - NONE

HQS PLEASED TO NOMINATE IDEN, A GS-14 CAREER AGENT, FOR AN ASSIGNMENT TO VIETNAM. DOB 14 JUNE 1923. SUBJECT MARRIED WITH TWO SONS AGES 19 AND 14 AND A DAU AGE 22. SLIGHT FRENCH. SUBJECT JOINED WOFIRM IN FEB 1961, AFTER COMPLETING 21 YEARS OF SERVICE WITH THE US ARMY. HIS LAST ASSIGNMENT WHILE IN THE ARMY WAS A TWO YEAR TOUR OF DUTY IN LAOS AS A CAPT. IN THE SPECIAL FORCES. AFTER A BRIEF TRAINING AND ADMIN PROCESSING PERIOD IN HQS, HE WAS ASSIGNED PCS TO JMWAVE IN AUG 1961 AND HAS BEEN ASSIGNED THERE AS A PM SPECIAL OPS OFFICER SINCE THAT DATE. SUBJECT IS A PROFICIENT AND COMPETENT OPS OFFICER WHOSE PERFORMANCE DURING HIS ASSIGNMENT TO JMWAVE HAS CONTINUOUSLY SHOWN AN OUTSTANDING PROFICIENCY IN THE SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT OF INDIGENOUS AGENTS. HE MAINTAINED THE MORALE OF HIS 30 AGENTS ABD KEPT THEM AT A HIGH LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY BY A STRONG TRAINING SCHEDULE AND BY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING OPS IN THE FIELD OF RECONNAISSANCE, CACHING, DECEPTION AND SPECIAL OPS/INTEL COLLECTIONS OPS. SUBJECT IS A HARD WORKER, CAPABLE ADMINISTRATOR AND AN ABLE AGENT HANDLER WHO GETS ALONG WELL WITH HIS CONTEMPORARIES. HE IS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED AS A SECTION SUPERVISOR IN THE SPECIAL OPS BRANCH AND HAS TWO OFFICERS AND ONE SECRETARY

FE/PERS/VNO DEWALLACE X5459
VNO JCASWELL
CFE/PERS LCLARITY
C/WH/COG PHILLIPS
CCS/OCU EFITZGERALD

SOD/PERS JHALPIN
WH/CONTR MARTIN
CSPS/AGENT PANEL REDMOND

RELEASE ACFE------------

UNDER HIS SUPERVISION. SUBJECT HAS BEEN RATED STRONG IN THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES, AND WAS PROMOTED TO GS-14 EQUIV IN AUG 1967. AVAILABLE FOR EARLY JUNE 1968 ARRIVAL. DEFER TO STATION FOR DETERMINATION OF SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENT. COMPLETE BIO PROFILE FOLLOWS VIA POUCH. PLEASE ADVISE.

EWAN W. FASOLT

DISTRIBUTION

3 COS, VIETNAM VIA TP

-00000

CONFIDENTIAL TELEPOUCH S/C/A TO FVSS-11752 TO COS,

VIETNAM 29 MARCH 1968

IDEN - MR. GRAYSTON LYNCH

14-00000

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
[redacted]. [illegible]

2. DATE OF BIRTH
14 Jun [illegible]

3. GRADE
GS-14 equiv

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment)
DDP/FE/TBL

5. PRESENT POSITION
Ops Off/C/A/ Miami

6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION
6588

7. PROPOSED STATION
Savannkhet, Laos

8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade)
Career Agent/Ops Officer

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION
Nominal AID

10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE
4 May 68

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
0

12. COMMENTS
Request re-evaluation of current medical taken in Miami and results forwarded Hqs.

13. DATE OF REQUEST
12 Apr 68

14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
Dale R. Skovgaard
FE/PERS/TBL

15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING
5 E 22

16. EXTENSION
6588

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION
Approved by OMS-17 Apr 68

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION
Approved by OS/PSD 17 Apr 68

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION
Qualified for Proposed Assignment
Approved by CS/CS Agent Panel
Date) 15 [illegible] 1968

/S/
Secretary, CS/CS Agent Panel

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 Jun 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE Equiv GS-14	5. SD Career Agent
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
11 July 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Section Supervisor of one of the four sections within Special Operations Branch. Section consists of two officers and one secretary.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for the supervision of a 25 man indigenous commando group. Group consists of 2 operational intelligence collection teams, 4 infiltration team boat crews and an 8 man alert/contingency, commando team.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for the recruiting, training, administration and operational matters for 25 agents involved in infiltration/exfiltration operations into a denied area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administrative duties for Section operations to include financial support, supplies and equipment, clearances, cover, real estate and intra-Station coordination.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reporting to include operational, contact, quarterly/monthly reports and other required correspondence, preparation of operational plans and training schedules/syllabuses.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Uses Agents assigned him for collection of information on illegal activities of local Cuban refugees.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-61 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During most of the period reported on, Subject was concerned with administrative problems associated with the phase-out of the Station. Despite the consequent operational lull, Subject continued to maintain a satisfactory degree of morale in agents assigned him, worked up and implemented realistic training programs, and continued to develop excellent targets studies against the possibility of a policy change. In addition, important information collected locally by Subject on illegal activities of Cuban refugees was of great interest to other agencies offices in the area. Subject was the only Station source of such information which was acquired only because of Subject's ability to maintain rapport with agents, terminated during the period because of the cutback in infiltration operations.

It could also be noted as Subject finishes his long tour at this Station and prepares for his next assignment, that he is a thoroughly professional intelligence officer and is, in many ways, an outstanding one. Technically, he is an expert on infiltration tactics and, through his Special Forces experience, an expert on anti-guerrilla warfare as well. Just as important, is his ability to gain respect and rapport with foreign agents. He has an imaginative approach to operations, is resourceful in devising tactics, and determined in carrying out his assignments. He is a definite asset to WOFIRM.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 24 April 68	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ [illegible] (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal) [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 24 April 68	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Branch Chief, Special Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.) John Hannon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs with the Rating Officer's comments and overall evaluation of Subject's performance. Please see Subject's previous Fitness Reports for additional remarks on Subject's performance by this Reviewing Officer.

DATE 24 April 68	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station/ Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

ORIG: JON L. MATTSON:JB
UNIT: FE/PERS/TEL
EXT: 6582
DATE: 18 APRIL 1968

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: FE8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, SOD6, CCS3, CSPS, OP2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CONFIDENTIAL 19 21 20 Z CITE DIRECTOR 92884

TO VIENTIANE

ADMIN PERS CHAPPIE

REF: DIRECTOR 88672

Ca 4-97

DUE TO PERSONAL MATTERS CONCERNING SETTLEMENT OF FAMILY IRVING C. DEVUONO NOW PROGRAMMED TO ARRIVE HQS 13 MAY FOR TWO WEEKS TDY WITH ESTIMATED ARRIVAL FIELD MID JUNE. WILL ADVISE FIRM ETA WHEN KNOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

CFE/TEL [illegible]
SOD/PERS [illegible] (phone)

WILLIAM E. NELSON
CFE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MARY T. [illegible]
CFE/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: Dale Skovgaard:mas
UNIT: FE/PERS/TBL
EXT: 6588
DATE: 29 March 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 44

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 32 PER ____
CONF. FE 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR . WH/COG 8, WH 8, SOD 6, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2, D/MS 2, OF 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CONFIDENTIAL 1 21 44 Z

TO JMWAVE CITE DIRECTOR 87647

ADMIN PERS CHAPPIE

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR ASSIGNMENT SAVANNAKHET, LAOS IN MAY 68. SUBJECT SHOULD REPORT TO HQS SOON~~EST~~ AS FEASIBLE FOR APPROX 2 WEEKS TDY BRIEFINGS AND PROCESSING UNDER NOMINAL LNGROW COVER. WHEN PROCESSING COMPLETED DEVUONO CAN RETURN TO MIAMI, THEN DEPART PCS FOR LAOS. SUBJECT AND DEPENDENTS SHOULD TAKE MEDICALS SOONEST AND HAVE RESULTS FORWARDED HQS.

2. PLEASE ADVISE SUBJECT'S ARRIVAL HQS. SUGGEST USE JMPIGEON.

END OF MESSAGE

CFE/TBL L. R. Devlin
SOD/PERS JACK HALPIN (PHONE)
WH/~~PERS~~ CONTR. J.J. Martin
VNO HERB BURROWS (PHONE)
VNO/PERS Wallace

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

MARY T. BOULGER
CFE/PERS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

DATE: 22 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/OP
Benefits and Services Division

This is to advise you that Irving C. Devmono has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 1 November 1967. The Contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/SOD.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

ORIG: L. MATTSON:jd
UNIT: FE/PERS/TBL
EXT: 6588
DATE: 19 MARCH 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ADV: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR

(classification) 21 23 (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 84505

VIENTIANE

ADMIN PERS

IRVING C. DEVUONO, IDENTITY, IN WHOM STATION PREVIOUSLY HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST, MAY BE AVAILABLE FOR LAOS ASSIGNMENT IN MAY. ALSO UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR VIETNAM ASSIGNMENT. QUERY STATION'S CURRENT INTEREST IN DEVUONO FOR PM ASSIGNMENT. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

CFE/TBL

FE/PERS/VNO Mr. Bright (signed)

C/VNO Mr. Caswell (signed)

Joseph W. Smith
ACFE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Mar T. Boulger
CFE/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: [illegible] :JB
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] MARCH [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO .... BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ RID COPY

INFO:

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CONFIDENTIAL

CITE DIRECTOR 04506

VIENTIANE

ADMIN PERS

REF: DIRECTOR 94525

IDENTITY - MR. GRAYSTON LYNCH

END OF MESSAGE

JOSEPH W. SMITH
ADFE
RELEASING OFFICER

CFE/TRL

COORDINATING OFFICERS

MARY T. [illegible]
CFE/PERS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

☐ YES ☐ NO

TO FILE NO.

FILE NO.

RET. TO BRANCH ☐

☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, WH/COG 8, OP 2, CCS 3, CSPS, FE 8,

S E C R E T 061932Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1556

6 MAR 68 IN 85008

DIRECTOR

CHAPPIE PERS JMWALLOP

REF: DIRECTOR 83039

DEVUONO ARRIVING 1030 HOURS 7 MARCH VIA NAL FLT 100.

WILL CALL IDEN REF.

SECRET

SECRET

File - G. Lynch

CORAL GABLES FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
2501 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida 33134
Telephone 444-3541

VERIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT

TO Concord Research Corporation (261 SW 6th Street, Miami, Fla.)
P.O. Box 5046, Miami, Fla. 33101

RE Grayston L. Lynch

An application for credit has been made by your employee whose name is shown above.

We would appreciate your forwarding a confirmation of the applicant's employment for our confidential use. Our stamped, self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your reply.

Date Employed	Position Held	Annual Earnings	Permanent or Temporary
Jan 1962	Project Manager	$16,800 per year	Permanent

Martha R. [illegible]
fr Daniel S. Kolar
Vice-President

Note: Mr. Lynch said he will take full responsibility for above. He did not wish to use Charles S. Wilson Assoc. & Ace Cartography Co. Under these covers he was paid out of Hqs and filed covert returns only. He was assigned to Concord when everyone at the station was transferred over to some cover entitiy so that they could file income returns overtly only.

Above is for a conventional bank loan to purchase a home and is more or less routine.

3/18/68

OK

Backdated to show continuity of employment

M-520

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

SECRET

ORIG: B.WEYLAND:ps
UNIT: SOD/PERS
EXT: 4321
DATE: 4 MARCH 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 2K PER ______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RI
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: SOD6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR WH8, WH/COG-8, CCS 3
FE8, CSPS, OP2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 5 21 24 Z CITE DIRECTOR 0003

8 MAR 1968

TO JMWAVE

CHAPPIE PERS

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 1472 (IN61817)

Grayston Lynch

IRVING C. DEVUONO UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR VIETNAM ASSIGNMENT. REQUEST HE REPORT TO HQS TDY FOR DISCUSSIONS IN THIS CONNECTION 7 MARCH 68 AND CALL IDEN FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/PERS L. Palmer (Telcon)
WH/COG Ortman (Telecon)
FE/VNO Caswell (Telecon)
FE/VNO/PERS D. Wallace (Telecon)
SOD/GB Porter (Draft)

BW

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

RAYMOND J. GOODHART
C/SOD/SS

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: B.WEYLAND:ps
UNIT: SOD/PERS
EXT: 4321
DATE: 4 MARCH 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 38 PER _______ #
CONF: SOD6 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR WH8, WH/COG [illegible]
FE8, CSPS, 6P2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 5 21 24 Z CITE DIRECTOR 80040

6 MAR 1968

TO JMWAVE

CHAPPIE PERS

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 80039

IDENTITY - MRS. BETTY R. WEYLAND, EXT. 4321.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/PERS L. Palmer (Telecon)
WH/COG Ortman (Telecon)
FE/VNO Caswell (Telecon)
FE/VNO/PERS D. Wallace (Telecon)
SOD/GB Porter (Draft)

BRW

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

RAYMOND J. GOODHART
C/SOD/SS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

E 22

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 4

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, C/WH6, C/SOD3 C/OPSER, C/CCS 3
C/CSPS

SECRET 011645Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE [illegible]472 (MAR 6 IN 61171)

DIRECTOR

RYBAT WOTACK IUJEWEL JMWALLOP

REF [illegible] 28915

PER REF IRVING C. DEVUONO MADE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE REASSIGNMENT. DEVUONO HAS NOW BEEN WITHOUT ANY MEANINGFUL WORK FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS AND IS BEGINNING TO SHOW THE EFFECTS THIS INACTIVITY. SUBJECT REQUESTS AND JMWAVE STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EARLY REASSIGNMENT. PLEASE ADVISE. CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR HQS ANY CONSULTATION AT ANYTIME.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Grayston L. Lynch	DATE (from item 5-1) 12 Jan 68	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) John Hannon	DATE (from item 5-2) 12 Jan 68
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 22 Jan 68	DISPATCH NUMBER: UFGT-21043	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 14 June 28	2. SERVICE DESIGN D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Operations Officer (CA) GS-14	4. STATION OR BASE JMWAVE	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER JMOCEAN

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 1 June 61	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE Available at	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ any time. ----	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE ------------

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

3 dependents, ages 14, 18, 44

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

Regardless of timing of assignment perfer that family remain in Miami area until end of school year.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8).

a. Principal SO Case Officer since 1961 for Commando Group, which varied in strength from 24 to 42 agents, and maintenance of 9 infiltration craft.

b. Conceived, planned and conducted over 70 overwater penetration operations into denied areas by the Commando Group and infiltration craft; operations included sabotage, raids, infiltration and exfiltration of agents, ELINT, caching, deception and reconnaissance operations.

c. Case Officer for an average of 4 reporting assets on Intel/CI type missions in exile community.

10 MAR 1963

C/WH/COG
WH/EXO
SOD/Pres (WH)

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

a. CSR
b. Desk orientation
c. Training in language of area of assignment, if appropriate.

FORM 9-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

Prefer assignment as Special Operations Case Officer in operationally active area.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE)

2 BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE FE 3RD CHOICE Africa

1 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE FE 3RD CHOICE Africa

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Subject's service experience and performance at this Station make him an ideal choice for an assignment as requested in Para 11 above. He is an activist who will put his full energy into any appropriate assignment. Station recommends that he be given an assignment of his choice as soon as possible. He can be spared immediately.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

WH Division regrets to advise that it has been unable to locate a suitable assignment for Subject within the Division. Since Mr. Lynch is employed under the IU JEWEL project, it is recommended that he be referred to SOD for his next assignment.

DATE 20 Feb 68 TITLE C/WH/Pers SIGNATURE Henry L. Berthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ______ DATED: ______

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGT-20915
DATE - 26 DECEMBER 1967
TO - CHIEF, WHD
INFO - CHIEF, WH/COG - CHIEF, WOTACK - CHIEF, WOMOLD
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE
SUBJECT - RYBAT - AVAILABILITY CAREER AGENT /GS-14/ OF IRVING C. DEVUONO FOR REASSIGNMENT

DUE TO AN EXTENSIVE CUTBACK IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS AT JMWAVE STATION, DICTATED BY REASONS OF ECONOMY AS WELL AS A CHANGE IN OPERATIONAL POLICY, THE SERVICES OF IRVING C. DEVUONO ARE NO LONGER NEEDED AND HE MAY BE CONSIDERED AVAILABLE FOR REASSIGNMENT. RESUMES OF DEVUONO'S WOFIRM AND PRE-WOFIRM EXPERIENCE, PREFERENCE AS TO REASSIGNMENT AND SUPERVISOR'S COMMENTS ON DEVUONO'S PERFORMANCE FOLLOW.

WOFIRM EXPERIENCE

1. FOLLOWING RETIREMENT FROM THE U. S. ARMY IN 1960, DEVUONO ENTERED WOFIRM 1 FEBRUARY 1961 AS CONTRACT AGENT GS-11. HE WAS CONVERTED TO CAREER AGENT, GS-13 IN MID-1961 AND WAS PROMOTED TO GS-14 LEVEL IN LATE 1967.

2. DEVUONO'S FIRST ASSIGNMENT WITH WOFIRM WAS AS PM OFFICER IN THE BAY OF PIGS TASK FORCE. HE ENGAGED IN THE LAST STAGES OF PREPARATION FOR THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION AND ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE LANDING AND SUBSEQUENT RESCUE OPERATIONS. FOR HIS PERFORMANCE, HE WAS DECORATED BY THE THEN CHIEF, WOFIRM.

3. DEVUONO WAS THEN ASSIGNED TO THE JMWAVE STATION AND HAS FULFILLED THE FUNCTION OF PM OFFICER ASSIGNED AS CASE OFFICER FOR THE AMLILAC COMMANDO GROUP WHICH HAS VARIED IN STRENGTH OVER THE YEARS FROM 42 TO 24 TRAINED ASSETS. ONE OF DEVUONO'S MOST IMPORTANT TASKS HAS BEEN CONCEIVING, PLANNING AND BRIEFING OF THE AMLILAC TEAM ON JMWAVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS. [illegible] ASSIGNED

DEVUONO'S TASKS WERE CENTERED AROUND TRAINING AND RUNNING OPERATIONS INTO THE DENIED AREA. THESE OPERATIONS INCLUDED SABOTAGE, RAIDS, INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION OF SO TEAMS ON WOLENS MISSIONS, RECONNAISANCE, AND ELINT DECEPTION OPERATIONS. BECAUSE THE AM[illegible]ILAC GROUP HAS ALSO MANNED AND OPERATED THE INFILTRATION CRAFT ASSIGNED TO THE ACTIVITY, SUBJECT HAS ALSO BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERALL SUPERVISION OF MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONAL USE OF SOME 17 SMALL CRAFT, AS WELL AS INSURING THAT BOAT CREWS MAINTAINED THEIR PROFICIENCY.

PRE-WOFIRM EXPERIENCE

1. PRIOR TO JOINING WOFIRM, DEVUONO SERVED IN THE U. S. ARMY FOR 21 YEARS, RETIRING AS A CAPTAIN IN LATE 1960. THE LAST FIVE YEARS OF HIS ARMY CAREER WERE SPENT IN SPECIAL FORCES UNITS WHERE HE SERVED AS TEAM LEADER OF OPERATIONAL TEAMS AND AS AIR OPERATIONS AND TRAINING OFFICER. DEVUONO SERVED IN FRANCE AND GERMANY FOR OVER FOUR YEARS, IN PANAMA, PUERTO RICO AND CUBA, AND THE BETTER PART OF ONE YEAR IN LAOS. HE IS QUALIFIED IN ALL PHASES OF SPECIAL FORCES AND AIRBORNE OPERATIONS - SPECIAL NOTE SHOULD BE TAKEN OF HIS QUALIFICATIONS AS MASTER PARACHUTIST, RADIO OPERATOR, AND SPECIAL FORCES INSTRUCTOR.

ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE

1. SO CASE OFFICER IN ACTIVE OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
2. SO CASE OFFICER IN ACTIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. SO CASE OFFICER IN MIDDLE EAST OR AFRICA
4. INSTRUCTOR

SUPERVISOR'S COMMENTS

1. DEVUONO'S PERFORMANCE AT JMWAVE LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT HE IS EXTREMELY WELL QUALIFIED IN ALL PHASES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS WORK. DESPITE, OR PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF, HIS ELEVEN YEARS EXPERIENCE IN THIS FIELD, HE RETAINS DEDICATION AND ENTHUSIASM

FOR HIS WORK, AS REFLECTED BY HIS CONSTANT SEARCH TO IMPROVE MODUS OPERANDI. HIS TARGET STUDIES AND PREPARATION FOR OPERATION HAVE UNIFORMLY DEMONSTRATED HIS CONSCIENTIOUS APPROACH TO THE TASK AND A THOROUGHNESS THAT COMES FROM EXPERIENCE. HE IS A STRONG LEADER, AND HAS DEVELOPED EXCELLENT RAPPORT WITH HIS AGENT PERSONNEL, THUS GAINING THEIR ACCEPTANCE FOR THE HIGH LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE HE EXPECTS.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING, DEVUONO IS ALWAYS ALERT TO WOLENS REQUIREMENTS, BOTH AS A BY-PRODUCT AS WELL AS THE PRIME OBJECTIVE OF CERTAIN OPERATIONS HE HAS DIRECTED. HE HAS ALWAYS USED HIS AGENT PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY HIS PRINCIPAL AGENT, AS SOURCES OF WOLENS OPERATIONAL AND TARGET INFORMATION COLLECTED FROM THE EXILE COMMUNITY.

3. THE STATION FEELS THAT DEVUONO IS A HIGHLY VALUABLE ASSET TO OUR ORGANIZATION AND RECOMMENDS HIM WITHOUT QUALIFICATION FOR ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHIN HIS FIELD.

HAROLD V. KARABLY

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

WH/COG

WOTACK

WONOLD

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH UFGT-20915 PAGE THREE

1 - RYBAT CHRONO
1 - C/SSD
1 - DCOS/O
1 - C/SO CHRONO

ORIGINATING
C/SO HAROLD V. KARABLY
COORDINATING
DCOS/O FJI
RELEASING
COS FREDERICK J. [illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4160
DATE: 26 October 1967

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG 8, CR 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 27 17 53 Z CITE DIRECTOR 17233

TO JMWAVE

Car Agt.

TERM OF IRVING C. DEVUONO CONTRACT IN ERROR. STATION AUTHORIZED DELETE PHRASE "TWO YEARS" AND INSERT "INDEFINITE PERIOD".

END OF MESSAGE

CPD Mr. Brooks (telecoord)

SOD/Pers Mrs. Ingraham (telecoord)

C/CDS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 28 June 1967	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Irving C. Devuono Irving C. DEVUONO

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 28 June 1967	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Louis F. Thurland. Louis F. THURLAND
DATE 7/3/1967	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Hugh R. Dendy Hugh R. DENDY

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) DEVUOMO, Irving C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 June 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE Equiv GS-13	5. SD Career Agent
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Career Agent	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG	8. CURRENT STATION		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)			ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1967 - 10 July 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Section Supervisor of one of the four sections within Special Operations Branch. Section consists of two officers and one secretary.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for the supervision of a 25 man indigenous commando group. Group consists of 2 operational intelligence collection teams, 4 infiltration team boat crews and an 8 man alert/contingency commando team.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for the recruiting, training, administration and operational matters for the 25 agents involved in infiltration/exfiltration operations into a denied area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administrative duties for Section operations to include financial support, supplies and equipment, clearances, cover, real estate and intra-Station coordination.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reporting to include operational, contact, quarterly/monthly reports and other required correspondence, preparation of operational plans and training schedules/syllabuses.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper. During the period under review, Subject has continued to produce at his previous high level and he has planned and executed three intelligence collection operations against a denied area with the two teams under his supervision and direction. His leadership qualities have, to a large degree, enabled him to maintain his commando group morale at a high level under the difficult circumstances of enforced inactivity. Subject's indigenous agents respect him and are willing to follow his instructions to the letter. Subject's seemingly limitless resourcefulness, drive and initiative coupled with his demonstrated proficiency for this type of work mark him as one of the few persons known to the Rater who is ideally suited to this particular type of agent handling on a day-to-day, face-to-face basis.

During the reporting period Subject has committed his four infiltration boat teams on a total of seven operations and excellent results have been realized. He has conducted extensive testing of equipment and techniques in support of Station requirements and Headquarters requests. His reporting after these field tests has shown that his reporting ability has improved to such a degree to warrant a rating of strong in this duty.

He is cost and security conscious and has demonstrated his effectiveness in the use of personnel, equipment and operational funds. Subject has not had the benefit of formal language training and does not have a definitive language capability. In view of his long tenure of field assignments during his career with WOFACT, it is recommended he be given

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 June 1967	Irving C. DEVUONO signed in pseudo on fld. transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
6 Months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 June 1967	Deputy Chief, SO Branch	John F. Murnane signed in pseud on fld. trans.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject continues to show professional ability in handling the Commando Group. In addition he has been deeply involved in planning and executing intelligence gathering operations. He has adapted to this new field and is performing overall in an outstanding manner.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
July 3, 1967	Chief, Special Operations Branch	George D. Frenchon signed in pse. fld. trans.

SECRET

Continuation of Section C/Narrative Comments

serious consideration for formal training and orientation prior to his next assignment within WOFACT.

SECRET

Mr. Irving C. Davuono

Dear Mr. Davuono:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer of this organization, hereby contracts with you, as a ~~contract employee~~ Career Agent under the terms and conditions set forth below:

1. New Benefits. By virtue of your employment relationship under this agreement you are:

(a) Covered under the Civil Service Retirement Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. From the basic compensation paid you hereunder there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6-1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Social Security deductions required by virtue of your cover activities will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

(b) Covered under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization unless you execute a written waiver of such coverage. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder.

(c) Eligible for coverage under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Because of your eligibility under this Act (whether or not you choose to enroll), your coverage under the contract employees health program shall cease thirty-one (31) days after the effective date of this agreement.

2. Your previous contract with the United States Government, effective 1 June 1961, is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto.

3. All provisions of said previous contract not in conflict with this agreement are incorporated by reference into and made a part of this agreement.

(Continuity of Service)

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

4. This agreement is effective as of 1 Mar 1967 and shall continue thereafter for two (2) years unless sooner terminated as set forth in your previous contract. If this agreement becomes effective during an overseas assignment nothing contained herein shall be construed as extending that assignment beyond its originally contemplated duration or invalidating your entitlement to return travel expenses (if applicable) upon completion of that assignment.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Irving C. Devuono

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

7HL/PC
15 Aug 1967

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 40

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION 7

WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE WH8 2DD 6 CCS 3 CSPS CPSER 1 G 7

DDS 2 ADDP DDP SECUR 4

S E C R E T 111628Z CITE JMWAVE 8135

11 Jul 67 09257

Jm 7/11/67

DIRECTOR

REF: FHB 30-1 PARA 44

MR. GRAYSON LYNCH LOST $980.00 OF OFFICIAL FUNDS DURING TRAINING PHASE OF OPERATION EAGLE. COMPLETE REPORT WILL FOLLOW AFTER INVESTIGATION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SOD 7-750

30 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Grayston L. Lynch
Recommendation for Promotion to GS-14

1. I am forwarding with my endorsement the recommendation from JMWAVE that Mr. Grayston Lynch, GS-13, Step 6, be promoted to GS-14, Step 3.

2. Mr. Grayston L. Lynch was employed by the Agency in February 1961 and has served as a Career Agent with JMWAVE at the equivalent of grade GS-13 since June 1961. He has an excellent record with the Agency and was presented the Intelligence Star for meritorious duty and heroism under hazardous conditions performed in the Spring of 1961. During his entire tour with JMWAVE as a Paramilitary Operations Officer he has shown strong leadership qualities and has demonstrated outstanding proficiency in the supervision and management of indigenous agents.

3. Based on the foregoing, I strongly recommend that Mr. Lynch be promoted to GS-14.

Bruce B. Cheever
Chief,
Special Operations Division

Approved by CS/CS Agent Panel
(Date) 3 AUG 1967
Len Collins
Secretary, CS/CS Agent Panel

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

EYES ONLY

14-00000

RYBAT
SECRET

21 April 1967

MEMORANDUM

WSO- 3004

TO : Chief of Station

THRU : DCOS/S

FROM : Chief, Special Operations Branch

SUBJECT: Promotion Recommendation - Irving C. DEVUONO

Distribution:
1-COS
1-REG (Dummy)
H&D 1-C/SO Chrono (Dummy)
1-C/SO/Pers

1. Irving C. DEVUONO is 43 years of age. He joined WOFACT as a Contract Agent 10 February 1961 after completing 21 years of service with the U.S. Army. His last assignment while in the Army was a two-year tour of duty in Laos as a captain in the Special Forces. After a brief training and administrative processing period in Headquarters WOFACT, he was assigned to JMWAVE PCS on 27 August 1961 as a GS-13 Career Agent. He has been assigned to JMWAVE as a Paramilitary Special Operations Officer since that date.

2. DEVUONO is a proficient and competent Operations Officer whose performance during his six-year assignment to JMWAVE has continuously shown an outstanding proficiency in the supervision and management of indigenous agents. He has used his knowledge and experience, gathered over a 21 year period with the Army, to an outstanding degree. He has maintained the morale of his 30 agents and kept them at a high level of proficiency by a strong training schedule and by planning and implementing operations in the field of reconnaissance, caching, deception and Special Operations/intelligence collection operations. During the past eight months he has recruited, trained and operationally committed two intelligence collection teams into PBRUMEN. Subject is a hard worker, capable administrator and a very able agent handler. He has the ability to gain the respect of his agents by his general knowledge of tradecraft matters and his ability to plan operations. He is a personally rugged individual and has established good rapport with a wide variety of agent types. Subject gets along well with his contemporaries. He is presently assigned as a section supervisor in the Special Operations Branch and has two officers and one secretary under his supervision. He manages and supervises his section in an able manner.

Grayston Lynch

SECRET

RYBAT

3. Subject has been in grade since June 1961. His performance to date has been exceptionally proficient and he is recommended highly by the Special Operations Branch. It is the writer's opinion that Subject is fully capable of carrying out the assigned duties that are commensurate with a promotion to Grade GS-14.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

AT

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WOTACK

INFO.

Chief, WH Division

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT CHAPPIE DYVOUR PERS
Irving C. DEVUONO - Promotion Recommendation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFGS-9396, dated 7 April 1967

1. The referenced dispatch requested the Station's comments relative to Subject's performance and other qualifications for promotion consideration. The following is a recommendation for promotion for Subject to GS-14.

2. Subject is 43 years of age. He joined WOFACT as a Contract Agent 10 February 1961 after completing 21 years of service with the U. S. Army. His last assignment while in the Army was a two year tour of duty in Laos as a Captain in the Special Forces. After a brief training and administrative processing period in Headquarters, he was assigned PCS to JMWAVE on 27 August 1961 as a GS-13 Career Agent. He has been assigned to JMWAVE as a Paramilitary Special Operations Officer since that date.

3. Subject is a proficient and competent Operations Officer whose performance during his six-year assignment to JMWAVE has continuously shown an outstanding proficiency in the supervision and management of indigenous agents. He has used his knowledge and experience, gathered over a 21 year period with the Army, to an outstanding degree. He has maintained the morale of his 30 agents and kept them at a high level of proficiency by a strong training schedule and by planning and implementing operations in the field of reconnaissance, caching, deception and Special Operations/intelligence collection operations. During the past eight months he has recruited, trained and operationally committed two intelligence collection teams into PBRUMEN. Subject is a hard worker, capable administrator and a very able agent handler. He has the ability to gain the respect of his agents by his general knowledge of tradecraft matters and his ability to plan operations. He is a personally rugged individual and has established good rapport with

Distribution:
3 - C/WOTACK
\2 - C/WH Div

/continued/

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGT-[illegible]

DATE

MAY 16 1967

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER

74-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGT-19425

a wide variety of agent types. Subject gets along well with his contemporaries. He is presently assigned as a section supervisor in the Special Operations Branch and has two officers and one secretary under his supervision. He manages and supervises his section in an able manner.

4. Subject has been in grade since June 1961. His performance to date has been exceptionally proficient and he is highly recommended by JMWAVE. A current fitness report was submitted by UFGT-18424, dated 20 March 1967. It is the Station's opinion that Subject is fully capable of carrying out the assigned duties that are commensurate with a promotion to Grade GS-14.

Edmund K. GENNARO

SECRET

Mr. Irving C. Devuono

Dear Mr. Devuono:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1961, as amended.

Effective 13 August 1967, said contract, as amended, is further amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph three (3) entitled "Compensation and Taxes" to read as follows:

> "For your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at a basic salary of $16,152, the equivalent of a GS-14/3."

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

SECRET/RYBAT

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, WOTACK [illegible]

Chappie/Pers -- Irving C. DEVUONO

The WOTACK Personnel Committee recently completed a promotion review of IUJEWEL contract personnel at grade GS-13 equivalent, which included Irving C. DEVUONO. While no recommendation was made for DEVUONO during this review, WOTACK would appreciate your comments relative to his performance and other qualifications for promotion consideration.

Homer D. SHETTERLY

Distribution:
  2 - COS, JMWAVE

UFGS-9390

SECRET/RYBAT

7 APR 1967

Distribution: SOD/PERS J.R. Shields smr 4321
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/PERS
1 - C/SOD/GB
1 - C/SOD/SSWH/PERS
1 - SOD/PERS
1 - SOD/RI C/SOD/GB
1 - CHRONO
C/SOD/SS

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 1 December 1966	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Irving C. DEVUONO

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 1 December 1966	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Hugh R. DENDY Hugh R. Dendy
DATE 17 March 1967	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Frederick J. INGHURST Frederick J. Inghurst

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER [redacted] Career Agent

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) DEVERNO (First) Irving (Middle) C.
2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 June 23
3. SEX M
4. GRADE GS-13
5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Career Agent
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG
8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1966 - 31 December 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises 25 Field Agents and two WOFACT personnel engaged in Special Operations missions. The Agents comprise crews of 4 SO Infiltration Craft, 2 SO Infiltration Teams, and a Special Alert Team. These Agents perform overwater infiltration, exfiltration, and caching operations into a denied area (PBRUMEN).	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises the training of 25 Field Agents in operation of small craft and all related activities, PM operational techniques and tradecraft.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops operational plans and programs for specific SO Operations. Tests and evaluates new equipment and techniques for possible use by SO Branch or other Station activities.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administers all personnel and administrative matters for 25 Field Agents. Handles real estate, subsistence and logistics for 25 Field Agents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C
NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period of this report Subject has continued to show an outstanding proficiency in the supervision of the Field Agents under his control. He has continued to maintain the morale of his agents and to keep them at a high level of proficiency by a strong training schedule and by planning and executing outstanding operations in the field of reconnaissance, deception, and Special Operations Teams. During the last four months he has also had the responsibility of forming and training three additional Infiltration Craft Crews. Subject formed two Special Operations Infiltration/Exfiltration Teams and conducted one infil/exfil operation into PBRUMEN. Subject has remained active in testing new equipment and techniques for possible use by the Station. Subject has an excellent concept of Special Operations-PM techniques and acts as advisor to Chief of Special Operations Branch on PM type activities in Special Operations. Subject continues to provide reports on exile activities in all areas and is constantly pushing his Agents in this field. He is a hard worker and is a capable administrator and supervisor. He knows his job, does not need close supervision and has shown ability to branch out into other fields of WOFACT activities. He is cost and security conscious and has shown that he is effective in the use of personnel, space, equipment and operational funds.

SECTION D
CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 1 Dec. 1966

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ Irving C. DEVURIO (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 18 Months

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 1 December 1966

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, Special Operations Branch

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ George D. French, Jr. (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer has been closely associated with Subject during the entire period of his assignment to this Station and concurs in the Rating Officer's evaluation of Subject's handling of specific duties as well as the narrative comments. As a result of this close personal contact with Subject and observation of his day-to-day handling of operational situations, the Reviewing Officer considers Subject to be one of the most capable and well qualified senior special operations officers at this Station. Please see Subject's three previous Fitness Reports for additional comments on Subject's performance at this Station.

DATE: 17 March 1967

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Deputy Chief of Station

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ [illegible] (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1900-0-2043

1. Agency and organizational designation: DDP/WH

2. Payroll period

3. Block No.

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): DEVUONO, Irving C. (P) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary: ~~$14,050~~ $14,665

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks: I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by: jlv 6 July 1966

13. Audited by

XX Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date: 9 Oct 66

15. Date last equivalent increase: 11 Oct 64

16. Old salary rate: $14,665

17. New salary rate: $15,113

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

[illegible]

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

XXX No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 8000 1126-508

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: Career Agent

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) DEVUCHO	(First) Irving	(Middle) C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 Jun 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE Equiv. GS-13 / 5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 01 July 1965 - 31 Dec 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a 30-man Indigenous Commando Group.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains the training of the group at a proficient level in weapons, tactics, pre-strike rehearsals and related activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops operational concepts for infiltrations/exfiltrations, raids, caching and rescue operations and prepares operational plans for same.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Reporting to include operational, contact and monthly reports, and other required correspondence.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Case Officer for one FI Reporting Agent to include handling, reporting and guidance of Agent.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject has been under my supervision for approximately 6 months. During this period he has shown an outstanding proficiency in the supervision of his Commando Group. He is responsible for the logistical support, maintenance, planning and operations of the group and must also maintain their motivation and moral. As a result of the stand-down in PM activities at this Station, one of his major duties has been keeping his group motivated and happy. Subject has performed these tasks in a very professional manner; he has shown strong leadership qualities and a definite ability to adapt to difficult and frustrating changes in the operational climate. Subject has had the additional duty of handling an FI Agent for the Station. He has spent long hours on this activity and has shown that he is fully capable of broadening his scope of activities to other fields besides the supervision of a commando group. He is cost and security conscious and has shown that he is effective in the use of personnel, space, equipment and operational funds.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 17 February 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Irving C. DEVUONO (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 17 Feb. 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Special Operations Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Hugh R. DENDY (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attachment.

DATE 19 February 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Frederick J. INGHURST (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

Attachment

Section D., 3.

This is the third Fitness Report prepared on Subject since his assignment to this Station. The comments set forth on the two previous Fitness Reports by the Reviewing Officer and the Chief of Station are in the main still applicable. The Reviewing Officer has been most favorably impressed with Subject's performance in his present position. Subject has continued to perform his job in his usual competent, dependable and professional manner. The Reviewing Officer shares the Rating Officer's high opinion of Subject's performance and there is no doubt that Subject has contributed significantly to the Station's activities. Subject's over-all performance continues to warrant an evaluation of Strong.

Deputy Chief of Station

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, Items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, Items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Irving C. DEVUONO

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 6/14/65	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Stanley R. ZAMKA
DATE 6/23/65	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)*

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) DEVUONO, Irving C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 06-14-23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify): Career Agent				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 01 October 1963 - 30 June 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a 40 man Indigenous Commando Group	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops operational concepts for in/exfiltration, raids, caching and rescue operations and prepares operational plans for same.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Real Estate, Materiel, and Subsistence Support relating to the group.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to demonstrate a decided proficiency in the supervision of the type of unit for which he has responsibility. His men respect him and follow his orders readily. Subject officer is loyal and security minded. He is resourceful, acts with initiative and delegates responsibility. He is cost conscious. Subject is capable of handling larger units of indigenous commandos. He thinks clearly and is a versatile individual in the PM field.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	Irving C. DEVUONO /S/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
		Stanley R. ZAMKA

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attachment.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
JUN 23 1966	Deputy Chief of Station	Frederick J. [illegible]

SECRET

Attachment

Section D., 3.

The Reviewing Officer is familiar with Subject's performance based primarily on discussions with Subject and Subject's supervisor, detailed examination of Subject's operational plans, general observation of Subject during the past four years and a first hand knowledge of the results of operations conducted under Subject's guidance. Subject is a hard-working, dedicated officer who has a knack for getting things done in the operational field. Subject is exceptionally well qualified for the job he is doing. Additionally, Subject has a flair for getting along with the members of the Commando Group without losing objectivity. Subject's operational planning is sound and complete in all details. Subject is completely self-sufficient in operational command and agent relationship situations. Subject's performance at this Station clearly warrants an over-all evaluation of Strong.

SECRET

25 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Personnel Operations Division

FROM : Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT : Custody of the Honor Award presented to Mr. [redacted]

I. C. [illegible]

Due to security restrictions, the Honor and Merit Awards Board is acting as custodian of the Honor Award and related papers listed below: Intelligence Star
Intelligence Star Certificate

When security restrictions no longer prevail, the awardee may obtain his award by calling the Secretariat.

Jeanne L. Baker
JEANNE L. BAKER

Distribution:
Orig. - Subject's OPF
1 - Subject's Division Chief
1 - HMAB Case File

SECRET

SECRET

BRIEF FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Grayston L. Lynch, Captain, U. S. Army (retired), Career Agent,
DDP/CA Staff, GS-13 Equivalent
Recommended for Intelligence Star

Captain Lynch was employed by another government agency prior to the Cuban invasion. During the preparations for the Cuban invasion, Captain Lynch was granted Agent status with CIA with the understanding he would return to his parent agency at the completion of the project. The Board recommends that he be awarded the Intelligence Star for his activities under fire on 16-17 April 1961. He personally led the beach reconnaissance party on the night of 16 April and succeeded in placing beach markers in preparation for the landing. On 17 April, his ship was besieged by an air attack. He was successful in leading the convoy to a point off the beach, during which time gunfire from his vessel destroyed two of the attacking aircraft. During the period 22-24 April, Captain Lynch led a team of three back to the objective area and rescued nine survivors of the invasion forces.

SECRET

SO - Irving C. DEVTONO

MEMORANDUM

6 December 1965

WCH-1044

TO:
D/OPS
D/SUP
Chief, JMBAR
Chief, FI
Chief, SO
Chief, MA
Chief, CP
Chief, JMRIM
Chief, Air
Chief, Logistics
Chief, Security

Distribution:
1 - Each addressee
1 - Each Station participant
1 - REG
1 - WCH Chrono

FROM: Chief of Station

SUBJECT: Commendation for Performance in HUBBARD I/II

1. The Chief of Station wishes to commend all Station members and agents who were involved in the HUBBARD I/II operation. The successful exfiltration of the valuable agents AMKHAN-2 and AMKHAN-3 plus twelve members of their families on 4 - 5 December was indeed a very impressive performance in response to an urgent requirement. All who participated in the HUBBARD I/II operation can take great pride in the fact that despite considerable difficulties it was possible to carry out the exfiltration of a sizeable group of persons in a swift and flawless manner.

2. Chief, SO: Please extend to the commander of the AMLILAC group and to the personnel who participated in the HUBBARD/I and/or the HUBBARD/II actions the congratulations and the appreciation of "The Chief" concerning their fine performances.

3. Chief, MA: Please extend to the ship captains and the commanders of the operational vessels and to all of the crew members who participated in the HUBBARD/I and/or the HUBBARD/II actions the congratulations and appreciation of "The Chief" concerning their fine performances.

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-552642

1. Agency and organizational designations DDP/SAS	2. Payroll period	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) DEVUONO, Irving C. (P) CAREER AGENT	6. Grade and salary $12,880		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks: I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.	11. Appropriation(s)	12. Prepared by jvl 24 June 1964 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase ____________

14. Effective date 11Oct64	15. Date last equivalent increase 14 Oct 62	16. Old salary rate 13,555 ~~$12,880~~	17. New salary rate 13,755 $13,265	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better. ____________ (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods).
Period(s):
☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP. ____________

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.
____________ Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 8000 1126-508

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

LEVUONO

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) [redacted]	(First) [redacted]	(Middle) [redacted]	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 451-18-7989

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED Fayetteville, N.C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Victoria, Texas	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE 8301 sw 155 Ter, Miami, Fla

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Houston, Texas	DATE OF MARRIAGE 26 Apr 45
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Janette K Lynch	8301 SW 155 Ter, Miami, Fla	235-4512	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**DATE OF BIRTH**
Sharon Ann Lynch	Same as above	F	3 Sep 46
Jeffrey Lee Lynch	" " "	M	4 Apr 49
Robert Thomas Lynch	" " "	M	11 Jan 54
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
Henry Thomas Lynch	Deceased		
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
Ruby Lynch	Rt 1, Box 46-A Victoria, Texas		

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
Wife only

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) ~~Mrs Janetta K Lynch~~ Lynch, Herbert A.	RELATIONSHIP ~~Wife~~ brother
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) ~~8300 SW 155 Ter, Miami, Fla~~ Rt 1, Box 46-A, Victoria, Tex	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER ~~235-4512~~
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE None	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) ~~Yes~~	YES	☐
	NO	☒
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) wife	YES	☐
	NO	☒
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	☒
	NO	☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(41)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Perrine-Cutler Ridge Bank, Perrine, Fla - Grayston L and Janette K Lynch

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

With wife

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" who possess the power of attorney?)*

Wife

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Miami, Fla	6 Apr 64	

CONFIDENTIAL

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.:

FROM: Office of Finance

SUBJECT: Irving G. DEVUONO - 1962 Income Tax Liability

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Reference is made to Subject's 1962 covert income tax return which reflects an outstanding tax liability of $2,364.89. To date no payment has been received. The return was filed with the Covert Unit of Internal Revenue Service without payment. Headquarters has been requested by IRS to furnish information as to when payment of the tax liability can be expected.

2. In order to preclude the necessity of either revealing Subject's true name and address to IRS or accepting service of a levy, it is requested that DEVUONO be contacted and requested to forward his remittance for the tax liability to Headquarters as soon as possible. He should be reminded that checks in payment of covert tax liabilities are to be made out to a fictitious payee. An early reply is requested.

Dora B. Pernecky
DORA B. PERNECKY

Distribution:
3 - JMWAVE

JM/III

Jim

HARVEY SHAW

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGS - 5426	4 DEC 1963
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

1 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, PERSONNEL

SUBJECT : Insurance for Irving C. DEVUONO

1. Irving C. DEVUONO, a career agent with PM, is interested in acquiring the term insurance which KUBARK has available for persons in DEVUONO's category.

2. Please forward the necessary applications and information on this subject to Aubrey K. PAUKERT/PM for passage to DEVUONO.

SZamka
Stanley R. ZAMKA
Chief, PM

PAUKERT/hko/211

Distribution:
  Orig - Addressee
    1 - Typing chrono
    1 - DEVUONO file.

SECRET

LIFE INSURANCE APPLICATION
(CONTRACT LIFE)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (P) [illegible]
First M. Last

POLICY NO.
EFFECTIVE DATE
TOTAL PREMIUM PAID

Date of Birth [illegible]	Monthly Premium [illegible]	Annual Salary [illegible]	Insurance Class

FOR HQ DESK USE
COMPONENT
ROOM NO.
BLDG.
EXT.

(CHECK APPROPRIATE BLOCK)

Male ☒ Female ☐

Full-time employee
Yes ☒ No ☐

NAME OF BENEFICIARY (T) [illegible]
First and Middle Only

RELATIONSHIP [illegible]

DATE SIGNED [illegible]
(P) SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

(Date)

TO :

SUBJECT: Authority to Make Payroll Deductions

I hereby authorize you to deduct the sum of [illegible] per pay period from my salary starting with the pay period beginning [illegible].
These deductions are to continue until terminated by me in writing.

(P) Signature

S-E-C-R-E-T

GRAYSTON L. LYNCH OR
JANETTE K. LYNCH

No.

19 [illegible]
63-660
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF $ [illegible]

DOLLARS

PERRINE-CUTLER RIDGE BANK
PERRINE, FLORIDA

⑆0631⑉0660⑆ 22-309-6

HEALTH STATEMENT

THE EMPLOYEE IS TO COMPLETE SECTION I. (AND/OR SECTION I, IF REQUESTING INSURANCE FOR DEPENDENTS)

HOSPITALIZATION AND SURGICAL GROUP POLICY

SECTION I. TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE IF REQUESTING INSURANCE ON HIMSELF

1. Male ☒ Female ☐ Single ☐ Married ☒ Birthdate [illegible] Height [illegible] Weight [illegible]

2. Have you any deformities or impairments of health? If yes, give complete details

3. Have you now, or ever had any of the following? (Answer "yes" or "no" to each.)

HEART OR CIRCULATORY DISEASE	EPILEPSY	DISEASE OR IMPAIRMENT OF EYE	MENTAL DISORDER	KIDNEY DISEASE	STOMACH OR INTESTINAL DISORDER
no	no	no	no	no	no
TUBERCULOSIS OR RESPIRATORY DISEASE	**DIABETES**	**DISEASE OR IMPAIRMENT OF EAR**	**NERVOUS BREAKDOWN**	**HERNIA**	**CANCER**
no	no	no	no	no	no

4. If answer to any of above questions is "yes," give complete details including specific ailment, dates and duration of each illness

5. Within the last five years, have you consulted a doctor or been a patient at a clinic or hospital for any condition other than those mentioned above. List all conditions giving medical diagnosis, dates and duration of each condition (treatment received, if applicable); if none, so state

[illegible]

6. Have you ever had or been advised to have any surgical operation? Give nature and date of each operation with statement as to whether or not recovery was complete; if none, so state

[illegible]

[illegible]

3 [illegible]

[illegible]

7. Has any insurance company or association refused to grant insurance on your life or offered a modified policy? Give name of company and date NO

8. Are you in good health? yes if not, explain

9. If female, are you pregnant? ________ if "yes," how far advanced?

I hereby declare that all statements and answers given above are true and complete. Furthermore, it is understood the Association reserves the right to request an examination by a physician selected by them.

Employee's Signature [illegible] Date [illegible]

FORM 8-69 1677

141

SECRET

3 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/B&F

SUBJECT : Federal Income Taxes
Irving G. DEVUONO (P), Contract Employee

1. During his recent visit to Headquarters, DEVUONO raised questions concerning his Federal income tax returns and interest allegedly due for income received during calendar year 1962. He stated he had filed covert returns for 1961 and 1963 and that he would file a covert return for 1964. He had previously been advised that he owed interest on his 1962 income in the amount of $165.54. He stated that this was not correct as the verbal instructions given him by Mr. Robert Bladergroen of OGC were followed by him when he filed his 1962 covert return. According to DEVUONO, Bladergroen discussed tax matters with him during a visit to JMWAVE sometime in April 1963.

2. As I was not previously acquainted with the facts in DEVUONO's case, I did not attempt to judge it nor to promise him that it could be resolved to his satisfaction. I did, however, inform him we would investigate the matter and would officially advise the Station of the decision. Therefore, please initiate appropriate action with the covert tax people and the Office of General Counsel (Mr. Bladergroen) to set this matter at rest. Informally, Bladergroen informs me that he recalls his conversations with DEVUONO and that DEVUONO either did not understand his instructions or chose to disregard them. I believe Mrs. O'Leary and at least one other member of her staff with whom DEVUONO consulted during his visit can assist in resolving this matter. I do not find any correspondence in his Personnel Folder other than a copy of a cable, IN 57726, dated 12 June 1963, bearing on this Subject.

Charles J. Francis
DC/WH/SS

SECRET

"I hereby certify that this is an accurate summary of my (our) income tax return for the year 1962 filed with the District Director in Jacksonville, Fla., that the tax due shown thereon was remitted in full by me, and that any future adjustments, payments or refunds in relation to the return will be reported promptly by me to Headquarters."

Signature

MAY 20 8 23 PM '64

S E C R E T 202146Z

WAVE CITE DIR 22598

TYPIC PERS

REF DIR 96991 / Grayston Lynch

IRVING C. DEVUONO AWARD CEREMONY SCHEDULED FOR 12 NOON 27 MAY. PLS CONFIRM HIS AVAILABILITY BY CABLE.

S E C R E T

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1- EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

per

1-Chrono
✓ 1-201

WKP?

Lynch Grayston Leroy 451-18-7989

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED Fayetteville, N.C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If assigned abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Victoria, Texas	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE 8301 sw 155 Ter, Miami, Fla

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

SINGLE ☐ X MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Houston, Texas	DATE OF MARRIAGE 26 Apr 45
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Janette K Lynch	8301 SW 155 Ter, Miami, Fla	235-4512	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Sharon Ann Lynch	Same as above	F	3 Sep 46
Jeffrey Lee Lynch	" " "	M	4 Apr 49
Robert Thomas Lynch	" " "	M	11 Jan 54
NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
Henry Thomas Lynch	Deceased		
NAME OF MOTHER (or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
Ruby Lynch	Rt 1, Box 46-A Victoria, Texas		

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY?
Wife only

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) ~~Mrs Janette K Lynch~~ LYNCH, HERBERT A.	RELATIONSHIP ~~Wife~~ brother
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) ~~8301 SW 155 Ter, Miami, Fla~~ Rt 1, Box 46 A, Victoria, TEXAS	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER ~~235-4512~~
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE None	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) ~~None~~	YES	~~X~~
	NO	X
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) WIFE	YES	
	NO	~~X~~ X
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 5.)	YES	X
	NO	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

SECRET

PART III

NOTE: DETACH THIS PORTION OF FORM AND DISTRIBUTE SEPARATELY

CITIZENSHIP
U.S.A.

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
451-18-7989

H.A.

5505 Camberly Ave., Springfield, Va.

SECRET

3134

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

rience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and compli- -s the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Perrine-Cutler Ridge Bank,Perrine,Fla - Grayston L and Janette K Lynch

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

With wife

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

Wife

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

NED AT Miami,Fla	DATE 6 Apr 64	SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : AL HOESER:ear
UNIT : SAS/PERSONNEL ☐ INDEX
EXT : 6576 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 24 JANUARY 1964 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62
ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

24 JAN 64 22 33 5z

TO : JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS-8

INFO : DDP, CI/P-2, VR

DEFERRED SIG CEN
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 96991

TYPIC PERS

REF: WAVE 0484 (IN 98432)

PRESENTATION CEREMONY FOR DEVUONO BEING SCHEDULED FOR MAY 64. WILL ADVISE FIRM DATE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS Comment: Advise of 28 or 29 Jan. 64 acceptable for DEVUONO presentation.

Mr. Baker is scheduling subject for presentation sometime after 15 May 64

mailed
Sec 3665

Orville C. Dawson

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

ORVILLE C. DAWSON
C/SAS/PERSONNEL

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 24-25

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO : DOP, OP 2, VR

IN 98423

S E C R E T 142250Z

14 JAN 64 IN 98423

DIR CITE WAVE 3464

TYPIC PERSONNEL

REF A UFGS 3125

B UFGT 5336

SUGGEST IRVING C. DEVUONO BE PRESENTED HIS INTELLIGENCE STAR 28 OR 29 JAN. PLS CABLE IF THIS ACCEPTABLE OR DETERMINE APPROPRIATE DATE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

[illegible]

FROM: Recorder, HMAB Room 7 P 03, Hdqrs.	EXTENSION 4441	NO.	DATE 23 January 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. Samuel Halpern EXO/SAS Rm. GG 27 08, HQ	24 Jan 64		L	Subject should be given this prior to the presentation ceremony which were trying to arrange for 28 Jan 64. Bob Gaynor
2. SAS/Personnel	24 Jan 64		JAH	See DIR-96771. Ceremony rescheduled for May 64 per [illegible] T. Porembly X2234 [illegible] 24 Jan 64 JAH
3. File/				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :Lynch, Grayston L. DATE: 22 [illegible] 1964

Thru :Recorder, Honor and Merit Awards Board

FROM :Security Advisor, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT:Lynch, Grayston L. - Personnel Matter
(Award Recommendation)

1. The Office of Security has been advised that you will be a recipient of an honor award in the Headquarters Building in the near future. This memorandum is designed to alert you to the security implications of receiving this award. As must be obvious to you, your role with the organization has been one involving very sensitive operations and projects calling for extraordinary security precautions. You will be expected to continue this kind of exacting security orientation in all dealings you may have with the outside world regarding this award.

2. First, the organization's security policies require that the number of persons on the outside learning of an award be limited. In your case, such persons should be limited to those in your immediate family.

3. Secondly, you are asked to scrupulously avoid releasing or cooperating in the release of any publicity regarding the award to public information media such as radio, television or the newspapers. This award should never be mentioned in the presence of any reporter or representative of any public information media.

4. After receiving your award you will be asked to return it together with any accompanying papers to the Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, for safekeeping. When the cover and security factors requiring secrecy about your connection with CIA are no longer operative these award materials will be returned to you.

SECRET

5. Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to the undersigned at Room 4E42, Headquarters Building, extension 5961.

William R. Kotapish

William R. Kotapish

S E C R E T

7 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, COVER

SUBJECT : Alias Documentation for Irving C. DEVUONO (P)

REFERENCES: : Memo to C/COVER dated 23 May 1963
Memo to C/PM dated 18 July 1963

1. Irving C. DEVUONO has used the alias George Lee in the local area. The circumstances which required the use of this alias is as follows:

DEVUONO, accompanied by the Real Estate Officer from the Cover Branch, under the alias Gregory Williams, went to ISLAMORADA in April 1963 to determine the suitability of S/H 177 for the AMLILAC Group. It was not anticipated at that time that DEVUONO would be required to use his name with the owner, Eddie Sweeting. However, arrangements for the S/H were made on the spot and the name George Lee given as the occupant of the house.

2. If possible it is requested that alias documentation be established in the name of George Lee. This is not an absolute requirement, however, and a registered alias could be assigned.

Stanley R. ZAMKA
Chief, PM

PAUKERT/hko/211

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - Typing chrono
1 - DEVUONO file

S E C R E T

SECRET

27 August 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

VIA : DCOS/OS

FROM : Chief, Finance, JMWAVE

SUBJECT : Tax Problem of Irving G. DEVUONO

While on TDY at Headquarters, the writer conferred with the Head of the Covert Tax Unit on the subject problem. The writer was informed that the Covert Tax Unit is not able to accept and forward a Covert return for the year 1962 for the subject individual since a Form 1099 had been issued. It was further stated that the Internal Revenue Service, while performing a service last year (tax year 1961) of this nature, would not under any circumstances permit a person and/or persons receiving a Form 1099 or W-2 to file a Covert Return for such reported income. Therefore, it appears all avenues of escape for Irving G. DEVUONO have been closed and he should file an amended return for Tax Year 1962 to include the KUBARK income reported on Form 1099.

Humphrey O. Timanus
Chief, Finance, JMWAVE

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

12-62

ORIG : D. J. TACCONELLI:ls
UNIT : SAS/FINANCE
EXT : 7763
DATE : 3 JUL 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SAS 8
INFO : FD, DDP, CCS 2, RF

4 JUL 63 00 37z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 52022

TYPIC FINAN

REF: A. UFGS 3110
B. WAVE 9623*

1. AMENDED 313A OF AUG 61 STATED IRVING G. DEVUONO SIGNED ROUGH DRAFT AND THAT HE PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE PROPER REPORTING AND PAYING FEDERAL INCOME AND SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. AMENDED 313A APPROVED 1 JULY 63 STATED SUBJ WILL RECEIVE COVERT EARNINGS STATEMENT FOR 1963 KUBARK EARNINGS.

2. STATION WAS NOTIFIED BY REF A SUBJECT COULD NOT FILE 1962 COVERT TAX RETURN AND THAT HQS UNABLE INTERCEDE IN CASES WHERE INDIVIDUALS RECEIVED 1099'S WITHOUT IDENTIFYING TAXPAYER'S TRUE NAME WITH THE COVERT IDENTITY AND KUBARK. OTHER INDIVIDUALS PAID BY COVER MECHANISM WOULD ALSO BE IDENTIFIED. DEVUONO KNEW NO TAXES WERE WITHHELD AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY WHETHER FILING OVERTLY OR COVERTLY. UNFORTUNATELY NO ALTERNATIVE BUT FILE AMENDED 1962 OVERT RETURN IRS DIRECTLY AND PAY TAXES DUE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: (IN 57726)

SAS COMMENT: *WAVE querried if DEVUONO personally signed form 313A. DEVUONO stated he had been informed he would file covert return on KUBARK income and to prepare for tax payment accordingly.

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

C/FD/C&TAB/T&AS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

HELEN A. VIGNESS
CHIEF, SAS/FINANCE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

3-17

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Co

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO : FD 2, DDP, OP 2, S/C 2

IN57726 OCD

SECRET 112344Z

DIR CITE WAVE 9623

TYPIC FINANCE

12 JUN 1963

REF UFGS 3110

1. PLS ADVISE IF DEVUONO PERSONALLY SIGNED FORM 313A. SUBJECT STATES HE HAD BEEN INFORMED HE WOULD FILE COVERT RETURN ON KUBARK INCOME AND TO PREPARE FOR TAX PAYMENT ACCORDINGLY. FOR THIS REASON HE DID NOT FILE OVERT TAX ESTIMATES AND THUS FACES PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO DO SO. STA SEES NO NEED FOR FORM 1099 IN DEVUONO CASE AS HE HAS RETIREMENT INCOME. IN ADDITION WILSON ASSOCIATES IS ONLY NOMINAL COVER FOR ADMIN AND OPS USE AND THIS COVER DOES NOT PAY EMPLOYER'S SHARE OF SOCIAL SECURITY TAX. REALIZE PROBLEMS INHERENT PARA 3 REF BUT DUE KUBARK ADVICE TO DEVUONO RE COVERT RETURN REQUEST HDQS INTERCEDE WITH REVENUE SERVICE THIS TIME AND HENCEFORTH NOT ISSUE 1099.

lost one in draft for

2. ADVISE SOONEST.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

30 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Irving C. DEVUONO

SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction

1. This memorandum is to confirm your appointment as Chief, AMLILAC and to provide you with instructions for the direction of that group.

2. The mission is to adapt current assets into a force which can enter the target area by sea or air to conduct reconnaissance, caching, sabotage, raids and/or guerrilla warfare support operations.

3. The organizational concept to be followed is that of small teams which can function independently or in combination and entirely under indigenous leadership. All personnel should be fully qualified in basic paramilitary skills and should be physically and mentally prepared to mount operations on short notice. Airborne capabilities will be developed when facilities necessary for training become available.

4. The standards for members of the group should be constantly upgraded by culling of members who become marginal or who do not develop as expected. Recruitment of promising new members will be dependent on the needs of the station based on policy directives. Priority should be given to sabotage training to permit the mounting of a sabotage program at the earliest possible moment. Coincidentally, planning and thought should be given to the topics of cover, recruitment, training and establishment of those facilities necessary for a rapid expansion of the group if a full scale operational program should be developed. Also, the force should be identified to the primary exile authority as a non political and independent body which is unilaterally engaged in the overthrow of the existing regime. The tempo of training should be maintained at a level sufficient to assure the continual proficiency of the group in all categories of activity in readiness for the order to mount a full scale program with all teams participating simultaneously. Readiness will not itself be justification for operations.

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET

5. Your staff must be organized to permit close contact with team members so as to assure control over them and at the same time provide full security for the existence of your organization. It must also provide security for the planning of all activities in such a way as to assure the compartmentation of staff and team personnel associated with the different categories of operational activity.

6. The following guide lines are provided for the organization:

a. The size and military nature of the force require that the highest possible standard of security be maintained for all personnel and activities. Specifically, the scope should not be comprehended by team members, and compartmentation by teams should be practiced to the maximum.

b. Should, if possible, be composed of men who have no dependents.

7. The following tasks should be undertaken immediately:

a. Continue development of cover for all personnel, their absences, injuries, deaths.

b. Continue the development of concepts to provide for training, during active and inactive periods, transportation to training and staging areas and safehouse utilization.

c. Continue to devise procedures for handling and storage of classified material, arms and equipment.

d. Establish standards for recruitment, discipline, chain of command and security.

Stanley R. Zamka
STANLEY R. ZAMKA
Chief, PM

APPROVED:

Andrew K Reuteman
Chief of Station

SECRET

SECRET

11 April 1963

To: Chief/PM

From: Chief/Finance

Subject: 1962 Income Tax for Irving C. DEVUONO

1. The subject person has submitted the attached memorandum which outlines his objection to paying the self-employment social security tax under the proviso of being self employed. Unfortunately the subject's contract contains the following proviso:

> Paragraph 8(d): From the salary paid pursuant to this contract these shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6½%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. When circumstances of your cover warrant or require contributions to social security such contributions will be at your expense and you will not be reimbursed therefor by the Government.

Humphrey O. Timmanus
Chief/Finance - JMWAVE

9 April 63

TO : COS

FROM : IRVING C DEVUONO

SUBJECT : INCOME TAX

I was sent to this Station in Aug 61 and was given a cover breifing at Headquarters before I left in which I was told that since I was paying into a retirement fund of this organization that they would no longer withold Social Security from my pay. In late 61 I was notified that they wre refunding to me all money withheld for incme tax up to that time and that I would have to file on the inside and to start withholding my own taxes. This was done and I was told by this station to file the covert return with them and to file an overt return on my Army retirement pay. This I did for the year 1961. I was also told by BOB the tax man to file this years return the same way. I made my own tax withholding during 1962 and have the money to cover the taxes,but now I am told that because someone made a mistake and mailed both me and the IRS a form 1099 on my 1962 pay that now I must file an overt return. This now will cause me to pay $225.00 selfemployment tax And ~~[illegible]~~ will make me liable to a 6% penalty for not filing an estimated return quarterly. Since I would not have had to pay these extra taxes if the mistake in mailing the form 1099 had not been made and since I did everything in this matter that the station wanted me to do I do not feel that this extra cost should be [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ by me. I feel this is penalizing me for someone elses mistake. I ~~ask~~ request that this matter be reconsidered and that I be informed as to how I should file my 1962 tax return and that I also be told how this years withholding is to be done.

S E C R E T

18 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Transfer of Irving C. DEVUONO to the AMLILAC Group

1. On 15 March 1963 a meeting was held at Ace Cartography in order to advise both Irving G. CADICK and Irving C. DEVUONO as to the latters transfer from the AMTABBY group to the AMLILAC group. In attendance at this meeting were Stanley R. ZAMKA, CADICK, DEVUONO and the writer.

2. ZAMKA initiated the discussion by stating that the 15th would be DEVUONO's last day with CUSOG and that he should take care of any accounts outstanding and complete processing out of CUSOG. DEVUONO was advised he would be contacted by WALTUCK later in the day in reference to his next assignment.

3. CADICK was then advised he should plan a caching operation during the month of April. The exact location, weight and contents of the cache would be passed to him the afternoon of the 15th. CADICK requested that a boat, the Squall King, with which a great deal of training had been accomplished be permitted to go on this caching operation. ZAMKA agreed that security wise the use of an organic AMTABBY boat might be worthwhile. CADICK will include the use of the Squall King in the operational plan which he will submit this coming week.

4. This meeting broke up at 1130 hours, 15 March 1963.

Philip S. Waltuck

Philip S. WALTUCK
PM Case Officer

Distribution:
Orig - C/PM
1 - Typing chrono
1 - CUSOG chrono

S E C R E T

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmittal to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* IRVING G. DEVUONO

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 20/11/63	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* STANLEY R. ZAMKA
DATE 20 November 1963	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Andrew K. REUTEMAN:

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 6-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) DEVUOHO (First) Irving (Middle) O.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 June 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 5. SD Contract
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Career Agent		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
X	SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 May 1962 to 30 September 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a 30-man Commando Group and supervises the Group's implementation of operations which includes pre-strike rehearsals and briefings and organization of logistical support.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains the training of the Group at a proficient level in all weapons, tactics, and related PM activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops operational concepts for raids and caching operations and prepares operational plans and operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises Real Estate, Materiel, and Subsistence Support relating to the Group.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C
NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has shown a decided proficiency in the supervision of the type of unit for which he has responsibility. His men respect him and follow his orders readily. He is resourceful, acts with initiative, and delegates responsibility. In his field he thinks clearly and is decisive and versatile in his actions. He is capable of handling larger units of personnel and assuming greater responsibility in the PM field. If he were required to accept duties of a broader nature in the intelligence field involving less supervision of his own activities, he would need to improve in the areas of written and oral expression and in his understanding of KUBARK requirements and responsibilities. In this regard he would need additional training and exposure to more extensive KUBARK fields as he has not had the opportunity for participating in such KUBARK activities. Subject does not have the proficiency of the language used.

SECTION D
CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 26 Nov. 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Irving O. DEVUONO (signed in pseudo on Fld. Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 17	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 26 Nov. 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/PM Br., JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Stanley R. KAHKA (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attached Sheet

DATE 26 Nov. 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

Continuation of FITNESS REPORT, Section D:

Subject is a well-qualified para-military specialist, who has fully mastered the tools of his trade. Subject applies all of his para-military knowledge in the performance of his current duties as the senior outside case officer for a thirty-man commando group, which is capable of carrying out a variety of different missions. These missions include caching operations, sabotage raids, tactical intelligence reconnaissance activities and contingency missions related to war plans. Subject is at his best in dealing with men and military equipment. Subject's major weakness is in records management and reports writing. Despite this minor weakness, Subject's over-all performance warrants an evaluation of Proficient.

Subject has the potential to train and operationally exploit para-military forces in units which have a T/O strength of not more than 60 men. Subject could command a conventional military formation at the battalion level. Subject is capable of mounting counter-insurgency operations with the use of forces up to battalion strength.

Subject's work comes to the attention of the Reviewing Officer on a bi-weekly basis.

Subject's future assignments should be in the para-military field. If Subject is to remain in operations in Latin America, he must be given an opportunity to study Spanish on a formal basis.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE aKF

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Personnel
Award of Intelligence Star - Irving C. DEVUONO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGS 3125 dated 17 May 1963

Irving C. DEVUONO will be available for the presentation ceremony at Headquarters at any time during the next 30 days. Subject desires that any group present be small and he, himself, will be accompanied by his wife.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
  Orig & 2 - Addressee

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
18 June 63

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 25 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-5536

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Special Affairs Staff (Provisional)

SUBJECT
TYPIC/PERSONNEL
Award of Intelligence Star - Irving C. DEVUONO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGS-2865, dated 22 March 1963

Please advise status of paragraph 2 of Referenced Dispatch.

END OF MESSAGE

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGS-3125

DATE
17 MAY 1963

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Special Affairs Staff (Provisional)

SUBJECT: TYPIC/PERSONNEL
Award of Intelligence Star - Irving C. DEVUONO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGT-4416, dated 13 March 1963

1. Headquarters officers in charge of arranging the award ceremony are reluctant to initiate any arrangements without more information regarding the urgency indicated in Reference. The fact that we reminded them that it had been a year since the award was authorized had little effect.

2. Are there any plans in the future to send Irving C. DEVUONO to Headquarters? If so, then with several days advance notice of such a trip arrangements for the ceremony could be initiated.

3. It also would be helpful to indicate whether DEVUONO will bring his family and anticipate a large ceremony or whether he would prefer a smaller, more intimate group gathered in the Director's Office.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

BM
55

DATE TYPED: 19 Mar 1963

DATE DISPATCHED: 22 MAR 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGS-2865

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

SECRET

Lynch

25 September 1962

TO : Chief/Station, JMWAVE

FROM : IRVING G. DEVUONO

SUBJECT: Housing Allowance

ATTN : Chief/Support, JMWAVE

1. The writers' contract, as Career Agent, states in Para 4: "Allowance: You will be entitled to: (a) living quarters allowance in conformance with applicable government regulations. You may be provided quarters by your cover facility or the government and, in such event, you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowance herein indicated.

(b) Cost of living allowance in conformance with applicable government regulations including, but not limited to, a post allowance or an equalization allowance in lieu thereof, a supplementary post allowance, a transfer allowance, a basic service transfer allowance, an education allowance, and a separation allowance."

2. It appears clear to the writer that any housing allowance which applies to staffers also applies to the writer. This would then necessarily have to commence at the same time for both types in order to be equal.

3. It is requested the writers' housing allowance be timed to commence on the same date as the Staffers in order to comply with the intent of the contract.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

25 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Application of Housing Allowance for Certain Contract Personnel

It is requested that the contracts for the following named Contract Employees and Career Agents be amended to include, → Effective 1 September 1962 in the applicable paragraph, the provision:

"You are herein authorized housing assistance in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization."

CADICE, Irving G. (Career Agent)
DEVIDNO, Irving C. (Career Agent)
HORMATH, Harold R. (Career Agent)
GIAVASCO, Philip D. (Contract Employee)
HEARD, Bruce R. (Contract Employee)

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief, TFW/Support

DDP/TFW/Personnel:JHMARTIN:jtr (25 September 1962)

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - TFW/Personnel

Memo approved by C.P.D., Mr [illegible] 1 Sep. 62.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH | SECRET

PROCESSED	ACTION	ACTION REQUIRED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Task Force W

SUBJECT GYROSE
Award of Intelligence Star - Irving C. DEVUONO

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Please advise Irving C. DEVUONO that the Honor and Merit Awards Board has approved the award of Intelligence Star for subject.

2. When Irving C. DEVUONO returns to Headquarters arrangements will be made with the Director, KUDARK, for presentation of the award.

3. I wish to add my own personal congratulations for this fine recognition of DEVUONO's service to the Agency.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

DATE TYPED: 18 May 1962
DATE DISPATCHED: 21 MAY 1962
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGS - 1382
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:
CROSS REFERENCE TO:

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 - TFW/Personnel
1 - TFW/Registry
1 - Chief, TFW
1 - Honor & Merits Award Board 5-E-68 Hqs. Bldg.

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	EXT
TFW/Personnel	James Durham, jr.	6576

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/TFW/Personnel		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	RELEASING OFFICER'S NAME
C/TFW/SS	19 May 62	for John F. Blake

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Administrative
Award of Intelligence Star - Irving C. DEVUONO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See para 2

PRIORITY

REFERENCE: UFGS 1382 dated 18 May 62

A. JMWAVE would appreciate being advised as to a date which would be convenient for the director of KUBARK to make the presentation of the Intelligence Star to Irving C. DEVUONO.

B. In order that DEVUONO can make arrangements to be in Headquarters to receive the award on the date selected a cable reply would be appreciated.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - Addressee

MR. GRAYSTON LEROY LYNCH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
11 Mar 63	MAR 13 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-4416

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

9 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, PM

SUBJECT : Irving C. DEVUONO Award of Intelligence Star

REFERENCE : UFGS-1382 dated 18 May 1962

1. Reference is drawn to paragraph 2 of reference which states that when DEVUONO returns to Headquarters arrangements will be made for the Director to make the award to DEVUONO.

2. 10 months have passed since this award was granted and it is recommended that action be taken to send DEVUONO to Headquarters to receive his award.

Philip S. Waltuck
Philip S. WALTUCK

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - Typing chrono
1 - DEVUONO file

SECRET

S E C R E T

14 February 1963

TO : COS, JMWAVE

FROM : Chief/CUSOG Irving G. Cadick

SUBJECT: Fitness Report, Devuono

1. The subject report being due, the writer is the only person observing DEVUONO's work and has statements and commendations which should be reflected in his fitness report. The contents of this memorandum will be established in DEVUONO's file in other form at later date by the writer.

2. DEVUONO has completed one year with CUSOG. In this period he has shown a complete and practical knowledge of paramilitary techniques and tactics. This knowledge is born of experience and application. His application of this knowledge for KUBARK has resulted in visible progress in the technical abilities of CUSOG personnel.

3. He has shared CUSOG responsibilities of organization, administration and operational preparation in a manner to follow out KUBARK practices to its credit.

4. He carries out clear instructions to the letter, reflecting a military background.

5. Contrary to observances noted in a previous fitness report DEVUONO has been found to be anything but naive in his dealings with PBRUMENS during the period observed.

6. His administrative and accounting procedures within CUSOG are in order.

7. Hesitating to call them weaknesses, the writer must state that DEVUONO's entire experience with KUBARK has been field experience, usually far out on a long string of contacts into a KUBARK installation, a fact which has prevented a look at any of the administrative side of paramilitary as conducted by KUBARK.

8. This man has good potential for helping KUBARK's paramilitary effort, which potential will be more effective when he has been schooled in the terminologies and pecularities of paramilitary KUBARK-style. It is recommended a tour by DEVUONO where such schooling can be conducted as on-the-job training would most bring out this potential.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

VIA : Chief, Contract Personnel Division/OP

SUBJECT : Qualification for Premium Pay

REFERENCES : (A) Memorandum to ADCI from General Counsel, dated 29 May 1962. Subject: Delegation of Authority (OGC 62-1131)

(B) Memorandum to DD/S from Chief, Task Force W, dated 17 August 1962. Subject: Application of Housing Allowance and Premium Pay to Certain JMWAVE Contract Personnel.

1. This is to certify that Irving G. DEVUONO, a Career Agent, assigned PCS to the geographic area of JMWAVE and JMBAR, qualifies for premium payment according to the authorization contained in the referenced memorandums. This certification is based upon the following conditions of subject's employment during his PCS assignment.

(a) Subject's hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively.

(b) In order to satisfactorily discharge his duties, subject is required to perform substantial amounts of irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty, and duty at night and on holidays.

(1) A substantial amount of irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty means an average of at least six hours of such overtime duty a week.

(2) The irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty is a continual requirement, generally averaging more than once a week.

SECRET

(3) Night and holiday duty will be performed from time to time.

(c) Subject is responsible for recognizing, without supervision, circumstances which require him to remain on duty.

2. The effective date for this premium payment will be the beginning of the first pay period following 4 September 1962.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

APPROVED:

/s/ Emmett D. Echols — 29 JAN 1963

Director of Personnel — Date

To Finance Division:

*APPROVED:

/s/ Joseph B. [illegible]

Special Contracting Officer

* Approved as an amendment to the compensation paragraph of subject's current contract authorizing Premium Pay in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) DEVUONO (P) IRVING C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX M	4. GRADE
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT JMWAVE

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To Aug 61 - April 62	SPECIAL (Specify) At the request of C/CA/PM per UFGW-783

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Develop and control a 22-man commando team.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plan and mount commando operations.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Administer and provide records for the support of a 22-man commando team.	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 3-4

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					X		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY				X			
SECURITY CONSCIOUS				X			
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS				X			
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

As a former military officer, Subject is hard working and abundantly sincere in his efforts to fight Communism. His performance since Aug 1961 has not been at the top level of his capabilities for several reasons, not all of which are within his ability to overcome. Subject has had little clandestine training, and is therefore not always able to comprehend the intangible factors which prevent, delay and cancel operations. A further reason is the absence of military law as a basis for discipline for his men. Still another reason is the directive for only limited action with which he has had to live since August. This is merely to say that in a period of policy formation when the action forces have had to be held in limbo, he has not been at his best.

Subject's dealings with his agents have in turn been affected by his own frustrations. His inability to rationalize situations has resulted in obtuse explanations to them which have made them harder to handle. His reluctance to put things on paper has detracted from his performance and denied him the clarifying process which reporting provides. His security consciousness has been similarly affected by his frustrations.

Subject is in need of training in tradecraft and PM operations. His basic qualifications for PM Case Officer work are such that he can, with training, do a much better job. This combined with a program of concentrated action would undoubtedly bring out the best in him, which should be of real value to the Agency.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 9 May 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Clarence D. Higgins

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 10 May 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/S/JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Eric S. Radovich

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-O-594645

1. Agency and organizational designations: DDP/TFW

2. Payroll period:

3. Block No.:

4. Slip No.:

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): DEVUONO, Irving C. (F) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary: $11,880

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks: I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s):

12. Prepared by: Jlv 23 Oct 62

13. Audited by:

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
14Oct62	1 Jun 61	$11,880	$12,245	(Signature or other authentication) Date

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):

Period(s):

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 8000 1126-505

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

25 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Application of Housing Allowance for Certain Contract Personnel

It is requested that the contracts for the following named Contract Employees and Career Agents be amended to include, in the applicable paragraph, the provision:

"You are herein authorized housing assistance in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization."

CADICK, Irving G. (Career Agent)
[illegible], Irving O. (Career Agent)
[illegible], Harold R. (Career Agent)
GIAVACCO, Philip D. (Contract Employee)
HEARD, Bruce R. (Contract Employee)

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief, TFW/Support

*APPROVED:

Special Contracting Officer

*Approved as amendment effective 1 September 1962 to the contracts for the individuals listed above.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

DD/P 2-2108

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff

THROUGH : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Approval of Award of Intelligence Star for Irving C. DEVUONO

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board takes pleasure in notifying you that the award named above has been approved for subject individual. You are requested to inform subject of the award and of the security provisions governing it as set forth in the enclosed memorandum from the Office of Security.

2. When subject returns to Washington, please notify the Secretariat, Honor and Merit Awards Board, Office of Personnel, so that arrangements may be made with the Director's office for presentation of the award.

Robert M. Gaynor

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: FRED F. CYRUS:vlm
UNIT: TFW/SUPPORT
EXT: 8712
DATE: 19 APRIL 1962

1694

TO: JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO: DDP, CCG 2, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

APR 19 21 26Z 62

LOGS

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT 74622
SIG CEN

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 05283 05283

GYROSE

REF WAVE 2863 (IN 21497)

1. THE ESTABLISHED COVER FOR SUBJECTS OF REF IS THE CHARLES S. WILSON AND ASSOCIATES, 413 DADE COMMONWEALTH BUILDING, MIAMI, FLORIDA. TELEPHONE NUMBER REMAINS SAME. THIS FIRM, WHICH IS PURELY NOTIONAL IS ENGAGED IN TRAINING CANDIDATES FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE MERCHANT MARINE. THEY ARE MAINLY ENGAGED IN TRAINING NAVIGATIONAL SUBJECTS.

2. THE COVER FIRM IS BACKSTOPPED IN THE MAIMI AREA. THERE IS NO REPEAT NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COVER FIRM AND THE ZENITH TECHNICAL ENTERPRISES COMPANY.

3. PLS ADVISE JOHN K. TARTARILLO AND IRVING C. DEVUONO OF THE ABOVE.

4. RE PARA TWO REF MR. RICHARD BILADEAU WILL ARRIVE 23 APRIL VIA NAL NO. 209. PLS MEET AND BILLET.

END OF MESSAGE

TFW COMMENT: Requested cover clarification on three employees assigned to JMDUSK; requested TDY services of cover representative.

Fred F. Cyrus

C/TFW/PERS Louis W. Armstrong

Fred F. Cyrus

JOHN F. BLAKE
C/TFW/SUP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

FRED F. CYRUS
DC/TFW/SUP
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

[illegible]

SECRET

16 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT: Project ZRJEWEL Reports.
William Robertson - Grayston Lynch

REFERENCE: Memo from Chief, CA/PAG to Chief, WH/4;
1 June 1961, Subject: Assignment of
Robertson and Lynch to WH Division.

1. Paragraph 9 of Reference requested that CA/C/PAG be kept informed of the standard of performance, and of the acquisition of additional capabilities by either training or experience, of Robertson and Lynch during the period of their assignment to WH Division.

2. As Robertson and Lynch now have been employed operationally by WH/4 for a period of six months, and as they are the first to have been engaged under the new ZRJEWEL program, it would be appreciated if we could have reports from Chief, WH/4 on these men at an early date. In addition to the data required on regular Fitness Reports, we are interested particularly in knowing from WH/4:

a. How these men are being used, i.e., whether they are engaged in operations, training, planning, etc.; and the extent to which this has been exclusively in the field of PM activities.

b. If engaged in agent operations, whether they are employed as singleton agents, principal agents, recruiters, etc.

c. The degree and general location of their possible exposure to hazardous duty, if any.

d. The degree to which they may have been compromised in terms of personal security, if at all, and the general location where this may have happened.

e. Any new skills they may have acquired either by training or experience.

SECRET

3. Also, since CA/PMG has ultimate responsibility for these ZRJEWEL personnel after their operational usefulness to WH Division has ended, it would be very helpful to us in planning the future conduct of the ZRJEWEL program if occasionally we could have a report directly from each of these men personally, giving us their own appraisal of their current utilization. In this regard we would appreciate your view as to whether this would be feasible, within the bounds of operational security, and whether it could best be accomplished by requesting written reports, or by oral de-briefings when these men are in the Washington area.

Paul E. Eckel
Chief
Paramilitary Group,
CA Staff

CA/PMG/EFFox:rah
15 January 1962
Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CA/C/PMG
1 - Robertson File
1 - Lynch File
1 - Project ZRJEWEL File
1 - Chrono

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Irving C. DEVUONO

Thru : Recorder, Honor and Merit Awards Board

DATE: [illegible]

FROM : Security Advisor, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT: Award Recommendation

Ref : Recommendation for Honor or Merit Award, dated 16 October 1961

1. In the reference DEVUONO is recommended for an honor or merit award. It is noted the reference states he is currently in the field.

2. If the award is granted, the following security measures are recommended:

a. The award should be retained within Headquarters until such time as DEVUONO returns to Headquarters on a permanent change of station and security/cover considerations permit the release of the award to him. There would, of course, be no objections to informing him of the granting of the award by use of Agency secure channels.

b. Prior to DEVUONO's receiving physical possession of the award he should be instructed there are no objections to his showing the award to his immediate family and his associates in the Agency but that he should not release or cooperate in releasing any publicity regarding the granting of the award.

N. Harris Lyon

cc: C/WH

[illegible]

11 December 1959

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Policy Concerning Guests at Award Ceremonies

1. The Office of the Director has determined that when inviting guests to award ceremonies, the Agency will be as liberal as possible within the bounds of available space and security considerations since one of the purposes of an award ceremony is to let the family, friends, and associates of the recipient know that he has been honored.

2. In implementing this policy the points listed below will be guiding criteria:

a. Any Agency employee who is a friend of a recipient may come to the ceremony, up to the limit of space available, if the recipient asks that he be present.

b. Any Government employee (who is not employed by the Agency but who is witting of the recipient's employment) can come so long as there are no operational security reasons that would make his presence inappropriate.

c. Any friend who is not employed by the Government may be invited only if it is obviously desirable (Example-- A very close old friend who stood in the relationship of "family" to the recipient when subject had no immediate family). Friends who are not employed by the Government normally would be discouraged.

Robert M. Gaynor

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder,
Honor and Merit Awards Board

SECRET

Lynch

12 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Awards, Cases of Mr. William Robertson and Mr. Grayston Lynch

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend cash awards for subject employees.

2. In recent paramilitary operations against Cuba, Mr. Lynch and Mr. Robertson served as operations officers of the Central Intelligence Agency vessels BLAGAR and BARBARA J respectively. Both of these employees, in the course of extremely hazardous operations, repeatedly exposed themselves to fire by opposing land, sea and air forces. Their fearless and skilled leadership enabled indigenous forces to conduct an amphibious landing under the most difficult conditions, and their courageous determination to keep their vessels in position to support the operations, although under heavy air attack, was in keeping with the best traditions of the American people at war. Furthermore, their repeated landings, in person, on a hostile shore for the purpose of rescuing Cuban survivors of the invasion force, was a demonstration of extraordinary valor. Their exemplary conduct throughout the combat action was above and beyond the call of duty.

3. Military personnel performing in combat in such a manner would be eligible for the highest decorations for heroism.

4. In view of the extraordinary heroism displayed by Mr. Robertson and Mr. Lynch, I strongly recommend that they be awarded an appropriate commendation, and, in addition, a cash bonus award of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) each.

J. Hawkins
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief, WH/4/PM

APPROVED: ______________________
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCUR: ______________________
Acting Chief, WH/4

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - AC/WH/4

SECRET

SECRET

COVERT AGREEMENT SUPPLE IT - INCOME AND FEDERAL TAX DA

TYPE OF PRINT ☒ ORIGINAL ☐ CORRECTION

1. PSEUDONYM
Irving C. DEVUONO

2. 3877

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS (Check as appropriate)
☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☐ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY NA
TOTAL AMOUNT (Per annum) $
AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX $
(EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED (Allowances, etc.).
PAYMENTS TO BEGIN (Date)

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY NA
☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☐ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID NA
INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD
☐ NONE THIS COUNTRY $ FOREIGN $
IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☐ YES ☒ NO NAME OF COUNTRY

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)
☒ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099
COVER FACILITY (Cryptonym)

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)
☐ COVERT (If covert only, omit rest of this item.) ☐ FORM W-2 ☒ FORM 1099
NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER
Charles S. Wilson Associates

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX (Check one)
☐ HAS BEEN FILED ☐ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☒ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY. NA

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 (Or equivalent) ATTACHED 5

13. MARITAL STATUS (Complete as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED
DATE OF MARRIAGE 26 April 1945
DATE OF DEATH
DATE OF DECREE
CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE U.S.
RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE (Country) U.S.

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE (Omit self and spouse)

RELATIONSHIP (No names)	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
Wife	26 July 1922	U.S.	U.S.
Daughter	3 Sept 1946	U.S.	U.S.
Son	4 Apr 1949	U.S.	U.S.
Son	11 Jan 1954	U.S.	U.S.

15. REMARKS Since cover company is not able to issue W-2, subject will be personally responsible for proper reporting and paying of Federal Income Tax as independent contractor. Also, subject will be responsible for payment of Social Security as independent contractor.

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

17. FORM PREPARED BY ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☒ OFFICIAL

SECRET

PART III

NOTE: DETACH THIS PORTION OF FORM AND DISTRIBUTE SEPARATELY

18. 3877

19. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

IF SOCIAL SECURITY NO. IS NOT AVAILABLE, HAVE FORM NO. SS-5, "APPLICATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS," COMPLETED AS PROVIDED IN DETAILED PROCEDURES.

20. CITIZENSHIP

21. ADDRESS OF RECORD (In U.S.)

22. ADDRESS (Foreign)

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

ORIG : RICHARD F. GILLS (RGY)
UNIT : WH/4/PERSONNEL 1776
EXT : 8717
DATE : 9 JUNE 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

157

14-20

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE

FROM : ~~DIRECTOR~~ BELL

CONF : BELL 15

INFO : WH 4, BELL S/C

DEVU ONO

JUN 14 2215Z 61

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 5070

OUT 5070

TO WAVE INFO CITE ~~DIR~~ BELL 1047

1047

JMZIP ADMIN

REF: BARR 0010 (IN 1538)

1. PARA 1 REF STATES DOCS FOR MR. GRAYSTON LYNCH SENT TO WAVE BY COURIER 30 APRIL.

2. IF STILL AT WAVE, PLEASE FORWARD HQS SOONEST. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Stated documents for Mr. Lynch sent WAVE by courier 30 April.

Judy / Wave

WH/4/SECURITY

WH/4/LOGISTICS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
C/WH/4/SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

Herbert Juul
HERBERT V. JUUL
C/WH/4/PERSONNEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

INCOME AND FEDERAL TAX DAT.

TYPE OF PRINT		
	☐	ORIGINAL
	☒	CORRECTION

1. PSEUDONYM: Irving C. DEVUONO

2. 6[illegible]35

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS *(Check as appropriate)*

☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☐ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY N.A.

TOTAL AMOUNT *(Per annum)*	AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX	EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED *(Allowances, etc.)*.	PAYMENTS TO BEGIN *(Date)*
$	$		17 JUN 1963

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY N.A.

☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☐ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID N.A.

INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD: ☐ NONE ☐ THIS COUNTRY $ ☐ FOREIGN $

IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD: ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☐ YES ☒ NO NAME OF COUNTRY:

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS *(See item 16 below)*

☒ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

COVER FACILITY *(Cryptonym)*:

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS *(See item 16 below)*

☒ COVERT *(If covert only, omit rest of this item.)* ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER:

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX *(Check one)*

☐ HAS BEEN FILED ☒ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☐ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY. NA

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 *(Or equivalent)* ATTACHED 5

13. MARITAL STATUS *(Complete as appropriate)*

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 26 April 1945

DATE OF DEATH:

DATE OF DECREE:

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE: U.S.A.

RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE *(Country)*: U.S.A.

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE *(Omit self and spouse)*

RELATIONSHIP *(No names)*	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
Wife	1922	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
Daughter	1946	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
Son	1949	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
Son	1954	U.S.A.	U.S.A.

15. REMARKS This correction is submitted in view of the contents of HAVE 9623 (IN 57726), which requests that Subject report compensation via a Covert Return and not Form 1099, as stated previously.

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

The employer's names and methods for reporting compensation shown in Items 8, and/or 9, above are approved.

DATE:

SIGNATURE AND TITLE:

17. FORM PREPARED BY ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☒ OFFICIAL

PART I CERTIFIED CORRECT

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL:

PART II CERTIFIED CORRECT *(Explain when not signed)*

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL *(Pseudonym)*: Not available

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 6-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(30)

SECRET

COVERT AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENT - INCOME AND FEDERAL TAX DATA

TYPE OF PRINT: ☐ ORIGINAL ☐ CORRECTION

1. PSEUDONYM: IRVING C. DEVUONO

2. 3845

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS (Check as appropriate)
☐ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☐ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY

TOTAL AMOUNT (Per annum)	AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX	EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED (Allowances, etc.).	PAYMENTS TO BEGIN (Date)
$	$		

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY
☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☐ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID
INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD: ☐ NONE THIS COUNTRY $ FOREIGN $
IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD: ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☐ YES ☐ NO NAME OF COUNTRY

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See Item 16 below)
☐ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099
COVER FACILITY (Cryptonym)

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See Item 16 below)
☐ COVERT (If covert only, omit rest of this item.) ☒ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099
NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER: FINANCE AND ACCOUNTS SECTION, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX (Check one)
☐ HAS BEEN FILED ☐ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☒ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY. NA

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 (Or equivalent) ATTACHED 5

13. MARITAL STATUS (Complete as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 26 April 1945
DATE OF DEATH:
DATE OF DECREE:
CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE: U.S.
RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE (Country): U.S.

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE (Omit self and spouse)

RELATIONSHIP (No names)	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
~~JANETTE KENYON~~	1922	US	US
~~SHARON ANN~~	1947	~~US~~	~~US~~
~~JEFFREY LEE~~	1949	~~US~~	~~US~~
~~ROBERT THOMAS~~	1954	~~US~~	~~US~~
			US

15. REMARKS

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

The employer's names and methods for reporting compensation shown in Items 8, and/or 9, above are approved.

DATE
SIGNATURE AND TITLE

17. FORM PREPARED BY ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☒ OFFICIAL

PART I CERTIFIED CORRECT
DATE: 6/1/61
SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL

PART II CERTIFIED CORRECT (Explain when not signed)
DATE
SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL (Pseudonym)

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 8-60 3138 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(30)

6 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Employee Accounts Section,
Finance Division

SUBJECT : Additional Compensation and Bonus for
Grayston L. Lynch

It is hereby certified that Mr. Lynch satisfactorily completed his maritime assignment and is entitled to payment of additional compensation and bonus as provided in his basic contract of 10 February 1961, as amended 28 March 1961.

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
Chief, WH/4/Support

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/4/Finance

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

534

DATE : 6 JUN 61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMBARR

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : WH 4, BELL S/C

Pers

ROUTING

1

4

5

6

SUPPORT

JUN 6 1756Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 2786

PRITY BELL INFO WAVE CITE BARR 0041

JMZIP

REF A BARR 0010 (IN 1538)*

B WAVE 5994 (IN 1172)

C BELL 0251 (out 8473)

1. BARR HAS NO DOCUMENTS BELONGING TO GRAYSON LYNCH.

D

2 FOR INFORMATION REGARBING REF DOCS YOUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED TO REF A.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *BARR STATED PERSONAL ITEMS BELONGING TO SANTA ANA CASE OFFICER AND DOCS AND CASH BELONGING TO CASE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO SANTA ANA AND BLAGAR, SENT TO WAVE BY COURIER ON 30 APR PER WAVE INSTRUCTIONS.

Alick

BARR

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

2 JUN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/PMG

ATTENTION : Ernest F. Fox

FROM : Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : S-14114
#180184

1. Reference is made to the memorandum dated 12 May 1961 in which a covert security clearance was requested to enable utilization of Subject as a Career Agent, serving as a paramilitary specialist in any area that is needed. Subject will aid in providing senior paramilitary support for Agency activity under Project ZRJEWEL.

2. This is to advise that a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

David E. Hanlon

Victor R. White
XXXXXXXXX

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

PSEUDONYM		PRINT	CRYPTONYM
SPONSORING COMPONENT	CASE OFFICER		EXTENSION

PERSONAL DATA	EMPLOYMENT STATUS	EFFECTIVE DATE	CITIZENSHIP
CURRENT PCS POST	FUTURE PCS POST (Effective Date)		DATE OF BIRTH

DEPENDENT INFORMATION (Names NOT Required) ATTACH FORM 311 OR W-4

RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDE WITH SUBJECT, IF NOT, WHERE

IS SPOUSE UNDER CONTRACT OR EMPLOYED BY WOFACT. YES ☐ NO ☐ IF YES PROVIDE PSEUDONYM

COVER DATA	EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVER	SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER	☐ YES ☐ NO

OFFICIAL COVER	NONOFFICIAL COVER		
☐ UNREAD	☐ BONAFIDE	☐ PROPRIETARY	☐ DEVISED
☐ OTHER (Specify)	☐ OTHER (Specify)	COVER FACILITY CRYPTONYM	

COVER, SALARY AND ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)	SALARY $	ALLOWANCE $

PAY PERIOD USED BY COVER ☐ WEEKLY ☐ BIWEEKLY ☐ MONTHLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY

TYPE OF TAX DOCUMENTATION TO BE ISSUED BY COVER

REMARKS (Pertinent to Personal or Cover Data)

WOFACT DATA	PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION	☐ HEADQUARTERS	☐ FIELD	(EFFECTIVE DATE)	(AMOUNT) $

WOFACT TO REPORT	☐ UNREAD 1099	☐ UNGOLD 1099	☐ DEVISED FACILITY 1099	DEVISED FACILITY ACCOUNT NO.
	☐ UNREAD W-2	☐ UNGOLD W-2	☐ DEVISED FACILITY W-2	

IF SUBJECT IS UNDER NONOFFICIAL COVER CONSULTATION WITH THE COVERT TAX COMMITTEE IS REQUIRED

For completion by Central Cover Staff A TAX ASSESSMENT ☐ WILL ☐ WILL NOT BE ASSIGNED BY THE COVERT TAX COMMITTEE

COMMENTS

APPROVAL		AUTHENTICATION	
DATE	SIGNATURE CENTRAL COVER STAFF	DATE	SIGNATURE RESPONSIBLE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. TO OFFICE OF FINANCE, COPY TO CENTRAL COVER, COPY TO FILE

FORM 9-66 **313a** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(30)

SECRET

NOTE: DETACH THIS PORTION OF FORM AND DISTRIBUTE SEPARATELY

IF SOCIAL SECURITY NO IS NOT AVAILABLE, HAVE FORM NO SS-5, "APPLICATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS," COMPLETED AS PROVIDED IN DETAILED PROCEDURES.	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO
ADDRESS OF RECORD (IN U.S.)	ADDRESS (Foreign)	

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. TO OFFICE OF FINANCE, COPY TO CENTRAL COVER, COPY TO FILE

FORM 9-66 **313a** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(30)

Dearborn

1 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT: Assignment of Robertson and Lynch to WH Division

1. This is in response to your oral request for the transfer or assignment of Robertson and Lynch from this Staff to WH Division.

2. These employees were recruited as Career Agents under CA/PMG Project ZRJEWEL, and therefore are to be administered in accordance with the terms of this Project.

3. Under the terms of Project ZRJEWEL, CA/C/PMG is responsible initially for their selection and recruitment, and sub-sequently for their training and developmental assignments until they are transferred to an existing operational project under jurisdiction of an operating division.

4. Selection and recruitment involves complete processing to contract status under provisions of HB 20-1000-1, and requires also:

a. Security Clearances

b. Medical Clearances

c. Provision of Cover

d. Financial Briefing

e. Assessment and Evaluation

5. Training and development requires that subjects be pro-vided tutorial or group training, according to their individual needs, to qualify them as senior PM officers capable of serving overseas as

case officers, instructors, advisors, or consultants; and capable of developing indigenous forces, directing operations, and personally participating in operations. The training envisioned normally would include, but not be limited to:

a. Language aptitude testing and subsequent language training.

b. Clandestine tradecraft.

c. Paramilitary operations training.

d. Covert Action Operations training and CI Familiarization.

6. Although both subjects are now under contract, as of this time, of all of the above-mentioned items of processing, training and development, the following yet remains to be done:

Robertson - medical clearance, provision of cover, financial briefing, Spanish language aptitude test and Spanish language training. Clandestine refresher training as deemed advisable.

Lynch - provision of cover, financial briefing, assessment and evaluation, language aptitude test and possible language training, and all basic Clandestine Operations training.

7. Project ZRJEWEL further provides that administrative responsibility for these employees including compensation, operational security, etc. will be transferred to the Operating Division for such periods of time as the employees are under the jurisdiction of the Division for operational duties. For administrative purposes, it is suggested that WH Division assume these responsibilities for both Robertson and Lynch as of 1 June 1961.

8. One of the major considerations in the contract employment of these two officers has been that their lack of association with the Agency, thus far, permits their operational utilization in circumstances

where staff employees cannot participate, and their long range continued employment is, to a certain extent, dependent on their being able to maintain this posture. It is requested, therefore, that you take every reasonable precaution to maintain their 'deniable' status.

9. Since the CA Staff will once again become responsible for these officers whenever such time may come that you no longer have a requirement for them, it would be very much appreciated if this office would be kept advised as to their standard of performance, acquisition of additional capabilities, by either training or experience, and we should be consulted before any changes or amendments are made in their contracts which might become commitments to be assumed by the CA Staff.

Signed
ALFRED T. COX

Alfred T. Cox
Chief, Paramilitary Group
Covert Action Staff

cc: C/WH
CCG
C/CA

[illegible]

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 10 February 1961, as amended. Effective [illegible], said contract, as amended, is hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. Your status is that of a Government employee under contract and, as such, your rights and benefits are governed by the provisions of this agreement. It is specifically understood that you are not entitled to rights and benefits pertaining to appointed staff status, except as provided herein.

2. Cover. In the performance of your services hereunder, you will act under cover suitable to conceal your relationship with the Government. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

$11,155

3. Compensation and Taxes. For your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at a basic salary of ~~$11,000~~ per annum. You will be entitled to a post differential in conformance with applicable Government regulations. In addition you will be entitled to authorized overtime, within-grade promotions and legislative pay adjustments in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed personnel. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. Unless precluded by such requirements, taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

4. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) living quarters allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be provided quarters by your cover facility or the Government and, in such event, you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost of living allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations including, but not limited to, a post allowance or an equalization allowance in lieu thereof, a supplementary post allowance, a transfer allowance, a home service transfer allowance, an education allowance and a separation allowance.

SECRET

5. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped, in conformance with applicable Government regulations. Upon the completion of each two (2) years of successful overseas service under this contract, you may be authorized travel expenses for you and your dependents from your permanent post of duty overseas to your place of recorded residence in the United States and return travel expenses to your permanent post of duty overseas. You will be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

6. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government or your cover facility. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

7. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

8. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government staff employees. Such annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government.

(d) From the salary paid pursuant to this contract there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6 1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. When circumstances of your cover warrant or require contributions to social security, such contributions will be at your expense and you will not be reimbursed therefor by the Government.

(e) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the U.S. Citizen full-time Career Agent in the line of duty while permanently assigned abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a U.S. citizen full-time Career Agent permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

(f) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Career Agents in this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

9. Offset. Any and all compensation, allowances or other benefits (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities will be used to offset amounts due you under this contract and will reduce accordingly the Government's direct payment obligation hereunder. Sums so offset are payment by the Government under this contract and for purposes of Federal income taxation. You will report every four (4) months during the term of this agreement all benefits received from or through your cover activities and, if such benefits exceed those due you under this contract, the report will be accompanied by said excess amount, which you hereby agree is the sole property of the Government. Failure to submit timely reports and, as appropriate, excess payments, may result in suspension of any payments due you hereunder. As an alternative to the above, the Government may at any time exercise its basic right to require payment over to it of the emoluments received by you from or through your cover activities which would otherwise be offset as described above. In such cases the Government will pay directly to you the emoluments called for by this contract.

10. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

11. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

12. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

13. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in

writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 March 1961, and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon ninety (90) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event initially required medical and security requirements for this contract cannot be met, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government while you are on an overseas assignment under this contract, you will not be entitled to the return travel expenses to the United States as set forth in paragraph five (5) above. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Barney C. [illegible]

[redacted]

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

DH C/CI/15 May 61
CA/2 informed
Career Agent.

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: Ernest F. Fox

DIVISION: CA/IMG

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 4611

DATE: 10 May 1961

SECTION I GENERAL

1. NAME ☐ [illegible] ☒ TRUE
[redacted]
DEVUONO, IRVING C.

2A. PROJECT: ZRJEWEL

2B. PERMANENT STATION: indefinite

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 1121-4111-8017

4. SLOT NO.: NA

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: Irving C. DEVUONO

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): CSA

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Career Agent

SECTION II PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: USA

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 37

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 14 June 1923

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Victoria, Texas

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): North Carolina, Fayetteville

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate) ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife - age 38
Daughter - age 14
Son - age 11
Son - age 7

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: Retired

21. VETERAN: yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat): Reserve longevity

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U.S. Army

24. RANK OR GRADE: Capt.

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $11,000.00

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: if applicable

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): commercial

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY ☐ COVER ☒ CIA ☐ NOT WITHHELD

SECTION V ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: yes

32. POST: yes

33. OTHER: normally due staff employee

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): none

SECTION VI TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL: where cover requires ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH: Same as (18) above

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS or ☒ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Where applicable

43. ENTERTAINMENT: where applicable

44. OTHER: operational equipment or cover items

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS or ☒ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

FORM 204 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET

CASE OFFICER: Ernest F. Fox

DIVISION: CA/PG

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 4611

DATE: 10 May 1961

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

45. BENEFITS *(See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-130 or successor regulations.)*

Missing Persons Act
BEC - Annual & sick leave
Death & Disability benefit
Fed. ~~TR~~ Retirement Act
Home Leave benefits
C.E.H.A. Health Ins.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)*	☐	PROPOSED	48. TYPE *(Check)*	☐	PROPRIETARY	☐	CULTURAL	☐	COMMERCIAL	☐	TOURIST
	☐	ESTABLISHED		☐	SUBSIDIZED	☐	EDUCATIONAL	☐	MILITARY	☐	OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)*
☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: [illegible]
DAYS ____ MONTHS ____ 2 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: to be negotiated

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*: ?

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(PI, PP, other)*: PM

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Provide senior paramilitary support for Agency activity

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE: Retired after 21 years of Army service. Has specialized in special forces operations and had service overseas. From 1956 to present commanded and trained SF team in Guerrilla Warfare. Was instructor in US Army NCO School for 3 years. 10 Feb.'61 -date CIA contract.

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☒ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE *(No degree)* ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
German			X						
French			X						
Laotian			X						

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

Oct.'38 to Oct.'60 US ~~Amry~~ Army. Retired ~~xx~~ with 21 years service as Captain. Retirement pay $281.00 per month

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

Hazardous duty pay premium where indicated.

☐ MORE

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICIAL
10 May 1961	Ernest F. Fox Ernest F. Fox	15 May 61	Charles J. Francis

SECRET

24 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contract Negotiations with Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

1. After discussing the proposed contract for Mr. Lynch with Messrs. Earman, Collins, Barnes, King, Esterline, and others and obtaining their agreement that the proposed contract was a fair one, I met with Mr. Lynch on the morning of 24 May 1961. I outlined, in detail, to him at that time the many advantages accruing to him through the new contract over the previous contract. Mr. Lynch stated that he had not been fully aware of these benefits,that he was afraid he had given the wrong impressions to us with regard to his salary demands, and that he would be glad to sign the contract as offered.

2. Mr. Lynch signed the contract later in the morning.

3. I also had advised Mr. Lynch that Colonel King and Mr. Esterline had been requested to look into the possibility and desirability of obtaining for him a bonus award because of his services on the Project. I told him that they had agreed to look into this, that no promises could be made, and that any such award was a matter entirely outside the scope of his contractual arrangements and employment by this Staff.

4. I then called Mr. Earman and advised him of the above. Mr. Earman indicated that he was sure the Director would be very pleased to hear that a suitable agreement had been reached, but that the Director also would undoubtedly raise the question of the bonus award at some future date. I, therefore, undertook on behalf of Mr. Earman to re-raise the question of the award with Mr. Esterline early in the week of May 29, 1961.

Alfred T. Cox

Alfred T. Cox
Chief, Paramilitary Group
Covert Action Staff

Original + 1 - Subject File
1 - Chrono File

SECRET

GRAYSTON L. LYNCH - COMPARISON OF CONTRACTS

1. TYPE OF CONTRACT

a. Under his present contract LYNCH is serving as a Contract Employee.

b. The new contract would make him a Career Agent. Under R 20-1000, a Career Agent is an individual who has demonstrated his operational value to the Agency over a period normally of not less than three years for U.S. citizens. LYNCH has served with the Agency only for a period of about three months.

2. COMPENSATION

a. Rate of pay under present contract is $9,500 per annum, plus a post differential in accordance with regulations.

155

b. New rate of pay would be $11,000, plus post differential, plus ingrade promotions and legislative pay adjustments effecting Government personnel.

3. ALLOWANCES

a. Present contract does not provide for any special allowances.

b. The new contract provides for (1) living quarters allowances, and (2), cost of living allowance including but not limited to, a post allowance or equivalent, supplementary post allowance, transfer allowance, home service transfer allowance, education allowance, and separation allowance.

4. TRAVEL

a. Present contract pays cost of operational travel, plus per diem in lieu of subsistence.

b. New contract pays cost of operational travel and per diem, plus: (1) cost of PCS travel and transportation for dependents, household effects and automobile; (2), storage of household and personal effects not shipped; and (3), after two years overseas, all travel for self and dependents from duty station to home residence and return to duty station.

5. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

a. Present contract authorizes operational expenses as specifically approved.

b. New contract expands this to include operational entertainment and purchase of information.

6. BENEFITS

a. Present contract provides death and disability benefits under Federal Employees Compensation Act, and benefits under the Missing Persons act; and states that Social Security deductions will be withheld by the Government.

b. New contract provides for these same benefits; but would make deductions for the Civil Service Retirement Fund instead of the Social Security. In addition the new contract provides for, (1) Sick and Annual leave equal to that of Staff employees; (2), cost of hospitalization and travel for illness or injury incurred in line of duty, while PCS abroad; (3) cost of hospitalization and travel of dependents while abroad; and (4), authorization to apply for enrollment in the Agency health insurance program.

7. TERM

a. The term of the present contract is for one year, subject to termination upon 30 days notice.

b. The new contract is for an indefinite term, subject to termination upon 90 days notice.

8. SPECIAL BONUS

a. There is an Amendment to the present contract, dated 2 May 1961, and made retroactive to cover the period 28 March thru 22 April 1961, only, which authorizes a bonus of 40% of normal monthly compensation while LYNCH was serving aboard ship involved in clandestine maritime activity.

b. There can be no provision in any new contract for declaring a bonus for unforeseen future activities.

9. COMMENT

a. During our first discussions with LYNCH 10 May 1961, on the question of salary, he stated that he would not accept a new contract at the rate of pay ($9,500) of his present contract, because the Director had promised that he would receive more; however, he would not give us a figure that he would accept. Before the new contract was written he was told that it would be for $11,000, and he voiced no objection. After the contract was written and presented to him for signature, he stated that he wanted $12,500, plus "hazardous duty pay", and that he wanted to take the contract to the Director for review.

b. At the time of his retirement, LYNCH was an Army Captain with 20 years service, and I understand that he was in jump status. Remuneration for this service was about $9,425 per annum, including all allowances. His present retirement pay is $281 per month, or $3,372 per year, and I understand that he would be authorized to retain this in addition to all pay and allowances received from an Agency contract.

Ernest F. Fox

17 May 1961

14-00000

SECRET

23 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4/Personnel

SUBJECT : Recall of Captain Rydberg and Mr. Lynch for further Testimony

1. Mr. Eduardo Garcia, owner of the ships used in the JMATE operation, has requested a $250. bonus for each of the men employed by him. This is consistent with the bonus arrangement for all Cubans participating in the operation.

2. Chief, WH Division, has approved the payment of such a bonus to all Garcia personnel, except the survivors of the Rio Escondido. He is withholding approval for these personnel, pending a further investigation into alleged mutinous acts by the survivors, while aboard the Blagar. He has requested that additional information on this subject be obtained from both Captain Rydberg and Mr. Lynch.

3. It is requested that you contact Captain Rydberg and Mr. Lynch, and have them return to Washington at their earliest convenience for the purpose of giving further testimony in this regard.

R. W. BROWN
Chief, WH/4/Logistics

SECRET

SECRET

23 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: G.L. Lynch - ZRJEWEL

1. Lynch called today at 1200 noon. He said that he wanted to let me know that he was back, and to find out what had been done about his contract.

2. I told him that I had heard nothing since he had left. I said that before he left we had rather leaned over backwards to write a contract for him which he had not accepted; that instead he had taken the matter to the Director, and that I had then been requested to deliver a copy of the contract to the Director's office which I had done. I said that I had then acted as a messenger boy only, and had not discussed the matter at the Director's office, nor heard anything about it since.

3. Lynch said that he could fill me in from there. He said that at the Director's office the contract had been turned over to the Director's Executive Officer who was to review it and recommend a salary figure. Lynch said that he had agreed to accept whatever figure the Executive Officer recommended, and was told to call CA/C/PMG/Mr. Cox on his return.

4. I asked Lynch where he could now be reached, and he said that he was at Bob Moore's office on X-8912.

CA/PMG/EFF

SECRET

NOTE:

Since his precipitate meeting with the Director about 1730 hours on 16 May 1961, Lynch has not been heard from. Presumably he returned to his home in Fayetteville, North Carolina.

On 18 May 1961, CA/PMG had calls from the office of both WH/4 and C/WH asking if we knew of Lynch's whereabout, and whether we had a record of his Fayetteville address. The answer to both questions was negative. Subsequently his address was located in files and WH was informed.

CA/PMG/EFF
18 May 1961

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 12 May 1961

TO:
- ☐ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
- ☒ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: Ernest F. Fox; CA/RMD
2405 K. Bldg.; x4611

SUBJECT: (True name) Lynch, Grayston Leroy

PROJECT: ZRJEWEL

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: Devuono, Irving C.

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.: 189184

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	XXXXXXXXX COVERT SECURITY XXXXXX Clearance	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: To serve as a paramilitary specialist in any area that is needed.

FULL DETAILS OF USE:

To provide senior paramilitary support for Agency activity under Project ZRJEWEL.

18 May Verbal ok from [illegible] OS x 26 May – Will get [illegible] on 29 May

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☒ YES	☐ NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☒ YES	☐ NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION:

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

FIELD TRACES

☒	NO RECORD	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☒	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☒	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Ernest F. Fox; CA/RMD	4611	Alfred T. Cox; CA/C/RMD

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

✓

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 38043 A

DATE 5/14/61

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE)

Grayston L. LYNCH
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS:

SECRET

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 38043 B

DATE 5/14/61

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE)

Irving C. DEVUONO
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS:

SECRET

SECRET

11 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security

SUBJECT : Interim Activities Report on Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

While serving with WH/4 as a contract employee during the period 10 February 1961 to the present, subject performed all assigned duties in an exceptionally fine manner and fully demonstrated his understanding of and appreciation for good security practices.

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
Chief, WH/4/Support

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Transfer Lynch

FROM: CA/C/PMG

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/4 Rm. 1725 Qtrs. I				
2. WH/4/Pers				2-3/ Note: In view of subsequent developments it appears that CA ~~the~~ might begin arrangements for career agent status. But check with Cox. H. Jim
3. Dick				
4.				
5. File				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

4 MAY 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/4

SUBJECT: Captain Grayson L. Lynch, USA (Ret.)

1. Pursuant to conversations with personnel representatives of your office on 2 May 1961, I agreed to hold a position vacancy in Project ZRJEWEL for subject individual at his current basic pay level.

2. It was understood and agreed that WH/4 would continue to carry Subject on his present contract as long as his services are needed in the Division. It would be appreciated if you would inform me when Subject will be available for ZRJEWEL.

Alfred T. Cox

Alfred T. Cox
Chief
Paramilitary Group, CA

1. Grayston Leroy ...

Nº 2686

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS (Check as appropriate)

☒ HEADQUARTERS ☒ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☐ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY

TOTAL AMOUNT (Per annum) $ 9500	AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX $ 9500	EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL (BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED (Allowances, etc.))	PAYMENTS TO BEGIN (Date)

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY N/A

☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☒ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID N/A

INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD: ☐ NONE ☐ THIS COUNTRY $ ☐ FOREIGN $

IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD: ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☐ YES ☐ NO NAME OF COUNTRY

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below) NA

☐ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

COVER FACILITY (Cryptonym)

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)

☐ COVERT (If covert only, omit rest of this item.) ☒ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER

U. S. Army Finance and Accounts Office Washington, D.C.

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX (Check one)

☐ HAS BEEN FILED ☐ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☒ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY. NA

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 (Or equivalent) ~~ATTACHED~~

13. MARITAL STATUS (Complete as appropriate)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 26 April 1945

DATE OF DEATH:

DATE OF DECREE:

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE: U.S.

RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE (Country): U.S.

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE (Omit self and spouse)

RELATIONSHIP (No names)	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
daughter	1946	U.S.	U.S.
son	1948	U.S.	U.S.
son	1955	U.S.	U.S.

15. REMARKS

~~W-4 and Form 61 attached~~ add and [illegible] wife.

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

The employer's names and methods for reporting compensation shown in Items 8, and/or 9, above are approved.

DATE: [illegible] SIGNATURE AND TITLE

17. FORM PREPARED BY ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☒ OFFICIAL

PART I CERTIFIED CORRECT

DATE: [illegible] SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL

PART II CERTIFIED CORRECT (Explain when not signed)

DATE SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL (Pseudonym)

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (30)

SECRET

PART III

~~SS-5~~

NOTE: DETACH THIS PORTION OF FORM AND DISTRIBUTE SEPARATELY

18. Nº 2686

19. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 451-18-7989

IF SOCIAL SECURITY NO. IS NOT AVAILABLE, HAVE FORM NO. SS-5, "APPLICATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS," COMPLETED AS PROVIDED IN DETAILED PROCEDURES.

20. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

21. ADDRESS OF RECORD (In U.S.): 533 Terry Cir. Fayetteville, N.C.

22. ADDRESS (Foreign)

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

SECRET

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (30)

[illegible]

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 10 February 1961.

Effective 28 March 1961 and continuing through 28 April 1961, the first two sentences of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" are deleted, and in lieu thereof is substituted the following:

"In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties, you will receive from the Government, the following:

(a) Basic compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $9500 per annum.

(b) A post differential in conformance with applicable Government regulations.

(c) Additional compensation in the amount of $79.17 per month as recompense for sub-standard living and working conditions and applicable only during such periods as you are engaged in clandestine maritime activities.

(d) A monthly bonus in the amount of $237.50 to be accumulated and credited to your account for payment upon certification of your satisfactory completion of assignment on board a ship engaged in clandestine maritime activities.

Effective 29 April 1961, the original two sentences of said contract are reinstated in full force and effect.

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

DHL/AM/8 May 61
WH/Jmarc

SECRET

2 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

Irving C. [illegible]

SUBJECT : Amendment of Contract - [redacted]

1. It is requested that the contract of [redacted] be amended to authorize the following additional compensation only while he is assigned to, and serves aboard, a ship involved in clandestine maritime activities:

a. Additional monthly compensation in the amount of $79.17, representing 10% of normal monthly compensation, as recompense for sub-standard living and working conditions.

b. A monthly bonus of $237.50, representing 30% of normal monthly compensation, to be accumulated and paid upon satisfactory completion of his assignment on board a ship involved in clandestine maritime activities.

2. It is requested that this amendment be effective for the period 28 March 1961 thru 28 April 1961.

for J. D. ESTERLINE
Chief, WH/4

Distrubution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle)
LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: 533 TERRY CIR FAYETTEVILLE N.C.
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 533 TERRY CIR FAYETTEVILLE, N.C.

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE: HOUSTON TEXAS
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 26 APR 45

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:

IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED:
DATE SPOUSE DIED:

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S):

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
JANETTE KENYON LYNCH	533 TERRY CIR, FAYETTEVILLE, N.C.		
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**AGE**
SHARON ANN LYNCH	" " "	F	14
JEFFREY LEE LYNCH	" " "	M	12
ROBERT THOMAS LYNCH	" " "	M	7
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
HENRY THOMAS LYNCH	DECEASED		
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
RUBY LYNCH	RT # 1 BOX 46A, VICTORIA, TEX	UNKN.	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES?

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (~~Mr.~~, Mrs, ~~Miss~~) (Last-First-Middle): JANETTE K. LYNCH
RELATIONSHIP: WIFE

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 533 TERRY CIR FAYETTEVILLE, N.C.
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: HO-4-3443

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☐ YES ☒ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☒ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☒ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, FAYETTEVILLE, N.C.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JAN 57

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

MR + MRS. GRAYSTON L. LYNCH

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

WIFE HAS COPY ALSO FILED COUNTY COURT HOUSE BRIDGEWATER

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

(WIFE) JANETTE K. LYNCH

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON D.C	DATE 19 FEB 61	SIGNATURE Grayston L. Lynch

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a Contract Employee for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $9500 per annum. In addition, you will be entitled to a post differential in conformance with applicable Government regulations. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. Unless precluded by such requirements, taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government. This may include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel and while on temporary duty away from your domestic permanent post of assignment. Payment and accounting for such expenses will be in conformance with applicable Government regulations.

3. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved and financially limited by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in conformance with applicable Government regulations.

4. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

5. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) The United States Government will withhold from the compensation due you under this contract, social security deductions in conformance with the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, and the procedures of this Organization (presently 3% on the first $4800). For reasons of security, all inquiries concerning your relationship to the Social Security system shall be made directly to this Organization, and in no event may any such problem be presented by you or on your behalf to any representative of the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance unless authorized by this Organization.

5. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangement, monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner. It is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment by the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

8. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless otherwise instructed by an authorized Government representative), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

9. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

10. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

11. Term. This contract is effective as of 11 21-1961, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
[redacted]

WITNESS: ______________________________

APPROVED:

____

[illegible]
[illegible]

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: See R 20-1000 and HR 20-[illegible] for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and two copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: ROMAN, W.
TELEPHONE EXTENSION:
DIVISION: WHD
DATE: 2 November 1960

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☐ PSEUDO ☒ TRUE
[illegible]
[redacted]

2A. PROJECT: JMARC

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Washington, D. C.

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 1535-5000-9021

3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☒ UV

4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES:

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☐ YES ☒ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)

Dick Gills WH/4/Plans

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Oral OK [illegible]

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: ☐ OBTAINED ☒ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Contract Employee

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: US

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 37

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): June 14, 1923

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Victoria, Texas

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Victoria, Texas

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:

Wife	Age 38
Daughter	Age 14
Son	Age 11
Son	Age 7

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: (Retired)

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat): Reserve-Longevity

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army

24. RANK OR GRADE: Captain

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $9500

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: -----

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): -----

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER	CIA
YES	☐	☒
NO	☐	☐

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: No

32. POST: No

33. OTHER:

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any):

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES: ☐ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☐ YES ☒ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☒ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

NA

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER FACILITIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: X

43. ENTERTAINMENT: X

44. OTHER: X [illegible]

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☐ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER FACILITIES AND PROCEDURES

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET

CASE OFFICER

DIVISION

TELEPHONE EXTENSION

DATE

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HH 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations re: benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

FECA
Social Security
Missing Persons

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☒ PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

NA ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)

☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS — MONTHS — 1 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: ASAP

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 30 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other)

Paramilitary

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

PM Training

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Retired after 21 years of Army service. Has specialized in special forces operations and had service overseas. From 1956 to present commanded and trained an SF team in guerilla warfare. Was instructor at 7th Army NCO School for three years.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☒ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
German			X						
French			X						
Laotian			X						

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

October 1938 to October 1960 US Army. Retired with 21 years service as captain. Retirement pay $281.00 per month.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
	JACK HAWKINS		WILLIAM E. [illegible]

SECRET

10 November 1960
DATE

LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	RANK	SN	BR	DIV	RGT NO.
Lynch,	Grayston	L.	Captain	0966311	Armor		

MOS or AFSC	CEI	DOR	CAT	PULHES
31542	113	17Sep54		1-1-1-1-1-1

MARITAL	DOB	POB	CHILDREN	FOREIGN REL
Married	14Jun20	Galveston Texas		

CURRENT ADDRESS	CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE	MILITARY SERVICE
533 Terrace Circle Fayetteville, North Carolina	Salesman	Special Forces Svc from 1938 to present
LANGUAGE		

FLYING ETC	CIVILIAN EDUCATION	MILITARY SCHOOLING
	Two (2) Year College GED	AB Armd Co Officer Crse

REMARKS:

FA team Commander
~~Em~~ Excellent Physical Condition
Combat Experience, awarded Bronze Star and Purple Heart
IQ 130
Good Company Commander Type.
No Staff training or experience.

New Contract file
HJ

SECRET

COVER DATA

NAME: Grayston L. Lynch COVER: Ace Cartography Co.

JOB TITLE: General Manager SALARY: (TRUE: Career Agent - GS-13/5 $13,755

(COVER: $12,000 per year

EOD DATE: June 1964 SUPERVISOR: Geo. French, C/SO

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: EOD career agent in HQS Feb 61 - training - and PCS to WAVE Aug 61 - Hqs assigned Wilson Assoc. cover; in June 1964 Subj was under Ace Cartography Co. as Gen. Magr. & V-Pres. Will remain that cover while in Wave building.

MARITAL STATUS: married DEPENDENTS: 3 children

DPOB: 14 June 1923 - Gilmer, Tex. SOC. SEC. NO.: 451-18-7989

HOME ADDRESS: 12550 Moss Ranch Road
Miami, Fla. HOME PHONE: 666-3716

REMARKS:

Subj will indicate that he was an Army Officer and retired

Accepted position with Ace Cartography.

OFFICE ASSIGNMENT: SO OFFICE PHONE:

Pseudo: Irving C. Devuno

SECRET

SECRET
COPY

1 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT: Assignment of Robertson and Lynch to WH Division

1. This is in response to your oral request for the transfer or assignment of Robertson and Lynch from this Staff to WH Division.

2. These employees were recruited as Career Agents under CA/PMG Project PRJEWEL, and therefore are to be administered in accordance with the terms of this Project.

3. Under the terms of Project ZRJEWEL, CA/C/PMG is responsible initially for their selection and recruitment, and subsequently for their training and developmental assignments until they are transferred to an existing operational project under jurisdiction of an operating division.

4. Selection and recruitment involves complete processing to contract under provisions of HB 20-1000-1, and requires also:

a. security clearances

b. Medical Clearances

C. provision of cover

d. Financial Briefing

e. Assessment and Evaluation

5. Training and development requires that subject to be provided tutorial or group training, according to their individual needs, to qualify them as senior PM Officers capable of serving overseas as case officer, instructors, advisers, or consultants; and capable of developing indigenous forces, directing operations, and personally participating in operations. The training envisioned normally would include, but not be limited to:

a. Language apititude testing and subsequent language training
b. Clandestine tradecraft
c. Paramilitary operations training
d. Covert Action Operations training and CI Familiarization

6. Although both subjects are now under contract, as of this time, of all of the above mentioned items of processing, training and development, the following yet remains to be done:

Robertson : Medical clearance, provision of cover, financial briefing, Spanish language aptitude test and spanish language training, Clandestine refresher training as deemed adviseable.

S E C R E T

C O P Y

Lynch - provision of cover, financial briefing, assessment and evaluation, language aptitude test and possible language training, and all basic Clandestine Operations training.

7. Project ZRJEWELL further provides that administrative responsibility for these employees including compensation, operational security etc. will be transferred to the Operating Division for such periods of time as the employees are under the jurisdiction of the Division for operational duties. For administrative purposes, it is suggested that WH Division assume these responsibilities for both Robertson and Lynch as of 1 June 1961.

8. On of the major considerations in the contract employment of these two officers has been that their lack of association with the Agency, thus far, permits their operational utilization in circumstances where staff employees cannot participate, and their long range continued employment is, to a certain extent, dependent on their being abot to maintain this posture. It is requested, therefore, that you take every reasonable precaution to maintain their "deniable" status.

9. Since the CA Staff will once again become responsible for these officers whenever such time may come that you no longer have a reqiore,emt fpr tje,. ot wpi;l be veru ,icj apprecoated of tjos office would be kept advised as to their standard of performance, acquisition of additional capabilities, by either training or experience, and we should be consulted before any changes or amendments are made in their contracts which might become commitments to be assumed by the CA Staff

Alfred T. Cox
Chief, Paramilitary Group
Covert Action Staff

c/WH
CCG
C/CA

Note from: F.Y. Orig hand carried
to Bob [illegible] / Jones; Moore
said WH/4 Personnel would
contact CA/SG & effect transfer

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CI Staff

DATE: 24 May 1961

FROM : Corinne L. Hassell/DRB

SUBJECT: LYNCH, Grayston L.

Per telephone request of Helen Ingraham/CI Staff, IR on Grayston L. Lynch is forwarded. I saw subject 2 November 1960 when he came in to follow up on his application dated 4 January 1960 when he was interviewed by Mr. Neil Doherty, then Chief/DRB. Subject returned to the United States in July 1960. He had served as Team Leader with the Laos Army where he ran a training center in FAO Vientiane. I told him Mr. Moore was working on something for him and that if it developed, he would be contacted. That was my last contact with Mr. Lynch.

Corinne L. Hassell

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
LYNCH, Grayston L. (Applicant for Agency Position)

FROM:
LYNCH, Grayston L.

NO.

DATE
18 July 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. To RB Fuller				MEMO TO RECORD Subject again called in, via phone, on 18 July 1960 to ascertain possible Agency interest. Was advised that, as of date, no interest had been given to his application. He will again follow-up in about 6-to-9 months. Paul R. Wilson Paul R. Wilson
2.				
3.				
4.				Tuesday 2 Nov 60
5.				Per Ken Donaldson FE nothing likely in S. East Asia area because of pres situation in that area.
6.				
7.				
8.				Subject contacted a Sue Bell Moore (WH) yesterday.
9.				
10.				I called Mrs Moore ~~[illegible]~~ & briefed her re FE situation. She is working on something for this man in WH I.
11.				
12.				
13.				clb 3 Nov 60
14.				(S is legally separated as of 17 July 60 - Retired from Army for longevity, 31 July 60)
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O-[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Lynch, Grayston L.

FROM:

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. FE P VCL	25 FEB 1960		
2. C FE VCL			
3. FE P VCL			
4. FE P		[illegible] MAR 1960	
5. CSPO	MAR 15 1960	3/17/60	
6. DRB	[illegible]	3/22	
7. Darlene DRB Files			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Are you still interested in Capt. Grayston L. LYNCH for staff or contract employment?

1 to 2 Pl. call me W

3 to 4: FE VCL has advised Vientiane to acquaint themselves with subject and to evaluate him while he is on duty in Laos. It may be their evaluation will make further consideration of him unnecessary.

Ken D.

5) See above, pls.

5 to 6: Nothing more to do now.

7 to DRB

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 476731

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

LYNCH, Grayston L.

FROM:

Neil F. Doherty/DRB

NO.

DATE 29 January 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. Lou Armstrong 2119 I Bldg.	1960			① for information & forwarding to FE (attn Goodchild)
2. FE/Pers				
3.				
4.				2-8 nothing here, Lou. Goodchild is still with C. Francis in PP Staff.
5.				
6.				
7.				
8. CSPO 2122 I	9 Feb 60			
9. DRB (Doherty)				
10. R. B. Goodchild 1410 K Bldg.		17 Feb. '61		⑩ For information only - on your referral. Neil Doherty
11. Mr. Staten FE/Pers. 2313	23 FEB 1960	24 FEB 1960		10-11: Capt. Lynch, known to Robert Moore, FE/P/RO, was referred to Mr. Whitehurst for interview while in town a couple of weeks ago. Doherty DRD obtained applicant forms if Whitehurst's further interested either staff or contract-wise. R. M. Goodchild
12. FE/P/RCL				12/ Ken See if Whitley interested [illegible]
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 476711

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

1. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 4 January 1960
2. PLACE: Washington, D.C.
3. PREVIOUS APPLICATION: ☐ YES ☐ NO
4. INTERVIEWER: Neil F. Doherty
5. REFERRED BY:
6. TYPE OR PRINT IN CAPS — LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: LYNCH, Grayston L.
7. PERMANENT ADDRESS: 533 Terry Circle, Fayetteville, N.C. — TELEPHONE: HU 4-3443
8. BUSINESS ADDRESS: FC-4 77th SF Op. Ft. Bragg, N.C. — TELEPHONE: 46126
9. TEMPORARY ADDRESS: — TELEPHONE:
10. DATE OF BIRTH: 14 June 1923
11. PLACE OF BIRTH: Gilmer, Texas
12. CITIZENSHIP: ☒ U.S. ☐ OTHER (Specify country)
U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☒ BIRTH ☐ NATURALIZATION — IF NATURALIZED INDICATE DATE
13. ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOW(ER) ☐ DIVORCED
14. NO. OF DEPEND. (Excluding wife) 3
15. FOREIGN RELATIVES, INCLUDING WIFE (Reg. 10-9)

None

16. EDUCATION (Schools, degrees, dates, majors, thesis title, grade average or class standing, extra-curricular activities, etc.)

1946 Aercy Jones Institute, Battle Creek, Mich.
1948 US Army GED 2 years college

17. MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Employers, positions, duties, salaries, reasons for leaving)

18. MILITARY EXPERIENCE (Branch, serial no., stations, training duties, command responsibilities, rank held, reserve status, current proficiency and interest). INCLUDE ALSO DRAFT, ACTIVE MILITARY OR RETIRED STATUS.

1938 - Date US Army Capt. Special Forces team leader.
Retiring - 30 September or 31 October 1960

FORM NO. 182 REPLACES FORM 37-117
1 SEP 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4-11)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

19. AREA KNOWLEDGE (Areas, type of knowledge, how acquired, etc.)

Germany - 3 years
Japan 8 months
Korea 4 months
Panama 2 months

JAN 29 4 17 PM '60

20. LANGUAGE FACILITY (Give tests when skill warrants and rate below)

LANGUAGE	NATIVE FLUENCY	FLUENT BUT FOREIGN	ADEQUATE FOR TRANSLATION	ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH	ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL	LIMITED	ACQUIRED BY
German	weak						
Thia &Laotian	introductory						

21. SALARY REQUESTED

22. POOL INTEREST ☐ YES ☐ NO

23. ACCEPTABLE STATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ YES ☐ NO
ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☒ YES ☐ NO
OVERSEAS ☒ YES ☐ NO

PREFERENCE LIMITATIONS

24. HEALTH
Good

25. FORMS GIVEN ☐ PHS ☐ APP. 1 ☐ MED. ☐ SEC. AGREE. ☐ C/A (If required)

26. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION (Appearance, manners, personality, maturity, motivation, flexibility, intelligence, emotional stability, qualifications for intelligence work, career planning, over-all impression, pertinent unfavorable factors)

Big, strong, outdoor type,. Has a long term interest in staff employment but will accept contract. Though he prefers to take his family with him he will serve two years overseas without them if necessary.

His first area of interest is Europe/Germany but he would serve where ever assigned.

Looks like a good PM prospect for a training officer down below. Jungle warfare, escape and evasion are his specialities.

Will contact us when he returns from special six month assignment in Laos.

Copy to Mr. Lou Armstrong for information.

27. RECOMMENDED FOR

28. SERIAL NUMBERS

29. TESTS

nb

30.

Neil F. Doherty
SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

29 January 1960
DATE

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/4

SUBJECT: Captain Grayson L. Lynch, USA (Ret.)

1. Pursuant to conversations with personnel representatives of your office on 2 May 1961, I agreed to hold a position vacancy in Project ZRJEWEL for subject individual at his current basic pay level.

2. It was understood and agreed that WH/4 would continue to carry Subject on his present contract as long as his services are needed in the Division. It would be appreciated if you would inform me when Subject will be available for ZRJEWEL.

Alfred T. Cox
Chief
Paramilitary Group, CA

CA/PMG/APHaney:tcf
3 May 1961
Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CA/C/PMG
1 - CA/C/SG
2 - CA/PMG

Memorandum

Capt Grayston L. Lynch, 0[illegible]311
533 Terrace Circle
Fayetteville, N. C.

Al -

Name & address of officer about whom I just spoke to you on telephone.

Barn

1340
24 Oct 60.

SF Officer
well qualified in all aspects of SF ②
① available and
2 [illegible] will [illegible] [illegible]

From The Desk Of

Lt. Col. Wilson

GRAYSTON LEROY LYNCH

7th S.F. Group, Ft.Bragg, N.C.

Gilmer, Texas

14 June 1923 x

6 1½ x
194

TEXAS CAPTAIN U.S. ARMY

46126 Ft BRAGG SEP 54 PRESENT

14 Oct 38 20Sep 13 Oct 41 19Sep RA6288750
[illegible] Jun 48 50 30 Sep 47 50 ARMY 0965311

x

MILITARY SERVICE

Grayston L. Lynch
DOB: 14 June 1923

Oct 1938-Oct 1941	Enlisted service, 2d Infantry Division, 23d Infantry Regiment and 2d Reconnaissance Troop
Dec 1941- May 1945	Enlisted service, 2d Infantry Division, 2d Reconnaissance Troop, Platoon Sergeant, Wounded in Belguim.
May 1945-Sep 1947	Patient United States Army Hospitals.
Sep 1947-Jun 1948	Civilian - Sold Insurance and managed a Naval Officer's club, Houston, Texas.
Jun 1948-Sep 1950	Platoon Sergeant, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas.
Sep 1950-Oct 1951	Entered active duty as 2d Lieutenant, sent to Korea. Saw combat as Platoon Leader, 2d Reconnaissance Troop, 2d Infantry Division.
Oct 1951-Sep 1953	Company Commander, Reception Center, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
Sep 1953-Sep 1956	Instructor, 7th Army NCO Academy, Munich, Germany. Instructed in Tactics, Weapons, Leadership and Engineer equipment.
Sep 1956-Present	7th Special Forces Group(Abn), Fort Bragg, NC - Attended Special Forces Officer's Course 1956, served as Air Operations Officer and Team Leader of a Special Forces Operational Team. Trained team in all subjects of unconventional warfare to include training in all weapons, both American and foreign; demolitions and sabotage; Escape and Evasion; Guerrilla and Anti-guerrilla tactics; Supply and administration; Medical subjects; intensive study of selected target areas; Language of target areas; Political, Economical and Military situations of target areas. A one year study of South East Asia. Particular attention to Guerrilla Warfare operations in this area. Conducted training in radio communications work; Air resupply and Air infiltration of denied areas. 25% of this training was in classified subjects

that can not be covered here. I have had training in Intelligence nets and allied subjects and have been an instructor in all the subjects covered here. I have also led my team on a six (6) month classified mission in South East Asia, where very valuable training was received in an actual area of operation.

Radio oper C.W. 10 WPM
Parachutist

Public Speaking, USIA Germany
1954-56, U.S.Army 1956-60

1946 U.S.A.F.I.

U.S.A.F.I. 1947 1948 2yr Level

THE ARMORED SCHOOL FT. KNOX, KY.-1952-53
THE SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL, FT.BRAGG, N.C.-1956

x

FRENCH	x	x	x	x
GERMAN			x	
LAO	x	x x	x	x

John J. Hanretty	7th S.F.G., Ft.Bragg, N.C.	Maj.U.S.ARMY
Herbert Brucker	" " " "	Capt.U.S.Army
Phillip Mallory	" " " "	Capt.U.S.ARMY
	X	
	X	
	X	
	X	
		X
	X	
	X	
	X	
	X	

1) Traveled and lived in England, France, Germany, Belgium, Japan, Korea, and S.E.Asia while in military service.

2) I will retire as Capt. from the U.S.Army on 31 Oct 1960.

SECRET

28 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Personnel Security Division, Office of Security

SUBJECT : LYNCH, Grayston LeRoy #189184

Please be advised that Mr. Lynch was signed to contract effective 8 February 1961.

RICHARD F. GILLS
WH/4/Personnel

SECRET

SECRET

CSI 240-3

REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION OF MILITARY COVER ORDERS

TYPE IN TRIPLICATE

DATE: 27 February 1961

NAME: Grayston L. LYNCH

GRADE: Capt.

SERVICE NO. & BRANCH *(If military)*:

TYPE OF TRAVEL: ☐ PCS ☒ TDY

NO. OF DAYS TDY:

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT: 28 February 1961

ITINERARY: Washington, D. C. to New Orleans, La. and return.

TYPE OF IDENTIFICATION: ☐ DA FORM 1602 ☐ DD FORM 1173 ☐ DD FORM 720

TITLE FOR PASSPORT:

TRAVEL DATA

COVER & PASSPORT	COVER ORDERS	TRAVEL
☐ (DAC) (DAFO) COVER	☐ TAG	☐ SUBSEQUENT DEPENDENT TRAVEL
☐ MILITARY COVER	☐ FBIS	☐ CONCURRENT DEPENDENT TRAVEL
☐ OFFICIAL COURIER	☐ OTHER *(Specify)*	☐ CIPAP
☐ TYPE PASSPORT *(Specify)*	☒ CLEARANCE *(Specify)* Staff	☐ EXCESS BAGGAGE *(Indicate LBS over)*

DEPENDENT TRAVEL DATA

RELATIONSHIP	NAME	ADDRESS	AGE
	NA		

REMARKS

Orders should cover period from 28 February to 31 May 1961

SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER	☐ CONCUR ☐ NONCONCUR
TITLE OF REQUESTER WH/4/Personnel	OFFICIAL COVER & LIAISON, CCD

CPB ONLY

SUSPENSE DATE FOR ORDERS	REQUESTER

FORM 3-60 938 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

TO : Chief, WH-4, Security
Date: 14 February 1961
FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS
SUBJECT: LYNCH, Grayston LeRoy
#189184

1. This is to advise that Subject has successfully completed his polygraph interview and is approved for access to information classified through TOP SECRET as required in performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days to contract with the Subject within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. This clearance is limited to use under contract as specified in your request and no promise of staff employment is to be made or implied to Subject in any manner whatsoever.

4. This office is to be advised when a contract is signed with the Subject. In addition, notify this office when contract is terminated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

WAOsborne
W. A. Osborne

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 10 February 1961

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): LYNCH, Grayston L.

3. POSITION TITLE: Contract Employee

4. GRADE:

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DCI/WH/4

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5717

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☒ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ ~~OVERSEAS RETURN~~ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQ/TDY
OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 13 February 1961
STATION: WH Area
TDY OR PCS: TDY
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: HERBERT V. JUHL C/WH/4/PERSONNEL

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1905 Quarters Eye

EXT.: 5717

10. ~~REPORT OF EVALUATION~~ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
COMMENTS

Physical taken on 13 February - 89 hand carried by individual.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION
QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

DATE: 2 MAR 1961

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(28)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :Chief, WH-4, Security

DATE: 17 November 1960

FROM :Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS

SUBJECT:LYNCH, Grayston LeRoy - #189184

1. Subject is approved for appointment as specified in your request under provisions of CIA Regulations 20-1000 with access to information classified through TOP SECRET as required in performance of his duties, contingent upon a satisfactory polygraph interview.

2. Arrangements for the polygraph interview are to be made by your office, however, contracting with the Subject should be delayed until you are advised by memorandum of the results.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

WAOsborne
W. A. Osborne

SECRET

SECRET

CONTRACT EMPLOYEE BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Name (True): Grayston L. Lynch . Date of Birth: 14 June 1923

Place of Birth (City & State): Gilmer, Texas

Marital Status: Married Name of Spouse: Janette K. Lynch

No. of Dependents (Excluding Employee) 3 Years of Birth: 26 July 22/wife
11 Jan 54/son
4 Apr 49/son

Clerical Skills: Typing Speed NA w.p.m. Shorthand Speed NA w.p.m.

Non-KUBARK Employment: Name of Firm	Employment Dates From(Mo-Yr)	To(Mo-Yr)	Position Title
1. U. S. Army	Oct 1938	Oct 1960	Captain
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			

Non-KUBARK Education	Name	City & State	Diploma/ Degree	Year Completed	Major Fields
High School	Pettus High	Pettus, Texas	Not Grad/Grad USAFI-1946		
College					
Other			1 yr college level - USAFI		

Foreign Languages & Proficiency: (Native, Good, Poor, None)	Language	Read	Speak	Write	Understand
	1. Lao		x		Poor
	2. Spanish	x	x		Poor

KUBARK Sponsored Training:	Course Title	Year	Course Title	Year
	1. Radop	1961	4.	
	2.		5.	
	3.		6.	

KUBARK Employment History:

From (Mo-Yr)	To (Mo-Yr)	Position Title	Equiv. GS Grade	F/T or P/T	Component & Location
Feb 61	June 61	PM/ C/O	GS-11	F/T	WH
June 61	Present	PM/ C/O	GS-13	F/T	WH

Data as of 18 August 1965

HAVE YOU EVER HAD ACTIVE MILITARY, MILITARY RESERVE, OR NATIONAL GUARD STATUS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF YOU ANSWERED "NO" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, SIGN THIS FORM IN PSEUDONYM AND RETURN IT TO THE PERSONNEL BRANCH.

IF YOU ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, COMPLETE THIS FORM AND RETURN IT TO THE PERSONNEL BRANCH

PSEUDONYM
(Please Print) LAST FIRST MI
[illegible]

DATE OF BIRTH
MO DAY YR
[illegible]

MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 (As amended) ☐ YES ☒ NO
2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION
3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON RETIRED AUS
5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE (Specify)
HAVE SERVED →	X								[illegible]

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S) US Army [illegible]
3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (Past service) 31 Oct 1960
4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES [illegible]
5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY → PAST SERVICE Oct 14 195[illegible]
6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION
7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE → PAST SERVICE Capt
8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER [illegible]
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE PAST SERVICE 31204
10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE PAST SERVICE
11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY Experience:

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☒ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐	UNDUE HARDSHIPS
RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	☐	OTHER:
RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY	☐	

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED
REGULAR ☐ RESERVE (Including the National and Air National Guard) ☒ OTHER (Including AUS)

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD Status

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.? ☐ YES ☐ NO
3. Are you a member of a KUBARK Reserve Unit ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☒ ARMY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NAVY ROTC
☐ NAVY ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ AIR NAT'L GUARD KUBARK Category: I ☐ II ☐ III ☐

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE Capt
6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK 11 [illegible] 59
7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION
8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☒ RETIRED
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE
10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE
11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT? ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO
15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
16. [illegible] TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE [illegible] INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY YEARS MONTHS
17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT?

Present Marital Status: ☐ Single ☐ Married

SIGNATURE (P)

SECRET

14-00000

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE [illegible]	**PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT**	THIS DATE (Fill In)

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible]
2. AGE 37
3. SEX ☐ MALE ☐ FEMALE
4. HEIGHT [illegible] 1/2
5. WEIGHT [illegible]
6. COLOR OF EYES
7. COLOR OF HAIR
8. TYPE COMPLEXION
9. TYPE BUILD
10. SCARS (Type and Location)
11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES
12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) [illegible]
13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO. [illegible]
14. CURRENT PHONE NO.
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country) [illegible]
17. NICKNAMES
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED
19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.
20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority).

SECTION II POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING
2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary). $
3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT
4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL

OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (Check (X) each item applicable)

WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify):
OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

FORM 4-59 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(4)

14-00000

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISSUED BY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE (Fill In)

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible]

2. AGE: 37

3. SEX: ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

4. HEIGHT: [illegible]

5. WEIGHT: 144

6. COLOR OF EYES

7. COLOR OF HAIR

8. TYPE COMPLEXION

9. TYPE BUILD

10. SCARS (Type and Location)

11. OTHER DISTINGUSHING PHYSICAL FEATURES

12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country): [illegible]

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO.: [illegible]

14. CURRENT PHONE NO.

15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.

16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country): [illegible]

17. NICKNAMES

18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED

19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.

20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority).

SECTION II — POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING

2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary). $

3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT

4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (Check (X) each item applicable)
☐ WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify):
☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

FORM 4-50 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

141

SECTION III — CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): [illegible]

3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.

4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☑ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

5. DATE NATURALIZED

6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.

7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE

8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country)

9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☐ YES ☑ NO

10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY

11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☑ NO

13. GIVE PARTICULARS

14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)?

15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.

16. PORT OF ENTRY

17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY

18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue)

19. DATE VISA ISSUED

SECTION IV — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☑ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country)

3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To)

4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: USAFI

2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country)

3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1946

4. GRADUATE: ☑ YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL

2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country)

3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To)

4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
USAFI			1947	1949	[illegible]		[illegible]

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 4

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
[illegible]	[illegible]	1953	53	
[illegible]	[illegible]	195[illegible]		
	[illegible]			

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

SECTION V

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak: EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			HOW ACQUIRED: NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
[illegible]													X	X	X				
[illegible]													X	X	X				
[illegible]															X				

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION VI — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
England							
[illegible]							
[illegible]							
[illegible]							
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]					

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

Travelling [illegible]

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.

SECTION VII — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM					
		☐ GREGG		☐ SPEEDWRITING	☐ STENOTYPE	☐ OTHER (Specify):	

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.).

SECTION VIII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

[illegible] CW [illegible]

[illegible]

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.?
☐ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE (Provide License Registry Number, if known).

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of Issue)

7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of Issue)

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.
Public Speaking - 9510 - [illegible] 1953-55
US Army - [illegible]

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) [illegible]

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY [illegible]

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) [illegible] D.C. [illegible]

4. KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible]

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB [illegible]

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
[illegible]

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING
[illegible]

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

[illegible]

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) [illegible]
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY [illegible]
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) [illegible]
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB [illegible]
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES [illegible]
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) [illegible] 51 - Sept 52
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY [illegible]
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) [illegible]
4. KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible]
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) [illegible]
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY US Army
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) [illegible]
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB 2nd Lieut - Platoon Leader
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) [illegible] - Sept 53
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) [illegible]
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB Platoon Sgt
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

5

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

6

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
[illegible]

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
[illegible]

4. KIND OF BUSINESS
[illegible]

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB
[illegible]

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

7

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
Nov. 45 - Sept 47

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Patient in US Army Hospital

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

8. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN. 21 Yrs - 3 mos

9. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☐ YES ☑ NO

HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☑ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

SECTION X **MILITARY SERVICE**

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 *(As amended)* ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE *(Specify)*
HAVE SERVED →	X								
NOW SERVING →									

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S)
[illegible]

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY *(Past service)*
31 October 1960

4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES *(Past and current service)*
23 yrs.

5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY → PAST SERVICE: Oct 1937 CURRENT SERVICE:

6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE → PAST SERVICE: Sgt. CURRENT SERVICE: Capt.

8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER *(If now serving, provide current number)* [illegible]

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: CURRENT SERVICE:

10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: CURRENT SERVICE:

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES *(Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)*

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☐	HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☒	RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐	UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐	RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐	RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY		OTHER:
☐	RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐	RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY		

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

☐ REGULAR ☐ RESERVE *(Including the National and Air National Guard)* ☐ OTHER *(Including AUS)*

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? ☑ YES ☐ NO

2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.? ☐ YES ☑ NO

3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? ☐ YES ☑ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☑	ARMY	☐	MARINE CORPS	☐	NATIONAL GUARD	☐	COAST GUARD	☐	NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER	
☐	NAVY	☐	AIR FORCE	☐	AIR NAT'L. GUARD	☐	ARMY ROTC	☐	AIR FORCE ROTC		

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY *(Active)* ☐ STANDBY *(Inactive)* ☐ RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE

10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT ☐ YES ☒ NO

13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY — YEARS: MONTHS:

17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT?

SECTION XI — FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY. ☐ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES. ☐ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled)* SPECIFY:

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance

(Middle) *(Maiden)* *(Last)* Lynch

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)*

6. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*

7. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address, if deceased)*

11. DATE OF BIRTH

12. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*

13. CITIZENSHIP

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY
15. PLACE OF ENTRY
16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *(Country(ies))*
17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED
18. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)*
19. OCCUPATION
20. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers)*
21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*
22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE *(From and to - By Mo. and Yr.)*
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE
24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
[illegible]	Daughter			
	Son			
	Son			

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN *(Including step-children and adopted children)* WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS *(including spouse, parents, step-parents, sisters, etc.)* WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨

SECTION XIV FATHER *(Give same information, for Stepfather and/or Guardian on a separate sheet)*

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*
2. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH
4. CAUSE OF DEATH
5. CURRENT ADDRESS - *Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country)*
6. DATE OF BIRTH
7. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*
8. CITIZENSHIP
9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY
10. PLACE OF ENTRY
11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *(Country(ies))*
12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED
13. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)*
14. OCCUPATION
15. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed)*
16. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED.
17. [illegible] MILITARY SERVICE *(From-and-To)*
18. BRANCH OF SERVICE
19. COUNTRY
20. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION XXVI CERTIFICATION

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT
3. SIGNED AT (City and State)	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates, sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

Sec IX Cont: Employment:

Dec [illegible] - May [illegible] - US Army -

Motor Sgt - 2nd Infantry [illegible] Reconnaissance Troop
Wounded in Belgium

Oct 35 - Oct 41 - U.S. Army - 2nd Infantry [illegible] -
2nd Infantry [illegible]
[illegible] Reconnaissance Troop.

7
9
11
12
13
14
15
Oth
Mil

GRADE

Arabic
Chinese
Cantonese ( )
Mandarin (/)
French
German
Italian
Japanese
Portuguese
Russian
Spanish
African
Asian
European
Scandinavian

Languages

SECRET

CF Status

EE
FE-North
FE-South
-Africa
NEA-East
NEA-Middle
WH
WE

SEA

Area Knowledge

Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec

Shots OK until

24hrAvailabi'ty
Insurance
Type of Passport
Power of Atty.
Will
Psuedo

Task Force Commander (/)
GW-E&E-Resistance Officer(/)
a.Plan,Tactics,Strategy (/)
b.Weapons Tactical General (2)
c.Reception land,air,sea, Infil-exfil ( )
d.Techniques,cach.,surviv(/)
Air Operations Officer (/)
a. Planning,tactics (/)
b. Pilot ( )
c. Parachutist ( )
d. Balloonist ( )
( )Prop ( ) Pilot( ) Launch
Maritime Ops Officer ( )
a. Planning ( )
b. Operating ( )
c. Support ( )
d. Training ( )
Sabotage Officer (/)
a. Plan.,Target.,Train(/)
b.Explosives Demos Special ( ) Devices
c.UDT
Support Officer ( )
a. Personnel,Admin,PersAff( )
b. Finance ( )
c. Records and Reports ( )
Headquarters
Field

Location

Commo
Log
Medical
OTR
SEC
PSS
PP
FI
CI
[illegible]
Other

Competency Code:
(1) Best Qualified
(2) Experienced (one or more years)
(3) Trained (OTR or on-the-job)

Cleared for availability by:

Cover:

Present Military Status:

Past Military Experience: Sr Officer

Security Limitation:

Check with:

CF Position:

FI-Intell-Tech Support ( )
a. Intell Process ( )
b. Target Analysis ( )
c. Ops Tradecraft ( )
d. Agent Handling ( )
Political Action Officer( )
Propaganda Off,Media ( )
Security Officer ( )
Communications Officer ( )
Logistics Officer ( )
Medical Officer ( )
Other ( )
Order of Battle (/)
Interrogation ( )

Home Address: 535 Terrace Circle
Fayetteville, N.C.
Home Phone:
Office Address.
Extension:
Position:

FI
CI
PP
PM

SECRET

Revised
Form 148 1-60

SECRET

LYNCH, Grayston L

Emp

T for

DOB: 14 June

MILITARY EXP

Oct.'38 - Oct.'41	Enlisted service, 2d Infantry Division, 23d Infantry Regiment and 2d Reconnaissance Troop
Dec.'41 - May'45	Enlisted service, 2d Infantry Division, 2d Reconnaissance Troop, Platoon Sergeant, Wounded in Belguim.
May '45 - Sept'47	Patient United States Army Hospitals.
Sept'57 - June'48	Civilian - Sold Insurance and managed a Naval Officer's Club, Houston, Texas.
June'48 - Sept'50	Platoon Sergeant, 2d Armored Division, Ft. Hood, Tex.
Sept'50 - Oct.'51	Entered active duty as 2d Lieutenant, sent to Korea. Saw combat as Platoon Leader, 2d Reconnaissance Troop, 2d Infantry Division.
Oct.'51 - Sept.'53	Company Commander, Reception Center, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.
Sept.'53 - Sept'56	Instructor, 7th Army NCO Academy, Munich, Germany. Instructed in Tactics, weapons, Leadership and Engineer equipment.
Sept'56 - Oct.'60	7th SF Gp (abn), Ft. Bragg,; Attended SF Officer's Course 1956, served as Air Operations Officer and Team Leader of a Special Forces Operational Team. Trained team in all subjects of unconventional warfare to include training in all weapons, both American and foreign; demolitions and sabotage; Escape and Evasion; Guerrilla and Anti-Guerrilla tactics; Supply and administration; Medical subjects; intensive study of selected target areas; Language of target areas; Political, Economical and military situations of target areas. A one year study of SouthEastAsia. Particular attention to Guerrilla Warfare operations in this area. Conducted training in radio communications work; Air resupply and Air infiltration of denied areas. 25% of this training was in classified subjects. Has had training in intelligence nets and allied subjects and have been an instructor in all the subjects covered. Also lead his team on a six (6) month classified mission in SouthEastAsia, where very valuable training was received in an actual area of operation.

For a little more info on subject see 201 file.

NOTE: Subj. was interviewed by ICA for mission to Saigon. But was not followed up.

Consult [illegible]

STANDARD FORM 66
October 1959
PRESCRIBED BY U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Federal Personnel Manual Ch. 293
66-102

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 74-52 BOX 40

MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW A. 35655 7

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OP/F

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 August 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT - CSC - DISABILITY *Jimm wif*

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 30 | YEAR 71

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2255-5300

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08

16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 12,215

18. REMARKS:

Not Recommended for Agency Reserve List. Per JO

Concur:

Ellen Ranochak 8/19/71
OP/RAD/ROB/Ellen Ranochak

cc: PAYROLL
cc: SECURITY

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: *Robert E. O'Brien*
ROBERT E. O'BRIEN, C/PE/SS/NPIC

DATE SIGNED: *08/12/71*

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 43

20. EMPLOY CODE: 15

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 72997 | ALPHABETIC NPIC

22. STATION CODE: 75803

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOOTRS CODE:

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 04 | DA. 30 | YR. 17

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC; 2 - CRSA; 3 - FICA; 5 - NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: *Q, BHB, CK, CC*

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT; 2 - 10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RISE PROV TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVED; 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES; 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES; 2 - NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: *8/23/71*

46. OP APPROVAL: *Ralph A. Peacock* Ralph S. Peacock

DATE APPROVED: 17 AUG 1971

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
3-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Bureau of Retirement, Insurance, and Occupational Health
Washington, D.C. 20415

RCH:HQ:bf
07-27-71

NOTICE OF APPROVAL OF DISABILITY RETIREMENT APPLICATION

Chief, Benefits and Services Div.
Central Intelligeace Agency
Washington
DC 20505

Stop 64

26 July 71

The applicant for disability retirement identified below has been found totally disabled for useful and efficient service in his position:

NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE) Maksymiec, Myroslaw Andrew	DATE OF BIRTH 04-30-17	CLAIM NUMBER CSA-1 348 500
DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY AND LOCATION (IF DIFFERENT THAN THAT SHOWN IN ADDRESS ABOVE) Same		POSITION
REMARKS		

This employee should now be separated in accordance with the procedure outlined in Federal Personnel Manual Supplement 831-1 or similar instructions issued by your agency. Please forward the applicant's Final Individual Retirement Record (SF 2806) as soon as possible. In addition, please observe the following instructions:

1. UNDER "REMARKS" IN THE SERVICE HISTORY RECORD OF THE FINAL FORM 2806, GIVE DATE PAY CEASED.
2. ATTACH ONE COPY OF THIS FORM TO THE 2806 FORWARDED.
3. IF EMPLOYEE IS INSURED UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM, SUBMIT THE ORIGINAL OF COMPLETED AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS (SF 56) WITH THE FINAL INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT RECORD UNLESS THE EMPLOYEE WISHES TO CONVERT TO AN INDIVIDUAL POLICY.
4. IF EMPLOYEE IS ENROLLED UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM AND APPARENTLY IS ELIGIBLE TO CONTINUE HEALTH BENEFITS ENROLLMENT AS A RETIRED EMPLOYEE, PLEASE SUBMIT WITH THE FINAL INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT RECORD:
    - All triplicate copies of Health Benefits Registration Forms (SF 2809) and any medical certificates attached thereto.
    - Quadruplicate copy of Notice of Change in Health Benefits Enrollment (SF 2810) transferring enrollment to the Civil Service Retirement System.
5. IF FOR ANY REASON THE FINAL FORM 2806 CANNOT BE FORWARDED WITHIN 10 DAYS, PLEASE FURNISH PROMPTLY THE INFORMATION REQUESTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF DUPLICATE OF THIS LETTER.

Jack Goldberg

JACK GOLDBERG
CHIEF, CLAIMS DIVISION

(OVER)

BRI 46-48
November 1969

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 May 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MATSYNIEC, Myroslaw A.

1700

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LWOP NTE -90 days
27 Aug 1971

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 28 YEAR 71

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1255-5300

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/NPIC
Development Complement

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: D and E Tech

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08

16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: $12, 215

18. REMARKS:

Pending Disability Retirement LWD - 5.28.71

Other [illegible] 5/28/71 PSI DUE: 4-29-73
PB 6/10/71

cc - Security
cc - Payroll

PAB [illegible] 6/1/71

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
Robert E. O'Brien, C/PB/CC/NPIC

DATE SIGNED: 5/26/71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 38
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 72997 ALPHABETIC NPIC
22. STATION CODE: 71213
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 04 DA. 30 YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRACE: MO. 05 DA. 02 YR. 66
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 07 DA. 02 YR. 71
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. 08 DA. 27 YR. 71
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RSRV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 6-3-71

46. OP APPROVAL: Ralph S. Pollock
Ralph S. Pollock
Chief, Special Activities Staff
Office of Personnel

DATE APPROVED: 28 MAY 1971

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 May 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 25 YEAR 71

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1255-5300

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/NPIC
Development Complement

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

6
22

11. POSITION TITLE: D and E Tech 9

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08

16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 12, 215

18. REMARKS:

Pending Disability Retirement

+01lw

6
19

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert E. O'Brien, C/PB/SS/NPIC

DATE SIGNED: 5/26/71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 57

20. EMPLOY CODE: 18

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 72997 ALPHABETIC NPIC

22. STATION CODE: 72715

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HQQTRS. CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 04 DA. 30 YR. 17

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OACH 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV. TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5-27
7-20

46. O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

JMC1 24 AUG 71

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 035655	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A					
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT CSC DISABILITY FROM LWOP				4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 30 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 2255 5300 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS					10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	
11. POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH					12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS			15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1670.08		16. GRADE AND STEP 09 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 12215
18. REMARKS						

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition (4 51)

11 3199

27-4292

Mr. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec
4718 Asbury Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20016

12 AUG 1971

Dear Mr. Maksymiec:

As you bring to a close more than thirty years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
O - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: /s/Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel
11 AUG 1971

OP/RAD/ROB/ERanochak:sl (4 August 1971)

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

NOTICE OF RATING

APPLICANT MUST FILL IN ALL BLANKS DOWN TO HEAVY BLACK LINE

EXACT TITLE OF EXAMINATION: TECHNICIAN IN ENGINEERING & PHYSICAL SCIENCE (WA-7-1

DATE OF EXAMINATION:

NAME: Mr. Myroslaw A. Makuymiec

ADDRESS: 4718 Asbury Place, N. W.

CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE: Washington, D. C. 20016

This is not a notice of appointment. It is a record of your rating. It is important that you keep it. It is noted that your application was not rated for any position with a lower entrance salary than that which you indicated thereon.

Your Rating is — ELIGIBLE

☐ This examination is not rated on a numerical basis

☑ Your numerical rating is:

GS-10 100
GS-11 96

Your Rating is — INELIGIBLE for the reasons checked below:

☐ The lowest acceptable salary indicated on your application is higher than the salary shown on our announcement.

☐ You did not pass the written test. All competitors must attain an earned rating of 70 without regard to veteran preference. When an applicant's paper falls below the passing mark it is not scored further. Ineligibles do not receive a numerical grade.

☐ Your application does not show that you meet the minimum requirements as to experience (or education) which were specified in the examination announcement.

☐ Your eligibility is suspended pending your furnishing the Commission proof of correction of physical condition, as shown on the attached notice.

☐ Failed to reply to official correspondence.

☐

IF THERE IS A CHECK BELOW, IT INDICATES THE AMOUNT OF VETERAN PREFERENCE CREDIT INCLUDED IN YOUR RATING

☐ 5 POINTS—IF YOU ARE APPOINTED YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER EVIDENCE OF HONORABLE SEPARATION FROM THE ARMED FORCES.

☑ 10 POINTS

If you have received an eligible rating, be sure to read the important message on the back of this form.

25 JUL 1969

INTERAGENCY BOARD OF
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINERS FOR
WASHINGTON, D. C.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20415

(Issuing Office and Date of Issue)

CSC FORM 4000
OCTOBER 1963

IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO ELIGIBLES

YOU HAVE RECEIVED AN ELIGIBLE NOTICE OF RATING. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?

IT MEANS THAT: Your name has been placed on the list of persons who have passed this examination, in its proper relative standing. This list of eligibles, or register, is kept by the office whose name and address appears in the lower right-hand corner on the other side of this notice.

IT MEANS THAT: When your name is reached on the register, you will be considered for the type of jobs for which you have qualified, (in the geographical area) covered by the examination. (When a Federal agency requests the Commission to supply the names of eligibles, the names of the three eligibles at the top of the register are certified to the agency for consideration.) The agency appointing officer may choose any one of these three persons, so long as he complies with the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, as amended.

IT MEANS THAT: Your prospects for getting a job from this examination cannot be predicted. They depend upon how many vacancies may occur to be filled by eligibles, and on your relative standing on the register. Your name will be certified for consideration as it comes within reach and as requests for eligibles are received. (If you are not selected, your name will go back on the register in its proper relative standing, to be considered again when within reach until the register is terminated.)

IT MEANS THAT: YOU MUST INFORM THE OFFICE WHICH ISSUED THIS NOTICE OF RATING OF ANY CHANGES IN YOUR ADDRESS OR IN THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT. SEND ANY NEW INFORMATION CONCERNING YOUR ADDRESS OR AVAILABILITY TO THE OFFICE WHOSE NAME AND ADDRESS IS SHOWN IN THE LOWER RIGHT-HAND CORNER ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THIS NOTICE, AND REFER TO THE TITLE OF THE EXAMINATION AND THE RATING RECEIVED.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Any offer of appointment or inquiry as to availability which you may receive from a Federal agency will show whether you are being considered for a limited temporary, a career-conditional, or a career appointment.

2. If, when you are considered for appointment, you signify that you are not available or you fail to reply to a communication, your name will be removed from the register until you satisfactorily explain your reasons and specify the conditions under which you would be willing to accept any appointment. When you are unable to accept any appointment you should request that your name be suspended from the register until you are again able to acce [illegible] requests for restoration to the register while it is still in use, changes in availability, or transfer of eligibility, will be acted on without further notice to you.

3. If you are now employed by the Federal Government and have received an eligible rating, show this notice to your personnel officer. He should be aware of your eligibility on this examination. THIS DOES NOT RELEASE YOU FROM YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP THE OFFICE MAINTAINING YOUR ELIGIBILITY INFORMED OF CHANGES AS MENTIONED ABOVE.

4. A competitor who received an eligible rating may, under certain conditions, have his eligibility transferred from the register of one civil service office to a similar register in another civil service office.

A competitor who wishes to have his eligibility transferred should send his request to the office where his eligibility is maintained.

[illegible] determination will then be made, and the competitor will be notified, as to whether his eligibility can be transferred.

5. A register established from an examination held in order to fill a specific type of position at a stated salary may also be used to fill vacancies in related positions or at a lower salary. When you accept a career-conditional or a career appointment, your name will be removed from all registers established as a result of this examination. Until your name is removed, your willingness to accept a lower salary will not affect your eligibility for positions at a higher salary.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 O—794-130

If you are not appointed or the register is not officially terminated earlier, your eligibility from this examination will be in effect for a period of 18 months only unless you submit up-to-date information about your qualifications before that time by letter, Standard Form 57 or Form 57A; however, such information will not be accepted if you have had eligibility for less than 1 year. The date of issue which appears on this "Notice of Rating" is that on which your period of eligibility began.

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

[illegible]

Mr. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec
4718 Asbury Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016

Date: [illegible]

A preliminary review has been made of the application(s) which you submitted for consideration under Announcement No. 413, Mid-Level Positions in Administrative, Staff, and Technical Services. The experience and training described in your application appear acceptable under the general terms of the announcement. You will be considered for positions for which your experience and training qualify you at grade: GS-11

However, applicants who appear to meet the general announcement requirements for a particular grade level are not thereby qualified for all positions at that grade. When a government agency requests names of eligibles to consider in filling a vacancy, applications showing skills and backgrounds that match the requirements of the job to be filled are carefully reviewed. The best qualified candidates are referred for consideration, ranked in accordance with their relative qualifications with due regard to Veterans Preference.

As you know, applicants may establish eligibility with any two offices maintaining lists under this announcement. In accordance with your request, your eligibility is on the list(s) maintained in the city or cities indicated below:

Washington, D.C.

Please see reverse for complete addresses and other important information.

CSC Form 970
November 1967

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 April 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW A. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 08 YEAR 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6255-4100
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
6 DDI/NPIC
3 PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH -9-
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0644
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 7,987 ✓

18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Lawrence R. [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 4/29/66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQDTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF EOD MO.	DA.	YR.
22	10	72150	NPIC	75013		1	04	30	17	05	08	66	05	08	66

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 3-FICA 5-NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: (AR RES) PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0-WAIVED 1-YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS 3-BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5-6-66
46. O.P. APPROVAL: M. T. [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 5/6/66

FORM 6-53 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Plans Branch/P&DS

11 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant for Plans and Development

SUBJECT : Appreciation for Effort Concerning Publication Technical Development Program - 1965

1. It is my pleasure to inform you of an outstanding contribution that Mr. Myroslaw Maksymiec, a member of your Staff, made toward the successful completion of the NPIC Technical Development Manual for 1965.

2. Mr. Maksymiec's technical advice and superior photographic skill were responsible for the high quality photographs that insured the excellent quality reproductions contained in the 1965 Technical Development Manual.

3. The success of the manual was due in no small part to Mr. Maksymiec's contribution and I wish to personally commend him for his contribution.

Paul W. Reinowski

PAUL W. REINOWSKI
L/Colonel, USAF
Chief, Plans Branch, Plans and
Development Staff

Mr. Maksymiec:

It gives me considerable pleasure to pass on to you this letter from the Chief of Plans Branch, NPIC. I was aware of your efforts in support of this manual and I would like to thank you for another job well done.

A copy of this correspondence should be forwarded to the Support Staff for entry in your official records.

GORDON T. SOWERS
Colonel, USAF
Assistant for Plans and Development

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 June 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MAKSIMCZUK MYROSLAW A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 05 YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: Z V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3255-4100-~~5565~~

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/NPIC
PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

3
A

11. POSITION TITLE: ~~RAD TECH~~ D and E Tech (9)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0644

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: JP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.01 ~~1060.02~~

16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 6600

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Herbert V. Juul | DATE SIGNED: 30 June '64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. REGISTER CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	72 150	[illegible]	75013		1	04 30 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION | O.P. APPROVAL | DATE APPROVED: 7-2-64

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

TAB L

16 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Career Service Board, NPIC

THROUGH : Secretary, Career Service Board, NPIC

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion

1. NAME: Maksymiec, Myroslaw Andrew

2. POSITION TITLE AND PRESENT ASSIGNMENT:

Photog (Gen) occupying Physical Scientist Slot, assigned to the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch of the Plans and Development Staff.

3. PRESENT GRADE, TIME IN CIA:

GS-7/3, EOD Date November 1961

4. EDUCATION AND TRAINING: High School

5. EXPERIENCE:

Mr. Maksymiec retired as a Master Sergeant in July 1961, after 20 years of Army photographic experience. He worked in PSD/PIB from November 1961 until 15 September 1963. On this date he was assigned to the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch of the Plans and Development Staff on a 30-day trial basis. This period was extended to January, 1964 at which time the assignment was made permanent.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion

6. JUSTIFICATION FOR PROMOTION:

Mr. Maksymiec's primary experience has been in practical photography. Since joining the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch, he has learned the theoretical side of photography and combined this with his already extensive knowledge of the photographic process. He has carried out several investigations which indicate a natural bent for scientific methods. After initial briefings, he requires little, if any, supervision. His maturity is a distinct asset in his work, where extreme attention to detail and good judgement are absolute necessities. He exhibits a willingness to work for the group, no matter the hours, and cooperates and works well with others.

His responsibilities and quality of effort are deserving of more than his current GS-7 status. It is therefore recommended that Mr. Maksymiec be promoted to GS-8.

John W. Cain

JOHN W. CAIN
Assistant for Plans and Development
P&DS, NPIC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 January 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MAKSYMIEC Myroslaw A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 | DAY | YEAR

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4255-1030-6000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/NPIC
PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: PHOTOG GEN *

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0303

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1060.02

16. GRADE AND STEP: 07-~~1~~ 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~5795~~ 6185

18. REMARKS:
* Photog Gen occupying Physical Scientist Slot

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Herbert [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 14 Jan. '64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC [illegible] ALPHABETIC [illegible]

22. STATION CODE: [illegible]

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HQSTRS. CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 04 DA. 30 YR. 17

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. LEI EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 17 JAN 1964 EC

46. O.P. APPROVAL: David H. Ricketts

DATE APPROVED: 17 January 1964

FORM 4.62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

Personnel Officer
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY

QUESTIONNAIRE ON APPLICANT FOR A POSITION

NOTE.—The information you furnish on this form will be held in confidence

APPLICANT'S NAME: Myroslaw A. Maksymiec

POSITION APPLIED FOR: Photographer GS-9

EXAM OR REF. NO: PT-58

The spaces at the right of the questions listed may be used for your answers. If you prefer to make a general statement, or need additional space for your reply, the space under "General Comments" on the reverse should be used. *The questions and explanatory statements in italics are given as guides to the type of information we should like to have, and need not be answered specifically if you consider other factors to be more pertinent.*

1. During what period of time, how well, and in what connection have you known the applicant? *(i. e., employer, personal acquaintance, coworker, etc.)*	His employer since January 1962.
2. ABILITY. How would you rate the applicant on knowledge of and interest in his specialized technical field? *(Is he better or less well informed than the average? An enthusiast? An authority? Does he express himself well in writing? Does he keep up with new developments? Contribute new ideas? Prefer old methods?)*	Average - At present, employee is under close supervision, he will continue this until he is capable of assuming duties assigned.
3. PERSONALITY. How would you characterize the applicant's temperament and stability? *(Is he moody? Even-tempered? Is he cooperative? Sometimes stubborn? Is he unsure of himself? Self-confident? Is he impulsive? Cautious?)*	Applicant gets along well with fellow employees and is cooperative.
How would you evaluate the applicant's ability to meet and deal with others? *(Is he friendly? Awkward? Reserved? Tactful? Does he make a poor first impression? Improve on acquaintance? Does he talk fluently? Haltingly? Too much? Dogmatically?)*	Applicant is friendly.
Do you know of anything in the applicant's background, or does he have any characteristics or personal habits which might adversely affect his efficiency or his relations with fellow-workers? *If your answer is YES, please give details.*	No
Do you have any knowledge of behavior, activities, or associations which would indicate that the applicant is not reliable, honest, trustworthy, and of good conduct and character? *If your answer is YES, please give details.*	No
4. LOYALTY. Do you have any reason to question the applicant's loyalty to the United States? *If your answer is YES, please give details.*	No
To your knowledge, does the applicant belong or has he belonged to any organization which advocates overthrowing or altering our constitutional form of government by force or other illegal means? *If your answer is YES, please give details and list the organizations.*	No
To your knowledge, does the applicant associate, or has he associated, with any person whose loyalty to the United States is questionable or who belongs to any of the types of organizations described above? *If your answer is YES, please give details.*	No

Form FAA-[illegible]

WORK HABITS. How would you describe the applicant's approach to his work? [illegible] Methodical? Careless? [illegible] Thorough? Does [illegible] Organize his [illegible]	[illegible] in detail [illegible]
How would you rate the applicant's industry and dependability? [illegible]	[illegible] He should improve with more [illegible]
6. POTENTIALITIES. What is your opinion of the applicant's administrative ability? (Is he primarily a follower or a leader? Would he be best as a [illegible], a planner, or an independent worker? Is he hesitant? Is he [illegible]? Does he need close supervision? Know how to delegate authority?)	Ad[illegible] administrative responsibility [illegible] presently in [illegible] He tends to be a follower.
What is your estimate of the applicant's capacity to advance? (Is he a plodder? [illegible] with the job? Is he interested in doing a good job or merely concerned with promoting himself? Does he avoid responsibility? Accept it readily?)	Capacity for advancement will depend on his initiative and ability in the future.
What kind of job or what level of work in general do you think the applicant might be expected to hold in ten years? Give reasons [illegible]	Not applicable
7. RECOMMENDATION. If the applicant was employed by you, what was his	TITLE Photographer [illegible] SALARY $9,323 REASON FOR LEAVING Higher grade
Would you reemploy him?	☒ YES ☐ NO ☒ AT SAME SALARY ☐ LOWER SALARY ☐ HIGHER SALARY
"This person, if employed, may conceivably be assigned by the Federal Aviation Agency to your own city in connection with an activity, such as aircraft inspection, air traffic control, airport planning, etc., directly related to the flying safety of you and your family. In view of the above, would you recommend him for a position of such responsibility?"	Not applicable

8. GENERAL COMMENTS.—*Please make any additional remarks you think might be helpful to us in deciding about the applicant's suitability for employment. (If additional space is needed, continue on separate sheet.)*

Mr. [illegible] has had past experience as a photographer with the Armed Forces. He is a good photographer. Since he has been employed [illegible] his duties are that of data room processing.

E. D. Ellis

Signature [illegible] WCE Address [illegible] Washington, D.C.

Designation Director [illegible] Date [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 January 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER	035655 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	1 / 22 / 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	Regular
6. FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	2255-1010-7000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/NPIC Data Management Division Technical Branch Photographic Lab Section Contact Printing Unit
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	Photog (Gen)
12. POSITION NUMBER	239
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	1060.02
16. GRADE AND STEP	7-1
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 5,355 ✓
18. REMARKS	New S/C
18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	
DATE SIGNED	
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	Alan E. Mayer
DATE SIGNED	16 Jan 1962

4

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	37
20. EMPLOY. CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC	42510
21. OFFICE CODING — ALPHABETIC	NPIC
22. STATION CODE	
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. HQDTRS. CODE	1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	4 30 17
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE; MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/CD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.))	
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	
46. O.P. APPROVAL	
DATE APPROVED	

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (4)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 July 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Excepted Appointment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 28 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2255-1010-7000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/NPIC
Data Management Division
Technical Branch
Photographic Laboratory Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Photog (Gen)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 49

12a. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1060.02

16. GRADE AND STEP: 7 - 1

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 5355 ✓

18. REMARKS: One copy sent to Security.

OFFICE/DIVISION WITHIN CEILING
24 NOV 1961
Date
Position Con. Clk.

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: William L. Banfield

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Alan E. Mayer

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 11
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 92500 ALPHABETIC NPIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGRITY CODE:
24. HISTORY CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. [illegible] DA. 30 YR. 27
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 11 DA. 28 YR. 61
27. DATE OF SEP.: MO. 11 DA. 28 YR. 61
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 4 = NONE — CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE — MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 45[illegible]
34. SEX: [illegible] - 1
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 1 (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. 06 DA. 9 YR. 41
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. 11 DA. 28 YR. 61
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT: 1 = YES, 2 = NO — CODE 2
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1 (0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES) — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 0[illegible]-12-[illegible]
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0
0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.)
3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 2
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) CODE 1 — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 4
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) CODE 2 — NO. TAX EXEMP. — STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7 JUL 1961

46. O.P. APPROVAL: D. W. McCauley by [illegible] 7/11/61

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 23 March 1961
SOURCE:
CANDIDATE (Last, First, Middle): MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw Andrew
PLACE OF BIRTH: Manchester, N.H.
DATE OF BIRTH: 30 April 1917
TEMPORARY ADDRESS: 3268 Valley Drive, Alexandria, Virginia
PHONE: TE 6-8218
PERMANENT ADDRESS: 3268 Valley Drive, Alexandria, Virginia
PHONE: TE 6-8218
BUSINESS ADDRESS: Office Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Pentagon.
PHONE: OX 7-1376
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Washington, D.C. - DRB
DATE AVAILABLE:
RECM (Office, serial): Photo Lab Tech
GS- 7
TESTS:

EDUCATION:
1933 - 1935 Central High School - Manchester, New Hampshire - completed 2 yrs.

EMPLOYMENT: SEE ATTACHED FORM 57.

MILITARY:
1941 - Date Master Sergeant - Chief of Staff for Intelligence 1950 to Date - Photography and lab work of all types with the Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

The applicant is about to retire after 20 years military service. Mr. Maksymiec has a pleasant personality, presents a good personal appearance in his Master Sergeant's uniform, and seems to be about average in intelligence and maturity.

Subject has had some excellent photo and photo lab experience while working with the military attache and in headquarters.

Attached is form 57 plus several letters of commendation. Please refer to POD/CH/CSSB for consideration by NPIC as Photo Lab Tech at about the GS-7 level.

DATE SENT TO HQ: JBS
INTERVIEWER: G.E. POST

FORM 3-60 1667 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4-38)

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

75-1095/A

DD/A 75-2235

9 MAY 1975

Mr. Myroslaw Maksymiec
4718 Asbury Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20016

Dear Mr. Maksymiec:

This letter is in response to the comment you made to the Director on Alumni Day, 26 April 1975, concerning a special medallion for NPIC employees who participated in the Cuban missile crisis.

I have had the appropriate records reviewed. The Certificate of Commendation you and other NPIC employees received was awarded by direction of the President in recognition of the meritorious service performed.

It is hoped that the lack of a medallion to accompany this certificate will in no way detract from the contribution you made during this period of crisis.

Sincerely,

/s/ John E. Blake

John F. Blake
Deputy Director
for
Administration

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - ER
? - DDA
1 - D/Pers
~~2~~ 1 - DD/Pers/SP (1 w/held)
1 - OPF

Originator: (Signed) F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

5 MAY 1975

DD/Pers/SP/RLAustin,Jr:goc ([illegible] May 75)

[illegible]

DD/A 75-2034

2 6 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

Fred:

1. The facts behind the question raised with the Director by Mr. Maksymec on Saturday, 26 April, are, according to him, as follows.

2. After NPIC had done its fine work during the Cuban missile crisis it appears that two different types of recognition were given. Determinations were made first on certain individuals whose contributions were such that they should receive an Agency medal award. A second group of some 200 were then identified for their level of contribution and received some kind of certificate from the White House signed by the President. Mr. Maksymec was in the latter group and espouses the cause that a "special medallion" should have been given along with the White House certificate. Mr. Bob Gaynor also spoke to me on this matter on Saturday, and has a good recollection on the whole matter.

3. Will you do what you can on the matter and prepare me a letter to be sent to Mr. Maksymec?

John F. Blake
Deputy Director
for
Administration

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Adse

WATER BASED ACRYLIC EPOXIES • ANTI-DUST COMPOUNDS
FLOOR SEALERS • LEVELLING COMPOUNDS • R[illegible] COATINGS

M. A. Maksymiec
VICE PRESIDENT SALES

Environmental Coating Industries Corporation
7204 Poplar Street · Annandale, Virginia 22003 (703) 354-4282

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DLen	7 May	J
2	DD/A FYI		
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Al did a nice job of putting this problem to bed. You might want to forward to Jack for info.

-B

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
DD/Pers	7 MAY 1975

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

[illegible]-1196

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Myroslaw Maksymiec - Retired Employee

The meeting with Mr. Maksymiec on 6 May 1975 was to satisfy his request to review his official personnel file (this matter was being treated in the manner of a request under the Freedom of Information Act). Location: Main Reception Interview Room at Headquarters Building - 3 p.m.

The duration of the meeting was one (1) hour of which time Mr. Maksymiec used approximately 7 to 8 minutes to quickly thumb-thru the OPF. It is my impression that he was surprised: 1) we were allowing him to see all the material in the file (he described vividly, a 1971 unpleasant encounter with Mr. Echols, the Director of Personnel, who refused to show him a document and would only read to him a small portion from it - this caused his request and subsequent interview with the DCI, Mr. Helms), and 2) at the reality that the file contained nothing actually derogatory (he stated he had seen and signed the fitness reports so these represented nothing unknown).

The major portion of the time was consumed in my listening to his evaluation and assessment of the various supervisors and co-workers at NPIC and their shortcomings. He regaled me with much of his background and history with the military and initial application and entrance on duty with the Agency; his personal acquaintance and relationships with notables - a former American Ambassador to Ethiopia, Joseph Simonson, the Emperor of Ethiopia, several Generals and Congressional personalities, Mr. Helms and Mr. Arthur Lundahl, and his membership in the Explorer Club.

Presently he is Vice President for Sales of the Environmental Coating Industries Corporation located in Annandale, Virginia - the company removes corrosion and stains from surfaces. He offered the company services at the 1974 Alumni session, to clean the stains from the Nathan Hale statue at the front of the building, at a cost of $300. He plans to follow-up on his proposal, since he has not heard anything from the Agency.

He mentioned that Mr. Blake, at the direction of the DCI, (1975 Alumni Day) was to explore and advise him (Maksymiec) of the possibility of striking and issuing a medal to about 200 Agency personnel (of whom he is one) for their participation in certain aspects of the 1962 Cuban crisis.

Our meeting ended with Mr. Maksymiec indicating he had no intention of "going after anybody," but he was curious what was in his file, and that was the basis for asking to see it.

Abraham Schwartz

4-00000

SECRET

...ICATION OF ... SHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFIC... COVER BACKSTOP

DAT: 17 FEB 71

FILE NUMBER: 11814

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 035055

ID CARD NUMBER: Air Force 8995

TO: (Check)

X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION
	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) NPIC

ATTN: NPIC/Chief Support Staff

REF: Form 1322 DTD FEB 71

SUBJECT: MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.

OFFICIAL COVER

	BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
X	DISCONTINUED

UNIT: Logistical Support Grp. Prov.

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)

A. TEMPORARILY FOR ____________ DAYS

EFFECTIVE DATE ____________

B. CONTINUING AS OF

	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X	ASCERTAIN THAT CIA W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

X	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11) Operational Use Only

DATE

X	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

EDF/pw

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CO
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - OF
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 12-70 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 11 August 64

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) NPIC

ESTABLISHED FOR: MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.

ATTN: Mr. Carl Batchelder

FILE NO.: K-8235

REF: Form 1322 16 June 64 Requesting cover

ID CARD NO.: B8995

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: Logistical Support Group, Provisional

EMPLOYEE NO.:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

OPERATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

☒ Block Records: (OPUFIZD 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______________________.

b. Continuing, effective EOD ______________.

NA Submit Form 642 to change limitation category. (HHB 20-7)

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued. (HB 20-461-1)

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover. (R 240-250)

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility. (R 240-250)

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE 8/14/64

☐ Remarks:

☒ Cover History Nov 61-present-overt-NPIC

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

~~CCS~~/al

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-OL/TELSVC, Copy 5-PSD/OS, Copy 6-File.

FORM 1-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTICE OF EMPLOYER DESIGNATION FOR TAX PURPOSES

035655 MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A

EMPLOYER IS CIA AS OF 7 JUNE 1964

SECRET

UMC: 24 AUG 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

5277

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT CSC DISABILITY FROM LWOP
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 07 30 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 2255 5300 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12215
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 43
20. Employ Code: 18
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC):
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Position Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 04 30 17
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC; 2 - CIA; 3 - FICA; 4 - NONE) CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0HD0000
32. Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE; MO DA YR):

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT; 2 - 10 PT):
36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE):
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVED; 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE):
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)):
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS):
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE):

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8-24-71
DN

FORM 3-66 1150
Mfg. 6-72
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BDC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

UBU: 22 JUN 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 | DA 25 | YR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1255 5300 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12215
18. REMARKS: OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Vetran Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	18	72997	NPIC	75013		1	04 30 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSR 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 2 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-23-71 Mr

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-66 Mfg. 6-73

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

B15

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	72 700	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	BI	ADJ.
GS 09	5	$11,866	05/04/69	GS 09	6	$12,219	05/02/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 3/15/71

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS N.E.FISHER

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

DHD: 6 JULY 1971

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEAVE WITHOUT PAY NTE: 27 AUGUST 1971
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 DA 28 YR 71 1700
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 2255 5300 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12215
18. REMARKS: OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 38
20. Employ Code: 18
21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC: 72997 ALPHABETIC: NPIC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Suppl. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 04 DA 30 YR 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO 05 DA 08 YR 66
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 05 DA 02 YR 71
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO 08 DA 27 YR 71
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 FICA 4 None CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 None 1 5 Pt 2 10 Pt
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: PROF. TEMP. RESV. CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 Waiver 1 Yes HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 No previous service 1 No break in service 2 Break in service (less than 3 yrs.) 3 Break in service (more than 3 yrs.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 Yes 2 No CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 Yes 2 No CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7-12-71

FORM 1150 5-66 Mag. 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 700	V	GS 09 5	$11,866

14-00000

[illegible] 12 [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]55
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]ROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible]
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. [illegible] DA. [illegible] YR. 7[illegible]
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: [illegible] 53 [illegible]
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 5 USC [illegible] 3[illegible]
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI [illegible]
TECHNICAL SERVICES AND SUPPORT GROU
RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING DIVISION
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH
12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]844
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: 1[illegible]
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 167[illegible]08
16. GRADE AND STEP: [illegible] 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 1[illegible]564
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: [illegible]7
20. Employ. Code: 1
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC [illegible] ALPHABETIC [illegible]
22. STATION CODE: 75[illegible]13
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. [illegible] Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. [illegible] DA. 3[illegible] YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4/[illegible] POSTED

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition
Mfg. 10-67

SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-51)

(When Filled In)

PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U.S.A.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCS 01/31/70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 039655	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 01 11 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	0255 5600 0000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI/NPIC DDI/NPIC/TSSG/RED/ATB	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0644	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1670.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 09	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
2-3-70

Form 11508 7-66 . MFG. 10-68 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 700	V	GS 09 5	$11,197

B-8

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	72 700	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	7. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	8. TYPE ACTION SI	ADJ.
GS 09	4	$ 9,308	05/07/67	GS 09	5	$ 9,590	05/04/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE H. L. Dullard

DATE 5 March '69

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS OC

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 700	V	GS 09 5	$10,564

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 09/30/68

1. SERIAL NUMBER 035655	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 09 22 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 9255 5600 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS ODI/NPIC NPIC/TSSG/ESD/ELB	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0644	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1670.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 09	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10-8-68

Form 1150B 7-66 MFG. 9-66 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 215 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 150	V	GS 09 4	$ 8,861	$ 9,308

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 07/13/68

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 04 YR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6. FUNDS

X	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9255 5600 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: O AND E TECH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0644
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS

POSTED
7-16-68 u

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous
7-66 MFG. 9-66 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 150	V	GS 09 4	$ 8,479	$ 8,861

B5

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
035659	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	72 150 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 09	3	$ 8,210	05/08/66	GS 09	4	$ 8,479	05/07/67			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [redacted] DATE 14 March 1967

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg. 3-65

(4-51)

[illegible] 6 MAY 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMILC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 05 08 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V; CF TO V; V TO CF; CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6255 4100 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

DDI/NPIC
PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0644
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 7987
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 72150; ALPHABETIC NPIC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 04 30 17
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.): 05 08 66
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.): 05 08 66
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC; 2 - FICA; 3 - NONE): CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE (0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT; 2 - 10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR; RESV; PROV; TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE (0 - WAIVER; 1 - YES); HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES; 2 - NO); CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES; 2 - NO); CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
5-16-66

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 150	V	GS 08 3	$ 7,070	$ 7,325

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962,"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 150	V	GS 09 3	$ 7,987	$ 8,218

SECRET
(When Filled In)

83

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PCS 02/20/67

1. SERIAL NUMBER 035655	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONV. TO CAREER EMPLOYEE STATUS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 11 DA 24 YR 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI/NPIC	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	
11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP
17. SALARY OR RATE		

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

Form 1-63 11508 MFG. 6-65 Use Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

38

1. Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	72 150 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 08	2	$ 6,850	07/05/64	GS 08	3	$ 7,070	07/04/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS D.Y. AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 7 July 1965

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

DLS: 3 JULY 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 035655	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 05 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5255 4100 0000
				8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI NPIC PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0644	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1670.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 08 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 6600

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Mgrl. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE [illegible] MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	72150	NPIC	75013		1	04 30 17	07 05 64	07 05 64

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
						34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY [illegible]	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 14 JUL 1964

(When Filled In)

MHC: 22 JAN 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 01 22 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X | V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4255 1030 6000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/NPIC
PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: PHOTOG GEN
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0303
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: 1P
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1060.02
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 6185
18. REMARKS: PHOTOG GEN OCCUPYING PHYSICAL SCIENTIST SLOT.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 72150 | ALPHABETIC NPIC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 04 30 17
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
23 JAN 1964

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

22 JAN 1964

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND OCT MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 340 V	GS 07 3	$ 5,910	$ 6,185

255-1060

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	92 340 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 07	2	$ 5,725	11/25/62	GS 07	3	$ 5,910	11/24/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 961 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

THIS NOTICE IS USED IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 (NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION) TO EFFECT THE REASSIGNMENT OF NPIC PERSONNEL LISTED BELOW TO THE NEWLY REORGANIZED NPIC STAFFING COMPLEMENT. THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF REASSIGNMENT IS 11 NOVEMBER 1962.

SLOT NO.	SERIAL NO.	NAME	COST CENTER NO.	HDQTRS.
0246	015527	FLETCHER FRANCE	3255-1034-6000	DEPT
0248	029579	HARTWIG GERTRUD	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0249	022046	BECK LOUIS F	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0253	003600	SMITH JAMES O	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0253	018340	BUTLER FRANCES	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0257	037112	SEDGEWICK JOHN	3255-1050-6000	DEPT
0265	008822	LIPP ABRAHAM	3255-1005-6000	DEPT
0287	025489	VIRGA JANE ELLI	3255-1005-6000	DEPT
0287	027941	SMITH ALBERTA E	3255-1005-6000	DEPT
0296	032386	JACKSON RUTH EV	3255-1020-6000	DEPT
0356	022338	FARMER JENNY E	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0359	033665	LEGUTKO ELIZABE	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0372	002358	ALLEN JAMES L	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0378	001988	BEUCHERT HARRY	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0378	055262	MOTHES GORDON	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0382	023918	DEARSTINE RONAL	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0387	022003	CIAMPA JOSEPH L	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0387	035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROS	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0393	002633	BUMBRAY GEORGE	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0398	007307	DADE THERESA MA	3255-1032-6000	DEPT

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR_ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR_ST	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	92500	V	07 1	$ 5355	07 1	$ 5540

109

2030

2040

6 255-1030

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	92 500 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-07	1	$ 5,540	11/26/61	G -07	2	$ 5,725	11/25/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ /. NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ /. LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE: [illegible]

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form P-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

BWS: 22 JAN 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 01 22 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2255 1010 7000
8. LSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI NPIC
DATA MANAGEMENT DIVISION
TECHNICAL BRANCH
PHOTOGRAPHIC LAB SECTION
CONTACT PRINTING UNIT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: PHOTOG GEN
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0239
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1060.02
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 5355
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	92500	NPIC	75013		1	04 30 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR):
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1/23/62 JM

Form 8-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-61)

[illegible] 1-22-62

BWS: 29 NOV 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (CAREER PROVISIONAL)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 11 DA 26 YR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2255 1010 7000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI NPIC
DATA MANAGEMENT DIVISION
TECHNICAL BRANCH
PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: PHOTOG GEN
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0049
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1060.02
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 5355
18. REMARKS: SUBJECT TO THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF A TRIAL PERIOD OF ONE YEAR.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 11
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 92500 | ALPHABETIC NPIC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 04 DA 30 YR 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO 11 DA 26 YR 61
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 11 DA 26 YR 61
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE; CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 04515
34. SEX: M1
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 1 (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO 06 DA 19 YR 41
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO 11 DA 26 YR 61
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE P
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1 (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES); HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 001168309
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0
- 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
- 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
- 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS)
- 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 8
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO): 1; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS: 4
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE 2; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

[illegible]

Form 8-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-61)

[illegible] 11-28-61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 035655

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Maksymiec, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4/30/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE D & E Technician	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/TSG/RED/ATB	8. CURRENT STATION Wash. D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 30 Sept. 1969 - 30 Sept. 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists physical scientists on their research projects by assisting with optical bench experiments and performing routine data collection utilizing the supporting metrological equipment.	M
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Operates electro-optical laboratory equipment such as densitometers, sensitometers, microdensitometers, photometers, and microscopes with minimum supervision.	M
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Performs precision photographic processing of film and plate material to specific tolerances of density and contrast in support of on-going research projects.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assists physical scientists in the graphing and routine algebraic manipulation of data.	M
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares written reports and briefing materials on assigned projects.	M
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Performs periodic maintenance and calibration of laboratory equipment.	M

20 OCT 1970
J8

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	M

FORM 7-60 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the past reporting period, Mr. Maksymiec's responsibilities were more pointedly directed towards the requirements of a laboratory technician as described in the position description and less towards his previous utilization as a photographer. A conference was held with him on 15 June to explain the need for this redirection and a memo ATB 147/70 dated 16 June was prepared and furnished to him detailing of performing these duties and was anxious to stop being thought of as a photographer and welcomed the opportunity to move into a more technically oriented activity. The specific duties outlined are listed in Section B of this report.

It was expected that there would be a learning period during which his proficiency would gradually increase in these new responsibilities. However, progress has not been as rapid as had been hoped due to what appears to be a lack of initiative on his part coupled with severe emotional outbursts against his immediate supervisor and other Center personnel. The latest of these occurred on 28 August in which he used abusive language in the presence of other Branch personnel including the Branch Chief against his Section Chief. This necessitated a written letter of reprimand and his transference to direct supervision by the Branch Chief, and as of 5 October 1970, to another Section within the Branch.

The ratings of M in Duties 1 and 2 of Section B reflect primarily the subject's reluctant participation in data collection and his lack of initiative in learning the operation of the microdensitometer. In duties 4, 5, 6, he has required a maximum amount of supervision which has resulted in senior personnel doing the work

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 5 Oct 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Myroslaw O. Maksymiec

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 10/5/70	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Advanced Technology Branch TDL/NPIC	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE FRANK R. FRIBERG

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the rater's comments. We have been making every effort to aid Mr. Maksymiec in becoming an asset to RED as a laboratory technician. To date, there has been little noticeable progress; in fact, the temper outbursts mentioned above indicate a deteriorating condition. Unless this situation improves, it may be necessary to recommend termination action.

As I have stated in previous comments, it's unfortunate that he cannot find a position which takes advantage of his expertise in photography, since this would go a long way to resolving his problems.

DATE 9 October 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/Research & Engineering Div.	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE NICHOLAS R. GAROFALO

noted 9 Oct 1970
C/TSO

Mr. Myroslaw A. MAKSYMIEC FITNESS REPORT

Section C (Continued)

themselves. It may be argued that this has not provided him with sufficient first-level supervision to allow him to learn the skills required to perform these duties.

To insure that he is given every opportunity to perform in his new section, written assignments and accomplishments will be submitted on a daily basis.

In line with previous reports, it is still felt that Mr. Maksymiec is essentially mis-assigned as he is an expert photographer and should be assigned in some area where his skill can be utilized to its fullest extent.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MAKSYMIEC (First) Myroslaw (Middle) A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4/30/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE D and E Tech	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/TSSG/RED	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 30 September 1968 - 30 September 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conducts experimental laboratory investigations related to the photographic process. This involves the determination of what approach to take to a given problem; keeping detailed records of various experiments tried; determing results and making recommendations for possible solutions.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As Senior Photographic Technician has the responsibility for maintenance of all photographic equipment and aids in the selection of new equipment. Helps in the procurement of photographic supplies.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups; prepares prints for display and report purposes.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

NOV 3 21 69

Mr. Maksymiec is basically an excellent photographer who occasionally lends a hand as a D&E Technician. Unfortunately, he must be rated according to his job classification as a D&E Technician, and he suffers accordingly.

In his previous fitness report, he was alerted to the urgent need to direct his interest toward becoming a technician and away from his photographic activities. He has not completely heeded this advice.

Two distinct training activities were advised for assisting him in making the transition: a course of instruction in math necessary to discharging technician's duties, and on the job project work. The former persisted for only a short time, due presumably to his lack of ability and/or interests. He improved very little from this instruction. His assistance on a project for developing an ammonia leak detector was effective, and the project was a success; however, his thin knowledge of the scientific method diminished his appreciation of the concept of experimentally controlled variables. In short, he had to be watched closely to insure that his well-meaning "improvement" did not disrupt the experimental plan. His interest and cooperation in this program were commendable, and his overall project performance was adequate.

Mr. Maksymiec is basically mis-assigned. His abilities and interests lie in the photographic field where he does a very commendable job. However, the Laboratory needs the services of properly trained technicians to assist the physical scientists in their research efforts. Since Mr. Maksymiec's expertise is not in this area, it is again recommended that suitable employment as a photographer be found for him.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 15 Oct 1969
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Mieczyslaw T. Maksymiec

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 30
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 15 Oct 69
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, Exploratory Laboratory ATB/RED/TSSG
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: HENRY L. DOLLARD H L Dollard

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

In light of the past and present ratings of Mr. Maksymiec, I feel that we are doing him an injustice in keeping him in his present post. Every effort should be made to find a more suitable position for him.

DATE: 15 October 1969
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, RED/TSSG
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Nicholas R. Garofalo

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Maksymiec, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 04/20/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD TP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE D and E Tech	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/TSSG/ESD	8. CURRENT STATION Wash. D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 October 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 30 September 1967 to 30 September 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conducts experimental laboratory investigations related to the photographic process. This involves the determination of what approach to take to a given problem; keeping detailed records of various experiments tried; determining results and making recommendations for possible solutions.	W
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As senior photographic technician has the responsibility for maintenance of all photographic equipment and aids in the selection of new equipment. Helps in the procurement of photographic supplies.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups; Prepares prints for display and report purposes.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Maksymiec's ability as a staff photographer is un-diminished. His photographic ability is considered by all in the Center as excellent.

It has been pointed out to Mr. Maksymiec that the laboratory does not have a basic requirement or a slot for a photographer, and since he is carried as a D & E technician, he should be more qualified than he is in other aspects of photographic and scientific research other than straight "picture taking", as he does not have the basic foundation either in formal education or experience to perform successfully as a D & E technician. This lack of qualification in this area can be partly explained by two factors: (1.) Mr. Maksymiec's position description was recently changed due to the reorientation of the laboratory's primary mission and function; and (2.) Because of his previous photographic responsibilities he did not have the opportunity to gain the new skills required to fulfill his new duties as a D & E technician. Mr. Maksymiec will have to be re-trained from a photographer into a D & E technician so that he can contribute more to help solve the laboratory assigned tasks.

Mr. Maksymiec still had problems in his relationship with other members of the laboratory during this reporting period. It appears to have been about his concern with his position in the laboratory grade structure and his feeling that he was "ignored" by senior members of the laboratory. Mr. Maksymiec seems to have had a feeling that members of the laboratory including his Chief did not recognize his ability as a photographer and pay suitable deference to his age.

Continued on another sheet.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10 Oct 1968	Mieczyslaw G Maksymiec

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
18		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
10 Oct 1968	Chief/NPIC/TSSG/ESD/EL	

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the ratings and comments of the rating officer. In the latter part of the rating period the activities of the Exploratory Laboratory were being changed from ad hoc research projects to a directed program of planned investigations against NPIC and community problems. This change in activities reduced the freedom of choice in tasks to be accomplished and increased the demand for versatility in laboratory personnel. The lack of freedom and the assignment of unfamiliar tasks are distasteful to Mr. Maksymiec since he doubts that these activities will provide the personal recognition he has enjoyed for many years as an outstanding photographer.

Continued on another sheet.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
14 October 1968	Chief, ESD/TSSG	WILLIAM G. MATHEWS

SECRET

Maksymiec, Myroslaw | Fitness Report

Section C Continued

He has also had serious disagreements with a summer intern and another member of the laboratory which had to be settled by conferences with the laboratory chief. A major disagreement with the Laboratory Chief took place recently which resulted from his feeling that he had been treated unfairly without consideration for his age, knowledge and training.

As a result of these problems, a series of conferences with Mr. Maksymiec and senior members of the division were held in order to find a possible solution for his problem. Because of these meetings, an in-house training program has been initiated for Mr. Maksymiec. It is hoped that this will do much to alleviate his feelings of repression and make him a contributing member of the laboratory once again.

Section D Continued

In spite of the reduction in need for Mr. Maksymiec's primary skills, he has expressed a desire to continue his present assignment. Therefore, a program of retraining has been instituted to broaden his knowledge and increase his versatility in carrying out laboratory investigations. Mr. Maksymiec is a hard working, dedicated employee and there is every reason to expect that he will try hard to overcome his deficiencies. However, his age, limited education, previous success in photography, and lack of knowledge in scientific methods pose serious obstacles to be overcome. His present attitude is characterized by his own statement, "Show me how, and I will do it."

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW A.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 30 April 1917
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-09
5. SD: IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: NPIC/TSS/EDL
8. CURRENT STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 October 1967
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 30 September 1966 - 30 September 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists senior branch members on their projects, carrying out photographic processing, providing assistance and consultation on the practical application of photography.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As senior photographic technician has the responsibility for maintenance of all photographic equipment and aids in the selection of new equipment. Helps in the procurement of photographic supplies.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups. Prepares prints for display and report purposes.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

20 OCT 1967
JW

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OCT 19 10 54 AM '67

Mr. Maksymiec continues to excel in his primary duty as staff photographer. He processes his own photography and the finished product is consistently outstanding.

He cooperates most willingly with other members of the staff in assisting them with the practical photographic aspects of their projects.

There have been a few minor personality conflicts on procedural matters related to job assignments between Mr. Maksymiec and both staff and non-staff personnel, which have been reported to his laboratory chief and the executive officer, TDS. It is believed that this is due to his strong desire to excel at his job. This problem has been discussed with Mr. Maksymiec and it is expected that he will avoid such occurrences in the future.

During this reporting period Mr. Maksymiec has satisfactorily completed a night school course in technical reading and writing at Montgomery Junior College and is currently pursuing a course in photography at American University. He is to be highly commended for this continuing effort to train himself for a more responsible position.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 Oct 1967	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
6		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
9 Oct. 1967	A/Ch/Exploratory Development Laboratory	HENRY L. DOLLARD

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The report reflects some minor flaws in the performance of Mr. Maksymiec; however, he is a willing worker anxious to please and to try to show that he is capable of a higher position.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 October 1967	Executive Officer, TDS	

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training
Correction of Memo Dated 10 August 1965

18 MAY 1966

This is to advise you that MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A, training request # R-13339 attended the following external training program:

COURSE: Color Photography MonoPack Color

INSTITUTION: US Department of Agriculture Graduate School

DATE: 1 February - 21 May 1965

GRADE: A

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Doris A. Stilwell

Attachments:

X Grade Report attached to reference memo.
___ Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
___ Certificate of Completion
___ Roster of Participants
___ Training Report by Institution
___ Training Report by Student
___ None
___ Other: ________________

GROUP I
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

PICSB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
Secy
035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 30 Apr 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/P&DS/EDLB		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 October 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 March 1966 - 30 September 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists senior branch members on their projects, carrying out photographic processing, providing assistance and consultation on the practical application of photography.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Carries out experimental laboratory investigations related to the photographic process, develops techniques, constructs supporting equipment.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 As senior photographic technician has the responsibility for maintenance of all photographic equipment and aids in the selection of new equipment. Helps in the procurement of photographic supplies.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups. Prepares prints for display and report purposes.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

18 OCT

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If more space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OCT 12 1 56 PM '66

Mr. Maksymiec is a valuable member of the EDLB and serves as its senior lab technician. He works closely with other members of the staff and contributes to the success of the laboratory.

His duties require him to maintain and develop many skills in the field of photographics. He carries out these duties and other responsibilities in a professional manner and with a minimum of supervision.

As senior laboratory technician he provides guidance for his junior technician. His ability to train this man in the field of photographic technology is considered superior.

Mr. Maksymiec recently completed a review course in "Basic Grammar." This course pointed out his main difficulties in written expression, and his teacher suggested methods for overcoming these difficulties. As a result of this course and after a consultation with Mr. R. B. Cheatham of the Educational and Psychological Service Bureau, Georgetown University, Mr. Maksymiec plans on taking a special English course at Montgomery Junior College this fall. This course concentrates on the fundamental of reading and writing. When he successfully completes this English course, he expects to continue his education with the ultimate goal of receiving his Bachelor's degree. Mr. Maksymiec is ambitious and hopes to train himself for a more responsible position. He is to be commended for this effort, and he will be given all possible aid within the laboratory to help him fulfill his educational program.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 3 Oct 1966

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Myroslaw A. Maksymiec

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 37

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE: 3 October 1966

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Richard E. Ewing RICHARD E. EWING

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above evaluation. Mr. Maksymiec is doing a fine job in the Laboratory and at the same time is working hard to get ahead as his concentration on furthering his education illustrates.

DATE: 4 October 1966

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Deputy Assistant for Plans and Development

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: JOHN A. PAGENSTECHER

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Maksymiec, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 30 Apr 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD TP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE D and E Technician	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/PSDS/EDLS		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☒ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☒ SPECIAL (Specify): PROMOTION

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July 1965 - 31 March 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists senior branch members on their projects, carrying out photographic processing, providing assistance and consultation on the practical application of photography.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Carries out experimental laboratory investigations related to the photographic process, develops techniques, constructs supporting equipment.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 As senior photographic technician has the responsibility for maintenance of all photographic equipment and aids in the selection of new equipment. Helps in the procurement of photographic supplies.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups. Prepares prints for display and report purposes.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

21 APR 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 21 PM '66
MAIL ROOM

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Maksymiec continues to support the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch well as its senior laboratory technician. His duties require him to work closely with the physical scientists and by himself on various projects which require many practical and some theoretical skills.

Mr. Maksymiec works very well with others, follows instructions willingly, and carries out his responsibilities in a professional manner. He requires very little supervision and completes his assignments quickly and competently.

Mr. Maksymiec has made a conscientious effort to overcome his writing deficiency and has greatly improved this necessary skill since his last review. Although there is still room for improvement, it is felt that real progress has been made and improvement will continue in the future with sufficient practice.

Mr. Maksymiec's duties require him to provide guidance to the laboratory's junior technician. His ability to train this man and to help him increase his photographic skills is considered above average. It is felt that he is presently doing the work of a higher grade, so it is recommended that Mr. Maksymiec be promoted to GS-09.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
31	This report is for promotion purposes.	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4-19-66	Chief, Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch	Richard E. Ewing Richard E. Ewing

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above evaluation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
19 April '66	Deputy Assistant for Plans and Development	John A. Pa[illegible]stecher

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAINING REPORT Grammar and Punctuation (20 Hours Part-Time)	No. of Students 23	Date of Course 16 - 26 May 1966

Section I IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

Name of Student	YOB	EOD Date	Office	GS	SD
MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	1917	November 1961	NPIC	08	IP

Section II COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHOD

This course is taught 2 hours a day for 2 weeks. A pretest is given to determine the student's proficiency. The course is conducted through lectures, examples, and exercises; and the evaluation is based on a series of quizzes and a final examination.

The objectives of the course are the review and application of basic grammar principles and fundamental punctuation rules.

Section III METHOD OF EVALUATION

Student achievement is judged on the basis of competence in understanding and applying the principles and rules presented in the course objectives.

Section IV ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This trainee's rating is marked by an asterisk.

Subject	Poor	Fair	Satisfactory	Excellent
Grammar	3*	3	11	6
Punctuation	5*	9	6	2

EXCELLENT - - Thorough knowledge of material presented and above average performance in meeting course goals.

SATISFACTORY- average knowledge of material presented and adequate performance in meeting course goals.

FAIR- - - - - borderline knowledge of material presented and limited performance in meeting course goals.

POOR- - - - - inadequate knowledge of material presented and unsatisfactory performance in meeting course goals.

Section V COMMENTS

This review course in grammar and punctuation was too advanced for Mr. Maksymiec. He needs an elementary course on the English fundamentals preferably on a tutorial basis before he can adequately apply the rules of punctuation and grammar to his work.

In a personal conference with Mr. Maksymiec, the instructor analyzed his weaknesses in grammar and punctuation and suggested ways in which he might improve his performance in these areas.

continue comments on reverse side ☐

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:	Signature of Chief Instructor Margaret A. Hunt	Date 14 JUL 1966

MONTGOMERY JUNIOR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR
GRADE REPORT

MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
4718 ASBURY PL NW
WASHINGTON DC 20016

DATE
1/27/67

ADVISER
COORDINATOR

COURSE AND NO	TITLE	SEM HRS ATT	EARNED	GRADE	QUAL PTS
TNEN 101	TECH REDG & WRITG I	3	3	C	6

IMPORTANT: If no inaccuracy in this record is reported to the office of the Registrar within (2) weeks of its receipt, the record will stand as it is.

RETAIN THIS RECORD. It is part of your cumulative record and must be presented at the time of your next registration. Credit is given only for grades of D or better.

CURRENT SEMESTER			CUMULATIVE		
CREDIT HRS			CREDIT HRS		
ATT	EARNED	AVERAGE	ATT	EARNED	AVERAGE
3	3	2.00	3	3	2.00

WILLIAM B. BENSON
REGISTRAR

STUDENT ORIGINAL

GRADE REPORT INFORMATION

Grade of "D" is generally not accepted by colleges for transfer credit.

Incompletes must be completed by the date approved by the instructor in the course, or the grade will be recorded as "F".

Grade of "WP" is recorded only when a course is officially dropped.
Courses dropped within first three weeks of semester are not included in a student's record

A quality point average of 2.0 is required for graduation. Transfer students are expected to maintain an average higher than 2.0 to receive recommendation to upper division of a college or University

[illegible]

A - Superior	4
B - Good	3
C - Average	2
D - Poor but Passing	1
F - Failure	0
I - Incomplete	None
R - Registered for audit only	None
WP - Withdrawn, dropped	None
WF - Withdrawn, failing	0
S - Satisfactory	None
U - Unsatisfactory	None

14-00000

P-_-O-A [illegible] MONO [illegible] 3

C/A

351-3423 EM-21350

PAID [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

PAID

DATE

THE GRADING SYSTEM

A – EXCELLENT
B – GOOD
C – FAIR
D – PASSABLE
F – FAILURE
7 – AUDITOR
8 – INCOMPLETE
9 – WITHDRAWN

INCOMPLETE ETC. IN ORDER TO RECEIVE CREDIT, AND A LETTER GRADE REPRESENTING QUALITY OF WORK DONE, ALL WORK MUST BE COMPLETE BY THE END OF THE NEXT REGULAR SEMESTER. STUDENT MUST FILE IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OFFICE A MEMORANDUM COVERING ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH THE INSTRUCTOR.

NAME M A [illegible]
Washington 16 DC
4718 Asbury Pl

GRADE A C. Roelbell

GRADUATE SCHOOL
U S D.A.

49070

THE
AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY
Washington, D. C.

GRADE REPORT

STUDENT NUMBER	STUDENT NAME
[illegible]	[illegible]

COURSE NUMBER	SECT	COURSE TITLE
[illegible]		[illegible]

OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

210-B CC O. AND COLOR PRINTING PHOTOGRAPHY 3

REGISTERED FOR:
1 ☑ CREDIT
2 ☐ AUDIT

C/A

351-3423 EM-21350

PAID [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

PAID

DATE

THE GRADING SYSTEM

A – EXCELLENT
B – GOOD
C – FAIR
D – PASSABLE
F – FAILURE
7 – AUDITOR
8 – INCOMPLETE
9 – WITHDRAWN

INCOMPLETE. IN ORDER TO RECEIVE CREDIT, AND A LETTER GRADE REPRESENTING QUALITY OF WORK DONE, ALL WORK MUST BE COMPLETE BY THE END OF THE NEXT REGULAR SEMESTER. STUDENT MUST FILE IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OFFICE A MEMORANDUM COVERING ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH THE INSTRUCTOR.

NAME M.A. MAKSYMIEE
WASHINGTON 16 DC
4718 ASBURY PL

GRADE A [illegible]

29076

GRADUATE SCHOOL
U S D A

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20007

EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES BUREAU

August 24, 1966

Name: Mr. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec

Mr. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec, age 49, came to this Bureau on August 1, 1966, in connection with the Veterans Administration's educational and vocational counseling program for former servicemen. Mr. Maksymiec is married, has two children, ages five and eight, and is employed by a federal governmental agency as a photographic research technician (GS 09/3). He retired from the United States Army in 1961 in the grade of Master Sergeant after serving for over 20 years with primary duties as an intelligence photographer. His education includes eight years of formal schooling, a high school completion equivalence certificate, and additional courses with the Graduate School, Department of Agriculture, and the United States Armed Forces Institute. Mr. Maksymiec stated that he was interested in further education at the college level in order to improve himself both personally and professionally in a field related to his present vocational activities.

In addition to several conferences with the undersigned, Mr. Maksymiec was administered a battery of educational and vocational tests. This report contains the results of these conferences and tests, the results of which should not be interpreted either as conclusive or final. They should be considered primarily as indications of various psychological factors that should be seriously considered by Mr. Maksymiec in making decisions concerning his educational and vocational goals.

In order to determine Mr. Maksymiec's fields of vocational interest he was given the Kuder Vocational Preference Record. When compared to a representative group of men in the national population, Mr. Maksymiec indicated that his interests are significantly similar to persons who are engaged in computational, scientific, and literary activities. Men who have interests similar to Mr. Maksymiec's are found in various engineering fields, astronomy, seismology, economics, psychology, and technical publications writing. These fields are closely allied to his present occupational endeavors.

On the Educational Interest Inventory, a device that is beneficial to an individual in discovering his interests in various fields of study, Mr. Maksymiec's responses indicated that his study interests are very high in physics; high in engineering, chemistry, earth science, and history and political science; high average in communication, zoology, and mathematics; and average in psychology. The areas in which he showed low to average interest were music, education, industrial arts, agriculture, botany, sociology, literature, art, business administration, and economics.

Name: Myroslaw A. Maksymiec

Mr. Maksymiec also took the Army General Classification Test, Civilian Edition, to find out his overall level of mental ability. His score revealed that he exceeds approximately 78 percent of adults in general mental capacity as measured by this instrument. A safer evaluation of his performance is that he is probably in the upper 25 percent of adults regarding his global intelligence.

On the Michigan Vocabulary Profile Test, an instrument that attempts to measure a person's intellectual interests as well as the amount of information he has retained in various areas of knowledge, Mr. Maksymiec indicated, when compared with college freshmen, that he exceeds approximately 50 percent in his knowledge of human relations, 69 percent in government, and 67 percent in the physical sciences. On the lower side, he does as well or better than 24 percent in his familiarity with commerce, 31 percent in mathematics, and 24 percent in fine arts.

In order to find out Mr. Maksymiec's ability to handle English, a basic necessity for one to perform well in college, he was given the Cooperative English Tests. When compared to college freshmen, he showed that he exceeds from 52 percent to 78 percent in his understanding of vocabulary; from 5 to 17 percent in his ability to comprehend what he reads; from 2 to 11 percent in his speed of comprehension; and from 18 to 36 percent in his overall ability to know and understand what he reads under timed conditions. In his skill to express himself properly in English, he exceeds from 1 to 6 percent of college freshmen. When reading and expression are combined into one score, it may be said that Mr. Maksymiec exceeds from 6 to 12 percent of college freshmen in his overall usage of English.

The results of the above tests indicate that Mr. Maksymiec has made the most of his learning opportunities both within and outside the military service. Although he completed only eight years of school, he has acquired a considerable amount of knowledge by observation, reading, and personal experience. In spite of his broad experiences and acquired knowledge, it will be necessary for him to improve his reading and writing skills in English, however, before he begins college courses. Although he manifests a high interest in engineering and scientific fields, he should probably not consider these fields as majors because of his deficiency in mathematics. It is believed the skills in English can be developed but it is doubtful if the mathematical deficiencies can be overcome sufficiently to major in a scientific area. It is probably advisable, therefore, for Mr. Maksymiec to consider one of the social sciences as a college major. His background in photography and military subjects, combined with a college major in an appropriate social science, would probably provide him with the necessary qualifications to become a geographer or an intelligence analyst in government service.

It is understood that Mr. Maksymiec has enrolled in Montogomery Junior College, Takoma Park, Maryland, for the 1966 fall semester and that he will take a special English course concentrating on the fundamentals of reading and written expression. After he completes this instruction, he might consider working for an associate of arts degree in a social science at this junior college with the ultimate goal of transferring later to a four-year college to work toward a bachelor degree.

I have appreciated knowing and talking with Mr. Maksymiec and I trust he will contact this Bureau if he requires further counseling assistance. My best wishes go with this report in whatever plans Mr. Maksymiec makes concerning his future plans and goals.

Richard B. Cheatham

Richard B. Cheatham
Counseling Psychologist

RBC:jw

Enclosure

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training

18 FEB 1966

This is to advise you that MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A. training request # R-15016 attended the following external training program:

COURSE: Color Photography, Monopack Color Printing

INSTITUTION: US Department of Agriculture Graduate School

DATE: 20 September 1965-14 January 1966

GRADE: A

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Attachments:

- X Grade Report
- ___ Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
- ___ Certificate of Completion
- ___ Roster of Participants
- ___ Training Report by Institution
- ___ Training Report by Student
- ___ None
- ___ Other: ____________

GROUP 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training

10 AUG 1965

This is to advise you that MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A. training request # R-13339 attended the following external training program:

COURSE: Color Photography MonoPack Color

INSTITUTION: USDA Graduate School

DATE: January 1965

GRADE: A

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Russell Shaw

Attachments:

X Grade Report
__ Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
__ Certificate of Completion
__ Roster of Participants
__ Training Report by Institution
__ Training Report by Student
__ None
__ Other: __________

GROUP 1



R-270-B

COLOR PHOTOGRAPHY AND COLOR PRINTING

3



P-220 A

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1ﾐ

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): MAKSYMTEC, Myroslaw A.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 04/30/17
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: 08
5. SD: IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: D and E Tech
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: NPIC/P&DS/EDLB
8. CURRENT STATION: Washington, D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☒ SPECIAL (Specify): Eligible

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 July 1965
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 30 June 1964 - 30 June 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups. Prepares prints for display and report purposes.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Carries out experimental laboratory investigations [illegible] the photographic process, develops techniques, [illegible] supporting equipment, prepares technical reports.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assists senior branch members on their projects, carrying out photographic processing, providing assistance and consultation on the practical application of photography.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Shares responsibility for maintenance of photographic equipment, cares for the laboratory's camera inventory, assists in the maintenance of other laboratory equipment.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance. Serves as the laboratory's senior technician.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Assists in the selection of photographic equipment and materials for the laboratory.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

21 JUN 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUN 18

Mr. Maksymiec, in serving as the senior laboratory technician, sets a fine example for those whose responsibilities are similar and for the younger professionals for whom he provides photographic laboratory services. As a photographer he possesses rare compositional skills; his photographs of equipment for report and briefing purposes are exceptionally well-crafted, the finishing of surpassing quality. His work is careful, thorough, painstakingly accurate, and professional by all standards.

After more than a year in his present position, he feels more relaxed and self-assured. He asserts his views and ideas more competently and has become an integral and important part of this laboratory's operations. Mr. Maksymiec works exceptionally well with others, accepts responsibility freely and requires a minimum of direction. Most of his assignments come as discretionary orders, with complete freedom to utilize his own talents and inclinations towards the solution of his assigned problems. He continues to improve his capabilities, and is presently enrolled in a Department of Agriculture course in the fundamentals of photographic color processing, at his own request.

Mr. Maksymiec's one major weakness lies in the difficulty with which he writes reports. The ability to communicate ideas and results of investigations clearly, through written reports, is a necessary attribute of laboratory branch members, and Mr. Maksymiec must concentrate extra effort to improve his performance in this regard. During the next reporting period, he will be given assistance to improve his reporting capabilities.

[illegible] comment where applicable on supervisory ability and cost consciousness.

SECTION D

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10 June 1965	Myroslaw O. Maksymiec

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
22	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 June 1965	Chief, Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch	Richard E. Swing Richard E. Swing

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above evaluation. It is felt that Mr. Maksymiec will devote that effort necessary to overcome the noted weakness.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
14 June '65	Deputy Assistant, Plans and Development	A. FACHSTECHER

14-00000

PICSB
Secy

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 30 April 1927	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHOTOG GEN	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/P&DS/EDLB		8. CURRENT STATION WASHINGTON, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
X	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 July 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
June 1963 - 30 June 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups. Prepares prints for display and report purposes, has the responsibility for maintaining a file of negatives and prints.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Carries out experimental laboratory investigations relating to the photographic process, develops techniques, constructs equipment in support of these investigations, and prepares technical reports.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assists senior branch members on their projects, contributing primarily in the photographic area.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assists in the selection of photographic equipment and materials for the laboratory and maintains a suitable working inventory.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Is responsible for maintenance of photographic equipment, and cares for laboratory's camera inventory. Assists in the maintenance of other laboratory equipment.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

7 JUL 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF ... MAIL ROOM
JUN 17 9 20 AM '64

Mr. Maksymiec's background and experience lie in practical photography, about which there is extremely little he does not know. He transferred from PSD/PLB primarily because there was little opportunity to use this experience, and because the advancement potential appeared to be minimal.

From the day of his transfer, Mr. Maksymiec has performed capably. Much of the work has been new to him, requiring him to learn and master many aspects of theoretical photography. He has acquired proficiency in the use of laboratory measuring instruments. He has applied himself and learns rapidly, with good retention. His frame of mind has improved, and this is manifested in a more relaxed, yet completely involved approach to his work. He works well with other and cooperates fully in all group problems. He accepts responsibility and requires direction of effort only in those theoretical areas where he has no experience. When responsible for the expenditure of funds, he exhibits a commendable cost-consciousness.

He recently took examinations for the purposes of completing his High School education, and has attended mathematics classes at Fort Myer. This is an additional indication of the interest and feeling for his job, which is manifested by a consistently proficient level of output. He is a valued member of the Exploratory Development Laboratory Staff.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
12 June 1964	Miroslaw ? Maksymiec

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
10		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
15 June 1964	Chief, Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch, P&DS	Richard E. Swing RICHARD E. SWING

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur with ratings and comments.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 June 64	Assistant for Plans & Development	John W. Cain JOHN W. CAIN

SECRET

14-00000

PICSS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Photog Gen	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/PSD/PLB		8. CURRENT STATION Wash. D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 July 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
August 1962 - June 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operates specially designed contact printers, and expose negatives, positives, and prints.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Operate continuous processing equipment and develop negatives, positives and prints.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operate specially designed projection printers and expose enlarged negatives positives and prints.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develop negatives, positives and prints by manual processing methods.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER A

21 AUG 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

AUG 19 12 17 PM '63

The quality and quantity of Mr. Maksymiec's work are improving. However, it must be stated that, despite the fact that Mr. Maksymiec is not happy in this assignment he is making an effort to improve his performance. Every effort is being made to locate a position within NPIC or elsewhere more in keeping the Mr. Maksymiec's evaluation of his own abilities and experience.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 1 Aug 63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 21 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE July 31, 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Photographer(Gen)PLB/PSD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Melvin C. Muir MELVIS C. MUIR

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I am in accord with Mr. Muir's comments. Some improvement has been shown by Mr. Makeymiec.

DATE 31 July 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/Photo Lab Branch, PSD/NPIC	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JAMES L. ALLEN

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH Apr 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Photog (Gen)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC, FSD, PLB		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
X	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

X	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
November 61 - August 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operate continuous and manual contact printers.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Operate continuous processing equipment and prepare negatives, positives and prints.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepare negatives, positives and prints by manual processing methods.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Operate specially designed projection printers and prepare enlarged negatives positives and prints.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER A

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

FEB 12 9 22 AM '63

The volume of work produced by Mr. Maksymiec has been adequate; the quality of work produced has been good but there is need for further improvement. However, Mr. Maksymiec is making every effort to improve the quality of his work. He is cooperative and gets along well with his fellow employees.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 7 February 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Augustaw J Maksymiec

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Photog (Gen) PLB/PSD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Melvin C. Muir MELVIN C. MUIR

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I am in accordance with the foregoing comments on Mr. Maksymiec's performance.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/Photo Lab Branch, PSD/NPIC	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE James L. Allen JAMES L. ALLEN

SECRET
(when filled in)

TAB M

IP CAREER SERVICE BOARD

RECOMMENDATION FOR PROMOTION

DATE: 15 April 1966

NAME Maksymiec, Myroslaw A.	PRESENT GRADE GS-08	AGE 48	(PHOTO)
POSITION TITLE, NUMBER AND GRADE D and E Technician, Slot 0644, GS-09			

PROMOTE TO GS(9)	COMPONENT ASSIGNMENT (DIVISION, BRANCH, SECTION) NPIC/P&DS/EDLB		
EOD CIA (DATE) 27 Nov 1961	EOD NPIC (DATE) 27 Nov 1961	TIME IN GRADE (MONTHS) 20	TIME IN PRESENT POSITION (MONTHS) 31

EDUCATION

High School equivalent certificate; completed a course in color photography in January 1966 (6 credit hours) taken at the Department of Agriculture Graduate School.

EXPERIENCE

Mr. Maksymiec retired as a Master Sergeant in July 1961 after 20 years of Army photographic experience. He has been with the Center from November 1961 and with the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch of the Plans and Development Staff since 15 September 1963. He is the senior technician for the laboratory.

JUSTIFICATION

Mr. Maksymiec's laboratory skills are of the highest professional quality. His duties as the senior laboratory technician require him to work closely with the physical scientists and by himself on various projects which require many practical and some theoretical skills. He conducts experimental laboratory investigations related to the photographic process, develops special techniques, and constructs supporting equipment. He carries out his assignments with little or no supervision and works well with others in the laboratory. He is an important and valued member of the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch. It is felt that Mr. Maksymiec is doing the work of a higher grade; therefore, it is recommended that Mr. Maksymiec be promoted to grade GS-09.

John Pagenstecher
JOHN A. PAGENSTECHER

IP FORM 260 7 65

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

STANDARD FORM 56
JANUARY 1970
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENT 870—1 56—102

( ) AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF ( ) INSURANCE STATUS
Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	2(a). DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year) 30 April 1917	2(b). SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER 001 | 16 | 8309

3. CHECK THE REASON FOR TERMINATING INSURANCE

- (a) ☐ Separated (includes resignations)
- (b) ☒ Retired →
- (c) ☐ Died as an employee
- (d) ☐ Died as a reemployed annuitant
- (e) ☐ End of 12 months non-pay status
- (f) ☐ Other (specify)

NOTE: If the reason checked is "b, Retired" your group life insurance (but not accidental death and dismemberment benefits) will continue during retirement if you meet the conditions described in "Notice to Retiring Employee" below.

4. CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX CONCERNING SF 54, DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

(a). ☐ CURRENT SF 54 ATTACHED

(b). ☒ A CURRENT SF 54 IS NOT ON FILE WITH THIS AGENCY

(c). ☐ A CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (OR EQUIVALENT)

NOTE: IF EMPLOYEE (A) DIED OR (B) IS RETIRING OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION UNDER CONDITIONS ENTITLING HIM TO RETAIN HIS LIFE INSURANCE, ATTACH CURRENT SF 54, IF ANY, TO ORIGINAL SF 56 AND CHECK BOX 4 (a) ON ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF SF 56. IF NO CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE, CHECK BOX 4 (b). IN ALL OTHER CASES, SHOW WHETHER OR NOT CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE BY CHECKING BOX 4 (b) OR (c). A CURRENT SF 54 IS ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN CANCELLED BY EMPLOYEE OR AUTOMATICALLY BY TRANSFER OR PRIOR TERMINATION OF INSURANCE.

5. DATE OF EVENT CHECKED IN ITEM 3 (MONTH, DAY, YEAR) 30 July 1971	6. ANNUAL BASIC PAY RATE (NOT AMOUNT OF SALARY) ON DATE IN ITEM 5. CONVERT DAILY, HOURLY, PIECEWORK, ETC. RATE TO ANNUAL RATE. $ 12,215 PER ANNUM	7. DID EMPLOYEE HAVE OPTIONAL INSURANCE ON DATE IN ITEM 5? NO [☒] YES [☐] IF YES, GIVE RECEIPT DATE OF ELECTION OF OPTIONAL INSURANCE (SF 176 or 176-T)	8. DATE OF NOTICE OF CONVERSION PRIVILEGE (SF 55) TO EMPLOYEE (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)

9. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM, AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS, OFFICIAL RECORDS AND THAT THE EMPLOYEE NAMED WAS COVERED BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 5.

Personal signature of authorized agency official	Name and address of agency, including zip code Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505
Typed name of authorized agency official Francis G. Monan	
Title Insurance Officer, Alternate	Phone number, including area code Date 17 AUG 1971

SEE OTHER SIDE
FOR
INSTRUCTIONS TO EMPLOYING AGENCY

PART 3—FILE COPY

14-00000

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT
AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) 035655 (first) (middle) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW ANDREW	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) APRIL 30 1917	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 001 16 8309
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
Myroslaw A Maksymiec

DATE
15 Feb 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 26 4 11 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1963
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION

[illegible]

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Superintendent of Schools

[illegible]

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

18 February 1963

TO: Myroslaw Maksymiec

The President of the United States has formally recognized the vital contribution of the members of this organization, during the critical period last year, by awarding a Presidential commendation to the National Photographic Interpretation Center.

A copy of the commendation which is attached will be made part of your official personnel file, and a certificate of commendation is being presented to you for your retention.

Once again let me add my expression of appreciation for your efforts which enabled all of us to merit this achievement.

Arthur C. Lundahl
ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director

Acknowledged: Myroslaw Maksymiec

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in commending the NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER for outstanding achievement and service to the security of the United States and the Free World during a time of grave international crisis.

CITATION:

"The National Photographic Interpretation Center distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service during the period from 1 May 1962 through 31 December 1962. During the period of international crisis, the Center served as the focal point for the receipt and immediate analysis of intelligence photography and was instrumental in identifying the nature and magnitude of the threat to world peace. Although working under great stress, personnel of the Center were able to carefully analyze and process a massive volume of critical intelligence material, thereby enabling the United States to respond immediately and effectively to the developing threat. The outstanding achievement of the members of the National Photographic Interpretation Center is in keeping with the finest traditions of service to the United States."

All Armed Forces personnel assigned or attached to the Center and performing duty at any time during this period are hereby authorized to wear the emblem or ribbon for the following decoration, as appropriate to their service:

Army - Meritorious Unit Commendation
Navy - Navy Unit Commendation
Air Force - Air Force Outstanding Unit Award

All members of the Center will be presented an appropriate certificate in recognition of their outstanding achievement and will have this commendation made a matter of record in their official files.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

9 January 1963

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

19 November 1962

TO: Myroslaw Maksymiec

Several weeks ago, it was my pleasure to pass on to you a letter of commendation from the Director of Central Intelligence. Now, the President of the United States has sent the attached letter of appreciation and commendation to the Center, which will be made part of your official personnel file. Again, I want to commend you for your vital contribution to the Center's achievement, and express my appreciation for your sustained efforts.

Arthur C. Lundahl
ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director

Acknowledged: Myroslaw Maksymiec

14-00000

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1962

Dear Mr. Lundahl:

While I would like to make public the truly outstanding accomplishments of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, I realize that the anonymity of an organization of your high professional competence in the intelligence field must be maintained.

I do want you and your people to know of my very deep appreciation for the tremendous task you are performing under most trying circumstances. The analysis and interpretation of the Cuban photography and the reporting of your findings promptly and succinctly to me and to my principal policy advisers, most particularly the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has been exemplary.

You have my thanks and the thanks of your government for a very remarkable performance of duty and my personal commendation goes to all of you.

Sincerely,

Mr. Arthur C. Lundahl
Director
National Photographic Interpretation Center

SECRET

SECRET

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

6 November 1962

TO: Myroslaw Maksymiec

I have attached for your personal acknowledgment a Commendation from the Director of Central Intelligence which will be made a part of your official personnel file. You contributed in a very real way to the effort for which NPIC is being commended and I want to add my congratulations to those expressed by the Director.

Arthur C. Lundahl

ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director

Acknowledged:

SECRET

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

2 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. As Director of Central Intelligence and on behalf of the entire intelligence community as well as the United States Government, I wish to commend you and the personnel under your command for the outstanding work you have been performing, especially during the past four months of the Cuban buildup.

2. Your analysis and interpretation of the Cuban photography and the manner in which you reported your findings to the President, his principal policy advisors, most particularly the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, and the entire intelligence community have been of the highest order.

3. I have full knowledge of the tremendous pressures and long working hours with which NPIC was confronted. I regret that the anonymity required of a professional intelligence agency such as yours prevents public acknowledgment of NPIC accomplishments. You and your people should take great pride in your accomplishments as well as in your ability to perform them without public acclaim.

John McCone

John A. McCone
Director

SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

REMOVE FROM FILE AND RETURN TO A&E, ROOM 1331, R&S WHEN INDIVIDUAL EOD'S

A&E PROFESSIONAL APPLICANT TESTING REPORT

DATE: 16 November 1961

NAME: MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw Andrew

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT: PIC Photographer

DATE AND PLACE TESTED: 7 November 1961, Washington, D. C.

RECRUITER: Capriotti

1. This report presents information that may be helpful in arriving at selection/placement decisions. The comments are necessarily tentative and in terms of general assets and liabilities. A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF A&E INFORMATION IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC CONTEMPLATED ASSIGNMENTS MAY BE ARRANGED BY CALLING X3052.

2. A&E Comments: Mr. Maksymiec performs poorly on various measures of intellectual ability. (He evidently has a foreign language background which may have affected his performance particularly on the verbal tests.) His knowledge of contemporary world-affairs approaches an average rating in comparison with Agency professional personnel. He also performs fairly well on a test of arithmetic problems. He would appear best suited for an essentially technician level position, which presumably the proposed "Photographer" position would be.

3. FOREIGN LANGUAGE APTITUDE:

X				
VERY POOR	POOR	AVERAGE	GOOD	VERY GOOD

REMOVE FROM FILE AND RETURN TO A&E, ROOM 1331, R&S WHEN INDIVIDUAL EOD'S

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 29 August 1961.

Signature

27 Nov 1961
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED JUNE 1957
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A4

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON, D.C. (Place of employment)

I, BOGUSLAW ANDRZEJ [illegible], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

27 Nov 1961
(Date of entrance on duty)

(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 27 day of Nov A. D. 1961,

at Washington, D.C. (City) (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

Personnel Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U. S. C. 18, or by a person designated to administer oaths under Section 206, Act of June 26, 1943, 5 U. S. C. 16a. If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*) 3409 VALLEY DRIVE ALEXANDRIA. VA

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH 30 APRIL 1917
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city and State or city and foreign country*) MANCHESTER NEW HAMPSHIRE

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, PLEASE NOTIFY EILEEN. MAKSYMIEC
(B) RELATIONSHIP WIFE
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE 3409 VALLEY DR ALEX VA
(D) TELEPHONE NO. TE-68218

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blank below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (Check one)	SINGLE (Check one)
MARYANNLLOYD	SEDGEWICK ST NW WASH	1. LAWYER 2. FULL TIME 3. FAA	SISTER INLAW	✓	
CHARLES LLOYD	" "	1. LAWYER. 2. FULLTIME 3. DEPT OF DEFENCE	BROTHER INLAW	✓	
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*		✓
7. DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*	✓	
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, CHARGED, OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES, FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 12 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		✓
9. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN BARRED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 12.*		✓

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10. (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		✓
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		
11. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT:		
A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE:		
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT:		
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.*		✓

PAYMENT FOR ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE UNDER [illegible] FEDERAL S[illegible]

12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
7	TWENTY YEAR ARMY RET		☐ YES ☐ NO
			HAS LEAVE PERIOD COVERED BY SUCH PAYMENT EXPIRED?
			☐ YES ☐ NO

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER.—You must determine [illegible] appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress [illegible] to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, any record of recent discharge or arrest, age, citizenship, [illegible] members of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should particularly check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and/or other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1959—O-517782

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1954
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1, R1, AND S2

ATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CIV AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*)
MAKSYMIEC·MYROSLAW·A

2. DATE OF BIRTH
30 APRIL 1917

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U.S. ARMY	1941	FEB	25	1961	JULY	31	HON

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☐ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☐ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
20	5	7

12. TOTAL SERVICE

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

27 Nov 1961
(DATE)

Myroslaw A Maksymiec
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 27 day of Nov (MONTH) 1961 at Washington (CITY) D.C. (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

(OVER)

[illegible]

30 August 1961

[illegible]

1. I have known Mr. [illegible] for more than seven years. For approximately two years (1954-1956) during that period he worked under my direct daily supervision in the Office of the Army Attache, American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Since that time I have maintained periodic contact with Mr. (then M/Sgt E-7) [illegible].

2. Although Mr. [illegible] was primarily the photographer and chief of the photographic laboratory while working with me in Ethiopia, he was also in charge of supply and transportation for the Office of the Army Attache. In addition, he learned to type and was of considerable assistance in helping to get out the many reports the office was required to make.

3. In the field of photography I consider Mr. [illegible] to be one of the outstanding photographers in the Armed Services of the United States. His work with me was consistently superior both from a technical viewpoint and from a photographic result viewpoint. None of the assignments that I gave Mr. [illegible] were routine, nor were they easy. Invariably they involved considerable ability, tenacity, diplomacy, and judgement. His many assignments were carried out by every possible means of transportation - on foot, on mule back, by truck (on almost impassable roads), and by plane. He always accomplished his mission. His detailed captions were uniformly accurate and valuable, clearing up [illegible] the subject [illegible] being covered.

4. His work in photography was so outstanding that [illegible] Addis Ababa [illegible] Mr. [illegible] photographic [illegible] one of the outstanding [illegible]

[illegible]

5. [illegible]

6. [illegible] outstanding ability.

7. I have been informed [illegible] the Pentagon, Mr. MACSYNNE has continued to serve the interests of the United States [illegible] Ethiopian Ambassador to the United States as well as the Ethiopian Army Attache. He has been of service to the Military Assistance Directorate and in that capacity has been especially commended by Brigadier General Henry [illegible] Director of the Institute.

8. While actively attending the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in 1958-1959, Mr. MACSYNNE was of considerable assistance to me in the detailed preparation of my thesis [illegible] The Organization [illegible] strategic significance to the United States.

9. Based on my personal observations and knowledge, I feel that Mr. MACSYNNE is eminently qualified for specialized work in the field of intelligence. He would be particularly valuable in all phases of photography and in collection, evaluation, or dissemination of intelligence. His investigative ability, particularly in the fields of map reading, geography, order of battle, or technical subjects is outstanding. He has the unique ability to collect and assemble pertinent data and to prepare clear and concise written reports.

10. I have found Mr. MACSYNNE to be [illegible] loyal, forceful, capable and conscientious. He has demonstrated high courage and moral integrity. He is eminently outstanding in his [illegible] field of photography [illegible] peers.

11. [illegible] unhesitatingly [illegible] Mr. MACSYNNE for any [illegible] of which [illegible] continued [illegible] this

[illegible]



ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

29 APR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Registrar, Office of Medical Services

SUBJECT : Medical Report for Myroslaw A. Maksymiec

1. Mr. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec is applying for disability retirement.

2. In accordance with FPM Supplement 831-1, S 10-5, it is requested that a medical report be submitted to this office to be forwarded with other documents to the Bureau of Retirement, Insurance and Occupational Health, Civil Service Commission.

3. Mr. Maksymiec plans to remain on duty through 28 May 1971 pending a decision on his application for retirement.

4. Copies of the following documents are attached: Application for Retirement (2801), [illegible], (2801-A), and Physician's Statement, (2801-B).

/s/ Francis G. Monan

Francis G. Monan
Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

Attachments

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF
1 - Insurance Branch
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/LBirch:sl (28 April 1971)

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
035655	MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW ANDREW	30 APRIL 1912		9

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
WASHINGTON	D.C	HIGH SCH. Cer	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1. MONTGOMERY JUNIOR COLLEGE		ENGLISH				3 HRS
2. AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASH DC		[illegible]	on AFRICA			18 HRS

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1. DEPT OF AGRICULTURE COURSES	ADVANCE COURSE [illegible]			SEM 6 HRS
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Maiden)
MAKSYMIEC	EILEEN	E	BURKE

3. DATE OF BIRTH 15 Oct 1911	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) WORCHESTER MASS
5. OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER —

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED
YES		

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

TFS 30 July 71

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

	NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.	ETHIOPIA	INTELLIGENCE AND [illegible]	1953 TO 1955					X
2.								

MAR 23 10 59 AM '71

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

PHOTOGRAPHY, SWIMMING, FISHING
PHOTOGRAPHY USED IN PUBLICATION TITLED (COME ALONG ETHIOPIA 1968)
ALSO LIFE MAGAZINE 1955

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☒ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL FORT HOLABIRD MD	INTELLIGENCE	1950	RESIDENT ARMY AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

	NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.	THE EXPLORERS CLUB	NEW YORK NY	1969	1971
2.	NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY	WASHINGTON D.C	1958	1971
3.				

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE: 11 Feb 1971

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PLW

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444i, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
035655	MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW ANDREW	30 APRIL 1917

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SYSTEM	WASHINGTON DC	1966	☑ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.	AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON DC			1966 TO PRESENT (11/69)			4.5 [illegible] 21 HRS
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
MILITARY LANGUAGE SCHOOL, MONTEREY CALIF	RUSSIAN	1947		4 MONTHS
INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL FORT HOLABIRD	INTELLIGENCE STUDY	1949		1 MONTH

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.	DEPT OF AGRICULTURE COURSE COLOR PHOTOGRAPHY	TECHNICES OF OF COLOR PROCESSING	1967		6 CREDIT HOURS
2.		AND QUALITY COLOR CONTROLS	1968		6 MONTHS

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)
MAKSYMIEC ~~A~~ EILEEN ELIZABETH BURKE

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
23 OCT 1925	WORCHESTER MASS	
5. OCCUPATION	**6. PRESENT EMPLOYER**	
HOUSEWIFE		
7. CITIZENSHIP	**8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)**	**9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED**
YES		

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(29)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY—CHECK (X)			
				RESI-DENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGN-MENT
1.							
2.							

OCT 27 1 39 PM '69

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED—CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE
18 NOV 1969

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS STATEMENT

Tech. in Eng. & Physical Science (FA-?-18)

4 | 30 | 1917

001-16-8309

Washington D.C.

202 362-1350	202 351-3435

☒ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss

MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW ANDREW

4718 Asbury Place, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20016

PAY $12,??? per yr. or GRADE 11

	X	

Will you accept?	YES	NO
(A) Temporary appointment —1 month or less?		X
—1 to 4 months?		X
—4 to 12 months?		X
(B) Less than full time work?		X

(C) Will you accept a job in	YES	NO
—Washington, D.C.?	X	
—any place in the United States?		
—outside of the United States?		
—only in (specify)		

EDUCATION

X 1935 | 12

District of Columbia Public High School, Washington, D. C.

	Dates attended From	To	Years completed Day	Night	Semester hours	Quarter hours	Type of degree	Year of degree
Montgomery Junior College Takoma Park, Md.	1965	1966		1	9		NA	NA
American University Washington, D. C.	1966	1969		2	9			

(D) Chief undergraduate college subjects

See Enclosure No. 5

(F) Major field of study at highest level of college work

(G) Other schools or training

See Enclosure No. 5

HONORS, AWARDS, AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

1. CIA-Meritorius Service Award - Jan 9, 1963
2. Gold Medallion by Emperor of Ethiopia May 17, 1957

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

	Read	Speak	Understand	Write
Russian	X	X	X	X
Ukranian	X	X	X	X
Polish	X	X	X	X

11-61 Photographic Researcher GS-1311-9

12,000 per annum Washington

40 D.C. 2 Technicians Photography

G. E. [illegible] - Personnel Central Intelligence Agency

202-351-[illegible] Washington, D. C.

Advancement into broader fields

See Enclosure No. 1

From 1957 To 7-31-61 Director of Photography E9

Starting $ 6200. per annum Washington

Final $ 9400. per annum 40 D.C. 64 Technicians Photography

Deputy Chief

MAJ GEN Alva R. Fitch, USA Publications & Services Br., Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Dept. of Army, Washington, 25, D. C.

Retirement

See Enclosure No. 2

From 1954 To 1956 Army Attaché E7

Starting $ 6660. per annum Addis Ababa

40 Ethiopia 16 Technicians Photography

MAJ GEN John A. Klein Army Attaché System G2, Intelligence, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.

Military Assignment

See Enclosure No. 3

[illegible], MYROSLAW ANDREW

APRIL 20, 1917

1950	1953	Army Attache		E7
5200 annum 6000 annum	40	London, England	33 Technician: Photography	

BRIG. GEN. R. E. Williamson, USA

Office of the Army Attache
American Embassy, London, England

Military Assignment

See Enclosure No. 4

5	1941	1949	Photographer	
1800 annum 4000 annum	40	Various		Photography

Commanding Officer

Department of the Army, G-2 Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

Military Assignments

Served as an Intelligence and Investigative Photographer throughout the South Pacific, Far East, Near East, Africa, Europe, and the Continental United States.

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1967
FM. 171 - Experience 18-1

Enclosure No. 1, Page 1

During the period November 1961 to the present, I am employed by the Central Intelligence Agency, located in Washington, D. C.

I lectured, conducted seminar, and advised on the operations of photography, cameras, lighting, printing, processing, and editing.

On an independent basis I performed complex black and white and color, still, and motion picture photographic assignments. Utilized, as appropriate, combinations of cameras, and other gear which included ultra-high speed cameras (1-5 thousand frames per second) plus compatible stroboscope lighting components, varied mirror, filter, and mounting devices.

Advised on the installation and operation of photographic set-up and rendered the technical decisions relative to the required optical, mechanical, and electronic adjustments.

Commendations:

I was awarded the 'Certificate of Commendation' by direction of the President of the United States, for meritorious service with the Central Intelligence Agency, on January 9, 1963.

Works:

'Come Along to Ethiopia' by Joseph Simonson was published in 1968 by T. S. Denison and Co., Inc. Pictures utilized in this historical-pictorial endeavor were my works and credit is given accordingly in the introduction. (Library of Congress 67-28078)

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 26, 1977
FM. 171 - Experience 18-2

Enclosure No. 2, Page 1

During the period 1957 through 1961, I was employed by the Publications and Services Branch, Office Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

Mission

Use, setup, arrangement of photographic equipment, techniques, and processes.

Develop, adapt, and create the foregoing in order to be responsive to unprecedented situations that require photographic equipment for situations of extreme conditions. (Weather, radiation, explosion, etc.). Create training films to deal with specific subjects.

Conduct training classes in basic and advanced photography, motion picture, and laboratory procedures.

Operations

I was responsible for the direction of technician/specialist photographers, concerned with reproduction of film using the most advanced Eastman-Kodak, Bell and Howell, and Houston Fearless printing and processing equipments.

During this phase there was a demand for high production and extreme accuracy in a minimum of time. My responsibilities required me to adapt to changing conditions under adverse conditions to achieve objectives that were required in a matter of hours.

I developed workload schedules based on task/mission requirements, available manpower, and the degree of skill available. The changing tasks and mission objectives required a maximum ability on my part to train personnel to meet the requirements of operating officials.

I established and conducted training classes in the operation and maintenance of equipment.

I developed workload schedules based on task/program/mission requirements, priorities, available manpower, and the degree of skill available.

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1917
FM. 171 - Experience 18-2

Enclosure No. 2, Page 2

Broke down each task into specific operations and handling elements, established a sequence of operations compatible to economical, efficient, and timely reproduction of motion picture film. I applied labor standards by utilization of labor standard data to each work increment to be performed.

I was responsible for determining the overall manpower requirements, equipment, materials, etc., necessary to accomplish the objectives of the organization under my jurisdiction.

I maintained progress chart status of all assigned task, program, established priorities, and directed technician in proper sequence to prevent production delays, work stoppage, and disruption of work schedule.

I reviewed quality and quantity of work produced by means of sampling, inspection, etc.

Accomplishments - Commendations

(1) Awarded 'Certificate of Appreciation', Department of Defense, Military Assistance Institute.

> "As the termination of your active service draws near, I desire to express my personal appreciation for the splendid service you have rendered the Military Assistance Institute during the past two and one-half years. Whenever you were called upon to serve as a guest briefer for Officers assigned to duty with the MAAG-Ethiopia, you cheerfully accepted this responsibility, in addition to your regularly assigned military duties.
>
> Your expert knowledge of the culture, geography, history, and living problems in this area was extremely beneficial to U. S. Military personnel stationed with the MAAG.
>
> The successful manner in which you presented these subjects, (illustrated with colored slides of scenes professionally photographed by you) materially aided our students to adjust themselves to conditions encountered in living in an unfamiliar country and in becoming productive at an early date after arrival at their new station.

Enclosure No. 2, Page 3

The attached Certificate of Appreciation is but a minor expression of our thanks to you for your efforts. The staff and faculty of the Institute join me in wishing you every success."

HENRY C. NEWTON
Brigadier General, USA (RET)
Director

(2) Fitness Report

"I have known Mr. MYROSLAW A. MAKSYMIEC for more than seven years. For approximately two years (1954-1956) during that period he worked under my direct daily supervision in the Office of the Army Attache, American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Since that time I have maintained periodic contact with Mr. (then M/Sgt E-7) MAKSYMIEC.

Although Mr. MAKSYMIEC's primary job was photographer and chief of the photographic laboratory while working with me in Ethiopia, he was also in charge of supply and transportation for the Office of the Army Attache.

In the field of photography I consider Mr. MAKSYMIEC to be one of the outstanding photographers in the Armed Services of the United States. His work with me was consistently superior both from a technical viewpoint and from a photographic result viewpoint. None of the assignments that I gave Mr. MAKSYMIEC were routine, nor were they easy. Invariably they involved considerable ability, tenacity, diplomacy, and judgment. He always accomplished his mission. His detailed captions were usually accurate and valuable, showing a keen insight into the subject (human or machine) being covered.

His work in photography was so outstanding that at one time at Addis Ababa, at a request from TIME - LIFE Magazines, I consented for Mr. MAKSYMIEC to complete a photographic report commenced by Mr. Alfred Eisenstadt, one of the outstanding photographers in the U. S. Several pages of pictures taken by Mr. MAKSYMIEC appeared with the article in LIFE Magazine. His work also was commended personally by the U. S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and by the Emperior Haile Selassie I, who awarded him a gold medal.

Enclosure No. 2, Page 4

Mr. MAKSYMIEC's many skills include outstanding technical ability in every phase of operations in a photographic laboratory.

I have been informed that while working in Washington, at the Pentagon, Mr. MAKSYMIEC has continued to serve the interests of the United States. He has been a lecturer at the Military Assistance Institute, and in that capacity has been officially commended by Brigadier General Henry C. Newton, Director of the Institute.

While I was attending the U. S. Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania in 1958-1959, Mr. MAKSYMIEC was of considerable assistance to me in the detailed preparation of my thesis: "The Greater Somaliland Movement, a study in the strategic significance to the United States".

Based on my personal observation and knowledge, I feel that Mr. MAKSYMIEC is eminently qualified for specialized work in the field of intelligence. He would be particularly valuable in all phases of photography, and in collection, evaluation, or dissemination of Intelligence. His investigative ability, particularly in the fields of map reading, geography, order of battle, or technical subjects is outstanding. He has the unique ability to collect and assemble pertinent facts and to prepare clear and concise written reports."

JOHN D. TOWNSEND
Colonel U. S. Army-G
Headquarters, Joint United States
~~Military Mission for Aid to Turkey~~
Operations and Training Branch
APO 254, N. Y. N.Y.

(3) Letter of Appreciation

M/Sgt. M. A. Maksymiec, RA 20140533
Chief of Staff, Intelligence
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Please accept my sincere thanks for the assistance rendered the Post Office Department recently with Mr. Seyoum Tekle Haimanot, Staff Officer, Ministry of Posts, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Enclosure No. 2, Page 5

As Mr. Seyoum is making a study of some of the operations of our Government and I can assure you that your talks and outlines played a great part in his orientation. Your knowledge of Ethiopia, its habits and customs is remarkable and I want to congratulate you on your pictorial coverage of the country.

Mr. William Armbrust joins me in thanking you for assisting in the instruction of Mr. Seyoum and especially for your kindness in showing the remarkable pictures.

Sincerely,

Edgar B. Jackson
Special Assignments
Office of the Deputy Postmaster
General, Washington, D.C.

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1917
FM. 171 - Experience 18-3

Enclosure No. 3, Page 1

During the period 1954 through 1956, I was assigned by Army Attache System, G2 Intelligence, Department of the Army, to conduct, direct, establish photographic center and perform specific photographic assignments in Ethiopia, Africa.

Mission and Tasks

During this period I directed and participated in photography of selected areas, equipments, training film, and selected subjects.

I modified and planned the installation of photographic equipments that were faced with situations of excessive heat in some instances and of severe low temperatures in others. These conditions were also subject to abnormal influences.

It was essential that I had a thorough familiarity with the mission objectives that would permit me to plan the photographic recording and reporting on film within a minimum of interference with program operating sequences. This required me to participate with operating officials, engineers, scientists, as a member of the team in order to define the capabilities and limitation of cameras and equipment to the total planning of the specific program. This broad knowledge permitted me to utilize my abilities, imagination, and creative ability to fully develop the photographic aspects.

I determined the kind of film, position, camera coverage, background, etc.

I developed the workload schedules based on mission requirements, priorities, manpower, and the degree of ability available.

I reviewed quantity and quality of work performed by means of visual inspection and by discussions with team leaders, particularly where problem areas existed or the mission was one with unusual scope and objectives.

I was responsible for the procurement of photographic equipment and supplies necessary for the assigned mission. This responsibility also included the repair and maintenance of all equipments in use.

14-00000

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1917
FM. 171 - Experience 18-3

Enclosure No. 3, Page 2

I maintained progress charts for all tasks, programs, missions, that indicated the status of installation, filming, reproduction actions for each task/program.

I directed the reproduction phases of the foregoing filming as indicated in Enclosure No. 2.

Artistic Segments

I exercised artistic and creative ability in using photography as a means of communication of information, historical, splendor, etc., to fulfill educational, military, international objectives.

I exercised control of the settings, actions of the event to be photographed. I suggested actions/behavior of principals; selected backgrounds; rehersed actions prior to photographing events.

Training

I conducted orientation and briefing courses for U. S. personnel in basic-advanced photography and basic-advanced laboratory techniques.

Accomplishments - Acknowledgements

(1) Transmittal of Medallion to Myroslaw A. Maksymiec, U. S. Army, G2:

"It is a genuine pleasure to forward herewith a gold medallion which His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, sent to the American Embassy herewith the desire that it be transmitted to you by this office. His Imperial Majesty, upon giving the medallion to the Charge d'Affaires, said that he wished you to have it as a token of his appreciation of your work.

Since high recognition reflects very honorably on your period of service here in Ethiopia and is a fine recommendation of your professional talents. I [illegible] opportunity to add my own congratulations to those of His Imperial Majesty and to ext[illegible] best wishes for continued success in your career."

ERNEST H. DAVIS, LT COL, GS
Army Attache

The Foreign [illegible]
U. S. Army Attache, American [illegible] of America, Office of the [illegible] Ababa, Ethiopia

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
April 30, 1957
[illegible] 171 - Experience 12-3

Enclosure No. 3, Page 3

(2) Letter of Appreciation - State Department to Department of the Army:

"Whether this is unusual or whether you can appropriately pass this letter on to officials concerned in the Department of Defense I do not know. But I do want to write the strongest sort of commendation of the work of Master Sergeant Myroslaw A. Maksymiec. Sergeant Maksymiec was associated in the Office of the Army Attache here in Addis Ababa, particularly for the purpose of photographic coverage.

It would please me if you would be able to forward this letter of mine to appropriate officials in the Defense Department. I know that Colonel John D. Townsend, who was the Army Attache here during practically all of Sergeant Maksymiec's service, would agree with me both in my estimate of the Sergeant's usefulness and efficiency and in seeing to it that this letter of commendation be endorsed in the Defense Department.

At the present time Sergeant Maksymiec is assigned in the photography laboratory in the Pentagon. Undoubtedly he is making a fine contribution there. I do know that he was of vast importance to our total American operation here in Ethiopia, not only military, while he was stationed with the Army Attache in Addis Ababa. He is a competent, cooperative, and persistent workman in attaining desired goals. His photographic output is way above average, both in quantity and quality. The Army Attache system, based on my observation of Sergeant Maksymiec's work in Ethiopia, stands in very great debt to him."

Joseph Simonson
United States Ambassador
American Embassy, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, April 17, 1957

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1917
FAL. 171 - Experience 13-3

Enclosure No. 3, Page 4

(3) Letter of Appreciation. Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army Map Service to Department of Army - Intelligence:

"During his recently completed tour of duty in the office of the Army Attaché, Ethiopia, M/Sgt. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec, was able to make an outstanding contribution to the Engineer intelligence and photography holdings on that country. The material he acquired and gave to the Engineers for reproduction was of quality and quantity far exceeding that which has normally been received from similar sources.

Considering the nature of the country in which M/Sgt. Maksymiec served, the material acquired could only have been obtained as a result of an enterprising, ~~persistent~~, and determined effort on his part.

A great number of the photographs taken by M/Sgt. Maksymiec have been retained by the Engineers to be used in Engineer intelligence studies. Favorable comments following his debriefing were due largely to the accurate and current information supplied by him.

Since satisfaction of Engineer requirements undoubtedly constituted only part of the overall duties of the Attache, Ethiopia, M/Sgt. Maksymiec's alertness and enthusiasm towards collection of materials of Engineer interest are greatly appreciated. He has made an invaluable contribution to the Engineer Intelligence and mapping effort.

It is requested that this letter be made a part of M/Sgt. Maksymiec's official records."

/s/ J. D. ABELL
Colonel, Corps of Engineers
Commanding

MSTYSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1917
SF. 171 - Experience 18-4

Enclosure No. 1, Page 1

During the period 1950 through 1953, I was the Supervisory Photographer for Chief of Photographic Laboratory for the Department of the Army, Office of the Army Attache, American Embassy, London, England.

Mission

Direct the technical operations of Technical Photographers and Photographic Laboratory Technicians. Operations included all of European Theater.

Training

I conducted regular seminars on all aspects of photography and photo laboratory techniques for personnel assigned to the European Area.

Operations

I performed the basic operations as indicated in Experience 18-3 - Mission-Tasks and Artistic Segments. In addition to the foregoing I supervised specialists and technicians' efforts in high volume reproduction of film that averaged over a million feet (black/white/color) of motion picture film.

Equipment utilized was the latest Eastman-Kodak, Bell and Howell, and Houston Fearless printing and processing equipment.

In directing this effort I worked in close coordination with motion picture producers in the planning and organizing the photographic aspects of specific task/program. It was my duty to plan work and secure esthetically perfect photographs that will permit achieve attainment of task/program objectives. This required the ability and judgment in varying processes, also in the utilization of equipment that transcended the normal processes and procedures in order to produce effects that would spotlight the task/program objectives which the photograph was designed to produce.

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 20, 1917
FM. 1174 Experience 13-4

Enclosure No. 4, Page 7

Commendations

(1) The Foreign Service of the United States of America; Office of the
Air Attache; American Embassy, London, England

201-Maksymiec, Myroslaw A. (Enl)

1. I wish to offer my appreciation to you for the part you played in accomplishing the highly-classified project assigned to you within the allotted period of time.

2. Your superior efforts in completing this project have materially benefited the Office of the Air Attache. The responsibility you have assumed, in addition to the long hours of work required during this period, deserves the highest praise.

JACK W. WOOD
Brig. Gen., USAF
Air Attache

(2) TO: Master Sergeant Myroslaw A. Maksymiec
Office of the Army Attache
American Embassy
London, England

1. The Army Attache has informed me of the outstanding manner in which you have performed your duties and has commended your services to me as deserving special recognition. Therefore, as you complete this tour of duty in the Army Attache System I wish to express to you my appreciation for the commendable manner in which you performed your duties.

2. Since your assignment to the London office in August 1950, you have performed all assigned duties in a superior manner. The nature of your duties often required that you work on many occasions at night and on normal non-working days, which you cheerfully did with utmost willingness. This continued demonstration of loyalty to duty reflects creditably upon yourself and the Attache System.

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1917
FM. 171 - Experience 18-4

Enclosure No. 4, Page 3

3. My best wishes to with you for continued success in future assignments.

4. A copy of this letter is being ~~forwarded~~ded to The Adjutant General for inclusion in your official 201 file and copies will accompany your next efficiency report.

MAJ. GEN. R. C. PARTRIDGE
Department of the Army
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Intelligence
Washington, 25, D. C.

MYROSLAV ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1917
FM. 171 - Education 14D and 14G

Enclosure No. 5, Page 1

Advanced Photography - 9 semester hours
English - 3 semester hours
Public Speaking - 3 semester hours
History - Africa - 3 semester hours

1965 - Present - American University, Washington, D.C.

1963 - Photography - Eastman Kodak Co., Rochester, New York

1950 - Military Intelligence School "Photography", Ft. Holabird, Maryland

1947 - Russian Language, Intelligence School, Monteray, California

Intelligence Training:

School of Photography

School of Advanced Photography

School of Photography - Camera Repair

School of Photography - Electronic Systems Repair

14-00000

ATTACH SUPPLEMENTAL SHEETS [illegible] FORM [illegible]

Answer all questions correctly and fully

20. [illegible] Grade	Job title	City: Manchester	21. [illegible]
GS-9	Physical Scientist	State (or Country): New Hampshire	Wash., D.C.

22. REFERENCES. List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. [illegible] REFERENCES.

Full Name	[illegible] Address [illegible]	Business or Occupation
COL John D. Townsend	First Army-G3-Hdqrs., Fort George Meade, Maryland	Military Intelligence
Mr. Richard E. Swing	513 Carron Avenue Rockville, Maryland	Scientist
GEN John Willems (Ret.)	7813 Lake Adlon Drive San Diego, California	Military Intelligence

23. VETERAN PREFERENCE. A. Have you ever served on active duty in the United States military service? [illegible]
If "Yes," complete Items B through E below.
Yes ☒ No ☐

B. List for all active military service

Dates (From-To)	Branch	Serial or Service Number
1941-1961	U.S. Army	RA-20140533

C. Have you ever been discharged from the armed services [illegible]
If "Yes," [illegible]
Yes ☐ No ☒

D. Do you claim 5-point preference based on active duty in the armed forces?
Yes ☒ No ☐

If "Yes," you will be required to furnish records to support your claim at the time you are appointed.

E. Do you claim 10-point preference? [illegible]
Yes ☐ No ☒

If "Yes," complete and attach Standard Form 15, "Claim for 10-point Veteran Preference," together with the proof called for in that form.

ANSWER ITEMS 24 THROUGH 33 BY PLACING AN "X" IN THE PROPER COLUMN

	Yes	No
24. Are you a citizen of the United States? If "No," give country of which you are a citizen	X	
25. Before answering this question read Item 25 in the attached instructions.		
A. Are you now, or within the last ten years have you been, a member of: (1) The Communist Party, U.S.A., or any subdivision of the Communist Party, U.S.A.?		X
(2) An organization that to your present knowledge advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of government of the United States by force or violence or other unlawful means?		X
B. If your answer to Item A(1) or A(2) is "Yes," write your answers to the following questions in Item 34 or on a separate piece of paper. (1) The name of the organization? (2) The dates of your membership? (3) Your understanding of the aims and purposes of the organization at the time of your membership?		
26. To ensure that you are not placed in a position which might impair your health or [illegible] to you or to others, we need information about [illegible]. Do you have, or have you had [illegible] epilepsy, tuberculosis, or diabetes? If your answer is "Yes," [illegible] Item 34.		X
27. Within the last five years have you been fired from any job for any reason?		X
28. Within the last five years have you quit a job after being notified that you would be fired? If your answer to 27 or 28 is "Yes," [illegible]		X
29. Have you ever been convicted of an offense against the law [illegible] (You may omit: (1) traffic violations for which you paid a fine of [illegible] or less; and (2) any offense committed before your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in a juvenile court or under a Youth Offender law.)		X
30. While in the military service were you ever convicted by general court-martial? If your answer to [illegible] is "Yes," [illegible]		X
31. A. [illegible]		X
B. [illegible]		X
32. [illegible]	X	
33. [illegible]		X

31. Retired from U. S. Army [illegible]

[illegible] Write on EACH sheet your name, birth date, and examination [illegible]

ATTENTION—READ THE FOLLOWING CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING THIS APPLICATION

[illegible]

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

SIGNATURE [illegible]

DATE SIGNED

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE—FOR USE OF EXAMINING OFFICE ONLY

☐ Refer for medical action ☐ [illegible] ☐ Disapproved [illegible]

Announcement No.

Material Sub. No.

Name

☐ Approved ☐ Submitted

☐ Disapproved ☐ Returned

Ineligible

Initials Reviewed?

Option

Grade

Earned Rating

Preference

Augmented Rating

☐ 5 Points (Tent.)

☐ 10 Points Comp. Dis.

☐ Other 10 Points

☐ Disall.

☐ Being Investigated

Initials and Date

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

☐ 5 Pt. ☐ 10 Pt. Comp. Dis. ☐ 10 Pt. Other

Preference has been verified through proof that the separation was under honorable conditions, and other proof as required.

Signature and Title

Agency

Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
035655	MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	04/30/17

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL	MANCHESTER N.H.	1932-1936	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1. AMERICAN UNIV. WASH D.C						16 HRS
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
MILITARY LANGUAGE SCHOOL MONTEREY CALIFORNIA	RUSSIAN	1946	1947	12 MO

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL	INTELLIGENCE PHOTO	1950	1950	3 MO
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) MAKSYMIEC (First) EILEEN (Middle) E (Maiden) BURKE

3. DATE OF BIRTH 1928 1925?

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) WORCHESTER MASS

5. OCCUPATION HOUSE WIFE

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER NA

7. CITIZENSHIP YES

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

SECRET

(4-51)

6

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCT 24 9 15 AM '68
MAIL ROOM

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (✓) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Ethiopia Europe	Intelligence	1954-[illegible] 1950-[illegible]		✓	✓		✓

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (✓) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

Photography, Scuba diving, Fishing.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☑ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED
Language + Intelligence	Intelligence	1948 1950	☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1. National Geographic Society	Washington D.C.	1948	1968
2. Regular Army Sgt Club	Washington D.C.	1966	1968
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE
10 Sept 1968

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Myroslaw G.

SECRET

-P+HS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP
035655	KASYMIEC HYROSLAW A	M	04/30/17	GS -09-04

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
1P	D A & E TECH	NPIC	WASH., D. C.

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
NO OVERSEAS SERVICE			

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		

FORM 1-67 444J
Mfg. 7-67

SECRET

(4-31)

8 6 AUG ENTD

SECTION III

EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From - To)	GRADUATE
WASHINGTON	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	1964 HIGH SCHOOL CERTIFICATE	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM./QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
1.	SILVER SPRINGS MARYLAND MONTGOMERY JUNIOR COL		ENGLISH	SEPT 1966				1-SEM 3 SEM-HRS
2.								
3.								
4.								

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

NONE

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.		NONE			
3.					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.		NONE			
3.					
4.					
5.					

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.	U.S DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE GRADUATE SCHOOL	COLOR PHOTOGRAPHY AND COLOR PRINTING	JAN 1964		YEAR 3 SEM HRS
2.	" "	" "	SEPT 1965		YEAR 3 SEM HRS
3.					
4.					
5.					

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

SECTION V — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED -- CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM.
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER. SPECIFY: NONE

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

NONE

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

PHOTOGRAPHY, SWIMMING, ICE SKATING, (WELL)

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving) OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

NONE

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO NONE

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

NONE

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

NONE

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NONE

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

NONE

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. — specify)

2. BRANCH OR CORPS

3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty) FROM — TO —

4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. — specify)

5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation if past service)

6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

NONE

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

NONE

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS.

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
1.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
2.		NONE		☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
3				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
4.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
5.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED

SECRET

SECTION VIII AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

NONE

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

NONE

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

NONE

SECTION VIII — AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)
2. LOCATION (Country, City)
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

NONE

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)
2. LOCATION (Country, City)
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

NONE

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)
2. LOCATION (Country, City)
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

NONE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	MARITAL STATUS		
1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried. SPECIFY) NONE			
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)			
3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)		
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER		
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED	

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
WILLIAM. MAKSYMIEC	SON	1/30/60	YES	4718 ASBURY PLACE WASHINGTON D.C
SHARON ANN MAKSYMIEC	DAUGHTER	2/6/61	YES	4718 ASBURY PLACE WASHINGTON D.C

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
	NONE		

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 Sept 1967	Myroslaw J. Maksymiec

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 57
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. Kind of position applied for or name of examination

2. Option(s) (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. Place of employment applied for (city and State)
Washington D.C. or vicinity

4. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
Myroslaw Andrew Maksymiec

5. Street and number or R. D. number
3268 Valley Drive

City or post office (including postal zone) and State
Alexandria , Virginia

6. Place of birth
City Manchester
State or foreign country New Hampshire

7. Date of birth (month, day, year)
April 30, 1917

8. ☒ Male ☐ Female

9. Height without shoes 5 feet 8 inches
Weight 185 pounds

10. ☒ Married ☐ Single

11. Home phone TE 6 8218
Office phone OX 71376

12. Legal or voting residence (State)
New Hampshire

13. If you have ever been employed by the Federal Government, indicate last grade
Yes M/Sgt U.S.Army (E-7)
Dates of service in that grade
From 6-51 To Present

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of
Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Apptur. ☐ Nonappor.
Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned
Entered Register:
Notations:
App. Review:
Approved:

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Augm. Rating
			☐ 5 Points (Tent.)	
			☐ 10 Point Comp. Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Point	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being Investigated	
Initials and Date				

14. AVAILABILITY INFORMATION. A. Indicate the lowest salary you will accept $, per annum
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

B. If you are now a Federal employee, indicate the lowest grade you will accept

C. Will you accept appointment for ☐ 1 to 3 months? ☐ 3 to 6 months? ☒ 6 to 12 months?
Acceptance or refusal of a short-term appointment will not affect your consideration for another appointment.

D. Are you willing to travel ☒ Occasionally? ☐ Frequently? ☐ Constantly?

E. Will you accept appointment ☒ In Washington, D. C.? ☐ Anywhere in United States? ☐ Outside U. S.?

F. If you will accept appointment only in certain locations, list them:
Washington D.C. or vicinity

15. VETERAN PREFERENCE. A. If you claim 5-point preference based on wartime military service, indicate:

Date(s) of entry into active service	Date(s) of separation	Branch of service (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.)	Serial number. If none, give grade or rating at separation
Feb 25, 1941	Expected to be July 1961	Army	RA 20140533

B. Do you claim 5-point preference as a peacetime campaign veteran? ☐ Yes ☒ No

C. Do you claim 10-point preference? ☐ Yes ☒ No

D. Have you ever been granted 10-point veteran preference or 5-point preference as a peacetime campaign veteran by the U. S. Civil Service Commission? ☐ Yes ☐ No If so, indicate below the office which granted this preference to you. Attach your notice of preference allowance if available. It will be returned to you.

Name of U. S. Civil Service Commission office or name of Board of U. S. Civil Service Examiners

Address of Commission office or Board of Examiners
City
State

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY. The information contained in answer to question 15A has been verified with the discharge certificate, which shows that the separation was under honorable conditions.

Signature Agency
Title Date

(Continued on next page)

18. EXPERIENCE (*Start with your present position and work back*)

① Dates of employment (*month, year*)

From Feb 1941 To present time

Salary or earnings

Starting $ 65.00 per month

Final $ 405.00 per month

Classification Grade (*if in Federal service*)

Exact title of your position: Pvt to M/Sgt U.S.Army

Place of employment

City Washington

State D.C.

Kind of business or organization (*manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.*)

Name and address of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*)

Ass't Chief of Staff for Intelligence
U.S.Army The Pentagon Washington, D.C.

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Lt. Col Pilla

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work: Retiring from military service

② Dates of employment (*month, year*)

From 6-1935 To Feb 41

Salary or earnings

Starting $ 50.00 per wk

Final $ 75.00 per wk

Classification Grade (*if in Federal service*)

Exact title of your position: Photographer

Place of employment

City

State

Kind of business or organization (*manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.*)

Name and address of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*)

Borgeois Studios
188 Walnut St Manchester, N.H.

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Ulic Borgeois

Reason for leaving

Description of work: To enlist in the U.S.Army

Assignment, studio portraiture work, also lab work

③ Dates of employment (*month, year*)

From To

Salary or earnings

Starting $ per

Final $ per

Classification Grade (*if in Federal service*)

Exact title of your position

Place of employment

City

State

Kind of business or organization (*manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.*)

Name and address of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*)

Name and title of immediate supervisor

Reason for leaving

Description of work

#17- Special Qualifications and Skills

(D) 1. At the close of my assignment to the Office of the Army Attache, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, I was awarded the Gold Medalion (Order of Ethiopia) by Emperor Haile Selassie for extraordinary photography accomplishments concerning the American Embassy and the Emperor (1953-1955).

2. Also on the personal recommendation of Alfred Eisenstaedt, Life Magazine's head photographer, I was contracted by Life Magazine to cover the Silver Jubilee of Emperor Haile Selassie (1955). This included all photography work and literature concerning the Jubilee. This work appeared in Life Magazine issue November 20, 1955.

3. While assigned to the Office of the Army Attache in London (1950-1953) covered special assignments for the American Embassy, including the Ambassador's presenting of his credentials to the Court of St. James; King George VI's funeral; and Queen Elizabeth's coronation.

All of the above 1,2,and 3 were photographed and processed by myself up to the finished product.

4. Concerning my recent photographic work, I won 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th prizes in the Military District of Washington Photographic Contest 1960. Also won 1st prize for Ft. Myer, Virginia, photographic contest 1960.

5. Because of my extensive knowledge of Ethiopia, I have been lecturing at the Foreign Service Institute, Arlington Towers, Virginia, from 1956 to the present time. This also included the showing of my personal color slides on Ethiopia at all of the lectures.

6. Have also had my photos accepted for publication in TRAVEL Magazine and have appeared in numerous issues.

7. Shot official aerial photos of the Pentagon Building and surrounding areas in 1959.

#17-B - Cameras and Laboratory Equipment that I am extensively familiar with:

Cameras

1. Leica 35 mm
2. Kardon 35 mm
3. Kodak 35 mm
4. Minox Miniature
5. Rolleiflex 6 x 6
6. Speed Graphic 4 x 5
7. 8 x 10 View Cameras (Kodak)
8. 70 mm Roll Camera
9. K-20 Aerial Camera
10. 16 mm Turret Movie Camera

Lab Equipment

1. Standard Photostat Machine
2. Ozalid Machine
3. Recordax Copy Camera
4. Robertson Copy Camera
5. Omega Enlarger (4x5) Auto Focus
6. Leitz Foca-Mat Model III C Auto Focus
7. Morse Contact Printer (Aerial Type)
8. Lomaco Power Contact Printer

Prior to entry into military service worked for Borgeois Studios, Manchester, N.H. 1939 to 1941 as laboratory technician. In 1945 resumed photography career in U.S.Army and continued in this field up til the present time. Skills were developed in the photographer and photographic laboratory fields and rose to my present rank of Master Sargent. My skills as a photographer include an operating knowledge of all characteristics of cameras and equipment used in Army photography and the theory and practices of still and motion picture photography. For example, some of my duties include:

1. taking still photographs for news releases, publicity, medical and historical value
2. taking still and aerial photographs and motion pictures
3. taking of motion pictures for use in preparing training, information, and historical film
4. supervising the taking of still and motion pictures
5. assisting superiors to establish priorities, scope of missions, and work schedules
6. assigning photographers to mission on basis of qualifications, criticising completed work in discussion with photographers, pointing out technical and artistic deficiencies and methods by which such defects can be avoided

My qualities as a senior N C O in this field include knowing the capabilities and limitations of subordinate personnel, being very able to instruct and demonstrate proper camera techniques, and be able to constructively criticize and evaluate the composition of photographs and motion pictures.

My skills in photographic laboratory field include a knowledge of all the operating characteristics of Army photographic laboratory equipment; the techniques of both conventional and semiautomatic photographic processing of still and motion picture black-and-white and color film; the ability to demonstrate and instruct the appropriate photographic laboratory techniques and processes; the ability to organize and supervise operation of a large Army photographic laboratory; the knowledge of operating procedures and installation and organizational maintenance techniques pertaining to Army photographic laboratories; and am able to supervise, plan, and conduct training in all phases of photographic processing. Am exceptionally skilled in making copy negatives of all types, performing line [illegible] work, making line negatives and half-tone negatives, view graphs, 35 mm slides and 2 1/4 x 3 1/4 slides.

With regards to my physical qualifications, I have very good near and far vision, good eye-hand coordination, good manual dexterity, and very good color vision. My hearing is above normal and my speech clear and well annunciated.

ATTACH SUPPLEMENTAL SHEETS OR FORMS HERE

Dates of employment *(month, year)*
From To

Exact title of your position

Salary or earnings
Starting $ per
Final $ per

Classification/Grade *(if in Federal service)*

Place of employment
City
State

Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*

Name and title of immediate supervisor

Reason for leaving

Description of work

If you need additional experience blocks, use supplemental sheets. SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET.

17. SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND SKILLS.

(A) Licenses and Certificates.—Indicate the kind of license or certificate and the State or other licensing authority which granted it; for example, pilot, teacher, electrician, lawyer, radio operator, C. P. A., etc.

Kind of License .... Licensing Authority ....

(B) List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key-punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices.

Photographer, still and motion camera
Photostat machine, ozalid: all types
of photo reproduction and film processing equipment.

(C) Approximate number of words per minute in:
Typing .... Shorthand ....

(D) Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application, such as:
(1) Your more important publications. *(Do not submit copies unless requested)*
(2) Your patents or inventions.
(3) Public speaking and public relations experience.
(4) Membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.
(5) Honors and fellowships received.

18. EDUCATION.

A. Give the highest elementary or high-school grade completed ...10th...
If you completed high school, give date ....

B. Name and location of last high school attended:
Central High, Manchester, N.H.

C. Name and location of college or university:	Dates attended		Years completed		Credit hours		Degrees received
	From	To	Day	Night	Semester	or Quarter	

D. Chief undergraduate college subjects	Credit hours		E. Chief graduate college subjects	Credit hours	
	Semester	or Quarter		Semester	or Quarter

F. Other schools or training, such as trade, vocational, Armed Forces, or business. Give for each name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, certificates, and any other pertinent data:

19. Have you lived or traveled in any foreign countries?
☒ Yes ☐ No
If answer is "Yes," give in Item 34 names of countries, dates, and length of time spent there and reason or purpose *(military service, business, education, or vacation)*.

20. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.	Reading			Speaking			Understanding			Writing		
	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair

21. REFERENCES.—List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT RELATED TO YOU AND WHO HAVE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 18, EXPERIENCE.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Edward C. Sweeney	725 15th Street, N.W. Wash D.C.	Attorney
2. Edward King	452 Oakwood Street, S.E. Wash D.C.	Adm Ass't to Senator Bridges
3. William Armbrust	4006 Loraine Ave Falls Church Va	Ass't Postmaster Bureau of Budget

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
22. (a) Are you a citizen of the United States of America, or (b) as a native of American Samoa do you owe allegiance to the United States of America?	X	
23. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party, U. S. A., or any Communist organization?		X
24. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of a Fascist organization?		X
25. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means?		X
If your answer to question 23, 24, or 25 above is "Yes," state on a separate sheet to be attached to and made a part of this application the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities. (See instruction sheet)		
26. Does the United States Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 34 for EACH such relative: (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) department or agency by which employed; and (5) kind of appointment.*		X
27. A. Have you any physical handicap, chronic disease, or other disability?		X
B. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown?		X
C. Have you ever had tuberculosis?		X
If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 34.		

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
28. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.?	X	
29. Do you receive or have you applied for an annuity from the United States or District of Columbia Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 34.*	X	
30. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 34.*		
31. Have you ever been barred by the U. S. Civil Service Commission from taking examinations or accepting civil-service appointments? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 34.*		X
32. A. Have you ever been discharged from employment because: (1) Your conduct was not satisfactory?		X
(2) Your work was not satisfactory?		X
B. Have you ever resigned after official notification that: (1) Your conduct was not satisfactory?		X
(2) Your work was not satisfactory?		X
C. Have you ever been discharged from the Armed Services under other than honorable conditions?		X
If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 34 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.		
33. Have you ever been arrested, charged, or held by Federal, State, or other law-enforcement authorities for any violation of any Federal law, State law, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance? Do not include anything that happened before your 16th birthday. Do not include traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed. All other charges must be included even if they were dismissed. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 34 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		X

34. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS. Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.

Item No.		Item No.	
19	Australia 1 yr 1942	29	Retiring July 1961
	New Guinea 1943 1 yr		after 20 years of active
	Phillipine 1944 1/2 yr		service in the U.S. Army
	Japan 1945 1/4 yr		
	United Kingdom 1950-1953		
	Ethoopia 1953-1955		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

ATTENTION: If you are appointed, all facts you give will be subject to investigation including a check of your fingerprints. Before signing this application, go back over it to make sure you have answered all questions correctly and fully, so that your eligibility can be decided on the basis of all the facts. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for cancellation of your application or your dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date 27 March 1961

Signature of applicant

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SERIAL	
[illegible]	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (2-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
MAKSYMIEF MYROSLAW. ANDREW.	30 APR	30	1917

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
RUSSIAN. ~~POLISH~~ ~~UKRIANIAN~~ 654	27 NOV.	27	1961	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE.

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

[✓ 3.] I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 27 Nov 1961	SIGNATURE Myroslaw
(46)	(47)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
[illegible]

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
MAKSYMILEC MYROSLAW ANDREW	APRIL	30	1917
3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
~~UKRANIAN~~ UKRAINIAN 804	NOV	27	196

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 2.] I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 27 NOV 1961	SIGNATURE Myroslaw P. [illegible]
(46)	(47)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
[illegible]	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24) MAKSYMIEC. MYROSLAW ANDREAY		2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH APRIL	DAY 30	YEAR 1917
3. LANGUAGE (31-33) POLISH 624	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH NOV	DAY 27	YEAR 1961	5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A.

Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B.

Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C.

Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. *Speaking* (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. *Understanding* (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 27 NOV. 1961	SIGNATURE
(46)	(47)

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISSUED BY G. E. Post

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE (Fill in) 6 JUN 1961

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last First Middle): Maksymiec, Myroslaw Andrew
2. AGE: 43
3. SEX: ● MALE ☐ FEMALE
4. HEIGHT: 5ft 6inc
5. WEIGHT: 200 lbs
6. COLOR OF EYES: hazel
7. COLOR OF HAIR: brown
8. TYPE COMPLEXION: ruddy
9. TYPE BUILD: stocky
10. SCARS (Type and Location): NA
11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES: Roman nose becaus of deviated septum
12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country): 3268 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.
13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO.: 3409 Valley Dr. Alex. Va. TE 6-3218
14. CURRENT PHONE NO.: TE 6-3218
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.: OX 21376
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country): Manchester N.H.
17. NICKNAMES: Mac, Marco
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED: NA
19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES: childhood nickname for about 30 years
20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority): NA

SECTION II — POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING: General all around photography and photo labatory work
2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary). $ 6,000
3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT: 8-1-61
4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: ● OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:
5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (Check (X) each item applicable): ● WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify):
6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA: Mass.

FORM 11-56 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

141

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 4-30-17
2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Manchester N.H.
3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): [illegible]

4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ● BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):
5. DATE NATURALIZED: NA
6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.: NA

7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: NA
8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country): NA

9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☐ YES ● NO
10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY: NA

11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

NA

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ● NO
13. GIVE PARTICULARS: NA

14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)?: NA

15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.: NA
16. PORT OF ENTRY: NA
17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY: NA

18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue): NA
19. DATE VISA ISSUED: NA

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED.

●	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: Bakers-Ville School
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Elm Street Manchester N.H.
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1923-1931
4. GRADUATE: ● YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: Central High
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Manchester, N.H.
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1931-1932
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ● NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To):
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

(14)

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
U.S. Army Language School	Russian	1948	1948	4

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).)	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Ukrianian												●						●	
Polish												●						●	

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

NA

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

NA

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

NA

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

☐ YES ☐ NO NA

SECTION VI GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.
Special Passport # 18805 Issued 21 July 1950

SECTION VII TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
NA	NA	☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE OTHER (Specify): NA

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.).
NA

SECTION VIII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.
Photography, ice hockey, swimming, football

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.
All types of photography work and lab work

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.
Ozalid mach. automatic photostat. recordax equipment; all types of photo lab equipment including still and motion picture cameras.

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

151

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ● NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE (Provide License Registry Number, if known).

NA

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of Issue)
NA

7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of Issue)
NA

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).

Photo coverage and write up concerning the Silver Jubliee of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, which appeared in Life Mag. 11-2[illegible]-55. Also asst. Col John D. Townsend U.S.A. in the preperation of his paper during his attendance at the Army War College on "The Horn of Africa" 1959.

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NA

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

Giving breifings to all MAAG personell going to Ethiopia from 1955 to present, at the Military Institute Arl. Towers Va.

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

NA

SECTION IX

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
2-25-41 to present

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
U.S. Army

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
Ft. Myer Va.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS
U.S.A.

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Col Angelo Pelia

6. TITLE OF JOB
Photography

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ 525 PER mo.

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
M/Sgt. U.S.A.

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Photography all types of lab work for Asst. Chief of Staff Intell

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING
Retireing from active duty 7-31-61

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

152

SECTION X

MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 (As amended) ☐ YES ● NO
2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION: NA
3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.: NA
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON: NA
5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS: NA

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE (Specify)
HAVE SERVED							●		
NOW SERVING	●								

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S): Asst. Chief of Staff Intell.
3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (Past service): N A
4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES (Past and current service): 20 years
5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY — PAST SERVICE: — CURRENT SERVICE: 2-25-41
6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION: NA
7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE — PAST SERVICE: — CURRENT SERVICE: [illegible]
8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER (If now serving, provide current number): RA 201[illegible]
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: [illegible] — CURRENT SERVICE: Asst. Chief of Staff
10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: NA — CURRENT SERVICE:
11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)

Intelligence photography, general PIO work for the past 11 years. I have been involved in Intelligence photography for the Asst. Chief of Staff Intell.

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE	● RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	☐ OTHER:
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY	

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED
☐ REGULAR ☐ RESERVE (Including the National and Air National Guard) ☐ OTHER (Including AUS)

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ● NO
2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L GRD. OR AIR NAT'L GRD.? ☐ YES ● NO
3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? ☐ YES ● NO
4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☐ ARMY	☐ MARINE CORPS	☐ NATIONAL GUARD	☐ COAST GUARD	☐ NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
☐ NAVY	☐ AIR FORCE	☐ AIR NAT'L GUARD	☐ ARMY ROTC	☐ AIR FORCE ROTC	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION
8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE
10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE
11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES
12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT ☐ YES ● NO
13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? ☐ YES ● NO
15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY — YEARS: 20 MONTHS:
17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT? Adj. General Office Wash D.C.

155

SECTION XI — FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

NA

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
First and Merchants	National Bank of Richmond Va.
Credit Union	Pentagon Wash. D.C.
The Amoskeag National Bank	Manchester, N.H.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN OR PETITIONED FOR BANKRUPTCY? YES [✓ NO]

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO 4 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

NA

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
Mayer & Co.	Wash. D.C.
Woodward & Lothrop	Wash. D.C.
Julius Garfinkel	Wash. D.C.

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? [✓ YES] NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

Retirement from the United States Army 20 years

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☒ NO (If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)

SECTION XII — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled) SPECIFY: Married

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME (First) Eileen (Middle) Elizabeth (Maiden) Burke (Last) [illegible]

4. STATE ANY OTHER NAMES EVER USED: Dimples

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH ANY OF THESE NAMES WERE USED. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 14 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

5. DATE OF MARRIAGE: Nov. 15,1958

6. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Arlington Va.

7. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 132 Bay State Rd. Worcester, Mass.

8. LIVING: [✓ YES] NO

9. DATE OF DEATH: NA

10. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

11. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address if deceased): [illegible] Valley Dr. Alex. Va.

12. DATE OF BIRTH: 10-23-25

13. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Worcester, Mass.

14. CITIZENSHIP: yes

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA

15. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA

17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA

18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA

19. OCCUPATION: Housewife

20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last employer): NA

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): NA

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.): NA

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: NA

24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED: NA

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: NA

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
William Thomas	son	1-30-60 Wash DC	USA. ~~yes~~	5200 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.
Sharon Ann	daughter	2-6-61 Wash DC	USA. ~~yes~~	5266 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.
Wasyl Makarymiec	father	Austria 11-11-86	USA. ~~yes~~	92 Vinton St Manchester N.H.

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. 2

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, grandparents, sisters, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. 1

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information for Stepfather and/or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Makarymiec Wasyl

2. LIVING: ● YES ☐ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH: NA

4. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: Bill, William

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 15 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country): 92 Vinton Street Manchester N.H.

7. DATE OF BIRTH: 11-11-86

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Sgasow Austria

9. CITIZENSHIP: USA ~~yes~~

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: 1914

11. PLACE OF ENTRY: New York

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): Austria

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: 4-4-45

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): Manchester N.H.

15. OCCUPATION: retired

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed): NA

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED: NA

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To): NA

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: NA

20. COUNTRY: NA

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: NA

157

SECTION XV **MOTHER** (Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Maksymiec, Justina
2. LIVING: ● YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: ---
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: ---
5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: NA

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED (No., Street, City, State, Country): State Hospital Concord N.H.
7. DATE OF BIRTH: 1896
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Austria, Sobrotwar
9. CITIZENSHIP: AUSTRIAN ~~US~~
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: 1912
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: New York
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Countries): Austria
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: ---
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): ---
15. OCCUPATION: Housewife
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed): NA
17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED: NA
18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To): NA
19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: NA
20. COUNTRY: NA
21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: NA

SECTION XVI **BROTHERS AND SISTERS** (Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Marker, John
2. RELATIONSHIP: brother
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country): ~~yes~~ USA.
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 8112 13? Pier 61 St. Lauderdale Fla.
5. LIVING: ● YES ☐ NO
6. AGE: [illegible]

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Loudenslager, Olga
2. RELATIONSHIP: sister
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country): ~~yes~~ USA
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 92 Vinton St. Manchester, N.H.
5. LIVING: ● YES ☐ NO
6. AGE: 52

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Maksymiec, Wasyl
2. RELATIONSHIP: brother
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country): ~~yes~~ USA.
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 596 So. Willow St. Manchester N.H.
5. LIVING: ● YES ☐ NO
6. AGE: [illegible]

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

6
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

7
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

8
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

151

SECTION XVII — FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Burke, Thomas William
2. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: NA
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA
5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: Tom, Tommey

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 19 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 152 Bay State Rd., Worcester, Mass.
7. DATE OF BIRTH: 1-12-96
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Lowell Mass
9. CITIZENSHIP: ~~yes~~ USA
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY: NA
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Countries): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA
15. OCCUPATION: retired
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): NA

SECTION XVIII — MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Burke, Eileen Veronica
2. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: NA
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA
5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: NA

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 19 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 152 Bay State Rd., Worcester, Mass.
7. DATE OF BIRTH: Aug. 7,1896
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Killarney, Ireland
9. CITIZENSHIP: ~~yes~~ USA
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY: 1911
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: Boston, Mass.
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Countries): Ireland
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: 12-2-29
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): Worcester, Mass.
15. OCCUPATION: Housewife
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): NA

SECTION XIX — RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

SECTION XIX CONTINUED TO PAGE 19

157

14-00000

SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE.
No

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1
1. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Lloyd, Charles Thomas
2. RELATIONSHIP: brother-in-law
3. AGE: 40
4. CITIZENSHIP: USA
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 4941 Sedgwick N.W. Wash. D.C.
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known): Adm. of Civil Defense Mob. Wash D.C.

2
1. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Lloyd Maryann
2. RELATIONSHIP: sister-in-law
3. AGE: 37
4. CITIZENSHIP: USA
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 4941 Sedgwick N.W. Wash. D.C.
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known): Federal Aviation Agency Wash D.C. (as of July 1961)

3
1. NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. CITIZENSHIP:
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country):
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known):

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Maj.Gen. John H. Willems	Asst. Chief Staff 2E494 Pentagon Wash DC	Ft. Myer No. Area Quarter 15 B Arl. Va
Alfred Eisenstaedt	Time Life Radio City N.Y.	72-15 37 Ave. N.Y.
William Armhurst	Post office Dept. Washing. D.C.	4006 Loraine Ave. Falls Church Va.
Edward Sweeney	3300 Nebraska N.W. Wash. D.C.	3300 Nebraska N.W. Wash. D.C.
James Anton	335 Maryland Ave. N.W. Wash. D.C.	335 Maryland AVE N.W. Wash. D.C.

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS, IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY - NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Alfred Eisenstadet	Time Life Radio City N.Y.	72-15 37 Ave. N.Y.
Edward Sweeney	3300 Nebraska N.W. Wash. D.C.	3300 Nebraska N.W. Wash. D.C.
Dr. Allen Cross	3301 Nebraska Ave N.W. Wash. D.C.	3301 Nebraska Ave N.W. Washington D.C.
John Reeves	Reeves Bakery 1209 F St. Wash D.C.	4610 Rockwood Pkwy N.W Wash. D.C.
Charles Gallant	261 Constitution Ave. Wash D.C.	6422 Garnet Dr. Kenwood Md.

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Mr. Gordon Cooney	NA	3246 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.
Mr. George Hebenstreit	NA	3258 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.
Mr. Leland Parkhurst	NA	3305 Elmore Dr. Alex. Va.

160

SECTION XXII CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind *(Include membership in, or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country)* to which you belong or have belonged

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
N.C.O.	Ft. Myer Va.	1947	1961
American Leg.	Manchester N.H.	1945	1947
Ukrianian Club	Manchester N.H.	1938	1942

SECTION XXIII RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	INCLUSIVE DATES	
	FROM	TO
3268 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.	1958	1961
United States Army	1941	1958

161

SECTION XXIV ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ● NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, EXPLAIN

NA

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? ● YES ☐ NO

4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?
Very moderately

5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS? ☐ YES ● NO

6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?
NA

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940

Asst. Chief Staff Intel. Pentagon Wash. D.C.

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

Asst. Chief of Staff for Intell date of investegation 1950

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS *If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.*

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A *MINOR* TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD? ☐ YES ● NO

IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE.

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ● NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ● NO

SECTION XXV PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(First-Middle-Last)* Eileen Elizabeth Maksymiec	2. RELATIONSHIP wife
3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* 3255 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.	4. HOME PHONE NO. TE 6-8213
5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE NA	6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT. NA

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

Mr. Wasyl Maksymiec 92 Vinton St. Manchester N.H.

SECTION XXVI

CERTIFICATION

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES 28 June 1961	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT
3. SIGNED AT (City and State) Washington D.C	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Jerome I. Finnigan.

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates. Sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

Sec. XII #.5. Nickname all her life.

Sec. XIV #5. english translation and a short name for William. for about 50 years.

Sec. XVII #5. variations of the name Thomas. for about 60 years.

Sec. VI

Australia- well acquainted with the townsville area-terrainwise resided in this area one year in 1943-- work assigment.

Philippines- Terrain 3 mons. 1945 work assigment

Japan " " " " " "

Canada " 1957-1958 visit

British Isles 3 years 1950=53 work assigment Terrain, harbors, inland water ways utilities, railroad.

Norway	visits	1950-51-52-53	terrain	
Sweden	"	" " " "	"	& harbors
Denmark	"	" " " "	"	
France	"	" " " "	"	
Germany	"	" " " "	"	
Switzerland	"	" " " "	"	
Italy	"	" " " "	"	& harbors
Spain	"	" " " "	"	
Portugal	"	" " " "	"	
Greece	"	" " " "	"	
Lebanon	"	" " " "	"	
Turkey	"	" " " "	"	
Ireland	"	" " " "	"	
Tangier & No. Coast of Africa	visits	1952	terrain.	
Egypt	visits	1952-53-54-55	terrain	
Sudan	"	" " " "	"	
Aden	"	" " " "	"	
French Somliland	"	" " " "	"	
Kenya	"	1954	"	
Italian Somliland	visits	1954	"	
Eritria	"	1953-54-55	"	

Ethiopia Residence 1953-1955 Terrain harbors utilites, railroads, industries, political parties work assigment.

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 20 November 1961

YOUR REFERENCE: 04515 NPIC

CASE NO. : 194081

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw Andrew

1. This is to inform you of security approval of the subject person as follows:

   ☒ Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Regulations 10-210 and 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

   ☐ Subject has been approved for appointment under the authority of Paragraph 4(d) of Regulation 10-210, and under Regulation 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

   ☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

   ☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

   ☐

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM NO. 1173 REPLACES FORM 38-101 WHICH IS OBSOLETE
1 MAR 57

CONFIDENTIAL

(5)

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF SECURITY ACTION

DATE : 26 July 61

YOUR REFERENCE: 04515

CASE NO. : 194081

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw Andrew

This is to inform you that security approval is granted for the employment of Subject as follows:

☐ Provisional approval is granted upon the condition that Subject:

a. not have access to classified material or information
b. not have access to secure areas
c. not be issued a building badge or Agency credential
d. not be assigned to any unclassified duties other than contained in request
e.

Security processing to effect security clearance for access to classified information is continuing. Your office will be advised upon completion of this action.

☐ Approval for access to classified information through SECRET under the provisions of Regulations 10-210 and 20-730.

Upon successful completion of a personal interview in the Office of Security after Subject reaches age 18, she may be approved for access to classified information through TOP SECRET. Your office will be advised upon completion of this action.

Officials of the employing office should be advised of this security limitation and should be instructed to supply supervisors with advice as to the limitation so as to insure continued compliance.

☒ Subject may be invited to Washington for further processing but is not to receive classified material or information.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

W. A. Osborne
W. A. OSBORNE
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 1337 REPLACES FORM 38-106
1-58 WHICH MAY BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL

104-10224-10002

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

[illegible] SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MURPHY, David E

INCLUSIVE DATES: 15 July 1947 to 19 Oct 1976

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: Office of Personnel

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

MURPHY, DAVID TERMINATED

56700

SECRET

19 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Compromise of Cover: DAVID E. MURPHY

As a result of information obtained from reliable sources who served in Vietnam, it has been established that the above named individual should be presumed to have been compromised as a CIA employee to the North Vietnamese Intelligence Service as of January 1968. It is presumed that the identification of this individual as a CIA employee was passed by the North Vietnamese to the Soviets.

FWM Janney
F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

0100.26

056-14-4578 DOB: 06-23-21

UNCLASSIFIED

MURPHY, DAVID E. 1 of 1



Dept of the Army Personnel file

E-tape

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 July 1975

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056700

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, David E.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA (VOLUNTARY) - CIARDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 18 YEAR 75

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF

7. [illegible]: 6215-1000 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643, Section 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DCI/NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: NATIONAL INTEL OFF

12. POSITION NUMBER: AC19

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYY

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.65

16. GRADE AND STEP: 18 1

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000

18. REMARKS

Co-ordinated with Frank Driscoll/ROB 21 July 1975.

S. Charles Valenti 7-14-75

7/14/75

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Paul H. Hildebrand, AO/DCI

DATE SIGNED: 7-10-75

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: O Career Service

DATE SIGNED: 7/15/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. VACANCY CODE: /

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. 25 YR. 27

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC / 2-OTHER / 3-FICA / 5-NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0,BJ,00,0,0

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0-NONE / 1-5 PT / 2-10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RES. PROV. TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0-WAIVED / 1-REG / 2-REG/OPT / 3-INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE / 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE / 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) / 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: OR 8/5/75 957

46. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 22 JUL 1975

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY 007622

14-00000

Ret 9-18-75

Mr. David E. Murphy
1537 Forest Villa Lane
McLean, Virginia 22101

Dear Dave:

I am happy to send to you, under separate cover, your Agency Retirement Medallion. The Medallion is a tangible form of recognition and appreciation of your service to the Agency. It should serve as a lasting reminder of an honorable career, rewarding associations and the knowledge that you played your part in a vital activity.

Let me, therefore, add my congratulations and wish you the very best for the future.

Sincerely,

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

75-4585

October 28, 1975

Mr. David Murphy
1537 Forest Villa Drive
McLean, Virginia 22101

Dear Dave,

Please let me add this additional note of best wishes to you on the occasion of your retirement. You made a major contribution not only to the individual operations and responsibilities you held during your service but also to the growth of a more professional agency. I must express my own personal appreciation for the last year of service as a National Intelligence Officer, wherein I think you have broken new ground again for us for the future. Please accept my personal thanks, as well as those of the Agency, for the many contributions you made to both of us.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bill

W. E. Colby
Director

WEC:lm (24 Oct 75)

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - D/Pers

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

10 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement -
Mr. David E. Murphy

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50h.

Grade: GS-18 Position: National Intelligence Officer
Career Service : Operations
Office/Division : Office of the DCI
Date Requested for Retirement: 18 July 1975
Age at that Date : 54
Years of Creditable Service : 32
Years of Agency Service : 27
Years of Qualifying Service : 16

3. The applicant's Career Service recommended that the request be approved.

/s/ [illegible]

Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

4. The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

/s/ [illegible]

F. Director of Personnel

11 JUL 1975
Date

Distribution:
0 - Return to ROB
1 - Applicant
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/WFMadigan:jat/3[illegible]975)

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 26 November 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056700
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, David E.

CCB

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 25 YEAR 74
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO CF / CF TO CF X
7. FAN AND NSCA: 5115-2000 0001
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DCI/NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE / NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS / SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

C
57

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: NATIONAL INTEL OFF (78)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0050
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYY
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.65
16. GRADE AND STEP: 18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000
18. REMARKS:

[illegible]

* Wash, D.C.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Paul H. Hildebrand, AO/DCI — DATE SIGNED: 11/27/74

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: PD/DCI — DATE SIGNED: 12/2/74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 56
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC: 01150 R 10
22. STATION CODE: 15013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 06 DA 23 YR 21
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION-CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2-BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS; 3-BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED CODE 1-YES 2-NO; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: PC 12-4-74 [illegible] 1974
46. O.P. APPROVAL: B. DeFelice
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 01 [illegible]

November 15, 1974

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is with regret that I find it necessary to submit my resignation from the Foreign Service Reserve to be effective November 23, 1974.

My duties with the Department of State have been a source of great interest and pleasure to me, and I look forward to the possibility of further service with the Department should circumstances permit my consideration for employment in the future.

Sincerely,

/s/
David E. Murphy

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Department
1 - CCS/OCS/S
1 - AO/DCI

11-12-71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(6)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 October 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056700

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, David E.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 27 YEAR 74

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. CAN AND NSCA: 5113-2000 0001

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DCI/NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

C 59

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE:
SPEC ASST 1ST W C ATTACHE
NATIONAL INTEL OFF (18)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0050

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYY

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.65

16. GRADE AND STEP: 01 1 / 18 1

17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~$[illegible]~~ $36,000 / $ 36,000

18. REMARKS:
FROM: PARIS STATION, POSITION # 0620.

FSR-1/1 Salary is $36,000

CONCUR: Stephen C. Entz
DDO/EUR

David [illegible]
C/[illegible]

Supergrade

10 T

24065 Paris Francs

Concur: Kathleen O. Bell
DDO [illegible]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Donald P. Padgett
for Paul H. Hildebrand, AD/DCI

DATE SIGNED: 10/23/74

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: DDO [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 11/5/74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGRATE CODE	24 VOUCHER CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	0615 0010	7[illegible]	S	1	06 03 21		

A 17

EOD DATA

K. C. 11 07 74

[illegible]

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) MURPHY, David	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* W-Marian	CLAIM NUMBER 74-0893

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 15 December 1973.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE [illegible] June 1974	SIGNATURE OF [illegible] REPRESENTATIVE

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 MAY 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056700

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, DAVID E

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 | DAY 02 | YEAR 68

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF XX

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8136 1231

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
CENTRAL REGION
PARIS STATION

21 A

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE:
SPEC ASST 1ST SEC W C ATTACHE
CHIEF OF STATION (00)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0620

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05

16. GRADE AND STEP:
01 1
18 1

17. SALARY OR RATE:
24,944
$ 27,055

18. REMARKS:

FROM EUR/DEV COMP

25 A

* Wash, D.C.

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 5/28/68

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED: 5/29

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 41600 | ALPHABETIC [illegible]

22. STATION CODE: [illegible]

23. INTEGREE CODE: 5

24. MINOR CODE: 2

25. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

EOD DATA

44. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

45. C.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 3 JUN 1968

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) MURPHY, David E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921	3. GRADE GS-18
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/SR OC	5. PRESENT POSITION Chief	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 5777
7. PROPOSED STATION Paris, France	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) COS 0620 GS-00	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION Integree	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 1 June 1968	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 3

12. COMMENTS

Form 89 attached. Mr. Murphy is scheduled to be integrated in the Department of State in March 1968.

Subject had medical evaluation on 13 June 1968.

13. DATE OF REQUEST 10 January 1968	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING Hqs. 4B01	16. EXTENSION 6913

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS

22 JAN 1968

Chairman, Overseas Candidate Review Panel [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 MARCH 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056700
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, DAVID E.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION - DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 3 | DAY 20 | YEAR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF ☒
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8136 1186
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
DEVELOPMENT COMPLIMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SPEC. ASST. 1st SEC. w/c., ATTACHE OPS. OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 1 1 / 18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 24,944 / $ 27,055

18. REMARKS

[illegible] SICK AND [illegible] HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED
SON DOB: 5 JUN 52
DAU DOB: 22 AUG 54
Other

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: M. RONEY COVER OFFICER x5013
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 55
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC [illegible] ALPHABETIC [illegible]
22. STATION CODE: [illegible]
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. MOUTHS CODE:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. [illegible] DA. [illegible] YR. [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46. C.S. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 FEB 68

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056700
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, DAVID E
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT & Transfer C.F. Funds
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 | DAY 10 | YEAR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8236 1186
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $27,055

18. REMARKS

* INTEGRATING 20 March 1968

CC SECURITY

CONCUR (Cheers) DDP/SB

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/SS 4-3-68

IN TRAINING PRIOR TO OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT AS CHIEF OF STATION PARIS IN JUNE 1968

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLIFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 3/6/68

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 8 Mar 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 20
20. EMPLOY CODE: 13
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 4444 | ALPHABETIC EUR
22. STATION CODE: 2...
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. OCCUP CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 | DA. 23 | YR. 21
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 – CSC 2 – CBGB 3 – FICA 5 – NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REG. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 – NONE 1 – 5 PT 2 – 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV.-TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 – WAIVER 1 – YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0 – NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 – NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 – BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3 – BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 – YES 2 – NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 – YES 2 – NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3/11/68
46. OP APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher
DATE APPROVED: 8 April 68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. David E. Murphy as
Chief of Station, Paris, France

1. The appointment of Mr. David E. Murphy, GS-18, as Chief of Station, Paris, France, effective on or about 1 June 1968 is recommended. Mr. Murphy would replace Mr. Laughlin Campbell.

2. Mr. Murphy has been an employee of the Agency since April 1948 and is presently assigned as Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division at Headquarters. In addition to the French language, Mr. Murphy is fluent in German and Russian. A biographic profile including information regarding his Agency experience and training is attached.

THKaram

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachments
Biographic Profile
Current Fitness Report

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

13 Oct 67
Date

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 December 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 056700

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, DAVID E.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XXX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 7234 0573 0000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP SB DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

D

47

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER - DEP CH (56)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0001

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 18 1

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 25,890

18 REMARKS:

?

56

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: E. G. JORNSSON, C/SB/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 12/27/66

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC: 45040 SB

22 STATION CODE: 75013

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 VOUCHERS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR: 06 23 21

26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR:

27 MO DA YR:

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR:

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA CODE:

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR:

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE:

36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR:

37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR:

38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE:

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE:

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE:

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS:

44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED CODE:

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10 [illegible] 66

46 C/P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 29 Dec 1966

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

D 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED
16 May 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056700 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) ✓ MURPHY, DAVID E.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 05 DAY 22 YEAR 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6234-0573	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel) PL 88-643 Sect. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) / 15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE $

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY CODE | 21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 HOURS CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR | 26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR | 27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28 [illegible] MO DA YR | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA CODE | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA MO DA YR | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR | 37 LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42 [illegible] | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION | 46 C.P. APPROVAL | DATE APPROVED

See Memo signed by
D/Pers dated MAY 17 1966

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 26 December 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056700

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, DAVID E.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 3 | DAY 01 | YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4234-1000-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

P. 42

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer Div Ch

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 18

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20,000

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. EMPLOY. CODE | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. VOUCHER CODE: 1 | 25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 06 DA 23 YR 21 | 26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR | 27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28. [illegible] EXPIRES: MO DA YR | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE, MO DA YR | COO DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR | 38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE, HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 42. [illegible] CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

DATE APPROVED: 28 FEB 1964

1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 September 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056700
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, David E.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 9 DAY 16 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4234-1000-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/SR Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ~~Division Chief~~ CPS OFFICER-DIV CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~$18,500~~ $18 500

18. REMARKS

From DDP/EE/OC
Slot 1

PSI 9-15-63
TO GS 17-2

Recorded by CSPD

Recorded by CSPD
EP

CSPO/A 9/20/63

Security [illegible] 10/16/63
10/15/63

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERS
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL: [illegible] SR PMC
DATE SIGNED: 9/20/63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23.	24. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27.
37	10	8041	SR	1562		1	06	23	21		

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46. D.P. APPROVAL: B W Bond for D/Pers
DATE APPROV: 23 Sep

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 July 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056700

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, David E.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH | DAY | YEAR

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP EE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OF DIV CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 1

17. SALARY OR RATE: $16,530

18. REMARKS:

cc: Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED: 27 Jly 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

ADD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION | APPROVAL | DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 7 JUNE 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 56700
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, David E.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 6 | DAY [illegible] | YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: X V TO V
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2259 1010 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EE Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS Off Div Ch (OT)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 15775
18. REMARKS:

One copy has been forwarded to the Office of Security.
From: DDP/EE
Office of the Chief
Washington, D.C.
#2

Recorded CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: M. McKenney
Margaret E. McKenney, C/EE/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 6-7-62

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 6/7/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

37 10 5[illegible] EE 75213 1 06 12 32

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 6/7/62

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 August 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 56700 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MURPHY, David E.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Vouchered Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 20 | YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
	XX	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2239-1010-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EE Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops of~~ficer~~ {D Div Ch}

12. POSITION NUMBER: 2

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (SG)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: $15,515

18. REMARKS

One copy has been forwarded to the Office of Security.

From: DDP/EE/German St/BOB/510/Berlin, Germany

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 5/1/61
25/1/61

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
8/9/61
Margaret M. McKenney, Chief, EE/Personnel

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. EMPLOYEE CODE | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGRATION CODE | 24. POSITION CODE: 1 | 25. DATE OF BIRTH: 06-23-21 ~~10-21-13~~ | 26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (CODE: 1 = CSC, 2 = FICA, 3 = NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. FEGLI | 39. FEHB / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42. FED. TAX DATA | 43. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46. O.P. APPROVAL
10 Aug 61

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A

SECRET

SECRET

28 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. David Murphy, GS-16, as D/Chief, EE Division

The Clandestine Services Career Panel endorsed the appointment of Mr. Murphy.

Al Lipp
Clandestine Services
Career Service Panel
(Section A)

APPROVED:

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

1 - AUG 1961
Date

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
BERLIN COMMAND
APO 742

LO 5-21

5 May 1961

SUBJECT: Orders

TO: MR DAVID EDMUND MURPHY (DA Empl, US, GS16) SFP # 176 232
USA Rgn Spt Gp

1. You WP Washington, DC OA 5 Jun 61 purpose accomp PCS. You are rel fr asg USA Rgn Spt Gp and further atch to (8727) Washington 25, DC.

2. Fol depn auth conc mov and pur unrationed items at DBS instl:

MRS MARY MURPHY	AMERICAN DEPN	(wife,) SFP # 178 087
STEVEN JOSEPH MURPHY	AMERICAN DEPN	(son, 14 yr)
VINCENT MURPHY	AMERICAN DEPN	(son, 11½ yr)
GERALD MURPHY	AMERICAN DEPN	(son, 8½ yr)
BARBARA MURPHY SFP # 178 088	AMERICAN DEPN	(daughter, 6½ yr)

3. Max per diem auth by CPR T3.4-4.
4. Tvl by coml air, rail, sea and motor trans auth. TBMAA.
5. TC will furn trans (mil train) TSN, PCS. Shpmt of HHG and/or personal effects NTE 8750 lb gross weight is auth. PPSIA.
6. Cost of mov HHG wi Germany is chargeable to: 2112020(T) 89-1141 P2000-03 07/08 591-523 (2860.6000) FOR USE OF DISB OFF APO 742 ONLY. No other costs will be charged to these funds. All other costs chargeable to: 2112020 32-1765 P2740.3-02 05 549-092. HHG to be packed in mil CONEX or lift van containers and shipped through mil channels to the TO, Cameron Sta, Alexandria, Va for MR MURPHY.
7. You are resp for securing nec pass clnc, imm changing mailing address, and prov aprop ofl with nec docu rqr for entry into the US.
8. You will poss suf negotiable dol inst to defray all nec exp incd to this tvl.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Roy E Hinney
ROY E. [illegible]
CWO W-2, USA
Asst Adjutant General

DISTR:
40 - Div concerned (Central Clnc)
2 - Div concerned
1 - FLO, USA Tempo B 2d & R Sts S.W., Wash 25, DC (BY AIRMAIL)
3 - Fin & Acct Br
1 - PM Div
1 - G2 Div
5 - AG (1 - Accom
  1 - Records
  1 - Mil Pers
  2 - Orders)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

...al No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. [illegible] EOD Mo. Da. Yr.		
6700	MURPHY DAVID E	06 23 21	1	M 1	04 05 48		
7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Bill. Serv. Credit, Etc. Yes-1 No-2	Code
12 30 42	1	50 USCA 403 J			04 05 48		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE	5281	BERLIN, GERMANY	27005

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USitd - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	AREA OPS OFF (DC08)	1680	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
16 1	$14190	01	12 28 58	06 26 60	9 3130 55 017

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	07 07 59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE	5320	BERLIN, GERMANY	

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USitd - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	CHIEF OF BASE	510		0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
	$				0139 9300 3017

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
C/EE/PER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
ANNELL WELLAND X3064

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
CHIEF, EASTERN EUROPE DIV

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		6 [illegible]			
C. Classification			E. Approved By		6 Aug 59

Remarks:

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

[illegible]

1 July 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Appointment of Mr. David Edmund Murphy as Chief of Base, Berlin, Germany

1. The appointment of Mr. David Edmund Murphy as Chief of Base, Berlin, Germany, effective on or about 15 August 1959, is recommended. Mr. Murphy would replace Mr. William K. Harvey who is scheduled to be reassigned to Headquarters as Chief, Division D, effective 15 August 1959.

2. Mr. Murphy has been an employee of the Agency since April 1948, and is presently assigned as Deputy Chief of Base, Berlin, GS-16. A biographic data sheet, including information regarding the Agency experience and training, is attached.

for Sidney A Stein
JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
Chief, Eastern Europe Division

1 Attachment:
Biographic Information

The recommendation in Paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

Richard Helms
/s/ Deputy Director (Plans)

24 July '59
(Date)

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

DATE: 1 July 1959

NAME: David Edmund Murphy

GRADE: GS-16

SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD:DI

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 23 June 1921, Utica, New York

MARITAL STATUS: Married

EDUCATION AND CAREER OUTSIDE THE AGENCY:

1938-42	State Teachers College, Cortland, New York, B.S. Education
1942-46	Military Service, U. S. Army, Interpreter and Ops NCO, Liaison
1943-44	University of California, Russian Area and Language Program
1945	U. S. Army, Officers Liaison School, Russian, MIS, Le Vesinet, France
1946	University of California, History
1946-48	Department of the Army, Seoul, Russian Linguist

LANGUAGES:

French - Reading-Native; Writing, Pronunciation, Speaking and Understanding-High

German - Reading-High; Writing, Pronunciation-High; Speaking-Intermediate; Understanding-Native

Russian-Reading, Writing and Understanding-Native; Pronunciation and Speaking-High

CIA EXPERIENCE:

5 Apr 48	CAF-12, OSO/FBZ/Intelligence Officer, Ops, Korea Liaison Unit
2 May 48	CAF-12, Intelligence Officer, Tokyo Military Liaison Unit
19 Feb 50	GS-12, Intelligence Officer, Ops, OSO/FDZ-FRU, Intelligence Ops Branch, Yokosuka
17 Jul 50	GS-12, Intelligence Officer, Ops, OSO/FDZ, Headquarters, Field
26 Nov 50	GS-13, Intelligence Officer, Acting Chief, OSO/FDS/W. Section, Headquarters
7 Jan 51	GS-13, Intelligence Officer, OSO/FDM/S, Karlsruhe
18 Feb 51	GS-13, Intelligence Officer, OSO/FDS/SOS/MOB/Office of the Chief, Karlsruhe
17 Feb 52	GS-14, Intelligence Officer, OSO/FDS/SOS/MOB/Office of the Chief, Karlsruhe

30 Aug 53 GS-14, Intelligence Officer, Chief, DDP/SR, SR-3, West Branch, Office of the Chief, Headquarters

14 Feb 54 GS-15, Intelligence Officer, Chief, DDP/SR, SR-3, West Branch, Office of the Chief, ~~Headquarters~~

5 Dec 54 GS-15, Area Ops Officer, DDP/EE, German Mission, Berlin Operations Base, Operations Div, Berlin

3 Jun 56 GS-15, Area Ops Officer, DDP/EE, German Station, BOB, Soviet Branch, Berlin

28 Dec 58 GS-16, Area Ops Officer, DCOB, DDP/EE/German Station, Berlin Ops Base, Berlin

CIA TRAINING:

Phase I, II and III CE	Waiver
Commo	26 April-7 May 1948
SES Refresher	6-10 May 1948
Ops Security	15-26 November 1954

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

V to V		V to UV		DATE PREPARED Mo 12 Da [illegible] Yr 58
UV to V	X	UV to UV		

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) [illegible], DAVID E	3. Date Of Birth Mo 6 Da [illegible] Yr 22	4. Vet. Pref. None 0, 5 Pt 1, 10 Pt 2 Code 0	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. [illegible] Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

13

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE SOVIET BRANCH	Code	15. Location Of Official Station BERLIN, GERMANY	Station Code
16. Dept.- Field Dept. - Ufld. - Frgn. - Code	17. Position Title AREA OPS OFFICER	18. Position No. 511	19. Serv. GS / 20. Occup. Series 0136.01
21. Grade & Step 15 4	22. Salary Or Rate $ 13,670	23. SD [illegible]	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr / 25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr / 26. Appropriation Number 9 3130 55 017

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee [illegible]	Code 01	30. Separation Date	

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP/EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE	Code 5351	32. Location Of Official Station BERLIN, GERMANY	Station Code
33. Dept.- Field Dept. - Ufld. - Frgn. - Code 4	34. Position Title AREA OPS OFFICER (DCOB)	35. Position No. [illegible] [illegible]	36. Serv. / 37. Occup. Series
38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo 2 Da 10 Yr 57 / 42. PSI Due Mo [illegible] Da [illegible] Yr [illegible] / 43. Appropriation Number

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) C/EE/PER [illegible]

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) [illegible] WATERS Ext. [illegible]

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

Date Approved

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[illegible]		D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks
[illegible] 1950 IS [illegible]

Recd [illegible]
CS.[illegible]

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 1152a [illegible] USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[redacted]

[illegible]

[redacted] [redacted]

(1) Dave Murphy (2) Hugh Montgomery (3) Vincent Thill

[illegible]

1. [illegible] in reference [illegible] I would like to [illegible] (1) [illegible] (2) [illegible] for the promotion action taken in the cases of [redacted] [redacted] [illegible] as you know I consider [illegible] merit this recognition of their service and contribution.

2. In connection with (3) [redacted] whose recommended promotion from grade GS-13 to [illegible] approved by the KUDOVE Career Service, I consider, as we discussed in Washington during October, that the equities in favor of [illegible] [redacted] are quite strong. I have discussed the Board's action with [redacted] and while he has accepted it with his usual unfailing and commendable well-disciplined decency, he cannot, of course, help but feel a certain disappointment and this action cannot help but raise grave doubts in his mind [illegible] exactly what future in KUBARK he can look forward to. Although [redacted] has not himself made any request or comment that [illegible] action be taken concerning his promotion, I would like to submit for your consideration the following comments concerning him. [redacted] is in fact an excellent and a valuable officer. While it is quite true that he in all probability will never be among the very small percentage of outstandingly competent officers in KUDOVE, I consider him well above the average and certainly a more valuable officer in many ways than the average GS-13 [illegible] or KUBARK as a whole. This judgment is based not on [redacted] personal traits which are exceptional but on his consistent day-to-day contribution to the operations and administration of the Base and with the full realization of the fact that quite properly KUBARK promotions presently are being granted on much stricter standards than in the past. While [redacted] will never be completely at his best in the direct handling of [illegible] of agent cases, he has shown far more competence at this than most [illegible] officers and there are numerous responsible positions in [illegible] organization that he is capable of filling more than adequately. [redacted] as you know is a mature, experienced individual who has held responsible positions in the past and who handles himself quite well both inside and outside [illegible]. He was recently ([illegible] September 19[illegible]) commended by

Dick Helms

[redacted] [illegible] and this was a well-deserved recognition not only of his performance in connection with the operation but as a reflection of his consistent performance since he was assigned here in August 19[illegible]. The recommended promotion of [redacted] was first submitted on [illegible] January 19[illegible] and was warmly concurred in by COS. Further, while as you know I do not believe that time in grade should ever be a controlling factor in any promotion, I [illegible] that [redacted] [illegible] and conscientious service with KUBARK and the fact that he has been in his present grade for almost [illegible] years substantially increase the equities in favor of his promotion at this time. Considering the above factors and [illegible] particularly our [illegible], which I believe is well-warranted, [illegible] [redacted] as a superior officer when compared with officers of that level.

Distribution:

[illegible]

(1) (2) (3)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

breakdown in [illegible] as well as the demonstrated fact that he is seriously [illegible] [illegible] to his [illegible] value to the organization. I would like to urge that the action of the Career Service Board in [redacted]'s case be reconsidered at this time.

3. If you agree and if you consider it appropriate I would appreciate your resubmitting this case immediately to the Career Service Board with a strong request that their disapproval action be reversed. If you do not concur or if you feel that this is not a sound move for tactical or other reasons, I would appreciate your advice as to acceptable timing on resubmitting the recommendation of [redacted]'s promotion. As a matter of interest, I would appreciate some indication of the reasoning of the [illegible] Career Service Board in disapproving [redacted]'s promotion.

4. It is suggested that COS may desire to comment separately on this case.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Wm Harvey

VLA

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MURPHY, David E.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 06 Da 23 Yr 21	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt (Yes-1, No-2) Code
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. Military Cred. Serv. (Yes-1, No-2) Code			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE SOVIET BRANCH	Code	15. Location Of Official Station BERLIN, GERMANY	Station Code
16. Dept.-Field (Dept.-Usfld.-Fran.) Code	17. Position Title AREA OPS OFF (DCOB)	18. Position No. [illegible] ~~RGF 511~~	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.01	21. Grade & Step 15 4	22. Salary Or Rate $ 13,670	23. SD DI
24. Date Of Grade Mo [illegible] Da [illegible] Yr [illegible]	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 9 3130 55 017	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION (TEMPORARY)*	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo 12 Da 21 Yr 57	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
33. Dept.-Field (Dept.-Usfld.-Fran.) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.
37. Occup. Series	38. Grade & Step 16 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 14,190	40. SD
41. Date Of Grade Mo 12 Da 21 Yr 57	42. PSI Due Mo 6 Da 26 Yr 60	43. Appropriation Number	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Acting Deputy Director (Plans)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	[illegible]	E. D/Pers		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	[illegible] Dec

Remarks
* Promotion to the grade indicated is temporary and for such duration as the Director will determine. Your permanent grade is the grade from which you are temporarily promoted.

(4)

FORM 1152a
5-57

Date Dec. 21, 1954

Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Gentlemen:

1. In accordance with the policy of this agency, it is understood and agreed by me that I shall be required to serve a minimum term of two years from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, unless terminated by the Government for its convenience. If the assignment is terminated at my request in less than twenty-four months, the [illegible] shall prevail:

(a) If I [illegible] in less than twelve months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of [illegible] shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses involved in the transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the foreign station, and pay all such expenses for return to the United States.

(b) If I resign between the twelfth and twenty-fourth month from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the United States.

2. Part (a) above shall not apply to employees who have served in a departmental position with CIA or who have served an overseas tour of duty with CIA, and in such case part (b) only shall apply, amended to read: "If I desire to terminate or return to the United States prior to the expiration of twenty-four months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the United States."

David E. Murphy

Witness:

Helen M. Adams

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

Transfer from Vouchered
to Unvouchered Funds

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation date on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. DAVID E. MURPHY	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 27 Oct 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
REASSIGNMENT *
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ~~ASAP~~ 5 Dec 1954 per HGP
B. APPROVED: 5 Dec 1954

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops. Off. (Br Ch) BC-130	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops. Off. BG-F-1106
GS-0136.01-15 $10,800.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $10,800.00
DDP/SR SR-3	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/EE German Mission Berlin Operations Base Operations Division
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Berlin, Germany
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

TRANSFER FROM VOUCHERED TO UNVOUCHERED FUNDS.
* This action is cut in accordance with the 20 October Machine Run.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Burton B. Lifschultz A C/EE
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) 3884/C.Danish
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: 11/12

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
			XX		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
				SD-FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3400-20 TO: 5-3130-55-017	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible] 1 Dec 54 [illegible]

[illegible]

DO NOT SET EFFECTIVE DATE WITHOUT APPROVAL FROM CONTROL SECTION, 7533, PRD
DATE 11/23/54 POSITION CONTROL CLERK RH
WITHIN CEILING CERTIFICATION. EFFECTIVE DATE MAY 54
ESTABLISHED.
DATE
REMARKS:
POSITION CONTROL CLERK

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		11/23
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	TAO	11/23
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		11-30
E.		

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: NOV 9 1954

F. APPROVED BY Ralph Pollock

SECRET

10-1-54

10-87329-3

STANDARD FORM 52
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. David E. Murphy	23 June 1921		

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 28 ~~14~~ Feb 1954
B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intell. Officer (Chief) BC-142-[illegible]	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer (Br.Ch) BC-130-[illegible]
GS-132-~~14~~ 15 ~~[illegible]~~ $10,800	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-~~14~~ 15 ~~[illegible]~~ $10,800
~~DDP/SR~~ SR-3 (West Branch) Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR-3
~~Washington, D.C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Charles H. Dixson

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Charles H. Dixson
Title: SR Personnel Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	SYCE	I. A.	REAL.

CD:FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION
M	W	FROM: 4-3400-20 TO: 4-3400-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	KW	2/16
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	2/4
E.		

REMARKS: [illegible] 2/4/54 for typing

P[illegible] 2/16

F. APPROVED BY [illegible] 2/16/54

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) EDMUND Mr. David E. Murphy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 9 Dec 53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Promotion		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED: 11 Feb 54	

FROM—		TO—
~~Intell. Officer (Chief)~~ BC-142-14	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intell. Officer (Chief) BC-142
GS-132-14 $9800.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-15 $10,800.00
~~DDP/SR~~ ~~SR-3 West Branch~~ ~~Office of the Chief~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR-3 West Branch Office of the Chief
~~Washington, D.C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Darwin B. Powell
FI/OMO.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Charles H. Dixon

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J. Keith Reid
Title: DD/P Admin.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD:FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3400-20 TO: 4-3400-20	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:	

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

DATE: JAN 8 1954

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	WW	2/3	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		2/3/54	
E.			
F. APPROVED BY Ralph A. Wolf			

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
8714th AAU
Washington 25, D. C.

LETTER ORDERS
Number 9-12

17 September 1953

Subject: Orders

To; Individual concerned

1. The following named individual will proceed on temporary duty as indicated below. Upon completion of temporary duty individual will return to proper station. TDN. TDY. TPA. 2142020 401-3139 P1313-02 S&S-037. Security Clearance: TOP SECRET. Immunizations (SR40-230-1) will be accomplished prior to departure from CONUS.

NAME	GRADE	TITLE	STATUS
DAVID E MURPHY	GS-14	Executive Officer	Department of the Army Civilian

2. Travel will be as follows:

Present station: Washington, D. C.
Itinerary: CIPAP. From Washington, D. C., to Frankfurt, Germany, reporting upon arrival thereat to Commanding Officer, 7997th Composite Group, APO 757, c/o Postmaster, NYC, NY, thence to Munich, Germany, and such other places in such order and with such frequence as may be necessary to complete the assigned mission and return to Washington, D. C.

Date: c/a 17 September 1953.
Period: Not more than twenty (20) days.
Purpose: Consultations with U. S. Army officials in Germany.

Travel by military and/or commercial aircraft, rail, bus, and ship within or outside the continental limits of the United States as necessary for the expeditious accomplishment of assignment is auth.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL BO[illegible]:

Francis Downs
FRANCIS DOWNS
Captain, AGC
Asst Adj

DISTRIBUTION:
4

1120 Eye
3/14 54

SECRET
Security Information

STANDARD FORM 52
PRESCRIBED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible]

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mrs David E. [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June '21	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST [illegible] July '53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
Reassignment
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Officer	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer (Chief) [illegible]
GS-0132-14 $7,[illegible]0.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132-14 [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	[illegible] [illegible] Branch Office of the Chief
Karlsruhe, Germany	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Please transfer leave FROM Unvouchered TO Vouchered funds.

Security Approval has been granted for [illegible] requested by this request.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
Charles H. [illegible]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Phyllis E. [illegible] Ext. [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY [illegible] Chief, [illegible] Security Branch [illegible]
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL
			Ⓡ 92

15. SEX [illegible]	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: [illegible]	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET
Security Information

AIR

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible] February 1952

Chief of Station
Frankfurt
Personnel

[illegible]

[redacted]

David E. Murphy

1. This is to advise that the promotion of the above named individual from GS-13 at $[illegible] to GS-14 at $[illegible], has been approved, effective 17 February 1952.

2. A dispatch from the payroll section will follow showing the new breakdown in salary.

[illegible]

[illegible]/th

[illegible]

14-00000

AIR SECURITY INFORMATION MGKA- [illegible]

Chief, Foreign Division M 1 December 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe EYES ONLY

Administrative

Promotion of • REDSOX

1. Recommendation is made hereby for the promotion of Subject from grade GS-13 to grade GS-14. Subject was assigned to MOB as Chief of the Soviet Operations Section in February 1951 charged with the overall direction of the REDSOX operational effort into the USSR. In May Subject took over as Chief of the Combined Soviet Operations Base in MOB responsible for the joint ZACANTH-ZACACTUS effort. Into this ever increasing area of operational and executive responsibility Subject has brought a high order motivation, outstanding drive, and excellent operational know-how. His devotion to a task nothing short of monumental and replete with frustrations is worthy of considerable commendation.

2. As Chief, CSOB, Subject is in direct command over approximately 80 ZACANTH and ZACACTUS personnel including a very large training installation at KAT 60 miles away from MOB Headquarters. Most of this personnel has reported at MOB during the past eight months and most of it has been newly recruited and completely inexperienced in the intelligence field. Subject has met the challenge of the problems thus posed, along with those attendant upon a broad operational effort, with commendable success.

3. Subject confronts the future of REDSOX operations with a clear concept of the operational problem and a concise definition of our capabilities in coping with it. If anything, the responsibilities he will have to shoulder will be greater.

Walter I. Newhouse

A very well earned promotion

MLC

Distribution:
3-[illegible]
2-[illegible]
1-[illegible]

16 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, SED

Subject: MURPHY, David E.

It is requested that Mr. David E. Murphy be transferred from slot #1, Munich, FLM/S for DAD to slot #2, Office of Chief, Soviet Operations Section/MOB.

Phyllis M. Landrum

Phyllis M. Landrum
Administrative Clerk, FDS

14-00000

[illegible] 1-8-57

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NUMBER 2745

MURPHY, David [illegible]

NATURE OF ACTION: Resignation *

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: COB 2 Jan 1951

WHEN LEAVING (VOLUNTARILY)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE: David E Murphy

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intell. Off. (Acting Chief) GS-13	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-13 $6700.00 p.a.	#4414
OFFICE	OSO	
BRANCH	FDS	
DIVISION AND SECTION	W Section	
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

* To accept other employment.

Please transfer leave to Unvouchered funds.

RECOMMENDED:

7 December 1950
DATE

B M [illegible]
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE

SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
14 [illegible]	1804	10-1-47

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
	✓ ✓		

DATE

SIGNATURE

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2115[illegible]

ALLOTMENT: 951-105

CSC Authority:

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
1-24-[illegible]	[illegible]

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE

SIGNATURE

APPROVALS

SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE 12/9/50

SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1949

SECRET

[illegible]

PERSONNEL TRANSFER LETTER

(THIS IS NOT A TRAVEL ORDER)

5 January 1951

TO: Mr. David Murphy

1. Pursuant to authority vested in me, your official station is hereby established as Karlsruhe, Germany, eff. 7 January 1951. Upon receipt of proper Travel Orders you will proceed from Washington, D. C. to such station, ______________________________

2. The travel to your new station is to be accomplished as soon as practicable after receipt of proper Travel Orders. This transfer is not for your convenience or benefit, or at your request, but in the best interests of the Government.

3. In accordance with the provisions of applicable agency regulations, and subject to the availability of funds, the shipment at Government expense of your household goods and personal effects, including packing, crating, unpacking, uncrating, drayage, and temporary storage not to exceed ninety days, within the prescribed weight allowance, is authorized.

4. Subject to the availability of funds, the movement of your immediate family at Government expense is authorized in accordance with agency regulations.

5. Authorization for the shipment of a personally owned automobile at Government expense, when consistent with agency regulations, is hereby authorized.

CHIEF, EMPLOYEES DIVISION

FORM NO. [illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

4 December 1950

MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF, SPD

Subject: MURPHY, David E.

It is requested that Mr. David E. Murphy be transferred from slot #1, Western Section, FDM Headquarters to slot #1, Munich, FDM/S for DAD.

Dana B. Durand

Dana B. Durand
Deputy Chief, FDS

APPROVED:

For the Assistant Director

Official Station
changed to Karlsruhe
Per FDS

SECRET

PERSONNEL TION REQUEST

REGISTER NUMBER [illegible]

NAME [illegible], David [illegible]	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE 26 Nov 50
NATURE OF ACTION Transfer ~~Promotion~~	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-12	Intelligence Officer acting (Chief) GS-13
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12 $6600.00 per annum	GS-12 [illegible].00 per annum
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDS	FDC
BRANCH AND SECTION	S. Section	W. Section QAR
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

S-1

Employee EOD with CIA 5 April 1948 as CAF-12.

3717

132

RECOMMENDED:

2 October 1950
DATE

Wm. G. [illegible]
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

SURVEY NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED	
1450	1434	[illegible]	
GIS	VICE	T.O.	SEAL
	✓		

DATE 11/2/50
SIGNATURE [illegible]

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2115400
ALLOTMENT: 9571-105
CSC AUTHORITY: [illegible]

DATE SIGNATURE [illegible]
SIGNATURE [illegible]

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE
SIGNATURE [illegible]

APPROVALS

SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE [illegible] 50
SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE [illegible]

DATE
SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
OCT 1949

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

ENTRANCE ON DUTY RECORD

TO: CSC, FIS		DATE 25 September 1950	
		BUILDING L	ROOM
FROM: PERSONNEL OFFICER		EOD DATE 18 September 1950	
NAME OF EMPLOYEE Murphy, David Edward			
POSITION TITLE Intell. Officer		GRADE GS-12	SALARY $6600.00
PAYROLL Vouchered		DUTY STATION Washington, D. C.	
DATE SECURITY CLEARED Concurrence 17 August 1950		DATE OATH OF OFFICE ADMINISTERED 18 September 1950	
DATE PERMANENT IDENTIFICATION REQUESTED N. A.		DATE FINGERPRINTED N. A.	
DATE BRIEFED BY SECURITY N. A.		DATE OF PHYSICAL EXAMINATION N. A.	
DATE 24 MONTH AGREEMENT SIGNED N. A.			

EMPLOYEE'S EMERGENCY ADDRESS
Mrs. Marian Murphy
2739 Buchanan St.
Arlington, Va. Temple 0171

EMPLOYEE'S LOCAL ADDRESS
Same as above

REMARKS:

Subject transferred from Unvouchered to Vouchered Funds.

POSTED
25 Sep 50

FORM NO. 37-75
RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

PERSONNE ‹CTION REQUEST

[illegible] 11 Sept 50 ~~[illegible]~~

NAME MURPHY, David [redacted]	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE [illegible]
NATURE OF ACTION Excutit Appointment	WHEN LEAVING [illegible] LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE: #5245

	FROM	TO
TITLE	4 5	Intelligence Officer ([redacted]) GS-12
GRADE AND SALARY	Aug 1	GS-12 [illegible].00
OFFICE	17	OSO
DIVISION	FC.	FDS
BRANCH AND SECTION		"S" Section
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

130

S-1
Please transfor leave from unvouchered funds.
Security Concurrence requested 15 August 1950.

Security Concurrence 8/17/50
[illegible] Cut 4/15/51

RECOMMENDED:

15 August 1950
DATE

SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED
17 Aug 50

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE	SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
1799	1743	12-19-47

NEW	VICE	[illegible]	REAL
		✓	

DATE	SIGNATURE
8/16/50	

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 5115702
ALLOTMENT: 3313103
CSC AUTHORITY:

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
1-20-57	

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE

APPROVALS SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
17 Aug 50	

FORM NO. 37-9
NOV 1949

Trans to FDS [illegible] to file

Date: 28 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COVERT PERSONNEL BRANCH:
VIA: ADSO

Subject: Promotion Request

Name: David E. Murphy
Title of Position: Chief, FDS/Far East Section
Grade & Salary: GS-12 $6600.00
Place of Assignment: Washington

It is requested that the above-named employee be promoted from the grade and salary above-indicated to: GS-13 $7600.00.

Harry A. Rositzke
(Originating Officer)
Chief, FDS
(Title)

RECOMMEND APPROVAL:

Robert A. Schow
ADSO

SECRET

28 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COVERT PERSONNEL BRANCH:
VIA: ADSO

Subject: Promotion Request - David E. Murphy

1. Mr. David E. Murphy, on the basis of proved capabilities, has been assigned in Washington as Chief of the FDS/Far East Section, to Slot Number 1 of the FDS/Far East Headquarters T/O, after having returned from a field assignment of 25 months' duration at FRU/FEC. Since the inauguration of the REDBIRD program on 1 February 1950, he has served as Chief of the Soviet Operations Section in Japan and prior to that was the chief Soviet operations specialist at FRU/FEC.

2. As Chief of FDS/Far East Section he has final responsibility, subject to the approval of the Chief, FDS, for all FDS operational activities in the Far East and for all FDS operations conducted within that portion of the USSR east of the Ural mountains. In connection with his work he is responsible for the recruitment, training, and overall direction of staff employees assigned to the Far East Section at headquarters and those assigned to the Soviet Operations Section at FRU/FEC as well as for the planning, directing, implementing, and support of all operations indicated above. When the full T/O strength has been reached, there will be a total of 14 staff employees under his supervision.

3. Mr. Murphy is particularly well qualified as Chief, FDS/Far East Section in terms of linguistic ability, knowledge of the USSR, wartime and post-war operational work, and administrative and executive experience as Chief, Soviet Operations Section, FRU/FEC. His performance during the time he has been in FDS has been outstanding in every respect and it is strongly urged that adequate recognition of his past work and present capabilities be given by promoting him to the grade of GS-13 authorized for the position he is now holding. Mr. Murphy has been in the grade of GS-12 for two years and three months.

4. Attached is a memorandum from FDZ covering subject's performance as a member of that Division and concuring in the desirability of his promotion.

H.A. Rositzke
CHIEF, FDS

SECRET

SECRET

27 July [illegible]

TO : [illegible], [illegible]

THROUGH: [illegible], [illegible]

FROM : Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT: MURPHY, David

It is requested that action be taken for the transfer of Mr. David Murphy from [illegible] to [illegible]. Mr. Murphy will occupy Slot #1, Chief of the Siberian Section of [illegible].

[illegible]
Harry A. [illegible]
Chief, [illegible]

Approved:

Harry W. [illegible]
Chief, [illegible]

cc: [illegible]

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL MGKA- 15369

15 March 1950

Finance Officer

COS - Karlsruhe

Administrative
Unpaid debt to AMEXCO

1. Request that the undersigned be given the sum of $4.85, Military Payment Certificate, for purpose of paying the AMEXCO, Karlsruhe, Germany.

2. This amount represents an unpaid sleeper reservation debt (Paris to Karlsruhe) of [redacted], dating back from 26 December 1949. Murphy

3. Amount to be T/A'd to Washington.

NORMAN T. BRAVER

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - Finance
1 - Registry
1 - A & S Unit

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. ZCAW-/[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Ch.of of Station, [illegible]

DATE: 18 August 1949

FROM : Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative - Staff Personnel

SPECIFIC- Promotion of [redacted]

David E. Murphy

REFERENCE:

(A) Dispatch [illegible] to [illegible], Personnel: Promotion of Roland L. JEWETT, [illegible] dtd 21 April 1949

1. We fully endorse the estimate of Roland L. JEWETT's qualifications and accomplishments set forth in referenced dispatch. However, the Promotion Board is at the present time unable to consider his promotion because of the following:

a. He has been in the grade of CAF-12 since 5 April 1948. This is several months short of the minimum time in grade necessary to be considered for promotion.

b. The grade of CAF-13 generally requires more than one tour of duty with the organization.

C. B. Swift, Jr.

Prepared by: G. Steitz G.S.

Rudyerd Boulton
RELEASING OFFICER
OPSO

HDA
COORDINATING OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

16-1-1

FORM NO. 31-29
APR 1947

17881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-599

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Tokyo Station

DATE: 7 June 1949

FROM : Confidential Funds Branch

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative
SPECIFIC- Payroll Change Notices

1. Attached herewith are payroll change notices for the pay period 1 May thru 31 May 1949, for the following individuals:

Rhodes, Donald F.
Fosbod, Harry D.
Morrell, Gordon A.
Vo[illegible], [illegible] L.
[redacted]
Dermott, Leo J.

2. Forwarded for employees' information.

COPY

CHARLES N. DAVIS

Encls:
6 Payroll change notices.

RELEASING OFFICER
AU(E)

COORDINATING OFFICER [illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER [illegible]
FIZ

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. ZJTA-463

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief FBZ

DATE: 21 April 1949

FROM : Donald F. Rhodes

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Personnel
SPECIFIC- Promotion of David E. Murphy (real name, changed from pseudonym in FBZ)

1. It is requested that , Operations Officer at this station, be promoted from CAF-12 to CAF-13. He received his present grade on 5 April 1948.

2. Mr. arrived in Tokyo on 26 May 1948, and his performance of duties as Soviet Operations Officer has been consistently superior. He is intelligent, hard-working and continually striving for improvement in all phases of his work, and he is familiar with all phases of the work of this unit.

3. The subject has been responsible for much of the planning of future operations in the Far East, i.e., Plan ARCADE and revisions, and has implemented the Operational Research and File Section (Plan POMERANIAN) which is now functioning smoothly. It is anticipated that he will fill the slot of Executive Officer for Internal USSR Operations.

4. In view of the growth of this unit and added responsibilities therein of the subject, his past performance and his value to the unit, it is felt that the requested promotion is justified.

Donald F. Rhodes
DONALD F. RHODES

HOADLEY/ljt

[illegible]

SE
CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] January 19[illegible]

MEMORANDUM

TO : Deputy Budget Officer

FROM : Deputy Personnel Officer

SUBJECT: Foreign Post Differential

1. In accordance with Part 325, Sub-Chapter B, Chapter III. Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations,

David E. Murphy

is eligible to receive foreign post differential pay as prescribed by regulations.

George E. Meloon
Deputy Personnel Officer

George E. Meloon
Deputy Personnel Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : OSO Promotion Board Attn: Mr. [illegible]

DATE: 10 May 1949

FROM : Acting Chief, FBZ

SUBJECT: Promotion of Mr. David E. Murphy

Attachment: 1. Dispatch, Tokyo to Chief, FBZ, Subject: Promotion of David E. Murphy, ZJTA-463, dated 21 April 1949

1. Attachment 1. forwards a recommendation for promotion of Mr. David Murphy, intelligence officer, CAF-12, Military Liaison Unit, Tokyo.

2. The Branch fully endorses the estimate of Mr. Murphy's qualifications and accomplishments set forth in Attachment 1. He is one of our most industrious and accomplished case officers. With respect to his promotion at this time the following considerations are pointed out:

a. He has been in the grade of CAF-12 since 5 April 1948. This is five months short of the minimum time in grade necessary to be considered for promotion.

b. While reorganization of our field T/O's in the Far East will come about in the next several months, there is at present no CAF-13 slot in the Tokyo Liaison Unit.

c. To consider Mr. Murphy for promotion as a general intelligence officer of this grade he would have to be considered capable of taking over a branch or division and as a rule proven as a chief of a fairly large field establishment. While the subject may potentially have qualifications for these his experience within the organization has not yet included such assignments.

3. It is recommended that subject not be considered for promotion at this time.

Harry W. Little, Jr.

Harry W. Little, Jr.
Acting Chief, FBZ

Originator: C. B. Swift, Jr.
Dep. Chief FEA: Paul Eckel

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: [illegible] April [illegible]

TO : CPD

FROM : CSB

SUBJECT: MURPHY, David E. #51454

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 April 194[illegible], relative to the above-named subject.

2. Based upon a review of the subject's file as well as information from other available sources, the Security Branch is pleased to concur with your request for the change of station of subject from F E, Korea to FE, Tokyo.

[illegible]
Chief, Security Branch, SO

SECRET

SECRET

To:	TOKYO (EUREKA)	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	30 APR 48
Confirmation:	FBZ (1-2)	OUT 62249
Information:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CAS (7), CPD (8), TRANS (9)	

WASH 6425

TO: TOKY CITE: WASHF

1. RE TOKY 614 (IN 41519) RELEASE FROM XXIV CORPS ASSURED IN SEOU 242 (IN 40250). ASSIGNMENT TOKYO OUTLINED IN WASH 5818 (OUT 61720). HAD ASSUMED [redacted] DISCUSSED THIS WITH YOU PRIOR TO SEOU 252 (IN 40984).

2. HERMIT SLOT OCCUPIED BY JEWETT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED YOUR STATION T/O. REQUEST YOU OBTAIN G-2 CONCURRENCE ON BASIS OUTLINED YOUR PARA 2.

3. AWAITING JAPAN TCA AND ARR FOR [redacted] AS REQUESTED IN WASH 5929 (OUT 61733).

David Murphy

C. GILPATRIC OPERA	GEA	LLOYD GEORGE
releasing officer	originating and coordinating officer	authenticating officer

TOD: 0051Z 1 MAY 48

SECRET

1. NAME David E. Murphy   Date 20 April 1948

CAF 12

2. POSITION Intelligence Officer   ANNUAL GROSS SALARY 3905

3. DESTINATION Japan

4. HOME ADDRESS 1521 15th Avenue, San Francisco, California

5. SALARY DATA: (FOR EACH FOUR WEEKLY PAY PERIOD)

A - To be paid by Japan Station Office $150.00

B - Tax withheld in U.S. $ 44.20

C - Insurance withheld in U.S. $ 12.50

D - Bond deductions withheld in U.S. $ ——

E - Retirement deductions withheld in U.S. $ 22.73

F - Other - (specify in detail) $ ——

G - To be paid to allottee by Washington Office $224.82

Total Gross Salary For Pay Period $454.24

6. Overseas payment to begin with payroll period 4 April 1948 Through 1 May 1948

7. Allotment Instructions:
Mail or deliver four weekly check to Mrs. Marian Murphy
(Name as it should appear on check)

At the following address Bank of America, Main Branch, San Francisco, California

8. All adjustments in salary to be effected in: (initial one)

A - Net overseas payment ____ B - U.S. Allotment X

9. Leave balance as of 5/15/48 - Date of departure (Approximate date of departure)
(Took 40 hrs. of annual leave en route , after 5/15/48.)
A - Annual leave 24 hours B - Sick leave 14 hrs.

10. Classification of Assignment: (Check one) Temporary ____ Permanent X

11. Payment of allowances for quarters and/or cost of living is X is not ____ authorized (check one)

12. Authorization of allowances for quarters and/or cost of living is in accordance with Bureau of the Budget Circular A-8 (cite authority)

13. Allowance for quarters and cost of living data:
(To be stated in cases where deemed necessary by Special Funds Division.- If filled in it will be the responsibility of person making payment to ascertain that the maximum, as stated, is allowable under existing regulations in each individual case, and that all proper deductions are made)

Current Maximum Rate Authorized	Annual	For Four Weekly Pay Period
Quarters	$ ** 1000	$ 76.92
Cost of Living	$ ——	$ ——
Other (specify)	$ ——	$ ——

14. Dependency Status:
____ Married with dependents in area ____ Married without dependents in area
____ Single with dependents in area * X Single without dependents in area

15. Advances transferred ____________ as per T/A attached

16. REMARKS: **If quarters furnished no allowance due subject. If quarters not furnished maximum $1000 until arrival of family at which time a maximum of $1500 is allowable.

*Family departing at a later date.

APPROVED:
Administrative Officer
Branch Chief
Personnel Officer
Special Funds Officer

I hereby authorize and direct the Special Funds Division to make the above allotment from my compensation.

David E. Murphy
Signature of employee

HEADQUARTERS
SAN FRANCISCO PORT OF EMBARKATION
FORT MASON, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO:
TCSFP-201-CPCO

15 April 1948

Murphy, David E.

SUBJECT: David E. Murphy

TO: Commanding Officer
Seattle Port of Embarkation
Seattle, Washington
ATTN: Civilian Personnel Officer

There is no record of Mr. Murphy repatriating through this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

EDWIN M. [illegible]
Captain, TC
Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen.

2 Incls
1. Ltr dtd 8 Apr 48
2. Form 50

TCSEP 201 CPB 1st Ind MD/gt

HQ, SEATTLE PORT OF EMBARKATION, Seattle 4, Washington, 20 April 1948

TO: Commanding Officer, Headquarters Complement, 520th AFBU, Washington National Airport, Washington 25, D. C.

Forwarded in event Mr. Murphy being finalized your station. No record of repatriation thru this port.

FOR THE CHIEF, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BRANCH:

RALPH JAY
Chief, Oversea Travel Section

2 Incls
n/c

FORM NO.
DEC 1947 35-6

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To:	SEOUL (GIANT), TOKYO	PRIORITY
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	9 APR 48
Confirmation:	FBZ (1-2)	OUT 61187
Information:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), CAS (7), CPD (8)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 5213

TO: SEOU, TOKY CITE: WASHF

Murphy, David E. ✓

1. [redacted] EMPLOYMENT ACTION COMPLETED BUT STATES UNWILLING RETURN SEOUL PER ORIGINAL PLAN WITHOUT WIFE WHOSE SHIPMENT CANCELLED FOUR DAYS AGO BY ARMY. REGRET [redacted] ALSO AFFECTED. LITTLE HOPE FOR EXCEPTION FROM RULE.

2. BELIEVE FOLLOWING COMPROMISE POSSIBLE IF YOU THINK FEASIBLE:

A. [redacted]. TO RETURN SEOUL LONG ENOUGH TO EFFECT NORMAL TRANSFER TO ATIS TOKYO OR OTHER COVER OFFICE WITH HELP OF G-2 TWENTY FOURTH CORPS AND FORCES.

B. WILL THEN PROCEED TOKYO FOR WORK IN PREPARATORY PHASES OF WHALEBACK AND TO PLACE WIFE ON JAPAN DEPENDENT LIST. [redacted] WELL-QUALIFIED FOR LAMBDA PHASES OF WHALEBACK.

C. ADDITIONAL WORK ON HEAVY LAMBDA PROJECTS TO BE DONE ON TDY TO SEOUL FROM TOKYO OR ON REAR ECHELON SUPPORT BASIS IN JAPAN WHICH MAY INVOLVE RED [illegible] AND SPARGK.

RELEASING OFFICER ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD:

SECRET

Copy No.

IT F DEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THI .OR

14-00000

2430 E Street, NW.
Washington, D. C.
8 April 1948

Commanding General
San Francisco Port of Embarkation
San Francisco, California

Dear Sir:

Attached hereto is Standard Form 50 on Mr. David E. Murphy, who entered on duty with this organization 5 April 1948. Mr. Murphy was employed by the Department of the Army as a political analyst from August 1946 to 2 April 1948.

Please forward Official Personnel Folder as outlined in Federal Personnel Manual, Chapter R-1. In forwarding the Official Personnel Folder, please attach official transcript of leave record.

It is requested that the Official Personnel Folder be forwarded to:

Edwin M. Terrell
2430 E Street, NW.
Washington, D. C.

If Mr. Murphy didn't return through this port, please forward this letter to Seattle; or, if the personnel file has been sent to St. Louis, I would appreciate your forwarding this letter there.

Sincerely yours,

EDWIN M. TERRELL
Chief, Personnel Division

Attachment

SECRET

UNVOUCHERED

5 April 1948

[illegible] : [illegible]

[illegible] : [illegible]

[illegible] David Edmund Murphy

[illegible] xxx [illegible] Korua [illegible] xxx [illegible]

Chloris D. Hudson for
E. M. TERRELL

SECRET

2430 E Street, NW.
Washington, D. C.
5 April 1948

REGISTERED ADDRESSEE ONLY

Mr. David Edmund Murphy
Apt. 304
4607 Connecticut Avenue, NW.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

This letter is to officially confirm our telephone conversation this morning, advising you that your employment with this agency has been approved at an annual base salary of $5905.20.

It is requested that you report for duty as soon as possible, today, to Que Building, 25th and Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, D. C.

Sincerely yours,

EDWIN M. TERRELL
Chief, Personnel Division

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy

1 April 1948

[illegible] Attention: Mr. Mulcah y
[illegible]

[illegible]

Please [illegible]

MURPHY, David Edmund [illegible]

processed for a position in this office [illegible]

[illegible] 145

[illegible]

[illegible]

COPY

CIA CFB [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

PLEASE RETURN TO 1075 QUB

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

March 29 1948

TO: CFD

VIA: ______

Name of Candidate David E Murphy

Position Considered for FB2 Office ______ Interviewer ______

Personal appearance	Dignified.......	☐	Natural...	☑	Awkward......	☐
	Well-groomed....	☐	Clean.....	☑	Slovenly.....	☐
	Wide-Awake......	☑	Stolid.....	☐	Apathetic....	☐
	Impressive......	☑	Ordinary..	☐	Insignificant	☐
Personality	Persuasive......	☐	Responsive	☑	Taciturn.....	☐
	Imperturbable...	☐	Steady....	☑	Excitable....	☐
	Cheerful........	☐	Tranquil..	☑	Dejected.....	☐
	Straight-forward	☐	Reserved..	☑	Evasive......	☐
	Modest..........	☐	Complacent	☐	Conceited....	☐
	Dominant........	☐	Confident.	☑	Submissive...	☐

Is education adequate? Yes(✓) No( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes(✓) ~~No~~( )

Area knowledge Europe + Korea (student of Soviet politics

Previous intelligence or related experience MIS - Int. during war in Europe (7th Army, USFET, etc.) and w/ XXIV Corps, Korea 1 yr.

Salary level requested $5900 Lowest Salary Acceptable $5900

- -

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ______

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: fluency in Russian and Soviet background; analytical abilities; interest in intelligence career

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: Int. Off. Branch FB2 Division NEA

Location: Field - Korea

Salary Level: P-5

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration:

At a later time in Europe or other areas against USSR.

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

C. Gilpatric

Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

29 Mar 1948

TO : CPD

VIA:

Name of Candidate: MARRY [illegible]

Position Considered for [illegible] Office [illegible] Interviewer [illegible]

Personal appearance	Dignified		[illegible] ...	X	Awkward	
	[illegible]	X	[illegible]	X	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	X	[illegible]		Apathetic	
	Impressive	X	Ordinary..		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive	X	Responsive	X	Taciturn......	
	Imperturbable		Steady....	X	Excitable	
	Cheerful	X	Tranquil..		Dejected	
	[illegible]	X	[illegible]		[illegible]	
	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	
	Dominant		Confident..	X	[illegible]	

Is education adequate? Yes ( ) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes( )No( )

Area Knowledge [illegible]

Previous intelligence or related experience: [illegible]

Salary level requested $[illegible] Lowest salary acceptable $[illegible]

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons:

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: [illegible]

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: [illegible] Branch [illegible] Division [illegible]

Location: [illegible]

Salary level: [illegible]

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration:

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

29 March 1948

TO : CPD

VIA: ____________

Name of Candidate David E. Murphy

Position Considered for Intell Officer Office 030 Interviewer ______

Personal appearance	Dignified		[illegible]	X	Awkward	
	Well groomed	X	Clean		Slovenly	
	[illegible]	X	[illegible]		[illegible]	
	Impressive	X	Ordinary		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive	X	Responsive		Taciturn	
	Imperturbable		Steady	X	Excitable	
	Cheerful	X	Tranquil		Dejected	
	[illegible]	X	Reserved		[illegible]	
	Modest		[illegible]	X	[illegible]	
	Dominant		Confident	X	[illegible]	

Is education adequate? Yes (X) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes(X)No( )

Area Knowledge Korea, Soviet East Asia, Western Europe

Previous intelligence or related experience member G-2 Section XXIV Corps, Korea from December 1946 - present

Salary level requested $ 5900 Lowest salary acceptable $ ______

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ______

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: Education, experience, interests, language qualifications

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: Int. Ops. Officer Branch FB2 Division NEA

Location: Seoul, Korea

Salary level: CAF-12

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: Operations, analysis, reporting on Soviet Union

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

Jos. E. Lemieux

Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

29 March 1948

TO : CPD

VIA: ______

Name of Candidate Murphy David E.

3607 Conn Ave NW
Phone listed under Rimmer

Position Considered for ______ Office ______ Interviewer ______

Personal appearance	Dignified		Natural...	✓	Awkward......	
	Well groomed...	✓	Careless...		Slovenly ..	
	Well dressed ...	✓	Sloppy...		Apologetic ..	
	Impressive....		Ordinary..		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive.....	✓	Responsive	✓	Taciturn.....	
	Imperturbable...		Steady....		Excitable...	
	Cheerful.... ..	✓	Tranquil..		Dejected.....	
	Straightforward	✓	Reserved.		Evasive	
	Modest		Complacent		Conceited...	
	Dominant....		Confident.	✓	Submissive...	

Is education adequate? Yes (✓) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes(X)No( )

Area Knowledge Korea

Previous intelligence or related experience G-2 XXIV Corps

Salary level requested $5900 Lowest salary acceptable $ CAF-12

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ______

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: Education experience personality language

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: IO Branch FBZ Division ______

Location: [illegible]

Salary level: CAF-12

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: ______

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

Given PH 457 to complete and return
Interviewed by Lung—
Eckel
Gifford

Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD.

David E. Murphy

Subject transferred to CIA from the War Department and has accrued ~~annual~~ and sick leave to his credit with that agency. Several letters were forwarded requesting both personnel folder and leave with negative results. In the meantime, subject transferred overseas to his duty station. No further communications will be forwarded to the War Department until subject has returned from overseas for reassignment because to do so may tend to "blow" his cover. (As the records were not available in any of the ZI military establishment, ~~our~~ any future communication may be forwarded to the army establishment in Tokyo requesting the records and the form 50 will immediately identify subject's CIA connection.

Harold E Ballou

Herold E. Ballou

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET
[illegible]

BIOGRAP

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

Date	23 JULY 1975
FILE NO.	10495
SS NUMBER	056-14-4578
EMPLOYEE NUMBER	056700
ID CARD NUMBER	

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) NIO

ATTN: CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

REF: RETIREMENT

OFFICIAL COVER: ESTABLISHED ☐ / XX DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: DAVID E. MURPHY

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ________

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ________ (HHB 20-7)

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ________ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

SUBMIT FORM [illegible] FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-[illegible])

SUBMIT FORM 1323 IF TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-20)

EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS

XX EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD

XX SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

XXX SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ________ (HHB 20-7)

NA EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

XX RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

XX SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

SUBJECT WILL BE ACKNOWLEDGED AS CIA FOR ENTIRE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BUT WILL NOT REVEAL SPECIFIC PLACES OR LOCATIONS OF COVER ASSIGNMENTS.

:DC:mlr

SECRET

FORM 1551

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF EST[illegible]SHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

[illegible] NOV. 1974

FILE NO.: 10[illegible]95

TO: (check)

X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OF — [illegible] NUMBER: [illegible]-14-4573

☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, CP — EMPLOYEE NUMBER: [illegible]700

X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action [illegible]) — ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

REF: ORAL FROM C/CCS

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: DAVID E. MURPHY

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ________

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER *(Specify)*

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ________ *(HHB 20-7)*

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*

SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR 240-2e)*

SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR 240-2e)*

EAA CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

X CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE: SOD

X SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*

X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 1 *(HHB 20-7)*

X EAA CATEGORY I XX CATEGORY II ☐

X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR [illegible] HOSPITALIZATION CARD

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY:
APRIL [illegible]-1950-JAPAN-DAC
1951-1953-GERMANY-DAC
OCT 53-1954-HQS-DAC
19[illegible]-7 AUG [illegible] - GERMANY-DAC
7 AUG [illegible]-MARCH [illegible]-HQS-DAC
20 MARCH [illegible]-JUNE [illegible]-HQS-STATE-INTEL[illegible]
JUNE [illegible]-1 JULY 74-FRANCE-STATE-INTEL[illegible]
1 JULY 74-[illegible]-NOV 74-HQS-STATE-INTEL[illegible]
[illegible] NOV 74-HQS-[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION:
[illegible]

S[illegible]

[redacted]

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET [illegible]

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 1 NOV 1974

FILE NO. 10405

SS NUMBER [illegible]-18-[illegible]

EMPLOYEE NUMBER 054700

ID CARD NUMBER

TO: (Check)

- X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) [illegible]

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: FORM 2458, DATED 13 MARCH 1974

OFFICIAL COVER: X ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: DAVID E. MURPHY

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

XX ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

- X ☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EOD EFFECTIVE DATE ______
- ☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)
- X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY B (HHB 20-7)
- X SUBMIT FORM 3254 STATE #-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
- X SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2)
- X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFER OF COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2)
- X EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☒
- X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AGS HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:

- ☐ SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ #-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
- ☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)
- ☐ EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
- ☐ RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
- ☐ SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

APRIL 45-1950-JAPAN-DAC
1951-1953-GERMANY-DAC
OCT 53-1954-HQS-DAC
1954-7 AUG 61-GERMANY-BERLIN-DAC
7 AUG 61-MARCH 66-HQS-DAC
20 MARCH 66-JUNE 69-HQS-STATE-INTEGRATED
JUNE 69-1 JULY 74-FRANCE, PARIS-STATE-INTEGRATED
1 JULY 74-HQS-STATE-INTEGRATED

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD OR CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SRB
COPY 4 - CCS/C TRB
COPY 5 - CCS/FILE

[illegible] BRANCH [illegible] STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

(13-20-43)

SECRET

8 September 1961

File K-2913

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : MURPHY, David E.

1. Cover arrangements [redacted] have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 7 August 1961, it is requested that your records be properly blocked [redacted] to deny [redacted] Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. [redacted]

For G[illegible]HOUSE
Acting Chief, Central Cover Group

cc: SSD/OS

[illegible] SECRET [illegible]

1580a [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING	FILE
TO: Retirement Operations Branch Office of Personnel	DATE
RETIREE	CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Cover & Commercial Staff, the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT		CIVIL SERVICE		CIARDS	DATE					
COVER		OVERT ROUTINE		COVERT (OFFICIAL COVER) LOCK-UP		COVERT (NOC) SPECIAL	**RETENTION OF AWARDS**		YES		NO
CORRESPONDENCE		OVERT		COVERT		THRU CCS				

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE		U.S. GOV'T. CHECK				OTHER *(Payment instructions follow)*
TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE		CIA		CSC		OTHER *(MEMO FOLLOWS)*
REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION		YES		NO		INTERNAL TRANSFER

INSURANCE

FEGLI		OVERT		COVERT		MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD:

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE		YES		CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE		YES		NO		OVERT		COVERT

REMARKS

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH
COVER & COMMERCIAL STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

______ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, OFFICE OF SECURITY

429 [illegible] SECRET [illegible]

7 - OFF. PERS. FILE ROOM

14-00000

DATE: [illegible] 1 OCT 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
[illegible]	MURPHY DAVID E

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA-CONTR	07 11 75	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA		8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	6113 2[illegible]	[illegible]	PL 88-643 SECT 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DCI/NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS SPECIAL ACTIVITIES	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
NATIONAL INTEL OFF	AC[illegible]	DYY

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.55	18 1	36000

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150, EFFECTIVE DATE 07/11/75 AS FOLLOWS: ITEM NUMBER 7, FAN AND NSCA, WHICH READ 6115 [illegible] TO READ 6113 [illegible].

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE [illegible] TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE [illegible] FORCED."

MURPHY, DAVID E.

[illegible] BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

2[illegible] STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. MILITARY Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
			[illegible] 23 21		

[illegible] NT DATA CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
	[illegible]	65	07 11 75			

[illegible] COMP DATE (DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
OCT 1975

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74 Mrg 10-74

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

DATE: 6 AUG 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

0EF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056700	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MURPHY DAVID E

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 18 YR 75

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☐

7. FAN AND NSCA: 6115 1000 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DCI/NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: NATIONAL INTEL OFF

12. POSITION NUMBER: AC11

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYY

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.65

16. GRADE AND STEP: 18 1

17. SALARY OR RATE: 36000

18. REMARKS:
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Mission Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 06 DA 23 YR 21
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0BJ0000
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE / MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE / HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
42. STATE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9/8/75

FORM 1152 9-72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF
TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI
AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE
DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	056700	44 735	CF	GS 16 1	$36,000

LMP: 10 DEC 74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

0CF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 056700	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MURPHY DAVID E

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 23 74	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE SAN AND NSCA 5113 2000 0001	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DCI/NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS SPECIAL ACTIVITIES	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE NATIONAL INTEL OFF	12 POSITION NUMBER 0350	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DYY

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.65	16 GRADE AND STEP 1S 1	17 SALARY OR RATE 36000

18 REMARKS

WASH., D.C.
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Career Cate-	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
56	10	06150	NIO	75013		1	06 23 21		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPT	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1 P.S.S.

FORM 1150
9-71 Mfg 8-73

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

14-00000

KHN: 19 NOV 74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

0DF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 056700	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) MURPHY DAVID E				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 10 27 74	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 5113 2000 0001	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DCI/NIO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS SPECIAL ACTIVITIES				10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11 POSITION TITLE SPEC ASST 1ST WC ATTACHE NATIONAL INTEL OFF				12 POSITION NUMBER 0250	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DYY
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.65			16 GRADE AND STEP 01 1 13 1	17 SALARY OR RATE 36000 36000

18 REMARKS PARIS, FRANCE
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Health Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	05150	NIO	75013	S	0	05 23 21		
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data		EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE	36 SERV COMP DATE	37 LONG COMP DATE	38 CAREER CATEGORY	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE				40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE		42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA			44 STATE TAX DATA			

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: CUP

VTHID
2 NOV

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

LMF

UD

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	056700	44 735	CF	GS 18 1	$36,000

OD

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	056700	44 735	CF	GS 18 1	$36,000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

A21

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible]

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible] U.S.C.A.
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA [illegible] YR 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: [illegible]
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DIV.
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE
11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [illegible]
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: [illegible]
16. GRADE AND STEP: [illegible]
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ. Code
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC / 2 CA / 3 FICA / 5 NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE / 1 5 PT / 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVER / 1 YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE / 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE / 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. / 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES / 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES / 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

11-6-72

FORM 3-65 1150 Use Previous Edition
Mfg. 10-67

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	056700	44 735	CF	GS 18 1	$36,000

— 1D

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	056700	44 620	CF	GS 18 1	$36,000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	056700	44 620	CF	GS 18 1	$35,505

1

[illegible]

MURPHY DAVID E

0620

25A

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
056700	MURPHY, DAVID E.	44 600 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-18	1	$28,000		GS-18	1	$30,239	02-23-69			X

8. Remarks and Authentication

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SUPPLEMENT, TO THE BUDGET FOR 1970, ON EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SALARY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED 15 JANUARY 1969 AS AUTHORIZED BY PL 90-206, THE FEDERAL SALARY ACT OF 1967."

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Mfg. 3-65 Use Previous Edition

OD/PER

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	056700	44 600	CF	GS 18 1	$27,055	$28,000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PLW: 7 JUN 68

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056760	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MURPHY DAVID E

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 | 02 | 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5136 1231 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD CENTRAL REGION PARIS STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE SPEC ASST 1ST SEC W C ATTACHE CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0620	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP 01 1 18 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 24944 27055

18. REMARKS
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Multiple Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	44600	EUR	24065	S	3	06 | 23 | 21		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-10-68 mh

FORM 5-66 1150 mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET SF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(45)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] 11 Apr 6[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MURPHY DAVID E
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION-DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 03 DA. 20 YR. [illegible]
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☒ | CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 8136 1155 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
WASH., D.C.
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
SPEC ASST 1ST SEC W C ATTACHE
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 01 1 / 18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 24944 / 27055
18. REMARKS:

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $27055 AND FSR SALARY OF $24944 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.
ALL SICK AND ALL HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPT. OF STATE.
MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED SON DOB: 5 JUN 52 DAU DOB: 22 AUG 54
OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 35
20. Employ. Code: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 44997 | ALPHABETIC EUR
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE: 3
24. Hqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 08 DA. 2[illegible] YR. 21
26. DATE OF GRADE:
27. DATE OF LEI:
28. [illegible] EXPIRES:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39. [illegible] HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[illegible]

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3 APR 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MURPHY DAVID E
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 3 | 10 | 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 0236 1186 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 317
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 27055
18. REMARKS: TO BE INTEGRATED TRAINING

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 20
20. Employ Code: 13
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC: 44997 — ALPHABETIC: EUR
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Position Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 06 | 23 | 21
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE — CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE — MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE — 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAN RES. CODE / PROV. TEMP.
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE — 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE — 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP. — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM 58

POSTED
4-[illegible]

1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET PLW

[illegible]

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	55700	48 040	V	GS 18 1	$25,890	$27,055

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZF: 3 JAN 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
056700	MURPHY DAVID E

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	12 30 66	REGULAR

6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
7234 0573 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SB DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER D CH	0001	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	18 1	25890

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Homes Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	48040	SB	75013		1	06 23 21		

28. NTE EXPIRES 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 30. RETIREMENT DATA 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO. 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE 36. SERV. COMP. DATE 37. LONG COMP. DATE 38. CAREER CATEGORY 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962,"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	056700	48 040	V	GS 18 1	$25,382	$25,890

MAY 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056700
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MURPHY DAVID E
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 05 22 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6234 0573 [illegible]
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. [illegible]
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/SR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 18
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ Code
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC)
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE: 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)
44. STATE TAX DATA (CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS		GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	056702	48 040	V	GS 18 1	$24,500	$25,382

SECRET
(When Filled In)

28 FEB 68

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
056700	MURPHY DAVID E

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	03 01 68	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 8238 1000 1000
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SR OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER DIV CH	0001	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	18 1	20000

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Emploc Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	48010	SR	25013		1	06 23 21	03 01 68	03 01 68

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REC NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE
36. SERV COMP DATE
37. LONG COMP DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLS: 17 OCT 63

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 056700
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MURPHY DAVID E
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 09 16 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4234 1000 1000
8. LOC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/SR
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER DIV CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 18500
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 48040 | ALPHABETIC SR
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Region Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 06 23 21
26. DATE OF GRADE:
27. DATE OF LEI:
28. NTE EXPIRES:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 NONE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE
37. LONG COMP. DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: 0 WAIVED 1 YES
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPT

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

17 OCT 1963

056700 MURPHY DAVID E 94 040 V

OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Date Eff. Salary	NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	TYPE ACTION PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 17	1	$18,000	09/16/62	GS 17	2	$18,500	09/15/63			

Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 11 July 63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 961 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS: EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR_ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR_ST	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	056700	94040	V	17 1	$16530	17 1	$18000

PSC: 14 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056700	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MURPHY DAVID E		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 16 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V; CF TO V; V TO CF; CF TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3230 1010 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP EE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OF DIV CH		12. POSITION NUMBER 0001	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 17 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 16530
18. REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	54040	EE	75013		1	06 23 21	09 16 62	09 16 62

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR — 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30. RETIREMENT DATA CODE — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR — EOD DATA — 33. SECURITY REQ. NO — 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR — 37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR — 38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE — 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE; HEALTH INS. CODE — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE — 42. LEAVE CAT CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS — 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9-21-62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition 9/21/62 SECRET

(When Filled In)

2: 26 JUNE 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056700	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MURPHY DAVID E

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 26 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2239 1010 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP EE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OF DIV CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0001	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 15775

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 54040 ALPHABETIC EE	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Mestre Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 05 23 21	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTC EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

29 JUN 1962

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-61

Jun 6/26/62

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
56700	MURPHY DAVID E	DDP/EE V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 16	2	$15,515	06/26/60	16	3	$15,775	12/24/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ ✓/ NO EXCESS LWOP

14632 PP#2

/ ✓ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

PSC: 18 AUG 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 056700	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MURPHY DAVID E

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 08 20 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X CF TO V	CF TO CF	2239 1010 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP EE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OF D DIV CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0002	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 15515

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	10	54040	EE	75013		1	06 23 21 ~~10 21 13~~		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP. DATE	38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

CODED
25 AUG 1961

Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 26 JULY 1960

1. Serial No. 556700	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MURPHY DAVID E	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 06 Da. 23 Yr. 21	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 04 Da. 05 Yr. 48		
7. SCD Mo. 12 Da. 30 Yr. 42	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 04 Da. 05 Yr. 48	13. Mil. Ret. Credit Yes-1 No-2 Code 2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE	Code 5220	15. Location Of Official Station BERLIN, GERMANY	Station Code 27005
16. Dept. - Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5 Code 5	17. Position Title CHIEF OF BASE	18. Position No. 0510	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.01	21. Grade & Step 16 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 15515	23. SD 01
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 12 Da. 28 Yr. 58	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 60	26. Appropriation Number 0139 9300 3017	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action CONVERSION TO PERMANENT SUPERGRADE RANK	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. 07 Da. 27 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE	Code 5220	32. Location Of Official Station BERLIN, GERMANY	Station Code 27005
33. Dept. - Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5 Code 5	34. Position Title CHIEF OF BASE	35. Position No. 0510	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.01	38. Grade & Step 16 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 15515	40. SD D
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 12 Da. 28 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 24 Yr. 61	43. Appropriation Number 1139 1700 3017	

44. Remarks
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON 27 JULY 1960 APPROVED YOUR PERMANENT GRADE AS GS-16.

POSTED
29 Aug 1960

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	MURPHY DAVID E	556700	52 20	GS-16 2	$14,430	$15,515

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.: 556700
2. NAME: MURPHY DAVID E
3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.: DDP/EE [illegible]
4. FUNDS: UV
5. ALLOTMENT:

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 16	1	$14,190	12	28	58	GS 16	2	$14,430	06	26	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION ☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT
13. REMARKS
14. AUTHENTICATION

E D ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 1-60 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b.

SECRET

OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 7 AUG 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None 0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
556700	MURPHY DAVID E	06	23	21		1	M 1	04	05	48

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Agcy Allotm. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2	Code
12	30	42		1	50 USCA 403 J						04	05	48		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE	5201	BERLIN, GERMANY	27005

16. Dept.-Field Dept.-1 Unfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	AREA OPS OFF (DCOB)	1680	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. [illegible] Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
16 1	$ 14190	D1	12	28	58	06	26	60	9 3130 55 017

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	08	09	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE	5220	BERLIN, GERMANY	27005

33. Dept.-Field Dept.-1 Unfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	CHIEF OF BASE	5510	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. [illegible] Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
16 1	$ 14190	D1	12	28	58	06	26	60	0139 9300 3017

44. Remarks

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a

(4)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 16 DEC 1958

1. Serial No. 556700	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MURPHY DAVID E	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 06 Da. 23 Yr. 21	4. Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 04 Da. 05 Yr. 48
7. SCD Mo. 12 Da. 30 Yr. 42	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 04 Da. 05 Yr. 48
					13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE	Code 5281	15. Location Of Official Station BERLIN, GERMANY			Station Code 27005
16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USFld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 5	17. Position Title AREA OPS OFF (DCOB)		18. Position No. 1680	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01
21. Grade & Step 15 4	22. Salary Or Rate $ 13670	23. SD D.I	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 02 Da. 14 Yr. 54	25. PSI Due Mo. 02 Da. 07 Yr. 60	26. Appropriation Number 9 3130 55 017

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION (TEMPORARY)*	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. 12 Da. 28 Yr. 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE	Code 5281	32. Location Of Official Station BERLIN, GERMANY			Station Code 27005
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USFld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 5	34. Position Title AREA OPS OFF (DCOB)		35. Position No. 1680	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01
38. Grade & Step 16 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 14190	40. SD DI	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 12 Da. 28 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 60	43. Appropriation Number 9 3130 55 017

44. Remarks

*PROMOTION TO THE GRADE INDICATED IS TEMPORARY AND FOR SUCH DURATION AS THE DIRECTOR WILL DETERMINE. YOUR PERMANENT GRADE IS THE GRADE FROM WHICH YOU ARE TEMPORARILY PROMOTED.

1/5/59

FORM NO. 1150a

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 15 DEC 1958

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
556700	MURPHY DAVID E	[illegible]	23	21	1	M	1	04	05	48	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2	Code
12	30	42		1	50 USCA 403 J						04	05	48		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE SOVIET BRANCH		BERLIN, GERMANY	

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	AREA OPS OFF	0511	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 4	$ 13670	D1							9 3130 55 017

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data	
REASSIGNMENT	56	12	15	58	REGULAR	01		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE GERMAN STATION BERLIN OPS BASE	5281	BERLIN, GERMANY	2705

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	AREA OPS OFF (DCOB)	1680	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 4	$ 13670	D1	02	11	54	02	07	60	9 3130 55 017

44. Remarks

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
556700	MURPHY DAVID E	DDP/EE	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	3	$13,370	02	10	57	GS 15	4	$13,670	08	10	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Robert F. Zunzer	4 Aug 1958	

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560 1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
556700	MURPHY DAVID E	DDP/EE	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	3	$13,370	02	10	57	GS 15	4	$13,670	08	10	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
15	5	13970	02	07	6

13. REMARKS

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a 1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

[illegible]

12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85-462 AND DCI

DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MURPHY DAVID E	556700	GS-15-3	$12,150	$13,370

GORDON M. STEWART
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
556700	MURPHY DAVID E	DDP/EE	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
15	2	$11,880	08	14	55	15	3	$12,150	02	10	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

CF

2-8

2-13

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
556700	MURPHY DAVID E	DDP/EE	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
15	2	$11,880	08	14	55	15	3	$12,150	02	10	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
[illegible] C. McNAMARA	23 Jan 1957	

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

PERSONNEL FOLDER

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. Miss Mrs. – One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. DAVID E MURPHY	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 12 May 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
REASSIGNMENT *

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: 5 JUN

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—			TO—	
Area Ops~~x~~ Off.	BG-F-511	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops. Off.	BG-F-511
GS-0136.01-15	$11,880.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-15	$11,880.00
DDP/EE German Station Berlin Ops Base ~~Soviet Branch~~		10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/EE German Station Berlin Ops Base Soviet Branch	
Berlin, Germany		11. HEADQUARTERS	Berlin, Germany	
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	

15

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

* New T/O

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
EE/Per.

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
3584/C.Parish

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

SD-DI

15. APPROPRIATION
FROM 6-3120-55-017
TO Same

17. Yes

LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

INITIAL OR SIGNATURE

4373 23 May

14-00000

7/19/55

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 50 19 PART 1

U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER [illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

KWB

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. DAVID EDMUND MURPHY	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 19 July 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT (CORRECTION)*	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 13 Feb 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops. Off. BG-P-1106	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops. Off. (Deputy Ch) BG-P-51
GS-0136.01-15 $10,800.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $10,800.00 per annum
Berlin Operations Base Operations Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/EE German Mission Berlin Operations Base
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Berlin, Germany
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3130-55-017 TO: 6-3130-55-017	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

*This action corrects Item #8, on the "to" side, on Notification dated 14 Jan. 1955, to show the correct title, previously shown as Area Ops. Off.

POSTED
20 JUL 1955

SECRET

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Director of Personnel

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

Unvouchered

2/14/55

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. DAVID EDMUND MURPHY
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 23 June 1921
3. RECORD NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 14 Jan 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment *
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: FEB 13 1955
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
	Area Ops. Off. DCP-1106	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops. Off. [illegible]-511XXXXX
	GS-0136.01-15 $10,800	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 ($10,800)
	DDP/EE German Mission Berlin Operations Base Operations Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/EE German Mission Berlin Operations Base [illegible]
	Berlin, Germany	11. HEADQUARTERS	Berlin, Germany
	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

~~Action cut in accordance with Reg.~~
Per IN-87914

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 13 MAR. 1955
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: 11610

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): EE/Per

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): 3023/C. Danish

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	LA	REAL

DD-DP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM 5-3130-55-017
TO Same
18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT: Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A		
B. CSC OR P.C. CONTROL	Smith	2/1/55
C. CLASSIFICATION		2/1/55
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		2/4
E.		

REMARKS

F. APPROVED BY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (3 PART)

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 26 Nov. 1954 [illegible]

1. Name: MR. DAVID EDWARD MURPHY
2. Date of birth: 23 June 1921
4. Date: 2 Dec. 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. Nature of action (use standard terminology): REASSIGNMENT
6. Effective date: E.O.D. 5 Dec. 1954
7. Civil Service or other legal authority: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops. Off. (Br Ch) BC-130	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops. Off. BC-f-1106
GS-0136.01-15 $10,800.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $10,800.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR-3	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/EE German Mission Berlin Operations Base Operations Division
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Berlin, Germany
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPTL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. Veteran's preference: 5 pt. x

14. Position classification action: BD-FI

17. Appropriation: FROM 5-3400-20 TO 5-3130-55-217

18. Subject to C.S. Retirement Act: Yes

20. Legal residence: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. Remarks: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

POSTED
12-17 KH

Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered Funds.

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

.NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

0071

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. David Edmund Murphy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 21	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 16 Feb. 54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 28 Feb. 54	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Intell. Officer(Chief) BC 142	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops. Officer(Br. Ch) BC 130
GS-132-15	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $10,800.00 per annum
BR-3(West Branch) Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/ER BR-3
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

0	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
		X			

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3400-20 TO: same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

PERFORMANCE RATING

Assistant Director for Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 - 244347

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CH. R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. David Edmund Murphy
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 23 June 21
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 9 Feb. 54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 14 Feb. 54
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
EC-142-14	8. POSITION TITLE	Intell. Officer(Chief) EC-142
GS-132-14 $9800.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-15 $10,800.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR-3 West Branch Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ S.A. ☐ REAL. ☐ CD-FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3400-20 TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

TRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

uty Assistant Director for Personnel

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1953 — 248547

Jan 2 '57

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
Security Information

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 6 Aug. 1953 pal

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. David Edmund Murphy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June '21	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 28 Aug. 1953

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment BOD	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 30 Aug. 1953	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer 8-19	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Chief)BC 132-1
GS 132-14 $9800.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS 132-14 $9800.00 per annum
OSO USSR SOS/MOB	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR-3 West Branch Office of the Chief
Karlsruhe, Germany	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington D.C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.

CD FI

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-3410-55-007
TO: 4-3400-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM Unvouchered Funds

cting
hief, Personnel Division
TRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

KW

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET
Security Information

1-29 Feb 8 53

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

1. Agency and organizational designations CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	2. Pay period	3. Block No. [illegible]	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) [illegible], David C.	6. Grade and salary GS-14 $9600.00		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s)
[illegible] 0?-7

12. Prepared by
JR GS-14

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
26 Aug 52	17 [illegible] 52	$9600.00	$9800.00

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ in pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ in LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—61111-2a * U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 975/85

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: MURPHY, David Edmund

DATE: 14 January 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: Reassignment & Promotion

EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 February 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer	Intelligence Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-13 #8360.	GS-14 #9600
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FBS	USSR
BRANCH	SCS/MOB Office of Chief	SCS/MOB Office of Chief
OFFICIAL STATION	Karlsruhe ([illegible])	Karlsruhe ([illegible])

QUALIFICATIONS

APPROVAL

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE

CLASSIFICATION F 546

PERSONNEL OFFICER

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

position # 17, Field

CATALOG FILE
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

37-1

SECRET

GPO 83-900337

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: MURPHY, David Edmund

DATE: 3 February 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Transfer

EFFECTIVE DATE: 18 February 51

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-13	Intelligence Officer GS-13
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-13 $7600.00	GS-13 $7600.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDM/S for DAD	FDS
BRANCH		SCS/MOB Office of the Chief
OFFICIAL STATION	KARL	KARL

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS L C [illegible] 8 Feb 51	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Wm G. Tharp	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION 7 Feb 51 : 5 91 Austin J. Thomas	PERSONNEL OFFICER 9 Feb	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____________

ENTERED ON DUTY ____________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

S-2

130

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
[illegible] 1951
SALARY ADJUSTED TO $ 8360

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
[illegible]

FORM NO. 37-[illegible]
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO [illegible]

SECRET

P

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME
MURPHY, David Edmund

DATE
7 December 1950

NATURE OF ACTION
Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE
7 January 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer GS-13
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-13 $7600.00
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		FDM/S for DAD
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION		~~Munich~~ Karlsruhe J.K.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION F511	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 8 January 1951

SECURITY CLEARED ON Concurrence 14 December 1950

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 8 January 1951

ENTERED ON DUTY 7 January 1951

DOC - 02/17/54
CEOD - 04/05/47
LCD - 04/05/47

Chloie D. Hudson
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

S-1

Please tra[illegible] from Vouchered [illegible]

SERVICE DATES VERIFIED
BY [illegible] DATE [illegible] 54

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL F

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 50
[illegible]
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER [illegible], FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(mfe)

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. David E. Murphy
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 23 June 1921
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: #4414
4. DATE: 26 Jan. 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Resignation *
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: cob 6 Jan. 1951
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer(Acting Chief) GS-13	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-13-132-$7600.00 per [illegible]	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
OSO FDS W Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
	SV			Bu.#1480 CSC#1434 10/1/47

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: 2115900 951-105
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

*To accept other employment.

LWD: 1/6/1951
LWL: 403 hours 1/8/1951 thru 3 hours 3/20/1951
1 Holiday 2/22/1951.

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING

22. SIGNATURE:
R.B.J. HOPKINS
Chief, Personnel Branch

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

lag

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. David E. Murphy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. 3717	4. DATE 15 Nov. 1950

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Transfer & Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 26 Nov. 1950	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Sch. A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer, GS-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Acting Chief) GS-13
GS-12-130-$6600.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-13-132-$7600.00 per annum
OSO FDS "S" Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO FDS W. Section
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WHITE	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	[illegible]	[illegible]	REV.
	VT		

Bx#1880
CSC#21434
10/2/47

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 2215900
TO: 951-10?

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT: Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

ROBERT S. WATTLES
Employees Division

(SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-879848

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 21, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

F. C. 17 Aug. 1950
(mfs)

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. David E. Murphy

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 23 June 1921

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: #3249

4. DATE: 18 Sept. 1950

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Excepted Appointment

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 18 Sept. 1950

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(r)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer, GS-12
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12-130-$6600.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO FDS "S" Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.
		X	

Bu.#1799
CSC#1743
12/19/1947

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 2115900
TO: 221-103

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 18 Sept. 1950

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject has satisfactorily completed trial period.

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

E. R. J. HOPKINS
Chief, Employees Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1949 | 073048

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: MURPHY, David Edmund

DATE: 14 August 1950

NATURE OF ACTION: Resignation

EFFECTIVE DATE: ~~COB 22 August 1950~~ COB 17 Sept. 195

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (CFS)	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12 $6600.00	
OFFICE	OSO	
DIVISION	FDZ	
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C. (Field)	

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BR.

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Please transfer leave to vouchered funds.

Harry B. Hendricks
Authorized Certifying Officer

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1948

SECRET

MURPHY, David Edmund

Transfer

19 July 1950	
17 July 1950	
Intelligence Officer (Ops.)	Intelligence Officer (Ops.)
GS-12 $6600.00	GS-12 $6600.00
OSO	OSO
FDZ/FBU	FDX
Intelligence Operations Branch	Intelligence Operations Branch
Yoko.	Wash., D. C. (Field)

Employee completed tour of duty in the field.

POSTED

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: MURPHY, David Edmund

DATE: 27 February 1950

NATURE OF ACTION: Amendment to Transfer *

EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 February 1950

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intell. Officer (Ops) GS-12	Intell. Officer (Ops) GS-12 Soviet
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12 $6600.00	GS-12 $6600.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDZ	FDZ – [illegible]
BRANCH		Intell. Ops Branch
OFFICIAL STATION	Yokosuka	Yokosuka

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTED
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	COPY IN PAYROLL FILES CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH Omm INITIALS

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

* This action amends Transfer action dated 13 February 1950, to show correct salary.

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: MURPHY, David Edmund

DATE: 13 February 1950

NATURE OF ACTION: Transfor

EFFECTIVE DATE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intell. Officor (Ops) OS-12	Intell. Officer (Ops) Soviet OS-12
GRADE AND SALARY	OS-12 $6400.00	OS-12 $6400.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDZ	FDZ-FSU
BRANCH		Intell. Ops Branch
OFFICIAL STATION	Yokosuka	Yokosuka

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS: See 15 Feb 50

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR:

EXECUTIVE: CMW

CLASSIFICATION: Austin J. Thomas F-592

PERSONNEL OFFICER: Robert H.

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

S-11

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: MURPHY, DAVID EDMUND

DATE: 4 NOVEMBER 1949

NATURE OF ACTION: CONVERSION-CLASSIFICATION ACT OF 1949 *

EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 OCTOBER 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (OPS)	INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (OPS)
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-12, $6474.60	GS-12, $6600.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	FDZ	FDZ
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION	TOKYO, (MLU)	TOKYO (MLU)

QUALIFICATIONS

CLASSIFICATION

APPROVAL

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

PERSONNEL OFFICER

EXECUTIVE

[illegible] IN PAYROLL [illegible]
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS [illegible]

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

*PER AUTHORITY CONTAINED IN LTR., DCI-28 OCTOBER 1949.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME MURPHY, David E.	DATE 2 November 1949
NATURE OF ACTION Periodic Pay Increase	EFFECTIVE DATE 16 October 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops)	Intelligence Officer (Ops)
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-12, $6235.20	CAF-12, $6474.60
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	FDZ	FDZ
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Tokyo (MLU)	Tokyo (MLU)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER 11/4	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ______

SECURITY CLEARED ON ______

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ______

ENTERED ON DUTY ______

______
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Subject last received an increase in salary on 5 April 1948.

This is to certify that the conduct and services of the employee during this period were satisfactory in all respects.

Charles N. Davis
Authorized Certifying Officer

Branch Chief

POSTED

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

12

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side.

NAME David E. Murphy	DATE 29 April 1948
LEGAL ADDRESS California	MARITAL STATUS Married
LOCAL ADDRESS	NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS

TELEPHONE	CITIZENSHIP USA	SEX M	AGE 26

NATURE OF ACTION Change of Station	EFFECTIVE DATE [illegible]

	FROM	TO
Title	Intelligence Officer (Ops.)	Intelligence Officer (Ops.)
Grade and Salary	CAF-12 $5905.20	CAF-12 $5905.20 330 6235.20
Office - Branch	OSO - FBZ	OSO - FBZ
Division		
Section		
Official Station	Korea (Liaison Unit)	Tokyo military (Liaison Unit)
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)	▨	▨
Quarters		
Cost of Living		
Special Foreign Living		

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

Slot #2. Security requested 29 April 1948

[illegible] 5/18/48

APPROVAL

FIELD		HEADQUARTERS U.S.	
CHIEF OF STATION	DATE	E.M. Terrell PERSONNEL OFFICER	4-30-48 DATE
SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	DATE	BRANCH CHIEF	DATE
	DATE	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	DATE
	DATE	CHAIRMAN PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMITTEE	DATE
	DATE	Charles N. [illegible] SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	5/3/48 DATE

SECRET

FORM NO. 37-1
JUN 1947 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

SECRET

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side.

NAME David Edmund MURPHY			DATE 1 April 1948
LEGAL ADDRESS California		MARITAL STATUS Married	
LOCAL ADDRESS			NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS
TELEPHONE	CITIZENSHIP U.S.	SEX Male	AGE ~~29~~ 26
NATURE OF ACTION Appointment			EFFECTIVE DATE ~~5 April 1948~~

	FROM	TO
Title		Intelligence Officer (Ops.)
Grade and Salary		CAF-12 $6905.20
Office - Branch		OSO - FBZ
Division		
Section		
Official Station		Korea (Liaison Unit)
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)	▨	▨
Quarters		
Cost of Living		
Special Foreign Living		

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

Copy of Form 57 attached along with OSO interview sheets, for review. Security clearance granted 18 July 1947, is being brought up to date. Position #2, Control No. 146. Oath of Office, No-Strike Affidavit, 24-Month Agreement, and Letter of Appointment executed 5 April 1948.

APPROVAL

SERVICE DATES VERIFIED
BY RW DATE

FIELD		HEADQUARTERS U.S.	
	DATE	E. M. [illegible] PERSONNEL OFFICER	4/2/48 DATE
	DATE	BRANCH CHIEF	DATE
DSC - 02/14/54	DATE	ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	4/5/48 DATE
~~SCD - 04/05/54~~	DATE	CHAIRMAN PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMITTEE	4/5/48 DATE
LCD - 04/05/54	DATE	SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER	DATE

SECRET

FORM NO. 37-1
JUN 1947 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

OPF

22 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Plans Staff

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Distinguished Intelligence Medal -- Mr. David E. Murphy

The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Distinguished Intelligence Medal has been approved for Mr. David E. Murphy in recognition of his contributions to this Agency. You are requested to inform him of the award and of the security considerations governing it as set forth in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security. Arrangements for presentation may be made with the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 4473, room 5 E 69, Headquarters.

/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Att

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
~~1~~ - OPF w/forms 382 & 600
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

Executive Registry
75-6,298

DATE Off
6 August 1975

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO. 056700	NAME (Last-First-Middle) MURPHY, David E.	BIRTHYEAR 1921	SEX M	TYPE EMPLOYEE Staff
OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DCI/NIO	SD D	SCHEDULE GS	GRADE 18	STATION

BE AWARDED

Distinguished Intelligence Medal

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD April 1948 - July 1975

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. David E. Murphy is hereby awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal in recognition of his outstanding service to the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 27 years. During this period Mr. Murphy held a series of senior positions in Headquarters and overseas. Long an acknowledged expert, both operationally and substantively, in the Soviet field, he led the components having prime responsibility for that area to major gains in the fulfillment of Agency missions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Throughout his career Mr. Murphy displayed his intellectual and leadership abilities, professionalism and dedication to duty. His many accomplishments reflect great credit on him, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by DDO on 29 July 1975)

APPROVED

/s/ Vernon A. Walters

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

15 AUG 1975

DATE

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
F. W. M. Janney

SIGNATURE /s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
R. L. Austin, Jr.

(4)

FORM 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

ODF

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A

1. EMPLOYEE NO.: 056700
2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle): Murphy, David E.
3. POSITION TITLE: National Intel Off
4. GRADE: GS-18
5. SD: DYY
6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: NIO/DCI
7. RECOMMENDED AWARD: Distinguished Intelligence Medal
8. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED: 1948 - 1975
9. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT: 31 July 1975
10. POSTHUMOUS: YES ☐ ☒ NO
11. HOME ADDRESS:

1537 Forest Village Lane
McLean, Virginia 22101

12. HOME PHONE: 356-9523

SECTION B

LIST ANY PERSONNEL GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD WHO ASSISTED IN THE ACT OR PARTICIPATED IN THE PERFORMANCE.

13. FULL NAME:

14. TYPE OF AWARD:

SECTION C

ATTACH NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PERFORMANCE OR SERVICE WARRANTING AWARD, ANY SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND A PROPOSED, UNCLASSIFIED CITATION.

SECTION D

15. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION: Gordon Mason
Gordon Mason, Chief, Plans Staff, DDO
DATE: 28 JUL 1975

16. HEAD OF D CAREER SERVICE (Career service of nominee)
TITLE AND SIGNATURE: See item 18
DATE:

17. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE
TITLE AND SIGNATURE: See item 18
DATE:

18. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT
TITLE AND SIGNATURE: William E Nelson
William E. Nelson, DDO
DATE: 29 July 1975

FORM 11-73 600 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY

CONFIDENTIAL

OPF

1. As Mr. David E. Murphy, GS-18, retires on 31 July 1975, he will have completed some 33 years of Federal service, 27 of which have been with the Agency. His record has been an outstanding one in all respects. His accomplishments and the level and range of responsibilities he has exercised fully warrant the award of the Distinguished Intelligence Medal in recognition thereof.

2. Mr. Murphy brought to the Agency from his previous military and civilian experience and study, a knowledge of the Russian language and of the Soviet system. It was in the field of Soviet operations that he rapidly made his mark, first in Japan and then in Germany. His incisive mind, vitality, enthusiasm, imagination, managerial talent and keen analytical ability led to early recognition on the part of his superiors that Mr. Murphy was an outstanding officer with very high potential. By 1954, he had risen to the position of DCOB, Berlin and in 1959 became Chief of that large and important base. He distinguished himself there. In recognition of his abilities and accomplishments he then rose successively to the position of DC/EE Division, C/EE Division, C/SR Division and C/SB Division. Each assignment was one of increasing responsibility and challenge in the direction of efforts of the Clandestine Service and the Agency against our hardest targets. The laudatory fitness reports he received from top Agency management in these assignments clearly reflect the high professional regard in which he was held and convey the judgments of the major significance of the contributions he made to the Agency mission in support of U.S. policy and national security.

3. After revitalizing and redirecting our Soviet program as C/SR and of the enlarged SB Division, Mr. Murphy was appointed COS, Paris in 1968 and served in that position until 1974. His six years in Paris were marked by steady progress in all areas of the missions and objectives assigned to that large and complex station and by the handling of delicate political and internal crisis situations in France effectively and to the benefit of the Agency and the United States. His analyses of the situation in France at times of tension and crisis were particularly remarked upon for their clarity, incisiveness and value to U.S. policy makers. For his leadership of the Paris Station, Mr. Murphy's performance was characterized as "Outstanding" in each of the years of his service there.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Mr. Murphy returned from France in 1974 and was assigned as a National Intelligence Officer with responsibility to the DCI in the area of Special Activities. He has served in this assignment of high trust and responsibility until his retirement.

5. Mr. Murphy's long, distinguished career has been exceptional in contributing to the mission of the Agency both operationally and substantively. His dedication, drive and intelligence led to high achievement in all of his assignments and to his being entrusted with ever-increasing responsibilities. It is strongly recommended that he be awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal in recognition of his outstanding service in the CIA.

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 056700	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Murphy, David E.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 23 Jun 21	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-18	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/EUR	9. CURRENT STATION Paris	10. CODE (ck one) ☐ HQS ☐ OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ☒ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) 1 April 1973 - 1 June 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS ~~UPDATE FORM~~ IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

FORM 45 [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

15. [illegible] 28 OCT 1974

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE

☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☒ HAVE NOT ATTACHED

DATE: 30 June 1974

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ David E. Murphy per OFAT-1435

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Under Mr. Murphy's leadership the Paris Station became very operationally oriented, concentrating on high priority targets, and much exceptionally fine intelligence and counterintelligence production resulted. I have some doubt that these operational successes - as outstanding as they were - really required the total number of personnel of all categories who were committed to them. Nevertheless, Mr. Murphy made Paris a shining example for all other large stations.

DATE: 30 August 1974

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Associate Deputy Director for Operations

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: David H. Blee

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT

DATE: Sept 25 1974

SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

7 May 1974

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: David E. Murphy

Employee No.: 056700; Grade: GS-18; DOB: 23 June 1921; Chief of Station, Paris; Months under my Supervision: 14; Period under Review: 1 April 1973-1 June 1974.

OVERALL RATING: OUTSTANDING

1. At the end of May 1974, Mr. Murphy will leave Paris after a most successful six-year assignment as Chief of Station. He distinguished himself by having molded this Station into a cohesive, well-disciplined, and highly productive unit. I reiterate my evaluation of Mr. Murphy as, overall, the most effective chief of a major station in the European Division. His earlier fitness reports and his excellent record in Paris attest to this.

2. In the past year under Mr. Murphy's direction, the Paris Station has continued to make significant progress on all major fronts. As examples, I can cite two direct Soviet recruitment attempts, an imaginative effort to get closer to several other primary Soviet targets, a perceptible improvement in our French liaison relationships, a marked increase in both quality and quantity of priority economic intelligence reporting, the acquisition of new sources to cover the French internal scene, and a revitalization of several existing assets into producers of valuable intelligence. Although normally most of the credit for such achievements rests with the individual operations officers concerned, in Mr. Murphy's case he personally becomes involved in each

operation and therefore the cited progress is a direct reflection of Mr. Murphy's talent and skill as a dynamic operational manager. Paris is a sprawling metropolitan area where operating obstacles, particularly those relating to access to ma~~jor ta~~rgets, are further exacerbated by sporadic French scrutiny of our activities. It is therefore all the more noteworthy that the progress made by the Station has been accomplished without any embarrassing flaps through Mr. Murphy's insistence that the highest standards of tradecraft be practiced by Station personnel and by visiting case officers.

3. Mr. Murphy can take considerable personal pride in his record in Paris. His personal concern with all areas of Station activity and his common-sense approach to both operational and administrative matters are indicative of this officer's competence as one of this Agency's most gifted and thoroughly professional senior officers. His wide range of interests, his wealth of operational engagement, his ability to make well-reasoned and prompt decisions, his aggressiveness, and his persuasiveness are all hallmarks of Mr. Murphy's superb performance. Although Mr. Murphy shows a lively impatience with bureaucratic roadblocks and cogently articulates his views on all issues, his correspondence with Headquarters is invariably presented factually and in a dignified and unemotional tone; this I have appreciated and would like to add that Mr. Murphy promptly implements Headquarters guidelines and decisions.

4. Mr. Murphy's performance clearly merits the rating of OUSTANDING.

Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr.
Chief, European Division

SECRET

26 April 1973

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: David E. Murphy

GS-18; Employee No.: 050700; DOB: 23 June 1921;
Career; Chief of Station, Paris; Service
Designation: D; Period under Review: 10 Jan 1972
to 31 March 1973; Months under my Supervision: 15

OVERALL RATING: OUTSTANDING

1. Given the size of the Paris Station and the complexity of its diverse activities, on overall performance Mr. Murphy is rated as the most effective Station Chief in the European Division area. In the period under review, substantial progress has been made against all operational targets. Under Mr. Murphy's tutelage particularly noteworthy accomplishments are noted in the Soviet field against human targets and on a superbly executed technical penetration; in the area of liaison where Mr. Murphy has almost single-handedly developed productive relationships at senior levels and as testament to his efforts, successfully enlisted outstanding liaison support to a delicate CI investigation of primary interest to this Organization; and more recently, Mr. Murphy has effectively harnessed Station resources and assets to collect timely intelligence on economic topics, to move forward in the effort to thwart terrorism, and to furnish valuable reporting on the critical French elections of March 1973. Under his direction, the Station has acquired a number of productive and responsive assets in the past year, while other operational programs have improved upon their high quality/intelligence production record.

2. Mr. Murphy is a thoroughly professional senior intelligence officer who plays a very active role in practically all of the Station's operational activities. His incisiveness and keen analytical talent enable him to

SECRET

SECRET

make sound and well-reasoned judgments. It is to Mr. Murphy's credit that all Paris-based operations are run with the highest degree of professionalism and adherence to strict tradecraft procedures. Mr. Murphy has also acquired a wealth of knowledge and background on the local political scene; this is considered a valuable requisite for targeting purposes, for briefings and for maintaining his excellent relations with senior Embassy officers, including the Ambassador.

3. Given his long service in the European area and his grasp of European problems confronting the Division, exchanges with Mr. Murphy both personal and through correspondence have been extremely helpful in formulating Division operational policy.

4. Mr. Murphy clearly merits an overall rating of OUTSTANDING.

Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr.
Chief, European Division

I certify that I have read this report:

David E. Murphy

[illegible]
Date

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Agree that the record fully supports this "outstanding" rating of a talented and hard-driving officer who has produced in all posts.

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr., ADDO

7 May 73
Date

6 January 1971

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : David E. Murphy, GS-18, Employee Number 056700~~, DOB~~: 23 June 1921; Career, Chief of Station, Paris; Service Designation: D.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW : 1 April 1971 to 9 January 1972

MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 41 months

OVERALL RATING : Outstanding

My feeling that Dave Murphy has done an outstanding job as Chief of Station, Paris is so amply documented in the preceding Fitness Reports that this final report before I leave the Division need not be lengthily repetitive. It is useful to record, however, that during the last half of this year his Station has been deeply involved in the reporting and analysis of some highly sensitive developments on the French political scene. Much of the analysis of this situation has been handled by Dave himself, and has proven of real significance to our highest level customers. We have briefed a number of ranking officials in Washington on Dave's findings, and they have been uniformly appreciative. Dave therefore deserves credit for alerting Washington to a difficult situation concerning which the U.S. Government has had little or no information except from this Agency's sources.

Mr. Murphy's performance continues to be Outstanding.

John L. Hart
Chief
European Division

REVIEWING OFFICER'S COMMENTS:

Date 13 Feb 72

Cord Meyer
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

Fully concur in this "outstanding" rating of an exceptional performance, a rare combination of substantive knowledge, operational initiative, and managerial competence.

SECRET

TO : David E. Murphy

SUBJECT: Annual Fitness Report

1. In accordance with the fitness report procedure for EUR Division, a copy of the fitness report on the Chief of Station is forwarded to him upon completion by the Rating Officer. Depending upon the grades of the Chiefs of Station concerned, the fitness reports are prepared either by the Chief or Deputy Chief of EUR, and those written by Chief, EUR go to Deputy Chief WOMACE for review.

2. It should be borne in mind that this fitness report has been prepared in accordance with the EUR Division policy for such reporting as established in Field Notice 41.

3. Please sign at the bottom of this letter of transmittal on the line indicated, to certify that you have seen the fitness report. The transmittal letter should then be returned to Headquarters for inclusion in your personnel file.

John L. Hart

I certify that I have seen my fitness report for the period 1 Apr. 71 - 9 Jan. 1972

/s/ David E. Murphy
SIGNATURE

4 February 1972
DATE

SECRET

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~ (When Completed)

Rcd 7/18/75

26 DEC 1973

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency; retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED David Murphy	POST AmEmbassy PARIS	
POSITION Chief, SPP	GRADE	AGENCY
RATING PERIOD 11/2/72 - 11/1/73	DATE OF REPORT October 31, 1973	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER John N. Irwin II John N. Irwin II	TITLE Ambassador	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☒ Yes ☐ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

I first met Mr. Murphy following the assumption of my present duties at the end of March 1973. Therefore, I am in a position to comment on his performance only during the last seven months covered by this report. During that time, Mr. Murphy's performance has been thoroughly outstanding in every respect. During his years in France, he has developed a real expertise on this country, both in terms of how it functions and with regard to the manner in which France looks at the world.

Mr. Murphy has effectively directed and coordinated a large staff, and I have been particularly gratified at the extent to which his staff coordinates its reporting with other interested elements of the Mission. I am told by my DCM that, based on his experience, the coordination between Mr. Murphy's office and the substantive sections of the Embassy is better at this post than at any post he has known or heard of. This is in large part a direct tribute to Mr. Murphy's leadership.

I find I am calling increasingly on Mr. Murphy's advice in the preparation of Embassy assessments on a broad range of policy issues. His contributions have been perceptive and, by and large, accurate.

I consider Mr. Murphy one of a handful of my closest advisors in the Mission and hold him in the highest regard.

FORM DS-[illegible] 73 [illegible] (When Completed) SECRET

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ SECRET

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency; retains one copy.)

I. OFFICER BEING RATED Chief, CAS	POST AmEmbassy, Paris, France	
POSITION	GRADE	AGENCY
RATING PERIOD 11/2/71 - 11/1/72	DATE OF REPORT 2/26/73	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER Jack B. Kubisch Jack B. Kubisch	TITLE Chargé	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

II. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☒ Yes ☐ No

III. NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

In my opinion, David Murphy has done an outstanding job during the period covered by this report.

I arrived to take up my duties as DCM in this Embassy in December 1971. However, since that time I have served as Chargé on a number of occasions and while, when the Ambassador was present, the Ambassador preferred to deal directly with Mr. Murphy and, as a result I had only collateral dealings with him, I feel I had more than ample opportunity to observe his performance and evaluate it. I can say without hesitation whatsoever that he performed in a superb manner during a particularly difficult period. He deserves top marks not only for his own performance but for the manner in which he directed those operations here in France for which he has had the responsibility.

[illegible] ~~XXXXXXXXXXX~~ When Completed SECRET

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)

ROGER CHANNEL

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.	OFFICER BEING RATED Chief, CAS	POST AmEmbassy, PARIS	
	POSITION	GRADE	AGENCY
	RATING PERIOD 11/2/70 - 11/1/71	DATE OF REPORT January 19, 1972	
	SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER Arthur K. Watson Arthur K. Watson	TITLE The Ambassador	
	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

II.

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☐ Yes ☒ No

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

III.

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

My last year's report on Mr. Murphy was a comprehensive one and evidence of my high regard for him and for his work. During this past year he has, if anything, exceeded his past level of performance, and I continue to regard him as one of the most valuable members of my staff.

FORM
[illegible] FS-372

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED [illegible]
Special Assistant to the Ambassador

POST
AmEmbassy, PARIS

POSITION

GRADE

AGENCY

RATING PERIOD
11/1/69 - 10/30/70

DATE OF REPORT

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER
Arthur K. Watson
Arthur K. Watson

TITLE
Ambassador

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

TITLE

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☐ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☐ Yes ☒ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

Mr. Murphy is an outstading officer in every sense. His advice and counsel have been of the utmost value to me and my executive staff throughout this rating period. He has excellent judgement, a quick mind and a thorough knowledge of France and French politics. And he has common sense, as well as a good sense of humor. His personal conduct is impeccable; his behavior, gentlemanly.

Mr. Murphy is widely known and respected in the French official and diplomatic community. His contacts are numerous and useful. He and his wife make an excellent representational team. He speaks excellent French.

Mr. Murphy's relations with other senior officers at the Embassy are cordial and harmonious. He is a good administrator and is well-liked by his subordinates, as well as his collegues.

In sum, I am delighted to have Mr. Murphy on my staff and consider him an officer of the highest calibre.

FORM 4-65 FS-572

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : David E. Murphy, GS-18, Employee Number 056700, DOB: 23 June 21; Career, Chief of Station, Paris; Service Designation: D.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW : 1 April 1970 to 31 March 1971

MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 32 months

OVERALL RATING : Outstanding

1. During the reporting period, Mr. Murphy has continued his usual virtuoso performance. The Station has been very heavily occupied in one degree or another against most of the hardest targets, and Mr. Murphy has been fully on top of everything that has gone on.

2. Particularly worthy of note is the manner in which Mr. Murphy has raised the level of our liaison in France, taking advantage among other factors of a change for the better in the leadership of the external service. Although this situation has certainly been favorable, it could not have been exploited so fully had it not been for Mr. Murphy's rare combination of charm, persuasiveness, and a superb professional background.

3. I consider Mr. Murphy's performance outstanding.

John L. Hart
Chief
European Division

REVIEWING OFFICER'S COMMENTS: Concur fully -

Date: 25 May 71

Cord Meyer Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

TO : David E. Murphy

SUBJECT: Annual Fitness Report

1. In accordance with the fitness report procedure for EUR Division, a copy of the fitness report on the Chief of Station is forwarded to him upon completion by the Rating Officer. Depending upon the grades of the Chiefs of Station concerned, the fitness reports are prepared either by the Chief or Deputy Chief of EUR, and those written by Chief, EUR go to Deputy Chief CS for review.

2. It should be borne in mind that this fitness report has been prepared in accordance with the EUR Division policy for such reporting as established in Field Notice 41.

3. Please sign at the bottom of this letter of transmittal on the line indicated, to certify that you have seen the fitness report. The transmittal letter should then be returned to Headquarters for inclusion in your personnel file.

/s/ John L. Hart

I certify that I have seen my fitness report for the period 1 Apr 70 - 31 March 71.

/s/ David E. Murphy

SIGNATURE

11 May 1971

DATE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : David E. Murphy, GS-18, Employee Number 055700, DOB: 23 June 21; Career, Chief of Station, Paris; Service Designation: D.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW : 1 April 1969 to 31 March 1970

MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 20 months

OVER-ALL RATING : Outstanding

1. Mr. Murphy has been Chief of Station, Paris, for approximately twenty months. During his tenure, this, perhaps the most difficult of all stations, has become a rationally deployed, well-articulated and generally successful organization for perhaps the first time in its history. Intensive efforts are being mounted against virtually all assigned targets with satisfying success, in some cases producing unique results. Liaison relationships, which began to thaw before de Gaulle's departure from Government, are now reasonably cordial and, above all, useful. Most of the credit for the splendid progress that has been made is directly due to Mr. Murphy himself.

2. Dave Murphy is completely oriented toward operational achievement. He has an incisive mind, enormous vitality, and enthusiasm. He is positive, impatient, forceful and articulate. He can absorb and integrate detail, and bring focus on difficult problems. He inspires both colleagues and subordinates to give their best efforts. He is fully responsive to guidance and indeed will often seize the initiative when new courses of action are indicated.

3. It would be difficult to describe the minor miracle that Mr. Murphy has wrought as anything short of outstanding.

John L. Hart
Chief,
European Division

REVIEWING OFFICER'S COMMENTS: Concur -

Date: 5 May '70

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr.
ADDP

SECRET

TO : Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT: Annual Fitness Report

1. Effective with this fitness report cycle, KEYWAY is initiating a procedure by which a copy of the fitness report on a Chief of Station is forwarded to him upon completion by the Rating Officer. Depending upon the grades of the Chiefs of Station concerned, the fitness reports are drafted either by the Chief or Deputy Chief of KEYWAY, and those drafted by Chief, KEYWAY go to Deputy Chief WOMACE for review.

2. Please sign at the bottom of this letter of transmittal on the line indicated, to certify that you have seen the fitness report. The transmittal letter should then be returned to Headquarters for inclusion in your personnel file.

/s/ John L. Hart

I certify that I have seen my fitness report for the period 1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970.

/s/ David E. Murphy

SIGNATURE

May 22 1970
DATE

Veuillez accepter, mon cher [illegible], mes remerciements les plus vifs.

SECRET

SECRET

[redacted]

9 May 1969

TO : David E. Murphy , Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT: Annual Fitness Report

1. Effective with this fitness report cycle, KEYWAY is initiating a procedure by which a copy of the fitness report on a Chief of Station is forwarded to him upon completion by the Rating Officer. Depending upon the grades of the Chiefs of Station concerned, the fitness reports are drafted either by the Chief or Deputy Chief of KEYWAY and those drafted by Chief, KEYWAY go to Deputy Chief WOMACE for review.

2. Please sign at the bottom of this letter of transmittal on the line indicated, to certify that you have seen the fitness report. The transmittal letter should then be returned to Headquarters for inclusion in your personnel file.

/s/ John L. Hart

I certify that I have seen my fitness report for the period ~~10~~ 1 April March 1968 - 31 March 1969.

/s/ David E. Murphy
SIGNATURE

[illegible]
DATE

[redacted]

SECRET

28 April 1969

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : David E. Murphy, GS-18, Employee Serial Number 056700, DOB: 23 June 1921; Chief of Station; Career; Service Designation: D.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW : 1 April 1968 - 31 March 1969

MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION : 12

OVERALL RATING : Outstanding

1. Long before Mr. Murphy departed for Paris in June 1968, he began preparing himself for this assignment as Chief of Station by reading files, interviewing personnel, and discussing cases. As a result, on arrival in Paris he was already well oriented concerning the Station's problems and had formulated plans for revitalizing it.

2. The entire year in Paris has of course been overshadowed by the Vietnam Peace Conference and a large proportion of the Station's effort has perforce been devoted to supporting the U.S. delegation. The Station has responded exceptionally well to this demand though it has forced a slow-down in normal Station activities.

3. A number of other events have also taken place in France or concerning France which have forced the Station during the past nine months to perform firemen's duty -- the May-June riots which extended into August, the dissolution of the Assembly and re-election of deputies, the Czech crisis beginning 21 August, the December monetary crisis, the Near East crisis, continued student unrest, the President's trip and currently the problems precipitated by DeGaulle's resignation. All of these developments have been covered amazingly well.

4. While the exceptional events enumerated above have forced the Station to concentrate its efforts on the immediate issues, Mr. Murphy nonetheless proceeded with the longer range goals of the Station. He has worked at improving relations with the French Services, personally becoming deeply

13 MAY 1969

involved even in routine liaison activity. Consequently, our relations during the past nine months with the French have improved considerably. This improvement can partially be attributed to a reawakening on the part of the French Government to the Communist and New Left threat (which was brought into focus by the May-June riots) but it was also in large measure due to Mr. Murphy's concerted efforts to cultivate selected officials, initiate substantive discussions and increase our own level of exchange with the Services.

5. Operations against the Communist Party have been reactivated with emphasis on the international aspects of the Party, particularly support of subversion abroad. Operations against the large Soviet and Chinese targets are beginning to move ahead. Production-wise, the take from both unilateral sources and liaison increased significantly during 1968. We expect further increase in 1969.

6. There are still many weak spots in the Paris Station and many refinements and adjustments to be made. But Mr. Murphy has made an exceptional beginning; the Station is moving in the right direction and during this coming fiscal year we should begin to see the worth of the programs which are being so energetically pursued by him. Without question, his performance has been Outstanding.

John L Hart

John L. Hart
Chief,
European Division

REVIEWING OFFICER'S COMMENTS:

Concur -

Cord Meyer Jr.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

30 April 69

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FORM

16 April 1968

Name: David E. Murphy (056700)

Date of birth: 23 June 1921

Sex: Male

Grade: GS-18

SD: D

Official position title: Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

Current station: Headquarters

Type of report: Annual

Reporting period: 1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

1. The reporting period saw Mr. Murphy conclude his tour of duty in the SB Division in order to take up an assignment as Chief of one of the major European stations.

2. As previous Fitness Reports have indicated, Mr. Murphy continued as Chief, SB Division until the end of his assignment to bring to perhaps the most difficult operational problems in the CS his full energies and considerable abilities. Under his leadership, close coordination with all the other area divisions has been accomplished. His performance has been a fine one.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report.

David E. Murphy

Comments of reviewing official:

Concur.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAINING REPORT - LANGUAGE

COURSE TITLE: FRENCH - PART-TIME

INSTRUCTOR: N. Bergin

PROGRAM:

NO. OF STUDENTS:

NO. OF HOURS: 61.00

DATE OF COURSE: 01/15/68 - 05/06/68

STUDENT

NAME	YOB	EOD DATE	OFFICE	GS	SD
MURPHY, DAVID	21	04/48	SB	18	D

(See reverse side for definitions of proficiency levels)

LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY AT ENTRY INTO TRAINING ☒ INSTRUCTORS ESTIMATE ☐ OFFICIAL TEST

BEFORE	NO PROFICIENCY	SLIGHT	ELEMENTARY	INTERMEDIATE	HIGH
READING					
WRITING					
PRONUNCIATION				X	
SPEAKING				X	
UNDERSTANDING					X

LANGUAGE TRAINING OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

The general aims of language training are attainment of proficiency in speaking, understanding, reading and writing. The specific objectives are (1) ability to produce and distinguish the sounds of the language; (2) ability to use a stock of basic sentences and expressions; (3) ability to recombine the elements of basic sentences and expressions and to apply them to new situations; (4) ability to comprehend the language spoken at normal speed in various situations; (5) ability to write and read the language commensurate with ability to speak.

Methods used in all courses stress oral drills and free conversation based at first on memorized material and, at a later stage, on varied reading materials. Written and oral tests are given at intervals. Listening to and recording on tapes in the Language Lab is essential for class preparation.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	EXCELLENT
ACHIEVEMENT		X	
ATTITUDE		X	
ATTENDANCE		X	

LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY AT COMPLETION OF TRAINING ☒ INSTRUCTORS ESTIMATE ☐ OFFICIAL TEST

AFTER	NO PROFICIENCY	SLIGHT	ELEMENTARY	INTERMEDIATE	HIGH
READING					
WRITING					
PRONUNCIATION					
SPEAKING				X	
UNDERSTANDING				X +	X

Foreign Language Aptitude Test: None

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: PAUL J. ANGELIS 01/24/68
SIGNATURE, HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OR SECTION — DATE

FORM 2222

SECRET

S E C R E T

TRAINING REPORT

China Operations Course No. 1-68
40 hours, full time   4 - 8 March 1968

Student : Murphy, David E.
Office : EUR
Year of Birth: 1921
Service Designation: D
Grade : GS-18
No. of Students : 25
EOD Date : April 1948

COURSE OBJECTIVE

To prepare Clandestine Services officers to conduct operations against Communist China from the point of view of Human Source Collection; to present material directed toward the updating of officers in the operational realities inside and outside China today; and specifically to train officers in providing political, political-military, advanced weapons and other coverage of the priority China target which cannot be obtained by technical means.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No record is made of individual performance in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

15 MAR 1968

Henry C. Barringer   Date
Chief Instructor

S E C R E T

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Chiefs of Station Seminar No. 2-68
80 hours, full time 5 - 16 February 1968

Participant	: David E. Murphy	Office	: C/SB
Year of Birth:	1921	Service Designation:	D
Grade	: GS-18	No. of Students	: 18
EOD Date	: 1948		

COURSE OBJECTIVES, CONTENT AND METHODS

The COS Seminar is aimed to prepare prospective Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Station and Chiefs of Base for field assignments. Emphasis was upon the difficulties confronting Chiefs of small or medium-sized installations, since they must handle a peculiarly wide range of problems. Included were case studies serving to remind outgoing chiefs of various operational approaches and techniques, but more time was devoted to policy, coordination, management, reporting, and administrative responsibilities of the Chief of Station, both within CIA and in the government at large, at home and abroad.

The bulk of the course is given in lectures and question periods conducted by officials responsible for the missions, functions, programs, and services discussed. A few key items of suggested reading are included, and bibliographies of suggested reading tailored to the individual's assignment are offered for those who want them.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No further assessment of individual capacity or performance is made in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

[illegible] FEB 1968

Henry C. Barringer Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

c56-700

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FORM

26 April 1967

SB-1-D

Name: David E. Murphy

Date of birth: 23 June 1921

Sex: Male

Grade: GS-18

SD: D

Official position title: Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

Current station: Headquarters

Type of report: Annual

Reporting period: 1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

Mr. Murphy's responsibilities during this reporting period were enlarged to encompass the Satellites as well as the Soviet Union. There has been no change in his fine performance reflected in the previous report.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report.

David E. Murphy

Comments of reviewing official:

5 MAY 1967
WP

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 056700

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Murphy David E.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 23 June 1921
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS 18
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief, SR Division
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/SR
8. CURRENT STATION: Headquarters
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)* ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*: ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1966
12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*: 1 April 1965 - 31 March 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Mr. David E. Murphy

1. This report covers the performance of Mr. Murphy as Chief of the SR Division for the past year.

2. The past year has seen a measurable increase in the work load of the SR Division, with no let up in the energetic efforts of the Division to accomplish its mission. A number of new audio operations have come into being and the support rendered the Division by the other area divisions has been a reflection of the success of Mr. Murphy's program to enlist the interest and the energies of the other area divisions in attacking one of our principal targets.

3. Mr. Murphy has now assumed new responsibilities as chief of a substantially enlarged division including the satellites as well as the Soviet Union. This is a tribute to his own outstanding management of his division as well as a recognition of the close operational interrelationship between Soviet and satellite activities.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted the above report.

David E. Murphy

Comments of reviewing official:

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans

31 [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 056700

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MURPHY (First) David (Middle) E.
2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921
3. SEX M
4. GRADE GS 18
5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief, SR Division
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR
8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
X CAREER
☐ RESERVE
☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL
X ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1965
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached memorandum — RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 — RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 — RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 — RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 — RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 — RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER O

30 APR 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

1 April 1965

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF ANNUAL FITNESS REPORT
(For the period ending 31 March 1965)

SUBJECT: Mr. David E. Murphy

1. This report is the first full year report of Mr. Murphy's performance as Chief of the SR Division.

2. Perhaps his greatest contribution during this past year has been the energizing of the Division's several components with a consequent very noticeable increase in the efforts of the Clandestine Services as a whole against our Soviet targets. Mr. Murphy's enthusiasm and imagination have been contagious, and we are as a result profiting from his sound approach to the role and mission of his Division. He has fully understood the fact that the SR Division cannot alone discharge the responsibilities of the Clandestine Services for intelligence and counter-intelligence activity against our Soviet requirements, but must harness the interest and the energies of all the area divisions. In this respect, Mr. Murphy is achieving nothing short of remarkable success. His arrangements with DODS are also improving the quality of that Division's work in the SR field, while his general administration of his Division from a managerial point of view has continued to be excellent.

3. The overall evaluation of Mr. Murphy's performance during this past year, including his regard for cost and manpower factors, is outstanding. It is because of the quality of this performance that favorable consideration has been given in principle to the gradual investment of an increasing portion of the manpower assets of the Clandestine Services to his Division. His plans and his accomplishments to date justify confidence that these increases are being well invested and will provide a maximum return.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

1 April 1965

Fitness Report - Mr. David E. Murphy

Reviewing Official:

Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report.

David E. Murphy
David E. Murphy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
056700

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) Murphy	(First) David	(Middle) E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1921	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-17	5. SD D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer - Division Chief	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1964	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

2 APR 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

1 April 1964

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF ANNUAL FITNESS REPORT
(For the period ending 31 March 1964)

SUBJECT: Mr. David E. Murphy

1. Mr. Murphy relinquished his duties as Chief, Eastern Europe Division in September 1963 and took over his present responsibilities as Chief of the SR Division at that time. This report covers the period from 1 April 1963 to the present and thus includes comments on his performance as Chief, EE Division and Chief, SR Division.

2. Mr. Murphy combines an extraordinary talent for this work with a considerable and varied experience in it. His previous report indicated that he was turning in an outstanding performance in dealing with the affairs of the EE Division, and he continued this level of his performance in the first six months covered by this report. A general reorganization of senior officers in the Clandestine Services offered the opportunity to put Mr. Murphy in charge of the division which he had long aspired to direct and for which position he was eminently qualified, both linguistically and by field experience. He is showing excellent results in refurbishing the Division and giving it new life and impetus. His considerable energies enable him to give an outstanding performance in managing and directing his Division's affairs while at the same time engaging personally and most actively in a number of very important Divisional cases. His competence includes awareness of the need for keeping his costs down and getting the maximum from his manpower. He is showing imagination and initiative and is probably the best qualified and best prepared officer ever to head the Division.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

Reviewing Official:

Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted the above report.

David E. Murphy
David E. Murphy

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
63-7

18 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Mr. David E. Murphy

1. This memorandum is in lieu of the Fitness Report Form on Mr. Murphy and covers the period from 1 April 1962 through 31 March 1963, during which Mr. Murphy has served as Chief of the Eastern Europe Division.

2. After a long series of assignments dating from April 1948 and involving duty at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Karlsruhe and Berlin where he served as Chief of Base of that important installation, Mr. Murphy returned to Headquarters in August 1961 as Deputy Chief of the EE Division and became Chief of that Division in June 1962. I should like to quote from the fitness report on Mr. Murphy written at the time he was assuming his new responsibilities as Chief of EE Division: "There is every reason to believe that Mr. Murphy will manage the EE Division in the same outstanding manner with which he won the ungrudging respect of the Berlin community as the leader of American intelligence in that area." A previous fitness report covering his first year as Chief of Base, Berlin is equally laudatory.

3. In his responsibility for streamlining and improving the effectiveness of his Division in both its headquarters and overseas postures, Mr. Murphy has been energetic and imaginative. He is an authority on the situation in West Germany but particularly in Berlin and has played a highly useful role in government councils on these problems. He has excellent working knowledge of Russian, French and German, and his operational experience as a result

29 APR 1963

of his field assignments is truly *extensive*.

4. In conducting the affairs of his Division during this past year, Mr. Murphy has without question borne out the prediction that he would turn in an outstanding performance. He has done this and continues to do it.

Thos H Karamessines
Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director (Plans)

David E. Murphy
David E. Murphy

23 April 1963
Date

Reviewing Official:

Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

13 APR 1963
Date

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Mr. David E. Murphy

1. This memorandum is in lieu of the Fitness Report form. It covers Mr. Murphy's performance in the EE Division, Clandestine Services from 27 May 1960 to 31 March 1962.

2. Mr. Murphy has entered upon his new assignment as Chief of the EE Division with vigor. There is every reason to believe that Mr. Murphy will manage the EE Division in the same outstanding manner with which he won the ungrudging respect of the Berlin community as the leader of American intelligence in that area. He continues to perform with the same competence as was reflected in his previous Fitness Report.

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET [illegible]

SECRET

27 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: David E. Murphy

1. Murphy's performance since he became COB Berlin last summer must be almost as well known to Headquarters as it is to me. His projected assignment as Deputy Chief EE, then the realization that his continuation in Berlin is essential, and later still his detail to the Paris conference as the KUBARK referent on Berlin all recognize different aspects of his remarkably high qualifications.

2. As COB Berlin he is a worthy successor to William K. Harvey; he is fully on top of the job. This was expected, but in addition he has shown an astonishing virtuosity in the field of coordination, in which his pioneering work has set a fine example for the rest of KUBARK overseas. In a few months he learned more about the totality of American intelligence in Berlin than anyone would have supposed possible; then he used his knowledge with great diplomatic skill to bring about one improvement after another. The successful reform of the Marienfelde situation followed his suggestions, with the whole community willingly cooperating once he had demonstrated the advantages to be gained. He knows more of both the big picture and the small details of Army operations than the Army's own local commander (to say nothing of all higher echelons) and with this knowledge has already improved the Army's product, for example in providing detailed briefs which the Army system is not geared to supply. His grasp of the whole subject, his ability either to generalize usefully or to go into deep detail as appropriate, his speed and thoroughness in attacking the many problems are all demonstrated in the series of brilliant memoranda which have come from him for many months. In addition I have several times witnessed his impressive skill in negotiation, in bilateral discussion with one or other colleague in Berlin, in meetings of the ICCB, in presentations before the [illegible], and in particularly delicate dealings with Maj. General Van Natta. It is quite clear that he has won the ungrudging respect of the whole community as the leader of American intelligence in Berlin.

Hugh T. Cunningham

Hugh T. Cunningham
Chief of Station, Germany

I certify that I have seen this memorandum

David E. Murphy

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: EGBT 1805

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: Unknown

TO: Chief, EE through COS, Germany
(Attention: Howard W. Vinchurch)

INFO: COS, Germany Chief, SR thru EE

FROM: Chief of Base, Berlin

DATE: 23 April 1959

SUBJECT: Administrative/Personnel
[redacted] Fitness Report

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: COS: Execute attached Fitness Report

REFERENCE(S)

Attached is a memorandum Fitness Report concerning [redacted] covering the period from 28 September 1958 through 31 March 1959. This report has been read by and discussed with [redacted] It is requested that [redacted] append such comments as he may have as Reviewing Official.

[redacted]

[redacted]

William Harvey

Attachment: Memo Fitness Report

Distribution:
④ - Chief, EE w/att (4 copies) thru COS
2 - COS, Germany w/att (1 copy)
2 - Chief, SR w/att (1 copy) thru EE

(Cy in EE/Pers - Murphy file)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
EGBT 2387

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
Unknown

TO
Chief, EE thru COS, Germany

INFO
COS, Germany (Attention: [redacted] Cunningham
Chief, SR thru Chief, EE

FROM
Chief of Base, Berlin

DATE
28 August 1959

SUBJECT
Administrative/Personnel
[redacted] Memorandum Fitness Report

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
David E. Murphy

REFERENCE(S)

Hugh Cunningham

Murphy

Attached is a memorandum Fitness Report concerning [redacted] covering the period from 31 March 1959 to 29 August 1959. It is suggested that [redacted] and/or [redacted] append any reviewing comments they may have. This report has been prepared at this time due to my departure PCS from BOB on 29 August 1959.

Ronald MacMillan

[redacted]

William K. Harvey

Attachment: h/w
Memo Fitness Report

Distribution:
3 - EE thru COS w/att (3)
2 - COS w/att (1) - Attn: [redacted] Cunningham
1 - SR w/att (1) thru EE

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
ATT H/W TO EGBT 2387

MEMORANDUM FITNESS REPORT

David E. Murphy
SUBJECT : [redacted]

Murphy's

Since the submission of the last Fitness Report concerning Murphy [redacted], his performance has consistently continued at the same outstanding level of competence and effectiveness. During this period, in anticipation of [redacted] assuming duties as Chief of Base at the end of August 1959, I have in increasing measure delegated responsibility to him and he has been fully involved in all major phases of the operational direction of the Base. During the entire month of July he was Acting Chief of Base. During this period his performance was outstanding and he directed the operations of BOB in a fully effective, well organized and thoroughly competent manner. I have nothing further to add concerning [redacted] great abilities and fine performance which are fully covered by the detailed comments in his last two Fitness Reports and in the promotion recommendation dated 28 September 1958 on the basis of which he was promoted from grade GS-15 to grade GS-16.

Murphy's

[redacted]

[redacted]

/s/ William K Harvey

I certify this report
has been seen by me:

[redacted] /s/ David E. Murphy

28 August 1959

COS and DCOS fully concurred in the ratings and statements concerning Murphy's Jewett's performance in prior fitness reports and happily concur in this memorandum also.

[redacted]

/s/ [illegible]

Distribution:
③ - COS for EE
1 - COS
1 - SR thru EE

CONCUR

James H. Critchfield

13 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FITNESS REPORT -- [redacted]

It is noted that detailed comments concerning [redacted] competence, performance and potential were transmitted to Headquarters in his last Fitness Report by dispatch [illegible]-1003 dated 28 September 1958 recommending [redacted] promotion from grade GS-15 to grade GS-16, which recommended promotion has since been approved and made effective.

There is little to add to the comments in [redacted] last Fitness Report except to record his performance for the six month period since the submission of this report, during which period he has served as full-time Deputy Chief of Base and Chief of Operations and for appreciable periods as Acting Chief of Base. [redacted] outstanding performance has continued during this period. He is a fully mature, capable, experienced, senior officer and one of the finest operations and intelligence officers I know in [redacted]. He possesses great drive and a complete grasp of the professional aspects of his assignment. He has done an outstanding job in every assignment he has been given and has fully demonstrated his competence to direct the activities and operations of a large and complex [redacted] field base. During the period covered by this report Jewett has exhibited no outstanding weaknesses and in all respects his performance has been outstanding.

[redacted]

[redacted]

14-00000

SECRET

18 June 1959

Reviewing Officers Comments - David Murphy [redacted] Fitness Report

Murphy [redacted] is unquestionably one of the outstanding officers in CIA [redacted]. I have personal knowledge of very few officers who are his equal in operational talent, initiative, imagination and experience. He has also thoroughly demonstrated high qualities of leadership, good judgment and an impressive ability to deal effectively with people.

[redacted]

/s/ John A. Bross.

CONCUR:

James Critchfield

Chief, Eastern European Division

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
		ATT H/W TO EGUP 2397

MEMORANDUM FITNESS REPORT

David E. Murphy

SUBJECT : [redacted] Murphy's

Since the submission of the last Fitness Report concerning Murphy [redacted], his performance has consistently continued at the same outstanding level of competence and effectiveness. During this period, in anticipation of [redacted] assuming duties as Chief of Base at the end of August 1959, I have in increasing measure delegated responsibility to him and he has been fully involved in all major phases of the operational direction of the Base. During the entire month of July he was Acting Chief of Base. During this period his performance was outstanding and he directed the operations of BOB in a fully effective, well organized and thoroughly competent manner. I have nothing further to add concerning [redacted] great abilities and fine performance which are fully covered by the detailed comments in his last two Fitness Reports and in the promotion recommendation dated 28 September 1958 on the basis of which he was promoted from grade GS-15 to grade GS-16.

Murphy's

[redacted]

/s/ William K. Harvey

I certify this report
has been seen by me:

[redacted] /s/ David E. Murphy

28 August 1959

COS and DCOS fully concurred in the ratings and statements concerning Jewett's performance in prior fitness reports and happily concur in this memorandum also.

[redacted]

/s/ Richard F. McMillan

Distribution:
(3 - COS for EE
1 - COS
1 - SR thru EE

CONCUR

/s/ James H. Critchfield

James H. Critchfield
Chief, EE Division

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

EGBT-1003, 28 Sep 58

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MURPHY	(First) DAVID	(Middle) E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION FI	
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Berlin Operations Base			6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief of Base and Chief of Operations			
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP		9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 31 July 1955 - 28 September 1958			

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE 28 Sept 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR /s/ WILLIAM K. HARVEY	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Base

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 28 Oct 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL /s/ JOHN A. BROSS	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached sheet.	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

See attached sheet.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY: While I do not consider that Subject is better suited for any other type of position than the one he now holds and the one that has been recommended for his next assignment, it should be pointed out that he is an unusually versatile officer capable of performing with distinction any one of a wide range of [redacted] assignments, both in the field and at Headquarters.

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO FITNESS REPORT (PART I) PERFORMANCE

Section C, Paragraph 2 (Specific Duties):

	Rating No.
Duty No. 1: Directs as Branch Chief a large (30 officers and clerical employees) operational branch engaged in all phases of Soviet operations including handling some of the most complex and valuable such operations [redacted] C/A has.	6
Duty No. 2: Serves as Chief of Operations, Deputy Base Chief, and frequently Acting Chief of Base, BOB.	6
Duty No. 3: Directly runs agents in espionage and counter-espionage cases.	6
Duty No. 4: Plans, implements, directs and analyzes Soviet CE operations of the most complex character.	7
Duty No. 5: Conducts liaison with other Bases and units of C/A [redacted] and with other U.S. agencies.	5
Duty No. 6: Trains and develops younger officers on a supervisory and tutorial basis.	6

Section C, Paragraph 3 (Narrative Description):

Subject is C/A without question one of the most outstanding operations officers in [redacted] He is distinguished by his drive, the incisiveness of his approach to operational and other problems, the depth of his operational understanding, the soundness of his operational judgment, and his broad, almost unique, knowledge of Soviet matters, particularly in the counter-espionage field. He is a brilliant CE officer, an outstanding agent handler, and an excellent executive, and has fully demonstrated his capabilities in all of these fields during the almost four years he has been assigned to BOB. These abilities, plus his unusual language capabilities and his broad and detailed area knowledge, make Subject, in my opinion, one of the most valuable, versatile and effective officers in [redacted]. CIA The only weaknesses I have noted in Subject during the almost four years that I have been completely and intimately familiar with his work on a daily basis, are a tendency at times to be too impatient with other officers particularly those who do not begin to measure up to his very high standards of performance, and an occasional tendency to be somewhat undiplomatic in his handling of personnel. It should be clearly pointed out, however, that neither of these factors are of sufficient importance or weight to, in any material way, decrease the effectiveness of Subject's consistently fine performance and are, in my opinion, merely the inevitable corollary of Subject's great drive and intense dedication to his profession. It also should be pointed out that while Subject is an exacting supervisor, he is never unreasonable nor in any sense dictatorial, and he has demonstrated the capacity of quickly developing and retaining the full loyalty, cooperation and respect of the officers with whom he works. It is, I think, significant also that the respect which other officers hold for Subject increases in direct proportion to the level of professional competence and experience which these officers attain.

In assessing Subject's performance and capabilities, it should be pointed out that he has been officially recommended for promotion from grade GS-15 to grade GS-16 and that he has been officially recommended to succeed the present incumbent as Chief of Base, BOB. Further comments concerning Subject in this connection are contained in EGBT-1003 dated 28 September 1958, the covering dispatch to this Fitness Report which should be read in conjunction therewith.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MURPHY DAVID E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION FI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Berlin Operations Base	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief of Base and Chief of Operations		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 31 July 1955 - 28 September 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion **
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 28 Sept 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR /s/ WILLIAM K. HARVEY	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Base

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 28 Oct 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL /s/ JOHN A. BROSS	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHOSE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
3		A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND WIDE (VARIOUS LOCATIONS)
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

46 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

See attached sheet.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

See attached sheet.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Except for the reasonable, general limitations imposed by the fact that Subject has several small children, I know of no other factors which would condition or limit his future assignments or which need to be taken into account in connection therewith.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	5	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. [illegible]	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO FITNESS REPORT (PART II) POTENTIAL

Section E, Paragraph 13:

•• This report in addition to being an Annual efficiency report should be read as a recapitulation and full analysis of Subject's performance since his assignment to BOB in December 1954 and of his present capabilities and future potential in support of the official recommendation that he be promoted from grade GS-15 to grade GS-16 and that he be made Chief of Base, BOB, upon the departure of the present incumbent.

Section G, Paragraph 4:

CIA

Subject has clearly demonstrated the potential for becoming a most senior [redacted] executive. He is fully capable now of directing with full effectiveness a large, complex field Base or Station and, with the minimum of familiarization, capable of performing any one of a number of senior executive positions at Headquarters. I consider Subject to be one of that very small handful of most capable [redacted] CIA officers who should ultimately occupy the key executive positions in [redacted]

DDP

Section H, Paragraph 1:

Subject does not need additional training. It has been recommended that he be made Chief of Base, Berlin, for his next assignment. Upon the completion of that assignment he should, in my opinion, return to Headquarters and, if possible, assigned as Deputy Chief of a foreign area division with the view to his becoming Chief of such division at the appropriate time, or occupying another suitable position of similar stature within [redacted]. DDP After a reasonable Headquarters' assignment within this framework he should, however, be reassigned to the field as Chief of a major [redacted] station where his great abilities in the planning, development, and implementation of espionage and counter-espionage can be brought to bear with maximum impact. In any event, whatever assignment Subject may be given in the future, either at Headquarters or in the field, should involve direct operational and/or operational/supervisory responsibilities. Given the very small CIA number of [redacted] officers who have attained, or are likely to attain, Subject's level of competence, and given Subject's intense personal preoccupation with the operational side of [redacted] work, I do not believe that [redacted] can afford to use Subject on any non-operational or non-operational/supervisory assignment for any length of time.

CIA CIA'S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

CODED 10-19

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It is designed to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff, and
2. A periodic record of work performance useful to the effective utilization of personnel.

1955 OCT 21 AM 10:27

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 90 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a real way he knows where he stands.

Initial Field

Posted Pos. Control
BY
DATE 26 OCT 1955

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

Rec'd 21 Oct 55

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK--FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY [illegible]	1. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI

4. GRADE: GS-15
5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current): BOB
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT: 1 July 1955
7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 22 December 1954 - 31 July 1955

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Ops Off. - DC/1 0136[illegible]
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: Dec 54

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Deputy Chief of Base, BOB, and, in addition Chief of the Soviet Branch.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True): William Harvey
2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True): William Harvey
3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS: OCT - 4 1955
5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE REPORT AND SIGNATURES: W. Taylor

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 1 SEP 54 45a

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
10 31 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description should not be considered favorable or unfavorable of itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

In the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. Each category is divided into three small blocks. This is to allow you to make finer distinctions in your description. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
a. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
b. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.							X							
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.							X							
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.											X			
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.								X						
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.												X		
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.													X	
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.													X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.													X	
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITY.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.												X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.											X			
24. [illegible]								X						
25. [illegible]												X		

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.												X		
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.													X	
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".													X	
29. TOUGH MINDED.												X		
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.												X		
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.														X
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.												X		
36. DELIBERATE.							X							
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.												X		
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.							X							
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												X		
41. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT.												X		
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.												X		
43. HAS DRIVE.														X
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.												X		
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.											X			
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.												X		
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.											X			
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Drive, ability to get things done, fully competent professional grasp of operational and Soviet problems, enthusiasm, high degree of intelligence and initiative.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

This is difficult to answer. Like any officer he has a few weak points but very few which can be considered outstanding. He still needs some experience and maturing, but on balance he is an outstanding KUBARK officer.

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION | TO | DATE

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

[illegible] 5/11/54
3.9. - 18 May 54

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE) MURPHY, DAVID E.	2. GRADE GS-15	3. POSITION TITLE AREA OPS OFF (FC) CD FI	
4. OFFICE SR	STAFF OR DIVISION ER-3	BRANCH	☐ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD — IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 5 Apr 53 To 4 Apr 54	6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☐ Reassignment	☒ Annual ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor	☐ Special

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

Present position is Chief, SR/3 (West Branch). Responsible to the Chief, SR Division for directing and planning SR operations in the western RSFSR, BSSR and Ukrainian SSR. These operations cover the FI, PP and PM missions of SR Division. Chief, SR/3 is also responsible for directing and coordinating operations directed at the above areas of the USSR mounted from Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Low Countries, France, Italy and the Iberian Peninsula. In implementing the latter, coordination is effected with the appropriate area desks of the EE and WE Divisions. In addition to the above responsibilities in the operational field, Chief, SR/3 is responsible for directing counter-espionage operations arising from RIS action against emigre groups with which we are in contact and our positive operations.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
None			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

Planning and direction of FI and PP operations aimed at the USSR and its European satellites.

10. 25 May 1954 — DATE

David E. Murphy — SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

In all ways this officer has been energetic, enthusiastic, and forceful in discharging the duties listed. He has demonstrated these qualities in devising and implementing his operations, and in addition has displayed great technical competence personally as an operational officer. His imagination and energy are boundless, and in this regard serves as an example to his subordinates.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1953

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Murphy is outstanding in his ready grasp of the many equities present in an involved operational situation. Additionally, he has a quick and perceptive understanding of the political and international aspects of intelligence developments.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

This officer must develop, in terms of his own great potential, an ability to inspire loyalty and enthusiastic support in his subordinates, through consideration of and regard for their own competences.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

This officer is capable of increasing responsibilities as measured by his growth in 13 above. Further, increased responsibilities should be preceded by demonstrations of tempered and balanced judgments so well within this officer's capabilities.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Well fitted for operational tasks and supervision.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Tradecraft, and rotation to a foreign post in about one year.

FI/training

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

29 July 54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

30 July 54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

14-00000

[redacted] | GS 14 | | February 1951

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST, DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Feb 1951-May 1951 Chief, Soviet Sec., MOB. May 1951-May 1952 Chief, CSOB. Responsible for planning and execution, upon Headquarters approval, of all REDSOX operations and activities conducted by Soviet Sec., MOB, later CSOB. May 1952 to present Deputy Chief, CSOB. As deputy, assisting Chief CSOB in carrying out responsibilities noted above.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED.

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR
Russian	x			x			x		
French	x				x		x		
German		x				x		x	

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TITLE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Operations	Headquarters

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT, WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO
EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO
LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

February 1953
DATE

[redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

DATE FROM: May 1952
DATE TO: Feb 1953

OCCASION FOR REPORT: ANNUAL ☑ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☑ YES ☐ NO
IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☑ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11
HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO
DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION?

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE					✓		
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							✓
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						✓	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS							✓
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							✓
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						✓	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE							✓
H. DISCRETION						✓	
I. INITIATIVE							✓
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE						✓	
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)							✓
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION	✓						
M. TACT					✓		
N. VERACITY (NON-FALLIBILITY)						✓	
O. LEADERSHIP						✓	
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						✓	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA							✓

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU:
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☑

11. STATE HERE ANY DEFINITE REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OF EACH EMPLOYEE WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR ANY RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

A remarkably talented and energetic operations officer whose [illegible] of daily [illegible] and maturity [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

February [illegible], 1953

[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] THIS REPORT IS TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST FIRST MIDDLE: [redacted]

GRADE/RATING: GS 15 | SALARY: [illegible] | DATE OF [illegible]: 23 Feb 1951

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST) [illegible]

From date assignment to theater to 14 May 1951 Chief, Soviet Operations Section, MOB. Directed all operations into USSR mounted by Section. From 14 May 1951 to present, Chief, Combined OSO OPC Soviet Operations BASO. Directed all activities aimed at work within the USSR including that involving USSR emigre groups.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. none

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
Russian	X			X			X		
French		X			X			X	
German			X			X		X	

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Same	Same

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESS(ES) ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

19 June 1951
DATE

[redacted]

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

DATE FROM: 23 Feb 51 DATE TO: 23 May 51

OCCASION FOR REPORT: ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☒ XX

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION?

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE					X		
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							X
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							X
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE					X		
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION						X	
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT					X		
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP					X		
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA					X		
Q. MENTAL STAMINA							

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU

DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. A STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT COVERING EACH CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE IN THE FIELD WILL BE RENDERED BY SUCH EMPLOYEE AND HIS OR HER IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR ON 1 JUNE OF EACH YEAR ON THIS FORM. EACH EMPLOYEE WILL EXECUTE ITEMS 1 TO 6 INCL. SIGN THE FORM AND DELIVER SAME TO HIS REPORTING OFFICER FOR COMPLETION OF THE EFFICIENCY RATING AND FORWARDING TO WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS NOT LESS THAN 10 DAYS AFTER CLOSE OF REPORTING PERIOD.

A. THE REPORTING OFFICER IS DEFINED AS THE EMPLOYEE'S IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR, IN OTHER WORDS THE PERSON WHO IS PRESUMABLY BEST ACQUAINTED WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S WORKING EFFICIENCY. HOWEVER, DEPENDING UPON CIRCUMSTANCES, THE CHIEF OF STATION MAY NOT WISH TO ENTRUST THE IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR WITH THIS RESPONSIBILITY. IN ANY CASE, THE CHIEF OF STATION WILL CHANGE OR MODIFY THE RATING OF THE REPORTING OFFICER WHEN SUCH CHANGES OR MODIFICATIONS ARE CALLED FOR. THE CHIEF OF STATION IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACCURACY OF FACTS AND STATEMENTS WHICH APPEAR ON THE STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT. IN MANY CASES, ESPECIALLY IN A SMALL UNIT, THE CHIEF OF STATION MAY WISH TO FILL OUT ALL THE REPORTS HIMSELF.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT, THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL REPORTS, UTILIZING THE SAME FORM, WILL BE RENDERED.

A. UPON COMPLETION OF FIRST NINETY (90) DAYS OF SERVICE AT A STATION.

B. UPON RELIEF OR REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING SENIOR.

C. UPON DETERMINATION OR RECOMMENDATION THAT AN EMPLOYEE IN A FIELD STATION SHOULD BE REASSIGNED TO ANOTHER STATION OR RETURNED TO U.S. FOR REASSIGNMENT OR OTHER DISPOSITION. SUCH REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED SO AS TO REACH THE WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE AFTER SUCH REASSIGNMENT DETERMINATION IS MADE. IF POSSIBLE, THE REPORT SHOULD BE SENT IN AT LEAST THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT IN ORDER THAT ALL TIME POSSIBLE MAY BE DEVOTED TO APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION. IF CONSIDERATION OF REASSIGNMENT IS BEING GIVEN WITHOUT EMPLOYEE'S KNOWLEDGE, ITEMS 1 TO 6 WILL BE FILLED IN AS FAR AS POSSIBLE BY THE RATING OFFICER WITHOUT REFERRAL TO EMPLOYEE.

3. IN FAIRNESS TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE IMPORTANCE OF CAREFULLY PREPARED AND ACCURATE EFFICIENCY REPORTS CANNOT BE OVERSTRESSED. THE FOLLOWING BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RATING SHOULD ALWAYS BE KEPT IN MIND:

A. ALWAYS BASE YOUR JUDGMENT ON:

(1) WHAT YOU HAVE OBSERVED THE INDIVIDUAL DO OR FAIL TO DO.

(2) TYPICAL PERFORMANCE, NOT ON AN ISOLATED STRIKING INCIDENT.

(3) EXAMPLES RELEVANT TO THE CHARACTERISTIC UNDER CONSIDERATION.

(A) THE EFFICIENCY REPORT IS TO BE USED TO RATE ALL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES. BUT REPORTING OFFICERS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT DIFFERENT STANDARDS PREVAIL IN DIFFERENT ASSIGNMENTS WHEREAS IT IS NECESSARY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER POSSESS INITIATIVE. THIS SAME TRAIT IS NOT ALWAYS DESIRABLE, EXCEPT IN A MINOR WAY, FOR A TYPIST. THE RATINGS AND EVALUATIONS SHOULD BE IN REFERENCE TO THE JOB - THE ACTUAL WORK ASSIGNMENT FOR WHICH THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYEE IS BEING PAID. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO ARRIVE AT A JUST ESTIMATE OF THE QUALITIES OF THE PERSON REPORTED ON FOR THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE REPORT. AVOID EXAGGERATIONS AND SUPERLATIVES. THEY DETRACT FROM THE VALUE OF A REPORT AND ARE UNFAIR TO OTHERS.

B. BIASED OPINIONS BASED ON PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PREPARATION OF EFFICIENCY REPORTS IS AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF ALL SUPERVISORS OF EMPLOYEES, AND THE ACCURATE AND TRUE EVALUATIONS EXPRESSED THEREIN ARE A DIRECT REFLECTION UPON HIS OWN ABILITY AND QUALIFICATION FOR THE POSITION HE HOLDS.

C. NO REPORTS WILL BE RENDERED COVERING PERIODS OF LESS THAN 90 DAYS OBSERVED SERVICE.

4. REPORTS WILL NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL; HOWEVER, THE CLASSIFICATION MAY BE RAISED IF DEEMED ADVISABLE BY RATING OFFICER.

5. REPORTS WILL NEVER BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON.

DISPOSITION OF REPORTS

1. REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH CHIEF IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE REPORTING PERIOD.

2. IF THE REPORTING OFFICER IS THE CHIEF OF STATION, REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED BY HIM TO THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH CHIEF IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS.

3. IF THE REPORTING OFFICER IS NOT THE CHIEF OF STATION, THE REPORT WILL BE REFERRED TO THE NEXT IN COMMAND FOR REVIEW AND FINALLY TO THE CHIEF OF STATION FOR FORWARDING TO WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS.

4. UPON RECEIPT OF REPORT IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS, THEY WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE BRANCH CHIEFS PROMPTLY AND THEN REFERRED TO THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL FOR RETENSION IN THE PERSONNEL FILE OF THE EMPLOYEE.

A. IF A CHANGE OF PERSONAL STATUS IS REPORTED UNDER SECTION 8, ONE COPY OF SUCH REPORT WILL BE DETACHED AND SENT TO THE SECURITY OFFICE.

ANY DESIRED REMARKS OF REVIEWING OFFICER AND/OR CHIEF OF STATION

Approved!

~~xxxx~~ Subject reports directly to undersigned on operational matters. Undersigned has visited subject twice at his station during rating period. Undersigned feels the following items in the report should be evaluated upward:

A - excellent
F - excellent
I - outstanding
J - excellent
[illegible] - outstanding

Harry C. Rositzke

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

Name (Pseudonym)	Grade	Date Assigned to Present Dut
[redacted]	GS-14	Feb 51

1. Indicate period of time you have observed employee being reported on.
From: May 52 To: [illegible]

2. Are entries based upon actual observations? ☑ on official reports? ☐

3. Do you concur in employee's description of duties? ☑ yes ☐ no. If no, explain

4. Is employee qualified to perform all present duties? ☑ yes ☐ no. If no, explain limitations.

5. If employee, as a result of previous training, experience, background or personality, is more qualified for other duties, indicate.

✓

6. Evaluation of employee's performance of duties:
Highly energetic and competent performance including training of younger operations personnel

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE. TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE.

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST FIRST MIDDLE [redacted]
LAST RATING [illegible]
SALARY [illegible]
DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT POST [illegible]

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

[illegible] for [illegible] conv[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] for over [illegible]
[illegible] of [illegible] Inc. [illegible] Administration [illegible] one of
[illegible] to [illegible] to [illegible] for
[illegible]

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. None.

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
Italian	X			X			X		
French	X				X		X		
German		X				X		X	

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-50 STATE)
TYPE OF DUTY LOCATION
Headquarters, [illegible] (For conversations with Lang. [illegible])
(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?
MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO
EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO
LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

14 March 1950
DATE

[redacted]

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM Jul 49
DATE TO Feb 50

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO
IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☐ NO
IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEE'S DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11
HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO
DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO
TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? GS-13. Position now filling.

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE				X			
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							X
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS							X
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						X	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						X	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION						X	
I. INITIATIVE							X
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)							X
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT					X		
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP						X	
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA							X
Q. MENTAL STAMINA							X

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU:
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☒ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☐

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

Subject's aggressiveness and intense interest in the detail of his work, do at times, make it difficult for employee to work with some individuals on first contact. It was therefore necessary to rate him as only good under 9a. This Reporting Officer feels that this is no particular down-grading in this case because time usually heals any difficulties in this regard. Respect for the individual's abilities tends to override the personality weaknesses particularly with his close associates. This Reporting Officer considers this employee as outstanding in our field because, first, his intense interest, second, his inate ability and knack for the work, his training and background, and his great devotion

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEET)

DATE

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL [illegible]

[redacted]

STATUS & EFFICIENCY REPORT

Section 6 (contd)

Number of dependents: One additional - Son, Vincent Brian, born 22 July 1949, Tokyo General Hospital.

Section 11 (Contd)

to duty. The only problem is to keep him from becoming too over-enthusiastic and wearing himself out.

7. For each Factor observed, check the appropriate box indicating how the employee compares with all other persons of the same classification who are known to you.

RATING FACTORS	Unknown	Unsatisfactory	Fair	Good	Very Good	Excellent	Outstanding
Ability to work and get along with people.					✓		
Interest and enthusiasm in work.							✓
Security consciousness.						✓	
Ability to grasp instructions and plans.							✓
Willingness to accept responsibility.							✓
Attention to duty.							✓
Judgment and common sense.						✓	
Ability to analyze problems and reach firm decisions.							✓
Discretion						✓	
Initiative and creativeness							✓
Supervisory ability or leadership.						✓	
Ability to obtain results and get things done.							✓
Tact					✓		
Motivation for continued work for Agency.							✓
Carry out an assignment involving mostly admin duties					✓		
Carry out an assignment involving mostly operational duties.							✓

8. Indicate your attitude toward having this employee under your command or supervision:

☐ Definitely do not want him.
☐ Be satisfied with him.
☐ Prefer not to have him
☐ Be pleased to have him
☑ Particularly desire him.

9. Recommendation:

Subject recommended for senior operational slot SR Hqs.

Ross C. Lane
Section Chief

10. To be completed by Branch, Division, Desk, or Base Chief.

Do you consider the rating officer to maintain:

a. extremely high rating standards ☐

b. about average rating standards ☑

c. lenient rating standards ☐

11. Do you concur in overall rating and recommendations? ☑ yes ☐ no. If no, explain or add additional comments.

Ross C. Lane
Chief,

12. To be completed by Chief of Mission.

Do you concur in overall rating and recommendations? ☑ yes ☐ no. If no, explain.

An outstanding staff officer.

for Chief of Mission

FILE COPY OF STANDARD FORM 56
"AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS—FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM"

on file with the Retirement Operations Branch,
Office of Personnel (x3257).

DP

SE

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Murphy	056700 David	E.	June 23, 1921	056 14 4578
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

David E. Murphy

DATE

19 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 21 11 29 AM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
[illegible]

SECRET

Proposed Assignment to Key Position
European Division

29 December 1971

Field Position	Incumbent	Extension
Chief of Station, Paris GS-18	David Murphy GS-18	Home leave in August 1972 and return for new tour.

APPROVED:

Cord Meyer (for)

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

30 Dec 71
Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
056700	Murphy	David	E

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OF.I NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
06	20	68					1			France	240

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☒ DISPATCH
☐ CABLE
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐ OTHER (Specify)

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. OFPT-14059
DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 7/5/68

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ PCD
☐ C & L DIVISION, ETC.
☒ C & T DIVISION

☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 7/23/68

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

1 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David E. Murphy

SUBJECT : Service in the Clandestine Services Records Committee

1. I wish to take this opportunity to thank you for your service as a member of the CS Records Committee. The contributions which you have made to our deliberations have been of considerable assistance to me and to the CS records program.

2. I believe that effective records and information systems are vital to the success of an intelligence organization and that the Records Committee plays an extremely important role in ensuring that these systems are consonant with more pressing and dramatic operational and policy requirements. The advice, assistance and participation of yourself and other senior officials have enabled us to meet our obligations and make steady improvement in this area. I hope I may continue to count on your suggestions, initiative and advice in this area in the future.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of DAVID E. MURPHY

Effective 20 March 1968

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth existing policies of concern to you while integrated and to reiterate certain rights and obligations which derive from your true status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS18-$27,055. per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of 20 March 1968. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected as a FSR-1 at a salary of $24,944. per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of 2 Years from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable

regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they do not exceed the salary and allowance payment due you on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due you, the difference will be paid to you by this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due you, the excess amounts will be remitted to this organization at intervals to be designated by the Office of Finance. Computations hereunder will be based on the aggregate gross amounts due and received. That portion of retirement contributions withheld by your cover facility which exceeds the retirement contributions applicable to your organization salary will be deducted from the gross amount of the overpayment. Upon integration, the payroll office of this organization will establish the date on which you would normally receive a regular step increase from your cover facility. Failure to report a grade promotion received from a cover facility does cause errors in processing regular step increases. Regular step increases, incorrectly processed in such manner, should be reported immediately to this organization. To eliminate this problem, any grade promotion received from a cover facility will be reported immediately by you to this organization's payroll office through channels showing both the old and the new rate and the effective date. All salary difference payments and adjustments will be reflected on earnings statements.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integrating into your cover facility you will continue to be covered by the particular retirement system in which you are a participant as an employee of this organization. Salary received from your cover facility and any salary differences payable by this organization will be subject to appropriate retirement contributions.

b. Appropriate Federal income tax withholdings shall be made from taxable income received from both your cover facility and this organization. Additionally, while serving in the United States, withholdings shall also be made for District of Columbia or State income tax, when applicable. You may claim reimbursement for excess income taxes paid on overt tax returns by reason of taxable income from your cover facility exceeding the taxable income due you as an employee of this organization.

c. All annual and sick leave which is accrued to your credit at the time of integration will be transferred to your cover facility. While integrated you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon termination of your integration, your unused annual leave, sick leave, and home leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization and your leave record will be reconstructed as of the beginning of the leave year in which you return to this organization, as explained in the Handbook on Leave for Special Situations. Serving in an integrated capacity does not permit the carryover from one leave year to another of an annual leave balance which exceeds the ceilings authorized by regulations of this organization and the Federal leave law. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, upon your "resignation" you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization, including any income taxes withheld by your cover facility in order to receive credit for such annual leave.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Evelyn M. Flagg
Personnel Office
Evelyn M. Flagg

ACCEPTED:

David E. Murphy
David E. Murphy

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) Murphy (First) David (Middle) Edmund
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 036 - 14 - 4518

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY 1321 [illegible] San Francisco Calif.
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) N/A
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE 1537 Forest Villa Ln, McLean, VA
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE 66 [illegible] Ave, San Francisco, Calif.

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE San Francisco, Calif.
DATE OF MARRIAGE 29/2/44
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE
DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED
DATE SPOUSE DIED
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE Mary	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) 1537 Forest Villa Ln, McLean, VA.		TELEPHONE NO. 356 3594
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Steven	HHC [illegible] Ft Monmouth, N.J.	M	1947
Vincent	46 [illegible] St Apt 8, Boston Mass [illegible]	M	1949
Gerald	1537 Forest Villa Ln, McLean, VA.	M	1952
Barbara	1537 Forest Villa Ln, McLean, VA	F	1954
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian) Deceased	ADDRESS		TELEPHONE NO.
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian) Mrs. [illegible] Murphy	ADDRESS [illegible] Mineral Ave Syracuse, [illegible]		TELEPHONE NO.

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Mary [illegible] Murphy
RELATIONSHIP Wife
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) and NAME OF EMPLOYER IF APPLICABLE
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES ✓ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES ✓ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 5.) YES ✓ NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 5 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

[illegible]

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

VIENNA TRUST CO. McLEAN, VA. Branch

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☑ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☑ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] IN WIFE'S POSSESSION

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

VIENNA TRUST CO.

ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DO NOT NOTIFY MOTHER IN CASE OF EMERGENCY SHE SHOULD BE ADVISED THROUGH MY SISTER - MRS. GEORGE MENTER, 19 BELLEWOOD CIRCLE, NORTH SYRACUSE, N.Y.
Telephone: AREA CODE 315 x GL 7 - 2498

IN THE EVENT OF COMMON DISASTER, PLEASE NOTIFY MY SISTER-IN-LAW: MRS ZINA BASNETT, 66 HEATHER AVE. SAN FRANCISCO CALIF.

AREA CODE 415 X 386 - 7179

DATE [illegible] 63
SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

IMPORTANT

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility (OPM 20-6-1 dated 12 October 1961) for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the field have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checked out for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 30 July 1962.

David E. Murphy
Signature
DAVID E. MURPHY

27 Feb 1968
Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
056700	Murphy	David	E.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TOY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
11	13	67	11	20	67		02			Europe	901

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	RCB		
	T S & DIVISION, CTBS.	DATE	SIGNATURE
	F & T DIVISION	12-15-67	

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME: LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
056180	MURPHY	DAVID	E.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 56, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA 1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA 2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
05	24	67	06	03	67	2			EUR	801

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☐ CABLE
☐ OTHER (Specify)
☐ DISPATCH
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 3B-1-67

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 5/23-6/03/67

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ SEO
☒ C B & L DIVISION, CTRS.
☐ C B F DIVISION

☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 9/22/67

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

14-00000

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
200 Maryland Ave. N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
Telephone 543-1400

EARL WARREN,
Chairman
RICHARD B. RUSSELL
JOHN SHERMAN COOPER
HALE BOGGS
GERALD R. FORD
JOHN J. McCLOY
ALLEN W. DULLES

J. LEE RANKIN,
General Counsel

NOV 1 0 1964

Noted by DCI.
WE

John A. McCone, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

On behalf of the Commission and myself I wish to thank you and the Central Intelligence Agency for your generous assistance to the Commission in its investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The cooperation of your Agency was unlimited and we are especially indebted to your Deputy Director of Plans Richard Helms, and Messrs. Arthur Dooley, Thomas Hall, David Murphy, Raymond Rocca, Lee Wigren, and John M. Whitten.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel

65930S APR 566

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

65930S APR 566

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
056700	MURPHY	DAVId	E	~~[illegible]~~ 18

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	10	02	65	11	05	65	FE, NE, WE	202

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER SR-15-66 (1)		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
SR-15-66 (1)	10/2 - 11/5-65

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	C & L DIVISION	DATE 3/30/66	SIGNATURE M. B. Soria
X	C & T DIVISION		

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

14-00000

314364 SEP 10 .5

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE.

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE COMPONENT
1-6	7-24			25-26
056700	MURPHY	DAVID	Z	~~[illegible]~~ 48

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39	WE	40-42
	2	07	08	65	07	20	65		801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
SB-385-65	7/8 - 7/20/65

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
✓	C & L DIVISION	DATE 5/31/65	SIGNATURE B [illegible]
	F & T DIVISION		

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-30)

14-00000

6 21 Nov 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
056700	MURPHY	David	E.	48 SR

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	ARRIVAL MONTH 28-29	ARRIVAL DAY 30-31	ARRIVAL YEAR 32-33	DEPARTURE MONTH 34-35	DEPARTURE DAY 36-37	DEPARTURE YEAR 38-39	COUNTRY	UNIT 40-42
1. PCS (Basic) 3. CORRECTION 5. CANCELLATION									

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	DEPARTURE MONTH 28-29	DEPARTURE DAY 30-31	DEPARTURE YEAR 32-33	RETURN MONTH 34-35	RETURN DAY 36-37	RETURN YEAR 38-39	AREA(S)	UNIT 40-42
2. TDY (Basic) 4. CORRECTION 6. CANCELLATION	2	11	06	64	11	21	64	WE- NE- EE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
SR - 92-65	6 - 21 Nov. 64

REMARKS

[illegible] FEB 1965

PREPARED BY	X	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION ☒ FINANCE DIVISION	DATE 2/11/65		SIGNATURE M. B. LORIA

FORM 8-62 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

14-191

dupl

BV 524666

NOV 16, 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
56700	MURPHY	DAVID	E.	SR 48

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	 DAY	 YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	 DAY	 YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	 DAY	 YEAR	RETURN MONTH	 DAY	 YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	10	01	64	10	12	64	WE EE NE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☑ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☐ CABLE
☐ OTHER (Specify)
☐ DISPATCH
☐ DUTY STATUS ON TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 2 thru 12 October 1964

REMARKS

11/10/64

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION ☑ FINANCE DIVISION	DATE 11/10/64	SIGNATURE

FORM 9-62 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6		7-24		25-26
56 700	MURPHY	David	E	48

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	DAY	YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DAY	YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DAY	YEAR	RETURN MONTH	DAY	YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
✓ 2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	05	26	68	0[illegible]	[illegible]	68	WH	811

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
☐	FINANCE DIVISION		

FORM 8-61 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 25?6 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	7-24			25-26
056700	Murphy	David	E.	~~SR~~ 48

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) ✓ 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	34	02	07	64	02	10	64	Germany	270

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
☐ FINANCE DIVISION		

443121 FEB 25 [illegible]

FORM 8-62 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

400767 JUL 5 63

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
26700	MURPHY	DAVID	E.	44

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	ARRIVAL MONTH 28-29	ARRIVAL DAY 30-31	ARRIVAL YEAR 32-33	DEPARTURE MONTH 34-35	DEPARTURE DAY 36-37	DEPARTURE YEAR 38-39	COUNTRY	OMIT 40-42
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION									

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	DEPARTURE MONTH 28-29	DEPARTURE DAY 30-31	DEPARTURE YEAR 32-33	RETURN MONTH 34-35	RETURN DAY 36-37	RETURN YEAR 38-39	AREA(S)	OMIT 40-42
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	2	05	27	63	05	30	63	WE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 27 May - 30 May 1963

REMARKS

400767 JUL 5 63

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE 6/18/63	SIGNATURE
✓	FINANCE DIVISION		

FORM 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

JUN 1963

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

400765 JUL 563

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
56700	Murphy	David	E	44

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	05	01	63	05	08	63	WE YEE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

400765 JUL 563

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION		DATE 5/17/63	SIGNATURE
☐ FINANCE DIVISION			

FORM 8-62 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

14-101

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

307235 AUG 17 62

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5		6-23		24-25
26709	Murphy	David	E	54

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
✓ 2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41
	2	05	03	62	06	02	62	EE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
FISCAL DIVISION		DATE	SIGNATURE
✓ FINANCE DIVISION		8-15-62	

FORM 4-59 1451a

SECRET

(4-40)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 102 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5	6-23			24-25
56700	MURPHY	DAVID	E	54

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	ARRIVAL				DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41
					08	20	61	GER	

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	DEPARTURE				RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41
	2	09	28	61	10	04	61	EE	901

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☑ TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐ DISPATCH
☐ CABLE	☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐ OTHER (Specify)	

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
T.D. EE-4215-62	9/28/61 - 10/4/61

REMARKS

1-3-62

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
☐ FINANCE DIVISION	[illegible] 62	

FORM 1451a

SECRET

US Forces/New York, NY

14 December 1959

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

THRU: Mr. Hugh T. Cunningham
CCA
APO 757, US Forces

TO: Mr. David E. Murphy
USA BEG
APO 742, US Forces

1. I would like to take this opportunity, upon the eve of my departure from Berlin, to thank you for the assistance you have given to me.

2. Your constant cooperation with members of my staff and with the other units in this Command has been particularly appreciated. Your advice, which I know was based on intimate knowledge of the intricate problems peculiar to Berlin as well as on your thorough professional competence, was most valuable in developing plans and politics for this headquarters. In addition, the valuable and timely information provided by you has contributed to an important degree to the security of this city. I am certain that my successor will continue to benefit greatly from your assistance.

3. I wish you continued success in your assignment and sincerely hope that someday we will once again have the pleasure of working together.

BARKSDALE HAMLETT
Major General, USA
U. S. Commander, Berlin

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMMUNICATIONS UNIT, EUROPE
APO 757

AEUMG-COH 4 June 1959

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: Mr. William Harvey
7971 USARSG
APO 742, US Forces

1. As the Commanding Officer of this unit, it gives me particular pleasure to extend my appreciation to Mr. David Murphy and Mr. Liebenau for the able and extremely valuable assistance which they rendered to an operation of this unit on 24 May 1959.

2. Mr. Murphy, when informed on Sunday 24 May that some assistance was needed by this unit, despite the short notice, wholeheartedly and unstintingly rendered advice and logistical support. Because of unforeseen circumstances, certain support was lacking for a particular operation, and Mr. Murphy immediately proferred the necessary aid. In discussing the various phases of the operation, Mr. Murphy was good enough to share his rich experience with representatives of this unit and thus facilitate implementation of the project.

3. Mr. Liebenau's consideration, tact and concern over the security and success of the operation merit praise. Despite the short time allocated to Mr. Liebenau's phase in the operation, he consistently deferred to the wishes of the members of this unit, recognizing that security of the operation was paramount.

4. Such cooperation and spirit of friendliness as exhibited both by Mr. Murphy and Mr. Liebenau are a very welcome new page in the relationship between this unit and your organization. It is a significant step toward the type of coordination and cooperation which will in the last analysis benefit the intelligence community to the detriment of the opposition.

cc: Mr. Gaines

GEORGE C SHELDON
LtCol , MPC
Commanding

JUN 8 1959

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of twenty-four months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

Office of Personnel

David E. Murphy

David E. Murphy

Date: 19 August 1957

FORM NO. 9118

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. NAME (Last) [illegible] (First) [illegible] (Middle) [illegible]

2. THIS DATE 1 [illegible] 71

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME:

☑ [illegible] AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA) ☐ MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA

☐ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED ☐ AIR TRIP INSURANCE

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance):

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FOLLOWING INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
WAEPA		✓	77	Pd. Ded. Jan 55-8-59	76.66

David E. Murphy
SIGNATURE

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

SIGNATURE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY:

CPB: [illegible]
SIGNATURE

IACO:
SIGNATURE

8. REMARKS:

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to [illegible] for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPB f

FORM NO. 37-190
1 MAR 56

(4)

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R3

STATEMENT OF PRIOR ~~FEDERAL~~ AND MILITARY SERVICE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*) Murphy, David [redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
Department of the Army HQ XXIV Corps Seoul, Korea	1946	July		1948	March		
US Government (KuBARK)	1948	April		present			

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
US ARMY	42	6	16	46	1	31	honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I ~~swear~~ (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

16 April 1953 [redacted]
(DATE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 16 day of April (MONTH) 1953 at ______ (CITY) ______ (STATE)

SEAL

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Alberta Y. Heigle

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
1	[illegible]	—
[illegible]	7	[illegible]

SCD - 12/31/42
Verified 6/14/57
B Schwingman

12. TOTAL SERVICE [illegible]

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

PART III.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 12*)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)	13	[illegible]	[illegible]
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*Leave purposes*)	[illegible]		

PART IV.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES

(To be completed only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes)

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 12*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 14*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			

ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)			
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*RIF purposes*) (*Enter as the "service computation date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF-7*)			

REMARKS:

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. ZJLW - 466

CLASSIFICATION

TO: John C. FITCH, Tokyo, Japan
Attention: Homer D. COLBURN
Patrick J. LODGE

DATE: 16 August 1949

FROM :

SUBJECT: GENERAL-
Commendation
SPECIFIC-

David E. Murphy

1. I desire to commend Marion A. FREDERICKS, Homer D. COLBURN and [redacted] for their excellent work in the compilation of the study "Central [illegible] in Sakhalinskaya Oblast." I particularly wish to commend [redacted] on the organizational and analytical aspects of the study.

2. This work is the best and most complete of its kind that we have, and will contribute materially to the advancement of United States intelligence interests throughout the world. It will give each of you satisfaction to know that the study will also be used in our European offices for its pertinent operational content and as a guide to the method of compilation and analysis of this type of operational information.

ROBERT A. SCHOW

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

44-0-2

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

(7-63)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

V-1
JJ-2

Date

Dear Mr. Murphy:

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective

Position: Intelligence Officer

Base Salary: GS-13 $7600.00

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave in accordance with Civil Service Commission rules and regulations, or such other provisions of law or regulations as may be established in lieu thereof.

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with CIA Regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside continental United States, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by CIA Regulations.

3. As a condition of your employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the continental United States. Each time you are so assigned, unless otherwise specified in advance by CIA, you will be required to remain at the post to which assigned for a period of 24 months from the date of arrival thereat, unless sooner transferred, reassigned or separated for reasons beyond your control. If you wish to return to the United States for personal reasons during that period, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

4. If this employment is for assignment to an overseas post, it is understood and agreed that, unless earlier separated for reasons beyond your control, you will remain in Government service for 12 months after your arrival at your first overseas post, and if you violate this agreement, any money expended by the United States on account of your travel and the transportation of your immediate family and household goods will be considered a debt due to the United States.

5. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of six months from date of employment. In the event

either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

6. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of CIA. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by Civil Service rules and regulations.

Official authorized to sign letters of appointment.

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by CIA.

David E. Murphy
Employee

January 7, 1951
Date

Form No. 51-104
June 1948

14-00000

File
mN

AGREEMENT

In consideration of the Government's undertaking to transport, without cost to me, to my official overseas station, the vehicle described below which is my personal property;

I hereby undertake not to sell or in any other manner dispose of said vehicle during the term of my employment by the Government overseas without prior written authority from properly authorized representatives of the Government; and

I understand that I will be held personally liable to the full extent of the cost of such transportation, and shall reimburse the Government to the full amount of such cost in the event that I do sell or otherwise dispose of the said vehicle without such authorization.

MAKE: Pontiac
TYPE: SED-CPE
YEAR MODEL: 1950
MOTOR NUMBER: 4233492
[illegible]: 3379.

Witnessed this date 8 December 1950.
Muriel Neal

Dennis E. Murphy
Employee's Signature

SECRET

Date: 5 April 19[illegible]

Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency that, except as Central Intelligence Agency may deem it in its best interests to recall or transfer me from my overseas post, it is understood and agreed by me I shall be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to serve a minimum period of twenty-four months at my place of employment outside the continental United States, and if I resign or terminate my appointment or return to the United States before the expiration of twenty-four months after the date of arrival at my overseas post, unless separated for reasons beyond my control, the Central Intelligence Agency will not pay my return travel expenses from such station outside the United States.

2. It is further understood and agreed by me that I shall remain in the Government service for the twelve months following my arrival at my overseas post unless separated for reasons beyond my control. In the event of a violation by me of the agreement in this paragraph, any moneys expended by the United States on account of my travel, including per diem while in a temporary duty status in Washington, expenses of transportation of my immediate family, and expenses of transportation of my household goods and personal effects from any place of actual residence at time of appointment to place of employment outside the continental United States, and for such expenses on my return from such post of duty to my place of actual residence at time of assignment to duty outside the United States, shall be considered as a debt due by me to the United States.

David E. Murphy

WITNESS:

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

5 April 1948 (date)

Dear Mr. Murphy:

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Group, has accepted your employment effective 5 April 1948

Position: Intelligence Officer (Ops.)
Base Salary: $5905.20

2. This appointment is not a Civil Service position. You will be entitled to annual and sick leave (only in accordance with Civil Service rules and regulations). You will be reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with the Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended. If stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, you will be granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by CIG regulations.

3. If you are ordered to a station outside the continental United States, you will be required to serve a minimum period of twenty-four months at such a station. If you wish to resign or terminate your appointment or return to the United States before the expiration of twenty-four months after the date of ~~departure~~ arrival at the ~~[illegible]~~ overseas post, CIG will not pay your return travel expenses from a station outside the United States.

5.3. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of CIG. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by Civil Service rules and regulations.

Kelly

ASSISTANT CHIEF, PERSONNEL DIVISION

4. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of six months from date of employment. In the event either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be offered other types of employment if available, and, if not available, you will be terminated.

ACCEPTED:

David E. Murphy

David E. Murphy

AFFIDAVIT

STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CIA (DEPT. OR ESTAB.)   [illegible] (BUREAU OR OFFICE)

Washington, D. C. (PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT)

I, David Edmund Murphy, DO HEREBY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I AM NOT ENGAGED IN ANY STRIKE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT I WILL NOT SO ENGAGE WHILE AN EMPLOYEE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; THAT I AM NOT A MEMBER OF AN ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES THAT ASSERTS THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT I WILL NOT WHILE A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE BECOME A MEMBER OF SUCH AN ORGANIZATION.

David E. Murphy
(SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE OR APPOINTEE)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS fifth DAY OF April, 1948 AT Washington, STATE OF D. C.

A. C. Arabaisle

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

OATH OF OFFICE

I, David Edmund Murphy
(NAME IN FULL, PRINT OR TYPE)

DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ALL ENEMIES, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC; THAT I WILL BEAR TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE TO THE SAME; THAT I TAKE THIS OBLIGATION FREELY, WITHOUT ANY MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION; AND THAT I WILL WELL AND FAITHFULLY DISCHARGE THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE ON WHICH I AM ABOUT TO ENTER, SO HELP ME GOD.

David E Murphy
SIGNATURE OF APPOINTEE

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 5 DAY OF April.

A.D., 19 48 AT Washington (CITY OR PLACE), D. C. (STATE)

(SEAL)

FORM 50 [illegible]
[illegible] 1940 88-33

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) MURPHY, David E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 23 June 1921	3. GRADE GS-18
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/SB/OC	5. PRESENT POSITION Chief	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 5777
7. PROPOSED STATION Paris, France	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) COS 0020 GS-00	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION Integree	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 1 June 1968	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 3

12. COMMENTS

Form 80 attached. Mr. Murphy is scheduled to be integrated in the Department of State in March 1968.

Subject had medical evaluation on 13 June 1967.

13. DATE OF REQUEST 10 January 1968	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING Hqs. 4B01	16. EXTENSION 6512

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

[illegible] 12 68

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR DUTY

FIC 2

24 March 1948 194__

Murphy, David E. WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR

1 Overseas

☒ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED:

None

JOHN R. [illegible], MD

FORM NO. 37-32
NOV 1947

(1055)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Cle

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
056700	MURPHY DAVID E.	

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 444a

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAY 6 10 35 AM '68

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (X))			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED (CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM) ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 056700	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) MURPHY DAVID E	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH 06/23/21	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS -18-01
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER D CH	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT SR	9. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
JAPAN	PCS CC	48/05/01	50/07/01
GERMANY	TDY CC	50/08/01	50/09/01
GERMANY	PCS CC	51/02/01	53/08/01
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY CC	54/01/01	54/05/01
GERMANY	PCS VV	54/12/22	61/08/10
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY CC	61/09/26	61/10/04
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY CC	62/05/23	62/06/02
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY CC	63/05/01	63/05/08
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY CC	63/05/27	63/06/08
GERMANY	TDY CC	64/02/07	64/02/10
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY CC	64/05/26	64/05/31
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY CC	64/10/01	64/10/12
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY CC	64/11/06	64/11/21
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY CC	65/07/19	65/07/20
ASIA AREA	TDY CC	65/10/04	65/11/07

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 25 May 67
INITIALS:

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	EDUCATION AND/OR TRAINING, GENERAL	NY ST UNIV	42

FORM
1-67 444J

SECRET

6 7 JUL ENTO

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION III

EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From - To)	GRADUATE
Eastland High School	Syracuse, New York	1934-38	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM./QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1 NY State Univ, Cortland, N. Y.	Educ	Social Studies	1938-42	BS	42	
2 Univ. California, Berkeley, Calif	His		1946	None		1 Semester graduate stu
3						
4						

5 IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
~~Univ. Calif, Berkeley, Calif~~ 1 Army Specialized Training Program	Russian area and lang.	1943	1944	9 months
~~U. S. Officer In School~~ 2 Mis Le Visinet, France	Russian language	1945		3 months
3				

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

I have resided and worked in France, Germany, Korea and Japan. I have visited for professional and personal reasons most countries in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. I have never been in Africa, the Soviet Union or any of the East European Communist countries.

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE TYPE ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

✓ [illegible]

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, ROP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. Provide license registry number if known

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☒ NO
2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify): Army
2. BRANCH OR CORPS: Mil Intel
3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty): FROM 1942 TO 1946
4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify)
5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation from past service)
6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER
7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
   - ☒ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
   - ☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
   - ☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
   - ☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
   - ☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
   - ☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
   - ☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
   - ☐ OTHER (Specify)
8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

Military Intelligence NCO, Russian - French interpreter

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)
6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			

SECRET

When Filled In

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY

2. NAME OF SPOUSE Last MURPHY	First Marianne	Middle NMI	Maiden ESCOVY
3. DATE OF BIRTH 20 July 1921	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Shanghai, China		
5. OCCUPATION Housewife	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER		
7. CITIZENSHIP U. S.	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) Stateless		9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED 1946

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Steven J.	Son	2/2/47-San Francisco	U. S.	1537 Forest Villa Lane McLean, Virginia
Vincent B.	Son	7/22/49-Tokyo	U.S.	" " " "
Gerald H.	Son	6/5/52-Munich	U. S.	" " " "
Barbara A.	Daughter	8/23/54-Washington, D. C.	U.S.	" " " "

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
11 April 1967	David E Murphy

SECRET

14-00000



PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS COMPLETELY. IF QUESTION DOES NOT APPLY WRITE "NOT APPLICABLE". WRITE "UNKNOWN" ONLY IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER AND CANNOT OBTAIN THE ANSWER FROM PERSONAL RECORDS. USE A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER FOR EXTRA DETAILS ON ANY QUESTION OR QUESTIONS FOR WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ROOM. ATTACH TWO RECENT PASSPORT SIZE PICTURES TO THIS FORM, DATE TAKEN WRITTEN ON THE BACK OF EACH. TYPE, PRINT OR WRITE CAREFULLY; ILLEGIBLE OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL NOT RECEIVE CONSIDERATION

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS? YES ☐ NO ☐

SECTION 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

NAME: MR. ☒ MISS ☐ MRS. ☐ FIRST: David MIDDLE: Edmund LAST: Murphy
TELEPHONE: OR 5032

PRESENT ADDRESS (STREET AND NUMBER): 4607 Conn Ave CITY: Washington DC STATE: COUNTRY:

LEGAL RESIDENCE (STREET AND NUMBER): 1521 35th Avenue CITY: San Francisco, Calif. STATE: COUNTRY:

NICKNAMES: none

OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED: none

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? not applicable

HOW LONG? not applicable

IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (WHERE, WHEN AND BY WHAT AUTHORITY): not applicable

DATE OF BIRTH: 23 June 1921

PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY: Utica. STATE: New York COUNTRY: USA

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: US

ACQUIRED BY: BIRTH ☒ MARRIAGE ☐ NATURALIZATION ☐

NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: NUMBER: DATE ISSUED: NAME OF COURT:

LOCATION OF COURT: CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

PREVIOUS CITIZENSHIP: no other

DATE HELD: FROM: TO:

OTHER CITIZENSHIPS (GIVE PARTICULARS): none

STEPS TAKEN TO CHANGE PRESENT NATIONALITY (GIVE PARTICULARS): none

LAST U.S. PASSPORT: NUMBER: 87026 DATE: 7 June 1946 PLACE OF ISSUE: San Francisco Calif

ALL OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS YOU HAVE HAD (GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES): none

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS:

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.: DATE OF ARRIVAL IN THIS COUNTRY: PORT OF ENTRY: PASSPORT OF COUNTRY:

LAST U.S. VISA: NUMBER: TYPE: DATE: PLACE OF ISSUE:

SECTION 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE: 26 SEX: male HEIGHT: 6'0" WEIGHT: 160 EYES: hazel HAIR: brown

COMPLEXION: ruddy SCARS: none BUILD: medium

OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: none

14-00000

SECTION 3. MARITAL STATUS

MARRIED ☒ SINGLE ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ SEPARATED ☐

DATE OF SEPARATION OR DIVORCE

PLACE

REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE

NOTE: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

NAME OF WIFE OR HUSBAND	FIRST Marianne	MIDDLE (FOR WIFE, MAIDEN) Escovy	LAST Murphy	DATE OF MARRIAGE 25 Feb 1944

PLACE OF MARRIAGE San Francisco, Calif

(HIS OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE — STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY: 1521 35th Avenue San Francisco, Calif

LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE

CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 1521 35th Avenue CITY, STATE: San Francisco, Calif COUNTRY

DATE OF BIRTH July 1921

PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY, STATE, COUNTRY: Shanghai, China

CITIZENSHIP US

DATE ACQUIRED 1946

WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY, STATE: San Francisco Calif. COUNTRY

OCCUPATION Housewife

LAST EMPLOYER Did part-time translation for French Commercial Attache, San Francisco, Calif to Mar/1941

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: unknown CITY STATE COUNTRY

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE — FROM: none TO: BRANCH OF SERVICE COUNTRY

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS) none

SECTION 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (INCLUDE PARTIAL DEPENDENTS)

NAME Steven Joseph Murphy	RELATIONSHIP son	AGE 13 mos
CITIZENSHIP US	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY 1521 35th Avenue San Francisco, Calif.	
NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY	
NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY	

SECTION 5. PARENTS

NOTE: FOR STEPFATHER, STEPMOTHER AND/OR GUARDIAN, GIVE THE SAME INFORMATION AS REQUIRED BELOW ON SEPARATE SHEET

NAME OF FATHER — FIRST, MIDDLE, LAST: Howard Leo Murphy — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE

CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE: 216 South Miller Ave Syracuse NY COUNTRY

DATE OF BIRTH October 1894

PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY, STATE: Syracuse, NY COUNTRY

CITIZENSHIP US

DATE ACQUIRED

WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY STATE COUNTRY

OCCUPATION Personnel Analyst

LAST EMPLOYER Dept of Labor State of New York

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: unknown CITY, STATE: Syracuse, NY COUNTRY

SECTION 5. PARENTS

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED [illegible] AGE 2)

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE — FROM: none — TO: — BRANCH OR SERVICE — COUNTRY

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): none

NAME OF MOTHER — FIRST: Anne — MAIDEN: Brown — LAST: Murphy — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 216 South Midler Avenue — CITY: Syracuse — STATE: NY — COUNTRY

DATE OF BIRTH: 7 January 1896 — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: Syracuse, — STATE: NY — COUNTRY

CITIZENSHIP: US — DATE ACQUIRED — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: Housewife — LAST EMPLOYER

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): none

SECTION 6. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (INCLUDING HALF-, STEP-, AND ADOPTED BROTHERS AND SISTERS)

NAME — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST: Mrs George Mentor

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 216 So Midler Ave. — CITY: Syracuse — STATE: NY — COUNTRY

NAME — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

NAME — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

SECTION 7. PARENTS-IN-LAW

NAME OF FATHER-IN-LAW — FIRST: Joseph — MIDDLE: (unknown) — LAST: Escovy — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 1521 35th Avenue — CITY: San Francisco — STATE: Calif. — COUNTRY

DATE OF BIRTH: 1893 (approx) — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: unknown — STATE — COUNTRY: Russia

CITIZENSHIP: US — DATE ACQUIRED: unknown — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY: San Francisco — STATE — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: Merchant — LAST EMPLOYER: self employed

NAME OF MOTHER-IN-LAW — FIRST: Barbara — MAIDEN: (unknown) — LAST: Escovy — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 1521 35th Avenue — CITY: San Francisco — STATE: Calif. — COUNTRY

DATE OF BIRTH: 1905(approx) — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: Nikolaevsk(now Novosibirsk) — STATE — COUNTRY: Russia

CITIZENSHIP: US — DATE ACQUIRED: unknown — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY: San Francisco, — STATE: Calif — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: Housewife. — LAST EMPLOYER

SECTION 8. RELATIVES

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO LIVE ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A FOREIGN POWER, ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS.

NAME unknown	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY	
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION		
NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY	
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION		
NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY	
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION		

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE (UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN) none

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY	
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)		
NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY	
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)		
NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY	
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)		

SECTION 9. EDUCATION

SCHOOL Eastwood High School	ADDRESS Midler Avenue	CITY STATE COUNTRY Syracuse New York	
DATES ATTENDED	FROM 1934	TO 1938	DEGREE college entrance diploma
SCHOOL	ADDRESS	CITY STATE COUNTRY	
DATES ATTENDED	FROM	TO	DEGREE
COLLEGE State Teachers College	ADDRESS Cortland New York	CITY STATE COUNTRY	
DATES ATTENDED	FROM Sept 1938	TO June 1942	DEGREE B. Ed.
COLLEGE Univ of California	ADDRESS Berkeley	CITY STATE COUNTRY	
DATES ATTENDED	FROM Spring Semester 1946	TO	DEGREE graduate work - no degree

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE S not applicable

CLASSIFICATION

ORDER NUMBER

APPROXIMATE INDUCTION DATE

BOARD NUMBER

ADDRESS OF BOARD STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE

IF DEFERRED, STATE REASON

SECTION 11. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE - UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN

COUNTRY US

SERVICE US Army

SERVICE DATES FROM: 16 June 1942 TO: 30 Jan 1946

GRADE Tec 4

SERIAL NUMBER 32289466

TYPE OF DISCHARGE honorable

LAST STATION Liaison Team 546-R, MIS, USFET

COMMANDING OFFICER Lt Michael Burda

REMARKS:
(1) Attended following schools in service:
ASTP Russian Area and Language Program, Univ of Calif, Berkeley, Calif.
US Army Officers Liaison School (Russian Section), MIS, Le Vesinet, France.
(2) Also served in G-2 Section, 13th Armored Division.

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (USE ADDITIONAL SHEET IF NECESSARY)

NOTE: INCLUDE BELOW PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 15 YEARS.

EMPLOYER War Department

JOB TITLE Russian Linguist

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE HQ USAFIK, US-USSR Joint Commission

KIND OF BUSINESS -

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY translated and interpreted assisted in preparation studies on USSR in Far East

NAME OF SUPERVISOR E.V. Prostov

DATES COVERED FROM: August 1946 TO: December 1946

SALARY CAF 6 PER year

REASONS FOR LEAVING transferred to G-2 Section USAFIK

EMPLOYER G-2 Section USAFIK

JOB TITLE Political Analyst

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE HQ USAFIK APO 235

KIND OF BUSINESS -

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY collated, analyzed information, prepared intelligence reports on Soviet occupied Zone, USAFIK G-2

NAME OF SUPERVISOR Col TM [illegible]

DATES COVERED FROM: December 1946 TO: March 1948

SALARY P-5 PER year

REASONS FOR LEAVING presently on leave

EMPLOYER

JOB TITLE

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE

KIND OF BUSINESS

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY

NAME OF SUPERVISOR

DATES COVERED FROM: TO:

SALARY PER

REASONS FOR LEAVING

EMPLOYER

JOB TITLE

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE

KIND OF BUSINESS

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 6)

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY | NAME OF SUPERVISOR

DATES COVERED | FROM: | TO: | SALARY | PER

REASONS FOR LEAVING

EMPLOYER | JOB TITLE

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER | CITY | STATE | KIND OF BUSINESS

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY | NAME OF SUPERVISOR

DATES COVERED | FROM: | TO: | SALARY | PER

REASONS FOR LEAVING

EMPLOYER | JOB TITLE

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER | CITY | STATE | KIND OF BUSINESS

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY | NAME OF SUPERVISOR

DATES COVERED | FROM: | TO: | SALARY | PER

REASONS FOR LEAVING

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW GIVE DETAILS CONCERNING ANY POSITION FROM WHICH YOU MAY HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED OR WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE.

DETAILS:

SECTION 13. CHARACTER REFERENCES—FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE
Col John N. Robinson	c/o Adjutant General(believed on leave at present)
Maj Harmon Rimmer	Pentagon
Mrs Mary Noble Smith	Prospect Terrace Cortland New York
Mr Sheldon Stephenson	Minoa, New York
Mr Herbert Brown	Time Inc. Los Angeles, Calif.

SECTION 14. SOCIAL ACQUAINTENCES—FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE
Robert Mahaney	626 West 114th Street NYC
Maj John Lahmer	Pentagon
Sam Baskett	Bowditch Ave Berkeley Calif.
Mr Vincent Carrol	Electrical Sect. NY Central RR, Syracuse NY
Florian Orlikowski	Law School, Catholic University Washington DC

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS—THREE IN THE UNITED STATES [illegible]

CONTINUED TO PAGE [illegible]

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE STATES

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
Jesse Tucker	[illegible] South [illegible] Ave	Syracuse	NY
George Sullivan	167 Shotwell Park,	Syracuse	NY
Mrs Charlotte Nicholson	212 South [illegible] Avenue	Syracuse	NY

SECTION 16. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? YES ☐ NO ☒
IF ANSWER IS "YES" EXPLAIN BELOW:

DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS?
Yes, moderately

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENCE, AND DISPOSITION OF CASE.
no

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? YES ☐ NO ☒
IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

SECTION 17. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES ☒ NO ☐ IF ANSWER IS "NO", STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME.

NAMES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
Account with the Chase National Bank (Garfield Branch) NYC was closed 26 March and will be transferred to my wife's account with the Bank of America, San Francisco.

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? YES ☐ NO ☒ IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE PARTICULARS:

SECTION 18. CREDIT REFERENCES-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME / ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE

Note: Never having engaged in any commercial activity and in view of my comparatively short work history, I hesitate in naming individuals as credit references.

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
1933	approx 1937	1205 Glenmore Pl South,	Syracuse	NY	
1937	1938	Collingwood Ave	Syracuse	NY	
1935	1939	3[illegible] Lincoln Ave	Portland	[illegible]	

(CONTINUED ON PAGE 8)

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7)

FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
1939	1942	216 South Miller Avenue	Syracuse	NY	
Note: During period 1939 1942 attended college but spent vacations in / Syracuse					
1942	1946	US Army(however spent leaves in Syracuse)			
Feb 1946	July 1946	Fulton Avenue	San Francisco	Calif.	
July 1946	March 1948	HQ USAFIK APO 235			

SECTION 20. RESIDENCES OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
Jan 1945	Jan 1946	European Theater		military service
July 1946	March 1948	Korea		government service

SECTION 21. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ALL KINDS TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS. INCLUDE ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR A BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OR TO WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT.

NAME Note: While attending Univ of Calif. in the spring of 1946 I secured a membership in American-Russian Institute in order to utilize their library of Soviet periodicals in my work. I have no interest in or sympathy with this organization and have had no other connection with the organization. To my knowledge I have not concealed this information from any government agency.

NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

SECTION 22. LANGUAGES-FOREIGN (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT", "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
Russian	fluent	fluent	fluent
French	fair	fluent	fluent
German	slight	fair	slight

SECTION 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATI[illegible]

INDICATE ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE [illegible] WHICH MAY FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR P[illegible]

None in addition to that mentioned in previous sections

SECTION 24. SPORTS AND HOBBIES

track, soccer in college; tennis, badminton at present.

SECTION 25. EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE

NAME Mrs Marianne Murphy

RELATIONSHIP wife

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER 1521 35th Ave CITY San Francisco STATE Calif. COUNTRY TELEPHONE OVerland 1-941

SECTION 26. INFORMATION AND FINAL COMMENTS

NOTE: YOU ARE INFORMED THAT CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION. IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO".

no

SECTION 27. CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR MY IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT Washington, D.C.
City State

DATE 30 March 1948

WITNESS

David E. Murphy
SIGNATURE

14-00000

Standard Form [illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. [illegible]

[illegible] in INK. [illegible] any change in [illegible] address.

1. Name of [illegible] position applied for:

2. Optional [illegible] (if mentioned in examination announcement):

3. Place of employment applied for:

4. Mr. Mrs. Miss (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
Mr. David Edmund Murphy

5. Street and number or R. D. number
4507 Conn Ave

City or post office (including postal zone), and State
Washington DC

6. [illegible] California
7. Office phone No. OR 5032

8. Place of birth (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country)
Utica NY

9. Date of birth (month, day, year): 23 June 1921
10. Age last birthday: 26
11. ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. ☒ Married ☐ Single
13. Height without shoes: 6 feet 0 inches. Weight [illegible] pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? X Yes ☐ No
If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade: P-5 January 1948

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Accept ☐ [illegible]	[illegible] ☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible]	[illegible]
Notations:		Approval

OPTION	SCORE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		
3 to 6 months?		
6 to 12 months?		X
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— in Washington, D. C.?	X	
anywhere in the United States?	X	
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations:

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept: $ P-5 CAF 12 per year.
You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify: ☐ Occasionally ☐ Frequently ☒ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. [illegible] Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any [illegible] which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the armed forces under question 17 (Military experience).
(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.
(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (Month, year)
From 16 Dec 1946 To present time

Place of employment (city and State):
Seoul KOREA

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) (If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):
Dept Army HQ USAFIK APO 235

Kind of business or organization (e. g. wholesale silk, insurance agency, etc.):
G-2 Section

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
4 - analysts, clerical

Name and title of immediate supervisor:
Col T.M. Watlington G-2 USAFIK

Reason for desiring to change employment: Wish to perform similar duties with other agency.

Exact title of your present position:
Political Analyst

Salary or earnings
Starting, $ P-3 per
Present, $ P-5 per

Description of your work: Collated, analysed information in the military, political, economic and social fields concerning the Soviet Zone in KOREA and adjacent Soviet or Soviet controlled areas. Prepared periodic intelligence reports, special studies based on above information for the CG, USAFIK, higher and adjacent commands. Analysed collecting agency operations, prepared missions, targets based on selected EEI. Used Russian language extensively in performing these duties.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

[illegible]

18. CONTINUED

Dates of employment (Month, year): From August 1946 To Dec 1946

Place of employment (city and State): Seoul KOREA

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Dept Army HQ USAFIK US-USSR Joint Com.

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): -

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: none

Name and title of immediate supervisor: E.V. Prostov

Reason for leaving: Transferred to G-2 USAFIK

Exact title of your position: Russian Linguist

Salary or earnings: Starting $ CAF 6 per

Final $ per

Description of your work: As US-USSR Joint Commission was adjourned did limited amount of translating or interpreting. 75% time assisted in preparation of weekly summary political summary "USSR and the Far East" for CG USAFIK, Political Advisor, Dept of State, and American Commissioners, US-USSR Joint Commission. In compiling summary Soviet periodicals were used in addition to intelligence reports furnished by US agencies.

Dates of employment (Month, year): From To

Place of employment (city and State):

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division:

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.):

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for leaving:

Exact title of your position:

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per

Final $ per

Description of your work:

Dates of employment (Month, year): From To

Place of employment (city and State):

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division:

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.):

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for leaving:

Exact title of your position:

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per

Final $ per

Description of your work:

Dates of employment (Month, year): From To

Place of employment (city and State):

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division:

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.):

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for leaving:

Exact title of your position:

Salary or earnings: Starting $ per

Final $ per

Description of your work:

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet [illegible] Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size [illegible] on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to [illegible]

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE. In order to [illegible] requirements of war veterans [illegible] the training and experience they have acquired in the Armed Services. Fill in [illegible] for each service school you have [illegible] no special or technical schools while in the service, write in Item (a) "No atte[illegible] [illegible] service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all [illegible] in duty assignment, showing dates of such assignment.

(a) First Special Service School attended: ASTP Russian Area and Language	(b) What were you taught in first special service school? Russian language, history, geography, economy. Language course was intensive consisting of 1[illegible] hours of Russian per week. Second semester history and geography were taught in Russian.
Location: Univ Calif Berkeley Calif	
Dates attended (months, years): From Sept 43 To March 44	
Rating received at end of this training: attendance certificate of completion or /	
(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School): G-2 Section, 13th Armd Div	(d) What did you do during this duty assignment? Performed duties as operations NCO in G-2 Section. As chief clerk of shift supervised journal, situation map posting, radio operators. Maintained Order of Battle files; became familiar with PI.
Dates of duty assignment (months, years): From July 44 To June 45	
(e) Second Special Service School attended: US Army Officers Liaison School	(f) What were you taught in Second Special Service School? Russian language, Soviet Army organization, Soviet military history, Soviet literature and culture. The emphasis was placed on military Russian and contemporary Soviet life.
Location: Le Vesinet, France	
Dates attended (months, years): From June and July 1945	
Rating received at end of this training: Certificate of completion	
(g) Duty assignment after this training: Liaison Team 546-R HQ MIS USFET	(h) What did you do during this duty assignment? Performed liaison duties with Soviet Army in Germany. Liaison involved problems of military govt and tactical units.
Dates of duty assignment (months, years): From July 194~~4~~5 To Jan 1946	

✓

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experiences, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION —Circle highest grade completed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of:
☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(a) Give name and location of last high school attended: Eastwood High, Syracuse NY

(b) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired: French, European history

(c) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended		Years Completed		Degrees Conferred		Semester Hours Credit
		From—	To—	Day	Night	Title	Date	
State Teachers, Cortland NY	Soc studies	1938	1942	4		BSEd	June 1942	unknown
Univ Calif Berkeley Calif	hist	Spring Sem 1946		?		–	–	–

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
Social Studies Educ.		Russian language and literature	
Mod European Hist		German history	
Political Geography		Russian history seminar	
elect history courses			

(e) Other training such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school), or "in service training" in a Federal agency.

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended From—	Dates Attended To—	Years Completed Day	Years Completed Night

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages	Reading Exc.	Reading Good	Reading Fair	Speaking Exc.	Speaking Good	Speaking Fair	Understanding Exc.	Understanding Good	Understanding Fair
Russian	x				x		x		
French	x					x	x		

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired? study, home, travel.

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries, indicate (1) names of countries, (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e.g., business, education, recreation)

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices:
none

Approximate number of words per minute in typing ..... shorthand .....

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)
☒ Yes ☐ No Give kind of license and State. teacher
First license or certificate (year): temp 1942 New York
Latest license or certificate (year):

22. Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application such as:
(a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(b) your patents or inventions
(c) public speaking and public relations experience
(d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

none

23. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

	FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.	Herbert Brown	Time Inc. Los Angeles Calif	publishing
2.	Colonel John N Robinson	c/o Adj General (leave at present) (believed on	USA
3.	Mrs Mary Noble Smith	Prospect Terrace Cortland NY	professor of dramatic arts

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		X
28. Since your 16th birthday, have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail, for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes" give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating if retired from military or naval service		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 38.		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? If your answer is "Yes" show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.	X	
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?	X	
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?	unable	
(c) Was service performed on an active full time basis, with full military pay and allowances?	X	

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service.	Date of separation or separations
16 June 1942	30 Jan 1946

Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	Serial No. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation.)
army	32289456

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY, OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service-connected disability?		

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d) IS "YES" AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19.....

Agency:

Title

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions (indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	
18	Do not have personal records available in Washington to give details as to semester hours.	19	March 1948; government service.
19	European Theater (France, Germany) Jan 45 - Jan 46. military service. Korea July 46		

If more space is required, use paper of the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SEC. 80)

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date ....31 March 1948

Signature of applicant David S. Murphy

(Sign your name in ink as you usually write it, and if female, print name as of ... Mrs. Mary L. Doe.)

GPO 16—16—47264-1

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 22 March 1955

PROT 2- 1083

TO: **Chief, EE**

FROM: Chief, Communications Security Division

SUBJECT: Notification of Cryptographic Clearance - **David E. Murphy**

1. Subject employee has been granted a cryptographic clearance effective this date (or 6 February 1955.)

2. Subject has been informed of the granting of clearance and has been briefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters.

3. A cryptographic clearance is not a permanent clearance. It will be revoked immediately should the employee fail to maintain the security standards prescribed in CIA Regulation 90-500. It may also be revoked because of lack of need or for appropriate administrative or technical communications security reasons.

4. An individual holding a CIA cryptographic clearance is authorised to have custody, access to, or knowledge of staff cryptographic material or information only to the extent necessary for the performance of his official duties. A cryptographic clearance alone does not constitute authorization to perform cryptographic duties without the prior approval of the Assistant Director for Communications.

5. When Subject employee no longer requires the clearance because of a change in assignment or duties (e.g. return from overseas assignment, replacement as acting communicator) it is requested that the Communications Security Division (2411 K Building, ext. 3021) be notified so that the clearance may be revoked.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY DIVISION:

CHEATH A. TOOLEY
Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
  2 - Addressee
  1 - Security Office (2512 I Bldg.)
  1 - Personnel Office (Wing 1-H Curie Hall)
  1 - OC-S/PROT file

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

APR 22

David E. Murphy

1. Date of last CIA clearance **March 30, 1948**

2. Cryptographic clearance:

   Approved **April 21, 1948**

   Disapproved ______

   If disapproved, give details under remarks.

3. Remarks: ______

Robert Cunningham

April 21, 1948
(Date)

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM
Chief, Security Branch, SO.
(Authentication Officer)
Security Division

Orig: CSB file
cc: TRS, 1209 Que
CGD, SSCS, 355 South
CPD, 1059 Que

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FBZ
Attention: Paul Eckel

DATE: March 30, 1948

FROM : CSB

SUBJECT: DAVID E. MURPHY - #31454

In response to your memorandum of March 15, Subject as above, please be advised that the original security clearance granted as of July 18, 1947, is hereby confirmed.

Robert H. Cunningham

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM
Chief, Security Branch, SO

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]
(1)

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

Investigation Report

Subject: MURPHY, David E.

Date: July 18, 1947

To: FBI (2)

Number: 31484

1. Investigation directed by: RHC
2. Sources of information: FBI
3. Remarks

4. Recommendation:

SECURITY APPROVAL RECOMMENDED, THOUGH SUBJECT
RECEIPT OF DEROGATORY INFORMATION A ME
E DATE. INTERVIEW WAIVED.
THE APPLICANT ENTERS UPON DUTY WITHIN
FROM ABOVE DATE, THIS APPROVAL BECOMES
INVALID.

By Rite
Security Officer
ROBERT H. CUNNINGH

oft
CC: CPD

CONF

NO.
1946 88-161

CONFIDENTIAL

GAP OF THE DESIGNATED FILE BEING MICROFILMED

[illegible]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

[illegible]

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Kimsey, Herman E.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 11/16/49 - 11/12/65

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

186

KIMSEY, HERMAN E. 61555 D

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 July 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 61555

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KIMSEY, HERMAN E.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: TERMINATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 9 | DAY ~~30~~ 20 | YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3226-1064 1000 ~~3225-1050-1000~~

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/TSD
Authentication
Graphic Arts Reproduction Branch
Analysis and Research Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: DOCUMENT TECH CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0652

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1397.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 (4)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $11415

18. REMARKS: Continuous Agency service from 23 March 1953 to 20 September 1962.

Form 1150 Remarks: Terminated in accordance with provisions of CIA Regulation 20-27, Separation of Surplus Personnel, pursuant to authority of Director of Central Intelligence contained in Section 102 (c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. This termination does not affect your right to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the U. S. Government if you are declared eligible for such employment by the U. S. Civil Service Commission.

Authorized Maximum Separation Compensation in accordance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 20-32, Separation Compensation.

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES R. SHIELDS

DATE SIGNED:

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: JAMES R. SHIELDS, TSD/CMO

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

DATE OF BIRTH: 12 11 16

EOD DATA

POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

D.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 26 SEP 1962

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

Director of Personnel

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DATE PREPARED: Mo 05 Da 09 Yr 60

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

X V to V
UV to V
V to UV
UV to UV

1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): KIMSEY, Herman E.
3. Date of Birth: Mo 12 Da 11 Yr 16
4. Vet. Pref.: None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code:
5. Sex: M
6. CS - LOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt.: Yes - 1 No - 2 Code:
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Appt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI: Yes-1 No-2 Code:
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT. LCD: Yes - 1 No - 2 Code:

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP/TSS
Authentication
Graphic Arts Reproduction Div
Analysis and Research Branch

Code:
15. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D.C.
Station Code:
16. Dept.-Field: Dept. - X Unlid. Frgn - Code 2
17. Position Title: IO TECH AIDS
18. Position No.: 92
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0136, 63
21. Grade & Step: 13 3
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 10, 370
23. SD: D
24. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr [illegible] 57
25. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr [illegible] 61
26. Appropriation Number: 0225-1005-1000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT
Code: [illegible]
28. Eff. Date: Mo Da Yr [illegible]
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR
Code:
30. Separation Date:

6

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDP/TSD
Authentication
Graphic Arts Reproduction Branch
Analysis and Research Section

Code:
32. Location Of Official Station:
Station Code:
33. Dept.-Field: Dept. - Unlid. Frgn - Code 2
34. Position Title: DOCUMENT TECH-CH
35. Position No.: 658
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 1397. 01
38. Grade & Step:
39. Salary Or Rate: $
40. SD:
41. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr [illegible] 57
42. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr [illegible] 61
43. Appropriation Number:

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title):
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Emanuele Fontana ext. 3031
C. Request Approved By (Signature and Title):
JAMES R. SHIELDS
Career Management Officer, TSD

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[illegible]	[illegible]	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	[illegible]	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	

Remarks:

[illegible] by
CSPD

FORM 1152a (Use Previous Edit.)

SECRET

14-00000

Std. Form 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible] VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. – Miss – Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. HERMAN E. KIMSEY
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 24 Jan 57
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED:
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
IO TECH AIDS BY 92	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO TECH AIDS BY 92
GS-0136.63-12 $7785 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.63-13 $8990 per annum
DDP/TSS Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary):

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title):

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Dave Richards Ext. 3031

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: JASPER L. OLMSTEAD
Title: Career Management Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	C. A.	REAL.

SD-DT

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM 7-2505-20 TO Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT: Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE CALIF.
21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS:

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A		
B. CIV. OR POS. CONTROL		31 [illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E		
F. APPROVED BY		

REMARKS:

SL[illegible]

[illegible] 25 Jan 57

PERSONNEL INFORMATION CARD

The following applicable items must be [illegible] rted immediately when an employee (1) enters on duty, (2) changes name, home or office address or telephone number, (3) transfers to an[illegible] component of the agency, or (4) is to be absent from agency for more than 10 days in which case enter the office telephone number of the administrative officer, (5) changes marital status.

HERE: STATE TYPE OF CHANGE

NAME: Kinsey, Herman Edward DATE: 2 April 1953

OFFICE DESIGNATION & LOCATION: A&R GABO TSS Central 22 2792

NEW ADDRESS:

PRESENT ADDRESS: 1723 "G" St. N.W.

HOME TELEPHONE NO: National 8-2786 MARITAL STATUS: Single

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL'S NAME TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TELEPHONE DIRECTORY? YES ☐ NO ☑

REMARKS: Return to 1107-I

SERIAL NO.	NAME	ORGANIZATION			OFFICE		OFFICE TELEPHONE NUMBER	HOME PHONE		DATE		
		OFF	DIV	BR	ROOM	BUILDING		EXCHANGE	NUMBER	DAY	MO	YR

IDM 003400

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/P
PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME MR. HERMAN E. KIMSEY
STATION Washington, D.C.
ASSIGNMENTS IO TECH AIDS
AGE 40 years DATE 24 January 1957
DDP UNIT TSS
PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION DT

PRESENT GRADE GS-12
PROPOSED GRADE GS-13
CS TRAINING

PRESENT TO SLOT NUMBER & GRADE BY 92

PROPOSED TO SLOT NUMBER & GRADE BY 92 GS-13

EDUCATION:

Two years coll. - No degree

LANGUAGE:

Japanese - slight

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (Excluding SSU OSS):

1941-'43-Military Service
'44-'45-McCloud River Lbr. Co., Brakeman, $1.10 p/h
'44-'48-U.S. Forest Service, Camp Administrator
'48-'51-Military Service

SUMMARY OF CIA [illegible] ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES

Appt. - 23 Mar 1953-Tech Projects Off, GS-9
Reassign-13 Sept 1953, Technologist, TSS/GARD, GS-9
Promot-9 May 1954-Technologist, TSS/GARD, GS-11
Reass-27 Feb 1955-IO Tech Aids, TSS/GARD, GS-11
Promot-19 Jun 1955-IO Tech Aids, TSS/GARD, GS-12

RECOMMENDED BY
JOSEPH F. MARZEN
Acting Chief, TSS/GARD

[illegible]
CHARLES J. RYAN
AC/TSS/AUTH

SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM

G-3467
10 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, TSS Administrative Staff

SUBJECT : Request for Promotion - Herman E, Kimsey

1. It is requested that Herman E. Kimsey be promoted from GS-12 to GS-13. Mr. Kimsey has been in grade for over 18 months. Mr. Kimsey has been Chief of the A&R Section of GARD for over 22 months. During this time he has exhibited ability in conducting and managing the activities of his branch. Mr. Kimsey is a Questioned Documents Analyst and is well-fitted to perform the duties required of the A&R Branch.

2. It is recommended that Mr. Kimsey be promoted to GS-13.

Joseph F. Marzen
JOSEPH F. MARZEN
Acting Chief, TSS/GARD

Distribution:
~~2~~ - Addressee
1 - TSS/SRB
1 - TSS/GARD/file
1 - TSS/GARD/Chrono

Concurs - C J Ryan

SECRET
(When filled in)

DD/P

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: KIMSEY, Herman F.
AGE: 39 years
DATE: 27 May 1955

STATION AND DUTIES: Washington, D.C. IO Tech. Aids
DD/P UNIT: TSS
PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: DT

PRESENT GRADE: GS-11
PROPOSED GRADE: GS-12
CIA TRAINING:

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BY 92 GS-11

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BY 92 GS-12

EDUCATION: Two years college - no degree

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Japanese - slight

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
'41 - '43 - Military Service
'44 - '45 - Mc Cloud River Lbr. Co., Brakeman, $1.10 p/h
'46 - '48 - U.S. Forest Service, Camp Administrator
'48 - '51 - Military Service

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
Appt 23 Mar 1953, Tech Projects Off. GS-9
Reassignment 13 Sept 1953, Technologist, GARD GS-9
Promoti n 9 May 1954 - Technologist, GARD GS-11
Reassign 27 Feb 55 - IO Tech Aids, GARD, GS-11

RECOMMENDED BY:
CHARLES YECH, JR.
Chief, TSS/GARB

CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD: Mr. Kimsey has been acting Chief of the Analysis and Research Branch of GARD for over 12 months and during this time has exhibited ability in conducting and directing the activities of this Branch. Mr. Kimsey is a professional document analyst and is very well fitted to perform the duties required of the Analysis and Research Branch, both in its connections as Quality Control for GARD document production and as Handwriting Typewriter and Falsification analyst. Request that in view of the foregoing, Mr. Kimsey be promoted to GS-12.

SECRET

FORM NO. 59-44
1 JAN 54

(4)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. [illegible] E. KELSEY
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 27 May 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 19 JUN 1955
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
IO TECH AIDS BY 92-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO TECH AIDS BY 92
GS-0136.63-11 $5940 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.63-12 $7040 per annum
DDP/Technical Services Staff Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

APPROVED BY TSS CAREER SERVICE PANEL

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Tom Clines x 3031

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: JASPER L. OLMSTEAD
Title: Career Management Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-[illegible]

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-2515-20 TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	6/7/55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	6-8-55	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY: Robert [illegible] Orville [illegible] 6-8-55

SECRET

Standard Form 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. - Miss - Mrs. — One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. HERMAN E. KIMSEY	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec. 1916	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 16 Feb. 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) REASSIGNMENT		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED	

FROM—		TO—
TECHNOLOGIST BY 93	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (TECH AIDS) BY 92-11
~~GS-1390.01-11 $5940 per annum~~	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.63-11 $5940 per annum
~~DDP/Technical Services Staff~~ ~~Graphic Arts Reproduction Division~~ ~~Analysis and Research Branch~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
~~Washington, D.C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

APPROVED BY TSS CAREER SERVICE PANEL

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) Tom Clines x 2031	Signature: MARION D. SHAW
	Title: Career Management Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				~~SD-TS~~ DT

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM 5-2515-20 TO same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CIVIL OR PHYS. CONTROL		2/18/55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	2-21-55	
E.			
F. APPROVED			

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. [illegible] E. KINSEY

2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 December 1916

3. REQUEST NO.

4. DATE OF REQUEST 23 April 1954

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 9 MAY 1954

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
	TECHNOLOGIST BY 93-9	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	TECHNOLOGIST BY 93
	GS-1390.01-9 $5185	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1390.01-11 $5940
		10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Div ~~[illegible] & Analysis~~ Analysis & Research Branch
		11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington D. C.
	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

PERIODIC STEP [illegible] 23 Mar 54

TO SALARY $ 5185

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) Tom Clines 8305

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Harold G. Jenkins
HAROLD G. JENKINS
Signature:
Title: Acting Personnel Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-TS

15. SEX M

16. RACE W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-2515-20
TO: 4-2515-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Approved by TSS Career Service Board ([illegible])

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	DC	29 Apr 54	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	5/7/54	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY [illegible] 5/5/54

10—67329-6

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
[illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr. – Miss – Mrs. – One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. [illegible] E. KINSEY	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec '16	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 23 Mar 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) REASSIGNMENT		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: APR 1 [illegible]	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		B. APPROVED:	

FROM—		TO—
TECH PROJECTS OF BY 256-9	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	TECHNOLOGIST BY 93-9
GS-1390-9 ~~$5060~~ 5185	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1390.01-9 ~~$5060~~ 5185
~~DDP/Technical Services Staff~~ ~~Graphic Arts Reproduction Div~~ Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Div Analysis & Research Branch
~~Washington D. C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ XX DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ XX DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

[illegible] 28 Mar 54

[illegible] 5185

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) Tom Glines 0305

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature: HAROLD O. JENKINS

Title: Acting Personnel Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-TS

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-2515-20 TO: 4-2515-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	BC	2 Apr 54	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	[illegible]	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—(One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Herman E. KINSEY
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 [illegible] 1916
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 21 Aug 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 13 Sept 53
B. APPROVED: 13 Sept 53

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	TECH PROJECTS OFF BY 256-9		Same
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1390-9 $5060		"
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Div Office of the Chief		" " "
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington D. C.		"
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer to Vouchered Funds from Unvouchered Funds.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY ROBERT W. MUENSTER

Signature:

Title: Personnel Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	DEPT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	SUCC.	I.A.	REAL.

SS-TS

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-2515-10 TO: 4-2515-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [illegible] AUG [illegible] 1953

4-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ENTRANCE ON DUTY NOTICE

1. DATE
23 March 1953

2. TO:
Mr. Muenster Quarters Eye

3. OFFICE (Division, Branch, Etc.)
TSS GS 9 $5060.00

4. THE PERSON NAMED BELOW MEETS THE STANDARDS FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THIS AGENCY SUBJECT TO THE TYPE OF CLEARANCE INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9. THE SIGNED CLEARANCE FROM I&S FOR ENTRANCE ON DUTY HAS BEEN MADE A PART OF THE PERSONNEL FILE OF THIS INDIVIDUAL. HE/SHE IS REPORTING FOR DUTY THIS DATE.

5. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
KIMSEY HERMAN EDWARD

6. JOB TITLE AND GRADE
TECH. PROJ. OFFICER GS 9

7. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ACTION
23 March 1953

8. ☒ E.O.D.
☐ REASSIGNMENT
OTHER:

9. TYPE CLEARANCE
Full

10. REMARKS (Include Medical or Other Limitations)

Frank J. Dewald Jr.
PERSONNEL OFFICE

DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL AND COPY (WHITE) TO ITEM NO. 3. COPY (PINK) TO PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM NO. 37-116
NOV 1952 PREVIOUS EDITIONS TO BE USED

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

ITS DATE

NAME: Herman Edw. Kinsey

REFERENCE BY: [illegible]

HOME ADDRESS: Box 185, McCleod, [illegible]

TELEPHONE:

BUSINESS ADDRESS: Student - YMCA - 634 - Wash. D.C.

TELEPHONE:

DATE OF BIRTH: 30 years old

PLACE OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED): U.S. - birth

NAME OF SPOUSE: Single - no kids -

DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED):

SALARY REQUESTED: GS-9

NO. OF DEPENDENTS: 1 - Mother

INTERVIEWER:

EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES)

File

Subject is currently employed in the CIC at Ft. Holabird, not [illegible] at Ft. [illegible]

[illegible]

8-30-52

MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION, SPECIAL SKILLS, SALARY LEVELS)

File -

MILITARY OCCUPATION (RANK, SERIAL NO., DATES OF SERVICE, DUTIES AND AREAS)

5/41 - 11/43 - CDD - broke neck on 24' jump at Benning - Army

11/46 - 1/44 - Enlisted CIC - basic training (Holabird), & then assigned as instructor for 11 mos - taught identification - collection of evidence, etc.

[illegible]

FORM NO. 37-117
JAN 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

14-111

CONFIDENTIAL

AREA KNOWLEDGE (RESIDENCE OR STUDY)

[illegible] - [illegible] - 1944 - 3 mo. - CIC -

[illegible] - 1950 - 6 mo. " - "Likes" -

[illegible] - 1957 - 10 mo. - " - "OK" -

LANGUAGE FACILITY

[illegible] fluency" - [illegible] [illegible] no [illegible] [illegible] -

[illegible] [illegible] - NS 1957.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS (BE COMPLETE AND JUSTIFY DECISIONS, NOTE ANY UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.)

[illegible]; solid; good appearance; clean; mature; [illegible]; confident; seems of average intelligence — certainly [illegible] "brain". Handles himself OK — impressed as a plugger — somewhat [illegible] — probably do a good, dependable job, on a[n] individual [illegible]. [illegible] intent on [illegible]; doesn't [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] at [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] — [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Would [illegible] [illegible] at [illegible] 9-7 [illegible] — [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]; CIC experience ([illegible] [illegible] + [illegible]); [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]; [illegible] [illegible]; [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. TRC - FE -

[illegible] 3 Jan 3[illegible].

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

Bal.
1643-9 1606

SOURCE FIELD ☐ CASUAL ☐		NTROL NUMBER
		DATE 11-16-49
RECOMMENDED FOR BRANCH	DESK	REFERRED BY
NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE) Kinsey, Herman Edward	GRADE	DEPT., OFFICE OR BRANCH
SERIAL NUMBER	ORGANIZATION Host	DATE OF BIRTH 12-11-16
ADDRESS (~~BUSINESS OR MILITARY~~) Y.M.C.A. 1736 G St.		TELEPHONE
ADDRESS (HOME)		TELEPHONE
CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED) Born in New Mexico		
NAME (HUSBAND OR WIFE) [illegible]		DATE OF BIRTH
PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED)	ae

EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, GRADES, AND EXTRA CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES)

LANGUAGES (DEGREE OF FLUENCY, HOW ACQUIRED)

FOREIGN EXPERIENCE (EXTENT AND PURPOSE)

PRINCIPAL CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE (MAIN OCCUPATION, SPECIAL SKILLS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ELECTIVE OFFICES)

MILITARY EXPERIENCE (PRINCIPAL DUTIES, SERVICE SCHOOLS. IF OFFICER: MANNER OF PERFORMANCE RATINGS; IF EM: AGCT SCORE, DEGREE OF SKILLS, MOS AND MOS TITLES.

FORM NO. 30-1
NOV 1948

(1038)

ANDIDATE MUST NOT SEE THIS PAGE

UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES [illegible]

REMARKS: (ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION)

Sent over by Schmidt - I & S for interview & testing.
- has been interviewed in the band -
Good appearance. Neatly dressed - pleasant

May be a good man as a plugging type.
Conscientious worker but doubt very much
that he is a "flash" at anything? Very
slow spoken.

[illegible] - He will bring in typed form 57's
[illegible] & [illegible]?

CLEARED FOR CONSIDERATION BY:

SERVICE RECORD CHECKED: FORM NO. 88-1 ☐ FORM NO. 57 ☐

RATINGS

FACTORS	SUP	E	VS	S	UNS	EXPLANATION
MOTIVATION - ENERGY, EFFORT, INITIATIVE, INTEREST IN ASSIGNMENT.						
PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE - JUDGMENT, DECISIVENESS, ALERTNESS, PERCEPTION.						
STABILITY - EMOTIONAL CONTROL AND MATURITY, ABSENCE OF NERVOUS SYMPTOMS.						
ABILITY TO WORK WITH OTHERS - TACT, ABSENCE OF ANNOYING TRAITS.						
LEADERSHIP - ORGANIZING ABILITY, ABILITY TO WIN COOPERATION.						
PHYSICAL ABILITY - APPEARANCE, PRESENCE, VIGOR, STAMINA.						

SIGNATURE DATE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 61555

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible], [illegible] Edward
3. SEX: M
4. DATE OF BIRTH: Dec 1916
5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE: 23 Mar 1953

6. MARITAL STATUS: Single
7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee): 0
YEAR(S) OF BIRTH:
8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA
SPOUSE:

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS — MEMBERSHIP: Mar 1956
OTHER STATUS:
10. LAST MED. RPT.: Feb 1959
QUAL. FOR: O/S TDY
EVAL. FOR: TDY O/S

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS — NONE: X
SERVICE:
GRADE:
ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA:
RELEASE TO MIL. SER.:
TO BE DEFERRED:
RETIRED:

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None
13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None
14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1935-45 McCloud River Lumber Co, McCloud, California - Lumberman, Brakeman (intermittently)
1941-43 Military Service, US Army, Sgt - Intelligence Non-commissioned Officer
1939; 1940; 1945-46 Dept of Agriculture, US Forest Service, Calif - Forest Guard; Camp Superintendant
1946-49; 1950-53 Military Service, US Army, CIC, M/Sgt - Instructor USA; Special Agent in charge of Document Laboratory, Japan; Special Agent, Combat CIC Team, Korea; Instructor & Chief, Investigative Laboratory, USA.

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

High school graduate
Various Military Schools

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1955 Non-clerical Basic Typing

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Mar 1953	Tech Proj Off	301	9		TSS/Graphic Arts Reproduction	Hq
Feb 1954	Technologist	1390.01	9	TS	DDP/TSS/GARD/Ch,Anal&ResBranch	"
May 1954	"	1390.01	11	DT	" " " " " " " "	"
Jun 1955	I.O. (Tech Aids)	0136.63	12	DT	DDP/TSS/Auth/GARD/Ch,Anal&Res	"
Feb 1957	" " "	0136.63	13	DT	" " " " " " " "	"
May 1960	Document Tech	1397.01	13	D	" " " " " " " "	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: 15 Sep 1961
21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: OP/PCD/CAP/
22. LAST FILE REVIEW BY / REVIEWED BY EMPLOYEE: 3 Aug 1959

FORM 8-61 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
[illegible]	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
KIMSEY, Herman Edward	Dec 1916

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS

See Attachment

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appreciation 1953 from Chief, NEA for excellent work on Report C-145 performed by TSS personnel. Endorsed by Chief, [illegible]/TSS.

Commendation 1955 from the field, conveyed by the Career Management Officer, TSS for efficiency in rendering support to an operation.

27. DATE REVISED	28. PROFILE PREPARED BY
15 Sep 1961	OP/POD/[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
61555

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) KIMSEY,	(First) Herman	(Middle) E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE DOCUMENT TECH CH			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSD/AUTH/GARB	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

NOT ELIGIBLE	X MEMBER	DEFERRED	
PENDING	DECLINED	DENIED	

9. TYPE OF REPORT

INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD
From Jan 1960 thru To Dec 1960

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Section personnel	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Oral Briefings	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Monitoring the writing of and writing technical reports	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other Government Questioned Document Labs.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Monitors Graphology Program	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION E ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-55 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject continues to perform his duties as Supervisor of the many complex A&R activities in a competent manner. His knowledge of the technical aspects of his Sections' many functions help to insure a continuation of work flow and his ability to absorb and retain technical data related to his field of endeavor serves as an aid in the presentations of his numerous oral briefings.

One apparent weakness, which he continues to retain, is in his work relations with technical personnel; he has a tendency to drift from main topic under discussion to unrelated subjects, which, while they may be informative, decreases not only the Subject's productive capability, but, also that of the technical personnel.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
31 January 1961	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
46	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
31 January 1961	DC/TSD/GARB/	Paul J. Szego PAUL J. SZEGO

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
31 January 1961	Chief, TSD/GARB	JOSEPH F. MARZEN

SECRET

STA. DAB. FORM 57
REVISED MARCH 1961
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

57-103

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

APPLICATION NO.

1. Kind of position applied for, or name of examination | Announcement No.

2. Options for which you wish to be considered *(if listed in examination announcement)*

3. Primary place(s) of employment applied for *(City and State)*

4. Name *(First, middle, maiden, if any, last)*
Mr. Mrs. Miss Herman Edward Kimsey

5. Address *(Number, Street, City, Zone, State)*
3700 Mass. Ave., N. W. Washington, D. C.
or c/o W. S. Linebarger, Box 407
Mt. Shasta, California WA-6-4646

6. Home phone: FE-8-6400

7. Office phone: 351-3295

8. Legal or voting residence *(State)*: District of Columbia

9. Height without shoes: 5 feet 11 inches

10. Weight: 200 lbs.

11. Sex: ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. Marital status: ☒ Married ☐ Single *(incl. widowed, divorced)*

ANNOUNCEMENT NO.

13. Birthplace *(City and State, or foreign country)*: Gallup, McKinley County, New Mexico

14. Birth date *(Month, day, year)*: December 11, 1916

15. Social Security Number: 556 | 10 | 4750

16. If you have ever been employed by the Federal Government, indicate last grade and job title:
GS-13, Intelligence Officer (Section Chief) (Step 4) (GS-14 Slot)
Dates of service in that grade
From 12 Feb. 1957 To 20 September 1962

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Examining Office Only

☐ Appor. ☐ Nonappor.
Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned
Entered Register:
Notations:
App. Reviewed:
App. Approved:

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Augm. Rating
			☐ 5 points (Tent.)	
			☐ 10 points Comp. Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Point	
			☐ Disab.	
			☐ Being Investigated	
Initials and date				

17. AVAILABILITY INFORMATION

A. Lowest grade or pay you will accept $ Per or grade OPEN

B. Will you accept temporary appointment? *(Acceptance or refusal of temporary employment will not affect your consideration for other appointments.)* ☒ Yes ☐ No If "Yes," indicate by "X" in appropriate box or boxes.
☒ 1 mo. or less ☒ 1 to 4 months ☒ 4 to 12 months

C. Will you accept less than full-time employment (less than 40 hours per week)? ☒ Yes ☐ No

D. Are you willing to travel? ☐ Not at all ☐ Occasionally ☒ Frequently

E. Will you accept employment: In Washington, D.C.? ☒ Yes ☐ No Outside U.S.? ☒ Yes ☐ No

F. Will you accept appointment only in certain locations? ☐ Yes ☒ No
If "Yes," list locations:

18. ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE AND VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. List Dates, Branch, and Serial or Service Number of All Active Service

From	To	Branch of Service	Serial or Service Number
19 May 1941	5 Nov. 1943		
29 Nov. 1946	8 Oct. 1949	U. S. Army	RA 39080108
5 Jan. 1950	20 Mar. 1953		

B. Have you ever been discharged from the armed forces under other than honorable conditions?
☐ Yes *(Give details in Item 39)* ☒ No

C. Do you claim 5-point preference based on wartime military service? ☐ Yes ☒ No

D. Do you claim 5-point preference based on service during peacetime campaign? ☐ Yes *(Complete and attach Standard Form 15)* ☒ No

E. Do you claim 10-point preference? ☐ Yes ☒ No *If "Yes," check type of preference claimed and complete and attach Standard Form 15, "Veteran Preference Claim"* TYPE: ☐ Compensable disability ☐ Disability ☐ Wife ☐ Widow ☐ Mother

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information given in answer to Question 18 has been verified with the discharge certificate and/or other proof which shows that the separation was under honorable conditions.

VETERAN PREFERENCE ALLOWED: ☐ 5-point ☐ 10-point Comp. Disab. ☐ Other 10-point ☐ None

Signature and title | Agency | Date

16-76610-1

Herman Edward Kimsey
Attachment I

1962 to Present - Associated as a technical consultant with Security Associates, Inc., Washington, D. C., specializing in commercial and industrial security.

1953 to 1962 - Intelligence with U. S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency, GS-13, $11,415. As Chief of a small branch of highly specialized analysts, I exercised a wide variety of talents and was responsible for the following: the direction and administration of the branch operations; determined the course of action for further research effort within the branch; monitored and supervised a program of special personnel assessment; evaluated technical analyses and their relationship to specific cases; advised and consulted with members of Senior Staff components of CIA; delivered numerous technical briefings to both U. S. and foreign police and intelligence services; initiated and maintained projects carried out by private organizations such as universities, private consultants, and private research corporations. During the above period, I trained and briefed numerous others engaged in police and intelligence work. I also initiated and developed four technical systems currently in operation on a world-wide basis within CIA and wrote numerous articles for an intelligence periodical. In January 1962, CIA presented me with one of the largest individual Monetary Suggestion Awards ever given by that Agency.

Herman Edward Kimsey December 11, 1916

Questioned Document Analyst .. (Continued)

b. Participated in establishing document analysis facilities in foreign governments and present plans call for continuation of this TDY consulting and advisory work.

Per request from Training, periodically briefs Foreign Intelligence Services and Agency personnel. These briefings cover general capabilities of the Section and are intended to inform the student of the question document problem.

II SUPERVISION RECEIVED:

The Section Chief receives technical requests directly from the customers and advises them and the Branch Chief on the technical problems, personnel, and other requirements for making determinations. Staff and Branch Chiefs establish guides on administrative matters. Review of accomplishments can only be made in the light of the customers application of evaluation results. Decisions required as a result of Section work are usually "Eyes Only" for customers application in offices of Senior Staffs of the major components in the Agency. The recommendations for participation in setting technical standards for mechanical and personnel identification methods or in financing such activity would be evaluated on the basis of the incumbent's evaluation of potential benefits to Agency technical services to intelligence efforts.

III QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED:

Qualifications for this position will be written in the preliminary Qualification Standatds developed for the GS-1397.01, Document Analyst title, upgraded by Civil Service Commission Hearing, to GS-14, 1958.

Herman Edward Kinsey December 11, 1916

I. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The analysis and Research Section is responsible for advisory, developmental and service work in the field of Questioned Document Analysis in support of overt and covert activities of the Agency. This includes technical testing and research into handwriting and document evaluation or authentication.

The Section Chief directs the assignments of projects, studies developments in scientific fields supporting authentication work, advises Agency officials on the current and long range capabilities in authentication or evaluation of documents and prepares recommendations for direction of the program.

Specifically:

1. The Section Chief, under the policy direction of Staff Chief, and administratively reporting to Branch Chief, provides administrative and technical supervision to Questioned Document Analysts in the Section and continually insures that their technical competence is maintained. The Section Chief reviews requests for analysis of documents and contents, establishes priorities for use of Section Personnel and suggests available external facilities for analysis or research.

2. Studies developments in Analysis and evaluation of documents and their contents as done by other Federal Agencies (FBI, Post Office, Treasury, Insurance Corporations, Private Practitioners in the Questioned Document Analysis field and Clinical Psychologists. Initiated inter-agency collaboration on use of technical facilities and indices of characteristics of paper and writing materials.

3. Makes review of recommendations of Document Analysts, Consultants, and Contract Employees engaged in analytical and projective studies, determines courses of action for additional research, confers with case officers and program leaders on the availability of additional data, time limits, operational potentials, etc., to develop additional facts of problems to be employed or to make final recommendations on the contents, validity, possible origination and processing of documents subject to study.

4. a. As advisor and consultant to major component program officials, provides authoritative material on the potential of identification involving documents and other physical items, makes periodic evaluations of case history records and provides other technical documentation service as may be required.

(Continued on Page 2)

1946 to 1953 - Worked as a Special Agent (MOS-1301) in the Army's Counter Intelligence Corp in the grade of Master Sargeant. My duties consisted of investigating crimes of security nature; member of a combat CIC team in Korea; two assignments as an instructor at the basic CIC School; enlisted Chief of the Technical Laboratory at the CIC Center, and enlisted Chief of Special Projects Technical Laboratory (CIC), Far East Command. During this period, I co-authored two text books for the CIC school and rewrote one other. Further, I experienced over 2,000 lecture hours as an instructor in the basic CIC school and lived and worked three years in two foreign countries.

1945 to 1946 - Held the position of Camp Superintendent of a 100 man forest camp engaged in timber disease control, U. S. Forest Service, California.

1941 to 1943 - Military Service, U. S. Army, Intelligence NCO, MOS 631, Combat Intelligence.

1939 to 1940 - Forest Guard, U. S. Forest Service, California

1935 to 1939 - Lumber Industry, California

Additional Information upon request.

Herman Edward Kimsey
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington 16, D. C. 20016
Telephone FEderal 8-6400

RESUME

I Personal

Age 46 - Married - No Children

II Education

a - Grammar School - Oregon & California
b - Junior High School - Oregon & California
c - High School - Oregon & California
d - College Level GED (USAFI) 1948

III Special School and Training Courses

a - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control and Prevention, Shasta National Forest, California; 1939 and again in 1940.
b - U. S. Army Chemical Warfare School for Instructors, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, 1942
c - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control & Prevention, Shasta National Forest, California, 1946.
d - U. S. Forest School for Timber Disease Control (Blister Rust), Klamath National Forest, California, 1946
e - U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corp School for Special Agents, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1946 and 1947.
f - Instructor Guidance Course, U. S. CIC School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1947 and again in 1952.

IV Empirical Background

1962 to Present - Associated as a technical consultant with Security Associates, Inc., Washington, D. C., specializing in commercial and industrial security.

1953 to 1962 - Intelligence with U. S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency, GS-13, $11,415. As Chief of a small branch of highly specialized analysts, I exercised a wide variety of talents and was responsible for the following: the direction and administration of the branch operations; determined the course of action for further research effort within the branch; monitored and supervised a program of special personnel assessment; evaluated technical analyses and their relationship to specific cases; advised and consulted with members of Senior Staff components of CIA; delivered numerous technical briefings to both U. S. and foreign police and intelligence services; initiated and maintained projects carried out by private organizations such as universities, private consultants, and private research corporations. During the above period, I trained and briefed numerous others engaged in police and intelligence work. I also initiated and developed four technical systems currently in operation on a world-wide basis within CIA and wrote numerous articles for an intelligence periodical. In January 1962, CIA presented me with one of the largest individual Monetary Suggestion Awards ever given by that Agency.

PLEASE BE SURE TO READ ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING ITEM 19

19. EXPERIENCE (Start with your PRESENT position and work back)

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

1

Dates of employment (month, year) From Unemployed To present time

Exact title of position

Number and kind of employees you supervise

Salary or earnings Starting $ per Present $ per

Classification Grade (If in Federal service)

Place of employment (City & State)

Kind of business or organization (Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, etc.)

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work NOT APPLICABLE

2

Dates of employment (month, year) From 23 Mar. '53 To 30 Sept. '62

Exact title of position Intelligence Off. (Sec Chief)

Number and kind of employees you supervised 5 Analysts

Salary or earnings Starting $ 5,060.00 per annum Final $11,415.00 per annum

Classification Grade (If in Federal service) GS-13 Step 4

Place of employment (City & State) Washington, D. C.

Kind of business or organization (Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.) U. S. Govt.

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, etc.)
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor
Chief, Personnel Operations Division
ATTENTION: Frank G. Johns

Reason for leaving Reduction in force. Small section assimilated by 3 larger branches, and

Description of work my slot and grade eliminated.

SEE ATTACHED JOB DESCRIPTION AS APPROVED BY CIA
Also Attachment I

3

Dates of employment (month, year) From 29 Nov. '46 To 20 Mar. '53

Exact title of position Special Agent CIC

Number and kind of employees you supervised 0-5 Technicians

Salary or earnings Starting $ 900.00 per annum Final $3300.00 per annum

Classification Grade (If in Federal service) M Sgt. (E-7)

Place of employment (City & State) Ft. Holabird, Md.

Kind of business or organization (Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.) U. S. Army CIC

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, etc.)
Investigative Control Section
AC of S - G-2, Ft. Holabird, Maryland

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor
Millard F. Dougherty, Maj., Inf.
add. unknown (last supervisor)

Reason for leaving Better Job.

Description of work Under Investigative Control Section, A. C. of S., G-2, Ft. Holabird, Md.; Enlisted Chief of Tech. Lab.; Instructor in Basic Agent Course; Member of Combat CIC Team, Korea; Student in Basic Course and 2 Instructor Guidance Courses; Enlisted Chief of Special Projects, [illegible] Laboratory. For Dept. Investigated crimes of security nature. (As lab. chief, specialized in Questioned Document Analysis.)

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 57-A OR BLANK SHEETS

SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

ATTACH SUPPLEMENTAL SHEETS OR FORMS HERE

● ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS CORRECTLY AND FULLY

20. SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND SKILLS

A. Kind of License or Certificate (For example, pilot, teacher, registered nurse, lawyer, radio operator, C.P.A., etc.) None	B. State or other licensing authority	C. Year of first license or certificate	D. Year of latest license or certificate
E. Special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use. (For example, short wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key punch, turret lathe, transcribing machine, scientific or professional devices) Industrial machinery (lumber) including Diesel locomotive (small); Forensic Laboratory equipment (questioned documents); Identi-Kit [illegible]; Tech. Intelli- [illegible]		F. Approximate number of words per minute: Typing N. A.	Shorthand N. A.

G. Special qualifications not covered in application. (For example, your most important publications (do not submit copies unless requested); your patents or inventions; public speaking and publication experience; membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.; and honors and fellowships received.)
Suggested and directed development of the Identi-Kit System; Member of IAI; Over 200 lecture hours at CIC School; Co-author of CIC Manual and rewrote 2 others; wrote 3 articles and 1 technical book review for "Studies in Intelligence".

21. EDUCATION

A. Place "X" in column indicating highest grade completed

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
											X

B. If you graduated from high school, give date: USAFI 1935 (GED-1947)

C. Name and location of last high school attended: McCloud High School, McCloud, California

D. Name and location of college or university	Dates attended From	Dates attended To	Years completed Day	Years completed Night	Credit hours Semester	Credit hours Quarter	Degree received	Year received
None								

E. Chief undergraduate college subjects	Semester Hours Credit	Quarter Hours Credit	F. Chief graduate college subjects	Semester Hours Credit	Quarter Hours Credit
None					

G. State major field of study at highest level of college work
College Level GED (USAFI) 1948

H. Other schools or training (For example, trade, vocational, Armed Forces, or business) Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, certificates, and any other pertinent data.
Chemical Warfare Sch., 103rd Inf. Div.School - Camp Claiborne, La., 1 June 1943
Counter Intelligence Corps Basic Course, Fort Holabird, Md., 28 May 1947; Instructors Guidance Courses, Ft. Holabird, Maryland, 26 September 1947 and again 17 April 1952.

22. FOREIGN TRAVEL

Have you lived or traveled in any foreign countries?
☒ Yes ☐ No
If "Yes," give in Item 19 names of countries, dates and length of time spent there and nature or purpose (military service, business, education or vacation).

23. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Enter foreign language and indicate your knowledge of each by placing "X" in proper column	Reading Exc.	Reading Good	Reading Fair	Speaking Exc.	Speaking Good	Speaking Fair	Understanding Exc.	Understanding Good	Understanding Fair	Writing Exc.	Writing Good	Writing Fair
None												

24. REFERENCES

List three persons living in the United States or territories of the United States who are NOT RELATED TO YOU AND WHO HAVE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 19.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, and State)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Albert W. Somerford (Lt. Col., Ret.)	Clarksburg, Maryland	Dir. Bur. of Iden. Lab., P. O. Dept.
Joseph H. English	19 Eastover Drive Silver Spring, Maryland	Ques. Doc. Analyst FBI Laboratory
Henry C. Newton Brig. Gen. USA (Ret.	601 Patrick Henry Drive Falls Church, Virginia	Dir. Mil. Assis. Institute

(8 years)

ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States of America? If "No," give country of which you are a citizen	X	
26. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., the Communist Political Association, the Young Communist League, or any Communist organization?		X
27. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means?		X
If your answer to 26 and/or 27 above is "Yes," state on a separate sheet attached to and made a part of this application the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities. (See Instruction Sheet.)		
28. Have you any physical handicap, chronic disease, or other disability?		X
29. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown?		X
30. Have you ever had tuberculosis?		X
If your answer to 28, 29, or 30 above is "Yes," give details in Item 39.		
31. Have you ever been barred by the U.S. Civil Service Commission from taking examinations or accepting civil service appointment? *(If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.)*		X
32. Does the United States Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X
33. Do you receive or have you applied for an annuity from the United States or District of Columbia Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
34. Are you an official or employee of any State, territory, county, or municipality? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
35. Have you ever been discharged (fired) from employment for any reason?	X	
36. Have you ever resigned (quit) after being informed that your employer intended to discharge (fire) you for any reason?		X
If your answer to 35 or 36 above is "Yes," give details in Item 39. Show the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case. This information should agree with statements made in Item 19—Experience.		
37. Have you ever been arrested, taken into custody, held for investigation or questioning, or charged by any law enforcement authority? (You may omit: (1) Traffic violations for which you paid a fine of $30.00 or less; and (2) anything that happened before your 16th birthday. All other incidents must be included, even though they were dismissed or you merely forfeited collateral.)		X
38. While in the military service were you ever arrested for an offense which resulted in a trial by deck court or by summary, special, or general court-martial?		X
If your answer to 37 or 38 is "Yes," give details in Item 39, showing for each incident: (1) date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) law enforcing authority or type of court or court martial, and (5) action taken.		

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS. *Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.*

Item No.		Item No.	
22	Japan, Military Service, 1948-9,	35	Because of bad eyes. When this was
	1950-1; Korea, Military Service		corrected, I returned to the same job
	1950-1; Panama 1959, Peru, 1959;		under the same supervisor - brakeman on
	Japan 1962; Hong Kong, 1962;		a diesel locomotive
	Thailand, 1962; Taipei, 1962,		

If more space is required, use full sheets of paper approximately the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, date of birth, and examination title. Attach on inside of this application.

Okinawa, 1962.

ATTENTION: READ THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING THIS APPLICATION

A false or dishonest answer to any question in this application may be grounds for rating you ineligible for Federal employment, or for dismissing you after appointment, and may be punishable by fine or imprisonment (U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 1001). All statements made in the application are subject to investigation, including a check of your fingerprints, police records, and former employers. All information will be considered in determining your present fitness for Federal employment.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and are made in good faith.

Signature of applicant ______________________ Date ______________
(Sign in ink)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 57
REVISED MARCH 1961
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

57-103

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT NO.

1. Kind of position applied for, or name of examination | Announcement No.

2. Options for which you wish to be considered *(if listed in examination announcement)*

3. Primary place(s) of employment applied for *(City and State)*

4. Name *(First, middle, maiden, if any, last)* Mr. Mrs. Miss Herman Edward Kimsey

5. Address *(Number, Street, City, Zone, State)*
3700 Mass. Ave., N. W. Washington, D. C.
or c/o W. S. Linsbarger, Box 407
Mt. Shasta, California WA-6-4646

6. Home phone PE-8-6400

7. Office phone 351-3295

8. Legal or voting residence *(State)* District of Columbia

9. Height without shoes 5 feet 11 inches

10. Weight 200 lbs.

11. Sex ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. Marital status ☒ Married ☐ Single *(Incl. widowed, divorced)*

13. Birthplace *(City and State, or foreign country)* Gallup, McKinley County, New Mexico

14. Birth date *(Month, day, year)* December 11, 1916

15. Social Security Number 556 10 4750

16. If you have ever been employed by the Federal Government, indicate last grade and job title:
GS-13, Intelligence Officer (Section Chief) (Step 4) (GS-14 Slot)
Dates of service in that grade.
From 12 Feb. 1957 To 20 September 1962

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of
Examining Office Only

☐ Appor.
☐ Nonappor.

Material
☐ Submitted
☐ Returned

Entered Register:

Notations:

App. Reviewed:

App. Approved:

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Augm. Rating
			☐ 5 points (Tent.)	
			☐ 10 points Comp. Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Points	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being Investigated	
Initials and date				

17. AVAILABILITY INFORMATION

A. Lowest grade or pay you will accept $ Per or grade OPEN

B. Will you accept temporary appointment? *(Acceptance or refusal of temporary employment will not affect your consideration for other appointments.)* ☒ Yes ☐ No If "Yes," indicate by "X" in appropriate box or boxes.
☒ 1 mo. or less ☒ 1 to 4 months ☒ 4 to 12 months

C. Will you accept less than full-time employment (less than 40 hours per week)? ☒ Yes ☐ No

D. Are you willing to travel? ☐ Not at all ☐ Occasionally ☒ Frequently

E. Will you accept employment: In Washington, D.C.? ☒ Yes ☐ No Outside U.S.? ☒ Yes ☐ No

F. Will you accept appointment only in certain locations? ☐ Yes ☒ No
If "Yes," list locations:

18. ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE AND VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. List Dates, Branch, and Serial or Service Number of All Active Service

From	To	Branch of Service	Serial or Service Number
19 May 1941	5 Nov. 1943	U. S. Army	RA 39080108
29 Nov. 1946	8 Oct. 1949		
[illegible] Jan. 1950	20 Mar. 1953		

B. Have you ever been discharged from the armed forces under other than honorable conditions?
☐ Yes *(Give details in Item 37)* ☒ No

C. Do you claim 5-point preference based on wartime military service? ☐ Yes ☒ No

D. Do you claim 5-point preference based on service during peacetime campaign? ☐ Yes *(Complete and attach Standard Form 15)* ☒ No

E. Do you claim 10-point preference? ☐ Yes ☒ No *If "Yes," check type of preference claimed and complete and attach Standard Form 15, "Veteran Preference Claim."* TYPE ☐ Compensable disability ☐ Disability ☐ Wife ☐ Widow ☐ Mother

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information given in answer to Question 18 has been verified with the discharge certificate and/or other proof which shows that the separation was under honorable conditions.

VETERAN PREFERENCE ALLOWED: ☐ 5 point ☐ 10 point Comp. Disab. ☐ Other 10 point ☐ None

Signature and title | Agency | Date

PLEASE BE SURE TO READ ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING ITEM 19

19. EXPERIENCE *(Start with your PRESENT position and work back)*

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

1

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From Unemployed To present time

Exact title of position

Number and kind of employees you supervise

Salary or earnings

Starting $ per

Present $ per

Classification Grade *(If in Federal service)*

Place of employment *(City & State)*

Kind of business or organization, *(Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work NOT APPLICABLE

2

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 23 Mar. '53 To 20 Sept. '62

Exact title of position Intelligence Off. (Sec Chief)

Number and kind of employees you supervised 4 Analysts

Salary or earnings

Starting $ 5,060.00 per annum

Final $11,415.00 per annum

Classification Grade *(If in Federal service)* GS-13 Step 4

Place of employment *(City & State)* Washington, D. C.

Kind of business or organization, *(Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* U. S. Govt.

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor
Chief, Personnel Operations Division
ATTENTION: Frank G. Johns

Reason for leaving Reduction in Force. Small section assimilated by 3 larger branches, and

Description of work my slot and grade eliminated.

SEE ATTACHED JOB DESCRIPTION AS APPROVED BY CIA
Also Attachment 1

3

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 29 Nov. '46 To 20 Mar. '53

Exact title of position Special Agent CIC

Number and kind of employees you supervised 0-5 Technician

Salary or earnings

Starting $ 900.00 per annum

Final $3300.00 per annum

Classification Grade *(If in Federal service)* M/Sgt. (E-7)

Place of employment *(City & State)* Ft. Holabird, Md.

Kind of business or organization, *(Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* U. S. Army CIC

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*
Investigative Control Section
AC of S - G-2, Ft. Holabird, Maryland

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor
Millard F. Dougherty, Maj., Inf.
add. unknown (last supervisor)

Reason for leaving Better Job

Description of work Under Investigative Control Section, A. C. of S., G-2, Ft. Holabird, Md.; Enlisted Chief of Tech. Lab.; Instructor in Basic Agent Course; Member of Combat CIC Team, Korea; Student in Basic Course and 2 Instructor Guidance Courses; Enlisted Chief of Special Projects, Tech. Laboratory., Far East; Investigated crimes of security nature. (As lab. chief, specialized in Questioned Document Analysis.)

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 57-A OR BLANK SHEETS
SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

Herman Edward Kimsey

December 11, 1916

4. 15 April 1945 - 1 October 1946 Camp Superintendent 100 employees, laborers

$2694 per annum
$3021 per annum SP-7 Yreka, California U. S. Forest Service

U. S. Forest Service, Yreka, California Art London, % USFS, Ykreka, California

Enlist in Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army

Supervised 100-man forest camp for the purpose of controlling timber disease.

5. 5 November 1943 - 15 April 1945 Laborer None

$0.90 per hour
$1.10 per hour Unknown McCloud, California Lumber

McCloud River Lumber Company, McCloud, California- James Herbert, McCloud, Calif.

Return to the United States Forest Service.

Operated lumber carrier and brakeman on small diesel locomotive.

6. 19 May 1941 to 5 November 1943 Sergeant MOS 631 up to 14 Intelligence Analysts
Intelligence NCO
Combat Intelligence

$21.00 per month Sergeant Continental Limits of United States U. S. Army
$75.00 per month Supervisor - Unknown

U. S. Army

Honorable Discharge

Supervised S-2 Section in Brigade HQ for the purpose of collection and evaluation of information on the subject of enemy military operations.

7. 1 May 1939 to 10 May 1941 - Forest Guard None

$100 per month Unknown McCloud, California U. S. Forest Service

United States Forest Service Earl Sullaway, McCloud, California
McCloud, California

Enlisted in the U. S. Army under draft requirement but not yet called for service.

Prevention and Suppression of forest fires.

8. January 1935 to May 1939 Laborer

Laborer in lumber [illegible] oil industry.

Herman Edward Kimsey
3700 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington 16, D. C. 20016
Telephone FEderal 8-6400

RESUME

I Personal

Age 46 - Married - No Children

II Education

a - Grammar School - Oregon & California
b - Junior High School - Oregon & California
c - High School - Oregon & California
d - College Level GED (USAFI) 1948

III Special School and Training Courses

a - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control and Prevention, Shasta National Forest, California; 1939 and again in 1940.
b - U. S. Army Chemical Warfare School for Instructors, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, 1942
c - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control & Prevention, Shasta National Forest, California, 1946.
d - U. S. Forest School for Timber Disease Control (Blister Rust), Klamath National Forest, California, 1946
e - U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corp School for Special Agents, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1946 and 1947.
f - Instructor Guidance Course, U. S. CIC School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1947 and again in 1952.

IV Empirical Background

1962 to Present - Associated as a technical consultant with Security Associates, Inc., Washington, D. C., specializing in commercial and industrial security.

1953 to 1962 - Intelligence with U. S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency, GS-13, $11,415. As Chief of a small branch of highly specialized analysts, I exercised a wide variety of talents and was responsible for the following: the direction and administration of the branch operations; determined the course of action for further research effort within the branch; monitored and supervised a program of special personnel assessment; evaluated technical analyses and their relationship to specific cases; advised and consulted with members of Senior Staff components of CIA; delivered numerous technical briefings to both U. S. and foreign police and intelligence services; initiated and maintained projects carried out by private organizations such as universities, private consultants, and private research corporations. During the above period, I trained and briefed numerous others engaged in police and intelligence work. I also initiated and developed four technical systems currently in operation on a world-wide basis within CIA and wrote numerous articles for an intelligence periodical. In January 1962, CIA presented me with one of the largest individual Monetary Suggestion Awards ever given by that Agency.

1946 to 1953 - Worked as a Special Agent (MOS-1301) in the Army's Counter Intelligence Corp in the grade of Master Sargeant. My duties consisted of investigating crimes of security nature; member of a combat CIC team in Korea; two assignments as an instructor at the basic CIC School; enlisted Chief of the Technical Laboratory at the CIC Center, and enlisted Chief of Special Projects Technical Laboratory (CIC), Far East Command. During this period, I co-authored two text books for the CIC school and rewrote one other. Further, I experienced over 2,000 lecture hours as an instructor in the basic CIC school and lived and worked three years in two foreign countries.

1945 to 1946 - Held the position of Camp Superintendent of a 100 man forest camp engaged in timber disease control, U. S. Forest Service, California.

1941 to 1943 - Military Service, U. S. Army, Intelligence NCO, MOS 631, Combat Intelligence.

1939 to 1940 - Forest Guard, U. S. Forest Service, California

1935 to 1939 - Lumber Industry, California

Additional Information upon request.

Herman Edward Kimsey

December 11, 1916

I. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The analysis and Research Section is responsible for advisory, developmental and service work in the field of Questioned Document Analysis in support of overt and covert activities of the Agency. This includes technical testing and research into handwriting and document evaluation or authentication.

The Section Chief directs the assignments of projects, studies developments in scientific fields supporting authentication work, advises Agency officials on the current and long range capabilities in authentication or evaluation of documents and prepares recommendations for direction of the program.

Specifically:

1. The Section Chief, under the policy direction of Staff Chief, and administratively reporting to Branch Chief, provides administrative and technical supervision to Questioned Document Analysts in the Section and continually insures that their technical competence is maintained. The Section Chief reviews requests for analysis of documents and contents, establishes priorities for use of Section Personnel and suggests available external facilities for analysis or research.

2. Studies developments in Analysis and evaluation of documents and their contents as done by other Federal Agencies (FBI, Post Office, Treasury, Insurance Corporations, Private Practitioners in the Questioned Document Analysis field and Clinical Psychologists. Initiated inter-agency collaboration on use of technical facilities and indices of characteristics of paper and writing materials.

3. Makes review of recommendations of Document Analysts, Consultants, and Contract Employees engaged in analytical and projective studies, determines courses of action for additional research, confers with case officers and program leaders on the availability of additional data, time limits, operational potentials, etc., to develop additional facts of problems to be employed or to make final recommendations on the contents, validity, possible origination and processing of documents subject to study.

4. a. As advisor and consultant to major component program officials, provides authoritative material on the potential of identification involving documents and other physical items, makes periodic evaluations of case history records and provides other technical documentation service as may be required.

(Continued on Page 2)

Herman Edward Kimsey

December 11, 1916

4. 15 April 1945 - 1 October 1946 Camp Superintendent 100 employees, laborers

$2694 per annum
$3021 per annum SP-7
Yreka, California U. S. Forest Service

U. S. Forest Service, Yreka, California Art London, % USFS, Yreka, California

Enlist in Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army

Supervised 100-man forest camp for the purpose of controlling timber disease.

5. 5 November 1943 - 15 April 1945 Laborer None

$0.90 per hour
$1.10 per hour Unknown McCloud, California Lumber

McCloud River Lumber Company, McCloud, California- James Herbert, McCloud, Calif.

Return to the United States Forest Service.

Operated lumber carrier and brakeman on small diesel locomotive.

6. 19 May 1941 to 5 November 1943 Sergeant MOS 631 up to 14 Intelligence Analysts
Intelligence NCO
Combat Intelligence
$21.00 per month Sergeant Continental Limits of United States U. S. Army
$75.00 per month Supervisor - Unknown

U. S. Army

Honorable Discharge

Supervised S-2 Section in Brigade HQ for the purpose of collection and evaluation of information on the subject of enemy military operations.

7. 1 May 1939 to 10 May 1941 - Forest Guard None

$100 per month Unknown McCloud, California U. S. Forest Service

United States Forest Service Earl Sullaway, McCloud, California
McCloud, California

Enlisted in the U. S. Army under draft requirement but not yet called for service.

Prevention and Suppression of forest fires.

8. January 1935 to May 1939 Laborer

Laborer in lumber [illegible] oil industry.

Herman Edward Kimsey

Questioned Document Analyst (Continued) December 11, 1916

b. Participated in establishing document analysis facilities in foreign governments and present plans call for continuation of this TDY consulting and advisory work.

Per request from Training, periodically briefs Foreign Intelligence Services and Agency personnel. These briefings cover general capabilities of the Section and are intended to inform the student of the question document problem.

II SUPERVISION RECEIVED:

The Section Chief receives technical requests directly from the customers and advises them and the Branch Chief on the technical problems, personnel, and other requirements for making determinations. Staff and Branch Chiefs establish guides on administrative matters. Review of accomplishments can only be made in the light of the customers application of evaluation results. Decisions required as a result of Section work are usually "Eyes Only" for customers application in offices of Senior Staffs of the major components in the Agency. The recommendations for participation in setting technical standards for mechanical and personnel identification methods or in financing such activity would be evaluated on the basis of the incumbent's evaluation of potential benefits to Agency technical services to intelligence efforts.

III QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED:

Qualifications for this position will be written in the preliminary Qualification Standatds developed for the GS-1397.01, Document Analyst title, upgraded by Civil Service Commission Hearing, to GS-14, 1958.

ATTACH SUPPLEMENTAL SHEETS OR FORMS HERE

• ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS CORRECTLY AND FULLY

20. SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND SKILLS

A. Kind of license or certificate *(For example, pilot, teacher, registered nurse, lawyer, radio operator, C.P.A., etc.)* None	B. State or other licensing authority	C. Year of first license or certificate	D. Year of latest license or certificate
E. Special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use. *(For example, short wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key punch, turret lathe, transcribing machine, scientific or professional devices)* Industrial machinery (lumber) including Diesel Locomotive (small); Forensic Laboratory equipment (questioned document); Identi-Kit Opn.; Tech. Intelligence Equipment.		F. Approximate number of words per minute: Typing N. A.	Shorthand N. A.

G. Special qualifications not covered in application. *(For example, your most important publications (do not submit copies unless requested), your patents or inventions; public speaking and publications experience, membership in professional or scientific societies, etc., and honors and fellowships received.)*

Suggested and directed development of the Identi-Kit System; Member of IAI; Over 200 lecture hours at CIC School; Co-author of CIC Manual and rewrote 2 others; wrote 3 articles and 1 technical book review for "Studies in Intelligence".

21. EDUCATION

A. Place "X" in column indicating highest grade completed

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
											X

B. If you graduated from high school, give date: USAFI 1935 (GED-1947)

C. Name and location of last high school attended: McCloud High School McCloud, California

D. Name and location of college or university	Dates attended From	Dates attended To	Years completed Day	Years completed Night	Credit hours Semester	Credit hours Quarter	Degree received	Year received
None								

E. Chief undergraduate college subjects	Semester Hours Credit	Quarter Hours Credit	F. Chief graduate college subjects	Semester Hours Credit	Quarter Hours Credit
None					

G. State major field of study at highest level of college work: College Level GED (USAFI) 1948

H. Other schools or training *(for example, trade, vocational, Armed Forces, or business)*. Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, certificates, and any other pertinent data.

Chemical Warfare Sch., 103rd Inf. Div.School - Camp Claiborne, La., 1 June 1943
Counter Intelligence Corps Basic Course, Fort Holabird, Md., 28 May 1947; Instructors Guidance Courses, Ft. Holabird, Maryland, 26 September 1947 and again 17 April 1952.

22. FOREIGN TRAVEL

Have you lived or traveled in any foreign countries?

☒ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes," give in Item 39 names of countries, dates and length of time spent there and reason or purpose (military service, business, education, or vacation).

23. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Enter foreign language and indicate your knowledge of each by placing "X" in proper column	Reading Exc.	Reading Good	Reading Fair	Speaking Exc.	Speaking Good	Speaking Fair	Understanding Exc.	Understanding Good	Understanding Fair	Writing Exc.	Writing Good	Writing Fair
None												

24. REFERENCES

List three persons living in the United States or territories of the United States who are NOT RELATED TO YOU AND WHO HAVE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 19.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, Zone, and State)*	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Albert W. Somerford (Lt. Col., Ret.)	Clarksburg, Maryland	Dir. Bur. of Iden. Lab., P. G. Dept
Joseph M. English	15 Eastmoor Drive Silver Spring, Maryland	Ques. Doc. Analyst FBI Laboratory
Henry C. Newton Brig. Gen. USA (Ret.)	601 Patrick Henry Drive Falls Church, Virgin	Dir. Mil. Assis. Institute

ANSWER QUESTIONS BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COL.	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States of America? If "No," give country of which you are a citizen:	X	
26. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., the Communist Political Association, the Young Communist League, or any Communist organization?		X
27. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means?		X.
If your answer to 26 and/or 27 above is "Yes," state on a separate sheet attached to and made a part of this application the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities. (See Instruction Sheet.)		
28. Have you any physical handicap, chronic disease, or other disability?		X
29. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown?		X
30. Have you ever had tuberculosis?		X
If your answer to 28, 29, or 30 above is "Yes," give details in Item 39.		
31. Have you ever been barred by the U.S. Civil Service Commission from taking examinations or accepting civil service appointment? *(If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.)*		X
32. Does the United States Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X
33. Do you receive or have you applied for an annuity from the United States or District of Columbia Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
34. Are you an official or employee of any State, territory, county, or municipality? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
35. Have you ever been discharged (fired) from employment for any reason?	X	
36. Have you ever resigned (quit) after being informed that your employer intended to discharge (fire) you for any reason?		X
If your answer to 35 or 36 above is "Yes," give details in Item 39. Show the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case. This information should agree with statements made in Item 19—Experience.		
37. Have you ever been arrested, taken into custody, held for investigation or questioning, or charged by any law enforcement authority? (You may omit: (1) Traffic violations for which you paid a fine of $30.00 or less, and (2) anything that happened before your 16th birthday. All other incidents must be included, even though they were dismissed or you merely forfeited collateral.)		X
38. While in the military service were you ever arrested for an offense which resulted in a trial by deck court or by summary, special, or general court-martial?		X
If your answer to 37 or 38 is "Yes," give details in Item 39, showing for each incident: (1) date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) law enforcing authority or type of court or court-martial, and (5) action taken.		

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS. Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.

Item No.		Item No.	
22	Japan, Military Service, 1948-9,	35	Because of bad eyes. When this was
	1950-1; Korea, Military Service		corrected, I returned to the same job
	1950-1; Panama 1959, Peru, 1955;		under the same supervisor - brakeman on
	Japan 1962; Hong Kong, 1962;		a diesel locomotive
	Thailand, 1962; Taipei, 1962,		

If more space is required, use full sheets of paper approximately the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, date of birth, and examination title. Attach on inside of this application.

Okinawa, 1962.

ATTENTION: READ THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING THIS APPLICATION

A false or dishonest answer to any question in this application may be grounds for rating you ineligible for Federal employment, or for dismissing you after appointment, and may be punishable by fine or imprisonment (U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 1001). All statements made in the application are subject to investigation, including a check of your fingerprints, police records, and former employers. All information will be considered in determining your present fitness for Federal employment.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and are made in good faith.

Signature of applicant ______________________ Date ____________

(Sign in ink)

RESUME

Herman Edward Kimsey
3700 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016
Telephone: FEderal 8-6400

PERSONAL

Age: 46
Marital Status: Married, no children

EDUCATION

Grammar School - Oregon and California
Junior High School - Oregon and California
High School - Oregon and California
College Level GED (USAFI) 1948
Special Schools and Training Courses:

1. U.S. Forest Service School for Fire Control and Prevention, Shasta, National Forest, California; 1939 and again in 1940.
2. U.S. Army Chemical Warfare School for Instructors, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, 1942.
3. U.S. Forest Service School for Fire Control and Prevention, Shasta, National Forest, California, 1945.
4. U.S. Forest School for Timber Disease Control(Blister Rust) Klamath National Forest, California, 1946.
5. U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corp School for Special Agents, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1946 and 1947.
6. Instructor Guidance Course, U.S. Army CIC School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1947 and again in 1952.

EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND

From 1962 to present, I have been associated, as a technical consultant, with Security Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C. specializing in commercial and industrial security.

From 1953 to 1962, I was an Intelligence Officer with the U. S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency (Annual Salary $11,415, GS-13). As Chief of a small branch of highly specialized analysts, I exercised a wide variety of talents and was responsible for: the direction and administration of the branch operations; determined the course of action for further research effort within the branch; monitored and supervised a program of special personnel assessment; evaluated technical analyses and their relationship to specific cases; advised and consulted with Senior Staff components of CIA; delivered numerous technical briefings to both U.S. and foreign police and intelligence services; initiated and maintained liaison with other U.S. Government components; activated and directed research projects carried out by private organizations such as universities, private consultants, and private research corporations. During the above period, I trained and briefed numerous other agencies engaged in police and intelligence.

I also initiated and developed four technical systems currently in operation on a world-wide basis within CIA and wrote numerous articles for an intelligence periodical. In January 1962, CIA presented me with one of the largest individual Monetary Suggestion Awards ever given by that Agency.

From 1946 to 1953, I worked as a Special Agent(MOS-1301) in the Army's Counter Intelligence Corp in the grade of Master/Sergeant. My duties consisted of investigating crimes of security nature; member of a combat CIC team in Korea; two assignments as an instructor at the basic CIC School; enlisted Chief of the Technical Laboratory at the CIC Center, and enlisted Chief of Special Projects Technical Laboratory(CIC), Far East Command. During this period, I co-authored two textbooks for the CIC School and rewrote one other. Further, I experienced over 2,000 lecture hours as an instructor in the basic CIC School and lived and worked three years in two foreign countries.

1945-1946 I held the position of Camp Superintendent of a 100-man forest camp engaged in timber disease control, U.S. Forest Service, California.
1941-1943 Military Service, U.S. Army, Intelligence NCO, MOS 631, Combat Intelligence.
1939-1940 Forest Guard, U.S, Forest Service, California
1935-1939 Lumber Industry, California
Additional information upon request

Herman Edward Kimsey
37 · Massachusetts Ave., N. W.
Washington 16, D. C. (20016)
Telephone: FEderal 8-6400

RESUME

I Personal -

Age 46 - Married - No Children.

II Education -

a - Grammar School - Oregon & California.
b - Junior High School - Oregon & California.
c - High School - Oregon & California.
d - College Level GED (USAFI) 1948.

III Special Schools and Training Courses -

a - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control and Prevention, Shasta, National Forest, California; 1939 and again in 1940.
b - U. S. Army Chemical Warfare School for Instructors, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, 1942.
c - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control & Prevention, Shasta, National Forest California, 1945.
d - U. S. Forest School for Timber Disease Control (Blister Rust) Klamath National Forest, California, 1946.
e - U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corp School for Special Agents, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1946 and 1947.
f - Instructor Guidance Course, U. S. Army CIC School, Fort Holabird, Maryland - 1947 and again in 1952.

IV Empirical Background -

From 1962 to present, I have been associated, as a technical consultant, with Security Associates, Inc., Washington, D. C. specializing in commercial and industrial security.

From 1953 to 1962, I was an Intelligence Officer with U. S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency (Annual Salary - $11,415 - GS-13). As Chief of a small branch of highly specialized analysts, I exercised a wide variety of talents and was responsible for: the direction and administration of the branch operations, determined the course of action for further research effort within the branch; monitored and supervised a program of special personnel assessment; evaluated technical analyses and their relationship to specific cases; advised and consulted with members of Senior Staff components of CIA; delivered numerous technical briefings to both U. S. and foreign police and intelligence services; initiated and maintained liaison with other U. S. Government components; activated and directed research projects carried out by private organizations such as Universities, private consultants, and private research corporations. During the above period, I trained and briefed the police and intelligence agencies of more than 50 foreign countries and actually traveled and worked in 6 foreign countries. I also initiated and developed four technical systems currently in operation on a world-wide basis within CIA and wrote numerous articles for an intelligence periodical. In January 1962, CIA presented me with one of the largest individual Monetary Suggestion Awards ever given by that agency.

From 1946 to 1953, I worked as a Special Agent (MOS-1301) in the Army's Counter Intelligence Corp in the grade of Master/Sergeant. My duties consisted of investigating crimes of security nature; member of a combat CIC team in Korea; two assignments as an instructor at the basic CIC School; enlisted Chief of the Technical Laboratory at the CIC Center, and enlisted Chief of Special Projects Technical Laboratory (CIC), Far East Command. During this period, I co-authored two text books for the CIC School and rewrote one other. Further, I experienced over 2,000 lecture hours as an instructor in the basic CIC School and lived and worked three years in two foreign countries.

1945-1946 I held the position of Camp Superintendent of a 100-man forest camp engaged in timber disease control, U. S. Forest Service, California.

1941-1943 Military Service, U. S. Army, Intelligence NCO, MOS 631, Combat Intelligence.

1939-1940 Forest Guard, U. S. Forest Service, California.

1935-1939 Lumber Industry, California.

Additional information upon request.

NO [illegible]

Norman Edward Kinsey Dec. 11, 1916

Questioned Document Analyst - GS-14 (Section Chief) - page 2.

b. Section Chief participated in establishing document analysis facilities in foreign governments and present plans call for continuation of this TDY consulting and advisory work.

c. Per request from Training, Section Chief periodically briefs Foreign Intell. Services and Agency personnel. These briefings cover general capabilities of the Section and are intended to inform the student of the questioned document problem.

II. SUPERVISION RECEIVED:

The Section Chief receives technical requests directly from customers and advises them and the Branch Chief on the technical problems, personnel, and other requirements for making determinations. Staff and Branch Chiefs establish guides on administrative matters. Review of accomplishments can only be made in the light of the customers application of evaluation results. Decisions required as a result of Section work are usually "Eyes Only" for customers application in offices of Senior Staffs of the major components in the Agency. The recommendations for participation in setting technical standards for mechanical and personnel identification methods or in financing such activity would be evaluated on the basis of the incumbent's evaluation of potential benefit to Agency technical services to intelligence efforts.

III. QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED:

Qualifications for this position will be written in the preliminary Qualification Standards developed for the GS-1307.01, Document Analyst title, upgraded by Civil Service Commission Hearing, to GS-14, 1958.

3 Jan 1964

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

Republican National Committee

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

NAME Kinney, Herman Edward	Title, Grade & Salary [illegible] 55-14	Office & Extension [illegible]	DOB [illegible]	EOD 3/53	LWD 30 Jun 62	Type Referral 101
Reference Data						OP Interviewer E Wright

Resigned 1962

Date of Interview	Details of Out Placement (Including Cover & Security Data)
[illegible] 62	Kinney brought in copy of SF [illegible] knows what he wants + promised to check back [illegible] [illegible]
Sept 3 64	Subject came in late 1963 and was given assistance in filing for FAME and he qualified at a grade 13/14 level. He was re.ered to xxkxxi several jobs and I have just been informed that he has taken a position with the Republican National Committee as assistant security officer.
Nov 1964	Subject called to advisxx me that since the republicans had been beaten that he was out of a job.
Dec 1965	Called Mr Kinsey and refered him to The Plaza hotel in New York for a position as security officer. I called the personnel officer of the hotel and told him of Mr Kinsey's qualifications and set up an appointment fot and interview. Mr Kinsey went for the interview and was offered the position whicj paid $1.60 per hour and meals. at that time he was being considered for another position and zzzz asked time to consider offer.
Jan 14 1965	Contacted Mr Kinsey to see if he had made up his mind about the job in NY as I had some one else to refer. He advised me that he was being considered for position as security officer with the Republican National Committee and he would know after they met in Chicago Jan 22/
1/29/65	I hear from him periodically - So far [illegible] [illegible] He was hoping private industry.

3-62

OUT PLACEMENT INTERVIEW RECORD

(See Reverse)

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

NAME	Title, Grade & Salary	Office & Extension	DOB	EOD	LWD	Type Referral
Reference Data						OP Interviewer
Date of Interview	Details of Out Placement (Including Cover & Security Data)					

OUT PLACEMENT INTERVIEW RECORD

3-62

(See Reverse)

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

Bic Status:

NAME: Kinsey, Herman E.

Title, Grade & Salary: Section Chief 13

Office & Extension: TSD/PARB X 2009 Analytics Sect.

DOB: 12/16

EOD: 4?/53

LWD:

Type Referral: 1:1

Reference Data: Education TSD-photo analyst

CP Interviewer: Cooly

[illegible]

Date of Interview	Details of Out Placement (Including Cover & Security Data)
22 March 63	Saw Lott + Clinkscale. Thinks there is a good chance of this situation. Has good background in photo identification, etc. work etc. Has written several books in field. Knows [illegible] at Bos [illegible] Contact at NSA. Lives at Alton Texas. Will draft job statement + chart of work.
2 6 July	Did not see this man — he slipped out before we could catch him. MHD

3-62

OUT PLACEMENT INTERVIEW RECORD

(See Reverse)

S-E-C-R-E-T

X

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE
25 January 1962

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT

ATTN:

REF:

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED

ESTABLISHED FOR
ZIDGEY, Herman E.

FILE NO.
K-8689

ID CARD NO.

☒ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OCVIEW 20-800.1)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR 30 DAYS, EFFECTIVE 19 January 1962

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HH 20-800.2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HH 20-661.1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

[illegible]

☐ COPY TO [illegible]

Robert E. Young
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: 1 - RSD DO 1 - FID OS 1 - MCB COPY

FORM 12-61 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(13-20-43)

						NEW SALARY RATE		
						Salary	Effective Date	
GS	13	3	$11,155	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

5. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form No. 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	KIMSEY HERMAN E	161555	44 49	GS-13 3	$10,370	$11,155

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
161555	KIMSEY HERMAN E	DDP/TSS 6	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 13	2	$10,130	08	10	58	GS 13	3	$10,370	02	07	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.R.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
161555	KIMSEY HERMAN E	DDP/TSS 6	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 13	1	$ 9,890	02	10	57	GS 13	2	$10,130	08	10	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
JOSEPH F. MARZEN	10/7/58	Joseph F. Marzen

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
161555	KIMSEY HERMAN E	DDP/TSS	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 13	1	$ 9,890	02	10	57	GS 13	2	$10,130	08	10	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK HH

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

BRANCH

C. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
KIMSEY HERMAN E	161555	GS-13-1	$ 8,990	$ 9,890

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

[illegible] 29 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 061555	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KIMSEY HERMAN E		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION TERMINATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 1130 09 20 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: X V TO V; V TO CF; CF TO V; CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3276 1064 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP TSD AUTHENTICATION GRAPHIC ARTS REPRODUCTION BRANCH ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE DOCUMENT TECH CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0658	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1397.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 11415

18. REMARKS

TERMINATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF CIA REGULATION 20-27, SEPARATION OF SURPLUS PERSONNEL, PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONTAINED IN SECTION 102 (C) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED. THIS TERMINATION DOES NOT AFFECT YOUR RIGHT TO SEEK OR ACCEPT EMPLOYMENT IN ANY OTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IF YOU ARE DECLARED ELIGIBLE FOR SUCH EMPLOYMENT BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 12 11 16	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 1GT0003	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. / RESV. PROV. / TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

AUTHORIZED MAXIMUM SEPARATION COMPENSATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF CIA REGULATION 20-32, SEPARATION COMPENSATION.

POSTED
10-3-62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

9/21/62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EWS: 13 MAY 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 161555	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) KIMSEY HERMAN E	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 12 Da. 11 Yr. 16	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 03 Da. 23 Yr. 53
7. SCD Mo. 05 Da. [illegible] Yr. 42	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 03 Da. 23 Yr. 53 13. Elig. Serv. Credit, LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP TSS AUTHENTICATION GRAPHIC ARTS REPRODUCTION DIV ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH BRANCH	Code	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code
16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 5 Code 2	17. Position Title 10 TECH AIDS	18. Position No. 0092	19. Serv. GS 20. Occup. Series 0136.63
21. Grade & Step 13 3	22. Salary Or Rate $10370	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 26. Appropriation Number 0225 1005 1000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo. 05 Da. 15 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP TSD AUTHENTICATION GRAPHIC ARTS REPRODUCTION BRANCH ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH SECTION	Code 4449	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 5 Code 2	34. Position Title DOCUMENT TECH CH	35. Position No. 0658	36. Serv. GS 37. Occup. Series 1397.01
38. Grade & Step 13 3	39. Salary Or Rate $10370	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 02 Da. 10 Yr. 57 42. PSI Due Mo. 03 Da. 06 Yr. 61 43. Appropriation Number 0225 1005 1000

44. Remarks

POSTED
RK

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (4 PART)
[illegible]
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER [illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

are

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. [illegible] E. [illegible] 161555	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 4 February 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) PROMOTION 30	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 10 Feb 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	IO Tech Aids BY-92
GS-0136.63-12 $7735.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.63-13 $8990.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 444952	DDP/TSS Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-OT

15. FICA M	16. APPROPRIATION V FROM: 7-2725-20 TO: Same 750-13	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES, NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 03/23/53

POSTED
5 FEB 1957

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1956-[illegible]

MJ 2/4/57

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-O-331164

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Payroll period

3. Block No. 7-2[illegible]-20

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
[illegible]

6. Grade and salary
[illegible]-12 $7570

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s)
TSS-6

12. Prepared by
lp 25 Oct 55

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better
16 Dec 55	12 Jun 55	$7570	$7785	Service and conduct are satisfactory. David M. Richards

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

XX

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP):
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (3 PARTS)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Herman E. Kimsey
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 17 Jun 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 June 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
BY-92-11	8. POSITION TITLE	IO (Tech Aids) BY-92
GS-0136.63-11 $5940.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.63-12 $7040.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE ☐ WAIV ☐ OTHER ☐ 5-PT. X 10-POINT DISAB ☐ OTHER ☐
14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ C.A. ☐ REAL. ☐ [illegible]
15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 5-7515-20 TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

POSTED
6/22/55 GL

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

[illegible] 6/20/55

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950-O-[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 50 (4 PART)
[illegible]
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. [illegible] A F. [illegible]
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 [illegible] 1916
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 17 [illegible] 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): [illegible]
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 22 May 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: [illegible] 103 J

FROM		TO
IO ([illegible] ATTE) [illegible] 92-11	8. POSITION TITLE	[illegible] ([illegible] ATTE) [illegible] 92-11
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	[illegible]-11 [illegible].00 [illegible]
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	[illegible] Auth. [illegible] Production Division Analysis [illegible] Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	[illegible], D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: [illegible]

NEW	VICE	[illegible]	[illegible]

15. SEX: [illegible]
16. RACE: [illegible]
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-2515-2[illegible]
TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: [illegible]

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

[illegible] T/O

[illegible]
25 MAY 1955

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

[illegible] 5/18/55

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: [illegible]

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Herman E. Kinsey

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 25 Feb 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 27 Feb 1955

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Technologist BY 93	8. POSITION TITLE	I.O. (Tech Aids) BY 92-11
GS-1390.01-11	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.63-11 $5940.00 per annu
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE / WWII / OTHER / 5-PT. / 10-POINT: DISAB. / OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW / VICE / I.A. / REV. — SD-DY

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-2515-20 TO: Same

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

POSTED
2/28/55

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 21, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Jan

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME) Mr. Herman E. Kinsey	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 7 May 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 9 May 1954	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
BY 93-9	8. POSITION TITLE	Technologist BY 93
GS-1390.01-9 $5155.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1390.01-11 $5940.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Div. Analysis & Research Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WIFE	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			XXXX		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.R.	REAL.

SD-PT

CD-75

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-2515-20 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

(SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION)

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

5-8-57

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

6203

1. NAME (MR. – MISS – MRS. – ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Harman E. Kinzey
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec. 1916
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 20 Apr. 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 25 Apr. 1954
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Tech Projects Of NY 256-9	8. POSITION TITLE	Technologist NY 93-9
GS-1390-9	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1390.01-9 $5135.00 per annum
Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Graphic Arts Reproduction Div. Analysis & Research Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-TB

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-2515-20
TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES – NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 — 249347

4-28-54

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 037574

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Pay last

3. Employee No. 4-[illegible]-20

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
KIMSEY, Herman E.

6. Grade and salary
~~[illegible]~~ GS-9 $5060.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
DDP/TSB 5

12. Prepared by
dgo 9 Apr 56

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
23 Mar 56	23 Mar 55	$5060.00	$5185.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ [illegible] waiting period.
☐ [illegible] waiting period.

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 3, 1952, General Regulations No. 152

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. 1950
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
Security Information

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION pal

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Herman E. Kimsey
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11Dec.1916
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 29 Aug. 1953

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment 808
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 13 Sept. 1953
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A6.116(b)

FROM		TO
TECH PROJECTS OFF BY 256-9	8. POSITION TITLE	TECH PROJECTS OFF BY 256-9
GS 1390-9 $5060.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS 1390-9 $5060.00 per annum
DDP/TSS Graphic Arts Reproduction Div Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Graphic Arts Reproduction Div Office of the Chief
Washington D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD TS

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM 3-2515-10 TO 3-2515-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES, NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM Unvouchered Funds

Acting Chief, Personnel Division

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

SECRET
Security Information

1-9 7-2-53

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

[illegible] PERSONNEL ACTION

Page 35 of 36 pages.
6

(1) Staff or Division [illegible] (2) Date T/O Approved [illegible] (3) Effective date of Action [illegible]

	FROM				TO		
NAME	(5) ORG. INF. & POS TITLE	(6) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(7) SLOT NO. Y	(8) ACTION	(9) ORG. INF. & POS TITLE	(10) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(11) SLOT NO. BY
DIVISION Special Assistance Division (Cont'd)					SPECIAL ASSISTANCE DIV.		
[illegible]							
[illegible], [illegible]	Chemist	GS-12	239	B	Chemist	GS-1320-12	198
Lauchinger, Frank H.	Chemist	GS-7	242	B	Chemist	GS-1320-7	199
[illegible]							
High, Joe B.	Chemist	GS-12	243	B	Chemist	GS-1320-12	202
Lancer, Elizabeth S.	Trng Off-Tech Flds	GS-9	251	C	TRAINING Trng Off-Tech Flds	GS-1712-9	[illegible] Trng
[illegible]					SPECIAL ASSISTANCE DIV.		
* [illegible], Vincent	Seals Technician	GS-11	246	B	Seals Technician	GS-301-11	206
* [illegible], Herman E.	Seals Technician	GS-9	247	D	GRAPHICS ARTS [illegible] Tech Projects Off	GS-301-9	119 [illegible]

* Candidate in Process

(12) APPROVED BY: [illegible]
Staff or Div. Chief

(13) APPROVED BY: [illegible]
Class. & Wage Division

(14) APPROVED BY: [illegible]
Personnel Officer

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: KINSEY, Herman E[illegible]

DATE: 30 August 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 23 March 1953

	FROM	TO
TITLE		TECH. PROJ. OFF. BY-110 ~~[illegible] TECHNICIAN Y 247~~
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-301-9 $5060
OFFICE		Technical Services
DIVISION		GRAPHIC ARTS REP. DIV. ~~Special Assistance~~
BRANCH		Off. of Chief ~~Miscellaneous Techniques~~
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington D. C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR RW Muenster ROBERT W. MUENSTER	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☒

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 23 March 1953

SECURITY CLEARED ON 6 Feb. 1953

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED NA

ENTERED ON DUTY 23 March 1953

allot.
25-15-10

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Subject is to be employed in a civilian capacity.

DOG: 03/23/53
CSEOD: 03/23/53
LCD: 03/23/53

POSTED
DE 26 Mar 53

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1948

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

/ 9-10 -2

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 61555

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
KIMSEY Herman E.	11 December 1916	M	GS-13

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
D	DOC TECH CH	DDP/TSD/A/GARB

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐ NOT ELIGIBLE	☒ MEMBER	☐ DEFERRED	
☐ PENDING	☐ DECLINED	☐ DENIED	

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
31 January 1962	Dec 1960 - Dec 1961

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Section activities.	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Oral Briefings.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Monitoring the writing of and writing technical reports.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other Government Questioned Document Labs.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Monitors Graphology Program.	5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-55 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Kimsey possesses a wealth of knowledge in his technical field which, wher skillfully and tactfully utilized, helps to increase the productive capability of his Section's activities.

This thorough knowledge of A&R activities enables him to present his oral briefings in an informative and interesting manner.

Subject has been downgraded in Specific Duty #1 from a "4" to a "3". The basis for the lower rating in this category warrants the following explanation. There have been numerous and reoccuring complaints from personnel under his supervision that he does not display a complete respect for their professional capabilities. This weakness has definitely decreased the morale of the personnel under his supervision. Mr. Marzen, Chief, TSD/GARB, has discussed all areas of weaknesses with the Ratee and pointed out how they affect the overall work aspects of this section of TSD/GARB.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 7 March 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 58	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 7 March 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/TSD/GARB	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Paul J. Szego Paul J. Szego

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This was not signed by Mr. Kimsey and was not forwarded in March 1962 as Mr. Kimsey was in the process of leaving as a result of the 701 action.

DATE 13 February 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, TSD/GARB	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Joseph F. Marzen

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

8 MAR 1961

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 61555

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KIMSEY, Herman E.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916

3. SEX: M

4. GRADE: GS-13

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: DOCUMENT TECH CH

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/TSD/AUTH/GARB

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: Jan 1960 thru Dec 1960

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Supervises A&R Section personnel	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Questioned Document Analysis	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Liaison with other Government Questioned Document Labs.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Oral Briefings	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Monitering the writing of and writing technical reports	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6: Moniters Graphology Program	5

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 4

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject continues to perform his duties as Supervisor of [illegible] complex A&R activities in a competent manner. His knowledge of the technical aspects of his Sections' many functions help to insure a continuation of work flow and his ability to absorb and retain technical data related to his field of endeavor serves as an aid in the presentations of his numerous oral briefings.

One apparent weakness, which he continues to retain, is in his work relations with technical personnel; he has a tendency to drift from main topic under discussion to unrelated subjects, which, while they may be informative, decreases not only the Subject's productive capability, but, also that of the technical personnel.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 31 January 1961
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 46
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 31 January 1961
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: DC/TSD/GARB/
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Paul J. Szego PAUL J. SZEGO

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE: 31 January 1961
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, TSD/GARB
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Joseph F. Marzen JOSEPH F. MARZEN

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

Recorded Card

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 161555

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KIMSEY, Herman E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec. 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/A/GARD	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1960

11. REPORTING PERIOD From Jan 1959 to Jan 1960

SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Branch personnel and activities	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Oral Briefings	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Writing Technical Reports	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other Government Questioned Document Labs.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Monitors Graphology Program	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-53 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject's thorough technical knowledge of A&R activities qualifies him as a competent Supervisor. Since the last reporting period, he has delegated more responsibilities to personnel under his supervision. This, in effect, has increased the productive capability of his Branch.

ICE OF PERSONNEL
11 2 35 PM '60
MAIL ROOM

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 27 January 1960

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: W. E. Kinsey

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 34

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 27 January 1960

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: DC/TSS/GARD

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Paul J. Szego
PAUL J. SZEGO

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE: 27 January 1960

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, TSS/GARD

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: JOSEPH F. MARZEN

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
161555

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KIMSEY Herman E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13 .
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION 6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE DT IO TECH AIDS		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/A/GARD	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
January 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
Dec 1957 to Jan 1959

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Branch Personnel	RATING NO. 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Oral Briefing	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Writing Technical Reports	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other Gov't. Questioned Document Labs.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Monitors graphology program	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION E **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is a very competent supervisor from a technical standpoint in that he has a thorough applicable knowledge of the complex [illegible] activities. In many respects this tends to contribute to his main weakness in that he measures the potential of his personnel by his own level of proficiency rather than a team level. This creates a situation whereby he has tendency to perform many functions which he could delegate to his personnel.

SECTION F **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 22

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS

☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify)

DATE: 27 Jan. 1959

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Deputy Chief, TSS/GARD

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Paul J. Szego Paul J. Szego

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE: 27 Jan. 1959

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, TSS/GARD

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Joseph F. Marron

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any section. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8 of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KIMSEY Herman E.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DT
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/TSS/A/Graphic Arts Repro. Div.
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS
7. GRADE: GS-13
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 23 December 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 23 December 1956 to 23 December 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "W" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF RATER AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. DATE: 30 Dec. 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Joseph E. Marzen
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: C/TSS/GARD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos Control		17 JAN 1958
Reviewed by PUD		

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 30 Dec. 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Charles J. Ryan
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: ASSTC/TSS/AUTH

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4/5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD ENOUGH GUIDANCE OR TRAINING HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY EXHIBITS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - XXXXXXXXXXX CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES FORMS 37-151 AND 37-152 OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Performance

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 16 9 28 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Branch	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Oral Briefing	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Writing Technical Reports	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other Government (Questioned Doc. Labs.)	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Monitors the Graphology Program	RATING NUMBER 5

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Background and years of experience with Agency, qualifies subject as an excellent technician in all facets of questioned document analysis. He is performing an excellent job, monitoring the graphology program. He constantly strives for new ideas in his field of endeavor. In presenting oral briefings and in job discussions, he still retains the tendency of drifting from the immediate topic of discussion.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY. WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) KIMSEY	(First) Herman	(Middle) E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/A/Graphic Arts Repro. Div.			6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS		
7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 23 December 1957		9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 23 December 1956 to 23 December 1957		

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 30 Dec. 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Joseph F. Marzen Joseph F. Marzen	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/TSS/GARD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 30 Dec. 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Charles J. Ryan C J Ryan	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ASSTC/TSS/AUTH

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
2		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	1	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
	0	OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES FORM ... EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND ... WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Potential [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 16 9 25 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

20 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has technical qualifications but still shows weakness in administrative and management capabilities.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
2	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	2	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEEDS ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	2	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	2	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	2	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	3	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	2	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	3	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
2	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
2	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
2	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	2	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KIMSEY Herman E.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DT
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/TSS/AUTH/Graphic Arts Reproduction Division
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS
7. GRADE: GS-12
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 23 December 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 22 December 1955 to 23 December 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.

☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.

X I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.

☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR C, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.

☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 3-6-57
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: JOSEPH F. MARZEN
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, TSS/GARD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	Kr	20 MAR 1957
Reviewed by PUD	[illegible]	

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 14.3.57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: CHARLES J. RYAN C J Ryan
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: AC/TSS/AUTH

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: Occasionally reveals some area of weakness.

SECRET

(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).

9 3 4 57

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Branch	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with other Government Organizations) Questioned Documents	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Oral Briefing	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Document Analysis (for Repro.)	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Knowledge and ability to perform document analysis, questioned document analysis, identification and comparison of handwriting and typewriting. He constantly strives for new techniques in his field of endeavor. Has tendency to present his discussions too indirectly so that the importance of the main topic being discussed often becomes confus~~ing~~ed, vague and sometimes lost.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KIMSEY Herman E.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DT
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/TSS/AUTH/Graphic Arts Reproduction Division
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS
7. GRADE: GS-12
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 23 December 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 22 December 1955 to 23 December 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): XX ANNUAL ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 3-6-57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: JOSEPH F. MARZEN Joseph F. Marzen
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: C/TSS/GARD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 14·3·57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: CHARLES J. RYAN C J Ryan
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: AC/TSS/AUTH

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (Truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
1		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	1	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

10 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has technical qualifications but shows weakness in administrative and management capabilities. MAR 22 9 32 AM '57

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None, except on-the-job training and experience in the administrative functions of his branch.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
2	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	2	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	2	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	2	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	3	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	2	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	2	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
2	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
2	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
2	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	3	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisor(s) to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A [illegible] Report due 22 Dec 56

JAS 12 Dec 56

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

DEC 1955

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KIMSEY HERMAN E.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916
3. SEX: M
4. CAREER DESIGNATION: DT
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY: 23 March 1953
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: TSS
7. DIVISION: Graphic Arts Repro Div
8. BRANCH:
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT: XXX DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE: GS-12
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE: 22 Dec 1955
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 23 Dec 1954 to 22 Dec 1955

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: IO Tech Aids 0136.63 ~~Chief, Analysis and Research Branch/GARD~~
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 1 February 1954
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

Responsible for technical analysis of documents to be reproduced to determine special materials, techniques involved, existence of check points; analysis and comparison of reproductions and originals and preparation of critique on each reproduction. Determination of authenticity of alledged original documents; determination of source of origin of analysis, including graphology. Evaluation and research into new techniques in graphic arts and authentication areas and development of field expedients for this activity. Maintenance of world wide files of stationery, watermarks, handwriting and typewriting samples; maintains library of information relative to questioned document work, police science, forgery and counterfeiting.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ has ☒ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE: 29 November 1955

SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor): CHARLES YECH, JR. Charles Yech

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE:

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority): CHARLES J. RYAN

FORM NO. 37-189 1 MAY 54 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive scales are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale in each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Read each of the statements on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether the phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.	1	2	X	3			4			5			6	
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.									X					
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.											X			
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.									X					
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X				
5. UNEMOTIONAL.						X								
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.									X					
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.									X					
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.									X					
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.						X								
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.										X				
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.									X					
14. GETS THINGS DONE.										X				
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.									X					
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.										X				
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.										X				
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.									X					
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.									X					
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.								X						
25. ABLE TO [illegible] WITHOUT [illegible]											X			

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.									X					
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.									X					
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".								X						
29. TOUGH MINDED.							X							
30. OBSERVANT.										X				
31. CAPABLE.											X			
32. CLEAR THINKING.										X				
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.									X					
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.									X					
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.												X		
36. DELIBERATE.										X				
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.							X							
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.									X					
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.								X						
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X			
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										X				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.										X				
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.										X				
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.									X					
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.									X					
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.									X					
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.									X					

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Broad knowledge of technical aspects of intelligence and counter-intelligence work, particularly in the authentication field.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Excessive enthusiasm in his own field which causes him to "overtalk" occassionally; at times this results in an unconscious reaction by his hearers to give information he is passing on a lower professional evaluation than is justified.

SECRET

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

See "A" above.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 9 2 12 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Continued contact with questioned document profession: no formal training in this field available. Training in management and/or broad operational administration when personnel situation/work load permits.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☒ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 90 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A. SD·TS [illegible] 12/55

BY DATE

Posted Pos. C[illegible] 1/13

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

Assigned by [illegible] 1/14/65

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KIMSEY, Herman E.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec. 1916
3. SEX: M
4. CAREER DESIGNATION: TS
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY: 23 March 1953
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: DDP
7. DIVISION: TSS
8. BRANCH: GARD
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT: [XX] DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE: GS-11
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE: 23 December 1954
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 22 December 1953 to 23 December 1954

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Chief, Analysis & Research Branch 1290.01
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 1 February 1954
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency): Makes analyses of documents preliminary to reproduction; determines necessity for special procurement of paper, cloth, other materials; determines existence of check points, departures from normal security printings; makes critique of finished reproduction. Conducts questioned document analysis for operations desks; detection of forgeries, alteration; comparisons of handwriting, typing. Conducts training in field expedients of document reproduction and authentication; conducts briefing in general graphic arts activity. Researches into and develops new and field methods for document authentication and alteration. Maintains liaison with government and commercial organizations active in fields of documentation, police sciences, etc.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ has ☒ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE: 14 Dec. 54
SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor): Charles Yech Charles Yech

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected in attached memorandum)

THIS DATE: 15 Dec
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority): James H. Drum James H. Drum

FORM NO. 37-189 1 MAY 54 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left; then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion as whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE	APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒			
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.					☒	
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.			X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.				X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.				X		
4. HAS INITIATIVE.					X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.				X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.					X	
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.					X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.					X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.				X		
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.				X		
11. CALM.			X			
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.					X	
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.				X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.				X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.				X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.					X	
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.					X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.				X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.						X
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.					X	
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.				X		
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.				X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.					X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.					X	
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.					X	

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.									X					
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.								X						
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES: A "SPARK PLUG".							X							
29. TOUGH MINDED.						X								
30. OBSERVANT.								X						
31. CAPABLE.									X					
32. CLEAR THINKING.							X							
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.							X							
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.							X							
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.									X					
36. DELIBERATE.						X								
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.						X								
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.						X								
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.						X								
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.							X							
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.							X							
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.							X							
43. HAS DRIVE.							X							
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.							X							
45. VERSATILE.								X						
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.								X						
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.						X								
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.						X								
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.									X					
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.							X							

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Very broad knowledge of technical aspects in intelligence operations; enthusiasm and devotion to type of work he is doing.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Tendency to wander away from specific subjects during discussions because of the many vaguely related and remotely corollary situations he has experienced and/or learned about.

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

None

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

No

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None at present.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY...WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANYPLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

DE

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) KINSEY	(First) Herman	(Middle) E.	2. GRADE GS-[illegible]	3. POSITION TITLE Tech. Projects Officer GS-[illegible]
4. OFFICE DDP/TSS	STAFF OR DIVISION [illegible]	BRANCH Office of Chief	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 23 Mar 53 To 22 Dec 53

6. TYPE OF REPORT
☒ Initial ☐ Annual ☐ Special
☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

a. Analyze foreign documents for the purpose of reproduction.
b. Conduct a comparison critique between the original document and the reproduction.
c. Conduct operational document analysis by comparing and identifying handwriting, typewriting, inks, paper, etc., for the purpose of establishing the authenticity or true source of the document.
d. Conduct research in both laboratory and field methods of alteration, reproduction, and forgery of documents.
e. Maintain liaison with security-cleared government agencies and consultants engaged in document examination work.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
NONE			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Intelligence Documentation.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

Not applicable.

10.

DATE: 30 Nov 53

SIGNATURE: Herman E. Kinsey

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Kinsey is well qualified to perform all tasks assigned him and capable of greater responsibilities. He is mature, has broad experience in intelligence activities is an excellent instructor, capable of clear self-expression. He has acquired a wealth of knowledge in the field of document intelligence through wide field experience, academic study, and instructional experience. A pleasing personality, good contact man. His manner of performance on duties assigned has been excellent.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Acceptance of responsibility, thoroughness, eagerness to try new techniques and ideas, cooperation.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Wider knowledge of Graphic Arts mechanical techniques; exploration of new techniques in practical documentation.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Has capacity to handle greater responsibilities, especially in technical or associated training activities.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Possibly, at present feels he is performing valuable services to Agency which heretofore have received little support; charged with document reproduction and operational analysis, research.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None at present; continued widening of his present knowledge of advanced techniques in document examination and reproduction techniques.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

29 Dec 53
DATE

Charles [illegible] Jr.
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

29 Dec 53
DATE

C/GSRD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

Mr. Kinney has proved of great value in his assignment. He is qualified for higher responsibilities in his specialties.

SECRET

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN HEALTH BENEFITS ENROLLMENT

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF

A. IDENTIFYING DATA

1. NAME (LAST)	(FIRST)	(MIDDLE INITIAL)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. CARRIER CONTROL NO.
Vinsoy,	Herman	E.	12/11/16	09/306
4. ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET)			5. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.	6. ENROLLMENT CODE NO.
(CITY AND ZONE NUMBER)		(STATE)	11239001	421
			7. DATE ACTION BECOMES EFFECTIVE	

9-26-72

B. TERMINATION

☒ ENROLLMENT TERMINATES EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 7, ABOVE, WITH ELIGIBILITY TO CONVERT TO A NONGROUP CONTRACT.

C. CHANGE IN PLAN

☐ ENROLLMENT SHOWN BY ITEM 6, ABOVE, HAS BEEN TERMINATED BECAUSE OF ELECTION OF ANOTHER PLAN.

D. TRANSFER OUT

☐ NAME AND ADDRESS OF NEW PAYROLL OFFICE FOR RETIREMENT SYSTEM TO WHICH TRANSFERRING

E. TRANSFER IN

ENROLLMENT ACCEPTED BY THIS AGENCY ☐

F. SUSPENSION

☐ ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN SUSPENDED, EFFECTIVE ON DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 7, ABOVE, WHILE ENROLLEE IS ON ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY OR FOR THE REASON STATED IN REMARKS

G. REINSTATEMENT

ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN REINSTATED, EFFECTIVE ON DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 7, ABOVE. ☐

H. CHANGE IN NAME OF ENROLLEE

ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN CHANGED TO ☐

NAME

ADDRESS IF DIFFERENT FROM ITEM 4, ABOVE

DATE OF BIRTH

I. CHANGE IN ENROLLMENT — SURVIVOR ANNUITANT

ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN CHANGED FROM FAMILY COVERAGE TO SELF ONLY ☐

NEW ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER

J. REMARKS 7263 T1555

K. DATE OF NOTICE

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL

DATE

HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington 25, D. C.

QUADRUPLICATE To Employing Office

61555 | BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

KIMSEY, Herman Edward | Dec 1916

Fitness Report Dec 1957 - Jan 1959 -- "...is a very competent supervisor from a technical standpoint in that he has a thorough applicable knowledge of the complex A&R activities. In many respects this tends to contribute to his main weakness in that he measures the potential of his personnel by his own level of proficiency rather than a team level. This creates a situation whereby he has tendency to perform many functions which he could delegate to his personnel." Rater, P. J. Szego. Reviewer, J. F. Marzen.

Fitness Report Jan 1959 - Jan 1960 -- "...thorough technical knowledge of A&R activities qualifies him as a competent Supervisor. Since the last reporting period, he has delegated more responsibilities to personnel under his supervision. This, in effect, has increased the productive capability of his Branch." Rater, P. J. Szego. Reviewer, J. F. Marzen.

Appreciation 1953 from Chief, NSA, for excellent work on Report C-145 performed by TSS personnel. Endorsed by Chief, CARD/TSS.

Commendation 1955 from the field, conveyed by the Career Management Officer, TSS, for efficiency in rendering support to an operation.

9 Jul 1960 OP/PAD CAR/ael

[illegible]

SECRET
Security Information

Name: KINSEY, HERMAN EDWARD
Last, First Middle

TO: All C. I. A. Personnel

FROM: Personnel Director

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The Agency is currently revising the system for machine coding employee qualifications, thereby permitting more complete and accurate data on all personnel. The new system will aid in implementing Agency policies on promotion from within by facilitating the selection of personnel with desired education and experience for vacancies which may occur. It is also expected that the new system will provide readily accessible statistics for planning and management purposes.

2. The attached questionnaire is designed to cover adequately those factors in which the Agency is interested. Although the information is, in a large measure, already reflected in previous forms submitted by you, it is felt that your time within the organization may enable you to emphasize those qualifications pertinent to its needs. The questionnaire also serves to bring your education and qualifications record up to date.

3. Your cooperation is requested in completing the questionnaire as thoroughly and accurately as possible and returning it to your Administrative Officer within the time allotted.

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 13 May 53

George E. Meloon
George E. Meloon
Personnel Director

SECRET
Security Information

FORM NO. 37-182
MAY 1952

[illegible]

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry)	2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) KIMSEY, HERMAN EDWARD	3. Office CARD/TSS

4. Date of Birth 11 Dec 1916	5. Sex: X male (1) __ female (2)	Martial Status S Nr. Dependents 1	6. CIA Entry Date: 23 March 53

7. Citizenship: X U.S. __ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) X Birth (2) __ Marriage (3) __ Naturalization (4) __ Other(specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ________

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate

GED ~~4~~. Two years college, or less
5. Over two years, no degree
6. Bachelor degree
7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)

8. Masters degree
9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

4. Military or Intelligence Training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, command & staff, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
Counter Intelligence Corps	Mar-47	May-47	2 1/2	(MOS 1301) Basic course for Special Agent
Instructor Guidance Course	Apr-52 Sept-47	Apr-52 Sept-47	1	Instructor, CIC School
Chemical Warfare School	May-43	June-43	1/2	Gas Non Commisioned Officer

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. CIA Experience: State the specific nature of duties performed with CIA and CIG, starting with your present position. Take position titles from your official personnel papers, if you have personal copies. Please do not request your Official Personnel Folder. Include geographic area and subject matter dealt with, if applicable. Position Title is your classification title such as Geographer, Intelligence Officer, etc. Duty Title indicates your organization position such as - Section Chief, Branch Chief, Administrative Assistant, etc., and is to be filled in only if different to the Position Title. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From 23 Mar 53 To ______ Tot. mos. ___ Grade GS 9 Salary $5060.00 Office GARD/TSS Position Title: ~~Technical Projects Officer~~ Duty Title: Technical Projects Officer	Description of Duties: Foreign Document Analyst and Technician Duty Station, if overseas:
From ______ To ______ Tot. mos. ___ Grade ______ Salary ______ Office ______ Position Title: ______ Duty Title: ______	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From ______ To ______ Tot. mos. ___ Grade ______ Salary ______ Office ______ Position Title: ______ Duty Title: ______	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From ______ To ______ Tot. mos. ___ Grade ______ Salary ______ Office ______ Position Title: ______ Duty Title: ______	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.) See Military Work background Sec XVI

From May 46 To Oct 46 Tot. mo's 5 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) SP-7 Salary $3021.00 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 100 laborer & skilled laborer Employer U.S. Forest Service Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Forestry	Exact Title of your position Camp Supt. Description of Duties: Timber disease control, fighting forest fires, camp administration(food, pay, project records, etc.) Duty Station if overseas:
From Apr 45 To Apr 46 Tot. mo's 12 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) CPC 7 Salary $2694.96 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 35 laborers Employer U. S. Forest Service Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Forestery	Exact Title of your position Camp Supt. Description of Duties: Hazard Reduction project, fighting forest fires, camp administration.(food, pay, project records, etc) Duty Station if overseas:
From Oct 44 To Apr 45 Tot. mo's 7 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary $1.10 per hr Number and Class of Employees Supervised: none Employer McCloud River Lbr. Co. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Lumber	Exact Title of your position Brakeman Description of Duties: Brakeman on Deisel loco. Duty Station if overseas:
From June 44 To Oct 44 Tot. mo's 4 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary $90.00 + Exper. Per mon. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: none Employer Brown Shasta Ranch. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Horse racing and breeding	Exact Title of your position Laborer Description of Duties: Working with horses, cattle, and crops. Duty Station if overseas:
From Dec 43 To June 44 Tot. mo's 7 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary $90 per hr Number and Class of Employees Supervised: none Employer McCloud River Lbr. Co Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) lumber	Exact Title of your position laborer Description of Duties: Handle lumber & Operate machines. Duty Station if overseas:

SECRET
Security Information

Sec.II, Par.2.

From 19 May 1941 To 5 November 1943 Total Months 30
Military Service

From 5 Oct 1940 to 19 May 1941. Total months 7.
Classification Grade (If in Federal Service)--- Salary---.75 per hr
Number and class of employees supervised---- None
Employer---McCloud River Lumber Co.
Kind of Business---Lumber
Exact Title of your position---Brakeman
Description of Duties---Brakeman on a diesel locomotive.
Duty Station if Overseas---

From 1 May 1940 To 1 Oct 1940 Total Months 5
Class. Grade (If in Federal Service) Unk Salary $160.00 per mo.
Number and Class of Employees Supervised 10-20 laborers

Employer U S Forest Service
Kind of Business Forestry
Exact Title of your Position Forest Guard
Description of your duties Suppression and prevention of Forest Fires, enforcement of Forest Laws, & maintainance of Forest & equipt.
Duty station if overseas

From 1 Oct 1939 To 1 May 1940 Total months 7
Class. Grade (If in Federal Service) Salary 0.65 per hr.
Number and class of employees supervised None

Employer McCloud River Lumber Company
Kind of Business Lumber
Exact Title of your position Brakeman
Description of your duties Brakeman on diesel locomotive

Duty station if overseas

From 1 May 1939 TO 1 Oct 1939 Total Months 5
Class. Grade (if in Federal Service) Unk Salary $160.00 per month.
Number and class of employees supervised 10-20 laborers

Employer US Forest Service
Kind of business Forestry
Exact title of your position Forest Guard
Description of your duties Suppression and prevention of Forest fires, enforcement of Forest Laws, & maintainance of Forest & Equipt
Duty station if overseas

Sec II, Par. 2.

From 1 Jan 1939 To 1 May 1939 Total Months 4
Class. Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary 0.65 per hr
Number and class of Employees supervised None

Employer McCloud River Lumber Company
Kind of business Lumber
Exact Title of your position Brakeman
Description of your duties Brakeman on a deisel locomotive

Duty station if overseas

From 1 Oct 1938 To 1 Jan 1939 Total Months 3
Unemployed

From 5 May 1938 To 1 Oct 1938 Total Months 5
Class. Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary 150.00 per mo.
Number and class of Employees supervised None

Employer Union Oil Company
Kind of business Oil
Exact Title of your position Relief tank-truck salesman.
Description of youb duties Sale and delivery of oil & gasoline to stations.
Duty station if overseas

From Feb 1935 To April 1938 Total months 38
Class. Grade(if in Federal Service) Salary 0.50 per hr
Number and class of employees supervised None

Employer McCloud River Lumber Company
Kind of business Lumber
Exact title of your position Brakeman
Description of your duties Brakeman on diesel locomotive.

Duty station if overseas.

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 X Civil Police (Forest Service)
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 ___ FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 ___ Office of Strategic Services
24 ___ Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 X Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 ___ Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge Slight		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence Occupation etc., 2 years	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study (Inc. CIA training)
Japanese					X			X		

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ___

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ___

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		~~Residence~~ occupation	~~Travel~~	Study
Japan	1948-1949	X		
	1950-1950	X		
	1951-1951	X		
Korea	1950-1951		X (war)	

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specalized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc.	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.
	Horses, swimming, archery, boating,
	photography, and weapons.

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership. International Assn. For Identification
Youngstown, Ohio

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

Co-author of 2 text books at the Counter Intelligence Corp School
Observation and Description
Physical Evidence
Co-author of the CIC Investigator. A handbook for CIC Agents.

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No

SEC. X. CIA TESTS

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken in CIA:

Type of Test	Date Taken
Personnel Qualification Tests	Nov 1949

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour X (2) 4 year Tour X (3) Not interested __

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment in CIA do you think you are best qualified?

Operational or Instruction. Also considerable experience in supervisory capacity. Flare for organization

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status

Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ___ Yes X No.

If yes, indicate your present draft classification ____________

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status

Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___ Yes X No.

If yes, complete the following.

1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service ____________ Grade ____________ Location ____________

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated ____________

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ____________

Location of Service Records, if known ____________

SEC. XV. CIA TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken while in the CIA.

Course or Subject	Dates (from) (to)	Hours

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above. (Military Service-19 May41-5 Nov 43, 22Nov 46-8 Oct 49, [illegible] 52. Total Time [illegible] years)

Considerable study in Applied Psycology, Criminology, and Criminal Investigative Techniques. Delivered over 1500 hours of lecture on these subjects. Two (2) years experience in supervising an investigative type laboratory which specialized in document examination. Number of personnel, five (5). Two (2) years experience as Special Agent, CIC. Total of Six (6) years in CIC. Highest rank, Master Sergeant

Permanent MOS 1301

One (1) year experience with S-2 Section, Combat Intelligence, Interpertation and Evaluation of Information.

1 1/2 Years of general military training with emphasis on communications, Cavalry(Horse), Infantry, Parachute Troops, Tank Destroyers, & Field Artillery.

DATE 3 April 53

SIGNATURE

SECRET
Security Information

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on MAR 30 1953 (DATE) I have attended the Agency Indoctrination Course specified by Regulation 25-1.

Herman E. Kimsey
(NAME)

FORM NO. 51-121
DEC 1951

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA		
(Department or agency)	(Bureau or division)	(Place of employment)

I, Herman E. Kinsey do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

23 March 1953	Herman E. Kinsey
(Date of entrance on duty)	(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 23rd day of March A. D. 19 53.

at Washington D.C. (City) (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

5 USC 16 & 16a
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—60150-4

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

~~Hotel Vivian 1763 "G" St N.W.~~

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State): Hotel Vivian, 1763 "G" St. N.W. Washington, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec. 1916 (B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country): Gallup, New Mexico.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: W.S. Lineberger (B) RELATIONSHIP: Brother in law (C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: Box 185 McCloud, Calif. (D) TELEPHONE NO.: Yes

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES [✓ NO]

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (Check one)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—54190-8

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1957
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): Kinsey, Herman E.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U.S. Forest Service	1939	June	1	1939	Oct	10 ~~20~~	
U.S. Forest Service	1940	May	14	[illegible]	Oct.	10	
U.S. Forest Service	1945	Nov	28	[illegible]	Mar	15	see attached for 1945-46 [illegible]
U.S. Forest Service	1946	Nov	5	[illegible]	~~Nov~~ '47	~~29~~ 28	✓
CIA	53	Mar	23				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (Hon. or dishon.?)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
Army	1941	May	19	[illegible]	Nov	29	Hon.
Army	1946	Nov	29	[illegible]	Oct	8	Hon
Army	1950	Jan	5	[illegible]	Mar	23	Hon

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☑ YES ☐ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
Furlough	1939	Oct	1	[illegible]	May	1		7	
[illegible]								10/1/89	

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☑ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

[illegible] 1/15/57
9/15/58

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

23 March 53 (DATE)
Herman E. Kinsey (SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 23 day of March (MONTH) 1953 at Wash DC (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
	~~5~~	10
	4	27
	~~9~~ 11	~~24~~
	~~2~~ 4	24.
SCD	8/7/42	
	GCS 1-15-60	
2	5	17
2	10	9
3	2	18

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 10 ~~3~~ 20 ~~13~~

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

PART III.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 12*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)			
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)	53	3	22
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)	10	3	18
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*Leave purposes*)	42	12	3

PART IV.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES

(To be completed only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes)

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 12*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 14*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)			
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*RIF purposes*) (*Enter as the "service computation date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SP-7*)			

REMARKS:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 6 Feb. 1953

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division TS8-1#5 Your Reference: I-2594

FROM: Chief, Security Division Case Number: 71129

SUBJECT: KINSEY, Herman Edward

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the E.O.D. procedures.

E. P. Geiss

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

(8)

14-00000

CHRONOLOGICAL [illegible] EMPLOYMENT FOR [illegible] YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR [illegible] PERIOD [illegible] OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIOD [illegible]

14-00000

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE ~~Sept. [illegible]~~
Sept. 1963

[illegible]

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: McCord, James W., Jr.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 15 April 1951 – 24 April 1974

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

70 AUG ent'd

69 MAY ent'd

69 Sep Ent'd

McCORD, JAMES

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 7/18/78

TO: NOTE FOR THE FILE

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS

According to card notation in the files of C/[illegible]/OP the information referred to on the attached flag was transferred to the Office of the Insepctor General and the office of the Director of Security on 21 January 1965.

FROM: D J Houdeshelt

[illegible] Houdeshelt, C/FOIPB/OP

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

-E-T

OF FILE

tation is on file with

:s Staff, Office of

Quarters Eye, extension

☐ Hearing transcript and related papers

☒ Other EYES ONLY material

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

McCORD, JAMES W., JR.

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

70 3577

31 AUG 1970 70-4562

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

Dear Jim:

As you bring to a close more than twenty-five years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed notably to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - AC/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: /s/ H. B. Fisher 27 AUG 1970
A Director of Personnel

Concur: ______________________
AC/EAB/OS 1970

OP/RAD/ROB/MRDameron:jat/3257 (19 August 1970)

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

31 August 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Retirement - James W. McCord, Jr.

1. The retirement of Subject, effected as a result of a memorandum from the Head of his Career Service stating that he is surplus to the needs of the Service and that his retirement will be recommended to the Director under the provisions of the CIA Retirement and Disability System pertaining to involuntary retirement, in no way implies an adverse action. Subject signed an application for retirement of his own volition in order to qualify for an immediate retirement annuity. The liberalized criteria for such separations was established by the Agency to parallel similar actions under the Civil Service Retirement System in accordance with FPM Letter No. 831-23, dated 10 December 1969.

2. Any inquiry received concerning the nature of the separation of Subject from the Agency should be confirmed simply as a retirement.

Francis G. Monan

Francis G. Monan
Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 July 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MC CORD, James W., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Retirement (Involuntary) Under CIA Retirement and Disability System

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 31 YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1271-0501

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sec. 235(a)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/Office of Security
DD/Physical, Technical & Overseas Security
Physical Security Division
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Physical Security Officer

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0070

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15/~~8~~ 9

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~[illegible]~~ 28226 ✓ 28981

18. REMARKS

Subject's last working day will be 31 August 1970. See attached memos.

Retirement is submitted pursuant to a request from the Head of the Security Career Service.

Include on Agency Reserve List
1152 [illegible] 8/20/70.

cc/CSB - Info
cc/Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Edward K. O'Malley
C/PB/A&TS/OS

DATE SIGNED: 2 July 70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE:

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. VOUCHER CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 26 YR. 24

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1–CSC 2–OPGN 3–FICA 4–NONE CODE: C

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: GU CC C C

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO:

34. SEX:

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0–NONE 1–5 PT 2–10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0–WAIVED 1–YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0–NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1–NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2–BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3–BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1–YES 2–NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1–YES 2–NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-21-70

Noted
AWPalladi
ASIO 20 Aug 70
CA 6901

46. O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 20 Aug 70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

BSJ: 14 SEPT 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT-INVOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYS-CORR
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 08 31 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1271 0501 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SEC 235A
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION:
11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL SEC OF
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0070
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 9
17. SALARY OR RATE: 28989
18. REMARKS:

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 08/31/70 AS FOLLOWS: ITEM 16, GRADE AND STEP WHICH READ 15 8 TO READ 15 9; AND ITEM 17, SALARY OR RATE WHICH READ 28226 TO READ 28989.

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Use Previous Edition

BSJ: 27 AUG 70

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT- INVOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 31 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1271 0501 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SEC 235A

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: [illegible]

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: [illegible]

11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL SEC OF

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0070

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 8

17. SALARY OR RATE: 28226

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-51)

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

1 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

THROUGH : Director of Security

SUBJECT : Certificate of Distinction

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the award named above will be conferred on you in recognition of the excellent service you have rendered this Agency. Security considerations relevant to the award are explained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security.

2. The award will be presented to you at a ceremony to be held in the near future. Members of your family, Agency associates, and intimate friends who are aware of your Agency affiliation may attend the ceremony.

3. Invitations to the ceremony will be extended by the Secretariat, Honor and Merit Awards Board, Office of Personnel, extension 3645. Please send to that office the names and phone numbers of the guests you would like to have invited, and indicate any dates on which you would not be available for such a ceremony.

/Sgd/ Robert M. Gaynor

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - D/S
1 - D/Pers Reader Chrono/OPF
1 - Sec't, HMAB
1 - Recorder, HMAB

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

DATE [illegible]
11 August 1970

e Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

IAL OR ID NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BIRTHYEAR	SEX	TYPE EMPLOYEE
	McCORD, James Walter, Jr.	1924	M	

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	SD	SCHEDULE	GRADE	STATION
DDS/OS			GS-15	

BE AWARDED

Certificate of Distinction

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD Aug 1951 - Present

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., is hereby awarded the Certificate of Distinction in recognition of his exemplary performance of duty for over nineteen years. In a variety of assignments, both domestic and abroad, Mr. McCord has displayed unusual imagination, ingenuity, and effectiveness in accomplishing his assigned tasks. His achievements in the fields of audio-countermeasure techniques and physical and technical security are particularly noteworthy and represent a marked contribution to the mission of the Agency. His professionalism in the conduct of his work upholds the best traditions of service and reflects great credit on him and the Office of Security.

(Recommendation approved by DD/S on 23 July 1970)

REMARKS

APPROVED

R. E. Cushman, Jr.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

25 AUG 1970
DATE

SIGNATURE /s/ Robert S. Wattles
TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
ROBERT S. WATTLES

SIGNATURE
Signed Original
TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
ROBERT M. GAYNOR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) McCORD JAMES W.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH. TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
✓	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks). NO CHANGE
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee James W. McCord Jr.	Date Signed Aug 3, 70
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) 7 Winder Court, Rockville, Maryland 20850	Correspondence ☑ Overt ☐ Covert

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] AUG 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.

THROUGH : Head of SS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Involuntary Retirement

1. This is to inform you that the Director of Central Intelligence has approved the recommendation of your Career Service that you be involuntarily retired under the CIA Retirement and Disability System.

2. Your retirement will become effective 31 August 1970. Your annuity will commence as of 1 September 1970 and is payable on 1 October 1970. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative details necessary to process your retirement.

3. You will receive a lump-sum payment for your accrued annual leave up to 30 days or for whatever amount of leave credit you carried over from the last leave year if that amount is more than 30 days.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/MRDameron:dam/3257 (10 Aug 70)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

20 JUL 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Official Cover Branch, Central Cover Staff, DD/P

THROUGH : Chief, Administration and Training Staff, OS

SUBJECT : Summary of Agency Employment - James W. McCord, Jr.

REFERENCE : Memorandum to Chief, Administrative Staff/OS from C/OCB/CCS, dated 14 July 1970, Subject, James W. McCord, Jr.

Attached hereto is a summary of Agency Employment for Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., who is retiring 31 August 1970.

James P. O'Connell

James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

Att.

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT

JAMES W. MCCORD, JR.

Service with the Central Intelligence Agency began on 22 August 1951 and continued through 31 August 1970. During his career there was a variety of assignments involving investigations, research and report writing, technical and physical security programs and a two year tour overseas.

As an investigator during the first two years of employment, there was wide involvement in a variety of support activities requiring initiative and ingenuity.

During the seven years engaged in research and report writing, there was much independence of action and success depended on initiative, imagination and resourcefulness in pioneering new areas of interest. Beginning in May 1957, managerial responsibilities began with appointment to a Deputy Chief position of a research staff of some six professional and clerical personnel.

When serving overseas, responsibilities were managerial in nature as Chief of a regional staff of some ten professional and clerical personnel providing a full spectrum of security support.

From August 1964 to June 1965 he attended the Air War College as representative of the Agency.

Since 1965 two vital line positions were held involving the Agency's programs in the technical and physical security fields.

In heading up the technical security division, from 1965 to 1968, he had primary supervisory responsibility for some 40 professional and clerical personnel, preparing the budget and programs for the Agency's technical security program, and managing the obligating of authorized funding to assure that approved programs and goals were met. He was instrumental in guiding the development of new approaches, in establishing new training concepts and in bringing the Agency to a position of recognized leadership in this field.

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

Since October 1968, as Chief of a division responsible for the Agency's physical security program he had primary responsibility for the supervision of some 70 professional and clerical personnel, together with the programming, budgeting and implementing of the total physical security program of the Agency. As a result of his technological experience, he developed and implemented physical security programs which produced for the Agency a physical security posture of pre-eminent quality within the US Government.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In) 38

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 June 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124
2. NAME (Last–First–Middle): MCCORD, JAMES W., JR.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 | DAY 28 | YEAR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 0271 0501
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/SECURITY
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15
17. SALARY OR RATE: $
18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:
20. EMPLOY CODE:
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS. CODE:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. | DA. | YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE): CODE 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV./EMP | CODE
39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE (0—WAIVER, 1—YES) | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
- 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
- 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
- 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
- 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) | CODE | IND. TAX STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-6-70 MW
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 22 Jul 70

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
OP-1 1-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

70 3522

Registry
70-4562

31 AUG 1970

AUG 31 2 05 PM '70

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

Dear Jim:

As you bring to a close more than twenty-five years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed notably to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - AC/EAB/CS
1 - D/Pers
1 - CPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: /s/ H. B. Fisher 27 AUG 1970
A Director of Personnel

AUG 31 11 29 AM '70

Concur: ______________________
AC/EAB/CS [illegible] 1970

OP/RAD/ROB/MRDameron:jat/3257 (19 August 1970)

SECRET

31 JUL 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Involuntary Retirement - Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.

REFERENCE : Memorandum for Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. from Director of Security dated 30 June 1970, same subject

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., GS-15, Physical Security Officer, Office of Security, Support Services, has been recommended for involuntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50m. The purpose of this proposed retirement, to which Mr. McCord is agreeable, is to assist the Office of Security to reduce its personnel surplus. If such retirement is approved, Mr. McCord requests an effective date of 31 August 1970.

3. Mr. McCord has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and will meet the technical requirements for involuntary retirement under the System prior to the effective date requested. He is 46 years old and will complete 25 years of Federal service on 21 August 1970. This service includes over 19 years with the Agency of which 5 years were in qualifying service. The CIA Retirement Board has recommended that his involuntary retirement be approved.

4. It is recommended that you approve the involuntary retirement of Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50m.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles
Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

/s/ Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

9 AUG 1970
Date

SECRET

REQUEST AND AUTHORIZATION FOR ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING/ACTIVE DUTY TOUR

TO: HQ COMD USAF (PRP)

FROM: HQ COMD USAF (PRP-A)

1. ☒ BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT ☐ BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

2. GRADE, LAST NAME, FIRST, MIDDLE INITIAL, AFSN: LT COLONEL MC CORD, JAMES W.JR. 453-22-4741

3. PAFSC: 8011

4. PRESENT ADDRESS:
7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

5. ON FLYING STATUS: ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. AERO RATING: Aircraft Observer

7. IS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR 12 DAYS PLUS REQUIRED TRAVEL TIME

8. PURPOSE (Type): ☒ ANNUAL TOUR ☐ SCHOOL TOUR ☐ SPECIAL TOUR OF ACDUTRA ☐ SPECIAL TOUR OF AD

TITLE (Indicate specific school course or special tour title)

9. RESERVE ASSIGNMENT:
HQ USAF (AFESS-FE)
Washington, DC

10. UNIT OF ATTACHMENT

11. INDIVIDUAL WILL REPORT TO:
JOHN F. KENNEDY CENTER FOR SPECIAL WARFARE (A)
Student Dormitory, Bldg D-3601, Reilly Street and Bastogne Drive, Ft Bragg, North Carolina 28308

12. INDIVIDUAL WILL BE RELEASED FROM ORGANIZATION ATTACHED/ASSIGNED FOR ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING ON

	HOUR	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
11. Report	NLT 0800	19	Jan	70
12. Release	▨	30	Jan	70

13. INDIVIDUAL ☐ IS ☒ IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PARTICIPATE IN FLYING ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD OF ACTIVE DUTY COVERED BY THIS ORDER.

14. AUTHORITY: - AFM 35-3

15. INDIVIDUAL WILL PROCEED FROM PRESENT ADDRESS IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLY WITH REPORTING TIME AND DATE.

16. MODES OF TRANSPORTATION ☒ AUTHORIZED ☐ DIRECTED

☐ MILITARY AIRCRAFT

COMMERCIAL: ☒ AIRCRAFT ☒ RAIL ☒ BUS

17. PCS, TDN, PAY, ALLOWANCES, AND TRAVEL CHARGEABLE TO:
PAY & ALWS: 5703700 500 4261 P 723.01 (P&A) S594700

18. REMARKS: TRAVEL & PER DIEM: 5703700 500 6262 P 723.07 40861 40961 S668100
Security Clearance - TOP SECRET Training Category - D Pay Group - D
For period of this active duty only, mbr and dependents authorized Commissary (Para 1a, AFR 145-15), Base Exchange (Para 3-8a(1), AFR 147-14) & Base Theater (Para 3-10, AFR 34-32) privileges.

19. DATE: 16 Dec 69

20. PHONE NO.: 4579/4279

21. APPROVING OFFICIAL (Typed Name and Grade): E. E. THAYER, GS-12

22. SIGNATURE: E. E. Thayer

23. DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS:
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS COMMAND USAF
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332

24. RESERVE ORDER NO.: A - 2073

25. DATE: 16 Dec 69

26. FOR THE COMMANDER

27. DISTRIBUTION:
15 - Individual
1 - Indiv Pers Rec
2 - Unit of Asgmt
2 - Unit of Atch
2 - ARPC, 3800 York St, Denver, CO 80205
2 - HQ AFRES (CAFO), Dobbins AFB, GA 30060
1 - Records Set
35 - Reserve Personnel

28. SIGNATURE ELEMENT OF ORDERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICIAL:
E. E. Thayer
E. E. THAYER
Asst Director for Administration

MC CORD, James

0-130311

10 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John W. Coffey

I want to express my appreciation to you personally and through you to Howard Osborn and the other of your associates who contributed so effectively to the visit of the President on Friday. The arrangements were flawless; the security first-class without being intrusive. I am well aware of the amount of work and planning which went into the successful outcome. I particularly want to commend the good sense and judgment which prevailed throughout. It is easy to push people around. It is difficult to take proper precautions and at the same time make everyone feel as though it were his or her party. Thank you very much. Well done!

Richard Helms
Director

cc: Acting Executive Director

SECRET

James McCord

10 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/PTOS

SUBJECT : Security Support During President Nixon's Visit

1. I have received numerous and highly complimentary comments from the Director, the Executive Director and the Acting Deputy Director for Support for the role this Office played during the visit of President Nixon to the Agency on 7 March 1969. In addition, Mr. Don Gautreau, the Secret Service Agent responsible for protective measures during the visit, told me that he had never met a more highly professional group of personnel than our Security officers. He was impressed with the comprehensive coverage inherent in our protective measures.

2. Our performance on Friday was smooth, efficient and effective and once more is a tribute to our ability to rise to any occasion. This is possible only because of the quality of the effort put forth by each Security Officer who participated. I am very proud of all of you and I would like to particularly commend Jim McCord, Bill Wilkinson and Jim Greene for the work they did in planning our role in the ceremonies. Equally impressive was the performance of Hollis Whitaker and his people in the provision of audio coverage of the event.

3. I would like to have copies of this memorandum placed in the official Personnel File of every individual who participated in making this event such a great success.

Howard J. Osborn

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 October 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MC CORD, James W., Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY YEAR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9271-0501
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/Office of Security
DD/Physical, Technical & Overseas Security
Physical Security Division
Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Physical Security Officer 15
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0070
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15/7 8
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 21,192 = 24,393

18. REMARKS
From: DDS/Office of Security/Technical Division/Office of the Chief - #0642

CC:Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Edward K. O'Malley
Edward K. O'Malley, C/PR/AATS/OS
DATE SIGNED: 10/3/68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 3[illegible]
20. EMPLOY CODE: [illegible]
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC [illegible] ALPHABETIC [illegible]
22. STATION CODE: [illegible]
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. ROSTERS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - OBGR 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-4-68
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 4 Oct 68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226

September 5, 1968

Mr. Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Osborn:

This letter is in appreciation for the valuable assistance provided by your office during the Republican National Convention at Miami Beach, Florida.

I would particularly like to commend James W. McCord and the following members of his Division:

George Schwegman
Carroll Helkerson.

Their dedication and outstanding degree of technical competence contributed immeasurably to the success of our mission.

Sincerely,

Thomas J Kelley

Thomas J. Kelley
Assistant Director

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
OFFICE OF THE MANAGER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20305

IN REPLY REFER TO:
NCS-EO

21 NOV 1967

Mr. Howard Osborn
Director of Security
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Osborn:

On 8 November 1967, Messrs. James McCord, William Flannery, and William Marcy of your agency provided a most interesting and informative briefing on the subject, "Audio Threat by the Communist Block". Included in this presentation was the display of the latest electronic techniques and technical developments in the area of audio threat.

This presentation was most enlightening and proved to be of keen interest to the Agency NCS Representatives, staff members of the Office of the Manager, NCS and selected key personnel of the Defense Communications Agency.

We very much appreciate the availability of the above mentioned personnel and I should like to commend them on their excellent manner of presentation and thorough knowledge of the subject matter.

Obenchain, Jr.
I. R. OBENCHAIN, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Deputy Manager,
National Communications System

Copy to:
Mr. Georgia

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Commendation for Messrs. Frank Farrell, James McCord and their Assistants

FROM:
Acting Director of Security
Room 4E60

EXTENSION: 6777

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DD/PTOS	22 AUG 1967		
2. Ch Tech Div	8/30		
3. Ch Phy Sec Div		9/5	
4. C/SPS			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12. C/A&TS			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

It is a pleasure to commend Messrs. Frank Farrell, James McCord and their Assistants for the fine support they rendered as indicated in the attached letter. Such commendations reflect a high degree of professionalism.

Harlan A. Westrell
Harlan A. Westrell
Acting Director of Security
21 AUG 1967

Nice work!

Please document the appropriate files in A&TS and the Office of Personnel.

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Executive Registry
[illegible]

DD/S 67-4161

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Office of The Director
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, 20755

12 August 1967

Honorable Richard M. Helms
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Dick:

I want to thank you for the technical security demonstration recently presented to me by Howie Osborn and members of his staff. We are very conscious of the subject and welcome opportunities to be kept up-to-date on the state-of-the-art.

I would appreciate your also conveying my personal thanks to Messrs. Frank Farrell, James McCord, and their assistants, not only for the high degree of professionalism which they demonstrated during the session here but also for their continued advice and assistance to my security organization. I am sure you join me in encouraging continued close liaison of this type.

Faithfully yours,

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Director

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.** 8 March 1966

THROUGH : Head of SS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the system, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the system may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you do not have sufficient time prior to completing 15 years of service with the Agency in which you could complete a minimum of 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees."

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 6E-1319 Headquarters (extension 6001). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

20 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, A&TS

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W., Jr.
(Educational Matter)

Attached is a letter from George Washington University showing the completion of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in International Affairs. I understand this would be of interest to the Training and Personnel Branches for their files.

James W McCord Jr
James W. McCord, Jr.
Chief, Technical Division

Attachment:
As Stated Above

SECRET [illegible]

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

THE COLLEGE OF GENERAL STUDIES

July 7, 1965

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, Ala.

Dear Mr. McCord,

I am happy to inform you that you have passed satisfactorily the Comprehensive Examination for candidates seeking the degree of Master of Science in International Affairs.

Congratulations!

Very truly yours,

James G. Brown

for Grover L. Angel
Dean

cc: CGS File
Registrar # 183595

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 July 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER	058124
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	MC CORD, James W., Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	07 / / 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	6271-0208
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY TECHNICAL DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE	ELECT ENG - AUDIO SUPP (15)
12. POSITION NUMBER	0642
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0855.21
16. GRADE AND STEP	15 5
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 18,740
18. REMARKS	
18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	
DATE SIGNED	
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	Robert E. O'Brien Robert E. O'Brien, A/Chief/PersBr/OS
DATE SIGNED	7/16/65

A432

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	37
20. EMPLOY. CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC	16360
21. OFFICE CODING — ALPHABETIC	DCC
22. STATION CODE	75213
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. VOUCHER CODE	1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	01 26 24
26. DATE IN GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28. MIS EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA → 33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RSVR. PROV. TEMP.) CODE	
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES), HEALTH INS. CODE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	7/21/65 mw
46. O.P. APPROVAL	Michael R. Do[illegible]
DATE APPROVED	7/23/65

A37

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 August 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MCCORD, James W., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER ~~FROM~~ ~~[illegible]~~ TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 8 | DAY 16 | YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5271-0100

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
EXECUTIVE STAFF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0032

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 18,170

18. REMARKS

Verbal Concurrence: 20 August 1964 - George Rader, DDP/EE Personnel

Mr. McCord is being double slotted against position C032 for approximately one (1) year while attending the Air War College.

Date. 20 AUG 1964

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request

W. D. O[illegible]

Chief, Personnel [illegible] Div. [illegible]

cc: DDP/EE
cc: Cl Br

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ernest L. Hardt
Ernest L. Hardt, ChPersBr, [illegible]/OS

DATE SIGNED: 8/20/64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	[illegible]		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVE 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: From EE

46. O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 5-20-64

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 MAY 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MCCORD, James W. Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Confidential Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 27 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2139 9300 1017

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EE
German Station
Deputy for Combined Services
Security Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Frankfurt, Germany

11. POSITION TITLE: Security Officer ~~(58)~~

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0363

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ~~(15)~~

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 14055 ✓

18. REMARKS

One copy has been forwarded to the Office of Security.
W-4 and D-4 forms have been forwarded to Payroll.
Medical OK, JANUARY 1962 per the Office of Security.
From: DDS/Office of Security
Security Research Staff
Office of the Chief
Washington, D.C.
#365

5/22/62
MT 5/22/62

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Margaret E. McKenney, C/EE/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 5-11-62

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ernest J. Hardt for Chief, OS/PER

DATE SIGNED: 16 May 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23.	24.	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.
20	10	54460	EE	27015		3	01 26 24

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: SEC Career Sec 2 05-18 62

46. O.P. APPROVAL: MTJ

DATE APPROVED: 5/21/62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

25 June 1959

1. Serial No. 158124	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MCCORD JAMES W JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 26 Yr. 24	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt.-1 10 Pt.-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51	
7. SCD Mo. 03 Da. 27 Yr. 45	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 3112	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept. - USfld. - Frgn. - Code 2	17. Position Title SECURITY OFFICER	18. Position No. 0365	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1810.01

21. Grade & Step 14 2 3	22. Salary Or Rate $ 11,835 11595	23. SD SS	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 01 Yr. 56	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 7100 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. 6 Da. 28 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code [illegible]	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS Office of Security Security Research Staff Office of the Chief	Code 3112	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code [illegible]

33. Dept.-Field Dept. - USfld. - Frgn. - D Code 2	34. Position Title Security Officer	35. Position No. 0365	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 1810.01

38. Grade & Step 15-1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 12,770.00	40. SD ES	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 11 Da. [illegible] Yr. 59	42. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 25 Yr. 60	43. Appropriation Number 9-7100-20-001

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) Sheffield Edwards Director of Security
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) R. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature
A. Career Board			D. Placement	
B. Pos. Control		1959	E.	
C. Classification			F. Approved By	

Remarks

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

21 January 1959

1. Serial No.	158124	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	MCCORD JAMES W JR
3. Date Of Birth	Mo. 01 Da. 26 Yr. 24	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2)	Code 1
5. Sex	M 1	6. CS - EOD	Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51
7. SCD	Mo. 03 Da. 27 Yr. 45	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2)	Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav.	Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2)	Code	12. LCD	Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51
13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD (Yes-1, No-2)	Code 2		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations: DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY INSPECTION STAFF
Code: 3110
15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D.C.
Station Code: 75013
16. Dept. - Field (Dept - USlld - Frgn -): Code 2
17. Position Title: INVESTIGATOR
18. Position No.: 0033
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 1810.22
21. Grade & Step: 14 2
22. Salary Or Rate: $11,595
23. SD: SD
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. 07 Da. 01 Yr. 56
25. PSI Due: Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59
26. Appropriation Number: 9 7101 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT
Code: 16
28. Eff. Date: Mo. Da. Yr.
29. Type Of Employee: Regular
Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations: DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Office of the Chief
Code: 3111 3118
32. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D. C.
Station Code:
33. Dept. - Field (Dept - USlld - Frgn -): D
Code:
34. Position Title: Security Officer
35. Position No.: T365
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 1810.01
38. Grade & Step: 14-2
39. Salary Or Rate: $11595.00 pa
40. SD: SD
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. Da. Yr.
42. PSI Due: Mo. Da. Yr.
43. Appropriation Number: 9-7100-20-001

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Marcia Shepherd Ext. 2063
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): H. E. Steele
Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		1/28/59
B. Pos. Control		23 Jan	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		1-28-59

Remarks

(4)

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo 7 Da 10 Yr 58	X	V to V	V to UV
		UV to V	UV to UV

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) McCORD, James Walter, Jr.	3. Date of Birth Mo 1 Da 26 Yr 24	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No -2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Office of the Chief	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field Dept - Usfld - Frgn - D Code	17. Position Title Security Officer	18. Position No. 365	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1810.01

21. Grade & Step 14 ~~1~~ 2	22. Salary Or Rate 11,595 $ ~~11355.00~~ pa	23. SD SS	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 8-7101-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS/Office of Security Inspection Staff	Code 5110	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code

33. Dept.-Field Dept - Usfld - Frgn - D Code	34. Position Title Investigator	35. Position No. 33	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 1810.22

38. Grade & Step 14 ~~1~~ 2	39. Salary Or Rate 11,595 $ ~~11355.00~~ pa	40. SD SS	41. Date Of Grade Mo 09 Da 01 Yr 56	42. PSI Due Mo 06 Da 28 Yr 59	43. Appropriation Number 8-7101-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br. A&TS/OS	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) H. E. Steele Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Relda White, Ext 2063	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		7/16/58
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		7-16-58

Remarks

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITI .

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. JAMES W. McCORD, Jr.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jan 1924

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 4 Jun 57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:

B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Investigator (CI) T367	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Security Officer T365-14
GS-1810.22-14 $10,320.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.01-14 $10,320.00 pa
DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Internal Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 311201	DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary): No Fitness Report required - no change in supervision.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): H.E.Steele, Ch, Pers. Br., A&TS, OS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Jane Giesing, Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature: H. E. Steele

Title: Ch, Personnel Branch, A&TS, OS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL	
				SD-SS

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-7101-20 TO: Same

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		5 JUN 1957
C. CLASSIFICATION		6/5/57
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		6/11/57
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise *instructed*. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): MR. JAMES W. McCORD, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jan '24
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 6/19/56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED:
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Security Res Spec T405	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator (CI) T367
GS-1810.24-13 $9205.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.22-14 $10,320.00 pa
DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff External Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Internal Branch
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

No Fitness Report required - no change in supervision.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): H.E.Steele, Ch, Pers. Br., A&TS, OS
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): Jane Giesing, Ext. 2063
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: Ch, Admin & Training Staff, OS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	✓		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.	
				SD-SS

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION: W
FROM: 4-7101-20
TO: 6-7101-20
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Texas

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL	GH		
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			
F. APPROVED BY			

SECRET

E.O.

R.W. White

23 September 1954

Joseph S. Reff

Military Permit for Germany - James Walter McCord, Jr.

1. It is requested that a Military Permit for Germany be affixed to the Special Passport issued to the above subject.

2. Travel for the above subject is sponsored by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Housing accommodations are available.

3. It is further requested that any reference to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY be excluded from the permit issued.

Special Passport # 39738
Date of issue: 15 September 1954
Place of issue: Washington, D.C.
Valid Until: 14 September 1956
Occupation: Government Employee
Destination: Frankfurt
Duration in Germany: 2yrs.
Date of entry: 30 September 1954

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): MR. JAMES W. McCORD, JR.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 3/[illegible] January 1924

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 6/[illegible]/54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: 6 June 1954

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Investigator T297.01	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Security Officer TL05
GS-1810.27-12 $7240 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.01-13 $8360.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

PSI eff 6 June 54 - not in folder.

Approved by SE/CSB 8 June 54 *

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): Ervin A. Schmidt, Chief, ADSS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): C. E. Steele, Ext. 2263

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: C H Heney
Title: Executive Officer, Security Office

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT. (WWII)	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-SE

15. SEX: [illegible]

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-7103-20
TO: 5-7103-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

* Per Mr. Steele, SO - 6/8/54

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	Jm	9 June 54
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	Cw	6/9/54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Ralph S. Clark 10 June '54

SECRET

16—37920-8

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.* If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) [illegible], JR.
2. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]
3. REQUEST NO.
4. DATE OF REQUEST [illegible]

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Investigator (Gen) [illegible]	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator [illegible]
[illegible]-1810-12 [illegible].00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	[illegible]-1810.[illegible]-12 [illegible].00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Ervin W. Schmidt, Chief, A T3

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) [illegible] Steele, Ext. 7063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: E. W. Schmidt
Title: Chief, Admin & Training Staff, [illegible]

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-[illegible]

15. SEX M
16. RACE W
17. APPROPRIATION — FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: 4-7103-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: TEXAS

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION	[illegible]	[illegible]
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	7/21
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. JAMES W. McCORD, JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1/26/24	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 12/17/53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
REASSIGNMENT

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 6-0B
3 JAN 1954

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Investigator(Gen) T211.01	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator(Gen) T297.01
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division SSD Pool	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM UNVouchered Funds.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Ervin W. Schmidt, Chief, A&TS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
H.E. Steele, Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: EWSchmidt
Title: Chief, Admin. & Trng. Staff
SO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	J. A.	REAL.

CD-SE

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM 4-7130-30
TO 4-7103-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Security Concurrence 12/22/53

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	TEC	2/4
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS

F. APPROVED BY
[illegible] 12/22/53

SECRET

TO:
Director of Personnel
Department of Justice-F.B.I.
Washington, D. C.

DATE: 17 September 1951

In accordance with the requirements of the Federal Personnel Manual it is requested that the Official Personnel Folder and Leave Record of:

NAME: MCCORD, James Walter, Jr.

DOB : 26 Jan. 1924

PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED IN: Department of Justice-F.B.I.

BRANCH OR DIVISION :

LOCATION : Washington, D. C.

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT : October 1948 to February 1951

Be forwarded to:

Mr. K. B. J. Hopkins
Chief, Personnel Division
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Leave record
sent to Payroll
9-27-51

CONFIDENTIAL

22 August 1951
(Date)

I, James Walter McCord, Jr., hereby certify that the information appearing on my Personal History Statement dated 18 May 1951 is still accurate and correct, except as follows: No corrections

1. However an addition may be made to the education section inasmuch as one summer semester in evening Law School, Lincoln University, Oakland, Calif., was completed since the date of the application. This semester began 4 June 1951 and ended 10 August 1951.

2. In the certificate regarding Reserve Status filed with the original application it was reflected that I was in the Volunteer Air Reserve, USAF. On August 14 a letter Reserve Order from Hamilton AFB, Calif., was sent to me advising that I was being transferred from the Volunteer Air Reserve to the Organized Reserve with a mobilization assignment with the 19th District OSI, Travis AFB, California. (See Military Status Questionnaire)

James Walter McCord Jr.
(Signature)

CONFIDENTIAL

NK

8[illegible]0 Pacific Avenue
Alameda, California
July 20, 1951

Mr. Joseph B. Hagan
Chief, Personnel Procurement
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hagan:

Reference is made to your letter dated June 4, 1951.

At the present time I am in the position of finding it necessary in the very near future to make several decisions of considerable financial importance to me. Should your organization be in a position to indicate whether favorable consideration has been given my application, or to indicate by what date you may be in a position to make a decision in that regard, such information would be of very great help to me at this time. As you have been advised earlier, I am interested in the CIA as a career, am willing to accept an assignment either overseas or in this country at your discretion, and at the starting salary you believe commensurate with my past experience.

Any assistance you can furnish concerning the above request will be indeed appreciated.

Very truly yours

James Walter McCord Jr

James Walter McCord, Jr.

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

Request No. 1-7311
Date: 6 July

1. Full Name [illegible] (Last, First, Middle) 2. Year of birth 1926

3. Position Title SPECIAL AGENT Grade GS-11 Code ____

4. Location: Office I&S Division SO Branch ____
Code ____ Code ____ Code ____

5. Geographic destination SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. (City and state or country, as appropriate)

6. Type of Employee: ☒ 1. Regular ☐ 2. Contract ☐ 3. Consultant ☐ 4. Military ☐ 5. Other: ____

7. Funds: ☐ 1. Vouchered ☒ 2. Unvouchered

8. Type(s) of security clearance requested:

☒ Provisional for ____ (Show name of pool or group)

☒ Secret

☒ Full

☐ Waiver

9. Availability date: ____ (Day-Month-Year) 10. Estimated clearance date ____ (Month-Year)

11. Recruitment Source ____ Code ____

12. Sex and Veteran status: ☒ 1. M-V ☐ 2. M-NV ☐ 3. F-V ☐ 4. F-NV

13. Remarks:

2 PHS'S RETAINED BY I&S

Attachments:
( ) PHS
( ) Appendix I
( ) Photographs

Signature

PMC

Division

Form No. 37-104
Jun 1951

4 June 1951

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
820 Pacific Avenue
Alameda, California

Dear Mr. McCord:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your application for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Your application is being given consideration for current employment possibilities. This process is somewhat time consuming; however, we shall advise you as soon as a definite decision has been reached.

Any requests for further information should be addressed to the undersigned.

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH B. RAGAN
Chief, Personnel Procurement

Pool

10 May 1951

Mr. James Walter McCord, Jr.
[illegible] Pacific Avenue
Alameda, California

Dear Mr. McCord:

Thank you for your recent application for employment in our organization.

Enclosed you will find the forms which we require all prospective applicants to fill out in order that we may become more thoroughly acquainted with their background and experience. If you will be good enough to fill them out and return them with three passport size photographs of yourself, we will be in a better position to review your qualifications and will then advise you further. You may retain the fourth copy of the Personal History Statement for your own records.

We sincerely appreciate your interest in our organization and look forward to hearing from you in the near future.

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH B. RAGAN
Chief, Personnel Procurement

Enclosures (9)

RESTRICTED

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, James Walter McCord Jr., understand that by virtue of my duties in the Central Intelligence Agency, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to security standards set by the Central Intelligence Agency. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States.

5. I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regulations CIA", and the appendices thereto.

6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this ____ day of __________ 19____.

James Walter McCord Jr. ________ (Seal)

Sworn to before me this ____ day of __________ 19____,

at ______________________________.

____

FORM NO. 38-33
APR 1950

RESTRICTED

[illegible]20 Pacific Avenue
Alameda, California
April 13, 1951

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I am interested in securing an interview with your local Agent-In-Charge regarding the position of Special Agent with your organization. My prior investigative experience includes four years with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, two years as a Special Agent and two years as a Radio Technician, I hold a commission in the U. S. Air Force Reserve, and have held an assignment as Intelligence Officer in a Reserve Unit. My last annual two-week tour of duty in the Air Force Reserve was an Intelligence Officer Refresher Course at Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado in March, 1950. My age is twenty-seven, and I am married, no children.

Should it appear that an interview may be arranged, I shall be glad to talk with your representative at his convenience.

Very truly yours

James Walter McCord, Jr.

James Walter McCord, Jr.

14-00000

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET

[illegible]

BIOGRAPHIC

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

WATERGATE FILE REVIEW FLAG

SUBJECT: McCORD, James

FILE NO: 58124

DATE FLAGGED: 24 April 1974

All information contained in this file through the above date was reviewed for possible significance to "Watergate" or other related matters. This review was conducted by Office of Security personnel. Additionally, this file was in the custody of the Office of the Inspector General from 26 February 1974 until released to the Office of Security on 15 April 1974.

No action is required through date cited above for further "Watergate" related file review reporting.

File Cross Reference - 625000

Officer Reviewing File

DO NOT REMOVE OR DESTROY THIS FLAG WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SECURITY.

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

31 August 1970

FILE NUMBER: 13507

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 055124

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)

X	CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) OS

ATTN: OS/Chief Admin Staff

REF: Resignation Debriefing

SUBJECT: McCORD, James W. Jr.

OFFICIAL COVER:

	BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
X	DISCONTINUED

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)		CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
	A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF COB	X	DATE (as of CCB) August 1951
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	NA	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X	ASCERTAIN THAT CIA W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	OK	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-3a)		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-3a)		
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 ☒ FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Aug 51-Jun 53 CONUS DOD
Jun 53-May 62
May 62-May 64 Germany DAC
Jun 64 Overt

FORWARDING ADDRESS: # 7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS: UNK

Subject is to indicate CIA as place of employment for entire period.

~~DMW/gb~~

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - RCD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - S/OS
COPY 4 - CL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - CCS - CHRONO
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 8-66 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 20 Jul 64

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For Action) OS

ATTN: OS/AATS

REF:

SUBJECT: McCORD, JAMES W, Jr

FILE NO. K3930

ID CARD NO.

MILITARY COVER DISCONTINUED: Department of the Army/ overseas

☒ Unblock Records:
(OP Memo 20-800-11)

Effective 11 Jun 64

☒ Submit Form 642 To Change Limitation Category.
(HB 20-800-2 to be redesignated HHB 20-7)

☒ Return All Military Documentation To CCS. Overseas military documentation for subject and dependents should be returned to CPB.

☒ Remarks: Subject should be acknowledged as a current employee as he is to attend the Air War College as an overt employee.

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

7-23-64
WR

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James [illegible] Franklin

EDF/pp CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS: 1-PSD/OS

FORM 12-61 1551a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(13-20-43)

SECRET

8 March 1961

File No. K-3030

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W.

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above-named Subject. TDY

2. Effective 11 Mar - 27 March 61, it is requested that your records be properly blocked to deny Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

For GLEN E. MOOREHOUSE
Acting Chief, Central Cover Group

cc: SSD/OS

THIS [illegible] REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

FORM 1-59 1580a

(4-13-40)

03-18 61
wpc

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

Dear Mr. McCord:

It is the practice of the Organization to follow up with former employees six months after their retirement. We hope by such inquiry to obtain information on what our retirees are doing and where they are located, invite suggestions for improving the retirement program and to learn if the Organization might be of some assistance on any post-retirement matters.

We should like very much to hear from you on the above points and on any other topics you think would be useful to us.

For your convenience in replying, we have enclosed a sheet somewhat akin to a form on which we have listed those standard items of information we'd like to have on every retiree. The remainder of the sheet, including the reverse side, is for your comments and suggestions. We shall be most appreciative of your fullest response to this inquiry.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Carroll A. Duchay
Personnel Officer

Enclosures:
    Questionnaire
    Return Envelope

Distribution:
    Original - Addressee
        1 - OPF
        1 - RAD Subject's File

OP/RAD/EEAB/MLShobe:mlp (23 April 1971)

Actions


[illegible] JAMES W JR
052049 1924
790-101-43 OCTOBER '59

1 LAST NAME FIRST NAME (INITIAL(S))
MC CORD, JAMES W JR

2 APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty 08/22/51 P.I XX P.I
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act
Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d)
on ________ annual Leave Bal ________

3 TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
Years 25 Months 05 Days 04
☒ More than 15 years

4 DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
RETIREMENT*INV*UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM 08/31/70

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)

	Annual	Sick
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 1970	328	1729
6 Current leave year accrual through 8/22 1970	128	64
7 Total	456	1793
8 Reduction in credits, if any (current year)		
9 Total leave taken	367	4
10 Balance	89	1789*

11 Total hours paid in lump sum 89 hrs & 1 hol
12 Salary rate(s) $28,989.00
13 Lump sum leave dates
From 0830 09/01/70 09/17/70 0930 (Hours)

26 Certified correct by
(Signature) (Date)
for Chief Payroll (Title)
143-2585 (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14 Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ________
15 Current balance as of ________ 19__ ________
16 12-month accrual rate ________
17 Dates leave used prior 24 months ________
18 Monthly accrual date ________
19 Calendar days credit for next accrual date ________
20 Date basic service period completed ________

MILITARY LEAVE

21 Dates during current calendar yr ________ to ________
22 Dates during preceding calendar yr ________ to ________

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23 During leave year in which separated		
24 During step increase waiting period which began on 06/14/70		
25 During 12-month HL accrual period (dates):		

REMARKS
SCD
03/27/45

*S/L TRANS TO CIARDS 5 USC CH 63

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

[illegible]: 14 SEP 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT-INVOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYS-CORR

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 08 DA 31 YR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF

7. Cost Center No. Chargeable: 1271 [illegible]

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL [illegible] SEC [illegible]

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD/PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL AND OVERSEAS SECURITY
PHYSICAL SECURITY DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL SEC OF

12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [illegible]

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 [illegible]

17. SALARY OR RATE: [illegible]

18. REMARKS:
THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 08/31/70 AS FOLLOWS: ITEM 16, GRADE AND STEP WHICH READ 15 [illegible] TO READ 15 [illegible]; AND ITEM 17, SALARY OR RATE WHICH READ 28226 TO READ [illegible].

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: [illegible]
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA [illegible] YR [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE — CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: [illegible]
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE [illegible] MO [illegible] DA 31 YR [illegible]

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE — 1 NONE 2 5 PT 3 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES / PROV TEMP — CODE
39. FEGLI — HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE — 0 WAIVED 1 YES — HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE — 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9-16-70 [illegible]

FORM 5-64 1150 Mfg. 6-70 — Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BSJ

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

P. 6
1020

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIRED OPT-II VOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 | 31 | 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1?71 0001 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL [illegible] SEC 235A
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS, OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD, PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL AND OVERSEAS SECURITY
PHYSICAL SECURITY DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL SEC OF
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0070
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 9
17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~28205~~ 29979
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employee Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Position Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 01 | 23 | 24
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CS 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE / CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0000000
32. Correction Cancellation Data: TYPE / MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE / 1 NONE 2 5 PT 3 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CTR RES PROV TEMP / CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE / 0 WAIVER 1 YES / HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE / 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8-28-70

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BSJ

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible]CORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR [illegible] 70 5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable [illegible] 8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS/SEC	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER 13. SERVICE DESIGNATION [illegible]
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) 15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 17. SALARY OR RATE
18. REMARKS	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hours
25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR	28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE — CODE 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data
EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX	35. VET. PREFERENCE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG COMP. DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
2-5-70

FORM 5-66 1152 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

A-38

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
058124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	16 240	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 15	8	~~XXXXXX~~ 28,226	06/15/67	GS 15	9	~~XXXXXX~~ 28,989	06/14/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS		GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	058124	16 240	V	GS 15 8	$28,226

JLB: 10 OCT 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 058124	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MCCORD JAMES W JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 10 10 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9271 0501 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY DD/PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL & OVERSEAS SECURITY PHYSICAL SECURITY DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE PHYSICAL SEC OF	12. POSITION NUMBER 0070	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1810.07	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 24393

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 16240	ALPHABETIC SEC	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 26 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 10/10/68

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-66 Mfg. 10-67

SECRET JLB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

058124 [illegible] 16 240 V

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EP Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PS	LS	ADJ
GS-15	7	$23734	06-18-67	GS-15	8	$24593	10-06-68			

8 Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/S/Robert S. Wattles DATE: 10-04-68

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	058124	16 240	V	GS 15 7	$22,082	$23,734

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES	058124	16 240	V	GS 15 7	$21,192	$22,082

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	058124	16 240	V	GS 15 5	$19,415	$19,979

A 39

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number		4. LWOP Hours
058124	MCCORD JAMES	16 240	V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	6	$20,535	06/20/65	GS 15	7	$21,192	06/18/67			

8 Remarks and Authentication

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 9 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	058124	16 240	V	GS 15 5	$18,740	$19,415

---

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
058124	McCORD, JAMES	16 240 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE: Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	6. NEW SALARY RATE: Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	7. TYPE ACTION: PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-15	5	$19975	06/20/65	GS-15	6	$20585	08/28/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ Emmett D. Echols DATE: 08/18/66

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 08/31/65

1. SERIAL NUMBER 058124	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MCCORD JAMES W JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 08 DA 29 YR 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6271 0505 0000	8. CS OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS/SECURITY	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE ELECT ENG AUDIO SUPP	12. POSITION NUMBER 0642	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0855.21	16. GRADE AND STEP 15	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9/1/65

08 6-65 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-37)

RZR: 23 JUL 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 07 DA. 23 YR. 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6271 0208 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
TECHNICAL DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ELECT ENG AUDIO SUPP
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0642
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0855.21
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 18740
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 16360 ALPHABETIC SEC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 26 YR. 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

7/27/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

37.

JUN 23 12 24 PM '65

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
098124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	16 160 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	4	$18,170	06/23/63	GS 15	5	$18,740	06/20/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ X / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [redacted] DATE 8/6/65

mkl

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-31)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DUE: 14 AUG 64

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 053124
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 16 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5271 0100 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY EXECUTIVE STAFF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0032
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 18170
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 16160 ALPHABETIC SEC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 01 26 24
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA YR):
28. DTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA. YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: EE
G

E.O.D.

[illegible]
3 SEP 1964

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 20 AUG 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-01)
(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	058124	44 400	CF	GS 15 4	$16,005	$17,210

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
058124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	54 460 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	3	$15,525	06/24/62	GS 15	4	$16,005	06/23/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

2

133

6/18/63

6/7/63

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 5 June 63

6/23/63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	058124	54460	CF	15 3	$14380	15 3	$15525

058124 MCCORD JAMES W JR 24 175

5 Old Salary Rate				6 New Salary Rate				Type Action
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	
GS 15	2	$14,055	12/25/60	GS 15	3	$14,380	06/24/61	

8 Remarks and Authentication

to UV 5/27/6? Z 133

/✓/ NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS E.D.ECHOLS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 9-61 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EXP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
158124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	DDS/SEC 1	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 15	1	$13,730	06	28	59	GS 15	2	$14,055	12	25	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-563 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SS	MCCORD JAMES W JR	158124	31 12	GS-15 1	$12,770	$13,730

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
159124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	DDS/SEC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	2	$11,595	12	29	57	GS 14	3	11 835	06	28	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

JUN 27 3 30 PM '59
REC. PAYROLL BRANCH

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560b

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

PSC: 24 MAY 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)
058124	MCCORD JAMES W JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	05 27 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V CF TO V	X	V TO CF CF TO CF	
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	2139 9300 1017	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	50 USC 403 J	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP EE GERMAN STATION DEPUTY FOR COMBINED SERVICES SECURITY BRANCH	FRANKFURT, GERMANY

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
SECURITY OFFICER	0363	SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	1810.01	15 2	14055

18. REMARKS

SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREF CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
20	10	54460	EE	27015		3	01 26 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX
				EOD DATA		

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]
MAY 1962

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-61)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JEC:[illegible] 59

1. Serial No. 158124	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MCCORD JAMES W JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 26 Yr. 24	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 05 Da. 22 Yr. 51	
7. SCD Mo. 03 Da. 27 Yr. 45	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Appmt. Affidavits Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 05 Da. 22 Yr. 51	13. Military Credit Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 3112	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.		Station Code 75013
16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	17. Position Title SECURITY OFFICER	18. Position No. 0365	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1810.01

21. Grade & Step 14 3	22. Salary Or Rate $11835	23. SD SS	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 01 Yr. 56	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 7100 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 3112	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.		Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	34. Position Title SECURITY OFFICER	35. Position No. 0365	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 1810.01

38. Grade & Step 15 1	39. Salary Or Rate $12770	40. SD SS	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	42. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 28 Yr. [illegible]	43. Appropriation Number 9 7100 20 001

44. Remarks

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AES: 4 FEB 1959

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 158124	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MCCORD JAMES W JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 26 Yr. 24	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51	7. SCD Mo. 03 Da. 27 Yr. 45	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51
13. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY INSPECTION STAFF	Code 3110	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6) Code 2	17. Position Title INVESTIGATOR	18. Position No. 0033	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 1810.22	21. Grade & Step 14 2	22. Salary Or Rate $11,595	23. SD SS
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 01 Yr. 56	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 7101 20	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo. 02 Da. 04 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 3112	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6) Code 2	34. Position Title SECURITY OFFICER	35. Position No. 0365	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 1810.01	38. Grade & Step 14 2	39. Salary Or Rate $11595	40. SD SS
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 01 Yr. 56	42. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 9 7102 20 001	

44. Remarks

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	158124	GS-14-2	$10,535	$11,595

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

.LVL 29 JULY 58

1. Serial No. 158124	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MCCORD JAMES W JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 26 Yr. 24	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51		
7. SCD Mo. 03 Da. 27 Yr. 45	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Agmt Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code 2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code
16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	17. Position Title SEC OF	18. Position No. 0365	19. Serv. GS 20. Occup. Series 1810.01
21. Grade & Step 14 2	22. Salary Or Rate $11,595	23. SD SS	24. Date Of Grade 25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. Mo. Da. Yr.
26. Appropriation Number 9 7101 20			

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo. 07 Da. 29 Yr. 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY INSPECTION STAFF	Code 3110	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	34. Position Title INVESTIGATOR	35. Position No. 0033	36. Serv. GS 37. Occup. Series 1810.22
38. Grade & Step 14 2	39. Salary Or Rate $11,595	40. SD SS	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 01 Yr. 56 42. PSI Due Mo. 05 Da. 28 Yr. 59
43. Appropriation Number 9 7101 20			

44. Remarks

5 AUG 1958

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

[illegible] 8/11/58

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
15C124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	DDS/SEC /	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
14	1	$10,320	07	01	56	14	2	$10,535	12	29	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Hi E. Steele	11/8/57	Hi E. Steele

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R-1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME) MR. JAMES W. MCCORD, JR. 153124	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 Jan 1924	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 14 June 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT 56	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 16 June 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator (CI) T367	8. POSITION TITLE	Security Officer T365-14
GS-1810.22-14 $10320.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.01-14 $10320.00 per annum
Internal Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 311201	DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L 2	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/SS

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-7101-20 W TO: Same 750-13	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

20. REMARKS:

2 EOD 08/22/51

POSTED

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956-373667

773 6/21/51

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): MR. JAMES W. MC CORD, JR. 158124

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jun 1924

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 25 Jun 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION 30

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 Jul 1956

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Security Res Spec 2405	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (CI) 2367
GS-1810.24-13 $9205.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-14 $10,320.00 per annum
External Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 311230	DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Internal Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL XXX

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-SS

1

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO: 7-7101-20

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

1

20. REMARKS: Same 750-13

2 EOD 08/22/51

POSTED
6 JUL

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

(21) SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950 - 380000

7-6-56

14-00000

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1955-320C50

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Payroll period

3. Block No. 7103 Vouchered

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) McCORD, James Walter

6. Grade and salary GS-13 - $8990.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s) 08 - 1

12. Prepared by MG - 10/24/55

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
Dec 55	6 Jun 54	$8990.00	$9305.00

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better. [illegible]
SERVICE AND CONDUCT [illegible]
(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods.)
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ LWOP at end of waiting period
☐ LWOP at end of waiting period

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

whR

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jan 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 24 May 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 8 May 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Security Officer	8. POSITION TITLE	Security Res Spec T-405
GS-1810.01-13	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.24-13 $[illegible].00 p.a.
DDA/Security Office Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff External Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: 5-7101-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Texas

CD/SE

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

CODED
8 JUN 55

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel
SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

[illegible] 5/24/55

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954—[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG. .-Y

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Jam

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jan 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 4 June 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 6 June 1954
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator T 297.01	8. POSITION TITLE	Security Officer T 405
GS-1810.22-12 $7240.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.01-13 $8360.00 per annum
Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWH	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD-65

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-7103-20
TO: 4-7101-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Texas

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Lee 6/1/54

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

1. Agency and organizational designations

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1949 - 807974

3. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
McCORD, JAMES WALTER

4. Pay period
-/54

5. Block No.
6-7203-20

6. Slip No.

6. Grade and salary
GS 12 $7040.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous period											
8. New period											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
SECURITY 7

12. Prepared by
reh/3/10/54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
6JUN54	7DEC52	$7040.00	$7240.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Periods

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ to
☐ to

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL, 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jan 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 23 Apr 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 25 Apr 1954
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen)	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T297.01
GS-1810-12	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-12 $7040.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.

CD-SE

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Texas

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

KM 4-26-54

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1953 — 248347

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Corr. ~~22 Dec 53~~ Jan

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. — ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 Jan 24	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 28 Dec 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE B.O.B. 3 Jan 54	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen) T 211.01	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (Gen) T 297.01
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division SSD Pool	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER	
			X			Verified

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-8Z

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-7130-30 TO: 4-7103-20	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

"Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM Unvouchered Funds."

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:
Personnel Director

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible] 12 28 53

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1953 — 248347

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7/31/53
98

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed
If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. – Miss – Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. JAMES W. MCCORD	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1/26/24	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 7/7/53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 7/7/53
B. APPROVED: 7 July 1953

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
Investigator(General) T109.01-12	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator(General) T211.01
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	Same
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same
San Francisco Field Office San Francisco, California	11. HEADQUARTERS	SSD Pool Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
C. J. KING, DEPUTY CHIEF, ASTS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
FRED E. CYRUS, EXT. [redacted] 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: Chief, Admin. & Mng. Staff
SO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

CD-SE

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION
M	W	FROM: 4-7130-30 TO: 4-7130-30

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES – NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED
RD July 53 RSH

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	
E.		

REMARKS:

[illegible]

F. APPROVED BY Orville C Dawson 16 July 1953

10—67329-8

UNVOUCHERED

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Inspection & Security Office

Page 6 of 7 pa

Used in lieu of SF-52 &/or or SF-50 to document the following types of personnel action involving no change in grade or salary; (a) Change in Title (b) Change of Position No. (c) Reassignment within Division without series Code change
All Class seriesare the same on the From and To sides.
W/O App.: 1/14/53

Eff. Date: 2/15/53

NAME	ORG.INF.& POS.TITLE	SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	SLOT NOS.	ACTION	ORG.INF.& POS.TITLE	SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	SLOT NOS.
Chicago Field office (cont'd.)						Chicago Field Office	
Green, Paul R.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T180.01	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T180.05 -11
Brown, Stuart A.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T181	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T180.06 -11
Wakefield, James C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T181.04	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T180.07 -11
Ambrose, Vance E.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T180.04	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T181
Graham, Elwood M.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T211.07	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T181.01
Francis, Donald T.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T181.03	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T181.02
Anderson, Charles E.	Inv. Gen.	GS-10	T181.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-10	T181.03 -10
elle, Tell C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-10	T181.08	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-10	T181.04 -10
Anderson, Theodore M.	Inv. Gen.	GS-10	T181.07	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-10	T181.05 -10
ettinger, Helga M.	Clerk Steno.	GS-3	T215	b,c	Clerk Steno.	GS-312-3	T186.02 -3
San Francisco Field Office						San Francisco Field Office	
Finch, William G.	Inv. Gen.	GS-13	T189.01	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-13	T188
Spears, C. Calvin	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T189.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T189 -12
McCord, James W.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T190.03	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T189.01 -12
Haviland, Glenn A.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T190.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T190.01 -11
Mason, Robert E.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T207.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T190.02 -11
Stith, Ernest F.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T190.05	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T190.03
Gabriel, Jerome A.	Inv. Gen.	GS-9	T212.06	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T191.04 -9
Belt, William H.	Inv. Gen.	GS-10	T216.08	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-10	T191.05 -10
Quackenbush, William J.	Inv. Gen.	GS-9	T212.05	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T191.06 -9
Los Angeles Field Office						Los Angeles Field Office	
White, Victor R.	Inv. Gen.	GS-13	T147.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-13	T326 -13
Mullan, William J.	Inv. Gen.	GS-13	T189	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-13	T327
Rich, Edward H.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T188	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T328 -12
McClellan, Raymond F.	Inv. Gen.	GS-13	T179	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-13	T328.01
Alden, John S.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T190.01	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T329
Meek, Bert B.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T190.04	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T329.01
Ginger, John W.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T172	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T329.02
Geraty, Franklin H.	Inv. Gen.	GS-9	T172.12	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T329.03 -9
Conners, Donald C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-9	T191.04	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T329.04 -9
Kuh, Richard E.	Inv. Gen.	GS-7	T172.03	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-8	T330 -7
Coonan, John S.	Inv. Gen.	GS-7	T212	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-7	T330.01 -7
Kreykenbohm, Warren C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-9	T213.03	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T330.02 -9

App.by: EWSchmidt
Staff or Div. Chief

SECRET -SECURITY INFORMATION

App.by: Eugene C.
Class & Wage Div.

App.by: M. L.
Personnel Div.

10 Sept. '52

1. Agency and organizational designation
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2.

3. Block No
UV

4. Slip No

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
MC CORD, James W.

6. Grade and salary
GS-11 $5940.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX____	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks
Cancellation of PSI
BN

11. Appropriation(s)
1350 11

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase ____________

14. Effective date
31Aug. '52

15. Date last equivalent increase
22Aug. '51

16. Old salary rate
$5940.00

17. New salary rate
$6140.00

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
____
(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP____________

(Check applicable box in case of LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initial of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

1 16—61111-2a U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

12/17/52

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) JAMES W. MC CORD	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 11/12/52
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) PROMOTION B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: DEC 7 1952	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Investigator (Gen) T190.03-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator (Gen) T190.03
GS-1810-11 $6140.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810-12 $7040.00 pa
Inspection & Security Office Special Security Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same
San Francisco Field Office San Francisco, California	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same Same
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Title: EXECUTIVE OFFICER
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO:	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED
11 Dec 52

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		11-2[illegible]
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY 11·26·52 Mulcahy

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

INSPECTION & SECURITY OFFICE

CODE "T"

APR 1 9 19[illegible]

SPECIAL SECURITY DIVISION FIELD OFFICES

NAME	TITLE	GRADE SERIES	POSITION NUMBER
CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE (CONTINUED)			
DOYLE, C. Veronica	Clerk(Stenography)	GS-301-5	T185
FEHRMAN, Mary Margaret	Clerk(Stenography)	GS-301-4	T185.01-4
GAVRILOVICH, Gloria A.	Clerk(Stenographer)	GS-312-4	T186
SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE			
HUNT, William C.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-13	T187-13
RICH, Edward H.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T188-12
MULLAN, William J.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T189-12
FINCH, William G.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T189.01-12
SPEARS, C. Calvin, Jr.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T189.02-11
TURTON, Jack S.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T190
HARRIS, Jack A.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T190.01-11
HAVILAND, Glenn A.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T190.02-11
MCCORD, James W.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T190.03-11
MEEK, Bert B., Jr.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T190.04-11
STITH, Ernest P.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T190.05
GAMRATH, Murray W.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T191
ALDEN, John S.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T191.01
SULLIVAN, Thomas V.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-9	T191.02-9
JOVICK, Edward J.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-9	T191.03-9
CONNORS, Donald O.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-7	T191.04-7
SILBERT, Annie	Adm. Assistant	GS-301-5	T192-5
MILLAGE, Margaret K.	Clerk	GS-301-5	T193-5
VAN STEENBERG, Charlotte	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T194

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: McCORD, James Walter, Jr.

DATE: 27 June 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: New Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 22 August 51

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Investigator (General) (Special Agent)
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-11 - $5400.00 p.a.
OFFICE		Inspection and Security Office
DIVISION		Special Security Division
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION		San Francisco, Calif. (Field)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS G Greaves	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. J. KING Administrative Officer	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION F-572 (27 July 1950) C. C. Hutson 17 July 1951	PERSONNEL OFFICER D Mulcahy	JUL 23 1951

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 22 August 51

SECURITY CLEARED ON 14 August 51

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED NA

ENTERED ON DUTY 22 August 51

PPD ✓

Robert M. White
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

1010

Control No. 1544 - Slot No. 10.
Two copies of PHS retained for security processing. One PHS attached.

DOG - 12/07/52
EOD - 08/--/51
LCD - 08/22/51

REQUEST CONTACTS BE MADE
BY SECURITY ONLY

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES

SECRET

24 APR 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W., Jr. Emp. Ser. No. 58124
Fitness Report

1. This is an annual fitness report covering the period 1 April 1969 through 31 March 1970. Mr. McCord completed his first full year as Chief, Physical Security Division. During 1969 the Division underwent many changes, a direct result of the personal efforts of this employee. He has shown the initiative to seek out new ways and means to harden the security of our domestic and overseas facilities by tapping all possible technological sources both in and out of Government. His efforts have produced tangible results and in my judgment, our posture in the physical security field is far superior to any of our contemporaries.

2. With the spiraling costs of manpower, Mr. McCord has concentrated on the potential for use of technical devices to replace the human asset. He has made remarkable inroads into this field by way of imagination, ingenuity and drive.

3. Mr. McCord has the quality to inspire his subordinates. He is demanding, but understanding. On more than one occasion he was asked to take under his wing employees who were labeled "problems." Through personal interest and effort, he has salvaged the majority of these individuals to a point where they are performing in a highly satisfactory manner.

4. In the previous fitness report, I alluded to the fact that employee has a tendency to find it difficult to see another person's point of view. This, I feel, is attributable to an innate stubbornness which obviously is difficult to overcome. Mr. McCord is a very

30 APR 1970

principled individual who once convinced he has hit upon the proper course of action will usually yield only by direction. We've discussed this, and I've noted a determined effort on his part to broaden his tolerance for other opinions.

5. Overall, the employee has made a substantial contribution to the Office of Security by his dedication to his job, his tenacious attitude toward upgrading our physical security standards, a curious and inventive mind ever searching for better ways to solve a problem in his area of responsibility, and a cost consciousness in the administration of his division. I rate him an overall "Strong."

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

Noted by Employee:

James W McCord Jr
James W. McCord, Jr.

April 28 '70
Date

Reviewed By:

Howard J Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

29 APR 1970
Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
058124

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) McCORD, James W., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 01/26/24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Physical Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/PTOS/PhySD/OC	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1968 - 31 March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See Attached Memorandum	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

SECRET

[illegible] APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W., Jr., Emp. Ser. No. 058124
Fitness Report

1. This is an annual fitness report covering the period 1 April 1968 through 31 March 1969. During the first period of this report, Mr. McCord served as the Chief, Technical Division/ PTOS and continued to display a very high degree of professionalism in administering the Agency's world-wide Audio Countermeasures (ACM) program. Under his guidance, several new devices and techniques were developed which have helped the Agency and the intelligence community to maintain pace with the sophisticated advances by the opposition in the field of positive audio.

2. Mr. McCord initiated the necessary planning for the activation of the Interagency Training Center (ITC) which provides ACM instruction to all members of the community in the latest of equipment and techniques.

3. On 14 October 1968, he was reassigned to the position of Chief, Physical Security Division. Although he had relatively little experience in this particular field, he has quickly assimilated the necessary details to manage this Agency effort. He has taken steps toward the development and use of the most advanced physical security equipment and techniques to protect the Agency. Under the supervision of Mr. McCord, the Agency Security Command Center operations have been expanded and improved. He has been assigned the responsibility to organize and direct the Security efforts relating to the protection of Agency assets in time of demonstrations, riots, and other civil disturbances. He coordinated the Agency Security effort with the U. S. Secret Service in protection of the President of the United States during his recent visit to the CIA Headquarters.

SECRET

4. Mr. McCord is considered to be economical in his use of equipment, manpower and funds.

5. Perhaps one of the stronger attributes this employee possesses is his ability to organize. In a relatively short time, he has deliberated the Physical Security Division's mission and already taken steps to restructure it within existing manpower limitations to more effectively react to its responsibilities.

6. He inspires his subordinates and has the respect of his superiors. There have been instances, however, when Mr. McCord has exhibited a certain intolerance with individuals who do not agree with his point of view, resulting in some friction in their working relations. There has been much improvement in this regard, and I do not feel it will present any problem in the future.

7. I anticipate this employee will continue to absorb knowledge and experience in the physical security field at the rapid rate he has during his short tenure and am confident his efforts will result in a major contribution to the Office and Agency. I rate Mr. McCord a high "Strong."

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

Noted by Employee:

James W McCord Jr
James W. McCord, Jr.

18 April 1969
Date

SECRET

SUBJECT: McCORD, James W., Jr., Emp. Ser. No. 058124
Fitness Report - 1 April 1968 through 31 March 1969

Reviewed By:

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

21 APR 1969
Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
058124

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MC CORD, James W., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 01/26/24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Elect. Eng - Audio Support	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/PTOS/TD/OC		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
26 April 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises the Technical Division/OS.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops new techniques, procedures, and equipment to be used in the audio countermeasures field.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Plans operating programs for implementation by the Technical Division.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Selects and trains personnel in an expanding Division.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains liaison with his counterpart organizations throughout the U. S. Government.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 30 APR 1968 Ll	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-61 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. McCord supervises a technical operation with considerable skill. Although not an engineer by training, he has breached the difficult gap of communication between the administrative and technical aspects of his Division. He has maintained a high esprit de corps under difficult conditions which involve the necessity of his personnel to travel extensively throughout the world. Although such duty carries with it numerous family problems, Mr. McCord is able to manage the Division in such a manner as to maintain a high state of morale. Perhaps the most outstanding accomplishments which I attribute to Mr. McCord's fine management of his Division lies in the field of developing useful and esoteric equipment in the counteraudio field. I have a distinct impression that he and his Division are considerably ahead of other Government departments in this area of activity. This fact alone is a high tribute to his management skill. Because of the success in this field, I consider him to be economical in the use of manpower and funds.

During this rating period, the Technical Division has had operational success in the overseas area. I attribute this success to the careful planning and training which the incumbent has accomplished and directed. Further, he has already shown a high degree of skill in planning for a new activity of considerable responsibility which he will undertake during the coming fiscal year. I am highly

(Continued)

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 26 APR 1968

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James W McCord Jr

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 26

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 26 APR 1968

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Dep. Dir. of Sec. (PTOS)

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Ermal P. Geiss

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE: 4/29/68

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Director of Security

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Howard J. Osborn

SECRET

SECRET

Fitness Report - McCORD, James W., Jr. - Emp. Ser. No. 058124
Reporting Period 1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968
Section C. (Continued)

pleased to have Mr. McCord serve in his current position and consider him capable of advancement into broader areas.

Ernal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 058124

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): McCORD, James W., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 01/26/24
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-15
5. SD: SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Elec Eng-Audio Supp
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/PT&OS/TSD/OC
8. CURRENT STATION: Washington, D. C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 21 April 1967
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 15 January 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises Technical Division/OS, consisting of 29 professional employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops new techniques, procedures and equipment to be used in the audio countermeasures field.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Plans operating programs for implementation by the Technical Division.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Selects and trains personnel in an expanding Division.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains liaison with his counterpart organizations throughout the U. S. Government.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 01 MAY 1967	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. McCord supervises his Division in a vigorous manner. He is capable of instilling enthusiasm and esprit de corps within his organization--a difficult task because of the extensive amount of world-wide travel demanded from his subordinates. This travel is so extensive as to result in personal hardships.

During the rating period, Mr. McCord and two of his employees received the Certificate of Merit. These awards resulted from the vigorous and successful pursual of a technique having great promise in the audio countermeasures field.

Mr. McCord's performance of his liaison and coordination with other components of the intelligence community, which received special mention in his last Fitness Report, is now at a status which warrants a designation of "Strong." He is conscientiously working at the liaison problem in a difficult interdepartmental atmosphere.

Mr. McCord has an excellent grasp of the technical requirements of his position even though he is not an engineer. He has an exceptional environmental knowledge and appreciation. He sets his goals high. He is cost conscious in the field involving expensive equipment, which normally is costly to develop.

(Continued)

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 17 Apr 67
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 14
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:
DATE: 19 APR 1967
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Dep. Dir. of Sec. (PTOS)
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Ermal P. Geiss

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE:
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Director of Security
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Howard [illegible]

SECRET

McCORD, James W., Jr. - Serial #058124
Annual Fitness Report 15 January 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION C. (Continued)

I am highly pleased to have Mr. McCord serving in his current position and consider him capable of advancement into broader areas.

4-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 058124

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): McCORD, James W., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 01/26/24
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-15
5. SD: SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Electronic Engineer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/PT&OS/TechSecDiv/OC
8. CURRENT STATION: Wash., D.C.
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 25 April 1966
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1965 - 14 January 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

		RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	Supervises the Tech Division/OS	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	Plans and programs for the Division	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	Schedules and plans overseas coverage	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	Protection of Washington Area Buildings from penetration	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	Training of Division and other personnel	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	Works with Tech Co[illegible] and other units	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

6 APR 1966

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 6 10 26 AM '66
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. McCord was attending the Air War College during part of the reporting period. He became Chief of the Technical Division/OS on 20 July 1965.

Mr. McCord took hold of this Division with a heartening vigor and enthusiasm. Although not an Engineer, he soon learned enough of the technical business to meet many crash assignments with exceptional skill and judgment. By trying to get these assignments done within set time limits, he sometimes short-circuited a few coordinations in other offices, but this did not seriously detract, in my opinion, from a very proficient job.

While Mr. McCord has not had the Technical Division a sufficiently long time for me to judge his long range performance, I feel he will become an exceptionally proficient Chief. There was insufficient time for me to judge his cost and manpower consciousness.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
22 Mar 66	James McCord

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
6		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 March 1966	Dep. Dir. of Sec. (PTOS)	E. M. Winters E. M. WINTERS

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT James W. McCord, Jr.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

3. Comments of Reviewing Official

I concur thoroughly with Mr. Winters' evaluation of Mr. McCord's vigor and enthusiasm, skill and judgment. I would add to this that he has demonstrated extraordinary ingenuity and leadership in supervising the development of several new and valuable techniques in the countermeasures field. However, I would rate him only "Proficient" in Specific Duty Number 6, for I believe that he has not been as effective as he might be in liaison and coordination with other components of the Intelligence Community represented on the Technical Committee. This is unfortunate, for it detracts from his outstanding performance in all other elements of his assigned responsibilities. He must work on improving these relationships and he has been counseled to this effect by his current supervisor.

Date	Official Title of Reviewing Official	Typed Name and Signature
31 March 1966	Director of Security	Howard J. Osborn Howard J. Osborn

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: O 58124

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) McCORD, James W., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1/26/24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Exec Staff		8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- X ANNUAL
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See Section C.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

10 APR 1965

FORM 4-63 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Since 10 August 1964, Mr. McCord has been enrolled as a student at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. He will complete his course there on 4 June 1965. Prior to 10 August 1964, Mr. McCord was in a travel status from his assignment as Chief, Security Branch, Frankfurt, Germany.

In view of the above, no rating is made for this reporting period.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: Mr. McCord will be advised that he has not been rated for this period.

DATE: 31 Mar 65

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Asst. Dep. Dir of Sec. (PPS)

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: N. Harris Lyon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE: 30 March 1965

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Director of Security

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Howard J. Osborn

Howard J Osborn

SECRET

17 APR 1964

SECRET/[redacted]

17 March 1964

58124

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Fitness Report - James W. McCord, Jr. [redacted]
DOB: 24 Jan 1924, Male, GS-15,
SS German Station, Career, Annual Report
(1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964)

1. James W. McCord, Jr. [redacted] GS-15, has served as Chief, Security Branch, under my supervision for the subject period.

2. His duties were as follow:

a. Security policy advisor to COS and its senior Station and Base officers.

b. Supervised nine professional and four clerical employees of the Security Branch and the Military Personnel Unit.

c. Directed conduct of LCFLUTTER, SGLATERAL, Physical Security duties, and Investigations performed by the Security Branch.

d. Reviewed security of German Station and recommended ways and means for strengthening and improving.

e. Furnished technical security support and guidance to other Bases in EE, and outside of EE on request.

f. Reviewed investigative reports of the Security Branch and performed such other duties as directed by the COS; Chief, CSB; and Chief, Administrative Staff.

3. This individual is an outstanding security officer. He efficiently performs his broad responsibilities, effectively manages those he supervises and is cost conscious. On the last-mentioned item, he weighs both cost and security factor and has been flexible where he has felt security could be relaxed -- but recognizes that there are areas where cost is secondary. He continues to keep the proper personnel informed of his activities and he is one of the best security

22 APR 1964

SECRET/[redacted]

[illegible]

GROUP 1-Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification officers with whom I have had the pleasure to be associated. During this period he has been assigned responsibility for supervision of the Military Personnel Branch. This consolidation has given the Security Branch greater flexibility and has increased the utilization of available personnel. Subject has also instituted off-duty security training courses for those interested military personnel.

4. I would rate him from Strong to Outstanding on the duties in paragraph 2 above with an overall rating of Strong.

[redacted]

/s/ Daniel M. Kelley

Read: [redacted]

/s/ James W. McCord, Jr.

Reviewer's Comments;

I agree that McCord [redacted] is a very strong security officer. He tends to be conservative in his views and judgments. He maintains excellent morale in his Branch. In the never-ending conflict between economy and a desirable level of security, he usually leans toward the latter.

[redacted]

/s/ Wendell Little

SECRET

058 124

28 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Fitness Report (June 1962 - March 1963)
[redacted]

JAMES W. MCCORD

1. [redacted] GS-15, has served as Chief, Security Branch, under my supervision for the subject period.

2. His duties were as follows:

a. Security policy advisor to COS and its senior Station and Base officers.

b. Supervised nine professional and four clerical employees of the Security Branch.

c. Directed conduct of LCFLUTTER, SGLATERAL, Physical Security duties, and Investigations performed by the Security Branch.

d. Reviewed security of German Station and recommended ways and means for strengthening and improving.

e. Furnished technical security support and guidance to other Bases in EE, and outside of EE on request.

f. Reviewed investigative reports of the Security Branch and performed such other duties as directed by the Chief of Station, Deputy for Coordination and Services, and Chief, Administrative Staff.

3. McCord [redacted] has demonstrated time and again his ability to efficiently perform his broad responsibilities in a most efficient manner. His position is not an easy one. He is under the general supervision of the undersigned, while also working on activities directly for the COS and the DCS. He has been able to coordinate these activities in such a way as to earn the respect of all those with whom he deals. He has respected confidences, but also insured that the undersigned has been adequately briefed. He has acted for the undersigned in his absence and will continue to do so.

4. I would rate . . .

15 MAY 1963

[illegible]

SECRET

4. I would rate him from Strong to Outstanding on the individual functions, with an over-all rating of Strong. He is a good supervisor.

DANIEL M. KELLY /s/

[redacted]

READ:

[redacted]

JAMES W. McCORD /s/

[illegible] (DATE)

REVIEWER'S COMMENTS:

I agree with the comments of the rating officer. Subject is an outstanding staff officer and capable of assuming broader responsibilities. He never complains of obstacles, but uniformly produces excellent results.

WENDELL LITTLE /s/

[redacted]

SECRET

1 8 MAY 1962

SUBJECT: James W. McCord, Jr.
Annual Fitness Report - 1 April 1961 to 31 March 1962

During this reporting period, Mr. McCord has continued to function as coordinator of a comprehensive highly sensitive series of investigations involving investigative representatives of all elements of the intelligence community. This assignment has been carried out by Mr. McCord with considerable initiative, skill and enthusiasm.

Mr. McCord, during this reporting period, served as Case Officer on a sensitive and very important personnel security case which due to his efforts was brought to a successful conclusion with favorable results to the Agency.

Mr. McCord has performed a liaison function with a vital element of a friendly service which has resulted in the maintenance of a cordial relationship of great value to the Office of Security and the Agency. This liaison has required Mr. McCord to perform several periods of temporary duty overseas during which he not only carried out his liaison function, but handled other special investigative assignments in a successful manner.

On various occasions during the reporting period in the absence of the Chief, Mr. McCord has functioned as Acting Chief of SRS and has performed his duties in an extremely competent manner.

It is felt that Mr. McCord's forthcoming assignment as Security Officer, German Station will give him additional varied experience of value in his career development.

Paul F. Gaynor
Paul F. Gaynor
Chief/SRS/OS

SECRET

SECRET

Read by: James McCord Date: May 18 62

Reviewed by: Sheffield Edwards Date: 18 May 62

SECRET

SECRET

25 MAY 1961

SUBJECT: James W. McCord, Jr.
Annual Fitness Report - 1 April 1960 - 31 March 1961

During the reporting period, Mr. McCord on various occasions, has functioned as Acting Chief/SRS, during absences of the Chief and has discharged this function in a highly competent fashion.

Mr. McCord, since last report was rendered, has coordinated a comprehensive investigation of a highly sensitive security matter involving investigative representatives from all members of the U. S. intelligence community. This assignment has required a high degree of tact, patience and investigative skill on the part of Mr. McCord.

In addition, during the reporting period, Mr. McCord has served as Case Officer on a counter-intelligence case of considerable importance to the security of the Agency and has displayed rare qualities of initiative, energy, and imagination in developing this case.

Mr. McCord is considered particularly well-adapted by virtue of his experience, training and personality for his present assignment.

Paul F. Gaynor
Paul F. Gaynor
Chief/SRS/OS

Read by: ______________ Date: ______________

Reviewed by: ______________ Date: 17 APR 1961

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: James F. McCord, Jr.
Annual Fitness Report - 1 April 1959 - 31 March 1960

During the reporting period, Mr. McCord functioned as Acting Chief of the Security Research Staff, Office of Security for a period of six months. He discharged this function in an extremely able fashion and handled a number of highly sensitive assignments with skill and finesse.

Mr. McCord has demonstrated on many occasions the ability to subordinate his personal interests to the necessity for performing his assigned tasks.

In the latter two months of the reporting period, Mr. McCord has been coordinating a very important investigation being conducted in the intelligence community of a leak of highly sensitive information which has caused serious damage to U. S. intelligence collection capabilities. He has displayed rare qualities of initiative, imagination and coordination in the course of this investigation.

Mr. McCord has demonstrated repeatedly his ability to perform sensitive assignments of the utmost importance during the reporting period.

Paul F. Gaynor
Paul F. Gaynor
Chief/SRS/OS

Read by: ______________ Date: [illegible]

Reviewed by ______________ Date 4/27/60

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RECEIVED
FOR SS/CSB

FITNESS REPORT

28 APR 1959

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) McCORD,	(First) James	(Middle) W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924	3. SEX male	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD - SS	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/SRS/Office of the Chief	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)			

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 5/22/58 To 3/31/59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists in the development, implementation and coordination of all CI programs	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Receives, evaluates and develops information of a counter intelligence nature.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assists in the supervision of all aspects of the CI program	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Analyzes and evaluates results of counter intelligence operations.	RATING NO. 7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Plans operations necessary to resolve counter intelligence cases	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conducts such personnel investigations, interrogations and interviews as deemed necessary in sensitive cases.	RATING NO. 7

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify)						X	

[redacted]

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

During the past year Mr. McCord has shown superior supervisory and organizational ability. During July and August he personally organized and supervised a major project overseas which was of national interest. His plan of action was implemented smoothly and the CI mission was accomplished. Another major project was successfully directed by Mr. McCord with outstanding results.

Mr. McCord has the proven ability to organize complex problems into workable and seemingly simple plans of action. He is a good supervisor, delegates responsibility, and uses imagination and tenacity of purpose in meeting problems. He is continuing to improve himself. No special training is planned for the next year. Mr. McCord will continue to "grow." He is ready to assume greater responsibility and with further experience will qualify for a senior position in this Agency.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 8 April 1959

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James W McCord Jr

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: Since March 1954

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON:

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 8 April 1959

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, Security Research Staff/OS

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Harlan A. Westrell

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE: 13 April 1959

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Director of Security

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Edwards

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) McCORD,	(First) James	(Middle) W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924	3. SEX male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD - SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Security Research Staff				6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Acting Deputy Chief, SRS		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 22 August 1958			9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 August 1957 - 22 August 1958		

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify)
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 29 Sept 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Harlan A. Westrell Harlan A. Westrell		D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, SRS

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

Mr. McCord has demonstrated marked ability in all fields of responsibility. His work involves constant dealings with senior officials of the Agency concerning substantive, policy and procedural matters. In this he has displayed exceptional judgment and balance in promoting and protecting the interests of the Agency.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 2 October 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL R L Bannerman R. L. Bannerman	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Director of Security

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER [illegible] OF [illegible] OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR

COMMENTS:

BY [illegible] DATE
Posted For. Cont. [illegible]
Reviewed by [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 3 2 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assist in the development and coordination of all counter intelligence programs.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyze and evaluate results of a counter-intelligence operation.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plan operations necessary to resolve counter-intelligence cases.	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintain liaison with various sensitive government agencies as well as components of CIA regarding CI cases.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Receive, evaluate and develop information of a counter- intelligence nature.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conduct such interrogations, investigations and briefings as necessary.	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. McCord continues to exhibit superior organizational ability, as well as being a fine supervisor. His imaginative and analytical approach to complex problems quickly reduces them to useable plans. Mr. McCord is an excellent supervisor, can delegate responsibility, gives credit to his subordinates and continually works for self-improvement.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☑ NO IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) McCORD, (First) James (Middle) W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924	3. SEX male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD - SS	
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Security Research Staff	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Acting Deputy Chief, SRS			
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 22 August 1958	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 August 1957 - 22 August 1958		

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 29 Sept 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Harlan A. Westrell	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, SRS

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 2 Oct. 58	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL R L Bannerman	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Dep. Dir. Security

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (Truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
2	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
1	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Potential (4)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

16

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. [illegible] demonstrated organizational [illegible] initiative, steadiness under pressure, personality and [illegible] eventually qualify him for a senior position in this Agency.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 3 3 02 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None at present - recommend that he remain in his present position for at least two more years.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS, HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	5	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. [illegible] ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS REGARD FOR FACTS	5	18. IS [illegible]	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. WRITES CLEARLY	[illegible]	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN WORK WITH SUBORDINATES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	[illegible]	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under [illegible] as specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any [illegible]. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): McCORD, James W., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 January 1924
3. SEX: male
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD-SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Security Research Staff
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Investigator Acting Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 22 August 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 22 August 1956 - 21 August 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☑ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.

☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.

☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.

☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "U" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.

☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 28 August 1957

C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Harlan A. Westrell Harlan A. Westrell

D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief/Security Research Staff/OS

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

17 FEB [illegible]

Reviewed by [illegible] WHD 9/19/52

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 3 Sept 57

B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C F Heney C. F. HENEY

C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: EXECUTIVE OFFICER

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 5 3 42 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assist in the development and coordination of all counter intelligence programs	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plan operations necessary to resolve counter intelligence cases	RATING NUMBER 7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Receive, evaluate and develop information of counter intelligence nature	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyze and evaluate results of a counter intelligence operation	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintain liaison with various other sensitive govt.agencies as well as other components of CIA in conn.with CIA operations.	RATING NUMBER 6
Conduct such personnel invest., interrog. & interviews as deemed necessary in certain cases.	6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. McCord has a great organizational ability. This combined with an analytical mind, imagination and tenacity of purposes enables him to organize complex problems into workable and seemingly simple plans of action. He is a good supervisor, can delegate responsibility, gives credit to his subordinates and, in turn, is well liked by them. He is continually working to improve himself by both formal and informal training.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) McCORD,	(First) James	(Middle) W., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924	3. SEX male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD-SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Security Research Staff			6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Investigator Acting Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 22 August 1957		9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 22 August 1956 - 21 August 1957		

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 28 August 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Harlan A. Westrell Harlan A. Westrell	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief/Security Research Staff/OS

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE ~~28 August~~ 3 Sept 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL [illegible] HENRY C F Henry	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL EXECUTIVE [illegible]

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 5 3 42 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

36

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. McCord has a good educational background, well rounded personality, which combined with his organizational ability and further experience should equip him for a senior position in this Agency.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

McCord should continue in his present assignment as Deputy Chief/SRS for at least two more years.

McCord wishes to continue his study of Russian.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	5	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS PRODUCTIVE
4	8. HAS REGARD FOR FACTS	4	18. IS PERSISTENT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOTTED TIME LIMITS	5	30. SEES ALL [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) McCORD (First) James (Middle) W., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 January 1924
3. SEX: male
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD-SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Security Research Staff
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Investigator
7. GRADE: GS-12
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 22 August 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 22 August 1955 - 21 August 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 27 August 1956
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Harlan A. Westrell Harlan A. Westrell
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, CI/SRS

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		5 SEP 1956
Reviewed by PUD		7 [illegible]

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section. ☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

A. THIS DATE: 27 August 1956
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Paul F. Gaynor Paul F Gaynor
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, Security Research Staf

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY, HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (Do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 5 10 30 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Receives, evaluates and develops information of a counterintelligence nature.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Evaluates results of counter-intelligence operations.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans operations necessary to resolve counter-intelligence matters.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains liaison with various other sensitive government agencies as well as other components of CIA in connection with CI operations.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordinates SO resources in implementation of CI operations.	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conducts such personal investigation, interrogations and interviews as deemed necessary in certain cases.	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. McCord's greatest strength is his ability to follow tenuous counter-intelligence leads without becoming enmeshed in extraneous material. He organizes his work well, then proceeds to follow through to completion. He has ability to do vast quantities of work, shows iniative and imagination and gets along well with all classes of people.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team.* Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YES EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) McCORD, James W., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924	3. SEX male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD-SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Security Research Staff	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Investigator		
7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 22 August 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 22 August 1955 - 21 August 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 27 August 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Harlan A. Westrell Harlan A. Westrell	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, CI/Sec. Research Staff

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 27 August 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Paul F. Gaynor Paul F. Gaynor	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Security Research Staf

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

BY DATE
Positive Control

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (Truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

29 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. McCord is an outstanding individual who should continue to develop into a key employee. He is particularly good at organizing and directing operations. He does need further experience in his present position, but within two years should be ready to assume a senior position in the Security Office or in CI/DDP.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
Se[illegible] 10 [illegible] AM '56
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. **FUTURE PLANS**

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None planned for the present. Should continue to work in present position.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. **DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL**

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It serves to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the qualification of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

CODED

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A. Next due date - 22 Aug 56

Posted Pos. C 8/38 10/21/55

Rl 1926

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) McCORD, (First) James (Middle) W., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 Jun. 1924
3. SEX M
4. CAREER DESIGNATION SD:SS
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 22 August 1951
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO Security
7. DIVISION Security Research Staff
8. BRANCH
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE GS-13
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 31 August 1955
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 22 August 1954 to 22 August 1955

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION 1816.24
Chief, External Branch, Security Research Staff
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 1 January 1955
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

As Chief, External Branch (CI), planned and directed sensitive CI investigations; coordinated action with other Government investigative services; analyzed results of investigations, conducted and directed detailed research on CI problems; conducted interrogations and interviews on all phases of CI activity; wrote detailed reports on CI cases; supervised activities of SRS employees assigned to External Branch.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ has ☐ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE 9/28/55
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) Harlan A. Westrell

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE 9-28-55
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) Paul F. Gaynor

FORM NO. 45
1 OCT 54
REPLACES FORM 37-193, 1 MAY 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categor[illegible] scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

SEP 11 4 08 PM '55

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE	APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE
SAMPLES						
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X			
B. PRACTICAL.					X	
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.						X
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.					X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.					X	
4. HAS INITIATIVE.						X
5. UNEMOTIONAL.						X
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.						X
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.						X
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.					X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.					X	
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.						X
11. CALM.						X
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.						X
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.					X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.						X
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.						X
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.					X	
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.						X
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.						
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.					X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.						X
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.						X
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.					X	
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION						X
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.					X	
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.												X		
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.												X		
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES, A "SPARK PLUG".									X					
29. TOUGH MINDED.													X	
30. OBSERVANT.													X	
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.													X	
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.													X	
36. DELIBERATE.										X				
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.												X		
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.													X	
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.													X	
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.												X		
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.														X
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.										X				
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.											X			
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.										X				

SECTION F

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Ability to go into details of a CI case, following all pertinent leads without becoming involved in extraneous matters.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

None

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OVERSHADOWS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

None

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Employee has expressed desire to study Russian

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
XX 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
XX 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ...WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
XX 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS. Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
XX 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) McCORD (First) James (Middle) W.

2. GRADE GS-13

3. POSITION TITLE Security Officer CD-SE

☒ DEPTL.
☐ FIELD

IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

4. OFFICE Security

STAFF OR DIVISION Office of Chief

BRANCH

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 22 Aug. 1953 To 21 Aug. 1954

6. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ Initial
☒ Annual
☐ Special
☐ Reassignment
☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

To handle certain special assignments and conduct certain sensitive research for the Security Office, CIA. Research in many cases ~~of~~ is such high sensitivity that the conduct of same must be limited.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
none			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Same as my present assignments

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10

22 July 1954
DATE

James W. McCord Jr.
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. McCord has performed the above duties in an excellent manner. He has an unusual ability to develop information thru both research and investigation and in this instance has produced results which have been of great value to high authorities of this Agency.

FORM NO. 37-401
MAY 1952

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

In his "knack" for developing information from research and investigation, and in his utmost discretion in sensitive assignments.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

None noted.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Yes, he has definite promise of future increased responsibilities.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Not at this time.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None at this time. Will consider for Phase II Operations Course when work load permits.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE. NOT APPLICABLE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

11 Oct 1954
DATE

Sheffield Edwards
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR.

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

20 Jan 55
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

20. COMMENTS (Continued):

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Instruction to the Administrative or Personnel Officer

Consult current Administrative Instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

2. Instruction to the person evaluated

Since this evaluation will become an important part of your record, you will want to give to it as much care and attention as you would like to have it receive from your Supervisor and the Reviewing Official. With respect to Items 8 and 9, you should include courses of instruction or assignments, either within or outside of the Agency, which you consider pertinent to your career development.

3. Instruction to the Supervisor and the Reviewing Official

a. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of others, you bear primary responsibility for planning and fostering the development of each person under your supervision, commensurate with his capacity, aptitude, knowledge and skills. As an alert supervisor, you judge the people working with you on a job-by-job and day-by-day basis and use this information in carrying out your supervisory responsibilities. Although evaluation is a continuous process, it is necessary periodically to record your observations and recommendations for appropriate action. In preparing the report you should consider the individual's capabilities for further development in his present assignment and his potentialities for more effective utilization in other positions, including work of a more responsible and difficult nature.

b. The following traits are generally regarded as having some bearing on a person's performance and development. Although you are not asked for specific ratings, do not hesitate to refer to these or similar traits in your comments, which should be terse and precise.

COOPERATION
DEPENDABILITY
ACCURACY
SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS
INITIATIVE
RESOURCEFULNESS
STABILITY UNDER PRESSURE
ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS
JUDGMENT
LEADERSHIP

c. In fairness to the individual and in the interest of the Agency, the importance of carefully prepared and accurate Personnel Evaluation Reports can not be overstressed. The following basic principles of evaluation should be kept in mind:

(1) Base your judgment on

(a) What you have observed the individual do or fail to do.
(b) Typical performance as well as critical incidents.
(c) Examples relevant to the duties under consideration.

(2) Different standards prevail in different assignments. Every effort should be made to arrive at a just estimate of the qualities of the individual as demonstrated during the report period. Avoid exaggerations. They detract from the value of the report and are unfair to others.

(3) BIASED OPINIONS BASED ON PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PREPARATION OF EVALUATION REPORTS IS AN IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL SUPERVISORS AND THEIR CAREFUL PREPARATION IS AN INDICATION OF THE SUPERVISOR'S OWN ABILITY AND QUALIFICATION FOR THE POSITION HE HOLDS.

4. A FRANK DISCUSSION BETWEEN SUPERVISOR AND INDIVIDUAL CONCERNING THIS REPORT IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND BEST USE OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL'S CAPABILITIES.

THIS PORTION TO BE DETACHED ONLY BY AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ITEMS 1 THROUGH 8 WILL BE COMPLETED BY TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS BRANCH WHEN ACTION IS INITIATED IN PERSONNEL DIVISION

ROUTING AND ACTION SLIP FOR PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

DATE: 15 July 1954

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): McCORD, James W.

2. GRADE: GS-13

3. POSITION TITLE: Security Officer CD-SE

4. OFFICE: Security

STAFF OR DIVISION: Office of Chief

BRANCH:

☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD

IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 22 August 1953 To 21 August 1954

6. TYPE OF REPORT: ☐ Initial ☐ Reassignment ☒ Annual ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor ☐ Special

7. DATE REPORT DUE IN PERSONNEL OFFICE: 21 September 1954

8. AUTHENTICATION (T&R BRANCH):

ROUTING AND ACTION

REQUIRED ACTION	PERSON TO TAKE ACTION	DATE ACTION COMPLETED	INITIALS
9. a. Obtain two copies of CIA Form 37-151. b. Enter data in Items 1 through 6, above, in corresponding spaces of PER forms. c. Attach this action form and pamphlet "Your Evaluation Report" to PER forms. d. Deliver forms to immediate supervisor of person to be evaluated.	Evaluations Officer		
10. a. Deliver forms to person to be evaluated. b. Offer advice and assistance.	Supervisor		
11. a. Complete Items 7 through 10. b. Deliver forms to supervisor. ✓	Person to be Evaluated	15 Aug 54	jwmc
12. a. Complete Items 11 through 17. b. Attach warning memo, if required. c. Deliver forms to reviewing official (supervisor next in line).	Supervisor		
13. a. Review the evaluation. b. Discuss complete evaluation and recommendations with supervisor. c. Record additional comments on forms. d. Sign forms in Item 19. e. Deliver forms to supervisor.	Reviewing Official	1/30/55	
14. a. Discuss all aspects of evaluation with person being evaluated. (Explain right of appeal, if warning memo is prepared.) b. Sign forms in Item 18. c. Deliver forms to Evaluations Officer.	Supervisor		
15. a. Deliver original copy of evaluation form to Transactions and Records Branch, Personnel Division. b. Retain the carbon copy for use of operating office and Office Career Service Board. c. Detach Instruction Sheet of Form 37-151 if Item 20 (continued) is unused.	Evaluations Officer		

FORM NO. 37-151a
SEP 1953

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A — PERSONAL DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.: 058124
2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle): McCORD, James Walter, Jr.
3. POSITION TITLE: Physical Sec. Off.
4. GRADE: GS-15
5. SD: SS
6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Phys. Sec. Div.
7. OFFICE EXT. (If Hdqs): 6821
8. STATION: ☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD (Specify location)
9. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code): 7 Winder Court, Rockville, Md. 20853
10. HOME PHONE: 762-7678
11. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED: U. S. A. - Birth
12. RECOMMENDED AWARD: Certificate of Distinction
13. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT: 31 August 1970
14. POSTHUMOUS: ☐ YES ☒ NO
15. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: Marjorie Lee McCord
16. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
17. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code): Same
18. HOME PHONE: Same

SECTION B — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF HAZARD

19. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

20. FULL NAME
21. ORGN. TITLE
22. GRADE
23. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

24. FULL NAME
25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

26. LOCATION
27. INCLUSIVE DATES
28. TIME OF DAY
29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED
30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED
31. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO
32. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION C — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT, SERVICE, OR PERFORMANCE

33. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☒ YES ☐ NO
34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: Chief, Physical Security Division, PTOS, OS
35. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location): Headquarters
36. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSIGNED POSITION:

To plan and direct an Agency-wide physical security program for protecting Agency installations against unauthorized physical penetration and Agency information and material against loss, compromise or disclosure.

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED
38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO
39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL WHO ASSISTED OR CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE

40. FULL NAME
41. ORGN. TITLE
42. GRADE
43. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE PERFORMANCE

44. FULL NAME
45. TYPE OF AWARD

FORM 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
9-65

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION D — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act. Enclose unclassified citation.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. (Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.) What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation. Enclose unclassified citation.

When he retires 31 August 1970, Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., will have completed 25 years of Government service, 19 years of which were with the CIA in a variety of assignments covering the investigative, counter-intelligence, overseas security support, audio countermeasures and physical security fields within the Security Career Service.

During his early years of employment when assigned to the San Francisco Field Office, Office of Security, August 1951 to May 1953, Mr. McCord assisted in the covert entry and processing through customs of operational personnel from the Far East areas and performed safehouse duties and related tasks designed to ensure the protection and cover of such personnel.

When serving with the Security Research Staff, 1955 to 1962, Mr. McCord worked in direct support of Agency activities abroad of a specialized nature exploiting highly sensitive intelligence source material resulting in the reconstruction of Soviet espionage networks and resolving operational and security leads affecting both the British and United States Governments. The identities, composition and operations of Soviet intelligence services in Europe prior to 1950 and dating back into the 1930's, were reconstructed. Between 1955 and 1960, Mr. McCord was involved in contacting, developing and debriefing these identified and available

☒ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES (List individually) IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR PERFORMANCE, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESS OR INDIVIDUALS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.
1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY James P. O'Connell	48. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION James P. O'Connell Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)	49. DATE 14 July 1970

SECTION E — RECOMMENDATION FORWARDED THROUGH OFFICIALS CONCERNED FOR THEIR INFORMATION

50. HEAD OF SS CAREER SERVICE (Career service of nominee)	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Director of Security	DATE
51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Deputy Director for Support	DATE
52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	TITLE AND SIGNATURE	DATE

SECRET

former Soviet intelligence personalities. This activity led to close liaison with British and other Western intelligence representatives involving numerous trips to Europe. This liaison activity with representatives of the British MI-5 established a direct channel of communications resulting in a continuous exchange of leads and a flow of operational data over the years of benefit to the Agency.

During the period of his work with the Security Research Staff, in which he served as Deputy Chief from May 1957, Mr. McCord was the Agency's case officer in a number of double agent cases involving Agency staff employees who had been contacted and were being developed for recruitment by the Soviet intelligence service.

From 1962 to 1964, Mr. McCord served overseas as Chief of the Regional Security Support Staff located at Frankfurt, Germany with responsibility for the overall personnel and physical security and audio countermeasures programs applicable to the Stations and Bases of the European area. This assignment was followed by attendance at the Air War College, August 1964 to June 1965.

For the past five years, Mr. McCord has held two vital line positions with world-wide responsibilities involving the Agency's audio countermeasures and physical security programs.

As Chief of the Technical Division from 23 July 1965 to 10 October 1968, Mr. McCord supervised a technical operation with considerable skill. Although not an engineer by training, he spanned a difficult gap between the administrative and technical demands of his responsibilities, guiding the development of useful and esoteric equipment in the counter-audio field to a point where the Agency became the recognized leader among Government departments in this area of activity. This leadership is evidenced by the

Section D Continued - James Walter McCord, Jr.

establishment of an Inter-Agency Technical Training Center under the Executive Agency of the Technical Division for the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee of the United States Intelligence Board. Much of Mr. McCord's ideas, talents, and imagination went into the creation of this training activity which commenced operations about the time of his reassignment to the Physical Security Division.

Mr. McCord participated with two subordinate employees in the development of x-ray equipment for use by the Technical Division in detecting and locating hostile audio devices implanted in office appurtenances and walls of Agency occupied facilities. The responsibility for ensuring that appropriate protective methods for the safe use of this equipment was also associated with this development. The significance of this achievement was recognized by the Agency when Mr. McCord and his participating colleagues were awarded Certificates of Merit with Distinction in October 1966.

In his current position as Chief, Physical Security Division, Mr. McCord demonstrated his ability to quickly assimilate the necessary details of a field in which he had relatively little experience. He showed initiative in seeking out new ways and means to harden the security of the Agency's domestic and overseas facilities by tapping all possible technological resources, both in and out of Government, to produce for the Agency a posture in the physical security field which is the equal of, if not superior to, those of other elements of the United States Government. Illustrative of this effort is the expansion and improvement of the Agency's Security Command Center relating to the protection of Agency assets in time of demonstrations, riots and civil disturbances.

Throughout his Agency career, Mr. McCord has engaged his curious and inventive mind to search out even better ways to solve problems within his area of responsibility. As a result, his

Section D Continued - James Walter McCord, Jr.

Agency career is a record of sustained superior performance of duty of high value. The value of his exemplary performance over the years has often been recognized and commended by senior officials of the Agency. It is on this basis that Mr. McCord is nominated for the Certificate of Distinction upon the occasion of his retirement.

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
Certificate of Distinction

CITATION

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. is hereby awarded the Central Intelligence Agency's Certificate of Distinction.

During his nineteen years of Agency service, both domestic and foreign, Mr. McCord displayed remarkable imagination, ingenuity and effectiveness in the performance of his assigned tasks. His sustained superior performance of duty of high value over the years leaves a marked contribution to the overall mission of the Office of Security and the Agency, particularly in the areas of physical and technical security.

CONFIDENTIAL

DD/S 69-4658

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. The Committee on the Security of Headquarters Building in a series of twelve meetings between May and August 1969 conducted a detailed study and analysis of each facet of security of the Headquarters Building. I know that considerable time and effort were given to preparation of the detailed briefings, supplemental studies and reports, contributions to the formal report and implementation of the recommended corrective measures. I am appreciative of the efforts and contribution made by your staff to this important piece of business. Although I am sure that many of your staff have worked on this project, my attention has been drawn particularly to these officers:

Buckley, Robert
Carrico, H. Clifton
Elliott, Robert N.
Farrell, Francis M.
Fennessey, Robert E.
Geiss, Ermal P.
Good, Charles B.
Green, James P.
Griffin, Robert B.
Hayes, Robert J.
Herlihy, John F.
Kane, Edward J.
King, Joseph F.
Mantoni, Rudolfo
McCord, James W., Jr.
McGinn, John B.
O'Connell, James P.
Parr, Laurence
Petit, Alan F.
Sullivan, Arthur H.
Todd, Orin H.

2. I would appreciate it if you would pass this commendation on to the individuals concerned. Copies of this commendation have been forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in the Official Personnel File of each of the above officers.

R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
[illegible]

REQUEST AND AUTHORIZATION FOR ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING/ACTIVE DUTY TOUR

TO: HQ COMD USAF (PRP)

FROM: HQ COMD (PRP-A)

1. ☒ BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT ☐ BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

2. GRADE, LAST NAME, FIRST, MIDDLE INITIAL, AFSN, SSAN: 453-22-4741
MAJOR MCCORD, JAMES W. FV2099263

3. PAFSC: 8054

4. PRESENT ADDRESS
7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

5. ON FLYING STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. AERO RATING: Acft Obsr

7. IS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR 13 DAYS PLUS REQUIRED TRAVEL TIME

8. PURPOSE (Type) ☒ ANNUAL TOUR ☐ SCHOOL TOUR ☐ SPECIAL TOUR OF ACDUTRA ☐ SPECIAL TOUR OF AD
TITLE (Indicate specific school course or special tour title)

9. RESERVE ASSIGNMENT
Hq USAF (AFESS-FE)
Washington, DC

10. UNIT OF ATTACHMENT

11. INDIVIDUAL WILL REPORT TO
Registrar, Defense Intelligence School
U.S. Naval Station, Anacostia Annex (Bldg T-5)
Washington, DC 20390

12. INDIVIDUAL WILL BE RELEASED FROM ORGANIZATION ATTACHED/ASSIGNED FOR ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING ON

	HOUR	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
11. Report	NET 1300 NLT 1600	*8	Jun	69
12. Release	▨	20	Jun	69

13. INDIVIDUAL ☐ IS ☒ IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PARTICIPATE IN FLYING ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD OF ACTIVE DUTY COVERED BY THIS ORDER.

14. AUTHORITY - AFM 35-3

15. INDIVIDUAL WILL PROCEED FROM PRESENT ADDRESS IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLY WITH REPORTING TIME AND DATE.

16. MODES OF TRANSPORTATION ☐ AUTHORIZED ☐ DIRECTED
☐ MILITARY AIRCRAFT
COMMERCIAL: ☐ AIRCRAFT ☐ RAIL ☐ BUS

17. TDY, TDN, PAY, ALLOWANCES, AND TRAVEL CHARGEABLE TO:
PAY & ALWS: 5793700 509 4261 P723.01 S594700

18. REMARKS TRAVEL & PER DIEM: 5793700 509 6262 P723.07 40861 40961 S668100
Training Category - D Pay Group - D Security Clearance - TOP SECRET
Member and dependents authorized Commissary Privileges IAW Para 1a, AFR 145-15.
IAW Para M4201-14, JTR, member will incur no additional subsistence expenses.
*Students reporting after 1600 hours, 8 Jun 69, should contact the school Duty Officer at OX 8-2455.

19. DATE: 29 May 69

20. PHONE NO.: 4279/4069

21. APPROVING OFFICIAL (Typed Name and Grade): E. E. THAYER, ASST DIRECTOR FOR ADMIN

22. SIGNATURE: E. E. Thayer

23. DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS COMMAND USAF
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332

24. RESERVE ORDER NO.: A-961

25. DATE: 29 May 69

26. FOR THE COMMANDER

27. DISTRIBUTION
10 - Individual
1 - Indiv Pers Rec
2 - Unit of Asgmt
2 - Unit of Atch
2 - ARPC, 3800 York St, Denver Colo. 80205
2 - Hq AFRES (CAFO) Dobbins AFB, Ga. 30060
2 - Hq AFRES ( ) Robins AFB, Ga. 31093
2 - Records Set

28. SIGNATURE ELEMENT OF ORDERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICIAL
A. L. Newsom
A. L. NEWSOM, Colonel, USAF
Director, Reserve Personnel

AF FORM 933

SECRET

9 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - James McCord

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of a second Quality Step Increase to be awarded to this employee. The previous award was effective 28 August 1966.

2. May I again ask that you arrange an appropriate ceremony for the presentation of this Quality Step Increase which is in recognition of his continuing excellent performance.

/s/ [illegible]

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF - McCORD
1 - D/Pers Chrono
1 - C/PD

OP/DD/Pers/R&P/PD/JJCaldwell:sa (9 October 1963)

SECRET

SECRET

4 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION : Chief, Placement Division

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W., Jr. #058124
Quality Step Increase

The Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical, and Overseas Security has recommended, with the concurrence of the Director of Security, that Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. be granted a Quality Step Increase. The original recommendation from Mr. McCord's supervisor is attached for your consideration.

Edward K. O'Malley
Edward K. O'Malley
Secretary
Security Career Service Board

Attachment

John J. Caldwell 4 Oct '68
for Director of Personnel

SECRET

SECRET

4 OCT 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, OS Career Board

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase for
Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.

1. Mr. McCord has served as Chief of the Technical Division since 23 July 1965. Through his leadership and fine management of the Division, he and his engineers have developed several new and valuable techniques in the audio countermeasures field. The cost of research and development in these techniques was at a minimum and saved the Government much time and money in increasing the state of the art in audio countermeasures.

2. Mr. McCord supervises his Division in a vigorous manner and instills enthusiasm and esprit de corps within his organization--a difficult task because of the extensive amount of world-wide travel demanded from his subordinates.

3. Through the efforts of Mr. McCord the establishment of an Interagency Training Center for audio countermeasures is proceeding in an orderly basis, and the first courses offered to technical personnel in the intelligence community will begin this fall. The Technical Division, PTOS, serves as the Executive Agent for the operation of such school for the Community.

4. In view of Mr. McCord's sustained high level of performance of duties and the outstanding achievement in the research and development of new hardware and techniques in the audio countermeasures field, it is recommended that Mr. McCord be awarded a Quality Step Increase.

James P. O'Connell

James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

—FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

058124

NAME (last) (first) (middle): McCORD James W Jr

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): 1/26/24

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 453 | 44 | 4741

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: [redacted]

LOCATION (City State ZIP Code): [redacted]

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): James W. McCord Jr

DATE: 13 February, 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE [illegible]
PERSONNEL [illegible] RECEIVED
FEB 13 11 04 AM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 16, 1968)
176-101

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20- , Employee Conduct, dated 29 August 1961, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated August 1960, MAY 1964

James W McCord
Signature

10 July 64
Date

JAMES W MC CORD

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

MANAGERIAL GRID SEMINAR (50 hours) DATES: 23-28 April 1967

Student : James W. McCord, Jr.

Office : OS

Year of Birth: 1924

Service Designation: SS

Grade : 15

No. of Students : 46

EOD Date : August 1951

COURSE OBJECTIVES AND METHOD

Course objectives are to aid participants to: learn the managerial theories contained in the Grid; understand their personal managerial styles in Grid terms; evaluate convictions about managerial values; develop team action skills; increase candidness of communication; strengthen the use of critique for problem-solving and learning; and acquire an appreciation of Organization Culture and Development.

The method of learning offers a challenge to all participants regardless of level or experience. A Grid Seminar is not "taught" in the usual sense. In Grid teams, participants solve complex management problems. Objective solutions are made available. Individual and team performance is repeatedly assessed. Various measuring instruments are used to evaluate effectiveness.

Critique sessions assist each participant to understand how he might change his own behavior to increase his problem-solving effectiveness. Thus managers are not told the best way to manage, but they learn by convincing themselves.

About twenty to thirty hours of study are completed as prework. Insights gained are deepened and personalized during the intensive 50-hour Seminar.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

17 MAY

Chief Instructor

Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

760869 APR 1967

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) LAST / FIRST 7-24 / MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
058124	McCORD, James W. Jr	OS RR

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	UNIT
		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	UNIT
		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	✓	11	08	66	12	14	66	WE	S/1

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: CS/446/47

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 8 Nov 66 - 14 Dec 66

REMARKS

PREPARED BY

1/13/67

FORM 1451a

SECRET

7 MAR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical & Overseas Security

ATTENTION : Chief, Technical Security Division

SUBJECT : Security Presentation - Support Course

1. The Office of Security presentation at the Warrenton Training Center on 2 March 1967 was extraordinarily well received. Colonel Winters, Commanding Officer, WTC, has informed me of a number of superlative comments by those in attendance.

2. I want to express my appreciation to Messrs. James McCord, Alan Petit, and Carroll Melkerson for their most effective presentation on audio countermeasures. It was a highlight of the program and contributed immeasurably to its success.

3. I'd like to express a special word of thanks to Mr. William Herron, for his splendid support in preparing visual aids for the program on extremely short notice. I am aware that Bill worked long hours over the preceding weekend and virtually all night on one occasion in order to ensure the success of this program, while fulfilling heavy commitments to get audio countermeasures teams into the field.

4. I can be justifiably proud of the success of the presentation, and attribute this success in large part to the extraordinary team effort by the Office of Security components involved. Please extend my personal commendation to Messrs. McCord, Petit, Melkerson, and Herron and advise them that a copy of this memorandum will be placed in their Official Personnel Files.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

cc: Official Personnel Files

67-70

OD/S 67-0042

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226

January 3, 1967

The Honorable
Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence
Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dick:

I wish to express my appreciation for the valuable assistance provided by your agency during the recent tour of President Johnson to Southeast Asia. Your response to our request for technical assistance was most gratifying.

I would particularly like to commend to you Mr. Howard J. Osborn, Director, Office of Security, Mr. James McCord, Chief, Technical Security Division, and Mr. Arthur Sheridan, Regional Security Office, Far East, for their cooperation. Their dedication to duty and extensive knowledge and experience in technical support greatly contributed to the success of our mission.

Messrs. Robert Prouty and William Flannery of Mr. McCord's office and Mr. Phil Rush of Mr. Sheridan's office also contributed immeasurably to the success of the visit.

Please extend our sincere appreciation to your staff for a job well done.

Sincerely,

James J. Rowley

SECRET

9 JAN 1967

1st Endorsement

TO: Director of Security

It is always a pleasure to see commendations such as this in recognition of jobs well done.

I would like to add my congratulations and appreciation to you and all of the members of your staff for your fine efforts which contributed to the successful completion of the President's trip.

R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) McCord (First) James (Middle) W. Jr.
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY: 6801 Floyd Ave Springfield Va
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: Same
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: [illegible]

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Laredo Texas
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 30 May 1948
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE
DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED
DATE SPOUSE DIED
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE: Sarah Ruth McCord
ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Same as 1
TELEPHONE NO.: 451-5275

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Michael Steven McCord	Same as 1.	M	[illegible] 51
Carol Anne McCord		F	[illegible] 53
Nancy Ellen McCord		F	28 Nov 55

NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian): James W. McCord Sr.
ADDRESS: Box 63 [illegible] Okla
TELEPHONE NO.
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian): Marjorie L. McCord
ADDRESS: Box 63 [illegible] Okla
TELEPHONE NO.

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. Wife

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Mrs. McCord, Sarah Ruth
RELATIONSHIP: Wife
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Same as 1
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 451-5275
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: Same as 1.
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION: —

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES ✓ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES ✓ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) YES — NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Bank of Prince William, [illegible] Va [illegible]

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☑ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☑ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

Residence

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

Mrs. Dorothy Berry, Houston Texas

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
	[illegible]	[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

2[illegible] September [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Division

THROUGH : ADD/PTOS

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. It is with great ~~personal~~ gratification that I am able to pass along to you the attached letter from Mr. James J. [illegible], Director of the United States Secret Service, with its endorsement by the Deputy Director for Support and, indirectly, by the Director, commending you and members of your Division for the [illegible] technical support you have provided to the Secret Service over the past year.

2. Please accept my sincere appreciation for the very professional performance that you and your staff consistently turn in. It reflects the greatest credit on this Office and upon the Agency. I would appreciate it if you would convey my sentiments, as well as those of Mr. Rowley, Mr. Bannerman, and Mr. Helms to each of your people named in Mr. Rowley's letter. Once you have [illegible], I would appreciate it if you would return [illegible] to Administrative and Training Staff so that the requisite notation may be made to place in your Personnel Files.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

McCord, James W. Jr.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

File No.

September 1[illegible], 19[illegible]

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Attn: Director, Office of Security/[illegible]

Dear Sir:

During the past year representatives of your Agency's Office of Security assisted the Secret Service in our technical security program. Mr. Howard J. O[illegible], Director, Office of Security, has generously furnished us the support of his Technical Security Division headed up by Mr. James W. McCord. In turn Mr. McCord has given freely of his time, equipment and manpower to assist the Secret Service in the technical security of the President.

The assistance furnished by Mr. McCord's Division consisted of two special training courses, the loan of electronic equipment, manpower assistance for searching [illegible] Presidential and Vice Presidential rooms, etc., loan of engineering manpower for special [illegible], and above all a willingness to assist the Secret Service whenever possible.

Although all of Mr. McCord's Division should be recognized for their [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] activities of the Secret Service, the following [illegible] intimately involved with our problems and merit individual recognition:

Mr. Homer Johnson
Mr. Robert [illegible]
Mr. [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]. Alan [illegible]
Mr. [illegible] [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]

On behalf of the Secret Service I would like to express our deep appreciation for the excellent and dedicated assistance furnished by your Agency over the past year in the technical security area.

Very truly yours,

James J. Rowley
Director

SECRET

DD/S 65-3075

27 SEP 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. The Director was pleased with the attached letter from Mr. Rowley in which he expressed deep appreciation for the excellent and dedicated assistance rendered to the U. S. Secret Service during the past year. The Director wishes to continue this cooperation and assistance.

2. I appreciate very much this kind of performance which reflects credit upon the Agency and I compliment you and your staff for another job well done.

R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support

Att: Letter dtd 13 Sept 65 to DCI fr
Mr. Rowley, subj: Appreciation

SECRET

30 AUG 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - James McCord

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. As this award is designed to encourage excellence by recognizing and rewarding the employee, may I ask that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

/s/ Rex E. Greaves

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF - McCORD
1 - D/Pers-Chrono
1 - C/PD

OP/DD/R&P/PD/JJCaldwell:ksd (30 Aug 66)

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

19 AUG 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION : Chief, Placement Division

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W., Jr. #058124
Quality Step Increase

The Security Career Service Board has recommended, with the subsequent concurrence of the Director of Security, that Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. be granted a Quality Step Increase which would change his salary from GS-15, step 5, at $19,978 per annum to GS-15, step 6, at $20,585 per annum. The original recommendation from Mr. McCord's supervisor is attached for your consideration.

Ernest L. Hardt

Ernest L. Hardt
Secretary
Security Career Service Board

Attachment

APPROVED

John F. Caldwell 18 Aug '66
for Director of Personnel

SECRET

SECRET

28 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase -
James W. McCord, Jr.

1. Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. joined the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, in August 1961.

2. He has served successfully in various capacities in the Office of Security as an Investigator, Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff, Regional Security Officer, Germany, and upon his return from overseas, he attended the Air War College, where his overall performance was rated as outstanding.

3. For the past year, Mr. McCord has been serving as Chief, Technical Division.

4. Through Mr. McCord's imaginative planning, guidance, and direction, the Technical Division has developed numerous improvements in both instrumentation and techniques which have greatly enhanced the Agency's capability to detect clandestine microphones and other devices targeted against the Agency both domestically and overseas. It is, therefore, recommended that he be granted a Quality Step Increase.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in duplicate)

DATE: 8 JUL 1966

TO: Secretariat, Honor and Merit Awards Board

FROM: (Operating official) Director of Security

Section A — Personal Data

1. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle): McCORD, James W., Jr.
2. POSITION TITLE: Elec. Engr.-Audio Supt.
3. GRADE: 15
4. SD: SS
5. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Technical Division
6. STATION: ☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD (Specify location)
7. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, Zone, State): 6801 Floyd Ave., Springfield, Va.
8. OFFICE EXT. (Hdqs.): 4192
9. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED: U. S. - Birth
10. RECOMMENDED AWARD: Certificate of Merit
11. POSTHUMOUS: ☐ YES ☒ NO
12. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: Sarah Ruth McCord
13. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
14. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, Zone, State): Same as 7
15. HOME PHONE: 451-5279

Section B — Recommendation for Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard

16. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT: ☐ YES ☐ NO

Personnel in immediate vicinity or who assisted in act or shared in same hazard:

17. FULL NAME	18. ORGN. TITLE	19. GRADE	20. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

List any of the above persons given an award or recommended for award for participating in act:

21. FULL NAME	22. TYPE OF AWARD

Conditions under which act was performed:

23. LOCATION:
24. INCLUSIVE DATES:
25. TIME OF DAY:
26. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED:

Section C — Recommendation for Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance

27. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: ☒ YES ☐ NO
28. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: Chief, Technical Security Division, OS
29. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location): Headquarters
30. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: Supervises the activities of the Technical Security Division, OS

Personnel who assisted or contributed substantially to the service or performance:

31. FULL NAME	32. ORGN. TITLE	33. GRADE	34. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT
MARCY, William M.	Elec. Engr.	GS-10	OS/Technical Division
PETIT, Alan F.	Elec. Engr.	GS-13	OS/Technical Division

List any of the above persons given an award or recommended for award for participating in the performance:

35. FULL NAME	36. TYPE OF AWARD
MARCY, William M. PETIT, Alan F.	Certificate of Merit with Distinction

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED:
38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED: ☐ YES ☐ NO
39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT: ☐ YES ☐ NO

FORM 11-63 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Section D Narrative Description

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. (Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.) What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation.

40.

From early December 1965 through May 1966, Messrs. James W. McCord, Jr., Alan F. Petit, and William M. Marcy of the Technical Division, Office of Security, conceived and developed a unique technique for the use of a small portable X-ray machine which has been placed in extensive use in the Agency's Audio-Countermeasures Program. Experimentation during these months indicated that X-ray combined with a fluoroscopic screen had distinct advantages in terms of time and effort over the considerably more expensive X-ray film and processor. Along with this, they designed an innovation in the form of a fluoroscopic cloth which has the distinct advantage of flexibility over the fluorescent screens currently available on the commercial market.

The combination of the X-ray and the fluorescent cloth make it possible to rapidly scan in "real time" large wall surfaces and furnishings, a capability the Agency has not had before.

The Technical Division has greatly enhanced the world-wide use of this equipment in that they designed and developed a packaging plan whereby using two attache cases they are able to easily transport the X-ray fluoroscopic equipment, wall racks, and motor units making it possible to inconspicuously carry it into offices, residences, and safehouses.

These men have shown initiative, ingenuity and great imagination in the application of fluoroscopic scanning with X-ray.

This technique, much of which required many off-duty hours to develop, has greatly enhanced the Agency's capability to detect clandestine microphones and other devices targeted against the Agency both domestically and overseas.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

41. ENCLOSURES (List individually) If originator is not an eyewitness or does not have personal knowledge of the act or performance, attach affidavits of eyewitness or individuals having personal knowledge of the facts.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

42. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY ERMAL P. GEISS Ermal P. Geiss	43. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL MAKING RECOMMENDATION Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)	44. DATE 22 JUN 1966

Section E Recommendation Forwarded Through Officials Concerned For Their Information

45. Head of SS Career Service (Career service of nominee)	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Director of Security	DATE
46. Deputy Director of Operating Component	TITLE AND SIGNATURE	DATE
47. Deputy Director of Career Service	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Deputy Director for Support	DATE

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training

16 AUG 1965

This is to advise you that McCORD, James W., Jr. training request # R-12340 attended the following external training program:

COURSE: Air War College Program

INSTITUTION: Air War College

DATE: 7 August 1964-4 June 1965

GRADE: None

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Attachments:

- ☐ Grade Report
- ☐ Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
- ☐ Certificate of Completion
- ☐ Roster of Participants
- ☒ Training Report by Institution
- ☐ Training Report by Student
- ☐ None
- ☐ Other: ____________________

GROUP 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

AIR WAR COLLEGE
Air University
United States Air Force
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112

REPLY TO ATTN OF: AWCA

8 June 1965

SUBJECT: Training Reports

TO: Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Attached are Training Reports (AF Form 475) for Central Intelligence Agency representatives in the Air War College Class of 1965. These reports are forwarded for your information and appropriate distribution.

FOR THE COMMANDANT

J. K. BROCK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Administration

2 Atchs
1. TR, Mr. Copeland
2. TR, Mr. McCord

Strength Through Knowledge

I. IDENTIFICATION DATA (Read AFM 35-10 carefully before filling out any item)

1. LAST NAME — FIRST NAME — MIDDLE INITIAL: McCORD, James W., Jr.

2. AFSN: Civilian, Central Intelligence Agency

3. ACTIVE DUTY GRADE:

4. PERMANENT GRADE:

5. ORGANIZATION, COMMAND AND LOCATION:
Air University
Maxwell AF Base, Alabama

6. AERO RATING: CODE:

7. ACADEMIC PERIOD: 44 weeks

8. PERIOD OF REPORT: FROM 7 Aug 64 TO 4 Jun 65

9. REASON FOR REPORT: ☒ FINAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ DIRECTED

10. NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL OR INSTITUTION: Air War College, Maxwell AF Base, Alabama

11. NAME OR TITLE OF COURSE: Air War College Resident Course

12. LENGTH OF COURSE: 44 weeks

II. REPORT DATA (Complete as applicable)

1. COURSE HOURS COMPLETED: 1576

2. COURSE HOURS FAILED: None

3. AFSC AWARDED: N/A

4. AERO RATING AWARDED: N/A

5. DEGREE AWARDED: N/A

6. COURSE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED (Final report only): ☒ YES ☐ NO (If "No," also state) Officer earned off-duty college credits at AU Geo. Wash. Univ. Center towards [redacted] - MA degree.

6 B DISTINGUISHED GRAD (If Applicable):

7. TITLE OF THESIS: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Power in Africa, and its Implications for the U.S.

8. ACADEMIC FIELD: N/A

III. COMMENTS

PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OVERPRINT

1. WRITING ABILITY: ☐ NOT OBSERVED ☐ UNSATISFACTORY ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ EXCELLENT ☒ OUTSTANDING

2. SPEAKING ABILITY: ☐ NOT OBSERVED ☐ UNSATISFACTORY ☐ SATISFACTORY ☒ EXCELLENT ☐ OUTSTANDING

3. INDEPENDENT PROBLEM SOLVING ABILITY (Thesis, Staff Study, etc): ☐ NOT OBSERVED ☐ UNSATISFACTORY ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ EXCELLENT ☒ OUTSTANDING

4. GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING AND DISCUSSION: ☐ NOT OBSERVED ☐ UNSATISFACTORY ☐ SATISFACTORY ☒ EXCELLENT ☐ OUTSTANDING

a. ATTN: REVIEW AUTHORITIES: THIS EVALUATION COMPARES THE INDIVIDUAL REPORTED UPON WITH 278 OTHER EXCEPTIONAL OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS CAREFULLY SELECTED FOR ATTENDANCE AT THE AIR WAR COLLEGE. Mr. McCord was an outstanding member of this AWC class. As a member of the Student entertainment Committee, he early initiated the School into a get-together; ahead of time, he attended to the many details so thoroughly that the social activities were most delightful. Mr. McCord has a most friendly and direct manner of speaking with people. He seemed well-oriented toward the group endeavors. He considerately expressed his deferences toward the students of his seminars, through nice amenities appropriately made as the occasion permitted. In the seminar discussions, his participation was timely and positive, constructive and appropriately introduced so as to further the progress of the group endeavor. He was especially well-informed on the Sino-Soviet struggle for power in Africa. This student's outstanding over-all performance surpassed the high standards expected of the carefully selected members of the AWC.

IV. REPORTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME, GRADE, AFSN AND ORGANIZATION:
ARNO H. LUEHMAN, Maj Gen,
USAF, 1080A, Air War College

DUTY TITLE: Commandant

SIGNATURE: Arno H. Luehman

DATE: 11 June 1965

AF FORM 475 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE

TRAINING REPORT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST / FIRST / MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print) 7-24	25-26
58124	McCORD, JAMES W. JR.	16

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1				06	12	64	GERMANY	270

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
X	OTHER (*Specify*) Returnee Payroll Info		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. FORM 1460c	DOCUMENT DATE PERIOD 7-10-64

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	✓ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION ✓ FINANCE DIVISION	DATE [illegible] 64	SIGNATURE

FORM 8-62 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-121

CONTINUED SERVICE AGREEMENT FOR EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO TRAINING THROUGH NON-CIA FACILITIES

1. In consideration of my being assigned by the Central Intelligence Agency to training in Air War College (Course) at Montgomery, Alabama (Name of Facility) beginning August 1964 and ending June 1965, I agree to the following terms and conditions:

a. That, after having completed the training under the program described above, I will continue serving the Central Intelligence Agency (hereinafter the Agency) for a period of not less than 36 months, which period shall be deemed to commence the first workday after completion of the training covered by this agreement, unless I am involuntarily separated from the Agency;

b. That, if I voluntarily leave the Agency before completion of the agreed period of service and do not immediately, as determined by the Agency, enter the service of another Federal agency, I will reimburse the Agency for any additional expenses incurred by it in connection with my training, which expenses are defined to include (1) travel and per diem in lieu of subsistence, (2) transportation of immediate family, household goods and personal effects, packing, crating, temporary storage, drayage, and unpacking, (3) tuition and matriculation fees, (4) library and laboratory services, (5) purchase or rental of books, materials and supplies, (6) the cost of other services or facilities directly related to the training, but excluding salary, pay, or compensation received.

c. That, before voluntarily leaving the Agency to enter the service of another Federal agency during the agreed period of service, I will give the Agency at least ten working days' written notice, during which period it shall have the opportunity to determine whether I am to reimburse it for any additional expenses incurred; that should I fail to give such ten-day notice, or if the Agency notifies me that reimbursement is required, I will, upon demand, promptly reimburse the Agency for the additional expenses determined to be due.

d. That if I do not make prompt voluntary payment for the amount of additional expenses determined to be due under paragraphs b or c of

(NoCord)

this agreement, the Agency may recover such amounts from me or my estate by (1) set-off of accrued salary, pay, compensation, amount of retirement credit, or other amount due me from the Government, and by (2) such other methods as may be provided by law for the recovery of amounts due the Government.

e. That the assignment to training under this agreement does not commit the Government to continue my employment and, further, that I may be released in whole or in part from the terms of this agreement only by action of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(Signature)

James W. McCord

James W. McCord ✓

(Type Name)

13 July 1964

(Date)

WITNESS:

Russell R. Shaw

(Signature)

(Type Name)

13 July 1964

(Date)

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
Office of the Provost Marshal
[illegible], US Forces

9 MAY 1964

Dear Jim:

My tour of duty in Headquarters, United States Army, Europe will terminate in late May when I leave Europe to undertake new duties in Washington, D. C. My association with you and your staff has been a richly rewarding experience, both personally and professionally. The manner in which you have unobtrusively, yet effectively, served as the catalyst which welded together the activities of the many staff and operational agencies which share an interest in our national security, has been a source of continuing inspiration to me. Your efforts have enjoyed my unqualified personal support and have merited the admiration of those members of my staff who have been privileged to associate with you.

You have dramatically demonstrated a capacity for bringing together key personnel of agencies who seek, in the accomplishment of their individual missions, the realization of a common goal, in a manner calculated to preserve the individual integrity of each agency while exploiting those benefits of cohesiveness so essential to maximum effectiveness. Mindful that the application of a prescribed technique without adding the complementing ingredient of your confidence inspiring and persuasive personality would not have achieved the same measure of success, I unhesitatingly ascribe our abundant joint accomplishments to your generous personal contribution.

My future relationships with your associates will always reflect my admiration for the manner in which you have contributed to the attainment of our national aims and the manner in which your personal efforts have precipitated a more significant contribution from the other agencies with which yours has been associated.

Sincerely,

CARL C. TURNER
Brig Gen USA
Provost Marshal

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Office of Special Investigations
Office of the Deputy Director (USAFE)
APO 332, US Forces

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: AFISI-D

10 JUN 1964

SUBJECT:

TO: Mr. Gordon M. Stewart
Coordinator and Special Advisor
OCA, AMCONGEN
APO 757, US Forces

Dear Mr. Stewart

On the departure of Mr. James W. McCord I wanted you to know of OSI's appreciation for his constant support and cooperation during his tour. He has given us valuable assistance in the performance of our mission.

We appreciate also Mr. McCord's constant efforts to create unity of purpose and action among the many security and counterintelligence agencies in the area. Through his efforts new liaison avenues were opened to OSI which, on several occasions, facilitated the completion of our tasks. His efforts in contingency planning also were noteworthy.

OSI in USAFE will miss Mr. McCord. Please extend our good wishes to him and Mrs. McCord for continued success in their endeavors.

Sincerely

L. L. Free

L. L. FREE
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director (USAFE)

file passon

HEADQUARTERS
513TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
Office of the Commanding Officer
APO 757 US Forces

AEUMC-SD 5 June 1964

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: Mr. James W. McCord
United States Army Area Security Component
APO 757, US Forces

1. Upon your impending departure from overseas assignment, I wish to take this opportunity to express sincere appreciation on behalf of the 513th Intelligence Corps Group for your splendid cooperation with this organization.

2. The conference held by security officers in this area on a monthly basis, which was established largely due to your efforts, has provided an excellent opportunity for closer coordination, exchange of information, and integrated operations; and has resulted in benefits to the overall security missions of the United States agencies in this area.

3. Your professional competence, coupled with your cheerful approach to problem areas, has benefited all of those who have had the opportunity to work with you. I feel certain you will render distinguished service in your new assignment, and I wish you every success for the future.

Paul R. Lutjens
PAUL R. LUTJENS
Colonel, AIS
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCY EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
APO 757

IAEINT-I

8 June 1964

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
Chief, Security
USAASC
APO 757, US Forces

1. The news of your departure to a new station in the USA has been received with regret; your contributions in the intelligence community will be missed. At the same time it is gratifying to learn that you have been selected for such an important assignment of which you are most deserving.

2. I wish to express my appreciation for your efforts in organizing the Frankfurt Security Officers' Conference. I am aware that through your initiative and tenacity this organization expanded in size until all security and intelligence units in the Frankfurt area were represented, thus cementing their combined efforts into one sphere of cooperation. This, I am sure, has contributed immeasurably to the overall security mission of this community.

3. I also wish to specifically thank you for the security lecture you presented to members of my command in England. There have been many favorable comments received from personnel hearing that presentation, to the effect that the lecture indicated a very broad range of knowledge on your part and that it was presented in a truly professional manner.

4. The fine cooperation you have extended to personnel in my S2 Division has been of the greatest assistance to my command and all have voiced their appreciation and satisfaction concerning their association with you. I wish you the best of luck and success in your new endeavor.

James H. Keller
JAMES H. KELLER
Colonel, AIS
Chief

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

rec'd 21 Nov 63
[illegible] 771, 30 Oct 63

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true)	DATE (from item 9-1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 9-2)
James W. McCord, Jr. /s/	23 Oct 63	Daniel M. Kelly /s/	23 Oct 63

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW: George G. Ruder
DATE: 21 Nov 63

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

Arr c/s 3 June 62

1. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924	2. GRADE GS-15	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Chief, Security Branch/CSB
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known) Security Officer	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE German Station, CSB	7a. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD 9 June 1964
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR -----		7b. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS 20 July 1964

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on transmittal form):

1. Security policy advisor to COS and its Senior Station and Base Officers.
2. Supervises nine professional and four clerical employees of the Security Branch.
3. Directs conduct of LCFLUTTER, SGLATERAL, Physical Security Duties and Investigations performed by the Security Branch.
4. Reviews security of German Station and recommends ways and means for strengthening and improving.
5. Furnishes technical security support and guidance to other Bases in EE and outside of EE on request.
6. Reviews investigative reports of the Security Branch and performs such other duties as directed by COS, Chief, EE and Bases.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT.

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

Same as #8, above.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

Would like National War College training

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (Continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

1 ☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

2 ☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:
1ST. CHOICE OS/IOS 2ND. CHOICE OS/PPS 3RD. CHOICE OS/Staff

3 ☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:
1ST. CHOICE San Francisco 2ND. CHOICE Los Angeles 3RD. CHOICE Miami

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?
30 days INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 20

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

four; ages, 36, 11, 9, and 7

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Subject has rendered outstanding performance while assigned to the German Station. His preference to return for an additional two years after home leave is accepted with great pleasure.

Full consideration should also be given in the future for his request to attend the National War College.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING

Events have overtaken this FR, and Subject will be returning in the summer of 1964 to attend the Air War College.

16. NAME OF PERSONNEL OFFICER
George S. Rader
DATE 10 December 1963

SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF CAREER PANEL

17. EMPLOYEE ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT

REFERENCE
DISPATCH NO. X CABLE NO.

18. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME
ERNEST HALDT

SIGNATURE
Ernest Hardt

19. TITLE
OS/PPS

DATE
20 Jan 64

20. COMMENTS
Mr. [illegible] selected for Air War College and subsequently decided to return for this purpose.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6		7-24		25-26
58124	MCCORD	JAMES	W.	34

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	06	09	62				GERMANY	270

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☒	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 5/13 - 6/9/62

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT DATE 8/14/62	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED SIGNATURE

FORM 1551a

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

253130 MAY 31 62

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print) FIRST MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	7-24	25-26
#52124	Mc CORD JAMES W. JR.	54

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	04	01	62	04	14	62	C/E	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
05-655-62	4/1-14/62

REMARKS

9-10-62

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
FISCAL DIVISION		DATE	SIGNATURE
FINANCE DIVISION		29 May 62	

FORM 9-59 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SEP 63

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

James W. McCord

has attended and successfully completed the

SECURITY OFFICE
SPECIAL TRAINING COURSE

Security Officer Field Course #12

during the period 14 May *to* 25 May 1962

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA

WASHINGTON, D.C.

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

James W. McCord

has attended and successfully completed the

SECURITY OFFICE

SPECIAL TRAINING COURSE

Physical Security Training Course #8

during the period 23 April *to* 11 May 1962

William A Kotapish

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA

WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of Two Years from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

James Walter McCord Jr
James Walter McCord, Jr.
(Employee)

WITNESS:

Netta S Waller
Office of Personnel

Date: May 8 '62

FORM NO. 911a 1 FEB 56 [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Operations Support No. 50
120 hours, full-time, Phase I 2 - 20 April 62 8 Students
80 hours, full-time, Phase II 23 April - 4 May 62 10 Students

Student : McCORD, James W., Jr. Year of Birth: 1924

EOD Date: August 1951 Grade: GS-15 Office : OS

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The Operations Support Course emphasizes the role of support personnel in clandestine activities and their responsibility in originating material of a support nature at headquarters and in the field. The Course objectives are to provide the student with (1) an appreciation of the interrelationship between operating functions and support functions; (2) an understanding of some of the basic principles and techniques of Agency operations; (3) a knowledge of procedures, regulations and problems pertinent to the necessary support of operational activities.

a. Phase I covers instruction on organization, functions and responsibilities of the Clandestine Services; basic principles of clandestine activity accompanied by practical exercises; project and agent management; familiarization with defensive and offensive audio surveillance.

About fifty per cent of Phase I consists of lectures, briefings, and discussions; about thirty-five per cent is devoted to field exercises, practical written assignments, practice problems, and observing films as training aids in basic tradecraft. The remainder of the time is devoted to studying and testing.

b. Phase II includes name checks, records procedures, foreign travel, finance and property accounting, dispatch, pouch, cable and message-writing procedures. For this phase, problems have been developed to represent situations as they normally occur at a Class B Station.

About thirty-five per cent of Phase II is composed of lectures, briefings, and discussions; about fifty per cent is devoted to practice problems and practical written assignments. The remainder of the time is devoted to studying and testing.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

The adjectival ratings on this student for each major area of this course are the result of an evaluation of his work on his individual projects, on the other exercises, and on the final examination. Comparative judgment takes into account students in preceding classes as well as the present one. The numbers show how many students received each rating. An asterisk (*) shows the rating this student received. The rating the student receives represents the student's performance in the course with no allowance made for difference in age, education, experience and so forth.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

NAME McCord, James W., Jr.

MAJOR CATEGORIES

PHASE I	UNSAT	SAT	EXCELLENT
1. Tradecraft - Recognition of elementary principles.	0	2	6
2. Casing - Written observation of an assigned site.	0	2	6
3. Personal Meeting Plan - Written paper emphasizing techniques of effecting clandestine meeting.	0	5	3
4. Personal Meeting - Carrying out student's plan.	0	4	4
5. Contact Report - Written report of clandestine personal meeting.	0	2	6
6. Operational Support Procedures - General knowledge of Clandestine Services Organization and Functions; Agent and Project Management.	0	2	6
PHASE II			
1. Originating Headquarters and Field Dispatches. Indexing Requirements. Field Pouch Manifest.	0	2	8
2. Preparation of Headquarters and Field Cables. Writing and Indexing Messages. Use of Message Writing Techniques.	0	7	3
3. Type II Property Accounting - Fundamentals and Execution of Records.	0	1	9
4. Foreign Travel - Currency Conversion and Completion of Travel Voucher.	0	4	6
5. Familiarization with Class B Accounting and Preparation of Records.	0	0	10
6. Clandestine Services Headquarters and Field Support Procedures.	1	4	5

COMMENTS

Student cancelled per Registrar/Training, 29 March 1962.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Chief Instructor 18 May 1962 Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

TKC

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) McCord (First) James (Middle) W Jr
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 453-22-4741

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) S
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE [illegible] 5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Va
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE Same

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Lamesa Texas
DATE OF MARRIAGE 30 M.
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE
DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED
DATE SPOUSE DIED
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE Sarah Ruth McCord
ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Va
TELEPHONE NO. FL 4 7695

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Michael Steven McCord	Same	M	4/15/54
Nancy Ellen McCord	Same	F	3/25/55
Carol Anne McCord	Same	F	11/7/52

NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian) James W McCord Sr
ADDRESS Box 63 Thackerville Okla
TELEPHONE NO. —
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian) Marjorie Lee McCord
ADDRESS " " "
TELEPHONE NO. —

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
Parents + Luther Berry 3508-35th St Lubbock Texas (Father in law)

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Luther Berry
RELATIONSHIP Father in law
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 3508 35th St Lubbock Texas
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER Swift 9-3440
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE Same
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION Same

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) Yes
YES ✓ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) Yes
YES ✓ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)
YES ✓ NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

1st National Bank of Vienna Virginia – James W Jr and Sarah Ruth McCord

Nat'l Federal Credit Union.

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

With Wife

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

Dorothy Berry, sister in law, 2217-D Norfolk St Houston Texas

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

1st National Bank, Vienna Virginia

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington DC	May 8 62	James W McCord Jr

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

239754 MAR 13 62

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-5	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) 6-23 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 24-25
058124 ✓	McCORD	JAMES	W. JR	24

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41
	2	10	06	61	10	16	61	EE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: 05-544-62

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 10/4-10/61

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
☐ FINANCE DIVISION		

FORM 1451a
4-10

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Completed)

TRAINING REPORT

Americans Abroad Orientation - Free Europe (Germany)
28 hours 19, 20, 26 & 27 February 1962 Office :

Students : MCCORD, Sarah Ruth (Dependent- James W., Jr.)
Service Designation:

Year of Birth:
No. of Students :

Grade :
EOD Date :

COURSE OBJECTIVE - CONTENT AND METHOD

This course helps prepare personnel and their adult dependents for residence or travel in the general area and country of destination. Included are a briefing on "the Americans Abroad Problem," its implications for the individual employee or dependent and the Agency, practical advice for successful personal adjustment to everyday problems of working and living in the area of assignment, useful information on the area, and guide lines for understanding its major problems. Advice includes cues for effective inter-personal relations in the particular country or region. Area information includes an analysis of the importance of the region to the United States and descriptions of the people, their institutions, and current living conditions. The course offers lectures, panel discussions, films, slide commentaries, and selected readings for a recommended program of self-study. Employees and dependents recently returned from the area help to keep current the information on conditions.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only; no attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: A. M. Lewis 4 June 1962
Chief Instructor Date
ANTHONY M. LEWIS

SECRET
(When Completed)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE			OFFICE/COMPONENT
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
57129	McCORD	JAMES	W	24

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	06	12	61	06	29	61	EE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
T.O. 05-516-62	6/12/61 - 6/29/61

REMARKS

219883 NOV 15 61

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓	FINANCE DIVISION	12 Dec 61	

FORM 2-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

231 12/28/61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6		7/24		25-26
58124	McCord	James	W. Jr.	24

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		
	002	03	12	61	03	22	61	WE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REMINT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED.
☐ FISCAL DIVISION		DATE	SIGNATURE
☒ FINANCE DIVISION		5/22/61	

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
8-60

SECRET

(4-101)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

123189 DEC 16 60

TO: Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
58124	McCORD	JAMES	W.	24 ~~21~~

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39	EE, WE.	
	2	08	15	60	08	22	60		801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
	15-22 AUG. 60

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
PRE-AUDIT STATION		DATE	SIGNATURE
X FINANCE STATION		12/14/60	

FORM 5-59 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-101)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5	6-23			24-25
58124	McCord, Jr.	James	W.	31

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
1. PCS *(Basic)* 3. CORRECTION 5. CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
2. TDY *(Basic)* 4. CORRECTION 6. CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41
	2	10	05	59	10	17	59	WE - EE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: 05-278-60

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 5-17 Oct. 1959

REMARKS: 031347 FEB2160

PREPARED BY	☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION ✓ FINANCE DIVISION	DATE 2/23/60	SIGNATURE

FORM 6-56 1451a

SECRET

(4.10)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

N-R

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES AUTHORIZED IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) McCord (First) James (Middle) W. Jr

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: 5701 Floyd Ave

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad): 5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Va.

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Va.

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Lamesa Texas

DATE OF MARRIAGE: May 30 1948

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:

DATE OF DECREE:

IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED:

DATE SPOUSE DIED:

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE Sarah Ruth McCord	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 5701 Floyd Ave	TELEPHONE NUMBER FL 4-7684	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	AGE
Michael Steven McCord	Same	M	7
Carol Anne McCord		F	5
Nancy Ellen McCord		F	3
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian) James W McCord Sr	ADDRESS Purcell Oklahoma	TELEPHONE NUMBER —	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian) Marjorie Lee McCord	ADDRESS Purcell Okla	TELEPHONE NUMBER —	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES? Wife only

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Mrs. James W McCord Jr

RELATIONSHIP: Wife

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 5701 Floyd Ave Springfield Va.

HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: FL 4-7684

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:

BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? ☑ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? ☑ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? ☑ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 8 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

NAME AND DATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS: NW Federal Credit Union

The Springfield Bank, Springfield Va.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

James W. and Sarah Ruth McCord

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☑ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

My Wife

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington DC	1 Oct 58	James W. McCord

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

(CONVENED PURSUANT TO REGULATIONS R 20-635 AND [illegible] 20-635)

DATE
2 March 1959

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

NAME: (LAST) McCORD (FIRST) James (MIDDLE) Walter

POSITION TITLE: Actg. Dep. Chief/SRS/OS

PRESENT GRADE: GS-14

OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: Security

STATION: Headquarters

BE AWARDED:
Certificate of Merit with Distinction

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION, ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE DURING THE PERIOD
1 July - 15 August 1958

☐ APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION ☒ DISAPPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION

☐ APPROVES, BUT IN LIEU THEREOF, RECOMMENDS THE AWARD OF:

CITATION

REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF RECOMMENDED AWARD

The Honor and Merit Awards Board concludes from the information available to it that the service performed, while of unquestionable value, is not sufficiently outstanding to merit an honor award.

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
Gordon M. Stewart

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
Rudyard Boulton

SECRET

FORM 382 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR AWARD

(REGULATIONS R-20-635 & AFR 20-635)

DATE: 18 December 1958

TO: Honor Awards Board

THROUGH:

FROM: Office of Security

SECTION I — PERSONAL DATA

NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last) (First) (Middle): McCORD, James Walter

POSITION TITLE: Actg. Dep. Chief/SRS/OS

GRADE: GS-14

OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: Security

STATION: ☒ Headquarters ☐ Field (Specify location)

LEGAL RESIDENCE (number, street, city, zone, state): 5701 Floyd Avenue, Springfield, Virginia

CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED: Birth

IF ANY OF THE ABOVE ITEMS WERE DIFFERENT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDED AT THE TIME OF THE ACT OR SERVICE, INDICATE SUCH DIFFERENCES.

RECOMMENDED AWARD: Certificate of Merit with Distinction

POSTHUMOUS: ☐ Yes ☒ No

NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: Ruth McCord

RELATIONSHIP: Wife

ADDRESS (number, street, city, zone, state): 5701 Floyd Avenue, Springfield, Va.

IF PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS WERE SUBMITTED FOR THIS ACT OR SERVICE, INDICATE TYPE OF AWARD RECOMMENDED, BY WHOM, DATE, ORIGINATING OFFICE, AND ACTION TAKEN.

None

SECTION II — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION

WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT? ☐ Yes ☐ No

IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OR CERTIFICATES OF EYEWITNESSES OR INDIVIDUAL HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

FULL NAME	POSITION TITLE	GRADE	OFFICE ASSIGNED TO

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

FULL NAME	TYPE OF AWARD

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

LOCATION	INCLUSIVE DATES	TIME OF DAY

PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED.

SECTION III — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE

OFFICE, COMPONENT, OR STAFF [illegible] (designation and location)

Germany and Washington, D.C.

INCLUSIVE DATES [illegible]

1 July - 15 August [illegible]

ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED: ☒ Yes ☐ No

NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT: ☒ Yes ☐ No

SECTION IV	TO BE USED FOR ALL RECOMMENDATIONS

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ☐ DEED (OR ACT) ☒ ACHIEVEMENT OF PERSONNEL (OR SERVICE RENDERED)

AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION: WAS ACT VOLUNTARY? DESCRIBE WHY ACT WAS OUTSTANDING AND IF IT WAS MORE THAN NORMALLY EXPECTED. EXPLAIN HOW. IF IN AERIAL FLIGHT, DESCRIBE TYPE AND POSITION OF AIRPLANE, CREW POSITION OF INDIVIDUAL, AND ALL UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES. INDICATE RESULTS OF ACT.

AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE: TITLE AND DUTIES OF ASSIGNMENT, INCLUDING CHARACTER OF SERVICE DURING PERIOD FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED (GIVE COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF TECHNICAL OR SPECIALIZED POSITIONS, INCLUDING DATES OF ASSIGNMENT AND RELIEF). WHAT DID THE INDIVIDUAL DO THAT MERITS THE AWARD? WHY WAS THIS OUTSTANDING WHEN COMPARED TO OTHERS OF THAT GRADE AND EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR POSITIONS? INDICATE RESULTS OF ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE.

Reference is made to the attached memorandum dated 1 November 1958, which is the summary excerpted from the report of the operation submitted on that date.

Upon receipt of information, 2 July 1958, that a member of the ~~Soviet~~ Foreign Office in Moscow had mentioned to one of the American Embassy staff members that the Soviets had knowledge of the crew of the missing C-118, Mr. McCord was appointed head of a team of men from Headquarters to proceed immediately to Germany to plan for and debrief the crew of the C-118 in case they were released.

At Wiesbaden, acting upon policy guidance received from Headquarters, Mr. McCord made detailed plans for the interrogation of crew members; prepared news releases and made plans for the handling of the press; arranged for reunion of the crew members with their families; and arranged medical examinations, all with the view toward avoiding publicity or incidents which might reveal Central Intelligence Agency interest in the highly sensitive nature of the plane's flight.

When the crew arrived at Wiesbaden, Mr. McCord directed the over-all interrogations and participated in portions of the interrogation of the crew members himself. He prepared cables and dispatches for Headquarters as well as the over-all report of the debriefing of the crew. He briefed the crew members regarding their conduct before the press. He also assisted in the plans for the return of the crew members to Washington, all of which entailed around-the-clock work.

Upon return to Washington, Mr. McCord directed the detailed debriefing of the crew, covering all aspects of possible compromise of security of CIA personnel, operations, and cover unit activities, as well as various positive intelligence and counter-intelligence matters. Final reports were prepared and Mr. McCord participated in briefings of the DCI, DDCI, and various Air Force and Defense Department officials.

The ingenuity, foresight, planning and guidance exercised by Mr. McCord from the time the team first left for Europe, through the initial debriefing, and then in following through in the debriefings back at Headquarters, resulted in rapid and thorough interview of the crew members, assessment of the compromise to the Agency, and determination of appropriate action needed by the Agency to counter such compromise. His performance in that instance was of the highest degree and did much credit to this Agency in the highly professional manner in which it was performed.

RELATED POSITION OF PERSON INITIATING RECOMMENDATION TO PERSON BEING RECOMMENDED Head of Office	NAME, POSITION TITLE, AND GRADE OF PERSON MAKING RECOMMENDATION Sheffield Edwards Director of Security GS-18
LIST OF ENCLOSURES (Include proposed citation) Summary memorandum excerpt from report dated 1 November 1958	SIGNATURE
	DATE 15 December 1958

1 November 1958

SUBJECT: American C-118 Aircraft Downed in Soviet
Azerbaijan 27 June 1958 by Soviet MIG-17's

On 27 June 1958, a C-118 cargo plane, assigned to the U. S. Air Force in Wiesbaden, was fired on and forced down near Gendarkh, Soviet Azerbaijan. The plane was carrying nine U. S. airmen, three of whom are assigned to this Agency. They are Colonel Dale D. Brannon, Major Robert E. Crans and Major Bennie A. Shupe. The other six men were regular Air Force members assigned to Wiesbaden, Germany. The nine men were en route from Wiesbaden to Teheran and Pakistan on a flight carrying cargo for CIA. Col. Brannon and Major Crans were planning to get off the plane in Teheran had the plane remained on course.

The plane, while en route to Teheran from Nicosia and as a result of bad weather and navigation error, went off its plotted course and crossed into Soviet Armenia. There it was intercepted and fired on by three MIG-17's and caught fire in the left wing. Five of the crew bailed out and the other four rode the aircraft down to a safe landing on a small airstrip at Gendarkh in Soviet Azerbaijan. The crew members who had remained on the plane to its landing got out safely and the plane was burning fiercely when the crew last saw it. The part of the crew that parachuted was surrounded by Soviet peasants, some of whom beat and struck at the crew members. One of the men, Major Bennie Shupe, CIA employee, was taken by the mob to a telephone pole and narrowly escaped hanging before being rescued by the Soviet military.

Major Shupe and the remainder of the crew were turned over to the Soviet military, and after an overnight stay in a Soviet military garrison near Stepanakert were taken to a city believed to be Yevlakh, and then flown to Baku, Russia. There they underwent interrogation by Soviet intelligence officers, at least one of whom had served in the United States, as a Soviet Purchasing Commission employee 1943-45, and later in Canada in 1949-55 as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy. This RIS officer, Vladimir Bourdine, later served in 1955 as a personal interpreter for Khrushchev in a meeting with Prime Minister Nehru of India. Bourdine interrogated Colonel Brannon of CIA at considerable length during the period 30 June - 3 July 1958, while the crew was imprisoned in the MVD Headquarters building in Baku. Following their individual interrogations, the crew members were required to appear separately before a Commission of Soviet officials at the Baku MVD Headquarters who questioned them about the border violation by the C-118 aircraft, and requested them to sign statements attesting that they had been well-treated and received adequate medical care by the

Soviets. The inquiry by the Commission was perfunctory and did not involve an interrogation in the intelligence sense. The crew was then transported to Astara on the Soviet-Iranian border on 7 July 1958 and turned over to the American Air Attache.

On 2 July 1958 this Agency received information indicating that the Soviets might be considering releasing the nine fliers. Since no date or place of release was indicated, cables were sent to the various peripheral CIA stations around the Soviet border indicating the possibility of impending release. The Air Force agreed to alert its Air Attaches in the same areas of the possibility of impending release. At the same time a team of Agency personnel, including a medical officer, an Air Maritime officer, and two representatives of the Security Office were dispatched to Wiesbaden from Headquarters in anticipation of the release of the fliers. Three hours after the team arrived in Germany, the place of release was learned from the Soviets to be Astara on the Soviet-Iranian border, and a USAFE plane was dispatched that night from Wiesbaden with the Air Maritime team member aboard destined for Teheran to await the turnover of the American fliers at Astara. The fliers were turned over on 7 July 1958, were immediately flown to Wiesbaden, Germany where an initial joint CIA-AF debriefing of them was begun, and where initial press interviews were held, following careful briefing of the crew as to the text and limitations to be observed. Two days later, two members of the crew, one of whom was Major Shupe, a CIA employee, were permitted to give an interview to the Paris representative of Time-Life. Members of the CIA team were present during these press interviews, under appropriate cover arrangements, to furnish guidance to the CIA personnel.

Following the initial debriefing, the entire crew was flown to Washington, D. C. on 18 July 1958, for a more extended debriefing. These debriefings were completed on 6 August 1958 and covered the various aspects of possible compromise of the security of CIA personnel, operational and cover units activities, as well as various positive intelligence and counter-intelligence matters.

The three CIA men aboard the plane were extremely knowledgeable of highly sensitive Agency operational activities and of the identities of numerous CIA personnel. Colonel Brannon, as Commander of the CIA Air Support Operations in Europe, was knowledgeable of CIA operational activities on a world-wide basis, with many of these projects being extremely sensitive. Colonel Brannon and Major Robert Crans each carried briefcases containing classified material, and Brannon carried an address book containing several names, addresses and telephone numbers of CIA personnel and cover units. The two briefcases are believed to have been destroyed by the fire in the aircraft after landing. The address book of Brannon was taken from him by the Soviet peasants on landing and was later turned back to him by the Soviet Commission members at Baku. Neither he nor other members of the crew were questioned about either of the briefcases, their contents, nor about the address book and its contents. We assume that the Soviets have or will process the names in the address book through their Moscow files. Some of the other crew members carried personal notations in their wallets relating to a few other CIA personnel.

We have received no indications that Colonel Brannon or the other crewmen were drugged or otherwise tampered with by the Soviets. Brannon and some of the others did receive shots the first night and second day from the Soviet military for their wounds and burns; however, these shots are believed to have been for legitimate medical reasons.

The substance of the questioning, treatment and techniques of interrogation has been exhaustively explored with all the crew members in the course of the debriefings. In summation, the interrogations of the crew members were superficial and do not appear to have been backed up by close coordination and communication with Moscow for intelligence research purposes. It is possible that the quick acknowledgment by the Soviet Foreign Office of the landing of the C-118 in Soviet territory precluded the MVD from fully exploiting the crew members. Colonel Brannon and Captain Kane were separated from the group and given preferred treatment, apparently with the intention of developing them for information purposes. We are convinced that both men handled themselves extremely well and did not disclose any information concerning the Agency or its activities.

To date we have no indication that the Soviets knew at the time they interrogated the crew men, that the flight of the C-118 was connected with CIA in any way, nor that they knew three of the men aboard were CIA personnel. We do believe that in time the Soviets, through Brannon's address book, which lists the open Agency telephone number EX 3-6115 below his name on the first page, will connect him and possibly others in the address book with CIA. Since the Soviets questioned him about the 7170th Support Group and the 7405th Support Squadron in Wiesbaden, it is therefore presumed that they will associate those units with this Agency.

In addition to this report, debriefings of the crewmen were taped and typed, which will total some 7,000 - 9,000 pages when completed, are being distributed to the CI Staff and other interested components of this Agency as they are completed. Questions were solicited by this Office of all interested components, in order to cover all matters in the debriefings of interest to the Agency. Careful arrangements have been made with the Air Force in order that Agency interests will be adequately protected and proper security will be maintained in the handling of information and reports derived from the debriefings, and so that no compromise of the Agency interest in the flight of the C-118 will be made to the press.

CONCLUSIONS:

A. It is our opinion that the possible compromises arising out of this incident are relatively minor in nature and that no major compromises occurred.

B. That the Soviets "missed" on the true nature of the flight and personnel of the C-118.

C. That the reasons the crew members were given an early release were as follows:

1. Primarily, the Soviet interrogators failed to use all of the leads at their command, particularly Brannon's address book, and failed to break the crewmen through interrogation.

2. The crew did not inadvertently disclose through interrogations, the purpose of their flight, its relation to the Agency and that of three of its crew to CIA.

3. The Soviets apparently failed to check out the names and other data in Brannon's address book through their files prior to release of the crew.

4. No incriminating information or material was immediately recovered from the burned aircraft.

5. Several of the crew destroyed incriminating building passes and notations in their wallets while on their way down in their parachutes, or immediately after landing in their chutes.

6. There were either no leaks or insufficient leaks of incriminating information through any room conversations at Baku among the crew, which may have been monitored by the Soviets, or such conversations as there may have been were not properly interpreted, or interpreted soon enough to tip the Soviets that there was something unusual about the flight or the crew.

7. The crew members were all in uniform and not in mixed civilian and Air Force clothing, which properly established their cover.

8. Sufficient pressures were exercised by Agency, State, Air Force, and Executive action upon the Soviets to effect the release of the crew as soon as possible.

9. A factor that probably had an important bearing was the early acknowledgment by the Soviet Foreign Office of the downing of the aircraft and the attempts by the Soviets in the early stages to make this appear as a deliberate violation of the Soviet air frontier. This tended to take the "play" away from the MVD and military intelligence. In addition, this Government was stepping up the pressure for the release of the nine Army personnel who landed in East Germany in a helicopter, and the Soviets probably had no desire to create a duplicate of this incident.

10. Safeguards taken by the Agency and the Air Force were such that there was no leak to the press, during the crew's internment, of the fact that there was an intelligence connection of the flight and crew of the C-118.

D. That it is not believed, based on the evidence at hand, that the crew was drugged or otherwise tampered with medically.

E. That there are valuable points of guidance from a cover, operations, policy and code of conduct standpoint which can be gathered from experiences of these crewmen in the hands of the Soviets and can aid the Agency and its personnel in any future situation of a similar nature in which the Soviet military and RIS interrogators are encountered.

ACTION TAKEN TO SAFEGUARD AGENCY INTEREST IN THIS MATTER:

A. All possible steps were taken during the period immediately preceding and immediately after the release of the crew to effect the minimum of publicity and to safeguard and limit such publicity as was given out, in order to avoid disclosing the CIA connection of the flight and some of its crew.

B. Throughout the entire debriefing process in Germany and in the U. S., the maximum care has been taken to safeguard the information taken by transcript and classify it so that there would be access to the information therein on a need-to-know basis and by only properly cleared persons.

C. Steps were taken immediately by the German Station after the downing of the C-118 to change the combinations of the safes and locks in the buildings to which the crew had access.

D. The three men from this Agency who were aboard the flight, Brannon, Crane and Shupe, and the aircraft commander, Lyles, are being removed from the German area, being returned to the U. S. The three CIA crewmen are being returned to duty with the Air Force from the Agency.

E. Steps are continuing to be taken to properly safeguard Agency interests and personnel in regard to names of Agency personnel who appeared in Brannon's address book or in other notations appearing in any papers carried by other members of the crew.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. Continue to take all possible steps to prevent any disclosure to any unauthorized persons, particularly the press, about the CIA personnel aboard the C-118, or the true nature of the flight.

B. Continue to take all possible steps to change the cover designation of the units appearing in Brannon's address book to prevent any further compromise of these units.

C. Permit no further publicity about the flight itself, in order to minimize the possibility of the press learning of the CIA interest in the flight of the C-118.

D. Carefully follow all matters relating to the International Court of Justice interest in this flight, in order to prevent any compromise of Agency interests.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
15 8124

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24) McCord James W Jr		2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH Jan	DAY 26	YEAR 24
3. LANGUAGE (31-33) Russian 654	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH Nov	DAY 18	YEAR 58	5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. ✓ I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. ✓ I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. ✓ MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-63)

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. **Speaking (43)**

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. **Understanding (44)**

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 17 Nov 58	SIGNATURE James W McCord Jr
[illegible] C	CAT. E

HEADQUARTERS
USAF, HQRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR STAFF
(FIELD EXTENSION)
Washington 25, D.C.

CERTIFICATE

I concur in the Reserve assignment of **James W. McCord, Jr.** (Name) **Captain** (Grade) **AO 2 099 263** (SN) with this organization. In the event of partial or full mobilization, he will be made available for active military service.

I certify that no delay in his entry on active duty will be requested by this employing agency if he is ordered to active military service during a period of mobilization.

Date: **12 Jan 1956**

LOUIS G. [illegible]
Captain, Infantry
Mobilization Training Officer

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 DEC 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: James W. McCord, Jr.

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 22 August 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:
James W. McCord Jr.
Date: 10 January 1956

FORM NO. [illegible] 1 APR 55

(4)

SECRET

CAREER SERVICE QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION I (To be completed by employee)

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) McCORD, James W.	AGE 30	GRADE GS-13	NO. OF MOS. IN GRADE 2	CAREER DESIGNATION Security
STAFF OR DIVISION Office of Director of Security	BRANCH	POSITION TITLE Special Assistant to Director of Security		
NO. OF MOS. IN PRESENT POSITION 10	NO. OF MOS. IN OSS -	NO. OF MOS. IN CIG -	NO. OF MOS. IN CIA 36	

DATA ON ALL PERMANENT DUTY OVERSEAS OR IN U.S. FIELD (Include any TDY during last two years)

APPROXIMATE DATES OF SERVICE		LOCATION				
FROM	TO	COUNTRY	STATION	TDY	PCS	COMMENTS
August 1951	June 1953	U.S.	San Francisco Field Office		x	

INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SERVE TOUR OF DUTY OVERSEAS PCS

A ☒ YES B ☐ ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS C ☐ NO

INDICATE ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE IF PRECEDING ANSWER IS "A" OR "B"

PREFERENCE	COUNTRY	STATION	TYPE OF POSITION
1ST	JApan	Tokyo	Security
2ND	Germany	Frankfurt	Security
3RD	South America	Rio de Janeiro	Security

IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "B," STATE CONDITIONS. IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "C," EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS

INDICATE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OVERSEAS IN WHICH YOU WILL NOT SERVE AND EXPLAIN REASONS

None

INDICATE RELATIONSHIP AND AGE OF EACH DEPENDENT TO BE MOVED OVERSEAS

Wife - 26 Daughter - 9 yrs.
Son - 2

INDICATE KNOWN MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH THE AGENCY HAS IMPOSED ON YOUR SERVICE

None

FORM NO. 59-174
JUN 54

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS ON REVERSE SIDE.

(4)

SECRET

INDICATE ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING DEPENDENTS (old age, chronic illness, need for special educational facilities, etc.) OR ANY UNUSUAL PERSONAL SITUATION WHICH WOULD AFFECT YOUR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

None

DESCRIBE TYPES OF HEADQUARTERS AND U.S. FIELD POSITIONS FOR WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE CONSIDERED AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO SERVE

Security assignments in same or similar position as my present assignment.

REMARKS

DATE
30 August 1954

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTION II *(To be completed by employee's supervisor)*

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (months) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE
9 mos

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (months) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER HEADQUARTERS OR U.S. FIELD ASSIGNMENT
3 mos

COMMENTS ON AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYEE'S PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Do not contemplate considering for rotation for one year.

DATE
10 Sept 54

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

PERSONNEL OFFICER WILL FORWARD ORIGINAL TO OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND FIRST COPY TO APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE BOARD

SECRET

MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS

JAMES W. McCORD, JR.

27 August 1951

14 September 1951

FOR THE

3 October 1

CERTIFICATION:

This is to certify that I personally witnessed James Walter McCord, Jr., subscribe his signature to these papers on this date.

24 August 1951

Ervin W. Schmidt

Ervin W. Schmidt

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE 195

DIVISION

BRANCH

SECTION

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
		DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
Present Agency	San Francisco	22	Aug	1951	Present					
Federal Bureau of Investigation	San Francisco - San Diego, Washington D. C.	25	Oct	1948	10	Feb	1951	25	3	2
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Washington D. C. - New York City	9	Mar	1942	8 22	4 Nov	42 1943	14		1

SAC - 12/27/51

Total Civilian Service 1744

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
U. S. Army Air Corps	23	Nov	1943	30	Oct	1945			

Total Military Service 1

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

21 December 1951
DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

as of 12/31/51

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
21	3	6

SECRET

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

158104

1. Serial No. (no entry) [redacted]	2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) McCord James W., Jr.		3. Office IASO
4. Date of Birth [illegible] January 19[illegible]	5. Sex: x male (1) ___ female (2)	Marital Status ___ Nr. Dependents 2	6. Employment Date: 22 August 1951
7. Citizenship: x U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) x Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other(specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ________		

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
4. Two years college, or less
5. Over two years, no degree
6. Bachelor degree
7. [✓ Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)]
8. Masters degree
9. Doctors degree

[illegible] 29 NOV 1952

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd From	Dates att'd To	Yrs Compl Day	Yrs Compl Night	Degree Recd Title	Degree Recd Date	Sem Hrs
University of Texas Austin, Texas	Accounting		[illegible]	1[illegible]/[illegible]	4		[illegible]	1/49	120
Kilgore College Kilgore, Texas	[illegible]ing		[illegible]	[illegible]	1 sem.		none		16
Lincoln Univ. Oakland, Calif	Law		/[illegible]	[illegible]/1		1 sem.	none		8

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

CODED

School	Attendance Dates From	To	Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization

QUALIFIED [illegible]
DATE 20 [illegible]

4. Military, Intelligence or Investigative training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates From	To	Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization
[illegible] School, [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Operation of [illegible] and [illegible]
Intelligence School Lowry Air Force [illegible]	[illegible]/	[illegible]/[illegible]	[illegible] weeks	Air Force Intelligence Officers [illegible] Course
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Special Agent (Investigator) Radio Operator [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. State the nature of duties performed with this organization, starting with your present position. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mos. [illegible] Grade [illegible] Salary [illegible] Office I-30 Position Title: [illegible] Duty Title: [illegible]	Description of Duties: [illegible] [illegible] Duty Station, if overseas:
From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____ Grade ____ Salary ____ Office ____ Position Title: ____ Duty Title: ____	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____ Grade ____ Salary ____ Office ____ Position Title: ____ Duty Title: ____	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____ Grade ____ Salary ____ Office ____ Position Title: ____ Duty Title: ____	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____ Grade ____ Salary ____ Office ____ Position Title: ____ Duty Title: ____	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:

SECRET

SECRET

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Previous Employment: Describe your previous work experience in sufficient detail to permit full recognition of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.

From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) [illegible]	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas: [illegible]
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) [illegible]	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) [illegible]	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's 11 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) [illegible]	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:

SECRET

SECRET

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 ___ Civil Police
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 ___ FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 ___ Office of Strategic Services
24 ___ Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 ___ Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 ___ Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
LANGUAGE	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study
NONE										

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ____________

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ________

SECRET

SECRET

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
none				

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specialized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1.	2.		1. Yes [✓ 2. No]
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No

Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc.	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.
	[illegible]

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership.

SECRET

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

none

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented	
none	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No

SEC. X. TESTS (Within present organization)

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken.

Type of Test	Date Taken
none	

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

none

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour [illegible] (2) 4 year Tour yes (3) Not interested ___.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assigment do you think you are best qualified?

[illegible]

SECRET

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status
Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ___ Yes ___ No.
If yes, indicate your present draft classification x
V-A

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status
Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___ Yes ___ No.
If yes, complete the following. x
1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. x Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service [illegible] Grade 1st Lt. Serial Number AO-[illegible]63

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated Hq [illegible] USAF ([illegible])

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any

Location of Service Records, if known Not known, possibly [illegible] Calif.

SEC. XV. TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken in this organization.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours
I.S. [illegible] Course	[illegible]	[illegible]

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

DATE 10 November 1952

SIGNATURE

SECRET

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in triplicate when ordered overseas and whenever designated place of residence or marital or dependency status changes. IMPORTANT in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or member of family.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE: McCord, James Walter Jr.

RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED TO SERVICE: 820 Pacific Ave. Alameda Calif.

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (IF APPOINTED ABROAD): —

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED PERMANENT OR LEGAL RESIDENCE: Austin, Texas

MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE
☒ MARRIED
PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Lamesa, Texas
DATE OF MARRIAGE: May 30, 1948

☐ DIVORCED
PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE:

☐ WIDOWED
PLACE SPOUSE DIED:
DATE SPOUSE DIED:

MEMBERS OF FAMILY (DEPENDENTS ONLY)

IDENTIFICATION OF MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH
Sarah Ruth McCord	Wife	April 12, 19[illegible]

August 22, 1951
DATE

James Walter McCord
SIGNATURE

FORM NO. 37-79
MAY 1950

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Date 22 August 1951

Dear Mr. McCord:

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective.

Position: GS-11

Base Salary: $5400 per annum

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave in accordance with Civil Service Commission rules and regulations, or such other provisions of law or regulations as may be established in lieu thereof.

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with CIA Regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside continental United States, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by CIA Regulations.

3. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of six months from date of employment. In the event either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

4. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of CIA. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by Civil Service rules and regulations.

Official authorized to sign letters of appointment

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by CIA.

James Walter McCord Jr.
Employee

22 August 1951
Date

Form No. 51-105
June 1948

STANDARD FORM 61 [illegible]
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Central Intelligence Agency
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, James Walter McCord, Jr., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

22 August 1951
(Date of entrance on duty)

James Walter McCord Jr
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this .... day of ...., A. D. 19......,

at .... (City) .... (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city, and State)
820 Pacific Ave, Alameda, California

2. (a) DATE OF BIRTH: Jan 26, 192[illegible]
(b) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country): Waurika, Oklahoma

3. (a) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: Sarah Ruth M[illegible]
(b) RELATIONSHIP: Wife
(c) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 820 Pacific Ave, Alameda, California
(d) TELEPHONE NO.: Lakehurst 3-46[illegible]

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		✓
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		✓
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		✓
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		✓

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that the appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for listing of office, position, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose application was examined. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application or other pertinent papers. [illegible]

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the [illegible] Civil Service Rules and [illegible] appropriation acts. [illegible] In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under [illegible] Civil Service Commission [illegible].

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in duplicate when ordered overseas or whenever designated place of residence, marital or dependency status changes. This information is important in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or member of family.

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) McCord (First) James (Middle) Walter Jr

2. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: Alameda California

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (if appointed abroad): 5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Virginia

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED PERMANENT OR LEGAL RESIDENCE: 5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Virginia

3. MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE
☑ MARRIED
☐ DIVORCED
☐ WIDOWED

PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Lamesa Texas

DATE OF MARRIAGE: [illegible]

PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:

DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE:

PLACE SPOUSE DIED:

DATE SPOUSE DIED:

4. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE: Sarah Ruth McCord

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): 5701 Floyd Ave Springfield Va

TELEPHONE: FLeetwood

NAMES OF CHILDREN:
Michael Steven McCord
Carolyn Anne McCord
Nancy Ellen McCord

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): "

~~[illegible]~~	AGE
M	4½
F	2½
F	[illegible]

NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian): James W. McCord Sr

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): [illegible] Dallas Tx

TELEPHONE:

NAME OF MOTHER (or female guardian): Marjorie Lee McCord

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): Same

TELEPHONE: –

5. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME: Sarah Ruth McCord

RELATIONSHIP: wife

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): 5701 Floyd Ave Springfield Va

TELEPHONE: FLeetwood 4-7[illegible]

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 4 ABOVE WILL ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, DUE TO HEALTH OR OTHER PERTINENT REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE UNDER "REMARKS."

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

THE FOLLOWING AGENCY ENDORSED LIFE AND HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE POLICIES ARE IN FORCE IN MY NAME: THE "POLICY NO." SHOULD BE ENTERED IF POSSIBLE, SINCE THIS INFORMATION WILL ASSIST IN EXPEDITING ACTION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD A CLAIM BECOME PAYABLE.

6. FULL NAME OF COMPANY	ADDRESS OF HOME OFFICE	POLICY NO.
~~[illegible]~~ Mutual Benefit Hospitalization FEGLI	Omaha Nebraska	

7. I HAVE COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING: WILL ☐ YES ☐ NO POWER OF ATTORNEY ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. REMARKS:
All bank a/c known to family

SIGNED AT:

DATE:

SIGNATURE: James W. McCord Jr

FORM NO. 61 REPLACES FORM 37-78
1 JUL 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
2 May 1968

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) MCCORD, JAMES W., JR.	3. POSITION TITLE	4. GRADE
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH SFC		6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL EXECUTIVE

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

ROOM NO. & BUILDING

EXT.

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR TDY STANDBY
UNTIL [illegible]

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DONALD FARLEY

DATE
6 12 68

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(24)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 6 May 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): McCord, James W., Jr.

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE: GS-15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: SEC

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: [redacted] [illegible]

Room # 4E 63

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL - Executive

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	
STATION	
TDY OR PCS	
TYPE OF COVER	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

ROOM NO. & BUILDING:

EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR TDY ST[illegible]
UNTIL May 67
PETER BROWN

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

[redacted]

10 OCT

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: PETER BROWN

FORM 10-64 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 10 July 1964

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): MCCORD, JAMES H

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE:

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: SECURITY

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

XXXXXXX ☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS
XXX

ETA:

STATION: FRANKFURT

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

ROOM NO. & BUILDING:

EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DUTIES

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

JOE W. CLINE

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-55 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MC CORD, James W.		2. DATE OF REQUEST 11 Feb. '59
3. POSITION TITLE	4. OFFICE, DIVISION AND BRANCH Security	5. GRADE GS-13
6. REQUESTING OFFICER	7. BUILDING AND ROOM NO.	8. EXTENSION 5161

TYPE OF EVALUATION AND REPORT

9. TYPE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ OVERSEAS

EID

STATION

TDY-PCS

☐ OVERSEAS RETURN

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

10. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION DESIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH R 10-200

☐ YES ☐ NO

9A. REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES

☐ DISQUALIFIED

10A. REPORT OF OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED

☐ DISQUALIFIED

11. COMMENTS

DATE OF EVALUATION

16 FEB 1959

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF, MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 259 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. NAME (LAST) MCCORD (FIRST) JAMES (MIDDLE) W., JR.
2. DATE OF REQUEST 15 January 1962
3. POSITION TITLE Security Officer
4. OFFICE, DIVISION AND BRANCH Security
5. GRADE GS-15
6. REQUESTING OFFICER
7. BUILDING AND ROOM NO. 4E63 Langley
8. EXTENSION 5643

TYPE OF EVALUATION AND REPORT

9. TYPE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ OVERSEAS
ETD
STATION
TDY-PCS
☐ OVERSEAS RETURN
☒ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

10. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION DESIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH R 15-200

☐ YES ☐ NO

9A. REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED
☐ DISQUALIFIED

10A. REPORT OF OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED
☐ DISQUALIFIED

11. COMMENTS Re evaluation for TDY Stand by

CHECKED FOR [illegible] To 3 Jan 1963

DATE OF EVALUATION 3 JAN [illegible]

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF, MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 3-58 259 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. NAME (Last) McCORD	(First) JAMES	(Middle) W.	2. DATE OF REQUEST 18 December 1961
3. POSITION TITLE Security Officer	4. OFFICE, DIVISION AND BRANCH Security		5. GRADE GS-15
6. REQUESTING OFFICER [illegible]	7. BUILDING AND ROOM NO. 4E63 Langley		8. EXTENSION 5643

TYPE OF EVALUATION AND REPORT

9. TYPE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ OVERSEAS

ETD May 1962
STATION Frankfurt, Germany
TDY-PCS PCS
DAC Cover

☐ OVERSEAS RETURN

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

10. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION DESIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH R 10-200

☒ YES ☐ NO

9A. REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED

☐ DISQUALIFIED

10A. REPORT OF OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED

☐ DISQUALIFIED

11. COMMENTS

[illegible]

DATE OF EVALUATION

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF, MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 2-60 259 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (36)

-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 15 August 1960

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): MCCORD, James W.

3. POSITION TITLE: Investigator

4. GRADE: GS-15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: Security

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 2063

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ OVERSEAS RETURN

☒ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Robert J. Hayes

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3309 [illegible] Bld.

EXT.: 2064

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED TDY STAND BY
till 6 Sept 60

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) McCord (First) James (Middle) W., Jr.

2. DATE 19 June 1956

3. TO POSITION Investigator (CI)

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH Security

5. GRADE GS-13

6. TYPE OF POSITION

☒ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR

☐ EOD
☒ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

Tdy - Holland

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Subject is qualified for Departmental Duties and T.N, 1 months. (6/26/56)
May be re-evaluated upon request.

MEDICAL OFFICER

SECRET

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) McCORD, (First) JAMES (Middle) WALTER JR.

2. DATE 8 September 1954

3. TO POSITION S.O.

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH Security

5. GRADE GS-13

6. TYPE OF POSITION
- ☐ Departmental
- ☐ U.S. Field
- ☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
- ☐ EOD
- ☐ Overseas
- ☐ Returnee
- ☐ Pre-Employment
- ☒ Annual
- ☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

- ☒ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
- ☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
- ☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
- ☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Full duty/General (9-28-54)

[illegible] State 6 Oct [illegible]

File

SECRET

Mackin

MEDICAL OFFICE

LLC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.
Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.
If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.
Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — **BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA**

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
058124	MC CORD, James Walter, Jr.	26 January 1924

SECTION II — **EDUCATION**

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — **MARITAL STATUS**

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (COUNTRY(IES))	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — **DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE**

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 8-68 444 — SECRET — E-2 IMPDET — (14-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1							
2							

MAY 1 11 00 AM '69

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATING
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO
1. Council on Exceptional Children (CEC)	1201 16th Street, NW Washington, D.C.	1968	1969
2. National Association on Retarded Children (NARC)	450 Lexington Avenue New York City	1968	1969
3			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 17 April 1969

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the [illegible] Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO. 058124	NAME (Last-First-Middle) McCORD, James W., Jr.	DATE OF BIRTH 26 Jan 1924

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
No Change			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT: MAJOR	SUBJECT: MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED (FROM-TO)	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM. QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2. No Change						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)
No Change

3. DATE OF BIRTH — 4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION — 6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP — 8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) — 9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.				
2. No Change				
3.				

FORM 4440

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF [illegible]	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY: (CHECK (X)) RESI-DENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGN-MENT
1. No Change							
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

No Change

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

No Change

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED		
Add: Air Special Warfare Course	Counterinsurgency	Mar. 68		RESIDENT
			X	AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1. No Change			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE
22 April 1968

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 058124	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) MCCORD JAMES W JR	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 01/26/24	5. SCHEDULE, GRADE, STEP GS-15-06
6. SD SS	7. POSITION TITLE ELECT ENG AUDIO SUPP	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT SEC	9. LOCATION (City, Country) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	56/07/01	56/08/01
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 31	59/10/05	59/10/17
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	60/08/15	60/08/22
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	61/03/12	61/03/22
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	61/08/12	61/08/29
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	61/10/06	61/10/16
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 54	62/04/01	62/04/14
GERMANY	PCS 26	62/06/09	64/06/12
		Y M D	Y M D

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 7 Jul 67
INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		
M.S.	International Affairs	George Washington University	1965
BBA	Business Administration	University of Texas	1948

SECRET

07 SEP ENTD

SECTION III

EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From - To)	GRADUATE
Electra High School	Electra, Texas	1938-40	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	FIELD OF STUDY		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM./QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - TO			
1 George Washington University and American Univ., Washington, DC	PhD work in Internat. Affairs		1966-67	---	---	50
2 George Wash. Univ., Wash., DC	Internat.	Affairs	1964-65	M.S.	1965	30
3 Linc[illegible] Law School, Oakland, Calif.	Law		1951	---	---	1 year
4 University of Texas, Austin, Tex.	Business		1946-48	BBA	1948	120

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE, WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

1965 Masters Thesis: "The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Power in Africa," a 200-page thesis from unclassified sources comparing the efforts of the Sino-Soviets for influence in Africa and the comparative strengths of the local communist parties there.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1				
2				
3				

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1 Air War College, Montgomery, Ala.	National Strategy and International Affairs	1964	1965	10
2				
3				
4				
5				

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK ✓) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Europe (Germany & WE)	TDY & PCS	1957-64	Germany & Western Europe	x	x		x

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (✓) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Golf - fair

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES, SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING

Presentations at P [illegible] schools and
Internally at Agency-sponsored courses

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VII — **MILITARY SERVICE**

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify): Army

2. BRANCH OF CORPS: Air Corps

3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty): FROM 1945 TO 1945

4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify): Regular

5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation from service): Lt.

6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER: FV 30[illegible]363

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION:
☒ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

Active Duty - Navigator - Bombardier duties
Reserve - Intelligence Officer

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG:
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☒ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE: Major

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK: 1962

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION: ---

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☒ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

Intelligence Officer

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

Agency Unit

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED
1	Air War College, Montgomery, Ala.	National Strategy	1965
2			
3			
4			
5			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — **AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY**

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) August 1965 - present	2. LOCATION (Country, City) Washington, D.C.	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH OS/Technical Division
4. TITLE OF JOB Chief, Technical Division		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Supervision of the Office of Security audio countermeasures program domestically and overseas.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) Aug 64-Aug 65	2. LOCATION (Country, City) Montgomery, Alabama	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH OS
4. TITLE OF JOB student-Air War College		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Agency-sponsored - student at Air War College, study of national strategy & international affairs.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) June 62-Aug 64	2. LOCATION (Country, City) Germany, Frankfurt	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH EE/Security Branch
4. TITLE OF JOB Chief, Security Branch, German Station		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Chief of Security Branch activities in behalf of the German Station and supervision of certain security functions, such as polygraph and audio countermeasures, performed elsewhere in Western European area for the Agency.

SECRET

SECTION VIII — AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) June 60-Jun 62	2. LOCATION (Country, City) USA/Washington, D.C.	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH OS/Security Research Staff
4. TITLE OF JOB Deputy Chief		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Deputy Staff Chief, supervision of security research activities in behalf of the Office of Security

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) Aug 53-Jun 60	2. LOCATION (Country, City) USA/Washington, D.C.	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH OS/Security Research Staff
4. TITLE OF JOB Security Research Officer		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-12 to GS-15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Security research in behalf of the Office of Security

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) Jun 53-Aug 53	2. LOCATION (Country, City) USA/Washington, D.C.	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH OS/IOS
4. TITLE OF JOB Investigator		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-12

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Investigative supervision of certain field investigations of IOS.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV **MARITAL STATUS**

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY: Married

2. NAME OF SPOUSE: Last: McCORD First: Sarah Middle: Ruth Maiden: Berry

3. DATE OF BIRTH: 1927

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Lamesa, Texas

5. OCCUPATION: Housewife

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER: ---

7. CITIZENSHIP: USA

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES): ---

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: ---

SECTION X **DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE**

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Michael Steven McCord	Son	1951 Oakland, Calif	US	Springfield, Va.
Carol Anne McCord	Dau.	1953 Washington, DC	US	"
Nancy Ellen McCord	Dau.	1955 Washington, DC	US	"

SECTION XI **PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO
Air Force Association	Washington, D.C.	1951	Pres.

DATE: 13 Apr 67

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James W McCord Jr

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. 158124	CERTIFICATION FOR LANGUAGE AWAR	CD NO. 192

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) McCORD, James Walter		2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year) January 26, 1924
3. CAREER STATUS	4. SD	5. COMPONENT 08

6. LANGUAGE Russian	CODE 654	7. DATE OF TEST (Month, Day, Year) August 29, 1957	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE (Month, Day, Year) 29 Aug 57

9. TEST SCORES	READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
	S	--	S	S	S

10. AWARDABLE LEVEL	COMPREHENSIVE			SPECIALIZED-READING			SPECIALIZED-SPEAKING			NOT QUALIFIED AT ANY LEVEL
	ELEM.	INTER.	HIGH	ELEM.	INTER.	HIGH	ELEM.	INTER.	HIGH	
				[illegible]						

11. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS ELIGIBLE FOR THE AWARD INDICATED, HAVING MET ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SAID AWARD.	12. TYPE OF AWARD					13. I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	OBLIGATION REF. NO. / SIGNATURE
	II	A	V	R	ch E	

DATE	SIGNATURE	AMOUNT OF AWARD $100—	CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.	DATE

14. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION	$	15. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.
16. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION	$	17. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT
18. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD PAID	$	19. CHECK NUMBER ISSUED / DATE

20. FORWARD CHECK TO

FORM 1273
7-57

SECRET

(45)

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? .... (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ James (First) Walter (Middle) McCord Jr. (Last)

Telephone:
Office ....
Ext. ....
Home Lakehurst 3-[illegible]

PRESENT ADDRESS 920 Pacific Avenue, (St. and Number) Alameda, (City) California, (State) USA (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 920 Pacific Avenue, (St. and Number) Alameda, (City) California, (State) USA (Country)

B. NICKNAME Jim WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? none

.... UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ....

HOW LONG? .... IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ....

.... (Where?) .... (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 1/26/24 PLACE OF BIRTH Waurika (City) Oklahoma (State) USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U. S. (Country) BY BIRTH? Yes BY MARRIAGE? ....

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. .... ISSUED .... (Date) BY .... (Court)

AT .... (City) .... (State) .... (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) .... (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? .... TO .... ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? .... (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS ....

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS: ....

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? .... ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ....

LAST U. S. VISA .... (Number) .... (Type) .... (Place of Issue) .... (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 27 SEX Male HEIGHT 5'10½" WEIGHT 170

EYES Brown HAIR Brown COMPLEXION Medium SCARS none

BUILD Medium OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES none

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE .... MARRIED X DIVORCED .... WIDOWED ....

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS none

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Sarah (First) Ruth (Middle) [illegible] (Maiden) [illegible] (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE Lamesa, Texas, USA, May 30, 1948

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE Route C (St. and Number) Lamesa (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 820 Pacific Ave (St. and Number) Alameda (City) Calif (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 4/17/27 PLACE OF BIRTH Lamesa (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Secretary-Steno LAST EMPLOYER University of California

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) Berkeley, (City) California (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM none (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

Secretary-Steno, U. S. Army-Air Force Central Welfare Fund, Pentagon Bldg., Washington, D. C. Nov. '[illegible] - Jan '49

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME None, no dependents other than wife RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....
CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....
CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....
CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME James (First) Walton (Middle) McCord (Last) Sr.
LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Box 236 (St. and Number) Thorndale (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)
DATE OF BIRTH 12/15/04 PLACE OF BIRTH Waldron, (City) Arkansas, (State) USA (Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA
CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)
OCCUPATION School Teacher LAST EMPLOYER Thorndale High School
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS [illegible], (St. and Number) Thorndale, (City) Texas, (State) USA (Country)
MILITARY SERVICE FROM none (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....
COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN
none

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Marjorie (First) Lee (Middle) McCord (Last)
LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Box 236 (St. and Number) Thorndale (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)
DATE OF BIRTH 3/9/07 PLACE OF BIRTH Colony, Texas, U S A
CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER [illegible]

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM none TO .... BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

none

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME Bobby (First) [illegible] (Middle) McCord (Last) AGE 17
PRESENT ADDRESS Box 236 (St. and Number) Thorndale (City) Texas (State) USA (Country) U. S. (Citizenship)

2. FULL NAME [illegible] Gyle McCord (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE 8
PRESENT ADDRESS Box 236 (St. and Number) Thorndale (City) Texas (State) USA (Country) U. S. (Citizenship)

3. FULL NAME [illegible] (First) Mae (Middle) Ross (Last) AGE 25
PRESENT ADDRESS Box 304 (St. and Number) Holliday (City) Texas (State) USA (Country) U. S. (Citizenship)

4. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

5. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Luther (First) (none) (Middle) Posey (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 313 North 17th St., (St. and Number) [illegible] (City) Texas (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 11/27/07 PLACE OF BIRTH Burnett County, Texas

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Farming LAST EMPLOYER Self

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Sarah (First) Amy (Middle) Berry (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 313 North 17th Street, [illegible], Texas, USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 2/[illegible]/95 PLACE OF BIRTH Houston, Texas

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME none RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME none RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR Agent, Central Intelligence Agency

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ Base Starting Salary—[illegible]
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY

FREQUENTLY , CONSTANTLY X

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. X

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES X, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES X

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL North Ward ADDRESS Shamrock, (City) Texas, (State) USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1934-36 GRADUATE? yes

HIGH SCHOOL McLean ADDRESS McLean, Texas, USA (Country)
" " Electra " Electra, Texas, USA

DATES ATTENDED McLean, 1936-39 GRADUATE? Undergraduate
" " Electra, 1939-1940 " Yes

COLLEGE Hillsboro ADDRESS Hillsboro (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Business, Undergrad YEARS COMPLETED 1 semester

DATES ATTENDED Jan. 1946 - May 1946 DEGREE No, undergraduate

COLLEGE University of Texas ADDRESS Austin, (City) Texas, (State) USA (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Business Administration Accounting YEARS COMPLETED 4

DATES ATTENDED 9/46 to 10/48 DEGREE Bachelor of Business Administration

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS Accounting, General Business

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS NA

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

U. S. (Country) Army Air Corps 2nd Lieutenant (Rank) 1[illegible]/23/[illegible]-11/1[illegible]/[illegible] (Dates of Service)

Las Vegas Army Air Field
Las Vegas, Nevada (Last Station) AO-2092263 (Serial Number) Honorable Cert. of Servic (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS:

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 119 ADDRESS Austin, Texas

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON Classified V-A

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS Member USAF Volunteer Air Reserve, Hamilton Air Force Base, Calif.

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM 2/51 TO Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY self

ADDRESS 830 Pacific Ave, (St. and Number) Alameda, (City) California (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Credit Org. NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB Manager SALARY $ 8000 PER Annum

YOUR DUTIES Install credit systems for retail business firms

REASONS FOR LEAVING To re-enter investigative field

FROM 10/48 TO 2/51 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS-10

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Federal Bureau of Investigation

ADDRESS (St. and Number) Washington, (City) D. C. (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Investigative NAME OF SUPERVISOR Harry M. Kimball (last)

TITLE OF JOB Special Agent SALARY $ 5250 PER Annum

YOUR DUTIES To investigate violations of Federal Law.

REASONS FOR LEAVING To enter private business

FROM 1/[illegible] TO 10/48 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY University of Texas

ADDRESS (St. and Number) Austin, (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS University NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB Student SALARY $ NA PER

YOUR DUTIES Full-time student

REASONS FOR LEAVING Accepted position with FBI

FROM 3/47 TO 3/48 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Veterans Housing Office, University of Texas

ADDRESS (St. and Number) Austin, (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Vet. Housing NAME OF SUPERVISOR E. C. McConnell

TITLE OF JOB Assistant Manager SALARY $ 1320 PER annum (part-time)

YOUR DUTIES Assist manager in operation of nine veterans dormitories located on University of Texas campus. Position was part-time while attending the University of Texas

REASONS FOR LEAVING To devote full time to studies just prior to graduation.

FROM 11/43 TO 11/45 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U. S. Army Air Corps

ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB Bombardier SALARY $ 1970 PER annum

YOUR DUTIES Aircraft Observer-Bombardier performing duties of operation of bombing and navigational equipment aboard aircraft of U. S. Army Air Corps.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Conv. of Government

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE none SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Boxing-good prof.; baseball-good prof.; tennis-good prof.; football-fair prof.; golf-fair prof.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Trained as Radio Technician in FBI, capable of operating short-wave radio by voice or c.w., encoding or decoding messages related thereto, and trained in monitoring and identifying clandestine enemy radio stations in World War II.

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

Operate short-wave radio by voice or c.w. Code speed of [illegible] words per minute.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING [illegible] SHORTHAND

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC. No license in above

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ....

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) .... LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ....

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

No

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Dr. Geo Derbyshire	BUS. ADD.	53[illegible]-22nd St.,	Oakland,	Calif.
	RES. ADD.	9[illegible]7 Brookwood Rd.,	Oakland,	Cal.
2. Paul A. Martin	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	320 Pacific Ave.,	Alameda,	Cal.
3. W. C. McDonnell	BUS. ADD.	c/o Veterans Housing Office, Univ.		
	RES. ADD.	of Texas,	Austin,	Texas
4. W. C. Martin	BUS. ADD.	c/o Electra State Bank,	Electra,	
	RES. ADD.			Texas
5. Dr. C. C. Naylor	BUS. ADD.	c/o Drs. Harbour and Naylor,		
	RES. ADD.		Wichita Falls,	Texas

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Mr. Reed Long	BUS. ADD.	Rural Route,	Rio Hondo,	Texas
	RES. ADD.			
2. Thomas Clifton	BUS. ADD.	Box 267	Haskell,	Texas
	RES. ADD.	3[illegible]0		
3. Richard Mills	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	631 Bainbridge,	Alameda,	Cal.
4. Irene England	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	1132 Pearl St.,	Alameda,	Cal.
5. Mrs. G. M. McNeilly	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	2307 Salado St.,	Austin,	Texas

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Mrs. P. Martin	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	320 Pacific Ave,	Alameda,	Cal.
2. Alexander Olijarnyk	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	320A Pacific Ave,	Alameda,	Cal.
3. Mrs. Margaret Fowles	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	31[illegible] Pacific Ave,	Alameda,	Cal.

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS Bank of America, [illegible] Branch, Berkeley, Calif., and Bank of America [illegible], Calif.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.
1. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], Calif. (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME H. C. Capwell Co. ADDRESS 20th and Broadway, Oakland, Cal. (St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME Sears and Roebuck Co ADDRESS 2633 Telegraph Ave, Oakland, Cal (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM 1/50 TO Present 930 Pacific Ave., Alameda, Calif., USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 7/49 TO 1/50 2303 [illegible] St., Berkeley, Calif., USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 1/49 TO 7/49 72-10th St., [illegible], Calif., USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 10/48 TO 1/49 [illegible] N. Capitol St., Washington, D. C. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 6/48 TO 10/48 2502 San Antonio St., Austin, Tex., USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 9/46 TO 6/48 Hill Dorm C, Austin, Texas, USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 11/45 TO 9/46 Unknown, Hallettsville, Texas, USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 11/43 TO 11/45 U. S. Army Air Corps (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM 6/1/49 TO 6/10/49 Tijuana Mexico Vacation trip (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM ... TO ... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM ... TO ... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM ... TO ... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM ... TO ... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. Air Reserve Association, Univ. of Texas Chapter, Austin, Texas, USA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 9/46 to 9/48

2. ... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

3. ... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

4. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

5. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

6. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

7. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? No No

IF "YES," EXPLAIN:

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? Occasionally, in moderation Yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:
No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW: No

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Civil Service Commission

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

Federal Bureau of Investigation, August, 1948

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Sarah Ruth McCord RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS 020 Pacific Avenue (St. and Number) Alameda (City) California (State) USA (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

no

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Alameda, California (City and State) DATE May 16, 1951

Sarah Ruth McCord (Witness) James Walter McCord Jr. (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

Sec. 15 (cont.)

FROM 3/[illegible]/43 TO 11/[illegible]/43 CLASSIFICATION GRADE [illegible]-5

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Federal Bureau of Investigation

ADDRESS Washington D. C., USA

KIND OF BUSINESS Federal Investigative Agency

SUPERVISOR Mr. [illegible] Coffey (Last)

TITLE OF JOB Radio Technician SALARY $2[illegible]0 per annum

YOUR DUTIES Send and receive messages by radio by voice or c. w., encode and decode messages, monitor and identify clandestine enemy radio stations.

REASONS FOR LEAVING On military leave to enter U. S. Army Air Corps.

FROM [illegible]/41 to 3/43 CLASSIFICATION GRADE NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Electra State Bank

ADDRESS Electra Texas

KIND OF BUSINESS State Bank SUPERVISOR W. C. Martin

TITLE OF JOB Bookkeeper SALARY $1200 per annum

YOUR DUTIES Posted bank ledger and statement accounts and assisted in preparation of financial statements.

REASONS FOR LEAVING To accept better paying position with FBI

From 5/40 to [illegible]/41 CLASSIFICATION GRADE NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Tomlinson and Son

ADDRESS Electra Texas

KIND OF BUSINESS Retail Chain Store SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB Clerk SALARY $600 per annum, part-time

REASON FOR LEAVING To accept full-time and better paying position with the Electra State Bank, Electra, Texas.

FROM 9/36 to 5/40 High School Student, see Sec. 13 EDUCATION

Sec. 22 RESIDENCE [illegible] PAST 15 Years (cont.)

From [illegible]/42 to 11/43 [illegible]21 Massachusetts Ave, N. W., Washington, D. C.
From 9/39 to [illegible]/42 20[illegible] East [illegible] St., Electra, Texas
From 9/36 to 9/39 not recalled [illegible]ollerville, Texas

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 21 May 1962

PROT. 2-375

TO : Chief, CS

Director of Security

Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Notification of Cryptographic Clearance - James W. McCord, Jr.

1. Subject employee has been granted a cryptographic clearance under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Clearance is effective 22 May 62.

2. Subject has been informed of the granting of clearance, has been briefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Briefing Statement acknowledging responsibility for the protection of cryptographic information.

3. When Subject employee no longer requires the clearance in order to perform his assigned duties, it is requested that the Communications Security Staff (2411 "I" Bldg., Ext. 3021) be notified by Chief, CS, that the clearance may be revoked.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
1 - Chief, CS
1 - Security Office (Briefing Statement attached)
1 - Personnel Office
1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-59 1597a

(9)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 14 August 1951

Your reference:

Case Number: 52049

TO : Chief, Employees Division
Special Support Staff
FROM : ~~Chief, Security Division~~
Chief, Special Security Division
SUBJECT: McCORD, James Walter, Jr.

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

2. Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is an applicant for a position in I & S.

Robert H. Cunningham
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

B. Kaufer
17 Aug

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM NO. 38-101
MAR 1951

3rd Agency material
enveloped at request
of Office of Security

[illegible]

[illegible] SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF [illegible]

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MILER, NEWTON S.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 Dec 1948 to 30 Sept 1975

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: Office of Personnel

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

MILER, NEWTON SCOTT [illegible] 12773 D

14-00000

SECRET

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILES

SECRET

Handle With Care

5569

SECRET

No. [illegible]-77-40

6 December 1948

TO: Newton S. Miler ✓

SUBJECT: Emergency Transportation Orders.

1. You are authorized to ship personal and household effects from Shanghai, China on or about 7 December 1948 to Newton Hamilton, Pennsylvania.

2. Storage of effects for duration of emergency and not to exceed 90 days thereafter is authorized.

3. This authorization is in accordance with Cable WASH-[illegible] (Out 71009) dated 22 November 1948 which authorizes transportation and storage of effects due to emergency conditions in China.

DONALD H. GALLOWAY
Assistant Director
Special Operations

Consultant File
Combined 12/30/76 Em

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 460225552	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MILER NEWTON S		[illegible] 10/11/75
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONTRACT EXPIRATION (0600000)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 30 75	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CONSULTANT [illegible] (C) [illegible] ANNUITANT	
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 127-0170	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO DIRECTORATE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE STAFF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, U.S		
11. POSITION TITLE IC-COUNTERINTEL	12. POSITION NUMBER NTOP	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION [illegible]	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (INTERMIT) FEE	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.53	16. GRADE AND STEP SP [illegible]	17. SALARY OR RATE DEG: $ 1[illegible].460 E: 040175

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - -  STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 050126  SEX: M       MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP:             FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: NONE                        HOSPITILIZATION: N   PLAN:
FEGLI: INELIGIBLE        PREV. GOVT SERV: 5        SAL. [illegible] LIMIT: 0052
PAY BASIS: D             A/L IND: 0                S/L IND: 0
- - - - - - - - - - -  CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 040175 EXPIRATION DATE: 093075 DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 010575
- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES. - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N     FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: NHN      OPS EXPNS.: N          HOUSING: N           POST EQUAL: N
HOME LEAVE: 0    DIFFERENTIAL: N        OFFSET CLAUSE: N     [illegible]: N
LEGISL PAY: N    PREMIUM PAY: N         ALLOWANCE COMM: N    EDUCATION: N
STEP INCR: N     WTH TAX EXTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS: N     SEPARATION: N
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
PRA CODE:        PRA NTE:               NSCA:            AUTH:
SPF: 0029050

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGES [illegible]
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150b Use Previous Edition
8-72 MFG 7-74

SECRET

[illegible]

9 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Special Payroll Operations Branch
Office of Finance

FROM : Charles W. Sandman
Chief, Contract Personnel Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : Agency Consultants

1. On 24 May 1975, DCI approved the following consultants for termination, effective 30 June 1976:

Barager, Joseph R.
Croke, James J.
Doole, George A., Jr.
Pollack, Herbert

2. The following consultants terminated during FY-76 as indicated:

Angleton, James	30 September 1975
Clark, Kenneth E.	30 June 1975
Clarke, John M.	31 August 1975
Miler, Newton S.	30 September 1975
Rocca, Raymond G.	30 September 1975
Smith, Morgan G.	31 July 1975
Tweedy, Bronson	20 August 1975
Wriggins, W. Howard	30 November 1975

3. It is anticipated that the other consultants will continue their agreements with the Agency. Processing has been initiated for period 1 July 1976 through 30 September 1977.

/s/ Charles W. Sandman

Charles W. Sandman

CONFIDENTIAL

19 SEP 1975

CI 318-75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : Chief, CMG/Contract Personnel Branch

SUBJECT : Contract Termination - Mr. N. Scott Miler

It is requested that the contract for Mr. Newton Scott Miler be terminated close of business 30 September 1975.

George T. Kalaris
George T. Kalaris
Chief
Counterintelligence Staff

CONCUR:

H Lee Olson
CMG/Contract Personnel Branch — 22 SEP 1975
Date

Orig: MDMcCallum:C/CI/SG:09/18/75:R-1183:jrl

Distribution:
orig - Addressee
~~1~~ - OF/C&TD
1 - CMG/CPB
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/SG
1 - Chrono

/s/ Charles W. Sandman

[illegible]

E2 IMPDET CL BY
061790

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible]	PREPARED:04/16/75

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION INITIAL ENTRY	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 01 75	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CONSULTANT INDEPEND (A) REGPL CONTRACT CONSULTANT

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 5127-0170	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO DIRECTORATE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE IC-COUNTERINTEL	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (INTERNAT) FEE	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.53	16. GRADE AND STEP 56 C	17. SALARY OR RATE DCS: $ 131.40 LEI: 04017

18. REMARKS - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

BIRTH DAT : 050125 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: NONE HOSPITILIZATION: N PLAN:
FEGLI: INELIGIBLE PREV. GOVT SERV: 5 SAL. TASK LIMIT: 0052
PAY BASIS: D A/L IND: 5 S/L IND: 5

- - - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

EFF DATE: 040175 EXPIRATION DATE: 093075 DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 010575
REFERRING OFFICER: CI OPS SUPPORT ROOM LOC: DDCP PHONE: 4015

- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -

TAX STAMP: N FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: N TPS EXPNSE: N HOUSING: N POST/EQUAL: N
HOME LEAVE: 0 DIFFERENTIAL: N DEPOSIT OF FUNDS: N QTR GOVT: N
EXCISE PAY: N PATRIOT PAY : N ALLOWANCE COMP: N EDUCATION: N
STEP INCRS: N STF TAX DATE: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION: N

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

Mr. Newton S. Miler

Dear Mr. Miler:

The United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, hereby contracts with you as an intermittent consultant and you, by your signature below, hereby contract with the United States Government, according to the following terms and conditions.

1. Status. Your legal status under this agreement is that of an independent contractor. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as implying the creation of an employee-employer relationship.

2. Service. In consideration of the fee set-out in the next paragraph, you agree to make yourself available to the contracting office and provide consultation as requested in a place and time as mutually agreed.

3. Fee. In full consideration for your service as an intermittent consultant, you will be paid a fee calculated at the daily rate of $138.48. Said fees shall not exceed a total of $5,200 under this contract.

4. Taxes and Withholdings. The Agency will make no deductions or withholdings for income tax or social security from the fees paid you. Rather, an IRS Form 1099 will be issued to you on a calendar year basis or upon the termination of this contract. You acknowledge that it is your responsibility to satisfy both your Federal and self-employment tax liabilities.

5. Expenses. You will be provided funds for travel and such other expenditures as are in consonance with the service you are to provide when authorized by the contracting office, such authorizations not to exceed those provided to employees under Agency regulations. Accountings for such funds will be rendered in conformance with Agency regulations.

6. Secrecy. By virtue of this contract, you will become privy to employees, associates, plans, programs, methods and other information of the Central Intelligence Agency, in particular, and the U.S. Intelligence Community, in general. As a specific condition of this contract, you agree to keep forever secret, all classified information so obtained, to refrain from presenting a paper, writing for publication, making a speech through any media or forum, or other public statement on the subject of intelligence, factual or fictional, on a subject related to programs and functions of the Agency or the Intelligence Community, without the prior written authorization of the Director.

7. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 April 1975 and shall continue thereafter through 30 September 1975 unless sooner terminated by mutual consent of the parties hereto or by seven (7) day's written notice from one party to the other.

Witness the following signatures and seals.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY: 11 April 1975
Date

BY: Newton S Miler 7 April '75
Newton S. Miler
Date

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Consultant Status for - Messrs Angleton, Rocca, Hood and Miler

FROM:
Director of Personnel
5E 58 Hqs.

EXTENSION: 6825

NO.:

DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. General Counsel 7D 07 Hqs. OGC 75-1202	3/31/75	4/1/75	[illegible]/SK	
2.				
3.				
4. DD Pers				Executive Registry 75-1605/1
5. Director of Central Intelligence/7E 12 Hqs.	4/1	4/1	WEC/blp	1 APR 1975 Approved, but I think there should be a plan to phase down the degree of consulting, as we must counter any charge ~~that~~ our changes were flim-flam — we must get to the posture of running our ops on long-term future basis — WEC
6.				
7.				
8. O/Director of Personnel 5E 58 Hqs.		2 Apr	J	
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. OP/Contract Personnel Division/5E 67 Hqs.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

24 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CIOPS/SB

SUBJECT : ANGLETON, James
[illegible]

ROCCA, Raymond G.
016 791

HOOD, William J.
023 478

MILLER, N. Scott
029 633

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of [illegible] March 1975 requesting Consultant clearances on the [illegible] persons who are now Contract Type I employees.

2. This is to advise that Top Secret [illegible] approvals are hereby granted for use of the [illegible] persons as consultants on an intermittent, [illegible] basis as determined by the Acting Chief, CI [illegible] period 1 April to 30 [illegible] 1975. It is [illegible] that these persons will provide [illegible] not available from [illegible] and that [illegible] will work in the [illegible].

3. In order to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] contract Type I employees, their [illegible] is exchanged for a Visitor-[illegible].

FOR THE CHIEF, CLEARANCE DIVISION:

[illegible]

Distribution:
Orig - Adse
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-6)

REQUEST DATE (6-11)

NAME (Last-First-Middle) (12-28)

[illegible]

YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30)

POSITION TITLE

RECRUIT. REQN. NO. (31-33)

LOCATION (City, State, Country)

ASSIGNMENT (Office, Division, Branch)

SUB-CATEGORY CODE (36)

TYPE OF APPLICANT: ☐ REGULAR STAFF ☐ CONTRACT TYPE A ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ MILITARY ☐ SUMMER ONLY ☐ RE-EMPLOY. MIL. IF OTHER, SPECIFY:

OCCUP. CODE (37-42)

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS: ☐ HQS ☐ USF ☐ FF ☐ V ☐ CF

GRADE (43-44)

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PHS ☐ APPENDIX 1 ☐ PHOTO(S) ☐ REPORT OF INTERVIEW ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER

ORGN. CODE (45-48)

VETERANS STATUS: ☐ MALE-VETERAN ☐ MALE-NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE-NON-VETERAN

TYPE OF APPLICANT (49)

INVITEE CLEARANCE REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO

HEADQUARTERS (50)

CLEARANCE REQUIRED: ☐ PROVISIONAL FOR ☐ IAS ☐ OTHER (Specify): FULL

CLEARANCE REQUIRED (51)

NAME OF REQUESTER

Charles V. [illegible], Chief, Contract Personnel Division

RECRUITER'S CODE (52-54)

REMARKS:

Former Staff Employee Retired 31 December 197[illegible]

Former Contract Employee Terminated 30 March 197[illegible]

Approved [illegible] 1 April 197[illegible]

Return Security Clearance to: Nellie La[illegible]

DDP/CPD

5E 67 Hqs.

Contract is to be effective 1 April 197[illegible] - 30 September 197[illegible]

VET. PREF. & SEX (55)

BR. MIL. SERVICE (56)

LAST DIGIT ORGN. CODE (57)

REQN. NO. (72-74)

RECRUIT. SOURCE (78-79)

SPACE BELOW TO BE COMPLETED BY OS ONLY

APPROVAL GRANTED

☐ PROVISIONAL ☐ INVITEE

Not done because CI/OPS had made request and obtained only for JS

THIS IS NOT A CLEARANCE FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, MATERIAL, OR SECURE AREAS. A BUILDING BADGE OR AGENCY CREDENTIAL IS NOT TO BE ISSUED AT THIS TIME.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

DATE

CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION

[illegible] 377a

14-00000

75-1284

CONFIDENTIAL

26 MAR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Consultant Status for -

James Angleton
Raymond G. Rocca
William J. Hood
Newton S. Miler

REFERENCE : HR 20-52 and HHB 20-8

1. Action Requested:

This memorandum requests the Director to approve the use of Messrs Angleton, Rocca, Hood and Miler as Agency Consultants for the period 1 April - 30 September 1975.

2. Background:

a. All four officers retired under the CIARDS system 31 December 1974 and are currently contract employees, contracts to expire 30 March 1975.

b. It is proposed that Subjects' services be retained under consultant status on an intermittent, as-needed basis as determined by Acting Chief, CI Operations, Mr. George T. Kalaris. In view of the long and unique experience of these officers in counter-intelligence, not duplicated in any other personnel, the new Acting Chief, CI Operations will want to have available the benefit of their advice and counsel during the next few months.

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Payment for services as consultant for the period 1 April - 30 September 1975 shall be as follows: in each case the total allowable is one half or less of the difference between 90 percent of their former salaries and their current annuities;

- Mr. Angleton: at a fee of $138.48 per day not to exceed $6,000 for the period;

- Mr. Rocca: at a fee of $138.48 per day not to exceed $3,700 for the period;

- Mr. Hood: at a fee of $138.48 per day not to exceed $3,300 for the period;

- Mr. Miler: at a fee of $138.48 per day not to exceed $5,200 for the period.

3. Positions:

a. It is the position of CI Operations that there is a need for Subjects' services which cannot be met from on-board personnel. Coordination with Domestic Collection Division is not pertinent and has not been effected. Clearance from the Office of Security has been received.

b. The Office of Personnel affirms that on the basis of the information supplied above, this request appears to meet the policy requirements of HR 20-52, Consultants. It accordingly recommends that this request be approved.

c. The Office of General Counsel has reviewed this proposal and has found no evidence of conflict of interest.

4. Recommendation:

It is requested that approval be granted to engage James Angleton, Raymond G. Rocca, William J. Hood, and Newton S, Miler as consultants at a daily fee equal to the top step of a GS-15, which is currently $138.48.

David H. Blee

David H. Blee
Acting
Deputy Director for Operations

CONCURRENCES:

Director of Personnel — Date

Office of General Counsel — Date

APPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence — Date

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence — Date

End of Consultant
On Newton Scott Miler
Combined 12/30/76 Em

Executive Registry
75-1762

MAR 1975

Mr. Newton S. Miler
4314 Birchlake Court
Alexandria, Virginia 22309

Dear Scotty:

On the occasion of retirement, it has been the custom to send a letter to our employees in appreciation for their services. While your retirement has been stretched a bit by your willingness to help us on the transition to your successor, I do not want the occasion to pass without this recognition.

I sincerely regret the publicity which surrounded your retirement and the circumstances under which it occurred. These should not, however, conceal the fact that you have made a real contribution to your country, to this Agency, and to the intelligence profession in your many years of service. We do appreciate this contribution and wish you the best of satisfaction and enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Involuntary Retirement -
Mr. Newton S. Miler

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has been proposed by the Career Service concerned for involuntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j. This employee has been declared excess to the manpower requirements of his Directorate.

Grade: GS-16 Position : Operations Officer
Career Service : Operations
Office/Division : Counter Intelligence Operations
Date Proposed for Retirement : 31 December 1974
Age at that Date : 48
Years of Creditable Service : 30
Years of Agency Service : 27
Years of Qualifying Service : 11

3. The Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommended that this proposal be approved.

/s/ Donald [illegible]

Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

4. The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

Director of Personnel

Date

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

Administrative - Internal Use Only

OPF

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Plans Staff

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Career Intelligence Medal - Newton Scott Miler

The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Career Intelligence Medal has been approved for Mr. Newton Scott Miler in recognition of his career contribution to this Agency. You are requested to inform him of the award and of the security provisions governing it as set forth in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security. Arrangements for presentation may be made with the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 4473, room 5 E 69, Headquarters.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Att
Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
X - OPF w/Forms 382 & 600
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

E2 Impdet CL By 014029

Administrative - Internal Use Only

OPC

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

DATE
25 March 1975

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO. 012773	NAME (Last-First-Middle) MILER, Newton Scott	BIRTHYEAR 1926	SEX M	TYPE EMPLOYEE Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CIOPS	SD D	SCHEDULE GS	GRADE 16	STATION

BE AWARDED

Career Intelligence Medal

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD September 1947 - December 1974

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. Newton Scott Miler is hereby awarded the Career Intelligence Medal in recognition of his exceptional accomplishment for more than 27 years with the Central Intelligence Agency. A charter member of the Agency, Mr. Miler has held a series of increasingly responsible positions in Headquarters and overseas. His performance in each assignment has been marked by his leadership abilities, aggressiveness and imagination. Mr. Miler's overall contributions to the mission of the Agency have been significant and reflect credit on him and the Federal service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by A/DDO on 12 March 1975)

APPROVED

/s/ Vernon A. Walters

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

7 APR 1975

DATE

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
F. W. M. Janney

SIGNATURE
/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
R. L. Austin, Jr.

FORM 9-73 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIO (4)

OPS

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A

1. EMPLOYEE NO. 012773	2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle) Miler, Newton Scott	3. POSITION TITLE Ops Officer

4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D	6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CIOPS	7. RECOMMENDED AWARD Career Intelligence Medal

8. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED 1947 thru December 1974	9. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT December 1974	10. POSTHUMOUS YES X NO

11. HOME ADDRESS

4314 Birchlaker Court
Alexandria, Virginia 22309

12. HOME PHONE 780-1907

SECTION B

LIST ANY PERSONNEL GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD WHO ASSISTED IN THE ACT OR PARTICIPATED IN THE PERFORMANCE.

13. FULL NAME

14. TYPE OF AWARD

SECTION C

ATTACH NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PERFORMANCE OR SERVICE WARRANTING AWARD, ANY SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND A PROPOSED, UNCLASSIFIED CITATION.

SECTION D

15. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION

Gordon Mason

DDO/Chief, Plans Staff, Gordon Mason

DATE 10 MAR 1975

16. HEAD OF D CAREER SERVICE (Career service of nominee)	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item #18	DATE
17. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item #18	DATE
18. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	TITLE AND SIGNATURE William E. Nelson	DATE 12 Mar [illegible]

FORM 11-73 600 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY: 00[illegible]

SECRET

OPF

For 28 years Mr. Newton Scott Miler contributed greatly to the Central Intelligence Agency; in earlier years as an operations officer in China activities, starting off in 1947 in Mukden, later Shanghai, Hokkaido, Yokosuka, Subic Bay, Bangkok and Addis Ababa, and in recent years (1964 to 1974) he has specialized in counterintelligence; his ~~particular~~ competence being in the management of sensitive counterintelligence cases of the Agency and of other elements of the US Intelligence Community. An aggressive, independent, articulate officer, he was personally involved in the current conduct and in planning the future of counterintelligence as a function. He has exercised leadership and command in his specialty and has left his imprint on the modus operandi of his field. He has dealt with penetration operations, double agent operations, and in Soviet and Bloc operations targetted against Americans overseas, as well as in disinformation and deception operations. His performance in these has been a model of conception and execution. He has been a hard working and gifted officer who often made self-sacrifices to get his tasks accomplished. On his departure into retirement it is appropriate to award Mr. Miler the Career Intelligence Medal in recognition of his years of superior performance.

SECRET

6 MAY 1975

Mr. Newton S. Miler
4314 Birchlake Court
Alexandria, Virginia 22309

Dear Mr. Miler:

I am happy to send to you, under separate cover, your Agency Retirement Medallion. The Medallion is a tangible form of recognition and appreciation of your service to the Agency. It should serve as a lasting reminder of an honorable career, rewarding associations and the knowledge that you played your part in a vital activity.

Let me, therefore, add my congratulations and wish you the very best for the future.

Sincerely,

(Signed) F. W. M. Janney

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 December 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MILER, Newton Scott

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Retirement - CIARDS (Involuntary) & CANCELLATION OF NSCA

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 | DAY 31 | YEAR 74

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS:

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	☒	CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 5427 0170 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643 Section 235(a)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI Operations
Operations Group
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer, Ch[redacted]

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0053

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYA

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000

18. REMARKS:

Co-ordinated with Paul Seidel/ROB 9 January 1975.

Kathleen A. Ball

MSB/RS
10/30/74

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: McCallum
M. D. McCallum, C/CIOPS/SG

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 1/2/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 42
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HOOTIS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 03 DA 01 YR 26
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. UTI EXPIRES: MO DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - CIARDS, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 2, 00, 00, 0, 0
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV, PROV. TEMP; CODE
39. FEGL HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - REG, 2 - REG OPT, 3 - INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 01-10-75 14 JAN 1975
46. O P APPROVAL: BDeRice
DATE APPROVED:

1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 6 November 1972

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 012773

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): ✓ MILER, Newton Scott

CCB

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Conversion from FSR Status

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 26 | YEAR 72

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	XX	CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 3127-0170 | 0001

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/CI Staff
Operations Group
Office of the Chief

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer CH

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0053

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 33,634 ✓

18 REMARKS

cc: Finance and Security

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: W. D. McCallum
W. D. McCallum, CI Staff

DATE SIGNED: 11/6/72

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: R D [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 7 Nov 72

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 56

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 314DD | ALPHABETIC CI

22 STATION CODE: 75013

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HOURS CODE:

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. ✓ [illegible] 01 26

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 – CSC, 2 – CSCR, 3 – FICA, 5 – NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 – NONE, 1 – 5 PT, 2 – 10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RES. PROV. TEMP.; CODE

39 FEGLI: HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 – WAIVED, 1 – REG, 2 – REG/OPT, 3 – INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 – NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 – NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 – BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3 – BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 – YES, 2 – NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 – YES, 2 – NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:

46 O.P. APPROVAL: Henry B. Fisher

DATE APPROVED: 13 Nov 72

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

10 NOV 1972

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

Executive Registry
[illegible]

DD/O 73-4553

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 5, 1973

BY LIAISON

Honorable William E. Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Colby:

I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to you and through you to Messrs. N. Scott Miler, Bruce Solie, Jerry G. Brown, Ernest Tsikerdanos, Richard Sampson, George Fill, and Oleg Keikuatov for assistance rendered to this Bureau in a matter of mutual concern which occurred recently in Mexico City. The manner in which Messrs. George Fill and Oleg Keikuatov carried out their assignments is particularly noteworthy and indicative of the professionalism employed by representatives of your Agency.

This situation is another example of the cooperative attitude which prevails among members of the American intelligence community and I look forward to continued mutual reciprocity in matters of this nature.

Sincerely yours,

C M Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

LIEBERMAN, Gerald

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

3 May 1972

Dear Dick,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently concluded a Strategic Planning Seminar to which your agency made significant contributions. I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the outstanding assistance provided by Messrs. James Angleton, Raymond G. Rocca and N. Scott Miler.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

T. H. MOORER
Admiral, U. S. Navy

Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

14-00000

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

8 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES ANGLETON, CHIEF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STAFF, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Letter of Appreciation

1. I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge your support to the Strategic Planning Seminar recently hosted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Particularly noteworthy was your assistance in arranging for the video taping of interviews with Soviet Bloc defectors. Special consideration is due Mr. Wendell Cox who assisted in this project.

3. Separate communication is being sent to Mr. Helms by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff recognizing the outstanding presentations of Mr. Rocca and Mr. Miler. ✓

4. Please accept my personal appreciation for your support.

LeRoy J. Manor
LEROY J. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director for Operations
Counterinsurgency and Special
Activities (DOCSA)

15.5.

SECRET

21 AUG 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Clandestine Service
Career Service Board

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion -
Newton Scott MILER

1. This is a recommendation for the promotion for Mr. Miler from Grade GS-16 to GS-17. Details on career background and performance, elaborated in earlier promotions, will not be repeated.

2. Mr. Miler, in the last 18 months, has taken over as Chief of the Operational Group of the CI Staff. He has done an outstanding job in directing the performance of this component. Concurrently, he has implemented significant operational and reporting activity in several sensitive Staff undertakings. He has maintained mutually beneficial exchanges on CI matters with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with the Department of State, and with other components of the Agency responsible for security matters. The range, quality, as well as the quantity, of Mr. Miler's work, are in the highest professional tradition of the Clandestine Service.

3. Mr. Miler supervises as Group Chief a Deputy and six senior officers, six other officers and six support personnel. His unit covers the whole range of incoming counterintelligence correspondence. The problems on which he and individuals under his direct supervision are called upon daily to render policy assistance and operational guidance include - to name the principal ones - double agent cases, penetrations, audio operations, surveillances, operational and personal security flaps, presidential protection, and divisional and branch program review and planning. Mr. Miler has galvanized the whole effort along these lines and has given creative, affirmative leadership in finding solutions as well as in delineating problems.

SECRET

4. Mr. Miler's performance overall has been outstanding. Furthermore, we regard him as an individual with outstanding potential for counterintelligence in the Agency and in the U.S. intelligence community. We believe Mr. Miler's performance as Operational Group Chief warrants the earliest consideration for promotion to the Grade of GS-17.

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

SECRET

3 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Newton Scott Miler

SUBJECT : Clandestine Service Senior Seminar
26 May 1969 - 20 June 1969

1. By memorandum dated 26 February 1970 Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines, DDP, expressed his appreciation for the work of the Senior Seminar and asked that all the participating officers be so informed. A copy of his memorandum is attached.

2. I would like to add that I thoroughly enjoyed working with each and every member of the Seminar. I am sure you will agree that the experience was interesting and valuable. The congeniality, dedication, and general unanimity of our group on all the major issues were impressive.

Warren L. Dean
Seminar Chairman

Att.

cc: Official Personnel File

26 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Warren Dean
Mr. Constantine Broutsas

SUBJECT: Clandestine Service Senior Seminar

1. I have been some time getting around to expressing my appreciation to you and through you to the other officers who participated in the Senior Seminar. Maybe it is just as well because, as you probably are aware, a number of the findings of the Senior Seminar have been, in one form or another, acted upon. In some of the cases, action that was already underway was accelerated. In others, the Seminar produced useful insights on the basis of which action was taken.

2. I know that it was a considerable labor for you but I would like you to be aware of the fact that I and the other officers in the Clandestine Service involved in the matters dealt with by the Seminar have been helped greatly by its several findings.

3. It is probable that we will want to do another running of the Seminar later this year. If so, I know that we will benefit from the excellent pilot run which you conducted.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

DDP 9-5225

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

DEC 5 1969

Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Karamessines:

I appreciate very much your cooperation in making Mr. N. Scott Miler of your organization available to participate in our recent Internal Security Conference.

Mr. Miler's presentation was outstanding and I am sure greatly assisted our field people in their understanding of this vital and important topic.

Sincerely,

William T. Riley

William T. Riley, Director
Division of Security

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 September 1969

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 012773 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Miler, Newton Scott

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 05 YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 0127-0170

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
52 DDP/CI Staff
Operations Group
I Office of the Chief

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Foreign Service Reserve Officer
Ops Officer Ch (SG)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0053

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 03 6
16 3

17 SALARY OR RATE: 22909 ✓
$ 26,714 ✓

18 REMARKS:
* Wash., D.C.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert W. Sheay
Robert W. Sheay

DATE SIGNED: 9-16-69

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 NOOTBS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
22	10	3140C	CI	75013	5	1	03	[illegible]	26	10	05	69	10	05	69

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 – CS, 2 – OTHER, 3 – FICA, 5 – NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 – NONE, 1 – 5 PT, 2 – 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA. YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 – WAIVED, 1 – YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 – NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 – NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 – BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3 – BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 – YES, 2 – NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 – YES, 2 – NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1/3-64 ac

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 3 Oct 69

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

~~EYES ONLY~~

21 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion - Newton Scott MILER

1. This is a recommendation for promotion for Mr. Miler from Grade GS-15 to GS-16.

2. The career of this officer has been notably marked throughout with relatively important responsibilities for his age. His youth, intense drive, initiative, self-assurance, capacity for work, natural talent for determining the objectives, recognizing the problem, organization of the work to be done, administering and supervising the effort, have long been evident to those for and with whom he has worked. Years of service during which he has steadily matured has resulted in a recognition, by supervisors and subordinate fellow-workers alike of his unusually wide experience, proven soundness of judgement, organizational administrative and executive talent coupled with powers of expression both oral and written and demonstrated capacity for work. He is unquestionably a very outstanding officer.

3. Having entered on duty as a Code Clerk (GS-05) in October 1946 following an A. B. degree in Economics from Dartmouth College in a Navy V-12 Program, he was soon assigned to Shanghai where he remained a short period before a TDY assignment to open the communications station in Seoul, Korea. He was assigned to Mukden and Antung, Manchuria from April 1947 to June 1949 where despite being barely 21 years of age and an official designation as Code Clerk as Grades GS-5/7, he conducted Agent operations into Korea, USSR and China. He handled liaison with Chinese officers and counter espionage cases with X-2 officers. His talents were recognized and after TDY training at Headquarters, he was assigned to Shanghai as an Intelligence Officer. There he performed as a Case Officer and engaged in stay beyond planning, supervision of other junior Case Officers, and assisted in the evacuation of other CIA officers. Before he was 25 years of age, he established the station and served as Chief of Sapporo, Japan, for some 20 months (1949-51).

SECRET

~~EYES ONLY~~

4. He has successfully engaged in all types of operations - FI, CI, CA including PM and PW, but his principal talents have been in the Counter Intelligence, particularly Counter-Espionage field. His experience includes service as Chiefs of Station, Senior-Case Officer, Senior Staff Officer, and since September 1964, Deputy Chief of the Special Investigations Group of the CI Staff where he has had a major responsibility in the supervision of senior grade Counter Intelligence Officers as well as being personally and directly active in matters of agreat complexity and highest security considerations. In his service in that capacity he has demonstrated his outstanding abilities as a Counter Intelligence officer. He has carried a substantial portion of the work load of his office including supervision of both clerical and officer personnel, liaison with all elements of the Agency and other intelligence and security services of the government as appropriate. It is strongly recommended that he be promoted to Grade GS-16.

James A.
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED
16 July 1969

1. SERIAL NUMBER: C12773
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MILER, NEWTON SCOTT

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 18 | YEAR 69

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	XXX	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0227-0170

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/CI STAFF
Operations Group
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

I

52

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer - CH
Foreign Service Reserve Officer (5G)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0053

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	03 6 15 6	22,989 $ 25,189

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/CI STAFF/Spec Invest Grp/Pos. No. 0023

cc : Finance

Wash. D.C.

I

5G

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Bryan B. Burnett CI STAFF	16 July 69		7/14

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTPS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	2142	CI	75013	S	1	03 01 26		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - OFGN 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV. TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. OP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
7-18-69 DB		7-18-69

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

(When Filled In)

T's 2

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 January 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MILER, NEWTON Scott

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 12 YEAR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS:

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7127-0170

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/CI STAFF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15

17. SALARY OR RATE: $

18. REMARKS: EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE

20. EMPLOY CODE

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. ROUTES CODE

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSE 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE 2

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 1—WAIVER 2—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE

0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

ION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

45. O.P. APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated [illegible]

DATE APPROVED

OUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CP-922Y3D/djb
Ser: 0202P92
14 [illegible] 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. N. SCOTT MILER

VIA: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJ: Expression of Appreciation (U)

1.(U) I hereby express my appreciation for service of the highest degree of excellence provided to my office during the past several months. You displayed professional competence that can only be described as exemplary in nature.

2.(U) It is unfortunate that the work on which you performed is of such a nature that it precludes a specific description herein, but that need not detract from the significance of this message of approbation. Of all the attributes displayed, the two most worthy of note are your use of imagination and persistence. These two qualities enabled you to produce results which others had not been able to obtain. Near failure was transformed into success.

3.(U) Not to be ignored is your administrative ability. The marshaling of resources available to you and coordination of the efforts of your available personnel contributed materially to the degree and quality of results obtained as well as the expeditious manner in which you proceeded. Also, selflessness was manifested by your willingness to ignore assigned working hours and press on as long as any hope existed for obtaining results.

4.(C) As you are aware, the results achieved by you have significance beyond the boundaries of the Navy. The full import cannot be completely evaluated at this time but it is known that the lives of many persons will be enriched by your efforts. It is regretted that all persons affected will not have the opportunity to express their thanks to you in person for the part you have played.

5.(U) On behalf of all persons who will benefit from your efforts, and on behalf of the Navy and myself, I again express my deepest appreciation and say to you a most hearty "well done".

6.(U) If it is consistent with the policy of your Agency, it is requested that a copy of this letter be made a part of your official record.

E. B. FLUCKEY
REAR ADMIRAL, US NAVY
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

30 APR 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI Staff

SUBJECT : Mr. N. Scott Miler
Letter of Appreciation

1. On 25 February 1965, Mr. N. Scott Miler of your Staff presented an excellent lecture to participants in Security Officers Field Course #15 on "Security Support to CI Activities." Mr. Miler made the talk very interesting and stimulating, and, judging from the class comments, it was very well received.

2. I should like to take this opportunity to advise both you and Mr. Miler that his cooperation and efforts on behalf of the Office of Security are very much appreciated.

Howard J Osborn

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 22 September 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MILER, NEWTON SCOTT

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF [✓ X]

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5127-0170-0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP CI STAFF
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: (Attache Pol Off) OPS OF - D CH 1141

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0023

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP		17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		03	1	$14,860
GS	0136.01	15	3	17,600

18. REMARKS

10/17/64 10/15/64

FROM: DDP/AFRICA/EAST BRANCH/ADDIS ABABA STATION/CHIEF OF STATION/81 Ethiopia

cc: Sent to Finance and Security

PRA: HR 20-21 (c) (3) for 24 months from eff. date.

COORDINATION: Carl Taylor
AFRICA PERSONNEL

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: James L. [illegible]
CI STAFF

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Russell Cooper

DATE SIGNED: 10/14/64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

37 | 10 | 3122 | 01 | 03012 | 1 | 03 01 26

10 66 | .53

FOD DATA

FROM AF (3)

10-14-64

Russell Cooper 10/14/64

FORM 1152

SECRET

SECRET

1 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion - Newton Scott Miler

1. It is recommended that Newton Scott Miler be promoted from his present grade of GS-14 to GS-15. Miler was assigned to the Africa Division on 9 July 1961 and assumed his present position of Chief of Station, Addis Ababa, in September 1961. He has been in grade since 24 March 1957. In accepting his present assignment Miler assumed responsibility for a very complicated operational program requiring considerable reorientation and modification. In a short time he has been able to give purpose and direction to operations which previously had been the subject of considerable controversy within DD/P. It is worthy of note that Miler has accomplished this with an almost entirely new team, few of whom had any previous experience in African operations.

2. Under normal circumstances, the Supervisor would be inclined to delay a promotion recommendation pending further opportunity to observe first hand the performance of the individual. It is felt that Miler is a justifiable exception to this rule. Prior to his assignment to the Africa Division, Miler had been recommended for promotion by his former Supervisor who is presently Deputy Chief, CI-CE Staff. This man had apparently felt so strongly about Miler's performance that he had suggested that Miler be the one man on the CI-CE staff who should be given a jump promotion to supergrade. If necessary a memorandum supporting the remarks made can be obtained.

3. In addition to the above, the Supervisor has been associated with Miler in a professional relationship since 1946. The only gap in continuity was from the period 1956 to 1959. It is felt, therefore, that the Supervisor's evaluation of Miler's knowledge, ability, experience, and potential bears weight.

Grant A. Fielden

Grant A. Fielden
Chief, AF/E

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, CI Staff

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion of
Newton Scott Miler

1. It is recommended that Mr. Miler be promoted to Grade 15.

2. During the two years that he has been an officer of the Operations Group of the CI Staff Mr. Miler has demonstrated an exceptional ability to interpret counterintelligence experience and practice in guiding operations in this area throughout the divisions of the DD/P. He has applied field experience gained in one area, combined with expertly informed Headquarters knowledge, to intricate and sensitive problems affecting U. S. security in a variety of geographic areas from the Far East to the Western Hemisphere and Europe with outstanding skill and sureness of judgment. He is aggressive, devotes long hours uncomplainingly to his tasks, and willingly contributes his guidance to officers of less experience. In personal relationships throughout the Clandestine Services he is admired, respected, and well-liked. His recommendations are eagerly sought and contribute in major fashion to increased effectiveness in carrying out the CI mission. It is again strongly recommended that he be promoted to GS-15.

James R Hunt Jr
James R. Hunt, Jr.
Chief, CI Operations

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Career Service/Panel A

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion of
Newton Scott Miler

1. It is recommended that Mr. Miler be promoted to Grade 15.

2. Since July 1958 Mr. Miler has been serving in the Soviet/Satellite Branch of the CI Staff, Operations Division. In this position he has made a major contribution to the CI mission in his daily contacts with elements of the DD/P, Office of Training and Office of Security. Mr. Miler has excellent motivation, works long hours, readily accepts responsibility, and is highly effective in expressing his views both orally and in written form. He is resourceful, imaginative, and his operational judgment is superior. The frequency with which his professional advice is sought on an informal and personal basis is clear evidence of the high regard with which he is held by many individuals in the Clandestine Services. I strongly recommend him for promotion to the next higher grade.

James R. Hunt Jr.
James R. Hunt, Jr.
Chief, CI Operations

Mr Miler's record on this staff has been outstanding. I am sure that as a 15 he will be in demand for a field assignment (when his tour with this staff is over).
S. N. [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT: State Department Promotion of
MILER, Newton

1. The Department has informed this office that effective 12 April 1964 subject employee was promoted from FSR-4, $14,035 to FSR-3, $14,265.

2. It is requested that this notice be placed in the official folder of the employee concerned.

/s/ Henry C. Woodward
Chief, Official Civilian Branch, CCS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 May 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MILER, NEWTON SCOTT

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: Month 05 Day 13 Year 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2138 8400 1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

3

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP AFRICA
EAST BRANCH
ADDIS ABABA STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

11. POSITION TITLE: Pol Off Att / Chief of Station

12. POSITION NUMBER: 81

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		04	12,145
GS	0136.01	15 1	13,730

18. REMARKS **(From AF/East/Addis/81)**

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: A C Rosner
ADOLPH C. ROSNER, AF/Support

DATE SIGNED: 10 May

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 5/11/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.
22	10	52730	AF	22065		3	03 01 26		

FOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5/11/62

44. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 5/11/62

SECRET

SECRET

1 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion - Newton Scott Miler

1. It is recommended that Newton Scott Miler be promoted from his present grade of GS-14 to GS-15. Miler was assigned to the Africa Division on 9 July 1961 and assumed his present position of Chief of Station, Addis Ababa, in September 1961. He has been in grade since 24 March 1957. In accepting his present assignment Miler assumed responsibility for a very complicated operational program requiring considerable reorientation and modification. In a short time he has been able to give purpose and direction to operations which previously had been the subject of considerable controversy within DD/P. It is worthy of note that Miler has accomplished this with an almost entirely new team, few of whom had any previous experience in African operations.

2. Under normal circumstances, the Supervisor would be inclined to delay a promotion recommendation pending further opportunity to observe first hand the performance of the individual. It is felt that Miler is a justifiable exception to this rule. Prior to his assignment to the Africa Division, Miler had been recommended for promotion by his former Supervisor who is presently Deputy Chief, CI-CE Staff. This man had apparently felt so strongly about Miler's performance that he had suggested that Miler be the one man on the CI-CE staff who should be given a jump promotion to supergrade. If necessary a memorandum supporting the remarks made can be obtained.

3. In addition to the above, the Supervisor has been associated with Miler in a professional relationship since 1946. The only gap in contiguity was from the period 1956 to 1959. It is felt, therefore, that the Supervisor's evaluation of Miler's knowledge, ability, experience, and potential bears weight.

Grant A. Fielden
Chief, AF/E

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 July 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 112773

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MILER, Newton S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION -- Dept. of State

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 7 | DAY 20 | YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1123-2500-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/AF
East Branch
Addis Ababa Station

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

11. POSITION TITLE:
Attache, Political Officer
Chief of Station

12. POSITION NUMBER: 81

12a. PCB CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP		17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		4	6	$12,145 ✓
GS	0136.01	14	2	$12,720

18. REMARKS:

All sick and 115 hours annual leave to be transferred to the Dept. of State.

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: B Eggleston
B. Eggleston, Cover Officer, x 8106

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

55 | 10 | 52736 | AF | 2264

EOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

44. C.S. APPROVAL

1152

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 March 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MILER, NEWTON SCOTT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT & TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY [illegible] YEAR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2138 8400 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP AFRICA
EAST BRANCH
ADDIS ABABA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
11. POSITION TITLE: Chief of Station (D)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 81
12a. PCR CONTROL NO.:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (00)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 12730
18. REMARKS:

(From DDP/CI Staff Ops Div/Satellite Br/61)

Form 259 sent to medics. Subject to depart on or about 15 August.

Integration date · 19 July '61

CONCUR Ronald Gage CI STAFF

Security Approval [illegible] 7/27/61

Copy to Security 7/26/61

THEODORE M. FRANSEN, C/AF Support

SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ronald Gage

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

[illegible]

POST DATA

Ronald Gage

14-00000

1-1[illegible]

61-5562

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. Newton S. Miler,
Chief of Station, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

1. The appointment of Mr. Newton S. Miler as Chief of Station, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, effective on or about 15 August 1961, is recommended. Mr. Miler would replace Mr. William McGhee whose next assignment will be determined at a later date.

2. Mr. Miler has been an employee of the Agency since September 1947, and is presently assigned as CI Branch Chief, CI Staff, Washington, D. C., GS-14. A biographic profile, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

Bronson Tweedy
BRONSON TWEEDY
Chief, Africa Division

1 Attachment:
Biographic Information

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Mr. Miler has been interviewed by the ADDPA, by the Chief of Operations, and by myself, and we are satisfied that he is qualified for this assignment.

cPc
DDCI
([illegible])

5 JUL 1961
Deputy Director (Plans) (Date)

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

11 JUL 1961
Director of Central Intelligence (Date)

1400000

4R

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) [illegible]

2. EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.

3. THIS DATE [illegible]

4. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME

War Agencies Employees Protective Association (WAEPA)	Travel-matic Insurance*
United Benefit Life Insurance (UBLIC)	Flite-Plan*
Mutual of Omaha Hospitalization & Surgical	Emergency Travel Insurance*
Dread Disease*	
Income Replacement*	
Air Trip Insurance	

*Cash payment of premiums for insurance should cover the period of time the individual will be away from headquarters

5. DESTINATION [illegible]

TRAVEL
TDY
PCS

6. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INSURANCE PROGRAMS LISTED BELOW.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Newton S. Miler

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
[illegible]		✓			
		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

7. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

8. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE (FEGLI)

✓ I Am Covered Under FEGLI
I Waivered Coverage Under FEGLI

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Newton S. Miler

9. INTEGREE SALARY DIFFERENTIAL

✓ Sufficient to Cover Insurance Deductions

Insufficient – Other Arrangements Will Be Made

10. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY

CFB (Signature)

BCD (Signature) [illegible]

11. PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED—INSURANCE ACCOUNT NO.

INSURANCE PROGRAM	INITIAL DEDUCTION TO BEGIN PAY PERIOD ENDING	AMOUNT OF DEDUCTION	AMOUNT OF DEDUCTION EACH SUBSEQUENT PAY PERIOD
WAEPA LIFE (CODE 3)			
UNITED LIFE (CODE 7)			
MUTUAL HOSPITALIZATION (CODE 1)			

12. REMARKS

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

DISTRIBUTION
ORIGINAL—FINANCE DIVISION IF DEDUCTIONS ARE AUTHORIZED
DUPLICATE—RETAIN IN [illegible] DESTROY AFTER PROCESSING
TRIPLICATE—RETAIN IN CFB [illegible] PROCESSING, THEN TRANSMIT TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 33 [illegible] Obsolete previous editions

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

SECRET

30 October 1958

Following is an extract from a Memorandum of Conversation concerning Mr. Thomas E. Naughten's courtesy call on General Charles Cabell on 27 October 1958. Mr. Wm. V. Broe, ACFE, and Mr. Charles J. Baker, ACFE/THB were also present at this meeting:

"Mr. Naughten said he was very sorry to see Mr. Scott Miler leave Bangkok since he had a great deal of confidence in him and felt that he was unusually well suited for the job."

Charles J. Baker

Charles J. Baker
ACFE/THB

SECRET

SECRET

VOUCHERED

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) Miler, Newton Scott	3. Date Of Birth Mo 3 Da 1 Yr 26	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
					13. Mil Serv Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/FE Branch 4 - Bangkok Station Counter Subversive Section	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Bankok, Thailand	Station Code

16. Dept.- Field Dept. - Usfld. - Fran.	Code	17. Position Title Intell Officer (FI) ~~(Police-Spec. Investigations)~~	18. Position No. 2877	19. Serv. GS-	20. Occup. Series 0136.51

21. Grade & Step 14 1	22. Salary Or Rate 11,355.00 $ ~~10,320.00~~	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo 03 Da 24 Yr 57	25. PSI Due Mo 09 Da 21 Yr 58	26. Appropriation Number 8-3786-55-040

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP/CI Staff Ops Division Satellites Br.	Code 54/4	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code

33. Dept.- Field Dept. - Usfld. - Fran.	Code	34. Position Title IO CI PR CH	35. Position No. 61	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.53

38. Grade & Step 14 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 11,355.00 $ ~~10,320.00~~	40. SD DT	41. Date Of Grade Mo 03 Da 24 Yr 57	42. PSI Due Mo 09 Da 21 Yr 58	43. Appropriation Number 8-2705-27

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
[illegible] B. B[illegible] C/CI Support

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Mary L. Johnes 8527

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
S. Herman Horton
S. Herman Horton DC/CI Staff

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	Ronald Gage		D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks Concurrence by FE: Charles [illegible]

2 copies sent to Security

FORM 3-57 1152a

[illegible] Care [illegible] 6/4 [illegible]

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OPERATIONS MISSION TO THAILAND
BANGKOK, THAILAND

April 9, 1958

Mr. Theo E. Hall
Chief, Public Safety Division
International Cooperation Administration
Washington 25, D. C.

Re: Newton S. Miler

Dear Theo:

You have by now received our unclassified cable, TOICA 1408, advising of our acceptance of the resignation of Newton S. Miler who has served since December 27, 1956, as Chief of our Criminal Investigation Branch, Public Safety Division, USOM/T. It was with deep regret that I accepted the resignation since his departure on or about April 15, 1958, will be felt very keenly by both the Chief of the Division, Mr. Al DuBois, and myself.

Were it not for the pressing need of stateside medical attention for his wife and the fact that he should be with her during this period, I should have endeavored to prevail on him to take an alternative course of action. However, I am satisfied that there was no alternative and, hence, did accept the resignation effective April 15, 1958, it being noted that he is returning with his family to the States at his own expense.

This letter is to advise you of the facts leading to what would appear to be a sudden resignation. I also want to inform you that Miler's job performance here has, in my estimation, been of high order and can very easily be summarized by stating that he has performed most satisfactorily.

He has shown himself consistently to be tactful, considerate, and objective in his approach to his responsibilities and in the performance of his duties. I have at all times found that his judgment has been sound and mature. He has had warm and mutually satisfying relationship with his opposite numbers in the Thai police.

In furtherance of my statement of my confidence in him, I unhesitatingly designated him as Acting Chief of our Public Safety Division during Mr. DuBois' absence on TDY in Washington for the period March 9 through April 5, 1958. I naturally had continuing personal contact with him during that period and observed his handling of himself in Executive Staff meetings. The various attributes which I cited above were clearly demonstrated during this period and, in fact, his performance during this period permits me to add that I am satisfied with his supervisory abilities.

I would have no hesitancy in recommending his reemployment by ICA if in the future the present family health situation is rectified.

Sincerely,

Thomas E. Naughton
Director

cc: A. G. Stevens, PERS, ICA/W
C. E. Keating, M/PSI, ICA/W

14-00000

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

17 April 1958

1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): MILER, Newton Scott
3. Date Of Birth: Mo 03 Da 01 Yr 26
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS - EOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations: DDP/FE
Branch 4 - Bangkok Station
Counter Subversive Section
Code:
15. Location Of Official Station: Bangkok, Thailand
Station Code:
16. Dept. - Field: Dept. - Unfld. - Field - Code:
17. Position Title: Intell Officer (FI)
(Police Spec. (Investigations)
18. Position No.: 2877
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0136.51
21. Grade & Step: (3) 14 1
22. Salary Or Rate: $10,320.00
23. SD: DI
24. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr
25. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr
26. Appropriation Number: 8-3785-55-040

37

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: Conversion from FSS Status
Code:
28. Eff. Date: Mo 04 Da 16 Yr 58
29. Type Of Employee: Regular
Code:
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
Code: 316
32. Location Of Official Station:
Station Code: 50
33. Dept. - Field: Dept. - Unfld. - Field - Code:
34. Position Title: Intell Officer (FI)
35. Position No.:
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series:
38. Grade & Step: 14 1
39. Salary Or Rate: $10,320.00
40. SD:
41. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr 12/1/57
42. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr 9/13/58
43. Appropriation Number:

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Ronald Gage, CFE/Personnel
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Mozelle Little x 2957
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		4/21/58	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks: Subject resigned from FSS Status COB 15 April 1958, per Bang-4427

FORM 9-57 1152a

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. – Miss – Mrs. – One given name, initial(s), and surname): Newton Scott MILER

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Mar 1926

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 29 Mar '57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Amended Integration (ICA)
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 30 Nov '56

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Same	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Same
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	FSS-003-3 $9635
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

31

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Amended action to reflect change in item 9 from $9380 to $9635. No differential is to be paid as Subject's CIA salary is $9420 and his FSS salary is $9635.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): FI/OPS/CCB/OCL

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): William M. Murphy x 4403

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: William M Murphy
Title: Cover Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
			XX		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	F.A.	REAL.	
				SD:DI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM
TO 7-2180-31-040

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): NA

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B CL. – OR POS. CONTROL	JD	1957	
C CLASSIFICATION			
D PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E			
F. APPROVED BY			

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

UNVOUCHERED

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwis instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. Miss Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Newton S. Miler

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Mar 1926

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 22 [illegible] 57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

A. PROPOSED:

B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
I.O.(FI) BFF-2877-13 Police Spe. Invest.	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O.(FI) BFF-2877 Police Spec. Invest.
GS-0136.51-13 $9205.00 p/a FSS/3 $9380.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-14 $10,320.00 p/a FSS/3 $9380.00
DDP/FE Branch 4 - Bangkok Station Counter Subversive Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 4 - Bangkok Sta. Counter Subversive Section
Bangkok, Thailand	11. HEADQUARTERS	Bangkok, Thailand
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL DI

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary):

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Alfred C. Ulmer, Chief, FE/Division

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Henry P. Gilbert, x 3003

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature:

Title: CS/CSP

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.

SD:DI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION

FROM 7-3786-55-040

TO Same

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED

STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E			

F. APPROVED BY

10-69432-8

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. - Miss - Mrs. - One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Newton Scott MILER 512773

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 March 1926

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 30 Nov. 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): INTEGRATION - International Cooperation Administration
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 30 Nov. 1956

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Intell Officer (FI) BPP 2877-14	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intell officer FI (Police Specialist (Investigations) BPP 2877-14
GS-0136.51-13 $9420	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	CS-0136.51-13 (FSS-3 $9380)
DDP/FE Branch 4 BANGKOK STATION Counter Subversive Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 4 BANGKOK STATION Counter Subversive Section
Bangkok, Thailand	11. HEADQUARTERS	Bangkok, Thailand
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Subject is to be paid the difference between CIA salary of $9420 and FSS salary of $9380, to be paid by the International Cooperation Administration and allowances in accordance therewith

Ten days (10) annual leave and all sick leave will be transferred to ICA by CCB/OCL

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): FI/OPS/CCB/OCL

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): William M. Murphy 8403

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: William M. Murphy
Title: Cover Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	DISAB.	10 POINT GS-0	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	T.A.	REAL	
				SD-DI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM 9-3786-55-040
TO

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

09/18/47

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. OPS CONTROL	JP	DEC	INITIAL
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			
F. APPROVED BY			

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. Miss. Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Newton Scott MILER

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 March 1926

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 7 Nov 1956

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:

B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops Officer BFF 1699-13	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BFF-2877-13
GS-0136.01-13 ~~$9205~~ p/a $9420	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-13 ~~$9205~~ p/a 9420
DDP/FE China Base Office of the Chief of Operations Chi/Ind Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 4 Bangkok Station Counter Subversive Section
Subic Bay, P.I.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Bangkok, Thailand
☒ XX FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ XX FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary):

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): H. P. GILBERT, FE PERSONNEL OFFICER

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): FE/4/Support X3469 Dottie Poland

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY: Robert A. [illegible] FI/Ops for Ch/FI

Signature:

Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER, 5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	F.A.	LEGAL

SD: DI

15. CEX:

16. APPROPRIATION

FROM 7-3715-55-167

TO 7-3786-55-040

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): YES

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED

STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		11/9/56	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY: FE/Pers 8 Nov 56

SECRET

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

2

DATE
27 August 1956

NAME
Newton S. MILER

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION

X	PROMOTION		REASSIGNMENT		OTHER (Explain)
	ROTATION		TRAVEL		

FROM:
Area Ops Off, GS-13, Subic Bay

TO:
Area Ops Off, GS-~~14~~ 13 Subic Bay

EOD
Oct 46

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN
W	BASIC ORIENT. ALSO BIC. BITC. SOC. BTP. PH I			AIR OPS. 1 2 3 4 5	
CC	CLAND. M & T ALSO OC. PH II	9 Mar 54		MAR. OPS 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. OPS. ALSO AIC. AITC. SOC. CAI. PH III	27/4-28/5/54		CLAND. FLO. ACT. 1 2 3 4 5 6	
	RESISTANCE OPS ALSO PM. I-II-III RAFT			SURVIVAL 1 2 3 4 5 6	
X	CLAND. SERV. REV			BASIC PHOTO	21/8-10/9/48
X	WORLD COMMUNISM			DOCUMENTATION	
	ANTI-COMM. OPS.			LOCKS	
	ADMIN PROCEDURES			SECRET WRITING	
	OPS. SUPPORT			FLAPS & SEALS	
	TRADECRAFT PHASE			SMALL ARMS FAM.	
	ADMIN PHASE			OTHER TRAINING	
	REPORTS			Orbit Ops	
	ORDER OF BATTLE			Seminar	25/4-6/5/55
	COUNTERESPIONAGE			Russian Lan	28/9/48-1/49
X	ADV. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE			[illegible]	
	OPS. SECURITY				
	WAR PLANS				
	CLAND.POL.WARF.				
	STAYBEHIND OPS.				
	TECH. DEV. ORIENT.				
	INSTR. TECH.				
	EVASION-ESCAPE				
	SAD. OPS.				
	INVEST. TECH. ALSO CI TECH.				
	ADMIN REFRESHER				
	PROG. IMPROVE.				
X	BASIC SUPV.				
	BASIC MGMT.			PRE-TEST	
	BALLOON OPS.			ASSESSMENT	

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.
2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

TRAINING OFFICER COMMENTS:

☐ A. THIS DOES (NOT) MEET TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.
☐ NO FURTHER TRAINING RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN "S". THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY BASIC QUALIFYING STANDARDS.

☒ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE
☐ QUALIFYING ☑ REFRESHER
TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT:
☐ SOONEST and when
☒ UPON RETURN TO HQ. available

☒ D. WAIVER AND CC. SHOULD BE REQUESTED FOR THOSE COURSES MARKED WITH A "W".

☐ E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING WERE MADE ________ (DATE). THESE RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MET.

DIVISION TRAINING OFFICER
DONALD H. SAGE

STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,

FROM: Career Management Officer

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE
(A) 9 Nov 56

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER
R.G.[illegible] la/BCH

FORM NO. 467 REPLACES FORM 38-77
1 JAN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

14-00000

3

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.* If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.— One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. Newton S. MILER.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Mar. 1926

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 22 Dec 1955

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: 12 Feb 56

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
I.O. (FI) BFF1604-13	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BFF - 1699 -13
GS-0136.01-13 ~~[illegible]~~ p/a 9205.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $9205.00 p/a
DDP/FE China Mission Office of the Chief of Operations Plans and Development Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE China ~~Mission~~ Base Office of the Chief of Operations Chi/Ind Branch
~~Subic Bay, P.I.~~ YOKOSUKA, JAPAN	11. HEADQUARTERS	Subic Bay, P.I.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

SD: 14

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*): [illegible]

Robert A. [illegible] (w4) At FI/cmo

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): [illegible] P. MILLER FE/PERS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): Mary WICKHAM X 2185

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY:
Signature: RW Kelar
Title: m CS/CSP

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A	REAL

SD:DI

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3715-55-~~180~~ 167
TO: 6-3715-55-~~180~~ 167

18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Pa.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS:

[illegible]
[illegible] 2/6/56

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A		
B CEIL OR POS CONTROL	B	2/1/56
C CLASSIFICATION		
D PLACEMENT OR EMPL	L	1-2-56
E		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY:

[illegible] per FE [illegible] 30 Jan 56

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Newton S. MILER

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Mar. 1926

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 21 Apr. 55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

A. PROPOSED: ASAP

B. APPROVED: Bob 1 June 1955

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
	Ops Officer (CE) BF 193	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BFF 1684-13
	GS-0136.52-13 $8560 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-13 $8560 p/a
	DDP/FE Branch 2, China CE Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE China Mission Office of the Chief of Operations Plans and Development Branch
	Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	~~Subic Bay, P.I.~~ YOKOSUKA, JAP. Per Pat [illegible]
	☐ FIELD ☒ XX DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ XX FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL SD:DI

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Fitness report is attached.
Please transfer from Vouchered to Unvouchered funds. W-4 is attached.
Subject to be double slotted with Mr. Hayden Estey who is returning to the ZI PCS in July 1955.

B. REQUESTED BY: HENRY P. GILBERT, Personnel Officer, FE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Mary A. Wickham, x 2185

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature:

Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 PT. DISAB	10 PT. OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DI

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION

FROM: 5-3700-20

TO: 5-3715-55-180

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED

STATE: Pa.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Sec cove o/d
per TM 5/26/55
jam

E date o.k.
per John Martin FE
6/2/55
jam

No TU

22. CLEARANCES

	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL OR POS CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL		5/11/55
E.		

REMARKS.

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: [illegible] 1955

SECRET

F. APPROVED BY: for FE [illegible] 13 May 1955

STAND 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Newton S. MILER	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Mar. 1926	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 27 Sept. 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED: 13 FEB 1955	

FROM—		TO—
Ops Officer (CE) BF 192-13	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer (CE) BF 193
GS-0136.01-13 52 $8360 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE AND SALARY	GS-0136.52-13 $8360 p/a
DDP/FE Branch 2, China CE Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 2, China CE Section
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
H. C. CLINKSCALE, Personnel Officer, FE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Mary A. Wickham, x 2185

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: DD/P Admin.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL	
				SD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-3700-20 TO: Same	Yes		☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Pa.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION		12/9/54	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	MJ	Feb. 23 55	
E.			
F. APPROVED BY			

14-00000

Standard Form 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

TOUCHED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except CB and E unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. — Miss - Mrs. — One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Newton S. MILER

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Mar. 1926

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 10 Feb. 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 14 Feb. 54

B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
OPERS. OFF. BF-197-~~13~~	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer (CE) BF 192-13
GS-132-13 $8360	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.52 13 $8360
DDP/FE Branch 2 (China) Chinasaki Unit	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 2, China CE Section
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Mary L. Wickham, x 2185

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature: H. C. CLINESCALE

Title: Personnel Officer, FE

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-FI

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3700-20 TO: Same

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CHIEF OF POS. CONTROL	JIF	13FEB54	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	JAN	2/15	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

2/15/54

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. NEWTON S. MILER

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 March 1926

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 8 July 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: AUG 20 1953

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
OPERS. OFF [redacted] BF-197-12	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	OPERS. OFF [redacted] BF-197-
GS-132-12 $7240.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-13 $8360.
DDP/FE Branch 2 (China) Chigusaki Unit	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 2 (China) Chigusaki Unit
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary): Grade of slot GS-13

APPROVED BY FI [illegible] AND [illegible] BOARD
11 July 53 [illegible]

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Clarence E. Witt
Clarence E. Witt, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Bernhard von Ammon X 2135

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY: J. Keith Reid DD/Admin
Signature: [illegible] B. [illegible]
Title: FI/OMO.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT	
				DISAB	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD - FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM 3700-20 TO 3700-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES, NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE Pa.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: JUL 24 1953

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E		14 aug 53	

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Personnel Screening Board 8 July 1953

VIA : FE Personnel

FROM : Chief, FE/2

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion, Newton S. MILER

1. It is recommended that the subject be promoted from GS-12 to GS-13. He is assigned as Chief, CE Unit of FE/2, with responsibility for initiative and guidance of China CE program, spotting and developing leads, advising the operations desks on CI protection of their operations, and maintenance of necessary records and files for the Branch.

2. The subject has been in his present grade since 2 September 1951. During this period he was assigned to FRU/FEC, a case officer responsible for China Independent operations. The attached extract from FRU/FEC Dispatch outlines his duties and performances in this capacity. From March 1953 until the recent assignment to position described in Para 1, he has been acting as case officer in Headquarters, in charge of the STPHOENIX project.

3. Mr. Miler has been employed by the agency since 1946, during which time he has held various operational assignments both in and connected with China. He has developed an excellent background in this work. I have had the opportunity to become familiar with subject's work and consider that he has performed in an excellent manner. It is believed that he is a particularly well qualified operations officer, who is capable of successfully handling additional responsibilities and expanding the scope of the China CE program.

Grant A. Fielden
GRANT A. FIELDEN

SECRET
Security Information

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. – Miss – Mrs. – One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Morton S. [illegible]

2. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] 1916

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: [illegible] March 1953

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Excepted Appointment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: as soon as possible

B. APPROVED: 30 Mar. 53

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—

TO— OPS. OFF.

8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER: ~~[illegible]~~ FI-197-12

9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY: GS-136-12 ~~[illegible]~~ $7240

10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP FE Branch 2 (China) Chinmachi Unit

11. HEADQUARTERS: Washington, D. C.

☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENT

12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Slot #197 (GS-15 Slot)
Please transfer leave records from unvouchered funds.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Sherman [illegible], ext 3010

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature: Edward C. McNamara

Title: Sec. FE/PO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	OTHER 5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.

15. | 16. | 17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: 3700-20

18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (Accessions only)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES

	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. LEG. OR PHS. STANDARDS			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C Taylor	10 Mar 53	
E. APPROVED BY			

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ENTRANCE ON DUTY NOTICE

1. DATE 20 March 1953

2. TO: Jane Egan

3. OFFICE (Division, Branch, Etc.) DDP/FE Br.3

4. THE PERSON NAMED BELOW MEETS THE STANDARDS FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THIS AGENCY SUBJECT TO THE TYPE OF CLEARANCE INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9. THE SIGNED CLEARANCE FROM 165 FOR ENTRANCE ON DUTY HAS BEEN MADE A PART OF THE PERSONNEL FILE OF THIS INDIVIDUAL. HE/SHE IS REPORTING FOR DUTY THIS DATE.

5. NAME (Last) MILER, (First) NEWTON (Middle) S.

6. JOB TITLE AND GRADE OPERATIONS OFFICER GS-12

7. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ACTION 30 March 1953

8. ☐ E.O.D.
☐ REASSIGNMENT
OTHER: Trans. of Funds UV-V

9. TYPE CLEARANCE Conc.

10. REMARKS: (Include Medical or Other Limitations)

FRANK J. DEWALD, JR.
PERSONNEL OFFICE

DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL AND COPY (WHITE) TO ITEM NO. 3. COPY (PINK) TO PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM NO. 37-115
NOV 1952 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

A -201 [illegible] JRS/gc

LO 70-3 18 Mar 52

SUBJECT: Leave Orders

TO : Individual Concerned

1. The fol named indiv, this Hq, is atzd to proceed fr this sta o/a 18 Mar 52 to Hong Kong B.C.C. for leave of approx fifteen (15) days. Upon completion this leave, individual concerned will return to this Hq. for duty.

MR. [illegible] L. [illegible], GS-13

2. Tvl by comm a/c mil air, rail, wtr c/o mtr is atzd if indiv concerned so desires. All excess time to be charged to leave. All costs to be borne by individual concerned. No per diem atzd.

3. Authority to re-enter Japan granted by G-1, GHQ, CINCFE, Tokyo, Japan.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

J R Sollars
J. R. SOLLARS
2d Lt., AGC,
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
File - two (2)
Indiv Conc (15)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

12 December 1951

AG 201-AGCM

LO 347-1

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty

TO : Individuals Concerned

1. Fol named individuals WP o/a 13 December 1951 to Pusan and Seoul, Korea on detail for a period of 10 days TDY in connection with military intelligence activities. Upon compl will return to proper station.

Mr GRANT A. FIELDEN (GS-15)
Mr EARL N. LOCKARD (GS-13)
Mr N. SCOTT MILER (GS-13)

2. Tvl by mil acft, rail and govt mtr transportation auth. TDN. an alws of sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth while tvlg by air. No per diem auth.

3. Individuals are auth to perform duties as official couriers during period of detail.

4. Individuals will wear the Army Officers uniform less insignia in combat zone. Uniform may be purchased from QM Sales Store upon presentation of these orders.

5. Individuals may draw currently auth clothing and equipment for tvl to Korea. All clothing and equipment issued will be returned within seventy-two (72) hours after compl of detail.

6. Immunizations and physical inspection as prescribed by Circ 9, FEC 27 Feb 50 will be completed prior to departure.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

THOMAS F. WHALEY
Captain, AGC,
Asst Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION:
G2 Sec (1)
CPS (6)
G1 Sec (Civ Pers) (1)
Individuals (8) ea
Fiscal Division Officer of Comptroller (1)

14-00000

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
FIELD RESEARCH UNIT - FAR EAST COMMAND
YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

CLEARANCE SHEET

Date 1 December 1952

Mr. Miss Mrs. Houston S. Miler GS-12
(First Name Initial Last Name Rank or Grade)

is departing for ZI via
(Point of Destination)

SEA on 2 Dec 52 - [illegible] for
(Mode of Travel) (Time and Date)

PCS.
(TDY - approx no. of days; PCS, Returning to Perm Sta)

Individuals will obtain signatures from the Section and/or Officer as is indicated and in the following order. This clearance will be completed the day prior to departure. If the departure day is on Sunday or Monday, this form will be completed the preceding Friday.

Section or Officer	Date	Signature
1. Personnel Officer	1 Dec 52	
2. Communications Officer	DEC 1 1952	W. Edwards
3. Supply Officer	Dec. 2, 1953	
4. Registry Officer	2 Dec '52	
5. Security Officer	2 Dec '52	
6. Chief of Branch	2 Dec 52	F. J. Sears
7. Finance Officer	Dec. 1, 1952	V. C. Larson
8. ~~Housing Officer~~ Medical ~~(Room 315, Navy Admin Bldg.)~~		
9. Administrative Officer	2 Dec 52	for AG
10. ~~Executive Officer~~ C/Admin		for

Houston S. Miler
(Signature of Individual)

(This form is to be returned to the Personnel Officer when completed.)

RESTRICTED

FINANCIAL STATEMENT

The undersigned certifies that he (she) has paid up all outstanding local debts to the best of his (her) knowledge or that he (she) has made mutually satisfactory arrangements for the settlement of local debts, and that, if any legally incurred local debts have been overlooked, he (she) authorizes payment and subsequent payroll deductions to be made.

Newton S. Miler

14-00000

2-01

CONFIDENTIAL

24 November 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief of Mission

FROM: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT: Request for Promotion of N. S. Miler

A. Subject is the Chief, ChiInd Section. During the past 9 months and under his aegis, the Section has grown from a 3 - 4 man section with 2 or 3 additional people in the field, to approximately 10 people at Hqs and 4 to 5 in the field at all times. During this time, he has taken on the tremendous additional responsibility in his section of the primary handling of FRU relations with and support of HT MERLIN, as well as the building of a sound basis of an enlarged FRU sub-station in Hong Kong, in addition to the overall direction of all FRU China Independent operations.

B. Subject requires little supervision or assistance in carrying out his job. He is mature and competent.

C. Subject exercises a maximum of independent action, directing his section and at the same time giving what amounts to on-the-job training to the junior case officers assigned to him.

D. Subject supervises directly the 14-15 individuals mentioned in A above. As such he is responsible for all their work. He has discharged this responsibility, a particularly heavy one in view of the inexperience of his personnel, in an exemplary fashion.

E. Subject is a highly qualified operations officer with demonstrated executive abilities and hard working. He has consistently made a major contribution to the proper functioning of FRU.

CONFIDENTIAL

F. Subject was last promoted on 2 September 1951 from GS-11 to GS-12. He is a definite, career-employee asset to the organization and it is now recommended that he be promoted from GS-12 to GS-13.

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

12 December 1951

AG 201-AGOM

LO 347-1

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty

TO : Individuals Concerned

1. Fol named individuals WP o/a 13 December 1951 to Pusan and Seoul, Korea on detail for a period of 10 days TDY in connection with military intelligence activities. Upon compl will return to proper station.

Mr GRANT A. FIELDEN (GS-15)
Mr EARL N. LOCKARD (GS-13)
Mr N. SCOTT MILER (GS-13)

2. Tvl by mil acft, rail and govt mtr transportation auth. TDN. an alwc of sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth while tvlg by air. No per diem auth.

3. Individuals are auth to perform duties as official couriers during period of detail.

4. Individuals will wear the Army Officers uniform less insignia in combat zone. Uniform may be purchased from QM Sales Store upon presentation of these orders.

5. Individuals may draw currently auth clothing and equipment for tvl to Korea. All clothing and equipment issued will be returned within seventy-two (72) hours after compl of detail.

6. Immunizations and physical inspection as prescribed by Circ 9, FEC 27 Feb 50 will be completed prior to departure.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

THOMAS F. WHALEY
Captain, AGC,
Asst Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION:
G2 Sec (1)
CPS (6)
G1 Sec (Civ Pers) (1)
Individuals (8) ea
Fiscal Division Officer of Comptroller (1)

SECRET
Security Information

VIA: AIR

Dispatch No. ZJYA-6[illegible]

TO : Chief, FE
THRU : Philip J. CROCKETT
FROM : Chief of Mission, Yokosuka

SUBJECT: General - Administrative - Personnel
Specific - Recommendation for Promotion - Newton S. MILER

1. It is requested that Newton S. MILER be promoted from GS-12 to GS-13.

2. Subject served as the Chief, Chi/Ind Section until his departure for ZI on 3 December 1952. During the past 9 months and under his aegis, the Section has grown from a 3 - 4 man section with 2 or 3 additional people in the field, to approximately 10 people at Headquarters and 4 to 5 in the field at all times. During this time, he has taken on the tremendous additional responsibility in his section of the primary handling of FRU relations with and support of STPHOENIX, as well as the building on a sound basis of an enlarged FRU sub-station in Hong Kong, in addition to the overall direction of all FRU China Independent operations.

3. Subject requires little supervision or assistance in carrying out his job. He is mature and competent. He exercises a maximum of independent action, directing his section and at the same time giving what amounts to on-the-job training to the junior case officers assigned to him.

4. MILER supervises directly the 14 - 15 individuals mentioned above. As such he is responsible for all their work. He has discharged this responsibility, a particularly heavy one in view of the inexperience of his personnel, in an exemplary fashion.

5. Subject is a highly qualified operations officer with demonstrated executive abilities and a liking for hard work. He has consistently made a major contribution to the proper functioning of FRU.

6. MILER is a definite, career-employee asset to the organization. It is, therefore, recommended that he be promoted from GS-12 to GS-13.

/s/

S. HERMAN HORTON

EXTRACT

Registry

HEADQUARTERS
FIELD RESEARCH UNIT, FAR EAST COMMAND
YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

AG 201 - PERS 22 October 1951

LO 295-1

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty

TO : Individuals Concerned

1. Fol named individuals this orgn are atzd to proceed fr this sta o/a 25 October 51 to Sapporo, Japan a/o such other places as are nec for a period of TDY of approx five (5) days in conn with activ of this hq. Upon compl TDY, individuals to ret to proper sta.

Mr WILLIAM E DUGGAN (GS-15)
Mr GRANT A FIELDEN (GS-13)
Mr NEWTON S MILLER (GS-12) ✓
Mr ARSENY G YANKOVSKY (GS-12)

2. Tvl by mil a/o comm air, rail a/o mtr is auth. Civ tvl is directed as nec in the Govt Serv and will be perfmd in acc with Standard Govt Tvl Regs a/o applicable statutes. Dir costs will be pd by a/o reimbursement secured fr the FO of this orgn only. No other disb agt is atzd to effect payment.

JOHN F. HOOK
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: A

14-00000

Air

SECRET

ZJIA- 3112

Chief, Foreign Division Z
Attn : Finance Division
Chief of Mission, FRU/FEC

12 September 1951

Administrative

NEWTON S. MILER

ATTACHMENT: (1) Memorandum to Headquarters and Receipt

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum to Headquarters signed by subject employee requesting that the attached receipt for hospitalization of Mrs. Miler be forwarded to Government Employees Health Association for reimbursement.

APPROVED:

NEWTON C. BIRDSALL

SECRET

SECRET

Chief of Station
Personnel
Administrative
Practices

11 September 1951

1. This is to advise that the following promotions have been approved, effective 2 September 1951.

[redacted] From GS-11 at [illegible] to GS-12 at [illegible]

[illegible], Viola L. From GS-7 at [illegible] to GS-9 at [illegible]

2. A dispatch from the Payroll Section will follow showing the new increases in salary.

Miler

R. L. J. HAWKINS

RLJH/th

W. L. [illegible]

R. H. J. HAWKINS

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

AG 201 - AGCM

7 September 1951

LO 250-3

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty

TO : Individual concerned

1. Fol named individual WP o/a 8 September 51 to Pusan and Seoul, Korea for a period of indefinite TDY in connection with military intelligence activities. Upon compl will return to proper station.

MR NEWTON S MILER, DAC EMPLOYEE GS-13

2. Tvl by mil acft, rail and govt mtr transportation auth. TDN. An alws of sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth while tvlg by air. No per diem auth.

3. Subject is auth to perform duties as official courier during period of TDY.

4. Mr. Miler will wear the Army officers' uniform, less insignia, in combat zone. Uniform may be purchased from QM Sales Store upon presentation of these orders.

5. Individual may draw currently auth clothing and equipment for tvl to Korea. All clothing and equipment issued will be returned within seventy-two (72) hours after compl of TDY.

6. Immunizations and physical inspection as prescribed by Cir 9, FEC 27 Feb 50 will be completed by each individual prior to departure.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

THOMAS F. WHALEY
Captain, AGC
Asst Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION: C

Eyes Only

Personal Info

HEADQUARTERS
FIELD RESEARCH UNIT, FAR EAST COMMAND
YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

22 August 1951

AG 201 - PERS

LO 234-3

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty

TO : Individuals Concerned

1. Fol named individuals WP o/a 25 August 51 to Pusan and Seoul, Korea a/o such other places as are nec for a period of TDY of approx twenty (20) days in conn with activ of this hq. Upon compl TDY, individuals to ret to proper sta.

Mr. GEORGE E. AURELL (GS-15)
Mr. WILLIAM E. DUGGAS (GS-15)
Mr. CHATHAM C. CLARK (GS-15)
Mr. NEWTON S. MILER (GS-13)

2. Tvl by mil acft, rail a/o govt mtr auth. TDN. An excess baggage alws of one-hundred (100) pounds (official baggage) auth each individual in addition to sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth each individual while tvlg by air. No per diem auth.

3. Individuals are designated as Official couriers for period of TDY.

4. Individuals will wear the Army officers' uniform, less insignia, in combat zone. Uniform may be purchased from QM Sales Store upon presentation of these orders.

5. Individuals may draw currently auth clothing and equipment for tvl to Korea. All clothing and equipment issued will be returned within seventy-two (72) hours after return to Tokyo, Japan.

6. Immunizations and physical inspection as prescribed by Cir 9, FEC 27 Feb 50 will be completed by each individual prior to departure.

JOHN F. HOOK
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: C

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

19 Aug 51

AG 201 - AGOM

LO 231-7

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty

TO: Individuals concerned

1. Fol-named individuals WP o/a 20 Aug 51 to Pusan and Seoul, Korea on TDY for a period of approximately fifteen (15) days in connection with military intelligence activities. Upon compl will return to proper station.

CAPT JOHN M CLOSSON 01647225 SIG C
MR NEWTON S MILER, DAC EMPLOYEE GS-13 (on detail)

2. Tvl by mil acft, rail and govt mtr transportation auth. TDN. An alws of sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth while tvlg by air. No per diem auth.

3. Individuals are auth to perform duties as official couriers during period of TDY.

4. Mr Miler will wear the Army officers' uniform, less insignia, in combat zone. Uniform may be purchased from QM Sales Store upon presentation of these orders.

5. Individuals may draw currently auth clothing and equipment for tvl to Korea. All clothing and equipment issued will be returned within seventy-two (72) hours after compl of TDY

6. Immunizations and physical inspection as prescribed by Cir 9, FEC 27 Feb 50 will be completed by each individual prior to departure.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

Thomas F. Healey
THOMAS F. HEALEY
Captain, AGC
Asst Adj Gen

#1

DISTRIBUTION:
CG, Eighth Army APO 301 (1)
G2 Sec (1)
CPS (2)
G1 Sec (Civ Pers) (1)
2 individuals concerned (15 each) thru G2 Sec

HEADQUARTERS
FIELD RESEARCH UNIT, FAR EAST COMMAND
YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

AG 201 - PERS

16 August 1951

LO 228-2

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty

TO : Individuals Concerned

1. Fol named individuals WP o/a 18 August 1951 to Pusan and Seoul, Korea a/o such other places as are nec for a period of TDY of approx twenty (20) days in conn with activ of this hq. Upon compl TDY, to ret to proper sta.

CAPT JOHN M. CLOGSON 01647225 Sig C
Mr. NEWTON S. MILER (GS-13)

2. Tvl by mil acft, rail and govt mtr auth. TDN. An alws of sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth while tvlg by air. No per diem auth.

3. Individuals are designated official couriers.

4. Off may draw currently auth clothing and equipment for tvl to Korea. All clothing and equipment issued will be returned within seventy-two (72) hours after compl of TDY.

5. Civilian will wear the Army Officer's uniform less insignia, in the combat zone. Uniform may be purchased from QM Sales Store upon presentation of these orders.

6. Immunizations and physical inspection as prescribed by Cir 9, FEC 27 Feb 50 will be completed prior to departure.

Jno F Hook
JOHN F. HOOK
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: C

4 August 1951

Newton S. MILLER 25

FDZ

FEU/[illegible], 10 (Ops. Base Chief)

10 December 1950

GS-11

[illegible]/[illegible] Intell. Ops Br.
[illegible] Ops. Slot 224 CS-13

GS-12

(same as above)

Not applicable.

Very Good- Excellent.

20 June 1948

ESD #44 Shanghai, Code clerk, Oct 46-Jan 48
ESD #44 Mukden, Jr. Intel. Officer, Operations and Case Officer
FEU/[illegible], Intell. Officer (Ops), July 1949 to present
Excellent

Sep 46 - Dartmouth - AB Degree
(Economics)

Spanish: SRW
Chinese: L
Russian: [illegible]

Bernhard von Ammon, FE/[illegible]

CAJ 5 = 26 Oct. 46
CAF 7 = 8 Mar. 48
CAJ 9 = 19 Sep 49
CS 11= 10 Dec 50

Evan J. Parker, FE/ Admin

Lloyd George. Chief, FE3

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

28 Jul 51

AG 201 - AGOM

AG 209-2

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty

TO: Individuals concerned

1. Following individuals WP o/a this date to Pusan, Korea and Hq Eighth Army (MAIN) APO 301 on TDY for a period of approximately five (5) days in connection with military intelligence activities. Upon compl will return to proper station.

COL BENJAMIN H VANDERVOORT 022715 INF, GHQ FEC 8100th AU APO 500
MR WILLIAM E DUGGAN, DAC Employee, GS-15 (on detail)
MR NEWTON S MILER, DAC Employee, GS-12 (on detail)

2. Tvl by mil acft auth. Tvl will be performed at no expense to the mil air trans services. An alws of sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth each individual while tvlg by air. No per diem auth.

3. DAC Employees will wear the Army officers' uniform, less insignia, in combat zone. Uniform may be purchased from QM Sales Store upon presentation of these orders.

4. Individuals may draw currently auth clothing and equipment for tvl to Korea. All clothing and equipment issued will be returned within seventy-two (72) hours after return to Tokyo, Japan.

5. Individuals are auth to perform duties as official couriers during period of TDY.

6. Immunizations and physical inspection as prescribed by Cir 9, FEC 27 Feb 50 will be completed by each individual prior to departure.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

Thomas F Whaley
THOMAS F. WHALEY
Captain, AGC
Asst Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION:
CG, Eighth Army APO 301 (1)
G2 Sec (1)
3 Individuals concerned (15 each) thru G2 Sec
CPS (4)
G1 Sec (Civ Pers) (1)

Finance

HEADQUARTERS
FIELD RESEARCH UNIT, FAR EAST COMMAND
YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

AG 201 - PERS 25 July 1951

LO 206-2

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty

TO : Individuals Concerned

1. Fol named individuals WP o/a 27 July 1951 to Pusan and Seoul, Korea a/o such other places as are nec for a period of TDY of approx ten (10) days in conn with activ of this Hq. Upon compl TDY, individuals to ret to proper sta.

COL BENJAMIN H. VANDERVOORT 022715 Inf
Mr. WILLIAM E. DUGGAN (GS-15)
Mr. NEWTON S. MILER (GS-12)

2. Tvl by mil acft, rail and govt mtr auth. TDN. An alws of sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth while tvlg by air. No per diem auth.

3. Individuals are designated official couriers.

4. Off may draw currently auth clothing and equipment for tvl to Korea. All clothing and equipment issued will be returned within seventy-two (72) hours after compl of TDY.

5. Mr. Duggan and Mr. Miler will wear the Army Officer's uniform, less insignia, in the combat zone. Uniform may be purchased from QM Sales Store upon presentation of these orders.

6. Immunizations and physical inspection as prescribed by Cir 9, FEC 27 Feb 50 will be completed prior to departure.

John F Hook
JOHN F. HOOK
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: A

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

5 Jun 51

AG 201 - AGOM

LO 156-2

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty

TO: Off concerned, GHQ FEC 8100th AU APO 500

1. Following off WP o/a this date to Pusan, Taegu and Seoul, Korea on TDY for approximate number of days indicated in connection with military activities. Upon compl will return to proper station.

LT COL RICHARD T GREENWOOD 0889874 INF (indefinite period)
LT COL FRANCIS J [illegible] A0835906 USAF (10 days)
MAJ ANTONIO E DE GRASSI 01568927 INF (30 days)
CAPT JACK L PALMER 01330956 INF (30 days)
MR. [illegible] S MILER, DAC employee, GS-13 (10 days) (on detail)

2. Tvl by mil acft, rail and govt mtr transportation auth. TDN. An alws of sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth while tvlg by air. No per diem auth. Off are designated official couriers.

3. Mr. Miler will wear the Army officers' uniform, less insignia, in combat zone. Uniform may be purchased from QM Sales Store upon presentation of these orders.

4. Individuals may draw currently auth clothing and equipment for tvl to Korea. All clothing and equipment issued will be returned within seventy-two (72) hours after return to Tokyo, Japan.

5. Immunizations and physical inspection as prescribed by Cir 9, FEC 27 Feb 50 will be completed prior to departure.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

THOMAS F. [illegible]
Captain, AGC
Asst Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION:
G2 Sec (1)
5 Individuals concerned (15 each) thru G2 Sec
CPS (2)
G1 Sec (Civ Pers) (1)

14-00000

201- Miller

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. JCA - 183

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Mission, FRU/FEC
Chief of Administration

DATE: 4 May 51

FROM : CO, Sapporo, Japan

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative

SPECIFIC— Indigenous Personnel

1. On 7 April 51, KOMATA, Kazuhiko terminated his employment as houseboy for FRU Sapporo and proceeded to Yokosuka to work for Magnin.

2. On 8 April 51, SATO, Hiroshi (佐藤 34), recommended by KOMATA was employed by writer. SATO has been employed by Occupation Forces since May 1949 and was working at Northern Command Motor Pool prior his employment by writer. He was given a very good verbal recommendation by Lt. Col. Reinking, 7th Division Chaplain for whom he worked as houseboy from November 49 to March 50.

3. At request of Writer SATO was given a check by 6th CIC, Sapporo Area for possible CP affiliation which was found to be negative.

4. His salary will be 12,000 yen per month.

Miller, H. S.

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

14 Apr 51

AG 201 - Miller, Newton S [illegible]

LO 104-11

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty

TO: Individual concerned, DAC Employee, GS-12

1. MR NEWTON S MILLER WP o/a 17 Apr 51 to Pusan, Taegu and Seoul, Korea on detail for a period of approximately thirty (30) days as official courier in connection with intelligence activities. Upon compl will return to proper station.

2. Tvl by mil acft auth. TDN. An alws of sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth while tvlg by air. No per diem auth.

3. Individual will wear the Army Officers' uniform, less insignia, in combat zone. Uniform may be purchased from QM Sales Store upon presentation of these orders.

4. Individual may draw currently auth clothing and equipment for tvl to Korea. All clothing and equipment issued will be returned within seventy-two (72) hours after compl of detail.

5. Immunizations and physical inspection as prescribed by Cir 9, FEC 27 Feb 50 will be completed prior to departure.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RIDGWAY:

Lloyd R. Stewart
LLOYD R. STEWART
Major, AGC
Asst Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION:
G-2 Sec (1)
Mr Miller (15) thru G-2 Sec
CFS (2)
G-1 Sec (Civ Pers) (1)

SECRET

Date: 6 September 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COVERT PERSONNEL BRANCH:
VIA: ADSO

Subject: Promotion Request --

Name: Newton S. MILLER
Title of Position: Intelligence Officer
Grade & Salary: GS-9
Place of Assignment: FDB - ~~[illegible]~~
Sapparo, Hokkaido

It is requested that the above-named employee be promoted from the per Parker. grade and salary above-indicated to: GS-11 Intelligence Officer (Operations) FP $5400 per annum.

(Originating Officer)
for LLOYD GEORGE
CHIEF, FDB
(Title)

RECOMMEND APPROVAL:

ADSO

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

OSO

PROMOTION DATA SHEET

DATE: 6 September 1950

NAME: MILER, Mr. Newton B.

AGE: 24

OSO UNIT: Foreign Div. Z

STATION and DUTIES: FRU/FEC, Yokosuka, Japan
Station Commander in Hokkaido

DATE OF PRESENT GRADE: 19 September 1948

PRESENT GRADE: GS-9

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: FRU/FEC Field Ops Slot 7 GS-9

PROPOSED GRADE: GS-11

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: FRU/FEC Field Ops Slot 7 GS-11

IF GRADE OF THE PROPOSED T/O SLOT IS NOT HIGH ENOUGH TO ALLOW FOR THE PROMOTION, DO YOU RECOMMEND DESK AUDIT TO DETERMINE WHETHER PROMOTION IS POSSIBLE?

Not applicable.

MOST RECENT REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING and/or STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT: Very Good—Excellent DATE: 20 June 1948

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS:
ESD #44, Shanghai, Code clerk, Oct 46-Jan 48
ESD #44, Mukden, Jr. Intel. Officer, Operations and Case Officer
FRU/FEC, Station Commander, July 1949 to present

MANNER OF PERFORMANCE: Very Good - Excellent

SUMMARY OF EDUCATION AND QUALIFICATIONS:
Sep 46 - Dartmouth - AB Degree
(Economics

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Spanish: slight (read, write, speak)
Chinese: slight (speaks)
Russian: fair (read, write, speak)

RECOMMENDED BY:
John F. HOOK, Admin Officer, FRU/FEC

PREVIOUS GRADES and DATES:
CAF 5 - 20 Oct 46
CAF 7 - 8 Mar 48
CAF 9 - 19 Sep 48

CONCURRENCES:
Thomas F. Bland, (ex) Acting Chief of Mission
Evan J. Parker, Jr., FE/[illegible]/FRU
Lloyd George, Chief, FDZ

SECRET

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. ZJYW-367

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station FBU/FEC

DATE: 8 December 1949

FROM : Finance Division

SUBJECT: GENERAL. Administrative
SPECIFIC. [redacted] NEWTON S. MILER

1. Our records show an outstanding advance of $773.47 to subject which represents cost of return transportation from Headquarters to Japan. This item will be cleared at such time as subject's travel account, for the return trip, is received and processed.

2. Please have subject forward this claim account in order to clear this account.

COPY

CHARLES N. DAVIS

CND:mh

FD
RELEASING OFFICER
ADMIN.

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1948

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. ZJYW-216

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, FBU/FBC

DATE: 25 November 1949

FROM : Finance Division

Attn: Philip J. Crenshaw

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative
SPECIFIC- Payroll Change Notices

1. Attached herewith are Payroll Change Notices for the pay period 16 October thru 12 November 1949, for the following individuals:

Newton L. Miler [redacted]
Heppard, Charles

2. Forwarded for employees' information.

COPY

CHARLES E. DAVIS

Encls:
3 Payroll Change Notices

[illegible]

CMs:rr

Bishop
RELEASING OFFICER

Wolcott(FI)
COORDINATING OFFICER

W. Lloyd George
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
FDZ

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

44-1-6

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1948

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. [illegible] - 94

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, FBZ
Attn: Chief, Confidential Funds Branch

DATE: 19 November 1949

FROM : Chief, FBM/FBL

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Finance

SPECIFIC - Transmittal Signed Payroll Vouchers - Newton S. Miler

1. Attached hereto are signed payroll vouchers for Newton S. Miler for the period 1 - 28 May and 29 May - 25 June 1949.

2. The disbursement of these accounts was reported on Finance Posting Voucher #6661, but the attached forms were held at the Field Station for signature and forwarded here at a later date.

Approved:

Attachments: As stated

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO.

Pouch 18

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
EXTERNAL SURVEY DETACHMENT 44
U. S. NAVY/CHINA ZONE

22 May 1949

SPECIAL ORDERS

NUMBER 26

1. Fol named American Civilian employees are atzd and invtd to proceed fr this sta o/a 23 May 1949 to Tokyo, Japan and/or such other places as may be necessary for a pd of TDY of approx thirty (30) days in conn with ESD activ. Upon compl of TDY, each indiv will rst to this sta.

AMOS D. MOSCRIP, Jr.	(CAF-15)
NEWTON S. MILLER	(CAF-12)
JOHN W. STOWELL	(CAF-12)
SIGFRIED OPPENHEIM	(CAF-11)

Authority to enter Japan granted by G-1 GHQ, CINCFE, Tokyo, Japan.

Tvl by comm a/o mil air, rail, water, a/o mtr is atzd. TDN. Civ tvl is dirtd as nec in the Govt Serv and will be perfmd in acc with Standard Govt Tvl Regs a/o applicable statutes. Dir costs will be pd by a/o reimbursement secured fr the Fin Off of this orgn only. No other disb agt is atzd to effect payment.

Appropriation chargeable is 2195900.001, Working Fund, Army, General 1948/9.

AUTH: Radio 1868, COMNAVWESPAC, 2 Jan 47.

2. Fol named American Civilian employees are atzd and invtd to proceed fr this sta o/a 23 May 1949 to Canton, Hong Kong, China a/o such other places as may be nec for a pd of TDY of approx thirty (30) days in conn with ESD activ. Upon compl of TDY, each indiv will rst to this sta.

RONALD I. METZ
ERIC J. VESELY
S. P. CAMERON

Tvl by comm a/o mil air, rail, water, a/o mtr is atzd. TDN. Civ tvl is dirtd as nec in the Govt Serv and will be perfmd in acc with Stand Govt Tvl Regs a/o applicable statutes. Dir cost will be paid by, a/o reimbursement secured, fr the Fin Off of this orgn only. No other disb agt is atzd to effect payment.

Appropriation chargeable is 2195900.001, Working Fund, Army, General 1948/9.

AUTH: Radio 1868, COMNAVWESPAC, 2 Ja [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

(1.)

NEWTON S. ——————

—— ETI(—— CAF-9

1. Returned U.S. on TDY 14 June 48.
2. Received 30 day certificate of eligibility from date of return which carried him through 29 Aug. 48 because of leave taken from 16 June through 1 August 48.
3. Received additional per diem as follows:

    30 Aug - 30 Sept. 48 @ $4.00
    1 Oct - 30 Oct. 48 @ $4.00
    31 Oct - 30 Nov. 48 @ $4.00
    1 Dec. 48 - 15 Jan. 49 @ 4.00

4. Because of China situation and because of training subject was unable to depart prior this time. He is departing for his permanent post on 28 Jan. 49.
5. Recommend approval @ $4.00 thru. 28 Jan. 49.

JSR

IEM

g an additional
pproximately

egarding my status

rried
50
ington
Hamilton, PA.

ed apartment.

uty on which I am

o. of Days
4 months
1 month

increased personal
$6.00

1948 and I have

nent station is
13 days.

S. Niles
gnature)

ACT

APPROVED

DADSO (EXEC, OSO)

CONFIDENTIAL

Newton Miler
(1) File

CONFIDENTIAL

APPLICATION FOR ADDITIONAL PER DIEM

1. Application is made for TDY per diem during an additional period of temporary duty in Washington, D. C., of approximately 30 days duration.

2. I certify that the following information regarding my status is correct and accurate:

a. Marital status: Married
b. Number of dependents: ONE
c. Location of dependents: Washington, D.C.
d. Permanent residence: Newton Hamilton, PA.
e. I am presently living --
  In a hotel:
  With friends or relatives:
  Other: furnished apartment

3. The nature and duration of the temporary duty on which I am presently engaged in Washington is:

	No. of Days
a. State Department training:	4 months
b. OSO training:	1 mo.
c. Processing:	
d. Temporary departmental duty:	

4. I estimate that I am necessarily incurring increased personal daily expenses by reason of TDY status in amount of $ 6.00.

5. My period of TDY commenced 2 Aug 1948 and I have been paid per diem through 30 Nov 1948.

6. My estimated time of departure to my permanent station is 15 JAN 49. Per diem is hereby requested for 30 days.

Newton S. Miler
(Signature)

Recommended: @ $4.00 thru 15 January 49.

Chief, Personnel Division, OSO

APPROVED:

~~ADSO~~ (EXEC, OSO)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File

Newton Mil (6)

MILER, NEWTON S ICA CAF-9

1. Returned U.S. on TDY 14 June 1948
2. Received 30 day per diem eligibility which carried him through 24 Aug. 48 because of leave taken from 16 June 48 through 1 August 48.
3. Received additional per diem @ $4.00 from 30 August thru 30 October giving him a total of 92 days per diem.
4. Married - wife presently on maternity leave.
5. Has been enrolled in Russian Language Course by the Branch. Is scheduled for departure o/a 15 Jan. 1949.
6. Recommend approval @ $4.00 thru 30 November 1948.

JEK

1st Ind

additional
imately

ing my status
ed

tons DC.
illas, Pa.

apartment
which I am
Days
months.
Month.

nsed personal
$ 00.
18 and I have

tation is
2 days.

miles
e)

APPROVED:
Wm G Tharp
~~[illegible]~~ (EXEC, CSO)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

①

NEWTON S. MILLER - CAF-9

ade

1. Subject returned to U.S. on TDY on 14 June 48.

2. Received 30 days eligibility and has been paid per diem through 29 Aug 48, exclusive of leave taken from 16 June 48 thru 1 August 48.

3. Subject's wife is not drawing per diem. is pregnant and expects to resign in October.

4. Subject will be on TDY status until late December 48 since the Branch has enrolled him in a 90 day language course.

5. Recommend approval @ $4.00 for 30 days.

J S Kiff

W. T. Sharp
~~[illegible]~~ (EXEC, CSO)

additional
ximately

ding my status

D.C.

~~lton, Pa.~~

apartment

on which I am

f Days

4 months

1 month

reased personal
6.00 .

9 48 and I have

station is
20 days.

S. Niles
ure)

om 16 June 1948 thru

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

0

CERTIFICATION OF PER DIEM ELIGIBILITY

I hereby certify that Newton S. MILER is on temporary duty in Washington and that his permanent station is Shanghai, China. In accordance with S. O. Directive No. 10 (Revised), he is eligible for per diem at the rate of $6.00 per day for a period of thirty days (exclusive of annual leave), commencing 14 June 1948.

Chief, Personnel Division, OSO

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CID
Thru : COPS
FROM : Chief, FBZ

DATE: 21 June 1948

SUBJECT: Promotion for Newton Scott Miler

1. It is recommended that Mr. Newton Scott Miler, Operations Officer, Mukden, China, ESD station, be promoted from CAF-7 to CAF-9. Mr. Miler has been carrying out the functions and responsibilities of a CAF-9 officer for sometime. Records indicate that he was put in for promotion to CAF-7 August 1, 1947. Through delays caused by the long route from Mukden to Shanghai to Washington and by the reorganization of our promotion policy last winter, Mr. Miler was not promoted until March 2, 1948.

2. He has performed with distinction as an operations officer in Mukden, discovering an important, highly organized North Asian political movement and making operational contact with it. He is in the U.S. on TDY at this time and he is greatly needed in the Mukden operational area to handle the operation referred to and then at Peiping when Mukden is no longer tenable.

3. Mr. Miler feels that he has been in grade longer than the record shows because he was under the impression that action in the field set the date of the new grade. While this is in error, the field practice of giving a detailed notice of what would result from promotion in way of deductions and net pay tended generally to give employees the impression that promotion actions were definite long before they actually were. This paper work has since been stopped.

4. Because this operations officer has performed in an outstanding way, because he is badly needed in the field, and because he has great long term value to the organization and should be encouraged to develop, it is recommended that he be promoted to CAF-9 effective on the completion of his TDY when ready for return to China.

Lloyd George
Lloyd George
Chief, FBZ

[illegible] Answer [illegible]
[illegible] for [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]

17 June 1948

TO : Security Branch, OSO

FROM : Personnel Division, OSO HC/[illegible]

SUBJECT: Newton S. Miler

This is to advise your office of the return of Mr. Newton S. Miler from Shanghai, effective 14 June 1948. Subject is in Washington on TDY for 90 days, and your concurrence is requested on his return to Shanghai.

SECURITY CONCURRENCE: R. D. Cunningham CSB.
6/24/48

SECRET

[illegible]
EXTERNAL SURVEY DETACHMENT 44
U. S. NAVY, SHANGHAI, CHINA

370.5 (44)

SUBJECT: Invitational Travel Orders (TDY) 10 June 1948

TO : MR NEWTON S MILLER, American Civilian Employee.

1. Per authority Classified Radio 7873, 5 June 1948, WASH DC, the above named civ empl is atzd and invited to proceed from station Shanghai China to station Washington DC for TDY of approximately ninety (90) days in connection with EID training and reorientation. Upon completion of TDY, this civilian empl is further atzd and invited to return to station Shanghai China.

2. Travel will commence o/a 12 June 1948. Movement will be via commercial air and all charges incident to travel will be paid in advance at this station. Movement will be performed in accordance with Standardized Government Travel Regulations and/or applicable statutes. 217/85900 Working Fund, General 1947/8.

3. Processing to include immunizations will be completed prior to departure.

4. Temporary address which may be used while on TDY is P. O. Box 1925, Washington DC.

5. Travel Order authority: Radio 1668, COMNAVWESPAC, 2 January 1947.

Edwin R. Riley
EDWIN R. RILEY
1st Lt, INF
Adjutant

By direction . . . .

DISTRIBUTION: B

3

2 June 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Newton S. Miler and Nell C. S. Miler

1. Newton Miler arrived in Shanghai on 3 January 1947 under an 18 Months Agreement.

2. Nell C. Stine Miler arrived in Shanghai on 7 June 1946 also under an 18 months agreement. Subjects were married 8 March 1948.

3. The subjects will be returned on Tdy for 90 days upon completion of which they will be expected to execute new 24 months agreements and they will be returned to their permanent stations.

4. No Per Diem is to be paid to the subjects [redacted] [redacted] while on leave.

Miler

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. MS-95.1

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief of Mission
Attn: Chief, Admin Section

DATE: 13 May 1948

FROM: Commanding Officer
Mukden, Manchuria

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Personnel
SPECIFIC- Reserve Statue

1. In answer to your memorandum dated 29 April, subject as above, the following information is furnished on two employees at this station:

a. Newton Scott Miler -- Reserve status undetermined due to lack of records of physical examinations. Mr. Miler states his reserve status will have to remain pending until he can return to the zone of the interior for additional examinations and collection of records.

b. Malcolm Nishida -- Reserve status undetermined due to lack of records at this station. Mr. Nishida states that he is not certain whether he is a member of the enlisted reserve or not. All records pertaining to subject should be on file at the Washington Headquarters.

John K. [illegible]
JOHN K. [illegible]
Major, Infantry

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

13 May 1948

I certify that on 6 March 1948, I, Newton Scott Miler, U.S. citizen, was married, in accordance with United States State Department regulations governing foreign marriage of United States citizens, to Miss Nell Catherine Stine in Mukden, Manchuria.

Mrs. Nell Stine Miler, as of 6 March 1948, is my legal dependent and is entitled to all my material possessions, including whatever sum of money is deposited in my name in any bank, and including whatever sum of money is deposited under a joint bank account by my legal allottee, my Mother, Mrs. Elizabeth C. Miler, in any bank, in the event of my decease.

Mrs. Nell Stine Miler is also the legal beneficiary of my National Service Life Insurance policy number N 16 256 563.

Newton Scott Miler
Newton Scott Miler

Witness
John M. Classon
date 13 May 1948

Witness

date 13 May 1948

COPY

SECRET

To: Shanghai (Dwarf) ROUTINE

FROM: Special Operations 13 May 1948

Conf: CPD (1) OUT 62839

INFO: ADSO (2-3) COPS (4) CSD (5) FBZ (6-7)
CAS (8) SFD (9)

Newton Miler

WASH 6989

TO: SHAN CITE: WASHE

RE SHAN 1364 (IN 42357)

Present contracts 18 months. Why interest in length of contracts at this time? If reason is for TDY request, assume movements will be spaced according to your needs and our ability to handle. Recommend you encourage extension of tour up to 12 months beyond completion of contract.

COPY

SECRET

T.F.Bland
Admin

EMT/JBR

L. George

14-00000

Miler N. S.

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. SAL 911

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : N. S. Miler

DATE: 7 May 1948

FROM : Chief of Mission
Shanghai, China

SUBJECT: GENERAL. Administrative
SPECIFIC. Reorientation and Training

In reply to your memorandum dated 23 April 1948 in which you requested to be returned to the States on temporary duty for approximately sixty (60) days at the expiration of your present contract, wish to advise this has been favorably considered.

It is not possible at this time to be specific as to the date of departure; however, you may plan on departing sometime in June, the exact date to be determined later.

The memorandum forwarded by Nell Stine Miler has also been approved and she may depart at the same time as you.

JOHN F. HOOK

Approved:

____

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1948

(798)

May 6, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Newton Scott Miler
Nell C. Stine Miler

The above-entitled subjects are due to return to the States in May and June 1948, respectively.

Harry Little has advised that neither will return before August and probably later than August. It is probable that Newton Miler will be retained by the branch, but no action will be taken until final word is received from the branch.

Jarema

SECRET

23 April 1948

MEMORANDUM :

TO : John F. Hook
Chief, Admin. Section

THRU : Chief of Mission
Shanghai, China

INFO : Robert A. Koke
Chief, PI

1. It is requested that I be granted TDY duty in the United States for a period of approximately 60 days starting on or about 1 June 1948.

2. It is my understanding that in June 1948 the 18 months contract which I signed before leaving the United States in December 1946 will have expired. If this is the case I would like to take advantage of the expiration of the contract. However, even if, in June 1948, my contract has not expired I request that I be returned to the United States on TDY duty.

3. It is further request that my wife, Nell Stine Miler, be allowed to accompany me and that we be permitted to fly to the United States.

4. Mrs. Miler's contract with the organization expired 30 November 1947 but she has remained in China since that time and she desires to return to China with me and continue working with the organization.

N. S. Miler

N. S. Miler

FORWARDED FOR APPROVAL :

John K.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

APR 20

(2)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 16 Apr 48

Approval has been granted for the continued employment after marriage of Newton S. Miler and Nell C. Stine, both of ESD # 44, in accordance with policy established by Col. Galloway in Wash Cable 5386 (Out 61371).

Mr. Miler, CAF 7, is Intelligence Officer (Reports) working in Intelligence "P" Division. Miss Stine, CAF 5, is a clerk-typist assigned to Intelligence "Q" Division. They are not assigned to the same office or working for the same superivsor.

RCB

RETURN TO
OSO PERSONNEL DIVISION

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL

To:	SHANGHAI (DWARF)	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	14 APR 48
Confirmation:	CPD (1)	OUT 61371
Information:	ALGO (2-3), COPS (4), CRD (5), [illegible] (6-7), CAS (8)	

CONFIDENTIAL

WASH 5386

TO: SHAN CITE: WASHE

RE POLICY ON MARRIAGES BETWEEN MEMBERS OF STAFF. POLICY PROHIBITS MARRIAGE WHERE EITHER PARTY IS SUBJECT TO THE SUPERVISION OF THE OTHER OR IF BOTH ARE WORKING IN SAME OFFICE FOR SAME SUPERVISOR. CHIEF OF MISSION BEING SUPERVISOR OVER ALL EMPLOYEES CANNOT MARRY STAFF EMPLOYEE AND HAVE WIFE CONTINUE TO WORK. STAFF EMPLOYEES OUTSIDE THIS PROHIBITION MAY MARRY UPON APPROVAL HQS. AND BOTH CONTINUE EMPLOYMENT. EXAMPLE: STAFF MEMBER OF PEPPER DESIRING TO MARRY EMPLOYEE UNDER HILLRETH WOULD RECEIVE APPROVAL OF HQS. AFTER REQUEST FROM FIELD.

J. DREW ADMIN Releasing Officer	REW Originating and Coordinating Officers	L. GEORGE Authenticating Officer

TOD: [illegible] 14 48

COPY NO. 1

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

SECRET

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side

NAME Miler, Newton S.

DATE 8 March 1948

LEGAL ADDRESS 64 Fletcher, Ave., Mount Vernon, N.Y.

MARITAL STATUS Married

LOCAL ADDRESS Mukden, Manchuria

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS One

TELEPHONE

CITIZENSHIP USA

SEX Male

AGE

NATURE OF ACTION Change in Marital and Dependency Status

EFFECTIVE DATE 8 March 1948

	FROM	TO
Title	Jr. Intelligence Officer	Jr. Intelligence Officer
Grade and Salary	CAF-7, $3397.20	CAF-7, $3397.20
Office - Branch	FSRO	FSRO
Division		
Section		
Official Station	Mukden, Manchuria	Mukden, Manchuria
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)		
Quarters		
Cost of Living		
Special Foreign Living	#2300.00	#3000.00

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

APPROVAL

FIELD

Chief of Station — Date 25 May

Special Funds Officer — Date 5/17/48

Date 5/11/48

Date 5/17/48

Date

HEADQUARTERS U. S.

E.M. Jewell — Personnel Officer — Date 6.22.48

Branch Chief — Date

For the Assistant Director — Date

Chairman Personnel Review Committee — Date

Special Funds Officer — Date 6/24/48

SECRET

FORM NO.
JUN 1947 THE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

DISTRIBUTION OF SALARY

To be paid by Shanghai, China Office (FIELD) $ 75.00

Tax withheld in the United States 36.00

Insurance to be withheld in the United States
(Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased)

Retirement withheld in United States 13.08

Other (Specify in detail)

Allotments 135.24

Name of Allottee Mrs. Elizabeth C. Miles

Address 64 Fletcher Ave.,
Mount Vernon, New York

Total Gross Salary Per Pay Period $ 261.32

I HEREBY AUTHORIZE AND DIRECT THE DISBURSING OFFICE TO MAKE THE ABOVE ALLOTMENTS FROM MY COMPENSATION. ALL ADJUSTMENTS IN SALARY TO BE EFFECTED IN:

NET OVERSEAS PAYMENT

INITIAL ONE

U. S. ALLOTMENT NSM

Newton S. Miles
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

REMARKS: (Continued from reverse side)

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Prepare in triplicate. 2. Note under "Remarks" whether action is transfer from vouchered funds or another government agency. 3. If form is prepared in the field, enter distribution of salary over signature of employee. 4. If job description or other information is appropriate, enter under "Remarks."

SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side.

NAME MILER, Newton S.	
LEGAL ADDRESS New York	DATE 31 March 1949
LOCAL ADDRESS	MARITAL STATUS Married
TELEPHONE	CITIZENSHIP USA
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS	SEX M
AGE 23	
NATURE OF ACTION Change of Station	EFFECTIVE DATE 31 January 1949

	FROM	TO
Title	Intelligence Officer (Ops.)	Intelligence Officer (Ops.)
Grade and Salary.	CAF-9 $4479.60	CAF-9 $4479.60
Office - Branch	OSO - FBZ	OSO - FBZ
Division		
Section		
Official Station	Mukden	Shanghai
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)	▨	▨
Quarters		
Cost of Living		
Special Foreign Living		

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

per IN Cable 26493

COPY IN PAYROLL FILE
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH
INITIALS

APPROVAL

FIELD

CHIEF OF STATION — DATE

SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER — DATE

DATE

DATE

DATE

HEADQUARTERS U.S.

4/26/49

PERSONNEL OFFICER — DATE

BRANCH CHIEF — DATE

E M [illegible]

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR — DATE

CHAIRMAN [illegible] — DATE

SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER — 4/1/49 DATE

SECRET

FORM NO. JUN 1947 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side.

NAME: Newton S. Miler	DATE: 8 July 1948
LEGAL ADDRESS: New York	MARITAL STATUS: Married
LOCAL ADDRESS: -	NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS:
TELEPHONE: - CITIZENSHIP: USA SEX: M	AGE: 22
NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion	EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 Sept 1948 ~~On arrival at station~~

	FROM	TO
Title	Intelligence Officer (Ops.)	Intelligence Officer (Ops.)
Grade and Salary	CAF-7 $3397.20	CAF-9 ~~$4149.60~~ 4479.60 conv
Office - Branch	OSO - FBZ	OSO - FBZ
Division		
Section		
Official Station	Mukden	Mukden
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)		
Quarters	DOG - 08/18/55	
Cost of Living	CSEOD - 09/18/41	
Special Foreign Living	LOD - 09/18/41	

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

Subject has been in grade since 8 March 1948. This action is being processed as an exception to the present promotion policy.

9/26/48

APPROVAL

FIELD

CHIEF OF STATION — DATE

SERV[illegible]RIFIED

SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER — DATE

BY RA 9/4/55 DATE

DATE

DATE

HEADQUARTERS U.S.

E M Turell — PERSONNEL OFFICER — JUL 14 1948 DATE

BRANCH CHIEF — DATE

THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR — 7/14/48 DATE

CHAIRMAN PERSONNEL ... COMMITTEE — DATE

SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER — 7/16/48 DATE

SECRET

FORM NO.
JUN 1947 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

SECRET

AIR

Chief of Mission
Shanghai, China
Attn: Earl R. Wales
Special Funds

18 March 1948

Administrative
Promotions

1. Effective with the pay period beginning 7 March 1948 the following personnel received promotions to CAF-7 at $3397.20 per annum. The following is a breakdown of their salaries:

Name	Gross	Tax	Ret.	Paid Abroad	Net to P. A.
Miler, Newton S.	$261.32	$38.00	$13.08	$ 75.00	$135.24
Closson, John M.	261.32	38.00	13.08	100.00	110.24
Sincek, William A.	261.32	38.00	13.08	110.24	100.00
Modiz, Joseph J.	261.32	38.00	13.08	75.00	135.24

2. Forwarded for your information and action.

GLENN A. MALLORY

James Drum

(AMIN)

GAM:rr
E.T

SECRET

W. Lloyd George

23 January 1948

MEMO:

FROM: John F. Hook

TO : Newton S. Miller

Information furnished this Headquarters by Classified Official Dispatch SCAS-335 dated 11 December 1947 advises that you have been transferred from Communications and assigned a new job title of "Intelligence Officer".

APPROVED:

CONFIDENTIAL

2C [illegible] 121
File

6 January 1948

MEMORANDUM:

FROM : Leslie A. Weeks

TO : Glenn A. Mallory

THRU : Chief, FBZ

✓ Attached hereto is Personal History Statement on Mr. Newton S. Miler, completed in accordance with your Official Dispatch No. ZCAW-310, dated 26 November 1947.

Incl (1)

APPROVED:

Ralph T. Walker

CONFIDENTIAL

AIR POUCH

Chief of Station, Shanghai 11 December 1947

Executive

Administration

William S. [illegible]
Newton S. Miler
Hugh R. Redmond

The following employees have been transferred from Communications as requested, and assigned job titles as related to their duties:

Name	New Job Title
William S. [illegible]	Administrative Assistant
Newton S. Miler	Intelligence Officer
Hugh R. Redmond	Administrative Assistant

[illegible] A. [illegible]

Thomas F. [illegible] for [illegible] for [illegible] F. Lloyd George

CONFIDENTIAL

6 December 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Far East Personnel

As per the attached request, effective this date, the following employees have been transferred from the Communications Section of [illegible] and assigned to the duties as related in their titles. William [illegible] from Code Clerk to Administrative Assistant. [illegible] from Code Clerk to Intelligence Officer. Hugh [illegible] from Code Clerk to Administrative Assistant.

The approval for such action is in form of a memorandum from the Chief of FBZ, dated 2 December 1947.

cc: [illegible]
FBZ

AIR

Chief of Station, Shanghai 26 November 1947

Executive

Administrative

Newton S. Miler

1. Please pouch, as soon as possible, three (3) current Personal History Statements (forms attached) on above subject. Attached to each set of forms is an instruction sheet which should be adhered to.

2. These forms should be pouched within two weeks of receipt of this request.

3. These are required by this office in order to bring all personnel records up to date.

4. You may receive additional requests on other personnel from time to time.

E. W. Terrell

Attachments - Personal History Statements
(3 copies)

James H. Drum E. W. T. J.R. Coffey R. Lloyd George

COPY

25 November 1947

TO : CPD
Thru: FBZ and COPS

FROM : CCD

SUBJECT: Far East Personnel

1. Discussion of the attached letter with Captain Howard Olson revelas that the following ESD #44 personnel are officially assigned to Communications Division but actually are doing and for some time have done no Communications work, and have no apparent interest in returning to Communications Division:

William S. Renehan	- Services
Newton S. Miler	- S. I.
Hugh R. Hoover	- Services
Hugh R. Redmond	- S.I.

With the exception of Mr. Hoover, it is requested that transfer of the personnel from Communications Division to the Sections where they are now detailed, as indicated above, be formalized. Mr. Hoover is returning to the United States in December. Such transfers are, according to Captain Olson, acceptable to Colonel Moscrip, and will materially clarify all personnel records.

2. If the proposed action is approved and the transfer is effected, it is requested that the Commanding Officer, ESD #44 be advised by pouch and that the other questions contained in Mr. Renehan's letter be answered.

/s/ John W. Coffey
Deputy Chief
Communications Division

INCOMING

Copy Nr: 3
of 5 Copies
S/C NR: [illegible]

[illegible]

From: CO
To : ADMIN
Info :

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: [illegible] NOV 19[illegible]
T. F.: [illegible] Z
T. R.: 0[illegible] Z
T. D.: Lst
Nr. [illegible]

WHAT IS STATUS OF PROMOTION FOR [illegible]?

GEN.

	A	I
SSO		✓
SI		✓
K-2		
~~Registry~~		✓
Admin	✓	
Security		
Supply		
Comun		✓
Finance		

It is Forbidden to Copy or Reproduce this Message. Crypto Security Does Not Apply.

Handle This Message as CONFIDENTIAL Correspondence.

X H SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

This form is to be initiated in triplicate by the appropriate Branch or Office Chief for processing in accordance with existing personnel procedures. Upon approval, the original and one copy will be retained by the Disbursing Office and one copy returned to the originating office.

NAME Newton Scott ~~Miller~~ Miler (Miler)

DATE 13 November 1947

NATURE OF ACTION Periodic Pay Increase

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS None

EFFECTIVE DATE 19 October 1947

LOCATION OF DEPENDENTS

MARITAL STATUS Single

CITIZENSHIP U.S. SEX M AGE 21

FROM	TO
POSITION Code Clerk	POSITION Code Clerk
CONTROL NO.	CONTROL NO.
CLASSIFICATION CAF-5	CLASSIFICATION CAF-5
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY $2644.80	ANNUAL GROSS SALARY $2770.20
OFFICIAL STATION Mukden	OFFICIAL STATION Mukden
ALLOWANCES:	ALLOWANCES:
QUARTERS	QUARTERS
COST OF LIVING	COST OF LIVING
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING	SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING
TOTAL	TOTAL
OFFICE:	OFFICE:
BRANCH OSO - FBZ	BRANCH OSO - FBZ
DIVISION Commo	DIVISION Commo

TO BE PAID BY Mukden (Field) OFFICE

TAX WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	$ 75.00
INSURANCE TO BE WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES (Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased)	29.20
SAVINGS BONDS	-----
RETIREMENT WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	-----
OTHER (Specify in detail)	10.66

ALLOTMENTS Mrs. Elizabeth C. Miler (Name of Allottee)	98.23
Address Home Address	
TOTAL GROSS SALARY PER PAY PERIOD	$ 213.09

I hereby authorize and direct the Disbursing Office to make above allotments from my compensation.

Form No. 37-1
Sep 1946

SECRET

(Signature of Employee)

JOB DESCRIPTION:

RECEIVED
FUNDS BRANCH

1947 NOV 25 08 48

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS	REASONS FOR ACTION	DATE OF LAST PROMOTION
	Has received no salary increase since 7 October 1946.	

APPROVED ______ (Field) ______ OFFICE

______ (Chief of Mission) Date ______

______ (Security Officer) Date ______

______ (Special Funds Officer) Date ______

APPROVED — U.S. OFFICE

______ Date 13 Nov 47
OSO Personnel Division

______ (Branch Chief) Date 17 Nov 47
17/11/47

______ Date 5 Nov 47
Chief, Personnel Division

______ (Special Funds Officer) Date 25 Nov 47

Newton S. Miler

31 October 1947

Subject: Personnel

To : DIRECTOR, Special Operations
Washington 25, D. C.

Attn :

1. For sometime now, we have had the papers in Washington for the reclassification of Mr. David E. West and Mr. Newton S. Miler.

2. Mr. David West is now stationed in Peiping and is ably performing the duties of a Junior Intelligence Officer. He is responsible for the Harial net which he has very successfully taken over from Mr. Frank Bessac. In addition to this, he is also handling Glonads. It is hoped that his reclassification to a CAF-9 will be forthcoming.

3. Mr. Newton S. Miler, who is presently a CAF-5, is now stationed in Mukden and is performing the duties of a Junior Intelligence Officer. He is handling some North Korean operations from the Mukden station and is rapidly gaining experience. It is hoped that his reclassification to a CAF-7 will be acted upon.

4. It is requested that this headquarters be advised of any action taken by Washington regarding the reclassification of the above personnel.

Approved:

RALPH T. WALKER

SECRET

EXTERNAL SURVEY DETACHMENT 44
U. S. NAVY

ESS-003-918
③

18 September 1947

TO: Chief, Personnel and Services.

SUBJECT: Personnel Action Request - Newton S. Miler

Attached herewith is Form 37-1, Personnel Action Request, to effect promotion for Newton S. Miler.

Earl R. Wales
EARL R. WALES.

APPROVED:

Ralph T Walker

SECRET

[illegible] Miler

15 August 47

Dear Bob,

Thank you for initiating action on my promotion and for attempting to obtain a transfer. I understand the situation about the transfer and realize that nothing more can be done in the field. Am satisfied, however, since no complications will arise from my being carried on [illegible] books.

Have signed the personal action papers and this is, I hope, a rough draft of a job description.

Collection and dissemination of SI information; establishment and direction of intelligence nets; interrogation of POW's and refugees from Communist areas and North Korea; coordination of intelligence nets being run into North Korea, Communist Manchuria, Dairen and Siberia; at present am directing a CE net in Mukden which will eventually turn into an SI net.

Thanks again, Bob

Scott

Scott Miler

8 August 1947

Dear Scotty

Enclosed please find personal action papers for your promotion. Please sign all four copies and return as soon as possible. Also, please prepare a job description in rough draft. I will have it edited and typed on the form.

A cable was sent to Washington asking for your transfer and promotion and an answer came back advising that it was impossible to transfer personnel from one branch to another in the field. The only place possible would be Washington after you return to the States. They advised that all personnel in the field were assigned to FSRO and that we were free to use personnel in whatever capacity we deemed best and that promotion papers be pouched to Washington for their consideration. This evidently is their policy because Renehan and Hoover have both received raises and are working for Services though originally sent out for Commo work by Washington.

You are doing a good job, keep it up and don't forget to have a good time while Nell is there.

Bob

Robert A. Koke

SECRET

1 August 1947

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Promotion of Newton Scott Miler

To : MR. AMOS D. MOSCRIP, Jr.
Chief of Mission

1. It is requested that papers be initiated for the promotion of Newton Scott Miler to a CAF-7. Mr. Miler is at present a CAF-5 and has been in grade approximately one year. He arrived in China 3 January 1947.

2. Mr. Miler is at present performing the duties of a junior intelligence investigator at Mukden.

Robert A. Koke

Robert A. Koke
Chief, SI

8 Aug 47
[illegible]
[illegible]

Copy Nr:
of 6 Copies
S/C NR: 5140

INCOMING

WASHINGTON

From: WASH EASY
To : SHAN ABLE
Info :

Date: 5 AUGUST 1947
T. F.: 052251 Z
T. R.: Z
T. O.: Lst

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Nr. CK NR 271 WASH 5048

RE SHAN 513. MILER'S BEST USE IN YOUR AREA ARE DETERMINABLE BY YOU. PERMANENT TRANSFER TO INTELLIGENCE, POSITIVE OR OTHERWISE, MUST AWAIT DECISION AFTER HIS RETURN TO Z.I. IF YOU FEEL PROMOTION WARRANTED, SUBMIT PAPERS FOR CONSIDERATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

	A	I
SSO		✓
SI		✓
I-I		
Registry		✓
Admin	✓	
Security		
Supply		
Commun		✓
Finance		

TSC

It is Forbidden to Copy or Reproduce this Message. Crypto Security Does Not Apply.
Handle This Message as [illegible] Correspondence.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

File

TO : CFD

DATE: July 24, 1947

FROM : CSS

SUBJECT: MILER, Newton S.

Reference is made to your memorandum of July 17, 1947, relative to the above-entitled subject.

Based upon a review of the subject's file, as well as information from other available sources, the Security Division is pleased to concur with your request for transfer of the subject from COMMO, Shanghai, China, to COMMO, Mukden, Manchuria.

In view of recent instructions issued by the Assistant Director for Special Operations, we request that this office be furnished with two copies of current Personal History Statements of the subject in order that appropriate security checks may be initiated prior to further assignment.

Robert H. Cunningham

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM
Chief, Special Security Section

CONFIDENTIAL

17 July 1947

TO : Security Division

FROM : OSO, Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Miler, Newton S.

Security concurrence is requested on the transfer of Newton S. Miler from COMSO, Shanghai, China to COMSO, Mukden, Manchuria, effective 13 May 1947. Subject's title, grade and salary remains the same.

[illegible]

PERSONNEL [illegible]

This form is to [illegible] in triplicate by [illegible] or Office Chief [illegible] procedure. [illegible] by the Disbursing Office and one copy returned to the [illegible] Office.

Crw

NAME
Newton S. Miler
NATURE OF ACTION
Change of Official Station
EFFECTIVE DATE
13 May 1947
MARITAL STATUS
Single

DATE
12 May 1947
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS
None
LOCATION OF DEPENDENTS
CITIZENSHIP
USA
SEX
M
AGE

POSITION
Code Clerk
CONTROL NO.
CLASSIFICATION
CAF-5
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY
$2644.80
OFFICIAL STATION
Shanghai, China
ALLOWANCES: QUARTERS
COST OF LIVING
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING
1980.00 p.a.
TOTAL

OFFICE: BRANCH
COMMO
DIVISION

POSITION
Code Clerk
CONTROL NO.
CLASSIFICATION
CAF-5
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY
$2644.80
OFFICIAL STATION
Mukden, Manchuria
ALLOWANCES: QUARTERS
COST OF LIVING
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING
$1980.00 p.a.
TOTAL

OFFICE: BRANCH
COMMO
DIVISION

TO BE PAID BY
SHANGHAI, CHINA
OFFICE

	$
TAX WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	75.00
INSURANCE TO BE WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES (Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased)	27.20
SAVINGS BONDS	--
RETIREMENT WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	
OTHER (Specify in detail)	--
ALLOTMENTS	--

[illegible] S. Miler

Address:
64 Fletcher Ave., Mount Vernon, New York

TOTAL GROSS SALARY PER PAY PERIOD: 101.24
$ [illegible]

I hereby authorize and direct the Disbursing Office to make above allotments from my compensation.

Any increase in salary to be paid to allottee.

Form No. 37-1
Sep 1946

No change in salary allotments. ~~Employee's signature unnec~~
(Signature of employee)

JOB DESCRIPTION:

SPECIAL QUALIFICATION ________ PERSONAL EVALUATION ____ DATE OF LAST [illegible]

APPROVED ________________ OFFICE: APPROVED --- U. S. OFFICE:

________________ Date ______ E. M. Tessell Date 7-17-47
(Chief of Mission) (Administrative Officer)

Major, Ed. Date 21 June 47 Lloyd George Date 2-9-47
(Security Officer) ([illegible] Officer)

Nick J. Steichen Date ______ ________________ Date ______
([illegible] Officer) ([illegible])

________________ Date 22 July
(Special Funds Officer)

Vira P. Purdon 18 July 47

[illegible]

112.

[illegible]

This form is to be initiated in triplicate by the appropriate Branch or Office Chief for [illegible] personnel [illegible]. Upon approval, the original and [illegible] by the disbursing Office and one copy [illegible]

NAME Horton S. Miler

DATE 1 August 1947

NATURE OF ACTION Promotion ~~and Change~~ ~~[illegible]~~ (March)

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS none

EFFECTIVE DATE As soon as possible

LOCATION OF DEPENDENTS --

MARITAL STATUS Single

CITIZENSHIP USA SEX M AGE

FROM		TO	
POSITION	Code Clerk	POSITION	~~Jr. Intelligence Officer~~
CONTROL NO.	-	CONTROL NO.	
CLASSIFICATION	CAF-5	CLASSIFICATION	CAF-7
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	$2644.80	ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	$3977.20
OFFICIAL STATION	Mukden, Manchuria	OFFICIAL STATION	Mukden, Manchuria
ALLOWANCES:		ALLOWANCES:	
QUARTERS		QUARTERS	
COST OF LIVING		COST OF LIVING	
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING	$1460	SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING	$1460
TOTAL		TOTAL	
OFFICE:	COMMO	OFFICE:	~~FBO~~ Commo
BRANCH		BRANCH	
DIVISION		DIVISION	

TO BE PAID BY Shanghai, China OFFICE	$ 75.00
TAX WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	38.00
INSURANCE TO BE WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES (Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased)	--
SAVINGS BONDS	--
RETIREMENT WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES	13.08
ALLOTMENTS Mrs. Elizabeth C. Miler (Name of Allottee)	135.24 = 148.32
Address: 64 Fl[illegible] Ave., Mount Vernon, New Y.	
TOTAL GROSS SALARY PER PAY PERIOD	$ 261.92

I hereby authorize and direct the Disbursing Office to [illegible] the above allotments from my compensation. Any increase in salary to be paid to Allottee.

________________.

(Signature of Employee)

FBSH 97-1

JOB DESCRIPTION:

Collection and dissemination of SI information; establishment and direction of intelligence nets; interrogation of POW's and refugees from Communist areas and North Korea; coordination of intelligence nets being run into North Korea, Communist Manchuria, Dairen and Siberia; at present incumbent is directing a CE net in Mukden which will eventually turn into a SI net.

Incumbent is responsible to the Unit Commander for setting up and administering an organization which can secure all the above information without divulging any significant facts about ESD and yet have adequate loyalty to assure accurate reports being made by all agents.

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS   REASONS FOR ACTION   DATE OF LAST PROMOTION

APPROVED ______ OFFICE
([illegible])

Date: ______
([illegible])

Date: ______
([illegible])

Dick [illegible]
([illegible])

APPROVED ...... U. S. OFFICE

E. M. Terrell Date: MAR 9 1948
([illegible])

Date: 9 Feb.
([illegible])

Date: 3/9/48
([illegible])

Date: 1/?/48
([illegible])

14-00000

OUTGOING

Precedence ....

Copy Nr: ....
of .... Copies
S/C NR: 3217

From: CO AND CHIEF, SI

CONFIDENTIAL

To : CO, MUKDEN

Destination:

DATE: 29 April 1947
NR: 744

MILER DEPARTING SHANGHAI APPROXIMATELY FIVE MAY FOR YOUR STATION. MILER IS TO WORK AS SI INVESTIGATOR. SUBJECT TO YOUR DECISION WE BELIEVE MILER WOULD BE USEFUL ANTUNG. HE HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY BRIEFED HERE ON KOREAN OPERATION. HE HAS HAD SOME EXPERIENCE WITH TWENTY FOUR CORP IN SEOUL. WE BELIEVE HE WILL BE A VALUABLE ADDITION TO YOUR STAFF.

	A	I
SSO		
SI		
X-2		
Registry		
Admin		
Security		
Supply		
Commo		
Finance		

It is Forbidden to Copy or Reproduce this Message. Crypto Security Does Not Apply.

Handle This Message as CONFIDENTIAL Correspondence.

[illegible], S. II

INCOMING

Copy Nr :
of ________ Copies
S/C NR: 2733

From : [illegible]
To : [illegible]
Info :

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: [illegible]
T. F.: [illegible] Z
T. R.: Z
T. D.: Lt

CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE

Nr. [illegible] 23
[illegible]

RE SHAI 266:

RELEASE CLAIM ON MILER.

CONFIDENTIAL

	A	I
SSO		
S		
[illegible]		
Registry		
Admin		
Security		
Support		
Comms		
Finance		

CEP/

It is Forbidden to Copy or Reproduce this Message. Crypto Security Does Not Apply.

Handle This Message as CONFIDENTIAL Correspondence.

EXTRACT

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
EXTERNAL SURVEY DETACHMENT NO. 44
U. S. NAVY

1 April 1947

SUBJECT: Monthly Report, Communications.

TO : Commanding Officer, Headquarters, External Survey Detachment No. 44, Shanghai, China.

1. GENERAL PROGRESS

2. PERSONNEL

The following personnel are to be returned to Washington for termination or reassignment if possible during the period ending 1 July 1947. Some men are available for transfer to other branches in China as indicated below.

Civ. Newton S. Miler - returned from TDY in Tokyo. Good cryptman, now suplus. Available for transfer to S.I. branch, China.

/s/ HOWARD J. OLSON
HOWARD J. OLSON
Captain, Sig. C.
Communications Officer

14-00000

INCOMING

Copy Nr: 1
of 2 Copies
S/C NR: 3357

From: TOKYO

TOKYO

To : SHANGHAI

Date 26 MARCH 1947
T. F 252347 Z
T. R 260350 Z
T. D: Lst

Info :

SECRET

SECRET

CK NR 12, [redacted] TOKY 31

NEWTON S. MILER CLEARANCE INTO KOREA GRANTED BY COMMAND CG 24 CORPS SIGNED GILCHRIST G-1. CLEARANCE INTO FEC AREAS GRANTED COMMAND CINCFE SIGNED MURRAY, ASST G-1. WRITE CHANGE OF STATION ON ORDERS TAKING HIM TO SEOUL, KOREA. DO NOT MENTION ANY ORGANIZATION ON ASSIGNMENT. RE SHAN 266, WHICH I RELAYED TO SEOUL FOR ACTION KELLIS, IF MILER DOES NOT GO NOTIFY[redacted] WASHINGTON. WILL FORWARD REPLY FROM KELLIS.

SECRET

	A	I
SSO	✓	
SI		
1 2		
Registry		
Admin		
Security		
Supply		
Comm		
Finance		

THC

It is Forbidden to [illegible] or Reproduce this Message. Crypto Security [illegible] Does Not Apply.
Handle This Message as SECRET Correspondence.

Miler, [illegible]

INCOMING

Copy Nr:

of Copies

S/C NR:

From: WASH CAST

To : SHAN

Info :

Date: 12 MAR 47

T. F.: Z

T. R.: Z

T. O.: Lat

SECRET - ROUTINE

Nr. 0286

RE SHAN 083. TRANSFER NORDIN TO TOKYO IMPOSSIBLE. IF SURPLUS YOUR NEEDS, ADVISE ETD FOR U S FOR TERMINATION. MUST CANCEL WIFE'S TRANSPORTATION BEFORE 15 MARCH. CONCUR TRANSFER RICHARDSON. APPROVE TRANSFER MILER AS SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS CLERK.

	A	I
SSO		
SI		
X-2		
Registry		
Admin		
Security		
Supply		
Commun		
Finance		

It is Forbidden to Copy or Reproduce this Message. Crypto Security [illegible] Not Apply.

Handle This Message as Correspondence.

Precedence ....

OUTGOING

SECRET

Copy Nr: ....
of 6 Copies
S/C NR: 7897

From: SHAN
To: DELANEY
Destination: TOKYO

DATE: [illegible] MARCH 1947
NR: SHAN-266

DUE TO CHANGE OF HEART ON PART OF [illegible] AND [illegible], WE NOW DESIRE TO USE [illegible] AROUND FOR KOREAN PENETRATION. REQUEST YOU RELEASE YOUR CLAIM. ADVISE.

	A	I
SSO		
SI		
X-2		
~~Registry~~		
Admin		
Security		
Supply		
Comun		
Finance		

It is Forbidden to Copy or Reproduce this Message. Crypto Security Does Not Apply.

Handle This Message as SECRET Correspondence.

INCOMING

SEOUL VIA WASHINGTON

SECRET CONTROL

From: SEOUL

To: WASH FOX AND SHAN

Info:

Copy No.:

of Copies

S/C NR: 2919

Date: 2 MARCH 1947

T. F.: 011607 Z

T. R.: 0508/02 Z

T. D.: Lot

Nr. SEOUL 05 CX NR 02

SECRET CONTROL

NEWTON S. MILER DESIRES TO REMAIN IN SEOUL. IT IS REQUESTED THAT HE BE ASSIGNED TO LIAISON UNIT KOREA. HE HAS BEEN WORKING IN INTELLIGENCE WORK HERE IN ADDITION TO HIS CRYPT WORK AND HAS BEEN DOING VERY WELL.

SECRET CONTBOL

SSO		
SI		
X-2		
Registry		
Admin		
Security		
Supply		
Comm		
Finance		

It is Forbidden to Copy or Reproduce this Message. Crypto Security Does Not Apply.

Handle This Message as SECRET CONTROL Correspondence.

14-00000

FROM: SHANGHAI

TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

ACTION: EXEC (1)

ROUTINE

4 JAN 47

IN 46477

INFORMATION: ADSO (2-3), COPS (4), REG (5), FBM (6-7), SP FD (8), TRANS (9)

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY #1

SHAN 139

TO: WASHS CITE: SHAN

THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ARRIVED SHANGHAI 3 JANUARY: OLIVER HEATHOLD, PHILLIP POTTER, JOHN CLOSSON, THOMAS A. SMITH, [illegible] [illegible], AND HAROLD [illegible]. EACH EMPLOYEE PAID U. S. DOLLARS 287.50 FOR BOAT FARE WHICH INCLUDES $37.50 TRANSPORTATION TAX. WE WILL REIMBURSE EMPLOYEES FOR LATTER AMOUNT ONLY SINCE $250. WAS ADVANCED TO EACH BY SHEPHERD. WILL YOU NEED INDIVIDUAL RECEIPTS TO OBTAIN TAX REFUND.

CONFIDENTIAL

TOR: 0027 5 JAN 47

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

PERSONNEL TRANSFER LETTER

(THIS IS NOT A TRAVEL ORDER)

27 February 1951

TO: Mr. Newton S. Miller

1. Pursuant to authority vested in me, your official station is hereby established as Yokosuka, Japan. Upon receipt of proper Travel Orders you will proceed from Sapporo, Japan to such station, xxx.

2. The travel to your new station is to be accomplished as soon as practicable after receipt of proper Travel Orders. This transfer is not for your convenience or benefit, or at your request, but in the best interests of the Government.

3. In accordance with the provisions of applicable agency regulations, and subject to the availability of funds, the shipment at Government expense of your household goods and personal effects, including packing, crating, unpacking, uncrating, drayage, and temporary storage not to exceed ninety days, within the prescribed weight allowance, is authorized.

4. Subject to the availability of funds, the movement of your immediate family at Government expense is authorized in accordance with agency regulations.

5. Authorization for the shipment of a personally owned automobile at Government expense, when consistent with agency regulations, is hereby authorized.

CHIEF, EMPLOYEES DIVISION

FORM NO. 37-110
FEB 1950

SECRET

SECRET

6 June 1949

PERSONNEL TRANSFER LETTER
(This is not a travel order)

TO: **Newton S. Miler**

1. Pursuant to authority vested in me, your official station is hereby established as Hokkaido, Japan. Upon receipt of proper Travel Orders you will proceed from Takao, Formosa. to such station, via ________________.

2. The travel to your new station is to be accomplished as soon as practicable after receipt of proper Travel Orders. This transfer is not for your convenience or benefit, or at your request, but in the best interests of the Government.

3. In accordance with the provisions of applicable agency regulations, and subject to the availability of funds, the shipment at Government expense of your household goods and personal effects, including packing, crating, unpacking, uncrating, drayage, and temporary storage not to exceed ninety days, within the prescribed weight allowance, is authorized.

4. Subject to the availability of funds, the movement of your immediate family at Government expense is authorized in accordance with agency regulations.

5. Authorization for the shipment of a personally owned automobile at Government expense, when consistent with agency regulations, is hereby authorized.

Deputy Personnel Officer

SECRET

SECRET

file
Jm

(5.)

6 June 1949

MEMORANDUM

TO : Confidential Funds Branch
Attention: L. Frauenheim

FROM : Chief, Overseas Division

SUBJECT: Cancellation of Travel Orders

1. Due to erroneous information received from the field it is necessary to cancel the following travel orders:

Alwyne C. Pinder - UV-654-49
Ernest G. Seidel - UV-648-49
Ronald I. Metz - UV-655-49
Sara E. O'Connell - UV-656-49
Jean L. Victor - UV-652-49
Virginia H. Renshaw - UV-653-49
Newton S. Miller - UV-647-49
Verda M. Honnold - UV-651-49
William E. Renahan - UV-649-49

96

SECRET

SECRET

29 April 1949

PERSONNEL TRANSFER LETTER

(THIS IS NOT A TRAVEL ORDER)

TO: Newton S. Miler

1. Pursuant to authority vested in me, your official station is hereby established as Takao, Formosa
Upon receipt of proper Travel Orders you will proceed from Shanghai, China. to such station, via

2. The travel to your new station is to be accomplished as soon as practicable after receipt of proper Travel Orders. This transfer is not for your convenience or benefit, or at your request, but in the best interests of the Government.

3. In accordance with the provisions of applicable agency regulations, and subject to the availability of funds, the shipment at Government expense of your household goods and personal effects, including packing, crating, unpacking, uncrating, drayage, and temporary storage not to exceed ninety days, within the prescribed weight allowance, is authorized.

4. Subject to the availability of funds, the movement of your immediate family at Government expense is authorized in accordance with agency regulations.

5. Authorization for the shipment of a personally owned automobile at Government expense, when consistent with agency regulations, is hereby authorized.

George E. [illegible]
DEPUTY PERSONNEL OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-110
FEB 1949

SECRET

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
EXTERNAL SURVEY DETACHMENT 44
U. S. NAVY, CHINA ZONE

10 February 1949

5

SPECIAL ORDERS

NUMBER 11

1. EXTRACT

2. NEWTON S. MILER, American civilian employee, now Shanghai, China, is trfd PCS to Headquarters, Forward Echelon, External Survey Detachment 44, U. S. Navy, Takao, Formosa, effective immediately. Indiv concd will proceed to new DY station on/about 11 February 1949.

Tvl by comm or mil air is atzd. TDN. Civ tvl is dirtd as nec in the Govt Serv and will be perfmd in acc with Stand Govt Tvl Regs a/o applicable statutes. Direct costs will be pd by, a/o reimbursement secured from, the Fin Off of this orgn only. No other disb agt is atzd to effect payment.

Appropriation chargeable is 2195900.001, Working Fund, Army, General, 1948/9.

AUTH: Radio 1868, COMNAVWESPAC, 2 Jan 47.

OFFICIAL:

J F Hook
JOHN F. HOOK
Administrative Officer

By direction..........

JOHN F. HOOK
Administrative Officer

RESTRICTED

SECRET

31 January 1949

PERSONNEL TRANSFER LETTER
(This is not a travel order)

TO: **Newton S. Miler**

1. Pursuant to authority vested in me, your official station is hereby established as Shanghai, China. Upon receipt of proper Travel Orders you will proceed from Mukden to such station, via ________________.

2. The travel to your new station is to be accomplished as soon as practicable after receipt of proper Travel Orders. This transfer is not for your convenience or benefit, or at your request, but in the best interests of the Government.

3. In accordance with the provisions of applicable agency regulations, and subject to the availability of funds, the shipment at Government expense of your household goods and personal effects, including packing, crating, unpacking, uncrating, drayage, and temporary storage not to exceed ninety days, within the prescribed weight allowance, is authorized.

4. Subject to the availability of funds, the movement of your immediate family at Government expense is authorized in accordance with agency regulations.

5. Authorization for the shipment of a personally owned automobile at Government expense, when consistent with agency regulations, is hereby authorized.

Deputy Personnel Officer

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

Name of Employee: **Newton S. Miler**

Title and Branch **Intelligence Officer, FBZ**

Present Official Station: [illegible]

Station to which employee is being transferred **Shanghai, China**

Type of [illegible] Employee's [illegible]

Approximate Date Employee is to start Travel:

[illegible] X [illegible]

Movement of Family to be Requested YES ___ NO ___
(If "YES", complete spaces below)

Members of Family for whom Transportation is Requested:

Age [illegible] Relationship

Name, Address & Tel. No. of Person to be contacted in connection with movement:

Approximate Date It is Desired that Family be moved:

Movement of Household Goods and Personal Effects: YES X NO ___
(If "YES", complete spaces below)

Address and Location of Household Goods and Personal Effects:

Mr. W. H. Stine
Newton Hamilton,
Pennsylvania

Name, Address & Tel. No. of Person to be contacted in connection with movement:

Mr. W. H. Stine
Newton Hamilton,
Pennsylvania

Phone: On Mt. Union, Pennsylvania exchange.

List [illegible] Description of [illegible] to be moved
(If [illegible])

In accordance with Section 10.9 of the Special Funds Regulations, dated 1 June 1945.

[illegible]

Newton S. Miler

TSD

[illegible] January 1949

Chief, FBZ

Newton S. HILER

1. It is requested that Mr. Hiler's date of availability, previously indicated on his request for transportation as 21 January 1949, be changed to 28 January 1949.

LLOYD GEORGE
Chief, FBZ

Originator: A. I. Vallieres

Deputy Chief FBZ/HEA: Paul Eckel

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

26 January 1949

MEMORANDUM

TO : Deputy Budget Officer

FROM : Deputy Personnel Officer

SUBJECT: Foreign Post Differential

1. In accordance with Part 325, Sub-Chapter B, Chapter III, Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations,

Newton S. Miler

is eligible to receive foreign post differential pay as prescribed by regulations.

George E. Meloon

Deputy Personnel Officer

George E. Meloon
Deputy Personnel Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(This form to be prepared in [illegible] - original to Special Funds Division, duplicate [illegible] to office of destination, triplicate to Administrative Officer, and [illegible] not to be carried to destination [illegible] to Special Funds Officer)

1. NAME **Newton S. Miler** ✓ Date **25 January 1949**

2. POSITION **Intelligence Officer** **CAF 9** ANNUAL GROSS SALARY **4479.60** CONTROL NO. _

3. DESTINATION **Shanghai**

4. HOME ADDRESS **Newton, Hamilton, Penna.**

5. SALARY DATA: (FOR EACH FOUR WEEKLY PAY PERIOD) **10% Differential Post due upon arrival**

A - To be paid by **Shanghai** Station Office .... $ **90.00**

B - Tax withheld in U.S. .... $ **29.00**

C - Insurance withheld in U.S. .... $ -

D - Bond deductions withheld in U.S. .... $ -

E - Retirement deductions withheld in U.S. .... $ **20.68**

F - Other - (specify in detail) **Hospitalization** .... $ **2.96**

G - To be paid to allottee by Washington Office .... $ **201.94**

Total Gross Salary Per Pay Period .... $**344.58**

6. Overseas payment to begin with payroll period **9 January 1949** Through **5 February 1949**

7. Allotment instructions:
Mail or deliver four weekly check to **to the account of Newton S. Miler and/or Nell S. Miler**
Name as it should appear on check
At the following address **The Central National Bank, Mount Union, Pa.**

8. All adjustments in salary to be effected in: (Initial one)
A - Net overseas payment ___ B - U.S. Allotment **X**

9. Leave balance as of **1/28/49 (Date of departure)** (Approximate date of departure)
A - Annual leave **140** Hours B - Sick Leave **205** Hours

10. Classification of Assignment: (Check one) Temporary ___ Permanent **X**

11. Payment of allowances for quarters and/or cost of living is **X** is not ___ authorized (check one)

12. Authorization of allowances for quarters and/or cost of living is in accordance with **Standardized Government Civilian** (cite authority)

13. Allowance for quarters and cost of living data:
(To be stated in cases where deemed necessary by Special Funds Division - If [illegible] it will be the responsibility of person making payment to ascertain that the maximum, as shown, is allowable under existing regulations in each individual case, and that all proper deductions are made)

Current Maximum Rate Authorized	Annual	Per Four Weekly Pay Period
Quarters	$ -	-
Cost of Living	$ -	-
Other (specify) **SFLA**	$ * **2300.00**	**176.92**

14. Dependency Status:
___ Married with dependents in area **X** Married without dependents in area
___ Single with dependents in area Single without dependents in area

15. Advances transferred **None** as per T/A attached

16. REMARKS: * **Quarters percentage 20%. Subject must complete [illegible] - see CAI #11 and Standardized Govt. Civilian Allowance Regs. Dependent wife to follow at later date.**

Administrative Officer

Branch Chief

Personnel Officer

Special Funds Officer

File

Unvouchered Funds

DATE 27 December 1948

TO : Dispensary
FROM : CPD - OSO
SUBJECT: **Newton S. Miler.**

It is requested that subject, who entered on duty with OSO xxxxxxxxxx, be given a xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx overseas physical examination. He/xxx is scheduled for assignment to Shanghai, China, and inoculations should/xxx be started.

F. W. TERRELL

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible]ATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 2 APRIL 1975
FILE NO.: 1711

TO: (Check)
X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) CI

SS NUMBER: 480-22-3553
EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 112773
ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: RETIRED

OFFICIAL COVER:
☐ ESTABLISHED
X DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: NEWTON SCOTT MILER

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED
EFFECTIVE DATE ____________

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED
FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMME[illegible] LIMITATION CATEGORY [illegible] (HHB 20-7)

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ TO BE ISSUED (HHB 20-11)

SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE [illegible] COVER. (HR 240-2*)

SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2*)

EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

X CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS
EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD

X SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA ______ #-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

[illegible] CATEGORY [illegible] CATEGORY II ☐

X [illegible] TO CCS

X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR [illegible] HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

[illegible] IN THIS BLOCK.

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

SUBJECT WILL BE ACKNOWLEDGED AS
CIA FOR ENTIRE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT
BUT WILL NOT REVEAL SPECIFIC PLACES
OR LOCATIONS OF COVER ASSIGNMENTS.

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - [illegible]
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - [illegible]
COPY 4 - [illegible]
COPY 5 - [illegible]

JSimir

FORM 1551 [illegible]

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 030120

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 17 November 72 1711

SS NUMBER: 480-22-3553

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 012773

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)

☒ CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION

☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION

☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) CI

ATTN: Chief/CI Support Staff

REF: Form 2458 - dated 1 June 1971

SUBJECT: MILER, Newton Scott

OFFICIAL COVER: ☒ ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

UNIT: Dept of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE From EOD

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 3254 State #-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HB 240-2e)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HB 240-2e)

EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☒

☒ SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR Agc HOSPITALIZATION CARD

☐ CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:

☐ SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ #-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)

EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

☐ SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Oct 46-May 49-China-DNC
May 49-Dec 52-Japan-DAC
Dec 52-Jun 55-Hqs-Overt
Jun 55-Sept 55-Japan-DAC
Sept 55-Nov 56-Philippines-DAC
30 Nov 56-15 Apr 58-Bangkok-Int AID
May 58-19 July 61-Hqs-DAC
20 July 61-July 64-Ethiopia Int State
July 64-25 Nov 72-Hqs-Int State
26 Nov 72-Hqs-Nom State

DISTRIBUTION:

TJ:pb

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER CENTRAL STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

23 May 1958

File No. K-1112

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Personnel Security Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : **Newton S. MILER**

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named Subject.

2. Effective **immediately**, it is requested that your records be properly blocked [illegible] to deny [illegible] Subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

[illegible]

JOSEPH M. [illegible]
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

cc: PSD/OS

S E C R E T

THIS [illegible] REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

MILER NEWTON SCOTT 012773 41270170

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MILER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	31 400	CF	GS 16 6	$36,000

P: 15 JAN 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

0EF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 012773

2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): MILER NEWTON SCOTT

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (INVOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA

4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 12 31 74

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS ▶

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 5127 0170 | 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 235(A)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI OPERATIONS
OPERATIONS GROUP
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0053

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYA

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: 36000

18 REMARKS:
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45

20 Employ Code:

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 Mission Code:

25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 03 01 26

26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):

27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):

RETIREMENT DATA: CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0GU0000

32 Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO

34 SEX

37 LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAT | TENURE | PROV. | TEMP | CODE

39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 WAIVER | 1 YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION


AUGUST 69

POSTED
JAN 15 1975

Mfg 8-73 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY:007622

[illegible] MILER NEWTON SCOTT				31 400		CF			
GS	16	5	$36,000	10/01/73	GS	16	6	$3[illegible],000	09/29/74

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE [illegible] DATE 2/7/74

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK'S INITIALS F.W.M. JOHNER [illegible] BY

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions **PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION** (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION [illegible] OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MILER NEWTON SCOTT	[illegible]	31 400	CF	GS 16 5	$36,000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM 7 JAN 1973 TO 1 OCT 1972 UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11777, DATED 12 APR 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MILER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	31 400	CF	GS 16 5	$35,363

LML: 28 NOV 72

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MILER NEWTON SCOTT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): COB 11 26 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS				
	V TO V		V TO CF	
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3127 0170 0001
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/CI STAFF
OPERATIONS GROUP
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0053
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ~~WASH., D.C.~~
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 33634
18. REMARKS: "IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 56
20. Employee Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31400 ALPHABETIC CI
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 03 01 26
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 None
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction / Cancellation Data:
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPS; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

SECRET

[illegible]12773	MILLER [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ
GS 16	[illegible]	$32,[illegible]5	10/0[illegible]/72	GS 1[illegible]	[illegible]	$33,[illegible]	10/01/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 1/1/72

1/27

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS H.E.FISHER

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MILLER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	31 400	CF	GS 16 4	$32,645

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MILLER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	31 400	CF	GS 16 4	$30,943

I 52

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
012773	MILER NEWTON SCOTT	31 400	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	3	$20,317	10/05/69	GS 16	4	$29,202	10/04/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

100

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-64 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MILLER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	31 400	CF	GS 16 3	$26,317

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JLB: 8 OCT 69

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODP

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MILER NEWTON SCOTT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 10 | 05 | 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 0127 0170 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
ODP/CI STAFF
OPERATIONS GROUP
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
FOR SER RES OFF
OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0053
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP:
03 6
16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE:
22989
26714
18. REMARKS: WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF [illegible]

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	27. DATE OF LEI
22	10	31400	CI	75013	S	[illegible]	03	[illegible] 05 69	10 05 69

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
[illegible] ODD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. / PROV.; CODE
39. [illegible]: CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

10 - 28 - 69
DB

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BSJ

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF P.L. 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 9 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORG.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MILER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	31 400	CF	GS 15 6	$25,139

23 JUL 69

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 012773	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MILER NEWTON SCOTT

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 | 18 | 69	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Analysis No. Chargeable 0127 0170 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/CI STAFF OPERATIONS GROUP OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE OFFICER OPS OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0053	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 03 6 15 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 22989 25189

18. REMARKS

WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	31400	CI	75013	S	1	03 | 01 | 26		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. Correction - Cancellation Data

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE

36. SERV. COMP. DATE

37. LONG. COMP. DATE

38. CAREER CATEGORY

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE

- 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
- 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA

44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7-25-69 DO

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

JLB

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

012773 MILER NEWTON SCOTT					31 250	CF			
OLD SALARY RATE				NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	[illegible] Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ACT
GS 15	5	$22,416	05/07/67	GS 15	6	$23,075	05/04/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

00d

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

DB

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MILER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	31 250	CF	GS 15 5	$20,556	$22,416

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MILER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	31 250	CF	GS 15 5	$19,076	$20,876

14-00000

ESO

1. Serial No.	2. Name				3. Cost Center Number			4. LWOP Hours	
012773	MILER NEWTON SCOTT				31 250 CF				

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	4	$19,371	05/09/65	GS 15	5	$19,975	~~[illegible]~~ 05/07/67			

8. Remarks and Authentication

3

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: E.B. ECHOLS DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg. 3-65

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJT, 7 FEB 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MILER NEWTON SCOTT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 02 12 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V X / CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7127 0170 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/CI STAFF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS:

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ. Code
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Vet. Pref. Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSR, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE; CODE: 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE, MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[illegible] 1/7/67

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MILER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	31 250 CF	GS 15 4	$18,825	$19,371

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 4 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MILER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	31 250 CF	GS 15 4	$18,170	$18,825

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
012773	MILER NEWTON SCOTT	52 730 CF 3	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	1	$14,565	05/13/62	GS 15	2	$15,045	05/12/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

3
8-21
Ck 5/7/63
5/13/63

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: E.[illegible].ECHOLS DATE 13 [illegible] 1963

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

06

I52

MAY 12 4 23 PM '65

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
012773	MILER NEWTON SCOTT	31 250 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	3	$17,600	05/10/64	GS 15	4	$18,170	05/09/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

5

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: E. [illegible] ECHOLS DATE 11 [illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

JCD: 16 OCT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MILER NEWTON SCOTT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: 10 18 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5127 0170 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/CI STAFF
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ATTACHE POL OFF
OPS OF D CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 6023
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 03 1
15 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 14800
17600
18. REMARKS: ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: Number 31250 Alphabetic CI
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE: 1
24. Regm. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: 03 01 26
26. DATE OF GRADE
27. DATE OF LEI
28. NTE EXPIRES: 10 15 66
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 83
30. RETIREMENT DATA
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
LOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE
36. SERV COMP DATE
37. LONG COMP DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
42. CAREER CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: AF
3

POSTED

1150 SECRET

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

012773 MILER NEWTON SCOTT 42 730 CF

OLD SALARY RATE				NEW SALARY RATE						
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date			
GS 15	2	$16,180	05/12/63	GS 15	3	$16,695	05/10/64			

Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

EH 6/15/64

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MILER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	42 730	CF	GS 15 2	$15,045	$16,180

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
MILER NEWTON SCOTT	012773	42730	CF	15 1	$13730	15 1	$15665

14-00000

EP: 11 MAY 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): MILER NEWTON SCOTT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 05 13 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2138 8400 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC ~~403 J~~
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP AFRICA
EAST BRANCH
ADDIS ABABA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
11. POSITION TITLE:
POL OFF ATT
CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0081
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		04 0	12145
GS	0136.01	15 1	13730

18. REMARKS
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Mappl Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA	YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO	DA	YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO	DA	YR
22	10	52730	AF	22065	1	3	03	01	26	05	13	62	05	13	62

28. NTE EXPIRES
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE
36. SERV. COMP. DATE
37. LONG. COMP. DATE
38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

NOTED
Arc

Form 1150
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

SECRET 821
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
12773	MILER NEWTON SCOTT	4F 3 DDP ~~AF~~ 5 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last LII Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 14	3	$12,730	03/20/60	14	4	$12,990	09/17/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

SECRET

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

BWS: 25 JULY 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CDF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MILER NEWTON SCOTT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION - DEPT. OF STATE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 20 YR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2136 6400 1000
8. LSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP AF
EAST BRANCH
ADDIS ABABA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
11. POSITION TITLE: ATTACHE POL OFF
CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0061
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		04 0	12145
GS	0136.01	14 3	12730

18. REMARKS
SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $12730 AND FSR SALARY OF $12145 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.
ALL SICK AND 115 HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPT. OF STATE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Apptmt Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
55	10	52730	LF	22065	1	3	03 01 26		

28. NTE EXPIRES
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE
36. SERV COMP DATE
37. LONG COMP DATE
38. MIL SERV CREDIT
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

SECRET

AES: 7 JULY 61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 012773
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MILER NEWTON SCOTT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT & TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS*
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 07 DA. 09 YR. 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2138 8400 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP AFRICA
EAST BRANCH
ADDIS ABABA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0081
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12730
18. REMARKS:
*SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 20
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 52730 ALPHABETIC AF
22. STATION CODE: 22065
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 03 DA. 01 YR. 26
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSL 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

7/31/61

SECRET

(4-81)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	MILER NEWTON SCOTT	112773	54 14	GS-14 3	$11,835	$12,730

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
112773	MILER NEWTON SCOTT	DDP/CI 3	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR.				MO	DA	YR.
GS 14	2	$11,595	09	21	58	GS 14	3	$11,835	03	20	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP. None

10. INITIALS OF CLERK [illegible]

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-60 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 560A AND 560B.

SECRET

OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME						3. [illegible]			4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT	
512773	MILER NEWTON SCOTT						DDP/[illegible]			UV		
6. OLD SALARY RATE							7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR		GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR
GS 14	1	$11,355	03	24	57		GS 14	2	$11,595	09	21	56

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
JEAN M. EVANS	19 Aug 58	Jean M. Evans

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MILER NEWTON SCOTT	512773	GS-14-1	$10,320	$11,355

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

.L JULY 58

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 112773	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MILER NEWTON SCOTT	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 03 Da. 01 Yr. 25	4. Vet. Pref. Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 09 Da. 18 Yr. 47
7. SCD Mo. 05 Da. 23 Yr. 44	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Appt. Affidavit Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo. 09 Da. 18 Yr. 47
13. [illegible] Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FE BRANCH 4 BANGKOK STATION COUNTER SUBVERSIVE SECTION	Code 5163	15. Location Of Official Station BANGKOK, THAILAND	Station Code 71503	
16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 5	17. Position Title INTEL OF FI	18. Position No. 2877	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.51
21. Grade & Step 14 1	22. Salary Or Rate $11,355	23. SD 01	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 24 Yr. 57	25. PSI Due Mo. 09 Da. 21 Yr. 58
26. Appropriation Number 8 3765 55 040				

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	Code 02	28. Eff. Date Mo. 07 Da. 13 Yr. 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP CI STAFF OPS DIVISION SATELLITES BRANCH	Code 5414	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013	
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	34. Position Title IO CI BR CH	35. Position No. CC 1	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.53
38. Grade & Step 14 1	39. Salary Or Rate $11,355	40. SD 01	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 24 Yr. 57	42. PSI Due Mo. 09 Da. 21 Yr. 58
43. Appropriation Number 3 2765 27				

44. Remarks

[illegible]

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

EVL 30 APR 58

1. Serial No. 512773	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MILER NEWTON SCOTT	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 03 Da. 01 Yr. 26	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CSC EOD Mo. 09 Da. 18 Yr. 47	
7. SCD Mo. 05 Da. 23 Yr. 44	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 09 Da. 18 Yr. 47	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FE BRANCH 4 BANGKOK STATION COUNTER SUBVERSIVE SECTION	Code	15. Location Of Official Station BANGKOK, THAILAND	Station Code

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 5	17. Position Title POLICE SPEC INVEST. INTEL OF FI	18. Position No. 2877	19. Serv. FSS GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.51

21. Grade & Step 03 ~~15~~ 1	22. Salary Or Rate 9635 $10,320	23. SD D1	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. FSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number 8 3786 55 040

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action CONVERSION FROM FSS STATUS	Code 60	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. BOB 04 16 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP FE BRANCH 4 BANGKOK STATION COUNTER SUBVERSIVE SECTION	Code 5163	32. Location Of Official Station BANGKOK, THAILAND	Station Code 71503

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 5	34. Position Title INTEL OF FI	35. Position No. 2877	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.51

38. Grade & Step 14 1	39. Salary Or Rate $10,320	40. SD D1	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 24 Yr. 57	42. FSI Due Mo. 09 Da. 21 Yr. 58	43. Appropriation Number 8 3786 55 040

44. Remarks

POSTED

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PARTS)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

mjv

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. NEWTON SCOTT MILER 512773	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Mar 1926	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 22 Mar 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion 30	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 24 Mar 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
BFF-2877-14	8. POSITION TITLE	I.O. (FI) BFF-2877 (Police Spec(Investigations)
GS-0136.51-13 $9420.00 per annum (FSS-3 $9380.00 per annum)	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-14 $10,320.00 per annum (FSS-3 $9330.00 per annum)
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 516320	DDP/FE Branch 4 - Bangkok Station Counter Subversive Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS 5	Bangkok, Thailand
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DI

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION W FROM: 7-3786-55-040 TO: same 715-03	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:	

1

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 09/12/47

POSTED
1 APR 1957

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

[illegible] 3/29/57

1400000

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER OF FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MOO

1. NAME: MR. NEWTON SCOTT MILES 512773
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Mar 1926
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO:
4. DATE: 16 Apr 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION: INTEGRATION - INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION*(CORRECTION)**
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 Nov 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Intell. Officer (FI) BFF-2877-14	8. POSITION TITLE	Intell. Officer (FI) BFF-2877-14 (Police Spec.(Investigations)
GS-0136.51-13 $9420.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-13 $9420.00 per annum (FSS-3 $9635.00 per annum)
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 4 - Bangkok Station Counter Subversive Section
	516320	
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Bangkok, Thailand
	5	
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE ☐ WAIT ☐ OTHER ☐ 5-PT ☒ 10-POINT ☐
14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ I. A. ☐ REAL. ☐ SD/DI
15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION: W FROM: 7-3786-55-040 715-03 TO: same
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

*No differential is to be paid as Subject's CIA salary is $9420 and his FSS salary is $9635.

Ten days (10) annual leave and all sick leave will be transferred to ICA by OCB/OCL

**This corrects SF-50 effective 30 Nov 1956, ICA salary which read $9380 to read, $9635. This also corrects Promotion effective 24 Mar 1957.

POSTED
19 APR 1957

3 EOD 09/18/47

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

Cpr 4/16/57

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

IAJW

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. NEWTON SCOTT MILER 512773	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Mar 1926	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 14 Dec 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Integration-International Cooperation Administration	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 30 Nov 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Intell. Officer (FI) BFF-2377-14	8. POSITION TITLE	Intell. Officer (FI) BFF-2877-14 (Police Spec.(Investigations)
GS-0136.51-13 $9420.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-13 $9420.00 per annum (FSS-3 $9380.00 per annum)
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 516320	DDP/FE Branch 4 - Bangkok Station Counter Subversive Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS 5	Bangkok, Thailand
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD/DI

1

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-3786-55-040 TO: same 715-03	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

Subject is to be paid the difference between CIA salary of $9420 and FSS salary of $9380, to be paid by the International Cooperations Administration and allowances in accordance therewith

Ten days(10) annual leave and all sick leave will be transferred to ICA by OCB/OCL

3 EOD 09/13/47

POSTED
[illegible]

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1v1

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Newton Scott Miler 512773
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Mar 1926
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 30 Nov 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment 57
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 11-13-56 ~~2 Dec 1956~~
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer BFF-1699-13	8. POSITION TITLE	IO (FI) BFF-2877-13
GS-0136.01-13	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-13 $9420.00 per annum
China Base Office of the Chief of Operations Chi/Ind Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 4 Bangkok Station Counter Subversive Section
Subic Bay, P.I.	11. HEADQUARTERS 5	Bangkok, Thailand
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD/DI

1

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 7-3715-55-167
TO: 7-3736-55-040
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. REMARKS:

3 EOD

POSTED
DEC 1956

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

11/30/56

14-00000

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-O-320030

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Payroll period

3. Roll No. UV

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
MILER, NEWTON SCOTT

6. Grade and salary
GS-13 $9205.

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
PB-28.

12. Prepared by
wlr 11Jun56

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
26Aug56	27Feb55	$9205.	$9420.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
SERVICE & CONDUCT
ARE SATISFACTORY
(Signature or other authentication)

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

18. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 25, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 [illegible]

CHAPTER [illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

IVB

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. NEWTON S. MILER
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Mar 1926
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 6 Feb. 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): REASSIGNMENT
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 12 Feb 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE	I. O. (FI) BFF-1684-13		Area Ops Officer BFF-1699-13
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-13 $9205.00 per annum		GS-0136.01-13 $9205.00 per annum
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	China Mission Plans and Development Branch		DDP/FE China Base Office of the Chief of Operations Chi/Ind Branch
11. HEADQUARTERS	Yokosuka, Japan		Subic Bay, P. I.
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 6-3715-55-167 TO: 6-3715-55-167
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Pa.

21. REMARKS:

POSTED
8 [illegible]

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. – EMPLOYEE COPY

10 November 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, FINANCE DIVISION

ATTENTION : Payroll Section

SUBJECT : Changes in Allotment Account Designation -

Personal Services of [illegible]

1. FE Division requests that cost of personal services for subject employee be changed effective with the next pay period, as follows:

FROM ALLOTMENT 6-3715-55-180

TO ALLOTMENT 6-3715-55-167

2. When this change is accomplished, it is requested that one copy of this correspondence be returned to the Far East Division Budget Officer, with the notation that this action is accomplished.

C. E. BORNET III
Budget Officer
Far East Division

CONCUR

____

____

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, FINANCE DIVISION

ATTENTION : Payroll Section

SUBJECT : Changes in Allotment Account Designation - Personal Services of [illegible]

1. FE Division requests that cost of personal service for subject employee be charged effective with the next pay period, as follows:

FROM ALLOTMENT 5-3715-55-180

TO ALLOTMENT 5-3715-55-167

2. When this change is accomplished, it is requested that one copy of this correspondence be returned to the Far East Division Budget Officer, with the notation that this action is accomplished

C. F. BORGEST III
Budget Officer
Far East Division

CONCUR

____

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME: Mr. Newton S. Miler
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Mar 1926
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 1 June 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION: Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: B.O.D. 1 June 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Ops. Officer (CE) FW 193	8. POSITION TITLE	I. O. (FI) UFF 1604-13
GS-0136.52-13 ~~$[illegible].00~~ per annum 8560	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-13 ~~$[illegible].00~~ per annum 8560
DDP/FE Branch 2, China CE Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE China Mission Office of the Chief of Operations Plans and Development Branch
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Yokosuka, Japan
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: X
14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: SD-DI
15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 5-3700-20 TO: 5-3715-55-180
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT: Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Pa.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE

9205

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

JUN 1955

Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

713 6/2/55

14-00000

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 0

1. Agency and organizational entity, if any

3. Employee name (and social security account number when appropriate)
MILLER, Newton Scott

4. Pay to

5. Salary No.
5-3700-20

6. Slip No.

6. Grade and salary
GS-13 $8360.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks
[illegible] TO [illegible] EFFECTIVE
[illegible] 1955
SALARY [illegible]

7205.00

11. Appropriation(s)
FE-7

12. Prepared by
gal 1.21/55

13. Audited by

☐ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date
2/12/55

15. Date last equivalent increase
30/8/53

16. Old salary rate
$8360.00

17. New salary rate
$8560.00

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

Signature or other authentication

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following period(s)).

☐ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP

Where applicable but in case of excess LWOP

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 9, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50

U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

lvr

1. NAME: Mr. Newton S. Miler

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Mar 1926

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.

4. DATE: 1 Feb 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 13 Feb 1955

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
BF-192-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Ops Officer (CE) BF-193
GS-0136.52-13	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.52-13 $8360.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 2, China CE Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPTL.	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WAIV.	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: SD/TI

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-3300-20
TO: Same

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT: Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Pa.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

AM 2-1-55

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

sfw

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Newton S. Miler
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 3/1/26
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 2/13/56

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 2/14/56
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Operations Off BF-197	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Off (CE) BF-192-13
GS-132-13	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	13 GS-0136.5/ $8360.00 per annum
Chigasaki Unit	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 2 China CE Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD-PT

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-3700-20 TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

[illegible]

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SAM

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Newton S. Miler	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Mar. 26	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 27 Aug. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 30 Aug. 53	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Sch. A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Opers. Off. FF-197-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Opers. Off. FF-197
GS-132-12 $7240.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-13 $8360.00 per annum
DDP/FE Branch 2 (China) Chigasaki Unit	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Branch 2 China Same
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-3700-20 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Acting Chief, Personnel Division — SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

1. Agency and organizational designations

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952-0-88400

3. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
[illegible]

2. Pay roll

3. Block No.
07

4. Slip No.

6. Grade and salary
G-12 $7040

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation (s)
FS

12. Prepared by
an 2/25/53

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date
1 Mar 53

16. Date last equivalent increase
2 Sep 51

15. Old salary rate
$7040

17. New salary rate
$7240

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period
☐ LWOP at end of waiting period

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 7L FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Conc. 18 March 53
mep

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. – MISS – MRS. – ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Newton S. [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 March '26	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 23 March 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Excepted Appointment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 20 March 53	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116 (b)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer IF-197-12
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-12 $7240.00 p/a
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP FE Branch 2 (China) Chigasaki Unit
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT.	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 11X2100 TO: 3700-20	Yes	20 March 53	☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Pennsylvania

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

SF #61 affidavit has been executed.

Chief, Personnel Division

PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

[illegible]MATION [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. [illegible] S. [illegible]

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 March 1[illegible]

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 9 March 1953

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Resignation

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: as soon as possible
B. APPROVED: EOD. 27 Mar. 53

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
	Intelligence Officer	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	
	GS-1[illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ $1240	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	
	DDP [redacted] FE	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
	Washington (Field)	11. HEADQUARTERS	
	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Subject is resigning to accept other employment. Please transfer leave records to vouchered funds. Subject was not paid per diem.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): For Chief, FE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): [illegible], Ext. 3646

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for F/PD

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

15. SEX
16. SPACE
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B C.I.A. OR POS. CONTROL			
C CLASSIFICATION			
D PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C. Taylor	[illegible] Mar 53	
E			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

SECURITY [illegible]

UNCLASSIFIED

4/10/53

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Newton S. MILER
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 March 1926
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 9 March 1953

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.): Intelligence Officer

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ~~[illegible]~~
B. APPROVED: 15 Dec 52

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
	Intelligence Officer (OPS) ~~[illegible]~~	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer
	GS-12 $7,040.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	Same
	DDP FE FE-FRO/FEC Intelligence Operations Br. Field Ops Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same
	Yokosuka, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C. (Field)
	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary): Subj returned to U.S. 15 Dec 1952

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): for Chief, FE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Sherman [illegible], Ext. [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for C/FE

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	S. A.	REAL.

15. SEX:
16. RACE:
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible] Taylor	3-24-53
E.		

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME	[illegible]	DATE [illegible] 1951
NATURE OF ACTION	Promotion	EFFECTIVE DATE 2 September 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	[illegible] Officer (C/C)	Intelligence Officer (C/C)
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-11 $[illegible] per annum	GS-12 $[illegible] per annum
OFFICE	[illegible]	OSO
DIVISION	[illegible]	FDD-PRO/[illegible]
BRANCH	Intelligence Operations Br. Field Ops. Section	Intelligence Operations Br. Field Ops. Section
OFFICIAL STATION	Yokosuka, Japan	Yokosuka, Japan

APPROVAL

CLASSIFICATION	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	
	AUG 14 1951	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

FDD-PRO/FEO Slot #[illegible] Subject to Survey 152

DATE OF PRESENT GRADE: 10 December 1950

COPY IN TABULAR CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BR.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME MILER, Newton S.	DATE 17 August 51
NATURE OF ACTION Transfer	EFFECTIVE DATE 27 February 51

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer	Intelligence Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-11 $5400.00	GS-11 $5400.00
OFFICE	FDZ/FRU	FDZ/FRU
DIVISION	Intelligence Operations Branch Field Operations Station	Intelligence Operations Br.
BRANCH		Field Operations Station
OFFICIAL STATION	Hokkaido, Japan	Yokosuka, Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION Thomas M. [illegible]	PERSONNEL OFFICER AUG 14 1951	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

Per in Cable #26032

COPY IN PAYROLL
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BR

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

GPO (2)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: HIL[illegible], Ne[illegible]ton S.

DATE: 18 October, 1950

NATURE OF ACTION: Transfer and Promotion

EFFECTIVE DATE: ~~16 December 1950~~

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-9	Intelligence Officer (~~Base Chief~~) GS-11 Troy
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9 $4950.00	GS-11 $5400.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDZ	FDZ/FMU
BRANCH		Intelligence Operations Branch Field Operations Station
OFFICIAL STATION	Hokkaido, Japan	Hokkaido, Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE

CLASSIFICATION 22 Nov 50 F593

Austin J. Thomas
for Troy

PERSONNEL OFFICER

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ______

SECURITY CLEARED ON ______

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ______

ENTERED ON DUTY ______

______
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

S-7
Employee has been in grade since 19 September, 1949.

NOV 2 1950

POSTED
[illegible]

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME	MILLER, Morton S.	DATE 4 October, 1950
NATURE OF ACTION	Periodic Pay Increase	EFFECTIVE DATE 2 October, 1950
	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops)	Intelligence Officer (Ops)
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9 $4725.00	GS-9 $4850.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDZ	FDZ
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION	Hokkaido, Japan	Hokkaido, Japan

QUALIFICATIONS	APPROVAL FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER Robert [illegible]	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

L.S.I. 2 October, 1949

This is to certify that the conduct and services of the employee during this period were satisfactory in all respects.

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

POSTED

[illegible]

DIVISION CHIEF
FDZ

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1948

SECRET

GPO 83-900335

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: MILER, NEWTON SCOTT

DATE: 4 NOVEMBER 1949

NATURE OF ACTION: CONVERSION - CLASSIFICATION ACT OF 1949 *

EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 OCTOBER 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (OPS)	INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (OPS)
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-9, $4605.00	GS-9, $4725.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	FDZ	FDZ
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION	HOKKAIDO, JAPAN	HOKKAIDO, JAPAN

QUALIFICATIONS

CLASSIFICATION

APPROVAL

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

PERSONNEL OFFICER

EXECUTIVE

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

* PER AUTHORITY CONTAINED INLTR,- DCI- 28 OCTOBER 1949

FORM NO. 37-1
AUG 1949 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: MILER, Hezton Scott

DATE: 6 October 1949

NATURE OF ACTION: Periodic Pay Increase

EFFECTIVE DATE: 2 October 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops)	Intelligence Officer (Ops)
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-9, $4479.60	CAF-9, $4605.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	FDZ	FDZ
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Hokkaido, Japan	Hokkaido, Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Subject last received an increase in salary on 19 September 1948.

This is to certify that the conduct and services of the employee during this period were satisfactory in all respects.

Branch Chief

POSTED
13 Mar 50

FORM NO. 37-1 AUG 1949 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME Marion E. Miller				DATE 13 July 1949	
RESIDENCE AT TIME OF EMPLOYMENT					
LOCAL ADDRESS					
CITIZENSHIP	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	MARITAL STATUS	NO. OF DEPENDENTS	DATE OF APPOINTMENT
NATURE OF ACTION Transfer				EFFECTIVE DATE 6 June 1949	

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops)	Intelligence Officer (Ops)
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-9, $4479.60	CAF-9, $4479.60
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	[illegible]	[illegible]
DIVISION	CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	
OFFICIAL STATION	Tokyo	Hokkaido, Japan [illegible]

APPROVAL

FIELD	HEADQUARTERS
CHIEF OF STATION	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
	PERSONNEL OFFICER

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS ☐ YES [☑ NO]

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

AUTHENTICATED BY

REMARKS

Per In Cable 36002.

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
FEB 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: MILER, Newton S.

DATE: 1 June 1949

RESIDENCE AT TIME OF EMPLOYMENT:

LOCAL ADDRESS:

CITIZENSHIP	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	MARITAL STATUS	NO. OF DEPENDENTS	DATE OF APPOINTMENT

NATURE OF ACTION: Change of Station

EFFECTIVE DATE: 29 April 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Ops)	Intelligence Officer (Ops)
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-9 $4479.60	CAF-9 $4479.60
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	FEZ	FEZ
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Changtei	Takao

APPROVAL

FIELD	HEADQUARTERS
	WGJ.
CHIEF OF STATION	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
	PERSONNEL OFFICER George E. Wilson

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☑

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

POSTED

AUTHENTICATED BY

REMARKS

Per In Cable 31906

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
FEB 1949

SECRET

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 012773	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) MILER, Newton Scott	3. DATE OF BIRTH 03/01/26	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 16	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer CH	8. OFF. DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CIOPS/OPS	9. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.			10 HQ CO

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.)

12. TYPE OF REPORT: TEMPORARY X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-): 1 February 1973 - 31 January 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: February 1974

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 — RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. — RATING LETTER

8 JUN 74

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

FR. REPORT [illegible] 055431 311074

21 May 1974

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Newton Scott MILER (012773)
Reporting Period 1 February 1973 - 31 January 1974

1. Mr. Miler is a uniquely qualified senior officer who has specialized in counterintelligence. He has particular competence in background and management of sensitive counterintelligence cases of the Agency and of the other elements of the U.S. intelligence community. He is independent and aggressive in viewpoint, articulate, and personally deeply involved in the current conduct and future of counterintelligence as an operating function. He has excellent potential in the exercise of leadership and command in the counterintelligence specialty; in this respect I regard him as being without a peer among the younger officers in the DDO.

2. He has been a most dependable worker and counselor in the reorganization that has taken place in the DDO over the past year. He has been an unfailing source of constructive, forward-looking suggestions and ideas, not only with respect to the problems in his own specialty, but in the work of CIOPS as a whole. He made specific contributions to the formulation of the CIOPS Charter (DON 1-1180) and its organizational implementation (DON 1-1216). As a consequence of the reorganization of CIOPS, he has been designated as an Associate Chief, Counter Intelligence Operations for Operations. In conformity with the indication of Chief, CIOPS he has reorganized his component accordingly and commands resources consisting of 17 officers and junior officers and six clerical personnel [one GS-15, five GS-14s, five GS-13s, three GS-12s, two GS-11s, one GS-08 I.A., one GS-07 clerical, two GS-06s, three GS-05s] through which he covers Penetration operations, Double Agents, Soviet and Bloc operations against Americans overseas, Disinformation and Deception, and Counterintelligence COMINT. He has charged each of his operating sections with appropriate Letters of Instruction. He is meticulously informed of the work going on in each of his charges. Under his guidance and instruction there has been significant and measurable production and results during the past year. His performance of this task has been a model of conception and execution and reflects most favorably on his capacity to exercise command and leadership.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055431

SUBJECT: Newton Scott MILER (012773)
Reporting Period 1 February 1973 - 31 January 1974

3. Mr. Miler is a case specialist in sensitive counterintelligence matters. He has a career accumulation of exposure, recall, and operational insight into past and present activity along these lines with the FBI, State Department, Department of Defense, and the military agencies. He is skilled in the conduct of counterintelligence and security liaison on a senior level with these agencies. It is noteworthy that he has the confidence of the FBI leadership and in the past year he has worked on sensitive counterintelligence cases involving the Soviets and Bloc with the FBI in a highly productive and professional fashion. In addition he has taken the initiative in developing and conducting productive liaison on counterintelligence cases involving Penetration and Disinformation with the British services, MI-5 and MI-6, and the RCMP, the Australian, and the New Zealand security services. Mr. Miler's work with MI-5 and MI-6 has involved the production of studies and the chairing of meetings among liaison specialists in Soviet clandestine agent radio communications. He is a working committee member of the national inter-agency organization dealing with the planning and execution of deception in Double Agent operations, working directly under the Chief, CIOPS in this respect. This task brings him into close and continuing relationship with the appropriate component of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other interested Federal agencies. Because of his grasp and appreciation of the day-to-day problems of the charter responsibilities of CIOPS, he takes part actively and effectively in the training and doctrinal presentations within and outside the Office of Training (OTR). In particular, he participates in senior-level OTR training activities (the Mid-Career Course) and during the period under review in a special advanced counterintelligence course sponsored jointly by OTR and CIOPS for senior officers of the Office of Special Investigations/Air Force (OSI/AF) and in FBI retraining of its field officers in counterintelligence matters.

4. In addition to his managerial and advisory functions outlined above, Mr. Miler is charged with the management of specific live operations under the direction of Chief, CIOPS. Among other things, he is charged with the handling of a difficult and complex Soviet defector contact. This relationship requires the dedication of very much of his own time, and the presentation of detailed contact reports on a continuing basis and the maintenance of a very high order of personal and professional discipline.

5. It is impossible to say too much in praise-worthy description of the performance of this officer. He is one of the hardest working,

SUBJECT: Newton Scott MILER (012773)
Reporting Period 1 February 1973 - 31 January 1974

most gifted counterintelligence officers, and in the past year he has done a first-rate job with very restricted means and at the expense of continuing personal self-sacrifice. In all of his dealings I have found Mr. Miler to be cost conscious. I rate him Outstanding.

Raymond G. Rocca
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Operations

I certify that I have read the above comments.

Newton Scott Miler

21.5.74
date

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

I concur with the above evaluation.

James Angleton
C/CI/Ops
21 May 1974

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 012773	2. NAME (Last, First, middle) MILER, Newton S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 03/01/26	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 16	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer CH		8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI/OPS	9. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.		10. HQ CD

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		CONTRACT		OTHER (Spec.)

12. TYPE OF REPORT

	TEMPORARY	X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-)
1 March 1972 - 31 January 1973

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
February 1973

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT.

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

E2, IMPDET CL BY 11 MAY 1973

30 April 1973

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: N. Scott MILER
(1 March 1972 - 28 February 1973)

1. Mr. Miler directs and supervises the Operations Group of the CI Staff. Rather than repeat the specific duties enumerated in paragraphs one and two of Mr. Miler's Fitness Report for the period of 1 April 1970 - 29 February 1972, I believe it would be useful in describing what Mr. Miler is doing and what he is rated on, to detail the functions of the group he supervises. They are:

a. Conduct counterintelligence review of FI, SA, CI, and Third Party SIGINT collection projects (new, renewals, amendments).

b. Provide CI Staff guidance to, and participate in, the work of the Program Review Panel on programs, projects, and operational directives.

c. Provide CI representation and coordination for the DD/O on all defector matters.

d. Coordinate and provide guidance concerning decisions on Operational Approvals and Provisional Operational Approvals.

e. Conduct, as well as guide and supervise, damage assessment studies; coordinate such studies with non-DD/O elements of CIA and with other governmental agencies.

f. Conduct security reviews of operational activities.

g. Coordinate double agent operations.

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 055431

h. Keep current records of double agent operations and prepare summaries of them.

i. Coordinate and manage COMINT intelligence matters.

j. Provide TDY support to the field on CI matters, including operations.

k. Coordinate and conduct research into the CI aspects of the compromise of Agency information, sources, and methods.

l. Coordinate the counterintelligence equity in such programs as AEASSAULT and MHCOLOR.

m. Coordinate the CI operational element in tecynical operations.

n. Supervise and coordinate CIA task force support to the Secret Service and the rest of the intelligence community for trips abroad by the President and other designated dignitaries.

o. Brief COS's and other field personnel on an ad hoc basis.

p. Conduct special and sensitive CI operations. 9/5 70

q. Carry out counterintelligence coordination of DD/O operational activity.

r. Act as coordinator of sensitive CI cases and other operational matters between DD/O area divisions and other departments and agencies.

s. Participate as directed in special assignments on seminars, task forces, etc.

t. Participate in, and prepare memoranda, notices, and regulatory issuances about, DD/O and other Agency responsibilities, operations, operating procedures, etc., when these involve CI operational security and/or procedural problems.

u. Coordinate and arrange for dissemination of sensitive information from counterintelligence sources.

v. Conduct operational liaison with the FBI and the U.S. military services on security cases involving CI considerations.

w. Conduct operational liaison with the Department of State and other U.S. agencies regarding security cases which involve counterintelligence considerations.

x. Coordinate as directed with the Office of Security on the CI aspects of security problems involving the DD/O.

y. Conduct liaison and coordination with other U.S. departments and agencies on deception matters.

z. Conduct liaison with foreign services.

aa. Compile personality profiles on foreign intelligence personnel of special CI interest.

bb. Take part in foreign liaison briefings and training.

cc. Participate in programs, courses, and siminars of the Office of Training by lecturing and by providing case materials.

dd. Provide briefings and training lectures to the DD/I, the DD/S&T, to the military services, and to other governmental departments and agencies on CI matters.

ee. Participate in and coordinate on machine record (ADP programs).

ff. Initiate and participate in CI debriefings of defectors and other sources.

gg. Conduct CI case and operational research and analysis.

hh. Undertake research and analysis in support of other CI Staff activities.

ii. Establish and maintain special CI records and files as directed.

jj. Conduct special traces, using all Agency and U.S. Government assets.

kk. Prepare special studies, reports, and memoranda on CI cases and information for distribution to the intelligence community.

2. Mr. Miler has had wide operational experience in the Far East (Mukden, Manchuria; Shanghai; Japan; Korea; and the Philippines); Thailand in South East Asia; Chief of Station in Ethiopia; worldwide as the initial officer introducing the LCHARVEST program; and is well acquainted with numerous European services from extensive TDYs to Western Europe. His outstanding abilities are in Counter Intelligence. He is an expert in the field of deception. He works closely with senior counterparts in the FBI on operations and matters of very sensitive counterintelligence and counterespionage as directed by the Staff Chief. He also, as directed, plans, develops, and conducts special cases involving the handling of live

operational sources. He is an authority on enemy efforts to penetrate the Agency, the Departments of State and Defense.

3. Mr. Miler is an aggressive, loyal, hard working officer who has not yet reached the peak of his potential. It is a source of great satisfaction to know that his unique abilities will be available to the Agency for a number of years to come.

4. I rate Mr. Miler in the overall performance of his job as Strong.

Raymond G. Rocca
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE:

N. Scott Miler
N. Scott Miler

1 May 1973
Date:

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

J. Angleton
James Angleton

1 May 1973
Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 012773

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): MILER, Newton Scott
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 03/01/26
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: 16
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer, CH
7. ORGANIZATION OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/CI/OPS
8. CURRENT STATION: Washington, D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify)				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify)		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 March 1972
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1970 - 29 February 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 — RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

23 JAN 1973

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: N. Scott MILER
1 April 1970 - 29 February 1972

1. Mr. Miler directs and supervises the Operations Group of CI Staff consisting of 21 people, 16 of whom are officers. This Group gives staff day-to-day guidance, program support and technical guidance and review to the Clandestine Service's area Divisions and Branches on the Agency's current counterintelligence operations and activity. This Group reviews Agency counterintelligence operational plans, projects and amendments. It judges their technical feasibility and recommends changes and/or approval of such operations and programs.

Mr. Miler supervises personally the activity of his operational personnel in the performance of these duties. He conducts liaison, including specialized reporting and participates in working groups with other U.S. government components, in particular with the FBI, on operations and matters of sensitive counterintelligence and counterespionage as directed by the Chief, CI Staff.

Under the direction of Chief, CI Staff he participates in the Inter-Agency Working Group concerned with operational deception. In the course of his work he formulates CI policies, procedures and guidelines, develops new ideas and approaches and targets for CI operational and research projects that cut across Agency and government lines and require central coordination.

2. Mr. Miler plans, develops and conducts special cases including the handling of live operational sources as directed by C/CI Staff. He takes an active part in the maintenance, development and participation in sensitive, personal level working relations with the intelligence and security representatives of four foreign countries.

3. Mr. Miler is one of our counterintelligence leaders. He has a tremendous capacity for hard work and a willingness to perform the work without reference to time or personal interest. He is an extremely loyal individual. He has an extraordinary memory for operations and an ability to work constructively and usefully with details. He is ambitious, self-confident, a driving leader who is

SECRET E 2 IMPET CL BY 055431

JAN

JA

willing to accept responsibility. He is imaginative and creative in his approach to operations. A practical example of Mr. Miler's work along these lines was his presentation on CIA's role in operational deception at the JCS Strategic Planning Seminar held from 17-21 April 1972.

4. I rate Mr. Miler in the overall performance of his job as Strong.

Raymond G. Rocca
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE:

N. Scott Miler

N. Scott Miler

23.1.73

Date

REVIEW OFFICIAL:

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

23 Jan. 1973

Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012773

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MILER, NEWTON SCOTT	2. DATE OF BIRTH 25/01/26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD 0
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer CI	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/OPS GRP	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
April 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

10 JUN

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
EYES ONLY

4 MAY 1970

MEMORANDUM in Lieu of Fitness Report

SUBJECT: Newton Scott MILER
(1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970)

1. During the current rating period Mr. MILER was transferred from his previous position as Deputy Chief of the Special Intelligence Group of the Counter Intelligence Staff to the position of Chief of the Operations Group of the same Staff. This was a new position and as such required unusual skills and vigor to give dimension to the job to be done. Mr. MILER approached his task with imagination and energy. He inherited an incohesive group of capable officers and immediately began the task of trying to define common denominators for their operational activities, to weed out duplicatory and marginal tasks, to establish clearly delineated guidelines and to provide a sense of discipline, all aimed toward giving better counterintelligence guidance and support to the operations of the area divisions and the operational components of the CA Staff. DE 70

2. At the same time Mr. MILER has continued to handle, under the direct guidance of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, a number of extremely sensitive cases to which he has contributed analytically and developmentally. The cases required not only keen operational sense in their handling, but a strong feeling for liaison as many of the cases involved frequent high-level discussion and negotiation with other components of CIA as well as with outside agencies and departments. In fulfilling these responsibilities, Mr. MILER has worked without regard to hours or to his personal convenience. He has assiduously tried to reflect the thinking of the Chief of the CI Staff and to relate it to the operational problems he is handling. He has also given mature, insightful supervision and encouragement to the orientation and development of a Deputy Chief, Operations, another important innovation in the Staff's organization.

3. As a member of the Program Review Panel Mr. MILER contributed fully in examining, reviewing and commenting on the programs of the operating components within the Clandestine Service. He, together

SECRET
EYES ONLY

[illegible]

SECRET
EYES ONLY

with other members of the Panel have striven to devise a formula to give management a clear, concise picture of what we intend to do and what we are doing and have done to make those intentions reality.

4. Mr. MILER has maintained contact with a number of key foreign intelligence officials with whom he has worked overseas. His home has been available to them during their visits to the United States.

5. While being able to adjust his own thinking when and as required by a given situation, Mr. MILER has strong personal convictions on operational matters and does not hesitate to advance his opinions or to push for his recommended solutions.

6. Mr. MILER is currently directing an office which includes in its complement one GS-16 and SIX GS-15s. He is also responsible for the career development of EIGHT more junior case officers. The above is in addition to the normal supervision of the remaining group staff. In performing these functions, he is cost-conscious and economizes in the expenditure of government funds and the valuable time of senior officers.

7. Mr. MILER would be the first to admit that many problems remain for him in his current assignment. He would also readily acknowledge that he has not yet been able to clearly define each of these problems or to provide the perfect solution for every one which has been isolated. Progress, however, is being made every day and Mr. MILER clearly demonstrates that his promotion to GS-16 in 1969 was deserved and that it will not be the last which he will merit. This is an officer of high professional integrity and dedication. He is a self-starter, he works and thinks realistically. He speaks his mind when he has something to say - including critical things, yet retains a good sense for the craftsman's side of the CI job. He is not adept just at identifying problems, he finds the solution.

R G Rocca
Raymond G. Rocca
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

SECRET EYES ONLY

SECRET
EYES ONLY

NOTED:

N. Scott Miller
N. Scott Miler

7 May 1970
Date

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

J. Angleton
James Angleton
Chief, CI Staff

5 June 1970

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Reviewed by OP/FL/

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012773

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MILER, NEWTON SCOTT	2. DATE OF BIRTH 03/01/26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer D Ch	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/SIG		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER | RESERVE | TEMPORARY

CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

INITIAL | REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

X ANNUAL | REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
April 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1968 - 31 March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating pe t rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiv performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicat umber of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER
O

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Newton Scott MILER
(1 April 1968 - 31 March 1969)

1. Mr. Miler's performance as a counterintelligence officer and supervisor of both officer and clerical personnel has continued to be outstanding in every respect. He has continued to carry a major portion of the work load of the office. Highly favorable comments made in previous fitness reports by me continue applicable in every respect for the current reporting period. He is cost conscious and economizes in the expenditure of government funds.

2. Mr. Miler has previously been recommended for promotion.

Birch D. O'Neal
Birch D. O'Neal
Chief, CI/SIG

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE:

N. Scott Miler

15.5.69
Date

REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I concur in the above. Miler should be promoted at the first opportunity. It is overdue.

James R. Hunt
James R. Hunt
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

16 May 1969
Date

Recommended for Promotion.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012773

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MILER, N. SCOTT	2. DATE OF BIRTH 03/01/26 · 3. SEX M · 4. GRADE GS-15 · 5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OF D CH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT · 8. CURRENT STATION DDP/CI/SIG · Washington, D. C.
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
X CAREER · RESERVE · TEMPORARY	INITIAL · REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	X ANNUAL · REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):	SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. April 1968	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 9 APR 1968 CC	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. Reviewed by OP/PD/EAB	RATING LETTER O

FORM 8-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

24 April 1968

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Newton Scott Miler
1 April 1967 - ~~31 March~~ 1968

1. Mr. Miler's performance has continued to be outstanding. His forte is counter intelligence. His voluntary contribution of overtime is substantial. He also carries a most substantial portion of the work load of the office, including supervision of officer and clerical personnel. He handles all types of liaison within the Agency and with other intelligence and security services as the occasions for such arise. His work product ~~as to~~ both volume and usefulness, administrative ability, thoroughness, accuracy and general proficiency in all types of undertakings make him an outstanding officer. He is cost conscious and shows a deep sense of responsibility in economizing in matters affecting the expenditure of government funds.

2. Mr. Miler has been recommended for promotion.

Birch D. O'Neal
Birch D. O'Neal
Chief, CI/SIG

Employee's Signature:

N. Scott Miler

Date 24.3.68

Reviewing Official:
Concur in the above rating.

James R. Hunt
James R. Hunt
Deputy Chief, CI

Date 25/4/68

Reviewed by CB/PD, EAD

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012773

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) MILER,	(First) NEWTON	(Middle) SCOTT	2. DATE OF BIRTH 03/01/26	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OF D CH				7. OFFICE/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/SIG		8. CURRENT STATION WASH., D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
April 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 APR 1967 WP	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

FORM 45 6-66 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Newton Scott MILER
(1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967)

1. Mr. Miler has continued throughout another year to demonstrate an outstanding ability as a counter intelligence officer. He has also continued to carry a most substantial portion of the work load of his office including supervision of both clerical and officer personnel. He handles liaison with all elements of the agency and other intelligence and security services as appropriate.

2. Mr. Miler's wide knowledge of the agency, administrative ability, thoroughness, usefulness of work product, speed and proficiency in all types of undertakings, make him an outstanding officer. His ability and highly important contribution has been recognized and highly commended by the Director of Naval Intelligence in a memorandum forwarded through the Director of Central Intelligence dated 14 February 1967. Substantial financial recognition of his efforts, his contribution and value as an officer is in order.

3. Mr. Miler is cost conscious and shows a deep sense of responsibility in economizing in matters affecting expenditure of government funds.

Birch D. O'Neal
Birch D. O'Neal
Chief, CI/SIG

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE:

N. Scott Miler

24.4.67
Date

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

James R. Hunt
James R. Hunt
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

[illegible] 67
Date

SECRET

No special recognition is planned at this time.

Birch D. O'Neal
Chief, CI/SIG

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012773

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MILER, (First) NEWTON (Middle) SCOTT
2. DATE OF BIRTH 03/01/26
3. SEX M
4. GRADE GS-15
5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OF D CH
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/SIG
8. CURRENT STATION WASH., D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1966
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1965 - 31 March 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 — RATING LETTER

See attached Memorandum

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 — RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

18 APR 1965

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

12 APR 1966

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Newton Scott MILER
(1 April 1965 - 31 March 1966)

Mr. Miler is an outstanding Counter Intelligence officer with unusual abilities. He has an outstanding ability to handle Agency interests in the most involved, complex counterintelligence cases; a very absorbing, retentive mind; and an unusual ability to collate facts and express himself clearly both orally and in writing. He handles liaison with all other offices of the Agency and with any other agency of the Government where the need arises. His proficiency, speed, and excellent work product reflect creditably upon him and the Agency. Mr. Miler exercises supervisory responsibilities over other personnel of his office, is a good supervisor, good organizer, and is making a fine contribution to the counterintelligence effort of the Staff. He is cost conscious and shows a deep sense of responsibility in economizing with Government funds.

Birch D. O'Neal
Birch D. O'Neal
Chief, CI/SIG

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE

Newton S. Miler

REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur. James R. Hunt
James R. Hunt
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

SECRET

14 APR 1966

No Special Recognition is planned at this time.

Birch D. O'Neal

Birch D. O'Neal
Chief, CI/SIG

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012773

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): MILER, NEWTON SCOTT
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 03/01/26
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-15
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: OPS OF D CH
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/CI/SIG
8. CURRENT STATION: Wash., DC

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE	TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)			
	SPECIAL (Specify):			

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1965
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 18 September 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 RATING LETTER

See attached Memorandum

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

22 APR 1965

SECRET

20 APR 1965

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Newton S. MILER
(18 September 1964 - 31 March 1965)

1. Mr. Miler is Deputy Chief of the Special Investigations Group. He is a highly qualified senior counterintelligence officer who has demonstrated since his assignment to this office, an outstanding ability to handle Agency interests in the most involved, complex type of counterintelligence cases. He has a very absorbing, retentive mind, an unusual ability to separate important from unimportant facts, quickly collate facts and an ability to express himself clearly, both orally and in writing.

2. Mr. Miler handles liaison with other government agencies as the need arises and with a proficiency that reflects credit upon the Agency. He is a fast worker and produces an excellent product.

3. In his position, Mr. Miler exercises supervisory responsibilities over other personnel of the group. He is a good supervisor and demonstrates a keen sense of the need for efficient organization, handling and filing of intelligence materials. He is making a fine contribution in this field. Mr. Miler is cost conscious and shows a deep sense of responsibility as to the expenditures of government funds.

Birch D. O'Neal
Birch D. O'Neal
C/CI/SIG

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE:
Newton S. Miler

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:
James R. Hunt
James R. Hunt
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

Mr. Miler is an outstanding officer.
JH

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012773

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MILER Newton Scott	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Mar 1926	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/Africa/Br II	8. CURRENT STATION Addis Ababa			

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 October 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1964 - 11 September 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Performs all functions of a Chief of Station, supervising four staff officers, three intelligence assistants and two communicators.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains liaison with the Ambassador and other members of the Country Team.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides operational support for other Station and Agency components.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Provides over-all direction and guidance for unilateral and liaison operations.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

8 JAN 1965

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS** DEC 31

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

The narrative comments contained in Mr. Miler's previous Fitness Report continue to be applicable. Suffice it to say, for the purposes of this Fitness Report, Mr. Miler proved to be an alert, intelligent and experienced officer who did his best to produce satisfactory results in an area which has proved over the past years to be an extremely difficult area in which to operate.

Mr. Miler satisfactorily performed all supervisory duties, supervising 3 persons within the Station and providing guidance for communications personnel located in a large communications base in Ethiopia. He is cost conscious.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
16 Oct 64	Newton S. Miler

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 October 1964	C/AF/2	L. R. Devlin Lawrence R. Devlin

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Generally concur. Ethiopia has proved a tough nut to crack in operational terms. This has been true for all COS's.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 December 1964	Chief, Africa Division	G. Fields Glenn D. Fields

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 012773

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): MILER NEWTON SCOTT
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Mar 1926
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-15
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief of Station
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/AF/BR II
8. CURRENT STATION: Addis Ababa
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C) ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 May 1964
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Performs all functions of a Chief of Station; supervising four staff officers, three intelligence assistants, and two communicators.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Provides overall direction and guidance for unilateral and liaison operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains liaison with the Ambassador.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Provides operational support for other stations and agency components, including policy coordination functions for agency communications personnel at a large communications base in Ethiopia.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: P

9 JUL 1964

FORM 8-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

MAIL ROOM

Mr. Miler is an alert, intelligent, and experienced officer who has worked hard to produce results in what has proved over the past years to be an extremely difficult area in which to operate. With some notable exceptions, the station under his direction has failed to surmount these environmental problems and to develop productive operations against high priority targets. This should not be interpreted as meaning that the station has failed to mount new operations; merely that fewer key operations have been mounted than Headquarters would have desired.

Mr. Miler has been rated as adequate in his liaison with the Ambassador and other members of the country team despite the fact that the Ambassador, in a private conversation with Headquarters officers, indicated his dissatisfaction and that of the Deputy Chief of Mission with what the Ambassador described as Mr. Miler's failure to participate in country team activities and his failure to establish a satisfactory working relationship with the Ambassador. On the basis of the Ambassador's comments Mr. Miler might have been given a rating of "Weak" on this point. However, in view of the problems which sometime develop in the field in

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
Six	Employee is in the field--will be shown upon his return.	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
2 July 1964	Chief, Africa/BR II	L. R. Devlin Lawrence R. Devlin

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur. We have found Ethiopia especially difficult to crack.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
7-2-64	DC/AF	Glenn Fields

SECRET

SECRET

Section C cont., Newton S. Miler

coordinating agency operations with the overall policy objectives of the Embassy, the rating officer believes that Mr. Miler must be given the benefit of the doubt on this point.

The station under Mr. Miler's direction has been successful in developing CA operations within the field of labor, and liaison operations have improved considerably in recent months. Mr. Miler has been particularly successful and cooperative in servicing requests for operational support from other field stations. He has provided valuable support and coordination in Africa Division's efforts to penetrate and influence an effective and moderate all-African organization.

Mr. Miler has satisfactorily performed his supervisory duties, supervising nine persons within the station, as well as providing guidance for communications personnel located in a large communications base in Ethiopia. He is cost conscious and fully understands the need for economy.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
012773

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Miler, Newton S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Mar 1926	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP AF/Br II		8. CURRENT STATION Addis Ababa	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 In his capacity as Chief of Station, manages the affairs of that Station and supervises the work of four operations officers and two administrative assistants and is responsible for the performance of two communications officers.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Serves as a member of the Country Team and fulfills the responsibilities of an Embassy Officer.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordinates certain Agency business with the Ambassador, the Chief of the AID Mission, the Service Attaches and the MAAG Mission.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 In his overall area responsibility, has policy coordination functions concerning a ten-man Agency communications installation at a large U.S. Military station.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 8-61 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 29 3 37 PM '63

Subject has been at his present post for about eighteen months. He has been working aginst most difficult targets involving a government and a society enormously frustrating to deal with. In the light of this situation, it can only be said that the results of his efforts have been gratifying. Subject's performance, in any case, has been highly professional. He has succeeded in effecting a great amount of clarity regarding some fairly long-standing and complicated operational activities. He is particularly strong in the CA field. This is Subject's first assignment as a Chief of Station and it is interesting to observe that he possesses a great deal of natural managerial skill. In supervising subordinate personnel he has also considerable competence. Although he has experienced difficulty in the handling of one officer, there is no evidence that Subject has fallen short of doing his duty. Morale at his Station is high. Reference should be made to Subject's highly-developed sense of integrity and intellectual honesty. Another strong and useful attribute is his innate sense for anticipating possible Agency-Embassy problems and to act upon them before they evolve. If there is any weakness in Subject's performance as Chief of Station, it is probably the occasional belated communication to Headquarters. This Branch considers itself fortunate to have Subject in his present position and supports his desire to extend for one year beyond the expiration of his present tour. Subject's promotion during 1962 is further evidence of Headquarters' confidence in him.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 5 April 1963
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: Nine Months
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 5 April 1963
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/AF/2
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Earl H. Look

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur with the above.

DATE: 22 April 1963
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, Africa Division
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Bronson Tweedy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 012773
CSTD

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Miler, Newton S.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 March 1926	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/AF/East/Addis Ababa	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify)		

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1962

11. REPORTING PERIOD From: ~~Mar 61~~ - To: 31 Mar 62

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As COS directs and guides the operational activity of an 8 man Station and 2 man Base engaged in liaison with a local service, compatible and incompatible activities.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 In joint collaboration with Headquarters, helps determine KUBARK's operational country program.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Represents the organization in its field relations with other ODYOKE departments and components and the British Intelligence Service.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares and processes operational reports and covertly acquired intelligence product.	RATING NO. 5
		SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 CONTINUED NEXT PAGE	RATING NO.

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee.

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NECESSARY							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							X
[illegible] MAINTAINING AND [illegible] OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify)							X

[redacted]

[illegible]

45 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject has had lengthy experience both in field and headquarters operational assignments emphasizing FI and CI objectives. He is particularly mature in applying tradecraft principles and faces operational situations with detachment and balance. Subject approaches and executes his tasks with careful planning and forethought. He is attentive to detail; conscientious to duty. While Subject tends to be somewhat reserved, perhaps cautious, in a strange situation, he displays an even temperament and honesty toward associates and contacts.

This is an unusually qualified officer in experience and ability, uniquely suited to the long range needs of DD/P. During the period covered by this report he was recommended for promotion to GS-15.

SECTION B (CONTINUED)

Specific duty 5: Conducts unilateral FI operations involving a highly placed advisor to the Chief of State and an indigenous agent with extensive contacts in Government and dissidence movements. 6

Specific duty 6: Supervises the administration of his station including finance, property, records, and logistics. 5

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Subject is at his overseas post.

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

OTHER (Specify):

DATE 6/4/62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, AF/2	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Grant A. Fielden

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

A combination of illness shortly after arrival at station and subsequent lengthy royal mourning periods have given Miler less opportunity to show his talents than would otherwise have been expected. However, nothing has occurred in Addis to change the above high evaluation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Africa Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Bronson Tweedy

SECRET

4 JAN

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Newton Scott MILER
1 May 1959 - 31 December 1960

The performance of this officer since his last Fitness Report has continued to be outstanding in every respect, as indicated in repeated CI Staff recommendations for his promotion to Grade 15 attached hereto. The additional seasoning which he has gained in his present position during this period qualifies him to be Chief of Station in an area having an active unilateral operational program and fruitful liaison relationships.

James R. Hunt, Jr.
Chief, CI Operations

Reviewing Official:

S. H. Horton
S. H. Horton
Acting Chief, CI Staff

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 112773

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): MILER, Newton Scott
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 March 1926
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD/DI
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO - CI Br Ch
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/CI/OPS

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED	
PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED	

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)			

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1959
11. REPORTING PERIOD From: 13 Jul 58 thru To: ~~Apr~~ Mar. 59

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
Guiding and monitoring CI activities of a geographic division or those directed against an area target	6	Preparing special reports and disseminations on CI matters	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
CI review of all projects of an area division	6	Assists in area CI plans and programs including those affecting foreign liaison & training & briefing therefor	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.
Guidance and coordination on specific counterespionage cases	6	Participates in CI training and briefing through courses, seminars and individual meetings	6

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS		X					
OTHER (Specify)							

[redacted]

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-55 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This officer has had wide operational experience and, given his age (33), has outstanding potential. He is forceful, confident, and resourceful. With a little more seasoning in Headquarters he will be qualified to be a chief of Station in a large post.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 28 April 1959

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Newton S. Miler

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 April 1959	S.A. to Chief, CI Staff Chief, CI Operations	C. W. Tenney CW Tenney J. R. Hunt, Jr.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

✓ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 April 1959	Chief, CI Staff	James Angleton

SECRET

Y31

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MILER	(First) Newton	(Middle) Scott	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 March 1926	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FE/4/Thailand			6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief, Project MONOTONY s.c.(FI)		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP		9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 29 December 1956 - 29 June 1957		

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

X	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
☐	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 29 June 1957	C. [redacted] SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief of Station, Thailand

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

(S) Joseph W. Smith

Posted Fr Card BY JK 2 AUG 1957

(S) John L. Hart

8/16/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 29 June 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL [redacted]	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station, Thailand

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) SECRET Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 31 9 57 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this [illegible] period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do [illegible] as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing [illegible] at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Project MONOTONY	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Chief, FI element, MOCAR	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Case Officer	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is a highly competent and professional officer. In the short time he has been in Bangkok he has shown a command of his job with energy and enthusiasm in its pursuit.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...*productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): MILER Newton Scott
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 March 1926
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FE/4/Thailand
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief, Project MONOTONY
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): ~~29 December 1956 - 29 June 1957.~~ 29 Dec 56 - 29 June 57
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☒ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 29 June 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Joseph W. Smith (S) [redacted]
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Deputy Chief of Station, Thailand

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 29 June 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: John L. Hart (S) [redacted]
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief of Station, Thailand

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A group doing the basic job (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) whose contact with immediate subordinates is frequent (First line supervisor)
3		A group of supervisors who direct the basic job (Second line supervisors)
	2	A group, who may or may not be supervisors, which is responsible for major plans, operations and policy (Executive level)
	3	When contact with immediate subordinates is not frequent
3		When immediate subordinates' activities are diverse and need careful coordination
2		When immediate subordinates [illegible]
		Other (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUP

6 Months

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 31 9 57 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Has the potential for considerable progress in the assumption of more senior duties.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
A - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEEDED	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. [illegible]	3	15. [illegible]	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. [illegible]	2	16. [illegible]	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. [illegible]	4	17. [illegible]	3	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. [illegible]	3	18. [illegible]	3	28. [illegible]
4	9. [illegible]	4	19. [illegible]	3	29. [illegible]
4	10. [illegible]	3	20. [illegible]	4	30. [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

Posted For: [illegible] UZA 31 JUL 1956
Reviewed

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

1. NAME (For Headquarters use only) NEWTON SCOTT [redacted] MILER	1. DATE OF BIRTH 1 March 1926	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION [redacted] DI
4. GRADE GS-13	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) China Station, Subic Bay		
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 9 January 1956 - 15 June 1956		

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Area Ops. Off Chief, China Independent, China Station	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 1 October 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Subject is responsible for all China [illegible] operational activities outside of the framework of activities with the Chinese Nationalist Government. This includes the China Station Headquarters support responsibility for a field station complement of approximately 50 staff personnel located in scattered Far Eastern areas. Also, it includes the responsibility of supporting, guiding and stimulating LCHARVEST operations in the Far East. His position requires an understanding and appreciation of ODYOKE policies vis-a-vis many Asiatic governments.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE . FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True)
Grant A. FIELDEN

2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True)
Desmond FITZGERALD

3. THIS REPORT XX WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

4. DATE REPORT RECEIVED AT HQS
19 July '56

5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER OF HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES
Mary A. WICKHAM

DO NOT COMPLETE . FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 456

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OF PERSONNEL

SECTION IV

JUL 31

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.									X					
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.											X			
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.										X				
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.											X			
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.									X					
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.									X					
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14. GETS THINGS DONE.											X			
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.								X						
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.												X		
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.											X			
24. EVEN DISPOSITION								X						
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT											X			

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.												X		
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.										X				
30. OBSERVANT.											X			
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.										X				
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.									X					
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.									X					
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X			
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.												X		
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.									X					
45. VERSATILE.												X		
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.											X			
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.												X		
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.										X				
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

As a result of ten years service with KUBARK in varied Headquarters and field operational positions, he has acquired a unique knowledge, based on experience, of KUBARK practices and procedures. He has an outstanding ability to relate specific operations to overall programs designed to accomplish broad objectives. He has demonstrated qualities of operational and administrative leadership and management.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

He is sometimes unnecessarily intolerant or impatient with persons or ideas he is not in agreement with.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

NA

OF PERSONNEL
JUL 30 3 45 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None at present

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER..
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:

1. *The organization selection Board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

3/20/56

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY: Scott N. MILER

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 MAR. 26

2. SEX: M

3. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [redacted] DI

4. GRADE: GS-13

5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current): CHINA STATION. SUBIC BAY

6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT: 9 JAN. 1956

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 9 JULY 1955 - 9 JAN. 1956

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Area Ops. Off., Chief, China Independent, China Station

2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 1 October 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Subject is responsible for all China Base operational activities outside of the framework of activities with the Chinese Nationalist Government. This includes the China Base Headquarters support responsibility for a field station complement of approximately 50 staff personnel located in scattered Far Eastern areas. Also, it includes the responsibility of supporting, guiding and stimulating LCHARVEST operations in the Far East. His position requires an understanding and appreciation of ODYOKE policies vis-a-vis many Asiatic governments.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True): Grant A. FIELDEN

2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True): Desmond FITZGERALD

3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.: 9 March 1956

5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES: Mary WICKHAM

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a REPLACES FORM 45a 1 SEP 54
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION [illegible]

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OB-SERVED	CATEGORIES												
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.										X				
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.									X					
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.											X			
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.										X				
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.									X					
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.										X				
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.													X	
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA, CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.									X					
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.										X				
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.												X		
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.											X			
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.											X			
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.								X						
25. ABLE TO [illegible] HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.											X			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.										X				
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.										X				
30. OBSERVANT.									X					
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.										X				
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.									X					
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.								X						
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.									X					
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.										X				
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X			
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										X				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.										X				
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.									X					
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.											X			
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.													X	

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

An ability to apply the practices and principles of KUBARK to a particular task at hand. Positive qualities of leadership and management. The employee is superior in an operational sense. He is imaginative yet practical.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

The employee has a tendency to be piqued if his prerogatives are challenged.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Not applicable

[illegible] 29 [illegible] '56

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

The employee presently requires no additional training. Future training will depend upon his next assignment.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. [redacted] HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE. HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

COSED

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

Annual and [illegible] of Employee
Annual due 7 October 1955

[illegible] 5/19/55
5/11/55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) Miller	(First) Newton	(Middle) -	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 [illegible] 1926	3. SEX [illegible]	4. CAREER DESIGNATION [illegible]
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY [illegible] Oct. 194[illegible]	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO [illegible]		7. DIVISION FE		8. BRANCH [illegible]
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:				11. GRADE GS-13
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 7 November 1954	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) Oct. 1953 to 1 May 1955				

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: I.C. Ops. Off. (CE) 65-0126-13
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 23 Aug. 195[illegible] / 13 [illegible] 65

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

Period October 1953 to 23 August 1954: Chief, China Branch [illegible]
Period 23 August 1954 to 1 May 1955: Responsible for China Branch planning and programming to be submitted to senior staffs and other area Divisions regarding the development of [illegible] activities, principally in Europe. Conducted a field survey of [illegible] activities in Europe for the purpose of recommending specific plans, operational activities, personnel placement, etc..

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as recorded by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report [☒] has [☐] has not been shown to the individual rated

THIS DATE: 27 AUG 55
SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Robert [illegible]

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)
THIS DATE: 28 Apr 55
SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (next higher echelon of authority): [illegible]

FORM NO. 37-180 REPLACES [illegible] WHICH MAY BE USED

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF [illegible]

18 3 34 PM '56

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. No descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS		CATEGORIES													
		NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES	A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
	B. PRACTICAL.										X				
	1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.											X			
	3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.										X				
	4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
	5. UNEMOTIONAL.										X				
	6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.												X		
	7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
	8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.											X			
	9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
	10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.													X	
	11. CALM.										X				
	12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
	13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X	
	14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
	15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.													X	
	16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES													X	
	17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
	18. HAS STAMINA, CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
	19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION												X		
	20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
	21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES												X		
	22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS											X			
	23. RESPONDS WELL TO [illegible]										X				
	24. [illegible]											X			
	25. [illegible]														

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.													X	
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												X		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.											X			
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.										X				
36. DELIBERATE.												X		
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.													X	
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.										X				
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X			
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.											X			
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.											X			
43. HAS DRIVE.													X	
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.										X				
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.												X		
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.													X	
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

One of China Branch's most outstanding employees. Subject has been the "spark plug" for the LCHARVEST program in Europe which represents one of the largest developments for China CIS in the last eight months. Professionally capable with plenty of drive.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

N.A.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

[illegible]

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 15 3 34 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Further Field Experience

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE..
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY. ~~SHOWING AN UNEXPEC~~ [illegible] WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Reviewed by PUD [illegible] 21 Apr

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) Miller	(First) Newton	(Middle) Scott	2. GRADE GS-13	3. POSITION TITLE Ops Off	CD-FI
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION FE	BRANCH 2	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION	

ITEM 7

A. Creation and organisation of the China Branch CE section designed to provide a fuller exploitation of the potential against China. Requires planning and implementat of an overall program and the supervision, guidance and direction of 13 people in order to obtain the best operational results from analysing, critiquing and developing available and new information. Inauguration of a operational security program designed to provide maximum protection to China operations in the FI, PP and PM fields.

B. Case officer for a major CIA project (PM) which is being terminated on the basis of a definitive reassessment in terms of basic potential, exploitation and results acheived. The objectives of the porject were resistance but the implementation required the application of techniques and standards which can best be categorised in the FI field and which required a major CE effort. Duties required operational and policy guidance to field mission with attendant duties of reviewing all activities from operational and security standpoints. Supervision of administrative and logistic support from hdqs.

10.

19 March 1954
DATE

N. Scott Miller
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 16 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Subject is an outstanding person, with executive ability, leadership, and organizational abilities; he is aggressive and tremendously dependable. The conduct of his duties has paralleled these formidable characteristics.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

MAR 5 11 02 AM '54
MAIL ROOM

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Leadership and organizational capabilities plus an excellent professional knowledge gained in the field.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Nothing that a few more years of age, maturity (although he is extremely mature for his age) and supervisory experience would not ordinarily improve.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He is ready to become chief of a small station. Likewise, he would be excellent in a headquarters staff, particularly CE.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

He is now scheduled to go to the field in an operating capacity during the summer of 54.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

A training program is being planned for him and he will complete it before departing for the field.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

25 March 1954
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

25 March 1954
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) MILER	(First) Newton	(Middle) Scott	2. GRADE GS-12	3. POSITION TITLE Ops. Off.
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION FE	BRANCH II China	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 4-7-52 To 4-7-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

4-7-52 - assigned to FRU/FEC, Yokosuka

Duties in Field:

A. Chief of an operations section charged with the responsibility of supervising 17 operations officers and 3 administrative assistants in the development and conduct of positive and CE operations targeted against China. Operations undertaken by the section were mounted from the field headquarters and three sub-stations. Specific duties involved day to day operational guidance of case officers; planning of both long and short range positive operations; the direct control and guidance of CE operations in both a positive sense and for doubled agent operations; the establishment of administrative procedures to accomplish operational objectives and personnel supervision.

cont'd

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
none			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? Operations Officer or a Chief of Station in a field installation.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

15 June 1953
DATE

Newton S. Miler
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Subject has executed the tasks assigned him in an efficient, vigorous manner with complete loyalty to his superiors and to this agency, and always viewing the problem with a suspicious, yet objective, mind.

FORM NO. 37-181
MAY 1952

SECRET

[illegible] (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Subject's outstanding qualification is his initiative.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Effort should be made to improve his general headquarters techniques. This will tend to occur as he continues in a headquarters position of responsibility. Nothing should be done to limit his initiative and enthusiasm; he is fully capable of recognizing the need for tempering his drive to suit headquarters standards.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

At the conclusion of his headquarters tour, subject will be ready to assume a key position on a large staff, or in a small station. No greater responsibilities should be given subject during the next year, during which time, he will adjust from field to headquarters. As of 1 June 1953 subject became Chief, FE/2 CE.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Subject is presently best suited to CE work. At the close of this tour, consideration should be given to shifting him to positive intelligence operations, the conduct of which will be strengthened by his CE experience.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Before moving to his next assignment, subject should be given all formal training through Phase III, plus certain special TSS courses.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

31 July 1953
DATE

F. M. Plake
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

31 July 1953
DATE

Grant A Fielder
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

As an exception to the recommendations made in item #15, it is the reviewing officer's opinion that subject may well have a contribution to make in the CE field on a continuing basis. This is based on subject's performance in CE during the period covered by "A" and "B" of item #7 when subject worked under the reviewing official's supervision. It is felt that subject is genuinely interested in CE, and because of the high degree of specialization required subject might probably be encouraged to concentrate on this field.

SECRET

Section 7 cont'd

B. Staff and liaison duties with four CIA field missions which desired and requested support and assistance for CE activities, positive operations and in connection with PP and PM activities. Duties required offering advice and guidance and organizing procedures within the section and other elements of field headquarters to support other missions.

C. Liaison with non-CIA agencies such as G-2, AFFE and CIC in order to obtain information and cooperation of assistance to section and mission in achieving objectives.

Duties in Headquarters:

A. Creation and organization of a Branch CE section designed to provide a fuller exploitation of the potential against China. Requires the planning and implementation of an overall program and the supervision, guidance and direction of approximately 13 people in order to obtain the best operational results from analyzing, critiquing and developing available and new information.

B. Case officer for a major CIA project which is in the process of definitive reassessment in terms of basic potential, procedures for exploitation and results achieved to date. The project is basically designed to achieve a PM, or resistance, objective but the implementation of the project requires the initial application of techniques and standards which are designed to collect information a positive or FI sense and which require a major CE effort for the protection of the project. Duties require operational and policy guidance to field mission of approximately 90 CIA officers with the attendent duties of critiquing and reviewing activities from the operational and security standpoints, and the supervision of administrative support requirements from the field.

CONFIDENTIAL

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

SECRET

Sections 1 through 5 will be completed by employee. Type if possible.

1. NAME (Printed) LAST FIRST MIDDLE GRADE SALARY

MILER, Newton S [illegible]

Date of assignment to present duty 31 Jan 49

2. Describe type of duties since last efficiency report. (List most recent first. Describe concisely but fully)

1. CHIEF SECTION, CHI/IND & EG.
2. CHIEF SECTION, KOREA OPS
3. CHIEF STATION, SAPPORO

1 & 2 included ALL OPERATIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE duties EXECUTIVE position - 3 included every type duty finance etc. all involved liaison other agency ORGANS plus liaison with OUTSIDE (ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE) in 2 & 3.

3. If courses of instruction were completed during period of this report, list title, location of school, length of course and date completed.

NONE

4. Proficiency in Foreign Lang.

	READING	SPEAKING	TRANSLATION
Russian	poor	poor	poor
Chinese			poor
Japanese			poor

5. Preference for next duty after termination of current assignment in:

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
OPERATIONS	[redacted] FRU
OPERATIONS	HEADQUARTERS
OPERATIONS	FE

(List one or more in order of preference)

[illegible]

Newton S. Miler

Do not know when last report made, however, must be a change: viz:

Dependents:

Jo Ann	Miler	daughter	11 Jan 49
Judy Kay	"	"	13 June 50
Janet Lynne	"	"	17 Aug 51

14-00000

SECRET
MILER,

Sections 7 through [illegible] to be completed by immediate supervisor

7. Period covered by this report: Date from 31 MAY 1951 to 31 MAY 1952
Occasion for report: Annual ✓ ; Reassignment of Reporting Officer ;
Proposed Reassignment of employee reported on ... , Covering initial 90 days of employment ,

8. Is this employee qualified to perform all present duties: Yes ✓ No
Is employee better qualified for other duties: Yes ... No ✓
If so, what duty or duties

Do you concur in employee's description of duties under Section 2? Yes ✓
No . If NO, explain in Section 11.
Has employee striven for professional improvement: Yes ✓ No
Do you recommend employee for promotion: Yes ✓ No
If so, to what grade and for what position:

9. For each factor observed check the appropriate box to indicate how the employee compares with all others of the same classification whose professional abilities are known to you personally. Do not limit this comparison to the others now under your supervision. Do not hesitate to mark "Not Observed" on any quality when appropriate.

Rating Factors	Not observed	Unsatisfactory	Fair	Good	Very Good	Excellent	Outstanding
A. Ability to work and get along with people					✓		
B. Interest and enthusiasm in work						✓	
C. Security consciousness						✓	
D. Ability to grasp instructions and plans						✓	
E. Attention to duty			✓				
F. Judgment and common sense					✓		
G. Ability to obtain results and get things done					✓		
H. Discretion				✓			
I. Initiative					✓		
J. Ability to handle and direct people					✓		
K. Performance of present duties (Item 2)					✓		
L. Ability to evaluate intelligence info						✓	
M. Tact				✓			
N. Sagacity (Non-Gullibility)						✓	
O. Leadership				✓			
P. Physical stamina		✓					
Q. Mental Stamina					✓		

10. Indicate your attitude toward having this employee [illegible] supervision. Would you [illegible] , Be satisfied [illegible] , Be glad to have [illegible] , Particularly desire ✓

SECRET

Subject is a highly qualified operations officer with demonstrated executive abilities. His primary shortcoming is his lack of self-discipline as far as his personal self is concerned. This has resulted in subject's inability to observe normal working hours in ~~[illegible]~~ reporting for duty ~~[illegible]~~. It is not meant to infer that subject has been lax in total number of hours devoted to his job, rather he is inclined to set his own schedule, claiming illness as the cause. In considering the above, it should be kept in mind that subject has been in the field over three years, and is overdue for a mental and physical rest. It is reccommended that subject be considered for a Headquarters assignment in a senior operations capacity.

SECRET

31. Enter here any desired remarks pertaining to part [illegible] specific areas or lack thereof which are considered pertinent to the evaluation of this employee. Outstanding assets and/or serious limitations should be stated also reasons for and recommendations as to reassignment will be given if appropriate to this report.

(If additional space is needed attach extra sheet)

26 June 1952
(Date)

Frank A. Fielder
(Signature of Reporting Officer)

(If reviewing officer or Chief of Station does not concur with this report, exceptions will be stated in space provided below.)

(Signature of Reviewing Officer)

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

BIASED OPINIONS BASED ON PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENT RE- AND TRUE EVALUATIONS IS AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF ALL SUPERVISORS OF EMPLOYEES, AND THE ACCURATE AND TRUE EVALUATIONS SUBMITTED THEREBY ARE A DIRECT REFLECTION UPON HIS OWN ABILITY AND QUALIFICATION FOR THE POSITION HE HOLDS.

ANY DESIRED REMARKS OF REVIEWING OFFICER AND/OR CHIEF OF STATION

SECRET

[redacted] [illegible]

1. DESCRIPTION OF [illegible] ASSIGNMENTS [illegible] (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)
[illegible]

2. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. [illegible] at Foreign Service Institute - [illegible] Jan. 49.

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING EXC	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
Russian			X			X			X

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Operations Officer	Far East
Operations Officer	Europe
Operations Officer	South America

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?
MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO, NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

17 January 1950
DATE

[redacted]

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM 31 Jan 49 DATE TO 31 Dec 49
OCCASION FOR REPORT: ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☒ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 1? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11
HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION Senior Operations Officer - GS-11

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE					X		
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS					X		
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						X	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE					X		
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE					X		
H. DISCRETION						X	
I. INITIATIVE					X		
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)					X		
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION					X		
M. TACT					X		
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)					X		
O. LEADERSHIP					X		
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA					X		
Q. MENTAL STAMINA					X		

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☒ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☐

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.
While employee is young in years he has handled his duties in a very satisfactory manner. As Chief of the Sub-station in Hokkaido, his duties have been particularly delicate in the liaison capacity and in jointly mounted operations with the U.S. Army. He is recommended for promotion at this time, the Reporting Officer believes action [illegible] be delayed for an additional six months.

12 JUN 1950

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS)

[illegible] 1950
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

1. Chief of Station, [illegible] and [illegible] Group) These included all operational and ad-
2. [illegible]) ministrative duties, executive position.
3. Chief of [illegible]) All assignment included every type duty, i.e. oper-
ational, administrative, finance, etc.
All included liaison with other agency [illegible] liaison with military forces in 2 & 3

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED.

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.

	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
Russian			X			X			X
Chinese									X
Japanese									X

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Operations	[illegible]
Operations	Home Office
Operations	Far East

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

4 June 1952
DATE

[redacted]

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM 31 May 51 DATE TO 31 May 52

OCCASION FOR REPORT: ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO
IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11
HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO
DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? CS-13 Operations Officer

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE					X		
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY			X				
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE					X		
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE					X		
H. DISCRETION				X			
I. INITIATIVE					X		
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)					X		
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT				X			
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP				X			
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA		X					
Q. MENTAL STAMINA					X		

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

Subject is a highly qualified operations officer with demonstrated executive abilities.
His primary shortcoming is his lack of self-discipline as far as his personal self is
concerned. This has resulted in subject's inability to observe normal working hours in
reporting for duty. It is not meant to infer that subject has been lax in total number
of hours devoted to his job, rather he is inclined to set his own schedule, claiming
illness as the cause. In considering the above, it should be kept in mind that subject
has been in the field over three years, and is overdue for a mental and physical rest.
It is recommended that subject be considered for a Headquarters assignment in a

16 June 1952

Richard H Bryson

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL THIS REPORT BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE [illegible]

14-00000

IN [illegible] WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN [illegible] DAYS AFTER CLOSE OF REPORTING PERIOD.

A. THE REPORTING OFFICER IS DEFINED AS THE EMPLOYEE'S IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR. IN OTHER WORDS THE PERSON WHO IS PRESUMABLY BEST ACQUAINTED WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S WORKING EFFICIENCY. HOWEVER, DEPENDING UPON CIRCUMSTANCES, THE CHIEF OF STATION MAY NOT WISH TO ENTRUST THE IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR WITH THIS RESPONSIBILITY. IN ANY CASE, THE CHIEF OF STATION WILL CHANGE OR MODIFY THE RATING OF THE REPORTING OFFICER WHEN SUCH CHANGES OR MODIFICATIONS ARE CALLED FOR. THE CHIEF OF STATION IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACCURACY OF FACTS AND STATEMENTS WHICH APPEAR ON THE STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT. IN MANY CASES, ESPECIALLY IN A SMALL UNIT, THE CHIEF OF STATION MAY WISH TO FILL OUT ALL THE REPORTS HIMSELF.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT, THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL REPORTS, UTILIZING THE SAME FORM, WILL BE RENDERED:

A. UPON COMPLETION OF FIRST NINETY (90) DAYS OF SERVICE AT A STATION.

B. UPON RELIEF OR REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING SENIOR.

C. UPON DETERMINATION OR RECOMMENDATION THAT AN EMPLOYEE IN A FIELD STATION SHOULD BE REASSIGNED TO ANOTHER STATION OR RETURNED TO U.S. FOR REASSIGNMENT OR OTHER DISPOSITION. SUCH REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED SO AS TO REACH THE WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE AFTER SUCH REASSIGNMENT DETERMINATION IS MADE. IF POSSIBLE, THE REPORT SHOULD BE SENT IN AT LEAST THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT IN ORDER THAT ALL TIME POSSIBLE MAY BE DEVOTED TO APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION. IF CONSIDERATION OF REASSIGNMENT IS BEING GIVEN WITHOUT EMPLOYEE'S KNOWLEDGE, ITEMS 1 TO 6 WILL BE FILLED IN AS FAR AS POSSIBLE BY THE RATING OFFICER WITHOUT REFERRAL TO EMPLOYEE.

3. IN FAIRNESS TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE IMPORTANCE OF CAREFULLY PREPARED AND ACCURATE EFFICIENCY REPORTS CANNOT BE OVERSTRESSED. THE FOLLOWING BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RATING SHOULD ALWAYS BE KEPT IN MIND:

A. ALWAYS BASE YOUR JUDGMENT ON:

(1) WHAT YOU HAVE OBSERVED THE INDIVIDUAL DO OR FAIL TO DO.

(2) TYPICAL PERFORMANCE, NOT ON AN ISOLATED STRIKING INCIDENT.

(3) EXAMPLES RELEVANT TO THE CHARACTERISTIC UNDER CONSIDERATION.

(A) THE EFFICIENCY REPORT IS TO BE USED TO RATE ALL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES. BUT REPORTING OFFICERS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT DIFFERENT STANDARDS PREVAIL IN DIFFERENT ASSIGNMENTS WHEREAS IT IS NECESSARY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER POSSESS INITIATIVE, THIS SAME TRAIT IS NOT ALWAYS DESIRABLE, EXCEPT IN A MINOR WAY, FOR A TYPIST. THE RATINGS AND EVALUATIONS SHOULD BE IN REFERENCE TO THE JOB - THE ACTUAL WORK ASSIGNMENT FOR WHICH THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYEE IS BEING PAID. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO ARRIVE AT A JUST ESTIMATE OF THE QUALITIES OF THE PERSON REPORTED ON FOR THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE REPORT. AVOID EXAGGERATIONS AND SUPERLATIVES: THEY DETRACT FROM THE VALUE OF A REPORT AND ARE UNFAIR TO OTHERS.

B. BIASED OPINIONS BASED ON PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PREPARATION OF EFFICIENCY REPORTS IS AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF ALL SUPERVISORS OF EMPLOYEES, AND THE ACCURATE AND TRUE EVALUATIONS EXPRESSED THEREIN ARE A DIRECT REFLECTION UPON HIS OWN ABILITY AND QUALIFICATION FOR THE POSITION HE HOLDS.

C. NO REPORTS WILL BE RENDERED COVERING PERIODS OF LESS THAN 60 DAYS OBSERVED SERVICE.

4. REPORTS WILL NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL; HOWEVER, THE CLASSIFICATION MAY BE RAISED IF DEEMED ADVISABLE BY RATING OFFICER.

5. REPORTS WILL NEVER BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON.

DISPOSITION OF REPORTS

1. REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH CHIEF IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE REPORTING PERIOD.

2. IF THE REPORTING OFFICER IS THE CHIEF OF STATION, REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED BY HIM TO THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH CHIEF IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS.

3. IF THE REPORTING OFFICER IS NOT THE CHIEF OF STATION, THE REPORT WILL BE REFERRED TO THE NEXT IN COMMAND FOR REVIEW AND FINALLY TO THE CHIEF OF STATION FOR FORWARDING TO WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS.

4. UPON RECEIPT OF REPORT IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS, THEY WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE BRANCH CHIEFS PROMPTLY AND THEN REFERRED TO THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL FOR RETENSION IN THE PERSONNEL FILE OF THE EMPLOYEE.

A. IF A CHANGE OF PERSONAL STATUS IS REPORTED UNDER SECTION 6, ONE COPY OF SUCH REPORT WILL BE DETACHED AND SENT TO THE SECURITY OFFICE.

ANY DESIRED REMARKS OF REVIEWING OFFICER AND/OR CHIEF OF STATION

senior operations capacity.

Attachment: Status and Efficiency Report [redacted]

6. Names and birth dates of subjects three children

Jo Ann	daughter	born 11 January 1949
Judy Kay	daughter	born 13 June 1950
Janet Lynne	daughter	born 17 August 1951

SECTIONS 1 [illegible]

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT POST
MILER	Newton	S.	7	2397.20	3 Jan 47

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Same as previous report

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. NONE

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING EXC	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT (STATE IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Investigator-Analyst	China
" "	South America
" "	Europe

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☒ YES ☐ NO
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO
EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO
LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

4 June 1948
DATE

Newton S. Miler
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

DATE FROM	DATE TO
June '47	May '48

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO
IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11
HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO
DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO
IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? Sr. Investigator CAF-9

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK 'NOT OBSERVED' ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE					X		
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						X	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						X	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION					X		
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT						X	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP					X		
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						X	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR ANY RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

Employee acts as case officer in handling and directing agents. He
evaluates and edits reports from agents. Employee has improved
during last year and has large capacity for work. Good style of
writing. Prefers to work alone. Is quiet and reserved. Utilizes
sarcasm as a defense mechanism against potential critics. Only
occasionally [illegible] conflict with or impair his ability to work
with other people.

USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF [illegible]

30 June 1948
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

[illegible]

[illegible]

6. (con't.)

Married 6 March 1948 to Miss Nell C. Stine - American citizen - Address: P.O. Box 10, U.S. Navy 3930, c/o F.P.O., San Francisco, Calif.

Father-in-law: Mr. W. H. Stine, Newton Hamilton, Pa - American citizen

Mother-in-law: Mrs. Henrietta W. Stine, Newton Hamilton, Pa. - American citizen

Sister-in-law: Mrs. Betty S. Coyne, Philadelphia, Pa. - American citizen

14-00000

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

[illegible]

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING EXC	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
none									

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT (GIVE IF IN US-50 STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
SI or CE	So America
SI or CE	China
[illegible] or CE	U S

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO   NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO   EMERGENCY ADDRESSES ☐ YES ☒ NO   LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

June 1947
DATE

Newton S. Miles
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM: Jun 47   DATE TO: Jun 47

OCCASION FOR REPORT: ANNUAL ☒   REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐   PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐   COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO   IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEE'S DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☐ YES ☐ NO   IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE SHOWN EVIDENCE OF PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO   DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? CAF-6 Assistant Analyst

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK 'NOT OBSERVED' ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						X	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS					X		
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						X	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE					X		
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE					X		
H. DISCRETION					X		
I. INITIATIVE					X		
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.				X			
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)					X		
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT					X		
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)					X		
O. LEADERSHIP					X		
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA					X		

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU:
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐   PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐   BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐   BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☒   PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☐

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

[illegible]

[illegible]
DATE

Robert H Cole
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

[illegible]

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

Department of Defense Computer Institute

The Department of Defense Computer Institute

has conferred upon

Mr. N. Scott Miler

this certificate denoting satisfactory completion of the

Senior Executive Course

granted at the City of Washington, District of Columbia.

F. N. Quinn, Captain. U. S. Navy
Director

27 March 1970

TRAINING COMPLETED
Request No. [illegible]
Date 23 SEP 1970

TRAINING EVALUATION
Phase III, Course 2

SECTION I IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

Name [illegible] Newton [illegible]	Sex M	Date of Course 27 April-29 May '54	No. Students 48
Date of Birth 1 Mar 1926	EOD Date 7 Oct 1946	Grade or Rank GS-13	Office [illegible]

Projected Assignment or Present Position
Intelligence Officer, CE

SECTION II PERFORMANCE RECORD

The following grades show the achievement of this student in the major elements of the Course. The distribution of the grades received by all members of the class is presented numerically. In this distribution, this student's grades are marked with an *, so that his performance can be compared with the performance of the class as a whole.

MAJOR ELEMENTS	ADJECTIVAL RATINGS				
	Fail	Poor	Satisf	Excell	Sup
A. Organization of the Clandestine Services: 1. Mission, Objectives, Commitments	0	8	22	16	* 1
2. Organization and Function at Headquarters and Abroad	0	11	28	6	* 2
B. Operational Activities of the Clandestine Services: 1. Approaches to Operational Activity	0	6	25	15	* 1
2. Planning and Review of Operations	0	4	33	8	* 2
3. Operational and Intelligence Reporting	0	5	* 24	18	0
4. Administrative Requirements of Project Management	0	5	* 31	10	2
C. Skills Observed in Training: 1. Facility for Written Expression	0	4	26	* 16	1
2. Preparation of Cables	0	6	27	13	* 1
3. Facility for Oral Presentation	0	3	21	* 23	0

The content of these major elements, and the basis for assigning grades, is explained in OBJECTIVES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE.

SECTION III OVER-ALL RATING

This rating is an estimate of the student's ability to think and plan in terms of the character of CIA clandestine operations; to appreciate and to understand the policy considerations and factors which affect the choice of operations and the manner in which they must be conducted; and the operational security standards which must be maintained. IN THINKING AND PLANNING IN TERMS OF CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS, THIS STUDENT:

is incapable	has some difficulty	possesses adequate competence	is exceptionally skilled	is outstanding
☐	☐☐☐	☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐	☐☐☒	☐

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECTION IV

COMMENT:

Subject's grades speak better than any comments could. There is no question but that he brought more to the course and consequently had less to gain from it than any of his fellow students, which makes his performance the more worthy. His assistance to the instructors with Far East material is much appreciated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

Chief of Training

Chief Instructor

SECTION V. RATING AND COMMENT FOR OPTIONAL USE BY STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

This rating takes into account the student's age, education, grade, Agency experience, and projected assignment. It is an estimate of the implications of this Training Evaluation for the student's assignment and career potential. CONSIDERING THIS STUDENT's AGE, GRADE, EXPERIENCE, AND ASSIGNMENT, THIS PERFORMANCE:

is inadequate	is barely adequate	is acceptable and typical	shows high competence	shows extreme competence
☐	☐☐☐	☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐	☐☐☐	☐

Staff Training Officer

OBJECTIVES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

TRAINING OBJECTIVES: To provide the student with an understanding of the operational objectives, regulations, and procedures, and the basic policy considerations and operational security standards of the Clandestine Services of CIA sufficient to allow him to perform professionally an initial assignment under supervision within the DD/P organization. Specific objectives of the Major Elements of the Course are these:

A. Organization of the Clandestine Services

1. Mission, objectives, and commitments: The student should be familiar with the general content and source of the directives underlying clandestine objectives and activities, as they might appear in a country plan.

2. Organization and function at Headquarters and abroad: The student should be familiar with the organization, functions, and levels of responsibility of the Area Divisions, the Senior Staff, and the Field Station. He should appreciate the effect of local conditions in determining the organization of a Field Station. He should be familiar with the general nature of the HQ Support Organization, the assistance provided, and the coordination requirements to be met by the Field and the HQ Desk in matters of personnel administration, funding, logistics, communications, and TSS activities.

B. Operational Activities of the Clandestine Services

1. Approaches to operational activity: The student should be familiar with methods of attaining objectives (i.e. liaison, agent assets) and the policy considerations and other factors affecting the choice of particular methods.

(Reverse, please)

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: Supervisors and Training Officers Concerned

SUBJECT: Training Evaluations for Phase III #2

1. Attached is a training evaluation for one of the students who completed Phase III Course #2.

2. This student participated in the second presentation of the revised five-week curriculum for this course. As the course develops, it is possible to provide more detailed reports of performance, as represented by the nine grades assigned in Section II, "Performance Record."

3. As a consequence of introducing new material, there was considerable delay in returning graded assignments to the students, and some of the later assignments were not graded until after the course was completed. Because of this, students did not have sufficient opportunity to profit from the errors in their earlier performances. This factor should be considered when interpreting the attached report.

4. If you desire further information, please contact Chief, Assessment and Evaluation Staff, Extension 8307.

Matthew Baird
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

ORBIT OPERATIONS SEMINAR NO. 1

Name **MILER, Scott**	Dates of Course (See paragraph II, below)
Staff or Division **FE/China**	Present Position **In charge of LCHARVEST Program**

I. SEMINAR OBJECTIVE:

To discover and/or develop such basic working principles and operating concepts as can be derived from the experience and knowledge accumulated by the Clandestine Services in operating against the Soviet Union, European Satellites, and Communist China.

II. SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COURSE:

The Seminar reviewed the present operational situation and the operational future of the various Clandestine Services' programs against the Orbit. Emphasis was on the results achieved, present operational approaches, specific problems and recommendations. The Seminar was held half-days (0900-1230 hours) for two weeks (25 April-6 May), including, as well, two clean-up sessions (22 May, 1 June). The first week consisted of lectures on Orbit countries, summarizing the present operational situation; the second week was devoted entirely to Seminar discussions conducted by Harry A. Rositzke, Chief, Operations School.

III. CERTIFICATION OF COURSE COMPLETION:

Mr. Scott Miler

has participated in the entire Seminar.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

SPENCER L. TAGGART
Senior Instructor,
Operations School

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING

FILE [illegible]

TO: Retirement Operations Branch
Office of Personnel

DATE [illegible]

RETIREE [illegible]

CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Cover & Commercial Staff, the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT		CIVIL SERVICE	x	CIARDS	DATE [illegible]					
COVER	x	OVERT ROUTINE		COVERT (OFFICIAL COVER) LOCK-UP		COVERT (NOC) SPECIAL	**RETENTION OF AWARDS**	x	YES		NO
CORRESPONDENCE	x	OVERT		COVERT		THRU CCS				

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE	x	U.S. GOV'T. CHECK				OTHER *(Payment instructions follow)*
TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE	x	CIA		CSC		OTHER *(MEMO FOLLOWS)*
REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION	x	YES		NO		INTERNAL TRANSFER

INSURANCE

FEGLI	x	OVERT		COVERT		MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD: [illegible]

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE	x	YES		CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE	x	YES		NO	x	OVERT		COVERT

REMARKS

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH
COVER & COMMERCIAL STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS: ________________ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FORM 3429 SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

7 - OFF. PERS. FILE ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. N. Scott Miler

SUBJECT : Notification of Intent to Recommend Retirement

Personnel of the Deputy Director for Operations have been informed that we are in a surplus personnel situation. You have informed me that in these circumstances you are willing to be retired. I am grateful for your offer to assist in this matter. Accordingly, I intend to recommend your retirement which, if approved, will entitle you to an immediate annuity.

William E Nelson

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

27 March 1975

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT

N. Scott Miler was a CIA official from 17 September 1947 until his retirement as a GS-16 on 31 December 1974. His duties and responsibilities with CIA involved all aspects of foreign intelligence collection and counterintelligence including executive level planning and management of programs, budgets and personnel. He represented the CIA in Washington and overseas at the executive and command levels to U.S. Government agencies, departments and military services and with foreign intelligence and security services. His specialized responsibilities concerned Soviet and Soviet Bloc political, economic and espionage policies and activities.

He served overseas in China (now the People's Republic of China), and other Far East, Southeast Asian and African countries ~~Korea, Japan, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand and Ethiopia~~ and travelled extensively throughout Asia and Western Europe.

APPROVED:

Central Cover Staff

Date 1 April 1975

OS/EAB

Date 1 April 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE

[illegible]: 31 December 1974
Name (Last-First-Middle)
MILER, N. Scott

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks). continue to bank
✓	6. Only applicable to Retiree - Returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being.
	7. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	8. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee
N. Scott Miler

Date Signed
27/12/74

Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code)
4314 BIRCHLAKE CT.
ALEXANDRIA, VA. 22309

Correspondence
OVERT CORRESPONDENCE
☐ Overt ☐ Covert

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Retirement - Scott Miler

1. The retirement of Subject, effected as a result of a memorandum from the Head of his Career Service stating that he is surplus to the needs of the Service and that his retirement will be recommended to the Director under the provisions of the CIA Retirement and Disability System pertaining to involuntary retirement, in no way implies an adverse action. Subject signed an application for retirement of his own volition in order to qualify for an immediate retirement annuity. The liberalized criteria for such separations was established by the Agency to parallel similar action under the Civil Service Retirement System in accordance with FPM Letter No. 831-23, dated 10 December 1969.

2. Any inquiry received concerning the nature of the separation of Subject from the Agency should be confirmed simply as a retirement.

Ronald Gage

Ronald Gage
Chief
Retirement Affairs Division

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT
AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
MILER	NEWTON	SCOTT	3 - 1 - 26	480 22 3553
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

Newton S. Miler

DATE

14 Feb 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

[illegible]
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL [illegible]

FEB 19 2 31 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on Back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1964
(For use only until April 30, 1964)
176-131

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. SEND ORIGINAL TO CHIEF, CSPS AND RETAIN COPY IN DIVISION OR STAFF

SECTION I — IDENTITY

NAME MILER, Newton S.	SERIAL NO. 012773	POSITION TITLE Ops Officer CH	GRADE 16
COMPONENT DDO/CIOPS/OPS	DATE OF BIRTH 1 March 1926	MARITAL STATUS Married	NO. OF DEPENDENTS 1-wife

SECTION II — ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE

A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE(S) OF WORK PREFERRED. INCLUDE LANGUAGES THAT WOULD BE USED. INDICATE TRAINING DESIRED.

Programming, planning, implementing and running operations and counterintelligence activities including necessary domestic + foreign liaison.

B. LOCATION OF ASSIGNMENT (*Check and complete 1 or 2 or 3*)

☒ 1. I AM ABLE AND WILLING TO SERVE WHERE AND WHEN REQUIRED BY THE NEEDS OF THE SERVICE. THERE ARE NO SERIOUS FACTORS TO LIMIT MOBILITY.

☐ 2. I AM ABLE AND WILLING TO SERVE ONLY IN THE LOCATIONS LISTED BELOW. FACTORS WHICH AFFECT MY MOBILITY ARE: (*include family, special schooling, or medical requirements*)

☐ 3. I AM ABLE AND WILLING TO SERVE ONLY AT HEADQUARTERS. EXPLANATION OF REASONS:

DATE 12.10.73	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE N. Scott Miller	ROOM NO. 2B46 EXT. 6748

FORM 4-69 2896 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10-35)

SECTION III COMMENTS BY HOME BASE COMPONENT - SUITABILITY FOR ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS

A. ON THE BASIS OF ALL FACTORS INVOLVED (age, grade, prior experience, qualifications and suitability) STATE WHETHER PLANS FOR AN OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT WOULD BE REALISTIC. WHAT NEXT ASSIGNMENT IS PROPOSED?

This officer is one of two senior counterintelligence officers at Group Chief level. His greatest contribution to our service can be made at Headquarters at present.

B. FOR WHAT TYPE(S) OF WORK IS THIS OFFICER MOST SUITED. DETAILS ARE USEFUL IN CODING OF QUALIFICATIONS AND IN DETERMINING FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS. *(refer to CS qualification code structure)*

Counterintelligence duties.

C. DESCRIBE GROWTH POTENTIAL. SHOULD EMPLOYEE BE ASSIGNED TO A DIFFERENT KIND OF WORK? BE SPECIFIC AS TO AREAS OF CAREER DEVELOPMENT.

This officer has excellent growth potential to move into the top CI management positions. In a geographic division he could move into the COPS, Deputy Division Chief or a senior COS position.

D. WHAT KIND OF TRAINING, IF ANY, IS RECOMMENDED?

Senior training course.

SIGNATURE OF STAFF/DIVISION/BRANCH CHIEF

for

James Angleton, Chief/CI Operations

DATE

17 OCT 1973

SECTION IV ACTION BY THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE CAREER SERVICE

A. REASSIGNMENT OR EXTENSION IN POSITION ____________ COMPONENT(S) NOTIFIED ☐

B. CAREER EMPLOYEE STATUS RECOMMENDED ☐

C. QUAL/MOBILITY STATUS CODED/RECODED ☐

D. OTHER ACTION ____________ ☐

____
DATE ACTION COMPLETED

____
CSPS BRANCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
012773	MILER	NEWTON	SCOTT

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
04	03	72	04	11	72		2			FE	502

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓ TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐ DISPATCH
☐ CABLE	☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐ OTHER *(Specify)*	
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ SIC		
✓ [illegible] DIVISION, CTRD.	DATE 11/24/72	SIGNATURE
☐ [illegible] DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL ✓
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 8-72 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-101)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
C13773	Miler	Alan	Scott

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
09	19	71	10	09	71		2			EUROPE	SC1

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☐ DISPATCH
☐ CABLE
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐ OTHER *(Specify)*

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: CI 49-72
DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 10/27/71

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ OCS
☐ S & L DIVISION, CTFO.
☐ B & F DIVISION

☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE: 12/2/71

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

[redacted]

8 NOV 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Board

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion - Newton Scott MILER

1. This is a recommendation for promotion for Mr. Miler from Grade GS-15 to GS-16.

2. The career of this officer has been notably marked throughout with relatively important responsibilities for his age. His youth, intense drive, initiative, self-assurance, capacity for work, natural talent for determining the objectives, recognizing the problem, organization of the work to be done, administering and supervising the effort, have long been evident to those for and with whom he has worked. Years of service during which he has steadily matured has resulted in a recognition, by supervisors and subordinate fellow-workers alike of his unusually wide experience, proven soundness of judgment, organizational, administrative and executive talent coupled with powers of expression both oral and written and demonstrated capacity for work. He is unquestionably a very outstanding officer.

3. Having entered on duty as a Code Clerk (GS-05) in October 1946 following a A.B. degree in Economics from Dartmouth College in a Navy V-12 Program, he was soon assigned to Shanghai where he remained a short period before a TDY assignment to open the communications station in Seoul, Korea. He was assigned to Mukden and Antung, Manchuria from April 1947 to June 1948 where despite being barely 21 years of age and an official designation as Code Clerk as Grades GS-5/7, he conducted Agent operations into Korea, USSR and China. He handled liaison with Chinese officials and counter espionage cases with A-2 officers. His talents were recognized and after

Not approved by
CSCS Board

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

TDY training at Headquarters, he was assigned to Shanghai as an Intelligence Officer. There he performed as a Case Officer and engaged in stay behind planning, supervision of other junior Case Officers, and assisted in the evacuation of other CIA officers. Before he was 25 years of age, he established the station and served as Chief at Sapporo, Japan, for some 20 months (1949-51).

4. No attempt will be made to list here the many and varied assignments and successes he has had in this long and youthful career. He has successfully engaged in all types of operations - FI, CI, CA including PM and PP, but his principal talents have been in the Counter Intelligence, particularly Counter-Espionage field. His experience includes service as Chiefs of Station, Senior Case Officer, Senior Staff Officer, and since September 1964, Deputy Chief of the Special Investigations Group of the CI Staff where he has had a major responsibility in the supervision of senior grade Counter Intelligence Officers as well as being personally and directly active in matters of great complexity and utmost security considerations. In his service in that capacity he has demonstrated his outstanding abilities as a Counter Intelligence officer. He has carried a substantial portion of the work load of his office including supervision of both clerical and officer personnel, liaison with all elements of the Agency and other intelligence and security services of the government as appropriate.

5. His executive ability, thoroughness, usefulness of work product, energy, speed, proficiency, initiative, clarity of written and oral expression, managerial skill, experience, soundness of judgment, selflessness, tact, considerate and objective approach to his responsibilities and performance of duties, astute application of tradecraft, leadership, dependability, resourcefulness and general high professional competence make him an outstanding highly valuable officer to the Agency. It is recommended that he be promoted to Grade GS-16.

[illegible]

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

[redacted]

DD/P. 8-4255

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Jul
15.

October 14, 1968

Mr. Scott Miler
Central Intelligence Agency
McLean, Virginia 20505

Dear Scott:

The Office of Security is most grateful for the excellent presentation you made at the recent seminar of Special Agents.

4 OCT

Participating officers were certainly alerted to the very real challenge we face in maintaining personnel security. Your lecture was most enlightening to this group and should put their work into a new perspective.

We hope you will be able to assist us in our future training sessions.

Sincerely,

G Marvin Gentile

G. Marvin Gentile
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Security

Exempted from Automatic Decontrol

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

JUL 26 1968

TO: Mr. James Angleton
Deputy Director for Plans
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

FROM: G. Marvin Gentile
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

During the week of July 8 - 12, 1968, the Office of Security held a seminar for selected State Department overseas security officers. Among the multitude of subjects on the agenda, I considered none more important than personnel security. I was, therefore, immensely pleased that Mr. Scott Miler accepted our invitation to speak on "Foreign Intelligence Operations Against U. S. Personnel."

Citing statistics from his extensive research, Mr. Miler impressed us with the magnitude of hostile targeting efforts against Americans overseas. After this informative briefing, he engaged the conferees in a productive exchange of views on solving problems of mutual concern.

I am most grateful to you for permitting Mr. Miler's participation in our Regional Security Officer Seminar and hope that you will extend to him my appreciation for his excellent talk.

[illegible]

07-5[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

CONFIDENTIAL

IN REPLY REFER TO
OP-922Y3D/djs
Ser: 0202P92
14 FEB 1987

CONFIDENTIAL

87-0619

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. N. SCOTT MILER

VIA: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJ: Expression of Appreciation (U)

1.(U) I hereby express my appreciation for service of the highest degree of excellence provided to my office during the past several months. You displayed professional competence that can only be described as exemplary in nature.

2.(U) It is unfortunate that the work on which you performed is of such a nature that it precludes a specific description herein, but that need not detract from the significance of this message of approbation. Of all the attributes displayed, the two most worthy of note are your use of imagination and persistence. These two qualities enabled you to produce results which others had not been able to obtain. Near failure was transformed into success.

3.(U) Not to be ignored is your administrative ability. The marshaling of resources available to you and coordination of the efforts of your available personnel contributed materially to the degree and quality of results obtained as well as the expeditious manner in which you proceeded. Also, selflessness was manifested by your willingness to ignore assigned working hours and press on as long as any hope existed for obtaining results.

4.(C) As you are aware, the results achieved by you have significance beyond the boundaries of the Navy. The full import cannot be completely evaluated at this time but it is known that the lives of many persons will be enriched by your efforts. It is regretted that all persons affected will not have the opportunity to express their thanks to you in person for the part you have played.

5.(U) On behalf of all persons who will benefit from your efforts, and on behalf of the Navy and myself, I again express my deepest appreciation and say to you a most hearty "Well done".

6.(U) If it is consistent with the policy of your Agency, it is requested that a copy of this letter be made a part of your official record.

E B Fluckey
E. B. FLUCKEY
REAR ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 29 August 1961, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated ~~August 1960~~.

Newton S. Miller
Signature
NEWTON S MILLER

16 Sept 64
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

[illegible] THE CLEARANCE IN ORDER TO PERFORM HIS/HER ASSIGNED DUTIES. IT IS [illegible] THE COMMUNICATIONS [illegible] BE NOTIFIED THAT THE CLEARANCE MAY BE REJECTED.

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - EMPLOYEE'S COMPONENT [illegible]
1 - OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS:
[illegible] Blais
[illegible] BRANCH, [illegible]

FORM 15975 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
12773	Miler	Newton	Scott	42

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1				07	24	64	Ethiopia	220

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☐ DISPATCH
☒ CABLE
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐ OTHER *(Specify)*

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: IN 33997

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 7/25/64

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ FISCAL DIVISION
☐ PERSONNEL DIVISION

☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

FORM 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

201621 JUL 17 61

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
12773	MILER	NEWTON	S.	32

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH			DEPARTURE MONTH			COUNTRY	OMIT
		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	26-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	05	03	61	05	13	61	WE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
	3 May - 13 May 1961

REMARKS

201621 JUL 17 61

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
✓ FISCAL DIVISION ☐ FINANCE DIVISION		DATE 7/13/61	SIGNATURE

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

AVAT-1193

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (*true*) Newton Scott Miler	DATE (*from item 5-1*) 10 Jan 64	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (*true*)	DATE (*from item 5-2*)
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:			DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Mar 1926	2. GRADE GS-15	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE Chief of Station	7a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR 9 Sept 1961
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (*if known*)		5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	7b. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD 1 July 1964
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7c. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (*see special note on Transmittal Form*):

Chief of Station

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (*refer to catalog of courses, if available*):

FORM 3-58 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

☐ 2 [illegible] INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT

1ST CHOICE AF Division 2ND CHOICE NE DIVN 3RD CHOICE

☐ 1 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS

1ST CHOICE Africa 2ND CHOICE Latin America 3RD CHOICE Western Europe

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 30-40

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Four dependents; wife and daughters 15, 14 and 12.

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT Would appreciate consideration of educational facilities since in Africa particularly special arrangements will be required.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Africa Division cannot accommodate this officer after his return from the field.

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER DATE 25 February 1964 CARL T. TAYLOR	SIGNATURE Carl Taylor

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. CABLE NO. 1553 12.2.64
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME	20. SIGNATURE E Johnson
21. TITLE	22. DATE 8 Apr 64

23. COMMENTS

To CI Staff
EJ/let

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE TRANSMITTAL

INSTRUCTIONS

A. This questionnaire is designed to provide information for consideration by headquarters in planning your next assignment.

B. Each supervisor in the field will ensure that this questionnaire is completed for each employee under his immediate supervision and forwarded to headquarters eight (8) months prior to the individual's planned date of departure from the station.

C. The questionnaire will be completed and forwarded through normal channels to headquarters in triplicate.

SPECIAL NOTE

This form must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information or methods of operations, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of major duties may be reported in item No. 9. However, [illegible] On the other hand, the description of the major duties of certain other employees [illegible] should not be fully recorded on this form. In these cases a general statement of duties will be indicated in item No. 9 so as to show the level of responsibilities [illegible] the nature of your position. No names, operational techniques, objectives [illegible] should be included.

[illegible]

[illegible] P. [illegible]

T4-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

-Pg R

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) MILER (First) NEWTON (Middle) SCOTT

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: HANOVER, N.H. USA

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: NEWTON HAMILTON, PA.

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK THE ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE: MUKDEN, MANCHURIA, CHINA

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 6 MARCH 1948

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:

DATE OF DECREE:

IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED:

DATE SPOUSE DIED:

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S):

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE: NELL STINE MILER

ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): BOX 73, NAVY 3002, F.P.O. SAN FRANCISCO CALIF.

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

NAMES OF CHILDREN	SEX	AGE
JO ANN MILER	F	11 JAN 49
JUDY KAY MILER	F	13 JUNE 50
JANET LYNNE MILER	F	17 Aug 51

NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian): NEWTON BYRON MILER

ADDRESS: UNKNOWN

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian): ELIZABETH C. MILER

ADDRESS: 90 Conry, DELAVAN, Wis. RR 1

TELEPHONE NUMBER: 1098 J1

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES? MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHER

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): MRS. WALLACE H. STINE

RELATIONSHIP: MOTHER-IN-LAW

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): NEWTON HAMILTON, PA.

HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER:

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:

BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☑ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☑ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☑ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 7 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS: RIGGS NATIONAL BANK CHEVY CHASE BRANCH, WASH. D.C.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

NEWTON S, and NELL S. MILER

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

SAFE DEPOSIT BOX, CENTRAL NATIONAL BANK, MOUNT UNION, PA.

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Social Security # 480-22-3553-

SIGNED AT: Washington D.C.

DATE: 3 Oct 58

SIGNATURE: Newton S. Miler

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of Newton Scott Miler

Effective 20 July 1961

The purpose of this memorandum is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are integrated and to set forth certain rights and obligations which are incident to your status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS-14 $12,730 per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of 20 July 1961. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected at FSR-4 and salary of $12,145 per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of twenty-four months from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and (except as provided in paragraph three (3) above) allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they are less than or equal to the salary and allowance payments due on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due, the difference will be credited to your payroll account with this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due, the overage will be remitted to this organization at designated intervals, presently ____________________. Computations hereunder will be made on the basis of the aggregate gross due and received provided, however, that in computing remittances for overage Federal and, if applicable, District of Columbia income taxes withheld by your cover facility against the overage may be deducted. To assure timely accuracy in your payroll account with this organization you are expected to immediately report cover facility payroll changes.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integration into your cover facility, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and at your personal expense you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half per cent) on the basis of your cover salary or your salary from this organization, whichever is the greater.

b. If you receive taxable income from both your cover facility and this organization, necessary adjustments for Federal, and if applicable, District of Columbia income tax purposes will be made in conformance with instructions received from this organization.

c. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with the rules and regulations of this organization.

d. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with your cover facility of any status with your cover based on your services performed with that organization at the request of this organization.

SECRET

e. A portion of your annual leave and all the sick leave which has accrued to your credit at the time of your integration shall be transferred to your cover facility. The remainder of your leave will be held by this organization in escrow pending the completion of your integration. If the sum of your accumulated annual leave with your cover facility and this organization exceeds the maximum accumulation entitlement afforded you under the regulations of this organization, the excess will be forfeited. If possible, such forfeiture will be accomplished by reducing the leave credit in your escrow account with this organization. While integrated, you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon completion of your integration, your accrued annual and sick leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lumpsum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization including income taxes withheld by your cover facility.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

Weston S. Niles

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-28
12773	MILER	HELEN	SCOTT	52

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	09	09	61				ETHIOPIA	220

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☐ DISPATCH
✓ CABLE
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐ OTHER (Specify)

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: 12- 37419

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 12 September '61

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
FISCAL DIVISION		DATE	SIGNATURE
FINANCE DIVISION		[illegible]/61	

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OPERATIONS MISSION TO THAILAND
BANGKOK, THAILAND

April 9, 1958

Mr. Theo E. Hall
Chief, Public Safety Division
International Cooperation Administration
Washington 25, D. C.

Re: Newton S. Miler

Dear Theo:

You have by now received our unclassified cable, TOICA 1408, advising of our acceptance of the resignation of Newton S. Miler who has served since December 29, 1956, as Chief of our Criminal Investigation Branch, Public Safety Division, USOM/T. It was with deep regret that I accepted the resignation since his departure on or about April 15, 1958, will be felt very keenly by both the Chief of the Division, Mr. Al DuBois, and myself.

Were it not for the pressing need of stateside medical attention for his wife and the fact that he should be with her during this period, I should have endeavored to prevail on him to take an alternative course of action. However, I am satisfied that there was no alternative and, hence, did accept the resignation effective April 15, 1958, it being noted that he is returning with his family to the States at his own expense.

This letter is to advise you of the facts leading to what would appear to be a sudden resignation. I also want to inform you that Miler's job performance here has, in my estimation, been of high order and can very easily be summarized by stating that he has performed most satisfactorily.

He has shown himself consistently to be tactful, considerate, and objective in his approach to his responsibilities and in the performance of his duties. I have at all times found that his judgment has been sound and mature. He has had warm and mutually satisfying relationship with his opposite numbers in the Thai police.

In furtherance of my statement of my confidence in him, I unhesitatingly designated him as Acting Chief of our Public Safety Division during Mr. DuBois' absence on TDY in Washington for the period March 9 through April 5, 1958. I naturally had continuing personal contact with him during that period and observed his handling of himself in Executive Staff meetings. The various attributes which I cited above were clearly demonstrated during this period and, in fact, his performance during this period permits me to add that I am satisfied with his supervisory abilities.

I would have no hesitancy in recommending his reemployment by ICA if in the future the present family health situation is rectified.

Sincerely,

Thomas E. Naughten
Director

cc: A. G. Stevens, PERS, ICA/W
C. E. Keating, M/PSI, ICA/W

[illegible] 3 December 1956

Mr. Newton S. Miler

Dear Mr. Miler:

This is a memorandum of agreement between you and the United States Government in regard to your employment by CIA. It is hereby mutually agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of CIA, at the present grade and salary of GS-13^3, $9420 per annum, you will accept cover employment in the International Cooperation Administration effective as of 3 December 1956 You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to CIA, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of the ICA, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to the ICA is being effected at the class of FSS-3 and salary of ~~$9120~~ 9570 per annum.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of two (2) years from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of CIA, and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by CIA in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour by ICA. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by the Agency to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause either by ICA or CIA before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by the Agency to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause either by ICA or CIA before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of ICA. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of ICA and you will receive and retain the amount paid by ICA without regard to CIA regulations except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with CIA regulations.

4. It is specifically understood and agreed that as an appointed employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, you are entitled to receive and retain only the salary, allowances and other benefits which are commensurate with your appointed position and salary grade, except as provided in paragraph three (3) above. The compensation that you receive from ICA will be offset against your CIA salary and you will return to CIA not less than quarterly the amount by which in the aggregate your FSS salary, allowances and other pecuniary benefits exceed your CIA salary, allowances and other pecuniary benefits. In accordance with applicable CIA regulations, you will be reimbursed for any increased income tax liability resulting solely from your reporting your ostensible ICA income rather than your actual CIA income.

5. (a) Your status as a CIA employee will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with ICA, and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits, and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

(1) It is presently contemplated that all annual and sick leave which will have accrued to your credit at the time of integration into ICA will be held by CIA pending your transfer from ICA to CIA. While assigned to ICA, you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of that organization. Upon completion of your integration with ICA, your accrued annual and sick leave will normally be transferred to your credit with CIA. If security conditions require that you be given a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount of any lump-sum payment to CIA at the time of your reinstatement including any withholding tax deducted by ICA.

(2) Upon your integration in ICA, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half per cent (6-1/2%)) on the basis of your FSS salary or CIA salary, whichever is the greater.

(b) Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with CIA rules and regulations.

(c) You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with ICA of any status with ICA based on your services performed with that organization at the request of CIA.

6. If CIA considers it undesirable for you to continue the use of your ICA cover, your services will be utilized whenever possible in some other appropriate capacity as designated by CIA, unless the circumstances are such as to warrant your termination for cause.

7. Authorized instructions which you receive from CIA in briefing, training or in any other way are a part of this memorandum of agreement and are

incorporated herein to the extent that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

5. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by CIA from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with CIA will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Personnel

ACCEPTED:

Newton S. Miller

Newton S. Miller

SECRET

Date: [illegible]

Central Intelligence Agency
2430 "E" Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

1. In accordance with the policy of this Agency, it is understood and agreed by me that I shall be required to serve a minimum term of two years from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, unless terminated by the Government for its convenience. If the assignment is terminated at my request in less than twenty-four months, the following shall prevail:

(a) If I resign in less than twelve months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses involved in the transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the foreign station, and pay all such expenses for return to the United States.

(b) If I resign between the twelfth and twenty-fourth month from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the United States.

2. Part (a) above shall not apply to employees who have served in a departmental position with CIA or who have served an overseas tour of duty with CIA, and in such case part (b) only shall apply, amended to read: "If I desire to terminate or return to the United States prior to the expiration of twenty-four months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the United States".

Newton S. Miles
NEWTON S. MILES

Witness:

Marge E. Hobbs

SECRET

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

T+R

1. NAME (Last) MILLER (First) [illegible] (Middle) SCOTT

2. THIS DATE 13 Oct 57

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME:

☑ [illegible] AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION ([illegible]) ☐ MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA

☑ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED ☐ AIR TRIP INSURANCE [illegible]

✓ GEHA

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance):

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FOLLOWING INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID

SIGNATURE

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

N. Scott Miller
SIGNATURE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY:

CPB: Dodge
SIGNATURE

TACB:
SIGNATURE

8. REMARKS:

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to TACB for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPB files.

FORM NO. 37-190
1 MAR 54

Data on all permanent Duty Overseas posts :

from	to	country	station	[illegible]	comments
Feb 1951	Dec 1952	Japan	Yokosuka	x	** ***

** during period April to October 1951 was on extended and periodic TDY to Korea (all stations)

*** during period January to Dec 1952 on periodic TDY Hong Kong

Dec 1953 ~~Feb 1954~~ TDY to Japan, Hong Kong, Phillipines, FIC, Thailand, Pakistan, Switzerland, France, England

SECRET
Security Information

(2)

Name: MILER, Last, Newton First S. Middle

TO: All C. I. A. Personnel

FROM: Personnel Director

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The Agency is currently revising the system for machine coding employee qualifications, thereby permitting more complete and accurate data on all personnel. The new system will aid in implementing Agency policies on promotion from within by facilitating the selection of personnel with desired education and experience for vacancies which may occur. It is also expected that the new system will provide readily accessible statistics for planning and management purposes.

2. The attached questionnaire is designed to cover adequately those factors in which the Agency is interested. Although the information is, in a large measure, already reflected in previous forms submitted by you, it is felt that your time within the organization may enable you to emphasize those qualifications pertinent to its needs. The questionnaire also serves to bring your education and qualifications record up to date.

3. Your cooperation is requested in completing the questionnaire as thoroughly and accurately as possible and returning it to your Administrative Officer within the time allotted.

This form should be returned to H.C. Clinkscale, Room 1615 J Building by 26 February 1954.

CODED FOR QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 16 MAR 1954

George E. Meloon
George E. Meloon
Personnel Director

SECRET
Security Information

FORM NO. 37-152
MAY 1952

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry)	2. NAME: (last) MiLER (first) NewTON (middle) SCOTT		3. Office DDP/FI
4. Date of Birth 1 MARCH 1926	5. Sex: X male (1) ___ female (2)	Martial Status M Nr. Dependents 4	6. CIA Entry Date:
7. Citizenship: X U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) X Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other(specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ___		

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
4. Two years college, or less
5. Over two years, no degree
[✓ 6.] Bachelor degree
7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
8. Masters degree
9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	
DARTMOUTH College HANOVER, N.H.	ECO.	NAVAL SCIENCE	1944	46	4		AB	SEPT 46	APPROX 130

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

4. Military or Intelligence Training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, command & staff, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
V-12 + NROTC DARTMOUTH	1944	1946	28	GENERAL LINE

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. CIA Experience: State the specific nature of duties performed with CIA and CIG, starting with your present position. Take position titles from your official personnel papers, if you have personal copies. Please do not request your Official Personnel Folder. Include geographic area and subject matter dealt with, if applicable. Position Title is your classification title such as Geographer, Intelligence Officer, etc. Duty Title indicates your organization position such as - Section Chief, Branch Chief, Administrative Assistant, etc. and is to be filled in only if different to the Position Title. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

1.	From July 53 To PRESENT Tot. mos. 8 Grade 13 Salary $8360 Office FE/2 (CHINA) Position Title: I. O. Duty Title: SECTION CHIEF	Description of Duties: SECTION CHIEF FOR CHINA CE Supervise 13 full time AND from 2 to 6 part time EMPLOYEES. SECTION HANDLES CE OPS, COMPILES INTELL & BI STUDIES, PROCESSES AGENT CLEARANCES, CORRESPONDENCE FBI, STATE, I&NS. MAINTAINS CHINA FILES - Duty Station, if overseas: BRANCH SECURITY OFFICER
2.	From MAR To July 53 Tot. mos. 4 Grade 12 Salary $7240 Office FE/2 (CHINA) Position Title: I. O. Duty Title: SECTION CHIEF	Description of Duties: SECTION CHIEF FOR CHINA PM projects supervising 6 people. Responsible for supporting & guiding field - obtaining project ~~[illegible]~~ approval from Senior staffs etc. LARGEST independent PM project in CIA Duty Station, if overseas:
3.	From DEC 51 To DEC 52 Tot. mos. 12 Grade 12 Salary $7040 Office FE Position Title: I. O. Duty Title: SECTION CHIEF	Description of Duties: ESTABLISH AND BUILD CHINA Independent SECTION. Eventually supervised 14-18 employees engaged in mounting & conducting agent operations - Supervised all field headquarters & field stations. Liaison with other CIA & gov't installations Duty Station, if overseas: YOKOSUKA (FRU), JAPAN
4.	From FEB 51 To DEC 51 Tot. mos. 11 Grade 11 & 12 Salary 6000 - 7040 Office FE Position Title: I. O. Duty Title: SECTION CHIEF	Description of Duties: Supervise field headquarters & field Stations employees totaling approx. 25 for OSO (FE), duties in Korea, agent operations, support to I.O.'s in field, liaison with Army + Navy in Korea. Necessary commute constantly 3/4 of time in Korea Duty Station, if overseas: YOKOSUKA, JAPAN AND KOREA.

See attached.

SECRET
Security Information

TAIPEI [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work-

WORK EXPERIENCE OTHER THAN CIA :

WORK EXPERIENCE CONSISTED OF PART TIME OR SUMMER employment IN FOLLOWING FIELDS: (no attempt has BEEN to list employers or SALARIES SINCE BELIEVE ONLY employment OR ACTUAL WORK IMPORTANT. TIME period 1939-44 AND 1946 (July-Aug-SEPT))

NEWSBOY, WINDOW DRESSER (DISPLAY), SIGN PAINTING, GROCERY CLERK, TRUMPET PLAYER IN BAND, HABERDASHERY CLERK, SODA CLERK, LABORER, CARPENTRY APPRENTICE (1946) AND HOUSE painting.

Number and Class of Employees Supervised:	
Employer	
Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's	Exact Title of your position
Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary	Description of Duties:
Number and Class of Employees Supervised:	
Employer	
Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Duty Station if overseas:

A Experiencial
U.S. Miler

5. FROM JUNE 49 to FEB 51 tot. mos. 20

GRADE 9+11 SALARY 4500-6600

OFFICE FE

Pos TITLE I.O.

DUTY TITLE STATION CHIEF

Des of Duties – Establish and maintain station under Army CIC cover in liaison with all intell agencies of Army (G-2, CIC, CID etc) in Northern Japan. Plan and implement agent operations into USSR territory. Establish repatriate interrogation program. Compile operational research studies. Support communications and logistics, operations and other CIA activities tied into station. Supervise 4 employees.

Duty Station SAPPORO, JAPAN

6. From APRIL 49 to May 49 tot mos 1

Grade 9 Salary 4500

OFFICE FE (OSO)

Pos title I.O.

Duty title Case Officer

Des. of duties: temporary period waiting for Sapporo assignment. Agent operations, report writing, debriefing defectors, General support work to field case officers

Duty Station TAKAO, FORMOSA
TAIPEI FORMOSA

U.S. Miler

7. FROM JAN 1949 to APRIL 49 TOT MOS 4

GRADE 9 Salary 4500

OFFICE FE (OSO)

POS TITLE I.O.

Duty Title Case officer

Des of Duties - case officer work - agent operations stay behind planning (prior fall Shanghai to Communists), report writing, supervision jr. case officers assist ~~evacuation Shanghai~~ of CIA offices -

Duty Station - SHANGHAI, CHINA

8. FROM JUNE 1948 to JAN 49 TOT MOS 6

GRADE 7+9 Salary 3500-4500

OFFICE FE (OSO)

POS TITLE I.O.

Duty Title Case officer

Des of Duties - Home leave-training - language school, & hdqs work generally acquaint self with Washington procedures etc

Duty Station TDY WASH

10

ations,

fing

post

officers

FORMOSA

[illegible]

U.S. Wiler

11. From Oct 46 to JAN 47 tot mos #4

Grade 5 Salary 2500

OFFICE FE Communications

Pos TITLE Code Clerk

Duty title Code Clerk

des of duties - Hdqs or Wash

Schooling or training in code or cyphers? code work in signal center.

Duty Stations WASH and SHANGHAI, China

Mr. Morgan

FORM [illegible]
[illegible]

Foreign Service Institute
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REPORT

DATE: March 4, 1949
NAME OF EMPLOYEE: MILER, Scott
TITLE: FSS-M

LANGUAGE	RATINGS				
	INITIAL ABSOLUTE		ACHIEVEMENT	FINAL ABSOLUTE	
	SPEAKING	READING		SPEAKING	READING
Russian	none	none	C+	I	no rating

REMARKS:

Mr. Miler was enrolled in a semi-intensive Russian class and had 164 hours of training from October 4, 1948 to January 14, 1949. Due to frequent absences he had successfully completed only 4/5 (24 of the 30-unit Basic Course) of the course upon termination of training.

George L. Trager
George L. Trager
Professor of Linguistics & Anthropology

Mr. Miler's absenteeism was due to illness of his wife.

William J. Morgan
Deputy Chief, TRS

Henry Lee Smith, Jr.
Director, School of Language Training
SIGNATURE

ABSOLUTE RATINGS
A - BI-LINGUAL
B - FLUENT
C - FAIRLY FLUENT *(useful to the Service)*
D - COMMAND OF 30-UNIT BASIC COURSE
I - INSUFFICIENT TRAINING FOR RATING

ACHIEVEMENT RATINGS
A — SUPERIOR
B - EXCELLENT
C - GOOD
D - FAIR
E - UNSATISFACTORY
I - INCOMPLETE *(insufficient training for rating)*

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
FIELD RESEARCH UNIT - FAR EAST COMMAND
YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

CERTIFICATE

2 Dec '52
(Date)

I CERTIFY that I have been briefed by the Security Officer, Field Research Unit, Far East Command, prior to my departure from this station to the U.S. or a sub-station, as to all regulations on the transmission and possession of all classified and personal material. I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not taking any U.S. Government equipment in excess to what I am authorized. All equipment and supplies that I have been issued in excess has been turned in to the Supply Section of this Headquarters.

Newton S. Miler
(Signature)

(Grade, Rank, ASN)

J M Reynolds
(Security Officer)

NOTE:

To be completed in duplicate: Original to Personnel Office, duplicate retained by Security Office.

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
FIELD RESEARCH UNIT - FAR EAST COMMAND
YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

CERTIFICATE

[illegible] 1952
(Date)

I CERTIFY that I have been briefed by the Security Officer, Field Research Unit, Far East Command, prior to my departure from this station to the U.S. or a sub-station, as to all regulations on the transmission and possession of all classified and personal material. I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not taking any U.S. Government equipment in excess to what I am authorized. All equipment and supplies that I have been issued in excess has been turned in to the Supply Section of this Headquarters.

(Signature)

(Grade, Rank, ASN)

(Security Officer)

NOTE:

To be completed in duplicate: Original to Personnel Office, duplicate retained by Security Office.

SECRET

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE: 050

DIVISION: F02

NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE): [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

BRANCH:

SECTION:

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Organization		17	10	1946	31	12	51	25	2	5
Total Civilian Service										

SCD - 05/23/44
Verified 4/29/57
B.

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
U.S. Navy	15	3	1944	14	7	1946	13	4	2
Total Military Service									

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

16 April 1952
DATE

Newton S. Miler
[redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
17	6	8

as of 12/31/51

SECRET

Date: 30 December 1948

Central Intelligence Agency
[illegible] E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency that, except as Central Intelligence Agency may deem it in its best interests to recall or transfer me from my overseas post, it is understood and agreed by me I shall be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to serve a minimum period of twenty-four months at my place of employment outside the continental United States, and if I resign or terminate my appointment or return to the United States before the expiration of twenty-four months after the date of arrival at my overseas post, unless separated for reasons beyond my control, the Central Intelligence Agency will not pay my return travel expenses from such station outside the United States.

2. It is further understood and agreed by me that I shall remain in the Government service for the twelve months following my arrival at my overseas post unless separated for reasons beyond my control. In the event of a violation by me of the agreement in this paragraph, any moneys expended by the United States on account of my travel, including per diem while in a temporary duty status in Washington, expenses of transportation of my immediate family, and expenses of transportation of my household goods and personal effects from any place of actual residence at time of appointment to place of employment outside the continental United States, and for such expenses on my return from such post of duty to my place of actual residence at time of assignment to duty outside the United States, shall be considered as a debt due by me to the United States.

Newton S. Miler

WITNESS:

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, NEWTON S. MILER, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

30 March 1953
(Date of entrance on duty)

Newton S. Miler
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 30th day of March, A. D. 1953,

at Washington, (City) D.C. (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State) 5351 29th ST. N.W., WASAINGTON, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH 1 MARCH 1926 (B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country) MASON CITY, IOWA

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY MRS. NELL S. MILER (B) RELATIONSHIP WIFE (C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE 5351 29th ST. N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. (D) TELEPHONE NO. EM2-3866

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

(Check one)

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $5 OR LESS OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $5 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that the appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for [illegible] particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to [illegible]

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position it should be determined that appointee is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.* The appointing officer is responsible for [illegible]

(4) *Members of Family.* [illegible]

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444i, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
012773	MILER, Newton Scott	03/01/26	D	16

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM -- TO --			
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single Married Widowed Separated Divorced Annulled Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (COUNTRY(IES))

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
☐ SON ☐ DAUGHTER ☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible]				

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY—CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.	[illegible]	[illegible]					
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED—CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG

☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE
31.3.72

SIGNATURE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative. PWD

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
012773	MILER, Newton Scott	03/01/26	D	16

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1				
2				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1 ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2 ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 444a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (Check (x))			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

JUN 1[illegible] 1 55 PM '71

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED (Check (x) appropriate item)
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE W. Scott Miler

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

NSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is ~~done~~ automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I
BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
012773	Miler Newton Scott	03/01/26

SECTION II
EDUCATION
HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM--TO--			
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III
MARITAL STATUS

1 PRESENT STATUS (Single Married Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3 DATE OF BIRTH

4 PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5 OCCUPATION

6 PRESENT EMPLOYER

7 CITIZENSHIP

8 FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9 DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV
DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 444o

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (X))			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.			Oct 22 [illegible] 63				
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨
			RESIDENT AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE: 3 October '69

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Newton Scott Miler

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
When Filled In

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE GRADE STEP
012773	MILER NEWTON SCOTT		03/01/26	GS-15-04

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
D	CPS OF D CH	CI	WASH., D.C.

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
CHINA	PCS VV	47/09/16	49/05/01
ASIA AREA	PCS VV	49/05/01	52/12/03
AROUND THE WORLD	TDY CC	53/12/01	54/02/01
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY CC	54/11/01	54/12/01
NORTH PACIFIC	PCS CC	55/06/01	56/12/01
THAILAND	PCS CC	56/12/01	58/04/01
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY CC	61/05/03	61/05/13
ETHIOPIA	PCS CC	61/09/09	64/07/24

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: INITIALS:
29 Jun 67

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	ECONOMICS, GENERAL	DARTMOUTH COL NH	48

FORM
1-67 444
SECRET
6 7 JUL ENTD

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION III EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM./QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
1								
2								
3								
4								

DATE: [illegible]
CODED
OVERSEAS ONLY

5 IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1	FOREIGN SERVICE Institute	ORIENTATION	July 61	Aug 61	1
2					
3					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Ethiopia	Economic, political, Topographical, cultural, etc	61-64	61-64 US AND ETHIOPIA	X	X	X	X
EAST AFRICA	ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, CULTURAL, TOPOGRAPHICAL	61-64	61-64 US + EAST AFRICA		X	X	X
THAILAND	Political, cultural. Topographical, economic	52, 56-58	56 US + THAILAND	X	X	X	X
Philippines	Political, cultural Topographical, economic	55-56	55-56 Phil.	X	X	X	X
JAPAN	CULTURAL, TOPOGRAPHICAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC	46, 47, 49-52, 55	US JAPAN	X	X	X	X
KOREA	CULTURAL, TOPOGRAPHICAL	47-50-51	Korea, JAPAN CHINA	X	X	X	X
CHINA	POLITICAL, CULTURAL TOPOGRAPHICAL	46-49	46-58	X	X	X	X
USSR	Political cultural economic	[redacted]	46-67			X	X
WESTEN EUROPE	CULTURAL, ECONOMIC TOPOGRAPHICAL	54, 61, 64	54-67		X	X	X

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) 40
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, varitype, card punch, etc.)

mimeograph.

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Tennis - FAIR Skeet shooting - FAIR
Hunting - good photography - FAIR

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES, SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

CAMERAS - photocopying - rekordak, etc.

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☑ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR. (Do NOT submit copies unless requested.) INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE LECTURES 1957-58 ABOUT CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT TO STUDENTS AT CHULALONGKAN AND THAMMASET UNIVERSITIES, BANGKOK, THAILAND.

SECRET

SECRET

When Filled In

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY: NO CHANGE

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S), COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Judy Kay MiLER	DAUGHTER	SAPPORO, JAPAN 13 JUNE 1950	USA	5351 29th ST. N.W. Washington, D.C.
JANET LYNNE MiLER	Daughter	YOKOSUKA, JAPAN 17 August 1951	USA	5351 29th ST. N.W. Washington, D.C.

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

DATE: 10 May 1967

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Newton S. Miler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): MILER NEWTON SCOTT

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 5351 29th ST. N.W. WASHINGTON 15, D.C.

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): NEWTON HAMILTON PENNSYLVANIA

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: EM 3-0614

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: PENNA.

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: MILER NELL STINE

2. RELATIONSHIP: WIFE

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 5351 29th ST. N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)- INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: NA

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: EM 3-0614

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER:

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION:

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (~~Spouse~~, Mother, ~~Father~~) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
MRS. ELIZABETH C. MILER, c/o CONAY, DELAVAN, WIS. NO ~~[illegible]~~ LIMITATIONS NOTIFY OTHERS.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS: NA

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First): NELL (Middle): CATHERINE (Maiden): STINE (Last): MILER

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 6 MARCH 1948

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): MUKDEN, MANCHURIA, CHINA

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): Newton Hamilton, Penna.

7. LIVING: ☑ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH:

9. CAUSE OF DEATH:

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 5351 29th ST. N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. DATE OF BIRTH: 3 Feb 1922

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): PITTSBURGH, PENNA., U.S.A.

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY: NA

14. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): USA

16. DATE ACQUIRED: 3 FEB 1922

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): BIRTH

18. OCCUPATION: Housewife

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers): CIA, CIG, SSU, OSS

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country):

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM 444b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-61

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
NA

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE N A

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED NA

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
See 19 above.

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☑ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☑ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☑ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
THE Riggs NATIONAL BANK (CHEVYCHASE)	WAshington, D.C.

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☑ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

——— NA ———

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP USA

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☑ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
DARTMOUTH College, HANOVER, NH	ECO	NAVAL Sc.	1/3/44	9/46	AB	9/46	128+

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	
NROTC (V-12) DARTMOUTH	OFFICER TRAINING	1/3/44	6/1/46	120

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
	None					

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

—

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HDQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING
CHINA - JAPAN KOREA		1946 - 1953 1954 - 1955	1953 1954	1946-53 1955	None
ITALY, FRANCE, GERMANY BENELUX, ENGLAND		1953 1954		TDY's 53-54	None
Philippines, THAILAND		1955-56, 57-58		1955- 58	None
LAOS, CAMBODIA, VIETNAM, MALAYA/SINGAPORE, Indonesia		1954 1956		TDYs 1954-56	None
USSR & SAT BLOC		1958	1958	—	1958

SECTION IX — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
45	—	☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.) Mimeograph, recorder, etc,

SECTION X — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH FOOTBALL, BASKETBALL, TRACK, Swimming, tennis - good
art - fair photography - fair hunting - good

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

—

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

—

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

—

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue) ~

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4.

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

NA

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NA

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

None except organizational in connection cover assignments

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

na

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) 1 July 1958 —
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI STAFF/OPERATIONS/Soviet SATELLITE
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 0 - T/O not filled
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CHIEF, CI/OPS/SATELLITE BRANCH
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Counterintelligence STAFF FUNCTION concerning coordination reviews, guidance, etc. FOR SATELLITE CI/CE activities and operations within DD/P. Concurrently Deputy for Soviet activities.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) 29 Dec 1956 - 19 April 58
2. GRADE 13/14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/ BANGKOK FIELD STATION
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 15 - 22
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CHIEF Project MONOTONY; CHIEF FI, project TADCAR
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Supervision and implementation of FI, CE operational activities and intelligence collection. Responsible for conduct of liaison with THAI police and Intelligence Service.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) 7 July 1955 - Sept 1955
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DD/P/FE/CHINA MISSION/Japan
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 1
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CHIEF, FI
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Staff responsibility for FI activities in China Mission including LCHARVEST in FE.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) Sept 55 - 29 Dec 1956
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/CHINA/SUBIC BAY, P.I.
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 8-14
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CHIEF, INDEPENDENT SECTION (FI)
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Supervision of operational + support activities to LCHARVEST in FE and activities in Hong Kong. FI.

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 3

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sisters, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, (OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING) ▷

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
MILER, Jo Ann	Daughter	1949		X	US	with father
MILER, Judy Kay	"	1950		X	"	"
MILER, Janet Lynne	"	1951		X	"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED 16/2/59

SIGNATURE Newton S. Miler

SECRET

Form 2206

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions:

1. Answer all questions *completely*. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use a separate sheet for extra details on *any* question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Attach 2 recent passport size pictures to this form, date taken written on the back of each.
3. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will *not* receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE INSTRUCTIONS? yes
YES OR NO

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME Miss Mr. Mrs. Newton Scott Miler TELEPHONE
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS 11 Lebanon St, Hanover, N.H., U.S.A
St. & No. City State Country

LEGAL RESIDENCE 64 Fletcher Ave, Mount Vernon, N.Y., USA
St. & No. City State Country

B. NICKNAME Scotty ANY OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED

Not applicable UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? Not applicable

HOW LONG? — IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS Not Applicable
When

—
Where By what authority?

C. DATE OF BIRTH 1 March 1926 PLACE OF BIRTH Mason City, Iowa, USA
City State Country

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP American BY BIRTH? yes BY MARRIAGE? not applicable

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # — ISSUED — BY —
Date Court

AT Not Applicable
City State Country

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS CITIZENSHIP? not applicable WHAT? —

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? — TO — ANY OTHER CITIZENSHIP? —

GIVE PARTICULARS: not Applicable

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT NATIONALITY? NO GIVE PARTICULARS: not Applicable

E. LAST U.S. PASSPORT: NUMBER, DATE AND PLACE OF ISSUE not Applicable

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? not applicable GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES:

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS? not Applicable

F. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? not applicable

PORT OF ENTRY? not Applicable ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ——

LAST U.S. VISA not Applicable (Number, Type, Place of Issue, Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 20 SEX Male HEIGHT 6' WEIGHT 180

EYES Blue HAIR Brown COMPLEXION fair SCARS none

BUILD Medium OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES none

SEC. 3. FATHER (Give the same information for step-father and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Newton (First) Byron (Middle) Miler (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE —— CAUSE ——

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS 64 Fletcher Ave. (St. & No.), Mount Vernon (City), N.Y. (State), USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 26 Nov. 1900 PLACE OF BIRTH Osceola (City), Iowa (State), U.S.A. (Country)

CITIZENSHIP American WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? Not (City) applicable (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Meat packer LAST EMPLOYER G. A. Schmidt (Stahl-Meyer Co.)

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN ~~BUSINESS~~ ADDRESS 132 - E 127 St (St. & No.), New York (City), N.Y. (State), USA (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM unknown (Date) to (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE Army

COUNTRY USA DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE ? OR FOREIGN unknown

SEC. 4. MOTHER (Give the s[illegible] i[illegible]mation for step-mother on a s[illegible] [illegible]eet)

FULL NAME Elizabeth (First) Conry (Maiden) Miler (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST ADDRESS 64 Fletcher Ave, (St. & No.) Mount Vernon, (City) N.Y., (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 6 April 1900 PLACE OF BIRTH (farm) Turtle Valley (City) Wisconsin, (State) U.S.A. (Country)

CITIZENSHIP American WHEN ACQUIRED? birth WHERE? — (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION house wife LAST EMPLOYER unknown

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS unknown (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DETAILS OF GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN unknown

SEC. 5. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

FULL NAME Cora (First) M. Jane (Middle) Miler (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 64 Fletcher Ave, (St. & No.) Mount Vernon, (City) N.Y., (State) USA (Country)

FULL NAME Martin (First) Conry (Middle) Miler (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 64 Fletcher Ave., (St. & No.) Mount Vernon, (City) N.Y. (State) USA (Country)

FULL NAME — (First) — (Middle) — (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS — (St. & No.) — (City) (State) — (Country)

SEC. 6. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE X MARRIED — DIVORCED — WIDOWED —

STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE not applicable

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE REQUIRED DATA FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES)

NAME Not (First) Applicable (Middle) (If wife, Maiden) (Last) PLACE & DATE OF MARRIAGE

HER OR HIS ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 6. MARITAL STATUS (Cont'd)

DATE OF BIRTH Not Applicable PLACE OF BIRTH City State Country

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE? City State Country

OCCUPATION LAST EMPLOYER

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM Date TO Date BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SEC. 7. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Not Applicable First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country

BIRTH Date City Country CITIZENSHIP

WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE? City State Country

SEC. 8. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Not Applicable First Maiden Last

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country

BIRTH Date City Country CITIZENSHIP

WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE? City State Country

SEC. 9. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

NAME Not Applicable RELATIONSHIP

CITIZENSHIP AGE

ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country

NAME RELATIONSHIP

CITIZENSHIP AGE

ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country

NAME RELATIONSHIP

CITIZENSHIP AGE

ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO LIVE ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF A FOREIGN POWER, ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS: unknown

NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... St. & No. City State Country

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... St. & No. City State Country

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION ....

NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... St. & No. City State Country

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION ....

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

NAME Gladys V. Conry RELATIONSHIP Aunt AGE unknown

CITIZENSHIP American ADDRESS 3705 First Rd. So, Arlington, VA., USA (St. & No. City State Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) Civil Service, Washington, D.C.

NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... St. & No. City State Country

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

SEC. 12. GIVE *FIVE* CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — (Give business addresses where possible)

NAME: Leslie M. Shaw ADDRESS 2914 University Ave., Des Moines, Iowa

NAME: Edward Zanfrini ADDRESS 726 - 29th St, Union City, New Jersey

NAME Fred E. Gaehner ADDRESS 1315 - 32nd St, Des Moines, Iowa

NAME E. J. Hasty ADDRESS 1320 - 39th St., Des Moines, Iowa

NAME Richard Stuhrman ADDRESS 1042 - 63rd St, Des Moines, Iowa

SEC. 13. NAMES OF 5 PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES, NOT REFERENCES OR EMPLOYERS —(Give business addresses where possible)

1. NAME John M. O'Sullivan ADDRESS: 2053 - N 62nd St., Philadelphia, PA. (St. & No. / City / State)
2. NAME William E. Bates ADDRESS: 904 - 16th Ave, Tuscaloosa, Ala. (St. & No. / City / State)
3. NAME Mrs. Minnie Haas ADDRESS: 1009 - 40th St, Des Moines, Iowa (St. & No. / City / State)
4. NAME Thomas J. Dent ADDRESS: 10 School St, Hanover, N. H. (St. & No. / City / State)
5. NAME H. B. Ward, Jr. ADDRESS: 1242 - 37th St, Des Moines, IA. (St. & No. / City / State)

SEC. 14. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME: A. Frankel ADDRESS 1216 - 46th St, Des Moines, Iowa (St. & No. / City / State)
NAME: Mrs. Chapman ADDRESS 1214 - 46th St, Des Moines, Iowa (St. & No. / City / State)
NAME: R. Schreiber ADDRESS 4528 - University Ave, Des Moines, Iowa (St. & No. / City / State)

SEC. 15. EDUCATION

See separate sheet

SCHOOL: ADDRESS (City / State / Country)
DATES ATTENDED: DEGREE

SCHOOL: ADDRESS (City / State / Country)
DATES ATTENDED: DEGREE

COLLEGE: Dartmouth College ADDRESS Hanover, N. H., U.S.A. (City / State / Country)
DATES ATTENDED: 3/1/44 to present time DEGREE

COLLEGE: ADDRESS (City / State / Country)
DATES ATTENDED: DEGREE

SEC. 16. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

U.S.A. (Country) Navy (Service) A.S. (Rank) 3/1/44 - 7/1/46 (Dates)
Dartmouth NR.O.T.C. Unit (Last Station) 763-17-77 (Serial No.) honorable (Type of discharge) Capt D.E. Cummings (Com. Officer)

REMARKS: All service in school.

SEC. 15. EDUCATION

Monroe School (grade) Mason City, Iowa, U.S.A.
1931 - 1938

I.N. Bloom School (grade) Louisville, Ky., U.S.A.
April - June 1938

Highland Junior High School Louisville, Ky., U.S.A.
1938 - 1940

Tuscaloosa High School Tuscaloosa, Ala., U.S.A.
1940 - 1941

T. Roosevelt High School Des Moines, Iowa, U.S.A.
1941 - 1944

SEC. 17. SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS inactive NAVA[illegible] [illegible]serve - V6

CLASSIFICATION ORDER # APPROX. INDUCTION DATE

BOARD # ADDRESS

IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

SEC. 18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED FROM ANY POSITION, OR LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE? PLEASE GIVE DETAILS:

NO

SEC. 19. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? NO IF "YES," EXPLAIN:

DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS? yes

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE Booked for breaking street lights in Tuscaloosa, Alabama police station. Saw judge in private office, there was no fine or punishment. 1941

SEC. 20. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

Not Applicable

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? NO GIVE PARTICULARS

SEC. 20. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND (Cont'd)

D. GIVE *three* CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. Not Applicable

NAME: .... ADDRESS .... St. & No. City State

NAME: .... ADDRESS .... St. & No. City State

NAME: .... ADDRESS .... St. & No. City State

SEC. 21. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 10 YEARS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 10 YEARS.

See separate Sheet

EMPLOYER .... TITLE OF JOB ....

ADDRESS .... St. & No. City State Country

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY ....

KIND OF BUSINESS: .... NAME OF SUPERVISOR ....

FROM: .... TO: .... SALARY $ .... PER ....

REASONS FOR LEAVING ....

EMPLOYER .... TITLE OF JOB ....

ADDRESS .... St. & No. City State Country

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY ....

KIND OF BUSINESS: .... NAME OF SUPERVISOR ....

FROM: .... TO: .... SALARY $ .... PER ....

REASONS FOR LEAVING ....

EMPLOYER .... TITLE OF JOB ....

ADDRESS .... St. & No. City State Country

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY ....

KIND OF BUSINESS: .... NAME OF SUPERVISOR

FROM: .... TO: .... SALARY $ PER

(16031) REASONS FOR LEAVI ....

SEC. 21. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY

I have never been employed permanently as I have been in school all of the time. In the summer I worked on my Grandmother's farm in Delavan, Wisconsin. The few jobs I have had are:

1. Stock boy in Super Market on Saturdays only.
   Approx. 2 mo.   Nov., Dec. 1942
   Name of Employer and Supervisor unknown.
   42nd St. & University Ave., Des Moines, Iowa.

2. Clerk   Jerrem's Men's Store
   Locust and 7th Streets
   Des Moines, Iowa
   Christmas Holidays only - 1943.
   Employer and Supervisor : Leslie H. Shaw

3. Helper to window dresser and display man.
   This was connected with my course of study at Tuscaloosa, Ala. High School.
   March, April, May 1941.
   Employer and Supervisor: R. Harlen
   Allen and Jemison Hardware Co., Tuscaloosa, Ala.

4. Paperboy.   Louisville Times.
   1938-1939   Supervisor: unkown.

SEC. 21. CHRONOLOGICAL [illegible] (Cont'd)

EMPLOYER .... TITLE OF JOB ....

ADDRESS .... St. & No. .... City .... State .... Country

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY ....

KIND OF BUSINESS: .... NAME OF SUPERVISOR ....

FROM: .... TO: .... SALARY $ .... PER ....

REASONS FOR LEAVING ....

EMPLOYER .... TITLE OF JOB ....

ADDRESS .... St. & No. .... City .... State .... Country

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY ....

KIND OF BUSINESS: .... NAME OF SUPERVISOR ....

FROM: .... TO: .... SALARY $ .... PER ....

REASONS FOR LEAVING ....

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS

804 Madison Ave, Mason City, Iowa, U.S.A. (St. & No., City, State, Country) FROM: 1934 TO: 1938

Elwood Ave., Louisville, Ky., U.S.A. (St. & No., City, State, Country) FROM: 1938 TO: 1940

1444 Queenland Ave, Tuscaloosa, Ala, U.S.A (St. & No., City, State, Country) FROM: 1940 TO: 1941

1216 - 46th St., Des Moines, Iowa, U.S.A (St. & No., City, State, Country) FROM: 1941 TO: 1943

1009 - 40th St, Des Moines, Iowa, U.S.A (St. & No., City, State, Country) FROM: 1943 TO: 1944

IAVY - Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H., U.S.A. (St. & No., City, State, Country) FROM: 1944 TO: 1946

11 Lebanon St., Hanover, N.H., U.S.A (St. & No., City, State, Country) FROM: 14 July 46 TO: —

.... St. & No. .... City .... State .... Country FROM: .... TO: ....

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Not Applicable

.... City or Section .... Country .... Purpose DATES .... Month & Year TO .... Month & Year

.... City or Section .... Country .... Purpose DATES .... Month & Year TO .... Month & Year

(16083)

.. .cont'd)

SEC. 22 FINANCIAL

D. GIVE CO

NAME

NAME

NAME

SEC. 21. CHRON
EMPLO
WHAT
COVER

EMPLO

ADDI

YOU

KIN

FR

R

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL (Cont'd)

City or Section .... Country Not applicable Purpose .... DATES .... Month & Year TO .... Month & Year

City or Section .... Country .... Purpose .... DATES .... Month & Year TO .... Month & Year

City or Section .... Country .... Purpose .... DATES .... Month & Year TO .... Month & Year

City or Section .... Country .... Purpose .... DATES .... Month & Year TO .... Month & Year

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ALL KINDS TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS. INCLUDE ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR A BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OR TO WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT:

Not Applicable .... Name .... St. & No. .... City .... State .... Country

.... Name .... St. & No. .... City .... State .... Country

.... Name .... St. & No. .... City .... State .... Country

.... Name .... St. & No. .... City .... State .... Country

.... Name .... St. & No. .... City .... State .... Country

.... Name .... St. & No. .... City .... State .... Country

.... Name .... St. & No. .... City .... State .... Country

.... Name .... St. & No. .... City .... State .... Country

SEC. 25. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT", "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Spanish ... SPEAK Slight READ Slight WRITE Slight

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK READ WRITE

LANGUAGE SPEAK READ WRITE

LANGUAGE SPEAK READ WRITE

LANGUAGE SPEAK READ

(1683) LANGUAGE

SEC. 25 GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS (Cont'd)

B. HAVE YOU ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING WITH RESPECT TO:

MOTOR VEHICLES? no AIRPLANES? no RADIO? no

GIVE PARTICULARS

C. LIST *all* SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTERST YOU; INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Football - played high school and college until injured. Rated good by coaches and sportswriters. Had several scholarships.

Basketball - high school - fairly good

Track - fair

Art - pencil + pen + ink sketching - some oils - fair

Reading - hobby - Avid reader - philosophy, poetry, fiction, history.

D. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

NO

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Newton Byron Miler RELATIONSHIP Father

ADDRESS 64 Fletcher Ave, Mount Vernon, N.Y., U.S.A
St. & No. City State Country

(15083)

ANY OTHER CITIZENSHIP? ——

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

A. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO."

See separate sheet.

B. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT Hanover, New Hampshire (City and State) DATE 18 August 1946

Thomas P. Hunt
Witness

Newton Scott Miler
Signature of applicant

Applicant will not write below

COMMENTS OF INTERVIEWER:

SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY

Originating Official

DATE

SEC. 37.

In the Spring of 1942 I was questioned by a Postal Inspector about a letter I had mailed approximately one year previous for a Mr. Halren. He was the Display man for Allen and Jemison Hardware Co. in Tuscaloosa, Ala. I had been working with him for some time dressing windows, painting and decorating.

The letter in question was addressed to Mrs. Halren, who was out of town, and supposedly contained some money. I believe it was a dollar. The letter was received but there was no money in it.

I stated that I had known nothing of any money and that I also had had a fellow with me when the letter was mailed. I wrote to Mr. Halren about the incident but never heard from him.

There were apparently no further inquiries as I have heard nothing since the Postal Inspector questioned me.

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS COMPLETELY. IF QUESTION DOES NOT APPLY WRITE "NOT APPLICABLE". WRITE "UNKNOWN" ONLY IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER AND CANNOT OBTAIN THE ANSWER FROM PERSONAL RECORDS. USE A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER FOR EXTRA DETAILS ON ANY QUESTION OR QUESTIONS FOR WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ROOM. ATTACH TWO RECENT PASSPORT SIZE PICTURES TO THIS FORM, DATE TAKEN WRITTEN ON THE BACK OF EACH. TYPE, PRINT OR WRITE CAREFULLY; ILLEGIBLE OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL NOT RECEIVE CONSIDERATION.

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS? YES ☑ NO ☐

SECTION 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

NAME: MR. ☑ MISS ☐ MRS. ☐ FIRST: NewTon MIDDLE: ScoTT LAST: MiLER TELEPHONE:

PRESENT ADDRESS (STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): Box #10 NAVY #3930 F.P.O. SAN FRANCISCO Calif.

LEGAL RESIDENCE (STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): 64 FletcheR Ave, MounT VeRNON, New YoRK, USA.

NICKNAMES: ScoTTy

OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED: NoT Applicable

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NoT Applicable

HOW LONG? NoT Applicable

IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (WHERE, WHEN AND BY WHAT AUTHORITY): NoT Applicable

DATE OF BIRTH: 1 MARch 1926

PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): MASON CITY, IOWA, USA.

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: U. S.

ACQUIRED BY: BIRTH ☑ MARRIAGE ☐ NATURALIZATION ☐

NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: NUMBER: NoT applicable DATE ISSUED: NoT applicable NAME OF COURT: NoT applicable

LOCATION OF COURT (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): NoT applicable

PREVIOUS CITIZENSHIP: NoT applicable

DATE HELD: FROM: not applicable TO: not applicable

OTHER CITIZENSHIPS (GIVE PARTICULARS): NoT Applicable

STEPS TAKEN TO CHANGE PRESENT NATIONALITY (GIVE PARTICULARS): NoT applicable

LAST U.S. PASSPORT: NUMBER: 11965 DATE: 30 October 1946 PLACE OF ISSUE: Washington, D.C., USA

ALL OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS YOU HAVE HAD (GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES): NoT applicable

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: NoT applicable

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.: DATE OF ARRIVAL IN THIS COUNTRY: NoT applicable PORT OF ENTRY: NoT applicable PASSPORT OF COUNTRY: NoT applicable

LAST U.S. VISA: NUMBER / TYPE / DATE / PLACE OF ISSUE: NoT Applicable

SECTION 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR
21	Male	6' 0"	170	Blue	BROWN

COMPLEXION: FAIR

SCARS: SMALL SCARS ON EYEBROWS

BUILD: MEDIUM

OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: NoT applicable

FORM NO. 38-1
SEP 1944

SECTION 3. MARITAL STATUS

MARRIED ☐ ENGAGED ☐ SEPARATED ☐
SINGLE ☒ DIVORCED ☐

DATE OF SEPARATION OR DIVORCE: Not applicable
PLACE: Not applicable

REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE: Not applicable

NOTE: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

NAME OF WIFE OR HUSBAND — FIRST / MIDDLE (FOR WIFE, MAIDEN) / LAST: Not applicable
DATE OF MARRIAGE:

PLACE OF MARRIAGE:
(HIS OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE — STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:

LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☐
DATE OF DECEASE:
CAUSE:

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:

DATE OF BIRTH:
PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:

CITIZENSHIP:
DATE ACQUIRED:
WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:

OCCUPATION:
LAST EMPLOYER:

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE — FROM: TO:
BRANCH OF SERVICE:
COUNTRY:

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS).

SECTION 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (INCLUDE PARTIAL DEPENDENTS)

NAME: Not applicable
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP:
ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:

NAME:
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP:
ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:

NAME:
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP:
ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:

SECTION 5. PARENTS

NOTE: FOR STEPFATHER, STEPMOTHER AND/OR GUARDIAN, GIVE THE SAME INFORMATION AS REQUIRED BELOW ON SEPARATE SHEET

NAME OF FATHER — FIRST: NEWTON MIDDLE: BYRON LAST: MILER
LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: Not
CAUSE: applicable

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY: 64 Fletcher Ave, Mount Vernon, New York, USA

DATE OF BIRTH: 26 October 1900
PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY / STATE / COUNTRY: Osceola, Iowa, USA

CITIZENSHIP: US
DATE ACQUIRED: Birth
WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY / STATE / COUNTRY: Not applicable

OCCUPATION: Meat Packer
LAST EMPLOYER: Stahl-Meyer Incorporated

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY: [illegible] Street, New York, New York, USA.

SECTION 5. PARENTS [illegible]

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINU[illegible] PAGE 2)

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE — FROM: NOT — TO: Applicable — BRANCH OF SERVICE — COUNTRY

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS)
UNKNOWN

NAME OF MOTHER — FIRST: ELIZABETH — MAIDEN: CONRY — LAST: MILER — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: NOT — CAUSE: Applicable

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 64 Fletcher Ave, — CITY: Mount Vernon, — STATE: New York, — COUNTRY: USA

DATE OF BIRTH: 6 APRIL 1900 — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: FAIRFIELD, — STATE: Wisconsin, — COUNTRY: USA

CITIZENSHIP: USA — DATE ACQUIRED: NOT — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY: Applicable — STATE — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: Housewife — LAST EMPLOYER: NOT Applicable

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: NOT Applicable — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS)
NOT Applicable

SECTION 6. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (INCLUDING HALF-, STEP-, AND ADOPTED BROTHERS AND SISTERS)

NAME — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST
Brother — MARTIN CONRY MILER

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 64 Fletcher Ave, — CITY: Mount Vernon, — STATE: New York, — COUNTRY: USA

NAME — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST
Sister Cora Meredith JANE MILER

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: Grinnell College, — CITY: Grinnell, — STATE: Iowa — COUNTRY: USA

NAME — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

SECTION 7. PARENTS-IN-LAW

NAME OF FATHER-IN-LAW — FIRST — MIDDLE — LAST: NOT Applicable — LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

DATE OF BIRTH — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

CITIZENSHIP — DATE ACQUIRED — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION — LAST EMPLOYER

NAME OF MOTHER-IN-LAW — FIRST — MAIDEN — LAST — LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

DATE OF BIRTH — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

CITIZENSHIP — DATE ACQUIRED — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY — STATE — COUNTRY

OCCUPATION — LAST EMPLOYER

SECTION 8. RELATIVES

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO LIVE ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A FOREIGN POWER, ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS.

NAME Not Applicable | RELATIONSHIP | AGE

CITIZENSHIP | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NAME | RELATIONSHIP | AGE

CITIZENSHIP | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NAME | RELATIONSHIP | AGE

CITIZENSHIP | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE (UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN)

NAME GLADYS V. CONRY | RELATIONSHIP AUNT | AGE 45

CITIZENSHIP USA | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY 3705 First Road South, Arlington, Virginia, USA

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) U.S. Civil Service Employee - Statistics and old Age.

NAME | RELATIONSHIP | AGE

CITIZENSHIP | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

NAME | RELATIONSHIP | AGE

CITIZENSHIP | ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

SECTION 9. EDUCATION

SCHOOL Tuscaloosa High School | ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY Tuscaloosa, Alabama, USA.

DATES ATTENDED FROM Sept 1940 | TO June 1941 | DEGREE

SCHOOL Roosevelt High School | ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY Des Moines, Iowa, USA.

DATES ATTENDED FROM Sept 1941 | TO January 1944 | DEGREE Diploma

COLLEGE DARTMOUTH | ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY Hanover, New Hampshire, USA.

DATES ATTENDED FROM March 1944 | TO Sept. 1946 | DEGREE A.B. (Economics)

COLLEGE | ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY

DATES ATTENDED FROM | TO | DEGREE

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERV[illegible]US (CONTINUED ON PAGE 5)

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS

CLASSIFICATION See REMARKS	ORDER NUMBER - Section 11.	APPROXIMATE INDUCTION DATE	BOARD NUMBER
ADDRESS OF BOARD	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
IF DEFERRED, STATE REASON			

SECTION 11. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE - UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN

COUNTRY USA	SERVICE NAVY	SERVICE DATES	FROM: 1 MARCH 1944	TO: 1 JULY 1946
GRADE AS USNR V-12	SERIAL NUMBER 902 11 71	TYPE OF DISCHARGE Honor + DTC		
LAST STATION Dartmouth College	COMMANDING OFFICER CAPT. D.E. CUMMINGS			

REMARKS:
Never registered for selective service. Enlisted before draft age. Am now in Naval Reserve.

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (USE ADDITIONAL SHEET IF NECESSARY)

NOTE: INCLUDE BELOW PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 15 YEARS.

EMPLOYER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT			JOB TITLE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE ESD 44 - CHINA			KIND OF BUSINESS GOVERNMENT	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY INVESTIGATION			NAME OF SUPERVISOR ROBERT A. KOKE	
DATES COVERED	FROM: 7 October 1946	TO: PRESENT	SALARY CAF 5	PER
REASONS FOR LEAVING NOT Applicable -				
EMPLOYER			JOB TITLE	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE			KIND OF BUSINESS	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY			NAME OF SUPERVISOR	
DATES COVERED	FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
REASONS FOR LEAVING				
EMPLOYER			JOB TITLE	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE			KIND OF BUSINESS	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY			NAME OF SUPERVISOR	
DATES COVERED	FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
REASONS FOR LEAVING				
EMPLOYER			JOB TITLE	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE			KIND OF BUSINESS	

CONTINUED TO PAGE 4

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY | NAME OF SUPERVISOR

DATES COVERED | FROM: | TO: | SALARY | PER

REASONS FOR LEAVING

EMPLOYER | JOB TITLE

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE | KIND OF BUSINESS

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY | NAME OF SUPERVISOR

DATES COVERED | FROM: | TO: | SALARY | PER

REASONS FOR LEAVING

EMPLOYER | JOB TITLE

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE | KIND OF BUSINESS

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY | NAME OF SUPERVISOR

DATES COVERED | FROM: | TO: | SALARY | PER

REASONS FOR LEAVING

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW GIVE DETAILS CONCERNING ANY POSITION FROM WHICH YOU MAY HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED OR WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE.

DETAILS:

SECTION 13. CHARACTER REFERENCES-FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE
EDWARD ZANFRINI	DARTMOUTH College, HANOVER, N.H.
MINNIE HAAS	1041 40th ST., Des Moines, Ia.
Leslie SHAW	2714 UNIVERSITY Ave, Des Moines, IA.
John M. O'SULLIVAN	2062 - 62nd ST. N.W., Philadelphia, PA.
William E. BATES	904 16th AVENUE, Tuscaloosa, Alabama

SECTION 14. SOCIAL ACQUAINTANCES-FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE
Bobb SLATTERY	42 BARRE St. Montpelier, Vermont
HUBERT WARD	[illegible] 37 [illegible] St, Des Moines, [illegible]
Elwin Miller	DARTMOUTH College, HANOVER, N.H.
Tom McLAUGHRY	DARTMOUTH College, HANOVER, N.H.
John Reil	5540 [illegible]

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN T[illegible]TED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDR[illegible]

NAME UNKNOWN — ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE

NAME — ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE

NAME — ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE

SECTION 16. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? YES ☐ NO ☑

IF ANSWER IS "YES" EXPLAIN BELOW:

DO YOU USE , OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS? YES

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENCE, AND DISPOSITION OF CASE.

NO

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? YES ☐ NO ☑

IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

SECTION 17. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES ☑ NO ☐ IF ANSWER IS "NO", STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME.

NAMES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

UNKNOWN

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? YES ☐ NO ☑ IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE PARTICULARS:

SECTION 18. CREDIT REFERENCES-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME Not Applicable — ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE

NAME — ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE

NAME — ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER — CITY — STATE

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY
		Madison Ave, Mason City, Iowa, USA
1937	1940	Elwood Ave, Louisville Ky. USA
1940	1941	Queen City Ave, Tuscaloosa, Ala, USA

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 8)

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7)

FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY
1941	1943	76th Street, Des Moines, Iowa, USA
1943	1944	1041 40th St, Des Moines, Iowa. USA.
1944	——	64 Fletcher Ave, Mount Vernon, NY, USA

SECTION 20. RESIDENCES OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
JAN 1947	PRESENT		CHINA	US Govt business

SECTION 21. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ALL KINDS TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS. INCLUDE ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR A BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OR TO WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT.

NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
Mukden Club		Mukden,	Manchuria	(China)

SECTION 22. LANGUAGES-FOREIGN (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT", "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
Spanish	slight	slight	slight
Chinese	slight		

SECTION 23. GENERAL QUALIFIC[illegible]

INDICATE ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING YOU HAVE, ALSO, SET FORTH ANY QUALIFICATIONS AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION.

SECTION 24. SPORTS AND HOBBIES

Football, Basketball, Track, Swimming
Tennis —

Hobby - cartooning, oil painting.

SECTION 25. EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE

NAME: MRS. Newton B. Miler
RELATIONSHIP: MOTHER
ADDRESS (STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): 64 Fletcher Ave, Mount Vernon, New York
TELEPHONE: unknown

SECTION 26. INFORMATION AND FINAL COMMENTS

NOTE: YOU ARE INFORMED THAT CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION, IF SO, DESCRIBE, IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO".

Was once questioned ~~[illegible]~~ by a postal inspector about a latter which I mailed but which arrived minus one dollar supposedly enclosed.

SECTION 27. CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR MY IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT Shanghai (City) China (State)
DATE 5 January 1948

[illegible]
Witness

Newton S. Miler
Signature of Applicant

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Newton Scott Miler DDP/FE

was granted a TOP SECRET CLEARANCE on

9-23-46.

The personnel record reflects that this individual entered on duty 7 October 1946.

NOV 20 1954

Security Officer AC/PSB/SO

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 30 June 1961

PROT. 1-3?9

TO : Chief, AF

Director of Security

Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Notification of Cryptographic Clearance - Newton S. Miler

1. Subject employee has been granted a cryptographic clearance under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Clearance is effective 21 June 1961.

2. Subject has been informed of the granting of clearance, has been briefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Briefing Statement acknowledging responsibility for the protection of cryptographic information.

3. When Subject employee no longer requires the clearance in order to perform his assigned duties, it is requested that the Communications Security Staff (2411 "I" Bldg., Ext. 3021) be notified by Chief, AF, that the clearance may be revoked.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
- 1 - Chief, AF
- 1 - Security Office (Briefing Statement attached)
- 1 - Personnel Office
- 1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 1597a (9)

Munro, George Frederick

Coming. Call Skip (1542) when it arrives.

OLC (78-0433/1 6 Mar 78 Memo

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTRACT PERSONNEL

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

RETURN FILE TO 5E69

NOTICE: This is an Office of Personnel File and subject to 10 day limitation period. This file has been charged to [illegible]; and is due to be returned to CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, 5E-65 Hqs., x7841, as of ____________.

BENADUM, Jeremy K.

Terminated 31 December 71

302858

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 022177	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BENADUM JEREMY K		PREPARED:AR/EN/DS
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONTRACT TERMINATION (OPJOOO)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 12 31 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)	
6. FUNDS V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 1135-1014	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV LITEMPO	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION UNDETERMINED		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 7	17. SALARY OR RATE EOD: 103050 $ 29035 LEI: 041570

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 5 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 07
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 103050 FED SERVICE COMP: 110735
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-C HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN: 422
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 6 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 092567 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 103050
REFERRING OFFICER: WH-PERS REFF ORG: WH PHONE: 4460
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: NRN OPS EXPENSE: Y HOUSING: A COST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: N OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : N ALLOWANCE COMP: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1152 Use Previous
7-68 MFG 11-69 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 022077
2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): B_NADUM JEREMY K
PREPARED: 09/ 5/73

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE
4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 09 01 73
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (5)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-1014
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV
LITEMPO

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: UNDETERMINED

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER:
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 7
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 27463 DOG: 103060 LEI: 041973

18 REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:      15   SEX: M      MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 07
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 103060  FED SERVICE COMP: 110759
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-C               HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN: 422
FEGLI: YES/CPIN         PREV. GOVT SERV: 1        SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A            A/L IND: 3                S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 092567 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 10306
REFERRING OFFICER: WH-PERS           REFR ORG: WH         PHONE: 4460
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y     FED EXMP:               STATE EXMP:         STATE:
TRAVEL: NHN      OPS EXPNSE: Y           HOUSING: A          POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4    DIFFERENTIAL: N         OFFSET CLAUSE: Y    STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : N         ALLOWANCE COMM: N  EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y    OTH TAX ENTL: N         OTHER ALLCWNS : N  SEPARATION:
```

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous
7-64 MFG 11-69 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Jan 8 ?

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 222774
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BENADUM JEREMY K

PREPARED: 01/24/72

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 1 | 1? | 72

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-1?1?

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV
LITEMPO

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: UNDETERMINED

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: $* 25055 DOG: 100060 LEI: 141572

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:        15  SEX: M          MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 07
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 100?60  FED SERVICE COMP: 11 739
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D                       HOSPITALIZATION: F    PLAN: 422
FEGLI: YES/OPTN          PREV. GOVT SERV: 1      SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A             A/L IND: 8              S/L INC: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 092567 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 100060
REFERRING OFFICER: WH-PERS               REFR ORG: WH       PHONE: 4460
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y     FED. EXMP:              STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: MHN      OPS EXPNSE: Y           HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4    DIFFERENTIAL: N         OFFSET CLAUSE: Y     STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : N         ALLOWANCE COMP: N    EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y    OTH TAX ENTL: N         OTHER ALLOWNS : N    SEPARATION:
```

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1152a
? 1 69 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Mexico, D.F.
31 July, 1970

To: COS
From: Jeremy K. Benadum
Subj.: Military Service

Upon graduation from Pomona College, Claremont, California, in June, 1936, writer was commissioned as 2nd Lt. of Infantry. On October 25, 1939, writer went on active duty under the Thomason Act, being assigned to duty with the 30th U.S. Infantry, with headquarters at the Presidio, San Francisco, California. He remained on active duty until 30 July, 1940, at which time he reverted to reserve status. Writer remained in this status, with the rank of 1st Lt. until 1942, at which time all reserve officers in the FBI were requested to resign their commissions. The latter was done under an arrangement between the Defense Dept. and the FBI. Writer has never received a discharge, so is unable to produce same.

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) 7 Nov 1932

1. [illegible]	[illegible]	24 [illegible] 1916	30 Oct 1960
6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7	1959 1961 [illegible]	?
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	OTHER STATUS [illegible]	[illegible] 1951	[illegible]
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	Y		
12. ASSESSMENT DATE	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE	

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1932-40 [illegible] (2 mos)
1940-60 Dept of Justice, FBI

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

?-36 Pomona College, Claremont, Calif (Graduate) - ?

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

[illegible] Native
[illegible]
[illegible]

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

None

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (IF ANY)	LOCATION
Oct 1960	CE Ops Off (Career Agt)	[illegible]		-eqv DDP/WH/LITEMPO	Mexico City
Apr 1966	" " " " "	[illegible]		-eqv " " "	" "
Apr 1970	" " " " "	27,463	15/7	-eqv " " "	" "
Sep 1970	Ops Of(CareerAgt) 0136.01	27,463	15/7	-eqv " " "	" "

20. DATE REVIEWED
9 Dec 1970

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
[illegible]/cls

22. [illegible]

FORM 1200 (PART I) [illegible] SECRET PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
(P)	DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug 1915

[illegible] in Official Personnel Folder. Subject's EOD date as CA in Oct 1944.
No Photo Available.

[illegible] IENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

[illegible] MENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

[illegible]	10. PROFILE REVIEWED BY

FORM 1200 (PART 2) SECRET PROFILE

SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE - Jeremy K. BENADUM (P)

Service	From	To	Total Creditable Time Years	Months	Days
Active duty in U.S.Army	26 Oct 39	31 Jul 40	-	9	5
Federal Bureau of Investigation	12 Aug 40	31 Oct 60	-	-	-
CIA Career Agent	30 Oct 60	date	-	-	-

Using 12 Aug 1940 as a base date less above total creditable time equals a SCD of: 7 November 1939.

Paul Wilson
10 Jun 1969

14-0000

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, WH Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 104776, Para 2. A., Dated 23 January 1971

A sterile check in the amount of $48.00 payable to Jeremy K. BENADUM, former Career Agent, was forwarded to his allottee on 6 May 1971 for deposit to his account. The amount represents a refund of six months prepaid premiums on BENADUM's Contract Life Insurance policy which was cancelled effective 31 December 1970.

Norman R. PATERSILL

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMS-7234	DATE 7 MAY 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

1-WH/Contracts
1-WH/Registry
1-WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Contracts	MDoores	md (5 May 1971)	4460

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1	5-5-71	
WH/NOC	5 May 71	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/SS		Richard D. Wright

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

May 5, 1971

Wells Fargo Bank
464 California Street
San Francisco, California 94106

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Union Trust Company Treasurer's Check number 01-335154, dated April 27, 1971, payable to Mr. George Frederick Munro, in the amount of $43.00. Please deposit the enclosed check to Mr. Munro's account number 336361.

Sincerely,

Wm. Rodgers

Enclosure

Airmail, Certified.

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

REQUEST F OS MAILING

NO. 212472

SECTION I THIS SECTION FOR SENDER'S USE ONLY (TYPE OR PRINT)

CASE NO. 283887

MAIL AT (CITY AND STATE) Washington, D. C.

METHOD OF MAILING (CHECK AS APPROPRIATE)

XX AIR MAIL	SPECIAL DELIVERY	FIRST CLASS	REGISTERED	RECEIPT REQUESTED
PARCEL POST	OTHER (EXPLAIN) Certified Mail			

ADDRESSEE
Wells Fargo Bank

ADDRESS
464 California Street
San Francisco, Calif., 94104

NAME OF SENDER William S. Renehan

OFFICE WH/Contracts

EXTENSION 4460

DOCUMENT NO.

SECTION II THIS SECTION FOR OS USE ONLY

INITIALS OF RECIPIENT LB

DATE RECEIVED 5/6/71

REMARKS

SENDER'S COPY

FORM 1637
11-59

SECRET

(25-38)

14-00000

SECRET (When Filled In)

Date 4-19-71

TO : Administrative Officer/WH

FROM : Chief, Insurance Branch, BSD/Pers

SUBJECT : Refund on Cancelled Insurance Policies BENADUM, Jeremy K.
(NAME SUBSCRIBER)

Insurance Acct. No. 15574

1. According to the records in this office, subject employee is due a refund of prepaid premiums on his cancelled insurance policies listed below:

___	Contract Health Insurance	$
X	Contract Life Insurance	$ 48.00
___	United Benefit Life Insurance	$
___	WAEPA Life Insurance	$
___	Flight and Accident Insurance	$

2. Please notify this office (in writing) how to issue this refund. If we draw our check, it will be under the name of Government Employees Health Association, Inc. If applicable, please submit true name under separate cover for issuance of sterile check.

April 22, 1971

Please obtain sterile check and forward to W. S. Reachow, Wilkins for transmittal to Benadum [illegible]

3. If we do not hear from your office by 5-19-71 this money will be posted to Accounts Payable on our ledger and no further effort will be made by this office to contact subject employee.

Ref. - Approved [illegible] Branch

W. O. Brunkhorst
W. O. Brunkhorst

Group I
Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification.

SECRET (When Filled In)

14-00000

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINAT[illegible]

THIS FORM MUST [illegible]

DATE: 22 [illegible] 1971

NAME (Last, First, Middle • true or pseudonym): [illegible], [illegible] K. (P)

[illegible] AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: [illegible]

LOCAL ADDRESS: Mexico City, Mexico

PERMANENT ADDRESS: [illegible] California

PERMANENT STATION OR BASE: Mexico City, Mexico

POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE: [illegible] Agent

CONTRACT [illegible]

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
30 October 1960	[illegible]	[illegible]	31 December 1970

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

Retirement

INTERNAL STAFF OR [illegible] CLEARANCES (Add or delete as applicable)

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE	[illegible]	[illegible]	
LOGISTICS	[illegible]	[illegible] 71	
[illegible]			
Security	[illegible]	[illegible] 71	

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER — CLEARED BY (Signature): [illegible] C/[illegible]/Contracts — DATE: [illegible]

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES
(OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE)

OFFICE	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL
CENTRAL COVER STAFF				CLEARED BY (Signature): [illegible] DATE: [illegible] 71
OFFICE OF SECURITY PSD			22 December 1970 [illegible]	CLEARED BY (Signature): [illegible] DATE: [illegible]
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CPD				CLEARED BY (Signature): DATE:

[illegible] /s/ [illegible] Fentscher

REMARKS (Please initial)

Advance copy to CI/CSTD/[illegible]

[illegible] Officer

[illegible] OR DIVISION AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible]

C/[illegible]/2

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **OP/Retirement Office**
ATTN: Paul Sidel

DATE: **15 March 1971**

FROM : **C/WH/Contracts**

SUBJECT: **Jeremy K. BENADUM, Retirement**

1. Per our telecon this morning, I have sent over to you a copy of the cable from Mexico City (IN 266625) which stated BENADUM had elected not to make the payment as described in our outgoing cable which your office coordinated with on Friday.

2. It is understood that necessary papers will be forwarded from your office to Miss Harrison in the Office of Finance today. I have called Miss Harrison and she advised that upon receipt of the papers from you there would be no difficulty in insuring that BENADUM's actual annuity is computed including the retroactive portion for January and February and included in the check for March.

Wm. Renehan

SECRET

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4480
DATE: 12 March 1971

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12-2

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: US PER:

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

DISSEM: WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR. OP 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 2 21 582 [illegible] 7 CITE DIRECTOR 119534 119594

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: HMMS-7143

15 MAR 1971

1. PLEASE INFORM JEREMY K. BENADUM FOLLOWING.

A. HIS ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY VERIFIED AS 1 JULY 1937 THROUGH 14 JULY 1937 AND 1 DECEMBER 1939 THROUGH 30 JUNE 1940. THIS TOTALS ONE AND ONE-HALF MONTHS LESS THAN BENADUM CLAIMED.

B. VERIFICATION CIVILIAN SERVICE SHOWS NO RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS FOR PERIOD 1 JUNE 1942 THRU 28 FEBRUARY 1943. AMOUNT OF $307 REQUIRED TO PURCHASE CREDIT FOR THIS PERIOD. IF NOT PAID, BASIC ANNUITY WILL BE REDUCED BY 10 PERCENT OF AMOUNT OWED.

C. ANNUITY ESTIMATES RECOMPUTED ON BASIS CHANGE IN CREDITABLE MILITARY SERVICE AND EFFECT OF PAYMENT OR NON-PAYMENT FOR UNCOVERED PERIOD OF CIVILIAN SERVICE. IF PAID, ANNUITY ESTIMATED TO BE $1,195 PER MONTH. IF NOT PAID, ESTIMATE ANNUITY REDUCTION TO $1,194 PER MONTH. SHOULD REALIZE WOULD TAKE OVER TEN YEARS TO REGAIN AMOUNT OF PAYMENT.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF:
FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 119594

TO

PAGE TWO (2)

D. PLEASE ADVISE BENADUM'S DECISION. IF ELECTS MAKE PAYMENT, HIS CHECK PAYABLE TO TREASURER OF U.S. SHOULD BE FORWARDED HQS SOONEST.

2. ON RECEIPT OF DECISION AND, IF APPROPRIATE, PAYMENT FOR THE SERVICE, FINAL ANNUITY COMPUTATIONS WILL BE MADE. ANNUITY CHECK FOR MARCH WOULD INCLUDE RETROACTIVE AMOUNT DUE BENADUM FOR JANUARY AND FEBRUARY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: Advised full retirement annuity could not be paid pending receipt of verification of military service and billing for non-deduction civilian service between 1 Jun 42 and 1 Mar 43.

COORD: CP/Retirement - A. J. Sukovitz (in draft)

C/WH/1 [illegible]

C/WH/FI/NOC [illegible]

[illegible] V. BROE
C/WHD

[illegible] S. [illegible]
C/[illegible]/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION UNIT: WH8

FILE, VR OP2

ACTION NO. 113

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 15-1

SECRET

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

MAR 13 2 44 PM '71

ACTION COPY

S E C R E T 131727Z MAR 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 15858 13MAR IN286625

DIRECTOR

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: DIRECTOR 119594

15 MAR 1971

1. HEREMY K. BENADUM HAS SELECTED NOT RPT NOT MAKE PAYMENT AS PER REF PARA 1B. HAS BEEN ADVISED HIS ESTIMATE ANNUITY REDUCED TO $1,194 PER MONTH.

2. FILE DEFER. GP-1

S E C R E T

[illegible] of FX2 444 [illegible]

[illegible]

○ [illegible]

[illegible] - [illegible] other form, [illegible] needed [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 2

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 12 March 1971

SECRET

ROUTING AND CS INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 48 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH 8 | N C | FILE, VR, CP 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 22 21 56Z MAR 71 CITE DIRECTOR 119594

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: HMMS-7143

1. PLEASE INFORM JEREMY K. BENADUM FOLLOWING.

A. HIS ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY VERIFIED AS 1 JULY 1937 THROUGH 14 JULY 1937 AND 1 DECEMBER 1939 THROUGH 30 JUNE 1940. THIS TOTALS ONE AND ONE-HALF MONTHS LESS THAN BENADUM CLAIMED.

B. VERIFICATION CIVILIAN SERVICE SHOWS NO RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS FOR PERIOD 1 JUNE 1942 THRU 28 FEBRUARY 1943. AMOUNT OF $337 REQUIRED TO PURCHASE CREDIT FOR THIS PERIOD. IF NOT PAID, BASIC ANNUITY WILL BE REDUCED BY 10 PERCENT OF AMOUNT OWED.

C. ANNUITY ESTIMATES RECOMPUTED ON BASIS CHANGE IN CREDITABLE MILITARY SERVICE AND EFFECT OF PAYMENT OR NON-PAYMENT FOR UNCOVERED PERIOD OF CIVILIAN SERVICE. IF PAID, ANNUITY ESTIMATED TO BE $1,195 PER MONTH. IF NOT PAID, ESTIMATE ANNUITY REDUCTION TO $1,194 PER MONTH. SHOULD REALIZE WOULD TAKE OVER TEN YEARS TO REGAIN AMOUNT OF PAYMENT.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY________ PER________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO: FILE VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 119594

TO

PAGE TWO (2)

D. PLEASE ADVISE BENADUM'S DECISION. IF ELECTS MAKE PAYMENT, HIS CHECK PAYABLE TO TREASURER OF U.S. SHOULD BE FORWARDED HQS SOONEST.

2. ON RECEIPT OF DECISION AND, IF APPROPRIATE, PAYMENT FOR THE SERVICE, FINAL ANNUITY COMPUTATIONS WILL BE MADE. ANNUITY CHECK FOR MARCH WOULD INCLUDE RETROACTIVE AMOUNT DUE BENADUM FOR JANUARY AND FEBRUARY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: Advised full retirement annuity could not be paid pending receipt of verification of military service and billing for non-deduction civilian service between 1 Jun 42 and 1 Mar 43.

COORD: CP/Retirement - A. J. Sukowicz (in draft)

C/WH/1 ________

C/WH/FI/NOC ________

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. [illegible]
C/WH/[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ROUGH DRAFT
P. J. Seidel
10 March 1971

1. Please advise Jeremy K. BENADUM that the appropriate military ~~authority has~~ verified the following dates of active duty:

1 July 1937 through 14 July 1937
1 December 1939 through 30 June 1940

This service totals one and one-half months less than that claimed by BENADUM.

2. Records verifying BENADUM's civilian service show that during period 1 June 1942 through 28 February 1943 retirement deductions were not withheld from salary. The amount of $307.00 will be required to purchase credit for this period. If not paid, Subject's annuity will be reduced by 10 per cent of the amount owed or $31.00 per year. If Subject elects to make payment, his check should be made payable to the Treasurer of the United States and forwarded to Headquarters soonest.

3. Annuity estimates recomputed to reflect change in creditable military service and effect of payment or non-payment for uncovered period of civilian service. If paid, annuity will be $1,196 per month. If not paid, annuity reduced to $1,194.

4. Advise Headquarters BENADUM's election on payment vs non-payment option.

ORIG: WSRenehan:md
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 17 February 1971

TOTAL COPIES: 13

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 28 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, CF3

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 18 21 30z FEB 71

(elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 112046

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5618 (IN 266892)

B. HMMS-7143, DTD/17 FEB.

PLEASE SEE REF B.

22 FEB 1971

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: A. BENADUM requests Hqs identify deposit of $950.
B. Jeremy K. BENADUM, Retirement Annuity.

COORD: D C/WH/1

WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

[illegible] SECRET

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Jeremy K. BENADUM, Retirement Annuity

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

1. The Retirement Office has advised that Jeremy K. BENADUM's annuity check for January will be an interim payment representing about 75% of basic annuity.

2. The full annuity could not be paid pending receipt of verification of military service and billing for non-deduction civilian service between 1 June 1942 and 1 March 1943. Headquarters has been checking with the Retirement Office on a continuous basis but as yet the information has not been received. Upon receipt of the required info, you will be promptly advised.

3. Please assure BENADUM that he will receive retroactive payment in a subsequent check for full entitlement.

Norman R. PATERSILL

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS-7143

DATE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

1-WH/FI/NOC
1-WH/1
1-WH/Registry
1-WH/Contracts

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Contracts	WSSenehan	me (11 Feb 71)	4460

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/FI/NOC	12 Feb 71	
C/WH/1	12-2-71	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/SS	16 Feb 71	Richard B. Wright

USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

23

FILE, VR 0F 2

395

35

FEB 12 10 29 AM '71
ACTION COPY

S E C R E T 162254Z FEB 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 5618 16 FEB 71 [illegible]892

DIRECTOR

ADMIN FINANCE

17 FEB 1971

REF: HMMS-6919 DTD 22 JULY 70

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM REPORTS RECEIPT OF BANK DEPOSIT NOTICE COVERING GOVERNMENT CHECK IN AMOUNT $950.00. ONLY LARGE DEPOSIT BENADUM ANTICIPATES AT PRESENT TIME IS FIRST RETIREMENT ANNUITY CHECK.

2. REF INDICATED ESTIMATE FOR BENADUM ANNUITY $1,202 PER MONTH, WHICH HARD TO RECONCILE WITH $950 DEPOSIT. FACT THAT DEPOSIT FOR SUCH EVEN AMOUNT ALSO INDICATES IT MAY NOT BE FIRST ANNUITY PAYMENT.

3. BENADUM REQUESTS HEADQUARTERS IDENTIFY DEPOSIT IF POSSIBLE, AND PROVIDE EARNINGS AND DEDUCTIONS BREAKDOWN IF APPROPRIATE. BENADUM ALSO REQUESTS GROSS-DEDUCTIONS-NET BREAKDOWN OF ANNUITY PAYMENTS. GP-1

S E C R E T

Answered
17 Feb

SECRET

24 Jan 71

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Jeremy K. BENADUM, Payment of Annuity

REF: DIRECTOR 104776

1. At the time of transmittal of Reference, I had been informed that the military service still had not been verified. In talking about this matter with Mr. Sidel, I asked if he would request MMPD, possibly through some ~~sxxx~~ sergeant to sergeant or colonel to colonel whether the matter could be expedited. He assured me he would give this an all-out try and agreed to let me know during the forthcoming week.

2. In checking this morning I find that Mr. Sidel is out on leave and going into training for at least the next week. In asking how to get in touch with Mr. Sidel, eventually Mrs. S[illegible] came on the line. She advised that nothing new was in the record and there was no info on the verification of the military service and wished to assure me that just because someone went on leave or was out that a case was not dropped. I asked then if any effort has been made to contact MMPD. She said the file didn't reflect anything and agreed to check MMPD and let me know.

File

[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 7 15-3

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: W.Tanchea
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 6560
DATE: 22 Jan 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 34 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH/8
FILE, VR. OP 2, OF 2, CCS 2, CSPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

23 JAN 71 03 19z

CITE DIRECTOR 104776

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

25 JAN 1971

REF: MEXICO CITY 5381 (IN 248431)

FOLLOWING KEYED REF

1. ALTHOUGH ACTUAL REQUIREMENTS MAY VARY AMONG INDIVIDUAL BANKS, SUGGEST JEREMY K. BENADUM ADVISE BANK THEY WILL BE RECEIVING GOVERNMENT *annuity* CHECKS FOR DEPOSIT HIS ACCOUNT AND INCLUDE POWER OF ATTORNEY IN LETTER.

2. NO CARD OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF RETIREMENT PROVIDED. LENGTH OF SERVICE (32 YEARS 2 MONTHS INCLUDES SICK LEAVE) CITED HMMS 6919. INSURANCE CARD NOT ISSUED RETIREES ABROAD AS HOSPITALS WOULD NOT ACCEPT. SEE HMMS 7107 FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON FORWARDING HOSPITALIZATION CLAIMS. WILL BE PROVIDED ANNUITY STATEMENT WHICH WILL INCLUDE AMOUNT OF RETIREMENT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES.

A. STATION AUTHORIZED PAY FOLLOWING FIELD ALLOTMENT FOR PERIOD 13 - 31 DECEMBER AND T/A HQS.

(CONTINUED)

Jan 29 - [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Suite 3050

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY __________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO __________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______________

CONF:

INFO: FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

PAGE TWO (2)

7/CU/776

GROSS		$1,478.40	
DEDUCTIONS:			
FEGLI	12.38		
OPTIONAL FEGLI	8.25		
HOSPITALIZATION	14.09		
RETIREMENT	103.49		
INCOME TAX	191.55		
1970 TAX ADJUSTMENT	147.00		
		476.76	
		$1,001.64	
REFUND OF TAX OVER WITHHELD PAY PERIODS 11, 12 AND 13		121.50	
NET			$1,123.14

NOTE: CONTRACT LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE CEASED 31 DECEMBER. WILL REFUND PREPAID PREMIUMS.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____________ PER ____________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____________

CONF: | FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

7101776

[illegible]

[illegible]

PAGE THREE (3)

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

B. RETIREMENT CHECKS MAILED WITHIN FIRST WEEK OF MONTH FOLLOWING THAT FOR WHICH DUE.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: C/WH/B&F [illegible]

DC/WH/1 [illegible]

C/WH/FI/NOC [illegible]

OP/Retirement [illegible]

OF/C&TD/SAVS/Mr. Perzinger [illegible] (Para 2)(a)

CCS/DFB Mr. Shel [illegible]

OP/Insurance Br. [illegible]

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. PERHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

[illegible] CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES [illegible]

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

JAN 29 7 32 PM '71

ACTION COPY

DISSEM BY: 35 PER ______

ACTION UNIT: WHS

FILE, VR SP2, CCS2, CSPS, OF2

ACTION NO. 797

S E C R E T 20221Z JAN 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 5381

DIRECTOR

26 JAN 71 248431

4

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 5083 (IN 226314)

B. MEXICO CITY 5301 (IN 243202)

21 JAN 1971

1. BENADUM HAS ASKED WHETHER NECESSARY FOR HIM TO SUPPLY HIS BANK WITH POWER OF ATTORNEY OR SIMILAR FORM TO ENABLE BANK TO CREDIT RETIREMENT CHECKS TO HIS ACCOUNT. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS ADVISE.

2. BENADUM ALSO ASKING WHETHER HE SHOULD RECEIVE CARD, CERTIFICATE OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF RETIREMENT FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE INCLUDING LENGTH OF SERVICE CREDITED. PLEASE ADVISE.

3. DUE DISRUPTION OF NORMAL INCOME PATTERNS, BENADUM EXPERIENCING FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND REQUESTS PAYMENT OF FIELD ALLOTMENT FOR 13-31 DEC 70 SOONEST. REF B PROVIDED 1970 OVERT INCOME TAX ESTIMATE. ADVISE STATION OF NET AMOUNT FINAL FIELD ALLOTMENT SOONEST. ALSO ADVISE WHEN BENADUM CAN EXPECT FIRST RETIREMENT CHECK WILL BE SENT TO BANK. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WOGAME

ADM/JECENT - Jeremy K. BENADUM (P) - Tax Administration

REFERENCE: Mexico City 5301, 13 January 1971

1. Headquarters has reviewed BENADUM's estimated 1970 and 1971 true tax liabilities and it has been determined that his current withholding rate is sufficient to provide enough tax for these years.

2. Please advise BENADUM of the above and remind him that we need copies of his 1970 and 1971 tax returns when they are submitted to Internal Revenue so that we can reconcile to his true tax liability.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COS

3 FEB 1971

HMMS-7115

26 January 1971

S E C R E T

[illegible]

Internal Dist.

1 - WH/1
1 - WH/CON

CCS/CTS WHM LP 6697

WH/1

WH/CON

C/WH/SS

DISPATCH CONFIDENTIAL

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief, Benefits and Services Division/OP

SUBJECT
[illegible]
Hospitalization - Jeremy K. [illegible]

1. Please inform subject employee that in the future he must submit itemized medical bills to the address forwarded under separate cover.

2. All bills should show the name of the patient, the dates and types of services rendered, the amount charged per item, and the exact type of surgery performed if applicable. He should also submit a statement giving the exact diagnosis for each charge incurred. This information will constitute the submission of a claim.

3. Enclosed is a leaflet which explains his hospitalization insurance coverage. The coverage applies regardless of the country in which the claims are incurred. Charges of a recognized hospital are covered under this policy in accordance with the benefits itemized in the attached leaflet.

[illegible] R. [illegible]

Attachments:
1 as stated
1 U/S/C

Distribution:
2, COS, Mexico City

[illegible] - 7[illegible] [illegible] January [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

1. LAST NAME MUNRO FIRST NAME George INITIAL(S) F

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d):
On ________ Ann. Leave Bal. ________

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (As of date of separation)

Years	Months	Days
31	1	25

☐ More than 15 years

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION 12/31/70 RETIREMENT

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	Annual	Sick
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 19 70	560	2128
6. Current leave year accrual through 12/26 19 70	200	100
7 Total	760	2228
8 Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9 Total leave taken	760	0
10 Balance	0	2228*

11. Total hours paid in lump sum None

12 Salary rate(s) $27,463.

13 Lump sum leave dates:
From — to — (Hours)

26. Certified correct: Lillie E. McCallister
(Signature)
FOR CHIEF PAYROLL
(Title)
(Date)
(Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14 Date arrival abroad for HL purposes
15 Current balance as of ________ 19 ____
16 12 month accrual rate
17 Dates leave used, prior 24 months
18 Monthly accrual date
19 Calendar days credit for next accrual date
20 Date basic service period completed

MILITARY LEAVE

21 Dates during current calendar yr ________ to ________
22 Dates during preceding calendar yr ________ to ________

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or AWOL or Furlough Suspension (Hours)
23 During leave year in which separated	0
24 During step increase waiting period which began on 4/19/70	0
25 During 12 month HL accrual period (dates)	

REMARKS
SCD: 11/7/39

*Unused Sick Leave---2228 hours---"5 U.S.C. Ch 63"

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRANSMITTAL OF APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT
CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) Munro, George F.	2. TYPE OF RETIREMENT APPLIED FOR Voluntary	3. PROPOSED RETIREMENT DATE 31 December 1976

SECTION A RECOMMENDATION OF PARENT OFFICE

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT: ☐ APPROVAL
☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE Joseph DiStefano, WH/EXO	3. SIGNATURE OF OFFICE HEAD Joseph DiStefano	4. DATE 10 December 1970

SECTION B RECOMMENDATION OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT: ☑ APPROVAL
☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE Cord Meyer, Jr., ADDP	3. SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE Cord Meyer Jr.	4. DATE 10 Dec 70

SECTION C RECOMMENDATION OF CIA RETIREMENT BOARD

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT: ☐ APPROVAL
☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

2. TYPED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	3. DATE

FORM 3102a SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT

CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

To avoid delay - 1. Read information carefully. 2. Complete application in full. 3. Typewrite or print in ink

A. PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. NAME MR MRS MISS (Last) Munro (First) George (M.I.) F.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month) (Day) (Year) Aug 24 1915

3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 101-38-0460

4. ADDRESS (Number and street) (City and State) (Zip Code)

COPIES

CHECKS

5. (A) ARE YOU MARRIED?
☐ YES
☐ NO

5. (B) IF "YES" GIVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION

WIFE'S OR HUSBAND'S NAME (First) (Middle)	HIS (OR HER) BIRTH DATE (Month) (Day) (Year)	DATE OF MARRIAGE (Month) (Day) (Year)	ADDRESS OF SPOUSE IF DIFFERENT FROM ITEM 4

B. CIVILIAN SERVICE

1. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH

2. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

3. LOCATION OF EMPLOYMENT (City and State) Mexico City

4. TITLE OF LAST POSITION Career Agent

5. DATE OF FINAL SEPARATION (Month) (Day) (Year) December 31, 1970

6. APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF YEARS OF ~~[illegible]~~ SERVICE

7. DO YOU HAVE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE? ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. ARE YOU ENROLLED IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM? ☒ YES ☐ NO

C. MILITARY SERVICE

1. COMPLETE THE SCHEDULE BELOW IF YOU HAVE PERFORMED ACTIVE DUTY THAT TERMINATED UNDER HONORABLE CONDITIONS IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SERVICES: (A) ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AIR FORCE, OR COAST GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES; OR (B) REGULAR CORPS OR RESERVE CORPS OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE AFTER JUNE 30, 1960; OR (C) AS A COMMISSIONED OFFICER OF THE COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY AFTER JUNE 30, 1961. IF AVAILABLE, ATTACH A COPY OF YOUR DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE

BRANCH OF SERVICE	SERIAL NUMBER	DATE OF ENTRANCE ON ACTIVE DUTY	DATE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY	LAST GRADE OR RANK	ORGANIZATION AT DISCHARGE (Div., Regt., Co., etc.)
U.S. Army		25 Oct 39	31 Jul 40	2nd Lt.	Inf.

2. (A) ARE YOU A MILITARY RESERVIST (EITHER ACTIVE OR INACTIVE)? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. (B) ARE YOU IN RECEIPT OF OR HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR MILITARY RETIRED PAY (RETAINED PAY DOES NOT INCLUDE V.A. PENSION OR COMPENSATION) ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. (C) IF "YES" WERE YOU RETIRED FROM A RESERVE COMPONENT UNDER CHAPTER 67, TITLE 10, U.S.C. (FORMERLY TITLE III, PUBLIC LAW 810)? ☐ YES ☐ NO

D. DISABILITY INFORMATION

Only applicants for total disability retirement will complete Part D.

1. WHEN DID YOU BECOME TOTALLY DISABLED? (Month, year)

2. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR DISABILITIES. STATE WHEN INCURRED AND HOW THEY INTERFERE WITH PERFORMANCE OF THE DUTIES OF YOUR POSITION. (ATTACH ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON PLAIN SHEET OF PAPER IF NECESSARY)

E. OTHER CLAIM INFORMATION

1. (A) HAVE YOU EVER RECEIVED OR MADE APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

1. (B) IF "YES" STATE THE NUMBER OF YOUR COMPENSATION CLAIM AND THE PERIOD FOR WHICH YOU RECEIVED COMPENSATION

CLAIM NUMBER	FROM (Month) (Day) (Year)	TO (Month) (Day) (Year)

2. (A) HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED ANY APPLICATION UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM [illegible] DEPOSIT OR RECEIPT OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. (B) IF "YES" [illegible] AND GIVE THE CLAIM NUMBER IF KNOWN (Claim Number)
☐ RETIREMENT ☐ DEPOSIT OR REFUND
☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible]

3. (A) HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED ANY APPLICATION [illegible] RECEIPT, PURCHASE OF SERVICE CREDIT [illegible] ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. (B) IF "YES" [illegible]
☐ RETIREMENT ☐ PURCHASE OF SERVICE CREDIT
☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible]

4. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN [illegible] RETIREMENT SYSTEM [illegible] ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. (B) IF "YES" GIVE THE NAME OF THE [illegible] RETIREMENT SYSTEM Civil Service System

SECRET

INDICATE, BY SIGNING YOUR INITIALS IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW, THE TYPE OF ANNUITY YOU WISH TO RECEIVE. READ THE FOLLOWING AND CONSIDER THE MATTER CAREFULLY. NO CHANGE WILL BE PERMITTED AFTER AN ANNUITY HAS BEEN GRANTED. IF YOU WANT AN ANNUITY WITH A SURVIVOR BENEFIT, BE SURE TO GIVE THE OTHER INFORMATION CALLED FOR.

F. TYPES OF ANNUITY: MARRIED APPLICANTS ONLY

1. INITIALS ☐ **ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO WIDOW OR WIDOWER**

SPECIFY THE PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU WANT USED AS THE BASE FOR YOUR WIDOW'S (OR WIDOWER'S) SURVIVOR ANNUITY

If you want all your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the word "all" in the box below. If you want only part of your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the yearly amount of your annuity you want used.

$ ☐ THE SURVIVOR'S ANNUITY WILL BE 55% OF ALL OR WHATEVER PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU SPECIFY AS THE BASE FOR HER (OR HIS) BENEFIT

- If you are married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in F. 2.
- The annuity payable to you during your lifetime will be reduced by 2½% of any amount up to $3,600 a year used as the base for the survivor benefit, plus 10% of any amount over $3,600 so used.
- If you retire for total disability before age 60 and get a guaranteed minimum disability annuity, you may use all or any part of your "earned" annuity as the base for the survivor benefit. You cannot use any extra annuity which may be payable to make up the guaranteed minimum annuity.
- If your wife (or husband) should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies or remarries.

2. INITIALS ☐ **ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT**

(I do not desire my wife (or husband) to receive a survivor annuity benefit after my death.)

- If you choose this type, your wife (or husband) cannot be paid a survivor annuity after your death.
- This type provides annuity payments to you only.

G. TYPES OF ANNUITY: UNMARRIED APPLICANTS ONLY (Including Widowed and Divorced)

1. INITIALS ☐ **ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT**

- If you are not married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in G. 2.
- This type provides annuity payments to you only.

2. INITIALS ☐ **ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO NAMED PERSON HAVING AN INSURABLE INTEREST**

SPECIFY THE NAME, RELATIONSHIP AND DATE OF BIRTH OF THE PERSON YOU WISH TO RECEIVE THE SURVIVOR ANNUITY

NAME OF PERSON (First, middle, last)	
RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH (Mo., day, yr.)

SEE UNMARRIED EMPLOYEES UNDER INFORMATION REGARDING SURVIVOR ANNUITIES ON THE ATTACHED INFORMATION SHEET FOR EXPLANATION OF REDUCTION IN YOUR ANNUITY

- This type is available to all retiring unmarried employees who are in good health.
- It provides a reduced annuity to you and a survivor annuity to the person named as having an insurable interest.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies.
- The survivor's annuity will be 55% of the reduced annuity you receive.
- If you choose this type, you will have to undergo a medical examination which will be arranged by the Director of Personnel at no cost to you.
- If the person named as having an insurable interest should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.

H. CERTIFICATION OF APPLICANT

WARNING—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both (18 U.S.C. 1001)

I hereby certify that all statements made in this application are true to the best of my knowledge and belief

See Attached Memo dated

(DATE) 31 July 1979 (SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT)

I. FOR OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY

Mexico, D.F.
31 July, 1970

To: COS
From: Jeremy K. Benadum
Subj.: Retirement request

Writer herewith requests that his retirement date be established as 31 December, 1970.

CONCUR: Roger T. Kingman
Roger T. KINGMAN

SECRET

30 DEC 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. George F. Munro

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Request for Voluntary Retirement

1. I am pleased to inform you that your request for voluntary retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System has been approved by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Your retirement will become effective 31 December 1970. Your annuity will commence as of 1 January 1971 and is payable on 1 February 1971. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative processing required to effect your retirement.

3. You will receive a lump-sum payment for your accrued annual leave up to 30 days or for whatever amount of leave credit you carried over from the last leave year if that amount is more than 30 days.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat/3257 (28 December 1970)

SECRET

ORIG: JA Strassberger:md
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 30 December 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14-2

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 38 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO ____

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, CA2, CSPS,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 30DEC70 22 59z CITE DIRECTOR 098292

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 5083 (IN 226314)

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM'S APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT EFFECTIVE 31 DEC 70 APPROVED BY CHIEF, JKLANCE.

2. EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY APPROVED AS FOLLOWS:

26 OCT 39-31 JUL 40 U.S. ARMY, 2ND LT., 30TH INFANTRY DIV.

12 AUG 40-31 OCT 60 FBI.

1 NOV 60-31 DEC 70 RETIRED GOVT EMPLOYEE. DURING THIS TIME WORKED FOR:

AUG 61-NOV 67, CIA. MEXICANA DE VALVULAS MUNRO, S.A., TORONJIL NUM. 166, MEXICO, D.F. PRESIDENT AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDER.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY_______ PER_______ #_______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. _______

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO PAGE 2

098292

NOV 67-AUG 70, MAQUINADOS PRECISOS, S.A., TORONJIL NUM. 166, MEXICO, D.F. DIRECTOR AND MINORITY STOCKHOLDER.

3. PLS ENSURE BENADUM IS PROVIDED PARA 2 INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: DC/WH/1

WH/FI/NOC

WH/SS

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: WSRenehan:md
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 1 December 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: [illegible]
INFO: FILE, VR, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 1Dec70 22 45z CITE DIRECTOR 090837

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 4950 (IN 216442)

1. PARA 2 REF EFFECTIVE DATE 31 DECEMBER 1970 CORRECT AND HQS FORESEES NO DELAY IN BENADUM'S RETIREMENT AS PER SCHEDULE.

2. WHEN PARA 1 REF FORM SIGNED PLEASE ADVISE NUMBER AND DATE TRANSMITTAL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Advised Station has received retirement application for Jeremy K. BENADUM, and assumed delay will not effect Station plans to retire BENADUM on 31 Dec 1970.

TELECOORD: OP/RAD-Mr. M. Benthall

COORD: C/WH/1

WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN,
C/WH/CONTRACTS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

FILE, VR

180

S E C R E T 301315Z NOV 76 CITE MEXICO CITY 4950

DIRECTOR

30 NOV 21642
A

ADMIN/CONTRACTS

REF: HMMS-7035

1. HAVE JUST RECEIVED REF WHICH FORWARDED RETIREMENT APPLICATION. JEREMY K. BENADUM IS PRESENTLY AWAY ON LEAVE AND WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL 5 DEC. HE WILL COMPLETE FORM FROM AT THAT TIME AND WE WILL INCLUDE IN SUBSEQUENT POUCH.

2. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THIS PROCESSING HAS BEEN DELAYED SINCE WE HAD REQUESTED PROCESSING IN JUNE 1976. WE ASSUME THAT THIS DELAY WILL IN NO WAY AFFECT OUR PLANS TO RETIRE BENADUM ON 31 DEC 1976. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

Executive Registry
70-6135

10 DEC 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement -
Mr. [redacted]
[illegible]

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. George F. Munro, GS-15 Equivalent, Career Agent, Western Hemisphere Division, Clandestine Service, has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j, to be effective 31 December 1970.

3. Mr. Munro has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for voluntary retirement under the System. He is 55 years old with over 31 years of Federal service. This service includes over 10 years with the Agency all of which were in qualifying service overseas. The Head of the Clandestine Service Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board have recommended that his application for voluntary retirement be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

4. It is recommended that you approve the voluntary retirement of Mr. George F. Munro under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

R E [illegible], Jr.
Director of Central Intelligence

16 DEC 1970
Date

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) EOD: 7 Nov 1939

Munro, George F.

M | 24 [illegible] 1915 | 30 Oct 1960

Married | 7 | 1959 1961 1947 1948 1950 1951 1957

NA | ?

[illegible] | Jul 1961 | [illegible] | [illegible]

Y

1939-40 Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt (9 mos)
1940-60 Dept of Justice, FBI

?-37 Pomona College, Claremont, Calif (Graduate) - ?

Spanish - S,R,W Native
German - S,R,W [illegible]
French - S,R,W [illegible]

None

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SG	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
[illegible] 1960	CE Ops Off (Career Agt)	[illegible]	[illegible]	-eqv DDP/WH/LITHIFO	Mexico City
Sep 1966	" " " " "	29415	15	-eqv " " "	" "
Apr 1970	" " " " "	27,463	15/7	-eqv " " "	" "
Sep 1970	Ops Of(CareerAct) 0136.01	27,463	15/7	-eqv " " "	" "

9 Dec 1970 | [illegible]/ohs

FORM 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
Munro, George F.	24 Aug 1915

23. No Fitness Report in Official Personnel Folder. Subject's EOD date as CA is Oct 194[illegible].
No Photo Available.

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
9 Dec 1970	[illegible]

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) 1 FEB 67 REPLACES FORM 1200 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/Contracts 3D3102

EXTENSION: 4460

NO.:

DATE: 16 December 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CCS/~~OSD~~ DSN GH-44 ~~Mr. Biladeau~~				1, 3, 5: Your concurrences are requested on the attached resume for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent, who is retiring 31 Dec 70. BENADUM and the Station concur with indicating his period of Agency employment as being employed by the family business in Mexico.
2. State C CG-A		16 DEC 1970	Rcm	
CCS/DEB - G. Well		17 Dec	Gn	
3. CI Staff 2B1405 Mr. Granquist		19 Dec		
4. ~~CI/EXO~~				
5. ~~OS/ID~~ EAB/OS ~~4E29~~ 3E-49	28 Dec 70		Clg	
6. CI/EXO 2C43	29 DEC 1970			
7. WH/Contracts 3D3102				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

17 DEC 1970

FORM 610 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EMPLOYMENT RESUME

Mr. George Frederick Munro	31 December 1970
26 October 1939 - 31 July 1940	U. S. Army, 2nd Lt., 30th Infantry Division.
12 August 1940 - 31 October 1960	FBI, ~~Special Agent~~
1 November 1960 - 31 December 1970	Retired Government Employee. During this time worked for: Aug 61 - Nov 67, Cia. Mexicana de Valvulas Munro, S. A., Toronjil Num. 166, Mexico, D. F. President and principle stockholder. Nov 67 - Aug 70, Maquinados Precisos, S. A., Toronjil Num. 166, Mexico, D. F. Director and minority stockholder.

SECRET

17 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : [illegible]/CSIS

ATTENTION : C/C[illegible]

THROUGH : OP/[illegible]

FROM : Benefits & Services Division
OP/C[illegible]

SUBJECT : Retirement Processing - George Frederick Munro
(Career Agent)

1. George Frederick Munro (Career Agent) will reside in Mexico after his retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System 31 December 1970. He has been engaged in clandestine activity in Mexico on behalf of the Agency since 1 November 1960, and his affiliation with the Agency during this 10-year period must be concealed.

2. On 31 December 1960, Subject resigned from the Federal Bureau of Investigation after serving 20 years. A part of Subject's cover legend has been that he is a retired U.S. Government employee, although this was not actually the case. After 31 December 1970, he will be a bona fide U.S. Government retiree. In view of the foregoing, Subject's Civil Service Commission annuity statement, other Civil Service Commission material, as well as tax documentation, may be forwarded in the usual manner in envelopes bearing the return address of the Civil Service Commission. All other correspondence should be forwarded in sterile envelopes with a post office box used for covert retirees shown as the return address.

3. All monies due Subject should be deposited to his bank account with attribution to the U.S. Government. His bank account is as follows:

Wells Fargo Bank
464 California Street
San Francisco, California
Account #330351

SECRET [illegible]

SECRET

4. Subject has a Mutual of Omaha group life insurance policy that was arranged by the Agency. In his particular status, this policy would be convertible to term or some other type of insurance upon his retirement. However, this action would result in the surfacing of Subject's true identity to the underwriter. Therefore, in the interest of continuing security, Subject should be instructed to seek insurance with another insurer if he desires coverage following retirement.

5. If further information is needed, please contact CCS/DFB, Gordon Hall, Red 1353 or Black 6[illegible]4.

Daniel P. Shea
Chief, Central Cover Staff
Devised Facilities Branch

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 18-1-74

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ____ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR CCS 2 CP 2 OF 2

ACTION NO 692

S E C R E T 142150Z DEC 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 5083

DIRECTOR

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 092724

B. HMMS 7036

14 DEC 70 226314

1. FAMILY BUSINESS ESTABLISHED AUG. 1961 WAS "CIA. MEXICANA DE VALVULAS MUNRO, S.A.". SUBJECT WAS PRESIDENT AND PRINCIPLE STOCKHOLDER. THIS COMPANY WAS MERGED INTO "MAQUINADOS PRECISOS, S.A." FROM NOV. 1967 UNTIL AUG. 31, 1970. SUBJECT WAS A DIRECTOR AND MINORITY STOCKHOLDER. ADDRESS FOR BOTH ABOVE: TORONJIL NUM. 166, MEXICO 16, D.F.

2. SUBJECT REQUESTS OPTIONAL FEGLI AND HIS ENROLLMENT UNDER HIS HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN CONTINUE. OK

3. SUBJECT'S APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT WAS SIGNED ON 10 DEC 1970 AND IS BEING FORWARDED UNDER HMMT-10564, O ON 18 DEC.

4. REQUEST STATION BE ADVISED ON NET AMOUNT OF FIELD ALLOTMENT TO BE PAID SUBJECT FOR FINAL PERIOD, 13-31 DEC 70.

GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Forwarding of Retirement Application on Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMS-703[illegible]

We are forwarding under separate cover a retirement application from Jeremy K. BENADUM.

Dexter E. Rostedt
Dexter E. ROSTEDT

Attachment: U/S/C
Retirement Application

Distribution:
, Orig & 2cc: C/WHD, w/att., u/s/c

[illegible] 20 Dec 70
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-10[illegible]

DATE
16 December 1[illegible]0

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT

To avoid delay—1. Read information carefully; 2. Complete application in full; 3. Typewrite or print in ink

A. PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. NAME MR. MRS. MISS (Last) (First) (Middle): MUNRO GEORGE FREDRICK
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month) (Day) (Year): Aug. 24, 1915
3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 101-380-460

4. ADDRESS (Number and street) (City and State) (Zip Code)
Calle Ojo de Agua #43, Club de Golf "La Hacienda", Atizapan, Edo. de México.
CORRES: Apartado 10-700, México 10, D.F./
CHECKS: WELLS FARGO BANK, 464 California Street, San Francisco, California /(Acc't No. 0001-336361)

5. (A) ARE YOU MARRIED? ☒ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF "YES" GIVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION

WIFE'S OR HUSBAND'S NAME	HER (OR HIS) BIRTH DATE (Month) (Day) (Year)	DATE OF MARRIAGE (Month) (Day) (Year)	ADDRESS OF SPOUSE IF DIFFERENT FROM ITEM 4
KATHRYN AILEEN	Jan. 31, '18	7/9/45	

B. CIVILIAN SERVICE

1. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT
2. SERVICE DESIGNATION
3. LOCATION OF EMPLOYMENT (City and State)
4. TITLE OF LAST POSITION
5. DATE OF FINAL SEPARATION (Month) (Day) (Year)
6. APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF YEARS OF CIVILIAN SERVICE
7. DO YOU HAVE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE? ☐ YES ☐ NO
8. ARE YOU ENROLLED IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM? ☐ YES ☐ NO

C. MILITARY SERVICE

1. COMPLETE THE SCHEDULE BELOW IF YOU HAVE PERFORMED ACTIVE DUTY THAT TERMINATED UNDER HONORABLE CONDITIONS IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SERVICES: (A) ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AIR FORCE OR COAST GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES; OR (B) REGULAR CORPS OR RESERVE CORPS OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE AFTER JUNE 30, 1960; OR (C) AS A COMMISSIONED OFFICER OF THE COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY AFTER JUNE 30, 1961. IF AVAILABLE ATTACH A COPY OF YOUR DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE.

BRANCH OF SERVICE	SERIAL NUMBER	DATE OF ENTRANCE ON ACTIVE DUTY	DATE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY	LAST GRADE OR RANK	ORGANIZATION AT DISCHARGE (Div., Regt., Co., etc.)
30th. Inf.	2nd. Lt.	26/10/39	31/7/40	2nd Lt.	30th U.S. Inf.

2. (A) ARE YOU A MILITARY RETIREE (EITHER ACTIVE OR INACTIVE)? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. (B) ARE YOU A RECIPIENT OF OR HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR MILITARY RETIRED PAY (RETIRED PAY DOES NOT INCLUDE V.A. PENSION OR COMPENSATION)? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. (C) IF "YES" WERE YOU RETIRED FROM A RESERVE COMPONENT UNDER CHAPTER 67, TITLE 10 USC (FORMERLY TITLE III PUBLIC LAW 80-810)? ☐ YES ☐ NO

D. DISABILITY INFORMATION

Only applicants for total disability retirement will complete Part D.

1. WHEN DID YOU BECOME TOTALLY DISABLED? (Month) (Year)

2. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR DISABILITIES. STATE WHEN INCURRED AND HOW THEY INTERFERE WITH PERFORMANCE OF THE DUTIES OF YOUR POSITION. (ATTACH ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON PLAIN SHEET OF PAPER IF NECESSARY.)

E. OTHER CLAIM INFORMATION

1. (A) HAVE YOU EVER RECEIVED OR MADE APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ACT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

1. (B) IF "YES" STATE THE NUMBER OF YOUR COMPENSATION CLAIM AND THE PERIOD IN WHICH YOU RECEIVED COMPENSATION

CLAIM NUMBER	FROM (Month) (Day) (Year)	TO (Month) (Day) (Year)

2. (A) [illegible] ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. (B) [illegible] ☐ RETIREMENT ☐ REFUND ☐ [illegible]

3. (A) [illegible] ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. (B) [illegible] ☐ RETIREMENT ☐ REFUND ☐ [illegible]

4. (A) [illegible] ☐ YES ☐ NO

CONSIDER THE MATTER CAREFULLY. NO CHANGE WILL BE PERMITTED AFTER AN ANNUITY HAS BEEN GRANTED. IF YOU WANT AN ANNUITY WITH A SURVIVOR BENEFIT, BE SURE TO GIVE THE OTHER INFORMATION CALLED FOR.

F. TYPES OF ANNUITY: MARRIED APPLICANT ONLY

1. ☐ **ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO WIDOW OR WIDOWER**

SPECIFY THE PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU WANT USED AS THE BASE FOR YOUR WIDOW'S (OR WIDOWER'S) SURVIVOR ANNUITY

If you want all your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the word "all" in the box below. If you want only part of your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the yearly amount of your annuity you want used.

$ ALL

THE SURVIVOR'S ANNUITY WILL BE 55% OF ALL OR WHATEVER PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU SPECIFY AS THE BASE FOR HER (OR HIS) BENEFIT.

- If you are married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in F. 2.
- The annuity payable to you during your lifetime will be reduced by 2½% of any amount up to $3,600 a year used as the base for the survivor benefit, plus 10% of any amount over $3,600 so used.
- If you retire for total disability before age 60 and get a guaranteed minimum disability annuity, you may use all or any part of your "earned" annuity as the base for the survivor benefit. You cannot use any extra annuity which may be payable to make up the guaranteed minimum annuity.
- If your wife (or husband) should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies or remarries.

2. ☐ **ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT**

(I do not desire my wife (or husband) to receive a survivor annuity benefit after my death.)

- If you choose this type, your wife (or husband) cannot be paid a survivor annuity after your death.
- This type provides annuity payments to you only.

G. TYPES OF ANNUITY: UNMARRIED APPLICANTS ONLY (Including Widowed and Divorced)

1. ☐ **ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT**

- If you are not married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in G. 2.
- This type provides annuity payments to you only.

2. ☐ **ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO NAMED PERSON HAVING AN INSURABLE INTEREST**

SPECIFY THE NAME, RELATIONSHIP AND DATE OF BIRTH OF THE PERSON YOU WISH TO RECEIVE THE SURVIVOR ANNUITY

NAME OF PERSON *(First, middle, last)*	
RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH *(Mo., day, yr.)*

SEE UNMARRIED EMPLOYEES UNDER INFORMATION REGARDING SURVIVOR ANNUITIES ON THE ATTACHED INFORMATION SHEET FOR EXPLANATION OF REDUCTION IN YOUR ANNUITY

- This type is available to all retiring *unmarried* employees who are *in good health.*
- It provides a reduced annuity to you and a survivor annuity to the person named as having an insurable interest.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies.
- The survivor's annuity will be 55% of the reduced annuity you receive.
- If you choose this type, you will have to undergo a medical examination which will be arranged by the Director of Personnel at no cost to you.
- If the person named as having an insurable interest should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.

H. CERTIFICATION OF APPLICANT

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or wilful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both (18 U.S.C. 1001).

I hereby certify that all statements made in this application are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

10 Dec., 1970.
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT)

I. FOR OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY

Contract Service — Tierney K. Benadum (P)

Date	Action	Compensation	GS Equivalent
30 Oct 60	Hired as a Career Agent with LPAs, PSIs and Civil Service Retirement.	13,730	GS-15/1
27 April ~~18 Oct~~ 62	PSI	14,055	GS-15/2
14 Oct 62	LPI	15,045	GS-15/2
26 Apr. 63	PSI	15,525	GS-15/3
5 JAN 64	LPI	16,695	GS-15/3
26 Apr 64	PSI	17,210	GS-15/4
5 July 64	LPI	18,170	GS-15/4
10 Oct 65	LPI	15,825	GS-15/4
24 Apr 66	PSI	19,415	GS-15/5
3 Jul 66	LPI	19,978	GS-15/5
24 Sep 67	Contract terminated	19,978	GS-15/5
25 Sep 67	Career Agent with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs.	19,978	GS-15/5
8 Oct 67	LPI	20,856	GS-15/5
21 Apr 68	PSI	21,469	GS-15/6
14 Jul 68	LPI	23,075	GS-15/6
13 Jul 69	LPI	25,189	GS-15/6
24 Aug 69	Designated participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.		
28 Dec 69	LPI	26,700	GS-15/6
19 Apr 70	PSI	27,463	GS-15/7
10 Jan 71	LPI	29,099	"

ORIG: JAStrassberger
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 7 December 1970

TOTAL COPIES: 15-1

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: Zef PER: ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH-8 INFO: FILE, VR. 1 CCS-2, OP-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 08DEC70 12 17Z CITE DIRECTOR 092724

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4904 (IN 212197)

B. DIRECTOR 086503

PLEASE PROVIDE FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF JEREMY K. BENADUM'S FAMILY BUSINESS, AND TITLE OF [illegible] POSITION HE OCCUPIED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: a. Concurrence to proposed employment summary.

b. Proposed employment summary.

TELECOORD: CCS/DF Gordon Woll

COORD: C/WH/1

C/WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENIHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION　CLASSIFIED MESSAGE　TOTAL COPIES　ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN

SECRET
(When Filled In)

☐ INDEX　☐ NO INDEX

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

FILE, VR

150

SECRET 301315Z NOV 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4950

30 NOV 70 21642
A

DIRECTOR

ADMIN/CONTRACTS

REF: HMMS-7036

1. HAVE JUST RECEIVED REF WHICH FORWARDED RETIREMENT APPLICATION. JEREMY K. BENADUM IS PRESENTLY AWAY ON LEAVE AND WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL 5 DEC. HE WILL COMPLETE FEPA AT THAT TIME AND WE WILL INCLUDE IN SUBSEQUENT POUCH.

2. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THIS PROCESSING HAS BEEN DELAYED SINCE WE HAD REQUESTED PROCESSING IN JUNE 1970. WE ASSUME THAT THIS DELAY WILL IN NO WAY AFFECT OUR PLANS TO RETIRE BENADUM ON 31 DEC 1970. GP-1

1 DEC 1970

SECRET

When [illegible] call Mr. [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: WSRenehan:md
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 1 December 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____ PER ____ #

CONF:

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 1 DEC 70 22 45z CITE DIRECTOR 090837

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 4950 (IN 236442)

AND HQS FORESEES NO DELAY IN BENADUM'S RETIREMENT AS PER SCHEDULE.

1. PARA 2 REF EFFECTIVE DATE 31 DECEMBER 1970 CORRECT

2. WHEN PARA 1 REF FORM SIGNED PLEASE ADVISE NUMBER AND DATE TRANSMITTAL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Advised Station has received retirement application for Jeremy K. BENADUM, and assumed delay will not effect Station plans to retire BENADUM on 31 Dec 1970.

TELECOORD: OP/RAD-Mr. M. Benthall

COORD: C/WH/1

WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 17-1 | ROUTING AND OR INITIALS SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 7L PER ______ #

ACTION CH-8 | INFO FILE, VR CCS-2, OF-2, OP-2

ACTION NO. 639

SECRET 231506Z NOV 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4584 23 NOV 212197

DIRECTOR

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: DIRECTOR 303903

1. CONCUR EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY PER PARA 1 REF.

2. ALLOTTEE DESIGNATED: WELLS FARGO BANK,
464 CALIFORNIA ST., SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. ACCT. 333361. GP-1

SECRET

Copy sent to [illegible] [illegible] 30 Nov [illegible]

24 NOV 1970

SECRET

14-00000

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

Retirement Application and Related Information - Jeremy K. BENADUM

Reference: HMMT-10467

1. Since Jeremy K. BENADUM has expressed a desire to retire in December 1970, he should complete and return to Headquarters the attached Application for Retirement form. He may have his annuity checks sent directly to his bank for deposit if he wishes. This should be arranged with whatever bank is designated under Item 4 on the application. His checking account number should be recorded following the name of the bank. Items B-1 through B-4 may be left blank to be filled in at Headquarters. Since Subject's annuity will begin on the first day of the month following retirement, it is considered advantageous to make his retirement effective as of the last day of the month. In this way his annuity would commence the day following his last day as an employee.

2. When BENADUM retires, his regular Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (without accidental death and dismemberment benefits) will be continued at the same amount without further cost. The cost of the optional FEGLI, which he is eligible to continue, will be deducted from his annuity until he reaches age 65. These insurances will retain face value until BENADUM reaches age 65 at which time they will reduce at the rate of 2 per cent per month until they reach 25 per cent of their face value. If he wishes, Subject may elect at the time of retirement to convert to an individual life insurance policy in order to retain lifetime coverage in an amount equal to his present insurance. He must pay the premium applicable to the type of policy selected. A medical examination will not be required under the conversion privilege.

(continued)

Attachment:
Application for Retirement

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City

HMMS-7036

18 NOV 1970

SECRET

1 - WH/Pers
3 - ROB

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat (13 Nov 1970) 3257

AC/ROB

C/WH/Pers

C/WH/SS

3. Subject may also continue his enrollment under his health benefits plan. Premiums will continue at the same rate as that for employees and will be withheld from his monthly annuity payments.

4. Under the provisions of [illegible]HB 20-1 4c(2) Subject's prospective retirement precludes him from becoming eligible for home leave upon completion of his present tour.

5. BENADUM's request for retirement will be processed as expeditiously as possible following receipt of his completed application form. Upon approval of his retirement by Chief, JKLANCE, Subject will be notified.

/s/ Samuel F. Elsdon
for IRVING S. ONTIVEROS

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4465
DATE: 13 November 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #
CONF: WH 8
INFO
FILE, VR. CCS 2, CF-2, CP-2

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 13 NOV 70 23 22z CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY 086503

ADMIN CONTRACTS

16 NOV 1970

REF: FN 20-99

1. HQS PROPOSES FOLLOWING EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR JEREMY K. BENADUM. PLEASE ADVISE COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE.

A. ACTUAL EMPLOYERS TO DATE OF JKLANCE CONTRACT.

B. FOR PERIOD JKLANCE EMPLOYMENT 1 NOVEMBER 1960 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1970 RETIRED U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE EMPLOYED BY FAMILY BUSINESS (NAME AND ADDRESS).

2. ABOVE WILL PERMIT PAYMENT OF ANNUITY BY GOVERNMENT CHECK WHICH WILL SEND CURRENTLY DESIGNATED ALLOTTEE UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: C/WH/1
WH/FI/NOC
CCS/DF
CCS/CTS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

W. S. RENEHAN
C/WH CONTRACTS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: WSFenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 30 Oct 70

85

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER #
☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. D/OS 2, OP 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 30OCT70 17 39 CITE DIRECTOR 082587

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 4672 (IN 193185)

THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR A PRE RETIREMENT PHYSICAL; HOWEVER, COMPLETION OF TOUR PHYSICALS ARE AUTHORIZED. SEE FR 15-1. RESULTS OF PHYSICALS MUST BE FORWARDED HQS WHEN COMPLETED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Advise what portion of expenses incurred for physical exams are reimbursable.

COORD: C/WH/1
C/WH/EC/MOC
DD/PERS-SP
C/S Mr. Corrigan (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. FENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ [illegible]

TING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BY: AT: OCT 26 3 37 PM '70

DISSEM BY: PER ACTION COPY

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR OP2 OMS 2

ACTION NO. 181

S E C R E T 261940Z OCT 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4672 26 OCT IN 193185

DIRECTOR

ADMIN PERS

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM HAS ARRANGED TO HAVE COMPLETE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION WITH FAMILY PHYSICIAN IN SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF DURING PERSONAL TRIP THERE IN LATE OCT 70. HE HAS ASKED WHAT PORTION OF EXPENSES THEREFOR ARE REIMBURSABLE BY JKLANCE.

2. STATION CAN FIND NO INFORMATION ON PRE-RETIREMENT PHYSICALS. HEADQUARTERS GUIDANCE IS REQUESTED. GP-1

S E C R E T

27 Oct 70

SECRET

S E C R E T

MEXICO CITY

15 21 23 SEP 70

CITE DIRECTOR 067963

1. CONTRACT LIFE INSURANCE REFUND IN THE AMOUNT OF $48.00 DUE JERRY K. BENADUM FOR PAY PERIOD 23 AUGUST THROUGH 19 SEPTEMBER 1970, PAY AND T/A TO HEADQUARTERS THE SUM OF $1,470.23.

2. NET DUE BENADUM WILL BE $1,422.23 EACH PAY PERIOD THEREAFTER.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/1

17 SEP 1970

C/WH/[illegible]

C/[illegible]

C/[illegible]

14-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1	3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	
BY: ____ AT: ____	INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO	
	CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.	
	X-REF TO CS FILE NO.	
DISSEM BY 23 PER ____	☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____	
ACTION UNIT WH8	INFO FILE, VR CCS 2, CSPS, OP 2, FI 2	
ACTION NO. 486		

S E C R E T 272327Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3778

DIRECTOR

ADMIN CONTRACTS

27 JUL [illegible] 130647

M

REF: HMMS-6919

1. IT IS STATION UNDERSTANDING THRU LNPURE THAT EMPLOYEE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE ALLOWANCES, E.G., QUARTERS AND EDUCATIONAL, WHILE IN A LEAVE STATUS UNTIL DATE OF RETIREMENT BUT THAT EMPLOYEE UNDER THEIR SYSTEM NOT ALLOWED TO TAKE ANNUAL LEAVE IN LIEU OF LUMP SUM PAYMENT.

2. HOWEVER, JEREMY K. BENADUM IS RETIRING UNDER JKLANCE SYSTEM, AND SHOULD STATION DECIDE TO RETIRE HIM AS OF 31 DEC 70, WOULD HE BE ELIGIBLE FOR BOTH QUARTERS AND EDUCATIONAL ALLOWANCES THRU THIS DATE?

3. STATION REQUIRES ANSWER TO PARA 2 BEFORE ADVISING BENADUM OF OUR DECISION. GP-1

S E C R E T

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: ADMIN/RETIREMENT
Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMT-10467, 14 August 1970

1. Although we are certain that the following information is available at Headquarters, Jeremy K. BENADUM has requested that it be brought to the attention of the Retirement Office.

2. At the time of his retirement from LNERGO, 31 October 1960, he was paid $3,177.40 for annual leave accrued. This money was then turned over to JKLANCE via a check written on 5 September 1961. Income Tax charges had already been deducted from this total.

Dexter E. ROSTEDT

11 SEP 1970 [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig & 2cc: C/WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMT-10486

DATE: 31 August 1970

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WH Division
ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Jeremy K. BENADUM, Retirement

Action Required: Para 3
Reference : HMMT-10,467, Para 3

1. Reference indicated: Jeremy K. BENADUM advises his present plans call for his residing in the U.S. for a period of six months each year; he plans to return to the U.S. after 31 December 1970 and has asked the Station about reimbursement for the travel for himself and his family.

Ref asked whether return travel is authorized.

2. FR 22-2 provides: "Upon retirement while assigned abroad, ..., travel and transportation expenses from the last post of assignment to the place where the employee will reside in the U.S., ..." FR 22-21 specifies the time limit within which travel must be performed.

The above does permit BENADUM to be reimbursed for travel of self and authorized dependents after his retirement (31 Dec 70) to the place in the U.S. where he will reside.

3. STATION ACTION:

It is suggested BENADUM be asked to submit a written request for transmittal to Headquarters in which he cites the place in the U.S. where he will reside, the names of the dependents who will travel with him, mode of travel and, if known, the itinerary.

Upon receipt of the above, Headquarters will process a Request for Travel Orders and, upon approval, will advise the Station.

Norman E. PATERSILL

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

HMMS-6960

28 AUG 1970

S E C R E T

1-OP/CPD
1-WH/B&F
1-WH/FI/ROC
1-WH/1
1-WH/Registry
1-WH/Contracts

WH/Contracts WSRenehan be (24 Aug 70) 4460

C/OP/CPD

C/WH/B&F

C/WH/1

WH/FI/ROC

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Jeremy K. BENADUM - Retirement

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMS-6919

1. After careful review at the Station and discussions with Jeremy K. BENADUM, we have concluded that the most amicable and efficient separation date for BENADUM would be 31 December 1970. In our review of costs, we find the additional benefits to BENADUM result primarily from his additional two months of service increasing his retirement benefits.

2. Based on this decision we plan on having him begin leave on 14 August 1970 and are therefore submitting the following papers as requested in reference.

a) Attached is the signed original copy of an amendment contract which provides for his participation in the Organization Retirement Program.

b) A memo prepared by BENADUM requesting approval for him to retire 31 December 1970, and which is concurred in by the Chief of Station.

c) A statement in lieu of a copy of his discharge papers. As outlined in this statement, BENADUM indicates he never received an official discharge.

d) A report of cover earnings for the period 1 May 1969 through 30 June 1970. BENADUM's statement indicates he has received no income, either in dividends or salary, from his cover company since 30 April 1969.

3. BENADUM has indicated his present plans call for him residing in the U.S. for a period of six months each year. He plans to return to the States after 31 December 1970 and has queried the Station regarding reimbursement for return travel to the U.S. for himself and family. In future correspondence please indicate whether return travel is authorized.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/atts. herewith

Dexter E. ROSTIDT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-10,467	11 August 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

Mr. Jeremy K. Benadum

Dear Mr. Benadum:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 30 October 1960.

The purpose of this amendment is to formally record your official designation as a participant in the Retirement and Disability System of this organization, effective 24 August 1969. Your contributions into the Retirement and Disability Fund will be deducted by this organization as of that date. The regulations governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interest. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, you are hereby notified of your right to appeal. An appeal with reasons therefor must be received in this organization within thirty (30) days from the date of your acknowledgment of this contract amendment.

Effective close of business 23 August 1969 all contractual reference to Civil Service Retirement and your contributions thereto is deleted.

Social Security contributions required by virtue of your cover employmen will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

All other terms and conditions of this contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

APPROVED:

Jeremy K. Benadum

Jeremy K. Benadum

BY ______________________________

Contracting Officer

Mexico, D.F.
31 July, 1970

To: COS
From: Jeremy K. Benadum
Subj.: Retirement request

Writer herewith requests that his retirement date be established as 31 December, 1970.

CONCUR:
Roger T. KINGMAN

Mexico, D.F.
31 July, 1970

To: COS
JKB From: Jeremy K. Benadum
Subj.: Military Service

Upon graduation from Pomona College, Claremont, California, in June, 1936, writer was commissioned as 2nd Lt. of Infantry. On October 25, 1939, writer went on active duty under the Thomason Act, being assigned to duty with the 30th U.S. Infantry, with headquarters at the Presidio, San Francisco, California. He remained on active duty until 30 July, 1940, at which time he reverted to reserve status. Writer remained in this status, with the rank of 1st Lt. until 1942, at which time all reserve officers in the FBI were requested to resign their commissions. The latter was done under an arrangement between the Defense Dept. and the FBI. Writer has never received a discharge, so is unable to produce same.

Mexico, D.F.
31 July, 1970

To: COS
From: Jeremy K. Bonadum
Subj.: Cover Earnings

This is to advise that writer has received no income, either in dividends or salary, from his cover company since 30 April, 1969.

SECRET

2/10/7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM, Terminal Annual Leave

REFERENCE : HR 20-30 c (4)

1. It is requested that approval be granted for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent, to use accumulated annual leave prior to his retirement on 31 December 1970.

2. BENADUM has been assigned PCS to Mexico City since his employment in October 1960 and will retire in place. He has a maximum leave carryover of 560 hours plus leave accrued during 1970. BENADUM's request that he be permitted to use accrued annual leave in lieu of a lump-sum payment was endorsed by the Mexico City Station.

3. The Chief of Station, prior to departure for Mexico, recommended that BENADUM's request be approved. This was based on operational considerations which are in the best interests of the Agency for there to be an amicable separation when BENADUM retires.

4. The WH Division recommends favorable consideration be accorded this request.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET [illegible]

SUBJECT: Jeremy K. BENADUM, Terminal Annual Leave

CONCUR:

/s/ G. Droller

DDP/NSP

APPROVED:

/s/ H. B. Fisher

Director of Personnel

21 JUL 1970

DDP/WH/Contracts:WSRenehan:md (20 July 1970)

Distribution: Orig - WH/Contracts
1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/NSP
1 - CPD
1 - WH/1

3 [illegible] 70

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Clandestine Service Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Promotion Review of Career Agents

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject, dated 17 July 1970

1. Western Hemisphere Division has completed its review of GS-14 and above career agents. Bruce H. FERNALD, who is currently serving in Mexico City, has not been included in this review since he is home-based in the Soviet Bloc Division.

2. Attached are NSP Data Sheets on our four career agents in this GS-equivalent bracket, a ranking of these agents, and a promotion nomination for Benjamin A. LONGINO.

(Signed) William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachments

cc: DDP/NSP

DDP/WH/FI/EXO:J. Di Stefano:mj (30 Jul 70)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/NSP
1 - WH/EXO
1 - WH/SS
1 - WH/CTS
1 - WH/FI/NOC

SECRET

WH DIVISION RANKING OF GS-14 CAREER AGENTS

		Last Promotion
1.	Benjamin A. LONGINO *	May 1963
2.	Henry J. SLOMAN	December 1965

WH DIVISION RANKING OF GS-15 CAREER AGENTS

		Last Promotion
1.	Douglas J. FREAPANE	December 1968
2.	Jeremy K. BENADUM **	October 1960

---

* Nominated for promotion

** Scheduled for retirement 31 December 1970

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 28 July 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 24 PER: #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH-5 INFO FILE, VR, CCS-2, CS/5, CO/2, FE-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 2021 27z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY 054685

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 3778 (IN 130647)

B. HMMS-6919

1. EXCEPTION APPROVAL TO PERMIT USE OF ACCRUED LEAVE IN LIEU LUMP-SUM PAYMENT, WAS GRANTED ON BASIS OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS CITED PARA 2 REF B.

2. ASSUMING BENADUM'S ELIGIBILITY TO RECEIVE ALLOWANCES FOR PERIOD PARA ~~2 REF A (REMAINS~~ IN PLACE, CHILDREN ENTERED IN SCHOOL) HE THEREFORE ENTITLED RECEIVE THE ALLOWANCES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: A Should Station decide to retire BENADUM as of 31 Dec 70, would he be eligible for allowances thru that date.
B. BENADUM - Retirement; Report of Cover Earnings.

COORD: C/WH/1

OP/CPD

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 23. PER ______

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

1	
2	
3	55
4	1
5	C
6	
7	
8	D

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR CCS 2, CSPS, CP2, FI 2

ACTION NO. 486

S E C R E T 272327Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3778

DIRECTOR

ADMIN, CONTRACTS

27 JUL 70 I 30647 m

REF: HMMS-6919

1. IT IS STATION UNDERSTANDING THRU LNPURE THAT EMPLOYEE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE ALLOWANCES, E.G., QUARTERS AND EDUCATIONAL, WHILE IN A LEAVE STATUS UNTIL DATE OF RETIREMENT BUT THAT EMPLOYEE UNDER THEIR SYSTEM NOT ALLOWED TO TAKE ANNUAL LEAVE IN LIEU OF LUMP SUM PAYMENT.

2. HOWEVER, JEREMY K. BENADUM IS RETIRING UNDER JKLANCE SYSTEM, AND SHOULD STATION DECIDE TO RETIRE HIM AS OF 31 DEC 70, WOULD HE BE ELIGIBLE FOR BOTH QUARTERS AND EDUCATIONAL ALLOWANCES THRU THIS DATE?

3. STATION REQUIRES ANSWER TO PARA 2 BEFORE ADVISING BENADUM OF OUR DECISION. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

NON-STAFF PERSONNEL DATA SHEET	24 July 1970

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. SUBMIT FOR:
A. CONTRACT EMPLOYEES (TYPE A, B AND CAREER)
B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT OR MOC (US CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS ONLY)
2. THIS FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR OPERATIONAL OR FIELD AGENTS
3. COPIES OF THE FORM WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ORIGINATING COMPONENT (NUMBER OF COPIES AT ITS DISCRETION) AND BY CSPS/AGENT BRANCH (1 COPY ONLY)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE) BENADUM, Jeremy K. (P)			SEX Male	DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug 1915
MARITAL STATUS Married	NO. DEPENDENTS 6	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1917, 48, 50, 51, 57, 59	NATIONALITY U. S. A.	LAST MEDICAL EXAM 18 July 1961
DATE OF LATEST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL CSA, 22 December 1960		JOB TITLE Ops Officer		COMPONENT DDP/WH/1

CONTRACT CATEGORY Career Agent	EFFECTIVE DATE 30 Oct 1960	EXPIRATION DATE Indefinite	SALARY $27, 463	GRADE EQUIVALENT GS-15/7	PROJECT OR FAN # 1135-1014

BENEFITS	YES	NO
SOCIAL SECURITY		X
FECA DEATH AND DISABILITY	X	
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE	X	
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT	X	
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERCIAL CIA ANNUITY	X	
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		X
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE	X	
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS	X	
OTHER (EXPLAIN) Legislative Pay Increases		

NON-CIA EDUCATION

1936 Pomona College, California, A. B., Political Science
1939 Stanford University Law School, LL. B., Law
1940 FBI Academy

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

DATES FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
1939-40	U. S. Army			
1940-60	FBI	Mexico (1951-60) Peru (1943-47)	Legal Attache	$13, 000

CIA TRAINING

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (BEGINNING WITH EOD)

DATES FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR CAT.	LOCATION	PROJECT	SALARY	GRADE EQUIV.
Oct 60	Ops Officer (Career Agent)		Mexico	LITEMPO	13, 730	15
Apr 66	"		"	"	19, 415	"
Jun 70	"		"	"	27, 463	"
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		

None.

COVER

A. PRESENT COVER IS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NON-OFFICIAL

DIVISION EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY:

On comparison to official Station cover, and for the type of work that Subject has been engaged in, the cover is good. His cover is that of a retired former FBI employee ("rentista" in Mexico). He is an investor in a Mexican business firm and has properties in the United States which he manages from Mexico. Subject is also independently wealthy. Subject is known to be a CIA asset in high Mexican Government circles.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE:

The Station has consistently rated Subject's performance as "strong".

ADAPTABILITY (SUBJECT AND FAMILY) TOWARDS DUAL LIFE

Subject and his family have adapted completely to a dual life. Subject works full-time for CIA and there is no conflict of interest with regard to his work for us. (Subject has been employed in this same position for approximately ten years.) Subject's wife has a full schedule of activities surrounding her family and community. She is discreet and is not the type of woman who feels that she has to know and approve of her husband's every move.

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☐ NON-OFFICIAL (GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)

N/A. Subject has had the same cover and position since originally hired by the Agency. Prior to Agency employment, he was employed by the FBI in Mexico.

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

N/A. Subject will retire from Agency employment this year.

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

There are no plans to use Subject's services after his retirement.

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

EOD: ?

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BENADUM, Jeremy K. (P)

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: Aug 1915

5. CONTINUOUS COMP. DATE: ?

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married

7. DEPENDENTS (Excluding employee): NO. 6 — YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 1950 1917 1948 1950 1951 1957

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA — SPOUSE: ?

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS

MEMBERSHIP

OTHER STATUS: Ineligible

10. LAST MED. RPT.: Jul 1961

QUAL. FOR: Prop Assign

AVAIL. FOR: Prop Assign

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS — NONE: X — SERVICE — GRADE — ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1 — RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2 — TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3 — RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

?	Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt
19 ?-60	FBI - 20 years

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

Spanish - S,W,R Fluent
German - S,R Slight
French - S,R Slight

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

None

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Oct 1960	CE Ops Off (Career Agt)	$13730	GS15	DDP/WH/LITEMPO	Mexico City
Apr 1966	" " " " "	$13615	15	" " "	" "

20. DATE REVIEWED: 19 Sep 1967

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: ha

22. ITEMS 1 TO 19 REVIEWED BY EMPLOYEE: No

FORM 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	**BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)**

NAME (Last-First-Middle) BENADUM, Jerome V., (P)	DATE OF BIRTH Aug 1915

23. No Fitness Report in Official Personnel Folder. Subject's EOD date as CA is Oct 1960.
No Photo Available.

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

27. DATE REVIEWED 19 Sep 1962	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hc

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1000 (PART 2)
1 FEB 61 WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM
[illegible]

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT ADMIN/PERS
Transmittal of Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report - Jeremy K. BENADUM

Lynn Sparks

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith are three copies of a Memorandum in lieu of a Fitness Report on Jeremy K. BENADUM.

Dexter E. ROSTEDT

Attachment:
Memorandum h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-10432	DATE 21 July 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

21 July 1970

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Cover Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM

During the past three months I have had the opportunity to work with and direct the activities of Jeremy K. BENADUM. Within a few months he will be retired from further service and it is appropriate now to review his past performance and present status in order that this remain a permanent part of his record.

BENADUM, during the past ten years, has performed as the outside case officer for the LITEMPO Project. He was pressed into service after resigning his position with LNERGO, for whom he worked for a period of twenty years. His primary value to the Station, at that time, was his access to persons of all-levels within the Mexican Government and especially the Mexican Security Service. On further investigation it became clear it was his close personal and official relationship with LITEMPO-1 which offered him this access across the board. Gradually over the years he developed a similar relationship with LITEMPO-12, LITEMPO-4 and others.

His past evaluations are still valid, however, during the past three months he has gradually been phased out of liaison contacts and has been used principally to assist the Station in its orderly liaison transition. He is currently in touch with two liaison types officially but occasionally sees others on a purely social basis.

Although his retirement is not voluntary, he has good-naturedly assisted the Station in this very sensitive and delicate changeover. He will remain in Mexico after his retirement and has offered his assistance if needed. He presents no overriding handling problem, reports promptly and does a good job in submitting his monthly accountings.

Dexter E. Rostedt

S-E-C-R-E-T

Date 20 August 1962

Career Agent Biographic Data

a. Pseudonym of agent: BENADUM Jeremy K. Staff or Division: WHD
Last First MI

b. Date and place of birth: 24 August 1915, Omaha, Nebraska

c. Marital status: Married

d. Relationship and years of birth of dependents: Wife, born 31 Jan 1917, San Francisco, California--dau born 17 Sept 1948, San Mateo, Cal.--dau born 6 Mar 1950, San Mateo, Cal.--dau born 14 Jul 1951, San Francisco, Cal--son born 16 Aug 1957, Mexico, D.F.--dau born 19 Sept 1959, Mexico, D.F. -- dau born October 1961, Mexico, D.F.

e. Citizenship of agent: USA
(1) If naturalized, when?

(2) If naturalized, where?

g. Non-CIA education to include name and location of college, degrees, dates, and major:
Pomona College, Claremont, California, A.B. 1936, Political Science
Stanford Univ Law School, LL.B. 1939, Law
FBI Academy, August, September 1940

h. Military service Thomason Act Training, Infantry School, Oct 1939-July 1940
(1) Country served and years:

(2) Branch of service and rank:

i. Non-CIA employment: kinds of business or profession, positions, salaries, locations, and dates:
FBI - Aug 1940-Sept 1960, GS-14, $13,000/year when resigned.
Assistant Legal Attache, US Embassy, Lima, Peru, 1943-45
Legal Attache same post, 1946-47
Assistant Legal Attache, Mexico City, 1951-60
Deputy to Legal Attache 1957-60

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 2)

j. Dates of psychological assessment, professional and language aptitude tests, if applicable:

Not applicable

k. Languages, including English, using the following terms: Elementary, Intermediate, High, Native

Language	Reading	Writing	Speaking
Spanish	high	high	high
English	native	native	native
German	intermediate	none	intermediate
French	elementary	none	elementary

l. Agency training:

Subject Covered	Duration of Course	Years Taken
not applicable		

m. Alias or pseudonym used for psychological assessment, testing or training, if applicable:

not applicable

n. Security clearance number: **CSA, 22 December 1960 - S-11403**

o. Date of last LCFLUTTER: **None**

p. Contract provisions: (Underline One)

(1) Provision for periodic step increases [✓ Yes] No
(2) Provision for legislative pay increases [✓ Yes] No
(3) Provision for total offset of cover income [✓ Yes] No
(4) Provision for civil service retirement [✓ Yes] No
(5) Any unusual provisions (please specify)

S-E-C-R-E-T

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 3)

q. Date of beginning of current tour: 30 October 1960

r. Previous CIA employment:

Years	Type of Cover	CIA Duties	Project	City	Salary
None					

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM, Terminal Annual Leave

REFERENCE : HR 20-30 c (4)

1. It is requested that approval be granted for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent, to use accumulated annual leave prior to his retirement on 31 December 1970.

2. BENADUM has been assigned PCS to Mexico City since his employment in October 1960 and will retire in place. He has a maximum leave carryover of 560 hours plus leave accrued during 1970. BENADUM's request that he be permitted to use accrued annual leave in lieu of a lump-sum payment was endorsed by the Mexico City Station.

3. The Chief of Station, prior to departure for Mexico, recommended that BENADUM's request be approved. This was based on operational considerations which are in the best interests of the Agency for there to be an amicable separation when BENADUM retires.

4. The WH Division recommends favorable consideration be accorded this request.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Jeremy K. BENADUM, Terminal Annual Leave

CONCUR:

W/G. Droller
DDP/NSP

APPROVED:

/s/ H. B. [illegible]
Director of Personnel

21 JUL 1970

DDP/WH/Contracts:WSReneban:md (20 July 1970)

Distribution: Orig - WH/Contracts
1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/NSP
1 - CPD
1 - WH/1

14-00000

SECRET

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LITEMPO/Jeremy K. BENADUM - Agent Evaluation

XX

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCES : A. HMMA-32877, 28 August 1967
B. DIRECTOR-93663

1. In accordance with the request made in Reference B, the following is an up-dated Agent Evaluation on Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent and outside Case Officer for the LITEMPO Project. This evaluation should be considered in conjunction with Reference A, which is still valid and more extensive.

2. BENADUM continues to perform as the Outside Case Officer for the LITEMPO Project in a professional and efficient manner. The relationships he has developed with persons of all-levels within the Mexican Government and especially the Mexican Security Service allow him to obtain information of great interest to WOFIRM which might otherwise be unavailable. For example, via LITEMPO-12, Chief of a special investigative unit, the Station receives carbon copies of the reports prepared by the group. BENADUM also is able to ask this group to conduct investigations or provide file checks on persons of interest to the Station.

Continued.....

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - Chief, WHD

HMMA-37320

10 June 1969

SECRET

201-287227

3. BENADUM was able to establish a system whereby persons of interest to [illegible] residing in PERUMEN may obtain Mexican entry visas without the long delay usually required.

4. BENADUM writes well and has improved considerably in providing information he obtains from his contacts in written form. Usually, the reports he submits need little editing in order to be processed for dissemination.

5. This Officer speaks fluent Spanish which enables him to communicate with the persons with whom he meets in a free and easy manner. This ability certainly has assisted BENADUM in establishing the rapport and confidence so necessary in working with Latins, especially those working for the host government.

6. BENADUM presents no overriding handling problems for his Station Case Officer. He is willing to work long hours, reports promptly and does a good job in submitting his monthly accountings. Based upon the Regular Fitness Report system, this Officer could be rated as STRONG in judging his performance.

7. BENADUM is the only other Station Officer besides the COS who has good and ready access to various personages within the Mexican Government. With the departure of Willard C. CURTIS, the value of BENADUM to the Station should not be underestimated.

8. BENADUM was shown this evaluation in draft form.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOMINATION AND DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPANT
CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SECTION A

STATUS OF EMPLOYEE

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible] (OF Payroll No.)	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) BENADUM, Jeremy K.	3. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] May 1915	4. SD	5. EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY (Refer to R 20-2) Career Agent
6. CURRENT OCCUPATIONAL TITLE Operations Officer	7. GRADE GS-15 equiv.	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WH		
9. ASSIGNMENT LOCATION → ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ U.S. FIELD ☒ FGN. FIELD	10. LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE 25 October 1960	11. SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE 7 October 1939		

SECTION B

PERFORMANCE OF QUALIFYING SERVICE

1. Has this employee completed any qualifying service? ☒ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", list periods of such service below

INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)		OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED (City-Country or State)	CHECK ONE		TOTAL TIME	
MONTH/DAY/YR	MONTH/DAY/YR			PCS	TDY	MONTH	DAYS
Oct.30'60	present	Operations Officer	Mexico City	x		104	

2. Is this employee currently performing qualifying service? ☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes", complete the following:

BEGIN DATE	END DATE	OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION	PCS	TDY	MONTHS	DAYS

3. If employee was assigned in the United States during any period of qualifying service listed above, describe his duties below, pointing out those conditions which meet the requirements of QUALIFYING SERVICE.

4. Is this employee currently on official orders for a PCS assignment requiring the performance of qualifying service? ☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes", attach a certification to this effect.

5. CERTIFICATION - The information furnished above has been verified against official Agency records. Where no official record was available, a supporting statement is attached.

6. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL	7. SIGNATURE	8. DATE

Continued on Reverse Side

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C STATUS OF SERVICE AGREEMENT

(TO BE COMPLETED BY CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL)

☒ Form 3101, Service Agreement, is attached.

☐ Because of temporary absence of the nominee, Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be forwarded at a later date.

☐ (1) Nominee has over 15 years of Agency service or (2) nominee cannot be readily contacted to sign a Service Agreement. The signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" on file in the nominee's Official Personnel Folder should be accepted in lieu of Form 3101, Service Agreement.

☐ Nominee is overseas and a signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" is NOT filed in his Official Personnel Folder. Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be requested from the field upon notification that the CIA Retirement Board has recommended approval of his nomination.

SECTION D RECOMMENDATION OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE

1. Based on his career assignment and past and prospective performance of qualifying service, this employee is recommended for designation as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM. He is serving in a career field which normally requires the performance of qualifying service as an integral part of a career in that field.

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE	4. DATE

SECTION E RECOMMENDATION OF CIA RETIREMENT BOARD

1. The record of this employee has been reviewed and the CIA RETIREMENT BOARD has recommended on ____________ (DATE) that this employee:

☐ be designated as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
☐ NOT be designated as a participant

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE	4. DATE

SECTION F DETERMINATION BY DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

1. In accordance with Regulation 20-50, this employee is ☐ DESIGNATED ☐ NOT designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.	2. SIGNATURE OF DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	3. DATE

SECTION G ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

I certify that the information in
Section [illegible] is [illegible] to the best
of my knowledge.

SECRET

SECRET

20 August 1962

SUBJECT: Assessment of Career Agent, Jeremy K. BENADUM

1. Pseudonym and salary: Jeremy K. BENADUM, GS-15, $14,055.

2. Division or Staff and city: WH Division, Mexico City.

3. Operational duties: Subject maintains unofficial liaison between the Station and a Mexican Ministry. He also develops independent agents.

4. Cover: Subject has Inmigrante-Rentista status which allows him to remain in Mexico indefinitely and the only restriction on his activity is that he cannot be gainfully employed. In view of the fact he is a wealthy man in his own right and will soon be of age to collect retirement from his long service with the FBI, this cover presents no problems. After five years in this status he will obtain inmigrado status which will give him complete freedom of operation, with all the rights as a Mexican citizen, except that of voting. The cover is excellent because it is secure, allows him complete mobility, and require no administrative support. There are no existing or anticipated problems related thereto.

5. Division's assessment: Subject is an experienced, well-trained, serious intelligence officer, capable of spotting, assessing, recruiting and handling agents. Most of his experience and capability is in the field of collection of FI intelligence and operational support, the latter being his most outstanding area of contribution to Station objectives. He would also be capable of running CI operations. His knowledge of CA type work, however, cannot be assessed at Headquarters.

Subject's cover is a natural one and poses no difficulties. Since Subject has been in the intelligence field for over 20 years, he is psychologically prepared for his dual role in intelligence operations and is well qualified to operate without strong Station support.

Headquarters is not in a position to comment on the timeliness or quality of his operational reporting, but no defects in this regard have been noted nor have any been brought to the attention of Headquarters by the Station.

Subject needs no training.

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Jeremy K. BENADUM - Retirement, Report of Cover [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Reference: Mexico City 3340

1. Reference indicated Jeremy K. BENADUM had proposed an extension of his retirement from 31 October to an appropriate date in December 1970 in order for him to use his annual leave in lieu of lump sum payment.

2. Shortly before the COS left Headquarters for Mexico, a meeting was held during which the Branch Chief discussed contract personnel of the Station.

Ref was discussed and it was the COS's desire for there to be an amicable separation at the time of BENADUM's retirement. If, therefore, the extra two months would accomplish this, then the added costs would be worthwhile.

3. The following annuity figures have been provided by the Retirement Office and are predicated on a retirement date of 31 December 1970. Please keep in mind, the figures must be considered as estimates and subject to verification of service and final computations. Retirement would be under the Organization Program.

(Continued)

Attachment : As stated, herewith

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMS-6919

DATE: 22 JUL 1970

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

1-WH/1
1-WH/Registry
1-WH/Contracts
1-[illegible]

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Contracts	(WSRenehan	me (16 Jul 70)	4460

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1	16 7.70	
[illegible]	16 July 70	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/SS	21 Jul 70	Richard B. Wright

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATC

Annuity Without Survivor Benefit	$15,726 pa	$1,311 pm
Annuity With Survivor Benefit	14,424 pa	1,202 pm
Survivor Annuity (maximum)	8,649 pa	721 pm

High Three Average Salary $24,445

Creditable Service			
Service	31 yrs.	1 month	24 days
*Sick Leave Credit		2,232 hours	
Total	32 yrs.	2 months	

*Carryover into 1970	2,128 hours
Accrual in 1970	104 hours
Total	2,232 hours

(Note: The leave figures are on the basis that he has not taken any sick leave during 1970.)

4. The Retirement Office also advised that in order for BENADUM to be accorded use of his accumulated annual leave he should begin the leave on fourteen (14) August. This is based on his carryover into 1970 of 560 hours and his accrual during 1970. The figures are on the basis that no leave other than that reported to Headquarters has been taken.

5. In order to start the retirement processing, the following actions should be effected by the Station and the papers concerned returned to Headquarters, Attention, WH/Contracts.

a. Contract Amendment

Attached is the original and one copy of an amendment effective 24 August 1969 to BENADUM's contract which provides for his participation in the Organization Retirement Program.

The original and copy are to be signed by BENADUM. The copy is for Station retention.

b. Retirement Request

BENADUM is to submit a signed memo requesting approval for him to retire 31 December 1970. The request should be concurred with by the COS by the use of a concurrence line on the memo.

c. Military Service

Please obtain from BENADUM a copy of his discharge from the military service for transmittal to Headquarters. In the event he does not have the paper readily available, please do not delay transmittal of "a" and "b" above.

Upon receipt in Headquarters of the above papers, they will be processed by and thru offices concerned. The Retirement Office will, after completing service verification, etc., forward a dispatch which will provide BENADUM with detailed retirement type info including insurances.

6. Report of Cover Earnings

BENADUM's contract provides that he will submit a report of cover earnings each six months. The last report covered the period through 30 April 1969.

STATION ACTION:

Please have BENADUM submit a cover earnings report for transmittal to Headquarters for the period 1 May 1969 through 30 June 1970. The format may be the same as the report forwarded with HMMT-9712, 16 May 1970.

Norman R. PATERSILL

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT ADMIN/PERS
Transmittal of Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report - Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith are three copies of a Memorandum in lieu of a Fitness Report on Jeremy K. BENADUM.

Dexter B. ROSTEDT

Attachment:
Memorandum h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD w/att h/w

Rec'd 31 July 70
1 - WH/1
1 - WH/[illegible] [illegible] 70
[illegible] WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-10432

DATE
21 July 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER

21 July 1970

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Cover Agent Jeromy K. BENADUM

During the past three months I have had the opportunity to work with and direct the activities of Jeremy K. BENADUM. Within a few months he will be retired from further service and it is appropriate now to review his past performance and present status in order that this remain a permanent part of his record.

BENADUM, during the past ten years, has performed as the outside case officer for the LITEMPO Project. He was pressed into service after resigning his position with LNERGO, for whom he worked for a period of twenty years. His primary value to the Station, at that time, was his access to persons of all-levels within the Mexican Government and especially the Mexican Security Service. On further investigation it became clear it was his close personal and official relationship with LITEMPO-1 which offered him this access across the board. Gradually over the years he developed a similar relationship with LITEMPO-12, LITEMPO-4 and others.

His past evaluations are still valid, however, during the past three months he has gradually been phased out of liaison contacts and has been used principally to assist the Station in its orderly liaison transition. He is currently in touch with two liaison types officially but occasionally sees others on a purely social basis.

Although his retirement is not voluntary, he has good-naturedly assisted the Station in this very sensitive and delicate changeover. He will remain in Mexico after his retirement and has offered his assistance if needed. He presents no overriding handling problem, reports promptly and does a good job in submitting his monthly accountings.

Dexter E. Rostedt

14-00000

WSRenehan
WH Contracts
4460
16 July 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	SS	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	W

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH 8 FILE, VR, CO2, OF2, CCS2, CSPS/F12

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 17 20 53 z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 051189

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 3577 (IN114008)

B. HMMS-6919

POUCHING REF B ~~17~~ 22 JULY CONTAINING LEAVE AND ANNUITY INFO FOR JEREMY K. BENADUM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: a. Requested annual leave and retirement dates for Subject.

b. Transmittal of requested info.

COORD: C/WH/1

C/WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 2 July 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ____ PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

INFO: WH 8 FILE, VR, [illegible] 2 OF 2 CCS 2 CSPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 02 21 37z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 048159

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 3577 (IN 114008)

POUCHING DETAILS

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Requested annual leave and retirement dates for Jeremy K. BENADUM.

COORD: C/WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET 10
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR OP2

ACTION NO. 214

S E C R E T 010010Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3577 (PRALLETT ACTING)

DIRECTOR

ADMIN PERS CONTRACTS

1 JUL 70 114008

REF: MEXICO CITY 3540 (IN 025219)

IN ORDER FIRM UP ANNUAL LEAVE AND RETIREMENT DATES, REQUEST ANSWER TO REFERENCE SOONEST. GP-1

S E C R E T

1 JUL 1970

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 1020 1-64 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY: 23 PER ____

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 8 | INFO: FILE, VR D/OP, C/CCS 2, C/CSPS, C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 698

S E C R E T 021912Z JUN 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3340 (PRALLETT ACTING)

DIRECTOR

2 JUN [illegible] 085219

RYBAT ADMIN PERS CONTRACTS

REF: ED-7451

1. STATION DISCUSSED REFERENCE WITH JEREMY K. BENADUM WHILE BOTH UNDERSTAND HE NOT ELIGIBLE UNDER PREFERRED JKLANCE RETIREMENT UNTIL 31 OCTOBER 70. BENADUM PROPOSED EXTENSION OF RETIREMENT TO APPROPRIATE DATE IN DECEMBER 1970 IN ORDER USE 560 HOURS CARRYOVER PLUS UNUSED ACCRUAL DURING CURRENT YEAR IN LIEU LUMP SUM PAYMENT.

2. WITH HEADQUARTERS CONCURRENCE ABOVE, PLEASE FORWARD RETIREMENT PACKAGE AND ADVISE REVISED RETIREMENT DATE, DATE WHICH HE CAN BEGIN LEAVE AND ANNUITY UNDER SURVIVORSHIP PLAN.

3. BENADUM CLAIMED NEVER USED ANY SICK LEAVE AND REQUESTED CONFIRMATION BALANCE 11 JAN 70. GP-1

S E C R E T

C ____

DC ____

~~DDP~~ ____

[illegible]

Looking into problem

Career Agent

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
	BENADUM JEREMY K	WH	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
15	6	25189	042158	15	7	25909	041970	X	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 12/1/70

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

25 Mar 70

14-00000

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WH Division

ADMIN/CONTRACTS

Jeremy K. BENADUM, Quarters Allowance

Reference: HMMT-10052

1. Reference asked Headquarters guidance in determining possible adjustment in the Quarters Allowance for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent. Reference stated:

--BENADUM purchased his local residence 1 December 1964 for $50,200 and cost of utilities average $98 monthly.

--Although the current maximum Quarters Allowance for BENADUM is $4,700 per annum, the Station has been paying at the rate of $4,128.96 per annum.

--Reference forwarded a list of BENADUM's estimates of utilities costs and a LNPURE memo on personally owned quarters.

2. The formula described in Para 3 of the LNPURE memo has been used in prior cases and is that which is also used by the Allowance Committee. Based on this formula, 10% of $50,200 (original purchase price) plus $1,176 (yearly utilities), total $6,196. The amount granted BENADUM would presumably be the maximum unless the Station had determined a lesser rate was applicable due to cover or operational reasons.

3. Using the effective date (5 October 1969) of the current Quarters Allowance rate $4,700 ($4,100 plus $600 for dependents) minus the rate being paid, $4,128.96 ~~represents~~ an increase of $571.04 per year or $47.58 per month [illegible].

(continued)

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMS-6763

DATE

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

ORIGINATING

WH Contracts W. Renehan/me (19 March 70) 4460

COORDINATING

C/WH/B&F

C/WH/1

1-C/WH/B&F
1-C/WH/1
1-WH Registry
1-WH Contracts

RELEASING

AC/WH/SS George R. Thompson

DISPATCH

For the period 1 December 1964 - 31 March 1965, BENADUM was paid quarters at the rate of $4,024.92 although the maximum allowance was $3,700 per annum. For the four months, BENADUM was overpaid $108.26 ($27.07 x 4).

Presuming the project has sufficient funds and the COS decides the maximum rate is applicable, the overpayment is to be offset against the increase.

Norman R. PATERSILL

MINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ON

6 FEB 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : **Jeremy K. BENADUM**

THROUGH : Head of Career Service

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. In order to assist employees in planning for their eventual retirement, it is the practice of the Agency to notify each employee at a point in service five years prior to the date of scheduled retirement. I am, therefore, taking this opportunity to advise you that you are scheduled to retire in **August** 1975.

2. The prospect of retirement from the Agency deserves serious thought and careful planning so that you may make the transition to the next phase of life with purpose and confidence. To assist you in this regard, the Agency will make available to you various resources which are attuned to the needs of prospective retirees. In October 1970, the Agency will conduct a Retirement Information Seminar to which you will be invited. Your spouse, if you are married, may accompany you to this seminar. Following the seminar, you will be invited by the Retirement Counselor for your Directorate to an individual pre-retirement counseling session (or more than one, if you wish); this phase of retirement planning will be tailored solely to your own particular situation and circumstances and will be within the context of the retirement system under which you will retire. The individual counseling sessions are intended to give you a wide range of information on such matters as estimates of your annuity, survivor benefits, life and health insurance, Social Security, taxes, relocation and movement of household effects and assistance in obtaining other employment, if appropriate. In addition to the sessions with your Retirement Counselor, you will be invited to avail yourself of selected literature on all aspects of retirement.

3. Some persons who wish to retire voluntarily prior to the scheduled date, or who wish to commence their planning as early as possible, prefer to work with their Retirement Counselor well before the time he would normally contact them. If you believe you would benefit from such an earlier start on your personal planning, you are invited to contact the Retirement Counselor responsible for your Directorate. He is assigned from your Directorate to the Retirement Affairs Division, 212 Magazine Building in Rosslyn, on telephone extension 3328.

4. Experience has amply demonstrated that careful planning facilitates the transition to retirement. I recommend, strongly, that you avail yourself of the services the Agency offers you in planning your own retirement.

Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMIN/FINANCE
Jeremy K. BENADUM - Living Quarters Allowance

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Paragraph 3.

1. Subject purchased his local residence in Mexico City on 1 December 1964 at a cost of $[illegible] and has been residing in it since that date. Station has paid BENADUM a quarters allowance as follows:

1 December 196[illegible] to 31 March 1965 - $4,026.92 per annum
1 April 1965 to present - $4,128.96 per annum.

A review of subject's quarters accounting for the period 1 April 1968 to 31 October 1969 reflect his average monthly utilities costs at $95.00. (See Attachment A.)

2. Subject's basic quarters allowance has been as follows:

1 December 196[illegible] - $3,7[illegible] per annum
25 April 1965 - $[illegible] per annum (*)
16 July 1967 - $[illegible] per annum
14 July 1968 - $[illegible] per annum
5 October 1969 - $4,700.00 per annum.

(*) Effective date of family plan.

3. In view of separate cover attachment B received from the Embassy, Headquarters' guidance is requested in determining whether any adjustments should be made in BENADUM's quarters allowance.

for John A. [illegible]

Attachments:
A - Qtrs Acctg - H/W
B - Embassy Memo - [illegible]

Distribution:
(3) - C/WHD w/Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

DATE
[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible] 1969

To: Station

From: JKB

Subj.: PEQ EXPENSES FOR PERIOD 1 April, 1968 - 31 Oct., 1969.

Since December, 1964, when writer moved into his own home, he was not aware that receipts for utilities etc. would be necessary. As a consequence, the attached are not complete, but they are all that writer has been able to find.

1. Electricity: Receipts are complete.

2. Gas: Receipts are complete from Jan., 1969 to date. The 1968 receipts were destroyed, but the average consumption was the same.

3. Water: In writer's "colonia" there are no water meters. The cost of water, garbage collection, street lighting and cleaning etc. is included in a monthly quota which is paid to the Association of Colonos. The quota was raised in September, 1969 from 75.00 to 200.00 pesos per month.

4. Fuel Oil: Writer found only one receipt during the period in question. Two more are attached to indicate the monthly expense.

5. Firewood: Writer has contracted with an Indian with two burros to deliver wood twice each month. Each delivery is 56.00. The Indian is illiterate and receipts are not feasible.

[illegible] LIVING QUARTERS [illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
April 1968		146.86✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
May "			75.00	[illegible]	112.-
June "		108.90✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
July "			75.00	[illegible]	112.-
Aug "		105.00✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
Sept "			75.00	[illegible]	112.-
Oct "		104.00✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
Nov "			75.00	[illegible]	112.-
Dec "		103.75✓	75.00	[illegible]✓	112.-
Jan 1969		119.20✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
Feb "	130.55✓	121.95✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
Mar "		131.51✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
Apr "	102.05✓	111.35✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
May "		100.80✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
June "	100.90✓	[illegible]✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
July "		127.50✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
Aug "	100.56✓	110.45✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.-
Sept " TOTALS		46.62✓	200.00	[illegible]	112.-
Oct "					112.-
	994.35	1075.50	[illegible]	[illegible]	112.-

I CERTIFY THAT THE AMOUNTS CLAIMED [illegible] 11/12/69 PAID BY ME AS NECESSARY AUTHORIZED EXPENSES OF MAINTAINING MY LIVING QUARTERS; THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED FROM OTHER SOURCES EXCEPT AS INDICATED HEREIN; AND THAT THIS VOUCHER AND ATTACHMENTS, IF ANY, ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

MY GRADE WITH [illegible] IS 6/12. I RECEIVE ________ DOLLARS [illegible]

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS LIVING WITH ME ________

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS AWAY FROM POST ________

(X) ________ (SIGNATURE) ________ (DATE)

BALANCE: 1077.50

ATTACH ALL RECEIPTS — WILL BE [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] following [illegible]
[illegible] of which may be useful as a guide [illegible] on the [illegible]

- - -

[illegible] employee occupies personally owned quarters SF-1190 should show in Section 21 (1) the initial purchase price [illegible] Sections 21 (6) (7) and (8) should show annual rates for utilities as [illegible] by Section 132.5 of the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas). These are the only items of cost to be [illegible].

[illegible] quarters allowance system provided for [illegible] up to a predetermined maximum, the regulations [illegible] personally owned quarters should not exceed [illegible] converted to dollars at the exchange [illegible] plus allowable utilities. [illegible] taxes, depreciation, [illegible] maintenance of the [illegible] U.S. standards. Only light, fuel, and water [illegible] allowance.

[illegible] current quarters allowance system, it is expected that the [illegible] be paid unless the authorizing officer [illegible] necessary to [illegible] payment under Section 132.2 of the Standardized Regulations. The employee in personally owned quarters would be treated the same as any other (except that he cannot receive advance payment of quarters allowance under Section 113 of the Standardized Regulations). This makes unnecessary a special rate for personally owned quarters. The requirement to report the purchase price on SF-1190 is to provide the authorizing officer additional information to be considered, together with any other pertinent local circumstances, in deciding whether reduction of the allowance is necessary and, if so, how much. Only the utilities costs are to be considered in addition to the purchase price except in those rare instances where land rent is involved. Because of varying conditions between posts and individuals, it was not considered advisable to specify any certain percentage of the purchase price that should be considered.

In addition to the information on the SF-1190, the authorizing officer should consider local circumstances, which vary greatly from post to post, in deciding whether the occupant of personally owned quarters should be treated any differently than the employee in rented quarters who receives the flat rate allowance.

S/[illegible]Wallace
7/5/67

PERSONALLY-OWNED QUARTERS

Because of the number of inquires received regarding personally-owned quarters, the following memorandum which has been sent to a number of posts may be useful as a guide to our policy on the subject:

When an employee occupies personally owned quarters his SF-1190 should show in Section 21 (5) the initial purchase price as shown by the deed. Section 21 (6) (7) and (8) should show annual rates for utilities as authorized by Section 132.5 of the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas). These are the only items of cost to be considered.

When the quarters allowance system provided for reimbursement for quarters costs within a predetermined maximum, the regulations provided that the allowance for personally owned quarters should not exceed 10 percent of the purchase price, converted to dollars at the exchange rate available at the time of purchase, plus allowable utilities. The 10 percent of purchase price was ample to take care of taxes, depreciation, repairs, interest on investment, and amortization of the costs within a reasonable period of time by U. S. standards. Only light, fuel, and water could be added in arriving at the allowance.

Under the current quarters allowance system, it is expected that the flat rate will be paid unless the authorizing officer believes it necessary to reduce the payment under Section 134.2 of the Standardized Regulations. The employee in personally owned quarters would be treated the same as any other (except that he cannot receive advance payment of quarters allowances under Section 113 of the Standardized Regulations). This makes unnecessary a special rate for personally owned quarters. The requirement to report the purchase price on SF-1190 is to provide the authorizing officer additional information to be considered, together with any other pertinent local circumstances, in deciding whether reduction of the allowance is necessary and, if so, how much. Only the utilities costs are to be considered in addition to the purchase price except in those rare instances where land rent is involved. Because of varying conditions between posts and individuals, it was not considered advisable to specify any certain percentage of the purchase price that should be considered.

In addition to the information on the SF-1190, the authorizing officer should consider local circumstances, which vary greatly from post to post, in deciding whether the occupant of personally owned quarters should be treated any differently than the employee in rented quarters and receiving the flat rate allowance.

O/ALS:JWLethco
9/5/67

Jackie E. Persinger

IG: JACKIE E. PERSINGER
IT: FINANCE
T: 2135
TE: 23 DECEMBER 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
20 PER ____ P ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____________

NF: OE2 FILE, VR. WH8 DDP ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

06 15 14 Z JAN 70

CHIEF OF STATION, MEXICO CITY

000507

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM'S FLAT RATE TAX ASSESSMENT INCREASED FROM 21.9% PLUS SURTAX TO 22.9% PLUS SURTAX EFFECTIVE 14 DECEMBER 1969 FOR TAX YEAR 1970.

2. NET DUE BENADUM EACH PAY PERIOD WILL BE $1,263.26. SEE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND DEDUCTIONS FOR BREAKDOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

7 JAN 1970

C/WH/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/BF-L
C/C&TD
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (2)

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY JSS PER ________

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT OFZ

INFO FILE, VR WH8

ACTION NO. 906

S E C R E T 112302Z SEP 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1370

DIRECTOR

11 SEP 69 IN 42617

DIEARN

REF HMMS-6543

1. PLEASE ADVISE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ALLOTTEE BANK WHERE JEREMY K. BENADUM CHECK WOULD BE DEPOSITED PER REF.

2. IF CHECK NOT YET SENT, BENADUM REQUESTS THAT WE PAY LOCALLY.

3. PLS ADVISE.

4. FILE: 50-6-91/2.

S E C R E T

Cancel Agent

Ruth

12 SEP 1969

C/[illegible]/Dennis K2175

Sending cable to Mexico

telling them to pay Benadum.

and [illegible] headquarters

Benadum has no allottee on

record.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES. 12

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

G: JACKIE E. PERSINGER
IT: FINANCE
: 2125
TE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1969

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 46 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

NF: OF 2 INFO FILE. VR. WH 8

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 38732

MEXICO CITY 17 22 04z SEP 69

EF: CITE MEXICO CITY 1370** (IN 42617)

12 SEP 1969

1. TAX ASSESSMENT CHANGE EFFECTIVE 14 JULY 1969 INCREASES NET PAID BY STATION TO JEREMY K. BENADUM. IN PAY PERIOD 24 AUGUST - 20 SEPTEMBER 1969 PAY AND T/A TO HEADQUARTERS THE SUM OF $1,355.99. NET DUE BENADUM WILL BE $1,295.24 EACH PAY PERIOD THEREAFTER. SEE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND DEDUCTIONS FOR BREAKDOWN.

2. BENADUM ALSO DUE $729.40 FOR 1968 TAX REFUND. PLEASE PAY IN FIELD AND T/A TO HEADQUARTERS.

END OF MESSAGE

**SUBJECT REQUESTS LOCAL PAYMENT

S. S. Ripley
CTC PER TELECON

C/WH/

C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CATD

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

[illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

DATE:

CTC No. ____________________

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for ____________________

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee as indicated below. An acknowledged letter of tax instruction ☐ is ☐ will be forwarded.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date

2. Other payroll factors pertinent to this Covert Tax Committee tax assessment action are as follows:

/s/ [illegible] H. Luetscher
Approval Chief, CPD

Secretary, Covert Tax Committee

[illegible] 2049 SECRET [illegible] - CPD

SECRET

Mr. Jeremy K. Benadum

Dear Mr. Benadum:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 30 October 1960.

The purpose of this amendment is to formally record your official designation as a participant in the Retirement and Disability System of this organization, effective 24 August 1969. Your contributions into the Retirement and Disability Fund will be deducted by this organization as of that date. The regulations governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interest. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, you are hereby notified of your ~~right to appeal~~. An appeal with reasons therefor must be received in this organization within thirty (30) days from the date of your acknowledgment of this contract amendment.

Effective close of business 23 August 1969 all contractual reference to Civil Service Retirement and your contributions thereto is deleted.

Social Security contributions required by virtue of your cover employment will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

All other terms and conditions of this contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
/s/ [illegible]

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____
Jeremy K. Benadum

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Designation of Jeremy K. BENADUM as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. It is requested that the contract of Jeremy K. BENADUM be amended to officially record his designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System effective 24 August 1969.

2. This contract amendment will serve as BENADUM's official notification of his designation as a participant.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

SECRET [illegible]

[illegible]

ATE: 7 JULY 1969

MESSAGE FORM
[illegible]

SECRET 72

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 24 PER ____ # ____

CONF: ① F-2 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR WH-8

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY 09 10 53Z JUL 69 419031

PAY RAISE EFFECTIVE 13 JULY 1969 INCREASES NET PAID BY STATION TO JEREMY K. BENADUM. IN PAY PERIOD 29 JUNE - 26 JULY 1969 PAY AND T/A TO HEADQUARTERS THE SUM OF $1,199.98. NET DUE BENADUM WILL BE $1,254.74 EACH PAY PERIOD THEREAFTER. SEE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND DEDUCTIONS FOR BREAKDOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

10,906

WH/1 Charles M. Saunders

WH/CONT

C/WH/SB

C/WH/BF-1

C/CATD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

SECRET

12 JUN 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Audit Staff

VIA : SSA/DDS

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM, Cover Income

REFERENCES : A. Audit Staff Memo, 17 March 1969, Subject: Clarification of Cover Income

B. WHD Memo, 12 May 1969, Same Subject

1. Reference A indicated that since October 1961, Career Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM had not submitted cover income reports.

Reference B indicated that the Mexico Station had been requested to forward information in relation to Reference A.

2. Attached is a copy of the certification by Jeremy K. BENADUM in which he states he has received no compensation, allowances, or benefits in kind from cover activities for the period 1961 - 1969.

3. In view of the above certification, it is not necessary to amend BENADUM's contract to provide for retention of earned cover income in accordance with HN 20-32.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/Contracts:WSRenehan:ad (9 June 1969)

Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SSA/DDS
1 - WH/BAF
1 - WH/1
2 - WH/Contracts
1 - OF/C&TD/SAAS

SECRET

NOMINATION AND DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPANT
CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SECTION A — STATUS OF EMPLOYEE

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]

6. CURRENT OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	7. GRADE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT
Operations Officer	[illegible]	[illegible]

9. ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ U.S. FIELD ☐ FOREIGN FIELD

10. LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE: [illegible] October [illegible]

11. SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE: [illegible] October 19[illegible]

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE OF QUALIFYING SERVICE

1. Has this employee completed any qualifying service? ☐ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", list periods of such service below

INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) MONTH/DAY/YR	MONTH/DAY/YR	OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED (City-Country or State)	PCS	TDY	TOTAL TIME MONTHS	DAYS
Oct. 30 '60	present	Operations Officer	Mexico City	x			

2. Is this employee currently performing qualifying service? ☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes", complete the following:

BEGIN DATE	END DATE	OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION	PCS	TDY	MONTHS	DAYS

3. If employee was assigned in the United States during any period of qualifying service listed above, describe his duties below, pointing out those conditions which meet the requirements of QUALIFYING SERVICE.

11 JUN 1969

4. Is this employee currently on official orders for a PCS assignment requiring the performance of qualifying service? ☐ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", attach a certification to this effect.

5. CERTIFICATION - The information furnished above has been verified against official Agency records. Where no official record was available, a supporting statement is attached.

6. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL	7. SIGNATURE	8. DATE

Continued on Reverse Side

FORM 3103 SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **STATUS OF SERVICE AGREEMENT**

(TO BE COMPLETED BY CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL)

☒ Form 3101, Service Agreement, is attached.

☐ Because of temporary absence of the nominee, Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be forwarded at a later date.

☐ (1) Nominee has over 15 years of Agency service or (2) nominee cannot be readily contacted to sign a Service Agreement. The signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" on file in the nominee's Official Personnel Folder should be accepted in lieu of Form 3101, Service Agreement.

☐ Nominee is overseas and a signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" is NOT filed in his Official Personnel Folder. Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be requested from the field upon notification that the CIA Retirement Board has recommended approval of his nomination.

SECTION D **RECOMMENDATION OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE**

1. Based on his career assignment and past and prospective performance of qualifying service, this employee is recommended for designation as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM. He is serving in a career field which normally requires the performance of qualifying service as an integral part of a career in that field.

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE	4. DATE

SECTION E **RECOMMENDATION OF CIA RETIREMENT BOARD**

1. The record of this employee has been reviewed and the CIA RETIREMENT BOARD has recommended on ____________ (DATE) that this employee

☐ be designated as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
☐ NOT be designated as a participant

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE	4. DATE

SECTION F **DETERMINATION BY DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL**

1. In accordance with Regulation 20-50, this employee is ☐ DESIGNATED ☐ NOT designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.	2. SIGNATURE OF DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	3. DATE

SECTION G **ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

I certify that the information in
Section [illegible] to the best
of my [illegible].

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LITEMPO/Jeremy K. BENADUM - Agent Evaluation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCES : A. HMMA-32877, 28 August 1967
B. DIRECTOR-99663

1. In accordance with the request made in Reference B, the following is an up-dated Agent Evaluation on Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent and outside Case Officer for the LITEMPO Project. This evaluation should be considered in conjunction with Reference A, which is still valid and more extensive.

2. BENADUM continues to perform as the Outside Case Officer for the LITEMPO Project in a professional and efficient manner. The relationships he has developed with persons of all-levels within the Mexican Government and especially the Mexican Security Service allow him to obtain information of great interest to WOFIRM which might otherwise be unavailable. For example, via LITEMPO-12, Chief of a special investigative unit, the Station receives carbon copies of the reports prepared by the group. BENADUM also is able to ask this group to conduct investigations or provide file checks on persons of interest to the Station.

Continued.....

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-37320

DATE
10 June 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-287227

3. BENADUM was able to establish a system whereby persons of interest to KOFIRM residing in PBRUMEN may obtain Mexican entry visas without the long delay usually required.

4. BENADUM writes well and has improved considerably in providing information he obtains from his contacts in written form. Usually, the reports he submits need little editing in order to be processed for dissemination.

5. This Officer speaks fluent Spanish which enables him to communicate with the persons with whom he meets in a free and easy manner. This ability certainly has assisted BENADUM in establishing the rapport and confidence so necessary in working with Latins, especially those working for the host government.

6. BENADUM presents no overriding handling problems for his Station Case Officer. He is willing to work long hours, reports promptly and does a good job in submitting his monthly accountings. Based upon the Regular Fitness Report system, this Officer could be rated as STRONG in judging his performance.

7. BENADUM is the only other Station Officer besides the COS who has good and ready access to various personages within the Mexican Government. With the departure of Willard C. CURTIS, the value of BENADUM to the Station should not be underestimated.

8. BENADUM was shown this evaluation in draft form.

Willard C. CURTIS

4-00000

IG: JHMartin
NIT: WH/Contracts
T: 4460
ATE: 4 June 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 5

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. OP2, CI/A, CSPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET/RYBAT 05 20 45 z JUN 69 CITE DIRECTOR 08720

MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 0421 (IN 68828)

1. APPROVE JEREMY K. BENADUM CONTINUING IN ~~CONTRACT~~ CAREER AGENT STATUS UNTIL 31 OCTOBER 1970.

2. PROCESSING REQUEST FOR BENADUM ACCEPTANCE INTO WOFIRM RETIREMENT PROGRAM WITH RETIREMENT DATE EFFECTIVE 31 OCT 70. WILL ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-287227

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Concerning Jeremy K. BENADUM, HMMT-9712 had as attachments statement claiming no income from cover jobs.

COORD: C/WH/1

Mr. James B. Noland

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 14 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: d/ AT: 1735 Z

10H

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 13 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PRECEDENCE

ACTION c/WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, c/CCS 2, c/CSPS, DDP

451

S E C R E T 041610Z JUNE 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0486 4 JUN 69 IN 73313

d/

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN PERS

REF: MEXICO CITY 0421 (IN 68828)

5 JUN 1969

REQUEST ANSWER REFERENCE BY COB 6 JUNE AS BENADUM NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO MAKE JOB COMITMENTS TO PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYER.

S E C R E T

Answered 6/5/69

Ref. Mexico 0431

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY: DKB PER ______

ACTION: c/WH8 ☐ RID COPY

728

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (19)

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, c/CCS2, c/CSPS, D/OP

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 290032Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0421

29 MAY 69 IN 68828

DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN PERS

REFS: A. CONVERSATIONS COS MEXICO CITY HAD WITH HQS REPS 26-27 MAY

B. HMMT 9712

C. HMMT 9753

1. CONCERNING JEREMY K BENADUM REFERENCE B HAD AS ATTACHMENTS STATEMENT CLAIMING NO REPEAT NO INCOME FROM COVER JOBS.

2. REFERENCE C DATED 28 MAY 1969 HAS FOLLOWING ATTACHMENTS:

A. "SERVICE AGREEMENT" FORM SIGNED BY BENADUM

AND B. MEMORANDUM FROM BENADUM REQUESTING EFFECTIVE DATE OF HIS RETIREMENT BE 31 OCTOBER 1970 (IN ORDER TO GIVE NEW COS TIME TO BUILD RELATIONSHIPS WITH LITEMPOS AND TO GIVE BENADUM TEN YEARS OF SERVICE IN WOFIRM AND MAKE him ELIGIBLE FOR WOFIRM RETIREMENT).

3. REQUEST CABLED REPLY SINCE IF BENADUM TO BE RETIRED EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE 1969 HE MUST FIRM UP OTHER EMPLOYMENT.

SECRET

May 29 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Jeremy K. BENADUM - Retirement

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMT-9712 dated 16 May 1969

1. Reference is made to conversations COS, Mexico City, had at Headquarters on 26 May and 27 May 1969 concerning the postponement of the effective date of retirement of Jeremy K. BENADUM until 31 October 1970 in order:

a). To enable BENADUM to acquire eligibility for WOFIRM retirement; and,

b). To give the new COS, Mexico City, time to build up relationships with the LITEMPOs (the LITEMPO Project) with whom BENADUM now has excellent, close and long-standing relationships.

2. Headquarters suggested that:

a). BENADUM sign the regular "Service Agreement" form by which he requests that he become a member of the WOFIRM "Organization Retirement and Disability System"; and, that

b). BENADUM write a memorandum requesting that his date of retirement be postponed from 30 June 1969 until 31 October 1970.

3. These two forms are attached, in the original and one copy each.

4. It is requested that, after receipt and study of the attachments and the attachments sent with reference, Headquarters cable Mexico City and advise whether or not BENADUM is now to be assured that his retirement date is 31 October 1970.

Willard C. Curtis

Attachments: Herewith
Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/atts.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-9753	DATE 28 May 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 70 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH/S/BG, C/CCS 2, C/CS

#885 C/KI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2, D/DP

S E C R E T 130120Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0200

DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN LITEMPO

13 MAY 69 IN 56608

608

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 99663

B. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 53312)

1. AT TIME PROJECT LITEMPO SUBMITTED FOR RENEWAL IT NOT KNOWN THAT CURTIS RETIRING AS OF 30 JUNE 69. IT STATION'S OPINION THAT IF CURTIS AND BENADUM LEAVE SIMULTANEOUSLY (1 JULY 69), PROBERT WILL LACK TIME TO BUILD-UP RELATIONSHIP WHICH BENADUM HAS HAD FOR SOME TWENTY YEARS AND CURTIS FOR TWELVE YEARS WITH THIS VERY IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE SOURCE (AROUND FORTY PERCENT OF STATION POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND HALF CI/CE PRODUCTION) AND SUPPORT PROJECT. ALSO, SINCE CURTIS AND BENADUM ARE ONLY TWO WELL KNOWN TO LITEMPOS, THEIR JOINT DEPARTURE COULD BE MIS-INTERPRETED AND THEREBY DAMAGING TO THE STATON.

Cr. Agt.

2. FELL CURTIS DEPARTURE CHANGES PICTURE SUFFICIENTLY TO WARRANT AMENDMENT TO LITEMPO PROJECT TO ALLOW FOR RETENTION BENADUM.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: ______ PER ______ #

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0200 SECRET

3. ON OTHER HAND, STATION CONCERNED WITH TOTAL COSTS OF PROJECT. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS ADVISE STATION IF IT POSSIBLE TO AMEND BENADUM CONTRACT WHICH WOULD KEEP HIM AS CAREER AGENT, BUT AT SALARY IN HAND (AFTER RETIREMENT, FEGLI, TAX ETC.) OF ABOUT $15,000.00 PER ANNUM. POV ALLOWANCE OF $600 PER ANNUM AND NO ADDITIONAL BENEFITS, BUT WITH RIGHT ACCEPT OTHER PART-TIME
LO
EMPOLYMENT.

4. IF ABOVE POSSIBLE, WILL DISCUSS WITH BENADUM.

5. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Audit Staff

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM, Cover Income

REFERENCE : Audit Staff Memo, Dated 17 March 1969, Subject: Clarification of Cover Income Status of Career Agent, Jeremy K. BENADUM

1. Reference indicated Jeremy K. BENADUM may be receiving cover income, and requested a review be made to determine whether he should be refunding such income and whether his contract should be amended in accordance with FN 20-32.

2. The Mexico City Station has been requested to:

a. Forward Cover Earnings Reports for 1968 without delay.

b. If reports for previous years not readily available, BENADUM is to prepare and provide the Station for transmittal within a reasonable period.

c. If BENADUM has received cover earnings which have not been offset against his contract compensation, forward recommendations on amending his contract to provide retention if cover earnings in accordance with FN 20-32.

3. Upon receipt from Mexico of the requested information, the Division will take appropriate action.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/Audit Staff
1 - SSA/DDS
1 - OP/CPD
1 - O/Fin
1 - O/IG

SECRET

28 May 1969

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM - Request for Retirement

1. I herewith request that the effective date of my retirement be set as of 31 October 1970 instead of 30 June 1969.

2. This request is based primarily upon my desire to complete ten years of service in the Agency as is required by law in order to be eligible for Agency Retirement instead of being retired under Civil Services Statutes.

3. Secondly, however, I believe that by remaining in my present position until 31 October 1970 I can assure a better turn-over of contacts I have with a great deal less loss to the Agency.

4. I should appreciate a reply as soon as possible, since if my proposal is not accepted, I shall plan to accept other employment on 1 July 1969.

Jeremy K. Benadum

Jeremy K. BENADUM

SECRET

SECRET

SERVICE AGREEMENT

I understand that in order to qualify for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System, an employee must have signed a written obligation to serve anywhere and at any time according to the needs of the Organization in addition to meeting other specified criteria.

I hereby declare my intent to comply with this requirement as a condition to my being considered for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System.

In making this declaration, it is understood that the Organization will consider my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances.

Jeremy K. Beadum
Signature

28 May, 1969
Date

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMIN/PERS/Jeremy K. BENADUM - Forwarding of Documents

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCES : A. DIRECTOR-99663
B. HMMT-9686

1. In compliance with Reference A, forwarded herewith are the following:

a. Para 4c - Copy of Station memorandum to BENADUM.

b. Para 6a - BENADUM's certification regarding cover earnings for the period 15 March 1961 through 30 April 1969.

BENADUM's statement requested by paragraph 4c of Reference A was forwarded to Headquarters by Reference B.

2. As requested by paragraph 5b of Reference A, BENADUM's completed Form SF-144 is forwarded Under Separate Cover.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
1 - Station memo, h/w
2 - BENADUM Certification, h/w
3 - SF-144, U.S.C.

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - Chief, WHD, w/atts 1, 2, 3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-9712

DATE
16 May 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER

H/W ATTACHMENT #1 TO: HMMT-5712, 1 MAY 1969

7 April 1969

SUBJECT: Retirement

1. Reference is made to our conversations concerning the possibility of your retirement from our service.

2. I discussed this matter, along with all other personnel matters, while in Washington in March 1969; and the authorities indicated that they would like your retirement to become effective on 30 June 1969.

3. For your information, a drive is on to have officers over fifty years of age take advantage of the early retirement program, in order to:

a. Allow younger officers to move into active operational assignments;

b. Reduce expenses, by getting rid of the higher ranking (older) officers;

and

c. Put the early retirement program into effective use and make it customary for fifty year old officers to retire.

4. In order to carry out your retirement, I would appreciate it if you would submit your letter confirming that you are in accord with this plan to place you on retired status.

5. You should plan to dispose of the Government owned vehicle on or near your retirement date. As you know, this is accomplished by obtaining at least three bids, which you should report in writing, and then by selling to the highest bidder. Also, any contract on rental of the office-apartment you use which involves this office should be ended.

6. I regret that you will be unable to take home leave at Government expense; but regulations prohibit the payment of home leave expenses for persons within two years of effective retirement date.

7. The amount of your annual annuity, the pay allowable for your accumulated annual leave and other data relative to your retirement will be discussed in memoranda to follow.

8. I am ~~in the~~ same "boat" with you on several of the above items, if that is of any comfort.

9. Please sign this memorandum and return it to me.

Contents noted memorandum will be forwarded —

JKB

CERTIFICATION

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT COMPENSATION, ALLOWANCES OR BENEFITS IN KIND FROM THE UNDERSIGNED'S COVER ACTIVITIES COVERING THE PERIOD 15 MARCH 1961 THROUGH 30 APRIL 1969 ARE AS FOLLOWS:

CALENDAR YEAR 1961 - None
1962 - None
1963 - None
1964 - None
1965 - None
1966 - None
1967 - None
1968 - None
1969 - None (1 Jan-30 April 1969)

Jeremy K. Benadum 13 May, 1969.
JEREMY K. BENADUM (DATE)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY: 70 PER ________ #

ACTION C/WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE, VR, C/NTS/SG, C/CI 2, C/CS/S

#295 C/R/SO, C/CI, C/FI 2, D/OT

S E C R E T 130120Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0200

DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN LITEMPO

608

13 May 69 IN 56608

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 99663

B. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 53312)

1. AT TIME PROJECT LITEMPO SUBMITTED FOR RENEWAL IT NOT KNOWN THAT CURTIS RETIRING AS OF 30 JUNE 69. IT STATION'S OPINION THAT IF CURTIS AND BENADUM LEAVE SIMULTANEOUSLY (1 JULY 69), PROBERT WILL LACK TIME TO BUILD-UP RELATIONSHIP WHICH BENADUM HAS HAD FOR SOME TWENTY YEARS AND CURTIS FOR TWELVE YEARS WITH THIS VERY IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE SOURCE (AROUND FORTY PERCENT OF STATION POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND HALF CI/CE PRODUCTION) AND SUPPORT PROJECT. ALSO, SINCE CURTIS AND BENADUM ARE ONLY TWO WELL KNOWN TO LITEMPOS, THEIR JOINT DEPARTURE COULD BE MIS-INTERPRETED AND THEREBY DAMAGING TO THE STATON.

2. FEEL CURTIS DEPARTURE CHANGES PICTURE SUFFICIENTLY TO WARRANT AMENDMENT TO LITEMPO PROJECT TO ALLOW FOR RETENTION BENADUM.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0200 S E C R E T

3. ON OTHER HAND, STATION CONCERNED WITH TOTAL COSTS OF PROJECT. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS ADVISE STATION IF IT POSSIBLE TO AMEND BENADUM CONTRACT WHICH WOULD KEEP HIM AS CAREER AGENT, BUT AT SALARY IN HAND (AFTER RETIREMENT, FEGLI, TAX ETC.) OF ABOUT $15,000.00 PER ANNUM. POV ALLOWANCE OF $600 PER ANNUM AND NO ADDITIONAL BENEFITS, BUT WITH RIGHT ACCEPT OTHER PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT.

4. IF ABOVE POSSIBLE, WILL DISCUSS WITH BENADUM.

5. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE.

May 13 - Per [illegible]

S E C R E T

Currently GS-15 6 23,075 (Plus post in field)

every four weeks gross $1,774.40

Deductions

Retirement	115.34
Tax	456.75
FEGLI	14.30
Optional FEGLI	12.00
Hosp.	18.78
Add'l Life	12.00
Total Deductions	629.17

~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] in field

Plus standard 3400 [illegible] 4300

[illegible]

Net $1,145.23 x 13 per year

~~13~~ = $14,887.99

SECRET

O: Renehan/Tsikerdanos
IT: WH/Contracts
: 4460
TE: 7 May 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 10

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

NF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, CCS 2, CSPS, OP2, OF, C/WA, MPS/BG

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET/RYBAT 07 19 44z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 99663

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 47116) RYBAT

B. HMMA-36678

C. DIRECTOR 84074 RYBAT

1. IN VIEW OF SERVICE PERFORMED BY BENADUM IN THE EARLY 1960'S AND HIS ASSISTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRESENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH LIRAMA AND LITEMPOS, HQS WISHES TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS TO ENSURE AN EQUITABLE DECISION REGARDING BENADUM'S FUTURE. AS STATION WILL RECOGNIZE, REF A WHICH FOLLOWED REF B (THE PROJECT RENEWAL WHICH ABOLISHED THE POSITION HELD BY BENADUM IN MEXICO) AND FACT HQS HAS NO OTHER CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENT FOR HIS SERVICES IN MEXICO LIMITS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. AT PRESENT THERE APPEARS TWO COURSES OF ACTION OPEN:

A. TRANSFER ELSEWHERE AS A CAREER AGENT; OR

B. "DISCONTINUED SERVICE RETIREMENT" AS NOTED IN REF C SINCE BENADUM DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR WOFIRM RETIREMENT UNTIL OCTOBER 1970.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND-OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IO:
IT:
I:
TE:

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

NF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET/RYBAT

CITE DIRECTOR 99663

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 2

2. HQS BELIEVES IT BEST FOR WOFIRM AND STATION TO NOW COME TO AN AMICABLE PARTING OF THE WAY AND THEREFORE REQUESTS CURTIS' FRANK APPRAISAL OF WHAT EFFECT THE INVOLUNTARY AND POSSIBLY DISGRUNTLED RETIREMENT BENADUM WOULD HAVE ON JOHN A. PROBERT'S FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE LITEMPOS. HQS FEELS THAT THESE RELATIONSHIPS WITH WOFIRM HAVE SOLIDIFIED TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PLANS OUTLINED IN REF B ARE AN EXCELLENT MEANS OF HANDLING THESE CONTACTS.

3. HQS ALSO FEELS THAT THE DECISION REGARDING BENADUM SHOULD BE MADE PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF PROBERT AND ALL NECESSARY STEPS BE TAKEN TO EXPEDITE THIS. ACCORDINGLY, CURTIS' COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE MOST APPRECIATED.

4. IN EVENT BENADUM ELECTS TRANSFER AS CAREER AGENT ELSEWHERE HQS NEEDS FOLLOWING:

A. HAVE BENADUM COMPLETE FRQ SOONEST FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS. REASSIGNMENT PREFERENCES TO BE CABLED.

(CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

3:
T:
E:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

IP:

FILE, VR.

(classification)
SECRET/RYBAT

(date and time filed)

(elite) (pica)
(reference number)

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 3 CITE DIRECTOR 99663

B. IN ANY EVENT REQUEST COMPLETE FITNESS REPORT FOR PAST YEAR ON BENADUM, HAVE HIM SIGN AND FORWARD HQS. SOONEST. CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

C. REQUEST STATION FWD COPY MEMO OF 7 APRIL TO BENADUM WITH BENADUM'S MEMO OF 24 APRIL.

5. IN EVENT BENADUM PREFERS TO RETIRE NOW RATHER THAN BE CONSIDERED FOR REASSIGNMENT, THE ONLY METHOD IS THROUGH "DISCONTINUED SERVICE" ON BASIS JOB ABOLISHMENT.

A. RELATED REGULATIONS PROVIDE AN EMPLOYEE WHO IS INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATED IS ENTITLED TO AN IMMEDIATE ANNUITY WHEN, REGARDLESS OF AGE, HAS COMPLETED 25 YEARS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE.

B. REQUEST BENADUM'S COMMENTS AND, IN ANY EVENT, COMPLETE SF-144 "STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE AND MILITARY SERVICE" FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS ASAP.

C. ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE NOT A FACTOR IN COMPUTING RETIREMENT AS INDIVIDUAL RECEIVES LUMP SUM PAYMENT FOR CURRENT BALANCE OR

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

UO:
IIT:
T:
ATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
_______ PER _______ # _______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. _______

INF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET/RYBAT

CITE DIRECTOR 97663

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 4

CARRYOVER AT BEGINNING CURRENT LEAVE YEAR, WHICHEVER LESSER. AVAILABLE RECORDS INDICATE BENADUM CARRYOVER INTO 1969 WAS 560 HOURS.

D. ELIGIBILITY FOR HOME LEAVE CONTINGENT ON REASSIGNMENT.

6. RECENT AUDIT REPORT POINTED OUT THAT BENADUM'S COVER EARNINGS REPORTS AS REQUIRED BY PARA 9 OF HIS CONTRACT HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED.

A. REQUEST REPORTS FOR 1968 BE FORWARDED WITHOUT DELAY AND CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

B. IF REPORTS FOR PREVIOUS YEARS NOT READILY AVAILABLE, REQUEST BENADUM PREPARE AND PROVIDE STATION FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS WITHIN REASONABLE PERIOD.

C. IF HE HAS RECEIVED EARNINGS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN OFFSET AGAINST CONTRACT COMPENSATION, REQUEST STATION RECOMMENDATIONS BY DISPATCH ON AMENDING CONTRACT TO PROVIDE RETENTION OF COVER EARNINGS ACCORDANCE FN 20-32.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

RIG:
NIT:
T:
ATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET/RYBAT

CITE DIRECTOR 99663

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 5

WH COMMENTS: A. Attached
B. Submitted Project Renewal

COORD: CSAP
D/OP H.B. Fisher
C/WH/SS
C/WH/1

William V. Broe
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM S. KENEHAN
C/WH CONTRACTS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Audit Staff

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM, Cover Income

REFERENCE : Audit Staff Memo, Dated 17 March 1969,
Subject: Clarification of Cover Income
Status of Career Agent, Jeremy K. BENADUM

1. Reference indicated Jeremy K. BENADUM may be receiving cover income, and requested a review be made to determine whether he should be refunding such income and whether his contract should be amended in accordance with FN 20-32.

2. The Mexico City Station has been requested to:

a. Forward Cover Earnings Reports for 1968 without delay.

b. If reports for previous years not readily available, BENADUM is to prepare and provide the Station for transmittal within a reasonable period.

c. If BENADUM has received cover earnings which have not been offset against his contract compensation, forward recommendations on amending his contract to provide retention if cover earnings in accordance with FN 20-32.

3. Upon receipt from Mexico of the requested information, the Division will take appropriate action.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/Audit Staff
1 - SSA/DDS
1 - CF/CPU
1 - Q/Fin
1 - Q/IC
1 - [illegible]
[illegible]

WSRenehan
WH/Contracts
4460
2 May 1969

SECRET

SECRET/RYBAT

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 47116)
B. HMMA-36678

1. UNFORTUNATELY HQS ASSUMED ON RECEIPT OF REF B THAT BENADUM QUALIFIED FOR RETIREMENT UNDER THE WOFIRM RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM. HOWEVER, AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW IT WAS NOTED THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED TEN RPT TEN YEARS SERVICE WITH WOFIRM AND RETIREMENT WOULD NECESSARILY BE UNDER CIVIL SERVICE. BENADUM, AS CITED PARA 2 REF A, IS CORRECT IN THAT RETIREMENT THUS WOULD BE INVOLUNTARY. IN RETROSPECT THE STATION HAD NO AUTHORIZATION TO INFORM BENADUM HE WOULD BE RETIRED EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE, UNLESS STATION MEMO TO BENADUM CONCERNING HIS RETIREMENT WAS IN CONTEXT TO THE ABOLISHMENT OF HIS POSITION WITH THE REDUCTION OF THE LITEMPO PROJECT AND SINCE THE STATION HAD NO OTHER REQUIREMENT FOR HIS SERVICES HE MIGHT PREFER CONSIDER "DISCONTINUED SERVICE RETIREMENT" RATHER THAN TRANSFER ELSEWHERE AS A CAREER AGENT. REQUEST STATION FORWARD COPY MEMO OF 7 APRIL TO BENADUM WITH BENADUM'S MEMO OF 24 APRIL.

(CONTINUED)

SECRET/RYBAT

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 2

2. IN VIEW REFS, UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY OR WHERE BENADUM COULD BE USED AS STATION SUGGESTS IN PARA 5 REF A AS CONTRACT AGENT WHICH APPEARS CONTRADICTORY TO NO REQUIREMENT FOR SERVICES AS CAREER AGENT.

3. AS STATION HAS NO APPARENT JOB COMMENSURATE WITH BENADUM'S GRADE LEVEL AND EXPERIENCE AND IN VIEW HIS LONG STAY MEXICO, HQS THEREFORE CONSIDERING BENADUM FOR REASSIGNMENT.

A. REQUEST STATION CONTACT BENADUM AND HAVE HIM COMPLETE PRQ SOONEST FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS. REASSIGNMENT PREFERENCES TO BE CABLED.

B. REQUEST STATION COMPLETE FITNESS REPORT FOR PAST YEAR ON BENADUM, HAVE HIM SIGN AND FORWARD HQS SOONEST. CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

4. RECENT AUDIT REPORT CALLED OUR ATTENTION THAT COVER EARNINGS REPORTS AS REQUIRED BY PARA 9 OF BENADUM'S CONTRACT HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED.

A. REQUEST REPORTS FOR 1968 BE FORWARDED WITHOUT DELAY AND CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

(CONTINUED)

SECRET/RYBAT

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 3

B. IF REPORTS FOR PREVIOUS YEARS NOT READILY AVAILABLE, REQUEST BENADUM PREPARE AND PROVIDE STATION FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS WITHIN REASONABLE PERIOD.

C. IF HAS RECEIVED EARNINGS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN OFFSET AGAINST CONTRACT COMPENSATION, REQUEST STATION RECOMMENDATIONS BY DISPATCH ON AMENDING CONTRACT TO PROVIDE RETENTION OF COVER EARNINGS ACCORDANCE FN 20-32.

5. REQUEST ADVISE BENADUM:

A. ALTHOUGH AGREE THAT SHOULD HE WANT TO RETIRE, THE ONLY METHOD IS THROUGH "DISCONTINUED SERVICE" ROUTE CONSIDERING HE MAY PREFER RETIREMENT TO REASSIGNMENT. REQUEST HIS COMMENTS AND, IN ANY EVENT, COMPLETE SF-144 "STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE" FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS ASAP.

B. ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE NOT A FACTOR IN COMPUTING RETIREMENT AS INDIVIDUAL RECEIVES LUMP SUM PAYMENT FOR CURRENT BALANCE OR CARRYOVER AT BEGINNING OF LEAVE YEAR WHICHEVER LESSER. AVAILABLE RECORDS

(CONTINUED)

SECRET/RYBAT

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 4

INDICATE BENADUM HAD CARRYOVER OF 560 HOURS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: A. Attached
B. Submitted Project Renewal

COORD:
C/WH/1
CSAP
D/OP
C/WH/S3

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Jeremy K. BENADUM/Retirement

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : MEXICO CITY-0023, 29 April 1969

Forwarded herewith in original and a signed carbon is the 24 April 1969 memorandum written by Jeremy K. BENADUM and mentioned in Reference.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - Chief, WHD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-9686	DATE 30 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-287227

México, D.F.
24 April, 1969

SUBJECT: Involuntary Retirement

1. A desk officer from Headquarters visited the México City Station during mid-November, 1968. While here, the visiting officer talked with the writer for approximately one hour regarding the operation of the Litempo project and writer's plans for the future. The following points were discussed:

(a) The fact that the project was considered to be an important and successful one.

(b) Writer was specifically asked if he had any plans for an early retirement. Writer replied in the negative. The visiting officer indicated complete satisfaction with writer's desire to continue in the service, and noted that it would be particularly important in view of the upcoming change of Mexican administrations in December, 1970, and the necessity of keeping the project functioning at its current level of effectiveness.

(c) When the visiting officer asked whether the writer had ever visited Headquarters during his career with the service, and found that he had not done so, the officer asked whether writer could arrange to visit Headquarters for a week or ten days during his next home leave, which would take place in August, 1969. Writer indicated that he would be most pleased to do so.

2. Based on the foregoing, writer made plans to proceed to the United States on home leave in early August, 1969, to return in mid-September, 1969. Since such matters cannot be handled on short notice, writer has already rented a house in San Francisco, California for the period in question.

3. This is where matters stood, when, on 7 April, last, writer was advised that he would be retired, effective 30 June, 1969, in accordance with various changes of policy. He was also asked to confirm in writing that he is in accord with the plan to place him on retired status as of 30 June, next.

4. While the reasoning behind what appears to be a complete reversal of policy, vis-a-vis the writer, may be crystal clear to the responsible officials at Headquarters, writer is at a complete loss to understand.

For the writer to indicate his agreement with a plan which appears to him to be arbitrary, short-sighted and irrational, would be completely out of character for a person who has spent almost thirty years in the intelligence field, and has a justifiable pride in his status as a professional intelligence officer. As a professional, writer also realizes when the handwriting, however illegible it might be, is on the wall, and, that if the decision has already been made to retire him involuntarily, then retired he will be --- involuntarily. Little as it may matter, writer desires to emphasize that nothing in this memorandum should be construed to indicate writer's personal accord or approval.

5. According to writer's records, as of 30 June, next, he will have completed the following government service:

	Yrs.	Mos.	Days
(a) Military: 2nd. Lt., 30th U.S. Infantry; Presidio, San Francisco, 26 Oct., 1939 to 31 July, 1940..................		9	6
(b) Special Agent, 12 Aug., 1940 to 31 October, 1960.....	20	2	18
(c) Career Agent, 1 Nov., 1960 to 30 June, 1969........	8	8	
(d) Accumulated A/L as of 30 June, 1969, - 656 hrs.		3	22
Total Service	29	11	16

Writer desires to complete thirty years' service, and requests that the effective date for his involuntary retirement be set accordingly.

6. Home Leave: While writer readily understands the rationale of a ruling preventing the taking of home leave at government expense within two years of voluntary retirement, he does not see that the interests of fairness, justice or decency are being served in attempting to apply the same ruling to writer's involuntary retirement. As a matter of possible historical interest, writer desires to point out that, when he joined the service in 1960, he voluntarily gave up the home leave which he had earned with the   (3 years). Writer has

taken home leave in 1962, 1964 and 1966, in accordance with regulations. In line with what appeared to be Agency policy as of November, 1968, writer has made plans for home leave from 5 August to 15 September, 1969. Writer feels most strongly that he and his family should be allowed to take this leave at government expense.

7. Future of Project: Writer would be less than candid if he did not point out that the present success of the project is owing in large measure to contacts which writer has developed over an eighteen year period. The precipitous forced retirement of writer will preclude an orderly and intelligent period of transition, with a concomitant loss of effectiveness. Even though he is being retired, writer is still interested in preserving the results of his work in México, which writer regards as being of continuing importance to our country.

8. In conclusion, writer wishes to state that he has thoroughly enjoyed his association with the Agency during the past nine years, and is proud of his part in the accomplishments of the México City Station. Owing to the nature of writer's position, his personal contacts have been largely limited to the personnel of the Station here. The writer has the highest professional and personal regard for the Chief of Station, with whom he has been privileged to serve, as well as the highly competent case officers who have worked with writer on the project.

It is a source of great satisfaction and pride to the writer to have known and worked with a truly great American, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, whom the "San Francisco Chronicle" (generally a hostile critic of the Agency) described posthumously as "...The most creative, powerful and eminent U.S. intelligence officer of modern times". And, as one's career comes to a close, the words of President Nixon, in describing Mr. Dulles' great contribution to his country, have a very particular significance: "...In the nature of his task, his achievements were known to only a few. But, because of him, the world is a safer place today".

[illegible]

George F. Munro

GS-15/6 step

21469

______ (DATE)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr Fisher		
2	C/CPD	MAY [illegible]	WB
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

According to Charlie Redmond, this is not as big a problem as it appears. Redmond alleges that COS could have handled better. Redmond is on top of it and will lets us know if anything serious develops. BobF

Bil wait to hear further

SECRET

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[illegible] [illegible] X[illegible]	

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

FORM 237 Use previous editions

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ZJ PER ______ #

ACTION C/WH-5 ☐ RID COPY

466

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 52

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, D/OP, C/CI, C/MPS/BG, C/FI-2, C/CS-2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 291907Z APR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0025

DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN PERS

29 APR 69 IN 47116

REF HMMA-36678

1. AS INDICATED IN REFERENCE AND DISCUSSED BY THE COS DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO HEADQUARTERS, STATION PLANNED ASK JEREMY K. BENADUM, CAREER AGENT AND OUTSIDE CASE OFFICER FOR LITEMPO PROJECT, TO RETIRE FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE 69. THIS WAS DONE IN WRITING ON 7 APRIL 69.

2. BENADUM HAS WRITTEN MEMORANDUM DATED 24 APRIL 69 IN WHICH HE INDICATES THAT HE DOES NOT DESIRE TO RETIRE AND THAT ANY ACTION ALONG THESE LINES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED "INVOLUNTARY" ON HIS PART. JKB ALSO INDICATED THAT WITH ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE HE WILL LACK ABOUT MONTH IN COMPLETING FULL 30 YEARS SERVICE AS OF 30 JUNE AND ASKED THAT HE BE KEPT ON BOARD UNTIL FULL 30 YEARS ARE COMPLETED.

3. JKB REQUESTS THAT HE BE ALLOWED TO TAKE HOME LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE. HE INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING WITH REGULATION ABOUT NO HOME LEAVE WITHIN TWO YEARS OF VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT BUT SAID THAT HE CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS WHEN RETIREMENT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT: ____________ Z

DISSEM BY: __________ PER ________ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ____________

X-REF TO FILE NO ____________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR,

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0023 SECRET

IS "INVOLUNTARY", THE STATION WISHES TO INDICATE THAT JKB WAS REFUSED NORMAL HOME LEAVE DURING THE SUMMER OF 68 BECAUSE OF STUDENT PROBLEMS.

4. THE STATION REQUESTS THAT FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO ITEMS MENTIONED IN PARAS 2 AND 3 ABOVE. PLS ADVISE.

5. JKB HAS INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO REMAIN ACTIVE ON CONTRACT BASIS. THE STATION BELIEVES THAT CONSIDERABLE BENEFIT COULD ACCURE BY RETAINING JKB. PLS ADVISE IF HEADQUARTERS IS INTERESTED IN CONTRACTING JKB AND CONDITIONS SO THAT THEY MAY BE DISCUSSED WITH HIM. (HE WANTS 15,000 PER ANNUM PLUS 50.00 PER MONTH FOR USE OF POV.)

6. POUCHING COPIES OF MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY JKB WHICH IS DATED 24 APRIL 69.

7. FILES NONE.

SECRET

SECRET

T4-00000

Standard Form 144
Rev. August 1956
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supp. 296-31

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: This form is used only to establish creditability of service, which is otherwise not verified in the Official Personnel Folder, for leave and reduction in force purposes. The employee will complete Part I and the Personnel Office Parts II and III. When this form is used as a cumulative record or the employee's affidavit is used in the absence of a verified record, it must be filed on the right side of the Official Personnel Folder.

PART I— EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT.

1. NAME (Last, first, initial) ☑ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss
✓ MUNRO, GEORGE F.

2. BIRTH DATE (Mo., day, yr.)
✓ 8/24/15

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT ANY CLAIMED FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN VERIFIED (Do not include military service.) IF ANY OF THIS SERVICE WAS PART-TIME, WAE, OR INTERMITTENT, NOTE THIS UNDER "TYPE OF APPOINTMENT."

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM			TO			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT (If known)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
✓ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	40	8	12	60	10	31	SPECIAL AGENT
CIA	60	11	1	PRESENT			CAREER AGENT

S.C.D. 7 NOV 39
(Pd. w/o C?D)
(DOT/SAA 6/10/69)

4. LIST PERIODS OF ANY CLAIMED ACTIVE SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING ACTIVE DUTY AS A RESERVIST, WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN VERIFIED. (Also list Merchant Marine service, if it interrupted service shown in Item 3.)

BRANCH	FROM			TO			DISCHARGE (Hon. or Dishon.)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
✓ US ARMY (2nd. Lt., 30th U.S. Inf., Presidio, San Francisco, California)	39	10	26	40	7	31	HONORABLE

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? (If YES, list following information.) ☐ YES ☒ NO

TYPE IF KNOWN (L.W.O.P., Furl., Susp., A.W.O.L.)	FROM			TO			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
✓ No									

6. DO YOU CLAIM ANY TYPE OF VETERAN PREFERENCE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN VERIFIED? ☐ Yes ☒ No If "Yes," check one of the following statements if it applies to you: ✓
☐ I CLAIM PREFERENCE AS THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN.
☐ I CLAIM PREFERENCE AS THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN.
☐ I CLAIM PREFERENCE AS THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN.

7. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Date: ✓ 13 May, 1969.

✓ Geo. F. Munro
(Signature)

Subscribed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me on this ______ day of ______ (Month) 19____ at ______ (City) ______ (State)

SEAL

NOTE. If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission must be shown.

144-101

SECRET

CABLE DRAFT #2 1 May 1969

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

RYBAT ADMIN CONTRACTS LITEMPO

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 47116)
B. HMMA-36678

1. UNLESS STATION MEMO TO JEREMY K. BENADUM CONCERNING RETIREMENT WAS IN CONTEXT THAT DUE TO REDUCTION OF LITEMPO PROJECT AND THUS ABOLISHMENT OF HIS POSITION AND AS NO OTHER STATION REQUIREMENT FOR HIS SERVICES, HE MIGHT PREFER CONSIDER "DISCONTINUED SERVICE RETIREMENT" RATHER THAN TRANSFER, STATION HAD [illegible] ~~NOT BEEN~~ AUTHORIZED TO INFORM BENADUM HE WOULD BE RETIRED EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE. BENADUM DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR RETIREMENT UNDER WOFIRM RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AS DOES NOT HAVE REQUIRED TEN RPT TEN YEARS SERVICE WITH ORGANIZATION AND RETIREMENT WOULD BE UNDER CIVIL SERVICE. BENADUM, AS CITED PARA 2 REF A, IS CORRECT IN THAT RETIREMENT WOULD BE INVOLUNTARY. REQUEST FORWARD COPY STATION MEMO OF 7 APRIL TO BENADUM WITH BENADUM'S MEMO OF 24 APRIL.

2. IN VIEW REFS, UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY OR WHERE BENADUM COULD BE USED AS STATION SUGGESTS IN PARA 5 REF A AS CONTRACT AGENT WHICH APPEARS CONTRADICTORY TO NO REQUIREMENT FOR SERVICES AS CAREER AGENT.

3. AS STATION HAS NO APPARENT JOB COMMENSURATE WITH BENADUM'S GRADE LEVEL AND EXPERIENCE AND IN VIEW HIS LONG STAY MEXICO, HQS THEREFORE CONSIDERING BENADUM FOR REASSIGNMENT.

A. REQUEST STATION CONTACT BENADUM AND HAVE HIM COMPLETE FRQ SOONEST FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS. REASSIGNMENT PREFERENCES TO BE CABLED.

SECRET

B. REQUEST STATION COMPLETE FITNESS REPORT FOR PAST YEAR ON BENADUM, HAVE HIM SIGN AND FORWARD HQS SOONEST. CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

4. RECENT AUDIT REPORT CALLED OUR ATTENTION THAT COVER EARNINGS REPORTS AS REQUIRED BY PARA 9 OF BENADUM'S CONTRACT HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED.

A. REQUEST REPORTS FOR 1968 BE FORWARDED WITHOUT DELAY AND CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

B. IF REPORTS FOR PREVIOUS YEARS NOT READILY AVAILABLE, REQUEST BENADUM PREPARE AND PROVIDE STATION FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS WITHIN REASONABLE PERIOD.

C. IF HAS RECEIVED EARNINGS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN OFFSET AGAINST CONTRACT COMPENSATION, REQUEST STATION RECOMMENDATIONS BY DISPATCH ON AMENDING CONTRACT TO PROVIDE RETENTION OF COVER EARNINGS ACCORDANCE FN 20-32.

5. REQUEST ADVISE BENADUM:

A. ALTHOUGH AGREE THAT SHOULD HE WANT TO RETIRE, THE ONLY METHOD IS THROUGH "DISCONTINUED SERVICE" ROUTE CONSIDERING HE MAY PREFER RETIREMENT TO REASSIGNMENT. REQUEST HIS COMMENTS AND, IN ANY EVENT, COMPLETE SF-144 "STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE" FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS ASAP.

B. ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE NOT A FACTOR IN COMPUTING RETIREMENT AS INDIVIDUAL RECEIVES LUMP SUM PAYMENT FOR CURRENT BALANCE OR CARRYOVER AT BEGINNING OF LEAVE YEAR WHICHEVER LESSER. AVAILABLE RECORDS INDICATE BENADUM HAD CARRYOVER OF 560 HOURS.

SECRET

C. ELIGIBILITY FOR HOME LEAVE CONTINGENT ON REASSIGNMENT.

D. CURRENT POLICY EMPLOYMENT OF WOFIRM ANNUITANTS PRECLUDES REEMPLOYMENT UNDER CONTRACT EXCEPT DUE TO CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS WHICH COULD NOT OTHERWISE BE FULFILLED. THIS NOT APPLICABLE MEXICO AS HQS NOT AWARE ANY SUCH REQUIREMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: A. Attached
B. Submitted Project Renewal

COORD:

C/WH/1

CSPS

C/WH/SS

D/OP

Route [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

Tricrit

DRAFT 1 May 1969

CABLE TO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT ADMIN CONTRACTS LITEMPO

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 47116)
B. HMMA-36678

1. UNLESS STATION MEMO TO JEREMY K. BENADUM CONCERNING RETIREMENT WAS IN CONTEXT THAT DUE TO REDUCTION OF LITEMPO PROJECT AND THAT ABOLISHMENT OF HIS POSITION AND NO OTHER STATION REQUIREMENT FOR HIS SERVICES, HE MIGHT PREFER TO CONSIDER "DISCONTINUED SERVICE RETIREMENT" RATHER THAN TRANSFER ~~RETIRE RATHER THAN TRANSFER~~, STATION HAD NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED TO INFORM BENEDUM HE WOULD BE RETIRED EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE. REQUEST FORWARD COPY STATION MEMO OF 7 APRIL WITH BENADUM'S MEMO OF 24 APRIL.

2. IN VIEW REFS, UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY OR WHERE BENADUM COULD BE USED AS STATION SUGGESTS IN PARA 5 REF A AS CONTRACT AGENT WHICH APPEARS CONTRADICTORY TO NO REQUIREMENT FOR SERVICES AS CAREER AGENT.

3. AS STATION HAS NO APPARENT JOB COMMENSURATE WITH BENADUM'S GRADE LEVEL AND EXPERIENCE AND IN VIEW HIS LONG STAY MEXICO, HQS THEREFORE CONSIDERING BENADUM FOR REASSIGNMENT.

A. REQUEST STATION CONTACT BENADUM AND HAVE HIM COMPLETE FRQ SOONEST FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS. REASSIGNMENT PREFERENCES TO BE CABLED.

B. REQUEST STATION COMPLETE FITNESS REPORT FOR PAST YEAR ON BENADUM, HAVE HIM SIGN AND FORWARD HQS SOONEST. CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

SECRET

SECRET

4. RECENT AUDIT REPORT CALLED OUR ATTENTION THAT COVER EARNINGS REPORTS AS REQUIRED BY PARA 9 OF BENADUM'S CONTRACT HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED.

A. REQUEST REPORTS FOR 1968 BE FORWARDED WITHOUT DELAY AND CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

B. IF REPORTS FOR PREVIOUS YEARS NOT READILY AVAILABLE, REQUEST BENADUM PREPARE AND PROVIDE STATION FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS WITHIN REASONABLE PERIOD.

C. IF HAS RECEIVED EARNINGS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN OFFSET AGAINST CONTRACT COMPENSATION, REQUEST STATION RECOMMENDATIONS BY DISPATCH ON AMENDING CONTRACT TO PROVIDE RETENTION OF COVER EARNINGS ACCORDANCE FN 20-32.

retirement 5. REQUEST ADVISE BENADUM: ~~[illegible]~~

Although agree that should be permitted to retire, the only method is through ~~[illegible]~~ Discontinued Service route. If considering he may prefer retirement ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] reassignment, request his decision [illegible] and, in any event, complete

A. ~~HE NOT BEING INVOLUNTARILY RETIRED.~~ IF HE DESIRES RETIRE, ~~NECESSARY THAT HE SUBMIT MEMO REQUEST AND ALSO COMPLETE~~ SF-144 "STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE" FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS ASAP.

B. ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE NOT A FACTOR IN COMPUTING RETIREMENT AS INDIVIDUAL RECEIVES LUMP SUM PAYMENT FOR CURRENT BALANCE OR CARRYOVER AT BEGINNING OF LEAVE YEAR WHICHEVER LESSER. AVAILABLE RECORDS INDICATE BENADUM HAD CARRYOVER OF 560 HOURS.

C. ELIGIBILITY FOR HOME LEAVE CONTINGENT ON REASSIGNMENT.

D. CURRENT POLICY EMPLOYMENT OF WOFIRM ANNUITANTS PRECLUDES REEMPLOYMENT UNDER CONTRACT EXCEPT DUE TO CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS WHICH COULD NOT OTHERWISE BE FULFILLED. THIS NOT APPLICABLE MEXICO [illegible] ~~DUE TO STATION REDUCTIONS~~.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

WH COMMENTS: A. Attached
B. Submitted Project Renewal

COORD: ______
C/WH/1

______
CSPS

D/PERS

SECRET

SECRET

17 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Clarification of Cover Income Status of Career Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM

1. During the recent audit of WH Division, we noted that, since October 1961, Career Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM has not submitted cover income reports. These reports are required every six months by BENADUM's contract. Office of Finance personnel informed us that, since his payroll file does not indicate that he is under a cover activity, they do not expect these reports to be submitted and therefore have not requested them. However, operational files in WH Division Mexico Branch indicate that BENADUM owns his own business in Mexico City, is a member of the Board of Directors of another business, and spends a portion of his duty hours on these businesses. Therefore, it appears that BENADUM may be receiving cover income which should be refunded in accordance with his contract. In addition, the question arises as to whether BENADUM's contract should contain the provision (similar to Douglas J. FREAPANE's contract) that he can retain only the first $2,000 a year company profits as provided in FN 20-32.

2. It is requested that a review be made to determine whether BENADUM should be refunding cover income and whether his contract should be amended as indicated. Please notify this office of the results of this review.

R. H. FUCHS
Chief, Audit Staff

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/WH Div
1 - SSA/DDS
1 - OP/CPD
1 - O/Fin
1 - O/IG

SECRET

[illegible]

13 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Clarification of Cover Income Status of Career Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM

[redacted]

1. During the recent audit of WH Division, we noted that, since October 1961, Career Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM has not submitted cover income reports. These reports are required every six months by BENADUM's contract. Office of Finance personnel informed us that, since his payroll file does not indicate that he is under a cover activity, they do not expect these reports to be submitted and therefore have not requested them. However, operational files in WH Division Mexico Branch indicate that BENADUM owns his own business in Mexico City, is a member of the Board of Directors of another business, and spends a portion of his duty hours on these businesses. Therefore, it appears that BENADUM may be receiving cover income which should be refunded in accordance with his contract.

In addition, the question arises as to whether BENADUM's contract should contain the provision (similar to Douglas J. FREAPANE's contract) that he can retain only the first $2,000 a year company profits as provided in FM 20-32.

2. It is requested that a review be made to determine whether BENADUM should be refunding cover income and whether his contract should be amended as indicated. Please notify this office of the results of this review.

R. H. FUCHS
Chief, Audit Staff

Distribution:
- Orig. & 1 - Ch/WH Div
- 1 - SSA/DDS
- 1 - OP/CPD
- 1 - O/Fin
- 1 - O/IG
- 1 - WH Div. File
- 1 - Hqtrs. Chrono File
- 1 - Follow-up

RTM:ps

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

ACTION #517 WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CCS/, CSPS, [redacted]

1		6
2		7
3		
4		
5		10

S E C R E T 252257Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8172

DIRECTOR

25 Nov 68 IN 41479

LITEMPO

[illegible] m

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM WILL BE ON ANNUAL LEAVE FROM 29 NOVEMBER THROUGH 12 DECEMBER 68. PLANS DEPART MEXICO CITY ON 29 NOV VIA WESTERN FLIGHT 604 TO SAN FRANCISCO AND RETURN MEXICO CITY VIA WESTERN FLIGHT 627 ON 12 DEC. WHILE IN SAN FRANCISCO CAN BE REACHED AT IDEN A OR B.

2. BENADUM PLANS HAVE COMPLETE PHYSICAL EXAM WHILE ON LEAVE.

3. FILE: 50-6-91/2; 201-287227

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 14

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

ACTION #575 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, CCS2, CSPS, [redacted]

S E C R E T 252255Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8173

DIRECTOR

25 Nov 68 IN 41473

LITENPO

REF: MEXICO CITY 8172 (IN 41479)

1. IDENTITY A: MRS. KATHRYN COLLONAN (MOTHER-IN-LAW)
2090 PACIFIC AVE.
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
TEL: 931-0942

IDENTITY B: MRS. MARGARET COOK (SISTER)
195 ATHERTTN AVE.
TEL: 326-2225

201-257227
2. FILES: ~~[illegible]~~ 50-6-91/2

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG: PARRY BURTON
UNIT: FINANCE
EXT: 2125
DATE: 1 APRIL 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 25 PER ____ # ____

CONF: OF2 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR WH 3, OP2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 4 00 36 Z CITE DIRECTOR 88537

TO MEXICO CITY

DUE TO ELECTION OF OPTIONAL FEGLI EFF. 3/10/68, PAY JEREMY K. BENADUM AND T/A TO HEADQUARTERS A NET OF $1071.62 FOR PERIOD 3/10-4/6/68 AND EACH SUBSEQUENT PERIOD. SEE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND DEDUCTIONS FOR BREAKDOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/contracts

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) BENADUM	(first) JEREMY	(middle) K.	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) 1915	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

DATE

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMINISTRATIVE/PERSONNEL
Transmittal of Forms SF 176-T

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Process Forms

REFERENCE: FN 20-86, dated 2 February 1968

Forwarded herewith are the forms for the below listed personnel:

Oliver R. BYNAM - [illegible] Betty Jean Douglas
Jeremy K. BENADUM
Douglas J. FREAPANE
Bruce H. FERNALD
Wallace B. ROWTON - [illegible] Betty Jean Douglas

TO BCD 3/15/68

FOR/Willard C. CURTIS

ATTACHMENTS:
Forms SF 176-T (HEREWITH)

DISTRIBUTION:
1-3 - Chief, WH Division w/atts (5)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-8787

DATE
29 February 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Admin/Personnel - Fitness Reports for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Douglas J. FEINGLASS, and David M. WILSTED.

ACTION REQUIRED: Information Only.

REFERENCE : HMMS-5749, dated 11 January 1968.

1. Agent Evaluation Reports have been forwarded for the subject personnel as follows:

NAME	DISPATCH NUMBER	DATE
Jeremy K. BENADUM	HMMA-32877	28 August 1967
Douglas J. FEINGLASS	HMMT-8356	3 October 1967
David M. WILSTED	HMMA-31976	10 May 1967

2. Unless advised to the contrary the Station will forward future Agent Evaluation Reports for FREARANE and BENADUM to reach Headquarters in September of each year and for WILSTED to reach Headquarters in May of each year.

for/WILLARD C. CURTIS

[illegible]

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

HMMT-[illegible]

17 January [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960

1. Agency and organizational designation
DDP/WH

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
BENADUM, Jeremy K. (P) CAREER AGENT

2. Payroll period

3. Block No.

4. Slip No.

6. Grade and salary
$20,856

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
jlv 10 Jan 68

13. Audited by

XX Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
21Apr68	24 Apr 66	$20,856	$21,469

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following period):
Period(s):

XX No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 8000 1126-105

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

[illegible] Career Agents [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], Fitness Reports

Action Required: As noted

Headquarters has been conducting a review of Career Agent files and has noted that Fitness Reports have not been submitted for [illegible], [illegible], and [illegible] since December 1966 or before.

STATION ACTION:

It is requested that a current FR for the above mentioned be submitted for Headquarters files.

[illegible]

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

[illegible] - 5749

S E C R E T

Distribution:
1 - WH/Contracts
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/1

WH/Contracts/[illegible]: lsr (4 January 196[illegible]) [illegible]

C/WH/1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Admin/Personnel - Current Residence and Dependency Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Information Only

Forwarded under separate cover are the current residence and dependency reports for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Douglas J. FREAPANE, and David M. WILSTED.

for/WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachments:
As Stated Above, usc

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WH Division, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT - 8551	DATE 21 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) [redacted] (First) [redacted] (Middle)
1. [redacted]
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 101-38-0460

RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY: México, D.F.
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad): San Francisco, California
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: San Francisco, California
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: San Francisco, California

2. **MARITAL STATUS** (Check one)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: San Francisco, California
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 9-VII-45
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED:
DATE SPOUSE DIED:
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S):

3. **MEMBERS OF FAMILY**

NAME OF SPOUSE: Kathryn A. Munro
ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Calle Ojo de Agua 43, "La Hda."
TELEPHONE NO.: 65-24-36

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Pamela Emily	" " " " " " "	F	7-XI-61
Margaret Mary	" " " " " " "	F	19-IX-59
George F. III	" " " " " " "	M	16-VIII-57
(Cont.)			

NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian): George F. Munro (Deceased)
ADDRESS:
TELEPHONE NO.:
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian): Mrs. Emily Matthews
ADDRESS: Santa Barbara, Calif. 1320 Mission Ridge Rd., [illegible]
TELEPHONE NO.: 965-6146 (Area 805)

WHAT MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

4. **PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY**

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): MUNRO, KATHRYN AILEEN
RELATIONSHIP: Wife
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Calle Ojo de Agua 43, Club de Golf "La Hacienda", Edo. de México.
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 65-24-36
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: N/A
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) Yes
YES ☒ NO ☐

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)
YES ☒ NO ☐

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)
YES ☒ NO ☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of emergencies has shown that the absence of personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate or [illegible] matters. The information requested in [illegible] may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

[illegible] NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Wells Fargo Bank, 464 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

(Account in writer's name)

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE [redacted] CREDIT UNION? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

Mr. and Mrs. A.T. Cook, 195 Atherton Ave., Atherton, Calif.(326-2225)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

3. (Cont.) Children:	Address:	Sex:	DOB
Elizabeth Marie	(Same as indicated for others)	F.	14-VII-51
Kathryn Joan	" " " " "	F.	6-III-50
Barbara Ann	Univ. of Santa Clara, Santa Clara, Calif. (during school yr.)	F.	17 IX-48

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
México, D.F.	18 Dec., 1967	

CONFIDENTIAL

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

C/WH

BENADUM, Jeremy K., FREAPANE, Douglas J., and WILSTED, David M.

Action Required: As noted

The attached Form 61 should be completed in duplicate and true name by BENADUM, FREAPANE, AND WILSTED and forwarded to Hqs. It is important that the information contained on the form be filed in Hqs, therefore, rapid response would be appreciated.

Hugh E. WESTBY

Attachment:
As stated (h/w)

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

HMMS - 5668

S E C R E T

Distribution:
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/Contracts
1 - WH/1

WH/Contracts/J.Willis: lsr (14 Nov 67) 4460

C/WH/1

SECRET

Date 19 October 1967

Memorandum For: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/CP

This is to advise you that Jeremy K. Benadum has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 25 September 1967. The Contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/WH.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Insurance Branch

FROM : C/WH/CONTRACTS

SUBJECT : Applications for Health Insurance

The Employee Payroll numbers for the attached are as follows:

DOUGLAS J. FRRAPANE	-------------131890
JEREMY K. BERADUM	-------------058895
DAVID H. WILSTED	-------------915249

Re the above HMMT-8282 dated 18 Sept. 1967, which transmitted the attached applications, states: "All of the above Personnel have requested that their Dependents, as listed under their current contract employee type Health Insurance, be covered under the new Health Insurance for which they are applying."

Wm. Renehan

DDP/WH/Contracts/WSRenehan: jt (9 October 1967)

O & 1 - Addressee
2 - WH/Contracts

MR. JERZY E. [illegible]

Dear Mr. [illegible]:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer of this organization, hereby contracts with you, as a ~~contract~~ Career Agent ~~employee~~ under the terms and conditions set forth below:

1. New Benefits. By virtue of your employment relationship under this agreement you are:

(a) Covered under the Civil Service Retirement Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. From the basic compensation paid you hereunder there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6-1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Social Security deductions required by virtue of your cover activities will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

(b) Covered under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization unless you execute a written waiver of such coverage. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost; you will bear the remainder.

(c) Eligible for coverage under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Because of your eligibility under this Act (whether or not you choose to enroll), your coverage under the contract employees health program shall cease thirty-one (31) days after the effective date of this agreement.

2. Your previous contract with the United States Government, effective [illegible] October [illegible], is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto.

3. All provisions of said previous contract not in conflict with this agreement are incorporated by reference into and made a part of this agreement.

4. This agreement is effective as of 25 September 1957 and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated as set forth in your previous contract. If this agreement becomes effective during an overseas assignment nothing contained herein shall be construed as extending that assignment beyond its originally contemplated duration or invalidating your entitlement to return travel expenses (if applicable) upon completion of that assignment.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BY
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

REVIEWED:
/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Admin/Personnel - New Benefits for Certain Contract Employees

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Information Only

REFERENCE : Book Dispatch Number 0144, Dated 24 August 1965

1. Furnished herewith are amended contracts and applications for health insurance, except for CERVARIEN, for personnel as follows:

Fwd 6 Oct 67
HW

Jeremy K. BENADUM
Nora D. CERVARIEN
Bruce H. FERNALD SB
Douglas J. FREAPANE
Samuel J. KARTASUK SB
David M. WILSTED

2. Nora D. CERVARIEN's application for health insurance was forwarded in HMMT 8215, dated 22 August 1967.

3. All of the above personnel have requested that their dependents, as listed under their current contract employee type health insurance, be covered under the new health insurance for which they are applying.

4. Nadine M. HINTERSEHER has elected not to accept the new benefits.

5. Sandra B. CAZAZZUS will discuss the new benefits while she is at Headquarters.

6. Because of the indefinite future of Harriet K. SCHMEHL, action is deferred to Headquarters.

CA has taken action 5 Oct 67
HW

for/WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As Stated Above, h/w

SB accepted action on KARTASUK & FERNALD
Per telecon w/ Linda Bohannon
on 5 Oct 67 HW

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT - 8292

DATE
18 September 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

YES ☐ NO ______
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 19
CS FILE NO. ______
TO FILE NO. ______
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, CCS-3, CI/OPS, CI/OA, DF-2

SECRET 151840Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9233

DIRECTOR

15 NOV [illegible] 39532

REF HMMT-7199

JEREMY K. BENADUM AND FAMILY DEPARTING STATION BY AIR ON HOME LEAVE 16 NOVEMBER 1966.

SECRET

SECRET

Frederick C. Munroe

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT
[illegible] - Jeremy K. [illegible] (p) - Tax Handling

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The WOFACT Tax Committee has approved a flat rate assessment of [illegible]'s Federal tax obligation, beginning with tax year 1965. Attached is the letter of tax instruction which he should review. The original must be signed and returned to Headquarters.

[illegible]

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS (w/att)
2 - WH/Fero

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[illegible]	19 September 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

19 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy K. BENADUM (p)

SUBJECT: Federal Tax Obligation - Letter of Instruction

1. Based on the tax briefing held on 16 February 1966 by a representative of the Organization's Tax Committee, the Committee approved a flat rate assessment of your covert Federal tax obligation. This assessment has been developed in two stages: The first stage applies to tax year 1965 and is based on your taxable compensation of $18,303.20. The second stage relates to your future year tax position and is based on an average of your annual Organizational income of $19,305.60 developed from a two-year projection of your earnings, beginning with tax year 1966. Under this procedure you will not be required to file a covert tax return, beginning with tax year 1965.

2. Effective 20 December 1964, the beginning of tax year 1965, the Organization has applied a tax percentage of thirty (30.0) per cent to the gross taxable compensation paid by the Organization in 1965. Effective 19 December 1965, the beginning of tax year 1966, this percentage will be decreased to twenty-three and four-tenths (23.4) per cent.

3. The application of the percentage assessment to tax year 1965 results in a tax liability of $5,490.96 (30% of $18,303.20). After applying the tax withheld of $2,562.49, an additional payment of $2,928.47 is required. However, future changes in your income or tax status may justify a future revision of the assessment rate. In this event, this agreement would be amended accordingly.

4. The Tax Committee has granted you a basic $250.00 tax credit in computing the percentage rate. This credit is granted to give reasonable assurance that you will not pay higher tax than you would under ordinary reporting procedures. The computations of these percentage rates are attached.

5. The retroactive satisfaction of this assessment from 19 December 1965 will be made by attaching the Federal tax withholdings available in your pay account. You will be advised as to the effect of this payroll account adjustment. You must file a tax return directly with Internal Revenue consistent with your overt tax status and provide the Tax Committee with a certified true copy. It is extremely important for you to exercise care and accuracy in preparing this return. Provided below are specific criteria to assist you:

You will continue to file a tax return directly with Internal Revenue, reporting other income (interest, dividends, rental, etc.) and computing tax thereon. Any earnings received from a commercial source are reported on the Form 2555 (Statement to Support Exclusion of Income Earned Abroad) and excluded under the bona fide residence exclusion.

Any tax liability resulting from overt filing will be met by you separately from the covert tax assessment funds collected by the Organization.

6. You have recourse to the Organization for reimbursement of bona fide foreign income or related taxes paid on income received from or guaranteed by the Organization, in accordance with FHB 30-1, paragraph 45, (a) and (b).

7. Please acknowledge the original of this letter and return to Headquarters, attention: Covert Tax Committee.

8. The Tax Committee appreciates your cooperation in establishing this systemized method of satisfying your Federal tax liability on Organizational income.

THOMAS P. WEATHERWAX

Acknowledged:

____

Date____________________________

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Performance Report -- Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Jeremy K. BENADUM is a GS-15 Career Agent who has been employed by the Station in Mexico since 25 November 1960.

2. BENADUM is responsible for management of an outside operational activity employing six Mexican paid agents and twenty-six unpaid agents, all with access to or employed by the Mexican Government. The current budget for this project is $61,000. US per year. The project (LITEMPO) provides the Station with both high-level and low-level penetrations of the security and policy making branches of the Mexican Government. It also provides for a semi-official liaison arrangement between the Station and highest Mexican Government officials.

3. BENADUM for the past year has also directed the activities of a Station surveillance asset of six men. This team was placed under BENADUM when its existence became known to a high ranking security official already covered in the LITEMPO complex. Two members of the team were arrested by this service and BENADUM assisted in obtaining their release.

4. Prior to employment by the Station, BENADUM had been employed for twenty years by LNERGO. He has fluent Spanish; has adapted to living outside an official installation in a cover devised independently; has extensive experience in investigative and training activities. He has performed in a most valuable manner in the management of the above described projects and in the development of close working relationships with Mexican Government officials. Through these contacts, established over the years, COS Mexico and high-ranking Headquarters officials are able to meet covertly with the top officials of the Mexican Government.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-29666
DATE
4 August 1966
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
HQS FILE NUMBER
201-767777

SECRET

DATE: [illegible]

CTC No. ____________

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for [illegible]

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee as indicated below. An acknowledged letter of tax instruction ☐ is ☐ will be forwarded.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
[illegible]	
Twenty-three and [illegible]	[illegible]

2. Other payroll factors pertinent to this Covert Tax Committee tax assessment action are as follows:

19[illegible] covert tax withholding [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

/s/ [illegible] H. Zuetscher
Approval Chief, CPD

____
Secretary, Covert Tax Committee

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

Mr. Jeremy K. Benadum

[illegible] **Mr. Benadum**

Reference is made to [illegible] contract with the United States Government as represented by the Contracting Officer [illegible]

Effective **29 July 1956** said contract is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"**15**. TAXES. [illegible] the Government [illegible] must satisfy your Federal [illegible] the income paid to you under paragraph **three (3)** [illegible] Such income may be paid you by [illegible] Because of cover, operational and security [illegible] of this organization [illegible] instructions and establish procedures [illegible] of your Federal income tax [illegible] It is specifically understood and agreed [illegible] instructions and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms [illegible] of said contract shall remain in full force and effect.

[illegible]

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-O-56463

1. Agency and organizational designation UDP/WH	2. Payroll period	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) BEZADUM, Jeremy K. (P) CAREER AGENT	6. Grade and salary $18,825		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
jlv 7 Jan 66

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
24Apr66	26 Apr 65	$18,825	$19,415

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods).
Period(s):

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP. ____________

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

____________ Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a
6 GAO 8000 1126-509

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, [illegible] Division

INFO

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMINISTRATIVE/Personnel
Legislative Pay Increase for Contract Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Amend contracts to provide for the legislative pay increase for the below listed contract personnel.

REFERENCE : Item 2a of FN 20-56, dated 4 November 1965

Furnished below are the names of contract employees and career agents qualifying under the reference for the subject legislative pay increase:

CAREER AGENTS	CONTRACT EMPLOYEES
[illegible], [illegible]	[illegible], Howard F.
[illegible], Douglas J.	[illegible], Thomas F.
REDLICH, Leo C.	[illegible], Sandra P.
[illegible], David P.	[illegible], Preston T.

[illegible] L. [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - WHD

[illegible] 14
Fwd CPD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-[illegible]

DATE
18 November 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

MESSAGE FORM 13

SECRET

ORIG. : A. Sperainad
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4507
DATE : 16 December 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-287227

ROUTING

1		5	SS
2		6	
3		7	FI
4		8	

16DEC64 23 00z
ROUTINE

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8 INFO C/OA, OPSER, OT, VR, FILE

No
Bill R

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 71512

REF: HMMW-13153

WOULD APPRECIATE CABLE REPLY REF ON BEHADUM TRAINING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

0117
Dec 17

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City   xx

Chief, WHD

Training for Jeremy K. BENADUM

PRIORITY

REFERENCE: HMMA 24477

Action Required: Cable Reply to paragraph 3

1. Reference is made to paragraph 3 of HMMW 12349, 28 February 1964, which suggested that KUBARK training for BENADUM might be beneficial, and to page 8 paragraph 3 of HMMA 24477, the LITEMPO Project Renewal Request, which also indicated that a two-week intensive field training course would be valuable for BENADUM.

2. Headquarters has discussed this possibility with KUROAR, and they are prepared to send a trainer to Mexico City for two weeks beginning 18 January 1965. Headquarters has suggested that the trainer be prepared to cover positive intelligence and operational reporting, requirements, and elicitation from his contacts and agents.

3. Please cable whether the dates 18 - 29 January are convenient and whether the subjects to be covered are those envisioned by the Station.

4. Headquarters added to the Project Renewal request $748.95 to cover the per diem and travel of the TDY trainer.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

HMMW 13153   30 November 1964

SECRET

[illegible]-387207
50-6-9/1

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, KUDOVE

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Attribution of Income and Covert Tax Handling of Nonofficial Cover Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Jeremy K. BENADUM

REFERENCE: DOOX DISPATCH 4650, 16 November 1964

Enclosed is information requested in reference as prepared by BENADUM. Under separate true name cover is corresponding information as required. Numbers on the pertinent forms correspond to the numbered items listed in attachment to reference.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated (h/w, USC)

Distribution:
2 - KUDOVE, w/atts
2 - WHD, w/o atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-5281	11 March 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Career Agents - Legislative Pay Adjustments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Information

1. During Robert L. EASBY's recent TDY at Headquarters, he informed Howard D. MYNARD that the last Legislative Pay Adjustment had not been granted to the following named Career Agents at the Station. He was advised that follow-up action would be taken and information forwarded to the Station.

Jeremy K. BENADUM
Douglas J. FREAPANE
Victor W. OBOLD
Wallace G. RIKON
Donald Z. VELAZQUEZ
David M. WILSTED

2. The contract for each of the above named individuals except VELAZQUEZ contains the provision he shall receive any Legislative Pay Adjustment adopted by KUBARK. As the provision is a contractual item, the individual will automatically receive the increase without any requirement for a specific request or justification. Although not on the above list, the same information also pertains to Leo C. EHRLICH. VELAZQUEZ, a Contract Employee, was authorized the increase (Phase II) by an amendment effective 14 October 1962 as his contract does not provide for automatic entitlement.

3. The Payroll Branch advised that except for BENADUM, the increase was reflected in the pay period ending 18 January 1964 as indicated in the earnings statement provided each individual. HMMW-3534, 28 May, was sent to the Station by Payroll to increase BENADUM's field allotment in accordance with the pay adjustment.

Chester D. DAINOLD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-3566	12 June 1964
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/WH Personnel Officer

SUBJECT : **Within Grade Increase for Career Agents**

1. The following Career Agents assigned to your office will become eligible for a Within Grade Increase during the month of APRIL 1964.

Name (P)	Old Salary Rate	New Salary Rate	Date Due
Benadum, Jeremy K.	$16,695	$17,210	26 Apr 1964

Fwd - C/WH/3
7 Feb 64
Fwd - 10 Feb 64
O/P - 5E69

2. Please return the signed Within Grade Increase form to Jo Ann Varney Room 5 E 69.

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-592648

1. Agency and organizational designations: DDP/WH

2. Payroll period:

3. Block No.:

4. Slip No.:

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): BENADUM, Jeremy K. (P) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary: $16,695

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s):

12. Prepared by: Jlv 15 Jan 64

13. Audited by:

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
26Apr64	28 Apr 63	$16,695	$17,210	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):

Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP-status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 8000 1126-503

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT

Compensation Schedule II Increase - Jeremy S. [illegible], Emp # 058005

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: FN 20-29, 4 October 1963

It is requested that Subject's career agent contract be amended to provide for the compensation increase provided by Compensation Schedule II of the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution

3 - [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

[illegible]

DATE

[illegible] October 1963

CLASSIFICATION

[illegible]

HQS FILE NUMBER

2/4/63

MEMORANDUM TO : **DDP/WH Personnel Officer**

SUBJECT : Within Grade Increase for Career Agents

1. The following Career Agents assigned to your office will become eligible for a Within Grade Increase during the month of **APRIL 1963**

Name (P)	Old Salary Rate	New Salary Rate	Date Due
Benadum, Jeremy K.	**$15,045**	**$15,525**	**28 Apr 63**

Cancel

Fwd'd Office of Pers —
5E58
27 Feb 63

2. Please [illegible] Dorothy [illegible] Room [illegible].

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954 O-[illegible]

1. Agency and organizational designation
DDP/WH

2. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
BENADUM, Jeremy K. (I) CAREER AGENT

2. Payroll period
3. Store No.
4. Slip No.
5. Grade and salary
$15,045

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. For this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
Jly 15 Jan 63

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
Apr63	28Apr62	$15,045	$15,525

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

Joseph C. [illegible]
(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s)

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP):
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1125a - Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 20, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP —— PERSONNEL COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Finance Division

INFO
Chief, Services & Benefits Division/OP
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Payment of Term Life Insurance Premium - Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is Station T/A # 00125, representing Jeremy K. BENADUM's payment of $72.00 covering 6 months' premiums on his term life insurance.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment - 1 T/A, as noted

DISTRIBUTION:
2-Finance Division w/attachment
1-WH Division w/o attachment
2-Files

1-Benefits & Services Div/OP w/o att

Jan 11, 1963 [illegible]
[illegible] Insurance
office called [illegible] of the
[illegible] dispatch w/ T/A #.

[illegible] of att
[illegible] Fin. [illegible]
[illegible] 9 Jan 63

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
31 Dec 1962	31 Dec 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMM-T-3314

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

☒ TDY
☐ PCS
☐ INVITATIONAL

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. WH 317-63

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.

NAME: Jeremy K. BENADUM (P) Career Agent

OFFICIAL STATION: Mexico City, Mexico

OFFICE PHONE

GRADE: GS-13

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Mexico City to San Francisco for approx. 90 days home leave and return to Mexico City.

Purpose: Home Leave

Mode : Air, Common Carrier

TRAVEL DURATION BEGIN	TRAVEL DURATION END	PER DIEM ALLOWANCE DOMESTIC	PER DIEM ALLOWANCE FOREIGN		AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE CENTS PER MI NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
8 Dec.	1 Mar. 63	Max.	☒ MAXIMUM	☐ OTHER (See below)		

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP
		Wife
		Child
		Child
		Child
		Child
		Child
		Child
Under 2		Child

☐ ACCOMPANY TRAVELLER
☐ FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
☐ ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
☐ TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
☐ CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
☐ SHIPMENT ☐ NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
☐ SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED
ACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE
UNACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
☐ YES ACCOUNTING DUE DATE
☐ NO

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: $2,000.00

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.: 317
CHARGE COST CENTER NO.: 3135-5701-5185
DATE: 12/7/62
SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER: Edward Burroughs

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
	WH/Pers.	
	Chief, WH 3	

REQUISITIONING OFFICIAL
TYPED NAME AND TITLE: PAUL E. ARNISON
COMPONENT: C/WH/35
SIGNATURE
DATE: 7 Dec. 62

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL
TYPED NAME AND TITLE: RAYFORD W. HERBERT
COMPONENT: DC/WHD
SIGNATURE
DATE: 7 Dec. 1962

FORM 8-60 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
MFG. 3-62

SECRET

(35-40)

14-00000

718

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 1 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CCS 2, OP 2, S/C 2

Career Agent

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 1 0330Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 27561

DIR CITE MEXI 2722

1. REQUEST HQ TVL ORDERS FOR HOME LEAVE TVL OF JEREMY K. BENADUM, WIFE, 2 CHILDREN FULL FARE 4 CHILDREN HALF FARE, AND 1 BABY UNDER 2 YRS.

2. TO DEPART MEXICO CITY ABOUT 6 DEC FOR SAN FRANCISCO (HOME LEAVE POINT) VIA AIR, RETURN TO MEXICO CITY AFTER HOME LEAVE.

END OF MESSAGE

Dec 3
per file
wife DOB 31 Jan 1919
17 Sep 48
dau 6 Mar 50
" 14 Jul 51
" 16 Aug 57
Son 17 Sep 59
dau
dau Oct 61

Dec 4
Discussed with [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] for baby

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Date 20 August 1962

Career Agent Biographic Data

a. Pseudonym of agent: BENADUM (Last) Jeremy (First) K. (MI) Staff or Division: WHD

b. Date and place of birth: 29 August 1915, Omaha, Nebraska

c. Marital status: Married

d. Relationship and years of birth of dependents: Wife, born 31 Jan 1917, San Francisco, California--dau born 17 Sept 1948, San Mateo, Cal.--dau born 6 Mar 1950, San Mateo, Cal.--dau born 15 Jul 1951, San Francisco, Cal--son born 16 Aug 1957, Mexico, D.F.--dau born 19 Sept 1959, Mexico, D.F. -- dau born October 1961, Mexico, D.F.

e. Citizenship of agent: USA

(1) If naturalized, when?

(2) If naturalized, where?

g. Non-CIA education to include name and location of college, degrees, dates, and major:

Pomona College, Claremont, California, A.B. 1936, Political Science
Stanford Univ Law School, LL.B. 1939, Law
FBI Academy, August, September 1940

h. Military service Thomason Act Training, Infantry School, Oct 1939-July 1940

(1) Country served and years:

(2) Branch of service and rank:

i. Non-CIA employment: kinds of business or profession, positions, salaries, locations, and dates:

FBI - Aug 1940-Sept 1960, GS-14, $13,000/year when resigned.
Assistant Legal Attache, US Embassy, Lima, Peru, 1943-45
Legal Attache same post, 1945-47
Assistant Legal Attache, Mexico City, 1951-57
Deputy to Legal Attache 1957-60

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 2)

j. Dates of psychological assessment, professional and language aptitude tests, if applicable:

Not applicable

k. Languages, including English, using the following terms: Elementary, Intermediate, High, Native

Language	Reading	Writing	Speaking
Spanish	high	high	high
English	native	native	native
German	intermediate	none	intermediate
French	elementary	none	elementary

l. Agency training:

Subject Covered	Duration of Course	Years Taken
not applicable		

m. Alias or pseudonym used for psychological assessment, testing or training, if applicable:

not applicable

n. Security clearance number: **CSA, 22 December 1960 - S-11403**

o. Date of last LCFLUTTER: **None**

p. Contract provisions: (Underline One)

(1) Provision for periodic step increases [✓ Yes] No
(2) Provision for legislative pay increases [✓ Yes] No
(3) Provision for total offset of cover income [✓ Yes] No
(4) Provision for civil service retirement [✓ Yes] No
(5) Any unusual provisions (please specify)

S-E-C-R-E-T

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 3)

q. Date of beginning of current tour: 30 October 1960

r. Previous CIA employment:

Years	Type of Cover	CIA Duties	Project	City	Salary
None					

S-E-C-R-E-T

DISPATCH SECRET

PROCESSING

X

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Term Life Insurance Premium - Jeremy K. BENADUM

For your information

Ref: HMMT-2907

1. BENADUM'S application for the Term Life Insurance, together with the payment of $72.00 for the six months' premium have been received. His life insurance is now paid up through December 1962.

2. BENADUM did authorize deductions to pay the insurance premiums, but since he is being payrolled in the field, it will be necessary for him to forward future premium payments to Headquarters.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City

Sept 30 1963
The above is not correct;
he is payrolled in Hqs but
all is paid to him in the
Field. Insurance (which was pending)
will advise FI; FI will advise
fully new deduction

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
6 August 1962	[illegible]
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
[illegible]-3-2275 2531	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Distribution:
1 - WH/Pers
1 - WH/Mailroom

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Pers	C. Sandman	blt	5269

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/[illegible]		

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMM-T-2907

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
Chief, Finance Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
13 July 1962

SUBJECT
Pay Account -
Jeremy K. BENADUM

RE: "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information

REFERENCE(S)
HMM-S-2456

1. The Station was surprised to receive the reference, which stated that BENADUM's life insurance application had not been received in Finance Division as of 15 June 1962. Recently we received HMM-S-2450, dated 14 June 1962, which requested that the Station collect from BENADUM the premiums for his life insurance, and no mention was made of payroll deductions we had requested in HMM-T-2800. Therefore, the Station collected the sum of $72.00 from BENADUM in payment of 6 months premiums. This payment was forwarded to Headquarters under HMM-T-2892.

2. No action will be taken by the Station to change BENADUM's field allotment until notification is received from Headquarters. It would appear that the easiest means of now adjusting his pay account would be to refund the pre-paid premiums and begin payroll deductions for the life insurance.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

12 July 1962

DISTRIBUTION:
~~3~~ 2-Finance Division
2-WH Division
2-Files

4/10 Hqs Finance [illegible]
has paid through Dec.
[illegible] '62

[illegible]

SECRET

13374

S-E-C-R-E-T

LIFE INSURANCE APPLICATION
(CONTRACT LIFE)

POLICY NO. 46

EFFECTIVE DATE 4-25-62

TOTAL PREMIUM PAID 24.00

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (P) [illegible] K. [illegible]
First M. Last

[illegible]

DATE OF BIRTH ______ MONTHLY PREMIUM ______ ANNUAL SALARY 13,730 INSURANCE CLASS III

(CHECK APPROPRIATE BLOCK):

Male /X/ Full-time Employee
Female / / Yes /X/ No / /

NAME OF BENEFICIARY (T) [illegible] Relationship Wife
First and Middle only

DATE SIGNED 19 April 1962 (P) [illegible]
Signature of Employee

TO : FD.

SUBJECT : Authority to Make Payroll Deductions

I hereby authorize you to deduct the sum of $12.00 (w.s.)

per pay period from my salary starting with the pay period beginning

19 Apr 1962. These deductions are to continue

until terminated by me in writing.

(P) Signature

Code 5

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

✩ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-O-320086

1. Agency and organizational designation: DDP/WH

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): BENADUM, Jeremy K. (P) Career Agent

2. Payroll period:

3. Block No.:

4. Slip No.:

6. Grade and salary: $13, 730

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks: [illegible]

11. Appropriation(s):

12. Prepared by: gah 25 Jan 62

13. Audited by:

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
Apr62	30Oct60	325 $13, 730	$14, 055

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods): Period(s)

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised

Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S. October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

6/9/61

COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE & RETURN BOTH COPIES TO THE INSURANCE BRANCH THRU APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANNELS

HOSPITALIZATION APPLICATION
(CONTRACT PLAN)

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK.
POLICY NO. 459
EFFECTIVE DATE 6/25/61
CODE 902

*NAME OF EMPLOYEE JEREMY K. BENADUM
(First) (Middle) (Last)

DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug. 1915

MONTHLY PREMIUM

MARRIED /X/ SINGLE / /

SINGLE PLAN / / FAMILY PLAN /X/

FULL TIME EMPLOYEE /X/ YES
/ / NO

U.S. CITIZEN /X/ RESIDENT ALIEN / /

COVERED BY PRESENT TIE-UP PLAN
/ / YES /X/ NO

*PLEASE NOTE: "Name of Employee" and "Employee's Signature" should agree with the one shown on contract with the Agency.

(TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION)

Charlotte E. [illegible]
(PERSON TO CONTACT)

WH/3/Mexico 2555, 3162
(DIVISION) (EXT.)

1015 [illegible] Hall
(ROOM NO.) (BLDG.)

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT AS CONTRACT EMPLOYEE [illegible] 1960

EMPLOYEE'S PAYROLL NO. 058865

IS EMPLOYEE PAYROLLED
26 days /X/ monthly / /
Bi-weekly / /

IF FAMILY PLAN, COMPLETE FOLLOWING:
NAME OF WIFE/HUSBAND AILEEN K. BENADUM
(First) (Middle Initial)

CHILDREN UNDER [illegible] (A protected person's children shall include unmarried children under age [illegible]. Also, any step-children, legally adopted children, and foster children provided such children are dependent upon the protected person for support and maintenance.)

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	NAME	DATE OF BIRTH
2-Anne	9/17/48		
3-Joanne	5/6/50		
4-Mario	7/14/51		
5-Frederick	8/16/57		
6-Margaret	9/29/59		
7-[illegible]	[illegible]		

I hereby authorize deductions from my salary for payment of premiums under this contract.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

APPROVED:

Barnson
Administrative Officer of Division

*EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE [illegible] K. [illegible]
(See instructions above following*)

Date 15 March 1961

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [illegible]

DATE: 14 Jul 61

FROM : [illegible], Medical Staff

SUBJECT: [illegible]

[illegible] has been evaluated by the Medical Staff and found physically qualified for [illegible] assignment.

[illegible]
Administrative Officer

[illegible]

SECRET

Re: Banking Instructions

Although writer can bank [illegible] and accounts [illegible] the U.S., he feels that for security reasons it would be preferable to handle all salary payments, les[illegible] for retirement, [illegible] insurance, withholding [illegible], [illegible] in [illegible]

Mexico, D.F.
19 March, 1961

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned hereby certifies that he has received no compensation, allowances or benefits in kind from writer's cover activities during the period: October 30, 1960 to date.

Mexico, D.F.
15 March, 1961

Jeremy K. Benadum

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned hereby certifies that his previous employment by the U.S. Government terminated October 29, 1960, and that final salary payment for this employment covered the period October 16 through October 29, 1960.

Mexico, D.F.
15 March, 1961

Jeremy K. Benadum

[illegible] of Station, Mexico [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated

REFERENCE: [illegible]-9513

[illegible] 17 [illegible]

[illegible] Indexing [illegible]

1. The following information and/or documents are submitted in compliance with reference dispatch:

a. Original Form [illegible] signed in pseudonym.

b. Signed statement concerning banking instructions wherein Subject requests that all payments be made locally in pesos.

c. Since Subject wants his entire net pay paid locally, it is requested that Headquarters compute his pay and advise Station of the net pay which will represent his local field allotment.

d. Subject will be reimbursed actual quarters expenses locally, in accordance with FR 45-1050.

e. HEMADUM desires the hospitalization contract. Hospitalization Application (Contract Plan) is forwarded herewith in duplicate.

f. It is requested that Headquarters compute HEMADUM's pay from 30 October 1960 through the present pay period. Upon advice of the net amount due Subject, Station will collect any overpayments (or pay underpayments) and T/A the correct amount to Headquarters. Subsequently, his net pay will be considered field allotments and amounts paid will be T/A'd to Headquarters.

g. Certification of HEMADUM's sick and annual (accumulated) leave and the amount paid in a lump sum by his former employer for "accrued annual leave" are being forwarded in a separate dispatch.

h. HEMADUM has been advised by the COS to the effect that he must advise KUBARK before he applies for ODYOKE retirement.

i. Original signed contract is returned herewith. Copy of the contract has been retained for Station files.

j. Forwarded herewith is signed certification by HEMADUM concerning income from his cover activity as required by Para. 7, "Offset", of his contract.

k. Attached are Report of Medical History and certification from the examining physician in accordance with Para. 14(b) of Subject's contract.

2. The Station wishes to make the following additional observations:

a. Neither contract nor transmittal letter indicated the amount of "Cost of Living" Allowances Subject will receive, in accordance with Para. 6(b) of his contract. It is presumed that this computation will be received with his pay computation.

b. Subject's contract does not provide for "non-official cover premium pay" as originally requested by Station. Please advise.

c. Additional allowances as provided in Para. [illegible] of Subject's contract will be accounted for and paid locally, if Headquarters has no objections.

Willard C. CURTIS

14 April 1961

Attachments:
As stated

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters w/att
3 - Files

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
DATE POSTED	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: ~~See~~ paragraphs 2 and 3

REFERENCES : A. HMMT-1802, 25 January 1961
B. MEXI-6843, 2 December 1960

1. Attached is a Headquarters contract for Subject effective 30 October 1960, thus giving Subject continuity in his Government service and eligibility to continue his Government retirement. The contract is for the salary of a GS-15 step one.

2. The Station should comply with the following administrative requirements at its earliest convenience.

a. Submit a W-4 or a Form 313.

b. Forward banking instructions.

c. Inform Headquarters whether BENADUM desires a field allotment, the amount, and the effective date.

d. Inform Headquarters whether the Station plans to give BENADUM a quarters allowance under FR 45-1050. If not, please submit a quarters application.

e. Does BENADUM want hospitalization per paragraph 8 (e) of his contract? If so, please have him fill out the attached application. The premiums will be deducted from his salary. Information on the policy is also attached for BENADUM's information. (Please refer to Book Dispatch 2220 dated 11 October 1960.)

f. With regard to the oral agreement, Headquarters could not approve it since it was for $15,000 per year and not for the first step of a

CONTINUED

Attachments: (HEREWITH)
Contract (original and 1)
Memorandum and application for health insurance

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City, w/atts.
1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mex/Chrono
1 - FD/SAAS/Hudson

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
28 Feb. 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
2 MAR 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMM-W-9511

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-287227

GS-15, $13,730. The Station has two choices. It can collect all monies paid to BENADUM under his oral agreement, whereupon Headquarters can effect payment of salary and allowances effective 30 October 1960. Or an alternative method would be for the Station to notify Headquarters of a breakdown of what has been paid BENADUM, on the basis of which Headquarters would start payrolling BENADUM, deducting any overpayment of salary from net salaries due. Please advise Headquarters which method the Station and BENADUM prefer.

g. In order to establish BENADUM's leave record with KUBARK, BENADUM should furnish any final pay slip he might have received, which would reflect the amount of annual and sick leave he had as of his date of resignation and also, his salary rate at the time of resignation. If BENADUM has no such slip, a certified statement of the above is required. Since BENADUM's contract is effective 30 October 1960, the day after the end of his annual leave for 1960, BENADUM must return to KUBARK the gross amount he received from ODENVY for his "accrued carry-over" of 633 hours.

h. BENADUM should be told that he must advise KUBARK, should he still be in our employ, before he applies for ODYOKE retirement for which he will be eligible when he becomes 50 years of age because of his ODENVY service.

9. The Station should return to Headquarters the original signed copy of the attached contract. The copy may be retained by the Station.

END OF DISPATCH

SECRET

DHAHRAN CAIRO BEIRUT JIDDA

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF [illegible]

INFO CCO 2, OP 2, S/C 2

21 Feb 61 23 06 z

DEFERRED

X ROUTINE

OUT 76099

TO DHAH CAIR (FOR HYBRID) INFO BEIR JIDD CITE DIR 26357

26357

SOCALM

REF: DHAH-1233 (IN 45643)*
TAIZ-0179 (IN 47450)**

1. SUGGEST HYBRID MEET AND BRIEF TILSTOCK BEIR PRIOR 15 MARCH. DHAH ADVISE HYBRID VIA CAIR BEIR ETA TILSTOCK AND CONTACT PLAN.

2. KUBARK CONTRACT FOR T POUCHED DHAH FOR SIGNATURE. COVER CONTRACT SHOULD BE IN BEIR BEFORE 15 MARCH.

END OF MESSAGE

* TILSTOCK ETA 15 MARCH BEIRUT TO SIGN ICA CONTRACT.
** HYBRID PLANS TO BE IN BEIRUT UNTIL 15 MARCH.

NE/SS G P Thompson

CNE/2/UAR

CNE/3/IAJ

NE/COPS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/NE/2

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No

DISPATCH

	PROCESSING
X	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraphs 2 and 3

REFERENCES : A. HMMT-1008, 25 January 1961
B. HKI-6843, 2 December 1960

1. Attached is a Headquarters contract for Subject effective 30 October 1960, thus giving Subject continuity in his Government service and eligibility to continue his Government retirement. The contract is for the salary of a GS-15 step one.

2. The Station should comply with the following administrative requirements at its earliest convenience.

a. Submit a 5-3 or a Form 313.

b. Forward banking instructions.

c. Inform Headquarters whether BENADUM desires a field allotment, the amount, and the effective date.

d. Inform Headquarters whether the Station plans to give BENADUM a quarters allowance under FR 45-1050. If not, please submit a quarters application.

e. Does BENADUM want hospitalization per paragraph 8 (e) of his contract? If so, please have him fill out the attached application. The premiums will be deducted from his salary. Information on the policy is also attached for BENADUM's information. (Please refer to Book Dispatch 5120 dated 11 October 1960.)

f. With regard to the oral agreement, Headquarters could not approve it since it was for $15,000 per year and not for the first step of a

CONTINUED

Attachments: (HEREWITH)
Contract (original and 1)
Memorandum and application for health insurance

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/atts.
1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/1/Mexico/Chrono
1 - FD/SAAS/[illegible]

DATE TYPED
DATE DISPATCHED

21 Feb. 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-8513

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-287277

GS-15, $13,730. The Station has two choices. It can collect all monies paid to BEZADEH under his oral agreement, whereupon Headquarters can effect payment of this, and [illegible] effective 30 October 1960. Or an alternative method would be for the Station to notify Headquarters of a breakdown of what has been paid BEZADEH, on the basis of which Headquarters would start payrolling BEZADEH, deducting any overpayment of salary from net salaries due. Please advise Headquarters which method the Station and BEZADEH prefer.

8. In order to establish BEZADEH's leave record with KUBARK, BEZADEH should furnish any final pay slip he might have received, which would reflect the amount of annual and sick leave he had as of his date of resignation and also, his salary rate at the time of resignation. If BEZADEH has no such slip, a certified statement of the above is required. Since BEZADEH's contract is effective 30 October 1960, the day after the end of his annual leave for 1960, BEZADEH must return to KUBARK the [illegible] amount he received from ODENVY for his "accrued overpayment" of [illegible] hours.

9. BEZADEH should be told that he must advise KUBARK, should he still be in our employ, before he applies for ODENVY retirement for which he will be eligible when he becomes 50 years of age because of his ODENVY service.

10. The Station should return to Headquarters the original signed copy of the attached contract. The copy may be retained by the Station.

END OF DISPATCH

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :	550 1 DEC 60
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	MEXICO CITY
ACTION :	C/WH 2
INFO :	COP, C/CCD 2, C/CI, DD/S, S/A, D/OP, D/OS 2, S/C

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3	[illegible]	6	

DEC 2 0022Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 10827

10

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 6843

RYBAT

PUGH FROM CURTIS

REF A MEXI 6677 (IN 38281)

~~B DIR 13215~~ (out 95542)

CC (S. [illegible])

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM'S CURRENT ANNUAL LEAVE TERMINATED 29 OCTOBER PERIOD COVERED BY ACCUMULATED ANNUAL LEAVE ENDS 14 FEBRUARY 1961. BENADUM RECEIVED LUMP SUM CH~~A~~ECK FOR ACCUMULATED ANNUAL LEAVE WHICH HE WILL ENDORSE AND SEND TO KUBARK.

2. SUBJECT KNOWN BY OD~~A~~ENVY TO BE INDEPENDENT FINACIALLY AND CAN MAITAIN COVER OF RETIREMENT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY INSOFAR AS EXPLAINING SOURCE OF INCOME AND CONTINUED RESIDENCE MEXI. COS HAS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SEEN STATEMENT FROM CALIFORNIA BANK SAYING BENADUM HAS OVER 100,000 CASH ACCOUNT. CERTIFIED STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT BEING USED TO GET "RENTISTA" STATUS WITH MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION HE AND WIFE HAVE VALUABLE CALIFORNIA PROPERTIES.

3. IN CONSIDERING ADVISABILITY OF REVEALING TO ODENVY THE TRUE RELATIONSHIP OF BENADUM WITH KTCV Portion Garbled-Being Svcd BE WEIGHED PRIOR TO TAKING ANY ACTION:

A. STATION CONCURS IT IMPERATIVE BENADUM/KUBARK TRUE RELATIONSHIP BE KEPT ON NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

B. BENADUM ADVISES CURRENT ODENVY CHIEF MEXI WAS JEALOUS AND HIGHLY CRITICAL OF BENADUM'S CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF MEXI STATION MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS RESIGNATION.

C. SHOULD ODENVY CHIEF MEXI BECOME AWARE BENADUM FULL TIME EMPLOYEE OF KUBARK HE CAN BE EXPECTED TAKE ACTION TO HINDER OR IMPEDE HIS EFFECTIVENESS AS DEEP COVER AGENT FOR KUBARK. BENADUM NOT CONCERNED MEXI ODENVY CHIEF'S ABILITY TO SABOTAGE HIS WORK BUT

FEELS THAT THIS IS SITUATION THAT BEST BE AVOIDED.

D. AGREE BENADUM HAS RIGHT TO RESIGN AND KUBARK HAS RIGHT TO HIRE BUT STATION ALSO OF OPINION THAT IN SITUATION SUCH AS PRESENT CASE KUBARK HAS RIGHT TO HIRE AND PROTECT THE IDENTITY OF ANY DEEP COVER AGENT. FROM LEGAL POINT OF VIEW BENADUM RELATIONSHIP WITH ODENVY HAS TERMINATED AND HE NOT DIFFERENT NOW FROM ANY OTHER PBPRIMER THAT KUBARK WOULD HIRE ABROAD TO DO DEEP COVER WORK. STATION FEELS AND BENADUM CONCURS THAT ODENVY AWARENESS OF DETAILS OF THIS CASE COULD DEFINITELY DESTROY DEEP COVER EFFECTIVENESS.

E. FROM OPERATIONAL SECURITY POINT OF VIEW STATION OPPOSED

ODENVY BECOME KNOWLEDGEABLE OF KUBARK CONTACT WITH LITEMPO/2 JUST THE SAME AS STATION WOULD MOST ENERGETICALLY PROTEST THEIR AWARENESS OF KUBARK CONTACT WITH LITENSOR, LIERGO, LIELEGANT, OR LIENVOY TECH UNIT.

F. CHIEF ODENVY MEXI VERY DESIROUS HAVE CONTACT WITH LITEMPO/2 WHICH WAS POSSIBLE IN PAST ONLY THROUGH BENADUM/LITEMPO/1 FRIENDSHIP.

C. STATION OF OPINION THAT IN CASE BENADUM WAS BEING CONSIDERED FOR EMPLOYMENT AS REGULAR KUBARK STAFF THAT NORMAL HIRING PROCEDURE WOULD APPLY BUT CONSIDER IT IMPRUDENT TO ADVISE ODENVY OF WHAT PROMISES TO BE AN EXCELLENT DEEP COVER OPERATION.

4. STATION OF OPINION THAT BEST WAY AVOID SITUATION WITH ODENVY WITHOUT REVEALING THE MORE IMPORTANT FACTS IS FOLLOWING PROCEDURE:

A. IF ODENVY HAS TO KNOW OF OFFICIAL BENADUM/KUBARK RELATIONSHIP ADVISE ODENVY THROUGH LIAISON CHANNELS THAT KUBARK DESIRES SECURITY CLEARANCE FOR DISCUSSION CLASSIFIED MATERIAL WITH BENADUM AS "CONFIDENTIAL CONTACT OF CURTIS"

B. ODENVY WILL BE PLACED ON NOTICE THAT STATION IN CONTACT WITH BENADUM BUT WOULD NOT REVEAL FULL DETAILS OF TRUE KUBARK/BENADUM RELATIONSHIP.

C. PROCESSING OF THIS INFORMATION THROUGH LIAISON CHANNELS RATHER THAN KUSODA WOULD TEND DISPEL IMPRESSION BENADUM EMPLOYED FULL TIME BY KUBARK.

D. TO TELL ODENVY ONLY PART OF [illegible] WOULD BE ENOUGHT BASIS TO REFUTE ANY ARGUMENTS IN CASE ODENVY DECIDES MAKE ISSUE OF MATTER. BUT STATION UNABLE UNDERSTAND WHAT RIGHT ODENVY HAS TO MAKE ISSUE OF KUBARK HIRING OF FREE AND UNEMPLOYED PBPRIME CITIZEN.

5. IF HQS CONSIDERES IT IMPERATIVE THAT ODENVY BE ADVISED THIS MATTER IMMEDIATELY STATION REQUESTS THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN EXPIRATION DATE OF BENADUM'S ACCUMULATED ANNUAL LEAVE MENTIONED IN PARA 1 AND THAT ODENVY BE ADVISED AFTER 14 FEB OF INTENTION USE BENADUM AS STATION (COS) CONTACT.

6. RE SAM PAPICH INQUIRIES, BENADUM ADVISES THAT PAPICH IS FRIEND OF LONG STANDING WHOSE INQUIRIES HAVE BEEN PERSONAL RATHER THAN DIRECTED BY ODENVY.

7. IN FINAL ANALYSIS OF WHOLE PROBLEM HQS HAS ULTIMATE DECISION THIS PROBLEM BUT STATION OF OPINION THAT JUDGING FROM ODENVY CHIEF MEXI ATTITUDE TOWARD KUBARK IN PAST AND PRESENT THAT NOT MUCH WOULD BE GAINED AND A GREAT DEAL LOST BY REVEALING ALL THE FACTS TO ODENVY IN THIS CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

3

DATE :

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2

INFO : COP, C/CCD 2, C/CI, DD/S, SSA, D/OP, D/OS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING		
1		4
2		5
3		6

NOV 5 0709Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 38281

DIR CITE MEXI 6677

RYBAT

REF DIR 89217 (out 87521)

1. SUBJ WISHES CAREER AGENT STATUS WITH FOLLOWING:

A. KUBARK RETIREMENT WITH ANY LEGAL ADJUSTMENTS FOR FUTURE;

B. TERMINAL LEAVE ENDED 29 OCT EXCEPT FOR "ACCRUED CARRY-OVER" OF 633 HOURS. SUBJ WISHES GIVE AMOUNT RECEIVED FOR THIS TO KUBARK AND HAVE THIS 633 CARRIED OVER.

C. REQUEST BEGIN ON KUBARK PAYROLL ON 1 NOV. AS KNOWN TO URQUHART, SUBJ HAS BEEN WORKING FOR SEVERAL WEEKS FOR KUBARK WITHOUT PAY.

D. COVER IS REALISTA. SUBJ HAS NOTARIZED STATEMENT FROM BANK IN CALIFORNIA THAT HE HAS "OVER $122,000" ON DEPOSIT. IN ADDITION INCOME FROM PERSONALLY OWNED PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA SUFFICIENT TO TAKE CARE FINANCES NEEDS SUBJ AND FAMILY.

E. FORWARDING COPIES OF LETTER FROM HEAD ODENVY CONGRATULATING SUBJ ON COMPLETION TWENTY YEARS SERVICE, SUBJ'S LETTER OF RESIGNATION AND LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE. COS CAN PERSONALLY ASSURE CHIEF, KUSODA THAT SUBJ WAS IN GOOD STANDING WITH ODENVY AT TIME OF RESIGNATION.

2. COS STRONGLY URGES THAT NO REPEAT NO CHECK BE MADE WITH ODENVY ON SUBJECT OR ON LITEMPO/1. ANY CHECK, DISCREET OR OTHERWISE, WILL

Clayton Caldwell

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

[illegible] [illegible] OF [illegible] CHIEF NOTIFIED WITHIN [illegible] ... [illegible] SUBJ EMPLOYED BY KUBARK. THIS WOULD ENDANGER SECURITY OF LITEMPO OPERATION, WOULD PREJUDICE LITEMPO/1 AND LITEMPO/2 (ODENVY HAS "LIAISON ON CRIMINAL MATTERS" WITH LITEMPO/2).

3. COS AGREES THAT AFTER A TIME A CHECK COULD BE MADE WITH ODENVY BUT AT PRESENT SUCH CHECK WOULD MAKE IT OBVIOUS THAT INSTEAD OF RESIGNING FOR PERSONAL REASONS SUBJ RESIGNED (AND TOOK LITEMPO/1 WITH HIM) TO COME TO KUBARK.

4. APPRECIATE REF CABLE AND REQUEST ADVICE ON ANY ACTIONS STATION CAN TAKE TO FACILITATE AND SPEED APPROVAL OF PROJECT AND HIRING OF SUBJ.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED STATION RECONSIDER AND USE CAREER OR CONTRACT STATUS. IF STILL PREFERRED STAFF AGENT STATUS, SUBMIT DETAILED JUSTIFICATION CHOICE.

ORIG : CHARLOTTE L. ZID. jmc
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO 538
EXT : 2555
DATE : 31 OCTOBER 1960

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 2
INFO : COP, C/CCD 2, C/CI, D/OP, D/OS 2, S/C 2, OD/S, SS

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

87521

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 09817

RYBAT 09817

REF: MEXI 1610

1. CHOICE STAFF AGENT STATUS RATHER THAN CAREER OR CONTRACT AGENT STATUS FOR SUBJ MUST BE JUSTIFIED IN DETAIL TO KUDOVE AGENT PANEL WHICH IN PAST KNOWN TO FAVOR CAREER AGENT STATUS FOR THIS TYPE INDIVIDUAL. IF PANEL APPROVES STAFF STATUS THEN SUBMIT CASE TO CHIEF KUDOVE WHO MUST APPROVE EXCEPTION TO KUDOVE POLICY OF NO HIRING OF STAFF TYPE PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES AT HIGH GRADES.

2. SUGGEST STATION RECONSIDER AND USE CAREER OR CONTRACT STATUS. IF STILL PREFER STAFF AGENT STATUS SUBMIT DETAILED JUSTIFICATION CHOICE.

3. DOES SUBJ WANT KUBARK RETIREMENT BENEFITS? UNDER CAREER AGENT/STATUS MAY HAVE RETIREMENT OR SOCIAL SECURITY.

4. UNDER STAFF OR CAREER AGENT/STATUS CANNOT PICK UP SUBJ UNTIL END OF PAID TERMINAL LEAVE PERIOD HOWEVER SUBJ MAY ATTEST TO ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE ACCRUED AS OF END EMPLOYMENT ODENVY AND REIMBURSES KUBARK FOR ALL UNUSED ANNUAL LEAVE WHICH CAN BE CREDITED TO HIM UNDER KUBARK. ADVISE DATES TERMINAL LEAVE PERIOD AND CHOICE.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

PAGE 2

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
INITIALS
INITIALS

OUT 87521 DIR 09217

TO INFO CITE DIR

5. POUCH DETAILS COVER. STATION MAY WISH CONSIDER CONTRACT AGENT STATUS IF OFFSET CLAUSE APPLICABLE.

6. FORWARD HQS COPY ODENVY RESIGNATION ACTION SUBJ AND REASONS SUBJS RESIGNATION.

7. KUSODA DEEMS DISCREET CHECK ODENVY RECORDS NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH BASIC SECURITY PRACTICES. BELIEVE FAILURE INDICATE TO ODENVY ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS POSSIBLE OF INTEREST IN SUBJ MAY HARM RELATIONS BETWEEN ODENVY AND KUBARK AT BOTH HQS AND FIELD LEVEL IF KUBARK USE OF SUBJ EVER DETECTED. IF SUBJS COVERT ACTIVITIES EVER UNCOVERED IT WOULD BE ASSUMED HIS WORK BEING DONE ON BEHALF ODENVY WHICH COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING KUBARK. IN VIEW ~~RETIREMENT~~ RESIGNATION SUBJ HQS DOES NOT SEE HOW INFORMING ODENVY COULD JEOPARDIZE LITEMPO OP. STATION COMMENTS ON ABOVE REQUESTED. IF STATION STILL FIRM ON STAND NO ODYOKE CHECKS AND HAS CONSIDERATIONS OVERRIDING POINTS CITED ABOVE, PLS CABLE DETAILS FOR CONSIDERATION OF CASE BY CHIEF KUSODA. LCFLUTTER REQUIRED FOR STAFF STATUS.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Subject is George Munro

WH/Pers/Bowers
CPD/Leutcher
Agent Panel/Armstrong
D/IB/OS/Hanby
CI/CPS/Brown
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

[illegible] F. HOLMAN
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

Mr. Jeremy K. Benadum

Dear Mr. Benadum:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. Your status is that of a Government employee under contract and, as such, your rights and benefits are governed by the provisions of this agreement. It is specifically understood that you are not entitled to rights and benefits pertaining to appointed staff status, except as provided herein.

2. Cover. In the performance of your services hereunder, you will act under cover suitable to conceal your ~~relationship~~ with the Government. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

3. Compensation and Taxes. For your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at a basic salary of $13,730 per annum, the equivalent of a GS-15. You will be entitled to within grade promotions and legislative pay adjustments in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed personnel. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. Unless precluded by such requirements, taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

4. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) living quarters allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be provided quarters by your cover facility or the Government and, in such event, you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost of living allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations including, but not limited to, an education allowance.

5. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for authorized operational travel. In addition, upon the completion of each two (2) years of successful overseas service under this contract, you may be authorized home leave travel expenses for you and your dependents from your permanent post of duty overseas to your place of recorded residence in the United States and return travel expenses to your permanent post of duty overseas provided, however, that you have fulfilled any other requirements relating to home leave which are applicable to Government appointed employees. You may be entitled to per

diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel pursuant hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or those of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

6. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with Government regulations or those of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

7. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government or your cover facility to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

8. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives.

(d) Your Civil Service retirement status is preserved by virtue of the fact that you have transferred without a break in service from a position subject to Civil Service retirement deductions to your present status as an employee of the Government under contract. Contributions to the Civil Service Retirement Fund will be deducted by the Government from the basic compensation due you hereunder, i.e., presently $13, 730 per annum. In the event circumstances of your cover warrant or require contributions to social security, such contributions will be at your expense and you will not be reimbursed therefor by the Government.

(e) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Career Agent in the line of duty while permanently assigned abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by

the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Career Agent permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

(f) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Career Agents of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(g) You will be entitled to claim reimbursement for loss of personal property pursuant to Government regulations pertaining thereto.

9. Offset. Any and all compensation, allowances or other benefits (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities will be used to offset amounts due you under this contract and will reduce accordingly the Government's direct payment obligation hereunder. Sums so offset are payment by the Government under this contract and for purposes of Federal income taxation. You will report every six (6) months during the term of this agreement all benefits received from or through your cover activities and, if such benefits exceed those due you under this contract, the report will be accompanied by said excess amount, which you hereby agree is the sole property of the Government. Failure to submit timely reports and, as appropriate, excess payments, may result in suspension of any payments due you hereunder. As an alternative to the above, the Government may at any time exercise its basic right to require payment over to it of the emoluments received by you from or through your cover activities which would otherwise be offset as described above. In such cases the Government will pay directly to you the emoluments called for by this contract.

10. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

11. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

12. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

13. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 30 October 1960, and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated either:

(a) Upon thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Jeremy K. Benadum

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: [illegible] Forward original and one copy for each [illegible] contract.

FROM: [illegible]

DIVISION: WH

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: [illegible]

DATE: 15 November 1960

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO: Jeremy K. BENADUM

2A. PROJECT: [illegible]

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Mexico City

3. ALLOTMENT NO.:

4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: None

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): CSC- requested 10 Nov 1960

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., U.S. GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Career Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: USA

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 45

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 8/24/15

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country):

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Mexico City, Mexico

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:

Wife - Born 1/31/17
Daughter - Born 9/17/48
Daughter - Born 3/6/50
Daughter - Born 7/14/51
Son - Born 8/16/57
Daughter - Born 9/19/59

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: NO

21. VETERAN: yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army

24. RANK OR GRADE: 1st Lt.

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $13,730 GS-15/1

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL:

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): None

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY ☐ COVER ☒ CIA ☐ NOT WITHHELD

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: Yes

32. POST:

33. OTHER: [illegible] LWA,
10% Staff ~~and equalization for Staff Agents~~

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): Education Allowance

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PRACTICES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes

43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes

44. OTHER:

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PRACTICES

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST
(CONTINUED)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST PAGE

C. L. Z[illegible]

2555/3162

15 November 1960

COVER BENEFITS

All those noramlly given a Career Agent including retirement. For more details please refer to IN 38281 dated 5 November 1960 from Mexico City.

COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check)	☐ PROPOSED	48. TYPE (Check)	☐ PROPRIETARY	☐ CULTURAL	XX COMMERCIAL
	XX ESTABLISHED		☐ CLASSIFIED	☐ EDUCATIONAL	☐ MILITARY

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)
☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL XX NONE No income from cover

SECTION XI — TERM

52. DURATION indefinite

53. ~~1 [illegible]~~ 30 [illegible] 1960

54. RENEWABLE XX YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days) 30

55. [illegible] OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION XX YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (PI, PP, other)

PI/CE

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

run surveillance team

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

20 years employment with FBI

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)
☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE (No degree) XX COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK FLUENT	SPEAK AVERAGE	SPEAK POOR	WRITE FLUENT	WRITE AVERAGE	WRITE POOR	READ FLUENT	READ AVERAGE	READ POOR
Spanish	X			X			X		/
German			X						X
French			X						X

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Latin America

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

FBI - GS-14, $13,000

Approved by CS/CS Agent Panel
(Date) [illegible]

Secretary, CS/CS Agent Panel

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

NOTE: This is [illegible] Mexico [illegible] Agent [illegible]
C.A. PCS - not in [illegible] OK

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
15 November 1960	C. L. Ketrung		

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : [illegible] 60

	ROUTING
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2

INFO : COP, C/CCO 2, C/CI, CI/S, SSA, D/OP, S/CS 2, S/C 2

NOV 5 0709Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 38281

DIR CITE MEXI 6677

RYBAT

REF DIR 89217 ([illegible])

1. SUBJ WISHES CAREER AGENT STATUS WITH FOLLOWING:

A. KUBARK RETIREMENT WITH ANY LEGAL ADJUSTMENTS FOR FUTURE;

B. TERMINAL LEAVE [illegible] FOR "ACCRUED [illegible]-OVER" OF 633 HOURS. SUBJ WISHES GIVE [illegible] FOR THIS TO KUBARK AND HAVE THIS 633 CARRIED OVER.

C. REQUEST [illegible] ON 1 NOV. AS [illegible] TO URQUHART, SUBJ HAS BEEN WORKING [illegible] FOR KUBARK WITHOUT PAY.

D. COVER [illegible] STATEMENT FROM BANK IN CALIFORNIA THAT HE HAS "OVER [illegible]" ON DEPOSIT. IN ADDITION INCOME FROM PERSONALLY OWNED PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA SUFFICIENT TO TAKE CARE FINANCES NEEDS SUBJ AND FAMILY.

E. FORWARDING COPIES OF LETTER [illegible] CONGRATULATING SUBJ ON COMPLETION [illegible] YEARS [illegible], SUBJ'S LETTER OF RESIGNATION AND LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE, [illegible] THAT SUBJ WAS IN GOOD STANDING [illegible] AT TIME OF RESIGNATION.

2. [illegible]

CHECK [illegible] MADE WITH [illegible]

[illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

[illegible] EMPLOYED BY KUBARK. THIS WOULD EMBARRASS [illegible] TION, WOULD PREJUDICE [illegible] (AS [illegible] HAS "LIAISON ON CRIMINAL MATTERS" WITH [illegible]).

3. COS AGREES THAT AFTER A TIME A CHECK COULD BE MADE WITH ODENVY BUT AT PRESENT SUCH CHECK WOULD MAKE IT OBVIOUS THAT INSTEAD OF RESIGNING FOR PERSONAL REASONS SUBJ RESIGNED (AND TOOK LITEMPO/1 WITH HIM) TO COME TO KUBARK.

4. APPRECIATE REF CABLE AND REQUEST ADVICE ON ANY ACTIONS STATION CAN TAKE TO FACILITATE AND SPEED APPROVAL OF PROJECT AND HIRING OF [illegible].

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED STATION RECONSIDER AND USE CAREER OR CONTRACT STATUS, IF STILL PREFERRED STAFF AGENT STATUS, SUBMIT DETAILED JUSTIFICATION CHOICE.

ORIG: CHARLOTTE L. ZEHRUN
UNIT: WH/3/MEXICO 538
EXT: 2555
DATE: 31 OCTOBER 1960

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 2

INFO: COP, C/CCD 2, C/CI, D/OP, D/OS 2, S/C 2, DD/S, SS

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

INITIALS

INITIALS

87521

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR [illegible]

RYBAT 09217

Jeremy K. [illegible]

REF: HMMT 1610 *

1. CHOICE STAFF AGENT STATUS RATHER THAN CAREER OR CONTRACT AGENT STATUS FOR SUBJ MUST BE JUSTIFIED IN DETAIL TO KUDOVE AGENT PANEL WHICH IN PAST KNOWN TO FAVOR CAREER AGENT STATUS FOR THIS TYPE INDIVIDUAL. IF PANEL APPROVES STAFF STATUS THEY SUBMIT CASE TO CHIEF KUDOVE WHO MUST APPROVE EXCEPTION TO KUDOVE POLICY OF NO HIRING OF STAFF TYPE PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES AT HIGH GRADES.

2. SUGGEST STATION RECONSIDER AND USE CAREER OR CONTRACT STATUS. IF STILL PREFER STAFF AGENT STATUS SUBMIT DETAILED JUSTIFICATION CHOICE.

3. DOES SUBJ WANT KUBARK RETIREMENT BENEFITS? UNDER CAREER AGENT STATUS MAY HAVE RETIREMENT OR SOCIAL SECURITY.

4. UNDER STAFF OR CAREER AGENT STATUS CANNOT PICK UP SUBJ UNTIL END OF PAID TERMINAL LEAVE PERIOD HOWEVER SUBJ MAY ATTEST TO ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE ACCRUED AS OF END EMPLOYMENT ODENVY AND REIMBURSE KUBARK FOR ALL UNUSED ANNUAL LEAVE WHICH CAN BE CREDITED TO HIM UNDER KUBARK. ADVISE DATES TERMINAL LEAVE PERIOD AND CHOICE.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PAGE 2

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY
INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
INITIALS

OUT 87521 CIR 09217

TO
INFO
CITE DIR

5. POUCH DETAILS COVER. STATION MAY WISH CONSIDER CONTRACT AGENT STATUS IF OFFSET CLAUSE APPLICABLE.

6. FORWARD HQS COPY ODENVY RESIGNATION ACTION SUBJ AND REASONS SUBJS RESIGNATION.

7. KUSODA DEEMS DISCREET CHECK ODENVY RECORDS NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH BASIC SECURITY PRACTICES. BELIEVE FAILURE INDICATE TO ODENVY ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS POSSIBLE OP INTEREST IN SUBJ MAY HARM RELATIONS BETWEEN ODENVY AND KUBARK AT BOTH HQS AND FIELD LEVEL IF KUBARK USE OF SUBJ EVER DETECTED. IF SUBJS COVERT ACTIVITIES EVER UNCOVERED IT WOULD BE ASSUMED HIS WORK BEING DONE ON BEHALF ODENVY WHICH COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING KUBARK. IN VIEW ~~XXXXXXXX~~ RESIGNATION SUBJ HQS DOES NOT SEE HOW INFORMING ODENVY COULD JEOPARDIZE LITEMPO OP. STATION COMMENTS ON ABOVE REQUESTED. IF STATION STILL FIRM ON STAND NO ODYOKE CHECKS AND HAS CONSIDERATIONS OVERRIDING POINTS CITED ABOVE, PLS CABLE DETAILS FOR CONSIDERATION OF CASE BY CHIEF KUSODA. LCFLUTTER REQUIRED FOR STAFF STATUS.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Subject is George Munro

WH/Pers/Bowers
CPD/Leutcher
Agent Panel/Armstrong
D/IB/CG/Hamby
CI/OPS/Brown
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

NED P. HOLMAN
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIGREN, Lee H.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 11 Sept 1950 - 12 JAN 1978

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: Office of Personnel

ROOM: 5E 13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

MENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

7 Feb SETD 70 Aug EOTD 18 Aug EOTD 21 [illegible] 66
[illegible] Computation 1 Oct 1964

WIGREN LEE H
SSN 026-16-4073
DOB 12/

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

12 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee H. Wigren

VIA : Head of Career Service

FROM : B. DeFelice
Acting Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. In order to assist employees in planning for their eventual retirement, it is the practice of the Agency to inform each employee, well in advance of retirement, of the services the Agency provides for retirement planning.

2. The prospect of retirement deserves serious thought and careful planning so that you may make the transition to the next phase of life with purpose and confidence. To assist you in this regard, the Agency offers various resources which are attuned to the needs of prospective retirees. You will, in the future, be invited by a Retirement Counselor to an individual pre-retirement counseling session, or more than one if you wish. This phase of retirement planning will be tailored solely to your own particular situation and circumstances and will be within the context of the retirement system under which you will retire. The individual counseling sessions are intended to give you a wide range of information on such matters as estimates of your annuity, survivor benefits, life and health insurance, Social Security, taxes, and assistance in obtaining other employment. In addition, you will be invited to attend a Retirement Information Seminar that will be offered in the autumn of 1978.

3. Experience has amply demonstrated that advance preparation eases the transition to retirement. I recommend, strongly, that you avail yourself of the services the Agency offers you in planning your own retirement.

B DeFelice
B. DeFelice

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 AUGUST 1976

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 29 YEAR 76

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. CAN AND OBCA: T227-0171 0002

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI STAFF
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OP~~ERATIONS~~S OFFICER SAS (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: EQ15

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAA

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $30,441

18. REMARKS:
FROM: CIS EQ27

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: M.D. MCCALLUM, C/CI/SG
DATE SIGNED: 08/23/76

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CDG/14 K. Seeli
DATE SIGNED: 8/24/76

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 16

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 73560 ALPHABETIC CIS

22. STATION CODE: 75613

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOURS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 12 DA. 01 YR. 23

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—OBGM 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REC/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 31 AUG 1976 Bl 8-25-76

46. CP APPROVAL: Robert H.
DATE APPROVED: 08/31/76

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 MARCH 1976

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 | DAY 28 | YEAR 76
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR ✓
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ✓ | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. [illegible]: 6227-0171 | 0002
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI STAFF
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP
EXTERNAL RESEARCH BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ops ~~OPERATIONS~~ OFFICER CH (15) ✓
12. POSITION NUMBER: EQ27 ✓
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAA ✓
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ✓
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01 ✓
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5 ✓
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 30,441 ✓
18. REMARKS:

from GS 13/8

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [illegible].D. MCCALLUM, C/CI/SG
DATE SIGNED: 03/24/76
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Richard L. Schmidt CMG/13
DATE SIGNED: 4 March 1976

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 NOGITS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	31500	CIS	25213		1	12 01 23	03 28 76	03 28 76

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 4—NONE | CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP | CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: OK 3/25/76
46 O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 3/26/76

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

75-6710

21 NOV 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: John P. O'Reilly
Lee H. Wigren

SUBJECT : Letter of Commendation

We have just completed a high level, sensitive conference of considerable importance to both this Directorate and the Agency. You had the responsibility for virtually every aspect of its organization and administration. The planning and execution had to be done with comprehensive attention to detail without losing sight of our overall objectives. For weeks in advance and, particularly, during the conference itself you carried out your duties with energy, skill and competence which have reflected very creditably upon the Agency. You showed considerable tact and alertness in anticipating problems before they could arise. The close and cooperative relationship you established with the command and support personnel at the meeting site, and your obvious rapport with our various guests, also contributed to the efficient yet cordial environment in which the conference was conducted. You faced demanding and often complex responsibilities, and I commend you for your excellent performance in meeting them.

/s/ William E. Nelson

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 365248

SECRET

24 DEC 1975

CI 535-75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DDO Evaluation Boards

FROM : Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

SUBJECT : Promotion Recommendation for Lee H. Wigren

1. I recommend that Lee H. Wigren be promoted from GS-13 to GS-14. Mr. Wigren has been in grade since May 1962 and is now a GS-13, Step 8. He currently occupies a GS-15, Operations Officer, Branch Chief position.

2. Mr. Wigren was born 1 December 1923. He received a BA degree in Russian Studies from Yale University in 1947 and an MA degree in History from Harvard University in 1950. He entered on duty with CIA as a GS-06 clerk in March 1951. He subsequently attained professional status as an Intelligence Officer in 1952 and since that time has served variously as Intelligence Officer, Area Operations Officer, Biographics Officer, Instructor, and Operations Officer in DIV/D, Europe Division, SE Division, OTR, and since 1968 the Counterintelligence Staff.

3. Most of Mr. Wigren's career has involved CE and CI matters. He has been primarily concerned with various aspects of the Counterintelligence research and analysis activity of SE Division and, since 1968, the Counterintelligence Staff. In the course of his various assignments, he has developed a broad and deep substantive knowledge of the Soviet intelligence and security organs and their activities which has made him one of our more knowledgeable and effective CI analysts. He is careful and thorough in his research, he writes well, and he has an established reputation within and without CIA as an interesting and effective lecturer concerning counterintelligence matters. His career record reflects a consistently professional performance of above-average quality in his various CIA assignments. Additionally, that record is documented by several letters of appreciation from other US Government agencies and foreign liaison services for the highly professional assistance provided them by Mr. Wigren in the counterintelligence field.

2 IMPDET CL BY 012205

SECRET

4. Mr. Wigren is currently Chief of the External Research Branch of the CI Research and Analysis Group. He is performing the duties and responsibilities of this GS-15 position in a satisfactory manner. He manages the complex activities of six staff officers and nine contract personnel associated with this Branch and is responsible for the several research programs in which they are involved. He strives to direct and combine the best talents of the personnel under his supervision toward the achievement of his Branch's objectives while remaining sensitive to the personal and career interests of his employees. He is especially effective in dealing with the several contract personnel (including former defectors) under his supervision who, because of their professional status and diverse ethnic backgrounds, sometimes require especially understanding treatment.

5. In summary, Mr. Wigren is effectively and satisfactorily performing the duties of a GS-15 Branch Chief in a position which requires specialized substantive knowledge and the ability to manage activities and supervise personnel. I believe that his demonstrated ability in this position and his sustained record of job performance at an above-average level since his last promotion clearly merit his promotion to GS-14 at this time.

George T. Kalaris
Chief
Counterintelligence Staff

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 NOVEMBER 1975

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DELEGATION OF NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 28 YEAR 75
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ✓ | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. FAN AND [illegible]: 6227-0170 0002
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/~~CI STAFF~~ CIS ✓
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP
EXTERNAL RESEARCH BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ~~OPERATIONS~~ OPS OFFICER CH (15) ✓
12. POSITION NUMBER: EQ27 ✓
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAA ✓
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ✓
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01 ✓
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 8 ✓
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 28,254 ✓
18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: M.D. MCCALLUM, C/CI/SG
DATE SIGNED: 11/28/75
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CMG/13
DATE SIGNED: 28/11/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	31500	CIS	75813		1	12 01 23		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-2-75 HR 03 DEC 1975
46. [illegible] APPROVAL: Rasmussen
DATE APPROVED: 12/2/75

FORM 1152 1-72 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

201

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 SEPTEMBER 1975

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 | DAY 15 | YEAR 75

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 6227-0170 | 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI STAFF
RESEARCH & ANALYSIS GROUP
EXTERNAL RESEARCH BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS ~~OPERATIONS~~ OFFICER CH (15)

12. POSITION NUMBER: EQ27

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAA

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 8

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 26,905

18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: M.D. MCCALLUM, C/CI/SG

DATE SIGNED: 09/15/75

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CMG/13

DATE SIGNED: 17/9/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31500 | ALPHABETIC C13

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. ROOTS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 12 | DA. 01 | YR. 23

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 9-18-75 03 OCT 1975

46. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 13 Oct 75

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

DD/O 24-6450

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20374

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

C-2037/IS-2

2 5 JAN 1974

Mr. William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Nelson:

(C) It is a distinct pleasure for me to express my sincere appreciation to Messrs. Raymond Rocca, William Decker, William Donnelly, John Bogart, Joseph Flaherty, Lee Wigren, Robert Thomas and Paul Johnson, all members of your staff, for their outstanding participation and support of our new "Soviet Intelligence Elective Seminar." This seminar provided an in-depth examination of the Soviet Intelligence and Security Services for twelve graduate degree candidates enrolled in the School's new Masters Degree Program in Strategic Intelligence.

(U) Each Agency participant displayed a thorough knowledge of the subject interlaced with personal experiences and analyses which made each presentation unique and extremely valuable for the seminar members. In addition to the participants' formal presentations, they also spent valuable time informally talking with individual members of the seminar and faculty. Our students and faculty were enthusiastic in their praise of all aspects for the program; and they especially appreciated the candid discussions of the problems Soviet intelligence poses both for the Agency and the Intelligence Community. Please convey to each participant our sincere thanks for his outstanding presentation and his interest in the School's Graduate Program.

(U) Your continued cooperation in assisting this School to educate students whose intelligence capabilities will be an asset to the Services and Intelligence Community is deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

W. J. Furnas

W. J. FURNAS
Captain, USN
Commandant

Classified by IS-2
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY Two (2)
DECLASSIFY ON cannot be determined

CONFIDENTIAL

"Derivative information from material governed by CIA Regulation 10-29"

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 June 1968

I
53

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 14 YEAR 68

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9227-0170

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/CI STAFF
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0213

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: [redacted] 16329

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDS/OTR (Position No. 1238)

CONCUR:
OTR/Personnel

cc: Finance & Security

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 6-24-68
Ue 7-10 68

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Byron B.
CI STAFF

DATE SIGNED: 20 June 68

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul M.

DATE SIGNED: 27 JUN 1968

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31500 ALPHABETIC CI

22. STATION CODE: 75313

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOOURS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 12 DA. 10 YR. 23

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

D
4

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: From OTR
CG 28-68

46. OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 6/24/68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

Executive Registry
67-1576

South African Police Headquarters,
Private Bag 94,
Pretoria.

17th March, 1967.

Mr. R. Helms,
Central Intelligence Agency,
WASHINGTON D.C.

Dear Mr Helms,

During a recent conversation with one of my officers in connection with the visit of Mr. Henry Planko and Mr. Leo Wigren, it suddenly dawned on me that although I had, at the time, requested both Mr. John Mertz and Messrs. Planko and Wigren to convey my sincere thanks and good wishes to you - which I am sure they did - I had not yet written to you personally in connection with the matter.

Hank and Lee, as we affectionately remember them, proved themselves to be most worthy ambassadors of your country, as well as your service and I feel convinced that they left behind them a number of sincere new friends. They are both obviously experienced officers with a wide and thorough knowledge of their respective fields and we found their lectures highly instructive.

Fortunately, circumstances permitted the majority of my senior officers to attend the course in Pretoria and the lucid manner in which Hank and Lee delivered their lectures, brought us all under a new and deeper awareness of the vital role being played by the United States in the struggle against international communism, and for the very great need of unity and closer co-operation amongst the peoples of the free world if the communist onslaught is to be successfully withstood.

Please once again accept my sincere thanks for having made two such able and experienced officers as Hank and Leo available for the purpose of lecturing to us.

Kindest regards,
Sincerely,

---------------------- Major-General.
H.J. VAN DEN BERGH.
/RVZ

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219

IN REPLY REFER TO:

15 March 1967

Mr. John H. Richardson
Director of Training
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia 20505

Dear Mr. Richardson:

It is a pleasure to express the appreciation of the Staff and Faculty of the U. S. Army Intelligence School for the presentation by Mr. Lee A. Wigren, at Fort Holabird, on 8 March 1967, to personnel attending Class 67-SO-2 of the Senior Foreign Officer Intelligence Course.

Mr. Wigren's discussion of current trends in Soviet foreign policy was factual and timely. His examples of Soviet activity in the foreign policy sphere in Vietnam, the Middle East and Africa were of definite value to this class. The talk was highly interesting and was enthusiastically received.

Thank you for your continued cooperation in our guest speaker program. Would you please convey to Mr. Wigren the appreciation of the Staff and Faculty.

Sincerely,

RICHARD S. SMITH
Colonel, AIS
Commandant

S E C R E T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lee H. Wigren 8 August 1966

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the System, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the System may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you have 15 years or more of Agency service, but have not as yet performed 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees."

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 205, Magazine Building (extension 2847). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the CIA Retirement Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S E C R E T

ORIGINAL	SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (Mo.-day-yr)
CORRECTION	
THIS DATE	SIGNATURE (Office of Personnel)

FORM 171 CONFIDENTIAL GROUP 1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 7 April 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH [illegible] / DAY / YEAR 65

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CP TO V | V TO CP | CP TO CP

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5275-2500

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OTR
School of International Communism
Faculty

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Instr~~uctor~~ Intel (13)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1238

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1712.31

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $~~12,075~~ 12915

18. REMARKS

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 4/14/65

llc 4/21/65

Vice Henry Samoriski

CONCUR: Puffley 4/20/65
CSPO/A

CONCUR: ____ SR Personnel 4-19-65

CONCUR: ____ CSPO/B

Recorded by CSPO
LWT

1cc forwarded to Payroll; 1 cc forwarded to Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
MATTHEW BAIRD, Director of Trng

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	17500	OTR	9501		1	3 01 23		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: SR

46. O P APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 4-21-65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 May 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006195 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 13 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2234 1000 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR
Chief, Operations and Plans
Counterintelligence Branch
Research Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer (CH) ~~B~~
12. POSITION NUMBER: 351
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ~~14~~
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $10635 ✓

18. REMARKS:
From same slot.

VS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: A. B
ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED: 5/10/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 60050 ALPHABETIC SR
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS. CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 12 DA. YR. 23
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. APPT. EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 2 = FICA 3 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: CODE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED: 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5-16-62
46. O.P. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 5/10/62

SECRET

SECRET

5 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Career Service Board, Secretary

SUBJECT : Promotion Recommendation for Mr. Lee H. Wigren

1. In recommending most strongly Mr. Wigren's promotion from GS-12 to GS-13, I feel it is only necessary to emphasize Mr. Wigren's educational background at Yale and Harvard, where he received a B.A. and M.A. in History and Russian; his ten years of work in the Agency on Soviet intelligence in the CI Staff, FI/D, and SR Division; his ability during the past three years in SR to supervise a group of over twelve people performing a variety of research functions, ranging from major studies to operational aids, on the RIS; his appreciation of the counter-intelligence role of the Agency and his furtherance of our mission in that respect by the high standards of excellence of his production; and his vigor in assuming and carrying out the duties of a job formerly held by a GS-15.

2. Mr. Wigren has been in grade for almost four years. He has had responsibilities and performed duties far above his grade level for three of those years while dealing with practically all of the DD/P, other agencies of the government, and foreign intelligence and security services. He is an acknowledged expert in his field and equalled in it by no one else in the Agency, and possibly in the government as a whole. His fitness reports have reflected superior performance in every important respect and outstanding performance in many ways, with the highest personal characteristics possible, doing a job on a uniquely difficult subject, while using and training personnel who all too often have had little or no background for their positions.

3. In my opinion, Mr. Wigren is the most qualified GS-12 in the Division for promotion to GS-13, and I believe that the above comments and our four previous promotion recommendations amply support me.

John M. Maury

JOHN M. MAURY
Chief, SR Division

SECRET

2 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/SS

SUBJECT : Promotion Request,
Lee H. WIGREN

1. It is requested that Mr. Wigren be promoted to GS-13.

2. Mr. Wigren received his BA from Yale in 1947, majoring in history and Russian language and area studies, and his MA from Harvard in 1948 in history. He came on duty with the Soviet Intelligence Branch of what was then Staff C in March 1951, and stayed with that branch as a research analyst on Soviet Intelligence until after its transfer to SR/CE in early 1955, when he transferred to WE Division in search of a field assignment. Such assignment having become increasingly doubtful by 1957, he transferred to FI/D where he remained until assignment to this Division in April 1959 as Chief of SR/CE/Research.

3. I might as well admit at the start that I have known Mr. Wigren since we were in high school together and I have always been impressed with his ability, particularly in the research field. Additionally, he has been in or close to research on Soviet Intelligence for the past 8½ years. This, combined with his academic background in research methodology, history in general and Russian history in particular, made him my natural choice for his present job although I had never worked directly with him before. In the past five months, I have had reason to be happy about my choice. The main need in SR/CE/Research has been for an established program of studies which we might expect to be produced in regular order; this has been a need, to my personal knowledge, since 1955. Mr. Wigren has quietly set up such a schedule with realistic target dates, is in touch with each study at each point during its production, and shows every indication of meeting his deadlines. He has a long-range interest in counter-intelligence, knows what he is doing and why, and is able to orient his subordinates properly and direct their efforts.

4. Although Mr. Wigren has been in grade only a relatively short time, since April 1958, I feel that he is doing a difficult job excellently and that his promotion is justified on the basis of academic background, Agency experience and current performance.

EDWARD W. KNOWLES
SR/COP/CE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) WIGREN (First) Lee (Middle) H
2. GRADE GS-7
3. POSITION TITLE Intell. Off.
4. OFFICE DDP
STAFF OR DIVISION FI
BRANCH Staff C - CE
☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 4-19-52 To 4-19-53
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

1. Under general supervision, examine the structure and operational methods of Soviet intelligence services, and prepare studies based on this examination.
2. Conduct research to determine current relationships between Soviet intelligence services and those of the Soviet satellite countries.
3. Prepare analyses of special counterespionage problems for use in the field, headquarters and training.
4. Prepare counterespionage studies dealing with specific areas, and based on systematic analyses of espionage cases in those areas.
5. Assist in the review of Country Plans from the counterespionage viewpoint.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course | Location | Length of Course | Date Completed

The following courses were completed during the period April to July 1951, and have not been previously reported:

1. Basic Orientation Course; 2. Basic Intelligence Course; 3. Operations Course; and 4. Advanced Operations Course.

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? Research, analysis, and support -- all mainly in the field of counterespionage.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

21 April 1953
DATE

Lee H Wigren
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Highly satisfactory. Has displayed conspicuous good judgment, accuracy, and cooperation.

FORM NO. 37-151

SECRET

(Over)

(4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Judgment

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Knowledge of Soviet Intelligence, particularly operational analysis, for which he has shown a special aptitude.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Shows capacity for improvement and eventual leadership.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Training adequate. Eventual operational experience, preferably in Scandinavian area, desirable.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

DATE 21 April 1953
George E.
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

DATE 21 April '53
Newton D Holbrook
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ITEMS 1 THROUGH 8 WILL BE COMPLETED BY TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS BRANCH WHEN ACTION IS INITIATED IN PERSONNEL DIVISION

ROUTING AND ACTION SLIP FOR PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

DATE MAR 9 1953

1. NAME (Last) [illegible] (First) Leo (Middle) H
2. GRADE GS-7
3. POSITION TITLE Intell. Off.
4. OFFICE DDP
STAFF OR DIVISION FI
BRANCH ~~S~~ STC
☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 4-19-52 to 4-19-53
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor
7. DATE REPORT DUE IN PERSONNEL OFFICE 4-17-53
8. AUTHENTICATION (T&R BRANCH)

ROUTING AND ACTION

REQUIRED ACTION	PERSON TO TAKE ACTION	DATE ACTION COMPLETED	INITIALS
9. a. Obtain two copies of CIA Form 37-151. b. Enter data in Items 1 through 6, above, in corresponding spaces of FER forms. c. Attach this action form and pamphlet "Your Evaluation Report" to FER forms. d. Deliver forms to immediate supervisor of person to be evaluated.	Evaluations Officer	20 Apr 53	DBP
10. a. Deliver forms to person to be evaluated. b. Offer advice and assistance.	Supervisor	21 Apr 53	
11. a. Complete Items 7 through 10. b. Deliver forms to supervisor.	Person to be Evaluated	21 Apr 53	
12. a. Complete Items 11 through 17. b. Attach warning memo, if required. c. Deliver forms to reviewing official (supervisor next in line).	Supervisor	21 April 53	
13. a. Review the evaluation. b. Discuss complete evaluation and recommendations with supervisor. c. Record additional comments on forms. d. Sign forms in Item 19. e. Deliver forms to supervisor.	Reviewing Official	21 Apr '53	
14. a. Discuss all aspects of evaluation with person being evaluated. (Explain right of appeal, if warning memo is prepared.) b. Sign forms in Item 18. c. Deliver forms to Evaluations Officer.	Supervisor	21 Apr 53	
15. a. Deliver original copy of evaluation form to Transactions and Records Branch, Personnel Division. b. Retain the carbon copy for use of operating office and Office Career Service Board. c. Detach Instruction Sheet of Form 37-151 if Item 20 (continuation) is unused.	Evaluations Officer	APR 21 1953	DBP

FORM NO. 37-151A
SEP 1952

SECRET

1401

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED
8 AUGUST 1959

1. Serial No.: 106198
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN LEE H
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 12 | Da. 01 | Yr. 23
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt.-1, 10 Pt.-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M 1
6. CS - EOD: Mo. 03 | Da. 19 | Yr. 51
7. SCD: Mo. 03 | Da. 24 | Yr. 43
8. CSC Retire. (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA 403 J
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo. | Da. | Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code
12. LCD: Mo. 03 | Da. 19 | Yr. 51
13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP SR
CHIEF OF OPERATIONS
COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF
RESEARCH XXXXXXXX SECTION
Code: 4824
15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.
Station Code: 75013
16. Dept. - Field (Dept. - 1, USfld - 2, Frgn - 3): Code 2
17. Position Title: XX XX OPS OFFICER
18. Position No.: 0400
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0136.XX 01
21. Grade & Step: 12 1
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 8330
23. SD: 01
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. 04 | Da. 20 | Yr. 58
25. WGI Due: Mo. 10 | Da. 18 | Yr. 59
26. Appropriation Number: 0234 1000 1000 XXXXXXXXXX

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT
Code: 56
28. Eff. Date: Mo. [illegible] | Da. [illegible] | Yr. 59
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR
Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDP SR
CHIEF OF OPERATIONS
COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF
RESEARCH SECTION
Code: 4824
32. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.
Station Code: 75013
33. Dept. - Field (Dept. - 1, USfld - 2, Frgn - 3): Code 1
34. Position Title: OPS OFFICER
35. Position No.: D-14 351
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 0136.01
38. Grade & Step: 12 1
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 8330
40. SD: DI
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. | Da. | Yr.
42. WGI Due: Mo. | Da. | Yr.
43. Appropriation Number: 0234 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): ANDREW L. BUSBY CH/SR/PERSONNEL
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): E. C. JOHNSON X4407
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		8/17/59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		[illegible]	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks PER NEW T/O

SECRET

FORM NO. 1152
MAR 57

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

V to V	V to UV
UV to V	UV to UV

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: Mo 03 Da 26 Yr 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo / Da / Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2 / Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo / Da / Yr
106198	WIGREN, LEE H.	12 / 01 / 23	1	M 1	03 / 19 / 51

7. SCD Mo / Da / Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2 / Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo / Da / Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 / Code	12. LCD Mo / Da / Yr	13. Yes-1 No-2 / Code
03 / 24 / 43	1	50 USC 403 J			03 / 19 / 51	2

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI STAFF DIV D COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECTION BIOGRAPHIC UNIT		WASH., D. C.	

16. Dept.- Field (Dept.- Unfld.- Frgn.-) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	BIOGRAPHIC OFF	712	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo / Da / Yr	25. PSI Due Mo / Da / Yr	26. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	DI			9 2305 23

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo / Da / Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
REASSIGNMENT		04 / 19 / 59	REGULAR		

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP SR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF RESEARCH AND SUPPORT SECTION		WASH., D. C.	

33. Dept.- Field (Dept.- Unfld.- Frgn.-) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
XXX	IO CI	400 1-12	GS	0136.53

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo / Da / Yr	42. PSI Due Mo / Da / Yr	43. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	DI	4 / 20 / 58	10 / 18 / 59	9 3400 20 001

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): ANDREW L. BUSBY CH/SR/PERSONNEL

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): CHARLES B. REDMOND X4407

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): CONCURRENCE: FI/PERS

Date Approved: 14 April 59

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		57	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		1959	E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		15

Remarks: Two copies of this action have been forwarded to the Office of Security. One copy has been furnished Vouchered Payroll.

CONCURRENCE:

WM. K. [illegible], A.C. FI/D

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

3/3/57

14-00000

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. [illegible]	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) [illegible]	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 12 Da. [illegible] Yr. [illegible]	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex [illegible]	6. CS - EOD Mo. [illegible] Da. 1 Yr. [illegible]
7. SCD Mo. XX Da. XX Yr. XX	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority [illegible]	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. [illegible] Da. [illegible] Yr. [illegible] 13. Mil. Serv. Credit, Ctn Yes - 1 No - 2 Code -

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FI STAFF DIVISION D COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECTION BIOGRAPHIC UNIT	Code 4105	15. Location Of Official Station WASH. D. C.	Station Code 73013
16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code 2	17. Position Title BIOGRAPHIC OFF	18. Position No. 712	19. Serv. CS 20. Occup. Series 0132.31
21. Grade & Step 11 & 3	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6820	23. SD 51	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 01 Da. 16 Yr. 55 25. PSI Due Mo. 01 Da. 12 Yr. 58 26. Appropriation Number 0 2305 23

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Promotion	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. 20 APR 1958	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 4109	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No. [illegible]	36. Serv. 37. Occup. Series
38. Grade & Step 12 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 7570	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible] 42. PSI Due [illegible] 43. Appropriation Number

Approved by CS Career Service Panel
[illegible] 4/8/58

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
Frank B. Rowlett - C/FI/Div D

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Lee Shields - 8312

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
E. Johnson FI/PO

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	[illegible]	[illegible]
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	11 1958	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	[illegible]

Remarks

Fo 1152

(4)

14 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

VIA: FI/Personnel

SUBJECT: Personnel Action (Promotion)

1. It is recommended that Mr. Lee WIGREN be promoted from GS-11 to GS-12. Mr. Wigren has been in his present grade since 16 January 1955. Since he was assigned to Division D on 23 September 1957, he has been under my supervision. His performance during this time has been at least at a GS-12 level.

2. Mr. Wigren's duties warrant a GS-12. He is primarily engaged in research of a complex and tedious nature which requires a high degree of professional competence.

3. Mr. Wigren deserves a promotion on the basis of his job performance. Since coming under my supervision, he has consistently shown himself to be a conscientious, dilligent and capable employee; and the high quality of his reports are indicative of his intelligence, flair for research, and ability to write effectively.

Albert P. Kergel
ALBERT P. KERGEL
Chief, Special Activities Br., FI/D

APPROVED:

FRANK B. ROWLETT, Chief, FI/Division D

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WIGREN, LEE H.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 12 Da 1 Yr 23	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1
5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. Mil Serv Credit LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations 3 DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch, FI, PP, ~~PM~~ Sweden	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code
16. Dept.- Field (Dept - XX, Usfld-, Frgn -) Code	17. Position Title Area Ops Officer	18. Position No. AB-55	19. Serv. 65
20. Occup. Series 0136.01	21. Grade & Step GS-11 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6605	23. SD DI
24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 8-3600-20	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 57	28. Eff. Date Mo 11 Da 17 Yr 57	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations 9 DDP FI Staff Division D Counter-Espionage Section Biographic Unit	Code 4114	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code
33. Dept.- Field (Dept - XX, Usfld-, Frgn -) Code	34. Position Title Biographic Officer	35. Position No. 87-712-[illegible]	36. Serv. 65
37. Occup. Series 0132.31	38. Grade & Step GS-11 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6605	40. SD DI
41. Date Of Grade Mo 01 Da 16 Yr 55	42. PSI Due Mo 01 Da 12 Yr 58	43. Appropriation Number 8-2305-23	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Rowlett FRANK B. ROWLETT, Chief, FI/D	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) E. Johnson FI/PO
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Jean E. Stake, Ext. 4245	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		11/?/57	D. Placement		11/6/57
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Shaw	

Remarks

(Interview [illegible]
[illegible] K. O'[illegible]
WE/PT

FORM 1152a
5-57

Sec. Career Bd 11/7/57
JT 11/18

(4)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Personnel Folder

SUBJECT : Career Development Plan - for WIGREN, Lee H.

An individual career plan has been developed on the above subject, approved on 20 November 1956 and is on file in the FI Career Management Office.

ROBERT K. SKEELS
FI Career Management Officer

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1954—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Lee H. WIGREN	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 7 July 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP B. APPROVED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops. Officer BB 67-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BB 55
GS-0136.01-11 $5940.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-11 $5940.00 p.a.
DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch FI, PP, PM Sweden	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch FI, PP, PM Sweden
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL DP

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Incumbent, Carter, to be reassigned to field slot in WE.

~~Approved~~ Concurred
JUL 26 1955
DMCollins
PP/Career Service

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) AM Gregg WE
A. M. GREGG, Personnel Officer, WE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
H. E. EISSNER, x 3124

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: FI/OMC

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3600-20 TO: same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Mass.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		26 JUL 1955	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCR	26 Jul 55	
E.			
F. APPROVED BY		26 July 55	

SECRET

10—67373-8

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. Lee H. WIGREN
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 23 Feb. 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Reassignment
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: 13 Mar 1955
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Intell. Off. (FI) BV 227	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops. Officer BB 67-11
GS-0136.51-11 $5940.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-11 $5940.00 p.a.
DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sec.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch, FI, PP, PM Sweden
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Fitness report of October 1954 is current, adequate and needs no change or modification.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): Ann Gregg
A. M. GREGG, Personnel Officer, WE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): [illegible], X 2422

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: James P. [illegible]
Title: C/WE 1 March 55

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD - DI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-2305-23
TO: 5-3600-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Mass.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

I certify funds available:
Oblig. Ref. No. —
Charge Allot. No. 5-3600-20
Auth. Officer R. Martin

3-3-55
3-16-55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION	DK	3/10
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		3/11
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY R. A. Strickler

R. Steele 11 MAR 1955

10—57323-1

23 February 1955

TO: Chief, WE/1

FROM: SR/CE/Holbrook wsf

SUBJECT: Transfer of Personnel

1. This is to notify you that Lee H. Wigren, currently assigned to SR/CE, is available for release to WE/1.

STANDARD FORM 52
PRESCRIBED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

V O U C H E R E D

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in Items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Lee H. WIGREN	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/1/23	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 9 Dec. 1954
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) PROMOTION B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED:	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intell. Off. (FI) BV 227	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intell. Off. (FI) BV 227 *
GS-0136.51-9 $5185 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $5940 p.a.
DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sec.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sec.
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

* This slot recently upgraded

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
CW. Tenney
C. W. Tenney, Acting C/ETC

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Marguerite Roney Ext. 3535

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J.P. Humphrey
Title: FI/R2MO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: 5-2305-23	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION	CA	1/5
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	BAA	1/2/55
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

-7 JAN 1955

18—87320—2

4-00000

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: 10, December 1954

NAME: Leo H. Wigren

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION

X	PROMOTION		REASSIGNMENT	OTHER (Explain)
	ROTATION		TRAVEL	

FROM: Intell. Off. GS-9
Staff C Wash.

TO: Intell. Off. GS-11
Staff C Wash.

AOS

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	OTHER TRAINING COURSES	DATE TAKEN
	BIC(CS), ALSO				
	BIC, BITC, SOC.	51			
	BTP AND BOC				
	BTP II, ALSO OC	51			
	BTP III, ALSO				
	AIC, AITC, AOC	51			
	AND CAI				
	PO, ALSO PM I,				
	II, III AND RAFT				
	ITC ALSO CI				
	TECH				
	ADMIN				
	SIC	51			
	SUP				
	CEA				
	RPTS				
	OB				
	OSC (CE)	CC.		RCE	Oct 54
	E & E				
	CPW				
	WP SOC				
	CPO				
	STB				
	CEW				
	IT				
	GW				
	SAB				
	AO				
	MO				
	SUR				
	BFOT				
	DOC				
	LOCKS				
	S/W				
	F & S				
	SAF				

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☑ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.

2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

STAFF TRAINING OFFICE COMMENTS:

☑ A. THIS ☑ DOES ☐ DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN S, THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY MINIMUM STANDARDS.

☐ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE, WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ☐ QUALIFYING ☐ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT.

Racusin
SIGNATURE OF STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,
M. RONEY

FROM: Career Management Officer
J. P. HUMPHRIES

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 59-77
1 JAN 54
PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED
REPLACES FORM NO. 59-112
AUG 1953 WHICH MAY BE USED

SECRET (2-4-45)

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
in the CAREER STAFF of the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

To the Director of Central Intelligence

Sir:

I submit herewith my application for membership in the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency as defined below:

> "The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency is a group of carefully selected and trained individuals who accept an obligation to devote themselves to the needs of the Agency, and who intend to make a career with the Agency."

In accordance with this definition, I desire to devote myself to the faithful performance of duty in the Central Intelligence Agency, and I accept the obligations and conditions of that service which are determined to be essential to the furtherance of its mission.

I am aware of the many restrictions necessarily placed upon me by virtue of the security requirements inherent in my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency. I am also aware that as a member of the Career Staff, it will be my obligation to serve anywhere and at any time and for any kind of duty as determined by the needs of the Agency, and I have been assured that in order to carry out this policy, full consideration will be given to my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances. By virtue of this application for membership and upon my acceptance in the Career Staff, I am assured that, with continuing satisfactory work performance and conduct on my part, just and equitable attention will be accorded my personal progress during my tenure in the Career Staff. I am also assured that, on my satisfactory completion of any assignments, I will be offered reassignments which are compatible insofar as possible with my abilities and career interests, and that I shall be entitled to the benefits now available or to be made available in the future to members of the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Lee H. Wigren

(Signature)

20 September 1954

(Date)

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CAREER STAFF OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

APPROVED, TO TAKE EFFECT 1 JUN 1954

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

~~EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR~~

THE CIA ~~SELECTION BOARD~~

[illegible] Bratton

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.* If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Lee H. Wigren	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 23	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ~~23 Feb~~ 54 B. APPROVED: 14 Feb 54	7 C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Officer BV 227	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer(FI) BV227
GS 132 9 $5060 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS0136.51-9 $5060 per annum
~~DDP/FI~~ ~~Staff C~~ ~~Soviet Intelligence Branch~~ ~~Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sect.~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell.Ops. Guidance Sect.
~~Washington, D.C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for FI/PO

13 VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	S-PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB	OTHER

14 POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L A	REAL	
				CO-FI

15 SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-2305-23 TO.			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	DE	[illegible]	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	MH	[illegible]	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

[illegible] Humphries [illegible]

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Lee H. Wigren	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 12 May 53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Promotion B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 24 May 53	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Officer BV 227-7	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer BV 227
GS 132 7 ~~$4205~~ p.a. 4330	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS 132 9 $5060 p.a.
DDP/FI STAFF C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intel.Operations Guid.Sec.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI STAFF C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intel.Operations Guid.Sec.
Washington, DC	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, DC
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) R P Hawes
R.P.Hawes, Chief, SIC

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
IFrisce x3535

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [illegible]
Title: [illegible]

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL

CD-FI

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO: 2305-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CTRL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY 5/21/53

14-00000

ad 2864

RESTRICTED
Security Information

[illegible] November 1952

MEMORANDUM:

TO: PDC

THROUGH: Admin Personnel

FROM: CD/TI

SUBJECT: Change of Beneficiary.

1. It is requested that the name presently listed as beneficiary on my retirement policy be removed, and that the following name be listed as the sole beneficiary:

Mrs. Alice Ellen (Maier) Wigren (wife)
Apt #140
[illegible] Que Street, Northwest
Washington 7, D.C.

2. This change is to be effective immediately.

Lee H Wigren
Lee H. Wigren
x 2442

RESTRICTED
Security Information

14-00000

PERSONNL .CTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME: Leo H. Wigren

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: asap 11 May 52

NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Clork	Intelligence officor
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-6 $3920 p.a.	GS-7 $4205 p.a.
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	STC	STC
BRANCH AND SECTION	SIB	SIB
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

(Slot #106) JW

132

APPROVED: Richard P. Hawes
RICHARD P. HAWES, A/Chief, STC

RECOMMENDED:

(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT
APR 25 1952 H. C. Sedford

CLEARANCE REQUESTED

DATE	TYPE

CLEARANCE APPROVED

DATE	TYPE

DATE	SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
1803		1/9/47

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL
		✓	

EFFECTIVE DATE: 4/20/52 SIGNATURE: Thomas McTishen

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2123900

ALLOTMENT: 3000

C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch. A 6. 116 cls

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
1 May 52	M. Lieby

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
1 May 52	R. J. Goddard

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62009-1

14-00000

PERSONA ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME: WIGREN, Lee A.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 Sept 51

NATURE OF ACTION: Intra-agency Transfer

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Clerk	Clerk
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-6 $3450 p.a.	GS-6 $3450 p.a.
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	Staff C	Staff C
BRANCH AND SECTION	In~~ternational~~ Co~~mmunism~~	Soviet Intelligence
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL XX FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL XX FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

From Pos. #117 to 106. gm

C# 1806 3.01

Vice Margaret L. George to be reassigned.

#8081

RECOMMENDED:

13 Sept. 1951
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
7105		9-1-51

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		/	

DATE: 20 Sept 51
SIGNATURE: Thomas M. Fisher

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2123900

ALLOTMENT: 3005

C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sel. AE 115(1)

DATE SIGNATURE: 9-24-51
SIGNATURE: D. Lay

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE
SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE
SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE: 11 Sept 51
SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62183-1

CONFIDENTIAL

11 September 1951

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, CPD

VIA: ADMIN/Personnel

FROM: Chief, Staff C/OSO

SUBJECT: Change in T/O

It is requested that Lee A. Wigren be moved from Slot 117, Clerk, International Communism Branch, to Slot 106, Clerk, Soviet Intelligence Branch.

ERIC W. TIMM

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

ENTRANCE ON DUTY RECORD	DATE 19 March 1951
TO: OSO, ST. C.	BUILDING / ROOM
FROM: PERSONNEL OFFICER	EOD DATE 19 March 1951

NAME OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren

POSITION TITLE Clerk	GRADE GS-6	SALARY $3450.
PAYROLL Vouchered	DUTY STATION Washington, D. C.	
DATE SECURITY CLEARED Proc. 26 Feb. 1951 Full (verbal) 20 March 1951	DATE OATH OF OFFICE ADMINISTERED 19 March 1951	
DATE PERMANENT IDENTIFICATION REQUESTED 19 March 1951	DATE FINGERPRINTED 19 March 1951	
DATE BRIEFED BY SECURITY 19 March 1951	DATE OF PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 19 March 1951	

DATE 24 MONTH AGREEMENT SIGNED NA

EMPLOYEE'S EMERGENCY ADDRESS
A. H. Wigren, 218 Belmont Ave., Brockton, Mass.

EMPLOYEE'S LOCAL ADDRESS
3200 16th St. N. W., Washington, D. C. Apt. 319

REMARKS:
PC 26 Feb
Sec Cl 23 Mar

SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER
. C. CLINKSCALE HM

FORM NO. 37-75
DEC 1949

RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

Aragon-files

31 March 1951

The Honorable Richard B. Wigglesworth
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Wigglesworth:

This is in reference to your interest in the application of Mr. Lee Wigren for employment with this Agency.

I am glad to inform you that Mr. Wigren entered on duty with us on 19 March 1951.

We appreciate both your interest in the Central Intelligence Agency and your recommendation of Mr. Wigren.

Sincerely yours,

Walter L. Pforsheimer
Legislative Counsel

dcs
Central Records
Personnel
Stayback - 2

TO: Medical Division

FROM: Transactions & Records

SUBJECT: Lee H. Wigren

Request that above named subject be given a physical examination.

POSITION: Clerk

GRADE: GS-6

BRANCH: OSO, ST. C.

SERVICE: DEPT.

NATURE OF APPOINTMENT: EXC. APPT.

OK
3-19-57
Good

FORM NO. 37.118
MAY 1950

PERSONN ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO. 3383

NAME [illegible], Lee [illegible].	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE 19 March 1951
NATURE OF ACTION Excepted Appointment	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

2-26-51

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Clerk GS-6
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-6 $3[illegible].00 p.a.
OFFICE	P.C.	CCO
DIVISION		Staff C
BRANCH AND SECTION		F C Branch
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

Slot - 6
Security initiated 16 November 1950.

301

#9618

RECOMMENDED:

12 February 1951
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED
2/20/51 F G [illegible]

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE	SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO. 6799	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED 8 Feb 51

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

DATE 19 Feb 51	SIGNATURE Austin J. Thom[illegible]

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2115900
ALLOTMENT: 901-101
C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Scha 6.116(l)

DATE SIGNATURE 3-22-51	SIGNATURE L. a. Grim

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE
DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62460-1

14-00000

TO : [illegible]

March 7

FROM : McLeish

THRU : Wigren

[illegible] Mass

Grade and Salary 6 - 3450

Subject to completion of [illegible] and physical [illegible]

To report to [illegible] Building, [illegible]

adjacent to the [illegible] a.m.

[illegible]: EOD 19 Mar.

Subject to further processing

Waiver nat.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 March 1951
In reply refer to: ED-4

Mr. Leo H. Wigren
213 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Wigren:

In reference to your application for employment, this letter is to assure you that the processing of your papers as a GS 5, $[illegible] per annum is being continued by this agency. A definite offer of employment cannot be made, however, until such time as all processing has been completed.

The processing is a rather lengthy one; but when further information is available, we shall get in touch with you immediately.

In the meantime, it would be appreciated if you would advise us of any change in your present status, such as change of address, etc.

Your continued interest and patience are appreciated.

Very truly yours,

H.C. CLERKSCALE
Personnel Division

21 February 1951

The Honorable Richard B. Wigglesworth
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Wigglesworth:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 10 February 1951, in behalf of Mr. Lee Wigren, who has applied for a position with this Agency.

We are seriously considering Mr. Wigren for employment; however, security clearance necessary for this Agency is of such a detailed nature that considerable time is necessary before the checks are completed. On the information available to me I would say that it will take approximately three more weeks before the necessary checks will have been completed in Mr. Wigren's case.

Thanking you for your continued interest in the Central Intelligence Agency, I am

Sincerely yours,

Walter L. Pforzheimer
Legislative Counsel

WLPforzheimer:blc
Central Records
Personnel W/basic
Stayback - 2

RICHARD B. WIGGLESWORTH
13th District, Massachusetts

COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

February 10, 1951.

Mr. Walter L. Pforzheimer,
Legislative Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Pforzheimer:

Referring to my letter of November 27, 1950, I should greatly appreciate it if you would advise me what action, if any, has been taken on the application for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency filed by my constituent, Mr. Leo Wigren of 212 Belmont Avenue, Brockton, Massachusetts.

Sincerely yours,

218 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

January 15, 1951

Mr. D.V.Mulcahy
2430 E Street, NW
Washington, D.C.
attn. Miss Limbocker

Dear Mr. Mulcahy:

It has been some time since I have had any word regarding my application for a position with the C.I.A. At the time of my interview last fall, I understood that I would probably hear about it by the first of the year.

I should greatly appreciate a word as to the progress in processing of my application, and, if possible, the probable date on which I shall have to report to Washington. Such information would help me greatly in planning my course of action in the coming weeks.

If you should desire any additional information for my application, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Lee H Wigren

Lee H. Wigren

JAN 16

RICHARD B. WIGGLESWORTH
13TH DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

To Alice

November 27, 1950.

Mr. Donald V. Mulcahy,
Chief of Procurement,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mulcahy:

I have been asked to write you on behalf of a constituent of mine, Mr. Lee Wigren of 218 Belmont Avenue, Brockton, Massachusetts, who is most anxious to secure an appointment with the Central Intelligence Agency.

You no doubt are familiar with Mr. Wigren's experience and qualifications as I understand that he has filed an application for employment with your office and that he was recently interviewed by your.

I have known his father personally for many years and should be happy for his son's sake if his experience and qualifications fit him for some position in your organization.

Sincerely yours,

21 November 1959
In reply refer to: PD-4

REGISTERED ADDRESSEE ONLY

Mr. Leo H. Wigren
213 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Wigren:

This is to advise that actual processing of your application for employment with this Agency has been initiated. Specific details as to the type of appointment and salary will be contained in subsequent correspondence. Please direct all future correspondence to the undersigned.

The attached form should be completed and returned within two weeks. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

ROBERT B. J. HOPKINS
Chief, Employees Division

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

______________ 1950

Name of Candidate Lee H. Wilgren

Position Considered for STC Office 050 Interviewer E. W. Timm

Personal Appearance	Dignified......		Natural.....	✓	Awkward.....	
	Well-groomed...	✓	Clean	✓	Slovenly....	
	Wide-Awake.....	✓	Stolid......		Apathetic...	
	Impressive.....		Ordinary....		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive.....		Responsive..	✓	Taciturn....	
	Imperturbable..		Steady......		Excitable...	
	Cheerful.......	✓	Tranquil ...		Dejected....	
	Straight-forward	✓	Reserved....		Evasive.....	
	Modest.........	✓	Complacent..		Conceited...	
	Dominant.......		Confident...	✓	Submissive..	

Is education adequate? Yes (x) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes (x) No ( )

Area Knowledge None

Previous intelligence or related experience Only Research - Special Studies & Education

Salary level requested $ GS-6 Lowest salary acceptable $ ______

- -

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ______

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: He is enthusiastic - Bright & obviously has a flair for writing & research.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: Intel. Off. Branch STC Division 050

Location: Wash.

Salary level: GS-6

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: could be used on research & file review work, until can be trained for more responsible duties.

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

Signature of Interviewer

FORM NO. 26-1
MAY 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

4-00000

File

DATE 16 [illegible]

TO : I[illegible]

ATTENTION : Mr. [illegible]

FROM : Employees Division

SUBJECT : [illegible], Lee [illegible]

Attached hereto are Personal History Statements in duplicate submitted by subject in application for a position with [illegible] Intell Off [illegible] Washington, D. C.

Please initiate security investigation as soon as possible and notify this office of the results.

Atch: 2 [illegible]
2 photos

R. E. J. [illegible]
Employees Division

14 November 1950

MEMORANDUM

TO: SPD

FROM: Chief, Staff C

SUBJECT: Lee H. WIGREN

1. It is requested that the above-named applicant be processed with a view toward appointing him to the position of Intelligence Officer, GS-6, in Staff C/CSD. Inasmuch as he is presently unemployed, it would be appreciated if this could be handled as soon as possible.

2. It is noted that, although it appears in subject's file that he was on limited service in the Army, this was caused as a result of polio at an early age, and he has since suffered no ill effects. It is also noted that upon interview he readily agreed to overseas service if necessary, although he prefers service in Washington, at least for the time being.

3. In the event it is not contemplated that the applicant will be informed within the next week or ten days that his application is receiving favorable consideration, please let us know and we will write to him directly.

SECRET

[illegible]
Brockton, Massachusetts
October [illegible] 1950

P&P
RECD

Mr. Donald V. Mulcahy
Chief, Procurement & Placement
Employees Division
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Mulcahy:

Thank you for your letter (ED -2), dated 13 October 1950, which informed me that interest had been expressed in my qualifications.

I have completed the three copies of Form #34-1, and am returning them to you under separate cover by registered mail.

I shall plan to be in Washington ~~on~~ Wednesday and Thursday, November 8 and November 9, 1950 for the interviews which you suggested. I shall plan to report to Temporary L Building on the south side of the reflecting pool adjacent to the Lincoln Memorial at 9:30 A.M. of Wednesday, November 8, 1950.

If it should be impossible for me to have interviews on November 8 and 9, please notify me by letter or telegram. I shall leave Brockton for Washington at about 9:45 A.M. on Tuesday, November 7.

Sincerely,

Lee H. Wigren

Lee H. Wigren

Completed residence requirement for Ph. D. in History.

Room A 1E0P

23 October 1950
In reply please refer to ID -3

Mr. Lee H. Wigren
218 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Wigren:

Reference is made to your application for employment with this agency.

This is to advise you that interest has been expressed in your qualifications. However, before any commitment can be made, it will be necessary for you to appear for personal interviews in Washington. If you are interested in pursuing this mater, please arrange to be in Washington for two full days. It would be appreciated if you would complete and return the enclosed forms prior to your arrival.

It is requested that you report to Temporary L Building which is located on the south side of the Reflecting Pool adjacent to the Lincoln Memorial.

This is not to be construed as an offer of employment nor as an invitation to come to Washington at Government expense.

Very truly yours,

DONALD V. MULCAHY
Chief, Procurement & Placement
Employees Division

Encl.: 3 Forms 38 - 1

adG/taz

18 September 1950

Mr. Lee H. Wigren
218 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Wigren:

Reference is made to your correspondence regarding possible employment with this organization.

If you will complete the enclosed forms, and return them to this office at your earliest convenience, we will be able to review your experience and education for consideration for any possible employment opportunity. Upon completion of this process, we will communicate with you regarding the decision reached in your case.

Your interest in our organization is appreciated.

Very truly yours,

A. P. FLYNN
Chief, Procurement & Placement
Personnel Division

Encl: 2 Forms 57

ros

44083

218 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts
September 11, 1950

Central Intelligence Agency
National Security Council
2430 E Street NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I wish to inquire about openings with the Central Intelligence Agency for a man of my qualifications.

I am a graduate of Yale University (A.B., 1947), and have an M.A. degree from Harvard University (1948). In addition, I have completed two years of work toward a degree of Ph.D. at Harvard.

My major studies have been in history, government, and related subjects, with concentration in United States history. Part of my work at Yale was done under the wartime Army Specialized Training Program in Russian area and language studies. The graduate work which I have done has included research and writing in seminars as well as class study.

During World War II, I had approximately two years of administrative and teaching experience with the Information and Education Branch of the Army. After serving as a lecturer, I was sent to the School for Personnel Services, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, and was promoted to Administrative Non-Commissioned Officer in the Information and Education Office, Camp Pickett, Virginia. For one and one-half years in that position, I aided in the development of an education program for all permanent personnel at that camp. I was in direct charge of the program of weekly classes and discussion groups on history and current events. These classes covered such topics as : the progress of the war, the U.S. and its allies, and information about the enemy. My duties included supervising and inspecting classes, training instructors, doing research and preparation of class material, lecturing, planning displays, developing news dissemination media, and doing educational counselling. This work necessitated close cooperation with the Intelligence and Security officers of the camp.

I am twenty-six years of age and unmarried. I am a veteran of World War II, but not a member of any reserve.

I should prefer a position involving historical research or some related field, but would be interested in any opportunity that might be available. If there should be an opening for which

14081

my education and experience would qualify me, I should appreciate being considered for it. My academic records, personal and academic recommendations, or further details concerning my military work will be supplied if desired.

Sincerely,

Lee H. Wigren

Lee H. Wigren

14-00000

SECRET

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care


WIGREN LEE H
044732 1923

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1976

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	V	GS 14 5	$32,557

A11 LCS 100 090

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12010 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 09 OCTOBER 1977

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	0006198	CIS	GS 14 5	$34,850

15573

14-00000

KKK: 7 SEP 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 06 DA 29 YR 76	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA T227 0171 0002	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CI STAFF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER SAS	12. POSITION NUMBER EQ15	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DAA

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 30441

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 31500	ALPHABETIC CIS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO 12 DA 01 YR 23	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAP RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

FORM 1150
5-74 Mfg 10-74
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

CPD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION
PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR [illegible]

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible]

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA [illegible]

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY [illegible]

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDO/CIS
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP
[illegible] RESEARCH BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE
OPS OFFICER CI

12. POSITION NUMBER [illegible]

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION [illegible]

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES [illegible]

16. GRADE AND STEP [illegible]

17. SALARY OR RATE [illegible]

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE [illegible]
20. Employ. Code [illegible]
21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC [illegible] ALPHABETIC CIS
22. STATION CODE [illegible]
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR [illegible]
27. DATE OF LEI MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR [illegible]
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV. PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

BP

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74 Mfg 10-74

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11883 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 12 OCTOBER 1975

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 8	$28,254

RDJ: 4 DEC 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 076193	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DELEGATION OF HSCA	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 11 DA 22 YR 75	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 6227 3179 1172	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CI STAFF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP EXTERNAL RESEARCH BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CI	12. POSITION NUMBER E027	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DAA

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 28254

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 31534	ALPHABETIC CIS	22. STATION CODE 25813	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12 01 23	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV. PROV. TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0. WAIVER 1. YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

8 [illegible] 82

FORM 1150 5-74 Mfg 10-74 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

01.11 . 6 OCT 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006130	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 01 19 75	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ; CF TO V ; V TO CF ; CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 6227 0175 0400

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CI STAFF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP EXTERNAL RESEARCH BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 2027	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DAA

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 26185

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Harvey Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	31500	CIS	75013		1	12 21 23		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV, PROV. TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
09 .B

FORM 1150 5-74 Mfg 10-74 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JCS 11/30/7

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H					
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT				4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 07 74	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 5227 0170 0002	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CIOP DDO/CIOP/R AND AG/CRS					10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER-CH					12. POSITION NUMBER 0322	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DAA
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01				16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE
18. REMARKS						

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
NOV 26 1974
G

Form 11508 MFG. 9-72
8-72

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

(4-51)

14-00000

YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

WIGREN LEE H 006198 42279170

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 8	$26,905

1-52

1. SERIAL NO. 006198	2. NAME WIGREN LEE H	3. ORGANIZATION 31 500	4. FUNDS CF	5. LWOP HOURS

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	7	$24,811	05/02/71	GS 13	8	$25,500	04/28/74		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

DATE 1/7/74

SIGNATURE

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

(4-51)

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 7	$24,611

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 7	$23,642

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM
7 JAN 1973 TO 1 OCT 1972 UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
11777, DATED 12 APR 1974.

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 7	$22,487

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 6	$18,447

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED BY THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 6	$20,721

153

227-0170

APR 1 1

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
006198	WIGREN LEE H	31 500	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	6	$20,721	05/04/69	GS 13	7	$21,313	05/02/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Donovan E. Pratt

DATE: 12 March 1971

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

I53

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
006198	WIGREN LEE H	31 500	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	5	$16,329	05/07/67	GS 13	6	$16,809	05/04/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE 5/3/69

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS ML

AUDITED BY DH

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

DB

PLW: 15 JUL 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 606198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 14 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9227 0170 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/CI STAFF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0213	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 16329

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Health Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	31500	CI	75013		1	12 01 23		

28. FITE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM OTR

POSTED
07-31-68

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	17 500	V	GS 13 4	$13,815	$14,217

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	17 500	CF	GS 13 5	$14,665	$15,307

D-4

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006198	WIGREN LEE H	17 500 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last LH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	4	$14,217	05/09/65	GS 13	5	$14,665	~~XXXXXXXX~~ 05/01/67			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ ✓ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ ✓ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS — AUDITED BY

MF 5-1-67

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 3 / March / 67

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS		GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	000198	31 500	CF	GS 13 5	$15,307	$16,329

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS		GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGEN CHRISTINE ANN	498475	48 100	V	GS 06 1	$ 5,867	$ 6,137

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCS 09/24/66

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WIGREN LEE H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 09 | DA 19 | YR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6. FUNDS

X	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7275 3200 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/TRAINING

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: INSTR INTEL

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1238

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1712.31

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B
7-66 MFG. 9-66

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 4 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	17 500 V	GS 13 4	$13,335	$13,815

/07

53

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006198	WIGREN LEE H	48 200 V	—

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	3	$12,915	05/10/64	GS 13	4	$13,335	05/09/65			

9. Remarks and Authentication

/X/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 15 Mar 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

MAY 12

1 APR 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 21 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5275 2500 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS/OTR SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM FACULTY	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE INSTR INTEL	12. POSITION NUMBER 1238	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1712.31	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 12915

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 17500 ALPHABETIC OTR	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 12 01 23	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: SR - 2

POSTED
4/22/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

APPD 09/30/64

1 SERIAL NUMBER 006198	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H					
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT				4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 09 DA 30 YR 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5234 0573 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR DIVISION COUNTERINTELL GRP RES BR				10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH				12 POSITION NUMBER 1018	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS		15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0130.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

Form 1150B 1-63 MFG. 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

14-00000

234/1100

MAY 5 4 51 PM '64

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006198	WIGREN LEE H	48 080 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PG	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	2	$12,110	05/12/63	GS 13	3	$12,495	05/10/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 6 May 64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPC 04/23/64

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 04 DA 12 YR 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4234 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR DIVISION DDP SR CI GR RESEARCH BR	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 1017	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
27 APR 1964

Form 1150B
1-63 MFG. 1-63

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

27 APR 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	60080	V	13 1	$10635	13 1	$11150

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006198	WIGREN LEE H	60 080 2 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	1	$11,150	05/13/62	GS 13	2	$11,515	05/12/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS RCR AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 14 Mar 1963

Form PSI 550 Obsolete Previous Edition

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Jgd (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	48 080	V	GS 13 2	$11,515	$12,150

PSC: 11 MAY 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WIGREN LEE H
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 05 13 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2234 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP SR
CHIEF, OPERATIONS AND PLANS
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH
RESEARCH SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0351
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 10635
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 60080 ALPHABETIC SR
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 12 01 23
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR): 05 13 62
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR): 05 13 62
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 0 - NONE) CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR):
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT):
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR.):
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)):
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

Form 1150
8-61
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
106198	WIGREN LEE H	DDP/SR 2 V-20	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PBI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	2	$ 9,215	10/18/59	12	3	$ 9,475	04/16/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/X/ NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560. Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-31)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	WIGREN LEE H	106198	48 24	GS-12 2	$ 8,570	$ 9,215

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
106198	WIGREN LEE H	DDP/SR	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 12	1	$ 8,330	04	20	58

7. NEW SALARY RATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 12	2	$ 8,570	10	18	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ TO PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ TO LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLSTED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b.

SECRET

OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

BS 21 AUGUST 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
106198	WIGREN LEE H	12 01 23	1	M 1	03 19 51

7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code
03 24 43	1	50 USCA 403 J			03 19 51	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP SR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF RESEARCH & SUPPORT SECTION	4824	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USHd-4 Frgn-6 Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	10 CI	0400	GS	0136.53

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	DI	04 20 58	10 18 59	9 3400 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	08 23 59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP SR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF RESEARCH SECTION	4824	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USHd-4 Frgn-6 Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	OPS OFFICER	0351	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	DI	04 20 58	10 18 59	0234 1000 1000

44. Remarks

POSTED

FORM NO 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MCM 17 APRIL 59 X XX

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
106198	WIGREN LEE H	12	01	23		1	M 1	03	19	51		

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Rqmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit Code Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
03	24	43		1	50 USCA 403 J						03	19	51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI STAFF DIV D COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECT. BIOGRAPHIC UNIT	4109	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	BIOGRAPHIC OFF	0712	GS	0132.31

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	01	04	20	58	10	18	59	0 2305 23

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	57	04	19	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP SR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF RESEARCH & SUPPORT SECTION	4824	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	10 CI	0400	GS	0136.53

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	01	04	20	58	10	18	59	9 3400 20 001

44. Remarks

POSTED
21 APR 1959

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 18 APRIL 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
106198	WIGREN LEE H	12	01	23	1	M 1	03	19	51			
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Nil. Serv. Credit. Lcd Yes - 1 No - 2 Code
03	24	43	1	50 USCA 403 J					03	19	51	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI STAFF DIVISION D COUNTER-ESPIONAGE SECTION BIOGRAPHIC UNIT	4109	WASH. D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	BIOGRAPHIC OFF	712	GS	0132.31

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
11 3	$ 6820	DI	01	16	55	01	12	58	8 2305 23

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	04	20	58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI STAFF DIV D COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECT. BIOGRAPHIC UNIT	4109	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	BIOGRAPHIC OFF	0712	GS	0132.31

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 7570	DI	04	20	58	10	18	59	8 2305 23

44. Remarks

POSTED
17 APR 1958

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

4/15/58

SECRET

(4)

- E 17

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME						3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.				4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT	
106198	WIGREN LEE H						DDP/~~WE~~ FI				V-20	5005	
6. OLD SALARY RATE							7. NEW SALARY RATE						
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE				GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE			
			MO.	DA.	YR.					MO.	DA.	YR.	
11	2	$ 6,605	07	15	56		11	3	$ 6,820	01	12	58	

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

✓

JAN 7 8 45 AM '58
REC. PAYROLL BRANCH

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

FI 7

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME					3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.				4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT	
106198	WIGREN LEE H					DDP/~~WE~~ FI-19				V-20	5305	
6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE						
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE			
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.	
11	2	$ 6,605	07	15	56	11	3	$ 6,820	01	12	58	

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT [illegible] AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Albert P. KENGEL	9 Dec. '57	Albert P. Kengel

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 12 JANUARY 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	106198	GS-12-1	$ 7,570	$ 8,330

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DMG

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
106198	WIGREN LEE H	12	01	23		1	M	1	03	19	51	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Lee Yes-1 No-2	Code
XX	XX	XX		1	50 USCA 403 J						03	19	51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WE SCANDINAVIAN BR, FI, PP, PM SWEDEN		WASH. D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	AREA OPS OFF	55	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 6605	01							8 3600 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	57	11	17	57	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI STAFF DIVISION D COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECTION BIOGRAPHIC UNIT	4109	WASH. D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	BIOGRAPHIC OFF	712	GS	0132.31

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 6605	01	01	16	55	01	12	56	8 2305 23

44. Remarks

CODED
25 NOV 1957

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

[illegible] STEP INCREASE [illegible] CONFIDENTIAL

Agency and organizational designation

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954 [illegible]

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) [illegible] 106195

2. Payroll period

3. Block No. 6-3600-30

4. Step No.

6. Grade and salary [illegible]-11 $6390

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	[illegible] LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous accrual													
8. New accrual													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriations, WE 3

12. Prepared by [illegible] May 56

13. Audited by

☑ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
[illegible]	16Jan56	$6390	$6605

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

SERVICE AND CONDUCT [illegible]

ARE SATISFACTORY

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In [illegible] waiting period.

☐ LWOP [illegible] of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised

Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.

[illegible] 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

cab

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Lee N. Wigren 104198	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 29 July 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 31 July 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops. Officer BB 67-11	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BB 55
GS-0136.01-11 $6390.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-11 $6390.00 p.a.
DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch FI, PP, PM Sweden	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch FI, PP, PM Sweden
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3600-20 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

POSTED
16 AUG 1955

RANGE PERFORMANCE RATING:

ctor of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954—313735

rwa 8-5-55

STANDARD FORM 50 IN PART
REV. 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

FWB

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. LEE H. WIGREN
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 11 March 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): REASSIGNMENT
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 13 Mar. 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Intell. Off. (FI) DV-227	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops. Officer EB-67-11
GS-0136.51-11 $5940.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-11 $5940.00 per annum
DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sec.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch, FI, PP, PM Sweden
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	T. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 5-2305-23 TO: 5-3665-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Mass.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

3/24/55

ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

ector of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

RA 3-17-55

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954—313735

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION lvr

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Leo H. Wigren	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 14 Jan 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 16 Jan 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Intell. Off (FI) BV-227	8. POSITION TITLE	Intell. Off. (FI) BV-227
GS-0136.51-9 $5185.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $5940.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sec.
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-2305-23 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Mass.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

POSTED
1/25/55

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4 PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954—

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 997374

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Pay roll period

3. Block No. 4-2305-23

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) WIGREN, Ion H.

6. Grade and salary GS-9 $5060.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s) DDP/FI/Staff C 20

12. Prepared by dmo 2 Apr 54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 23 May 54	15. Date last equivalent increase 24 May 53	16. Old salary rate $5060.00	17. New salary rate $5185.00	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better. (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ [illegible] waiting review
☐ [illegible] at end of waiting period

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

.ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SFW

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Lee H. Wigren	12/1/23		2/13/54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment	2/14/54	50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Intell Off BV-227	8. POSITION TITLE	Intell Off (FI) BV-227
GS-132-9	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-9 $5060.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell Ops Guidance Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20 LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-2305-23 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 — 249347

R89 2-16-57

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

mkh

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME) Mr. Lee H. Wigren	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 23	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 23 May 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 24 May 53	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer BV 227-7	8. POSITION TITLE	Same BV 227
GS 132 7 $4330.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS 132 9 $5060.00 per annum
DDP/FI STAFF C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intel. Operations Guid.Sec.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same Same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION 11X2100	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2305-00 TO: 2305-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Chief, Personnel Division.

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible] 5-27-53

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1953-210794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

1. Agency and organizational designations
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2. Pay roll period

3. Block No. 2305-20

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
WIGREN LEE H.

6. Grade and salary
GS 7 $4205

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s)
CE 24

12. Prepared by
dh 5/6/53

13. Audited by

☐ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
10 May 53	11 May 52	$4205	$4330	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126c—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—61111-2a * U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 973763

SECRET
Security Information

COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION VOUCHERED TO VOUCHERED

Page 2 of 6 pages.

(1) Staff or Division FI (2) Date T/O approved 11/17/52 (3) Effective date of action 12/7/52

FROM					TO		
(4) NAME	(5) ORG.INT.& POS.TITLE	(6) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(7) SLOT NOS.	(8) ACTION	(9) ORG.INT.& POS.TITLE	(10) SCHED. SER GRADE	(11) SLOT NOS.
Staff - C Soviet Intell.Br. [illegible] D. Holbrook, III FI	intel.off.	GS 12	100	C	DDP FI/CE Soviet Intell.Br. intel.off.	GS 132 12	220
Admin Pool Frederick S. Youkstetter	intel.off.	GS 9	25	C	Soviet Intell.Ops.Sec intel.off.	GS 132 9	222
Staff - C Soviet Intell.Br. G. Wiley Gilstrap	intel.off.	GS 7	104	C	Soviet Intell.Ops.Sec. intel.off.	GS 132 7	223
Soviet Intell.Br. George E. [illegible]	intel.off.	GS 13	99	C	Soviet Intell.Ops.Guidance Section intel.off.	GS 132 13	225
Mary E. Woods	intel.off.	GS 11	102	C	intel.off.	GS 132 11	226
[illegible] E. Wigren	intel.off.	GS 7	106	C	intel.off.	GS 132 7	227
J. [illegible] H. Stovall, Jr.	intel.off.	GS 7	105	C	intel.off.	GS 132 7	228
Support & Protect.Br. [illegible] FI	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		Soviet Intell.Ops.Guidance [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Admin Pool Stuart C. Duncan	intel.off.	GS 7	81	C	Sov.Intel.Agent Iden.Sec. intel.off.	GS 132 7	230

[illegible] R. [illegible]
(12)APPROVED BY: R P Hanes
Staff or Division Chief

(13)APPROVED BY: [illegible]
Class. & Wage Div.

(14)APPROVED BY: [illegible]
Personnel Div.

SECRET
Security Information

STANDARD FORM 50
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(al)

1. NAME: Mr. Leo H. Wigren
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. '23
4. DATE: 2 May '52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 11 May '52
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A 6.11(b)

FROM		TO
Clerk	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer
GS-6- $3920.00 per. annum.	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-7-132 $4205.00 per. annum
OSO Staff C Soviet Intelligence	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO STC SIB
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	C.A.	REAL	
		X		No. 51803 12/9/'47

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2123900 TO: 3005
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT: Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED X STATE: Mass.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(106)

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

Chief, Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE CERTIFICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

1. Agency and organizational designations
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Approved

2. Pay roll period
3. Block No. [illegible]
4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name [illegible]
6. Grade and salary GS-7 $3795

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	TAX	RET.	BOND			NET PAY
7. Previous normal										
8. New normal										
9. Pay this period										

FEB 13 9 PM '52
DIVISION

10. Remarks
3

11. Appropriation(s)
12. Prepared by
13. Audited by

☐ Periodic step increase. ☐ Pay adjustment.

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. (a) Efficiency rating of "Good" or better than good and service and conduct satisfactory (b) (Signature or Other Authentication)	19. Suspense date
30 Mar 52	27 [illegible] 51	$3795	$3920		29 [illegible] 52

20. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s):
(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP
Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Feb. 3, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD FORM 50 (4 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R-1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(ml)

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Lee H. Wigren
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: J 8081
4. DATE: 24 Sept. 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Intra-Agency Transfer
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 Sept. 1951
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Clerk, GS-6	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-6-301 $3450.00 per. annum. Bu.#6799	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
OSO Staff C I. C. Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO Staff C Soviet Intelligence
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
Washington, D. C. ☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE / WWII / OTHER / 5-PT. / 10-POINT (DISAB / OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW / VICE / L.A. / REAL — Bu.#7803 9/7/51

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2123900 TO: 3003
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Mass.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(117) to (106)

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE EFFECTIVE 24 OCT. 1951 SALARY ADJUSTED TO $3795.00

R J Goodheart
R. J. GOODHEART
Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1950-O-593075

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 50 PART 1
OCTOBER 1946
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R-1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

P.C. 8/26/51
(pl)

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Lee H. Wigren	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec. 1923	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. #7018	4. DATE 19 March 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Excepted Appointment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 19 March 1951	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116(b)

	FROM	TO
8. POSITION TITLE		Clerk, GS-6
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY		GS-6-301 $3450.00 per. annum.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		OSO Staff C I C Branch
11. HEADQUARTERS		Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT.	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		X	

Bu. #6799
2/1/51

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2119900 TO: 901-101	Yes	19 March 1951	☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Mass.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

This appointment is subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.

DOG - 03/24/53
CSED. 03/19/51
LCD - 03/19/51

[illegible] DATES VERIFIED
BY [illegible] 1-19-55

H. C. Clinkscale
H. C. CLINKSCALE
Personnel Branch
SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

3-22-57

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1950-659876

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Wigren, Lee H.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/25	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-14	6. SD DAA
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI/R&A/P	9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		10. CODE (ck one) X HQS. ☐ DF	

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		CONTRACT		OTHER (Spec.)		TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
1 Nov 1976 - 31 Oct 1977

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
15 Nov 1977

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Manage the production, publication, and dissemination of CI studies and papers.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervise directly three professional and one clerical, and indirectly other officers, involved in CI publications work.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepare and edit CI research and analysis for publication.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with foreign intelligence services, other agencies and other CIA components to sponsor and promote CI production and exchange.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conduct training seminars and lectures, personally or in conjunction with CI defectors, for foreign services, other agencies, and CIA components.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

E2 IMPDET CL BY 012208

7801

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In August 1976 Mr. Wigren agreed to be responsible for establishing and managing a counterintelligence production element for the CI Staff. He has continued in that capacity up to the present time, in addition to serving as the nominal focal point for one of our more important CI defectors. Although he took the publication assignment with some reservations, he has done an excellent job of sponsoring, processing and publishing a variety of important counterintelligence documents for use with foreign and domestic intelligence and security services. He is well aware of the widespread respect and admiration for his achievements in this position, both in the processing of written studies and presentations which he makes based on his extensive counterintelligence background and knowledge. While he might find better acceptance with some operational background, there are also special advantages and strengths which derive from the depth of headquarters staff experience which constitutes his career. He is a very cooperative and responsive officer and is now felt to be the best candidate to take over counterintelligence training for the Agency, which he will phase in to in the near future.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 32

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

0 5 13 2

DATE: 6 December 1977

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, CI/R&A

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Leonard McCoy

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE

☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☒ HAVE NOT ATTACHED

DATE: 7 December 1977

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I endorse the rating officer's comments on Mr. Wigren's performance. One of the things that has impressed me most during my nine months as Chief of the Counter-intelligence Staff has been the impact of the publications program on the intelligence community at large. In the CI field, there is nothing in the U.S. Government comparable to it. With the current intensification of interest in counterintelligence, it affords the Agency a means of speaking to a wide audience on issues and problems of abiding concern. Mr. Wigren has done excellent work in drawing upon the resources of the Staff to collect and then to present counterintelligence materials in a way calculated to serve their purpose admirably. I have also drawn heavily on Mr. Wigren to prepare special briefing materials for my own

continued

DATE: 23 December 1977

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, CI Staff

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: B. Hugh Tovar

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.

DATE: 3 January 1978

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION E REVIEWING COMMENTS (continued)

Lee H. Wigren

use in dealing with senior echelons of the Agency and other government components. He is a fine officer, whom I expect to rely upon heavily in the counterintelligence training program. The latter I rank among the most important responsibilities of the Staff.

Still valid as of
6 December 1977.

9 FEB 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee H. Wigren

FROM : Leonard McCoy
Chief, CI/R&A

SUBJECT : Letter of Instructions

1. The following letter of instructions is provided to outline your functions as Special Assistant to the Chief, CI Staff Research and Analysis Group.

2. The objectives of CI/R&A are:

a. To provide current and relevant counterintelligence support to operations being conducted by CI Staff and the operating divisions in the interests of furthering intelligence collection and preventing the frustration of our operations by adversary intelligence services.

b. To conduct research and analyze information to facilitate the detection of the efforts of adversary intelligence services to penetrate the US and friendly foreign governments.

3. Your functions as Special Assistant to Chief, CI Staff Research and Analysis Group are as follows:

a. Select information and research and analysis products of CIA, other agencies, and liaison services for publication by the CI Staff as CI guidance and references.

b. Initiate and supervise the conduct of CI research and analysis by assigned personnel for publication by the CI Staff.

c. Establish and implement publication procedures, including editing, rewriting, organizing, sanitizing, classifying, setting up dissemination channels and

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012208

controls, and monitoring printing processes for CI Staff publications.

d. Initiate and coordinate the distribution of CI Staff publications as appropriate within the Agency, to other US government agencies, and to liaison services.

e. Maintain a record of CI Staff publications, including recipients, dates of distribution, responses and comments, related correspondence, and other pertinent information.

f. Conduct liaison with other government agencies and foreign intelligence services to promote the collection and dissemination of CI information.

g. Collect and maintain a library of past and present classified CI publications available from all sources for ready reference and consultation.

Leonard McCoy

I have read and understand this letter of instructions.

Lee H. Wigren

9 February 1977
Date

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
2 - CI/Personnel
1 - C/CI/R&A

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Wigren, Lee H.		3. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-14	6. SD DAA
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI/R&A		9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	10. CHECK (X) ONE xx HQS. ☐ OS		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					
X	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CONTRACT	☐	SPECIAL	☐	OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT							
☐	INITIAL	X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT (20-8-76)	☐	SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO) 1 Oct 75 - 31 Oct 76

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 Nov 76

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Manage a branch composed of six staff officers, seven contract personnel and a varying number of detailees.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervise the work of three Soviet intelligence officer defectors and their four contract employees.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Function as secretariat for an international research and analysis complex.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conduct counterintelligence research and analysis.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Establish a counterintelligence publications system which will collect and sponsor counterintelligence studies, produce studies, and distribute them according to need and security considerations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-75 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2, IMPDET CL BY 012208

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Wigren received a well-deserved promotion during this reporting period and moved in August to become the Staff Publications Officer. He made solid progress in the early part of the reporting period in making the transition from the narrow sphere he occupied in the previous Staff organization to the much more varied and challenging duties of the External Branch. By the time he left that position he had mastered its peculiar problems and proven his capability to manage its unusual personnel effectively and productively. He has retained responsibility for exploitation of the most useful asset in that branch and recently conducted the asset on a series of liaison visits which has resulted in a significant advance of our CI relations with the services concerned.

He has moved vigorously into the function of Publications Officer, which is one of the most important activities in the Staff. He was selected for this assignment because of his deep CI experience, writing ability, and his mature judgment in selecting and preparing CI information appropriate to various audiences. Cost-effective influences which he faces by participation in local government are also applied in his Agency work. He deals confidently with senior officers of the Staff and other components and gets the best effort out of his subordinates. His present assignment is tailor-made for him, and he exhibits no significant weakness in performing it.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 20	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 6 December 1976	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CI/R&A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Leonard McCoy

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 6 December 1976	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the present assessment of Mr. Wigren's performance by the rating officer. As chief of the External Branch he turned in a highly satisfactory performance. In his present capacity, Staff Publications Officer, he is off to an excellent start. I believe the passage of time will demonstrate that Mr. Wigren's strongest points, never heretofore fully exploited, are in writing and supervising publications of counterintelligence materials. Already one of the new CI Staff monthly publications which he initiated some time ago is earning us plaudits from both domestic and foreign counterintelligence services. Mr. Wigren's work comes to my attention several times a week. I am most pleased that he is a member of the staff at this time.

DATE 29 Dec 76	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE George T. Kalaris

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☐ HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 4 Jan 77	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

C [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (last, first, middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 13	6. SD DAA
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer Ch	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI/R&A/E	9. CURRENT STATION Hqs	10. CODE (check one) X HQS. ☐ DF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 October 1974 - 30 September 1975

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 October 1975

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

If QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Manages a branch composed of six staff officers and nine contract personnel	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises the work of three Soviet intelligence defectors and their six contract employees.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Acts as secretariat for an international research and analysis complex	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts counterintelligence research and analysis	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
C [illegible]

E2, IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

(4)

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Wigren is doing a quite satisfactory job of running the R&A External Research Branch. When the Group was reorganized he was almost fully committed to Duty No. 3 above. While maintaining that function at a commendable level of performance, he has accepted the assignment of running a new branch which is an amalgamation of components of several previous R&A branches. Comprising, as it does, the disparate elements of defector, contract, and staff officers, Mr. Wigren has done a very good job of assigning work and getting it done by this branch. He gets along well with the personnel and seems well-suited to the kind of bread-and-butter research and analysis which the branch carries out. He is very serious and purposeful in his approach and can be relied on to carry out assignments effectively and on time. His long experience in CI matters and his knowledge of past activities and events in the Staff are a valuable adjunct to the branch chief function which he now fulfills. He is one of very few officers of the former Staff who have been selected to participate in the reorganization and reorientation of the CI effort. He has shown by his performance and attitude a quite acceptable capability to adjust to the present Staff requirements in terms of methodology and intellectual approach. He is conscientious and enthusiastic, and is still feeling his way to some extent organizationally and functionally in his new position.

He reflects genuine consideration for the costs of performing his functions.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION ON TDY. -

DATE 31 October 1975	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CI/R&A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Leonard McCoy

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☒ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 7 November 75	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the assessment and evaluation of Mr. Wigren as set forth in this Fitness Report. He found himself in the midst of a changing situation and not only has adjusted well but also has made a useful contribution to the reorganization and redirection of the Counterintelligence Staff. His current assignment requires a good deal of common sense, understanding of human nature and the ability to devise meaningful projects for individuals whose expertise and capabilities are quite circumscribed and limited. Success in that respect is important to the Agency for reasons not necessarily associated with the value of the product which emerges from these projects. In his frequent contacts with representatives of foreign liaison officials, Mr. Wigren has invariably created a favorable

DATE 3 November 1975	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE George T. Kalaris

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE 7 November 1975	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION

Fitness Report - Wigren, Lee H.
006198

Reviewing Official Comments (continued)

impression which is also important to the Agency. In sum, I regard him as a competent officer who is performing well in his present assignment.

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 13	6. SD DAA

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI OPS/R&A	9. CURRENT STATION Washington,DC	10. CODE (ck one) x HQS. ☐ OF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 29 Sept 1973 - 30 Sept 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 October 1974

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 The conduct of research into sensitive counterintelligence cases, primarily cases involving Soviet intelligence and security and Bloc operations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assembles, collates, and analyzes selected counterintelligence materials reflecting data on Soviet intelligence organization and activity: maintains files of such materials. Uses these materials in memorandums, reports, and commentaries utilized in sensitive DDO liaison with designated counterintelligence and security services.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects, organizes and maintains other basic data on Soviet intelligence and security for research purposes. Acts as CIOPS referent on Soviet intelligence and security matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts, from time to time, counterintelligence source debriefings. Records, analyzes, and distributes the resulting data.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Lectures, participates in, and conducts briefings and presentations inside the Agency and under the auspices of the U.S. Intelligence Community on Soviet intelligence and security services and related USSR political developments and communist international and Soviet-directed subversion	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E2. IMPDET CL BY 056274

22

14-00000

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Although Subject has only been under my supervision for some four months, I can but agree with earlier comments on his performance. Subject has an encyclopedic knowledge of the organization, function and history of the various Soviet intelligence and security organs. He is a highly skilled researcher and a gifted writer. His work in preparing classified studies on the various aspects of the Soviet intelligence services and operations has been consistently impressive.

Subject has not had the field experience usually associated with his age and grade, but the lack of this has not been a drawback in his chosen research duties. In the future Subject will profit from seeking out opportunities for further activity rather than, as at present, waiting until assignments are given to him.

In addition to his research abilities, Subject is a highly effective lecturer, much sought after by other agencies who are conducting training in the CI field.

Subject has encountered some slight problems with his staff during the reporting period, but these are essentially minor. In my opinion Subject is in the forefront of research personnel at his grade level.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR AC/CIRA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE W Hood William J. Hood

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 16 Jan 75	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H Wigren

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I endorse Mr. Hood's Section D evaluation. I have found Mr. Wigren to be a very dependable and resourceful individual in undertaking the extensive research commitments that the staff has undertaken in meeting very heavy obligations of sensitive liaison exchanges over the past year. Mr. Wigren is above all a gentleman in his attitude toward and treatment of others. I would say in the long run this works to his disadvantage because his contribution and his modesty tend to be overridden by the pretentions and bluster of others. Mr. Wigren has what has now become a most precious commodity to the DDO in counterintelligence and that is a grasp on many of the aspects of the collegial memory. He is therefore in a position not only to contribute useful ideas for new projects, but to correct, amend, and modify suggestions and courses of action put up by others who do not have the facts. In other words, this is a man whose continued utility and potential are considerable in my judgment.

DATE 17Jan75	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADC/CIOPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Raymond G. Rocca

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE 17 Jan 75	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE L H Wigren

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (last, first, middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 13	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI/OPS/R&A	9. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	10. CODE (ck one) HQS. ☐ OP ☐		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 November 1972 - 28 September 1973

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: October 1973

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 The conduct of research into sensitive counterintelligence cases, primarily cases involving Soviet intelligence and security and Bloc operations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assembles, collates, and analyzes selected counterintelligence materials reflecting data on Soviet intelligence organization and activity: maintains files of such materials. Uses these materials in memorandums, reports and commentaries utilized in sensitive DDO liaison with designated counterintelligence and security services.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects, organizes and maintains other basic data on Soviet intelligence and security for research purposes. Acts as CI/OPS referent on Soviet intelligence and security matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts, from time to time, counterintelligence source debriefings. Records, analyzes, and distributes the resulting data.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Lectures, participates in, and conducts briefings and presentations inside the Agency and under the auspices of the U.S. Intelligence Community on Soviet intelligence and security services and related USSR political developments and communist international and Soviet-directed subversion.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY 055431

11 1974

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In the past six months the compartmented nature of Mr. Wigren's work has brought him more directly into the DC/CIOPS' cognizance rather than the Chief of the R&A component as has previously been the case.

I think Mr. Wigren's strengths and weaknesses have been winnowed thoroughly in previous reporting. He is a recognized expert in his topic and as such he represents a considerable capital investment by the Agency in that kind of expertise. He can write and he can speak with unusual fluency on his specialty and in consequence is a key man in the ongoing research and study of sensitive Soviet intelligence and security organization and operations, particularly penetrations and disinformation. This statement is backed up by production, in the form of briefing papers, memoranda, and other production, which goes outside the Agency. I have found his work to be extremely satisfactory, and more particularly, it is if he is given the time and specifications which are necessary ingredients of his meticulous and thoroughgoing approach to his work. Mr. Wigren could carry on in his specialty at a very high level of competence in any other part of the Agency, or for that matter anywhere in Government where there is any interest in Soviet intelligence and security. I am firm in the view that he merits the overall grading of "Strong."

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 11 JAN 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, CI/OPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE RG Rocca Raymond G. Rocca

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☑ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 11 Jan 74	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the rating officer's comments above.

DATE 11 JAN 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI/OPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE J. Angleton James Angleton

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 006198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/R&A	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
X	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. November 1972	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 November 1971 - 31 October 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analyzes and synthesizes materials dealing with both the history and current status of the Soviet intelligence and security services and with the operations directed by them against their major counter- (cont.)	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As a corollary of the above, serves as CI/R&A's principal point of contact with SB Division (except for ADP matters).	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Organizes and maintains basic CI data on the RIS, such as strength figures at home and abroad, changes in structure and functions, case histories, and other categories of facts. This information is (cont.)	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts occasional, detailed counterintelligence debriefings of knowledgeable sources selected by the DC/CI. Records and reports the resultant information.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Lectures and conducts briefings in various training courses both within CIA and in other governmental programs. The main topics dealt with are the Soviet intelligence and security services, political devel- (cont.)	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. Reviewed by OP/SPD PPB	RATING LETTER S 14 DEC 1972

JA

GROUP 1 [illegible]

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

As was noted in the preceding fitness report, Mr. Wigren has a solid and broad knowledge of the USSR: its history, government, and intelligence services. He also has a useful working knowledge of Russian. Consequently he serves in CI/R&A as senior referent on the RIS, against which target most of the group's work is directed.

A key responsibility in R&A is to serve as the Staff's repository and memory for essential elements of information about the RIS. Mr. Wigren has organized this abundance of material effectively, has ensured its retrievability, and continues to update it.

Mr. Wigren consistently shows sound and dispassionate judgment. He does not jump to conclusions but digs out the pertinent facts and brings them into proper focus. He is skeptical without being negative. He accepts tasks and responsibilities without quibbling, and he carries out these assignments successfully without needing further consultation or guidance.

He is a quiet person who keeps a low profile; but when a significant issue is at stake, he is firm, even tenacious, when persuaded that the facts are on his side.

(continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 29 Nov 72	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 46	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 29 November 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/CI/R&A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donovan E. Pratt Donovan E. Pratt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Wigren is a solid methodical researcher and analyst. He possess developed skills in presentation both in writing and from the platform. He works quietly and effectively with a minimum of supervision required once the job has been blocked out. He is a most dependable and consistently productive.

He is overly modest in personal demeanor and tends to prefer to concentrate his efforts on single tasks rather than to handle a range of simultaneous undertakings.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION B (Cont.) SPECIFIC DUTIES Lee H. WIGREN

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1

intelligence targets, especially the intelligence services of the non-Communist world.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3

provided to other Agency components, to other U.S. departments and agencies (principally the FBI), and to selected liaison services as appropriate.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5

opments in the USSR, and Communist subversion.

SECRET

SECTION C - NARRATIVE COMMENTS - (Continued)
Lee H. WIGREN

His supervisory responsibility is limited to providing guidance to one secretary whom he shares with others. I should not hesitate, however, to assign other employees to his supervision if our T/O permitted. His past record and his current performance (which demonstrates an ability to look ahead, to grasp essentials, to get along with others, and to be both fair and firm) show that he can handle a manager's role very well.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 006198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
WIGREN, Lee H.	12/01/23	M	13	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/CI/R&A	Washington, D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 November 1971	1 January 1971 - 31 October 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analyzes and synthesizes materials dealing with both the history and current status of the Soviet intelligence and security services and with the operations directed by them against their major counter- (cont.)	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As a corollary of the above, serves as CI/R&A's principal point of contact with SB Division (except for ADP matters).	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Organizes and maintains basic counterintelligence data on the RIS, such as strength figures, case histories, counteraction (e.g., the results of the AESMITE defection), etc.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Engages from time to time in counterintelligence interrogations/debriefings at the direction of the DC/CI. Records data thus obtained and prepares detailed reports.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Lectures and conducts briefings in various training courses both within CIA and in other governmental programs. The main topics dealt with are the Soviet intelligence and security services, political devel- (cont.)	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Wigren's responsibilities have broadened during the reporting period and will continue to grow. In part this change has resulted from the assignment of Mr. Edward Knowles to CI/OPS, but in equal or greater measure it is the product of Mr. Wigren's demonstrated ability to carry added responsibility with equanimity and resourcefulness.

Mr. Wigren has a very sound knowledge of the Soviet Union: its history, government, intelligence services, etc. He reads widely to keep his knowledge current. He maintains an excellent balance between a respect for the importance of facts and a creative faculty. Recently he has been increasingly concerned with ways to ensure a more regular, orderly flow of essential counterintelligence into this office and with restructuring the organization of this information to make it more readily responsive to our needs. His approach has been both imaginative and sound.

His work shows a very high level of organizational ability. This is reflected in his structuring of a report or speech, in the lucidity of his expression, and in his grasp of the inter-relatedness of the functions of this group. He is thoughtful and temperate; he does not jump to conclusions, show

(continued)

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 November 1971	Lee Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
34	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 November 1971	Chief, CI/R&A	Donovan E. Pratt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Wigren is a very knowledgeable research specialist in Soviet Bloc counterintelligence matters. He also is an excellent expositor of that kind of information from a lecture platform. He has done a good job. I am in agreement with the rating but would want this man to show more dynamism.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
18 NOV 1971	Deputy Chief, CI Staff	Raymond G. Rocca

SECRET

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 - (Continued)

intelligence targets, especially the intelligence services of the non-Communist world.

SPECIFIC DUTY No. 5 - (Continued)

opments in the USSR, and Communist subversion.

Section C - Narrative Comments - (Continued)

bias, or push pet theories. He is flexible, broad-gauged, and genuinely interested in his work. He reads Russian and uses this facility in his work.

Mr. Wigren does not need close supervision. He carries out tasks without seeking additional guidance or support when he encounters the usual difficulties. He relates well to others, and his creative abilities are frequently sparked by discourse and an exchange of views. He is exceptionally considerate and tactful in his dealings with other Agency employees.

At present he does not have supervisory responsibilities. Both his past record and his present performance show, however, that he is fully capable of quiet, competent leadership.

He has shown no deficiencies of any sort in respect to security or economy.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, LEE H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/R&A		8. CURRENT STATION Wash.,D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1970 - 31 December 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Obtains sensitive counterintelligence data from varied (including live) sources at the direction of the DC/CI. Records and prepares analyses of such data. The topics range from operations of primarily historical significance to current matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 In the course of carrying out specific duty No. 1, establishes and maintains relationships, as appropriate and directed, with non-CIA personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Analyzes and synthesizes materials dealing with the growth and development of the Soviet intelligence and security services and with the counterintelligence operations directed by them against the non-Communist services.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Lectures and conducts briefings in OTR courses and in the training programs of other U.S. Government agencies. The main topics covered are the Soviet intelligence and security services, political developments in the USSR, and Communist subversion.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

15 MAR 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

MAR 15 9 12 AM '71

Mr. Wigren continues to maintain the high quality of performance noted in his preceding fitness report.

His analytic work is characterized chiefly by his ability to view a case in perspective. He brings extensive experience to bear upon current undertakings and thus looks at a given RIS operation or project not as a picture in a frame but rather as one part of the history of Soviet intelligence.

His work is further characterized by flexibility, thoroughness, and sound judgement. He has a knack for getting at facts; he does not jump to conclusions. He organizes material well and writes with lucidity.

Mr. Wigren is also genuinely interested in his field. He reads and studies publications about the USSR during off-duty hours. He is able to read Russian and uses this language skill in his work.

Although he does not need close supervision, he is very responsive to guidance. He is also a congenial person whose relationships with his colleagues are uniformly cordial. Although he has no present supervisory responsibilities, both his past record (continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4 December 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 24	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 4 December 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CI/R&A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donovan E. Pratt Donovan E. Pratt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the high evaluation given Subject by his supervisor, Mr. Pratt. Mr. Wigren handles extremely sensitive operations in a competent, thoroughly professional manner. He relates well with his co-workers and is respected by them. I too believe he is performing his duties in an exceptionally proficient manner.

DATE 11 March 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, CI Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Raymond G. Rocca

SECRET

Section C - Narrative Comments (continued)

and his present performance demonstrate the-he is able to direct the work of others effectively. He has shown no deficiencies of any kind in respect to economy or security.

Reviewed by [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, LEE H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/R&A		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: January 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 14 July 1968 - 31 Dec 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analyzes sensitive counterintelligence cases as directed by the C/CI/R&A. These analyses range from operations of primarily historical significance to current and pressing matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analyzes and synthesizes materials dealing with the growth and development of the Soviet intelligence and security services and with the counterintelligence operations directed by them against the non-Communist services.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts substantial reviews of summary reports on overt publications dealing with the past and present of Soviet intelligence. This assignment does not consist merely of editing	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Lectures and conducts briefings in OTR courses and in the training programs of other U.S. Government agencies. The main topics covered are the Soviet intelligence and security services, political developments in the USSR, and Communist subversion.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-68 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Wigren joined CI/R&A on 14 July 1968, so that this fitness report is his first in his present assignment. Consequently a significant part of his time has been used, during the period of this report, in familiarizing himself with his job and its potential. His performance, nonetheless, has been consistently strong.

He brings to his assignment an excellent background, both academically and in terms of Agency experience. He shows consistently sound judgement and equanimity, an ability to sort out facts and to reach decisions on a factual basis. He seeks and welcomes guidance but is also fully capable of acting independently within his limits of responsibility.

Mr. Wigren has an excellent potential in the area of research and analysis. He has no present supervisory responsibilities. He is consistently aware of the significance of the cost factor.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 19 Aug 69

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Lee H Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 1 Year

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 31 AUG 1969

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, CI/R&A

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Donovan E. Pratt
Donovan E. Pratt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Highly competent, professional employee. Combines a capacity to do the research job and to articulate the results in a training setting, authoritatively. These are skills that are uncommon; they merit recognition, and encouragement. Tends to prefer settled, agreed-upon work load situation.

DATE:

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: RGRocca
Raymond G. Rocca

SECRET

Section B - Specific Duty #3

these summaries, which are compiled by another element of CI/R&A; the principal purpose is to carry out analyses designed to ensure that the relevance of the material to a broad R&A program is made fully explicit.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WIGREN, Lee H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec 1923
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-13
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Instr Intel CS
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: OTR/SIC
8. CURRENT STATION: Hqs.
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT:
XX CAREER | RESERVE | TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify):
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT:
INITIAL | REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX ANNUAL | REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1968
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1967 - 31 December 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Instructs in Introduction to Communism, USSR Survey, and CT courses. DA2	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises Introduction to Communism course.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts covert tutorial training programs for foreign nationals.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Participates as guest in programs of other U.S. government agencies.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 AT	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

03 [illegible] 68

Mr. Wigren has continued to broaden and strengthen his [illegible] well contribution to SIC activities. For most of this reporting period he has assumed the responsibility for supervision of the Introduction to Communism course -- a role which he has carried out with a high degree of success. He has a mature, disciplined, inquiring mind -- and appears to have found in this instructional assignment a function for which his talents and personality are well suited.

In addition, his contacts in SB division, which he maintains closely, are a valuable asset to SIC.

Mr. Wigren was one of two instructors who were the subjects of a highly complementary letter from the Director of the South African service to the DCI resulting from a training TDY in that country.

Subject -- in his supervisory capacity as chief instructor of Introduction to Communism is efficient and cost conscious in the use of personnel and equipment.

I strongly urge that his stated desire to transfer into a Training career status be given favorable consideration.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 January 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 January 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, SIC/OTR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John W. Morrison JOHN W. MORRISON

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Wigren has done very well during this reporting period. He makes a fine contribution to SIC. I concur in this rating.

DATE 22 January 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Director of Training	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Alfonso Rodriguez Alfonso Rodriguez

SECRET

4-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD	
WIGREN,	Lee	H.	1 Dec 1923	M	GS-13	D	

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Instr Intel

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: OTR/SIC

8. CURRENT STATION: Hqs.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX CAREER
RESERVE
TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

INITIAL
REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX ANNUAL
REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1966 - 31 December 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
Instructs in Introduction to Communism, USSR Survey, and CT courses.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
Conducts covert tutorial training programs for foreign nationals.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
Participates as guest in programs of other U.S. government agencies.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

10 FEB 1967

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF [illegible] MAIL ROOM
FEB 2 9 08 AM '67

Mr. Wigren has made a significant contribution to SIC's program during this reporting period -- his first complete one with this staff. I believe that my comment of last January that he "has excellent potential for further development as a senior instructor" has been validated. He has greatly broadened his scope, has participated actively in external programs, and, although he has not been assigned any to date, is ready to assume course supervisory responsibility. I strongly recommend this his request for an extension of his tour in OTR be accepted.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 24 January 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 January 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, SIC/OTR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John W Morrison JOHN W. MORRISON

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

No appropriate reviewing official.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee M.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Instr Intel		7. OFF/DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT OTR/SIC		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
XX CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)			XX	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):	
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1967			12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1966 - 31 December 1966		

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Instructs in Introduction to Communism, USSR Survey, and CT courses.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts covert tutorial training programs for foreign nationals.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Participates as guest in programs of other U.S. government agencies.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Wigren has made a significant contribution to SIC's program during this reporting period -- his first complete one with this staff. I believe that my comment of last January that he "has excellent potential for further development as a senior instructor" has been validated. He has greatly broadened his scope, has participated actively in external programs, and, although he has not been assigned any to date, is ready to assume course supervisory responsibility. I strongly recommend this his request for an extension of his tour in OTR be accepted.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 24 January 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 January 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, SIC/OTR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOHN W. MORRISON

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

No appropriate reviewing official.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) WIGREN,	(First) Lee	(Middle) H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Instr Intell				7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OTR/SIC		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 3 May 1965 - 31 December 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counselling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Instructs in Introduction to Communism, USSR Basic Country Survey, and CT courses.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts covert tutorial training programs.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

27 JAN 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Wigren has been a member of SIC staff for eight months. He brought to us a knowledge in depth of the Soviet intelligence services and Soviet methods of clandestine activities which have been a distinct asset, and which have provided most useful judgments and insights.

Mr. Wigren appears to have a sound, disciplined, scholarly attitude toward substantive problems, and a searching, imaginative approach to pedagogical problems. He has developed as a team member easily and effectively, and has been willing to take on increasing responsibility. I feel that Mr. Wigren has excellent potential for further development as a senior instructor.

Mr. Wigren has not--at this time--been assigned any supervisory responsibilities.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 14 January 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 14 January 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, SIC/OTR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John W Morrison JOHN W. MORRISON
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL No appropriate reviewing official.		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WIGREN, Lee H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 12-1-23
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-13
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/SR/CI
8. CURRENT STATION: Hqs
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1964
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1963 to 31 December 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and directs the work of a Branch of 8 people, and coordinates and guides the research work of other Branches of this Group. DA-12	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans the research program of SR/CI DC 31	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Gives lectures and briefings to Agency and foreign officials. DA 64	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Manages personnel.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Edits the research production of SR/CI DD 11	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Personally prepared a long and complicated report on a highly important matter under pressure of supervision and extremely tight deadlines.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

30 JAN 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 29 4 12 PM '64
MAIL ROOM

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Wigren is a conscientious and capable research officer with a good grasp of his material and is able to present it effectively to audiences of widely varied sophistication. Since his last report, the basic orientation of SR/CI has changed, and is now directed almost wholly to the creation and exploitation of operations. The organization thus needs more urgently than ever the digested operational experience which it is Mr. Wigren's job to produce. This has made it necessary to apply strict priorities based on operational need and relevancy, which has been difficult for Mr. Wigren, who has no direct operational experience. He has not been able to get the most out of his people, nor give them the sort of close and consistent guidance which some of them require in the face of changing or sudden requirements. He has a tendency to be over-concerned with organizational and bureaucratic exercise to the expense of substantive production. Nonetheless, his real qualities came to the fore recently when he produced well and used his staff effectively on an important and complicated project. He is a distinct asset in his responsible and demanding job.

Mr. Wigren performs his duties with maximum economy.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 22 January 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 14	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 22 Jan. 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, SR/CI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Tennent H. Bagley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

DATE 27 January 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, SR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE David E. Murphy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

mv

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER ✓
006198

SECTION A

GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
WIGREN LEE H.

2. DATE OF BIRTH 12-1-23

3. SEX M

4. GRADE GS-13

5. SD D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Ops Officer

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
DDP/SR/COPS/CI

8. CURRENT STATION
Hqs.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
September 1961 - 31 December 1962

SECTION B

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and reviews work of a section including 11 research analysts and three clerks. DA12	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and implements divisional research program on Soviet intelligence. DC45 DC30	RATING LETTER P+
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 DC31 Directs dissemination of CI studies and reports on RIS to appropriate U.S. and foreign consumers.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 DD11 Gives lectures and briefings to Agency and foreign officials as required.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 DA26 Effects coordination with CI Staff, OS, OTR and others on CI research matters.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Establishes divisional criteria for records and methods of information processing required for CI research.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 25 JAN 1963	RATING LETTER S+

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

SEE ATTACHED SHEET

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 14 January 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 44	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/SR/CI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward W. Knowles
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 16 JAN 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL SR/COP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward D. Goloway

SECRET

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Mr. Wigren is extremely proficient in handling his section from both the personnel and managerial standpoints. In addition, he is an expert on Soviet Intelligence in his own right and lectures on the topic to officials of this and other governments. He is particularly capable at training new researchers.

In reviewing his file today, I note that the Reviewing Official for his fitness report of a year ago noted his opinion that my ratings of Mr. Wigren at that time were too high. That opinion was not discussed with me or with Mr. Wigren. Perhaps the ratings were indeed too high, but I must say that considering the Fitness Report form and criteria in use at that time and his performance in relation to that of other officers in this branch and outside it, I would give him the same ratings today for that period.

The ratings in this current report will appear slightly lower than those of the last report. This is not entirely due to the different report form. Mr. Wigren's problems increased in both intensity and complexity during this period, and I do not feel that he met the increased burden with as much of an increase in performance as was necessary. This should not at all detract from my rating of his overall performance, which is still exceptional and only slightly less than outstanding.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 106192

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) WIGREN (First) Lee (Middle) H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH 12-1-23
3. SEX M
4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR/CI

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☒	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 1 Jan. '61 - Sept. '61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises & reviews work of Section including 9 research analysts and 4 clerks.	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Gives lectures and briefings to Agency and foreign officials as required.	RATING NO. 7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and implements divisional research program on Soviet Intelligence.	RATING NO. 6/	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Effects coordination with CI Staff, OS, ORR and others on CI research matters.	RATING NO. 7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Directs dissemination of CI studies and reports on RIS to appropriate U.S. and foreign consumers.	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Establishes divisional criteria for records and methods of information processing required for CI research.	RATING NO. 6

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5/

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Wigren's performance during the past year has been outstanding in every important respect. Despite great pressure and frequently difficult assignments he has directed his section in a calm and mature manner which has enabled it to meet deadlines on RIS research despite the relative inexperience of its personnel. His potential for development is excellent and the responsibilities of his section are being expanded to enable it to produce even more of its high-quality product.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
13 September	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 September 1961	C/SR/CI	E W Knowles Edward W. Knowles

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

While I quite agree that Mr. Wigren has done a very fine job, I consider that the ratings in Section E are overly generous. I base this on the fact that I know of no other highly-competent officer who has received 7 ratings on two-thirds of his specific duties; and I do not believe that Wigren's performance is better than any other officer's I know. There is no question in my mind that Wigren's performance in this job has been superior to any previous incumbents.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
14 Sept 1961	QUENTIN C. JOHNSON, SR/COP	Q C Johnson

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

13 MAR 1961

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
106198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12-1-23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR/CE		

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 Jan 61

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
1 Jan 60 - 31 Dec 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises & reviews work of Section including 8 research analysts and 2 clerks.	5+	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Gives lectures and briefings to Agency and foreign officials as required.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and implements divisional research program on Soviet Intelligence.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Effects coordination with CI Staff, OS, ORR and others on CI research matters.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Directs dissemination of CI studies and reports on RIS to appropriate U.S. and foreign consumers.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Establishes divisional criteria for records and methods of information processing required for CI research.	5+

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):		▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

MAR 9 2 55 PM '61

As Chief of SR's Research Section on Soviet Intelligence, Mr. Wigren's performance has continued to be superior in the same manner as described in Section E of last year's report. In addition to this he has worked closely with OTR on the revamping of the CI Operations Course. He has been particularly effective in organizing and leading briefings on the RIS given to chiefs and operations officers of foreign intelligence services during their visits to Washington, and in leading a seminar designed to assist SR personnel in handling liaison briefings. His success in carrying out a planned approach to SR's CI research problems, using personnel who have relatively little substantive experience, has been especially gratifying.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 24 February 61	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 24 February 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/SR/RISB	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward W. Knowles

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	106198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN Leo	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12-01-23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR/CE	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 25 Jan 1960

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 7 May 59-31 Dec 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises & reviews work of Section including 8 research analysts and 2 clerks.	5+	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Gives lectures and briefings to Agency and foreign officials as required.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and implements divisional research program on Soviet Intelligence.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Effects coordination with CI Staff, OS and others on CI research matters.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Directs dissemination of CI studies and reports on RIS to appropriate U.S. and foreign consumers.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Establishes divisional criteria for records and methods of information processing required for CI research.	5+

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Wigren has excellent substantive background on the Soviet Union and, except for a two year period on a WE operations desk, has devoted his entire 9 years in the Agency to research on Soviet Intelligence in one way or another. His performance for the past year in a job formerly held by GS-14's and 15's can only be described as superior. He has not only assumed responsibilities greater than those of the previous incumbents; he has carried these out with a minimum of support and in a calm, mature manner which has earned respect on all sides. Although his analysts have often been relatively inexperienced, he has geared their assignments to their capabilities and subjects designed to increase their competence. His most important contribution during this period has been in the formation of an organized plan of research in response to Agency and external requirements, and the establishment of improved records and procedures to carry out this program.

Although Mr. Wigren would prefer eventual assignment to the field as an operational officer, it seems to me his greatest potential lies in the kind of research and support of operations he is presently performing. I would therefore recommend that future training be oriented along these lines rather than strictly operational lines, and that planning for his eventual field assignment should emphasize his knowledge of Soviet Intelligence and his ability to deal with other specialists in a "liaison" relation.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 22 March 60	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS		REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE 21 March 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR SR/COP/CE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE E W Knowles Edward W. Knowles

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
X	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
Although [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] [illegible] anything which would contradict the rater [illegible] [illegible] to agree with the rating.

DATE 26 March 60	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL SR/COP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Quentin Johnson

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
106198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 December 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I. O. (FI)		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FI Div D

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD
From 7 Mar 58 - 31 Dec 58 To

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises 4 people - 3 professional (GS-7 through 9) conducting research and 1 clerical (GS-4)	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assists in developing new programs	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Writes reports	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Coordinates with other offices	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts research	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conducts external liaison	5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. WIGREN has shown intelligence, initiative and originality in his approach to various assignments. He has calmly accepted heavy working pressures and has efficiently carried out research and administrative matters requiring the careful disposition of manpower and time. He has willingly accepted responsibility and made decisions on his own when the need arose.

It is recommended that Mr. WIGREN take a course on the Communist Party and one on management.

During the sixteen months that he has been under my supervision Mr. WIGREN has capably carried out assignments of a progressively more difficult nature. And he appears to have the potential to assume greater responsibilities.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 16 January 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 16 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 16 January 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, SAS, FI/D	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Albert P. Kergel Albert P. KERGEL

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 19 January 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADC/FI/Division D	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WIGREN, Lee
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec 1923
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FI Div D Intel Support Br
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Biographic Officer
7. GRADE: GS-11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 19 Mar 58
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 23 September 57 - 19 March 1958
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 14 February 1958
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Albert P. Kergel Albert P. Kergel
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Spec. Act. Br., FI/D

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

Posted Pos. Control BY DATE 11 MAR 1958
Reviewed by [illegible] MAR 13

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 14 February 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Frank D. Rowlett Frank Rowlett
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, FI/D

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duties at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 7 2 16 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

4

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Writing specialized reports	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Evaluating significance of data	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Has and uses area knowledge	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Wigren is intelligent, competent and diligent.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

97.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FI Div D Intel Support Br	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Biographic Officer		
7. GRADE GS-11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 19 Mar 58	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 23 September 57 - 19 March 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 14 Feb. 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Albert P. Kergel Albert P. Kergel	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Spec. Ac. Br., FI/D

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 14 Feb. 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Frank B. Rowlett Frank B. Rowlett	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, FI/D

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Wigren has a flair for research which should enable him to assume responsibilities in work of a research nature.

PERSONNEL
MAR 7 2 16 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

It is planned to give Mr. Wigren an opportunity to assume more research responsibilities.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wigren, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 December 1923	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Scandinavian Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS-11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP ASAP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 19 March 1957 - 23 September 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
☐	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:
He is no longer in WE-1

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM AND COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 25 October 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Robert C. York	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE AC/WE-1/Sweden

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Per. Control		11/6/57
Reviewed by [illegible]		NOV 21 1957

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 25 October 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Edward Ryan Edward Ryan	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WE-1

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 3

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties [illegible] rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated wi[illegible] same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

[illegible] INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 30 3 55 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Is a Headquarters case officer	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Prepares correspondence and reports	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordinates with other offices	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

This officer is intelligent and possesses good judgement. He is neat and methodical in his work. Within the area of his explicit duties he is a willing worker who takes and executes orders faithfully. At this desk, the weaker aspect of his performance was in matters of initiative, drive and imagination. Though this impression may be heightened by Mr. Wigren's naturally quiet, unobtrusive manner, thefinal assessment must be that he is not inclined to go beyond carrying out assignments given to him.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 3-4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

In view of his relative strengths and weaknesses, Mr. Wigren would seem better fitted for work requiring studious and methodical application to one or a few activities or projects, rather than as an across-the-board operations case officer, either at Headquarters or in the field.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wigren, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 December 1923	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Scandinavian Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS-11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP ASAP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 19 March 1957 - 23 September 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
- ☒ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 25 Oct. 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR R. C. Yore Robert C. Yore	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE AC/WE-I/Sweden

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 25 Oct. 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Edward Ryan Edward Ryan	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WE-I

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 3

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	1	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	1	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	0	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify) In absence of actual experience of individual in supervisory job, ratings are very arbitrary

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

8 m.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 30 3 35 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

At the time of Mr. Wigren's last fitness report, the supervisor and reviewing officia discussed with him his particular weaknesses and strengths. [illegible] as [illegible] him that his advancement, particularly his overseas assignment, would depend upon his showing greater initiative and interest as a case officer. It should be recorded that Mr.Wigre took this to heart and consciously strove to improve his performance up to the time he left this office. The results were not such, however, as to seem to qualify Mr. Wigren for overseas service. By mutual agreement, therefore, he transferred to the FI Staff

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Section H.

FUTURE PLANS

No longer in WE-I

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	2	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
2	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	X	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
3	5. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET [illegible] WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	2	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS		18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
2	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. [illegible] CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	3	20. COMPLETES A[illegible] WITHIN ALLOWABL[illegible] LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Wigren, Lee H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. SEX: m
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP WE Scandinavian
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops. Officer
7. GRADE: 11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 19 March 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 19 March 1956-19 March 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS BEEN SENT TO HIM, A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW HE STANDS ON HIS PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

BY DATE
Posted PSS Control
Removed by PUD

B. THIS DATE: 25 March 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: E.C. Yore
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: C/WE-1/Sweden

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

I have discussed this report, and his general situation, in considerable detail with Mr. Wigren. He felt he did not wish to challenge the critical comments of the rating officers (I had two officers work together in that capacity), but felt that a rating of 3 under specific duty No.2 did not do him justice. I think he's right on this score and would raise that rating to a 4. I would say there has been an improvement in Mr. Wigren's performance within the last year, and I have raised with the Division Personnel Board the subject of a promotion for him to GS-12. The Board recommended deferment of his case for a fewmonths.

☒ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 25 March 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Edward Ryan
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, WE-1

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 29 11 20 AM '5[illegible]
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Writes Hqs and field Communications	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyses operations and proposes action.	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Coordinates with other area desks and staffs.	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Briefs superiors on his activities	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares intelligence reports	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Most notable among this officer's strong qualities are his intelligence, inquisitiveness, emotional stability and good judgement. He comprehends and analyzes situations and problems readily and in the latter seems very able at finding logical solutions. He expresses himself well orally and in writing. He is neat in both personal and work habits. Such weaknesses as Mr. Wigren seems to have lie in the areas of social relationship and motivation. He is calm and introspective, not gregarious nor easy to know. Though he is always polite and even tempered he seems at the roots, perhaps, unduly sensitive to criticism. In his attitude towards and the performance of his job he seems to do what he likes well, but to let the lessagreeable things slide.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET

2. For the Reviewing Official (continued).

Mr. Wigren has also asked that it be made a matter of record that, for a period of three months in 1956, he was acting chief of the Swedish Desk and handled these responsibilities effectively. I have agreed to cite the extent of his responsibilities. Certainly the routine business of the desk was kept moving during this period. I have pointed out with respect to the manner of his performance of his duties that his fitness report is not an unfavorable one. The factors which have turned this annual fitness report into a personal crisis for him are the simultaneous deferment of his hoped-for promotion, and the deferment of an overseas assignment for him -- both of which actions naturally reflect on his past performance. I have pointed out that we have to require appreciably better than average performances from officers we send overseas, that I believe we have in the Branch at least one better qualified candidate for the overseas assignment in question, and that I am obliged to give the assignment to the person I feel is best qualified.

Perhaps understandably, Mr. Wigren continues to believe that this report is not a fair reflection of his performance. I have told him that I can go no further in attempting to explain my judgement and have asked that he discuss his situation with the Deputy Division Chief and/or the Division Chief. He agreed to do so.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wigren, Leo H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec. 1923	3. SEX m	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WE Scandinavian	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops. Officer		
7. GRADE 11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 19 March 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 19 March 1956-19 March 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 25 March 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR R C Yore R. C.Yore	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/WE-1/Sweden

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 25 March 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Edward Ryan Edward Ryan	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WE-1

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

DATE
Board
[illegible]

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	3 2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	2 1	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	1	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55
REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 29 11 20 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
4

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

He is, I believe, at a crucial stage in his career. Depending upon his outlook and ambition during the next 3 to 5 five years he will have become either a mediocre senior case officer or an officer ready and able to assume executive responsibilities. He already has the inherent judgement and intelligence for more responsible jobs, but has not yet demonstrated a sufficient industry and resolve to make him as a promising professional.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Mr. Wigren has been undergoing a variety of specialized training, including Swedish language, preparatory to an assignment in Stockholm. Such an assignment has been deferred and future training plans must therefore be held in abeyance.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4 3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	2	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	2	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
1-2	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	X	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4 3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4 3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	3	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
3	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	3	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET

2. For the Reviewing official: Note:

I have indicated in ink in the forms wherein my judgement differs from that of the rating officer.

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Wigren Lee H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. SEX: M.
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [redacted] D1
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WE Scandinavian
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer
7. GRADE: OS 11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 19 March 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 19 March 55 - 19 March 56
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISOR(S).
☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 2 May 1956
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: J. J. Stenger, Jr. J. Stenger
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief Scand'l Sch [illegible]

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

I have discussed this report at length with Mr. Stenger, because of its critical character, and subscribe entirely to it. I think the discussion of the report with Mr. Wigren has been beneficial, and I believe an improvement will result, since Wigren seems to have good capabilities, if he cares to use them. If there is not an improvement within the next year, the question of a reassignment will have to be considered. Wigren tells me he feels he was not given any [illegible] of [illegible] and that the report is therefore to some extent [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] record.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 4 May 56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: [illegible]
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Branch Chief

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 3

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

BY DATE

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same work at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 15 3 PM '58

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB.
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Processing and dissemination of field information reports	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of correspondence to the field	RATING NUMBER 3
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handling of project outlines and renewals and other administrative details	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Providing operational support to the station	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

A large portion of Mr. Wigren's time is taken up with the processing of field information reports and the handling of administrative aspects of various FI projects, both of which he performs efficiently, although he occasionally requires supervision to ensure the prompt completion of project details. In the area of operational support for the field, which includes providing the station with requirements, with name traces, operational appraisal and operational guidance, Mr. Wigren, performs acceptably but occasionally shows a lack of initiative and originality of ideas such as would be required to raise the rating in this category. As regards preparation of correspondence for the field, Mr. Wigren here again performs acceptably, but occasionally shows of a lack of observance and attention to detail.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Although this question has been answered in the negative, it is believed that Mr. Wigren's performance would be rated higher in a position involving more research-type work.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Wigren (First) Leo (Middle) H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. SEX: M.
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [redacted]
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WE Scandinavian
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer
7. GRADE: GS 11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 19 March 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 19 March 55 - 19 March 56
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 2 May 1956
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: J.J.Stenger, Jr. JJ Stenger
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Swedish Desk WE-1

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 4 May 56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Edward Moran
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Branch Chief

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 3

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	1	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	1	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	1	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	1	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

12

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

In tho opinion of the rater, Mr. Wigren does not display quite the degree of initiative, originality of ideas, and attention to details required for assuming greater responsibility, although he is believed to be of better than average intelligence.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
PM '56
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Sx Within the next twelve months Subject may be considered for an overseas assignment. It is believed that such an assignment may be beneficial in giving Mr. Wigren broader experience which may serve to increase his potential to the Agency.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject is desirous of having overseas duty. Should he be assigned to an overseas post, it is believed that this duty may provide him with the necessary stimulus to bring out latent potential in addition to broadening his experience. Should an overseas tour not result in an increase in potential, particularly as regards initiative and ability to think originally, it is recommended consideration be given to employing Subject in a research-type job.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS, HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
2	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	3	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	2	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	2	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
3	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	3	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	2	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

BY DATE
5 12.13
2-12/14

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WIGREN, Lee H.
2. GRADE: GS-9
3. POSITION TITLE: IO (FI) CD-FI
4. OFFICE: DDP/FI
STAFF OR DIVISION: Staff C
BRANCH: Soviet Intel.Br
☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 19 Mar. 53 To 18 Mar.54
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

1. Conduct continuing examination of structure and operational methods of Soviet Satellite intelligence services. Maintain files and records pertinent to this examination.

2. Assist personnel of country desks in matters involving Satellite services. Advise and aid CE personnel of Satellite country desks.

3. Conduct research on problem of relationships between Soviet intelligence services and those of the Soviet satellites. Publish studies pertinent to this subject.

4. Prepare analyses of special counterespionage problems for use in the field, headquarters and training.

5. Prepare counterespionage studies dealing with specific areas (eg: Scandinavia) and based on systematic analyses of espionage cases in those areas.

6. Perform special tasks as assigned.

8. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?
CE, Research and Analysis.
IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.
1 October 1954
DATE
Lee H. Wigren
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

He has been for several years a one man orchestra, viz. list of duties above.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

-- OF PERSONNEL
OCT 8 8 53 AM '54
MAIL ROOM

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

doing about all one man can do on a difficult job

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

is growing with job

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

very good potential in research in satellite field

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

I do not think so

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

training completed -
rotation as desired in line with background

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

na

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

4 Oct 154
DATE

NW Holbrook
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

5 Oct 54
DATE

R P Hm
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) WIGREN (First) Lee (Middle) H

2. GRADE GS-7

3. POSITION TITLE Intell. Off.

4. OFFICE DDP

STAFF OR DIVISION FI

BRANCH Staff C-CE

☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD

IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 4-19-52 To 4-19-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

1. Under general supervision, examine the structure and operational methods of Soviet intelligence services, and prepare studies based on this examination.
2. Conduct research to determine current relationships between Soviet intelligence services and those of the Soviet satellite countries.
3. Prepare analyses of special counterespionage problems for use in the field, headquarters, and training.
4. Prepare counterespionage studies dealing with specific areas, and based on systematic analyses of espionage cases in those areas.
5. Assist in the review of Country Plans from the counterespionage viewpoint.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed

The following courses were completed during the period April to July 1951, and have not been previously reported:

1. Basic Orientation Course; 2. Basic Intelligence Course; 3. Operations Course; and 4. Advanced Operations Course.

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? Research, analysis, and support — all mainly in the field of counterespionage.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

21 April 1953

DATE

Lee H Wigren

SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Highly satisfactory. Has displayed conspicuous good judgment, accuracy, and cooperation.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over)

14

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Judgment

13. IN WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Knowledge of Soviet Intelligence, particularly operational analysis, for which he has shown a special aptitude.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Shows capacity for [illegible] and eventual leadership.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Training adequate. Eventual operational experience, preferably in Scandinavian area, desirable.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

DATE 21 Apr. 1953

George E. [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

DATE 21 Apr '53

Newton [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

noted - 28 Apr 53 RCI

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT
MANAGEMENT FOR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY (MEO)

Student: Lee H. Wigren　　Dates: 12-14 Sept 1977

Employee No.: 006198　　Office: DDO/CI

Service Designation: D

COURSE DESCRIPTION

The course is designed especially for people in managerial and supervisory positions. It is based upon the assumption that the Agency's ability to promote full utilization of all employees regardless of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, or age, depends upon the awareness and behavior of managerial/supervisory personnel. They have a critical role in making the decisions necessary to eliminate real or apparent discrimination and to promote productive work relations among employees who differ in race, sex, or culture. In fact managerial awareness and decisions have a great impact on the recommendations and efforts of EEO, FWP, Upward Mobility and other employees concerned with compliance and affirmative action.

OBJECTIVES

Through lectures, readings, films, group discussion, workshop exercises, and case studies, each supervisor, at the conclusion of the course, should be able to:

1) Identify some of the more prominent patterns of discrimination and describe their impact upon supervisory processes; 2) Have had the opportunity or been able to critically evaluate his or her own attitudes towards equality of opportunity; 3) Better contribute to the effective utilization of all employees by being aware of and sensitive to several creditable approaches to management behavior and actions; 4) Explain the historical background which gave rise to today's Equal Employment Opportunity Programs; 5) Articulate the Agency's progress in Equal Employment Opportunity Programs; 6) Describe what efforts the Agency is making to be fair to all employees, including describing such programs as the Upward Mobility Program, Federal Women's Program and the Hispanic Program; 7) Be responsive to the complaint process and know what he or she, as a supervisor, should do when faced with a complaint from an employee; and 8) Articulate the significance and importance of major legislation, executive orders and internal CIA policies which affect the management of Equality Opportunity Programs.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a cerificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Samuel R. Lewis 26 SEP 1977

Course Coordinator Date

CONFIDENTIAL

(When filled in)

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee H. Wigren

SUBJECT : Acknowledgment of Evaluation Board Functional Category

REFERENCE : Evaluation Board Precepts for Your Grade

1. Based upon an examination of your past assignments and duties, and after considering likely future assignments, you have been placed (subject to your signature below) in the functional category DAA for Evaluation Board purposes. Precise definitions of this category are contained in the Evaluation Board precepts for your grade. This placement is made in order that your performance, growth potential, and career planning may be judged against officers similarly placed professionally. YOU ARE URGED TO STUDY THE PRECEPTS AND CONSIDER YOUR OWN CASE CAREFULLY.

2. In general, you should consider the following;

a. Categories are sharply defined. Competition is within categories, not between them. Thus, a weak B/OG performance is not strengthened by reclassifying it as B/OS.

b. A change in category after sustained performance in a different category may cause a temporary loss of momentum in your career advancement until you have demonstrated proficiency in your new assignment.

c. A category change should not be initiated for the period of a temporary, training or rotational assignment unless a permanent change of career track will follow.

3. If you believe that this is not the correct category for you because the substantive nature of your job more closely approximates another category or because you have made a permanent change of career track, please take the matter up through your command channel to secure the concurrence of your component of assignment or of your home base component, as appropriate, to a change of your category. Previously assigned and acknowledged categories will remain in effect until a fully executed acknowledgment of change is received by the Career Management Staff.

4. Please sign and date this notification in the space provided and return it to your Personnel Evaluation and Management Officer or to your Personnel Officer.

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Lee H. Wigren
Signature of Addressee

[illegible] April 1977
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

9 FEB 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee H. Wigren

FROM : Leonard McCoy
Chief, CI/R&A

SUBJECT : Letter of Instructions

1. The following letter of instructions is provided to outline your functions as Special Assistant to the Chief, CI Staff Research and Analysis Group.

2. The objectives of CI/R&A are:

a. To provide current and relevant counterintelligence support to operations being conducted by CI Staff and the operating divisions in the interests of furthering intelligence collection and preventing the frustration of our operations by adversary intelligence services.

b. To conduct research and analyze information to facilitate the detection of the efforts of adversary intelligence services to penetrate the US and friendly foreign governments.

3. Your functions as Special Assistant to Chief, CI Staff Research and Analysis Group are as follows:

a. Select information and research and analysis products of CIA, other agencies, and liaison services for publication by the CI Staff as CI guidance and references.

b. Initiate and supervise the conduct of CI research and analysis by assigned personnel for publication by the CI Staff.

c. Establish and implement publication procedures, including editing, rewriting, organizing, sanitizing, classifying, setting up dissemination channels and

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012208

SECRET

controls, and monitoring printing processes for CI Staff publications.

d. Initiate and coordinate the distribution of CI Staff publications as appropriate within the Agency, to other US government agencies, and to liaison services.

e. Maintain a record of CI Staff publications, including recipients, dates of distribution, responses and comments, related correspondence, and other pertinent information.

f. Conduct liaison with other government agencies and foreign intelligence services to promote the collection and dissemination of CI information.

g. Collect and maintain a library of past and present classified CI publications available from all sources for ready reference and consultation.

Leonard McCoy

I have read and understand this letter of instructions.

Lee H. Wigren

Lee H. Wigren

9 February 1977
Date

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
2 - CI/Personnel ✓
1 - C/CI/R&A

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Bra[illegible] Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6		7-24	
000198	WIGREN	LEE	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42
10	24	75	11	02	75		2			EUROPE	801

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☑	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: CI-31-76

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: OCT 24 - NOV 2 - 75

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☐	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT
☐	OCO		ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☑	C & L DIVISION, CTBR.	DATE	SIGNATURE
☐	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
HOFFMAN BUILDING
2461 EISENHOWER AVENUE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22331

SECRET

IN REPLY REFER TO
NIS-22B/skc
3870
Ser S- 3460
19 November 1975

SECRET

From: Director, Naval Investigative Service
To: Director of Central Intelligence

Subj: Counterintelligence/Counterespionage Training (U)

1. (S) During the period 20 October through 28 October 1975, twenty-seven Special Agents of this Service attended an intensive, comprehensive course of instruction regarding counterintelligence techniques as applied overseas, the instructors and facilities for which were graciously provided by your Agency. As in past matters of this nature, Mr. William M. Decker, Mr. Nageeb Trabulsi, and the other dedicated members of your staff provided support and coordination truly unsurpassed in excellence. Both Mr. Decker and Mr. Trabulsi consistently devoted time and effort far beyond that which could normally be expected in order to ensure the highest quality of instruction and assistance.

2. (S) In addition to excellent administrative support, the caliber of instructors and content of the material discussed combined to make every presentation a significant and meaningful experience for the students concerned. Although it was evident that all instructors were highly motivated and fully conversant regarding their respective subjects, I wish to particularly cite those individuals who contributed generous amounts of their valuable time and extensive knowledge toward the improvement of the Naval Investigative Service counterintelligence posture overseas. Those gentlemen are:

Mr. Lee Wigren
Mr. Joseph Flaherty
Mr. John Bogart
Mr. Peter Ernest
Mr. Charles Beling
Mr. Edward Andrews

3. (U) I again wish to extend my most sincere appreciation for a job well done.

Copy to:
Chief, CI Staff

Classified by [illegible]
Subject to [illegible]
[illegible] intervals
Declassified on 31 Dec [illegible]

SECRET

NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
HOFFMAN BUILDING
2461 EISENHOWER AVENUE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22331

SECRET

IN REPLY REFER TO
NIS-22B/skc
3870
Ser S-3460
19 November 1975

Executive Registry
175-5946/1

SECRET

From: Director, Naval Investigative Service
To: Director of Central Intelligence

Subj: Counterintelligence/Counterespionage Training (U)

75-6524

1. (S) During the period 20 October through 28 October 1975, twenty-seven Special Agents of this Service attended an intensive, comprehensive course of instruction regarding counterintelligence techniques as applied overseas, the instructors and facilities for which were graciously provided by your Agency. As in past matters of this nature, Mr. William M. Decker, Mr. Nageeb Trabulsi, and the other dedicated members of your staff provided support and coordination truly unsurpassed in excellence. Both Mr. Decker and Mr. Trabulsi consistently devoted time and effort far beyond that which could normally be expected in order to ensure the highest quality of instruction and assistance.

2. (S) In addition to excellent administrative support, the caliber of instructors and content of the material discussed combined to make every presentation a significant and meaningful experience for the students concerned. Although it was evident that all instructors were highly motivated and fully conversant regarding their respective subjects, I wish to particularly cite those individuals who contributed generous amounts of their valuable time and extensive knowledge toward the improvement of the Naval Investigative Service counterintelligence posture overseas. Those gentlemen are:

Mr. Lee Wigren
Mr. Joseph Flaherty
Mr. John Bogart
Mr. Peter Ernest
Mr. Charles Beling
Mr. Edward Andrews

3. (U) I again wish to extend my most sincere appreciation for a job well done.

BARNEY MARTIN

Copy to:
Chief, CI Staff

Classified by: [illegible]
Subject to [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 1983

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
006198	WIGREN, LEE H.	12/01/23 13 D

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - TO			
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1 PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-66 444n

SECRET

24

14-5

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V

GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

OCT 15 03 [illegible] 70

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (Check (X)) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI

TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII

MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X

REMARKS

DATE
15 October 70

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Lee H Wigren

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) LAST	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
006198	WICKEN	LEE	H.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
						1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION					

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
11	07	72	11	12	73	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	2			WH	811

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON
31 DEC 77
(Insert date or event)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

CLASSIFIED BY 14537

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. CI 54-73

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCO	DATE 30 JAN 73	SIGNATURE
☒	C & L DIVISION, CTRS.		
☐	C & F DIVISION		

THIS [illegible] INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-)

[illegible] 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Official Personnel File

SUBJECT : Wigren, Lee H.

1. Studies in Intelligence is the Agency's quarterly professional journal. It publishes a wide variety of unique material--historical, analytical, technical, etc.—on all aspects of intelligence both as a profession and as a function of national security and foreign policy. Employees whose writings are accepted for publication make a valuable contribution to the Agency's work which ought to be reflected in their official files.

2. Accordingly, the Board of Editors wishes to record the fact that Studies in Intelligence has published the following material submitted by Mr. Wigren:

Book Reviews:	"Spy Ring" - Vol. V, No. 4 (Fall 1961)
	"Soviet Spy Ring" - Vol. VI, No. 2 (Spring 1962)

Hugh T. Cunningham
HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
Chairman, Board of Editors
Studies in Intelligence

Distribution:
0 - Subject's Official File
1 - CI/Pers

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
006198	Wigren	Lee	H.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
						1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION					

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
05	30	72	06	05	72	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	2			Ottawa Winnepeg	120

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		
	CABLE		DISPATCH
	OTHER (Specify)		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.
CI 121-72

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
30 May — 5 June 1972

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ OCO
X C & L DIVISION, CTBR.
☐ [illegible]

X REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE
22 August 1972

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PUNCHED

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6		7-24	
006198	Warren	Leo	H.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA	CODE	O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	CODE
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR						
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA	CODE	O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	CODE
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR						
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42
06	23	71	06	27	71		2			WH	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☐ CABLE
☐ OTHER (Specify)
☐ DISPATCH
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ DCS
☒ C & L DIVISION, CTRS.
☐ C & T DIVISION

☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 26 July 71

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

(4-10)

SECRET

GROUP 1

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY S

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
006198	Wigren, Lee H.		

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 98, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39	Ottawa Montreal WH	40-42
07	08	70	07	13	70		2				811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.:

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 7/8/70 to 7/15/70

REMARKS:

PREPARED BY			REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OCO			
X	C & L DIVISION, CTBO.	DATE 9/9/70		SIGNATURE
	C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GS 13 D

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
096198	WIGREN, Lee H.	12/01/23

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - - TO - -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER	
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-68 444n

SECRET

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

				KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1. Republic of South Africa	Security forces and General	1966			x		x
2.							

APR 15 5 12 PM '70

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE, OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE
9 April 1970

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Lee H Wigren

SECRET

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) WIGREN, LEE HOBART 006198	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) DEC 1, 1923	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 024 16 4873
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
Lee H. Wigren

DATE
19 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY
(Official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 20 11 17 AM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) WIGREN	(First) LEE	(Middle) HOBART	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 024-16-4813

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY BROCKTON MASS	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) FAIRFAX VA
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE FAIRFAX VA	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE FAIRFAX VA

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE WASHINGTON, D.C.	DATE OF MARRIAGE 27 SEPT 1952
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE —	DATE OF DECREE —
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED —	DATE SPOUSE DIED —

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
—

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
ALICE ELLEN (RADER) WIGREN	10107 ALICE CT, FAIRFAX VA	273-4950	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
- CHRISTOPHER LEE WIGREN	10107 ALICE CT, FAIRFAX VA	M	10 MAR 1957
- ERIC VICTOR WIGREN	" " " " "	M	15 AUG 1959
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
AUGUST HERMAN WIGREN	DECEASED		
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
IDA CAROLINE WIGREN	69 EARLE ST, BROCKTON MASS	JU 7-4615	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) MR. WIGREN, RUSSELL H.	RELATIONSHIP BROTHER
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 19 PONDEROSA LANE, EAST WALPOLE, MASS	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER 617-MO8-1487
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE —	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES	YES	✓
	NO	
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)	YES	✓
	NO	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	✓
	NO	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 11-63 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

- POTOMAC BANK + TRUST, FAIRFAX VA - checking (LEE H + ELLEN P.)
- COLUMBIA FEDERAL SAVINGS + TRUST WASHINGTON DC - Savings (" ")

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☑ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☑ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

ORIGINAL: WIFE; COPIES: RUSSELL H WIGREN + FILE IN OFFICE

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

RUSSELL H. WIGREN, 11 PONDEROSA LANE, E. WALPOLE MASS

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE 3 October 1966	SIGNATURE Lee H Wigren

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET

11 JAN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Training

SUBJECT : Recent Training for SELEVER/10 and SELEVER/11 under Project SELEVER

Reference: Memorandum for Director of Training - Subject: Request for Training for SELEVER/10 and SELEVER/11 under Project SELEVER, dated 30 September 1965.

Africa Division wishes to express its appreciation for the excellent support and cooperation rendered by members of the Covert Training Staff and School of International Communism during the recent one-month training course provided for SELEVER/10 and SELEVER/11. In particular we wish to thank Mr. Alexander Sogolow of the Covert Training Staff, who not only handled the majority of the training but also spent considerable time and made a special effort with the trainees during evenings and weekends "handholding" them. We also wish to thank in particular the following members of the School of International Communism for their assistance: Messrs. Hugh Clayton, Robert Kehoe, Alvin Korsalski, Henry Pisanko, Henry Schreiber and Lee Wigren.

Glenn Fields
Chief, Africa Division

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR

ATTENTION: Mr. Lee Wigren
Mr. Joseph Evans
Mrs. Kay Grady
Mr. Edward Knowles

SUBJECT: Training program for three Swiss Federal Police officers.

1. The Swiss Branch of the Eastern European Division wishes to express its appreciation to SR Division for its cooperation and support, in particular for the personal contribution of four of its officers, Mr. Lee Wigren, Mr. Joseph Evans, Mrs. Kay Grady, and Mr. Edward Knowles, during the recent training program for three Swiss Federal Police officers.

2. Mr. Wigren's, Mr. Evan's, Mrs. Grady's, and Mr. Knowles's uniformly excellent briefings on the Soviet Intelligence Services, their legal and illegal support structures, and their modus operandi contributed significantly to what we have reason to believe was a successful training venture. To this must be added the comments of the Swiss officers who pointed out that they were most impressed by the comprehensive and systematic development of the various themes which Mr. Wigren, Mr. Evans, Mrs. Grady, and Mr. Knowles presented and admitted that the briefings added a good deal to their knowledge of the subject.

Robert N. Crowell,
Chief, EE/Switzerland

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER 1-5 F.P.M.
0 GAO 1960

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959

(Read Instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ballpoint pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. ~~053400~~

PART A ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART:

1. NAME (LAST) WIGREN (FIRST) Lee (MIDDLE INITIAL) H.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
12	1	1923

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) 15 Moda Street (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) Fairfax, (STATE) Virginia ☐

5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant? YES ☐ NO ☒

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.

UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1 $4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2 $6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3 $10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN Association Benefit Plan

OPTION (HIGH OR LOW) High

ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER 4 2 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception: List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

If enrollment is for self only, answer Item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer Item 2 and Item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband Ellen R. Wigren	8/13/1927	1			6
Christopher L. Wigren	3/10/1957	2			7
Eric V. Wigren	8/15/1959	3			8
		4			9
		5			10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
(c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan.

2. Number of event which permits change (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)

3. Date of event which permits change

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

PART E ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

Lee H. Wigren June 24, 1960
(SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE 6/27/60

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION 7/10/60

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.

SA

Triplicate—To Employing Office

APR. 1959

10108

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE

This Outline, when completed, is a documented description of the individual's career interests and proposed career activities together with the comments of his supervisor and his Career Service. The original will be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder and will serve as a guide for future personnel actions affecting him. Implementation of career preferences must depend upon the needs of the Organization.

- CONSULT ATTACHED INSTRUCTION SHEET PRIOR TO COMPLETING THIS OUTLINE -

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (*Last-First-Middle*) WIGREN, Lee Hobart	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 December 1923	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION FI	4. GRADE 11
5. ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE none	6. POSITION TITLE —	7. OCCUPATIONAL CODE —	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT FI/D

SECTION B. CAREER INTERESTS

9. GENERAL TYPE OF ACTIVITY

Counterintelligence (CE)

10. SPECIFIC TYPE OF ACTIVITY (*Including assignments*)

A. IMMEDIATE (*Within next 1 to 2 years*)

Remain at present Division D assignment until about Spring 1962, participating in various aspects of the work of the office to which assigned, including the administrative side.

B. LONG-RANGE (XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX)

Field or headquarters assignments making use of background, interest and experience in Counterintelligence and/or area knowledge. Would welcome and seriously consider suggestions of possible future assignments.

SECTION C. TRAINING

11. ORGANIZATIONAL, EXTERNAL, AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

A. IMMEDIATE (*Within next 1 to 2 years*)

Basic Management Course; Communist Party Organization and Operations Course
On-the-job training within the office
Continued self-study of Swedish

B. LONG-RANGE (*Within next 3 to 5 years*)

To be planned at a later date, based on projected future assignments

12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS Although I feel that my interests, experience, and training fit me best for CE type assigments, I wish to gain some breadth of experience through diversified assignments. I also believe that my Scandinavian area and language knowledge should be put to use at some time during my career.

See Item 21

I RECOGNIZE THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MY CAREER PREFERENCES MUST DEPEND UPON THE NEEDS OF THE ORGANIZATION. I UNDERSTAND THAT MY PERFORMANCE, CAPABILITIES AND INTERESTS WILL BE GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION.	13. DATE COMPLETED 3 March 1958	14. SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

FORM NO. 1030
1 AUG 56

SECRET

Career Outline (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION D. COMMENTS BY SUPERVISOR

15. RELATIVE TO CAREER INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEE

Prior to completing this Career Preference Outline, Mr. WIG[illegible] and I discussed his career interests and desired training. I concur with the views which he has expressed in the completed outline.

16. RELATIVE TO TRAINING FOR EMPLOYEE

See item 15.

17. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Albert P. KERGEL

18. SIGNATURE
Albert P. Kergel

19. TITLE
Chief, Special Activities Branch, FI/D

20. DATE
3 March 1958

SECTION E. FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

21. COMMENTS

Detailed Individual Career Plan approved by FI Panel
on file in FI Career Management Office, 2048 L

22. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME
Robert A. Skeels

23. SIGNATURE
Robert A. Skeels

24. TITLE
FI Career Management Officer

25. DATE
14 APR 1958

LEAVE BLANK

SECRET

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

20 OCT 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee H. Wigren

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 1 July 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:
Lee H. Wigren
Date: 20 October 1955

Career Service Staff
Office of Personnel
3 JAN 1956

FORM NO. 511. 1 APR 55

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

CAREER SERVICE QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION I (To be completed by employee)

NAME (Last) Wigren	(First) Lee	(Middle) Hobart	AGE 30	GRADE 9	NO. OF MOS. IN GRADE ~~13~~ 14	CAREER DESIGNATION FI

STAFF OR DIVISION Staff C	BRANCH SIB	POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer

NO. OF MOS. IN PRESENT POSITION 40	NO. OF MOS. IN OSS 0	NO. OF MOS. IN CIG 0	NO. OF MOS. IN CIA 40

DATA ON ALL PERMANENT DUTY OVERSEAS OR IN U.S. FIELD (Include any TDY during last two years)

APPROXIMATE DATES OF SERVICE		LOCATION		TDY	PCS	COMMENTS
FROM	TO	COUNTRY	STATION			
None						

INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SERVE TOUR OF DUTY OVERSEAS PCS

A ☒ YES B ☐ ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS C ☐ NO

INDICATE ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE IF PRECEDING ANSWER IS "A" OR "B"

PREFERENCE	COUNTRY	STATION	TYPE OF POSITION
1ST	Sweden	Stockholm	Staff (CE)
2ND	Denmark	Copenhagen	Staff (CE)
3RD	Austria	Vienna or Salzburg	Staff (CE)

IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "B," STATE CONDITIONS. IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "C," EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS

INDICATE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OVERSEAS IN WHICH YOU WILL NOT SERVE AND EXPLAIN REASONS

Tropical areas. Wife's health will not permit.

INDICATE RELATIONSHIP AND AGE OF EACH DEPENDENT TO BE MOVED OVERSEAS

Wife age 27.

INDICATE KNOWN MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH THE AGENCY HAS IMPOSED ON YOUR SERVICE

None

FORM NO. 59-174
1 JUN 54

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS ON REVERSE SIDE.

(4)

SECRET

INDICATE ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING DEPENDENTS *(old age, chronic illness, need for special educational facilities, etc.)* OR ANY UNUSUAL PERSONAL SITUATION WHICH WOULD AFFECT YOUR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

None

DESCRIBE TYPES OF HEADQUARTERS AND U.S. FIELD POSITIONS FOR WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE CONSIDERED AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO SERVE

Like present assignment very much. Feel most qualified in CE work and would prefer to remain in it. Desire to continue work dealing with problem of Soviet Satellite intelligence services which is my specialty.

REMARKS

DATE 19 July 54	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H Wigren

SECTION II *(To be completed by employee's supervisor)*

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME *(months)* WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE	INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME *(months)* WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER HEADQUARTERS OR U.S. FIELD ASSIGNMENT

COMMENTS ON AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYEE'S PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

depends on circumstances

DATE 23 July '54	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Newton

PERSONNEL OFFICER WILL FORWARD ORI TO OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND FIRST COPY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE BOARD

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1949)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A6 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA .... WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, LEE H. WIGREN, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. ...., dated ...., 19......, filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

Lee H Wigren
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 19 day of March, A. D. 19 51

at Washington D. C.
(City) (State)

[SEAL]

Chloie D. Hudson
(Signature of officer)

....
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—68160-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)
3200 16th St. NW, WASHINGTON DC. (APT 319)

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 1 DEC. 1923
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*): BROCKTON, MASS

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: A. H. WIGREN
(B) RELATIONSHIP: FATHER
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 215 BELMONT AVE, BROCKTON, MASS.
(D) TELEPHONE NO.: BROCKTON 4402-W

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		✓
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		✓
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		✓
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $50 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		✓

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 15—43100-1

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER [illegible]
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS [illegible], 93, AND 53

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*)
WIGREN, LEE H.

2. DATE OF BIRTH
1 DEC 1923

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
NONE							

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U.S. ARMY	1943	FEB	17	1946	FEB	11	HONORABLE

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☐ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

10 January 1966
(DATE)

Lee H Wigren
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ (MONTH) 19____ at ______ (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

12. TOTAL SERVICE

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

144-102

(*OVER*)

✓ X

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

Lee H. Wigren

OFFICE: OSO/STC

DIVISION:

BRANCH:

SECTION:

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
		DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
Central Intelligence Agency,OSO	Washington, D.C.	19	Mar	1951	31	12	51	13	9	0 ✓
Total Civilian Service								13	9	0

SEC - 3/24/43
12/19/51
verified
J Gibbons

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
~~U.S. Army~~	~~12~~	Feb	1943	11	Feb	1951	~~24~~	11	7
Total Military Service							~~24~~ 26	11	7 ✓

Corrected copy submitted
10-66

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

11 December 1951
DATE

Lee H. Wigren
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

[illegible]

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE		
DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
8	7	8 ✓
	6	

SECRET
Security Information

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry)
2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) WIGREN, LEE HOBART
3. Office FI/CD/SIB
4. Date of Birth 1 DECEMBER 1923
5. Sex: ✓ male (1) ___ female (2)
Marital Status M
Nr. Dependents 1
6. Employment Date: MARCH 1951
7. Citizenship: ✓ U.S. ___ Other
8. Acquired By: (1) ✓ Birth (2)___ Marriage (3)___ Naturalization (4)___ Other(specify)
Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ___

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
4. Two years college, or less
5. Over two years, no degree
6. Bachelor degree
7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
[✓ 8. Masters degree]
9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	
BOSTON UNIV., CLA. BOSTON, MASS.	HISTOR	GOVT	1941	1943	1 1/2	—	—	—	
YALE UNIV. NEW HAVEN, CONN	HIS	TORY	1943	1944	—	—	—	—	—
" "	"	"	1946	1947	2 1/2	—	A.B.	1947	
HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.	HIST	ORY	1947	1950	3	—	A.M.	1948	

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

4. Military, Intelligence or Investigative training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
ARMY SPECIALIZED TNG. PROGRAM, YALE UNIV., NEW HAVEN, CONN.	JUNE 1943	MAR. 1944	9	RUSSIAN LANGUAGE + AREA STUDIES
SCHOOL FOR PERSONNEL SERVICES WASHINGTON + LEE UNIV., LEXINGTON, VA	OCT 1944	NOV 1944	1	TRAINING AS INFORMATION + EDUCATION SPECIALIST

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. State the nature of duties performed with this organization, starting with your present position. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From MAR 51 To NOV 52 Tot. mos. 20

Grade 7 Salary $4205

Office FI/CD/SIB

Position Title: INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Duty Title:

Description of Duties: - EXAMINATION OF STRUCTURE AND METHODS OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN CONNECTION WITH GENERAL FUNCTIONS OF SIB;
- RESEARCH ON RELATIONSHIP OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES;
- PREPARATION OF STUDIES OF COUNTERESPIONAGE SITUATION IN SPECIFIC AREAS REQUIRING

Duty Station, if overseas:

From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____

Grade ____ Salary ____

Office ____

Position Title:

Duty Title:

Description of Duties: ANALYSIS OF ESPIONAGE CASES IN THE AREAS. CONCLUSIONS ARE DRAWN ON CURRENT SOVIET INTELLIGENCE METHODS.
- PREPARATION OF SPECIAL STUDIES ON COUNTERESPIONAGE PROBLEMS, (eg. EVALUATION OF REASONS FOR FAILURE IN A GIVEN SERIES OF OPERATIONS)

Duty Station, if overseas:

From MAR 51 To MAY 52 Tot. mos. ↑

Grade 6 Salary $3795

Office (time included in above item)

Position Title:

Duty Title:

Description of Duties: [SAME AS ABOVE]

Duty Station, if overseas:

From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____

Grade ____ Salary ____

Office ____

Position Title:

Duty Title:

Description of Duties:

Duty Station, if overseas:

From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____

Grade ____ Salary ____

Office ____

Position Title:

Duty Title:

Description of Duties:

Duty Station, if overse

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Previous Employment: Describe your previous work experience in sufficient detail to permit full recognition of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.

From SEPT 1946 To JUNE 1947 Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: NONE Employer YALE UNIVERSITY Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position CATALOGUER Description of Duties: - PART-TIME WORK CATALOGING & INDEXING LETTERS IN CONNECTION WITH YALE EDITION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE OF HORACE WALPOLE: A LARGE-SCALE HISTORICAL PROJECT. Duty Station if overseas:
From AUG 44 To FEB 46 Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) S/Sgt ~~Salary~~ Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 15 LECTURERS Employer US ARMY Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position INFORMATION & EDUCATION SPECIALIST Description of Duties: - ASSISTED IN SUPERVISING & PLANNING INFO. & EDUCATION PROGRAM AT CAMP PICKETT, VA. DEVELOPED ON AND OFF-DUTY EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS; TRAINED & SUPERVISED UNIT EDUCATION PERSONNEL; PREPARED LECTURES & DISCUSSION MATERIALS Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	~~Exact Title of your position~~ Description of Duties: ON HISTORY, CURRENT EVENTS, ETC.; PUBLISHED DAILY NEWS SHEET; WROTE ARTICLES FOR WEEKLY PAPER; LECTURED; BROADCAST DAILY NEWSCASTS; MAINTAINED REFERENCE LIBRARY OF CURRENT INFO.; ~~Duty Station if overseas:~~
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	~~Exact Title of your position~~ ~~Description of Duties:~~ INSPECTED AND SUPERVISED EDUCATION LECTURES & CLASSES PREVIOUSLY DID SIMILAR WORK ON COMPANY LEVEL Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01___U.S. Secret Service
02___Civil Police
03___Military Police
04___U.S. Border Patrol
05___U.S. Narcotics Squad
06___FBI
07___Criminal Investigation Div.
21___Office of Naval Intelligence
22___Office of War Information
23___Army G-2
20___Office of Strategic Services
24___Air Force A-2
25___Foreign Economic Admin.
26___Counter Intelligence Corps
27___Immigration & Naturalization
28___Strategic Services Unit
29___Foreign Service, State Dept.
30___Central Intelligence Group
31___Armed Forces Security Agency
32___Coordinator of Information
33___Office of Facts & Figures
34___Board of Economic Warfare
35___Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study
FRENCH			X							X
SPANISH			X							X
RUSSIAN					X					X
SWEDISH					X				X	X

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein________

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality.________

FRENCH — HISTORY TERMINOLOGY
RUSSIAN — LARGELY FORGOTTEN THRU NON-USE; CAN BE REFRESHED

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of ~~Residence~~, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
USSR	1943-44			X
SCANDINAVIA (SWEDEN)	NO SPECIFIC DATES			X

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specialized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained
SWEDEN	POLITICAL PARTIES	STUDY, 1946-7
	(LTD)	

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1. ✓ LTD	2.		1. Yes 2. [✓ No]
Shorthand	1.	2.		~~1. Yes~~ 2. No
Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc. NONE	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications. STAMP COLLECTING; MUSIC; READING

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership. NONE

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

NONE

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented
NONE	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No

SEC. X. TESTS (Within present organization)

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken.

Type of Test	Date Taken
GENERAL TESTS TAKEN UPON ENTRANCE ON DUTY	MARCH 1951

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

NONE

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour X (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested ___.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment do you think you are best qualified?

RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND EXAMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA. DETERMINING PATTERNS OF INFORMATION BY SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF REPORTS.

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status

Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? - Yes ___ No.

If yes, indicate your present draft classification 5-A ([illegible])

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status

Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___ Yes ✓ No.

If yes, complete the following.

1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service ~~U.S. Army~~ Grade ~~S/Sgt~~ Serial Number ~~[illegible]~~

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated ___

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ___

Location of Service Records, if known ___

SEC. XV. TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken in this organization.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours
BASIC ORIENTATION (INTELLIGENCE) COURSE	APRIL - MAY 1951	4 wks
OPERATIONS COURSE	MAY - JUNE 1951	4 wks
ADVANCED OPERATIONS COURSE	JUNE - JULY 1951	3 wks
COURSE ON FUNCTIONS OF CIA COMPONENTS, ETC	JUNE 1951	1 wk

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

DATE 14 November 1952

SIGNATURE Lee H. Wigren

REPORT OF QUALIFICATIONS

NOTE: THIS REPORT MUST NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE.

Limbocker

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (OR APPLICANT)

WILGREN, Leo H.

THIS DATE

November, 1950

TEST RECORD

NOTE: PRINTED LINE REPRESENTS AVERAGE RANKINGS FOR PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. COLORED LINE REPRESENTS SUBJECT'S RANKS.

TYPING

	GROSS	NET	ERRORS
1.			
2.			
3.			

FOREIGN LANGUAGE READING TESTS

LANGUAGE	MEAN SCORE	SUBJECT'S SCORE
FRENCH LL	40	
FRENCH UL	38	
GERMAN	30	
ITALIAN	37	
SPANISH	35	

MEAN PROFILE



EVALUATION OF EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE

TYPE OF POSITION		OUTSTANDING	SUPERIOR	ADEQUATE	WEAK	INADEQUATE
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

QUALIFICATIONS TECHNICIAN

FORM NO. 37-706
FEB 1950

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Wigren, Lee

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
< • 2	8-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR •	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR •	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	> WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 5	• 446198	• WiG	• C	• BF45	3	3	4	1	3	4	57

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST		
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR
• BF45	7	7	8	0	7	4	66	• 11	17	66

> DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273 LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA. BJT

7 APR 1967

28 MAR 1967

The authorization to process this employee's disclaim of proficiency in the language factors indicated on this form is contained in a memorandum on file and designated "Language Proficiency Disclaim File", located in the Qualifications Analysis Branch, Office of Personnel.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Wigren, Lee

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
< • 2	6-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR •	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. TH FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUAL TIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR •	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 5	• 006198	• WIG	• C	• BK50	3	1	7	0	0	4	65

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST			
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR	
• BK50	7	0	7	0	0	4	66	• 11	17	66	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

B J T
APR 1967

20 MAR 1967

The authorization to process this employee's disclaim of proficiency in the language factors indicated on this form is contained in a memorandum on file and designated "Language Proficiency Disclaim File", located in the Qualifications Analysis Branch, Office of Personnel.

Wigren, Lee H

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
2	C-DIGITS	MUST CONTAIN 30-DIGITS

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
3										

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO-LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. CODE C-A-S.	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST BASE CODE	R	W.	P	S	U	T	YR
5	076198	WIG	C	BK50	3	1	3	1	1	4	57

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	7. DATE OF TEST MO	DA	YR	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.
BK50	3	1	7	0	0	4	65	09	30	65	

7 NOV 1966

3 NOV 1966

The authorization to process this employee's disclaim of proficiency in the language factors indicated on this form is contained in a memorandum on file and designated "Language Proficiency Disclaim File", located in the Qualifications Analysis Branch, Office of Personnel.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6		7-24		25-26
006198	Wigren	Lee	H.	RR

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	10	13	66	11	13	66	AF	803

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
AF-69-67	13 October - 13 November 1966

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☐	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OSA	DATE		SIGNATURE V. F. Palmer
X	C & L DIVISION			
☐	C & F DIVISION			

FORM 4-66 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

Office of Logistics
Training Report

3rd PRINTING SERVICES SEMINAR

Lee H. Wigren **GS-12** **SR/DIP**

has participated in the Office of Logistics sponsored training program, the Printing Services Seminar. The course program was scheduled on a part-time basis during the period 18 thru 20 October 1960, and consisted of 12 hours of classroom instruction, including an orientation tour of the Agency printing plant.

The program is primarily designed to contribute to the general background and knowledge of Agency printing responsibilities; to acquaint Agency personnel with the policies, functions and organization of CIA printing and reproduction services. Emphasis is placed on economy in printing, printing costs and cost estimating; various printing and photographic processes are explained.

CERTIFICATE OF COURSE COMPLETION:

The above-named individual has regularly attended the program.

Leo Tellez

LEO TELLEZ
Logistics Training Officer

LOGISTICS TRAINING
October 1960

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Completed)

Date 1 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

THROUGH: Staff Training Officer

SUBJECT: Completion of Management Conference

1. **Lee H. Wigren** has completed a Management Conference conducted for SR from 9 - 20 May 1960

2. The conference covered 40 hours of group discussions, lectures, and selected readings concerning problems of Agency management at the middle levels. The individual named completed all conference assignments. No grade has been given since no evaluation is made of any individual's performance in this conference.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

CHARLES D. FORD
Chief, Management Training Faculty

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Completed)

SECRET - EYES ONLY

TECHNICAL SERVICES STAFF

TRAINING DIVISION EVALUATION

PHOTO I - Basic Photography

NAME: Wigren, Loo [illegible].

OFFICE: STAFF: II DIV: [illegible] BRANCH: DATES TRAINED: from: Nov. 1[illegible] to: 7 Dec. 1956

The course is primarily designed to develop skills. Several subjects, however, (such as telephoto lenses, stereo photography etc.) are covered only briefly and the purpose in these subjects is merely to impart an understanding, and not a skill.

This form, therefore, evaluates -

a. The student's level of understanding (signified by the letter "U") or
b. The degree of skill attained (signified by the letter "S") -

whichever is applicable.

	none	Fair	Good	Very good	excellent
I Basic photographic theory and practices					
A. Manipulation of camera					
1. Leica (S)				x	
2. Signet (S) Retina IIC				x	
3. Camera focusing (S)				x	
B. Depth of Field scales (U)			x		
C. Relationship of aperture to shutter speeds (U)				x	
II Processing and Printing:					x
A. Developers, hypo, washing, drying (S)					
B. Loading NIKOR film developing tank (S)					x
C. Use and function of the enlarger (S)					x
D. Contrast papers - selection of proper paper for a particular negative (S)				x	
E. Print control (S)				x	
III Use of filters: (U)				x	
IV Use of exposure meter. (U)				x	
V Indoor photography:				x	
A. Employing only natural room lighting (S)					
B. Employing accessory room lighting for ID pictures (S)					x

SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

	none	Fair ~~[illegible]~~	Good ~~[illegible]~~	Very good	excellent
VI Document copying					
A. Techniques (S)				X	
B. Equipment (S)				X	
C. Selection of film (S)				X	
D. Developing and Printing (S)				X	
VII Telephoto, wide angle lenses, stereo photography (U)				X	
VIII Reflex Copy Printing:				X	
A. Use of permanent photo lab printing box (S)	X				
B. Use of portable "Contura" unit (S)	X				
C. Adaptation of "Contura" unit to clandestine needs (U)	X			~~X~~	
IX Graphics Registry/OCD - Understanding of what is necessary in a photograph in order to be of use to Graphics Registry (U)					
OBSERVED GENERAL TRAITS & CHARACTERISTICS					
I General Quality of prints				X	
II Choice of subject matter - organization and composition				X	
III Quality of darkroom work (cleanliness, neatness, etc.)					X
IV Attitude toward subject matter				X	

REMARKS:

Test Grade:

APPROVED:

C/TSS/Training Division

Gerry E. Worrell
Instructor

SECRET-EYES ONLY

Wigren, Leo H.

Instruction was given in general photography, and its application to the specific problems of ground intelligence photography, document copying with two methods, casing, fixed and mobile surveillance, available light, small object and ID photography and photography in room search.

This student is well organized in his work and has a fine foundation for the work he will be called upon to do. Currently he should be able to handle similar assignments intensfied in the field and with additional practice and experience is capable of applying photography widely and in a more techinical situation.

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE

This Outline, when completed, is a documented description of the individual's career interests and proposed career activities together with the comments of his supervisor and his Career Service. The original will be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder and will serve as a guide for future personnel actions affecting him. Implementation of career preferences must depend upon the needs of the Organization.

- CONSULT ATTACHED INSTRUCTION SHEET PRIOR TO COMPLETING THIS OUTLINE -

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	4. GRADE GS-11
5. ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE	6. POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer	7. OCCUPATIONAL CODE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WE/Swedish Desk

SECTION B. CAREER INTERESTS

9. GENERAL TYPE OF ACTIVITY

FI Operations

10. SPECIFIC TYPE OF ACTIVITY (Including assignments)

A. IMMEDIATE (Within next 1 to 2 years)

Assignment to Scandinavian Station

B. LONG-RANGE (Within next 3 to 5 years)

Reassignment to Headquarters Desk within WE/1

SECTION C. TRAINING

11. ORGANIZATIONAL, EXTERNAL, AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

A. IMMEDIATE (Within next 1 to 2 years)

CE Operations, 0.4
Communist Party Organization and Operations, C.2
Information Reporting, Reports & Requirements, 0.25
Secret Writing, T.9
Audio Surveillance, T.6

B. LONG-RANGE (Within next 3 to 5 years)

Language Study

12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

I RECOGNIZE THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MY CAREER PREFERENCES MUST DEPEND UPON THE NEEDS OF THE ORGANIZATION. I UNDERSTAND THAT MY PERFORMANCE, CAPABILITIES AND INTERESTS WILL BE GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION.	13. DATE COMPLETED 20 Nov56	14. SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE See Item 21

FORM NO. 1030
1 AUG 56

SECRET

Career Outline (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION D. COMMENTS BY SUPERVISOR

15. RELATIVE TO CAREER INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEE

See Item 21

16. RELATIVE TO TRAINING FOR EMPLOYEE

17. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR

18. SIGNATURE

19. TITLE

20. DATE

SECTION E. FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

21. COMMENTS

Detailed Individual Career Plan approved by FI Panel
on file in FI Career Management Office, 2048 L

22. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME
Robert A. Skeels

23. SIGNATURE
Robert A. Skeels

24. TITLE
~~FI Career Management Officer~~

25. DATE
13 FEB 1957

LEAVE BLANK

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] EVALUATION

NAME: **Leo WIGREN** DIVISION: **LE/FI**

COURSE: **Basic Audio**

DATES OF COURSE: **5 - 16 November 1956**

EVALUATION

1. Comprehension of Principles	**Good**
2. Alertness and Interest	**Good**
3. Operational Appreciation of Subject	**Good**
4. Manual Dexterity	**Good**
5. Care in Work	**Good**
6. Aptitude	**Good**
7. Technician Potential	**Good**

NOTE: "Technician Potential" is an estimate of the technical ability the student might acquire after advanced instruction and practice. It is not an estimate of his current level of technique.

Ratings: Poor, Average, Good, Excellent

Please return original of this form to TSS/TMD for proper distribution.
Please return three copies of this form to TSS/TMD for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
Office of Registrar
Office of Personnel
TSS/TMD

COVERT DISTRIBUTION
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - TSS/TMD

Geo. Bailey
Instructor

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO: Registrar, Office of Training

I certify that I completed the Cable Writing Refresher No. 8 on 27 June 56.

LEE H WIGREN
Name (Please Print)

WE
Staff or Division

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

Advanced Counterespionage Course No. 1

HIGREN, Leo H.
Name

M
Sex

4-15 Oct. '54
Dates of Course

12/1/23
Date of Birth

3/51
EOD

GS-9
Grade or Rank

DDP/STC
Office

Research and analysis - Intelligence Officer
Projected Assignment or Present Position

1. The Advanced Counterespionage Course is a specialized course of two weeks' duration designed for CE specialists and their supervisors. The Basic CE Course or equivalent experience is a normal prerequisite for entry into the Advanced CE Course. The course is conducted on a seminar, round-table basis. Emphasis is placed on student participation during staff and guest lectures. Time is allotted for reading the extensive material provided.

2. Specialized techniques of CE operations are emphasized. Counterespionage aspects of double agent operations, liaison situations, and defection are examined in detail. Special attention is given to the structure and modus operandi of Soviet and Satellite internal and external clandestine services. Similar studies are made of the Western Services, as they currently exist and as they may affect Agency operations.

3. Each student is required to give a presentation before the class. This hour-long presentation is based on a problem assignment given the student by the staff. Exception is made where students have the field or headquarters experience in CE or a related field; such a student is permitted to give a one-hour lecture based on specific experience. The "canned" problems are selected to test students' ability to do CE research, collate, make logical analyses, and present ideas effectively to a seminar group.

4. This evaluation is based primarily on the student presentation, and to a lesser degree on participation in seminar discussions when conducted by the staff.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

1. Mr. Wigren ranked in the top bracket of a strong class. He contributed effectively in seminar discussions. He appeared to be alert, and to have a good grasp of CE fundamentals.

2. Mr. Wigren's presentation dealt with his basic assignment in Staff C. The presentation was well organized and was a major contribution to the class's CE background.

3. In my opinion, Mr. Wigren has the background and grasp of CE principles adequate for a CE case officer and analyst.

Z

GHOSN ZOGBY

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

STUDENT'S NAME Leo Hobart Wigren

DATE OF REPORT 8 June 1951

TRAINING COURSE Operations

DIVISION OSO/STC/ICB

GRADE GS-6

AGE: 27

TRAINING PERIOD 7 May - 2 June 1951

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Clerk

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

	Possible Score	Achieved Score	
(1) Comprehension of basic principles of clandestine operations	(40)	25	Sat.
(2) Use of tradecraft (ability to apply principles of clandestine operations)	(50)	30	Sat. -
(3) Ability to evaluate operational data	(20)	12	Sat. -
(4) Ability to use operational data	(20)	11	Med. +
(5) Planning	(30)	19	Sat.
(6) Personality analysis	(20)	14	Sat.
(7) Personality manipulation	(50)	35	Sat.
(8) Adaptability to operational emergencies	(30)	20	Sat.
(9) Attention to detail	(20)	12	Sat. -
(10) Organization and presentation of written operational material	(20)	13	Sat.
TOTAL	(300)	191	

Overall adjectival rating . . . . . Satisfactory 64% . . . .

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait has not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, and the higher indicating above average.

Rating

~~(1) Ability to get along and work with people~~
~~(2) Ability to grasp instructions~~
~~(3) Enthusiasm and interest in work~~
~~(4) Industriousness~~
~~(5) Practical intelligence~~
~~(6) Astuteness~~
~~(7) Adaptability~~
~~(8) Effectiveness~~
~~(9) Stability~~
~~(10) Initiative~~
~~(11) Imagination~~
~~(12) Ability to handle and direct people~~

See Attachment

3. COMMENT. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths or weaknesses)

Ernest G. Weidul
ERNEST G. WEIDUL
CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED. Lawrence B. Shallcross
LAWRENCE B. SHALLCROSS
CHIEF, SID

REVIEWED.
CHIEF, TRD

FORM NO. 51-86
JAN 1950

SECRET

Lee H. Wigren
Grade: FWS-6

2. TRAIT RECORD. The following indicates the various traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations.

1. UNDERSTANDING INSTRUCTIONS
Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Misunderstood instructions completely on more than one occasion.	Was very slow to grasp instructions. Often requested additional explanation or repetition.	Understood instructions if given in detail.	Did not require a detailed explanation.	Grasped instructions quickly, completely, accurately.

2. PLANNING WORK
Not observed______

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Got in serious difficulty because of failure to plan work.	Planned inadequately.	Made plans which permitted adequate implementation of a project.	Gave evidence of careful, thoughtful, planning.	Planned thoroughly, allowed for almost all contingencies.

3. ABILITY TO WRITE
Not observed_____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Seemed unable to express thoughts clearly in written form.	Was weak in expressing thoughts clearly in written form.	Written work showed no significant weakness.	Displayed ability to express thoughts thoroughly in written form.	Was outstanding in ability to express ideas in clear, correct, coherent manner.

4. ATTENDING TO DETAIL
Not observed______

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Written and oral work suffered seriously from constant inattention to details.	Work frequently marred by careless or imprecise treatment of significant detail.	Work showed acceptable attention to significant detail.	Careful handling of significant detail.	Work was consistently outstanding for precise, accurate handling of detail.

CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION
Not observed_____

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Devoid of constructive imagination or inventiveness in approach to problems.	Showed only a very limited degree of constructive imagination.	Showed sufficient constructive imagination to meet most school situations adequately.	Demonstrated the possession of creative ability to a greater than average degree.	Outstandingly creative, inventive, or original.

FLUENCY OF ORAL EXPRESSION
Not observed_____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Unable to express self clearly. Presented ideas in a groping and incoherent fashion.	Lacked fluency or ease in his speech, but meaning usually clear.	Displayed reasonable facility in oral expression.	Spoke confidently, conveying ideas clearly and readily.	Outstanding in fluency and clarity of oral expression.

EFFORT
Not observed_____

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Work was unsatisfactory as a result of insufficient application of time and effort.	Applied minimum amount of time and effort necessary to satisfactorily accomplish assigned work.	Showed adequate compliance as regards time and effort for accomplishment of assigned work.	Volunteered greater time and effort than is normally expected in this course.	Was unusually industrious, giving generously of time, effort and interest.

8. INITIATIVE
Not observed_____

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Failed to act without being specifically instructed to do so.	Occasionally acted on his own.	Usually took steps to implement ideas.	Usually displayed enthusiasm and aggressiveness.	Displayed unusual energy, enthusiasm and aggressiveness.

PERSISTING IN EFFORTS
Not observed__✓__

1	2	3	4	5
Gave up as soon as he met opposition or difficulties in pursuing objective.	Gave up after several attempts had failed.	Surmounted minor difficulties, but was slowed by severe opposition.	Was slowed only by severe opposition.	Persisted in his efforts to achieve objectives despite repeated setbacks or severe opposition.

10. ENTHUSIASM AND INTEREST IN THE WORK

Not observed______

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Displayed no indication of genuine interest in the subject.	Appeared only mildly interested in the subject.	Displayed definite interest in making this sphere of activity his career.	Displayed unusual enthusiasm and interest.	Displayed exceptional enthusiasm and intense interest.

11. ABILITY TO GET ALONG WITH ASSOCIATES

Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Frequently alienated associates.	Was noticeably lacking in: a. sociability b. consideration of others c. cooperativeness.	Reasonably sociable, considerate and cooperative vis-a-vis associates.	Displayed definite a. sociability b. consideration of others c. cooperativeness.	Unusually sociable, considerate and cooperative vis-a-vis associates.

12. LEADERSHIP

Not observed______

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Appeared to withdraw from group activities to a marked degree even when requested to take part.	Took little part in group activities.	Normally participated within the group.	Displayed leadership ability on several occasions.	Consistently assumed leadership in group activities.

13. TACT

Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Markedly blunt and indiscreet	Occasionally said or did something which induced an unfavorable reaction.	Reasonably discreet.	Had good discernment for the appropriate thing to say or do.	Consistently demonstrated keen perception for fitting speech or conduct.

14. PERSUASIVENESS

Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Did not influence the thinking and actions of others	His opinions rarely affected his associates.	Was fairly successful in selling a point or himself.	Was very good at influencing others by his own personality and thinking.	Was outstanding in ability to command respect and attention through his personality and thinking.

15. COMMON SENSE

Not observed_____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Displayed lack of common sense.	Displayed inconsistencies in judgment.	Usually displayed sound judgment.	Consistently displayed sound judgment.	Displayed outstanding ability to make sound decisions.

16. ASTUTENESS

Not observed_____

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Appeared gullible and naive.	Lacked adequate skepticism and discernment.	Displayed adequate discernment and skepticism.	Displayed above average perspicacity and skepticism.	Displayed exceptional shrewdness and perspicacity.

17. ABILITY TO LEARN

Not observed_____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Showed no improvement during course of instruction.	Improvement was slow and laborious.	Assimilated course material in satisfactory fashion.	Showed marked improvement during progress of instruction.	Despite lack of previous experience displayed unusual ability to assimilate course material.

18. ADAPTATION TO TRAINING

Not observed_____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Did not adjust to training program. Remained disorientated, an outsider.	Accepted training but with reluctance.	Adapted himself to most aspects of training.	Accepted the training situation with good spirit.	Accepted training with obvious enthusiasm.

A rating of 3 in personality traits is considered average for a CIA operations officer.

NOTE: For remarks see page 6.

TRAINING EVALUATION

(STAFF ORIENTATION)

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it, although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the test results, observations and opinions of the various instructors for the course listed only. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer. Any questions as regards the evaluation of this student should be referred to the Chief, Records and Evaluation, TRO.

STUDENT'S NAME Lee Hobart Wigren

DATE OF REPORT 28 April 1951

TRAINING COURSE STAFF ORIENTATION 24

DIVISION CSO/STC AGE 27 GRADE GS-6

TRAINING PERIOD 2 - 27 April 1951

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Clerk

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 65% Unsatisfactory; 66 to 75% Satisfactory; 76 to 85% Excellent; 86 to 100% Superior.

Problems	Possible Score	Achieved Score	Percentage Score
(1) Editing of Information	(20)	14.9	75
(2) Reporting of Information	(40)	29.1	73
(3) Message Writing	(20)	14.3	72
(4) Interviews: Procurement of Information	(30)	21.3	71
(5) Interviews: Personality Handling	(30)	23.2	77
(6) Mapping and Sketching	(20)	15.7	79
(7) Observation and Description	(10)	7.9	79
(8) Security Problems	(5)	4.3	85
Objective Tests			
(9) Intelligence Tools and Objectives	(30)	22.2	74
(10) Reporting Mechanics	(20)	16.6	83
(11) USSR and Communism	(75)	64.5	86
TOTAL	(300)	234.0	78.0
Overall adjectival rating	Excellent		

2. TRAIT RECORD. The following indicates the various traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations.

1. UNDERSTANDING INSTRUCTIONS
Not observed____

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Misunderstood instructions completely on more than one occasion.	Was very slow to grasp instructions. Often requested additional explanation or repetition.	Understood instructions if given in detail.	Did not require a detailed explanation.	Grasped instructions quickly, completely, accurately.

2. PLANNING WORK
Not observed____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Got in serious difficulty because of failure to plan work.	Planned inadequately for the effective carrying out of a project.	Made plans which did not hinder the satisfactory completion of a project.	Gave evidence of careful, thoughtful planning.	Planned thoroughly, allowed for all contingencies.

3. ATTENDING TO DETAIL
Not observed____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Written and oral work suffered seriously from constant inattention to details.	Work frequently marred by careless or imprecise treatment of significant detail.	Work showed acceptable attention to significant detail, but contained a number of minor errors.	Careful handling of significant detail, with occasional lapses of a minor nature.	Work was outstanding for precise, accurate handling of detail at all times.

4. ABILITY TO WRITE
Not observed____

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Seemed unable to express thoughts clearly or correctly in written form.	Weak in English usage. Frequent grammatical or spelling errors.	Written work mechanically correct, but poorly organized.	Written work showed no significant weakness.	Outstanding in ability to express ideas in clear, correct, coherent manner.

5. PERSEVERING IN EFFORTS
Not observed____

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Gave up as soon as he met opposition or difficulties in pursuing an objective.	Gave up after several attempts had failed.	Surmounted minor difficulties, but stopped by severe opposition.	Renewed his efforts after a major setback.	Persisted in his efforts to achieve objectives despite repeated set-backs or severe opposition.

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-118
JAN 1951

6. CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION
Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Devoid of imagination or inventiveness in approach to problems.	Showed only a very limited degree of imagination.	Showed sufficient imagination to meet most school situations adequately.	Demonstrated the possession of creative ability to a greater than average degree.	Outstandingly creative, inventive, or original.

7. FACILITY OF ORAL EXPRESSION
Not observed______

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Unable to express self clearly. Presented ideas in a groping and incoherent fashion.	Lacked fluency or ease in his speech, but meaning usually clear.	Displayed reasonable facility in oral expression.	Spoke confidently, conveying ideas clearly and readily.	Outstanding in fluency and clarity of oral expression.

8. FORCEFULNESS
Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Was not able to project his own personality and ideas to others.	Rarely convinced anyone of his point.	Was fairly successful in selling a point or himself.	Was able to influence or control others through his personality and thinking.	Outstanding in ability to command attention and respect through personal forcefulness.

9. ADAPTATION TO TRAINING
Not observed______

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Did not adjust to training program. Remained disorientated, an outsider.	Accepted training, but with reluctance.	Adapted himself to most aspects of training.	Accepted the training situation with good spirit.	Accepted training with obvious enthusiasm.

10. TACT
Not observed______

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Continually alienated others by indiscreet actions or words.	Occasionally said or did something which induced an unfavorable reaction.	Not skilled, but avoided arousing antagonism in dealing with others.	Had good discernment for the appropriate thing to say or do.	Showed keen perception for fitting speech or conduct at all times.

3. REMARKS:

APPROVED. L B Halloran
CHIEF, STR

Charles L Bootler
CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

REVIEWED. R Kingsley
CHIEF, RES

14-00000

NR OP

A. RAW TEST DATA

TYPE OF TEST	RAW SCORE	PERC. TILE	TYPE OF TEST	RAW SCORE	PERCEN-TILE	TYPE OF TEST	RAW SCORE	PERCEN-TILE
DIRECTIONS			DIRECTIONS A	16	52	AREA INFO (AFFAIRS)		
DAT: CLERICAL			OTIS-HIGHER: A	66	87	AREA INFO (PEOPLE)		
SPELLING			GEN. TEST I	68	90	BENNETT LIBRARY INFO		
SENTENCES			LA-5			CIA CLASSIF. I		
NUMERICAL AB.			FRENCH LL			CIA CLASSIF. II		
ABSTR. REAS.			FRENCH UL			CORR. AND EFF. OF EXP.		
SPACE REL.			GERMAN LL			OSU TEST: FORM		
VERB. REAS.			ITALIAN LL			TECHNICAL READING		
MECH. REAS.			SPANISH LL			WATSON-GLASER:		
SUPV. TEST: FORM						GENERALIZATIONS		
ORAL DIRECTIONS TEST						INFERENCES		
						DISC. ARGUMENTS		
						RECOG. ASSUMPTIONS		
						GEN. LOG. REAS.		
						CONSISTENCY		
						APPL. LOG. REAS.		

DATE	TYPING	SHORTHAND			
	GROSS NET ERRORS	1	2	3	TOTAL TIME
9Nov.50					

B. PERSONAL DATA

AGE	SEX		STATUS		EDUCATION				
	M	F	NEW	EMP.	ELEM.	H.SCH.	COL.	DEG.	MAJOR
26	x		x						Limbocker

NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE INITIAL) WIGREN, Lee H. (5244)

SERVICE & GRADE G.S.5

POSITION Intelligence Officer

TEST RECORD

NOTE: PRINTED LINE REPRESENTS AVERAGE RANKINGS FOR PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. COLORED LINE REPRESENTS SUBJECT'S RANKS.

TYPING

SPEED	NET	ERRORS
1.		
2.		
3.		

FOREIGN LANGUAGE READING TESTS

LANGUAGE	MEAN SCORE	SUBJECT'S SCORE
FRENCH CC	40	
FRENCH CC	38	
GERMAN	30	
ITALIAN	37	
SPANISH	35	



37-703 Limbocker 9 Nov 53

14-00000

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
0. October 1975

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
Wigren, Lee H.

3. POSITION TITLE
Ops Officer

4. GRADE
GS-13

5. OFFICE DIVISION BRANCH
DDO/CI Staff/R&A

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.
6947

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP. S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE
Janice R. Lowden

ROOM NO. & BUILDING
2C43 HQS

EXT.
4013

10. COMMENTS

Mr. Wigren is planning to travel 10/24/75 to London, please expedite. Mr. Wigren had MPT/PHE in July 1975.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified for TDY Standby until 1 October 1977.

DATE
23 October 1975

William T. Golder, OMS/pro

FORM 2-69 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(26)

14-00000

②

CSC

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME Wigren, Lee	NATURE OF ACTION EOD
TITLE OF POSITION Clerk	GRADE G-6
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Dept.	

Subject was found physically ☒ fit ☐ unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Incl. o/s duty

10 Mar 51
DATE

SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-57
NOV 1948

PW/B

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
006198	WIGREN, Lee H.	12/01/23	D	13

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR				
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.		SEP 30 8 59 AM '71					
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

NO CHANGES

DATE: 22 Sept 71

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP
006198	WIGREN LEE W	M	12/01/23	GS -13-05

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
D	INSTR INTEL	OTR	WASH., D.C.

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
AFRICA	TDY-RR	66/10/13	66/11/13

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 7 AUG 1968
INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	HISTORY, GENERAL	YALE UNIV CONN	47
MSTR	HISTORY, GENERAL	HARVARD UNIV MASS	48

FORM 444
1-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

68 AUG [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (✓))			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
U.S.S.R.	POLITICAL	—— ?	TO DATE			X	X
REP. SOUTH AFRICA	POLITICAL/GENERAL	1966 Oct.-Nov	SUMMER + FALL 1966		X	X	X

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

NONE

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

SWIMMING (PROFICIENT); STAMP COLLECTING

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving) OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

NONE

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

——

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

——

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

——

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

OTR TEACHING ASSIGNMENT - LECTURING/BRIEFING ASSIGNMENTS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VII

MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify) ARMY

2. BRANCH OR CORPS

3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty) FROM FEB 1943 TO FEB 1946

4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify)

5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at termination of past service) S/SGT

6. SERIAL SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☑ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS.

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED		
1.			☐	RESIDENT
			☐	CORRESPONDENCE
			☐	AGENCY SPONSORED
2.			☐	RESIDENT
			☐	CORRESPONDENCE
			☐	AGENCY SPONSORED
3.			☐	RESIDENT
			☐	CORRESPONDENCE
			☐	AGENCY SPONSORED
4.			☐	RESIDENT
			☐	CORRESPONDENCE
			☐	AGENCY SPONSORED
5.			☐	RESIDENT
			☐	CORRESPONDENCE
			☐	AGENCY SPONSORED

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year): MAY 1959 - MAY 1965
2. LOCATION (Country, City): HEADQUARTERS
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/SR
4. TITLE OF JOB: CHIEF, RESEARCH BRANCH, C.I. GROUP, SR DIV.
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-12, GS-13
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

- PLANNED + IMPLEMENTED SR DIVISION RESEARCH PROGRAM ON SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
- SUPERVISED WORK OF SECTION (LATER BRANCH) WHICH AT MAXIMUM STRENGTH INCLUDED 17 ANALYSTS + CLERKS
- EDITED PUBLICATIONS
- DIRECTED DISSEMINATION OF PUBLICATIONS TO AGENCY AND U.S. INTEL COMMUNITY CUSTOMERS
- CONDUCTED LECTURES + BRIEFINGS FOR U.S. + FOREIGN LIAISON PERSONNEL
- ~~[illegible]~~

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year): SEPT 1957 - MAY 1959
2. LOCATION (Country, City): HQ
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/FI/D
4. TITLE OF JOB: BIOGRAPHIC OFFICER
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-11, 12
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

- CONDUCTED RESEARCH + PREPARED REPORTS
- CONDUCTED EXTERNAL LIAISON
- HELPED DEVELOP NEW PROGRAMS
- SUPERVISED 4 PERSONNEL

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year): APRIL 1955 - SEPT 1957
2. LOCATION (Country, City): HQ
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WE-1
4. TITLE OF JOB: AREA OPS OFFICER
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-11
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

- SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES OF STOCKHOLM STATION

SECRET

SECTION VIII

AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year): MAR 1951 - APR 1955
2. LOCATION (Country, City): HQ
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/STC/SIB *
4. TITLE OF JOB: INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-6, 7, 9, 11
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

- CONDUCTED RESEARCH
- PREPARED STUDIES ON SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
- STUDIED RELATIONSHIP OF SOVIET + EAST EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; PREPARED PAPERS ON SUBJECT; CONDUCTED BRIEFINGS

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year):
2. LOCATION (Country, City):
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH:
4. TITLE OF JOB:
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB:
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year):
2. LOCATION (Country, City):
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH:
4. TITLE OF JOB:
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB:
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried - SPECIFY)

2. NAME OF SPOUSE — Last: WIGREN — First: ELLEN — Middle: — Maiden: (RADER)

3. DATE OF BIRTH: 13 AUGUST 1927

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): ROANOKE VA

5. OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER: —

7. CITIZENSHIP: U.S

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES): —

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: —

SECTION X — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
CHRISTOPHER LEE	SON	WASHINGTON DC 10 MAR 1957	US	10107 ALICE CT, FAIRFAX VA
ERIC VICTOR	"	WASHINGTON D.C. 15 AUG 1959	"	"

SECTION XI — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO
YALE ALUMNI CLUB OF WASHINGTON DC			

DATE: 17 May 1968

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Lee H. Wigren

SECRET

30 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Certificate of Completion - Midcareer Course No. 1
7 October - 15 November 1963

The attached certificate indicates that Lee H. Wigren, SR, has completed the Agency's Midcareer Course No. 1. This course is one part of the Agency's Midcareer Training Program.

Among other topics, this course covers the functioning of the various components of the Agency, the functioning of other agencies of the U.S. Government, particularly those with intelligence and action responsibilities, and the Agency's relation to them. It also covers foreign, domestic, political and other factors affecting the policies of the U.S. Government.

Lester C Houck
Lester C. Houck
Chairman
Midcareer Course

14-00000

Valeat Intelligentia Melius

This certifies that

LEE H. WIGREN

has completed the

Midcareer Course

15 November 1963

Matthew Baird
DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

Marshall S. Carter
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

-Ly

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE
9 February 1959

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
WIGREN, Lee H.

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
15 Mode St, Fairfax, Virginia

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
Same

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
CRescent 3-4950

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
VIRGINIA

SECTION II PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
WIGREN, Ellen R

2. RELATIONSHIP
wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
15 Mode St, Fairfax, Virginia

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
NA

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
CR 3-4950

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
NA

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
NA

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Not desirable

SECTION III MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
NA

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME	(First)	(Middle)	(Maiden)	(Last)
	(Alice)	Ellen	Rader	Wigren

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
27 Sept 1952

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)
Washington, DC.

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)
Arlington Virginia

7. LIVING ☑ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH
NA

9. CAUSE OF DEATH
NA

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)
15 Mode St, Fairfax, Virginia

11. DATE OF BIRTH
13 August 1927

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
Roanoke Virginia

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY
NA

14. PLACE OF ENTRY
NA

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
U.S.

16. DATE ACQUIRED
Birth

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
NA

18. OCCUPATION
Housewife

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)
NA

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
NA

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
NA

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
NA

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
NA

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
NA

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
NA
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☑ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☑ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☑ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.
NA

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
NA

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
JEFFERSON FEDERAL SAVINGS	WASHINGTON DC
RIGGS (THRIFTI-CHECK)	" "

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☑ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

— NA

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
U.S.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: (CHECK (X) ONE)
☑ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☑ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS
NA

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)
— NA

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS
☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐ MASTER'S DEGREE
☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): Sept 1957
2. GRADE: 12
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FI/D
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 4
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

- Supervision of research personnel.
- Planning & preparation of reports
- Assisting in planning of office tasks

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII

CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
CHRISTOPHER L WIGREN	SON	1957	✓		U.S.	15 Hope St, Fairfax Va

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED
9 February 1959

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Lee H Wigren

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

AB

THIS DATE: 16 May 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, Leo Hobart
2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 15 Mode Street, Fairfax, Virginia
3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 15 Mode Street, Fairfax, Virginia
4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: CRescent 3-4950
5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Virginia

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: WIGREN, Ellen Rader
2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 15 Mode Street, Fairfax, Virginia
4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: none
5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: CRescent 3-4950
6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: none
7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: none
8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE: not desirable

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS (change)

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED
2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS: na

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME: (First) Alice (Middle) Ellen (Maiden) Rader (Last) WIGREN
4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 27 Sept 1952
5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Washington, D.C.
6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 4008 20th Road, North, Arlington, Virginia

CODED FOR QUAL[illegible]
DATE 10 JAN [illegible]

7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
8. DATE OF DEATH: na
9. CAUSE OF DEATH: na
10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 15 Mode Street, Fairfax, Virginia
11. DATE OF BIRTH: 13 August 1927
12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Roanoke, Virginia
13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY: na
14. PLACE OF ENTRY: na
15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.
16. DATE ACQUIRED: birth
17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): na
18. OCCUPATION: housewife
19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers): FORMER: Arlington County School Board
20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Arlington, Virginia

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM NO. 444b 1 SEP 56 REPLACES FORM 275 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR
From February 1943 to February 1946

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
Army

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
U.S.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

none

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
na

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. AGE

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES

5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT

7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. AGE

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES

5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT

7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. AGE

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES

5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT

7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. AGE

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES

5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT

7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

na

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

na

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Jefferson Federal Savings and Loan Inc.	Washington, D.C.
Riggs National Bank (Thriftcheck account)	Washington, D.C.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

na

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

na

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI

CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country)

U.S.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

na

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

na

SECTION VII

EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☒	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Boston University, Liberal Arts College Boston, Massachusetts	History		Sept 41	Feb 43	------	------	
Yale University New Haven, Connecticut	History		July 43	Apr 44			
" " " " " "	"		Mar 46	June 47	A.B.	1947	
Harvard University, Graduate School Cambridge, Massachusetts	History		Sept 47	June 50	A.M.	1948	

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
na				

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
~~Information & Intelligence~~				
Information & Education School Lexington, Virginia	information and education specialist course	October 1944	Nove 1944	1

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

none

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

LANGUAGE. (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
	R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK																		
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD

SECTION IX — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE", INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Sweden	political	na			x	x
USSR	political				x	x
Soviet Satellites	political					x

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

na

SECTION X — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
slight	none	☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.) na

SECTION XI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

stamp collecting, swimming, tennis

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

research and analysis experience in school and at work

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

na

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN. na

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)	6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

none

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

none

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

public speaking - high school, college, church

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

na

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) Mar 51 - Jan 55 up to	2. GRADE GS-9	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT STC/ Soviet Intelligence Branch
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION none	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE intelligence officer and research analyst	

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Research, preparation of case studies and analyses, lecturing. Specialization in intelligence services of Soviet satellites.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) Jan 55 - Mar 55	2. GRADE 11	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT SR/CE
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION none	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE intelligence officer	

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Same as above -- Branch was transferred

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) Apr 55 -	2. GRADE 11	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT WE-1 / Swedish Desk
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer	

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Study, guidance and support of operations; preparation and coordination of intelligence and operational reports; preparation of administrative documents; providing support to field stations. Acting desk chief for 3 months.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XIII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Christopher Lee Wigren	son	1957	x		US	15 Mode St, Fairfax, Virginia
Ellen Rader Wigren	wife	1927		x	US	same

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Previous addresses:

218 Belmont Avenue, Brockton, Massachusetts -- prior to Agency employment

3200 16th Street NW, Washington, D.C. -- March to July 1951

1616 16th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. -- July 1951 to August 1952

2700 Que Street, NW, Washington, D.C. -- August 1952 to April 1956

DATE COMPLETED: 11 [illegible] 1957

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
106198	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-20)			2. DATE OF BIRTH (21-30)		
			MONTH	DAY	YEAR
WIGREN, LEE HOBART			DECEMBER	11	1923
3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)			5.	
	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
SWEDISH 73Y	MAY	16	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE	

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

14-433

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

[✓ 3.] I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 16 May 1957	SIGNATURE
(46) e	(47) E

4-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD
106 195	

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
WIGREN, LEE HOBART	DECEMBER	1	1923

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
FRENCH 265	MAY	16	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-43)

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND INFORMATIVELY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 7C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 16 May 1957	SIGNATURE Lee [illegible]
(46) C	(47) E

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
106198	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) Month	Day	Year
WIGREN, LEE HOBART	December	1	1923

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) Month	Day	Year	5.
German 283	MAY	16	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 16 May 1957	SIGNATURE
(46) S	(47) E

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6) 106 198

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24): WIGREN, LEE HOBART

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30): MONTH December DAY 1 YEAR 1923

3. LANGUAGE (31-33): SPANISH 720

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39): MONTH MAY DAY 16 YEAR 1957

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

[✓ 4.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 5.] I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 16 May 1957	SIGNATURE Lee H Wigren
(46) 0	(47) 0

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
106198	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
WIGREN, LEE HOBART	DECEMBER	1	1923

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-37) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
RUSSIAN 654	MAY	16	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 16 May 1957	SIGNATURE
(46) S	(47) E

SECRET

NAME Leo H. Wigren DATE 31 May 1956

IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY:

NAME Mrs. Leo H. Wigren RELATIONSHIP wife

ADDRESS 15 Moda Street, Fairfax, Virginia

TELEPHONE CRescent 3-4950

WE FILE

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 57 NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type, write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNASSEMBLED examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2. OPTIONS (if mentioned in examination announcement):
3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State): WASHINGTON D. C.
4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: OCT. 5, 1950
5. Mr. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): Lee Hobart [illegible]
6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 218 Belmont Avenue
(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Brockton, Massachusetts
7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): Massachusetts
8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: ———
(B) HOME PHONE: 4402-W
9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): December 1, 19[illegible]
10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE
11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Brockton, Massachusetts
12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE
13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 9 INCHES
(B) WEIGHT: 150 POUNDS
14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO
(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE:

GS-6 #3450

ANNOUNCEMENT

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON APPOR.
MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED
ENTERED REGISTER
NOTATIONS
APP. REVIEW
APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ [illegible] PER YEAR.
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.
(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS
NOTE. Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.
(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY:
☒ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY
(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED:
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS:

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the space below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

①

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: TO PRESENT TIME
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Student
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (If in Federal Service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING, $ PER PRESENT, $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of books, etc.):
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:
REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT:
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Since discharge from the Army, 11 Feb.1946, I have been a student at Yale (until June 1947), and at Harvard (Sept.,1947 to date) under provisions of the G.I.Bill. Details of my studies are to be found elsewhere on this form.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM [illegible] TO June, 1947
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Indexer
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER
FINAL $[illegible].75 PER [illegible]
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): New Haven, Connecticut
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. Warren Smith – Editorial Staff – Yale Walpole Collection
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Yale University (W. S. Lewis, editor, Yale Walpole Collection)
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: none
REASON FOR LEAVING: [illegible]
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: This was a part-time job ([illegible] hours per week) through which I earned part of my room and board at college. I catalogued and indexed letters and other material in connection with the Yale edition of the correspondence of Horace Walpole. Mr. W. S. Lewis was general editor, but I worked under the supervision of Mr. Warren Smith of the staff. This job required a scholarly interest in English history. It provided an opportunity to participate in a large-scale historical project.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Aug. 1944 TO Feb. 1946
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Information and Education Specialist
CLASSIFICATION GRADE: MILITARY MOS [illegible]
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $[illegible] PER mo.
FINAL $[illegible] PER mo.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Camp Pickett, Virginia
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Captain [illegible], Jr.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Post Information & Education Office, Camp Pickett, Virginia
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): military
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 12-15 lecturers and clerical help
REASON FOR LEAVING: discharge from service
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: I helped organize the non-military education and information program at Camp Pickett. I prepared material for, and personally conducted lectures and discussions on history, current events, the U.S. and its allies, and the enemy. I trained and supervised other lecturers, and prepared material for their use. I published a daily news sheet for the whole camp, wrote articles for the weekly newspaper, and broadcast daily news summaries. I maintained a library of current information material and several War Information Centers. I aided military personnel in enrolling in USAFI correspondence courses. (details on extra sheet)

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM [illegible] 1944 TO Aug. 1944
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Unit Information and Education Clerk
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $54 PER mo.
FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Camp Pickett, Virginia
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Lt. [illegible]
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Supply Section, Hq. Detachment, [illegible] Camp Pickett, Virginia
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): military
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: none
REASON FOR LEAVING: promotion (to ③ above)
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: While a clerk in this unit, I was assigned the duty of acting as unit non-commissioned officer for the Information and Education program. [illegible], I conducted two or three hourly lectures or discussions each week on history, current events, and other topics under the direction and supervision of the Post Info & Ed Office, and attended briefing sessions at that office. I maintained a War Information Center consisting of news items and maps of battle areas. I promoted interest in correspondence courses available through the U.S.A.F.I. As a result of this work, I was [illegible] to the position of [illegible] Info and Education Non-Com[illegible] Officer when that position was [illegible]. (see ③ above)

FORM 57

Lee Richard Wigren
[illegible] Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

ADDITIONAL ANSWER FOR ITEM # 10, Block 8:
(Information & Education Enlisted Specialist, Aug, 1944 - Feb, 1946)

A. After completing the Army Specialized Training Program course in Russian area and language studies, I was assigned to the 310th Infantry, 78th Division, then at Camp Pickett, Va. While with that unit, I conducted "orientation" lectures covering world news and background material on the war (April-May 1944).

[illegible] but no disability

B. Because of my limited-service status, I was transferred to the Supply Section, Headquarters Detachment, 1318 SCU, at Camp Pickett. While a clerk in that unit, I performed the duties of a unit Info & Education lecturer -- lecturing on history and current events, maintaining maps and bulletins on the battle areas, and enrolling soldiers in correspondence courses. As a result of this work (May-July 1944), I was promoted to be Info & Education Non-Commissioned Officer in the Post Info & Education/Office.

C. The Post Information & Education Office was charged with the duty of planning, producing, and disseminating war information and non-military education for all troops permanently stationed at Camp Pickett and for a large hospital on the grounds. The purpose of this program was to help the troops to understand why and what we were fighting, and to understand their role in that fight. It was morale building through information.

As Non-Commissioned Officer for the Info & Education Office, I performed both administrative and functional duties. I aided in the development and execution of the policies and content of the education program, and was in immediate charge of the weekly instructional program. The following are the duties which I performed:

1. Prepared material for use in weekly lectures or discussions which all troops were required to attend.
   - Info & Education Branch in Washington supplied topical information for use in these classes. I expanded, revised, or supplemented it to suit it to the needs of our camp.
2. Trained men to conduct lectures in each of 12 to 15 units; briefed them on prepared material each week; and inspected their classes.
   - Each company or unit was required to have one or more men with suitable education or experience to conduct weekly classes on history and current events under the direction of the Info & Education Office. At briefing conferences, I discussed with them the topic for the following week, suggested means of presentation, and described general policies to be followed. I made periodic inspection visits to classes conducted by these men.
3. Lectured or conducted several discussions each week.
   - The topics of these classes were the same as those conducted by other men: basic U.S. and world history, current events, background material on the war, the relation of the U.S. to its allies, the enemy, and the role of the individual soldier. These classes contained from 75 to 100 men each, with all educational levels represented.

FORM 57

Le[redacted]obart Sigren
[illegible] Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR ITEM # 16, Block E (continued):
(Information & Education Enlisted Specialist, Aug, 1944 - Feb, 1946)

4. Designed and prepared displays for War Information Centers in camp libraries, and in post headquarters. Developed visual aides for classroom use.
   - Displays consisted of pictures, posters, maps, and explanatory material dealing with various topics such as: The German Army, Growth of the Japanese Empire, Nazi1sm, etc. Their purpose was to give a graphic presentation of background information concerning the war. The display at post headquarters also had maps and news items ~~dealing~~ with battle areas.
5. Compiled and edited daily news sheet, broadcast daily news summaries, and wrote articles on current events for camp newspaper.
   - At my suggestion, the news disseminating media at Camp Pickett were expanded by establishment of the news sheet and news broadcasts. The news sheet contained late news bulletins, factual background material, and some editorials. The news sheet and broadcasts were necessitated by the remoteness of the camp.
6. Did educational counselling and encouraged enrollments in correspondence courses offered by United States Armed Forces Institute.
7. Maintained close cooperation with camp newspaper staff, Public Relations Office, the Special Services Office, and the Intelligenc Officer.

I believe that my work as Non-Commissioned Officer in the Post Information & Education Office at Camp Pickett, Virginia, from August 1944 to February 1946 would be valuable to the Central Intelligence Agency.

The job was given to me as a promotion. I received special training for it at the School for Personnel Services, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia. While performing the duties of this job, I received promotions in rank from Private First Class to Staff Sergeant. During the closing months of my service, I was in complete charge of the office in the absence of any full-time Info & Education Officer.

As the result of my work, I was invited to attend a conference of the Info & Education officers and non-commissioned officers of the Third Service Command at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, and to address that conference on educational and counselling problems. Since my discharge was in process at that time, I was unable to attend. Upon discharge, I received a special commendation for my work from Colonel H.G.Paullin, Commanding Officer of Camp Pickett, and a letter of recommendation from my superior.
(Copies of these letters, orders, and commendations will be submitted if necessary.)

FORM 67

Robert Wigren
[illegible] Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR ITEM #17:

1. Army Specialized Training Program, Russian area & language course (Yale University, July 1943 - April 1944)

After completing basic training in June 1943, I was sent to the examination center at Georgetown University to be tested for entrance into the Army Specialized Training Program.

On the basis of a language aptitude test, I was sent to Yale to take the A.S.T.P. course in Russian area and language studies. This was a nine-month course running from July 1943 through March 1944. I completed the course with grades of "dean's list" rating, and received a certificate of completion of the course.

The program of study included courses in Russian history, geography, literature, and culture; modern European history; and Far Eastern history. Special lecturers from the Commerce Department, Lend Lease, and other agencies spoke to our classes occasionally.

Much attention was devoted to study of the Russian language. Classroom work, consisting of grammar, practice reading, and conversation occupied seventeen hours of our schedule each week. This was equivalent to about three years of normal language work.

2. School for Personnel Services, Course for Information & Education Enlisted Assistants (Washington & Lee U., Lexington, Va. Oct-Nov 1944

In order to be better prepared for work as Post Information and Education Non-Commissioned Officer at Camp Pickett, Virginia, I was sent to take the one-month course for Info & Education Enlisted Specialists, October and November 1944.

This course was prepared by the War Department, and conducted by military personnel. It presented material to be used in the preparation of Info & Education programs in camps, it suggested methods of presentation, and it provided practical experience in assessing and dealing with "orientation program" problems.

Some of the topics covered in lectures and discussions were:

Ideas as Weapons
Group Leadership Principles
Morale Factors
Global Warfare
Know the Enemy
Know our Allies
Know the U.S.A.
Teaching Methods

In addition, movies and visual aides were demonstrated.

Upon completion of this course (with a grade of Excellent), I received a certificate, and a Military Occupational Specialty Classification of : MOS 2274 (Information and Education Enlisted Specialist).

FORM 57

Robert Wigren
[illegible] Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR ITEM #18 (EDUCATION):

A. I attended Boston University, College of Liberal Arts from September 1941 until February 17, 1943. On the latter date, I was called to active duty with the Army Enlisted Reserve Corps after completing one and one-half years (three semesters) of work. My intention had been to major in history.

Among the subjects which I studied were:

- -History of Western Civilization
- -United States History
- -American Government
- -Comparative Government
- -General Economics
- -Psychology
- -Astronomy
- -English Composition
- -English Bible
- -French
- -Spanish

B. After basic training in the Army, I was sent to Georgetown University (June 1943), to take qualifying examinations for the Army Specialized Training Program. As a result, I was sent to Yale to study in the ASTP Russian language and area course (curriculum #71). This course covered the following subjects:

-Russian History___3 terms
-Russian Geography__2 terms
-Russian Literature and Customs_____1 term
-European History___3 terms
-Far East History___1 terms
-Russian Language___3 terms
(intensive course, 17 hours of class work per week)

This course was taught by regular instructors at Yale with full college standards maintained. I received a certificate for successful completion of this course. I also received one year of academic credit for this work.

C. Upon discharge from service in February 1946, I entered Yale for the spring term, and majored in history. I was graduated from Yale in June 1947. Among the subjects I studied at Yale were:

- -United States History
- -American Thought & Civilization
- -U.S. Diplomatic History
- -History of the Contemporary World
- -Senior Essay: "The Interchurch World Movement and the Steel Strike of 1919".
- -Moral and Political Philosophy
- -American Government in Transition
- -American Immigration
- -Public Opinion and Propaganda
- -Greek Classics
- -English Literature
- -The New Testament
- -German

(continued on next page)

Feb 57

Lee [redacted] Wigren
518 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR ITEM #18 (EDUCATION, continued):

D. In September, 1947, I entered Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences again to major in History. In June 1948, I received a degree of Master of Arts. Since then, I have done two years of additional graduate work toward a degree of Doctor of Philosophy. My studies in graduate school included:

- Ancient Greek History
- English History from 1688
- U.S. Colonial History
- History of the Westward Movement
- Seminar: The New Deal: "The Communist Party in the New Deal Period"
- Seminar on the West: "The Attitude of Massachusetts Democracy toward Populism in the 1890's"
- American Literature
- Directed reading in American History
- Directed reading in English History

In addition, I audited the following courses:

- The Immigrant in American History
- Government Regulation of Industry
- U.S. Intellectual History
- American Social & Cultural History
- The British Empire
- European Intellectual History in the 18th and 19th Centuries

I also attended a course of lectures on college teaching.

(Transcripts of school records will be supplied if needed)
(Educational recommendations may be obtained from:
Miss Florence Leetch
Graduate Placement Office
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts)

14-00000

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM June 1941 TO Dec 194[illegible]

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Store clerk

CLASSIFIED GRADE (if in Federal service) —

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ .31 PER hr. FINAL $ .65 PER hr.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Brockton, Massachusetts

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Frank [illegible], mgr of produce dept.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, [illegible] St, Brockton (Mr. Jack Edwards gen. mgr.)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Grocery

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU None

REASON FOR LEAVING Proceeding on active duty into Army

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK This was parttime work on weekends and during summer vacations. I sold vegetables and fruit in the produce department of this large grocery store.

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

	DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
1	July 1943	April 1944	Yale University, New Haven, Conn.	Army Specialized Training Program, Russian area & language study (curriculum #71) (details on extra sheet)
2	Oct. 1944	Nov. 1944	Washington & Lee U., Lexington, Va.	U. School for Personnel Services, course for Information & Education enlisted assistants (details on extra sheet)

18 EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED Brockton High School, Brockton, Mass.

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF ☒ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☒ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED history, civics

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Boston University, Boston, Mass.	History	1941	Feb. 1943	1½	—			
Yale University, New Haven, Conn.	"	1943 1946	1944 1947	2½	—	A.B.	1947	—
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.	"	1947	1950	3	—	A.M.	1948	—

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
History: European, U.S., Russian, & other	48	History: Greek, English, American	30
Govt, Public Opinion & Propaganda	12	Literature	6

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN-SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT none

SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19 INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
French		x				x		x	
Russian			x			x			x

22 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)? ☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20 IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES, (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation) none

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ..... SHORTHAND .....

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

C. - Community Fund speaker
- Winner, 10th District American Legion Oratorical Contest
- Class President, Boston University 1942-43

Item #1A: References [illegible] listed below [illegible] file with:
[illegible]
Please obtain copies of these references from [illegible].

1. [illegible]	[illegible], MASS.	PROFESSOR
2. PROFESSOR DAVID OWEN	HISTORY DEPT, HARVARD UNIV, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.	PROFESSOR
3. MR. H. B. FISHER	SEYMOUR RD., WOODBRIDGE, CONN.	FORMERLY WITH F.B.I.

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
17 Feb. 1943	11 Feb. 1946
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO (*if none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).
Army	ASN- 11 127 0[illegible]

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		X
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*indicate item numbers to which answers apply*).

ITEM NO		ITEM NO	
19.	Spanish: Reading, Good; Speaking,		Fair; Understanding, Fair

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Lee H. [illegible]

(Sign your name in INK (one giv[illegible]e, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if marrie[illegible] your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1946-O-89297 16—63940-1

STANDARD FORM 57 - NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

ICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYM

INSTRUCTIONS: In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type, write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State): WASHINGTON D. C.

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: OCT. 5, 1950

5. MR. ~~MRS.~~ ~~MISS~~ (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): Lee Hobart Wigren

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 218 Belmont Avenue

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Brockton, Massachusetts

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): Massachusetts

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: ——

(B) HOME PHONE: 4402-W

9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): December 1, 19[illegible]

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Brockton, Massachusetts

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 9 INCHES

(B) WEIGHT: 150 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE

GS-6 $3450

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON APPOR.	MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED	ENTERED REGISTER
NOTATIONS		APP. REVIEW: APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ [illegible] PER YEAR.
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR:
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY:
☒ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

A/C

16. EXPERIENCE: It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① **PRESENT POSITION**

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Student

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING, $ PER; PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Since discharge from the Army, 11 Feb. 1946, I have been a student at Yale (until June 1947), and at Harvard (Sept. 1947 to date) under provisions of the G. I. Bill. Details of my studies are to be found elsewhere on this form.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is *not* applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if *you* do not know the *answer* and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the *end* of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do *not have* sufficient room.

2. *Type*, print, or write carefully; illegible or *incomplete* forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Mrs.~~ Mr. ~~Miss~~ LEE (First) HOBART (Middle) WIGREN (Last)

Telephone:
Office EX.-6115
Ext. 2772
Home DE.-1688

PRESENT ADDRESS 2700 - QUE ST. NW (St. and Number) WASHINGTON (City) 7 D.C. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AVE, (St. and Number) BROCKTON (City) MASS (State) U.S.A. (Country)

B. NICKNAME .... WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? ....

.... UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ....

HOW LONG? .... IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ....

.... (Where?) .... (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH .... PLACE OF BIRTH .... (City) .... (State) .... (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP .... (Country) BY BIRTH? .... BY MARRIAGE? ....

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. .... ISSUED .... (Date) BY .... (Court)

AT .... (City) .... (State) .... (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? .... (Yes or No) .... (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? .... TO .... ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? .... (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS ....

....

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? .... GIVE PARTICULARS:

....

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ....

PORT OF ENTRY? .... ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ....

LAST U. S. VISA .... (Number) .... (Type) .... (Place of Issue) .... (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE .... SEX .... HEIGHT .... WEIGHT ....

EYES .... HAIR .... COMPLEXION .... SCARS ....

BUILD .... OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ....

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE .... MARRIED .... DIVORCED .... WIDOWED ....

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ....

....

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Alice (First) Ellen (Middle) Rozer (Maiden) Wigren (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE Washington, District of Columbia September 27, 1952

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 4008 - Twenty-[illegible] Road (St. and Number) Arlington (City) Virginia (State) United States (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

(As of 28 Sept 52) PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 2700 Que Street (St. and Number) Washington (City) D.C. (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Aug. 13, 1927 PLACE OF BIRTH Roanoke (City) Virginia (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ....

CITIZENSHIP .... WHEN ACQUIRED? .... WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Teacher LAST EMPLOYER Arlington County School Board

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS Arlington County School Board (St. and Number) Arlington (City) Virginia (State) USA (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM .... (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN COUNTRY ....

....

OCCUPATION .... LAST EMPLOYER ....

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM .... TO .... BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME William (First) Cecil (Middle) Rader (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS — (St. and Number) Nace, (City) Virginia (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Aug 23, 1903 PLACE OF BIRTH Nace, Virginia

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? — (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Farmer LAST EMPLOYER —

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Beulah (First) Sara (Middle) Roder (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS — (St. and Number) Nace (City) Virginia (State) U.S.A. (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH June 17, [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] Virginia

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

CITIZENSHIP U.S WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? — (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Teacher LAST EMPLOYER Botetourt County School Board

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

NONE

1. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT: NONE

1. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

FORM NO. SEP 1952

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ (Use No Initials) LEE (First) HOBART (Middle) WIGREN (Last)

Telephone: Office: NONE Ext. NONE Home: 4402-W

PRESENT ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV. (St. & No.), BROCKTON (City), MASSACHUSETTS (State) U.S.A. (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV. (St. & No.) BROCKTON (City) MASSACHUSETTS (State) U.S.A. (Country)

B. NICKNAME SONNY WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? NONE

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NOT APPLICABLE

HOW LONG? —— IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ——

NOT APPLICABLE (Where?) —— (By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH DEC. 1, 1923 PLACE OF BIRTH BROCKTON (City), MASS. (State), U.S.A. (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE? ——

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # —— ISSUED —— (Date) BY —— (Court)

AT NOT APPLICABLE (City) —— (State) —— (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? NO (Yes or No) —— (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? —— TO —— ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? —— (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NOT APPLICABLE

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS:

FORM NO. 38-1
SEP 1949

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NOT APPLICABLE

PORT OF ENTRY? — ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY?

LAST U.S. VISA
Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 26 yrs; 11 mos SEX MALE HEIGHT 5'9" WEIGHT 150 lbs.

EYES BLUE HAIR LIGHT BROWN COMPLEXION FAIR SCARS NONE

BUILD MEDIUM OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES MOLE ON LEFT ARM AT ELBOW

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE YES MARRIED — DIVORCED — WIDOWED —

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NOT APPLICABLE

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE -- INCLUDE ANNULMENTS -- USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NOT APPLICABLE

NAME OF SPOUSE NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Maiden Last

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE —

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE —
St. & No. City State Country

LIVING OR DECEASED — DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS —
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH — PLACE OF BIRTH —
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

CITIZENSHIP — WHEN ACQUIRED? — WHERE? —
City State Country

OCCUPATION — LAST EMPLOYER —

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS —
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM — TO — BRANCH OF SERVICE —
Date Date

COUNTRY — DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN —

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents) NONE

NOT APPLICABLE

1. NAME NOT APPLICABLE RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____

CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME AUGUST (First) HERMAN (Middle) WIGREN (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE ____ CAUSE ____

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV., BROCKTON, MASS., U.S.A. (St. & No. City State Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1889 PLACE OF BIRTH CHICAGO, ILLINOIS U.S.A. (City State Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOT APPLICABLE

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? ____ City State Country

OCCUPATION HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER LAST EMPLOYER SCHOOL DEPT, BROCKTON, MASS.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS HIGH SCHOOL, BROCKTON, MASS, U.S.A. (St. & No. City State Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM JULY 1917 (Date) TO AUG 1919 (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ARMY

COUNTRY U.S.A. DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

MASS. STATE GUARD, 1ST LIEUT., 1942-45.

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME IDA (First) CAROLINE (HALLQUIST) (Middle) WIGREN (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE ____ CAUSE ____

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV., BROCKTON, MASS. U.S.A. (St. & No. City State Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1892 PLACE OF BIRTH QUINCY, MASS.

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? ____ City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOT APPLICABLE

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM TO BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME RUSSELL HERMAN WIGREN AGE 20
   First Middle Last
   PRESENT ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV., BROCKTON, MASS. U.S.A.
   St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
2. FULL NAME AGE
   First Middle Last
   PRESENT ADDRESS
   St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
3. FULL NAME AGE
   First Middle Last
   PRESENT ADDRESS
   St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
4. FULL NAME AGE
   First Middle Last
   PRESENT ADDRESS
   St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
5. FULL NAME AGE
   First Middle Last
   PRESENT ADDRESS
   St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW NOT APPLICABLE

FULL NAME
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE?
City State Country

OCCUPATION LAST EMPLOYER

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW NOT APPLICABLE

FULL NAME
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE?
City State Country

OCCUPATION LAST EMPLOYER

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES: NONE

1. NAME NONE RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME STEPHEN P. ANDERSEN RELATIONSHIP HUSBAND OF MY FATHER'S COUSIN AGE C. 55.

CITIZENSHIP U.S. ADDRESS 4509 7th ST, NW, WASHINGTON, D.C.
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE

2. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

SEC. 12 EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL WHITMAN SCHOOL ADDRESS BROCKTON, MASS. U.S.A. (City / State / Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1928-1937 GRADUATE? YES

HIGH SCHOOL BROCKTON HIGH SCHOOL ADDRESS BROCKTON, MASS. U.S.A. (City / State / Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1937-1941 GRADUATE? YES

[illegible] PAGES 13-14 [illegible]

COLLEGE YALE UNIVERSITY ADDRESS NEW HAVEN, CONN. U.S.A. (City / State / Country)

DATES ATTENDED DEGREE A.B. (1947)

COLLEGE HARVARD UNIVERSITY ADDRESS CAMBRIDGE, MASS. U.S.A. (City / State / Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1947-1950 DEGREE A.M. (1948) AND WORK TOWARD PhD

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

U.S.A.	ARMY	S/SGT	17 FEB 1943 TO 11 FEB 1946
Country	Service	Rank	Dates of Service
CAMP PICKETT, VA	ASN 11-127-072		HONORABLE
Last Station	Serial No.		Type of Discharge

REMARKS: WAS MEMBER OF ARMY ENLISTED RESERVE, FROM NOV. 1942 TO 17 FEB 1943

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 28 ADDRESS COURT HOUSE, BROCKTON, MASS.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON NOT APPLICABLE

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS NONE

SEE EXTRA SHEET FIRST

SEC. 14 CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

1. FROM MARCH 1946 TO SEPTEMBER 1950

SINCE MY DISCHARGE FROM THE ARMY, (11 FEB. 1946), I HAVE BEEN A STUDENT AT YALE (UNTIL JUNE 1947) AND AT HARVARD (SEPT 1947 - SEPT 1950) UNDER PROVISIONS OF P.L. #346 - THE G.I. BILL. DETAILS OF MY STUDY ARE TO BE FOUND UNDER ITEM #12 OF THIS FORM.

2. FROM SEPT. 1946 TO JUNE 1947

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY EDITORIAL STAFF, YALE EDITION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE OF HOR[illegible] WALPOLE (YALE UNIVERSITY)

ADDRESS STERLING MEMORIAL LIBRARY, (St. & No.) NEW HAVEN, (City) CONN. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS SCHOLARLY RESEARCH NAME OF SUPERVISOR MR. WARREN SMITH

TITLE OF JOB INDEXER (PART-TIME WORK) SALARY $[illegible] (TOTAL 12 HRS) PER PER WEEK

YOUR DUTIES PART-TIME TO EARN PART OF BOARD AT COLLEGE. I INDEXED + CATALOGUED LETTERS IN CONNECTION WITH YALE EDITION OF HORACE WALPOLE'S CORRESPONDENCE

REASONS FOR LEAVING GRADUATION

3. FROM AUGUST 1944 TO FEBRUARY 1946

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U. S. ARMY

ADDRESS INFORMATION-EDUCATION OFFICE, (St. & No.) CAMP PICKETT (City) VA. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS INFORMATION-EDUCATION (MILITARY) NAME OF SUPERVISOR CAPT. J. W. YOWELL, JR.

TITLE OF JOB INFORMATION-EDUCATION ENLISTED SPECIALIST (MOS 2274) SALARY $ up to 96 PER MO.

YOUR DUTIES ORGANIZING + ADMINISTERING INFORMATION AND NON-MILITARY EDUCATION PROGRAM DETAILS ON PAGES 14, 15, 16.

REASONS FOR LEAVING DISCHARGE FROM SERVICE

DETAILS OF THIS WORK ARE ON PAGES 14, 15, 16 OF THIS FORM

4. FROM JUNE 1941 TO DECEMBER 1942

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY GREAT ATLANTIC + PACIFIC TEA CO.

ADDRESS MAIN STREET (St. & No.) BROCKTON (City) MASS. (State) U.S.A (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS GROCERY NAME OF SUPERVISOR FRANK PIUERONIS

TITLE OF JOB PRODUCE CLERK (PART-TIME) SALARY $ .65 PER HR

YOUR DUTIES SOLD VEGETABLES + FRUIT (FRIDAYS, SATURDAYS, AND SUMMER VACATIONS

REASONS FOR LEAVING TO ENTER ARMY

5. FROM c. OCTOBER 1940 TO JUNE 1941

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY KENNEDY BUTTER + EGG CO.

ADDRESS MAIN STREET, (St. & No.) BROCKTON (City) MASS (State) U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS RETAIL GROCERY NAME OF SUPERVISOR A. M. JACOBS

TITLE OF JOB CLERK (PART-TIME) SALARY $ .31 PER HR.

YOUR DUTIES SELLING COFFEE, TEA, BUTTER, ETC. (SATURDAYS)

REASONS FOR LEAVING SUMMER REDUCTION OF HELP - (I had been on a part-time basis only.)

ITEM #14 (Form 38-1)

EXTRA SHEET

LEE HOBART WIGREN
215 BELMONT AVE.
BROCKTON, MASS.

The following material is meant to PRECEDE the information given in this Form 38-1 under Item #14. Please use it first.

OUTLINE HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INCLUDING CASUAL EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT. ONLY MAJOR ITEMS (WHICH ARE MARKED BELOW WITH ✱) ARE INCLUDED ON REGULAR FORM. DETAILS ON OTHERS WILL BE SUPPLIED IF NECESSARY

DATES	WHERE	NATURE OF WORK
SEPT. - NOV. 1950	AT HOME	- SEEKING EMPLOYMENT - TICKET SELLING FOOTBALL GAMES, BROCKTON HIGH SCHOOL
SEPT. 1947 to SEPT. 1950	HARVARD UNIV. STUDENT (UNDER G.I. BILL) [FALL, SPRING, SUMMER TERMS, 1947-8, 1948-9, 1949-50]	✱ - STUDYING - CHAUFFEURING - SUMMER, 1948 } 2 weeks each. - SUMMER, 1949 [FOR MR. C.E. CHAMBERLAIN, 220 BELMONT ST. BROCKTON, MASS.]
MAR. 1946 to JUNE 1947	YALE UNIV. STUDENT (UNDER G.I. BILL) [SPRING + SUMMER, 1946 FALL + SPRING, 1946-7]	- STUDYING ✱ - INDEXER (Part-Time) FOR YALE EDITION OF HORACE WALPOLE CORRESPONDENCE, 1945-47 - OFFICE WORK FOR SECRETARY TO DEAN OF YALE COLLEGE (Part-Time) - SUMMER, 1946
FEB. 17, 1943 to FEB. 11, 1946	U.S. ARMY	(1) CAMP LEE, VA. - BASIC TRAINING - FEB - JUNE 1943 (2) YALE UNIV. (ARMY SPECIALIZED TRAINING PROGRAM) - JUNE 1943 - MAR. 1944 (3) CAMP PICKETT, VA. - 310th INFANTRY, 78th DIVISION - APRIL + MAY, 1944 - SUPPLY SECTION, 1315 S.C.U. - MAY - JULY, 1944 ✱ - INFO. + EDUCATION OFFICE - JULY 1944 - FEB. 1946 (4) CAMP MEADE, MD. - DISCHARGE - FEB. 11, 1946
SEPT. 1941 to FEB. 17, 1943	BOSTON UNIV. STUDENT	- STUDYING ✱ - CLERK, A+P GROCERY STORE, MAIN + CALMOR STREETS, BROCKTON - (Part-Time) - JUNE 1941 - DEC. 1942
1935 to 1941	JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT	- CLERK, KENNEDY BUTTER STORE, MAIN ST., BROCKTON (PART TIME) - OCT. 1940 - JUNE 1941 - PAPER ROUTE

STARRED ITEMS ARE DETAILED ON FORM 38-1

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NONE —

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

Street and Number City State

1. REV. J. MANLEY SHAW
BUS. ADD. CENTRAL METHODIST CHURCH, BROCKTON, MASS.
RES. ADD. 258 W. ELM ST, BROCKTON MASS.

2. MR. C. WESLEY WILLIAMS
BUS. ADD. 41 ARLINGTON ST, BROCKTON MASS.
RES. ADD. 32 GIFFORD ST, BROCKTON MASS.

3. MISS LYDIA A. GIBBS
BUS. ADD. HIGH SCHOOL BROCKTON MASS.
RES. ADD. 78 BURNSIDE AV, BROCKTON MASS.

4. REV. PAUL STOPENHAGEN
BUS. ADD. HARVARD-EPWORTH METHODIST CHURCH CAMBRIDGE MASS.
RES. ADD. 30 LANGDON ST, CAMBRIDGE MASS.

5. MR. H. B. FISHER
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. SEYMOUR RD, WOODBRIDGE CONN.

6. MR. CLARENCE A. McLAUGHLIN
BUS. ADD. (?) —
RES. ADD. 8806 LOWELL PLACE, BETHESDA, MARYLAND

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. MR. KENNETH G. RYDER
BUS. ADD. CAMBRIDGE JR. COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
RES. ADD. — BOWKER ST, LEXINGTON MASS.

2. MR. ROLAND J. GIBSON
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. ADAMS A-33 CAMBRIDGE MASS.

3. MR. HERMAN CARR
BUS. ADD. PHYSICS DEPT. HARVARD UNIV. CAMBRIDGE MASS.
RES. ADD. HARVARD UNIV. CAMBRIDGE MASS.

4. MR. HUTSON K. HOWELL
BUS. ADD. OPTICAL LABORATORY BOSTON UNIV. BOSTON MASS.
RES. ADD. 14 MORSE AV. BROCKTON MASS.

5. MR. JOHN D. SHOVE, JR.
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 15 ALBANY ST. CAZENOVIA NEW YORK
(!)

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. MISS ELBA E. HERRICK	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	232 BELMONT AV,	BROCKTON	MASS.
2. MRS. FRANK B. YATES [and family]	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	246 BELMONT AV,	BROCKTON	MASS.
3. MR. EDWARD HENNESSY (Neighbor for many years)	BUS. ADD.	238 FOREST AV,	BROCKTON	MASS.
	RES. ADD.	40 BOUVE AV,	BROCKTON	MASS.

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS PEOPLE'S SAVINGS BANK, 221 MAIN ST, BROCKTON, MASS.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? NO
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

1. NAME MR. PAUL C. BENNETT ADDRESS 282 GREEN ST, (St. & No.) BROCKTON, (City) MASS. (State)
2. NAME MR. HARDING E. PORTER ADDRESS 106 HILLBERG AV, (St. & No.) BROCKTON, (City) MASS. (State)
3. NAME MR. WILLIAM C. NYE ADDRESS 34 CARLYNN RD, (St. & No.) BROCKTON, (City) MASS. (State)

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

		St. No.	City	State	Country
FROM 1933	TO 1927	128 MENLO ST,	BROCKTON,	MASS.	U.S.A.
FROM 1927	TO 1943	44 BOUVE AV,	BROCKTON,	MASS.	U.S.A.
FROM 1943	TO 1946	U.S. ARMY			
FROM 1946	TO 1950	218 BELMONT AV,	BROCKTON,	MASS.	U.S.A.
FROM MAR 1946	TO JE 1947	YALE UNIV.	NEW HAVEN	CONN	U.S.A.
FROM 1947	TO 1950 SEPT. TO MAY EACH YEAR	26 MELROSE ST,	ARLINGTON,	MASS.	U.S.A.
FROM	TO				
FROM	TO				

SCHOOL RESIDENCES (during school terms only)

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES NONE

		City or Section	Country	Purpose
A. FROM	TO			
FROM	TO			
FROM	TO			

FROM ______ TO ______ City or Section ______ Country ______ Purpose ______

FROM ______ TO ______ City or Section ______ Country ______ Purpose ______

FROM ______ TO ______ City or Section ______ Country ______ Purpose ______

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT — NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: NONE

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? NONE GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES:

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: NOT APPLICABLE

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. CENTRAL METHODIST CHURCH (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) BROCKTON (City) MASS. (State) U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ATTENDED SINCE BIRTH; MEMBER SINCE c. 1935

2. HISTORY CLUB, BROCKTON HIGH SCHOOL (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) BROCKTON (City) MASS (State) U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1937-1941

3. DRAMATIC CLUB, BROCKTON HIGH SCHOOL (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) BROCKTON (City) MASS. (State) U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1939-1941

4. ORDER OF DEMOLAY OSAMEQUIN CHAPTER (Name and Chapter) MAIN ST. (St. & No.) BROCKTON (City) MASS (State) U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ca. 1940-42 (no exact records)

5. BOSTON UNIVERSITY WESLEY CLUB (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) BOSTON (City) MASS (State) U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1942-43 [Methodist Student Club]

6. AXA FRATERNITY (Name and Chapter) BOSTON UNIVERSITY (St. & No.) BOSTON (City) MASS. (State) U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1942-43 [Pledged, but didn't complete membership]

7. YALE WESLEY FOUNDATION (Name and Chapter) FIRST METHODIST CHURCH (St. & No.) NEW HAVEN (City) CONN. (State) U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1943-44; 1946-47.

[CONTINUED [illegible] 16 [illegible]]

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE FRENCH SPEAK FAIR READ FLUENT WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE SPANISH SPEAK SLIGHT READ FAIR WRITE SLIGHT

LANGUAGE RUSSIAN SPEAK FAIR READ SLIGHT WRITE SLIGHT

SWEDISH — SLIGHT — SLIGHT — SLIGHT

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

BICYCLING; SWIMMING; HIKING

STAMP COLLECTING; PROPAGANDA STUDY

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

YES. ① MY MILITARY DUTIES AS INFORMATION AND EDUCATION ENLISTED SPECIALIST (MOS 2274) IN POST INFO + EDUCATION OFFICE, CAMP PICKETT, VA. [SEE SEC. #14③]

② PUBLIC SPEAKING

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

1. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (1950) (application not yet complete)
2. CIVIL SERVICE – APPLIED FOR POSITION OF HISTORY AND LITERATURE PROFESSOR AT COAST GUARD ACADEMY, NEW LONDON, CONN. (1950)

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

– UNCERTAIN. MAY HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATED FOR HISTORY TEACHING POSITION (AUGUST, 1950).

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: NO

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? NO IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? NEVER USED THEM.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME AUGUST H. WIGREN RELATIONSHIP FATHER

ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV., (St. & No.) BROCKTON, (City) MASS (State) U.S.A. (Country)

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

NO

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT BROCKTON, MASSACHUSETTS DATE NOVEMBER 1, 1950
City and State

Witness

Lee H. Wigren
Signature of Applicant

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

SEC. 12 - EDUCATION (Continued from p. 6)

COLLEGES ATTENDED:

(1) Boston University, College of Liberal Arts, Boston, Mass.
- Attended: Sept. 1941 to Feb. 1943.
- Completed 3 semesters of work, majoring in History.
- Called to active duty with U.S. Army, Feb. 17, 1943.

Subjects:

-History of Western Civilization	-Astronomy
-United States History	-English Composition
-American Government	-English Bible
-Comparative Government	-French
-General Economics	-Spanish
-Psychology	

(2) Yale University, New Haven, Conn. - Army Specialized Training Program: Russian Area & Language Course (curriculum #71)
- Attended: June 1943 to March 31, 1944 (sent by the U.S. Army)
- Completed course, received certificate and one year of academic credit.

Subjects:

-Russian History ____ 3 terms	-European History ___ 3 terms
-Russian Geography ____ 2 terms	-Far East History ___ 1 term
-Russian Literature and Customs ____ 1 term	
-Russian Language ____ 3 terms (intensive; 17 class hours per wk.)	

(3) Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
- Attended: March 1946 to June 1947
- * A.B. degree awarded in 1947 - majored in History

Subjects:

-United States History	-American Immigration
-American Thought & Civilization	-Greek Classics
-U.S. Diplomatic History	-English Literature
-History of Contemporary World	-New Testament
-Moral and Political Philosophy	-Public Opinion & Propaganda
-American Govt. in Transition	-German
-Senior Essay: "The Interchurch World Movement and the Steel Strike of 1919"	

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1950 O - 897433

(OVER)

STARRED ITEMS ARE DETAILED ON FORM 50-7

(6) Harvard University, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts

- Attended: Sept.1947 to Sept.1950
- A.M. Degree awarded, 1948 (in History)
- Completed residence requirements toward Ph.D. in History

Subjects:

-Ancient Greek History — -U.S.Colonial History
-English History from 1688 — -History of the Westward Mvt.
-American Literature
-Seminar on the New Deal: "The Communist Party in the New Deal Period".
-Seminar on the West: "The Attitude of Massachusetts Democracy toward Populism in the 1890's."
-Directed reading in American and English History.

In addition, I audited the following courses:

-The Immigrant in American History
-Government Regulation of Industry
-U.S.Intellectual History
-American Social and Cultural History
-The British Empire
-European Intellectual History in the 18th & 19th Centuries.

I also attended a lecture course on college teaching.

(Educational recommendations may be obtained from Miss Florence Leetch, Graduate Placement Office, Farlow House, Cambridge, Massachusetts)

SEC. 14-③ - (continued from p. 7)

WORK AS INFORMATION-EDUCATION SPECIALIST (MILITARY), (1944-46)

(1) After completing the ASTP course at Yale, I was assigned to the 310th Infantry, 78th Division, Camp Pickett, Va. While there, I conducted "orientation" lectures covering world news and background material on the war (April-May 1944)

(2) Because of my limited-service status, I was transferred to the Supply Section, 1312 SCU, at Camp Pickett. I performed the duties of a unit Info & Education lecturer -- lecturing on history and current events, maintaining maps and bulletins on battle areas, and enrolling soldiers in USAFI correspondence courses (May-July 1944). As a result of this work, I was promoted to the Post Info & Education Office.

(3) The Post Information & Education Office had to plan, produce, and disseminate war information and non-military education for all troops permanently stationed at Camp Pickett, and for a hospital on the grounds. The purpose of that program was to help troops to understand why and what we were fighting, and to understand their role in that fight. It was morale building through information.

As Non-Commissioned Officer for the Info & Education Office, I performed both administrative and functional duties. I aided in the development and execution of the policies and content of the education program, and was in immediate charge of the weekly instructional program.

The following are the duties I performed:

A) Prepared [illegible] which [illegible]
- Info & Education Branch in Washington supplied series for use in these classes. I compiled, revised, or simplified them to suit them to the needs of our men.

B) Trained men to conduct lectures in each of 25 to 30 units; briefed them on use of the prepared material each week; and inspected their classes.
- Each company or unit was required to have one or more men with suitable education or experience to conduct weekly classes on history and current events under direction of the Info & Education Office. At briefing conferences, I discussed with them the topic for the next week, suggesting means of presentation, and describing general policies to be followed. I made periodic inspection visits to classes led by these men.

C) Lectured or conducted several discussions each week.
- The topics of these classes were the same as those used by the other men: basic U.S. history; current world events; background material on the war; the relation of the U.S. to its allies; the enemy; and the role of the individual soldier. Classes contained 75 to 100 men each, with all levels of education represented in them.

D) Designed and prepared displays for War Information Centers in camp libraries and the post headquarters. Developed visual aids for classroom use.
- Displays consisted of pictures, posters, maps, and explanatory material dealing with various topics, such as: "The German Army", "Growth of the Japanese Empire", "Nazism", "The United Nations", etc. The purpose was to give a graphic presentation of background information concerning the war. The display in the post headquarters had maps and news items dealing with battle areas.

E) Compiled and edited daily news sheet; broadcast daily news summaries; wrote articles on current events for camp newspaper.
- At my suggestion, the news-dissemination media at Camp Pickett were expanded by establishment of the news sheet and news broadcasts. The news sheet contained late news bulletins, factual background material, and some editorials. The news sheet and broadcasts were necessitated by the remoteness of the camp.

F) Did educational counselling and encouraged enrollments in correspondence courses offered by U.S. Armed Forces Institute.

G) Maintained close cooperation with camp newspaper staff, the Public Relations Office, Special Services Office, and the Intelligence Officer.

To be better prepared for work in the Post Info & Education Office I was sent to the School for Personnel Services, Washington & Lee University, Lexington, Va., for a one-month course for Info & Education Enlisted Specialists, (October-November 1944)

This course was prepared by the War Department and conducted by military personnel. It presented material to be used in preparing Info & Education programs in camps, it suggested methods of presentation, and it provided practical experience in assessing and dealing with orientation problems.

(OVER)

STARRED ITEMS ARE DEFINED ON FORM 35-1

Some of the topics covered in lectures and discussions in this course were:

-Ideas as Weapons
-Group Leadership Principles
-Morale Factors
-Global Warfare
-Know the Enemy
-Know our Allies
-Know the U.S.A.
-Teaching Methods
-Movies and Visual Aids

Upon completion of this course (with a grade of "Excellent"), I received a certificate, and a Military Occupational Specialty Classification of MOS 1274 (Information-Education Enlisted Specialist).

- - - - - - -

I believe my work as Non-Commissioned Officer in the Post Info & Education Office at Camp Pickett would be valuable to Central Intelligence. The job was given to me as a promotion. I received special training for it at the School for Personnel Services. While performing the job, I received promotions in rank from Private first class to Staff Sergeant. During the closing months of my service, I was in complete charge of the office in the absence of any full-time Info & Education Officer.

As the result of my work, I was invited to attend a conference of the Info & Education officers and non-commissioned officers of the Third Service Command at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, and to address that conference on educational and counselling problems. Since my discharge was in process at that time, I was unable to attend. Upon discharge, I received a special commendation from Colonel F.G.Paullin, Commanding Officer of Camp Pickett, and a letter of recommendation from my superior.

(Copies of these letters, orders, and commendations will be submitted if necessary)

SEC. 22 - CLUBS, ETC. (Continued from p. 10)

8. NEW ENGLAND METHODIST STUDENT MOVEMENT COUNCIL
- OFFICE OF CHAPLAIN, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MASS.
- DATES: 1946 - 1947

9. HARVARD WESLEY FOUNDATION {1556 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
38 LANGDON ST., CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
- DATES: 1947 - 1950

10. GRADUATE HISTORY CLUB, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
- DATES: 1948-1950 (irregular attendance).

11. HENRY ADAMS CLUB (FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY)
- HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
- DATES: 1947 - 1950

12. POST #35, AMERICAN LEGION, WEST ELM STREET, BROCKTON, MASS.
- DATES: 1946 - 1948.

THE FOREGOING ADDED MATERIAL IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE:

14-00000

8.C. 26 Feb.

File

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

To : Chief, Covert Personnel Division
~~Personnel Officer~~

From : Chief of Inspection and Security

Subject: WIGREN, Lee Hobart

Date: 23 March 1951

Number: 44732

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

☒ Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Memorandum dated 16 November 1950 stated subject is being considered for employment in OSO.

gkw

[illegible]
Chief, Personnel Security ~~Division~~
BRANCH

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
MAY 1949

14-00000

050
10

mew

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief, Covert Personnel Branch Date: 26 February 1951

FROM : Security Officer, CIA

SUBJECT: WIGREN, Lee Hobart - 44732

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 16 November 1950 which requested that subject be granted security clearance.

This is to advise that this office interposes no objection from a security standpoint to a temporary appointment of the subject to the Processing Pool, pending completion of further security action, upon the condition that subject (1) not have access to classified material, (2) not have access to CIA secure areas, (3) not be issued a CIA badge or credential. The subject may not be assigned for duty in any CIA staff or office without further authority from the Security Officer, CIA. This clearance does not include assignment to unclassified duties outside the immediate supervision of the Pool supervisor.

It is requested that this office be notified immediately when subject enters on duty so that final security processing may be scheduled.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

19 Mar

Kw

C V Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY mew
Chief, Security Division

Miss Huber notified 5 Mar Sth. Cal

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.

RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM ~~GF-53~~, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED. GA-50

IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4178.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

2029 Washcia cn/110 S. Corbat 06/EFK	12 Mar 93		

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

78-1129
432373

~~[illegible]~~

~~space [illegible]~~

FILE NO: Wash CIA AD 37

DOCUMENT:

FOLDER: ~~3~~ 11

PAGE:

BOX: 2

RETURN TO GA-50

IP/ARD Rm ~~GA-50~~

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB

432373

3

Folder #11

NCFE
July 1951-December 1952

SECRET
Security Information

31 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Background Material for Dr. Tyson's visit on Wednesday, January 7th.

1. I would like the attached papers to call to your attention the very good work that Dr. Tyson has done which is generally not known here. His successful use of emigres in making a calm and factual presentation to the American public of conditions behind the Iron Curtain is, in my opinion, the basis on which the Crusade for Freedom can be run by the Heritage Foundation in the future.

2. Dr. Tyson shares our doubts about the Free University in Exile. He agrees that the two principles upon which the University was founded:

A. that there were sufficient qualified Iron Curtain escapees to justify institutionalizing their education; and

B. that by creating such an institution for escapees an esprit de corps is created, together with a determination on the part of the escapees to serve their homelands at some future date

have not been proved.

3. All of the evidence to prove the validity of these principles is certainly not in. The evidence at hand raises serious doubts, and is as follows:

A. Of the current 208 students of the Free University, 37 are Yugoslavs, and 12 were born in Western European countries. (The high total ratio — almost 25% of the student body — of Yugoslav students, which is not a target country, together with the non-satellite born students indicates an inability to recruit the kinds of students the University was intended to train.) It should also be noted that from the information available to us it is not possible to determine what proportion of those listed as born in target countries actually left them before Soviet domination. I have the impression, which is substantiated by the recruiting missions of Mr. Royal Tyler throughout Europe and even Turkey, that suitable candidates are already extremely difficult to find. It should be noted also that of the 64 outside scholarships given to exiles in various European Universities, 16 are for Yugoslavs.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

B. We have had various reports which indicate that the morale of a number of students at Strasbourg is not good. These morale problems arise from a variety of reasons, among which are:

(1) They are not entirely certain why they are there and just what the American sponsors intend for them;

(2) They fear that after they finish their education they will be without jobs;

(3) There has been a steady and systematic campaign carried on by French Communist students at the University of Strasbourg to demoralize and disorganize the FEUE student body. In addition, several students are suspected of being espionage agents.

4. Dr. Tyson is leaving for Europe on the 21st of January to make a thorough investigation and evaluation of the Free University in order to answer these questions. We are aiding him by having the officials of the President's Escapee Program make available a complete inventory of escapees who might be potential candidates for the University.

5. Dr. Tyson was not the instigator of the proposals for a gymnasium for the Free University. The proposals were made and pushed by Royal Tyler and Spencer Phenix. The handling of this matter as far as Tyler was concerned was another example of his difficulties in dealing with Phenix for, as financial officer of NCFE, and having no position in the separate corporation, that is, the Free University, Phenix has and is dealing with matters of policy.

THOMAS W. BRADEN,
Chief,
International Organizations Division

Attachments: a/s
IO/TONIC:WFD/cmm
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - RI

SECRET
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

31 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

VIA: Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: NCFE Cooperation with CIA

The cooperation of NCFE in certain matters should be brought to your attention.

1. In aiding the Agency to take advantage of the Slansky trials, NCFE: (a) has made available complete monitoring of the trial; (b) is translating into Hungarian, Polish, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Albanian, transcripts of the trial; and, (c) is sending us complete extracts of the Iron Curtain press dealing with the trial. All of this has been, or is being done with great speed. NCFE is making a major project out of the Slansky trials and will distribute a pamphlet on the subject in the satellite languages to its extensive overseas mailing lists.

2. NCFE is relasing to the press and carrying on its broadcast the substance of incoming cable 2100 dated 17 December from Vienna, on Vienna Peace Conference.

3. Inaddition, NCFE has done some specific research for us with skill and great speed.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/TOMIC: WPD/hka
Distributions:
Orig. & 1- Addressee
~~1 cc - C/PP~~
2 cc - IO/TOMIC
1 cc - C/IO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

P.6450

[illegible]
[illegible]

Chief, Cover Division, Plans/FI

19 December 1952

Chief, Contact Division, OO

HM-591

Crusade for Freedom

The attached extract from the 12 December 1952 issue of Fifth Army's Domestic Intelligence Report is forwarded as being of possible interest to your office.

Encl: 1

E. M. ASHCRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL 726
SECURITY INFORMATION

"An S ". CHEN approached the Head of t Notre Dame versity Security Section, and requested a list of all Chinese nationals attending the University. Chen represented himself as a member of the STUDENTS RELATIONS SECTION, COMMITTEE FOR A FREE ASIA, INC., 105 Market Street, San Francisco, California. CHEN stated that his reason for requesting such a list was that his organization was active in promoting better relations between Chinese nationals attending colleges and universities in the United States and the American people. Notre Dame received for a second time a pamphlet from the COMMITTEE FOR A FREE ASIA entitled, "Asia in the World Today". Officials at Notre Dame have also been contacted by the NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE, 110 West 57th Street, New York 19, New York. This organization requested a list of all foreign instructors and students presently instructing or attending courses at the University. A business card attached to a pamphlet revealed the following information: Miss Ellen M. STUDELY, 1223 East 57th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois, Chinese Student and Alumni Service, Chicago Area, COMMITTEE ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG FOREIGN STUDENTS, 29 Broadway, New York 7, New York. There is no information in G-2 files this Headquarters relative to STUDELY or CHEN."

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

DD/P 1689

16 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Edward W. Barrett and NCFE

REFERENCE: Your Note Dated 11 December 1952

I'm informed by Admiral Miller that the matter of Edward W. Barrett joining NCFE as a director, was discussed at an Executive Committee meeting a month ago.

No formal decision was made because of considerable opposition so the matter has been tabled.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

15 December 1952

Dear Archie:

I much enjoyed our chance for a talk, and Bill Durkee, who assists me in the subject we discussed, is tremendously enthusiastic, as I am, about the possibility that you will consider favorably the appointment Frank mentioned.

Let me state again what seems to me most important in the facts under discussion. The job is of national and world-wide importance. It can help achieve greatness. It can endanger us all. It requires a man of imagination and ideas but also a man of deep and thoughtful responsibility to discharge it well.

I should like you to consider that I am at your service at any time to give you any facts you would like to have or any opinions for that matter. All of us here consider that we would be greatly privileged to be able to help you if you undertook the job.

Sincerely,

Thomas W. Braden

Mr. Archibald Alexander
1430 - 33rd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: C/IO

NO. 3-5308

DATE 11 December 1952

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. DDCI			12/11		EYES ONLY Mr Braden How much more does he want? I agree that we should do everything possible to get a strict accounting. This is a serious matter.
2. CIO	Mr Braden			TWB	
3. Durkee				WPD	
4.					
5. C/IO for file					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

16—61155-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

July 8,1952

Note: Nelson please deliver this to Allen.

To: Allen Dulles

You recently asked me for our views on Yugoslavia. The enclosed memorandum is a consensus formed from all of our key staff members. It also meets with the approval of John Hughes. I think this is a fair statement of what we are doing to date and what our views are. I hope this will be of some use to you.

Leonard

Enclosure

July 2, '[illegible]

MEMORANDUM

The National Committee for a Free Europe's policy in respect to Yugoslavia and Yugoslav exile activities may be summarized in the following statements.

1. The Committee does not now, nor does it plan to interfere, by radio or otherwise, with the domestic affairs of the Yugoslav people or of the Titoist regime.

2. In so far as our anti-Stalinist aims and activities coincide, we see no reason to obstruct such functional and mutually beneficial arrangements as may from time to time present themselves. Specifically, we have no objection to exchanging with Radio Belgrade certain types of radio materials in respect to the countries under Soviet domination which might enhance the effectiveness of our radio programs or otherwise aid the work of the National Committee for a Free Europe.

3. As an anti-Communist organization dedicated to the concepts of democracy and of individual freedom we feel it is entirely consistent and proper to extend aid to democratic Yugoslavs exiled from their homelands, within the budgetary and other limitations under which we operate. To this end a total of some 69 Yugoslavs are retained by the Committee and engaged in five types of work.

a) In Radio Free Europe, which has no Yugoslav desk, 13 Yugoslavs have been engaged as information analysts, program advisors and translators because of their technical abilities.

b) In the Mid-European Studies Center 31 Yugoslavs are engaged in research projects connected with the East European Enquiry, the Law Project and the East European Accessions List, and include 7 scholarship students.

c) In the Research & Publications Service 9 Yugoslavs are engaged in analysis of the Yugoslav press and other sources of information and in the publication of factual, non-propagandistic studies and bulletins designed to keep the emigration and interested Americans informed on domestic events.

d) The Free Europe University in Exile has selected 13 Yugoslav students on the same basis of individual merit as students from the other European Communist nations have been granted scholarships to study at Strasbourg.

e) Finally, the National Councils Division gives financial aid to three formerly prominent Yugoslavs in recognition of their past services to the cause of democracy.

In conclusion, the number of Yugoslavs thus supported by the Committee's various divisions represents 1.6% of the total exile staff.

SSW/bvb

Sent to State Dept. 28 July 1952

SECRET
Security Information

[illegible] 1671

11 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe

1. I would like to call DD/P's attention to this unsolicited memorandum. It is additional evidence for my own observation made to him orally that the work of backstopping NCFE is being carried forward in a manner which at least attempts to meet the challenge of servicing the entire Agency in those aspects of NCFE work which can be useful to the various Divisions of the Agency.

2. As he is aware, NCFE conducts an enormous amount of research and other activity. I believe we can now say with some certainty that this record is being put to use by Washington.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Memo from DC/O,SI dtd 26 Nov. 52

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, PP/IOD

DATE: 26 November 1952

FROM : Deputy Chief, Operations Staff, O/SI

SUBJECT: Fulfillment of Requirement RDA-3345

1. This offices wishes to express its appreciation for the excellent cooperation provided by your TONIC Branch in connection with our requirement RDA-3345 concerning higher education in Poland.

2. The material which we received met our need precisely and enabled us to close out this requirement.

Hayden Channing
HAYDEN CHANNING

CSI/JBQuigley:bm

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - Forward ✓
1 - Subject file
1 - Daily reading file
1 - Chrono
1 - Singel
1 - Chief, SRD (W. Platt)

SECRET
Security Information

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

3-5794

11 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: University of the Saar

1. The University of the Saar was created on 8 March 1947. It has four facilities -- two in Saarbrucken (Letters and Law) and two in Hombourg (Medicine and Science). Faculty members are French, German, Swiss, British and Saarois.

2. A number of "institutes" exist with undefined relations to the University though financed, as is the rest of the University, by the French Government, and include a special institute for interpreters, an institute for economic science, and a European Institute. The support of the French Government of this University, aside from its merits, is part of the French attempt to Europeanize the Saar.

3. The European Institute, devoted to European unity, is a recent creation and is largely the result of the promotions of former Deputy, Andre Philip. It was the European Institute to which the Herald Tribune article specifically refers.

4. The University participated extensively, especially the European Institute, in the European Youth Campaign. Some of the specific activities were as follows:

March 1952: The Campaign cooperated with the International Institute of the University of Sarrebruck in arranging a meeting of young professors in the Saar and another meeting of youth leaders, both to discuss European problems. Films were supplied by the Campaign for both these meetings.

By the end of April, 25 youth organizations (practically all) in the Saar were associated with the Campaign. During April, May, and June an extensive program of discussion groups was arranged in the secondary schools throughout the Saar. These groups were sponsored jointly by the Campaign and the youth groups of the Saar. The groups discussed all phases of the unity question but concentrated particularly on the Schuman

Plan due to the economic position of the Saar in this matter. Films and publications of the Campaign were used in the discussions. 7000 students participated.

During June 1952, in cooperation with the Campaign, students and professors of the International Institute formed a committee along with youth leaders to discuss the particular problems of the Saar in a United Europe.

On March 27, 1952 the Campaign held a large study group in cooperation with the European Institute of the University of the Saar. Students attended from Aix, Hambourg, Oxford, Tubingen, Leyden, Nancy, Berlin and Paris. Lecturers were provided by the Campaign.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P 1235

10 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT : University of the Saar

1. In the Sunday November 9 issue of the New York Herald Tribune there was a rather full and very interesting account of the purposes and objectives of the University of the Saar, which I am anxious for the addressees of the original and copies of this memorandum to read. The writer of the piece has evidently been much impressed with the efforts of this institution in the field of advancing European unity, and if the account which he gives is an accurate one, it seems to me that we should (a) know more about this and (b) give consideration to providing some support for it if it is good. It might even prove to be the case that this is a better and more deserving show than some of the activities which we are currently supporting having similar objectives. I think we are generally agreed that it is better to get in behind and give support and encouragement to a movement which has demonstrated the ability to stand on its own feet than to try to create and sustain an activity which would not exist but for our own contributions.

2. I should appreciate receiving from you in due course your estimate of the significance of this activity, etc.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/WE (Attention: Mr. Dulin)
C/EE

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P 1[illegible]35

10 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT : University of the Saar

1. In the Sunday November 9 issue of the New York Herald Tribune there was a rather full and very interesting account of the purposes and objectives of the University of the Saar, which I am anxious for the addressees of the original and copies of this memorandum to read. The writer of the piece has evidently been much impressed with the efforts of this institution in the field of advancing European unity, and if the account which he gives is an accurate one, it seems to me that we should (a) know more about this and (b) give consideration to providing some support for it if it is good. It might even prove to be the case that this is a better and more deserving show than some of the activities which we are currently supporting having similar objectives. I think we are generally agreed that it is better to get in behind and give support and encouragement to a movement which has demonstrated the ability to stand on its own feet than to try to create and sustain an activity which would not exist but for our own contributions.

2. I should appreciate receiving from you in due course your estimate of the significance of this activity, etc.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/WE (Attention: Mr. Dulin)
C/EE

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
3-5282

SECRET
Security Information

10 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Call by Spencer Phenix on DDCI

1. Spencer Phenix will call upon the DDCI Friday for the purpose of taking up with him certain questions among which are the following:

a. A gymnasium for the Strasbourg University. The history of the gymnasium request is as follows:

> On 8 August 1952, at a meeting of the PRC, NCFE proposed capital expenditures of $377,500 for the Free University in Exile. This amount was placed in a reserve fund along with other requested budget items. It was agreed that funds held in this reserve could be released to NCFE by the DD/P in conjunction with the DD/A if in their judgment the submission of further data justified such expenditures.
>
> On 17 September 1952, Spencer Phenix, for NCFE, made a request for $47,000 to be released from the CIA-held reserve for the construction of a gymnasium at the Free University.
>
> This request was rejected by the DD/P. He said he would reconsider the request if further data supported it.
>
> On 8 October 1952, Mr. Phenix made another request supplying further data. This time the request was reduced to $43,500. This request was also rejected by the DD/P.

In view of PRC action as indicated on preceding page it would appear to be Mr Phenix who is confused. I feel that in an unjustified and [illegible] request that it be summarily [illegible] extravagance I would have it reviewed by higher authority. FGW

By memorandum of 5 December 1952, Mr. Phenix refers to the fact that the trustees have given formal approval to the establishment of a gymnasium and that his understanding of the reserve fund is that when the Board of Directors of NCFE ask for the money, they receive it at once. He says that there appears to be some misunderstanding of this procedure, pointing out that the locus of misunderstanding "is in and around Frank W's office."

b. The Turkish Broadcasting Station. Mr. Phenix intends to raise this question as a basic policy matter, he having been informed by us that while there is great enthusiasm for the project and while the State Department has set January 15th as the date by which VOA must either secure agreement from the Turkish Government or withdraw itself from consideration, the basic policy question of whether RFE then moves in has not been definitively settled. Mr. Phenix would like to know definitely now whether, contingent upon the failure of the Voice to gain entry to Turkey, NCFE can proceed with the building of a Turkish station. This item, which will probably be in the neighborhood of five million dollars, was presented at the PRC meeting, at which time it was agreed it would be considered as a separate project at a later date.

Certainly Not without the firm Turkish Government approval.

c. The Slansky Trial. Mr. Phenix is worried about the statements in the Slansky trial indicating use of RFE by the United States Government to send operational messages. We have told him that this secret arrangement was made with RFE by CIA men in the field. No approval of Headquarters was ever requested. Corrective steps have been taken in the FE Division to insure that action which may compromise operational facilities does not occur again without prior consultation with and approval of top authority of NCFE and CIA.

If there is anything to this - it should be flatly denied.

d. Barbara Bowen. Mr. Phenix is concerned about a little girl who works in the Munich office, who through some mischance of several years standing is still on the roles of this Agency and draws retirement pay, although her salary is paid by NCFE. Phenix regards this as a penetration though in fact Miss Bowen is a valued employee of NCFE and has no contact with anyone from CIA. We are trying to regularize the situation by affording her the opportunity of resigning from the Agency or resigning from NCFE.

e. Second Installation for Strasbourg University. The trustees of the Free University in Exile have voted to create a German-speaking free university in exile, probably to be located in the Saar. Phenix reports in his memorandum of December 5th that the DDCI has given Royal Tyler assurance regarding this extension.

N.B. There is already in being a free University in the Saar. Let us not rush into something new of our own without first learning all about what is now there - and determining whether we might not help out with the existing effort rather than attempt to create something entirely new. FGW

Mr. Phenix requests assurance that if Mr. Royal Tyler approaches French authorities at the Saar to create such a university and is granted permission, the Agency will supply the funds. No formal request has been made and this project of course has not been budgeted.

f. Names of pensioned Army and Navy Officers. In compliance with DD/P Notice No. 20-6 issued on 27 October, we have asked Mr. Phenix to furnish the names of pensioned Army and Navy officers employed by NCFE. Mr. Phenix is concerned about the legal ramifications of this step, stating his fear that what this order implies for him is that the monies he dispenses as Treasurer are government funds. He has been assured by us that the purpose of the Agency-wide request is to inventory those who are receiving Navy and Army pensions and serving in proprietary organizations. He has also been assured that Army and Navy pensioners in his organization will be exempt from any action taken by the Agency on the problem of double pay. He is quite naturally worried about it.

2. The Philosophy of Spencer Phenix. In arguing his case on the above questions, and others, Phenix brings to his support the argument that he is not dispensing government funds. He says that once government funds reach the 1848 Foundation they become private funds. This is no mere self-delusion for the sake of maintaining a position before his conscience. Because from this conviction he proceeds to argue:

a. that the Agency cannot ask him to furnish such names as suggested above, or lists and records of any kind.

b. that the Agency has no right to query the decisions of the staff and directors as to the expenditure of funds once released by the Agency.

c. that the Agency has no right to intervene in NCFE affairs or to issue guidance or instructions after funds have been passed. Phenix modifies this point by volunteering that the Directors are always glad to receive advice from friends such as DDCI.

3. Spencer Phenix is a good man at his job and I understand the futility of arguing principle rather than cases. Nevertheless, the Phenix philosophy, argued as it is to the staff and directors of NCFE, and stated to us whenever possible -- frequently without relation to the facts under discussion -- often untempered by good humor, is beginning to try the souls of other good men.

There is neither time nor space here for me to comment adequately on these points, and on all that is in them. But if my view is S.P. holds them views, he is in conflict with ⓥ and other [illegible] and our staff, and ⓥ is in violation of the express understanding arrived at [illegible] all the principals in 1949. All agreed at that time that the ultimate responsibility lies with D.C.I. [illegible]

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

[illegible]
3-527.

Mr Wisner

December 8, 1952

Dear Allen,

When we were talking on the telephone last week you suggested that Alexander might possibly be interested in the N.C.F.E. and that he might be worth considering as President to succeed Min Miller. As you requested, I have not mentioned his name to anyone as yet and will not do so until I hear further from you. As I understand it, you are going to be talking to him some time this week and hope to ascertain then whether he himself would have some interest in this job. Whenever you do get any further information on this please let me know.

Meantime, a number of other names have been suggested and we will give them careful consideration. Naturally we will discuss them with you before taking any definite action.

Regards,

TWB

December 1, 1952

Dear Hedwood,

The enclosed documents may be of interest to you and are sent to you for information.

Sincerely yours,

Whiting Stratton

DEC 1952

C O P Y

October 31, 1952

The Honorable Joseph C. Grew
2840 Woodland Drive, N.W.
Washington 8, D. C.

Dear Mr. Grew:

Attached herewith you will find a most interesting summary of the methods that have been adopted by the USSR to attract the minds of youth in the satellite states.

It has long been known that some such program was being followed, but it is only recently that detail has become available.

In contrast to these methods, efforts expended in this country to teach our young people the real meaning of freedom as represented by western democracy are feeble. It is almost safe to state that we have been relying solely on an innate, sentimental aversion to "communism", because no intelligent or systematic means have as yet been organized that will capture the minds of the young people of the United States in the same fervent manner that the communist ideology has taken hold of Russian youth.

For a little more than a year, in connection with the reorganization of the research activities of the Division of Intellectual Cooperation we have been attempting to enlist the help of American intellectuals — not the intelligentsia. There is a difference.

From the very beginning I have been amazed to discover the dearth of people who are familiar with that section of Europe which engages NCFE interest — the belt of countries extending from the Baltic to the Aegean. I was curious to find out why there were so few upon whom we could draw for help, so I started an inquiry. The results are now being compiled.

We must remember that the teaching of history or of government in America has never been emphasized to the same degree that it has in Europe. The curricula of the secondary schools in that part of the world cover those subjects much more comprehensively than is the case with us. It was difficult for me to appreciate this at first, but our inquiry has verified it without any doubt. In practically all European countries now on either side of the Iron Curtain it has long been traditional to emphasize instruction in history, because the tides of war and change have ebbed and flowed across their lands for many centuries. We have been isolated and in most respects free from foreign influences as we have developed our democratic processes. Today American foreign policy faces grave issues, and in one part of the world it is deeply concerned with the very section of Europe about which all NCFE activities revolve. Yet the American public is practically illiterate respecting this area, both its past and its present. I know whereof I speak as a result of the inquiry above referred to. When it is completed I am inclined to think the results will be startling, particularly if we bear in mind that the issues at stake must be settled; that they are a concern to this country; and that our people are practically uninformed. They know little if anything about the historical significance behind what has occurred or will occur as the next few decades unfold because they have had no opportunity to learn the historic significance of it all.

In this country today there are approximately 800 colleges and universities offering four year courses of study leading to the Bachelor of Arts degree. This figure does not include the 575 junior colleges which usually conduct non-degree-granting programs two years in length — approximately the first two years of the traditional four year program. As far as our inquiry has gone it is already apparent that there are only several dozen institutions in the former group which offer instruction in this area, and very few in the latter. Most of those which do cover this area are the larger universities where the courses are really graduate in character and thus elective. In many instances brief coverage is supplied in survey courses, but even these can not and do not develop the attention that historically this part of the world now deserves. When this survey is completed a comprehensive report of the findings will be made. It will refer to colleges included in a list compiled by the American Council on Education which is the overall representative organization in this country for higher education.

I am calling the attention of the Directors to this situation because it seems to me we must realize that the American public not only does not know what we are doing, but actually can not understand the significance of why we are trying to do it. Generation after generation has grown up in America illiterate about the outside world. What we are discovering concerning the lack of knowledge of this area will of course prove true of other parts of the globe such as the Far East or South Africa.

In our Division we feel this particularly strongly because we are dependent on help from the academic world. The plain fact is more and more evident that we can not rely on American higher education as a prolific source of assistance. The relatively few individuals who have studied this region, and who are therefore qualified to aid us in our efforts, are either too overburdened with demands made on their time because they are qualified, or they are too young and inexperienced to be relied on in an enterprise as delicate as the one which we are conducting.

There are signs that in some academic localities interest in this field is developing. However, we can not wait for another generation to emerge even though, under whatever auspices, a program of training could be implemented to correct the situation. The important question is what can we do about it and what shall we do.

As already stated, the inquiry above mentioned grew out of our attempts to discover people in American higher education who are qualified to help us. We suspected they were not numerous, but we are amazed at the small number. We shall continue to try to persuade them to help us, but that well has begun to run dry already.

Can those associated with us do anything to emphasize this situation strongly enough in some quarters so that something will be attempted to correct it? Obviously this is not a problem that falls within the scope of NCFE; the problem concerns all colleges, universities, secondary schools and the enormous field designated as adult education. Responsibility may even rest with the government itself.

I shall appreciate your suggestions, and will send you the final report of this survey when completed.

Sincerely yours,

Levering Tyson

Enclosure:
"Youth in the Soviet Satellite States"

10 July 1952

1. At the last Project Review Committee meeting on NCFE, you asked that the State Department be consulted on policy in respect to National Councils. A review by State has begun. Meantime, however, for your information and in order to enable you to answer questions which may be raised by Messrs. Dolbeare or Miller, I want to explain to you how the IO Division is presently handling exile affairs.

2. The difficulty in this matter arises largely from the fact that three organizations are doing the job. State has apparently found it necessary to deal directly with exiles. CIA area divisions, EE and SE, also deal directly with exiles for area purposes. NCFE hands out the money and tries to keep them together in National Councils. Out of this triple play a large degree of bad feeling and mistrust has arisen between CIA and State on the one hand and NCFE on the other. State, including Wally Barbour, and the area divisions of CIA accuse NCFE of playing personal petty favorites and of not keeping us informed. On the other hand, cooperation of State and CIA with NCFE in giving positive continuing guidance in their efforts has not been forthcoming. In the past no coordinated attempt has been made to give NCFE high-level over-all policy direction. Relations have been personal, casual, uncoordinated, and sometimes confusing.

3. We have taken the following action to try to insure orderly efforts to fuse or coordinate the various exile activities conducted by the three organizations:

a. This division has asked the concerned area divisions to initiate plans for reorganization and unification of each national council. The resultant paper is then coordinated with the proper authorities in State and a final line is agreed upon.

b. This plan is then communicated to NCFE and the organization is asked for comments, criticisms and suggestions.

c. After such are made or agreed upon, the paper becomes the policy directive which charts NCFE's course of action.

d. NCFE then informs this division of progress being made and supposedly requests authority to depart from such completed policy papers.

To date two such policy directives have been written. The first was a plan for the reorganization of the Rumanian National Council. It was submitted to NCFE, and their criticisms and suggestions have been incorporated. The plan is now being executed.

The second was a similar State Department-CIA paper on the reorganization of the Bulgarian National Committee. This will be submitted to NCFE on Thursday, 10 July, and a similar course of action will be followed.

4. I realize that this will seem to you as a somewhat simple and obvious way of insuring coordination, but the fact is that it had never been done before. I hope that it results in as few flaps as possible and as few occasions when people are running off in all directions.

5. A current case where people are running off in all directions is the Polish situation. This broke at the very time we were beginning work on a coordinated CIA-State-NCFE paper. NCFE has been operating upon the assumption that if a Polish National Council is to be formed, all groups are to be represented. Unknown to NCFE, and in fact to me, EE Division has been making attempts to unify two of the three main groups by holding conversations with representatives in London. There are a good many charges and counter-charges flying about at present on this situation. The man abroad is saying he had informed NCFE of what he intended to do, and people in NCFE say he hadn't. We are trying to straighten it out, but the situation is illustrative of how the plan above outlined can prevent such flaps.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

28 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit by Robert Lang with Officials of CIA

REFERENCE: EYES ONLY Memorandum to C/P from Richard Helms, Acting Chief, Operations, DD/P, dated 25 Nov. 1952

1. After consultation with Mr. Durkee, I would like to make the following comments on Mr. Helms' memorandum. Mr. Helms is correct that Mr. Lang has had difficulty in dealing with CIA. Mr. Helms is also correct if he understood that this state of affairs is the responsibility of Admiral Miller. (To Admiral Miller's responsibility must be added that of Spencer Phenix, Vice-President and Treasurer.)

2. Within and outside NCFE, Admiral Miller's dealings with Mr. Lang are based on two attitudes:

a. Miller's desire to have control of his organization by having everything channeled through him; and

b. Miller's desire to maintain an autonomous organization which will accept over-all policy guidance from the highest levels of the government, but which will not allow either domination by, or close contact with, CIA in order to discuss that organization's problems or to be informed of its vehemently disordered activities.

In this connection, a statement by Admiral Miller in a letter to Mr. Alan Valentine, until recently President of the Committee for Free Asia, is of interest:

1 August 1952

"It was good to see you, if just for an instant, in Washington.

"For your private ear, I might tell you that we won our battle hands down. Merely to confirm this, our Executive Board is having lunch in Washington with Allen and Bedell next Monday. This will be a general talk, but I am sure that policies will come up for discussion. Happily, everything seems to be sailing along in good shape."

. . .

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

This letter was written at a time when the IO Division had achieved for CIA its first detailed budget from NCFE and was further asking a mutuality of relations between NCFE and CIA, ultimately defined in Memorandum of Understanding, dated 24 September, signed by H. B. Miller and Allen W. Dulles. It proves what at the time we only suspected, that Miller was calling on support from Valentine against CIA.

3. Mr. Phenix and Lang resent Admiral Miller's tendency for tight administration. Both have carried on a campaign within NCFE to discredit Miller. However, Mr. Phenix, perhaps Lang, and almost all of the responsible officials of NCFE back Miller in his attitude towards CIA. For example, despite repeated requests by DD/P and as recently as three weeks ago by DDCI personally, Miller has refused to turn over to CIA a list of NCFE employees. Even a request by DDCI to John Hughes has failed to produce this list.

In addition, Mr. Phenix acts as the German expert in NCFE, cutting out Lang. Phenix alone has negotiated and dealt with German high officials on RFE's position in Germany. Mr. Lang and Mr. Phenix have fundamental disputes about how RFE's German problems should be handled. Part of Mr. Lang's desire for personal talks with officials of the Department of State grows out of his wish to get backing for his position.

4. In a sense, RFE is the last NCFE bastion to be scaled. Mr. Lang's statement that he has received virtually no guidance, policy or otherwise from this organization is largely a play on words. Mr. Lang has not sought the guidance of members of his own organization, much less the guidance of CIA. When the IO Division took over responsibility for NCFE, the CIA intelligence support unit, which supplied RFE information and guidance, was abolished on Mr. Lang's advice that such information and guidance were no longer necessary. RFE broadcasting policy is set down in a handbook which has been thoroughly examined and accepted by CIA and from time to time specific guidance has been given to RFE. RFE accepts any materials and guidance as suggestions, not orders. We believe Lang is getting all the guidance there is to give, and that he is looking for the kind of high policy forecasting which does not exist.

5. These are the political facts of life for the IO Division, and indeed for CIA. The IO Division has attempted to deal with this situation by: (1) winning the confidence of the Directors and Division heads of NCFE, and (2) maintaining friendly personal relationship with both Admiral Miller and Mr. Spencer Phenix. Much progress has been made in gaining knowledge of, and control over, the activities of NCFE.

Aside from friendly dealings, our specific concept of gaining control over NCFE as a whole, has been to push and encourage the thought that NCFE should be operated as a whole. The present separation and uncoordinated activities of divisions, especially RFE, while perhaps

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

necessary in the past, is not satisfactory at present. Added to this has been the theme that there must be a re-thinking of what NCFE has done, is doing, and should do in the future. Our efforts are beginning to bear fruit. We have found that these lines have struck a responsive chord among the working personnel of NCFE. In many ways, the current RFE difficulties in Germany -- unfortunate as they are -- have been helpful, for they have made it clear to everybody concerned, including Mr. Lang, that re-thinking of objectives and techniques based on cooperative effort by NCFE and CIA as a whole is vital if the organization is to do its job effectively.

6. To reformulate our own and NCFE's ideas, the IO Division has been and is carrying on discussions with the officials and working personnel of NCFE. In some of these discussions, Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the State Department has been a direct participant. The IO Division has also been exploring these matters with officials of CIA and the Department of State.

7. These discussions have covered a wide variety of subjects which can generally be described as follows:

a. What is NCFE's place as a whole in American policy toward the satellite nations; what is American policy; what modifications are likely?

b. How can NCFE, especially the Division of Emigre Relations, contribute more effectively to psychological and political warfare, not only for effects behind the Iron Curtain but in the Free World? For example: How can NCFE securely engage in further activities in the pattern of its successful actions at the United Nations Slave Labor Hearings and the International Red Cross Meetings at Toronto?

c. Should NCFE continue to support emigre councils, or should some other technique be developed which can enable it to make more effective use of emigres for psychological warfare purposes?

d. How can the Research and Publications Division, the Division of Intellectual Cooperation, and the Free University best contribute to these efforts?

e. Is NCFE efficiently organized? What, for example, is the effect of the Division of Emigre Relations' dealings with emigres on the position of RFE in Europe, etc.?

f. How the formidable research and information resources of NCFE can securely be used by CIA?

g. How can NCFE be geared more closely to the activities and needs of CIA?

h. Analysis of Radio Free Europe's effectiveness, programming, political position in Germany, how RFE can be used to support CIA operations specifically, alternate broadcasting sites for RFE etc.

i. How can CIA give specific guidance to RFE? What kind of information is wanted, for example, by RFE? What studies and means of overcoming jamming can be made available to RFE? How can American and British legations in the satellites best provide guidance and information for RFE?

7. These are some of the topics being discussed. In a few weeks the time will come in my opinion when the main outlines of this common thought will be sufficiently clear so that the working officials of NCFE, including Mr. Lang, should meet with officials of CIA and the Department of State for two main purposes:

a. A briefing on U.S. policy toward CIA operations behind the Iron Curtain so that these officials will see clearly the way in which they are expected to fit into total U.S. efforts, and the manner in which they should operate.

b. Analyze and contribute, in some detail, to the main lines of thought developed in order to arrive at comprehensive working policy for NCFE, and detailed methods of its cooperation with CIA.

8. For the foregoing reasons, I suggest that Mr. Lang does not, at this time, come down to meet the CIA officials as suggested by Mr. Helms but that Mr. Lang's visit be a part of the IO Division's over-all effort to gain working control over NCFE as briefly outlined above.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO:TONIC:WPD/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)
1 cc - AC/OP/DD/P
~~1 cc - CPP~~
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

Bill — Are we answering this? They are writing memo. 2N

Orig given Ellenstein 1 Dec

Security Information

NOV 26 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Formation of a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organisation

REFERENCE: Memorandum to IO, Subject: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization, dated 12 September 1952

1. The NCFE negotiations for a united Rumanian refugee organization appear to be culminating successfully. Although a number of differences have been resolved, a few controversial matters remain. These points have been discussed several times, both with the NCFE and the refugees, but are of such importance as to warrant special attention and emphasis at this moment.

2. The most urgent problem, the one most likely to nullify the recent efforts and cause further difficulties, is that of General Radescu. The problem is to find a position which the General will consider sufficiently important for him and which we will consider sufficiently innocuous to ensure that he cannot interfere with the Committee. A majority of the refugees are in accord on the necessity for placing limitations of activity on the General. For operational reasons, we require such limitations. The existing good relations between the NCFE and the General should be utilised to persuade the General that a passive, honorary position is the only way to guard his health for, by implication, later action. He must be made to realise that he is not being shelved but is being saved. If he cannot be prevailed on to adopt this attitude, he will have to be told with complete frankness that his obstructionism cannot be tolerated, that he will have to remain passive outside, rather than within, the new organisation or risk losing the assistance he now receives. The first method is the more desirable, and it is suggested that the General's secretary, Barbu Niculescu, be informed of the NCFE's intention and warned of the latter step if his cooperation is not obtained in expediting the General's acceptance of a passive role. Niculescu should be dealt with quite frankly and informed of the consequences, to him as well as to the General, if he does not cooperate.

3. In regard to paragraph 4 of reference memorandum, the matter of the Council apparently has not been discussed thoroughly with the refugees. The importance of an organization for the masses of refugees, controlled by the Executive Committee of 16-17, should not be underestimated. The working commissions proposed by Visoianu (European Federation Movement, PW, Publications, etc.) should be drawn from the Council rather than from the refugees at large. Further, there are many refugees for whom the Committee has no need, nor we at present, who desire to participate in a refugee organization. That the desire to belong to something is particularly strong among the younger refugees, i.e. those of potential operational value, is evidenced by the number who have affiliated with the Iron Guard, other fanatic organizations, student, and professional groups. Membership should be open to large numbers of refugees (exclusive of hard-core Iron Guards, Communists, criminals, etc.), and should be manifested by membership cards. To strengthen the sense of participation small annual dues could be required or subscription to the Committee newspaper (which would be subsidized so that subscription cost would not be excessive). The formation of this Council is considered particularly worthwhile since it offers a way to draw worthy refugees from less desirable organisations and to develop their usefulness for the future.

4. With respect to the secret fund in the possession of Mr. Cretzianu of the Rumanian National Committee, we do not consider that an issue should be made of the disbursing and control of this money. Both Visoianu and Cretzianu have agreed to account for the funds and to auditing of the books. It is possible that a finance committee, consisting of Cretzianu and one or two others, will be appointed in the new organisation to handle the subsidies and to audit the secret fund.

5. Reports that Gafencu has developed an intransigent attitude toward the new committee have been received from several sources. As Mr. Dolbeare is in Europe and is a friend of Gafencu's, it is suggested that he attempt to obtain again Gafencu's cooperation with the current negotiations.

6. It is requested that this memorandum be forwarded to the NCFE so that the information may be of immediate assistance in the negotiations planned for this week.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

26 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT: Results of debriefing of Czech Defector

REFERENCE: Memo from Bob Joyce 17 Nov. 52, attaching State Cable from Frankfort #313

1. I am sure Bob Joyce will upon reflection not allow himself to be troubled by the remarks of one Czech defector to the State Department Mission in Germany.

2. These are the facts:

a. Radio Free Europe has been most careful in its handling of the subject of liberation. They have not in the past nor do they now allow anyone to speak on the air of "liberation now".

b. Attached for your information is a detailed guidance on this subject issued by Radio Free Europe -- policy which governs all of their broadcasts.

c. As an example of how careful Radio Free Europe is on this subject, RFE did not use Mr. John Foster Dulles' recent controversial campaign speech on the subject of liberation because they believed that even though it was news and a statement made by a responsible American, it might be misinterpreted behind the Curtain.

3. I think that Radio Free Europe has maintained excellent discipline on this subject. You can imagine that it is under considerable pressure from Iron Curtain emigration to take the line of early hope for liberation in the prospect that in some way American public opinion and world opinion might be thus committed to a policy of liberation by armed force.

4. I would be glad to have you show this memorandum to Mr. Joyce if you care to do so. He should know that everyone is constantly on the alert and carefully watching the problem he raises.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Special Guidance
dtd 2 Sept. 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CIO:WPD-TWB/eh 1 cc - IO/TONIC
Orig & 1 - Addressee 1 cc -CIO 1 cc - RI

EYES ONLY 25 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, P & P

SUBJECT: Talk with Mr. Robert Lang

1. I spent an hour and a quarter in New York on Friday, 14 November, with Mr. Robert Lang of Radio Free Europe. The major portion of this time was devoted to a briefing by Lang of the NCFE structure and the position which RFE occupies in it, including the philosophy of RFE operations. Lang gave an impressive performance and struck me on such short acquaintance as an individual of ability, judgment, and energy.

2. Mr. Lang made quite a point of the fact that his operation inside NCFE is virtually independent. He intimated that he receives no guidance from the President or other officers and has expended considerable effort in the past seeing to it that an iron curtain is kept between RFE and the top command of NCFE. He said that if RFE had not developed and expanded according to a philosophy which it itself had originated, it would have got nowhere and would still be frustrated by what he kept referring to as the "old State Department line" as exemplified by the views of DeWitt Poole, Fred Dolbeare, and others. He then pointed out that he had received virtually no guidance, policy or otherwise, from this organization. Also he claimed to suffer from lack of contact with us. He stated that when he saw Mr. Dulles a week or so ago, it was the first time he had talked to anyone in authority here in many a moon. As far as Mr. Braden and company are concerned, he said that they dealt largely with Admiral Miller and his immediate staff. It was clear that he would prefer to deal directly with Washington. He also feels inhibited by the fact that he has to cajole Admiral Miller into permission to come to Washington. He cited as evidence an incident recently when he felt obliged to ask a friend in the State Department to intercede with Admiral Miller to permit him to come down here for consultation.

3. There was nothing bitter or frustrated in Mr. Lang's remarks. Rather he struck me as an individual who was discussing the facts of life, be what they may.

4. I told him that I would discuss with you the wisdom of having him come down here for a day some time in the next week or so

in order to spend a couple of hours around a table with Tracy Barnes, Al Ulmer, Eric Timm, and other appropriate individuals, at which session he would have an opportunity to set forth his problems and invite whatever assistance we as an organization can provide.

5. After you have read the foregoing, I would like to talk with you and Mr. Braden for the purpose of passing on DD/P's reactions to my suggestion.

Richard Helms
Acting Chief, Operations, DDP

cc: Chief, IO

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P 1387

24 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organisations Division

SUBJECT : Dr. J. H. Retinger

1. Please note and return to Mr. Dulles the attached letter from Dr. J. H. Retinger who has asked Mr. Dulles for an appointment during his visit in Washington between November 25 and 28. You will also note that Mr. Dulles does not propose to answer the letter nor (presumably) to grant the appointment. I am not sure whether you are familiar with the background on Retinger including our past difficulties with him. If you are not, I think it is important for you to have a look at the files which include numerous items of derogatory information concerning Retinger and his declared hostility toward the National Committee for Free Europe. We went to the mat with our British friends in what I believe proved to be a successful effort to have Retinger removed from the key position which he held on the so-called McMillan Committee. (You are aware of the fact that the British Service is now working with the McMillan Committee and in support of it.)

2. Retinger's position as Secretary General of the European Movement -- as evidenced by the letterhead -- is probably known to you. Because of our interest in this activity, it is important for you and the appropriate members of your staff to be fully on notice of Retinger's connection and past performance. I could not be very enthusiastic about or too hopeful for the production of genuinely constructive results -- in keeping with policies of the United States Government -- of any organization of which Retinger would be the Secretary General. To the extent that his loyalties can be determined, it is clear that they do not run toward the United States.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment (1)
Letter to DDCI from Dr. Retinger
dated 15 November 1952.

cc: DDCI
C/PP

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

DF 1321.

21 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT : Leland Stowe; I&S Approval of NCFE Request.

1. This memorandum will record the understanding arrived at in a conversation today with Colonel Edwards, Chief of I&S, and reported orally to Mr. Durkee by me. Admiral Miller telephoned me today with an urgent request that we give our authorization and approval to the use of Mr. Stowe for a further period of six months in the capacity of a consultant to RFE and not as a regular employee. This was the same basis as was finally approved for the first period of six months which is about to expire.

2. In discussing this matter with Colonel Edwards I refreshed his recollection as to certain features of the original arrangement, including the fact that Stowe is an extremely capable individual who has attracted other good people, most notably Russell Hill, into the effort, and who has no serious security raps against him. (He is not regarded as a loyalty or security risk but rather as a source of possible embarrassment in view of certain earlier writings of his.) Admiral Miller informed me and I passed on to Colonel Edwards the fact that there have been no questions or flurries of any kind concerning Stowe and the further fact that he has been doing a very effective job. Colonel Edwards approved from a security standpoint the continuation of Mr. Stowe as a consultant to RFE for a further period of six months.

3. I requested Mr. Durkee to so advise Admiral Miller at the earliest possible moment. I assume he has done so.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/PP

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT NCFE	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. BRITISH
	4. DATE Nov. 1952
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY TS-98 1191

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

NOV 21 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Division
Thru: FI Plans

SUBJECT: NCFE Employment of Mr. Brutus Coste

1. This is to advise you that, due to delay in our operations, the NCFE has been requested to provide interim employment for Mr. Brutus Coste.

2. We have been informed that the NCFE/MESC has offered Mr. Coste a contract for the preparation of a study on integration of the Rumanian with the Soviet economy. However, in view of Subject's knowledge of the refugee political situation and interest in propaganda measures, a position utilizing this background would be more advantageous to the NCFE and this Division than the proposed economic study.

3. It is requested that the proposed employment of Subject be discussed with the NCFE and that we be informed of the action taken. This Division is prepared to reimburse the NCFE for Subject's salary if such is desired. It is understood that Subject will continue, during the period of NCFE employment, to perform for this Division certain assignments which will not interfere with his NCFE work.

4. Your approval of the proposal for such employment is requested.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SE-5/MCNewsom/kp (19 Nov. 1952)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI
2 - SE-5
1 - IO

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible] 1306

Executive Registry
3-4257

13 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. Jan Nowak

1. At your request, I had a conversation today with Mr. Jan Nowak, head of the Polish radio desk of RFE in Munich. I am sorry that you did not get to see him. Our conversation reminded me that our work is terribly important, which is a nice reminder on a busy afternoon.

2. I say "important" because Nowak reviewed with me the letters he had received from listeners in Poland and these, together with his own enormous enthusiasm for the work he is doing, reminded me that our long days in Washington have an effect on the lives and hopes of people far away. Nowak, who was in the Polish resistance during the war and who on one of his three escapes from Poland at one time spent several weeks in Switzerland where he had made contact with your representatives, later worked for the BBC and he pointed out that at no time during the war was he given to feel by the BBC the sense of responsibility and mission which he feels in his job in RFE. He said he was told when he was brought to RFE that the responsibility for the programs was his and that if at any time programs went on the air which were irresponsible, then he would lose his job. He says that when he has questions which he thinks might influence United States policy, he confers beforehand with Griffith and the Americans in Munich, and sometimes arguments ensue, but he feels, and I am certain he feels sincerely, that he has an equal share with Americans in a great effort to carry the truth back home.

3. I say "terribly" important because Nowak, like other exiles, wonders out loud how long our work can continue to have an impact. He is himself convinced that every Polish soldier is a potential ally of the West but he wonders, and makes his listener wonder, how long we can expect this sympathy among a rising generation for which the past is inexorably fading.

4. Nowak made one point which I am sure he intended for your ears, that he was afraid that "certain people in Germany" who had contacts into Poland might lead his friends behind the Curtain to

betray themselves unnecessarily and tragically. He said that he had heard that these people had promoted behind the Curtain a whispering campaign among the Poles at the time of the recent elections to the effect that the elections were to be postponed. He seemed to think this an unnecessary risk for those who took part in it. He also said that he had been approached by these same people who asked him to urge the Poles by broadcast to cross out the names of the Communist candidates when they voted. He learned only later, he said, that the system of voting at the last election was such that in order to cross out candidates it was necessary to step out of the ballot box and do it in the open before witnesses. He had in any event refused such suggestions. I got the impression that he feels some of our people are a little immature.

5. I liked him. As I say, seeing him made me proud of what we are doing.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

NOV 4

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: DD/P's Memorandum to you 30 October 1952 entitled, "National Committee for Free Europe, RFE, and Related Matters"

1. You will be interested to know, I am sure, that Mr. Wisner's friend, Mr. Georgescu, has recently been most helpful. Through his efforts and the cooperation of Jim Pekich of SE European Division, I believe that NCFE is on the threshold of a unified Rumanian National Council.

2. I'm in entire agreement also with Mr. Georgescu's observation on the personnel set-up within NCFE. As you know, Mr. Dolbeare is concerned about his role. He is the first to admit that his strength is ebbing, and that he should retire. I think it must be agreed also that Mr. Dolbeare has done a splendid job, a job that would have been, and will still be, difficult for a man in the prime of life.

I have discussed this problem in confidence with Francis B. Stevens. As a result of my inquiries about a possible successor to Mr. Dolbeare, Mr. Stevens suggests that Mr. Nathaniel Penistone Davis is a person eminently qualified to do this job. I would be interested in knowing whether Mr. Wisner knows this man.

3. I believe also, Mr. Georgescu's misgivings about Mr. Yarrow are well-founded. In the last two months, Mr. Yarrow has taken an increasingly prominent position in Mr. Dolbeare's Division, as a result of Mr. Dolbeare's physical inability to do a full time job. Mr. Yarrow is blunt, and inclined to be dictatorial. He has a predilection for direct action in situations that rightly call for finesse and careful development. For these reasons, in addition to the fact that he is of Russian extraction and speaks with a heavy accent, I am convinced that he should not replace Mr. Dolbeare. In my opinion, under the right leadership, Mr. Yarrow could continue to make a valuable contribution to NCFE's dealings with emigres as an administrator.

I believe that such a solution is politically possible, for NCFE in this phase of its activities is going through a period of groping and painful reorientation. I hope that the start we have made in working out a re-statement and a re-direction of activities within Division of Emigre Relations will provide a program of positive projects which will supply ammunition for psychological warfare, both behind the Iron Curtain and in the Free World. Such a program will call for an efficient administrator versed in exile affairs -- a position for which Mr. Yarrow is well qualified. Under the political leadership of a person of Mr. Davis' caliber, for direct dealings with emigres, I feel that the Division of Emigre Relations will be able to clear up present inefficiencies and contribute effectively to NCFE's over-all mission.

SECRET

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TONIC

SECRET
Security Information

DO/P [illegible]

30 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe, RFE, and related matters.

1. This memorandum is to inform you of a number of items which have recently come to my attention and to which I think you should give consideration and take necessary action. V. C. (Nica) Georgescu, who is an old friend and a very helpful consultant of the Agency, came to see me the other evening and discussed certain aspects of NCFE. Nica has been working on both factions of the Rumanians in an effort to bring them together, and I think that his criticism is, on the whole, constructive. He states that entirely apart from the question of factionalism among the Rumanian groups and other national groups, there is the greatest amount of inefficiency at the desk level of NCFE. This results from having too many politicians and diplomats in positions of authority and too few persons of any practical experience; too much time is consumed and too much of the general effort goes completely to waste as the result of endless political discussions, much of it entirely theoretical. It would be desirable to review the entire personnel set-up within NCFE at an early date and place in charge of the various desks individuals who are capable of administering their people and running a show. Such persons could be advised and assisted by the politicians and the diplomats, but they would have the responsibility for getting things done. Finally, Nica told me very confidentially that he thought Dolbeare, who has never been strong, was getting weaker and weaker, and he voiced some misgivings about Bernie Yarrow. He said that he does not know Yarrow at all well, but has the impression from others that Yarrow is high-handed and dictatorial in his dealings and that his background is not particularly suitable for a person who is to hold a position of so much responsibility in dealing with Southeastern European nationals.

2. I think I have already told you that Victor Riesel, the writer of the hostile pieces which you brought to my attention, complained about the treatment that he received from Finis Farr, who he said had led him to believe that he was going to be called upon for advice and assistance to the Agency. There were no follow-ups and Riesel was miffed. Riesel also singled out for sharp attack Captain Giniger, who he said he believed was in a high place in CIA and who was a thoroughly incompetent and undesirable

SECRET
Security Information

individual. He referred to Giniger as a "me, too Mick" -- whatever that means in Brooklynese. He also said that Giniger is a "pseudo-intellectual" and a "muddle-headed liberal". Lionel expressed himself as being annoyed that a person like Giniger should be used by the Agency while a person like himself should be ignored.

3. I hear that Howard Chapin is back at work but that his physical condition is not at all good and that the cause of the paralytic affect was not determined by the doctors.

4. At the Director's staff meeting this morning, he again raised the matter of our using the American Heritage Foundation for cover and possibly fund-raising purposes in connection with NCFE, CFA and the Freedom Crusade. He explained for the benefit of Mr. Dulles that the directors of the American Heritage Foundation have met recently and agreed to provide assistance to us and to make available to us their sponsorship, good name, etc. According to the Director, Mr. Sam Pryor has been primarily responsible for this decision although Winthrop Aldrich and D'Arcy Brophy were to some extent instrumental. The Executive Secretary of the Foundation, who was scheduled to visit Washington on 15 October, will be coming down sometime shortly after November 4. At that time we should be ready with concrete proposals as to the manner in which we would like to make use of the Foundation and its various assets. We would, of course, want to coordinate whatever is developed in this connection with the work that Henry Ford has undertaken to do for the Crusade this year. After some discussion it was agreed at the meeting that the American Heritage Foundation might be brought in either during the forthcoming Crusade campaign or immediately thereafter, depending upon what should appear to be most desirable. At the very least we should use the Foundation for cover purposes, since by advertising the support of this well-known organization, we would gain a very solid and substantial point of attribution as the source of funds. We might also wish to channel funds into the Crusade or directly into one or both of the two committees through the American Heritage Foundation. (This would require some straightening-out with the Treasury Department authorities to guarantee against any subsequent investigation.) Finally, the Crusade might be conducted in future years under the bannerhead of and in the name of the American Heritage Foundation. The big shots in the Foundation would not want to work at fund-raising themselves, and they have been assured that we would not ask them to do so. It would be up to us to provide the nuts and bolts of the effort.

cc: C/PP

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

29 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. THOMAS W. BRADEN
International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Change of name of Baltic Panels

With reference to your memorandum of October 15, 1952 concerning the desire of the Baltic Panels to change their names to the Committee for Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively, I wish to inform you that the Department perceives no reason to oppose such a change.

It is suggested however, that NCFE insist that the new names for the Baltic Panels be precisely those mentioned in your memorandum of October 15. It is our feeling that if the panels were to be called National Committees, for example, confusion might arise with respect to other organizations from these countries already in existence and the impression might be created that the committees are of greater political significance than we wish them to be.

ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: C/IO

NO. 10/2379

DATE 29 Oct 52

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. CPP		8 NOV 1952	Nov	CMB	As a matter of incidental info, Drew Pearson gave a big plug for contributions to the Crusade on his TV program last night (Nov. 9) a.c.u
2. DD/P			13 Nov	JBW	
3. C-IO				JWB	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

SECRET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECURITY INFORMATION

29 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. While in Detroit yesterday, I talked with Charles Moore, who is the Director of Public Relations for Ford Motor Company, and also with Henry Ford. I was merely paying a friendly call on Moore but he raised the matter of the Crusade and asked Mr. Ford to come in and talk about it. They are both very unhappy with Mr. Walsh, who is Admiral Miller's man on the Crusade and whom Miller secured from the State Department, and I also gathered the general impression of dissatisfaction with Miller and his whole effort -- "If we had known what kind of an outfit we were working with, we wouldn't have taken it over." On the other hand, both Mr. Ford and Moore said that they were "going ahead full steam and intended to see the job through to the best of their ability".

2. I think there is no action to be taken here and merely pass this on for your information, but it does bring to mind again what I think is growing evidence that the Crusade is more trouble than it is worth.

3. I think this ought to be the last Crusade for Freedom and that we ought to give thought to alternatives. We are now taking steps to take the Committee for Free Asia out of the Crusade next year, substituting a permanent fund-raising office in San Francisco, token donations from three Agency foundations, and making a serious attempt to obtain some money from Asian groups and contacts. Some other cover is obviously needed and we are thinking in terms of the American Heritage Foundation or other possibilities that may occur. We should take similar steps for the National Committee for a Free Europe.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, EE DIVISION
CHIEF, SE DIVISION
CHIEF, IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: Attempts of persons outside the Agency to influence Agency and State Department policy with respect to National Committee for a Free Europe

1. I have had reports from several sources that persons outside the Agency and outside the State Department have attempted to influence Agency operations and State Department policy in respect to the National Committee for a Free Europe. Two of these persons, it is reported, are Carmel Offie and Maynard Barnes.

2. To the extent that Messrs. Offie and Barnes are aware of our continuing relations with NCFE, their awareness constitutes a danger to our successful conduct of the operation. I therefore ask you and members of your Division to refrain from any contact with these gentlemen or with others who, by virtue of their suspicions or knowledge but without any official capacity whatever, are attempting to grind their personal axes through the National Committee for a Free Europe.

Not used

3. I have also had reports from several sources that members of this Agency who happen to hold strong personal views on the conduct of exile activities by NCFE have, in their direct relations with the exiles, encouraged the exiles to oppose NCFE decisions and policies. Please transmit to your respective staffs my strong aversion to this kind of in-fighting. I call your attention to the agreement signed by myself and Mr. George Kennan of the State Department on 18 February 1949, which reads in part:

> "Exiles and refugees will be referred to the New York Committee for all matters of an operational nature, including the provision of support and facilities for themselves and their activities."

The same memorandum states that "Certain operational activities will not properly fall within the province of the New York Committee" and reserves these activities to this Agency, but these reserved operational activities were clearly not intended to embrace the encouragement of the exiles to fight off decisions made by the Committee as to "the provision of support and facilities for themselves and their activities".

4. ~~Please also convey to members of your staff that I shall not tolerate further violations of the established policy set forth above.~~

5. If there is any basis whatever for these reports, I am sure that you will all agree that we should resolve our differences within the agency.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

see covering memo
+ page 2 in
Chrono 21 Oct

Analysis of Memorandum by Mr. Creighton Scott

The following memorandum, I believe, discusses most of the points raised by Mr. Scott.

1. Scripts prepared in Munich are almost never read by Americans before broadcast although the general content of each broadcast is agreed upon in programming conferences between the American and exile staffs. The reasons why the broadcasts are not read by Americans before they go on the air are as follows:

a. Because the natural inclination of Americans is to change the broadcasts, and such changes, RFE officials feel, are likely to lessen the "genuine" quality of exile broadcasts for the listeners.

b. Because the exiles feel themselves to be patriots working for their countries, and the submission of scripts to Americans before they are broadcast would be regarded by the exiles as casting doubt upon their allegiance and fervor.

The American staff believes that it can exercise policy control by suggestions during program discussions rather than by making deletions and corrections in the scripts themselves.

2. During my trip to Europe in June, I asked Mr. W. E. Griffith, Political Advisor for RFE, to institute the service of regularly translating the most sensitive RFE broadcasts after the fact. He has complied with this request and CIA now receives English translations of Munich scripts within a month after broadcast. CIA also receives an immediate teletype summary of all Munich broadcasts, as well as a weekly consolidated summary of all broadcasts. To provide for immediate English translation of all RFE programs after the fact would require an enormous staff of translators.

3. No doubt RFE has made the mistakes Mr. Scott mentions in connection with the items about the weakness of the Iron Curtain and the ease of crossing it, and the Czechoslovakian currency devaluation. On the first point, Mr. Scott's dates are in error, for RFE did not go on the air until July 4, 1950. Assuming that he means that such broadcasts were made from that date until April 1951, it should be noted that this was the very beginning of RFE when all of its broadcasts originated in New York. Such broadcasts certainly are not being continued. I assume they were the result of inexperience. The

14-00000

will be discontinued when HICOG goes out of existence, and they should not be reestablished. You will remember that at the hearings which considered NCFE's 1953 budget, the officials of NCFE asked for $500,000 to cover the expected loss of such privileges and because we felt that this was unjustified, we asked and were granted the right to retain this money in the CIA reserve pending further justification.

5. Mr. Scott's complaint that the Information Service of RFE has been too expensive and naive is probably correct. In part this is the result of CIA's inability, for justifiable security reasons, to make information on a large scale available to RFE. However, the Information Service is being reorganized. There is reason to believe that excellent professional newsmen, such as Russell Hill and Ed Chamberlayne will provide the competence necessary for an increase in efficiency.

6. In sum, Mr. Scott's criticisms and complaints seem a mixture of fact and fiction animated by a personal antagonism. His is but one of a number of such attacks by former employees. Our own approach to Radio Free Europe should be not so much an assessment of past success and failures, as an examination of future opportunities. A powerful instrument has been created, in the main successfully, in an incredibly short time. Where it goes from here, giving due consideration to criticism such as Scott's, seems to us to be our priority task.

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

27 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: President's Committee on Immigration and Naturalization

1. The attached memorandum, greatly modified in form by the General Counsel of NCFE, is to be presented tomorrow afternoon at an open hearing of the President's Committee which is conducting hearings on the McCarran Bill.

2. I was informed of this proposed presentation on Friday afternoon, October 17. I obtained the attached from Mr. Greenlea, NCFE General Counsel, today. NCFE does not know that Mr. Greenlea has been in touch with us and should not know.

3. I suggest that you review, with Mr. Wisnor, whether NCFE should make such a presentation. In essence, the presentation is an attack on the McCarran Bill. I suggest that, perhaps, NCFE should not testify for two reasons:

a. This is close to a clear example of a tax exempt charitable organization, attempting to influence legislation and;

b. The political implications are liable to be an embarrassment for CIA.

4. Apparently, NCFE is making this presentation in the hopes of receiving wide publicity so they will be in a position to say to the emigrees with whom they deal, "look what we are trying to do for you."

5. I urge your rapid concern, for the presentation is due to be made tomorrow afternoon.

William P. Durkee
WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TONIC

SECRET

The National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., was formed in 1949 when a group of private citizens joined together for positive action against Soviet enslavement. It concentrates its efforts on the 100 million Central and Eastern Europeans today living under inhuman conditions of force and fear. This tyranny, imposed by Soviet Russia in flagrant violation of her solemn guarantees, precludes the enduring world peace desired by free men everywhere. The National Committee for a Free Europe is the American peoples' answer to the Kremlin's despotic rule.

The Committee seeks:

(1) To pierce the Iron Curtain with messages of moral and practical value through the facilities of Radio Free Europe, thus taking the fight to the enemies' camp;

(2) To build for the future by educating young refugees from Communism through the Mid-European Studies Center here in the United States, and the Free European University in Exile in Strasbourg, France. In this manner we attempt to preserve the cultural heritage of the past which the enemy seeks to destroy;

(3) To develop political unity and a dynamic platform of aims and principles among the exile groups through the Division of Exile Relations;

(4) To assemble, analyze and distribute knowledge about current conditions in the captive area;

(5) To create active public support, both moral and material, for these activities.

Vital to the work and well being of the National Committee for a Free Europe are its approximately two thousand alien associates. 60 percent of these aliens are in Europe, with the rest residing either temporarily or permanently in the United States. At the present time over one hundred of these aliens residing here face imminent deportation.

It might be inserted parenthetically at this point that all of these aliens presently facing deportation have attempted to remain within the spirit and the letter of the law, but because of the absurdities of the law have been forced into the position of being wilful violators of it. We do not speak, either now or at any point in this discussion, about evadors of, or fugitives from, justice, but shall only refer to individuals of good faith, attempting to the best of their ability to conform to the rules and regulations of the country which they believe, often mistakenly, to be the refuge of the afflicted. Out

At various times during the history of our organization it has been necessary for the National Committee or its subsidiaries to ask certain aliens with particular talents to come to the United States on extremely short notice. Then They were, ~~of course,~~ admitted as visitors. After They ~~these aliens~~ had arrived in the United States, the aliens ~~they~~ were immediately faced with the problem of attempting in some manner to ~~regularise~~ their status here from visitor to permanent so that trips back and forth from Europe for visa renewal purposes would not be necessitated. Under the present immigration law the only possibility of accomplishing this ~~obtaining such regularization was~~ is by having

change

the alien apply at an American Consulate in Canada, await the issuance of a visa number, and then having the alien personally pick up the visa at the appropriate consulate. This procedure usually took from a year to 18 months. But new method this ~~mode of regularization~~ will cease under the new law, since aliens will not be admitted into the United States from Canada without having first completed certain residential requirements there.

[The only manner of safeguarding the residence of an alien visitor in the United States at present is to attempt to get unlimited extensions of his visitor's visa. This is of course impossible.] The alien finds himself, therefore, in the position of being deportable to the country from which he came, and in most cases after having stayed in the United States for over a year, the respective governments will refuse him permission to return. In the end the alien finds himself in a position worse than the one which he enjoyed while residing in a Displaced Persons camp in Germany.

Under the present law it is impossible to safeguard the residence in the U.S. of an alien here on a visitor visa; unlimited extensions are unprocurable

Students supported by our Mid-European Studies Center find themselves in an even more embarrassing position. They are allowed to come to the United States as students providing their re-entry permits to the countries from which they come are still valid. Any student who comes to take advantage of our scholarships comes for at least a period of from two to four years and is therefore unable to maintain his residence abroad and keep his scholarship at the same time. They soon arrive at the point where they cannot return to Europe, cannot continue their studies here, and are constantly harrassed by officers of the Immigration Service.

(Those students studying at our Free Europe University in Exile in Strasbourg cannot come to the United States to continue their studies at graduate schools here, because most of them are chargeable ~~to~~ heavily oversubscribed quotas. [illegible]

Our work here in the National Committee for a Free Europe is essentially psychological. Our associates in Radio Free Europe, the Division of Exile Relations, etc., cannot do efficient, effective or productive work without constant fear of imminent [illegible] ~~when they are constantly being~~ harrassed by officials ~~of the Immigration Service~~. ~~When their stay in the United States is on a day to day basis~~ [illegible] They cannot devote their full energies to the work for which they came to this country. ~~While it is true that~~ Most of them intend to return to the country of their origin when Communist domination is overthrown there, but until then they must have some assurance that they can remain peacefully here ~~until that moment~~. Therefore, it would seem appropriate that ~~some~~ provision be made in the immigration laws that ~~students~~ and ~~temporary~~ visitors in the United States fitting these categories be allowed to adjust their status to that of temporary, if not permanent, residence in the United States.

~~Another aspect of the law which should be considered is the fact that~~ Many of the exile leaders of various Iron Curtain countries were admiss~~able~~ ible to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 as amended. However, when asked by the Immigration authorities whether they intended to remain in the United States temporarily or permanently, they answered in all honesty that they intended to remain here only until their own countries had been liberated from the yoke of Communist tyranny. ~~Of course~~ Thus, by their own admission they were ~~therefore~~ automatically barred from adjusting their status from that of temporary visitor to permanent resident. ~~In the case of~~ Our student associates,

[illegible]

~~they~~ are obliged by the Committee as a requisite to receiving a scholarship, to sign a statement agreeing to return to the country of their origin when liberation comes so that their training will be of direct help in the cause of building a free world. It is indeed unfortunate that ~~both~~ neither the present law ~~and~~ nor the forthcoming one makes ~~no~~ any provision for political refugees except in the case of those individuals who are admitted to the United States under diplomatic standing and subsequently ~~left~~ leave the service of their government. [illegible] ?

At the present moment individuals awaiting adjustment under this particular section of the D.P. law are in an extremely precarious position. All of them have a lifetime of political activity behind them, and therefore the administrative delay in processing their applications, completing investigations, etc., has been interminable. Now, most of them are receiving notices from the Department of Justice stating that since their applications have not been processed within the time limit, they are now eligible for deportation proceedings which will be effected forthwith.

~~Both~~ Neither the present ~~and~~ nor the future immigration laws make ~~no~~ provision for administrative discretion in the enforcement of the deportation laws. Should the local commissioner be allowed to use his discretionary powers in the matter of deporting individuals such as those discussed, the problem [illegible] in great part would be ~~cleared up.~~ [illegible]

The national quotas system is completely out of accord with present worldwide conditions. Almost all of the Iron Curtain countries, with the possible exceptions of Czechoslovakia and Poland, have annual

[illegible] immigration are we going for this?

Do we want to [illegible] immigrants?

[illegible]

quotas of only 100, and these quotas are almost all oversubscribed to the year 2000. Should the mortgages laid on these quotas by the Displaced Persons Act be removed, or if Hungarians, for example, were able to borrow from the British quota, we should be able to bring to the United States many aliens possessing particular skills whose services are urgently needed by this organization. Many of our aliens are highly skilled technical, professional, medical or scientific men whose training, experience and ability would most certainly be prospectively beneficial to the United States.

It is because of the heavily oversubscribed condition of the quotas of Hungary, Bulgaria, etc., that most of the applications for visas, made as long as two years ago in American Consulates in Canada, are being returned unprocessed, with the notation that no action can be taken on their application due to the imminent approach of the effective date of the new law.

Neither the present law, nor the new law makes proper provision for Displaced Persons who are bona fide visitors to the United States. None of these people have passports from their own countries, since all of them have rejected the political party presently holding sway there. As a result they are traveling on French, German, or other free country affidavits of identity or travel documents. Before a visa can be extended under the law, the travel documents and re-entry permits must be valid for a period of sixty days beyond the date of application. These countries will not extend these documents since the bearers are not nationals of the issuing country. This, in effect, means that these visitors can only remain for a period of from six to nine months, and then must return to Europe, oftentimes without being able to complete the work for which they came.

Finally, it would seem that some provision could be made for the rapid processing of the visas of both prospective immigrants and prospective visitors so that in case of necessity an alien can be brought quickly to the United States without the usual two year delay.

Generally speaking, if some drastic changes are not made in the Immigration laws at the earliest possible moment, we can foresee the virtual disbanding the National Councils Division of this organization, and a serious curtailment of the quality of the broadcasts from Radio Free Europe~~, and, although it is not à propos to the present matter, we should like to point out that~~ [illegible] these broadcasts are making a terrific impact behind the Iron Curtain. One has only to read the virulent attacks against our organization printed in the Communist press all over the world to be assured of their effectiveness. The propaganda value to the Communist cause of the mass deportations now being planned of these well-known exiles is of course immeasurable.

When Public Law 414 was being debated in the Congress, it was submitted that the present Immigration and Nationality Act was one riddled with inconsistencies and completely engulfed in "red tape." We respectfully submit that the forthcoming law is full of even more inconsistencies, is completely unaware of present world conditions, will in effect stop all immigration except from those countries which are socially acceptable, and will create an impassible labyrinth of restrictive red tape.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible]

23 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Maynard Barnes and Carmel Offie

1. In conversation the other day you asked me through what channel Maynard Barnes and Carmel Offie were stating their opinions on the matter of NCFE's request to move the administrative headquarters of the exile countries from Washington to New York, and who was listening to Barnes and Offie.

2. The channel seems to be the Southeastern European Division and in particular Colonel Yatsevitch, SE/CPP. The Southeastern European Division maintains an extremely skeptical view of NCFE activities in the exile field and has gone to considerable trouble, through exiles as well as through Barnes and Offie, to create the greatest possible objection not only to the recent move of the exiles but to NCFE in general. I am attaching an article by Edgar A. Mowrer which was written at the behest of Mr. Offie and was originally intended to be the first of a series. We have been successful in having the series idea dropped.

3. While I believe that there is some justification in the points the SE Division continually makes about the exile record of the New York Committee, I think the inter-governmental squabble which is aroused by the Division's repeated attempts to use exiles, members of the State Department, and others as a sounding board for its own lack of sympathy with NCFE makes it difficult for the National Committee to fulfill its charter and for CIA to control day-to-day operations without interference from the State Department and others from outside the Agency.

4. I suggest that you send the attached memorandum to the Chiefs of EE, SE and IO. It is worded in such a manner that it will not reveal this reference.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments
1. Mowrer article.
2. Suggested memo.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

orig to Durkee

13 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

FROM : Chief, ROM/OIS

SUBJECT : Exchange of Intelligence Information between the NCFE and the DD/P Offices

1. The National Committee for a Free Europe is the reservoir of a great wealth of intelligence information, particularly in the field of psychological warfare. A four-day survey of the NCFE conducted by an OIS case officer indicated that three NCFE components - the Research and Publications Service, the Mid-European Studies Center, and the Radio Free Europe - can make a very valuable contribution to the operational intelligence required by the DD/P offices.

2. It is the purpose of this memorandum to suggest a procedure for the most effective use of the NCFE intelligence potential. The most practical approach seems to be as follows:

a. At this time it does not appear necessary to establish a continuous flow of raw and finished intelligence from the NCFE to the DD/P offices. Rather, we would like to use NCFE facilities whenever individual cases indicate that such action is advisable.

b. We would like to maintain a direct relationship with the NCFE for the purpose of enlisting its support in the work on our individual cases. When the nature of the case indicates that the NCFE can make a valuable contribution to it, we could make arrangements through the Chief of IO/TONIC, to make direct contact with one of the security-cleared NCFE officers. A permanently-designated OIS case officer (A. Snatton and/or H. Knoepfmacher) would then proceed to New York to discuss the substantive research problems in the NCFE and reach an agreement on the scope of NCFE support.

3. It is recognized that the final authority on all contacts with the NCFE rests with the Chief of IO/TONIC, and that the latter may direct and limit such contacts whenever he desires.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

4. We suggest that, for the purpose of meeting security requirements, the two OIS case officers assigned to NCFE liaison be given permanent cover which would be arranged by the NCFE Personnel Officer and the Chief of IO/TONIC.

5. It is recognized that the relationship between RQM/OIS and the NCFE must be based on mutual exchange of information. We are, therefore, prepared to provide such intelligence research support to the NCFE as may be given within security limits and our manhour capabilities. The requests for intelligence support from the NCFE would be channeled to RQM/OIS through the Chief of IO/TONIC.

6. Our proposals contained in this memorandum have been discussed with the Chief of IO/TONIC and an understanding has been reached on all points covered. It is requested that the suggested procedure be approved.

[illegible]

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P. 807

OCT 10 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/FI

FROM : C/RQM/FI

SUBJECT : Survey of the National Committee for a Free Europe

1. This memorandum serves to inform you of a four-day survey made of the National Committee for a Free Europe by Alexander Shatton of RQM/OIS. The survey has uncovered a great wealth of information, contained both in raw files and finished reports, which is of operational intelligence interest. We are now making arrangements, through the IO Division, for continuing access to the NCFE files and for direct liaison with the NCFE Staff.

2. In the course of his conversation with Shatton, the President of the NCFE (Admiral Harold Miller) expressed concern over the fact that he had not been notified of Shatton's arrival and stated that he does not look with favor at CIA individuals working in the NCFE without his knowledge. Although Shatton informed him that his visit had been cleared with the IO Division, Admiral Miller remained somewhat unconvinced that the arrangements had properly been made. I suggest that this misunderstanding be brought to the attention of the DD/P, so that he may be informed of the facts in the event the matter is brought up by Admiral Miller in his contacts with the DCI and the DDCI.

3. Mr. Shatton's visit to the NCFE headquarters took place on 16, 17, 18 and 19 September.

SECRET
Security Information

ODP 72

Awy 8 Oct: [illegible]
~ x TWB

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

4 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division, P & P Staff

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe's Request for Funds to Build a Gymnasium at the Free University-in-Exile; Reclamer of Admiral Miller.

1. I believe that I told Mr. Braden last evening of the telephone call which I had received from Admiral Miller and of what I had said in response to his request for funds to build the gymnasium. I want to make it clear that I offered him no specific encouragement, and confined my remarks to a statement that if he wished to draw up a proper application we would study it very carefully. I told him that this seemed to us an unnecessary expense and one which I would find difficult to defend with the Director in light of our present economy drive.

2. I should greatly appreciate a thorough staff job being done on this matter to relieve me of the necessity of thinking up all of the arguments pro and con, especially the latter. Will someone please dig up in the Congressional Records the speeches made during the last session of Congress in condemnation of the State Department's lavish approach to the educational and cultural exchange program? If we were ever forced to defend this Free University program, I think we would be extremely vulnerable on the score of having spent $50,000 for a gymnasium or anything like it. This is the icing on the cake and has the sound of being definitely in the luxury category. There is also the very questionable wisdom of our spending additional money on "permanent plant", when we cannot be sure how long we will be able to continue our support of this enterprise, nor for that matter how long the present flow of student material will continue.

3. Please -- let us sharpen up our thinking and our pencils as well. In the final analysis I shall probably have to veto this proposition, and will certainly do so unless it is much more convincingly supported than heretofore. However, I would like some help on this.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

1 Oit rec'd

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: NCFE-SE Division Conference on Rumanian Refugee Situation

REFERENCE: Memo to Chief, IOD, Subject: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organisation, dated 12 September 1952.

1. It is requested that the referenced memorandum be forwarded to the NCFE for study prior to the conference (ref, para. 8) between NCFE representatives and personnel of this Division.

2. Due to the importance of the negotiations with the Rumanians, no action should be taken on the plan outlined in the memorandum until after the conference is held. The Division representative to be assigned on TDY in New York (ref, para. 7) will be designated prior to the conference.

3. We have been informed that Mr. Visoianu has not received an acknowledgment of his letter and proposal. It is suggested that the NCFE write Mr. Visoianu, expressing appreciation for his communication, and inform him that the NCFE has been studying various proposals and hopes that within the next few weeks further discussions can be arranged.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

25 Sept. 52

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Request for Budget Revision for NCFE

REFERENCE: Memo to DD/A and DD/P from Comptroller 13 Sept. 52

1. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the subject memorandum requesting a budget revision for NCFE are explained in the supporting data attached to that memorandum. Items totaling $78,343 to be released from the reserve held by CIA, summarized in those paragraphs, are for material support of substantive operations already approved. Release of these items to NCFE is concurred in by International Organisations Division. It is recommended that the sum of $78,343 be released to NCFE.

2. The item in paragraph 3, i.e. $60,000 for nine months' operating expenses from July 1952 through March 1953 for the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, Paris, is concurred in by the IO Division. The reason for its concurrence is as follows:

a. Support in the amount of $71,000 for the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile through NCFE was undertaken by a memorandum for the DD/P dated 1 September 1951, Lewis S. Thompson, Chief, Special Projects, OPC.

b. In early June 1952, the matter of continuing support for the ICFTU in Exile was reviewed by the DDCI, Admiral Miller and Mr. Braden. It was decided that the ICFTU in Exile would continue to be subsidised in the amount of $60,000 for a nine months' period, running from July 1952 through March 1953.

3. A cable, IN-34233, from Mr. Braden indicates the Chief of the Paris Station and Mr. Braden have discussed the possibility of ending relations with the ICFTU in Exile. Mr. Braden indicates he wishes to take up this matter with the DDCI on his return.

4. It is therefore recommended that the sum of $60,000 be released to NCFE to enable them to continue payments as already agreed. If the support for the ICFTU in Exile should be terminated, funds remaining in NCFE's hands can be applied to other proposed activities now held for justification by CIA.

GERALD E. MILLER
Chief
Political and Psychological Warfare

Attachments
Reference memo with
attachments.

IO/TONIC:WPD:jp/eh
(24 Sept 52)

Distribution
Orig & 1 - Addressee
IO/TONIC - 2 cc
CIO - 1 cc
RI - 1 cc

[illegible] 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Library of Congress Eastern European Accessions

REFERENCE: Fund Memorandum No. 513, 2 September 1952

1. SE Division has noted with interest that effective August 20, 1952, the Washington research staff of the NCFE will begin processing books and publications received from the Iron Curtain countries by the Library of Congress. These accessions represent a very valuable source of information which this Division is presently unable to exploit, since we have no personnel with the language qualifications required to review all that is received for our specific interests.

2. Referenced memorandum indicates that the NCFE has arranged to microfilm portions of given books containing items of propaganda or informational value. One copy of the print will be mailed to the New York research desks, while the original microfilm will be sent by pouch to Munich, presumably for RFE. This Division requests that an additional copy of the print be obtained on a continuing basis by IO for further analysis by the interested Area Divisions and for pouching to our field stations which have indicated a specific interest in this material. It is suggested that the copy be broken down into sections corresponding to the Area Divisions interested in order that this material may receive immediate attention by the appropriate Area Division.

3. SE Division would appreciate receiving your comments regarding this request since we are anxious to utilize this material as soon as possible and wish to make other arrangements if these suggestions are found impractical.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

Copy to EE

SECRET
Security [illegible]

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

24 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT: Assignment of Mobile Radio Facility (MB-50)

1. According to Messrs. Rowland and Emmons Brown arrangements have been made to utilize the MB-50 in Germany.

2. The completion of the transaction is awaiting a test that is being undertaken by outside engineers through General McClelland. This test, I am told, is necessitated by the fact that there is not available a complete specification of the equipment.

3. It is estimated by Mr. Brown that the test will be completed in a few weeks.

/s/
C. LLOYD EGNER
Acting Chief
Pyschological Staff Division

PP/CPY:CLE:tms

Distribution:
Addressee - original & 1
Mr. Rowland - 1
✓Mr. Brown, IO - 1
~~[illegible] - 1~~
CPY - 1
PY/[illegible] - 1
subject file
~~[illegible]~~ - 1
RI - 1

SECRET

Subj file

17 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: Mr. W. P. Durkee, Chief, IO/TOMIC

SUBJECT: Refugee Stipendiaries of NCFE

REFERENCE: Secret Memo dtd 12 August 1952 from Chief, IO/TOMIC, to Chief, SE; Subject: List of Stipendiaries of NCFE.

1. In compliance with your request of 12 August, the referenced memorandum was circulated to the various interested branches of SE Division. Of the thirteen Rumanians listed as stipendiaries of NCFE, only one, Mr. Brutus Coste, is on the payroll of SE Division. However, it has been our understanding that Mr. Coste has received no stipend since December, 1951. We would appreciate a further check on the status of Mr. Coste with respect to his reported stipend. No other duplications were reported.

2. It is requested that in addition to the referenced list of stipendiaries, IO Division obtain from the NCFE and RFE a list of all refugee employees from within the SE area (Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia) who may be employed in any capacity, with their salaries and job titles. Such information has not been available to the interested branches in the past, but experience has shown that the availability of this data on a current basis would be most helpful to the responsible case officers.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

PP:CACrane:bar

Distribution:
Addressee - Orig & 1
SE/PP - 2
RI - 2

SECRET
[illegible]

12 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, PSYCHOLOGICAL STAFF DIVISION

ATTENTION: Mr. E. J. Harrison, PY Evaluation

SUBJECT: IPTONIC Use of PY Guidance Papers

1. In discussing this subject, the following facts of TONIC operations should be kept in view:

a. TONIC prepares its own daily guidance papers, written by a special staff which has at its disposal a European-wide news-gathering apparatus.

b. State Department overnight policy guidances are regularly delivered to TONIC on the day of issue.

2. Guidance papers from PY are dispatched as soon as they are received. For instance, Special Guidance on Bacteriological Warfare, dated August 7, 1952, and Weekly Propaganda Guidance No. 9, dated August 8, 1952, were sent on August 11.

3. The value of PY guidance papers for IPTONIC was taken up with TONIC officials last May. Their observations are contained in the following quotations from their letters to this Division:

a. The Chief Programming Official wrote:

"We have received several of these papers in the past couple of months. They are extremely useful for the following reasons:

a. They set forth clearly U. S. policy on one issue or another;

b. They occasionally report thinking in quarters from which we hear nothing directly;

c. They usually contain pertinent quotations of expression of views by the enemy which we can make use of (both published and other sources, such as interrogatories);

SECRET

d. They permit us to learn what lines are being laid down for propaganda addressed to other audiences than ours (other than central and eastern Europe).

"On the other hand, when these papers deal with our targets, they sometimes reveal a sharp divergence from our thinking and our points of view. Where this is owing to the fact that they have in mind black, while we deal in white, the difference can be legitimate. But even so, we find proposals that seem to us illogical, and now and then extremely unwise."

b. The President of the organisation wrote:

"You enclosed a paper giving additional guidance material for propaganda countering Communist BW charges. All the lines therein suggested have been successively used by us since February 25 or thereabouts when the topic first arose.

"Papers of this kind are of great use, provided they arrive promptly. By promptly is meant, either in anticipation of an event, or an expression of views on the day the event occurs."

c. The Deputy Director, Radio, wrote:

"With regard to the paper (Prop-103, dated 28 March 1952) that you enclosed, I checked Bob's department and they advise that from the beginning we have made the points specified in 6(a)3 and 5, 6(b)2, 9(a)1 and 2, 9(d), 9(e), 10.

"As a matter of information, to our particular audiences we may, instead of 6(b)1, that the Soviet Union is trying to persuade the leaders of German heavy industry, militarists, and ex-Nazis to go into partnership with it; and instead of 6(c) that the prohibition of alliances is fraudulent, Moscow intending, as in August 1939, to ally itself with a reactionary Germany against our peoples. Again to our audiences, we say instead of 9(a)2 that the German problem can be solved, and that the Western powers are attempting to solve it in the interest of the security of our audiences. We are glad to see that our line parallels that laid down in 9(d) and (e)."

4. A fair summary of the use of PY guidance papers for RFE is as follows:

a. They are useful insofar as they contain ideas that have not occurred to TONIC's own people or in reference to events that are not a matter of public knowledge.

b. In most cases the guidance papers arrive so late that TONIC is already engaged in treating the next stage in the development of the propaganda theme suggested.

c. As PY guidance papers, therefore, are at the moment another contribution to the thinking of TONIC officials, it is not possible to point to specific uses of the material suggested.

d. To be most useful, propaganda guidance from PY should treat the development of special themes that have a specific relation to precise U. S. Government operations and objectives aside from general U. S. foreign policy goals. To be most useful to RFE, such guidance should be developed over a period of time in anticipation of the actual facts or operations making up such programs.

EMMONS BROWN
Acting Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/TONIC:WPD/eg

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - PI

12 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization

REFERENCE: Memorandum to Chief, IO Division, Subject: SE Division Plan for Rumanian Emigre Organization, dated 28 May 1952

1. In view of the considerable length of time since NCFE opened negotiations for Rumanian refugee unity and subsequent developments, a reappraisal of the situation and a delineation of final action are required.

2. It is evident that expression of NCFE interest in the Council of Political Parties (actually it has been directed primarily toward the National Peasant Party) has had the desired effect on the two refugee groups in the United States, by raising the specter of a third force developing and being recognized by the Americans. It has also made the King aware of the seriousness with which the Americans regard the division between the two groups. Further, it has incited the Iron Guard to adopt a "democratic" facade in the hope, perhaps, of fitting eventually into the resulting organization. However, in spite of the success of the maneuver, further encouragement of the CoPP and the NPP could well prove dangerous to our overall objective of unifying the refugees, by adding fuel to their differences.

3. Careful consideration has been given to the various worthwhile proposals and counter proposals which were advanced in the course of the recent discussions. It is hoped, in this connection, that the NCFE has made it entirely clear to all the participants that this series of discussions was undertaken purely to explore the possibilities for agreement in concert with the refugees themselves, and that after hearing all sides of the question, the NCFE will present for their consideration a "package" proposal, on the basis of which final agreement should be reached. It is believed that the revision of the original plan, set forth below and embodying certain features which have developed in the course of the last three months, can provide a solution acceptable both to this organization and to the refugees. Operational considerations, the desirability of maintaining a reasonable degree of control, the necessity for taking into account the refugee concept of democratic procedures, as well as the firm stand on size taken by the Rumanian National Committee, these are all important factors affecting the problem. The final organization should be small enough to control, sufficiently selective to attract prominent exiles, inclusive enough to contain the rank and file, and of an optimum size to carry out its functions effectively.

4. An organizational form of a large passive Council, to which all Rumanians who meet certain qualifications could belong, but with all action vested in a small Executive Committee, offers a practical way to satisfy both U. S. and refugee requirements. The name of this overall organization should be the "Rumanian National Committee" since this would provide a sense of continuity and would facilitate acceptance of the proposal by Visoianu and the King. It would be formed by an expansion of the present Rumanian National Committee into the Executive Committee of approximately twenty persons. Membership in the Council would be extended to the rank and file by means of letters announcing the new organization and inviting participation. The "Council" of the Rumanian National Committee would include members from all countries and would not meet in session. Radescu should be designated honorary president of the Council. The Executive Committee would be the functional unit of the organization. It would appoint sub-commissions and groups to perform the work of the Committee and designate representatives of the Rumanian National Committee at various refugee centers in Europe, South America, and the Near East. A membership card would be issued to all who affiliate with the Council. Members of extremist groups would be excluded in principle from membership in the Rumanian National Committee, except in certain cases passed upon by the Committee and accepted by us. A newspaper would be published and distributed in liberal quantities.

5. The Executive Committee headquarters would be in New York City and work in conjunction with the NCFE and representatives of CIA. It is recommended that the position of chairman of the Executive Committee be held for a term of one year, elective by members of this committee only. Its members should be:

Constantin Visoianu, Chairman

Gheorghe Assan
Cornel Bianu
Vintila Bratianu
Nicolae Caranfil
Edmond Ciuntu
Brutus Coste
Alexandru Cretzianu
Anton Crihan
Carlos Davila
Mihail Farcasanu
Grigore Gafencu
Emil Ghilezan
Mircea Ionnitiu
Augustin Popa
Iancu Zissu

6. As the first step in achieving the organization outlined ~~above~~, it is suggested that the NCFE reply to Visoianu's memo expressing appreciation and inviting him to a discussion of his proposal. At this meeting, the NCFE should present the ideas outlined in paragraph 4 as the American view of the compromise which, after careful study, appears to offer the best possible solution. In the discussion, the NCFE should indicate that this plan is the result of much thought by interested groups after discussions with many refugees, that it has attempted to aid the refugees because of its interest in them and their country's welfare, and that it is prepared to support a Rumanian refugee organization in a number of ways. Visoianu should be invited to recommend the people whom he considers desirable for the Executive Committee. He will have been briefed by CIA prior to the meeting and will propose the same list generally as that in paragraph 5. The NCFE should then request Visoianu's cooperation and active participation in forming an organization along the lines suggested in paragraphs 4 and 5. It will suggest that Visoianu, Pope and Crihan work with Gafencu, Ghilezan and Coste for this purpose. Each of these gentlemen should be approached by CIA and NCFE prior to the opening contact meeting of the group. If any substitutions are made in the participants, CIA should be consulted prior to the time arrangements are completed. After this group has worked out details of the organization and consulted with the others suggested for the Executive Committee, the NCFE will issue invitations to a general meeting of this Committee and will assist in getting the other organisational details underway. Sub-commissions should be established immediately, using the refugees who have been participating in the recent NCFE discussions. Arrangements will be made for Visoianu and Gafencu and an additional delegation to be named later, to go to England to inform the King of the agreements reached and the details of the new organization.

7. During this phase of activity, it is recommended that someone from this Division be assigned on TDY in New York to work closely with the NCFE and advise on any necessary changes. CIA will contact certain refugees to ensure their cooperation prior to the initiation of this phase of activity.

8. This plan has been coordinated with the Department of State. It is requested that the details be forwarded to the NCFE and a meeting arranged to discuss the implementation.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SECRET
Security Information

11 September 1952.

MEMORANDUM FOR: the Record ~~DEPUTY DIRECTOR~~

SUBJECT: Conversation with Admiral H. B. Miller on Wednesday, the 10th of September.

The following is a memorandum of my conversation with Admiral Miller in New York on Wednesday, September 10th. I would like to preface this account with the observation that Admiral Miller seems to be in a highly emotional state and generally suspicious of those around him.

(1) Larry deNeufville

Admiral Miller reported his meetings with Larry deNeufville in Paris and indicated a difference in his projected use of Larry deNeufville and that envisaged by deNeufville, which Admiral Miller presumed represented CIA's interests. Miller proposes to use deNeufville as one of a three man brain trust, one of whom is Louis Gallantier and the other is still unnamed. He mentioned that he had originally considered deNeufville as an aide in administrative matters but had been informed that deNeufville was not equipped for such duties.

(2) VOA

Admiral Miller indicated that RFE was having difficulties with VOA, especially with the new Information Intelligence Unit created by the State Department, under the direction of Donald Shea, to provide information for VOA's broadcasts to the Iron Curtain countries. These difficulties included the preventing of RFE's information people from interviewing escapees.

(3) Information Service — Leland Stowe

Admiral Miller indicated that he was more than satisfied with Leland Stowe's activities, and that with the exception of RFE correspondents in London and Paris, they were satisfied with present personnel. He also stated that Russell Hill had become RFE correspondent in Germany. He further indicated that he will make every effort to keep Leland Stowe on after the expiration of the present six-month consultative contract.

SECRET
Security Information

(4) Father Morlion

Admiral Miller stated that he had conferences with Monsignor Cardini who stated that Father Morlion's information was not reliable. Admiral Miller reported that McDonald, the RFE correspondent in Rome, held the same view. Admiral Miller exhibited some suspicion of the actions of Mr. Delbeare in trying to sell him the matter of Father Morlion and Anna Brady, but stated if that was what Mr. Dulles wanted, that was all right with him.

(5) Crusade for Freedom

Admiral Miller indicated he was going to give two days a week to the Crusade for Freedom.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Acting Chief,
International Organizations Division

AC/IO:WPD/cmm

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee (via C/PP, and DD/P)
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/Tonic
2 cc - RI

National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

110 WEST 57TH STREET • NEW YORK 19, N. Y. • TELEPHONE PLAZA 7-7600

CABLE ADDRESS: NATFECOMM

September 9, 1952

Mr. Thomas Braden
2203 Foxhall Road, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Braden:

At the suggestion of Admiral Miller, I am enclosing six copies of the new Committee brochure "Weapon in the Struggle for Freedom." If you would like to have additional copies, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

S. S. Walker

Samuel S. Walker, Jr.
Director, Research and
Publications Service

SSW:bvb

SECRET
Security Information

2 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Security Procedures in the FEUE

Those present: Captain Sabalov, Dr. Tyson, Thomas Meyers, Francis Hand, Bob Cunningham, John Runney

1. The purpose of this meeting was to inform the Office of Inspection and Security of the security arrangements made in the selection of students for the Free University in Exile.

2. As a result of the discussions, an outline by Captain Sabalov of his security procedures, it was agreed:

a. That the present security practices were satisfactory and that the nature of the security problem does not call for the kind of security scrutiny necessary in Radio Free Europe.

b. That the FEUE is an excellent source of information for CIA and that in consequence Captain Sabalov will make available to this Agency:

1) A list of all applicants to the Free University with biographical data.

2) A list of all student with biographical data given general scholorship aid in Europe.

3. That no contacts by CIA with the Free University in Exile will be undertaken except by headquarters action or by field stations through Mr. Royal Tyler.

William P. Durkee

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
IO/TONIC

SECRET
Security Information

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

ER-3-2387

8 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Plans
Acting Chief, International Organizations

FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

1. Mr. Phenix when he was recently here advised me that the Board of NCFE desired to change its name from "National Committee for a Free Europe, ~~Inc.~~" to "Free Europe Committee." The purpose of this was to avoid confusion with the multitude of "national committees" for various purposes, some of them subversive.

2. This proposed change was discussed at the morning meeting with the Director and Deputies and no objection was found if the Committee really wanted to do it. I suggest that C/IO confirm this to Phenix as they want to set the legal steps in motion.

ALLEN W. DULLES

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

11 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Admiral Miller Letter about NCFE Personnel mentioned at the PRC Meeting on Friday, 8 August

1. Attached hereto is Admiral Miller's answer on behalf of NCFE to numerous requests for personnel records of NCFE in order to provide CIA with basic information about this project.

2. In view of NCFE's reticence to provide us with such basic information, Mr. Braden and I have discussed the possibility of whether we could effectively perform a liaison function here for you without such information, and we are agreed that we cannot. As you know, it is not our purpose to use this information to harrass people in New York or to quibble about salaries or details of assignments. We do think that the only way CIA can perform its responsibility toward NCFE is to keep itself fully informed in every field of NCFE's activity, and that knowing which employees are doing what is essential information.

3. You suggested at the PRC meeting on 8 August that you might be able to give us a hand in our effort to get this information.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
C/IO/TDNIC

Attachment
As stated.

IO/TDNIC:WPD/ah

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - TDNIC
2 cc - RI

see pink for attachment

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

7 August 1952

TWB

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Request While on Travel Orders

Please contact Larry d'Neufville to obtain debriefing paper of Sperling and to be present at further verbal debriefing of Sperling. Sperling will be available in Paris from the 15th of August to the 2nd of September.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
C/IO/TONIC

SECRET
Security Information

6 Aug 52

9

PRIORITY SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO REEVES FOR THOMAS BRADEN FROM LPA--SECURITY INFORMATION --CITE NY -3124

JOHN C. HUGHES RPT JOHN C. HUGHES SAYS:

"THE BULL-AUGUSTINE REPORT OF JULY 20 WAS PREPARED IN PARIS AND DISTRIBUTED BY ROYALL TYLER FROM THERE. IMMEDIATELY ON READING IT I PROPOSED A MODIFICATION OF THE NAME FOR THE PROPOSED OPERATION SO AS TO DEFINE MORE ACCURATELY ITS PURPOSE. I SUGGESTED WE CALL THE PROJECT FREE EUROPE EXILE CENTERS, AND THIS NAME WAS ACCEPTED.

"IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT EVER SINCE NCFE HAS BEEN IN ACTIVE OPERATION, INCREASING ATTENTION HAS BEEN PAID BY US TO THE PROBLEM OF THOSE REFUGEES IN WESTERN EUROPE WHO ARE NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH NCFE IS CONCERNED, AND SUBSTANTIAL SUMS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN THE HANDS OF THOSE NATIONAL COUNCILS WHICH SHOWED INITIATIVE IN THIS PARTICULAR FIELD TO ENABLE THEM TO BUILD UP THE MORALE OF THEIR HOMELESS NATIONALS. THE PRESENT REPORT AND ITS PROPOSALS LOOK TO A MORE EFFICIENT PERFORMANCE ON A SOMEWHAT LARGER SCALE OF WHAT IS ALREADY BEING DONE. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS RESULT, WE RECOMMEND EMPLOYING A SMALL AMERICAN STAFF (OF ABOUT EIGHT PEOPLE) TO SUPERVISE AND CONTROL THE ENTIRE OPERATION.

THE NCFE BUDGET FOR 1952-53 FOR WORK OF THIS CHARACTER INCLUDED APPROXIMTELY RPT APPROXIMATELY ~~$300,000~~ TO CONTINUE PREVIOUSLY

118,000

SECRET

APPROVED PROGRAMS. THE BULL-AUGUSTINE RECOMMENDATIONS SHOW THAT A MORE EFFICIENT AND SOMEWHAT MORE COMPREHENSIVE OPERATION (FOR EXAMPLE POLISH REFUGEES ARE NOW TO BE COVERED) WILL CL RPT COST ABOUT $400,000 FOR THE TEN MONTHS—SEPTEMBER THROUGH JUNE, AN INCREASE OF ONLY $100,000.

"THIS PROGRAM IS NOT A NEW ONE FOR NCFE AND IT INVOLVES NO RESETTLEMENT HOUSING OR LARGE SCALE SUBSISTENCE EXPENDITURES. IT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH OR DUPLICATE ANYTHING THAT IS NOW BEING DONE BY RPT BY OFFICIAL UNITED STATES AGENCIES NOR DOES IT INVOLVE ANY LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS. IT REPRESENTS AN EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT NCFE REALLY IS CONCERNED WITH THE MORALE OF REFUGEES REACHING WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES. WE SEE NO REASON, THEREFORE, WHY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT NEED BE CONSULTED AT THIS TIME. PLEASE DISCUSS WITH MR. DULLES RPT DULLES."

GR-351

SECRET
Security Information

5 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Project TPTONIC - Budget FY 1953

1. Returned herewith as requested are the budget data for the fiscal year 1953 received by CM in the late afternoon of 2 August 1952 for review, evaluation and specific comment.

2. Only a cursory examination of such data is possible within the time presently available. While from the information submitted it does not appear that any of the estimates shown are greatly out of line, it must be pointed out that CM does not feel that it is in a position to intelligently evaluate the proposed budget with respect to the program and operational purposes contained therein.

3. It is felt desirable, however, that sufficient detailed information pertinent to the organizational and management features of the project should be made available to CM to permit a review and examination of those aspects in conjunction with the related proposed budget provisions.

PRESTON L. SUTPHEN
Chief, Commercial Division

CM/HLS/fh

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
3 - CM
2 - RI/FI

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

5 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Project TPTONIC - Budget FY 1953

1. Returned herewith as requested are the budget data for the fiscal year 1953 received by CM in the late afternoon of 2 August 1952 for review, evaluation and specific comment.

2. Only a cursory examination of such data is possible within the time presently available. While from the information submitted it does not appear that any of the estimates shown are greatly out of line, it must be pointed out that CM does not feel that it is in a position to intelligently evaluate the proposed budget with respect to the program and operational purposes contained therein.

3. It is felt desirable, however, that sufficient detailed information pertinent to the organizational and management features of the project should be made available to CM to permit a review and examination of those aspects in conjunction with the related proposed budget provisions.

PRESTON L. SUTPHEN
Chief, Commercial Division

CM/HLS/fh

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
3 - CM
2 - RI/FI

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

TONIC

August 5,1952

Dear Dick:

Tom Braden, one of our friends will be coming over in your direction soon.

Please show him every courtesy and everything that we have in the way of operations. It is essential that he know our operations thoroughly, and all wraps are off.

Sincerely yours,

H. R. Miller

Mr. Richard J. Condon
Radio Free Europe
APO 407-A
c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

cc: Royall Tylor - Paris
cc: George Caesar - Lisbon ✓
cc: Oliver Hadwood — 635-10

AUG 6 1952

SECRET
Security Information

C
O
P
Y

SECRET
Security Information

H 3-1338(2)

4 August 1952

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1. It is understood by Sponsor and the Fund that activities of the Fund will be conducted in accordance with the following principles:

a. The fund will present to the Sponsor on or before 1 May of each year a proposed program and financial budget for the fiscal year beginning on 1 July. In general, this presentation will include detail comparable to other Sponsor budget presentations and, of course, must include as a minimum sufficient information to enable the Sponsor to analyze the program from both a budgetary and policy viewpoint.

b. After subjecting the program and budget to normal Sponsor review and analysis, the Sponsor will advise the Fund as to the specific activities of the over-all program which the Sponsor desires to support and as to specific amounts approved for expenditure in connection with each Fund division, including a small General Administration Contingency Fund which can be used at the discretion of the Fund for minor unforeseen requirements of any division. Exceptions, limitations, or other special provisions will be stipulated where appropriate. The Fund will undertake major activities other than those approved in its annual program only when mutually agreed by the Sponsor and the Fund. Transfer of funds from one Fund division to another division will not be made except by prior mutual agreement of the Sponsor and the Fund.

c. A reasonable reserve fund will be held by Sponsor and provided for in the budget to take care of unforeseen emergencies or contemplated activities which have not been sufficiently developed to permit detailed budgetary planning. Releases will be made from this fund to the Fund as appropriate upon presentation of proper justification to the Sponsor.

d. The Fund will furnish the Sponsor with such regular financial reports reflecting its operations as may be necessary to enable the Sponsor to properly account for the Fund expenditures. The Fund will also furnish the Sponsor with copies of audit reports made to the Fund by the firm of Certified Public Accountants employed for that purpose by the Fund with the approval of the Sponsor.

e. In order that the Fund may have available at all times sufficient net liquid assets to provide for liabilities which would exist in the event unforeseen liquidation became necessary, Sponsor will provide the Fund with an adequate liquidation reserve which will be held by the Foundation and invested in United States Government obligations of a readily convertible variety mutually agreed by Sponsor and the Fund. This reserve will be made available to the Fund as required, to be used only for the purposes of liquidation as mutually agreed by Sponsor and the Fund.

f. In case of liquidation, the assets of the Fund remaining after payment and discharge of all debts and liabilities of the corporation shall, as required by the Fund by-laws, be distributed "to such tax-exempt charitable organizations as shall be determined by the Board of Directors, in its discretion," but it is understood that the Fund will, in fact, designate the tax-exempt charitable corporation known as "The 1848 Foundation" as the recipient of such net assets.

g. The Sponsor will provide the Fund with appropriate guidance and the Fund, to the extent it is apprised thereof, will insure that all Fund activities are conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. Government policy and the Sponsor policy and mission. It is moreover recognized that developments unforeseen at the time of the approval by the Sponsor of any annual program may require the termination thereof, or any portions thereof, at any time by the Fund either at its own instance or at the request of the Sponsor.

h. The Fund will accept restricted gifts from private donors, other than Crusade for Freedom, Inc., only when mutually agreed by the Fund and the Sponsor.

i. The Fund may submit budgetary revisions either quarterly or whenever proposed new activities or unforeseen developments require a significant change in approved budgets.

j. Within the limits of approved budgets, the Fund will requisition funds from the Sponsor quarterly unless unanticipated requirements necessitate interim requisitions.

k. To promote their common security interest, the Sponsor will keep the Fund continuously advised as to desirable security procedures and the Fund will be free to request specific security guidance from the Sponsor at any time. The Fund will not elect or appoint a director, officer, key executive or any other person who will have knowledge of the Sponsor-Fund relationship without the prior specific concurrence of the Sponsor. In respect of employees who will not have knowledge of the Sponsor-Fund relationship, the Fund will, nevertheless, obtain appropriate security clearances from the Sponsor prior to employment.

2. Where appropriate, detailed procedures will be cooperatively developed by the Fund and the Sponsor to insure the effective implementation of the principles outlined in this Memorandum of Understanding.

For that purpose a liaison office in Sponsor's organization will be designated by Sponsor. Except on financial and budget matters which will be handled by the Fund with Sponsor's Office of Administration, and on matters which the Fund desires to take up with the Director of Sponsor or his immediate Deputies, relations between the Fund and Sponsor will be coordinated by or through this liaison office and, except as above, any matters which the Fund desires to bring to the attention of Sponsor may be referred to or through such liaison office.

Initialed as of this 4th day of August 1952:

/s/ A.W.D.
(Mr. Dulles)

/s/ H.H.M.
(Admiral Miller)

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	CPP		
2	DD/P		
3	DDCI		
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	C/IO	TWB	8 Dec
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE
☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS:

This may interest you as evidence of the good team spirit we have among some of our operating campaigners. It was left behind by Alan Valentine in his personal files.

Tom Braden
TWB

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

DDP 1610

National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

110 West 57th Street • New York 19, N. Y. • Telephone Plaza 7-7600

Cable Address: Natfrecomm

August 1, 1952

Mr. Alan Valentine, President
Committee for a Free Asia, Inc.
245 California Street
San Francisco, California

Dear Alan:

It was good to see you, if just for an instant, in Washington.

For your private ear, I might tell you that we won our battle hands down. Merely to confirm this, our Executive Board is having lunch in Washington with Allen and Bedell next Monday. This will be a general talk, but I am sure that policies will come up for discussion. Happily, everything seems to be sailing along in good shape.

I checked down there regarding any taboo concerning your help on the Crusade for Freedom campaign. I think there was a misunderstanding here. They have no thought of providing a complete taboo. Their thought was that all other operation should not stop and your time be devoted wholly to the Crusade.

Actually, we will call upon you for very little help. When Dick Walsh comes out to talk with you within the next ten days, he will give you a complete fill-in on what assistance we would like to have. I am sure you will have no trouble in giving us this assistance.

With regard to the wording of the language by which we transmit the money to you -- I am going to try to get a Board Meeting together on Tuesday at which time the necessary action will be taken to clear our forwarding letters to you insofar as capital expenditures go.

My very best regards.

Sincerely,

H. B. Miller

HBM:mlm

PRIVATE
AND
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Aug 1, 1952

[illegible]1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ID Division

SUBJECT : List of Rightist Rumanian Refugees.

1. In accordance with a request of Mr. John Leich for information on any questionable members of Gen. Radescu's League of Free Rumanians, transmitted herewith is a list of a number on whom information is available. Information on others will be forwarded to you as received.

2. Most of those listed have been connected with the Iron Guard groups, either as members or as fellow travelers, or with other groups whose ideology is in conflict with U. S. policy. The names preceded by an asterisk are considered unsuitable for employment in any American organization.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE Division

Encl.
List

SE/5/MCNewcomb:fc (13 August 1952)

1 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE Division
Chief, SE Division
Chief, WE Division
Chief, FY Division
Chief, Budget and Analysis Division
Chief, Operations Division

SUBJECT: TPTONIC Budget

1. Attached for your specific comments and evaluation is the TPTONIC proposed budget for fiscal year 1953.

2. It will be necessary to have your comments and initials on the cover sheet by Tuesday noon, August 5.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organisations Division

1 - EE
1 - SE
1 - WE
1 - PY
1 - AL/BD
1 - OD/CO
1 - CIO
2 - IO/TONIC
2- RI

SECRET

July ? Draft not sent

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NCFE-CIA RELATIONS

1. When this Division was delegated the responsibility of conducting CIA relations with NCFE it was immediately apparent that a variety of problems existed which made effective action on the part of IO Division difficult if not impossible. These difficulties may be generally summarized as follows:

(1) Satisfactory mechanical procedures to provide information to CIA and to insure effective cooperation and coordination of activities by CIA and NCFE did not exist. This was true not only in financial matters, such as the orderly submission of budgets and financial reporting, as well as security, but was also true of attempts to give NCFE policy guidance and to insure that NCFE's activities did not compromise CIA operation~~al activitie~~s.

(2) The attitude of the responsible officials of NCFE was one largely of non-cooperation in terms of NCFE and CIA efforts being joint to achieve the same objective. Indeed NCFE's attitude was that they are a separate organization with the responsibilities of a corporation in the State of New York, ~~and~~ that the role of CIA's representatives in dealing with them was one of being their salesmen rather than partners, that once their general activities were approved and financed, their responsibilities to CIA were fulfilled.

(3) NCFE has not only failed to provide information about its activities, but had generally expanded its relations with government agencies in an effort to play one agency against another and, indeed, in many cases play the personnel of one agency against other personnel in that agency. A general feeling of suspicion and distrust provaded CIA's relationships with NCFE.

2. In an attempt to properly discharge~~d~~ its responsibilities IO Division has attempted to solve the above problems by (1) preparing an agreement or directive which ~~states~~ sets out the joint responsibilities of CIA and NCFE and (2) which clearly states NCFE's duties and responsibilities to this Agency. To implement this agreement IO Division has, or is in the process of, creating orderly procedures by which this agreement will be put into effect.

3. If IO Division is to suceed in its task, which in our opinion is well begun, two conditions are ~~in our opinion~~ essential:

(1) That there be a single point of liaison between NCFE and CIA and that CIA act as the sole official governmental liaison with NCFE. It should be said that this does not mean that officials of NCFE will not consult with higher authorities in CIA, but that when they do, those responsible in IO Division will be fully informed.

(2) That NCFE clearly understands with whom they are to deal in CIA and that those with whom they deal on a regular basis are responsible officials entitled to respect as such—

officials whose responsibilities are to lend their cooperation and guidance insofar as it is necessary to achieve common objectives.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECURITY INFORMATION

22 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: CIA Investigation of Relations

PROBLEM

It is likely that at a meeting you will hold Monday, 4 August, with members of the Board of Directors of the National Committee for a Free Europe, these Directors will maintain they do not wish to sign or to accept a directive and/or agreement as to relations between NCFE and CIA, which has been approved by the CIA administrative staff and the International Organizations Division of CIA.

DISCUSSION

At the time responsibility for CIA dealings with NCFE was transferred to the IO Division, a survey was undertaken by this Division with the help of the CIA administrative staff under Mr. Wolf. The following was found to be the status of relations between CIA and NCFE:

1. Budget and Financial Relations.

a. No orderly submission of budgetary requirements on the part of NCFE has ever been established or practiced. For example, the CIA approved budget for the fiscal year 1952 was substantially different than the budget upon which NCFE based its activities. Bad communication has existed.

b. CIA has not exercised any form of control over NCFE expenditures after initial approval. For example, NCFE has been free to switch funds allocated for one project to some new project or to pay for extending an old one without further reference to CIA.

c. Monies raised by NCFE through the Crusade for Freedom or monies advanced by CIA and unspent at the end of the fiscal year have not been considered in the granting of funds for a new fiscal year.

SECRET

d. When budgets have been presented by NCFE, they have not been presented with reasonable thoroughness or accuracy nor have they indicated expenditures which are reasonably certain and those which are projections of possible activities for which NCFE has nevertheless asked for funds.

e. In certain instances, i.e. grants to certain national councils, NCFE makes expenditures for which there is no adequate accounting to NCFE and on which the Committee has had little or no information on how the money is spent.

2. Financial Reporting.

a. It is unquestioned that the internal business and accounting procedures of NCFE are excellent. However, adequate financial information has not been presented to CIA.

b. Security.

As the recent case of Leland Stowe indicates, NCFE has disregarded essential security considerations in the hiring of personnel. Neither the Security Officer, CIA, nor any other branch or component of CIA, has anything but extremely inadequate information as to who is on the NCFE payroll.

c. Policy Control.

In its relations with emigres through its National Councils Division and in its radio broadcasts through RFE, NCFE has in many cases not received adequate guidance from CIA and the State Department and in some instances not followed the guidance provided. CIA is seldom informed by NCFE of its proposed activities other than in its over-all budgetary presentation.

d. Coordination of CIA Activities with NCFE.

NCFE's activities in radio broadcasting, which account for three-quarters of its yearly budget, are almost entirely transferred overseas. The action of its 1400 or more overseas personnel often cut across CIA's own field operations. NCFE has not accepted coordination in this field.

3. IO Division and Administrative Staff Proposed Actions to Solve These Difficulties.

The IO Division with the assistance of the CIA Administrative Staff has prepared a memorandum of agreement to serve as a guide in the conduct of relations between CIA and NCFE. This agreement provides the following:

a. Adequate budget information upon which to evaluate the purposes and probable success of proposed NCFE activities as well as an adequate financial reporting system by NCFE so that this Agency can at all times be aware of and insure the approved expenditure of funds by NCFE.

b. Adequate security arrangements so that every employee of NCFE has been given a security clearance necessary for the proper protection of this operation.

c. The IO Division is to be the sole channel of liaison by NCFE to CIA and the State Department. The purpose of this provision is to insure adequate preparation and consistent policy guidance for NCFE in all its varied activities and to afford a single point of liaison and coordination with State Department and the area divisions of CIA. It is by no means intended to prevent officials and directors of NCFE from discussing problems with higher authorities and in fact the IO Division cannot give policy guidance without reference to higher authorities. In the past, however, NCFE has conducted liaison with many of the area divisions in CIA, with the State Department and with various officials in CIA, and there has been a resultant confusion.

d. The agreement provides for the submission of monthly reports by NCFE as to the status of its substantive activities.

4. Attitudes of NCFE.

The basic attitudes of NCFE about themselves is summed up by the comments on the first draft of the above-mentioned agreement by Spencer Phenix:

a. "Our friends can refuse to supply funds for disapproved activities but cannot legally or properly be given the 'right to disapprove or modify any activities or require abandonment, modification, or change in emphasis, in any of the existing programs'."

b. "Again, no agreement between our friends and ourselves can legally diminish our corporate right to spend our corporate funds . . ."

c. It is unacceptable that private consent of CIA should be required as to the appointment of new directors and officers.

d. The money given to NCFE by CIA is given first to the 1848 Foundation and this money is then donated to NCFE. CIA therefore has no right to inquire into policies or expenditures although "normally we would consult our friends".

5. Basic Attitude of CIA.

CIA has a duty and responsibility to insure affirmatively the conduct of the NCFE program in accordance with the CIA mission and with the DCI's responsibility to higher authority. A course of action based upon the view that NCFE's autonomy is such that it cannot accept the above-mentioned agreement, or some form thereof, might under conceivable circumstances, i.e. a change in the viewpoint of the German Government where most of NCFE's employees are located, the possibility of high-level changes in NCFE, or the growing insistence on the part of the exiles for armed liberation, lead to action not consistent with the DCI's responsibility. At present a situation exists in which CIA and the Division charged with CIA responsibility cannot exercise that responsibility.

6. Recommendation.

The PRC has reviewed this agreement and has refused to approve the budget of NCFE until this agreement or a modification acceptable to NCFE is adopted. The Director has approved this decision and it is suggested that he stand upon it.

L. K. WHITE
Acting Deputy Director
(Administration)

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - ADD/A (for DDCI)
1 cc - "
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

ER-3-1369

29 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations

FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

Attached is a memorandum which was handed me by Spencer Phenix covering a confidential report made by two NCFE people with regard to NCFE's action in connection with refugees. I have not read this in full and would like your recommendation and analysis so as to spare me this if possible.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Encl.

CONFIDENTIAL

July 15, 1952
Revised July 20, 1952

AN NCFE APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE SITUATION

- 1 -

INTRODUCTION

Reduced to its simplest terms, the European refugee problem can be resolved, saving liberation, only by the assimilation, or at least the integration of the refugees into the countries which receive them or by their emigration to countries better able to do so. National and international programs vast in scope and cost are required for these purposes, and it is obviously not within NCFE's power or interest to engage directly in them. But, in an indirect way, while paying attention only to its direct and fundamental interests, NCFE can contribute to the success of both types of programs, at least so far as they concern refugees from the ten NCFE countries.

The first step is, of course, for NCFE to analyze its position in relation to the European refugee situation and to formulate a policy accordingly. NCFE has been a constantly and rapidly growing organization, fully occupied with the immediate problems of expansion which have confronted it. NCFE has been deprived of the opportunity to pause and consider the consequences of its expansion in a changed situation, much less to deal with these consequences.

Several basic factors have combined to alter NCFE's position in relation to the European refugee situation. While IRO operated, NCFE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile elite and the mass of refugees, who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. IRO, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. IRO's several successor organizations have yet to prove their ability effectively and completely to perform its functions. During the early years of NCFE's existence, the frontier countries, Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain, were absorbed in post-war reconstruction or subjected to military occupation and hence were generally not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCFE in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of most of the exile National Councils were in the U.S. under nominal U.S. control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe, which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. As conditions approach the normal in each of these countries, NCFE's grounds for self re-assurance become less solid. Until its May 1, 1951 initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, which marked its appearance as an instrument actively affecting the countries whence the refugees flee, RFE could also ignore the presence of the refugees in the West. This, however, is no longer the case.

Fundamentally, any NCFE interest in the European refugee situation is an aspect of the general NCFE relationship with exiles. In the changed European situation in which this interest is and will be manifested NCFE should reconsider its basic instruments for such relationships : the National Councils. Their exceptions, gaps, and shortcomings should be carefully analyzed and the conclusions drawn therefrom. The inadequacy of the National Councils as a basic instrument in the changed situation in Europe will be indicated in this report. Certain adaptations of this instrument and the creation of new ones will be required if NCFE is to carry out its functions and realize its potentialities.

- II -

WHY NCFE IS CONCERNED IN THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE PROBLEM AND WHY THIS CONCERN SHOULD BE PROPERLY AND EFFECTIVELY MANIFESTED.

A. The Extent of NCFE's Concern to Date :

In the past NCFE has not directly concerned itself with the over-all problem of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain. This policy of NCFE has manifested itself in the following ways. NCFE has consistently made it clear that its chief interest lies in what it regarded as the political and intellectual elite of emigrations from the various Iron Curtain countries. Certain elements of this political and intellectual elite, however, realized the necessity and the importance of channeling some of their activities toward the mass of their respective emigrations on a national basis. This realization was dictated either by humanitarian or strictly realistic political principles, or by a combination of the two. Accordingly, these elements of the elite approached NCFE with their proposals for NCFE material and moral support of such activities. These proposals differed widely and were implemented at varying periods over the last three years, with the result that presently NCFE is indirectly supporting refugee activities on a national basis at an annual amount of £118,168.00, and with the further result that these activities are confused, haphazard, erratic, ill-coordinated and unjustly and inexplicably disproportionate. Some nationality groups, as for instance the Hungarians, have been receiving relatively large amounts for refugee activities, with other groups, as for example the Poles, who have a large emigration, receiving nothing.

The vehicles for the channeling of this support have also differed widely. Originally, NCFE 's theory in providing support for such activities was based upon the existence of National

Councils or Committees, the idea being that the National Councils should themselves undertake such activities in order to gain for themselves the necessary standing in their respective emigrations. This was not altogether inconsistent with NCFE's policy of emphasis upon direct assistance only to the intellectual and political elite, but was a subsequent development thereof.

The most ambitious and long-lived of these National Councils' refugee projects has been the Refugee Service of the Hungarian National Council, which is the best and almost sole surviving example of NCFE's original theory. The record, however, even of this prize example, is an extremely spotty one (details to follow in a descriptive report to be submitted separately). More importantly, the reasons for the spottiness of the HNC's record are not all attributable to the HNC itself; many, indeed, are due to the situation in which the NCFE's approach to the refugee problem, which has provided financial support, but little or no guidance or moral support. * Refugee service has had to operate and within are due to NCFE's

In the Rumanian case, NCFE's support for refugee activities was originally channeled through the Rumanian National Council, which ceased to enjoy NCFE recognition in 1950. Since that time, NCFE support for Rumanian refugee activities has been given to Rumanian Welfare, Incorporated, an organization entirely outside the National Council category, and which includes Americans on its Board of Directors.

In the Czechoslovak case, NCFE has channeled its support for refugee activities through the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, a National Council, which was the victim of a political split lasting from January 1951 until July 4, 1952. The Council of Free Czechoslovakia, in turn, channeled some of this support to an organization which enjoys the status of voluntary agency, the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees. This organization, like Rumanian Welfare, Inc., includes Americans on its Board of Directors, which is chaired by Professor James Shotwell. Unlike Rumanian Welfare, however, the AFCR in Germany and Austria received from IRO or HICOG and USCOA facilities and/or financial support as did other larger organizations such as the NCWC, the Lutheran World Federation, the World Council of Churches, the American Joint Distribution Committee, etc. which shared with it the status of voluntary agency. There is no doubt that Czechoslovak refugees have been, to some extent, the victims of the political fluctuations of their leadership in the U.S., and that, in a sense, NCFE must also accept some responsibility for allowing the political situation to have had repercussions of this nature.

A/

In the case of the Albanians, no specific sums in the budget (which has been provided by NCFE) of the National Committee for a Free Albania have been earmarked for aid to Albanian refugees; although despite this the NCFA has, it is reported, due chiefly to close American supervision in Rome, managed to do more for Albanian refugees in Italy than other National Councils, as for instance the HNC and BNC in Italy.

In the case of the Poles, because of the failure of the Polish emigration to produce a united national council which could be recognized by NCFE, no financial support whatsoever has been given by NCFE to Polish refugee activities, although the Poles have one of the most sizable emigrations of all the nationality groups with which NCFE cooperates, and although the Poles have an organization, American Polish War Relief, a voluntary agency, which seems to be at least as effective, if not more so than the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees or Rumanian Welfare, Inc., organizations with which it is roughly comparable.

In the case of the Yugoslavs, which is probably the most difficult case of all, from the U.S. and the NCFE point of view as well as from the viewpoint of the individual refugee, NCFE has confined itself to contributing small amounts to the Benevolent Association of Free Citizens of Yugoslavia in London, in order that certain exiled leaders—who rendered signal services to the Allied cause during World War II, through their participation in the revolt of March, 1941, which led Yugoslavia to resist the Nazi Invasion - might receive small stipends. Although this aid is rendered through an organization abroad, to exiles residing abroad, it is in line rather with NCFE's policy of providing assistance to a political and intellectual élite than with the policy of indirect support through National Councils or other organizations of refugee activity. No Yugoslav National Council, enjoying NCFE recognition, has ever emerged due to the delicate situation of Western policy vis-à-vis Tito's government.

In the case of the three Baltic States, although NCFE has been provided, both in the U.S. and abroad, with the instruments which have most nearly proved themselves capable of efficient, just and honest use of funds for refugee activities, no such funds have been placed at the disposal of the three Baltic Consultative Panels or their counterpart committees in Germany and elsewhere abroad.

Originally, also, although the principle was never clearly defined or rigidly adhered to, and, at present, is as much departed from as observed, it was felt that NCFE-supported refugee activities should be restricted, as much as possible, to the type of assistance which a consulate would render to its citizens who found themselves in difficulties in a foreign country. Such assistance would according to this line of thinking only occasionally and in cases of extreme and immediate need, be material; essentially it would consist of advice, translation and verification of documents and direction of the refugee to the appropriate agency capable of furnishing him with the type of further assistance, material or otherwise, which might be required. It has always been recognized, however, that the various National Councils acting as consulates for their anti-Communnist compatriots, who could not turn to the legally-recognized Communist embassies, legations or consulates of their countries for help, would have to provide some material assistance for those who turned to them for help, if only a tram ticket, to allow them to visit the various international and local social agencies who could help them, or the price of a meal or a night's lodging which would carry them over the necessary period of time which it always takes until the machinery of other agencies can be persuaded to start grinding for the assistance of these people. However, as time went on, NCFE assistance was also being given, directly or indirectly, to agencies which gave particular attention to material aid, as for instance the AFCR and Rumanian Welfare, neither of which has any clear and responsible relation with a National Council, yet each of which has been the victim, to some extent, of the vagaries of exile politics.

Some of the elements which seem, either consciously or unconsciously to have been operative in the development of this NCFE policy of only limited and indirect concern with the over-all problem of refugees from Eastern Europe were the following :

1. Refugees in the mass were already the direct concern of a large, well-staffed and well-financed international organization, the IRO, which meant that the problems confronting the National Councils and other organizations of the exile elite were limited in scope.

2. Until the initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia on May 1, 1951, NCFE (through RFE or any other instrument) was not itself an active factor in the refugee problem. It was not directly associated with the refugee himself, either through indirectly stimulating him to flee or through his increased value for information purposes.

3. The National Councils and Committees were considered to be a suitable instrument qualified to deal with the refugee problem in the limited manner in which it confronted them during the existence of IRO. It was felt that any credit for assistance to refugees could appropriately be given to the national councils, which would in turn reflect to the credit of NCFE, the U.S. and the Free West in general.

-III -

THE CHANGED SITUATION
U.S. AND EUROPE

While IRO operated NCFE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile elite and the mass of refugees who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. IRO, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. Even before IRO disappeared, care and maintenance of refugees in and out of camps had passed to the various local national authorities. IRO's functions of protection and care for the refugee in both legal and material aspects respectively from arrival to emigration have been divided among these governments and two international agencies, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and PICMME, none of which has been provided with the means adequate to the performance of their tasks assigned it, and the latter of which are only just becoming fully operational. In consequence of IRO's closure the various voluntary agencies, such as NCWC, LWF and WCC, etc., have been deprived of facilities which were provided by IRO in the past, with the result that they have been compelled to curtail their activities. Neither of IRO's successors has assumed the vast and vital coordinating function performed by IRO, with the result that the present confusion is discouraging. It may develop that the New State Department - MSA program for neo-refugees will clarify this confused situation, but at present it, itself, is as yet an unknown factor and naturally rumors regarding it at the field level have thus far only served to confound the confusion.

The period of IRO's existence coincided with the period of mass emigration, whereas at present emigration possibilities are small and uncertain, with the result that to the hard core remnant, which cannot be moved, is being added to the small but steady flow of new arrivals, most of whom are unable to emigrate and who must also face the appalling employment conditions in the frontier countries of Germany, Austria, Italy and Trieste (in the other frontier countries of Greece and Turkey the situation is probably similar) and the intermediary receiving countries such as France and Britain. Out of the more slowly moving remnants, particularly in the frontier countries, the possibility exists for the formation of more stable national committees, which would hence be more susceptible of control.

During the early years of NCFE's existence the frontier and intermediary receiving countries were either absorbed in post-war reconstruction or were subject to military occupation and hence were not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCFE, in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of the exile national councils were in the U.S. under nominal NCFE control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. There are now strong indications that the situation is more rapidly approaching its more normal aspect and that it is still in the process of change in this direction.

In January the British-backed Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement held its first mass meeting in London; in April the French Comité Nationale pour l'Europe Libre emerged; and in June the Germans attempted to bring about the emergence of a central organization of refugees, which, in its composition reflected traditional German sympathies with the Separatist movements of Eastern Europe, a policy which is in direct conflict with that of NCFE and RFE. Although the authorities, particularly in the frontier countries, probably lack special financial means to engage in activity on an NCFE-scale, they do possess, by virtue of their control of the legal and welfare framework within which the refugee must exist, the means to extend or withhold benefits so as to influence the refugee political situation to their advantage. It seems reasonable to suppose that as these nations gain in strength and independence this process will continue at an increasing rate.

As a result of the factors described above, the refugee finds himself in an increasingly hostile environment, deprived of an effective international protector and incapable, alone, unaided and unguided clearly to see his interests and defend them from exploitation. The Czechoslovaks and Poles in Germany provide striking examples of shortsighted, aimless exile pre-occupation with sterile political manouvering to the advantage of their German hosts. At the same time, the voluntary agencies in Germany, which, after IRO's demise, were granted certain facilities by HICOG must, after the ratification of the contractual agreements, look to the German Government for whatever facilities it may choose to grant them.

Until its May 1951 initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, which marked its appearance as an instrument actively affecting the countries whence the refugees flee, RFE could also ignore the presence of the refugees in the West. Since that time, however, the steady expansion of RFE's activity and its increasing need of refugees as informational sources have led to strong accusations that RFE is evading its responsibilities and failing to accept the consequences of its own effectiveness. Although RFE expressly refrains from specifically inciting its audiences to flee, its comparisons of life in the West with life in the East, inevitably constitute an indirect encouragement to escape. Those accusations and resentment are ill-concealed among the representatives of the various international and voluntary agencies.

RFE's information service men, who, of RFE's personnel, are in closest contact with the refugees, sympathize with this criticism and wish that they could do more for the refugees than they are presently able to do on their own. These RFE information gatherers are in competition with an endless series of rivals seeking this valuable commodity. They usually present the refugees who have been helpful in providing them with information with presents of food, cigarettes or money. Although they would like to be in a position to do more than this for their informants, they cannot, for, as they explain, they are not in the welfare business. One of their special difficulties is to persuade the refugees to come to them in the first place. Almost universally they have reported that if the refugees were made to realize that Free Europe was doing something for them, they would be more willing and even eager, to come to the RFE information offices in the camps to give freely of their information. Furthermore, RFE's propaganda can be dangerously weakened by the boomerang effect of the few disillusioned refugees who return to their homelands.

In consequence of the closure of IRO and the absence of any authority capable of organizing and controlling the refugee national committees a double vacuum exists. In respect to the first vacuum, the UN High Commission, PICME, the voluntary agencies and the State Department program have yet to prove their ability to fill it. In respect to the second vacuum, the British, the French, the Italians, the Austrians and the Germans have the possibilities of filling this vacuum. Of these, the German interest is most likely to provide the most direct and immediate conflict with NCFE-RFE interests. The fact that the Germans have demonstrated an interest in these committees and particularly in support of the Separatist elements indicates that these committees are not without political importance; Because of the political ambitions or honest desire to serve of their leaders and of the need of the refugee for spokesmen and representatives in their dealings with local authorities, such committees will always exist, whether or not they are controlled or supported. If these committees are to be controlled at all, it is obviously to NCFE's advantage that they be controlled by NCFE. It would be dangerous to assume that this control could be exercised solely through the "leaders" residing in the U.S. as the opportunity exists for these leaders and for those in Europe to play off one Western Power against another. It has already been demonstrated in one case that the branch of a national council, with headquarters in the U.S., due to the exigencies of the local situation may be obliged to follow a policy which is quite contrary to the interests of NCFE.

In addition to the major double vacuum described above, our survey has disclosed the existence of a number of minor vacuums in exile representation which have been filled by unscrupulous self-appointed national representatives whose presence has been largely responsible for the skepticism and mistrust with which exile representatives are frequently regarded by the international and voluntary agencies. This unfortunate factor may be traced to the lack of recognized accreditation for such representatives, to the absence of any responsible and consistent field supervision, control and backing of worthy and qualified representatives. In this regard, representatives of the UN High Commission and the voluntary agencies have expressed a definite interest in efforts to order the chaotic situation of the national representatives.

- IV -

RECONSIDERATION OF NCFE'S BASIC INSTRUMENT IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH EXILES AND REFUGEES: THE NATIONAL COUNCILS.

As we have shown above, it is to NCFE's interest to attempt to order this confused situation, and if the attempt is to be made, careful consideration must be given to the selection of the tools which are to be used. The Division of NCFE which has hitherto dealt with NCFE's relations with the exiles, and indirectly with the refugees, has been the National Councils Division. This Division has used as its basic instrument the National Councils and Committees which have their headquarters in the U.S. NCFE's experience over the past three years has served conclusively to modify the initial view of the National Councils as suitable instruments for the creation not only of an atmosphere of positive and constructive cooperation, but even for the effective implementation of NCFE policy and purpose.

The divisive factors of exile have resulted in :

1. The absence of any Polish National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;
2. The absence of any Rumanian National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;
3. A prolonged split (a year and a half) in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia;
4. A precariously balanced Hungarian National Council.

Other factors have produced a Bulgarian National Committee which is unsatisfactory from almost every point of view. Genuine and productive reform of the BNC will doubtless prove a prolonged and difficult process. This leaves the NCFE with a National Committee for a Free Albania, which could stand reform and which, nevertheless, has always been closely supervised by Americans and with the three Baltic Consultative Panels which were established entirely by NCFE in the first instance.

No single national council during its existence, with the possible exception of the three Baltic Consultative Panels, has demonstrated itself as being capable of even reasonably efficient and just administration of its own affairs. In each case NCFE has been obliged to step in, at first exercising only cursory supervision, but at present attempting to introduce systems of closer administrative and financial control and supervision, which, unless made sufficiently rigid, will doubtless prove as unsatisfactory as they have been in the past.

Where national councils do exist branches or sections of these councils which have demonstrated their effectiveness can and should be used where practical to implement on a secondary level NCFE projects and policies. For the primary implementation of these projects and policies, however, a more permanent, ordered and controllable apparatus must be found, one not liable to the naturally disruptive tensions of exile life. Even where unity in a national council can be produced, experience has proved that its continuity is at best tenuous and unreliable, with the result that the council becomes a delicate and cumbrous apparatus which must subordinate the achievement of practical goals to the maintenance of this temporary and elusive unity.

Further factors disclosed by our survey reinforce the conclusion that if NCFE is, as we believe it must, effective to develop its interest in the European refugee field, a new instrument must be found. These factors also tend to indicate roughly some of the qualities which this instrument must possess.

1. No single exile organization engaged in refugee activity, including those receiving NCFE support, is consistently good in all of its local branches. This observation applies also to those organizations receiving NCFE supports which do not fall into the national council category (the AFGR and Rumanian Welfare).

Conclusions :

In its activity in the European refugee field, NCFE must be completely free to select the organizations and individuals with which it may consider it practical to cooperate on any level. NCFE must therefore not be committed to support or to cooperate with any organization in all its parts and must be free to sever connections at any time with any organization or its parts (individuals or sections) with which it finds it no longer practical to cooperate. NCFE must be completely flexible in this operation.

2. The refugee in Europe is confronted with a situation which is fluid in all its aspects. He faces since the closure of IRO, a multitude of uncoordinated agencies, the continued existence of some (the voluntary agencies) is uncertain; the operations of others (the UN and PICME) remain to be developed fully; the scope and activity of another (the State Department Program) is in the rumor stage. He is uncertain, suspicious and fearful of the new status and intentions of the local national authorities under whose immediate jurisdiction he must live. He faces the after-effects of mass emigration, which, although it ceased some time ago, has deprived him of the most qualified of his compatriots and hence of stable national leadership. For himself, the limited, uncertain and uncoordinated emigration on an individual basis which still exists offers but faint hope for departure from the frontier countries. He faces almost impossible employment conditions, depending upon local situations and seasonal work which often requires his being shifted from place to place as the employment situation dictates. The majority, however, must stay in the camps or on the dole. He faces shifting camps which are often moved or dissolved by the local authorities. These factors combine to produce a demoralizing feeling of impermanence and insecurity. They are, in turn, aggravated by the unsympathetic attitude of the countries in which the refugee finds himself, an attitude which frequently approaches hostility and which is not improved by the presence in these countries of embittered expelled ethnic minorities who were once the citizens of the refugee's homeland. The homeland [illegible] is a deplorable feeling of apathy, hopelessness, isolation and abandonment and a total lack of any sense of direction or purpose.

Conclusions :

NCF 's approach to the refugee and his problems must be broad in order that it may impart a feeling of purpose, direction, continuity and security. This approach must have an attractive national flavor which will appeal to the refugee"s desire to belong, without encouraging his chauvinistic tendencies, and, indeed, should provide a positive substitute for them. To implement this approach NCFE's instrument in the field must again be supremely flexible but susceptible of close and rigid control. This instrument must be capable of conveying an impression of seriousness, responsibility and constructive interest, thus inspiring a feeling of confidence on the part of the authorities and agencies as well as the refugees.

3. In general it may be observed that in the frontiers countries there is a notable lack of knowledge of NCFE's role in support of the admittedly limited and relatively negligible refugee activities in which it is thus far/ indirectly engaged. RFE is, of course, widely known and almost as widely criticized for its failure to accept responsibility for its part in the refugee problem. FEUE is usually known, but only vaguely and secondarily, and in many cases the picture of its scope, activities and goals is distorted. There is a dim awareness of FEUE's connection with RFE, but a general failure to draw any conclusions therefrom.

Conclusion :

To engage in refugee activities of any nature or extent without clearly identifying and labelling NCFE as the organization ultimately responsible for these activities is a needless and senseless failure to exploit a possibility in the form of enhanced NCFE prestige and greater sympathy and cooperation with the work of RFE and FEUE on the part of both refugees and other active agencies. Particularly from the point of view of RFE's essential relationship to the refugees it is a serious mistake not to do so. Therefore the instrument which NCFE adopts for its work in this field must be identifiable only as an NCFE operation, clearly related to RFE and FEUE.

4. It has been mentioned previously that the international and voluntary agencies tend to regard the exile representatives with skepticism and tend to hold them at arm's length. This attitude seems partially to result from their ignorance of exile politics and their understandable reluctance to become involved therein. Their ignorance and disinterest has in several cases led them to choose refugee assistants and advisors of unfortunate political background and tendencies from the NCFE point of view. Again, however, as mentioned above, the representatives of several of these agencies have expressed a definite interest in having these insuppressible refugee groups somehow organized and controlled.

Conclusion :

Responsible and direct American control would therefore do much to dispel this negative attitude and would pave the way for a more positive and productive cooperation between the national refugee groups and the agencies active in their behalf. This control would also it is reasonable to suppose, help to fill vacuums in exile representation of the kind described above.

5. Another weakness of the organizations surveyed in the frontier countries is their almost universal tendency in greater or lesser degrees to discriminate politically or personally in the distribution of assistance. There is no comparison between the extent of this weakness in the tense and unsettled atmosphere of the frontier countries and the more normal environment of the intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain. In addition to the injustice of such discrimination, definite opportunities are lost through failure seriously to attempt to win over, through less narrow assistance, elements (such as the Czech and Slovak Separatists, Hungarian extremists and the Schwabs) which now oppose or inthe future might oppose the political and national structures which NCFE recognizes and supports.

Conclusion :

Again, close NCFE guidance and control are indicated so that injustices may be reduced and broader NCFE aims implemented, rather than thwarted by narrower interests of short-sighted and unenlightened refugee representatives.

- V -

HOW NCFE'S INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE PROBLEM MIGHT BEST BE MANIFESTED; MODIFICATIONS IN ITS PRESENT INSTRUMENTS AND CREATION OF A NEW ONE -- THE FREE EUROPE CONSULAR SERVICE. (FECS).

A. NCFE's approach

If NCFE is to modify its present instruments and create new ones to manifest its interest in the problem of refugees in Europe, it should first formulate a broad and comprehensive approach to the refugee as a type of person in whom and in whose problems this interest is to be shown.

This approach will, by the nature of NCFE's interest in the refugee, differ markedly from those of other organizations active in the field.

All these organizations, the intelligence agencies, the local national governments, the UN High Commissioner and the voluntary agencies, are interested in the Czechoslovak or Rumanian or Pole who crosses the border because, respectively, he might be a Communist agent or have information, he is or might be a political refugee or because he is a human being in need. NCFE is interested in him because he is a Czechoslovak or Rumanian or Pole -- a citizen of a country whose people were promised at Yalta certain rights and privileges which they have not received because of the violent interference of a Communist Russia. This is also the fundamental theoretical reason for RFE broadcasts to the Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, the Poles in Poland, etc. The fundamental practical reason is of course the interest of the United States in these nations and peoples as European political factors.

RFE obviously cannot create a military machine capable of liberating the nations of Eastern Europe. It is interested qhite simply in promoting the existence of certain attitudes, interests and activities which will one day contribute to the successful fulfillment of the promises made at Yalta. RFE is interested that mothers should teach their children certain truths to counter Communist lies; that workers should react in certain ways to Communist pressures; that students should understand the fallacies of the system which they are being seduced or forced to serve. In short, RFE wishes to direct Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, Poles in Poland and Hungarians in Hungary to act in the enlightened self-interest of their respective nations. The fact that this enlightened self-interest, as supported by RFE, coincides with our own and other broader interests serves only to underline its importance.

We have tried to point out in this report the extent to which the presence and activities and problems of the refugees from NCFE countries in Western Europe cannot but be of interest to NCFE. Again, NCFE need not concern itself directly with the feeding, housing, employment and emigration of these people, any more than RFE should itself undertake to raise an army.

This is not to say ~~tata~~ that NCFE may not find it advisable to continue to use limited welfare funds in its work with refugees. But its principal tasks will be to protect its interests by attempting to produce some order out of the chaos of refugees activities by giving to the refugee and his representatives a sense of direction and belonging which the other agencies active in the field are admittedly unable adequately to provide. Without it, the refugee in Europe almost inevitably sinks into a state of hopeless and isolated apathy. He belongs to nothing but the tense and quarrelsome fraternity of his fellow abandoned. Sitting unoccupied all day, his only activity soon becomes the endless intrigue of the political parties. With few books and less communication with the outside world, and particularly, without constructive leadership and guidance, the parties become almost the only organizations with a national flavor open to the refugee. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that refugee nationalisms become chauvinistic and ideas, of national interest, subordinated to the narrow and petty goals of the political parties.

The voluntary and other agencies and the local national authorities can hardly provide a constructive substitute since they only approach the refugee as such, reenforcing his apathy by their much needed gifts, unable to offer allegiance to anything other than the Churches, opposed or reluctant to undertake any attempt at support or guidance of his national tendencies. In all fairness, it should be noted, however, that the current approach to the refugee on the part of all these agencies is a conscious and considerable improvement on the exaggerated and incentive-killing IRO dole system.

But if NCFE approaches the new escapee, as well as the older DP, not as a needy "refugee" but as a citizen of his country who simply finds himself in a difficult position on this side of the Iron Curtain rather than on the other side, it should be possible to appeal to his desire for national continuity and then to some extent appeal to his ideas of his own enlightened self-interest in much the same way that such appeals are provided for the escapee's compatriots at home by RFE.

This approach would also take into account the significant fact that many of the new arrivals, (estimates run as high as 30%) are not real "political refugees". They leave their countries for economic reasons or because they are fed up or simply want to try out the conditions in the West which are described to them as so much superior to those in their homelands. Among these people there are of course many misfits, incompetents and undesirables. No one should delude himself with a picture of all refugees as worthy, deserving, honest people persecuted by a Communist regime and fleeing for their very lives.

NCFE interests, however, override this unfortunate reality: no individual who leaves a satellite country for any reason whatever should be allowed to fall into such a condition of disillusionment that he should consider returning or even consider sending word of his discouragement home. One such return or report of personal disillusionment can produce a most unfortunate countereffect to RFE and other Western propaganda. It is an accepted fact that there have been such cases and they are in fact regarded as one of the factors contributing to the present lower arrival rate of new escapees.

Granted this approach to the escapee and the old refugee and DP as a citizen, and the desire to promote among these people the idea of concern for their real self-interests, the idea which most adequately describes this approach is that of the "consulate".

The functions of a consulate are to protect the interests of the citizen abroad. Material assistance is provided only in cases of emergency -- the consulate's principal task is to take an active interest in guiding the citizen to those local agencies best able to satisfy his wants and to suggest approaches and attitudes most likely to benefit him during his stay abroad. The most glaring and urgent example of the need for such consular guidance may be found in the necessity for protecting the Czechoslovaks in Germany not only from the political opposion of the Germans, but from their own senseless, destructive and shortsighted political maneuverings.

B. Modifications of NCFE's present instrument.

As indicated above, it will of course be useful and desirable to incorporate in this approach and in the new instrument, (FECS), designed to implement it, features, (individuals and organizations) of the present instrument which have demonstrated their effectiveness. However, also as mentioned earlier, in order to assure the freedom of action and freedom of choice of the new instrument, certain modifications of these features of the present instrument will be required.

1. It will first of all be necessary that those features (individuals and organizations) of the present instrument considered suitable for incorporation in FECS be separated administratively and financially from their headquarters, since FECS will operate on the basis of the following procedural approach:

Such individuals or organizations will be incorporated in FECS on one primary basis -- their proved effectiveness in the past and/or their promise of effectiveness under NCFE guidance; their retention will be dependent upon their ability successfully to continue this performance. This is of course basically an adaptation of part of the approach which has enabled RFE and RFS to make effective use of qualified exile personnel for the attainment of their own goals.

2. For the undirected and uncoordinated system of almost complete lack of control which has hitherto generally prevailed in NCFE's relationship to refugee activities and exile organizations, will be substituted a system of control which will preserve at least the illusion of freedom through the incorporation of qualified exile organizations and individuals and the selection of others to fill gaps which such organizations and individuals have proved unable to fill. The fact of their ultimate responsibility to NCFE should be made abundantly clear. That this is in no way incompatible with the atmosphere of an illusion of freedom in which FECS's exile employees will be working is amply proved by the success of RFE national desks. It will be made clear to these employees that they should consider themselves to be working as consuls and consular assistants under a civil service program. They should be given the impression that the responsibility for the success of FECS in its attempts to assist the refugees lies in their hands, and that its failure for reasons of favoritism or dishonesty would constitute an evasion of their patriotic responsibility.

C. Functions and potentialities of FECS.

The underlying purpose of FECS is of course to serve the policies and basic interests of NCFE.. We have tried to indicate the extent to which its work with the refugees would be directly to these interests. Other interests which FECS would have the purpose of serving might be :

1) The prevention of misunderstandings on the part of the

refugees and other agencies active in the field regarding all phases of NCFE work, and particularly that of FEUE and RFE.

2) The attempt to keep the NCFE European Representative and the RFE Political Advisor informed of exile political developments in Europe which might affect their operations and to control and guide these developments wherever possible to the advantage of NCFE and RFE. For example, NCFE, designed to wage political warfare on a broad front, was recently almost outflanked in Germany. Some organized means of preventing such occurences, or at least of reporting their development, should be provided.

1. The primary function of FECS is to approach the refugee as a citizen and by so doing to try and set up conditions and introduce a spirit which will make it possible for the refugee to escape from the apathy which is his traditional lot and become a positive factor in the struggle of the West. FECS will attempt to perform this function in several ways :

a. Normal consular activity. FECS will engage in the normal consular activities of interventions on behalf of refugees with the local authorities, voluntary agencies, international agencies such as the UN High Commission, or wherever else it might effectively and usefully do so. It will provide translations, verify documents, advise refugees on all relevant matters in conjunction with these other agencies and generally interest itself in all aspects of the refugee's life and problems.

b. Material assistance. While material assistance should be kept to a minimum, it must be recognized that FECS will be required to provide more help of this kind than the normal consulates, since the physical condition of the person appealing for assistance will almost invariably be poor. Other organizations are better set up to provide such material needs, and FECS should of course attempt to cooperate with their already extensive efforts to prevent duplication. But FECS must have available emergency welfare funds in order to escape the accusation that it is a featherbed or another operation to "use" the refugee.

c. Refugee morale. The fundamental practical target of all FECS operations should be the improvement of refugee morale. This morale depends on two factors: the refugee's frame of mind and the atmosphere in which he lives.

The refugee's frame of mind should be improved in several ways. The first of these is the citizenship approach which is to govern all FECS operations. It should be manifested as soon as possible after the refugee's arrival and clearance, if only in the form of a greeting and briefing from someone not interested in milking the refugee of information and asking him questions. This briefing might include a description of the voluntary agencies which might assist the refugee, a description in simple terms of his legal status and, of course, of the FECS program, including the names and addresses of its representatives in the camps or areas to which the refugee might be sent. The refugee might also be saved considerable disillusionment if at this time he were given a carefully worded description of the difficult economic situation in which he will be obliged for some time to remain. For example in Germany, the refugee should be told of the presence of large numbers of refugees from the East Zone and of the German government's natural desire to assist them. A representative of one of the voluntary agencies suggested to us that the refugees are rarely made to understand that they are initially accepted into countries faced with unusually severe economic problems.

c

Secondly, the refugee's frame of mind might be improved by the installation of reading rooms containing publications in the national languages, some of them geared especially to the refugee and his problems. For example, some of the useful exile-organized refugee aid Committees such as the Anglo-Rumanian in London and the Hungarian Office in Munich produce regular bulletins containing local legal and employment news of interest to the refugee. Such bulletins should receive a wider distribution and others like them should be created. In this connection, it should be noted that RPS publications are not reaching the refugees, among whom our survey has indicated they would be most welcome and are much needed. Also in the reading rooms, radios should be provided in response to the desire, frequently expressed to us, of hearing RFE and other broadcasts in the national languages.

b)

The organization of constructive meetings, discussions and national celebrations would provide an outlet for refugee enthusiasms if they were supervised by competent leadership. Similarly, FECS should stimulate and possibly provide the means for self-help work projects, such as the paintings of barracks, the planting of gardens and the organization of sewing circles, language courses or discussion groups, etc....

The second factor involved in the question of refugee morale is that of his environment, the atmosphere in which he lives. ~~To a large extent this atmosphere would be improved in which h lives.~~ To a large extent this atmosphere would be improved by the organization, as noted above, of constructive outlets for the energies now dissipated in chauvinistic and petty political internal and international strife, both of which have at times led to murder in the camps.

d

FECS major effert in this direction, however, should be directed toward bridging the gap in a constructive manner between, on the one hand, the voluntary and international agencies and the local authorities, and, on the other, the essential national interests of the refugee. Occasionally representatives of the voluntary agencies have mentioned the fact that refugees sometimes cooperate with them best when the situation has been explained by one of their national representatives. For the reasons of suspicion on the part of these agencies cited earlier, this is not always done. FECS could provide a responsible instrument for so doing.

The principal gap which exists at present between the various authorities and the refugees is over the question of assimilation, or, as it is usually described, "integration" and "adaptation". There is a natural feeling on the part of these agencies and authorities that in view of the restriction of emigration possibilities, the only alternative open to many of the refugees is to adapt themselves to their environment. The refugee, is, however, quite understandably reluctant to do so: He plans to return to his country when it is liberated "next year"; he is sure he will emigrate shortly; particularly in Germany, he may strongly dislike or distrust the local population. There is also of course the determining factor of employment possibilities -- one of the aspects of the refugee problem with which FECS cannot and need not directly concern itself.

Indirectly, however, FECS can contribute to its resolution. For example, in Germany, the problem of national schools, which has been a score point, suggests a suitable compromise. The refugees have struggled to maintain full-time national schools for their children, sometimes succeeding with NCFE and other external support, while the local and international authorities have insisted that refugee children attend German schools. The refugee must be made to understand that it is to his children's interest to allow them to adapt as long as the essential elements of national culture can be preserved. This requirement could be and in some instance is already being met by extra-curricular instruction in the national language, history and culture.

In the same way the refugee must also be shown that by refusing to adapt, he may make of his national group an ingrown, despised and distrusted minority. If on the other hand, he shows willingness to adapt to the situation in which he finds himself, he is much more likely to obtain not only physical but psychological benefits in the form of broader practical experience, with the possibility that this experience may one day be of use to him in his own homeland. This is a difficult point which the mass of refugees will be reluctant to grasp. Some of their more intelligent leaders, however, -- the kind which FECS hopes to employ -- might be able to explain its importance. Also, the experience of one camp director in Trieste has proved that it is not impossible to get results through healthy national competitions ; if the Rumanians paint their barracks, the Hungarians feel more obliged to paint theirs. While probably ineffective among the hardened older refugees, shame might successfully be used among new arrivals, as for example, "If you say you intend to return after liberation, what will you tell your friends that you did for Poland in emigration ? That you helped create friends for Poland by keeping the neatest barracks in Germany --- or that you sat around a pigsty all day doing nothing ? That you refused to take a job in a construction company because it was beneath you, or that you helped to build a stronger and more prosperous west to hasten the day of liberation ?" Arguments of this kind were not wholly without effect on strikers, and shirkers, during the war. Doubtless they have been tried by representatives of the voluntary agencies, etc., but FECS representatives should have additional authority for such arguments by virtue of their membership in one division of an organization actively working in many ways for the liberation of the refugees' homelands.

Also, just as the presence of extracurricular schools, by their guarantee of the preservation of the essentials of national culture, encourage attendance at German schools, so the manifestations of NCFE's similar interest on the local level through FECS might liberate the refugee from the anxiety for maintaining his traditions within his smaller group and so diminish his reluctance to attempt some measure of adaptation. In this connection the citizenship approach applies particularly, since FECS must demonstrate that NCFE is not only generally and broadly interested in keeping satellite culture alive (in the DIO and (as at FEUE), but also in keeping the individual refugee living outside a camp, in touch with his compatriots and traditions not only through personal contact but by making available to him publications in his language, etc; In this way the refugee might be encouraged in his slow process of adaptation to strange and in many cases hostile environment.

This is again a vast problem affected by many factors far beyond the scope of FECS or NCFE. It is almost certainly true that if more respectable and worthwhile jobs were available to refugees, much of their apparently nationally based aversion to adaptation would disappear.

But if FECS makes emphasis on adaptation one of its major points of policy, and makes this fact clear to the local national and international authorities, and then actively implements this policy as suggested above, it will almost certainly find itself most sympathetically regarded by these authorities.

2. These are but a few of the functions which FECS should be able to perform; anyone regularly active in the field could probably suggest many more. There are, however, certain broader potentialities for the development of this instrument which might be briefly suggested here.

In the first place, it should be possible to gain some advantage, beyond the fact that they come to us, from the presence of the refugees in the West. FECS might be able to produce such an advantage.

To brand this approach as hopelessly idealistic is to ignore the extraordinary practical results achieved at Camp Valka from July 1951 to January 1952 by the German camp commander at that time, von Homeyer. When von Homeyer, with no previous experience of these problems arrived, Valka was in terrible situation. Knifings and riots were frequent and the Nuremberg police were not only on constant alert, but a force of 28 men was maintained at the camp.

Von Homeyer began by calling the national representatives together, and it took him two weeks to get them into one room.

Finally, when they had assembled, he gave them hell and explained it would be a waste of time for them to try to alter or influence the situation in their own countries from Valka. He told them he believed the cause of many difficulties was the personal interest of many of the leaders in preparing the way for big roles at home after liberation. He then presented his idea of forming the first European community at Valka. He told the national representatives he had no support from Munich — he was on his own and asked for their help and cooperation. One by one they came to him and agreed.

Von Homeyer's technique of making friends with the people, with whom he soon acquired an excellent reputation, was an effective instrument in swinging their national committees to his side, for aware of his popularity, they hesitated not to show active cooperation. As a means of delegating self-administration of the camp to elected representatives, von Homeyer was about to establish a small parliament when he was recalled by reason of a German administrative snafu in which favoritism played a part. Just before his departure, the Nuremberg chief of police approached him and asked that he request the withdrawal of the permanent squad, which the chief felt was no longer required due to the enormous progress in camp behaviour.

After von Homeyer's replacement by an unimaginative bureaucrat, the situation at Valka relapsed into violence. Yet his influence lingered, and delegations from the national groups visited him, begging him to return to the camp. Later, when the situation became even worse, delegates from the German administrative personnel at Valka also came to urge that he return. This was just before our talk with him, and the employees brought with them tales of the latest knifing. Obviously von Homeyer's idealistic and far-sighted approach to the refugee problem had made a profound impression not only upon the refugees themselves but on Germans associated with the problem in a practical way.

Von Homeyer's European community approach might be borne in mind in connection with NCFE's espousal of the policy of Federalism. Similarly the FECS citizenship approach might have the potentiality of being broadened to provide grass-roots emphasis on this aspect of NCFE's policy. The idea of European citizenship for refugees is not original or new, but it might provide NCFE and RFE with a useful propaganda weapon."

Von Homeyer's realistic and productive idealism perhaps also indicates the necessity for at least trying to uncover and support more positive elements than the usual exile political leaders, even though it is believed likely that the latter will be able to regain control of their political machinery and return to power after liberation. For this reason, not to attempt the production of more constructive leaders and attitudes more amenable to NCFE and US interests is an example of infatuation with "hard-boiled" realism for its own sake.

-:-:-:-:-:-:-

Another potential use of FECS might be in conjunction with certain proposals advanced by individual RFE staff members. These call for the use of refugees as sounding boards for group reactions to new broadcast themes and as sample groups for testing basic satellite country attitudes. Refugees helped by FECS might be more interested in contributing to such projects; conversely, FECS efforts to restore their feeling of belonging to the struggle for liberation of their countries would be immeasurable assisted by this opportunity for them to assist in the sharpening of this potent "sister weapon".

-:-:-:-:-

NCFE and RFE exile employees who by and large form a privileged class among the refugees as a result of being relatively well paid, should be encouraged to contribute small but regular amounts of their salaries on a voluntary deduction basis to refugee welfare. Some RFE employees have already done this on an informal basis and have expressed a desire to do so on a regular deduction basis but have been discouraged by the information that this would involve a violation of RFE regulations. In view of the success of a similar welfare fund instituted by the Polish Labor Service Companies attached to the U.S. Army in Germany, it is recommended that this possibility be investigated. FECS might prove a sure means of channeling such aid to the refugee.

-:-:-:-:-:-

The form for refugees in Turkey established by the Gazi Khan Bessolt Committee which has an international aspect resembling Von Homoyer's approach would qualify for inclusion in the FECS program, although no specific proposal can be made until after a detailed field survey.

D. Proposed organizations of FECS.

1. FECS will be a service section of NCFE under the directorship of NCFE's General European Representative. General policy headquarters will therefore be in Paris as well as the operational subsection responsible for the administration of the FECS branches in England and France. This will have the advantages of removing the general policy headquarters from the immediate tensions and pressures of the frontier countries. The Director will have the task of general policy coordination of FECS with other NCFE divisions and of gaining on a high level the acceptance of and cooperation with FECS by the national and international authorities concerned, perhaps by emphasis on the contribution which FECS could make to their efforts to resolve the refugee problem.

2. Operational headquarters under the direction of a FECS Deputy Director will be in Munich, the point closest to the refugees' geographical center : from Munich the German refugee reception center at Valka and the Austrian equivalent at Wels are each within half a day's drive, or less.

3. The Deputy Director will be responsible for the implementation on the operational level in all areas of all the functions of FECS in line with policies established by the Director. The Deputy Director will be responsible for general operational policy coordination with the national and international authorities and voluntary agencies locally active.

4. The Deputy Director will have six Area Assistants :

1) North Germany, center Bonn or Hannover.

2) South Germany, center Munich and Valka

3) US and French zones of Austria, center Salzburg and Wels.

4) British Zone Austria and Trieste - possibly two assistants

5) Italy, center Rome.

6) Paris, London and Benelux, center Paris.

7) Greece and Turkey, probably will require one area assistant each. However, no field survey of the refugee situation in these two countries has as yet been possible.

The duties of these Assistants will be to provide guidance, inspiration and close administrative and financial supervision of the various national sections of FECS in their respective areas. These Area Assistants must have considerable administrative and financial latitude in order that FECS may possess the high degree of flexibility essential to its effective exploitation of the fluid refugee situation. They must be fully informed of all employment and emigration possibilites, projects of voluntary agencies, etc. Their cooperation and relations with local authorities and active agencies must be close and their relations with them always excellent.

4. FECS will, in each area where it is to operate, form National Sections. These National Sections will be recruited and appointed by FECS. They may or may not include individual representatives of organizations already locally active. In rare cases in the frontier countries, bgt almost entirely in England and France, proven exile-organized refugee aid Committees will become the local National Sections. In cases where no proven exile-organized refugee aid Committees exist, the FECS Area Assistant will recruit with the help and approval of the Deputy Director a National Section Chief, who will in turn, with the approval of the Area Assistant, recruit his own paid assistant or associate where necessary, and as many as local volunteer section member-representatives as may be required by the amount of work, geographical distribution of the refugees, etc.

5. Possible organization of FECS national sections :

England

a) Albanians : special case

b) Bulgarians : Mme Karastoyanova as Section Chief

c) Czechoslovaks : Anglo-Czechoslovak Relief Committee

d) Estonians : Association of Estonians in Great Britain

e) Hungarians : Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
Possibly Father Henkey-Hönig

f) Latvians : Latvian Welfare Association

g) Lithuanians : Lithuanian Association in Great Britain

h) Poles : Polish Ex-Combatants Association

i) Rumanian : Anglo-Rumanian Refugee Committee

j) Yugoslavs : Yugoslav Welfare Committee (special case)

France

a) Albanians : special case

b) Association des Réfugiés Bulgares en France

c) Comité d'Aide Sociale aux Réfugiés Tchécoslovaques

d) Comité d'Entr'Aide Estonien

e) Comité des Réfugiés Hongrois

f) Association d'Entr'Aide Letton en France

g) Association Lithuanienne de Bienfaisance

h) Polish Section Chief and probably two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.

i) CAROMAN

j) Yugoslav Section Chief and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed (Special case).

Germany

a) special case

b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.

c) Czechoslovak Section, paid Associate and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed.

d) Estonian National Committee

e) Hungarian Office, plus Hungarian Relief Action

f) Latvian National Committee plus Latvian Red Cross

g) Lithuanian National Committee

h) Polish Section Chief and two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.

i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.

j) Yougoslav Section Chief and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed (Special case).

Austria

a) Special case - Albanians

b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.

c) Czechoslovak Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.

d) Estonians - none

e) Hungarian Section Chief and two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.

f) Latvians - none

g) Lithuanians - none

h) Polish Section Chief to be appointed. Possible use of APWR Salzburg representative, Mr. Knilski.

i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.

j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be appointed. Possible use of Colonel Bojovic (Special case).

Trieste

a) special case - Albanians

b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

c) Czechoslovaks - none

d) Estonians - none

e) Hungarian Section Chief and one paid assistant to be appointed. Possible use of Prof. Ternay as half-time Chief with full time assistant.

f) Latvians - none

g) Lithuanians - none

h) Polish Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

i) CAROMAN Trieste delegate and staff (Mr. Di Demetrio)

j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be recruited and appointed (Special Case).

Italy

a) Special case- Albanians

b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

c) Czechoslovaks - none

d) Estonians - none

e) Hungarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

f) Latvians - none

g) Lithuanians - none

h) Polish Section Chief and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed

i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be recruited and appointed (Special Case).

Note : In cases where no national section is provided due to the insignificant numbers of refugees present or probable, it is assumed that the area Assistant could handle the needs of special arrivals or cases if existent.

E. PROPOSED ANNUAL BUDGET FOR FREE EUROPE CONSULAR SERVICE.

1; Salaries

a; Americans

1) Deputy Director	$ 12,000.00
2) 5 Area Assistants at $7,500.00 per year. (the duties of the sixth Area Assistant, covering France, Britain and the Benelux countries might be performed by a member of the staff of the Paris office).	37,500.00
3) Executive Secretary to Deputy Director	4,000.00

4) Bookkeeper (possibly locally hired)	$ 3,000.00
	$ 56,500.00
5) Quarters and living allowances (35% rough estimate : $ 19,775.00)	19,775.00
Total American Salaries	$ 76,275.00
b. Exile Salaries	
1) 24½ ~~241/2~~ National Section Chiefs and Associates at $250 per month	83,500.00
2) 10 paid assistants for National Sections at $ 150 per month	18,000.00
Total salaries Exiles and American	$177,775.00
2. Travel in Europe and Maintenance of cars at $200 each for 7 American staff members ($1400.00 per month)	16,800.00
3. Two Annual Round trips U.S. - Europe	2,000.00
4. Rent, stationery, telephone, etc. for Deputy Director's office	6,000.00
5. Expenses (travel, stationery, postage, etc. for 24 1/2 National Section Chiefs at $30 a month per person)	8,820.00
6. Monthly subsidies to Exile-Organized Refugee Aid Committees	
a. Bulgarian Refugee Committee - London (Mrs. Karastoyanova)	3,000.00
b. Anglo-Czechoslovak Relief Committee (London)	3,000.00
c. Estonian Consulate - Welfare Division (London)	2,000.00
d. Latvian Welfare Association (London)	2,000.00
e. Lithuanian Welfare Committee (London)	2,000.00
f. Polish Ex-Combattants Association (London)	10,800.00
g. Anglo-Roumanian Relief (London)	5,400.00
h. Yugoslav Welfare Committee (London) through B.A.F.C.Y.	2,000.00
i. Association des Réfugiés Bulgares en France (Paris)	4,800.00

j. Comité d'Aide Sociale aux Réfugiés Tchécoslovaques (Paris)	$ 4,800.00
k. Comité d'Entr'Aide Estonien (Paris)	3,000.00
l. Comité des Réfugiés Hongrois (Paris)	10,800.00
m. Association d'Entr'Aide Letton en France (Paris)	3,000.00
n. Association Lithuanienne Bienfaisance (Paris)	3,000.00
o. CAROMAN (Paris)	4,300.00
p. Estonian National Committee (Germany)	6,000.00
q. Hungarian Office and Hungarian Relief Action (Germany)	20,000.00
r. Latvian National Committee and Latvian Red Cross (Germany)	7,000.00
s. Lithuanian National Committee (Germany)	8,000.00
t. CAROMAN (Trieste)	1,200.00
7. Matérial costs of Implementation of FECS Program (extra-curricular schools, reading rooms, meetings, subscriptions, charts, posters, publicity)	50,000.00
8. Welfare Fund	50,000.00
Total Annual Budget for FECS	$417,695.00

Capital Outlay in Initial Years of Operation

a. purchase of 5 cars at $1000 each for use of 5 areas assistants in frontier countries	5,000.00
b. 10 one-way trips U.S.-Europe for transportation to job of American personnel (and wives and children where they exist at $500 each)	5,000.00
c. Furniture and equipment for Deputy Director's office	700.00
Total	$ 10,700.00

-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-

Mary Augustine

Roger L. Bull

[illegible] Information

29 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Report of Ex-King Michael's Interest in Rumanian Refugee Unity

1. Transmitted herewith is a report which will be of interest to the NCFE in its current negotiations with the Rumanian refugees.

2. The views of the King with regard to the Iron Guards and others listed, are in agreement with those of this Division.

3. It is requested that arrangements be made for representatives of the NCFE to meet with personnel of this Division to discuss the current negotiations and utilizing this recent information.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

Attachment

Orig - Durkee

SECRET

SECRET

24 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: G. Popescu-Botosani; J. Radovan; J. Aron

1. This office has no objection, with respect to security, to the employment of the three subject Rumanians, who have requested State Department assistance in getting on the NCFE payroll.

2. However, it is recommended that no action be taken on their behalf until the present attempt to settle the refugee situation is completed, in order to avoid any appearance of NCFE's favoring one faction.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SB

4 Attachments
Biographies

SECRET

orig - Durkee

14-00000

625-1

SECRET
Security Inf

July 22, 1952

To: George Lofton

From: Leonard I. Stamm

For your information I enclose a copy of our contract letter with Leland Stowe. I send you this because of the considerable discussion of the case.

I can't tell you how much I appreciate your consideration and help in this whole affair. It really pulled us out of a deep, deep hole. My very best.

~~Leonard I. Stamm~~

attachment in ~~ACFE~~ TONIC files (dtd 17 July)

SECRET
Security I

SECRET

B.

File

22 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe

Attached is a memorandum which it is suggested be shown to the Director of Central Intelligence in time for a scheduled meeting of the Director, members of CIA, and members of the Board of the National Committee for a Free Europe on Monday, 4 August.

L. K. WHITE
Acting Deputy Director
(Administration)

Attachment
As stated.

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - ADD/A
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

DRAFT

SECRET
Security Information

[illegible] - Richards' memo

21 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: DCI

SUBJECT: Study of Working Relations Between NCFE and CIA by IO and AS/S

1. Following upon its assumption of responsibility for the NCFE project, IO, aided by the AS/S, has undertaken over the past two months an investigation into the NCFE/CIA relations. It ~~is apparent~~ has concluded that these relations have deteriorated to a dangerous extent and that the Agency has lost control of the NCFE activity to a degree it can no longer ignore.

2. In general, the fundamental defect in the relationship is that the NCFE has refused to recognize the legitimate duties and responsibilities of CIA for the policies, financial administration, and security aspects of the NCFE, and the latter has persisted in regarding itself as virtually autonomous. The secondary weakness in the situation has been the inadequacy and confusion of the procedures which were developed to maintain control over ~~and~~ of evaluation of NCFE's activities.

3. As examples of the consequences to which these weaknesses have led, the following are cited: (here should be discussed illustrations of specific problems such as those in your para. a.)

4. The remedy which is being developed as a consequence of this investigation is the re-definition of the responsibilities of CIA and authorities of NCFE and the development of new procedures for the conduct of relations between NCFE and CIA. These definitions and procedures have been reduced to a Memorandum of Agreement which has been prepared by CIA and submitted to NCFE for study. A copy of this Agreement is attached as Appendix A. The Senior Vice President of the NCFE has ~~xxxxxxx~~ reviewed this Agreement in detail and has prepared his comments thereon, a copy of

SECRET
Security Information

which is attached as Appendix B. In brief, these comments bear out in instance after instance the assertions set forth above as to the fundamental difficulties with which we are faced in the administration of this project.

5. The PRC already has reviewed this Agreement and the 1953 fiscal year budget submitted by NCFE. The Committee is so convinced of the weakness of the present situation and the need for its improvement along the lines suggested by the Memorandum of Agreement that it has refused to approve the budget of the NCFE until a satisfactory Memorandum of Agreement is concluded and the budget resubmitted in the manner prescribed therein.

6. There is, ~~thus~~, a choice between basically only two alternatives, viz.,

CIA either has a duty and responsibility to ensure, affirmatively, the conduct of the NCFE program in accordance with CIA's own special mission and general responsibilities as a Government agency, or

The NCFE is an autonomous organization operating independently of any Government direction and control, in which event this Agency should formally abdicate the responsibilities with which it has been charged in this connection.

13 July 1952

Dear Mr. Lea:

I would appreciate it if you would deliver this envelope to Mr. John C. Hughes, 40 Worth Street, New York.

Thanks,

/S/ Tom Braden

2203 Foxhall Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
17 July, 1952

Dear John:

I was glad of our meeting day before yesterday and I am looking forward to seeing you soon again.

Here is a memorandum I addressed to A. a short time ago which I would like you to read because it may give you some indication of how we are trying to get to work here. It is for your eyes only.

I talked to Min on the telephone this morning and he seemed in an extremely bellicose mood. This bellicosity, replete with references to "little people who get in his hair", "from now on I'm dealing only with the top", and "otherwise there are going to be some resignations here" is difficult for me because I am partly Irish, and as able to resign as the next man. I have succeeded, however, in maintaining my Scotch heritage to the fore so far, and since you assure me that none of this is personally directed at myself, or people like Bill Durkee whom I persuaded to come and help me or to the job that I am sincerely and honestly trying to do, I will try to keep it there. It was nevertheless awfully calming to have a chance for such a good talk with you.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

/s/ T

Mr. John Hughes
McCampbell & Company
40 Worth Street
New York, New York

SECRET
Security Information
~~EYES ONLY~~

3-5308

11 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. Admiral Miller will call upon the DDCI soon to request more funds for the Crusade for Freedom. At the present rate of expenditure, funds will run out on 31 December.

2. $488,991 was budgeted for the Crusade this year. We have told Admiral Miller that since the Crusade was unable to live within this budget, we were certain that the Agency would appropriate more money to wind it up, although we have explained that his request was embarrassing because the PRC had expressly approved $488,991 instead of a larger amount in the belief that less money should be expended this year. We have asked Admiral Miller to provide us with a financial statement of the Crusade cost to date as well as a breakdown of the further amount needed.

3. The Crusade this year has so far cost only a quarter of last year's expenditure and half of the amount expended in 1950. Receipts are up, 140% over last year at this date. On the whole, a much better job has been done to date than we anticipated -- and purely in terms of the amount raised the performance has been superior.

4. There is a good deal of gossip about the use of Crusade funds and I think you should be acquainted with it. Because the Crusade is a rather public enterprise, the gossip has occasionally been sounded not only within NCFE and this Agency but also among "semi-witting" private citizens who have been enlisted for short-term fund-raising on an unpaid basis. The gossip is that a good deal of money has found its way into the private hands of local Crusade chairmen and workers. In one instance, it is said, involving a local chairman in Minnesota, the amount which reached private hands was enough to build a new home. Another story I have heard repeated by different people on different occasions is that in the state of Nevada and certain other locales no money received by fund-raising chairmen last year was ever turned in to Headquarters, and no report ever made. Another item which some

of the people in the New York office talk about is the payment of $37,500 to Fred C. Smith, who worked for approximately one month in drawing up a Dimes for Freedom campaign which, as you recall, was rejected as a basis for this year's campaign.

5. No accounting of Crusade funds expended in the field has ever been made, and in a fund-raising campaign it is perhaps impossible to do so. Nevertheless, records involving payments for expense money to private citizens engaged for the duration of the campaign are chaotic. You will recall that Spencer Phenix, Treasurer of NCFE, refuses to have anything to do with expenditures for the Crusade.

6. Since we are winding up the Crusade this year and will attempt to place it on a more reliable basis through the Heritage Foundation, I suggest that you assure Admiral Miller that funds sufficient to wind up the Crusade will be forthcoming and that you instruct the IO Division to expedite a project granting these funds. I further suggest that in view of the allegations above, which I repeat for your private background information, you keep the position of the Agency faultless by requesting from Admiral Miller a budget in as much detail as possible for the amount necessary to liquidate the Crusade.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information

17 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Deputy Director (Administration)

FROM: Acting Chief, Administrative Staff (Special)

SUBJECT: Conference with TPTONIC Management re TPTONIC/CIA Agreement

1. On 9 July 1952 Mr. Echols and I conferred with the President and the Treasurer of the TPTONIC organization regarding the fiscal portion of the proposed Agreement to be reached between CIA and TPTONIC.

2. The purpose of the conference was to extend to the TPTONIC management an offer of aid in the interpretation and implementation of the fiscal phase of the Agreement in response to TONIC's request for assistance in this connection.

3. Our statement of the Agency's position may be summarized briefly as follows:

a. The Agency is insistent upon obtaining the detailed information regarding TONIC's activities which is essential in order to fulfill the Agency's fundamental policy, fiscal, and security responsibilities. The great size to which TONIC has grown makes it necessary for the Agency to take a closer interest in TONIC's activities than it has in the past.

b. Although final concurrence in an Agreement has not been reached by TONIC, it is necessary that revision of the financial budget be commenced immediately if PRC budget approval is to be obtained as soon as possible after a final Agreement has been reached. The budget document must be expanded in order to provide reasonably detailed information not only as to proposed changes from the previous year's activities but also regarding the continuing activities as well. Without this additional information there is lacking sufficient data on which to base the approval of any allotment of funds.

4. The President assured us that a revision of the budget would be undertaken immediately to provide not only the information the Agency requires but also to eliminate incompletely planned, vaguely foreseen requirements. He assured us that the revision would be completed in time to permit a review, prior to its presentation to the PRC, for the purpose of determining that the document attains the standards set forth in the Agreement. The Treasurer concluded that he was sufficiently familiar with the terms of the fiscal portion of the Agreement to be able to satisfy its requirements, but promised to call upon us if he should desire further clarification.

SECRET
Security Information

5. In order to avoid later misunderstandings we set forth briefly the concept of financial control contemplated in the budget section of the Agreement. We noted that the Agency must have confidence that the programs of the various TOMIC divisions are carried out to the approximate extent proposed in the Agency approved budget since other Agency plans must be synchronized harmoniously with TOMIC's approved program. Accordingly, the principle of establishing an expenditure ceiling for each of the TOMIC divisions is regarded by the Agency as fundamental with which inter-division transfers without Agency approval would be incompatible. We assured the President it positively was not the intent of the Agency to lift managerial responsibility from TOMIC's own hands, and that the controls contemplated by the Agreement are aimed not at stifling managerial activity but rather to the attainment of the minimum checks which the Agency feels it must insist upon in view of the scope and importance of the TOMIC program in the fulfillment of the Agency's own responsibilities and mission.

6. The President expressed his appreciation of the Agency's viewpoint in the matter of financial control although he did not expressly commit TOMIC to its adoption. He did, however, promise to undertake a point by point review of the terms of the Agreement immediately so that the specific areas of doubt or disagreement may be localized and disposed of in further negotiations.

7. This Staff feels that there is in reality no misunderstanding of the Agreement on the part of TOMIC nor any lack of technical confidence to carry out its terms. The problem of attaining and understanding, therefore, comes to nothing more than a determination by TOMIC management to accept the minimum of control upon which the Agency is insistent.

Frederick W. Richards
Acting Chief, Administrative
Staff (Special)

Distribution:
Acting DD/A - Orig.
CCC - 1
IO Division - 1 ✓
AS/S Chrono - 1

ER 3-0917

15 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe; proposed employment of Mr. Leland Stowe.

REFERENCE: Memo from Security Officer to DCI dated 12 January, and attachments.

1. As the result of an extensive consideration of the problem created by the NCFE offer of employment to Leland Stowe, and in light of the adverse information concerning Mr. Stowe's past connections and affiliations with certain organizations, it was decided by the Director upon the recommendations of Messrs. Dulles, Hedden and the undersigned that Mr. Stowe should not be employed by NCFE as Chief of the RFE information collection program.

2. When Admiral Miller was informed today of this decision, together with the reasons upon which it was based, he and his staff immediately proceeded to re-examine the entire problem and within an hour-and-one-half communicated to the undersigned an entirely new proposition concerning Mr. Stowe, of which the following were the principal elements:

a. In line with the Director's decision, Mr. Stowe would not be employed by NCFE as Chief of the information collection activity of RFE.

b. In lieu thereof he would be offered a contract as a "consultant and contributor of information" for a six-months term.

c. He would not be offered a salary but would be placed on a fee basis, and paid according to the amount of work and material which he contributes.

d. Thus he will not become an official of RFE or NCFE, and will not be in such a position as to enable anyone to maintain that he guides the policy of or controls the flow of information to Radio Free Europe.

e. Subject to prior approval from our security office, Admiral Miller and Mr. Lang will endeavor to secure the services of either Mr. Cy Burgin of the Time-Life organization, or Mr. Russell Hill of the New York Herald Tribune as Chief of the information collection activity of Radio Free Europe. They are both regarded as competent and experienced individuals, and Mr. Burgin has already indicated his interest in this position if it were open.

3. The proposal described in the preceding paragraph was submitted to Mr. Dulles and to Mr. Braden by the undersigned, and they both expressed their approval. Mr. Dulles said that, on the basis of our discussion with the Director, he felt certain that this arrangement would be acceptable from the standpoint of CIA. The Admiral was so advised by the undersigned and expressed himself as being entirely satisfied and very pleased. He undertook to check through Mr. Braden on the acceptability from a security standpoint of Messrs. Burgin and Hill.

4. One other aspect of this matter is worth recording for future reference: Mr. Hedden has stated that he has been well acquainted with Mr. Stowe for many years, having known him in college and having followed his career rather closely. On the basis of everything he knows about Mr. Stowe, Mr. Hedden is convinced that Mr. Stowe is a loyal American citizen and that there would be no real risk in his case on the issue of loyalty as such. In the opinion of Mr. Hedden, Mr. Stowe's past proclivity for becoming involved with left-wing movements (some of them presently regarded as subversive) is not a commentary on his loyalty but rather on his judgment. At times before and during the war he was prone to hop onto popular bandwagons and to take a line in his writings and broadcasts that seemed to be popular at the time. In other words, he is an opportunist by nature and prone to take up causes which appeal to him as having wide popular interest and support as of any given moment. This propensity on the part of Mr. Stowe is not without its professional and commercial aspects.

Signed FRANK G. WISNER

Encls
References.

FRANK G. WISNER

DD/P-FGW/bjm

Distribution:
Orig. - DCI, DDCI, IG - with enclosures.
cc: - C/IO - 1
Security Officer - 1
ER - 1
DD/P chrono - 1

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
2-0717

14 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Papers on NCFE Views on Yugoslavia

1. Here are NCFE's views on Yugoslavia which you asked for.

2. I am worried about item d) in particular. The other items may be justifiable on the grounds that we have to take care of people in this country, but item d) may seem to be taking unnecessary forward steps.

3. As you suggested, we have asked the State Department for a review of the entire national council policy, and I am sure we will get State's views on Yugoslavia at this time.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments
  1. Ltr to Allen Dulles from
     Leonard Stamm dtd 7 July 52.
  2. Memo dtd 2 July 52 re NCFE
     views on Yugoslavia.

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee (thru DD/P)
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - IO/TOMIC
2 cc - RI

SECRET

DD/P-1752

3.5643

18 December 1952

1 Jan 53

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Briefing of Secretary of the Army on 17 December on NCFE and CFA

1. On 17 December, I briefed Secretary of the Army Pace on the subjects of the National Committee for a Free Europe and the Committee for a Free Asia.

2. The briefing covered both physical assets and concepts. Secretary Pace asked many questions, for example:

a. How did NCFE handle the problem of Yugoslav exiles and at the same time use the Yugoslavian defection as an argument in its broadcasts to Iron Curtain countries?

b. How much did the State Department have to say about the day-to-day operations?

c. The duties of the President?

In addition, he expressed great enthusiasm over the concept of the two Committees and in general for the concept of covert psychological warfare. He interrupted at one point to talk at some length about his belief that while it was essential to continue to draft boys as soldiers and produce rifles, it was just as essential, and in the long run more conducive to ultimate peace, to wage the argument for democracy to a questioning world in a covert manner. He indicated that he thought very little of the government's overt propaganda program and that from what he knew about the government's covert program as conducted by CIA, it was the effective means to the end.

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Sr. 772

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS

Sent to N.Y. 23 July 1952

To Durkee: I think the content of ~~[illegible]~~ Wisner's memo, ought to be relayed to Miller, Walsh et al.

Return to E Hill for file

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

SECRET
Security Information

14 July 1952

For Miller

MEMORANDUM

I would certainly be inclined to agree with FGW on the importance of a dignified "worthy cause" sort of campaign. Moreover I would scrupulously avoid any activity which might cast doubt on the good faith of the Crusade (e.g.,"We gave our money for balloons at Christmas — where are they?")

REL
REL

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

ER 3-0732

9 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed Campaign of the Crusade for Freedom (ER 3-0686).

1. Please note the attached inquiry from Tom Braden, in which he raises two questions with respect to balloons. The following are my recommendations on the two questions, respectively:

a. I see no objection to reference by the Freedom Crusade campaign to the use of balloons, provided this is handled with care. By this I mean that it would be all right for the Crusade to refer to its former use of balloons and the effectiveness of this use, and also to say that the National Committee for a Free Europe will, on an appropriate occasion and at the right time, make further use of balloons. It would be wrong and unwise for many reasons to make a flat statement as to the exact time and content of further balloon operations. There is no point in thus telegraphing our punch to the opposition, and it would get us into trouble if we were to be too specific about the timing and subject matter of any new messages.

b. I would be very much opposed to the stunts such as dropping Christmas leaflets out of balloons over packed football stadiums. This is the kind of flamboyant publicity which we have agreed not to undertake this year, and incidentally which makes us look as though we were in the class with commercial advertisers or irresponsible and playful student pranksters ~~[illegible]~~, or both. I thought Abbott Washburn had gone to help Ike!

FGWisner
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)
ER 3-0686, dtd 7 July

DD/P-FGW/bjm

Distribution:
Orig. - addressee w/att
1 cc - ER
1 cc - DD/P chrono

SECRET
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
3-0686

SECRET

7 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Request for Decision as to whether Crusade for Freedom Campaign Beginning 15 November may use a Dropping of Leaflets Theme in its Propaganda.

1. Admiral Miller of NCFE has appointed a new head for Crusade for Freedom, Mr. Richard Walsh, formerly of the State Department. Mr. Walsh has submitted a new plan for the Crusade for Freedom campaign to begin November 15. The campaign will be based upon the idea of sending Christmas message leaflets behind the iron curtain with publicity that the Crusade for Freedom will use balloons among other methods for this purpose. It was originally contemplated that the Crusade would in fact send balloons as it did last year. Bearing in mind, however, the DCI's warning about using any propaganda device which might give the Soviet a weapon in its bacteriological warfare campaign, we have instructed the Crusade that there will be no actual transmission of balloons.

2. Will it be permissible for the Crusade to publicize the use of balloons, to employ such stunts as dropping the Christmas leaflets out of balloons over packed football stadiums in the United States and to give the general impression that balloons will be one of the ways to carry messages from the American people behind the iron curtain, even though they will in fact not be employed?

3. You will appreciate that an immediate decision is essential.

Thomas Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Distribution:
Original - DDCI through DD/P
cc: ADPC - 1
CIO - 1
IO/TONIC - 2
RI - 2

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

14 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WALTER PFORZHEIMER
Office of the General Counsel

SUBJECT: Follow-up on your report of 26 June 1952 re: Captain Stanislaw Oskierka.

1. The following report of 2 July 1952, is a reply to our presentation to the Admiral of the subject report:

"I have questioned Tom about the matter cited in your letter of 30 June 1952, File Number6-3039. Tom states that the facts are as follows:

1. By letter dated March 20, 1952, Congressman Robert Tripp Ross requested consideration for the employment of Captain Oskierka. The latter was interviewed on several occasions, and prospects of his employment were fully examined. After careful consideration, it developed that Oskierka was not useful in any division of our operation, and there was no job for him. He was personally so informed by Tom in a subsequent interview on May 6, 1952, in which Oskierka expressed his understanding of the situation.

2. Under date of May 23, 1952, Congressman Ross again wrote us stating that Oskierka had contacted him again about the possibilities of a job with us. I wrote the Congressman under date of June 5, 1952, telling him that, although we had made every effort to place him, we were unable to offer Oskierka a position.

3. On or about June 25, 1952, Congressman Ross' local secretary telephoned my office inquiring about Oskierka. My secretary referred her to Tom who then talked at some length with Congressman Ross' secretary. He told the latter that we had no position for Oskierka and that we had so informed the Congressman by letter above cited. In the course of the conversation, the secretary inquired as to what suggestions we could offer relative to such a position for Oskierka as would be useful in procuring an extension of his visitor's visa. Tom stated that he might suggest to the Congressman that he might make inquiry in Oskierka's behalf in various Government agencies in Washington, stating that Oskierka seemed to have various useful talents which might interest someone other than us.

SECRET

4. Tom has never talked with Congressman Ross. Tom did not state to his secretary or to anyone else that Congressman Ross' candidate might be able to get a position with you. Tom states that he knows better for obvious reasons than to make any such suggestion to anyone.

For your more complete information in this matter, a copy of an internal memorandum is enclosed.

Sincerely

/s/ H. B. Miller "

2. We should like to know if the information you obtained from CIA personnel agrees with this report.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Encl:-1 copy

IO/TURIC : NBV/hka
Distributions:
Orig:- Addressee
2 cc - C/IO ✓
2 cc - IO/TURIC
2 cc - RI

SECRET

C O P Y

SECURITY INFORMATION

May 27, 1952

Memorandum

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Captain Stanislaw Oskierka

There are no prospects for utilizing Captain Oskierka's services by the Fund.

I must say that I do not like the behavior of Oskierka in again trying to pressure us via Congressman Ross. As the attached file shows, he has been most courteously treated here; every effort has been made to place him; and he has expressed himself as being pleased with the treatment and attention accorded him. I personally informed him and explained in great detail that his background made it impossible for us to use him here. He stated to me that he thoroughly understood this and that he was quite satisfied that we had examined the proposition thoroughly.

I don't suppose that it can be told to Congressman Ross, but Bernie Yarrow has taken his whole story to certain of our friends to explore the possibilities of their possible interest in him since he stated to me that he is single and willing to go anywhere in the world to get into the fight.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION/OPC

FROM: AC/RDD/OTS

SUBJECT: Evaluation of New Type of Air Leaflet

REFERENCE: (a) Memorandum for RDD/TSS Subj: Request for Appraisal of Weiss proposal to NCFE of new type of air leaflet dtd 21 June 1952
(b) Telephone discussion between C/IOD/OPC and AC/RDD/OTS on 3 July 1952

1. Subject proposal has been received and will be established as RDD Ad Hoc Project No. 23.

2. This project will be carried out along the lines discussed in Reference (b), which will require a number of field experiments; therefore, some additional time will be needed for the complete evaluation. Information will be forwarded to you on these trials as it becomes available.

3. It is noted that the samples attached to Reference (a) are approximately 1¼" by 8". It is requested that you advise whether or not this leaflet is large enough for applications you have in mind. In the event that it is not, trials will be conducted with larger size leaflets of the same pattern.

L. R. DAILEY
Acting Chief
Research & Development

LRD:hmg

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

"CS" RECORD MATERIAL

DUE DATE

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM ~~[illegible]~~ ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED. 6A-50
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4548.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 12-62 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

3. 2D24 O Bowlin CA/HO		13 Nov	
4. S. Corbet OG/CFK			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14. RETURN TO 6A-50			
15. IP/ARD Rm ~~[illegible]~~			

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

78-1129
432393

~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible] 514590~~

FILE NO. Wash CIA AD 37

DOCUMENT:

FOLDER: 12 ~~[illegible]~~

PAGE:

BOX: 2

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

NCFE
January 1953-December 1953

LASSIFIED   R ICTED   CONFIDEN   SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (~~check mark insufficient~~) ~~before further~~ routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: C/IO/1	NO. IO-4-7
	DATE 31 Dec 53

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. CIO				TWB	FGW: I am sorry that through an oversight the 10 Dec 53 memo to DCI attached was neither routed through nor a copy sent to you. TWB DD/P noted
2.					
3. DD/P		[illegible] 6 54	18 Jan	CT 17	
4. C-IO					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

O. 51-10   SECRET   CONFIDENTIAL   RESTRICTED   UNCLASSIFIED

10-61155-3   U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

126

31 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Gregoire Gafencu

REFERENCE: Memo to DCI dtd 10 Dec'53, same subject

1. Both Whitney Shepardson and Bernie Yarrow were unable to persuade Gafencu to remain in the United States. He left for Paris 12 December 1953.

2. As a result of his own decision, Gafencu was informed it would not be possible for NCFE to continue support of him so long as he stayed in Europe, as it is now a firm NCFE policy not to give stipends to anyone overseas. Payments to Gafencu will, therefore, terminate as of 31 March 1954.

3. All the meetings between Mr. Shepardson and Gafencu were entirely cordial.

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief,
International Organizations Division

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

10 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Acting Chief, International Organizations Divisions

SUBJECT: Grigoire Gafencu

1. I have just spoken to Whitney Shepardson and he reports that he and Bernie Yarrow have been unable to persuade Gafencu to stay in the United States. Gafencu gave many reasons for wishing to live in Europe. He is leaving for Paris this Saturday.

2. As a result of his own decision, Gafencu was informed that it would not be possible for NCFE to continue support of him so long as he stayed in Europe, as it is now a firm NCFE policy not to give stipends to anyone overseas. Payments to Gafencu will, therefore, terminate as of 31 March 1954.

3. Mr. Shepardson stated that all of the meetings with Gafencu were entirely cordial.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief
IO/Branch 1

IO/Branch 1:WPD:jb
Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1
IO/Branch 1 - 2cc
CIO - 1cc
RI - 1cc

Gafencu ltr 12 Dec & attachment
(ltr from de Gaulle 25 NOV 53 to
Gafencu) returned to DCI
20 JAN
54

SECRET
Security Information

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED NFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief/IO Division		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		**INITIALS**	**DATE**
1	Exec. Asst. to DCI	JSE/dr	12 Jan 54
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

Remarks: The Director has noted the attached memorandum. He indicated to me that he had seen "something else on this". Do you know what he refers to?

JSE
JSEarman

1/20.

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

16—68468-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

14-00000

SECRET

8079

Executive Registry
5-0228

30 December 1953

Noted by DCI
11 Jan 54

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Report that Sensitive Files covering Emigre Activities may have been made Available to Senator McCarthy

1. The following report was made available to us by Eugene Lyons, former President of the American Committee, who still actively participates in Committee activities as a policy advisor. Mr. Lyons is a member of the Board of Directors of the American Friends for Russian Freedom, and he obtained this report from an unnamed source in the American Friends' organization.

2. A man named Verbitsky (fnu), living in Munich, has somehow managed to obtain the personal files of Georgi Mueller, the NTS safe-house keeper who was arrested as a Soviet agent last fall. These files contain, among other things, a number of letters to Mueller from Gregori Klimov, an influential emigre who is head of the emigre group known as the League of Post War Defectors. These letters involve Klimov in Mueller's activities, and implicate many other emigres. Verbitsky attempted to turn these documents over to unnamed authorities in the field; when he was ignored by these authorities, he mailed the entire parcel to Senator Joseph McCarthy.

3. The American Committee naturally considers that this correspondence, which, if it exists, no doubt contains a great deal of that unfounded denunciation and allegation which is so typical of emigre expression, may involve the American Committee as well as other matters of particular concern to the Agency.

4. The Chief, SR Division, has been made aware of this report.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief/IO

SECRET

14-00000

SIFIED RESTRICTED NFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICAT.... TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	~~SE/NE~~	JRR	JAN 4
2	Mr. Thomas Braden -	1028	K Bldg.
3	Dunlee —	Res.	
4	Discuss with		me
5	Braden 1028K		JWB
FROM		**INITIALS**	**DATE**
1	C/D/NE	St/g	31 Dec.
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

Remarks:

3-5 — Have [illegible] will put [illegible] Helms about this. We are about to engage [illegible]. We [illegible] major research project [illegible] with agency units in cooperation which will include [illegible]. Will discuss [illegible]

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
1947

10—03040-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

30 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRADEN

1. Professor Richard V. Burks of Wayne University is chairman of a small team of scholars engaged in a study of the European satellites.

2. The findings of this team are being given as the content of a course on the mid-European area. They are also, I believe, being broadcast.

3. The time of Professor Burks and his group is being purchased by the Mid-European Study Center which is, as you may know, under Mr. Stetson Holmes.

4. As yet Burks has no definite plan for the publication of his findings. Manifestly, the kind of book which would emerge from his research would have to receive some sort of subsidy. As you know, books of this sort, if they are considered important enough, are published as loss leaders by university presses. Also, as you doubtless know, university presses are in pretty straitened circumstances these days. If the Wayne University Press -- the normal place for the publication of Burks' book -- were to consider publishing the book, it might be able to publish it only with outside assistance. The figure would run probably between $1500 and $2000.*

5. In my opinion Burks is one of the most competent, if not the most competent man in the United States in this general field of investigation. Anything he turns out will be about as good as it comes. Although I have not seen any of this most recent work, my hunch is that it will be enormously valuable to the policy-maker and us estimators when the time comes for some deep thinking and critical decisions about the European satellites.

6. I thought you might be interested in the above, and with a little poking around yourself might feel inclined to give the venture whatever kind of boost seems appropriate.

Sherman Kent

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

* P.S. The proven way to get the best work out of a scholar is to have him know that it will be published + in normal course of events submitted to the critical [illegible] judgment of his peers.

SECRET
Security Information

PP/P 7643

1 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Current activities and behavior of Grigoire Gafencu.

REFERENCE: Paris 0615 (IN 37959) dated 28 November 1953

1. The reference telegram from Paris contains a recommendation that NCFE do what it can to prevail upon Gafencu to come back to the United States and engage himself in certain activities which may be of some use and value to NCFE. The following information was obtained yesterday from Mr. Tyler who is familiar with the background of the reference message.

2. Mr. Tyler stated that Mr. John Hughes has become somewhat concerned about the activities and behavior of Gafencu in Europe, and more especially in and around Paris, and although he does not believe that a major issue needs to be made of this matter, he is firmly of the opinion that Gafencu is not doing anything useful for the NCFE in Europe and that the net effect of his activities is somewhat to the disadvantage of the interests of the United States. Gafencu is believed to be maintaining a rather close association with Guy de la Tournelle (sp?) and his wife, who are described as "very sour apples and bitter opponents of EDC." Gafencu is also reported to have been involving himself with certain businessmen in France in a series of questionable oil promotion schemes. He is also reported to have been engaged in organizing a kind of information center in emigre circles and to be selling this information to Agence France Presse. Moreover, Gafencu has been selling himself and "throwing his weight around" on the basis of representations and strong intimations that he is a close and intimate friend of Mr. Allen Dulles. His utterances in this regard are regarded by Mr. Hughes as highly indiscreet, the more so since he appears to be living and entertaining on a scale sufficiently lavish to suggest that he is being provided with substantial funds -- well above the allowance granted to him by NCFE.

3. Mr. Hughes, as well as the Paris Station, fully appreciates that NCFE is not in a position to force the return of Gafencu to the United States. At the same time, he believes that NCFE should do

SECRET
Security Information

all that it can to get him out of Paris and he recommends that a strong invitation be extended by NCFE to Gafencu to return to the United States, and that this invitation be coupled with a statement to the effect that in view of budgetary considerations and the very marginal value of Gafencu's activities in Europe, it will not be possible for NCFE to continue his stipend unless he returns to the United States and engages himself in activities more useful to the program of NCFE.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Original: C/IO
cc: DCI
C/WE
C/SE

P. S. Since dictating this memorandum, I have received a report from a well-informed Rumanian source to the effect that Gafencu has returned to the United States within the past few days for the purpose of remaining here indefinitely. (The fact of Gafencu's return to the US has been positively established, and it is possible that within the next day or so confirmation will be obtained concerning his longer-range future intentions.) My Rumanian informant has told me that the real reason for Gafencu's return was an urgent request from Malaxa, who feels that he requires Gafencu's present in the United States to assist him (Malaxa) in government circles, etc. My Rumanian source is prejudiced against Malaxa, but has maintained contact with Gafencu notwithstanding this, and is convinced that Gafencu is still on Malaxa's pay roll and subject to Malaxa's demands for this reason.

29 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: The League of Free Rumanians

1. Correct title: The League of Free Rumanians.

2. The League has no offices but Barbu Niculescu is using the late General Radescu's address at 47 East 61st Street, New York; telephone PLaza 9-5540.

3. Its officers and executive committee are attached under Tab A.

4. Barbu Niculescu is Secretary General.

5. The League now has no offices and insofar as we know has discontinued publication of its bulletin. It is generally rumored that the organization is supported by Malaxa and it is presumed by knowledgeable people that in particular Malaxa supports Niculescu and Mihail Farcasanu, the two most active League officers, as well as Malaxa's nephew George Palade, who is a doctor in scientific research with Rockefeller Institute in New York.

6. Attached is a letter from Panuch to yourself dated 2 November 1953, your memo to Chief, SE Division and his reply, which you requested, as Tab B.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organisations Division

Attachments
Tabs A and B

CIO:TWB/eh
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/1
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET

Lang's file on this
has been in RE for
3 weeks. Do you
want to go ahead with
[illegible]?

14 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Conversation with Edward W. Barrett

1. I had a conversation with Ed Barrett on Friday, 11 December, who called to tell me about recent developments in respect to an Inter-European Radio Press Committee. He described the history of Hans Cohrssen's participation, with which you are familiar, and he went on to say that the two-fold objective at present is to get some sort of cooperation among European nations for broadcasting a frank discussion of foreign affairs in each other's countries, and secondly, to enlist the same sort of cooperation for a column which would appear in various countries, perhaps including this one, written by different people and discussing each week some aspect of foreign policy differences which might exist between and among countries.

2. The idea seems to me a pretty good one. Its principal asset is that it will allow the airing and discussion of issues among nations other than by diplomatic means.

3. Barrett pointed out that he is now putting Cohrssen definitely in a back seat, that he will soon come to us with a good responsible board of directors and officials. He said that he had enlisted Bob Lang's support and Bob had suggested to him that NCFE give the Institute a grant. Barrett said the Institute needs $25,000 to keep it going while it finds suitable leadership. I said that I would discuss the above with you and I would look forward to hearing from Mr. Lang.

SIGNED THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - DCIO, C/IO/1
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

14 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

VIA: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Conversation with Lee Pennington

1. On Friday, 11 December, I had a conversation with Lee Pennington, formerly of the FBI and recently appointed director of the National Americanism Commission of the American Legion.

2. Pennington was most cordial. He showed me a letter which he had written to the members of the Americanism Commission of the Legion in which he dismissed charges against RFE based principally on an attack by Kurt Glaser. The arguments he used in his letter he had drawn from briefings by this Agency. He thinks that this will be the end of the matter and that members of his Commission will no longer press for investigation of NCFE and RFE.

3. I took this opportunity to brief Pennington thoroughly on the World Veterans Federation which the Director had previously mentioned to him and about which he had had a little information, most of it false. He had been under the impression that we had something to do with it but that it was a left-wing outfit which we were investigating. At the end of our conversation he told me that he was thoroughly satisfied with the information I gave him and that he would take two steps in accordance with my request:

a. He would notify the Ford Foundation that the Legion looked upon the World Veterans Federation as a worthwhile outfit and would certainly not criticize the Foundation if it were to make a grant to the organization.

b. He said he would prevent any attacks on the organization coming from Legion membership being given serious consideration. He said that this could be taken care of by referring all such attacks to the Americanism Commission for study.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh
Orig & 1 - Addressees
1 cc - DCIO
1 cc - C/IO/1
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET

11 DEC 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: RFE Summary Reports

REFERENCE: Memorandum from C/10, dated 17 November 1953, Subject as above.

The appropriate SE Branches and Staffs have read the RFE Summary Report for October 1953, which you forwarded to this Division as an attachment to referenced memorandum. We have found the report well prepared and useful, both for SE Headquarters and for our field personnel working on propaganda projects. We would therefore appreciate your sending this Division two copies of subsequent RFE monthly reports, one of which will be retained by SE, while the other will be sent to our Athens Station.

JOHN H. RICHARDSON
Chief, SE

Addressee: 2

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

4 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: "News from Behind the Iron Curtain" - Mail Subscription for Mr. Arvo Tuominen

REFERENCE:
a. OSSA-1638, 20 Nov 1953
b. Memorandum to WE/PP-1 from IO/Branch I, 8 Oct 53
c. Memorandum to IOD/TONIC from WE/PP-1, 28 Sept 53
d. Memorandum to IOD/TONIC from WE/PP-1, 6 June 53

1. A recent dispatch from the Stockholm Station (reference a) reports that Mr. Tuominen is not receiving Subject publication. In light of reference memorandum b, which states that he has been on the mailing list since June 1952, it is apparent that there has been some slip-up in the distribution channels of this publication. A check of address indicates that Mr. Tuominen's address is the same as given in reference d.

2. It is requested that appropriate measures to taken to insure that Mr. Tuominen will receive this publication in the future. Please inform WE/PP-1 of the action taken regarding this matter.

PAUL BIRDSALL
C/WE

discussed orally (not sent)
sent sterile version to
Whitney.

River End, N. Roberts Lane
N. Arlington, Virginia
4 December 1953

Dear D'Arcy:

This is in reference to your telephone call of this afternoon. I have just had a full report on the matter of the seven visitors.

I am afraid you have got yourself on the hook on this one and nothing can be done about it except to go through with the bargain you made. This bargain, the documents indicate, was to bring the seven Czechs over here and take the responsibility you assumed when you signed the seven declarations of support affidavits.

Now having gotten that bad news off my chest, I hasten to add that I do not think this is going to be burdensome to you. You are doing a real public service, as I shall explain in a moment, and all of us will do our level best to help you.

I realize that you did not think you were assuming the responsibility for seven people. It is clear, however, that everyone else thought you were, and I think it is simply too late to change it now. The Czech regime is attacking the United States for its handling of emigres; it is attacking the camps which you have seen; it is pointing up the general hopelessness of an emigre's lot and the dullness and dreariness which you have noted at first hand. This little trip of our seven friends has set all the refugee circles in Germany gossiping. It is exciting news. It is undoubtedly known behind the Curtain. To call it off now would make a real difference -- not just in terms of the Crusade, but in terms of what refugees think about the United States and United States citizens.

The procedure from now on seems to lay itself out as follows: The seven refugees will arrive sometime during the month of December. This arrival date is important. HICOG has made every effort to expedite it so that they can come in December, and only overwhelming reasons ought to dictate a postponement. They will go to work and do whatever you, Clyde and Robb want them to do on behalf of the Crusade. After their work for the Crusade is over, all seven doubtless will wish to remain in the United States. We will all then jointly try to find jobs and places for them. The visas are good until next April, but if they can find jobs here it will probably be possible for us to secure special legislation for them to stay on indefinitely.

Now as to the questions you raise in your letter of November 24th. The National Committee for a Free Europe should certainly look after these people when they arrive and while they are here except insofar as they are directed by you to take up certain activities on behalf of the Crusade. The National Committee should also cooperate in trying to help you in your effort to find jobs for them when their tour is over, and I am sure the people there will do their best. I am sending a copy of this note to Whitney and I know that he will cooperate to the fullest.

As to your second question, I think the expenses of all seven ought to be paid for out of Crusade funds. They are over here on behalf of the Crusade and you are the one who asked them to come.

On the third question, as I indicated above, I think it would be a great blow to United States policies in this field if they were to turn around after their duties were over and limp back to a dusty refugee camp.

I think this is the way the whole thing ought to rest now and I do most earnestly urge you not to be too concerned about your personal responsibilities. We will all be lucky if we have to tackle no tougher problems.

Sincerely,

Mr. D'Arcy Brophy
American Heritage Foundation
345 E. 46th Street
New York 17, New York

cc: Mr. Whitney Shepardson

CIO:TnB/eh
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - Mr. Shepardson
1 cc - IO/Brl
1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

SECRET
Security Information

NOV 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Rumanian Emigre Organization

REFERENCE : Memorandum to Chief, SE from Deputy Director (Plans), dated 5 November 1953 - Subject: Rumanian National Council

1. In agreement with Mr. William Durkee of International Organizations Division, I share your view, as stated in paragraph 3 of the referenced memorandum, that Mr. Anthony Panuch should discuss the problem of the organization of Rumanian refugees with the NCFE rather than with this Agency. We were informed by Mr. Durkee that Mr. Panuch is fully aware of the NCFE position that the refugees should resolve their own differences before presenting a solution for the consideration of the NCFE. Mr. Durkee also informed the Rumanian Branch on 13 November that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Whitney Shepardson who concurred in the view stated above.

2. With reference to Mr. Panuch's statement that the "League in its present state is a useful operational vehicle," name traces reveal that fourteen members are Iron Guardists, five are suspected communist agents and four admit that they are on Nicolae Malaxa's payroll. Because of this unsavory composition, it appears unlikely that the League as presently composed would be useful operationally.

JOHN H. RICHARDSON
Chief, SE

cc: C/PP
C/IO/PP
IO/PP (Mr. Durkee)
General Counsel

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

7267

5 November 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Southeastern European Division

SUBJECT : Rumanian National Council

1. The attention of the SE Division and Messrs. Braden and Durkee is invited to the attached copy of a letter which I have just received from J. Anthony (Joe) Panuch concerning certain recent developments in the Rumanian emigre situation and with particular reference to the "League." You will note that Mr. Panuch has indicated that if we are interested in the League and its possibilities, he would be glad to talk to us about it.

2. I believe that the addressees of this memorandum will recall the significance of Mr. Panuch and the role which he has played recently, including his visit to me of about two or three months ago. (I was annoyed by and considered as a minor breach of confidence the reference which was made to my name in the material which was published concerning a communication addressed to King Michael, although I did note that this contained no representation that I had taken a position one way or another concerning the League or the proposed formula for resolving differences between the two principal Rumanian emigre factions.)

3. As regards the proposal of further conversations between Mr. Panuch and either myself or some other spokesman or representative of this Agency, I continue to be inclined to the view that these are matters which should be taken up by Mr. Panuch with Mr. Shepardson and not ourselves. If after consultation between the SE Division and IO Division it is agreed that this is the correct position, I should appreciate it if Mr. Braden or Mr. Durkee could talk with Mr. Shepardson about this letter and obtain his views for my benefit. I would then be in a better position to reply to Mr. Panuch's letter — presumably telling him that in line with my earlier advice to him, I still would recommend that he raise these matters with NCFE and not CIA. I could also add that I had been troubled by the appearance of my name in the published material referred

SECRET
Security Information

to above and cite this as an example of why I would prefer to stay out of the matter directly.

4. A copy of this memorandum is furnished to Mr. Houston because of his knowledge of the background of the old Malaxa allegations, and the difficulties which Malaxa is capable of creating for the Agency in the future. It will be recalled that Malaxa has charged that CIA has injected itself into the matter of his immigration status; that I have wrongfully involved myself in his affairs -- including some ridiculous charge that I kept him from getting a lucrative contract with the California Steel Company, etc., etc. -- none of which has any foundation in truth whatsoever.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment (1)
Letter to Mr. Wisner from
Mr. Panuch dated 2 November 1953.

cc: C/PP
C/IO/PP
IO/PP (Mr. Durkee)
General Counsel

C
O
P
Y

Law Offices of
J. ANTHONY PANUCH
60 East 42nd Street
New York 17, N.Y.

November 2, 1953

Confidential

Hon. Frank Wisner
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Frank:

Re: Romanian National Council

This is to bring you up to date on the aftermath of our conference of June 17th with respect to the above. On my return to New York I took the following steps:

1. Personally submitted the settlement formula to Rica Georgescu for mediation with Visoianu and Cretzianu, and to Larry DeNeufville for the information of the NCFE. Rica, in my opinion unwisely, took the position that the formula was not negotiable.

2. Directed the League to transmit the formula to King Mihail for his information and action and, pending final acceptance or rejection to "lay off" visavis Cretzianu, Visoianu et al. This was done.

3. Summoned Malaxa and the officials of the League to (a) inform them of the false charges made to the White House by Malaxa against you in 1951 and to demand their formal retraction; and (b) insist that Malaxa immediately make good on his commitment to General Radescu that he set up an independent "no strings attached" budget for the League -- an undertaking then six months in default. Malaxa agreed to comply with both demands and asked for time to the beginning of September when he hoped he would be released of the strain and mental anguish incident to his chronic immigration proceeding. Malaxa defaulted on both promises.

4. I issued an ultimatum to the leaders of the League to the effect that irrespective of my friendship with General Radescu, unless they disassociated themselves completely from Malaxa and any semblance of his influence -- direct or indirect -- I would resign as the League counsel. This severance of their relationship with Malaxa has been accomplished after a stormy showdown session between Farcasanu and Niculescu and Malaxa.

Mr. Frank Wisner

The League in its present state is in my opinion a useful operational vehicle in any Romanian situation in which the utilization of skilled and experienced personnel (notably Farcasanu and Niculescu) of conservative and non-Marxist political orientation is indicated. If you are at all interested in it as such, I should be glad to talk to you about it.

With best regards,

Faithfully,

/s/ Joe [illegible]

Honorary President
DR. PETER P. HLETKO

President
PHILIP A. HROBAK
P. O. Box 150
Middletown, Pa.

Vice-President
MICHAEL SINCHAK
333 Schoonmaker Ave.
Monessen, Pa.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
PAUL P. JAMRISKA
610 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.

JOSEPH O. PRUSA
205 Madison Street
Passaic, N. J.

JOHN J. SIROTNAK
610-613 Lincoln Tr. Bldg.
Scranton 3, Pa.

DR. JULIUS JANCI
311 W. King Street
Owosso, Mich.

STEPHANIE O. HUSEK
Georgian Court College
Lakewood, N. J.

Vice President
JULIA KRAJCOVIC
1845 W. 18th Street
Chicago 8, Ill.

Recording Secretary
FRANCIS HRUSOVSKY
10510 Buckeye Road
Cleveland 4, Ohio

Secretary-Treasurer
FRANK J. GURCAK
4755 Baptist Road
Pittsburgh 27, Pa.

ADVISORY COUNCIL
MICHAEL J. VARGOVICH
National President
First Catholic Slovak
Union of U. S. A.

HELEN KOCAN
National President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union

FRANK BOBUS
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol

STEPHEN J. TKACH
National President
Penna. Slovak Union

GABRIELA E. VAVREK
National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union

JOHN ROZBORIL
National President
Slovak Catholic
Cadet Union

The Slovak League of America

A Cultural and Civic Federation of Americans of Slovak Descent

Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
PHILIP A. HROBAK
P. O. Box 150
MIDDLETOWN, PA.

October 31, 1952

Mr. Kurt Glaser
1717 -20th St., N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

Dear Mr. Glaser:

I have read your article on Radio Free Europe - THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO "FREE EUROPE" - and I must say that it agrees with the facts as I know them. It is regrettable that such knowledge or information cannot get to the masses of the American public. I have visited the State Department and the National Committee for a Free Europe several times during the past two years to apprize them of the situation, but it seems they do not choose to do much about it. I had my information directly and indirectly from Slovak refugees in Germany and Austria....and London.

In December, 1951, the ASSOCIATION OF SLOVAKS IN GREAT BRITAIN, sent a "Memorandum" to the Nat'l Committee for a Free Europe in New York stating, in effect, the very things your article contains. The personnel of RFE in Munich was given in toto. At that time 31 program editors were employed by RFE - 29 Czechs and 2 Slovaks (renegades). Of the 29 Czechs employed - 27 were SOCIALISTS of one brand or another! The Memo mentions who they were....and I still have that list. Should you want to use it, you are welcome to it.

I have long been convinced that it is not in the ~~[illegible]~~ interests of America or other free countries to employ pseudo-[illegible] and left-wingers in the RFE, the Voice of America or any other governmental agencies. I simply would not trust them. Your article exposes the charlatans in RFE or used by the RFE and I certainly would recommend its publication. I, for one, certainly would!

Sincerely,

P. A. Hrobak

Statement.

I read with attention and interest the article "The 'Russia First' boys in Radio 'Free Europe'", by Mr.Kurt Glaser.

Having no documentation on hand in order to verify all particular affirmations contained in this article, I can express my entire adhesion as to its general line. I lived in Czecho-Slovakia between 1945 and 1948 and I know the policy of the "National Front "Government in Prague at that time from my personal experience.

In order to understand the Marxist tendency of some present politicians grouped in the so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia", it is necessary to point out that the Czech National Socialist Party of Mr.Beneš, Mr.Zenkl, Mr.Ripka, Mr.Stransky, etc. formed, on June 25th, 1945, the "Front of Working People" with the pro-Communist Social Democratic Party of Mr.Fierlinger, Mr.Lauschman and Mr.Majer and with the Communist Party of Mr.Gottwald. That "Front" constituted the closest ring of socialist solidarity and common action within the "National Front" Government composed of two more parties: the Czech Catholics and the Slovak Democrats. /See the articlo "Let us say the truth !", by Dr.Michal Zibrin, former Deputy of Slovak Democratic Party in Prague Parliament, published in "Jednota", on October 29th, 1952, Middletown, Pa./ This ring of the three Czech socialist parties is responsible for the evolution in the policy of Czecho-Slovakia until February 1948.

The Government of the "National Front", of which Mr.Zenkl was then Vice-Premier, Mr.Ripka Minister of Foreign

Commerce; Mr.Stransky Minister of Justice; Mr.[illegible] Delegate to the ILO, condemned already in 1949 to labor camps in Czecho-Slovakia. In [illegible]ber 1946, as Counsellor of the Presidency of the Slovak National Council in Bratislava I visited a great [illegible] that was being erected in North-Slovakia, at [illegible] n/Oravou. I met two of my friends who were working there as political prisoners and I managed to speak with them.

At about that time, Mr.Jan Papanek published in America his book "Czechoslovakia"/International University Press,New York/. On page 120 he says:"The so-called Bolshevik danger,a bogey for many nations,was taken calmly in Czechoslovakia,because the latter was free of every vestige of feudalism and its democracy was so all-embracing and successful,that there remainded no class whose dissatisfaction could lead to the acceptance of Communism as a possible remedy for it."

Just in the very time,when the "National Front"Government was eliminating Slovak and Czech patriots by mostly Communist People's Courts and was imprisoning them in "Labor camps",Mr. Papanek was playing in the USA the role white washer of Communism.

Now all these Gentlemen would like to change their tone. But the testimony of Czech Communists themselves are convincing them of double dealing. That the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" is infested even now by "Fellow-travellers",it has been proved by the "Hearings before the Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security laws of the Committee on the Judiciary,United States Senate,Eighty-Second Congress,First and Second Session on Espionage

3

activities of personnel attached to Embassies and Consulates under Soviet domination in the United States.July 9,1951-February 5 and 7,1952.United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1952.No.97249.

On page 7 one can read the testimony of Mr.Joseph Ignac Molnar,agent of F.B.I.Speaking of Mr.Erwin Munk,former organizer of Czech Red Espionage network in USA,Mr.Molnar said:

"He /Mr.Munk/told me that we had a very-well- organized underground movement which was giving them a lot of headaches, more than the National Council for Free Czechoslovakia,with its political prestige and its chairman,Peter Zenkl.

"We are not afraid,"he said,"of Zenkl and his organization because we have there our men who even hold higher positions and we can render them harmless whenever we wish."

The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia",against a strong opposition of anti-Communist Czechs and Slovaks,has been recognized by the National Committee for a Free Europe as a representative body of Czech and Slovak refugees.In this quality,it is a recruiting office for the personnel of the Radio "Free Europe".

Washington D.C.November 5,1952

Joseph A. Mikus

Former diplomat of the Czecho-Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Prague /1935-1939/,
Former Chargé d'Affaires of Slovakia in Madrid /1940-1944/.
Former Counsellor of the Presidency of the Slovak National Council
in Bratislava 1946-1948/.

Radio Europe 'Houses Reds'

Station Got Millions From Americans

By Dr. John B. Crane

Frankfurt, Germany.

"You would do well to make an vestigation of Radio Free urope," a prominent Washington wmaker advised me a few weeks go as we were having tea to ther near Heidelberg.

"I have just returned from unich," he continued, "where I spected both the facilities of the oice of America and of Radio ree Europe. I was much im reased with the Voice of America t-up and find they are doing a ery good job.

"But when I called at the plant f Radio Free Europe I got such frosty reception I could hardly lieve it. They tried to be polite ut were obviously delighted when I left. I figured maybe they had heard of my vigorous anti-Communist campaign when I ran for re-election."

Makes Headlines

Within the past month at least three other visiting American officials have tipped me off that I ught to investigate Radio Free Europe. The climax was reached oday when a Washington investi ator suddenly appeared at my partment for a chat and casually nnounced he was headed for lunich. When I inquired why, he replied:

"I want to inspect Radio Free Europe."

During the past week Radio Free Europe has twice made headlines in leading German periodicals. One important weekly paper, the Rheinischer Merkur, devoted an entire page to the problem of Radio Free Europe.

70 Millions from Americans

American readers will doubtless remember with what high hopes this radio broadcasting station was started two years ago under the sponsorship of outstanding private American citizens such as Gen. Lucius D. Clay, former American Military Governor in Germany.

The purpose of the new broadcasting station was to send programs behind the Iron Curtain to Poland, Czechoslovakia and other satellite countries to encourage them to hold out against their Communist Governments.

Millions of Americans welcomed this new weapon in the cold war against communism and contributed 70 million dollars for its support, according to the German press.

Anti-German Propaganda

The money was to be spent not only for building and equipping a broadcast station, but also for financing the escape of refugees from countries behind the Iron Curtain and giving them jobs at the new station in Munich.

Now come leading articles in the German press charging that Radio Free Europe is heavily infiltrated with Communists and that pro-Communist, anti-German propaganda is being fed to countries behind the Iron Curtain.

The well-known German weekly, Christ Un Welt, states that seven members of the Czech Department of Radio Free Europe have recently been arrested on suspicion of espionage, while one member, after working for several months, was found to be a Communist agent and fled over the border into Czechoslovakia with important personal records of Czecho emigrants' families.

'Saw the Light'

The German paper names names and places. For example, it charges that the executive editor of the Czech Division of Radio Free Europe, Pavel Tigrid, was editor of an illegal, Communist paper in 1932, known as Hallo Noviny.

It charges, further, that during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia Tigrid co-operated closely with an important Communist leader, Fucik, who had become editor of the Communist paper Rude Pravo. Tigrid was a contributor to the Communist Central Party organ when the war ended in 1945.

Shortly thereafter, however, he "saw the light" and fled to Germany as a refugee. Soon he was executive editor of the Munich radio station fighting communism.

Demand Shake-Up

The German paper further mentions by name five other prominent employes of Radio Free Europe who were, earlier, Communist Party members or who today have close relatives in important Communist Party posts in Czechoslovakia.

The Germans are demanding a drastic reorganization of Radio Free Europe. This seems to be on the point of being realized. It is reported that 25 employes of the organization have already resigned, and that Executive Editor Tigrid (alias Paul Dittrich) has submitted his resignation.

It is to be hoped that the "housecleaning" now in progress will put an end to the many ugly rumors that have been floating around about Radio Free Europe for the last several months.

14-00000

SLOVAK NEWSLETTER

[illegible]

[illegible]

23 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Monseigneur John C. Kirk

1. You asked me by telephone for a report on subject, who is domestic prelate on leave from the Savannah-Atlanta diocese in Georgia.

2. Monseigneur Kirk was formerly secretary to Archbishop Gerald P. O'Hara, Bishop of the Savannah-Atlanta diocese, and also his secretary while Bishop O'Hara was Apostolic Nuncio to Rumania from 1946 until O'Hara's official expulsion in July of 1950. (NCFE has been reliably informed that Kirk remained behind in Rumania disguised as a Swiss tourist. He visited many of the imprisoned hierarchy but eventually escaped. This report is without objective verification.)

3. Because no single member of the Rumanian hierarchy escaped, Kirk was appointed as president of the Rumanian Catholic Mission for Europe. The headquarters of the Mission is now Passeggiata del Gianicolo 5, Rome. Monseigneur Kirk resides at Via Panama 110, Rome.

4. While in the United States in 1952 as personal delegate of Cardinal Tisserant to the convention of the association of Rumanian Catholics in America, Kirk visited the office of NCFE. Members of the staff met with him on five occasions and made the following estimate:

> As a prelate on leave in a southern diocese, Kirk can be classified as a religious liberal interested in the betterment of various classes and, particularly the Negro. In Rumanian politics, he vigorously resisted the influence of the iron guard. Evidence of this is that in 1952 Kirk moved the headquarters of the Mission from Madrid, where it was located at Calle de Serrano 30, because of continuing attempts of the iron guardists to use him for political purposes.

5. A detailed account of the principal purposes and scope of the Rumanian Catholic Mission for Europe which Kirk heads is available

here. Highlights are:

a. Roughly 150,000 people under his jurisdiction.

b. Mission centers have been established in Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy, Argentina, Trieste, Spain and France.

c. Kirk is assisted by thirty priests located in the above areas.

6. Kirk is now in the United States and intends to return early in November. He is visiting NCFE in New York next week. His former chief, Archbishop O'Hara is now Nuncio for Ireland with headquarters in Dublin.

7. Statements made by Monseigneur Kirk in visits to NCFE together with extracts from correspondence are available if you should wish me to scan those and form an estimate of my own.

[illegible]

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressees
1 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT

19 October 1953

Jamming of western broadcasts to Russia began sporadically in 1948 and was well established by early 1949, first against VOA then also against BBC. Satellite language program jamming began first from Russian stations and then from jamming stations located in the Satellites proper. When RFE transmissions began in 1950, the organization and equipment were available for the new target.

At the present time, the organization for jamming - including the transmitters, the monitoring stations to watch for the undesired programs, and the control network to direct the jammers to the target - is apparently integrated throughout the Bloc, with a certain amount of cooperation between countries. That is, programs directed to one Satellite country may be jammed not only from within the country but from Russia and from neighboring Satellites.

At least some of the jammers are closely controlled so that efforts to evade them by changes in frequency or schedules are frequently met by a prompt reaction on the part of the jammer -- within a minute or less.

The extent of integration of the total Bloc jamming system makes it very difficult to separate the effort contributed within the Satellites. However, it is presently estimated that about 900 transmitters are in the jamming effort within the Bloc, and these appear to be fairly well distributed throughout the total of the frequencies that are being used at any given time. Therefore, at times when RFE is broadcasting to the Satellite countries with a considerable number of frequencies, there are undoubtedly hundreds of transmitters jamming these frequencies.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SEC[illegible]TION

DRAFT

19 October 1953

The effectiveness of the jamming is difficult to assess quantitatively from the few available observation locations within the Orbit and from the fan mail received. However, in general, it is apparent that jamming is most effective in large cities: approaching 100%. In rural areas, the picture varies from time to time and from place to place, but it appears that a considerable proportion of the programs to the Satellites can be received. For example, the RFE monitor in Vienna reported that, at that location, the medium frequency Czech broadcast from Holzkirchen on 719 kc was practically 100% jammed while only about 50% of the shortwave Czech programs were not intelligible. The Embassy in Warsaw reported in May that while VOA programs were unintelligible, RFE programs were "often intelligible."

SECURI[illegible]ATION

15 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Salary Information on NCFE People

1. Subsequent to Mr. Durkee's memorandum to you of 1 September 1953, which we discussed this morning, I learned that Mr. Dulles discussed with Mr. Shepardson the need for the information as to the salaries of NCFE people. Very likely this conversation was held pursuant to your own talk with the Director.

2. In any event, we have received precisely the information requested by the Inspector General in a memorandum of 6 October, and I have forwarded it to Win Scott.

3. I think your effort has been successful.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressse
1 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

15 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Dr. Francis Kase

REFERENCE: Letter from Dr. Karel Kase to Mrs. Dulles

1. Dr. Francis Kase has had the following relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency and National Committee for a Free Europe:

> He has never been an agent of CIA, but has been used from time to time by OO/Contacts for translations etc., and is now being paid between $150 and $200 per month for subsistence by OO/C.
>
> In December 1952, IO Division referred this man to the Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe. Unfortunately, he did not fit into their research pattern, but they think he is an extremely capable man.

2. Unless the Director wishes to instruct NCFE to hire Dr. Kase, I suggest Mrs. Dulles send the attached reply.

(Signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Suggested reply
to reference. see chrons

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

0044

14 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Vienna Conference with Ambassador Joseph Flack

1. On 2 September, representatives of RFE and VOA met with Ambassador Joseph Flack and solicited his comments on reported unrest in Poland, and the utility of RFE and VOA Polish broadcasts.

2. With reference to internal disturbances and partisan activities, Flack stated that there have been "absolutely none" in recent weeks, and added that earlier reports of unrest following the June uprisings in East Germany were proved to have been without foundation as a result of relatively unrestricted survey action then taken by numerous representatives of U. S., British and French diplomatic missions in Poland. He expressed his conviction that there is no significant underground organization in Poland which might be considered as an immediate asset by the West, and emphasized his belief that serious disturbances would not occur as long as the present Soviet control mechanism retains its power and the Soviet armies in Poland and East Germany go unchallenged. The bitter lessons of World War II, particularly the abortive Warsaw uprisings, and lack of confidence in the Polish emigration definitely discourage active resistance. The Poles increasingly tend to resent the action of the emigre leaders, regarding them essentially as symbols of failure, and, Flack feels, will undoubtedly develop new leaders from within the country when the time comes for action.

3. Flack carefully distinguished resistance as an immediate asset from resistance as a potential asset. He expressed the belief that the Catholic Church still offers the strongest and the best organized base of resistance in Poland as it is looked upon as the only symbol of continuity and solidarity with the past. To this he added his own appreciation for traditional Polish spirit of independence and Christian orientation, and emphasized his belief that Polish hatred of Russians and communism continues to mount. Unfortunately, similar sentiment persists with reference to Germany. Fear of German occupation or seizure of Polish territory continues to play a prominent part in Polish thought and is cleverly utilized by the Communist government in its propaganda effort.

SECRET
Security Information

4. Flack expressed certain misgivings with reference to the character of RFE and VOA broadcasts, emphasising his conviction that Western radio broadcasts should do nothing to compromise the position of the Catholic Church in Poland, always taking as guidance the attitude and statements of the Polish clerical leaders themselves. He strongly urged that all possible steps be taken to maintain the present volume of broadcasts into Poland as a means of preserving hope and belief in the inevitability of Soviet communism's collapse.

/s/
Sherman D. Lamb
Executive Secretariat, DD/P

Attachment

25 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT TO DCI

SUBJECT: Attached Letter from William H. Smyth

With reference to the second paragraph of the attached letter, the following information will answer the question:

> Mr. Smyth's statement before the House Committee on Foreign Relations was reprinted by the National Committee for a Free Europe. It appeared in "Progled", a monthly mimeographed newssheet, which is published in Serb, Croat and Slovene, and contains statements etc. made regarding Yugoslavia by prominent leaders, reprints from articles on Yugoslavia etc. It has a limited distribution (2-300) to Yugoslav emigres in this country, and its purpose is to keep the Yugoslav emigration in this country informed. It is indicated in the newssheet that the statements reprinted therein do not reflect the views or opinions of NCFE.

Signed THOMAS W. BRADEN
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (Mr. Long)
1 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DD/P 5288

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P		
2			
3	CIO - 1028-K		
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	25 Sept
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

Remarks: The attached reply was received from Mr. Shepardson in response to my request for them to study prospects for broadcasts to the Baltics. Reference your letter of 30 July to C.D. Jackson.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

[illegible] U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

5788

September 14, 1953

917-1

Dear Mr. Hadwood:

A short time ago the question was asked of us whether NCFE would recommend the extension of RFE broadcasting to the Baltic states. The question was made the subject of several papers which were prepared for, and circulated to, and thereafter discussed at three meetings of the NCFE policy committee.

Following these discussions, the NCFE position is as follows:

Broadcasts of the RFE type (i.e. the type to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary), directed at the three Baltic countries, would be plainly advantageous to the United States in terms of NCFE's objectives. There are even stronger arguments for starting such broadcasts at once than there were for starting them two years ago. However, now, as during the 1951 discussions, the problem arises whether such broadcasts (Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) cannot -- without damage to diplomatic usage -- be handled by the Voice of America. The fact that Soviet occupation of the Baltic nations has never been recognized by the Government of the United States would appear to remove the restraints under which the Voice of America must operate where the local government has an American diplomatic mission accredited to it.

If the Voice of America can transmit Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, we would not want to compete with them and would consider it preferable that they should do the job with the whole prestige of the non-recognition policy of the United States Government behind them. If we knew for certain that the Voice was not going to handle the task (which would be a different one and in addition to what we believe to be their present transmissions in the Baltic languages) then we would add the Baltic nations to the list of unfinished business to which RFE must direct its attention whenever sufficient resources become available.

However, sufficient resources are far from being available at the present time, and, urgent as are the needs of the Baltic listening audience in the present period of fermentation of freedom throughout the Satellite area, our first task must necessarily be to hold the audiences we already have in the face of the electronic war that is being waged against our transmissions by enemy jamming. RFE's original budget for 1953-54 was based on an orderly program to maintain present gains in the three main targets (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary)

Page 2
Mr. Hadwood
917-1

and to develop our present scanty capabilities in Bulgaria, and the lesser targets of Romania, and Albania. The original budget cut of about $1,500,00, now followed by a second cut of $1,000,000, make it doubtful if RFE can even maintain full audience-reaching capabilities to all of its main target areas, let alone maintaining the scanty capabilities to the other targets mentioned above. Indeed, the NCFE Board of Trustees will probably vote on September 15th (i) not to expand Bulgarian broadcasts, (ii) to shorten Romanian broadcasts, and (iii) to eliminate broadcasts to Albania.

To enter the Baltic area, as a real and not a token target, would (I am informed by RFE) cost additional sums of money several times greater than the cuts that have recently been made. Much as we would like to see this new area opened up in what is generally regarded as "RFE style", either by VOA or ourselves, I see no hope of RFE's being able to undertake the task until their budget allocations can not only reach, but substantially exceed, the amount needed to preserve existing programs (against enemy interference) at their existing audience-reaching level. And certainly if such budget additions were in sight, it would be necessary for us to consider, alongside the Baltic plan, the relative desirability of:

(a) Strengthening still further the signal to the three principal targets,

(b) Initiating the often discussed plan for installing transmitters in Turkey or Greece for reaching Romania and Bulgaria more effectively,

(c) Broadcasting to Albania as a more important target than the Baltic states.

Conclusion:

Unless it is regarded as of paramount national interest that RFE type broadcasts be made to the Baltic states; and

Unless it is clear that VOA is not in a position to provide such programs; and

Unless it is clear that such development by RFE is more important than:

(i) Additional signal strength to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary,

(ii) Additional signal strength and programs to Bulgaria and Romania, preferably from a new transmitter installation, and

Unless an adequate sum of money for one or all of these operations is in sight, -

NCFE does not recommend the extension of RFE broadcasting to the three Baltic states.

Sincerely yours,

Daniel C[illegible].

September 18, 1953

Memorandum for Messrs. Joseph B. Phillips
William Durkee
Thomas Braden ✓
George Morgan
Abbott Washburn

The attached memorandum is self-explanatory and was written to me by Mr. Jackson while he was away on vacation.

Could someone--perhaps Mr. Phillips--let us know when it has been decided how David will be handled?

Many thanks.

Marie McCrum

Marie McCrum
Secretary to C. D. Jackson

Attachments

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1953

Miss McCrum:

I have a feeling that no one on our side is prepared to keep a firm hand on the Jean Paul David trip.

David is himself a king-size free wheeler. Although he is unquestionably one of the French "doers," as opposed to "talkers," in this field, he is also quite a big-mouth and inclined to over-talk, over-promise and over-indulge in cloak-and-dagger stage setting. If he hasn't got a guard, armed to the teeth, with a beret and a half-burned cigarette glued to his underlip, lurking outside the dining-room, he can't enjoy his meal.

The plot is complicated by the fact that as far as the U. S. is concerned he has always been strictly covert. This time he arrives as strictly "overt" so no one on our side will really know how to behave since everyone will have to do and be the exact opposite of what they did and were during David's last trip.

I would suggest that you show the attached to Abbott Washburn, George Morgan, Tom Braden and/or Bill Durkee, and Joe Phillips (also this note) and suggest that they work out who should consider himself responsible. I personally hope Joe Phillips will be willing to take it on.

Incidentally, the American who handles David best is Helen Kirkpatrick. She might conceivably be drafted as chaperone for this trip.

C.D.J.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY

The following is from a dispatch written by Mr. William Tyler, dated 22 June 1953.

1. After a recent conversation with Jean Paul David, at which time he outlined his activities and ideas in connection with the mission with which he is charged by Georges Bidault, I received a letter from him.

2. It will be seen from this letter that David is most anxious that the report which he will make on his survey should represent, without committing any one country, a systhesis of the views and the resources of the Western powers allied under NATO, in the broad field of propaganda and psychological warfare designed to build support for Western defense policy and to promote the achievement of the objectives of these policies.

3. It occurs to me that a difficulty which we have to face, and which we are probably unique in having to face, is due to the organisational structure within which we operate officially in the general field under discussion. In a country like Italy, for example, it is possible for David to have exchanges of views with high officials of the government and to feel reasonably sure that even though such views are not to be taken as a commitment, they do in fact represent the disposition of the government in question, or any government likely to succeed it, toward these problems. In our case, however, it seems to me that it will require careful preparation to determine with whom David should consult and to work out a constructive position which will influence his report and his recommendations in a direction which we approve.

4. It is particularly difficult for me to make specific recommendations, since developments in Washington in the last few months are difficult to keep up with from overseas. It would, therefore, be particularly helpful to have headquarters' views at this stage on the following points, assuming that David will go to the States in late September on the last leg of his survey:

a. With whom should he meet for basic discussions. (It occurs to me that a suitable body, if still in existence, would be the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.)

b. Within what limits at this time are we prepared to discuss the problem of concerted action for the psychological strength of the North Atlantic Community.

5. As headquarters is aware, C. D. Jackson knows David personally, and it would perhaps be useful to arrange for conversations with him and any group he might have in mind. It is true that the position of David with regard to this Agency is anomalous, since the survey on which he is engaged, far from relating to covert operations, is of the most official

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

kind possible. As headquarters has pointed out, his interests in his present mission in reality pertain more to the State Department and NATO than to us, and it seems to me that we should not be in the direct line of fire except in the capacity of individual observers or participants in the conversations he will have. It would, therefore, seem to be all the more important that we arrive at a clear understanding among ourselves as to how David's trip to the States will be organised and what is to be the respective role of the component elements in the psychological effort with regard to his survey.

/S/ WILLIAM TYLER

ATTACHMENT #1

(TRANSLATION)

Translation of Letter from Jean-Paul David

June 19, 1953

My dear Bill,

You know that - probably toward the end of September - I am to leave for the United States on a mission entrusted to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Bidault is concerned - and justly so, about the problems connected with the objectives of my survey; and my desire is to produce a realistic report since I wish to avoid (you know my way of thinking) the traditional phraseology which generally takes the place of action.

To date, in Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway .. I have successively conferred with the Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Defense, of the Interior, of Education. I have also sometimes met with the Chiefs of Staff, and specialists of information and of psychological warfare.

To all of them, I have said:

"Mr. Bidault has requested me to make this survey and you have before you the text of the French note which speaks for itself and seems to require no further comment. I want to ask you to state, in writing and without in any way committing your Government or your particular services, what solutions seem reasonable. I wish to gather all constructive ideas on this matter. Your ideas will be useful, perhaps, to other countries - even if you think them inapplicable in your own. Then, I shall make a synthesis of the reports so assembled - adding thereto the thoughts of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in this respect. And, at the (NATO) 'Conference of the 14' at the end of October, we shall have available a program on the basis of which constructive action can be taken."

There, in telegraphic style, is my argument. I should add that everywhere I found an excellent welcome, everyone accepted this method and promised me substantial reports.

But, if in small or medium-size countries, I have encountered no major difficulties, I have no idea of the way of thinking of your compatriots on such matters. And this note is for no other reason than to ask you to express your thoughts, in view of the excellent advice you can give me.

I want to emphasize that, in my mind, the reports and suggestions gathered from all the specialists of all the ministries of any particular country will not commit any country in any way. I will name no one, compromise no one. I want to gather the sum of the ideas and resources of the Atlantic Community in this domain and add a few personal ideas which seem workable.

That is why, my dear Bill, I ask for your contribution as I would like to carefully prepare this trip across the Atlantic. Please forgive this long letter. Tell me what you think of all this.

s/ Jean Paul David

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible]
4-6653

16 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Whitney Sheperdson Phone Call to You of Yesterday, 15 September, Concerning Forced Labor

1. The central facts in this business are as follows:

a. NCFE had a letter sent to the President of the United States signed by various individual exiles expressing their gratification to the United States Government for its "initiative in placing as an item for the agenda of the 8th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the matter of 'Evidence of Existence of Forced Labor', . . ."

b. At this Division's direction the Department of State was asked to prepare an answer to this letter for the President's signature which NCFE could publicly exploit in cooperation with the United States Mission to the United Nations.

c. Late Friday afternoon this Division was informed by the Department that no answer could be forthcoming as the U.N. Delegation had decided not to push the forced labor matter at this time. NCFE was informed to this effect the same afternoon and again on Monday by this Division.

d. Because its letter was not being answered, NCFE erroneously assumed that the work it was doing on forced labor in cooperation with the U.N. Delegation was to be of no avail and in fact that it was the decided policy of the United States Government not to force this issue at this or any other time.

e. The net effect of this matter is as follows:

(1) The Department of State will draft an answer for the President's signature which will be transmitted to Secretary of State, Dulles for his personal approval after consultation with Ambassador Lodge. The approved answer will then be transmitted to President Eisenhower for his signature. Public exploitation

of the letter by NCFE will be undertaken on the guidance of the United States mission of the United Nations. In the meantime, NCFE will continue to work with the United States Mission to the U.N. but the timing and use of the materials developed by NCFE is to be determined by the United States Delegation.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief,
International Organisations Division

Executive Registry
4-5514

8 September 1953

10 Sep 53

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: British Foreign Office uneasiness concerning the tone and content of RFE broadcasting to the European satellites, and related matters.

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum of conversation prepared by Tracy Barnes, who sat in on a conversation which took place on 4 September in my office with Messrs Rob Scott and Adam Watson of the British Embassy. Tracy's memorandum covers the conversation quite fully, but I should like to point out certain impressions and conclusions of my own which I believe to be worthy of your consideration.

2. It was quite evident that Rob Scott, who, as you know, is the new Minister, and Watson had received some fairly strong prodding from Sir William Strang, and it was equally apparent that they were not particularly well prepared as they were somewhat embarrassed when called upon for specifications -- unable as they were to produce these. Three other features of the conversation which struck me rather forcibly were the following:

a. The fact that they placed primary emphasis on the absolute necessity at the present time of keeping the US-UK copybook completely smirchless until such time as there shall (may?) have been a high-level four-power meeting, including the Soviets, and until such time as it shall have appeared clearly that the Soviet Government is not prepared to make concessions and otherwise adopt a conciliatory approach. This is a fairly evident British line which they have been peddling for some time and I do not doubt that you heard something of it while in London. If followed to the letter and permitted to order our conduct, the result would be that we would, ourselves, adopt a total "sweetness and light" program for an indefinite period of time.

b. The fact that the Embassy representatives said that they had no intention of speaking with the State Department about any of this aroused some slight suspicion on my part that they may have been deliberately bypassing

SECRET
Security Information

the Department in the hope of getting a better deal directly with us. This is the more my impression, since if the British "sweetness and light" line is to be adopted and carried out in both letter and spirit -- then the State Department had better to get into line as well. Obviously the utterances of top State Department officials, both here and abroad, and State Department actions are much more important for the purposes of this particular British approach than are the actions and utterances of our unofficial gray and black media. /I reported the substance of the conversation to General Cabell who authorized me to bring it to the attention of Doc Matthews, which I have done, and at the same time requested him to advise us if the Department hears anything about this from the British Embassy./

c. Finally, Adam Watson dragged in by the tail some questions about the so-called "Freedom Corps", and asked me whether I could confirm that there had been a substantial "heating up" of this old proposal within the past month or six weeks. I replied that if this idea -- which was a very old one indeed in US Government circles -- had reached any particular climax within the past month, I was not aware of it. I said that I had heard that the State Department was considering asking the Foreign Office what it thought about such a program. Mr. Watson then replied that the State Department had, in fact, submitted this question to the Foreign Office and that the Foreign Office had replied that it recommended most strongly against any broaching of this subject at least until after the German elections. I thanked Mr. Watson for bringing me up to date, and the point was not further pursued.

FGWisner

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)
Memo for Record dtd 8 September, sgd by C/PP: Conv. betw. Messrs Wisner, Scott, Watson and Barnes.

detached 9/11 and filed in [illegible] PP's files

cc: C/PP

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

5589

11 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PP

SUBJECT: Recent conversation with members of the FO staff of the British Embassy re RFE broadcasts, etc.

REFERENCES: a. Memo dtd Sept 8 from DD/P to DCI; Subject: British Foreign Office uneasiness concerning tone and content of RFE broadcasting to the European satellites, and related matters.

b. Memo for Record dtd 8 September from C/PP: Subject: Conv. betw. Messrs Wisner, Scott, Watson and Barnes.

1. I am returning to you the original of the Reference a. memorandum for the file. Mr.Wisner asked whether you had shown your copy of this memorandum to Mr. Braden -- he thinks that both Mr. Braden and Mr.Durkee should see it.

2. Mr. Wisner asked me to tell you that his suspicions of Mr. Watson's sheepishness were rather fully confirmed by a subsequent conversation in which Mr. Watson admitted to Mr. Wisner quite frankly that neither he nor Mr. Rob Scott had had very much stomach for their mission that day. Mr. Watson rather doubted that we would hear any more about this.

BJM
BJM

Attached:
Ref. a. memorandum.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

25 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of ICFTU Developments

The attached extracts from RFE's Daily Guidance Bulletin are evidence of the day to day coverage that RFE is giving to ICFTU decisions. In addition we are setting up an arrangement whereby RFE will have continuing liaison with a member of the special committee appointed by the ICFTU. Through this channel we hope to supply RFE with documentary material on workers' conditions in the satellites and to insure also that the line taken by RFE toward labor issues is not in conflict with the ICFTU position.

CORD MEYER, JR.
Deputy Chief
International Organizations Division

DCIO:CM/mf

Distribution:
- Orig - Addressee via Jacobs
- 1 cc - CIO
- 1 cc - DCIO
- 1 cc - RI

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of ICFTU

The following extracts of RFE's Daily Guidance Bulletins indicate the general guidance around which more complete coverages are prepared for broadcasting:

Daily Guidance 554, June 30, 1953, Page 2, Paragraph d:

Concerning forthcoming conference of ICFTU, attention is called to Christian Science Monitor of June 24, reprinted in today's Information Bulletin, and to Report on America #13. "American Labor's Wide Horizons" as published on June 26.

Daily Guidance 560, July 9, 1953, Page 4, Last two lines:

Remarks by George Meany, president of American Federation of Labor, before Stockholm meeting at International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in addition to expressing the philosophy of free workers toward less developed areas, should have a special significance to our listeners at this stage of their struggle against Soviet colonialism. Meany declared that freedom to colonial peoples and inhabitants of protectorates was something democracies must take steps to insure as soon as possible. The Federation (ICFTU) should see to it that workers in such territories enjoyed trade-union organization liberty.

Daily Guidance 573, July 28, 1953, Page 3, Paragraph c:

As far as East Germany is concerned, most significant news is vote by International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to set up a fund "to support insurgent unions in East Germany and other satellite countries in their efforts to undermine communist control". George Meany, President of AF of L, predicted that substantial sums would be made available but "declined for obvious reasons" to say how they would be spent.

Meany's announcement would seem to be an event of major significance in which all target areas should be equally interested.

Latest reports on East German purge receive most of their meaning from fact that a faction presently losing out is said to be composed of communists who - - while not at all disloyal to the Kremlin - - are not Muscovites in the sense in which the victors are Muscovites. Chances are that all communist functionaries who did not spend the last war inside Russia are in danger of their jobs or, as the case may be, of their lives.

Human interest stories on recipients of food aid speak for themselves. However, emphasis might well be on fact that recipients are either primarily or exclusively unemployed workers - - and that communists deny the existence of unemployment.

SECURITY INFORMATION

Daily Guidance 590, August 20, 1953, Page 2, Paragraph f:

Note that ICFTU followed up on its promises reported here and created special fund for support of Soviet Zone workers.

19 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Food Program for Eastern Europe

1. This proposed program supports a plan for limited food distribution to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

It is generally agreed that it is highly desirable honesty to attempt food distribution through regular open channels, before utilizing any unusual method such as balloons, even though it is highly dubious the offers to distribute food will be accepted. It is further felt that no food program of any kind should be commenced unless it is certain to culminate in actual deliveries.

2. Formal Offer: A group such as a Committee to Assist the Peoples of Eastern Europe would be formed, which would in turn make an offer of a definite amount of food to representatives of the satellite governments of Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, the Department of State would be requested to take up the food offer officially with representatives of the governments concerned. CIA will arrange for the composition and sponsorship of the proposed committee. The food offer of the committee, taking note of the official statements indicating that a food shortage exists in each of those countries, would propose the establishment of an international commission to supervise the distribution of food to the needy children of the areas involved. This food would come from U.S. surplus stocks and through contributions made by the sponsoring organizations.

3. Delivery of Balloons: In event of refusal by the satellite regimes of the food offer, the committee might turn to the American Heritage Foundation for help. The latter would be asked to utilise its primary project, the Crusade for Freedom, both in raising public funds and delivering food by balloons.

Crusade for Freedom (NCFE)

A. Capabilities:

1. The Crusade can deliver 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 lbs. of food by way of 200,000 to 400,000 balloons into Czechoslovakia,

Hungary and Poland over a period of two to three weeks;

2. The Crusade can deliver 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 lbs. of food in 400,000 to 600,000 balloons into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland over a period of five to six weeks;

Capabilities (1) and (2) above, are possible within the time periods indicated only if U.S. military facilities and equipment for the necessary procurement and stand-by storage of the hydrogen gas for the balloons is available. (20,000,000 cubic feet of hydrogen gas will fill 200,000 balloons sufficient to lift 1,000,000 lbs.) If such storage facilities, etc. are not available, the time periods must be revised for (1) and (2) above to two months and three months respectively;

3. First balloon launching could commence within sixty days of project authorization;

4. Each food package, suspended to one balloon, would contain five lbs. of staples. (sugar, fat, flour, coffee, chocolate) Packages will be sealed and/or wrapped with polyephelene.

B. Costs:

1. Costs of operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland would be approximately $1.15 per net pound of food delivered, or a total figure of $1,166,000.00 for each 1,000,000 lbs. delivered.

2. Costs of operation into Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Baltic areas would be greater, due to added technical factors, necessity of shipboard launchings, etc. The unit cost figure would be $1.55 per net pound delivered.

C. Operational Considerations:

1. If delivery of food into satellite areas is considered feasibly, realistically sound, then entire operational effort must be centered at launching -- delivery of food in the shortest period of time. Counteraction to the impact of food deliveries will be immediate and sustained to include "tampering" with food packages, wholesale arrest, BW charges bolstered by staged photography.

2. Launching sites previously used by the Crusade for Freedom for balloon operations into Czechoslovakia were located along the Czech frontier between Cham and Hof. For launchings into Poland and Hungary, sites in Berlin and in and around Graz, Austria, respectively, would be the most operationally satisfactory.

Concurrence of the proper Austrian, West German and British representatives as to use of launching sites in their jurisdiction areas must be secured well in advance through the appropriate channels.

3. There is no guarantee that the Adenauer government will be favorably disposed towards this food delivery program, even if it wins the September 6 elections.

4. For an operation which envisions the launching of 200,000 balloons (1,000,000 lbs. of food) over as short a period as two to three weeks, a relatively large group of indigenous personnel must be hired, trained (four or five days) and supervised over a minimum five week period.

D. Psychological Considerations:

1. Most recent estimates indicates that the harvest in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland will be fair to average this year. Consequently, it would be a mistake to send food into these areas simply to alleviate a "desperate shortage" which might not in fact exist for workers in good standing. Rather, as a part of RFE's accompanying program exploitation, the population would be urged to conserve the packages as "iron rations" or "strike rations" against the day when they might not otherwise be able to afford absenteeism or loss of wages for other reasons.

2. One of the gravest risks to any food delivery program of this kind, especially should its launching interval be in access of two weeks, is the systematic poisoning of food parcels by the communists. The only really effective way of safe guarding against this is by anticipating it and pre-conditioning the people, via RFE, against contaminated efforts.

3. During the time when, and at the places where the food is packaged, the Crusade should arrange for supervision of such packaging by acceptable humanitarian/religious international groups, such as the Quakers or the Red Cross, in order to neutralise [illegible] charges and augment the bonafides of the committees and Crusade for Freedom.

4. The initial private and official offers of food to the satellite areas must be accompanied with certain conditions ensuring guarantees of delivery, in order to avoid communist acceptance of a [illegible] food offer as such, which would place us in the awkward position of having to subsequently request guarantees for proper distribution and delivery.

5. Type of RFE "running attack" during balloon operation is well illustrated by the following -- 'Czech workers would have to work 6.6 hours to earn enough money to buy one average pound of food parcels contents, whereas the American worker could earn the $1.15 per net lb. delivered in 1.2 hours.'

D. Conclusions:

1. The operation is large and the resultant psychological gains and losses, depending on many variables, could be extensive. Needless to say, the operation should not be undertaken, even in part, as a 'gesture' or on a 'gamble'.

2. Balloons are not the most economical means of delivering food, in point of fact, the movement of items by balloon is at least twice as expensive as any regular means. However, to date, balloons are by far the most feasible way of diffusing a relatively large amount of food containers into an otherwise denied area.

3. Planning of the operation in all its phases should include the Director of RFE, in order to ensure a well coordinated political warfare program.

E. Recommendations:

It is requested that should authority be given to proceed on this balloon-borne food program, such authorization be contingent on the following recommendations:

1. That the commencement of the balloon launching be generally planned for the end of this year.

2. That no more than 400,000 balloons be released (2,000,000 lbs. of food) at a cost of approximately $2,332,000.

3. That the balloon launching phase of the food delivery operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, not exceed ten full consecutive days from its date of commencement.

4. That $50,000 be made available immediately for preparatory work.

5. That food deliveries into Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and the Baltics not be considered until after the primary operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland has proved successful.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/BrI:NSD/eh
Orig - DD/P
2 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

SECRET

IO '3-2117

[illegible]

4-3-2-

22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations

I had a talk with Spencer Phenix about NCFE matters and the following points were discussed.

(1) A Strategy Board to guide RFE. Spencer feels the need for some higher level political guidance than RFE is getting from their staff people and talked about getting together a board of people like George Kennan, etc. I told Spencer that I thought it unlikely that George would give very much time to this but might be willing to give them an occasional idea or suggestion.

(2) Spencer asked me about the possibility of their finding some job for Sam Reber. I told him to wait on this until I had time to discuss it with FW.

(3) Spencer seemed disturbed that the allocation of one million a month until our budget was passed would cramp their operations. I told him that if they had particular difficulties to let me know. He also asked what they should do about the proposed allocation of $400,000 to help in the refugee situation. I told him I was not familiar with this particular issue.

(4) He suggested that it would be well to have a meeting here with some of the members of the Board and the Executive Committee and suggested a date around the first week in August. I told him I would do it if I had not already left the country by that time.

(5) Spencer is pleased with the better integration and coordination of activities between their shop and this office.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

cc: DD/P

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

1955

Executive Registry
3-6124

12 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed U.S. Aid for East German Refugees

1. Last year you testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the U.S. "iron curtain escapees" care-resettlement program, and during the course of testimony I understand you stated that the program excluded aid to ethnic groups such as Germans in accordance with PSB recommendations.

2. Mr. George Warren (UNA/Refugees) of the State Department has proposed that $300,000 be made available from his program for aid to selected East German refugee projects.

3. This proposal is being made as a gesture of aid to East Germans and has the support of HICOG, of James Reber, and of Representative Celler of New York, among other Congressmen. John Bross, CEE, has no objection.

4. Frank Hand in my office is the liaison point; is following this closely, and will keep us thoroughly informed but I thought, in view of your testimony, you would want to know of the projected policy switch.

Thomas Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations/Branch 1

SUBJECT: Coordination of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation

1. As both you and Mr. Slomich agreed in your informal conversation of yesterday, the present explosive situation in the satellite periphery and the interim Psychological Strategy Board guidance on its exploitation necessitate closer cooperation between our respective facilities and branches. I want to thank you for offering to make it possible for us to gain further access to NCFE libraries and open sources and for your offering us further technical assistance. I agree that it would be desirable to exchange a Branch officer so that we may have a better understanding of our respective assets and problems. SR/1 will provide one of your associates with a desk and complete access to our files at any time.

2. It may be well for us to discuss how we can best take advantage of further demonstrations and riots in the satellite areas. Should there be an uprising in Poland, for example, it may be desirable for RFE to place broadcasting time at the disposal of Radio Liberation so that the latter may address concentrated and repeated appeals to the Red Army not to fire on Polish workers and peasants, not to interfere in the Polish struggle for freedom, and to consider the Polish people as the allies of the Soviet people in their common struggle against Communism. It was this line that Radio Liberation followed during the East German uprisings. In the event of riots in Czechoslovakia where the Red Army is not present in force and where the satellite security forces may be unable to keep order, close cooperation will be even more desirable.

3. Consideration could be given to having RFE allot Radio Liberation regular time on its broadcasts to Poland and Bulgaria where there are large concentrations of Soviet troops so that Radio Liberation can further build up the idea of a free, Soviet anti-Communist moral and political authority and to express the solidarity of the Soviet peoples with the oppressed countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Radio Liberation could also allot regular time on its transmitters so that spokesmen of free Czechoslovakia and Poland could address the Soviet troops.

4. It will, of course, be necessary to discuss the divergent approaches of the two stations. Because of its sponsorship, its identity and its mission, Radio Liberation cannot treat the Soviet oppression of the Central and East European peoples in terms of nationalist domination and exploitation. Radio Liberation always distinguishes between the people on the one hand and the Party and Police on the other, and it is our policy to identify the Red Army with the people.

SECRET
Security Information

5. We will maintain close coordination on all matters relating to Radio Liberation broadcasts to the occupation troops and solicit your comments and suggestions on our broadcasts to the USSR proper and on all other matters.

ANDRE YEDIGAROFF
AC/BR/1

2 - Addressee
1 - C/IO

SECRET
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

JUL 22 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: Branch One

SUBJECT: General Pavle Gruya Pavlovic (201 - 14578)

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE to IO, dated 16 July 1952, Subject as above

1. Although not initially responsible for recommending that the NCFE subsidize General Pavle Pavlovic, in referenced memorandum SE Division endorsed the continuation of payments by the NCFE to Subject on the basis of his ability to aid in research work being done for CIA at the Pentagon, as well as of his need as a meritorious exile. We have recently been advised by Miss Stern of your office that the NCFE wishes to discontinue this payment since Subject does not participate directly in the NCFE's activities. We have been further advised that if SE Division wishes General Pavlovic to receive a regular income from the NCFE, SE must provide the necessary funds.

2. It is believed that termination of the subsidy by the NCFE will result in real personal hardship to the General, who, at the age of seventy, has no other known source of income. SE Division, however, is not in a position to provide the necessary funds, since this would necessitate the initiation of what would essentially be a charity project, falling more properly within the purview of IO/Branch One. Neither can this Division justify continuation of payments on the basis of work performed for SE, since he has been working primarily for the Department of the Army during the past year. The arrangements for his work at the Pentagon are such, however, that CIA can place research requirements on General Pavlovic whenever desirable.

3. In reviewing the case this year, we have ascertained from the Department of the Army that Subject has worked diligently and contributed materially to the work of his office. He has been particularly commended for his adaptability and readiness to work, which have shown themselves in his efforts to learn English and typing.

4. It is the opinion

4. It is the opinion of SE Division that the NCFE decision to terminate payments to General Pavlovic should be consistent with its policies vis-a-vis other Yugoslav emigres, many of whom receive regular stipends solely on the basis of "prestige". General Pavlovic's actual contribution to the efforts of the U.S. Government, if not of CIA or the NCFE directly, should be taken into consideration in addition to his very real need before halting payments to him. We would appreciate your informing us as to the final disposition of this case.

CHRISTIAN H. FREER
Acting Chief, SE

4805

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7/23 FGW saw
but decided
to take no
action.
BJM

22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Message from Whitney Shepardson

1. Whitney Shepardson cabled the following to his office with the request that they immediately give it to C. D. Jackson. This information and message was given to us today by Spencer Phenix.

> "Report this morning Mrs. Hilde Benjamin new East German Justice Minister rescinded right to strike granted June 11 by predecessor.
>
> Seems appropriate your boss Thursday press conference or perhaps more formally sum up recent Russian inspired communist actions behind curtain; in Czechoslovakia savings wiped out, future bleak, families, children bankrupt. In east Germany recision of elementary right of labor to strike is again denied and will be ruthlessly crushed by force. Satellite states long deprived of their food and goods by most vicious practices of colonialism known for two centuries. This is no paradise for workers, this is hell. In the United States this capitalist society so often denounced by Soviet propaganda lines, the savings of the workers are protected in law and in fact, and the right to strike is protected in law and in fact also. After almost two hundred years of its national existdnce there can not be found in the US one trace of the colonial practices which characterise Soviet rule over its satellite colonies.
>
> Condon asks that if such theme is used "give our boys a break so they can prepare and push home with background and variation."

(Signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Meeting with PSB

1. I understand that two of the matters that have come up before your PSB luncheon are:

a. C. D. Jackson's proposal to send food to East Germany via balloon.

b. C. D. Jackson's proposal for a monument memorial to be put up near the Brandenburg Gate. I would like to comment on these two proposals for what use it may be to you.

2. It seems to me food shipment via balloon is a meaningless gesture. It will not do any positive good because it can't get enough food into East Germany to make any difference. Thus a negative result is fostered; it looks and appears to be psychological warfare of a rather obvious kind. The food offers by the U. S. Government and those by the ICFTU were, as the London Times pointed out last Monday, psychological victories, but the Russians are now moving food into Germany in far greater quantities than we can do via balloon. In addition, there are obvious dangers from the standpoint of a BW play-back as Mr. Wisner suggested. It would be much easier and much more effective for the Russians to use the BW theme on balloon shipments than on any quantities of food that the Government or the ICFTU are actually able to get behind the Iron Curtain. In sum, balloons are a trick and food doesn't lend itself to tricks.

3. I think the monument idea is a respectable one but not on the level that the PSB people seem to want to play it. They have in mind a world campaign to be conducted in all countries, particularly in this one and in South America with a distinguished body of citizens to lead the campaign here. I do not think the memorial idea is big enough for that (the best memorial so far erected was Berlin's own decision to change the name of the Unterlinden to Strasse June 17). I think the memorial idea ought to be left to the Germans. We can delicately suggest it and see that it is followed up with any support necessary in this country through already existing organizations such as NCFE or the Crusade for Freedom if this is necessary. These should play a minor role.

CIO:TWB/ch
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - W.

SECRET

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

July 21, 1953

" PROSPERO "

Preliminary Report

The purpose of this operation was to exploit the present critical circumstances in the Communist empire and in Czechoslovakia in particular by bringing to the people of that country tangible evidence of the West's interest in and support for their resistance against the regime. There follows a brief summary of the salient facts about the operation:

1. 5402 rubber balloons and 1212 plastic balloons were launched from the primary site in Ellenfeld, a small German village on the Czechoslovak frontier and from the secondary site in Schönsee, some 40 miles to the south.

2. These carried a net total (after wastage) of approximately 10,000,000 messages of three types:

   a. A likeness of the new 1-crown note issued by the Czechoslovak regime following the recent currency reform. The text of this note is attached as Appendix A.

   b. A replica of the new 25-heller coin, bearing the words "All our people for freedom - All the free world for our people". The words "Free Europe" and the emblem of the Freedom Bell appeared in the center of the coin.

   c. A leaflet bearing photographs of the East Berlin demonstrations on one side and a text describing recent events in East Germany and the Soviet Union (including the Beria purge) on the other. Copies of this message are attached as Appendix B.

3. The target areas for the operation were: (a) the industrial and mining districts of northwest Bohemia; (b) the capitol of Prague and the heavily populated area north of Prague; (c) the city and environs of Pilsen; (d) the Ostrava region. (See display map.)

4. The operation took place between 0800 Monday, July 13, 1953 and 2400, Friday, July 17. Balloons were in the air 15 working days after conception of the idea, and 3 working days after final approval. The third (Berlin-Beria) message was sent to the printer on Saturday; on Monday 2,000,000 copies were at the site and on the way to their destination.

5. A crew of 22 workmen was transported from Munich to the site. Including guards, drivers, and supervisory personnel, the total payroll for the operation was approximately 40. The crew was billeted in a small hotel in the nearby village of Tirschenreuth and was fed in a Gasthof at the site. Working time totalled approximately 3000 man hours. The operation entailed the use of 7058 cubic meters of hydrogen, representing 17900 lbs. of lift. The weight of the hydrogen cylinders was 102 tons.

6. The rubber balloons carried an average payload of 2 lbs. and burst at an altitude of from 30,000 to 40,000 ft. They rose in the air at a rate of 100 to 500 ft. per minute. The total elapsed time from the leaflets' point of departure to arrival on the ground ranged from 2 to 5 hours. The plastic balloons carried a payload of from 1/10th to 4/10ths of a pound, travelled at an altitude of 30,000 ft., and penetrated from 60 to 300 miles, depending on the target desired. The plastic balloons do not burst but descend to the ground at a point determined by the amount of gas and weight of payload. At the peak of the operation well over one million messages were in the air at the same time.

7. The wind speed averaged 40 miles per hour and ranged from 230° (blowing into Northern Bohemia) to 270° (blowing towards Prague and Ostrava). Pilsen was bracketed from both launching sites. Meteorological data was obtained from the Neubiberg air base and confirmed by radar facilities located 7 kilometers from the site. These facilities and the personnel necessary to man them were obtained from the U. S. Army. They were able to track target balloons deep into the country. The radar units were also able to detect Czechoslovak air activity and to establish that the other side was also using radar, presumably in connection with the balloons.

8. Border activity was intensified during the period of operations. During 5 trips to the frontier (which was within sight of the launching location), it was observed that officers had replaced enlisted men on border patrols. On several occasions attempts were made by ground forces to shoot down

the balloons, although only two hits were observed by border police.

On Wednesday, July 15, at 1400 hours, two Migs flew along the frontier over the site and were clearly observed by the working party. Subsequently that afternoon the theodolite was moved to a hilltop point (from which, incidentally, the hills around Pilsen could be discerned) and Migs attempting to shoot down balloons were viewed by members of the party as well as by the German border patrol. As many as 7 Migs were observed at one time. Three hits were witnessed, two of which appeared to cause the balloons to explode and one of which simply caused the balloon to disappear. On Wednesday night additional planes were reported by border police. Searchlights were also seen. On Thursday, 5 Messerschmiths 109Fs replaced the Migs and succeeded in destroying three balloons. No air action was observed on Friday, although at 1000 hours a jet vapor trail materialized directly above the Launching site and was headed into Czechoslovakia. However, it was impossible to see the aircraft or to say for certain that this was a border violation.

9. On the last night of operations (Thursday) a procession of 80 plastic balloons with candle-lanterns was launched. Since the night was perfectly clear, the "torchlight parade" could be easily observed - the lights looked like stars marching quietly across the sky. No aircraft were seen.

10. The total cost of both the original operation and the supplementary Berlin-Beria message is estimated at less than $25,000, or a unit cost of 1/5th of a cent per message sent. A substantial portion of this represents transportation and other non-recurrent expenses which would not be involved in a sustained operation.

11. Note must be made of the invaluable technical and operational assistance provided by the two General Mills personnel, Mr. C. B. Moore and Mr. Fletcher Bartholomew, who were present on the trip. It should also be mentioned that the help of RFE personnel was exceedingly valuable.

12. As of the date of this report, regime reaction includes:

a. Rude Pravo editorial read over Radio Prague on July 18 (Appendix C), plus supplementary articles in Svobodno Slovo and Mlada Front.

b. Commentaries over Radio Moscow in Russian and Polish and over Radio Warsaw.

c. Articles in the Romanian and Hungarian press.

d. An article in Moscow Pravda.

13. In accordance with previous plans, Western publicity about the operation was discouraged.

Conclusions

The limited purpose of "Prospero" has, so far as we know, been substantially achieved. However, it must be acknowledged that an operation of this kind is both strongly provocative and (because of its tangible form) susceptible to dangers not risked by radio. There is the further complication that it is launched from German soil and could conceivably cause injury to RFE's position in Germany. All of these factors must be carefully weighed in considering any future action of this sort.

Further, this must be classified as a "crash action", as evidenced by the time elapsed between conception and termination. Crash actions are good once or twice, but are not to be recommended as a habit either from the point of view of cost or, even more important, in cognizance of the utter necessity of careful and thorough preparation of the best possible message.

On the positive side, this can be stated:

1. The message was timely, worth saying, and closely integrated with RFE policy.
2. Enemy reaction was immediate and sorely hurt.
3. Internal conditions and the world Communist situation suggest that the action was taken at an apt moment.

4. Technically, with radar help it was proved that balloons could be launched carrying relatively heavy payloads on an assembly line basis with a high degree of target accuracy. This was not previously known.

5. Aside from the impact of the messages, the very fact that the West was interested enough to go to the trouble and expense of penetrating the Iron Curtain by a means which the regime is powerless to prevent - by Migs or bullets - cannot be lost upon the captive peoples.

S. S. Walker, Jr.

MESSAGE ON LEAFLET

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS! HEAR THE MESSAGE WHICH COMES ~~TO~~ YOU TODAY FROM THE FREE WORLD!

THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER!

THE PEOPLES OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES ARE GROWING STRONGER!

The Soviet Union is getting weaker. The struggle for Stalin's heritage shakes the entire Soviet empire and fear creeps through the Kremlin. Who will fall with Beria and who will fall after Beria? How many millions will fall victims to the new purge which is now going to begin - the biggest purge which the Soviet Union has ever known?

How many victims will fall in the Soviet Union and how many in the occupied countries? Who will fall with Beria in Prague and who will be dragged down by his fall in Bratislava? Who will be the new Slansky and who the new Clementis? And when the purge spreads and broadens, down from the Politbureau to the lands and districts, to the offices and the factories - how many functionaries will safely survive?

Only those will survive who detach themselves from the sinking Communist boat in time. Only those who join the people and help the people's struggle against the oppressors.

The Soviets have trapped themselves in a blind alley. If the Moscow boot weighs even heavier on the necks of the oppressed people and if Moscow's demands upon the frightened puppet governments become more pressing, the resistance of the people will only grow: for the people will not return into submission. If the Communist regimes, in order to appease the wrath of the people, try to bribe their subjects by promising concessions - as in Hungary and in Eastern Germany - they will get nowhere: for the people will no longer be deceived by phony concessions.

The people are growing stronger. The first flames of revolt have flared out in Czechoslovakia and in Eastern Germany. From Pilsen, from Moravska Ostrava, from Oslavany, from Berlin, Dresden and Magdeburg the echo of this revolt has roared throughout the world and deeply shaken the entire Soviet realm: the people showed their strength.

The Communist regimes recognized the menace and became afraid. They started apologising. They started self-criticising. They started giving promises. In Germany the anti-labor decrees had to be revoked. In Czechoslovakia the frightened government was forced to desist from applying the penal laws concerning absenteeism. In Moscow, under the influence of the news of the peoples revolt in Czechoslovakia and Germany, the internal struggle became sharper. Beria and his all-powerful police fell as victims. Your resistance has helped to alter the course of history: new forces made their appearance on the battlefield, the people won their first major victory in their fight with the regime.

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS!

The more your oppressors are shaken by uncertainty, the greater is the certainty of your victory. The regime is afraid of you, it knows that power is fundamentally on your side. This is the time when people's unity, common agreement, and unity of purpose are capable of winning concessions. Your battlefield of labor is in the factories and in the fields. On this battlefield of labor you have the advantage of numbers. On this battlefield you cannot be vanquished. You will not be content with bribes, you will ask more and more from the exploiters. We do not presume to give you orders nor to give you advice. You and your new leaders who are being born in the struggle know best how and where to strike. But we want you to know that you are not alone: Among the masses of people behind the Iron Curtain the fire of revolt is smouldering and its sparks are flying from country to country. Everywhere in the free world your friends are with you. Their help will grow as your determination grows.

FREE EUROPE!

MESSAGE ON BANKNOTE

On one side:

Czechoslovaks, know this:

The regime is weaker than you have dared to think! Power lies with the people and the people stand opposed. With unity and courage, organize your strength: Down with the collective! Insist on workers' rights! Today demand concessions; tomorrow - freedom!

On other side:

Men call this the hunger crown - gift of the Soviet Union. It is the symbol of regime desperation, of five-year failure: It is a challenge to fight, to meet weakness with strength, to resist as you know best.

The other captive peoples are uniting and will join you in your struggle.

The free world is with you!

All power to the people!

RFE LS 7-24-53

CAESAR INFO WALKER FM MICHIE

OUR VIENNA BUREAU YESTERDAY REPORTED FOLLOWING BALLOON REACTION QUOTE SEVEN MEN FROM PARDUBICE SAID THAT ALL LAST WEEK PEOPLE WERE JUMPING LIKE FROGS TO CATCH THE LEAFLETS AS THEY CAME DOWN. MANY PEOPLE WORE THE COINS AROUND THEIR NECKS. MANY SOLDIERS WERE CHECKED OUT FROM THEIR ARMY UNITS TO COLLECT THE LEAFLETS. SAME REFUGEES SAID ALSO THAT IN PILSEN MIG PLANES TOOK OFF EVERY HOUR FROM THE AIRPORT TO SHOOT DOWN THE BALLOONS. THERE WERE NO REPEAT NO LEAFLETS AND NO REPEAT NO BALLOONS IN THE BUDEJOVICE AREA IT WAS REPORTED. NEVERTHELESS ALL THE GENDARMERIE INTERVIEWED THE POPULATION TO SEE IF THEY HAD SOMEHOW OBTAINED ANY. ALSO THE POSTMEN HAD ORDERS FROM THE GENDARMERIE TO ASK EVERYBODY ALONG THEIR POSTAL ROUTES IF THEY HAD ANY LEAFLETS. UNQUOTE

[illegible]

TO CAESAR FOR W[illegible]ER . [illegible] MICHIE

RADIO WARSAW JULY 20 0700 HOURS QUOTE BALLOON ACTION. AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS HAVE LATELY LAUNCHED IN WESTERN GERMANY A CAMPAIGN AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA - THE DAILY RUDE PRAVO STATED IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE A CAMPAIGN CONDEMNED TO FIASCO UNQUOTE. FROM AUSTRIA SMALL BALLOONS CONTAINING DENOUNCING LEAFLETS HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED IN THE DIRECTION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE ACTION - AS ANNOUNCED BY THE MUNICH SLANDER-STATION FREE EUROPE - WAS LED BY AMERICAN EXPERTS WHO CAME TO WESTERN GERMANY FOR THAT INTENTION. IT IS A FACT SAYS RUDE PRAVO THAT BALLOON EXPERTS HAVE NOT SPARED THE LEAFLETS. DURING TWO DAYS TIME CZECHOSLOVAK CITIZENS HAVE BROUGHT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF LEAFLETS TO SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND NATIONAL COMMITTEES. CZECHOSLOVAK WORKING MASSES ARE DEEPLY INDIGNANT AT THIS DISHONEST PROVOCATION OF WARMONGERS UNQUOTE.

RADIO WARSAW JULY 22 0700 HOURS QUOTED THE NOTE SENT BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT SENT A NOTE TO THE MAERICAN EMBASSY IN PRAGUE IN WHICH IT PROTESTS VIOLENTLY AGAINST SPREADING ON CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORY SOME LEAFLETS, CALLING FOR ANTI-STATE ACTIVITY. THE NOTE STRESSED THAT THE PROVOCATIONS HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO ARE STAYING IN THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION ZONE IN WESTERN GERMANY UNQUOTE

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS SERVICE

July 20, 195

The following report is one of the first full attacks on the recent "Balloon Operation" in Czechoslovakia. The text was read over Radio Prague on July 18, 1953:

We are going to read to you now an article from today's Rude Pravo. The article is called "An Action Doomed to Failure". Thanks to the peace policy of the Soviet Union and of all the countries of the camp of peace, the conviction that a war can be prevented grew stronger among the people all through the world. Naturally, this evolution creates a great concern with those for whom war constitutes a source of immeasurable gains and of a luxurious life. Therefore the warmongers do their best to put obstacles in the way which leads towards the lessening of international tension. In Korea the part of the provocateur and saboteur of the peace effort was given to Syngman Rhee. In Germany bandits were used, recruited from the ranks of Nazi war criminals in the democratic sector of Berlin as well as in some other parts of the German Democratic Republic. And after the failure this much heralded day, there comes the hypocritical and demagogical offer to help to the population of the DDR, which was made for obvious propaganda reasons which, in fact, was admitted by the Western bourgeois press.

Into this chain of provocations which are aimed against the strengthening of peace there also belongs the American propaganda action which was started in the last days in Western Germany against Czechoslovakia. In a similar way in which two years ago the ill-famed "Crusaders for Freedom" were doing it, today again balloons dispersing inflamatory leaflets over our territory are being sent from the Bavarian side.

The Munich transmitter Free Europe, financed by Ford and similar "institutions" speaks bombastically of the propaganda balloon action which, allegedly is the biggest action of this kind which ever has been attempted and for the direction of which there came to Western Germany specialists from America.

We can indeed certify that the balloons specialists did not spare the leaflets in the first two days tens and hundreds of thousands of those leaflets are with our police and our national committees where they are being brought by our citizens after having been discovered. The farmer Hajek from Doubravice, district of Cesky Brod, brought an entire parcel of leaflets which came down in one piece. Josef Korinek from Zatec brought an entire balloon which fell down. The leaflets are being brought by the workers of the Vladimir Lenin Works as well as other factories, by farmers, railwaymen and children. Yet even if the balloon action was not only four times bigger - as Free Europe says - but hundreds times bigger than the Crusade action of 1951, it will bring to its initiators the very opposite of what they had in mind.

With words of justified anger our citizens come with the leaflets and they are especially offended by the fact that one of the leaflets is some kind of a facsimile of the new Czechoslovak crown stamped on both sides by inflamatory words. Our citizens hold in esteem the new crown which is firm and valuable and has a great purchasing power which helped us to get rid of rationing and, therefore, with sharp and often crude words they criticize that its image had been misused as the basis for printing big lies concerning the government of our republic and the USSR.

The second leaflet is propagating the Fascist provocations which took place on seventeen June in the German Democratic Republic. When those provocations ended by failure, their organizers ordered that they should be used at last for the printing of leaflets with pictures, demonstrating the bandits of Berlin in action; as they are starting fires or indulging in provocations, etc.

Those pictures belong into the series of the photographs which the Nazis throatcutters used to take while they were starting fires in the occupied countries, in the Ukraine, in Oradour, in Li Lidice. It is quite natural that this, too, can only create disgust towards those who have started this criminal action. Besides, the pictures of the Fascist provocations in Berlin are no sensational news for us, as the directors of the balloon action obviously imagine. Similar pictures were published not long ago in our Svet Prace, It demonstrates the absolute political shortsightedness which when people mentioned it is described as stupidity of the organizers of the balloon action who think that they could influence our people by leaflets one side of which constitutes a glorification of hatred and of the attack against peace which was to take place on 17th June in Berlin.

In vain is the part of the defender of Czechoslovak working people - and this will always be the same - assumed by those, from whose actions there emanates the wish to start a new murderous war which is not wanted by any honest working citizen whatever be his political or his religious opinion. This provocation clearly demonstrates how the USA reactionary circles plan the lessening of international tension.

It is a gross heresy just at the time when the people of the entire world are looking forward with hope towards the possibility of a truce in Korea, when with confidence they are following the peace policy of USSR, aiming at the peaceful settlement of all disputed international questions.

Therefore, the balloon action was met with sharp condemnation on the part of our people. The balloon specialists would certainly not like to hear what the people say when they bring the leaflets to the SNB and to the National Committees. It is worth noticing that even such people who so far did not find an active attitude to the socialist development express their surprise about the means the West is employing. And all our people are deeply offended by the latent violating of the independence of our State territory. They are surprised by the great amount of stupidity of the people who thought that they will achieve anything by the balloons. True, the Crusaders of Freedom in the West are losing more and more possibilities for conducting enemy activity on the territory of our Republic. On the frontiers of our country there stands a vigilant guard which breaks all the attempts of their agents and so they must be contented with the balloon action which our people overtly laughed at and which they condemn.

They openly say that the entire action was a kind of gansterism which not even Hitler dared to commit at the time of the greatest hatred campaign against Czechoslovakia. When they are bringing the leaflets which they had found to the security organs and to the administrative organs, they ask that the action should be publicly condemned.

This spontaneous disgust concerning the balloon action demonstrated in which complete isolation, lack of information and ignorance of the real thinking of our working people do live the mercenaries of Free Europe which is the patron of this action. Free Europe even broadcast, while propagating the balloons, some kind of poor poetry in which one says, that "Always all the good things were coming from above" and that our people knew this".

Yet our people have got a longer memory than Free Europe believes. They will remember what good came to them from above from the West; that it was the bombs which on the eve of the end of the war were murdering women and children in peaceful residential quarters of Prague and Plzen and which destroyed the Plzen Skoda Works and the Prague Kolben Works in order to make our reconstruction more difficult. Later we were getting from above, from Western Germany a flood of the Colorado beetle which was supposed to bring us misery and starvation, and they knew very well what American pilots are bringing from above to the women and children of Korea.

And one more coincidence: One of the boxes with leaflets which was found near Brezoe in the Plzen Region carried the inscription Munchen and also with the name of Munich are connected for every citizen the memories of the worst time of our nations: the memories how in reality looks the love of the so-called friends of our people.

In fact the organizers of the ridiculous and stupid balloon action spent their dollars for balloons, paper and metal stamps carrying the emblem of Free Europe which are also being spread. They can hardly expect any thanks on the part of their employers because the result is exactly the contrary of the expected. True, a few business men finally got their pockets full but otherwise the action was doomed to failure from its very beginning. This action blown up by Free Europe deflated soon just as its balloons.

413 / 7-

RFE 7 7-21-53

PHENIX LANG WALKER GRIFFITH FM CONDON

FOLLOWS RADIO PRAGUE ANNOUNCEMENT 0910 TODAY RE NOTE ON BALLOONS.

"THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING NOTE TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES ON JULY 20, 1953:

DURING THE PAST DAYS BALLOONS WERE SENT TO CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORY WITH LEAFLETS OF A NATURE DESIGNED TO INCITE DISCONTENT OF THE POPULATION AND TO ENCOURAGE ANTI-STATE ACTIVITIES. THIS NEW ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE CZECHOSLOVAK WORKING PEOPLE WITH PROPAGANDA MEANS OF SO PRIMITIVE A LEVEL, UNDERSTANDABLY MET WITH INDIGNANT RESISTANCE, THAT THE ENTIRE ACTION

WAS PREPARED AND CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN CITIZENS SENT FOR THIS PURPOSE TO GERMANY, TO GERMAN TERRITORY UNDER US OCCUPATION ADMINISTRATION. IT IS THEREFORE A NEW INSTANCE WHERE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ABUSED ITS POSITION AS AN OCCUPATION POWER TOWARDS ENDS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FOUR POWER AGREEMENT ON GERMANY, WHICH BINDS THE UNITED STATE TO CARRY OUT THE OCCUPATION ACCORDING TO THE BASIC TENET THAT GERMANY IS NEVER AGAIN TO BECOME A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND ITS NEIGHBOURS.

a

ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACTOR WHICH MAKES THIS NEW VIOLATION OF BASIC PRICIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PARTICULARLY OBJECTIONABLE IS THE FACT THAT IT TOOK PLACE AT A TIME WHEN THE NATIONS OF THE ENTIRE WORLD ARE INCREASING THEIR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE PEACE AND ASSURE PEACEFUL COOPERATION.

THE AIM OF THIS PROVOCATIVE ACTION, ORGANIZED UNDER THE PROTECTION OF US OCCUPATION AUTHORIITIES IS TO INCREASE THE POLICIES OF THE SO-CALLED COLD WAR AND TO PREVENT A LOOSENING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION.

FOR THESE REASONS THE GOVERNMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA DECISIVELY PROTESTS AGAINST THIS ACTION AND ASKS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO FURNISH INFORMATION ON THE STEPS TAKEN TO PREVENT SIMILAR PROVOCATIONS AIMED AGAINST PEACEFUL COEXISTANCE OF NATIONS, REPRESENTING CRUDE INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIRS."

END MSG

[illegible] July 25, [illegible]

Czechoslovakia

Balloon Operation

The "Commentary of the Week" quotes an article from "Rude Pravo" dealing with the preparation for "X-Day". No lies broadcast from abroad, no balloon operation can deny the fact that the plan for "X-Day" which had been prepared for 5 years failed with the Berlin plots.

The weekly programme "Uncle from Stiavnica" tries to ridicule and underestimate the significance of the balloon operation. This programme was broadcast by Radio Bratislava in Slovak dialect. It tells the story of the "uncle" who found some of the crowns which had been put into the balloons on the road and of course immediately recognized that they were only the imitations of the real crowns. Next day he entered the tobacconist's shop and when paying gave the sales girl by accident the crown he had found on the road. She only laughed and told him he could not get anything for that crown but has to pay with real Czechoslovak currency.

14-00000

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs' Note to America Legation

REFERENCE: Memo dated 21 July 1953 - Subject: "Czech Reactions to Balloon Operation"

1. The Czech Desk of the Department of State is preparing an answer to the Czech note which will generally disclaim any U.S. Governmental responsibility for the balloon operation. The VOA is being instructed to brush off the Czech note and to cite it as another example of the regime's attempt to prevent the Czech people from getting the truth.

2. RFE will not comment on the note except to report the U.S. reply as a news item, but will comment on the Rude Pravo editorial taking the line the Czech Government can't let its people know the truth and also speculating on how many Czechs did not turn in their pamphlets.

[illegible] BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief,
International Organizations Division

C-IO/Branch 1/WPD/mhj

Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1
C-IO/Branch 1 - 2
CIO - 1
RI - 1

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Czech reactions to balloon operation

1. Attached are Czech reactions to the balloon operation including the text of a note from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered today to the American Embassy in Prague.

2. Radio Free Europe has been instructed not to comment upon this note until directed.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment: a/s

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Follows Radio Prague announcement 0510 today re note on balloons:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following note to the Embassy of the United States on July 20, 1953:

During the past days balloons were sent to Czechoslovakian territory with leaflets of a nature designed to incite discontent of the population and to encourage anti-state activities. This new attempt to influence the Czech working people with propaganda means of so primitive a level, understandably met with indignate instance, that the entire action was prepared and carried out by American citizens sent for this purpose to Germany, to German territory under U.S. occupation administration. It is, therefore, a new instance where the U.S. Government abused its position as an occupation power towards ends incomparable with the four power agreement on Germany, which binds the U.S. to carry out the occupation according to the basic tenet that Germany is never again to become a threat to world peace and its neighbors.

Another important factor which makes this new violation of basic principle of international law particularly objectionable is the fact that it took place at a time when the nations of the entire world are increasing their efforts to strengthen the peace and assure peacefull cooperation.

The aim of this provocative action, organized under the protection of U.S. occupation authorities is to increase the policies of the so-called cold war and to prevent a loosening of international tensions.

For these reasons the Government of Czechoslovakia decisively protest against this action and asks the Government of the U.S. to furnish information on the steps taken to prevent similar provocation aimed against peaceful co-existence of nations, representing crude interference in internal Czech affairs."

14-00000

C O P Y

MUNICH RFE 29 - JULY 20, 1953

PLEASE NOTE THAT TODAY'S PRAVDA CARRIED REPRINT OF MAJOR PORTION OF RUDE PRAVO BALLOON EDITORIAL, INCLUDING MENTION OF RFE, UNDER TITLE: "ANSWER OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE TO THE PROVACATEURS AND SLANDERS". UNITED PRESS CARRIED STORY OF RUDE PRAVO EDITORIAL UNDER VIENNA DATELINE JULY 18.

END

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS SERVICE

July 20, 1953

The following report is one of the first full attacks on the recent "Balloon Operation" in Czechoslovakia. The text was read over Radio Prague on July 18, 1953:

We are going to read to you now an article from today's Rude Pravo. The article is called "An Action Doomed to Failure". Thanks to the peace policy of the Soviet Union and of all the countries of the camp of peace, the conviction that a war can be prevented grew stronger among the people all through the world. Naturally, this evolution creates a great concern with those for whom war constitutes a source of immeasurable gains and of a luxurious life. Therefore the warmongers do their best to put obstacles in the way which leads towards the lessening of international tension. In Korea the part of the provocateur and saboteur of the peace effort was given to Syngman Rhee. In Germany bandits were used, recruited from the ranks of Nazi war criminals in the democratic sector of Berlin as well as in some other parts of the German Democratic Republic. And after the failure this much heralded day, there comes the hypocritical and demagogical offer to help to the population of the DDR, which was made for obvious propaganda reasons which, in fact, was admitted by the Western bourgeois press.

Into this chain of provocations which are aimed against the strengthening of peace there also belongs the American propaganda action which was started in the last days in Western Germany against Czechoslovakia. In a similar way in which two years ago the ill-famed "Crusaders for Freedom" were doing it, today again balloons dispersing inflammatory leaflets over our territory are being sent from the Bavarian side.

The Munich transmitter Free Europe, financed by Ford and similar "institutions" speaks bombastically of the propaganda balloon action which, allegedly is the biggest action of this kind which ever has been attempted and for the direction of which there came to Western Germany specialists from America.

We can indeed certify that the balloons specialists did not spare the leaflets in the first two days tens and hundreds of thousands of those leaflets are with our police and our national committees where they are being brought by our citizens after having been discovered. The farmer Hajek from Doubravcice, district of Cecky Brod, brought an entire parcel of leaflets which came down in one piece. Josef Korinek from Zatec brought an entire balloon which fell down. The leaflets are being brought by the workers of the Vladimir Lenin Works as well as other factories, by farmers, railwaymen and children. Yet even if the balloon action was not only four times bigger - as Free Europe says - but hundreds times bigger than the Crusade action of 1951, it will bring to its initiators the very opposite of what they had in mind.

With words of justified anger our citizens come with the leaflets and they are especially offended by the fact that one of the leaflets is some kind of a facsimile of the new Czechoslovak crown stamped on both sides by inflamatory words. Our citizens hold in esteem the new crown which is firm and valuable and has a great purchasing power ~~which~~ helped us to get rid of rationing and, therefore, with sharp and often crude words they criticize that its image had been misused as the basis for printing big lies concerning the government of our republic and the USSR.

The second leaflet is propagating the Fascist provocations which took place on seventeen June in the German Democratic Republic. When those provocations ended by failure, their organizers ordered that they should be used at last for the printing of leaflets with pictures, demonstrating the bandits of Berlin in action; as they are starting fires or indulging in provocations, etc.

Those pictures belong into the series of the photographs which the Nazis throatcutters used to take while they were starting fires in the occupied countries, in the Ukraine, in Oradour, in Li Lidice. It is quite natural that this, too, can only create disgust towards those who have started this criminal action. Besides, the pictures of the Fascist provocations in Berlin are no sensational news for us, as the directors of the balloon action obviously imagine. Similar pictures were published not long ago in our Svet Prace, It demonstrates the absolute political shortsightedness which when people mentioned it is described as stupidity of the organizers of the balloon action who think that they could influence our people by leaflets one side of which constitutes a glorification of hatred and of the attack against peace which was to take place on 17th June in Berlin.

In vain is the part of the defender of Czechoslovak working people - and this will always be the same - assumed by those, from whose actions there emanates the wish to start a new murderous war which is not wanted by any honest working citizen whatever be his political or his religious opinion. This provocation clearly demonstrates how the USA reactionary circles plan the lessening of international tension.

It is a gross heresy just at the time when the people of the entire world are looking forward with hope towards the possibility of a truce in Korea, when with confidence they are following the peace policy of USSR, aiming at the peaceful settlement of all disputed international questions.

Therefore, the balloon action was met with sharp condemnation on the part of our people. The balloon specialists would certainly not like to hear what the people say when they bring the leaflets to the SNB and to the National Committees. It is worth noticing that even such people who so far did not find an active attitude to the socialist development express their surprise about the means the West is employing. And all our people are deeply offended by the latent violating of the independence of our State territory. They are surprised by the great amount of stupidity of the people who thought that they will achieve anything by the balloons. True, the Crusaders of Freedom in the West are losing more and more possibilities for conducting enemy activity on the territory of our Republic. On the frontiers of our country there stands a vigilant guard which breaks all the attempts of their agents and so they must be contented with the balloon action which our people overtly laughed at and which they condemn.

They openly say that the entire action was a kind of gangsterism which not even Hitler dared to commit at the time of the greatest hatred campaign against Czechoslovakia. When they are bringing the leaflets which they had found to the security organs and to the administrative organs, they ask that the action should be publicly condemned.

This spontaneous disgust concerning the balloon action demonstrated in which complete isolation, lack of information and ignorance of the real thinking of our working people do live the mercenaries of Free Europe which is the patron of this action. Free Europe even broadcast, while propagating the balloons, some kind of poor poetry in which one says, that "Always all the good things were coming from above" and that our people knew this".

Yet our people have got a longer memory than Free Europe believes. They will remember what good came to them from above from the West; that it was the bombs which on the eve of the end of the war were murdering women and children in peaceful residential quarters of Prague and Plzen and which destroyed the Plzen Skoda Works and the Prague Kolben Works in order to make our reconstruction more difficult. Later we were getting from above, from Western Germany a flood of the Colorado beetle which was supposed to bring us misery and starvation, and they know very well what American pilots are bringing from above to the women and children of Korea.

And one more coincidence: One of the boxes with leaflets which was found near Brezce in the Plzen Region carried the inscription Munchen and also with the name of Munich are connected for every citizen the memories of the worst time of our nations: the memories how in reality looks the love of the so-called friends of our people.

In fact the organizers of the ridiculous and stupid balloon action spent their dollars for balloons, paper and metal badges carrying the emblem of Free Europe which are also being spread. They can hardly expect any thanks on the part of their employers because the result is exactly the contrary of the expected. True, a few business men finally got their pockets full but otherwise the action was doomed to failure from its very beginning. This action blown up by Free Europe deflated soon just as its balloons.

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Note to Czechoslovak Government

Verbatim Text

Following is text note for transmission FONOFF in reply to its note July 20.

Begin text. The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with reference to the Ministry's Note of July 20, 1953, concerning the release of balloons from the US Zone of Germany has the honor, upon instructions of the US Government, to make the following reply:

The balloons apparently in question were not released by any official agency of this Government but by the Crusade for Freedom, an organization established by private American citizens. The US Government has ascertained that the balloons were released for the purpose of communicating with the people of Czechoslovakia.

It is a fundamental conviction of the American Government and people that free communication between peoples constitutes a principle upon which the very life of the international community should be founded. If any government attempts to erect a wall sealing off its people from contact with the outside world, it is inevitable that ways will be found both by the people inside that country and by the peoples of other countries outside to penetrate that artificial barrier and maintain some line of contact with one another. The use by those outside of such media as balloons confirms that the Czechoslovak Government has created a barrier interfering with free communication. The US believes that the best assurance that this means of communication will not be used is to obviate the need for it by permitting what is natural and necessary in the modern world, namely, free contact between nations and the free exchange of information and ideas.

As for

As for the content of the messages carried to Czechoslovakia by this medium, it is understood that they contained information on current developments in Central and Eastern Europe and in addition various statements focusing on the idea of "freedom". There would be no reason for a government to be disturbed about the principle of freedom in a message to its people, if conditions of freedom actually existed in that country. One cannot readily believe that the Czechoslovak Government would even raise this issue with the US Government if the fundamental freedoms were observed in Czechoslovakia and if the Czechoslovak Government were not now especially concerned about the attitude of the people toward the absence of those freedoms.

The US Government cannot agree that the transmission of these messages to the people of Czechoslovakia from the territory of the US Zone of Germany by the Crusade for Freedom Committee involved any misuse of the position of the US as an occupying power. Such communication is clearly not contrary to any quadripartite agreements affecting Germany. Nor does such communication violate any other international agreement to which the US Government is a signatory.

With reference to efforts to strengthen world peace the US, as is generally known, has endeavored in every practicable way to work step by step, in accordance with the deep interests of the American people in permanent peace and in cooperation with other countries, toward building an enduring structure of international peace and stability. The US seeks to help bring about a relaxation of international tension wherever there are genuine possibilities of doing so. It is recognized at the same time that true international tranquillity presupposes conditions which assure human rights and fundamental freedoms for the people concerned. End text/

Cable soonest intended date delivery so press release may be issued here.

SECRET
Security Information

Follows Radio Prague announcement 0510 today re note on balloons:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following note to the Embassy of the United States on July 20, 1953:

During the past days balloons were sent to Czech territory with leaflets of a nature designed to insight discontent of the population and to encourage anti-state activities. This new attempt to influence the Czech working people with propaganda means of so primitive a level, understandably met with indignate instance, that the entire action was prepared and carried out by American citizens sent for this purpose to Germany, to German territory under US occupation administration. It is therefore a new instance where the US Government abuse its position as an occupation power towards ends incomparable with the four power agreement on Germany, which binds the US to carry out the occupation according to the basic tenet that Germany is never again to become a threat to world peace and its neighbors.

Another important factor which makes this new violation of basic principle of international law particularly objectionable is the fact that it took place at a time when the nations of the entire world are increasing their efforts to strengthen the peace and assure peaceful cooperation.

The aim of this provocative action, organized under the protection of US occupation authorities is to increase the policies of the so-called cold war and to prevent a loosening of international tensions.

For these reasons the Government of Czech decisively protest against this action and asks the Government of the US to furnish information on the steps taken to prevent similar provocation aimed against peaceful co-existence of nations, representing crude interference in internal Czech affairs."

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P		
2			
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	4 June
2			
3	file NCFE		

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS:

Attached is Mr. Durkee's recommendation in respect to Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr., International Federation of Free Journalists and the Free European Press Service. His recommendation is that we do not support this organisation for PW or intelligence purposes. I concur in it.

see 2 June Chrons TWB

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 30-4

16—68794-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET
Security Information

4237

20 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/IO

SUBJECT: Zygmunt Nagorski; Free European Press Service; International Federation of Free Journalists.

REFERENCE: Memo to DD/P fr C/IO dtd 12 June, same subject.

1. I have read with interest the reference memorandum which concludes with recommendations against the utilization of Nagorski and his "organization" in connection with PP operations, including dissemination activities. It is my recollection that there had been a previous recommendation against the use of this individual and his colleagues and associates as sources of information. It is my further recollection that in part as the result of a recommendation which we received from C. D. Jackson, we recently granted a very modest ($3500 per month) subsidy to cover a try-out period of a few months' duration.

2. Will you please advise me if I am wrong on any of my points of recollection as indicated above. If, on the other hand, my recollection is accurate, will you please prepare for my signature a brief communication suitable for transmittal to Mr. C. D. Jackson and stating, in effect, that whereas we did in fact go forward with a modest subsidy for a three (?) month period, we have now had an opportunity to re-examine this entire situation in detail, including the identity and character of Nagorski's sources and associates, and have reached the conclusion that we have no interest or desire to continue our support and relationship with Nagorski beyond the conclusion of the trial period.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/[illegible]
C/IO ✓

Attachments:
Ref. memo and tabs.

SECRET
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

20 July 1953

IO, Attn: Mr. Durkee
VIA : Chief, EE
DC/EE/P

Proposed Balloon Campaign in Event President Offers Food to Poland

1. With reference to our discussion of 17 July, attached hereto is a sample of the coupon which it is recommended that the Crusade for Freedom distribute by balloon from Germany in the event that a Presidential offer of food for Poland is refused by the Polish Government. This coupon reads as follows:

> The bearer of this coupon is entitled to receive from the food supplies donated by Americans:
>
> (food listed will be those specifically offered)
>
> Stamped across the coupon are the words, "Invalid due to the rejection of the offer by The Polish 'Peoples' Republic".

2. We are advising the Frankfurt mission of this plan and requesting their estimate of the number of leaflets which they could release by balloon from the Baltic. Please advise us whether or not your printing facilities can supply the German mission with whatever number of leaflets they undertake to distribute. We, on the other hand, will advise you soonest of the number of balloons we will require from your stocks and the address to which they are to be consigned.

3. In the event that the Crusade desires to include a printed message on the reverse of the leaflet, it is requested that the text of the message be cleared either with this desk or with the German mission prior to printing.

Attachment:

WALPOLE DAVIS
Deputy Chief

See Dike's
reply 29 July
Chrono

EE/P:ECHoward:ms
20 July 1953
2 Addressee
1 RI
2 EE/P

16 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/PP

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden

SUBJECT: Mr. Kenneth Dean Koch

1. In January of this year I discussed with your office the retention of Kenneth Dean Koch in Berlin as RFE representative, due to his extensive usefulness to FI in Berlin, providing FI with cover facilities, leads, general services and working very satisfactorily in supporting the FI mission in Berlin. At that time I was assured by IO that they would do everything possible to retain Mr. Koch in Berlin as the RFE representative. In May of this year I had occasion to visit Bob Lang in New York on another matter and I again touched upon Mr. Koch's assignment in Berlin, at which time Mr. Lang assured me that no changes would be made in Koch's assignment in Berlin without prior clearance with me. He also emphasized that no man would be sent to Berlin who did not meet with our complete approval. In the meantime, Koch was sent to Israel to set up the RFE office but seemingly met with opposition on the part of Israel authorities and has returned to Germany with no definite job envisaged for him. John Elliott has taken over the RFE office in Berlin and there seems to be no attempt to make any concessions to FI wishes in Berlin.

2. We find this solution an extremely unsatisfactory one. Elliott, by background, general character, and ability, is not as useful to FI in Berlin as Koch was and I seriously doubt that RFE would find him as satisfactory as Koch in standard RFE business. I knew Elliott when he was a newspaper man, and I have checked with several of his former colleagues who agree that he does not have any of the hard-hitting qualities so desirable for an RFE representative in Berlin. This is not an attempt to belittle his ability as a journalist but the job in Berlin is very much more than that. In short, I would appreciate your office taking steps with RFE to return Dean Koch to Berlin as RFE representative, since his services to FI are very much desired even on a part-time basis. Our main reason for wanting Koch in Berlin is that the RFE office attracts a large percentage of Satellite refugees and as such it is important for us to have the head of the RFE office in Berlin

Security

cognizant of our intelligence interests in order to be able to channel the right type of refugee to our doorstep. Furthermore, in many cases the RFE representative can perform valuable screening and cutout functions which would preserve his own cover and yet save us valuable time and effort.

3. I would appreciate any action you can take on this subject and refer you to IN 40404 from Berlin which is attached. Please keep me advised on any progress you make in this case.

PETER SICHEL
Chief, EE/FI

Attachment: IN 40404

Read by Wisner
7/17/53

SECRET
Security Information

16 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE Report on recent Soviet Zone Politburo Meeting

1. Attached herewith, I am forwarding you a cable which has just been received in New York from Munich.

2. The information contained therein was transmitted by the RFE correspondent in Hamburg, Major Ramsey, who reportedly got it from a usually reliable British SIS contact.

3. RFE has asked us to treat this information with extreme caution and strictly as speculation.

Signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment: a/s

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SOVIET ZONE POLITBURO MEETING

Cable dated 7/16/53 from Munich to New York

"East German aling President Wilhelm Pieck is definitely on the way out, reliable sources in close contacts with the East German Government said here today. The sources stated that Pieck's ouster was disclosed during an East-West German Communist Politburo meeting which ended in East Germany on July 12. Top German Communist leaders were also told that East German Secret Police Chief, Wilhelm Zaisser, is now suspended or under house arest. Zaisser was arrested for publication of casulty figures of the June 17 revolt, the source said. His ouster also falls in line with recent Communist policy shifts all over the Red Empire, they said. At the meeting it was disclosed that SED head Walter Ulbricht will remain a potent force in East German politics despite recent rumors of his impending purge. Premier Otto Grotewohl will be given increased power in the new government set-up, the sources said. During a discussion of recent events in the Soviet at the Politburo meeting, the Communist leaders were given information from Moscow reporting that Foreign Minister Molotov will emerge during the next month as the key figure in the Soviet Union. Premier Malenkov will serve as a figurehead for Molotov, the sources revealed. The Red Army is fast becoming a major political force in Russia and several generals have been recalled from outpost areas by order of Molotov, the sources said. The USSR is suffering from acute shortages of raw materials, especially rubber and oil, as well as strategic metals of the rarer varieties, it was disclosed at the meeting. In view of this, the top Communists were told that Russia would continue its "peace offensive" for at least another year. The sources, reported to be "highly reliable", said that the revelations released at the meeting were to be used as "policy directives" by East and West Communist leaders."

NOTE:

FYI. "This information was released through our Central News with the warning to treat with extreme caution, adding that Political Advisor's office agreed it is of most explosive nature and should be handled strictly as speculation."

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

3529

Noted by DCI

8 Aug 53. 932

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Purge of Beria

Attached herewith is a guidance received by RFE on the purge of Beria.

Cord Meyer Jr.

CORD MEYER, JR.
Deputy Chief,
International Organizations Division

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE: PURGE OF BERIA

I BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS:

(THIS WILL BE ISSUED LATER IN MORE DETAIL AS SOON AS TIME PERMITS.) THE FOLLOWING FACTS, HOWEVER, STAND OUT IMMEDIATELY:

1. NO PERSON OF BERIA'S RANK IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS FALLEN SINCE BERIA HIMSELF REPLACED YEZHOV IN 1938; THE PURGE COULD NOT BEING AT A HIGHER LEVEL. THE CHARGES AGAINST BERIA (OF BEING A BOURGEOIS RENEGADE IMPERIALIST AGENT WHO TRIED TO OVERTHROW THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, DESTROY THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND RE-ESTABLISH CAPITALISM IN THE USSR) ARE OF A MAGNITUDE COMPARABLE ONLY TO THOSE AGAINST THE TROTSKYITES AND THE RIGHTISTS IN THE 1920'S.

2. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION TO STALIN IS DEVELOPING MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. IT TOOK FOUR YEARS FOR STALIN TO REMOVE THE RIGHTISTS. FURTHERMORE, CONSIDERING THE SHIFT TO THE RIGHT IN THE EAST GERMANY AND HUNGARY, AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS LATE AS A WEEK OR SO AGO OF " PRO-NATIONALIST" CHANGES IN TADJIKISTAN, THE DECISION IN THE STRUGGLE MUST HAVE HAPPENED ONLY WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS. BERIA'S ABSENCE (WHEN ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO WERE PRESENT) AT THE BOLSHOI THEATRE ON JUNE 28 WAS ONE OF THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATIONS OF HIS APPROACHING FALL; THE JULY 8 EDITORIAL OF IZVESTIA, THE SECOND.

3. THE FORCES WHICH DESTROYED BERIA ARE CERTAINLY A COLLECTIVE GROUP, NOT SIMPLY MALENKOV HIMSELF. MALENKOV'S NAME APPEARS ONLY ONCE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL EMPHASIZES COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.

4. THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL MARKS A NEW REVERSAL IN THE GENERAL LINE—AWAY FROM RIGHTISM AND TOWARD LEFTIST EXTREMISM, OR PERHAPS MORE ACCURATELY AWAY FROM MODERATION AND TOWARD; — FASCIST EXTREMISM. THE SHIFT TO AN EXTREMIST COURSE IS BASICALLY IN TWO QUESTIONS:

A. THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION
B. AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION

IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT BERIA WAS PRO-NATIONAL MINORITY AND ANTI-INTENSIFICATION OF COLLECTIVIZATION. THE GROUP WHICH HAS REMOVED HIM IS PRO-GREAT RUSSIAN AND PRO-COLLECTIVISATION. IT IS RETURNING TO THE STALINIST LINE. WILL THE DOCTORS' PLOT BE REVIVED? THE SLANSKY TRIAL? SLANSKY-TYPE TRIALS IN THE SATELLITES?

5. NOT ONLY BERIA HIMSELF HAS FALLEN BUT THE WHOLE APPARATUS OF THE SECRET POLICE IS DENOUNCED, WILL LOSE MUCH FACE AND IMPORTANCE AND WILL BE SUBJECTED TO A TREMENDOUS PURGE, WHICH MUST SHAKE THE WHOLE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE TO ITS FOUNDATIONS.

8. THE PEACE OFFENSIVE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE—BUT WILL HAVE NOW A PURELY PROPAGANDA CHARACTER; NO GENUINE CONCESSIONS (E. G., SURRENDERING OF EAST GERMANY) WILL NOW TAKE PLACE. ON THE INTERNAL SCENE IN THE SOVIET SPHERE THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE TALK OF IMPROVING THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE WORKERS BUT IN ACTUALITY THE COURSE WILL BE TOWARD INCREASED CAPITAL INVESTMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF CONSUMER GOODS—PARTICULARLY IN THE SATELLITES.

II. GUIDANCE:

CAUTION: AS BEFORE, WE SPECULATE ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KREMLIN AND THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES BUT WE DO NOT ACCEPT ANY ONE PARTICULAR THEORY. THIS IS THE END OF THE FIRST ACT OF THE POWER STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION, BUT ONLY THE FIRST ACT; THERE ARE MANY MORE AND BLOODIER ACTS TO COME. THE COALITION WHICH DESTROYED BERIA IS JUST AS SUBJECT TO INTERNAL DISSENSION AS WAS THE MALENKOV-BERIA-MOLOTOV COALITION FORMED AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN. THE BASIC ANALOGY HERE IS TO STALIN'S TACTICS AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. FIRST HE ELIMINATED TROTSKY AND THE LEFTISTS (THE NEW COALITION NOW ELIMINATES BERIA); THEN HE ELIMINATED THE RIGHTISTS (PROBABLY THE NEXT ACT IN THIS PRESENT DRAMA WILL INVOLVE ELIMINATION OF THE REST OF THE COALITION BY THE RISING ELEMENT IN IT).

A. TO THE PEOPLE:

AS THE BOLSHEVIKS DEVOUR EACH OTHER EVER MORE FEROCIOUSLY, OUR PEOPLES CAN LOOK ON WITH PLEASURE AND ASSURANCE WHILE THEIR OPPRESSORS ARE MAKING THEMSELVES WEAKER AND THEY (THE EASTERN EUROPEAN PEOPLES) ARE BECOMING STRONGER. WHEN THE KREMLIN IS WEAKENED BY DISSENSION THE SATELLITE KREMLINS ARE EVEN MORE WEAK AND PARALYZED. AND OF COURSE THE PURGE HAS JUST BEGUN. LOCAL SATELLITE COMMUNIST BIG SHOTS WILL BE TOO OCCUPIED WITH SAVING THEIR OWN SKINS TO BE AS TYRANNICAL AS BEFORE. THIS COULD NOT COME AT A BETTER TIME FOR THE PEASANTS AND WORKERS OF EASTERN EUROPE: AFTER EASTERN GERMAN REVOLTS AND CZECHOSLOVAK DEMONSTRATIONS, THEY NOW KNOW THEIR OWN STRENGTH AND THEIR OWN POWER. AS THEY ARE MARSHALLING THEIR FORCES, THEIR TYRANTS' STRUCTURE OF CONTROL IS CRACKING. THE EVENTUAL DOOM OF COMMUNISM HAS NEVER MORE CERTAIN THAN NOW. THE REGIMES WILL CERTAINLY TRY, AS THE KREMLIN IS TRYING, TO PRESENT A FACADE OF "MONOLITHIC UNITY." BUT YOU KNOW, AS THEY KNOW, THAT THE FACADE IS HOLLOW AND THAT THE REGIMES, CONFUSED AND RENT WITH INTERNAL DISSENSION, WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ANY ONE CLEAR AND DECISIVE POLICY. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD WARN THE PEOPLE THAT THIS SHIFT TO EXTREMISM MAY MEAN (IN HUNGARY IN PARTICULAR) THAT THE KREMLIN WILL ORDER ITS PUPPETS TO TAKE A MORE EXTREME COURSE THAN BEFORE (BUT HERE ALSO WE MUST WAIT AND SEE—CONFUSION NOW REIGNS EVERYWHERE). NOW IS THE TIME, IN THIS PERIOD OF CONFUSION, FOR THE PEOPLE TO SECURE THE GAINS THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE AND PRESS ON FOR MORE. IN A VERY REAL SENSE, THE PEOPLE RE MORE THAN EVERY ACTORS ON THE STAGE RATHER THAN SPECTATORS IN THE AUDIENCE. LED BY YOUR NEW LEADERS, YOU THE PEOPLE MUST CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS IN THE COLLECTIVE FARMS AND IN THE TRADE UNIONS, IN THE WAYS YOU KNOW SO WELL, TO FORCE THE REGIMES TO MAKE ACTUAL CONCESSIONS TO YOU.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

B. TO THE COMMUNISTS:

THE KREMLIN IS RIGHT IN ONE POINT--THIS IS AN EVENT OF IMMENSE SIGNIFICANCE. IT PROVES ONCE MORE, AND MORE DRAMATICALLY THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE THIRTIES, THAT NO COMMUNIST CAN EVER BE SAFE. THOSE OF YOUR LIKE ZAPOTOCKY WHO TRIED TO HEDGE IN HIS BRATISLAVA SPEECH ON THE NATIONALIST ISSUE; THOSE OF YOU LIKE NAGY, GERO AND BATA WHO BECAME THE SYMBOLS OF THE RIGHTIST COURSE--YOU ARE SUITABLE OFFERINGS FOR THE NEW SLAUGHTER. AND THOSE COMMUNIST LEADERS WHO HAVE NOT BECOME PREMATURE RIGHTIST DEVIATIONIST WILL NOW UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO BECOME EXTREMISTS AS FAST AS POSSIBLE--NO MATTER HOW MANY OF THEIR COMRADES THEY MUST DRAG DOWN IN A NEW PURGE. AND WHAT IS THE POINT OF TRYING TO BECOME AN EXTREMIST AGAIN? YOU KNOW THAT THE NEW SOVIET DICTATOR (REMEMBER WE CANNOT BE SURE WHO HE WILL BE, HAVING ELIMINATED BERIA, WILL NOW TRY TO ELIMINATE BERIA'S OPPONENTS. AS COMMUNISTS (SEE CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN) YOU HAVE ONLY TWO CHOICES. YOU CAN AID THE PEOPLE AND SABOTAGE THE REGIME, THUS CROSSING THE "GOLDEN BRIDGE" TO SAFETY, OR -- YOU CAN FLEE. THERE IS NO OTHER CHOICE.

C. TO THE SECRET POLICE:

YOUR TURN HAS NOW COME. IF ALL THE PEOPLE THAT BERIA PROMOTED AND ALL THE LOCALNORGANS OF THE MVD IN THE USSR ARE TO BE PURGED, AS IS NOW ANNOUNCED, WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO YOUR POOR MARIONETTES IN THE SATELLITES? YOU HAVE EVEN LESS CHANCE TO SURVIVE THAN THE ORDINARY COMMUNIST. AGAIN, YOU CAN MAKE YOUR PEACE WITH THE PEOPLE OR YOU CAN FLEE. OTHERWISE, YOUR DOOM IS CERTAIN.

NOTE:

AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE ABOVE, OUR PRESENT LINE (THE INCREASING STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE, THE INCREASING WEAKNESS OF THE REGIME) REMAINS INTACT. CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN E ALMOST COMPLETELY INTO THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND MUST NOW BE IMPLEMENTED (WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES FOR HUNGARY AND POLAND) WITH RENEWED VIGOR.

END MESSAGE

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Purge of Beria

Attached herewith is a guidance received by RFE on the purge of Beria.

CORD MEYER, JR.

CORD MEYER, JR.
Deputy Chief,
International Organizations Division

Attachment

SECRET

PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE: PURGE OF BERIA

I BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS:

(THIS WILL BE ISSUED LATER IN MORE DETAIL AS SOON AS TIME PERMITS.) THE FOLLOWING FACTS, HOWEVER, STAND OUT IMMEDIATELY:

1. NO PERSON OF BERIA'S RANK IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS FALLEN SINCE BERIA HIMSELF REPLACED YEZHOV IN 1938; THE PURGE COULD NOT BRING AT A HIGHER LEVEL. THE CHARGES AGAINST BERIA (OF BEING A BOURGEOIS RENEGADE IMPERIALIST AGENT WHO TRIED TO OVERTHROW THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, DESTROY THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND RE-ESTABLISH CAPITALISM IN THE USSR) ARE OF A MAGNITUDE COMPARABLE ONLY TO THOSE AGAINST THE TROTSKYITES AND THE RIGHTISTS IN THE 1920'S.

2. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION TO STALIN IS DEVELOPING MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. IT TOOK FOUR YEARS FOR STALIN TO REMOVE THE RIGHTISTS. FURTHERMORE, CONSIDERING THE SHIFT TO THE RIGHT IN THE EAST GERMANY AND HUNGARY, AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS LATE AS A WEEK OR SO AGO OF " PRO-NATIONALIST" CHANGES IN TADJIKISTAN, THE DECISION IN THE STRUGGLE MUST HAVE HAPPENED ONLY WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS. BERIA'S ABSENCE (WHEN ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO WERE PRESENT) AT THE BOLSHOI THEATRE ON JUNE 28 WAS ONE OF THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATIONS OF HIS APPROACHING FALL; THE JULY 8 EDITORIAL OF IZVESTIA, THE SECOND.

3. THE FORCES WHICH DESTROYED BERIA ARE CERTAINLY A COLLECTIVE GROUP, NOT SIMPLY MALENKOV HIMSELF. MALENKOV'S NAME APPEARS ONLY ONCE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL EMPHASIZES COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.

4. THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL MARKS A NEW REVERSAL IN THE GENERAL LINE—AWAY FROM RIGHTISM AND TOWARD LEFTIST EXTREMISM, OR PERHAPS MORE ACCURATELY AWAY FROM MODERATION AND TOWARD; - FASCIST EXTREMISM. THE SHIFT TO AN EXTREMIST COURSE IS BASICALLY IN TWO QUESTIONS:

A. THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION
B. AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION

IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT BERIA WAS PRO-NATIONAL MINORITY AND ANTI-INTENSIFICATION OF COLLECTIVIZATION. THE GROUP WHICH HAS REMOVED HIM IS PRO-GREAT RUSSIAN AND PRO-COLLECTIVISATION. IT IS RETURNING TO THE STALINIST LINE. WILL THE DOCTORS' PLOT BE REVIVED? THE SLANSKY TRIAL? SLANSKY-TYPE TRIALS IN THE SATELLITES?

5. NOT ONLY BERIA HIMSELF HAS FALLEN BUT THE SHOLE APPARATUS OF THE SECRET POLICE IS DENOUNCED, WILL LOSE MUCH FACE AND IMPORTANCE AND WILL BE SUBJECTED TO A TREMENDOUS PURGE, WHICH MUST SHAKE THE WHOLE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE TO ITS FOUNDATIONS.

6. THE PEACE OFFENSIVE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE--BUT WILL HAVE NOW A PURELY PROPAGANDA CHARACTER; NO GENUINE CONCESSIONS (E. G., SURRENDERING OF EAST GERMANY) WILL NOW TAKE PLACE. ON THE INTERNAL SCENE IN THE SOVIET SPHERE THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE TALK OF IMPROVING THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE WORKERS BUT IN ACTUALITY THE COURSE WILL BE TOWARD INCREASED CAPITAL INVESTMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF CONSUMER GOODS--PARTICULARLY IN THE SATELLITES.

II. GUIDANCE:

CAUTION: AS BEFORE, WE SPECULATE ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KREMLIN AND THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES BUT WE DO NOT ACCEPT ANY ONE PARTICULAR THEORY. THIS IS THE END OF THE FIRST ACT OF THE POWER STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION, BUT ONLY THE FIRST ACT; THERE ARE MANY MORE AND BLOODIER ACTS TO COME. THE COALITION WHICH DESTROYED BERIA IS JUST AS SUBJECT TO INTERNAL DISSENSION AS WAS THE MALENKOV-BERIA-MOLOTOV COALITION FORMED AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN. THE BASIC ANALOGY HERE IS TO STALIN'S TACTICS AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. FIRST HE ELIMINATED TROTSKY AND THE LEFTISTS (THE NEW COALITION NOW ELIMINATES BERIA); THEN HE ELIMINATED THE RIGHTISTS (PROBABLY THE NEXT ACT IN THIS PRESENT DRAMA WILL INVOLVE ELIMINATION OF THE REST OF THE COALITION BY THE RISING ELEMENT IN IT).

A. TO THE PEOPLE:

AS THE BOLSHEVIKS DEVOUR EACH OTHER EVER MORE FEROCIOUSLY, OUR PEOPLES CAN LOOK ON WITH PLEASURE AND ASSURANCE WHILE THEIR OPPRESSORS ARE MAKING THEMSELVES WEAKER AND THEY (THE EASTERN EUROPEAN PEOPLES) ARE BECOMING STRONGER. WHEN THE KREMLIN IS WEAKENED BY DISSENSION THE SATELLITE KREMLINS ARE EVEN MORE WEAK AND PARALYZED. AND OF COURSE THE PURGE HAS JUST BEGUN. LOCAL SATELLITE COMMUNIST BIG SHOTS WILL BE TOO OCCUPIED WITH SAVING THEIR OWN SKINS TO BE AS TYRANNICAL AS BEFORE. THIS COULD NOT COME AT A BETTER TIME FOR THE PEASANTS AND WORKERS OF EASTERN EUROPE: AFTER EASTERN GERMAN REVOLTS AND CZECHOSLOVAK DEMONSTRATIONS, THEY NOW KNOW THEIR OWN STRENGTH AND THEIR OWN POWER. AS THEY ARE MARSHALLING THEIR FORCES, THEIR TYRANTS' STRUCTURE OF CONTROL IS CRACKING. THE EVENTUAL DOOM OF COMMUNISM WAS NEVER MORE CERTAIN THAN NOW. THE REGIMES WILL CERTAINLY TRY, AS THE KREMLIN IS TRYING, TO PRESENT A FACADE OF "MONOLITHIC UNITY." BUT YOU KNOW, AS THEY KNOW, THAT THE FACADE IS HOLLOW AND THAT THE REGIMES, CONFUSED AND RENT WITH INTERNAL DISSENSION, WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ANY ONE CLEAR AND DECISIVE POLICH. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD WARN THE PEOPLE THAT THIS SHIFT TO EXTREMISM MAY MEAN (IN HUNGARY IN PARTICULAR) THAT THE KREMLIN WILL ORDER ITS PUPPETS TO TAKE A MORE EXTREME COURSE THAN BEFORE (BUT HERE ALSO WE MUST WAIT AND SEE--CONFUSION NOW REIGNS EVERYWHERE). NOW IS THE TIME, IN THIS PERIOD OF CONFUSION, FOR THE PEOPLE TO SECURE THE GAINS THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE AND PRESS ON FOR MORE. IN AVERY REAL SENSE, THE PEOPLE RE MORE THAN EVERY ACTORS ON THE STAGE RATHER THAN SPECTATORS IN THE AUDIENCE. LED BY YOUR NEW LEADERS, YOU THE PEOPLE MUST CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS IN THE COLLECTIVE FARMS AND IN THE TRADE UNIONS, IN THE WAYS YOU KNOW SO WELL, TO FORCE THE REGIME TO MAKE ACTUAL CONCESSIONS TO YOU.

B. TO THE COMMUNISTS:

THE KREMLIN IS RIGHT IN ONE POINT--THIS IS AN EVENT OF IMMENSE SIGNIFICANCE. IT PROVES ONCE MORE, AND MORE DRAMATICALLY THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE THIRTIES, THAT NO COMMUNIST CAN EVER BE SAFE. THOSE OF YOUR LIKE ZAPOTOCKY WHO TRIED TO HEDGE IN HIS BRATISLAVA SPEECH ON THE NATIONALIST ISSUE; THOSE OF YOU LIKE NAGY, GERO AND BATA WHO BECAME THE SYMBOLS OF THE RIGHTIST COURSE--YOU ARE SUITABLE OFFERINGS FOR THE NEW SLAUGHTER. AND THOSE COMMUNIST LEADERS WHO HAVE NOT BECOME PREMATURE RIGHTIST DEVIATIONIST WILL NOW UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO BECOME EXTREMISTS AS FAST AS POSSIBLE--NO MATTER HOW MANY OF THEIR COMRADES THEY MUST DRAG DOWN IN A NEW PURGE. AND WHAT IS THE POINT OF TRYING TO BECOME AN EXTREMIST AGAIN? YOU KNOW THAT THE NEW SOVIET DICTATOR (REMEMBER WE CANNOT BE SURE WHO HE WILL BE, HAVING ELIMINATED BERIA, WILL NOW TRY TO ELIMINATE BERIA'S OPPONENTS. AS COMMUNISTS (SEE CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN) YOU HAVE ONLY TWO CHOICES. YOU CAN AID THE PEOPLE AND SABOTAGE THE REGIME, THUS CROSSING THE "GOLDEN BRIDGE" TO SAFETY, OR -- YOU CAN FLEE. THERE IS NO OTHER CHOICE.

C. TO THE SECRET POLICE:

YOUR TURN HAS NOW COME. IF ALL THE PEOPLE THAT BERIA PROMOTED AND ALL THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE MVD IN THE USSR ARE TO BE PURGED, AS IS NOW ANNOUNCED, WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO YOUR POOR MARIONETTES IN THE SATELLITES? YOU HAVE EVEN LESS CHANCE TO SURVIVE THAN THE ORDINARY COMMUNIST. AGAIN, YOU CAN MAKE YOUR PEACE WITH THE PEOPLE OR YOU CAN FLEE. OTHERWISE, YOUR DOOM IS CERTAIN.

NOTE:

AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE ABOVE, OUR PRESENT LINE (THE INCREASING STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE, THE INCREASING WEAKNESS OF THE REGIME) REMAINS INTACT. CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN E ALMOST COMPLETELY INTO THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND MUST NOW BE IMPLEMENTED (WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES FOR HUNGARY AND POLAND) WITH RENEWED VIGOR.

END MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: IO/Branch 1

NO.:

DATE: 15 July 1953

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. CIP		15 JUL 19	7	CTB	Tom - Thanks - This suits me great - What does State think? The messages are stronger than what I thought State would buy - BUT - Good - Tracy. How was your trip - let's exchange early next week. Tracy
2. C/IO				TUB	
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

4. 263

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

16—61135-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
4-3495

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: RFE - Balloon Operation

Attached herewith is the story of the balloon operation and an early report of what happened.

Cord Meyer Jr
CORD MEYER, JR.
Deputy Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment: a/s

SECRET
Security Information

FOLLOWING RELEASED LOCALLY TODAY: RELEASE FROM RADIO FREE EUROPE:
EMBARGOED UNTIL 11:30 GMT - JULY 14, 1953

MUNICH, JULY 14, 1953-- THOUSANDS OF HIGH ALTITUDE BALLOONS CARRYING MESSAGES OF HOPE TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE WERE RELEASED ON THE CZECH BORDER LAST NIGHT BY THE CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM.

CARRIED BY STRONG WINDS AT ALTITUDES UP TO 30,000 FEET, THE BALLOONS WERE EXPECTED TO REACH AS FAR AS THE INDUSTRIAL CENTER OF OSTRAVA ON THE POLISH BORDER, WITH PILSEN, PRAGUE, MOST AND SOKOLOV AS SPECIAL TARGETS.

THE "BALLOON BARRAGE"-- THE SECOND AIMED AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY THE CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM -- WILL CONTINUE FOR SEVERAL DAYS. A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 12,000,000 MESSAGES, OR ONE FOR EVERY PERSON IN THE COUNTRY, WILL BE SENT.

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM LAUNCHED A SIMILAR BARRAGE AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON AUGUST 23, 1951, AND ANOTHER AT POLAND ON AUGUST 28, 1951. HOWEVER, THE PRESENT OPERATION IS FOUR TIMES AS LARGE AND BELIEVED TO BE THE BIGGEST EVER ATTEMPTED.

MESSAGES CARRIED BY THE BALLOONS RELEASED LAST NIGHT AND TODAY WERE OF THREE TYPES: A REPRODUCTION OF A NEW ONE-CROWN NOTE, BEARING A PLEA TO OPPOSE THE COMMUNIST REGIME; A PAMPHLET EXPLAINING THE RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN EAST GERMANY AND THE FALL OF SOVIET POLICY CHIEF LAVRENTI BERIA; AND AN ALUMINUM COIN STAMPED WITH THE "FREEDOM BELL" AND THE SLOGAN "ALL CZECHS AND SLOVAKS FOR FREEDOM--ALL THE FREE WORLD FOR THE CZECHS AND SLOVAKS."

THE BALLOONS USED IN THE OPERATION CALLED "WINDS OF FREEDOM" ARE OF TWO TYPES, A RUBBER SPHERE WHICH EXPLODES AT HIGH ALTITUDES, SCATTERING ITS MESSAGES OVER A WIDE AREA, AND A PLASTIC BALLOON WHICH DESCENDS ON THE TARGET. BOTH TYPES ARE FILLED WITH HYDROGEN.

THE FULL TEXT OF THE MESSAGE PRINTED ON THE ONE CROWN NOTE FOLLOWS:

ON ONE SIDE --

CZECHOSLOVAKS, KNOW THIS; THE REGIME IS WEAKER THAN YOU HAVE DARED TO THINK; POWER LIES WITH THE PEOPLE AND THE PEOPLE STAND OPPOSED. WITH UNITY

AND COURAGE, ORGANIZE YOUR STRENGTH: DOWN WITH THE COLLECTIVE! INSIST ON WORKERS' RIGHTS! TODAY DEMAND CONCESSIONS; TOMORROW - FREEDOM!

ON THE OTHER SIDE --

MEN CALL THIS THE HUNGER CROWN - GIFT OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS THE SYMBOL OF REGIME DESPERATION, OF FIVE-YEAR FAILURE: IT IS A CHALLENGE TO FIGHT, TO MEET WEAKNESS WITH STRENGTH, TO RESIST AS YOU KNOW BEST. THE OTHER CAPTIVE PEOPLES ARE UNITING AND WILL JOIN YOU IN YOUR STRUGGLE. THE FREE WORLD IS WITH YOU! ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

THE FULL TEXT OF THE PAMPHLET ABOUT EVENTS IN EAST GERMANY: CZECHS AND SLOVAKS! HEAR THE MESSAGE WHICH COMES TO YOU TODAY FROM THE FREE WORLD:

THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER! THE PEOPLES OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES ARE GETTING STRONGER! THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER. THE STRUGGLE FOR STALIN'S HERITAGE SHAKES THE ENTIRE SOVIET EMPIRE AND FEAR HAS CREPT INTO THE KREMLIN. WHO WILL FALL WITH BERIA AND WHO WILL FALL AFTER BERIA? HOW MANY MILLIONS WILL FALL VICTIMS TO THE NEW PURGE WHICH IS NOW GOING TO BEGIN - THE BIGGEST PURGE WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS EVER KNOWN?

HOW MANY VICTIMS WILL FALL IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW MANY IN THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES? WHO WILL FALL WITH BERIA IN PRAGUE AND WHO WILL BE DRAGGED DOWN BY HIS FALL IN BRATISLAVA? WHO WILL BE THE NEW SLANSKY AND WHO THE NEW CLEMENTIS? AND WHEN THE PURGE SPREADS AND BROADENS, DOWN FROM THE POLITBUREAU TO THE LANDS AND DISTRICTS, TO THE OFFICES AND THE FACTORIES - HOW MANY FUNCTIONARIES WILL SAFELY SURVIVE?

ONLY THOSE WILL SURVIVE WHO WILL DETACH THEMSELVES FROM THE SINKING COMMUNIST BOAT IN TIME. ONLY THOSE WHO JOIN THE PEOPLE AND HELP IN ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST THE OPPRESSORS.

AT ANY RATE, THE SOVIETS ARE IN A BLIND ALLEY. IF THE MOSCOW BOOT WILL WEIGH EVEN HEAVIER ON THE NECKS OF THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE AND IF MOSCOW'S DEMANDS UPON THE FRIGHTENED PUPPET GOVERNMENTS OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES WILL BECOME MORE PRESSING, THE RESISTANCE OF THE PEOPLE WILL ONLY GROW: FOR THE PEOPLE WILL NOT RETURN INTO SUBMISSION. IF THE COMMUNIST REGIMES, IN ORDER TO APPEASE THE WRATH OF THE PEOPLE, WILL TRY TO BRIBE THEIR SUBJECTS BY PROMISING CONCESSIONS AS WE HAVE SEEN IN HUNGARY AND IN EASTERN GERMANY, THEY WILL NOT GET ANSWERS: FOR THE PEOPLE WILL NOT BE DECEIVED ANYMORE BY PHONY CONCESSIONS.

THE PEOPLE ARE GROWING STRONGER. THE FIRST FLAMES OF REVOLT FLARED OUT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND IN EASTERN GERMANY. FROM PILSEN, FROM MORAVSKA OSTRAVA, FROM BERLIN, DRESDEN AND MAGDEBURG THE ECHO OF THIS REVOLT FLARED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND DEEPLY SHOOK THE ENTIRE SOVIET REALM: THE PEOPLE SHOWED THEIR STRENGTH.

THE COMMUNIST REGIMES RECOGNIZED THE MENACE AND BECAME AFRAID. THEY STARTED APOLOGIZING, THEY STARTED SELF-CRITICISING, THEY STARTED GIVING PROMISES. IN GERMANY THE ANTI-LABOR DECREES HAD TO BE REVOKED. IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA THE FRIGHTENED GOVERNMENT WAS FORCED TO DESIST FROM APPLYING THE PENAL LAWS CONCERNING ABSENTEEISM. IN MOSCOW, UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE NEWS OF THE PEOPLES REVOLT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND GERMANY, THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE BECAME SHARPER. BERIA AND HIS ALL-POWERFUL POLICE FELL AS VICTIMS. YOUR REVOLT HELPED TO ALTER THE COURSE OF HISTORY: NEW FORCES MADE THEIR APPEARANCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD, THE PEOPLE WON ITS FIRST MAJOR VICTORY IN ITS FIGHT WITH THE REGIME.

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS: THE MORE YOUR OPPRESSORS ARE SHAKEN BY UNCERTAINTY, THE GREATER IS THE CERTAINTY OF YOUR VICTORY. THE REGIME IS AFRAID OF YOU, IT KNOWS THAT POWER IS FUNDAMENTALLY ON YOUR SIDE. THIS IS THE TIME WHEN PEOPLES UNITY, A COMMON AGREEMENT AND A UNITED PURPOSE ARE ABLE TO WIN CON-

CESSIONS. YOUR BATTLEFIELD IS IN THE FACTORIES AND IN THE FIELDS. ON THIS BATTLEFIED OF LABOR YOU HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF NUMBERS. ON THIS BATTLEFIELD YOU CANNOT BE VANQUISHED . YOU WILL NOT BE CONTENT WITH PROMISES, YOU WILL ASK FOR DEEDS. YOU WILL NOT BE CONTENT WITH BRIBES, YOU WILL ASK MORE AND MORE FROM THE EXPLOITERS. WE DO NOT PRESUME TO GIVE YOU ORDERS NOR TO GIVE YOU ADVICES. YOU AND YOUR NEW LEADERS WHO ARE BEING BORN IN THE STRUGGLE KNOW BEST NOW AND WHERE TO STRIKE. BUT WE WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT YOU ARE NOT ALONE: AMONG THE MASSES OF PEOPLE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN THE FIRE OF REVOLT IS SMOULDERING AND ITS SPARKS ARE FLYING FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. EVERYWHERE IN THE FREE WORLD. YOUR FRIENDS ARE WITH YOU. THEIR HELP WILL GROW AS YOUR DETERMINATION GROWS.

SECRET
Security Information

The following was received from Condor, Munich

Have report early afternoon that Czech fighter plane attempting shoot down balloons. In only instance so far reported, planes shot down two out of ten that were in air at moment. Also have report that attempts being made shoot balloons down from ground, but no success. This shooting occurred at 1410 local time, which is only report so far. Will inform you of any developments.

SECRET

Secret
Security Information

The following received from Condon, Munich

Following is full story as of 1700 local time on shooting. At 1400 two possibly three jet aircraft, presumably MIG, which kept well within Czech territory, managed after considerable moving to shoot down two repeat two balloons. Aircraft departed area and have not returned since. Small arms fire during most of afternoon accounted for total of three repeat three balloons. Small arms fire effective only during periods when weather conditions did not permit rapid rise of balloons crossing border at height within range of submarine guns and carbines.

- - - - -

Walker's report - Temper of residence in launching area calm and unworried.

End of Message

SECRET
Security Information

8 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO

FROM: EE/Czechoslovakia

SUBJECT: Bohumil HOUSER

1. Reference is made to a letter dated 25 June 1953 and addressed to you from Mr. Leo M. Cherne, Executive Director of the Research Institute of America, forwarding certain proposals sent to the latter by Mr. Bohumil HOUSER of the International Rescue Committee, Camp Valka, Nuernberg, Germany. This memorandum will summarize for you our knowledge of Subject, and our present interest in his activities.

2. Subject was born 1 March 1922 in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. He reportedly fought in the underground in World War II and was taken prisoner. From the end of the war until December 1945 he was employed as interpreter to the U.S. military unit in Falknov, Czechoslovakia, and in 1949 he was head of the personnel department of the Brown Coal Mining Company in Falknov.

3. According to a report from the British Army of the Rhine, he was recruited by the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service in 1946 in Cheb, Czechoslovakia, and is an ardent Communist. According to the CIC, he travelled to Belgium shortly after the war, and then returned to Germany (sic).

4. We do not know exactly when Subject left Czechoslovakia. He seems to have emigrated to Australia in 1949 or 1950, and to have returned to Germany some time prior to September 1951, when he became associated with the American Fund for Czech Refugees and with the International Rescue Committee. According to one informant, Subject was deported from Australia for Communist Party activities.

5. On 14 April 1953 Subject sent Mr. Cherne an operational proposal of such interest that, in spite of the unfavorable information on Subject, we felt obliged to investigate it further. Upon our instructions, an agent of the Munich Operations Base contacted Subject on or about 25 June, using air force cover, and obtained the identity of Subject's lead. This person turned out to be an individual who has been suspected since 1949 of being an agent of the Czech Intelligence Service, and who has very recently been crossing lines with one or two operations being run by Berlin Operations Base. Under the circumstances it appears very likely that Subject's lead amounts to nothing more than a provocation or fabrication. We are still waiting for an appraisal and recommendations from the field.

SECRET
Security Information

RICHARD A. FINNEY

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
4-3207

7 July 1953

Noted by DCI
7/13

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Proposed Balloon Operation

1. The following message was received from Whitney Shepardson on the proposed balloon operation.

Shepardson talked at length with Conant yesterday, Monday. Conant did not object to the proposed balloon operation, but on the contrary "endorses" the project, but said he could not "request" acquiescence. Thus Shepardson says we have "improved upon our minimum expectations".

Shepardson says further that Adenauer has been away since last Saturday but that Lentz and Hallstein were to have returned last night and HICOG is trying to arrange an appointment with either or both for today, Tuesday.

Shepardson will send further word after these talks.

Cord Meyer Jr. for
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information

[illegible]-4559

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

7 July 1953

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Conversation with Congressman Kersten

1. On 6 May Congressman Kersten addressed a letter to the State Department, enclosing a letter dated 6 May 1953, which he had received from Mr. Creighton Scott, a former employee of Radio Free Europe at Munich, Germany. This letter was highly critical of certain personnel in RFE, particularly as regards allegations of pro-communist attitudes. On 6 July I discussed these criticisms with Congressman Kersten in detail, conveying to him orally the material contained in the memorandum of 17 June 1953 from the Director of Security; Subject: Inquiry by Congressman Kersten; which the Director of Security had noted should be utilized in this meeting with Congressman Kersten.

2. The Congressman noted the difficulty in evaluating the type of criticisms which Mr. Scott had made but appeared willing to accept our explanation.

3. Congressman Kersten then turned to certain criticisms which he had heard expressed regarding RFE from several sources, including Scott. One such criticism is that RFE is not doing the best it should on religious programs. He feels that this aspect of the broadcasts could probably be considerably strengthened, particularly among Catholic elements.

4. Mr. Kersten cited the opinion of Count Tarnowski (sp. ?), a well known Pole, who told the Congressman that any fourteen year old Soviet citizen would be so well briefed on Soviet philosophy as to turn up their noses at the RFE material. The Count (and Kersten appears to agree) feels that the Soviet population has more sophisticated philosophical material thrown at them by their own Government, and that it should be an important function of RFE to counter with an attempt to destroy the Soviet philosophical material and shake the Soviet faith in their theoreticians.

5. Congressman Kersten realized that it is difficult to capture a wide audience with philosophical arguments, but he feels that if these arguments reached a segment of important leaders behind the Iron Curtain, it would help to destroy and counter the philosophical teachings of Marx, Lenin, et al. The Congressmen feels that many of our broadcasts deal with economic matters, and, while these are important, RFE should go

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

deeper and hit harder on religion and philosophy.

6. While Congressman Kersten is aware that many of the captive population are not interested in rightest movements, it is his opinion that RFE cannot beat communism with socialism. In particular, he felt (and Scott bore this out in their conversation) that we were making too much use of Czech socialists, and we were using socialists from the Benes Government which had sought to compromise with the communists. While he recognizes the popularity of Benes and Masaryk in Czechia, he feels they are not effective in Slovakia, where there is a heavy Catholic population.

7. Congressman Kersten plans to go to Europe, probably in September. While he did not say so, I believe he would welcome an invitation to visit RFE, Munich. Furthermore, as the author of the Kersten Amendment and of several resolutions on the enslaved peoples, at least one of which may receive Congressional approval at this session, consideration might be given as to whether it would be advisable to request the Congressman to utilize RFE facilities to broadcast while he is abroad.

Walter L. Pforzheimer
Legislative Counsel

OGC/WLP:jps

Mr. Kirkpatrick gave the original of this to the DCI, who read it and took a copy for NCFE

SECURITY INFORMATION

3 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: D'Arcy Brophy and Louis Novins' Trip to Europe

1. Mr. Brophy and Mr. Novins tell me that you have agreed to pay their expenses for their trip to Europe. I told them that since they were traveling on our business they should draw the money from Heritage Foundation funds which have been made available.

2. I think this is the tidiest way of handling the transaction. Novins gave me some representations that it would be better to channel funds for the trip through one of his clients, Paramount Pictures. This seems to me complicated and insecure, and I recommend that if this subject is raised with you directly, you again suggest use of Heritage funds.

W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/Br I
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

1 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Comments on Arthur Page's letter of 29 June 1953

1. I think a budget presentation before a mixed audience of PRC members and directors or members of the Executive Committee of NCFE plus supposedly members of the NCFE staff would be extremely confusing, whether it were held here or in New York. Not all the members of the PRC have detailed knowledge of NCFE operations and most of the members of the Executive Committee do not have such knowledge. I see a meeting such as Arthur Page suggests going about as follows:

a. IO Division presents the budget with cuts which we plan to recommend.

b. Members of the Executive Committee of NCFE oppose the cuts.

c. PRC is placed in a position of turning down its own staff before the assembled outsiders with whom the staff is working.

2. I should suggest instead that we follow the following procedure:

a. IO Division presents the budget with the suggested cuts in same.

b. PRC considers these cuts carefully.

c. PRC calls in expert members of the staff of NCFE, i.e. Spencer Phenix, Bob Lang, Bernie Yarrow etc., if it desires to do so, and questions them on any matter within their respective responsibilities and in particular about the suggested cuts.

d. The experts leave the room.

e. PRC makes up its mind whether to accept the cut proposed or to make bigger cuts, or to add to the budget, as it may desire to do.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

3. It would be useful to brief the Executive Committee on the reasons why any changes in the budget are made after they are made, and it might be well to have a luncheon with the Executive Committee down here or in New York after the action has been taken and have the Director explain the reasons ~~why PRG did this or that.~~ for Agency action.

4. I suggest that you write Arthur Page saying that you think a meeting such as Phenix suggests would confuse our procedures but that you do think a ~~later meeting~~ luncheon here with the Executive Committee to explain the actions taken and have a meeting of minds for the work ahead after the budget has been passed would be useful.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

JUN 30 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Funds for Balloon Operation

This will authorise you to inform officials of TPTONIC that the restrictions imposed by the Project Review Committee, at its meeting on 29 May 1953 of $3,000,000 for operating expenses of TPTONIC for the first quarter of fiscal year 1954, may be exceeded by the funds necessary to prepare and/or execute a balloon operation.

/s/ A.W. Dulles

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

IO/BrI:WPD/eh
(30 June 1953)

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - Finance
1 cc - Budget
1 cc - IO/AD
1 cc - CIO ✓
1 cc - RI
1 cc - DCI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

JUN 29 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PP

SUBJECT: Recent Developments in the Rumanian Refugee Situation

1. In a verbal report to the Rumanian National Committee upon his return from a trip to Europe to secure former King Michael's approval of a proposed refugee committee, Mr. Visoianu stated that the King did not reject the proposal advanced for the reorganization and enlargement of the present Committee, although he indicated no interest in having the plan put into effect immediately. This information on the attitude of the King is contrary to that previously reported by a member of the Rumanian National Committee, who stated that the King had finally rejected the proposal upon the recommendation of his ADC, Petru-Lazar.

2. In his last conversation with Mr. Visoianu, the King requested that the members of the present Rumanian National Committee should send him, either jointly or individually, their opinions in writing about the following points:

a. On what grounds does the Rumanian National Committee consider that it cannot continue in its present form?

b. What are the criteria for choosing the members of the new committee and who are the persons who should belong to it?

c. Who are the Rumanian exiles and Rumanian organizations in exile which could be consulted by the King to advise him in the matter of forming a new National Committee?

3. The Rumanian National Committee members plan to send a joint resolution to the King requesting that he entrust Visoianu with the formation of a new committee to be comprised of members whose names were submitted to the King. Should Michael refuse this request, the Committee intends to tender its resignation.

4. Visoianu reported that he had conversations in Paris with Gafencu, Gherman, Veniamin and Antoniade, to whom he proposed membership in the new committee. At that time, which was before the death of General Radescu, Gafencu refused because of the exclusion of the General in the new organization. Since Visoianu was unable to return to Paris after his conversations with the King, a meeting with Gafencu subsequent to Radescu's death has not been possible. Gherman did not refuse to

become a member of the new committee, but wished to be accepted as a representative of the Socialist Party. This would be difficult because of Gherman's affiliation with the left-wing faction which seceded from Petrescu's Party in 1946, subsequently joining with the Communist Party. Antoniade and Veniamin have agreed to become members of the new committee.

5. In a letter to the Fund on 26 May 1953, Gafencu stated that an attempt should be made to give support to a new committee through a large national council in order to establish unity of the leaders and of the Rumanian colony abroad. He said that on the day of General Radescu's death he had received a letter from the General asking him to take over "his task" to assure the unity of the Rumanians abroad. Gafencu also wrote that friends in Paris and abroad had asked him to take over the leadership of a small "ad hoc" committee with the support of all the Associations of Free Rumanians, which he stated he will do if the New York group assures him of their support. After that, he indicated he would see if there would be a possibility of an understanding with the Visoianu group.

6. Prince Nicholas reports that he has been approached by Gafencu with a request that he join forces with Gafencu to form a new Rumanian refugee committee under Gafencu's leadership and with headquarters in France. A committee embracing such individuals as Nicholas and General Ion Gheorghe, whom Gafencu also reportedly approached, would not be acceptable to segments of the Rumanian refugee colony because Nicholas is not on good terms with the King and has had Iron Guard associations, as does Gheorghe.

7. It would appear that there is little reason to believe that the Rumanian refugees will set aside their factional differences and personal ambitions to form a representative committee at this time.

CHRISTIAN M. FREER
Acting Chief, SE

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

25 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of Stockholm ICFTU Congress

1. At our request RFE is going to give full coverage to the ICFTU Meeting in Stockholm. It has arranged to have the meeting covered by three desks. The Hungarians are using a Stockholm stringer, while the Poles and Czechs are each sending editors. In addition, there will be overall coverage to the central newsroom by RFE's information correspondent, Dreifuss. Messages from the labor leaders of the free world will be broadcast to the Czech people, in line with our recent guidance.

2. A copy of the UN Slave Labor Report was delivered to the boat of Col. Mullany's friend yesterday afternoon prior to departure.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/Branch 1

SECRET

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Miss Tisthammer	—	—
2	C/IO		
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO		
2	O/D C/I		
3			6/30

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE
☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

Remarks:

Alice:

Please insure that Mr. Dulles sees this before the NCFE people come in, and that they don't get their hands on it. TWB

TWB

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

10—68343-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
4-2858

23 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with NCFE with afternoon.

According to my informants (I have not talked to Arthur Page), the Executive Committee of NCFE made two decisions at its meeting yesterday:

1. That the performance of RFE in the recent difficulty was like that of a divisional commander who refuses to obey the corps plan, and

2. That RFE should immediately devise procedures so that future guidances from CIA will be put into effect without the two-week delay caused by Lang's refusal.

3. As I understand it, however, it is a fact that the guidance is not yet fully in effect and that the action part of the guidance, that is to say, paragraph 4, of the instructions of the Executive Committee to Radio Free Europe (you have a copy on your desk), has not yet been put into effect. I am guessing that you will get a lot of talk this evening about how most of this has been done before and is already standard operating procedure etc. etc. etc.

4. If you want to take a firm line this evening, I suggest that you stick to trying to find the answers to two questions:

a. Is the guidance initiated by you and passed upon by the Executive Committee fully in effect?

b. Have any steps been taken to make sure that in the future guidances will be put into effect?

TWB

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information

30 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Jesse McKnight, Department of State

1. Mr. McKnight called to report that Mr. Herbert Pierce from the UN Public Affairs Office is very disturbed about the conduct of "some RFE man" in New York, who is approaching members of the US Mission to the United Nations and asking them all sorts of questions, for example, their views on the recent Doctors' Trial.

2. Mr. McKnight feels that this practice should be discontinued, especially in view of the fact that the new members of the US Mission are not yet fully informed about, or sympathetic, to RFE. He feels that any questions concerning US policy on particular issues should be cleared with Mr. Kretzman, the VOA Policy Chief in New York.

3. I think this matter ought to be discussed with Bob Lang. Would you let me know whether you will take it up with him, or whether you wish me to do so.

You do so.
Thos

ELLEN STERN
IO/[illegible]

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Meeting to Discuss State Department Proposals on how to Counter-Check Items on UNGA Agenda.

1. I attended a meeting on Wednesday, 28 January 1953, to discuss paragraphs 6 and 7 of the attached paper prepared by the Department of State. It calls for the establishment of "a commission of independent members to study the nature and extent of this escapee problem, with the view of determining the reasons and circumstances impelling these people to escape" and suggests that "this inquiry could follow the pattern of the commission on forced labor. The Commission would hear refugees in such places as Western Germany, Geneva, etc., and its eventual report to the assembly would, in fact, be a report on the entire communist system, the denial of basic human right, etc."

2. The questions raised in the meeting centered around the possibility of CIA's intelligence activities being compromised by the investigations of this commission. It was decided that FI, REDCAP and the operating people were the ones competent to make the decision.

3. Mr. Lazarus informed me by telephone on 30 January, that the above-mentioned individuals had presented him negative answers on the subject proposal. Their conclusions are being forwarded to the DDP and subsequently to the Department of State. Mr. Lazarus further stated that any recommendations by IO would be welcome.

ELLEN STERN
IO/TOMIC

IO/TOMIC: ES/hka

Distribution:
Orig. -Addressee
2 cc -IO/TOMIC
1 cc -C/IO
1 cc - RI
1 cc - Mr. Braden
1 cc - Mr. Hand

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

23 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECURITY OFFICER, CIA

SUBJECT: Leland Stowe

1. Pursuant to my conversation with Mr. Hamby, I have talked with the Director of RFE and he has agreed to terminate subject's present job.

2. He intends to bring subject to New York and make him his personal consultant in the New York office. He assures me of his full intentions to carry out this plan and further assures me that he has no intention of giving subject administrative or operational authority of any kind.

3. Is this arrangement satisfactory to you?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
CHIEF
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - IO/Br I
1 cc - IO/Security Officer
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

22 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Julius Epstein

In response to our request from the Fund, we are forwarding herewith the general information available concerning Julius Epstein.

(Signed) Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachments: (5)
- Ltr. to Nelson dtd 4/20/53
- Personal biography by Epstein
- Excerpt from Congressional Record for 2/9/52
- Booklet by Epstein
- Article by Arthur Bliss Lane

IO/Branch 1:WPD:jb
Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1 via CPP
IO/Tonic - 2cc
CIO - 1cc
RI - 1cc

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Collège de l'Europe Libre
CHATEAU DE POURTALÈS - STRASBOURG-ROBERTSAU (Bas-Rhin)
BOITE POSTALE 61. STRASBOURG R. P.
TÉLÉPHONE DIRECTION : 832.95 - INTENDANCE : 832.96
ADRESSE TÉLÉGRAPHIQUE : EXILUNIVER STRASBOURG

Paris
April 4th, 1953.

Dear Tom:-

You should have this, at least [illegible] will be sent to the Royall Tyler-Leone report.

Davis meets with our Ex. Committee on the 9th. I hope they handle that situation firmly. Hope, too, Frank has been made aware of what we've been up against.

Sincerely,
Ty.

COPY COPY

April 1, 1953

No. 26 Dear Adolf,

A day or two before I sailed for Europe in January, 1953, I received a typed manuscript copy of the "Progress Report on the College de l'Europe Libre", which has now appeared in mimeographed form under date of February 27, 1953, over the signatures of Royall Tyler and Richard Sears.

I admit to considerable curiosity when this document appeared. In the covering letter Royall Tyler merely stated, "It comes from Dick Sears". I rather wondered why this report should be compiled when it was known I was coming to Europe presumably to examine into conditions and it seemed to me immediately that this might be a counter foil to what it was expected I would find. In reply to a direct inquiry from me, Sears now states it was prepared "to reinforce the German language unit project by supplying information that was apparently lacking.

At the risk of indicating an overly suspicious temperament, which is not characteristic of me, I feel that this report over-simplifies a complex situation. It embodies a point of view that the operation at Strasbourg is proceeding smoothly and successfully, which it is not. It assumes that a paper plan (for the National Seminars) is in full and healthy bloom, which is not the case. I have stated so frequently (almost ad nauseam) that you must live in this frustrating atmosphere for a while before you can understand what conditions are. Royall Tyler and Sears have never had that experience and formed their opinions from what they have been told by Davis, Galy, Straka, and Donzelot. The latter in turn was constantly fed information by Galy and Straka, and altogether has spent only three or four days on the ground. He has had numerous talks in Paris with Galy and some of the tutors.

So, while the factual material in this report can not be questioned — I mean the statistics and the historical portions — the interpretation of them does not reflect the disappointing results. This pertains to the work of the Committee on Awards on the one hand and the actual operation at Robertsau on the other.

When I asked Sears how widely this report had been distributed he told me "to the Trustees of FEUE, to the members of the Association du College

COPY

de l'Europe Libre and to Messrs. Thomas Braden, John C. Hughes, C. D. Jackson and Whitney H. Shepardson". I assume, therefore, that the members of our Executive Committee, to whom I am sending copies of this letter, have received it.

The sentence (bottom of Page 9 and going over to top of Page 10), "These were men of advanced education, expert in their knowledge of their own countries but also, most of them, having studied in French institutions and so capable of forming a bond for the students between their training at home and in exile.", is not an accurate description of the caliber of the tutors.

On Page 14, second line, I would question definitely the phrase "well organized administration". Also on that page, sixth line, the sentence, "Special French courses were being given to those who still showed weakness.", is misleading. Such courses were announced, but the program for teaching the French language is only now being outlined with the help of the French language staff at Strasbourg University after a conference with them I called for this purpose.

On the same page again, fifth line from the bottom, the phrase "the severity of the action taken in the autumn has had a salutary effect in imposing firmer discipline and setting higher standards" simply is not so. The manner in which the action was taken, and the inaccuracy of some of the judgments, which had to be reversed, called forth protests from staff and students alike and did as much as anything else to cause present low student morale.

On Page 16, the last sentence in the first paragraph reads, "A fresh start in life combined with exposure to Western thought and practice will, we are encouraged to hope, produce a full return." Instead of what the statement implies, the students have witnessed a cleavage between the European staff and the Americans, — and the "exposure to Western thought and practice" has been anything but inspiring or unifying.

The distribution of this document can be and will be very misleading by its implications that success has been achieved to an extent that warrants our proceeding on our present path. That will be unfortunate. We have acquired a fund of valuable experience and we have made mistakes. The net result is the present situation. Fundamental changes must be made, which are bound to be unpleasant, but they are essential, unless we are going to continue a mere charity operation and miss the real purpose of FEUE.

Sincerely yours,

LT:ECK

Dr. A. A. Berle, Jr.
70 Pine Street
New York 5, N. Y.

Levering Tyson
President

SECURITY INFORMATION

6 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Information reported by Bob Lang, RFE

Bob Lang has had reported to him the following:

1. Epstein, an investigator for Senator McCarthy, has just turned into the Senator a 150-page anti-RFE report.

2. Lang has received this report from three former RFE employees. The first two, FARAGO and TATER, reported to Lang they were visited by Epstein. They reported this interview to Lang because Lang has considerable derogatory information on them. They do not wish to be identified with any such report. The third informant is one DeGASTER, about whom Lang has written you. DeGASTER resigned a job in RFE to come to work -- presumably for us -- which collapsed, and has since been trying to get his RFE job back. Bob considers his report for that reason to be quite reliable. DeGASTER wrote a letter to the New York Times, which was published 8 March, in which he referred to himself as a former employee of RFE. Epstein apparently read the letter and immediately came to see DeGASTER. During their conversation, Epstein referred to a 150-page uncomplimentary report he had compiled on RFE.

3. NCFE says that it has some derogatory information on Epstein and it will be forwarded to us.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organisations Division

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)
1 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECURITY INFORMATION

[✓ UNCLASSIFIED] RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

18-3-1106

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Exec Officer, DD/P		9 Apr
2			
3	PP - 2042		14 April
4	IO-CIO	TWB	
5	RP		
FROM	C/IO (retain or destroy)	INITIALS	DATE
1	Sp. Liaison, DD/P		4/9/53
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

REMARKS: Mr. Wisner suggested this be circulated as indicated for information.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED [✓ UNCLASSIFIED]

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

Executive Registry
3-2728

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

April 3, 1953

My dear Mr. Wisner:

I want you to be informed of the action which I am taking in regard to international broadcasting facilities in this country.

I have sent a letter to the companies concerned along the lines of the enclosed which gives a full explanation.

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Johnson

Robert L. Johnson
Administrator

Enclosure:

Copy of letter to broadcasting
companies terminating contracts.

Mr. Frank Wisner,
Central Intelligence Agency.

4/9/53 cc - ER File

COPY OF LETTER TO [illegible]
[illegible] CANCELLED

Gentlemen:

Earlier this month at the request of President [illegible] I undertook to serve as the head of the United States Information Administration of which the Voice of America is a part.

The study of this complex [illegible] to be continued [illegible] policy [illegible] Certain of these [illegible] be decided on higher Government levels than [illegible].

However, from the standpoint of efficient operations and in view of the recent directive of the Bureau of the Budget requiring all possible economies, it is mandatory upon me to take promptly whatever steps are necessary to prevent the Government from becoming obligated for facilities or services which I believe will not be needed.

It is my obvious duty, in order to protect the Government, to give at this time formal 90 day notices of termination of a number of these contracts to avoid any possible liability thereunder continuing into the next fiscal year. However, I feel that it is due to your Company and to the others similarly situated to accompany these notices with the frankest explanation of the reasons for them.

Last fall there was a reduction of more than 15 per cent made by the Voice of America in the number of hours of radio programs originating in the United States. This has left an excess transmitter capacity. Aside from the [illegible], to correct this condition, consideration is being given to decentralizing to points outside the United States more of the programs now originating here. This would result in [illegible] required [illegible] in the United States.

In my judgment, protection of the Government's interests requires that a notice of termination [illegible] contracts [illegible]

Associated Broadcasters of California.

Crosley, as to the installation at Mason, Ohio

General Electric, as to the installation at Belmont, California

Westinghouse - [illegible]

World Wide Broadcasting Corporation

Upon the [illegible] of the [illegible] Wayne, New Jersey, this [illegible] contract with General [illegible] will also be terminated.

I personally must take the responsibility [illegible] this magnitude in the facilities [illegible] reduction of this plan is to be [illegible] installations to be affected [illegible] experience of the International [illegible] Department. I have also [illegible] a management engineering survey which was made [illegible] all domestic facilities used by the Voice, [illegible] based my decision primarily thereon. I have obtained [illegible] and in acting upon, [illegible] competent persons in private industry, who have [illegible] familiarity with the operations of the Voice.

The decision to terminate these contracts has been taken with full realization of the policy of Public Law 402 relative to private enterprise in the broadcasting field. Very recently I acted to terminate construction contracts for two large Government transmitting stations in this country.

This present action is not intended to prejudice a continuance or increased participation on a private basis in international broadcasting by these licensees. I shall cooperate to this end.

This action is taken with genuine regret particularly because you and your Company have rendered in many ways services of great value to the United States, and because I know that this has been done in a highly patriotic spirit.

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Johnson
Administrator

6 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Agency Channel to NCFE

1. Now that Larry deNeufville is working for NCFE, I know that there will be a strong tendency on the part of all of us to deal with NCFE through Larry, this not only because he is an able man but because we all know him so well.

2. If we take this course, however, we shall confuse channels of communications as between the Agency and NCFE by adding to the normal IO/Branch I (William P. Durkee, Chief) channel and to such informal channels as necessarily exist still another channel. This would make the job of all of us more difficult and confound our constant efforts at orderly procedure.

3. I hope that higher authority will bear this in mind.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)
1 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

14-00000

CM 3067

3-9241

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

3 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMINISTRATION)

SUBJECT: Request from the NCFE for the release of $150,000 from the CIA held reserve for the FEUE.

1. Mr. Spencer Phenix, on behalf of the NCFE, upon authorization of the Board of Directors, has requested the release of $150,000 from the CIA held reserve for FEUE capital construction for the following purposes:

(a) "Alterations to the main building

Installation of a refrigerated cold room for the storage of food	$5,600.
Additional automatic kettles and equipment in the kitchen and service room	1,700.
Additional office space on the second floor	600.
Total	$7,900.

The original dining room installation provided for service for a student body of 100; the increase in enrollment (now almost 200) has demonstrated that more refrigeration and storage space and equipment is needed.

Housing the women students in the main building with resultant changes in the physical lay-out has meant the readjustment of office space and it has proved possible to provide two new offices on the second floor for the estimated cost of $600.

(b)

Improvements to the furnished house adjoining the main building and used as residence by the Assistant Dean	6,000.
Necessary additional furniture to replace items removed by Lessor and improve living conditions.	1,200.
Total	$7,200.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

The contemplated alteration involves principally the installation of central heat connected with the main heating system. At the present time there is no central heating, the building is constantly damp in wintertime and the attempt to maintain a satisfactory temperature with stoves and portable heaters has proved unsatisfactory. Other improvements consist of additional kitchen equipment, including a gas water heater, a kitchen cabinet, the construction of a closet, repairs to the electrical system and conversion of existing garage space into a small dining room.

(c) Construction of an auditorium for student meetings, lectures and recreation activities, such as concerts, student theatricals, moving pictures and the like with, as a secondary feature, facilities for indoor exercise during the winter months.

Total	$102,800.

The auditorium will have a reinforced concrete foundation, outside walls of pine clapboards (similar to recently constructed dormitory and lecture hall) with compressed fireproof straw material for insulation, a composition roof of the same material used on the new dormitory and lecture hall and with main framing of steel. Satisfactory lighting and heating systems are included and the interior finish will be such as to provide satisfactory acoustic qualities. Also included in this building are offices and living quarters for the "concierge." The architect's estimate shows the estimated cost of the auditorium itself (17 meters x 22 meters in size, including $5,000. for steel costs and $3,000. for safety glass) as $55,000, the additional cost of the stage with the "concierge's" accommodations above as $19,000, connecting passage between auditorium and adjoining building, $2,300, relocation of library and alteration of study halls, $1,100, movable seats, stage and window curtains, motion picture equipment with screen and window curtains, motion picture equipment with screen and athletic equipment, $22,400. (All figures approx.)

(d) Re-surfacing walks between buildings and installation of a few electric lights at strategic points along the walks. $3,000.

(e) Installation and equipment of a central telephone switchboard with necessary wiring and additional telephone instruments so as to permit intercommunication

	between the various buildings and offices.	$3,000.
(f)	Additional furniture required for the "concierge's" quarters, equipment for the kitchen enlargement and additional furnishings for the women's dormitory.	$5,500.
(g)	Architect's fees.	$6,000.
	Total	$135,400.

Savings are due to a great simplification in the architect's proposal for the auditorium, the elimination of the new residence for the Assistant Dean, made possible by the recent agreement on the part of the owner to permit the Assistant Dean to occupy his present quarters until the termination of the lease on the entire property instead of requiring him to vacate the quarters this summer; the elimination for the time being of a proposed small apartment building to accommodate visiting professors and officials; post-ponement of certain landscaping expenses and the elimination of a proposed enlargement of the dining hall now felt to be unnecessary since a limit of 200 has been fixed for next year's enrollment.

In order to complete new construction by August 1, 1953, work should start not later than March 15, 1953, and in view of the time necessary for the preparation of working plans, opening of bids, and signature of contracts, it is of the greatest importance that the necessary funds be made promptly available."

2. The difference between the total of $135,400 and the $150,000 asked for is a 10% margin allowance for price increases.

3. We recommend, for release from the CIA held reserve by the DD/P and the DD/A, all items except (a) and the 10% margin allowance, a total of ~~[illegible]~~.
31,600

[illegible] W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/Branch 1:WPD:jb
Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1 (DD/P)
1 cc (DD/A)
CONCURRENCE: 1 cc Comp.
[illegible] 1 cc CIO
1 cc IO/Br. 1 ✓

EDWARD R. SAUNDERS
Comptroller

N Deputy Director (Plans)

/s/ ~~[illegible]~~ WRW
Deputy Director (Administration)

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P 3098

2 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Good news concerning William Heimlich.

1. I have just received through Mr. Durkee a report from the RFE people in Munich to the following effect.

2. Mr. Heimlich has visited the premises and talked to some of the key personnel of RFE-Munich. He was cordially received and shown around. At the conclusion of his visit, Mr. Heimlich stated that whereas he was not primarily or particularly interested or concerned with NCFE/RFE activities and operations (presumably meaning that he was more concerned with the State Department information project -- and presumably MSA), he had been very much impressed by what he had seen. He was satisfied that this was a hard-hitting operation; that there was no "fat" on it; and that he would so report to the Senate Committee upon his return.

[illegible]

FRANK G. WISNER
Acting Deputy Director.

cc: C/IO - information.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible]
3-2822

2 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

VIA: Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: Points raised by you in connection with Mr. Durkee's conversation with Leland Stowe on 11 March 1953 and Whitney Shepardson on 16 March 1953.

The following answers to Mr. Wisner's comments on subject memos have been prepared by Mr. Durkee:

1. "Mr. Lang does not intend to put Stowe in official charge of Munich operations. My remark was intended to indicate that apparently with Lang's consent, Mr. Stowe is becoming increasingly influential in the Munich operation. If Stowe's Information Service develops, so that it is writing scripts and programming as he proposes, and if Stowe's suggestions for dealing with the German problem are followed, he will indeed, if given Lang's full support, be the dominant RFE figure in Munich.

2. "The original 'ice-box' statement was indeed passed on by us. My reference was to our approval of an alternate 'ice-box' statement entitled, 'NCFE Policy Statement', which Shepardson proposes to use in place of the original. I have not been able to determine whether this received our approval and, therefore, on 24 March, sent it through channels to the DD/P and the [illegible] for their official approval."

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIOD		
2	Dunhee		
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	PP/C/Admin		26 Mar
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☒ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE
☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS: CPP asks that you prepare a reply to the two points raised by F.G.W. and send same to F.G.W. via CPP.

SUSPENSE 2 APRIL

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

SECRET

2363

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: IO/Branch I

NO. IO-3-841

DATE 16 March 1953

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/IO				TWB
2. C/PP			19 Mar	CTB
3. D/DP				FGW
4. Mr Barnes			26 Mar	CTB
5. Mr Braden				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

Tom:

Frank W should see this at least the record of conversation as it continues [illegible] with him.

WPD

3 To 4 and 5 —

① I had not known before that Larry proposes to put Stone in charge of the Munich question. He has never told us this and I doubt that he would make such a change without letting us, especially since he is aware of certain difficulties in the Stone case.

② I was distinctly under the impression that (contrary to what Bill D says) the Ice box statement was seen and was approved by AWD. Could I be wrong on this. I suppose Spencer Phenix would know, but I thought you two did.

FGW

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH LELAND STOWE ON 11 MARCH 1953 AT HAY ADAMS HOTEL - 9:30 A.M. TO 12:15 PM

During the course of our conversation Mr. Stowe stated that he was pleased to have had the opportunity to meet here and to clear up his status. He also stated that:

a. In his opinion Mr. Lang is indispensable to the operation of RFE, but that it was necessary for Mr. Lang to be in Munich more often. He feels that in spite of Mr. Lang's over-all comprehension that developments in Munich have out-run Lang's or anyones capacity to understand it without closer contact with its day to day operations.

b. He has a high regard for Mr. Richard Condon, whom he feels is doing an excellent job. It is Stowe's opinion that Condon needs a competent administrative assistant and that Alan Michie, RFE correspondent in London, could fill such a position. Lang agrees with him. Stowe feels it remarkable that during his considerable time with RFE that he has never heard a bad word about Mr. Condon.

c. He has a very high regard for Mr. Griffith and the role he plays in RFE's operations, however, it was his feeling that it is impossible for Mr. Griffith to adequately take care of RFE's outside relations in Germany because: (1) Griffith does not have the time and; (2) He is not particularly effective in dealing with Germans because of his youth and rather pedantic manner. He informed me that there is a possibility of getting Raymond G. Swing for employment with RFE and that he felt Swing could excellently undertake the job of dealing with the German government and German public because of Swing's language facility, his familiarity with Germany and his prestige.

d. He is reorganizing the News and Information Service of RFE because the drying up of escapees has increased the need for top rank correspondents with depth of European experience and political knowledge, so that significant ideas and contributions to RFE propaganda can be developed. He also feels that a reorganized news gathering service will lead to more effective American leadership because of the respect the exiles will have for its American personnel. Such procedures, in his opinion, are necessary in order to properly integrate the various free radio desks, their use of information resources and to professionalize program content. He says he intends to have his News and Information Service prepare scripts to be used by all desks. In addition, Stowe pointed out a news gathering service of top rank correspondents will allow him great operational flexibility, for personnel can be interchanged at will.

SECRET
Security Information

c. Stowe also made a strong plea for Malcom Davis who is a personal friend.

COMMENTS:

Stowe is a strong person who is taking over RFE Munich, apparently with Lang's consent. I suspect Lang gives his consent because he has been unable to dominate either Griffith or Condon. Lang has presumably heretofore dealt with this problem by insisting upon N.Y. policy control and by keeping an inordinately large Czech, Polish and Hungarian program desk in New York.

I am sure there is merit in many of Stowe's observations but suspect that real trouble is brewing between New York and Munich, especially among exile personnel as this becomes more a Stowe "American" operation.

William P Durkee
WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TCHIC

SECRET
Security Information

#

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH WHITNEY SHEPARDSON - 16 MARCH AT 9:00 AM

1. Mr. Shepardson said that he had gone over Drew Pearson business with his entire staff and that they had all agreed that a policy of silence was clearly indicated — that this was not a time to release the "ice-box" statement which he referred to as "ice-box" statement number 1 and number 2. Shepardson said he would feel out C. D. Jackson in his meeting with him today to determine whether C. D. thought any approach to Pearson should be made and whether he himself would be the one to do it. He agreed that such an approach to Pearson should be made by noone else.

2. When I queried him about the "ice-box" statement number 2, he said he referred to the NCFE Policy Statement which states the fact of US Government support. He said that it was his understanding that it had been cleared down here. I replied that to my knowledge this was not so. I told him all we had ever had was a draft statement which had been discussed informally. He agreed that if this was in fact the case, he would immediately send the policy statement for our formal approval.

3. During the course of our conversation he indicated that Abbot Washburn had arranged for RFE to appear before the Jackson Committee on March 26 and also had arranged for the rest of NCFE to make a presentation some time in April. I asked whether Mr. Dulles was informed of this and he said he was not aware that he was. I suggested that some problem existed here for NCFE is Mr. Dulles' responsibility and that no-one denied that NCFE/RFE should make such a presentation, it was still a fact that such a unilateral presentation might lead to some difficulties. I therefore suggested that we make a joint presentation whether written or oral, to which Mr. Shepardson agreed.

4. I discussed the problem of security in RFE, Munich, and our concern that a security man competent to deal with questions other than the mere internal security of RFE be placed in Munich. Shepardson immediately agreed that this should be done and we agreed that I would prepare a paper for him outlining what we thought our problems are. In the meantime, Myers will not be informed of our discussions on this subject. We also agreed that the matter of working out the placement of such a person in RFE would be a matter of joint study, but that it was largely a problem for him to work out with such assistance as we can give.

5. We discussed the question of construction funds for the FEU and Shepardson agreed that he would talk with Spencer Phenix in order to arrive at an over-all estimate of University affairs before submitting an official request for funds. It was agreed, therefore, at this time we would not take any action on Phenix's request dated 17 February 1953.

6. I stated that I was anxious for a thorough review of Albanian-Rumanian emigre questions and we agreed that after Shepardson had time to give personal attention to details of these matters, we would have a full discussion here.

SECRET
Security Information

William P. Durkee
WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/Tonic

SECRET
Security Information

1 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: Release of Funds for purchase of apartments to house FEUE personnel.

1. Spencer Phenix, Treasurer of NCFE, has submitted a request for the sum of $52,300.00 to purchase four apartments in Strasbourg, France, to house some of the tutorial staff of the Free University in Exile (see attached). FEUE can obtain these premises by special arrangement with the city of Strasbourg, to whom these apartments belong. There is an acute housing shortage in Strasbourg so that these apartments are necessary if the teaching staff of the University is to be reasonably accommodated.

2. I recommend that this sum be released to FEUE from the CIA held reserve for FEUE capital construction. The purchase price of these quarters is readily recoverable, if necessary, by resale because of housing shortages in the city of Strasbourg — a shortage which will not be substantially relieved for sometime.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment: Ltr.fr.Phenix dtd
3/23/53

CONCURRENCE:

Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET
Security Information

23 March 1953

Dear Nelson:

As requested by you this morning, I quote below the text of a letter received today from Paris, regarding the unfurnished apartments which the City of Strasbourg is prepared to sell for use by Robertsau personnel.

"This morning I sent you the following cable:

'FOR ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND FRANCS CAN HAVE OPTION EXPIRING ONE MAY TO PURCHASE FOUR UNFURNISHED APARTMENTS PRICED AT SIXTEEN MILLION ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND FRANCS STOP OPTION MUST BE TAKEN UP NOT LATER THAN TWENTY SEVEN MARCH STOP TYSON AND I FAVOR PURCHASE AS REPRESENTING MOST SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF HOUSING PROBLEM LETTER FOLLOWS SABOLOT'

As stated in Binet's memorandum of the 9th of March the city of Strasbourg is in control. They are willing to give us an option on these apartments, at a cost of 160,000 francs, said option to expire on 1 May 1953. They give us until the 27th of March to take up this option.

The apartments will be finished on the 1st of August. They have offered us the following apartments:

a)	Southern exposure - ground floor - 3½ rooms, plus kitchen, bathroom and maid's room in attic.	Fr. 4,075,000
b)	Southern exposure - 3rd floor - 4 rooms, plus kitchen, bathroom and maid's room in attic.	Fr. 4,520,000
c)	Northern exposure - 2nd floor - 3 rooms, plus kitchen, bathroom and maid's room in attic.	Fr. 3,555,000
d)	Northern exposure - 2nd floor - 4 rooms plus kitchen bathroom and maid's room in attic.	Fr. 3,950,000
	TOTAL	Fr. 16,100,000

To the above total must be added the costs of:

a) Registration, transfer and notary fees.

b) Installing electrical fixtures.

c) Installing stoves and ice boxes in kitchen.

d) Furnishing apartments, (I assume none of our staff will have their own furniture, etc.)

It is estimated the ~~above~~ will come to Fr. 4,300,000, making a total of 20,400,000 francs or $58,300.00 at 350 francs to the dollar.

I am aware of your reasons for not wishing to own real estate in Europe. However, the problem of finding suitable quarters for the College staff is a difficult one. Providing the funds are available, Ty and I are in favor of purchase, as these apartments provide an immediate partial solution to a difficult problem.

If you should decide to take up the option, we can discuss the financial details of the purchase when you visit Paris next month."

You will note that for the relatively small payment of 160,000 francs, an option will be granted valid until 1 May 1953, and since it is obvious that a final decision cannot be immediately made, I have cabled Paris, requesting that the option be purchased so that we may have time to consider the problem carefully.

I shall be in Washington next Sunday evening and available for discussion Monday morning. If you have not been able to clear the question before then, I suggest that you set up a meeting with George Lefton at which Daniel Church and I can present our views in the hope of obtaining prompt determination.

Sincerely,

s/William L. Digby

DD/P 3787

14 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, PP

SUBJECT: Letter from G. M. Dimitrov

The attached letter to Mr. Shepardson with appended Agenda and Procedures of the Plenary Session of the B.N.C. came to me through a reliable source in New York. Mr. Dimitrov is unaware that these papers have fallen into our hands. I am passing them along to you for whatever interest they may have. You may want to send them to Tom Braden for his scrutiny and files. It should be underlined that Mr. Dimitrov must not become aware of our having secured this material.

Richard Helms
Chief of Operations, DD/P

Attachments

SECURITY INFORMATION

9 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Bradshaw Project

Attached is an accounting signed by William L. DIGBY of the Bradshaw Project for the period August 15, 1952 to May 27, 1953. This is for retention in your files.

(Signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
As stated.

CIO:TWB/ah

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

2 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Remarks for meeting with Spencer Phenix et al on Thursday, 2:30 PM, 4 June 1953

1. At a PRC action on Friday, 29 May, as an interim action pending a full review in August of NCFE's total program and budget the Division recommended:

a. NCFE be given three months operating expenses - $3,945,104 - the current rate of expenditures;

b. $813,590 to be put in the Free Europe University in Exile account -- the proposed FY 1954 operating expenditures -- with authority for NCFE to draw upon this account for three months at the current rate of expenditures. NCFE authorities had requested that the full amount be made available to them at this time to enable them to comply with the legal requirements of the Board of Regents of the State of New York, to which the University is responsible. It was expressly stated that the activities of the FEUE would be subject to the later full review and that the recommended action in no way implied approval of University activities at this time; and

c. Approval for RFE capital expenditures of $1,299,275 for the completion of RFE's transmitter program in its present locations. The funds for these expenditures were to come out of Crusade funds which, as you know, are specifically raised for capital construction.

2. In its action the PPC:

a. Refused to allow the $3,945,104 which NCFE requested to cover its current operating expenses by cutting this figure to $3,000,000 with the statement NCFE can come back for more if necessary, and with the further stipulation that Crusade funds be used for this purpose;

b. Refused to allow RFE to undertake its proposed capital development but authorized this Division to investigate the possibility of using two 100 kw transmitters owned by this Agency and as well as the purchase of the unused 100 kw's from VOA; and

c. Refused to appropriate any money for the FEUE, but directed NCFE to transfer funds from other accounts including that of the Crusade for Freedom to the FEUE, authorising NCFE to incur expenditures for three months at the current rate.

3. The intent of this Division in its recommendations to the PRC was to provide NCFE and the FEUE with the operating funds necessary to continue its activities in the FY 1954 at the current rate. These funds were to tide NCFE over the first months of FY 1954, pending a thorough budgetary and program review and subsequent presentation and recommendations to proper CIA authorities in the month of August. At that time Whitney Shepardson will have completed his initial tour of inspection, and can be on hand to defend his budget and our recommendations thereto.

The only exception to this procedure was the request for approval of RFE's capital needs. This request was made after a thorough examination of proposals by this Division and General McClelland, Office of Communications, his technical staff and RFE engineers. As a result, General McClelland authorized this Division to state to the PRC that the RFE proposals were technically sound. As far as these capital expenditures are concerned the IO Division had completed its review and recommended their approval in order that there be no delay in getting this additional transmitter equipment in place.

4. I would strongly suggest that the meeting on Thursday not involve a general budgetary review. It should be confined, in my opinion, to a statement to Mr. Spencer Phenix and his budgetary officer, who should be the sole NCFE officers present, that CIA will conduct through the IO Division:

a. A thorough and detailed review of all current activities and new activities proposed by NCFE;

b. A financial review in the sense that all financial information necessary to support the NCFE program and budget is made available. Our study of this financial information will be confined to a general review to ensure accuracy, adequate explanations of uncertain items and a general analysis to ensure proper budgetary procedures. I would like to point out and strongly emphasise that we have already received the utmost cooperation from the officials of NCFE in getting such program and fiscal information.

5. We cannot, in my opinion, having granted NCFE broad authority in the execution of its task, seek to impose our judgment for theirs in the details of their management of this project. Such matters as were raised at the PRC, i.e. whether the request for replacement of 32 trucks is based on Agency standards for truck replacement, have in my opinion no place in such a review. We can review management and fiscal policies in a broad sense to satisfy ourselves that they are

sound. NCFE officials should be present at the budget review to answer such questions. This is their responsibility. If we are dissatisfied with the present management, we should get a new one.

We have, however, the responsibility of making a detailed review of the policies and the activities of NCFE undertaken in pursuance of their mission as given to them by this Agency. NCFE is entitled to know that its programs and policies are approved and that no after the fact question can arise. Equally, NCFE is not entitled to undertake programs or activities which are not approved by this Agency.

At the completion of its review of NCFE's proposed program for FY 1954, a review which involves detailed examination in cooperation with the CIA staffs and area divisions and with the Department of State, IO Division will make its recommendations to the proper Agency officials for their final action. Such an orderly procedure will enable this Agency to have completely reviewed NCFE's activities, to have concurred in each, and will allow NCFE to proceed in the knowledge that its activities are fully authorized and approved.

6. I, therefore, propose that the meeting on Thursday be confined to Phenix and his budget officer during which the above approach can be made. I will leave for your judgment the question whether the actions of the PRC on Friday should be opened for review and modification. Phenix will certainly want to do so for the following reasons:

a. The operating funds authorized are not adequate;

b. The directive to use Crusade funds for operational expenses runs counter to established procedures and NCFE's commitments to the public in the use of such funds;

c. The failure to approve RFE capital items now means a delay into next year of the installation of transmitting equipment, which if approved now, can be in place and operating by October of this year. (This will not be the case if you authorize our use of the Agency owned 100 kw's and a purchase of the VOA transmitters can be arranged, which I believe can);

d. There are not sufficient surplus funds, excluding the Crusade, to apply to the Free Europe University account. (There are, however, impressed cash funds which are a three months' operating advances in NCFE's possession which can be used - Phenix agrees.)

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DCI		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		**INITIALS**	**DATE**
1	CIO	TWB	8 May
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS:

This is the letter which Whitney Shepardson sent to Sol Levitas, about which you are aware.

TWB

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM SEP. 1947 30-4

10—68796-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

4-1139

May 5, 1953.

20 May 53

Mr. E. M. Levitas,
Executive Editor,
The New Leader,
7 East 15th Street,
New York 3, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Levitas:

In January 1953 an arrangement was made whereby you were to send 1000 copies of *The New Leader* to England and to Europe during the current year.

We wish to discontinue that arrangement. We do not wish to have our contribution used any longer in that way.

I would like to discuss with you at your early convenience the question of the return to us of some part of that contribution in view of the paper, printing and mailing costs which will be saved by the discontinuance.

Yours sincerely,

President.

WE3:IRH

Orig to IO/Br I

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

MAY 4

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: IO/BRANCH ONE

SUBJECT: Utilization of Various Balkan Emigre Groups by SE Division for Operational Purposes

In reply to a request made by Miss Stern of your office for detailed information concerning the operational utilization of various Balkan emigre groups by SE Division, there are attached as tabs to this memorandum studies covering our activities among the Albanian, Bulgarian, Rumanian and Yugoslav emigration. We understand that this information is required to provide a basis for reviewing the operational plan and budget of the Fund for the coming year. Since the information is considered highly sensitive, it is forwarded for your information only.

Christian M. Freer
Acting Chief, SE

Tab A - SE Utilization of Albanian Emigre Groups
Tab B - SE Utilization of Bulgarian Emigre Groups
Tab C - SE Utilization of Yugoslav Emigre Groups
Tab D - SE Utilization of Rumanian Emigre Groups

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Orig given Burke
paper.
Rec'd 31 Mar.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Reported Financial Support of
Dr. Dimitrov by Bulgarians in Germany

REFERENCE: Memorandum (IO-3-682), dated 2 March 1953

1. With regard to reference memorandum, this Division has long suspected that some such arrangement existed. Any money which Dr. Dimitrov managed to extract from the Guard Company members is obtained by him as a result of his own personal sway exercised over this group of Bulgarians.

2. It has also come to our attention that Dr. Dimitrov is receiving money from miscellaneous Bulgarians in Canada and the United States in the name of a trust fund which he has set up. You are no doubt aware of this development.

3. We are most interested in getting from you, your estimate of Dr. Dimitrov's income from all sources as well as a listing of those sources of income about which you know.

CHRISTIAN M. FREER
ACTING CHIEF, SE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

MAR 27 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF IO DIVISION

SUBJECT : Proposal for Establishing a Microfilm Library of Rumanian Reference Material

1. The attached paper outlines a project which may be of interest to your division. A Rumanian emigre, interested in propaganda and cultural activities, prepared the paper after consulting with a number of refugee scholars.

2. Although the results of such a project would be of great value to our Rumanian operations, implementation is considered beyond the scope of the activities of this Division. Further, it appears more practicable for a project of this type to be undertaken by a research or cultural organization, rather than an intelligence agency, in order that the results may be more widely used.

3. It is suggested that the NCFE, which is concerned with worthwhile employment of refugee intellectuals, may be interested in this project for its Mid-European Studies Center. If the NCFE is not in a position to finance such a project, it is possible that a privately endowed foundation would be interested. The emigre has discussed this project with Dr. Sergius Yacobson of the Library of Congress and with Professor Moseley of the Russian Institute of Columbia University. He has reported that both agencies appear interested.

4. Because of some doubt concerning the reliability of three of the individuals mentioned in section III of the attached report, the following data is submitted for your information:

a. Dr. Mircea Eliade was formerly editor of an Iron Guard (Rumanian fascist group) newspaper and a doctrinaire of the Guard. He is reported to have disassociated himself from the Guard in the last year but this information cannot be confirmed.

b. Dr. Leontin Constantinescu reported as formerly pro-Iron Guardist in his sympathies.

SECRET

c. Dr. Ion Claudian is reportedly engaged at the present time in emigre Iron Guard activities in Europe.

5. If further information is desired, please contact Miss Newsom, extension 495.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

Attachment: As stated above

SECRET
Security Information

Orig to [illegible]
↓ Stern
Recd: 4/2/53

26 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Bulgarian Guard Company

REFERENCES: Secret Memo from Chief, IO, Subject: Information on Quasi-soldiers located in Frankfurt dated 19 March 1953

1. Sole control of the Bulgarian Guard Company was assumed by USAREUR in December 1952. Since there was never a definite period of enlistment, members of the Company were free to leave at will. As a result, there was a considerable turn-over of personnel. The maximum T/O strength was 200. Peak strength, about 30 in excess of T/O, was reached in 1952. However, this number was immediately reduced to 200.

2. The Company was continually plagued by the constant political activism of the adherents of Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov. It is estimated that a maximum of 40 members were hard-core Dimitrov adherents.

3. The first Bulgarian Commander of the Company was Stefan Boidev. Upon his removal from the Company, Borislav Baichev was appointed in his place.

4. Stoyan Dobrev (Papazov) does not appear on the last roster of Guard Company members (September 1952) available to us. He was one of the early members of the Company.

JOHN E. BAKER
CHIEF, SE

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 25 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

SUBJECT: The New Leader

Confirming the instructions from DCI which I relayed to you by telephone last week, CIA is not to pay for overseas subscriptions to the New Leader either by direct or indirect channels.

(Signed) ALFRED C. ULMER JR.

ALFRED C. ULMER JR.
Assistant Chief
Political and Psychological Warfare Staff

cc: C/IO

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
Security Information

16 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Memorandum dated 13 March 1953, Subject: "Notes on Paris Trip"

1. C. D. Jackson wrote the Doris Duke Foundation on Cohrssen's behalf, asking that he be granted $10,000. He was granted this amount.

2. Zurcher Berle & Co. are meeting in New York today and I have done everything that I can to ensure that Tyson gets full backing. I think this was really already being done as far as possible. When I got back, I suggested that this be done and a telegram was sent to Tyson giving him full authority to act in any manner in which he saw fit, including the firing of Malcom Davis. In my discussion with Shepardson this morning he agreed that the entire subject of the University and its future should be discussed immediately. He will, therefore, examine their position in this matter for our consideration and he agreed to withdraw the request for construction funds until they themselves know what they wish to do.

pls discuss with me

3. In discussing the FTUC in Exile with Spencer Phenix while you were away, I was informed that you had decided that support would be withdrawn after June 30. If this is so, I wonder how Pacak could be employed unless it has other means of support. Phenix also informed me that Lennen agreed to go back to Paris for at least six months on an expenses paid basis with no salary.

Frankfurt is supposed to make high level defectors available to RFE. I discussed this while in Munich and was assured that this would be done. The difficulty up to now has been Truscott and the Munich station's inability to insist upon anything from Frankfurt.

4. ACUE has a bank account which is used to bank funds passing through the Committee and which show on ACUE books. Another account is impossible for cover reasons as funds passed to it would not show in ACUE accounts in New York but would in Paris. As a result arrangements were made to have Fugitt's account a joint one with some administrative officer in Paris or to have Fugitt sign a blank check to be held in the Paris office. All these matters were gone into in great detail by Knott. Thayer, in my opinion, is using a technique through Tom Hester of making business impossible. Knott shares this opinion, as do others. For example, Fugitt was granted a raise about one year ago, he has not yet received it, etc.

5. I know nothing about the Swiss franc matter and moreover my impression is that financial procedures now followed in the unity projects, to which I presume you refer, and which are not in this Division, have been arranged at

SECRET
Security Information

the direction of administrative and finance people. Jim Knott, who is as scrupulous and thorough as any man can be, made all such arrangements and I would accept his recommendations of what needs to be done, if anything.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TOPIC

SECURITY INFORMATION

25 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Dr. Paul A. Fabry

At Clover's suggestion, I saw Paul Fabry, a very impressive and learned young Hungarian who is not a citizen and who wanted a job. I have replied to him negatively in the attachment and do so because there is a long list of allegations in the files about his and his wife's Communist associations. These allegations may or may not be correct but are accepted as correct by John Hughes who advises most strongly against having anything to do with him.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

C
O
P
Y

25 March 1953

Dear Dr. Fabry:

I have given a lot of thought within the past few days to the question of your immediate future which you raised with me. I find on checking into our rules and regulations that I simply can't help you here. I am sorry about this because you are an impressive man to talk to.

I wish you good luck elsewhere.

Sincerely,

Thomas W. Braden

Dr. Paul A. Fabry
347 W. 87th Street
New York, New York

orig given TONIC 10 March

what has TONIC done about this?

TWB Harry Rees talked to Sichel on this

7 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO/PP

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden

SUBJECT: Mr. Ramsey

1. Reference our conversation sometime ago, I would like to give you the results of our Registry checks on Ramsey, who may or may not be identical with the present British citizen employed by RFE in Hamburg.

FTT-289 19 Aug 48	Subject arrived in Trieste under sponsorship of Charles K. MOFFLY, director of AIS. He speaks fluent Serbian and during war was commander of a Yugoslav camp in Egypt. Has been assigned to planning section of AMG. AIS is cover for SIS.
FTTA-291 3 June 49	Individual believed identical with subject signed interrogation report either as or for the Trieste Security Officer.
IN-44033 24 Sept 49	ANTOMIJE, suspected DA for British, has for three weeks been under constant BIS interrogation by Italian speaking British sergeant in apartment of Maj. A.I.E. RAMSEY. Surveillance reveals apartments several FSS officers in building. Gold, SIS chief, seen entering and leaving building with subject and several unidentified British women.
FTT-371 5 Oct 48	Subject is the head of five British officers who are in Trieste making a survey of the entire area prior to conducting special mission in Yugoslavia.

MAV-00625 20 June 47	Subject British PSO (Pub. Sec. Officer) Graz. Intervened in the case of Josef Meger.
IN-22201 2 Sept 47	Subject is in Graz. Question as to whether in FSS or MI-6.
IN-21808 27 Aug	Subject was named by Mary Allison Mikse, now held in prison in Baden by the Soviets, as BIS officer in Graz.
WEL-593 12 Sept 47	Public Safety Officer in Military Government in Graz. He has been in contact with representatives of British Austrian Station.

2. Ramsey no doubt is an extremely desirable officer for RFE and I see no objection to a man with intelligence background being employed by RFE, since quite obviously the combination of language and background must be invaluable to their program, but I still believe that these RFE posts which could be exploited best by us should be occupied by American citizens, who can be cleared by us and who will have American intelligence interests closest to their hearts. You may or may not know that RFE, especially in such places as Berlin and Vienna, is one of the important screening points for refugees coming from the Satellite areas and as such the RFE representatives act as bird-dogs for this Agency's FI program wherever possible.

3. I should appreciate your keeping me advised on the possibility of keeping Kenneth Dean Koch in Berlin as the RFE representative.

PETER SICHEL
EE/FI [illegible]

SECRET
Security Information

2574

5 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division
ATTENTION: Mr. Durkee
VIA: C/PP
SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe. Miscellaneous matters; conversation with Mr. Lang.

1. This is a brief report for the benefit of Mr. Durkee and for the information of Messrs. Barnes and Braden, concerning certain aspects of my luncheon conversation with Mr. Robert E. Lang of 4 March.

2. I believe that I was successful in covering in one way or another all of the points raised with me by Mr. Durkee prior to my conversation with Mr. Lang. I will not attempt in this memorandum to recapitulate the entire conversation, but I will comment on certain aspects thereof and state that, in general, the conversation seemed to me to be quite satisfactory.

3. I received the impression that there are still "wheels within wheels" and much internal friction within the NCFE set-up. This is very regrettable, but it seems to be a fact of life which I think should be brought to the attention of Mr. Shepardson at a very early date, and he should be urged to bring the warring factions together on a more amicable basis. The personalities involved are all important to the success of the operation and it is a great shame that they spend so much of their time and energy trying to out-maneuver and checkmate one another. I would not "give up" Bob Lang on this in talking with Mr. Shepardson -- but simply make this as a general observation of ours.

4. I came down quite hard on Bob with respect to the Leland Stowe brochure which Mr. Durkee handed to me and which I return to you herewith. I pointed out that this thing struck us as quite bad, and for three good and sufficient reasons, to wit:

a. It represents too much concentration of effort on publicity and propaganda within the United States -- our target is the satellites and to some extent the rest of the free world, but we have no charter to operate or propagandize within the United States and this only invites trouble when it is done;

SECRET
Security Information

b. As written, this communication or brochure has every appearance of offering a new international news service to American editors. (It is called "The RFE News and Information Service".) It is not indicated whether this will be charged for or furnished free of charge to the proposed newspaper recipients -- but in either case it would be almost sure to bring down upon the head of RFE the wrath, indignation and hostility of all the major news services who are extremely jealous and sensitive about competition of any kind, but particularly Government competition. The news services and newspapers have played ball pretty well in covering up our dark secret, but I suspect that anything of this kind would make enemies out of friends and set the news services upon a course of deliberate exposure.

c. This move points up and invites attention to Leland Stowe's present position and, as such, opens up unnecessary vulnerabilities to the kind of attack with which we are all too familiar concerning individuals who have "written a book".

Bob Lang had no ready or very satisfactory explanation of this matter -- said that he had not known about it or had not seen it -- and that he could only interpret it as an effort on Stowe's part to personally rehabilitate himself. I said that I had no objection to a program of self-rehabilitation on Stowe's part, but that he simply could not do so at the expense of the organization for which he works. Lang appeared to agree.

5. I told Mr. Lang that as far as we understood it there would be no objection to his going to Turkey to see what he could negotiate for himself. Ambassador McGhee's cable appears to have relieved State Department's objections and the only question seems to be one of operational feasibility and desirability as regards his making the effort with the Turks. I ventured to predict that he would run into difficulties with the Turks, and suggested that if he were to fail in his Turkish mission he might stop by in Greece to look into the situation there, which I said we had reason to believe might be more favorable.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)
Mimeo brochure offering reports via "RFE's News & Information Service."

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Rec'd 6 March 53
sent to Stern

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/IO

ATTENTION : Miss Stern

SUBJECT : Material for Transmittal to RFE.

1. Forwarded herewith is a list of persons who are considered to be acceptable script writers for Albanian material to be prepared for use by RFE. It was originally intended to forward a list of persons not considered suitable, but it was later felt that this negative approach might allow some unacceptable persons to slip through. You will note that this approved list consists of only 30 names. If RFE proposes to use any persons not on the list all that they have to do is submit the name of the proposed script writer so that we may check our files for any information on him. Immediately upon receipt of the name of a person we will reply, stating whether the person is: (a) unacceptable now, (b) may be used one time only, or (c) may be used and added to the approved list.

2. Of particular interest to us, and something we consider worthy of RFE's attention, is the recent use of Ernest Koliqi for the preparation of a script. Mr. Koliqi is a member of the BKI, a political organization which has been unacceptable in the past. Mr. Koliqi is further unacceptable as an individual by reason of his past. From the condensed information available on him it appears that he "cooperated with the Italian Minister to Tirana in preparing the Italian occupation . . . returned to Tirana (he had long lived in Italy as he does now) where he held the post of Minister of Education 1939-1943. Member of the Albanian Fascist party."

3. It would seem that the use of Mr. Koliqi for the preparation of scripts is subject to serious question. In this script for February 22, page 2, he states "a much better presentation of the various literary phases . . . is the anthology entitled The Albanian Writers published in 1941 by the Minister of Education." (Note that he was the Minister of Education during this period under the Fascist government.)

4. There are other specific examples of possibly doubtful persons having been used in the preparation of scripts. Dimiter Berati, a Zogist official when Zog was in power, a Fascist official when the Fascists were in power, and now reported to be a Communist stooge, was used on several occasions. Zef Shiro, formerly, and possibly still, editor of the Fascist magazine "Albania" was used for the preparation of a script on January 5.

5. As was agreed in a

SECURITY INFORMATION

5. As was agreed in a recent discussion between Major Mitchell of this Division and Miss Stern of your office, we hope such embarrassments may be avoided in the future by bringing the facts to the attention of RFE and by asking RFE to limit its list of writers to those specifically approved by this Division.

JOHN R. BAKER
Chief, SE

Attachment (1)

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

1. Alimehmeti, Kasem (Dr.)
2. Andoni, Alfred
3. Andoni, Vasil
4. Bajraktari, Muharem
5. Binaku, Ejup
6. Damani, Selim
7. Delvina, Hiqmet
8. Dibra, Adem (Dr.)
9. Dilo, Jani
10. Dine, Dilaver
11. Dosti, Hasan
12. Ermenji, Abas
13. Farka, Ibrahim
14. Fratari, Rauf
15. Gogh, Georges
16. Kogi, Atlas
17. Kotta, Nuci
18. Kryeziu, Said
19. Kupi, Abas
20. Maci, Halil
21. Meniku, Halil
22. Mulleti, Hysini
23. Pali, Zef
24. Perpoza, Hysen
25. Pashkopija, Nexhat
26. Rushiti, Haki
27. Skendi, Stavro
28. Tafilaj, Tani
29. Toptani, Ishan
30. Zernal-Cenay, Asllan

SECRET
Security Information

Suspense 6 March

26 February 1953

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Dr. Bela Boszormenyi-Nagy

1. This is in response to your request for our views regarding the attached letter from Dr. Bela Boszormenyi-Nagy.

2. Our files contain only a limited amount of information regarding Dr. Boszormenyi-Nagy. However, it is unlikely that information regarding Hungary which he acquired prior to September 1948 would add very much to information we have obtained from refugees and defectors who left Hungary more recently and who were better situated to observe at first hand the top government officials there.

3. I would suggest, therefore, that in acknowledging Dr. Boszormenyi-Nagy's letter we advise him not to make a special trip to Washington. Instead, we might suggest that if he is here on other business at some future time he should get in touch with Mr. DuBose at Sterling 3-5520. (DuBose is with the Contact Division, Office of Operations).

JOHN A. BROSS
Chief, Eastern European Division

5 Mar 53

Note on cover sheet returned to EO/DD/P states:

"IO/TONIC concurs in subject memo - ES per WPD

Sent to DD/P (Va. Hill)

5 March 1953

SECURITY INFORMATION

William F. Heinlich

Scheduled to be employed at a salary of $10,000 on December 1949 as a program adviser until March 1950. Worked under General Clay and under General Frank Howley.

Used to be with RIAS (Radio in American Sector). Told he would not be continued because up to the time (no date) records showed three official investigations on the following subjects:

1. When serving as Intelligence Officer, why instead of putting the Goebbels diaries as captured documents into official channels known to him, did he turn them over to private persons in a transaction from which he subsequently expected to profit, both in cash and in a future position with Double Day.

2. When serving as an Intelligence Officer, how did it happen that another captured document being the German Appraisal of USSR Intelligence Service was changed in a foot locker sent by Heinlich to his home.

3. When serving as head of RIAS, entertaining at the expense of the station and ultimately, therefore, of the US government at private American parties, why did he accompany a German female singer during her appearance at a German vaudeville theater? In the latter case, the entire RIAS symphony orchestra appeared without payment at the German theater for a period of one week. There was an investigation into the existance of extensive payroll padding at RIAS when subject was informed that the State Department did not wish to inform him and he thereupon resigned.

HICOG Appraisal:

He is generally dishonest in his day to day dealings and apparently is in the habit of fabricating any story which contributes to his particular objectives at any particular time. The people in HICOG would not look with favor upon his employment by any American organization in Germany.

Private Source:

He is going abroad to survey installations, etc. Munich people have been warned against him.

114-4

February 25, 1953

Dear George:

Confirming what I have just told you on the phone, our mutual friend wrote Michael a note the exact contents of which are as follows:

> "After you left this afternoon, Mr. Robert Voegeler came in to see me, and among other things told me that to his certain knowledge, RFE had been infiltrated.
>
> "I picked up the word and asked him if he would tell me more about it, to which he replied that maybe he had used too strong a word. So then I told him to pick any word he wanted, but to tell me what he meant.
>
> "He then told me that there were people working for RFE who were either ex-Communists or ex-Socialists who were utterly discredited in their own country and who were doing us more harm than good. I asked him if he cared to tell me who some of these people were, to which he replied that he did not come to the office to denounce anybody. I thought I would leave it at that and we went on to another subject.
>
> "However, the purpose of his trip to Washington was to feed information to Senator McCarthy's Committee, and he will be returning in another ten days to give him some more advice.
>
> "I think it would be most important for you or Bob Lang to have a word with this gentleman and see if you can't find out whom he is talking about, as I am sure you would be eager to know and to act if justified."

It was our friend's suggestion, and we will act upon it, that together with Michael and Kenneth Walters I try to see Voegeler. This I will do as soon as I can locate him, and I learn that he is now in New York. We here have information that Voegeler associates socially with an individual who, having failed of employment with the Fund some time ago, has since lost no opportunity to condemn the Fund as being infiltrated. The latter individual's identity is known to Michael as is also the basic situation which gives some color to the allegation.

I will reserve further comment on this until I see you personally, or I will instruct Michael to give you this background when he next goes down to see your colleagues.

Sincerely,

SECRET

Orig given
[illegible] 13 Feb

FEB 12 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: Attempts of Virgil POPA to Secure Employment with RFE Munich

1. The information below was reported by a KUBARK source, and was acquired in Munich during October 1952:

a. Virgil POPA has renewed his attempts to secure employment with RFE Munich. Subject is in possession of a letter of recommendation signed by Barbu NICULESCU and issued in the name of General Nicolae RADESCU. The letter recommended Subject as a good and capable Rumanian to General Ion GHEORGHE and Alexander GREGORIAN, the latter an RFE employee, and requested them to assist Subject in gaining employment with RFE Munich. Subject has taken the letter to GREGORIAN in Munich, and has visited him several times, in each instance pressing him for a job.

b. POPA has explained to GREGORIAN that he wishes to emigrate to the United States, but because he is anti-SIMA, the Simists have informed U. S. authorities that he is a Legionary. As a result, he was interned at Ellis Island and refused entry into the United States. GREGORIAN is aware that POPA is still an important Legionary leader, and that this explanation is a typical Legionary maneuver.

2. It is requested that RFE be informed of the above information.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SECRET

#764-6

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12 February 1953

Dear Oliver,

Would you be kind enough to pass on the enclosed memorandum to Ed Greene.

Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

Kenneth

Kenneth J. Walters

Enc. 1

sent to 2433 Holmes Run Drive
Falls Church, Va.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

C
O
P
Y

12 February 1953
110 W. 57th Street
New York City

Dear Ed,

I saw your name on a piece of paper today written in recommendation of one Chica Cantacuzino on 2677th stationery no less.

We are considering him for a job with the Rumanian desk and would be grateful for your comments. He seems, so far as we have been able to determine, to be well equipped but a difficult personality.

Hope to see you sometime soon.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Bob

Robert E. Lang

(For Edward Greene)

12 February 1953

At 1715 I was called to Brad Connor's office and shown a memorandum dated 10 February 1953, "Meeting with Representatives John Taber and Cliff Clevenger on February 6, 1953 - Baker East and Baker West". The memorandum was signed by General Stoner. Present were:

Rep. John Taber
Rep. Cliff Clevenger
Dr. Wilson Compton
General Frank Stoner
I/R - Mr. Crosby

IPO - Mr. Connors
I - Mr. Harris
IBS/NY - Mr. Morton
S - Mr. Barnard
- Mr. Lourie

General Stoner had been discussing the need for money for more installations for VOA. At the top of page 3 of his memo, there is found the following:

> "Mr. Taber mentioned that we had a large Munich plant. He said that this was the alleged place of employment of Ruby Parsons. We stated that our plant in Munich was not comparable to the large plant built up by RFE, that we felt there should be a closer coordination on a technical level between the various US activities engaged in international broadcasting in Europe and that there wasn't any reason why a single centralized plant should not be able to serve Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Armed Forces Network, and the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.
>
> "When liberation of the Peoples of Russia was mentioned as a potential broadcaster, Mr. Taber made notes and said that he would look into the matter. He was told that the single building in Munich erected by RFE could also house all the feeders located in separate sites and separate buildings pertaining to U.S. activities mentioned above. He was particularly interested in this possibility."

Mr. Connors told me that he had ordered page 3 of this memo rewritten to omit these two paragraphs before the paper got further circulation. However, he wanted us to know what Stoner had said as shown by these two paragraphs, so that we could take any action we see fit with reference to Taber and Clevenger. Connors said he didn't know how far we cut in the Appropriations Committee. He said that he had warned Stoner "twenty times" not to reveal such things. He stated that Stoner had learned these things while in Germany.

ARISTIDES G. LAZARUS

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PYD

SECRET
Security Information

10 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMINISTRATION)

VIA: General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reimbursement of Mr. Francis B. Stevens

1. It is requested that approval be given to reimburse Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the Department of State for a trip to Glens Falls, New York. This trip was made at our request and with the approval of the DDP and DCI, to approach Mr. Nathaniel P. Davis as a possible replacement for Mr. [illegible], head of the Division for Exile Relations of the National Committee for a Free Europe.

2. Mr. Stevens was asked to do this work because of his close personal friendship with Mr. Davis. Mr. Stevens is also acting in the capacity of a State Department contact with the National Committee for a Free Europe.

3. An accounting of Mr. Stevens' expenditures is attached. The airline stubs, to be attached to a voucher, are being kept in this Office, pending approval of this request.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Approved:

General Counsel

Deputy Director (Administration)

Attachment: 1 (a/s)

IO/Br.1:T:jb
Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1
Gen.Counsel - 1cc
IO/Br.1 - 1cc ✓
CIO - 1cc
RI - 1cc
IO/AD - 1cc

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

2159

FEB 6 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NCFE Support of the New Leader

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of 12 January 1953 (ER #3-6149), same subject.

1. On 30 January, Saul Levitas advised our PY Staff by telephone that he had received a call from Spencer Phenix. According to Levitas Mr. Phenix stated that NCFE has decided to provide the New Leader with $18,000. $12,000 of this amount will be a direct payment to the magazine for services and the remaining $6,000 will be used to renew 1,000 subscriptions to the United Kingdom.

2. The PP Staff is preparing for your consideration a project separate from the above which would envisage sending subscriptions to the New Leader to key Socialist and Labor people in certain other priority areas.

RH

RICHARD HELMS
Chief of Operations, DD/P

APP/ACU/gvm
31 January 1953

Distribution:
- Addressees - Orig & 1
- Chief of Operations, DD/P - 1
- ~~Executive Registry - 2~~
- CPY - 1
- CIO - 1✓
- APP - 1
- RI - 1

SECRET
Security Information

3-6.75 (DDP 2042)

3 February 1953

My dear Mr. DeBarcza:

I appreciate your letter and your interest. I recall with pleasure our acquaintance during the war and have noted your desire to serve the "democratic cause".

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) ALLEN W. DULLES

Mr. G. DeBarcza
11, Rangor Road
Croydon
N.S.W.
Sydney, Australia

CIO:TWB/mf (19 January 1953)
retyped O/DDCI:RHL/lob (23 January 1953)
retyped O/DDCI:AWD/mam (3 February 1953)
Dist:
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - DDCI Chrono
1 cc - ER
1 cc - CIO ✓
1 cc - RI
1 cc - TONIC

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Rec'd 2 Feb 53
Copy sent to E. Stern

what has done? This should go to Lang.
yes went to New York

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

FROM : Chief, SE

SUBJECT : Viorel Virgil TILEA

1. It is our understanding that Viorel TILEA is currently under consideration for the position of head of Rumanian broadcasts for RFE. In this connection we call your attention to information in our files indicating (a) the possibility that Subject is a British Intelligence agent; (b) that a close relationship exists between Subject and Nicolae MALAXA, the well-known Rumanian industrialist now in the United States, and (c) that Subject has ties with former King CAROL. MALAXA is currently under scrutiny not only by this Agency but by the FBI, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, the Department of Justice and the House Judiciary Committee, for his alleged collaboration with King CAROL, with the IRON GUARD and later, with the Rumanian Communist Government. CAROL's activities are, of course, a matter of record.

2. Numerous usually reliable sources have indicated their belief that TILEA is an agent of the British Intelligence Service. This opinion appears to be held by many knowledgeable Rumanian emigres.

3. That Subject is definitely linked to Nicolae MALAXA is borne out by the following:

a. A report by the FBI on Nicolae MALAXA dated 20 October 1948 indicates that the following telephone calls were made on MALAXA's own telephone in New York:

"March 20, 1948. Number called: District 3000, Wash. D.C. Person called: V. TILEA, Mayflower Hotel. Viorel TILEA is the former Rumanian Minister to the Court of St. James who has been active in Subject's behalf.

"April 1, 1948. Incoming collect call from V. TILEA, calling from EXecutive 7300, Wash. D.C.

"April 14, 1948. Telegram sent to London, International 575, signed VIOREL (VIOREL TILEA).

"April 14, 1948. Telegram sent to Paris, International 550, signed TILEA.

SECRET

From the same report:
"Confidential Informant T-3 advised the Bureau on May 11, 1948 that he had received information that among the members of the Board of Directors of the Rumanian-American Economic Corporation (Note: This was set up by MALAXA) are Viorel TILEA and Grigore GAFENCU. . ."

From TILEA's own statements to the Bureau in the same report:
". . .he (TILEA) could honestly say that MALAXA, in his opinion and in the opinions of many Rumanians, is by far the best Rumanian citizen. Mr. TILEA indicated that there never had been any question about the character of MALAXA and that no one could level any charges against him that would concern his character, morals or patriotism . . . Mr. TILEA stated that he was very sympathetic towards MALAXA at the present time . . ."

b. In the case of a suit brought before the Supreme Court, County of New York, in November 1948, by Mircea A. GROSSU, formerly employed by MALAXA, against the latter for recovery of certain funds, the following was given as "Third Cause of Action":

"That on or about the 10th day of August 1948, at the special instance and request of the defendant, and upon defendant's promise to repay the plaintiff the sum of three thousand ($3,000.00) dollars, plaintiff paid to one Mr. V. V. TILEA, the sum of three thousand ($3,000.00) dollars.

"That no part of the said sum of three thousand ($3,000.00) dollars has been paid to plaintiff by defendant, although demand therefor has been duly made."

c. Another source is quoted as follows in March 1948:

"There is an important consideration which, in the minds of some Rumanian political exiles, necessitates the greatest caution concerning collaboration with TILEA. It is a well-established fact that TILEA has close business connections with MALAXA and is working hand in hand with him. As TILEA's collaboration is of no interest for MALAXA from a business point of view, it is clear that the strong ties which exist between them are of another nature. It is obvious to Rumanians abroad that TILEA should not be included in a Rumanian National Committee."

4. Concerning TILEA's alleged ties with King CAROL, the following references are taken from our files:

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

a. From a report dated 24 August 1944 from the London office of OSS:

"TILEA's Free Rumanians are also satisfied (with the new developments in Rumania) though more moderately. They too are for MICHAEL and MANIU but they suspect Russian intrigue to be responsible for the latest changes. The fact that ex-King CAROL has expressed his satisfaction is also gratifying for them since several of TILEA's men have not given up the hope of bringing CAROL back to Rumania. They have maintained a correspondance with the ex-King, and they would have much to expect from him if he came back to power. TILEA's followers are likewise very pleased with the fact that most of the men forming the new Government are of the same political color as themselves. They are almost all former King CAROL favorites and good friends of some of the members of the Free Rumanian movement . . ."

b. From an OSS report addressed to Mr. Allen W. Dulles from "B.C." dated 5 May 1942:

"Regarding the Rumanian diplomat who is expected to arrive in New York (as per my recent memorandum) to take over the leadership of the Rumanian movement here, my informants believe that he is Mr. Viorel TILEA, the man who started the Free Rumanian movement in England. The British are said to have looked upon him with disfavor. He is a friend of King CAROL and of VAIDA. It is reported that Mr. TILEA is to enter the United States via Mexico and it is believed that he may already be there conferring with CAROL."

c. From a report by Emil GHILEZAN in 1948:

"DAVILA might be watered down to the point where he is acceptable to the Political Parties, but never TILEA, who is a King CAROL man."

d. From a report dated 1951, evaluated as B-3, from a London source, concerning the activities of Father Vasile LEU, the discredited Rumanian emigre priest who has set himself up as a bishop:

"From Istanbul LEU intends to visit King MIHAI, to request the episcopal crozier. This plan seems to have been worked out by LEU and Mme. Elena LUPESCU. Former King CAROL will apparently finance LEU's bishopric. . . Informant gained the impression that LEU's plans are supported by Viorel TILEA and Major Gheorghe ILIESCU. . ."

e. From a report, evaluated as B-3, coming from Paris in November 1952:

SECRET

"Judging from opinions gathered here during the last weeks Source is inclined to believe that General Nicolae RADESCU is ready to repudiate the King. In such an action he would be backed by the pro-CAROL clique Gheorghe RAUT, Prof. Nicolae HERESCU, Col. Gheorghe ILIESCU, Viorel TILEA, General Ion Gheorghe."

5. A member of the National Peasant Party and supporter of Iuliu MANIU, TILEA broke away from that group around 1935 to join Alexander VAIDA-VOEVOD who founded the fascist RUMANIAN FRONT. VAIDA-VOEVOD, having aided CAROL in becoming dictator, became President of the NATIONAL RENAISSANCE FRONT, the totalitarian party set up by CAROL in 1938. VAIDA-VOEVOD was an advocate of the "numerus valahichus", an ultra-nationalist policy aimed at limiting to 5% the number of Jews allowed to practise professions or to attend universities. In 1938, according to this source, who is considered usually reliable, TILEA became one of the mainstays of the CAROL dictatorship. Another source, in referring to this period, states that TILEA who was then Under Secretary of State, acted as liaison between VAIDA-VOEVOD and the IRON GUARD.

6. A source evaluated as usually reliable stated that in late 1946 TILEA wrote to Alexander CRETZIANU requesting loan of 30,000 pounds from the "resistance funds" in Switzerland which CRETZIANU controlled. Upon receiving CRETZIANU's refusal, TILEA reportedly wrote to the latter that it would be necessary, since he had not received the treatment to which he believed he was entitled, "to revise his attitude (towards CRETZIANU) in future."

7. In the interests of expediency we have not made an exhaustive search of the files for information on Subject at this time since this would involve a considerable delay in forwarding information. We are, therefore, submitting the above in the form of an interim report for your immediate consideration.

SECRET [illegible]

2 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/TONIC

SUBJECT: Call from Admiral Miller

1. Wants to put Paul Kesten on Board - has radio experience. Please secure Security Clearance on him right away.

2. Re Yugoslav publication which Adm. Miller called Bill Durkee about and has not yet received an answer. What do our friends across the street think of it? Ask Willa if she has any dope on it. They have run 500 copies off and are just holding them.

TWB

TWB:

1. Ellen will start the clearance on Paul Keston. Cleared back in 1952

2. Bill Durkee took this up with Stevens at State who asked that we hold off until Amb. Allen returned from Yugoslavia and they got his views. Ellen talked with Stevens a couple days ago on this and rather than say to go ahead on the distribution of these publications, he asked if we couldn't hold off a couple more days until Amb. Allen returns. She told Sam Walker this. She has also had a letter from Dolbeare on it so everyone is after her on this.

eh

SECRET

28 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Agenda for discussion with Messrs. Ford, Brophy et al.

BACKGROUND:

1. For your information, the following are current facts in the American Heritage Foundation take-over of the Crusade for Freedom:

a. The American Heritage Foundation will undertake the Crusade for Freedom subject to reconsideration after a period of one year;

b. PRC has recommended the sum of $25,000 be granted the American Heritage Foundation for its preliminary work;

c. Two CIA staff agents will be employed on the premises of AHF -- an administrative assistant and a financial man.

AGENDA:

2. In your discussions with Henry Ford and D'A. Brophy Wednesday, I wonder whether you should make the following points:

a. The principal objectives of the AHF program are to provide cover for NCFE-RFE and CFA through a multiplicity of ostensible sources of funds. Fund raising is a distinctly secondary objective.

b. For several reasons, cover fund-raising for the Committee for a Free Asia should be carried on outside the Crusade for Freedom activity. We may at some future date wish to transfer the fund-raising for the Committee for a Free Asia to some other organisation. In any event, we do not want the Crusade name linked with the Committee for a Free Asia.

c. The previous Crusade operations have been inefficiently operated. It has cost a dollar to raise a dollar. We know that AHF will be run on a businesslike basis, as have AHF past operations.

d. We want a dignified operation which will enlist the support of representative groups and individuals. While we are interested in securing real contributions from the public for the Crusade, the Crusade's primary purpose is to serve as a cover. It was and is intended therefore that its tenor be educational -- a dignified presentation to the American public of events behind the Iron Curtain and a request for the public's support of NCFE/RFE efforts to give aid and hope to the satellite peoples.

e. We request that before further funds are authorized, a memorandum of understanding along lines of the attached be signed by both parties. (Your attention is invited to the provision requiring two CIA staff agents assigned to AHP staff).

(signed) [illegible]

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Draft Memo of Understanding

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig - DCI (THRU DD/P)
1 cc - IO/Br I
1 cc - IO/Br II
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI
1 cc - CPP

Tentative Memorandum of Understanding
Between Fund and the Foundation

Subject to the specific understanding that the Fund shall at all times have authority to veto either in part or as a whole any fund raising or other activities that the Foundation may desire to undertake in its conduct of the Fund's campaign, and equally that the Fund may request that specific action or actions be taken, the Fund agrees:

1. To provide funds for Foundation's overhead and maintenance of a basic staff.
2. That Foundation should continue its normal fund-raising activities, but such activities other than provided for in 1 above and 3 below cannot be financed by the Fund.
3. To approve, by June 1 of each year, a campaign budget for the next fiscal year beginning 1 July, terminating 30 June of the next year.
4. Subject to Fund's budgetary review and policy guidance, to vest in the Foundation management and operational authority over the public fund-raising activities.
5. To designate a competent liaison officer through whom Fund-Foundation relations will be maintained.
6. To provide an administrative assistant and a fiscal officer to work on Foundation premises.
7. To provide thorough fiscal and other procedures.
8. To define and provide a liquidation reserve acceptable to the Fund and Foundation should relations be terminated.

The Foundation agrees:

1. To submit by May 1 each year its budget for the next fiscal year following that date.
2. Not to undertake other fund-raising activities which would conflict with the terms and purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding.
3. To observe procedures as provided by the Fund.
4. To employ Fund-chosen administrative assistant and fiscal officer to work on Foundation premises.

5. To have an annual audit by a firm to be designated by the Fund.

6. To exercise management and operational authority within the framework of policy guidance provided by the Fund. The primary objective of the fund-raising activities is to provide a multiplicity and variety of plausible, attributable sources of funds. The secondary objective is to raise as large a sum of money annually as is feasible and consistent with the above purpose.

7. Provisions of this Memorandum of Understanding will subsequently be more specifically detailed and may be amended by mutual agreement between the Fund and the Foundation.

Date ____________________ FUND

Date ____________________ FOUNDATION

HOURLY BROADCASTING BREAKDOWN

	Original Programming Hours		Total Broadcast Time	
Language	Weekdays	Sundays	Weekdays	Sundays
Czechoslovakia	11	11 3/4	19 7/12	16 7/12
Hungarian	9 1/2	10	16 3/4	16 7/12
Polish	6 5/6	6 5/6	16 5/6	16 3/4
Rumanian	1 1/2	1	3	3
Bulgarian	1 1/2	1	2 3/4	2 3/4
Albanian	1/2	1/2	1 1/4	1 1/4
	30 5/6	31 1/12	60 1/3	56 11/12

Program Dept. Personnel - N.Y. (Total) -111
Munich (Total) -468
-579

(Free Lance not Included)

FBI - Aug'51. 31 Jan 53

State Dept. consideration

Further inquiries resolved with [illegible]

O'Connel - 2591

Mr. Braden:

Ellen says a clearance has been in since 4 Dec 1952 on Allen Michie. Nothing has been done in Security on it and possibly they can get to it next week. O'Connel on 2591 is the one handling it.

FBI made a check on him in Aug 51 and found some rather derogatory info. State was considering him for employment and dropped it because of FBI check.

Do you want to call Lang and tell him clearance has not been secured yet?

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

V.O.A. Relay Project: U.S. Assistance in Expansion of Turkish Radio Networks

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. State F-ACSI No. 454

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY TS # 85360-B

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 8-57 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

In reply refer to:

26 January 1953

Dear David:

~~[illegible]~~

You may be interested in a dispatch which I received here a couple of days ago and which I quote as follows:

> "On January 14, Alexander Booker of the German Foreign Office informally brought to our attention a map of Eastern Europe which appeared in the December issue of "News from Behind the Iron Curtain", a monthly periodical published by the "National Committee for a Free Europe". This map which is shown in small scale on page 1 of this periodical, shows all of Eastern Germany, including East Prussia, the Satellite States, and the former Baltic States. In the case of the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, the area is simply shown as belonging to Poland, and its pre-war borders are not set off by a dotted line. With respect to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, however, the territories that were annexed by the Soviet Union during or after World War II are clearly marked by a dotted line. Furthermore, the Eastern Zone of Germany as well as East Prussia are shown in the same colors as the Soviet Union, whereas the Baltic and Satellite States are shown in white.
>
> "Although Booker admitted that the map itself was not of great importance, he nevertheless pointed out that it represents 'a typical example of the one-sided anti-German propaganda' put out not only by the National Committee for a Free Europe but also by Radio Free Europe. Such propaganda, he said, can only increase the misgivings which many Germans, particularly the refugees, already entertain with respect to the activities of the committee and on the operations of Radio Free Europe on German soil. Finally, Booker politely hinted that the German Government would welcome it if the U. S. High Commission would use its influence with the National Committee for a Free Europe to stop dissemination of such anti-German propaganda in the future. A more constructive and objective propaganda policy of the committee and Radio Free Europe along the lines of a larger European Community that would embrace Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as a reunited Germany and the other European nations would not only contribute to a better understanding

> between the various refugee elements but would also have the full support of all Germans, Booker added."

Incidentally, I think you are doing an awfully good job on this kind of thing. The other night I actually read through an entire copy.

The article on music for the masses and the general expose of the attack on the arts is particularly significant, I think. Until the recent anti-Semitism, this field of culture is the one field of Soviet activity in which they were vulnerable before neutralists and fellow-travelers everywhere. The tendency of the intellectual to swallow the Soviet line on culture, to fall for the Stalin Prises, the high status accorded the obedient intellectual in Soviet society, and pseudo-scientific appeal of the Marxian dogma of equality is dangerous. In a free society, the intellectual is the origin of ideas.

Anything we can do to show the fact that every aspect of Soviet culture has been transformed into an instrument of the State, that the intellectual's role is important only so long as he is obedient, that in fact the product of the Soviet artist would not hold a candle to the standards set by fellow-traveling circles in Western Europe, and that the Soviet has corrupted the principles of equality on which it presumes to stand is terribly important.

I am sure you are aware of all the above but I thought of it when I read the piece in the last issue, and my comment is just another way of telling you what a good job I think you are doing.

Sincerely,

Oliver Hadwood

(Mr. David Powers
New York, New York)
CIO:TWB/eh
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - Leonard Stamm
1 cc - TONIC
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

Mr. Dulles & I suggest the
project but Mr. Smith hasn't.

SECRET
Security Information

27 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Exploitation by RFE of Physicians (Plot)

1. Attached herewith the January 17 Washington Post Editorial on "Communist Antisemitism", which you requested.

2. This editorial has not been previously sent to New York. However, I should like to call your attention to the fact that the material covered in this editorial has already been exploited by RFE, as evidenced in their guidances of 13, 14 and 15 January.

ELLEN STERN
IO/TONIC

Attachments:
As stated above

JWP wrote Ltr. to Lang 30 Jan 53

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

26 January 1953

TO : Deputy Director (Plans)

FROM : Comptroller

SUBJECT: Additional Funds for Crusade for Freedom

1. Reference is made to memorandum dated 15 January 1953 from Chief, PP to the DD/P and to the memorandum of 8 January 1953 for the DD/CI submitted by the Chief, IO Division wherein request is made for additional funds of $553,109 for the Crusade for Freedom.

2. On 24 January 1953 a representative from this office discussed and reviewed the basis for the request for additional funds with officials of the Crusade for Freedom. The following unaudited amounts were presented for review:

An operating bank account overdraft	$18,802.67
Unpaid invoices on hand	106,406.03
Unpaid Commitments for the 1952 campaign	123,294.03
Total bank overdraft, unpaid invoices and commitments to 24 January 1953	$248,502.73

The Crusade officials have estimated that in addition to the above $248,502.73 a further amount of $18,000 will be required for expenses to close out the 1952 campaign.

3. It is recommended that the $253,000 approved by the PRC, 21 January 1953 be made available to the Crusade for Freedom from the allotment to the DD/P area for the fiscal year 1953. The use of unvouchered funds is recommended.

ERSaunders
E. R. SAUNDERS

Funds approved for release
Richard Helms
Acting DD/P
27 January 1953.

SECRET
Security Information

UNCLASSIFIED [✓ RESTRICTED] CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P	CWT	29 Jan
2	C.I.O	RWB	
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief, FBID	8	28 Jan
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

REMARKS: The attached item carries reference to CIA and was published in the Restricted USSR Daily Report.

This distribution is made to DD/P; DD/I; Chief, FI; Chief, PP; Chief, Intelligence Control Branch, OCI; AD/OO; General Counsel; and Col. Wood, I & S.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL [✓ RESTRICTED] UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

14-00000

RESTRICTED

- HU 4 - HUNGARY
Jan. 26, 1953

'JOINT' ONLY ONE OF U.S. SPY TENTACLES

Budapest, Hungarian Home Service, Jan. 23, 1953, 1900 GMT--L

(Commentary by Pal Lendvai)

(Summary with Quotations)

In the report carried by an "American bourgeois weekly" the name of the banker Warburg was included among several philanthropic U.S. businessmen. Warburg was described as one of the most zealous among them. The adjective would have been truly apt if applied not to Warburg's philanthropic activities but to his business activities.

"In the history of American capitalism we have heard of many a shrewd and base businessmen, but few have been more cunning or more ready for any and every wickedness than Warburg. By profession he is a banker--and not just any second-or third-rate speculator, but a member of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, the second largest banking firm in the United States. At the same time, he is also chairman of Joint, the Zionist Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization.

"It will be remembered that the Joint has been, to the accompaniment of the eulogies of the bourgeois press, acting for years under a philanthropic disguise and with the alleged purpose of providing financial aid to Jews in Europe and other countries.

"In reality this organization--as revealed by the Slansky trial and the case of the group of doctor-wreckers unmasked in the USSR--has served as a forward base of American imperialism and has carried out, under the direction of the U.S. espionage service, spying, terrorist, and sabotage activities against the USSR and the People's Democracies.

Birds of a feather flock together: Joint is given away by the identity of the man heading it. Mr. Warburg, donning the robe of the philanthropist and placing himself in the role of savior of the Jews, has been the bosom friend and business partner of the West German banker Pferdemenges, one of Hitler's former financiers and advisers, one of the wickedest Nazi war criminals.

"Warburg, the Zionist leader, and Pferdemenges, the Hitlerite, have jointly founded with vast initial capital a banking firm in Hamburg, the most important investment in West Germany of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company.

"This same Warburg who, with one hand, scribbles humanistic and charity appeals has pocketed with the other--as a chief shareholder of I.G. Farbenindustrie--rich dividends resulting from the manufacture of poison gas for the Auschwitz death camp, where several million people, including many hundreds of thousands of Jews, were killed. This same Warburg who preaches about helping the victims of the war is one of the main architects of the cold war and, with the golden rain of dollars he helps to set on its feet again the bloodthirsty and money-hungry German imperialism.

"Such is the likeness of philanthropists for whom every life extinguished, every bomb dropped means the clinking of gold. Under the expert direction of Mr. Warburg, the principal task of Joint has been spying and the organization of sabotage for the overthow of the People's Democratic regimes. This was the organization which directed the base activities of the doctor-wreckers and gave instructions for the extermination of the leading cadres of the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, it does not look with contempt upon currency deals and black marketeering or smuggling. Spying and sabotage have proved excellent business also. Through the illegal emigration movement in Czechoslovakia, for instance, Joint made a profit of 9 dollars for every dollar invested. The damage which these criminals have caused the Czechoslovak People's Republic would have covered the costs of 20,000 room flats or 177,000 car loads of wheat."

Joint, though important, is by no means the only espionage and terror organization of American imperialism. "The U.S. Government long ago made an institutional and an official governmental activity of the organization of assassinations and acts of terror. The Mutual Security Act provides 100 million dollars for the recruitment into armed formations of "war criminal and other criminals who fled from the USSR and the People's Democracies," for action against their countries of origin.

"Since the end of the World War Two the war incendiaries have been tenaciously and systematically building up their interwoven and world-embracing espionage network." The sum total invested for the purpose is far in excess of the amount stipulated in the Mutual Security Act.

'The Swiss paper DIE TAT estimates the annual operating costs of the Central Intelligence Agency, employing 6,500 permanent and tens of thousands of temporary spies, at 300 million dollars.

"That agency was recently given a new chief, following the resignation of Gen. Bedell Smith, with the appointment a few days ago of Allen Dulles, the brother of the new Secretary of State, the immediate director of the secret war against the USSR and the People's Democracies, the recruiting officer of the Rajks, Szonyis, Slanskys, and other traitors of the same brand.

"The central espionage organization embraces several bodies active in spying and diversion and camouflaged with impressive names, the espionage organization known as the National Committee for a Free Europe being one of the many maintained with U.S. dollars and directing its own branch organizations all over Europe. That committee, too, has been headed by Allen Dulles, and its members have included President Eisenhower, Gen. Clay, and representatives of the yellow trade unions and of Wall Street."

That committee has been the motive force behind the various national committees, including the one led by "proven traitors like Ferenc Nagy, Mikolajczyk, and their associates." In Strasbourg and other places espionage has been given a scientific standing at universities, together with various methods of incendiarism and assassination. The "Green International" is also one of the committee's branches, allied to the gang of the international scum of landlords deprived of their estates.

"It is but a few months ago that the Czechoslovak State Security organs unmasked a terrorist group belonging to the international espionage organization. The outbursts of fury of the imperialist lie-manufacturers, their wailings, the salvoes of rage coming from the bourgeois politicians, are proofs in themselves that the exposure of the undercover joint agencies, the recent liquidation of American spy and terrorist groups in Bulgaria and Poland has touched the organizers of a new war to the quick.

"According to data not quite complete, in the past year alone 41 American spy groups and terrorist organizations have been liquidated in the USSR and the People's Democracies. We must be prepared for the time when the enemy, precisely because of the new blow suffered by him, will try to harm us by even viler means.

"We must always remember Stalin's wise words to the effect that so long as there is capitalism around us, there will be wreckers, diversionist spies, and terrorists sent by foreign countries to stab the Soviet Union in the back. Let us therefore fight with even greater vigilance, let us fight even more implacably against the enemy's attempts to prevent, by sabotage and subversion, the building of Socialism. The frustration of his plans depends upon us and upon our vigilance."

1953 BUDGET

Radio Free Europe (operating expenditures)	$ 9,526,302.00	
" " " (capital ")	2,981,120.00	
Total RFE		$12,507,422.00
National Committee for a Free Europe Operating Expenditures	3,774,517.00	
National Committee for a Free Europe Capital expenditures	NONE	
Total NCFE		3,774,517.00
Free Europe University in Exile Operating Expenditures	628,631.00	
Capital "	6,000.00	
Total FEUE		634,631.00
GRAND TOTAL		$16,916,570.00
Reserve for Contingency (to be held by NCFE)		100,000.00
To be held by sponsor		1,783,430.00
TOTAL BUDGET		$18,800,000.00

SECRET
Security Information

26 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Meeting of Poles to be held here in February

REFERENCE: Memorandum on same subject from CIO to IO/Branch I, dated 23 January 1953

1. NCFE has confirmed that a meeting of ambassadors and diplomats of the Polish Government in Exile is to be held here in the middle of February.

2. The following individuals are scheduled to attend the meeting:

a. Ambassadors

Papee	Ambassador to the Vatican
Potocki	Ambassador to Madrid
Zenczykowski	Ambassador to Lebanon

b. Agents

Morawski	Paris
Raczynski	London
Rabinski	Ottawa
Lipski	Washington
Arciszewski	Buenos Aires
Dombinski	Cuba

c. Others

Romer	Montreal
Librach	Secretary-General of the Foreign Office of the Government in Exile, coming from London
Ciechanowski	Former Ambassador to Washington (until 1945)
Weszolaki	Former Consul to the Embassy in Washington (until 1945)

3. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss and decide matters concerning the foreign policy of the Government in Exile. NCFE has heard rumors, but does not know for a fact, that the Poles intend to pay their respects to the new Administration. If this should be done, General Sosnkowski (who is returning from Canada at the end of this week) would be the spokesman, since he knows Eisenhower personally.

4. NCFE is in no way involved in sponsoring or financing this meeting. The Polish Government in Exile has funds of its own which should enable it to send delegates.

SECRET
Security Information

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TONIC

23 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/BRANCH 1 - Miss Ellen Stern

SUBJECT: Meeting of Poles to be held here in February

1. John Bross telephoned me late today to inquire whether NCFE knows anything about a meeting of a group of Poles in the Polish Government in Exile to be held in February. Sokolowsky(?) was mentioned as a member of this group, and it is their intention to meet with Poles from South America, and pay their respects to the new Administration.

2. The Embassy in London is concerned about visas for these Poles and Bob Joyce has asked John Bross whether we are giving any encouragement to this proposed meeting.

3. Will you find out from NCFE what they know about this?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO Topic file

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible]

23 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO BRANCH I

SUBJECT: Use of RFE as Playback in event of hostilities

1. I believe you held some conversations with the Communications people about Spencer Phenix's idea, which he expressed to me, that RFE might be used as a playback in the event of hostilities. Will you let me know the results of those conversations, whether our Communications people think it is possible or not possible, and in general what their ideas are.

2. Spencer Phenix has been asking me about this for reasons which you know, and I think we ought to give him some kind of a definite answer.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - C/IO/Br2
1 cc - CIO

[illegible]

Mr Brown

Return to CIO for file
R:6906

orig indexed
30 Jan

27 January 1953
(Haller)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO

FROM: Chief, PI/Plans/Cover

SUBJECT: Comments concerning Crusade for Europe

1. In December 1952 Mr. Reichhardt discussed with your division contact made by OO/C representatives with Mr. Buckner of General Motors in Detroit in regard to General Motors' contributions to the Crusade of Freedom. Mr. Buckner recently reported to OO/C the following information.

2. Suzanne LaFollette, Managing Editor of the Freeman Magazine, New York, recently wrote a letter to Mr. Jordan of General Carton Company, Battle Creek, Michigan, in which she criticized the Crusade for Freedom. She stated, among other things, that the promoters of the Crusade are a "bunch of micro liberals and do not know anything about reaching iron curtain countries".

3. The letter is reported to have been turned over to the Battle Creek newspaper, Enquirer, but its contents have not yet been published.

4. According to Mr. Buckner, LaFollette's comments have curtailed efforts to solicit funds for the Crusade and he fears that this type of information might reach other city groups.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

22 January 1953

sent to DD/P
22 Jan

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Statements made by Robert Vogeler

1. Our friends in New York have informed us that Robert Vogeler gave a talk at the Women's Athletic Club in Chicago on 13 January 1953 on the subject of psychological warfare.

2. In the course of his address he reportedly remarked that RFE was broadcasting nothing but concert music, baseball scores and "junk." He stated that RFE was an organization originally formed with private capital because of dissatisfaction with VOA. However, it ran out of money because the public failed to support it and a governmental loan was made which has enabled it to stay in business. Since then, RFE has become guilty of the same kind of poor programming that characterizes VOA.

3. Our friends are sending down a complete report of this speech. They feel that some sort of action should be taken to stop Robert Vogeler from continuing to make such remarks.

[illegible]
Chief, PP/Radio

Luckie memo 13 Jan sent to [illegible], see Chrono.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

26 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Draft NCFE Policy Statement

1. Attached is a draft NCFE Policy Statement which has been reviewed and accepted by the Executive Committee of NCFE, but which was sent to us without the knowledge of Admiral Miller and therefore should probably not be commented on by you to any of our friends in New York unless you have also received a copy from another source. Admiral Miller probably intends to send us this statement after it has been approved by the Board of Directors.

2. You may wish to compare it with the old ice-box statement now in effect, also attached.

3. You may also wish to note Part I, paragraph 2 in which mention is made of government support. It is apparently the intent of NCFE to make this statement not an ice-box statement, but a public document and if so, I think you ought to make particularly certain that you approve this part of it.

4. Finally, I think you will want to note the general tenor of Part III. Perhaps I am quibbling, but it seems to me a trifle full-blown. I realize that NCFE is a separate government agency just under cabinet status, but this reads a little bit as though it were putting on the trappings of national sovereignty.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachments
As stated.

CIO:TWB/mf
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee thru (CPP)
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI
1 cc - IO Brl

Secret

For Bill Durkee

[illegible] 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting

1. Today the PRC approved $253,000 for the Crusade for Freedom, the money to be held in escrow and to be paid out on Frank Wisner's signature subsequent to an audit by a CIA auditor who will go over the Crusade's books and account to us for the reliability of the Crusade's estimate of $253,000 to wind up the affair this year.

2. PRC set aside the request for $300,000 for next year's campaign on the grounds that the Agency should first settle matters with the Heritage Foundation and start clean on a Heritage Foundation estimate.

THOMAS W. [illegible]

[illegible]

19[illegible]

4/7 [illegible] deficit in April
& they had [illegible] on hand
so we will [illegible] this
~~total~~.

They now say they need
261 thousand more.

1951

expenses 2,132,478 (79000)
receipts 2,011 221

1950

[illegible] 117 000 ([illegible])
receipts 1,[illegible]7000

1611
12/60

TRANSMITTAL SLI

21 January 1953
DATE

TO:
Mr. Braden

BUILDING K	ROOM NO 1030

REMARKS:

Mr. Durkee asks "to have you ask Joan to tell Dorkis"

Trust you know what this means!

FROM:
IO/Tonic

BUILDING K	ROOM NO. 1402	EXTENSION 8080

FORM NO. 38-8
SEP 1946

SECRET
Security Information

21 January 1953

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

Per telephone conversation from Mr. Durkee on 21 January 1953, the following was stated:

> "Returns are $600,000. These are returns in central banks. Other returns reported but not in central banks. This brings the total up close to $1,000,000. Twenty-one states have yet to report in."

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

8 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: Additional Funds for the Crusade for Freedom

A. Funds requested for termination of 1952 campaign.

1. Admiral Miller has requested a sum of $261,108.92 for the 1952 Campaign of the Crusade for Freedom.

2. From April 1, 1952, the starting date of the 1952 campaign, the Crusade for Freedom has had available to it $550,760.81. Of this amount, a total of $106,239.81 was cash on hand as of April 1, 1952, and returns of cash from the field to headquarters after that date. $444,528.00 of this amount were CIA contributions to the 1952 Campaign. Actual expenses of the Crusade from April 1 through December 20, 1952, were $473,439.38. Available cash as of that date was $69,328.43. Expected additional expenses will be $330,437.35. Additional funds of $261,108.92 are thus requested. Not included in the figure of cash on hand as of December 20, 1952, are the funds in a payroll revolving account of $8,000. These funds can be deducted from the total requested if a decision is made that the present Crusade organization is to be terminated and transferred to the American Heritage Foundation.

3. Total expenditures of the 1952 Campaign will thus total $803,866.73. It should be noted that of this amount $35,928.66 was spent to clear up remaining 1951 Campaign expenses, leaving a net of $767,938.07 expended on the 1952 Campaign.

4. A comparison of the total cost of the 1951 Campaign with that of the Campaign conducted in 1952 clearly shows that the instructions of the PRC that the Crusade be scaled down in amount was complied with. Total expenditures during the 1951 Campaign were $1,932,475, while total expenditures this year will be $767,938.07. This year's expenditures are also less than those of the initial Campaign of 1950 when expenditures were $917,000. Receipts in 1950 were $1,317,000, while receipts in the 1951 Campaign were $2,011,221.94.

5. Detailed statements attached. (Tab A) (Note particularly item 3 which compares field expenses between 1951 and 1952 Campaigns)

B. 1953 Campaign.

1. Attached (Tab B) hereto are Admiral Miller's proposals for a 1953 Crusade Campaign. He has requested a sum of $830,000 for this purpose. This $830,000 is an addition to the sum requested above for the termination of the 1952 Campaign. In view of the request of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency that the American Heritage Foundation take over and run the 1953

SECRET
Security Information

Crusade Campaign, no action should be taken on Admiral Miller's proposals. However, it is recommended that a sum of $300,000 be made available for the remainder of the fiscal year 1953, to be drawn upon by the DD/P, to finance such activities as may be necessary to transfer the direction of the 1953 Crusade Campaign to the American Heritage Foundation and to prepare the beginnings of that Campaign.

2. Should the American Heritage Foundation decide against taking over the Crusade Campaign for 1953, the present Crusade organization will have to again be reexamined with policies and financing decided.

C. Recommendations.

1. It is therefore recommended that the sum of $253,108.92 be made available to the 1952 Crusade for Freedom for the remainder of fiscal year 1953.

2. That $300,000 be allotted to be used on the authority of the DDP in the transfer to, and start of a 1953 Campaign by the American Heritage Foundation in the fiscal year 1953.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECURITY INFORMATION

TAB A

December 23, 1952

SUMMARY OF FUNDS NEEDED

Total Cash Received		$550,767.81	
Less Payroll Revolving Account		8,000.00	$542,767.81
Expenses April 1, 1952 thru 12/20/52			473,439.38
Available Cash -			$ 69,328.43
1952 Field Budget		$247,585.00 (See #3 Tab A for breakdown)	
Spent - November	$26,203.60		
" - December	51,394.05		
Advances to Field	24,950.00		
1952 Field Commitment		72,547.65 $175,037.35	
Ad Council "		25,000.00	
Campaign Printing "		100,000.00	
Payroll last half of December Commitment		10,000.00	
Telephone Charge November "		1,700.00	
" " December "(estimated)		1,700.00	
Airline " November "		3,500.00	
" " December " "		3,500.00	
Miscellaneous Hdqs. Exp. " "		10,000.00	
		$330,437.35	$330,437.35
Funds Needed -			$261,108.92

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

December 29, 1952

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM, INC.

ANALYSIS OF CASH RECEIPTS AND CASH DISBURSEMENTS

	RECEIPTS From 4/1/52 to 12/31/52				DISBURSEMENTS from 4/1/52 to 12/20/52				
	1848 Foundation	1951 Field Refunds And Advances	Misc.	Total	Total Paid By Months	1951 Field Expenses	Easy Baker	Special Budget	Advances
Balance of cash on hand 4/1/52 -87,371.55 8,000.00 Pay Roll A/c				95,371.55		(Included in total)			
April	-	1,179.80	1,046.32	2,226.12	24,921.49	2,069.96	2,794.33	437.00	
May	177,816.00	596.52	583.05	178,905.57	26,893.84	1,400.29	93.36		
June	-	27.28	858.52	885.30	29,978.70	4,694.99	146.03		
July	-	-	830.04	830.04	56,797.41	3,337.51	16,143.11		
August	133,362.00	68.79	906.84	134,337.63	39,094.47	105.59	4,406.89		
September	133,350.00	-	2,560.05	135,910.05	31,314.32	-	-		
October	-	-	746.52	746.52	56,632.89	18.70			
November	-	-	814.89	814.89	86,130.18	280.90			
December	-	-	739.64	739.64	121,676.08	-	-	-	
Total	444,528.00	1,782.39	9,085.87	550,767.81	473,639.38	11,907.96	23,583.72	437.00	24,452.92
							437.00		
							$24,020.72	-Munich sub Total	

SUMMARY:

CASH on hand 4/1/52	95,371.55	
CASH Received 4/1 - 12/31/52	455,396.26	
Total		$550,767.81

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Security Information

December 10, 1952

FIELD EXPENSES

STATE	1951			1952		
	FEES AND SALARIES	EXPENSES	TOTAL	FEES AND SALARIES	EXPENSES	TOTAL
ALABAMA	$ 562.00	$ 1,777.08	$ 2,339.08	$ 1000.	$ 750.	$ 1750.
ARIZONA	600.00	3,986.21	4,586.21	1000.	750.	1750.
ARKANSAS	555.00	7,392.55	7,947.55	1275.	1750.	3025.
CALIFORNIA, NO.	11,275.00	12,886.15	24,161.15	4000.	6000.	10000.
SO.	21,050.00	16,623.68	37,673.68	4000.	6000.	10000.
COLORADO	6000.00	14,085.87	20,085.87	2000.	4375.	6375.
CONNECTICUT	6,151.65	7,215.06	13,366.71	1000.	500.	1500.
DELAWARE	7,466.00	7,852.52	15,318.52	-	1000.	1000.
D.C., WASHINGTON	7,605.19	3,762.38	11,368.57	2550.	250.	2800.
FLORIDA	6,600.00	10,353.25	16,953.25	1000.	1725.	2725.
GEORGIA	6,200.00	6,189.53	12,389.53	800.	1700.	2500.
IDAHO	1,050.00	3,440.97	4,490.97	2000.	2000.	4000.
ILLINOIS	22,016.67	16,570.82	38,587.49	2500.	2500.	5000.
INDIANA	14,433.31	6,325.69	20,759.00	1000.	1000.	2000.
IOWA	2,425.80	7,004.31	9,430.11	750.	2000.	2750.
KANSAS	3,500.00	6,364.24	9,864.24	1000.	1500.	2500.
KENTUCKY	1,200.00	13,715.88	14,915.88	1800.	2800.	4680.
LOUISIANA	2,000.00	4,980.12	6,980.12	-	1000.	1000.
MARYLAND	14,936.00	15,703.04	30,639.04	2800.	1000.	3800.
MAINE	2,822.78	3,549.73	6,372.51	1000.	1000.	2000.
MASSACHUSETTS	7,015.98	16,152.26	23,168.24	1890.	3200.	5080.
MICHIGAN	2,100.00	18,509.10	20,609.10	-	2000.	2000.
MINNESOTA	25,875.00	25,318.20	51,193.20	3700.	1600.	5300.
MISSISSIPPI	1,000.00	7,052.36	8,052.36	500.	2300.	2800.
MISSOURI	8,000.00	35,000.00	43,000.00	3300.	6700.	10000.
MONTANA	3,828.00	6,662.59	10,490.59	500.	500.	1000.
NEBRASKA	2,000.00	13,208.22	15,208.22	1200.	1800.	3000.
NEVADA	2,664.93	4,810.59	7,475.52	2300.	1300.	3600.
NEW ENGLAND	6,419.57	3,374.12	9,793.69	-	-	-
NEW HAMPSHIRE	883.30	2,749.94	3,633.24	500.	1000.	1500.
NEW JERSEY	6,199.97	11,819.74	18,019.71	2000.	2500.	4500.
NEW MEXICO	1,250.00	3,290.44	4,540.44	-	-	-
NEW YORK STATE	5,372.17	28,719.99	34,092.16	5000.	7500.	12,500.
NEW YORK CITY	38,000.00	129,968.08	167,968.08	7500.	10,000.	17,500.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

Page 2 - Cont'd.

	1951			1952		
STATE	FEES & SALARIES	EXPENSES	TOTAL	FEES & SALARIES	EXPENSES	TOTAL
NORTH CAROLINA	$ 4,255.00	$ 9,250.67	$ 13,505.67	$ 800	$ 1,550	$ 2,350
NORTH DAKOTA	780.38	2,881.17	3,661.55	-	2,000	2,000
OHIO	11,800.00	13,657.86	25,457.86	2,400	2,400	4,800
OKLAHOMA	3,250.00	3,928.49	7,178.49	2,000	2,000	4,000
OREGON	2,200.00	8,300.00	10,500.00	2,000	2,500	4,500
PENNSYLVANIA, EAST)- " WEST)	8,375.00	40,601.49	48,976.49	6,000	8,000	14,000
SOUTH CAROLINA	4,229.17	6,368.21	10,597.38	4,000	4,000	8,000
SOUTH DAKOTA	860.00	1,123.67	1,983.67	2,000	1,400	3,400
TENNESSEE	700.00	15,808.09	16,508.09	1,000	1,000	2,000
TEXAS	14,200.00	18,470.76	32,670.76	3,600	4,250	7,850
RHODE ISLAND	2,206.54	7,330.52	9,537.06	10,000	26,750	36,750
UTAH	525,00	5,499.59	6,024.59	500	2,500	3,000
VERMONT	750.00	1,682.74	2,432.74	-	-	-
VIRGINIA	3,633.74	4,185.41	7,819.15	500	250	750
WASHINGTON	4,312.51	5,876.26	10,188.77	750	1,500	2,250
WEST VIRGINIA	2,000.00	2,455.73	4,455.73	2,000	2,000	4,000
WISCONSIN	5,000.00	7,322.53	12,322.53	1,000	500	1,500
WYOMING	1,773.84	2,729.70	4,503.54	1,200	3,800	5,000
				-	-	-
WASHINGTON, D. C. (Federal Employees)	816.51	5,627.12	6,443.63		1,500	1,500
(MUNICH	10,555.52	1,898.89	12,454.41	-	-	-
(LENWOOD PLAN	6,796.73	7,062.48	13,859.21	-	-	-
TOTALS	$338,077.26	$648,478.69	$986,555.95	$99,605	$147,980	$247,585

secret
Security Information

SECRET

SUGGESTED PLAN OF ORGANIZATION
FOR CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM FOR 1953

On November 13, 1952, General Clay and Campaign Chairman Stassen wrote to state chairmen for the 1952 Crusade requesting their opinion and suggestions on the basis of continuing the Crusade throughout the year. Replies indicated unanimous agreement favoring a year-round educational program climaxed by a fund drive in the fall. Experience since this confirms this need.

This would require the development of a field organization on a modest scale to bring into the Crusade as many citizens as possible and to continue the fine state leadership which was secured for the 1952 campaign. These objectives may be attained in two ways.

The first way is to secure at the national level the endorsement and cooperation of national groups in all fields of activity, with the ultimate idea of securing volunteer leadership on the state and local level.

The second way is to work directly in the state from the city and county level.

We are presently staffed to carry out the method necessary in the first approach on the national level. However the second method requires a more concentrated effort. For organizational purposes the country should be divided into four regions with a national representative in charge of each region. This national representative should at all times be regarded as a member of the national staff delegated to be of service to the states within his region on a year-round basis. His functions generally are:

1. To interpret national policy to the state chairmen.
2. To facilitate the flow of material, news releases, etc., from the national office to the units within the various states.
3. To assist the state chairman in securing from the national office assistance of all kinds.
4. To aid the state chairman in perfecting his organization.

At the time of the campaign the various state chairmen would, with the counsel of the national representative, secure the assistance of individuals or agencies at the state level to carry on the intensive phase of the campaign effort, within budgetary limitations.

Experience in the field in voluntary organizations over the years indicates that this method of regional representation is effective and economical for the following reasons.

1. The national representative is the full-time employee of the organization, with a knowledge of the broad phases of the work of the organization. He is therefore equipped to interpret policy and exercise judgment as rapidly as required.

TAB B

SECRET
Security Information

2. As an employee of the national organization he is directly responsible to the national organization, and is by the fact under its control, and subject to its supervision within a general framework of action.

3. Working the year-round with state chairmen and state committees, the national representative is in an excellent position at campaign time to secure the type of temporary personnel and help that the chairman and the state situation require.

TABLE OF PERSONNEL
CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

Executive Vice Chairman
    Secretary

Campaign Director
    Secretary
    Assistant to Campaign Director
    Clerk-Stenographer

National Representatives -- Headquarters in New York
    A. Labor, Veterans, Federal Employees
    B. New York City operation and special assignments
    C. Management Groups, Corporate Appeals and special assignments
        two stenographers

National Representatives -- in Field
    Five National representatives will be assigned on a regional basis to work with state chairmen and state committees.

Assistant Treasurer's Office -- Accounting Department

    Assistant Treasurer
        Secretary
        Chief Accountant
        Assistant Accountant
        Stenographer

Telephone Operator
Stock Clerk and Messenger

Publicity and Public Relations Director
    Secretary
    Assistant Director -- Features, Magazines, House Organs
    Stenographer

    Director -- Speakers Bureau

Radio and TV Director
    Secretary

Director Women's and School Groups

National Representatives for assignment on a Regional Basis
    New England and Middle Atlantic (Out of New York Office -- 1 man)
    South [illegible])
    Midwest
    Far East

Munich Operation -- Public Relations
[illegible]

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

1953 Budget

January	$55,000		
February	55,000		
March	45,000	1st Quarter	$145,000
April	45,000		
May	45,000		
June	50,000	2nd Quarter	140,000
July*	60,000	(*Printing $80,000)	
August	90,000		
September	110,000	3rd Quarter	260,000
October	100,000		
November	60,000		
December	45,000	4th Quarter	205,000
	$750,000		$750,000
July printing	80,000		80,000
TOTAL - 1953	$830,000		$830,000

It is requested that the budget be made available on a quarterly basis with a payment on January 1 of $145,000 to cover the first quarter; another payment on April 1 of $140,000 to cover the second quarter; a third payment on July 1 of $260,000 and the fourth on October 1 of $205,000.

In addition to this, it is requested that in order to keep all printing well in advance of the campaign $80,000 be made available on or about July 1.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

1951 CONTRIBUTIONS

Alabama	$ 12,588.60
Arizona	5,399.38
Arkansas	22,161.19
California - North	58,699.21
" - South	75,872.71
Colorado	51,128.01
Connecticut	36,890.43
Delaware	2,464.06
Washington, D.C.	43,401.61
Florida	28,926.88
Georgia	44,874.21
Idaho	11,110.04
Indiana	46,000.13
Illinois - Chicago Area	57,649.81
" - Down State	29,448.26
Iowa	25,746.82
Kansas	27,837.48
Missouri	100,471.49
Kentucky	27,532.48
Louisiana	18,670.40
Maine	9,992.16
Maryland	23,960.69
Massachusetts	49,916.45
Michigan	103,698.49
Minnesota	67,494.44
Mississippi	10,548.27
Montana	15,289.51
Nebraska	8,764.06
Nevada	6,008.32
New Hampshire	9,172.44
New Jersey	57,489.56
New Mexico	21,042.03
North Carolina	38,563.78
North Dakota	8,739.73
Ohio	65,343.44
Oklahoma	37,293.71
Oregon	29,639.08
Pennsylvania	135,052.40
Rhode Island	14,867.15
South Carolina	24,738.02
South Dakota	1,564.89
Tennessee	44,118.99
Texas	75,729.70
Utah	15,227.07
Vermont	5,105.89
Virginia	31,243.18
Washington	17,347.66
West Virginia	8,375.58
Wisconsin	23,996.11
Wyoming	7,233.49
New York State	158,895.98
New York City (Metropolitan)	139,438.14
Alaska	80.00
Canada	15.77
Mexico	14.00
Anonymous	262.65
Misc.	11,938.05
	1,999,144.78
Munich (Contributions in European currency)	5,173.07
N.C.F.E. (Contributions received by N.C.F.E. and credited to Crusade)	6,912.09
TOTAL	$ 2,011,229.94

orig returned to Tonic

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

January 20, 1953

Dear Balcom:

The following is submitted for consideration but without recommendation so far as the Fund's Board is concerned, since a question of basic policy is involved which can be determined only by the Corporation.

The Fund now occupies an entire building, except for the ground floor which contains two small stores and a moving picture theatre, under a sub-lease from the operator of the moving picture theatre. The Fund's sub-lease expires November 21, 1956 but the Fund has the option to cancel on November 21, 1954 on payment of an indemnity of $61,800. During the reconstruction of the building to fit it for Fund occupancy the Fund contributed roughly $160,000. to the cost of asphalt tile floors, acoustic tile ceilings on certain floors, fluorescent lighting fixtures, partitioning and air conditioning. The Fund's offices take up about 32,760 square feet so that disregarding leasehold improvements rent paid by the Fund of $123,760 per annum average $3.777 per square foot. The Fund has no right of renewal at the expiration of the five-year term.

The owner of the fee has recently placed the building on the market. The asking price is $1,250,000 compared with the assessed valuation of $1,150,000. The Fund's landlord is seeking a reduction in this assessment and we are informed has been granted a reduction in rent by the owner of the fee, justification therefor being the increased tax burden (the Fund's landlord's lease being a net lease) and the less than anticipated income from his moving picture theatre. The owner of the fee has rejected an offer of $700,000 in cash for the building.

In the opinion of the Fund's counsel the Fund, if it owned the building, would be exempt from New York City real estate taxes in respect of all the space occupied by the Fund, namely, the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh floors. An appropriate amount of the total valuation attributable to the two stores and moving picture theatre on the ground floor would be subject to taxation. 1952 real estate taxes amounted to $38,900.

The Fund's current rent of $3.777 per square foot is very low for air conditioned property in the desirable location where the Fund's offices now are. Should the present owner or an investment or speculative purchaser refuse to renew the Fund's lease in November 1956, without a substantial increase in rent, the Fund would, if it were still in operation on the present scale and if the New York real estate market is not depressed, be faced with either a greatly increased rent cost or

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

the expense of moving to other less desirable quarters where the rent would probably also greatly exceed the present $3.777. Our difficulties in 1951 in this connection demonstrate the possible magnitude of that problem.

If it be true that the building, if owned by the Fund, would be exempt from real estate taxes (except for the commercially leased property which certainly could be leased for more than the tax cost) the operation of the building would cost the Fund considerably less than the present annual rental of $123,760. In the absence of a more careful study than it is possible to make without disclosing our possible interest in such a purchase the amount of that saving can be little better than guesswork. My guess is it should be between $50,000. and $75,000, allowing interest on the capital investment at a two per cent rate.

The question is whether the Fund should or should not attempt to purchase the building either to safeguard the right of continued occupancy or to effect the estimated saving in annual expense, or both. If the answer is in the affirmative, we shall see what can be done toward negotiating a satisfactory price and estimating in detail the probable annual saving and advise you further before any commitment is made so that you can approve or disapprove the entire deal. If there is a reasonable chance that you would approve, I suggest you take immediate steps to ear-mark the necessary funds so that if a satisfactory price can be agreed upon the transaction can be promptly concluded.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ William

William L. Digby

DD/P 1997

SECRET
Security Information

Suspend

1078

15 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Eastern European Division

SUBJECT : Arthur Maixner; young Czech political refugee recommended by Mr. Ortona of the Italian Embassy.

1. Attached hereto is a letter from Egidio Ortona of the Italian Embassy, who is recommending for our consideration the above-named individual who is said to be the son of Dr. Arthur Maixner, formerly the Minister Plenipotentiary of Czechoslovakia to the Vatican. Also attached is a brief curriculum vitae of Maixner.

2. It is rather unusual for a foreign diplomat, even though he be on good terms with officials of this Agency, to recommend personnel to us for our use, and under the circumstances I do not suppose that there would be any way in which you could make secure use of this young man even if you were to find him in other respects suitable. In other words, he is "blown" by the very fact of his having been recommended to us by a foreign diplomat. And I am also aware of the fact that this would be a good cheap way of effecting penetrations of the Agency were we to follow the practice of acting favorably on recommendations of this character. Nevertheless, there may be some aspect of this matter which would have significance to you or to Mr. Timm which I do not readily perceive, and accordingly I am passing this on to you and to Mr. Timm with this thought in mind. For example, there is a bare possibility that because of the contacts and connections of Maixner and his father, a former Czech diplomat, it might be possible to make use of him (on an arm's-length basis) in a program of defector solicitation.

WPD seeing Security on this man.

3. I am also furnishing a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Braden in view of the possibility that Maixner might be of some use to Radio Free Europe, assuming that the objection of his having been introduced to this Agency by Ortona could be overcome.

4. In any case, I should appreciate your suggesting a suitable reply to Mr. Ortona, bearing in mind the fact that he has been helpful to us in the past and does seem to be well disposed.

Harry Reis

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosures (2)
As specified.

cc: C/IO
C/FI
C/WE

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: CPP

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/IO				
2. Bill - did you show him this?				
3.				WD
4.				
5. Return to C/IO file				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

attachment to Crusade memo.

TWB gave this to Henry Ford Jr (?)

COMMENTS

Tom - I would definitely get this dope to Archie.

Tracy

[illegible]

No, it wasn't written at the time. I however explained verbally the Crusade & showed him samples of literature etc.

Bill: Let's send it to him then. It's a good excuse for getting in touch with him again which I want to do. Can you draft me a letter?

Please send white copy & return this to me. [illegible]

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

16-61150-1 ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

15 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Briefing Papers on NCFE and CFA

1. Before I send this memorandum to Messrs. Brophy, Ford et al., I want you to have a look at it for reasons we discussed on the telephone today. Please give me a quick reaction.

2. I am also enclosing a memorandum on CFA which is about what they would want to know.

3. These are the only copies I have left of these two memoranda and I must have them back.

TWB

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments
TS 85308
TS 85340

[illegible] Secret

~~35960~~

R 1D/Sec
14 SEP 1972

SECRET

1 COPY OF 3 COPIES

NCFE has, from small beginnings, for purposes only generally defined, grown into a large institution organized as follows:

NCFE is a non-profit membership corporation, organized under the laws of New York State. Intimately associated with it are three separate corporations; the Crusade for Freedom (the fund raising and cover mechanism), the Free Europe University in Exile, and the Portuguese radio relay installation, Raret.

The Committee's major divisions, functions and budget for 1953 are as follows:

a. Division of General Administration - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - $779,100

This is a headquarters administrative unit in NCFE's New York headquarters. It is not an over-all administrative unit, as each subdivision has its own administrative organization.

b. Division of Emigre Relations - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - $1,[illegible],2[illegible]2

The Division of Emigre Relations is the political center of NCFE. Through this Division, support is given to the various emigre organizations and to individual emigres.

In the past two years, this Division has attempted -- with conspicuous lack of success -- to create unified refugee groups. It is at present in the process of reviewing and revising its relations with individual emigres and emigre organizations. It is attempting to exercise closer financial control over those organizations and to develop a program using emigre groups and individuals in a way which will contribute more positively to psychological warfare efforts. This Division of NCFE is the most responsive to guidance.

c. Division of Intellectual Cooperation - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - $1,028,[illegible]

The activities of this Division are principally directed to the building of intellectual resources which will ensure continuity with the past and which can be used when the satellite countries are liberated. The Division's activities consist of:

1. The East European Inquiry, an outgrowth and enlargement of the Danubian Inquiry, which was created by Woodrow Wilson in 1918. Its aim is to prepare basic materials in order to meet the minimum needs of those who will be charged with the reorganization of the Danubian area.

2. Other Studies of a miscellaneous nature useful to the other divisions of NCFE and to students of Central Europe.

3. Scholarships to American universities this year will be 80-85 to highly qualified exiles who have signed a pledge to return to their homelands after liberation.

4. Textbooks to replace Communist textbooks are being prepared in stockpile and manuscript form.

5. The Mid-European Law Project, which digests and annotates current legislation from the Iron Curtain countries.

6. The East European Accessions List, which publishes a monthly annotated bibliography of current published material from the satellites received in the Library of Congress.

d. Free Europe University in Exile - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - $637,[illegible]31

Two hundred exile students, all escapees, are provided with board and lodging at the University in Strasbourg. Each student attends the University of Strasbourg for his or her formal education. The Free University, in addition to providing board, lodging, and tuition, conducts courses and seminars dealing with the countries of origin of these exile escapees. The University operates on the theory that these young people are being equipped for future leadership after liberation.

e. Research and Publication Service - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - $[illegible]

The Committee for Research and Publications was created in November 1951 to make available in currently useful form information about the satellite countries. It gathers information from four basic sources:

1. The analysis of 270 Communist newspapers and periodicals;

2. RFE's overseas information-gathering network;

3. Monitoring reports from all major satellite radio stations. The analysis of the 10,000 publications from the satellite area received annually by the Library of Congress. The compiled information is used in the following ways:

a) Within NCFE - Daily digest of all Iron Curtain information. These are prepared for the use of RFE's New York language desk;
b) Weekly trend meetings by RFE -- RPS desk heads to discuss the interpretation and use in radio programming of events in the Iron Curtain countries;

c) Research projects on specific targets for RFE's New York and Munich language desks. Daily monitoring highlights summarize major events in all satellite countries;

d) RFC also makes available its information files to the Divisions of Intellectual Cooperation and Emigre Relations;

e) A "Black Book" prepared every six months, contains communist attacks against NCFE-RFE;

f) To the general public - "News from Behind the Iron Curtain, a monthly magazine of source material about the target area, is issued to some 5,000 people in the field of communications. 142 research studies have been distributed outside the Committee to a total of 32,900 people. Foreign language bulletins in each of the major tongues of the satellite countries, are distributed to some 5,000 exiles in 53 countries outside the Soviet orbit. These bulletins, which average 100 pages each, are the only complete and unbiased source of information about their captive homelands available to those who have escaped.

f. Radio Free Europe - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - $3,324,555 NY, $5,909,971 Germany, $1,271,795 Paris

Radio Free Europe's main broadcasting studio and equipment is located in Munich, Germany. Broadcasting facilities are maintained also in New York and there is a relay station in Portugal. RFE broadcasts an average of about 1,026 hours per week. Of this broadcasting time 187½ hours are original programming, directed mainly to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Broadcasts to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania are prepared and relayed from New York. New York exercises policy control over RFE broadcasts through daily guidances and a tele-type system between Munich and New York.

Radio Free Europe has its own information section to provide its broadcast materials. It has correspondents and offices in London, Paris, Stockholm, Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Salzburg, Vienna, Linz (Austria), Wels (Austria), Graz (Austria), Rome, Trieste, Athens and Istanbul. These offices produce an average of over one thousand reports per month. In addition, material for broadcasting comes from: 1) satellite press publications; 2) RFE's monitoring service of satellite and Russian broadcasts; 3) information from the Division of Emigre Relations, private letters, news service, the BBC, VOA and others.

II

The foregoing is a cursory outline of NCFE and a brief record of our attempts to solve administrative problems. To complete the picture, the following is a brief outline of the major psychological problems we face with NCFE.

NCFE is not what it should be -- an integral and balanced part of the total U.S. program for dealing with the satellite nations of Eastern Europe. The top officials of NCFE have no detailed comprehension of U.S. policy, nor any understanding of how they can contribute to its development and operation. They give only lip service to the idea of obtaining policy guidance from Washington. Their apparent attitude has been that they can make a trip to Washington, determine what "high policy" is, and return to New York with the job done. This push-button mentality, added to their deep-seated suspicion of Government interference, has lead them to resist our efforts to study their role and to develop new ideas, or reassess old ones.

As a result of these attitudes, there has been considerable difficulty in gaining information about NCFE activities, problems and plans. For example, we do not receive any regular communication from Admiral H.B. Miller; we have received no list of NCFE personnel, nor any minutes of meetings of the Staff Executive Committee, or the Board of Directors. Even more important than this is the fact that the heads of divisions are prevented from having contact with us, except on occasions when Admiral Miller is out of town. As a result, for instance, Mr. Lang, the head of RFE, who has considerable problems and is anxious for the fullest liaison, is prevented from dealing with us personally. Conversely, every attempt to deal with NCFE personnel individually is looked upon with suspicion and carried on by NCFE personnel with some apprehension. The reasons for Admiral Miller's attitude are two-fold: (a) In his organization he wants everything done through him; and (b) He does not wish any outside "control" over his activities. (Admiral Miller's manner of conducting affairs within the Committee is resented by Mr. Spencer Phenix and other members of the Board of Directors, but Mr. Phenix and NCFE Directors support Admiral Miller in his reluctance to deal outside the Board.

This lack of consultation and common study has clear reflections in the organizations itself. NCFE is not an integrated organization. Each division operates separately, without any real relation to other divisions. Added to this, the lack of a clear understanding of the Committee's purposes and of its place in the total psychological warfare efforts of the United States has led to real dissatisfaction among the Division heads. They are anxious to know what they are doing, to integrate their own efforts and to cooperate to the maximum.

To formulate our own and NCFE's ideas, we have been and are carrying on discussions with the officials and working personnel of NCFE. In some of these discussions, Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the State Department, has been a direct participant.

These discussions have covered a wide variety of subjects which can generally be described as follows:

(1) What is NCFE's place as a whole in American policy toward the satellite nations? What is American policy? What modifications are likely?

(2) How can NCFE, especially the Division of Emigre Relations, contribute more effectively to psychological and political warfare, not only for effects behind the Iron Curtain, but in the Free World? For example - How can NCFE securely engage in further activities in the pattern of its successful actions at the United Nations Slave Labor Hearings and the International Red Cross Meetings at Toronto?

(3) Should NCFE continue to support emigre councils, or should some other technique be developed which can enable it to make more effective use of emigres for psychological warfare purposes?

(4) How can the Research and Publications Division, the Division of Intellectual Cooperation, and the Free University best contribute to these efforts?

(5) Is NCFE efficiently organized? What, for example, is the effect of the Division of Emigre Relations' dealings with emigres on the position of RFE in Europe, etc?

(6) How can we give specific guidance to RFE? What kind of information is wanted, for example, by RFE? What studies and means of overcoming jamming can be made available to RFE? How can American and British legations in the satellites best provide guidance and information for RFE?

III

There are, in addition, some specific current problems that should be mentioned. They are:

(1) RFE's position in Germany. The position of Radio Free Europe in Germany is becoming increasingly difficult. The political situation in Germany has developed so that the German expellees, numbering some 9,000,000 votes, have joined with the extreme nationalist elements, some of whom are non-German extremists, such as Slovak Separatists. This groups holds a potential possible balance of power between the CDU and the SPD. As a result, both parties, but particularly the SPD, are becoming more vociferously nationalistic. RFE, as an American operation in Germany, including the Voice of America, will be the subject of pressure. RFE is most vulnerable of all because of its Eastern European personnel and the nature of its broadcasts. RFE's problems are the subject of careful study at the present time by NCFE, and others.

Should RFE be forced out of Germany -- its facilities in Portugal can be expanded to take over the job. Programming can be moved to London and Paris. In addition, RFE has asked us to consider the feasibility of their locating a station in Turkey to enable them to program full time with a strong signal into Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania.

(2) Crusade for Freedom. The Crusade for Freedom, the fund raising cover mechanism of NCFE and CFA, is pretty much out of hand. It is operated as a separate corporation and the responsible officials of NCFE, except Admiral Miller, have literally washed their hands of any attempt to control or direct its activities. As a result, it has become a high pressure, fund-raising outfit which has little comprehension of the reasons for its existence or knowledge of the kind of publicity which should be undertaken. Among the working personnel of NCFE, it is looked upon with great skepticism and much apprehension. The single strength of the Crusade for Freedom is the fact that it does raise money from individual Americans, not much money, but still some 23,000,000 Americans have contributed. This fact is a powerful weapon. For example, Adenauer's party, the Bundestag, in defending RFE from attacks by the SPD, cites as one of its main arguments the support and concern of 23,000,000 Americans that this activity be continued.

Immediate attention is being given to having the Crusade conducted next year by the Heritage Foundation. Mr. C. M. Vandeburg of that organization has stated he would take on the job.

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

1950 CAMPAIGN

1. The Crusade was launched by General Dwight D. Eisenhower on a nation wide broadcast.

2. The symbol of the Crusade, a ten ton World Freedom Bell, inscribed with a quotation from Lincoln, "This World under God shall have a new birth of freedom", toured the United States from coast to coast. The "Freedom Bell" was sent to Berlin to become part of a "Freedom Shrine", and tolled there over an international radio hookup.

3. Freedom Scrolls signed by 15,000,000 contributors were taken to Berlin to become a permanent part of the Freedom Shrine.

4. In the United States, local committees were established throughout the country. General Lucius Clay was appointed chairman of the Fund raising campaign of the Crusade for Freedom. Mr. Abbott Washburn, Chief, Public Relations for General Foods Corp. was appointed as the director. Assisting companies were: Fund raising - John Price Co., Inc. - Advertising - Hewitt, Ogilvy, Benson & Mather Inc. Small mass contributions were solicited. Contributions from large individual donors were solicited later, in order to afford the fund raising campaign a broader continuity. Literature (samples attached) of all kinds, explaining Radio Free Europe were distributed.

5. Financial results were as follows:

Expenses;	$917,000.00
Contributions;	$1,317,000.00

1951 CAMPAIGN

The 1951 Crusade Campaign was begun by the launching of balloons into Czechoslovakia and Poland containing pamphlets of encouragement to the people of these countries. Copies of the message and samples of the balloons were used to solicit contributions in the United States. Publicity dealt largely with Radio Free Europe. Free magazine advertising was widely used for the first time. A coast to coast telethon was used.

Inadvertently, through mistakes of the staff and the failure to adequately brief community leaders, the Crusade mistakenly implied that the Voice of America was ineffective -- that only Radio Free Europe, the privately supported radio broadcasting station, could do an effective job.

After conferences with the State Department, it was agreed that VOA and RFE were complimentary activities and that in the future the Crusade:

(1) Would not put out anything which might be interpreted as a criticism of the Voice. To that end, an attached leaflet was inserted as an insert in the January 1952 "Crusader", a newsletter which was sent out to the 8,000 regional chairman of the Crusade for Freedom. It was intended to acquaint the regional Crusade organizations with the facts about the Voice of America and to offset any criticism or unfortunate comparison between Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America.

Financial results were as follows:

Expenses; $1,932,478

Contributions; $2,011,229.94

1952 CAMPAIGN

The 1952 Crusade Campaign was begun by General Eisenhower, Adlai Stevenson and Henry Ford, II, the 1952 Campaign Chairman. The Campaign was endorsed in a letter from President Truman:

> "I understand that on the success of the 1952 Crusade rests the plans of the Crusade for Freedom to build more radio stations in Free Europe and Asia. If this can be done, and I believe that it will be done, the Free world can more effectively get the truth behind the Iron Curtain.
>
> "It is essential that the people everywhere know that we are working for peace, freedom and prosperity for all mankind."

The assistance of the Advertising Council was enlisted and for the first time outdoor billboard advertising was used. Records were made containing 2 fifteen minute programs on "The RFE story" and spot films were arranged for television with narration by Henry Fonda.

For the first time, fund raising letters seeking large contributions were sent to all leading corporations.

The Campaign was highly organized on the local level with state chairmen in almost every state. The Post Office Department permitted the use of a local post office address for receipts. Endorsements were obtained from many organizations such as the American Legion, VFW, CIO, National Auto. Dealers, American Brewers Foundation, and Catholic War Veterans etc. For fund raising purposes on a mass scale — a freedomgram to be signed by contributors has been distributed. These freedomgrams, translated into six languages will be broadcast over Radio Free Europe.

SECRET
Security Information

13 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STAFF

SUBJECT: Request by the Directors of NCFE for a statement from the responsible officer in CIA that NCFE has no responsibility of any kind for the initiation of, nor for the payments in respect to radio equipment known as the MB-50.

1. The enclosed letter, is as you suggested, drafted for the signature of Mr. Tracy Barnes, which when signed, should be transmitted to this Office for New York's attention.

2. Two versions have been prepared. Both should be signed, the sterilized version will be sent to New York, the unsterilized original will be retained in our files.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachments:
As stated above

SECRET
Security Information

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

Executive Registry
3-0221

Mr Hedden

Please speak to me about this

12 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director Central Intelligence

FROM : Chief, International Organizations

You may wish to speak to the Director about the fact that Charles Moore, a very close friend of mine who is Director of Public Relations for the Ford Motor Company, called me last week to suggest that his boss, Henry Ford, would like to be asked to become President of the Heritage Foundation.

I think this lays to rest any fears we may have had of Mr. Ford's (in reality Mr. Moore's) criticism of the Crusade for Freedom leading to Mr. Ford's becoming inactive on our behalf.

The Director might wish to call Mr. Ford and ask him to become President if it is feasible for Mr. McCloy to become Chairman of the Board. In discretion, the Director may not wish to mention to Mr. Ford the message passed to me by Mr. Moore.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SUMMARY OF FACTS ON RADIO FREE EUROPE

Radio Free Europe (RFE) was established as a separate division of NCFE when the latter was incorporated on May 17, 1949. RFE has been on the air since mid-July ~~X~~ 1950. At the close of 1950, RFE broadcasts were totaling 7½ hours daily, programs of 1½ hours each being addressed to the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. The total cost of this earliest period, from 17 May 1949 to 30 June 1950, was $[illegible]237.87, operating and capital costs being roughly even. The next year was to see these same costs rise in the same ratio - capital to operating - to a total of $4,958,[illegible].23.

Today, RFE broadcasts to all the above mentioned countries, with the addition of Albania, at a weekly total rate of 1066 hours, of which 190 hours are original programming - some [illegible]% of the total free world broadcast hours directed at the Orbit. The original program broadcasts are directed mainly to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Broadcasts to Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania are prepared and relayed from New York.

The estimated expenditures of RFE for the fiscal year 1953 are capital $2,981,120, operating expenses, $9,596,160 ~~[illegible]~~, for a total of $12,577,280. Estimated operating expenses (only) of [illegible] for the same period are $21,616,300. A summary of RFE expenditures to date is as follows:

	Capital	Operating	Total
For Period 17 May 49 to 30 June 50	$ [illegible]	$ [illegible].26	$ [illegible],237.87
For Period 1 July 50 to 30 June 51	2,461,038.[illegible]	2,497,[illegible]	4,958,[illegible].23
For Period 1 July 51 to 30 June 52	2,777,[illegible]10.66	6,561,[illegible]27.41	9,340,03[illegible].07
For Period 1 July 52 to 30 June 53	2,981,1[illegible]	9,596,16[illegible]	12,577,280.00
TOTALS TO INCLUDE 30 JUNE 1953	[illegible]	$16,[illegible]	$27,427,[illegible].17

RFE INSTALLATIONS

RFE's principal installations are its main broadcasting station and production equipment, located in Munich, Germany; broadcasting facilities maintained in New York City and the major relay center at Lisbon, Portugal.

In Germany, transmitters are in operation at Holzkirchen and Biblis, while monitoring, recording and receiving functions are at Schleissheim and Loosburg. In Portugal, the 50 and 100 kw [illegible] transmitting complex is at Gloria, while receiving/monitoring facilities and production/editing are at Maxoqueria and Lisbon, respectively.

Original capital investment in Germany as of 30 June 1950 amounted to ~~$[illegible]~~ $198,193.10. Original capital, for Portugal as of 30 June 1950

Cont

was in the amount of $ ~~[illegible]~~ $549,908.56

INVENTORIES OF FIXED ASSETS (At Cost):

	TOTAL	NEW YORK	GERMANY	PORTUGAL
Acquired:				
Prior to July 1, 1952	$3,113,305.28	$316,511.20	$1,561,982.26	$1,234,811.82
Current Fiscal Year	1,034,937.80	97,909.29	261,727.89	675,300.62
	$4,148,243.08	$414,420.49	$1,823,710.15	$1,910,112.44

Breakdown of revised 1953 budget as it applies to New York, Munich and Lisbon offices follows:

	Capital	Operating	Total
New York	$ 158,000.00	$2,405,044.00	$2,563,044.00
Lisbon	768,261.00	1,232,696.00	2,000,957.00
Munich	2,054,859.00	5,958,420.00	8,013,279.00
Total	$2,981,120.00	$9,596,160.00	$12,577,280.00

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

RFE is in part supported by the Crusade for Freedom, a major fund-raising mechanism. From September 4, 1950 to date, the Crusade has been responsible for some 4½ million dollars in contributions to NCFE and RFE. Expenditures for the Crusade, over the same period, amounted to some 2 3/4 millions. All monies raised, above expenditures, or a total of 1 3/4 millions have been spent directly and solely on RFE's capital installations, i.e., transmitters, receivers, supporting equipment.

PERSONNEL

RFE in July 1950 employed 177, of whom 118 were Americans, 24 of them were employed in Germany. At present, RFE has a total staff of 1778, of whom 252 are American. In New York, the policy and administrative headquarters, the staff number 195. In Munich, which is the programming headquarters, there are 1249 employees. At Lisbon, the technical relay headquarters, there are now 334 individuals. These figures include only staff employees on the regular payroll.

14-00000

SECRET
[illegible]
SECURITY INFORMATION

MAJOR RFE CONTRIBUTIONS

RFE is a major instrument in total U.S. political and psychological warfare efforts directed at Central and Eastern Europe. It has contributed in the following ways:

RFE made an intensive campaign of Stalin's death and linked this event with the death of Gottwald and the illness of Pieck. During the intensive period of the Stalin story, RFE was on the air 24 hours with all its 21 transmitters on a single frequency, which was switched continuously from country to country. It beat all Western press agencies by 2½ hours in announcing Gottwald's illness and is usually about 2 hours ahead of VOA and BBC in announcing events of major importance.

Radio Free Europe was the first to inform the Agency of the recent riots in Pilsen, the reshuffle of the Hungarian Communist Government, etc.

RFE has contributed in the launching of two balloon operations: one in the summer of 1951, when barrages of balloons were hurled at Czechoslovakia and Poland, another on 14 July 1953, when thousands of balloons were launched into Czechoslovakia.

RFE is an effective machinery through which the U.S. Government can work unofficially as cannot be done through VOA or RIAS.

RFE gives hope to those behind the Iron Curtain and its broadcasts have provided incentives to escape: e.g. escape of two Polish pilots, Freedom Train.

Interrogation of refugees and escapees from behind the Iron Curtain. Escapees often prefer to go to RFE reception center rather than more official U.S. outfits. Interrogation reports are of immense value to intelligence and to formulation of U.S. policy.

RFE guidances: Highly intelligent analyses of current situations and lines to be followed in broadcasts. Of extreme value to U.S. Government.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE in Turkey

ACTION NECESSARY: Will you please decide or cause to be decided the following question: Should the National Committee for a Free Europe in its approach to Turkish authorities exploring the possibility of creating an RFE station in Turkey contact Turkish authorities as a non-governmental private Committee or as a CIA-financed institution?

Background

1. The State Department has asked that RFE not approach Turkish authorities until VOA's attempt to get into Turkey has been accepted or refused by the Turks. The Department has now given the Voice of America until 15 January to conclude its negotiations with the Turkish Government. These negotiations appear to be leading nowhere and, on the assumption that VOA will not gain entrance to Turkey, the Department has authorized RFE to begin negotiations on the above date.

2. Bob Lang, Bill Durkee and Mr. Wadsworth, former Ambassador to Turkey, as well as the NE Division have all been in on discussions as to how NCFE should approach the Turks. Mr. Wadsworth counsels that all cards be laid on the table, and he bases his reasoning on his belief that the Turks will know about it anyhow and that RFE is likely to get further if it comes clean. The NE Division on the other hand hopes that the approach can be that of a private committee and that no mention need be made of CIA's interest.

3. Your advice on the above question will not constitute approval of the building of a Turkish station or of operations from Turkey. By PRC decision at the last hearing on NCFE's budget these questions in Turkey must be brought back here for approval if the attitude of the Turks is favorable.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

[redacted]

68 APR ENTD

QUALIFICATIONS

PICCOLO JOSEPH S
265-46-1914

14-00000

4-29-80

SECRET OP/IRB
(When Filled In)

22 CSS 1980

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

OF ACTION CODE: PC

DATE PREPARED MO DA YR: 040980

CONTROL NO: 207

1 SSN: 265441914

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): PICCCLU JOSEPH S

3 NAME TYPE: T

4 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR: 12-08-35

5 SEX: M

6 CITIZEN: U

7 RETIREMENT (1 CSC, 2 FICA, 3 FS, 4 NONE, 5 CIARDS, 6 CSC FF, 7 OTHER) CODE: 5

8 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR: 12-27-54

9 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR: 12-24-57

10 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR: 02-04-73

11 LEI DATE MO DA YR: 01-28-79

12 VETERANS PREFERENCE (0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT DISAB, 3 10 PT COMP, 4 10 PT OTHER) CODE: 0

13 ANNUITY STATUS CODE:

14 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

15 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA YR: 050480

16 AFFILIATION: STAFF EMPLOYEE-CAREER

FROM	TO
17. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS CDC /CIS CPERATIONS GROUP SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH	17 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/IAD COVERT ACTION STAFF AREA OPERATIONS BRANCH AREA SECTION
18 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C. 19 HQ: 1 20 POS NO: GK067	18 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: 19 HQ: 20 POS NO:
21. EMPLOYEE OCCUPATIONAL TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER 22 SUFFIX: 23. SERVICE DESIG: DAC	21 EMPLOYEE OCCUPATIONAL TITLE: 22 SUFFIX: 23 SERVICE DESIG:
24. SCHEDULE: GS 25. OCC SERIES: 0136.01 26 GRADE: 13 27 STEP: 7 28. SALARY & PAY BASIS: 35249 PA 29 HOURS: 80	24 SCHEDULE: 25 OCC SERIES: 26 GRADE: 14 27 STEP: 4 28. SALARY & PAY BASIS: 38184 PA 29 HOURS:
30 TOUR: F 31. PROJECT NO: 270172 32 FLSA: E 33 NSCA: 34. SCC: P 35 DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT CODE / NTE (MO. DA YR):	30. TOUR: 31 PROJECT NO: 32. FLSA: 33 NSCA: 34. SCC: 35 DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT CODE / NTE (MO DA YR):
36 POSITION OCCUPATIONAL TITLE: CPERATIONS OFFICER 37 PERSONAL RANK ASSIGNMENT CODE / NTE (MO DA YR):	36 POSITION OCCUPATIONAL TITLE: 37. PERSONAL RANK ASSIGNMENT CODE / NTE (MO DA YR):
38. POSITION DATA SCHEDULE GRADE: GS 14 SD: G SUFFIX: SCC: P 39 DETAIL ORGANIZATION:	38 POSITION DATA SCHEDULE-GRADE: SD: SUFFIX: SCC: 40 EMPLOYEE OFFSET SSN:

41. REMARKS

REASSIGNMENT - CHANGE OF HOME BASE ACTION RECENTLY PROCESSED - EFF DATE: 4/15/80

CONCUR: LINDA L. CROWLEY (TELECORD)
IAD/PERS 4/11/80

36165

FOR OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY

42 AFFIL:
43 ORGANIZATIONAL CODES ALPHA / NUMERIC:
44 STATION CODE:
45 ACTION NTE MO DA YR:
46 SPECIAL CODE:
47 VARIABLE DATA:
48 OVERRIDE CODES:
49 REMARKS CODES:
50. SPEC REF 1 / 2:
51 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION NAME: DATE: 4/9/2

REQUEST AND APPROVAL SIGNATURES

52 SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER: Thomas J. Magee
THOMAS J. MAGEE, C/CI/SP
DATE: 11 Apr 80

53 SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CM/13 Charles J. Rakowsky
DATE: 11 Apr 80

54 SIGNATURE OF OFFICE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER: Lynda Johnson
DATE: 4/29/80

FORM 1152 (8-79) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

T.31
4-16-80

SECRET UP/TRB

1 6 APR 1980

Type of action code: RE-SP

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED MO DA YR: 040480
CONTROL NO: 201

1 SSN: 265441914
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): PICCOLO JOSEPH S
3 NAME TYPE: T
4 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR: 12-08-35
5 SEX: M
6 CITIZEN: U

7 RETIREMENT (1 CSC 2 FICA 3 FS 4 NONE 5 CIARDS 6 CSC FF 7 OTHER) CODE: 5
8 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR: 12-27-54
9 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR: 12-24-57
10 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR: 02-04-73
11 LEI DATE MO DA YR: 01-28-79
12 VETERANS PREFERENCE (0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT DISAB 3 10 PT COMP 4 10 PT OTHER) CODE: 0
13 ANNUITY STATUS

14 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CHANGE OF HOME BASE REASSIGNMENT
15 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR: 041580 ✓
16 AFFILIATION: STAFF EMPLOYEE-CAREER

	FROM	TO
17 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDO /CIS OPERATIONS GROUP SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH	DDO/IAD COVERT ACTION STAFF AREA OPERATIONS BRANCH AREA SECTION
18 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASHINGTON, D.C.	
19 HQ	1	
20 POS NO	GK067	CT089
21 EMPLOYEE OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	OPERATIONS OFFICER	
22 SUFFIX		
23 SERVICE DESIG	DAC ✓	DWC
24 SCHEDULE	GS ✓	
25 OCC SERIES	0136.01	
26 GRADE	13 ✓	
27 STEP	7	
28 SALARY & PAY BASIS	35249 PA	
29 HOURS	80	
30 TOUR	F	
31 PROJECT NO	270172	244163 ✓
32 FLSA	E	
33 NSCA		
34 SCC	P ✓	
35 DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT CODE / NTE (MO DA YR)		
36 POSITION OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	OPERATIONS OFFICER	Ops Off
37 PERSONAL RANK ASSIGNMENT CODE / NTE (MO DA YR)		
38 POSITION DATA SCHEDULE GRADE	GS 14	GS 14
SD	C	D
SUFFIX		—
SCC	P	P
39 DETAIL ORGANIZATION		
40 EMPLOYEE OVERLAP SSN		024-30-9618 ✓

41 REMARKS

CONCUR: Thomas Magee (Telecord) *FROM CIS ✓ 4 April 1980
CIS Pers Date

I Agree To Change My Home Base from A (CIS) to W (IAD).

970839

Concur: Hall
CAS/MSB

Joseph Piccolo
Joseph Piccolo
2 Apr 80
Date

FOR OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY

42 AFFIL
43 ORGANIZATIONAL CODES ALPHA: IAD ✓ NUMERIC
44 STATION CODE
45 ACTION NTE MO DA YR
46 DETAIL CODE
47 VARIABLE DATA
48 OVERRIDE CODES
49 REMARKS CODES
50 SPEC REF 1 2
51 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION NAME ✓ DATE 4-15-80

REQUEST AND APPROVAL SIGNATURES

52 SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER: Linda L. Crowley Linda L. Crowley DATE 7 April 80
53 SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CM/13 Charles J. Rakowsky DATE 10 April 80
54 SIGNATURE OF OFFICE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER: Lynda Bohannon DATE 4-17-80

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061836

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) PICCOLO, Joseph S., Jr.	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT self	CLAIM NUMBER 79-0126

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 10/5/78.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 17 Nov 1978	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE Ernest L. Hardt

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 11-73 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY (4-21-55)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

11/27

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 Nov 1977

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2 NAME (Last—First—Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT - CHANGE OF FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 07 YEAR 77

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 8027 0172 0000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI STAFF
OPERATIONS GROUP
SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER (14)

12 POSITION NUMBER: GK67

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAS

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 29,490

18 REMARKS

I CONCUR IN THE CHANGE OF MY CATEGORY FROM B/OG TO B/OS.

Joseph S. Piccolo
Joseph S. Piccolo

23 Nov 77
Date

~~[illegible]~~
~~already [illegible]~~

Wykle
CMS/MSK 12/02/77

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: E. Walton
Henry E. Walton, C/PCS/CSS/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 11/29/77

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CM 13 [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 12/1/77

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HQ/OTHS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA. YR
37	10	31400	CIS	25013		1	12 08 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG OPT 3—[illegible] HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12·2·77 AEO

08 DEC 1977

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007

12 JUN 1978

Dear Joseph,

Please accept my appreciation for an assignment well done as a member of the FY 1978 GS-07 Secretarial/Clerical DO Personnel Evaluation Boards from 17 April through 19 May 1978.

I well recognize the complexities involved in the comparative evaluation of 560 clerical careerists -- a task further complicated by this being only the second year it has been undertaken. Your deliberations were vital to the Directorate's determination to bring to this group of valuable employees the advantages of the merit system.

Full-time service with the Evaluation Boards represents a major contribution to the Directorate's program of personnel assessment and management. Not only were your promotion recommendations valued, but recommendations for career development and training were also extremely helpful.

I believe that your service on the Board broadened and sharpened your own focus on personnel aspects of Agency management. Too, I think that the time spent in this endeavor could only have made you better aware of our need for complete, careful and candidly written appraisals of our employees.

Sincerely,

John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

28 APR 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI Staff

SUBJECT : Recommendations by the GS-13 FY 78 Evaluation Board Regarding PDP

Having carefully reviewed all personnel files of GS-13 personnel, the FY 78 DO Personnel Evaluation Board recommended that the following officer be identified in his division's Personnel Development Plan (PDP). This individual was selected because of his relatively high potential, in the estimation of the Evaluation Board, for growth to positions of leadership within the Agency.

Category BOS

Joseph Piccolo

Woodson K. Johnson
Vice Chairman, CMS/13

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

11 APR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph S. Piccolo

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase

1. My congratulations on the award to you of a Quality Step Increase. This recognition of superior sustained performance reflects great credit on you and the job you have been doing.

2. I am confident that your future performance will be of continuing high quality.

With personal best wishes,

John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059687

CONFIDENTIAL

23 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

FROM : Wesley L. Laybourne
A/Chairman, DO Personnel Evaluation Boards

VIA : Chief, Career Management Staff

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Quality Step Increase
for Joseph S. Piccolo (CI)

1. Mr. Piccolo joined the Agency in 1957 and since then has served 12 years as a field-case officer in Mexico, Nicaragua and Brazil as well as tours at Headquarters in LA Division and currently on the CI Staff. He was promoted to GS-13 on 4 February 1973.

2. Mr. Piccolo has performed in a strong to outstanding manner during the past year as described in his fitness report covering the period October 1976 to September 1977. He was engaged during this period in a number of CI projects, including "a sensitive, multi-level project which has resulted in a neutralization of some Soviet espionage activity abroad." He also was called upon to support CI activities requiring extensive travel abroad in support of joint Agency and FBI objectives and "he executed these assignments with a singular degree of professionalism." He recently also organized and ran in Spanish a CI course for foreign liaison and the Station involved described the effort "as an outstanding contribution." During the previous fitness report period he participated in two CI surveys in Africa and Latin America and because of this experience he was recently named to head another CI survey to take place in Latin America in the future.

3. It is the view of the Fiscal Year 1978 GS-13 DO Personnel Evaluation Board that Mr. Piccolo has performed in a sustained high manner which exceeds the normal requirements of his position and that this sustained high performance promises to continue. He is, therefore, recommended for a Quality Step Increase.

Wesley L. Laybourne

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Quality Step Increase
for Joseph S. Piccolo (CI)

CONCUR:

B. Hugh Tovar
Chief, CI Staff   Date

APPROVED:

fr Director of Personnel   Date

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph S.Piccolo

SUBJECT : Acknowledgment of Evaluation Board Functional Category

REFERENCE : Evaluation Board Precepts for Your Grade

1. Based upon an examination of your past assignments and duties, and after considering likely future assignments, you have been placed (subject to your signature below) in the functional category B/OS for Evaluation Board purposes. Precise definitions of this category are contained in the Evaluation Board precepts for your grade. This placement is made in order that your performance, growth potential, and career planning may be judged against officers similarly placed professionally. YOU ARE URGED TO STUDY THE PRECEPTS AND CONSIDER YOUR OWN CASE CAREFULLY.

2. In general, you should consider the following;

a. Categories are sharply defined. Competition is within categories, not between them. Thus, a weak B/OG performance is not strengthened by reclassifying it as B/OS.

b. A change in category after sustained performance in a different category may cause a temporary loss of momentum in your career advancement until you have demonstrated proficiency in your new assignment.

c. A category change should not be initiated for the period of a temporary, training or rotational assignment unless a permanent change of career track will follow.

3. If you believe that this is not the correct category for you because the substantive nature of your job more closely approximates another category or because you have made a permanent change of career track, please take the matter up through your command channel to secure the concurrence of your component of assignment or of your home base component, as appropriate, to a change of your category. Previously assigned and acknowledged categories will remain in effect until a fully executed acknowledgment of change is received by the Career Management Staff.

4. Please sign and date this notification in the space provided and return it to your Personnel Evaluation and Management Officer or to your Personnel Officer.

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Joseph S. Piccolo
Signature of Addressee

20 Nov 77
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

9 NOV 1977

ØCF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 NOVEMBER 1977

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025658
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 01 YEAR 77
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 8027 0172 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
   DDO/CI STAFF
   OPERATIONS GROUP
   SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER (14)
12. POSITION NUMBER: GK07
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 29,490
18. REMARKS

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry E. Walton, C/PCS/CSS/Pers — DATE SIGNED: 11/2/77

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CI 13 — DATE SIGNED: 11/7/77

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 ROUTES CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	31400	CIS	75013		1	12 05 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OASDI 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11/8/77 AEW 10 NOV 1977

46 O.P. APPROVAL — DATE APPROVED: 11/8/77

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL. BY. 007622

Mexico City October 1977

IN424833

MEXI 42342

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

Liaison officials join station in extending appreciation to Joseph Piccolo for his outstanding contribution to the current task of moulding the KDSLEUTHS into an effective counterintelligence organization.

Their high degree of enthusiasm was matched only by the professional way in which they prepared their instruction material, the ingenuity of their delivery, and above all the high impact that they had on the students and their superiors.

Wish to complement the above two colleagues for a job well done and for having upheld in their own respective fields the high standards and prestige of the Agency in our eyes and in those of our liaison counterparts.

Request that a copy of this cable be placed in their respective personnel files.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 October 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Career Management Staff

SUBJECT : Request for Change of Career Designation to B/OS-Operational Specialist from B/OG-Operational Generalist

1. It is requested that my career designation be changed to B/OS-Operational Specialist from that of B/OG-Operational Generalist. It is believed that the career activities and recent events described below clearly meet the criteria set forth in the Career Service Personnel Evaluation System Handbook.

2. In July 1977, I changed my home base from Latin America Division to the Counterintelligence Staff. This change of home base was precipitated by the cancellation of a planned overseas tour in Latin America which was scheduled to begin in July 1977. The cancellation of the tour was caused by State Department objections to my assignment because of publicity accorded me by Philip Agee and Counterspy Magazine.

3. The following is a career summary noting Operational Specialist related activities only:

January 1976 - Present	CI Staff
August 1973 - August 1975	Liaison Officer, Managua Station, (Spanish language)
August 1972-June 1973	Liaison Officer, Rio de Janeiro Base, for a Special Project (Portuguese language)
February 1969-December 1969	Liaison Officer, Headquarters, Latin America Division/Cuban Operations (British [MI-6] & U.S. Navy)
April 1968-January 1969	Liaison Officer, Managua Station, (Spanish language)
August 1962-August 1965	Counterintelligence Section, Headquarters, Latin America Division, Cuban Task Force exploiting two intelligence service defectors (Spanish language)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 025[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Based on the above history and more recent activities since joining the CI Staff, I believe my career development and potential will be better realized as an Operational Specialist.

Joseph S. Piccolo Jr.

CONCUR: Richard J McGinnis
CI/-13

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER TOTAL COPIES 24 RUN BY Joseph Picardo

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA6

ACTION # 1

INFO: FILE VR ~~DDO~~ ~~PCS/PRQ~~ CS/IMCO, CMS, CMS/INS, CMS/PCB, ODOY

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 232134 EIA995 PAGE 01 IN 424833

TOR:2721242 OCT 77 MEXI 42342

SECRET 270252Z OCT 77 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 42342 (BERG ACTING)

Pers
RMO

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL KDSLEUTH SGCHART ADMIN RECORDS

1. LIAISON OFFICIALS JOIN STATION IN EXTENDING APPRECIATION TO [redacted] AND [redacted] FOR THEIR OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION TO THE CURRENT TASK OF MOULDING THE KDSLEUTHS INTO AN EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION.

2. THEIR HIGH DEGREE OF ENTHUSIASM WAS MATCHED ONLY BY THE PROFESSIONAL WAY IN WHICH THEY PREPARED THEIR INSTRUCTION MATERIAL, THE INGENUITY OF THEIR DELIVERY, AND ABOVE ALL THE HIGH IMPACT THAT THEY HAD ON THE STUDENTS AND THEIR SUPERIORS.

3. WISH TO COMPLEMENT THE ABOVE TWO COLLEAGUES FOR A JOB WELL DONE AND FOR HAVING UPHELD IN THEIR OWN RESPECTIVE FIELDS THE HIGH STANDARDS AND PRESTIGE OF THE AGENCY IN OUR EYES AND IN THOSE OF OUR LIAISON COUNTERPARTS.

4. REQUEST THAT A COPY OF THIS CABLE BE PLACED IN THEIR RESPECTIVE PERSONNEL FILES.

5. FILE: 50-6-180/2. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

08 JUL 1977

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 June 1977

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT-CHANGE OF HOME BASE
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 | DAY 19 | YEAR 77
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF ☒
7 CAN AND NSCA: 7227 0172 | 0000
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI STAFF
OPERATIONS GROUP
SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11 POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER (4)
12 POSITION NUMBER: EP93
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAG
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 5
17 SALARY OR RATE: $27,548

18 REMARKS

I CONCUR IN THE CHANGE OF MY HOME BASE TO CI STAFF.

Joseph S. Piccolo
Joseph S. Piccolo — 24 Jun 1977
Date

CONCUR:

John Halpin (telecord) — 24 June 1977
LA/PERS — Date

CMP/PCS/D 07-06-77

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Alec T. Monroe
Alec T. Monroe, C/PCS/CSS/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 24 June 1977
18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Joseph S. Seffle
CI 1
DATE SIGNED: 7-5-77

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31400 | ALPHABETIC CIS
22 STATION CODE: 75013
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 VOUCHER CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 12 | DA 05 | YR 35
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA | YR
27 DATE OF LEI: MO | DA | YR
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO | DA | YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—DISAB 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO | DA | YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. | DA | YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG-OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7/6/77
46 O P APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 12 Jul 77

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL BY. 007622

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: DDO

EXTENSION: 1414

NO.

DATE: 27 September 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/CI	[illegible] 1623		(12)
2.			
3.			
4. C/CI/OG	(FYI)		B
5. DC/CI/OG MR. PICCOLO			P
6. C/CI/OG/AO			—
7. + STAFF.			—
8.			
9.			
10.			
11			
12.			
13.			
14			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Thank you for sending me the Lima Station security review and the Station's response in HPLA-13576. Both are very well done and illustrate the usefulness of CI and Ops Security surveys.

cc: ADDO
DDO/REG

To 4:
Please circulate
u

Comment made by the DDO on the CI Survey of the Lima Station which was Done B, [illegible], Joseph Piccolo and Anthony Silen

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 7 JULY 1976

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 18 YEAR 76

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS:

	V TO V		V TO CF
XX	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 CAN AND NSCA: 8227-0172 0000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI STAFF
OPERATIONS GROUP
SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER (14)

12 POSITION NUMBER: EP93

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 25,198

18 REMARKS

FROM LA DIVISION.

VICE ANTHONY J. SSLEO

CONCUR: HENRY L. BERTHOLD (TELECOORD 07/07/76)
C/LA/PERSONNEL

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: McCallum
M.D. MCCALLUM, C/CI/SG

DATE SIGNED: 07/07/76

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
C/CMG/13

DATE SIGNED: 9 July 76

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTHS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
16	10	31400	C15	75013		1	12 08 55		

28 VET EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-OTHER 3-FICA 4-NONE	30 CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32 MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV. TEMP	38 CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0-WAIVED 1-REG 2-REG/OPT 3-INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	43 CODE	43 NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	44 CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-12-76 JR * from LA

46 C.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 7/14/76

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED 20 AUGUST 1975

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 08 DAY 31 YEAR 75	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒	7 CAN AND NSCA 0135-4534-0000	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LATIN AMERICA DIVISION CUBA OPERATIONS GROUP OPS BRANCH	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPERATIONS OFFICER (14)	12 POSITION NUMBER CQ65	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DQG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13 4	17 SALARY OR RATE $23,997

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDO/LA/Managua, Nicaragua

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL H. L. BERTHOLD, C/LA/PERS	DATE SIGNED 20 AUG 75	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Richard L. Schmidt DDO/Cmb-13	DATE SIGNED 22 August 75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 35	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 5150d	ALPHABETIC LA	22 STATION CODE M5013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12-08 35	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-OTHER 3-FICA 4-NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV, TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVED 1-REG 2-REG/OPT 3-INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION CK 8/25/75 3 SEP 1975	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 AUGUST 1975

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 26 | YEAR 75

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 6135-1049-0002

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/LATIN AMERICA DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

11 POSITION TITLE: ~~OPERATIONS~~ OPS OFFICER DX05 (13)

12 POSITION NUMBER: CR49

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: $23,997

18 REMARKS:

[illegible] SAME

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: H.I. BERTHOLD, ~~C/~~LA/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 12 AUG 75

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 13/8/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 ROUTES CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
58	0	51 60	LA	5075		3	12 08 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—FS 2—CRSR 3—FICA 4—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: CK 8/18/75

46 OP APPROVAL: Jackie C [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 8/18/75

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8/7/74

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S ✓

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CHANGE OF NSCA

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 19 YEAR 74

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7 FAN AND NSCA: 5135 1049 0002

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/WH DIVSSION
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 2-MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

11 POSITION TITLE: ASST ATTACHE POL OFF
OPS OFFICER ~~[illegible]~~ 13

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0396

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 5 4
13 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: 18479 ✓
$ 22055 ✓

18 REMARKS

* Managua, Nicaragua

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L Berthold WH PER

DATE SIGNED: 7 Aug 74

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: J K.

DATE SIGNED: 8/9/74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51660 ALPHABETIC WH

22 STATION CODE: 52073

23 INTEGREE CODE: 5

24 NOOTIC CODE: 3

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 12 DA 08 YR 35

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1—WAIVER 2—REG 3—REG/OPT 4—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: JK 8/13/74

46 O P APPROVAL: Jack [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 8/13/74

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (4)

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 01-0337

E2-2 IMPDET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 September 73

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 58
0256[illegible]

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Piccolo, Joseph S ✓

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 17 YEAR 73

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 4135-1049 0001

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/WH Div.
Foreign Field
Branch 2 5
Managua, Nicaragua Station

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Managua, Nicaragua

11 POSITION TITLE:
Asst Attache/Pol Off
Ops Off*/DCOS (23)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0396

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	05 3 13 2	17,075 $ 20,357

18 REMARKS
From: DDO/WH/FF/Br 5/ Rio de Janeiro
* Ops Officer DCOS occupying Ops Officer position. 09037 - Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
Approved 259A attached

1 Security
1 Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 9/4/73

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: H J Lehman
DATE SIGNED: 9-7-73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HDQTRS. CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51660	WH	53073	S	3	12 08 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR:
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OBCH 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE:
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 9-7-73

46 O P APPROVAL: H. A. Stuart

DATE APPROVED: 14 Sep 73

FORM 8-73 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 01-0332

E2-2 APON

(4)

SECRET

DD/O 73-2921

5 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo, GS-13, as Deputy Chief of Station, Managua, Nicaragua

1. The appointment of Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo, GS-13, as Deputy Chief of Station, Managua, Nicaragua, effective on or about 15 September 1973 is recommended. Mr. Piccolo would be replacing Mr. Ralph G. Seehafer.

2. Mr. Piccolo entered on duty with the Agency in February 1957. His Agency employment has been exclusively in the Western Hemisphere Division with field tours in Mexico City and Managua. He is currently serving in Rio de Janeiro as Chief of our FI Section. Mr. Piccolo has a very good command of the Spanish language.

3. A Biographic Profile, including information regarding his Agency employment and training, is attached.

James E. Flannery

James E. Flannery
Acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment:
Biographic Profile (Part I and Part II)

The recommendation in Paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

William E Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

5 Jun 1973
Date

E2, IMPDET
001062

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 January 1973

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Piccolo, Joseph S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 04 YEAR 73

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7 CAN AND NSCA: 3135-0694-0002

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP/WH Division
Foreign Field
Branch5-Brasilia, Brazil Station
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Base

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

11 POSITION TITLE
Attache Political Officer
Ops Officer (13)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1865

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)
FSR
GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP
05 3
13 2

17 SALARY OR RATE
17,075
$20,357

18 REMARKS
FROM: ~~ESXXSXX~~
GS-12/5

* Home Base: WH

* Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 31 Jan 73

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED: 1/31/73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 32
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51835 ALPHABETIC WH
22 STATION CODE: 09037
23 INTEGREE CODE: S
24 HOQTRS CODE: 3
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR [illegible]
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO 02 DA 04 YR 73
27 DATE OF LEI: MO 02 DA 04 YR 73
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION-CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR.
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46 OP APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 2/1/73

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

02 FEB 1973

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622

21 OCT 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, GS-12, CS Evaluation Board

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to GS-13, Joseph S. Piccolo

1. Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo entered on duty with the Agency in February 1957 as a file clerk. He progressed rapidly from that position to that of Intelligence Assistant and subsequent acceptance into the Agency Junior Officer Trainee Program. In addition to Headquarters assignments he has served as operations officer in Mexico City Station (1965-1968) and Managua Station (1968-1969). Since February 1970 he has been assigned to Brasilia Station, Base Rio de Janeiro, where he is serving on an extension of tour until June 1973. He has been in grade GS-12 since September 1968.

2. Mr. Piccolo has been consistently evaluated as a very Strong performer in his current grade and this in a variety of assignments which have progressed upwards in responsibility and have included field FI and liaison responsibilities, Headquarters desk officer and liaison officer; up to his current assignment as senior officer in charge of one of the Station's major operational programs, Communist Party and terrorist operations including direct handling of the Station's most sensitive CP agent. He has been evaluated by the Rio de Janeiro Base Chief as the most mature, dependable and competent case officer at the Base. He has excelled in the handling of intricate sensitive penetration operations where the highest professional standards are demanded. He carries a very heavy work load lightly and is a prodigious contributor in both operational and information reporting. His performance as a supervisor has been characterized by conscientiousness, a good sense of detail, perceptiveness, fairness and firmness. Two Chiefs of Station have emphatically endorsed the very

[illegible]

high evaluation placed on Mr. Piccolo's performance. His current COS has especially commended him on his handling of a complex current case involving liaison in which Mr. Piccolo has demonstrated an unusual grasp of detail, excellent judgment, poise under pressure, and extraordinary stamina. The ~~COS has~~ stated that Mr. Piccolo is already performing well above the GS-13 level.

3. Several supervisors have commented on Mr. Piccolo's quiet unassuming personality which belies the intensity with which he approaches his work. Underlying the quiet manner it has been noted that he is tough-minded and aggressive in his agent handling and exploitation and is highly experienced and skilled in the basic craft of the intelligence business. He is linguistically talented and can function in both the Spanish and Portuguese languages. He has had the ~~basic~~ Agency operations courses including some in technical operations. He is also an intelligent supervisor with a capability for lighting fires under his charges when necessary. He is highly respected and appreciated by all his colleagues and though he maintains a low-profile he moves easily in his official cover circles.

4. Mr. Piccolo has already proven his ability to perform at the next highest grade. Most supervisors have emphasized his potential for assuming ever increasing responsibilities. He has realized this potential with each succeeding assignment and particularly in his current one. He fits both the general and specific criteria for promotion. He has shown himself in possession of the requisite qualities of reliability, seriousness of purpose, imagination, and dedication. He has personally applied the specifics of his profession in a successful manner and has demonstrated his ability to supervise and inspire others in their application as well.

5. Mr. Piccolo's request for a one-year extension of his current tour has been approved. At the culmination of that period an appropriate assignment will be arranged for him commensurate with the Agency's needs, his desires and the continued furtherance of his career.

6. It is hereby strongly recommended that Mr. Piccolo be promoted from GS-12 to GS-13.

Theodore Shackley

Theodore G. Shackley
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

09657

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 February 1972

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 02 DAY 20 YEAR 72
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 2135-0694

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP/WH Division
Foreign Field
Branch 5 - Brasilia, Brazil Station
Rio do Janeiro, Brazil Base

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
Rio do Janeiro, Brazil ~~Base~~

11 POSITION TITLE
Attache, Political Officer
Ops Officer (D43)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1865

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR		05 2	15,732
GS	0136.01	12 4	$17,453

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/FF/BR 5/RIO DE JANEIRO BASE/0197 ✱ HOME BASE: WH

✱ Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 17 Feb 72	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 23 Feb '72

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTES CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	51825	WH	07037	5	3	12 08 [illegible]		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—CRGR 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR	37 LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV, TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
2-24-72		2-24-72

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

25 FEB 1972

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET/RYBAT - TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - HBRT-08619

DATE - 3 NOVEMBER 1971

TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

INFO - CHIEF OF STATION, BRASILIA

FROM - CHIEF OF BASE, RIO DE JANEIRO Joseph S. Piccolo

SUBJECT - FORWARDING OF FITNESS REPORT - HOWARD A. TRECKLER

REF - DIRECTOR 190967

FORWARDED HEREWITH IS A FITNESS REPORT FOR HOWARD AM TRECKLER.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

1. SENIOR FI OFFICER WITH SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES OVER ONE JUNIOR OFFICER AND ONE CAREER AGENT. S

2. STATION CP OFFICER WITH COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITIES OVER STATION AND BASE ACTIVITIES AND DIRECT AGENT HANDLING FUNCTIONS AGAINST CP AND RELATED TARGETS. S

3. CASOLOFFICER FOR SEVERAL SENSITIVE, COMPLEX, HIGH LEVEL PENETRATIONS OF VARIOUS HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS. S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION S

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

SUBJECT IS PERHAPS THE MOST MATURE, DEPENDABLE AND COMPETENT CASE OFFICER WE HAVE. HE HAS EXCELLED IN THE HANDLING OF INTRICATE, SENSITIVE PENETRATION OPERATIONS WHERE THE HIGHEST PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS ARE DEMANDED. HE CARRIES A VERY HEAVY WORK LOAD LIGHTLY AND IS A PRODIGIOUS CONTRIBUTOR IN BOTH OPERATIONAL AND INFORMATION REPORTING. HIS PERFORMANCE AS A SUPERVISOR HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, A GOOD SENSE OF DETAIL, PERCEPTIVENESS, FAIRNESS AND FIRMNESS. HE IS AT HIS BEST IN PRACTICAL SITUATIONS, HOWEVER COMPLEX AND OBSCURE, RATHER THAN IN DEALING WITH PHILOSOPHICAL OR THEORETICAL PROBLEMS BUT THIS IS OBVIOUSLY MORE A MATTER OF INCLINATION, THAN OF INTELLECT. HE IS HIGHLY RESPECTED AND APPRECIATED BY ALL HIS COLLEAGUES AND ESPECIALLY BY THIS SUPERVISORM

SUBJECT IS UNDER GRADE FOR HIS PERFORMANCE, EXPERIENCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES. HE IS OF ALL THE BASE OFFICERS MOST DESERVING OF A PROMOTION. A SEPARATE RECOMMENDATION TO THIS EFFECT IS BEING FORWARDED.

REVIEWING OFFICIAL COMMENTS

THE COS CONCURS EMPHATICALLY WITH THIS WELL-WRITTEN EVALUATION. THE SUBJECT IS VASTLY UNDER-RATED IN JKLANCE, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF HIS QUIET, UNASSUMING PERSONALITY. BUT HE IS A STRONG, VERY STRONG, OFFICER. HIS ABILITY TO HANDLE THE MOST DIFFICULT DETAIL SHOULD NOT DETRACT FROM HIS OVERALL CAPABILITIES. HE IS SOUND AS A ROCK, AND MERITS A PROMOTION, WHICH IS RECOMMENDED BY THE COS.

LESTER T. ARKLEIGH

DISTRIBUTION VIA TP
C/WHD

DISTRIBUTION VIA POUCH
COS, BRASILIA

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 May 1970

G
57

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 31 YEAR 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 0135 0694

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH/FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 5
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL STATION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

11 POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE POLITICAL OFF
OPS OFFICER (13)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0197

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR		05 1	$13,618
GS	0136.01	12 3	$15,138

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/DEV. COMP
APPROVED 259a ATTACHED

*HOME BASE WH

* Wash, D.C.

1 - Finance
2 - Security

Secur[illegible] 5/22
DB 6/12

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Henry L. Berthold C/WH/Pers	25 May 70	Paul M. [illegible]	[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTERS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51730	[illegible]	09037	5	3	12 08 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1–CSC 2–OFGH 3–FICA 5–NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0–NONE, 1–5 PT, 2–10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0–WAIVED, 1–YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0–NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1–NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2–BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3–BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1–YES, 2–NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1–YES, 2–NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 06-02-70 [illegible]

46 O P APPROVAL: James B. [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

G
60

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

NAME (Last, First, Middle) Piccolo, Joseph	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 [illegible] 1935	3. GRADE GS-12
OFFICE DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP WH/COG	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Officer	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 6815
PROPOSED STATION Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Ops Officer/5197/ GS-13	
TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE o/a 1 June 70	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 1

12. COMMENTS

Vice Robert Stone
Forms DS 1686 attached

[illegible] CSPS/B

13. DATE OF REQUEST 2 February 1970	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Susan E. Ruttenberg Susan E. Ruttenberg	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3D 5309 Hqs.	16. EXTENSION 6815

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

3 MAR [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 February 1970

'G
60

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PICCOLO, JOSEPH S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 02 DAY 08 YEAR 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 0135 0623	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE FOREIGN SERV. RES. OFF OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 06 2 12 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 10,962 $14,281

18. REMARKS * WASH, D.C.

FROM: DDP/WH/COG/ON ISLAND OPERATIONS BR./POS # 1159

* FOR TRAINING

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Henry L. Berthold C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 3 Feb 70	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Paul M. [illegible]	DATE SIGNED 6 Feb 70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY CODE 13	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51997	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 15013	23. INTEGREE CODE S	24. [illegible] CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12 05 55	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. [illegible] EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI [illegible] INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

G
42

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 02-10-70 JJK	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 02-10-70

FORM 3-69 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 JUNE 69

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658 ✓
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S. ✓

42

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 03 YEAR 69
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0135 0620
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
ON-ISLAND OPERATIONS BRANCH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE:
POL OFFICER
OPS OFFICER (14)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1159
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR		06 1	9721
GS	0136.01	12 2	$ 12580

18 REMARKS

FROM: Pos. #1152

X [illegible] D.C.

1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Personnel
DATE SIGNED: 26 Jun '69
18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul M. [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 2 July 69

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 NOOTAS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51500	WH	7523	S	1	12 08 35		

28 [illegible] EXPIRES MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REG NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

G
41

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 07-03-69 CK
46 O P APPROVAL: [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 07 03 69

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 Feb 69

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH [illegible] DAY [illegible] YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO CF ☐ / CF TO V ☒

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9135 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
THIRD COUNTRY BRANCH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
Pol officer (13)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1152

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 06 1 / 12 2

17 SALARY OR RATE: 9721 / $ 12580

18 REMARKS:

FROM: Pos.#0396, WH/Br.2/Managua, Nicaragua

Security Approval [illegible] 2-19-68
Clc 2-25-69

1 - Security
1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 17 Feb 69

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 20 Feb [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 34

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC [illegible] ALPHABETIC [illegible]

22 STATION CODE: [illegible]

23 INTEGREE CODE: 5

24 [illegible] CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR [illegible]

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LD: MO DA YR

28 [illegible] EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT

36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible]

46 O.P. APPROVAL: [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

Form 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

Executive Registry
68-3[illegible]2

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

68-3266

August 1, 1968

The Honorable
Richard M. Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
McLean, Virginia

Dear Dick:

As you know, the President and Mrs. Johnson visited Managua, Nicaragua on Monday, July 8, 1968, upon their return from the San Salvador Conference.

Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Ronald M. Pontius of the Presidential Protective Division, has informed me that Mr. Joseph Piccolo and Mr. Carl Jenkins were of particular assistance in establishing and coordinating the relations with the Nicaraguan security organizations, and President Somoza's staff. Mrs. Elizabeth Jenkin's assistance as an interpreter was also greatly appreciated.

Personally and on behalf of the United States Secret Service, I wish to extend my sincere appreciation and thanks to the above mentioned personnel for the capable and professional manner in which they performed their duties.

Sincerely,

James J. Rowley

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 AUGUST 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 9 DAY 15 YEAR 68
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF
7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 9135 1049
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

6
53

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 2
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

11 POSITION TITLE: ~~POLITICAL OFFICER~~ OPS OFFICER (13)
12 POSITION NUMBER: 0396
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 07 4 / 12 ~~2~~
17 SALARY OR RATE: 8,969 ✓ / $ ~~12,220~~ 12580

PSI 9-22-68.

18 REMARKS:

FROM: GS-11/4 $11,223

* Managua, Nicaragua

1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD, C/WH PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED: 28 Aug '68
18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Turbot
DATE SIGNED: 3 SEP 1968

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 ROSTERS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
32	10	51650	WH	5207	S	3	12 08 35	09 22 68	09 22 68

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR:
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - OTHER, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE) CODE:
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR:
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO:
34 SEX:
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT):
36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR:
37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR:
38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV, PROV TEMP) CODE:
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS CODE:
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)):
42 LEAVE CAT CODE:
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO) CODE, NO TAX EXEMPTIONS:
44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO) CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE:
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:
46 OP APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 4 Sep 68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

EYES ONLY
SECRET

16 JUL 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section B)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-12--Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo

1. It is recommended that Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo be promoted to the grade of GS-12. Mr. Piccolo has been in grade as a GS-11 since September 1966 and is presently serving as an operations officer at Managua, Nicaragua.

2. Mr. Piccolo is a promising young officer who first entered the Agency in 1957 as a clerk in Agency Records section (RI). He also did a tour in the Records Section of the Mexico City Station. After a short separation for military service, Mr. Piccolo returned to the Agency and later was appointed to the Junior Officer Training Program. Since his completion of that program he has served in Headquarters and Mexico City as an operations officer prior to his assignment to Managua in March of 1968.

3. Mr. Piccolo has consistently received high ratings from his superiors in the field and at Headquarters. He is an active operations officer with a special flair for agent handling. He has a good command of the Spanish language, is a dedicated employee of the Agency and has a great deal of growth potential. Since going to Managua he has been in charge of the Managua Station during the home leave absence of the Chief of Station for a period of almost two months, during which time the Station continued its high level of performance. While this was his first period of his career where he had supervisory responsibility, he did show himself to have ability in this area and is a further indication of his growth potential.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

EYES ONLY
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 JUNE 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: ~~REASSIGNMENT~~ - ~~CORRECTION~~

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH [illegible] DAY [illegible] YEAR [illegible]

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF XX

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 8135 1049

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 2
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

11 POSITION TITLE:
POLITICAL OFFICER
OPS OFFICER (13)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0396

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR		07 4	8,596 ✓
GS	0136.01	11 4	$10,623 ✓

18 REMARKS:

~~CORRECTION OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO FROM 2004 to 1049~~

+ Managua, Nicaragua

1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD
C/WH/PERSONNEL

DATE SIGNED: 27 Jun 68

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 1 JUL

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
31	10	51650	WH	52012	5	3	[illegible]		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - OASI 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA YR | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 3 - 10 PT | 36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR | 37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR | 38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46 O P APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 APRIL 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 25658

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 | DAY 21 | YEAR 68

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 8135 1094

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 2
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

11 POSITION TITLE:
POLITICAL OFFICER
OPS OFFICER (13)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0396

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, FB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	07 4 11 4	8,596 $10,623

18 REMARKS

* nufico

FROM: DDP/WH/1/MEXICO CITY/SLOT 0939

* Subject must engage in language study during this tour and fully qualify at the intermediate level upon completion of tour per [illegible].

1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
HENRY L. BERTHOLD C/WH/PERSONNEL	9 Apr 68		19 APR 1968

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	516652	WH	52073	5	3	12 05 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—CBGB 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVED 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 STATE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES; 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
4/22/68	McKech	

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

G-57

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	10 April 1967
1 SERIAL NUMBER	025658
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)	PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 05 DAY 07 YEAR 67
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6 FUNDS	V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	7135-0990
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	PL 88-643 Sect. 203
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11 POSITION TITLE	
12 POSITION NUMBER	
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	
16 GRADE AND STEP	11
17 SALARY OR RATE	$

18 REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	
DATE SIGNED	
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	
DATE SIGNED	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	
20 EMPLOY CODE	
21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	
22 STATION CODE	
23 INTEGREE CODE	
24 HOOTRS CODE	
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	
26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	
27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)	
28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30 RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-FICA, 3-NONE) CODE	2
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE; MO DA YR)	
EOD DATA	
33 SECURITY RFQ NO	
34 SEX	
35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT)	
36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	
37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	
38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE)	
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0-WAIVED, 1-YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS, 3-BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	
42 LEAVE CAT CODE	
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)	
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	04-19-67H
46 O.P. APPROVAL	See memo signed by D/Pers dated 3 APR 1967
DATE APPROVED	

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26 May 1967

Joseph S Piccolo

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

THROUGH : **Chief of Station, Mexico City**

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : Book Dispatch 5096 dated 12 August 1965

1. You have been found to be qualified as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System and have been so designated effective **7 May 1967**

2. Although such designation under present statutes is viewed favorably by most persons, the regulation governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interests. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, you are hereby notified of your right to appeal. An appeal with reasons therefore must be received in Headquarters within 60 days of the date of this memorandum or acceptance of designation will be assumed. Any questions that you may have in connection with your designation that cannot be answered by referring to referenced Book Dispatch should be forwarded to Headquarters.

3. We believe that the benefits of the Organization Retirement System are superior to the benefits of the Civil Service Retirement System. However, there are a few situations in which an employee *at the time of retirement* may have so many years of service (almost 37) that he would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service System. Because of this, the policy decision has been made that a participant in the Organization System who would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service System may, not later than one year prior to his retirement, apply to be removed from our system and transferred to the Civil Service System. Thus, you should not anticipate this contingency as a factor in deciding whether you regard your designation as a participant adverse to your best interests.

Richard B Egan

RICHARD B. EGAN

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

5 JUL 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section B)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-11, Joseph S. Piccolo

1. It is recommended that Joseph S. Piccolo be promoted from GS-10 to GS-11. Subject has been stationed in Mexico City since April 1965.

2. Chief of Station, Mexico City stated in his recommendation for promotion of Piccolo that Subject has been an unusually productive officer since his arrival in Mexico City. He is capable of carrying a large workload. He has initiative and drive and the quality of his work is uniformly excellent. His command of Spanish has enabled him to handle agents in that language without any difficulty. He has the ability to handle agents of widely varying ages and social levels. His ability to make himself at once liked and respected has contributed to make him an excellent agent handler. He has put to good use the professional training he received as a member of the JOT program.

3. The latest Fitness Report submitted on Subject dated 1 June 1966 gives subject an Outstanding in Agent Handling and an overall performance of Strong. This Fitness Report states that every operation assigned to Subject has shown marked improvement under his tutelage, that his operational reporting is exemplary, and that he has won the admiration and respect of his colleagues and agent assets alike. The Rating Officer states that he has never served with a more promising young case officer in his 18 years of KUBARK experience. Promotion of this officer is fully endorsed by the undersigned.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 SEPT 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 09 DAY 25 YEAR 66	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6 FUNDS V TO V · V TO CF CF TO V XX CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE 7135 0990	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11 POSITION TITLE POLIT OFFICER OPS OFFICER (~~12~~) (11)	12 POSITION NUMBER 0939	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 7 3 11 ~~1~~ 3	17 SALARY OR RATE 7,975 $ ~~10,100~~ ~~9851~~ 10,166

18 REMARKS

FROM: GS-10/~~7~~ $8,997

C 46

1 S Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Robert D. Cashman C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 19 Sept 66	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED SEP 21 1966

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	51620	WH	45025		3	12 08 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR		33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
							SCD DATA		

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVER 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
					216 55	.00			

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 09-22-66N	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED

FORM 8-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 AUGUST 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH AUG DAY 29 YEAR 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ XX CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6135 0990	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY STATION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO		
11 POSITION TITLE Polit. Officer ~~OPS OFFICER~~	12 POSITION NUMBER 0939	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR ~~GS (11)~~	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 07 2 ~~10 2~~ 3	17 SALARY OR RATE 7245 $ ~~8,170~~ 8440

18 REMARKS

FROM: GS 9 2/$7,465

I certify that the promo-
tion is absolutely essen-
tial in accord with [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 23 January 1965.

Recorded By
CSPD
PM

1-Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERSONNEL	DATE SIGNED 27 Aug 65	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Kenneth L. Corbet	DATE SIGNED 27 AUG 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 22	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 57300	ALPHABETIC WH	22 STATION CODE 45015	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE 3	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12 08 35	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RES'V PROV./TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVED 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 8/27/65 dlh		46 O P APPROVAL K L Corbet		DATE APPROVED 27 AUG 1965					

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION - DEPT. OF STATE

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 27 | YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135 0990

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11 POSITION TITLE:
POLIT. OFFICER
OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0939

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 07 2
~~1009~~ ~~2~~ 3

17 SALARY OR RATE: 7245
$ ~~8170~~ 7710

18 REMARKS

all SICK AND all HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPT. OF STATE

MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: W Roney
M.RONEY COVER OFFICER X5013

DATE SIGNED

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
55	10	57 300	WH	45075		3	12 22 35		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR, RESV PROV, TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 9/20/65

46 O P APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

EYES ONLY
SECRET

8 JUL 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: CS/CS Panel C

SUBJECT : Proposed Nomination for Promotion to GS-10
Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo

1. Mr. Piccolo's work since completion of the Career Training Program has been reflected in a series of progress reports.

2. At this time, in view of his pending transfer and my own, I should like to recommend him for promotion. His performance to date merits it.

3. As I have stated in his fitness reports and in recommending him for the Career Training Program, Mr. Piccolo already is a capable operations officer and has unusual potential. His experience, common sense and flair for operations make him even now the equal of most officers who are serving in grades considerably higher than his.

approved
8/21/65

by Jacob D. Esterline
William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

EYES ONLY

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 22 JUNE 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 7 DAY 4 YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135-0990

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
42 DDP WH
G FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (11)

12 POSITION NUMBER: ~~0115~~ 0139

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (~~12~~ 11)

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 09 2

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 7,465

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDP/SAS/INTELLIGENCE STAFF/RESEARCH SEC./0908/WASH.D.C

FORM 259 HAS BEEN SUBMITTED Security Approval Granted by Pers. on/as 6/25/65 Jlc 7/15/65

52 G TO BE EFFECTIVE ON OR BEFORE 4 JULY 1965. MR. PICCOLO WILL REPLACE MR. RAYMOND J. SWIDER WHO WILL BE REASSIGNED

Recorded By CS. D

1-Security

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Edward F. O'Malley
ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 23 June

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 7/14/65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
30	10	51620	ww	45675		3	12 08 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE

39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-12-65 HH

46 O P APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 7/14/65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 February 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, Joseph S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 2-3 DAY YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 COS CENTER NO CHARGEABLE: 5235-1162

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Special Affairs Staff
~~Counter~~-Intelligence Staff
~~Operations~~ Section
Research

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS. OFFICER (C)

12 POSITION NUMBER: ~~0888~~ 0908

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (10)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 (2)

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 7465

18. REMARKS

From: DDS/OTR/JOTC, D.C., #748.

See 46

I concur in the Change of Service Designation from "SJ" to "D":

Joseph S. Piccolo

CONCURRENCE:

Robert B. Freeman
Chief, JOTP

1 cy Security

Recorded By
CSPD
JMB

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: 2/1/65

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 24-2-65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO	DA	YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO.	DA	YR.
31	10	49200	SAS	7513		1	12	08	33						

28 NTE EXPIRES MO.	DA.	YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO.	DA.	YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO	DA	YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO	DA	YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI-HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVED 1—YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: JOTC (M) 03/04/65

46 OP APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 July 1964

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 25658
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, Joseph S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 19 | YEAR 64
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS	XX	V TO V		V TO CF	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5275 2100
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OTR
Junior Officer Trainee Corps

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington,D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: JR OF TRAINEE
12 POSITION NUMBER: 748
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SJ

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0090.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 9 2
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 7260

18 REMARKS

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert B. Freeman, C/JOTP
DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert B. Freeman for MATTHEW BAIRD, DTR
DATE SIGNED: 7/16/64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE:
20 EMPLOY CODE:
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE:
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HDQTRS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 12 | DA. 08 | YR. 35
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA | YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO | DA | YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO | DA. | YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO:
34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE:
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 17 JUL 1964
46 O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 7/15/64

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 December 1963

L

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 625658
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, Joseph S.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 05 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ▶ XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4275 1190 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/OTR Junior Officer Trainee Corps
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: JR OF TRAINEE
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0748
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SJ
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0090.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $6600 ✓
18. REMARKS:

Security Approval Granted by Form. [illegible] 12/20/63 [illegible] 12/23/63

Subject has concurred in Change of Service Designation from D to SJ.
From DDP/Special Affairs Staff, FI/CI Branch, Pos. No. 683.

Recorded by CSPD DW

[illegible] for CSCS
[illegible]
Sec, [illegible]

cc: Security.

37
F

P
M

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert B. Freeman
Robert B. Freeman, C/JOTP
DATE SIGNED: 12/10/63

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert B. Freeman
✓ MATTHEW BAIRD, DTR
DATE SIGNED: 12/17/63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGRATED CODE	24. [illegible] CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	5730	TLTC	75013		1	12	08	35		

EOD DATA

44. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12/11/63 ul
45. C.S. APPROVAL: [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 12/16/63

SECRET

GROUP 1

CONFIDENTIAL

27 JUN 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph S. Piccolo

THROUGH : Chairman/CS Panel/Section D

SUBJECT : Application for Junior Officer Training Program

1. I am pleased to inform you that you have been accepted for the JOTP in the class of January 1964. Let me congratulate you and wish for you the maximum profit and pleasure from your proposed training.

2. You will remain in your present component until shortly before the beginning of the Integrated Training Program. At that time you will be reassigned.

3. Should you have any further questions, do not hesitate to call on Program staff members.

/s/

MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

cc: Chairman/CS Panel/Sec. D ✓

Distribution:
- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - DTR
- 1 - OPers/Official File

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 March 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025658
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, Joseph S.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 28 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3232-1000-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

2
A

DDP
Special Affairs Staff
FI/CI Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ~~[illegible]~~ OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~[illegible]~~ 0683
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ~~[illegible]~~
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: ~~[illegible]~~ 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 (2)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 6295
18. REMARKS:

Promotion recommendation ~~[illegible]~~ attached.

NOTE ON 1150:
Intelligence Analyst occupying Operations Officer position

Recorded by CSPD

19a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Louis W. Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/SAS/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: 9/25/63

19b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL
DATE SIGNED: 4/24/63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23.	24. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH
22	10	1300	SAS	20013		1	12 08 35

FOR DATA

5 09 11 63

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 04/21/63

44. C.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 8-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(8)

SECRET

6 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Clandestine Services Career Service Panel

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion of Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo

1. It is recommended that Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo be promoted from GS-7 to GS-8. He has been in grade GS-7 since 19 July 1960 and was assigned to what is now the Special Affairs Staff (formerly Task Force W) on 27 August 1962.

2. As long ago as 16 June 1960 when he was a GS-6 Mr. Piccolo was considered to have merited promotion to GS-9, but an Agency policy precluding multiple grade promotions prevented his being considered for GS-9 at that time. He was promoted to GS-7 on 19 July 1960. On 4 May 1961 Mr. Piccolo was recommended for promotion to GS-8 at a time when he was expected to leave the Agency in order to comply with his obligation for military service. The recommendation was not approved on the grounds that promotion spaces were limited. Mr. Piccolo served in the Air Force between 4 October 1961 and 27 August 1962 when he returned to the Agency and began working in the CI Branch of the Special Affairs Staff.

3. Mr. Piccolo has demonstrated an aptitude for CI and FI operations and is one of the most promising younger men in the CI Branch. His performance since returning from military service has been superior in all respects.

4. I am happy to recommend Mr. Piccolo for promotion.

Harold F. Swenson

Harold F. Swenson
C/SAS/CI

[illegible]

Recommend Approval:

Desmond FitzGerald
C/SAS

Date

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 June 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, Joseph S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REEMPLOYMENT (MILITARY) (cas/

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 23 | YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X | V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3232-1000-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Task Force W
FI - CI Branch

2
A

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ~~ASSISTANT~~ ASST (O)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0635

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (O)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28

16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 (O) 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~5520~~ 5,685

18. REMARKS:

C 02/60

OFFICE/DIVISION [illegible]
Date
WP

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Louis W Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 27 Jun 62

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23.	24.	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
17	10	6136	TFW	15613		1	12 08 35	07 24 60	07 22 62 ~~07 23 61~~

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		1		FOD DATA	10775	M 1

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38.	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
0	12 22 54	12 25 57		C 1	265-44-191

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	42. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED	CODE	TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED	CODE	MARITAL STATUS	STATE CODE
0	6		1	0		1	2	08

41. CODE:
0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MO.)
3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MO.)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Kearns 6/28/62

46. C.P. APPROVAL: James W Watson
DATE APPROVED: 7/11/62

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-5) 10775

REQUEST DATE (6-11) 12 July 1962

AME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) (12-26) PICCOLO, JOSEPH STEPHAN

YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30) 1935

OSITION TITLE Intelligence Assistant

POSITION NUMBER (31-36) 0685

OCCUP. CODE (37-43) 0301.28

GRADE (43-44) GS-07

OCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY) Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH) DDP/TFW

ORGN. CODE (45-48) 1

TYPE OF APPLICANT ☒ REGULAR ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ CONTRACT ☐ MILITARY

CONVERSION ACTION Reemployment Mil

IF OTHER, SPECIFY

TYPE OF APPL. (49) 9

NAME OF REQUESTER (OR OFFICIAL) E.D. Echols/hc

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS ☐ HQS ☐ USF ☐ FF ☐ V ☐ UV

HDQTRS. & FUND (50) 1

CLEARANCE REQUIRED PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP) ☐ SECRET ☐ FULL

CLEARANCE (51)

ATTACHMENTS ☐ PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ☐ APPENDIX I ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER ☐ PHOTOGRAPH(S) ☐ APPENDIX II ☐ REPORT OF INTERVIEW

RECRUIT. CODE (52-54)

VETERANS STATUS ☐ MALE - VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - VETERAN ☐ MALE - NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - NON-VETERAN

VET PREF. & SEX (55) 1

IAR attached. Your Case # 109709.

Re-Employment Military

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

FORM 3-61 377 USE PREVIOUS ED

SECRET

MPO I

(9)

19 June 1962

Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 "E" Street N.W.
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the instructions I received upon departing the Agency for Military Duty, I hereby apply for reinstatement with the Agency, effective 27 August 1962. My Unit is scheduled for discharge on 24 August 1962.

Since 1 October 1961, I have been serving on active duty with the United States Air Force in the 121st Tactical Fighter Squadron which is a part of the 113th Tactical Fighter Wing, and have been stationed at Andrews AFB, Washington, D.C. with the exception of several TDY trips as noted below. I have not left the continental limits of the United States in this tour of Active Duty.

16 Oct 61 to 3 Nov 61 Nellis AFB, Las Vegas, Nevada
27 Nov 61 to 2 Dec 61 Myrtle Beach AFB, Myrtle Beach, S.C.
12 Feb 62 to 17 Mar 62 Myrtle Beach AFB, Myrtle Beach, S.C.
2 May 62 to 11 May 62 Robins AFB, Warner-Robins, Ga.

My duties have been as an Administrative Specialist, first in the Unit Maintenance Section then in the Unit Orderly Room, with an additional duty of acting First Sergeant and Disaster Control NCOIC.

My financial situation dictates that I return to gainful employment at the earliest possible date, ergo the request for 27 August 1962. However, the need to attend to some personal affairs will require that I be absent from Washington D.C. for the week of 3 through 7 September 1962. Therefore, if at all possible, I would like to be placed on five (5) days of advanced annual leave for 3 through 7 September or five days LWOP. If neither of the two aforementioned requests can be granted, then I request reinstatement effective 10 September 1962.

[illegible]

I do not anticipate any further travel from the Washington D.C. area prior to my release from active duty and will be available for personal interview if desired. I may be contacted at the following address and phone number:

SSGT Joseph S. Piccolo AF22928914
121st Tactical Fighter Squadron
Andrews AFB, Washington 25, D.C.
Tel: 981-3218

Yours Sincerely,

Joseph S. Piccolo

OPF

TERM

SSGT Joseph S. Piccolo AF22928914
121st Tactical Fighter Squadron
Andrews Air Force Base
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Piccolo:

This will acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 17 January 1962 regarding your unpaid annual leave.

We have been advised by our payroll office that a check for your unpaid annual leave will be mailed to you on 16 February 1962, in accordance with your request.

Very truly yours,

[illegible]

H. F. Heggen
Office of Personnel

Distribution:
- 0-Addressee
- 1-OPF
- 1-C/BSD
- 1-BSD Reader

OP/BSD/ERDougherty:lab (24 Jan 62)

121st Tactical Fighter Squadron
Andrews Air Force Base
Washington 25, D.C.
17 January 1962

Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 "E" Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

On 4 October 1961 I separated from the Agency as I was called to active duty with the United States Air Force in the defense mobilization. I left my annual leave, sick leave, and retirement accounts in escrow status as I planned to return to the Agency upon release from the military. I still intend to return to the Agency. However, I would now like to be paid in coin of the realm for the amount of annual leave which I left in escrow. It is further requested that my sick leave and retirement accounts be maintained on an escrow status.

Please forward correspondence on the above to the following address:

SSGT Joseph S. Piccolo AF22928914
121st Tactical Fighter Squadron
Andrews Air Force Base
Washington 25, D.C.

Yours Sincerely,

Joseph S. Piccolo

1/24/62 Mrs. Betty McMahon advised me that a check for unpaid annual leave would be mailed to subject on 16 Feb 62. We forwarded thermofax of this letter to Payroll Branch for attention of Mrs. McMahon in accordance with her request.
E. Daugherty

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

NAME (Print or type — Last, First, Middle Initial): PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.

DATE: 13 April 1962

ORGANIZATION (Formal Unit): DDP/WH/ 4

PAY NO. (If required by agency): 025658

I hereby apply for 80 hours of Military (Specify type*) leave beginning April 16, 1962 (Month Day Hour) a.m. XXX and ending April 27, 1962 (Month Day Hour) XXXX p.m.

*e.g. Annual, Sick, Leave Without Pay, Compensatory.

I understand that any annual leave authorized in excess of the amount available to me during the leave year will be charged to leave without pay.

NOTE TO EMPLOYEE: *If you are applying for sick leave, complete the appropriate statement below.*

During this absence I was:

- ☐ Incapacitated for duty by sickness or injury.
- ☐ Incapacitated for duty by pregnancy and confinement
- ☐ Undergoing medical, dental, or optical examination or treatment
- ☐ Required to care for a member of my family (__________ (Name and relationship)) with contagious disease. __________ (Specify disease)
- ☐ Required to be absent because of exposure to contagious disease __________ (Specify disease and explain circumstances of exposure)

This Military Leave requested in accordance with Public Law 87-378.
Cost Control Chargeable: 2635 5000 8021

NAME AND ADDRESS OF ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR PRACTITIONER (If any): I am currently on active military duty.

TELEPHONE NO.:

REMARKS: XPlease mail check to:SSGT Joseph S.Piccolo,AF22928914,121st Tactical Fighter Sqdns
Andrews Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

STANDARD FORM 71
Revised April 1959
71-104

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE

U. S. Civil Service Commission
Chapter 11—FPM

4/14/62

Orig fwd to Phil Bowers – x8246 1414 Barton Hall.
ems

3 April 1962

Mr. H.F. Hegger
Chief, Benefits and Services Division
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hegger:

Enclosed please find the signed Application for Leave as requested in your letter. Your attention and consideration of this matter in my behalf is greatly appreciated.

Please forward any further correspondence on this matter to my address at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington D.C.

Hoping for an early release from duty and return to the fold, I remain,

Yours Sincerely,

Joseph S. Piccolo

RECEIVED

2

SSGT Joseph S. Piccolo, AF22928914
121st Tactical Fighter Squadron
Andrews Air Force Base
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Piccolo:

We have reviewed your Agency personnel file in connection with your military separation which was effective 4 October 1961.

Our interpretation of Comptroller General rulings indicate that the provisions of Public Law 87-378 would preclude any further military leave for employees in your category during the calendar year 1961. However, this is not viewed as erasing your entitlement to military leave in 1962 for this period of active duty.

Our records reveal that you were granted 3 days military leave in October 1961 for this tour of active duty, and accordingly, we believe that you are entitled to an additional 12 days of paid military leave.

We have enclosed an Application for Leave (Standard Form 71) for your signature and return to us. We will complete the form for you and forward it to your office for their approval.

Very truly yours,

H. F. Heggen
Chief, Benefits and Services Division

Enclosure:
Standard Form 71
Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - OGC
1 - D/Pers
1 - C/BSD
~~1~~ - OPF
1 - BCB R[illegible]r

/s/ H Richard [illegible]
CONCUR: Office of General Counsel

OP/BSD/BCB/[illegible]Dougherty:p[illegible] (15 March 62)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 September 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 25658

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): PICCOLO, Joseph S. effdate 10/4/61 EKS

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: SEPARATION (MILITARY) LWD

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH DAY YEAR ~~[illegible]~~

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2635-5000-2021

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): C.S. REG. 3[illegible].2

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH Divn.
Branch 4

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Intelligence ~~[illegible]~~ ASST. (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0629

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (7)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28

16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 (2)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 5520

18. REMARKS

Subject requests that payment for unused Annual Leave and retirement benefits be held in escrow pending his return from military service.

mil Leave 2-4 Oct 61. EKS

LWD - 29 Sep 61

1 cy to Payroll

[illegible] 1/3

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: PC Bowers
PHILIP C. BOWERS Chief, WH/Personnel

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: James W. Watham

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

20. ACTION CODE: 48

21. EMPLOYEE CODE: 12

22. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC

23. STATION CODE

24. INTEG. CODE

25. [illegible] CODE: 1

26. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 12 08 35

27. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

28. DATE [illegible]: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 4 BG 00 5 1

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA

EOD DATA

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. [illegible]: 1 = YES 2 = NO

39. CODE

40. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE HEALTH INS. CODE

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE

42. [illegible] CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; TAX EXEMPT [illegible]

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED; CODE; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. [illegible] 10/3/61

46. C.P. APPROVAL: [illegible] 10/3/61

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A

SECRET

(4)

PSC1 . CCT 1961

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OLF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION SEPARATION (MILITARY)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 04 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2035 5000 8021	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY C.S. REG. 35.2	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
11. POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE ASST	12. POSITION NUMBER 0629	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0301.28	16. GRADE AND STEP 07 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 5520

18. REMARKS

ANNUAL LEAVE AND RETIREMENT TO BE HELD IN ESCROW.

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions (4-61)

HEADQUARTERS
113TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING
District of Columbia Air National Guard
Andrews Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C.

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 228)

13 September 1961

1. By direction of the President, the following named Airmen, (ANGUS), are ordered to extended active duty IAW Special Order G-34, Hq Tactical Air Command, Dated 1 September 1961 Involuntary, IAW AFM 45-2, 1 May 1961.
ADN Number: ANG 002.
ASSIGNMENT: Relieved from 121st Tactical Fighter Squadron (SD), District of Columbia Air National Guard, Andrews Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C. and assigned to 121st Tactical Fighter Squadron (SD), Andrews Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C., Tactical Air Command, with further assignment 12th Air Force.
REPORTING DATA: Effective date of entry 1 October 1961. Individuals will proceed to Andrews Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C. on effective date of duty. Report to Commander, 121st Tactical Fighter Squadron (SD), not later than 0800, 1 October 1961.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Continuation on active duty is upon successful completion of physical examination to be accomplished as soon as practicable after reporting for duty unless already accomplished. Individuals not successfully completing physical examination will be processed for release IAW AFM 35-4. AUTHORITY: Authority confirmed by Public Law 117, 87th Congress; Hq USAF Message AFCOP 98401, 31 August 1961 and DAF AFOMO Letter 653M, 29 August 1961.
TRANSPORTATION: Travel as directed is necessary in the Military Service. Travel by privately owned conveyance with NO days travel time authorized. If privately owned conveyance is not used, travel time will be the time of common carrier used. Transportation of dependents and movement of household goods is not authorized except as specifically provided by AFM 45-2.
FUNDING: AMN PAY & ALWS: 5723500 248-211 P514 S503725 0100
TRAVEL: 5723500 P534.02 S503725 2132 2290

AIRMEN

SSgt ARTHUR S JETT SR, AF13476686, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 8 April 1962)(HOR: Box 322A, 300 Belle Fonte Lane, Clinton, Md)

SSgt HARRY E KNUTSON, AF37562536, PAFSC 70250, DAFSC 70250, (Date of Separation: 12 November 1963)(HOR: 822 Green Street, Alexandria, Va)

SSgt BARRY G MADDEN, AF13463856, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 15 March 1963)(HOR: 7006 Greig St, Apt 28, Washington 27, DC)

SSgt MELVIN O MYERS, AF13535676, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 1 May 1964)(HOR: 5411 Dumphrey Drive, Washington 28, DC)

SSgt GRANVILLE R NICHOLS, AF13464103, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43171C, (Date of Separation: 5 May 1963)(HOR: 6423 Pendall Drive SE, Washington 20, DC)

SO 228 HQ 113TH TACFTRWG, DCANG, Andrews AFB, Washington 25, DC, 13 Sep 61

SSgt JAMES J PENNINGTON, AF134[illegible]14, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 28 August 1962)(HOR: Cheltenham, Md)

SSgt JOSEPH S PICCOLA, AF22928914, PAFSC 70250, DAFSC 70250, (Date of Separation: 8 September 1963)(HOR: 1850 Columbia Pike, Arlington 4, VA)

SSgtHAROLD S QUILLEN JR, AF13546060, PAFSC 27150, DAFSC 27150, (Date of Separation: 26 June 1962)(HOR: 3404 79th Ave SE, Washington 28, DC)

SSgt RAYMOND D SHAUVER, AF16431357, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 24 February 1963)(HOR: Box [illegible]1, Clinton, Md)

SSgt ROBERT J SPEIDEL, AF22928352, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 1 March 1962)(HOR: Old Stage Rd, Mitchellville, Md)

SSgt CLIFFORD N STONE, AF13466764, PAFSC 64650, DAFSC 64570, (Date of Separation: 13 March 1964)(HOR: 909 Emerson Street NE, Washington, DC)

SSgt JOHN J TOLTOWICZ, AF13444357, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 26 April 1964)(HOR: 122 72th St, Seat Pleasant, Md)

A1C RONALD E ANDERSON, AF22928298, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 24 September 1963)(HOR: 908 Hudson Ave, Takoma Park, Md)(Over 4 Yrs Svc)

A1C ROBERT D BARNES, AF18501663, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 7 October 1963)(HOR: 7608 Atwood Drive,District Heights, Md)(Over 4 Yrs Svc)

A1C JOHN F BLOCK, AF22928211, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 10 March 1962)(HOR: 214 S. Adam Street, Arlington 4, Va) (Over 4 Yrs Svc)

A1C CARL W BRAGG, AF13574198, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 12 August 1963)(HOR: 4 W. Nelson Street, Apt 302, Alexandria, Va)(Over 4 Yrs Svc)

A1C JIMMY L CARTER, AF18496933, PAFSC 43151C,DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 3 June 1963)(HOR: 4704 Hudson Ave, Apt 3, Washington 23, DC)(Over 4 Yrs Svc)

A1C EDWARD J JENKINS, AF22932705, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 18 January 1963)(HOR: 3594 Martha Curtis Drive, Alexandria, Va)(Over 4 Yrs Svc)

A1C FRANCIS M KOSCHEKA, AF23739492, PAFSC 43151C, DAFSC 43151C, (Date of Separation: 7 April 1964)(HOR: 7354 Forrest Rd, Apt 201, Hyattsville, Md)(Over 4 Yrs Svc)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Emerson H Cashour

EMERSON H CASHOUR
CWO W-3, DCANG
Ass't Administrative Officer

DISTRIBUTION
P

	V to V		V to UV	**SECRET** (When Filled In)	**REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION**
	UV to V		UV to UV		

DATE PREPARED Mo Da Yr

1. Serial No	2. Name (Last First Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None 0 5 Pt 1 10 Pt 2	Code	5. Sex	6. EOD Mo	Da	Yr
12[illegible]	PICCOLO JOSEPH C	12	04	35		0	M 1	02	04	57

7. SCD Mo	Da	Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes 1 No 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav Mo	Da	Yr	11. FEGLI Yes 1 No 2	Code	12. LCD Mo	Da	Yr	13. Mil Serv Credit LCD Yes 1 No 2	Code
12	27	54		1	50 USCA 403 J						02	04	57		2

3A

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 4	4617	WASH., D.C.	75013

16. Dept - Field (Dept - USHq - Frgn)	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No	19. Serv	20. Occup Series
	2	INTELL ASST	0629	GS	0301.28 ✓

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	25. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	26. Appropriation Number
06 1 2	$ ~~4459~~ 4995	0	06	28	59	~~06~~	~~26~~	~~60~~	235 1000 1000 ✓

ACTION 06 25 61

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff Date Mo	Da	Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	07	24	60	REGULAR	01	

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
	4617		75013

33. Dept - Field (Dept - USHq - Frgn)	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No	36. Serv	37. Occup Series
	2			GS	✓

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	42. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	43. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ ~~4980~~ 5355		07	24	60	07	23	61	✓

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) J. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)	Date Approved
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) John Washinko X8242		

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	Mooney	7/21/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	WK	7-26-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	W. Kearney	7-25-60

Remarks

Recorded by
CSPD
7-22-60

☐ Continued On Reverse Side

FORM NO. 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(4)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
525596	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	12	[illegible]	3[illegible]	[illegible]	M 1	0[illegible]	[illegible]	57			
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code
12	27	54	1	50 USCA 403 J				1	[illegible]	[illegible]	57	2

DC

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
CS/CS DEV COMP DDP WH DIVISION	4688	WASH., D.C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
1	MAIL AND FILE SUP	011060	GS	0305.05

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
06 1	$ 4490	DS	06	28	59	06	28	60	0320 1998

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	01	04 17 60	REGULAR	01	

3

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 4	4617	WASH., D. C.	

33. Dept. - Field Dept - X USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	INTELL ASST	D-9 BA-629	GS	0301.28

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
06 1	$ 4490	D							0235 1000 1000 ~~[illegible]~~

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
PAT CASSELL X8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		4/14/60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		4-14-60

Remarks Staffing Complement Change.

2 copies to Security.

Recorded by
ESPB
4-12-60

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph S. Piccolo

VIA : Chief, WH

1. The problem of effective management of the operational records of the Clandestine Services is one of our most important responsibilities. In this connection, you have been selected by your Division, and authorized by the Clandestine Services Records Committee, to act as Records Officer for your component. Your selection is based on your professional qualifications to carry out an assignment requiring experience, judgment, and a knowledge of the objectives of the Clandestine Services. A copy of this memorandum will be placed in your official personnel folder to record your appointment as Records Officer.

2. You are to act on behalf of your Division or Staff element in authorizing the destruction of material of no value to the Clandestine Services in accordance with criteria established for this purpose. You are empowered to authorize the destruction of documents and index cards recommended for destruction by other members of your Branch, and to desensitize KAPOK and RYBAT material which is no longer sensitive or which has been restricted in error. Your signature will be recognized by RID as that of an officially appointed Records Officer.

3. At the meeting of 15 March 1960 , you were briefed on the details of your duties as Records Officer. It is now considered that you will be able fully to execute your duties as Records Officer and thus make a real contribution to the CS Records Management Program.

Wendell E. Little

WENDELL E. LITTLE
DDP/RMO

cc: Personnel Jacket of Addressee

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No 525658	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) PICCOLO JOSEPH S	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 12 Da. 06 Yr. 35	4. Vet Pref. None 0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2 Code 0	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 02 Da. 04 Yr. 57
7. SCD Mo. 12 Da. 27 Yr. 54	8. CSC Ret-t. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 02 Da. 04 Yr. 57
					13. Mil. Serv. Credit Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

8

14. Organizational Designations COP WH BRANCH III MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	Code 4652	15. Location Of Official Station MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	Station Code 35075

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code 5	17. Position Title MAIL AND FILE SUP	18. Position No. 0510	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0305.05

21. Grade & Step 06 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 4490	23. SD DS	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 57	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 60	26. Appropriation Number 0135-5700-3000 ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code ~~[illegible]~~	28. Eff. Date Mo. 01 Da. 10 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

DC

31. Organizational Designations CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT DDP/WH DIVISION	Code 0138	32. Location Of Official Station *WASHINGTON, D. C.	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code 1	34. Position Title	35. Position No. 01160	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number 0320-1998

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) PCBowers P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Pat Cassell X8242	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		1-11-60	D. Placement		
B. Pos Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved B.		

Remarks * OTHER - PENDING LWOP AT EXPIRATION OF ANNUAL LEAVE

~~[illegible]~~AL. To be effective beginning of first pay period in January 1960. Subject will be going on Leave Without Pay.

2 copies to Security Office.

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 12 Da. 08 Yr. 35	4. Vet Pref (None 0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 0
5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. Da. Yr.	7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.
13. Mil. Serv. Credit, Etc. (Yes-1, No-2) Code			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT DDP/WH DIVISION	Code	15. Location Of Official Station WASHINGTON, D. C.	Station Code
16. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code /	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv. / 20. Occup. Series
21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate $	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 6 Da. 28 Yr. 59
25. PSI Due Mo. 6 Da. 26 Yr. 60	26. Appropriation Number 0320-1998		

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action LEAVE WITHOUT PAY (Not to exceed 12 mos.)	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code	30. Separation Data	

W. PC

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

Cancelled per [illegible] 1-25-60

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
33. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code /	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv. / 37. Occup. Series
38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.
42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number		

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER P C Bowers	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Pat Cassell X8242	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		12/1/59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		1-11-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

Leave Without Pay to begin upon expiration of annual leave. LWOP status not to exceed twelve months.

1 copy to Security 1 copy to Finance

L-1

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. [illegible]	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) [illegible]	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority [illegible]	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI 12. TCD Yes-1 No-2 Code Mo. Da. Yr. 13. Mil. Serv. Cred. etc. Yes-1 No-2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH III MEXICO CITY, [illegible] STATION	Code [illegible]	15. Location Of Official Station MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	Station Code [illegible]
16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title [illegible] SUP	18. Position No. [illegible]	19. Serv. / 20. Occup. Series [illegible]
21. Grade & Step 05 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ [illegible]	23. SD [illegible]	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. / 25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. / 26. Appropriation Number 9 [illegible]

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code [illegible]	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. 6 15 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code d	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 1	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title 7, 6	35. Position No.	36. Serv. GS 37. Occup. Series
38. Grade & Step 6 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 4430	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 6 21 59 42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 6 26 60 43. Appropriation Number

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Ronald Brandon X3242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[illegible]	6 [illegible] 59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	6-25-59	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Hancock	6-27-59

Remarks

[illegible] 13 5 [illegible] 33

Recorded by CSPD

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION SECRET

1. Serial No. 52558	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) PICCOLO JOSEPH S	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr. 12 [illegible] [illegible]	4. Vet. Pref. (None 0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 0
5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. Da. Yr. 2 04 57	7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr. 12 27 54	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr. 12 [illegible] 57
13. Mil. Serv. Credit, Etc. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH III MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	Code 4651	15. Location Of Official Station MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	Station Code 45075
16. Dept.-Field (Dept.-, Unfld.-, Frgn.-) Code 5	17. Position Title MAIL AND FILE CLERK	18. Position No. 510	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0305.05	21. Grade & Step 04 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 3850. ~~[illegible]~~	23. SD — DS
24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 02 04 57	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 02 09 [illegible]	26. Appropriation Number 8 3570 55 000	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. 29 JUN 1958	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 4652	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
33. Dept.-Field (Dept.-, Unfld.-, Frgn.-) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.
37. Occup. Series	38. Grade & Step 5 1	39. Salary Or Rate 4040. $ ~~3670.00~~	40. SD
41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 6 29 59	43. Appropriation Number	

8

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
PC Bowers
P. C. Bowers [illegible]/Personnel Officer

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
John Washinko X6242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

L 1

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET

[redacted]

Air Pouch

HMM-T-242
RYBAT-0728

Chief, WH Division

4 June 1958

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Administrative

Promotion Recommendation - [redacted] PICCOLO, Joseph S.

ACTION REQUESTED: Consideration of recommended promotion

1. It is recommended that [redacted] be promoted from GS-4 to GS-6. [redacted] has been in grade since 4 February 1957 and has been on duty at the Mexico City Station since 2 December 1957.

2. Since his arrival at this Station, [redacted] has demonstrated his ability to assume increasing responsibility and definite potential as a supervisor. He has displayed initiative and intelligence in the handling of records management problems and has come up with several time saving suggestions which have been adopted with resulting efficiency. He is a conscientious and very hard worker, putting in many hours of overtime in an attempt to bring the files up to date.

3. A separate dispatch is being prepared which will recommend a reorganization of the slots presently on the Mexico City T/O for the Registry Section, in order to bring the gradesinto a more realistic relation to the greatly increased workload which has developed during the past two years. A request for the reclassification of [redacted] slot, Slot #BAF-402 to GS-7 will be included in this separate dispatch, along with appropriate job descriptions.

Winston M. Scott
[redacted]

BMT
3 June 1958

Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

[redacted]

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION (10 Oct 57)

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MR. JOSEPH E. PICCOLO	3. Date Of Birth Mo 12 Da 8 Yr 35	4. Vet. Pref. None-1 5 Pt.-2 10 Pt.-3	Code 0	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr			
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2	Code 1	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

VOUCHERED

14. Organizational Designations DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Index Section	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code

16. Dept.- Field Dept. - X Ufld. Fran. -	Code	17. Position Title File Clerk	18. Position No. 424.09	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0305.01				

21. Grade & Step GS-4 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 3415	23. SD DB	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 5-2309-23

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment Transfer of Funds	Code 400	28. Eff. Date Mo 11 Da 03 Yr 57	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

UNVOUCHERED

31. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch III Mexico City, Mexico Station	Code 4657	32. Location Of Official Station Mexico City, Mexico	Station Code 45075

33. Dept.- Field Dept. - Ufld. Fran. - X	Code	34. Position Title Mail & File Clerk	35. Position No. BAF * 510	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0305.05

38. Grade & Step GS-4 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 3415	40. SD DB	41. Date Of Grade Mo 02 Da 04 Yr 57	42. PSI Due Mo 02 Da 04 Yr 58	43. Appropriation Number 5-3570-55-000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) P. C. BOWERS, WH/Personnel Officer	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) H. C. MONTAGUE, E-8242	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		11/1/57
B. Pos. Control		1957	E.		
C. Classification		1/9/57	F. Approved By		

Remarks 2 Copies to Security Transfer FROM Vouchered Funds TO Unvouchered Funds.

* Memorandum submitted to Management on 27 September 1957 requesting the establishment of this position.

FORM 8-57 1152a

SECRET

file

16 September 1957

PICCOLO, Joseph S.

Mexico City RAF-153

File Clerk* 4

Subject will be blocking Secy-Steno slot

Robert N. Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN

Robert S. Wattles
Robert S. WATTLES

J. C. KING

13 February 1957

TO: CIA Security Control Officer

VIA: 1) Chief, Interim Assignment Section
2) Chief, Employee Services

FROM: Joseph S. Piccolo

SUBJECT: Permission to continue in Course

1. It is requested that I be granted permission to continue in the following evening course at the University of Virginia's Northern Extension in Arlington:

U. S. History - Mondays - 7:00 to 9:40 P.M.

2. It is understood that tuition and all other expenses will be borne by the undersigned.

Joseph S. Piccolo

Distribution:
Original and 3 - Employee Services
1 - IAS

APPROVED FOR THE
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

JOSEPH S. REFF
C/RSD

Employee will make no reference to, or discuss his CIA connection, assignment or duties while participating in above activity.

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Joseph Stephan Piccolo
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 8 Dec 1935
3. REQUEST NO.: DC/01 C-6351
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 1 Aug 1956
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Excepted Appointment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 4 Jul 57
B. APPROVED:
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—

8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER — TO: File Clerk BV-424.09 /DPP
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY — TO: GS-0305.01-4 $3415.00 pa
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS — TO: DDP/FI
Records Integration Division
Analysis & Operations Branch
Index Section
11. HEADQUARTERS — TO: Washington, D.C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL — FROM: ☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL — TO: ☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Applicant - double slot.
Draft deferment and restoration conditions per R 20-410, para. 5b.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): John M. Scott, Chief/RI John M. Scott
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Ruth Robinson, Ext. 2519
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

Concurred in by DS Career Service Panel
SD: DS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE X | WWII | OTHER | 5 PT. | 10 POINT DISAB. | OTHER
14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I. A. | REAL
15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION FROM TO 7-2309-23
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:
20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		4/5/57	
C CLASSIFICATION			
D PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E			
F APPROVED BY			

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : File

DATE: 1/30/57

FROM : M. George Carlis

SUBJECT: Ciccolo, Joseph

Subject called today and will EOD Monday, 4 February 1957.

30 January 1957

Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo
2210 - 20th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Piccolo:

We are pleased to inform you that your appointment with this Agency has been approved at Grade GS-4, salary $3415.00 per annum.

Your permanent employment will depend upon the completion of the following processing at the time of entering on duty: taking the oath of office, signing a loyalty affidavit, participating in a final security interview and completing a medical examination which will include determination of physical health and emotional stability. Should anything of an unfavorable nature arise during this period, your employment will not result in a permanent appointment.

We hope you will be able to join us at an early date. Please telephone Mrs. Martha George-Adis on Executive 3-6115, extension 2781, as soon as possible, in order to arrange an entrance-on-duty date. If at all possible, we would appreciate your selecting a Monday.

Please report to the Receptionist at Curie Hall at 8:15 a.m. and ask for Mrs. George-Adis on the reporting-for-duty date that you establish with this office. Curie Hall is located at the intersection of 23rd Street, Independence Avenue, and Ohio Drive, S. W., with entrance on Ohio Drive.

The gross salary quoted will be subject to deductions for Federal income tax and 6½ percent for the United States Civil Service Retirement Fund. In addition, the benefits of low-cost group life insurance are available to Federal civilian employees. The enclosed pamphlet outlines the features of the program and lists the amount which will be deducted from your salary each pay period for this term insurance. This insurance is not obligatory. However, if you do not wish coverage, which is automatic, you should sign a Waiver of Life Insurance Coverage form at the time you enter on duty.

You will not receive a pay check for approximately four weeks after your entrance on duty.

If you have any problems, Mrs. George-Adis will be glad to discuss them with you when you call.

Very truly yours,

G. M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

Enclosures (2)
Life Insurance Pamphlet
Map

OP/CORRES/bjs(George-Adis)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : File

DATE: 11 Jun 1957

FROM : M. Smith

SUBJECT: Piccolo, Joseph

Checked with Gladys, M.C., she advised that Subject will be a permanent case.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : File

DATE: 27 Jan 1956

FROM : M. Smith

SUBJECT: Piccolo, Joseph

[illegible] this date. [illegible] Gladys in M. C. advised that the Medical Division is [illegible] subject and she is awaiting further information from Medical Division. [illegible] they have [illegible].

19 November 1956

Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo
2210 - 20th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Piccolo:

This is to assure you that processing is continuing on your application for employment with this Agency.

Please advise us if any circumstance should arise which might affect your interest in employment with this organization.

Your continued interest and patience are appreciated.

Very truly yours,

H. G. Reynolds
Director of Personnel

OP/CORRES/JN (Smith)

12 September 1956

Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo
2210 - 20th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Piccolo:

A review of the medical history information which you submitted indicates that for proper medical evaluation it is necessary that you come to our medical office for a pre-employment medical examination which will include determination of physical health and emotional stability.

An appointment may be scheduled at 8:30 a.m., on any Tuesday, Thursday or Friday. Please advise Miss Ruth Griffin by letter, 2430 E Street, N.W., Washington 25, D.C., or by telephone EXecutive 3-6115, extension 2781, of the date you will be able to report. We would appreciate your giving us at least two weeks advance notice. When you come for your examination, please report to our Medical Office in Central Building, 2430 E Street, N.W. Inasmuch as some parts of the examination are given in the morning and others in the afternoon, it is necessary that you plan to be here the entire day.

We will not be able to reimburse you for any travel or incidental expenses which you incur for this purpose.

Very truly yours,

H. G. Reynolds
Director of Personnel

OP/CORRES/tjs(Griffin)

30 August 1956

Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo
2210 - 20th Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Piccolo:

We are pleased to inform you that your application for employment with this Agency has been reviewed with interest by appropriate officials and that actual processing has been initiated for a position at Grade GS-4, salary $3415.00 per annum.

Your final appointment is dependent upon a number of factors including character and reference investigations, and other processing procedures which may require as long as 120 days. You may be sure that this processing is being accomplished as rapidly as possible.

During this period please notify us of any changes in your present status such as change in address, employment, marital status, etc. If it should develop that you cannot accept the position, please let us know immediately. If you have any questions concerning your application, please do not hesitate to get in touch with us. Your future correspondence or inquiries should be directed to the attention of Miss Ruth Griffin.

Members of this Agency are entitled to the regular United States Government leave and retirement benefits. Our salaries conform to the rates prescribed by Congress for United States Government agencies.

Thank you for your cooperation and patience during this waiting period.

Very truly yours,

H. G. Reynolds
Director of Personnel

OP/Correw/sed/Griffin

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-5): C-6351 FI

REQUEST DATE (6-11): 21 Aug 56

NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) (12 - 28): PICCOLO, JOSEPH STEPHAN

YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30): 1935

POSITION TITLE: File Clerk

POSITION NUMBER (31 - 36): 424.09

OCCUP. CODE (37 - 42): 0305.01

GRADE (43-44): GS-04

LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): Washington, D. C.

ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH): DDP/FI/RI

ORGN. CODE (45-48):

TYPE OF APPLICANT: ☒ REGULAR ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ CONTRACT ☐ MILITARY

CONVERSION ACTION:

IF OTHER, SPECIFY:

TYPE OF APPL. (49): 1

NAME OF REQUESTER (OR OFFICIAL): H. G. Reynolds mhb

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS: ☒ HQS ☐ USF ☐ FF ☒ V ☐ UV

HDQTERS & FUND (50): 2

CLEARANCE REQUIRED: PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP): ☐ SECRET ☒ FULL

CLEARANCE (51): 1

ATTACHMENTS: ☒ PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ☒ APPENDIX I ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER 2 PHOTOGRAPH(S) ☐ APPENDIX II ☒ REPORT OF INTERVIEW

RECRUIT. CODE (52-54): 101

VETERANS STATUS: ☐ MALE - VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - VETERAN ☒ MALE - NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - NON-VETERAN

VET. PREF. & SEX (55): 2

REMARKS:

1(SO) 1(OTF)

SPACE BELOW FOR SO USE ONLY

FORM NO. 377 REPLACES FORM 37-186 WHICH IS OBSOLETE
1 DEC 55

SECRET

(8)

16 July 1956

Mr. Joseph Stephan Piccolo
2210 20th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Piccolo:

Your application for employment with this Agency is presently under active review. Appropriate members of our staff will determine whether we have a position available for a person of your qualifications. Although we cannot predict the length of time needed for this review, we will make every effort to expedite a determination. Should there be unavoidable delays in reaching a decision, we shall do our best to keep you as fully informed as possible regarding the status of your case.

In the meantime, if you should have any questions, feel free to get in touch with us by mail. We ask your patience and assure you of our desire to make the review period as short as is compatible with the careful evaluation to which we feel each case is entitled.

Very truly yours,

H. G. Reynolds
Director of Personnel

OP/Corres/evm(Hennings)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CLERICAL & COMMUNICATIONS REPORT OF INTERVIEW

DATE AND PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 31 May 1956, Washington, D.C.

SOURCE: Gordon B. Lamb, another applicant.

CLEARANCE REQUESTED: ☐ FULL ☐ PROVISIONAL

AVAILABILITY DATE:

NAME (Last - First - Middle)	MARITAL STATUS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
PICCOLO, Joseph Stephan	Single	M	8 December 1935

PERMANENT ADDRESS 1636 -- N.E. 20th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida	TELEPHONE Logan 4-5834
TEMPORARY ADDRESS 2210 - 20th Street N.W., Washington, D.C.	TELEPHONE Adams 4-2355

POSITION RECOMMENDED (Grade and Title)	TEST SCORES			
	LA-5	TYPING	SHORTHAND	OTHER
GS-4 Clerk				

ACCEPTABLE STATION

☒ WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S.

☐ OVERSEAS (Under conditions stipulated)

LIMITATIONS

CITIZENSHIP

☒ U.S. BY BIRTH

☐ U.S. BY NATURALIZATION DATE ____ PREVIOUS NATIONALITY ____

☐ OTHER (Specify)

HEALTH: Good.

FOREIGN RELATIVES:

BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION

MILITARY SERVICE, IF ANY (Primary and duty MOS and length of time in each, training, dates of entrance and discharge, areas visited)

Member: D.C. Air National Guard. Rank: Airman 1/C. Draft classification: 1-D.

EVALUATION AND BACKGROUND DATA (Include education and work experience)

1953 - Present, Georgetown University (School of Foreign Service), Diplomatic & Consular, grade average: "75".
August 1953 - September 1955, F.B.I., Clerk, GS-4 ($3150.), to attend school full time.

Mr. Piccolo is of medium height and weight, dark hair, and rather quiet, pleasant, not very talkative and does not give one the impression of being a Ball-of-Fire. Has no area knowledge. Has had slight knowledge of Spanish of which he is taking at the present time in school. Claims good health.

Although has had some nervous disorder which were aftereffects of a gland virus, he had psychiatric consultation for about five months but no treatment. Apparently after this disease (this virus) he couldn't concentrate on his studies and consulted a psychiatrist to obviate the situation. Claims no restrictions otherwise. Tentatively planning to go to law school. Really isn't certain what to do in the future. No 10-9 that he knows of. Several years clerical experience with FBI. Based on past government clerical experience, believe he is worthy of consideration. Might be possibility for regular FI/RI job.

Scheduled him for the GS-4 clerk test on 5 June 1956 and gave him forms.

HOLD FOR FORMS AND TEST SCORES. SHOP TO ERNIE HARDT FOR FI/RI.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

DATE REPORT AND FORMS FORWARDED TO HEADQUARTERS

GEORGE S. RAD

FORM NO. 1 MAY 56 182b DEE

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Applicant Information
Sheet No. 1

To all persons applying for employment
with the Central Intelligence Agency:

This paper is the first step in applying for employment or consultant status with the Central Intelligence Agency. No application may proceed beyond this first step if the applicant is not in agreement with the conditions stated below:

General Considerations:

1. The National Security Act of 26 July 1947 (Public Law 253, 80th Congress) which created the Central Intelligence Agency places upon the Agency the responsibility:

a. "to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security;

b. "to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

c. "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government . . . ;

d. "to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

e. "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

The special character of this national responsibility requires the Agency to maintain correspondingly special employment criteria which may be different from the routine or normal employment standards of other Government departments and agencies which do not have the highly sensitive responsibility borne by the Central Intelligence Agency. It follows that the investigation of applicants prerequisite to their acceptance is a time-consuming process which, in addition to loyalty and security checks, includes evaluation of competence, physical and emotional fitness, and availability of a suitable position at such time as employment may be offered. This is called "clearance" of an applicant.

2. Investigation of an applicant may reveal something which prevents his clearance - perhaps something of which the applicant is genuinely unaware, perhaps something which only the special employment criteria of the Agency make unacceptable. In any event, adverse findings by the Agency are conclusive and final so far as the Agency is concerned, and no statement of specific reasons is made to the applicant.

3. Employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is not a right upon which an applicant can insist. Offer of employment which is subject to full clearance does not constitute a commitment on the Agency's part giving an unsuccessful applicant grounds for any claim against the Agency. Acceptance of employment upon the condition of clearance is at the applicant's risk, taken with the knowledge that a very substantial percentage of applicants are not cleared.

Statement of Understanding and Agreement

I have read, understand, and agree to the foregoing General Considerations. If not accepted for employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, I will make no claim or demand in conflict with those considerations.

I have also seen and read Applicant Information Sheet No. 2.

(Signature of Applicant)

14-00000

SECRET

SELECTIVE SERVICE ACTION REQUEST

1 DATE OF REQUEST
10 October 1957

TO : DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR - ☐ DRAFT DEFERMENT ☒ U.S. PERMISSION TO LEAVE COUNTRY
☐ CANCELLATION OF DRAFT DEFERMENT (Only items 1, 2, 17, 19 are required)

2 NAME (Last-first-middle)
PICCOLO, Joseph Stephan

3 DATE OF BIRTH
8 December 1935

4 PRESENT ADDRESS (Number, street, city, zone, state)
2210 20th Street, NW, Washington, D. C.

5 PLACE OF BIRTH (City or town, state, country)
Yonkers, New York

6 IF NONCITIZEN, INDICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION NUMBER

7 POSITION TITLE AND GRADE
Mail and File Clerk, GS-4

8 OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH
DDP/WH/III

9 SERVICE DESIGNATION
LB

10 EOD DATE
4 February 1957

11 OFFICIAL STATION
Mexico City

12 SELECTIVE SERVICE SERIAL NUMBER
AF 229 239 14

13 SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION
1-D

14 NUMBER AND ADDRESS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD
Local Board #44, 521 S. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida

15 APPROPRIATE WORDING FOR "PERMIT" (SSS Form No. 300) UNDER "INDIVIDUALS OR ORGANIZATION REPRESENTED" (Check one)
☒ U.S. GOVERNMENT ☐ SELF ☐ OTHER (Specify)

16 APPROPRIATE WORDING FOR "PERMIT" UNDER "NATURE OF BUSINESS" (Check one)
☒ U.S. GOVERNMENT ☐ SELF ☐ OTHER (Specify)

17 JUSTIFICATION

18 EXPECTED DEPARTURE DATE FOR OVERSEAS
1 November 1957

19 TYPED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL (Regulation 20-680)
Robert S. WATTLES, C/WH/Support

REPORT OF ACTION FROM DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

20 TO (Office of origin)

21 DATE OF ACTION

22 ACTION REGARDING THE ABOVE REQUEST

[illegible]
GENERAL [illegible]
18 Nov 57

SENT TO WH/Pers on 11 Feb 58
DATE

/s/ Gordon M. Stewart

SIGNATURE OF DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

DISTRIBUTION (By OD PERS): 1 - [illegible] 2 - PERSONNEL FOLDER 3 - CPD 4 - [illegible] OF ORIGIN, 5 - OFFICE SECURITY

FORM NO. 575 REPLACES FORM 37-95 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 JUN 55

SECRET

(8)

14-00000

SECRET

BIOGRAPH

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : **Colonel Omer**

DATE: 24 [illegible] 1960

FROM : **Gordon M. Stewart** /s/ Gordon M Stewart

SUBJECT: **PICCOLO, Joseph Stephan - Cancel Permission to Leave the Country and DIRECTED 4-F Deferment**

It is requested that the Permission to Leave the Country granted subject on 18 November 1957 and renewed on 8 December 1959 be cancelled. Please also cancel the DIRECTED 4-F Deferment allowed on 18 November 1957. SSS Form 110 is attached; SSS Forms 300 have been destroyed.

Mr. Piccolo was born on 8 December 1935 in Yonkers, New York. His permanent address is 1636 N. E. 20th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : **Colonel Omer**

DATE: [illegible]

FROM : **Gordon M. Stewart** /s/ Gordon M Stewart

SUBJECT: **PICCOLO, Joseph Stephan - Renew Permission to Leave the Country**

It is requested that the Permission to Leave the Country granted subject on 18 November 1957 be renewed. SSS Form 300 issued on this date has been destroyed. Please retain the DIRECTED 4-F Deferment allowed subject on 18 November 1957. Subject will return by December 1960 at which time we will cancel his DIRECTED Deferment.

Mr. Piccolo was born on 8 December 1935 in Yonkers, New York. His permanent address is 1636 N. E. 20th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

14 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Personnel

SUBJECT: SSS Form 300 for Joseph S. Piccolo

1. Forwarded is SSS Form 300 for Mr. Piccolo. While the Director of Selective Service has issued this permit for a period of two years, the files of this office and the office of the Director of Selective Service reflect a termination date of his overseas service of at least December 1960.

2. As we discussed earlier, this termination date has been set to avoid the possibility of Mr. Piccolo's authorized absence placing him in a position which might preclude the necessity of his meeting his military obligation as established by his local board.

J. L. Olmstead
Deputy Chief, Personnel
Operations Division

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - SSS File ✓

OP/POD/JLOlmstead:ahw (14 Dec 59)

SECRET

SELECTIVE SERVICE ACTION REQUEST

1 DATE OF REQUEST: 10 October 1957 ~~01~~ 8325 8109

TO : DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR - ☒ DRAFT DEFERMENT ☒ S.S. PERMISSION TO LEAVE COUNTRY ☐ CANCELLATION OF DRAFT DEFERMENT (Only items 1, 2, 17, 19 are required)

2 NAME (Last-first-middle): PICCOLO, Joseph Stephan

3 DATE OF BIRTH: 8 December 1935

4 PRESENT ADDRESS (Number, street, city, zone, state): 2210 20th Street, NW, Washington, D. C. ?

5 PLACE OF BIRTH (City or town, state, country): Yonkers, New York

6 IF NONCITIZEN, INDICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION NUMBER:

7 POSITION TITLE AND GRADE: Mail and File Clerk, GS-4

8 OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/III

9 SERVICE DESIGNATION: DS

10 EOD DATE: 4 February 1957

11 OFFICIAL STATION: Mexico City

12 SELECTIVE SERVICE SERIAL NUMBER: ~~AB 229 289 14~~ 8-44-35-604

13 SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION: 1-D

14 NUMBER AND ADDRESS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD: Local Board #44, 521 S. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida

15 APPROPRIATE WORDING FOR "PERMIT" (SSS Form No 300) UNDER "INDIVIDUALS OR ORGANIZATION REPRESENTED" (Check one): ☒ U.S. GOVERNMENT ☐ SELF ☐ OTHER (Specify)

16 APPROPRIATE WORDING FOR "PERMIT" UNDER "NATURE OF BUSINESS" (Check one): ☒ U.S. GOVERNMENT ☐ SELF ☐ OTHER (Specify)

17 JUSTIFICATION

3 years + 8 mos - Air National Guard
Andrews Air Force Base

no active duty of training.
told he would be put on:

discharge + transfer to inactive reserve.

position not established

18 EXPECTED DEPARTURE DATE FOR OVERSEAS: 1 November 1957

19 TYPED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL (Regulation 20-680): Robert S. Wattles
Robert S. WATTLES, C/WH/Support

REPORT OF ACTION FROM DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

20 TO (Office of origin):

21 DATE OF ACTION:

22 ACTION REGARDING THE ABOVE REQUEST

~~DEFERRED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE PER GENERAL [illegible]~~ 15 Dec 57

~~SENT TO [illegible] DATE 11 Feb 58~~

Gordon M. Stewart
SIGNATURE OF DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

DISTRIBUTION (By OD PERS): 1 - [illegible] 2 - PERSONNEL FOLDER, 3 - [illegible] 4 - [illegible] 7 - [illegible] 8 - OFFICE SECURITY

FORM NO. 575 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 37-85 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Record

DATE: 29 Oct 57

FROM : S. Richelderfer

SUBJECT: Piccolo, Joseph Stephan

Subject was advised this date that the Agency would request a directed deferment. He was told the meaning of a "directed deferment" and advised not to contact his local board and they will not contact him. He was sent to see Captain Noble in Reserve Affairs Branch. Captain Noble was not in and subject was interviewed by Sgt. MacKenzie. I talked to MacKenzie and stressed the fact that subject should be advised to be sure to drop out of the National Guard. MacKenzie said that he would have to request to be put in a standby reserve status. This seems to be a satis factory arrangement, since we are requesting a directed deferment, the L.B. will not contact Piccolo.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Mexico City Clerical Requirements

1. PAD has attempted to locate two suitable candidates for the WH vacancies who will not be eligible for the draft. Machine runs were used, as were file referrals, checks with approriate Administrative and Personnel representatives in Agency components, and a thorough screening of Tables of Organization. A total of 25 individuals at the GS-5 or lower level were checked out. One candidate was located, a Mr. William G. Rawls, Clerk, GS-4 with WE. He has been accepted by the Division for the January requirement. The January deadline was chosen for him because he will be able to pass the typing requirement for State integration. We had no success in finding a candidate for the 1 November deadline. All of the others were disqualified, largely because of marriage, unwillingness to accept the assignment.

2. Under the circumstances, it is recommended that Mr. Rawls be processed against the January requirement and that Mr. Joseph Piccolo, who was originally submitted for the November departure, be processed for the assignment, and that a directed deferment be requested for him.

Robert W Sheay

Robert W. Sheay
Chief, Personnel Assignment Division

28 Oct 57.

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
451 INDIANA AVENUE NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ADDRESS REPLY TO
THE DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE

July 18, 1958

Attention:
Colonel Omer

FOR PERSONAL ATTENTION
OF STATE DIRECTOR

State Director of Selective Service
310 Charlotte Street
St. Augustine, Florida

Subject: Joseph Stephan Piccolo
SS No. 8-44-35-604

Dear Colonel Wall:

Reference is made to our letter of November 18, 1957, advising you that the Director of Selective Service had directed that the above-named registrant be classified in Class IV-F until further notice, under section 1622.60 of the Selective Service Regulations.

Mr. Piccolo has now received SSS Form No. 80 (Standby Reserve Questionnaire). Due to circumstances beyond his control, Mr. Piccolo is unable to complete this form, which is enclosed. Please return it to the local board with the instruction that it not be re-mailed until such time as the Director withdraws his directed classification of Mr. Piccolo under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended.

For The Director,

DANIEL O. OMER
Colonel, JAGC
General Counsel

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Gordon M. Stewart ✓


PICCOLO JOSEPH S
109709 1935
710-101/14 JULY 69

14-00000

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

PICCOLO JOSEPH S 025658 41351049

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 21 January 1964

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT , JOTP

ESTABLISHED FOR: PICCOLO, Joseph S.

ATTN: Mr. Wiley

FILE NO.: 4455

REF: Pre-employment Cover Briefing

ID CARD NO.:

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Research Translation Group

☒ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ________.

X bX CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE 6 January 1964.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin

AMM/sl CHIEF, MILITARY COVER [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: [illegible] 1-PSD OS 1-ADPD COPY

FORM 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS

(40-20-40)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 11 June 1963

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT *(For Action)* OS

SUBJECT: PICCOLO, Joseph S.

ATTN: Mr. White

REF: Form 1322 dtd 4 June 63 removing cover

FILE NO. 4455

MILITARY COVER DISCONTINUED: US Army Records Analysis Group

ID CARD NO.

☒ Unblock Records: *(OP Memo 20-800-11)*

Effective EOD.

☒ Submit Form 642 To Change Limitation Category. *(HB 20-800-2 to be redesignated HHB 20-7)*

NA Return All Military Documentation To CCS.

☐ Remarks:

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Frianki
CD/DD CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1 OSD OS 1-PSD OS

551a SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

15 August 1961
4455

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : **PICCOLO, Joseph S.**

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/or have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 15 January 1961, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~reopened~~ to deny ~~acknowledge~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of ______________

For GLENN E. MOORHOUSE
Acting Chief, Central Cover Group

cc: SSD/OS

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

FORM 1-58 1580a (4-15-40)

SECRET

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Personnel
[illegible] Division
[illegible]

SUBJECT : Joseph Stephen [illegible] (?)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum from [illegible] dated 16 October [illegible] regarding [illegible] Inasmuch as [illegible] you are requested to block his [illegible] for the [illegible] time that he has been [illegible] by this Agency.

2. Thank you for your cooperation.

Thomas K. Sharge
for [illegible]

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

[redacted] [redacted]

16 October 1957
C-1641 (Miladenu)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Personnel
Records & Services Division
Counseling Branch/CP

SUBJECT : Joseph Stephan Piccolo (T)

1. It is requested that you close your records concerning subject to all outside inquiries regarding Agency connection from 16 October 1957 forward. You will be advised in the future if it is deemed advisable to reopen these records.

2. Thank you for your cooperation.

Thomas N. Strange
for JOHN G. SOUTHARD
CHIEF, CCB/NC

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

28 September 1961
File No. 4455

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Chief, PSD/OS
Attention: Mr. Robert C. Swendiman

SUBJECT : PICCOLO, Joseph S.
GS-7, WH - Cover Debriefing

1. Mr. Piccolo entered on duty with the Agency on 4 February 1957 and will resign on 4 October 1961. During his period of employment he utilized nominal state cover in Mexico from 1 November 1957 to 14 January 1960, and from 15 January 1961 to resignation used nominal Department of the Army cover in Headquarters.

2. Mr. Piccolo was instructed to indicate his employer for the entire period as CIA, 2430 E Street, N. W., Washington 25, D. C.

3. He was further instructed to indicate, whenever necessary, that he travelled, listing various countries en route to and from Mexico, but not reveal the specific location or details of his cover assignment.

4. Mr. Piccolo's forwarding address will be 1636 N.E. 20th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. His new employment is 121st Tactical Fighter Sq., Andrews AFB.

5. The above information is furnished for your guidance and inclusion in the Subject's personnel and security files.

For ROBERT E. YOUNG
Chief, Military Cover Branch, CCG

10-5-61

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PROCESSED 05-02-80				CONTROL NUMBER 202	
1 SSN 265441514	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S I		3 DATE OF BIRTH 12-08-35	4 SEX M	5 CITIZEN U

6 RETIREMENT	7 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	8 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	9 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	10 LEI DATE MO DA YR	11 VETERANS PREFERENCE	12 ANNUITY STATUS
CIARS	12-27-54	12-24-57	05-04-80	05-04-80	NONE	

ACTION TAKEN

13 NATURE OF ACTION PROMOTION	14 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05-04-80	15 LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403
	16 POSITION NUMBER C1069	17 AFFILIATION STAFF EMPLOYEE-CAREER
18 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO LAD COVERT ACTION STAFF AREA OPERATIONS BRANCH AREA SECTION	19 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D.C.	
	20 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENTAL	21 COVER TYPE 22 COVER ORGANIZATION

23 EMPLOYEE OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	24 SUFFIX	25 SERV DESIG	26 SCHEDULE	27 OCC SERIES	28 GRADE	29 STEP	30 SALARY & PAY BASIS
OPERATIONS OFFICER		DNC	GS	0136.01	14	4	58164 PA

31 HOURS	32 TOUR	33 PROJECT NO	34 FLSA	35 NSCA	36 SCC	37 DEVELOPMENT COMP CODE	NTE (MO. DA. YR.)	38 PERSONAL RANK ASSIGN CODE	NTE (MO. DA. YR.)	39 DETAIL ORGANIZATION
80	F	244163	E		PROF					

POSITION INFORMATION

40 OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	41 SUFFIX	42 SERV. DESIG	43 SCHEDULE	44 GRADE	45 SCC	46 SPEC REF	47 SEPARATION DATA CODE
OPERATIONS OFFICER		D	GS	14	PROF		

48 REMARKS

FC
13 MAY 1980 42

CA

SFN = 0109705 SER = 0025658

H.E. FITZWATER

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

FORM 1150 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PROCESSED: 04-17-80
CONTROL NUMBER: 201

1 SSN 265441914	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S		3 DATE OF BIRTH 12-08-35	4 SEX M	5 CITIZEN U
6 RETIREMENT CIARDS	7 SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR) 12-27-54	8 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) 12-24-57	9 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) 02-04-73	10 LEI DATE (MO DA YR) 01-28-79	11 VETERANS PREFERENCE NONE
12 ANNUITY STATUS					

ACTION TAKEN

13 NATURE OF ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
CHANGE OF HOME BASE

14 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 04-15-80
15 LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403
16 POSITION NUMBER: C1065
17 AFFILIATION: STAFF EMPLOYEE-CAREER

18 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO IAD
COVERT ACTION STAFF
AREA OPERATIONS BRANCH
AREA SECTION

19 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
20 HEADQUARTERS: DEPARTMENTAL
21 COVER TYPE:
22 COVER ORGANIZATION:

23 EMPLOYEE OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	24 SUFFIX	25 SERV. DESIG	26 SCHEDULE	27 OCC SERIES	28 GRADE	29 STEP	30 SALARY & PAY BASIS
OPERATIONS OFFICER		DHC	GS	0136.01	13	7	35249 PA

31 HOURS	32 TOUR	33 PROJECT NO	34 FLSA	35 NSCA	36 RY	37 DEVELOPMENT COMP CODE	NTE (MO. DA YR)	38 PERSONAL RANK ASSIGN CODE	NTE (MO DA YR)	39 DETAIL ORGANIZATION
80	F	244163	E		PROF					

POSITION INFORMATION

40 OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	41 SUFFIX	42 SERV DESIG	43 SCHEDULE	44 GRADE	45 SCC	46 SPEC REF	47 SEPARATION DATA CODE
OPERATIONS OFFICER		D	GS	14	PROF		

48 REMARKS
FROM: CIS

SFN = 0109709 SER = 0025058

POSTED
1980

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

A11 LCB 100 075

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12165 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 OCTOBER 1979

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	0025658	CIS	GS 13 7	$35,249

11508

---

1 SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
025658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	51 400		

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ.
GS 13	6	$32,028	01/30/77	GS 13	7	$32,943	01/28/79			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE Stephen F Cirone

DATE 4 Jan 77

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK'S INITIALS

AUDITED BY OC

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

14 51

A11

L08 100 075

*PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12087 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 08 OCTOBER 1978

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	0025658	CIS	GS 13 6	$32,028

11566

---

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
025658	PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.	31400		

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ.
GS 13	5	$29490	01-30-77	GS 13	6	$30357	03-26-78		X	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE /s/ FWM JANNEY

DATE 24 MARCH 1978

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITOR

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

LSM 122077

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT-CHANGE OF FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY

4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 11 07 77

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 8027 0172 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI STAFF
OPERATIONS GROUP
SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: GK67

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: UAS

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: 29490

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 Employ Code: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31400 ALPHABETIC CIS

22 STATION CODE: 75013

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 Hdqtrs Code: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 12 03 35

26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)

27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)

37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV EMPM TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 1 WAIVED 2 REG; HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ARW

FORM 1150
5-74 Mfg 10-74

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

LJF

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

A11 L08 100 075

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12010 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 09 OCTOBER 1977

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	0025658	CIS	GS 13 5	$29,490

11934

14-00000

PLF: 112277

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 11 DA 01 YR 77

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 8027 0172 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI STAFF
OPERATIONS GROUP
SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: GK67

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: 29490

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 Employ Code: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31400 ALPHABETIC CIS

22 STATION CODE: 75013

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 Hdqtrs Code: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 12 DA 08 YR 35

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: CSR / FICA / NONE — CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE — MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE — 0 NONE; 1 5 PT; 2 10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP — CODE

39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE — 0 WAIVER; 1 YES — HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS.
3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO TAX EXEMP — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
23Nov77
AED

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74 Mfg 10 74

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

AEO 15 JUL 77

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT-CHANGE OF HOME BASE	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 19 77	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA 7027 0172 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CI STAFF OPERATIONS GROUP SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPERATIONS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER EP93	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DAG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13 5	17 SALARY OR RATE 27548

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20 Employ-Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 31400 ALPHABETIC CIS	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12 08 35	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction; Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

RDG

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74 Mfg 10/74

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
[illegible]	[illegible]	31 4[illegible]	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ.
GS 13	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	GS 13	4	[illegible]	[illegible]			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

pao

CLERKS INITIALS

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1976

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
RICCIO JOSEPH S	[illegible]	31 400	V	GS 13 4	$26,738

14-00000

Khk: 22 JULY 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 07 | 18 | 76	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA T227 0172 | 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CI STAFF OPERATIONS GROUP SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPERATIONS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER EP93	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DQG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13 4	17 SALARY OR RATE 25198

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
16	10	31400	CIS	75013		1	12 | 08 | 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: LA

POSTED
JUL 1976

FORM 1150 Use Previous

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (4-81)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11883 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 12 OCTOBER 1975

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	C25658	51 500	CF	GS 13 4	$25,198

[illegible] 11 SEPT 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]2565[illegible]	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH [illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 6135 4630 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA DIVISION CUBA OPERATIONS GROUP OPS BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPERATIONS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0065	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D05

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 [illegible]	17. SALARY OR RATE 23[illegible]

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE [illegible]7	20. Employ. Code 1[illegible]	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 515[illegible] ALPHABETIC LA	22. STATION CODE [illegible]	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO 12 DA [illegible] YR [illegible]	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

RCS

FORM 1150 Use Previous
1-74 Mfg 10-74 Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

KHHI: 22 AUG 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR "COB" 08 25 75
	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 6135 1049 0002

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/LA DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER DCOS

12 POSITION NUMBER: CR49

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: DOG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: 23997

18 REMARKS
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
56	10	51660	LA	52973		3	12 08 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT

36 SERV COMP. DATE MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVED 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150
5-74 Mfg 10-74

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	025658	51 660	CF	GS 13 3	$23,270

Lt-52

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
025658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	51 660	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ
GS 13	3	$23,270	02/03/74	GS 13	4	$23,997	02/02/75			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous edition

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

PRC: 22 AUG 74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

IDF

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
025652	PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
CHANGE OF NSCA	02 | 10 | 74	REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5135 1040 0002	50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/WH DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 2-MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION	MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
ASST ATTACHE POL OFF OPS OFFICER	0395	DOC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	05 4 13 3	18479 22355

18 REMARKS
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Mdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51564	WH	52273	S	3	12 | [illegible] | 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction /Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAT PROV RESV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JK 8/23/74

FORM 1150 Use Previous

SECRET DMS

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	025658	51 660	CF	GS 13 2	$21,366

---

7 G-52

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
025658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	51 660	CF	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 13	2	$21,366	02/04/73	GS 13	3	$22,055	02/03/74		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK'S INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RCS: 20 SEP 73

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 09 17 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS ▶	☐ V TO V	☐ V TO CF		7 FAN AND NSCA 4135 1049 0001	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	☐ CF TO V	☒ CF TO CF			

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 2-MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

11 POSITION TITLE ASST ATTACHE POL OFF OPS OFFICER DCOS	12 POSITION NUMBER 0396	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 05 3 13 2	17 SALARY OR RATE 17075 20357

18 REMARKS
OPS OFFICER DCOS OCCUPYING OPS OFFICER POSITION
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	10	51660	WH	52073	S	3	12 08 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 5 NONE) CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 WAIVED, 1 YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

10 Sep 73

FORM 1150 9-72 Mfg 11-72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

05

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

0JCS 07/21/73

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE IN N.S.C.A.

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 01 YR 73

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6 FUNDS				
		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 4135 C694 0001

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/WH DIVISION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1865

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13

17 SALARY OR RATE:

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

J.F. BLAKE

POSTED
7·25·72

Form 1150a 9·73 MPG 9·73 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4-51)

THIS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS
A C.I.A. EMPLOYEE FOR PURPOSES OF
WITHOLDING STATE AND FEDERAL TAXES

DATE DESIGNATED JANUARY 03 1961

25658 JOSEPH S PICCOLO 635500080

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LML: 06 FEB 73

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 04 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No Chargeable 3135 0694 0002	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 5-BRASILIA, BRAZIL STATION RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL BASE	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

11 POSITION TITLE ATTACHE POLITICAL OFFICER OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1865	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 05 3 13 2	17 SALARY OR RATE 17075 20357

18 REMARKS

RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC 51825 WH	22. STATION CODE 09037	23 INTEGREE CODE S	24 Hdqtrs Code 3	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12 08 35	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 02 04 73	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 02 04 73

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2-NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POS

FORM 3-66 1150 Mfg 11 71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

MDP

(When Filled In)

655

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	025658	51 825	CF	GS 12 5	$18,906

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CS [illegible]

1 SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]25[illegible]	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible] J. S[illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DELEGATION OF [illegible].C.A.	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 | 01 | 7[illegible]	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 3152 0[illegible] [illegible]002	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 18[illegible]	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP [illegible]2	17. SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX	
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11 21 72

SECRET

FORM 3-66 1150 Mfg 11-71 Use Previous Edition

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

G57

1. SERIAL NO.	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
025658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	51 825	CF	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 12	4	$17,453	09/20/70	GS 12	5	$17,987	09/17/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Stephen

DATE 10/7/72

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1/3./5 15

CLERKS INITIALS H.E.FISHER

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	025658	51 825	CF	GS 12 4	$17,453

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FS: 8 MAR 72

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OJF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 025656

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 02 DA 20 YR 72

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS

☐	V TO V	☐	V TO CF
☐	CF TO V	☒	CF TO CF

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 2135 0694 (XXX)

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 5-BRASILIA, BRAZIL STATION
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL BASE

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

11 POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE POLITICAL OFFICER
OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1865

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR		05 2	15732
GS	0135.01	12 4	17453

18 REMARKS
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 Employ Code: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51825 ALPHABETIC WH

22 STATION CODE: 03037

23 INTEGREE CODE: S

24 Hdqtrs Code: 3

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 12 DA 08 YR 35

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSR 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	025658	51 730	CF	GS 12 4	$16,543

657

1/5/75

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
025658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	51 730	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 12	3	$15,138	09/21/69	GS 12	4	$15,611	09/20/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 7/14/70

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS F. S. WATTLES

POSTED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

P

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JBC: 2 JUN 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

COF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025658
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): PICCOLO JOSEPH S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 05 31 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 0135 0604 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH/FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 5
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL
11. POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE POLITICAL OFF
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0187
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 1
12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 13618
15138
18. REMARKS:

WASH., D.C.

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hours Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51730	WH	09037	S	3	12 [illegible] 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVED 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06-10-70

SECRET

BBG

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	025658	51 997	CF	GS 12 3	$15,138

EOD: 10 FEB 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025550	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR [illegible]	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS	V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF X CF TO CF	
7 Financial Analysis No Chargeable 0135 0325 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH.,D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE FOREIGN SERV RES OFF OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 3037	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP [illegible] 12 3	17 SALARY OR RATE 10062 14231

18. REMARKS
WASH.,D.C.
TRAINING.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 Employ Code 13	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51557 ALPHABETIC WH	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE S	24 Mnemonic Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12 [illegible] [illegible]	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX	
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
2-16-70 jik

FORM 1150
5-66
Mfg 10-67
Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BBG

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	025658	51 500 CF	GS 12 2	$13,835

COG

G42

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
025658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	51 500	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 12	2	$13,835	09/22/68	GS 12	3	$14,281	09/21/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 22 July 1969

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1/000

CLERKS INITIALS R. S. WATTLES

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

SEP 13 4 15 PM '69

3: 7 JUL 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 03 69	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF		7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 0135 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF			

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH WH/COG ON-ISLAND OPERATIONS BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE POL OFFICER OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1159	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 06 1 12 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 9721 12580

18. REMARKS
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Majors Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51500	WH	75013	S	1	12 08 35		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
07-07-69 JK

FORM 1150 3-66 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

PLW

14-00000

EOD: 25 FEB 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OOF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 02 | 25 | 69	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☒ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9135 0620 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH WH/LOG THIRD COUNTRY BRANCH			10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE POL OFFICER OPS OFFICER			12 POSITION NUMBER 1152	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 06 1 12 2	17 SALARY OR RATE 3721 12580	
18 REMARKS MANAGUA, NICARAGUA					

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51500	ALPHABETIC WH	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE S	24 Hdqtrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 12 | 08 | 35	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) / 27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO / 34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE		40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]
2-27
2-7C

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-66 Mfg 10-67

SECRET

JLB.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

2

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
025658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	51 650	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 11	4	$ 11223	09/25/66	GS 11	5	$ 11563	09/22/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Ellen Terrell

DATE 12 July 68

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ 040

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

SEP 10 2 02 PM '68

COMPENSATION & TAX DIVISION

JLE:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DDP

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 22 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9135 1049 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 2 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MANAGUA, NICARAGUA		
11 POSITION TITLE POLITICAL OFFICER OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0396	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 07 4 12 2	17 SALARY OR RATE 8969 12580

18 REMARKS
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 22	20 Employee Code 16	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51650 ALPHABETIC WH	22 STATION CODE 52073	23 INTEGREE CODE S	24 Military Code 3	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12 08 35	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 09 22 68	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 09 22 68
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX	
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG. COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE OVER 3 YRS	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9/26/68

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET SE

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	025658	51 650	CF	GS 11 4	$10,623	$11,223

PLW:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHANGE OF FAN	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 02 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS ▶	☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9135 1049 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 2 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MANAGUA, NICARAGUA		
11. POSITION TITLE POLITICAL OFFICER OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0396	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 07 4 11 4	17 SALARY OR RATE 8596 10623

18. REMARKS
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51650	WH	52073	S.	3	12 08 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	025658	51 620	CF	GS 11 4	$10,166	$10,623

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PLW:

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 025653	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 21 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR		
6 FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 0135 1094 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 2 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA STATION			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MANAGUA, NICARAGUA		
11. POSITION TITLE POLITICAL OFFICER OPS OFFICER			12 POSITION NUMBER 0396	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 07.4 11 4	17 SALARY OR RATE 8596 10623	

18 REMARKS
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51650	WH	52073	S	3	12 08 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]
4/13/65

FORM 3-66 1150 (Mfg. 10-67) Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FYD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJI, 17 MAY 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 05 07 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7135 0990 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 203	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO		
11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP 11	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE 2	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[illegible]

FORM 1-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BJI

SECRET
(When Filled In)

N.M.: 23 SEPT 66

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OOF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 25 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	7135 0990 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE POLIT OFFICER OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0939	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 07 3 11 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 7975 10166

18. REMARKS
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	51620	WH	45075		3	12 0 35	09 25 66	09 25 66

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RES PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
025658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	51 620 CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PM Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 10	3	~~8,744~~ 8997	08/29/65	GS 10	4	~~9,000~~ 9285	08/28/66			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: E. B. ECHOLS DATE 7/16/66

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(451)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	025658	51 620 CF	GS 10 3	$ 8,744	$ 8,997

PJH: 27 AUG 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 08 29 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135 0930 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE:
POLIT OFFICER
OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0939

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		07 2	7245
GS	0136.01	10 3	8440

18. REMARKS
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	51620	WH	45075	1	3	12 08 35	08 29 65	08 29 65

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	W/ TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9-9-65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PJH: 27 AUG 65

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION INTEGRATION DEPT OF STATE	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 08 27 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	6135 0990 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE POLIT OFFICER OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0939	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 07 2 09 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 7245 7710

18. REMARKS

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $7710 AND FSR SALARY OF $7245 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH. ALL HOURS SICK AND ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPT OF STATE.
MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 55	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC 51820 WH	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE S	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12 08 35	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9-9-65 WA

FORM 11 62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

342

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
025654	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	37F 49 200 V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 09	2	$ 7,469	07/19/64	GS 09	3	$ 7,710	07/18/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

01

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 559
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY EK

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 16 June 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 961 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

Jun 22 1 34 PM '65

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S.	025654	51 620	CF	GS 10 3	$ 8,44[illegible]	$ 8,744

RZR: 2 JUL 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 04 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS V TO V CF TO V X V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6135 0990 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0939	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 09 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 7465

18. REMARKS
SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 20	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51620 ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12 08 35	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7-22-65 AH

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

OLD: 5 MAR 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025658
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): PICCOLO JOSEPH S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CHG OF SERVICE DESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 03 DA 05 YR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5235 1162 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/SAS INTELLIGENCE STAFF RESEARCH SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0908
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 7465
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 49200 ALPHABETIC SAS
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 12 DA 08 YR 35
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
FROM
H
03/08/65 2K

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

[illegible]

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES
Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JOD: 17 JULY 64

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
025658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	07 19 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	5275 2100 0000	50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDS/OTR JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINEE CORPS	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
JR OF TRAINEE	0748	SJ

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0090.01	GS 2	7260

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Approp Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	28300	JOTC	75013		1	12 08 35	07 19 64	07 19 64

28 NTE EXPIRES — 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30 RETIREMENT DATA — 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — EOD DATA — 33 SECURITY REQ NO — 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE — 36 SERV COMP DATE — 37 LONG COMP DATE — 38 CAREER CATEGORY — 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA — 42 LEAVE CAT CODE — 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA — 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7-21-64

20 JUL 1964

FORM 1150 — Use Previous Edition — SECRET

14-00000

[illegible] 3 [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER / 2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CHG OF SERVICE DESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 01 [illegible] 68

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: [illegible] 1190 1000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/OTR JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINEE CORPS

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: JR OF TRAINEE

12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SJ

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: [illegible].01

16. GRADE AND STEP: [illegible]

17. SALARY OR RATE: 8000

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 32

20. Employ Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC: [illegible] — ALPHABETIC: [illegible]

22. STATION CODE: [illegible]

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. Hdqtrs Code: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 12 [illegible]

26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)

27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC / 2 FICA / 3 NONE — CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE — MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE — 0 - NONE / 1 - 5 PT / 2 - 10 PT

36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)

37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)

38. CAREER CATEGORY

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE — 0 - WAIVED / 1 - YES — HEALTH INS CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE — 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE / 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE / 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 DAYS / 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 DAYS

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES / 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES / 2 NO — CODE — NO TAX EXEMP — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM SAS

POSTED
[illegible]

FORM 11-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

445-1196

1 Serial No	2 Name			3 Cost Center Number				4 LWOP Hours		
025658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S			28 300 V						
5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	ISI	ADJ
GS 08	2	$ 6,600	04/28/63	GS 08	3	$ 6,810	04/26/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS UN AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [redacted] DATE 2/11/64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 961 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

REC [illegible]
[illegible] 20 2 15 PM '64

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	025658	49 300 V	GS 08 2	$ 6,395	$ 6,600

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZR: 26 APR 63

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 025058	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) PICCOLO JOSEPH S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 04 28 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: X V TO V; V TO CF; CF TO V; CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3232 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF FI/CI BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0583
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 08 2
17. SALARY OR RATE 6295	

18. REMARKS
INTELLIGENCE ANALYST OCCUPYING OPERATIONS OFFICER POSITION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF EOD MO DA YR
22	10	51300	SAS	75013		1	12 05 35	04 28 63	04 28 63

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 NONE CODE | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT | 36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR | 37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 NO 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D.P.

POSTED
05/01/63 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

29 APR 1963

SECRET

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	023658	61300	V	07 3	$ 5685	07 3	$ 5910

P.C : 5 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025658
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): PICCOLO JOSEPH S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REEMPLOYMENT (MILITARY) (CAREER)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR: 08 25 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE: 3232 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: C.S. REG. 35.204
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP TASK FORCE W
FI - CI BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0685
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 5685
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 12
20 Employ Code: 10
21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC: 61300 ALPHABETIC: TFW
22 STATION CODE: 75013
23 INTEGREE CODE
24 Health Code: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: 12 08 35
26 DATE OF GRADE: 07 24 0
27 DATE OF LEI: 07 22 62
28 NTE EXPIRES
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REG NO: 10775
34 SEX: M
35 VET PREFERENCE: 0
36 SERV COMP DATE: 12 27 54
37 LONG COMP DATE: 12 24 57
38 MIL SERV CREDITED: C
39 FED. HEALTH INSURANCE: 1
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO: [illegible]
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: 0
42 LEAVE CAT CODE: 6
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: 1 C
44 STATE TAX DATA: 1 2 05

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

Form 1150 Use Previous Editions

9/5/62 Abe

SECRET

PSC: 6 OCT 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 025658
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): PICCOLO JOSEPH S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: SEPARATION (MILITARY)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 10 DA 04 YR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2635 5000 8021
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: C.S. REG. 35.2
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH
BRANCH 4
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0629
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 5520
18. REMARKS:

ANNUAL LEAVE AND RETIREMENT TO BE HELD IN ESCROW.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 48
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Reqmt. Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 12 DA 08 YR 35
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1BC0051
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT, LCD
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

10/4/61

Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
125658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	DDP/WH 3A V-20	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	FSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 07	1	$ 5,355	07/24/60	07	2	$ 5,520	07/23/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/✓/ NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition SECRET (4-61)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 22 JULY 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
125658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	12	08	35		0	M	1	02	04	57			
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 / Code
12	27	54		1	50 USCA 403 J						02	04	57	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 4	4617	WASH., D.C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	INTELL ASST	0629	GS	0301.28

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
06 2	$ 4995	D	06	28	59	06	26	60	0235 1000 1000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	07	24	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 4	4617	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	INTEL ASST	0629	GS	0301.28

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ 5355	D	07	24	60	07	23	61	1235 1000 1000

44. Remarks

POSTED
28-08-60 WK

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	125658	46 17	GS-06 2	$ 4,640	$ 4,995

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
525638	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	DDP/WH	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR				MO	DA	YR.
GS 06	1	$ 4,490	06	28	59	GS 06	2	$ 4,640	06	26	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-58 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b.

SECRET

OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

BES: 15 APRIL 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. [illegible] None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code			[illegible] EOD Mo	Da.	Yr.
125658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	12	08	35		0	M 1		02	04	57

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. [illegible] Yes - 1 No - 2 / Code
12	27	54		1	50 USCA 403 J					1	02	04	57	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH DIVISION CS/CS DEV COMP	4688	WASH., D.C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 U'fld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	1	MAIL AND FILE SUP	011060	GS	0305.05

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24 Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
06 1	$ 4490	DS	06	28	59	06	26	60	0320 1998

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT & TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	01	04	17	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH ~~5~~ 4	4617	WASH., D.C.	75013

33 Dept. - Field Dept - 2 U'fld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	INTELL ASST	0629	GS	0301.28

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41 Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42 PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
06 1	$ 4490	D	06	28	59	06	26	60	0235 1000 1000

44. Remarks

04-19-60 WK

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 8 JAN 60

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5-Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
525658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	12	08	35		0	M	1	02	04	57	
7. SCD Mo. / Da. / Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 / Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
12 27 54	1	50 USCA 403 J						02	04	57		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	4652	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	35075

16. Dept. - Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	MAIL AND FILE SUP	0510	GS	0305.05

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
06 1	$ 4490	DS	06	28	59	06	26	60	9 3570 55 060

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	67	01	10	60	REGULAR	29 ~~01~~	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
CS/CS DEV COMP DDP WH DIVISION	4688	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	MAIL AND FILE SUP	011060	GS	0305.05

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
06 1	$ 4490	DS	06	28	59	06	26	60	0320 1998

44. Remarks

OTHER

[illegible]

1-28-60 AYH

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
525658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	DDP/WH 7	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 5	1	$ 4,040	06	29	58	GS 5	2	4 170	06	28	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

4/ 655340
559

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

JH
cm

C>

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

1304

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
525658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	DDP/WH 7	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
4	1	$ 3,415	02	04	57	4	2	$ 3,500	02	09	58

REMARKS

PSI effected 2/9/58 to GS-4-2 $3.500
per advices from UV Payroll (Addie Billings)
KJ 8/1/59

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
ROBERT N. DAHLGREN	21 Jan 58	Robert N Dahlgren

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (8)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 25 JUNE 1959

1. Serial No	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
525658	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	12	08	35		0	M	1	02	04	57

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2	Code
12	27	54		1	50 USCA 403 J						02	04	57		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	4652	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	45075

16. Dept. - Field Dept-1 Unld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	MAIL AND FILE CLK	0510	GS	0305.05

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
05 2	$ 4190	DS	06	29	58	06	28	59	8 3570 55 060

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	06	28	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	4652	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	35075

33. Dept. - Field Dept-1 Unld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	MAIL AND FILE SUP	0519	GS	0305.05

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
06 1	$ 4490	DS	06	28	59	06	28	60	9 3570 55 060

44. Remarks

POSTED
JUN

Form No. 1150a
1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

LLC 27 JUNE 58

1. Serial No.			2. Name (Last-First-Middle)		3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
525658			PICCOLO JOSEPH S		12	08	35		0	M 1	02	04	57
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8 CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
12	27	54		1	50 USCA 403 J						02	04	57

13 Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2	Code
	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	4651	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	45075

16. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	MAIL AND FILE CLERK	510	GS	0305.05

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25 PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26 Appropriation Number
04 2	$ 3850	DS	02	04	57	02	09	58	8 3570 55 060

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	06	29	58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	4652	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	45075

33. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	MAIL AND FILE CLK	0510	GS	0305.05

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
05 1	$ 4040	DS	06	29	58	06	28	59	8 3570 55 060

44. Remarks

POSTED

Cf [illegible]

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
PICCOLO JOSEPH S	525658	GS-04-2	$ 3,500	$ 3,850

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCC

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
525552	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	12	0?	25	0	M 1	02	04	57	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
12	27	54		1	50 USCA 403 J					1	02	04	57		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI RECORDS INTEGRATION DIVISION ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONS BRANCH INDEX SECTION		WASH. D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	FILE CLERK	424.05	GS	0305.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
04 1	$ 3415	DS							8 2300 23

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT (TRANSFER TO UNVOUCHERED FUNDS)	06	11	03	57	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	4151	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	45075

33. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	MAIL AND FILE CLERK	516	GS	0305.05

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
04 1	$ 3415	DS	02	04	57	02	16	58	8 3570 55 0 0

44. Remarks

SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

1961

Form No. 1 MAR 57 1150a

SECRET

(4)

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

.NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN.

F. 20 Dec 1957
6351

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME) MR. JOSEPH S. PICCOLO 125858	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Dec 1935	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 4 February 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 4 Feb 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC A 403 j

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	File Clerk BW-424.09
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0305.01-4 $3415.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Index Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:18

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: 7-2309-23	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY) 4 Feb 1957	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Florida

20. REMARKS.

RG-101

Subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.
Subject to the satisfactory completion of a medical examination.
Pay rate shown is subject is subject to adjustment upon verification of prior service.

DOE: 2/4/57
CSCOD: 2/4/57
LCD: 2/4/57
SCD: 12/27/54

PSI DUE 2/9/58

Personnel Folder Requested [illegible]
From [illegible]
Initials [illegible]

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1950-079007

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A 265 441914 GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
025658	Piccolo, Joseph S.	8 Dec 35	M	GS-13	DAG

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION	10.
Ops Officer	DDO/CI/O/C/LA	Hqs	X YES ☐ NO

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			12. TYPE OF REPORT			
X CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ TEMPORARY	☐ INITIAL	X ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT	☐ SPECIAL
☐ CONTRACT	☐ SPECIAL	☐ OTHER	13. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 Oct 78 - 30 Sept 79		14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U - Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken & proposed in Section D.
M - Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P - Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serve as senior CI coordinator for LA Division; to monitor the Division's CI activities; to provide guidance and support for its CI problems and operations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Participate in Counterintelligence and Operational Security Surveys.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Screen LA Division traffic containing items of CI significance; maintain liaison with other CI components of the USG; perform special CI case assignments.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintain CI working files including basic information on the CI objectives of LA Division.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during this rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	

DERIVATIVE CL BY 057250
REVW ON Dec 99
CL BY 09c

FORM 45
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

DEC 12 8 10 AM '79

Mr. Piccolo's wide experience in LA Division and Cuban operations, his inquisitive instincts, his activist style and his keen analytical skills, superbly qualify him to serve as the senior CI Staff coordinator for LA Division. One obvious measure of his strong, continued effectiveness, is that in any given week he receives more requests for guidance, CI file reviews, and other forms of CI support, than any of our other area division coordinators.. On the other hand, because of his in-depth, across the board knowledge of LA's operational activities, he represents a unique resource to C/CI when the latter has to respond knowledgeably and rapidly to inquires from the DDO level on LA related matters. On that score alone, C/CI has commented on his deep satisfaction with Mr. Piccolo's impressive performance.

During the year, Mr. Piccolo led the team which conducted an in-depth CI and Operational Security Survey of Brasilia Station and its two Bases. The final report was well received by the Division and the Station, which began implementing certain of the team's suggested recommendations before its return to Headquarters. As with other CI survey reports, the Brasilia study was forwarded to the DDO and the DCI for their information. Mr. Piccolo is one of the more experienced survey officers, having participated in or led five station survey exercises in AF and LA Divisions.

//continued//

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 14	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Fitness [illegible] Rating Profile 0 2 S 13 P ___ M ___ U	
DATE 10 Dec 1979	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CI/OG/OC	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Stephen F. Creane

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 10 Dec 79	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Piccolo is a very competent, serious and ambitious officer. As the senior CI coordinator for LA Division, he has represented the Staff extremely well and, more importantly, has ensured rapid, professional and informed follow-up on counterintelligence problems and leads in that active area. He knows his client division well, his advice and support are regularly sought, and he has an unusual ability to penetrate to the essentials of a given operational matter. All with whom he deals in LA Division hold him in high esteem.

(continued)

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/CI/OG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Jack Friedlander

4. BY EMPLOYEE

[illegible]	DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

The operational traffic Mr. Piccolo screens for the "front office" is usually accompanied by pertinent insights on the significance of the development or event reported. He has been praised more frequently for his commentaries than any of our other coordinators, which is another reflection on his intimate familiarity with the LA operational scene. Numerous examples of his productive and versatile service to the Division and Staff can be cited but we will note for the sake of brevity only three to underscore out point. (1) For the past two years he has been the guiding and principal referent on a joint Agency/FBI proposal which would enable the FBI to engage in foreign CI operations against the Soviet intelligence services on the Mexican side of the border. His perseverance in shepherding the instrument through its various ~~approval~~ stages in the Agency and the Department of Justice, is finally paying off with the recent notification that the SCC/CI had informally approved the agreement. (2) This past summer Mr. Piccolo was temporarily assigned to assist NE Division as a consultant, because of his Brasilian expertise, in a case involving a Brazilian walk-in who claimed PLO connections. Ultimately Mr. Piccolo participated directly in the interrogation/assessment process, and was a key factor in finally persuading the Brazilian to return to Brasil to work in place against the PLO. Finally (3), he has quite justifiably earned the reputation (per student critiques and faculty commentary) as one of the most effective instructors on the CI Staff. He lectures regularly in the CI and BOC courses, and participates in the Walk-Ins and Doubled Agent seminars for our military and FBI colleagues.

Again, Mr. Piccolo's performance during this past year, as in previous years, reflected a sustained superior effort, which, I am convinced, will continue to be the pattern in the future.

SECTION E REVIEWING COMMENTS (continued)

Rating officer properly highlights Mr. Piccolo's determination and perseverence in pushing a major joint CIA-FBI program through Washington's often unbelievable bureaucracy. A lesser man would have thrown in the towel long ago. Mr. Piccolo, understanding the importance of this proposal, was determined to "hang in there;" success resulted.

A veteran CI survey officer, Mr. Piccolo headed a team inspecting Brasilia Station during this year. Perceptive identification of a number of potential counterintelligence and operational security problems, have induced this Station to take certain corrective action and its future operational programs will surely benefit from these.

Major contamination via Philip Agee has severely limited this officer's ability to serve in his area of specialty, Latin America. Nonetheless, we need to identify in the not too distant future a challenging overseas assignment that will take advantage of his impressive operational skills and experience. He is patently an officer with highly developed on-the-street instincts and, if he is to achieve his considerable potential, needs additional overseas postings.

In the meantime we are fortunate indeed to have him on our Staff; he is one of our best. I unhesitatingly concur in the Rating Officer's letter grades and narrative comments.

14 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo, Jr.
CI Staff/Operations Group
Operations Coordination Branch/LA

SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction

General:

1. As the Latin America Division Coordinator for the Operations Coordination Branch, CI/OG, your basic duty is to serve as the initial and principal point of contact between the CI Staff and LA Division with respect to counterintelligence activities involving the Division and its respective Stations. While the position of Coordinator has certain liaison aspects it also requires that the incumbent, in support of the DDO's objective to reintegrate CI disciplines within the Operations Directorate, take an active role in stimulating CI practices and operations in LA Division. Accordingly, you are expected to be fully knowledgeable of the missions and responsibilities of the CI Staff (See DDO Notice No. 1-1339, dated 16 July 1975; DDO Notice No. 51-54, Coordination on Counterintelligence Matters, dated 4 May 1976); and in general the interests and activities of the other functional branches of the Operations Group as they relate to LA Division. To enable you to accomplish your specific duties you will be supported by an Assistant LA Coordinator.

Specific Duties:

2. As the LA Coordinator, your major continuing duties will be:

a. To develop close and effective working relationships with LA Division to ensure you are currently and fully aware of CI problems and activities in that Division; to provide LA Division with guidance and support for its counterintelligence operations.

b. To participate when requested in the planning and conduct of Field Counterintelligence and Operational Security Surveys designated by the C/CI Staff.

WARNING NOTICE
[illegible]
AND METHODS INVOLVED

DERIVATIVE CL BY [illegible]
DECL [illegible] ON 14 Mar 99
DERIVED FROM [illegible]

c. To monitor and screen LA cable traffic and select items of CI significance for routing to appropriate CI Staff components, together with supplemental information as needed; to maintain liaison with other USG components as appropriate; to perform special assignments on CI cases as may be required by CI Staff.

d. To maintain CI working files, including basic information with respect to the CI Objectives of each LA Division Station.

e. To serve as back-up Coordinator for other divisions as may be required, and as your work schedule permits.

3. During your assignment to CI/OG/OCB Fitness Reports on your performance will be based on the provisions of this LOI. Any major changes in this LOI will be made in writing and will require your signature to be effective.

Stephen F. Creane
Chief, CI/OG/OC

I have read and understood the above.

Joseph S. Piccolo, Jr.
LA Division CI Coordinator

14 Mar 77
Date

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

265-44-1714

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 025658
2. NAME (Last, first, middle): PICCOLO, Joseph S.
3. DATE OF BIRTH: 8 Dec. 35
4. SEX: M
5. GRADE: GS-13
6. SD: DAG
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer
8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDO/CIOC/LASE
9. CURRENT STATION: Hqs.
10. CHECK (X) ONE: X HQS. ☐ OS

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Oct. 77 - 30 Sept. 78
14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: October 78

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintain close working relationships with LA Division personnel in support of DDO counterintelligence operations and activities; and provide guidance and support in the furtherance of those activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assist in the review and coordination of assigned double agent cases in your geographic area which are sponsored by the U.S. military and other U.S. agencies; and help manage certain select foreign CI cases.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Monitor hostile intelligence approaches to U.S. persons in your geographic area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Participate in the LASE Section contribution to an overall CI Staff annual evaluation of counterintelligence programs in LA Division field stations.	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Screen non-restricted DDO operational telecommunications for items of CI significance.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER

FORM 45

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review Mr. Piccolo was the senior referent in the Branch for LA Division affairs. In this capacity he functioned most effectively and efficiently, and fully exploited his more than 17 year's association with LA Division.

With respect to Specific Duties, No's 3 and 5 are pretty much self explanatory and are the bread-and-butter type activities that provide you a data base for approaching other responsibilities and keep you au courant of operational conditions. There is no rating for No. 4 as this activity this year was handled by O/C/CI.

In terms of Specific Duty No. 1., Mr. Piccolo has had several field station assignments in LA Division plus several at Headquarters. He maintains close and continuing contact with country desks and staff officers and when appropriate has initiated operational comments and suggestions. For example, when reviewing the traffic from an on island Cuban reporting source he noted indications that the source might be under hostile control, and sent forward a memorandum outlining these indications to COG while defering to them for further action. On another occasion when a walk in appeared at an overseas Station he again approached COG

-Continued -

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 12

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 1 Dec 78

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: DC/OG/OCB

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: John F. Markham

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.

DATE: 1 Dec 78

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Joseph S. Piccolo

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This Fitness Report is one of the most thorough and balanced from a substantive view which I have reviewed in some time. I find it to be accurate from my perspective and reflects my own contention that Mr. Piccolo is for his grade one of the most productive, aggressive and versatile officers we have in the DO.

Earlier this year Mr. Piccolo received a QSI in recognition of his fine performance on the CI Staff during the previous year. There is no question that a sustained superior effort on Mr. Piccolo's part will continue to be the pattern in the future. He has a prosperous career ahead of him.

DATE: 1 December 1978

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, CI/O/C

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Stephen J. Creane

4. BY EMPLOYEE

[illegible]

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION

Continuation of Fitness

Joseph S. Piccolo

and outlined to them the reasons he believed the walk-in was a provocation. COG agreed to withold any attempts at operational exploitation until the walk-in's bona fides were better established. The walk-in subsequently failed a polygraph on the question was he being directed at us.

With respect to Duty No. 2, usually focused on the activities of USAINTA while his colleague focused on those of OSI. In any event, each could readily fill in as substitute if the other were absent. The range of operational initiatives available to us in these cases is, for the most part, limited and our main in-put is in terms of area knowledge and operational experience. Nevertheless, Mr. Piccolo did address himself to the problem of coverage of controlled U.S.: Person double agents when travelling overseas and drafted a general consent agreement for agents to sign permitting us CI coverage of them while abroad. The suggestion is in the hands of the military services the FBI and Agency legal authorities and its ultimate fate is not known.

In terms of ad hoc assignments Mr. Piccolo has participated in two CI Operational Surveys, namely Buenos Aires and Bogota. In both instances he was the team leader. A CI Survey is defined as an in depth review of a Stations operational activities designed to detect efforts by and determine the capabilities of foreign intelligence services to carry out recruitment, penetration, provocation and deception operations and to evaluate the threat these pose to the Station. The Surveys are time consuming and taxing, requiring a review of all pertinent Headquarters files, a visit to the Station to review field files and interview all operational personnel, and then return to Hqs. to compile a report that may run as few as fifty pages or more than one hundred. The reports are addressed to the COS and the DDO, although the DCI has instructed that he be routinely included on the distribution of each report. Mr. Piccolo's level of performance is reflected in the fact that Bogota was his fourth survey.

In another ad hoc activity Mr. Piccolo was responsible for retrieving a proposal regarding joint activities with the FBI in a very sensitive area from the Bench Mark paper being submitted to the National Security Council/Special Coordination Committee NSC/SCC) on counterintelligence programs, and suggesting that it be submitted jointly with the FBI to appropriate USG authorities. This suggestion is currently being implemented and in so doing has required consultation and meetings with the FBI from the working level to very senior officers.

Mr. Piccolo is an experienced and professional officer requiring a minimum of supervision. He is aggressive, imaginative and has demonstrated his initiative. He writes well and is even stronger in his verbal skills. He can defend his position vigorously and skillfully but is disciplined and will accept the final decision if contrary to his own view without grousing. He has an engaging personality. I would be happy to serve with him again either at Hqs or overseas.

SECRET

1 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo
CI/LANE Section

SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction

I. Introduction

This LOI is intended to provide you with the general missions and goals of the Operations Coordination Branch (CI/OC) and the specific duties which you, as an officer in the LANE Section, have been assigned.

II. Operations Coordination Branch - General Missions and Goals

CI/OC is responsible for monitoring and coordinating the foreign CI activities of CIA and other U.S. agencies, and providing appropriate support and guidance to such activities. It conducts CI and Operational Security Surveys of Directorate field stations, and manages certain select, sensitive foreign CI operations. It investigates and issues the necessary approvals for the operational use of all prospective DDO agents and assists in the monitoring of agent performance for CI purposes. It contributes critiques annually to EPDS on the progress of field stations toward their CI objectives, and in general monitors the counterintelligence performance of CIA elements in accordance with the pertinent protions of Executive Order 12036.

III. The Operations Group was reorganized in December 1977 and its functions and responsibilities were restructured along geographic lines. The effect was an amalgamation of the former Area Operations Branch and the functional branches into three geographic components consisting of an EAAF Section, a EURFR Section, and a LANE Section. Also at that time, the Clearance Section, formerly the Ops Clearance Branch, R&A Group, was transferred to CI/OC

IV. Specific Duties

As an officer in the LANE Section, CI/OC, your duties are as follows.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 057250

1. Develop and maintain close and effective working relationships with LA Division personnel in support of DDO counterintelligence operations and activities; and to provide guidance and support in the furtherance of those operations and activities.

2. To screen non-restricted DDO operational telecommunications in the LA area for selection and routing of items of CI significance to appropriate Branch and Staff officers.

3. To assist in the review and coordination, in conjunction with the central referent, of assigned double agent cases in your geographic area which are sponsored by the U.S. military and other U.S. agencies; and to help manage certain select, foreign CI cases.

4. To monitor hostile intelligence approaches to U.S. persons in your geographic area, including U.S. Government military and civilian employees, tourists and U.S. resident aliens.

5. To participate in the LANE Section contribution to an overall CI Staff annual evaluation of the counterintelligence program conducted under the Operating Directive of the respective stations in the LA area.

During your tour with CI/OC fitness reports on your performance will be prepared and based on the provisions of this LOI. Any major changes in your duties will be made in writing with your concurrence and will require your signature to be effective.

I have read and understood the above:

Joseph S. Piccolo

1 Sept 78
Date

John F. Markham

SECRET

1 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo
CI/LANE Section

SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction

I. Introduction

This LOI is intended to provide you with the general missions and goals of the Operations Coordination Branch (CI/OC) and the specific duties which you, as an officer in the LANE Section, have been assigned.

II. Operations Coordination Branch - General Missions and Goals

CI/OC is responsible for monitoring and coordinating the foreign CI activities of CIA and other U.S. agencies, and providing appropriate support and guidance to such activities. It conducts CI and Operational Security Surveys of Directorate field stations, and manages certain select, sensitive foreign CI operations. It investigates and issues the necessary approvals for the operational use of all prospective DDO agents and assists in the monitoring of agent performance for CI purposes. It contributes critiques annually to EPDS on the progress of field stations toward their CI objectives, and in general monitors the counterintelligence performance of CIA elements in accordance with the pertinent protions of Executive Order 12036.

III. The Operations Group was reorganized in December 1977 and its functions and responsibilities were restructured along geographic lines. The effect was an amalgamation of the former Area Operations Branch and the functional branches into three geographic components consisting of an EAAF Section, a EUREF Section, and a LANE Section. Also at that time, the Clearance Section, formerly the Ops Clearance Branch, R&A Group, was transferred to CI/OC

IV. Specific Duties

As an officer in the LANE Section, CI/OC, your duties are as follows.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 057250

1. Develop and maintain close and effective working relationships with LA Division personnel in support of DDO counterintelligence operations and activities; and to provide guidance and support in the furtherance of those operations and activities.

2. To screen non-restricted DDO operational telecommunications in the LA area for selection and routing of items of CI significance to appropriate Branch and Staff officers.

3. To assist in the review and coordination, in conjunction with the central referent, of assigned double agent cases in your geographic area which are sponsored by the U.S. military and other U.S. agencies; and to help manage certain select, foreign CI cases.

4. To monitor hostile intelligence approaches to U.S. persons in your geographic area, including U.S. Government military and civilian employees, tourists and U.S. resident aliens.

5. To participate in the LANE Section contribution to an overall CI Staff annual evaluation of the counterintelligence program conducted under the Operating Directive of the respective stations in the LA area.

During your tour with CI/OC fitness reports on your performance will be prepared and based on the provisions of this LOI. Any major changes in your duties will be made in writing with your concurrence and will require your signature to be effective.

I have read and understood the above:

Joseph S. Piccolo

John Markham
John F. Markham

1 Sept 78
Date

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Piccolo, Joseph	3. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 35	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-13	6. SD DAG

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI/OG/SO	9. CURRENT STATION HQS	10. CODE (CK 1) XX HQS. ☐ OF ☐

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM- TO) 1 Oct 76-30 Sep 77

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 Oct 77

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operations officer for multiple lead highly sensitive CI project.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer for CI/FBI project involving extensive international and domestic travel.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Investigation and exploitation of CI leads derived from Agency and/or FBI operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Ad hoc assignments; i.e. CI Operational Surveys, CI training of foreign liaison, etc.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 To serve as Acting Branch Chief.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Piccolo is an integral part of the Special Operations Branch which, in way of explanation, is charged with undertaking certain sensitive operations assigned by Chief, CI; it is also responsible for a variety of ad hoc requirements not normally found elsewhere in the DDO which require the handling of off beat but CI related investigations; and in rendering support to the FBI in its cases abroad. Mr. Piccolo in the fulfillment of these assorted tasks of the Branch has demonstrated discretion, tact, flexibility, open mindedness, operational knowhow and good common sense. He is viewed as a highly experienced, completely dependable officer, requiring a minimum of supervision. He does, however, know when to seek guidance and accepts it with good cheer. His approach to operational problems is based on a solid appreciation of what is required and is not afraid to express his views on a problem when necessary, but he will implement a decision once made. These attributes coupled with his fairness, single minded approach to his work and dedication, mark him as a professional in the true sense of the word.

/Continued/

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 15	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 October 1977	AC/CI/OG/SO	Daniel R. Niesciur

2. BY EMPLOYEE

	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	25 OCT 77	Joseph S. Piccolo

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have known Mr. Piccolo since early this year and have been much impressed by his professionalism, conscientiousness and capacity for just plain hard work. He has done everything that we have asked him to do quickly and well. His work both on the sensitive and productive CI project mentioned by the rating officer and on several counterintelligence surveys has been consistently first-rate. He thinks well and he writes well. Based on his broad field experience, his language skill and his deep dedication to the Agency, he would appear to have considerable growth potential. He is one of our very best officers. I unhesitatingly concur in the rating officer's letter grades and narrative comments.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 OCT 1977	Chief, CI Ops Group	Jack Friedlander

4. BY EMPLOYEE

	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☐ HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.		Joseph S. Piccolo

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT
October 1977

Joseph S. Piccolo

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS - /Continued/

In addressing the specific duties, Mr. Piccolo has been engaged during the past year in the exploitation of a sensitive multi-lead CI Project which has resulted in a neutralization of some Soviet espionage activity abroad. In the furtherance of this project he supervised, with an even hand, one intelligence assistant. Mr. Piccolo has been called upon to support CI activities requiring extensive travel abroad in support of joint Agency and FBI objectives. He executed these assignments with a singular degree of professionalism. Recently he organized and ran a CI training course for foreign liaison. This required the preparation of course material in Spanish and personally delivering lectures in the Spanish language. The Station described this effort as an outstanding contribution to the current task of molding the liaison service into an efficient and effective counterintelligence organization. More recently, based on previous experience and participation in CI Operational Surveys, he has been designated to head a CI Survey team going to Latin America. Finally, during the period of this report, due to the absence of the Branch Chief, Mr. Piccolo has served well as the Acting Branch Chief and during his tenure kept work flowing smoothly, efficiently and without change of pace. To sum up, Mr. Piccolo is in the opinion of this rater a solid first class officer whose judgment is totally dependable and whose accomplishments have been significant. We would commend Mr. Piccolo for any assignment in field operations above any of his peers.

25 October 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph S. Piccolo, Jr.

SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction

Dear Mr. Piccolo:

This Letter of Instruction sets forth your responsibilities and duties as an operations officer assigned to the Counterintelligence Staff. Your performance of the duties described below will serve as the basis of the preparation of your fitness report. Any questions, clarification or elaboration regarding these instructions should be discussed with the Chief, CI/OG/SO and/or Chief, CI/OG.

General

1. Working under the supervision of the Chief, CI/OG/SO, you are responsible for the initiation, coordination and support of certain counterintelligence operations designed to detect and neutralize efforts by adversary foreign intelligence services which seek to penetrate U.S. Government agencies (especially CIA) as well as any intelligence service abroad with which CIA maintains a liaison relationship. To do this effectively you will be expected to develop and maintain close working contact with other components of this Agency as well as officers of other U.S. agencies involved in counterintelligence.

2. Through perusal of pertinent cable traffic and other available data you should keep abreast on a continuing basis of the activities, personnel and political factors affecting the hostile opposition as well as problems which confront friendly liaison services and Agency installations overseas. It is further expected that you will contribute sound operational planning and participate actively in decisions reached concerning those counterintelligence operations assigned to you. You will also be expected to keep your immediate supervisor fully informed of all major developments and problems of an operational or administrative nature.

[illegible]

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 061197

3. In the absence of the Chief and/or Deputy Chief, CI/OG/SO, you will act in his place, assuming all the responsibilities and duties of that job.

Duties

4. In fulfilling your responsibilities you will be expected to perform the following duties:

a. Operations officer for multiple lead highly sensitive CI project.

b. Case officer for CI/FBI project involving extensive international and domestic travel.

c. Investigation and exploitation of CI leads derived from Agency and/or FBI operations.

d. Ad hoc assignments; i.e. CI Operational Surveys, CI training of foreign liaison, etc.

e. To serve as Acting Branch Chief.

Jack Friedlander
Chief, CI Staff
Operations Group

I have read and understood the above.

Joseph S. Piccolo, Jr.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12/08/35	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-13	6. SD DQG
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI/OG/AO & SO	9. CURRENT STATION HQS		10. CODE (CA, I) ☒ HQS. ☐ OF	

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO) 01/12/76 - 09/30/76

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. October 1976

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conduct CI operational surveys	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 To serve as acting branch chief	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 To serve as operations officer for a multiple lead CI project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 To case officer a CI project involving inter-division travel abroad.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

E2 IMPDET CL BY 008885

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Piccolo joined the CI Staff at his initiative and has served in several different roles in the period of this report. These included positions as survey officer in the Area Operations Branch for six months, operations officer in the Special Operations Branch for three months and then acting chief of that branch for two months. Overall he has performed his duties in these positions with efficiency and thoroughness.

During the six month period Mr. Piccolo was assigned to the Area Operations Branch, his duties consisted of participation in CI operational surveys of two countries, e.g., Ethiopia and Peru. By way of explanation, a CI operational survey is defined as an in-depth review, both at Headquarters and in the field, of a Station's operational activities in order to detect efforts by and determine the capabilities of foreign intelligence services to accomplish recruitments, penetrations, provocations and deception operations plus an evaluation of the threat these pose to future operations and assets. The surveys are conducted by a team of two or more operations officers and their final report may be 100 or more pages in length. The report is addressed to the DDO and the Area Division Chief and gives them a detailed CI profile of the Station.

(CONTINUED)

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 14 DEC 1976	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/CI Staff Ops Group	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert G. L. Wall

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☐ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Joseph S. Piccolo

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully concur with the comments of the supervisor. I have been most pleased with the manner in which Mr. Piccolo has moved in and taken over the management of his branch in the absence of the branch chief who departed with little warning. Mr. Piccolo is a hard-nosed, honest evaluator of CI problems. He has, however, the ability to manage problems and people with tact and professionalism.

DATE [illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI Staff Ops Group	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Lawrence M. Sternfield

4. BY EMPLOYEE

[illegible] HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN [illegible] OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☐ HAVE NOT ☐ ATTACHED A STATEMENT [illegible] EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Joseph S. Piccolo

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT Joseph S. Piccolo, Employee #025658

SECTION D - NARRATIVE COMMENTS (Continued)

The two countries which Mr. Piccolo helped survey represent widely varying operational and social environments. In both instances, however, the Station Chiefs cabled Headquarters at the end of the field aspect of the survey complimenting the team on the thoroughness and understanding with which they conducted the survey, and commented on the usefulness and practicality of the team's recommendations. It should noted that these cables had considerable impact on DDO management and were used widely in the extension of the survey program into other areas.

Although Mr. Piccolo's field exposure has been exclusively in the Latin American area, he has a widely varied operational background, having served in varying operational capacities in several stations, and he is perceptive in his understanding of operational realities. His personality is positive and outgoing, and in most instances he is able to initiate very quickly a responsive dialogue with fellow officers. He is adaptable in outlook and reads quickly and with understanding; qualities almost indispensible in an activity of this kind. Im sum, Mr. Piccolo approached both Surveys with enthusiasm and a sense of responsibility, completed his written report (he had a different partner in each case) promptly and accurately. He undoubtedly would have been engaged in a third survey except his temporary tour ended and he was assigned permanently elsewhere in the Staff.

In his duties in the Special Operations Branch, Mr. Piccolo has excelled in his management responsibilities in the sense of both getting the work out of his people and in getting along with them. He is on good terms with all of them. He has shown good CI mentality and a thoroughness which is essential to good CI work. His dedication to his work is shown by his punctuality in the morning and his presence in his office well after five most evenings. His production as operations officer has been steady and thorough for both of the projects for which he has responsibility. Unfortunately, he experienced a period of ill health following a hectic TDY; however, he returned to duty at the first opportunity and resumed his duties with vigor. His versatility was recently demonstrated by his participation in a joint meeting with representatives of a foreign service over a period of several days and evenings during which he proved fully effective in achieving Agency objectives in a liaison and social environment.

The most impressive aspect of Mr. Piccolo's performance and one deserving special mention in this fitness report is his ability with the written word. It is fully accurate to say that the survey reports to which he contributed were much better written than were those of his peers. He has the ability to describe an operational situation in terms which are at the same time meaningful, concise and easy to read. It is a pleasure to read his material and to compliment him on this ability in this report.

SECRET

15 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph S. Piccolo, Jr.

SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction

Dear Mr. Piccolo:

This Letter of Instruction sets forth your responsibilities and duties as an operations officer assigned to the Counterintelligence Staff. Your performance of the duties described below will serve as the basis of the preparation of your fitness report. Any questions, clarification or elaboration regarding these instructions should be discussed with the Chief, CI/OG/SO and/or Chief, CI/OG.

General

1. Working under the supervision of the Chief, CI/OG/SO, you are responsible for the initiation, coordination and support of certain counterintelligence operations designed to detect and neutralize efforts by adversary foreign intelligence services which seek to penetrate U.S. Government agencies (especially CIA) as well as any intelligence service abroad with which CIA maintains a liaison relationship. To do this effectively you will be expected to develop and maintain close working contact with other components of this Agency as well as officers of other U.S. agencies involved in counterintelligence.

2. Through perusal of pertinent cable traffic and other available data you should keep abreast on a continuing basis of the activities, personnel and political factors affecting the hostile opposition as well as problems which confront friendly liaison services and Agency installations overseas. It is further expected that you will contribute sound operational planning and participate actively in decisions reached concerning those counterintelligence operations assigned to you. You will also be expected to keep your immediate supervisor fully informed of all major developments and problems of an operational or administrative nature.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 008885

SECRET

3. In the absence of the Chief and/or Deputy Chief, CI/OG/SO, you will act in his place, assuming all the responsibilities and duties of that job.

Duties

4. In fulfilling your responsibilities you will be expected to perform the following duties:

a. To carry out ad hoc operational requirements as may be assigned such as the conduct of CI Surveys at overseas stations.

b. To serve as Branch Chief or Deputy Branch Chief as required in the absence of the incumbent.

c. To serve as the Headquarters case officer for certain highly sensitive CI operations.

d. To exploit CI leads arising out of sensitive material and command channel communications.

LStayeil

Lawrence M. Sternfield
Chief, CI Staff
Operations Group

I have read and understood the above.

Joseph S. Piccolo
Joseph S. Piccolo, Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT

NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Joseph S. Piccolo	3. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 1935	4. SEX M	5 GRADE GS-13	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION Managua

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		CAREER PROVISIONAL		RESERVE
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

	ANNUAL		21-MONTH		30-MONTH	X	REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-) 21 Jan - 7 Aug 1975	13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M–Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P–Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S–Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O–Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (*indicate number of employees supervised*).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for the Station's Operational Program targetted against Communist, Terrorist and political Left target	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts daily liaison operation to extract intelligence and operational support for Station unilateral efforts and to assess and cultivate liaison or other military officers for unilateral recruitment.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Cultivates a Cabinet level target for eventual recruitment as an agent of influence	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Acts as DCOS and, in the absence of the COS, as ACOS	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Develops unilateral assets in the MHABYSS target area.	RATING LETTER (*)
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Serves as Station Technical Referent	RATING LETTER (*)

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

30 DEC 1975

FORM 45N

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This is an end of tour report covering the fourteen months in which this Officer has been under my supervision. Managua Station has just submitted its first Statement of Accomplishment Goals under the newly-established MBO reporting system and schedule. Consequently, this report combines Subject's duties as specified in two previous LOI's which run from 1 June 1974 to 30 May 1975 and from 1 June 1975 through 31 July 1975. The duties listed are therefore broader than those to be reflected in the latest LOI now being formulated as a logical adjunct to the new MBO format and content.

(*) (On specific duties No. 5 and 6, there is so little content or substance associated with these duties as to make a Letter Rating meaningless. The Narcotics target in Nicaragua is practically non-existent and there is no current need for technical operations to support approved operational activities. The duties are listed only because they were included in the LOI.)

DUTY NO. 1

Responsible for the operational program against the communist and extremist target, this officer handles three agents and a contract agent in a highly proficient manner.

(See Attached Sheet)

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 14	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 7 August 1975	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The assessment given above of Mr. Piccolo's performance seems to be well-balanced and generally fair. His performance as described fits with my knowledge of it. It should be noted that it is very difficult to establish much of an operational record in Managua because of the lack of intelligence targets and the low level of community interest in developments in Nicaragua. It is to his credit that Mr. Piccolo was able to recruit in the only target available--the terrorist FSLN.

Mr. Piccolo is poised and quiet in demeanor. He is a reliable, dependable officer of good judgment.

I agree with the rater that Mr. Piccolo should be given the opportunity to do something different. A rotational tour to another DDO component would probably be very helpful to his overall development and motivation at this time. I concur in the overall assessment of his performance as "Strong."

DATE 9 December 1975	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, LA Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Raymond A. Warren

I certify that I have seen [illegible]
entries in this report.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 DEC 1975

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

He handles a contract agent who, in turn, handles a low level penetration of the orthodox communist party. This marginal asset is kept on the payroll at a modicum cost for the purpose of filling gaps, and for spotting, until better coverage can be developed. The contract agent, whose administration is almost identical to that required for a NOC, also produces information on the extremist target through his marital connections.

Also handled under Duty No. 1 is a high level member of a legal political party of socialist persuasion, which has traditionally demonstrated a propensity for cooperation with the communists and/or extremists in Nicaragua. This paid agent produced twenty eight intelligence reports with a Value Quotient (VQ) average of 4.07 over this period. This agent, handled directly, requires and receives close and alert guidance. He has provided valuable spotting information, which the Case Officer has followed up, accomplishing the full cycle of assessment, development and successful recruitment of a member of the communist youth organization, who will be targetted against both the communist youth, the orthdox party, and hopefully, into the FSLN (terrorist organization.)

Acting upon a lead from ERHATCHET-2, a former media asset, this Officer also contacted, assessed, developed and recruited a student who was formerly with the Revolutionary Students Front (FER-support arm of the FSLN terrorist organization.) This asset is being targetted against the FER and FSLN.

Considering the paucity of leads available on the elusive but important FSLN target, (a Priority 1 Objective of the Station), these two recent recruitments are judged to be very significant achievements, attributable to this Officer's language fluency, sincerity, experience and style, which makes it all look easier than it really is.

Subject has been criticized in his last two Fitness Reports for not developing new assets into the key target area (terrorists). It is important, therefore, to recognize his efforts and achievements now, as detailed above. He had never been a strong recruiter, but had always been an above-average agent handler who could extract more information and services

NARRATIVE COMMENTS (Continued)

from agents than most Case Officers. His two new recruitments represent the Station's most promising propects against the FSLN in the long history of FSLN operations in Nicaragua. It is suggested that this Officer's contribution of only two recruitments (at the very end of his tour of duty) could well be more meaningful and productive than the efforts of a super-salesman whose acquisitions later prove to be marginal or useless.

DUTY NO. 2

Subject conducts Station liaison at the working level with two contacts. His main job is the maintenance of the relationship, an effort handicapped by political considerations which oblige him to take but never give, to cancel scheduled training, and to maintain a low profile. Nevertheless, he does manage to extract information of interest on the terrorist and political targets, and the relationship does provide him with access to certain military officers who are being assessed and developed. Additionally, this Officer shares the task with the COS of conducting liaison at the policy level, an even more difficult, and less productive effort. Subject's warm and winning personality and extensive experience are key factors in his ability to maintain the relationship at all, which results in clear net gain to the Organization.

DUTY NO. 3

Subject has done exceedingly well in the development and cultivation of ERLANK-1 for gradual recruitment as an agent of influence. PRQ Parts I and II have been submitted, and ERLANK-1 is responding to Subject's overtures of friendship. ERLANK-1 has agreed to a turn-over, and this was accomplished very recently.

DUTY NO. 4

In this very small Station, the DCOS function is not a critical one, but when obliged to exercise his authority in this

NARRATIVE COMMENTS (Continued)

function, Subject has done very well. More importantly, in his several stints as ACOS (during COS illness which required hospitalization and medical consultations out of country), Subject really shone in his performance. He was obliged to deal with the most difficult Ambassador ever encountered by this rater, and represented and protected Station interests with skill and dignity.

Subject requires little supervision, by virtue of his thorough knowledge and extensive experience in practically every aspect of the mechanics of clandestine operations in Latin America. His avocation is "Administration", in the full sense of the word, and he administers his work load impeccably. The assignment just completed was his first command job, and he has acquired the additional managerial skills necessary for him to progress in his career. There is no question of his additional potential, and it is natural to envision him as a Deputy Chief of Station at a larger Latin American Station, or, better, as a Chief of Base in his next field assignment. He is above average in security and cost-consciousness. He is fluent not only in Spanish, but also in Portuguese, and more importantly, in human relations. He can establish rapport with people at all levels of society.

His personality is a pleasant one. He is low-keyed, soft-spoken, sincere and methodical and establishes natural excellent rapport with his co-workers, both subordinate and superior. While easy to get along with, he still knows how to effectively administer training, guidance, advice and discipline to his subordinates without alienating them. This rater has gotten on well with Subject. His experience, self-confidence and directness are such, however, that he might well be difficult to supervise if there were any kind of personality clash involved. In sum he knows what he is doing, and would be inclined to resent and resist advice or guidance which he might judge as unsound. While some might consider the trait a shortcoming, this rater considers it a strength, overall.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS (Continued)

If forced to search for a deficiency in his performance over the past fourteen months under my supervision, it would be necessary to point to a weak showing in operational and representational entertaining. In the former category, particularly, he could have spent more of his weekend and night hours with Liaison/Military and other contacts for developmental purposes. In his regular work hours, however, which included some nights and weekends, he was more than gainfully employed in the accomplishment of his assigned duties. He is not a clock-watcher, but stays with the Liaison, and agent meetings, as well as with the paperwork until they are completed.

This Officer is the victim of personnel requirements, which has resulted in an Organizational failure to challenge his talents and ingenuity. His re-assignment to the Cuban Operations Section next, for example, will be his fifth assignment in that area in 15 years. It is recommended that he obtain rotational experience in another geographical or functional area, to broaden him.

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 1935	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 13	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer -- DCOS	8. OFF. DIV. BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/LA/CAM	9. CURRENT STATION Managua	10. CODE (ck one) HQS. X OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: XX CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: XX ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 6 June 1974 - 30 September 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: ASAP

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached Cable in Lieu of Fitness Report.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] 007034 8 MAR 1979

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

See attached Cable in Lieu of Fitness Report

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 20 January 1975	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Raymond J. Swider

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED XX HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 20 January 1975	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Joseph Piccolo

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attached

DATE 05 February 75	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/LA Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Raymond A. Warren

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE 20 February 1975	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Joseph S. Piccolo

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

#HSMT-2529-

14-00000

F 21 WG 3 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER SOP# 123 (E.O) TOTAL COPIES 6-7 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY J.4 21 AT 13 ... Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT 41A (2)*

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DDO

ACTION COPY

-- EYES ONLY —

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 724290 EIA353 PAGE 01 IN 471163

TOR:211432Z JAN 75 MANA 11575

S E C R E T 211330Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 11575 SECTION 1 OF 2 0172

TO: DIRECTOR,

ADMIN PERS

RYBAT

*CABLE SEC SUGGESTS DISSEM TO: 40P
IF DESIRED, SEND FORM 1604 TO CABLE SEC.

REF: DIRECTOR 644201.

1. FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED PER REFERENCE. SECTION "B":

SPECIFIC DUTY NUMBER ONE: STATION OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATIONAL PROGRAM DIRECTED AGAINST COMMUNIST, TERRORISTS AND POLITICAL LEFT. RATING LETTER "S";

SPECIFIC DUTY NUMBER TWO: STATION LIAISON OFFICER, RATING LETTER "S";

SPECIFIC DUTY NUMBER THREE: MANAGES UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF SECURITY SERVICE. RATING LETTER "S";

SPECIFIC DUTY NUMBER FOUR: SUPERVISES CONTRACT AGENT WHO HANDLES PENETRATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY AND SPOTTER/ASSESSER OF POTENTIAL TERRORIST MOVEMENT PENETRATION ASSETS. RATING LETTER "P";

Piccolo

SPECIFIC DUTY NUMBER FIVE: DCOS, SUPERVISING ONE CLERICAL, ONE CONTRACT AND TWO COMMUNICATORS AND ACTING OFFICER

SECRET

7.71 MFG 3/74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 275 RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR.	STAFF
ACTION #			1 2 3 4 5 6

T 724290 EIA353 PAGE 02 IN 471163

TOR:211432Z JAN 75 MANA 11575

IN CHARGE IN ABSENCE OF COS. RATING LETTER "S". OVERALL RATING LETTER "S".

2. SECTION "C" NARRATIVE COMMENTS FOLLOW:

(1) IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE STATION OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE COMMUNIST AND POLITICAL LEFT AND INDIGENOUS TERRORIST MOVEMENT, SUBJECT HAS PERFORMED VERY WELL ALTHOUGH NOT YET SUCCESSFUL IN EFFECTING ADDITIONAL PENETRATIONS. RECRUITMENT NOT HIS STRONGEST POINT. ADDITIONALLY, HE WAS BURDENED WITH TOO MUCH AND TOO DIVERSIFIED A WORKLOAD. THIS OFFICER WILL RECEIVE A NEW LETTER OF INSTRUCTION SHORTLY, REFLECTING THE SUDDEN AND URGENT NEED OF SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS AGAINST THE LOCAL TERRORIST GROUP WHICH HAS EMERGED AS REAL THREAT TO PHYSICAL SECURITY OF OFFICIAL PERSONNEL AND TO POLITICAL STABILITY OF NICARAGUA. HIS HANDLING OF ESTABLISHED ASSETS IN THIS FIELD HAS RESULTED, OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS, TREBLING THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTING OVER THE PREVIOUS SIX MONTH PERIOD. AN ADJUNCT TO THESE DUTIES IS THE HANDLING OF ONE U.S. CONTRACT AGENT WHO HANDLES A PENETRATION OF THE ORTHODOX COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS CONTRACT AGENT

S E C R E T

71 MG 3/74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 724290 EIA353 PAGE 03 IN 471163

TOR:211432Z JAN 75 MANA 11575

ABSORBS MORE OF THE CASE OFFICERS TIME THAN HE MERITS, AND THIS IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO UNFORTUNATE LACK OF NATURAL APTITUDE ON PART OF THIS PARTICULAR CONTRACT AGENT. ADJUSTMENTS WILL BE MADE TO MAKE BETTER USE OF CASE OFFICER TIME.

(2) AS STATION LIAISON OFFICER, HE PERFORMS IN AN EXTREMELY STRONG MANNER, USING HIS WINNING WAYS WITH THE NICARAGUAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS TO EXTRACT, ON CONTINUING BASIS, NET GAIN FOR OUR MISSION. THE CHIEF OF THE SERVICE IS ESPECIALLY FOND OF THE OFFICER AND BECAUSE OF THE FRIENDSHIP OCCASIONALLY VOLUNTEERS TIDBITS OF INFORMATION WHICH ARE TECHNICALLY STILL UNRELEASABLE STATE SECRETS. TRECKLER IS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF ATTEMPTING TO REDIRECT LIAISON EFFORTS TOWARDS BETTER AND INCREASED COVERAGE OF THE COMMUNIST AND TERRORIST TARGETS, WHILE WALKING THAT TIGHTROPE OF AVOIDING AGENCY COMMITMENT TO ANY NEW LARGE EXPENDITURES OF RESOURCES. WITHIN THE LIAISON CONTEXT, HE HANDLES THE UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF THE SECURITY SERVICE, WHO COMPLEMENTS STATION COVERAGE OF THE LOCAL SUBVERSIVE

FORM
771 MG 3/74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

S E C R E T 75

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 724290 EIA353 PAGE 04 IN 471163

TOR1211432Z JAN 75 MANA 11575

SCENE WITH VITAL INFORMATION CURRENTLY NOT AVAILABRL FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE. THIS ACTIVITY TAKES MUCH LATE HOUR EFFORT TO ENSURE GOOD OPERATIONAL SECURITY, WHICH SUBJECT PERFORMS FAITHFULLY TO HIGH STANDARDS AND WITH GOOD CHEER.

(3) DCOS AND OCCASIONAL ACOS, SUPERVISING ONE CLERICAL, ONE CONTRACT AND TWO COMMUNICATORS, SUBJECT SHOWS MUCH STRENGTH AND POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY IN THE FUTURE. HIS LOW KEY AND DELIBERATE SPEECH AND BODY MOVEMENTS ARE MOST DECEPTIVE. HE IS, IN FACT, SELF CONFIDENT, PLEASANT, AND FIRM BUT COMPASSIONATE WITH SUBORDINATES. AS ACOS HE DOES AN EXCELLENT JOB OF DEALING WITH THE MOST DIFFICULT AMBASSADOR EVER ENCOUNTERED BY THE RATER.

8 PAGE 3 MANAGUA 11575 S E C R E T

(4) IN THE SEVEN AND A HALF MONTHS IN WHICH THE OFFICER HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION, HE HAS ALWAYS IMPRESSED WITH THE DEPTH OF HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE FUNCTION AND MISSION OF A FIELD STATION. HE IS A "NATURAL" FIELD INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, HIGHLY FLEXIBLE, HARD WORKING

71 MHG 3/74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1	4
2	5
3	6

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE VR

ACTION #

AND WITH THE INVALUABLE ABILITY TO GET ALONG WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL LEVELS, FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNTRY TO THE MOST ILLITERATE OF NICARAGUANS. UPON ARRIVING AT THE STATION FIFTEEN MONTHS AGO, IN THE WAKE OF THE DISASTROUS EARTHQUAKE, HE SET ABOUT TO INSTITUTE SOME SEMBLANCE OF SECURITY OVER STATION DOCUMENTS, ESTABLISHED A SECURE PAPER FLOW ROUTINE, SET UP MISSING FILES AND SUGGESTED MANY NEW OFFICE PROCEDURES WHICH HAVE CONTINUED TO THE PRESENT. WHEN THE STATION WAS BURDENED WITH A PERSONNEL SITUATION IN WHICH THE STATION FINANCES, LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT WERE NOT BEING HANDLED COMPETENTLY, SUBJECT STEPPED IN QUIETLY AND ENSURED THAT THESE ESSENTIAL DUTIES WERE BEING PERFORMED TO ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS. THAT BURDEN LASTED FOR A YEAR BUT HE NEVER COMPLAINED OR RECEIVED RECOGNITION. HE IS REMARKABLE IN THAT HE KNOWS ALMOST EVERY ASPECT OF EACH FIELD STATION JOB, BY VIRTUE OF HAVING DONE THEM PROFESSIONALLY HIMSELF IN THE PAST. HE HAS SERVED AS A FILE CLERK, AN INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANT AND CASE OFFICER. NOW,

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 724293 EIA353 PAGE 06-08 IN 471163

TOR:211432Z JAN 75 MANA 11575

AT THIRTY NINE YEARS OF AGE, HE STANDS IN MY OPINION, HEAD AND SHOULDERS ABOVE HIS GRADE PEERS IN EXPERIENCE, MATURITY, RELIABILITY, DEPENDABILITY AND UNFAILINGLY GOOD COMMON SENSE, HIS 17 YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE ORGANIZATION, 10 OF THEM ABROAD, HAVE RESULTED IN HIS FORMATION AS AN UNUSUALLY VERSATILE, HIGHLY KNOWLEDGEABLE AND COMPLETELY PROFESSIONAL OPERATIONS OFFICER. HIS OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS HAS RUN THE GAMUT FROM RUNNING ACCESS AGENTS, THIRD COUNTRY DENIED AREA OPERATIONS, DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS, C.P. PENETRATION

SECRET

2-71 MFG. 3 71

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 724275 EIA340 PAGE ~~01~~ 7-7 IN 471155 63

TOR:211427Z JAN 75 MANA 11575

S E C R E T 211330Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 11575 FINAL SECTION OF 2

TO: DIRECTOR,

ADMIN PERS

RYBAT

PROGRAMS TO HIS CURRENT DUTIES, AND INCLUDE EXTENSIVE SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT OF NOC'S. HE IS ABOVE AVERAGE IN HIS COST-AND SECURITY-CONSCIOUSNESS, KEEPS EXCELLENT RECORDS, SPEAKS FLUENT SPANISH AND IS A VALUABLE MEMBER OF THE EMBASSY TEAM.

(5) THE RATER APPRECIATES THE ROCK-SOLID RELIABILITY OF THIS OFFICER, CONSIDERS HIM TO BE AN IDEAL DEPUTY CHIEF OF STATION, AND WOULD GLADLY SERVE AGAIN WITH HIM IN ANY CAPACITY AT ANY TIME. IN VIEW OF HIS PERFORMANCE, ABILITY, PROFOUND CONCEPT OF STATION FUNCTION PLUS CONTINUED POTENTIAL FOR ADVANCEMENT, HE SHOULD BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION FOR ADVANCEMENT TO THE NEXT GRADE, AT THE NEXT APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY.

3. SUBJECT HAS SEEN AND SIGNED ABOVE ON 20 JANUARY 1975. E2, IMPDET.

** S E C R E T

SECRET

5 February 1975

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Subject: Joseph S. Piccolo
6 June 1974 - 30 September 1974

I concur in the above assessment. As indicated above Mr. Piccolo is a quiet officer but at the same time solid and dependable.

Raymond A. Warren
Deputy Chief
Latin America Division

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009560

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT

NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 1935	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-13	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer-DCOS	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/WH/2	9. CURRENT STATION Managua

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX CAREER	☐ CAREER PROVISIONAL	☐ RESERVE
☐ CONTRACT	☐ SPECIAL	☐ TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ ANNUAL	☐ 21-MONTH	☐ 30-MONTH	X REASSIGNMENT / Of Supervisor	☐ SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-) 20 Sept 1973-5 June 1974

13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. N/A

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Acting COS Duties. Supervises tw clerical, one NOC officer and tw communicators DA12	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Station operations officer with direct agent handling responsibilities for Communist Party and related targets DF 62	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison Officer	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Station operations officer for operations directed against the Narcotics target DG 14	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Operations Officer handling a sensitive liaison penetration operation DI 13	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 10	RATING LETTER S

FORM 3-73 45N

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

(The following is directly keyed to Subject's "Letter of Instructions")

As ACOS he has demonstrated a thorough understanding of Agency policies and regulations. He works well with those he supervises and has exhibited unusual patience while diligently instructing and correcting employees. During my absences, he has worked well with Senior members of the Embassy and has been accepted by Embassy and Station personnel alike as a mature, sensible and experienced officer.

As Liaison Officer for the Station, hehas done an excellent job of improving the effectiveness of the "Special Unit"by offerring his expertise, impproving their physical working conditions and convincing them to expand their horizons. The unit appears to be responding well to his leadership and should prove more productive in the future.

His handling of a sensitive unilateral contact in Liaison has resulted in obtaining what information the contact is willing to disclose. Although categorized as a penetration, the operation is more that of a contact who is willing to provide inside information to clarify certain situations and events rather than an agressive penetration seeking all that lies behind the scenes. This is a principal liaison contact with whom a good working relationship must be maintained and such a relationship does exist.

He has made very little progress in operations against the Narcotics target. Subject inherited very little in sources and has not developed any new prospects. (Continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4 June 1974	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Joseph Piccolo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 4 June 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ George Fill

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This seems to be a fair report which rates Subject about the same way that I would, based on my understanding of his performance. Subject is a mature and competent officer who does a fine job of handling existing operations and administrative tasks but has not been very aggressive in developmental work. The sleepy tropical atmosphere of Managua may not be very inspiring operationally, but new business is needed and Subject is believed to be capable of turning in a stronger performance in that area. He has the potential for further career advancement.

DATE 3 July 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, WH Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Raymond A. Warren

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 25658

Section C - Narrative Comments (Continued)

Subject's performance is strong in handling the present unilateral sources directed against the internal domestic target. Specifically, he has a thorough understanding and knowledge of the Christian Socialist and Communist Parties. Subject, however, has not made an effort to develop new potential sources.

In summation, it is clear that Subject has the background, experience and knowledge to perform the tasks in an outstanding manner. Some of these tasks, those that interest him most, he does very well now, Others, that he has determined are not of sufficient value or interest, he disregards. Where Subject must take steps to improve is in his overall attitude towards work to be accomplished. This being a very small station can be a handicap to an officer who must work harder to produce the little intelligence of interest that is available. Subject must spend more of his free time among the local community in an attempt to expand his contacts, contacts that could result in the development and recruitment of new sources.

Subject is well liked and accepted by the American Community. He and his wife entertain well and his good command of the local language makes him a strong member on this very small team.

Subject keeps excellent records and has done much to improve the records management of the Station. He is careful with organizational funds and his bookeeping is consistently up to date.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT

NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 025658	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 35	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-13	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/wh/5	9. CURRENT STATION Rio de Janeiro

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ CAREER PROVISIONAL ☐ RESERVE

☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ ANNUAL ☐ 21-MONTH ☐ 30 MONTH ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☒ SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-) 1 Aug 72 - 12 July 73

13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U--Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M--Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P--Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S--Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O--Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As Deputy Chief of Base, sharing in supervision of the whole Base (including direct supervision of two NOC's) and serving as acting Base Chief during the COB's absence.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Serving as senior FI/CI case officer for the Base and as consultant on ALSOBER/ALPALOOKA matters for other Bases and Station.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Providing informal guidance to the case officers concerning operational and other related problems.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Development of new operations: spotting, selection, development and recruitment of new assets.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Operational and intelligence reporting and correspondence.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER [illegible]

FORM 45N

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject is an exceptionally responsible and mature officer who also combines with these virtues outstanding ability in the fine tuning, analysis and direction of highly complex human cases. During the period under review he handled a most complex and delicate exploitation and termination of a high level ALSOBER penetration with CKPOLAR ramifications with a substantial degree of success. He has also served, in his capacity as deputy base chief, as counsellor and provider of guidance to case officers concerning virtually all of the Base's operations and particularly the more complex and difficult agent cases. His unusually keen intuition and perceptiveness have consistently helped the Base to avoid pitfalls and recognize important but obscure operational factors. His operational judgement is extremely sound.

During the period under review Subject has had an opportunity to demonstrate his ability as a supervisor and the results have been impressive. He is naturally careful and thoughtful as well as objective in his dealings with people and he adds elements of sensibility and sympathy as well which enable him to get good responses and inspire confidence. Case officers and other personnel tend to gravitate to him naturally seeking help and guidance and he gives of himself generously in these situations. He has shown excellent leadership potential also during the occasions on which he has taken over as acting base chief and has not been afraid to take

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 July 73	/s/ Joseph Piccolo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 July 73	Chief of Base	/s/ David B. McGrath

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in this excellent rating in all respects. The performance of this fine officer has been superior. He played a crucial role at the Base. He is a strong considerate supervisor with potential for growth. The failure to get out on the street and recruit during the past year (I am not familiar with previous experience) can be partly attributed to immersion in the complex, time consuming surfacing/disposal case, but must also be attributed partly to his personality (or at least his mood at that stage of his tour). Subject is perhaps more comfortable, or seemed to be during the rating period, handling going agents (indigenous and NOC's) which he does superbly,

(continued)

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 July 73	COS	/s/ Wilfred Kopolowitz

CONFIDENTIAL

new initiatives during these occasions, after due thought and consultation, if he thought they were warranted. And he has been an excellent judge of men (and women) and their quality. In his dealings with LNFALL, its various LNBUZZ agencies and their directors he has held up the Base's interests and image well while seeking fair and practical answers and solutions. He has a good sense of economy in monetary as well as other affairs. As he becomes more senior and more exclusively a supervisor and executive he should become more and more effective.

Subject is an excellent operational manager and agent handler who gets the best out of his assets. He is probably not so strong as an operational starter and developer and this appears to be due in part to an instinct to avoid exposure and eschew the glad hand. On the other hand, he has undertaken two rather difficult developmental operations starting from scratch during the past six months and has at least proven that he can do this kind of work when it is necessary. In both these cases he may have tried to move too fast in order to reach recruitment point before his departure but this is understandable. His written work is well conceived and conscientious and perhaps even somewhat above average for case officers of his grade and experience. Like most BKHERALD officers, however, he does not take sufficient pains to achieve simple, clear, forceful expression with the result that, while his best efforts are effective his second best is apt to result in lack of organization and clarity. He should work on this - a suggestion might be that he practice avoiding metaphors and adopt a straight declarative sentence style.

In conclusion, Subject's performance has been first class in the most important respects and his relatively minor weaknesses are not incurable. He should have an excellent future as a senior case officer and supervisor, particularly if he attacks and cures these weaknesses. His overall performance in his present tour has been very strong indeed.

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET

Section D - 3

Comments by Reviewing Official

plotting operational strategy (another very strong point), advising less experienced officers (he demonstrated considerable talent here) than he is going after new assets. Subject clearly has the brains, the poise, the empathy and the all-around appeal to do so. There is no doubt about his being able to devise and execute sound recruitment scenarios and pitches. He did not, however, get to the "critical" point during this past year and he understood the priority which Division and Station management was attaching to new recruitments. Subject more than earned the promotion to GS-13 recently accorded. In my judgment he should be given the opportunity to move quickly to the next higher grade. In many aspects of the Base/Station mission he has already demonstrated to my satisfaction that he has the ability to become a valued senior officer of our organization. At an appropriate point he should be a candidate for senior school training.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025658

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/5	8. CURRENT STATION Rio de Janeiro		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 August 1971 - 31 July 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Senior FI officer with supervisory responsibilities over two outside case officers.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Station CP officer with coordinating responsibilities over Station and Base activities and direct agent handling functions against CP and related targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Case officer for several sensitive, complex, high level penetrations of various high priority targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

23 AUG 1972

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject continues to be one of the strongest officers in the Base and will undoubtedly be a solid line backer as number three officer under the new staffing pattern. His judgment is considered and sound, his operational savvy, experience and talent invaluable. His supervisory functions have changed somewhat since last evaluation, and he now handles two active NOC officers (rather than one NOC and one inside case officer) who in turn handle a variety of operations including government as well ~~as CP~~ and terrorist penetration. As we have noted in past fitness reports, he is an intelligent supervisor with a capability for lighting fires under his charges when necessary. His thorough knowledge and understanding of the ALSOBER and ALPALOOKA fields has earned him the respect of all his colleagues.

Like the rest of us, he is not perfect, of course. His performance over the past year has been less strong on the operational development side and he should shift some of the emphasis of his efforts in this direction in order to achieve a better balanced performance. This will not be easy because at present he is unavoidably saddled with some serious and complex operational problems (not of his own making) and the demands of his NOC supervision are heavy. However, he is capable of adjusting his time and putting out the necessary effort and we have

(CONTINUED)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 2 Aug 1972	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Joseph S. Piccolo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 13	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 2 Aug 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Base	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David B. McGrath

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The rating of Strong is deserved. This is a really fine officer, very cerebral, experienced and skilled in the basic craft of our business, linguistically talented, toughminded and agressive in agent handling and exploitation. His lack of development/recruitment activity during the reporting period reflects to some degree a deliberate decision to keep a low profile in the Mission and in the city due to the particularly sensitive nature of ongoing projects handled. This still applies to some degree but we all now agree that during the remaining months of his tour an effort can be made to exploit this officer's considerable talents in the crucial area of creating new assets. I strongly endorse the recommendation for promotion.

DATE 2 Aug 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ W. D. Koplowitz

SECTION C - NARRATIVE COMMENTS CONTINUED

no serious doubts that he will do this.

Subject was denied a promotion on the previous round, which represents, in our opinion a lack of recognition of his fine performance and potential. He deserves a promotion and his proper career development demands one.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025658

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/5	8. CURRENT STATION Rio de Janeiro		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
X SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1971 - 3 November 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Senior FI officer with supervisory responsibilities over one junior officer and one career agent.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Station CP officer with coordinating responsibilities over Station and Base activities and direct agent handling functions against CP and related targets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Case officer for several sensitive, complex, high level penetrations of various high priority targets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 21 NOV 1971	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

NOV 24 9 03 AM '71

Subject is perhaps the most mature, dependable and competent case officer we have. He has excelled in the handling of intricate, sensitive penetration operations where the highest professional standards are demanded. He carries a very heavy work load lightly and is a prodigious contributor in both operational and information reporting. His performance as a supervisor has been characterized by conscientiousness, a good sense of detail, perceptiveness, fairness and firmness. He is at his best in practical situations, however complex and obscure, rather than in dealing with philosophical or theoretical problems but this is obviously more a matter of inclination, than of intellect. He is highly respected and appreciated by all his colleagues and especially by this supervisor.

Subject is under grade for his performance, experience and responsibilities. He is of all the Base officers most deserving of a promotion. A separate recommendation to this effect is being forwarded.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
3 Nov 1971	/s/ Joseph S. Piccolo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
3 Nov 1971	Chief of Base	/s/ David McGrath

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The COS concurs emphatically with this well-written evaluation. The subject is vastly under-rated in JKLANCE, perhaps because of his quiet, unassuming personality. But he is a strong, very strong, officer. His ability to handle the most difficult detail should not detract from his overall capabilities. He is sound as a rock, and merits a promotion, which is recommended by the COS.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 Nov 1971	Chief of Station	/s/ David A. Phillips

SECRET

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TRAINING REPORT

Weapons Training/Defensive Driving Course No. 12/72 4-8 October 1971
Date

TRAINEE: Piccolo, Joseph S. **OFFICE: WH**

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF COURSE:

The course provides basic proficiency training in the use of weapons for self-defense and in the techniques of defensive driving to counter vehicular kidnaping for Agency officers being assigned to hostile or unstable political and operational environments abroad.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD:

This is to certify that Mr. Piccolo has satisfactorily completed the prescribed course of instruction.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Joseph M. Hudacek
JOSEPH M. HUDACEK
Chief, Special Activities Branch

12 October 1971
Date

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.			2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/08/35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Branch 5		8. CURRENT STATION Rio de Janeiro	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 23 June 1970 - 31 December 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station FI Chief, supervising one officer directly, several on a part-time basis, and one outside staffer.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station CP program; makes recruitment attempts, runs agents (including one of international importance).	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordinates FI/CP activities of the three Bases in Brazil.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Handles funds and materials, and financial accountings.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 19 FEB 1971	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SCD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject gets an "S" across the board for a solid performance.

This rating officer has worked with Subject on a number of assignments over the past ten years. During this time he has risen from a very junior position to his present grade and responsibility due to steady, solid performance oriented towards operations; i.e. he gets out into the street to practice what he has learned.

Only a few days before this report Subject was on-the-scene supervisor of a professionally conducted recruitment attempt. In such operations his experience against a hard target (PBRUMEN) has been evident.

Subject is a good manager of JKLANCERS, including one on his first overseas tour, and indigenous agents, including one of considerable international access. He makes them all work on target. Under his supervision one of the Station's moderately useful agents has successfully been moved into the extremely important terrorist area. Subject uses imagination in his day-by-day work (and handles Station JMROD assignments).

His handling of money and records and materials is impeccable.

Both Subject and his wife mix well with their colleagues, and (cont'd)

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
19 Jan. 1971	/s/ Joseph S. Piccolo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 Jan. 1971	COS	David A. Phillips

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the evaluating officer's comments and would like to cite for emphasis the high degree of professionalism which characterizes Subject's attitude and performance.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 Jan. 1971	DCOS	David B. McGrath

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT - HOWARD A. TRECKLER

SECTION C (CONT'D)

enhance the LNCUFF image generally. Previously fluent in Spanish, Subject speaks Portuguese well after only a few months in Rio de Janeiro.

In short, Subject is a solid, professional officer, with his eye and his actions always on the target. He maintains his forward thrust within a framework of prudent judgment, and is maturely deliberate in deciding to take a risk. That's the name of the game.

It is requested that Subject's name be placed on the list of officers being considered for promotion.

[illegible] OP SPD/PPB

I GUAGE TR SECRET EPORT

Date of Report	19 May 1970
Student Name:	PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.
Office:	WH
Course:	PORTUGUESE FULL-TIME
Inclusive Dates	01/05/70-04/23/70

Proficiency Level Before and After Training

	Before	After
Speaking	--	2+
Aural Comp.	--	2
Read Comp.	--	2+

* Instructors Estimate vice Official Test

Hours of Instruction

Scheduled [illegible] Actual 282

Absences 74

LANGUAGE TRAINING AIMS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

The general aim of this course of study was to provide the student with a command of a foreign language in a skill and at the level set by the sponsoring office. Speaking, aural comprehension and reading comprehension, as required, were emphasized. Fluency and accuracy were given equal importance in training and in evaluation of the student. Cultural matters were covered only incidentally.

This student evaluation is based on (1) Instructor and Linguist observations; (2) regularly administered oral and written achievement tests; (3) a final comprehensive achievement examination. The achievement rating reflects only performance and achievement in the course and is conditioned by the length of time the student spent in training, achievement potential based upon his or her aptitude for language study and upon motivation. This rating should not be confused with the Proficiency Rating which is submitted separately on Form 1273, Certification of Language Proficiency.

PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING COURSE AIMS

(Overall progress in the course is shown as unsatisfactory, marginal, satisfactory, above average, superior when compared against established standards for such training).

Speaking	Aural Comprehension	Reading Comprehension
ABOVE AVERAGE	ABOVE AVERAGE	ABOVE AVERAGE

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

This student, with no experience in Portuguese, held his own extremely well in a class with three other students, all of whom had had previous training in the language.

He did especially well in pronunciation and soon succeeded unusually well in eliminating any interference from Spanish. Because of his knowledge of Spanish, the student's ability to read and understand is greater than his ability to speak.

His mastery of the course material was very good. His oral use of the language was generally limited to short sentences. In longer sentences he had a tendency to get lost in mistakes of syntax. He was almost always aware of his mistakes and would correct them himself, at the completion of a sentence. He always responded well to correction.

The areas in grammar presenting problems were 1) use of the subjunctive 2) a tendency to overlook, or sidestep, idiomatic expressions 3) failure to

See reverse side for additional comment

Instructor

For the Director of Training:

SECRET

Department Chief
Language School/OTR

use the preposition with certain verbs requiring the use of a preposition with dependent infinitives.

In my judgment, the student already has the ability to use the language effectively in basic, every-day situations. After a matter of months in the foreign environment he should be able to function effectively in all job-related situations. Because he was extremely diligent and conscientious, he would be an excellent candidate for further language training.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)		2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Piccolo, Joseph	S.	12/ 2/31	M	GS-12	D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT		8. CURRENT STATION	
Ops Officer		DDP, [illegible]/Branch 6		Rio de Janeiro	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 22 June 1970 - 31 December 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station FI Chief, supervising one officer directly, several on a part-time basis, and one outside staffer.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station CP program; makes recruitment attempts, runs agents (including one of international importance).	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordinates FI/CP activities of the three Bases in Brazil.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Handles funds and materials, and financial accountings.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject gets an "S" across the board for a solid performance.

This rating officer has worked with Subject on a number of assignments over the past ten years. During this time he has risen from a very junior position to his present grade and responsibility due to steady, solid performance oriented towards operations; i.e. he gets out into the street to practice what he has learned.

Only a few days before this report Subject was on-the-scene supervisor of a professionally conducted recruitment attempt. In such operations his experience against a hard target (PBRUMEN) has been evident.

Subject is a good manager of JKLANCERS, including one on his first overseas tour, and indigenous agents, including one of considerable international access. He makes them all work on target. Under his supervision one of the Station's moderately useful agents has successfully been moved into the extremely important terrorist area. Subject uses imagination in his day-by-day work (and handles Station JMROD assignments).

His handling of money and records and materials is impeccable.

Both Subject and his wife mix well with their colleagues, and (cont'd)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
19 Jan. 1971	/s/ Joseph S. Piccolo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
12 Jan. 1971	COS	David A. Phillips

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the evaluating officer's comments and would like to cite for emphasis the high degree of professionalism which characterizes Subject's attitude and performance.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 Jan. 1971	DCOS	David B. McGrath

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT - HOWARD A. TRECKLER

SECTION C (CONT'D)

enhance the LNCUFF image generally. Previously fluent in Spanish, Subject speaks Portuguese well after only a few months in Rio de Janeiro.

In short, Subject is a solid, professional officer, with his eye and his actions always on the target. He maintains his forward thrust within a framework of prudent judgment, and is maturely deliberate in deciding to take a risk. That's the name of the game.

It is requested that Subject's name be placed on the list of officers being considered for promotion.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 025658

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Piccolo, Joseph S.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 12/08/35
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-12
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/COG
8. CURRENT STATION: Headquarters

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: January 1970
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 15 January 1969 - 31 December 1969

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M–Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P–Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S–Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O–Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 1. Is responsible for providing Headquarters' guidance and support to WH/Miami and other Field Stations concerning on-island agent operations; corresponds with the Field. DB10	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 DUb2 2. Is Headquarters case officer handling several on-island agents. 3. Maintains liaison with Office of Communications, TSD, Security, Finance, Cover, and other Headquarters components.	RATING LETTER S S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 4. Maintains liaison with the Navy (FOSG) and with the representative of MI-6 in Havana. DU4K DF31	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 5. Prepares studies for the Division and the DDP concerning on-island collection activities. cV7	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 6. Monitors developments in Cuba affecting the conduct of our on-island operations, especially developments involving the Cuban Department of State Security (DSE).	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 7. Supervises an intelligence assistant and a secretary.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

(This report is being written not by, but after consultation with, Subject's immediate supervisor, who is temporarily assigned elsewhere. The writer is one step removed from immediate supervision of Subject and has worked with him only since October 1969. In what follows, there is no difference of opinion between the supervisor and the writer, and statements not specifically attributed to one or the other represent the judgment and observation of both.)

Subject is an experienced officer whose primary field, on-island agents, is by definition difficult and frustrating and has recently become more so owing to developments beyond his control. Despite this situation he has continued to support successfully the most productive Cuban in-place FI agent that the Agency has.

The compromise of a major on-island operation during the reporting period was due not to any deficiency on Subject's part but rather to a general lack of Agency control over the operation from its inception. In any case, it is to Subject's credit that he wrote a candid and thorough analysis and damage report on the case (Writer).

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 30 Jan 1970
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: Pls see above
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 30 January 1970
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, WH/COG/OPS
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Glenn O. Brown

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Based on 3 months experience in dealing with subject I have found him to be a thoroughly professional operations officer who shows good judgement and makes good use of his field experience in carrying out his function as COG's on-islands case officer. He performs with a minimum of supervision and is most perceptive in monitoring activities and events related to his area of activity. I believe Mr. Piccolo has considerable potential for moving up to more important positions.

DATE: 3 February 1970
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Deputy Chief, WH/COG
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Wesley L. Laybourne

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

/continued/

Subject's in-house liaison has been effective, as has his liaison with the Navy FOSG (Supervisor). It does not appear that liaison with the representative of MI-6 in Havana for the exploitation of operational matters has been used to its fullest potential, although it should also be noted that this responsibility is not purely Subject's.

Subject appears to be a thoughtful and effective supervisor who is concerned with the further training and development of those under his supervision (Supervisor).

S E C R E T

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION -- TECHNICAL SCHOOL

SHORT RANGE AGENT CONTACT SURVEY (A-106)

Training Report

Name : PICCOLO, Joseph S.

Office: WH/COG

Date : 6 June 1969

1. OBJECTIVES:

To provide a general knowledge in:

a. Selected gear used for clandestine short range agent contacts. Included are representative samples of:

One way RF radio devices; two way RF radio devices; two way carrier current devices; optical communicators; and special telephone devices used for establishing agent contact.

b. The philosophy, purpose, considerations and manageability of short range agent contact systems; including message security, link security, reliability and feasibility of agent contact systems.

INSTRUCTOR
TSD/TECHNICAL SCHOOL

S E C R E T

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025658

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) Piccolo	(First) Joseph	(Middle) S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/08/35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	Ops Officer			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/2		8. CURRENT STATION MANAGUA	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
27 Apr 68-15 January 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Overall liaison responsibilities with the Office of National Security, with emphasis on guidance of the Special Unit. This was his principal duty during his service in Nicaragua and outweighs the other duties noted below. DE51	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Processing into disseminable intelligence of raw reports produced by liaison; preparation of cables and operational dispatches. DF21	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Handling of one FI operation (ERRATIC-5) and of other miscellaneous operational duties as assigned. DE62	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Acting as Chief of Station in the absence of the COS.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This officer made excellent progress in working with the liaison service and was notable in his efforts to organize, train, and direct rather than simply sit back and accept the intelligence product. His liaison operation is the single most important operation of Station Managua and it could not have been in better hands. His working relationships with personnel of the liaison service were based on mutual friendship and respect and that service was as sorry to see him leave as was the Station. He also earned the friendship and respect of his colleages and cover facility personnel of all levels and had rare success in his dealings with administrative personnel of the cover facility, a most uncooperative lot.

It is difficult for the rating officer to stand back and be flatly objective about this fine employee who is a friend of many years standing and who impressed the rating officer years ago as an officer of rare potential. His tour in Managua was cut short by a personal tragedy (illness and death of a minor dependent) which set into motion a transfer which could not later be reversed. Despite the pressures of this tragedy, this employee performed at a high level throughout this service in Managua and both he and his charming wife proved outstanding examples of "true grit." His tour in Managua proved him once again to be a mature, competent professional who should be able to advance to high positions in the organization. He accepts responsibility well--acted without hesitation

~~(continued)~~

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
11 Feb 1969	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
9 months	Employee left PCS prior to preparation of report. Should be shown to him at Headquarters.	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
15 January 1969	Chief of Station	/s/ Robert T. Shaw

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the rating officer's evaluation of Mr. Piccolo.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
11 Feb 1969	C/WH/2	Edwin M. Terrell

SECRET

SECTION C, continued

when serving as Acting Chief of Station during the COS' absence on home leave. He has rare ability to see the relevant and has the courage of his convictions--will argue a point. Physically slow moving--given to ambling like a tired old bear--he can be quite deceiving in an age which seems to specialize in rapidly moving young men-on-the-go. There is no wheel spinning about this officer and no sham. He has his eye on the future and moves along relentlessly in that direction. Obstacles bother him but don't deter him. He is in short a steady, dependable man with forward momentum.

One area in which he could use some improvement is in his writing. This has been discussed with him. The rating officer has recommended that he take a course in effective written English. His writing is at times vague and convoluted.

His fine performance was rewarded in September 1968 with a much-merited grade promotion so he cannot be recommended for promotion at this time. It is recommended, however, that he be given a position with head room to allow for advancement to higher grade as soon as he is eligible. The rating officer would be pleased to serve with this officer at any time, any place.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025658

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/8/35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
May 1966 - 30 October 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Agent handling and exploitation. Acts as case officer for a variety of operations including a double agent operation.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Administrative management of project activities.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operational planning (target analysis etc.)	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Programming and handling of covert action activities.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reporting and processing of intelligence information	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 20 DEC 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 8-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This young case officer has displayed considerable professionalism after only a relatively short time in the clandestine operations field. He is very versatile and resourceful and has shown a high amount of initiative. He is at his best as an agent handler and has developed close relationship with the assets entrusted to him. He has been helped in this by a high degree of fluency in Spanish and his pleasant personality. His reporting, particularly his cable writing still leave room for improvement, but on the whole, this officer has been one of the mainstays of the PBRUMEN Section during his tour, which unfortunately has been marred by poor health.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNA[redacted]
30 Nov 67	/s/ Joseph S. Piccolo

2. BY SUPERV

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
16 months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
30 Nov. 1967	Ops Officer	Francis Sherry

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully concur with the comments of the rating officer. Subject is an excellent case officer suitable for assignment either outside or under official cover. He needs further training in written staff work, however, and at a convenient moment in his career would benefit greatly from intensive training in reports writing, rapid reading, and related subjects.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
30 Nov. 1967	Chief of Station	Winston D. Miller

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

Training Report

Field Finance and Logistics Course No. 5 -68 18 March - 5 April 1968
(Three Weeks, full time) 120 hours (date)

Student : ~~Piccolo,~~ Joseph

Year of birth: 1935 **Office** : WH

Grade : GS-11 **Service Designation** : D

EOD Date : 0862 **Number of Students** - Logistics: 22
Finance : 16

COURSE OBJECTIVES

The principal objective of this course is to prepare students for logistics and finance responsibilities at Class B or C and Type II or III field stations. The course familiarizes students with techniques, regulations, and procedures as they pertain to finance, logistics, foreign travel, personnel and physical security at a field station. Emphasis is placed on practical applications; therefore, students concentrate on preparing and maintaining Station financial and property records, preparing foreign travel vouchers, preparing personnel documentation and the changing of safe combinations and the repair of simple safe malfunctions. The course covers (1) Finance: the budgetary process, covert currency funding, cash controls, advances, accountings, voucher preparation, financial management of projects, and allotment and cost control. (2) Logistics: authorities, classifications, and controls as they pertain to acquisition, use, transfer, and disposal of materiel; real estate and vehicles; property accounting procedures; shipment and storage of personal effects; and reporting to Headquarters. (3) Travel: regulatory authorities and limitations, computation of per diem, and travel voucher preparation and procedures for both TDY and PCS travel. (4) Personnel: regulatory procedures covering contract personnel, leave, overseas medical benefits; the use and preparation of field duty status reports, integree settlement sheets, field reassignment questionnaires, personnel clearance and transfer sheets and fitness reports. (5) Security: acquaintance with overseas safekeeping equipment; emergency destruction procedures and materiels.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Testing includes three practical problem tests. (1) The Finance Test Problem involves maintaining a set of Class B Records for a period of one month. (2) The Logistics Test Problem requires the maintenance of a set of Type II property records covering a years's transactions. (3) The Travel Test Problem involves solution of a travel problem including preparation of a travel voucher. A test covering the proficiency level attained in Personnel and Security is not given.

Grades are given in accordance with the fitness report system. (Weak, Adequate, Proficient, Strong, and Outstanding)

TEST RESULTS:

Finance:	Maintenance of Class B and C Station Cash Journals and Subsidiary Records	S
Logistics:	Maintenance of Type II Accounting Stations Documentation, Registers, and Stock Records	O
Travel Test:	Preparation of a TDY travel voucher and the computation of per diem.	P

NARRATIVE COMMENTS:

Mr. Piccolo had difficulty in the computation of per diem. If his future duties will include responsibility for travel, I suggest that additional instruction in per diem computation be given him.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

John W. Field

John W. Field
Instructor

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 025658

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PICCOLO Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]	3. SEX	4. GRADE [illegible]	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH-1	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	XXX	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) June 1966 to September 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Agent handling and exploitation. Serves as case officer to a variety of agents including one double agent	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Administrative management of project activities including accounting, funding, etc.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operational reporting, including contact reports, operational progress reports, etc.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Reporting and dissemination of intelligence information	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Target analysis; preparation and implementation of plans for new operations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conception and initiation of covert action programs in support of [illegible] operations	[illegible]

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SEP 28 3 30 PM '66
MAIL ROOM

This employee has continued to perform in the same manner described in detail under this section in the last fitness report prepared by the same rating officer (May 1966). He has had to assume an even heavier work load owing to the imminent transfer of his supervisor whose [illegible] assets have of necessity been turned over to this employee. His health has not improved as expected and it is felt that he should be sent to WOLADY for a complete medical check-up as soon as he can be spared for the time required.

Once again, it is recommended that this officer be promoted as soon as possible to GS-11.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 September 1966	/s/ Joseph S. Piccolo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
4 months TDY 11 months PCS	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 September 1966	Ops Officer XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	/s/ Robert T. Shaw

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer agrees with the Ratings and the Comments of the Supervisor of this officer which are reflected in this Fitness Report.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Chief of Station	/s/ Winston Scott

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025658

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PICCOLO, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/8/35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
XXX SPECIAL (Specify): To support promotion req.

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
1 June 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
October 1965 to May 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Agent handling and exploitation. Serves as case officer to a variety of agents including one double agent.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Administrative management of project activities including accountings, funding, etc.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operational reporting, including contact reports, operational progress reports, etc.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Reporting and dissemination of intelligence information.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Target analysis and preparation of plans for mounting new operations.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conception and initiation of covert action programs in support of FI/CI operations.	RATING LETTER O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

27 MAY 1966

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

MAY 27 11 15 AM '66

This employee has turned in a consistently fine performance since his assignment to Mexico City. Every going operation assigned to him has shown marked improvement under his tutelage, most notably the PBRUMEN refugee debriefing operation which has finally developed into a highly productive enterprise under the guidance of this officer. He is handling a sensitive PBRUMEN double agent case in a most professional manner. His operational reporting is exemplary and his writing style, once somewhat obtuse, has shown steady improvement. Despite a relatively short period in the role of field case officer, he has won the admiration and respect of colleagues and agent assets alike. He has a winning way with people - a reflection of his sincere interest in them. He has a high degree of initiative and drive, is imaginative and resourceful. In operations he shows a welcome degree of aggressiveness. His supervisory ability, except as exercised indirectly through others, has not yet been sufficiently put to the test to enable the rating officer to make a determination, but it appears that he already possesses the essentials of a good supervisor. He has had some health problems in Mexico but in spite of these has not let up in any way in his work. Indeed, one wonders what he would be capable of if he were in perfect health given the high level of performance to date.

It is a pleasure for the rating officer to go on record as stating that never in his 18 plus years with the organization has he had the pleasure of serving with a more promising young case officer.

It is recommended that he be promoted to GS-11 as soon as eligible.

In addition to the period covered by this report (Oct 65-May 66) this employee served at the Mexico City Station in TDY status from April 65 to Aug. 65. His performance at that time was also taken under consideration in the preparation of this report.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 12 May 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Joseph S. Piccolo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4 months TDY 7 months PCS	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 12 May 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert T. Shaw

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs in the comments of the rater. I have observed this officer closely during his tour at the Station. He has largely overcome a tendency to freewheel somewhat and shows an increasing willingness to accept guidance from more experienced officers. Compared with other officers of the same grade at this Station, it is my belief that his overall performance should be rated O rather than S.

In the Station's view he is a young officer who should advance steadily and with more experience should be able to handle a demanding deep cover assignment.

DATE 12 May 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief ofStation	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Alan P. White

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025658

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PICCOLO, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 6 December 35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Cuba	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
~~1 [illegible]~~ 16 Mar 65 - 30 Sept 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Please note other side	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

15 DEC 1965

FORM 4-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current po[illegible]spective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 14 1 51 PM '65
MAIL ROOM

Dispatch HMMT - 5685 dated 13 August 1965 form COS - Mexico City

" In view of the fact that Subject's recend servi[illegible] Mexico Station was done while he was on TDY, this Station is not in a position to prepare a fitness report covering Subject's performance for the period. Since he was absent from Headquarters, it is felt that he might possibly not be credited for his fine work unless the Station expresses its views.

" Subject plunged into work with the PBRUMEN Section immediately upon arrival and was given a wide variety of assignments ranging from surveillances on a rainy street at 4:00 a.m. to the preparation of operational reviews. He was given a number of existing agent assets to handle with a minimum of overlap with the previsus case officer. He performed very well in every instance. He is able, enthusiastic, and capable of carrying a large work load. His colleagues in the office and his agents and contacts outside found him a pleasure to work with. The only weakness noted during his TDY assignment was in his written work--a tendency to be unclear -- but this is something the Station is certain he can work out satisfactorily and it is not a serious shortcoming."

Mr. Piccalo returned to Mexico City PCS 29 Sept 1965

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Employee had left the Station and will be shown report upon hi return to Hqs.	
DATE 13 August 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR COS, Mexico City	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston M. Scott /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 13 August 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025658

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PICCOLO Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD SJ	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C/RR/OS	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.			

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 October 1964 - 15 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operations officer for handling communications training of a double agent.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Operations officer handling a Cuban intelligence service defector being utilized in recruitment operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operations officer assisting in handling and debriefing a Cuban intelligence service defector.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

20 MAR 1965

FORM 4-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Piccolo is an energetic, capable, all-around officer with a flair for operations and a great deal of common sense. He reacts correctly and instinctively when operational problems arise. His agent handling has been superior. He has a good knowledge of tradecraft and also understands records management. Although young, he is mature and self-reliant, needing little supervision.

Mr. Piccolo's promotion is being recommended in a separate memorandum.

Mr. Piccolo is cost conscious and effective in the use of space, equipment and funds. He does not hold a supervisory position.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 23 Mar 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 16 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 III 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/SA/CI (WH/C/SP)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harold F. Swenson Harold F. Swenson
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Concur in rating of Supervisor.		
DATE 24 March 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Asst. Deputy Chief, WH/C	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John T. Flynn John T. Flynn

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

17 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, DD/P

ATTENTION : Administrative Officer

FROM : Chief, Junior Officer Training Program

SUBJECT : Trial Attachment of Junior Officer Trainee Joseph S. Piccolo for on-the-job training

1. This memorandum confirms the attachment of Subject for on-the-job training in your Division as the second phase of the JOT Program undertaken with your cooperation.

2. The purposes of this trial attachment are:

a. To test his abilities in the practical application of his formal training;

b. To evaluate his potential and suitability for permanent assignment;

c. To train him for a specific assignment appropriate to his aptitudes and development;

d. To stimulate his motivation for a career in the Agency.

3. The attachment for six months effective 13 July 1964 can be adjusted by mutual consent according to circumstances or need for additional training. It is especially important that the Chief/JOTP be notified immediately if the trainee is not appropriately placed or is not effective in his work.

4. The JOT has been fully informed of the significance of this trial period in his career development.

5. Details of administrative procedures are attached.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

R. B. Freeman

ROBERT B. FREEMAN

Attachment
Distribution:
1 - Addressee w/att.
1 - C/CSPD w/att.
1 - O/Pers. Official Files w/att.
1 - JOT Piccolo w/att.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DETAILS FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ATTACHED JOT'S

For Supervisor.

1. The office or division will maintain time and attendance records during the period of this attachment.

2. Overtime can be authorized only after supervisor has checked with the JOT Training Officer. CTR will be reimbursed by division or office for overtime payments. The T&A clerk should report to JOTP at the end of each pay period any overtime worked by a JOT.

3. Any security violations by this JOT will be handled in the manner that is appropriate to the division or staff. Chief/JOTP will be notified in this event.

4. Supervisors will execute any fitness reports covering the period of this attachment. Chief/JOTP will countersign such reports.

5. Supervisors will provide job performance data to the Chief/JOTP when the JOT enters a promotion zone of consideration.

6. JOTP is located in Room 743, Broyhill Building, Extension 3261. Any questions should be addressed to Mr. JOHN GERRY

7. It is requested that each supervisor submit a progress report after three months of attachment. In the event of rotational assignments within a division where supervisors change, a progress report should be submitted at the end of each phase of the rotation.

For JOT:

8. Any leave will be worked out with the supervisor and if approved must be communicated by telephone to the JOTP office. See paragraph (1) above.

9. The JOT will furnish Chief/JOTP with a progress report after the first month of attachment and every two months thereafter. Items desired include:

a. Description of activities
b. Plans for next reporting period
c. Names and titles of supervisors
d. Assessment of value of present experience
e. Any constructive suggestions

These reports should be routed to Chief/JOTP via the supervisor.

10. The JOT will advise this office of his room number and extension and name of his supervisor as soon as possible after attachment.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[illegible] CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

11 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Chief, Western Europe Division, DD/P**

ATTENTION : Administrative Officer

FROM : Chief, Junior Officer Training Program

SUBJECT : Trial Attachment of Junior Officer Trainee
Joseph S. Piccolo for on-the-job training

1. This memorandum confirms the attachment of Subject for on-the-job training in your Division as the second phase of the JOT Program undertaken with your cooperation.

2. The purposes of this trial attachment are:

a. To test his abilities in the practical application of his formal training;

b. To evaluate his potential and suitability for permanent assignment;

c. To train him for a specific assignment appropriate to his aptitudes and development;

d. To stimulate his motivation for a career in the Agency.

3. The attachment for six months effective **13 July 1964** can be adjusted by mutual consent according to circumstances or need for additional training. It is especially important that the Chief/JOTP be notified immediately if the trainee is not appropriately placed or is not effective in his work.

4. The JOT has been fully informed of the significance of this trial period in his career development.

5. Details of administrative procedures are attached.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

R. B. Freeman

ROBERT B. FREEMAN

Attachment
Distribution:
1 - Addressee w/att.
1 - C/CSPD w/att.
~~1~~ - O/Pers. Official Files w/att.
1 - JOT Piccolo [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

DETAILS FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ATTACHED JOTS

For Supervisor:

1. The office or division will maintain time and attendance records during the period of this attachment.

2. Overtime can be authorized only after supervisor has checked with the JOT Training Officer. OTR will be reimbursed by division or office for overtime payments. The T&A clerk should report to JOTP at the end of each pay period any overtime worked by a JOT.

3. Any security violations by this JOT will be handled in the manner that is appropriate to the division or staff. Chief/JOTP will be notified in this event.

4. Supervisors will execute any fitness reports covering the period of this attachment. Chief/JOTP will countersign such reports.

5. Supervisors will provide job performance data to the Chief/JOTP when the JOT enters a promotion zone of consideration.

6. JOTP is located in Room 743, Broyhill Building, Extension 3261. Any questions should be addressed to Mr. JOHN GERRY.

7. It is requested that each supervisor submit a progress report after three months of attachment. In the event of rotational assignments within a division where supervisors change, a progress report should be submitted at the end of each phase of the rotation.

For JOT:

8. Any leave will be worked out with the supervisor and if approved must be communicated by telephone to the JOTP office. See paragraph (1) above.

9. The JOT will furnish Chief/JOTP with a progress report after the first month of attachment and every two months thereafter. Items desired include:

a. Description of activities
b. Plans for next reporting period
c. Names and titles of supervisors
d. Assessment of value of present experience
e. Any constructive suggestions

These reports should be routed to Chief/JOTP via the supervisor.

10. The JOT will advise this office of his room number and extension and name of his supervisor as soon as possible after attachment.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

7/23/64

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING REPORT
OPERATIONS COURSE

SECTION A

GENERAL

Operations Course No. 17
(720 hours, full-time)

9 March - 10 July 1964
(Date)

Student : PICCOLO, Joseph S.

Office : OTR/JOTP

Year of Birth: 1935

Service Designation: SJ

Grade : GS-08

Number of Students : 54 began
53 finished

EOD Date : February 1957

SECTION B

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Ranges from inadequate to less than satisfactory (in terms of a new and inexperienced case officer).
A - Adequate	Has achieved the basic level required. Satisfactory, characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	More than satisfactory. Has acquired a solid beginner's proficiency. This rating may be interpreted as representing "average" on our rating scale.
S - Strong	Exceptional proficiency, characterized by thoroughness, initiative, originality, and an exceptional student understanding of the case officer role in clandestine operations.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of other students doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SKILLS	RATING LETTER
1. Agent acquisition (spotting, development, assessment, understanding and use of motivation, recruitment).	P
2. Agent handling (building and maintaining rapport, establishing control, elicitation, briefing, debriefing, training).	S
3. Operational security (cover, compartmentation, clandestine communications).	P
4. Intelligence sense (recognition of information of intelligence value, differentiation between fact and opinion, separation of intelligence information from operational information, alertness to leads).	S
5. Intelligence reporting (disseminability of FIR's and intelligence cables, authentication of information).	P
6. Operational reporting (contact reports, cables, dispatches).	P

GENERAL FAMILIARIZATION

1. Foreign Intelligence Collection Programs.	P
2. Covert Action Programs.	P

The student also received general instruction by presentations, discussion of cases, reading and some practical application in Counter-intelligence programs and procedures. He was also given general familiarization in operational photography and the operation of basic audio-surveillance equipment, and heard short presentations on secret writing, surreptitious entry and covert entry of envelopes. Other areas of general familiarization included Counterinsurgency, paramilitary activity, and general operational administration and support.

OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Letter in rating box corresponds to the statement which most accurately reflects the student's level of performance, and takes into account everything about him which influenced his effectiveness.

This rating is a reflection of the degree to which the instructors feel that the student is both suitable and competent for overseas service in the Clandestine Services.

P

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Significant strengths and weaknesses and their relationship to overall performance in the Operations Course. This section amplifies and explains, as necessary, the rating letters given above.

Mr. Piccolo's performance throughout the course seldom deviated from the "Proficient" level. His strongest showings were frequently in areas where he used knowledge gained from previous Agency experience together with his natural ability to get along with people in face-to-face situations. He excelled in agent handling because he made an extra effort to establish and maintain rapport, was competent in solving operational administration and support matters with a minimum of guidance, and was imaginative in devising cover and in establishing clandestine communications. Shortcomings, however, arose in other areas because he occasionally relied too much on his ability to improvise, rather than to spend extra time in analyzing, planning and otherwise preparing for agent meetings.

Mr. Piccolo easily recognized leads of operational or intelligence value, and as the course progressed, displayed marked improvement in his writing of cables, dispatches and reports.

Mr. Piccolo acquired a more than satisfactory knowledge of the principles and techniques taught during the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Howard L. Fiedler
Chief Instructor

24 July 1964
Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

OPERATIONS COURSE NO. 17

9 March 1964 -- 10 July 1964

Number attending course: 54

	RATING	W	A	P	S	O
	OVERALL:	0	5	32	16	1
	Skills					
1.	Agent Acquisition:	0	5	30	17	2
2.	Agent-Handling:	0	7	25	18	4
3.	Operational Security:	0	1	34	19	0
4.	Intelligence Sense:	0	3	24	23	4
5.	Intelligence Reporting:	0	3	33	11	4
6.	Operational Reporting:	0	6	25	21	2
	General Familiarization					
1.	Foreign Intelligence:	0	5	33	13	0
2.	Covert Action:	0	5	39	9	1

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JOT TRAINING REPORT

SUBMITTED AS INITIAL FITNESS REPORT IN LIEU OF FORM 45

1. NAME OF JOT - (LAST)	(FIRST)	(MIDDLE)	GRADE	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.
PICCOLO,	Joseph	S.	GS-08	025658

2. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	REPORTING PERIOD		TO
7/31/64		1/6/64	6/30/64

3. This Junior Officer Trainee has been engaged in courses of the Integrated Program with intensive training in Clandestine Operations.

Detailed evaluations of his performance in each phase are contained in his Official Personnel Folder. Definition of the rating letter corresponds to that in Section B, Fitness Report Form 45 (4-62).

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN INTEGRATED PROGRAM | P

4. COMMENT AND PERTINENT OBSERVATIONS:

During his training, Mr. Piccolo has acquired a good knowledge of the principles and techniques of clandestine operations. He has demonstrated a good intelligence sense and a particular ability for handling agents.

He has had no supervisory responsibilities yet, and he appears to be cost-conscious as far as the undersigned can judge.

DATE 14 August 1964 RATER John Gerry TRAINING OFFICER/JOTP

20 AUG 1964

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

PERFORMANCE RECORD

International Communism - Challenge and Response

JOT Class 10 February - 6 March 1964

Course Description

A. Statement of Objectives.

1. To develop a familiarization with the doctrine, organization and tactics of International Communism as represented by the Communist parties and organizations in the free world; and in addition, to make the student aware of the capabilities, methods and problems of the Soviet Union and China.

2. To develop an understanding of the challenges facing the United States and the free world from the objectives, activities and capabilities of International Communism; and to assist the student to articulate the U.S. position at home and abroad to meet these challenges.

B. Course Method

1. Approximately one-half of the course is devoted to lectures, one-fourth to seminars, exercises and demonstrations, and one-fourth to individual study.

2. Student achievement is judged on the basis of performance in two written examinations and participation in seminars, and exercises.

Name: Piccolo, Joseph

Written Work

1st Examination: Doctrine, CP Organization & USSR 67 Proficient

2nd Examination: China, CP Activities 59 Proficient

Over-all Written Work Proficient

Oral Work

Seminars, Exercises Strong

Comment:

S-E-C R-E-T

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

Introduction to the Clandestine Services (JOT Program) 3 - 7 February 1964

Student : Joseph S. Piccolo

Year of Birth: 1935

Grade : GS-08

EOD Date : February 1957

Office : JOTP

Service Designation: SJ

No. of Students : 36

OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT

The purpose of this five day bloc of instruction is to acquaint the Junior Officer Trainee with the general organization and functions of the Clandestine Services. This orientation takes place during the preliminary phase of the JOT Program at Headquarters. It consists of lectures by representatives of major components of the Clandestine Services and discussion periods and is presented to assist the JOT in making his choice of considering a career in the Clandestine Services. This instruction also serves as an introduction to the subsequent training program at ISOLATION.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No record was made of individaul performance in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor

11 FEB 1964
Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAINING REPORT INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES COURSE (120 Hours)	COURSE NO. 21	NO. STUDENTS 37	DATE OF COURSE 13 - 31 Jan 1964

IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME OF STUDENT	YOB	EOD DATE	OFFICE	GS	SD
PICCOLO, Joseph S.	1935	February 1957	JOTP	08	SJ

KEY TO RATINGS

W - Weak	Ranges from inadequate to less than satisfactory.
A - Adequate	Has achieved the basic level required. Satisfactory, characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	More than satisfactory. Has acquired a solid beginner's proficiency.
S - Strong	Exceptional proficiency. Characterized by thoroughness, initiative, originality, and an exceptional student understanding of the work involved in intelligence production.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE IN SKILLS

	RATING		RATING		RATING
BRIEFING	P	WRITING	A	ANALYSIS	P

OVER-ALL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

	RATING
The RATING LETTER reflects the over-all performance of the student in the course and is thus a measure of the extent to which the student possesses the skills and techniques required in the production of finished intelligence. The rating is not necessarily arrived at by mathematically averaging the in skills ratings, but takes into consideration any outstanding strengths or weaknesses that should be reflected in an evaluation of the performance of the student as a whole. The RATING LETTER is a consensus of the view of the faculty.	P

REPORT OF OBSERVATIONS, JUDGMENTS AND IMPRESSIONS

This is a general, unspecific, narrative report of observations, judgments, and impressions. It includes intangible factors such as the student's attitude, cooperativeness, attentiveness, maturity, and judgment. It also includes the general impression the student has made on the faculty. This report will not be included unless the instructors believe that it would add something to the previous evaluation of performance in skills as well as to the evaluation of the OVER-ALL PERFORMANCE of the student.

☐ over

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING	James T. Lowe CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION FACULTY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL	DATE 3 Feb '64

FORM 3-63 2070 SECRET (45)

S-E-C-R-E-T

JOT INTEGRATED PROGRAM
(CLASS OF JANUARY 1964)

Introduction to Intelligence
(40 hours, full-time)

6 - 10 January 1964

Student : **PICCOLO, Joseph S.**

Year of Birth: **1935**

Grade : **GS-08**

EOD : **February 1957**

Office : [illegible]

Service Designation: SJ

Number of Students : 75

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

In the introductory phase of the JOT Integrated Training Program the course objectives are: (1) to instruct the student in the basic concepts of intelligence and the role of national intelligence within the Government; (2) to describe the intelligence community; its members, their duties, and their relationship to CIA; (3) to define and describe the functions of CIA and identify the components performing them; and (4) to explain the processes and means by which CIA fulfills its responsibilities for collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence.

Instructional techniques include lectures given by Orientation Faculty members, guest speakers, seminars, reading, review exercises and training films.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Evaluation is based on a 40 question multiple choice test. The numbers placed in the columns below show how many students received each rating. This student's rating is indicated by the asterisk.

Satisfactory	Excellent
	*
28	47

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief, Orientation Faculty

21 [illegible]

GROUP 1
Excluded from [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
025658

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PICCOLO Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec. 1935	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-7	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Assistant	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TFW/CI		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
September 1962 - 18 January 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises Correspondence Routing-Control Section of Branch	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops, implements, and manages Branch systems for mail routing-control, files and a Special Project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares dispatches and cables for transmission to the field, assists in preparing CI disseminations to other government agencies.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Runs name traces and prepares summaries of information on personalities.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Other duties as assigned.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

28 FEB 1963

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Employee returned to duty with the Agency in September 1962 after completing a tour of military duty. At that time he was assigned to TFW/CI. Although employee expressed a desire to work in operations at that time, he agreed to perform the duties outlined in Section B. He was called upon to perform these duties because of the dire need within TFW/CI for someone with his talents to establish and manage Branch systems for mail routing-control and files. Employee was promised an operational assignment as soon as the systems were established and functioning in an orderly and efficient manner. Employee has performed his duties exceptionally well and has established systems for mail routing-control, and files for the Branch which are functioning well. It is strongly recommended that this employee be assigned to duties of an operational nature and relieved from his present duties as soon as possible. Employee has the capability of assuming more and greater responsibility.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Joseph L.

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 20 February 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/TFW/CI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE VICTOR WALLEN

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This employee gives promise of continued professional growth.

DATE 21 February 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, SAS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Bruce B. Cheever

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

FOREIGN LANGUAGE APTITUDE AND EXPERIENCE REPORT

DATE OF TESTING

NAME

OFFICE

☐ MALE
☐ FEMALE

The category checked below is an interpretation of the scores made by the person named above on a battery of foreign language aptitude tests. The relationships between test performance and subsequent training performance of trainees in Agency language training courses are indicated by the graphs next to the aptitude categories. The graphs to the left are for women and the graphs to the right are for men. From these graphs you can read for each aptitude category the probability that a person in that category will perform in an Agency foreign language training course at an average or better-than-average level. For example, 22 percent of the women who obtain an aptitude rating of "8" can be expected to be average or better in course performance, while 5 percent of the men with ratings of "8" can be expected to be average or better in course performance. A man needs an aptitude rating of "6" to have about the same expectation of success in language training as a woman with a rating of "8." At the other end of the scale, 80 percent of either men or women who obtain aptitude ratings of "2" can be expected to do average or better-than-average work in training. The differences in relationship are due to differences between men and women in both training performance and test scores. On the average women are somewhat higher on both.



Since many things other than aptitudes enter into the determination of training course performance, in any class of students there will usually be some whose performance will be better than would be expected from their test scores, just as there will likely be some whose performance is poorer than expected. STRENGTH OF MOTIVATION, PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH A FOREIGN LANGUAGE, and other factors should be considered in selecting people for language training and in interpreting language training results. For example, the number of languages previously studied or learned and the amount of academic and nonacademic language-learning experience are factors not measured by the tests but are indicative of probable success in learning a foreign language. Whether such experience was in the same language as the one to be studied or in a different one is, of course, an additional relevant factor.

NUMBER OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES STUDIED OR LEARNED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL -

MONTHS OF ACADEMIC TRAINING			NONACADEMIC EXPERIENCE (1 year or more)	
HIGH SCHOOL	COLLEGE	OTHER	READING OR WRITING	SPEAKING

DATE

SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, A & E STAFF
James B. La

NOTE: This report may be shown to the individual concerned

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JUN 1961

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 025653

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible] Jose L. S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec. 1935	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-7
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intell. Asst.	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/[illegible], Br. 4, D.C.	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 June60 To 30 April61	SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion recommendation

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises Operations Support Section (6 to 8 employees)	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison in support of operations	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Processes security clearances	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 performs name traces and summarizes information	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "F" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
23 11 44 AM '61
MAIL ROOM

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

One of Mr. Piccolo's outstanding characteristics is his desire to improve himself. This is evidenced by both his continued educational program on the outside and by his successful effort to learn everything possible about his job. He also wants very much to obtain further career training within the DDP area, particularly in the FI field. I believe he has a definite potential for such work and that he should be given an opportunity for appropriate operational training as soon as possible.

His performance while under my supervision has consistently been well above that to be expected of an employee in his present grade, and I strongly recommend that he be promoted at once to GS-8. He has more than earned it.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 4 May 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Joseph L. Piccolo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 7 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 3 May 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR WH/4/Executive Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Jesse G. Douglas Jesse G. Douglas

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 14 May 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Acting Chief, WH/4	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE E. A. STANULIS

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Recorded by CSPD

12 JUL 1960

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Piccolo, Joseph S.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 12 - 8 - 35
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-6
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intell Assistant
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/4/Ops Support

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐ NOT ELIGIBLE ☐ MEMBER ☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING ☐ DECLINED ☐ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 1 Feb - 15 June 1960

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises Operations Support and Registry Section (6 employees)	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison in support of operations	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Processes security clearances	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Performs duties of Branch Records Management Officer	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Performs name traces and summarizes information	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Acts as case officer for sensitive operations	4

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

During the rating period Mr. Piccolo has been performing tasks that are normally assigned to personnel who hold a minimum GS rating of GS-9. Without exception he has performed each of his assignments expeditiously and thoroughly. In addition to his normal administrative functions Mr. Piccolo has been acting as a case officer on certain sensitive and complicated clandestine operations. He has performed these duties in a superior fashion. It is my unqualified opinion that Mr. Piccolo should receive at least a two-grade promotion immediately. However it is recognized that this is contrary to current Agency policy and therefore it is strongly recommended that he be promoted to the grade of GS-7 immediately. Mr. Piccolo is intelligent and extremely industrious. He has worked long hours performing a variety of important tasks. It is my opinion that Mr. Piccolo has the attributes required of career personnel working in the Foreign Intelligence area and that he should be permitted to have his career designation changed to FI. Mr. Piccolo should also be given the opportunity to receive Agency training so that he might be better qualified to perform tasks in this area of activity. There is no question that he would become a professional case officer. The Section C rating has been given after careful consideration of the rated individual's grade and grade level performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 16 June 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Joseph L. Piccolo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4 1/2	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 16 June 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, WH/4	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert Reynolds Robert Reynolds

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Promotion in this case is completely justified in the reviewing official's opinion

DATE 16 June 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH/4	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Jacob D. Esterline

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
655380

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 December 1935	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-5
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DS	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE [illegible]		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT WH/III/Mexico

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

X	NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
2 Mar 58 - 31 Mar 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Manages files of Restricted Projects	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares memoranda	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Prepares pouches	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Name checks	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-60 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(61)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Since the previous Fitness Report, employee has been designated as the alternate to the Station's Records Officer. During periods when the Records Officer has been on duty elsewhere, this employee has assumed responsibility for the Station's records establishment and performed his duties in a competent manner. Based on these considerations, the ratings contained in Sections B, C, and D were determined. (Note Section D, items 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10.) Employee needs more experience in the following:

1. The analysis of intelligence material for file categorization (note Section D, Item 4);

2. Records Management techniques;

3. More experience in the interpretation of data in memoranda preparation (note Section D, items 7 and 9).

His supervisor feels that considerable progress has been made on the points enumerated above, and as the employee gains experience, these weaknesses should reconcile themselves. His supervisor will continue to assign him duties designed to broaden his knowledge and effectiveness in records management. (Cont'd)

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
20 May 1959	/s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
17 months	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 May 1959	Records Officer	Lorenzo D. Sanchez

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
CS FILE ROOM
JUN 10 2 44 PM '59

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 May 1959	Acting Chief of Station	Warren L. Dean

SECRET

SECTION E (Continued)

His supervisor recommends the promotion of this employee to GS-6. It is felt that his promotion would assure the continued development of an employee who has the potential of a good records officer.

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PICCOLO, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 December 1935	3. SEX Male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT WHD/III/Mexico City	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE File Clerk		
7. GRADE GS-4	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 2 December 1957 - 2 March 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☒ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify).
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 19 March 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Lorenzo B. SANCHEZ	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Registry

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		17 Apr 1958
Reviewed by PUD		30 Apr 58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 19 March 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Winston M. SCOTT	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERS... AUG 13 2 15 PM '58 MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only)*
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are.

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
Manages files (chronos)	5	Prepares memoranda	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5**	**RATING NUMBER**
Prepares pouches	5		
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6**	**RATING NUMBER**
Name checks	4		

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Employee is competent, displays initiative and intelligence in approaching records management problems. He definitely likes records work and has supervisory potentialities. Employee needs more experience in the analysis of record material and composition of memoranda. He is conscientious and is a very hard-working employee.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY. WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YES EXPLAIN FULLY.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PICCOLO, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 December 1935	3. SEX Male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT WHD/III/Mexico City	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE File Clerk		
7. GRADE GS-4	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 2 December 1957 - 2 March 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☒ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 19 March 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Lorenzo B. SANCHEZ	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Registry

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO:

A. THIS DATE 19 March 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Winston M. SCOTT	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHOSE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
2	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
0	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
2	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 455 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE SECRET Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 15 2 15 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Three months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Employee has the potential for a good records officer. Should he develop as rapidly throughout his tour as he has done in this initial period, he will be ready to assume the responsibility for the records establish[illegible] any medium sized field station in his next assignment.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Supervisor will give employee instruction in Records Management techniques, and every opportunity to gain experience in analysis of record material.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Employee should be given a grade promotion as soon as practicable because he deserves it and so as to encourage him.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
2	8. [illegible]	4	18. IS [illegible]	3	28. [illegible]
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
1	10. [illegible]	3	20. [illegible]		30. DOES NOT REQUIRE CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PICCOLO Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 1935	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FI RI—A&O	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE 0305.01 File Clerk		
7. GRADE GS-4	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 4 Feb 1957 - 18 Oct 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)
☐	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

Joseph L. Piccolo

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
X	THIS REPORT ~~REFLECTS~~ THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 21 October 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Shirley Smith Shirley Smith	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Desk Supervisor, RI/IN

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	RV	
Reviewed by PUD	BX	12/3/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 22 October 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL August J. Zarichak	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Supervisor, RI/IN Section

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

RATING NUMBER: 4

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 20 11 19 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only)*.
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conducting name checks to render case disposition.	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Alphabetizing and filing index cards.	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject performed his duties effectively and competently. He gets along well with his fellow employees.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents,...*and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DS

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PICCOLO Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 1935	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FI RI A&O	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE 0305.01 File Clerk		
7. GRADE GS-4	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 4 Feb 1957 - 18 Oct 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☒ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

Joseph S. Piccolo

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE 21 October 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Shirley Smith Shirley Smith	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Desk Supervisor, RI/IN

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 22 October 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL August J. Zarichak August J. Zarichak	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Supervisor, RI/IN Section

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1 RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

7. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 20 11 19 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this [illegible] period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty ([illegible] supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing [illegible] duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken ~~down even~~ further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conducting name checks to render case disposition.	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Alphabetizing and filing index cards.	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

8. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject performed his duties effectively and competently.
He gets along well with his fellow employees.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YES EXPLAIN FULLY.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAINING EVALUATION--CLERICAL INDUCTION

SECTION I — IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME OF STUDENT PICCOLO, Joseph S.	SEX M	DATES OF ATTENDANCE FULL ... 11-15 February 1957
DATE OF BIRTH 8 December 1935	EOD DATE 4 February 1957	TITLE AND GRADE File Clerk GS-4

SECTION II — CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

Each course subject is taught daily in 45-minute sessions for a 5-day period. Students who do not meet Agency standards in shorthand and/or typewriting within this 5-day period receive further instruction in an attempt to meet the established qualifications. The second week of geography instruction is given to students who have not been assigned to their positions.

SECTION III — OBJECTIVES

To develop speed and accuracy in shorthand, to take dictation at a minimum of 80 words per minute for 3 minutes, and to transcribe with 5 or fewer errors in not more than 15 minutes. (For qualification, students must meet this requirement at least once.)

To develop speed and accuracy in typewriting and to type a net score of 40 words per minute on a 10-minute writing (Score attained after deduction of errors). (For qualification, students must meet this requirement at least once.)

To review the fundamentals of grammar, punctuation and capitalization, and word usage, and to aid the students in applying these principles of correct English usage.

To familiarize students with countries, capitals, products, political situations, and communist attitudes of Europe and Asia. (These continents are covered in alternate weeks.)

To introduce students to the system of filing as outlined in the Agency's "Handbook for Subject Filing."

SECTION IV — RATINGS

Each student is not assigned to all course subjects. The subjects this student has completed are those for which ratings are recorded below.

SHORTHAND	WPM	ERRORS		QUALIFIED		YES	NO
TYPEWRITING	WPM	ERRORS	NET	QUALIFIED		YES	NO

NOTE: Student met Agency standards in the following subjects before entrance to course:

SHORTHAND

TYPEWRITING

SUBJECT	RATINGS IN	POOR	FAIR	SATISFACTORY	EXCELLENT
GRAMMAR	THIS CLASS				
	CLASSES				
PUNCTUATION AND CAPITALIZATION	THIS CLASS				
	CLASSES				
WORD USAGE	THIS CLASS				
	CLASSES				

NUMBERS INDICATE HOW MANY STUDENTS RECEIVED EACH RATING. THE ASTERISKS INDICATE THIS STUDENT'S RATINGS.

EXCELLENT - - - thorough knowledge of material presented and above-average performance in meeting course goals.
SATISFACTORY - - average knowledge of material presented and adequate performance in meeting course goals.
FAIR - - - - - - borderline knowledge of material presented and limited performance in meeting course goals.
POOR - - - - - - inadequate knowledge of material presented and unsatisfactory performance in meeting course goals.

Instruction in geography and in filing provides background information. Consequently, achievement is not measured in these subjects. Participation is indicated below.

GEOGRAPHY [illegible] EUROPE X ASIA FILING

SECTION V — COMMENTS

[illegible]

[illegible] SIGNATURE OF [illegible]

Mary J. [illegible]

FORM NO. 321 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

THIS INFORMATION IS FOR AUTHORIZED PERSONS ONLY. TEST SCORES ARE NOT TO BE REVEALED TO EXAMINEE.

EVALUATION OF TEST RESULTS (CLERICAL)

DATE: 5 June 1956

NAME: PICCOLO, Joseph Stephan

GRADE AND POSITION: GS-4 Clerk

PERSONNEL OFFICER: Mr. Rader

THIS REPORT IS PROVIDED AS A SERVICE OF THE ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION STAFF, OFFICE OF TRAINING, TO ASSIST APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS IN REACHING DECISIONS ABOUT THIS INDIVIDUAL. IT IS NOT INTENDED THAT YOUR DECISION BE BASED ON RESULTS OF TESTS ALONE, BUT THAT YOU COMBINE THIS INFORMATION WITH WHAT YOU KNOW ABOUT HIS BACKGROUND OF EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE.

THIS REPORT EVALUATES THE SUBJECT'S PERFORMANCE ON SEVERAL TESTS BY SHOWING HOW WELL HE HAS DONE IN COMPARISON WITH OTHERS TESTED AT CIA FOR THE SAME GRADE LEVEL IN THE SAME KIND OF WORK. SCORE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR EACH TEST AT EACH GRADE LEVEL ARE SUB-DIVIDED TO DERIVE THE DESCRIPTIVE RATINGS BELOW AS FOLLOWS: VERY HIGH - HIGHEST 10%, HIGH - NEXT LOWER 15%, ABOVE AVERAGE - NEXT LOWER 15%, AVERAGE - MIDDLE 20%, BELOW AVERAGE - NEXT LOWER 15%, LOW - NEXT LOWER 15%, VERY LOW - LOWEST 10%.

NOTE: *It is important that you remember two essential points as you review this report!*

1. *This evaluation is applicable only for the grade and position stated above. Re-evaluation is necessary if an individual is to be considered for any other grade, and may be requested by the Placement Officer.*
2. *All tests are not of equal importance for every position. It will therefore be necessary for you to recognize the relative importance of each test to the specific requirements of the position for which this person is being considered.*

NAME OF TEST	VERY LOW	LOW	BELOW AVERAGE	AVERAGE	ABOVE AVERAGE	HIGH	VERY HIGH
	10%	15%	15%	20%	15%	15%	10%
CLERICAL SPEED AND ACCURACY			✓				
SPELLING				✓			
SENTENCES					✓		
NUMERICAL ABILITY						✓	
ABSTRACT REASONING					✓		
SPACE RELATIONS							
MECHANICAL REASONING							
VERBAL REASONING							
LA-B							

TYPING TEST			SHORTHAND TEST			
GROSS	NET	ERRORS	FORM	LETTER I	LETTER II	LETTER III

LANGUAGE BACKGROUND

SUBJECT STATED THAT HE(SHE) LEARNED THE ____________ LANGUAGE BEFORE LEARNING ENGLISH AND THAT HE(SHE) IS MORE PROFICIENT AT THIS TIME IN ____________

THESE FACTS ARE BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A SERIOUS DIFFICULTY WITH THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE COULD IMPAIR PERFORMANCE ON THESE TESTS TO SOME DEGREE.

REMARKS:

DESCRIPTIONS OF THESE TESTS ARE GIVEN ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS REPORT

FORM NO. 2674 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 JUL 55

CONFIDENTIAL

(13-98)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TEST	DESCRIPTION
CLERICAL SPEED AND ACCURACY	A test of speed and accuracy of response in a simple perceptual task. Measures ability to perceive, retain momentarily, and correctly respond to simple number and letter combinations.
SPELLING	A test of ability to distinguish between correctly and incorrectly spelled words of everyday usage found to be most frequently mispelled.
SENTENCES	A test of ability to distinguish errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar in sentences.
NUMERICAL ABILITY	A test of ability to reason with numbers, to manipulate numerical relationships, and to deal with quantitative materials. No verbal element is present in the format of the problems.
ABSTRACT REASONING	A non-verbal test of reasoning ability. Measures ability to perceive relationships in changing abstract figure patterns and to generalize changes into operating principles.
SPACE RELATIONS	A test of ability to visualize and mentally manipulate forms and patterns in three-dimensional space.
MECHANICAL REASONING	A test of ability to understand and apply mechanical and physical principles presented pictorially in familiar settings.
VERBAL REASONING	A verbal test of reasoning ability. Measures ability to abstract, generalize, and think constructively from concepts presented in word analogies.
LEARNING ABILITY Form 5	A test of general mental ability consisting of questions on vocabulary, arithmetical reasoning, and verbal analogies.
TYPING	A ten-minute straight copy test of speed and accuracy in typing material of average difficulty. Typing scores are reported as follows: Gross - Total words per minute. Net - Gross words per minute minus 1 for each error made. Errors - Total Number
SHORTHAND	A test composed of three typical business letters dictated at different speeds as follows: Letter I: 60 words per minute; Letter II: 80 words per minute; Letter III: 100 words per minute. Maximum possible scores are as follows: Letter I / Letter II / Letter III Form A: 49 / 50 / 60 Form B: 50 / 51 / 49 Form C: 50 / 50 / 50

JUN 6 11 01 AM '55

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
025658	PICCOLO	JOSEPH	S

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
01	20	77	01	24	77					WEST HEM	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. LA 137-77

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 20 JAN 77 to 24 JAN 77

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OCO		
✓	C & L DIVISION, CTOD.	DATE 2/10/77	SIGNATURE
	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph S. Piccolo

SUBJECT : Acknowledgment of Evaluation Board Functional Category

REFERENCE : Evaluation Board Precepts for Your Grade

1. Based upon an examination of your past assignments and duties, and after considering likely future assignments, you have been placed (subject to your signature below) in the functional category DOG for Evaluation Board purposes. Precise definitions of this category are contained in the Evaluation Board precepts for your grade. This placement is made in order that your performance, growth potential, and career planning may be judged against officers similarly placed professionally. YOU ARE URGED TO STUDY THE PRECEPTS AND CONSIDER YOUR OWN CASE CAREFULLY.

2. In general, you should consider the following;

a. Categories are sharply defined. Competition is within categories, not between them. Thus, a weak B/OG performance is not strengthened by reclassifying it as B/OS.

b. A change in category after sustained performance in a different category may cause a temporary loss of momentum in your career advancement until you have demonstrated proficiency in your new assignment.

c. A category change should not be initiated for the period of a temporary, training or rotational assignment unless a permanent change of career track will follow.

3. If you believe that this is not the correct category for you because the substantive nature of your job more closely approximates another category or because you have made a permanent change of career track, please take the matter up through your command channel to secure the concurrence of your component of assignment or of your home base component, as appropriate, to a change of your category. Previously assigned and acknowledged categories will remain in effect until a fully executed acknowledgment of change is received by the Career Management Staff.

4. Please sign and date this notification in the space provided and return it to your Personnel Evaluation and Management Officer or to your Personnel Officer.

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Joseph S. Piccolo

Signature of Addressee

11 April 1977

Date

CONFIDENTIAL

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME			
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	
1-6	(Print)	7-24		
025 658	PICCOLO	JOSEPH	S.	JR.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only) REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
06	12	76	06	27	76		2			AFRICA	803

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

x	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. CI 106-76

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 6/12/76

REMARKS

PREPARED BY			REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OCA			
x	B & L DIVISION, CTRD.	DATE		SIGNATURE
	C & T DIVISION	7-27-76		C. Wallat

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE [illegible]

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
C25658	PICCOLO	JOSEPH	S.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO-DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 98, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
08	25	76	09	03	76		2			EUROPE	801

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. CI 25-76

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 8-22-76

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
[illegible]			
[illegible]		DATE	SIGNATURE
[illegible]		[illegible]	

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a [illegible]

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

AN ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE EXECUTED BY EACH EMPLOYEE AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AND WHEN A CHANGE OCCURS IN THE INFORMATION SHOWN BELOW. ITEMS OF CHANGE MAY BE REPORTED IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCKS WITHOUT COMPLETING THE REMAINDER OF THE FORM EXCEPT THE EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AND DATE. WHEN EXECUTING ITEM 4 ALSO COMPLY WITH HHB 20-7, PERSONNEL EMERGENCY AND LOCATOR RECORDS. THIS FORM WILL BE COMPLETED ONLY BY HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL AND NOT SENT TO THE FIELD. FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

GENERAL

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) PICCOLO (First) Joseph (Middle) Stephan Jr.

1. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Falls Church, Virginia
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 14 Feb 1967

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:

2. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE: Norma W. Piccolo
ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code): 2627 Mattox Creek Dr. Oakton, Va. 22124
TELEPHONE NO.: (703) 620-4130

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Burgundy R. Piccolo	Same	F	17 May 71
Normandy D. Piccolo	Same	F	23 Feb 70

NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian): Joseph Piccolo Sr.
ADDRESS: 1636 N.E. 20th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Fla. 33305
TELEPHONE NO.: (305) 564-5834

NAME OF MOTHER, INCLUDING MAIDEN NAME (or female guardian): Irene A. Sutor Piccolo
ADDRESS: 1636 N.E. 20th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33305
TELEPHONE NO.: (305) 564-5834

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY (IF ANY) HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY: Both Parents and my In-Laws are aware.

3. OTHER RELATIVES WHO ARE DEPENDENT UPON ME FOR AT LEAST 51% OF THEIR SUPPORT AND MEET OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN TRAVEL REGULATIONS (HR 23-11). SPECIFY NAMES AND RELATIONSHIPS.

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP
None		

4. PERSON RESIDING IN U.S. TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Mrs. PICCOLO, Irene A.
RELATIONSHIP: Mother

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER IF APPLICABLE: 1636 N.E. 20th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Fla. 33305
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: (305) 564-5834

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code, and name of employer if applicable): N/A
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (IF "NO" GIVE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ORGANIZATION HE BELIEVES YOU WORK FOR.) X

IS THE INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (IF "NO" GIVE NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON, IF ANY, WHO CAN MAKE SUCH DECISIONS IN CASE OF EMERGENCY.) X

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE MAY BE NOTIFIED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (IF "NO" EXPLAIN WHY IN ITEM 6.) X

The persons named in item 2 or 4 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Joseph S. Piccolo Jr. & Norma W. Piccolo (Joint Accounts)

Potomac Bank & Trust Co. (Checking and Savings)
10355 Lee Highway (Safe Deposit Box)
Fairfax, Virginia 22030

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

Safe Deposit Box, Potomac Bank & Trust. (Copy with Parents)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address) Specified in Will. Initial contact would be In-Laws. Mrs. Bertha G. Wyatt, 6633 Hoadly Road, Manassas, Va. 22110

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

My Wife.

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

7. RESIDENCE DATA - TO BE COMPLETED ONLY BY EMPLOYEES ENTERING ON DUTY
(No Approval Required)

RESIDENCE WHEN EMPLOYED (Full Address)

PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE AS DEFINED IN HR 22-3 (Full Address)
2657 Mattox Creek Drive,
Oakton, Virginia 22124

8. CHANGE IN PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE (See HR 22-3)
(To Be Completed by Employee Desiring Such Change While Assigned in Headquarters)

FULL ADDRESS
Mr. Norman H. Wyatt (In-Laws)
6633 Hoadly Road
Manassas, Va. 22110

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OR DESIGNEE

DATE

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL (when applicable see HR 22-3)

DATE

SIGNED AT
Washington D.C.

DATE
28 Feb 77

SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SERVICE ABROAD AGREEMENT

I. GENERAL

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU AGREE TO SERVE THE PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION II BELOW AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS OBLIGATED TO RETURN YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS UPON THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF THIS PERIOD. YOUR ALLOWABLE EXPENSES WILL BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS.

IF YOU TERMINATE YOUR PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BEFORE YOU COMPLETE 12 MONTHS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE FOLLOWING THE DATE OF YOUR ARRIVAL ABROAD, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO REIMBURSE THE GOVERNMENT FOR ALL EXPENSES IT INCURS IN THE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS, YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO YOUR POST. IF YOU FAIL TO COMPLETE YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD YOU WILL NOT BE ENTITLED TO THE RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOURSELF, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO THE UNITED STATES. IF, HOWEVER, AGENCY OFFICIALS DETERMINE THAT YOUR EARLY DEPARTURE IS NECESSARY FOR OFFICIAL REASONS, OR FOR PERSONAL REASONS OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST TO THE GOVERNMENT, THEY MAY WAIVE THE REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES ALREADY INCURRED, OR AUTHORIZE YOUR RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION, WHICHEVER IS APPLICABLE.

IF ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF HR 20-30, YOU WILL BE GRANTED HOME LEAVE AS SOON AS IT CAN BE ARRANGED AT GOVERNMENT CONVENIENCE AFTER COMPLETION OF YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY, PROVIDED YOU HAVE SERVED AT LEAST 18 MONTHS OF CONTINUOUS CREDITABLE SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. HOME LEAVE AND HOME LEAVE TRAVEL ARE CONTINGENT UPON YOUR WILLINGNESS TO RETURN, AND CONTEMPLATION BY AGENCY OFFICIALS THAT YOU WILL RETURN TO SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY AFTER HOME LEAVE OR UPON COMPLETION OF AN ASSIGNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

YOU ARE ADVISED THAT ANY MONIES DUE YOU FROM THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE APPLIED IN LIQUIDATION OF ANY INDEBTEDNESS ARISING FROM VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT. YOU WILL BE AFFORDED ALL NORMAL RECOURSE IN APPEALING DECISIONS MADE PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE PICCOLO, Joseph S. Jr.	SD D

II. TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD

1. NAME OF POST OF ASSIGNMENT: Mexico City, Mexico

2. PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD AS PRESCRIBED IN A, B, OR C BELOW

A. STANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF 24 MONTHS X

[illegible]

B. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ________ MONTHS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PER HR 23-19

OPERATING OFFICIAL

C. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ________ MONTHS FOR THIS TOUR ONLY FOR THE EMPLOYEE SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT. (See HR 20-18)

REQUESTED (Memo attached)

OPERATING OFFICIAL

CONCUR

CAREER SERVICE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

III. PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE

3. YOUR "PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE" IS A PLACE TO WHICH ALLOWABLE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES MAY BE [illegible] IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES PURSUANT TO HR 22. ITS DESIGNATION WILL BE KEPT IN YOUR OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

4. [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

5. PHYSICAL DWELLING PLACE (Permanent Place of Residence unless address in item 6 is approved in lieu thereof) FULL ADDRESS 2687 Mattox Creek Drive Oakton, Virginia 22124	6. OTHER PLACE REQUESTED (Requested Permanent Place of Residence if different from item 5) FULL ADDRESS N/A
	CONCUR
	DEPUTY DIRECTOR | DATE
APPROVED	APPROVED
DEPUTY DIRECTOR | DATE 7/9/99	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL | DATE

IV. HOME LEAVE POINT

7. AMONG THE PLACES YOU MAY REQUEST AS A HOME LEAVE POINT ARE: YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE SHOWN ABOVE, HEADQUARTERS AREA, AND WHERE YOUR CHILDREN, PARENTS, PARENTS-IN-LAW, BROTHERS, SISTERS, BROTHERS-IN-LAW, OR SISTERS-IN-LAW RESIDE.

8. YOU MAY REQUEST FOR APPROVAL SOME OTHER POINT SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-30D(3)(C). THE REQUEST MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A MEMORANDUM EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 7 ABOVE FULL ADDRESS 6633 Hoadly Road Manassas, Virginia 22110 RELATIONSHIP OF RELATIVE AT HOME LEAVE POINT Parents-in-law	10. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 8 ABOVE FULL ADDRESS
	CONCUR
	DEPUTY DIRECTOR | DATE
APPROVED	APPROVED
DEPUTY DIRECTOR | DATE 3/9/99	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL | DATE

EMPLOYEE CERTIFICATION

I have read and understand my service obligations and travel entitlements as described in this agreement.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [illegible]	DATE [illegible] Feb [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
< ● 2	6-DIGITS ●	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS ●

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA	YR	5. DATE CODED MO	DA	YR
●			●		

THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< ● 3	●	3-LETTERS ●	●							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO	DA	YR	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA	YR
●			●		

WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. CODE C-A-D	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< ● 5	● 025658	● PIC	● C	● BL18	1	3	1	1	1	4	69

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	7. DATE OF TEST MO	DA	YR
● BL18	1	3	1	E	1	4	76	● 02	11	76

DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME
< ● 4	●	3-LETTERS ●

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
A - ADDITION TO RECORD
C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				

FORM 1962a

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE A = ADD C = CHANGE D = DELETE	CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR
135154.	PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.										

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
								02/11/76	12/12/35	13	LA

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN SPANISH BL18 (NAME OF LANGUAGE) AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING	TEST RATINGS
I+	+	+	E	I	Z = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE S = SLIGHT H = HIGH E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS: "+" Indicates not tested or Pronunciation included in Speaking grade)

DATE 1976

12. SIGNATURE

13. TEST NUMBER
27137

FORM 1-74 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET E2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 1 - CP/OAB

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER ________ TOTAL COPIES 14-L RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT CI/A

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. CI/PLN CI4

1

2 LA

3

4

5

6

T 839692 EIA497 PAGE 01 IN 889961

TOR:1415532 APR 76 LIMA 32942

S E C R E T 1415192 APR 76 STAFF

Joseph S. Piccolo

CITE LIMA 32942

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT SGCHART

1. WISH COMPLIMENT MESSRS. PICCOLO AND SILEO ON THEIR HANDLING OF CI SURVEY AT LIMA. THEY WERE WELL PREPARED IN ADVANCE, WORKED HARD HERE, AND WERE VERY SELF SUFFICIENT, CAUSING MINIMUM DISRUPTION OF STATION ACTIVITES. THEY DUG DEEPLY BUT MADE A GREAT EFFORT TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE AT ALL TIMES, RATHER THAN JUST PLAIN CRITICAL. ONCE WE GOT GOING THE FEELING THAT WE WERE BEING INSPECTED QUICKLY DISAPPEARED AND WAS REPLACED BY ONE OF TEAMWORK.

2. ASIDE FROM PROVIDING HQS WITH OUR CI PROFILE, BENEFITS ACCRUED TO THE STATION FROM THE SURVEY. IT MOTIVATED A USEFUL SELF-ANALYSIS BEFORE THE TEAM ARRIVED. THE TEAM'S STUDY OF HQS FILES, WHICH MOST OF US HAD NEVER READ, UNCOVERED VARIOUS INDICATORS WHICH GAVE BETTER PERSPECTIVE TO MANY OF OUR CASES. THE INFORMAL FRANK DISCUSSIONS RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF IDEAS FOR CHANGES WHICH WE WILL MAKE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE TEAM'S FORMAL REPORT, AT WHICH TIME WE WILL COMMENT ON ACTIONS TAKEN AND PLANNED. AND PROVIDE A FEW IDEAS WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR FUTURE SURVEYS.

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 839692 EIA497 PAGE 02-02 IN 889961

TOR:141553Z APR 76 LIMA 32942

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

4 50P123 0 1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

1 C/CI
2 [illegible]
5 file

C/AF2

RF FILE VR

1000 2

EYES ONLY

T 032600 EIA582 PAGE 01-01 IN 963669

TOR:281314Z JUN 76 ADDI 30375

file

S E C R E T 281305Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE ADDIS ABABA 30375

TO: DIRECTOR.

WISH COMMEND MESSERS PICCOLO AND THOMPSON FOR EXCELLENT PROFESSIONAL WORK IN ADDIS ABABA. DURING RECENT CI SURVEY. BOTH OFFICERS MADE DETAILED STUDIES OF CASES, FILES AND STATION ACTIVITIES THAT RESULTED IN SOUND ORAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT. WE ARE IMPLEMENTING THESE RECOMMENDATIONS AT ONCE. SURVEY WAS EXTREMELY VALUABLE FOR ALL STATION PERSONNEL. E2 IMPDET

#131

Joseph I Piccolo

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

FILE PUNCHED BY

SERIAL NO.	NAME			
1-6	LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	
025658	PICCOLO	JOSEPH	S.	JR.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42
03	22	76	04	11	76		2			WESTERN HEMISPHERE	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. CI 76-76

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 3/22/76

REMARKS

PREPARED BY			REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OSA			
✓	O & L DIVISION, CTRS.	DATE 4/28/76		SIGNATURE C Wollitz
	C & F DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-74 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

(4-101)

DISSEM BY 7 PER TOTAL COPIES 14 L RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT 9/A7

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR. C/TPH/J C/CI/1

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 839692 EIA497 PAGE 01 IN 889961

TOR:141553Z APR 76 LIMA 32942

S E C R E T 141519Z APR 76 STAFF C/CC

CITE LIMA 32942

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT SGCHART

1. WISH COMPLIMENT MESSRS. PICCOLO AND SILED ON THEIR HANDLING OF CI SURVEY AT LIMA. THEY WERE WELL PREPARED IN ADVANCE, WORKED HARD HERE, AND WERE VERY SELF SUFFICIENT. CAUSING MINIMUM DISRUPTION OF STATION ACTIVITES. THEY DUG DEEPLY BUT MADE A GREAT EFFORT TO BE CONSTURCTIVE AT ALL TIMES, RATHER THAN JUST PLAIN CRITICAL. ONCE WE GOT GOING THE FEELING THAT WE WERE BEING INSPECTED QUICKLY DISAPPEARED AND WAS REPLACED BY ONE OF TEAMWORK.

2. ASIDE FROM PROVIDING HQS WITH OUR CI PROFILE. BENEFITS ACCRUED TO THE STATION FROM THE SURVEY. IT MOTIVATED A USEFUL SELF-ANALYSIS BEFORE THE TEAM ARRIVED. THE TEAM'S STUDY OF HQS FILES, WHICH MOST OF US HAD NEVER READ, UNCOVERED VARIOUS INDICATORS WHICH GAVE BETTER PERSPECTIVE TO MANY OF OUR CASES. THE INFORMAL FRANK DISCUSSIONS RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF IDEAS FOR CHASES WHICH WE WILL MAKE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE TEAM'S FORMAL REPORT, AT WHICH TIME WE WILL COMMENT ON ACTIONS TAKEN AND PLANNED. AND PROVIDE A FEW IDEAS WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR FUTURE SURVEYS.

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE , VR ,

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 839692 EIA497 PAGE 22-02 IN 889961

TOR:141553Z APR 76 LIMA 32942

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

22 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA Division

SUBJECT : Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo - Completion of Senior Operations Course #2/76

1. Mr. Piccolo attended the Senior Operations Course from 3 November to 12 December 1975 (SOC #2/76). Individual student grades and class rankings have not been used to evaluate student performance. The diverse background of the students and the nature of the course material used in the SOC preclude formal testing. This memorandum attests to Mr. Piccolo's satisfactory completion of the course.

2. During the six weeks of the course, 59% of the time was devoted to subjects and activities directly related to operations, including 30% devoted to "hands-on" time with technical equipment and "on-the-street" practice of tradecraft. 31% of the time was devoted to material broadly categorized as "ops management," including about 10% on the Soviet and China targets. The final 10% of the time was devoted to subjects categorized as "management overview and ops support," which consisted of meetings with DO division and staff chiefs and visits to labs and other ops support facilities in the Headquarters area. The ten officers in the class ranged in grade from GS-12 to GS-14 (average grade 12.9), average age was 43.6 (Mr. Piccolo's age is 40). The class members' average years of Agency service was 16.8, and their average years of overseas service was 9.2.

3. The six weeks, normally 30 days of instruction time, was shortened to 28 days by the Thanksgiving Day weekend. Of these 28 days, Mr. Piccolo spent six days in intensive training in Persuasion and Manipulation Skills as taught in the SAI system. He spent approximately another eight and one-half days on technical tradecraft (photo, audio, and commo equipment familiarization and usage) and street tradecraft (surveillance, car toss, dead drop, brush pass, etc.) including three days intensive practice of these skills in a live exercise conducted in Richmond. Another five days were spent at Headquarters meeting with the chiefs of all DO divisions and staffs, and visiting three operational support laboratories in the metropolitan area. The approximately eight and one-half remaining days were consumed by a combination of miscellaneous operations management subjects, student seminars, and term paper writing (though the latter was accomplished mostly on the students' own time). This running of the course was keynoted by remarks by the ADDO, and the Headquarters week was climaxed by an hour and a half with the DDO. The guest speaker at the graduation dinner of SOC #2/76 was Agency Historian Dr. Walter Pforzheimer.

E2 IMPDET
CL by 056184

SECRET

SUBJECT: Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo - Completion of Senior Operations Course #2/76

4. Mr. Piccolo, as a 40-year-old GS-13/4, was at about the average age for this class and slightly above average in grade. Although formal grades are not given to graduates of the SOC, it was the consensus of DTS staff instructors involved in SOC #2/76 that Mr. Piccolo would almost certainly rank number one in this particular group. Bringing to the class broad operational experience and understanding, Mr. Piccolo was an active participant in the six-day SAI block of instruction and made contributions based on his own operational past. The tradecraft instructors who conducted the live problem in Richmond described Mr. Piccolo as the best student in street tradecraft. One of the Course Coordinators commented that Mr. Piccolo, "exhibited, more than any of the others, the ability to lead the group." Mr. Piccolo's term paper on the subject of how a NOC station might be established in Rio de Janeiro was careful and thorough and was described by the panel as "an excellent overall plan." To a man of Mr. Piccolo's experience, at least some of the course may have seemed a little basic or redundant, but he never let it show, and always took part with the same enthusiasm as the more junior members of the class.

5. A copy of this memorandum is being placed in Mr. Piccolo's official personnel file.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

John W. Dayton

JOHN W. DAYTON
Course Coordinator
Senior Operations Course

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME: LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
035655	Piccolo	Joseph	S

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			08	08	75		1			Nicaragua	5[illegible]C

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
IN 655939	11 Aug 75

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	RCO		
	C & A DIVISION CTRO.	DATE 8/25/75	SIGNATURE
✓	C & P DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE: Joseph Piccolo

DATE (from item 5-1): 11 Sep 74

NAME OF SUPERVISOR: Raymond Swider

DATE (from item 5-2): 11 Sep 74

DATE ARRIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 23 September 1974

[illegible] NUMBER: IDNAT-2486

DATE [illegible] SERVICE:

HOME BASE COMPONENT: WH

DATE OF BIRTH: 8 Dec 35

DESIGN: D

CURRENT POSITION AND GRADE: Ops Officer/DCOS GS-13

STATION OR BASE: Managua

CURRENT COVER:

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD: 20 Sept 1973

1B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE: 5 Jan 1976

1C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ: 19 Jan 1976

1D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE: 5 March 1976

2. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Three (3) Dependents Ages: 32, 5 and 4

3. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

Adequate medical facilities or a reasonable proximity to them.

4. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).

Deputy Chief of Station, supervising/managing - support/finance and records personnel and activities, handling Liaison with the indigenous Security Service, managing operations directed at penetrating the political left and terrorist movement, and handling the Principal Agent (NOC) presently employed at the Station.

5. TRAINING DESIRED
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Training should be keyed to provide an even broader base for the continued development of my overall management skills and potential which have initially developed through on the job application. Courses should be those available to supervisory level personnel.

An Operational Training requirement that should be satisfied as soon as possible is the Soviet Operations Course.

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

SECRET

6. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

6A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

I am interested in remaining in the "managerial cone" and in obtaining a position that will give me increased responsibility as well as career growth through promotion. Based on my experience and performance as Acting Chief of Station Managua for two months in 1968, Deputy Chief of Base Rio de Janeiro for the last 10 months of my tour in 1972-73 and present assignment as Deputy Chief of Station Managua, I request assignment to a position which entails supervision of several employees and requires exercise of managerial skills and judgement. If assigned to another tour overseas, a position as Deputy Chief of Station in a medium to large size Station would be preferred. If assigned to Headquarters, I would like to work where an overview of the related operational and managerial activities can be experienced. If the above assignmentsare not available, a tour which would broaden my operational knowledge would be desired, ie: SB Division, China Ops activity or OTS.

6B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, 3 OR 4 (*for 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☒ EXTEND TOUR 3 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO 5 January 1976 (DATE)

1 BE ASSIGNED TO HQDTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE FI STAFF 2ND CHOICE SB Division 3RD CHOICE WH Division

2 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION.
1ST CHOICE WH Division 2ND CHOICE EUR Division 3RD CHOICE SB Division

3 RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION.

PREPARE UPDATING OF PERSONAL SECURITY INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOI-F 240-8 AND FORWARD UNDER SEPARATE COVER. INDICATE DATE FORWARDED OR TO BE FORWARDED.

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

7. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Given his steady, reliable and productive performance, every effort should be made to accomodate his expressed preferences. There can be no doubt that by temperament and experience he would be of greater value to the Organization in the field rather than at Headquarters, but a tour at Headquarters does appear timely now, following the past 5 years in the field. I do not honestly know how he will perform in Staff work, being a Field Station activist, but the experience should have a further broadening effect upon him.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

8. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Subject has been approved for assignment to Headquarters, LA/COG.

DATE 24 Jul 75 TITLE C/LA/Pers SIGNATURE H.L. Berthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

9. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

10. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ____ DATED ____

CABLE NO. ____ DATED ____

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE ____ DATE ____

SECRET

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) PICCOLO, Joseph S., JR.	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* W-Norma	CLAIM NUMBER 76-0015

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 4/21/75.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 11-73 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
025658	Piccolo	Joseph	S

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 98, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 2 - CORRECTION 3 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			07	13	73		1			BRAZIL	090

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☑	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. RIOD 19355	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 2/13/73

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCO		
☐	C & L DIVISION STBD.	DATE 6/16/73	SIGNATURE
☐	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(6-19)

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
Piccolo, Joseph S.

2. DATE OF BIRTH
12/08/35

3. GRADE
GS-13

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment)
DDO/WH/Rio de Janeiro

5. PRESENT POSITION
Ops Officer

6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION
5671

7. PROPOSED STATION
Managua, Nicaragua

8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade)
Ops Officer 0596 GS-13

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION
State SSN# 265 44 1914

10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE
09/10/73

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
three

12. COMMENTS
Physicals to be taken in the field.

13. DATE OF REQUEST
18 May 1973

14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
Karl Fleck

15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING
3D 5317 Hqs

16. EXTENSION
5671

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

Qualified overseas PCS.

25 July 1973 William T. Golder OMS/pro

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

SECRET

WH

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

ME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if 34) Piccolo, Joseph	DATE (from item 5-1) 9 Nov 1971	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (type) David Mc Grath	DATE (from item 5-2) 9 Nov 1971
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 18 November 1971	DISPATCH NUMBER: HBRT 8679, 11 Nov 71	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 35	2. SERVICE DESIGN D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Ops Officer/Chief FI Brazil, GS-12	4. STATION OR BASE Rio de Janeiro	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER LNGOLD

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 23 June 70	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 30 June 73	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 15 July 73	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 15 September 73

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

3 Dependents ages: 29, 3, 2

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

None.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 345-8)

Chief, FI for Brazil (Coordinating activities of Station and Bases).
Ops Officer for Communist Party Operations.
Ops Officer for Revolutionary Terrorist Operational Activities.
Supervisor for one full time inside and one full time outside Operations Officer and related FI activities of several Base Officers.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Advanced Operations Course.
Management Courses in Preparation for assuming positions of increased supervisory responsibility.

FORM 702 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

Deputy Chief of Station of a small Station or Senior FI Officer position with supervisory responsibilities at a large Station. These choices for next assignment are made on the basis of the increasing responsibility of positions I have held as my career has developed. This career has included experience in most types of FI and CI operations as well as some CA activities. It has also provided me with supervisory experience, including Acting Chief of Station for a two month period. Assignment to a position of greater responsibility is desirable for the continued development of my career.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 *(for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice)* IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

[1]. EXTEND TOUR 12 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO 30 June 1973 (DATE)

[3]. BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY; INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE. 1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE OTR 3RD CHOICE EUR

[2]. BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION; INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION 1ST CHOICE WH/Central America Costa Rica 2ND CHOICE Mexico 3RD CHOICE Spain

[4]. RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

COB Comment: I recommend that Subject's desire for a 12-month extension be honored. His other choices also appear sound as alternatives.

COS Comment: COS strongly recommends that Subject extend for one year. He is handling an extremely important agent, and we would hate to change this relationship now. After one year, however, Subject's career would best be served by a new assignment.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Per HBRS 4729, Subject's request for a one year's extension of tour is approved.

DATE 6 Dec 71 TITLE C/WH/Pers SIGNATURE Henry L. Berthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ______ DATED ______

CABLE NO. ______ DATED ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Piccolo,	Joseph	Stephen	265-44-1914

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY Washington D.C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) N/A
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Fairfax, VA.	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE Fairfax, VA.

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Falls Church, VA.	DATE OF MARRIAGE 14 Feb 67
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE N/A	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED N/A	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

N/A

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE Norma W. Piccolo	ADDRESS (No. Street, City, State, Zip Code) 10607 Springmann Dr. Fairfax, VA. 22030	TELEPHONE NO. 591-9059	
NAMES OF CHILDREN Normandy Dawn	ADDRESS " "	SEX Female	DATE OF BIRTH 23 Feb 70
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian) Joseph Piccolo	ADDRESS 1636 N.E. 20th ST. Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. 33305	TELEPHONE NO. (305) 564-5834	
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian) Irene D. Piccolo	ADDRESS " "	TELEPHONE NO. " "	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
Parents and In-Laws

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Piccolo, Irene D.	RELATIONSHIP Mother
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) 1636 N.E. 20th ST. Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER (305) 564-5834
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE N/A	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)	YES	✓
	NO	
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)	YES	✓
	NO	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	✓
	NO	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM

(CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE)

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Potomac Bank and Trust Co. (Checking + Savings)
Fairfax, VA. 22030

Joseph S. Piccolo Jr.
Norma W. Piccolo

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

Safe Deposit Box, Potomac Bank + Trust Co. Fairfax, VA.

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

Wife

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Re: Item #4 - Contact for Emergency should follow the below order

A. Wife (Item 3)
B. Mother (Item 4)
C. In-Laws
Mr. Norman H. Wyatt
Rte 2 Box 342 B
Manassas, VA. 22110
Tel: (703) 368-9761

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Wash D.C.	20 May 70	

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY S

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) 7-24 LAST / FIRST / MIDDLE
025658	Piccolo, Joseph S.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42
06	23	70					1			Brazil	090

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 2Y20032

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 24 June 70

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		√ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCS		
x	C & L DIVISION CTRD.	DATE 5 8 70	SIGNATURE
☐	C & P DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
025658	Piccolo	Joseph Jr	S.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
			01	14	69	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	1			~~Ma~~nagua, ~~Nicaragua~~ Nigeria	525

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
						2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION					

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
✓	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. IN 15783

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 6 January 1969

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		✓ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	RCO		
☐	C & L DIVISION, OTRS.	DATE 1/13/68	SIGNATURE Phyllis [illegible]
✓	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(6-10)

Executive Registry
[illegible]

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226

68-3266

August 1, 1968

The Honorable
Richard M. Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
McLean, Virginia

Dear Dick:

As you know, the President and Mrs. Johnson visited Managua, Nicaragua on Monday, July 8, 1968, upon their return from the San Salvador Conference.

Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Ronald M. Pontius of the Presidential Protective Division, has informed me that Mr. Joseph Piccolo and Mr. Carl Jenkins were of particular assistance in establishing and coordinating the relations with the Nicaraguan security organizations, and President Somoza's staff. Mrs. Elizabeth Jenkin's assistance as an interpreter was also greatly appreciated.

Personally and on behalf of the United States Secret Service, I wish to extend my sincere appreciation and thanks to the above mentioned personnel for the capable and professional manner in which they performed their duties.

Sincerely,

James J. Rowley

14-00000

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): Piccolo Joseph S. 025658

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): Dec 9, 35

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 265 44 1914

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY:

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print):

DATE: 15 Mar. 68

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

BENE[illegible] [illegible]ELING
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAR 20 1 19 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1966
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-141

INSTRUCTIONS TO EMPLOYING AGENCY

1. ***Who must file.***—All employees not excluded by law or regulation from insurance coverage, including those who have previously waived coverage, are required to complete and file Standard Form 176-T. Employees who are in the service on February 14, 1968, as well as those who are appointed after that date but before April 14, 1968, must file the form.

2. ***Automatic cancellation of previously filed waivers.***—All "Waivers of Life Insurance Coverage" (SF 53) on file are automatically canceled as of the first day of the first pay period beginning on or after February 14, 1968. Payroll offices are to begin regular insurance deductions on the automatic cancellation date for employees who do not file a new waiver, i.e., those who do not check box **C** of SF 176-T, on or before that date.

3. ***Employees failing to file.***—If an employee does not return a completed SF 176-T, contact him and urge him to do so even if he does not want optional insurance (he will, of course, be automatically covered for regular insurance). If he still fails to file SF 176-T by April 14, 1968, or 31 days after appointment, whichever is later, file one for him as of that date: mark box **B**, and note in the space provided for his signature "employee contacted—failed to elect optional insurance." See note 2 below.

4. ***Review of completed forms.***—(a) Review both copies of the SF 176-T for legibility, completeness, and consistency. Reconcile with the employee any obvious major discrepancy such as a mark in more than one box.

   (b) If the employee marked box **A** or box **C**, make sure the Statistical Stub is complete. Then detach and mail stubs, in a bundle, weekly to:

   Office of Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance
   (Statistical Stubs)
   4 East 24th Street
   New York, New York 10010

   (c) If the employee marked box **B**, detach and destroy the stub.

5. ***Date of receipt and effective date.***—(a) Stamp date of receipt by employing office in the space provided for this purpose on both the Original and the Duplicate.

   (b) The effective date is determined from the table below.

6. ***Disposition of forms.***—(a) File the Original SF 176-T in the official personnel folder in all cases.

   (b) Any necessary payroll change, with effective date, may be posted in the space reserved on the Duplicate for employing office.

   (c) The Duplicate may be destroyed, if no payroll action is required, or after the requirements of the agency's payroll system have been met.

7. ***Use of SF 176-T.***—SF 176-T "Election, Declination, or Waiver of Life Insurance Coverage" should not be used after the initial filing period (after April 14, 1968). A revised edition will be available for use after that date.

TABLE OF EFFECTIVE DATES

DATE SF 176-T RECEIVED BY EMPLOYING OFFICE	EMPLOYEE'S DECISION	EFFECTIVE DATE (IF NO WAIVER, SF 53, IN EFFECT)	
		OF DECISION	OF DEDUCTIONS
On or before February 14, 1968.	Elects optional (in addition to regular) (box **A**).	Coverage effective February 14, 1968	Deductions begin 1st day of 1st pay period beginning on or after February 14, 1968
	Declines optional (but not regular) (box **B**).	Declination effective February 14, 1968.	
	Waives regular (so ineligible for optional) (box **C**).	Waiver effective last day of pay period in which February 14, 1968 falls.	Deductions stop last day of pay period in which February 14, 1968 falls.
After February 14 but not later than April 14, 1968.	Elects optional (in addition to regular) (box **A**).	Coverage effective on date of receipt	Deductions begin 1st day of 1st pay period beginning on or after date of receipt
	Declines optional (but not regular) (box **B**).	Declination effective on date of receipt, but employee loses automatic optional protection on February 14, 1968	
	Cancels previously elected optional (but not regular) (box **B**)	Cancellation effective last day of pay period in which received	Deductions for optional stop last day of pay period in which received
	Waives regular (so ineligible for optional) (box **C**)	Waiver effective last day of pay period in which received	Deductions stop last day of pay period in which received

NOTES 1 Because regular insurance coverage and deductions are automatic unless waived (by checking box C) A and B elections do not affect regular insurance effective dates.

2 An employee for whom the agency files SF 176-T because he failed to file is deemed to have declined optional but not regular insurance.

3 An employee with an uncanceled waiver (SF 53) on file cannot be insured any earlier than the first day he is in duty and pay status in a pay period beginning on or after February 14, 1968. Filing of an SF 176-T before that date will not cancel an SF 53 any earlier. Deductions begin the day he becomes insured.

4 The effective date of regular (and optional) insurance coverage for an employee who has been on leave without pay for more than 1 year is the first day he is in pay and duty status. Deductions are effective the same day.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
025658	Piccolo	Joseph	S.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 56, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
			01	20	68	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	1			MEXICO	450

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
						2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION					

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 35014

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 01/22/68

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		
☐ [illegible]	☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ [illegible]	DATE 1-29-68	SIGNATURE
☒ [illegible]		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1051a [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Joseph Piccolo	DATE (from item 5-1) 16 March 1967	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Francis Sherry	DATE (from item 5-2) 16 March 1967
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS:	DISPATCH NUMBER: HMMT 7713	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE: 11 MAY 1967	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 35	2. SERVICE DESIGN D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE PBRUMEN Section/ Operations Officer GS-11	4 STATION OR BASE Mexico City	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER LNGOLD

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 29 Sept. 65	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 31 Jan 68	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 8 Feb 68	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 15 April 1968

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

One, age 24

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

Due to continued health problems, (a high splenic flecture of the colon) a post at an altitude lower than Mexico City would be desirable. Although this illness has not impaired my ability to perform my work, it has put a strin on me and it is disconcerting not to feel completely up to par for extended periods of time.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Operations officer in the PBRUMEN section responsible for a refugee debriefing center, unilateral FI assets directed against PBRUMEN, double-agents and other CI assets directed against PBRUMEN, a photographic support operation, and a small CA leaflet harrassment operation.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

1. Audio Surveillance Management
2. CA Propaganda Activities
3. Counterintelligence Operations

FORM 202 [illegible]

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT Operations Officer Western Hemisphere Division

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

To date, I have worked in operational activities of primarily CI and FI orientation with a greater emphasis on the former. In order to round out my early career stage as an operations officer, an assignment with more CA orientation would be beneficial.

If available, my grade not withstanding, an assignment as supervisor of a section or as Chief of Base would be desirable in preparation for the eventual assumption of duties with higher responsibility in the future.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 *(for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice)* IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☒ EXTEND TOUR Three MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO 31 January 1968.
(DATE)

3 BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE WHD 2ND CHOICE WED 3RD CHOICE TRAINING

1 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Managua 2ND CHOICE Madrid 3RD CHOICE Rio de Janeiro

2 RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

It is recommended, primarily because of problems of health (at the high altitude in this post) that this officer be allowed one of the choices he has listed under 11 B. The departure of this officer will mean a loss to the operational capacity of his Section; and it is with regret that Chief of Station, Mexico City concurs with his request for re-assignment.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

WH Division proposes that Mr. Piccolo be extended to December 1967. He will then be assigned to Managua under non-official cover replacing James D. ZABOTH.

DATE 10 May 67 TITLE C/WH/Pers SIGNATURE Edward K. O'Malley Robert D. Cashman

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT: Next Tour = Managua. Extension [illegible]

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. [illegible] DATED: [illegible]

CABLE NO. ____ DATED: ____

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: [illegible] DATE: ____
(SIGNATURE)

SECRET

10741

Standard Form No. 2809
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 890-1
November 1965

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM
(Read instructions on back of last page. The entry boxes are to be typed.)

TO EMPLOYING OFFICE: SHOW OLD CARRIER'S CONTROL NUMBER ONLY IF ELECTION IS TO CANCEL ENROLLMENT OR TO CHANGE OPTIONS OR TYPE OF ENROLLMENT IN THE SAME PLAN

New Carrier's Control No. 9535~~981~~

Old Carrier's Control No. 0 [illegible] 1

PART A

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL)
Piccolo
Piccolo Joseph S

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
12	8	35

3. ARE YOU NOW MARRIED? YES ☐ 1 NO ☒ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY) (STATE) (ZIP CODE)

5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

IMPORTANT

IT IS ILLEGAL FOR AN EMPLOYEE OR A MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY TO BE COVERED UNDER MORE THAN ONE ENROLLMENT. IF YOU ARE ALREADY COVERED THROUGH THE FAMILY ENROLLMENT OF ANOTHER FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEE OR ANNUITANT YOU MUST REGISTER NOT TO ENROLL OR THE OTHER ENROLLMENT MUST BE CANCELED OR CHANGED TO SELF ONLY. SIMILARLY, IF A FAMILY MEMBER LISTED BY YOU IN PART B IS COVERED THROUGH HIS (OR HER) OWN ENROLLMENT, YOU CANNOT ELECT A FAMILY ENROLLMENT UNLESS THE FAMILY MEMBER CANCELS HIS (OR HER) ENROLLMENT.

PART B

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL OR CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only; answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2.

IF YOU ARE CHANGING YOUR ENROLLMENT ALSO FILL IN PART D.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from back page of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
[illegible]	[illegible]	4 2 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception: List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 21, including (a) legally adopted children and (b) stepchildren, foster children, and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 21 who became disabled before age 21 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 21 or over if one is not already on file.) DO NOT LIST PARENTS OR OTHERS WHO ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FAMILY MEMBERS. THEY WILL NOT RECEIVE BENEFITS, EVEN IF THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON YOU AND ARE LISTED.

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband Norma E	Oct 29, 43	1			6
		2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

PART C

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES.

1. I ELECT NOT TO ENROLL IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT. ☐

2. I ELECT TO CANCEL MY PRESENT ENROLLMENT UNDER THE CODE NUMBER SHOWN BELOW. ☐

Present Enrollment Code Number

PART D

FILL IN THIS PART, AS WELL AS PART B, TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

ANSWER ITEMS 1, 2 AND 3 TO SHOW ENROLLMENT CODE BEING CHANGED AND ELIGIBILITY FOR CHANGE

1. ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER OF PRESENT PLAN: 4 2 1

2. NUMBER OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE (See table on back of duplicate for proper number): 2

3. DATE OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
2	14	67

PART E

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F

TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
HEAL[illegible] S OFFICER
(ALTERNATE)
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 1-17-67

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 2-12-67

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. SF 2811 REPORT NO.

REMARKS

FOR USE ONLY BY AGENCY

[illegible]

2809-108 Triplicate—To Employing Office

SECRET

TTR

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of Mr. Joseph Piccolo

Effective August 27, 1965

The purpose of this memorandum is to call your attention to existing policies ~~which~~ are particularly material to you while you are integrated and to set forth certain rights and obligations which are incident to your status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS-10 & $8170 7710.00 per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of August 27, 1965. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected at FSR-7 and salary of $7245 per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of Two Years from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and (except as provided in paragraph three (3) above) allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they are less than or equal to the salary and allowance payments due on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due, the difference will be credited to your payroll account with this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due, the overage will be remitted to this organization at designated intervals, presently ______________________. Computations hereunder will be made on the basis of the aggregate gross due and received provided, however, that in computing remittances for overage Federal and, if applicable, District of Columbia income taxes withheld by your cover facility against the overage may be deducted. To assure timely accuracy in your payroll account with this organization you are expected to immediately report cover facility payroll changes.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integration into your cover facility, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and at your personal expense you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half per cent) on the basis of your cover salary or your salary from this organization, whichever is the greater.

b. If you receive taxable income from both your cover facility and this organization, necessary adjustments for Federal, and if applicable, District of Columbia income tax purposes will be made in conformance with instructions received from this organization.

c. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with the rules and regulations of this organization.

d. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with your cover facility of any status with your cover based on your services performed with that organization at the request of this organization.

e. All annual and sick leave which is accrued to your credit at the time of integration will be transferred to your cover facility. While integrated you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon completion of your integration your accrued annual and sick leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization including any income taxes withheld by your cover facility.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

IMPORTANT

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility (OPM 20-5-1 dated 12 October 1961) for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the ~~field~~ have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checkedout for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 30 July 1962

Joseph L. Piccolo
Signature
JOSEPH PICCOLO

27 Aug 65
Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	*(Print)* 7-24	25-26
025658	PICCOLO, JOSEPH S.	57

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	UNIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	09	29	65				MEXICO CITY	4/50

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	UNIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☒	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. HMMT-5946	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 7 OCTOBER 1965

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ [illegible] DIVISION ☒ [illegible] DIVISION	DATE 10/19/65	SIGNATURE

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] NOV 1965

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6		7-24		25-26
125658	Piccolo,	Joseph		51

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	ARRIVAL				DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	DEPARTURE				RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
✓ ~~2 - TDY (Basic)~~ 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	09	15	65	10	11	65	WH	811

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	OFFICIAL ANNOTATED OR SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
[illegible]	DATE	SIGNATURE
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

FORM 1051a [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

T4K

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) Piccolo	(First) Joseph	(Middle) S.	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 205-44-1914

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY Washington D.C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) Washington D.C.
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE OF MARRIAGE
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE N/A	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
NAMES OF CHILDREN N/A	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian) Joseph Piccolo	ADDRESS Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	TELEPHONE NO. LO 4-5834	
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian) Irene A. Piccolo	ADDRESS Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	TELEPHONE NO. LO 4-5834	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
Parents

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Piccolo, Irene A.	RELATIONSHIP Mother
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 1636 N.E. 20th St. Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER LO 4-5834
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE N/A	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION N/A

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) ☒ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) ☒ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) ☒ YES ☐ NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 61

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5.	VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Ft. Lauderdale National Bank (checking & savings)
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
Joseph Stephan Piccolo

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

With Parents

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*
N/A

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

6.	ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Hqs	22 Dec 65	

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN HEALTH BENEFITS ENROLLMENT

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959

A. IDENTIFYING DATA

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): Piccolo, Joseph
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 12/8/35
3. CAREER CONTROL NO.: 089869
4. ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE):
5. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.: 11239901
6. ENROLLMENT CODE NO.: 421
7. DATE ACTION BECOMES EFFECTIVE: 8/25/62

B. TERMINATION

☐ ENROLLMENT TERMINATES EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 7 ABOVE, WITH ELIGIBILITY TO CONVERT TO A NONGROUP CONTRACT

C. CHANGE IN PLAN

☐ ENROLLMENT SHOWN BY ITEM 6, ABOVE, HAS BEEN TERMINATED BECAUSE OF ELECTION OF ANOTHER PLAN.

D. TRANSFER OUT

☐ NAME AND ADDRESS OF NEW PAYROLL OFFICE (OR RETIREMENT SYSTEM) TO WHICH TRANSFERRING.

E. TRANSFER IN

ENROLLMENT ACCEPTED BY THIS AGENCY ☐

F. SUSPENSION

☐ ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN SUSPENDED, EFFECTIVE ON DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 7, ABOVE WHILE ENROLLEE IS ON ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY OR FOR THE REASON STATED IN REMARKS

G. REINSTATEMENT

ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN REINSTATED, EFFECTIVE ON DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 7, ABOVE. ☒

H. CHANGE IN NAME OF ENROLLEE

ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN CHANGED TO: ☐

NAME — ADDRESS IF DIFFERENT FROM ITEM 4 ABOVE — DATE OF BIRTH

I. CHANGE IN ENROLLMENT — SURVIVOR ANNUITANT

ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN CHANGED FROM FAMILY COVERAGE TO SELF ONLY ☐

NEW ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER

J. REMARKS

[illegible] 10141

K. DATE OF NOTICE

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL

HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER

(ALTERNATE) NAME OF AGENCY

DATE: 8/27/62

Central Intelligence Agency

ADDRESS: Washington 25, D. C.

QUADRUPLICATE — To Employing Office

REV. AUG. 1961

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MILITARY STATUS QUESTIONNAIRE
(READ INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

1. THIS DATE (Month-day-year): AUGUST 27, 1962
2. NAME (Last-first-middle): Piccolo, Joseph Stephan
3. DATE OF BIRTH (Month-year): Dec 1935
4. SEX: ☒ (1) MALE ☐ (2) FEMALE
5. OFFICE TO WHICH ASSIGNED:
6. SCHEDULE AND GRADE: GS-7
7. SUBJECT TO CURRENT DRAFT: ☐ YES ☒ NO
8. INDICATE DRAFT CLASSIFICATION, IF ANY: 1-D

1-6. SERIAL NUMBER: 025658
7-24. NAME:
25-28. DOB: 12-35
29. SEX: 1
30-31. OFFICE CODE: 61
32-34. SCHD: GS
35-36 GR.: 07
37. DRAFT STATUS: v
38-39. CLASS.: 1-D

VETERANS COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING

9. BRANCH OF SERVICE ON SEPARATION (Check one): ☐ (1) ARMY ☐ (2) NAVY ☐ (3) MARINE ☒ (4) AIR FORCE ☐ (5) COAST GUARD
10. ~~MIL.~~ GRADE ON SEPARATION: STAFF SERGEANT
10A. YRS/MOS OF ACTIVE SERVICE: 1 YR 1 MO
11. STATUS AT TIME OF SEPARATION (Check one): ☐ (1) REGULAR ☒ (2) RESERVE ☐ (3) DRAFTEE ☐ (4) OTHER (Specify in Comments)
12. TYPE OF SEPARATION (Check one)

40. BRANCH SERVICE: 4
41-42. MIL. GRADE: E-5
43. STATUS AT SEPARATION: 2

PLEASE NOTE

ALTHOUGH YOU MAY HAVE A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY, DO NOT CHECK THE BOX "RETIRED-SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY" UNLESS YOU WERE ACTUALLY RETIRED FOR THIS REASON. IF OTHERWISE, CHECK "HONORABLE DISCHARGE" OR "RELEASED TO INACTIVE DUTY" AS APPROPRIATE, EVEN THOUGH YOU MAY BE DRAWING A DISABILITY ALLOWANCE OR COMPENSATION.

☐ (1) RELEASED TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ (2) HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ (3) RETIRED-20 (or more) YRS. SERVICE
☐ (4) RETIRED-LESS THAN 20 YRS. SERVICE
☐ (5) RETIRED-AGE
☐ (6) RETIRED-SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY
☐ (7) RETIRED-COMBAT DISABILITY
☒ (8) OTHER-SPECIFY UNDER COMMENTS

44. TYPE OF SEPARATION (A-less than 8 yrs; B-8 yrs or more)

1 A	3 A	5 A	7 A
1 B	3 B	5 B	7 B
2 A	4 A	6 A	[✓ 8 A]
2 B	4 B	6 B	8 B

MEMBERS OF RESERVE FORCES COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING

13. RESERVE BRANCH OR SERVICE: D.C. Air Nat'l Guard
14. ORIGINAL ENTRY DATE IN ARMED SERVICES: 13 FEB 54
15. SERVICE SERIAL NO.: AF22928914
16. MOS, AFSC, DESIGNATOR, OR RATING: 70250
17. MIL. GRADE: SSGT
18. RESERVE CATEGORY (Check one): ☒ (1) READY ☐ (2) STANDBY ☐ (3) RETIRED
19. EXPIRATION DATE OF APPOINTMENT OR ENLISTMENT (Month and year): AUG 1963
20. MIL. MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT: 121ST TAC FTR SQ Andrews AFB
21. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED: 121ST TAC FTR SQ Andrews AFB

45. BRANCH SERVICE: 8
46-49. ENTRY DATE: 0254
50-59. SERV. SER. NO.: [illegible]
60-64. MOS, AFSC, ETC.: 70250
65-66. MIL. GRADE: E5
67. CATEGORY: 1
68-71. EXPIRATION DATE: 0863
72. MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT: 2
73. ASSIGNMENT UNIT: 2
74. MOBILIZATION CATEGORY: 2

22. COMMENTS

Item 12. Honorable Separation From Active Duty USAF To Active Reserve DC ANG. 24 Aug 62.

FORM 1 61 536 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED JUNE 1953
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER [illegible]

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) LANGLEY, VIRGINIA (Place of employment)

I, JOSEPH L. PICCOLO, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

25 AUGUST 1962 (Date of entrance on duty)

Joseph L. Piccolo (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 22nd day of August A. D. 1962

at Langley (City) Virginia (State)

[SEAL]

David W. Huber (Signature of officer)

Personnel Clerk (Title)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U. S. C. 16, or by a person designated to administer oaths under Section 206, Act of June 26, 1943, 5 U. S. C. 16a. If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

1 PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State): 1100 6th Street S.W. Washington 24, D.C.

2 (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 8 Dec 35

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State or city and foreign country): Yonkers, New York

3 (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, PLEASE NOTIFY: MRS. Joseph Piccolo

(B) RELATIONSHIP: Mother

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 1636 N.E. 20th ST. FT. LAUDERDALE, Fla.

(D) TELEPHONE NO.: LO 4-5834

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blank below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MAR-RIED (Check one)	SIN-GLE (Check one)
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, CHARGED, OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 12 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		X
9. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN BARRED BY THE U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for each debarment in Item 12.*		X

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10 (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		X
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		X
11. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT: A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE: (1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT: (1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.*		X

12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO		ITEM NO	

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER.—You must determine that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, any record of recent discharge or arrest, age, citizenship, and members of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should particularly check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and/or other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER [illegible]
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS [illegible] AND [illegible]

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1 NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): Piccolo, Joseph S.

2 DATE OF BIRTH: 8 Dec 35

3 LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
F.B.I. WASH. DC.	53	AUG	8	55	Sept	?	
C.I.A. WASH DC.	67	FEB	13	61	OCT	4	

4 LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U.S. AIR FORCE	61	OCT	1	62	AUG	24	Hon.

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☒ YES ~~NO~~
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)
C.I.A.

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

27 August 1962 (DATE)

Joseph S. Piccolo (SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 27 day of Aug (MONTH) 1962 at [illegible] (CITY) Virginia (STATE)

SEAL

David W. Huber

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

12. TOTAL SERVICE

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

(OVER)

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 29 August 1961.

Joseph J. Piccolo
Signature

22 August 1962
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
25658	PICCOLO	JOSEPH	S	46

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	35-37	38-39		40-42
	1				01	18	60	MEXICO	450

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☒	OTHER (Specify) RTN: [illegible] INFO		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 25 JAN 60

REMARKS

PREPARED BY

BASIC DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON ABOVE DOCUMENT CITED

[illegible] 1/13/ [illegible]

14-00000

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN HEALTH BENEFITS ENROLLMENT STATUS

[illegible]

A. IDENTIFYING DATA

Pierson [illegible]

[illegible] 7-30-61

B. TERMINATION

☐ YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN HAS BEEN TERMINATED EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 7, ABOVE. [illegible] NONGROUP CONTRACT

SEE PART [illegible] ON OTHER SIDE [illegible]

C. CHANGE IN PLAN

☐ YOUR ENROLLMENT SHOWN BY ITEM 6, ABOVE, HAS BEEN TERMINATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR RECENT ELECTION OF ANOTHER PLAN.

D. TRANSFER

☐ YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO:

EMPLOYING OFFICE OR RETIREMENT SYSTEM ADDRESS

SEE PART II ON OTHER SIDE FOR INFORMATION ON TRANSFER OF ENROLLMENT

YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THIS OFFICE ☐

Effective 1 Oct 61

E. SUSPENSION OR REINSTATEMENT

[illegible]

☒ YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN HAS BEEN SUSPENDED BECAUSE YOU ARE ON ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY OR FOR THE REASON STATED IN REMARKS.

SEE PART [illegible] ON OTHER SIDE FOR INFORMATION ON ENTRY ON ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY

YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN HAS BEEN REINSTATED, EFFECTIVE ON DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 7, ABOVE ☐

F. CHANGE IN NAME OF ENROLLEE

THE ENROLLMENT SHOWN IN PART A, ABOVE, HAS BEEN CHANGED TO: ☐

NAME ADDRESS IF DIFFERENT FROM ITEM 4, ABOVE DATE OF BIRTH

G. CHANGE IN ENROLLMENT — SURVIVOR ANNUITANT

YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN HAS BEEN CHANGED FROM FAMILY COVERAGE TO SELF ONLY. ☐

NEW ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER ☐

H. REMARKS

11 741

T 5637

I. DATE OF NOTICE

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL DATE

HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER (ALTERNATE) NAME OF AGENCY ADDRESS D.C.

QUADRUPLICATE

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER 153 F.P.M.
6 GAO 3000

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ballpoint pen.) 10741

EMPLOYEE'S CONTROL NO. 089959

PART A ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) PICCOLO (FIRST) Joseph (MIDDLE INITIAL) S.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH 12 DAY 8 YEAR 35

3. Are you now married? YES ☐ 1 NO ☒ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE) 3828 Garfield Street N.W. Washington 7, D.C. ☐

5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☐ NO ☒

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1
$4,000 TO $5,999 ☒ 2
$6,000 TO $9,999 ☐ 3
$10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
ASSOCIATION BENEFIT PLAN	HIGH	4 2 1

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box)
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
(c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan.

2. Number of event which permits change (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)

3. Date of event which permits change MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

J (YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) 28 June 1960 (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE 6/3/60

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION 7/ /60

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY

WH

Triplicate — To Employing Office

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE

DO NOT COMPLETE • FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true) PICCOLO, Joseph S.	DATE (from item 8-1) 18 Jun 59	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) SCOTT, Winston M.	DATE (from item 8-2) 18 Jun 59
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW.	RDBrandon R. D. BRANDON, WH/Personnel		DATE 1 Jul 59

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 8 December 1935	2. GRADE GS-5	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Mail and File Supervisor	
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known) ~~RID~~	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Mexico City		7A. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD 2 Jan 1959
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7B. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS 30 Jan 1960

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form).

Sterilization and preparation of outgoing pouches, processing of incoming pouches, analysis of mail for filing, name checks and preparation of memoranda, records liaison, operation of Registry during absence of Chief, photo work during absence of KURIOT representative.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

Return to WHD or RID in analysis or report work with the intention of entering the IO or JOT program upon completion of studies at Georgetown University (approximately 1-1/2 years).

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

These courses that would be preparatory for entrance into the operational field.

FORM NO. 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
1 MAR 57 EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[2] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[1] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE WHD 2ND. CHOICE RID 3RD. CHOICE WED

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS

1ST. CHOICE MADRID 2ND. CHOICE ROME 3RD. CHOICE SALVADOR

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 15

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

None

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

It is recommended that this employee be returned to Headquarters in January 1960 in order that he may complete his college education at Georgetown University. His replacement, who should be a trained RID specialist, should arrive in Mexico in early December 1959.

This employee should be allowed to take KUBARK training courses which would lead to his becoming an I.O. upon completion of his college education. It is believed he can become a very good I. O. with training.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Concur with Chief of Station recommendation for assignment at Headquarters in RID since there are no appropriate positions in WH Hqs to which he could be assigned.

16. NAME OF PERSONNEL OFFICER P. C. BOWERS DATE 1 July 1959	SIGNATURE PC Bowers

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. ______ CABLE NO. ______
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME	20. SIGNATURE
21. TITLE	22. DATE

23. COMMENTS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

Patricia H. Keefe
Office of Personnel

Joseph S. Piccolo
(Employee)
Joseph S. Piccolo
Date: 4 Nov 1957

FORM NO. 911a [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED MARCH 1956
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A8

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) .... (Bureau or division) Washington, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, Joseph Stephan Piccolo, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

4 Feb. 1957 (Date of entrance on duty) Joseph S. Piccolo (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 4th day of February A. D. 19 57,

at Washington, (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL] (Signature of officer)

Appointment Clerk (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

14-00000

RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

FORM 1451

NAME OF EMPLOYEE

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO

COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE ☐ YES ☐ NO

TELEPHONE EXT

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE, SPINDLE, OR MUTILATE

INSTRUCTIONS

THIS FORM MUST BE RETURNED WHETHER YOU HAVE HAD OVERSEAS SERVICE OR NOT.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCOMPANYING CARD, THEN FILL OUT THIS FORM AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE.

DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 20-31	WHERE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED	POSITY 1 / 2 ENTER NO	DATES FROM MO YR 33 34 35 36	DATES TO MO YR 37 38 39 40	SERVICE AS CIVILIAN 1 MILITARY 2 ENTER NO 41	RESPONSIBLE U.S. GOVT DEPT OR AGENCY	DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 42 44
450	Mexico	1	12 57	12 58	1	CIA	100

IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED, CHECK HERE ☐ AND ASK YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CARDS

SECRET

a. ....
1.
1. ....
2. ....
3.
1. ....
2. ....
3.

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, CHARGED, OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES, FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 12 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		X
9. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN BARRED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 12*		X

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10. (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		X
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		X
11. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT: A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE: (1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT: (1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.*		X

12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO		ITEM NO	
			HAVE YOU [illegible]
			[illegible] FEDERAL CR
			D. C. [illegible]
			☐ ☒

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER.—You must determine that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, any record of recent discharge or arrest, age, citizenship, and members of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should particularly check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and/or other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-82169-6

115 N3

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1956
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1, R3 AND S3

TATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AN AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF IPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): Piccolo, Joseph S.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 5 Dec. 1935.

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON. D.C.	1953	AUG	3	1953	SEPT	9	CLERICAL

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
NONE							

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU.
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	1	[illegible]

12. TOTAL SERVICE [illegible] 1 1

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

4 FEB 1957
(DATE)

Joseph S. Piccolo
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 4th day of Feb (MONTH) 1957 at Washington (CITY) D.C. (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown

INSTRUCTIONS: *File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved*

(OVER)

Part III.– DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS. *(Complete for noncompetitive hires based on competitive status as required by instructions in FPM Chapter 52.)* Employee has a competitive status. This determination is based upon the following evidence:

NAME OF AGENCY	SIGNATURE AND OFFICIAL TITLE	DATE

PART IV.—DETERMINATION OF CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	TOTAL SERVICE *(Item 12)*	NONCREDITABLE SERVICE *(Item 13)*	CREDITABLE SERVICE *(Leave Purposes)*	ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE *(Present Agency)*	LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE *(Leave Purposes)*	SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE *(Leave Purposes)*
Years			Verified [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Months				[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Days				[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

PART V.—DETERMINATION OF CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES. *(Complete only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes.)*

	TOTAL SERVICE *(Item 13)*	NONCREDITABLE SERVICE *(Item 14)*	CREDITABLE SERVICE *(RIF Purposes)*	ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE *(Present Agency)*	LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE *(RIF Purposes)*	SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE* *(RIF Purposes)*
Years						
Months						
Days						

* Enter as the "Service Computation Date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF 7

REMARKS:

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Date 4 February 1957

Dear **Mr. Piccolo:**

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective **4 February 1957.**

Position: **File Clerk**

Base Salary: **$3415.00 per annum**

2. You will be entitled to receive annual and sick leave, retirement coverage and such other employee benefits as may be provided by Agency regulations or applicable Federal laws and regulations.

3. As a condition of your employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the continental United States. Each time you are so assigned, the duration of the tour of duty will be prescribed in advance and will normally consist of a period of 24 months. You will be required to serve the prescribed period of the overseas tour of duty from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty unless this tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience or it is terminated for circumstances that are considered by the Agency to be beyond your control.

4. If you terminate your assignment at an overseas post of duty for reasons within your control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at the overseas post of duty, it is understood and agreed that you will be liable for reimbursing CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred by the Government in the transportation of yourself, your dependents, household effects and automobile to your overseas post of duty, and you will pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

5. It is further understood and agreed that if you terminate your overseas assignment for reasons within your control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of your prescribed tour of duty, you will pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of yourself, your dependents, household effects and automobile to the United States.

6. If you wish to return to the United States for personal reasons during your overseas tour of duty, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

7. Your employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of 12 months from the date of employment. In the event either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be considered for other types of available employment for which you are suited, or your employment will be terminated.

8. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and available funds permit.

Office of Personnel

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by CIA.

Joseph S. Piccolo
(Employee)

4 February 1957
(Date)

CONFIDENTIAL

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

Request date: 23 Aug 79

Applicant has/applicant has not previously been seen by OMS ☐ YES ☐ NO

Name (Last, First, Middle): Piccolo, JosephSS.

Social Security No.: 265-44-1914

[redacted]

Date of birth: 5 Dec 35

Sex: M

8 GRADE: GS-13

9 AFFILIATION CD: A11

10 DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIVISION: DDO/CI Staff

11 EMP. EXT.: 6663

12 POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer

COMPLETE 13-19 FOR EACH DEPENDENT TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN WITH EMPLOYEE ONLY IF 2 IS CHECKED "DEPENDENT"

13 DEPENDENT NAME (L F M)	14 SOC. SEC. NO.		16 DOB (DMY)	17 SEX	18 RELATIONSHIP	19 DEPENDENT PREVIOUSLY SEEN BY OMS (yes - no)
		[redacted]				

20 REQUESTED ACTION (more than one action is acceptable)

APPLICANT		PRE EMPLOYMENT		EOD			
ASSIGNMENTS		O/S PCS		STATION			NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN
		O/S TDY		TYPE COVER		POSITION	
		O/S RETURNEE		FITNESS FOR DUTY		OTHER (specify)	
	XXX	O/S TDY STANDBY		RETURN TO DUTY			
		O/S PLANNING		SPECIAL TRAINING			
SEPARATION		RETIREMENT		MOR CIARDS		MOR CSC	
ROUTINE		REGULAR ANNUAL		EXECUTIVE ANNUAL		MPT PHE	

21 COMMENTS

Please renew TDY standby. Mr. Piccolo's present TDY clearance expires in October 1979.

22 REQUESTING DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIV	23 ROOM & BLDG.	24 EXTENSION	25 SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER
DDO/CI/PERS	2C26 Hqs.	4313	Deirdre A. Adams

FOR OMS USE ONLY

FOR APPLICANTS	
	APPROVE PROCESSING FOR EOD
	HOLD PENDING RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL MEDICAL INFORMATION (form letter attached)
	REQUEST PRE EMP. MEDICAL EVALUATION
	OTHER (see comments)

COMMENTS

DATE

OMS SIGNATURE

FOR OTHER ACTIONS

REQUESTED ACTION	QUAL	COND QUAL	DEFER	DISQUAL
TDY STBY	X			

OMS ASSESSMENT CODE

EXAMINATION FACILITY

COMMENTS

Qual TDY STBY until Sept. 31

Oct 1, 1979

James J. Graham OMS/PEO

DATE

OMS SIGNATURE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY

FORM 2608

4 - OMS

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
REGARDING MILITARY SERVICE OBLIGATION

I understand that in accepting a position with the Central Intelligence Agency while subject to induction into the Armed Forces under the Selective Service Act, I cannot and will not expect deferment from such military service by virtue of my employment with the Central Intelligence Agency.

SIGNED Joseph L. Piccolo

WITNESS George Roder

DATE 31 May 57

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 278
1 OCT 56

(12)

I

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

(SCREENED AREAS WILL BE COMPLETED BY OMS)

OMS DATE:

6 Sep 77

APPLICANT HAS APPLICANT PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN BY OMS ☐ YES ☐ NO

DEPENDENT(S) EMPLOYEE

1 NAME (Last, First, Middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.	SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 265 44 1914	5 CHART NO. 012424	DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 35	SEX M	
8 GRADE GS-13	9 AFFILIATION CD A11	10 DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIVISION DDO/CI/OG/SO	11 EMP EXT 6348	12 POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	

COMPLETE 13-19 FOR EACH DEPENDENT TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN WITH EMPLOYEE ONLY IF 2 IS CHECKED "DEPENDENT(S)"

13 DEPENDENT NAME (L F M)	14 SOC SEC NO	15 CHART NO	16 DOB (DMY)	17 SEX	18 RELATIONSHIP	19 DEPENDENT PREVIOUSLY SEEN BY OMS (yes, no)

20 REQUESTED ACTION (more than one action is acceptable)

APPLICANT		PRE EMPLOYMENT		EOD		
ASSIGNMENTS		O/S PCS	STATION	ETD ETA (DA MO YR)	NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN	
		O/S TDY	TYPE COVER	POSITION		
		O/S RETURNEE		FITNESS FOR DUTY		OTHER (specify)
	XX	O/S TDY STANDBY		RETURN TO DUTY		
		O/S PLANNING		SPECIAL TRAINING		
SEPARATION		RETIREMENT		MDR/CIARDS		MDR CSC
ROUTINE		REGULAR ANNUAL		EXECUTIVE ANNUAL		MPT/PHE

21 COMMENTS

22 REQUESTING DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIV DDO/PCS/CSS/Pers	23 ROOM BLDG 2C43	24 EXTENSION 4013	25 SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER Virginia L. Rodgers Virginia L. Rodgers

FOR OMS USE ONLY

FOR APPLICANTS	
	APPROVE PROCESSING FOR EOD
	HOLD PENDING RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL MEDICAL INFORMATION (form letter attached)
	REQUEST PRE EMP MEDICAL EVALUATION
	OTHER (see comments)

COMMENTS

Oct 31, 1977 - [illegible]
Nov 1, 1977 - [illegible]

DATE OMS SIGNATURE

FOR OTHER ACTIONS

REQUESTED ACTION	QUAL	COND QUAL	DEFER	DISQUAL
TDY STDBY	XX			

COMMENTS

Expires 1 October 1979.

9 November 1977
James J. Graham, OMS/PEO

DATE OMS SIGNATURE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM 2698

2 - OMS

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

OMS DATE: 3/7/77

1 REQUEST DATE (DD MM YY): 25 Feb 77

2 ☐ APPLICANT ☒ DEPENDENT(S) ☐ EMPLOYEE

HAS APPLICANT PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN BY OMS ☐ YES ☐ NO

3 NAME (Last First Middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.	4 SOCIAL SECURITY NO 265-44-1914	[redacted]	6 DOB (DD MO YR) 8 Dec 35	7 SEX M	
8 GRADE GS-13	9 AFFILIATION CODE A11	10 DIRECTORATE OFFICE/DIVISION DDO/LA/Hqs	11 EMP EXT 7350	12 POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	

COMPLETE 13-19 FOR EACH DEPENDENT TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN WITH EMPLOYEE ONLY IF 2 IS CHECKED "DEPENDENT(S)"

13 DEPENDENT NAME (L F M)	14 SOC SEC NO	15	16 DOB (DMY)	17 SEX	18 RELATIONSHIP	19 DEPENDENT PREVIOUSLY SEEN BY OMS (yes, no)
Piccolo, Norma		[redacted]	9Oct43	F	Wife	Yes
Piccolo, Normandy			3Feb70	F	Dau	Yes
Piccolo, Burgandy			7May71	F	Dau	Yes

20 REQUESTED ACTION (more than one action is acceptable)

APPLICANT		PRE EMPLOYMENT		EOD		
ASSIGNMENTS	X	O/S PCS	STATION Mexico City, Mexico	ETD/ETA (DD MM YR) 25 Jul 77	NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN Three	
		O/S TDY	TYPE COVER Designee	POSITION Operations Officer		
		O/S RETURNEE		FITNESS FOR DUTY		OTHER (specify)
		O/S TDY STANDBY		RETURN TO DUTY		
		O/S PLANNING		SPECIAL TRAINING		
SEPARATION		RETIREMENT		MUR/CIARDS		MUR/CSC
ROUTINE		REGULAR ANNUAL		EXECUTIVE ANNUAL		MPT/PHE

21 COMMENTS

Please schedule physicals

22 REQUESTING DIRECTORATE OFFICE/DIV DDO/LA/Pers	23 ROOM/BLDG 3D-3113 Hqs.	24 EXTENSION 7350	25 SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER Jill Kritzer

FOR OMS USE ONLY

FOR APPLICANTS

☐	APPROVE PROCESSING FOR EOD
☐	HOLD PENDING RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL MEDICAL INFORMATION (form letter attached)
☐	REQUEST PRE EMP MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐	OTHER (see comments)

COMMENTS

DATE

OMS SIGNATURE

FOR OTHER ACTIONS

REQUESTED ACTION	QUAL	COND QUAL	DEFER	DISQUAL

OMS ACCOUNTABILITY CODE

EXAMINATION FACILITY

COMMENTS

[illegible]

6 OCT 1977 [illegible]

DATE

OMS SIGNATURE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 006962

FORM 2698

3 OMS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 30 Sept 75

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Piccolo, Joseph S.

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-13

5. OFFICE DIVISION BRANCH: DDO/LA/COG

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA: 29 Sept 75
STATION: Managua
NO. OF DEP.S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

Kathy Hill

Kathy Hill, LA/Trng

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3C34 Hqs

EXT.: 5671

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Returnee Exam Completed. Qualified for TDY Standby until 1 October 1977.

DATE: 19 March 1976

William T. Colder, OMS/pro

JJ

FORM 259

SECRET

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Piccolo, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/08/35	3. GRADE GS-13
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDO/WH/Rio de Janeiro	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Officer	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 5671
7. PROPOSED STATION Managua, Nicaragua	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Ops Officer 0306 GS-13	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State SSN# 265 44 1914	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 09/10/73	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY three

12. COMMENTS

Physicals to be taken in the field.

13. DATE OF REQUEST 18 May 1973	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Karl Fleck	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3D 5317 Hqs	16. EXTENSION 5671

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

24 AUG 1973

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS

Chairman, Overseas Candidate Review Panel

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 259a

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 18 May 1973

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Piccolo, Joseph S. (dependentd of)

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-13

5. OFFICE DIVISION BRANCH: DDO/WH/Rio De Janeiro

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: ------

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 09/10/73
STATION: Managua, NIcaragua
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: State
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: three
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED: none

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Karl Fleck
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D 5317 Hqs
EXT: XXXX 5671

10. COMMENTS

Norma	WIFE	10/29/43	Physicals to be taken in the fild.
Normandy	Dau	02/23/70	
Burgandy	Dau	05/17/71	

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR OS PCS

05 18 73

DATE

PETER J. CAUGHAN

SIGNATURE FOR DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 359

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST FOR PRE-EMPLOYMENT MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE: 21 August 1956

2. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): PICCOLO, JOSEPH STEPHAN

3. SUSPENSE DATE (10 WORKING DAYS):

4. ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FI/RI

5. POSITION TITLE (and grade): File Clerk GS-4

6. PERSONNEL DIVISION: [XX] Overt ☐ Covert

7. THE MEDICAL OFFICE IS REQUESTED TO CHECK THE DESIRED ACTION, RETURNING THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THIS FORM TO THE APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL DIVISION NO LATER THAN THE SUSPENSE DATE INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 3.

A ☐ Approve processing for E.O.D.

B ☐ Hold pending receipt of additional medical information (Form letters attached)

C ☒ Request pre-employment medical examination

D ☐ Rejected for medical reasons

8. Remarks: (8/30/56)

Please have subject come in any day of the week except Mon. & Wed. at 8:30.

PE med
9/17 at 8:30
per [illegible]
9/13/56
[illegible]

Max N. Hartman

SIGNATURE FOR MEDICAL OFFICE

FORM NO. 570 REPLACES FORM 37-183
1 MAR 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

~~[illegible]~~
12424

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) PICCOLO, Joseph S.			2. DATE 21 September 57
3. TO POSITION File Clerk	4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH DDP/WH/III		5. GRADE GS-4
6. TYPE OF POSITION ☐ Departmental ☐ U.S. Field ☒ Overseas	7. EVALUATE FOR ☐ EOD ☒ Overseas PCS ☐ Returnee Mexico City, Mexico	10 Jan 58 ☐ Pre-Employment ☐ Annual ☐ Special (Specify)	

MAIL ROOM
OCT 7 11 01 AM '57
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED PCS O/S ASSIGNMENT

OCT 4 195

MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) Piccolo,	(First) Joseph	(Middle) Stephen	2. DATE 17 Septreber, 1956.
3. TO POSITION File Clerk	4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH DDP/FI		5. GRADE GS-4

6. TYPE OF POSITION
- ☐ Departmental
- ☐ U.S. Field
- ☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
- ☐ EOD
- ☐ Overseas
- ☐ Returnee
- ☒ Pre-Employment
- ☐ Annual
- ☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

- ☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
- ☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
- ☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
- ☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Subject is qualified for Full Duty/General. (1/24/57)
Must be re-evaluated prior to any specific o/s assignment.

Vincent J. Ford
MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET

~~WHEN~~ FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE	CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR
	PICCOLO, JOSEPH JR.										

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
								03/04/69	12/08/35	12	WH

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN SPANISH (NEW WORLD) BL18 (NAME OF LANGUAGE)
AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
I	CODED	I	I	I+

TEST RATINGS: 0 = ZERO, I = INTERMEDIATE, S = SLIGHT, H = HIGH, E = ELEMENTARY, N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

FOR QUALIFICATIONS

DATE 17 MAR

12. SIGNATURE kaf

13. LD NUMBER 16565

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45) **SECRET** GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION 1 - OP/QAB

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	7. DATE OF TEST MO	DA	YR
BL18	1	3	1	1	1	4	69	03	04	69

DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273 LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA. LLC

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS
4		

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
A - ADDITION TO RECORD
C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD LLC

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR

FORM 10-64 1962a **SECRET** GROUP 1

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
< • 2	6-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR •	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR •	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	> WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 5	• 025658	• PIC	• A	• BL31	I	+	I	E	H	+	70

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST		
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR
• ++++	+	+	+	+	+	+	++	• 04	17	70

> DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

PLW

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3 NAME	ENTER UNDER "TYPE" = A - ADDITION TO RECORD C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD
< • 4	•	3-LETTERS •	

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

[illegible]

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
<• 2	6-DIGITS ●	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS ●

4 DATE OF BIRTH			5 DATE CODED			
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.
●			●			

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4 LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 3	●	●	●							

5 DATE SUBMITTED			6. DATE OF BIRTH			
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)
●			●			

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 5	• 025658	• PiC	• C	• BL18	4	3	4	4	4	4	59

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST			
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.
• BL18	E	3	i	E	i	4	68	• 04	09	68	

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3 NAME
<• 4	●	3-LETTERS ●

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
A - ADDITION TO RECORD
C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				

FORM 10-64 1962a

06 JUN 1968

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print) 7-24	FIRST	MIDDLE
025 65K	Piccolo	Joseph	S.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
04	27	68					1			NICARAGUA	525

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☒	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. UNMIT-1470

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD —

REMARKS

PREPARED BY			
☐ OCD	☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED	
☐ C & L DIVISION CTRS.	DATE 6/11/68	SIGNATURE	
☒ C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 8-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

IIC
OFFICIAL U[illegible] (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO 025696	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PICCOLO JOSEPH S	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 12/08/35	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS -11-04
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WH	9. LOCATION (Country, City) MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
MEXICO	PCS 64	57/12/01	58/07/01
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY 51	65/04/13	65/08/11
Europe	TDY	64/8/	64/10/
Europe	TDY	64/11/	64/12/
Mexico	PCS	65/9/30	68/1/70

[illegible] DATA
[illegible]
1 APR 1968 FG

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	~~NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD~~		
BSFS	International Affairs	[illegible]	64

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
MEXICO	Political, Economic	1957-57 1965-67	N/A	X			X
Belgium							
France							
Germany	NONE/Tourist	1965	N/A		X		X
Spain							
England							

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
Limited	none	☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER: SPECIFY:

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

None

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Dog Training – Limited

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

None

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. [illegible]

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR. DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED. INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING [illegible]

None

8. [illegible] WHICH YOU HAVE PATENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE [illegible]

None

9. [illegible] [illegible] Fraternity
[illegible] Fraternity

SECRET
- 3 -

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1 ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2 SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION: 4-A

3 LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS: 0150 Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

4 IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON: N/A

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1 MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. — specify): AIR NATIONAL Guard / Air Force

2 BRANCH OR CORPS: TAC

3 DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty): FROM Aug 61 TO Aug 62
Reserve Dec 63 Aug 61

4 STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. — specify): Reserve To Active Duty

5 RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation if past service): SSGT

6 SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER: AF 22928914

7 CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION:
☒ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service):
Admin Clerk And Acting 1st Sgt. For Tac Fighter Squadron

MILITARY RESERVE NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: None
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1 CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE:

2 DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK:

3 EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION:

4 CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☒ DISCHARGED

5 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service):
SEE 8 Above

6 IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS:
None

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED
1	None		
2			
3			
4			
5			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	**MARITAL STATUS**		
1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY			
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) Piccolo	(First) Norma	(Middle) Edythe	(Maiden) Wyatt
3. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Oct 43	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Wash DC		
5. OCCUPATION Housewife	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER N/A		
7. CITIZENSHIP USA	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) N/A	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED N/A	

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

DATE 15 March 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Joseph L. Piccolo Jr

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD
625 658	

PART I–GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Piccolo, Joseph Stephan	Dec	8	35

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
Spanish 720	AUG	29	62	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II–LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 61

SECRET

(4-61)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

[✓ 3.] I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED: 27 AUG 62

SIGNATURE:

(46)

(47)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
525658	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (*Last-First-Middle*) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Piccolo, Joseph S.	December	5	1935

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
SPANISH 720	August	24	1959	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

[✓ 2.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

[✓ 2.] I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 2.] I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-110, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 20 August 1959	SIGNATURE /s/
(46)	(47)

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

[illegible]

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes

SEC. I - PERSONAL BACKGROUND

1. FULL NAME [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

11. MARITAL STATUS

[illegible]

WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES)

NAME OF SPOUSE N/A

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE N/A

[illegible] ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE N/A

LIVING OR DECEASED N/A DATE OF DECEASE N/A CAUSE N/A

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS N/A

DATE OF BIRTH N/A PLACE OF BIRTH N/A

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. IMMIGRANT DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A

CITIZENSHIP N/A WHEN ACQUIRED N/A WHERE N/A

OCCUPATION N/A LAST EMPLOYER N/A

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS N/A

MILITARY SERVICE FROM N/A TO N/A BRANCH OF SERVICE N/A

COUNTRY N/A [illegible]

N/A

14-00000

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] WHERE NATURALIZED? [illegible]

OCCUPATION [illegible] LAST EMPLOYED [illegible]

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible] AGE [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

2. NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible] AGE [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

3. NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible] AGE [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NAME [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

[illegible]

EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

DATES ATTENDED [illegible] GRADUATED [illegible]

HIGH SCHOOL [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

DATES ATTENDED [illegible] GRADUATED [illegible]

COLLEGE [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY [illegible] YEARS COMPLETED [illegible]

DATES ATTENDED [illegible] DEGREE [illegible]

COLLEGE [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY [illegible] YEARS COMPLETED [illegible]

DATES ATTENDED [illegible] DEGREE [illegible]

OTHER UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE STUDY [illegible]

OTHER GRADUATE COLLEGE STUDY [illegible]

FORMER MILITARY SERVICE

REMARKS: [illegible]

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON [illegible]

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS [illegible]

Sec. 16. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible] CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) [illegible]

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY [illegible]

ADDRESS [illegible]
(Street) (City) (State)

KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible] NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB [illegible] SALARY $ [illegible] PER [illegible]

YOUR DUTIES [illegible]

REASONS FOR LEAVING [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible] CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) [illegible]

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY [illegible]

ADDRESS [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

REASONS FOR LEAVING [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible] CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) [illegible]

EMPLOYER'S NAME OR AGENCY [illegible]

ADDRESS [illegible]

KIND OF BUSINESS NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB SALARY

YOUR DUTIES

REASONS FOR LEAVING

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible] CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) [illegible]

EMPLOYER'S NAME OR AGENCY [illegible]

ADDRESS [illegible]

KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible] NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB [illegible] SALARY [illegible]

YOUR DUTIES [illegible]

14-00000

2

[illegible]

No

[illegible] GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY [illegible])

LANGUAGE Spanish SPEAK [illegible] READ [illegible] WRITE [illegible]

LANGUAGE [illegible] SPEAK [illegible] READ [illegible] WRITE [illegible]

LANGUAGE [illegible] SPEAK [illegible] READ [illegible] WRITE [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE WHICH FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR ASSIGNMENT?

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN.

No

DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

No

[illegible]

BUS. ADD. [illegible]

RES. ADD. [illegible]

Sec. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS. (Give [illegible] and business addresses where possible.)

[illegible]

Sec. [illegible] GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

[illegible] USA

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: [illegible]

[illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES?

No

[illegible]

[illegible] A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, [illegible] COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE.

[illegible]

[illegible]

27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT? [illegible]

No

28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 20 July 1962

YOUR REFERENCE: 10775 DDP/TFW

CASE NO. : 109709

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : PICCOLO, Joseph Stephens

1. This is to inform you of security approval of the subject person as follows:

☒ XX Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Regulations 10-210 and 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

☐ Subject has been approved for appointment under the authority of Paragraph 4(d) of Regulation 10-210, and under Regulation 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☒ XX A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM NO. 1173 [illegible] CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 20 December 1956

TO: Chief, Records & Services Division
Personnel Office

Your Reference: C-6351 FI

FROM: Chief, /Security Division
Personnel

Case Number: 109709

SUBJECT: PICCOLO, Joseph Stephan

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. **Subject is to be polygraphed as part of EOD procedures.**

W. M. Knott
W. M. Knott

[illegible] 1.23.57
[illegible]

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1953

(8)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 91 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R044

Prepared by:
Checked by:
Filed by:

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-FIRST-MIDDLE INITIAL-LAST) JOSEPH S. PICCOLO #18185	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12-8-35	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. F. B. I. 5714	4. DATE 9-9-55

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) RESIGNATION	6. EFFECTIVE DATE cb 9-9-55	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
File Clerk	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS 4 Series 305 FBI#54-D-167 $3415 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, SALARY, GRADE	
Div. Four Files Section D. C. ~~Washington Field Office~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX M	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION S & E, FBI 19 FROM: 19 TO: SAME	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) No FICA	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

APPROVED
J. Ed. Hoover
DIRECTOR F. B. I.

REMARKS.

Forwarding Address: 2210 20th Street, Northwest
Washington 9, D. C.

Leave in the amount of 55 hours extending thru 4:30 p.m. 9-20-55.
Owes for 216 hours plus 1 holiday for advanced sick leave which is being changed to LWOP for the period 6-1-55 (9:00 a.m.) to cb 7-6-55.
The above listed 55 hours leave is being used to offset his indebtedness.

3 6 OCT 12 1955

SIGNATURE AND TITLE

1. PERSONNEL FILE

STANDARD FORM 55
SEPTEMBER 1954
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 13 F. P. M.

NOTICE OF CONVERSION PRIVILEGE

Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954

An employee is entitled to convert to an individual policy when his group insurance terminates because of separation from an agency, transfer or appointment to a group excluded by law or regulation from insurance coverage, expiration of 12 continuous months in a nonpay status, or entry into the military service of the United States and acquisition of coverage under the Servicemen's Indemnity Act of 1951.

An employee whose group insurance terminates as indicated above may, under provisions set forth in his Certificate of Group Insurance, purchase an individual policy of life insurance without medical examination. The individual policy may be in an amount not exceeding the employee's group life insurance and will be issued at rates applicable to the type of policy purchased and to his current age and class of risk.

If you are entitled to convert group life insurance to an individual policy and wish to exercise this privilege, you must:

1. Ask the agency identified in the block below to give you a completed Agency Certification of Insurance Status, and
2. Follow the instructions printed on the Agency Certification of Insurance Status, and mail it to the Office of Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance, 330 Fourth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y. That office will promptly mail to you detailed information on how to apply for conversion.

IMPORTANT

THE TIME IN WHICH AN EMPLOYEE MAY CONVERT IS LIMITED. THE COMPLETED "AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS" (NOT THIS FORM) MUST BE MAILED TO THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE WITHIN 31 DAYS AFTER YOUR GROUP INSURANCE TERMINATES, OR WITHIN 15 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, WHICHEVER BASIS GIVES YOU THE MOST TIME.

UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, LIFE INSURANCE IS PAYABLE IF DEATH OCCURS WITHIN 31 DAYS AFTER AN EMPLOYEE'S GROUP INSURANCE TERMINATES, EVEN THOUGH HE HAS NOT APPLIED FOR CONVERSION. IF DEATH OCCURS WITHIN THIS PERIOD FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING POSSIBLE BENEFITS MAY BE OBTAINED FROM THE AGENCY NAMED BELOW.

Mr. Joseph S. Piccolo

DATE OF THIS NOTICE

September 8, 1955

INSTRUCTIONS TO EMPLOYING AGENCY

1. Fill in the name and address of the office which issues this notice (overprint or stamp if desired).
2. Fill in the date this notice is issued, and note this date in your records for possible future reference.
3. Give this notice, as required, to every employee on the date his insurance terminates (except by waiver).

NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS OF AGENCY

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room [illegible]
United States Department of Justice
Washington 25, D.C.

37

SEP 9 1958

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R064

Prepared by:
Checked by:
Filed by:

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-FIRST-MIDDLE INITIAL-LAST) MR. JOSEPH S. PICCOLO	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12-8-35	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. F. B. I. 12688	4. DATE 10-8-54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) PROMOTION	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 10-10-54	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY EXCEPTED BY LAW

FROM		TO
File Clerk	8. POSITION TITLE	Same
GS 3 (Series 305 FBI#54-D-86) $2950 per annum.	9. SERVICE, SERIES, SALARY, GRADE	GS 4 $3175 per annum
Div. Four Files Section D. C.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD D DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD D DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WW II	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION (Series 305 FBI# 54-D-167)

NEW	VICE	L. L.	REAL.
		X	X

Betty Brooke Koontz

15. SEX M	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION S. & E., FBI 18. FROM: 19. TO: same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) no FICA	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

APPROVED

DIRECTOR, F. B. I.

42 (Detroit)

REMARKS:
The provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 have been complied with.
The classification grade of this position is subject to post-audit and correction pursuant to Section 1310 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1952 - Public Law # 253, approved 11-1-51.
This promotion is temporary in accordance with Public Law #843 approved 9-27-50.

42 OCT 29 1954

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

1. PERSONNEL FILE

FD-185

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

REPORT OF PERFORMANCE RATING

Name of Employee: JOSEPH S. PICCOLO

Where Assigned: RECORDS & COMMUNICATIONS (Division) RECORDS SECTION; FILE REVIEW AND RESEARCH UNIT (Section, Unit)

Payroll Title: FILE CLERK GS-3

Rating Period: from 1-1-54 to 9-30-54

ADJECTIVE RATING: SATISFACTORY
Outstanding, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory

Employee's Initials JSP

	Signature	Title	Date
Rated by:	Mary C Wolfe	Supervisor	9/30/54
Reviewed by:	F. W. WAIKART	Supervisor In Charge	SEP 30 1954
Rating approved by:		Assistant Director	OCT 21 1954

TYPE OF REPORT

(X) Official
(X) Annual
( ) Administrative
( ) 90-day
( ) Transfer
( ) Separation from service
( ) Special

10
OCT 21 1954

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R064

Prepared by:
Checked by:
Filed by:

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - FIRST - MIDDLE INITIAL - LAST) MR. JOSEPH S. PICCOLO	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12-8-35	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. F.B.I. 18802	4. DATE 3-26-54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) CHANGE IN TITLE	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 3-28-54	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY EXCEPTED BY LAW

FROM		TO
Locate Clerk	8. POSITION TITLE	File Clerk
GS 3 (Series 305 CSC#3741) $2950 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, SALARY, GRADE	GS 3 same
Div. Four Files Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	same same
D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	same
☐ FIELD [D] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD [D] DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT.	OTHER 5 PT.		10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	REV.		REAL.	
				(Series 305 CSC#3741)

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION S. & E., FBI	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M		FROM: TO: same	no FICA		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

APPROVED
J. Edgar Hoover
DIRECTOR, F. B. I.

JWsm

MAY 18 1954

REMARKS:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

1. PERSONNEL FILE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

FD-185

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

REPORT OF PERFORMANCE RATING

Name of Employee: JOSEPH S. PICCOLO

Where Assigned: RECORDS & COMMUNICATIONS (Division) RECORDS SECTION FILING UNIT (Section, Unit)

Payroll Title: LOCATE CLERK GS-3

Rating Period: from 8-3-53 to 12-31-53

ADJECTIVE RATING: SATISFACTORY
Outstanding, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory

Employee's Initials J.P.

	Signature	Title	Date
Rated by:	Lawrence	Supervisor	12-31-53
Reviewed by:	F. W. WAIKART	[illegible]	DEC 31 1953
Rating approved by:		ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	JAN 9 1954

TYPE OF REPORT

(X) Official
(X) Annual

( ) Administrative
( ) 60 day
( ) Transfer
( ) Separation from service
( ) Special

JAN 14 1954

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
[illegible]
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER [illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Prepared by:
Checked by:
Filed by:

1. NAME: MR. JOSEPH S. PICCOLO
This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 12-8-35
3. [illegible]: F.B.I. 10703
4. DATE: 12-4-53
5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 12-6-53
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A Part 6.108 (E)

FROM		TO
File Clerk	8. POSITION TITLE	Locate Clerk
GS 2 (Series 305 DJ#50-D-53) $2750 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, SALARY, GRADE	GS 3 $2950 per annum
Div. Four Files Section D. C.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	same same same
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD D DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD D DEPARTMENTAL

see below

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE X

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION (Series 305 CSC#3741): VICE X, REAL X
Hattie B. Hall
remove from rolls
effective cb 9-10-53

15. SEX: M
16. RACE:
17. APPROPRIATION S. & E., FBI
18. FROM:
19. TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): no FICA
19. DATE OF [illegible] (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

APPROVED
DIRECTOR, F. B. I.
J. Ed. Hoover

Vice change to be
add'l identical
[illegible]
[illegible]
(FE 124-D-50)
[illegible] 4-26-54.
[illegible] 5-12-54.

REMARKS:
The provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 have been complied with.
The classification grade of this position is subject to post-audit and correction pursuant to Section 1310, Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1952 – Public Law #253, approved 11-1-51.
This promotion is temporary in accordance with Public Law 3, approved 9-27-50.

1 G DEC 16 1953

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

—— 6869261

Give this card to the
APPOINTMENT CLERK
at the
PHS OUTPATIENT CLINIC
4th and C Streets SW.
EX. 6350 Ext. 8248
(or Code 178)

Spitale -

report 70 mm

1. FIRST JOSEPH | INITIAL S. | LAST NAME PICCOLO

2. POSITION TITLE File Clerk

3 DATE OF BIRTH 12-8-35 HAS AN APPOINTMENT ON ______ (Date) AT ______ (Time) A.M. P.M.

AT THE SERVICE CHECKED BELOW:

4. ☒ PHOTOFLUOROGRAM
5. ☐ MEDICAL EXAMINATION
6 ☐ LABORATORY
7 ☐ MEDICAL
8 ☐ OB GYN.
9. ☐ PHYS. MED.
10. ☐ SURGICAL
11. ☐ PEDIATRIC
14. ☐ DENTAL
15. ☐ ENT
16. ☐ NUTRITION
17 ☐ MENTAL HEALTH
18. ☐ DERMATOLOGY
19. ☐ OTHER (Specify) ______

SEP 11 1953

20 CLINIC REGISTER NO. [redacted]

21. NAME OF DOCTOR 9/11 -

STANDARD FORM 78A -- JULY 1949
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER M3

MEDICAL APPOINTMENT AND REPORT

16--86380-1

S 9 OCT 7 1953

3-123

VETERAN'S PREFERENCE AND SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT

Date 8-3-53

1. Are you eligible to claim Veteran's Preference under any of the existing Veterans Preference Bills? Yes ____ No X.

2. Furnish information substantiating Veteran's Preference claim, including disability rating, if any.

3. Are you currently receiving any Social Security benefit payments? Yes ____ No X.
(If you are receiving any Social Security benefit payments at the present time you should immediately contact the local Social Security field office as to whether you will still be entitled to such payment.)

Signature __________

8 9 AUG 24 1953

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1949)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

JUSTICE (Department or agency) F.B.I. (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON D.C. (Place of employment)

I, JOSEPH STEPHAN PICCOLO, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

8-3-57 (Date of entrance on duty)

Joseph S. Piccolo (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 3rd day of August, A. D. 1957

at Washington (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

Catherine C. Johns
(Signature of officer)

ACT OF [illegible]
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be* [illegible]

AUG 7 [illegible]

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

6 [illegible]

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false st[illegible]ent in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Imp[illegible]ation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

16[illegible] N.E. 20[illegible] St [illegible] Fla
1 PR[illegible]NT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State)

12-8-35
2 (A) DATE OF BIRTH

Yonkers, New [illegible]
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country)

3 (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY	(B) RELATIONSHIP	(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE	(D) TELEPHONE NO.
Mr. J[illegible] Piccolo	Father	Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. 16[illegible] N.E. 20[illegible] St	[illegible]

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

(Check one)

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating, if retired from military or naval service*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the signatures [illegible] other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical evidence. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointment of persons not subject to [illegible] is not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

3-85

OFFICIAL ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Date: August 3, 1953

Name: Joseph S. Piccolo

Eod: August 3, 1953

Under the Federal Bureau of Investigation performance rating plan, every new employee is given an entrance performance rating which will constitute his official rating until superseded by a subsequent official rating.

The official entrance rating for this employee is satisfactory.

AUG 7 1953

MEMORANDUM

RE: MR. JOSEPH S. PICCOLO

A character and fitness investigation including an appropriate loyalty check was conducted concerning this employee and he was found suitable for employment with this Bureau.

STANDARD FORM 50
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 91, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R024

Prepared by: Ab
Checked by:
Filed by:

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–FIRST–MIDDLE INITIAL–LAST): MR. JOSEPH S. PICCOLO
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 12-8-35
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: F.B.I. 2966
4. DATE: 8-3-53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): EXCEPTED INDEFINITE APPOINTMENT
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD 8-3-53
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A Part 6.108(E)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	File Clerk
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, SALARY, GRADE	GS 2 $2750 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Div. Four Files Section D. C.
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD D ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE X

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: VICE X
DJ#50-D-53
Cecilia Shirley Miniok
reassign GS 2 FBI#52-D-184
eff 6-23-53

15. SEX: M
16. RACE:
17. APPROPRIATION S. & E., FBI
FROM:
TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): no FICA
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 8-3-53
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

APPROVED:
J. E. Hoover
DIRECTOR, F. B. I.

REMARKS:
The provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 have been complied with.
The classification grade of this position is subject to post-audit and correction pursuant to Section 1310 of Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1952 – Public Law #253, approved 11-1-51.

This appointment is a temporary, indefinite appointment, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law #843, approved 9-27-50.

3 - AUG 24 1953

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

1. PERSONNEL FILE



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
TED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST

FD-140
(9-10-51)

Date May 23 1953

APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT

DIRECTOR:
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

☐ Special Agent (Law Trained)
☐ Special Agent (Accountant)
☐ Stenographer
☐ Typist
☒ Clerk
☐ Translator *
☐ Radio Operator *
☐ Laboratory Technician *
☐ ____________

(Check position applied for)

SIR:
I hereby make application for employment by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice in the position indicated by a check mark, and for your use in connection therewith I submit the following information.

NOTICE: Application MUST be typewritten or clearly printed. ALL questions MUST be answered. If a question is not applicable so state. Applications which are not complete and legible will not be considered. If space provided is not sufficient for complete answers, or you wish to furnish additional information, attach sheets of the same size as this application, and number answers to correspond with questions.

1. Name in Full: Piccolo (Family Name) Joseph (Given Name) Stephan (Middle Name)

a) List all other names you have used including nicknames, and maiden name of female applicants.

Joe, Pic, Lo.

2. Present Residence Address: N.E. 20th st.Ft Lauderdale, Fla.;1636 res.no (Street, City, State) Telephone 33324

3. Address to which you wish mail or telegram sent: 1636 N.E. 20 th st.Ft.Lauderdale,Fla. (Street, City, Zone No., State) Box none

4. Height 5'11 5. Weight 139 6. Date of Birth 8 Dec 1935 (Day, Month, Year) 7. Place of Birth Yonkers N.Y. (City, State)

8. Are you a U.S. citizen? yes 9. If not born in U.S. give date of entry none a) Place of entry none

10. Are you naturalized? no 11. Date none 12. Place none 13. Court none

14. Describe any physical defects or disabilities you have, including extent of defective vision, if any, with and without glasses (Snellen) and deficiencies in color vision and hearing none

15. If appointed as a Special Agent, are you willing and prepared to accept assignment or transfer to any part of the United States or its territorial possessions, for either temporary or permanent duration? N.A. a) If appointed to other positions, will you accept assignment anywhere in the United States or its territorial possessions? No b) If not, specify where you will accept assignment: Washington D. C.

16. If appointed as a Special Agent, or to other positions for assignment in Washington, D.C. are you willing to proceed to Washington, D.C. at your own expense, upon 10 days notice? yes a) If not, what is the minimum notice you will accept? 10 days 17. What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept? $ 2750 A

18. Are you now employed by an agency of the Federal Government? no a) Have you been so employed within the past 90 days? no b) Name of Agency none c) Location none

19. Have you ever before applied for employment with the Federal Bureau of Investigation? no a) Date none

b) Where did you apply? none

20. EDUCATION

	NAME OF SCHOOL	LOCATION	FROM	TO	COURSE PURSUED	DEGREES OR DIPLOMAS RECEIVED
HIGH SCHOOL	✓ St. Anthony's Central Catholic	Ft Lauderdale Fla. Ft Lauderdale Fla.	1949 1952	1952 1953	Acecemic Acedemic	 Graduate
COLLEGE	none	none	none	none	none	none
GRADUATE SCHOOL	none	none	none	none	none	none
MISCELLANEOUS	none	none	none	none	none	none

JUL 23 1953

21. [illegible] no a) In what states? none

22. [illegible] no a) In what states? none

* Applicants for these positions must attach a complete record of their technical qualifications, [illegible] and a detailed description of their experience in the specific work for which application is being made. Separate statements describing necessary qualifications for these positions will be furnished upon request.

23. If you have ever used any names other than your true name, during what period, and under what circumstances, were these names used? none

24. Have you ever legally changed your name? no 25. Date: none a) Place none b) Court none

26. Where do you consider your legal residence? Ft Lauderdale (City) Broward (County) Florida (State)

27. EMPLOYMENT: (List chronologically ALL employments, including summer and part time employment

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	FROM	TO	ANNUAL SALARY	POSITION AND KIND OF WORK		
a) Name Joseph Piccolo Address	1949	present	$500	teaching	J.Piccolo	still employed
b) Name Address						
c) Name Address						
d) Name Address						
e) Name Address						
f) Name Address						
g) Name Address						
h) Name Address						

28. MILITARY RECORD:

a) Have you ever served in the Armed Forces of the United States? no b) Branch none

c) Dates of Service none d) Type of Discharge none

e) Serial Number none f) Basis for Discharge none

g) Are you registered for Selective Service? no h) Local Board No. none i) City none

j) Do you claim Veteran's Preference? no k) Basis for claim none

29. Have you ever served in the Armed Forces of a foreign country? no a) Dates none

b) Country none c) Branch none d) Circumstances none

30. Have you ever visited or resided in any foreign country (except for travel in the Armed Forces of the U.S.)? no

a) Date passport issued none b) Place issued none

COUNTRIES VISITED	FROM	TO	REASON FOR TRAVEL
none	none	none	none

31. List any close relatives, including in-laws, now residing outside the United States (except those in the Armed Forces of the U.S.)

NAME	RELATION	AGE	CITY	COUNTRY	CITIZEN OF WHAT COUNTRY
none	none		none	none	none

YES NO

Write "YES" or "NO" in the appropriate column. If the answers to any of the following questions are "YES" you MUST give full details, using additional sheets if necessary, and numbering answers to correspond with questions.

32. Have you had any serious illnesses or operations in the past 5 years? — no

a) If so, describe and give dates

b) Were you hospitalized? — no

Dates: Hospital Location

c) How many days' work have you lost in the past 5 years due to illness?

d) Do you have any service disability? — no

e) Percentage: f) Nature of disability?

33. Do you have any sources of income other than your salary? — no

a) What are they? b) Total amount of such income $

34. Has your credit record ever been considered unsatisfactory, or have you ever been refused credit? — no

a) If so, give dates, places, names of creditors and circumstances

35. Are you now indebted to anyone? — no

a) Name: Address Amount

36. Have you ever been arrested (include traffic violations, but not parking tickets)? — yes

DATE	PLACE	CHARGE	DISPOSITION	DETAILS
Jan.8,1953	Ft Lauderdale	speeding	fined	$10.00

37. Has any member of your immediate family or close relative (including in-laws) ever been arrested for other than traffic violations? — no

NAME	RELATION	DATE	PLACE	CHARGE	DISPOSITION

38. Were you ever dismissed from a school, or was any disciplinary action, including scholastic probation, ever taken against you, during your scholastic career? — no

School: Date: Type of Action

39. Have you ever been dismissed or asked to resign from any employment or position you have held? — no

Employer's name: Date: Reasons:

40. Have you ever been a defendant in a court action? — yes

(If so, give date, place, court, names of parties involved, nature of action, and final disposition)

attached sheet

41. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party U.S.A. or any Communist organization — no

42. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of a Fascist organization? — no

43. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of any organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government, or which has adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or of seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means? — no

44. REFERENCES

Give three personal references (not relatives, former employers, fellow employees or school teachers) who are responsible adults of reputable standing in their communities, such as householders, property owners, business or professional men or women including your family physician if you have one, who have known you well during the past 5 years.

NAME	RESIDENCE ADDRESS	BUSINESS ADDRESS	NO. OF YEARS ACQUAINTED
a) Paul F. Gocke	3025 N.E. Center Ave. City	7300 Harbor Island, Miami Beach, Fla.	3 years
b) Dr.F.C. Haberman	420 N.E. 9 th Ave. City	115 Broward Blvd. Ft Lauderdale, Fla.	4 years
c) Harry F.Kestner	205 N.E. 1st street City	2200 E Sunrise Blvd. Ft Lauderdale,Fla.	2 years

45. List the names of any of your relatives who are now employed by the Federal Government

NAME	RELATION	AGENCY BY WHICH EMPLOYED	LOCATION
a) Frances Carpinelli	cousin	Veterans Administration	New York City
b)			
c)			

46. List names in FULL of any friends or acquaintances who are now employed in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Give the name of the city in which they are working, or were working when you last heard from them.

NAME IN FULL	LOCATION	LENGTH OF ACQUAINTANCE
a) none	none	none
b)		
c)		

47. List chronologically ALL of your residences for the past 10 years

FROM	TO	STREET	APT. NO.	CITY	STATE
✓ a) 1943	1945	658 Main Street	none	Dalton	Mass.
✓ b) 1945	1948	676 East Street	none	Pittsfield	Mass.
✓ c) 1948	1950	1100 N.E. 7th Ave.	none	Ft Lauderdale Fla.	Fla.
✓ d) 1950	1951	507 N.E. 11th Ave.	none	Ft Lauderdale	Fla.
✓ e) 1951	1953	1536 N.E. 20th street	none	Ft Lauderdale	Fla.
f)					
g)					
h)					
i)					
j)					
k)					
l)					

48. Are you single, married, widowed, separated or divorced? single

a) If divorced, give date of divorce none Place none Court none

49. Maiden name of wife or husband's full name: none

a) Occupation none Employer's name and address: none

b) Wife's or husband's present address none

c) Birthplace: none d) Date of Birth none e) Is he or she a U.S. citizen? none

f) Date of naturalization none g) Place none h) Court none

50. NAMES OF CHILDREN none AGE

NOTE: If you have been married more than once, give the above information concerning each former husband or wife. Even though a relative is deceased, give all information requested, and indicate last residence and year of death. Include step-brothers and sisters, and if you or your wife or husband have step-parents, legal guardians, or others who have raised you instead of your parents the requested information should be furnished concerning them as well as your real parents:

RELATIVES

FULL NAME	ADDRESS	AGE	PLACE OF BIRTH	OCCUPATION	DATE & PLACE OF NATURALIZATION
51. FATHER Joseph Piccolo	1636 N.E. 20th street	48	Naples, Italy	driving instructor	Pittsfield Mass.
52. MOTHER Irena Anna Piccolo	1636 N.E. 20th Street	44	Yonkers N.Y.	housewife	none
53. BROTHERS AND SISTERS					
a) Francis Donald	same	11	Pittsfield Mass.	student	none
b) Lewis Brian	same	9	Pittsfield Mass.	student	none
c)					
54. WIVES OR HUSBANDS OF BROTHERS OR SISTERS					
a) none	none		none	none	none
b)					
c)					
55. FATHER-IN-LAW	none		none	none	none
56. MOTHER-IN-LAW	none		none	none	none
57. BROTHERS AND SISTERS OF YOUR HUSBAND OR WIFE					
a)	none		none	none	none
b)					
c)					
d)					
58. OTHERS (indicate relation - see note above)					
a)	none		none	none	none
b)					
c)					

59. List all clubs, societies or organizations of which you are a member

a) Junior Civitan Club location Ft Lauderdale

b) location

c) location

d) location

60. Foreign languages

Foreign languages	speak	understand	read	write
a) none	none	none	none	none
b)				
c)				

Indicate your proficiency in each phase of each language as "slight" "good" "fluent"

61. List any special abilities you have, or avocations at which you are proficient with degree of proficiency.

Ability at public speaking. Ability tohold chauffers license.

Attach photograph here
securely with paste,
tape or staples

Attach an unmounted full face photograph of yourself, not larger than 2 3/4 x 2½ inches. Print your name plainly on the back of the photograph. The photograph must have been taken not more than 3 months prior to the date of this application.
NO APPOINTIVE CONSIDERATION WILL BE AFFORDED ANY APPLICANT UNLESS SUCH A PHOTOGRAPH IS FURNISHED.

I understand that all appointments are probationary for a period of one year, during which time the employee must demonstrate his fitness for continued employment by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I also understand that any appointment tendered me will be contingent upon the results of a complete character and fitness investigation, and I am aware that willfully withholding information or making false statements on this application will be the basis for dismissal from the service. I agree to these conditions, and I hereby certify that all statements made by me on this application are true and complete, to the best of my knowledge.

Respectfully,

(Signature of the applicant as usually written)

Question #40.

Jan. 10, 1953, Ft Lauderdale, Fla, Traffic court, Joseph Piccolo-City of Ft Lauderdale,Fla. Traffic violation, Fined $ 10.00.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: FLORES, DANIEL
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: MATERIAL AFTER 1967

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

Last Name
FLORES DANIEL
First Name
SSN 460-48-6230
DOB 06/04/35
CODED

14-00000

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: FLORES, DANIEL
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: MATERIAL AFTER 1967

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

Last Name FLORES DANIEL First Name Middle Initial
SSN 460-48-6230 DOB 06/04/35

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) FLORES, Daniel	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* self	CLAIM NUMBER 79 0606

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 1/4/79.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 7 Jun 1979	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE Ernest L. Hardt

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY [illegible]

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
FLORES, Daniel	Self	78-0668

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 4/12/78.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
6/6/78	Ernest L. Hardt

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

1076

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

31 JAN 1978

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 January 1978

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Flores, Daniel

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 11 YEAR 78

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 8035 0990 0000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/LA Division
Foreign Field
Mexico City, Mexico Station
Independent Ops Branch

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Mexico City, Mexico

11. POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer (14)

12 POSITION NUMBER: GK76

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DOG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 ~~4~~ 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~[illegible]~~ 26889

18 REMARKS:

Reassigned from position FS35

CMS/MSB

This action reflects
WGI- 1/29/78

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: J. Halpin CIA/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 1/27/78

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CMS 13

DATE SIGNED: 1/29/78

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HDQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
37	10	51620	LA	45075		3	08	04	35						

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OASDI 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REG. NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR, RESV PROV, TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1·27·78 AED

46 OP APPROVAL: Ann E. Dicksak

DATE APPROVED: 1·31·78

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL BY. 007622

☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UN·CLASSIFIED Jee

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

OMS CASE

1 REQUEST DATE (DD MO YR): 12 Sept 77

2 APPLICANT HAS APPLICANT PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN BY OMS ☐ YES

DEPENDENT(S) X EMPLOYEE

3 NAME (Last First Middle): Flores, Daniel

4 SOCIAL SECURITY NO: 460-28-[illegible] [redacted]

6 DOB (DD MO YR): 4 Aug 35

7 SEX: M

8 GRADE: 13

9 APPLICATION CD: All

10 DIRECTORATE/OFFICE DIVISION: DDO/LA

11 EMP EXT: 5270

12 POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

COMPLETE 13-19 FOR EACH DEPENDENT TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN WITH EMPLOYEE ONLY IF 2 IS CHECKED "DEPENDENT(S)"

13 DEPENDENT NAME (L F M)	14 SOC SEC NO	15	16 DOB (DMY)	17 SEX	18 RELATIONSHIP	19 DEPENDENT PREVIOUSLY SEEN BY OMS (yes no)
	[redacted]					

20 REQUESTED ACTION (more than one action is acceptable)

APPLICANT		PRE EMPLOYMENT		EOD		
ASSIGNMENTS	X	O/S PCS	STATION: Mexico City	ETD/ETA (DA MO YR): 14 Oct 77	NO OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN: 2	
		O/S TDY	TYPE COVER: Nominal State	POSITION: Ops Officer		
		O/S RETURNEE		FITNESS FOR DUTY		OTHER (specify)
		O/S TDY STANDBY		RETURN TO DUTY		
		O/S PLANNING		SPECIAL TRAINING		
SEPARATION		RETIREMENT		MDR/CIARDS		MDR/CSC
ROUTINE		REGULAR ANNUAL		EXECUTIVE ANNUAL		MPT/PHE

21 COMMENTS

Assignment to Tokyo, Japan has been cancelled, Subject is now being considered for Mexico City.

22 REQUESTING DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIV: DDO/LA/PERS

23 ROOM/BLDG: 3D3113 Hqs

24 EXTENSION: 5270

25 SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER: Diane K. Roy

26 OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

27 OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS

Jane Mura 7 OCT 1977

Chairman, Overseas Candidate Review Panel

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY ____________

FORM 2598

8 - OPNAS (when applicable)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

28 ... 1977

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 March 1977

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REMOVAL FROM PARTICIPATION IN CIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 10 YEAR 77

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 7135-4534-0000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643, Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/LA

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS:

SUBJECT REMOVED FROM SYSTEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH HN 20-763.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE:

20 EMPLOY CODE:

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC:

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HOOTRS CODE:

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 03 DA 04 YR 35

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA. YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-ORGN 3-FICA 4-NONE; CODE: 1

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV, TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVED 1-REG 2-REG/OPT 3-INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-24-77 ... MAR 1977

46 O P APPROVAL: Lorn Vaney

DATE APPROVED: 21 Mar 77

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 February 1977

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) Flores, Daniel
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 02 DAY 26 YEAR 77
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	
6 FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA 7135-4534 0000
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA Division Cuba Operations Group EA Area	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.
11 POSITION TITLE Operations Officer (13)	12 POSITION NUMBER FS35
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DQG	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP 13 1	17 SALARY OR RATE $24,308

18 REMARKS

Reassigned from DDO/LA Position CQ 66

CMS/MSB S. L. Valenti 2-17-77

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL J. Halpin CLA/PERS	DATE SIGNED 15Feb77	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER CMS/13	DATE SIGNED 2-24-77

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51500	ALPHABETIC LA	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 VOUCHER CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 03 04 35	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR
27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR	28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO
34 SEX	35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 2-25-77	OP APPROVAL 01 MAR 1977	DATE APPROVED 2-?-77

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 January 1977

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Flores, Daniel ✓

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 30 YEAR 77

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF

7 CAN AND NSCA: 7135 4534 0000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/LA Division ✓
Cuba Operations Group
WH Area

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash~~ington~~, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer ✓ (13)

12 POSITION NUMBER: CQ66

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQG ✓

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01 ✓

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 1

17 SALARY OR RATE: $24,308

18 REMARKS:

FROM: GS-12/4, $22,485

fr 12/4

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: John Halpin, C/LA/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 19 Jan 77

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 21 Jan 77

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23	24 CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	51506	LA	75013		1	08 04 35	01 30 77	01 30 77

EOD DATA

2-3-77

2/4/77

1152

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

19 NOV 1976

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 November 1976

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) Flores, Daniel

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 12 DAY 04 YEAR 76	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular
6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 7135-4534 0000	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA Division Cuba Operations Group WH Area	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE Operations Officer (12)	12 POSITION NUMBER CQ67	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DQG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 12 ~~8~~ 4	17 SALARY OR RATE 22485 ~~$21,804~~

18 REMARKS

Reassigned from DDA/OTR Position BD 33

Concur: Hugh McClafferty 10 Nov 76 (telecord)
OTR/PERS

CMS/MSB J.l. Valenti, CMS/MSB 11-16-76

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL John F. Halpin C/LA/PERS	DATE SIGNED 10 Nov 76	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Gregory A. Aul CMV-10	DATE SIGNED 11/15/76

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 ROSTERS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51500	LA	75013			[illegible] 28 35		

EOD DATA

STATE TAX DATA

Trainee Code

11/29/76

SECRET

20 OCT 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, GS-12 Evaluation Board

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to
Grade GS-13, Daniel Flores

1. Mr. Daniel Flores was recently assigned to OTR as an operations instructor to capitalize on his fine operational record which he developed during his two field assignments in Guayaquil, Ecuador, and in Lima, Peru, and his most recent operational assignment with LA/COG. His overall performance has clearly been characterized by exceptional proficiency and he has been rated by his most recent supervisor as "outstanding" for his handling of a sensitive on-island case and his development and pursuit of Cuban operational leads. Mr. Flores has definite growth potential and clearly meets or exceeds the criteria for promotion to Grade GS-13, a promotion which is most strongly recommended.

2. During the past year Mr. Flores was responsible for handling a very sensitive and well placed on-island Cuban asset. This asset is probably one of the "messiest and disorganized individuals" with whom a case officer in this Agency has had to contend. However, Mr. Flores clearly demonstrated his fine handling abilities in his manipulation and exploitation of this agent. As a result of his guidance and his ability to effectively debrief this person, Mr. Flores was able to make this asset one of our most productive on-island sources. During the last year this source produced 51 reports on subject matter which often commanded attention at the highest levels of our government.

3. Mr. Flores has shown a remarkable growth potential during the last year. He is determined, persistent, serious, and commendably aggressive. He is mature, self-assured, and his operational decisions are sound. His managerial skills are in keeping with his operational potential. He was often called

upon in the last twelve months to act as Chief of his section, a GS-14 position. He demonstrated sound leadership qualities by stimulating interest and enthusiasm in his staff. His operational programs were aggressive and imaginative. Mr. Flores' supervisory talents combined with his excellent professional skills portend a continuing and successful career in this Agency.

4. While assigned to LA/COG, Mr. Flores was involved in the spotting, assessing, developing access to, and eventually pitching a Cuban who was the head of Cubana Airlines in a Latin American country. The recruitment pitch was not successful but the details of this operation were handled in the most professional manner. Mr. Flores developed more leads to relatives and friends of Cuban officials during this period than any other LA/COG operations officer. He has native fluency in Spanish and feels "at home" operating in the field. While in LA/COG Mr. Flores was called upon to do a considerable amount of TDY travel since he was on call to meet his on-island asset anytime, any place whenever the agent traveled out of Cuba. In addition to these travels, Mr. Flores did a lot of traveling seeking out and debriefing potential access agents. During this last year he clearly demonstrated his ability to function independently and to assume responsibilities usually reserved for officers much more senior in grade and experience.

5. Mr. Flores was assigned in July 1976 to OTR on a two-year rotational assignment as an operations instructor. Upon completion of this assignment, Mr. Flores will return to this Division to assume responsibilities, either at Headquarters or in the field, commensurate with his demonstrated operational and managerial talents. In recognition of Mr. Flores' outstanding agent handling skills, his overall professional competency, and his obvious growth potential, it is strongly recommended that Mr. Flores be promoted to Grade GS-13.

Raymond A. Warren

SECRET

21 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OTR/LTD

FROM : Walter R. Cox
Chief, ALT Unit

SUBJECT : Completion of Training Report
Trainee: Daniel Flores
Training Program: MURAD

1. For your information and for documentation in Daniel Flores' official personnel file, this memorandum certifies that he received the five-day SAI Persuasion Skills course at an NOCB safesite in Arlington, Virginia, between 11 and 17 August 1976. The instructor was Mr. George Steitz.

2. Briefly, the SAI course is a program in human relations and communications effectiveness on the interpersonal level. It provides the trainee with a framework for analyzing problems usually encountered in supervisory or in agent development, recruitment, and handling situations and with a system for presenting his ideas in a way standing the best chance for success in gaining a target individual's willing acceptance. Flores was an active and most interested participant throughout the program and achieved a good understanding of the basic principles involved. A copy of his course critique is attached for your information.

3. Since Flores is an ALT Instructor, we plan to dispense with the formality of a post-training questionnaire.

Walter R. Cox

Originated by:
George W. Steitz

E-2 Impdet.
Classified by 024097.

SECRET

CTR/ALT
Staff
To: MURAD

Trainee: Mr. Daniel Flores
Instructor: Mr. Steitz

August 1976

To assist us in making decisions about future SAI training or application, your answers to the following questions will be most appreciated.

1. Do you feel SAI training was helpful to you? (If you choose to do so, please explain why or how.) This course was extremely useful to me. One of the main features of the course — how to perceive the others persons objectives before your own — was of particular interest because, as an instructor it will be one of the main tools I will use in evaluating the level of understanding of each trainee. This experience will also be very helpful to me in my career as a case officer. I can think of several instance where SAI could have helped me turn several failures (recruitment pitches) into successes.

2. Did SAI training provide you with any concepts or tools which can be applied in a practical way to your work problems? To your personal life? Any examples you care to mention? The benefits that this course will provide for me in my job as an instructor are clear. I am absolutely certain that putting the SAI concept into practice will bring forth not only self satisfication but career benefits as well. This will also be very helpful to me in my personal life. I can see now that some of the concepts will be put to work immediately.

3. What elements, segments, or aspects of the SAI training were of the most interest or use to you? The greatest revelation from an operational point of view, was the clarifcation of perhaps an erroneous idea we have about obtaining our intelligence objectives. I always operated under the belief that the most important thing in my work was to attain my objectives, i.e. the recruitment of an agent. SAI revealed that this is true but it also revealed that it is more important to first considered the target's (agent's) objectives. Once we do this our chances (in my opinion after taking SAI) success would probably increase by at least 90 per cent. If I were to stress one point it would be that more emphasis be placed on dealing with the target's rather than the CO's objectives.

4. Would you recommend SAI training for other of our personnel? I am sure that many people would be recommended for this training and that all would benefit from it. However, I would strongly recommend that personnel officers be given SAI as a prerequisite to their [illegible]. It would certainly help them in dealing with large numbers of different people.

5. What other components or categories of personnel do you believe would benefit from SAI training to a degree making it worthwhile for them to receive it?

6. Please comment, if you have any definite opinion, on the duration and pace of the training: too long/short? too fast/slow? The pace of the course was exellent. However, adding one or two more days would certainly help in putting the SAI concepts into practice by the trainee himself. That is, perhaps a live excercise with a person who is not aware of the training situation. A trainee could be tasked to elicit information from an unwitting participant. The use of videotapes and/or movies would help in testing the trainees perceptiveness through the course.

7. Any other comments you may wish to make:

A brief comment about the instructor. He was definitely responsible for the success of the course. Mr. Steitz showed excellent knowledge of the SAI material and throughout the course kept the student's interest alive x by showing tremendous enthusiasm in what he was teaching. The end result of the professionalism that Mr. Steitz demonstrated in the class is reflected in the comments stated here and in the confiddnce he instilled in me personally.

8. On a scale of 1 to 5, how would you rate SAI training in relation to other training you have received from the Agency? Please encircle applicable number:

Non-Essential	Slightly Helpful	Generally Helpful	Very Helpful	Essential
1	2	3	4	5
				X

C-NEMEN

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 June 1976

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 036130 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, Daniel ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment [illegible]

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 | DAY 21 | YEAR 76

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular ✓

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF ☒

7. FAN AND NTCA: 6175-3010 | 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDA/OTR
Functional Training Division
Operations Training Branch ✓

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C. ✓

11. POSITION TITLE: Instructor-Ops ✓ (13)

12. POSITION NUMBER: BD33 ✓

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQB ✓

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ✓

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1712.32 ✓

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3 ✓

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20678 ✓

18. REMARKS

B Dir MT
DQB to DQG

CONCUR: ______
LA/PERS

[illegible]
[illegible]

Concur: ______
DDO/MSB/MPC

payroll
security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Harry E. Fitzwater, DTR
DATE SIGNED: 29 Jun 76

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: DDO/CMG/12
DATE SIGNED: 7/1/76

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 17500 | ALPHABETIC CTR

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. OCCUP CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 03 | DA 04 | YR 35

26. DATE OF GRADE:

27. DATE OF LEI:

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 08 JUL 1976

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 26 AUGUST 1975

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130 ✓	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) FLORES, DANIEL ✓		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 09 DAY 14 YEAR 75	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS V TO V CF TO V V TO CF X CF TO CF	7 FAN AND NICA 6135-4534-0000	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA~~TIN AMERICA~~ DIVISION CUBA OPERATIONS GROUP OPS BRANCH	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE OPERATIONS OFFICER ✓ (14)	12 POSITION NUMBER CQ65 ✓	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DQB ✓	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01 ✓	16 GRADE AND STEP 12 2 ✓	17 SALARY OR RATE $ 19,078 ✓

18 REMARKS

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL H.L. BERTHOLD, C/LA/PERS	DATE SIGNED 26 AUG 75	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 56	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 5150 ALPHABETIC LA	22 STATION CODE 17613	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 VOCATION CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO 05 DA 24 YR 35	26 DATE OF GRADE ✓	27 DATE OF LEI

EOD DATA

5/5/75

D-WO

SECRET
(When Filled In)

40F REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 SEPTEMBER 1974

1 SERIAL NUMBER	036130
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)	FLORES, DANIEL
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 09 · DAY 15 · YEAR 74
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6 FUNDS	V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V ☐ · CF TO CF XX
7 FAN AND NSCA	5135 4534 0000
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDO/WH DIVISION [redacted] WH/COG OPS BRANCH
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH[redacted],D.C.
11 POSITION TITLE	POL OFF ATTACHE OPS OFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER	1159
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	DQB
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	FSR GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP	06 1 12 1
17 SALARY OR RATE	13,863 17,497

G
40

18 REMARKS

From position 1134

~~[illegible]~~

Wash., D.C

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	H.L. BERTHOLD D/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED	12 Sept 74
18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	
DATE SIGNED	16 Sept 74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	37
20 EMPLOY CODE	10
21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	5136 01 WH
22 STATION CODE	05013
23 [illegible] CODE	S
24 [illegible] CODE	1
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	08 04 35

G
42

EOD DATA

10 SEP 1974

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 July 74

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Flores, Daniel ✓

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 22 YEAR 74

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7 FAN AND NSCA: 5135-4534 0000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/WH Division
WH/COG
Ops Support Branch

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE:
Pol Officer Attache
Ops Officer (12)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1134

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQB

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR		06 1	13,863 ✓
GS	0136.01	12 1	$ 17,497 ✓

18 REMARKS

From Lima, Peru 57085

* Lima, Peru

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: H. L. Berthold, C/WH/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 11 July 74

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: David L. Shelton — DATE SIGNED: 7/18/74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51500	COA	75013	5	1	08 24 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCES | 30 RETIREMENT DATA CODE | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR | 37 LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE, HEALTH INS. CODE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: OK 7/16/74

46 OP APPROVAL: [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 7/23/74

1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 June 1974

1 SERIAL NUMBER	036130
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)	FLORES DANIEL
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 06 DAY 23 YEAR 74
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6 FUNDS	V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	4135 7084 ~~1021~~ 0000
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDO/WH Division
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	LIMA, Peru
11 POSITION TITLE	
12 POSITION NUMBER	
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	
16 GRADE AND STEP	12
17 SALARY OR RATE	$

18 REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

24 VOUCHER CODE	3
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	08 04 35
30 RETIREMENT DATA CODE	2
	EOD DATA

U
53

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: JK 04/a/

46 CSP APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 6/26/74

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
OPM (1-71)

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 NOVEMBER 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 036130
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES DANIEL
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 25 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4135 1084 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/WH DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
BR 3 - LIMA, PERU STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: LIMA, PERU
11. POSITION TITLE:
POL OFFICER ATTACHE
OPS OFFICER (12)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0136
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 06 1 / 12 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 13863 / $ 17497
18. REMARKS:
From: GS-11.4
HOME BASE: WH *Lima, Peru

Irving V. Blandford [illegible]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Jane Wurz, AC/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 19 Nov 73
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51760 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 52085
23. INTEGREE CODE: 5
24. HOOTHS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 03 DA 07 YR 35
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO 11 DA 25 YR 73
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 11 DA 25 YR 73
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CS 2-FICA 3-FICA 4-NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0-WAIVED 1-REG 2-REG/OPT 3-INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-23-73 29 NOV 1973
46. O P APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 23 Nov 73

FORM 4-73 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET CLASSIFIED BY 01-0111 E2 IMPDET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 Nov 71

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, DANIEL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 28 | YEAR 71

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 2135 1084

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH Division
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3 - LIMA, PERU STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: LIMA, PERU

11. POSITION TITLE:
POLITICAL OFFICER ATTACHE
OPS OFFICER (12)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0136

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP:
07 1
11 3

17. SALARY OR RATE:
10,014
$ 13,457

18. REMARKS:

From GS 10 3

*LIMA, PERU.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED: 23 Nov 71

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 11-30-71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTES CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	51760	WH	57035	S	3	05 04 35	11 28 71	11 28 71

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OEGH 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA. YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR-RESV PROV. TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-26-71

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 11/3/71

Form 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME – LAST (Print) 7-24	FIRST	MIDDLE
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
09	24	71					1			PERU	570

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐ TRAVEL VOUCHER

☐ DISPATCH

☑ CABLE

☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: 178740

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 9/10/71

REMARKS:

PREPARED BY:
☐ DCO
☐ C & L DIVISION CTRS.
☑ C & T DIVISION

☑ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE: 9/14/71

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE:

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 9-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
EYES ONLY

18 NOV 1971
Approved by CS Career Service Panel

17 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Panel A

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-11, Daniel Flores

1. It is recommended that Mr. Daniel Flores be promoted from GS-10 to GS-11.

2. Mr. Flores is 36 years old and joined the Agency in March 1962. He has successively been a file clerk, translator, intelligence assistant, career trainee and operations officer. He worked part time for several years so that he could obtain his BA degree from American University. This he did in 1967 with his specialty being Latin American Affairs.

3. Mr. Flores, who is bilingual in English and Spanish, has just completed his first overseas tour as an operations officer in Guayaquil, Ecuador. It is on the basis of his very fine performance during this tour that this promotion request is based. Also as a result of his record in Guayaquil, he has been assigned to Lima Station as an operations officer in a position which is rated as GS-13.

4. The Chief of Base, Guayaquil, and the Chief of Station, Quito, both have rated Mr. Flores as "Strong" in his fitness reports and both have stated that his performance in Guayaquil merited a Quality Step Increase. This QSI request is currently being processed and is based on the outstanding job Mr. Flores did in connection with a very sensitive technical operation. He planned the pre-installation aspects, supervised the installation, located the listening post, recruited the transcriber/secretary and processed all the intelligence which was produced. The intelligence derived from this source has been of consistently high quality and the operation has been described by the Chief of Station, Quito, as the best and most productive of all the operations in Ecuador. Throughout all aspects of the operation, Mr. Flores maintained tight control on its security and avoided any problems in this respect.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

[illegible]

5. By his performance in Guayaquil, Mr. Flores has demonstrated that he has found his proper role as an operations officer and that he has potential for growth in this area of endeavor. WH Division strongly recommends that he be promoted to GS-11.

James E. Flannery for
William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 7 September 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 036130
2. NAME (Last–First–Middle): FLORES DANIEL
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 14 YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2135 1084
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
LIMA, PERU STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: LIMA, PERU

11. POSITION TITLE: Political officer attache (13)
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0136
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 1
10 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 10014
$ 12285

18. REMARKS: (#Guayaquil, Ecuador) HB:WH

From DDP/WH #0376

Vice Donald Venute

Approved 259a attached.

From 259a: Mr. Flores' Spanish capabilities are native reading and high speaking which more than meet the language requirements of intermediate reading and speaking for the Station.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 9/13/71
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 11/6/71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	51700	WH	57035	5	3	08 04 35		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.: xx xx xx
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSI 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 9-17-71
46. O P APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED:

1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 JULY 1970

G
55

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130 ✓	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) FLORES, DANIEL ✓		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 07 DAY 26 YEAR 70	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE 1135 0884	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3 QUITO, ECUADOR STATION GUAYAQUIL, ECUADOR BASE	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION GUAYAQUIL, ECUADOR ✓		
11 POSITION TITLE POL OFFICER OPS OFFICER (09)	12 POSITION NUMBER 0376	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 07 1 10 2	17 SALARY OR RATE ✓ $ 9450 $ ~~10869~~ 11,231 ✓

18 REMARKS

* PRA NTE TWO YEARS IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-17d(1)(a).

FORMERLY A GS-9-3, $10539.

* Guayaquil, Ecuador.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL HENRY L. BERTHOLD	DATE SIGNED 21 July 70	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 22	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21 OFFICE CODING 51280 LCH	22 STATION CODE K5551	23 CODE 5	24 CODE 3	25 DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]
28 09 25 122	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE 81					

FOD DATA

SECRET

S E C R E T
EYES ONLY

Approved [illegible] CS Career
Service Panel
2 [illegible]

2 JUN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Panel (Section C)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-10, Daniel Flores

1. It is recommended that Mr. Daniel Flores be promoted from GS-9 to GS-10. Mr. Flores has been in his present grade since April 1969.

2. Mr. Flores joined the Agency in 1962. Initially he was employed on a part-time basis in the WH Division while attending American University. He received his AB degree in 1967 and became a full-time staff employee. On the strong recommendation of his supervisors, Mr. Flores was accepted for the Career Training Program which he completed in August 1968. After rejoining the WH Division, he was selected for assignment as an operations officer at the Guayaquil Base, where he arrived in May 1969.

3. Mr. Flores has made a most impressive beginning in Guayaquil. He has adapted to new tasks and a new environment with a mature assurance and a professional approach. Shortly after arrival in Guayaquil the Base was temporarily depleted of other officers. Mr. Flores carried out the duties of acting Chief of Base in a most commendable manner. His fluency in Spanish and his Latin background have been definite assets in the performance of his duties. His performance to date has demonstrated that he handles his agents securely and productively. Both Mr. Flores and his wife have been well accepted within the local community and they carry out their representational duties very effectively.

4. Mr. Flores has proven to be a competent operations officer. As he further develops through experience and responsibility he should become eligible for rapid advancement. In any case he is already performing at a level higher than his present grade and a promotion at this time is strongly recommended.

fr William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

S E C R E T
EYES ONLY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT
SECRET

TO	Chief, WH Division
INFO.	Chief of Station, Quito
FROM	Chief of Base, Guayaquil
SUBJECT	ADMINISTRATIVE/PERSONNEL - Promotion for [redacted] Daniel Flores

ACTION REQUIRED: See Below

Approved by CS Career
Service Panel
17 JUL 1970

During the visit of the Chief, WHD to the Base last November 1969 he mentioned to the COS, Quito and the COB that the promotion for Flores [redacted] (from GS-9 to GS-10) would be forthcoming; he also said this to Flores [redacted] during a private meeting. Thus far, however, there has been no notice of the promotion action. The COB assumes that the delay is related in some way to the dates set for meeting of the promotion panel for Flores' [redacted] grade. If this assumption is not correct, however, and some further action by the Base is necessary in addition to the recommendation contained in Flores' [redacted] last Fitness Report, the COB would appreciate being advised.

[redacted]
/s/ Robert L. Fambrini

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - C/WHD
2 - COS, Quito

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HEGT-1474	26 May 1970
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 APRIL 1969

C.
55

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION - DEPARTMENT OF STATE

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 10 YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9135 0884

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
QUITO, ECUADOR STATION
Guayaquil, Ecuador Base

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: GUAYQUIL, ECUADOR BASE

11 POSITION TITLE:
POL OFFICER
OPS OFFICER (09)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0376

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP:
07 1
09 2

17 SALARY OR RATE:
8153
$ 8744

18 REMARKS:

X All SICK AND All HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

X MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: J. CARSON, COVER OFFICER, X5013

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 55

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 517JD ALPHABETIC 104

22 STATION CODE: 19539

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 NOOTRS CODE: 3

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR 08 04 35

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-OPGH 3-FICA 4-NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV/TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0-WAIVE 1-YES HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 04-24-69

46 OP APPROVAL: Conrad B. Russell

DATE APPROVED: 04-24-69

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 April 1969

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, DANIEL

G
55

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Confidential
PROMOTION, TRANSFER TO [illegible] FUNDS, AND CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 06 YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 9135 0884

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
QUITO, ECUADOR STATION
GUAYAQUIL, ECUADOR BASE

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: GUAYAQUIL, ECUADOR

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (07)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0376

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 09 2

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 8744

18. REMARKS

X TO BE INTEGRATED. APPROVED 259a ATTACHED.

FROM: DDP/WH/Branch 4/Pos. 1441.
GS-08, step 2, $7956/annum.

I CONCUR IN CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION FROM SJ TO D:

(Signed on original) 3 Apr 69
DATE

CONCUR:
Arthur McNeil (Signed)
OTR/PERS

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD

DATE SIGNED: 3 APR 69

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 4 APR 1969

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 NOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
20	10	5173	WH	1559		3	08 04 35	04 06 69	04 06 69

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-OASI 3-FICA 4-NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA. YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVED 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

G
37

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible]

46 O P APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 SEPTEMBER 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 | DAY 06 | YEAR 68

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 4
URUGUAY/PARAGUAY SECTION

6
31

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
~~XCAREER TRAINEEX~~ (9)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1441

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: ~~D~~ SJ

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
~~XXXXXXXXX~~

16 GRADE AND STEP: 08 2

17 SALARY OR RATE: $7,956

18 REMARKS:

FROM: DDS/OTR/CAREER TRAINING PROGRAM/0748

9.25.68
Security [illegible]
10-4-68

CSPS/C
SEP 1968

CONCUR: ______________
OTR/CTP

1 - Finance
1 - Security

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD
C/WH/PERSONNEL

DATE SIGNED: 24 Sept '68

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Arthur T. McNeill, C/CTP

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51450 | ALPHABETIC WH

22 STATION CODE: 92313

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HOQTRS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 03 | DA 04 | YR 35

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA | YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO | DA | YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO | DA | YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO | DA | YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO.

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—YES | HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Dina CTP

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE A

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 June 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, Daniel

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 16 YEAR 68

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS

XX	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8275 2100

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OTR
CAREER TRAINING PROGRAM

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: CAREER TRAINEE

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0745

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SJ

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0090.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 08 2

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 7639

18 REMARKS

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Arthur T. McNeill
Arthur T. McNeill, C/CTP

DATE SIGNED: 6/13/68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 22

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 28300 ALPHABETIC CTP

22 STATION CODE: 75213

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 HOOTRS CODE: /

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 08 DA. 05 YR. 39

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OASH 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO.

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: 1-REG 2-RESV 3-TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: RC 6 13 68

46 O P APPROVAL: Edward M. McNamara

DATE APPROVED: 6 18 68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 November 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, Daniel

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION AND CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY ~~22~~ 17 YEAR 67
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 8275 2100
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/OTR
CAREER TRAINING PROGRAM
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: CAREER TRAINEE
12 POSITION NUMBER: 0748
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SJ

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0090.31
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 ~~3~~ 2
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~6847~~ ~~6664~~ 6,959

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/WH/COG/Intelligence Branch/Operations Support Section, #1174.
Subject has concurred in Change of Service Designation from D to SJ.

G
43

CONCUR: Henry L. Berthold
Chief, WH Personnel

CS/PS/C
DEC 1967

Security Approval [illegible] SD/35 12 1 67
11/28/67

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert B. Freeman, C/CTP
DATE SIGNED:
18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert B. Freeman
JOHN RICHARDSON, DTR
DATE SIGNED: 11/28/67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 22
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 28300 ALPHABETIC CTP
22 STATION CODE: 35013
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HOOTRS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 08 DA 04 YR 35
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO 12 DA 17 YR 67
27 DATE OF LEI: MO 12 DA 17 YR 67
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - OBGH 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS
42 TRANS CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: RL 12-1-67
46 O P APPROVAL: Michael Pentlyak
DATE APPROVED: 11/31/67

FORM 8-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

26 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Daniel Flores

THROUGH : Executive Secretary
CSCT Selection Board

SUBJECT : Application for Career Training Program

1. I am pleased to inform you that you have been accepted for the Career Training Program. Let me congratulate you and wish you the maximum profit and pleasure from your proposed training.

2. You will remain with your present Component until the beginning of the next Integrated Training Program, to begin 11 December. At that time you will be reassigned to the CTP T/O where you will remain until your training has been completed.

3. Should you have any further questions, do not hesitate to call on the Program Officers.

ROBERT B. FREEMAN
Chief, CTP

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 August 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: ~~PROMOTION & PAY ADJUSTMENT TO FULL TIME~~ (Change ~~(CORRECTION)~~ of Cost Center)

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 07 YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
~~OPERATIONAL~~ SUPPORT SECTION
OPERATIONS

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1174

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28

16 GRADE AND STEP: 06 3

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 6263. ✓

18 REMARKS

~~(FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. (#7) TO READ: 8235 0620~~

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold
C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 8/1/67

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 5 Sept 1967

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 31
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 57500 ALPHABETIC [illegible]
22 STATION CODE: 15023
23 INTELLIGENCE CODE
24 ROSTER CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]
26 DATE OF GRADE
27 DATE OF LD

EOD DATA

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 22 June 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) FLORES DANIEL	
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION + Pay Adjustment to Full Time	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 07 DAY 30 YEAR 67	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR ~~PART-TIME~~
6 FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 8235 1162	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH WH/COG INTELLIGENCE BRANCH OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECTION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11 POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE ~~CLERK~~ Asst (7)	12 POSITION NUMBER 1174	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0301.28	16 GRADE AND STEP 06 3
17 SALARY OR RATE $ 6263.		

G
43

18 REMARKS

Subject is returning to full-time duty on 30 July 1967.

Subject will graduate from Georgetown Univ. this month.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Robert D. Cashman C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 28 June	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
22	10	51500	WH	7253		1	08 04 32	07 30 67	07 30 67

EOD DATA

C/WH/P

7.18.

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

July '67

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary CSCS Panel, Section D

SUBJECT : Recommendation for the Promotion of Mr. Daniel Flores From GS-05 to GS-06.

1. Mr. Flores has been working in WH/COG and its predecessor groups since 1963. His fitness reports have been consistently good and the comments of his supervisors laudatory. In mid-1965 Mr. Flores was changed from full-time to part-time staff employee in order to allow him to attend American University on a full-time basis. His course of study leads to a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science with emphasis in Latin American affairs. Mr. Flores has made the Dean's List the past two semesters and will receive his degree in August 1967.

2. Throughout his career Mr. Flores has shown himself to be a strongly motivated employee, willing and capable. The calibre of his performance has been consistently good and he has shown steady improvement as he acquired the skills and knowledge of intelligence business. He is reliable and conscientious and we have good reason to expect that he will develop into a very competent operations officer. He will apply for the CT program in September and his application will be wholeheartedly supported by WH/COG.

3. In WH/COG Mr. Flores has served as an Intelligence Assistant in support of CI operations. In addition he has assisted in the training of agents in radio and secret writing communications. Mr. Flores is bi-lingual - Spanish and English - and is adept as an operational Translator-Interpreter.

4. Mr. Flores was promoted to GS-05 on 16 March 1964. He has been performing duties at GS-06 level for the past two years and it is sincerely recommended that he be promoted promptly to GS-06.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 Sep 66

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)
036130	FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	09 / 15 / 66	PART TIME

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	7235 1162	

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH WH/C INTELLIGENCE BRANCH OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECTION	WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
INTELLIGENCE CLERK (S)	1176	d

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0301.27	05 4	$ 5359.

18 REMARKS

From: WH/C.Intel Br., R & R Sec.DC # 1184

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Edward J. Dwalley Robert W. Cushman, C/WH/Pers	14 Sept 66		9/16/66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTIS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	30	51500	WH	25703		1	08 04 35		

28 MTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR REG PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1-YES / HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE: 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 CSP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
09-19-66		

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

S E C R E T
(When Filled In)

9 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. Daniel Flores**

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the System, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the System may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. This in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that your read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees."

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 205, Magazine Building (extension 2847). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the CIA Retirement Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

S E C R E T

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

17 JAN 1966

Claimant: **Daniel Flores**
File No.: 7000438

Mr. Wilfred J. Harren
Chief of Section
Division of Claims Services
Bureau of Employees' Compensation
Washington, D. C. 20211

Dear Mr. Harren:

Reference is made to Subject's claim for benefits of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.

Enclosed **is additional information submitted by claimant.**

If we may be of further assistance in this matter, please so advise.

Very truly yours,

/s/ B. DeFelice

B. DeFelice
Office of Personnel

Enclosures:
As stated

Distribution: ✓
O-addressee, 1-D/Pers, 1-BCB
OP/BSD/BCB/KLowden:sli(14 January 1966)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 August 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, Daniel

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY YEAR 1965

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Part Time

6 FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235-1162

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/C
Intelligence Branch
Reports and Requirements Section

35
6

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: INTELL. Service CLERK (E)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1134

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (06)

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.27

16 GRADE AND STEP: 05 (3)

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 5330

18 REMARKS:
From: DDP/WH/CI St., #1130, D.C.

52
6

Recorded by
CSPD

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/Pers.

DATE SIGNED: 13 Aug 65

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 8/20/65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY CODE: 20

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51501 ALPHABETIC WH

22. STATION CODE: 75813

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 NOOTHS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 08 DA 04 YR 35

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA. YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV, TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-20-65 WR

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 8/20/65

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) FLORES, Daniel	DATE PREPARED 15 January 1965

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PAY ADJUSTMENT (TO PART TIME) FROM FULL TIME	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 02 DAY 08 YEAR 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT ~~REGULAR~~ Casual (PART TIME)
6 FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235-1162	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP Special Affairs Staff Counter-Intelligence Staff Operations Section	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE ASST. (D)	12 POSITION NUMBER 1130	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS (35)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0301.28	16 GRADE AND STEP 05 (2)	17 SALARY OR RATE $ 5165

18 REMARKS

Subject to work on regularly scheduled tour not to exceed 19 hours per week.

Subject will be working Monday through Friday, from 1400 to 1700.

Recorded by
CSPD
am

Approved by C/Am CSPD

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/Pers.	DATE SIGNED 1/22/65	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 2/5/65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTHS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF EOD MO. DA. YR.
38	36	47150	SAS	25012		1	[illegible]	03 16 64	03 16 64

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37 LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVED 1—YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION T. Kenney 02/05/65	46 OP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Florcn, Daniel	Self	63-514

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 3 September 1964.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
12 JAN 1965	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 1076 [illegible] SECRET [illegible]

6 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CSPO

SUBJECT : Conversion to Part-Time Staff Employment
Mr. Daniel Flores

1. Mr. Daniel Flores is an Intelligence Assistant, GS-07, assigned to the CI Staff of WH/SA. He is currently pursuing a program of studies in Government at the American University with special concentration on Latin American Affairs. To complete the major portion of his remaining requirements for the bachelor's degree, he is planning to attend the University full-time for a year. Any requirements still outstanding at the end of that period would be completed at night.

2. The employee's duties in the CI Staff involves the translation of W/T and SW messages received from and sent to agents in Cuba, assisting in the training of agents in SW and communications procedures, and miscellaneous support functions in the CI Branch. He has proved invaluable because he has native fluency in every-day Spanish and is familiar with SW and communication techniques, problems, and training procedures. In addition to Mr. Flores' utility for such cases as may arise in the future, he is personally acquainted with two of the double agents now in place in Cuba and with the numerous problems which constantly arise in their handling.

3. In view of the need for Mr. Flores' services, the Chief, CI Staff, has asked the employee if he would be willing to continue in his present capacity on a part-time basis. The employee has indicated that he would accept such an arrangement. It is accordingly requested that WH/SA be permitted to convert him from a full-time staff employee to one employed on a part-time, regular tour of duty basis. Subject would be utilized for a total of 18 hours per week, the maximum time that his school program will permit him to devote to Agency duties.

Robert D. Cashman
C/WH/Personnel

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 22 July 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) FLORES, Daniel		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 08 DAY YEAR 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	
6. FUNDS X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235-1162	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP SAS Counter-Intell Staff Operations Section	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Wash., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE Intelligence Asst	12. POSITION NUMBER 1130	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0301.28	16. GRADE AND STEP 05 (2)	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 4850

36
F

18. REMARKS

From: SAS No. 0922 trans 37F

Recorded by
CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 27 Jul 64	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Vivian Graham	DATE SIGNED 31 July 1964

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 32	20. EMPLOYEE CODE [illegible]	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 49150	ALPHABETIC SAS	22. STATION CODE 76013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROOTERS CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 08 09 35	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR	28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION		46. CSP APPROVAL Vivian Graham		DATE APPROVED 31 July 1964				

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

3-15

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 January 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 036130 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, Daniel

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH DAY YEAR): 03 15 64 ~~24 64~~
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4232-1000-1000 ✓
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Special Affairs Staff
Research Branch
Reports, Records, Translation Section

38 F

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: TRANSLATOR (05)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0702
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (05)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1045.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 ~~01~~ 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~4690~~ 4,850 ✓

18. REMARKS:
Promotion recommendation attached; Fitness Report submitted previously.

Recorded by CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: for ORVILLE C. DAWSON, C/SAS/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: 13 Jan 64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23.	24. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH
22	10	49350	SAS	75013		1	[illegible] 35

FOD DATA

40. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:
41. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152

SECRET

19 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services,
Career Services Panel

SUBJECT : Mr. Daniel Flores -
Recommendation for Promotion

1. Mr. Flores has been with the Agency for about eighteen (18) months and has been a member of SAS since June 1963. During the six (6) months he has been with SAS he has demonstrated intelligence and initiative. In addition to his fulfilling his primary responsibility as a translator, he quickly picked up the knowledge and experience necessary for an Intelligence Assistant in the Operations Support Section. His duties and responsibilities accordingly have been broadened. He has demonstrated ability to function independently as a member of the Operations Support Staff. He is cooperative and has maintaned a cheerful disposition under presure and through many late hours and weekends of duty.

2. In view of his excellent performance in SAS, his intelligence and ability, and his growth potential for a career in CIA, I strongly recommend that he be promoted to GS-5 as soon as possible.

John K King
JOHN K. KING
Chief, SAS/Intel

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED

DESMOND FITZGERALD
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 April 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) FLORES, Daniel		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 05 DAY YEAR 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: X V TO V; CF TO V; V TO CF; CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3232-1000-1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP Special Affairs Staff Research Branch Reports, Records, Translation Section	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE TRANSLATOR	12. POSITION NUMBER 0702	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0031.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 04 (2)	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 4250

2

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/OPSER/RID, Ref.Br., #0147, DC Trans 9

CONCURRENCE: John M. [illegible]
Chief of Admin, OPSERV/RID

Recorded by
CSPD
DM

4/24/63

1 cy Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Louis W. Armstrong LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/SAS/Pers.	DATE SIGNED 24 Apr 63	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Vivian Graham	DATE SIGNED 1 May 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23.	24.	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27.
37	10	61350	SAS	75013		1	08 04 35		

FOD DATA

MAY 1 11 23 AM '63

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION [illegible] 05/05/63	46. O.P. APPROVAL Vivian Graham	DATE APPROVED 1 May 63

FORM 8-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] **REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION**	DATE PREPARED 25 September 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) FLORES Daniel		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Excepted Appointment (career provisional)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 03 DAY 11 YEAR 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2226 1200 1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP OPSER R I DIV Reference Branch Index Section - Night Shift	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Wash., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE File Clerk	12. POSITION NUMBER 0147	12A. PCR CONTROL NO.	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0305.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 04 1	17. SALARY OR RATE $4040

18. REMARKS

Regular tour of duty 3:30 PM to 12:00 PM daily/

Subject to trial period ~~and medical~~

Recorded by CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL John M. Wigglesworth John M. Wigglesworth, Chief, RID/ADM. 10/2/61	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER James W. Washam

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 11	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 39400	ALPHABETIC RI	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. POSITION CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 28 04 35	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR. 03 11 62	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR. 03 11 62
28. MIL. EXP. RES. MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 = CSR 2 = FICA 3 = NONE	CODE 1	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	FOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO. 07100	34. SEX M
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0	0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR. 03 11 58	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR. 03 11 62	38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE 2	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1	0 = WAIVED 1 = YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 460-42-6230
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0	0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 12 MOS. 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE OF MORE THAN 12 MOS.	42. SERVICE CAT. CODE 6	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE 1	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE 1	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0	STATE CODE 08

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION [illegible] 03-12-62	46. O.P. APPROVAL James W. Washam

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14 February 1962

Mr. Daniel Flores
Apartment 203
2828 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington 8, D. C.

Dear Mr. Flores:

We are pleased to inform you that your appointment with this Agency has been approved at Grade GS-4, salary $4040.00 per annum, as Clerk.

Your permanent employment will depend upon the completion of the following processing at the time of entering on duty: taking the oath of office, signing a loyalty affidavit, participating in a final security interview. Should anything of an unfavorable nature arise during this period, your employment will not result in a permanent appointment.

We hope you will be able to join us at an early date. Please dial 351-2781 and ask for Mrs. Shirley Wells, as soon as possible, in order to arrange an entrance-on-duty date. We would appreciate your selecting a Monday.

Please report to the Receptionist at 1016 - 16th Street, N. W., Room 201 at 8:15 a.m. and ask for Mrs. Wells on the reporting for duty date that you establish with this office. This address is located on 16th Street between K and L Streets opposite Hotel Statler.

Your gross earnings will be subject to deductions for Federal income tax and 6 1/2 percent for the United States Civil Service Retirement Fund. In addition, the benefits of low-cost group life insurance, which will be discussed with you at the time of your entrance on duty, are available to Federal civilian employees. This insurance is not obligatory. However, if you do not wish coverage, which is automatic, you should sign a Waiver of Life Insurance Coverage form at the time you enter on duty.

You will not receive a pay check for approximately four weeks after your entrance on duty.

If you have any problems, Mrs. Wells will be glad to discuss them with you when you call.

Very truly yours,

E. D. Echols
Director of Personnel

OP/Corres/mjt
File sent to: Shirley Wells

26 January 1962

Mr. Daniel Flores
Apartment 203
2828 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington 8, D. C.

Dear Mr. Flores:

Processing of your application for employment with this Agency is continuing. Please advise us if any circumstance should arise which might affect your interest in a position with us.

Your continued interest and patience are appreciated.

Very truly yours,

E. D. Echols
Director of Personnel

OP/Corres/sjm
File sent to:Wells

20 October 1961

Mr. Daniel Flores
Apartment 203
2828 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington 8, D. C.

Dear Mr. Flores:

In connection with your application with this Agency, it will be necessary for you to come to our Medical Office in Central Building, 2430 E Street, N. W., for a pre-employment medical examination which will include determination of physical health and emotional stability.

An appointment may be scheduled by dialing 351-2781 and asking for Mrs. Shirley Wells.

Very truly yours,

E. D. Echols
Director of Personnel

OP/Corres/car
file sent to shirley wells

12 October 1961

Mr. Daniel Flores
Apartment 203
2828 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington 8, D. C.

Dear Mr. Flores:

Your application for employment with this Agency has been reviewed with interest and the processing of your case has been initiated for a full-time position on the 3:30 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. shift at Grade GS-4, salary $4040.00 per annum, plus a ten percent night differential for the hours from 6:00 p.m. to 12:00 p.m., as Clerk.

Your final appointment is dependent upon a number of factors including character and reference investigations, and other processing procedures which may require as long as 120 days. You may be sure that this processing is being accomplished as rapidly as possible.

During this period please notify us of any changes in your present status such as change in address, employment, marital status, etc. If you cannot accept the position or if you have any questions concerning your application, you should write to Mrs. Shirley Wells.

Members of this Agency are entitled to the regular United States Government leave and retirement benefits. Our salaries conform to the rates prescribed by Congress for United States Government agencies.

Thank you for your cooperation and patience during this waiting period.

Very truly yours,

R. D. Echols
Director of Personnel

OP/Corres/car
file sent to shirley wells

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-8): [redacted] 07[illegible]00

REQUEST DATE (9-11): 6 October 1961

YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30): 4 August 1935

GRADE (43-44): GS-04

ORGN. CODE (45-48): 3900

TYPE OF APPL. (49): 1

HDQTRS & FUND (50): 1

CLEARANCE (51): 3

RECRUIT. CODE (52-54): 105

VET PREF. & SEX (55):

NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) (12 - 28): FLORES, DANIEL

POSITION TITLE: FILE CLERK

POSITION NUMBER (31 - 36): 0147

OCCUP. CODE (37 - 42): 0305.01

LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): WASHINGTON, D. C.

ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH): DDP/OPSER

TYPE OF APPLICANT: ☒ REGULAR ☐ CONTRACT ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ MILITARY

CONVERSION ACTION:

IF OTHER, SPECIFY:

NAME OF REQUESTER (OR OFFICIAL):

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS: ☒ HQS ☐ USF ☐ FF ☒ V ☐ UV

CLEARANCE REQUIRED: PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP): ☐ SECRET ☒ FULL

ATTACHMENTS: ☒ PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ☒ PHOTOGRAPH(S) ☒ APPENDIX I ☐ APPENDIX II ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER ☒ REPORT OF INTERVIEW

VETERANS STATUS: ☒ MALE - VETERAN ☐ MALE - NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - NON-VETERAN

FULL REQUESTED 6 October 1961

Regular tour of duty 3:30 PM to 12:00 PM daily.

1 - SO
1 - OTF

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

FORM [illegible] 377 USE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (9)

15 September 1961

Mr. Daniel Flores
Apartment 203
2828 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington 8, D. C.

Dear Mr. Flores:

Appropriate members of our staff are reviewing your application for employment to determine whether we have a position available for a person of your qualifications. Although we cannot predict the length of time needed for this review, every effort will be made to reach an early decision. We will keep you as fully informed as possible regarding the status of your case.

Very truly yours,

E. D. Echols
Director of Personnel

OP/Corres-bt
file sent to Mr. Washam

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 21 August 1961

SOURCE: gen info

CANDIDATE (Last, First, Middle): Flores, Daniel

PLACE OF BIRTH: San Marcos, Texas

DATE OF BIRTH: 4 August 1935

TEMPORARY ADDRESS:

PHONE:

PERMANENT ADDRESS: 2828 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Apt. 203, Washington, D.C.

PHONE: 265-8322

BUSINESS ADDRESS:

PHONE:

PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 16th St

DATE AVAILABLE: immediately on clearance

RECM (Office, serial): RI clerk 3:30-midnight

GS- 4

TESTS: SET

19-32-33-84

Mr. Flores had just been recently released from active duty with the USMC when he came in for interview. He has served two tours which included Security guard Embassy duty in Peru and Boliva. His wife was formerly stationed at the Embassy with Dept. of State. He appears to be a mature young man, clean cut, neat appearance, dark complexion and coloring. He is planning to continue his college education at C.U. and is available to work the 3:30 - midnight RI shift. A clerical position at the GS-4 level was discussed in the interview. His wife is a secretary with a law firm in town; they have no children.

Mr. Flores is in excellent health and had a very good record with the Marine Corps. Knows of nothing in his background that would be unfavorable in event of reference check. At initial interview he stated that he had no foreign connections, however, after contacting his family in Texas it was determined that his step-mother was born in Mexico and although she came to the US in 1922, she has never become a US citizen.

Full clearance.

DATE SENT TO HQS: 8 Sept 61

INTERVIEWER: Joy Cooney

FORM 7-60 1667a

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Applicant Information
Sheet No. 1

To all persons applying for employment
with the Central Intelligence Agency:

This paper is the first step in applying for employment or consultant status with the Central Intelligence Agency. No application may proceed beyond this first step if the applicant is not in agreement with the conditions stated below:

General Considerations:

1. The National Security Act of 26 July 1947 (Public Law 253, 80th Congress) which created the Central Intelligence Agency places upon the Agency the responsibility:

a. "to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security;

b. "to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

c. "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government . . . ;

d. "to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

e. "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

The special character of this national responsibility requires the Agency to maintain correspondingly special employment criteria which may be different from the routine or normal employment standards of other Government departments and agencies which do not have the highly sensitive responsibility borne by the Central Intelligence Agency. It follows that the investigation of applicants prerequisite to their acceptance is a time-consuming process which, in addition to loyalty and security checks, includes evaluation of competence, physical and emotional fitness, and availability of a suitable position at such time as employment may be offered. This is called "clearance" of an applicant.

2. Investigation of an applicant may reveal something which prevents his clearance - perhaps something of which the applicant is genuinely unaware, perhaps something which only the special employment criteria of the Agency make unacceptable. In any event, adverse findings by the Agency are conclusive and final so far as the Agency is concerned, and no statement of specific reasons is made to the applicant.

3. Employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is not a right upon which an applicant can insist. Offer of employment which is subject to full clearance does not constitute a commitment on the Agency's part giving an unsuccessful applicant grounds for any claim against the Agency. Acceptance of employment upon the condition of clearance is at the applicant's risk, taken with the knowledge that a very substantial percentage of applicants are not cleared.

Statement of Understanding
and Agreement

I have read, understand, and agree to the foregoing General Considerations. If not accepted for employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, I will make no claim or demand in conflict with those considerations.

I have also seen and read Applicant Information Sheet No. 2.

SIGNED at Washington, D. C., this 1st day of September, 1961.

Daniel Flores
(Signature of Applicant)
Daniel Flores

SECRET

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care



SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 6 OCTOBER 75

FILE NO.: 15675

SS NUMBER: 460-48-6230.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 036130

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)

X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP

☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP

X CHIEF, (OPERATING COMPONENT FOR ACTION)
ATTN: LA

REF.: Form 1322 dated 18 Aug 75

OFFICIAL COVER: X ESTABLISHED ☐ CANCELLED

STATUS: X STAFF ☐ CONTRACT

SUBJECT: FLORES, DANIEL

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER (BLOCK RECORDS)

☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED
EFFECTIVE DATE EOD

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED
FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)

X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 3 (HHB 20-7)

X SUBMIT FORM 3254 State W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

X SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)

X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)

X EAA, CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II X

X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

12 Mar 62-2 Dec 67-Hqs-Overt
3 Dec 67-9 Apr 69-Hqs-DAC
10 Apr 69-May 71-Ecuador-State-Int.
May 71-Sep 71-H/L & Tdy-State-Int.
Sep 71-Mar 74-Peru-State-Int.
Mar 74-13 Sep 75-Hqs-State-Int.
14 Sep 75- -Hqs-State-Nominal

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER (UNBLOCK RECORDS)

EFFECTIVE DATE:

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED (HHB 20-7)

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

DISTRIBUTION: [illegible]

FORM 1551 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 23 APRIL 1974

FILE NO.: 15675

TO: (Check)

- X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH

SS NUMBER: 460-486230

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 036130

ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: FORM 2458, DATED 16 JANUARY 1974

OFFICIAL COVER: X ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: DANIEL FLORES

UNIT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

X ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

X ☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE EOD

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED PCS ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)

X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 4 (HHB 20-7)

X SUBMIT FORM 3754 [illegible] (HHB 20-11)

X SUBMIT FORM 1322 [illegible] COVER. (HB 240-2e)

X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HB 240-2e)

X EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II XX

X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD

REMARKS AND OR COVER HISTORY

MAR 62-DEC 67-U.S.-OVERT
DEC 67-APR 69-U.S.-DAC
10 APR 69-MAY 71-GUAYAQUIL-STATE-INTEGRATED
MAY 71-MAR 74-PERU-STATE-INTEGRATED
MAR 74-MOS-STATE-INTEGRATED

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:

SUBMIT FORM [illegible] W-2 TO BE ISSUED. [illegible]

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ (HHB 20-7)

EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

[illegible] TO CCS

[illegible] IN THIS BLOCK

EP:blr

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 27 November 1967

FILE NUMBER: 15675

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 036130

ID CARD NUMBER: 1661

TO:
- X CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) CT

ATTN: Mr. Pavlyak

REF: Verbal Request

OFFICIAL COVER: X BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: X FLORES, Daniel (NMI)

UNIT: USAE, Geographical Evaluation & Analysis Gp

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (opmemo 20-800-11)		CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (opmemo 20-800-11)
	A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING ~~AS OF COB~~ 3 Dec 67		DATE (as of COB)
X	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)		SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X	ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HB 20-661-1)		RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
X	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
X	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)		
	CONCUR IN ISSUANCE: ☐ AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD ☐ NACS HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Mar 62 - Dec 62 Overt

EDP/nch

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - POD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
[illegible]

James F.

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER CONTROL STAFF

FORM 1551 [illegible]

SECRET

A11 L48 304 015

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12165 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 OCTOBER 1979

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	0036130	LA	GS 13 3	$31,333

5656

---

1. SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
036130	[illegible]	[illegible]		

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ.
13	3	$31,333	01/28/79	13	[illegible]	$32,[illegible]	[illegible]			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK'S INITIALS H.E. FITZWATER

FORM 10-73 560E

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

D 2/14/80

A11 L40 304 015

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12087 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 08 OCTOBER 1978

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	0036130	LA	GS 13 2	$28,368

.5678

---

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
036130	FLORES DANIEL	51 62C		

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ.
GS 13	2	$28,368	01/29/78	GS 13	3	$29,283	01/28/79			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE: Walter C. [illegible] DATE: 1/22/78

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK INITIALS: [illegible] AUDITED BY

FORM 10-73 560f Use previous edition

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SEA 021078

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 11 78	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 8035 0990 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION INDEPENDENT OPS BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPERATIONS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER GK76	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DQG

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 26889

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51620	ALPHABETIC LA	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqrs Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 08 04 35	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150
5-74 Mfg 10-74

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

SEA

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

A11 L48 100 255

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12010 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 09 OCTOBER 1977

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	0036130	LA	GS 13 1	$26,022

5927

CPD: 7 APR 77

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REMOVAL FROM PARTICIPATION IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 10 77	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA 7135 4534 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 203	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA DIVISION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DQG	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP 13	17 SALARY OR RATE
18 REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ Code
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC — ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE
23 INTEGREE CODE
24 Hdqtrs Code
25 DATE OF BIRTH — MO DA YR
26 DATE OF GRADE — MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI — MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES — MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA — 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE — CODE 1
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 Correction/Cancellation Data — TYPE — MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE — CODE — 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE — MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE — MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY — CAR RESV PROV TEMP — CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — CODE — 0 WAIVED 1 YES — HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE — CODE — 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO TAX EXEMP — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-4 Mfg 10 74

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

PLF: 01 MAR 77

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FLORES DANIEL
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 02 DA 26 YR 77
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 7135 4534 0000
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/LA DIVISION
CUBA OPERATIONS GROUP
EA AREA

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER: FS35
13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: DOG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 1
17 SALARY OR RATE: 24308

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Military Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51500	LA	75013		1	08 04 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES/ PROV TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVED 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74 Mfg 10-74

SECRET

14-00000

AEO: 1 FEB 77

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OLF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FLORES DANIEL
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 01 30 77
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 7135 4534 0000
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/LA DIVISION
CUBA OPERATIONS GROUP
WH AREA

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11 POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER: CG66
13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQG
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 1
17 SALARY OR RATE: 24308
18 REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hours Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	51500	LA	75013		1	03 04 35	01 30 77	01 30 77

EOD DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

KKK: 6 DEC 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL						
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT				4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 12 04 76		5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA 7135 4534	0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF			
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA DIVISION CUBA OPERATIONS GROUP WH AREA					10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE OPERATIONS OFFICER					12 POSITION NUMBER CC67	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DQG	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS		15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01			16 GRADE AND STEP 12 4	17 SALARY OR RATE 22485	
18 REMARKS							

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employee Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51500	LA	75013		1	03 04 35		

28 MTE EXP. DATE MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: CTA

PIF

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5.
[illegible]	[illegible] DANIEL	17 [illegible]	[illegible]	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EFF. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ
12	3	[illegible]	11/23/75	12	4	[illegible]	11/21/76			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1976

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HUGHES DANIEL	032190	17 900	CF	GS 12 3	$21,804

KKK: 15 JULY 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

0CF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT - CHANGE OF FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 06 21 76	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA T175 3010 3000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDA/OTR FUNCTIONAL TRAINING DIVISION OPERATIONS TRAINING BRANCH	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE INSTRUCTOR OPS	12 POSITION NUMBER 0D33	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DQG

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1712.32	16 GRADE AND STEP 12 3	17 SALARY OR RATE 20678

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	15	17500 OTR	75013		1	08 04 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 4 NONE; CODE)	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE; MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO.	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY (CODE)	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 WAIVED, 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: LA

DLM

AEO

FORM 1150
Use Previous Editions

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11883 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 12 OCTOBER 1975

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	51 500	CF	GS 12 2	$20,032

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	51 500	CF	GS 12 1	$18,463

14-00000

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

FLORES DANIEL 036130 41351084

---

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
036130	FLORES DANIEL	51 500	CF	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 12	2	20032 $19,076	11/24/74	GS 12	3	20676 $19,693	11/23/75		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK'S INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-74 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

14-311

[illegible] 10 SEPT 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO [illegible] DA 14 YR 75	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 6135 [illegible] [illegible]	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/LA DIVISION CUBA OPERATIONS GROUP OPS BRANCH	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPERATIONS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER CQ65	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DQB

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 12 2	17 SALARY OR RATE 19[illegible]73

18 REMARKS

WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 56	20 Employ Code 1[illegible]	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 515[illegible]	ALPHABETIC LA	22 STATION CODE 75[illegible]13	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR 25	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR

27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR	28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction /Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX	

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
19 SEP

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
9-72 Mfg 8-73

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4-31)

14-00000

LT-42

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
036130	FLORES DANIEL	51 500	CF	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ.
GS 12	1	18,463 ~~[illegible]~~	11/25/73	GS 12	2	19,078 ~~[illegible]~~	11/24/74			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE Nestor [illegible]

DATE 23 Sept 74

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS [illegible]

AUDITED BY

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

LMP: 27 SEPT 74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

0DF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 15 74	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA 5135 4534 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH DIVISION WH/COG OPS BRANCH	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE POL OFF ATTACHE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 1159	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DQB

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 06 1 12 1	17 SALARY OR RATE 13863 17497

18 REMARKS
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR
37	10	51500	WH	75013	S	1	08 04 35	

27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JK 9/27/74

FORM 1150 9-73 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 00 9027

06

14-00000

[illegible] 19 APR 74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 07 [illegible] 74
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7 FAN AND NSCA: 5135 4534 [illegible]
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/WH DIVISION
WH/COG
OPS SUPPORT BRANCH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE:
POL OFFICER ATTACHE
OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1134
13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: DOB

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: [illegible] 1 / 12 1
17 SALARY OR RATE: 13855 / 17497

18 REMARKS: LIMA, PERU

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37
20 Employ Code: 1[illegible]
21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC): 515[illegible] WH
22 STATION CODE: 75[illegible]13
23 INTEGREE CODE: 5
24 Category Code: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): [illegible]
26 DATE OF GRADE
27 DATE OF LEI
28 NTE EXPIRES
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 Correction/Cancellation Data
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE
36 SERV COMP DATE
37 LONG COMP DATE
38 CAREER CATEGORY
39 FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA
44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
OK 5/19/74

FORM 1150 Use Previous Editions SECRET

14-00000

DNS: 27 JUN 74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 135134	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 23 74	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	4135 1094 [illegible]	PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH DIVISION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION LIMA, PERU

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP 12	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION, AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGRATE CODE	24 Major Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA CODE 2	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data	IOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX	
35 VET PREFERENCE	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA	44 STATE TAX DATA					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
OK
28 JUN

330 03 DEC 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF.

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 25 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	4135 1084 0000	50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3-LIMA, PERU STATION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION LIMA, PERU

11 POSITION TITLE POL OFFICER ATTACHE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0136	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 06 1 12 1	17 SALARY OR RATE 13303 17497

18 REMARKS
LIMA, PERU

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Majors Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	51760	WH	57085	S	3	08 04 35	11 25 73	11 25 73

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE		36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY	CODE	39 FEGLI CODE	HEALTH INSURANCE 0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE		42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

uwB 12 4 73

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	51 760	CF	GS 11 4	$16,138

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	51 760	CF	GS 11 4	$15,394

C55

1 SERIAL NO.	2 NAME			3 ORGANIZATION		4 FUNDS		5 LWOP HOURS	
036130	FLORES DANIEL			51 760		CF			
6 OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 11	3	$14,197	11/28/71	GS 11	4	$14,641	11/26/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Richard L. Conolly

DATE 8 September 1972

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1/23
561

27 NOV

CLERKS INITIALS H.E.FISHER

AUDITED BY

FORM 7 66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

11/26

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	51 760	CF	GS 11 3	$14,197

BS: 8 DEC 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 11 28 71	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 2135 1084 0000
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3, LIMA, PERU STATION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION LIMA, PERU

11 POSITION TITLE POL OFFICER ATTACHE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0136	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 07 1 11 3	17 SALARY OR RATE 10014 13457

18 REMARKS
LIMA, PERU

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Military Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	51760 WH	57085	S	3	08 04 35	11 28 71	11 28 71

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 Correction / Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12-9-71

PEG

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-00000

WEB: 29 SEPT 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 19 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 2135 1084 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J			
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3 LIMA, PERU STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION LIMA, PERU			
11. POSITION TITLE POLITICAL OFFICER ATTACHE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0136	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D		
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 07 1 10 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 10014 12285	

18. REMARKS

GUAYAQUIL, ECUADOR

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51700 ALPHABETIC WH	22 STATION CODE 57085	23 INTEGREE CODE S	24 Code 3	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 08 04 35	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR XX XX XX	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX	
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAT NEW PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO			
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
2-6-71

FORM 3-64 1150 Mfg 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BS

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
036130	FLORES DANIEL	51 700	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 10	2	$11,901	07/26/70	GS 10	3	$12,285	07/25/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Richard L. Conolly

DATE 6 May 1971

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1
545

CLERKS INITIALS H.E.FISHER

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

JUL 19

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	51 700 CF	GS 10 2	$11,901

14-00000

BSJ: 10 AUG 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 07 DA 28 YR 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ / X CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1135 0884 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3 QUITO, ECUADOR STATION GUAYAQUIL, ECUADOR BASE		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION GUAYAQUIL, ECUADOR		
11. POSITION TITLE POL OFFICER OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0376	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 07 1 10 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 9450 11231	

18. REMARKS
GUAYAQUIL, ECUADOR.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 22	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51700	ALPHABETIC WH	22 STATION CODE 19559	23 INTEGREE CODE S	24 Hours Code 3	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 03 04 35	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 07 26 70	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 07 26 70
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR 07 25 72	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE 81	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEA
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RES PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

BSJ

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

G55

1 SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
036130	FLURES DANIEL	51 700	CF	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 09	2	$ 9,631	04/06/69	GS 09	3	$ 9,942	04/05/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

1 545

CLERKS INITIALS E.S.WHITTLES

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	51 700 CF	GS 09 2	$ 9,631

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	51 700 CF	GS 09 2	$10,210

JLD: 24 APR 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

COF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION INTEGRATION-DEPARTMENT OF STATE	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 10 69	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	9135 0884 0000	50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 3 QUITO, ECUADOR STATION GUAYAQUIL, ECUADOR BASE	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION GUAYQUIL, ECUADOR

11 POSITION TITLE POL OFFICER OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0376	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 07 1 09 2	17 SALARY OR RATE 8153 8744

18 REMARKS

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $8744 AND FSR SALARY OF $8153 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.
ALL SICK AND ALL HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPT. OF STATE
MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hours Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
55	10	51700	WH	19559	S.	3	08 04 35		

28 NTE EXPIRES | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 Correction/Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

SECRET

PLW

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JLB: 22 APR 69

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION, TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS AND CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 04 06 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V | CF TO V | X V TO CF | CF TO CF

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3135 0864 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 3
QUITO, ECUADOR STATION
GUAYAQUIL, ECUADOR BASE

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: GUAYAQUIL, ECUADOR

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0376

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 09 2

17 SALARY OR RATE: 8744

18 REMARKS:
TO BE INTEGRATED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Majors Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA	YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO	DA	YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO	DA	YR
20	10	51700	WH	19559		3	08	04	35	04	06	69	04	06	69

28 PTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CS 2 CS 3 FICA 4 NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE
36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
38 CAREER CATEGORY
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
04 23 69 0/2

SECRET

SF

JLB: 7 OCT 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 10 06 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9235 0620 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 4 URUGUAY/PARAGUAY SECTION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 1441	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION SJ

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 08 2	17 SALARY OR RATE 7956

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51450 ALPHABETIC WH	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Military Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 08 04 35	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction /Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE FEGLI CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM CTP

LOGGED
10/8/68

FORM 5-68 1150 Mfg 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

SF.

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	28 300	V	GS 08 2	$ 7,630	$ 7,956

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	28 300	V	GS 06 3	$ 6,263	$ 6,547

JLB: 24 JUN 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 06 | 16 | 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: X V TO V; CF TO V; V TO CF; CF TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 8275 2100 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS/OTR CAREER TRAINING PROGRAM	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE CAREER TRAINEE	12 POSITION NUMBER 0748	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION SJ	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0090.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 08 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 7630

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	28300	CTP	75013		1	08 | 04 | 35	06 | 16 | 68	06 | 16 | 68

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 5 NONE) CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 WAIVED, 1 YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS., 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
RC
6-24-68

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition
Mfg 10-67

SECRET JLB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FVD: 15 DEC 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible]

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)
030130	FLORES DANIEL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION AND CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION	12 17 67	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	6275 2100 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDS/OTR CAREER TRAINING PROGRAM	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
CAREER TRAINEE	0748	SJ

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0090.01	07 2	6959

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	28300	CTP	75013		1	08 04 35	12 17 67	12 17 67

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32. MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO) CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
KW
12-26-67

FORM 8-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAH: 20 SEPT 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 036130
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FLORES DANIEL
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CHANGE OF COST CENTER NUMBER
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 09 | 07 | 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 8235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
OPERATIONS SUPPORT SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1174
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28
16. GRADE AND STEP: 06 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 6263
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51500 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA. YR): 08 | 04 | 35
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9/13/67

FORM 1-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET MAH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In) 6-43

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 10/07/67

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FLORES DANIEL

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONV. TO CAREER EMPLOYEE STATUS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 03 | DA. 11 | YR. 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE:

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH DIVISION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION:

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP:

17 SALARY OR RATE:

18 REMARKS:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 Use Previous
7-65 Edition

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAIL: 28 JULY 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION & PAY ADJUSTMENT TO FULL TIME	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 07 30 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 8235 1162 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH WH/COG INTELLIGENCE BRANCH OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE ASST	12. POSITION NUMBER 1174
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0301.28	16. GRADE AND STEP 06 3
17. SALARY OR RATE 6263	18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
28	10	51500	WH	75013		1	08 04 35	07 30 67	07 30 67

28 NTE EXPIRES | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8 27 67 N

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

653

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
036130	FLORES DANIEL	51 500 V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	QSI	ADJ
GS 05	3	$ 5,573	03/14/65	GS 05	4	$ 5,694	03/13/66			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS — AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE — DATE 9 FEB 66

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E (4-31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	51 500 V	GS 05 4	$ 5,694	$ 5,859

FJH: 21 SEPT 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 09 19 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT PART TIME

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	7235 1162 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP/WH
WH/C
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE CLERK	12. POSITION NUMBER 1176	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0301.27	16. GRADE AND STEP 05 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 5859

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hours Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
7	36	51500	WH	75013		1	08 04 35		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO. / 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RESV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHO

POSTED

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

RZF: 28 JAN 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHG IN STRENGTH COUNT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 01 30 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT PART TIME
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6235 1162 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH WH/C INTELLIGENCE BRANCH REPORTS AND REQUIREMENTS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE CLERK	12. POSITION NUMBER 1184	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0301.27	16. GRADE AND STEP 05 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 5523

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS COMPUTER CODING TO REFLECT CHANGE IN STRENGTH COUNT OF PART TIME PERSONNEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF HR-20-10, REVISED 21 DECEMBER 1965.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
33	36	51500	WH	75013			08 04 35		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSL, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

[illegible]

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	51 500	V	GS 05 3	$ 5,330	$ 5,523

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PJH: 25 AUG 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 036130
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FLORES DANIEL
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 | 25 | 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: PART TIME
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235 1162 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH WH/C
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
REPORTS AND REQUIREMENTS SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE CLERK
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1184
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.27
16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 5330
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	20	51500	WH	75013		1	08 04 35		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR):
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT):
36. SERV COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS CODE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)):
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE, NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

8-27-65 W

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
036130	FLORES DANIEL	49 150 36F	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 05	2	$ 5,165	03/15/64	GS 05	3	$ 5,330	03/14/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: E. U. ECHOLS DATE 15 Feb. 1964

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 961 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

DLB: 5 FEB 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PAY ADJUSTMENT TO PART TIME FROM FULL TIME	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 02 08 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT PART TIME
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 1162 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE STAFF OPERATIONS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE ASST	12. POSITION NUMBER 1130	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0301.28	16. GRADE AND STEP 05 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 5165

18. REMARKS

SUBJECT TO WORK ON REGULARLY SCHEDULED TOUR NOT TO EXCEED 19 HOURS PER WEEK.
SUBJECT WILL BE WORKING MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY, FROM 1400 TO 1700.

3130

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
~~28~~	~~30~~	49150	SAS	75013		1	08 04 35	03 16 64	03 16 64

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE / CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA YR	37 LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA. YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RES. PROV TEMP / CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES / HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
02/05/65 WK

1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

DLB: 9 FEB 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PAY ADJUSTMENT TO PART TIME FROM FULL TIME (CORRECTION)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 02 08 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT PART TIME

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 1162 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE STAFF OPERATIONS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE ASST	12. POSITION NUMBER 1130	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0301.28	16. GRADE AND STEP 05 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 5165

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 02/08/65 AS FOLLOWS:
ITEM #19, ACTION CODE, WHICH READ 28, TO READ 31.
ITEM #20, EMPLOYEE CODE, WHICH READ 36, TO READ 20.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 [illegible] Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
31	20	49150	SAS	75013		1	08 04 35	03 16 64	03 16 64

28 NTE EXPIRES | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

14-00000

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	. . . . .
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .
GS-18	24,500		. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .

14-00000

MHC: 6 AUG 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 08 06 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 1162 000(	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS COUNTER-INTELL STAFF OPERATIONS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE ASST	12. POSITION NUMBER 1130	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0301.28	16. GRADE AND STEP 05 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 4850

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 49150	ALPHABETIC SAS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 08 04 35	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 [illegible]	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]
08/17/64

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 6 AUG 1964

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 07/01/64

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL					
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT				4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 19 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4232 1000 1000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS INTELL ST OPS SUP SEC				10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11 POSITION TITLE TRANSLATOR				12 POSITION NUMBER 0922	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS		15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1045.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 05	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 1-63 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

1. Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
036130	FLORES DANIEL	49 350 38F V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 04	2	$ 4,355	03/17/63	GS 04	3	$ 4,495	03/15/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE DATE 31 Jan 1964

WK

REC'D PAYROLL BRANCH
[illegible] 9 3 53 PM '64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9 61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4 51)

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	49350	SAS	75013		1	08 04 35	03 15 64	03 15 64

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE		42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)								

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
03/17/64 RK

FORM 11 62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	49 350	V	GS 04 2	$ 4,250	$ 4,355

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZP: 3 MAY 63

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 036130
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FLORES DANIEL
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 05 | 03 | 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X | V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3232 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF
RESEARCH BRANCH
REPORTS, RECORDS, TRANSLATION SEC
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: TRANSLATOR
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0702
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0031.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 04 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 4250
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC: 51350 | ALPHABETIC: SAS
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Region Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 03 | 04 | 35
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28. DTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE MO DA YR)

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE)
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12 May 1963 J.D.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AUPD 07/31/63

1 SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 07 DA 21 YR 63	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X V TO V	V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE 4232 1000 1000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
	CF TO V	CF TO CF			
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS			10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE TRANSLATOR			12 POSITION NUMBER 0702	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS		15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1045.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 04	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

POSTED
10/14/63 JK

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150P
1 63

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-51)

20t 1200

1 Serial No	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
036130	FLORES DANIEL	39 400 V 9	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 04	1	$ 4,110	03/11/62	GS 04	2	$ 4,250	03/17/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF ~~WAITING~~ PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 7 Feb., 1963

hus

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND
DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 . SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS.
EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
FLORES DANIEL	036130	39400	V	04 1	$ 4040	04 1	$ 4110

14-00000

EWS: 13 MARCH 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) FLORES DANIEL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (CAREER PROVISIONAL)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 03 11 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2226 1200 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP OPSER R I DIV REFERENCE BRANCH INDEX SECTION - NIGHT SHIFT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE FILE CLERK	12. POSITION NUMBER 0147	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0305.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 04 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 4040

18. REMARKS
SUBJECT TO THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF A TRIAL PERIOD OF ONE YEAR.
SUBJECT TO THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF A MEDICAL EXAMINATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 11	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 39400	ALPHABETIC RI	22. STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs. Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 08 04 35	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 03 11 62
27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 03 11 62								

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE 1	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO. C71CO	34. SEX M1

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT 0	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR 03 11 58	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR 03 11 62	38 MIL. SERV CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE P	CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES 1	HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO 460486230						

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE 6	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE 1	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS 0	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE 1	NO. TAX EXEMP 0
STATE CODE 08								

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

J. ECHOLS

Form 8 61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

14-011

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 460-48-6230	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Flores, Daniel	3. DATE OF BIRTH 4Aug35	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS13	6. SD DQG
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/LA	9. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	10. CHECK (X) TYPE ☐ HQS. ☐ OS		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO) 1Oct78 - 30Sep79

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED MEXICO CITY TELEPOUCH 51744 (in 3383966) dtd 13 Nov 79.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER

FORM 45 [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

NOV 15 9 01 AM '79
MAIL ROOM

SEE ATTACHED.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 13 Nov 79	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert Berg /S/

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 13 Nov 79	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Daniel Flores /S/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SEE ATTACHED.

DATE 13 Nov 79	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Stewart D. Burton /S/

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE REVIEWER'S COMMENTS ON THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWER'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 13Nov79	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Daniel Flores /S/

CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

/20/ *EYES ONLY*   CONFIDENTIAL   FRP: , , , , , , ,

EYES ONLY   DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION: C/LA-5 (653) INFO: RF, FILE, (7/W)

79 3383966   PAGE 001   3383966
TOR: 132307Z NOV 79   MEXI 51744

CONFIDENTIAL 132241Z NOV 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE MEXICO CITY 51744

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/LA/PERS

Daniel Flores

SUBJECT: ADMIN/RYBAT/PERS/FR FOR [redacted]

1. GIVEN BELOW IS THE FITNESS REPORT FOR [redacted] [redacted] FOR THE PERIOD 1 OCT 78 TO 30 SEP 79. RATINGS ON SPECIFIC DUTIES AND NARRATIVE COMMENTS WERE PREPARED BY HAROLD N. CHAIDEZ, DCOS. REVIEWING COMMENTS WERE PREPARED BY RONALD F. BRIERLEY, COS. THE REPORT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND CERTIFIED BY SUBJECT. SIGNED COPY OF FORM 45A BEING POUCHED.

2. THE FOLLOWING INFO IS KEYED TO FORM 45N, SECTION A: 1. 03H130; 4. M; 5. GS-13; 6. DOG; 9. MEXICO CITY; 10. CAREER; 11. ANNUAL; 12. 1 OCT 78 TO 30 SEP 79.

3. SECTION B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION - SPECIFIC DUTIES:

1. DIRECTS THE ACTIVITIES OF AN 18-MAN CI LIAISON TEAM RESPONSIBLE TO THE STATION. RATING LETTER - S.

2. RESPONSIBLE FOR TARGETTING CI OPERATIONS AGAINST SOVIET AND CUBANS IN MEXICO CITY. RATING LETTER - S.

3. CASE OFFICER FOR AGENTS AND OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST THE CUBAN TARGET. RATING LETTER - S.

4. SUPPORTS STATION OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE CHINESE AND OTHER TARGETS.

5. CASE OFFICER FOR ONE LIAISON PENETRATION. RATING LETTER - S.

OGERALL RATING - STRONG.

0-63 2 MEXICO CITY 51744 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. SECTION C - NARRATIVE COMMENTS.

SHORTLY BEFORE THE DEPARTURE OF THE FORMER COS, HE SUBMITTED A SPECIAL MEMORANDUM ON SUBJECT'S PERFORMANCE (MEXICO CITY 50702) WHICH CONCENTRATED MOSTLY ON SUBJECT'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE CI FIELD. A COPY OF THIS MEMORANDUM IS AVAILABLE IN SUBJECT'S PERSONNEL FILE. THE UNDERSIGNED FULLY ENDORSES THE LAUDATORY COMMENTS IN THAT MEMORANDUM, BUT SINCE SUBJECT HAS TAKEN ON BROADER RESPONSIBILITIES, IT IS NECESSARY TO COMMENT ON OTHER ASPECTS OF HIS WORK.

FOR THE PAST MONTHS, SUBJECT HAS BEEN DIVIDING HIS TIME ABOUT EQUALLY BETWEEN HIS CI RESPONSIBILITIES AND OTHER STATION OBJECTIVES, PRINCIPALLY THE CUBAN TARGET. SUBJECT WAS GIVEN THESE ADDITIONAL DUTIES BECAUSE THE CI OPERATIONS GROUP IS WELL ORGANIZED AND REQUIRES LESS DIRECT C/O INPUT, AND ALSO BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO DEDICATE ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES AGAINST THE CUBAN TARGET. THIS STATION IS ONE OF FOUR WITHIN THE DIRECTORATE WHICH HAVE BEEN SELECTED FOR A CONCENTRATED EFFORT AGAINST CUBA, AND THIS TARGET NOW RANKS NUMBER ONE AMONG THE STATION'S MANY PRIORITY OBJECTIVES. SUBJECT'S PAST EXPERIENCE IN CUBAN OPERATIONS, HIS ABILITY TO PASS AS A NATIVE IN THIS COUNTRY, AND HIS OTHER STRENGTHS, WERE THE INGREDIENTS WHICH THE STATION NEEDED TO EXPLOIT IN THIS EFFORT.

SUBJECT HAS TAKEN OVER THE PRINCIPAL STATION OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST CUBA. THIS WAS A FAIRLY NEW OPERATION AT THE TIME IT WAS ASSIGNED TO SUBJECT AND IT WILL MATURE UNDER HIS DIRECTION. FOR REASONS OF SENSITIVITY, A MORE DETAILED REVIEW OF SUBJECT'S WORK ON THIS OPERATION CANNOT BE PROVIDED, BUT THE RECORD SHOULD NOTE THAT DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS, HE HAS HANDLED THIS OPERATION IN A THOROUGHLY PROFESSIONAL MANNER WITH STEADY PROGRESS BEING MADE TO FULLY EXPLOIT THE OPERATIONAL AND REPORTING POTENTIAL. ALSO DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD, SUBJECT RENEWED CONTACT THROUGH HIS OWN EFFORTS WITH A FORMER REPORTING ASSET WHO HAD DRIFTED AWAY FROM COLLABORATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION. SUBJECT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO BREATH NEW LIFE INTO THIS OPERATION AND BRING IT BACK UNDER CONTROL.

SUBJECT ALSO COOPERATED WITH ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY IN ATTEMPTING TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH A LOCAL CUBAN

CONFIDENTIAL

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

79 3383966 PAGE 003 3383966
TOR: 132307Z NOV 79 MEXI 51744

OFFICIAL DURING THE TARGET'S VISIT TO THE BORDER AREA. SUBJECT WAS IN CHARGE OF COORDINATING THIS OPERATION WITH LOCAL LIAISON AND WITH THE OTHER AGENCY. THE OPERATION WAS SUCCESSFUL FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ARRANGING A MEETING WITH THE TARGET, BUT SINCE THE TARGET'S RETURN TO THE CAPITAL CITY, HE HAS REFUSED EFFORTS BY SUBJECT TO CONTINUE CONTACT.

ANOTHER EFFORT AGAINST THE CUBAN TARGET UNDER SUBJECT'S RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVES THE RESOURCES OF THE SPECIAL CI OPERATIONS GROUP. FOR SOME MONTHS NOW, THIS GROUP HAS BEEN TRYING TO MOUNT A SENSITIVE FI COLLECTION EFFORT AND PROSPECTS REMAIN ENCOURAGING THAT THIS EFFORT WILL SOON BE OPERATIONAL. THIS IS A FAIRLY COMPLEX UNDERTAKING WHICH REQUIRES PATIENCE AND AN ELEMENT OF GOOD LUCK IN ORDER TO BE SUCCESSFUL. SUBJECT DESERVES CONSIDERABLE CREDIT FOR THE PROGRESS MADE THUS FAR AND IF EVERYTHING GOES ACCORDING TO PLAN, THIS OPERATION SHOULD BE PRODUCING WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

APART FROM HIS WORK AGAINST THE CUBAN TARGET, SUBJECT WAS SUCCESSFUL IN RECRUITING AN ACCESS AGENT AGAINST A CHINESE OFFICIAL AND LATER WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH CLOSE RAPPORT WITH THE OFFICIAL HIMSELF. FOLLOWING UP ON A LEAD FROM ANOTHER SOURCE THAT A LOCAL NATIONAL HAD A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH A CHINESE OFFICIAL, SUBJECT USED HIS NATIVE LANGUAGE AND APPEARANCE AND RECRUITED THE LOCAL UNDER THE GUISE OF BEING A MEXICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO WANTED TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE IN MEXICO. ASSESSMENT INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE NEW SOURCE GREATLY FACILITATED THE ABILITY OF SUBJECT TO ESTABLISH CLOSE RAPPORT WITH THE CHINESE OFFICIAL ONCE CONTACT WAS MADE. SUBJECT WAS ABLE TO DISCERN THAT THE TARGET WAS POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE ON SEXUAL GROUNDS, BUT TIME DID NOT PERMIT THIS VULNERABILITY FROM BEING EXPLOITED BEFORE THE TARGET COMPLETED HIS TOUR AND DEPARTED THE COUNTRY. STATION REGRETS THAT A LEAD TO THIS TARGET WAS NOT IDENTIFIED EARLIER, BUT THIS DOES NOT DETRACT FROM THE PROFESSIONAL MANNER IN WHICH SUBJECT EXPLOITED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PUSH THIS CASE FORWARD AGAINST AN UNREALISTIC DEADLINE.

THIS REPORTING PERIOD HAS AGAIN BEEN ONE OF CONSIDERABLE ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF SUBJECT IN WHICH HE HAS DEMONSTRATED HIS TALENT FOR OPERATIONS AND PARTICULARLY HIS ABILITY TO

CONFIDENTIAL

DEVELOP AND HANDLE AGENTS. HE HAS DISPLAYED VERSATILITY AND FLEXIBILITY IN PURSUING HIS TARGETS AND IS EVER ALERT FOR VULNERABILITIES WHICH CAN BE EXPLOITED. HE USES GOOD JUDGMENT IN HANDLING HIS CASES AND HIS TRADECRAFT PROCEDURES DURING THIS PERIOD HAVE BEEN SOUND. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE PARTICULAR CUBAN CASES WHICH HE IS INVOLVED ARE NOT EASY ONES. THEY REQUIRE HARD WORK, AND THE FULL RANGE OF CASE OFFICER EXPERTISE IN ORDER TO PUSH THEM FORWARD. HIS RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE CI FIELD ARE EQUALLY DEMANDING. SUBJECT HAS MADE A VERY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORK OF THIS STATION DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD AND WELL DESERVES A RATING OF STRONG FOR HIS VARIOUS DUTIES AND A STRONG FOR HIS OVERALL PERFORMANCE.

5. COMMENTS BY REVIEWING OFFICER.

I CONCUR WITH THIS EVALUATION AND BELIEVE IT IS MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND OBJECTIVE. HAVING WORKED WITH SUBJECT DURING AN EARLIER PERIOD OF HIS CAREER WHEN HE WAS THEN A GOOD OFFICER (1970-72), I AM STRUCK BY THE REMARKABLE PROGRESS HE HAS MADE IN THREE KEY AREAS: OPERATIONAL THINKING AND ANALYSIS, WRITING, AND SOUND, PROFESSIONAL APPLICATION OF BASIC OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES.

I AM DELIGHTED THIS HIGHLY CAPABLE, AGGRESSIVE OFFICER WILL BE REMAINING A THIRD YEAR AT THIS STATION AND LOOK FORWARD TO A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION FROM HIM IN MOST OPERATIONAL AREAS OF PRESENT PRIORITY CONCERN.RVW 13 NOV 99 DRV D9C.3.

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT	NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
036130	Flores, Daniel	08/04/35	M	GS-13	DOG

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDO/LA/COG	Hqs

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		CAREER PROVISIONAL		RESERVE
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

X	ANNUAL		21-MONTH		30-MONTH		REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-): 1 Dec 76 - 30 Sep 77

13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 October 77

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervise the LA/COG/EA and Canada section which includes two operations officers, one intelligence analyst, and a secretary.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As section chief, provide operational guidance and support to the field stations' efforts to develop and recruit Cubans in that area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assume direct case officer responsibility for sensitive on-island reporting sources, including TDY travel for debriefing purposes when the assets are available; developing leads for potential recruitment efforts against new targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinate with other area division desks and components to provide maximum support to Cuban operational activities in their respective field stations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45N OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Flores came to the Cuba Operations Group from a brief assignment to the Office of Training. Prior to the OTR interim, Mr. Flores had been a COG case officer and was therefore familiar with its operational techniques. During this ten-month period under review, Mr. Flores served as a section chief with responsibilities for East Asian stations with a Cuban target (Tokyo, Manila, and Hong Kong) and Canada. Mr. Flores was the only GS-13 officer to hold section chief responsibility, yet his performance compared favorably with that of the GS-14 section chiefs. As a section chief, Mr. Flores was supervisor for two operations officers, one intelligence analyst and a secretary. He was responsible for ensuring the prompt handling of correspondence to and from the field stations, and providing operational guidance and direction on matters pertaining to Cuban operations. His section was managed in a competent manner with Mr. Flores demonstrating his ability to delegate functional responsibilities.

The Cuba Operations Group also functions in a direct case officer capacity, and Mr. Flores frequently traveled TDY to handle cases. He was the operations officer for one particularly sensitive and productive on-island reporting case. This required him to travel on short notice and to arrange for secure meeting and debriefing sessions of this reporting source.

Mr. Flores also traveled to Canada on various occasions to meet with liaison contacts and participate in developmental operations. One particular recruitment attempt required Mr. Flores to spend several days in a motel room observing the

--CONTINUED--

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Rating [illegible] Profile:	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/LA/COG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donald H. Winters

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 4 March 1977	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Daniel Flores	

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject likes to operate. He is very practical, experienced, and realistic. He is, however, a little quiet and tends to accept things the way they are. While I have no doubt as to his skills, he may need a bit more management experience to learn how to make things move despite obstacles. He has done a fine job running the East Asian and Canada section of Cuba Operations Group.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/LA/COG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Frederick W Latrash Frederick W. Latrash

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE [illegible] 1977	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT

Daniel Flores

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

cont.

movements of an operational target, and to devise a secure and timely method of approach to the individual Cuban.

In comparing Mr. Flores' performance as an operations officer and as a supervisor, I believe his performance is somewhat stronger in the former capacity. Mr. Flores has all the attributes of an excellent case officer: he is aggressive, thinks operationally, and is fast on his feet in an operational situation. He is further aided by his fluency in Spanish and has on more than one occasion successfully passed himself off as a Mexican businessman. During his TDY travels, he has repeatedly demonstrated dedication to the job at hand, willingness to work long hours, and a flexibility to handle all types of situations.

Mr. Flores is less enthusiastic when it comes to the paperwork and bureaucratic requirements of his position. While he is a good writer, he tends to handle his written tasks in a hurried manner and consequently, his work oftentimes requires review. He is also inclined to take the shorter and easier approach when handling the paper flow requirements. I mention these points not because they represent basic shortcomings, but simply to contrast them to his exceptionally high performance in his operations officer capacity.

In sum, Mr. Flores is an extremely experienced, competent and well motivated operations officer. His talent as a "street operator" with a keen sense for the human target has been amply demonstrated. He has now quite successfully been introduced to his first supervisory position and proven that he is competent for assignments of this nature. I believe Mr. Flores is capable of handling positions of increasing responsibility and should be given the opportunity to do so.

* * *

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) FLORES, Daniel	3. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 35	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 12	6. SD
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Instructor Ops	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDA/OTR/LTD	9. CURRENT STATION Hqs.	10. CODE (X one) X HQS ☐ DF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ☐ ANNUAL X REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 22 June - 19 November 1976

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: N/A

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conducts tutorial training in clandestine operational tradecraft skills for foreign agent and liaison personnel as well as U.S. staff and contract personnel.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 In collaboration with sponsoring Agency components prepares detailed training programs and schedules for the conduct of tailored tutorial and small-group training.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Evaluate trainee performance in each program and prepare final training reports, and as appropriate draft follow-up questionnaires for field evaluation of training effectiveness.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Participate in live problems and exercises as surveillant and role player as required and contribute to improvement in training materials and techniques.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

FEB 10 9 AM '77 MAIL ROOM

Mr. Flores joined the Agent and Liaison Training Unit in mid-June 1976 and after a week's familiarization with training materials, aids and office routine of the Unit, he attended a two-week Instructor Training Workshop at the Special Training Center. On completion of the Workshop, Subject returned to the Unit for further familiarization with the routine of the Unit, assisted in several surveillance problems, and monitored a two-week training program which included active participation as a trainee himself in the SAI (or persuasion skills) portion of the program. Subsequently Mr. Flores assisted as a role-player in a brief but significant program involving the training of a prominent U.S. citizen assisting the Agency in southern Africa. Mr. Flores then assisted another instructor in devising and conducting the first program this Unit has undertaken designed to teach surveillance awareness/detection to Staff Employees who are deemed likely to be subjects of terrorist surveillance and attack. Mr. Flores then planned for, and from 12 October through 19 November conducted a tutorial training program in clandestine operations tech-

(continued)

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 17 January 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, ALT Unit	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Walter R. Cox

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 26 Jan 77	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the ratings on specific duties and on the overall rating of STRONG for Mr. Flores. Although he was assigned to this Unit for a short period of time, he was proving to be a well qualified operations instructor. His home Division requested his return in order to give him a responsible position for which he was well qualified, and he should do well on that assignment.

DATE 19/1/77	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, [illegible]	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [illegible]

4. BY EMPLOYEE

[illegible]	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Continuation of Section D of Fitness Report on Daniel Flores, GS-12, for period 22 June - 19 November 1976 ---------------

niques for a U.S. citizen who is scheduled to serve as an NOC Officer in the Caribbean.

The first independent training task given to Mr. Flores was of a third-national field agent serving as an access agent, but this task was cancelled at the last minute when the concerned Base discovered grounds for field termination of the agent rather than providing tutorial training for the agent in the U.S. Mr. Flores was justifiably irritated at this turn of events which denied him what held promise for being a challenging initial training program.

It was with regret that we learned, early into what turned out to be Mr. Flores' only independent training program, that a priority requirement of his home-base Division would necessitate his return to Division duty soonest. The Division agreed to our request that Mr. Flores conclude the training program he had tailored, and begun, and Mr. Flores is to be commended for having done an exceptionally fine job in this assignment. The completion-of-training report was also well organized, and the questionnaire which asks for an evaluative follow-up from the trainee's field Station is to the point.

Early in his assignment Mr. Flores took over the maintenance and improvement of the Unit's operations training slides, consolidated them into an extremely functional package, and solicited ideas from other instructors to improve the package. Much to his credit and the Unit's benefit, Mr. Flores managed to persuade another Agency component to undertake--without charge--a major revamping of some of the slides using computor-designed art work to replace some of the less impressive early work in this field.

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 460-48-6230 036130	2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Flores, Daniel		3. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 35	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS13
6. SD DOG	7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/LA	9. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	10.	

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 15 Feb - 30 Sept 78

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT.

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED MEXICO CITY 47396 (IN 1584998) dtd 18 Nov 78	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 45

CLASSIFICATION

22. IMPDET CL BY

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

24 10 56 AM 78
MAIL ROOM

SEE ATTACHED.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Rating Officer Profile: 0 1 9 15 0 0 u0

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
18 Nov 78	DCOS	Robert Berg /S/

2. BY EMPLOYEE

	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	18 Nov 78	Daniel Flores /S/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SEE ATTACHED.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
18 Nov 78	COS	Lawrence Sternfield /S/

4. BY EMPLOYEE

	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☐ HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	18Nov78	Daniel Flores /S/

CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

/CONF/EYES ONLY CONFIDENTIAL FRP: , , , , , , , ,

EYES ONLY DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION: C/LA-5 (503) INFO: HF, FILE, (7/W)

78 1584998 PAGE 001 1584998
TOR: 182031Z NOV 78 MEXI 47396

C O N F I D E N T I A L 172250Z NOV 78 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE MEXICO CITY 47396

Pew

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/LA/PERS

Dan Flores

SUBJECT: ADMIN/RYBAT/PERS/FITNESS REPORT FOR [redacted]

1. GIVEN BELOW IS THE FITNESS REPORT ON SUBJECT FOR THE PERIOD 15 FEB - 30 SEPT 78. RATTING ON SPECIFIC DUTIES AND NARRATIVE COMMENTS WERE PREPARED BY HAROLD O. CHAIDEZ, DCOS. REVIEWING COMMENTS WERE PREPARED BY JOEL N. NEBECKER, COS. SUBJECT WAS NOT SHOWN A COPY OF THIS REPORT AS HE DEPARTED STATION ON EMERGENCY LEAVE BEFORE THE REPORT COULD BE TYPED. A COPY WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS RETURN AND ANY STATEMENT BY THE EMPLOYEE WILL BE TELEPOUCHED TO HQS. A SIGNED COPY OF FORM 45A WILL BE POUCHED AT THAT TIME.

2. THE FOLLOWING INFO IS KEYED TO FORM 45A, SECTION A: 1. 036130; 4. M; 5. GS-13; 6. DDO; 9. MEXICO CITY; 10. CAREER; 11. ANNUAL; 12. 15 FEB-30 SEP 78.

3. SECTION B. PERFORMANCE EVALUTATION - SPECIFIC DUTIES:

1. DIRECTS THE ACTIVITIES OF AN 18-MAN CI LIAISON TEAM RESPONSIBLE TO THE STATION, AND WHICH INCLUDES COORDINATING ALL RTACTION OPS INITIATED BY THE TEAM. RATING LETTER -- S.

2. RESPONSIBLE FOR TARGETTING CI OPERATIONS AGAINST SOVIETS AND CUBANS IN MEXICO CITY. RATING LETTER -- S.

3. CASE OFFICER FOR TWO PENETRATIONS OF LIAISON. RATING LETTER -- S.

4. COORDINATES SENSITIVE CE OPERATIONS RUN BY OTHER KUBLAZON AGENCIES WITH LIAISON COUNTERPARTS. RATING

CONFIDENTIAL

9/4

LETTER -- S.

5. CONDUCTS OTHER LIAISON RELATED CI ACTIVITY AND PREPARES NECESSARY MEMORANDA AND REPORTS. RTAING LETTER -- S.

OVERALL PERFORMANCE -- S.

4. SECTION C - NARRATIVE COMMENTS

THIS IS THE INITIAL REPORT WRITTEN ON SUBJECT AND COVERS A PERIOD OF SEVEN AND ONE-HALF MONTHS SINCE HIS ARRIVAL IN MEXICO IN FEB 78. SUBJECT HAS BEEN IN THE ORGANIZATION FOR OVER 16 YEARS AND SERVED TWO O/S ASSIGNMENTS PRIOR TO MEXICO CITY.

HIS PRIMARY DUTY IS TO SUPERVISE THE OPERATIONS OF A CI UNIT COMPOSED OF PERSONNEL SUPPLIED BY LIAISON BUT WHICH IS UNDER THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF THE STATION. THIS PARTICULAR UNIT REPRESENTS THE NUCLEOUS OF THE STATION'S CI OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. IT IS ALSO A STRONG CONTRIBUTOR TO STATION'S EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST THE HARD TARGETS IN THE FI FIELD. SUBJECT PARTICIPATES IN ALL LEVELS OF ACTIVITY WITH THIS UNIT FROM THAT OF A MANAGER TO SERVING AS AN OPERATIONS OFFICER. THE LEADERSHIP AND EXAMPLE WHICH HE SETS HAVE BEEN AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT IN THE SUCCESS ENJOYED BY THE UNIT IN RECENT MONTHS. IN APRIL 1978, THE STATION UNDERTOOK AN AUDIO OPERATION DIRECTED AT THE OFFICIAL OUT-OF-TOWN RETREAT OF A PRINCIPAL ADVERSARY IN MEXICO. SUBJECT PARTICIPATED IN THE RECRUITMENT OF A CARETAKER WHO PROVIDED ACCESS TO THE TARGET INSTALLATION AND WAS SUBSEGUENTLY INVOLVED IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE OPERATION EXCEPT THE ACTUAL INSTALLATION OF THE TECHNICAL DEVICES. THIS SUCCESSFUL OPERATION WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER ONE THE FOLLOWING MONTH, THIS TIME DIRECTED AT THE HOTEL ROOMS OF A VISITING COMMUNIST DIGNITARY. TWO VALUABLE REPORTS WERE PRODUCED FROM THIS OPERATION ON THE POLICIES AND PLANS OF A FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTY. IN JULY, SUBJECT SUPERVISED THE RECRUITMENT OF AN AGENT WHO HAS ESTABLISHED ACCESS TO A HOSTILE OFFICIAL INSTALLATION. A TECHNICAL OPERATION IS NOW UNDERWAY TO EXPLOIT THE SOURCE'S ACCESS.

IN SEPTEMBER, ANOTHER OPERATION BEGAN AGAINST THE RETREAT OF THE SAME PRINCIPAL ADVERSARY MENTIONED ABOVE SINCE A NEW PROPERTY HAD BEEN ACQUIRED. AGAIN, SUBJECT PARTICIPATED IN THE RECRUITMENT OF THE CARETAKER OF THE NEW SITE AND IN OTHER PHASES OF THE OPERATION WHICH CONTINUE AT THIS TIME.

IN ADDITION TO THESE SPECIFIC OPERATIONS, THE CI UNIT ALSO CARRIES OUT A HOST OF BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS, SURVEILLANCE, AND OTHER WORK AS REQUIRED IN THE CI FIELD. SINCE MEXICO CITY SERVES AS PROBABLY THE PRINCIPAL BASE FOR OPERATIONS BY THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, SELECTIVE TASKING MUST BE UNDERTAKEN TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY FROM THIS SMALL UNIT.

SUBJECT ALSO HANDLES TWO PENETRATIONS OF THE CI UNIT, AND IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING SUPPORT THROUGH THIS UNIT TO OTHR CI ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET AND CUBAN ESPIONAGE IN MEXICO.

INDEED, THE FIRST PART OF HIS TOUR IN MEXICO HAS BEEN A BUSY ONE. THE STATION FINDS HIM TO BE AN ENERGETIC, VERSATILE, AND HIGHLY QUALIFIED OFFICER. HE HAS HANDLED THE PERSONNEL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE SURFACED WITH HIS CI UNIT WITH TACT AND EFFECIENCY, AND HIS RAPPORT WITH HIS LIAISON COUNTERPARTS IS VERY GOOD. DURING RECENT CONVERSATIONS, SENIOR MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR HIGH REGARD FOR SUBJECT'S ABILITIES.

HIS ABILITY TO PASS AS A NATIVE IS AN ADDED FACTOR IN HIS FAVOR AND PROVIDES HIM WITH A GREATER DIMENSION FOR OPERATIONS. THE STATION HAS USED SUBJECT ON OCCASION FOR UNILATERAL OPERATIONS, BUT THIS USE MUST BE SELECTIVE IN ORDER NOT TO ADVERSELY IMPINGE UPON HIS PRIMARY WORK WITH THE CI UNIT.

SUBJECT IS VERY COST CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE USE OF STATION FUNDS AND EXTRACTS A HEALTHY RETURN FOR PROJECT MONIES USED TO SUPPORT THE WORK OF THE CI UNIT.

SUBJECT WELL DESERVES A RATING OF STRONG FOR HIS

CONFIDENTIAL

24 10 55

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

VARIOUS DUTIES AND AN OVERALL STRONG FOR THIS REPORTING PERIOD. WE LOOK FORWARD TO A CONTINUED HIGH LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE DURING THE YEAR TO COME.

5. SECTION D.1. SUBJECT HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION FOR SEVEN AND ONE-HALF MONTHS. D.3: COMMENTS BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

I FULLY CONCUR WITH THE NARRATIVE COMMENTS OF THE REVIEWER. SUBJECT HAS DISPLAYED A GREAT AMOUNT OF IMAGINATION AND ENERGY IN DIRECTING A DIFFICULT ACTIVITY NAMELY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY THAT IS SEVERELY RESTRICTED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES TO THE EXISTING EXECUTIVE ORDER. SUBJECT HAS DESPITE THIS BEEN ABLE TO KEEP A VERY POSITIVE THRUST TO HIS OPERATIONS AND HAS BEEN ABLE TO MOTIVATE THE AGENTS AND PERSONNEL UNDER HIS CONTROL. I AM TOTALLY SATISFIED WITH HIS ENERGY AND MOTIVATION. DESPITE THE FRUSTRATIONS INHERENT IN THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY HE CARRIES ON WITH A HIGH SPIRIT AND A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF GOOD WILL - NO MEAN ACHIEVEMENT AT THIS JUNCTURE OF AGENCY COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. E3, IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 194737	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Flores, Daniel	3. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 35	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-12	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/LA/COG	9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS.	OF	

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX CAREER	RESERVE	CONTRACT	OTHER (Spec.)	TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

XX ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT	SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
01 July 1975 - 30 June 1976

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 July 1976

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT.

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handle a sensitive and productive on-island agent in Cuban operations via TDY travel to meet, debrief, and prepare operational/intelligence reports.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Review incoming operational correspondence from Latin America on Cuban matters and ensure that prompt response and helpful guidance is provided.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintain a thorough familiarity with all Cuban activities in Latin America and our operations against them; carry out coordination with other components where appropriate.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develop leads against the Cuban target by locating, clearing, and ultimately interviewing relatives, friends, etc., of Cuban officials to obtain assessment data on the targets as well as use the leads in approaches to Cuban officials.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Work closely with the IA's of the section to ensure that they answer all required correspondence and to stimulate them to be creative and productive.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CL BY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer has worked under my supervision for approximately six months. This is the first fitness report I have prepared on him. After two field tours and his current assignment to Cuba Operations Group, he has developed into a solid and professional operations officer with the skills we hope our employees will develop. He is now highly motivated and creative in his work. He has demonstrated, particularly in recent months, a gratifying degree of drive and interest.

He has handled one of our most productive and sensitive on-island assets. With his guidance this agent has produced, within the past six months, some of the highest quality intelligence on Cuban plans and intentions this Agency has obtained. Because this agent must be serviced via TDY travel, the responsible case officer must be able to work with very little guidance and have the tradecraft skills and reports writing ability to work largely on his own. With this case Mr. Flores has demonstrated himself to be a first-class agent handler, highly attuned to operational information and quality intelligence production.

As Section Chief I have relied upon him heavily to provide the institutional memory our work demands. He has full grasp of all operations directed against Cuban officials, not only in those countries under his direct responsibility, but throughout Latin America. Since all of the officers in this section travel frequently to meet and debrief agents, Mr. Flores has frequently acted as Section Chief during the absence of the other two officers, a GS-14 position. He has been able to handle the job well both

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/LA/COG/NHA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Leonard D. Therty

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 20 Dec. 1976	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the ratings given by the rating officer.. Mr. Flores is indeed a fine operations officer and should have an exceptionally successful career in operations. The only weakness in him that I have ever noted is an occasional lack of drive and self-motivation and as noted by the rating officer, particularly in recent months, he seems to have cured this and has indeed been going at a fast pace.

Mr. Flores is leaving Cuba Operations Group for a rotational tour in the Office of Training. I believe that when he finishes this tour, he should return for an operational assignment in the Latin America area. He is an exceptionally fine case officer, has a native command of Spanish, and has a way of dealing with his agents that gets the most out of them. Future tours for him should involve supervision of younger case officers and he should begin to move into the managerial aspects of operations.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, LA/COG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Thomas A. Clayton

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

FITNESS REPORT

Daniel Flores

cont.

SECTION D

in terms of paper flow and personnel administration. He demonstrates an ability to advance further along these lines. Also during the period under review he participated in an approach against the local head of Cubana Airlines in a Latin America country. Although the recruitment effort was not successful, it was conducted in a professional manner and Mr. Flores used an access agent relative in a very effective manner.

He has been perhaps the most aggressive officer in the Cuba Operations Group in pursuing leads for interviews of relatives, friends, and acquaintances of Cuban officials posted abroad. During the period under review he conducted at least six such interviews and developed good assessment data on various targets.

As a native Spanish speaker, Mr. Flores has the ability to pass as a foreign national and has successfully carried out roles as a Mexican citizen, using OTS-provided false documents. This ability to pass as non-American has been of great assistance in handling the key case he relinquished only on leaving LA/COG.

Mr. Flores has now overcome an earlier reluctance to be aggressive which former supervisors might have noted. I am confident he will maintain and build further on what I have found to be a highly improved sense of enthusiasm. I am sure he will be a strong contributor to his new component.

* * *

No. 3

He is an officer who merits further responsibility and one who should continue to rise in rank as he assumes these additional responsibilities. It has been a pleasure to work with him and I should like to do so with him in the future.

S E C R E T

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 025231

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 194737	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Flores, Daniel	3. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 35	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-12	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/LA/COG	9. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS ☐ OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 October 1974 - 30 June 1975

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 July 1975

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Case Officer for COG's Latin America area responsible for operational support of LA field Stations Cuba programs.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer for two sensitive on-island agent operations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develop leads to potential Cuban recruitment targets and personally interview prospective access agents.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervisor for one Intelligence Analyst	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]

8 SEP 1975

12. IMPDET CL BY

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 25 11 08 AM '75

LA/COG is both a Headquarters [illegible] and an active operational "station" operating out of Headquarters, responsible for recruitment operations and agent handling. As such, Mr. Flores assignment is a combination of Headquarters desk chief and case officer of a large field station. His performance is being rated in both capacities which means that much higher criteria is being applied than for most Headquarters officers.

Mr. Flores has proved to be a professional agent handler, and has been used very effectively in two new, sensitive operations run from Headquarters. Although he did not participate in the recruitment of these sources, Mr. Flores was brought in to provide initial training, and detailed guidance necessary to develop the new assets into reporting sources. One was a complicated case of a DGI walk-in who Mr. Flores helped debrief, then trained and dispatched back to Cuba. The other was a successful false flag recruitment of a source with excellent access to the Cuban leadership; Mr. Flores' job, after being introduced by the recruiting officer, is to make the source into a fully controlled asset and maximize the excellent potential for intelligence information.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 8 August 1975

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: ADC/LA/COG

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: M. Michael Kline

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE: ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED

DATE: 9 Aug. 1975

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

LA/COG has six operations officers performing duties similar to those assigned to Mr. Flores--Case officer responsible for recruiting/handling agents directed against a hard target and also staff duties as a Desk Chief. These tasks are unique within the Latin America Division as these officers serve as field case officers and also as Headquarters desk officers. All on-island Cuban agents are handled by these six employees. I would rank Mr. Flores in the middle of this group, but it must be taken into consideration that all the other officers are senior in grade.

DATE: 8 August 1975

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: AC/LA/COG

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Thomas G. Clines

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 9 Aug. 1975

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

CLASSIFICATION

Continuation of Section D

His professional, no-nonsense handling has already contributed to highly significant information (a value quotient of 7.0 with one XX report) on some of the Agency's current Cuba priorities including Cuba's negotiating attitude vis-a-vis the U.S.

In his capacity as Desk officer for field stations in Latin America, Mr. Flores is charged with providing guidance and support aimed at recruitment operations against Cuban officials. He has conducted interviews of Cuban exiles in the U.S. and initiated a promising recruitment operation against a well placed third country official in Cuba. He supervises one intelligence analyst and, together, they effectively ensure timely response to field requests and help stations to identify operational opportunities, recruitment targets and--where necessary--keep them aware of the priority of the Cuban target.

By his performance, Mr. Flores has demonstrated he is a versatile case officer with good operational instincts; he is showing increasing agressiveness and imaginative support of field stations in their efforts to recruit Cuban officials. While he is an excellent agent handler who gets maximum intelligence production from his assets, he is less thorough when handling the administrative details involved in his operations. He needs more supervisory experience, and still tends to rely excessively on his IAs to search for operational leads and conduct operational research.

Mr. Flores was sponsored by the Division, and attended the mid-career course in November 1974. He has excellent potential for further advancement in the Division and has been a significant factor in LA/COG's success over the last year in developing access to Cuba, a recognized hard target.

Continuation of Section E

Subject excels as an agent handler motivating his agents and disciplining them when required to obtain quality intelligence. He handles two of LA/COG's most sensitive on-island agents and during this period, he has met these two agents in Europe and in Latin America. He has certainly targetted these two agents against priority objectives and the intelligence produced has been of vital interest to U.S. Government policymakers in this delicate period of Cuban negotiations. Latin America Division has received commendations from

Continuation of Section E

the intelligence community for reports acquired through Mr. Flores. Subject's staff duties include desk chief responsibilities for support and guidance to field programs including the research and targetting required to conduct an effective recruitment program. Although such duties requiring supervision are new to him, he is also making progress in this capacity. With proper guidance and assistance, he will develop into a most effective supervisor.

Mr. Flores native fluency in Spanish and his Latin background have proven most valuable to Cuban operations. In fact he represents himself as "Latin American" in handling one of this agents. For an officer his grade, he is very mature, self assured, has good common sense and is certainly a professional. Subject has completed two tours in the field and is an experienced ops officer. He is intelligent, imaginative, uses good tradecraft at all times and has a clear headed approach to the business. He expresses himself well orally and in writing, and works very well with other case officers. Mr. Flores keeps up to date on political, economic and social affairs pertaining to Cuba and he willingly accepts difficult tasks requiring frequent separations from his family.

Subject definitely has potential. He is operationally agressive and is gaining experience as a manager. Mr. Flores is already performing at a higher level than his grade. In approximately a year, he should be again dispatched to the field as a senior officer responsible for handling Soviet, Chinese or Cuban targets. During the next reporting period, Mr. Flores should receive training in superivsion. He is a solid performer in the Cuban Operations Group and has contributed much to our successes during the past year.

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (Last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
194737	Flores, Daniel	4 Aug 35	M	GS-12	D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION	10. CODE (ck one)
Ops Officer	DDO/LA/COG	Washington, DC	X HQS ☐ OF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) 5 March 1974 - 30 September 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Primary case officer for a sensitive Cuban penetration agent.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Provide operational support and guidance for Cuban operations conducted by LA Division Stations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Direct and supervise Intelligence Assistants assigned to specific areas of responsibilities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Desk case officer for access agents and support assets in LA Division Stations' Cuban operations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Search for leads in the U.S. for LA Division Cuban operations and personally debrief and exploit further exploitation.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 9-73 45 [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

E2 IMPDET CL BY 23 [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In a very short time, Mr. Flores has become an important factor in LA/COG's efforts to directly handle Cuban on-island agents, and to expand its recruitment program. His fluent Spanish, past operational experience, versatility and ability to blend into the local scene in most Latin American countries, make him highly qualified for his present assignment. He demonstrates sound operational judgment under often trying conditions, and good ability to communicate effectively both orally and in writing. His frequent TDYs demand long and unusual hours, which he gives ungrudgingly.

Almost immediately after his assignment to LA/COG in March 1974, Mr. Flores was called upon to handle a sensitive walk-in case. The agent had already been recruited and many of the developmental aspects of the case had been resolved prior to Mr. Flores' introduction, but it still required a Headquarters based case officer to provide the necessary continuity wherever the agent surfaced overseas. The case is complicated and time-consuming, involving extended TDYs and utmost adherence to good tradecraft procedures. It has developed into one of our most productive sources of information on Cuban clandestine

(cont'd)

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 NOV 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR LA/COG/OPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Myron M. Kline

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 6 Nov 1974	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the rating officer's comments and performance evaluation. Soon after his arrival at LA/COG, Mr. Flores took over the handling of a sensitive agent. While the agent's bona fides had already been established and his modus operandi determined, considerable ad hoc judgement and direction were required to continue the agent's motivation and ensure his viability. Mr. Flores did extremely well in his guidance of the agent in a series of complicated, extended meetings which took place in several LA countries. Good, professional tradecraft and sound judgement were exhibited by Mr. Flores.

As to his support of LA Station efforts against the Cuban target,

(cont'd)

DATE 16 Nov 74	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/LA/COG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Joseph Skura

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE 6 Nov 1974	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT - Daniel Flores

SECTION D (CONTINUED)

activities in Latin America, due largely to Mr. Flores' professionalism.

Mr. Flores' current assignment is a combination of operational and Headquarters desk responsibilities, the latter calling for the support of field stations in their efforts to develop individual Cuban recruitment programs. His extended TDYs have understandably prevented Mr. Flores from devoting much time to his desk responsibilities and it is somewhat difficult to judge his performance as a desk officer. He has a good grasp of what needs to be done, and his handling of specific tasks indicates good managerial potential. Nevertheless, he does need additional desk experience, especially in areas which will allow him to use his operational ability to support and guide field stations that are developing Cuban operational programs.

COMMENTS BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL (CONTINUED)

this aspect of his performance was less noteworthy, and it is believed more attention and research could have been given to this activity. Mr. Flores writes concisely and well, and his CI/CE instincts are sharp and true. He can be expected to turn in a solid desk performance in the future.

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT	NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
194737	Flores, Daniel	4 Aug 35	M	GS-12	D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDO/WH/Br 3	Lima, Peru

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		CAREER PROVISIONAL		RESERVE
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

	ANNUAL		21 MONTH		30-MONTH	XX	REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From to) 31 May 73-4 March 74

13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station officer responsible for operations against the MPCHEEK target	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Direction of and support for an outside principal agent and the assets handled by this principal agent	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Case officer responsible for a unilateral surveillance team	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

CONFIDENTIAL

APR 2 12 03 PM '74

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject's tour in Lima has been cut short by the serious illness of his daughter. As a result of this illness it was also necessary for him to spend the months of December and January on emergency leave in the United States, returning without his family in February in order to transfer his ops workload and pack out his personal effects for PCS transfer to Headquarters on 4 March.

Although the undersigned had the privilege of working with Subject only briefly, as rating officer he had the advantage of taking over handling of most of Subject's cases following the departure on emergency leave. Thus he was able to observe first hand and in detail the human material with which Subject had worked, the progress he had made in developing their access and capabilities, and the respect these agents had for him.

During the period covered by this report, Subject continued his pursuit of the MPCHEEK target as his primary operational responsibility. He developed and recruited a prominent member of the local MPCHEEK community who has good access to the MPCHEEK embassy and handled four other access agents. He also handled a unilateral surveillance team and the Station's press placement assets via a principal agent who in turn handled three sensitive assets.

(Continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 Mar 74	/s/ Daniel Flores

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 Mar 74	DCOS	/s/ Arthur T. Ladenburg

3 BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As the rater makes clear, Subject will be missed in Lima and we can only sympathize with the reasons why he must now leave. He was doing the Station a great deal of good and advancing his own career nicely as well. It is worth recalling that Subject presided here in Lima over what we understand is still a unique operational feat, a staged recruitment approach to an MPCHEEK official. Also, Subject was often used on a variety of operational tasks having little to do with his assigned targets because, in the

(Continued)

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 Mar 74	COS	/s/ Richard S. Welch

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Continuation of Narrative Comments

In carrying this heavy workload, Subject demonstrated that he is a superior agent handler. He succeeded in conveying to these people a sense of mission and participation which has kept their morale and motivation, and hence their production, at a high level. He also insisted upon work and security discipline, with a result that the record of these agents in prompt and reliable appearance for meetings and in responding in writing to requirements is extraordinarily good. They all have a clear idea of what is expected of them, confidence that performance will be rewarded and conversely that non-performance will not be tolerated. Just prior to his departure, Subject successfully terminated an entire surveillance team of long standing, a measure which was decided upon simply because the team had been heavily used for over five years and from a security standpoint replacement seemed to be in order. Letting old agents go is always a delicate and usually a thankless task. It takes finesse and bargaining skill. Subject showed these and more in divesting us of the team without a hitch.

During his last month in Lima, despite the fact that he was burdened with the problems of closing out his household and the normal operational and administrative cleanup prior to PCS departure, Subject made two very significant contributions to Station objectives. First, he coordinated with the Peruvian Government the official but necessarily discreet visit of a senior BKHERALD officer. Since the Station is not declared, Subject had to maintain his LNGOLD cover throughout, further complicating this delicate assignment. During the visit, he coordinated frequently with the head of the Peruvian National Intelligence Service and with the chief administrative aide of the President of Peru. He also participated directly in one meeting with the President. This was of course not the type of assignment which would normally be entrusted to a "junior officer", but Subject is junior only in relative grade, certainly not in maturity, self-assurance or judgment. Then with only three days left in Lima, Subject led an installation team which entered a building recently purchased by the MPCHEEKs, remained for almost 48 hours and made two apparently excellent audio installations.

The Station will miss Subject a great deal. As the above incidents demonstrate, when the tough or sensitive assignments came up, he was the officer we turned to most frequently. He never balks, argues inconvenience, or seeks the way out. He is cooperative, helpful, and in a low-key way is always effective. We hope he will not object to the term "old reliable" -- he has been that in Lima, and more.

SECRET

SECRET

Continuation of Comments of Reviewing Officer

first instance he was bilingual and could fade into the Lima background. But he would not have been so regarded if he had not shown ample good sense, zeal, and balanced judgment in unfamiliar situations. We hope Subject can get overseas again within a reasonable time and consider that the Station that gets him will be fortunate.

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT	NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 036130	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Flores, Daniel	3. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 35	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS11	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/WH/3	9. CURRENT STATION Lima, Peru

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		CAREER PROVISIONAL		RESERVE
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL*		TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

XX	ANNUAL		21 MONTH		30 MONTH		REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July 1972-31 May 73

13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station officer responsible for operations against the MPCHEEK target.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handler for sensitive unilateral penetration of the Revolutionary Government	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervise principal agent	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Miscellaneous operational support activity, including direction of a unilateral surveillance team.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 3/73 45N

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Following realignment of Station officer assignments last year, Subject was given the responsibility for operations against the MPCHEEK "hard target". He also assumed additional tasks in more traditional areas, such as coverage of the local government, penetration of the Communist Party, and press placement activity. The breadth of these operational commitments attests Subject's professional ability and versatility. (This would be a senior case officer's load by any description and Subject's performance at it was the reason behind our recommendation for accelerated promotion last year.)

Particularly against the difficult MPCHEEK target, this officer has displayed admirable determination despite the inherent frustrations and disappointments of working against this remote and suspicious group. During the period under review, his job has been the more difficult since the MPCHEEKS, in all probability reacting to a Station attempted recruitment operation (in which Subject played a major role), have withdrawn into a defensive shell which makes access operations verge on the impossible. Nevertheless, he has continued to probe their defenses, and has managed to develop two leads which, with the exercise of patience and application of his proven operational resources, could eventually give us access to the official MPCHEEK Mission here. This officer refuses to become discouraged, a quality officers working on hard targets must have.

Special mention is made of Subject's successful bid to make recontact and establish regular meetings with a valuable penetration of the revolutionary government. The agent had broken contact with his former handler in the belief that such action was dictated by his security situation. Our choice of Subject to attempt to recontact this asset was dictated by his experience in dealing with skittish Latins and our belief that Subject could bring it off with tact, reading the situation /CONTINUED/

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 28 June 1973	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Daniel Flores

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 20	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 28 June 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Thomas J. Keenan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As described, this officer is a steady and solid performer who carries a major case load securely, productively, and without complaint. He has even volunteered to take on additional work when he has seen opportunities to help the Station's overall mission. Because he blends in well on the local scene, he is often drafted for all kinds of ad hoc operational work. This is invariably well done. He is operationally aggressive but also shows lively awareness of the tricky operational climate here and does not push beyond what the traffic will bear. His agents respect his seriousness, which permits him to get more utility out of them. He is a pillar of this Station.

DATE 2 July 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Pichard S. Welch

CONFIDENTIAL

Section C continued.....

as it developed, and make appropriate on-the-spot adjustments to control the asset's reactions. All this had to be accomplished with great regard to security because of the sensitive position occupied by the agent. Subject's performance has been effective and, given the operation's importance, can really be called outstanding. The agent is again a prime source on the radical sector of the government, which is crucial to developments locally.

Further, this officer continues to manage an outside principal agent who in turn handles leftists, Communist Party and press placement assets, so directing these efforts that they contribute effectively to overall Station objectives. More recently, Subject has taken over the unilateral deployment of a new audio operation targetted against a senior local Communist Party official and is carrying it through successfully. This officer also handles much of the support requirements for his various operations, including management of safehouse keepers, overseeing a small surveillance team, and acquisition of rental cars and property in alias. There is little doubt that some of Subject's success can be attributed to his Latin background and fluent Spanish. But both of these advantages might be wasted by a less capable all-round officer. In his case, they provide him with complementary skills that enhance his superior performance. In the view of the reporting officer, Subject carries more than his own share here in Lima in a manner normally calling for an officer of considerably more senior grade and experience.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
036130

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Flores Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3		8. CURRENT STATION Lima		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- XX ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 August 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
24 September 1971 - 30 June 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Direction of and administrative support for three outside principal agents whose efforts he directs against the Communist Party, extreme left and labor targets	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Coordinator of all Station operations against the left, including management of the project covering this activity.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Case officer in charge of the Station's labor reporting assets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E O 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1) (2)
AUT.
IMPDET
(unless impossible, insert date or event)
31 AUG 73

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In the period of this report, Subject established himself and his family at this post and undertook the direction of the Station's operations against the subversive left which had formerly been handled by an officer two grades senior to Subject. He has proved equal to the task. He learned his new assignment rapidly and adapted well to the handling of his cases through outside principal agents, a security requirement of the local scene which can be frustrating for an aggressive officer ~~with~~ fluent Spanish such as Subject. However, he has shown maturity and superior handling ability in directing his assets against the subversive left and particularly the Communist labor union. His intimate knowledge of the extreme left enabled him to plan secure contact with a "walk-in" to the Embassy who at first appeared genuine. After thoroughly debriefing this individual, drawing upon his knowledge of the extreme left, Subject was able to recommend no continuing contact with him due to specific fabrications on the part of the walk-in.

He is careful in management of funds entrusted to him for his operations and provides required administrative and operational reports in a timely manner. There have been past comments on Subject's weakness in writing. He has worked hard on this, and the rating officer feels that he is now competently producing the reports required. Subject understands that this is an area that requires continuing attention for a growing professional. /CONTINUED/

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 August 1972	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Daniel Flores

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 August 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Thomas J. Keenan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject has come up the hard way, both in pushing on to finish his education and in BKTRUST. As a result he is way under-graded for his maturity and for his operational contributions. That we have given Subject a major responsibility here (STPAGODA) attests to how much confidence we have in him and his ability. He is, of course, bi-lingual and mixes well with Latins, an advantage he uses well. A good "street" operator, he still has a way to go in organizing his paper work and in relating to Hqs needs.

DATE 15 August 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Richard S. Welch

SECRET

SECTION C continued.....

A comment must be made on Subject's great ability to adjust rapidly to one-time and target of opportunity assignments. His performance in meeting with two high level agents of other stations who had to be met during stays in Peru, and his on-site assistance in an audio operation against a priority target have been of the highest order. No doubt his fluent Spanish greatly assisted him in these tasks, but his experience and good judgment were major factors in his excellent performance in the role of utility operations officer.

To exploit Subject's talents to the fullest, and provide him with the professional challenge equal to his ability, he has now been assigned the management and handling of the difficult Chinese target, a top priority for the Station. This is a true measure of our confidence in him.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
036130

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Flores, Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 08/04/35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 October 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 May 1971 - 30 September 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Reviewed by [illegible]

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 17 2 17 PM '71

Mr. Daniel Flores completed his first tour in Guayaquil and departed the field on 28 May 1971. Following home leave, Mr. Flores returned to Headquarters in August for approximately two months training prior to his next assignment to Lima, Peru. This training included Weapons Familiarization and Defensive Driving, CA, China and Labor Ops, Communist Party, TSD briefings, and on-the-desk Reports Writing Familiarization.

Since Mr. Flores has been on leave or training status for most of this reporting period, no meaningful rating can be given.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS
1.	BY EMPLOYEE
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION employee in training	
DATE 16 August 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR WH/Personnel Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John Ferguson
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Flores, Daniel
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Aug 1935
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-10
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/3
8. CURRENT STATION: Guayaquil

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
XX CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL XX REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1970/30 April 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Case Officer responsible for a Base project targetted against the subversive left.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case Officer responsible for a sensitive technical operation including the selection of intelligence resulting from the operation.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Development of new agent assets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of dispatches, intelligence reports and other correspondence pertinent to his area of responsibility.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

Reviewed by [illegible]

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUN 7 3 25 PM '71

There has been little change in Subject's performance since the submission of his last report covering the period through 30 September 1970.

The highpoint of his activities during this period, as it has been throughout his tour, has been his management of a sensitive technical operation which has been a consistent producer of unique and high level intelligence. This has been a good performance on Subject's part indicative of his professional capability to conduct clandestine operations.

Subject's writing ability has improved during this period, and there is little doubt that his efforts in this regard are paying off. Further experience should see continued improvement of his writing skills.

As Subject's first tour comes to a close he can look back on a generally strong performance in all phases of his operational activity on behalf of the Base's objectives.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
3 May 1971	/s/ Daniel Flores

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
20		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 May 1971	COB, Guayaquil	/s/ Robert Fambrini

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the ratings and remarks of the supervisor. During his first tour abroad, Subject has done very well in his main fields of activity. His outstanding attribute at the moment is his persistence not only in going after operational targets but also in improving himself. He has encountered some difficulty in presenting his ideas in written form but he has faced up to this problem and, as the rating officer notes, has made significant improvement.

(Continued)

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 May 71	COS, Quito	/s/ Paul V. Harwood

Continuation of Comments by Reviewing Official

Subject has a clear-headed approach to the collection of intelligence and is realistic in evaluating potential sources. His fluency in the Spanish language has facilitated his movement in the local community and he has developed several potentially useful sources and identified others.

In considering this officer for promotion, two facts should be kept in mind:

a. He is probably older and certainly more mature than the average officer at his grade level. He is anxious to get ahead and this explains much of his initiative and drive.

b. The rating officer has rated him very realistically which, in my view, adds to the importance of the outstanding rating given him on Specific Duty No. 2.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TRAINING REPORT

Weapons Training/Defensive Driving Course No. 1/72 2-6 August 1971
Date

TRAINEE: **FLORES, Daniel** OFFICE: **WH**

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF COURSE:

The course provides basic proficiency training in the use of weapons for self-defense and in the techniques of defensive driving to counter vehicular kidnaping for Agency officers being assigned to hostile or unstable political and operational environments abroad.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD:

This is to certify that Mr. Flores has satisfactorily completed the prescribed course of instruction.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Joseph M. Hudacek
JOSEPH M. HUDACEK
Chief, Special Activities Branch

9 August 1971
Date

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Certification of Handgun Qualification

9 August 1971
Date

Mr. Frederick E. Owens and
(Instructor SAB Staff, OTG, ISOLATION)
Identity

Trainee FLORES, Daniel, WH
Identity

on 2-6 August, Mr. Flores was given 28 hours
date identity

instruction in firing techniques, weapon care and safe weapons handling procedures. Subsequently Mr. Flores (identity) fired the handgun qualification course with a Automatic (Cal.-9mm) / Revolver (Cal.38) (weapon) achieving a score of 258 / 261 out of a possible 300. Mr. Flores (identity) demonstrated that he had absorbed the instruction on safe weapon handling and that he exercises due care and discretion. Accordingly Mr. Flores (identity) is certified as qualified with the Automatic (Cal. - 9mm) / Revolver (Cal. - 38) (weapon) as of this date.

Signed

Fred E. Owens
FREDERICK E. OWENS, SAB/OTG
Instructor Identity

SECRET

Continuation of Narrative Comments

the target is good. The project is, however, in need of good human reporting assets and it is expected that as Subject overcomes a weakness mentioned in the next paragraph he will be able to devote more of his time to this important task.

The Subject has encountered some difficulty in the preparation of written material -- dispatches, intelligence reports -- and finds it necessary to spend an extended portion of his time on its preparation. The rater has discussed this with Subject on several occasions, and it is believed that his difficulty is due to a lack of experience, and that in time and with a continuing effort on his part he will develop his writing skills.

The Subject's overall attitude and response towards his professional responsibilities during the first tour have been positive. He is interested in the kind of work he is doing, likes it and is willing to put in the kind of long hours it sometimes demands without complaint.

Continuation of Comments of Reviewing Official

of the Base. He responds positively to guidance and direction; he is eager for new opportunities to enlarge his experience and knowledge. He appears to be completely motivated toward the work of this organization; it is a pleasure to have him in Guayaquil.

SECRET

Released by [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The period covered by this report encompasses the middle portion of the Subject's first tour as a Case Officer. His performance during this period has been balanced in that he has shown the kind of intelligence and maturity necessary to successfully carry out clandestine operational activity. He has also shown a weakness which he will need to overcome in order to achieve his full operating potential.

The Subject has turned in fine performance in the overall management of a very important and sensitive audio operation which has been under his care since the pre-installation phase. His sure and careful handling of all succeeding phases of this operation led to a secure, uncomplicated installation, the recruitment and training of support agents, and the dissemination of valuable intelligence information. Subject's natural fluency in the Spanish language has been especially useful in this operation. His handling of this installation has been of a high professional caliber throughout.

The Subject is also responsible for the management of a project targetted against the subversive left. His handling of this project has been good: he is a good agent handler; knows how to target his assets against objectives of most importance; and, his knowledge of

(Continued)

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 30 Oct. 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Daniel Flores

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 30 Oct. 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert L. Fambrini /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the ratings. This has been a good year for Subject, one which has given him a rather unusual opportunity to learn many facets of the work of this organization and one in which he has shown a very satisfactory level of accomplishment. Shortly after his arrival in Guayaquil he became, for a short time, the Acting Chief of Base, and through that period and the ensuing change in Base Chiefs, he showed a professional maturity we felt to be exceptional for a young officer on his first tour. He has worked hard and intensely for improvement in the quantity and quality of his operational production, and he has collaborated very effectively with the other officers

(Continued)

DATE 30 Oct. 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John A. [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 036120

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Flores, Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Branch 3	8. CURRENT STATION [illegible]		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					X ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):					SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 October 1969 - 30 September 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Case Officer responsible for Base project targetted against the subversive left	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case Officer responsible for a sensitive audio operation including the selection of the intelligence resulting from the operation	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 The development of new agent assets and operations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of dispatches, intelligence reports and other correspondence pertinent to the operation in his area of responsibility	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Section C Narrative Comments, Cont'd

disciplined, effective manner enabling him to maintain a continuity and productivity within the Base operational requirements with security and dispatch.

Socially Subject and his wife are proving to be good mixers and both are gaining in popularity within the local foreign and indigenous communities. They both have gained the respect and appreciation of the complex not only as compatible personalities, but in her willingness to participate actively in joint charitable endeavors and his professional cooperative attitude. Their optimistic and positive conduct at official and non-official functions is a credit to the Base.

Subject's native fluency in Spanish and his Latin background is proving to be a definite asset in the performance of his assigned operational tasks and ability to handle agent assets amicably and productively.

He maintains accurate accounting records and is demonstrating responsible acute cost consciousness in the use of funds and properties.

This rater's principal criticism of this employee is his tendency toward impulsiveness and too-quick judgement before weighing all the facts and implications in the pursuit of his operational requirements; however, this weakness is more a function of his inexperience in the field and will be resolved as he gains more field experience.

Subject, although exhibiting resourcefulness and imagination in performing his assigned operational tasks also has a tendency to accept the judgement of other senior grade officers too readily rather than express his own convictions and trust in his own assessment of a situation.

This rater has conseled this Officer regarding these tendencies and he is taking measures to rectify them.

In judging his over all performance, this Rater is of the opinion if he continues to apply himself in handling tasks worthy of a senior grade officer, he should be considered for a promotion to the GS-10 level at the earliest opportunity.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Flores, Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8-4-35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Br 3	8. CURRENT STATION Guayaquil		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 13 May 1969 - 30 September 1969

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Case Officer responsible for handling Base operations and assets targetted against hard- and soft-line communist activities in the coastal areas of Ecuador.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case Officer responsible for the handling of three sensitive audio operations. He is also responsible for the translations, processing, and dissemination of the relevant intelligence info.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Case Officer of student assets targetted against the extreme leftist elements within student groups.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Development of new contacts and operations, including following up operational leads and recruitment pitches.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Case Officer responsible for writing his own intelligence disseminations prepared from information obtained from his agent assets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Drafts operational correspondence, Project Renewals, and Progress Reports.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OCT 28 10 46 AM '69

This employee, a GS-09, arrived PCS at the Guayaquil Base on 13 May 1969 and has been under this Rater's supervision during this four and one-half month period. Guayaquil is his first overseas assignment with this Agency.

During this short reviewing period, this Officer has demonstrated a marked insight and knowledgeableness of the operations he has been assigned, and has provided a number of good ideas and suggestions for the betterment of these operations. Subject is proving to be a hard worker and has not complained of the many extra hours he has devoted to his operations. He has accepted responsibilities without hesitation and is not afraid to take on difficult tasks using initiative and ingenuity in their completion. This latter quality has been amply demonstrated when the Rater was unexpectedly confined to a hospital in the Panama Canal Zone for the full month of August 1969, leaving this employee solely responsible for the Base as the only inside Case Officer at the Base during this time. Rater's absence corresponded with a change in Case Officer PCS assignments at the Base, which left the Base temporarily depleted of Officers. During this period, Subject exhibited an ability and maturity expected of an officer of higher grade and greater field experience. He organized his increased workload in a

...Continued...

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
2 October 1969	/s/ Daniel Flores

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
2 October 1969	Chief of Base	/s/ Neil Hinckley

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This Officer has made a most impressive beginning in Guayaquil. He has in a few short months adapted to new tasks and a new environment with mature, if modest, assurance and a professional approach which speaks highly for the training and experience he has had. He has taken on, in the absence of the Chief of Base and other senior officers, responsibilities uncommon to an officer of his junior position, and he has handled them in a superior fashion. He and his wife have entered into their representational responsibilities with great enthusiasm and effectiveness, and I predict a most highly successful tour for him in Ecuador. Because he has shown a personal and professional competence beyond his grade level, it is strongly recommended that he be considered for promotion to GS-10 at the earliest opportunity.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 October 1969	Chief of Station	/s/ John S. Morgan

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Flores Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/4		8. CURRENT STATION HQS		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☐ ANNUAL XX REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 19 September 1968 - 30 April 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operations officer handling the Headquarters direction and support of FI projects and activities. DB10	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of operational correspondence, dispatches, cables and special memoranda.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordination of operational matters with other components and desks.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 13 MAY 1969	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Flores did a fine job while he was assigned to the Chile desk. He had responsibility for a variety of FI projects, including several complex and sensitive ones, which he ably handled. He had a full workload and in addition to his assigned responsibilities he was given FI assignments of every type as they arose. On one occasion he was sent on an operational trip to New York City where he was to contact, assess and support a target personality. Owing to circumstances beyond his control nothing went as expected but Mr. Flores, acting alone, improvised and adapted to the situation. This is indicative of the initiative and eagerness he displayed in his desk work. He was willing to learn and he accepted guidance and instruction to the letter. In addition Mr. Flores writes well and this is always an asset.

Mr. Flores is fluent in Spanish. It is my impression that if there is one thing that Mr. Flores wants to be that is a field case officer. He is now getting that chance. He will soon leave on an assignment to Ecuador. I have no doubt that he will do very well.

Mr. Flores did not have any managerial duties.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE April 28, 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 28 April 69	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/4/Chile	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert Wiecha

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above assessment.

DATE 29 April 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH/4	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Raymond A.Warren

SECRET

[illegible]

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE) GS Employee Serial No.

FLORES, **Daniel** **07** **036130**

2. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP REPORTING PERIOD

30 November 1968 17 December 1967 - 31 October 1968

3. This Career Trainee has been engaged in courses of the Integrated Program with extensive training in Clandestine Operations.

Detailed evaluations of his performance in each phase are contained in his Official Personnel Folder. Definition of the rating letter corresponds to that in Section B, Fitness Report Form 45 [illegible].

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN INTEGRATED PROGRAM Proficient

4. COMMENT AND PERTINENT OBSERVATIONS.

Mr. Flores entered the CT Program on 11 December 1967, sponsored by DDP/WH Division. His work during formal training was characterized by determination, hard work, and a strong ambition to become a successful Clandestine Services operations officer. He responded well to supervision and guidance and experienced no difficulties in assimilating the principles and techniques covered by the instruction. In Operations Course Phase I, the key course for DDP case officers, he achieved an overall performance rating of HIGH PROFICIENT.

At the previous request of his Division Chief, Mr. Flores was, effective 10 October 1968, reassigned to DDP/WH Division.

27 NOV 1968

25 November 1968 John Gerry

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FLORES, Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-05	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Clerk	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG	8. CURRENT STATION WASH., D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
CAREER | RESERVE | TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify)

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
INITIAL | REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
ANNUAL | REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
X SPECIAL (Specify) Recommendation for Promotion

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 February 1967-15 June 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Performs intelligence operations support work in connection with Cuban CI operations in third countries. Assembles lead files, collates data on hand and additions information received in preparation for target analysis. DEM	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens Cuban Spanish language publications for information of value in the branch counter espionage-counter intelligence records and for operational data. DEM	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison between two contract agents and WH/COG/CICS and maintains the administrative records for these cases.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares translations from Spanish to English and English to Spanish of operational correspondence. DEM	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Flores is a part-time staff employee who works a maximum of 19½ hours per week while attending university full-time. In August 1967 he will obtain his bachelor's degree in political science. He will revert to full-time employment upon finishing his university studies and will be recommended to the Office of Training for admission in the CT class beginning November 1967.

The limitations imposed by part-time employment have prevented us from assigning Mr. Flores to jobs within the branch such as the monitoring of active field cases which require close, daily attention. However, he is qualified for this type of duty. His performance in the duties described above is excellent. He accomplishes his tasks quietly and efficiently with a minimum of guidance from his supervisor. Because he is bi-lingual in Spanish and English he is of great use to the Branch in screening quickly and accurately materials which are of counter-intelligence interest.

Mr. Flores agency work background, coupled with his formal education about to be completed and his own desire to make a career in intelligence make him an extremely valuable employee, one in whom the Agency should not hesitate to invest time and money for the advancement of his career training.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: June 14, 1967
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE:
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: DC/WH/COG/CICS
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Carl Trottin

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I would rate Mr. Flores essentially the same as Mr. Trottin. I wish to stress that, although young and inexperienced in intelligence work at the present time, the potential is certainly there. After CT training Mr. Flores should be a fine, dedicated and competent officer.

DATE:
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WH/COG/CICS
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Harry Mahoney

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
036130

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Flores Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-05	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Clerk	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG		8. CURRENT STATION WASH., D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
	CAREER	RESERVE	X	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	TEMPORARY		ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 66 - 31 Jan 67

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conducts liaison between two contract agents and WH/COG/CICS	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains files and handles administrative matters for these same two contract agents, including travel, housing, payments, etc.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares translations from Spanish to English and from English to Spanish	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares material for input for the CUIS Madine Program	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

1 FEB 1967

FORM 8-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JAN 30 10 48 AM '67
MAIL ROOM

Mr. Flores has continued to perform at the same proficient level cited in his previous fitness report. The ratings and remarks appended to this report, accordingly, still remain applicable.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Arnold Flores

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 26 January 67	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WH/COG/CICS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harry T. Mahoney

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Flores turns in a good piece of finished work and has demonstrated increasing ability as a Case Officer. As soon as he graduates I plan to recommend him for CT training. I have discussed the matter with him and hepplans to make a career with the Agency which will be mutually advantageous to him and the Agency.

DATE 30 Jan 67	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, WH/COG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Earl Williamson

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FLORES, Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-05	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Asst.	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C	8. CURRENT STATION Washington D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☑ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 65 - 31 March 66

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conducts liaison between two contract agents and WH/COG/CICS	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains files and handles administrative matters for these same two contract agents, including travel, housing, payments, etc.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares translations from Spanish to English and from English to Spanish	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares material for input for the CUIS Machine Program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Dec 2 1 30 PM '66

Mr. Flores is a part-time staff employee who works a minimum of nineteen hours per week; he is also a full time college student in his senior year, majoring in political science and specializing in Latin American studies. Subsequent comments should be prefaced by the statement that Mr. Flores' overall performance of his assigned duties would be considerably more efficient if he were able to devote full time to his assignment. On the other hand, Mr. Flores is preparing himself academically for a useful career with the Agency and in the rater's opinion shows promise of becoming a very capable and competent officer.

Mr. Flores is bilingual and has served very efficiently as a translator for the Branch. He has gained very valuable experience as a case officer in the handling of two contract agents of WH/COG/CICS and in doing so has demonstrated tact, sound judgment and a fine ability to handle people. Mr. Flores is very personable, intelligent and makes an excellent appearance. With the completion of his studies he should be able to make the transition from Intelligence Assistant to Junior Case Officer, which the rater heartily recommends.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
30 November 1966	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
11 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
30 November 66	DC/WH/COG/CICS	John A. Castoro

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Flores has worked closely under my direct supervision in the handling of the two contract employees listed under Specific Duty No. 1 and 2. I concur with the rating of Mr. Castoro and can only emphasize that I believe Mr. Flores will make a good Case Officer and I plan to recommend him for CT status as soon as he is able to be with us full time.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
30 Nov 1966	Chief, WH/COG/CICS	Harry T. Mahoney

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): FLORES, Daniel
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Aug 35
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-05
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intel Clerk
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/COG
8. CURRENT STATION: WASH., D.C.
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Recommendation for Promotion

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 February 1967-15 June 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Performs intelligence operations support work in connection with Cuban CI operations in third countries. Assembles lead files, collates data on hand and additions information received in preparation for target analysis.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens Cuban Spanish language publications for information of value in the branch counter-espionage-counter intelligence records and for operational data.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison between two contract agents and WH/COG/CICS and maintains the administrative records for these cases.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares translations from Spanish to English and English to Spanish of operational correspondence.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-64 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Flores is a part-time staff employee who works a maximum of 19½ hours per week while attending university full-time. In August 1967 he will obtain his bachelor's degree in political science. He will revert to full-time employment upon finishing his university studies and will be recommended to the Office of Training for admission in the CT class beginning November 1967.

The limitations imposed by part-time employment have prevented us from assigning Mr. Flores to jobs within the branch such as the monitoring of active field cases which require close, daily attention. However, he is qualified for this type of duty. His performance in the duties described above is excellent. He accomplishes his tasks quietly and efficiently with a minimum of guidance from his supervisor. Because he is bi-lingual in Spanish and English he is of great use to the Branch in screening quickly and accurately materials which are of counter-intelligence interest.

Mr. Flores agency work background, coupled with his formal education about to be completed and his own desire to make a career in intelligence make him an extremely valuable employee, one in whom the Agency should not hesitate to invest time and money for the advancement of his career training.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE June 14, 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/WH/COG/CICS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Carl Trettin

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I would rate Mr. Flores essentially the same as Mr. Trettin, I wish to stress that, although young and inexperienced in intelligence work at the present time, the potential is certainly there. After CT training Mr. Flores should be a fine, dedicated and competent officer.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/COG/CICS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harry Mahoney

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
036130

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FLORES, Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 35	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-05	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Asst.	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SAS		8. CURRENT STATION Washington D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):					SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Served as interpreter for WH/SA counterintelligence operations officers and Office of Communications officers in training and briefing agents being prepared for dispatch to denied area (Cuba). DE62	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assisted in the debriefing of a Cuban intelligence service defector. DP32	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Translated and participated in the preparation of agent S/W messages, cover letters, and OWVL messages. DB63	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Performed traces and research relating to counterintelligence operations and activities. DC30	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

13 APR 1965

FORM 6-63 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Flores was a particularly useful and versatile employee in the WH/SA counterintelligence operations unit. Although he had no operational training or previous operational experience, he learned rapidly and performed well the operational support type duties assigned to him. His fluent knowledge of the Spanish language, his willingness to learn and perform tedious tasks, and his conscientious approach to his work were important factors in his performance. His previous assignments in the RI Division and in WH/SA as a translator and in conducting name traces gave him a good background.

With respect to specific duty #3, on two separate operations in New York City Mr. Flores participated in the training and preparation of agents for dispatch to Cuba. In the first operation he interpreted for training in S/W, OWVL, W/T (medium speed) and related subjects. The second operation involved OWVL only. This experience enable Mr. Flores to perform duties (specific duty #3.) relating to communications with agents in Cuba.

Mr. Flores plans to continue his university education and attain a degree. Arrangements have been completed so that he may work in the Agency on a part time basis beginning in January 1965. He will attend classes at a local university as a full time student.

Mr. Flores was promoted from GS-04 to GS-05 on 16 March 1964. He has been performing duties at the GS-06 level, and he should be promoted.

(see page two)

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 6 April 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David Flores

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 15 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 6 April 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/SA/CI Ops (WH/C/RR/OS)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Richard Tansing

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

DATE 4-6-65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/SA/CI (WH/C/SP)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harold F. Swenson

SECRET

Mr. Flores is cost conscious and effective in the use of space, equipment and funds.

Mr. Flores does not hold a supervisory position.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
036130

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FLORES Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug. 1935	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-4	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Translator	7. OFF DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- ☐ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- X SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion Recommendation

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
10 June 1963 to 6 December 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translates material from Spanish to English and vice-versa. Translates agent messages.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Performs name traces, analyses, extracts and summarizes obtained information.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares and initiates requests for operational clearances.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Writes and prepares dispatches, cables and memoranda.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

30 DEC 1963

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Flores entered on duty with Special Affairs Staff in June 1963. Due to his proficiency in Spanish he was assigned to translating duties and immediately proved to be an invaluable asset to this office as well as to the Staff as a whole. He worked many late hours and weekends helping to facilitate the flow of translations from this office to the different components within SAS. His performance of these duties can best be characterized as "exceptional" in all degrees.

Mr. Flores expressed a desire to move into a position of greater responsibility and this request was readily granted approximately one month ago. He is currently being trained as an intelligence assistant in Ops Support functions and his performance to date has been excellent. In his new duties Mr. Flores requires very little supervision. This can be attributed in part to his degree of intelligence as well as the background he obtained for his present duties while assigned to his previous job in RID/INDEX. Mr. Flores spent approximately one year in his former job and the knowledge he brought with him relating to name tracing procedures has enabled him to grasp the duties of his new position quite rapidly.

As a means of furthering his education Mr. Flores is attending American University at night. He has expressed a desire to obtain some agency training and would like very much to be enrolled in the Intelligence Orientation Course as soon as possible.

Mr. Flores entered the agency as a GS-4 in March 1962. It is strongly recommended that he be promoted at the earliest possible date to a GS-5.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 17 Dec 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Daniel Flores Daniel Flores

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 17 Dec 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR CHIEF, SAS/ICS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOSEPH A. HOUGHAN

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the assessment of the supervisor, concur in his decision to move Mr. Flores into a position of greater responsibility, and I support the recommendation that Mr. Flores be promoted.

Attached is a formal recommendation.

DATE 19 Dec 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL CHIEF, SAS/INTEL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOHN K. KING

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
036130

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FLORES Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-4	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE File Clerk	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OPSER/RID/RE/IN		8. CURRENT STATION Hdqrs.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
XX	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
13 December 1962 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conducts name traces in the Main Index of the Records Integration Division.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Fulfills daily and weekly maintenance duties required of all name checkers; e.g., filing, auditing and refiling.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

28 [illegible]

FORM 6-61 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in mind their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

MAIL ROOM
APR 23 4 13 PM '63

During this reporting period, Mr. Flores continued to conduct himself in the exceptionally proficient manner which was noted in his last Fitness Report. He is one of two name tracers who specialize in a particular area, a fact which tends to increase the difficulty as well as the responsibility of name tracing. In spite of this burden, Mr. Flores has consistently maintained an above average level of production and an exceptionally high quality in his finished products.

Mr. Flores is a conscientious and highly motivated employee who evidences a sound sense of responsibility. He has frequently voiced a desire to take advantage of any career opportunities the Agency may offer to him. He is currently enrolled as a full-time student at the American University.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 10 April 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Flores

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 10 April, 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, RID/EI (H/S)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE James J. Raley JAMES J. RALEY, Jr.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 16 April 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, RID/Index	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE AUBREY L. POSEY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 036130

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FLORES, Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-4	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE File Clerk	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OPSER/RID/RB		8. CURRENT STATION Hdqrs.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
XX	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

X	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 12 January 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 12 March 1962 - 12 December 1962

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Performs name traces of personal and impersonal subjects in the RI/Index.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Fulfills daily and weekly requirements of maintenance duties; e.g., filing, purging, auditing, and screening of index cards.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

From the outset Mr. Flores has shown many characteristics of an above-average employee. His initial training in the intricacies of his duty assignment was marked by a high degree of application, interest, and achievement. Since that time Mr. Flores has proven himself a conscientious and responsible employee, one whose work record is distinguished by a high calibre of quality and quantity.

Because of his fine record, Mr. Flores was chosen one of the three area specialists for this section. He specializes in the Spanish-Portuguese area and his work is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

At present Mr. Flores is registered at American University as a sophomore. Inasmuch as he has exhibited both potentiality and strong working habits, I recommend that Mr. Flores be given the Professional Battery Test at the earliest opportunity.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
3 January 1963	Daniel Flores

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
7 months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
3 January 1963	Deputy Chief, RID/IN (N/S)	James J. Raley JAMES J. RALEY, Jr.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully concur in the above evaluation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 January 1963	Chief, RID/Index	AUBREY L. HOSEY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAINING EVALUATION--CLERICAL INDUCTION

SECTION I — IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME OF STUDENT FLORES, Daniel	SEX M	DATES OF ATTENDANCE 19-23 March 1962 FULL PART
DATE OF BIRTH 4 August 1935	EOD DATE 12 March 1962	TITLE AND GRADE File Clerk GS-4

SECTION II — CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

Each course subject is taught daily for a 5-day period. Students who do not meet Agency standards in shorthand and/or typewriting within this 5-day period receive further instruction in an attempt to meet the established qualifications. The second week of geography instruction is given to students who have not been assigned to their positions. It is possible that not all students will be assigned to every course subject.

SECTION III — OBJECTIVES

To meet the typewriting criterion based on the scale on the reverse of this page. (For qualification, students must meet this requirement once.)
To take dictation at 80 words a minute for 3 minutes and to transcribe with 5 or fewer errors in not more than 20 minutes. (For qualification, students must meet this requirement once.)
To recognize errors in grammar and in punctuation and capitalization.
To study the politics and the geography of countries of Europe and Asia. (These continents are covered in alternate weeks.)
To receive instruction in typing of reproduction masters, making erasures, caring for the typewriter, and utilizing typing shortcuts.
To become familiar with the system of filing as outlined in the Agency's "Handbook for Subject Filing."

SECTION IV — QUALIFICATION IN SKILLS

COURSE PERFORMANCE				QUALIFICATION		
				QUALIFIED		NOT QUALIFIED
				IN COURSE	AT EOD	
TYPEWRITING	WPM 44	ERRORS 15	NET 29			X
SHORTHAND	WPM	ERRORS				

SECTION V — RATINGS

Agency samplings of students' ratings indicate the percentage distribution as noted below. This trainee's rating is marked by the asterisk.

SUBJECT	POOR	FAIR	SATISFACTORY	EXCELLENT
GRAMMAR	4%	18% *	51%	27%
PUNCTUATION AND CAPITALIZATION	20% *	27%	41%	12%

EXCELLENT - - - - thorough knowledge of material presented and above-average performance in meeting course goals.
SATISFACTORY - - average knowledge of material presented and adequate performance in meeting course goals.
FAIR - - - - - - borderline knowledge of material presented and limited performance in meeting course goals.
POOR - - - - - - inadequate knowledge of material presented and unsatisfactory performance in meeting course goals.

SECTION VI — FAMILIARIZATION LECTURES

X GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE ☐ GEOGRAPHY OF ASIA X AGENCY FILING SYSTEM X OFFICE PRACTICE

SECTION VII — COMMENTS

This student was assigned to the class in typewriting at his own request. Because it is not necessary for an individual whose job title is File Clerk to meet Agency standards in typewriting, he was released from training when his final processing was completed.

CONTINUE COMMENTS ON REVERSE SIDE ☐ OVER

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, CLERICAL INDUCTION TRAINING MARY J. MEEK

FORM 3-61 321 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROSS WORDS	ERRORS	NET WORDS	GROSS WORDS	ERRORS	NET WORDS
45	5	40	63	14	49
46	6	40	64	14	50
47	6	41	65	15	50
48	7	41	66	15	51
49	7	42	67	16	51
50	7	43	68	16	52
51	8	43	69	16	53
52	9	43	70	16	54
53	9	44	71	17	54
54	9	45	72	18	54
55	10	45	73	18	55
56	10	46	74	19	55
57	10	47	75	19	56
58	10	48	76	20	56
59	11	48	77	20	57
60	12	48	78	20	58
61	12	49	79	21	58
62	13	49	80	21	59

This scale conforms to that used by the Civil Service Commission. The number of errors indicated after the gross is the maximum permissible for that specific number of gross words typed; i.e., an individual who types 60 words per minute would be allowed no more than 12 errors in a 10-minute typewriting test.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF TEST RESULTS (CLERICAL SKILLS)

NAME FLORES, Daniel (NMI)	TITLE AND GRADE File Clerk GS-4	DATE OF BIRTH 4 August 1935
DATE 14 March 1962	PERSONNEL OFFICER - IAS	

AGENCY STANDARDS

TYPEWRITING The typewriting criterion is based on the scale on the reverse of this page.

SHORTHAND Dictation at 80 words a minute for three minutes and the transcription of the dictated material with five or fewer errors in not more than twenty minutes.

EXAMINEE'S RATINGS

TYPEWRITING: WAM 43 Errors 14 Net 22 Qualified: Yes ______ No X

SHORTHAND: WAM ______ Errors ______ Qualified: Yes ______ No ______

REMARKS: Training in typewriting recommended if he so desires. It is not necessary for his job title.

MARY J. MEEK
CHIEF, CLERICAL INDUCTION TRAINING

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

THIS INFORMATION IS FOR AUTHORIZED PERSONS ONLY. TEST SCORES ARE NOT TO BE REVEALED TO EXAMINEE.

OFFICE OF TRAINING, ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION STAFF
EVALUATION OF TEST RESULTS (CLERICAL)

DATE: 14 March 1962

NAME: FLORES, Daniel ([illegible])

GRADE AND POSITION: GS-[illegible] File Clerk

PERSONNEL OFFICER: TAS

TEST RESULTS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE FACT FINDING PHASE OF MOST PERSONNEL OPERATIONS. EVALUATION OF THESE MEASUREMENTS IN RELATION TO OTHER FACTUAL MATERIAL IN THE PERSONNEL RECORD PROVIDES ONE OF THE BASES FOR THE SELECTION AND PLACEMENT OF APPLICANTS AND FOR COUNSELING WITH NEW EMPLOYEES. HOWEVER, THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL CAN AND WILL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF A SPECIFIC JOB MUST REST ON THE JUDGMENT OF THE RECRUITER OR PLACEMENT OFFICER, WHO CONSIDERS ALL ASPECTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S ABILITY, BACKGROUND, AND PERSONALITY IN RELATION TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.

THIS REPORT EVALUATES THE SUBJECT'S PERFORMANCE BY COMPARING HIS SCORES WITH THOSE OF A NATIONWIDE GROUP OF TWELFTH GRADE STUDENTS OF THE SAME SEX. SPECIFIC APTITUDES ARE IDENTIFIED BY USING A VARIETY OF TESTS RANGING FROM WORK SAMPLES OF FILING AND CHECKING TO MEASURES OF REASONING ABILITY. IN EVALUATING THESE TEST SCORES FOUR GENERAL CONCEPTS SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND: (1) TESTS ARE MORE EFFECTIVE IN SCREENING OUT POTENTIAL FAILURES THAN IN IDENTIFYING THOSE WHO WILL PERFORM SUCCESSFULLY. (2) PERSONS WHOSE SCORES ARE PREDOMINANTLY IN THE LOWEST 15% ORDINARILY ARE NOT SUITED FOR OFFICE WORK. (3) MOST JOBS DO NOT REQUIRE HIGH SCORES ON ALL TESTS, BUT HAVE A RANGE WITHIN WHICH PEOPLE CAN DO THE WORK EFFECTIVELY AND TEND TO REMAIN ON THE JOB. (4) EFFICIENCY IN PLACEMENT NECESSITATES MATCHING THE JOB AND THE INDIVIDUAL; BOTH THOSE WHO ARE OVERQUALIFIED AND THOSE WHO ARE UNDERQUALIFIED ARE LIKELY TO QUIT.

A DESCRIPTION OF THE SIX TESTS IN THE BATTERY IS GIVEN ON THE BACK OF THIS FORM. IN CASES WHERE THE PATTERN OF THE TEST SCORES APPEARS TO INDICATE APTITUDE IN PARTICULAR AREAS THIS WILL BE NOTED IN THE REMARKS SECTION. WHERE RESEARCH STUDIES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE TESTS TO JOB PERFORMANCE THESE COMMENTS WILL RELATE TO SPECIFIC JOBS. THIS SECTION MAY ALSO INCLUDE A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S POTENTIAL IN RELATION TO HIS INTERESTS AND BACKGROUND.

CONSULTATION OR FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING INTERPRETATION OF TEST SCORES IS AVAILABLE BY CALLING EXTENSION 8017.

NAME OF TEST	VERY LOW		LOW		AVERAGE		HIGH		VERY HIGH	
	2%	5%	9%	15%	19%	19%	15%	9%	5%	2%
CLERICAL SPEED AND ACCURACY							✓			
SPELLING							✓			
SENTENCES					✓					
NUMERICAL ABILITY						✓				
ABSTRACT REASONING						✓				
VERBAL REASONING					✓					

REMARKS:

Mr. Flores should be referred for P&TB, preferably while he is still in the IAS.

DESCRIPTIONS OF ABOVE TESTS ARE GIVEN ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS REPORT

FORM 2670 [illegible] CONFIDENTIAL [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

A-11A

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN Spanish A	DATE PREPARED 4-1-80

SSN	NAME (Last-First-MI)	UNDERCOVER	DATE OF BIRTH YEAR	MONTH	DAY	GRADE	DIVISION
460 42 6230	Flores, Daniel	☐	35	8	14	13	LA

TYPE CHANGE	LANG CODE	READING*	SPEAKING*	UNDERSTANDING*	DATE TESTED YR	MO	DA	TYPE TEST
C	BL18	+	5	5	80	2	20	N

*SEE BACK FOR PROFICIENCY LEVEL DEFINITIONS

REMARKS

Outside Test.

CERQUAL SYSTEM
Updated
APR 4 1980
By.............

CERTIFICATION OF PROFICIENCY:
CHIEF OF TESTING/LS

TEST NUMBER
42001

FORM 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
10-79 EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

RVW 40 YRS FR DATE PREPARED
DRV A6C9.2 BY 011954

(10-49)

PART 1 – INFO SYS. BR.

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE Daniel Flores	DATE (From item [illegible]) 22May79	NAME OF SUPERVISOR Lawrence Sternfield	DATE (From item [illegible]) 22May79
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS 5 June 1979	DISPATCH NUMBER HMMT-14447	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE	HOME BASE COMPONENT LA

DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 35	SERVICE DESIGN. DQG	CURRENT POSITION AND GRADE Ops Officer, GS-13	STATION OR BASE Mexico City	CURRENT COVER

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD February 1978	1B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE Operations Officer GS-13	1C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ SEE 6A	1D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE SEE 6A

2. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU

Spouse - 43
Daughter - 5

3. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Child's schooling

4. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).

Liaison Officer in charge of an 18-man unit.

5. TRAINING DESIRED
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Training in a third language.
Additional management training offered either by the Agency or by a private institution. Consideration for an appointment to a War College.

202 [illegible]

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

6A. [illegible]

As noted in 6B below, my first choice for my next assignment is that of Chief of Base in Barcelona, Spain, or Chief of Base in Latin America. I have served three tours overseas and a four-year tour at Headquarters in Cuban Operations. In the past ten years I have gained experience in technical operation, operations related to the priority and hard targets and, prior to my assignment to Mexico City, as supervisor of one of the four branches in Cuban Operations. In Mexico City my responsibilities consist of the supervision and administration of an 18-man unit composed of Mexican nationals which I manage and direct operationally in co-ordination with the Government of Mexico. I have been in Mexico City fifteen months.

Should the Chief of Base position in Barcelona become available in th summer of 1980 or 1981 and this job is offered to me, I would be

6B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, 3 OR 4 (FOR 1ST, 2ND, 3RD AND 4TH CHOICE) IN BOXES [illegible] COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR. *Please see 6A

☐ EXTEND TOUR 4-16 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO depending on next assignment.
(DATE)

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HQS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE
1ST CHOICE War College 2ND CHOICE Management 3RD CHOICE Headquarters Tour Program.

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. INDICATE GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION.
1ST CHOICE Barcelona 2ND CHOICE COB Latin Am 3RD CHOICE Washington, D.C.

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION.

PREPARE UPDATING OF PERSONAL SECURITY INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOI-F 240-8 AND FORWARD UNDER SEPARATE COVER. INDICATE DATE FORWARDED OR TO BE FORWARDED.

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

7. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Based upon Subject's experience both prior to and during his current tour, his requests for assignment as stated by him are very reasonable. I fully endorse his requests.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

8. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

DATE ______ TITLE ______ SIGNATURE ______

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

9. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT

10. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY: DISPATCH NO. ______ DATED ______
CABLE NO. ______ DATED ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE ______ DATE ______

SECRET

6A Continued. . .

amenable to an extension in Mexico City for a period of 12 to 16 months depending on the timing of the assignment. If I were to be assigned to a country where an additional language is needed, time for language training should be taken into consideration.

In the event that a position as Chief of Base does not become available within the next year or two, my second choice is to be considered for a War College either for calendar year 1980 or 1981. This would enable me to more fully participate in the Agency's rotational program and would provide me with a higher level of training needed for career mobility in the Agency.

My third choice is to be considered as a candidate for the agency's management program at one of the participating Universities in the United States with the intention of accepting a field assignment immediately after the termination of this training. I am prepared to make all the necessary arrangements toward this end (i.e., applying for admission, etc.) provided a list of Universities is furnished to me.

As noted above, I am willing to remain in Mexico City through the summer of 1981 if my first choice is approved. In the event that my first choice cannot be granted I would be available to return to the United States in the summer of 1980 to prepare for my second or third choice. Should my second or third choice not be granted, I would prefer to return to the United States for an assignment in Washington.

C 10

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
036130	Flores	Daniel	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO CFI NO. 38, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
0 2	1 5	7 8					1			Mexico	4 5 0

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: IN 0326885

DOCUMENT DATE-PERIOD: 2/15/78

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCO	☐	
☐	C & L DIVISION, CTRD.	DATE	SIGNATURE
☒	C & F DIVISION	2/23/78	

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

See item in Daily —
Log 16 Jan

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTE TO OUTGOING PCS TRAVELERS

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the field have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checked out for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 9 July 1970.

DANIEL FLORES
NAME
(Please Print)

Daniel F
SIGNATURE

Jan 30, 1978
DATE

FORM 5-74 3661 CONFIDENTIAL E 2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTE TO OUTGOING PCS TRAVELERS

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the field have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checked out for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 9 July 1970.

Daniel Flores
NAME
(Please Print)

Daniel F
SIGNATURE

14 Nov. 1977
DATE

FORM 5-74 3661 CONFIDENTIAL E 2, IMPDET CL. BY 007622 (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SERVICE ABROAD AGREEMENT

I. GENERAL

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU AGREE TO SERVE THE PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION II BELOW AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS OBLIGATED TO RETURN YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS UPON THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF THIS PERIOD. YOUR ALLOWABLE EXPENSES WILL BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS.

IF YOU TERMINATE YOUR PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BEFORE YOU COMPLETE 12 MONTHS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE FOLLOWING THE DATE OF YOUR ARRIVAL ABROAD, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO REIMBURSE THE GOVERNMENT FOR ALL EXPENSES IT INCURS IN THE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS, YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO YOUR POST. IF YOU FAIL TO COMPLETE YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD YOU WILL NOT BE ENTITLED TO THE RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOURSELF, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO THE UNITED STATES. IF, HOWEVER, AGENCY OFFICIALS DETERMINE THAT YOUR EARLY DEPARTURE IS NECESSARY FOR OFFICIAL REASONS, OR FOR PERSONAL REASONS OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST TO THE GOVERNMENT, THEY MAY WAIVE THE REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES ALREADY INCURRED, OR AUTHORIZE YOUR RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION, WHICHEVER IS APPLICABLE.

IF ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF HR 20-30, YOU WILL BE GRANTED HOME LEAVE AS SOON AS IT CAN BE ARRANGED AT GOVERNMENT CONVENIENCE AFTER COMPLETION OF YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY, PROVIDED YOU HAVE SERVED AT LEAST 18 MONTHS OF CONTINUOUS CREDITABLE SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. HOME LEAVE AND HOME LEAVE TRAVEL ARE CONTINGENT UPON YOUR WILLINGNESS TO RETURN, AND CONTEMPLATION BY AGENCY OFFICIALS THAT YOU WILL RETURN TO SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY AFTER HOME LEAVE OR UPON COMPLETION OF AN ASSIGNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

YOU ARE ADVISED THAT ANY MONIES DUE YOU FROM THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE APPLIED IN LIQUIDATION OF ANY INDEBTEDNESS ARISING FROM VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT. YOU WILL BE AFFORDED ALL NORMAL RECOURSE IN APPEALING DECISIONS MADE PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE: Daniel Flores

SD: D

II. TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD

1. NAME OF POST OF ASSIGNMENT: Mexico City

2. PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD AS PRESCRIBED IN A, B, OR C BELOW

A. STANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF 24 MONTHS XX

B. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ______ MONTHS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PER HR 20-18.

OPERATING OFFICIAL: J. Halpin CIA/PERS

C. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ______ MONTHS FOR THIS TOUR ONLY FOR THE EMPLOYEE SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT. (See HR 20-18)

REQUESTED (Memo attached)

OPERATING OFFICIAL

CONCUR

CAREER SERVICE | DEPUTY DIRECTOR

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

III. PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE

3. YOUR "PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE" IS A PLACE TO WHICH ALLOWABLE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES MAY BE AUTHORIZED IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES PURSUANT TO HR 22. ITS DESIGNATION WILL BE KEPT IN YOUR OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

4. IN REQUESTING YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN ITEM 5 [illegible] (HR 22 [illegible]) NORMALLY INDICATE THE PLACE WHERE YOU PHYSICALLY RESIDED IN THE UNITED STATES [illegible] OR THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO AT THE TIME OF YOUR [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

5. PHYSICAL DWELLING PLACE (Permanent Place of Residence unless address in item 6 is approved in lieu thereof)

FULL ADDRESS

8151 LARKIN LANE
VIENNA, VIRGINIA 22180

APPROVED

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE
Kaye L Hellmich	1/9/78

6. OTHER PLACE REQUESTED (Requested Permanent Place of Residence if different from item 5)

FULL ADDRESS

CONCUR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	DATE

IV. HOME LEAVE POINT

7. AMONG THE PLACES YOU MAY REQUEST AS A HOME LEAVE POINT ARE: YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE SHOWN ABOVE, HEADQUARTERS AREA, AND WHERE YOUR CHILDREN, PARENTS, PARENTS-IN-LAW, BROTHERS, SISTERS, BROTHERS-IN-LAW, OR SISTERS-IN-LAW RESIDE.

8. YOU MAY REQUEST FOR APPROVAL SOME OTHER POINT SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-30B(3)(C). THE REQUEST MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A MEMORANDUM EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 7 ABOVE

FULL ADDRESS

PORTLAND, OREGON

RELATIONSHIP OF RELATIVE AT HOME LEAVE POINT

IN-LAWS

APPROVED

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE
Kaye L Hellmich	1/9/78

10. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 8 ABOVE.

FULL ADDRESS

CONCUR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR	DATE

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	DATE

EMPLOYEE CERTIFICATION

I have read and understand my service obligations and travel entitlements as described in this agreement.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	DATE
	[illegible] 30 1977

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME: LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR ~~CANCELLATION~~ *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. '50. REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
03	08	77	03	11	77		2			CANADA	120

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. AA 10-77

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 3/8-3/11/77

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CENTRAL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
[illegible]		
X [illegible]	DATE 3/11/77	SIGNATURE
[illegible]		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1951a [illegible]

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print) 7-24		
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 96, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
02	04	77	02	06	77		2			WESTERN HEMISPHERE	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. LA 10-77

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 2/3 - 2/6/77

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
[illegible]		
✓ [illegible]	DATE 2/8/77	SIGNATURE
[illegible]		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
04	12	77	04	15	77		2			CANADA	120

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. LA 10-77

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 4/12-4/15/77

REMARKS

PREPARED BY			ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
✓	OCO F & L DIVISION, CTRS. F & I DIVISION	X REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT DATE 7/11/77	SIGNATURE Mike Masango

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

AN ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE EXECUTED BY EACH EMPLOYEE AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AND WHEN A CHANGE OCCURS IN THE INFORMATION SHOWN BELOW. ITEMS OF CHANGE MAY BE REPORTED IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCKS WITHOUT COMPLETING THE REMAINDER OF THE FORM EXCEPT THE EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AND DATE. WHEN EXECUTING ITEM 4 ALSO COMPLY WITH HHB 20-7 PERSONNEL EMERGENCY AND LOCATOR RECORDS. THIS FORM WILL BE COMPLETED ONLY BY HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL AND NOT SENT TO THE FIELD. FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

GENERAL

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last)	(First)	(Middle)
Flores	Daniel	

1. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Lima, Peru	DATE OF MARRIAGE ~~18~~ Nov 1960
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE N/A	DATE OF DECREE

2. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Dorothy A. Flores	8151 Larkin La. Vienna, Va. 22180	573-0797	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**DATE OF BIRTH**
Zola Marie Flores	8151 Larkin La. Vienna, Va. 22180	F	15 Mar 74

NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.
Jose S. Flores	Box 39 Gonzales, Texas 78629	512-672-6061
NAME OF MOTHER, INCLUDING MAIDEN NAME (or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**
N/A		

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

None

3. OTHER RELATIVES WHO ARE DEPENDENT UPON ME FOR AT LEAST 51% OF THEIR SUPPORT AND MEET OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN TRAVEL REGULATIONS (HR 22-15). SPECIFY NAMES AND RELATIONSHIPS.

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP
N/A		

4. PERSON RESIDING IN U.S. TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Mr. Vicente Patlan	RELATIONSHIP Brother-in-law
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE 627 S. River St., Seguin, Texas 78155	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER 512-379-1087
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE Seguin School District	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) Department of State	YES NO	 X
IS THE INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) Dorothy A. Flores - 8151 Larkin Lane, Vienna, Va. 22180	YES NO	 X
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES NO	X

The persons named in item 2 or 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

FORM 11-73 61 [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Riggs National Bank Joint account: Daniel and/or Dorothy a Flores

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

At home. New is being prepared.

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?

☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address) Mr. and Mrs. Raymond Arnett

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

7. RESIDENCE DATA - TO BE COMPLETED ONLY BY EMPLOYEES ENTERING ON DUTY

(No Approval Required)

RESIDENCE WHEN EMPLOYED (Full Address)	PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE AS DEFINED IN HR 22-3 (Full Address)

8. CHANGE IN PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE (See HR 22-3)

(To Be Completed by Employee Desiring Such Change While Assigned to Headquarters)

FULL ADDRESS	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OR DESIGNEE	DATE
	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL (when applicable per HR 22-3)	DATE
SIGNED AT	DATE Dec 30 1977	SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
026130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58 REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
12	14	77	12	15	77		2			CANADA	120

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ OCO	☐		
☒ C & L DIVISION, CTBO. ☐ C & T DIVISION	DATE 2/1/78		SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
026130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
01	16	78	01	19	78		2			WESTERN H.	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ OCO
☒ C & L DIVISION, CTBD.
☐ C & T DIVISION

☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 2/6/78

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 2-74 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

(4-10)

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME: LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	7-24		
026130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
10	28	77	11	03	77		2			WESTERN HEMISPHERE	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OCO		
X	C & L DIVISION CTGN.	DATE 1/23/78	SIGNATURE Janet G. Fan
	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1-74 1451a

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
026130	Flores	Daniel	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
						1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION					

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
10	17	77	10	20	77	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	2			Canada	120

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 16 Dec 77

REMARKS

PREPARED BY

DATE [illegible]

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

CONFIDENTIAL

SE TRAINING REPORT	SOVIET/EAST EUROPEAN OPERATIONS COURSE		
STUDENT Flores, Daniel		YEAR OF BIRTH 1935	GRADE GS-12
EOD DATE March 1962	OFFICE LA	SERVICE DESIGNATION D	COURSE DATES 7 - 15 November 1977

COURSE OBJECTIVES

To orient the student on the special nature of the Directorate of Operation's Soviet/East European target and to examine the application of clandestine methods for collecting information on assessing and preparing recruitment operations against Soviet/East European personalities.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No evaluation is made of individual performance in the course.

SE Training Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICES

BEHAVIORAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH

HUMAN ELEMENTS IN OPERATIONAL TARGETING

1. This certifies that Daniel Flores - LA has completed five days of training in the course, Human Elements in Operational Targeting.

2. Primary goals of the course are to familiarize Agency case officers with applied psychology techniques as they relate to operational data collection, evaluation and application in the assessment and manipulation of target personalities.

3. This is a certificate of attendance only. Student achievement was not evaluated.

OTS/Training Branch

E2 IMPDET CL BY 019432

CONFIDENTIAL

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT/CERTIFICATION OF HANDGUN QUALIFICATION

TITLE: Countering Terrorist Tactics Course No. 16-77 DATES: 19-23 September 1977

STUDENT: FLORES, Daniel OFFICE: LA SD: D

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF COURSE:

(S) This course stressed countermeasures to thwart terrorist acts against U.S. personnel abroad. Coverage includes a discussion of the modus operandi of terrorist groups, recognition and familiarity with explosive devices employed, basic skills training in the use of hand weapons and Mace-type chemical devices, discussion and demonstration of residential security measures, and specialized driving techniques designed to counter vehicular kidnapping attempts.

PERFORMANCE RECORD:

(U/AIUO) This is to certify that the student has satisfactorily completed the prescribed course of instruction.

HANDGUN QUALIFICATION:

(C) Student completed 24 hours of instruction on handguns at the Special Training Center on 23 September 1977 ; subsequently fired the Handgun Qualification test achieving a score of:

Revolver (Cal. - .38)	289
Automatic (Cal. - 9mm)	255

out of a possible 300.

(U/AIUO) The student demonstrated satisfactory application of safety procedures; mechanical aptitude; marksmanship techniques; and maintenance during range firing/classroom sessions; and is qualified to use the handguns (or similar guns) listed above.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

John H. Sawyer
John H. Sawyer 9/26/77
Chief, Special Activities Branch/OTD Date
Special Training Center

E2 IMPDET
CL by 056382

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST (Print) FIRST MIDDLE
1-6	7-24
[illegible]	[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
12	04	76	12	08	76		2			Canada	120

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: [illegible]

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: [illegible] 25-30 Sept '77

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	PPB		
✓	[illegible]	DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE
	[illegible]		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a [illegible]

SECRET

(4-10)

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Contgol Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
036130	Flore,	Daniel	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
01	19	77	01	22	77		2			WH	311

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. LA-16-77

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 1 Dec 76 to 30 Sept 77

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☐	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCA	DATE		SIGNATURE
X	C & L DIVISION, CTRO.	21.2/80		
☐	C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 2-74 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

(4-10)

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print) 7-24	FIRST	MIDDLE
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
						1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION					

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
02	09	77	02	18	77	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	2			CANADA	120

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

per. Joyce. 5467

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. LA 10-77

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 2/9 - 2/18/77

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	SCO		
X	C & L DIVISION, CTDB.	DATE 3/25/77	SIGNATURE
☐	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 2-74 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

(4-10)

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) LAST	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
02	22	77	02	25	77		2			CANADA	120

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. LA 10-77

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 2/22-2/25/77

REMARKS

PREPARED BY			REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OCO			
X	C & L DIVISION, CTDS.		DATE 3/25/77	SIGNATURE
	C & F DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

14-101

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 39, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
03	03	77	03	05	77		2			WESTERN HEMISPHERE	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. LH 10-77

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 3/3-3/5/77

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED BY CENTRAL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	[illegible]		
X	[illegible]	DATE 3/25/77	SIGNATURE
	[illegible]		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a [illegible]

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

AN ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE EXECUTED BY EACH EMPLOYEE AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AND WHEN A CHANGE OCCURS IN THE INFORMATION SHOWN BELOW. ITEMS OF CHANGE MAY BE REPORTED IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCKS WITHOUT COMPLETING THE REMAINDER OF THE FORM EXCEPT THE EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AND DATE. WHEN EXECUTING ITEM 4 ALSO COMPLY WITH HHB 20-7, PERSONNEL EMERGENCY AND LOCATOR RECORDS. THIS FORM WILL BE COMPLETED ONLY BY HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL AND NOT SENT TO THE FIELD. FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

GENERAL

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last)	(First)	(Middle)
Flores	Daniel	

1. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Lima, Peru	DATE OF MARRIAGE 18 Nov 1960
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE

2. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Dorothy A. Flores	8151 Larkin Lane, Vienna, Va. 22180	573-0797	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Zola Marie Flores	(Same as above)	F	15 Mar 74
NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
NAME OF MOTHER, INCLUDING MAIDEN NAME (or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

Mr. Lonnie Bruce - Brother-in-law

3. OTHER RELATIVES WHO ARE DEPENDENT UPON ME FOR AT LEAST 51% OF THEIR SUPPORT AND MEET OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN TRAVEL REGULATIONS (HR 22-15). SPECIFY NAMES AND RELATIONSHIPS.

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

4. PERSON RESIDING IN U.S. TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last, First, Middle) Mr. Vincente Patlan	RELATIONSHIP Brother-in-law
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code, and name of employer if applicable) 627 South River St., Seguin, Tex. 78155	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER 512-379-1087

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER IF APPLICABLE BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

Seguin School District System

[illegible]

Department of State X

[illegible]

Dorothy A. Flores - Spouse X

[illegible] X

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

7. RESIDENCE DATA - TO BE COMPLETED ONLY BY EMPLOYEES ENTERING ON DUTY

(No Approval Required)

RESIDENCE WHEN EMPLOYED *(Full Address)*	PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE AS DEFINED IN HR 22-3 *(Full Address)*

8. CHANGE IN PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE (See HR 22-3)

(To Be Completed by Employee Desiring Such Change While Assigned to Headquarters)

FULL ADDRESS	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OR DESIGNEE	DATE
	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL (when applicable see HR 22-3)	DATE
SIGNED BY	DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE /s/

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) LAST	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 30, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
04	26	76	05	08	76		2			WESTERN Hem	881

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 870-7-76

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD APRIL 26 - May 8 76

REMARKS

PREPARED BY

[illegible]

[illegible]

REPORT [illegible] CONTROL DIVISION

DATE 6-9-76

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42
06	15	76	06	20	76		2			WESTERN HEMISPHERE	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. LA 07-76

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 6-14-76

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
OTS
✓ O S DIVISION [illegible]
[illegible]

REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 9-20-76

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE C Wahl

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TRAINING REPORT

Instructor Training Workshop

Student:	Flores, Daniel	**Office:**	OTR
Year of Birth:	1935	**SD:**	D
Grade:	GS-12	**EOD Date:**	1962
Number of Students Enrolled:	6	**Date of Course:**	7/26 - 8/8/76

COURSE OBJECTIVES--CONTENT AND METHODS

The Workshop objectives provide participants with a knowledge of the major principles, methods, and practices of effective instruction, and an opportunity to develop skills as an instructor by applying this knowledge in an instructional setting. Participants are able to analyze their audience and teaching objectives, prepare lesson plans, effectively present the material to be learned, and then evaluate the results of their training efforts.

The instruction required maximum student involvement with major emphasis on the application of instructional methods in the students presentation of units of instruction. Students were not graded during the Workshop, but they were constructively evaluated by the instructor and fellow participants both verbally and through the use of video tape.

Students were required to give a fifteen-minute lecture, a twenty-minute demonstration, and a fifty-minute lesson in his basic subject.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only, since examinations are not used in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

11/10/76 Stanley W Specker
DATE STANLEY W. SPECKER
Chief Instructor

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010628

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

0 36130
3/F-135/4534

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
036130	Flores	Moses	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR ~~CANCELLATION~~ (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 98, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
07	16	75	07	19	75		2			LA	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☑ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☐ DISPATCH
☐ CABLE
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐ OTHER (*Specify*)

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ OCO
☑ B & L DIVISION, CTRS.
☐ C & T DIVISION

☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 11/21/75

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE R Berg

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 2-74 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

(4-10)

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
056130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only) REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
07	25	75	07	29	75		2			LATIN AMERICA	805

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY			
☐ OCO	☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED	
☒ C & L DIVISION, CTRD.	DATE 12/11/75	SIGNATURE	
☐ C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 2-74 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO: Office of Personnel Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	7-24		
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
12	08	75	12	13	75		2			WH AREA	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. LA-07-76

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD Dec 8-13-75

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OCO		
✓	B & L DIVISION, CTDD.	DATE	SIGNATURE
	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-8	NAME (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 56, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
10	15	75	10	22	75		2			WESTERN HEM.	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. LA-145-76

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 10/15-22/75

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT?	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ OCO		
✓ C & L DIVISION, CTRS.	DATE	SIGNATURE
☐ C & F DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(13-101)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
10	30	75	11	04	75		2			WH BRET	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☑	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: LA 166-76

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: OCT 30 - NOV 4-75

REMARKS

PREPARED BY

REPORT ANNOTATED AS CONTROL RECORDED

DATE

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1051a

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

5/E

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Rep[illegible]

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) LAST	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
036130	Flores	[illegible]	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39	Latin	40-42
08	16	75	09	02	75		2			America	505

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
[illegible]	✓	
✓ [illegible]	DATE 11/23/75	SIGNATURE
[illegible]		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a [illegible]

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

SECRET
(When Filled In)

5/E

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
036130	Flores	Daniel	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
06	05	75	06	11	75		2			Europe	801

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCO	X	
X	C & L DIVISION, ETC.	DATE 3/5/75 ~~[illegible] 75~~	SIGNATURE
☐	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(8-101)

14-00000

SECRET

C/F

18 NOV 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meritorious Unit Citation -- Cuban Operations Group, Latin America Division

On 13 November 1975 the Director of Central Intelligence approved award of the Meritorious Unit Citation to the Cuban Operations Group in recognition of the outstanding performance of the following employees from 1 October 1974 to 30 September 1975:

Felipe Acevedo
Carol A. Barr
Vivian A. Barry
P. Claudette Broyles
Daniel Calloway
Thomas G. Clines
Frank Esquivel
Owen H. Faust
Mary D. Felton
Daniel Flores
Nancy B. Fortson
Ann Goldsworthy
Clyde I. Hinkley
Christine Hopkins
Kathryn Kemp
Myron M. Kline
Barbara Morgenthaler
Mary Muldoon
Mary Musgrave
Sylvia Palmer
Elizabeth Reilly
Carol Rhodes
Nestor D. Sanchez
Joan Silverlieb
Allen Smith
John Blake Smith
Priscilla Tench
Len Therry
Mary A. Velous
Donald Venuto
William Watkins
Anne Zimmerman

R. L. Austin, Jr.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
1 - Each OPF
1 - C/LA
1 - Recorder/HMAB
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB

SECRET E2 Impdet Cl By 014029

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

FILE PUNCHED BY

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
36130	Flores	Daniel	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 58 REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
07	04	75	07	14	75		2			WH	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ OCS
☑ C & L DIVISION, [illegible]
☐ [illegible]

☑ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 9/15/75

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

(4-10)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE
PROCESSED
BY/4

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
D36130	Flores	Daniel	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			03	05	74		1			Peru	570

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 135131

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	RCO		
☐	C & L DIVISION, CTDS.	DATE 3/08/74	SIGNATURE
☒	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

S/E

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print) 7-24	FIRST	MIDDLE
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
						1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION					

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
10	05	74	10	07	74	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	2			Europe	801

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. WH 119-75

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 10/4 - 10/7/74

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ [illegible]	☒	
☒ [illegible]	DATE 12/23/74	SIGNATURE
☐ [illegible]		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a

ADMINISTRATIVE-Internal Use Only

14-101

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY [illegible]

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME: LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
[illegible]	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 38, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
07	07	74	07	11	74		2			WH	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☑	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☑ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCO		
☑	C & L DIVISION, CTRD.	DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE [illegible]
☐	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(8-10)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Br

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	*(Print)*	7-24	
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58 REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
06	13	74	06	21	74		2			WA	P11

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☑	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. WH 542-74

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 6/13-6/21/74

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☑ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ OID		
☑ [illegible]	DATE	SIGNATURE
☐ [illegible]	7 Nov 74	

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE
Internal Use Only

S/E

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Repo[illegible]

FILE PUNCHED BY/[illegible]

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24
036130	FLORES	Daniel

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58 REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42
08	12	74	08	16	74		2			LA AREA	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE-PERIOD 12-17 Aug. 74

REMARKS

PREPARED BY [illegible]

[illegible]

X [illegible]

[illegible]

ABOVE DATA VERIFIED AS CORRECT BASED UPON ACCOMPANYING DATA [illegible]

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

[illegible] OF EMPLOYEE *(use pseudo only if SA)* Daniel Flores	DATE *(from item 5-1)* 27 Feb 73	NAME OF SUPERVISOR *(true)* Richard Welch	DATE *(from item 5-2)* 27 Feb 73
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 2 March 1973	DISPATCH NUMBER: HPLT-6502	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 1935	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE GS-11 FI Case Officer	4. STATION OR BASE Lima	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER LNFALL

6A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 24 Sept 1971	6B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 30 Nov 1974	6C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 1 Feb 1975	6D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 15 Feb 1975 (depending on training.)

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Wife: 37, daughter: 3

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

None

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR *(see special note on transmittal form).*
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

September 1971 - July 1972 - Activities of the Communist Party and extreme leftist groups. Labor activities. Preparation of project outlines and progress reports.

August 1972 - Present - Chinese Operations. News media capability. Preparation of project outlines and progress reports.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

In the near future I would like to take an advanced operations course. In connection with this, I would like to concentrate on the Soviet and Chinese targets in Latin America. Special courses in these two areas would be extremely helpful. Some time in the future I would like to attend the mid-career course.

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

At this point in my career the Soviet and Chinese targets are of major interest to me. Although I would prefer to work on Chinese operations in my next assignment, as an alternative I would consider working on Soviet operations.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 *(for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice)* IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☒ EXTEND TOUR 14 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO 31 November 1974 (DATE)

☐ IF ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

☒ IF ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Caracas 2ND CHOICE Mexico 3RD CHOICE Buenos Aires

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Concur. This officer is doing a good job on his assigned targets and his overall abilities give the Station a flexibility it often needs to call on.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Subject's tour has been extended fourteen months to 31 November 1974.

DATE 4/23/73 TITLE C/WH/Pers SIGNATURE H.L. Berthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. HPLS-3284 DATED (typed 23 Apr 73)

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
036130	FLORES	DANIEL	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42
			05	28	71		1			ECUADOR	195

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
X	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: 16318

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 28 May 1971

REMARKS

PREPARED BY				ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	[illegible]	X	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	
	[illegible]	DATE		SIGNATURE
X	[illegible]	6/9/71		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a [illegible]

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SERVICE ABROAD AGREEMENT

I. GENERAL

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU AGREE TO SERVE THE PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION II BELOW AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS OBLIGATED TO RETURN YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS UPON THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF THIS PERIOD. YOUR ALLOWABLE EXPENSES WILL BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS.

IF YOU TERMINATE YOUR PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BEFORE YOU COMPLETE 12 MONTHS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE FOLLOWING THE DATE OF YOUR ARRIVAL ABROAD, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO REIMBURSE THE GOVERNMENT FOR ALL EXPENSES IT INCURS IN THE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOU, YOUR DEPENDENTS, YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO YOUR POST. IF YOU FAIL TO COMPLETE YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD YOU WILL NOT BE ENTITLED TO THE RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF YOURSELF, YOUR DEPENDENTS AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL EFFECTS TO THE UNITED STATES. IF, HOWEVER, AGENCY OFFICIALS DETERMINE THAT YOUR EARLY DEPARTURE IS NECESSARY FOR OFFICIAL REASONS, OR FOR PERSONAL REASONS OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST TO THE GOVERNMENT, THEY MAY WAIVE THE REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES ALREADY INCURRED, OR AUTHORIZE YOUR RETURN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION, WHICHEVER IS APPLICABLE.

IF ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF HR 20-30, YOU WILL BE GRANTED HOME LEAVE AS SOON AS IT CAN BE ARRANGED AT GOVERNMENT CONVENIENCE AFTER COMPLETION OF YOUR PRESCRIBED TOUR OF DUTY, PROVIDED YOU HAVE SERVED AT LEAST 18 MONTHS OF CONTINUOUS CREDITABLE SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. HOME LEAVE AND HOME LEAVE TRAVEL ARE CONTINGENT UPON YOUR WILLINGNESS TO RETURN, AND CONTEMPLATION BY AGENCY OFFICIALS THAT YOU WILL RETURN TO SERVICE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY AFTER HOME LEAVE OR UPON COMPLETION OF AN ASSIGNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

YOU ARE ADVISED THAT ANY MONIES DUE YOU FROM THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE APPLIED IN LIQUIDATION OF ANY INDEBTEDNESS ARISING FROM VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT. YOU WILL BE AFFORDED ALL NORMAL RECOURSE IN APPEALING DECISIONS MADE PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEEMENT.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE	SD
Daniel Flores	D

II. TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD

1. NAME OF POST OF ASSIGNMENT
Currently Guayaquil, Ecuador and Next Assignment: Lima Peru

2. PERIOD OF SERVICE ABROAD AS PRESCRIBED IN A, B, OR C BELOW

A. STANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF 24 MONTHS X

B. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ________ MONTHS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PER HR 20-18.

OPERATING OFFICIAL

C. NONSTANDARD TOUR OF DUTY OF ________ MONTHS FOR THIS TOUR ONLY FOR THE EMPLOYEE SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT. (See HR 20-18)

REQUESTED (Memo attached)

OPERATING OFFICIAL

CONCUR

CAREER SERVICE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

III. PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE

3. YOUR "PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE" IS A PLACE TO WHICH ALLOWABLE TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES MAY BE AUTHORIZED IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES PURSUANT TO HR 22. ITS DESIGNATION WILL BE KEPT IN YOUR OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

4. IN REQUESTING YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN ITEM 5 ON THE REVERSE SIDE, YOU WILL (as prescribed in HR 22-3) NORMALLY INDICATE THE PLACE WHERE YOU PHYSICALLY DWELLED IN THE UNITED STATES, ITS POSSESSIONS OR THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO AT THE TIME OF YOUR PCS TRANSFER TO A POST ABROAD. YOU MAY REQUEST IN ITEM 6 THE DESIGNATION OF ANOTHER PLACE AS YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE IF YOU CAN ESTABLISH THAT YOUR PHYSICAL DWELLING PLACE IS (or was) TRANSITORY AND THAT SUCH OTHER PLACE IS YOUR DOMICILE OR HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN USED BY YOU AS A PHYSICAL DWELLING. INFORMATION THAT CAN BE PRESENTED IN AN ATTACHED STATEMENT AS EVIDENCE INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, STATE VOTING REGISTRATION, PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND PLACE WHERE INCOME OR PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID.

FORM 3154 REPLACES FORM [illegible] WHICH IS OBSOLETE
8-70

SECRET

[illegible]

CONTINUED ON THE REVERSE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

5. PHYSICAL DWELLING PLACE (Permanent Place of Residence unless address in item 6 is approved in lieu thereof)

FULL ADDRESS

Washington, D. C.

APPROVED

DEPUTY DIRECTOR: for

DATE: 5-20-71

6. OTHER PLACE REQUESTED (Requested Permanent Place of Residence if different from item 5)

FULL ADDRESS

CONCUR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DATE

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

DATE

IV. HOME LEAVE POINT

7. AMONG THE PLACES YOU MAY REQUEST AS A HOME LEAVE POINT ARE: YOUR PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE SHOWN ABOVE, HEADQUARTERS AREA, AND WHERE YOUR CHILDREN, PARENTS, PARENTS-IN-LAW, BROTHERS, SISTERS, BROTHERS-IN-LAW, OR SISTERS-IN-LAW RESIDE.

8. YOU MAY REQUEST FOR APPROVAL SOME OTHER POINT SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-30B(3)(C). THE REQUEST MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A MEMORANDUM EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 7 ABOVE

FULL ADDRESS

4505 Washington Street
Milwaukie, Oregon

RELATIONSHIP OF RELATIVE AT HOME LEAVE POINT

Parents-in-law

APPROVED

DEPUTY DIRECTOR: for

DATE: 5-20-71

10. DESIGNATION PER ITEM 8 ABOVE.

FULL ADDRESS

CONCUR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DATE

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

DATE

EMPLOYEE CERTIFICATION

I have read and understand my service obligations and travel entitlements as described in this agreement.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: See Dispatch Attached

DATE: 5/20/71

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

AN ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE EXECUTED BY EACH EMPLOYEE AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AND WHEN A CHANGE OCCURS IN THE INFORMATION SHOWN BELOW. ITEMS OF CHANGE MAY BE REPORTED IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCKS WITHOUT COMPLETING THE REMAINDER OF THE FORM EXCEPT THE EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AND DATE. WHEN EXECUTING ITEM 4 ALSO COMPLY WITH HHB 20-7, PERSONNEL EMERGENCY AND LOCATOR RECORDS. THIS FORM WILL BE COMPLETED ONLY BY HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL AND NOT SENT TO THE FIELD. FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

GENERAL

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) FLORES (First) Daniel (Middle)

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 460-48-6230

1. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Lima, Peru

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 18 November 1960

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE: "NA"

DATE OF DECREE:

2. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE Dorothy A. Flores	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) The American Embassy, Lima, Peru	TELEPHONE NO.	
NAMES OF CHILDREN Kendra Flores	ADDRESS (Same as above.)	SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 3 March 197
NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian) Jose S. Flores	ADDRESS Box 39, Gonzales, Texas 78629	TELEPHONE NO. 512-672-6061	
NAME OF MOTHER, INCLUDING MAIDEN NAME (or female guardian) Agustina Flores (Deceased)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
Mr. Lonnie G. Bruce

3. OTHER RELATIVES WHO ARE DEPENDENT UPON ME FOR AT LEAST 51% OF THEIR SUPPORT AND MEET OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN TRAVEL REGULATIONS (HR 22-15). SPECIFY NAMES AND RELATIONSHIPS.

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

4. PERSON RESIDING IN U.S. TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Mr. Lonnie G. Bruce

RELATIONSHIP: Brother-in-law

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: 973 E. Walnut St., Seguin, Texas 78155

HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 512-379-7620

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:

BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES X NO

IS THE INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES NO X

Dorothy A. Flores The American Embassy Lima, Peru

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) YES X NO

The persons named in item 2 or 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

FORM 61 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

The Riggs National Bank, Federal Office, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C.

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

7. RESIDENCE DATA - TO BE COMPLETED ONLY BY EMPLOYEES ENTERING ON DUTY
(No Approval Required)

RESIDENCE WHEN EMPLOYED *(Full Address)*	PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE AS DEFINED IN HR 22-3 *(Full Address)*

8. CHANGE IN PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE *(See HR 22-3)*
(To Be Completed by Employee Desiring Such Change While Assigned to Headquarters)

FULL ADDRESS	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OR DESIGNEE	DATE
	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL *(when applicable per HR 22-3)*	DATE

SIGNED AT Headquarters	DATE 7 June [illegible]	SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Daniel Flores	DATE (from item S-1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Robert Fambrini	DATE (from item S-2)
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 30 October 1970	DISPATCH NUMBER: HEQT 1506	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE: 04 MAR 1971	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 4 August 1935	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Operational Officer GS-10	4. STATION OR BASE Guayaquil	5. [illegible] FOR CURRENT COVER LNCUFF

6A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 13 May 1969	6B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 15 May 1971	6C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 1 June 1971	6D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 1 August 1971

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Spouse (Expecting child in March 1971)

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

NA

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR *(see special note on transmittal form).*
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Case Officer responsibilities including running project targetted against suversive individuals and organizations; agent handling including penetration agents; responsibility for audio operations and related support agents; preparation of intelligence reports, dispatches and other reports related to Case Officer duties.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

1. Soviet Operations Course. (If possible, I would like to co-ordinate this course with my home leave in the summer of 1971.)
2. Language training. Preferably Portuguese because I would like to serve in Brazil sometime in the future.

FORM 8-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I would like a position of increased responsibility, preferably as a Case Officer for Soviet Operations in Latin America. If this is possible I would like to take the Soviet Operations Course at Headquarters prior to my next assignment.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE)

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HQDTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Caracas, Vene 2ND CHOICE Mexico 3RD CHOICE Lima, Peru

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

It is believed that this officer's performance at his present post of assignment has provided sufficient indication of his competence as a field case officer, and that he should have no problem filling a Soviet Operations Officer slot at a medium sized field installation. He should attend the Soviet Operations Course prior to such assignment.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

WH Division has selected Mr. Flores for assignment to Lima in September 1971.

DATE 1 Mar 71 TITLE C/WH/Pers SIGNATURE H.T. Berthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. 113900 DATED: ______
CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE ______ DATE ______
(SIGNATURE)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY RT

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6 036130	(Print) Flores	7-24 Daniel	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
05	13	69					1			Ecuador	145

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
✓	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. ZU 57300

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 13 May 1969

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ [illegible]		
☐ [illegible]	DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE [illegible]
☐ [illegible]		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 8-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(8-101)

SECRET

Not Approved by
CS Career Service
[illegible] JAN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Panel (Section C)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-10, Daniel Flores

1. It is recommended that Mr. Daniel Flores be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10.

2. Mr. Flores joined the Agency in 1962; initially he was employed on a part-time basis in the WH Division while attending the American University. He received his AB degree in 1967 and became a full-time staff employee. On the strong recommendation of his supervisors, Mr. Flores was accepted for the Career Training Program which he completed in August 1968. After rejoining the WH Division, he was selected for assignment as an operations officer at the Guayaquil Base where he arrived in May 1969. Mr. Flores is bi-lingual in Spanish.

3. Both as a Headquarters and field operations officer Mr. Flores has carried out his assignments with intelligence, enthusiasm and initiative. As the Guayaquil Base officer in charge of Communist penetration operations, his performance has been of high caliber. In August 1969, during the forced absence of the Chief of Base and other senior officers, Mr. Flores assumed the full responsibilities for running the base for a period of several weeks. He performed the duties of Acting Chief of Base in a superior manner. In addition to his operational competence, the Guayaquil Chief of Base has observed that Mr. Flores' ability to develop social relations with ease has been a distinct asset for the Base.

4. Mr. Flores has already proven to be a competent operations officer. As he further develops through experience and responsibility he should become eligible for rapid advancement. In any case he is already performing at a level far higher than his current grade and a promotion at this time is strongly recommended.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

IMPORTANT

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the field have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checked out for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 28 October 1964.

Daniel Flores
Signature

7 April 1969
Date

DANIEL FLORES

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) Flores, (First) Daniel (Middle)
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 460-45-6230

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY Washington, D.C
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Washington, D.C
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE Washington, D.C

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Lima, Peru
DATE OF MARRIAGE 14 Oct 1960
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE
DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED
DATE SPOUSE DIED
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE Dorothy A. Flores
ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) Accompanying
TELEPHONE NO.
NAMES OF CHILDREN
ADDRESS
SEX
DATE OF BIRTH
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian) José S. Flores
ADDRESS Gonzales, Texas (Box 39)
TELEPHONE NO. 512/672-6061
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian) Deceased
ADDRESS
TELEPHONE NO.
WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Mr. Lonnie G. Bruce
RELATIONSHIP Brother-in-Law
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) 973 S Walnut Street, Seguin, Texas
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER (512) EX9-7620
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE (Same as above)
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES ☐ NO ☒
Department of the Army

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES ☐ NO ☒
Dorothy A. Flores (Spouse)

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) YES ☒ NO ☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 3-67 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Riggs National Bank : Daniel and Dorothy A Flores
17th and Penn. Avenues, Washington, D.C.
(1750 Penn Avenue

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

At home. Will leave with responsible person for safe keeping

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☐ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

N/A

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

But may before I leave.

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

My father should not be notified in case of an emergency because of his health and age.

SIGNED AT

DATE
7 April 1969

SIGNATURE
Daniel Flores

CONFIDENTIAL

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of **Daniel Flores**

Effective **10 April 1969**

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth existing policies of concern to you while integrated and to reiterate certain rights and obligations which derive from your true status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of **GS-9 $8744.00** per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of **10 April 1969**. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected as a **FSR-7** at a salary of **$8153.00** per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of **two (2) years** from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable

regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they do not exceed the salary and allowance payment due you on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due you, the difference will be paid to you by this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due you, the excess amounts will be remitted to this organization at intervals to be designated by the Office of Finance. Computations hereunder will be based on the aggregate gross amounts due and received. That portion of retirement contributions withheld by your cover facility which exceeds the retirement contributions applicable to your organization salary will be deducted from the gross amount of the overpayment. Upon integration, the payroll office of this organization will establish the date on which you would normally receive a regular step increase from your cover facility. Failure to report a grade promotion received from a cover facility does cause errors in processing regular step increases. Regular step increases, incorrectly processed in such manner, should be reported immediately to this organization. To eliminate this problem, any grade promotion received from a cover facility will be reported immediately by you to this organization's payroll office through channels showing both the old and the new rate and the effective date. All salary difference payments and adjustments will be reflected on earnings statements.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integrating into your cover facility you will continue to be covered by the particular retirement system in which you are a participant as an employee of this organization. Salary received from your cover facility and any salary differences payable by this organization will be subject to appropriate retirement contributions.

b. Appropriate Federal income tax withholdings shall be made from taxable income received from both your cover facility and this organization. Additionally, while serving in the United States, withholdings shall also be made for District of Columbia or State income tax, when applicable. You may claim reimbursement for excess income taxes paid on overt tax returns by reason of taxable income from your cover facility exceeding the taxable income due you as an employee of this organization.

c. All annual and sick leave which is accrued to your credit at the time of integration will be transferred to your cover facility. While integrated you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon termination of your integration, your unused annual leave, sick leave, and home leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization and your leave record will be reconstructed as of the beginning of the leave year in which you return to this organization, as explained in the Handbook on Leave for Special Situations. Serving in an integrated capacity does not permit the carryover from one leave year to another of an annual leave balance which exceeds the ceilings authorized by regulations of this organization and the Federal leave law. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, upon your "resignation" you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization, including any income taxes withheld by your cover facility in order to receive credit for such annual leave.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:
- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): 036730 Flores Daniel
DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): 4 August 1935
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 460 48 6230
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY:
LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB" THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE

SIGNATURE (do not print): Daniel C. Flores
DATE: [illegible]

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on Back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY - Retain in Office of Personnel Folder

S-E-C-R-E-T

- TRAINING REPORT -

Operational Interrogation Course No. 2-69
(Full time - three weeks) 4 - 22 November 1968

Student: Flores, Daniel

Office: WH

Grade : 08

EOD : Mar 62

Number of Students Enrolled: 9

Service Designation:: D

COURSE OBJECTIVE

To teach the student to interrogate and to manage interrogation.

RATING

Class Performance : Satisfactory

Interrogation Aptitude: Average

GENERAL CLASS PERFORMANCE

Excellent: 3 Satisfactory: 6 Unsatisfactory: 0

GENERAL CLASS APTITUDE FOR INTERROGATION

High: 2 Average: 6 Low: 1

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

17 DEC 1968
Date

Ezekiel S. Ramirez
Ezekiel S. Ramirez
Chief Instructor

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT OPERATIONS COURSE (FULL TIME)	Course No. OC-1-3/4-68	No. of Students Began [illegible] Finished 70	Dates of Course 27 May - 16 August 1968

STUDENT IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME OF STUDENT	YOB	ECD DATE	OFFICE	GS	SD
FLORES, Daniel	193[illegible]	March [illegible]	CTP	0[illegible]	[illegible]

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Ranges from inadequate to less than satisfactory (in terms of a new and inexperienced case officer).
A - Adequate	Has achieved the basic level required. Satisfactory, characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	More than satisfactory. Has acquired a solid beginner's proficiency. This rating may be interpreted as representing "average" on our rating scale.
S - Strong	Exceptional proficiency, characterized by thoroughness, initiative, originality, and an exceptional student understanding of the case officer role in clandestine operations.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of other students doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

COURSE OBJECTIVE

This course is designed to prepare selected staff officers from the Career Trainee Program for field operations officer work with the Clandestine Services. The student's understanding of the Clandestine Services doctrines, policies and operational concepts and his ability to apply these related items is measured by a series of practical exercises. Successful completion of the Operations Familiarization Course (OFC) is a prerequisite for admission to the Operations Course.

	RATING LETTER
TRADECRAFT	P
INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORTING	P
CLANDESTINE SERVICES OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS	P

The trainee also received basic instruction and practical work in photography, including the use of a 35mm camera and in darkroom procedures; in audio-surveillance, and in the use of S/W and agent radio communications systems. In addition, he was given general familiarization on such subjects as surreptitious entry, documentation and authentication, observation and sketching.

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
P

This rating corresponds to the statement which most accurately reflects the student's level of performance and takes into account everything about him which influenced his effectiveness. This rating is a reflection of the degree to which the instructors feel that the student is both suitable and competent for overseas service in the Clandestine Services.

Overall performance ratings of all students in this class:

WEAK 0 ADEQUATE 0 PROFICIENT 40 STRONG [illegible] OUTSTANDING [illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Significant strengths and weaknesses and their relationship to overall performance in the Operations Course. This section amplifies and explains, as necessary, the rating letters given above.

Mr. Flores' overall performance in this course was at the high proficient level. He is a very friendly and personable individual who put forth a good deal of effort to do well in the course. Mr. Flores takes a very practical approach to solving problems and his attitude throughout the course was excellent.

Mr. Flores acquired a good understanding of the principles and techniques of Clandestine Services operations, and in problems requiring face-to-face encounters with simulated agents in the live exercises he came through as a very friendly and personable individual. He was particularly effective in debriefing situations and demonstrated flexibility in meeting the problems that arose during the simulated agent meetings.

Mr. Flores demonstrated a good understanding of Clandestine Services programs in Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Covert Action. His performance was graded strong in handling of a simulated walk-in defector, and in a Counterintelligence case study and a Covert Action case study his understanding and analyses were judged highly proficient. He received a rating of adequate in photography.

Mr. Flores has good writing skills and acquired a thorough understanding of intelligence and operational reporting procedures and formats of the Clandestine Services. His intelligence reports were consistently complete, accurate and clear. His operational reports suffered occasionally from weak organization, and on one occasion he had difficulty distinguishing operational from intelligence information; but his reports were generally complete and accurate and showed a sound understanding of operational reporting requirements.

Mr. Flores is a personable and intelligent individual who got along very well with his colleagues and with the instructors. With his excellent attitude and strong desire for a career in the Clandestine Services together with his willingness to work hard, Mr. Flores should have little difficulty in developing into an effective case officer as he gets greater experience.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

A P Frizzell

Arthur P. Frizzell	23 August 1968
Chief Instructor	Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Operations Course, Phase II-3-68
(416 hours, full-time)

4 March - 3 May 1968
(Date)

Student : FLORES, Daniel

Office : CTP/OTR

Year of Birth: 1935

Service Designation: SJ

Grade : GS-07

No. of Students: 60 Began; 60 Finished

EOD : March 1962

COURSE OBJECTIVES:

The course is designed to prepare junior clandestine services officers for duties related to the conduct of Special Operations. Upon completion of training, the officer will be capable of developing and implementing actions which will contribute to the elimination of subversive insurgency in the underdeveloped area of the world in furtherance of U.S. policy. He shall also be capable of developing plans for the conduct of Special Operations in support of United States military operations in wartime; and will be able to plan for the use of special ground, air, and maritime operations in direct support of other intelligence activities.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD:

The performance rating and narrative comments below are derived from a synthesis of all observations and evaluations submitted on each trainee by the instructor staff. Student rating is indicated by the asterisk.

INCOMPLETE 0   ADEQUATE 0   PROFICIENT * 48   STRONG 12

NARRATIVE COMMENTS:

Mr. Flores is a self-sufficient, steady worker, who demonstrated an excellent ability to adapt himself to the various training situations. His proficient performance during Operations Course, Phase II-3-68 did not fluctuate appreciably from beginning to end.

Mr. Flores was always mentally alert, receptive to instruction and responsive to instructional exercises. He cheerfully accepted all responsibilities, consistently produced satisfactory results, and appeared to demonstrate a sense of pride in his accomplishments. His conscientious effort, sincerity, and cooperative attitude enabled him to develop a sound working relationship with his colleagues.

Continued on Page 2

TRAINING REPORT

Operations Course, Phase II-3-68 4 March - 3 May 1968
(416 hours, full-time)

Student : FLORES, Daniel

Office : CTP/OTR

Service Designation: SJ

NARRATIVE COMMENTS (Continued)

Of noteworthy mention was Mr. Flores' pleasant, industrious performance throughout the Jungle Environmental Training in Panama. He established a cheerful environment for his colleagues and completed assigned responsibilities with enthusiasm, determination and cooperation. His sustained high-level performance and ability to adapt to the terrain earned him the respect and appreciation of his classmates.

The degree of performance attained in the course indicates Mr. Flores has gained a sound familiarization of the Special Operations activities, responsibilities, skills, and concepts.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor, Operations Course, Phase II

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

NAME OF TRAINEE: Flores, Daniel

DOB: 1935 SD: SJ

OFFICE: CTP GS: 07

COURSE: CS RECORDS I &
CS RECORDS II
(Biographic Research)

DATE : 9 - 16 May 1968

HOURS : 30 - part time

OBJECTIVES

1. To provide briefing in the CS requirement for biographic research, the importance of this research in the investigative process, and in the importance of the role of the biographic researcher.

2. To provide instruction in the nature, content and means of access to repositories of biographic information in the CS and other elements of the Agency and the community.

3. To introduce the concept of research and investigation and the processes involved therein, and to provide practical work in research as done at headquarters.

4. To alert the students to the nature of analysis in producing finished reports of biographic research.

5. To provide practice in writing the report of biographic research.

METHOD OF INSTRUCTION

The course is presented by means of lecture, discussion and demonstration. More than fifty percent of the class time is devoted to an exercise in biographic research, an exercise in analysis of the materials recovered, and preparation of a report of the research.

ADJECTIVAL RATINGS USED IN THE TRAINING REPORT

EXCELLENT	Student demonstrated unusual competence in achieving the course objectives. His understanding of the course content was unusually thorough and perceptive. Where skills were taught, he demonstrated particular facility in their use.
[✓ SATISFACTORY]	Student's achievement of the course objectives was competent. He demonstrated good understanding of the course content. Where skills were taught, he demonstrated basic facility in their use.
UNSATISFACTORY	Student did not demonstrate adequate competence. Although he may have made some progress, he fell short of the minimum standards for achievement of the course objectives.

SECRET

NARRATIVE RATING OF ACHIEVEMENT:

Mr. Flores showed considerable ability and experience in his handling of the practical problem. He should have no trouble in doing work of this kind with a minimum of supervision.

Overall adjectival rating of achievement:

Satisfactory ✓

Overall adjectival ratings of achievement of all employees in the course:

EXCELLENT: 2 SATISFACTORY: 14 UNSATISFACTORY:

Attendance at this course does not provide the student with operational knowledge and background sufficient to qualify him as an independent researcher, capable of making operational judgments.

NOTE: CS Records I (Introduction to Records) is a prerequisite for this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

24 MAY 1968

Date

Charles H. Schafer
Chief Instructor

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAINING REPORT INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES COURSE (120 Hours)	COURSE NO. 3-68	NO. STUDENTS 46	DATE OF COURSE 29 Jan - 13 Feb 1968

IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME OF STUDENT	YOB	EOD DATE	OFFICE	GS	SD
FLORES, Daniel	35	Mar 1962	CTP	07	SJ

KEY TO RATINGS

W - Weak	*Ranges from inadequate to less than satisfactory.*
A - Adequate	*Has achieved the basic level required. Satisfactory, characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.*
P - Proficient	*More than satisfactory. Has acquired a solid beginner's proficiency.*
S - Strong	*Exceptional proficiency. Characterized by thoroughness, initiative, originality, and an exceptional student understanding of the work involved in intelligence production.*
O - Outstanding	*Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.*

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE IN SKILLS

BRIEFING	RATING	WRITING	RATING	ANALYSIS	RATING
	P		A+		P

OVER-ALL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

The RATING LETTER reflects the over-all performance of the student in the course and is thus a measure of the extent to which the student possesses the skills and techniques required in the production of finished intelligence. The rating is not necessarily arrived at by mathematically averaging in the skills ratings, but takes into consideration any outstanding strengths or weaknesses that should be reflected in an evaluation of the performance of the student as a whole. The RATING LETTER is a consensus of the view of the faculty.

RATING: P-

REPORT OF OBSERVATIONS, JUDGMENTS AND IMPRESSIONS

This is a general, unspecific, narrative report of observations, judgments, and impressions. It includes intangible factors such as the student's attitude, cooperativeness, attentiveness, maturity, and judgment. It also includes the general impression the student has made on the faculty. This report will not be included unless the instructors believe that it would add something to the previous evaluation of performance in skills as well as to the evaluation of the OVER-ALL PERFORMANCE of the student.

☐ OVER

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION FACULTY
INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL

DATE

FORM 10-65 2070 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

PERFORMANCE RECORD

The Challenge of World-Wide Communism

CT Class [illegible] Feb - 1 May 19[illegible]

Course Description

A. Statement of Objectives

1. The student should recognize the challenge confronting the United States and the free world posed by the objectives, activities, and capabilities of World-Wide Communism.

2. The student should achieve a knowledge of the doctrine, organization and tactics of free-world Communist parties; and, similarly, of the capabilities, the policies, and the problems of the USSR and the People's Republic of China.

B. Course Method

1. Approximately one-half of the course is devoted to lectures, one-fourth to seminars, exercises and demonstrations, and one-fourth to individual study.

2. Student achievement is judged on the basis of performance in one written examination and participation in seminars and exercises.

NAME Flores, Daniel

Written Work

Examination Proficient

Oral Work

Seminars, Exercises Proficient

Comment:

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION COURSE NO. 2-68
(152 hours, full-time)

2 Jan. - 26 Jan. 1968
(Date)

STUDENT : FLORES, Daniel

OFFICE : CTP

YEAR OF BIRTH: 1935

SERVICE DESIGNATION: GJ

GRADE : GS-07

NUMBER OF STUDENTS : 114 Began

114 Finished

EOD DATE : March 1962

COURSE OBJECTIVE AND CONTENT

The Operations Familiarization Course is a four-week course designed to provide the student with an understanding of the Clandestine Services programs, operational methods and reporting techniques. Special emphasis is given the basic elements of tradecraft, the fundamentals of operational and intelligence information reporting, and the Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Covert Action programs of the Clandestine Services. General orientation is also provided in special operations and staff communications.

METHODS

The instructional methods used included class discussions, lectures, films demonstrations, practical exercises and case studies. Practical exercises were conducted in operational and intelligence information reporting, surveillance, casing, handling of walk-in defectors and planning for, meeting and debriefing an agent. The operational programs of various Clandestine Services Divisions were discussed by representatives of the respective Headquarters components.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

The student's rating is based on understanding of the material presented as demonstrated by his participation in class discussions, the preparation of intelligence and operational reports, the application of operational principles in the practical exercises and the grade received on a comprehensive written examination given in the final week of the course which covered all areas of course content. Other factors considered in determining the final rating were the student's interest, attitude and preparation for assignments. The number of students receiving each adjectival rating on overall course performance is shown below. This student's rating is indicated by an asterisk. Explanatory narrative comments are included with a rating of ADEQUATE or STRONG. When considered pertinent by the training staff, comments may also be included with a PROFICIENT (average) rating.

UNSATISFACTORY	ADEQUATE	* PROFICIENT	STRONG
1	1	87	25

✓ Mr. Flores' overall performance in the course was at the solid proficient level. It should be noted that he demonstrated a particularly good attitude throughout the course. He took full advantage of the training offered to increase his knowledge of the Clandestine Services.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

Arthur [illegible]
Chief, [illegible]

9 Feb. 1968
DATE

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIENTATION TO INTELLIGENCE FOR CT'S
(Class of December 1967)

Duration: 11-22 December 1967
(80 hours, full time)

STUDENT : Daniel FLORES

YEAR OF BIRTH: 1935

GRADE : GS-07

EOD : March 1962

OFFICE : CT

SERVICE DESIGNATION: SJ

NUMBER OF STUDENTS : 88

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

In the Orientation to Intelligence Course the objectives are: (1) to instruct the student in the basic concepts and terminology of intelligence; (2) to describe the history of U.S. intelligence and the current role of intelligence in the national security structure; (3) to outline the composition and mission of the intelligence community, noting the Agency's significant role therein; (4) to define the mission of CIA in supporting the DCI and to identify the functions of the Agency's major components, particularly in the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence; and (5) to identify and discuss major problems facing the Agency. The area surveys and "Articulating the United States" elements of the course are designed to introduce the students briefly to some of the intelligence problems presented by major regions of the free world and to stimulate thought about the American way of life and its relationship to these areas.

Instructional techniques include lectures given by members of the Orientation and Briefing Faculty, guest speakers from Agency components, seminars, directed reading, review exercises, training films, and intelligence exhibits.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

The individual student evaluation is based on his score achieved on a written examination given at the conclusion of the course. This test, consisting of 100 items, covered all major aspects of the course content. The rating assigned to this student is:

PROFICIENT

The evaluation system used was as follows:

O = Outstanding - 0-3 wrong
S = Strong - 4-8 wrong
P = Proficient - 9-15 wrong
A = Adequate - 16-25 wrong
W = Weak - 26- wrong

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Lawrence C. [illegible] 8 January 1968
Chief, Orientation & Briefing Faculty Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONFIDENTIAL

26 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Daniel Flores

THROUGH : Executive Secretary
CSCT Selection Board

SUBJECT : Application for Career Training Program

1. I am pleased to inform you that you have been accepted for the Career Training Program. Let me congratulate you and wish you the maximum profit and pleasure from your proposed training.

2. You will remain with your present Component until the beginning of the next Integrated Training Program, to begin 11 December. At that time you will be reassigned to the CTP T/O where you will remain until your training has been completed.

3. Should you have any further questions, do not hesitate to call on the Program Officers.

Robert B. Freeman
ROBERT B. FREEMAN
Chief, CTP

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MILITARY STATUS QUESTIONNAIRE
(READ INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

1. THIS DATE (Month-day-year): March 15, 1962

1-6. SERIAL NUMBER: 006100

2. NAME (Last-first-middle): Fackes, Daniel (N)

7-24. NAME:

3. DATE OF BIRTH (Month-year): August 1935

4. SEX: ☑ (1) MALE ☐ (2) FEMALE

25-28. DOB: 0835

29. SEX: 1

5. OFFICE TO WHICH ASSIGNED: DDP/OPSER/RI

6. SCHEDULE AND GRADE: GS-04

30-31. OFFICE CODE: 39

32-34. SCHD.: GS

35-36 GR.: 04

7. SUBJECT TO CURRENT DRAFT: ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. INDICATE DRAFT CLASSIFICATION, IF ANY:

37. DRAFT STATUS: 2

38-39. CLASS.:

VETERANS COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING

9. BRANCH OF SERVICE ON SEPARATION (Check one): ☐ (1) ARMY ☐ (2) NAVY ☒ (3) MARINE ☐ (4) AIR FORCE ☐ (5) COAST GUARD

10. MIL. GRADE ON SEPARATION: Cpl. (E4)

10A. YRS/MOS OF ACTIVE SERVICE: 4 yrs.

40. BRANCH SERVICE: 3

41-42. MIL. GRADE: E 4

11. STATUS AT TIME OF SEPARATION (Check one): ☒ (1) REGULAR ☐ (2) RESERVE ☐ (3) DRAFTEE ☐ (4) OTHER (Specify in Comments)

43. STATUS AT SEPARATION: 1

12. TYPE OF SEPARATION (Check one)

PLEASE NOTE

ALTHOUGH YOU MAY HAVE A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY, DO NOT CHECK THE BOX "RETIRED-SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY" UNLESS YOU WERE ACTUALLY RETIRED FOR THIS REASON. IF OTHERWISE, CHECK "HONORABLE DISCHARGE" OR "RELEASED TO INACTIVE DUTY" AS APPROPRIATE, EVEN THOUGH YOU MAY BE DRAWING A DISABILITY ALLOWANCE OR COMPENSATION.

☐ (1) RELEASED TO INACTIVE DUTY
☒ (2) HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ (3) RETIRED-20 (or more) YRS. SERVICE
☐ (4) RETIRED-LESS THAN 20 YRS. SERVICE
☐ (5) RETIRED-AGE
☐ (6) RETIRED-SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY
☐ (7) RETIRED-COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ (8) OTHER-SPECIFY UNDER COMMENTS

44. TYPE OF SEPARATION (A-less than 8 yrs; B-8 yrs or more)

1 A	3 A	5 A	7 A
1 B	3 B	5 B	7 B
[✓ 2 A]	4 A	6 A	8 A
2 B	4 B	6 B	8 B

MEMBERS OF RESERVE FORCES COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING

13. RESERVE BRANCH OR SERVICE:

14. ORIGINAL ENTRY DATE IN ARMED SERVICES:

45. BRANCH SERVICE:

46-49. ENTRY DATE:

15. SERVICE SERIAL NO.:

16. MOS, AFSC, DESIGNATOR, OR RATING:

50-59. SERV. SER. NO.:

60-64. MOS, AFSC, ETC.:

17. MIL. GRADE:

18. RESERVE CATEGORY (Check one): ☐ (1) READY ☐ (2) STANDBY ☐ (3) RETIRED

65-66. MIL. GRADE:

67. CATEGORY:

19. EXPIRATION DATE OF APPOINTMENT OR ENLISTMENT (Month and year):

68-71. EXPIRATION DATE:

20. MIL. MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT:

72. MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT:

21. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED:

73. ASSIGNMENT UNIT:

74. MOBILIZATION CATEGORY:

22. COMMENTS:

FORM 536 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
(Classify When Filled In)

OUTSIDE ACTIVITY APPROVAL REQUEST

SEE HR 10-7 BEFORE SUBMITTING TO EAB AN ORIGINAL AND 3 COPIES OF THIS FORM

TO : DIRECTOR OF SECURITY; ATTN: EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH

DATE 16 April 1962

THROUGH: (Operating official, administrative and/or security officer)

JOHN A. MAYO, Jr.
Security Officer, RID

FROM :

NAME AND GRADE OF EMPLOYEE (Print or type)	COMPONENT	ROOM NO. AND BLDG.	PHONE
FLORES, Daniel GS-04	DDP/OPSER/RID/RB/I	1 B 4003	6727

1. DESCRIPTION OF OUTSIDE ACTIVITY FOR WHICH APPROVAL IS REQUESTED:

Bartender

2. FULL NAMES OF ORGANIZATION AND/OR PERSONS INVOLVED

Bartenders Union Local Old 75 **Mr. Patrick Duffy**

3. DATE(S) OF PARTICIPATION AND LOCALE OF ACTIVITY

On call different days of the week.
914 F Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

4. REMARKS

In engaging in the requested activity I will make no reference to, or discuss my CIA assignments or duties nor will I make reference to or discuss my CIA employment except as authorized by Headquarters Regulation 10-7.

Daniel Flores
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING EMPLOYEE

5. CONCURRENCES AND/OR APPROVAL WITHIN OPERATING OFFICE

(signed) John M. Wigglesworth
JOHN M. WIGGLESWORTH
Chief, RID/ADMIN

FOR COMPLETION BY EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH AND RETURN OF ORIGINAL TO EMPLOYEE

OP

20 Apr 62

W. A. Osborne

FORM 9-61 879 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY (9-38)

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER [illegible] F P M
[illegible]

H[illegible]ALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FOR[illegible]

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959

(Read In[illegible] on [illegible] Use only typewriter or [illegible])

[illegible] NUMBER
4536490

PART A
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL)
FLOR[illegible]

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH DAY YEAR

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ NO ☐

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE)

5. SEX MALE ☒ FEMALE ☐

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by, or enrolling in a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 through the employment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant? YES ☐ NO ☒

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1
$4,000 TO $5,999 ☒ 2
$6,000 TO $9,999 ☐ 3
$10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN: [illegible]

OPTION (HIGH OR LOW): HIGH

ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER: 4 [illegible] 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband [illegible]	[illegible]	1			6
		2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant), does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer [illegible] attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT

[illegible] ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES, AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. [illegible] to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act ☐

3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box)
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act ☐ 2
(c) Any other reason ☐ 3

PART D
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B
1. Enrollment code number of present plan
2. The type of event which permits change (See table on back of duplicate for proper number)
3. Date of event which permits change MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART

(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001)

PART F
TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
[illegible]
HEALTH BENEFITS [illegible]
(SIGNATURE OF [illegible] OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE
[illegible]

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION
[illegible]

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS
FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY

2809-103

Triplicate—To Employing Office

SEPT. 1959

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 29 August 1961.

Signature

15 [illegible] 1962
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED JUNE 1957
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A6

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.-- *Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY .... WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, FLORES, DANIEL, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

11 March 1962 .... Daniel Flores
(Date of entrance on duty) (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 12th day of March A. D. 19 62.

at Washington, D. C.
(City) (State)

[SEAL] (Signature of officer)

Appointment Clerk
(Title)

NOTE -- *The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U. S. C. 16 or by a person designated to administer oaths under Section 2b, Act of June 26, 1943, 5 U. S. C. 16a. If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

1 PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State)
2829 Connecticut Ave. N.W. #205 Washington 8, D.C.

2 (A) DATE OF BIRTH
August 4, 1935

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State or city and foreign country)
San Marcos, Texas

3 (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, PLEASE NOTIFY
Mrs. Daniel Flores

(B) RELATIONSHIP
Wife

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE
2825 Connecticut Ave, N.W., Wash, 8, DC

(D) TELEPHONE NO
DU-7-5444
265-5522

4 DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☐ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blank below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MAR-RIED (Check one)	SIN-GLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5 (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	X	
6 ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12		X
7 DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? If your answer is "Yes" give details in Item 12		X
8 SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, CHARGED, OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? (DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED.) If your answer is "Yes" give in Item 12 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.		X
9 SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN DEBARRED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? If your answer is "Yes" give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 12		X

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10 (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		X
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		
11 SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT,		
A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE:		
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT:		
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		X
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? If your answer to A, B or C is "Yes" give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case		X

12 SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER. You must determine that the appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for binding of office, [illegible] any record of arrest & discharge or arrest, age, citizenship, and member of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should positively check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and on other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1958
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS 11, 81, AND 52

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CI .IAN AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): FLORES, DANIEL

2. DATE OF BIRTH: August 4, 1935

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon or dishon?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.	1957	July	25	1961	July	25	Honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☐ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☐ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. C. S. STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
4	—	—

12. TOTAL SERVICE
4 — —

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

12 March 1962
(DATE)

Daniel Flores
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 12th day of Mar, 19 62 at Washington, D. C.
(MONTH) (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

Shirley [illegible]

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

(OVER)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) FLORES (First) DANIEL (Middle) (A.)
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 462-05-6630

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED: 2828 Connecticut Ave, Wash 8, D.C.
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 2828 Connecticut Ave, Wash. 8, D.C.
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE:

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: LIMA, PERU, SOUTH AMERICA
DATE OF MARRIAGE: Oct, 14, 1961
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED:
DATE SPOUSE DIED:
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S):

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE: DOROTHY A. FLORES
ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 2828 Connecticut Ave. N.W.
TELEPHONE NO.: 265-8322
NAMES OF CHILDREN:
ADDRESS:
SEX:
DATE OF BIRTH:
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian): JOSE D. FLORES
ADDRESS: 501 S. Guadalupe St., San Marcos, Texas
TELEPHONE NO.:
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian): Concepcion R. Flores
ADDRESS: 501 S Guadalupe St, San Marcos, Texas
TELEPHONE NO.:
WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, DANIEL ARNETT
RELATIONSHIP: WIFE
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 2828 Conn. Ave. N.W., Wash. 8, D.C.
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 265-8322
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: 1000 16th St. N.W., Washington 6, DC
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION: RE 7-5444

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES ✓ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES X NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) YES X NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 6-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

(8)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

UNION TRUST CO., WASH. D.C. – DANIEL OR DOROTHY A. FLORES
BANK OF CALIFORNIA, PORTLAND ORE, DANIEL OR DOROTHY A. FLORES

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT
Washington DC

DATE
March 13 1962

SIGNATURE
Daniel A. Flores

CONFIDENTIAL

☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

REQUEST DATE: 12 Sept 77

APPLICANT HAS APPLICANT PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN BY OMS: ☒ YES ☐ NO

X DEPENDENT(S) EMPLOYEE

NAME: Flores, Daniel

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 460-48-6230 [redacted]

DOB: 4 Aug 35

SEX: M

GRADE: 13

APPLICATION CC: All

DIRECTORATE/OFFICE DIVISION: DDO/LA

EMP. EXT.: 5270

POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

13 DEPENDENT NAME	14 SOC SEC NO	16 DOB	17 SEX	18 RELATIONSHIP	19 DEPENDENT PREVIOUSLY SEEN BY OMS (yes, no)
Flores, Dorothy	[redacted]	31Jan35	F	wife	yes
Flores, Zola M.		15Mar74	F	dau	yes

20 REQUESTED ACTION

APPLICANT: PRE EMPLOYMENT / EOD

ASSIGNMENTS: X O/S PCS — STATION: Mexico City — ETD: 14 Oct 77 — NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 2

O/S TDY — TYPE COVER: Nominal State — POSITION: Ops Officer

O/S RETURNEE — FITNESS FOR DUTY — OTHER (specify)

O/S TDY STANDBY — RETURN TO DUTY

O/S PLANNING — SPECIAL TRAINING

SEPARATION: RETIREMENT — MDR/CIARDS — MDR/CSC

ROUTINE: REGULAR ANNUAL — EXECUTIVE ANNUAL — MPT/PHE

21 COMMENTS

Assignment to Tokyo, Japan has been cancled, Subject is now being considered for Mexico City.

22 REQUESTING DIRECTORATE OFFICE DIV: DDO/LA/PERS

23 ROOM/BLDG: 3D3D3 Hqs

24 EXTENSION: 5270

25 SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER: Diane M. Hoy

FOR OMS USE ONLY

FOR APPLICANTS

☐ APPROVE PROCESSING FOR EOD

☐ HOLD PENDING RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL MEDICAL INFORMATION

☐ REQUEST PRE EMP MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ OTHER

COMMENTS

DATE — OMS SIGNATURE

FOR OTHER ACTIONS

REQUESTED ACTION	QUAL	COND QUAL	DEFER	DISQUAL

OMS ASSIGNABILITY CODE — EXAMINATION FACILITY

COMMENTS

QUALIFIED [illegible] OS. [illegible] MUST [illegible] EVALUATED PRIOR [illegible] FUTURE OF PCS.

[illegible]

26 OCT 1977

DATE — OMS SIGNATURE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY

FORM 2598

4 - OMS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1 DATE OF REQUEST: 28 July 1976

2 NAME (Last, First, Middle): Flores, Daniel DOB: 4 August 1935

3 POSITION TITLE: Instructor

4 GRADE: GS-12

5 OFFICE DIVISION BRANCH: OTR/FTD/OTB

6 EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5191

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☒ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8 OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Phronsie A. Joynes

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 6E57 Hqs

EXT.: 5191

10 COMMENTS

Destination: World-Wide

11 REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified for TDY Standby until 1 August 1978.

DATE: 31 August 1976

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: William T.Golder, OMS/PEO

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-73

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (26)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 18 June 1976

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Flores, Daniel DOB 1935

3. POSITION TITLE: Instructor

4. GRADE: GS-13

5. OFFICE DIVISION BRANCH: OTR/FTD/OTB

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5191

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☒ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (*One block must be checked*)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Phronsie A. Joynes

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GD57 Hqs.

EXT.: 5191

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified for TDY Standby until 1 August 1978.

DATE: 31 August 1976

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: William T. Colder, OMS/PEO

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-71

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 10 Mar 75

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Flores, Daniel (NMN) [illegible]

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-12

5. OFFICE DIVISION BRANCH: DDO/LA/COG

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 7265

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- ☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- ☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- ☒ TDY STANDBY
- ☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ RETURN TO DUTY
- ☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
- ☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- ☐ HDQS/TDY
- ☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED

- ☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

- ☐ YES
- ☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Kathy Hill
Kathy Hill, LA/Trng

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D5317 Hqs

EXT.: 7431

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Disposition deferred until subject fulfills medical requirements.

DATE: 1 April 1975

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: William T. Golder, OMS/Registrar

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
3-69

SECRET [illegible]

(20)

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Flores, Daniel 460-48-6230	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Aug 1935	3. GRADE GS-10
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/WH/Guayaquil (State)	5. PRESENT POSITION 0376	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 7431

7. PROPOSED STATION Lima, Peru	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Ops Officer/0636/GS-13

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE Sept 71	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY two

12. COMMENTS

Vice: Donald J. Venuto
Please schedule appointments week of 31 May 1971/

Mr. Flores' Spanish capabilities are native reading and high speaking which more than meets the language requirements of intermediate reading and speaking for the Station.

Gregory V. [illegible]
[illegible]/SOD 12 May 71

13. DATE OF REQUEST 11 Mar 71	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Joan Wright Joan Wright	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3D 5309 Hqs	16. EXTENSION 7431

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

15 JUN 1971

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS

G. E. Lott [illegible]

Chairman, Overseas Candidate Review Panel

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 11 Mar 71

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Flores, Daniel (Dependents of)

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-10

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/Guayaquil

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 7431

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: September 1971

STATION: Lima, Peru

TDY OR PCS: PCS

TYPE OF COVER: State

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: Two

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Joan Wright

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D 5300 Hqs

EXT.: 7431

10. COMMENTS

Dorothy	wife	31 Jan 1938
Kendra	dau	3 Mar 1971

Please schedule appointments week of 31 May 1971.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION: QUALIFIED FOR OS PCS 16 8 71

SPERRY PRESTON

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 330 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 11 Mar 71

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Flores, Daniel (Dependents of)

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-10

5. OFFICE DIVISION BRANCH: DDP/WH/Guayaquil

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 7431

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: September 1971

STATION: Lima, Peru

TDY OR PCS: PCS

TYPE OF COVER: State

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: Two

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Joan Wright

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D 5300 Hqs

EXT.: 7431

10. COMMENTS

Dorothy	wife	31 Jan 1938
Kendra	dau	3 Mar 1971

Please schedule appointments week of 31 May 1971.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION QUALIFIED FOR OS PCS 6 · 8 71

SPERRY PRESTON

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

SECRET

1. [illegible] (Title) [illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible]

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and [illegible]) [illegible] (State)

5. PRESENT POSITION [illegible]

6. [illegible] EXTENSION [illegible]

7. PROPOSED STATION Lima, Peru

8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Ops Officer/0136/GS-12

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State

10. ESTIMATED DATE OF [illegible]

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO [illegible]

12. COMMENTS

Vice: Donald J. Venuto
Please schedule appointments week of 31 May 1971/

Mr. Flores' Spanish capabilities are native reading and high speaking which more than meets the language requirements of intermediate reading and speaking for the Station.

13. DATE OF REQUEST 11 Mar 71

14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Joan Wright

15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3D 5309 Hqs

16. EXTENSION 7431

17. OF[illegible] Qualified Overseas POB

11 June 1971

Joe W. Cline, OMS/pro

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 2594 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Flores, Daniel	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 August 1935	3. GRADE GS-08
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (If overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/WH/4	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Officer	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 6815
7. PROPOSED STATION Guayaquil	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Ops Off 0376 GS-09	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION Department of State	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE o/a 27 April 69	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 1

12. COMMENTS

VICE KENNETH R. GOODMAN

WILL INTEGRATE IN 14 APRIL 1969 FSI CLASS

89's ATTACHED.

10 MAR 1969

13. DATE OF REQUEST 6 March 1969	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL PPMacDougall PPMacDougall	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3D5309 Hqs.	16. EXTENSION 6815

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

25 MAR 1969

QUALIFIED [illegible]

Chairman, [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

2590

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 6 March 1969

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Flores, Daniel (dependent)

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-08

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/4

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6815

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: o/a 27 April 1969

STATION: Guayaquil

TDY OR PCS: PCS

TYPE OF COVER: Department of State

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 1

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED: 1

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: PPMacDougall WH/Personnel

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3D5309 Hqs.

EXT.: 6815

10. COMMENTS

Wife - Dorothy A. - 1/31/35

11. REPORT [illegible] QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED OS PCS 4-21-69

SPERRY PRESTON

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Flores, Daniel

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 August 1935

3. GRADE: GS-09

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment): DDP/WH/4

5. PRESENT POSITION: Ops Officer

6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION: 6815

7. PROPOSED STATION: Guayaquil

8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade): Ops Off 0378 GS-09

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION: Department of State

10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE: o/a 27 April 69

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 1

12. COMMENTS

VICE KENNETH R. GOODMAN

WILL INTEGRATE IN 14 APRIL 1969 FBI CLASS

83's ATTACHED.

13. DATE OF REQUEST: 6 March 1969

14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: PPMacDougall

15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING: 3D5309 Hqs.

16. EXTENSION: 6815

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

MEDICALLY QUALIFIED FOR
PROPOSED OS PCS.

DONALD FARLEY

3 21 69

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 6 October 1961

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): FLORES, DANIEL

3. POSITION TITLE: File Clerk

4. GRADE: GS-04

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/OPSER

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Shirley Wells

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 801 1016 16th Street

EXT.: 2781

10. ~~REPORT OF EVALUATION~~
COMMENTS

TRANS SECTION

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

NOV 29 10 25 AM '61

DATE: 22NOV 1

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(28)

7

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PRE-EMPLOYMENT MEDICAL EVALUATION

REQUEST FOR PRE-EMPLOYMENT MEDICAL EVALUATION			1. DATE 6 October 1961
2. NAME (Last) FLORES,	(First) DANIEL	(Middle)	3. SEX ☒ Male ☐ Female
4. ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT DDP/OPSER	5. POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE File Clerk GS-04		

6. MEDICAL STAFF REQUESTED TO CHECK DESIRED ACTION BELOW, RETURN ORIGINAL COPY TO OFFICE OF PERSONNEL.

☐ Approve Processing For E. O. D.	☐ Hold Pending Receipt of Additional Medical Information (Form Letters Attached)	☒ Request Pre-Employment Medical Examination 10 Oct 61	☐ Rejected For Medical Reasons

7. REMARKS

259 Forwarded as of 6 October 1961

Signature for Medical Staff

FORM NO. 570
1 MAY 56

Obsolete Previous Editions

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444r, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
036130	Flores, Daniel	08/04/35

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1. American University, Washington, DC	Political Science		1962-1967	B.A.	1967	120 hrs
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1 ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2 ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 444n
SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESI-DENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGN-MENT
1							
2							

JUL 30 [illegible] AM '60

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1			
2			
3			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE
21 June 1960

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

THE AMERICAN [illegible]
WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[illegible]	
M	F
X	

[illegible] FI[illegible], Daniel
[illegible] 15575
[illegible] 9-62 Graduate Nondegree Wash. Sem.

Date & Place of Birth: 4-8-35, San Marco, Texas

ADMISSION RECORD: Full Standing

PREVIOUS RECORD: San Marcos High School, Texas 5/55

TOOLS OF RESEARCH PASSED:

COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATIONS PASSED:

	TITLE OF COURSE	SEM. HOURS	GRADE	QUALITY POINTS
	FALL 62			
[illegible]	INTRO ECONOMICS I	3	C	3
[illegible]	ENGLISH COMP I	3	C	3
[illegible]	BACKGROUNDS CIV I	3	D	
[illegible]	INTRO WORLD POL	3	C	3
	SPR 63			
[illegible]	INTRO ECONOMICS II	3	D	
[illegible]	AMERICAN GOVT NATL	3	D	
27101	ENGLISH COMP II	3	F 7-1-63	
[illegible]	BACKGROUNDS CIV II	3	C	3
	FALL 1963			
5101	COMP & READING II	3	B	6
[illegible]	ECON ANAL INCOME	3	F	3
	SPRING 1964			
[illegible]	INTRO PHILOSOPHY	3	C	3
[illegible]	[illegible] GOVT ST & LOC	3	F	3
	SPRING 1965			
[illegible]	[illegible] BIOLOGY	3	C	3
[illegible]	[illegible] POL [illegible] POWERS	3	B	6
[illegible]	HIST MOD PHILOSOPHY	3	C	3
[illegible]	STATE GOVERNMENT	3	B	6
	SUMMER 1965			
[illegible]	[illegible] SCIENCES	3	B	6
[illegible]	[illegible] NEW TESTAMENT (Course cancelled by Univ.)			
	FALL 1965			
	STUDENT NUMBER 460-48-6230			
[illegible]	[illegible] LATIN AMER	3	A	9
[illegible]	[illegible]	3	C	3
[illegible]	[illegible]	3	C	3
[illegible]	[illegible] POLIT THEORY	3	C	3
[illegible]	[illegible] PSYCHOLOGY	3	D	
	SPRING 1966			
	COLLEGE OF ARTS & SCIENCES			
[illegible]	[illegible]	3	A	9
[illegible]	[illegible]	3	A	9

[illegible] 7/3/66

CATALOG NUMBER	TITLE OF COURSE	SEM. HOURS	GRADE	QUALITY POINTS
	NEW STUDENT NUMBER			
10306	INTRO ACCOUNTING I	3	[illegible]	3
37458	ADV SPANISH II	3	A	9
53511	MODERN POLIT THEORY	3	A	9
	SUMMER 1966			
	COLLEGE OF ARTS & SCIENCES			
29531	RUSSIA SINCE 1917	3	B	6
37559	TCHRS ADV SPAN II	3	B	6
47376	PROB RELIG THOUGHT	3	C	3
	FALL 1966			
	COLLEGE OF ARTS & SCIENCES			
33450	CONTEMP INT POLIT	3	B	6
33584	LATIN AMER SEM I	9	A	27
37550	GOLDEN AGE NOVEL	3	A	9
53548	GOV & POL LAT AMER	3	C	3
	SPRING 1967			
	COLLEGE OF ARTS & SCIENCES			
33440	INTERNATL LAW & ORGANIZA	3	B	6
33529	LAT AMER INTERNATL RELA	3	A	9
37354	MODERN SPANISH DRAMA	3	B	6
37551	SPANISH 19TH C NOVEL	3	B	6
53150	U S POLITICAL SYSTEM I	3	C	3

REMARKS: [illegible] Spring 1966. Fall 1966.

REGISTRAR'S CERTIFICATION

[illegible]

DATE JUL 12 1967

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE, GRADE, STEP
086130	FLORES DANIEL		08/04/35	GS -05-04

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
D	INTELLIGENCE CLERK	WH	WASH., D.C.

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
NO OVERSEAS SERVICE			

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		

SECRET

07 MAY 1970

SECTION III EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (from - to)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM./QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
1	The American University	Pol.Sci.	Spanish Literature	1962 -	1967	A degree will be conferred		
2	Washington, D.C.					in July	1967.	114 Sem. Hrs.
3								
4								

5 IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

AGENCY SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which if any of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Bolivia	Economic, topographic, cultural and political.	Nov. 1959- Jan. 1960	American Univ. 1962-1967	X		X	
Peru	Topographic, cultural, and political.	Jan. 1960- Nov. 1960	American Univ. 1962-1967	X		X	
Latin America in general.	Economic, topographic, cultural, and political.		American Univ. 1962-1967			X	

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) 45

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER, SPECIFY

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving) OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR. (do NOT submit copies unless requested) INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1 PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried, Other) No change

2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3 DATE OF BIRTH	4 PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5 OCCUPATION	6 PRESENT EMPLOYER

7 CITIZENSHIP	8 FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRIES	9 DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

DATE 29 March 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD
[illegible]	

PART I-GENERAL

~~Flores~~

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
FLORES, DANIEL	Aug. 4, 1935		

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
SPANISH 1/20	MARCH	12	1962	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

[✓ 2.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

[✓ 1.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

[✓ 1.] I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

[✓ 1.] I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING — CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED March 13, 1962	SIGNATURE Daniel Sl[illegible]
(46)	(47)

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

[illegible] BY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

[illegible] DATE [illegible]

September 6, 1961

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, Daniel

2. AGE: 26

3. SEX: ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

4. HEIGHT: 5' 8"

5. WEIGHT: 165 pds.

6. COLOR OF EYES: Brown

7. COLOR OF HAIR: Black

8. TYPE COMPLEXION: Dark

9. TYPE BUILD: Medium

10. SCARS (Type and Location): Right cheek, one-half inch scar; left upper lip, one-quarter inch scar; both received playing football

11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES: None

12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country):
2828 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., #203
Washington 8, D. C.

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO.:
2828 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
#203 - Washington 8, D.C.

14. CURRENT PHONE NO.: 265-8322

15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.: None

16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country): Washington, District of Columbia

17. NICKNAMES: Dan

18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED: None

19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES: Personal acquaintances - twelve years

20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what Authority): NA

SECTION II — POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING:
Any phase of communications; administration; or personnel work.

2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary): $ 4,250.00

3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT: Immediately

4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: ☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (Check (X) each item applicable):
☒ WASHINGTON D C ☐ ANYWHERE IN U S ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify):
☒ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U S

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA:
I would be willing to travel within the United States provided said travel would not involve a permanent move whereby my legal residence would be changed. However, it is my wish to live overseas on a permanent basis.

FORM 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
11-58

JOY COONEY



SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH: August [illegible], 1935
2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): San Marcos, Texas
3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): United States of America
4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify)
5. DATE NATURALIZED: NA
6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.: NA
7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: NA
8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country): NA
9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☐ YES ☒ NO
10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY: NA
11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

NA

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☒ NO
13. GIVE PARTICULARS: NA
14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)? NA
15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.: NA
16. PORT OF ENTRY: NA
17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY: NA
18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue): NA
19. DATE VISA ISSUED: NA

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☒ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: San Marcos Elementary School
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): San Marcos, Texas, U.S.A.
3. DATES ATTENDED (From and To): Sept., 1942 - May, 1951
4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: San Marcos High School
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): San Marcos, Texas, U.S.A.
3. DATES ATTENDED (From and To): Sept., 1951 - May, 1955
4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: NA
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From and To):
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED	DATE RECEIVED	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

[illegible]

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

NA

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
NA				

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
Marine Security Guard School - Henderson Hall Hq. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D.C.	Security Guard Training	9/22/58	10/31/58	(5 wks)

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

Weapons Training in Marine Corps.

Acted as partisan during cold weather training at Bridgeport, California (Pickle Meadows - [illegible]).

SECTION V — FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT DISCERNIBLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Spanish	X		X		X													X	

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED" INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

NA

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN

NA

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO USE SPECIAL AND TECHNICAL VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS

Could act as literal interpreter at almost any level.

5. IF YOU HAVE ABILITY IN A FOREIGN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

Yes

SECTION VI GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Bolivia	General knowledge	11/13/58 to 1/14/60		X			
Peru	General knowledge	1/14/60 to 11/20/60		X			
Chile		6/15/59 to 6/21/59			X		
Argentina		6/21/59 to 6/30/59			X		
Uruguay		6/30/59 to 7/2/59			X		

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

Marine Security Guard - American Embassy - Bolivia and Peru
Vacation - Chile; Argentina; Uruguay; Panama

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED

No. 174850 (SP-35575) Passport has been cancelled.

SECTION VII TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (✓) APPROPRIATE ITEM			
		GREGG	SPEEDWRITING	STENOTYPE	OTHER (Specify)
45 wpm	None				

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (*Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.*).

Thermofax, mimeograph, switchboard

SECTION VIII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Football - good
Basketball - fair
Swimming - good
Reading - average
Contract Bridge - very good

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.

None to my knowledge

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2 SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO (*Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving*), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

None

SECTION VIII CONTINUED ON PAGE 5

52

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE [illegible]

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? YES NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE [illegible] LICENSE. (Provide License Registry Number, if known).

NA

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of Issue)	7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of Issue)
NA	NA

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR [illegible] THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).

None

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

None

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

Have spoken in my father's church and other churches approximately 150 times. Met and assisted public in Embassies during my tour of duty with the Marine Security Guard.

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

None

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for last [illegible] years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, [illegible] statements.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To [illegible]) From 1949 to 1952	2. NAME OF EMPLOYER [illegible] Hillburn's Drug Store
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) San Marcos, Texas	
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Drug Store	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. William Hillburn
6. TITLE OF JOB Fountain attendant	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $1[illegible].00 per month
	8. CLASS GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Employee at soda counter	
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING To participate in school events (football).	

SECTION IX CONTINUED ON PAGE [illegible]

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) July 195 -June 1955	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Diamond Grocery Store
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) South Guadalupe St., San Marcos, Texas	
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Grocery Store	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Ignacio Gonzales
6. TITLE OF JOB Butcher	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $30.00 PER week
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Slaughtering and preparing meat for sale as well as actual selling.	
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING To attend college ?	
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) May, 1955 - September, 1955	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY San Marcos Baptist Academy
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) San Marcos, Texas	
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Private School	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. John Sparkman
6. TITLE OF JOB Painter's Assistant	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 35.00 PER week
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Painted dormitories in the Academy	
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING To attend school	
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) September, 1956 - July, 1957	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Economy Department Stores
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) San Marcos, Texas	
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Clothing Store	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Max Mendlovitz
6. TITLE OF JOB Sales Clerk	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 30.00 PER week
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Assisted customers in selecting and buying goods.	
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING To join the Marine Corps.	
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) July 26, 1957 - July 25, 1961	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY United States Marine Corps
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia	
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Military	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Col. John Magruder
6. TITLE OF JOB Marine Corps Museum Attendant	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 100.00 PER month 8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service) Cpl. (E-4)

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

5

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Acted as guide to all visitors entering Museum, explaining Marine Corps history, etc. Also on several occasions acted as interpreter for visiting military personnel from Latin America.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING
Discharged

6

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - Mo. and Yr.)
July 24, 1961 - August 30, 1961

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
Ohio Valley Engineering Company

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
S. Capitol and I Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS
Construction

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Mr. L. G. Brice

6. TITLE OF JOB
Laborer

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ 2.17 per hour

8. CLASS, GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Handyman for Company

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING
Temporary work while seeking permanent employment.

7

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - Mo. and Yr.)

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ PER

8. CLASS, GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

8. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN
7 1/2 years

9. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION [✓ YES] NO

HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? YES [✓ NO]

IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

Honorably discharged from United States Marine Corps.

14-00000

SECTION X MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 (As amended)? ☒ YES ☐ NO
2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION: [illegible]-A
3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.: [illegible]-55-35-157
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON: NA
5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS: #55 - 111 1/2 E. San Antonio St., Laredo, Texas

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NATL GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE (Specify)
HAVE SERVED			X						
NOW SERVING									None

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S): Personnel Administration
3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (Past service): 25 July, 1961
4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES (Past & current service): 4 Years
5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY — PAST SERVICE: 26 July, 1957 — CURRENT SERVICE:
6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION:
7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE — PAST SERVICE: Cpl. (E-4) — CURRENT SERVICE:
8. SERVICE SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER (If now serving, provide current number):
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: 0141 - Chief Clerk — CURRENT SERVICE:
10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: None — CURRENT SERVICE:
11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)

Past Service: Clerk - Maintained personnel service records.
2 years as Security Guard in the American Embassies in La Paz, Bolivia and Lima, Peru.

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☒ HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS	
☒ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	☐ OTHER:	
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY		

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

☒ REGULAR ☒ RESERVE (Including the National and Air National Guard) ☐ OTHER (Including AUS)

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? ☒ YES ☐ NO
2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.? ☐ YES ☒ NO
3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? ☐ YES ☒ NO
4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☐ ARMY	☒ MARINE CORPS	☐ NATIONAL GUARD	☐ COAST GUARD	☐ NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
☐ NAVY	☐ AIR FORCE	☐ AIR NAT'L. GUARD	☐ ARMY ROTC	☐ AIR FORCE ROTC	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE: Cpl. (E-4)
6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK: May, 1959
7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION: January 22, 1962
8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY-Active ☒ STANDBY-Inactive ☐ RETIRED
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE: 0141
10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE: None
11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

None

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT? ☐ YES ☒ NO
13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO
15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY — YEARS: 7 MONTHS: 7
17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT? Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington 25, D.C.

SECTION XI FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES X NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

Wife's Income

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
The Bank of California, N.A.	330 S.W. 6th Avenue, Portland, Oregon
Union Trust Company	15 and H Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN OR PETITIONED FOR BANKRUPTCY ☐ YES X NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
General Motors Acceptance Corp.	1310 S.W. Yamhill Street, Portland 5, Oregon
Gulf Oil Corporation	P.O. Box 7245, Atlanta 9, Georgia
Hinde Furniture Company	917 Caroline Steet, Fredericksburg, Virginia

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES X NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES, OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☒ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details in separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled) SPECIFY: Married

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME (First) Dorothy (Middle) Anne (Maiden) Arnett (Last) Flores

4. STATE ANY OTHER NAMES EVER USED: Dorothy A. Moran

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (including length of time) UNDER WHICH ANY OF THESE NAMES WERE USED. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS (where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 10 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

5. DATE OF MARRIAGE: November 14, 1960

6. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Lima, Peru

7. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): American Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia

8. LIVING: X YES ☐ NO

9. DATE OF DEATH

10. CAUSE OF DEATH

11. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address if deceased): 2828 Connecticut Ave., N.W., #203, Washington 8, D.C.

12. DATE OF BIRTH: January 31, 1935

13. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Portland, Oregon

14. CITIZENSHIP: United States of A

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY NA

15. PLACE OF ENTRY NA

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country-ies) NA

17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED NA

18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) NA

19. OCCUPATION Legal Secretary

20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed, give last employer)
Boykin and De Francis
Former: Department of State

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
1000 16th St., N.W., Suite 603, Washington D. C.

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.)
None

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE

24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN Foreign Service - Jan., 1953 - Oct., 1960; Civil Service - [illegible] - [illegible]

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
None				

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, [illegible] WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST [illegible] OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information for Stepfather and/or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) Jose S. Flores

2. LIVING Y YES ☐ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH

4. CAUSE OF DEATH

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED None

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 15 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country)
501 S. Guadalupe Street, San Marcos, Texas

7. DATE OF BIRTH December 23, [illegible]

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Mier y Noriega, [illegible], Mexico

9. CITIZENSHIP USA

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY May 2[illegible], 1913

11. PLACE OF ENTRY Unknown

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country-ies) Mexican

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED 193[illegible]

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) Austin, Texas

15. OCCUPATION Baptist Minister

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed)
Mexican Baptist Church

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED
501 S. Guadalupe Street, San Marcos, Texas

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to) 19. BRANCH OF SERVICE
To my knowledge never served in any military service

20. COUNTRY

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION XV **MOTHER** *(Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)*

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Flores, Agustina
2. LIVING: ☐ YES [✓ NO]
3. DATE OF DEATH: June 1959
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Unknown
5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: None to my knowledge

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 15 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED (No., Street, City, State, Country): S. Austin and Lee Streets, San Marcos, Texas
7. DATE OF BIRTH: September 20, 1903
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Mier y Noriega, Nuevo Leon, Mexico
9. CITIZENSHIP: Mexican
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: Unknown
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: Unknown
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA
15. OCCUPATION: Housewife
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed): NA
17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED: NA
18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To): NA
19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: NA
20. COUNTRY: NA
21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: NA

SECTION XVI **BROTHERS AND SISTERS** *(Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)*

	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) / 4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	5. LIVING	6. AGE
1	Patlan, Frances 631 S. River St., Seguin, Texas	Sister	U.S. of America	X YES ☐ NO	[illegible]
2	Renteria, Rachel 311 Lambert St., San Antonio, Texas	Sister	U.S. of America	X YES ☐ NO	39
3	Black, Rebecca Mary 501 S. Guadalupe St., San Marcos, Texas	Sister	U.S. of America	X YES ☐ NO	34
4	Flores, Samuel Rosemary and [illegible], Seguin, Texas	Brother	U.S. of America	X YES ☐ NO	32
5	Flores, Joe [illegible] 2, Box 190, San Marcos, Texas	Brother	U.S. of America	X YES ☐ NO	[illegible]
6	[illegible], Esther [illegible] St., [illegible], Virginia	Sister	U.S. of America	X YES ☐ NO	[illegible]
7	Flores, Eleazar Deceased	Brother	U.S. of America	☐ YES X NO	[illegible]
8	Flores, Juan Deceased	Brother	U.S. of America	☐ YES X NO	[illegible]

SECTION XVII FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Arnett, Carl Raymond
2. LIVING: X YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH:
4. CAUSE OF DEATH:
5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: Ray
INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 15 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.
6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 4505 Washington St., Milwaukie, 22, Oregon
7. DATE OF BIRTH: January 2, 1909
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Minot, North Dakota
9. CITIZENSHIP: U.S. of America
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA
15. OCCUPATION: Warehouse Foreman
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): Rudy Wilhelm Inc., Portland, Oregon

SECTION XVIII MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Tompkins, Alma Dean
2. LIVING: X YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH:
4. CAUSE OF DEATH:
5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: Alma Dean Arnett
INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 15 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.
6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 13920 S.E. Portland View Place, Portland 36, Oregon
7. DATE OF BIRTH: May 4, 1910
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Portland, Oregon
9. CITIZENSHIP: U.S. of Americ
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA
15. OCCUPATION: Homemaker
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed):

SECTION XIX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): None to my knowledge
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE

NA

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1. 1. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Arnett, Raymond Wesley
2. RELATIONSHIP: Bro-in-law
3. AGE: 24
4. CITIZENSHIP: U.S. of America
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): U.S. Army Depot, Pueblo, Colorado
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known):

2. 1. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Miller, Claude
2. RELATIONSHIP: 2nd Cousin
3. AGE: Unk
4. CITIZENSHIP: U.S. of America
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Air Station, Quantico, Virginia
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known): Aviation - 1st S. S., USMC

3. 1. NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. CITIZENSHIP:
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country):
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known):

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES NOT RELATIVES IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Mr. and Mrs. José Espinosa	S. Guadalupe St., San Marcos, Texas	San Marcos, Texas
Rev. Carlos Paredes	First Baptist Church Austin, Texas	Austin, Texas
Mr. Thaxter L. Goodell	2130 E. St., N.W., Washington, D.C.	3722 Jason Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia
Mr. Alfred Beaty	Dept. of Agriculture	1711 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D.C.
Cpl. Michael Hennessy	The American Embassy, Lima, Peru	172 Bartolome Herrera, Miraflores, Lima, Peru

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY - NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Mr. Howard Kirkland Jr.	Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.	Hilltop House, Euclid St., Wash., D.C.
Mr. Max Pine		3571 Section Road, Cincinnati 36, Ohio
Miss Mary Ann Newman	Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.	Allen Lee Hotel, 23rd & F Sts., N.W., Wash., D.C.
Miss Ruth P. Stewart		601 Cascade, Boulder, Colorado
Mrs. Eva Lux		173 Bartolome Herrera, Miraflores, Lima, Peru

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Miss Nancy Payne		202 Hanover St., Fredericksburg, Virginia
Lt. and Mrs. William Paulman		c/o Leo Felts, Route 1, [illegible]

SECTION XXII CLUBS SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind (including membership in or support of any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country) to which you belong or have belonged.

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
Spanish Club	San Marcos High School, San Marcos, Texas	Sept., 1954	May 1955
Distributive Education Club	San Marcos High School, San Marcos, Texas	Sept., 19[illegible]	May 1955
Baptist Youth Organization	First Mexican Baptist Church, San Marcos, Tex.	Jan., 1957	May 1957

SECTION XXIII RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	INCLUSIVE DATES FROM	TO
4736 Kenmore Ave., #201, Alexandria, Virginia	March 1961	Aug., 1961
402 Hanover St., Fredericksburg, Virginia	Dec., 1960	Mar., 1961
172 Bartolome Herrera, Miraflores, Lima, Peru	Jan., 1960	Nov., 1960
USIS Building, 3rd & 4th Floors, Calle Potosi, La Paz, Bolivia	Nov., 1959	Jan., 1960
"F" Company, Headquarters Marine Corps, Henderson Hall, Washington 25, D.C.	Sept., 1958	Nov., 1959
Cold Weather Training Battalion, Pickle Meadows, Bridgeport, California	Jan., 1958	Aug., 1958
Marine Corps Base, 29 Palms, California	Dec., 1957	Jan., 1958
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California	July, 1957	Nov., 1957
Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California	Nov., 1957	Dec., 1957
501 S. Guadalupe St., San Marcos, Texas	May 1956	July, 1957
Howard Payne College, Brownwood, Texas	Sept., 1955	May, 1956
501 S. Guadalupe St., San Marcos, Texas	19[illegible]6	Sept., 1955

SECTION XXIV ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION EXPLAIN

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
6. IF SO TO WHAT EXTENT?

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940

I served 4 years in the United States Marine Corps.

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

An investigation (I do not know by whom) was conducted prior to my departure for Bolivia where I was attached to the American Embassy. This investigation took place during August and September of 1958.

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XXV PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (First-Middle-Last): Mrs. Daniel Flores
2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 2928 Conn. Ave., #302, Washington 8, D.C.
4. HOME PHONE NO.: 265-3122
5. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country) - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: Boykin and De Francis
1000 16th St., Suite 603, Washington 6, D.C.
6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT.: DI 7-5444
7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS PLEASE SO STATE

In all cases wife: Relative, Mrs. Vicente Patlan, 631 S. River St.,
Seguin, Texas Telephone Fr 9-1037

SECTION XXVI

CERTIFICATION

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to a material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURE September 5, 1961	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Daniel Flores
3. SIGNED AT (City and State) Washington, District of Columbia	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Marylee Cooley

NOTE. Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates; sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

MARITAL STATUS: Item #4, Section XII
September 1, 1956 to October 6, 1956. Married to Lt. Col. Joseph G. Moran in Portland, Oregon, by Circuit Court Judge. Used name of Moran until November 14, 1960, when changed to Flores.

FATHER-IN-LAW: Item #5, Section XVII
Short name for Raymond

GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL: Item #1, Section VI

Argentina	2 July 1959 to 3 July 1959	Travel
Panama	10 November 1958 to 13 November 1958	Travel

SEE ATTACHED SHEET FOR PERTINENT INFORMATION RELATIVE TO STEP-MOTHER.

Signed at Washington, D. C., this 7th day of September, 1961.

Daniel Flores
Daniel Flores

ATTACHMENT TO FORM NO. 444 - PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Section XV - STEPMOTHER

Full name: Concepcion R. Flores
Living: Yes
Other Names She Has Used: None to my knowledge
Current Address: 501 S. Guadalupe Street, San Marcos, Texas
Date of Birth: December 9, 1914
Place of Birth: Mexico
Citizenship: Mexican
If Born Outside U.S. - Date of Entry: December 8, 1922
Place of Entry: Unknown
Former Citizenships: None
Occupation: Homemaker and Missionary
Present Employer: Mexican Baptist Church, SanMarcos, Texas
Never served in Military or other Government service to my knowledge.

This paper is attached to and hereby made a part of Form No. 444.

Daniel Flores
Daniel Flores

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 19 January 1962

YOUR REFERENCE: 07100 OPEER

CASE NO. : 195221

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : FLORES, Daniel

1. This is to inform you of security approval of the subject person as follows:

☒ Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Regulations 10-210 and 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

☐ Subject has been approved for appointment under the authority of Paragraph 4(d) of Regulation 10-210, and under Regulation 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☒ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☐ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne
Chief, Personnel Security Division

2/1/62 [illegible]

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1173 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH IS OBSOLETE

CONFIDENTIAL

(8)

PRESCRIBED BY U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Federal Personnel Manual Ch. 293
66-101

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 74-57 BOX 67

372024

1 Feb 77
69 Feb Extd
(W)
67 Jun Extd
Carded

TERMINATED
WILLIAMSON, EARL J. 60389 D

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 May 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060589
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Williamson, Earl J. COB
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Conversion and Retirement (Voluntary) under CIA Retirement & Disability Sys
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 30 YEAR 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF ☐
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 2135-0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sec. 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH Branch 6 Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer, Ch[redacted] (15)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1844
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 30,701
18. REMARKS: From: FSR 3/5

LSV Telecomd w/H. Suice 6/28/72

1 - Security 1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 30 May 72
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 5 Jun 72

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

FOD DATA

Form 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE

Name (Last-First-Middle)
Williamson, Earl J.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
Declined [illegible]

2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).

3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).

4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).

5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks).
To bank as usual

6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment).
I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being.
☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services.
☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.

7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.

8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).

9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).

10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee
Earl J Williamson

Date Signed
[illegible]

Address (Street, City, State Zip Code)

Correspondence
☐ Overt ☐ [illegible]

OPF

ADMINISTRATIVE -- INTERNAL USE ONLY

15 SEP 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

THROUGH : Acting Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Certificate of Distinction for Mr. Earl J. Williamson

The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Certificate of Distinction has been approved by the Executive Director-Comptroller in recognition of Mr. Williamson's sustained superior performance. Security considerations relevant to the award are contained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security. Arrangements for presentation may be made with the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 3645, room 412, Magazine Building.

/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Att
Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers -- OPF w/forms 382 & 600
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

ADMINISTRATIVE -- INTERNAL USE ONLY

OPF

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

Executive Registry
72-[illegible]

29 August 1972

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO. 060389
NAME (Last-First-Middle) WILLIAMSON, Earl J.
1915
SEX M
TYPE EMPLOYEE Staff
OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT CS/WH
SD D
SCHEDULE GRADE GS . 15
STATION

BE AWARDED

Certificate of Distinction

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD **June 1952 - June 1972**

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. Earl J. Williamson is hereby awarded the Certificate of Distinction in recognition of his sustained superior performance throughout his Agency career. Since 1952 he has served in a variety of important positions in Headquarters and overseas in which the superior quality of his performance was sustained by his skillful leadership and dedication. In each assignment he has shown unswerving dedication to duty, good judgment and the ability to respond quickly in demanding situations. Mr. Williamson's overall contributions to the mission of the Agency reflect credit on him and the Federal Service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by ADD/P on 11 August 1972)

APPROVED /s/ W. E. Colby

Executive Director

14 SEP
DATE

SIGNATURE /s/Harry B. Fisher

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
Harry B. Fisher

SIGNATURE /s/ R. L. A[illegible] Jr.

TYPED NAME OF SECRETARY
R. L. Austin, Jr.

FORM 352

Off

[illegible]

SECTION A

[illegible]

5613 Janet Lane, Vienna, Virginia

Certificate of Distinction | 30 Jun 1972

15. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: Virginia J. Williamson | 16. RELATIONSHIP: Wife | 17. ADDRESS: 5613 Janet Lane, Vienna, VA | 18. HOME PHONE: [illegible]

SECTION B RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF HAZARD

19. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT

20. FULL NAME	21.	22. GRADE	23. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD

24. FULL NAME	25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED

26. LOCATION	27. INCLUSIVE DATES	28. TIME OF DAY

29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED | 31. ASSIGNMENT | 32.

SECTION C RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT, SERVICE, OR PERFORMANCE

33. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☒ YES ☐ NO

34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE
Recommendation covers entire career

35. COMPONENT OR UNIT ON (Designation and location)
Chief of WH/6

36. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSIGNED POSITION

Chief of WH/6

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED: covers entire career | 38. XX

40. FULL NAME | 41. | 42. GRADE | 43. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

OPF

Mr. Williamson entered on duty with the Agency in June 1952, after having served with the Army, CIC, from 1942 to 1949 and, subsequently, as Chief, Civil Intelligence Branch in the Panama Canal Zone Government from 1949 to 1952. In January 1955 he was appointed Deputy Chief of Station, Havana and remained in this position until January 1959 when he was reassigned to Headquarters. Mr. Williamson served as Deputy Chief of Station, Madrid, from 1963 through 1965, and as Deputy Chief of WH Division Cuban Operations Group from 1966 to June 1968. He assumed the position of Chief of Station, San Jose, in June 1968. Since April 1971 Mr. Williamson has been assigned as Chief, WH Division, Branch 6, which encompasses the important Chile area.

Mr. Williamson has held positions of responsibility from the very outset of his Agency career. While demonstrating ample qualities of leadership and excellent managerial skills, his consuming interest lies in the real heart of Agency activities--the production of intelligence and the conduct of actions against our targets. This was high-lighted during his recent tour as COS, Costa Rica. The last year of his tour was marked by two extremely delicate, highly productive operations targeted against the Communist Party of Costa Rica, and a political action operation of a most sensitive nature stemming from them. This latter operation, focused as it was around the president of the country

XX CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

49. ENCLOSURES (List individually) IF THE NOMINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR PERFORMANCE, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESS OR INDIVIDUALS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY

Theodore G. Shackley

Chief, WH Division

DATE 26 JUL 1972

HEAD OF CS CAREER SERVICE
(Career Service of nominee)

Deputy Director for Plans

Director for Plans

0ff

-continued-

called for constant good judgment on how to pursue U.S. Government interests with this highly sensitive and significant intelligence target.

Over the years Mr. Williamson has been extremely effective in liaison activities. Through his skillful approach and genuine interest in the problems of representatives of foreign countries, he has been able to enlist support for our operations.

During the past year, the task of supervising the WH/Chile Branch has been a most challenging one. Chile has become a knotty foreign policy problem, and is the subject of continuous and extensive discussions between the Agency, the State Department, and other components of the Government, while receiving the attention of the most senior policy makers. Requirements from many directions have required constant pressure to respond with ideas, methods, procedures and the subsequent position papers. Through it all Mr. Williamson has maintained a sense of balance and professionalism which permits a proper focus on the crisis of the moment. We have been fortunate in having an officer of Mr. Williamson's caliber in this position during such a difficult period.

In recognition of Mr. Williamson's demonstrated continuous superior performance as a senior intelligence officer, which has contributed to the accomplishment of the mission of the Agency, it is recommended that he be awarded the Certificate of Distinction.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

21 March 1973

Dear **Earl:**

You have just completed, at my direction, seven weeks of full-time service on the GS-13 Clandestine Service Personnel Evaluation Board. I know that this work has been particularly demanding. Your participation and diligent application of your professional experience have been decisive factors in the successful accomplishment of the Board's missions.

In the course of this assignment you have become thoroughly familiar with the use and interpretation of personnel files and personnel practices of the Clandestine Service. Having reviewed and analyzed the files of one hundred or more CS officers, you have had to make judgments and recommendations concerning their relative-ranking and their qualifications for promotion, for training required to overcome a deficiency or enhance career effectiveness, for changes of assignment to further career development and for Quality Step Increases to recognize outstanding performance. In so doing, you have carefully studied the career development of a large number of officers in all components of the CS, both as individuals and in relationship to each other in terms of merit and value to the Clandestine Service.

You have become familiar with a broad spectrum of personnel and administrative problems on a practical working level and have acquired a knowledge of personnel management which will better equip you to handle supervisory positions which require personnel reporting and career development of subordinates. The committee format of the panels has also deepened your understanding of the conference approach to management problems.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Mr. Earl Williamson
WH Division

I wish to commend you personally for your participation in an evaluation procedure which helps to strengthen the Clandestine Service Career Service. A copy of this letter will be included in your official personnel file so that your supervisors and future Evaluation Boards may make due note of this service.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

14-00000

D.D.N. State

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 JUNE 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060389
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WILLIAMSON, EARL J.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 | DAY 13 | YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 1135-0623
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: FSR OFFICER / OPS OFFICER - CHIEF
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 03 5 / 15 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 25,087 / $28,291

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/FF/SAN JOSE/0198

SLOTTING IN DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT PENDING ISSUE OF PCR FOR BRANCH 6 (NEW).

*Other

*San Jose, Costa Rica

*HB:WH

6/16/71

PB 6/24/71

2 - SECURITY
1 - FINANCE

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY D. BERTHOLD, C/WH/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 9 Jun '71

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED: 16 Jun '71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTES CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	18	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	5	1	[illegible]		

EOD DATA

44 OP APPROVAL — DATE APPROVED: 6/16/71

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 September 1971

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 060389

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Williamson, Earl J.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 22 YEAR 71

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF X

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 2135-0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

C
43

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
Branch 6
Office of the Chief

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE:
FSR Officer
Ops Officer, Ch[illegible] (15)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1844

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP:
03 5
15 6

17. SALARY OR RATE:
25,087
$ 28,291

18. REMARKS

*Home Base: WH — *Wash., D.C.

From : DDP/WH/Dev Comp

1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 28 Sep 71

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Gregory [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: [illegible] '71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

C
60

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTIES CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	51480	WH	75013	5	1	[illegible]		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA CODE: 1—CSC 2—OASI 3—FICA 4—NONE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE: 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE: 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE: 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 9-30-71

46 C.P. APPROVAL: [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

BS: 20 OCT 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 060389	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WILLIAMSON EARL J			
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 22 71	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V	X	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 2135 0620 0000
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J				
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH.,D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE FSR OFFICER OPS OFFICER CH		12 POSITION NUMBER 1844	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 03 5 15 6	17 SALARY OR RATE 25087 28291	

18 REMARKS
WASH.,D.C.

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Major Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	51480 WH	75013	S	1	03 13 15		

28 NTE EXPIRES | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RET PAYMENT DATA | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 Correction/Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

IOS

SECRET DMB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VCD: 1_ JUL 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CDF

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
080333	WILLIAMSON EARL J

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	06 13 71	REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	2135 0623 0000	50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
FSR OFFICER OPS OFFICER CHIEF	9557	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	03 3 15 6	25087 26261

18 REMARKS

OTHER
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Mispos Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	13	31557	WH	75013	S	1	03 13 13		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (CODE)	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE)	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA	44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
Jd 7.2.71

SECRET WEB

Executive Registry
[illegible]

30 JUN 1972

Mr. Earl J. Williamson
8613 Janet Lane
Vienna, Virginia 22180

Dear Earl:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have every reason to feel great pride in your accomplishments. Your record of service is both example and goal for the young people who are now just beginning their careers in intelligence.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

/s/ Dick

Richard Helms
Director

Good luck & best wishes!

Distribution:
- 0 - Addressee
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - D/Pers
- ✓ - OPF
- 1 - ROB Soft File
- 1 - ROB Reader

Originator: /s/Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

27 JUN 1972

OP/RAD/ROB/FJSeidel:baw/3257 (20 June 1972)

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

223499

CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Request for Retirement

I. Name of Applicant : Earl J. Williamson DOB : 13 March 1915
Grade : GS-15 Position : Operations Officer
Office/Division : Western Hemisphere Division
Career Service : Clandestine Service

II. Date Requested for Retirement : 30 June 1972
Age at that Date : 57
Years of Creditable Service : 29
Years of Agency Service : 20
Years of Qualifying Service : 13

III. Applicant's Career Service
Recommends : X Approval ___ Disapproval
Reasons for recommending disapproval ___

IV. Retirement Board
Recommends : X Approval ___ Disapproval
Reasons for recommending disapproval ___

V. Director of Personnel
Recommends : X Approval ___ Disapproval
Reasons for recommending disapproval ___

/s/Harry B. Fisher 20 JUL 1972
Director of Personnel Date

VI. Action by Director of Central Intelligence : ✓ Approved ___ Disapproved

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence Date

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

1-1981

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. Earl J. Williamson as Chief, Branch 6, WH Division

1. The appointment of Mr. Earl J. Williamson as Chief of Branch 6, WH Division effective on or about 12 April 1971 is recommended. Mr. Williamson will replace Mr. Lawrence M. Sternfield who will assume the duties of Chief, Cuban Operations Group, WH Division.

2. Mr. Williamson has been an employee of the Agency since June 1952; he has recently completed his assignment as COS, San Jose. Attached is a biographic profile which reflects his training, foreign language proficiency, and Agency experience.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment:
Biographic Profile (Parts I and II)

The recommendation in Paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

Deputy Director for Plans

16 Apr 71
Date

SECRET

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

WSLUGGAGE - [redacted]

FROM: Director of Personnel 5 E 56, Headquarters	EXTENSION 6825	NO. HRSS - 1700	DATE 11 FEB 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Deputy Director for Plans Attn: DDP/OP 3 C 29, Headquarters	12 FEB	12 FEB 1971	
2.			
3. C/WH Division 3 D 3107, Headquarters	[illegible]		
4. Mr. Williamson			Ojm
5. ~~RID/SD~~ ~~1 D 17, Headquarters~~			
6.			
7. Director of Personnel 5 E 56, Headquarters			
8.			
9. Chief, BSD/OP 5 E 61, Headquarters			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

PLEASE HANDLE AS EYES ONLY MATERIAL.

PLEASE CALL X-4078 FOR HAND-CARRY TO NEXT ADDRESSEE.

4. This was held for your return.

4-7. My wife was divorced in Mexico 5 yrs ago. Her [illegible] husband [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Ojm

PSEUDO NAME/POUCH

7. Per above.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Earl J. Williamson

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

SUBJECT : Foreign Divorce Decree

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to bring certain information to your attention which relates to the fact that your current spouse was a party to the dissolution in Mexico of a former marriage.

2. Recently, the Office of General Counsel completed a study of the validity of a Mexican divorce decree and potential problems arising from such a divorce for JKLANCE employees concerned and JKLANCE. A summary of OGC's study is attached.

3. You will note from the attachment that the employee whose current marriage follows a Mexican divorce may be confronted with serious problems affecting eligibility for payment of various government benefits such as reimbursement of hospitalization expenses, survivorship benefits and certain types of overseas allowances. My purpose in writing to you, therefore, is to be sure you are made aware of and understand the seriousness of the problems which would arise in the event of a challenge to the validity of the Mexican divorce and, consequently, to the validity of the current marriage. This challenge could arise at any time and from a number of sources.

4. JKLANCE has another interest stemming from Mexican divorces and this is one of security, depending upon the employee's specific employment. In the event such a divorce is challenged, subsequent litigation and attendant publicity become quite probable. It is, of course, in JKLANCE's best interest that this sort of activity be avoided where possible.

5. Recognizing that there are various types of Mexican divorce, and also that the various states in the United States have decided cases in different ways depending on the type of Mexican divorce involved and its own case law,

you may wish to discuss your personal situation with your attorney or a representative of JKLANCE's Office of General Counsel. In the meantime, however, JKLANCE's position with respect to your situation is that it assumes the validity of your current marriage, unless the earlier Mexican divorce action and your current marriage are challenged. Should that challenge ever occur, it may be necessary for JKLANCE to determine that your eligibility for benefits based on your current marriage must be suspended until such time as the challenge is litigated or otherwise resolved. Special note should be taken of the fact that such a challenge might arise after your death, possibly resulting in the distribution of insurance proceeds and other death benefits to other than your immediate family as constituted at your death and contrary to your own intentions and wishes.

6. Please advise me of your plans and any actions taken in connection with the above. If you have any questions on the substance of this memorandum or its purpose, please do not hesitate to let me know.

CLARK F. RIBBLE

Att

Distribution:
0 - Addressee through DDP/OP and C/WH Division
1 - Director of Security
1 - General Counsel
1 - D/Pers Subject
1 - D/Pers Chrono
✓1 - OPF
1 - C/BSD

OP/BSD/RLAustin:jas (10 Feb 71)

SECRET

27 JAN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Foreign Divorce Decrees,
Agency Employees - Staff or Contract

REFERENCE : Memorandum for Director of Security
dated 18 December 1969 from the
Director of Personnel

1. Mr. Earl James Williamson was married to Virginia Lobo Portuondo on 30 November 1965.

2. Mrs. Williamson was granted a divorce at Juarez, Mexico on 17 June 1963.

Harlan A Westrell
Harlan A. Westrell
Deputy Director
For Personnel Security

SECRET [illegible]

SECRET

SSA-DD/P #71-0895

29 MAY 1971

DD/P 1-2642

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Mr. Earl J. Williamson - Request for Approval of Ten Days of Additional Home Leave

REFERENCE : HR 20-30b(3)(b)(10)

1. The circumstances surrounding Mr. Earl J. Williamson's departure from San Jose, where he had been Chief of Station, are described in the attached memorandum. Because of the disruptive nature of his PCS transfer to Washington, Mr. Williamson has requested an additional ten days of home leave. As he is a State Department integree, the Office of Finance, subject to approval of his request, can offset the State disallowance of his additional home leave and the charge to his annual leave by adjusting Mr. Williamson's escrow leave account as appropriate.

2. Due to the nature of his transfer, Mr. Williamson's request for an additional ten days of home leave appears to be warranted. In accordance with the provisions of the referenced regulation, it is recommended that Mr. Williamson's request for an additional ten days of home leave be approved.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment:
As stated

SECRET [illegible]

SUBJECT: Mr. Earl J. Williamson - Request for Approval of Ten Days of Additional Home Leave

CONCUR:

fr Gordon Mason
Deputy Director for Plans

25 May '71
Date

The request in paragraph 2 is APPROVED

Director of Personnel

25 May 1971
Date

SECRET

14 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Home Leave - Earl J. Williamson

1. The following are the circumstances concerning my departure and home leave from San Jose, Costa Rica.

a. My home leave and return for a second tour to San Jose was approved by Chief, WH Division in the summer of 1970 for January 1971.

b. In October 1970 home leave and return orders were requested from State Department and physicals were taken.

c. In December 1970 home leave and return orders were received from the Department based on the itinerary I had requested to be effective on or about 1 January 1971.

d. My departure scheduled for 3 January was deferred by the Ambassador based on operational considerations at the time.

e. On 8 January 1971 I was officially declared PNG by the Costa Rican Government.

SECRET

f. To give the public impression that my departure was a routine transfer, the Department, the Agency, and the GOCR agreed to the postponement of my departure until 21 February 1971.

g. On 11 February 1971 I received Department orders based on my previously requested itinerary for home leave and reassignment to Washington.

h. My home leave itinerary included five days annual leave in Mexico enroute and 25 days home leave reporting for duty on 5 April. I actually arrived in D. C. on 23 March and was fully occupied until 5 April in locating and renting a home and getting my family settled.

i. In accordance with Department regulations, I have been credited with only 15 days home leave and the additional 10 days have been charged to annual leave.

2. I submit that the circumstances of my departure from San Jose were unusual and beyond my responsibility or control. The delay in departure definitely occurred because of operational requirements abroad which negated my original home leave schedule. I would like to request the granting of an exception to the 15 day home leave limitation to show my return to duty as of 23 March (the date I arrived in D. C.) rather than 5 April the date the Department has me returning to duty.

Earl J. Williamson

Earl J. Williamson

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 September 1970

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 060389 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Williamson, Earl J.

G
1,3

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
~~[illegible] NTE [illegible] September 1970~~

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 20 YEAR 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-0856

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
Foreign Field
Branch 2
San Jose, Costa Rica Station

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: San Jose, Costa Rica

11 POSITION TITLE:
First Secretary
Chief of Station (14)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0198

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05

16 GRADE AND STEP:
03 5
15 6

17 SALARY OR RATE:
$ 23,672 ✓
$ 26,700 ✓

18 REMARKS: To add PRA information.

X HB WH

PRA in accordance with HR 20-17e(1)(c)
NTE: 09-14-72

X San Jose, Costa Rica

2 - Security
1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 23 Sep 70

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 9/22

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTOS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51650	WH	16069	5	3	03 13 15		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-OTHER 3-FICA 4-NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
09 14 72	83							

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR | 37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV TEMP) CODE | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0-WAIVED, 1-YES) HEALTH INS CODE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO) CODE, NO TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO) CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 09-25-70 [illegible]

46 OP APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 9-28-70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 APRIL 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER	060389
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)	WILLIAMSON, EARL J.
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	05 / 19 / 68
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6 FUNDS	V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒ XX
7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8135 0856
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 2 SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA STATION
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA
11 POSITION TITLE	SECOND SECRETARY ~~OPS OFFICER~~ - CHIEF OF STATION(?)
12 POSITION NUMBER	0198
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	FSR GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.05
16 GRADE AND STEP	03 1 15 ~~4~~ 5
17 SALARY OR RATE	16,616 ✓ $ ~~20,243~~ 20,851 ✓

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/C OFFICE OF THE CHIEF/SLOT 1106

Wash. D.C.

1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
HENRY L. BERTHOLD C/WH/PERSONNEL	14 May 68		10 May 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTHS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51650	WH	1506	S	3	02 13 15		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-OTHER 3-FICA 4-NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR REG PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0-NO FEGLI 1-YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1-YES 2-NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1-YES 2-NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 OP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED

1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Williamson, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH March 1915	3. GRADE GS-15
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/WH/COG	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Officer	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 7451
7. PROPOSED STATION San Jose, Costa Rica	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Chief of Station, 0198	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE June 1968	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 2

12. COMMENTS

13. DATE OF REQUEST 14 February 1968	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL John F. Conroy John F. Conroy	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3 D 5309 HQS	16. EXTENSION 4516

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

QUALIFIED FOR [illegible] ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS

Chairman, Overseas Candidate Review Panel

[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

259a

SECRET

SECRET

19 DEC 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. Earl J. Williamson as Chief of Station, San Jose, Costa Rica

1. The appointment of Mr. Earl J. Williamson as Chief of Station, San Jose, Costa Rica, effective on or about June 1968 is recommended. Mr. Williamson would replace Mr. Louis P. Napoli.

2. Mr. Williamson has been an employee of the Agency since June 1952 and is presently assigned as Operations Officer, GS-15, Deputy Branch Chief of the WH/COG. Mr. Williamson has served in Havana and Madrid and has excellent command of the Spanish language. A biographic profile, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment:
Biographic Profile (Parts 1 & 2)

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Deputy Director for Plans ________ Date ________

The recommendation in Paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

JAN 1968

Director of Central Intelligence ________ Date ________

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JAMAICA CONSTABULARY.
OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER.
P.O. BOX 464.
KINGSTON, JAMAICA

ANY REPLY OR SUBSEQUENT REFERENCE TO THIS COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND NOT TO ANY OFFICER BY NAME AND THE FOLLOWING REFERENCE QUOTED:—

No.________

21st September, 1967.

Mr. Arthur Jacobs,
U.S. Embassy.

My dear Arthur,

Now that Earl Williamson has come and gone I would like to record how very grateful I am to yourself and your Government for arranging his visit to Jamaica.

2. As far as our Intelligence Committee is concerned, his visit was an unqualified success at all of the various levels at which he spoke, and I hope that he felt the same way about it.

3. For my part, I believe that it was particularly valuable because it made my Government aware - at the highest level - of the mutual benefit to be derived from the closest co-operation between our two Organizations.

4. I would be very grateful if you would pass on to the appropriate quarter our highest appreciation of Mr. Williamson's work during his two days in Kingston.

Yours Sincerely,

(J.M. Humfrey)
Senior Supt. of Police, Special Branch,
The Jamaica Constabulary.

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: [illegible] June 66

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 060339

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WILLIAMSON EARL J.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7125 1162

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: ~~DDP/ II~~
WH/C OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Attache Political OF
OPS OFFICER (P CH) (15)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 11[illegible]

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: [illegible]

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): CSC
GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 03 1
15 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: [illegible]
$ [illegible]

18 REMARKS

From: WH/C/ FI Branch, C/S #1142

Replacement for Mr. Flynn who is reassigned to FE Div.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Edward F. [illegible]
Robert E. Cushman, [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 29 June

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 14 July 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51520 ALPHABETIC WH
22 STATION CODE: 25013
23 INTEGREE CODE
24 HOURS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 03 DA 13 YR 15
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28 VTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAT DESIG PROV TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 07-15-66 [illegible]

46 O P APPROVAL: H Miller

DATE APPROVED: 07-15-66

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 January 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060389

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WILLIAMSON, Earl J.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135-1162

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/C
Foreign Intelligence Branch
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: ATTACHE
OPS. OFF (CH) (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1148

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS (15)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 03 (1)
15 (4)

17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~11,860~~ 18,875
$ 18,825

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/WE/Madrid, Spain, #0397.

Vice John H. SHERWOOD, pending reassignment to DDP/FE, South VietNam.

CONCURRENCE: GKMazzuman
Chief, WH/Personnel

Recorded By
CSPD

1 by Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Edward K. O'Malley
ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/Pers.

DATE SIGNED: 18 Jan 66

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 1/21/66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 VOUCH CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	11	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	03 13 15		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSR, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE, MO, DA, YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED, 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED, 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 01 25 66
CS/OP APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 1-25-66

SECRET

SECRET

Chief of Station, Madrid

Director of Personnel Earl J. Williamson

WSLUOOAGE - - Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

Action: Advise Subject
REF: Book Dispatch 5096

1. Subject has been found to be qualified as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System and has been so designated effective 24 October 1965.

2. Although such designation under present statutes is viewed favorably by most persons, the regulation governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interests. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, Subject should be notified promptly of his designation and of his right to appeal. Any questions he may have should be answered in accordance with information contained in Book Dispatch 5096 or referred to Headquarters. An appeal with reasons therefore must be received in Headquarters within 60 days of the date of this dispatch or acceptance of designation will be assumed.

3. We believe that the benefits of the Organization retirement system are superior to the benefits of the Civil Service retirement system. However, there are a few situations in which an employee at the time of retirement may have so many years of service (almost 37) that he would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service system. Because of this, the policy decision has been made that a participant in the Organization system who would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service system may, not later than one year prior to his retirement, apply to be removed from our system and transferred to the Civil Service system. Thus, Subject should not anticipate this contingency as a factor in deciding whether he regards his designation as a participant adverse to his best interests.

/s/ RICHARD B. AGA

1 DEC 1965

OBSI - 2591 1 Dec. 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 Oct. 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 060389

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WILLIAMSON, EARL J.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 | DAY 24 | YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | XX CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6136-1347

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

F
0
57

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WE
FOREIGN FIELD
MADRID STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MADRID, SPAIN

11 POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE
OPS OFF (DCOS)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0897

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, FB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP:
03 1
15 4

17 SALARY OR RATE:
14,860
$ 18,170

18 REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

1 cc to OP/BSD/RB
1 cc to CCS
1 cc to Finance through CCS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Philip C. B[illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 3 OCT 1965

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28	10	5[illegible]	[illegible]	6[illegible]3[illegible]		3	03 13 15	09 16 62	09 12 65

28 VTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE; CODE 2

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVED 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-14-65 [illegible]

46 OP APPROVAL: [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MADRID

ACTION WE 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR OP 3 LCGS 4

SECRET 031135Z

DIR CITE MADR 6406 3 DEC 65 IN 07186

ADMIN PERS

EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED WIROM 624 RE RESIGNATION MR. EARL WILLIAMSON AND SHIPMENT HHE TO JACKSONVILLE FLORIDA. WILLIAMSON AND WIFE SAILED 1 DECEMBER AND ARRIVE NEW YORK 9 DECEMBER. PRESUME HE WILL REPORT HQS 13 DEC. EMBASSY MAY NOT SHIP HHE UNTIL FULL SHIPPING ADDRESS SUPPLIED. FYI EMPLOYEE DID NOT SUBMIT RESIGNATION TO SECSTATE PRIOR DEPARTURE MADRID. EMBASSY IS REQUESTING SHIPPING ADDRESS INFO FROM STATE BY TELEGRAM.

SECRET

CFN: 6406 WIROM 624 MR EARL WILLIAMSON HHE JACKSONVILLE FLORIDA 1 NEW YORK 9 HQS 13 NOT SHIP HHE FYI NOT SUBMIT MADRID

BT

SECRET

SECRET

29 JUL 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : WILLIAMSON, Earl James

1. Attached are the papers pertaining to the request of Mr. Williamson to remain with the Agency following his marriage to Miss Virginia Josefina Lobo, a Cuban citizen residing in Madrid, Spain.

2. The Office of Security records on Mr. Williamson and Miss Lobo contain no unfavorable information.

Howard J. Osborn

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[illegible]

65-4105 [illegible]

2 6 JUL 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Request of Earl J. Williamson, GS-15, to Remain in the Employment of CIA Following Marriage to an Alien

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval: this recommendation is contained in paragraph 7.

2. Mr. Earl J. Williamson, a GS-15 Operations Officer, has requested permission to remain in the employ of CIA as a Staff Employee following his marriage to Miss Virginia J. Lobo, a 26 year old Cuban citizen living in Spain. The marriage is scheduled to take place in October 1965.

3. Mr. Williamson, 50 years old, attended Loyola University in 1947-48 and Berlitz School of Languages in 1948. Prior to joining CIA, Mr. Williamson served with the U.S. Army (1942-49) achieving the rank of 1st Lieutenant in CIC. Subsequently, he was Chief, Civil Intelligence Branch in the Panama Canal Government (1949-52). Mr. Williamson entered on duty with CIA in June 1952 as a GS-12 Operations Officer with WH Division. In January 1953 he was appointed DCOS, Havana, remaining in this position until January 1959 when he was reassigned to Headquarters. In August 1960 Mr. Williamson was assigned to Madrid and in 1963 was appointed DCOS, Madrid, which is the position he presently occupies.

4. The COS, Madrid, Mr. James A. Noel, has known Miss Lobo for over three years. He says she is a most attractive young lady who is a member of a distinguished and respected Cuban family. She is well educated, fluent (bi-lingual) in English, intelligent, cultured, and gracious. He has found her to be discreet at all times.

5. Chief, WE Division strongly believes on the basis of past performance and proven ability that Mr. Williamson is the kind of officer whom the Agency should retain. Mr. Williamson's record to date shows that he is a mature, experienced, and dedicated officer,

SECRET
EYES ONLY

who has spared no effort to expand and improve the Agency's coverage in his area of assignment. WE Division and WH Division, where Mr. Williamson will be reassigned, foresee no difficulty, adverse effect in future usefulness or mobility as a result of this marriage.

6. I have reviewed Mr. Williamson's employment record and consider him an able and valuable member of the Clandestine Services. He has consistently performed his duties well, has strong to outstanding Fitness Reports, and is a definite asset to the Agency. I believe that the proposed marriage will not detract from his long term use by the Clandestine Services.

7. In view of the above consideration, I recommend that Mr. Williamson be continued in Staff Employment Status following his proposed marriage.

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachments

Concur:

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

2 Aug 65
Date

The recommendation contained in paragraph 7 is approved:

Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

3 AUG 1965
Date

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET

16 JUL 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Personnel Management Committee

SUBJECT : Request of Mr. Earl J. Williamson, GS-15, to Remain in Staff Status Following Marriage to an Alien

1. Attached is a request from Mr. Earl J. Williamson for permission to continue in a staff status with the Agency following marriage to a Cuban citizen. WE Division strongly recommends favorable consideration.

2. Mr. Williamson is a fifty year old officer who entered on duty with the Agency in 1952. He has been assigned to the Madrid Station since October 1960 where he has served as the Deputy Chief of Station and since May 1964 as the Western European Coordinator for Cuban Activities. Since his assignment to the Madrid Station, Mr. Williamson's performance has been outstanding. He is a mature, experienced, and well-rounded officer who is particularly well-suited for Agency employment. In every sense of the word, Mr. Williamson is a dedicated officer who has spared no effort to expand and improve the Agency's coverage in his area of assignment.

3. WE Division concurs with the Chief of Station, Madrid, who has stated that he does not believe that Mr. Williamson's marriage will adversely affect in any way his future usefulness or mobility of assignment in the Agency. Mr. Williamson plans to proceed with the marriage in October 1965 shortly prior to his return for reassignment to WH Division. Informal discussion with WH Division has indicated that they foresee no difficulty with their plans for Mr. Williamson were he to marry this alien as planned. Mr. Williamson is integrated in the Department of State and will be required to submit a similar request after Agency decision is received if he retains his integrated status in his next assignment.

SECRET

4. WE Division strongly believes that on the basis of his past performance and proven capability, Mr. Williamson is the kind of officer whom the Agency should retain. We. therefore, recommend that you favorably endorse his request and forward it to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for consideration.

W D O'Ryan

William D. O'Ryan
Chief
Western Europe Division

ATTACHMENTS:
- A. Employee's Request to Marry
- B. Letter of Resignation
- C. RYBAT Attachment to OSMT-4211
- D. Proposed Spouse's Intent to Become a Citizen
- E. Proposed Spouse's Biographic Data

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROC. POINTS	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
[redacted] - Application to Marry an Alien

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

[redacted] application for permission to marry an alien is transmitted to Headquarters with my strong recommendation that it be promptly approved and he be so notified. It has been my privilege to have known [redacted] fiancee for over three years. She is a most attractive young lady and is a member of a distinguished and respected Cuban family. She is well-educated, fluent (bi-lingual) in English, intelligent, cultured and gracious. I have found her at all times to be discreet. There is no question whatsoever in my mind that she will be a most loyal American citizen and a credit to her new country and to the Agency in every way. In future assignments abroad she will, without question, be an aid to [redacted] in the development of contacts and in carrying out their joint representational responsibilities. She is indeed a very fine person. I have no reservations whatsoever - mental or otherwise - with respect to the security aspects of this marriage - as far as I have been able to ascertain, none exist. I do not feel that [redacted] marriage to this young lady should in any way restrict his future assignments.

I urge speedy and favorable processing of this application.

WOODROW C. OLIEN

DATE TYPED
1 Jul 65

DATE DISPATCHED
2 Jul 65

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SUBJECT: Request for permission to marry Miss Virginia Lobo,
a Cuban citizen.

In compliance with FR-20-5b(1), the writer hereby requests permission to marry Miss Virginia Lobo, a Cuban citizen, and permission to remain in the employ of the Organization after marriage.

The following attachments are forwarded with this request:

(a) Completed Form 444

(b) Certificate of Miss Lobo of intent to become a United States citizen.

(c) One passport size photograph.

(d) Letter of resignation.

Earl J. Williamson

10 June 1965

In compliance with FR-20-5 para. b(1), the writer hereby recites his intent to marry Miss Virginia Lobo, a Cuban citizen, with the understanding that the Organization may not permit me to remain employed after marriage. Therefore this letter can be considered as a resignation notice, said resignation to become effective not later than 45 days after the date of marriage, if permission is not obtained and the marriage occurs.

Earl J. Williamson

10 June 1965

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that as soon as possible after my marriage to Earl J. Williamson I intend to become a citizen of the United States.

Virginia Lobo

Virginia Lobo

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 AUGUST 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060389

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WILLIAMSON, EARL J. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CC CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4136-6400-1017

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
MADRID STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MADRID, SPAIN

11. POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE
OPS OFFICER - DCOS

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0897

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS ~~[illegible]~~

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP:
04 0
15 ~~5~~ 2

17. SALARY: ~~14,045~~ $ ~~14,503~~ 15,045 ✓

REMARKS

FROM: MADRID STATION/0400 ([illegible])

Recorded by
CSPD
JM

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: GEORGE MOGANNAM, AC/WE/PT

DATE SIGNED:

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 30 Sep 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 5060 ALPHABETIC WE

22. STAT. LOC. CODE: 67033

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. [illegible] CODE: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 03 DA. 13 YR. 15

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT, 2 = 10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = NO LIFE, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)

42. MILITARY CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible]

46. O.P. APPROVAL: [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 30 Sep 63

1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

SECRET

CD/P 3-5632

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. Earl J. Williamson as Deputy Chief of Station, Madrid, Spain

1. The appointment of Mr. Earl J. Williamson as Deputy Chief of Station, Madrid, Spain, effective on or about 25 October 1963, is recommended. Mr. Williamson will occupy a new position.

2. Mr. Williamson has been an employee of the Agency since June 1952, and is presently assigned as Operations Officer, GS-15. A biographic data sheet, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

W D O'Ryan

WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
Chief
Western Europe Division

1 Attachment:
Biographic Profile (Part 1)

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

Deputy Director (Plans)

4 NOV 1963
(Date)

SECRET

SECRET

13 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Salary Adjustments Upon Promotion

1. The following CSCS Officer was promoted effective 16 September 1962, shortly before the effective date of the Salary Reform Act of 1962. Had the promotion been processed as of the effective date of the Act, 14 October 1962, he would have received substantial additional salary benefits as indicated below.

2. The purpose of this memorandum is to record the salary disadvantage which may continue to apply to this officer in comparison to those now junior in rank but who may accrue a salary advantage over such senior officers upon promotion through the operation of this Act.

Name	Salary Upon Promotion	Salary if Promoted on 14 October 1962
WILLIAMSON, Earl J.	$13730 - $14565	$15045

Robert W. Shea
Secretary, Clandestine Services
Career Service Board

SECRET

SECRET

20 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Career Service Section A

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion - Mr. Earl J. Williamson

1. Since October 1960, Mr. Williamson has served as Deputy Chief of the Madrid Station, and during an extended period of this time, he was Acting Chief of Station. His performance has been outstanding. Not only has he assisted his Chief in the management of the Station, but simultaneously managed to reinvigorate our liaison program in Spain, which was the particular area of responsibility originally assigned to him. His service has been noteworthy not only for his vigor in initiating new activities but also for his balanced, yet energetic, cutting away of deadwood, useless procedures and purposeless activity.

2. In recent months, in part on his own initiative, and later under forced draft at Headquarters direction, Mr. Williamson has been instrumental in mounting an active operational program targeted against Cuba. Due almost entirely to the imagination, energy, and effort which he has applied, this program has already had considerable success in the acquisition of intelligence and the recruitment of agents, and promises to be even more productive in the future.

3. Mr. Williamson's activity since his assignment to Madrid is clearly of outstanding caliber and it is noteworthy that the present Chief of Station as well as the preceding Chief of Station have both, on the record, rated him as exceptionally able, energetic, and mature. Mr. Williamson has been in his current grade since December 1956. In view of the considered judgment concerning the value of his performance in Spain, his good administrative qualities, his obvious maturity, energy, judgment and experience, it is strongly recommended that Mr. Williamson be promoted to grade GS-15.

William D O'Ryan

WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
Acting Chief
Western Europe Division

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]
[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
[illegible]T-2653

TO
Chief, E

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

DATE
19 January 1962

SUBJECT
Administrative/Personnel
Recommendation for Promotion - [redacted]

RE "X" - CHECK ONE
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
See below

REFERENCES

1. Subject is a mature, experienced, well-rounded operations officer and administrator. For the past fifteen months he held the position of Deputy Chief of the Madrid Station. For an extended period of time during that period he was Acting Chief of Station. As the attached Fitness Report will attest he has at all times discharged his responsibilities in an outstanding manner. In addition to the approximately four months that I have been able to observe Subject's performance at this post, I also had the privilege of serving with him at [illegible] and I was then, as I am now, impressed with his professional competence and his fine personal attributes. In every sense of the word, Subject is a dedicated officer who works "around the clock" in his efforts to expand and improve [redacted] coverage in this area.

2. Considerable credit is due to Subject for the improvement of our relations with the local security services. During the past three months he has spent a considerable amount of time and effort in bringing about needed reforms and economies in the operation of our "outside activity", cutting away deadwood and streamlining the actual operations. In addition, Subject has been particularly effective in developing and recruiting independent assets (including a stay-behind agent) for the [illegible] operation.

3. The attached Fitness Report speaks for itself. Subject has been in his current grade since December 1956. Given his age, his experience and maturity, and his consistently fine performance in his current position, I strongly urge that he be actively considered for promotion to GS-15 at the next appropriate panel meeting.

[redacted]

19 January 1962

Attachment: Fitness Report (1)

Distribution:
[illegible]

DISPATCH

SECRET

CMS-2212

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid R1F

10 May 1961

SUBJECT
Administrative/Personnel
Recommendation for Promotion of [redacted] EARL J. WILLIAMSON

(CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED
BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
See para 2 below

REFERENCES
OSMT-2208, 5 May 61

1. As reflected in his most recent Fitness Report, Subject, who has been serving as Deputy Chief of Station and Chief of Liaison at this Station, has demonstrated outstanding talents in management of personnel and their activities, developing relationships with liaison in operations both joint and independent. Because of my confidence in him, which is apparently shared by Headquarters, he is being retained here for a long period as Acting Chief of Station after my departure. As I have said in his Fitness Report, he is the best deputy I have had in my [redacted] CIA career and altogether an outstanding officer.

2. Subject has been in grade four and a half years as a GS-14 and because of his outstanding qualifications, I recommend he be immediately considered for promotion to GS-15.

ARCHIBALD ROOSEVELT
[redacted]

5 May 1961

Distribution:
3 - C/WH

SECRET

FI file

4 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Personnel Officer, FI

SUBJECT : Earl J. WILLIAMSON
Recommendation for Promotion

1. Mr. Williamson has been with the WH Division since June 1952 and at the Havana station since 17 January 1953. With approximately eight months headquarters training he has worked into a position demanding extremely sensitive liaison work. His efforts have been highly successful and are marked by an excellent grasp of the problems involved. Mr. Williamson also acts as Chief of Station during any absence of the Chief. The variety of problems he encounters are met with considerable ability.

2. The promotion of Mr. Williamson to the next higher grade is recommended, in view of the excellent performance of his present responsibilities. He has demonstrated his capacity to perform fully and effectively in a field assignment.

J. C. KING
Chief, WH

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 September 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060389 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WILLIAMSON, EARL J.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 16 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / XX CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3136-6400-1017

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
MADRID STATION
LIAISON BRANCH

14

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MADRID, SPAIN

11. POSITION TITLE: ATTACHE
~~OPS OFF D BR CH~~ OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 400

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	04 15 1	10,645 13,730

18. REMARKS

PRA in accordance with HR 20-21c.(1) in order to complete two year tour of duty.

Recorded by CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: THOMAS M. FISHER, C/WE/PT

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 14 SEP 1962

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROSTER CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
22	10	62660	WE	67033		3	03 13 15		

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 50

FOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 14 SEP 1962

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records & Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT State Department Promotion of

WILLIAMSON, Earl J.

1. The Department has informed this office that effective April 1, 1962 subject employee was promoted from FSR-5, $10,555 to FSR-4, $10,645

2. Request this notice be placed in the official folder of the employee concerned.

Chief, Central Cover Group

cc: Operating Component Compensation
and Tax Accounts Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

V to V	V to UV	DATE PREPARED	Mo 08 · Da 04 · Yr 60
UV to V	x UV to UV		

1. Serial No. 560389	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WILLIAMSON EARL J.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 03 Da 15 Yr 15	4. Vet. Pref. None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. Mil Serv Cred LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code					

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

7

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WE IBERIAN BRANCH		WASH., D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field Dept.-Ustld.-Fran.- Code 1	17. Position Title ATTACHE OPS OFFICER D BR CH	18. Position No. BB-179	19. Serv. FSR GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01 ✓

21. Grade & Step 05 14 3	22. Salary Or Rate $ 10,555 12,730	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo 12 Da 16 Yr 56	25. PSI Due Mo 06 Da 11 Yr 61	26. Appropriation Number 1136-1000-1000 ~~[illegible]~~

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	67	Mo 08 Da 07 Yr 60	~~HA~~ REGULAR	014	

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

14

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WE MADRID STATION LIAISON ~~SECTION~~ BRANCH	4733	MADRID, SPAIN	67033

33. Dept.-Field Dept.-Ustld.-Fran.- Code 5	34. Position Title ATTACHE OPS OFFICER	35. Position No. RBF-400	36. Serv. FSR GS	37. Occup. Series ✓

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number 1136-6400-3017 ✓

SOURCE OF REQUEST

I certify funds available:

A. Requested By (Name And Title) THOMAS M. FISHER, WE PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) GEORGE MOGANNAM, x3124 George K. Mogannam

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

Oblig. Ref. No. 1-886

Charge Allot. No. 1136-6400-3017

Auth.

Date Approved

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		8-25-60	E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		8-25-60

Remarks

COPIES SENT TO FINANCE AND SECURITY.

8/15/60

CS/D 8-24-60

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 4-58 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

				DATE PREPARED Mo	Da	Yr
	V to V		V to UV	4	11	60
	UV to V	X	UV to UV			

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo / Da / Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 / Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo / Da / Yr
560389	WILLIAMSON, Earl J.		1	M	

7. SCD Mo / Da / Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 / Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo / Da / Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2 / Code	12. LCD Mo / Da / Yr	13. Mil Serv Cred - LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 / Code
	1					

5

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP CI STAFF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM DIV AREA OPERATIONS BRANCH IV		Washington, D. C.	

16. Dept.- Field Dept. - Uslid- Fran - / Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
1	Attache IO CI BR CH	0211	FSS GS	0136.53

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo / Da / Yr	25. PSI Due Mo / Da / Yr	26. Appropriation Number
04 2 14 ~~2~~ 3	9380 $ ~~11595~~ 11835	DX	12 / 16 / 56	06 / 11 / 61	9 2700 07 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo / Da / Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
REASSIGNMENT	67	05 / 15 / 60	Regular		

I certify funds available:

7

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

0136-1000-1000

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WE IBERIAN BRANCH ~~PI, PP, PN~~	5712	Auth. Officer Juanita [illegible] Washington, D. C.	

33. Dept.- Field Dept. - Uslid- Fran - / Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	Attache OPS OFF D BR CH	D14 179	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo / Da / Yr	42. PSI Due Mo / Da / Yr	43. Appropriation Number
C4 14 3	9380 $ 11835				0136-2000-1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)	Date Approved
THOMAS M. FISHER, WE PERSONNEL OFFICER		
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) GEORGE MOGANNAM x3124		

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		5-9-60

Remarks

CI [illegible]

Copies sent to Security and Finance

RECEIVED 5 5 60

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION) 4-60

SECRET

30 June 1959

Dear Mr. Stuart:

It gives me great pleasure to accept an appointment to the Foreign Service Reserve Corps, FSR-5. I understand that this appointment will be granted in accordance with the conditions as outlined in your letter of May 27, 1959.

Sincerely yours,

Wallace W. Stuart, Esquire
Chief, Personnel Operations Division
Department of State
Washington, 25, D. C.

30 June 1959

Dear Mr. Stuart:

I hereby tender my resignation from the Foreign Service Staff Corps to accept an appointment as Foreign Service Reserve Officer, Class FSR-5. This resignation is tendered pursuant to the conditions contained in your letter of May 27, 1959, in which it is stated that my resignation from the Foreign Service Staff Corps will be effected without a break in service.

Sincerely yours,

Wallace W. Stuart, Esquire
Chief, Personnel Operations Division
Department of State
Washington, 25, D. C.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MAY 27 1959

Dear Mr. Williamson:

Your application for appointment as a Foreign Service Reserve Officer under the special provision of Foreign Service Circular No. 239, dated March 28, 1958, has been reviewed.

The Department is pleased to offer you an appointment at class FSR-5, $ 9515 per annum. The FSR appointment will be made under authority contained in Section 522 (1) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, and will not carry entitlement to any reemployment rights in the Foreign Service Staff Corps.

Acceptance of the offer and conditions of the Foreign Service Reserve Officer appointment should be submitted as soon as possible. A formal letter of resignation from the Foreign Service Staff Corps, the effective date to be established by the Department, should be submitted immediately. The Department will effect the dates of the resignation and new appointment actions without a break in service.

As a Foreign Service Reserve Officer you will be eligible under established regulations and prescribed procedures at any given time (1) for periodic in-class salary increases provided you meet the minimum performance standards of the Foreign Service and (2) for class-to-class promotions based upon merit.

Sincerely yours,

Wallace W. Stuart

Wallace W. Stuart, Chief
Personnel Operations Division

Mr. Earl J. Williamson,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D. C.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

V to V | V to UV
UV to V | X | UV to UV

DATE PREPARED: Mo [illegible] Da [illegible] Yr [illegible]

1. Serial No. 500329	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) Williamson, Earl J.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 3 Da 15 Yr 15	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11 FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. [illegible] Yes - 1 No - 2 Code					

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch II Paraguay-Uruguay Section	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field Dept - Ufld - Fron - Code 1	17. Position Title (Attache) Area Ops Off DCOS	18. Position No. 458	19. Serv. FSS GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01
21. Grade & Step 4 2 14 2	22. Salary Or Rate 9300 $11595	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr
26. Appropriation Number 9 3500 10 200				

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo 3 Da 9 Yr 59	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code	30. Separation Date

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP/CI Staff International Communism Division Area Operations Branch IV	Code 543	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code

33. Dept.-Field Dept - Ufld - Fron - Code 1	34. Position Title (Attache) IO CI BR CH	35. Position No. 211	36. Serv. FSS GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.53
38. Grade & Step 4 2 14 2	39. Salary Or Rate 9390 $ 11595	40. SD DI	41. Date Of Grade Mo 12 Da 16 Yr 55	42. PSI Due Mo 12 Da 13 Yr 59
43. Appropriation Number 9-2700-17-001				

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Bryan B. Burman [illegible] C/CI Support	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) [illegible] C/CI Staff	Date Approved
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Mary L. Lohnes 8537		

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	Ronald Gage	2/25/59	D. Placement		
B. Pos Control			E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	

Remarks

WH Concurrence [illegible]

Three copies have been sent to C/Security. 26 Feb 59

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 1152a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UU

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo / Da / Yr	4. Vet Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 / Code	5. Sex	6 CS - EOD Mo / Da / Yr
510359	WILLIAMSON, Earl J.	3 / 15 / 15	0	M-1	4 / 26 / 52

7. SCD Mo / Da / Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 / Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10 Apmt. Affidav Mo / Da / Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 / Code	12 LCD Mo / Da / Yr	13. Yes - 1 No - 2 / Code
11 / 25 / 42	1				4 / 26 / 52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station		Havana, Cuba	

16. Dept.- Field Dept. - Ustld. - Fran. - x / Code 5	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
x / 5	(Attache) Area Ops Off (DCOS)	BHF-115	YSB GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo / Da / Yr	25 PSI Due Mo / Da / Yr	26. Appropriation Number
4 - 2 14 - 2	9380 $ 11,595	DI -			9-3545-55-055

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo / Da / Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
REASSIGNMENT	670	10 / 19 / 58	Regular	9M	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH Branch II Paraguay-Uruguay Section	4675	Washington, D. C.	

33. Dept.- Field Dept. - Ustld. - Fran. - / Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1		BA-458		

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo / Da / Yr	42. PSI Due Mo / Da / Yr	43. Appropriation Number
4 - 2 14 - 2	9380 $ 11,595		2 / 16 / 58	2 / 13 / 59	9-3500-10-200

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL	
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)	
JOHN WASHINKO X 8242	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

2 copies Security
vice: Charles Dickens

Form 1152a

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. - Miss - Mrs. - One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Earl J. WILLIAMSON
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 15 Mar 1915
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 14 Dec 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 16 Dec
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Off (DCOS) BAF-115		Area Ops Off (DCOS) BAF-115
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $9205.00 p.a. ~~7630.00 p.a.~~		GS-0136.01-14 $10,320.00 p.a. 7630.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station		DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station
11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana, Cuba		Havana, Cuba
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL (D)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Approved by CS Career Service Panel
17 Dec

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): J. KOFLANOVICH X8242

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE ☐ WWII ☐ OTHER ☐ 5 PT ☒ 10 POINT DISAB ☐ OTHER ☐

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ I.A. ☐ REAL ☐ SD-DI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-3545-55-055 TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		17 Dec	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		17 Dec 56	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY: 72B 14 Dec 56

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. – Miss – Mrs. – One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
MR. Earl J. WILLIAMSON	15 Mar 1915		7 May 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED.
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED.
B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Off (FI) BAF-116	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Off - D COS BAF-115
GS-0136.51-13 $9205.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $9205.00 p.a. (FSS-6 $7570.00 p.a.)
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch III HAVANA-CUBA STATION
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana, Cuba
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL 14 (D)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

New T/O

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) for C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) J. KOFLANOVICH X-4457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: for CS/CS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

CD-DI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 6-3545-55-055 TO: Same			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: 14 May 56

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS.
A			
B CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C CLASSIFICATION			
D PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	RWA	24 May	
E			

F. APPROVED BY per 25 May 56

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Date ______________

TO : Chief, Placement and Utilization Division/OP
Attn : Mr. William Hughes, OC Placement Officer

FROM : Chief, Operations and Training Division/OC

SUBJECT: Communications Training for JOHN E. WILLIAMSON

The communications training record for this individual is on file in the American Activities Branch, Room 2308, I Building. If information is desired concerning this training, please call extension 2977.

W. O. Edwards
WILLIAM O. EDWARDS

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

1 December 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Processing Branch

SUBJECT: Request for Badges -
Earl J. WILLIAMSON and Ignacio CARRANZA

1. It is requested that building badges of Mr. Williamson and Mr. Carranza be given to the bearer, Miss Gloria Graceffa. Mr. Williamson and Mr. Carranza, presently stationed at Havana, Cuba, will be at headquarters this coming weekend and it will be necessary that they have their badges in order that they may enter and leave the buildings without an escort.

2. Mr. Roy L. Malcolm, Operations Officer of the Havana desk of WHD, will be responsible for the return of these badges to CPB.

Preston

HOWARD J. PRESTON
CWH/AD

Badges returned this [illegible] Dec 54
[illegible]
[illegible] Malcolm

SECRET

SECRET

4 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Personnel Officer, FI

SUBJECT : Earl J. WILLIAMSON
Recommendation for Promotion

1. Mr. Williamson has been with the WH Division since June 1952 and at the Havana station since 17 January 1953. With approximately eight months headquarters training he has worked into a position demanding extremely sensitive liaison work. His efforts have been highly successful and are marked by an excellent grasp of the problems involved. Mr. Williamson also acts as Chief of Station during any absence of the Chief. The variety of problems he encounters are met with considerable ability.

2. The promotion of Mr. Williamson to the next higher grade is recommended, in view of the excellent performance of his present responsibilities. He has demonstrated his capacity to perform fully and effectively in a field assignment.

J. C. King
J. C. KING
Chief, WH

SECRET

File info

SECRET
Security Information

OCT 18 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant, Intelligence
Department of State

SUBJECT: WILLIAMSON, Earl James, Request for Appointment in the Foreign Service

REFERENCE: Annex E-9 to Memorandum of 23 November 1951, Subject, Representation in Foreign Service Missions

1. It is requested that Mr. Earl James Williamson, GS-12, $7040, be appointed in the Foreign Service with the title of Attache, FSS-6, $6501, for duty in the American Embassy at Habana, Cuba. Mr. Williamson will occupy position number 2 of Annex E-9.

2. It is requested that subject arrive at his destination on or about 15 December 1952.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

BY ERIC W. TIMM

Enclosures: a. Application Forms 57 and DSP-34

b. Occupational History Supplement

c. Proposed Biography

WHD/vol
23 September 1952
Distribution: Orig & 1 - addressee
1 - CFI
1 - WHD (green)
2 - LC

Security Information

Secret

EARL JAMES WILLIAMSON

OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE: June 1952 to Present - Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

SECRET
Security Information

PROPOSED BIOGRAPHY

WILLIAMSON, Earl J.—b. Auburn, New York, March 13, 1915; Auburn Senior High School grad; Loyola College, 1947-48; buyer with electrical supply co., 1934-1941; U.S. Army, 1941-48, 1st lt., overseas duty; Governor's Staff, Canal Zone Government, 1948 to 1952.

Security Information

Date 26 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: PERSONNEL BOARD/SO

THRU: ADMIN/SO

SUBJECT: Transfer - WILLIAMSON, Earl J.

Approval is requested for the transfer of subject from

OPS OF., GS-12, $7040.00 at San Salvador, El Salvador,
(title) (station)

to OPS OF., GS-12, $7040.00 at Havana, Cuba
(title) (station)

J. Caldwell King
Chief, WH

APPROVAL: Davis B. Powell
for the Personnel Board
30 Sept. 1952
(date)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Personnel Division DATE: 11 April 1951

FROM : PD (C)

SUBJECT: Williamson, Earl James

The following personnel action has been cancelled:

DESIGNATION	INTERESTED UNIT
Williamson, Earl James Intelligence Officer	OSO, FDT

Reason: Branch holding until December 1951. Sent to Placement until released.

Joseph S. Reff
Joseph S. Reff

File

I&SS
M.R.
Med. Serv.
FDT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: WILLIAMSON, Earl James

DATE: 15 August 1950

NATURE OF ACTION: Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer (OPS)
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-11 $5400.00
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		FDT
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION		Lima

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION F-593	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Cancelled [illegible]

REMARKS:
S-2
Sec. Init. 14 August 1950.
Employee is replacement for George Stone.

130

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

EMPLOYMENT CHECK SHEET

NAME Williamson, Earl Terry	INITIATING OFFICE AND DIVISION	EXTENSION

FOLLOW THROUGH DATA

DATE RECEIVED FOR PROCESSING	SECURITY CLEARANCE		CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE	
	DATE INITIATED	DATE EFFECTIVE	DATE INITIATED	DATE EFFECTIVE

DATE MEMO REC'D (ADM. INST. 10-2)	DATE 37-1 PREPARED	DATE 37-3 PREPARED	DATE SF89 TO DISPENSARY

DATE HELD	TAB FOR	REASON HELD
25 Sept.	~~14 Nov.~~	25 Sept. No Interim to be sent subject is in Canal Zone.
~~24 Nov.~~	~~12 Dec.~~	Check security
28 Dec.	~~15 Jan~~	FDT sent cable to field. Check Ann Peterson on reply so we'll know when subj. is to report.
	15 Jan	28 Dec. - Subj. still in Army FDT trying to get release. Check on results.

FORM NO. 37-81
JUL 1950

SECRET

7 August 1950

MEMORANDUM

FDT

TO: Chief, Employees Division

FROM: Chief, Foreign Division T

SUBJECT: Earl J. WILLIAMSON

1. It is requested that subject be processed at the grade of GS-11 for Slot No. 2, Intelligence Officer Operations, Lima, Peru, as a replacement for Mr. George P. Stone. Mr. Stone will be transferred to another station in Latin America in the next few months.

2. Although Mr. Williamson is at present a GS-9, he has had a total of approximately 8 years in investigative work with C.I.C., and FDT believes that a rating of CAF-11 is thoroughly justified. Since his present salary in the Canal Zone is $ 5750 per annum, it is specifically requested that he be processed at the grade of GS-11, $ 5600 per annum.

ARodriguez for WW

SECRET

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MAST

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

SECRET
~~[illegible]~~ when Completed)

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.

OFFICER BEING RATED Chief CAS	POST American Embassy, San José	
POSITION	GRADE	AGENCY
RATING PERIOD February 1 - November 30, 1969	DATE OF REPORT December 3, 1969	
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER Sandy M. Pringle	TITLE Chargé d'Affaires ad interim	
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE	

II.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☐ Outstanding ☒ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☒ Yes ☐ No

III.

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

The performance of the Chief CAS continues to be very fine. He is highly experienced and capable both in his job and in this geographic area. I find him most cooperative, as does, I am sure, the Country Team as a whole. He is dependable, his judgment is good, he speaks to the point and his advice is sound. In addition to his thorough professional competence, both he and his wife are active and effective socially.

~~[illegible]~~ When Completed)
SECRET

SECRET
[redacted]

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency, retains one copy.)

I.	OFFICER BEING RATED Chief CAS	POST American Embassy, San José	
	POSITION	GRADE	AGENCY
	RATING PERIOD July 1968 - January 1969	DATE OF REPORT January 31, 1969	
	SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER	TITLE Deputy Chief of Mission	
	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE Ambassador	

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

II.

☐ Outstanding ☒ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☒ Yes ☐ No

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

III.

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

The Chief CAS has performed during these initial six months in a most satisfactory manner. He is experienced, able, and knows the area well. He is very cooperative with the Country Team, and his counsel is useful and to the point. In addition to performing his official duties faithfully and well, he and his wife are active and effective socially.

The Reviewing Officer concurs in this report.

[redacted]

FS 372

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ES LISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP	14 June 1972	FILE NO. 2432

TO: (Check)			
	x	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION	SS NUMBER 069-03-9635
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION	EMPLOYEE NUMBER 060389
	x	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH	ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: Chief Support Staff	OFFICIAL COVER	x	ESTABLISHED
REF: Retirement Debriefing			DISCONTINUED
SUBJECT WILLIAMSON, Earl J.	UNIT Department of State		

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

x	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS
	☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE EOD
	☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)
x	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
x	SUBMIT FORM 3254 State W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
x	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HB 240-2a)
x	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HB 240-2a)
NA	EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
NA	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ________ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ________ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Subject will be denied for entire period of employment except for US Government employment applications.

Forwarding address: c/o Sixto Co.
Quiedo 7-13,
Torrimar
Bayamon, Puerto Rico 00619

Employment address: Sixto Company

DISTRIBUTION

RF:ss

FORM 1551

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	060389	51 480	CF	GS 15 7	$30,701

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DS: 28 JUN 72

Dotte

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 060389

2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): WILLIAMSON EARL J

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS & RETIREMENT-VOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT & DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO DA YR 06 30 72 C08

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7 Financial Analysis No Chargeable: 2135 0620 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH DIVISION
BRANCH 6
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1844

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: 30701

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

45 | 20 Employ Code: 10

21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 Hdqtrs Code

25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR: 03 13 15

26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: 6EJ0XX0

32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE

36 SERV COMP DATE

37 LONG COMP DATE

38 CAREER CATEGORY

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA

44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6 29 72

MLH

665

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
060389	WILLIAMSON EARL J	51 650	CF	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 15	6	$28,291	09/07/69	GS 15	7	$29,097	09/05/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Joseph Di Stefano

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

WITHIN [illegible]
PER E.O. [illegible]
FOR [illegible] EQUIVALENT INCREASE.

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORG'N.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	060389	51 650	CF	GS 15 6	$28,291

FVD: 13 OCT 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OOF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060389	WILLIAMSON EARL J

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	09 20 70	REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	1135 0856 0000	50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 2 SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA STATION	SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
FIRST SECRETARY CHIEF OF STATION	0198	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.05	03 5 15 6	23672 26700

18 REMARKS
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Military Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	10	51650 WH	16059	S	3	03 13 15		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE / MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
09 19 72	83							

35 VET PREFERENCE	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA	44 STATE TAX DATA
CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)		FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
BSJ 10-14-70

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE
CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	060389	51 650 CF	GS 15 6	$26,700

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE
CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	060389	51 650 CF	GS 15 6	$26,700

G53

SEP 3 11 22

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
060389	WILLIAMSON EARL J	51 650	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 15	5	$24,469	09/10/67	GS 15	6	$25,189	09/07/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE July 22 1969

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

✓
5-39

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL ORGN. FUNDS GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	060389 51 650 CF GS 15 5	$24,469

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	060389	51 650	CF	GS 15 5	$20,356	$22,416

O.C.

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON CHARLES	062134	42 775	CF	GS 13 4	$17,293

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FVD:

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 060389	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WILLIAMSON EARL J			
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 19 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6 FUNDS	V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☒	V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☐	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 8135 0856 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 2
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA STATION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

11 POSITION TITLE SECOND SECRETARY CHIEF OF STATION		12 POSITION NUMBER 0198	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16 GRADE AND STEP 03 1 15 5	17 SALARY OR RATE 16616 20856

18 REMARKS
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hours Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51650	WH	16069	S	3	03 13 15		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 4 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
~~~~ 5/31/68

1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)
~~~~

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	060389	51 500	CF	GS 15 5	$19,978	$20,856

---

5 G40 5

1 Serial No.	2. Name			3 Cost Center Number				4. LWOP Hours		
060389	WILLIAMSON EARL J			51 500 CF						
5. OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	4	$19,371	09/12/65	GS 15	5	$19,978	09/10/67			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS SB AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: E. D. ECHOLS DATE [illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560E

PJH: 15 JUL 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060389	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WILLIAMSON EARL J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 07 15 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7135 1162 0000	8. CS, OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 30 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH WH/C OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE ATTACHE POLITICAL OF OPS OFFICER D CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 1106	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 03 1 15 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 15395 18825

18. REMARKS
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51500	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE 1	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 03 13 15	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RES PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ECHOLS

07-15-66

FORM 11-63 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	060389	51 500	CF	GS 15 4	$18,825	$19,371

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NJ14. 18 FEB 66

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

COF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060389
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): WILLIAMSON EARL J
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 02 18 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135 1162 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/C
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1148
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		03 1	15395
GS	0136.01	15 4	18825

18. REMARKS: MADRID, SPAIN

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	10	51500	WH	75013	1	1	03 13 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM WE
2

T. D. ECHOLS

02-18-66 N

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

RZF: 21 OCT 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OUF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060389	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WILLIAMSON EARL J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 10 DA 24 YR 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V X · CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5136 1347 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY SECTION 203 P.L. 88-643	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE FOREIGN FIELD MADRID STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MADRID, SPAIN		
11. POSITION TITLE ATTACHE OPS OFF DCOS	12. POSITION NUMBER 0397	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) F&R GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 03 1 15 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 14850 18170

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
MADRID, SPAIN

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28	10	50660	WE	67033	1	3	03 13 15	03 16 62	03 12 65

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
		2					

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10-22-65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 4 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	060389	50 660	CF	GS 15 4	$18,170	$18,825

10

F57

1 Serial No	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
060389	WILLIAMSON EARL J	50 660 CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	3	$17,600	09/13/64	GS 15	4	$18,170	09/12/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

01

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

663

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

87

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 4 Aug 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPC 03/30/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 060389	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) WILLIAMSON EARL J				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION SERIES CODE ADJUSTMENT		4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 03 DA 29 YR 65		5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	V TO V CF TO V	X CF TO CF V TO CF		7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE 5136 1347 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE DIVISION		10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MADRID, SPAIN			
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER DCOS		12 POSITION NUMBER 0897		13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15		17 SALARY OR RATE	
18 REMARKS					

POSTED
11/16/65 JK

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 1-63
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
WILLIAMSON EARL J	50 660 CF 10G	

Old Salary Rate				New Salary Rate		7 Type Action		
Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
17,030	09/15/63	GS 15	3	17,600	09/13/64			

01

663

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY EH

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 22 July 64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4 51)

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	Per Annum Rates and Steps									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.	....		....		.....		.....	.....

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLS: 8 OCT 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 060389	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) WILLIAMSON EARL J		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 10 08 63	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☒ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE 4135 6400 1017	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE MADRID STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MADRID, SPAIN		
11. POSITION TITLE ATTACHE OPS OFFICER DCOS	12 POSITION NUMBER 0897	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 04 0 15 2	17 SALARY OR RATE 11150 15045

18 REMARKS
MADRID, SPAIN

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	10	50660	WE	67033	1	3	03 13 15		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS; 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED CODE 1 YES 2 NO; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/24/63 JK

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

8 OCT 1963

(When Filled In)

060389 WILLIAMSON EARL J 62 660 CF 17

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	
GS 15	1	$14,565	09/16/62	GS 15	2	$15,045	09/15/63	

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

663

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 15 July 63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	060389	50 660	CF	GS 15 2	$15,045	$16,180

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	060389	[illegible]	CF	15 1	[illegible]	15 1	[illegible]

PSC: 14 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060389	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WILLIAMSON EARL J

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 09 16 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3136 6400 1017	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF			

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WE MADRID STATION LIAISON BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MADRID, SPAIN

11. POSITION TITLE ATTACHE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0400	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 04 0 15 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 10645 13730

18. REMARKS
MADRID, SPAIN

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	62660	WE	67033	1	3	03 13 15	09 16 62	09 16 62

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
	80							

EOD DATA

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9/17/62

Bar 9/14/62

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
560389	WILLIAMSON EARL J	DDP/WE 14 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LBI	ADJ.
GS 14	3	$12,730	12/13/59	14	4	$12,990	06/11/61			

9. Remarks and Authentication

/.

663

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

ok

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-61)

L

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BWS: 5 AUG 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
560389	WILLIAMSON EARL J	03	15	15	1	M	1	06	26	52	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
11	25	42		1	50 USCA 403 J						06	26	52		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WE IBERIAN BRANCH	4712	WASH., D.C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USild - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	1	ATTACHE OPS OFF D BR CH	0179	FSS GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
05 14 3	10555 $12730	D	12	16	56	06	11	61	0136 1000 1000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	67	08	07	60	REGULAR	0M	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WE MADRID STATION LIAISON BRANCH	4733	MADRID, SPAIN	67033

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USild - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	ATTACHE OPS OFFICER	0400	FSR GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
05 14 3	10555 $12730	D	12	16	56	06	11	61	1136 6400 3017

44. Remarks

POSTED
08-26-60

Form 1150a

SECRET

(4)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	WILLIAMSON EARL J	560389	47 12	GS-14 3	$11,835	$12,730

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 10 MAY 1960

1. Serial No. 560389	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WILLIAMSON EARL J	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 03 Da. 15 Yr. 15	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 52	
7. SCD Mo. 11 Da. 25 Yr. 42	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt Affidav Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 52	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP CI STAFF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM DIV AREA OPERATIONS BRANCH IV	Code 5430	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 1	17. Position Title ATTACHE IO CI BR CH	18. Position No. 0211	19. Serv. FSS GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.53

21. Grade & Step 04 14 3	22. Salary Or Rate 9380 $ 11835	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 12 Da. 16 Yr. 56	25. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 13 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 2700 17 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 57	28. Eff. Date Mo. 05 Da. 15 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code QM	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WE IBERIAN BRANCH	Code 4712	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 1	34. Position Title ATTACHE OPS OFF D BR CH	35. Position No. 0179	36. Serv. FSS GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01

38. Grade & Step 04 14 3	39 Salary Or Rate 9380 $ 11835	40. SD D	41 Date Of Grade Mo. 12 Da. 16 Yr. 56	42. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 11 Yr. 61	43. Appropriation Number 0136 1000 1000

44 Remarks

FO[illegible]D

05-12-60 UK

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a

a E 5/10/60

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3 ASSIGNED ORGAN	4 FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
560389	WILLIAMSON EARL J	DDP/CI 5	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR				MO	DA	YR.
GS 14	2	$11,595	06	15	58	GS 14	3	$11,835	12	13	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS
000

14. AUTHENTICATION

C.M. STEWART

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-60 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b. **SECRET** OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 6 MAR 1959

1. Serial No. 560389	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WILLIAMSON EARL J	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 03 Da. 15 Yr. 15	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 52	7. SCD Mo. 11 Da. 25 Yr. 42	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 52
13. Mil. Serv. Credit Yes-1 No-2 Code 2			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 11 PARAGUAY URUGUAY SECTION	Code 4675	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 1	17. Position Title (ATTACHE) AREA OPS OFF DCOS	18. Position No. 0458	19. Serv. FSS GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.01	21. Grade & Step 04 2 14 2	22. Salary Or Rate 9350 $11595	23. SD DI
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 12 Da. 16 Yr. 56	25. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 13 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 3500 10 200	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 57	28. Eff. Date Mo. 03 Da. 08 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code OM	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP CI STAFF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM DIV AREA OPERATIONS BRANCH IV	Code 5430	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 1	34. Position Title ATTACHE IO CI BR CH	35. Position No. 0211	36. Serv. FSS GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.53	38. Grade & Step 04 14 2	39. Salary Or Rate 9350 $11595	40. SD DI
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 12 Da. 16 Yr. 56	42. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 13 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 9 2700 17 001	

44. Remarks

POSTED
12 MAR 1959

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a 3/9/59 SECRET (4)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES 15 OCT 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
560369	WILLIAMSON EARL J	03	15	15		1	M 1	06	26	52	

7. SCD Mo	Da	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo.	Da	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
11	25	42		1	50 USCA 403 J						06	26	52

13.	Yes - 1 No - 2
Code	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III HAVANA, CUBA STATION		HAVANA, CUBA	

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	(ATTACHE) AREA OPS OFF (DCOS)	0115	FSS GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
04 2 14 2	$ 9380 11595	DI							9 3545 55 055

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data	
REASSIGNMENT	67	10	19	58	REGULAR	OM		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH II PARAGUAY URUGUAY SECTION	4675	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	(ATTACHE) AREA OPS OFF DCOS	0458	FSS GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
04 2 14 2	$ 9380 11595	DI	12	16	56	12	13	59	9 3500 10 200

44. Remarks

20 J.B.

J. M. STEWART

FORM NO. 1150a

SECRET

EMM 10/16/58

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO	2 NAME						3 ASSIGNED ORGAN				4 FUNDS		5 ALLOTMENT	
560389	WILLIAMSON EARL J						DDP/WH 7				UV			
6. OLD SALARY RATE							7. NEW SALARY RATE							
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE				GRADE	STEP	SALARY		EFFECTIVE DATE			
			MO	DA	YR						MO	DA	YR	
GS 14	1	$10,320					GS 14	2	11,595 $10,535		06	15	58	

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
ROBERT N. DAHLGREN	15 May 58	Robert N. Dahlgren N.B.

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO 1 MAR. 56 560 SECRET PERSONNEL FOLDER (4) L I

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WILLIAMSON EARL J	560389	GS-14-2	$10,535	$11,595

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

mjv

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. EARL J. WILLIAMSON 560383	2. DATE OF BIRTH 15 Mar 1915	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 14 Dec 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion 30	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 16 Dec 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Off (DCCS) BAF-115 (Attache)
GS-0136.01-13 $9205.00 per annum (FSS-5 $7630.00 per annum)	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,320.00 per annum (FSS-5 $7630.00 per annum)
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 265230	DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station
	11. HEADQUARTERS 5	Havana, Cuba
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REA.	
				SD/DI

15. SEX M	W	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-3545-55-055 TO: same 170-35	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 06/26/52

POSTED

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

dah

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Earl J. Williamson
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 15 Mar 1915
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 31 May 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment 56
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 3 June 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer (FI) BAF-116 (Attache,		Area Ops. Officer D COS BAF-115 (Attache
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-13 $9205.00 per annum (FSS-6 $7570.00 per annum)		GS-0136.01-13 $9205.00 per annum (FSS-6 $7570.00 per annum)
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH	465230	DDP/WH- Branch III Havana-Cuba Station
11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana, Cuba	5	Havana, Cuba
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-3545-55-055 170-85
TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☑ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

1

21. REMARKS:

3 EOD

POSTED
6/9/56

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. ~~EMPLOYEE COPY~~

[illegible] 6/6/56

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-[illegible]

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Payroll period	3. Block No 117	4. Slip No
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) [illegible]	6. Grade and salary [illegible]-11 $8990		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:	11. Appropriation(s) WH-6	12. Prepared by Jab 12 Sep 55 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better XXXXXXXXXXXXX
[illegible]Oct 55	11 Apr 54	$8990	$9285.20	SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

JAB Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T

Combined Personnel Action in lieu of SF-52.

Change of Service Designation from D to DI.

Effective date: 12 June 1955

FI

	[illegible]DL
[illegible]S, Joseph [illegible]	13
BELL, Raymond	14
[illegible]RIGHT, Frederic J.	14
BROWN, Edward P.	13
[illegible], Herbert [illegible]	13
GRIFFIN, Fred	14
HILL, Harry C.	13
HODGSON, James [illegible]	13
[illegible]ARD, John Eliot	13
LEICHLITER, Vyrl F.	13
[illegible]ECK, W. S.	13
L[illegible]KIE, Martin J.	13
[illegible]S, Donald T.	13
ROWLETT, Frank B.	16
TILTON, John S.	14
WILSON, Raymond B.	13
[illegible]D, Fred R.	14

SR

[illegible]CK, Melvin	13
FIEDLER, Harold I.	14
F[illegible], George A.	13
GAINES, Stanley [illegible]	14
KI[illegible]R, George	15
LEVY, Frank A.	14
[illegible]LL, Francis	13
[illegible]T, Bill C.	13

WH

CA[illegible]T, John O.	14
S[illegible], Harold F.	13
~~[illegible]~~	~~13~~

Robert A. Stricklin by John J. Caldwell 10 June 1955

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

2 Dr MK
4/1/54

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. Earl J. WILLIAMSON
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 15 March 1915
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 4 Mar. 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: APR 11 1954

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
INTELLIGENCE OFCR (F) BAF-116-12 (ATTACHE, FSS-6)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	INTELLIGENCE OFCR, (F) BAF-116 (ATTACHE, FSS-6)
GS-0136.51-12, $7240.00 p.a. (FSS-6, $6681.00 p.a.)	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-13, $8360.00 p.a. (FSS-6, $6681.00 p.a.)
DDP/WH	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH
Havana, Cuba	11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana, Cuba
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

BAF-116

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: MAR 23 1954

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): C/WH J C King

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): V. C. Lynch X4487

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: R Burrows
Title: DD/P Admin 3/24/54

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM 4-3545-55-055
TO 4-3545-55-055
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

PURSUANT TO [illegible] EFFECTIVE [illegible]
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: 8990

[illegible]
1 April 54 W

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A		
B CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	as	3/29
C CLASSIFICATION		
D PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	D Taylor	3/31
E		

REMARKS.

F. APPROVED BY

for Schrader

Taylor 3/29/54

2/10/54

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Earl J. WILLIAMSON	2. DATE OF BIRTH 15 Mar 1915	3. REQUEST NO. -	4. DATE OF REQUEST 6 Feb 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 14 Feb 54 B. APPROVED: FEB 14 1954	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Ops OF -DEP CHIEF, EA-144-12 (ATTACHE , FSS-6)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO-FI - BAF-116-12 (ATTACHE , FSS-6)
GS-132-12, $7240. 00 p.a. (FSS-6, $6501.00 p.a.)	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-12, $7240.00 p.a. (FSS-6, $6501.00 p.a.)
DDP/WH	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH
HAVANA, CUBA	11. HEADQUARTERS	HAVANA, CUBA
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

BAF-116

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) V. C. Lynch C/WH	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Title:
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) V. C. Lynch X 4457	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB. OTHER
			Y	

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD: D

~~CD-UT~~

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES, NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
		FROM 4-3545-55-055 TO [illegible]			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		4/8	
C CLASSIFICATION			
D PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	R.T.	7/9	
E			

F APPROVED BY

☆ U GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 987374

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Pay [illegible]

3. Block No. UV

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) WILLIAMSON, Earl J.

6. Grade and salary GS-12 $7040.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s) WH-6

12. Prepared by JK 8-25

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
27 Sept 53	2 Mar 52	$7040.00	$7240.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Use appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods). Period(s).

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In non-pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP

ak Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen. U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950 General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

WH 4-6

SECRET
Security Inform

P. Forek
1/13/52
72

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

Unvouchered

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Williamson, Earl	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 12/22/52
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Integration		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 12/29/52	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		B. APPROVED: 29 Dec 52	

FROM—		TO—
Operations Officer	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Attache (Political Officer)
GS-12, $7040	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	FSS-6, $6501
WH/FI	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	WH/FI
Havana	11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Subject is to be paid the difference between CIA salary of $7040 and FSS salary of $6501 to be paid by the Department of State and allowances in accordance therewith. Sick and annual leave are to be held in escrow until subject reverts to GS status.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) FI/OPS/LCB	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Title:
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) Mrs. Frellic - X403	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

90832D
21 Jan 53 DE

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B CIA OR PUA CONTROL			
C CLASSIFICATION			
D PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E			

F APPROVED BY
D Mulcahy 1-5-53

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]
27 Oct 52

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME WILLIAMSON, Earl J.		DATE 26 September 1952
NATURE OF ACTION ~~Promotion~~ Reassignment		EFFECTIVE DATE 26 October 1952
	FROM	TO
TITLE	Operations Officer, GS-12	OPS OF A-144-12
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12, $7040.00 per annum	GS-132-12, $7040.00 p.a.
OFFICE		
DIVISION	WH	WH
BRANCH	III	III
OFFICIAL STATION	San Salvador, El Salvador(#3527)	Havana, Cuba (#3517)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS 10.22.52	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Davis B. Powell	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER 10-23-52	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ______

SECURITY CLEARED ON ______

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ______

ENTERED ON DUTY ______

______
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS: See app 21 Oct 52 WH action
CPA
A-144

C/WH ______ Date ______

POSTED
24 Oct 52

FORM NO. [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

WH/III 30 June 52 [illegible]

NAME: WILLIAMSON, Earl J.

DATE: 3 April 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 26 June 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Operations Officer, GS-12
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-12, $7040.00 per annum
OFFICE		
DIVISION		WH
BRANCH		Branch III
OFFICIAL STATION		San Salvador, El Salvador (#3527)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
R M Gregg 5-9-52		
CLASSIFICATION F912	PERSONNEL OFFICER	
Thomas M. Fisher	Goodbread	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 27 June 1952

SECURITY CLEARED ON 9 May 1952

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 27 June 1952

ENTERED ON DUTY 26 June 1952

DOG - 04/11/54
CSEOD - 06/26/52
LCD - 06/26/52

Robert J. Hayes
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

132

REMARKS:
S-#2
Please initiate security clearance. Addendum to PHS attached.

30 June 52 [illegible]

POSTED

3 April 1952

C/WH

FORM NO. 37-1

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) WILLIAMSON, (First) Earl (Middle) J.

2. DATE 6 June 1956

3. TO POSITION Area Ops Off (DCOS)

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH DDP, WH, III

5. GRADE GS-13

6. TYPE OF POSITION

☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☒ Overseas

Havana, Cuba

7. EVALUATE FOR

☐ EOD
☒ Overseas
☒ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Subject is qualified for proposed PCS overseas assignment (6/12/56).

Max W. Hartman
MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 060389

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Williamson Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 03/13/15	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer, Chief	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/6		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
XX CAREER	☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY	☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		XX ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):		☐ SPECIAL (Specify):	
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. February 1972		12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1971 - 31 January 1972	

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 6 APR 1972	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

See MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT attached.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 14 March 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Acting Deputy Chief, WHD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Richard S. Welch (signed)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT attached.

DATE 14 March 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Acting Chief, WHD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE James E. Flannery (signed)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 060389

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Williamson, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Mar. '15	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer/Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/2	8. CURRENT STATION San Jose		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1970 - 31 March 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached memorandum.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

See Attachment.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Earl J. Williamson

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 14 April 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, WH Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James E. Flannery

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attachment.

DATE 24 June 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH DIVISION	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /signed/ William V. Broe

SECRET

14 April 1971

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Earl J. Williamson
1 April 1970 to 31 March 1971

Mr. Williamson departed San Jose, Costa Rica, on 21 February 1971, after having served as Chief of Station for two and one half years. The last year of his tour was highlighted by two extremely delicate, highly productive operations targeted against the Communist Party of Costa Rica, and a political action operation of a most sensitive nature stemming from them. This latter operation, focused as it was around the president of the country, called for constant good judgment on how to pursue U.S. Government interests with this highly sensitive and significant intelligence at hand. (It was highlighted at the WH Division's Chiefs of Station Conference held in February 1971 as a classic example of both the collection and use of intelligence on the real "national interest" level.)

Throughout these operations, Mr. Williamson handled himself very well, especially during the latter part of his tenure when he was under considerable pressure as an almost inevitable consequence of the impact of these operations. Ultimately, Mr. Williamson's recall from Costa Rica was requested by the Costa Rican Government. It should be stressed that this was a mark of his operational success rather than the result of any operational "flap" or miscue whatever. (The U.S. Ambassador was the government's ultimate and preferred target but, for a variety of reasons, it was desired by local authority to avoid that kind of a confrontation with the U.S. Government, so Mr. Williamson was selected as the next best target in the Embassy.) Publicity based on false and self-serving leaks by the local government placed Mr. Williamson under the most intense strain in his final weeks. The fact that, under these general circumstances, he continued to function normally, responding to numerous demands being made on him by the situation and Headquarters, and set about paving the way for his successor to take up the cudgel from the best operational platform -- all this speaks for itself and certainly underlines the fine quality of Mr. Williamson's professional and personal characteristics.

In the realm of normal activity, Mr. Williamson handled his officers with both firmness and tact. He was a good manager, ran a taut Station, and had cut back on several marginal operations, streamlined others, and initiated some new ones. He writes well and quickly, and he has exceptional fluency in Spanish. He moved very well in the local community and, during his tenure, established a wide range of contacts.

Mr. Williamson's relationship with the Ambassador was excellent, and his wife was a great help to him in discharging his representational duties and in developing contacts within the Costa Rican community.

In sum, Mr. Williamson is a "pro" who turned in a strong performance both before and after the chips were down.

James E. Flannery
Deputy Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

I certify that I have seen
this memorandum:

Earl J. Williamson

[illegible]
Date

Earl J. Williamson
1 April 1970 to 31 March 1971

Comments of Reviewing Official:

I fully concur with the Rater's comments. I am pleased that Mr. Flannery explained the circumstances surrounding Mr. Williamson's recall from Costa Rica so well. His tour was a fine piece of operational work and in no way should it be tarnished by misinterpretation or gossip.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

24 June 1971
Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 060389

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Williamson, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Mar 15	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officor/Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/2	8. CURRENT STATION San Jose

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)		
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	*Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.*
M–Marginal	*Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.*
P–Proficient	*Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.*
S–Strong	*Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.*
O–Outstanding	*Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.*

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (*indicate number of employees supervised*).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 9 JUL 1970	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

23 June 1970

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Earl J. Williamson
1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

Costa Rica has become progressively more important to the Agency because of its very active Communist Party and signs of the imminent arrival of the Soviets. In anticipation, Mr. Williamson has geared his Station and honed his operations to cope with these problems. San Jose Station has some of the more sophisticated and interesting operations in the Central American area, and the Station is preparing to exploit its assets to the maximum to meet the expected presence of the Soviets.

Mr. Williamson is an old "pro" who has had a variety of experiences in the intelligence field and who brings to his work maturity garnished with enthusiasm and expertise.

He has done particularly well in guiding his subordinates and extracting the maximum from them. His leadership is deft but firm.

His relationship with the past ambassador, a difficult person to deal with, who was not at first happy to have Mr. Williamson, progressed to the point that he became a valuable member of the Country Team and had the respect of the ambassador. There is a new ambassador now and it is clear that Mr. Williamson has gotten off to a very good start with him.

SECRET

He has a large range of contacts in the community and he has been helped by a charming wife who is an asset to him in his work.

His subordinates have a high regard for him--from a professional as well as personal standpoint--~~and look~~ to him for guidance and leadership.

He is judicious in the use of government funds, extracting the maximum from the operational dollar. His Spanish is excellent, and his experiences in Latin affairs have given him a grace in moving among the locals.

He is rated as Strong.

Horton
John R. Horton
Deputy Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

I certify that I have seen
this memorandum:

E J Williamson
Earl J. Williamson

24 Nov 1970
Date

SECRET

SUBJECT: Earl J. Williamson
1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

Comments of Reviewing Official:

I concur completely with the Rater's comments concerning this excellent officer. Mr. Williamson has again and again shown himself to be the real professional that he is. It is a comfort to a Division Chief to have such a COS in the field.

William V. Broe

8 JUL 1970
Date

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 060389

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Williamson, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 03/13/15	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/2		8. CURRENT STATION San Jose	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
XXX CAREER	RESERVE / TEMPORARY	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		XX ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):	
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1969		12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1968 - 31 March 1969	

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-64 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

See attached Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	/subject in field/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 July 1969	Deputy Chief, WH Division	/signed/ John R. Horton

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 July 1969	Chief, WH Division	/signed/ William V. Broe

10 July 1969

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Earl J. Williamson
1 April 1968 - 31 March 1969

Mr. Williamson began his tour as Chief of Station, San Jose, in July 1968. He was well prepared for the responsibilities of the assignment, having served in two important stations as Deputy Chief of Station, and as Deputy Chief, WH/COG.

At the outset of his assignment, Mr. Williamson was confronted with an ambassador who had reservations on several matters connected with the station, including problems concerning the establishment of a "third country" radio operation. Shortly thereafter Panamanian exile and guerrilla activities placed an additional burden on the San Jose station and on relations with the ambassador. Mr. Williamson weathered these initial rough spots well, keeping Agency interests protected.

In the seven months since his arrival in San Jose, Mr. Williamson not only succeeded in overcoming the ambassador's initial frostiness, but has mollified the ambassador's misgivings on several potential items of conflict. Furthermore, he has won a strong endorsement from the ambassador who has made it a point to inform Headquarters officers that he is highly pleased by the manner in which Mr. Williamson is handling his assignment.

SUBJECT: Earl J. Williamson
1 April 1968 - 31 March 1969

Mr. Williamson has an aggressive, constructive and realistic approach to operations. He has made a good assessment of the station's operational assets and personnel and has succeeded in sharpening general performances. Coordination and cooperation between the station and Headquarters leaves nothing to be desired.

He displays appropriate cost-consciousness. The morale of station personnel is high. Mr. Williamson and his wife are highly regarded by embassy personnel, and have established a wide circle of Costa Rican friends and contacts.

He has put in a Strong performance.

John R. Horton
Deputy Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

I certify that I have
seen this memorandum:

Earl J. Williamson
Date

SECRET

SUBJECT: Earl J. Williamson
1 April 1968 - 31 March 1969

I concur with the rater's comments. Mr. Williamson has handled himself most professionally and adriotly and the Costa Rica Station is making fine progress under his leadership.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

28 July 1969
Date

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
060389

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Williamson, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 03/13/15	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer D Ch	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT WH/COG	8. CURRENT STATION Hqts.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER	RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			
	SPECIAL (Specify):			

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
04/68

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached Memorandum for the Record.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

25 JUN 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUL 22 0 53 AM '68
MAIL ROOM

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 20 June 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Earl J. Williamson

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 19 June 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WH/COG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE David A. Phillips

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I heartily concur with the rating and comments submitted by Mr. Williamson's superior. Mr. Williamson is a fine professional who very much deserves his new assignment as Chief of Station, San Jose, Costa Rica.

DATE 21 June 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William V. Broe

SECRET

SECRET

19 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report -
Mr. Earl J. Williamson

1. Mr. Williamson is on the eve of his departure as an overseas Chief of Station. This is a logical and justified next step in his career development. Mr. Williamson's responsibilities have been considerable in recent years: DCOS in two important Stations; Chief, FI and then Deputy Chief of WH/COG. It should be pointed out that in the latter position he was Acting Chief for long periods, performing admirably. His new assignment indicates that the most senior officers in the Division have recognized this.

2. Mr. Williamson is a professional intelligence officer in the strictest sense of the word. He is hard-driving and tenacious; despite his seniority he is on any list of activists; he has the capability of getting things going, of getting the job done. He applies rigid standards to his subordinates, but no less rigid than those he applies to himself. He is cost-conscious to an unusual degree. He is a fluent speaker of idiomatic Spanish and can handle himself well in any milieu. If Mr. Williamson is ever less than diplomatic it is when considering ersatz operational proposals or phoney practices, neither of which he can tolerate.

3. There is no question that in his next assignment Mr. Williamson will benefit from the social graces of his charming wife. In his own private life Mr. Williamson maintains numerous important contacts.

SECRET

4. In summary, Mr. Williamson is a dedicated and professional intelligence officer. He will undoubtedly continue his fine performance as a Chief of Station, and should in time be promoted to the next higher grade.

David A. Phillips
Chief, WH/COG

SECRET

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION -- TECHNICAL SCHOOL

SHORT RANGE AGENT CONTACT SURVEY (A-106)

Training Report

Name : WILLIAMSON, Earl J.

Office: WH

Date : 10 May 1968

1. **OBJECTIVES:**

To provide a general knowledge in:

a. Selected gear used for clandestine short range agent contacts. Included are representative samples of:

One way RF radio devices; two way RF radio devices; two way carrier current devices; optical communicators; and special telephone devices used for establishing agent contact.

b. The philosophy, purpose, considerations and manageability of short range agent contact systems; including message security, link security, reliability and feasibility of agent contact systems.

Louis Capriatta
for
Lawrence S. Martin
INSTRUCTOR
TSD/TECHNICAL SCHOOL

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

24 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM : Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT : Completion of External Training

This is to advise you that Earl J. Williamson training request # R-022109 attended the following external training program :

COURSE : NATIONAL INTERDEPARTMENTAL SEMINAR

INSTITUTION: FSI

DATE : 26 Feb.-22 Mar. 1968

GRADE : Successfully Completed

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Attachments:

__ Grade Report
xx Certificate of Completion
__ Roster of Participants
__ Training Report by Student
__ Training Report by Institution
__ None
__ Other: ____________

GROUP 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

Department of State • Department of Defense •
Agency for International Development • U.S. Information Agency

NATIONAL INTERDEPARTMENTAL SEMINAR

This is to certify that

Earl J. Williamson

has successfully completed the seminar on

PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNAL DEFENSE

at the Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C.

March 22, 1968

A TRUE [illegible]
SIGNED ORIGINAL

Seminar Coordinator

Geo. L. C

Director of FSI

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Chiefs of Station Seminar No. 3-68
80 hours, full time

Participant : Williamson, Earl J.
Office : WH
Year of Birth: 1915
Service Designation: D
Grade : GS-15
No. of Students : 15
EOD Date : June 1952

COURSE OBJECTIVES, CONTENT AND METHODS

The COS Seminar is aimed to prepare prospective Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Station and Chiefs of Base for field assignments. Emphasis was upon the difficulties confronting Chiefs of small or medium-sized installations, since they must handle a peculiarly wide range of problems. Included were case studies serving to remind outgoing chiefs of various operational approaches and techniques, but more time was devoted to policy, coordination, management, reporting, and administrative responsibilities of the Chief of Station, both within CIA and in the government at large, at home and abroad.

The bulk of the course is given in lectures and question periods conducted by officials responsible for the missions, functions, programs, and services discussed. A few key items of suggested reading are included, and bibliographies of suggested reading tailored to the individual's assignment are offered for those who want them.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No further assessment of individual capacity or performance is made in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Henry C. Barringer — 26 APR 1968
Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 060389

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Williamson Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Mar 15	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer D Ch	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG	8. CURRENT STATION WASH., D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 19 Feb 66 - 31 March 67

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached memorandum.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

20 JUN 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-60 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign-language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUN 14 3 27 PM '67

See attached memorandum.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	Carl J. Williamson

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
12		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 May 1967	Chief, WH/COG	Thomas J. Flores

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur. Mr. Williamson is one of the relatively few Division officers who, having reached a senior position, still enjoys making recruitments and handling agents. He will be going to the field during the next calendar year to a senior assignment.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 June 1967	Deputy Chief, WH Division	Jacob D. Esterline

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report - Mr. Earl J. Williamson

1. Mr. Williamson reported to WH/Cuban Operations Group in February 1966 and immediately took over the functions of Chief of the FI Branch. This Branch is concerned with the conduct of positive intelligence operations on a world-wide basis against the Cuban target. A small proportion of these operations were conducted directly from Headquarters (including the direction of assets inside Cuba, a denied area). The larger number of these operations was conducted through third countries and supervision involved the provision of staff support and guidance and extensive dealings with other Divisions and, to a lesser degree, with representatives of foreign liaison services. Mr. Williamson took hold of these duties quickly and forcefully and carried them out effectively and efficiently.

2. In July 1966, Mr. Williamson was appointed Deputy Chief of the Cuban Operations Group. In this role his duties involved supervision of the totality of the operational effort, including FI, CI, maritime infiltrations, propaganda, political action, and economic warfare. Again, Mr. Williamson undertook his broader duties forcefully and efficiently. He has shown qualities of leadership and good managerial skills in dealing with personnel and organizational matters.

3. During this period, Mr. Williamson has primarily been interested in substantive operational matters. He has carried out efficiently and promptly those staff functions which I have assigned to him, but I detect a certain lack of interest in these. Probably this reflects his most outstanding ability and consuming interest in the real heart of our activities-- the production of intelligence and in the conduct of actions against our target. He has participated personally in several operations and is one of the relatively few senior officers who delights in handling agents and making recruitments.

SECRET

4. Mr. Williamson is conscientious and economical in the use of operational assets, manpower and money. He is married to a charming young woman who is socially active, entertains well and is a real asset in representational activities.

5. Mr. Williamson's Spanish is fluent and colloquial, and in combination with his extensive understanding of Latin America and its people contributes enormously to his effectiveness.

Thomas J. Flores

Thomas J. Flores
Chief, WH/COG

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
060360

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILLIAMSON, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]	3. SEX [illegible]	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD [illegible]
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer F Ch	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible]	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					
☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 MAY 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 December 1965 - 18 February 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE SECTION C.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 4-60 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

OFFICE OF PERS...
SEP 30 10 04 AM '66
MAIL ROOM

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject's last fitness report covered the period April - November 1965, while assigned to Madrid, Spain. He departed the Station 1 December 1965, arrived Headquarters 15 December and was on home leave until his reassignment to DDP/WH Division on 16 February 1966. Therefore, no evaluation can be submitted on Subject's performance during that period. After 16 February 1966 his evaluations should be handled by DDP/WH.

William C. Cooley
William C. Cooley
DC/Personnel
European Division
30 September 1966

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE	CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR
	WILLIAMSON, EARL J.	A-ADD C-CHANGE D-DELETE									

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
								04/11/67	03/13/15	15	WH

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN SPANISH (NEW WORLD) BL18 (NAME OF LANGUAGE) AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
I	+	H	H	H

TEST RATINGS
O = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE
S = SLIGHT H = HIGH
E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE

12. SIGNATURE

13. LO NUMBER
13655

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (16-65) **SECRET**

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1 - OP/QAB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 060389

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Williamson, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Mar 1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Madrid		8. CURRENT STATION Madrid	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
1 April 1965 - 15 November 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 In charge of Cuban operations of the Madrid Station	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supports other WE stations in the conduct of their Cuban operations, including recruitment, debriefing and briefing of persons of operational and intelligence interests.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with officials of National Police and Spanish military intelligence service on matters relating to Cuban operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Drafts operational dispatches and cables.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 In charge of Station during absences of the Chief of Station	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 24 JAN 1966	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JAN 21 2 49 PH '66

MAIL ROOM

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject is departing Spain for an assignment PCS Headquarters following a tour of over five years at the Madrid Station. During the past three and one-half years he has headed up the Station's Cuban operations, has acted as a coordinator of Cuban activities in Western Europe and has actively participated in operations in support of other WE stations.

Starting completely from scratch, the Station was able, under Subject's able direction, to develop extensive operations against the priority Cuban target, including technical operations against the installation, recruitment and defection of important officials, penetration of commercial establishments, recruitment and training of internal assets, bi-lateral operations with the local services, etc.

Subject is an officer of considerable energy and drive. He has a knack of developing and exploiting interesting contacts and much of the success of the Station's Cuban program was due to his intimate connections in Cuban exile circles. Subject was also able to enlist the support of the local services in connection with certain aspects of the over-all program which could not be handled unilaterally.

Subject has shown himself to be "cost conscious" in the utilization of funds and manpower. His Cuban unit of the Station was

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 1 Dec 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Earl J. Williamson

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 50	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 1 Dec 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Noel

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Having observed subject's work only from Headquarters, my evaluation of his performance is based entirely on the results and production which he and the section which he supervised achieved. During the rating period, the station's Cuban operations were conducted vigorously with fine results. This report appears to be fair and objective.

DATE 19 Jan. 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WE/5	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Francis G. Coleman

SECRET

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS** (continued)

composed (in addition to himself) of four case officers, two reports officers and a secretary. Although he may be considered a "tough" supervisor in demanding the best of his subordinates, the record will show that he was able to build a very successful program.

During his tour at this Station, Subject made an important contribution toward the achievement of high priority targets. He is in every sense of the word an experienced, energetic and dedicated officer.

Since Subject's activities in support of other WE stations in the conduct of Cuban operations were under the direction of Headquarters, the rating box for this specific duty has been left blank for completion by the appropriate Headquarters official.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
0 60389

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Williamson, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Mar.1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer DCOS	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Iberian		8. CURRENT STATION Madrid	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises Station's Cuban operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supports other WE stations in conduct of their Cuban operations, including assessment, recruitment, debriefing and briefing of persons of operational and intelligence interest.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordinator of Cuban operations for Western Europe.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with officials of National Police (DGS) and Spanish Military intelligence service on matters relating to Cuban operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Drafts operational dispatches and cables.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Assumes charge of Station during absence of Chief of Station.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

19 MAY 19

FORM 6-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

MAY 19 3 13 PM '65

During the period under review Subject's activities in support of Cuban operations elsewhere in Europe and his responsibilities as Coordinator of Cuban activities for Western Europe have kept him away from the Madrid Station approximately one half of the twelve month period. Since these activities were under the direction of Headquarters, and not this Station, the rater does not feel qualified to comment on Subject's performance of Specific Duties 2 and 3 and has therefore left those rating boxes blank for completion by the appropriate Headquarters' official.

With respect to Specific Duty 1, supervision of Station's Cuban operations, Subject has applied himself aggressively and imaginatively to this task and the rater feels that Station's Cuban operations have been maintained at a high level and have been an important contribution to KUBARK's world-wide effort against this priority target. Obviously Subject's frequent and prolonged absences from the Station have not permitted him to give this task his undivided attention or the day-to-day continuity that is so necessary and important.

In the conduct of the Station's Cuban operations Subject has direct supervision of four operations officers, one full time and one part time reports officer, and a secretary. Subject is an efficient organizer and supervisor. He thinks and writes clearly. He is fluent in Spanish. In the conduct of the extensive Cuban operations he has shown himself to be

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS (Cont'd.)

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 April 1965	/s/ Earl J. Williamson

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 April 1965	Chief of Station	/s/ James A. Noel

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I know subject and am thoroughly familiar with his work and performance. I concur in this report with one exception, namely the rating given subject for specific duty No. 6. Because of his travels which absented him from the Station for one-half of the past year, subject perforce was inadequately qualified to take charge of the station in the absence of the COS. Specializing on Cuban operations entirely, he has but a limited knowledge of the station's other activities and considering only the effectiveness of his performance of this duty, I could not rate him higher than P. This is not a comment on his capability but rather an evaluation of his effectiveness in performance of this particular duty.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 May 1965	Chief, WE/5	Francis G. Coleman Francis G. Coleman

SECRET

SECTION C - (Cont'd.)

"cost conscious" both with respect to the commitment of funds and the utilization of man power. In a word, Subject is an experienced, energetic and dedicated officer.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
60389

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Williamson	Earl	J.	13 Mar. 1915	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops. Officer

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WE/Iberia

8. CURRENT STATION: Madrid

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 In charge of Station's Cuban operations. Responsible for planning, directing and supervising all activities relating to spotting, assessing and recruiting of agents; collection of intelligence through introduction of agents to target area, debriefing of refugees, operations conducted with liaison, and from sensitive sources.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supports other WE Stations in conduct of their Cuban operations, including assessment, recruitment, debriefing and briefing of persons of operational and intelligence interest, as well as warm and cold pitches to potential candidates for defection.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts personal liaison with leading officials of the Spanish Military Intelligence Service and National Police (DGS) on matters of mutual interest.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Drafts operational dispatches and cables.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Assumes charge of Station during absence of the Chief of Station.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

4 MAY 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

During the period under review Subject's duties and activities have continued to be concentrated on the Cuban target. Subject's performance of those duties has been eminently satisfactory and have received the recognition and commendation of Headquarters. Subject is an all-round operations officer with considerable experience and no significant weaknesses. His strengths are his aggressive approach to his operational responsibilities, his sound judgment and his complete dedication to duty. Due to Subject's energy and imagination the Madrid Station has been able to develop a highly effective and well-balanced program of Cuban operations. In addition Subject has spent a good part of his time in support of high level Cuban operations outside of Spain, assignments which he has carried out with a high degree of professionalism and success. In every sense Subject can be classified as a man of action.

In the conduct of the Cuban operations Subject has direct supervision of three operations officers, one reports officer, and one secretary. In addition he maintains indirect supervision of a debriefing center, an intelligence processing shop and all activities relating to the recruitment, training and dispatching of agents to the target country. Subject maintains contact with high level liaison officers whose cooperation and support are needed for a good part of our overall operations and the excellent cooperation we have received from those officials attests to the skill of Subject. Subject, of course, is fluent in Spanish. His drafting of cables and dispatches is excellent. Subject has at all times exhibited cost consciousness in the planning and execution of his operational responsibilities. In a word Subject is an excellent officer and a credit to the organization in every respect.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 April 1964	/s/ Earl J. Williamson

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
[illegible]		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 April 1964	Chief of Station	/s/ James A. Noel

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing official concurs in the high evaluation given this officer. He is a hard-driving, dedicated individual who is completely dedicated to his present task and assignment.

MAY 1 12 20 PM '64

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 April 1964	Chief, WE/5	J. Fred E. Hubbard

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
00329

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Williamson Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 March 1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible]		8. CURRENT STATION Madrid	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1962 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 In charge of Station's Cuban operations. Responsible for planning, directing and supervising all activities relating to spotting, assessing and recruiting of agents; collection of intelligence through introduction of agents to target area, debriefing of refugees, operations conducted with liaison, and from sensitive sources	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supports other WE Stations in conduct of their Cuban operations, including assessment, recruitment, debriefing and briefing of persons of operational and intelligence interest, as well as warm and cold pitches to potential candidates for defection	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts personal liaison with leading officials of the Spanish Military Intelligence Service and National Police (DGS) on matters of mutual interest	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Drafts operational dispatches and cables	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Assumes charge of Station during absence of the Chief of Station	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

16 MAY 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MAIL ROOM
MAY 8 2 55 PM '63

During the period under review, Subject's duties and activities have been in the main devoted to the conduct of Cuban operations. His performance of those duties has been characterized by vigor and imagination. Concrete results have been achieved. The Station's performance in connection with all phases of this top priority activity, carried out under Subject's supervision, has been the subject of commendatory comments from Headquarters. In addition to direction the Station's own Cuban operations, Subject has been frequently called upon to support other WE Stations in connection with various phases of their Cuban operations, particularly in making both "warm" and "cold" approaches to high level diplomatic candidates for defection. These assignments have been undertaken by Subject with much enthusiasm and a high degree of professionalism. As a matter of fact, Subject was away from Madrid on these and similar missions for 120 days during calendar year 1962.

In the conduct of the Cuban operations, Subject has direct supervision over four officers and indirect supervision of the debriefing center, the intelligence processing shop and all activities relating to the recruitment, training and dispatching of agents. Through personal liaison with leading Spanish intelligence and security service officials, he has been most successful in obtaining their cooperation in support of our operations. In addition, Subject has expended much of his after-hours time to maintaining contact with agents and persons of operational interest.

Subject is fluent in Spanish. He is an efficient organizer and supervisor and thinks and writes clearly. In summary, he is an experienced, energetic and highly dedicated officer. While he is well qualified to take over his own Station, it is my hope, and recommendation, that he be given a second full tour here in Madrid. In my opinion, it

(continued in Part 3 below)

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10 April 1963	/s/ Earl J. Williamson

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 April 1963	Chief of Station	/s/ James Noel

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

would be a great mistake to move him from Madrid until and unless there is a drastic and favorable change in the Cuban situation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
30 April 1963	AC/WE/3	Ed McGuiggan

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
060389

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Williamson	(First) Earl	(Middle) J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 March 1915	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS Officer			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Madrid	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 1 April - 31 Dec 61

SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of Station	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops and maintains contacts with nationals of another country for third country operations	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Directs all liaison operations with Spanish services and supervises Station officers engaged in liaison duties	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervises the operations of an outside shop run jointly with local security services	RATING NO. 7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Personally conducts liaison with a number of top level local officials	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Develops, recruits and handles agents for independent operations	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5/6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-60 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(41)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is a strong officer from every important point of view. He is experienced, intelligent, alert, aggressive, extremely hard working and conscientious. He is never satisfied with the status quo but is constantly striving to acquire new operational assets or to improve the functioning or production of old or current projects. He is tough-minded and abundantly endowed with intellectual as well as physical courage. If he has any one weakness, it is his impatience with subordinate officers and employees who do not tackle their operational duties with the same degree of zeal that he himself applies. His direct and forceful manner in calling such shortcomings to the attention of case officers under his direction has, on infrequent occasions, caused some minor and transitory resentment. In most cases, however, it has also resulted in improvement in the attitude and performance of the officer in question.

Subject is especially effective in his dealings with high level liaison officers and the fact that our relations with the various security services are currently on a cordial and more productive basis is due mainly to the thought, energy and time which Subject has devoted to this important activity. At the same time, subject has not permitted liaison considerations to inhibit the planning and development of independent operations and agents. In this connection he has been especially effective in developing valuable assets for third country (Cuban) operations.

Subject has an outgoing personality; makes friends easily, especially among Latins. He is a mature person who is respected by his Station colleagues and by the senior ODACID and other agency representatives with whom he maintains contact. He has direct supervision over nine officers and clerks. He is a good administrator. He writes effectively.

(Continued on attached sheet)

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
12 January 1962	/s/ Earl J. Williamson

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
4 months	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 January 1962	Chief of Station	/s/ James Noel

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

XX	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully endorse the evaluation and comments of the supervisor. Subject is noteworthy for his calculated aggressiveness, initiative and determination. His stewardship of the Madrid Station while he was Acting Chief was commendable. He reports well, is reasonable, and in my opinion has fully earned promotion to GS-15.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
31 January 1962	Chief, WE	

SECRET

SECRET

As a well rounded operations officer and administrator, Subject is qualified to run his own station and, in my opinion, it would be an injustice to him if he is not assigned as chief of a medium sized station when his service in Spain is completed. It is my hope, however, that Subject will be given a second tour at Madrid when his current tour ends in October 1962.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 60369

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILLIAMSON, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 March 1915	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Madrid/WE	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 3 Oct 60 - 31 Mar 61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of Station	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Contacts with nationals of another area in connection with operations in another area	RATING NO. 7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Directs all operations connected with liaison and supervises other officers conducting same	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with number of local officials	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5-6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 6-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 1 2 49 PM '61
MAIL ROOM

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This officer, who is Deputy Chief of Station and also Chief of Liaison, directly supervises a sizeable number of personnel involved in joint operations with liaison and directs the operations in which they are engaged. In the comparatively short time he has been in this Station he has succeeded in making major advances in our liaison relationship to the point where we can now accomplish considerably more than before his arrival. He is energetic, imaginative, gets things done, and works round the clock — his off duty hours he employs mainly in developing further his liaison and other operational relationships. Furthermore, unlike some officers in liaison he is also most active developing independent operations. As for his qualities as a deputy, suffice it to say that he is the best deputy I have had in my entire career with this organization — a truly outstanding officer, as reflected in the numerical ratings I have given him, whom I would be glad to have with me any place I may be assigned.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 5 May 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Earl J. Williamson

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 7	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 5 May 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Archibald B. Roosevelt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☒ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

In view of Mr. Williamson's relatively short time in his present job, I do not feel sufficiently familiar with his performance to comment.

DATE 25 May	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL [illegible]	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
Williamson Earl J.	15 March 1915	M	GS-14

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
D	Ops Officer - Dep. Br. Chief	DDP/WE/5

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 15 June - 2 October 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Read, study and prepare for assignment to Madrid as Chief of Liaison and DCOS Madrid	5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handle specific operational traffic involving WH activities in or related to Spain	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepare an assessment and plan for Spanish liaison	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 9-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

In the limited period covered by this report Mr. Williamson [illegible]ed a professional competence based on experience. He accepted direction willingly and evidenced maturity and balance.

MAY 11 2 59 PM '61
MAIL ROOM

Given the limited time on the desk and the preparatory nature of his tasks, there is no firm basis for judging his ability to handle subordinates or to make major substantive decisions. Available evidence, however, indicates no major weaknesses, and indeed, gives promise of considerable capacity.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Mr. Williamson is in Madrid

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 2 May 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WE/5	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Thomas F. Thiele Thomas F. Thiele

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- ☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- ☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- ☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- ☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 3 May 61	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AD Chief, WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert E. Porter

SECRET

ROBERT E. PORTER JR.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	560389

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILLIAMSON, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 15 March 1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO CI		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/ICD

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1960

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 5 March 59 To 31 March 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervision of CI/ICD Branch IV (WH). (3 research officers and one clerk-typist)	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Review of WH Projects re CP operations; making of appropriate recommendations.	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Guidance & support of CP operations in WH, at Headquarters	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Direct, on-the-scene (TDY) support of CP operations in the field (recruitment of agents)	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Williamson is very energetic and enthusiastic. He maintains excellent working relations with the WH Division. He has performed special operational tasks in the Field at the specific request of Chief, WHD. He is particularly well qualified for foreign liaison work in a Spanish-speaking country (e.g. Spain, or an important Latin American country).

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 24 3 07 PM '60
MAIL ROOM

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 18 Feb 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Earl J. Williamson Earl J. Williamson

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 14	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE [illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, CI/ICD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Paul J. Burke Paul J. Burke

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE [illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI/ICD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Lothar Metzl

SECRET

SECRET

Recorded by
CSPD

27 NOV 1959

24 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: CS/Career Service Panel/Section A

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Earl J. Williamson

A fitness report was due on Mr. Earl J. Williamson for the period 31 March 1959. Mr. Williamson was assigned to the CI Staff on 8 March 1959 after completion of an overseas tour with WH Division. A fitness report for the CI Staff for such a short period of time would serve no useful purpose.

Byron B. Burnes

Byron B. Burnes
C/CI/Support

SECRET

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO HKH-T-143

MT-1

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 4 September 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana SPR

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative/Personnel

SPECIFIC— Field Fitness Report - [redacted] WILLIAMSON, Earl J.

Reference: HKH-A-4049, 21 November 1957

Action Required: None; for Headquarters' information only

There has been no material change in the duties or performance of [redacted] since the submission of his last annual Field Fitness Report. Therefore, the above report, which was forwarded in the reference, may also be considered as the writer's final fitness report on [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

WILLIAM B. CALDWELL

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

SPR/mnr

3 September 1958

BY DATE

SEP 1958

26

SD-DE

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
DEC. 1949

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILLIAMSON, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 March 1915	3. SEX M	4 SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Habana Station	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief of Station		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 30 September 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 30 September 1956 - 30 September 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE 15 November 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William B. CALDWELL	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
Posted Per Control LW 5 [illegible] 1957
Reviewed by PUD 13/11/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 29 Nov 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL JC King	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WHD

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS. Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DEC 3 4 02 PM '57
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MAIL ROOM
DEC 3 4 02 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

B. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS ~~AIR CONDITIONING~~
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. *For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.*

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of Station	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Handling agents and ops	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Liaison with Department of Investigation	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reporting	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Contact and development of operational assets	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is an excellent Deputy Chief of Station. He is liked and respected by his co-workers in the Station and by superiors and colleagues in the cover establishment. His perseverance in developing and maintaining operational contacts in all fields has paid dividends. He has contributed sound advice and operational know-how to all Station officers' operations and has maintained our liaison on a productive basis. He is extremely thoughtful. He prefers (and excels at) operational work as contrasted to routine paper work.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILLIAMSON, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 March 1915	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Habana Station	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief of Station		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 30 September 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 30 September 1956 - 30 September 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 15 November 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William B. CALDWELL	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 29 Nov 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL JC King	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WHD

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
3		A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
2		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 3 4 02 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

41 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is qualified to have his own station

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Training upon re-assignment

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject is very adaptable - is single - and will accept assignment anywhere. His liaison duties, briefly suspended through no fault of his own, have been fully re-established.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS: HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	5	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
WILLIAMSON,	Earl	J.	13 March 1915	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/Havana

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: DCOS

7. GRADE: GS-13

8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 30 September 1956

9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 30 September 1955 - 30 September 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

in field

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
16 October 1956	CALDWELL, William	Chief of Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

Posted BY DATE 11/19/56

11/20

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
13 Nov 1956	J. C. KING	Chief, WHD

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 19 10 59 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS
- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same work at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of Station	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Handling agents and operations	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Liaison with Bureau of Investigations	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reporting	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Contact and development of operational assets	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is outstanding in the development and maintenance of high-level assets. He has a wide acquaintance among local people and Americans. He has demonstrated administrative and executive ability. He prevers outside contact work to routine desk work.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS. Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY. WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE - BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WILLIAMSON, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 March 1915	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Havana	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE DCOS		
7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 30 September 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 30 September 1955 - 30 September 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 16 October 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR CALDWELL, William	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 13 Nov 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL J. C. KING	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief/WHD

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		[illegible] the basic job (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) whose contact with immediate subordinates is frequent (First line supervisors)
3		[illegible] of supervisors who direct the basic job (Second line supervisors)
3		[illegible] (Executive level)
2		When contact with immediate subordinates is NOT frequent
2		When employee's subordinates' activities are [illegible]
3		[illegible]
		Other (Specify)

FORM 45 (Part II) [illegible] SECRET Potential

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
25

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is capable of having a station of his own.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 19 10 53 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None at present.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject is single and willing to go anywhere.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff, and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to effective utilization of personnel

1955 OCT 20 PM 2:34

CODED

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 90 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A [illegible] rept due 25 Mar 56

CES 10 Oct 55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

10/21/55

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY WILLIAMSON, EARL J	1. DATE OF BIRTH 15 March 1915	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION ~~[illegible]~~ D1
4. GRADE GS-13	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) Intelligence Officer - KUTUBE		
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 September 1955	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 30 September 1954 - 30 September 1955		

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Intelligence Officer - KUTUBE (Acting Deputy Chief of Station) 0136.51	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 10 August 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

a. Acting Deputy Chief of Station
b. Liaison with Bureau of Investigations
c. Contacts and development of operational assets
d. Handling agents
e. Reporting

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) CALDWELL, William B	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True)
3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☒ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED	
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS Oct 13, 1955	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES G. Cline

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 SEP 50

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. Note that each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you [illegible] at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
Oct 17 3 54 PM '59
MAIL ROOM

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.								X						
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.									X					
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.									X					
5. UNEMOTIONAL.									X					
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.							X							
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.								X						
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.											X			
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.									X					
11. CALM.									X					
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.								X						
14. GETS THINGS DONE.									X					
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.								X						
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.										X				
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.									X					
18. HAS STAMINA. CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME									X					
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION										X				
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X						
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.									X					
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS								X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION									X					
24. EVEN DISPOSITION												X		
25. ABLE TO [illegible] STRONG SUPPORT										X				

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.										X				
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.									X					
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".									X					
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
X 30. OBSERVANT.								X						
31. CAPABLE.										X				
32. CLEAR THINKING.									X					
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.									X					
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.											X			
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.									X					
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.												X		
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.									X					
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.									X					
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.									X					
45. VERSATILE.										X				
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.									X					
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.									X					
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.										X				
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.									X					
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.									X					

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject is an excellent liaison officer and outside contact man. He speaks fluent Spanish and has developed many valuable and productive contacts and assets among all classes of natives. He is enthusiastic, thoughtful, considerate, friendly, and gets along well with his co-workers. While acting as Deputy Chief of Station he has demonstrated administrative and supervisory ability.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Being particularly interested in operational matters, he perhaps is not as thorough in the paper work and reporting that goes with it; however, since acting as Deputy Chief of Station, as indicated above, he has demonstrated increased aptitude in this respect.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

No.
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 17 9 52 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF Y

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Additional experience in field and at Headquarters and refresher courses.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*).

I would be pleased to have Subject serve with me at any post.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☒ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS. Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☒ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE. WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☒ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

WH/6

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It serves to provide:
1. The organization selection Board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure [illegible] accurate and complete. Final [illegible] with the [illegible]. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by [illegible] of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

DATE
BY
Posted
Reviewed

F/
H

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY: WILLIAMSON, Earl J.
1. DATE OF BIRTH: 13 March 1915
2. SEX: M
3. SERVICE DESIGNATION: KUFIRE SD-F1
4. GRADE: GS-13
5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current): Intelligence Officer - KUFIRE
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT: 30 September 1954
7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 17 June - 30 September 1954

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Intelligence Officer - KUFIRE 60136 51-17
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 14 Feb 54 ~~19 January 1953~~ BAF-116
3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

A. Liaison with Servicio de Inteligencia Militar and Buro de Investigaciones
B. Contacts and development of operational assets
C. Handling agents
D. Reporting

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE · FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True): Robert E. WHEDBEE
2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True): William B. CALDWELL
3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☒ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.: 18 Jan 1955
5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES: J C King

DO NOT COMPLETE · FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO 45a
1 JUN 54

SECRET

(8)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.								X						
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.									X					
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.								X						
5. UNEMOTIONAL.									X					
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.						X								
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.								X						
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.											X			
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.									X					
11. CALM.							X							
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.								X						
14. GETS THINGS DONE.									X					
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.								X						
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.										X				
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.									X					
18. HAS STAMINA. CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.									X					
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.										X				
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X						
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.									X					
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.								X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.									X					
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT										X				

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.										X				
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.									X					
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".									X					
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.								X						
31. CAPABLE.									X					
32. CLEAR THINKING.								X						
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.									X					
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.											X			
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.									X					
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.										X				
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.									X					
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.									X					
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.									X					
45. VERSATILE.									X					
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.									X					
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.									X					
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.	X													
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.									X					
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.	X													

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

He is an excellent liaison and contact man. His unflagging good humor and friendly manner have made him very popular with all classes of Americans and natives. Even when carrying out disagreeable tasks, he manages to do it with the least possible offense to others.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

He is not a desk man. Although he writes well he would be bored with the routine involved in processing, collating and reporting.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 24 12 30 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

No. See above.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

But his gregarious nature makes him seek counsel and advice when he is quite capable of making the right decision himself.

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Additional experience in the field and at Headquarters, plus refresher courses.

F. OTHER COMMENTS *(Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):*

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☒ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☒ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT.. HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☒ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION; MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION; WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST [redacted] FIRST [redacted] M CODE | GS RATING 11 | SALARY $8360 | TO PRESENT GRADE 17 Jan 53

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY ALL DUTIES)

Case Officer for three [illegible] projects, including agent direction, preparation of agent requests and translation and preparation of reports. Developmental activity with new [illegible] sources. Liaison with two security agencies of [illegible] government. Deputy Chief of Mission and during absence of Chief responsible for over-all direction of [illegible] activities.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
Spanish		X			X			X	

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-50 STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Operations Officer	Mexico City
	Lima, Peru
	Santiago, Chile

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO   NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO   EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO   LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

9 June 1954
DATE

[redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM 1 June '53 DATE TO 1 June '54

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☒ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO   IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO   DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☒ NO   IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? because recently promoted

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						X	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						X	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						X	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION					X		
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT						X	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)					X		
O. LEADERSHIP					X		
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA					X		

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS)

9 June 1954
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT AGREE WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF.

J C King
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

1. NAME (SURNAME) (MR) FIRST MIDDLE | GS RATING 12 | SALARY 7,C[illegible] | DATE [illegible] 1 Jan 1953

2. [illegible] EFFICIENCY REPORT, [illegible] MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY

Operation's Officer, case officer for one agent, liaison duties with local security organizations. Developmental work on additional sources of intelligence information. Research work on leading Communist Party personalities to examine penetration potentialities.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.

	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
		X			X			X	

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Operation Officer	Chile
" "	Peru
" "	Mexico

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRAIGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

1 June 1953
DATE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

DATE FROM 20 April '53 DATE TO 1 June '53

OCCASION FOR REPORT

ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? Due to short time in field

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK 'NOT OBSERVED' ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						X	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						X	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						X	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE					X		
H. DISCRETION					X		
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT						X	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)					X		
O. LEADERSHIP					X		
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA					X		
Q. MENTAL STAMINA					X		

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -

DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

USE ADDITIONAL SPACE [illegible]

13 June 1953

Theodore G. [illegible]
[illegible] REPORTING OFFICER

[illegible]

[illegible]

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

[illegible]

12 | 7,040 | [illegible] January 1953

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Case officer for one a[illegible] . liaison duties with the local security organizations, developmental work on additional sources of intelligence information, research work on leading communist party personalities to examine penetration possibilities.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED. none

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
Spanish		x			x			x	

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-50 STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Case officer	Chile
" "	Peru
" "	Mexico

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO   NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO   EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO   LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRAIGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

14 May 1953
DATE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM: 19 Jan.
DATE TO: 20 April '53

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☒

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO   IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO   DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☒ NO   IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION?

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK "NOT OBSERVED" ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE							X
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS					X		
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY					X		
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE					X		
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE					X		
H. DISCRETION						X	
I. INITIATIVE					X		
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)					X		
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION					X		
M. TACT						X	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP					X		
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA					X		
Q. MENTAL STAMINA					X		

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU:
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS)

May 2[illegible], 1953

Thurston C. [illegible]
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT AGREE WITH THIS REPORT, DIFFERENCES WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF

J. C. King
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 9 July 1970, and the information brochure for PCS Returnees, dated May 1964.

Earl J. Williamson
Signature

19 April 1971
Date

Earl J. WILLIAMSON

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

SECRET

file under [illegible]

14 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THRU: Chief, WH Personnel

SUBJECT: Immediate Family of
Earl J. Williamson

It is hereby requested that Mrs. Estella Lobo, mother-in-law of the writer, be added to Agency personnel records as one of his dependents.

The writer is personally responsible for over 51% of Mrs. Lobo's support which is reflected in his federal income tax returns.

Earl J. Williamson
Earl J. Williamson
Deputy Chief, WH/COG

cc: C/WH Personnel

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Williamson	Earl	60389 J.	13 March 1915	069 03 9635

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

Earl J. Williamson

DATE

14 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
[illegible]
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

MANAGERIAL GRID SEMINAR (50 hours) DATES: 23-28 April 1967

Student : Earl J. Williamson
Office : WH
Year of Birth: 1915
Service Designation: D
Grade : 15
No. of Students : 46
EOD Date : June 1952

COURSE OBJECTIVES AND METHOD

Course objectives are to aid participants to: learn the managerial theories contained in the Grid; understand their personal managerial styles in Grid terms; evaluate convictions about managerial values; develop team action skills; increase candidness of communication; strengthen the use of critique for problem-solving and learning; and acquire an appreciation of Organization Culture and Development.

The method of learning offers a challenge to all participants regardless of level or experience. A Grid Seminar is not "taught" in the usual sense. In Grid teams, participants solve complex management problems. Objective solutions are made available. Individual and team performance is repeatedly assessed. Various measuring instruments are used to evaluate effectiveness.

Critique sessions assist each participant to understand how he might change his own behavior to increase his problem-solving effectiveness. Thus managers are not told the best way to manage, but they learn by convincing themselves.

About twenty to thirty hours of study are completed as prework. Insights gained are deepened and personalized during the intensive 50-hour Seminar.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor

17 MAY 1967
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Earl J. Williamson	DATE (from item 5-1) 29 Sep 64	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) James Noel	DATE (from item 5-2) 29 Sep 64
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 8 October 1964	DISPATCH NUMBER: OSMT-3880	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 13 March 1915	2. SERVICE DESIGN KUTUBE	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE D/Chief of Station GS-15 W.European Coordinator for Cuban Activities	4. STATION OR BASE Madrid, Spain	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER ODACID

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 3 October 1960	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 10 November 1964	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 30 November 1964	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 9 December 1964

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

None

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

None

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR *(see special note on transmittal form).*
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-4)

D/Chief of Station
Chief, Cuban Ops
Coordinator for Cuban operational activities throughout WE area.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Believe would profit from attending Senior seminars on CA and CP activities.

FORM 9-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

COS - WE or LA

Chief, Ops - At large station with diversified activities.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR. Present tour ends 3 Oct. 1964 and home leave has been approved.

☐/ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE).

3 BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE WE 2ND CHOICE LA 3RD CHOICE EE

2 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE WE 2ND CHOICE LA 3RD CHOICE EE

1 RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Subject has done an outstanding job at this Station during his four years in Madrid. I recommend that he be returned to this Station following home leave in view of the high priority given to his present duties and responsibilities and the obvious fact that the important program which he is now heading up would suffer greatly if he were to be rotated, at this time, to another assignment. When he is eventually transferred from Madrid I feel strongly that he should be given a chief of station assignment within the Division in view of his consistently fine record, his experience, maturity and devotion to duty.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Mr. Williamson's desire for home leave and return to Madrid for another tour has been discussed with the Secretary, CSPO/A, ~~and he~~ has been advised by WE Division that this has been approved.

DATE 9 Oct '64 TITLE C/WE/PT SIGNATURE

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY C/WE who obtained approval for ext. CSPO was by-passed on this. Nevertheless, Williamson has been notified. No action on this FRQ taken by CSPO. T.C. 10/12/64

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE DATE

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7 BELOW

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(true)* Earl J. Williamson	DATE *(from item 5.1)* 6 April 1962	NAME OF SUPERVISOR *(true)* James Noel	DATE *(from item 5.2)* 5 April 1962
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW			DATE

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 13 March 1915	2. GRADE GS-14	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE Deputy Chief of Station	7a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR 3 October 1960
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION *(if known)*		5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Madrid	7b. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD March 19[illegible]
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7c. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

Deputy Chief of Station, Chief, Liaison and Operations.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

See item 8 above.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*:

None at this time.

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE WE 2ND. CHOICE WH 3RD. CHOICE CI

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:

1ST. CHOICE Rome 2ND. CHOICE Mexico City 3RD. CHOICE Lima, Peru

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 30

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

None

11a. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

None

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

I strongly recommend that Subject return to this post for a second tour of duty. Additional training while on home leave in the United States is not deemed necessary.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

202 forwarded for record purposes. Extension already approved by Chairman, Personnel Management Committee.

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER
THOMAS M. FISHER
DATE 5 October 1962

SIGNATURE Thomas M. Fisher

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT

18. REFERENCE
DISPATCH NO. ______ CABLE NO. ______

19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME

20. SIGNATURE

21. TITLE

22. DATE

23. COMMENTS

Second tour appr 10 Oct 62

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle)
WILLIAMSON Earl J.

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: 41 First Ave, Auburn, N.Y.

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 3208 Herschel St. Jacksonville, Fla (Legal residence)
Home Leave Address: 337 Marital Road
Pleasant Hill, Calif

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE: | DATE OF MARRIAGE:

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE: | DATE OF DECREE:

IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED: | DATE SPOUSE DIED:

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S):

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NA			
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**AGE**
NA			
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
Deceased			
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
Deceased			

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES? None

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Mr. Edwin J. Williamson | RELATIONSHIP: Brother

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 4227 E. 50th Street, Kansas City 19, Mo. | HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER:

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: | BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☐ YES ☒ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☐ YES ☒ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☐ YES ☒ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 8 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS: National Bank of Washington

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JAN 61

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

My name only

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

With me in my personal papers

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

14 December 1959

TO: Chief, CI/Support

VIA: Deputy Chief, CI Staff

FROM: Chief, CI/ICD

SUBJECT: Earl J. Williamson

1. Subject is mentioned in a book by Jules Dubois, entitled Fidel Castro. Page 379 of this book is attached.

2. It is suggested that this be included in subject's personnel folder.

Attachment: (1)

Fidel Castro - published in 1959 by The New Bobbs-Merrill
Company, an Associate of Howard W. Sams
& Co., Inc. Indianapolis and New York

[illegible] Williamson

mistaken policy that was ultimately rectified when the Platt Amendment, which had allowed our government to intervene in Cuba, was abolished in 1934.

There are diplomatic and military lessons to learn from the recent civil war in Cuba. A policy of winning governments and losing people must definitely be discarded if we are going to win and maintain the sincere friendship of the people of Latin America. We are looked upon as the champions of freedom, freedom of the people, by the people and for the people, and our message in that regard should be transmitted to the peoples of the Americas.

The retention of the Military Missions in Cuba was a serious mistake, compounded by the fact that there was a proviso in the agreement that permitted their immediate withdrawal in the event of a civil war. Yet it was stated that their continued presence was necessary for hemisphere defense. In February 1959 the Missions were withdrawn at the request of the Cuban government because Castro felt that officers who trained an army he had defeated could not teach him anything about warfare in his country.

The Central Intelligence Agency, I understand, reported the steady and inevitable collapse of the Batista regime and the indignation over the retention of the Military Missions. Did the other government agencies who were responsible for co-ordinating policy regarding Cuba make adequate and sensible use of this evaluated intelligence? If not, why not?

And there were other members of the embassy staff in Havana who did not spend all their after-office time at useless cooky-pushing cocktail parties but had their ears to the ground and developed friendships with the man in the street, the student and the rebel. Earl Williamson was one and he is now in Washington, and so was Ignacio Carranza, now on duty in Guatemala. The Cuban people are grateful for their understanding and objective approach to their problems, and their discreet inquiries which helped save the lives of political prisoners.

No ambassador should be sent to any post unless he can speak the language of the country. A new look in relations with Cuba began with the arrival of Ambassador Philip W. Bonsal in

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(true)* WILLIAMSON, Earl J.	DATE *(from item 8-1)* 5 Dec 57	NAME OF SUPERVISOR *(true)* CALDWELL, William B.	DATE *(from item 8-2)* 5 Dec 57
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:		H.C. Montague	DATE 17 Dec 57

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 13 March 1915	2. GRADE GS-14	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief of Station
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION *(if known)* DI	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Habana, Cuba	
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None		7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE July 1958

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

Deputy Chief of Station - supervise 12 employees

External liaison with Cuban Department of Investigation

KUTUBE Operations Officer

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

1st Choice: See Item 8

2nd Choice: Office of the Inspector General

8. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*:

Refresher Operations Course

FORM NO. 202
1 SEP 56

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[1] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

JAN 23 3 01 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION:

1ST CHOICE: San Jose, Costa Rica
2ND CHOICE: Santiago, Chile
3RD CHOICE: Madrid, Spain

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 30

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

None

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Subject is qualified to be Chief of Station. Recommend assignment as requested.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Recommend assignment Headquarters.

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Robert N. Dahlgren	SIGNATURE: Robert N. Dahlgren
TITLE: C/WH/III	DATE: 19 December 1957

17. REMARKS (additional comment)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

C.I.A.
(Department or agency) (Bureau or Division) (Place of employment)

I, EARL J. WILLIAMSON, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

... PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

NAME OF EMPLOYEE

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO

COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE: YES ☑ NO ☐

TELEPHONE EXT

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE, SPINDLE, OR MUTILATE

INSTRUCTIONS

THIS FORM MUST BE RETURNED WHETHER YOU HAVE HAD OVERSEAS SERVICE OR NOT.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCOMPANYING CARD, THEN FILL OUT THIS FORM AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE

DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN	WHERE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED	TYPE ENTRY	DATES FROM MO. YR.	DATES TO MO. YR.	SERVICE (CIVILIAN, MILITARY)	RESPONSIBLE U.S. GOVT UNIT OR AGENCY	DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN
125	Panama C. Zone	1	07 46	06 49	2	Army	070
125	Panama Canal Zone	1	06 49	12 52	1	Canal Zone Govt	670
170	Cuba	1	01 53	08 58	1	Organization	100 52

[SEAL]

SECRET

(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)
Carillon House, 2500 Wisconsin Ave. N.W. Wash. D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: MAR 13, 1915
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*): AUBURN, NEW YORK

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: EARL WILLIAMSON
(B) RELATIONSHIP: Father
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 41 First Ave, Auburn N.Y.
(D) TELEPHONE NO.: —

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		✓
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		✓
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case*		✓
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		✓

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that the appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose application was examined. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with his application and/or other personal papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such a determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE: WH

DIVISION:

NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE): Williamson Earl James

BRANCH:

SECTION:

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
		DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
CIA	Wash, DC	28	6	1952						
Canal Zone Gov	Pan. Canal	2	2	1949	6	6	1952	5	4	3
Total Civilian Service								5	4	3

SCD - 11/25/42
verified 9/19/[illegible]
J Gibbons

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
U.S. Army	8	9	1942	6	2	1946	29	4	3
US Army	4	4	1946	1	2	1949	28	9	2
Total Military Service							57	13	5

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

June 27, 1952
(DATE)

Earl J. Williamson
(SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE)

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

R J Hayes
5 USC 16 [illegible]

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
2	7	9

as of 27 June 52

14-00000

FORM DSP-34
1-20-52

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPLICATION FOR FOREIGN SERVICE AND DEPARTMENTAL EMPLOYMENT

(Use with Standard Form 57)

If more space is required, use additional sheets of paper. Write on each sheet your name, address and date of birth. Identify each item, and attach to this application.

BUDG BUREAU NO. 47-R071.3
APPROVAL EXPIRES August 31, 1954

1. a. NAME *(Print)*
Earl J. Williamson

b. ADDRESS
2500 Wisconsin Ave. N.W.
Washington D.C.

2. USE OF APPLICATION - Check one box below to indicate whether you wish this application to be considered for Foreign Service employment only, or for both Foreign Service and Departmental employment. Completion of this form is not required for Department employment only. Standard Form 57 must be filled out in any case.

☒ FOREIGN SERVICE ONLY ☐ FOREIGN SERVICE AND DEPARTMENTAL

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(Place from which you will expect transportation of self and household effects, if any, if appointed to the Foreign Service)*
Balboa, Canal Zone

4. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED? IF A NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE. *(Section 11 on Form 57)*.
NA

5. a. ARE YOU NOW INVOLVED IN ANY LITIGATION OR SEPARATION AGREEMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO
b. DO YOU KNOW OF ANY PROSPECTIVE LITIGATION IN WHICH YOU MAY BE INVOLVED? ☐ YES ☒ NO
(Give details, if answer is yes to a. or b.)

6. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT? *(Exclusive of allowances)* $ PER YEAR

7. WHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE, IF ANY, ON YOUR IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY FOR DUTY IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD?
None

8. a. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE *(If wife, give maiden name)*
None
b. DATE OF BIRTH
c. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State or Province, and Country)*
d. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED?
e. IF NATURALIZED, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NO. OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE.

9.

NAMES OF DEPENDENTS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH	WILL RESIDE WITH YOU OVERSEAS	
			YES	NO
None				

10. a. FATHER'S NAME
Earl Williamson
b. PRESENT ADDRESS
41 First Ave., Auburn, N.Y.
c. PLACE OF BIRTH
Auburn, N.Y.

11. a. MOTHER'S NAME *(Maiden)*
Margaret Lawler
b. PRESENT ADDRESS
Deceased
c. PLACE OF BIRTH
Auburn, N.Y.

12. IF PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, DID THEY EVER OBTAIN UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP? *(Check below)*
FATHER ☐ YES ☐ NO
MOTHER ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR A POSITION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR TAKEN AN EXAMINATION FOR A POSITION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If "Yes" give date, nature of position applied for, and kind of examination taken, if any.

FORM [illegible] PAGE [illegible]

14. RELATIVES NOW RESIDING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS
None		

15. FOREIGN LANGUAGES *(Replaces Item 10 on Form 57)*

Name and indicate the extent of your competence, i.e. Excellent, Good, Fair

A. LANGUAGE	B. READ	C. WRITE	D. SPEAK	E. UNDERSTAND
Spanish	Good	Good	Good	Good

16. LIST PRESENT OR FORMER FOREIGN CONNECTIONS:

A. BUSINESS
B. EMPLOYMENT
C. MILITARY

17. DATES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE FOR LAST 15 YEARS

DATES	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE OR COUNTRY
1948-52	0824 Arcacia Pl.	Balboa, Canal Zone	Panama
1941-48	U.S. Army	U.S.	U.S.

18. DOES YOUR FINANCIAL POSITION PERMIT DISCHARGE OF ALL DEBTS INCURRED? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF "NO," STATE INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW:

NAMES OF CREDITORS	AMOUNTS DUE	DATES ON WHICH OBLIGATIONS WERE CONTRACTED

19. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN MEDICALLY DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS IN ITEM 39 OF FORM 57.

20. PRESENT MILITARY STATUS

A. ARE YOU REGISTERED WITH A SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," STATE BELOW THE NUMBER AND ADDRESS OF THE BOARD, AND YOUR CLASSIFICATION:

B. DO YOU HAVE A MILITARY RESERVE STATUS? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF "YES," STATE BELOW, THE BRANCH OF SERVICE; YOUR SERIAL NUMBER; YOUR ORGANIZATION UNIT AND HEADQUARTERS.

MI Reserve -0-944652 - No organization

21. LIST OTHER NAMES, IF ANY, BY WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN KNOWN INCLUDING MARRIED NAMES, IF MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, GIVING DATE DURING WHICH NAMES WERE USED. DO NOT DUPLICATE INFORMATION SUPPLIED IN ITEM 16 ON FORM 57.

None

22. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM?
Subject to Civil Service Retirement Act

23. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, IF ANY.

24. If you believe the information you have supplied on this application does not fully show your qualifications for Foreign Service Employment, state in Item 55 of Form 57 or on a separate sheet, any additional appropriate data that you wish to have considered.

DATE September 19, 1952

SIGNATURE Earl J. W. Lawson

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Williamson, Earl J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH March 1918	3. GRADE GS-15
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/WH/COG	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Officer	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 7461
7. PROPOSED STATION San Jose, Costa Rica	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Chief of Station, 0198	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE June 1968	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 2

12. COMMENTS

13. DATE OF REQUEST 19 February 1968	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL John F. Conroy	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3 D 5309 Hqs	16. EXTENSION 4516

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

MEDICALLY QUALIFIED FOR
PROPOSED OS PCS
REX HART

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

4 12 69

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
060389	Williamson, Earl J.	Mar 13, 1915

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - TO			
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1 PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3 DATE OF BIRTH

4 PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6 PRESENT EMPLOYER

7 CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1	☒ ADD ☐ DELETE Mrs.Estella Lobo	Mother-in-law	20 Apr 1904 Matanzas, Cuba	Cuban	Resides with me.
2	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 8-68 444n

SECRET

510

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

	NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
					RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1								
2								

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED (CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY):

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

	NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
			FROM	TO
1				
2				
3				

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE
1 May 1967

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Earl J Williamson

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT ... USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP
060389	WILLIAMSON EARL J		03/13/15	GS-15-04
6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. [illegible]	
D	OPS OFFICER D CH	WH	WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	[illegible]	FROM	TO
CUBA	PCS CC	53/01/17	58/11/10
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY CC	59/06/18	59/06/27
SPAIN	PCS RR	60/11/03	65/11/~~10~~ 29
PUERTO RICO	TDY 45	66/02/14	66/02/19
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY RR	66/05/20	66/05/30
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY RR	66/08/01	66/08/13
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY RR	66/10/12	66/10/15
" "	"	66/12/8	66/12/14

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: INITIALS:
2 Jun 67

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		

SECRET

07 JUN [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV	GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL						
NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY:			CHECK IF
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
France	political topographic,cultural	1960- 1965			X		X
England	"	"			X		X
Belgium	"	"			X		X
Netherlands	"	"			X		X
Austria	"	"			X		X
Copenhagen	"	"			X		X
Norway	"	"			X		X
Sweden	"	"			X		X

SECTION V — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED (Check (X) appropriate item) ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.
2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS PERTAINING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES, SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES
3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC. ☐ YES ☐ NO
4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. [illegible]
5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)
6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)
7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR. [illegible] INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING [illegible]
8. [illegible]
9. [illegible] SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) WILLIAMSON	(First) Virginia	(Middle) Josephine	(Maiden) Lobo
3. DATE OF BIRTH 12 July 1938	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Habana, Cuba		
5. OCCUPATION Housewife	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER		
7. CITIZENSHIP Cuban	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRIES None	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED	

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Aurelio Jose	step-son	28 July 1960	Cuban	Washington, D.C. 2813 N. Glade St., N.W.

Certificate [illegible] 12 [illegible] 13 [illegible]

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO

DATE 19 April 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Earl J. Williamson

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 15 September 1958

PROT: 8-321

TO : Chief, WH

Director of Security

Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Division

SUBJECT : Notification of Cryptographic Clearance - Earl J. Williamson

1. Subject employee has been granted a cryptographic clearance under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Clearance is effective 18 August 1958.

2. Subject has been informed of the granting of clearances, has been briefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Briefing Statement acknowledging responsibility for the protection of cryptographic information.

3. When Subject employee no longer requires the clearance in order to perform his assigned duties, it is requested that the Communications Security Division (2411 I Bldg., Ext. 3021) be notified by WH, that the clearance may be revoked.

FOR CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
1 - WH
1 - Security Office (Briefing Statement attached)
1 - Personnel (Wing 1-H Curie Hall)
1 - CC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 57-NOV. 1947
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

LICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYM

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type, write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

1 NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR

2 OPTION(S) *(if mentioned in examination announcement)*

3 PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR *(City and State)* Foreign Service

4 DATE OF THIS APPLICATION Sept. 19, 1952

5 MR. MRS. MISS *(First name)* Earl *(Middle)* James *(Maiden, if any)* *(Last)* Williamson

6 (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER 2500 Wisconsin Ave. N.W.

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE *(including postal zone)* AND STATE Washington, D.C.

ANNOUNCEMENT

7 LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State) New York

8 (A) OFFICE PHONE

(B) HOME PHONE Woodley 3467

9 DATE OF BIRTH *(month, day, year)* March 13, 1915

10 ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11 PLACE OF BIRTH *(city and State, if born outside U.S., name city and country)* Auburn, N.Y.

12 ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13 (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES 6 FEET .... INCHES

(B) WEIGHT 272 POUNDS

14 (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE GS-12 Feb. 1952

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

APPTD. NON-APPTD.	MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED	ENTERED REGISTER
NOTATIONS:	APP. REVIEW APPROVED:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.) ☐ 10 POINTS ☐ WIFE OR WIDOW ☐ DISAL. ☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $............ PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY
☒ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED.
☐ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal duties which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① **PRESENT POSITION**

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)* FROM July 1948 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION Governor's Staff

CLASSIFICATION GRADE *(if in Federal Service)* GS 12

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $5900 PER yr. PRESENT $8800 PER yr.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(city and State)* Balboa Hgts., Canal Zone

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Governor Francis Newcomber

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)* Canal Zone Government
Balboa Hgts. Canal Zone

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of brick, etc.)* Agency of Federal Government operating Panama Canal.

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU 10

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT Career in Foreign Service

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
As representative on Governor's Staff handled liaison activities between Governor's office and other Government Agencies in Panama area, including U.S. Embassy. Other special duties as assigned by Governor. Reviewed applicant files for Pan Canal organizations.

On [illegible] Service

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM 9/8/1941 TO 6/30/48

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: 1st Lt.

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 320 PER MO. FINAL $ 480 PER MO.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): U.S. and Panama

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Various

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): U.S. Army

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Military

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 0 to 50

REASON FOR LEAVING: Sep. (Honorable)

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

Enlisted man and later officer in G-2 Section. U.S. Army

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM 10/34 TO 6/41

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Ass't Mgr.

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 120 PER MO. FINAL $ 180 PER MO.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Auburn, N.Y.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: E. Williamson - Owner, Mgr.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): E. Williamson

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Elec. Cont. and Supply Co.

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 3 - 10

REASON FOR LEAVING: Military Service

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

Buyer and merchandise man for electrical appliances and contracting supplies.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR LEAVING:

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM TO

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

CLASSIFIED GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 38) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES		LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
FROM	TO		
ep. '42	Nov. '42	Camp Pickett, Va.	Basic training
ov. '42	Jan. '43	Baltimore, Md.	Hq. det. tr.
ep. '43	Oct. '43	Chicago, Ill.	Adv. tr.
ay '44	Jan. '44	Ogden, Utah	Spec. AAF training

18. EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF
☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED
Auburn Senior High School, Auburn, N.Y.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED		DEGREES CONFERRED		SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
		FROM	TO	DAY	NIGHT	TITLE	DATE	
Loyola College, Baltimor	Geo- politic	9/47	6/48		1			

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS

(E) OTHER TRAINING SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED	
		FROM	TO	DAY	NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR
See HS									

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?
☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:
FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)
LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES, (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

See Item 16 (2)

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

None

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING SHORTHAND

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

None

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

	FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.	Mr. Z. J. Henry	100 S. 47th St., Harrisburg, Pa.	Personnel Mgr.
2.	Daniel E. McGrath	Crocker Bldg., San Francisco, Calif.	Attorney
3.	Abner Riddle	Box 2014, Balboa, Canal Zone	Businessman

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D)

DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
9/8/41	6/30/48
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	**SERIAL NO** (*if none, give grade or rating at time of separation*)
Army	0944652

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?	X	
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19.....

Agency: .... Title. ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO		ITEM NO	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80)

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Earl J. Williamson

(Sign your name in INK, giving one given name, initial or initials, and surname.) If female, give Miss or Mrs. and, if married, your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe.")

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-48664-1

STANDARD FORM 57 NOV 1947
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

·ICAT· N FOR FEDERAL EMPLOY·

INSTRUCTIONS: In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type, write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions in the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR
Intelligence Officer

2. OPTIONS (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State)

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION
14 July 1950

5. Mr. ☒ Mrs. Miss (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
Carl James Williamson

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER
0839-L Arcadia Place

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE
Balboa, Canal Zone

ANNOUNCEMENT

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State)
New York

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE
Balboa 3100

(B) HOME PHONE
Balboa 3223

9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)
March 15, 1915

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State, if born outside U S, name city and country)
Auburn, New York

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES 6 FEET 0 INCHES
(B) WEIGHT 174 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE
GS-9, July 1950

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPROV. ☐ INELIGIBLE
MATERIAL: ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED
ENTERED REGISTER

NOTATIONS:
ACTION
APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 6,000 PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR:
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY.
☒ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☒ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

16. EXPERIENCE: It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM February 1949 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION
Ass't Chief, Civ. Int. Br.

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service)
GS-9a

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING, $ 5,000 PER Annum
PRESENT, $ 5,250 PER "

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)
Balboa Hgts., Canal Zone

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Stanton Brown, Chief, Civil Int. Branch

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
Civil Intelligence Branch, Executive Dept., The Panama Canal

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)
U.S. Government

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
In absence of chief—11 clerks, stenos & investigators.

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT
Personal betterment

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Intelligence investigations of employees of the Panama Canal-Railroad and of incidents within the Canal Zone of a suspected sabotage or espionage nature.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM: Apr. 42(App) TO: Sept 42
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Electrician
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ FINAL $ 58 PER HR

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Baltimore, Maryland.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Can not recall

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): M.Enterprise Elec. Co.
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Electrical Contracting

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 2-4, helpers and clerks.
REASON FOR LEAVING: Enlisted in AUS

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:
Employed in the capacity of a mechanic. Actual duties consisted mostly of final checkout and inspection of electrical installations on defense housing projects in Balto. area.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM: May 41(App) TO: Apr 42
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Electrician
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 60 - PER WK FINAL $ 110 PER WK

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Baltimore, Maryland
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Robert Miller, Supt.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): H.E. Crook Co., Balto., Md.
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Construction corporation

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 1-3 assistants
REASON FOR LEAVING: Termination of defense contract

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:
Employed as an electrician on defence contracts. Handled material and supplies.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM: July 1933 TO: Apr. 1942
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Ass't Mgr.
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 20 PER wk FINAL $ 50 PER "

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Auburn, New York
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Earl Williamson, owner (father)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Williamson Elec. Co.
31 East Genesee St., Auburn, N.Y.
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Electrical Contracting & Supplies.

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 2-8, salesman and mechanics
REASON FOR LEAVING: self betterment

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:
Entered business as stock and supply clerk, later became salesman and in charge of a group of outdoor salesman. Advanced to Ass't manager where I was responsible for wholesale buying of contracting supplies and appliances.

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM TO

TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 57) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
Oct. 42	Dec. 42	Balto., Md.	Basic CIC Agt's training Sch.-Inv. techniques.
Sept43	Nov. 43	Chicago, Ill	Advanced CIC Agt's trn. Sch. " "
April44	June 44	Ogden, Utah	CIC AAF Trn. Sch. Trn in sabotage detection on aircraft and aircraft installations.

18. EDUCATION. (Circle highest grade completed):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF:
☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED
Auburn Senior High, Auburn, N.Y.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED
none

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Loyola, Balto., Md.	-	1947	1948		-			4

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
Political science	4		

(E) OTHER TRAINING SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR IN-SERVICE TRAINING IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT
Berlitz School of Foreign Language, Balto., Md.	Spanish (350 hrs. private instruction)	1948	1948	-	-

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
Spanish	X	X	X

20. ☐ YES ☒ NO

Panama & Canal Zone, July 1949 to present, Military service

None

None

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. John C. Power	2055 Belvedere Ave., Balto., Md.	Attorney
2. Francis J. Holtzner	4220 W. 2nd St., Los Angeles, Calif.	Salesman
3. Edward J. Henry	3 Farm Bureau Ins. Co. Harrisburg, Pa.	Personnel Mgr.

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO A JOB? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE LAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
Sept 42 Apr 46	Feb 46 Present
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO. (*if none, give grade or rating at time of separation*)
Army	0-914652

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		X
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		X
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		X

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19.....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

☞ SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Earl J. Williamson

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initials, and surname). If female, print Miss or Mrs. and (your) ... name as Mrs. Mary L. Doe.)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS COMPLETELY. IF QUESTION DOES NOT APPLY WRITE "NOT APPLICABLE". WRITE "UNKNOWN" ONLY IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER AND CANNOT OBTAIN THE ANSWER FROM PERSONAL RECORDS. USE A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER FOR EXTRA DETAILS ON ANY QUESTION OR QUESTIONS FOR WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ROOM. ATTACH TWO RECENT PASSPORT SIZE PICTURES TO THIS FORM, DATE TAKEN WRITTEN ON THE BACK OF EACH. TYPE, PRINT OR WRITE CAREFULLY; ILLEGIBLE OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL NOT RECEIVE CONSIDERATION.

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS? YES ☒ NO ☐

SECTION 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

NAME MR. ☒ MISS ☐ MRS. ☐	FIRST Earl	James	MIDDLE Williamson	LAST	TELEPHONE Balboa 3223

PRESENT ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: Arcacia Place 0839-L
CITY: Balboa,
STATE:
COUNTRY: Canal Zone

LEGAL RESIDENCE STREET AND NUMBER: 41 First Avenue
CITY: Auburn,
STATE: New York
COUNTRY: U.S.A.

NICKNAMES: None
OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED: Not applicable

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? Not applicable
HOW LONG? Not applicable

IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (WHERE, WHEN AND BY WHAT AUTHORITY): Not applicable

DATE OF BIRTH: 15 March 1915
PLACE OF BIRTH CITY: Auburn,
STATE: New York
COUNTRY: U.S.A.

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.
ACQUIRED BY: BIRTH ☒ MARRIAGE ☐ NATURALIZATION ☐

NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NUMBER: Not applicable
DATE ISSUED: Not applicable
NAME OF COURT: Not applicable

LOCATION OF COURT CITY STATE COUNTRY: Not applicable

PREVIOUS CITIZENSHIP: Not applicable
DATE HELD FROM: TO:

OTHER CITIZENSHIPS (GIVE PARTICULARS): Not applicable

STEPS TAKEN TO CHANGE PRESENT NATIONALITY (GIVE PARTICULARS): Not applicable

LAST U.S. PASSPORT NUMBER: 58
DATE: 10 Sept. 1948
PLACE OF ISSUE: Colon, Republic of Panama

ALL OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS YOU HAVE HAD (GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES): None.

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: None

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN THIS COUNTRY: Not applicable
PORT OF ENTRY:
PASSPORT OF COUNTRY:

LAST U.S. VISA NUMBER: Not applicable
TYPE:
DATE:
PLACE OF ISSUE:

SECTION 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR
35	Male	6'	174 lbs.	grey	grey

COMPLEXION	SCARS	BUILD
Ruddy	None	Medium

OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: None

SECTION 3. MARITAL STATUS

MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DATE OF SEPARATION OR DIVORCE [illegible] PLACE [illegible]
SINGLE ☐ DIVORCED ☐

REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE [illegible]

NOTE: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

NAME OF WIFE OR HUSBAND	FIRST Shirley	MIDDLE (FOR WIFE, MAIDEN) [illegible]	LAST [illegible]	DATE OF MARRIAGE [illegible]

PLACE OF MARRIAGE [illegible]	(HIS OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE	STREET AND NUMBER [illegible]	CITY [illegible]	STATE [illegible]	COUNTRY U.S.A.

LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐ DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER [illegible]	CITY [illegible]	STATE [illegible]	COUNTRY U.S.A.
DATE OF BIRTH 15 May 19[illegible]	PLACE OF BIRTH Unknown	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY U.S.A.
CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.	DATE ACQUIRED Not applicable	WHERE ACQUIRED	CITY Not applicable	STATE	COUNTRY

OCCUPATION Unknown

LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER Unknown CITY STATE COUNTRY

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE FROM: Not applicable TO: BRANCH OF SERVICE COUNTRY

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS) Not applicable

SECTION 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (INCLUDE PARTIAL DEPENDENTS)

NAME NONE	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY STATE COUNTRY
NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY STATE COUNTRY
NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY STATE COUNTRY

SECTION 5. PARENTS

NOTE: FOR STEPFATHER, STEPMOTHER AND/OR GUARDIAN, GIVE THE SAME INFORMATION AS REQUIRED BELOW ON SEPARATE SHEET

NAME OF FATHER FIRST Earl MIDDLE None LAST Williamson LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE Not applicable CAUSE

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER [illegible]	CITY [illegible]	STATE [illegible]	COUNTRY [illegible]
DATE OF BIRTH 15 Sept. 19[illegible]	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITY [illegible]	STATE [illegible]	COUNTRY [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.	DATE ACQUIRED Not applicable	WHERE ACQUIRED	CITY Not applicable	STATE COUNTRY

OCCUPATION Electrical Contractor

LAST EMPLOYER Self

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER [illegible] CITY [illegible] STATE [illegible] COUNTRY [illegible]

SECTION 5. PARENTS [illegible]

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTIN[illegible] PAGE 2)

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE FROM: | TO: | BRANCH OR SERVICE | COUNTRY

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS)
NONE

NAME OF MOTHER FIRST: [illegible] MAIDEN: Lawler LAST: [illegible]
LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☒

DATE OF DECEASE: [illegible] Feb. [illegible]
CAUSE: Heart failure

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: [illegible] First Avenue CITY: Auburn, STATE: New York COUNTRY: U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]
PLACE OF BIRTH CITY: Auburn, STATE: New York COUNTRY: U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.
DATE ACQUIRED: Not Applicable
WHERE ACQUIRED CITY: Not Applicable STATE: COUNTRY:

OCCUPATION: Housewife
LAST EMPLOYER: Self

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: [illegible] First Avenue CITY: Auburn, STATE: New York COUNTRY: U.S.A.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS)
NONE

SECTION 6. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (INCLUDING HALF-, STEP-, AND ADOPTED BROTHERS AND SISTERS)

NAME FIRST: [illegible] MIDDLE: [illegible] LAST: [illegible]
PRESENT ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: [illegible] Avenue
[illegible] First Avenue CITY: Auburn,
Auburn, STATE: New York
New York COUNTRY: U.S.A.
U.S.A.

NAME FIRST: Jane MIDDLE: Elizabeth LAST: Carr
PRESENT ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: [illegible] Elizabeth St. CITY: Auburn, STATE: New York COUNTRY: U.S.A.

NAME FIRST: Joan MIDDLE: Marie LAST: Doyle
PRESENT ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: [illegible] Holly St. CITY: Auburn, STATE: New York COUNTRY: U.S.A.

SECTION 7. PARENTS-IN-LAW

NAME OF FATHER-IN-LAW FIRST: MIDDLE: LAST:
LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: CAUSE:

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

DATE OF BIRTH: PLACE OF BIRTH CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

CITIZENSHIP: DATE ACQUIRED: WHERE ACQUIRED CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

OCCUPATION: LAST EMPLOYER:

NAME OF MOTHER-IN-LAW FIRST: MAIDEN: LAST:
LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: CAUSE:

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

DATE OF BIRTH: PLACE OF BIRTH CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

CITIZENSHIP: DATE ACQUIRED: WHERE ACQUIRED CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

OCCUPATION: LAST EMPLOYER:

14-00000

SECTION 8. RELATIVES

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO LIVE ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A FOREIGN POWER, ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS.

NAME: Not applicable
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP: Not applicable
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION: Not applicable

NAME: Not applicable
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP: Not applicable
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION: Not applicable

NAME: Not applicable
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP: Not applicable
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION: Not applicable

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE (UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN)

NAME: Not applicable
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP: Not applicable
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN): Not applicable

NAME: Not applicable
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP: Not applicable
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN): Not applicable

NAME: Not applicable
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP: Not applicable
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE / COUNTRY:
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN): Not applicable

SECTION 9. EDUCATION

SCHOOL	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
Holy Family	Auburn,		New York	U.S.A.
DATES ATTENDED	FROM [illegible]	TO [illegible]	DEGREE Grade school diploma	
SCHOOL	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
Auburn Senior High	Auburn,		New York	U.S.A.
DATES ATTENDED	FROM [illegible]	TO [illegible]	DEGREE High school diploma	
COLLEGE	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
DATES ATTENDED	FROM [illegible]	TO [illegible]	DEGREE [illegible]	
COLLEGE	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
[illegible]				
DATES ATTENDED	FROM	TO	DEGREE	

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERV[illegible] TUS (CONTINUED TO PAGE [illegible])

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS

CLASSIFICATION [illegible]	GROUP NUMBER	APPROXIMATE INDUCTION DATE	BOARD NUMBER

ADDRESS OF BOARD [illegible]	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE

IF DEFERRED, STATE REASON
[illegible]

SECTION 11. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE - UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN

COUNTRY [illegible]	SERVICE	SERVICE DATES	FROM: [illegible]	TO: [illegible]

GRADE 1st. Lt.	SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	TYPE OF DISCHARGE [illegible]

LAST STATION Governor's Office, The Panama Canal	COMMANDING OFFICER Governor Newcomer

REMARKS:
My entire military career has been spent with the Counter Intelligence
Corps. At the present time I am assigned to the Gov's Office of the
Panama Canal and employed as an investigator with the Civil Intelligence
Branch, The Panama Canal.

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT(USE ADDITIONAL SHEET IF NECESSARY)

NOTE: INCLUDE BELOW PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 15 YEARS.

EMPLOYER Williamson Elec. Co.			JOB TITLE Sales, asst. Manager	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE 31 West Genesee St Auburn, New York			KIND OF BUSINESS Electrical Contracting	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY Employed as a Clerk, later as salesman/ then became ass't mgr.			NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible] (father)	
DATES COVERED	FROM: 1932	TO: 1941	SALARY [illegible]	PER [illegible]
REASONS FOR LEAVING Left for personal reasons and self betterment				
EMPLOYER F.D. Crowe Co.			JOB TITLE [illegible]	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Baltimore, Md.			KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible]	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY Employed as electrician [illegible] defense contract			NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]	
DATES COVERED	FROM: 1941	TO: 1942	SALARY [illegible]	PER [illegible]
REASONS FOR LEAVING Termination of temporary defense contract				
EMPLOYER Enterprise Elec. Co.			JOB TITLE Electrician	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Baltimore, Md.			KIND OF BUSINESS Contracting	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY Worked mostly on final check of electrical installations			NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]	
DATES COVERED	FROM: [illegible]	TO: [illegible]	SALARY	PER
REASONS FOR LEAVING [illegible]				
EMPLOYER United States Army			JOB TITLE	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Various [illegible] - PANAMA [illegible]			KIND OF BUSINESS	

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 4)

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY: Intelligence Specialist - Investigator
NAME OF SUPERVISOR: [illegible]
DATES COVERED FROM: [illegible] TO: Present
SALARY: [illegible] PER: [illegible]
REASONS FOR LEAVING: Not applicable

EMPLOYER: Not applicable
JOB TITLE:
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE: Not applicable
KIND OF BUSINESS:
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY: Not applicable
NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
DATES COVERED FROM: Not applicable TO:
SALARY: PER:
REASONS FOR LEAVING: Not applicable

EMPLOYER: Not applicable
JOB TITLE:
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE: Not applicable
KIND OF BUSINESS:
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY: Not applicable
NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
DATES COVERED FROM: Not applicable TO:
SALARY: PER:
REASONS FOR LEAVING: Not applicable

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW GIVE DETAILS CONCERNING ANY POSITION FROM WHICH YOU MAY HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED OR WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE.

DETAILS: Not applicable

SECTION 13. CHARACTER REFERENCES—FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
John C. Power	[illegible] Belvedere Ave.	[illegible]	[illegible]
John Herold	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Kenneth G. Bennett	[illegible] Ins. Co. Building, [illegible] St.	[illegible]	[illegible]
Robert G. Clark	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

SECTION 14. SOCIAL ACQUAINTENCES—FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] Clark	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS—THREE IN THE UNITED STATES [illegible]

[illegible]

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN [illegible] STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

NAME [illegible]	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER [illegible]	CITY	STATE
NAME Miss Elizabeth Cornell[illegible]	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER [illegible]	CITY	STATE
NAME [illegible]	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER [illegible]	CITY	STATE

SECTION 16. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? YES ☐ NO ☐
IF ANSWER IS "YES" EXPLAIN BELOW.

DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS?
[illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENCE, AND DISPOSITION OF CASE.
No

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? YES ☐ NO ☒
IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

SECTION 17. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES ☒ NO ☐ IF ANSWER IS "NO", STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME.

NAMES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
National City Bank of N. Y., [illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? YES ☐ NO ☐ IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE PARTICULARS:

SECTION 18. CREDIT REFERENCES-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME [illegible]	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER [illegible]	CITY	STATE
NAME Calvert Bar[illegible] ~~[illegible]~~	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER [illegible]	CITY	STATE
NAME [illegible]	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS

FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 8)

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7)

FROM: [illegible]	TO: [illegible]	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER [illegible]	CITY [illegible]	STATE	COUNTRY [illegible]
FROM: [illegible]	TO: [illegible]	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER [illegible]	CITY [illegible]	STATE [illegible]	COUNTRY [illegible]
FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

SECTION 20. RESIDENCES OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

FROM: (MO. AND YR.) [illegible]	TO: (MO. AND YR.) [illegible]	CITY OR SECTION [illegible]	COUNTRY [illegible]	PURPOSE [illegible]
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE

SECTION 21. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ALL KINDS TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS. INCLUDE ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR A BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OR TO WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT.

NAME [illegible] of England [illegible]	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY [illegible]	STATE [illegible]	COUNTRY [illegible]
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

SECTION 22. LANGUAGES-FOREIGN (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT", "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE [illegible]	SPEAK [illegible]	READ [illegible]	WRITE [illegible]
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE

SECTION 23. GENERAL QUALIFI[illegible]

INDICATE ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE [illegible] TRAINING YOU HAVE, ALSO, SET FORTH ANY [illegible]CATIONS AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION.

I received [illegible] training [illegible] Service Command, [illegible], in 19[illegible], attended the advanced [illegible] at Chicago, Ill. in 19[illegible] and received [illegible] weeks training at the CIC [illegible] school in Ogden, Utah in 19[illegible]. Have worked as an agent for CIC since 19[illegible] in [illegible], Ind. Dayton, Ohio, and Baltimore and as resident agent in Columbus, Ohio and Phila., Pa.

SECTION 24. SPORTS AND HOBBIES

[illegible]

SECTION 25. EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE

NAME [illegible] Williamson			RELATIONSHIP [illegible]	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER [illegible] First Avenue	CITY [illegible]	STATE New York	COUNTRY U.S.A.	TELEPHONE Unknown

SECTION 26. INFORMATION AND FINAL COMMENTS

NOTE: YOU ARE INFORMED THAT CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION, IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO".

NO

SECTION 27. CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR MY IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT Baltimore, Maryland DATE 17 July 195[illegible]
City & State

Witness

Signature of Applicant

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TO : Chief, Communications
Acting

DATE: 8 August 1952

FROM : Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: WILLIAMSON, Earl James
#43726

In reply to your memorandum this is to advise that subject meets the current requirements for cryptographic clearance and is approved for such duties as of this date.

E. P. Geiss
E. P. Geiss

SECRET

5/16 [illegible] U

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 9 May 1952

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division

Your Reference: L-9389

FROM: Chief, Security Division

Case Number: 43726

SUBJECT: WILLIAMSON, Earl James

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the EOD procedures.

Flore Byrd n.t. 15 May

C. V. Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY

EOD: 25 June 1952 per Miss Lynch
B Brown 6/13/52

To EOD: about 25 June 1952 in Washington per Virginia Lynch. 6/20/52 B. Brown.

K

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. [illegible]-101
JUL 1951

14-00000

050 VV
40

SECRET
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY APPROVAL

To : Chief, Employees Division, Special Support Staff ~~Personnel Officer~~
Date: NOV 20 1950

From : Chief of Inspection and Security
Number: 43726

Subject: WILLIAMSON, Earl James
#43726

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

☒ Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Your memorandum dated 14 August 1950 stated Subject is an applicant for EOD.

George Blake Jr
George [illegible], Jr.
~~Chief, Personnel Security Division~~
Chief, Special Security Branch

Ann Kingsbury notified 22 Nov. CN.

SECRET
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM NO. 38-101
MAY 1949

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE 7/13/73

SECRET

7 March 1975

MEMO FOR THE FILE

Meeting with PACHANKIS 3 March 1975, 1345-1500, Restaurant at the Marrior Motel near National Airport

PACHANKIS stated that our old agent Miguel DIAZ Isalgue was having trouble getting his U.S. citizenship approved. DIAZ had sent in all the papers and I&NS told him the only thing left was the swearing in. So DIAZ waited a year and a half and I&NS never called him in. He called them in November 1974 and was told that there were no problems; that he would be called.

The DIAZ file shows that I&NS requested our traces in December 1974. IP/EIB sent them; there may be something in them that is causing a problem now though that doesn't explain the 1½ year delay before.

On 6 March, I told PACHANKIS to have DIAZ call I&NS one more time and if there is a real problem, we'd see what we could do.

Mary D. Felton

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

VMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP 271830Z

CITE CIA/DDO

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER ~~638431~~

CONF: IP/EIB INFO: FILE C/OPS, CI/OP, LSN/10, LA8, OSG/IC

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 27
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SOP 104
0 201-307337

TO: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

FOR: COMMISSIONER

CIR-316/02811-74

REF: YOUR REQUEST FORM G-325A DATED 3 DECEMBER 1974 FROM MIAMI, FLORIDA.

CSR

1. SUBJECT: DIAZ-ISALGUE, MIGUEL ANGEL

DOB: 14 FEBRUARY 1937

POB: MANTANZAS, CUBA

2. REASON FOR REQUEST: INVESTIGATIONS

3. THE FILES OF THIS OFFICE CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON SUBJECT FROM REPORTS DATING FROM APRIL 1967 TO SEPTEMBER 1972 FROM SOURCES OF VARYING RELIABILITY.

4. IN 1956 SUBJECT HELPED FOUND THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL, WHICH HELPED CASTRO COME TO POWER IN CUBA. SUBJECT HELD NUMEROUS EXECUTIVE POSITIONS IN THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IN COMMUNIST CUBA. HE WAS THE INTERIOR MINISTER'S PERSONAL DELEGATE IN PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE AND LATER IN HAVANA PROVINCE. AT ONE TIME HE WAS HEAD OF THE CUBAN ~~DRIVER'S~~ DRIVERS' LICENSE BUREAU. ABOUT

gk

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

27 DEC 74
201-307337

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 017706

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE CIA/DDO

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

63813/

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 -201-307337

1960 HE LEFT CUBA TO OPPOSE THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT OF FIDEL CASTRO. FROM ABOUT 1961 TO 1972 SUBJECT WAS IN CONTACT WITH THIS AGENCY.

5. SUBJECT HAS NUMEROUS RELATIVES WHO ARE OR HAVE BEEN IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. AMONG THEM ARE:

COUSIN: ANTONIO MASSIP ISALGUE, WHO DEFECTED IN 1967 TO WEST GERMANY, WAS DETAINED IN THE USSR FOR APPROXIMATELY 12 YEARS DUE TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET ATOMIC SCIENCE.

COUSIN: JOSE MASSIP ISALGUE IS ONE OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE CUBAN MOTION PICTURE INSTITUTE.

AUNT: SARA ISALGUE Y ISALGUE IS MARRIED TO SALVADOR MASSIP WHO HAS HELD THE POST OF AMBASSADOR IN CUBAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS.

RELATIONSHIP TO SUBJECT UNKNOWN: ALBERTO SEMIDEY WAS A CUBANA AIRLINES PILOT WHO SERVED AT ONE TIME AS CHE GUEVARA'S PILOT.

6. ACCORDING TO A REPORT DATED 3 MAY 1967, MARTA (ISALGUE) RODRIGUEZ, SUBJECT'S COUSIN, WAS ALLOWED TO LEAVE CUBA AS A RESULT OF THE DIRECT INTERVENTION OF MANUEL PINIERO, DIRECTOR OF CUBAN DGI, WHO WAS A CHILDHOOD FRIEND OF HERS.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ABS CON ACP TOO TYPE MPO DCI
OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA/DDO

CONF: INFO: FILE

63813/

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 201-307337

7. ANOTHER REPORT DATED 27 APRIL 1967 INDICATED THAT FERNANDO DE ROJAS, HUSBAND OF MARTA RODRIGUEZ AND A FANATICAL CATHOLIC, WAS SERVING A 30 YEAR PRISON TERM IN HAVANA, CUBA. OTHER RELATIVES WHO WERE AT THAT TIME IN CUBAN PRISONS WERE CARLOS PEDRAZA A■ND SPOUSE GINA ISALGUE, AND R~~O~~AMON GUIN.

gK

8. NO FOR~~IE~~EIGN DISSEMINATION.

9. CLASSIFIED BY 019706. EXEMPT FROM ■■■GENERAL DECLASSIFI■CATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATE~~■~~GORY PARA 5B(2). ■■■■■■■■■■AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE.

BASED ON: 201-307337

FILE IN: 201-307337

DATE: 23 DEC 1974
ORIG: M EAKER
UNIT: IP/EIB: ACR/DC
EXT: 9245

COPSLSN
RELEASING OFFICER

COORD IN DRAFT:
LA/COG: SANCHEZ
COORDINATING OFFICERS

FOR C/IP/EIB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

019706

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

FORM G-325A (REV. 8-27-72)N

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

(Family name) (First name) (Middle name) DIAZ-Isaigue, Miguel Angel	☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (Mo-Day-Yr) 02-14-37	NATIONALITY CUBAN	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO (if any) A11 264 049
ALL OTHER NAMES USED (Including names by previous marriages)		CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH Matanzas, Cuba		SOCIAL SECURITY NO (if any) 265-72-0741

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (If known)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	DIAZ	Miguel	1889 Matanzas, Cuba	
MOTHER (Maiden name)	ISALCUE	Blores	1895 Santo Domingo Province del Cibao,	Havana, Cuba

HUSBAND (If none, so state) OR WIFE — FAMILY NAME (For wife, give maiden name)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
PORTILLA	Fabiola	8-29-38	Matanzas, Cuba	4-24-59	Matanzas

FORMER HUSBANDS OR WIVES (if none, so state) FAMILY NAME (For wife, give maiden name)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
1519 S. W. 19th Street	Miami	Florida	USA	Dec.	66	PRESENT TIME	
2328 N. E. 6th Avenue	Miami	Florida	USA	Nov.	63	Dec.	66
1343 N. E. Miami Court	Miami	Florida	USA	Nov.	61	Nov.	63

APPLICANT'S LAST ADDRESS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES OF MORE THAN ONE

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE		FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS. (IF NONE, SO STATE.) LIST PRESENT

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
Cuba Electric and Furn., Corp. 1795 SW 8 Street	Chief Clerk	Feb.	65	PRESENT TIME	
Byron Construction Co., 3925 E. 10 Ct., Miami, FL	Purchaser	Jan.	62	Feb.	65
Gulf Air Incorporated, 408 Olympia Bldg. Miami, FL					

Show below last occupation abroad if not shown above. (Include all information requested above.)

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT-OF-STATUS
☒ OTHER (SPECIFY): INVESTIGATIONS

Are all copies legible? ☐ Yes

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER

DATE 12-03-74

IF YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IS IN OTHER THAN ROMAN LETTERS, WRITE YOUR NAME IN YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IN THIS SPACE:

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

E SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

(6)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR, IP/AN, EUR6, C/OPS

ACTION NO. 726

S E C R E T 191932Z JUL 72 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 15252

663820

DIRECTOR, MADRID.

AKULE TYPIC AMWOLF

REF: A. DIRECTOR 289389

B. WH/MIAMI 15173 (IN658155)

1. PACHANKIS RECONTACTED AMCHALK-5 17 JULY. NO PROBLEMS AROSE AS AMCHALK-5 RECALLED PANCHANKIS FROM PREVIOUS OPS CONTACTS.

2. AMCHALK-5 KNOWS VERY LITTLE OF AMWOLF-1'S PRESENT PROFESSIONAL OR PERSONAL BACKGROUND. HOWEVER, FROM THE TWO CONTACTS HE HAD WITH AMWOLF-1 HE DESCRIBED LATTER AS INTELLIGENT, CAPABLE, AFFABLE AND SOMEONE WHO COULD LISTEN TO REASON. AMCHALK-5 STATED HE STILL BELIEVES AMWOLF-1 RECRUITABLE ALTHOUGH HE ADMITS THIS BASED ON PREVIOUS ASSESSMENT AND THIS COULD NOT BE CHANGED.

3. AMCHALK-5 WILLING ASSIST US IN ANY WAY. HE FEELS HE IN GOOD POSITION MAKE PITCH (IF WE SO DESIRE) BECAUSE AMWOLF-1 KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS AND WHO HE IS AND, MOST IMPORTANT AMWOLF-1 WILL KNOW THIS NOT ANOTHER TEST BY HIS OWN SECURITY PEOPLE. THIS LATTER POINT, ACCORDING TO AMCHALK-5 TERRIFIIES MOST PERUVIAN OFFICIALS.

CS COPY FILED IN 201-840126

~~ADVANCE COPY~~ [illegible]

RECORD COPY

30?337

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 1525 SECRET

4. MEETING TERMINATED AMENABLY WITH PACHANKIS MAKING NO COMMITMENTS EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THEY WOULD MEET AGAIN. WILL POUCH FULL CONTACT REPORT VIA UFAA-4237.

5. RE AMWOLF-1 INLAWS, PACHANKIS REPORTS THEY NOT WILLING MAKE PHONE CALL AS THEY FEEL PHONE CALL WILL ONLY INCREASE PROBLEMS FOR AMWOLF-1.

6. FILE: 201-840126 AND 201-307337. EX-2, APDIR, WN-SISM.

SECRET

SECRET

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____

S E C R E T 291535Z APR 66 CITE BUENOS AIRES [illegible]

29 APR 66 IN 00245

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY PANAMA CITY

RYBAT KEDJOP AERCRAFT AETARGET TECHS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 99872

B. BUENOS AIRES 2480 (IN 99[illegible])

1. BELIEVE WE MAY BE ABLE ALLOW HQS 35 DAY PERIOD IN ORDER PRE-FAM SUITABLE COMPONENT PART OR ACCESSORY. WE HAVE BRIEFED AMSTALK-1 TO SCRUTINIZE THOROUGHLY THE UNIT PRESENTLY IN CASTAGNA SHOP AND TO DETERMINE IF OTHER EMBASSY UNITS OF SAME MAKE. ALSO TO CONCENTRATE ON PLUG/OUTLET SINCE THIS MAY HAVE CONCEALMENT POSSIBILITIES.

2. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

BT.

201

AMSTALK-1

ORIG: ...ENN HUNT/rbo
UNIT: SB/O/PT
EXT: 6587
DATE: 29 APR 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 21 PER SB, 1 (E.O.)
CONF: C/SB-5 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR DDP, H/F C/WH 2

EYES ONLY C/TSD

SECRET

(date and time filed) 29 19 [illegible] Z

CITE DIRECTOR 95272

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO: PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0485 (IN 99229)

CONCUR.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH [illegible]

TSD/AOB [illegible] BRENNAN, [illegible]

WH/ [illegible] C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

WH/1/A

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 15 PER ______

ACTION
WH/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-307337

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☒ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO
FILE, VR, CI/OPS/ICG 5, CI/CI

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

WAVE

S E C R E T 301725Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2211

BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR

30 APR 68 IN 01194

RYBAT AMSTALK

REF DIRECTOR 94087

AMSTALK-1 ALIAS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FORM FORWARDED HQS, FOR RELAY TO BUENOS AIRES, AS ATTACHMENT TO UFGT-21785 DATED 30 APRIL 1968.

S E C R E T

BT

SC

RF

SECRET

201-307337

C/SB (50)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐

5 1700

PRECEDENCE

C/SB 5 ☐ DDP, ADDP

Classified EYES ONLY

S E C R E T 291535Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0496 29 Apr 68 IN 00245

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY PANAMA CITY BA 496 (IN 00245) 29 Apr 68

RYBAT REDTOP AEROCRAT AETARGET TOURS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 95?78

B. BUENOS AIRES BASE [illegible]

1. BELIEVE WE MAY BE ABLE ALLOW ONE 30 DAY PERIOD IN ORDER PRE-PAR SUITABLE COMPONENT PART OR ACCESSORY. WE HAVE BRIEFED AMSTALK-1 TO SCRUTINIZE THOROUGHLY THE UNIT PRESENTLY IN CASTAGNA SHOP AND TO DETERMINE IF OTHER EMBASSY UNITS OF SAME MAKE. ALSO TO [illegible] TABLE OR PLUG/OUTLET SINCE THIS MAY HAVE CONCEALMENT POSSIBILITIES.

2. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

201

(AmsYalk-1

Sov/ops

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief, JMWAVE

INFO.
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET
Letter for AMSTALK-1's Wife

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded under cover, please find a letter written by AMSTALK-1 for delivery to his wife. AMSTALK-1 tells us (we certainly agree) that he would prefer for JMWAVE to mail the letter rather than trusting the international mail from here.

2. Incidentally, to date we are highly pleased with AMSTALK-1. We greatly appreciate JMWAVE's assistance in the AERONAUT operation.

Edwin W. SHROYER

USC Attachment

Distribution:
2 - C, JMWAVE w/usc att.
1 - C, SBD wo/a
1 - C, WHD wo/a

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-19,386	DATE 26 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 74-120-221 (c)

30 [illegible] 1968

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, JMWAVE

INFO.: Chief, Soviet Bloc Division
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT: RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET
Letter for AMSTALK-1's Wife

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded under cover, please find a letter written by AMSTALK-1 for delivery to his wife. AMSTALK-1 tells us (we certainly agree) that he would prefer for JMWAVE to mail the letter rather than trusting the international mail from here.

2. Incidentally, to date we are highly pleased with AMSTALK-1. We greatly appreciate JMWAVE's assistance in the AERONAUT operation.

Edwin W. Shr
Edwin W. SHROYER

USC Attachment

Distribution:
- 2 - C, JMWAVE w/usc att.
- 1 - C, SBD wo/a
- 1 - C, WHD wo/a

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABA-19,386	26 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 74-120-221 (6)

ORIG: GLENN HUNT
UNIT: SB/O/PT
EXT: 6587
DATE: 26 April 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	4	6	C
2		7	
3		8	
4	Avg	9	L
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER SB 1 EO

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/SB5 ☐ RID COPY
C/TSD

INFO: FILE , VR DDP ADDP C/WH 2

"EYES ONLY"

SECRET
(classification)

26 23 58 Z
(date and time filed)

(elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 95072

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REF BUENOS AIRES 0480 (IN 99086)

1. REF TIMETABLE ~~[illegible]~~ DOES NOT/ OFFER~~S~~ SUFFICIENT TIME TO PRE-FAB SUITABLE COMPONENT PART OR ACCESSORY WHICH MUST BE DONE AT HQS. AS MENTIONED DIRECTOR 86830 NEED AT LEAST 30 DAYS FOR PRE-FABBING AFTER RECEIPT PART AT HQS.

2. SUGGEST CONTINUE EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES VIA AMSTALK/1 CASING.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH MESTRES
TSD/AOB E. Brennan (in draft)
WH/4 W Warren \sc

file
Amstalk-1

~~[illegible]~~ /ops

William V Broe
C/WH

DC/SB/AO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 26 April 1968 dt

TO: WH/4/A - J. Keirle

C NO. 201-307337

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: AMSTALK/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☒	FIELD TRACES JMWAVE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☒	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☒	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Plus FBI thru JMWAVE.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

ALE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED C/SB (E.O.)

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: C AT: 2055 Z

DISSEM BY 2 PER SB/(E.O.)

ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

ILED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE. VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2, C/TSD "EYES ONLY"

AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	C
2		7	
3		8	
4	CWY	9	
5		10	

26 APR 68 IN 99229

S E C R E T 262005Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0485

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET AERONAUT TECHS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 94456

B. BUENOS AIRES 0480 (IN 99086)

1. VIEW REF B IT NOW APPARENT AMSTALK-1 WILL HAVE FREQUENT ACCESS TARGET SITES OVER NEXT MONTH PERIOD. WE ALSO ENVISION ADDITIONAL ACCESS AT LATER DATE.

2. IN ORDER FULLY PREPARE AMSTALK-1 FOR COMING MISSION, WE INTRODUCED STATION TECH HENRY C. GAUDET TO HIM ON 23 APRIL. SINCE THIS DATE GAUDET HAS BRIEFED AMSTALK-1 DAILY IN STATION UNILATERAL SAFEHOUSE ALLOWING HIM STUDY AETARGET BUILDING BLUEPRINTS, INTERNAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND STATION REDTOP MUGBOOK (OUR HOPE BEING AMSTALK-1 CAN CONCENTRATE ON OFFICES OF SENIOR REDTOP OFFICERS OR INTEL OFFICERS). IN THESE BRIEFINGS AMSTALK-1 HAS BEEN TOLD CONCENTRATE OBSERVATION ON FURNISHINGS, ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES, OUTLETS, TELEPHONES, FLOOR MOLDING, ETC.

3. RATHER THAN CALL PANAMA TECH TO BUENOS AIRES AT THIS TIME, BELIEVE IT ADVISABLE ALLOW GAUDET HANDLE

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
[illegible]

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR,

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 0485 SECRET

PRELIMINARY BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS. WE WILL OF COURSE KEEP PANAMA ADVISED AND ONCE AMSTALK-1 REPORTS CONCRETE FINDINGS WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED AS CONCEALMENT SITES, WE WILL CALL IN PANAMA OR HQS TECHS TO WORK ON CONSTRUCTION OF DEVICE TO BE INSTALLED.

4. REQUEST COMMENTS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES
SECRET
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO C/SB
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: C AT: 1515

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

aug

DISSEM BY 4 PER SB # 1

ACTION C/SB 5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE. DDP. ADDP. C/WH 2, C/TSD

"EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 261710Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0480

26 APR 68 IN 04068

C

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REF BUENOS AIRES 9611 (IN 08283)

1. AMSTALK-1 COVER LEGEND NOW WORKED OUT WITH BIOGENESIS WHICH HAS FURNISHED FALSE ARGENTINE CEDULA FOR A-1. CEDULA BEING PROCESSED AT MOMENT AND WILL BE READY FOR TURNOVER TO A-1 LATER 29 APRIL WHEN WE WILL INTRODUCE A-1 TO CASTAGNA. IN MEANTIME OVER WEEKDEND WE SENDING A-1 TO MENDOZA (HIS ALLEGED POB) IN ORDER GIVE GUTS TO COVER LEGEND.

2. ON 26 APRIL, BIOGENESIS HANDED US ROUTINE REPORT RESULTING FROM 24 APRIL INTERVIEW WITH CASTAGNA. HIGHLIGHTS REPORT AS FOLLOWS:

A. CASTAGNA CALLED TO SOV EMBASSY 23 APRIL IN ORDER PICK-UP AND TAKE TO HIS WORKSHOP ONE AIR-CONDITIONER (MAKE FRIGIDAIRE). THIS UNIT STILL IN HIS WORKSHOP AND HE PLANS RETURN IT 30 APRIL.

SECRET

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 0469 S E C R E T

B. CASTAGNA ALSO CALLED TO SOV COMMERCIAL MISSION WHERE HE PICKED UP THREE AIR CONDITIONER UNITS WHICH PRESENTLY IN HIS SHOP AND WHICH HE SCHEDULED RETURN ON 6 MAY.

C. HE ALSO SCHEDULED FETCH REFRIGERATOR FROM SOV COMMERCIAL MISSION ON 26 APRIL.

D. CASTAGNA SAID THAT BY AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET EMBASSY, OVER NEXT 10 TO 15 DAYS HE TO PICK UP TWO OR THREE AIR CONDITIONERS AT A TIME FOR REPAIR AND OVERHAUL UNTIL ALL 11 UNITS REPAIRED.

3. WHIE WE DO NOT ENVISION AMSTALK-1 ROLE OR OUR AUDI/O INSTALLATION ATTEMPT AS LIMITED TO OUTSIE (I.E., IN CASTAGNA WORKSHOP) INSTALLATION IN AIR CONDITIONER, DO BELIEVE HOWEVER WE HAVE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY AT THIS TIME TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF INSTALLING DEVICE IN AIR CONDITIONER OR PERHAPS IN POWER PLUG. AS WE SEE IT WE (VIA AMSTALK-1) WILL HAVE ACCESS TO EACH UNIT FOR A PERIOD OF 7 DAYS OR MORE. ALSO WE HAVE ALREADY UNDERTAKEN OPERATION IN ORDER DETERMINE IF EITHER OF OUR TWO LPS (ONE 35 FEET AND OTHER 70 FEET FROM TARGET) ARE ON COMMON

14-00000

PAGE 3 BUENOS AIRES 0492 S E C R E T

ELECTRICAL GRID WITH TARGET SO THAT CARRIER CURRENT INSTALLATION FEASIBLE. HOPE HAVE ANSWER WITHIN FEW DAYS.

4. IN LIGHT ABOVE, WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND TECHNICAL THOUGHTS AS TO WHAT OUR PRESENT CAPABILITY IS IN ORDER INSTALL DEVICE IN AIR CONDITIONER UNITS. WE PREPARED FURNISH EXEMPLARS OR COMPONENTS NEEDED BY HQS OR PANAMA.

5. FINALLY, WE REALIZE TWO SOVIET TECHNICIANS (ANDREY NIKOLAYEVICH KOSHKIN AND YURIY BORISOVICH KABATOV) IN OUR AREA. HOWEVER THEY SCHEDULED DEPART SHORTLY AND WE WILL ATTEMPT DELAY RETURNED OF DOCTORED UNIT UNTIL THEY HAVE DEPARTED.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO.
Chief, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational
AMSTALK-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: See Below

REF : DIRECTOR- 94087

Forwarded as an attachment is one Form No. SD 56490, Parts A and B, for AMSTALK-1's signatures requested in Reference.

Leland H. COBFIELD

Attachment: Herewith
Stated Form

Distribution:
3-COS, BA w/att 1 cy
2-C/WHD w/o att
2-WH/COG w/o att

APR 29 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT- 21785

DATE
25 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201- 307337

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: GLENN HUNT/jd
UNIT: SB/C/FF
EXT: 6587
DATE: 24 APRIL 68

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 41 PER SB, 1 (E.O.)

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/SB 5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2, C/TSD

"Eyes Only"

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 25 21 49 Z CITE DIRECTOR 04406

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO: PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET AERONAUT TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0456 (IN 95885)

1. BASED ON TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, WE PREFER HAVE AGENT DO THOROUGH CASING OF EVERY ROOM HE HAS ACCESS TO DURING AT LEAST FIRST TRIP TO EMBASSY. AMSTALK/1 SHOULD THEN BE DEBRIEFED BY PACY TECH SOON AFTER THIS FIRST CASING. ON BASIS THIS INFO PACY TECH THEN CAN BETTER GUIDE AMSTALK/1 TO POTENTIAL CONCEALMENT SITES FOR ADDITIONAL CASING DURING SUBSEQUENT VISITS TO EMBASSY. AT THIS POINT GUIDANCE ON SIZES CAN ALSO BE INJECTED, IF NECESSARY. REQUEST THEREFORE THAT AMSTALK/1 BE INSTRUCTED OBSERVE AND NOTE FURNISHINGS, ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES, OUTLETS, ETC., IN DETAIL OF EVERY ROOM HE VISITS AND BE PREPARED SUPPLY PACY TECH WITH SKETCHES, DESCRIPTION, ETC.

2. PANAMA CITY: PLS PROVIDE TECH FOR DEBRIEFING/BRIEFING AMSTALK/1 UPON REQUEST FROM BUENOS AIRES.

END OF MESSAGE

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201 AMSTALK-1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 11 TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 — Arg

6, 7, 8, 9, 10

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY X PER ______

ACTION C/SB5 ☒ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR, C/L-16, C/WH/COG5, C/CI,

S E C R E T 232006Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2133 (STEADMAN ACTING)

DIRECTOR

RYBAT REDTOP BIOGENESIS

audio op involving one time use of amstalk-1 against Sov Bloc

23 Apr 68 IN 96829

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 92789

NO DEROGATORY STATION TRACES. LOCAL LNERGO CHECK NEGATIVE.

S E C R E T

BT

file cc amstalk-1-201
& soft op file

Said "updated POA being processed for amstalk-1 use as stated DIR-86830, and please forward any derogatory station traces and local LNERGO check results"

J-K

JK passing results [illegible] to C1/OA. 24/IV 0730 hrs

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 97466

TO

AC/SB/O/WH MESTERS (phone)

TSD/AOB E. BRENNAN (phone)

WH/4

C/WHD

HEStone
DC/SB/AO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRO N BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OF PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

Fambrini:mr

DATE: 23 April 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

Arg

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____ PER ____ #

CONF: C/WH-6 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-307337

INFO: FILE , VR . C/WH/COG-5, C/CI

C/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

SECRET 24 21 47 Z CITE DIRECTOR 94007

TO JMWAVE INFO BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT AMSTALK

REF: JMWAVE 2093 (IN 93904)

1. PLEASE POUCH ALIAS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FORM TO BUENOS AIRES.

2. FOR BUENOS AIRES: UPON RECEIPT FORM HAVE AMSTALK-1 SIGN PART A IN TRUE NAME AND PART B IN ALIAS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref attached.

201

Thomas Polgar
William V. Broe
C/WHD

C/WH/4

Paul E Oberst
for David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

DATE 24 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Jack Lally

SUBJECT : Trace Results -
AMSTALK/1 (201-307337)

REFERENCE : POA Request dated 18 April 1968

Field X RID X Division X traces have been completed on Subject with the results indicated below:

REFERENCE(S)	COMMENTS
RID and DIVISION	Negative
FIELD - JMWAVE 2133(IN 96629) 23 April 1968	No derogatory station traces. Local FBI check negative.

RAYMOND A. WARREN

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 20 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3	Arg	8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION C/SB5 ☒ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR, C/SB6, C/WH/COG5, C/CI,

S E C R E T 232006Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2133 (STEADMAN ACTING)

DIRECTOR

RYBAT REDTOP BIOGENESIS

audio op involving one time use of AMSTALK-1 against Sov Bloc

23 APR 68 IN 90829

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 92789

NO DEROGATORY STATION TRACES. LOCAL LNERGO CHECK NEGATIVE.

S E C R E T

BT

file cc AMSTALK-1-201 & soft of file

Said "updated POA being processed for AMSTALK-1 use as stated DIR-86830, and please forward any derogatory station traces and local LNERGO check results" J-K

JK passing results traces to C1/OA. 24/IV 0900 hrs.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 30 PER SB .1(E)

ACTION c/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. DDP ADDP C/WH 7 "EYES ONLY"

c/TSD

S E C R E T 222215Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0456

22 APR 68 IN 95885

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET AERONAUT TECHS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 92787

B. BUENOS AIRES 0418 (IN 93025)

INTENT OF REF B WAS AS FOLLOWS: IN ORDER THOROUGHLY BRIEF AMSTALK-1 AS TO WHICH AREAS AND OBJECTS WE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY DIVULGE TO HIM BEFORE HIS ENTRY INTO TARGET AREA (AT LEAST IN GENERAL TERMS) SIZES OF TRANSMITTERS AND HOW A TRANSMITTER COULD BE CONCEALRED. WOULD ALSO PINPOINT TO AMSTALK-1 OUR INTEREST IN WALL OUTLETS, PLUGS, ETC. IN SO DOING BELIEVE WE WOULD IN FACT BE INDICATING OUR CAPABILITIES AND FOR THIS REASON, WE REQUEST HQS APPROVAL.

S E C R E T

BT

John Allan/SB
calling 24/IX
1115 hrs

SG says this was approved [illegible] SG [illegible] 24/IX

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY Y PER SB

ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-307337

X-REF TO FILE NO.

(ES) FILE RID ☐ RET. TO

BRANCH ☒ WH/4/AR DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2, C/WH/COG 2, C/TSD BUCN EYES ONLY

SB/OPT

1	SB/OPT	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 221610Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0452 22 APR 68 95643

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REF DIRECTOR 92997

1. AMSTALK-1 ARRIVED AS SCHEDULED. CONTACT MADE. WE PRESENTLY WORKING OUT COVER DOCUMENTATION AND LEGEND WITH BIOGENESIS.

2. APPRECIATE HQS AND JMWAVE ASSISTANCE TO DATE.

SECRET

BT

WH/4/AR

Fambrini

SECRET 201-307337

14-00000

ORIG: Robert Fambrini:mr
UNIT: WH 4/Ar
EXT: 6609
DATE: 19 April 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	4	6	
2		7	
3	Ang	8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER SB 1(E.O.)

CONF: C/WH/2 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☑ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. [illegible]

INFO: FILE, VR, C/SBS DDP ADDP "EYES ONLY"
C/WHCOG2 C/TSD

(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) ~~NO NIGHT ACTION~~ 19 22 17 Z
(reference number) 9209
CITE DIRECTOR

TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO ROUTINE JMWAVE PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REFS: A. BUENOS AIRES 0401 (IN 91374)
B. JMWAVE 2044 (IN 91440)

1. AMSTALK-1 SECURED THREE MONTH TOURIST VISA FROM ARGENTINE CONSULATE, BALTIMORE ON 19 APRIL. WILL ARRIVE BUENOS AIRES 21 APRIL VIA PANAM FLIGHT 203. PLEASE MEET PER REF A.

2. ADVISE AMSTALK-1 ARRIVAL AND CONTACT BUENOS AIRES.

END OF MESSAGE

Cables attached.

[illegible]

SB/O/WH L. Mestres (phone)
TSD/AOB F. Foley (phone)
TSD/AB T. Japicks (phone)
CI/R&A/TC J. Burke (phone)
WH/2 T. Desmond (phone)
WH/COG J. McTighe (phone)
SB/O/PT G. Hunt (phone)

Calvin H. Baughn
William V. Broe
C/WHD

Raymond A. Warren
C/WH/4

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
COPY NO.

Subj: Meeting with AMTALK-1

1. Subject was met in Room 602, Roger Smith Hotel, Washington at 1900 hxxx hours, 18xxxxxxxx19x 19 April 1968. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the problems Subject ran into at the Argentine Consulate in New York. He said that one of the rqmts. of the New York office was that he present a letter of introduction from the Nicaraguan Consulate in New York. This latter was relayed by phone on 17 April, and resulted in Subject's return to Washington. During the interim between the 17 April phone call and the 18x 19 April meeting it was decided to have Subject make an effort to secure the visa from the Argentine Embassy in Washington. Accordingly Subject called the Embassy on 19 April and was informed that no visasxx were granted xxx by the Embassy, but that he could get one from the Consulate in Baltimore. Subject called the Baltimore office and was informed that if he showed up prior to 1500 hours a visa could be issued without waiting. Subject asked about requirements such as a letter of introduction from the a Nicaraguan diplomatic installation, and was told that there was no such requirement. Following the call Subject was told to take a bus to Baltimore and make application for the visa. Upon receipt of the visa he will return to Washington, and will be contacted at his hotel room between 1500 and 1600 hours.

While in New York Subject purchased his flight tickets to Buenos Aires as follows: Panam Flight 203, departing from Kennedy Airport at 2100 hours, 2x 20 April 1968. This information has already been passed to Mr. Louis Weinchowski, Alien Affairs Staffx for coordination with I&NS.

Subject reported his expenses to date and noted that he only had $150.00 left of the $1,000.00 advance made by JMWAVE. He pointed out that at the present rate he would arrive in B.A. with little cash, and might draw the attention of customs because of this. Accordingly, a $200.00 advance will be drawn for Subject and turned over to him on the morning of 20 April 1968.

Subject turned over receipts as follows:

a.	National Airlines Flight No. 108, Miami to Washington, 16 April 1968	$64.05
b.	Eastern Air Shuttle - Travel from Washington to New York, 16 April 1968	18.00
c.	Eastern Air Shuttle - Travel from New York to Washington, 18 April 1968	18.00
d.	Airwayte Hotel, Washington, D.C. This room was used for an operational meeting between AMSTALK-1 and Mr. Robert L. Fambrini.	7.00
e.	Taxi Fares	25.00
	TOTAL	$ 132.05

Subject also spent $630.00 for one round trip ticket New York/Buenos Aires/New York. This will be accounted for on his return from Buenos Aires.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY: AT: Z
DISSEM BY 38 PER SB ·1 EO
ACTION
C/SB5 (☒ RID COPY
C/TSD

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-307337
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ WH/PA C.T.Y. DESTROY ☐ SIG.
INFO.
FILE. VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH/COG 2,
WAVE

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	37/C/77	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 182219Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2093

19 APR 68 IN 93904

DIRECTOR

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REF A UFGW 7016

B JMWAVE 2044 (IN 91442)

REF A ARRIVED JMWAVE 18 APRIL, TOO LATE FOR STATION TO OBTAIN AMSTALK-1 PSEUDO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FORM. AMSTALK-1 LEFT MIAMI 16 APRIL AS SCHEDULED AND EXPECTS LEAVE NEW YORK 20 APRIL ON RECEIPT ARGENTINE VISA. PLEASE ADVISE ON DISPOSITION UNSIGNED FORM.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET 201-307337

SECRET (When filled in)

REQUEST FOR ADVANCE OF FUNDS	NAME OF ADVANCEE Robert L. Fambrini	DATE 19 April 1968	AMOUNT $200.00	DATE - VOUCHER NO. 2-12 31
	PAYABLE TO	ROOM 3B 09	BUILDING Hqs	TELEPHONE EXT 6609

PURPOSE

Operational Advance to AMSTALK-1 to replace funds spent in preparation for his travel to Buenos Aires.

Charge Project BIFFIN

STATUS OF OUTSTANDING ADVANCES

DATE	AMOUNT	UNACCOUNTED BALANCE

I agree that I will fully account for this advance by submission of vouchers and refund of any unexpended balance to the place of accounting stated and by the due date checked below. In the event of my failure to so account and refund any unexpended balance, I authorize deduction from my salary to effect settlement.

DUE DATE	✓
ON ARRIVAL AT DESTINATION ON OR ABOUT	
MONTHLY—ON THE LAST WORKDAY OF EACH MONTH	

PLACE OF ACCOUNTING

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to $200.00 *of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.*

DATE

SIGNATURE OF ADVANCEE: Robert L. Fambrini

DATE

SIGNATURE OF AGENT: Mary L. Rivera

REQUESTING OFFICER

DATE

SIGNATURE

APPROVED

DATE

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Raymond A. Warren
Chief, WH/4

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO. 813-0635

DATE

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE

AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS ADVANCED

I acknowledge receipt of funds in the amount stated hereunder to be used for the purpose stated and accounted for as shown above.

DATE

AMOUNT $200.000

SIGNATURE OF ☐ ADVANCEE ☒ AGENT

Mary L. Rivera

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION—ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 DESCRIPTION—ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. SHIP. DOC. NO. 32-33 DIV	34-39 STATION CODE REC. RPT NO. PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXPENSE CODE	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	48-49 OBL. REF. SUB. NO.	50 L CODE	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST—FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL FY	FUNDS		61-66 CK. NO. X REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS 68-70 DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT

DATE

PREPARED BY

DATE

REVIEWED BY

TOTALS

FORM 7-65 281 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(50-40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AERONAUT/AETARGET/Operational
Transmittal of MOC for AMSTALK-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION: For your signature

REF : DIRECTOR- 90438

Transmitted herewith as attachment is the Memorandum of Oral Commitment for AMSTALK-1 requested in Reference. Headquarters is requested to return a copy of the signed MOC to JMWAVE to provide the Station with authority to make payments to the agent.

Leland H. Cobfield
Leland H. COBFIELD

Attachments:
1 - MOC (Herewith)
2 - Identities (Under Separate Cover)

Distribution:
~~3~~-C/WHD w/att #1 (3 cys H/W); att #2 (3 cys USC)
2-WH/COG w/o atts.

APR 18 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA- 29892

CS COPY

DATE
17 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201- 307337

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

TO : Chief, WH Division

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Engagement of IDENTITY A, 201- 307337

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under REDTOP. The effective date of the oral contract is 15 April 1968 and it shall continue until completion of the operational assignment.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval, to utilize Subject as requested, has been obtained. Request to reinstate OA, JMWAVE 1802, 26 March 1968. DIRECTOR 86830, 28 March 1968, initiates priority reinstatement action.

3. CITIZENSHIP: The Subject is a Cuban citizen and was born on 14 February 1937 at Matanzas, Cuba and resides at IDENTITY B.

4. COMPENSATION: Commencing on the effective date of this agreement, Subject will be paid compensation at the rate of $800.00 per month. Such payments to be made following completion of satisfactory service.

5. TAXES: Subject will be obligated to pay U.S. income tax. Taxes will be deducted from the above stated paid compensation. Subject is eligible for Social Security (IDENTITY C). Subject is married and has a total of four dependents other than himself. Subject's dependents are residing in the U.S.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: The Subject will be paid $19.00/day per diem during the time he is travelling and when he is in the country of assignment.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: When properly authorized, Subject will be reimbursed for:

a. Operational travel including mileage claims for official use of his personal automobile.

b. Operational hotel expenses, meals, telephone calls, etc.

8. OTHER COMMITMENTS:

BONUS: No commitment for a bonus has been made. However, with prior approval of the appropriate Chief of Station, a bonus may be authorized for outstanding performance in the line of duty. The amount of the bonus will be commensurate with the risk taken and the results which were achieved. In the event of Subject's death in the line of duty, an amount not to exceed $5,000.00 will be paid to Subject's estate.

9. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject. There is no provision in this MOC to pay severance pay and Subject is not eligible for severance pay because of the nature of this operational assignment.

SIGNED: H. L. Steadman
FIELD CONTRACTING OFFICER

REVIEWED:
CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
[illegible] 2, 1968

REVIEWED:
Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

IDENTITIES:

A: Miguel DIAZ Isalgue

B: 1519 S.W. 19th Street
Miami, Florida

C: 265 - 72 - 0741

CS COPY

SECRET

18 April 1968

Memo for the Record.

Subject: Contact with AMSTALK-1

AMSTALK-1 telephoned at 1815 hours, 17 April 1968 and reported that he went to the Argentine Consulate General in New York and applied for a tourist visa. He said he was told by them that there would be no trouble granting the visa, but that they wanted him to go to the Nicaraguan Consulate in New York and secure a letter of introduction. He told them he would and left the Consulate General. He took no further action.

After consultation with WH/4 it was decided to advise AMSTALK-1 to travel to Washington on 18 April and on 19 April go to the Argentine Embassy in Washington and try to get a visa there.

AMSTALK-1 was called and the above instructions were passed to him. He will call after 1800 hours to advise regarding his whereabouts in Washington.

AMSTALK-1's New York location

Travelers Hotel
Room 221A
Phone: 212-335-1200

Pat Phelan comments (18 April 68) . [illegible] [illegible] (cut hair, grow mustache, change glasses) & receive Equadorian passport would require 2 weeks from date request initiated.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REIMBURSEMENT VOUCHER FOR PURCHASES AND SERVICES OTHER THAN PERSONAL

NAME OF CLAIMANT: **Robert L. Fambrini**

DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12

DESCRIPTION OF EXPENDITURE - ATTACH RECEIPTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

	AMOUNT
Operational Travel - POV - Hqs Bldg - National Airport (Airwayte Hotel) - Headquarters. Operational meeting with AMSTALK-1 on 16 April 1968 23 miles @ 10¢/mile Charge Progect BIFFIN	$ 2.30

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY, OR EMERGENCY NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Robert L. Fambrini
SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT

I authorize my agent [illegible] $2.30 [illegible] when paid to my agent.

DATE:
SIGNATURE OF PAYEE: Robert L. Fambrini

DATE:
SIGNATURE OF AGENT: Mary L. Rivera

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIG. REF. NO.:
CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.: 8135-0635
DATE:
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE:

APPROVED
DATE:
SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Raymond A. Warren C/WH/4

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT
DATE:
SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER:

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS RECEIVED
PAYMENT RECEIVED IN THE AMOUNT OF $ 2.30
DATE:
SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☒ AGENT: Mary L. Rivera

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. SHIP. DOC. NO. Y.M.	34-39 STATION CODE REC. RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.	40-41 E XC PO EO NE D	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR COST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL	61-66 CT. NO. REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS 68-70 OC OR DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT
										TOTALS		

DATE:
PREPARED BY:
DATE:
REVIEWED BY:

FORM 2-65 264 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 18 April 1968

TO:
- ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM:
June Keirle
WH/4/A
3 B 17 X6667

SUBJECT: (True name) Miguel Angel DIAZ Isalgue

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: AMSTALK/1 (formerly AMICE/14)

CI/OA FILE NO.: 94543

RI 201 FILE NO.: 307337

OS FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Argentina

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

It is requested that a POA be granted for subject's one-time use to assist in the casing and possible installation of a proposed audio operational under the cover of an air conditioner repairman against the Soviet Embassy in Buenos Aires.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO.

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☒	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☒	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☒	WILL FORWARD JMWAVE
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Stephen C. Cheasman C/WH/4/A	6602	Raymond A. Warren C/WH/4

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

PRQ PART I (EQUIVALENT)

NAME: Miguel Angel DIAZ Isalgue (201-307337)

DPOB: 14 February 1937, Matanzas City, Cuba

CIT: Cuban

LOC: 1519 S.W. 19th St. Miami, Florida

WIFE: Fabiola de la Portilla; 2 sons and one daughter

PARENTS: Deceased

RELATIVES: One sister, aunt and cousin reside in U.S.

OTHER: Paroled into U.S. on 22 June 1961 at Miami -- Alien #A 11 264 049
Address at time of entry -- 219 Romano Street, Coral Gables, Florida.

14-00000

ORIG: JuneKeirle:mr
UNIT: WH/4/Ar
EXT: 6009
DATE: 18 April 1968

TOTAL COPIES 17

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 15 PER

CONF: C/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO WH/4/Ar BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-307337

INFO: FILE VR, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI.

C/F12

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

S E C R E T 19 18 38 Z CITE DIRECTOR 92789

TO JMWAVE

RYBAT REDTOP BIOGENESIS

REF: DIRECTOR 86830

UPDATED POA BEING PROCESSED FOR AMSTALK-1 USE AS STATED REF. PLEASE FORWARD ANY DEROGATORY STATION TRACES AND LOCAL LNERGO CHECK RESULTS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: POA being processed for one time use of AMSTALK-1 in Buenos Aires in proposed Audio Ops targeted against Soviet Bloc.

SB/O/WH L. Mestres (telecon)

C/WH/4

William V. Broe
C/WHD

for David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

17 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMSTALK-1

1. Background: AMSTALK-1 is a JMWAVE asset who was selected to fill a Station Buenos Aires requirement for a native Spanish speaking agent with a technical background. His task in Buenos Aires will be to work in the repair shop of a firm that has access to all Soviet installations in Buenos Aires. He will accompany a member of the firm when it is called by the Soviets to repair, maintain or install electrical appliances located in one of the installations. AMSTALK-1's initial task will be to case the installation for the purpose of locating a suitable site for an audio installation.

2. The undersigned met AMSTALK-1 in his room at the AIRWAYTE Hotel, National Airport, Washington, D.C. at 1530 hours, 16 April 1968. The meeting followed a telephoned exchange of prearranged recognition signals. The purpose of the meeting was to pass to AMSTALK-1 a Nicaraguan passport in alias and an Immunization Record in the same alias. He will use these documents for the remaining portion of his travel - Washington/New York/Buenos Aires- and to secure an Argentine tourist visa from the Argentine Consulate General in New York. AMSTALK-1 was briefed on the contents of the passport, and in the manner in which it is to be used, i.e., as a travel document only, and to be turned over to Station Buenos Aires for safekeeping during his TDY in Buenos Aires.

3. AMSTALK-1 was given the undersigned's first name only and home phone number with instructions that he is to call after 1800 hours on the day he secures the visa and purchases his flight tickets. The call will be made at least 24 hours prior to his departure from New York to allow time to inform the Station of his travel schedule and to coordinate his departure with the Alien Affairs Staff. AMSTALK-1 had already been briefed by JMWAVE regarding contact in Buenos Aires.

SECRET

4. AMSTALK-1 said that the cover for his travel from Miami was coordinated with JMWAVE, and is as follows: He is on a business trip to Equador where he has had business connections (he has actually traveled there on business). He has had to leave on short notice because he received word to go to Equador to take care of business matters.

5. AMSTALK-1 said he would like to send letters to his wife while he was in Buenos Aires. He was instructed to pass the letters to the Station who would send them on from there.

Robert L. Fambrini
WH/4/A

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - WH/COG
1 - SB/O/WH
1 - SB/O/PT
1 - TSD/AB
① - AMSTALK-1/201

2.

ORIG: GLENN HUNT/rbo
UNIT: SB/O/PT
EXT: 6587
DATE: 18 APR 68

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 15 PER

CONF: C/SB 5

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/WH/COG 5, DDP, ADDP, CSDO, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3

SECRET 19 1838Z

CITE DIRECTOR 92787

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO: PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0418 (IN 93025)

RF

PLS CLARIFY TO WHOM YOU PROPOSE SURFACE CONCEALMENT CAPABILITIES AND WHAT EFFECT IF ANY YOU FORESEE ON AMSTALK/1 CASING ROLE.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH

TSD/AOB J. McBEE PHONE

WH/4

WH/COG

C/WH

DC/SB/AO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO. 434

14-00000

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY 22/21 PER 56 . 1 A

ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

DDP, ADDP, C/TSD

C/WH 2, C/WH/COG 2 "EYES ONLY"

SECRET 172020Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0418 17 Apr 68 IN 93025

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REFS A JMWAVE 2044 (IN 91440)

B. BUENOS AIRES 0262 (IN 77574)

1. PER REQUIREMENT REF B PARA 2 B, STATION FEELS IT NECESSARY TO SURFACE OUR CAPABILITIES IN SPECIAL CONCEALMENT IN ORDER REALIZE MAXIMUM UTILITY AMSTALK ACCESS.

2. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

C
SC
RF

G-HUNT is replying

cable means exposure of "special concealment" capabilities to AMSTALK-1. G. Hunt says this cannot be done (E Brennan concurs).

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG: R. LA CRUZ
UNIT: WH/4/AR
EXT: 6609
DATE: 16 APRIL 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 3 PER: 82

CONF: C/S85 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: EE, WH 8, C/WH 2, C/WH/COG 2

Eyes only

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 91947

TO JMWAVE INFO BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET

REF: JMWAVE-2044 (IN-91440)

TA ALL ADVANCES [redacted] TO HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

DIR 91947
16 Apr 68

WH/B & F David A. McIlhatton (draft)

C/WH/4

SB/O/WH

WH COMMENT: Reply to JMWAVE query regarding funds advanced to AMSTALK-1. Ref attached.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED c/SB (E.O.)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED

BY D AT 0120 Z

DISSEM BY Pc PER SB/(E.O.)

ACTION c/SB5 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 4 TOTAL COPIES 13

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-309337

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☒ WH/4/A DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO C.T.-4

FILE VR. DDP ADDP C/WH 2 C/WH/LOG-2

c/TSD "EYES ONLY"

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	E/C/77	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 152256Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2044

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO BUENOS AIRES

16 APR 68 IN 91440

NO NIACT

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

AN	FI	
PS	DESP	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

REF DIRECTOR 91205

1. RE PARA 2A REF, AMSTALK-1 SCHEDULED ARRIVE WASHINGTON 1418 HOURS 16 APRIL VIA NATIONAL 108. NOT ABLE MAKE RESERVATION AIRWAYTE HOTEL FROM THIS END BUT WILL TRY REGISTER IN TRUE NAME ON ARRIVAL. IF UNABLE SECURE ROOM THEN WILL AWAIT CONTACT AT LEFT SIDE NATIONAL CAR RENTAL COUNTER NORTH TERMINAL FROM 1618 ONWARD, CARRYING ROLLED UP MAGAZINE LEFT HAND, AND WILL RESPOND VERBAL BONA FIDES PER REF, ON CONCLUSION MEET WITH HQS OFFICER, AMSTALK-1 CAN CONTINUE TO NEW YORK VIA SHUTTLE.

2. ALL IMMUNIZATIONS UPDATED 15 APRIL AND IMPACTED WISDOM TOOTH REMOVED. AMSTALK-1 WILL BE ADVANCED 1000 DOLLARS PRIOR DEPARTURE COVER TRAVEL EXPENSES AND PER DIEM THROUGH ARRIVAL BUENOS AIRES. SINCE POSSIBLE THAT JMWAVE OPERATIONAL PHASE OUT MAY BE COMPLETED PRIOR RETURN AMSTALK-1 SUGGEST THAT ADVANCE BE TA'D HQS. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET 201-309337

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ 2

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE, VR,

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 2044 SECRET

3. IN VIEW FACT THAT AMSTALK-1 WELL KNOWN MIAMI AREA, AND CONSIDERATION THAT AS OSTENSIBLE NICARAGUAN MIGHT BE ASKED PRODUCE DOCUMENTATION WHILE BUYING TICKET FOR BUENOS AIRES, STATION ADVISED AMSTALK-1 BUY TICKET HIMSELF AFTER FALSE DOCUMENTATION IN POSSESSION. DO NOT BELIEVE DEPARTURE FOR BUENOS AIRES WILL BE DELAYED.

SECRET

BT

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SB
ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY C AT 2050 Z
DISSEM BY 2 PER SB # 1 (BA)
ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 16
SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-307337
X-REF TO FILE NO 74-120-221
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☒ WH/Y/A CI-Y DESTROY ☐ SIG
INFO
FILE, VR, ~~DDP, ADDP~~, C/WH 2, C/WH/COG 2, C/FI

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

"EYES ONLY"
BUEN

S E C R E T 151900Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0401

15 APR 68 IN 81374

PRIORITY

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE INFO ~~PANAMA CITY~~

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 91205

1. UPON ARRIVAL EZEIZA AIRPORT, AMSTALK-1 WILL BE MET BY IDENTITY WHO WILL USE TRUE NAME WITH A-1. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE GOOD PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION, A-1 SHOULD NEVERTHELESS CARRY COPY TIME MAGAZINE IN LEFT HAND IN ORDER FACILITATE RECOGNITION. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, AMSTALK-1 SHOULD TELEPHONE IDENTITY AT LNPURE OR AT HOME (IF WEEKEND INVOLVED).

2. PLS CLARIFY PARA 4 REF. WHAT CHANGE WAS RECOMMENDED?

S E C R E T

BT

DC74-120-221 **SECRET** 201-307337

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security/Alien Affairs Staff
Attention: Mr. Louis Weinchowski

SUBJECT : AMSTALK-1 Travel

REFERENCE : 5 April 1968 Memorandum requesting documentation for AMSTALK-1

1. It is requested that a Form I-512 be issued in the name of Juan Hidalgo ELIZONDO Romano (travel alias to be used by AMSTALK-1) to allow his re-entry into the United States from Buenos Aires, Argentina. Upon receipt the Form I-512 will be pouched to Station Buenos Aires. It will not be turned over to AMSTALK-1 until just prior to his return to the United States.

2. AMSTALK-1 has been used operationally since 1961.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/4/Ar/R.Fambrini:mr

(15 April 1968)

Distribution:
Orig & 1-OSec/AAS
1-C/WHD
1-WH/REG
1-C/WH/4
②-WH/4/Ar

[illegible]

AB Memo No. 9562
19 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4/Argentina

ATTENTION : Mr. Robert Fumbrini

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Nicaraguan Ordinary Passport in Alias for Use by AMSTALK-1 - AB Case No. 8237

REFERENCE : WH Memorandum dated 5 April 1968, same subject

1. Transmitted herewith for use as outlined in Reference are the following two documents issued in alias for AMSTALK-1: Nicaraguan Ordinary Passport No. 86781 and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Form I-94 (stapled in the passport, page 9). Also furnished herewith is a travel itinerary on which AMSTALK-1 should be briefed before he applies for the Argentine visa in New York.

2. In keeping with arrangements made by TSD/AB, the Medical Office is preparing, for direct delivery to WH/4, the International Vaccination Certificate in alias to be used with the above documents. This certificate should be checked for accuracy as to name, place and date of issue. It is also understood that AMSTALK-1 will have received a bona fide smallpox vaccination prior to departing from the U.S.

3. TSD/AB prepared the above Nicaraguan passport on the strength of information that BIOGENESIS would instruct an Argentine Consular post in the U.S. to place a visa in the passport. The document was prepared in one week from date of request because of operational urgency. The requirement specified use of a Central American passport. To avoid placing a long, time-consuming simulated itinerary in the passport, it was given a recent issuance date, which necessitated issuance on the basis of exemplars issued nearly one year earlier (the most recent ones available). This short itinerary also would seem to make application at this time in the U.S. for an Argentine visa somewhat unusual. Since we are now informed that AMSTALK-1 is to obtain his Argentine visa without BIOGENESIS assistance we wish to make the limitations of the documentation provided for this operation, and agreed to by Mr. Fumbrini, a matter of record. This confirms discussion with Mr. Fumbrini. A telephone check with the Argentine Embassy by WH indicated that a Nicaraguan transient in the U.S. can obtain an Argentine visa in this country.

SECRET

4. It is understood that the passport will be needed for about six months, following which it is to be returned to TSD/AB. Should further operational need exist for this document beyond that time, it must be borne in mind that the expiration date is 7 March 1969 and that annual revalidations are needed from that time forward. Any such revalidations would have to be entered by TSD/AB. Also, use of this passport for travel other than that originally intended (direct from U.S. to Argentina and back within six months) will require careful scrutiny by TSD/AB of the situation at the time of the intended future travel.

5. In accordance with verbal arrangements between Messrs. Fambrini and Phelan, please pass on to TSD/AB details of AMTALK-1's procurement of the Argentine visa and any other travel control events of significance in the use of this passport so that TSD/AB may gain from the experience of this agent in the use of this alias document.

6. Any further questions concerning this case should be referred to the undersigned or to Miss Tina Jepikse on extension 2531.

PJ Phelan

Patrick J. Phelan
TSD/AB

Attachment: 1 Envelope (h/w)
Nicaraguan Passport,
Travel Itinerary

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/OS/AAS (Info)

Attachment to AB Memo No. 9562

TRAVEL ITINERARY FOR NICARAGUAN ORDINARY PASSPORT No. 86781

Date	Page	Type of Item
7 Mar 68	3	Passport issued by Foreign Office, Managua, Nicaragua
7 Mar 68	8	Exit permit for departure from Nicaragua, valid until 7 April 1968
12 Mar 68	9	U.S. Non-immigrant multiple-entry B-2 visa valid until 12 March 1972
3 Apr 68	8	Leave Managua (Las Mercedes Airport) at 0940 hours by Pan American Airways Flight 2502 (Boeing 727 Jet Clipper)
3 Apr 68	9	Arrive Miami International Airport at 1435 hours
3 Apr 68	9	U.S. Immigration Form I-94 (stapled on U.S. visa), showing permanent Nicaragua residence, anticipated U.S. address, flight information, etc.
3 Apr 68	--	International Smallpox Immunization Certificate issued by U.S. Public Health Service, Miami, Florida, at the time traveler arrived in U.S. because previous certificate was lost.
7 Mar 69	--	Passport expiration date.

NOTE: Biographic information concerning the bearer appears on pages 2 and 4 of the passport.

SECRET

RECEIPT FOR AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS

AB CASE NO. 8937

TO: TSD/AB

DATE 12 April 1968

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS TRANSMITTED WITH MEMO NO. 9562 DATED 12 April 1968 AND PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH WH Memorandum date 5 April 1968

Nicaraguan Passport No. 86781

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

NOTE. Authentication Materials must be returned to TSD/AB as soon as the intended operational use has been fulfilled; unused documents, whether filled in or blank, must be returned to TSD/AB when no longer needed.

TSD/AB should be notified if any of the Authentication Materials are destroyed, lost, or for any other reason can no longer be returned.

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security/Alien Affairs Staff
Attention: Mr. Louis Weinchowski

SUBJECT : AMSTALK-1 Travel

REFERENCE : 5 April 1968 Memorandum requesting documentation for AMSTALK-1

1. It is requested that a Form I-512 be issued in the name of Juan Hidalgo ELIZONDO Romano (travel alias to be used by AMSTALK-1) to allow his re-entry into the United States from Buenos Aires, Argentina. Upon receipt the Form I-512 will be pouched to Station Buenos Aires. It will not be turned over to AMSTALK-1 until just prior to his return to the United States.

2. AMSTALK-1 has been used operationally since 1961.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/4/Ar/R.Fambrini:mr

(15 April 1968)

Distribution:
- Orig & 1-OSec/AAS
- 1-C/WHD
- 1-WH/REG
- 1-C/WH/4
- 0-WH/4/Ar

241

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED C/SB
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 15
SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED
BY [illegible] AT 2325 Z
INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-307337
X-REF TO FILE NO 74-120-221
DISSEM BY 30 PER SB (X-RO)
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY
INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH/DO 2, "EYES ONLY"
C/WH 2, C/TSD, WAVE
RID AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY 3/0/PT

S E C R E T 032223Z APR 62 CITE JMWAVE 1911

3 Apr 62 IN 84001

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES

PRIORITY

NO NIGHT ACTION

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REFERENCE: BUENOS AIRES 2316 (IN 83405)

1. BECAUSE OF AMSTAK-1 EXTENSIVE WOFIRM OPERATIONAL HISTORY, IT ESSENTIAL THAT HE BE GIVEN PUERTO RICAN DOCUMENTATION IN ALIAS FOR TRAVEL TO BUENOS AIRES AND THAT HIS TRUE IDENTITY BE WITHHELD EVEN FROM BIOGENESIS.

2. RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO DOCUMENTING AMSTALK-1 IN ALIAS AS PUERTO RICAN TOURIST FOR TRAVEL TO BUENOS AIRES. AFTER ARRIVAL B.A. SUITABLE ALIAS DOCUMENTATION DEVISED BY STATION AND BIOGENESIS, IN LINE WITH COVER REQUIREMENTS AND POSSIBLY AS CITIZEN ARGENTINA SHOULD BE PROVIDED. OBVIOUSLY HIS DOCUMENTATION WHILE IN B.A. MUST BE ABLE WITHSTAND WHATEVER CHECK SOV EMBASSY LIKELY MAKE ON PEOPLE SERVICING ITS PREMISES.

S E C R E T

BT

3/0/PT

SECRET

201-307337

SECRET

2 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMOTIN-117
201-307337

Green List Check results on Subject were reported non-derogatory per Check #187024.

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - 201-307337

201-307337

SECRET

14

SECRET

April 1965

CONF: [illegible] DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO [illegible]

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

BY: 720 PER SG. 1(S.O)

C/WH 2 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: C/SB5 DDP ADDP [illegible]

C/WH/COG-2 C/TSD

12 23 22 Z

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 91207

TO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES, JMWAVE INFO ROUTINE PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0390 (IN 89137)

1. CHECK WITH LOCAL ARGENTINE CONSULAR OFFICIAL CONFIRMS BIOGENESIS-49 PARA 1 REF ADVICE RE ISSUANCE TOURIST VISA. CONCUR WITH BUENOS AIRES SUGGESTION.

2. VIEW ABOVE CHANGE PROPOSE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE:

A. ADVISE AMSTALK-1 PREPARE FOR DEPARTURE ON 16 APRIL FOR TRUE NAME TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WITH SHORT STOPOVER WASHINGTON FOR RECEIPT ALIAS DOCUMENTS AND BRIEFING. PRIOR DEPARTURE AMSTALK-1 SHOULD MAKE RESERVATION FOR SIX HOUR STAY AT AIRWAYTE HOTEL, NATIONAL AIRPORT, WASHINGTON WHERE HE WILL BE CONTACTED TWO HOURS AFTER SCHEDULED ARRIVAL OF FLIGHT. PLEASE ADVISE LATTER. FIRST CONTACT WILL BE PHONE CALL TO AMSTALK-1. CALLER WILL ASK "HAVE YOU SEEN THE NEW SALES ROOM?" AMSTALK-1 REPLY "I HAVE SEEN THE ONE ON THE FIFTH FLOOR." AFTER EXCHANGE TIME WILL BE SET FOR MEETING

(continued)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Robert Tambrini:mr
[illegible] WH/Ar
[illegible] 09
[illegible] 3 April 1968

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 91805

PAGE TWO

AMSTALK-1'S ROOM.

B. IN ORDER ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR ISSUANCE VISA IN NEW YORK REQUEST JMWAVE PURCHASE ROUNDTRIP TICKETS FOR NEW YORK/BUENOS AIRES/MANAGUA FLIGHT FOR DEPARTURE ON 20 APRIL. RETURN PORTION CAN BE CHANGED IN BUENOS AIRES, AND SHOULD BE LEFT OPEN. PLEASE CABLE FLIGHT AND DEPARTURE DATE WHEN KNOWN.

3. REQUEST BUENOS AIRES CABLE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMSTALK-1 ON ARRIVAL AIRPORT. WILL BE PASSED TO HIM AT 16 APRIL MTG.

4. FYI: NICARAGUAN PASSPORT BEING PREPARED BY WOACRE ON BASIS ORIGINAL VISA ARRANGEMENT (SEE BUENOS AIRES 0316, IN 83405). EXEMPLAR IS ONE YEAR OLD. UNFORTUNATELY, TIME FACTOR AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT ALLOW CHANGE.

5. FOR BUENOS AIRES: FOLLOWING INFO REQUESTED PARA TWO REF: DPOB 5 MAY 1938, MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

END OF MESSAGE

(continued)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

S E C R E T

DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ RID COPY

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

S E C R E T

TO

PAGE THREE

CITE DIRECTOR 71285

SB/O/WH J. Noland (phone)

SB/O/PT G. Hunt (draft)

WH/COG J. McTighe (draft)

CI/R&A J. Bark (draft)

WH/2

TSD/AB T. Japikse (phone)

TSD/AOB E. Brennan (phone)

William V. Broe
C/WHD

Raymond A. Warren
C/WH/4

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY H-1 PER 53 . L

ACTION
C/53 5 ☑ RID COPY

C/F-D

EVES CAN'T

[illegible] MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-307237

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ WH/4/A DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO CT-4

FILE, VR. DDP ADDP [illegible] [illegible]-2

	AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1	[illegible]	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 121857Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2018

12 APR 68 IN 90534

DIRECTOR INFO BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REFERENCES: A. BUENOS AIRES 0390 (IN 89137)

B. DIRECTOR 89761

C. DIRECTOR 90438

1. DEFER TO HQS ON RESPONSE TO PARA 2 REF A REQUEST. ASSUME ALL AGREE TRUE IDEN WILL NOT BE REVEALED TO LIAISON.

2. RE PARA 2 REF B, WISH POINT OUT THAT AMSTALK-1 COULD ALSO SECURE VISA AT ARGENTINE CONSULATE MIAMI IF CONSONANT WITH HQS PLANNING.

3. STATION PREPARED ASSIST AS REQUESTED PARA 3 REF B. HOWEVER, SINCE DEPARTURE DATE WILL DEPEND ON RECEIPT VISA, PLAN HAVE HIM BUY OPEN TICKET LOCALLY. ON ISSUANCE VISA, AMSTALK-1 WILL INFORM STATION OF FIRM TRAVEL PLANS BY PHONE FROM NEW YORK IF HE IS TO APPLY FOR VISA, AND DEPART FROM THERE. JMWAVE WILL THEN RELAY FLIGHT DATE AND NUMBER TO ADDRESSEES. DIR PLS RECONFIRM IT WISHES NEW YORK TRAVEL.

4. RE REF C, AMSTALK-1 AGREED TO SALARY, PER DIEM, TRAVEL ALLOWANCES, AND WAS BRIEFED ON TERMS MOC WHICH WILL

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **SECRET** *(When Filled In)* GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY 1 6 2 7 3 8 4 9 5 10
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		
BY: AT: 2	INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO		
	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.		
	X-REF TO FILE NO.		
DISSEM BY PER	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO	BRANCH ☐	DESTROY ☐ SIG.
ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO: FILE, VR.		

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 2018 S E C R E T

BE FORWARDED HQS SEPARATELY.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

SECRET

12 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA
Attention: Mr. Jack Lally

SUBJECT : AMSTALK-1 (201-307337)

1. It is requested that the responsibility for the handling of AMSTALK-1 be transferred from WH/COG to WH/4/Argentina.

2. Please disregard the request for the cancellation of Subject's Operational Approval submitted by WH/COG.

Raymond A. Warren
Chief, WH/4

DDP/WH/4/Ar:S Keirle:mr (12 Apr 68)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 201-307337

SECRET

ORIG: W. J. [illegible]
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 5061; R - 1457
DATE: 11 APRIL 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

55

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 32 PER ___ #
CONF: C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO WH/COG/OPS BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
[X] NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-307237 201-238687
INFO: FILE, VR C/WH 6, C/CI, D/COMMO 3

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 11 21 39 Z CITE DIRECTOR 90691

11 APR 68

AN CS | FI |
PS | DEST | WH/COG
ABSTRACT X | COPY

1P

TO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC MIGUILE AMGHOST COMMO

REF: JMWAVE 1938 (IN 86154)

RE PARA 2 REF, PLS CONTINUE SIGNAL PLAN AS HQS ANTICIPATES USING IN NEAR FUTURE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Paragraph 2 of the reference asks if Headquarters wishes to deactivate or continue a signal plan established for communication with Manuel Pineiro Losada, Chief of the Cuba DGI.

MICROFILMED
APR 23 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AMSTALK-1/CI
201-307237
11 April 1968

B. 201-238687

Paul E. Oberst
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/WH/COG/OPS

Paul E. Oberst
DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: ROBERT FAMBRINI:mr
UNIT: WH/4/Argentina
EXT: 6609
DATE: 10 APRIL 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER SB
CONF: C/WH 2

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO WH/4/A BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-307337

INFO: FILE, VR DDP ADDP C/SBS "EYES ONLY" C/TSD C/WH/COG 2

SECRET

11 00 05 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 90438

TO JMWAVE INFO BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REF: JMWAVE 1967 (IN 88230)

CONCUR $800 MONTHLY SALARY AND METHOD PAYMENT MENTIONED PARA 2 REF. VIEW LATTER REQUEST JMWAVE PREPARE MOC. CHARGE ALL EXPENSES TO PROJECT BIFFIN (FAN 8135-0635). TA Headquarters.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref attached.

WH/4/A
Chief

Reports

C/WH/4
WH/2
SB/O/WH J. Noland (phone)
TSD/AOB F. Foley (phone)

William V. Broe
C/WHD

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 11 TOTAL COPIES 16 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED C/SB

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

BY M AT 0025Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-309337

PRECEDENCE

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 32 PER 56-180

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH WH/4/A DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SB5, ☒ RID COPY C/TSD,

INFO FILE VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH2, C/WH/COG2, "EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 102212Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0390 10 APR 68 IN 89137

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 69761

1. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH BIOGENESIS THIS DATE REVEAL IT SIMPLER AND CERTAINLY MORE RAPID FOR AMSTALK-1 SIMPLY APPLY FOR REGULAR TOURIST VISA. ACCORDING BIOGENESIS-49, VISA WILL BE GRANTED WITHOUT DELAY AND BIOGENESIS BACKSTOPPING NOT NECESSARY. ONCE AMSTALK-1 ARRIVES HERE, BIOGENESIS CAN WORK OUT NECESSARY COVER DOCUMENTATION AND LEGEND, AS WELL AS PROLONG AMSTALK-1 STAY.

2. PLS CABLE DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH PLUS CURRENT ADDRESS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET 201-307337

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ISSUED MESSAGE ✓ TOTAL COPIES 16 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1	SG/4/CT	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-307337

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ WH/1/A DESTROY ☐ SIG

DISSEM BY 27/31 PER SB (EO)

ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/TSD

C/WH 2, C/WH/COG 2, WAVE EYES ONLY

S E C R E T 092129Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1967

9 APR 68 IN 06230

DIRECTOR INFO BUENOS AIRES PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT ALTARGET TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 89761

1. CONCUR WITH ARRANGEMENTS PARAGRAPH 3 REFERENCE. TO ENABLE US MAKE RESERVATION NEED ESTIMATE HOW LONG AMSTALK-1 WILL HAVE TO SPEND IN NEW YORK FOR VISA PROCESSING. BUENOS AIRES PLEASE ADVISE.

2. DETAILS PROPOSED MOC NOT YET DISCUSSED WITH AMSTALK-1 AND PREFER NOT TO UNTIL CONSIDERATION GIVE TO INCREASING MONTHLY SALARY TO $800 REPEAT $800 PER MONTH. ALTHOUGH IT LIKELY SUBJECT WILL ACEPT WHATEVER SALARY OFFERED, AND ALTHOUGH HE HAS NEVER QUIBBLED ABOUT MONEY, FACT IS HE WILL BE MAKING A CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL AND FINANCIAL SACRIFICE IN TERMS HIS EXTENDED ABSENCE FROM A GROWING AND PROSPEROUS BUSINESS AND FROM HIS FAMILY. IN OUR VIEW PROPOSED SALARY INADEQUATE. IN ADDITION IT PROBABLE SUBJECT AWARE OF HIGHER SALARIES PAID MEMBERS OF JMCHALK PROGRAM KNOWN TO HIM PERSONALLY. OTHER TERMS MOC MENTIONED IN REFERENCE ARE FAIR. STATION WILL PAY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 1967 S E C R E T

MONTHLY SALARY IN FORM OF CASHIER'S CHECK TO AMSTALK-1 BANK. WILL USE BAYFRONT ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. FOR PAYROLL AND COVER PURPOSES.

3. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: ROBERT FAMBRINI:cc
UNIT: WH/4/A
EXT: 6609
DATE: 8 APRIL 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION.
BY 30 PER SB # 1(E.O.)

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH2 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR C/SBS, DDP, ADDP "EYES ONLY"

C/WH/COG 2, C/TSD

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

0 23 40 Z

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 89761

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO: JMWAVE PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 0316 (IN 83405)

B. JMWAVE 1929 (IN 85238)

C. JMWAVE 1930 (IN 85787)

1. PHOTOS REQUESTED REF A POUCHED 8 APRIL VIA HABS 3069. FOLL IS REQUESTED INFO RE DOCUMENTATION: NICARAGUAN ORDINARY PASSPORT NO. 86781, ISSUED IN MANAGUA, NICARAGUA ON 7 MARCH 68 BY MINISTER OF STATE, OFFICE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. WOACRE PREPARING PASSPORT AND WILL COMPLETE 15 APRIL.

2. REQUEST VISA FOR AMSTALK-1 BE SENT TO ARGENTINE CONSULATE NEW YORK. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN KNOWN VISA WILL BE READY FOR PICKUP, AND ANY INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMSTALK-1 RE PICKUP PROCEDURE.

3. REQUEST BUENOS AIRES AND JMWAVE COMMENTS ON FOLL PROPOSED SCHEDULE:

A. WHEN PASSPORT READY WILL FORWARD TO JMWAVE.

B. WHEN BUENOS AIRES ADVISES PER PARA 2 [redacted] ABOVE, JMWAVE WILL PASS DOCUMENTATION TO AMSTALK-1 AND INSTRUCT HIM TRAVEL TO NEW YORK TO PICKUP VISA AND INITIATE TRAVEL TO BUENOS AIRES. IN ORDER

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT: PAGE TWO
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY PER #

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 89761

TO: PROVIDE HQS AND BUENOS AIRES WITH FLIGHT INFO PRIOR TRAVEL AMSTALK-1 SHOULD PURCHASE TICKETS FOR FLIGHT FROM NEW YORK TO BUENOS AIRES IN JMWAVE AREA.

C. BUENOS AIRES SHOULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS MEET AMSTALK-1 UPON ARRIVAL AT AIRPORT. PLEASE PROVIDE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

4. FOR JMWAVE: HQS PREPARING MOC FOR $550.00 GROSS MONTHLY SALARY, $19.00 PER DIEM WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES AND EN ROUTE AND ALL TRAVEL. EFFECTIVE DATE OF MOC WILL BE 15 APRIL 68. REQUEST ADVISE IF THIS ACCEPTABLE TO AMSTALK-1 AND METHOD FOR MAKING SALARY PAYMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH J. Noland (draft)
SB/O/PT G. Hunt (draft)
CI/R&A J. Burke (draft)
WH/2
WH/COG J. McTighe (draft)
TSD/AB Tina Japikse (phone)
TSD/AOB E Brennan (phone)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

RAYMOND A. WARREN
C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH | SECRET | PROCESSING

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
AMSTALK-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See below

Forwarded as an attachment is one Form No. SD56490, Parts A and B. It is requested that AMSTALK-1 sign Part A in true name, and Part B in the name shown in paragraph 2.F., DIRECTOR 83444.

Wendel J. RAMOVA

Attachment:
One form, h/w

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
UFGW-7016	8 April 1968
CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
SECRET	AMSTALK-1 201

Distribution:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono
1 - Tempo
1 - WH/COG

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/4/A	Robert Fambrini	ll	6609

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/4/A		Stephen G. Chaconas
C/WH/4		Raymond A. Warren

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG		David A. Phillips

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: WH/4/Argentina
EXT: 6509
DATE: 5 APRIL 1968

(7)

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 PER SE # 1 (GO)

CONF: C/WH 2 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-207337

INFO: FILE, VR, SAS, ADDP, C/TSD

(classification) S E C R E T
(date and time filed) [illegible] Z
(reference number) CITE DIRECTOR 89203

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

SE
RF

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 88444

B. DIRECTOR 88922 (NOT SENT PANAMA CITY)

C. JMWAVE 1930 (IN 85787) (NOT SENT PANAMA CITY)

THREE MONTH LIMITATION ON VISA FOR ECUADORIAN PASSPORT NOT IN LINE WITH STATION BUENOS AIRES PLANNED USE FOR AMSTALK-1, AND WISH AVOID SURFACING PASSPORT IN ARGENTINA FOLLOWING AMSTALK-1 ENTRY. GOING AHEAD WITH PREPARATION NICARAGUAN PASSPORT PER REF A. IN ADDITION, WILL BE LESS TIME CONSUMING.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/4
SB/O/WE J. Noland (phone)
SB/O/MT G. Hunt (phone)
CI/R&A/TC J. O'Keefe (phone)
WH/2
WH/COG J. [illegible] (phone)
TSD/AB E. Brennan (phone)
TSD/AOB T. Japika (phone)

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SB/TSD(KY-3)

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY Jl AT: 2035z

DISSEM BY: 5 PER

ACTION C/TSD3 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 45

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH3, C/SB5, C/CI, C/FI

C/WH/COG 5, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2
3
4
5

S E C R E T 051913Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0350 5 APR 68 IN 88066

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

RYBAT REDTOP AQUATIC

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 88922

WE CONCUR USE ECUADOREAN OR NICARAGUAN PASSPORT.

S E C R E T

BT

RF

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD/AB

VIA : Office of Security/Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT : Request for Alias Documentation for AMOTIS-117

1. In accordance with preliminary conversations between Mr. Robert Fambrini, WH/4/A, and Miss Tina Japike and Mr. Patrick Phelan, TSD/AB, it is requested that an ordinary Nicaraguan passport be issued in the name of Juan Hidalgo ELIZONDO Romano for AMOTIS-117's use to travel from the United States to Argentina and return. In addition, it is requested that an Arrival-Departure Record (I&NS Form I-94) be prepared for Subject.

2. The requested passport should contain a forged United States multiple entry tourist visa and a cachet showing entry into the United States via Miami, Florida, in early April 1968. Inclusion of the forged United States visa in Subject's passport will not afford him any privileges he does not already legally hold in his true identity. The passport should be valid through the end of 1968.

3. The following information should be included on the Form I-94 to be prepared for Subject:

a. Permanent address in Managua, Nicaragua: Calle 15 de Septiembre No. 493.

b. Anticipated address in the United States: Airport International Hotel, Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida.

4. The above requirements are being coordinated with the Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, Office of Security, who will be kept informed every time the passport is being used for travel from or to the United States prior to exit and reentry to the United States. The information will include flight number, date and place of departure and reentry. The Alien Affairs Staff has been requested to provide Form-512 in alias.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/4/Argentina:ROBERT FAMBRINI:mr (5 April 1968)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - OS/Alien Affairs Staff
1 - C/WHD
1 - WH/Registry
1 - AMOTIN-117 201
1 - R.Fambrini
1 - Memo Chrono
1 - C/WH/4

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

IG: Patrick J. Phelan
IT: TSD/AB/WH
T: 2532
TE: 4 April 1968

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
28 PER ______ #
CONF: C/TSD 3 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR C/WH 6, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 5 00 15 Z CITE DIRECTOR 88922

WH/4/A
Chief ______
CA ______
FI/CI ______
Reports ______

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT [illegible] AQUATIC

REFS A. JMWAVE 1991 (IN 84391)
B. BUENOS AIRES 0329 (IN 84918)
C. DIRECTOR 88444

1. PUERTO RICAN COVER SUGGESTED REF A NEEDS U.S. PASSPORT ENTER ARGENTINA.

2. NICARAGUAN COVER REQUIRES INSTRUCTIONS FROM ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTRY BE SENT ITS CONSULATE IN HOUSTON TEXAS TO PLACE VISA IN PASSPORT.

3. WOACRE SUGGESTS USING ECUADOREAN PASSPORT INSTEAD WHICH REQUIRES NO VISA FOR THREE MONTH STAY ARGENTINA. CAN EXTEND SOJOURN BY LOCAL EXTENSION. ADVISE IF CONCUR.

4. WOACRE CAN START DOCUMENTATION WORK AS SOON AS ITEMS OF REF C ARE RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD Comment: Request for documentation for AMOT-117 to travel to Argentina.

WH/4/AR Steve Chaconas by phone x7710
X WH/COG James McTight by phone x5061

EVERETT C. O'NEAL
C/TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible] C. JOHNSON
TSD/OCP
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 3C PER SB 11(E)(C)

ACTION
C/SB5

☒ NO COPY

ASSIGNED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH2, C/WH/COG2 "EYES ONLY"
5

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	SB/5/RT	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 042236Z APR 65 CITE JMWAVE 1929 [illegible] 85238

DIRECTOR INFO BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT ASTARGET TECHS

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 58444

1. PLEASE CANCEL CRYPTONYM AMOTIN-117. PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT BY AMOTS (JMWAVE-1354) DID NOT MATERIALIZE. REGRET FAILURE NOTIFY HQS EARLIER. WILL CONTINUE USING AMOTALK-1.

2. PER PARA 2 REFERENCE, PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION SUBJECT FOLLOWS: HEIGHT 5' 11", WEIGHT 155 LBS, MEDIUM FRAME, WIRY BUILD; LIGHT SKIN, CLEAR COMPLEXION; EYES BLACK, HAIR BLACK, STRAIGHT, USUALLY UNCOMBED; HAS FULL HEAD OF HAIR, NO RECEDING HAIRLINE; OVAL SHAPED FACE, NOSE MEDIUM AND STRAIGHT; EARS CLOSE TO HEAD; FOREHEAD LARGE. EYEBROWS FULL BUT NOT BUSHY; WEARS PRESCRIPTION GLASSES, ~~XXX~~ DARK BROWN PLASTIC FRAMES ABOUT 50 PER CENT OF TIME.

3. PHOTOS AND SIGNATURES WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY. BELIEVE NICARAGUAN DOCUMENTATION EVEN BETTER THAN PUERTORICAN.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 2 TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY PT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: 1530 Z

DISSEM BY 6 PER JIS . 1 - CD

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-307337

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE. VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2, C/WH/COG 2, C/TSD

"EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 041445Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0329 (BUEN)

4 APR 68 IN 34918

PRIORITY DIRECTOR JMWAVE, INFO PANAMA CITY

PRIORITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REFS A DIRECTOR 88444

B JMWAVE 191 (IN 24391)

1. PAST EXPERIENCE INDICATES BIOGENESIS, THOUGH PROBABLY WILLING TRY, WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY OBTAINING REQUIRED PASSPORT. ALSO FEAR CONSIDERABLE TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED. THEREFORE CONCUR REFS SUGGESTIONS FOR NICARAGUAN PASSPORT IN FALSE NAME.

2. SUGGEST HQS CABLE NECESSARY DATA EVEN WHILE PASSPORT IN PREPARATION AND WE WILL PUT BIOGENESIS TO WORK AT ONCE ON VISA.

SECRET

BT

SECRET 201-307337

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED C/SB

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY [illegible] AT 2325 Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER SB 1(E.D.)

ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR. DDP, ADDP C/WH/COG 2 "EYES ONLY" C/WH 2 C/TSD

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 032223Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1911

3 APR 68 IN 84291

PRIORITY DIRECTOR ~~INFO~~ PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES

NO NIGHT ACTION

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REFERENCE: BUENOS AIRES 0316 (IN 83405)

WH/4/A
Chief SC
CA
FI/CI
Reports

1. BECAUSE OF AMSTLAK-1 EXTENSIVE WOFIRM OPERATIONAL HISTORY, IT ESSENTIAL THAT HE BE GIVEN PUERTO RICAN DOCUMENTATION IN ALIAS FOR TRAVEL TO BUENOS AIRES AND THAT HIS TRUE IDENTITY BE WITHHELD EVEN FROM BIOGENESIS.

2. RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO DOCUMENTING AMSTALK-1 IN ALIAS AS PUERTO RICAN TOURIST FOR TRAVEL TO BUENOS AIRES. AFTER ARRIVAL B.A. SUITABLE ALIAS DOCUMENTATION DEVISED BY STATION AND BIOGENESIS, IN LINE WITH COVER REQUIREMENTS AND POSSIBLY AS CITIZEN ARGENTINA SHOULD BE PROVIDED. OBVIOUSLY HIS DOCUMENTATION WHILE IN B.A. MUST BE ABLE WITHSTAND WHATEVER CHECK SOV EMBASSY LIKELY MAKE ON PEOPLE SERVICING ITS PREMISES.

S E C R E T

BT

TSD/AB will reply

TSD/AB - CANNOT ISSUE U.S. PASSPORT TO AMSTALK-1. PUERTO RICAN DOCUMENTATION NOT FEASIBLE.

S. [illegible] SB/C/[illegible] - INFORMED.

SECRET

ORIG: ROBERT FAMBRINI:mr
UNIT: WH 4/Argentina
EXT: 6609
DATE: 3 APRIL 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 4

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER SB, 1(E.O.)

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 2 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/SAS, DDP, ADDP, "EYES ONLY"

C/WH/COG 2, C/TSD

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 3 23 11 Z CITE DIRECTOR 88444

WH/4/A
Chief ____
CA ____
FI/CI ____
Reports ____

TO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0316 (IN 83405) 201-305337

1. AS MENTIONED JMWAVE 1802 (IN 76557) AMOTIN 117 (FORMERLY AMSTALK 1) HOLDS CUBAN PASSPORT. HQS CONCERNED RE POSSIBILITY AMOTIN 117 TRUE NAME TRAVEL MAY DRAW UNWANTED ATTENTION VIEW CUBAN IS KNOWLEDGE HIS IDENTITY AND PAST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING CONTACTS IN JMWAVE AREA. IT ALSO POSSIBLE SOVIETS IN BUENOS AIRES MAY HAVE ACCESS TO AIRLINE MANIFESTS WHICH WOULD REVEAL AMOTIN 117 ENTRY IF HE TRAVELS IN TRUE NAME. REQUEST THEREFORE STATION ADVISE IF BIOGENESIS HAS CAPABILITY PROVIDE ARGENTINE PASSPORT IN ALIAS WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO AMOTIN 117 FOR HIS USE TO TRAVEL TO BUENOS AIRES. IF THIS NOT FEASIBLE HQS CAN DOCUMENT AMOTIN 117 WITH NICARAGUAN PASSPORT. HOWEVER, THIS LATTER WILL TAKE MINIMUM ONE WEEK, NOT COUNTING FURTHER DELAY WHICH WILL BE CAUSED BY INABILITY BIOGENESIS ISSUE

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIG: ROBERT FAMBRINI:mr
UNIT: WH/4/A
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#________

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 88444

TO

PAGE TWO

NECESSARY VISA PRIOR RECEIPT INFO REQUESTED PARA 1.A. REF. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. FOR JMWAVE: IN EVENT BIOGENESIS UNABLE SUPPLY ARGENTINE PASSPORT REQUEST FOLLOWING SOONEST:

A. CURRENT PASSPORT SIZE PHOTO AMOTIN 117: ONE FRONT VIEW, AND ONE EACH THREE QUARTER VIEWS OF RIGHT AND LEFT SIDES.

B. HEIGHT IN INCHES AND WEIGHT IN POUNDS.

C. COMPLEXION, COLOR EYES AND HAIR.

D. SHAPE OF FOREHEAD AND NOSE.

E. DESCRIPTION DISTINCTIVE FEATURES.

F. SIX SAMPLES AMOTIN 117 SIGNATURE USING FULL NAME: JUAN HIDALGO ELIZONDO ROMANO.

END OF MESSAGE

(continued)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: ROBERT FAVERINI:mr
UNIT: WH/4/A
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ #________

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR

(elite) (pica)

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 88444

TO

PAGE THREE

SB/O/WH J. Noland (phone)

SB/O/PT G. Hunt (phone)

CI/R&A/TC J. O'Keefe (phone)

WH/2 T.Desmond (draft)

WH/COG J. McTighte (phone)

TSD/AOB E. Brennan (phone)

TSD/AB Tina Japiks (phone)

William V. Broe
C/WHD

Raymond A. Warren
C/WH/4

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED C/SB
ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY: B AT: 2110 Z
DISSEM BY: 32 PER SB.LEO
ACTION C/SB5 ☒ RID COPY

ASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-309337
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☒ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG
INFO. FILE. VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH2, C/WH/COG2, C/TSD, "EYES ONLY"

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 SB/0/ICT

BUEN

2 APR 68 IN 83405

S E C R E T 022010Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0316

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

PRIORITY

REF: DIRECTOR 86830

1. ON 1 APRIL DISCUSSED DOCUMENTATION QUESTION WITH BIOGENESIS-66 WHO ON 2 APRIL RECEIVED FORMAL BIOGENESIS APPROVAL FOR FOLLOWING:

A. UPON RECEIPT PHOTOGRAPH, BIO DATA, PRESENT ADDRESS, DOCUMENTATION (TYPE, NUMBER, DATE AND PLACE ISSUED AND BY WHOM), BIOGENESIS WILL OBTAIN SIX MONTH TEMPORARY VISA WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED TO ARGENTINE CONSULATE MIAMI (OR OTHER LOCATION AS WE DESIRE).

B. UPON ARRIVAL, BIOGENESIS AND STATION WILL WORK OUT BACKGROUND LEGEND FOR WHICH BIOGENESIS WILL FURNISH NECESSARY DOCUMENTS.

C. AMSTALK-1 WILL BE INTRODUCED TO CASTAGNA AND PLACED ON HIS PAYROLL, INCLUDING SOCIAL SECURITY, AND HOSPITALIZATION COVERAGE.

2. IN VIEW A, ABOVE PLEASE CABLE AMSTALK-1 DATA AND INDICATE WHERE VISA SHOULD BE FORWARDED.

SECRET

2 APR 68
201-309337

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 0316 S E C R E T

3. RE PARA 4 REF: ONCE AMSTALK-1 HAS PENETRATED AND SUCCESSFULLY CASED TARGET, WE SHALL CERTAINLY CONSIDER USE OF PACY TECH. HOWEVER EVEN SO, BELIEVE AMSTALK-1 WOULD SERVE OUR INTERESTS BEST THIS REGARD RATHER THAN CASTAGNA SINCE LATTER'S ABILITY CERTAINLY BELOW AMSTALK-1 VIS-A-VIS AUDIO DEVICES AND INSTALLATIONS THEREOF. ALSO NOTE, IF FEASIBLE, OUR PURPOSE IS POSSIBLY MAKE UNILATERAL INSTALLATION. USE AMSTALK-1 RATHER THAN CASTAGNA ESSENTIAL THIS REGARD.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: 2

DISSEM BY: 74 PER SB . 1(E0)

ACTION: C/SB-5 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-207337

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ WH/4/A DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH-2, C/WH/COG-2, C/TSD

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	C/SB/PT	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

EYES ONLY

WAVE

S E C R E T 292301Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1801

DIRECTOR INFO BUENOS AIRES

29 MAR 68 IN 81181

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT ALTARGET TECHS

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 86832

WH/4/AB

INDEX

AMSTALK-1 SALARY 492.00 GROSS AT TIME OF TERMINATION.

1. VIEW HIS RECALL AND EXTENDED TDY SENSITIVE JOB, SUGGEST APPROPRIATE INCREASE BE MADE, EITHER ALONG LINES SALARIES OTHER JMCHALK AGENTS, OR ON A FLAT DAILY RATE (20 TO 25 DOLLARS) PLUS NORMAL PER DIEM FOR DURATION OF ASSIGMMENT.

S E C R E T

BT

29 MAR. 68

201-307337

SECRET

27 March 1965

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA
Attention: Mr. Jack Lally

SUBJECT : Request for an Amendment of [illegible]-117's Operational Approval (201-307337)

1. It is requested that Subject's Operational Approval be amended for his one-time use to assist in the casing and possible installation of a proposed audio operation under the cover of an air conditioner repairman against the Soviet Embassy in Buenos Aires.

2. We would appreciate expeditious handling of this request because this operation is expected to get underway sometime in early April 1965, (per BUENOS AIRES-0341, IN-73483).

3. This request has been coordinated with Mr. David Phillips, WH/COG.

G

Raymond A. Warren
Chief, WH/4

Attachment:
BUENOS AIRES-0341

CONCUR:

David Phillips
WH/COG

Date

DDP/WH/4/Arjgentina:JUNE KEIRLE:mr (27 March 1968)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/COG
1 - 201-307337
1 - Memo Chrono (WH/4/A)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 21 PER 1

ACTION C/SB5 ☒ RID COPY

SIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE. VR. C/WH/COG 5, C/WH 6, C/SOD 3, C/TSD 2

C/CI, C/FI 2, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 271638Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1817 27 Mar 68 IN 78232

DIRECTOR INFO BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET PBRUMEN

REF JMWAVE 1802 (IN 78557)

1. LELAND H. COBFIELD, CO FOR AMSTALK/1, WILL BE HQS 28 MAY FOR INTERVIEW WITH WOTACK. WH/4 AND SB SOD MAY WISH CONSULT WITH HIM ON REF PREPARATIONS FOR DISPATCH OF AGENT TO BA. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS THE QUESTION OF HOW TO DOCUMENT AMSTALK/1 FOR HIS TRAVEL AND FOR DURATION OF STAY THERE.

~~SO~~

RLF

file 201

2. HQS AND BUENOS AIRES SHOULD REVIEW UFGA-17794, DTD 18 SEP 1964 AND ATTACHMENTS. SUBJECT, AMICE/14, IS NOW AMSTALK/1.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

ORIG: FABBRINI/G.HUNT/-bo
UNIT: WH/4/A SB/O/PT
EXT: 1069 1551
DATE: 27 March 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER SB 1(E.O.)

CONF: C/WH2 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, C/CSS, DDP AND "EYE ONLY"

C/WHCOG 2, C/TSD

(date and time filed) 28 23 29 Z

WH/4/A Chief 86830

SECRET

ALL DOCS RE PREPARATION AMSTALK-1 FOR TRAVEL TO B.A. ON LEFT HAND SIDE OF FILE.

TO JMWAVE INFO: BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REF: JMWAVE 1802 (IN 78557)

1. INITIATING PRIORITY ACTION REINSTATE AMSTALK-1 OA FOR USE DESCRIBED DIRECTOR 83378. WILL ADVISE WHEN GRANTED, AND WILL THEN REQUEST JMWAVE MAKE TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS.

2. REQUEST JMWAVE ADVISE RE AMSTALK-1 SALARY AND/OR PER DIEM REQUIREMENTS.

3. FOR BUENOS AIRES: REQUEST ADVISE JMWAVE RE DOCUMENTATION AMSTALK-1 WILL NEED TO ENTER ARGENTINA. ASSUME THAT BECAUSE AMSTALK-1 WILL BE INTRODUCED TO BIOGENESIS AS WOFIRM TECH PER PARA 11.A., HABA 19121, THEY WILL PROVIDE COVER FOR HIS ENTRY, NECESSARY RESIDENCE DOCUMENTS, AND PROVIDE THOROUGH BACKSTOPPING WHATEVER LEGEND INVOLVING OTHER THAN PBRUMEN NATIONALITY STATION CONSIDERS BEST CALCULATED TO ESTABLISH NORMALCY AMSTALK-1 PRESENCE IN CASTAGNA SHOP, AND STAND UP IN EVENT GOA ROUTINELY CHECKS ON BACKGROUND CREW MEMBERS.

4. FOR BUENOS AIRES: PER BUENOS AIRES 0260 (IN 77574) WISH

/CONTINUED/

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

☐ RID COPY

INFO.

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 76830

PAGE 2

MAKE CLEAR IT UNLIKELY RAN INSTALLATION CAN BE MADE IN SOVIET EMBASSY BY AGENT TECH SUCH AS AMSTALK-1. CANDIDATES UNCOVERED THUS FAR HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE WOFIRM AUDIO DEVICES AND NO AUDIO TECH ABILITY (IN CONTRAST GENERAL MECHANICAL, TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE). APPEARS QUESTIONABLE HOW MUCH AGENT SUCH AS AMSTALK-1 CAN ACCOMPLISH BEYOND CASING. SINCE ULTIMATE INSTALLATION WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE PREFABBED DEVICE WHICH COULD BE INSTALLED BY CASTAGNA, WE SUGGEST YOU ALSO CONCENTRATE ON SUITABLE COMPONENT PARTS, ACCESSORIES OR OTHER ELECTRICAL FIXTURES USING PACY TECH AS SUGGESTED PARA 3, HABW 11024. WE FEAR THAT BY PLACING HEAVY XXXXXX RELIANCE ON AGENT TECH TO MAKE INSTALLATION WE MIGHT MISS OPPORTUNITY FOR MORE CERTAIN INSTALLATION USING COMPONENT PART. AS YOU MAY BE AWARE PREFABBING COMPONENT PART COULD TAKE 30 DAYS AFTER RECEIPT HQS.

5. ALL ADDEES: PLS USE ABOVE SLUG LINE ON FUTURE TRAFFIC THIS OP.

END OF MESSAGE

SH Comment: Ref attached.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 86830

TO

PAGE 3

SB/o/WH J. NOLAN, IN DRAFT
TSD/AOB E. BRENNAN, BY PHONE
CI/R&A/TC ______
C/WH/4 ______
WH/3/P ______
~~C/S/ ______~~
WH/LOG ______
ADC/SB/AO ______

William V. Broe
C/WH

SB/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 41

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 32

ACTION SB5 ☒ RID COPY

CSDO, CI, FI2, EI [illegible] 2, [illegible]

WH, WH/COG 5, SB3, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 261926Z MAR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 6271

26 MAR 68 IN 78467

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET TECHS PBRUMEN

REF DIRECTOR 85763

1. OUR UNDERSTANDING SUBJECT DIRECTOR 85528 CANNOT BE TURNED BILATERALLY; HENCE, WE DID NOT ARRANGE VISIT TO CARTAGENA [illegible].

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
DISSEM BY 3 PER #
ACTION [illegible] RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ACTION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐
ADV. COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:
INFO:
FILE. VR, [illegible], C/S65, C/503, [illegible], C/A, C/K2, [illegible], CS/DO

26 MAR 68 IN 78557

SC
RLF

SECRET 262127Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1802

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY

NO NIACT

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET TECHS PBRUMEN

REFERENCE DIRECTOR 85763

1. AMSTALK-1 CONTACTED MARCH 26, 1968 PER REF TDY ASSIGNMENT. HE AGREED MAKE SELF AVAIALABLE AS REQUIRED. LOCATION PROPOSED OPERATION AND DETAILS NOT REVEALED AMSTALK-1 THIS MEETING. HOWEVER, HE APPRISED REQUIREMENT ASSUME COVER ROLE OF LABORER FOR AIR CONDITIONER COMPANY IN SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY AND STRINGENT NEED LIVE COVER THIS ROLE. ALSO ADVISED RISKS, SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND SENSITIVITY, AND FACT OPERATIONAL TASKS WOULD POSSIBLY PROVIDE HIM ENTRE FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATION WHERE HE WOULD BE REQUIRED CONDUCT CASING AND OTHER REQUIRED TASKS. AMSTALK-1 EXPRESSED NO QUALMS REGARDING HIS ABILITY CARRY OUT OPERATIONAL TASKS, OR TO LIVE AND WORK IN ACCORDANCE COVER REQUIREMENTS.

2. IF AMSTALK-1 SELECTED FOR OPERATION, REQUEST HIS OA

SECRET

BE REINSTATED. FYI SUBJECT STILL A REFUGEE WITH PAROLEE STATUS AND PBRUMEN PASSPORT. REQUEST ADVISE NATURE SUPPORT

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 1802 SECRET

TO BE FURNISHED BY JMWAVE AND ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME MAKE NECESSARY TRAVEL AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS.

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: Et

ORIG: ROBERT FABBRINI:mr
UNIT: WH/4/Argentina
EXT: 6609
DATE: 25 MARCH 1968

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 21 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH/COG 5, C/SB 5, C/TSD 3, C/FI 2, C/CI, ADDP, DDP, C/CI/RA,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 85763

TO JMWAVE PRIORITY INFO BUENOS AIRES PANAMA CITY

TSD/AOB MUST COORD.

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET TECHS PBRUMEN

REFS: A. JMWAVE 1703 (IN 72882)
B. DIRECTOR [illegible] 85689 (not sent JMWAVE)
C. BUENOS AIRES 0260 (IN 77574)

1. BASED REF A INFO APPEARS AMSTALK-1 BEST AVAILABLE CANDIDATE. REQUEST JMWAVE DETERMINE EARLIEST DATE HE AVAILABLE FOR TRAVEL TO BUENOS AIRES TO ASSIST STATION PER DIRECTOR 83378.

2. FOR B.A.: SUGGEST SUBJECT DIR 83528 VISIT CASTAGNA SHOP TO SURVEY AIR CONDITIONING UNITS AND SPARE PARTS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Refs and DIRECTOR 83378 attached.

WH/4/A
Chief ____
____
CA ____
____
FI/CI ____ S.C.
____
Reports ____
____

C/WH/4 C. Warren
WH/COG Bill Murray (phone)
WH/2 Jos. Diamond
SB/O/WH Jim Noland (phone)
SB/O/PT Glen Hunt (draft)

William V Broe
C/WHD

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SB

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: J AT: 1925 Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER

ACTION C/SB5 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE W TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE: VR. CS/DO C/WH/COG 5 C/WH6 C/TSD3 C/FI2 C/CI C/CI/RA DDP ADDP

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 251800Z MAR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0260

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

25 MAR 68 IN 77574

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET TECHS PBRUMEN

REFS A DIRECTOR 85087

B BUENOS AIRES 0241 (IN 76485)

C JMWAVE 1703 (IN 72882)

1. HAVE DISCUSSED CASE WITH SUBJECT DIRECTOR 83528. HE IN AGREEMENT OUR PROPOSALS.

2. OUR SPECIFIC NEEDS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. NATIVE SPANISH SPEAKER WHO CAN PASS AS NON U.S. AND WHO HAS TECHNICAL ABILITY PASS AS CASTAGNA HELPER IN AIR CONDITIONER BUSINESS.

B. HAS SUFFICIENT TECHNICAL ABILITY IN ORDER ACCOMPLISH THOROUGH CASINGS AND ON BASIS THESE FIRST HAND CASING REPORTS CAN MAKE REALISTIC RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHAT DEVICE IF ANY CAN BE INSTALLED.

3. WHAT WE HAVE IS OPPORTUNITY SEND A TRAINED AND CONTROLLED ASSET INTO VITAL TARGETS. ON BASIS HIS CASINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WE CAN THEN DETERMINE WHAT DEVICE HE (SINCE HE WILL HAVE REPEATED ACCESS) CAN OR CANNOT INSTALL.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **SECRET** *(When Filled In)*	TOTAL COPIES GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		1	6	
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO		2	7	
BY: AT: Z	CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.		3	8	
	X-REF TO FILE NO.		4	9	
DISSEM BY PER #	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO	BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.	5	10	
ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO: FILE. VR.				

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 0260 SECRET

4. STATION WISHES MOVE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE THIS OP AND TAKE ADVANTAGE REF B OPPORTUNITY. REQUEST HQS SELECT BEST AVAILABLE CANDIDATE FROM REF C AND ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: ROBERT FAMBRINI:11
UNIT: WH/4/A
EXT: 6609
DATE: 25 MARCH 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: ___ PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 74-120-221

CONF: C/WH 6 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR C/SB5, C/TSD3, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, C/CI, C/CI/RA, C/FI 2

(elite) (pica)

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 25 21 40 Z CITE DIRECTOR 85686

WH/4/A
Chief ___
CA ___
FI/CI ___
Reports ___

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0241 (IN 75485)

BASED YOUR RECENT DISCUSSION WITH SUBJ DIR-83528 PLEASE FORWARD DETAILED ACCOUNT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR TECH CANDIDATE. ALSO ADVISE HOW THIS OP WILL BE CARRIED OUT, PARTICULARLY ROLE CASTAGNA BROS WILL PLAY AND HOW THIS WILL DIFFER FROM TECH'S ROLE. BASED YOUR RESPONSE WILL INITIATE SEARCH FOR CANDIDATE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref attached.

SB/O/PT Glen Hunt (phone)

Calvin H. Smyth
For William V. Broe
Chief, WHD

Raymond A. Warren
Raymond A. Warren
Chief, WH/4

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: 2

DISSEM BY 35/21 PER

ACTION c/WH 5 ☒ RID COPY

MESSAGE ✓ TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

INFO. FILE. VR. c/WH/COG 5, c/WH-6, DDP, ADDP, c/CI, c/CI/OA, c/TSD 3, c/FI 2

D/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

RC			
1		6	
2	OPS	7	OS
3	EW	8	TC
4		9	
5		10	SS

RR

SA DESTROY COG/REG

S E C R E T 182227Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1703 18 MAR 68 IN 72082

M

DIRECTOR INFO BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET TECHS PBRUMEN

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 83378

ACTION [illegible]

1. JMWAVE HAS NO TRAINED PBRUMEN AUDIO TECHS AVAILABLE FOR REF TDY. HOWEVER NUMBER OF TRAINED RADIO OPERATORS WITH TECHNICAL BACKGROUND WHO TRAINED AND SEASONED IN OPERATIONS WITH NATIVE SPANISH CAPABILITY, AVAILABLE AND POSSIBLY SUITABLE. WHILE JMWAVE NOT AWARE HQS PLANS FOR FURTHER USE INDIVIDUALS NOW ASSIGNED JMCHALK, BELIEVE THIS PROGRAM HAS NUMBER INDIVIDUALS WORTH CONSIDERING, INCLUDING XICOBALT-1, 2, 3, OR 4, UNLESS SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS PRECLUDE THEIR USE IN BUENOS AIRES. USE OF AMLILAC-30 OR AMLILAC-33 MAY ALSO WARRANT CONSIDERATION ALTHOUGH THEY BEING CONSIDERED FOR ASSIGNMENT ELSEWHERE.

2. XICOBALT-4 (FORMERLY AMLILAC-32) POSSIBLY WARRANTS SPECIAL CONSIDERATION BECAUSE OF HIS EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING AS ELECTRICIAN'S HELPER DURING PERIOD JANUARY 1966-OCTOBER 1967 WITH A PRIVATE COMPANY. THIS EXPERIENCE DID INCLUDE WORKING ON AIR CONDITIONERS. IN ADDITION HE IS

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

RF AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 1703 SECRET

32 YEAR OLD BACHELOR WHO HAS HAD EXTENSIVE TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AS MEMBER OF AMLILAC GROUP INCLUDING TRAINING IN RADIO. MOST RECENTLY HE HAS BEEN ON JMCHALK OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT TO LA PAZ.

3. IN ADDITION TO JMCHALK PERSONNEL, STATION IS STILL IN CONTACT WITH AMSTALK-1 WHO RECENTLY TERMINATED, BUT WHO BY VIRTUE HIS TRAINING, EXPERIENCE, AND BACKGROUND MAY BE BEST CANDIDATE. AMSTALK-1 IS 32 YEAR OLD GRADUATE OF UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA WHO HAS BEEN ACTIVELY ASSOCIATED WITH WOFIRM SINCE 1961 AS AN MHAPRON INFILTREE/RECRUITER SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAM LEADER AND PRINCIPAL AGENT. HE IS HIGHLY TRAINED, MOTIVATED SEASONED OPERATOR WHO HAS RECEIVED RADIO TRAINING AND PRESENTLY IS PART OWNER OF ELECTRICAL APPLIANCE STORE IN JMWAVE AREA. HIS WORK INCLUDES SALE AND INSTALLATION OF ELECTRICAL APPLIANCE INCLUDING AIR CONDITIONERS. AMSTALK-1 HAS EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE TDY ASSIGNMENTS ON SHORT NOTICE.

4. ABOVE ARE OUR IMMEDIATE CANDIDATES. OTHERS

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

ACTION ☐ NO COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR,

PAGE 3 JMWAVE 1703 S E C R E T

COULD BE FOUND. ADVISE WHAT ACTION IS DESIRED AND WHAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ANY OF THE AFOREMENTIONED INDIVIDUALS IS REQUIRED.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET RYBAT

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET
Photograph of AMSTALK-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: BUENOS AIRES 0316

Forwarded herewith is Subject's photograph as requested in paragraph 1 (a) of Reference.

Wendel J. RAMOVA

Attachment:
Photograph - Herewith

Distribution:
3 - COS, Buenos Aires, w/att.

201 file

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABS-3069	8 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET RYBAT	

1 - Chrono
1 - Tempo
1 - 201
1 - SB/O/WH
1 - SB/O/PT
1 - WH/COG
1 - TSD/AOB
1 - TSD/AB

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/4/Ar	Robert Fambrini	mr	6609

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/4/A	8 APR 1968	Stephen G. Chaconas
SB/O/WH		J. Noland (phone)
SB/O/PT		G. Hunt (phone)
WH/COG		J. McTighe (phone)
TSD/AOB		K. Brennan (phone)
TSD/AB		P. Phelan (phone)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/4	[illegible]	Raymond A. Herren

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE WH/COS

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational
Termination of AMSTALK-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION: Cancel OA and MOC

1. Transmitted herewith are the Agent Service Record, Damage Report and Form 2457 on AMSTALK-1, who was terminated 29 February 1968. Subject was terminated for economy reasons, the lack of operational activity and because of the current JMWAVE reorganization. The termination was amicable and without prejudice. Attempts to place Subject with another JMWAVE component or the JMCHALK program were unsuccessful. Please cancel Subject's OA and MOC.

2. JMWAVE believes it worth noting that Subject has an excellent operational record and has participated in a number of special operations as a team member, team leader and principal agent. In addition, he had a hand in the recruitment of AMTRUNK-19, and, as recently as June 1967, made a WOFIRM-sponsored operational trip to Madrid.

3. As a result of the good will built up with Subject over the years of WOFIRM service and the excellent rapport maintained with him throughout, Subject offered to make himself available on short notice for any WOFIRM operational assignment. His 201 file contains his current location, in the event recontact with him becomes desirable at a later date.

Special Contracting Officer

Leland H. COBFIELD

APPROVED:

Attachments: Herewith, 2 cys ea
1 - Agent Service Record
2 - Damage Report
3 - Form 2457

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/atts. 1,2,3 H/W (2 cys ea)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED 8 March 68	DATE DISPATCHED MAR 1
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA- 29702	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201- 307337	

SECRET

Att. #1 to UFGA- 29702

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

201- 307337

1. Agent's cryptonym or pseudonym: - AMSTALK-1 (formerly AMICE-14)
2. Project identification: AMTRUNK, AMSCAR
3. Agent recruited by: Irving N. PEGGINS, Stanley R. ZAMKA
4. Capacity in which agent served: Team member, Team Leader of Special Operations infiltration team. Later P/A other operational teams.
5. Rate of pay: Gross: $492.00 ~~Net:~~ $443.95
6. Other commitments: None - Subject has MOC, Amendment provides for severance pay.
7. Agent dismissed by: Leland H. COBFIELD
8. Reason for dismissal: Economy, lack of operational activity, redirection of WOFIRM operations, reorganization at JMWAVE.
9. Security risks: See Damage Report. Subject exposed to large number WOFIRM employees, sites, techniques and training and operations.
10. Is Agent recommended for re-use: Yes. Subject is one of the Station's most capable, highly motivated assets.
11. Manner of dismissal: Amicable - Subject offered to serve in any operational capacity as needed.
12. Letter of termination signed: Termination and Quit Claim filed in 201- 307337.

SECRET

CS COPY

H/W Att. #2 to UFGA- 29702

SECRET

8 March 1968

DAMAGE REPORT

NAME: AMSTALK-1 (formerly AMICE-14) 201- 307337

Last date SGSWIRLED 2 June 1966, 7 December 1966, June 1967

Safehouse and Training Areas Exposed and Cover Companies Exposed

Camp Rose, ISOLATION, Survival and Maritime Training Sites
Firing Range

Safehouses 116, 164, 177, 206, 211, 216, 224, 256, 296, 316, 318, 326, 317

South Allapattah Properties, May 1967

Cover Companies:
Byron Construction Company (Chief Clerk 1 August 1965)
Gulf Air, Inc. (Identification Card #254, 26 May 1964)
Consolidated Associates Engineering Cover for S/H 224
Red Sunset Cover for S/H 316
Seminole Holding Company
Allied Research

Indigenous Agent Personnel Exposed

AMTRUNK-9	by	true name	AMPOLISH-1	by	alias
AMAGREE-1	"	true name	AMSUGAR-3	"	alias
AMAKA-1	"	" "	AMSCAR-1	"	"
AMTRUNK-7	"	" "	AMSPRAG-1	"	"
AMTRUNK-13	"	" "	AMMIRROR-1	"	"
AMTRUNK-19	"	" "	AMDIAL-4	"	"
AMTRUNK-25	"	" "	AMLILAC-50	"	"
AMTRUNK-21	"	" "	AMLILAC-51	"	"
*AMTRUNK-24	"	" "	AMANCHOR-20	"	"
AMAROMA-2	"	" "	AMANCHOR-21	"	"
AMAROMA-3	"	" "	AMANCHOR-25	"	"
AMLUNT-2	"	" "			
AMTRUNK-22	"	" "			
AMLABEL-1	"	" "			
AMANCHOR-9	"	" " & by alias	AMICE-27		
AMPAN-18	"	alias	AMSUGAR-3		
AMTOWEL-1	"	"	AMSCAR-1		
AMTOWEL-2	"	"	AMSCAR-5		
AMTOWEL-3	"	"	AMTOBY-13		
AMBIG-5	"	"			
AMANCHOR-8	"	"			

*Knows this individual assigned to Caracas.

SECRET

[illegible] CS COPY [illegible]

AMSTALK-1

SECRET

WOFIRM Personnel Exposed

Reuben A. HANNULA as Fred Folsom
Irving N. PEGGINS as Joe Webster
Aubrey K. PAUKERTas Jerry
Andrew F. QUAAL as Bill
Hugh R. DENDY as George
Kurt G. MAKRICKAS as Jack
Rudolph W. SOSPINE as Jack
Ewan K. SCHWAMBRON as Bob
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as Dewey
Alton T. PIRNACK as Larry
Thomas K. ADARKAR as Ed
John K. TARTARILLO as John
Marcus A. PREUSSE as Jim
Merritt R. TOOVEY as Warren
Irving C. DEVUONO as Lee
Paul J. NAPOLILLI as Paul
John K. GARZYNSKI as Roy
William R. GOMERSALL as Doc
Clayton B. FARSHTEY as Frank
Willard R. NAUMAN as Rod
Leland H. COBFIELD as Paul
Paul H. KUBIAK as Rene
Peter O. TRADURN as Larry

Fletcher R. THENNE as Harry
Daniel V. GUSSOW as Bill
Humphrey O. EDDERK as ski
Wilfred B. KNEAFSY as Pete
Charles F. MASENGILL as Frank
Lloyd V. MEADERDS as Bob
Clayton D. HEIPPERT as Don
Austin G. DETLOFF as Bill
John H. HEMMING as George
Carl M. BERSCHIUSKI as Gene
Gary T. BERNARD as Bob
Keith D. WINETT as Bob
Daniel R. HOSKIER as Fred
Lyman C. MARTEWICZ as Bill
Aubrey R. PARANT as Randy.
Kenneth T. STARKROOD as Ray
Andrew S. PARMERS as Angel
Lester S. KLINETOP as Bob
Harold R. NOEMAYR as Roger
Stanley R. ZAMKA as Dr. Mendez
George H. RAMSKILL as Harold
Mark H. ANGERHOFER as John

Instructors at ISOLATION by first name or nick names
Stanley B. JERSAWIT - True - CI trip to Spain, June 1967

Indigenous Instructors Exposed

AMPAL-1
AMSKILL-1
AMSWING-2
AMCLEVE-6
AMCLEVE-8
AMTERRY-1
AMSWING-1
AMHINT-18
AMHINT-19
AMPULP-2
AMTABBY-56
AMJILT-1

AMYELL-3
AMPHODARCH-11
AMWIND-1
AMPULP-2

SECRET

Operational Areas Exposed

STEAMER Operational Area

CONE area

THOR area

AMSCAR area

Loading Sites and Vessels Exposed

M/V TRITON and crew
M/V ROINA and crew
M/V JADE and crew
M/V CROWN and crew
M/V PETREL and crew
O/V RIGGER and crew
O/V PIKE and crew
Tarpon Properties
SH #177

Internal Assets Exposed

AMTRUNK-9, -10, -11 (arrested)
AMTRUNK-19 (relative)
AMSCAR-2, -3, -4, -6 (these assets doe not know AMSTALK-1)
AMKISS-1 (this asset does not know AMSTALK-1)
AMKISS-2, -3 (these assets do not know AMSTALK-1)
AMPORCH-1 (this asset does not know AMSTALK-1)
AMTRUNK-9 (recruited, trained, brought out, put back in and then out. Went in by himself and presumed dead.)
AMTRUNK-10 (in Prison)
AMTRUNK-11 (AMSTALK-1's uncle - in Prison)
AMLASH-1 (in Prison)
AMSTALK-1 Aunt (used for accommodation address - still there)
AMTRUNK-15 (arrested in 1964)
AMTRUNK-18

Relatives in WOLADY

Wife
Daughter & 2 sons
Sister
Aunt
Cousin

Relatives in PBRUMEN

Mother and Father are dead
uncles, aunts, cousins are still in PBRUMEN

SECRET

H/W Att. #3 to
UFGA- 29702

INVENTORY - NON STAFF PERSONNEL

	RECORD NO.			
	1	2	3	4
A	ARBITRARY NO.	SUBJECT'S 201 201- 307337	OTHER FILE NO.	
B	SURNAME AMSTALK-1	1ST NAME / PERSONALIA	OTHER GIVEN NAME/TELECODE	TYPE OF NAME
C	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	NATURALIZED-US (yes or pending)
D	COUNTRY CURRENTLY RESIDES	CITY CURRENTLY RESIDES/YEAR	MARITAL STATUS (most recent)	SEX (M or F)
E	OVERT OCCUPATION	LANGUAGE	LANGUAGE	LANGUAGE
F	MILITARY SERVICE/COUNTRY	BRANCH OF SERVICE	INCLUSIVE DATES	
G	COUNTRY AREA KNOWLEDGE	COUNTRY	COUNTRY	
H	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces)			CODE
I	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces)			CODE
J	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	TYPE EMPLOYEE TYPE A OR B	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE WIFE	FULL, PART TIME OR WAE
K	MAINTENANCE/SERVICE	CONSULTANT	PROPRIETARY OR SUBSIDY	CAREER AGENT
L	FIELD AGENT	HQS. FF OR USF	INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR	MOC/MOA
M	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	POA / STATUS	STAFF CLEARANCE	CSA/PCSA
N	HQS COMPONENT RESPONSIBLE	FIELD STATION RESPONSIBLE	PROJECT	COVER
O	ENTRY ON DUTY DATE	YEARLY SALARY	DATE LAST PAY CHANGE	
P	PART OF A RETIREMENT PLAN - SPECIFY (limit to 62 spaces)			
Q	DATE TERMINATED 29 February 1968	REEMPLOYABLE Yes	STAFF CEILING SPACE	
R	REMARKS (re termination, etc.) (limit to 62 spaces) CS COPY			ATTITUDE

FORM 2457

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: ~~CHIEF, CI/OA~~

FROM: (Division) WH/COG/OPS (Case officer) O. Williams (Extension) 5136

SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used): Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue

NAME SHOWN IS: ☒ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☐ CRYPT

CI/OA NO. C-94543

201 NO. 201-307337

PROJECT

DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH

AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

Subject is no longer of Operational interest to the Station.

REF: UFGA-29702, 12 March 1968

201-307337

DATE: 26 March 1968

SIGNATURE

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 1-60 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

6 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMOTIN-117 (Formerly AMSTALK-1)
201-307337

1. It is requested that Subject's OA be amended to include his use as a reporting asset with the AMOT organization in the JMWAVE area.

2. An up-to-date PRQ Part II and Green List Check will follow.

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 201-307337
1 - WH/COG/OPS

201-307337

SECRET

201-307337

24/2/68

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Thank You

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
201-307337	Ufga-27441	

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
[illegible]	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
Transmittal of Amendment to MOC for AMSTALK-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: For your information.

REFS : A. DIRECTOR 72757
B. UFGA- 25747, April 66

Transmitted herewith in three copies is an Amendment to the Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Subject.

Leland H Cobfield
Leland H. COBFIELD

Attachment: Herewith
Amendment to MOC

Distribution:
3-WH/COG w/atts. 3 cys H/W

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE TYPED
28 Feb 68

DATE DISPATCHED
MAR 4 1968

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA- 29636

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201- 307337

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET CS COPY

AMENDMENT TO MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

TO : Chief, WH Division

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Amendment to Memorandum of Oral Commitment for 201- 307337 (AMSTALK-1)

Please amend Subject's MOC, effective 1 February 1968 as follows:

Add to Paragraph 9, Contingent Obligations:

"With prior approval of the Chief of Station, upon termination Subject may be paid up to one month's severance pay for each year's service, with three months the maximum."

REVIEWED:

Special Contracting Officer

SIGNED H. L. Steadman
Field Contracting Officer

REVIEWED:
Contract Approving Officer
Mar. 14, 1968

ATT to UFGA 29136

201-307337

CS COPY

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

TO : Chief, WH Division

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Amendment to Memorandum of Oral Commitment for 201- 307337 (AMSTALK-1)

Please amend Subject's MOC, effective 1 February 1968 as follows:

Add to Paragraph 9, Contingent Obligations:

"With prior approval of the Chief of Station, upon termination Subject may be paid up to one month's severance pay for each year's service, with three months the maximum."

REVIEWED:
/s/ Rogers C. Brooks
Special Contracting Officer

SIGNED ______________________
Field Contracting Officer

REVIEWED: ______________________
Contract Approving Officer

AMSTALK

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267337

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET 28

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

PROC 25

ACTION WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR WH 8, FI, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2, MPS/BG 3, CCS 3, CSPS, DO 4

14 FEB 68 IN 51191

4/1P

AN... FI
PS/...
ABSTRACT X [illegible]

SECRET 142246Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1264

DIRECTOR

AMOT

1. REQUEST AMENDMENTS OA OF AMTERRY-1 (AMOTIN-116, SALARY $424 PER MONTH) AMSTALK-1 (AMOTIN-117, SALARY $424 PER MONTH). BOTH ASSIGNED AMOT CI/CE OFFICE.

2. ABOVE TO REPLACE AMOTIN-23, AMTOIN-62, AND AMOTEX-15 WHO LEFT AMOT ORGANIZATION IN JANUARY, AND ALSO AMTOIN-3 (ASSIGNED TO SATION CARACAS) AND AMOTIN-33 (ASSIGNED TO STATION LA PAZ) WHO NO LONGER ON AMOT ORGANIZATION T/O.

SECRET

SECRET

MICROFILMED
MAR 19 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B 201-[illegible]

201-267337
[illegible] 1968

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WH

INFO

Chief, Domestic Ops Division; Chief, DO Base, New York; Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT

Operational/TYPIC/MHGUILE/AMSTALK
Pedro Luis PINERO Eiria

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: HMMA-33829, 12 January 1968

1. On 30 January 1968 AMSTALK-1 was shown the passport picture of Pedro Luis PINERO Eiria, which was received at JMWAVE as an attachment to the reference, for possible identification as one of the two Cubans he had met with in Madrid on 23 June 1967.

2. AMSTALK-1 said the individual in the photo was definitely not "Guillermo". He said that if the individual was one of the two he had met with, it would have to be the second man, who used no name but gave the impression of being a bodyguard. However, he said the second man had darker skin tones; looked like an Arab or Lebanese; appeared to have some Negro blood, although he would not classify him as a mulato; and had curly hair which was almost kinky. The eyes, lips and receding hairline are very similar, but the individual he met had a large bushy mustache.

Flora B. Shinnery
Flora B. SHINNERY

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG
2 - DO Base, New York
2 - DO Division
2 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

FEB 5 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-29441

DATE

31 Jan 68

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

201-307337

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACTION PUSHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO
Chief, Domestic Ops Division
Chief, DO Base, New York

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/MHGUILE/AMSTALK
C. Transmittal of Iden Kit Composites

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. DIRECTOR 49660, 6 Nov 67
B. JMWAVE 0179, 9 Nov 67
C. UFGA-28958, 13 Nov 67
D. DIRECTOR 51514, 14 Nov 67

Action Required: See para 5

1. Forwarded herewith are Iden Kit Composites, as requested in paragraph 3 of reference A, which were made by AMSTALK-1 of the two DGI officers he met with in Madrid on 23 June 1967.

2. Guillermo (composite No. 1) was described by AMSTALK-1 as being about 5'8" tall, slender build, light brown hair, dark eyes, long pale face, thin lips, and having no distinguishing characteristics such as unusual scars or marks.

3. Guillermo's companion, fnu lnu, (composite No. 2) was described by AMSTALK-1 as medium height, heavy stocky build, dark hair, thick lips, and having no distinguishing characteristics such as unusual scars or marks.

4. The composites have been sent to the AMOTs for possible identification.

5. Please advise JMWAVE if any identification is made of Guillermo or his companion.

Flora B. Shinnery
Flora B. SHINNERY

Attachment - Herewith
Iden Kit Composites

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/att
2 - C/WH w/o att
2 - C/DO Base, N.Y. w/att
2 - C/DO Div w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
21 Nov 67

DATE DISPATCHED
NOV 29 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-29012

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-307337

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO
Chief, Domestic Ops Division
Chief, DO Base, New York

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/MHGUILE/AMSTALK
Transmittal of Photographs

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 2

References: A. DIRECTOR-49660, 6 Nov 67

B. JMWAVE-0179, 9 Nov 67

1. Attached hereto is a photograph of two unidentified Cuban DGI officers identified by AMSTALK-1 as the two individuals he met with in Madrid on 23 June 1967. Guillermo (number 1 on photo) conducted the entire conversation with AMSTALK-1 which lasted one hour, while the individual (number 2 on photo) who accompanied Guillermo spent the entire time pacing the room and discreetly checking for listening devices.

2. DO Base, New York: Please advise JMWAVE if an identification is made as to whether Pedro Luis PINERO Siria, who is scheduled to be assigned to the Cuban Mission to the UN in New York City, is Guillermo or his companion.

Flora B. Shinnery
Flora B. SHINNERY

Attachment - Herewith
Photo

Distribution:
✓ - WH/COG w/att
2 - C/WH w/o att
2 - C/DO Base, New York w/att [illegible]
2 - C/DO Division w/att [illegible] w/o att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
9 Nov 67

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28958

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-307337
201-307337

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET



23 June 1967

1. "Guillermo" line

2. fine line

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
FROM 24

IFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	C/	5	
2		6	
3	FI	7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH/COG-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/DO-4, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/EUR-4, C/F

3 Nov 67 IN 50457

S E C R E T 091835Z CITE JMWAVE 0179

DIRECTOR INFO DO BASE/NEW YORK, MEXICO CITY

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF: DIRECTOR 49660

Weatherway

1. FILES REFLECT AMSTALK-1 IDENTIFIED PROFILE PHOTOS TAKEN 23 JUNE BY QUOTAS AS THE TWO UNIDENTIFIES CUBAN DGI OFFICERS WITH WHOM HE MET IN MADRID. PHOTOS APPARENTLY HANDCARRIED TO JMWAVE BY JERSAWIT. NO PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS WERE OBTAINED.

2. POUCHING COPIES PHOTOS HQS AND DO BASE NEW YORK.

S E C R E T

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WHDivision		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief of Station, JMWAVE; C/EUR			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Madrid			MICROFILM
SUBJECT TYPIC/MHGUILE/AMSTALK Taped Conversation			
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES : MADRID 1832			

Attached is transcription, in Spanish, of the conversation referred to in reference.

(18)

Leslie H. HENDRIQUE

Attachment: Spanish Transcription

Distribution:

2 - C/WH w/1 cy att
2 - COS,JMWAVE w/1 cy att
1 - C/EUR w/1 cy att
[illegible]

1 DTI

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA-22701	DATE 10 July 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-307337

Miguel - Sientate, quieres un cigarrillo?

Guillermo - Como no, gracias.

Miguel - La situation no se cual es, te das cuenta, entonces quiero conocer la situacion.

Guillermo - Ante todo, vamos a tener la perspectiva de una conversacion, en todos nuestros aspectos, e incluso en la actitud necesaria queremos verle a fin de rectificar. Toda esta conversacion va a ser algo mas tecnica, lo mas armado, tratando de subsanar, y siendo lo mas ecuanime posible .

Miguel - Si, yo creo que tanto Uds. como yo, todos tenemos ......, somos cubanos, y entonces podemos conversar. Entonces que lleguemos o no a un acuerdo ya es otra cosa, pero siempre podemos hablar y no creo que con eso se perjudicaran ni Uds. ni yo. Mis ideas Uds. saben cuales son. Siempre han sido esas, desde que luchabamos contra Batista, o sea no es una situacion nueva ni es una cosa improvisada. Y tambien saben por que me fui de Cuba. No fue ambicion politica, porque yo estaba muy bien con el gobierno y tenia muchos amigos, sino simplemente porque no estaba de acuerdo con las ideas. Pero bueno es una parte de la cosa que no vamos a discutir, pero sinceramente en lo que .... me vine de los EEUU aqui y no es cosa de juego y estar metido ya en la situacion esperando llamado de Uds. tampoco. De Cuba llegue el jueves pasado.

Guillermo - ...... de La Habana?

Miguel - Mando un telegrama pero con la direccion equivocada, con el numero equivocado. No lo entregaron entonces mande uno a los dos dias como no tuvo exito entonces............

Guillermo - Como preambulo te digo que te conocemos, nos conocemos mas o menos. Sabemos las ideas de (oidas?). Queremos saber que quieres tu de ideas, de accion, de hechos, de exposiciones, colocaciones mas alla de lo debido, las ventajas, etc. Mira, fijate, cuando nosotros te conociamos durante la lucha revolucionaria de tipo continental, tu no eras un tipo comun, tu eras un tipo singular.

Miguel - Yo soy un cubano mas, igual que Uds.

Guillermo - Te quiero decir, tu tienes personalidad, tenias ideas, tenias barba, te pusiste ..... mas o menos, en una cuestion luchando por ahi. Luego vienen los primeros años donde entra una serie ya de compr ensiones en cuanto al proceso. Tu en lo que te rodea. Fijate, en cuanto a los años interesantes, quisiera que tu me hicieras un analisis para poder empezar la discusion, ese año 1959-60, que te paso a ti?

Miguel - 1959-60, empezando, yo nunca presencie el 26 de Julio. Fui Presidente del Directorio, fui amigo personal de Jose Antonio DEFICTICSC (fon) de CHOMON (fon), de FEPIN (fon), de toda la gente del Directorio. Es mas, nunca presencie el 26 de Julio. Yo tuve la suerte de conocer a un individuo, al mejor amigo de Fidel Castro, que si conocia las ideas de Castro. Y se lo puedo decir como un secreto, porque sino lo perjudico, puesto que lo quiero entrañablemente, es para mi como un hermano. Yo se los digo Uds. lo saben. El sabia como Fidel pensaba, inclusive Fidel lo reconocio en una reunion personal, que teniamos

CS COPY

(Cont)

Miguel - en Santa Fe en el año en que fue convocado, un mes antes. Estaba Federico, no Federico no, Santamaria, Isaac, Fidel y no me acuerdo quien mas estaba. Entonces FIDEL le dice, se rio y le dijo Isaac tu de Jefe del Ejercito y yo de Presidente de la Republica, a ver quien se mueve en Cuba, que fuera de estilo comunista, y desde entonces mas nunca se vieron, y el retroproceso ya se conoce. Esa es una de las partes de ..... con las cuales yo estaba predispuesto con .... de Fidel, perfectamente con Fidel y conocia sus ideas, y asi fue como en el año 1956 en los EEUU, en el 1957...... inclusive los primeros meses del gobierno, como diez muchachos conversamos eso y somos el ...., el lo sabe.

Guillermo - Fijate, viendo perspectivamente como se representa tu suspicacia, tu desavenencia, ya visto el proceso, el desarrollo (Miguel interrupts)

Miguel - Dijimos al principio que ibamos a hablar con sinceridad, no es cierto? Ud. ve que yo hablo muy claro.

Guillermo - Fijate, nosotros tenemos que buscar un punto de coincidencia, si no buscamos un punto de coincidencia ....(Miguel interrupts)

Miguel - Especificamente, cual es la razon por la cual Uds. han buscado que me viniera hasta aqui?

Guillermo - Mira Miguel, te voy a hacêr la historia.

Miguel - Ahora comprendiendo, porque podemos estar hablando tres dias seguidos y no nos decimos nada.

Guillermo - Mira aqui vamos a hablar con sinceridad. Tu eres un individuo que, claro, para un cubano es poco comun, entonces una serie de boberias, boberias dentro del personal, tecnicamente mal hecho, entonces tuvo el ...... una serie de problemas que nosotros no podemos anticipar sobre este punto la manera necesaria y dejar la otra, era un caso especifico. Entonces que pasa, pero claro ponemos .... la familia que pasa con este que esta de tonto aqui viendo a gente que como .... Entonces eso parte de la historia; se congela la salida y la entrada de todo el mundo alli.

Miguel - Eso que te digo de Fidel se lo dije a Mabelo en el año 1956 en mi casa. Me dice Miguel, ven aca. Yo en aquel entonces era Presidente de la Asociacion de ...... Me dijo Miguel, por que no vienes a trabajar con nosotros en el .... 26 de Julio. Yo se que Fidel es comunista y tu lo sabes tambien. No, estas equivocado, no me estoy equivocado.

Guillermo - A nosotros nos interesa en cuanto a lo hecho buscar la linea de coincidencia, porque fijate tu a tu parte es una cosa. Tu eres un agente que para nosotros ..... todavia no ....., porque en el lugar donde te colocaste no se te confia. Primero de todo que apoyas demasiado ...... desde el punto de vista tecnico, vamos a mantener una estetica.

Miguel - No hay nada mas logico que si tu vas a ..... tu madre, no que la ..... sino que la veas. Mi madre es una mujer que te voy a decir una cosa, todo lo que le ha hecho a Cuba ha sido bien. Toda su vida ha sido maestra, ha tenido muchos amigos, ha hecho mucho efectivamente en contra de Batista, te das cuenta? O sea que el estado ha tenido consideraciones con ella y con el resto de la familia por .... merece tambien, aparte de lo que haya sido yo, eso es completamente aparte de mi, yo no tengo nada que ver con ella.

Guillermo - No tienes nada que ver pero ..... Mira chico aqui hay una cosa que esta escrita en la carta, mira (probably shows him something). Hay un millon de cosas a solucionar, partiendo del entendimiento mutuo. Que eso es lo que tratamos de participarte, queremos decirte.

Miguel - Bueno, pero que tipo de entendimiento por ejemplo?

Guillermo - Buscar una linea, tratar de ubicar que te molesta, que te mortifica, que tienes y entonces vamos a ver, vamos a entrar en discusion, hoy, podemos tener una discusion diaria, porque esto es problema de mas de un dia, podemos discutir a ver hasta donde podemos llegar. A ver quien eres tu de veras, o que quieres. Aparte de eso, mira tu juicio es contradictorio, tu eres combatiente de un cuadro y te metes en ese bando y te destandas en ese bando. Las cosas que tu vienes a plantearnos a nosotros son contradictorias. No en el origen ideologico, que ya estamos de acuerdo tu no eres comunista, pero en la cuestion practica, es la contradiccion de la persona. Porque hay millones de cosas ideologicas que no vamos a entrar.

Miguel - Yo no se, especificamente .... para que esos senores puedan dejarla en libertad que es lo que habria que hacer.

Guillermo - .... (speaks in very low voice)

Miguel - Espero que no, pero estoy tratando de ayudar porque... (Guillermo interrupts)

Guillermo - ....Mira Miguel, el (balon?) moderno de lo que el mensaje que te queriamos dar es ese. Que discutas con el, discutas un poco, no ..... (he mentions Manolo again). Que trates de discutir con el, ese es el objetivo nuestro, y ademas la carta esta puesta.

Miguel - De manera que eso, la actitud mia, es una actitud, una posicion clara, definida, no pueden tener Uds. en ningun momento idea de que yo pueda tener un doble juego con Uds., siempre hablar con claridad. Yo con Uds. no podria llegar nunca en la vida a ningun tipo de acuerdo en cuanto al trabajo se refiere, porque mis ideas son radicalmente opuestas a las de Uds. Eso no quiere decir que no pueda conversar con Uds. ni eso no quiere decir que no les tenga afecto a Uds., que somos como hermanos, mismo Manolo, Manolo y yo siempre nos llevamos bastante bien, pero ahora el esta en un lado y yo estoy en otro, radicalmente opuesto. No estoy dispuesto a enganarme.

Guillermo - Chico.............

Miguel - Creo que las dos lineas saben que estamos aqui.

Guillermo - Que quiere decir eso?

Miguel - Quiere decir que el gobierno de los EEU U saben, no que estoy en esta habitacion en este momento pero que estoy en Espana y que vine a hablar con Uds. Por eso le digo a Ud. que la intencion mia no es crear un doble juego ni a Ud. ni a mi. Ellos saben que mi madre esta en Cuba, estan conscientes de eso, y que en Cuba Uds. ...... Lo que quiero decir es que no hago juego sucio con Uds.

Guillermo - (habla de una situacion y de analizarla mas, muy dificil de entender)

Miguel - Es una lucha que ha tenido muchas alternativas. Como Uds. vieron yo cometi un error, Uds. tambien cometieron un error, todos cometimos errores, todos fueron susceptibles de cometer errores. Pero siempre podemos hablar. siempre podemos hablar, este hecho por ejemplo, que estemos nosotros reunidos aqui, hace dos o tres años yo creo que hubiera sido imposible.

Guillermo - Este planteamiento muy fino, es un planteamiento que a nosotros nos protege: eso si, nos protege. Tendriamos que entrar a la cuestion ideologica como tu planteas no creo que de momento ..... En nuestra opinion, entonces el planteamiento que tu haces, que tengo que hacer yo?......

Miguel - Yo no haria nada que afectara en ninguna forma mi modo de pensar. Ya le digo no tengo ningun interes en hacerles que tengan una idea equivoca o erronea, un doble juego como se que hay quien lo hace, que se ponen a hacerle juego a Uds. para ver lo que dicen o hacen. Yo vivo en los EEUU, me siento cubano, soy cubano y debo sentirme como tal, y quiero a Cuba y quiero a mis amigos que estan alla, no a los amigos que estan en el gobierno, otros que estan presos, y por eso he venido aqui a conversar con Uds.

Guillermo - Esa es una disyuntiva un poquito cerrada, un poquito cerrada. Yo no puedo creer sobre los amigos que tu tienes alla y que estan en el gobierno, no se que no te gustaria nada positivo para ellos. Los otros amigos que tu tienes alla que estan presos, esos si que tampoco puedes esperar nada positivo para ellos. Hay una cosa cierta, a traves de 8 años que son 8 años de revolucion, tu sigues manteniendo una conducta en tu opinion nunca jamas equivocada. Hasta cuando tu podras seguir manteniendo esa linea de conducta? 27, 14, 15 anos? Tus amigos seguiran presos, yo ~~xx~~ tendre una opinion quizas no muy buena de ti. El problema de Cuba yo no creo que se defina en una forma facil. Cuba ya no es un caso aislado, tu lo sabes. Cuba forma parte de un problema continental incluso mundial.

Miguel - Por desgracia, tanto para Uds. como para nosotros.

Guillermo - Nosotros no, nosotros por suerte. Pero bien, esa es la situacion. La situacion es un poco dificil. Porque EEUU no han podido liquidar .... America Latina es un continente en revolucion, Asia tambien. Claro, estos son nuestros puntos de vista que por supuesto pueden ser muy divergentes a los tuyos.

Guillermo - Cuando eramos mas debiles, cuando estabamos mas aislados, no podiamos influir, en cambio el que hubo ahora tengo una fe absoluta (?). Es una situacion dificil y que perspectivamente, no se, quiza tu entres en analisis perspectivo de lo que tu hagas.

Miguel - Hay una cosa que es la siguiente, estaba analizando la situacion. Desde el punto de vista de Uds. esta bien; ahora el punto de vista mio es el siguiente: yo no soy comunista, por lo tanto .... en Cuba.... las ideas..

Guillermo - Fijate, mira yo te diria a ti otra cosa. Yo te diria a ti que en Cuba hay gente que no es comunista, que no simpatiza con la revolucion, que es Catolica que tienen todas sus ideas, de todo tipo, sociales, prediales, diversas en general, no coincidentes con las ideas de la revolucion, sin embargo estan en Cuba, tienen sus ninos, tienen su trabajo, disfrutan de sus vacaciones, o sea que es una actitud de familia que ...... Una cosa es el ciudadano que se va a los EEUU o se va para Pakistan Occidental que no quiere saber nada mas de Cuba.

Miguel - El que se vayá de Cuba y no quiera sáber mas de Cuba no es buen cubano.

Guillermo - O quiera saber de Cuba, se entere por la prensa, como avanza la revolucion, las dificultades de la revolucion, la situacion mundial por la zona de Cuba, Cuba con relacion a la situacion mundial, se sigue enterando, se siente cubano, tiene una bandera cubana en la casa, se sigue sintiendo cubano. Sin embargo, se dedica a una serie de juegos un poquito peligrosos, tu te das cuenta? Introduccion de RF 48A (fon), introduccion de ......, introduccion de .... y hasta ahora nosotros no hemos tenido mas remedio que defendernos, defendernos de la forma mas humana posible, porque yo te digo a ti realmente con el cargo que tenia tu hermano (?) que ..... era para ....., estamos hablando en nuestro propio idioma. Nosotros no podemos estar dando bombones al que nos tira piedras, y ademas vacaciones al que nos introduce materiales de espionaje.

Miguel - .... exactamente igual.

Guillermo - Quizas, si.

Miguel - En los EEUU no, porque en los EEUU la situacion del pais es distinta, a la de los paises latinos. Es mejor.

Guillermo - Hay una diferencia sensible, por ejemplo nosotros no lo hacemos digamos contra nuestro propio pais, contra nuestro propio pueblo.

Miguel - Tu crees que el pueblo de Cuba esta contento con la situacion de ahora?

Guillermo - Yo creo que si, mira yo te voy a decir otra cosa para que tu tengas una idea clara y nitida de esto. Hay una serie de gente con nivel cultural bastante jodido que no tienen porque ponerse en contra de la revolucion, aunque no sean revolucionarios sinceros, que si miramos del punto de vista economico, han mejorado con la revolucion, si lo miramos desde el punto de vista politico, han mejorado tambien, te das cuenta? Entonces a esas personas nosotros los consideramos tambien parte del pueblo de Cuba. Mira, a nosotros no nos preocuparia mucho de que tu lograrse de tu (?), incluso .... un poquito, tu te das cuenta?

Miguel - El problema es que esos senores, con mi forma de pensar tampoco me daria muchos resultados. No seria valioso para eso.

Guillermo - (Talks about how successful they've been, very difficult to understand what it is)...... que tu estes con un servicio de inteligencia de un pais que esta tratando de ......

Miguel - del comunismo?

Guillermo - Vamos a hablar de esto como liderazgo de que? Vamos a llamarlo por su nombre. De la escuela. Cosas concretas porque se habla en abstracto se parece a la otra (?) Cuando se habla en concreto tenemos que llegar al sistema social de algo, a escuelas, a hospitales~~, a comida~~, a existencias sociales.

Miguel - .... sistema social que se conoce por el nombre comunista de capitalista y en los sistemas sociales se puede progresar....... como el cambio de Rusia de la epoca de los zares a la fecha actual es una cosa increible, posiblemente nunca se ha visto....... por eso los EEUU y otros paises como los EEUU tambien ....

Guillermo - Igual que el de Peru, el de Ecuador, el de Bolivia, el de Brasil.

Miguel - Tu sabes el problema de Sudamerica cual es.

Guillermo - (interrupts), El origen de esta cuestion es muy simple. En primer lugar tu tienes la Cuba de tu informacion parcial. Esta la otra Cuba, la Cuba que combate, la Cuba que rinde, la Cuba que va el 31 de diciembre, 300.000 o 400.000 a un lugar a festejar, la Cuba que tiene cuero. Tu basas tu informacion en base a que? EEUU esta viviendo a costa de Nicaragua, de Costa Rica, de Bolivia, de Panama. Porque mira, si hablamos de liberacion lo primero que tendriamos que liberar seria la humanidad.

Miguel - La situacion actualmente en Cuba no es de la mejor. Hay escasez de todo. Negar eso seria faltar a la forma en que estamos conversando.

Guillermo - Si, hay escasez, eso tu sabes por que hay escasez? Porque todo el mundo come, son dos cosas que se vienen hacia si. En toda Cuba, desde la sierra, no hay un nino, no hay un anciano, no hay un hombre que se quede sin comer, pero hambre hambre endemica no hay.

(then they talk about 5 minutes, very difficult to understand, possibly about Cubans living in Miami and how they live.)

Guillermo - No nos pusimos de acuerdo.

Miguel - Para mi hubiera sido una posicion mas comoda haberle hecho juego a Ud. y lo pude haber hecho, puesto que he venido aqui, nadie me conoce aqui, nadie sabe que yo estoy. Hemos hablado con sinceridad. Otra cosa, no creo que hubiera sido correcto crear un doble juego y aceptar, cambiar mi manera de pensar. Eso seria lo que casi cualquier otra persona hubiera hecho pero yo prefiero... Espero que algun dia cambie de manera de pensar. El mundo da muchas vueltas y quien sabe, nadie sabe, ahora esta fanatizado con esas ideas, a lo mejor cambia.

Adios, mucho gusto.

[illegible]/COG/CICS
106
29 JUNE 67

SECRET

98

RID COPY

INFO: FILE WH 8, CCS 3, CS 2,

SECRET

C/CA 2, C/CI

CITE DIRECTOR 15608

JMWAVE

TYPIC AMSTALK

REF: MADRID 1850 (IN 99189)

29 19 29 Z

JERSAWIT REMAINING HQS FOR DEBRIEFING AMSTALK-1 CASE. ETA MIAMI EVENING 30 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

SECRET

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 3

ASSIFY TO FILE NO.

REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM 4

ACTION WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐

UNIT — TIME ESEC —

INFO FILE VR, WH8, EUR8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 280843Z CITE MADRID 1858

28 JUN 67 IN 95847

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSTALK

REF MADRID 1832 (IN96924)

PEDRO L. PINERO EIRIN AND EDUARDO ARAOZ AGERO LEFT MADRID FOR HABANA ON CUBAN FLT 471 OF 26 JUNE 67.

ACTION

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-307337
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A
TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
3

ACTION
WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WH/COG
TIME 1353Z
BY G

INFO
FILE VR, CS/DO, EUR 8, WH 8, CCS 3, CSPS, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 271325Z CITE MADRID 1850

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

27 JUN 67 IN 99189

TYPIC AMSTALK

REF A DIRECTOR 14637

B MADRID 1832 (IN 96929)

ABSTRACT X

1. JERSAWIT LEAVES 28 JUNE FLT 201 TWA TO NEW YORK THEN NATIONAL FLT 387 TO WASHINGTON ARRIVING ABOUT 2127 HRS. WILL REPORT HEADQUARTERS MORNING 29TH JUNE.

2. PER REF B SUGGEST JMWAVE MEET AMSTALK-1 AS PASSPORT DOES NOT INDICATE HE HAS EITHER ENTERED OR LEFT SPAIN AND DOCUMENTATION THAT HE CARRYING INDICATES CAN RETURN TO UNITED STATES ONLY FROM SPAIN OR FRANCE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

201-307337

27 June 67

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE P TOTAL COPIES 36

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CA	CICS
MO —	CI/OS

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	PT
2		4	
3		7	
4	RS	8	C

FROM
8

ACTION
TSD 6

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, EUR 8, WH/COG 8, WH 8, FI, CI, CI/OPS

CT

SECRET 271118Z CITE MADRID 1848

DIRECTOR INFO FRANKFURT

AQUATIC

27 JUN 67 IN 99066

REF MADRID 1832 (IN 96929)

AN SRT-3R TRANSMITTER WAS INSTALLED IN ZURBANO HOTEL ROOM OCCUPIED BY AMSTALK-1 ON 15 JUNE. MEETING BETWEEN AMSTALK-1 AND TWO UNKNOWN PBRUMEN IS OFFICERS RECORDED IN NEARBY LP ROOM OCCUPIED BY STANLEY B. JERSAWIT ON 23 JUNE. TRANSMITTER REMOVED 26 JUNE. DETAILS BY DISPATCH.

SECRET

BT

14-00000

15

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-307331
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑
DESTROY ☐ SIG. WH/COG/OPS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

PRECEDENCE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE 2

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY
WH/[illegible]	1912	C

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH, C/CI, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI, C/RI/SD

S E C R E T 231757Z CITE MADRID 1832 23JUNE IN 96929

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

~~[illegible]~~ TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF: MADRID 1812 (IN 96673)

3P

1. FOLLOWING PARA 3 REF AT 1350 HRS 23 JUNE "GUILLERMO" TELEPHONED AMSTALK-1 ADVISING OF MEETING IN 10 MINUTES AND THAT AFTER DISCUSSION BOTH COULD LUNCH TOGETHER. AT 1420 HRS GUILLERMO ACCOMPANIED BY OTHER UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUAL (BOTH HAD BEEN NOTED CAREFULLY OBSERVING ALL MOVEMENTS HOTEL VISITORS AND PERSONNEL FROM 2130 TO 2335 HRS EVENING 22 JUNE) ARRIVED AMSTALK ROOM. UPON ENTERING BOTH OPENED JACKETS TO PERMIT OBSERVANCE OF FIREARMS. ENTIRE CONVERSATION WHICH LASTED ONE HOUR CONDUCTED BY GUILLERMO WHO CLAIMED HE DIRECTLY REPRESENTING AMGHOST-1 WHO ALLEGEDLY REMEMBERED AMSTALK-1 FROM YEARS BACK AND HAD FOND MEMORIES OF AMSTALK-1. ENTIRE PITCH TO DISASSOCIATE FROM ANTI-CUBAN OPS WAS LOW-KEYED WITH ONLY IMPLIED THREATS AS TO THE SAFETY OF FRIENDS AND RELATIVES OF AMSTALK IN CUBA. DIRECTLY STATED CUBAN HOLDING MOTHER WHO WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE FOR THE U.S. BECAUSE OF THE CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES OF AMSTALK-1. NO INDICATIONS GIVEN

MICROFILMED
JAN 21 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

CS COPY

AS TO BENEFITS WHICH MIGHT ACCRUE TO AMSTALK IF HE ACCEPTED PROPOSAL, AND HE RESPONDED HE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO HIS PRESENT POSITION. INDICATED HE IS SPAIN WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF WOFACT AND ON WOFACT INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED GUILLERMO DELIVER SMALL PACKET DIRECTLY TO AMGHOST-1. GUILLERMO SOMEWHAT SURPRISED AT THIS HOWEVER STATED PACKET WOULD BE PERSONALLY DELIVERED TO AMGHOST-1. AS BOTH SIDES FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THEIR POSITIONS MEETING CONCLUDED WITH NO INDICATION OF FOLLOW-UP AND NO FURTHER MENTION TAKE AMSTALK-1 TO LUNCH.

2. ENTIRE EXCHANGE BETWEEN AMSTALK-1 AND GUILLERMO WAS ON A FRIENDLY BASIS WITH NO OVER EMOTION. INDIVIDUAL WHO ACCOMPANIED GUILLERMO SPENT ENTIRE TIME PACING ROOM AND DISCREETLY CHECKING FOR LISTENING DEVICES. DID NOT DISCOVER DEVICE WHICH HAD BEEN PLACED IN ROOM AND TAPE OF ENTIRE PROCEDURE WITH GOOD FIDELITY ACQUIRED.

3. WHILE THERE NO INDICATIONS THAT FUTURE MEETINGS MIGHT BE HELD, CONDUCT THIS OP BY CUBANS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE AND POSSIBILITY EXISTS NOW THAT AMSTALK-1 KNOWN TO TWO UNIDENTIFIED CUBANS THAT FOLLOW-UP APPROACH UNDER NON WOFACT CONTROLLED CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT BE ATTEMPTED.

SECRET

SECRET in contact with subject of 201-307 [illegible]

PAGE 3 MADRID 1832 SECRET

4. STATION ATTEMPTING THROUGH QUOTAS AND OTHER UNI-LATERAL MEANS TO IDENTIFY AMSTALK-1 CALLERS. QUTIMID FURTHER REPORTS THAT GOVIN (MO) ORDERED DOUBLE ROOM RESERVATION FOR 22 JUNE FOR PEDRO PINERO AND EDUARDO ARAOZ. QUOTA-37 WHO COVERED AMSTALK MEET, IDENTIFIED CALLERS AS PINERO AND ARAOZ ALTHOUGH POSSIBLY TRAVELLING ALIAS DOCUMENTATION. WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS IDENTIFY.

[illegible]

[illegible]

5. UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY JERSAWIT WILL RETURN WITH AMSTALK-1 DIRECT TO JMWAVE VIA AERONAVES MEXICO AIRLINES 27 JUNE.

6. INDEX PINERO., ARAOZ, GOVIN.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

[illegible] 337

AMSTALK

[illegible]

[illegible] AND [illegible]

[illegible] C-96673

[illegible] OF CUBAN [illegible]

HECTOR P. [illegible] ALFREDO PACHECO,

SEVILLA, OF [illegible] [illegible]. GINERO AND

[illegible] FROM HAVA[illegible]

GINERO AND ARAGO [illegible] OF ROSTAL PIZARRO,

[illegible] THEY COULD [illegible]

[illegible] PHONED [illegible] OSCAR SOVIL AND THE

[illegible] FOR SEVILLA [illegible]

[illegible] AT SEVILLA

[illegible] PARAGRAPH [illegible]

[illegible] ALVAREZ, [illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-301334

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-840126

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. WH/COG 153

John Mertz

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

38

ACTION C/WH/COG 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/EUR 4, ADDP C/CI

S E C R E T 231932Z CITE JMWAVE 7836 WHVL

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

23 JUN 67 IN 97144

BT

CT

[redacted] TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF: MADRID 1812 (IN 96673)

1. JMWAVE TRACES EDUARDO ARAOZ AGERO REFLECT ONE EDUARDO ARAOZ BORN CA. 1938 HABANA, 5 FEET 8 INCHES, 145 LBS, WHITE FAIR SKIN, OVAL FACE, STRAIGHT DARK HAIR, DARK EYES, BEARDLESS, WEARS GLASSES ONLY FOR DISGUISE, DSE MEMBER (AMGIFT-1 DEBRIEFING 18 NOV 66 HUMBERTO MUNIZ DE LA CAMPA WHOSE NIECE MARRIED TO ARAOZ).

2 NO JMWAVE TRACES PEDRO L. PINERO EIRIA.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

FI

CS COPY

SECRET

LX-3267
LX-3267
June 1967

SUBJECT: CUIS RECRUITMENT ATTEMPTS AGAINST EXILES IN THE U.S.

201-307337

2. AMSTALK-1 (Identity B) received recruitment letter in very sophisticated operation involving a frame of 35 mm film rolled up and concealed in a hollowed out crucifix on rosary beads sent via his cousin who came out on the airlift on 11 April 1967. The letter believed to be from AMGHOST-1 was mildly threatening to AMSTALK-1's family and friends in Cuba and suggesting a meeting with the CUIS in Spain or Canada. Local LNERGO not advised. AMSTALK-1 and JMWAVE Case Officer are currently in Madrid on this operation. It is believed that this operation was initiated by AMGHOST-1 for unknown reasons, but possibility exists it is to establish a communications channel to WOFACT.

Extracted from report prepared by CI Section, JMWAVE Station June 1967

450

INDEX	FI	
[redacted]	[redacted]	
ABSTRACT	X	[redacted]

CS COPY

201-307337

SECRET

2

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH/COG

FROM LR

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY WH/COG 1303

INFO FILE VR, C/WH 6, C/EUR 4, O/CI, C/FI 2

CA CICS CIOS

23 JUN 67 IN 96673

S E C R E T 231223Z CITE MADRID 1812

ACTION

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

~~KAPOK~~ TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF A MADRID 1726 (IN 90513)

B MADRID 1632 (IN 84232)

1. EDUARDO ARAOZ (CUBAN DIP PP 67/204) AND PEDRO PINERO (CUBAN DIP PP 67/205) REGISTERED AT SAME HOTEL AS AMSTALK-1 AND JERSAWIT NIGHT 22 JUNE. REF B SHOWS ARRIVAL ON CUBANA FLT OF 3 JUNE OF PEDRO L. PINERO EIRIA, PP-D-67-205 AND EDUARDO AMIOZ AGERO PP-D-67-204, WHO BELIEVED TO BE IDEN WITH ABOVE.

2. QUTIMID SHOWS INTERNAL TRAVEL IN SPAIN OF PINERO AND ARAOZ.

3. SECOND CALL MADE TO AMSTALK NIGHT 22 JUNE SETTING UP MEET AT 1400 HOURS 23 JUNE.

4. NO STATION TRACES. REQUEST IMMEDIATE TRACES PINERO AND ARAOZ.

S E C R E T

BT

CT

23 June:
Traces sent
by Hal Simmons,
RI cy sent
for processing
by Roger Tilton.

Document
Noel E Noyes
WH/R&D

201-[illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

15

ACTION c/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/EUR 4, C/CI, C/FI 2

201-307337

MADR

AN	FI	
PS	DEPT	WH/C
ABSTRACT		INDEX

S E C R E T 211252Z CITE MADRID 1731

21 JUN 67 IN 94764

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF MADRID 1726 (IN 90513)

UNIDENTIFIED MALE, CUBAN ACCENT, TELEPHONED AMSTALK-1 20 JUNE, 2300 HRS. STATED WAS INSTRUCTED INFORM AMSTALK THAT GUILLERMO NOT YET MADRID BUT WOULD ARRIVE 22 JUNE AND TELEPHONE AT SAME HOUR.

S E C R E T

BT

15

201-307337

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-3073
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. Willes/pp
F. Mertz
~~FROM~~ 8
ACTION C/WH/COG 5
INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/EUR 4, C/CI, C/FI 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

S E C R E T 151550Z CITE MADRID 1726
MADR

15 Jun 67 IN 90513

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

[redacted] TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF MADRID 1697 (IN 88634)

BT
C.T.

AMSTALK ARRIVED MADRID. SENDING CABLE HAVANA 15 JUNE STATING "WAITING FOR YOU HOTEL ZURBANO. MY TIME RESTRICTED. CONFIRM."

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

AN
~~FI~~
IH
FI
RI
L
FI

CS COPY

15 June 67
201-30[illegible]

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

ORIG: C. TRETTIN:jaf
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 5106
DATE: 14 JUNE 67

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	CA	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 21 PER #

CONF: C/WH/COG-5 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

RS C

INFO: FILE , VR . C/WH 5 C/EUR 4 C/CI C/FI 2

SECRET
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 11170

TO MADRID INFO: JMWAVE 15 1935 Z

CI BT ES

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REFS: A. MADRID 1697 IN 88634

B. MADRID 1691 IN 88486

TO ENSURE THAT ALL INFO PERTINENT TO EVALUATION OF AMSTALK-1 OP IS AVAILABLE FOR STUDY AND CONSIDERATION WHEN MADRID PHASE COMPLETED, JERSAWIT SHOULD [redacted] INCLUDE IN HIS FINAL REPORT A COMPLETE, DETAILED ACCOUNT OF AMSTALK-1'S ACTIVITIES DURING PERIOD HE ALONE IN LISBON AND REASON HIS APPARENT FAILURE HEED [redacted] INSTRUCTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS

EUR/CUBA

AC/EUR/SR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 30

ACTION C/WH/COG5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/EUR 4, C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/INT4

MADR 13 JUN 67 IN 88634

S E C R E T 131725Z CITE MADRID 1697

IMMEDIATE JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF MADRID 1691 (IN 88486)

WH/C

INDEX

AMSTALK LOCATED THROUGH EFFORTS SPANISH LIAISON. ARRIVING MADRID 15 JUNE DUE NEED CONFIRMATION OF THROUGH FLIGHTS TO PARIS. WILL MEET AT AIRPORT AND FACILITATE ENTRANCE MADRID.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted]

#2

ACTION

C/WH/COG 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/EUR 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/[illegible] 2

MADR

S E C R E T 131256Z CITE MADRID 1691

13 JUN 67 IN 82486

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

AMSTALK WAS NOT ALLOWED TO BOARD FLIGHT OF 11 JUNE FOR MADRID DUE FACT DID NOT HAVE CONFIRMED RESERVATION FOR ONWARD TRAVEL PARIS. WAS INSTRUCTED TO OBTAIN CONNECTING PASSAGE FROM MADRID TO PARIS AT WHICH TIME HE COULD LEAVE LISBON FOR MADRID. UNABLE DO THIS ON 11 JUNE BECAUSE AIRLINE OFFICES CLOSED. WAS FURTHER INSTRUCTED TO RETURN TO HOTEL WHERE WOULD BE CONTACTED. TELEPHONE CALLS TO HOTEL EVENING 11 JUNE INDICATED AMSTALK STILL REGISTERED IN HOTEL HOWEVER NOT IN ROOM. TELEPHONE CALLS TO HOTEL 12 JUNE INDICATED AMSTALK CHECKED OUT. AMSTALK HAS CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS IN MADRID. IT QUITE POSSIBLE AMSTALK HAS HAD DIFFICULTY WITH PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES. STATION HAS ASKED QUOTA TO ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN FROM PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES AMSTALK'S WHEREABOUTS IN LISBON. AS OF MORNING 13 JUNE QUOTA EFFORTS THUS FAR HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE.

AN CA	PI	
RS	D	[illegible]
ABSTRACT		INDEX

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES V

SECRET

AMSPAM

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CI	5	
2		6	
3	FIO	7	
4		8	

[redacted] 38

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/EUR4, C/CI, C/FI2

S E C R E T 092238Z CITE JMWAVE 7644

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO DIRECTOR 9 JUN 67 IN 86332

NO NIACT

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF MADRID 1643 (IN 84932)

AERONAVES MEXICO ADVISED FLIGHT 450 REQUISITIONED BY MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND FLIGHT WILL OVERFLY MADRID. JERSAWIT AND AMSTALK/1 AND ALL OTHER MADRID PASSENGERS WILL BE OFF-LOADED LISBON, PROCEEDING MADRID 11 JUNE, TRANSPORTES PORTUGUESES FLIGHT 706, ARRIVING 1930 HOURS. JERSAWIT WILL PHONE HENDRIQUE FROM LISBON IN EVENT OF FURTHER CHANGE. AMSTALK/1 HAS NO SPANISH VISA AND PER REF WILL APPEAR TO BE IN TRANSIT TO PARIS.

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 201-307337

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. WH/COG/OPS

FROM John Iuect 2

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION

C/WH/COG 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR, C/WH6, C/EUR4, CI/CI, CI/PI2, CI/Ilalita

8 JUN 67 IN 84932

SECRET 081222Z CITE MADRID 1643 (MADR)

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

[redacted] TYPIC MHCUILE AMSTALK

REF. JMWAVE 7601 (IN 74392)

OUR UNDERSTANDING CUBAN WHO HAS VALID CUBAN PASSPORT DOES NOT NEED VISA TRAVEL FRANCE. ACCORDILLY SIMPLEST SOLUTION APPEARS TO BE PURCHASE TICKET MIAMI-MADRID (IN TRANSIT) CONNECTING WITH AIR FRANCE OR OTHER TO PARIS. AMSTALK COULD THEN DISEMBARK IN MADRID (IN-TRANSIT SECTION) WHERE WOULD BE MET BY QUOTA AND NAN K. FLAXMAYER KNOWN TO AMSTALK AS SARA. SUGGEST JERSAWIT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR AMSTALK BAGGAGE. VARIOUS RAMIFICATIONS IN HAVING QUOTAS ADVISE AERONAVES MEXICO PER SUGGESTION MADE IN REFERENCE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CS COPY

08 June 67
201-307337

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ~~201-307337~~

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. WH/COG/OPS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE 3e

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR C/WH6, C/EUR4, C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/INT2

S E C R E T 072105Z CITE JMWAVE 7601 (STEADMAN ACTING)

WH/COG

PRIORITY MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

7 Jun 67 IN 84392

NO NIACT

[redacted] TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF: MADRID 1631 (IN 84145)

1. LOCAL LNYUMA SUGGESTS QUOTAS CONTACT AERONAVES MEXICO MADRID AND CONFIRM AMSTALK-1 WILL BE PERMITTED ENTRY. AERONAVES SHOULD THEN CABLE THEIR MIAMI OFFICE THAT AMSTALK-1 WILL BE PERMITTED ENTRY SPAIN EVEN THOUGH LEAVING HERE WITH INSUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION. PLEASE HANDLE AND ADVISE.

2. RESERVATIONS MADE FOR AERONAVES FLIGHT 450, 9 JUNE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

mw

AN

FI

CS COPY

7 June 67

201-307337

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-301337

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. WH/COG/OPS

[redacted]

32/21

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/EUR 4, C/WH 6, C/FI/INT 2, C/CI

SECRET 071520Z CITE MADRID 1631 MADR

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

[redacted] TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF: JMWAVE 7586 (IN 83359)

7 Jun [illegible] 84145

1. QUOTAS ADVISE INORDINATE DELAY AS WELL AS SECURITY PROBLEMS IN SEEKING PERMISSION SPANISH FOREIGN OFFICE. QUOTAS AGREE AMSTALK-1 PROCEED MADRID WHERE WILL BE MET BY STATION OFFICER AND QUOTA REPRESENTATIVE AND BE ESCORTED THROUGH IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS AND DOCUMENTS PUT IN ORDER AFTER ARRIVES MADRID.

2. ADVISE FLIGHT NUMBER AND DATE.

SECRET

ST

SECRET

CS COPY

23 AMSTACK
AMSTALK -1

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
30

ACTION
C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/EUR 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2

SECRET 061532Z CITE JMWAVE 7586 STEADMAN ACTING 6 JUN 67 IN 83359

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

KAPOK TYPIC MHQUILE AMSTALK

REF MADRID 1621 (IN 83198)

CT

1. SPANISH CONSUL NEW ORLEANS RETURNED AMSTALK-1 (IDEN) VISA APPLICATION 6 JUNE STATING THAT SINCE AMSTALK-1 NON-RESIDENT VISA REQUEST WOULD NECESSITATE FORWARDING SPAIN FOR APPROVAL AND THIS WOULD TAKE APPROXIMATELY EIGHT WEEKS. ABOVE DESPITE FACT AMSTALK-1 HAD PREVIOUSLY SPOKEN WITH CONSUL NEW ORLEANS AND BEEN ASSURED VISA QUICKLY AVAILABLE. AMSTALK-1 PAPERS BEING HELD NEW ORLEANS.

2. CAN MADRID VIA LIAISON HAVE SPANISH OFFICIALS ADVISE CONSUL ISSUE VISA. NO OBJECTION INFORMING THAT AMSTALK-1 WOFACT ASSET AND ON WOFACT MISSION. LEAVE TO MADRID DISCRETION WHAT BACKGROUND MUST BE PASSED BUT PREFER KEEP TO MINIMUM NECESSARY.

3. BELIEVE IT OPERATIONALLY DESIREABLE MEET 9 JUNE DEPARTURE DATE, IF MADRID CAN ASSIST, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW POSSIBLE TIE IN OF PRESENCE IN SPAIN OF MIRET AND MORI, AS CITED REF, WHO BOTH KNOWN TO AMSTALK-1. MET MIRET DURING CASTRO'S RISE TO POWER. WENT TO PRIMARY SCHOOL WITH MORI.

4. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-301337
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

WH/COG
30 John Mertz

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

Amstalk

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CI	5	
2		6	
3	MO	7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH/COG5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/EUR4, C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/INT3,

S E C R E T 062210Z CITE JMWAVE 7590 STEADMAN ACTING

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO DIRECTOR (DIAZ)

NO NIACT

6 JUN 67 IN 83343

[redacted] TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF JMWAVE 7586 (IN 83359)

IDENTITY IS MIGUEL ANGEL (DIAZ) ISALGUE, BORN 14 FEB 1937, HABANA, RESIDING 1519 S.W. 19TH ST., MIAMI, TRAVELLING ON I-512 RE-ENTRY PERMIT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

ES COPY

201-307733

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 24

ACTION C/WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/EUR-4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/IPT 2

CA	CICS
MO —	CI/OS —
DDP	CI/IPT —
FI —	SS
RS	ESEC —

S E C R E T 061810Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1665

5 JUN 67 IN 83241

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, JMWAVE

RYBAT TYPIC WATCHLIST LIENVOY

1. FOLLOWING FROM LIENVOY RESUMEN 5 JUNE:

ON BEHALF OF FRENCH MILATT IN MEXICO CUBAN EMBASSY WAS CONTACTED AND INFO REQUESTED ON ARRIVAL DATE IN PARIS OF COMANDANTE PEDRO MIRET (201-169120) AND CAPT ENRIQUE GONZALEZ SINCE FRENCH MILATT HAD RECEIVED LETTER SAYING THEY WOULD BE TRAVELLING ON 7 JUNE. CUBAN EMB MEXICO AWARE THEY TRAVELLING ON 7 JUNE BUT NOT AWARE OF HOW THEY PLAN TO TRAVEL.

2. NEITHER MIRET NOR GONZALEZ ARRIVED MEXCIO ON CUBAN FLIGHT OF 5 JUNE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

CT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBE

INFO FILE, VR, CS/OO, WH 8, RI/AN, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

ACTION

5 Jun 67 IN 33198

ES

S E C R E T 061814Z CITE MADRID 1621

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC AMSTALK AMSTAFF

1. PEDRO MIRET PRIETO, 201-169120 WHO LISTED OUR CUBAN IS RUN ARRIVED MADRID IBERIA 5 JUNE 1967 FROM HAVANA. DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT D/65-293. SAME FLIGHT CARLOS MORI BALLENILLA WHO LISTED OUR MACHINE RUN AS DSESGGENT. DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT D 67-315.

2. QUAFE REPORTED BOTH REMAINING MADRID AS MEMBERS SIX MAN COMMERCIAL MISSION TO FOLLOW UP ON SPANISH/CUBAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. OTHER FOUR NAMES COMMERCIAL MISSION MEMBERS ARE: JOSE BREUIL GALIGARCIA, DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT D/65/201; CARLOS GANCES OLOVIS, DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT D-67-314; EMILIO J. DIAZ CRISTOBAL, DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT D-67-313; ENRIQUE GONZALEZ GARCIA-ESPINOSA, DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT D-67-332.

4. INDEX ALL NAMES.

SECRET

S E C R E T *Bergs Sued

BT

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 1

SECRET

ORIG: C. TRETTIN:
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 5106
DATE: 6 JUNE 67

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1 CA	6 CICS
2 MO	7 COS
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 28 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO RS BRANCH C/CI ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR C/WH6, C/CI

SECRET
(classification)

(date and time filed) 6 22 11 Z

(elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 07993

PRIORITY
TO /JMWAVE ~~[illegible] MADRID~~ CE3

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF: JMWAVE 7571 (IN 83066)

CONTENT MESSAGE APPROVED. DELETE SIGNATURE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS

WH/SAO C. C

DDP
~~C/EUR~~

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 12

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY
WH/COG	1705Z	S

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, C/WH C, C/CI
WAVE

S E C R E T 061557Z CITE JMWAVE 7571 STEADMAN ACTING

6 JUN 67 IN 83066

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

AN CA	PI	
FS	DC	WH/C
ABSTRACT		INDEX

REF JMWAVE 7570

13

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSED SCORCH MESSAGE TO AMGHOST-1: COMMANDANTE, WE TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PROIVDE YOU A PRIVATE MEANS BY WHICH WE CAN COMMUNICATE WITH YOU, AND YOU WITH US, A MEANS WHICH CAN EVENTUALLY BE USED FOR THE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS OR, SHOULD THE NEED EVER ARISE, FOR USE IN NEGOTIATIONS WHERE UTMOST SECRECY AND DISCRETION ARE DESIRED. ALONG WITH THIS LETTER WE ARE SENDING CIPHER MATERIALS, DIRECTIONS, AND A CARBON SHEET FOR SECRET WRITING FOR USE IN ESTABLISHING THIS DIRECT CHANNEL. THE EQUIPMENT IS BEING GIVEN TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES SEALED IN PLASTIC, WITH THE REQUEST THAT IT BE DELIVERED TO YOU UNOPENED. WE WILL TRANSMIT OUR RADIO MESSAGES TO YOU EACH MONDAY AT 0700 CUBAN DAYLIGHT TIME ON FREQUENCY 4670. THE MUSICAL SELECTION SIBONEY WILL INDICATE TRANSMISSION OF A TRUE MESSAGE. THE MUSICAL SELECTION GRANADA WILL INDICATE TRANSMISSION OF A DUMMY MESSAGE. IF YOU WISH TO INITIATE COMMUNICATIONS WITH

SECRET

US, MAILE YOUR LETTERS CONTAINING SECRET WRITING TO MIGUEL DIAZ. YOU HAVE HIS ADDRESS. WE BELIEVE THAT A DIRECT CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION CAN BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL, AND ASSUME THAT YOU WILL ACCEPT THIS OFFER IN GOOD FAITH. WHETHER OR NOT YOU HAVE NEED TO COMMUNICATE WITH US NOW, WE ARE SURE YOU REALIZE THAT THE SITUATION IN CUBA, AND YOUR OWN SITUATION, MAY CHANGE. WE WILL LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU. TIMONERO.

2. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL OF CONTENTS AND SIGNATURE (NOTE ENGLISH MEANING) OR SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE BE RECEIVED BY NOON 8 JUNE TO ALLOW FOR PREPARATION PRIOR TO JERSAWITZ DEPARTURE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

*NO RECORD IN
CABLE SEC
1325 6 JUNE

PRECEDENCE

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-307339
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM WH/COG
8 John Merte

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY
WH/COG	1750Z	J

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/EUR 4, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 061557Z CITE JMWAVE 7570 STEADMAN ACTING

(WAVE)

06 JUN 67
IN 83059

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MADRID

~~KAPOK~~ TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF JMWAVE 6980 (IN 59918)

1. UPON ARRIVAL MADRID JERSAWIT WILL BRIEF COS IN DETAIL ON AMSTALK-1 OP AND BACKGROUND AS WELL AS POSSIBLY RELATED OPERATION (AMSTRUT/3). MEANWHILE, FOR MADRID AND DIRECTOR, FOLLOWING IS PLAN JMWAVE PROPOSES.

2. AMSTALK-1 WILL SEND CABLE FROM MADRID TO DROP ADDRESS CUBA STATING HE AT HOTEL ZURBANO AWAITING CONTACT. WILL INDICATE WILL NOT BE MADRID BEYOND 20 JUNE. WHEN AND IF CUBANS CONTACT AMSTALK-1, HE WILL ATTEMPT CONTROL TIME AND PLACE OF MEET. ALTHOUGH THIS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN AMOUNT OF NEGOTIATION, HE WILL IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES AGREE TO MEET WHICH TOTALLY UNDER CUBAN CONTROL (E.G. IN CUBAN INSTALLATION.)

3. WHEN MEETING MADE, AMSTALK-1 WILL LISTEN TO WHATEVER PROPOSITION CUIS REPS MAKE. IF PROPOSITION APPEARS TO BE DIRECTED TO WOFACT (AS OPPOSED TO AMSTALK-1 PERSONNALY) AMSTALK-1 WILL ARRANGE FOR SECOND MEETING AND WILL REPORT

SECRET

CS COPY

06 June 67
201-307339

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 7570 SECRET

MEET TO CASE OFFICER. IF PROPOSITION IS MERELY ATTEMPT TO DOUBLE, AMSTALK-1 WILL TELL CUBANS THEIR EFFORTS FUTILE, AFFIRM HIS LOYALTY TO WOFACT AND HIS INTENTION CONTINUE WORK AGAINST REGIME. WILL ADD THAT HIS TRIP WOFACT SPONSORED AND REQUEST ON BEHALF OF WOFACT THAT MESSAGE AND SMALL PACKET BE DELIVERED PERSONALLY TO AMGHOST-1.

4. MESSAGE WILL BE SHORT OVERT NOTE TO AMGHOST-1 INDICATING THAT PERSONAL MESSAGE ON BACK CAN BE DEVELOPED BY SCORCH. (PROPOSED TEXT BEING CABLED HQS SEPARATELY FOR APPROVAL). PACKET WILL CONTAIN DECIPHER PAD FOR OWVL BROADCASTS, ENCHIPER PADS FOR USE IN SW MESSAGES, AND SYSTEM 37 CARBON SHEET. INSTRUCTIONS FOR USING PADS IN SPANISH WILL COMPLETE PACKET.

5. ABOVE BASED ON POSSIBILITY, AS NOTED PREVIOUS TRAFFIC, THAT AMGHOST-1 ATTMPTING MAKE CONTACT WITH WOFACT; IN ANY CASE PLOY PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY FOR WOFACT TO OPEN PRIVATE COMMO CHANNEL TO AMGHOST-1 FOR LATER EXPLOITATION. THERE OBVIOUSLY OTHER POSSIBILITIES WHICH MAY NOT BE CLEAR UNTIL MEET TAKES PLACE AND WHICH MAY REQUIRE QUICK DECISIONS.

SECRET

JAN 5 4 24 PM '70
DEC 23 3 14 PM '61

PAGE 3 JMWAVE 7570 S E C R E T

SECRET

WILL APPRECIATE MADRID COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-30733

AMSTALK

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CI/S	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	mo —	8	

~~FROM~~ 15

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OA, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 060742Z CITE MADRID 1605

Qew

6 JUN 67 IN 82817

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO

DYVOUR EMSUMAC PBRUMEN AMSTAFF

REF A. MADRID 1594 (IN 808[illegible])

B. DIRECTOR 06672

1. BELIEVE POSSIBILITY EXISTS SUBJECT OF REFS MAY BE INVOLVED IN AMSTALK MATTER IN VIEW OF TIMING AND SUBJECT'S BACKGROUND.

2. IN VIEW OF SUBJECT'S CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS AND UNUSUAL MODE OF ARRIVAL MADRID, STATION PROPOSES HAVING EMSUMAC/8 ASK QUOTA/31 FOR JOINT HOSTILE INTERROGATION OF SUBJECT AT WHICH EMSUMAC/8 WILL TRY ASCERTAIN REAL REASONS BEHIND SUBJECT'S TRIP TO SPAIN. STATION WOULD ALSO PASS INFO CONTAINED REF B TO EMSUMAC/8 AND TO QUOTA. LATTER HAS MENTIONED SUBJECT'S ARRIVAL TO STATION. EMSUMAC/8 , IF ASKED, WILL MENTION HE RECEIVED INFO ON SUBJECT FROM SANTO DOMINGO AS QUOTA DOES NOT KNOW EMSUMAC/8 IN CONTACT WITH STATION. AMSTALK MATTER WILL NOT BE MENTIONED TO EMSUMAC/8 OR QUOTA.

3. REQUEST PRIORITY HQS COMMENTS AND PERMISSION TO PASS INFO REF B TO EMSUMAC/8 AND QUOTA

SECRET

S E C R E T

3 JUN 67

JMWAVE 7257 IN 80859

Requested authorization to release AP type pads with cover kit for AMCHOST-1.

Authorization granted by Phil Joyce of Commo. x 9018
CED 6 June 67

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM

ACTION
WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

INFO
file, VR, EUR 8, [illegible], CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2, CI/OA, [illegible]

S E C R E T 021825Z CITE MADRID 1594

DIRECTOR, SANTO DOMINGO, JMWAVE, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS

3 JUN 67 IN 81041

DYVOUR ENSUMAC PBRUMEN

1. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS, STATION, BASE, LIAISON, AND AMOT TRACES ON FERMIN OSCAR RAFAEL (ALVAREZ) TINEO, DOMINICAN NATIONAL DPOB 7 JULY 1923, PUERTO PLATA, DOMREP, DOMINICAN CEDULA 14276 SERIES 37. SUBJECT ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVANA 22 MAY 1967 ON CUBANA WITHOUT PASSPORT AND VISA BUT WITH EIGHT PAGE "IDENTITY BOOK" EXPEDITED BY CUBAN AUTHORITIES AND RENEWED 5 MAY 1967 FOR SUBJECT'S DEPARTURE.

2. SUBJECT DETAINED AT AIRPORT BY SPANISH AUTHORITIES AND INTERVIEWED BY ENSUMAC/8 AND MELCHOR FUENTES, DOMINICAN CONSUL GENERAL. LATER RELEASED AND INTERROGATED AT DOMINICAN EMBASSY BY ANOTHER OFFICIAL USING QUESTIONS PREPARED BY ENSUMAC/8. LATTER PLANS TO REINTERROGATE SUBJECT NEAR FUTURE. SUBJECT ALSO SEEN BY QUWEB SHOP BUT WAS CONSIDERED TOO NERVOUS AT TIME TO BE SUBMITTED TO INTERROGATION BUT SUBJECT WILL BE REQUESTED TO RETURN DURING COMING WEEK.

3. FOLLOWING IS SUBJECT'S STORY BASED ON THE TWO INTERVIEWS

SECRET

MENTIONED PARA TWO BUT OMITTING INFO SUBJECT SUPPLIED ON DOMINICANS LIVING IN CUBA AND CUBAN PERSONALITIES KNOWN TO HIM WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATE CABLE. BEFORE LEAVING DOMREP IN 1947, SUBJECT WORKED FOR ESSO STANDARD OIL AND HAD BEEN PRIVATE IN EIGHT COMPANY DOMINICAN ARMY COMMANDED BY CAPTAIN SANTOS MELIDO MARTE PICHARDO. LEFT DOMREP IN LAUNCH (GOLETA) WHICH HE SAILED TO DUTCH WEST INDIES (SUBJECT HAD A "CARNET DE GENTEDE MAR"). FROM THERE, SUBJECT WENT TO UNITED STATES WHERE HE WORKED FOR ? "F. RINALDI AND COMPANY", 116 BROAD STREET, NEW YORK CITY (SUBJECT HAD SOCIAL SECURITY CARD NO. 058-28-1629). IN 1951, SUBJECT RECEIVED CUBAN VISA IN NEW YORK ON "LETTER OF IDENTITY AND TRANSIT" GIVEN BY U.S. AUTHORITIES AND LEFT MIAMI FOR HAVANA 19 JULY 1951. SUBJECT WAS PHOTOGRAPHER IN CUBA AND WORKED FOR PUBLICITY AGENCY. SUBJECT FOUGHT WITH CASTRO IN THE ESCAMBRAY FRONT UNDER COMMAND OF ARMANDO FLEITAS DIAZ. IN 1961, WAS POLICE SERGEANT AND CHIEF OF WELFARE SECTION AND WAS ARRESTED ON 16 APRIL OF THAT YEAR "DUE TO THE BAY OF PIGS LANDING" AND ACCUSED OF CONSPIRING AGAINST CASTRO. SUBJECT SENTENCED IN 1963 TO "SUSPENDED MINOR PENALTY" BUT LATER CASE REVIEWED AND SENTENCED TO THIRTY YEARS IN PRISON. AFTER SPENDING FIVE YEARS

IN PRISON, THANKS TO THE EFFORTS OF SUBJECT'S CUBAN WIFE WORKING THROUGH SPANISH CONSUL IN HAVANA, SUBJECT WAS PUT ON A PLANE TO MADRID WITH EXPENSES PAID BY SPANISH CONSUL. SUBJECT LATER MENTIONED THAT IN 1963 HE WENT TO MEXICO USING HIS CUBAN IDENTITY BOOK AS DOCUMENTATION. FACT THAT THIS STATEMENT CONTRADICTED PREVIOUS STATEMENT THAT HE ARRESTED IN 1961 AND SPENT FIVE YEARS IN JAIL NOT BROUGHT TO SUBJECT'S ATTENTION BY DOMINICAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL (NOT ENSURAC/E3).

A. FOLLOWING ARE NAMES AND LOCATIONS OF SUBJECT'S CLOSE RELATIONS. WIFE: LAURA ONDINA INOCENCIA CRUZ E YIRIO, DIVISION 111, APARTADO 8, SEGUNDO PISO, BETWEEN SITIOS AND PENALVER, HAVANA, CUBA; FATHER: VIRGILO ALVAREZ (NOT KNOWS IF STILL LIVING); MOTHER: CARMEN CELIA TINEO MARTINEZ, PUERTO PLATA, DOMREP; DAUGHTERS: MILAGROS, CARMEN LIDIA, AND YOUNGEST WHOSE NAME SOURCE DOES REMEMBER, PUERTO PLATA; AUNT: ALTAGRACIA TINEO MARTINEZ, CALLE 12 DE JULIO, PUERTA PLATA.

5. SUBJECT'S PERSONAL STORY APPEARS STRANGE AND REALIZE THERE ARE MANY GAPS AND AT LEAST ONE APPARANT CONTRADICTION. ESPECIALLY SURPRISING IS THAT SUBJECT DID NOT ARRIVE WITH SPANISH VISA.

6. INDEX.

S E C R E T

ST

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

AMSTALK

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CI	5	
2		6	
3	MB	7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR8, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI, FI

S E C R E T 221726Z CITE MADRID 1588

3 JUN 67 IN 81025

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSTALK MHGUILE

REF: JMWAVE 7500 (P79833)

ROOM RESERVED FOR AMSTALK-1 AT ZURBANO HOTEL BEGINNING 12 JUNE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	J	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: Joel Beyer:pr
UNIT: WH/7/DR
EXT: 5940
DATE: 1 June 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 8 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY INFO: FILE , VR . WH/COG 8, EUR 8, FI, CI, CI/OA, CI/OPS CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 2 1453Z CITE DIRECTOR 06672

TO MADRID INFO: SANTO DOMINGO JMWAVE

REF: MADRID 1546 (IN 77511)*

FOLLOWING IDENTIFIABLE INFO SUBJ REF:

RESIDED CUBA 1956 TO 1963. WAS POLITICAL INSTRUCTOR "HAVANA PRISON", ALLEGED CUBAN AGENT AND CLAIMED TO BE PROCEEDING TO US IN FUTURE AS AGENT WITH WIFE, ALSO COMMUNIST. SUBJ AND WIFE NAMED ON LIST OF REPATRIATES FROM CUBA TO DR IN 1963. SUBJ OBSERVED IN REBEL ZONE WITH COMMUNISTS DURING 1965 REVOLUTION AND ON LIST OF COMMUNISTS CONSIDERED DANGEROUS IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

END OF MESSAGE

*Arrival in Madrid, from Havana, of Fermin Oscar Rafael ALVAREZ Tineo.

C/WH/7
EUR/IB/S
WH/COG/CICS Harry Mahoney
(tele/coord ~~by O. Williams)~~
WH/COG/MO Robert Ortman
(tele/coord ~~by Chiocca)~~

EDWARD FENIMORE
C/EUR/SR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[redacted] 28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION

C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/EUR4, C/CI, C/FI2, C/CCS3, WAVE

S E C R E T 012156Z CITE JMWAVE 7500

1 JUN 67 IN 79833

PRIORITY MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REFERENCES: A JMWAVE 6920 (IN-59918)

B MADRID 1560 (IN-59220)

~~CI~~	~~FI~~	
FS	~~DGST~~	w/a/C
ABSTRACT		INDEX

1. AS OP BASED PREMISE THAT DGI AWARE AMSTALK-1 TRIP SPONSORED BY WOFACT FEEL NO SECURITY FACTOR ARISES IN MAKING JOINT RESERVATIONS. OPERATIONALLY IMPORTANT THAT JERSAWIT AND AMSTALK-1 BE REGISTERED SAME HOTEL SO THAT JERSAWIT READILY AVAILABLE.

2. TIME ELEMENT PRECLUDES GETTING CONFIRMED RESERVATIONS THROUGH LOCAL TRAVEL AGENCY. REQUEST MADRID MAKE RESERVATIONS AND ADVISE. WILL CONTACT HENDRIQUE ON ARRIVAL.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

32/21

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/EUR 4, C/WH 6, C/CI

MADR

S E C R E T 011318Z CITE MADRID 1580

1 JUN 67 IN 79699

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF: MADRID 1568 (IN 79220)

RESERVATION MADE FOR JERSAWIT ONLY ON 10 JUNE AT HOTEL ZURBANO.

S E C R E T

BT

AN ~~[illegible]~~	AN/CCD
~~PS~~ ~~DTST~~	
ABSTRACT	INDEX

SECRET

201-307337

1 June 67

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-307337
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[redacted] 3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, C/WH 6, C/EUR 4, C/CI

MADR

S E C R E T 011031Z CITE MADRID 1568

1 JUN 67 IN 79220

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF JMWAVE 7439 (IN 77602)

ABSTRACT X
INDEX
C/WH/COG

STATION MAKING RESERVATIONS FOR JERSAWIT HOWEVER FOR SECURITY REASONS BELIEVE PREFERABLE AMSTALK/1 MAKE OWN RESERVATIONS THRU TRAVEL AGENCY FROM THAT END.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-307337
1 June 67

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-3?7337
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY SIG. C.E. Tullia

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
3c

ACTION
C/WH/COG 3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WHC, C/EUR 4, C/CI, C/FI2,

S E C R E T 291850Z CITE ~~JM~~WAVE 7439 WAVE

29 MAY 67 IN 77602

AN C.C.	BY	WH/C
PG	DESK	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF JMWAVE 7292 (IN 71143)

JERSAWIT AND AMSTALK-1 HAVE RESERVATIONS ARRIVE MADRID 10 JUNE, AERONAVES MEXICO. IF POSSIBLE PLEASE RESERVE ADJACENT ROOMS WITH BATHS HOTEL EMPERATRIZ OR OTHER MODERATE PRICED HOTEL. IF THIS NOT POSSIBLE GET ROOMS ON SAME FLOOR. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

201-307337

14-00000

WH/COG

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING

	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WOBONE

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
FJDUST/SGSWIRL/PBRUMEN
Transmittal of SGSWIRL Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: None Required

1. Forwarded herewith [redacted] are JMWAVE SGSWIRL reports with below list of IRD numbers, 201 numbers and cryptonyms where available.

IRD NUMBERS	201 NUMBERS	CRYPTS
(#55089)	(-320030)	(AMCRUMP/4)
(#55368)	(-314484)	(AMSPAN/32)
(#55394)	(-283573)	(AMPAN/14)
(#62386)	(-307337)	(AMSTALK/1)
(#64730)	(-742600)	(AMANCHOR/9)
(#64789)	(-297762)	(AMANCHOR/6)
(#78270)	(-802897)	(AMLILAC/52)

2. The identities of above reports are forwarded [redacted] as a separate cover attachment.

Daniel R. HOSKIER

Attachments:
1. Reports [redacted]
2. Identities [redacted]

Copy

Distribution:
2 - C/WOBONE, w/atts 1/1-7, h/w
2/1-7, u/s/c
2 - C/WH, w/o atts
~~8~~ - WH/COG, w/o atts

201-307337

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
25 May 67	MAY 26 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-19540

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-320030
201-314484; 201-283573
201-307337; 201-742600

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

[redacted]

UFGT 19540|03

#62336
17 May 1967

DESENSITIZED

12

Subject: Iden A

AMSTALK/1 was interviewed and tested at a covert site in the Miami, Florida area on 17 May 1967 at the request of Stanley B. JERSAWIT. The interview was conducted in English in which AMSTALK/1 is fluent.

Testing was requested following receipt by AMSTALK/1 of a recruitment letter, apparently from the Cuban Intelligence Service. Details regarding the letter were forwarded to Headquarters under UFGA-27562.

AMSTALK/1 is presently a WOFACT principal agent who, although he never worked with the CUIS, was acquainted with numerous Cuban Intelligence personalities. He was last SGSWIRLed on 7 December 1966.

RESULTS

AMSTALK/1's cousin, Iden B, did bring AMSTALK/1 a letter from Cuba and AMSTALK/1 believes that the letter came from the CUIS.

AMSTALK/1 was never previously contacted by the CUIS and he has not been given any means of contacting the CUIS which he has not revealed to WOFACT.

AMSTALK/1 has no reason to believe that his cousin has not told him all she knows about this matter and he himself is not concealing from WOFACT anything that he knows about it.

AMSTALK/1 cabled a reply to the letter exactly as instructed by WOFACT.

While future intentions are not a valid topic for SGSWIRL testing, AMSTALK/1 was asked during testing whether he is now willing to engage in an operation involving direct confrontation with the CUIS and whether he would continue his anti-Castro activities even though his friends or relatives in Cuba might be in danger. For what it is worth, there was no indication of deception when AMSTALK/1 replied affirmatively to both of those questions.

DETAILS

Prior to testing AMSTALK/1 mentioned that during the pre-Castro era he was frequently in contact with persons now in the upper echelons of the Cuban government. Among these were Iden C and Iden D. Although he was asked on numerous occasions to join the 26th of July Movement he was never asked to work for CUIS or contacted by Cuban Intelligence with respect to working for them prior to the present instance.

SECRET

CS COPY

201-307337

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET

AMSTALK/1 said that he believes that Iden B has passed on to him all the information she was told to by the CUIS. He said however that Iden B talked with Iden C about forty-five minutes and he feels certain that Iden C told her more about his (AMSTALK/1's) activities than she has admitted knowing.

AMSTALK/1 said that Iden B told Iden C that she would not cooperate with the CUIS in any action which would harm her husband, Iden E, who is presently in prison in Cuba. She was apparently re-assured that what she was to do would not make her husband ashamed of her. For this reason AMSTALK/1 says that he feels that the intent of the CUIS is to neutralize him. AMSTALK/1 is of the opinion that the CUIS thinks he occupies a much more important position within WOFACT than he actually does.

AMSTALK/1 said that he is perfectly willing to follow WOFACT directions; that he will gladly engage in a direct confrontation with the CUIS if this is desired and that he would do so even though friends or relatives of his in Cuba might be in danger.

Daniel R. HOSKIER

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

#62388
17 May 1967
IDENS

201-307337

Iden A Miguel Angel DIAZ Isalgue
DPOB: 14 February 1937
Matanzas, Cuba

Iden B Marta ISALQUE Rodriguez

Iden C Manuel PINEIRO

Iden D "Pepin" NARANJO

Iden E Fernando de ROJAS

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

[redacted]

SECRET

Carl: 22 May 1967

I think we ought to go out on record on this case before JMWAVE really gets all wrapped upx in a bum operation. Did that cable ~~xxxxx~~ we had drafted ever fly ?? In any event, you know pretty much what my feelings on this matter are and we should get them (assuming we are in agreement) down on paper someplace. Although there isn't any blame on us for the FAGHOST/3 fiasco it has made me rather leery of taking JMWAVE's ideas. Even though Jake says we can't knit-pick on JMWAVE we can at least make our views a matter of record.

Thank you,

hm

Discussed w/ Harry. Agree that since previous cable turned down little chance in getting anything worked out.

T

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMSTALK

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CI	5	
2		6	
3	RID	7	
4		8	

[redacted] 3

ACTION
C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, C/EUR 4, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/CCS 3, C/CSPS

S E C R E T 191002Z CITE MADRID 1459

19 MAY 67 IN 70571

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

⑪

REF: JMWAVE 7188 (IN 67460)

NO OBJECTION JERSAWIT AND AMSTALK TRAVEL MADRID.

JERSAWIT CAN CONTACT HENDRIQUE ON ARRIVAL.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

SECRET

Earl: - 19 May 1967

AMSTALK/1 has probably already sent a cable to the CUIS agreeing to meet them in Madrid since we [illegible] fooled around bending over backwards not to hurt JMWAVE's delicate sensibilities. However, the attached is a pretty good try and we should at least make it a matter of record that we don't think it is a well thought out operation when WAVE has to send a CO when there is a three man PBRUMEN section in the Madrid Station.

hm

FORM 2-65 12 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

1. MESSAGES ARE CONSIDERED ROUTINE UNLESS A HIGH PRECEDENCE IS INDICATED IN THE ADDRESS LINE.
2. SEND ORIGINAL AND YELLOW COPY TO CABLE SECRETARIAT. REMOVE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.
3. DO NOT ERASE NIT AND CONTINUE TYPING. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYP TEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPAC END TEXT LINES WITHIN THE RIGHT MARGIN GUIDE PROPRIATE FOR YOUR TYPEWRITER.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: Harry Mahoney:mew
UNIT: C/WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 6835
DATE: 19 May 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________
CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR

TO JMWAVE MADRID

TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REFS A. MADRID 1459 (IN 70571) *

B. JMWAVE 7188 (IN 67460) **

C. UFGA 27552 ***

1. UNLESS THERE ARE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS NOT EVIDENT HQS, SUGGEST AMSTALK-1 CABLE HIS TELEPHONE NUMBER IN MIAMI TO CUIS SUPPLIED DROP ADDRESS AND REQUEST TELEPHONIC CONTACT. IF CONTACT MADE, SUGGEST AMSTALK-1 ASK REAL PURPOSE FOR CUIS DESIRE MEET WITH HIM. DECISION RE ADVISABILITY MAKING TRIP CAN BE MADE ON BASIS REPLY TO AMSTALK-1 QUERY.

2. IF AMSTALK-1 TRIP WARRANTED, SUGGEST INITIAL PHASES AMSTALK-1 VISIT MADRID BE HANDLED BY MADRID STATION PBRUMEN OPS OFFICER. IF CUIS OFFICER ACTUALLY SHOWS AND DEVELOPMENTS WARRANT, JERSAWIT COULD THEN PROCEED MADRID.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG COMMENT: * Says MADRID has no objection JERSAWIT and AMSTALK travel to Madrid

CONTINUED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

FORM 7-65 12 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

1. MESSAGES ARE CONSIDERED ROUTINE UNLESS A HIGH PRECEDENCE IS INDICATED IN THE ADDRESS LINE.
2. SEND ORIGINAL AND YELLOW COPY TO CABLE SECRETARIAT. REMOVE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.
3. DO NOT ERASE ... AND CONTINUE TYPING. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPE ... TEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPAC... END TEXT LINES WITHIN THE RIGHT MARGIN GUIDE ...PROPRIATE FOR YOUR TYPEWRITER.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY _______ PER _______ # _______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO _______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

** Says AMSTALK-1 cabling CUIS supplied address indicating availability for mid-June meeting, asks MADRID concurrence of plan to send JERSAWIT to Madrid with AMSTALK-1, and says AMSTALK-1 will be re-SGSWIRLED prior to trip.

*** Transmitted documents related to CUIS request to meet with AMSTALK-1.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH COG/CICS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	C/	5	
2		6	
3	RID/	7	
4		8	

FROM zf

ACTION C/WH/COG-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/EUR-4, C/CI, D/Secur-4

19 MAY 67 IN 71143

(79)

S E C R E T 192024Z CITE JMWAVE 7292

DIRECTOR, MADRID

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF: JMWAVE 7188 (IN 67460)

1. PER REF ON 16 MAY AT STATION DIRECTION AMSTALK-1 SENT TELEGRAM TO LUIS SUPPLIED ADDRESS STATING "HAVE VACATION MID-JUNE. NEED ASSURANCE MEETING POSSIBLE BEFORE PLANNING COSTLY TRIP. CONFIRM. GUILLERMO." (GUILLERMO SIGNATURE INDICATED MEET TO BE IN SPAIN.)

2. ON 18 MAY AMSTALK-1 RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM HAVANA ADDRESSED TO HIS HOME READING "ALL WELL. GUILLERMO."

3. STATION INTERPRETS PROMPT ANSWER AS REQUESTED CONFIRMATION. THUS STATION PLANS SEND AMSTALK-1 AND JERSAWIT MADRID MID-JUNE AND, PER CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED IN LUIS LETTER CITED JMWAVE 6942, IN 58376 ANOTHER TELEGRAM WILL BE SENT GIVING PRECISE LOCATION.

4. SGSWIRL ADMINISTERED AMSTALK-1 ON 17 MAY. NO DECEPTION INDICATED.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO	DATE LETTER NO.

TO : ATTN:	FROM:

SIGNATURE

REPLY	DATE

SIGNATURE

ORIGINATOR'S SUSPENSE

FORM 5-61 1831

SECRET

FORM 4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306337
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. WH/COG/OPS John Mertz

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

25/11

ACTION C/WH/COG 5

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR C/WH 6, C/EUR 4, C/CI, C/CCS 3,

S E C R E T 152145Z CITE JMWAVE 7186 WAVE

15 MAY 67 IN 67460

MADRID, DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMSTALK

REFS: A MADRID 1376 (IN 63023)

B JMWAVE 6942 (IN 58376)

C JMWAVE 6980 (IN 58918)

1. AMSTALK-1 SENDING CABLE CUIS SUPPLIED DROP ADDRESS WHICH WILL INDICATE AVAILABILITY FOR MID-JUNE MEETING. CABLE WILL REQUEST CONFIRMATION THAT MEETING POSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY TRIP. WHEN CONFIRMED, AMSTALK-1 WILL PREPARE FOR TRIP TO MEET CUIS IN MADRID.

2. SUBJECT MADRID CONCURRENCE, PLAN SEND STANLEY B. JERSAWIT MADRID WITH AMSTALK-1. MADRID SUPPORT WILL BE REQUESTED TO ASSIST IN TECHNICAL AND PHYSICAL COVERAGE OF MEETING.

3. AMSTALK-1 WAS SGSWIRLED IN DEC 66. FOR THE RECORD, PLAN RE-ADMINISTER PRIOR TO TRIP.

4. DIRECTOR: PLS TRANSMIT REFS B AND C TO MADRID.

S E C R E T

BT

93

AN
AB
FI

SECRET

CS COPY

15 May 67
201-306337

14-00000

AMSTALK

ORIG: MICHAEL OLEJARZ:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/FI
EXT: 5061
DATE: 12 MAY 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	FI	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4	DDO	9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

3 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201--356707
19-300-16

INFO: C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

FILE, VR. C/CI/SO, C/WH 6, [illegible],
CI, C/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 21 35 Z CITE DIRECTOR 01236

MADRID INFO: JMWAVE

KAPOK KEYWAY AMMOON MHGUILE

REFERENCE: MADRID 1376 (IN 63023)*

(3)

1. REVIEW AMSTALK/1'S FILE INDICATES FOLLOWING WHICH IS KEYED TO REFERENCE:

A. AMSTALK/1 HAS NEVER WORKED FOR CUIS BUT IT NOW APPEARS CUIS ATTEMPTING COERCE HIM INTO COOPERATING WITH THEM.

B. YES - AMSTALK/1 IS CURRENT PA FOR AMTRUNK INFIL-EXFIL OPS.

C. NO.

D. THERE IS NO known CONNECTION BETWEEN AMTRUNK/19 AND AMSTALK/1 OTHER THAN BEING COUSINS. AMSTALK/1 LEFT PBRUMEN IN 1958 AND HAS NOT RETURNED EXCEPT ON OPS MISSION.

E. SINCE SGSWIRL OF AMTRUNK/19 DID NOT INDICATE ANY APPARENT DECEPTION NOR HAS AMTRUNK/19 DONE ANYTHING TO BRING SUSPICION ON HIMSELF, HQS DOES NOT BELIEVE A/19 DOUBLED. HOWEVER, HQS CANNOT OVERLOOK FACT AMTRUNK/19's ABILITY TO BRING COMMO GEAR ETC INTO PBRUMEN WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM SECURITY OFFICIALS. IN ORDER CLARIFY THIS, REQUEST OTHER AMMOON ASSETS BE QUERIED RE CUSTOMS PROCEDURES FOR CUBANA PERSONNEL.

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | SECRET | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 01236

PAGE FOUR

F. HQS NOT ABLE COMMENT.

2. RE REPORTING OF AMTRUNK/19 AND ESTABLISHMENT OF BONA FIDES, MOST OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM AMTRUNK/19 WAS CONFIRMED OR REPORTED BY OTHER AMMOON ASSETS. NO INDICATION DECEPTION OR FABRICATION OF INFO FROM AMTRUNK/19.

3. HQS PLANNING OPERATIONAL REVIEW OF AMTRUNK CASE AND WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: *Queries re AMSTALK/1 and AMTRUNK/19 case.

C/EUR/SR

C/WH COG/FI
[illegible]
EUR/CUBA

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

AMSTALK

TRETTIN

ORIG: H. [illegible]:jaf
UNIT: WH/COG/COG/CICS
EXT: 6835
DATE: 12 MAY 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	CICS	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	MU	10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 49 PER ____ # ____

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 6

SECRET
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 01129

12 20 21 Z

JMWAVE

KAPOK MHCJILE AMSTALK

REF: JMWAVE 7100 (IN 64414)

1. IT IS OUR OPINION THAT BEFORE SENDING AMSTALK-1 OFF TO SPAIN WE OUGHT TO TRY TO OBTAIN MORE ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL ACTUALLY OCCUR A MEETING BETWEEN AMSTALK AND A RESPONSIBLE CUIS OFFICER TO DISCUSS A PROPOSAL MORE SPECIFIC THAN THAT DESCRIBED IN THE CUIS MESSAGE.

2. IF THIS OPERATION RESULTS IN ANY SORT OF AN ENTENTE BETWEEN AMSTALK-1 AND THE CUIS IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO REVIEW AND EXAMINE EACH FACET MINUTELY. THEREFORE WE SUGGESTED THE SGSWIRL, IF POSSIBLE, OF AMSTALK-1 AND MARTHA TO ASSURE THE CLOSEST EXAMINATION AND CORROBORATION OF EACH PHASE OF THE STORY AT THE EARLIEST POINT IN ITS DEVELOPMENT. HOWEVER, THIS IS AN OPERATIONAL JUDGMENT AND WITHIN WAVES PEROGATIVE TO DECIDE.

C/WH/COG/CICS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REG		5 MAY 1967		Wa
2. WH/C,		17/5/67		[illegible]
3. HM				
4. M.C.		2 June	2 June	[illegible]
5. A.K.				R
6.				
7.				
8. WH/C/MO		20 JUN 1967	28 June	[illegible]
9.				
10. ~~[illegible]~~				
11.				
12. WH/C/CICS				
13. TRETTIN				
14. WH/COG/OI				[illegible]
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COMMENTS

- Note the draft which A I originated.
- check machine run for possible lead to Menendez. many MENENDEZ [illegible]

4 photos detached for transmittal to TSD. To be returned for filing in 201

EXPEDITE

F-11

Extracted for [illegible] files. [illegible]

Can [illegible] get physical description of MENENDEZ

2) Are crucifixes, or rosary beads in Cuba generally made to snap open?

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-30733

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
CUIS Proposal for Meeting with AMSTALK-1

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References: A. JMWAVE 6942, dated 2 May 1967

JMWAVE 6980, dated 4 May 1967

Attached for Headquarters information and evaluation are copies of three JMWAVE memoranda, WSO's 3012, 3013, and 3022, covering the background and events of the CUIS proposal to AMSTALK-1 requesting a meeting to be held in either Canada or Spain. It should be noted that some information reported initially is corrected in later memoranda. As presented in references and brought out inmore detail in the attached memoranda, the operation by the CUIS seems to be directed by Manuel PINIERO; the professionalism shown in the preparation of the message and the subsequent concealment of the message were certainly not warranted by the circumstances. If the purpose were only to get a message to AMSTALK-1, a simple typed letter in a sealed envelop would have done the job. The use of strip film which necessitates special equipment for reading, also suggests the possibility that the entire operation is designed for the purpose of opening a channel to WOFACT. PINIERO would probably assume AMSTALK-1 would report the incident to WOFACT and the utilization of professional techniques might be a means of establishing bona fides in order that WOFACT not dismiss the message as other than genuine. Also attached for Headquarters are photographs of the crucifix in which the message to AMSTALK-1 was concealed.

4 Atts

Attachments:
1. 1 cpy WSO 3012
2. 1 cpy WSO 3013
3. 1 cpy WSO 3022
4. 6 photographs

Distribution:
0 - WH/COG

Stanley B. JERSAWIT

201-307337

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
[illegible]

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
10 May 67	MAY 11 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27552

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-307337

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Attachment #1 to UFGA-27552

SECRET

26 APRIL 1967

MEMORANDUM

WSO-3012
Distribution:
1 - 201-307337 File
1 - Reg.
1 - SO/I/Chrono
1 - Ramskill
1 - D/OPS
1 - C/IO
1 - C/IS

TO : File of AMSTALK-1
(201-307337)

INFO : D/OPS
C/IO
C/IS

THRU : C/SO

FROM : SO/I/RAMSKILL

SUBJECT: Recruitment Proposal Received by AMSTALK-1.

1. On 25 April 1967, RAMSKILL and COBFIELD met with AMSTALK-1 at safehouse #316 at his request for the purpose of discussing what the agent described as "a matter of urgency".

ISALGUE (spelling)

2. AMSTALK-1 said that his cousin, one Marta ISALQUE Rodriguez, 44 years old, arrived in Miami via the Freedom Flight on 11 April 1967. She is the wife of Fernando de ROJAS, who is presently serving a 30 year sentence in La Cabana Prison for conspiracy against the Castro Government. Marta had applied for exit from Cuba some time ago, but it wasn't until she wrote a letter to Manuel PINEIRO, aka Barba Roja, Director of the DGI and close family friend of the ISALGUE's prior to the Revolution, that she had any inkling that her exit request would be honored. Following dispatch of the letter, she was telephoned by PINEIRO who said that he had taken her case under his personal supervision, and that she would be visited by someone from his office in the near future. The following day, PINEIRO's secretary called on Marta to discuss the situation, and obtain necessary additional details. Not hearing anything concrete for about one month, Marta again wrote to PINEIRO, who again telephoned her saying that immediate action would be taken. The following day she was visited by two men who claimed to be from PINEIRO's office. One identified himself as MENENDEZ and said that he was a former close friend of AMSTALK-1. They gave Marta a definite date for her departure from Cuba, and promised to return again to insure that the plans were working smoothly. Just prior to leaving Cuba, Marta was revisited by the two PINEIRO representatives, and was told that she had been

SECRET

Att 1 to UFGA 27552

CS COPY

201-307337

granted a farewell meeting with her husband in La Cabana. On her way to the airlift, she was permitted a lengthy conversation with her husband, and was given a new cross to attach to her rosary beads, and told that inside the cross was a message for AMSTALK-1 in Miami, and that she would be doing AMSTALK-1 and herself a favor by delivering it. MENENDEZ added that the message was from a good friend of AMSTALK-1's. Marta later boarded the Freedom Flight under the supervision of MENENDEZ who permitted her to bring with her certain of her personal jewelry which a normal exile is not permitted.

2. AMSTALK-1 avoided meeting Marta at the airport for reasons of security, and saw her for the first time on the following night, 12 April, but there were so many friends and family present that they had no chance to talk alone. Marta did indicate, however, that she wanted to have a long talk with AMSTALK-1. The following day, Marta left for West Palm Beach where she stayed with relatives for about one week. She returned to Miami and telephoned AMSTALK-1 on 24 April, at which time a meeting was arranged for the same evening. It was at this meeting that Marta gave AMSTALK-1 the above story and the rosary.

3. There is attached a translation of the message to AMSTALK-1 which was hidden in the lower upright of the cross. It appears to be a positive 35mm film strip of one frame. According to TSD, it was a professional concealment job. The name and address to which AMSTALK-1 may direct his replies is unknown to the agent, although all of the facts in the message indicate that the writer knows AMSTALK-1's position exactly. The agent believes that the reason for the sending of the message at this time is that he was involved in the CUBELA/GUIN wrap up and because this is the first time that a close relative of his has come out. The agent has agreed to follow whatever instructions we may have for him without question, and reiterated that the Cuban colony here and the Castro Government know that he cannot be influenced by any such threats of blackmail against his family, a condition he has been living with for the last five years.

4. In addition to the above, Marta provided the following information:

a. AMTRUNK-19, cousin of both Marta and AMSTALK-1, appears to be assuming a role of lesser importance in his job and in Cuba as the result of the departure of

Che Guevara, to whom he was very close. AMTRUNK-19's wife, who used to be a secretary to the wife of Raul CASTRO, has all but dissassociated herself from revolutionary activity. She was formerly very active.

b. Jose MASIP Isalgue, another cousin, is still writing for the Cuban Institute of the Theatre. He remains very pro-Communist.

c. Antonio MASIP Isalgue, another cousin, is presently in East Germany studying. He cannot return to Cuba. He previously studied and/or worked in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

d. Certain fruits which are grown in Cuba, but were heretofore exported and unavailable locally, are now plentiful. On occasions , they are given free to the public in the local markets. On the other hand, canned Soviet goods, which were plentiful before, are now almost non-existent.

e. The Isle of Pines was closed and the 50,000 prisoners have been transferred to the mainland to work on farms.

f. A live-and-let-live attitude has been adopted by the Castro Government in relation to the opponents of the regime. Persecution is falling off.

g. Marta's husband, Fernando de ROJAS, was sent to Matanzas following the CUBELA/GUIN wrap up, and was interrogated, but was exonerated from any implication, and returned to La Cabana.

h. During Marta's conversations with her husband prior to her leaving Cuba, the two PINEIRO agents joined in the talk without being in any way oppressive, and encouraged Marta and her husband to suggest ways in which "the system" might be improved.

5. AMSTALK-1 was asked about the possibility of Marta's providing additional information or support, and if she might consent to entering into contact with an American. The agent made it clear that she was frightened by what the implications of the message she had brought out for AMSTALK-1 might be, and had no intention of getting any further involved in clandestine relationships, since both her husband, and adopted mother (mother of AMSTALK-1) were still in a dangerous position. AMSTALK-1 was instructed to review the message he had received, talk again with his cousin, Marta, and add whatever he could to amplify the available information in this matter.

Miguel:

In the last years of the revolutionary process we have been in contrary positions and, at times, our acts have affected your decisions to oppose us by serving third interests. The struggle has had its ups and downs, but without a doubt, the weight is now in our favor.

Your decision to oppose us, I repeat, drove you to resort to using your family and friends; who have been progressively rolled up, such as Fernando, Carlos, Ramon, Gina and others. Since this is a war to the death, as far as we are concerned, our strength permits us the luxury of not retaliating indiscriminatly. But our accounts are not paid and you must understand that in this type of struggle, there must be an eventual clearing of accounts.

Miguel, you know that we have concrete proof against persons close to you, against whom, until this time, we have not acted. These persons, in additions to the crime for which they are directly responsible, have dedicated themselves ultimately to the violation of many other laws of the country; the stimulus and example you have set in this matter has made you responsible for this. Even in light of the foregoing or any other of your economic or social needs, we ought to exchange opinions.

Our proposition is: To have a meeting in Canada or Spain, where we would discuss the entire situation with the intent of forgetting the past and examining present realities.

To let us know of your decision to go to one or another of the countries, send a cable to the address which is appended. If you will go to Canada, sign it Enrique, if Spain, Guillermo. Send this cable a month prior to your departure. When you arrive in the chosen country, send another cable indicating your exact location and contact instructions. If you are unable to go to either of the countries mentioned above, write an open text letter explaining why you can't, and an alternate suggestion.

Remember Miguel, that others depend on your decision. For this reason we recommend you be discreet. The bearer can add some details to our proposition.

You decide if the war is to continue. Some of we old fig' who remember you prefer that it does not.

Arturo PITA Rey

Miguel:

En los últimos años del proceso revolucionario hemos estado en posiciones antagónicas y, de cierto forma, nuestras actuaciones han sido correspondientes a tu decisión de combatirnos puesto al servicio de terceros intereses. Las batallas, de todo tipo, han tenido sus alternativas, pero sin dudas la balanza es favorable a nosotros.

Tu decisión de combatirnos, repito, te impuso la necesidad de acudir a familiares y amigos; los cuales han ido cayendo sucesivamente, como Fernando, Carlos, Ramón, Gina y otros. Pese a que esta guerra está planteada a muerte, nuestra fortaleza nos permite no tener que golpear indiscriminadamente. Pero nuestras cuentas no estan saldadas y es necesario que entiendas que en este tipo de lucha no puede quedar eslabón sin aclaración.

Miguel, tu sabes que tenemos pruebas demoledoras contra personas muy allegadas a ti, contra las cuales, hasta el momento, no hemos actuado. Esas personas, además de los delitos sobre los cuales tienes responsabilidad directa, se han dedicado ultimamente a violar otras muchas leyes del país; tu culpa en esto último es el estímulo y ejemplo que les inculcaste. Alrededor de todo esto o de cualquiera otra necesidad humana, económica, social, que tuvieras debemos intercambiar opiniones.

Nuestra proposición es: Tener una entrevista en Cánada o España, donde discutiríamos toda una política encaminada a tratar de ir olvidando el pasado y situarnos a la altura de las realidades presentes.

Para hacernos llegar tu decisión de ir a uno u otro país, envías un cable a la dirección que te adjuntamos. Si vas al Cánada lo firmas Enrique y si vas a España, Guillermo. Este cable lo mandas un mes antes de partir. Cuando llegues al país envías otro diciendo el lugar exacto donde resides y como localizarte. De no poder ir a ninguno de los países señalados, escribe en texto convencional explicando lo que te lo impide y la solución que propones.

Recuérda, Miguel, que otros varios dependen de tu decisión, por lo que te recomendamos discreción. La portadora puede agregarte algunos detalles de nuestro planteamiento.

Tu decides si la guerra continúa. Algunos viejos combatientes que te recordamos, preferiríamos que no.

Arturo Pita Rey
Calle 25 No. 3116 e/ 34 y 36,
Marianao.

Attachment #2 to UFGA-27552

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

27 April 1967

WSO-3013

Distribution
~~1-201-307337~~ File
1-SO/II Chrono
1-REG

TO : AMSTALK-1 201 File

THRU : Chief, SO Branch

: DCOS/O

: Chief, IO Branch

FROM : SO/II/Leland H. COBFIELD

SUBJECT: April 26 Meeting with AMSTALK-1

REFERENCE: WSO-3012, 27 April 1967

1. COBFIELD and RAMSKILL had a second meeting with AMSTALK-1 at S/H 316. An enlargement of the message which was concealed in the crucifix and brought to Miami from Cuba by the cousin of AMSTALK-1 was shown to AMSTALK-1. He read the message and the English translation, commenting that the English coincided with his own interpretation.

2. AMSTALK-1's reaction to the contents of the letter was mild and he did not appear too concerned about the threats to his family (paragraphs 2 and 3). He stated that he did not recognize the name at the bottom of the letter (Arturo PITA Rey) and commented that from talks with his cousin he believed the real sender of the letter was Manolo PINIERO "Barba Roja" (Director of the DGI), and that the name and address was probably an accomodation address used by the Cuban Intelligence Service.

3. AMSTALK-1 identified the names in Paragraph 2 as follows:

Fernando	- Fernando de ROJAS - husband of AMSTALK-1's cousin, Marta (the source of the message) presently serving a 30 year jail sentence in Havana. Fernando de ROJAS was described by AMSTALK-1 as a fanatical Catholic.
Carlos	- Carlos PEDRAZA - husband of Gina ISALGUE who is AMSTALK-1's aunt and also in jail.
Ramon	- Ramon GUIN member of former AMTRUNK net and connected with Rolando CUBELA presently sentenced to Isle of Pines Prison.
Gina	- Gina ISALGUE sister of AMSTALK-1's mother and wife of Carlos PEDRAZA, presently in jail.

SECRET

ATT 2 to UFGA 27552

CS COPY

201-307337

In addition AMSTALK-1 stated that the regime might also take action against his mother and another sister of his mother living together in Havana (ages 72 and 78 respectively)and unable to obtain permission to leave Cuba, and Andres VARGAS Gomez, a friend presently serving a jail term in Cuba.

4. AMSTALK-1 agreed to follow whatever course of action we wished, i.e. in terms of answering the letter, not answering it, arranging a meeting according to the instructions contained in the message, or other. He was told not to take any action re answering the letter until we advised him of our interest.

Attachment #3 to UFGA-27552

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

2 May 1967

WSO-3022
Distribution:
~~1-201-307337~~ File w/atts
1-C/IO w/atts
1-SO/II Chrono w/o atts
1-REG w/o atts

TO : AMSTALK-1 201-307337 File

THRU : Chief, SO Branch

; DCOS/O

: Chief, IO Branch

FROM : SO/II/Leland H. COBFIELD

SUBJECT: May 1, 1967 Meeting with AMSTALK-1 Concerning Recruitment Proposal He Received.

1. For the meeting AMSTALK-1 prepared the attached material. Attachment 1 is a type written report by AMSTALK-1 of events which took place in Cuba between his cousin, Marta ISALQUE Rodriguez de ROJAS, and Manolo PINEIRO and his representatives. Attachment 2 is a message written by AMSTALK-1 and addressed to PINEIRO containing his thoughts regarding a possible answer. (The message has not been sent by AMSTALK-1, and he will not take any action without our concurrence.)

2. On April 30, 1967 AMSTALK-1 met with his cousin. According to his cousin, the only persons, who know about the crucifix, and the conversations about it and the message, are Manolo PINEIRO, MENENDEZ and the other representative of PINEIRO inside Cuba; and AMSTALK-1 and herself in Miami. She told AMSTALK-1 that none of the conversation about the crucifix or the message took place in the presence of her husband, at the jail, and that MENENDEZ and the other PINEIRO Representative, specifically cautioned her not to reveal anything about the subject to anyone including members of the Cuban G-2, security etc. To her knowledge no one else knows about the subject. As a sidelight she told AMSTALK-1 that MENENDEZ had informed her that unless she cooperated with them and agreed to carry and deliver the message, she would not be permitted to leave Cuba; but that the other individual with MENENDEZ, interrupted at this point and told her that she would be permitted to leave whether or not she agreed to do as they asked. ✓

3. AMSTALK-1 also stated that his cousin told him that she had not been asked by PINEIRO, or his representatives, or anyone else, to carry any other messages or do anything else for them in the U. S.

CS COPY

SECRET

ATT 3 to UFGA 27552

201-307337

[illegible]

ATTACHMENT #1

PAGE 1

4/30/67

TO PAUL

FROM DAVID

SUBJECT: MESSAGE BROUGHT FROM CUBA BY MRS. MARTA ISALGUE RODRIGUEZ, WIFE OF FERNANDO DE ROJAS PENICHE, WHO RESIDES AT 4740 NW. 1ST. MIAMI, FLA., TELEPHONE 445-3100.

BODY OF THE INFORMATION: MARTA ISALGUE'S HUSBAND WAS CONDEMNED TO PRISON FOR 30 YEARS IN 1961, ACCUSED OF CONSPIRING AGAINST THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT AND OF LEADING THE ORGANIZATION OF ING. RAY IN HAVANA. HE WAS FIRST HELD AT THE ISLE OF PINES AND IS CURRENTLY AT LA CABANA, HAVANA.

MARTA ISALGUE HAS THREE CHILDREN, 11, 9 AND 7 YEARS OLD, AND BECAUSE OF HER CHILDREN SHE HAD BEEN TRYING TO LEAVE CUBA FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. MRS. MARTA IS A CHILDHOOD FRIEND OF MANUEL PINEIRO, AS WELL AS ALL HIS FAMILY. FOR THIS REASON SHE DECIDED TO WRITE HIM A LETTER AT THE END OF THE MONTH OF JANUARY 67, SO THAT PINEIRO WOULD HELP HER LEAVE CUBA. THIS SHE DID AND APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS FROM THEN A MAN APPROXIMATELY 45 YEARS OLD APPEARED AT HER HAVANA HOUSE LOCATED AT REPARTO DEL VEDADO. THIS MAN CLAIMED TO BE PINEIRO'S SECRETARY (EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), WHO TOLD HER THAT MANOLO HAD RECEIVED HER LETTER BUT BECAUSE OF HIS MULTIPLE OCCUPATIONS IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO SEE HER; HOWEVER, HE HAD SENT HIM SO THAT HE WOULD HELP HER MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AND THAT THE FOLLOWING

DAY HE WOULD GO T IMMIGRATION TO ARRANGE FOR HER DEPARTURE.

APPROXIMATELY 25 DAYS FROM THE FIRST LETTER, MARTA SENT A SECOND LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IN WHICH SHE REQUESTED SHE BE ALLOWED TO KNOW WITHOUT ANY EVASION IF HER PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED OR NOT. THE NEXT DAY MANOLO PINEIRO TELEPHONED HER AND SPOKE WITH HER FOR 45 MINUTES. DURING THE CONVERSATION, ALMOST AT THE END OF IT, HE ASKED, "AND YOUR BROTHER?" SHE REPLIED, "WHAT BROTHER?" AND THEN HE SAID, "MIGUEL WHO HAS BEEN VERY CALM LATELY." SHE REPLIED, WHAT ELSE COULD SHE DO. SHE HAD THREE CHILDREN AND HAD TO WORK HARD FOR THEIR SUPPORT. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION PINEIRO TOLD HER THAT HE WOULD SEND SOME FRIENDS TO SEE HER. THE NEXT DAY TWO MEN ARRIVED. ONE OF THEM USING THE NAME OF MENENDEZ SAID THAT HE KNEW ME AND THAT HE HAD A LETTER FROM A FRIEND TO SEND ME. USING THIS PRETEXT HE ASKED MARTA FOR AN OBJECT WHERE HE COULD INSERT A MESSAGE. MARTA SHOWED HIM SEVERAL THINGS AND HE CHOSE THE CROSS. AT THAT MOMENT HE TOLD HER THAT SHE WOULD BE LEAVING ON 11 APRIL AND THAT HE WOULD COME TO PICK HER UP SO THAT SHE WOULD SEE HER HUSBAND BEFORE SHE LEFT. 10 DAYS LATER HE RETURNED WITH THE CROSS AND TOLD HER WHERE THE MESSAGE WAS HIDDEN, THEN TOOK HER TO SEE HER HUSBAND AT LA CABANA.

MENENDEZ RECOMMENDED TO MARTA MAXIMUM DISCRETION EMPHASIZING THAT ONLY FIVE (5) PERSONS KNEW OF THE MESSAGE: MARTA, THEY TWO, PINEIRO, AND OF COURSE I WHO WOULD FIND OUT WHEN THE MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED TO ME AND THAT MY REACTION UPON RECEIVING IT COULD DEPEND ON THE SOLUTION OF MANY/FAMILIAR PROBLEMS OR PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY/ THIS MENENDEZ WAS PRESENT WHEN MARTA CHECKED IN AT THE LAGUITO IN HAVANA AND

ALSO AT THE VARADERO AIRPORT WHEN MARTA LEFT FOR THE UNITED STATES. THEY ALSO DEMANDED THAT SHE DID NOT MENTION TO ANYONE OF THEIR CONVERSATION NOT EVEN WITH ANY MEMBER OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR THAT IT WOULD NOT BE THEM.

THE INTERVIEWS TOOK PLACE IN MARTA'S HOUSE IN HAVANA.

[illegible]

ATTACHMENT #2

MANOLO:

RECEIVED YOUR LETTER THRU MY SISTER MARTA AND MY ANSWER IS AS FOLLOWS: SINCE YOU GAINED THE POWER IN CUBA IT WAS MY DECISION TO FIGHT YOU; HAVING DONE SO FROM THE FIRST MOMENT NOT DUE TO POLITICAL OR ECONOMICAL AMBITION BUT TO THE IDEOLOGICAL DISCREPANCIES YOU WELL KNOW. I DO NOT KNOW IF YOU REMEMBER THAT IN THE YEAR 1956 WE SAW EACH OTHER AT THE CAFE WHICH BELONGS TO YOUR COUSIN IN AGUIAR AND OBRAPIA IN OLD HAVANA. THEN YOU TOLD ME THAT YOU WERE GOING TO THE SIERRA MAESTRA AND I TOLD YOU THAT I WAS LEAVING FOR THE UNITED STATES. FROM THAT TIME AND EVEN BEFORE THEN WE HAVE NOT FOLLOWED THE SAME IDEOLOGICAL LINES. I KNOW THAT I HAVE FAMILY AND VERY DEAR FRIENDS, SOME IMPRISONED AND OTHERS AT YOUR MERCY, IN MY COUNTRY, BUT THAT I KNEW FROM THE TIME I CLANDESTINELY LEFT CUBA. FOR THIS REASON I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE REALIZATION OF THESE FACTS COULD AFFECT YOU OR ME. IF THE SCALE IS IN YOUR (PL.) FAVOR AS THEY SAY AND IF AS YOU SAY YOU HAVE BEEN GENEROUS, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE GOING TO CHANGE YOUR WAY OF ACTING FOR THE PLEASURE OF PUNISHING SOME ELDERLY AND POOR INDEFENSIVE PRISONERS. WITH REGARDS TO A CONVERSATION I HAVE NO OBJECTION IN HAVING ONE AT ALL IN ANY ONE OF THE TWO COUNTRIES YOU HAVE MENTIONED AS LONG AS YOU SEND ME THE MONEY FOR THE ROUND TRIP FARE TO THAT LOCATION AND, OF COURSE, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ONLY OBJECTIVE OF THE TRIP IS TO CONVERSE PREFERABLY WITH YOU MANOLO, SINCE WE BOTH KNOW EACH OTHER.




JERUS





14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-367337
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. WH/COG/OPS
Jim Mertz
FROM
22

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH/COG5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH5, C/CI, CI/FI2

S E C R E T 122137Z CITE JMWAVE 7100 (WAVE)

10 MAY 67 IN 64414

DIRECTOR

[illegible] MHGUILE AMSTALK

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 99921

B. JMWAVE 6980 (IN 59718)

1. AGREE THAT TIME CONSUMING, EXPENSIVE, DOUBLE THINK OP UNDESIRABLE. QUICKEST AND BEST WAY TO RESOLVE CASE AND DETERMINE CUIS MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES WOULD SEEM TO BE TO HAVE AMSTALK-1 CONFRONT CUIS SOONEST RATHER THAN ENGAGE IN CORRESPONDENCE DESIGNED TO POSTPONE OR EVADE CONFRONTATION. ALSO REASONS FOR CHOOSING AMSTALK-1 IN FACT SPELLED OUT FAIRLY CLEARLY IN CUIS MESSAGE.

2. STATION ADVOCATES CAUTIOUS AND SKEPTICAL APPROACH TO ENTIRE OP, BUT SEES LITTLE REASON SUSPECT EITHER AMSTALK-1 OR MARTA OF PROVOCATION OR COMPLICITY OTHER THAN AS REPORTED. PREPARATION OF STRIP FILM AND CONCEALMENT DEVICE ARE PROFESSIONAL INTEL JOBS, AND STRONGLY SUPPORT STORY THAT MESSAGE IS FROM CUIS. BECAUSE OF THESE FACTORS AND AMSTALK RECORD WITH WOFACT DO NOT FEEL SGSWIRL WOULD PRODUCE ANY BENEFICIAL RESULTS AT THIS POINT.

AH
AS
I
FS
FI

SECRET

CS COPY

10 May 67
201-367337

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 7100 SECRET

3. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

JAN 5 2 29 PM '70
FORWARDED
RID/EDI

DEC 13 8 14 AM '67
[illegible]D
RID/EDI

00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO 201-307337

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. WH/COG/OPS

J. Moritz

FROM 4

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT ~~NOTIFIED~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/EUR 4 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, C/WH/COG 5, C/WH 6, C/CT, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 091236Z CITE MADRID 1376

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

IN 63023

9 May 67

~~KAPOK~~ KEYWAY AMMOON MHGUILE

REF: DIRECTOR 98887

FOR MADRID BACKGROUND USE ONLY WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION FOLLOWING POINTS REF CABLE.

9 - MAY 1967

A. IS AMSTALK-1 NOW WORKING FOR CUIS OR DID HE FORMERLY WORK FOR THEM?.

B. IS AMSTALK-1 NOW COLLORATING FULLY WITH WOFACT?

C. IS AMSTALK-1 INVOLVED IN DOUBLE AGENT OP?

D. WHAT IS CONNECTION AMSTALK-1 WITH AMTRUNK-19 OTHER THAN FAMILY RELATIONSHIP?

E. IS THERE SUSPICION POSSIBILITY AMTRUNK-19 DOUBLED?

F. WHY DOES CUIS EXPECT AMSTALK-1 MIGHT BE WILLING MEET THEM IN OTHER COUNTRY?

S E C R E T

BT

CS COPY

09 May 67

201-307337

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 10

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1 CI	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG: C. TRETTIN:jaf
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 6835
DATE: 9 MAY 67

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 48 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

SECRET
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

5 2[illegible] 03 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 99921

TO JMWAVE

KAPOK MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF: JMWAVE 6980 (IN 59918)

1. EBK CONCUR RUNNING EXPLORATORY OP TO CLARIFY NATURE PINIERO PLOY. AMSTALK-1 SHOULD INDICATE WILLINGNESS, IN PRINCIPLE, MEET WITH PINIERO OR HIS DESIGNATED PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE BUT SHOULD INSIST MORE DEFINITE PROPOSAL THAN VAGUE EXCHANGE OPINIONS OR "EXAMINE PRESENT REALITIES." IN ESSENCE SHOULD REPLY THROUGH ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS WITH QUESTION "WHY ME".

2. IF WE ASSUME PINIERO TRYING ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACT UNBEKNOWNST HIS SUPERIORS AND ASSISTANTS, THIS APPROACH MAY FORCE HIM ABANDON IDEA IF AMSTALK-1 REPLY COMES TO ATTENTION PINIEROS CO-WORKERS. NEVERTHELESS, HQS WANTS AVOID TIME CONSUMING, EXPENSIVE, INCONCLUSIVE, DOUBLE-THINK OP AND BELIEVE DIRECT, REALISTIC RESPONSE BY AMSTALK-1 BEST WAY RESOLVE CASE AT ONSET.

3. TO ATTEMPT VERIFY STORY AS REPORTED BY AMSTALK-1 SUGGEST WAVE EXAMINE ALL FACETS SKEPTICALLY AND CONSIDER

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________ #________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

PAGE TWO
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 95921

TO SPECIAL SGSWIRL OF AMSTALK-1 AND DIRECT INTERVIEW AND SGSWIRL OF MARTA IF POSSIBLE.

4. HQS TRACES PITA PENDING.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG COMMENT: Ref requests Hqs comments re (1) proposition by Manuel Pineiro to meet with AMSTALK-1 in Canada or Spain, (2) JMWAVE's views of the proposition and (3) JMWAVE's suggestions for the running of this operation.

C/wh/COG/CICS

WILLIAM V. EBRE BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

S E C R E T

ORIG: MICHAEL OLEJARZ:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/FI
EXT: 5061
DATE: 4 MAY 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	FI	6	
2		7	
3	MO	8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 22 PER ______ # ______

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-356707
X-REF: 19-300-16
19-5-1

INFO: FILE , VR C/WH/C C/RI/SD C/EUR4 C/CI C/FI2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 4 23 23 Z CITE DIRECTOR 98887

(3)

TO MADRID INFO: JMWAVE

KAPOK KEYWAY AMMOON MHGUILE

REF: JMWAVE 6942 (IN 58376)* (NOT SENT MADRID)

1. AMSTALK/1 (FORMERLY AMICE/14) RECEIVED NOTE FROM CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WHICH WAS DELIVERED BY HIS COUSIN WHO ARRIVED IN MIAMI ABOARD A FREEDOM FLIGHT. NOTE HIDDEN INSIDE HOLLOWED OUT CRUCIFIX AND ADDRESSED TO AMSTALK/1. CONTENTS OF NOTE INDICATED THAT CUIS IS AWARE OF SUBJ'S ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES AND IS ALSO AWARE OF ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES OF HIS CLOSE FRIENDS. THEY ALSO SUGGESTED AMSTALK/1 MEET WITH THEM IN EITHER SPAIN OR CANADA. AMSTALK IS TO ADVISE CUIS OF HIS DECISION BY CABLING ADDRESS GIVEN IN NOTE WHICH IN CUBA.

2. AS STATION AWARE AMSTALK/1 IS COUSIN OF AMTRUNK/19. SUGGEST STATION BEAR PARA 1 BACKGROUND IN MIND FUTURE MEETINGS WITH AMTRUNK/19.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: *Advised of letter received by AMSTALK/1 from CUIS.

C/WH/COG/CI

C/WH/COG/FI William J. Kiernan Jr.

EUR/CUBA

C/EUR/SR

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO 201-302331

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-302331

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. W. Jones/ops

FROM 15

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PRONIBITED

ACTION C/WHCOG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EUR 4

S E C R E T 041518Z CITE JMWAVE 6980

4 MAY 67 IN 59918

DIRECTOR

[redacted] MHGUILE AMSTALK

REF JMWAVE 6942 (IN 58376)

1. SEVERAL ITEMS IN REF CALL FOR COMMENT:

A. OPERATION APPEARS TO BE DEFINITELY UNDER PERSONAL DIRECTION MANUEL PINEIRO, AS EVIDENCED BY PHONE CALLS AND MENENDEZ STATEMENT PARA 7 REF.

B. OPERATION IS OBVIOUSLY PROFESSIONAL INTEL JOB. STRIP FILM WELL DONE AND CRUCIFIX CONCEALMENT DEVICE EXCEPTIONALLY EFFECTIVE.

C. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS PROFESSIONALISM APPEARS UNNECESSARY. LETTER FROM PINEIRO TO AMSTALK-1 (ON PAPER, NOT STRIP FILM) COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN GIVEN AMSTALK-1 COUSIN FOR DELIVERY AS REFUGEES ARE NOT BODILY SEARCHED AND CUBANS DOUBTLESS AWARE OF THIS. IN FACT LETTER COULD HAVE BEEN MAILED FROM HAVANA OR NEW YORK (AS HAVE BEEN OTHER RECRUITMENT LETTERS) THROUGH MAILING WOULD PERHAPS REDUCE BONA FIDES.

D. STRIP FILM LETTER NOT EASY FOR AVERAGE PERSON TO READ, AS REQUIRES SOME SORT OF ENLARGING EQUIPMENT. PINEIRO

82

AW

AB X

FI

SECRET

CS COPY

24 May 67

201-302331

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 6980 S E C R E T SECRET 29 PM '70

COULD NOT ASSUME THEREFORE THAT AMSTALK-1 COULD READ IT UN-AIDED. RID/EDI

E. NO MENTION WAS MADE IN LETTER OF ADVANCING MONEY, OR REIMBURSING AMSTALK-1, FOR TRAVEL TO SPAIN OR CANADA.

F. ALL AVAILABLE INFO INDICATES AMSTALK-1 WELL KNOWN BY CUIS TO BE NOT ONLY WOFACT, BUT ALSO ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO CASTRO REGIME, TO EXTENT CUIS WOULD NOT EXPECT HIM TO COOPERATE EVEN IF FAMILY INSIDE THREATENED.

2. ABOVE LEADS JMWAVE TO BELIEVE THAT PINEIRO, IN SETTING UP OP, FULLY EXPECTED AMSTALK-1 TO TURN MATTER OVER TO HIS WOFACT CASE OFFICER, WHO COULD EASILY READ STRIP FILM LETTER AND FOR WHOM USE OF STRIP FILM AND PROFESSIONAL CONCEALMENT DEVICE WOULD PROVIDE BONA FIDES THAT THIS ACTUALLY IS CUIS OP. IN SHORT, APPEARS TO STATION THAT PINEIRO FULLY EXPECTS, IF AMSTALK-1 MAKES MEETING REQUESTED, THAT IT WILL BE UNDER WOFACT SPONSORSHIP.

3. IF THIS TRUE, PURPOSE OF OP IS UNCLEAR. APPEARS DOUBTFUL THAT CUIS AIM IS TO KIDNAP OR OTHERWISE HARM AMSTALK-1; WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DO IN CANADA OR SPAIN, AND HAVE NO REASON BELIEVE THEY CONSIDER AMSTALK-1 SUFFICIENTLY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 JMWAVE 6980 SECRET

IMPORTANT. APPEARS POSSIBLE PINEIGO IS ATTEMPTING TO OPEN HIS OWN CHANNEL TO WOFACT A LA AMSTRUT-3 POSSIBLY TO BYPASS ABRAHANTES. OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE OTHER POSSIBLE AIMS.

4. AMSTALK-1 IS AGREEABLE ACCEPTING COMPLETE WOFACT DIRECTION IN EXPOITING THIS OPERATION. IF HQS CONCURS, JMWAVE PROPOSES HAVE AMSTALK-1 SEND TELEGRAM INDICATING HE PREPARED TRAVEL SPAIN AND MAKE MEET THERE IN ORDER FIND OUT WHAT PINEIRO UP TO. PLAN TO HANDLE OP ON ASSUMPTION PINEIRO REALIZES HE IN FACT SETTING UP MEET WITH WOFACT, I.E. SEE NO REASON DELAY MATTERS BY SUGGESTING ALTERNATE MEETING SITE OR USING "SEND ME TRAVEL MONEY" PLOY. APART FROM FINDING OUT PURPOSE OF MEET, WOULD PLAN OP SO WE COULD IN FACT SEND PINEIRO MATERIAL FOR COMMO CHANNEL WHETHER THIS WHAT HE HAS IN MIND OR NOT.

5. HQS COMMENTS REQUESTED.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

201-307347

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CI	5	
2		6	
3	FO	7	
4		8	

FROM 25

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/EUR 4,

S E C R E T 022256Z CITE JMWAVE 6942 3 MAY 67 58376

DIRECTOR

KAPOK MHGUILE AMSTALK

(1)

1. MARTA (ISALQUE) RODRIGUEZ, WHO IS COUSIN OF AMSTALK-1, ARRIVED MIAMI VIA AIRLIFT 11 APRIL 67, ADVISED AMSTALK-1 SHE HAD MESSAGE FOR HIM. CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDED HER DELIVERING MESSAGE UNTIL 24 APRIL WHEN SHE TOLD FOLLOWING STORY.

2. MARTA APPLIED FOR AIRLIFT SOME TIME AGO, BECAME DISCOURAGED RE CHANCES AND WROTE PERSONAL LETTER TO MANUEL PINEIRO WHO KNOWN TO HER FAMILY. SHORTLY AFTER, SHE TELEPHONED BY PINEIRO WHO STATED HE TAKING CASE UNDER PERSONAL SUPERVISION AND WHO SENT SECRETARY TO OBTAIN NECESSARY INFO. AFTER NOT HEARING FURTHER NEWS AFTER ONE MONTH, MARTA AGAIN WROTE PINEIRO, WHO AGAIN TELEPHONED AND ON FOLLOWING DAY SENTHTWO MEN WHO GAVE HER DEFINITE DEPARTURE DATE AND PROMISED TO SEE THAT ALL WENT SMOOTHLY. ONE, IDENTIFIED AS "MENENDEZ," STATED THAT HE FRIEND OF AMSTALK-1.

3. TWO PINEIRO AIDES WERE HELPFUL, ARRANGED FOR MARTA

SECRET

TO VISIT HER HUSBAND (FERNANDO DE ROJAS) IN JAIL, INDICATED MARTA WOULD BE PERMITTED TO TAKE SOME OF HER PERSONAL JEWELRY WITH HER (WHICH NOT NORMALLY ALLOWED REFUGEES.) IN ADDITION, AIDES BORROWED BARTA'S WOOD AND SILVER CRUCIFIX, AND WHEN THEY RETURNED IT TOLD HER THAT INSIDE CROSS WAS A MESSAGE FOR AMSTALK-1 FROM FRIEND, THAT SHE WOULD BE DOING AMSTALK-1 AND HERSELF A FAVOR TO DELIVER IT.

4. WHEN MARTA GAVE ABOVE STORY TO AMSTALK-1 AND DELIVERED CRUCIFIX HE TURNED IN TO STATION. INSIDE CRUCIFIX IN HOLE CARVED IN WOOD WAS ROLLEDXUP PIECE OF STRIP FILM WITH POSITIVE IMAGE OF TYPED LETTER TO AMSTALK-1. LETTER STATES THAT ALTHOUGH AMSTALK-1 FOR PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAS BEEN SERVING THIRD INTEREST, OPPOSING REGIME, REGIME IS NOW WINNING. CONTINUES AMSTALK-1 OPPOSITION DROVE HIM/USE HIS FAMILY (UNDERLINED) AND FRIENDS WHO HAVE BEEN PROGRESSIVELY ROLLED UP, MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY FERNANDO DE ROJAS, CARLOS PEDRAZA (HUSBAND OF AMSTALK-1 AUNT), RAMON GUIN, AND GINA ISALGUE (WIFE OF PEDRAZA). LETTER THEN STATES CUBANS HAVE CONCRETE PROOF AGAINST OTHERS CLOSE TO AMSTALK-1 AGAINST WHOM THEY HAVE NOT YET ACTED. IMPLIES SINCE THESE PEOPLE

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

FOLLOWING AMSTALK-1 EXAMPLE, HE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR ACTS, AND SAYS IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING AND "YOUR ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL NEEDS" CUBANS AND AMSTALK-1 SHOULD EXCHANGE OPINIONS.

5. LETTER CONTINUES WITH PROPOSITION TO HAVE A MEETING IN CANADA OR SPAIN. "WHERE WE WOULD DISCUSS ENTIRE SITUATION WITH INTENT OF FOREGETTING PAST AND EXAMINING PRESENT REALITIES." SUGGESTS THAT AMSTALK-1 NOTIFY OF HIS DECISION BY SENDING CABLE TO ARTURO PITA REY, CALLE 25 NO. 3416 E/34 Y 36, HAVANA INDICATING BY SIGNATURE WHETHER MEET TO BE CANADA OR SPAIN. CABLE SHOULD BE SENT ONE MONTH PRIOR DEPARTURE. ON ARRIVAL, AMSTALK-1 SHOULD SEND ANOTHER CABLE INDICATING EXACT LOCATION AND GIVING CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS. IF UNABLE GO TO EITHER CANADA OR SPAIN, SEND OPEN TEXT LETTER EXPLAINING REASON AND SUGGESTING ALTERNATE COUNTRY.

6. JMWAVE TRACES PITA NEGATIVE; HAVANA TELEPHONE DIRECTOR LISTS NAME AT ADDRESS GIVEN.

7. MARTA STATES SHE TOLD BY MENENDEZ THAT ONLY HE, PINEIRO, AND PINEIRO'S OTHER AIDE WERE AWARE OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 4 JMWAVE 6942 S E C R E T

AND THAT SHE SHOULD TELL ONLY AMSTALK-1, SHOULD NOT MENTION IT "EVEN TO OTHER CUBAN G-2 REPS."

8. STATION POUCHING FULL REPORT AND COPY OF LETTER. STATION COMMENTS ON ABOVE AND OPS PROPOSAL FOLLOW BY SEPARATE CABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

[redacted]

#62386
9 December 1966

Subject: Iden A

AMSTALK/1 was interviewed and tested at a covert site in the Miami, Florida area on 7 December 1966 at the request of Leland H. COBFIELD. The interview was conducted in English, in which AMSTALK/1 is fluent.

AMSTALK/1 is Principal Agent of a WOFACT infiltration team. He was last SGSWIRLed on 2 June 1966.

RESULTS

AMSTALK/1 is not cooperating in any way with the government of any country other than WOLADY and he is not obligated in any way to any Cuban exile group.

AMSTALK/1 has never done anything on purpose to cause an operation to fail and he has not discussed with or reported to any unauthorized persons any details of his WOFACT operational activities.

AMSTALK/1 has not failed to report anything of significance that occurred during his WOFACT missions.

AMSTALK/1 has never taken any unauthorized persons to a WOFACT safe site.

AMSTALK/1 is not involved in any activities which he wishes to hide from WOFACT.

DETAILS

No significant information was developed during the interview.

EXAMINER's COMMENT: AMSTALK/1 was very cooperative. His test results are of above average validity.

Daniel R. MOSKIER

[redacted]

CS COPY

UFGT-18224/05

201-307337

[redacted]

#62186
9 December 1966
IDEN

Idem A   Miguel Angel DIAZ Isalgue
DPOB: 14 February 1937
Matanzas, Cuba

201-307337

[redacted]

DESENSITIZED

?

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WOBONE

INFO
Deputy Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
FJDUST/SGSWIRL/PBRUMEN
Transmittal of SGSWIRL Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: None

1. Forwarded herewith [redacted] are the following SGSWIRL reports with below list of IRD numbers, 201 numbers and cryptonyms:

IRD NUMBERS	201 NUMBERS	CRYPTS
(#42416)	(-215388)	(AMOT/14)
(#42067)	(-118302)	(AMOT/40)
(#42469)	(-291555)	(AMOT/63)
(#55013)	(-355647)	(AMAKA/1)
(#55463)	(-730168)	(AMNUBA/2)
✓(#62386)	(-307337)	(AMSTALK/1)
(#70143)	(-300063)	(AMTRUNK/21)
(#78201)	(-291767)	(AMTRUNK/25)
(#78253)	(-288001)	(AMOT/268)

2. The identities of above reports are forwarded [redacted] as a separate cover attachment.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments:
1. Reports [redacted]
2. Identities [redacted]

COPY

Distribution:
2 - C/WOBONE, w/atts. 1/1-9, h/w;
2/1-9, u/s/c
10 - DC/WH, w/o atts.

201-307337

DATE TYPED
13 Dec 66

DATE DISPATCHED
DEC 15 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-18224

CROSS REFERENCE TO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-730168
201-215388; 201-355647;
201-300063; 201288001;
201-118302; 201-29155;
201-307337; 201-291667

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
Activities Report, AMSTALK/1, Principal Agent for the AMTRUNK Team.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: For Your Information

1. Operational Activity:

A. During the period June-August 1966, AMSTALK/1 was instrumental in assisting in the preparation of the AMTRUNK Operational Team consisting of AMAKA/1, AMTRUNK/24, and AMTRUNK/25 for STEAMER IX and X, a two phase operation targetted at southern Matanzas and Havana. During the final planning stages, however, it was decided to omit for the present the portion of the operation directed at Havana, and AMTRUNK/7, a former AMTRUNK Team guide on operations in the northern Matanzas area, was rehired specifically for the exfiltration phase of the STEAMER IX and X Operation. AMSTALK/1 was responsible for convincing AMTRUNK/7 to rejoin his former team, and arranged the necessary cover details which would explain AMTRUNK/7's absence from the JMWAVE area during the operation.

B. During July 1966, AMSTALK/1 attended the majority of the three week communications instructors course, but as the result of the press of business in preparing for the STEAMER Operation, was unable to complete the course; it is believed, however, that AMSTALK/1 could perform as a qualified instructor even though he did not receive his "diploma".

C. A part of AMSTALK/1's contribution to the STEAMER Operation was the extensive and comprehensive debriefing of refugees to the JMWAVE area from the operational area. The information obtained from these reports was of value to the AMTRUNK Team in planning for the STEAMER Operation.

2. Operational Expenses:

Salary (June-August 1966 Gross)	$1,476.00
Mileage (June-August 1966)	383.00
TOTAL	$1,859.00

[illegible] 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

Distribution: H/W
3-WH/C

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DATE TYPED 15 Sept. 66	DATE DISPATCHED SEP 19 1966
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-25975	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-307337	

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER Page 2 of 2 UFGA-25975

3. Intelligence Production:

AMSTALK/1 did not provide any disseminable reports during the period under review. He did, however, provide the Station with considerable operational information through his contacts in the local community, and through refugee leads provided by the Station.

4. Projected Plans:

STEAMER IX and X is planned for launching on 11 September 1966. AMSTALK/1 who has assisted in the planning phase, and who has provided the Station with the services of AMTRUNK/25 and AMTRUNK/7 will accompany the AMTRUNK Team during its travel to its infiltration point and during its return from its exfiltration point in order to provide on-the-spot guidance and support.

Philip G. ELMARD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

UFGA-25747/37

Attachment to UFGA-25747

S E C R E T

AMENDMENT TO MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

TO : Chief, WH Division

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Amendment to Memorandum of Oral Commitment for 201- 307337 (AMSTALE-1)

Please amend Paragraph 4 of the Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Subject to read as follows:

4. COMPENSATION. Effective 1 May 1966, Subject will be paid compensation at the rate of $402.00 per month. Such payments to be made following completion of satisfactory service.

SIGNED: Field Contracting Officer

REVIEWED: H. G. Allsworth (signed)
Contract Approving Officer

REVIEWED:
Don H. Lusticker
Special Contracting Officer

S E C R E T

Group 1 - Excluded from Automatic Downgrading & Declassification

201-307337

14-00000

SECRET

CK

INVENTORY - NON STAFF PERSONNEL

	1	2	3	4
	RECORD NO.			
A	ARBITRARY NO.	SUBJECT'S 201 201-307337	OTHER FILE NO.	
B	SURNAME AMSTALK/1 ~~AMICE-14~~	1ST NAME PERSONALIA	OTHER GIVEN NAME/TELECODE	TYPE OF NAME C
C	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	DATE OF BIRTH 14 Feb 37	CITIZENSHIP Cuba	NATURALIZED-US (yes or pending)
D	COUNTRY CURRENTLY RESIDES USA	CITY CURRENTLY RESIDES-YEAR Miami, 66	MARITAL STATUS (most recent) Married	SEX (M or F) M
E	OVERT OCCUPATION Construction Work	LANGUAGE Span, R,W,S	LANGUAGE Eng, R,W,S	LANGUAGE
F	MILITARY SERVICE-COUNTRY	BRANCH OF SERVICE	INCLUSIVE DATES	
G	COUNTRY AREA KNOWLEDGE Cuba	COUNTRY	COUNTRY	
H	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces) Principal Agent			CODE PM
I	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces)			CODE
J	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	TYPE EMPLOYEE TYPE A OR B	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE WIFE	FULL, PART TIME OR WAE
K	MAINTENANCE/SERVICE	CONSULTANT	PROPRIETARY OR SUBSIDY	CAREER AGENT
L	FIELD AGENT Yes	HQS., FF OR USF USF	INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR	MOC/MOA MOC
M	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL Yes	POA [redacted] STATUS	STAFF CLEARANCE	CSA/PCSA
N	HQS COMPONENT RESPONSIBLE WH	FIELD STATION RESPONSIBLE JMWAVE	PROJECT	COVER Non Off
O	ENTRY ON DUTY DATE 1 Feb 63	YEARLY SALARY $5300.00	DATE LAST PAY CHANGE 16 Jun 64	
P	PART OF A RETIREMENT PLAN - SPECIFY (limit to 62 spaces) USSS			
Q	DATE TERMINATED	REEMPLOYABLE	STAFF CEILING SPACE	
R	REMARKS (re: termination, etc.) (limit to 62 spaces)			ATTITUDE

FORM 4-68 2457

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

(9-51)

UFGT-16523/03

ISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, KUSODA

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: FJDUST/LCFLUTTER/PBRUMEN
0 Transmittal of LCFLUTTER Results

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action: None

1. Forwarded herewith (RYBAT) are the following LCFLUTTER reports with below list of IRD numbers, and 201 numbers and cryptonyms.

IRD NUMBERS	201 NUMBERS	CRYPT
(#)	(-284815)	(AMJOKE/1)
(#66308)	(-300038)	(AMS[illegible]/1)
(#55013)	(-355674)	(AMA[illegible]/1)
(#62386)	(-307337)	(AMS[illegible]/1)
(#70143)	(-300063)	(AMTR[illegible]K/2[illegible])
(#70173)	(-772275)	(AMTO[illegible]EL/3)
(#78201)	(-)	( )
(#78202)	(-733685)	(AMO[illegible])

2. The identities of the above reports are forwarded as a separate cover attachment.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments:
A. Reports [redacted]
B. Identities [redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

Distribution:
2 - C/KUSODA w/atts. A/1-8 h/w; B/1-8 [illegible]/c
3 - C/WH w/o atts.

CS COPY

201-307337

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-16523

DATE
JUN 1 4 195

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-284815; -300038; -355674; -307337;
-300063; -772275; -733685

14-00000

[redacted]

62386
2 June 1966

Subject: Iden A

AMSTALK/1 was interviewed and tested on 2 June 1966 at a safe site in the Miami area at the request of George H. RAMSKILL. The interview was conducted in English.

AMSTALK/1 is a Principal Agent of an infiltration team.

RESULTS

AMSTALK/1 is not cooperating in any way with the government of any country other than PBPRIME.

He has never done anything on purpose to cause a mission to fail.

He is not obligated to any of the Cuban exile organizations.

He does not discuss with or report to any unauthorized persons regarding his operational activities. He has not taken any unauthorized persons to a safehouse or a training site.

AMSTALK/1 was asked whether anything had ever happened on a mission which he did not report during his after-action debriefings. He replied in the negative and there was no indication of deception.

DETAILS

AMSTALK/1 stated that he was interested in the possibilities of going into private business in Costa Rica, but so far he had made no commitments. If and when he does he plans to give KUBARK the necessary notice.

EXAMINER'S NOTE:

While AMSTALK/1's charts during previous tests were unresolved, the charts of 2 June 1966 were readable and are considered valid.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

Keith D. WINETT

[redacted]

62386
2 June 1966
IDEN

Iden A   Miguel Angel DIAZ Isalque
DPOB: 14 February 1937
Matanzas, Cuba

[illegible]

201-307337

SECRET
(When Filled In)

A mtec. IV

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

DIAZ ISALGUE, MIGUEL
201-307337
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RYBAT

019-006-084/03
UFGA-17037
28 JUL 64

PAZR- 2097241

```
1000001.00000000 00000
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
111_1_1111111111111111
2222222222222222.222_22
3333333333333333333333
.444444444444444444_4
5555555555555555555555
61.66666666666666666666
77_7_77777777777777_777
8888888888888888888888
999999__99999999.9999
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
```

2 097 241

16.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
3. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

DIAZ ISALGUE, MIGUEL
201-307337
SEX M COB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
< USA, FLA, MIAMI
NEPHEW-IN-LAW OF CARLOS PEDRAZA AGUILAR, 201-734357
FFN 19-120-30-71/4

019-005-030
UFGA-25600
25 JUL 66
P3

R 6608010386

FILE IN 201-307337

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

☐ DES ☒ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : D. STANFORD/jln
UNIT : WH/C/RR/OS
EXT : 7646
DATE : 24 MARCH 1966

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-307337

24 SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : JMWAVE

24 MAR 66 22 59z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8

INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 90699

TYPIC

REF: UFGA-24781*

CONCUR REF CRYPT CHANGE TO AMSTALK/1.

END OF MESSAGE

RL

WH/C/Comment: *Requested AMICE/14 be changed to AMSTALK/1.

201-307337

24 Mar 66

WH/C/MO/PM

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

24-20

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN T. FLYNN
A/DCWHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACTION COMPLETED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
Request Change AMICE-14 Cryptonym

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED - See Below

REFERENCES - None

1. During late 1962 while still a member of the AMICE organization, AMICE-14 received some informal para-military training from JMWAVE. The cryptonym was assigned to him at that time.

2. Subject resigned from AMICE in March 1963 at which time he became a fully-recruited asset of Station JMWAVE. Subject has been associated with the MHAPRON-oriented AMTRUNK (STEAMER) project as Team Leader and Principal Agent since his resignation from AMICE.

3. Since Subject's activities for the past three years have been totally unrelated to those of AMICE, it is requested that his cryptonym be changed to forestall any further possible confusion between his current duties and the activities of his former parent organization.

4. In anticipation of a favorable reply to this request, the cryptonym AMICE-14 will be cancelled effective 15 March 66 and the new cryptonym AMSTALK-1 assigned to the Subject of 201-307337 as of that date.

Philip G. ELMARD

CS COPY

Distribution
3 - WH/C

201-307337

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
17 March 66

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA=24781

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-307337

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
DEPUTY CHIEF, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMENDMENT OF MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT, SUBJECT OF 201-307337 [illegible] Miguel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

UFGA- 9000 dated 27 May 1963
(Original MOC)

ATTACHED HERETO IS AN AMENDMENT TO THE MOC OF SUBJECT.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

DISTRIBUTION -
3 - DC/WH/SA W/ATT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

134

CS COPY

201-307337

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA- 20339	DATE MAR 17 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201- 307337

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

TO : Deputy Chief, WH/SA

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT : Amendment of Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Subject of 201 - 307337

REFERENCE: UFG A-9000 dated 27 May 1963 (Original MOC)

Subject's MOC, transmitted to you in above reference, is amended as follows:

Delete paragraphs eight (8) and nine (9) and substitute the following paragraphs:

8. OTHER COMMITMENTS.

BONUS. With prior approval of the Chief of Station, a bonus may be authorized for outstanding performance in the line of duty. The amount of the bonus will be commensurate with the risks taken and the results which were achieved; amount not to exceed $500.00 per any single payment.

9. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject except that with prior approval of the Chief of Station, Subject will be entitled to the benefits applicable to Category B as outlined in Paragraph 4 of JMWAVE Instruction 20-50.

[illegible] 10 1965

SIGNED:

FIELD CONTRACTING OFFICER

REVIEWED:

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

REVIEWED:

Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

CS COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 1/

☐ COPY ☑ ISSUED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	SS	5	
2		6	
3	[illegible]	7	
4		8	

FROM

ACTION

INFO

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

VR, FILE, [illegible]

S E C R E T 052136Z

ISOL INFO DIR CITE WAVE 9119

~~KAPOK~~ TYPIC [illegible] AMAROMA

per CSN 43-43

1. FOLL INFO PROVIDED ON AMAROMA TEAM SCHEDULED TRAINING 15 MARCH THRU 9 APR 65.

05 MAR 65 IN 17019

A. TRAINEES

(1) AMAROMA-1 KNOWN AS VICTOR

(2) AMAROMA-2 AS RAUL

(3) AMAROMA-3 AS FRANCISCO

(4) AMAROMA-4 AS ALBERTO

B. INTERPRETER

AMICE-14 KNOWN AS DAVID. SUBJ EXPERIENCED P/A AND TEAM LEADER. NO PREVIOUS TRNG ISOL.

C. CASE OFFICER. IDEN KNOWN AS FRED WILL ACCOMPANY TRAINEES ON FLIGHT. C/O WILL BE ASSIGNED FOR LAST THREE DAYS AND ACCOMPANY TEAM BACK WAVE AREA.

D. SECURITY: ALL AMAROMAS HAVE POA, AMICE-14 OA. ALL LCFLUTTERED AND WILL BE PROPERLY BRIEFED

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-43

[illegible]MENT AT TRNG SITE.

E. TRNG RECEIVED. AMAROMAS RECEIVED ONE WEEK FI/TRADECRAFT AND THREE WEEKS PM INCLUDING MAP AND COMPASS, WEAPONS AND NIGHT MOVEMENT PLUS ONE MONTH BASIC RADIO OPERATOR TRNG. AMICE-14 RECEIVED FULL CYCLE WAVE TRNG.

F. TRNG REQUIRED. TWENTY TWO DAYS PM PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION EXCEPT DELETE 4 HRS BAR AND ADD 4 HRS 30 CAL LMG. PHOTO TRNG NOT REQUIRED.

G. MEDICAL. TRAINEES WILL NOT REQUIRE SHOTS.

H. OP AREA AND MISSION UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. AMAROMAS ARE RADOP TRAINEES WHO ON COMPLETION COMMO AND OPS TRNG WILL BE INDIVIDUALLY ASSIGNED PM INFIL TEAMS. NO TEAM LEADER SELECTED BUT AMICE-14 WILL SUPERVISE AND ALTERNATE LEADERSHIP ASSIGNMENTS.

2. ISOL PLS PROVIDE TRNG WEAPONS, WINTER CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT.

3. C/O WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND AND BIO DATA ON EACH TRAINEE.

SECRET

AMICE-14
36/

☑ COPY ☐

41 **SECRET**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(Ap'ly not already there)

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/SA 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T [illegible]152Z

[illegible] INFO DIR CITE [illegible]

[illegible]

REF: [illegible] (IN 17346)*

[illegible] (IN 17340)

SUBJECT REFS AUTHORIZED VISA [illegible]

[illegible] SHOULD APPLY TO CONSULATE IN HAVA[illegible],

AS MEXI PROCEDURES INVOLVE DELAY IN RECEIPT[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

* HAVE MHAPRON INTEREST IN [illegible] AND DESIRE ASSIST HIM LEAVE CUBA LEGALLY THEN MEXI TO HONDURAS.

3 FEB 65 IN 72460

Ex-Cdte Carlos Federico ✓ MONTIEL Rivero, MCR DR

✓ Well known to AMICE-14 who monitoring his activities.

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : M.C.Capraro:pam
UNIT : WH/4/Chile
EXT : 6609
DATE : 12 Jan 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
1 MOB — TCS — RPTS — CI — SI — SEG
SB — AR — CA — HH — NS
LOG

TO : SANTIAGO JMWAVE

FILE AMICE-14 (201)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO DDP, WH/SA 8, C/CA, CA 2, CA/O 4, VR, FILE

TO SAGO INFO: WAVE CITE DIR 76857

REFERENCES: WAVE 6997 (IN 57777)
UFGA 17794
UFGA 18485

(with AMTRUNK op)

1. IN VIEW INCREASING PRIORITIES OF TECH AND SURVEILLANCE OPS AGAINST SOVIET SATELLITE INSTALLATIONS IT WOULD APPEAR AMICE-14 WELL QUALIFIED AS SUPPORT AGENT. AS SINGLE MAN AND STUDENT APPEARS PARTICULARLY USEFUL TO ACQUIRE AND MAN LISTENING AND OBSERVATION POST AS OPPORTUNITIES FOR THESE ARISE. HIS ACCESS INTO STUDENT CIRCLES ALSO COULD BE USED TO SPOT AND POSSIBLY RECRUIT CANDIDATES FOR UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE TEAM AS WELL AS CANDIDATES FOR MHSPAWN YOUTH AND STUDENT OPNS.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE WAVE AND SAGO VIEWS RE AMICE-14 SUITABILITY OR PROHIBITIONS IF ANY IN CONTEXT ABOVE. ALSO APPRECIATE COMMENTS ON AMSPELL RELATIONSHIP WITH AND KNOWLEDGE OF AMICE-1 IF ANY AND WHETHER ANY CONFLICT OF XXE INTERESTS LIKELY DEVELOP WITH AMSPELL PERSONNEL IN SAGO.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref requested reply re possible utilization in SAGO of AMICE-14.

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

WH/SA/MOB Mr. Cizi by phone

JOSEPH Y. KIYONAGA
C/WH/4

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

24 SECRET

☐ COPY ☑

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/SA-5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI-2,

SECRET 080123Z

DIR CITE WAVE 6877

RYBAT TYPIC AMTRUNK-AMLASH

REF A WAVE 5329 (IN 31751)

B WAVE 6745 (IN 53500)

AMICE-14 (201)

IN 55776

1. AMTRUNK-9 NOW ALMOST TWO WEEKS OVERDUE ON RETURN FROM REF B TRIP PBRUMEN. AMICE-14 WHO IN DAILY CONTACT WITH A-9 WIFE REPORTS THAT NEITHER SHE NOR AMFAUNA-3 HAVE HEARD ANY WORD OF A-9 AS OF 7 JAN. WAVE SOURCES STILL REFLECT NO NEWS A-9. AMFAUNA-3 WHO REPORTEDLY PAYMASTER THRU YET UNDISCLOSED SPONSOR FOR A-9 TRIP RECENTLY GAVE WIFE A-9 $100 FOR SUPPORT FOR WHICH MRS A-9 DID NOT SIGN RECEIPT.

2. WAVE ATTEMPTING CLARIFY IDEN OF SPONSOR BEHIND AMFAUNA-3. ALTHOUGH ACSI HAS REPEATEDLY DENIED INVOLVEMENT, A-3 STILL CURRENT ACSI SOURCE AND VASQUEZ FORMER ACSI AGENT. WAVE SOURCES DO NOT INDICATE THAT EITHER A-3 OR AMFAUNA-1 WHO ALSO MENTIONED BY A-9 AS INVOLVED IN VASQUEZ RESCUE ATTEMPT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO UNDERWRITE BOAT EXPENSES AND MONEY PAID TO AGENTS WHICH IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF $1200, AND FULFILL OBLIGATION CARE FOR FAMILIES IF A-9 AND CREW DO NOT RETURN. WAVE ALSO TRYING ESTABLISH IDEN OF PUERTO RICAN

SECRET

IDENTIFIED ONLY AS "JORGE" WHO REPORTEDLY VISITED A-9 SEVERAL TIMES PRIOR TO TRIP AND WHO APPEARS BE AMFAUNA-3 BOSS.

3. IF AMTRUNK-9 CAUGHT AND FORCED TALK, HE COULD VIRTUALLY DEPLETE AMTRUNK OPERATION AND SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE AMLASH-1. A-9 KNOWS MOST KEY FIGURES IN AMTRUNK INFIL AREA (SEE PARA 2 REF B) AS WELL AS AMTRUNK-11 WHO IS GO-BETWEEN FOR AMTRUNK-10 WITH AMTRUNK-15 IN INFIL AREA. NO INDICATION THAT A-9 KNOWS A-10 AS RECRUITED AGENT BUT THIS FACT KNOWN TO A-11 WITH WHOM A-9 WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT. A-11 HAS MENTIONED A-10'S FRIEND "CHARLES" (AMLASH-1 WAR NAME) IN S/W MSGS BUT IT NOT CERTAIN THAT A-11 KNOWS CHARLES' TRUE IDEN. ALTHOUGH AMICE-14 CURRENTLY PROHIBITED FROM FURTHER INFILS, INFO RE A-14 PAST OPS RECORD INSIDE PBRUMEN COULD ALSO LEAD TO A-14 MOTHER AND AUNT WHO MAINTAIN S/W ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR BOTH A-10 AND A-11.

4. ALL SAFEHOUSE WHICH SURFACED TO A-9 HAVE BEEN TERMINATED AND M/V NEPTUNE WHICH USED FOR A-9 RE-INFILTRATION IN SEP 63 SINCE SOLD. OTHER THAN AMICE-14 A-9 DOES NOT KNOW TRUE NAMES OF ANY OF CURRENT AMTRUNKS IN WAVE AREA.

SECRET

CFN *REF: RYBAT YOBITE

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM
CARACAS

ACTION
WH 8

INFO
VR. FILE DDP, WH/SA 8, CI/OA

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

~~AMICE-14~~ 14

4/15 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BY ~~☐~~ COPY ☐ DUMMY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY KS

AMTRUNKS

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

WH/SA 14

AN	M	~~PB~~		~~[illegible]~~
		FF		~~DESTROY~~
ABSTRACT	★	~~INDEX~~		

S E C R E T 071420Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE CARA 9712

TYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF A. WAVE 6775 (IN 54304) ✱

B. UFGA 17794

C. HVCA 11754

IN 55340

7 JAN 65

SEE REF C FOR NEGATIVE REPLY TO POSSIBLE UTILIZATION AMICE-14 [illegible]

S E C R E T

CFN ✱ REQUESTED REPLY AS TO UTILIZATION AMICE-14

Diaz A. Miguel
Isalgue

[illegible] ops

7 JAN 65

201-307337

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

f AMICE-14 (201)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

2 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

MRD - FYI

☑ RID COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 3

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH/SA 8, CI/OA

S E C R E T 15235Z

MONT CARA INFO DIR CITE WAVE 6779

DYVOUR PERUMEN

REFS A. UFGA-17794, 23 SEP 64

B. UFGA 18485, 6 NOV 64

REQUEST ADDRESSEES REPLY REFS RE POSSIBLE [illegible]

AMICE-14 YOUR AREAS.

S E C R E T

CFN

FI

16 JAN 65 IN 54304

SECRET

ROB
~~EOB~~
CI
INT
IOS
RETS
SI
SS
PERS
LOG
BF
SEC
SB
AR
CA
HH
NS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

FILE,

S E C R E T 050049Z

5 Jan 65 IN 53500

DIR CITE WAVE 6745

ee Pm.

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMTRUNK

REF A. WAVE 6313 (IN 46961)

B. WAVE 6314 (IN 46957)

1. OP AMTRUNK X POSTPONED TO LATE JANUARY SINCE AMTRUNK/9 HAD NOT RETURNED FROM REF TRIP. AMTRUNK/9 ALONG WITH AMTRUNK/3 (FORMER GUIDE WHO TERMINATED MID-63) AND 3RD PERSON LEFT WAVE AREA 21 DEC 64 FOR AMTRUNK INFIL AREA THENCE HAVANA TO RESCUE JOSE (VASQUEZ) NEREY AND 3 OTHERS WHO IN HIDING AT HOME IDEN A. AMICE/14 RCVD INFO FROM BOTH WIFE A/9 AND IDEN B THAT FUNDS FOR OPERATION PROVIDED BY AMFAUNA/3 OSTENSIBLY FROM KUBARK. AMFAUNA/3 IS ACSI SOURCE NO. 180 UNDER WHOSE NET VASQUEZ WORKED UNTIL A/3 EXFILTRATED BY AMTRUNKS SEP 63.

Exfil guided by CIA.

ACSI 290

2. ACCORDING WIFE A/9 TRIP PLANNED FOR ONE WEEK DURATION BUT NO WORD YET RCVD FROM AXO TO EXPLAIN DELAY. A/9 WIFE STATES A/9 PLANNED CONTACT AMTRUNK/15 AND 18 TO ARRANGE TRANSPORTATION TO HAVANA. A/9 INTENDED NOTIFY HIS WIFE BY OPEN CODE COMMERCIAL CABLE UPON SAFE ARRIVAL HAVANA AND ALSO PRIOR EXFIL. ON 30 DEC, WIFE A/9 STATES, AMFAUNA/3 TELEPHONED IDEN A IN HAVANA. REPORTEDLY VASQUEZ HIMSELF ANSWERED PHONE AND STATED A/9 HAD NOT YET ARRIVED. AS OF 4 JAN,

A/9 WIFE HAS RCVD NO WORD [illegible] SOURCES [illegible] OF A/9.

3. ON 27 DEC IDEN C CALLED HER DAUGHTER IDEN D IN [illegible] AREA FROM HAVANA TO PASS CRYPTIC MSG TO COUSIN AMICE/14 TO EFFECT [illegible] AMTRUNK/19 IN TROUBLE. APPEARS MSG INSTIGATED BY AMTRUNK/11 WHO [illegible] PERIODIC CONTACT WITH A/19.

SECRET

4-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO: VR, FILE, DDP

S E C R E T 050049Z

DIR CITE WAVE 6746

5 Jan 65 IN 53525

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMTRUNK

REF WAVE 6745 (IN 53500)

IDEN A- GLORIA (CABERERA) BARRIOS

NBR 72 27TH STREET BETWEEN "N" [illegible] "O"

APARTMENT 3

VEDADO, HAVANA.

IDEN B- MARIA TERESA (VARGAS) GOMEZ.

IDEN C- CLARA (ISALGUE) ISALGUE.

IDEN D- MARIA DE CARIDAD (ISALGUE) ISALGUE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SLSHELL-5 VOL. V

201-3073

5 of

SECRET

OFFICIAL CS FILE

SECRET

FORM 1505B
3-63

SECRET

20 Jan 1975

LX 4629

CONTACT REPORT

Agent - PACHANKIS [redacted]

D/P/T: 20 Jan 75/ Fairfax Holiday Inn/rm 363/0830-0930

201-307337

<8. Miguel Angel DIAZ Isalque: I showed P the letter from DIAZ to the PO Box 982 Coral Gables box; P said he did not know that address and had no idea how DIAZ might have got it. I told P it was a sensitive address which we did not want to have blown, asked him to contact DIAZ, ostensibly because KALBING (who long ago was having P prime DIAZ for a trip to Madrid, which never came off) had sent regards and an explanation of why the Madrid thing fell thru) P is to make no mention of the Coral Gables address or the letter, but assuming DIAZ will bring it up, to try to discover how DIAZ got that address, while also discovering what it is DIAZ had in mind when he wrote the letter. P thinks he has DIAZ' phone number, if necessary can use the ploy of having seen DIAZ' TV ad for his furniture store.>

Emery D. PREMSELAR

SECRET

X

LA/CFE1

RECORD COPY

20 JAN 75

DIAZ 201-307337

14-00000

Fred Burns
4?58

201- [illegible]

[illegible]

28 March 1975

SUBJECT: Contact Report on Miguel DIAZ Isalgue. (D)

1. (Background). (D) was an agent of ours during the early/mid 1960s and put his life on the line many times for us in different assignments. In c. Oct 1963, he was examined and approved by INS to become an american citizen. He paid the $25.00 court fee and expected to be called shortly thereafter for the Naturalization Court ceremony. To date, he has not been Naturalized and INS has refused -according to (D)- to satisfactorily explain the reason for this unusual delay. (D) asked us in c. February 1975 to help determine the cause for the INS delay. Hqs came back saying he should make one more attempt with INS before Hqs would check with their INS laison.)

2. On 21 and 27 March, I met with (D) and informed him of the Hqs suggestion that he check once again with INS. (D) informs me he went back to INS and has been given the same evasive/vague explanation: "Your case is under investigation. We'll call you when its finished." (Or words to that effect.)

3. (D) has extensive business relations in both Costa Rica and Venezuela. He desparately needs a US passport to travel freely.

4. As far as I know, (D) has been a loyal/daring agent who has always been ready to cooperate (and still does). If we possibly can -consistent with current policy- offer a hand to this man, at this time, we will be creating a great amount of goodwill with (D) God know we need to hang on to as many good and old friends as we can.

5. IF -for some reason- D's case with INS is murky, and he is ineligible to be an AMCIT, then we should know that, too.

6. Before beating this dead horse any further, let me sum up. If its a bureaucratic snafu by INS, lets help (D) If, on the other hand, INS has a legitimate case against (D), lets find out the details for the sake of our security.

(D)

7. I promised/to pass the word to our people up North and hopefully have some word on the status of his case soon.

Henry S. FALHANKIS.

F/G PAF 201-307337

MEMORANDUM

TO: Marvin L. Extrom DATE: January 7, 1975

FROM: McKercher and Avant MKA 3/75

SUBJECT: Letter from "MIGUEL"

Att: Andy:

Enclosed is a copy of the letter received in our "Special Payments" P. O. Box 982 (Coral Gables Station), which I translated to you over the telephone on this date. Also enclosed is a copy of the envelope.

MARIO GIRBAU

PHONES: 541-[illegible]
541-2396

Hogarama Discount

MUEBLES Y EFECTOS ELECTRICOS

2236 W. FLAGLER ST.
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33135

NOVEMBER 27 1974.-

AMIGO JOE:

SI PUEDES DAME UN TIMBRAZO CUANDO RECIBAS LA CARTA. PUEDES LLAMARME A MI NUEVO NEGOCIO CON LOS TELEFONOS QUE PUEDES VER EN EL PAPEL TIMBRADO O A MI CASA DESPUES DE LAS 10 P.M.

GRACIAS,

MIGUEL

TELEFONO DE MI CASA. 856-1345

Hogarama Discount
2235 W. FLAGLER STREET
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33135

PM

MR. ELIOTH L. ARENS
P.O. BOX 982
CORAL GABLES, FLA, 33134

ZX - [illegible]

38

12 February 1975

SUBJECT: Contact Report on Miquel DIAZ Isalgue.

1. Miquel was met for lunch at the Marriott Hotel on 12 February, to ascertain why he wanted to see me and how he came into possession of the sensitive Office accomodation address.

2. Getting hold of Miquel was difficult and had to be done in a round about way. I could not tip my hand and admit I had received his letter. I had to write to his home address and enclose a stamped, self addressed envelope to my new PO Box.

3. As always, our meeting was most pleasant and comfortable. Our association goes back many years and I have always had the greatest respect for his talents and motivation.

4. Miquel stated he had been trying to reach me and thought he could do it through:

H/ 0030'

Orlando SIMON Casas
1613 NW 14th Court
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla
tel: 763-1346.

Orlando worked inside for the Organization in the 1960s, had been imprisoned and finally released in c. 1970. I had debriefed him at that time and serviced some other requests he had to make to the Organization in subsequent months. Orlando's wife and Miquel's wife are related. Orlando's wife had been receiving Organization assistance while he was in prison and evidently received her funds through the reference PO Box. Miquel wanted to get in touch with me and asked Orlando if he had a way of communicating with the Organization. Orlando then supplied Miquel with the PO Box.

2

5. I did not press Miquel for any further details. I believe this answers most of our questions. I denied having received Miquel's letter and Miquel reasoned that it was "probably one of those old addresses which isn't in use anymore." I seconded his thoughts. I said I had been trying to get hold of him since Christmas to say hello, but he had changed his phone.

6. Miquel's interest in seeing me was for the following:

A. On 25 October 1973, he was interviewed by INS for his US citizen's application, was approved, and paid $25.00 at the US District Court in Miami. He has never again been called back. This is usually a routine, fast process.

RECORD COPY

12 Feb 75
201-307337

B. Miguel has been to INS in Miami on several occasions to inquire re the delay in giving him (and his wife and daughter) their US citizenship. He has always been told that "nothing is wrong," and that he will be called soon. But over a year's wait is not normal and something must be wrong.

C. In view of Miguel's past relationship with us he wonders if this is holding up his citizenship. He asks us to inquire with the responsible authorities and let him know the present status of the case.

D. Would the Office please contact INS so we can assist Miguel in some way and find out why he has not been called to take his citizen's oath? Thanks in advance.

E. The details are:

Miguel DIAZ Isalgue A 11 264 049
Has US District Court receipt # 82427, dated Oct 25, 1973 for $25.00.

Wife: Fabiola Pura DE LA PORTILLA de DIAZ A 12 445 501
Has US District Court receipt under the name of Fabiola Pura DIAZ, # 82426, date 25 Oct 1973, for $ 25.00.

Daughter: Maria Rosa DIAZ A 12 445 502.

7. Operationally, Miguel is always ready and willing to cooperate and collaborate. When I was last asked to contact Miguel over a year ago he was asked if he would be available to re contact SLFOZ-1 in Madrid. Although his answer was in the affirmative, there was never any followup.

8. Miguel now has business ventures in both Costa Rica and Venezuela. He claims to have well placed friends in the Costa Rican government. He has recently began importing appliances into Venezuela. His contact there is:

2K 201-0756656
Antonio BUSTILLO (mit unknown) Caucasian male.
DPOB: c. 1934 in Guantanamo, Oriente, Cuba.

BUSTILLO is the "right hand man" of Venezuelan Minister, and confidant of Carlos Andres PEREZ: 201-0104034

Note!
Orlando GARCIA (mit unknown) Caucasian male.
DPOB: c. 1924 in Havana, Cuba.

9. Miguel led me to understand that he is available in whatever task we might need him. I have promised to pass this on to the Office. I have just scratched the surface not knowing

what interest, if any, the Office has. But, with the impending re-establishment of GOC diplomatic relations with both Costa Rica and Venezuela, Miguel might be useful to us in developing access agents to the new Cuban mission personnel, or any other assignment we might require along these lines. Please advise.

10. I promised Miguel that I would pass on his request to the Office and get back to him just as soon as I had some answer.

PS: For the record: Miguel is not looking for a job. He appears affluent and quite busy with his business ventures. But, I am almost certain he would contribute his services for the cause, if we need him, with complete dedication.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

201-309337

DISPATCH

Chief, [illegible]

Chief, [illegible]

Chief of Station, [illegible]

[illegible] - Forwarding of Contact Report

Reference: [illegible]

As promised in reference, we are forwarding herewith Henry C. [illegible] report of his meeting with [illegible].

Stanley F. [illegible]

Attachment:
Contact report, herewith

Distribution:
[illegible] - Chief, [illegible] w/att. herewith
[illegible] - COS, [illegible] w/att. herewith
[illegible] - Chief, [illegible] without att

[illegible] COPY
FOR [illegible] FILING IN
[illegible] 367337

CS COPY [illegible] 201-840126

UFAA-4237

Typed: 28 July 1972

201-840126
201-307337

[illegible]

CS COPY FILED IN

[illegible] (Chase [illegible] 802 [illegible])
(LEHI)

[illegible] GHOST [illegible]
(SCAMP) [illegible]

[illegible]

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 35 PER

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR IRAN, EUR6, CI/OPS

ACTION NO 1579

S E C R E T 181635Z SEP 72 STAFF

711080

CITE MADRID 17263

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI.

AKULE TYPIP TREF: WH/MAIMI 15782 (IN 708738)

1. QUTIMID REPORTS AMWOLF-1 AND FAMILY PROBABLY RETURNING HOME PCS IN FEBRUARY. THIS HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. BELIEVE IT BEST TO SCHEDULE FIRST WEEK IN OCTOBER, FROM POINT OF VIEW HERE THIS WOULD BE BEST TIME.

2. HAVE HAD LOOSE SURVEILLANCE ON AMWOLF-1 FROM TIME TO TIME AND PLAN TO ONCREASE COVERAGE OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS.

3. FILE: 201-307337. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

FI

TCMP
WW

18 Sep 72

CS COPY

SECRET SLSHELL 201-307337

SECRET

7 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/LA/COG/CI

ATTENTION Chris Hopkins

SUBJECT: MHMUTUAL/MHSAVVY

1. MHSAVVY/2 received this date a letter in his Kenneth L. Arens post office box of the following substance:

(Envelope mailed November 29, 1974)

"November 27, 1974

Hogarama Discount
2225 West Flagler Street
Telephone 541-2395

"Dear Joe:

Please call me when you receive this letter. You can call me at my new business with the telephone number given above or you can call me at my home after 10:00 p.m. Home Number 846-1345. Thank you.

Miguel"

2. A copy of the original letter in Spanish is being forwarded by MHSAVVY/2 to MHMUTUAL. When received it will, in turn, be forwarded to LA/COG/CI. MHSAVVY/1 and 2 state that Hogarama Discount is owned by Miguel Diaz Izalgue. Further, MHSAVVY/1 states that he knows this man was in contact with BKHERALD some years ago.

201-367337

Cedric D. BARTILUCCI(P)
CCS/MHMUTUAL

CCS/MHMUTUAL/CDB/maf

E2 IMPDET CL BY 000264

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee

SECRET

[illegible]

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

FILE, VR C/IPAN C/EURS C/CI

ACTION NO. 940

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 202003Z SEP 72 STAFF

713460

CITE WH/MIAMI 15838 (VEAUSELL ACTING)

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR.

TYPIC AKULE

REF: A. WH/MIAMI 15782 (in 708737)

B. MADRID 17260 (in 711054)

C. WH/MIAMI 15653 (in 697422)

1. CONCUR FIRST WEEK OCTOBER AS BEST DATE. PLEASE CONFIRM SPECIFIC DATE SOONEST.

2. FILE: 201-307337. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

20 Sep 72

201 307337

CS COPY

SECRET

SECRET
(When filled in)

SUSPENSE MEMORANDUM RECORD

A memorandum was written concerning the Subject

of this 201 on 16 DEC 1974 (date) for

INS (requestor) by [illegible] (analyst - name)

9245 (office - extension) in reply to a request

received on [illegible] Dec 74 (date).

NOTICE

REMOVE AND DESTROY THIS SUSPENSE MEMORANDUM RECORD WHEN NAME TRACE REQUEST FORM AND/OR DDO COPY OF MEMORANDUM IS FILED IN THIS 201.

SECRET
(When filled in)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059858

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION · CLASSIFIED MESSAGE · TOTAL COPIES 18-1 · ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION UNIT
WH/25 · FILE, VR, WHA, d/wh8 c/ci

ACTION NO.
510

746790

10

S E C R E T 301634Z OCT 72 STAFF

CITE MADRID 17555 MADR

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT TYPIC

1. AMCHALK-5 RETURNED DIRECT TO MIAMI VIA AERONAVE DE MEXICO FLIGHT ON 28 OCTOBER.

2. FILE: 201- E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

WH/

CS COPY

30 OCT 1972

SECRET

201-307337

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION UNIT
c/EUR 5

ACTION NO.
510

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

TOTAL COPIES 11-1

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

		5	
2	CCS	6	
3		7	
4		8	

FI

FILE, VR c/ipla c/wh c/ci

746790

U

S E C R E T 301634Z OCT 72 STAFF

CITE MADRID 17555

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT TYPIC

1. AMCHALK-5 RETURNED DIRECT TO MIAMI VIA AERONAVE DE MEXICO FLIGHT ON 28 OCTOBER.

2. FILE: 201 307337 E2 IMPDET.

↑ AMCHALK-5 file

S E C R E T

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7/2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION # 906

FILE VR IP/AN, EUR6, CI, C/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 192330Z OCT 72 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 21420 (INFO)

738672

MADRID, DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

TYPIC AMWOLF

REF: DIRECTOR 326678

Travel of Pedro Pinero

1. FYI: PINERO'S NAME DOES NOT APPEAR ON ANY AIRLINE MANIFESTS DEPARTING MEXICO CITY FOR MADRID OR OTHER EUROPEAN CITIES BETWEEN 13-17 OCT. WILL ATTEMPT MONITOR POSSIBLE ONWARD TRAVEL.

2. FILE: AMWOLF-1, AMCHALK-5, 201-0824376.
201-840846 201-361537

E2 IMPDET, WN-SISM.

S E C R E T

CS COPY 201-0824376

19 OCT 72

0307337

SECRET

MARY FELTON
WH/COG/FI
7265 R. 0229
18 OCTOBER 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 13 PER ___ # ___

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

WH8 | FILE, VR, EUR 6 C/IC 2 C/OPS FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

18 OCT 72 21 33z

MADRID INFO MEXICO CITY WH/MIAMI 326678

TYPIC AMWOLF

REF: MEXICO CITY 21363 (IN 734975) (NOT SENT MADRID)

1. REF REPORTED TRAVEL PEDRO PINERO ERIN, PP D/71/1177, CUBA TO MEXICO, 13 OCTOBER 72.

2. THOUGH CUBANS SUPPOSEDLY UNAWARE PLANNED AMCHALK-5 APPROACH TO AMWOLF-1, SUGGEST MADRID WATCH FOR POSSIBLE ARRIVAL PINERO, AS HE INVOLVED IN JUNE 1967 AMWOLF-1/AMCHALK-5 MEETING.

3. MEXICO CITY: IF PINERO'S ACTIVITIES OR ANY ONWARD TRAVEL COME TO ATTENTION OF STATION, PLS REPORT.

4. FILE: AMWOLF-1, AMCHALK-5, 201-S24376. E2 IMPDET.

201-810124 201-307337

END OF MESSAGE

CS COPY FILED IN 201-0824376

WH COMMENT:

Ref reported travel, paragraph 1.

18 OCT 72

201-0307337

C/WH/COG

C/EUR/IB

C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION NO. 417

INFO FILE, VR DDP, ADDP, C/EURS, C/CI, C/FI2, C/IP/AN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

82

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T 171407Z OCT 72 STAFF

CITE MADRID 17443

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT TYPIC

REF MADRID 17403 (IN 730839)

735833

5/r. AMCHALK 101

1. THROUGH QUEYE SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DETERMINED ON 16 OCTOBER THAT AMWOLF/1 LEFT THE CONSULATE ALONE AND WENT TO HIS APARTMENT. ON THE BASIS OF THIS ALERT, POSITIONED AMCHALK/5 NEAR GARAGE WHERE AMWOLF/1 PARKS HIS CAR.

2. AT 1656 HOURS 16 OCTOBER WHEN AMWOLF/1 LEFT THE GARAGE, AMCHALK/5 WAS ABLE TO STOP HIM HALF A BLOCK FROM HIS APARTMENT AND CARRIED ON A SIX MINUTE CONVERSATION. INITIALLY AMWOLF/1 WAS COLD, VISUALLY UPSET BUT LATER BECAME JOVIAL. AT FIRST INSISTED THAT AMCHALK/5 COME TO THE CONSULATE OR CALL HIM TO SET UP MEETING. HOWEVER, AMCHALK/5 INSISTED THEY TALK THEN AND AMWOLF/1 AGREED. AFTER AMCHALK/5 MADE THE PITCH, AMWOLF/1 REACTED BY SAYING "THESE 'JOHNIES' HAVE EVERYTHING AND NOW THEY REALLY STEPPED ON ME". AMWOLF/1 ENDED THE CONVERSATION BY AGAIN AKSING AMCHALK/5 TO COME TO CONSULATE OR CALL HIM SO THEY COULD HAVE ANOTHER TALK. AMWOLF/1 RETURNED TO THE CAR WHERE HIS WIFE WAS WAITING AND STARTED THE MOTOR AND THEN STOPPED AGAIN AND GOT OUT. HE THEN HAD AMCHALK/5 COME OVER AND INTRODUCED HIS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 17443 S E C R E T

WIFE TELLING HER THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN PITCHED ON BEHALF OF WODUAL. SHE REACTED BY SMILING PLEASANTLY AS IF THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING WRONG WITH WHAT HAPPENED.

3. AMCHALK/5 COMMENTED TO CASE OFFICER THAT HE DID NOT THINK AMWOLF/1 WOULD CHANGE HIS POSITION NOW. AMCHALK/5 BELIEVES WE SHOULD WAIT A FEW DAYS BEFORE ATTEMPTING ANOTHER CONTACT EITHER BY ANOTHER MEETING OR TELEPHONE CALL. STATION AGREES WE SHOULD WAIT A FEW DAYS BUT THAT A TELEPHONE CALL SHOULD PRECEDE ANY MEETING. IF THE TELEPHONE CALL PRODUCES A CONTINUED NEGATIVE REACTION, WOULD NOT PROCEED WITH SECOND MEETING UNLESS HQS DESIRES CONTRARY. BELIEVE WE WILL GET SOME REACTION FROM QUTINID IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THAT AFTER THE ENCOUNTER, AMWOLF/1 WENT TO THE EMBASSY BUT DID NOT REMAIN. SURVEILLANCE WAS NOT ABLE TO LOCATE HIM AT THE CONSULATE.

4. POUCHING DETAILED REPORT.

5. FILE: 201-840126. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

SECRET

WH/COG/281-72

10 October 1972

CONTACT REPORT: Meeting with AMCHALK-5

TIME AND PLACE: Kennedy Airport, New York, Saturday
7 October 1972

1. I met AMCHALK-5 at the airport and spent three hours with him between flights. I passed him the note from C/COG for delivery to his contact in Madrid station. This note confirmed what I told AMCHALK-5 orally concerning the amount of money that could be offered AMWOLF-1 for his defection or recruitment.

2. I briefed AMCHALK-5 on the contact arrangements and operational plan proposed by Madrid. AMCHALK-5 is still confident that he will have success in his contact with AMWOLF-1.

Alan G. Morrill
C/WH/COG/FI

5 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Record

SUBJECT : Meeting with AMCHALK-5

TIME AND PLACE: Miami, 3 and 4 OCTOBER

1. I met AMCHALK-5 at 1430 hours at the Rusty Pelican Restuarant. I told him we would like to have him travel immediately in order to arrive in Madrid by 9 October. AMCHALK-5 said he could make it with no problem. He wasn't sure his wife would be able to go on such short notice, but that didn't matter. I briefed him on the contact arrangements sent from Madrid and described WIBALDA to him. I told him WIBALDA'S name is "ROBERTO." AMCHALK-5 said he would make the 0930 hours contact on 10 October, but of course if something goes wrong that he will go to all the alternate meetings. He will be wearing a white sports jacket, white shirt, blue tie, blue slacks and black shoes.

2. I told AMCHALK-5 that WIBALDA would have the letter for AMGHOST-1 for him to take to the meeting, and I told him again not to use the letter unless his recruitment pitch had no results. If he does pass the letter, I suggested that he flex it to prove to AMWOLF-1 that it does not contain a bomb.

3. I told AMCHALK-5 that it looked good for a surprige contact with AMWOLF-1 on 10 October ~~and~~ because he would be going to lunch with a woman not connected with his office. AMCHALK-5 was pleased to hear this ~~was~~ because he feels he must make the contact unannounced for it to be effective. He said that if the October 10 contact was missed, there would probably be another luncheon the following week. AMCHALK-5 is willing to stay in Madrid as long as necessary.

4. AMCHALK-5 was sorry to hear that I won't be going to Madrid because he wants to be sure that he is given as much flexibility as possible, and not forced to handle the approach in a manner that he would not be comfortable with. I told him

file: AMCHALK-5

that WIBALDA understood the situation, and that I was sure it would all go well. AMCHALK-5 assured me that he has no intention of letting himself get into a physically dangerous situation during the contact.

5. If the contact is made next week, AMCHALK-5 will be back before ~~the~~ PACHANKIS is. I said we would want to debrief him in Miami and that either I would see him or PACHANKIS would. I said that if PACHANKIS talks to him, he can tell PACHANKIS the complete details of the operation unless I phoned him otherwise.

6. We arranged to meet again at 1900 hours when AMCHALK-5 would have his itinerary, and I could pass him the money he needed. AMCHALK-5 doesn't want to be paid for this job, but I insisted again that we would pay all his expenses, and I told him to save his hotel bill and other receipts. We met at 1900 hours at the Vizcaya bar and then drove around in AMCHALK-5's car. I passed him $1,500 for which he signed a receipt. AMCHALK-5 had gotten reservations and will leave Miami for New York on 7 October and then fly to Lisbon that same night. He will spend 8 and 9 October in Lisbon where he will rent a car and drive to Madrid, arriving in the evening on 9 October. He has reservations in the Agumar Hotel for 9 October, and he will make the first contact at 0930 hours on 10 October.

7. I wished AMCHALK-5 good luck. He is much more optemistic about his chances with AMWOLF-1 than I am, but it is good to work with a man with enthusiasm. Just in case AMCHALK-5 should be successful, we should be prepared to support him. I suggest that we cable Madrid telling them what and how much we are willing to offer should AMWOLF-1 be interested in defecting. I told AMCHALK-5 that he could promise asylum, but I did not tell him how much money he could offer as an inducement for either recruitment in place or defection.

Oscar C. KALBING

that WIBALDA understood the situation, and that I was sure it would all go well. AMCHALK-5 assured me that he has no intention of letting himself get into a physically dangerous situation during the contact.

5. If the contact is made next week, AMCHALK-5 will be back before ~~the~~ PACHANKIS is. I said we would want to debrief him in Miami and that either I would see him or PACHANKIS would. I said that if PACHANKIS talks to him, he can tell PACHANKIS the complete details of the operation unless I phoned him otherwise.

6. We arranged to meet again at 1900 hours when AMCHALK-5 would have his itinerary, and I could pass him the money he needed. AMCHALK-5 doesn't want to be paid for this job, but I insisted again that we would pay all his expenses, and I told him to save his hotel bill and other receipts. We met at 1900 hours at the Vizcaya bar and then drove around in AMCHALK-5's car. I passed him $1,500 for which he signed a receipt. AMCHALK-5 had gotten reservations and will leave Miami for New York on 7 October and then fly to Lisbon that same night. He will spend 8 and 9 October in Lisbon where he will rent a car and drive to Madrid, arriving in the evening on 9 October. He has reservations in the Agumar Hotel for 9 October, and he will make the first contact at 0930 hours on 10 October.

7. I wished AMCHALK-5 good luck. He is much more optemistic about his chances with AMWOLF-1 than I am, but it is good to work with a man with enthusiasm. Just in case AMCHALK-5 should be successful, we should be prepared to support him. I suggest that we cable Madrid telling them what and how much we are willing to offer should AMWOLF-1 be interested in defecting. I told AMCHALK-5 that he could promise asylum, but I did not tell him how much money he could offer as an inducement for either recruitment in place or defection.

Oscar C. KALBING

SECRET	TELEPOUCH
DISPATCH NO	UFAA 4402
FILE NO	201-307337
DATE	15 SEPTEMBER 1972
INDEXING	NO
MICROFILM	NO
TO	CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
FROM	CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI
SUBJECT	TYPIC/AKULE - AMCHALK/5
REF	WH/MIAMI 15782

1. DURING THE 12 SEPTEMBER 1972 MEETING MENTIONED IN REFERENCE, AMCHALK/5 COMMENTED ON AMBEDEW/1'S LATEST BOOK AND THE FACT THAT HE WAS MENTION IN THREE OR FOUR PAGES. SENSING AMCHALK/5 DISCOMPOSURE, PACHANKIS INQUIRED AS TO THE REASON. AMCHALK/5 REPLIED, "IT'S NOT THAT I'M UPSET OR NOT. I JUST SEE NO REASON TO BRING ME OUT IN THIS BOOK."

2. THE ABOVE IS FORWARDED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR WHATEVER INTEREST IT MAY HAVE, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE PROPOSED USE OF AMCHLK/5 IN THE AMWOLF/1 OPERATION.

STANLEY F. SPECKLER

DISTRIBUTION

3 C/WHD

E2 IMPDET

SECRET

SLSHELL/5

[redacted]

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO UFAA 4403

FILE NO 44-8-24

DATE 15 SEPTEMBER 1972

INDEXING NO

MICROFILM NO

TO CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

INFO CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION

CHIEF OF STATION, TOKYO

FROM CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

SUBJECT AKULE/TYPIC/AMDODGE - 1972 CUBAN PRESENCE LIST

REF FJTA 61848, DATED 28 AUGUST 1972

WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ACOPY OF THE LIST MENTIONED IN REFERENCE.

STANLEY F. SPECKLER

DISTRIBUTION

3 C/WHD

2 C/FE

2 COS, TOKYO

E2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR U.S. COMINT NAME CHECK

TO : CRS/ISG		DATE 25 September 1972
FROM:	BINGHAM MARG WH/C/FI EXT. 5910	GC-841 3D38 TUBE DU3
OFFICE DESIG. ROOM NO. AND		

NOTE: 1. If additional space is necessary, continue on reverse side.

2. Use CRS Service Request, Form 2816 when requesting COMINT documents.

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME DIAZ Isalgue		GIVEN NAMES Miguel A.	
SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED		AKA, ALIASES	
SEX m	DATE OF BIRTH 14 Feb 37	CITIZENSHIP Cuban	RESIDENCE Miami, Fla.

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(occupation, CP membership, I.S. affiliations, etc.)*

(Previous check requested in March 1968)

SPOUSE *(If wife, give maiden name)* OR OTHER RELATIVES

RESULTS OF CRS/ISG INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	COMMENTS No additional information either SI or collateral since March 1968. CRS/ISG/WH/CUBA,ese, 27 Sep 72
DOCUMENT REFERENCES	

FORM 3-71 501 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-9-35)

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO UFAA [illegible]

FILE NO 201-307357

DATE 15 SEPTEMBER 1972

INDEXING NO

MICROFILM NO

TO CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

SUBJECT OTYPIC/AKULE - AMCHALK/5

REF WH/MIAMI 15782

1. DURING THE 12 SEPTEMBER 1972 MEETING MENTIONED IN REFERENCE, AMCHALK/5 COMMENTED ON AMBEDEW/1'S LATEST BOOK AND THE FACT THAT HE WAS MENTIONED IN THREE OR FOUR PAGES. SENSING AMCHALK/5 DISCOMPOSURE, PACHANKIS INQUIRED AS TO THE REASON. AMCHALK/5 REPLIED, "IT'S NOT THAT I'M UPSET OR NOT. I JUST SEE NO REASON TO BRING ME OUT IN THIS BOOK."

2. THE ABOVE IS FORWARDED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR WHATEVER INTEREST IT MAY HAVE, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE PROPOSED USE OF AMCHLK/5 IN THE AMWOLF/1 OPERATION.

STANLEY F. SPECKLER

DISTRIBUTION

3 C/WHD

E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 12-1
TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

MARGE BINGHAM:CK
WH/COG/FI
1819
29 AUGUST 1972

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

FILE, VR. WH/8, CI/OP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 29AUG72 21 15z CITE DIRECTOR 306739

WH/MIAMI.

AKULE TYPIC

1. PLEASE FORWARD SOONEST UPDATED PRQ'S I AND II NEEDED FOR REINSTATEMENT AMCHALK-5 POA.

2. FILE: 201-307337 E2 IMPDET

END OF MESSAGE

29 Aug 72

201-307337

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

E2 IMPDET CL BY 054353

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

O. Bathe
ORVILLE BATHE
AC/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

15 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/COG

FROM : Thomas P. Keogh, Jr.

SUBJECT : Proposal to Continue Attempt to Establish Channel/Dialogue With AMGHOST-1 (201-840126)

1. As a follow-up measure to our attempt to establish a channel to AMGHOST-1 by using AMGHOST-2 on 10 August in Montreal, I propose that we establish an operation with the same end; on this occasion, however, I propose that at this stage we use AMWOLF-1 as our secure channel to AMGHOST-1.

2. The dramatis personae in this operation are: (a) AMCHALK-5 (201-[illegible]), reliable, courageous asset who has been involved with and who knows AMGHOST-1; and (b) AMWOLF-1, Deputy Chief of Center, Cuban Intelligence Services (CUYS), Madrid.

3. Timing of this operation would be for that period in September in which AMCHALK-5 visits Europe.

4. The place for the meeting between AMCHALK-5 and ARAOZ would be in Madrid, Spain, at a place mutually convenient to both. The meeting would be established either by telephone or by personal contact.

5. The purpose of this operation is to establish a channel of communications/dialogue with AMGHOST-1.

6. This operation involves AMCHALK-5's passing of a sealed envelope with a message in it for AMWOLF-1's unopened transmittal to AMGHOST-1. AMCHALK-5's instructions would be to pass the sealed and unopened communication to AMWOLF-1. AMCHALK-5 would then tell AMWOLF-1 that the message must be transmitted directly without tampering or being opened to AMGHOST-1. AMCHALK-5 would add that AMGHOST-1 is waiting for this communication. (FYI: Director 148293, dated 10 June 1971, paragraph 2 noted "that AMWOLF-1 was contact man in DGI effort recruit AMCHALK-5 in June 1967.")

SECRET

7. The message to AMCHALK-5 follows:

M.

We arranged to meet "PUSHKIN" recently but you apparently called the meeting off. We can understand your hesitancy to meet with us in that place and at that time. We do, however, wish to meet with you anytime, any place of mutual agreement via any secure channel of your personal confidence. As you can see, in this instance, we have selected an officer whose loyalty to you is unquestioned. We intended to tell "PUSHKIN" of possible pitfalls in your path. We still wish you to know of these dangers. We realize that you are a true revolutionary in every sense of the word. We have no quarrel with you as a true revolutionary nor with the system that has established itself over the years. We will not countenance nor do we believe that you will countenance continued foreign intervention in your system wherein lies the major danger to your futre. We would also like to make you an offer which would be difficult for you to refuse. To contact one of our reliable officers concerning this opening of a two-way channel of communications, contact or have your selected man contact DIAZ in which you showed some interest in 1967 and he will then contact us. He will then relay the time and meeting date to us, and we will then open our dialogue using only trusted personnel.

Greetings,

L.

8. I believe that our chances for success in this operation are reasonably good for the following reasons: (a) AMCHALK-5 is sufficiently courageous to meet AMWOLF-1 in the Cuban Ambassador's office in Madrid, if necessary; (b) AMWOLF-1 is a trusted colleague and follower of AMGHOST-1. For this reason and in the belief that AMGHOST-1 was awaiting the message, he would find a way to deliver the message unopened to AMGHOST-1; (c) AMGHOST-1 from all available reporting, background material, SI traffic, we have reason to believe that AMGHOST-1 is not held in the confidence of the Soviets nor does he respect their presence in Cuba, a presence which can only be interpreted as promising difficulties for AMGHOST-1; and (d) Bona fides for the originator are contained in a copy of a letter from AMGHOST-2 to her relatives which she signs with the name "PUSHKIN."

SECRET

9. I request authorization to commence this operation immediately with appropriate alterations as required.

Thomas P. Keogh Jr.

Thomas P. Keogh, Jr.
WH/COG/FI

KEN ALBRIGHT:drl
WH/COG/OPS
7144/1819
7 JUNE 1971

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 24-2

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO Albright BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

WHS

FILE, VR. CI/OPS, CI/ICG, CI/CI, CI/EURS, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

0 Jun 71 21 11 2

CITE DIRECTOR 148293

MADRID INFO MEXICO CITY, WH/MIAMI

RYBAT AKULE TYPIC

REFS A. DIRECTOR 144880

B. MADRID 13854 (IN 344957)

C. MEXICO CITY 16774 (IN 346873)

1. VIEW REF C, MADRID CONTACT WITH CUBANS APPEARS BE UNIQUE AND ON PART CUBANS INTENTIONAL. REQUEST STATION'S [illegible] IF NAVARRO AND ARAOZ, IN CONVERSATION CITED PARA 2, [illegible], GAVE IMPRESSION THEY SUSPECTED EITHER STATION OFFICER OF BEING JKLANCE. IF SO, WHAT WOULD BE PURPOSE OF CUBANS [illegible] CONTACT?

2. NOTE THAT ARAOZ WAS CONTACT MAN IN DGI EFFORT RECRUIT AMCHALK/5 IN JUNE 67 AND IN SUBSEQUENT CONTACT CANADA NOV 69 WHICH REQUESTED BY JKLANCE. JUNE 67 MEETING USED BY JKLANCE AS OPPORTUNITY ESTABLISH COMMO

[illegible] GHT:drml

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 148293

LINK BETWEEN MANUEL PINEIRO AND JKLANCE. COMMO LINK, THOUGH NOT USED TO DATE, POSSIBLY STILL VIABLE. AT TIME OF JUNE 67 CONTACT OSCAR GOVIN CABRERA PCS MADRID AND INVOLVED IN OP IN SUPPORT CAPACITY, ARRANGING HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS FOR [illegible] AND PARTNER AND THEIR SCHEDULES WHILE IN SPAIN.

[illegible] HQS INTERESTED IN LONG SHOT POSSIBILITY THAT CUBANS/DGI MAY BE SEEKING SOME SORT OF DIALOGUE WITH JKLANCE [illegible] WOULD LIKE TO ENCOURAGE THIS DIRECT CONTACT UNTIL [illegible] NATURE CUBAN INTEREST BECOMES APPARENT. SUCH DIALOGUE WOULD HAVE HIGH POLITICAL (AND POSSIBLY POLITICAL ACTION) IMPORTANCE AND WE DO NOT WISH SNUFF IT OFF PREMATURELY. [illegible] ENCOURAGE STATION PURSUE MATTER DIRECTLY WITH EFFORT THROUGH THIRD COUNTRY DIPLOMATS PER PARA 4, REF B AS SECONDARY EFFORT.

4. FILE: 19-5-1.

KEN ALBRIGHT:drml

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE THREE CITE DIRECTOR 148293

WH/COG Comment: Ref A requested further info on reported direct social contact between Madrid Station officers and 6 DGI officers at three recent diplomatic luncheons. Ref B advised DGI officers involved and Station's intention pursue through third country nationals. Ref C advised there had been no contact between U.S. officials and Cubans in Mexico City in over one year.

C/WH/COG ________

DC/WH/1 ________

C/E/IB ________

HERWOOD
R/COPS

William V Broe
BROE
C/WHD

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

WH/COG/ER RH

ACTION UNIT C/WH-8

INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI-2

ACTION NO. 664

S E C R E T 291822Z JUL 70 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 9642

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

29 JUL IN 132156

REFS: A. SANTO DOMINGO 8946 (IN 045580)

B. WH/MIAMI 8435 (IN 131863)

1. EMFENCE-2 (IDENTITY), FORMERLY WAS AMBLOW-1. PREVIOUS CONNECTIONS WITH TORRIENTES NOT KNOWN, ALTHOUGH HE DID ATTEND MARCH 1970 MEETING CUBAN EXILES REPORTED REF A AT WHICH TORRIENTES SPOKE.

2. FILE 201-044791. GP-1

S E C R E T

RID

SECRET

File: AMCHALK-1 201

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 38 PER ______ # ______

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. JUL 29 10 04 PM '70

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

ACTION COPY

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT	INFO	
c/WH8		FILE, VR c/RI/SD, c/CI, c/EI2
ACTION NO. 708		

S E C R E T 291822Z JUL 70 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 9643

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

29 JUL 70 132157

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 9642 (IN 132156)

IDENTITY: AMADEO BARLETTA, JR., MANAGER GENERAL MOTORS SANTO DOMINGO. FORMERLY MANAGER AMBAR MOTORS HABANA. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

DIAZ Isalgue Miguel
14 Feb 1937

~~SARA DIAZ Isalgue~~ sister HAVANA
Mercedes DIAZ Isalgue sister
~~[illegible]~~

Jose MASSIP Isalgue cousin
~~husband of~~ CP member
~~SARA SARA Isalgue~~

Marta Isalgue Rodriguez cousin
11 APR 67 Arrives w/message

Meets in MADRID
22 June 67

SARA Isalgue Isalgue
wife of SALVADOR MASSIP
for CUBAN Amb to Poland

Blac mail:

Fernando de Rojas husband of MARTA
Carlos Pedraza
Ramon Guin (AMTRUNK-10)
Gina Isalgue

MARTA GONZALEZ.
Penetrated AMTRUNK
infil/exfil group

QUTRUNK-19 CUBANA pilot

Jose Alberto Sarmiday Isalgue
Cubana pilot
QUTRUNK-19

SARA ISALgue Isalgue
Salvador Massip

Jose Massip Isalgue

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE

TO: Ann Kirk

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:

Elmiro Alino Agero

Pedro Luis Pinelo Elim

Shown to AMNIP-1 - he did not recognize any of them.

FROM: Ennis

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

AMCHALK-5



2.


A
26
H
C
E
L
29
D
M
61
B
09

20 November 1967
Identikit Composite by AMSTALK-1 of
free lance





UFGA 28958
13 Nov 67
Date of Photo 23 June 67

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE AMCHALK-5 aka AMSTALK-1, AMICE-14

NAME	Miguel Angel DIAZ Isalque 201-307337
DPOB	14 Feb 1937, Matanzas City, Cuba
CIT	Cuban, Paroled into USA 22 June 1961, #A 11 264 049
ADDRESS	1519 SW 19th Street, Miami, Florida
DEPENDENTS	Wife, three children; parents deceased
ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE	University of Havana, four (4) years, no degree Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 6 months
LANGUAGE ABILITY	Spanish and English
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE	
1961-1968	JMWAVE Team Leader and Principal Agent. Subject participated in 15 black infil operations into Cuba during this period. It is clear from AMBEDEW-1 that the DGI had penetrated his team and knew various details of their operations.
June 1967	AMCHALK-5 was the target of a DGI initiated recruitment attempt. The pitch was turned down, but at the same time AMCHALK-5 passed an SW message for DGI Chief Pineiro. This resulted in the establishment of the AMGHOST commo channel.
April-May 1968	AMCHALK-5 assisted the Buenos Aires Station in an audio operation targeted against the Official Soviet Installation. For technical reasons the operation was unsuccessful, but AMCHALK-5 was lauded for his efforts by the BA Station.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 5/ (54-3)
ADVANCE COPY ☐ SLOTTED
BY dl AT 1530 Z
DISSEM BY 5 PER
ACTION C/TSD3 ☒ RID COPY
C/FI2

CLA[illegible]IED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
INFO.
FILE. VR. CS DO C/WH 8 C/WH/COG 5 C/CI

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

SECRET 051429Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1930 5 APR 68 IN 35787

dl

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT REDTOP AQUATIC

RE DIRECTOR 88922

CONCUR USE ECUADOREAN DOCUMENTATION. HENDRIQUE WILL HAND CARRY PHOTOES TO HQS.

ETA SUNDAY

PHOTOS IN HAND ON MONDAY

SECRET

BT

207-307337

SECRET

[illegible] WH/[illegible]

REFERENCES: A. WH/MIAMI [illegible] ([illegible])

B. OTTAWA 6728 ([illegible])

C. WH/[illegible] 589[illegible] ([illegible])

1. IN LIGHT POSSIBLE DANGER TO AMCHALK-5 RAISED BY REF A, DESIRE [illegible] INITIATE CONTACT WITH AMCHALK-5 ON ARRIVAL MONTREAL. IN ADDITION WHEN AMCHALK-5 KNOWS DETAILS OF MEETING WITH DGI, SURVEILLANCE SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM SMABOVE. ALTHOUGH UNDERSTAND FROM REF B SMABOVE CAN NOT PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SURVEILLANCE, ASSUME THEY CAN AT LEAST PROVIDE COVERAGE OF AMCHALK-5/DGI MEETING WHEN TIME AND PLACE HAVE BEEN SET.

2. AMCHALK-5 SHOULD NOT MAKE MEETING WITHOUT CONFIRMATION SURVEILLANCE CAN BE PROVIDED.

(continued)

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

[illegible] 56569

PAGE TWO

3. AMCHALK-5 SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED NOT TO GET INTO CAR WITH CUBANS. IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED TO BY THE AGENT AND SMABOVE THAT SUCH A MOVE IS A SIGNAL FOR SMABOVE TO TAKE PREVENTIVE ACTION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/CI/OPS/WH Frank Hughes (in draft)

John R. Horton
AC/WHD

James E. Flannery
C/WH/COG

J. J. Fieldhouse
C/E/EC

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

18 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT: Use of AMCHAIK/5 Against the DGI in a Counterintelligence Operation

1. The attached cables contain background information on a counterintelligence operation to be initiated in Montreal, Canada. Set forth below are several significant points, which have not been mentioned in the cable traffic. If these points have not been considered in the operational planning, then it is believed the overall risks are going to be far higher than planned.

Physical Danger to AMCHAIK/5 and His Relatives in Cuba

2. It is believed AMCHAIK/5 still has close relatives in Cuba. The DGI's first letter to AMCHAIK/5 in 1967 carried an implied threat to these relatives. The writer does not know what happened to the relatives after AMCHAIK/5 double crossed the DGI in the 1967 meeting. But they are surely going to be in jeopardy again if they are there, because the DGI, in the writer's opinion, will eventually discover this second double cross.

3. Furthermore, the DGI initiated an operation to assassinate AMCHAIK/1 who participated in Bolivia in the GUEVARA roll-up. The DGI just might consider AMCHAIK/5 as great an enemy as AMCHAIK/1.

4. It is my recollection that when ARACE and [illegible], the two DGI officers, met AMCHAIK/5 in Madrid, they were armed; moreover they clearly displayed their holsters to AMCHAIK/5.

AMCHAIK/5's Participation in Sensitive Operations

5. AMCHAIK/5 has been involved in Miami-based CIA Cuban operations since 1961. The AMCHAIK Project Outline

[illegible] [illegible] of him [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] operations, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. He would be a real prime if [illegible] get him to date.

[illegible]tion

[illegible] this operation involves our C[illegible] [illegible] possible threat of violence, it is suggested [illegible] be checked out [illegible]. It appears [illegible] Division may have some equities in [illegible]'s expenses and one at least, the [illegible] because of his involvement in the [illegible] operation. It is not known whether the SR Division, [illegible], or [illegible] have been consulted.

7. To the writer, on the basis on the information available, the risks in the operation appear to be unduly great for the operational objectives outlined. Futhermore, we are undoubtedly going to be immediately confronted with the problem of releasing information to the [illegible], because they undoubtedly are going to want to debrief him in full [illegible] knowledge of CIA.

RICHARD A. [illegible]
CI/OPS/[illegible]

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE AMCHALK-5 aka AMSTALK-1, AMICE-14

NAME	Miguel Angel DIAZ Isalgue 201-307337
DPOB	14 Feb 1937, Matanzas City, Cuba
CIT	Cuban, Paroled into USA 22 June 1961, #A 11 264 049
ADDRESS	1519 SW 19th Street, Miami, Florida
DEPENDENTS	Wife, three children; parents deceased
ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE	University of Havana, four (4) years, no degree Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 6 months
LANGUAGE ABILITY	Spanish and English
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE	
1961-1968	JMWAVE Team Leader and Principal Agent. Subject participated in 15 black infil operations into Cuba during this period. It is clear from AMPEDEW-1 that the DGI had penetrated his team and knew various details of their operations.
June 1967	AMCHALK-5 was the target of a DGI initiated recruitment attempt. The pitch was turned down, but at the same time AMCHALK-5 passed an SW message for DGI Chief Pineiro. This resulted in the establishment of the AMGHOST commo channel.
April-May 1968	AMCHALK-5 assisted the Buenos Aires Station in an audio operation targeted against the Official Soviet Installation. For technical reasons the operation was unsuccessful, but AMCHALK-5 was lauded for his efforts by the BA Station.

SECRET

201-307337

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 32 PER REF.

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8 INFO FILE. VR C/[illegible] C/CI C/FI 2 DDP C/[illegible]

ACTION NO. 197 10

S E C R E T 142040Z SEP 72 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 15782 WMF4

DIRECTOR, MADRID.

AKULE TYPIC

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 308883

B. WH/MIAMI 15698 (IN 701613)

C. MADRID 17199 (IN 702392)

D. WH/MIAMI 15653 (IN 797422)

1. DURING 12 SEPT CONTACT AMCHALK-5 PACHANKIS MENTIONED POSSIBLE TARGET DATE MADRID TRIP EITHER LATE SEPT OR EARLY OCT. AMCHALK-5 REPLIED EITHER DATE AGREEABLE. EVEN IF TARGET DATE CONFLICTS WITH HIS REF D EUROPE VACATION HE WILLING DELAY THAT IN ORDER ASSIST US. HE WOULD APPRECIATE, HOWEVER, ADVANCE INFORMATION SO THAT HE CAN MAKE APPROPRIATE PLANS.

2. AMCHALK-5 ADVISED PACHANKIS HE REQUESTED AND EXPECTS RECEIVE SPANISH VISAS FOR HIMSELF AND WIFE BY END WEEK 15 SEPT. HE PLANS TAKE HER ALONG (WILL PAY ALL HER EXPENSES) AS HE BELIEVES HER PRESENCE THIS OSTENSIBLE VACATION TRIP WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY AMWOLF-1 AS LOGICAL.

708738
m

AN
13
JA
[illegible]
EZ
[illegible]
FI

14 Sep 72
201-307337

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	SECRET (When Filled In)	GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		
BY: AT:	SEP 21 8 54 AM '72		
DISSEM BY PER #	[illegible] IP/EDI		
ACTION UNIT	FILE VR		
ACTION NO.			

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 15782 S E C R E T

WE TEND AGREE. YOUR COMMENTS REQUESTED.

3. PLEASE ADVISE TRAVEL DATES IN SUFFICIENT TIME SO THAT WE CAN ALERT ANCHALK-5 MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. ALSO PLEASE FORWARD OPS PLANS REQUESTED REF B.

4. FILE: 201-307337. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

SEP 25 '72

AR

N

MAR 15 73

SEP 21 11 16 AM '72

SECRET

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - UFAA-4398

FILE NO - 201-307337

DATE - 14 SEPTEMBER 1972

INDEXING - NO

MICROFILM - NO

TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

SUBJECT - C TYPIC/AKULE - PRQ PART I ON AMCHALK/5

REFERENCE - DIRECTOR 326739

1. AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCE, WE ARE FORWARDING UNDER SEPARATE COVER COPIES OF PRQ PART I ON AMCHALK/5.

2. SINCE THE STATION (AT HEADQUARTERS' REQUEST) HAS ONLY RECENTLY RECONTACTED AMCHALK/5 SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF UTILIZING HIM IN THE AMVOLE/1 OPERATION, WE DO NOT FEEL WE ARE PRESENTLY IN POSITION TO SUBMIT A MEANINGFUL PRQ PART II ON HIM. WE BELIEVE THAT HEADQUARTERS, WITH THE COMPLETE 201 FILE READILY AVAILABLE, MAY BE IN THE BEST POSITION TO FULFILL PRQ PART II.

STNALEY F. SPECKLER

ATTACHMENT: USC (VIA POUCH)

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

3 C/WHD: W/ATT USC

S/C [illegible]
Date: 20 Sep 72

E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

USC ATTACHMENT TO

DISPATCH NO. UFAA-4398

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) Miguel (Middle) Angel (Last) DIAZ y Isalgue (Nee)

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: same

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.): same

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

As youth, used name of father: Miguel-DIAZ-Pardo, "because many persons thought it was a compu-nd name."

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 14 February 1937

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Matanzas, Cuba

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

Enjoys a drink, has given up smoking cigars. No bad-major vices.

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

None

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
x M ☐ F	35	40	FT. 5 IN. 10	180	fair	normal

h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE
black	brown	own	strong	straight

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

None

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE Undistinguished. While physically clean, he does not display care or distinction about his dress, or appearance. He still wears hair

o. PROMINENT FEATURES in crewcut style.

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

Has slight trace of pock marks on fact, probably strong acne when youth.

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 2-61 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

[illegible] 7378

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 10.)
Cuban

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)
Owner (paying mortgage)

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 12.)
1519 S.W. 19th St., Miami, Fla.

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED
Not applicable.

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)
1967: Spain, Portugal, Argentina
1969: Spain, Portugal, Mexico
1970: Canada, Spain
1971: Italy 1972: Costa Rica

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION Part owner Cuban Elec.& Furn. Corp.

17. TITLE
Secy of Corp.

18. SALARY (Per annum)
ca. $25,000.00

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)
Equity in Cuba Electric & Furniture Corp.
Equity in home at 1519 S.W. 19th St., Miami, Fla.

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Roamn Catholic "non-practicing."

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
One of Founders of "Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil" DRE in 1956.
[illegible] group which cooperated with Castro

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Baldor Elementary Havana, Cuba. (private)	Elementary	c. 1944	1949	
Baldor High School Havana, Cuba.	1st yr. High School	c. 1950		
Instituto Sagrado Corazon Matanzas, Cuba (Catholic)	2-3-4 yrs. H.S.	c. 1951	1953	
Instituo de Matanzas. Matanzas, (Public)	5th yr. H.S.	c. 1954	1954	graduated high schoo
U of Havana LSU, Baton Rouge, La.	2 yrs Law School Geology	c. 1955 c. 1957	1956 1958	
U of Havana	2 yrs Law School	c. 1959	1960	lacked few courses for law degree

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
English	X		X		X		X	
French	X			X		X		
Spanish	X		X		X		X	

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

None

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

None

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
not applicable					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY, INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

26.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): 1966-1972
b. EMPLOYER: Cuba Elec. & Furniture Corp.
c. ADDRESS: 1795 SW 8th St. Miami, Fla.
d. TYPE OF WORK: Part Owner Appliance store
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ fluctuates/presently c. $25,000 per year.
f. REASON FOR LEAVING:

27.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): 1961-1966
b. EMPLOYER:
c. ADDRESS:
d. TYPE OF WORK:
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING:

28.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): c. 1961
b. EMPLOYER: National Trucking
c. ADDRESS: 54th St. & 35th Ave., Miami, Fla.
d. TYPE OF WORK: Driver
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ c. $1.70 PER hour
f. REASON FOR LEAVING:

29.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To): 1959-60
b. EMPLOYER: (see attached page)
c. ADDRESS:
d. TYPE OF WORK:
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING:

30.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To):
b. EMPLOYER:
c. ADDRESS:
d. TYPE OF WORK:
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING:

SECTION VIII

29.b. Held several executive positions in Cuban Ministry of Gobernacion (Interior Ministry) under Jose NARAJO. Was Minister's personal delegate in Pinar Del Rio Province; same in Havana province; head of the Driver's License Bureau. Salary $300.00 plus expenses. Left position and Cuba to oppose Communist Government of Fidel Castro. Before this time, never had position/job.

SECTION IX

MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

Not applicable

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) Fabiola (Middle) Pura (Nee) (Last) DE LA PORTILLA y Garcia

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 24 April 1959

35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Matanzas, Cuba

36. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 Aug. 1937

37. PLACE OF BIRTH: Matanzas, Cuba

38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Cuban

39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS: still Cuban

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased): 1519 SW 19th St., Miami, Fla.

SECTION X

CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Maria Rosa DIAZ		x	1960	Matanzas, Cuba	Cuban
Miguel Angel DIAZ	x		1963	Miami, Fla.	USA
Alejandro Manuel DIAZ	x		1964	Miami, Fla.	USA
Renier DIAZ	x		1970	Miami, Fla.	USA

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

Citizenships as listed at birth. They all live with parents.

SECTION XI

FATHER

41. FULL NAME: Miguel Angel DIAZ Pardo

42. YEAR OF BIRTH: Deceased since 1942 at age 54.

43. PLACE OF BIRTH:

44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Cuban

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

46. OCCUPATION:

47. PRESENT RESIDENCE:

SECTION XII

MOTHER

48. FULL NAME: Dolores ISALGUE y Isalgue. Deceased since 1968 at age 71. Born in

49. YEAR OF BIRTH:

50. PLACE OF BIRTH:

51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH:

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS: Dominican Republic of Cuban parents. Always a Cuban.

53. OCCUPATION:

54. PRESENT RESIDENCE:

SECTION XIII — BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Mercedes DIAZ Isalgue now married to ALFONSO	x	-	1933	Havana, Cuba	Cuban

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

Still Cuban

SECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Antonio MASSIP Isalgue (cousin) has been in USSR since c.1955. Said to be atomic scientist and not allowed to leave USSR because of his knowledge. (See attached page for continuation)

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

None.

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. Met Eduardo ARAOZ Agero in Montreal c. 1969-70. Is a boyhood friend of Manolo PINIERO. Has met many DSE/DGI personalities in Cuba prior 1960 (all recorded previously).

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS Felix SUAREZ (partner) also owns Nelson TV in Miami and Marco Discount in PR. Sebastian VEGA (friend, former partner) owns Perla Appliance in Miami. Renier DIAZ (close friend) owns Atlantic Color Center, paint store in Miami.

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE
14 September 1972	

SECTION XIV

55. (Cont'd): Jose MASSIP Isalgue (cousin) - one of directors of ICAIC (Cuban motion picture institute)

Sara ISALGUE y Isalgue (aunt) - married to salvador MASSIP. All of above have been long-time PSP (Cuban Communist Party) members. Sara and Salvador have been prominent in Cuban educational circles (he dean of a school at U of Havana and she author of many textbooks used in Cuban schools before and after Castro). He has held posts in Cuban diplomatic missions as Ambassador.

Alberto SEMIDEY Isalgue - Was Cubana Airlines pilot; served at oen time as Che GUEVARA's pilot, but heard recently "grounded." No other details.

201-302357

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. *Write clearly.*
2. *Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"*
3. *Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.*

DISPATCH NO:

SECTION I — **GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA**

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Nee)*
[illegible]

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT
[illegible]

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*
Same

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES; LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*
As youth, used name of father: [illegible], because many persons thought it was a compound name."

5. DATE OF BIRTH
14 February 1957

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
Matanzas, Cuba

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*
Enjoys a drink, has given up smoking cigars. No bad major vices.

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)*
None

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

a. SEX M ☐ F ☐	b. AGE 5[illegible]	c. APPARENT AGE [illegible]	d. HEIGHT FT. [illegible] IN. [illegible]	e. WEIGHT [illegible]	f. COMPLEXION [illegible]	g. FACE *(Shape)* [illegible]
h. COLOR OF HAIR [illegible]	i. COLOR OF EYES [illegible]	j. TEETH [illegible]	k. BUILD [illegible]	l. POSTURE [illegible]		

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES
[illegible]

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE [illegible]

o. PROMINENT FEATURES [illegible]

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES
[illegible]

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING; ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

SECTION II	CITIZENSHIP
10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP	11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (*If different than Item 10.*)

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant*)

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*If different than Item 12.*)

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

[illegible]

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Countries, dates and purposes*)

[illegible] Spain, Portugal, [illegible]
19[illegible] Spain, Portugal, Mexico
1970: Canada, Spain
[illegible]

SECTION III	OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA	
16. PRESENT OCCUPATION Part owner [illegible]	17. TITLE [illegible] of Corp.	18. SALARY (*Per annum*) [illegible]

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (*Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property*)

Equity in Cuba Electric & Furniture Corp.
Equity in home at 1519 S.W. 19th St., Miami, Fla.

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

[illegible] Catholic (non-practicing).

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

One of founders of "Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil" [illegible]

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
[illegible] Elementary, [illegible] (private)	[illegible]	c. 1941	[illegible]	
[illegible] High School	[illegible]	c. [illegible]		
Instituto [illegible] Corazon [illegible]	[illegible] 3-4 yrs. [illegible]	c. [illegible]	[illegible]	
Instituto de [illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]	c. [illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible] of Havana [illegible]	[illegible]	c. [illegible] c. [illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible] of Havana	[illegible]	c. 195[illegible]	[illegible]	

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
(*List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.*)	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
English								
[illegible]								

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

None

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
not applicable					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDS ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]	b. EMPLOYER [illegible]	c. ADDRESS [illegible]
	d. TYPE OF WORK [illegible]	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ [illegible] PER [illegible]	f. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible] per year
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]	b. EMPLOYER [illegible]	c. ADDRESS [illegible]
	d. TYPE OF WORK [illegible]	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ [illegible] PER [illegible]	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]	b. EMPLOYER [illegible]	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION VIII

29.b. Held several executive positions in Cuban Ministry of Gobernacion (Interior Ministry) under Jose NARAJO. Was Minister's personal delegate in Pinar Del Rio Province; same in Havana province; head of the Driver's License Bureau. Salary $300.00 plus expenses. Left position and Cuba to oppose Communist Government of Fidel Castro. Before this time, never had position/ job.

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE:	☐ SINGLE	☐ MARRIED	☐ WIDOWED	☐ SEPARATED	☐ DIVORCED	☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (*First*) (*Middle*) (*Nee*) (*Last*)
[illegible]

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE [illegible]	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE [illegible]
36. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]	37. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS [illegible]

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Last residence, if deceased*)
[illegible]

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (*Identify child and give his, or her, present address*)

Citizenship [illegible] at birth. [illegible] live with [illegible]

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME [illegible]	42. YEAR OF BIRTH [illegible]	43. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible]
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME [illegible]	49. YEAR OF BIRTH	50. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible]
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS [illegible]	53. OCCUPATION	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

Still Cuban

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Antonio MASSIP Isalgue (cousin) has been in USSR since c.1955. Said to be atomic scientist and not allowed to leave USSR because of his knowledge. (See attached page for continuation)

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

None.

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. Met Eduardo [illegible] Agero in Montreal c. 1965-7[illegible]. Is a boyhood friend of Manolo PINIERO. Has met many DSE/DGI personalities in Cuba prior 1960 (all recorded previously).

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS Felix [illegible] (partner) also owns [illegible] in Miami and Marco Discount in [illegible]. Sebastian VILA (friend, former partner) owns Perla Appliance in Miami. Ramon [illegible] (close friend) [illegible] Color Center, [illegible] store in Miami.

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE
14 [illegible] 197[illegible]	

SECTION XIV

55. (Cont'd): Jose MASSIP Isalgue (cousin) - one of directors of ICAIC (Cuban motion picture instituto)

Sara ISALGUE y Isalgue (aunt) - married to salvador MASSIP. All of above have been long-time PSP (Cuban Communist Party) members. Sara and Salvador have been prominent in Cuban educational circles (he dean of a school at U of Havana and she author of many textbooks used in Cuban schools before and after Castro). He has held posts in Cuban diplomatic missions as Ambassador.

Alberto SEMIDEY Isalgue.- Was Cubana Airlines pilot; served at oen time as Che GUEVARA's pilot, but heard recently "grounded." No other details.

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) (Nee)
[illegible]

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1)
[illegible]

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)
[illegible] youth, used [illegible] of father: [illegible] [illegible], "[illegible]", [illegible] [illegible] persons thought it was a [illegible].

5. DATE OF BIRTH
[illegible] 1937

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
Matanzas, Cuba.

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)
Enjoys a drink, has given up smoking cigars. No bad major vices.

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)
None

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX ☐ M ☐ F	b. AGE [illegible]	c. APPARENT AGE [illegible]	d. HEIGHT FT. [illegible] IN. [illegible]	e. WEIGHT [illegible]	f. COMPLEXION [illegible]	g. FACE (Shape) [illegible]
h. COLOR OF HAIR [illegible]	i. COLOR OF EYES [illegible]		j. TEETH [illegible]		k. BUILD [illegible]	l. POSTURE [illegible]

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES
None

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE [illegible]

o. PROMINENT FEATURES [illegible]

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES
[illegible]

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 2-61 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(4-20)

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 10.)

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 12.)
[illegible], Fla.

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)
[illegible]: Spain, Portugal, Argentina
1969: Spain, Portugal, Mexico
1970: Canada, Spain
1971 Ital[illegible]   1972: Costa [illegible]

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION Part owner Cuba Elec. & Furn. Corp.

17. TITLE Secy of C.E.F.

18. SALARY (Per annum) ca. [illegible]

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)
Equity in Cuba Electric & Furniture Corp.
Equity in home at 3519 S.W. 10th St., [illegible], Fla.

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Roman Catholic (non-practicing).

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
One of founders of "Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil" DRE in 19[illegible].

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE RECEIVED
Baldor Elementary Havana, Cuba (Catholic)	Elementary	c. 1941	194[illegible]	
Baldor High School Havana, Cuba	1st yr. High School	c. 195[illegible]		
Instituto Sagrado Corazon Matanzas, Cuba (Catholic)	2-3-4 yrs. H.S.	c. 1951	1953	
Instituto de Matanzas Matanzas, (Public)	5th yr. H.S.	c. 1954	1954	[illegible]
U of Havana LSU, Baton Rouge, La.	2 [illegible] Geology	c. 1955 c. 1957	1956 195[illegible]	
U of Havana	2 yrs Law School	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ YES	READ NO	WRITE YES	WRITE NO	SPEAK YES	SPEAK NO	UNDERSTAND YES	UNDERSTAND NO
English	X		X		X		X	
French	X			X		X		

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

none

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

none

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
not applicable					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY, INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE. INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1966-1972	b. EMPLOYER Cuba Elec. & Furniture Corp.	c. ADDRESS 1735 [illegible] 8th St. Miami, [illegible]
	d. TYPE OF WORK Part of Appliance store	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ Owner[illegible]/presently c. $25,000 per year. PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1961-1966	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) c. 1961	b. EMPLOYER National Truckin[illegible]	c. ADDRESS 545 [illegible] St. & [illegible] Miami
	d. TYPE OF WORK Driver	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ c. $1.[illegible] PER hour	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1959-60	b. EMPLOYER (see attached pg. 3)	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION VIII

29.b. Held several executive positions in Cuban Ministry of Gobernacion (Interior Ministry) under Jose NARAJO. Was Minister's personal delegate in Pinar Del Rio Province; same in Havana province; head of the Driver's License Bureau. Salary $300.00 plus expenses. Left position and Cuba to oppose Communist Government of Fidel Castro. Before this time, never had position/job.

14-00000

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

Not applicable

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Nee) (Last)
Fabiola [illegible] DE LA PORTILLA y Garcia

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE 24 April 1959	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE Matanzas, Cuba
36. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] 1937	37. PLACE OF BIRTH Matanzas, Cuba
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS still Cuban

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)
[illegible] SW [illegible] St., Miami, Fla.

SECTION X CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Maria Rosa DIAZ		x	1960	Matanzas, Cuba	Cuban
Miguel Angel DIAZ	x		196[illegible]	Miami, Fla.	USA
Alejandro Manuel DIAZ	x		196[illegible]	Miami, Fla.	USA
Ronier DIAZ	x		1970	Miami, Fla.	USA

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

Citizenships as listed at birth. They all live with parents.

SECTION XI FATHER

41. FULL NAME Miguel Angel DIAZ Pard[illegible]	42. YEAR OF BIRTH Deceased	43. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] 1942 at age 54.	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII MOTHER

48. FULL NAME [illegible]	49. YEAR OF BIRTH [illegible]	50. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible]
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS [illegible]	53. OCCUPATION [illegible]	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE [illegible]	

SECTION XIII — BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible] DIAZ Isal [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	Havana, Cuba	[illegible]

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

Still Cuban

SECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.
Antonio HASSIP Isaigue (cousin) has been in USSR since c.1955. Said to be atomic scientist and not allowed to leave USSR because of his knowledge. (See attached page for continuation)

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

None.

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. Met Eduardo ARAOZ Agero in Montreal c. 1960-70. Is a [illegible] friend of Manolo PINEIRO. Has met many DGE/DGI personalities in Cuba prior [illegible] (all recorded previously).

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS Julio [illegible] (partner) also owns [illegible] in Miami and Marco Discount in [illegible]. Sebastian VIDA (friend, former partner) owns Perla Appliance in Miami. Remigio DIAZ (close friend, ex-partner) [illegible] Color Center, paint store in Miami.

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE
[illegible] 1972	

SECTION XIV

55. (Cont'd): Jose MASSIP Isalgue (cousin) - one of directors of ICAIC (Cuban motion picture institute)

Sara ISALGUE y Isalgue (aunt) - married to salvador MASSIP. All of above have been long-time PSP (Cuban Communist Party) members. Sara and Salvador have been prominent in Cuban educational circles (he dean of a school at U of Havana and she author of many textbooks used in Cuban schools before and after Castro). He has held posts in Cuban diplomatic missions as Ambassador.

Alberto SEMIDEY Isalgue.- Was Cubana Airlines pilot; served at one time as Che GUEVARA's pilot, but heard recently "grounded." No other details.

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 15 April 1970 lc

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/COG/OPS

ATTENTION : D. Geisler

201 307337
C

The file on AMCHALK/5 is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit up-dated PRQ Part I + II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Please also refer CI/OA's Form 889 sent your office on 18 February 1970 and to CI/OA's Form 125 which reinstated Subject's POA on 17 November 1969.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/S/ John E. Howard
CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

FORM 6-65 691a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

10

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - UFAW-304

FILE NO - 201-307337, 19-136-1/3

DATE - 6 MARCH 1970

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJECT - O AMCHALK-5 CONTACT WITH CUIS

ACTION - SEE BELOW

REFS - A. UFAA-1736, 29 JANUARY 1970
B. UFAA-1803, 14 FEBRUARY 1970

MICROFILMED
MAR 27 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. HEADQUARTERS CONCURS THAT THE CHANNEL TO THE CUIS SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN.

2. SINCE FURTHER CONTACT WITH AMCHALK-5 IS INDICATED AND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT HIS PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL EXPIRED ON 17 FEBRUARY 1970 UPDATED PRQ PARTS I AND II ARE ONCE AGAIN NECESSARY.

WALTER E. GAENZLE

DISTRIBUTION -

3 - COS, WH/MIAMI /BY TAPE/

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION -

1 - WH/COG/CHRONO
1 - WH/COG/OPS

Originated by: CB Charles Best,
WH/COG/OPS X7144

Coordinated by: C/WH/COG/OPS H Brown

Released by: Glen O. Brown for
C/WH/COG

CS [illegible]

AN UW
AB X
h
4
FI

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 18 February 1970 JM
TO: WH/COG/OPS D. Geisler	C NO. 201-307337
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: AMCHALK/5

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☒	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired 17 February 1970. Please submit updated PRQ I and updated PRQ II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

On 17 November 1969, when the POA was reinstated, your office was requested (Form 125) to run a new G. L. with results to CI/OA, and to send CI/OA a statement as to current Field, RI and Division traces. The same memo also requested an updated PRQ I and PRQ II. None of these have been received as yet.

No [illegible] Green list sent 9 Sept 69 No info.
Do you want this cancelled? D

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

(20)

S

41P

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFAA-1803

FILE NO - 201-307337; 19-136-1/3

DATE - 14 FEBRUARY 1970

INDEXING - NO

MICROFILM - NO

TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

INFO - CHIEF OF STATION, OTTAWA

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

SUBJECT - STATUS OF AMCHALK-5 CONTACT WITH CUIS

REFERENCE - UFAW-671, 1 DECEMBER 1969

ACTION REQUIRED - SEE PARAGRAPH 6

1. AMCHALK-5 HAS NOT BEEN RECONTACTED BY THE CUIS SINCE THE NOVEMBER 1969 MEETING REPORTED IN REFERENCE. IT WAS NOT ANTICIPATED THAT SUCH CONTACT WOULD BE MADE PRIOR TO LATE DECEMBER AND POSSIBLY NOT UNTIL JANUARY 1970, SINCE THE RELEASE OF FERNANDO ROJAS BY FIDEL CASTRO WAS A CONTINGENT FACTOR. AS FAR AS WE KNOW ROJAS HAS NOT YET BEEN RELEASED. THERE HAVE BEEN TWO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HOWEVER WHICH MAY MEAN THE RELEASE IS IN PROCESS. ROJAS'S WIFE WHO LIVES IN MACON, GEORGIA, RECEIVED A LETTER WRITTEN BY ROJAS AND DATED 19 DECEMBER. ROJAS SAID IN HIS LETTER THAT HE HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER PRISON FROM LA CABANA AND THAT HE AND OTHER PRISONERS WERE DEALING WITH A DELEGATE FROM THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CONCERNING VISITS BY CLOSE RELATIVES IN EXILE. ALSO, ROJAS'S SISTER WHO IS STILL IN CUBA WROTE

MICROFILMED
FEB 18 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TO HER AUNT IN THE UNITED STATES THAT SHE HAD SEEN ROJAS AND THAT HIS PHYSICAL APPEARANCE IS MUCH IMPROVED. SPECIFICALLY, SHE MENTIONED HIS BEING SUNTANNED. THIS MAY BE INDICATIVE THAT HE IS BEING READIED FOR RELEASE.

2. ALTHOUGH INSTRUCTED BY HIS CASE OFFICER TO DO SO, AMCHALK-5 HAS NOT YET PREPARED THE FIRST PART OF THAT HISTORY OF RVROCK ACTIVITY AGAINST CUBA WHICH WAS A TASK ASSIGNED BY HIS CUIS CONTACT IN CANADA. IN DISCUSSING THIS ON 12 FEBRUARY, AMCHALK-5 REITERATED HIS RELUCTANCE TO PREPARE SUCH A DOCUMENT AND SAID THAT WHILE HE WOULD BE WILLING TO WRITE THE PAPER FOR HIS CASE OFFICER, HE COULD NOT DO SO IF IN THE COURSE OF PREPARATION HE HAD IN MIND THAT IT WOULD BE PASSED TO THE CUIS. AMCHALK-5 CITED HIS PAST CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MANUEL PINEIRO AND PEPIN NARANJO AND SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS MUCH CLOSER TO THE LATTER, BOTH KNEW HIM WELL ENOUGH THAT THEY AND OTHERS WOULD REGARD ANY SUCH DOCUMENT WITH COMPLETE DISTRUST.

3. AMCHALK-5 SAID HE HAD REASSESSED THE ENTIRE MATTER OF HIS CUIS CONTACT AND HE NOW FEELS THE CUIS:

A) RESPONDED TO HIS INITIATION OF CONTACT OUT OF CURIOSITY,

B) IS NOT PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN

[illegible] CHANNEL [illegible] TO THE FREE WORLD;

C) WILL NOT GIVE CREDENCE TO ANY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION OFFERED BY HIM, AND

D) MAY PROCEED WITH RELEASE ROJAS AND OTHERS JUST TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH HIM.

4. AMCHALK-5 REVIEWED THE TENOR OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH EDUARDO ARAOZ AND AGAIN MENTIONED HE HAD DEVELOPED GOOD RAPPORT WITH ARAOZ. AMCHALK-5 IS INCLINED TO BELIEVE HE CAN PURSUE THIS RELATIONSHIP POSSIBLY TO THE POINT OF EVENTUALLY DISAFFECTING ARAOZ. AMCHALK-5 RECALLED THAT IN THEIR CONVERSATION WHENEVER HE POINTED TO SOME OBVIOUS DIFFICULTY OR FAILING OF THE REGIME, ARAOZ CONSISTENTLY TIED HIS DEFENSE TO THE PREDICTED SUCCESS OF THE 1970 SUGAR HARVEST. AMCHALK-5 FEELS THAT THE FAILURE OF THE TEN MILLION TON CAMPAIGN WILL SERIOUSLY SHAKE ARAOZ'S FAITH IN CASTRO.

ARAOZ
201-840176

5. IT APPEARS THAT WHETHER OR NOT ROJAS IS FREED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, IF THERE IS NO ATTEMPT BY THE CUIS TO CONTACT AMCHALK-5 BY THE END OF FEBRUARY, AMCHALK-5 CAN SEND ANOTHER LETTER TO THE ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS INDICATING HIS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE ANOTHER MEETING. THE STATION FEELS THIS COURSE MAY BE NECESSARY TO ASSURE THE CASE KEEPS MOVING. IF ARAOZ MAKES THE NEXT MEETING WE OUGHT TO AT LEAST BE ABLE

TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE STATUS OF THE SUGAR HARVEST HAS MEASURABLY AFFECTED HIS FAITH IN CASTRO. IF ANCHALK-5 IS CORRECT IN HIS ASSESSMENT THAT THE CUIS IS INTERESTED IN KEEPING A CHANNEL OPENED, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE CASE BE KEPT ACTIVE NOW WHEN THERE MAY BE OTHER CUIS PERSONALITIES WHO MEASURE THEIR FAITH IN THE REGIME BY THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE "DIEZ MILLONES".

I doubt that
we should depend too
much on the failure
of the 10 in
affecting many
important people.

6. HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ON THE FOREGOING WOULD BE WELCOMED.

FREDERICK C. BRADSPIES

DISTRIBUTION

3 - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY TAPE

2 - CHIEF OF STATION, OTTAWA BY POUCH

SECRET RYBAT UFAA-1803 PAGE FOUR

BT

N

N

N

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

ORIG: ENNIS/BROWN:bjs
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 4163-1325
DATE: 11 FEBRUARY 1970

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/WH8 FILE, VR. C/EUR5, C/RI/SD, ADDP, DDP, CS/DO, C/CI, C/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 23 54z Feb 70 CITE DIRECTOR 008403

TO OTTAWA INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC SMADD AMROSE

REFERENCE OTTAWA 6863 (IN 022291)

ABSTRACT INDEX HR WH/COG P

2P

1. FYI ONLY, RELIABLE INFO FROM SENSITIVE SOURCE HAS INDICATED FIDEL CASTRO ANGRY AT DGI BECAUSE TWO DGI OFFICERS PNG'D FROM UNITED NATIONS DURING SUMMER 1969. END FYI. ~~ALSO~~ DEFECTIONS AMBEDEW-1 AND AMDELAY-1 HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO WHAT IS POSSIBLY WANING INFLUENCE OF DGI WITHIN CUBAN GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE. PNG OF RAMIREZ MAY CONTRIBUTE FURTHER IF HE INDEED DGI. ONLY INFO THAT HE MIGHT BE DGI IS FROM SMABOVE. TEND AGREE SMABOVE SUPPOSITION BASED ON SEEING HIM WITH ARAOZ BEFORE AND AFTER CONTACT WITH AMCHALK-5. ALSO, SMABOVE CONSIDERED HIM CUIS SUSPECT BEFORE AND APART FROM AMCHALK-5 OPERATION, PER OCOA 14598, 15 AUG 69. SMABOVE MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL DETAILS CONFIRMING RAMIREZ DGI CONNECTION.

MICROFILMED
MAR 10 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

/continued/

CS COPY

D19-120-50

11 Feb 70

201-307337

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 009403

TO

PAGE TWO

2. HQS INTERESTED IN KNOWING ~~[illegible]~~ IF SMAROVE ~~[illegible]~~ HAS ANYTHING SPECIFIC IN MIND AS REGARDS ~~[illegible] TAKING ADVANTAGE~~ ANY OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITY.

3. AMBEDEW-1 DID NOT RECOGNIZE RAMIREZ PHOTO, WHICH BEING POUCHED PRIORITY TO WH/MIAMI.

4. FILE: 201-207337, 19-120-50.

END OF MESSAGE

E/BC/C

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

EUR/BC

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
AMCHALK
Dismissal of AMCHALK-5

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: As indicated

References: A. WH/MIAMI 5683
B. UFGA-29702, 12 March 1968

1. AMCHALK-5 was advised on 17 October 1969 that his services with RVROCK had not been in sufficient demand to justify his retention on the payroll beyond 30 November 1969. Accordingly, on 31 October 1969 AMCHALK-5 executed a termination secrecy oath and quitclaim which are forwarded as separate cover attachments hereto. The agent was paid his salary through 30 November plus a bonus equivalent to one month's salary.

2. During the afternoon of 31 October 1969 and following the meeting that morning with AMCHALK-5 which was to have been the final meeting; AMCHALK-5 initiated contact with writer and advised that he had, upon returning to his office from the morning meeting, received a letter from Cuba. This letter was in response to one which he had sent to an old accommodation address. Reference A and subsequent correspondence describe the letter received by AMCHALK-5 and developments which followed. Although AMCHALK-5 was reimbursed for cost of his transportation to Canada and was paid per diem for the duration of his travel, he has collaborated with the Station since 30 November 1969 on a voluntary basis without compensation.

3. Since severance of AMCHALK-5 from the Station payroll had been imminent for some time and he was not being used operationally, no request was submitted for renewal or up-dating

S/C att'd
15 JAN 1970

[redacted]

[redacted]

Attachments:
Agent Service Record, hw
Termination Secrecy Oath, usc
Quitclaim, usc

3AC

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD w/atts as stated above

CS COPY JAN 30 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAA-1736	29 January 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-307337

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-1736

of the agent's operational clearance status. Currently, the agent is being met once weekly only to debrief him on possible new developments in re his renewed contact with the DGI; there have been no developments since that described in UFAW-671, 1 December 1969.

4. An agent service record for the period subsequent to Reference B is forwarded herewith.

Frederick C. Bradspies
Frederick C. BRADSPIES

SECRET

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. Agent's Cryptonym or Pseudonym: AMCHALK-5 (formerly AMSTALK-1 and AMICE-14)(See also SD 56490)
2. Project Identification: AMCHALK
3. Agent Recruited by: Leleand H. COBFIELD
4. Capacity in which Agent Served: Technical agent on REDTOP operation. Also to establish contact with opposition service.
5. Rate of Pay: $300 per month gross
6. Other Commitments: None
7. Agent Dismissed by: Frederick C. BRADSPIES
8. Reason for Dismissal: Economy, lack of requirements for operational use.
9. Security Risks: Subject knows location of Station meeting site #206. Knows Frederick C. BRADSPIES and Joel N. NEBECKER in true first name only. Subject also knows accommodation address #1402.
10. Is the Agent Recommended for Re-Use: Yes. Subject is currently collaborating with the Station on an operation on a voluntary, uncompensated basis.
11. Manner of Dismissal: Amicable. Subject reiterated his willingness to serve in any operational capacity as needed.
12. Letter of Termination Signed: Termination Agreement and Quitclaim and Termination Secrecy Oath signed 31 October 1969.

SECRET

CS COPY

H/Watt/ to UFAP 01736

201-307337

TERMINATION AGREEMENT AND QUITCLAIM

I, THE UNDERSIGNED Miguel A. Diaz, HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE BEEN RENDERING SERVICES TO AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE GOVERNMENT. I ACKNOWLEDGE FURTHER THAT MY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT IS TERMINATED AS OF 30 November 1969. I ACKNOWLEDGE FINALLY THAT I HAVE NO CLAIMS OF ANY KIND AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND DO NOT INTEND TO TENDER ANY CLAIMS TO OR AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ARISING OUT OF MY PAST RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES.

DATE 10-31-69 (Write name longhand)

PLACE Hollywood, Florida

WITNESSED Frederick C. Bradspies
Frederick C. BRADSPIES

CS COPY

S/C att 2 UFAA 01736

201-302337

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, Miguel A. Diaz, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of our country. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of our government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims I may have against the Organization or our government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of the Organization concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

5. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to our government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

S/C att 3 to UFAA 01736

201-307337

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of our government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and volentarily affix my signatvre hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and our government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 31st day of

October 1969.

at Hollywood, Florida

Signature

Frederick C. Bradspies

Witness: Frederick C. BRADSPIES

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

I

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN EUR6 E2 CI CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 588

S E C R E T 072159Z JAN 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6193

7 JAN IN 003034

OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

1. AMCHALK-5 REPORTS THE FOLLOWING WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO SMABOVE: ONE LYDIA ANDERSON NEE CRUZ, CURRENTLY WORKING IN CUBAN TRADE MISSION IN MONTREAL, IS MARRIED TO RCAF OFFICER COLONEL JOHN ANDERSON WHO POSSIBLY RETIRED. RESIDING WITH THE ANDERSONS IS HER SISTER ALEIDA CRUZ WHO REPORTEDLY IS OF LOOSE MORALS. ALEIDA HAS A SIX-YEAR-OLD SON WHO SHE HAS SENT TO STUDY IN HAVANA.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION WHICH SMABOVE MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ON ABOVE INDIVIDUALS.

3. FILE: 14-2-12/6.

S E C R E T

file AMCHALK/5 201

SECRET

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - UFAW-731

FILE NO - 201-307337, 14-2-12

DATE - 2 JAN 1970

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

INFO - CHIEF OF STATION, OTTAWA

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJECT - TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/AMROSE
REVIEW AMMUG BOOK PHOTOS WITH AMCHALK-5

ACTION - SEE BELOW

REFS - NONE

IN AN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY THE DGI TYPES WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE AMCHALK-5 MEETING IN MONTREAL, REQUEST WH/MIAMI SHOW AMCHALK-5 PHOTOS OF THE FOLLOWING CUBAN DIPLOMATS WHO ARE CURRENTLY STATIONED IN CANADA-

A. RICARDO ESCARTIN FERNANDEZ
MUG BOOK VOL. I NO. 895

B. WALFREDO GARCIGA ORAMAS
MUG BOOK VOL. I 83
VOL. II NO. 62

C. RICARDO CABRISAS RUIZ
MUG BOOK VOL. I NO. 391 AND NO. 909

D. ANGEL HERNANDEZ GONZALEZ
MUG BOOK VOL. II NO. 61

E. ORLANDO RODRIGUEZ RAMOS
MUG BOOK VOL. I NO. 908

F. HUMBERTO CASTANEDA BARBAN
MUG BOOK VOL II NO. 63 AND 35.

m/B

AN UW
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
ES
RF
D
FI

EDGAR N. VASSALOTTI

DISTRIBUTION /BY TAPE/
3 - COS 3 - COS, WH/MIAMI
2 - COS, OTTAWA

Hqs Distribution:
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - Originator

Originated by - Michael Olejarz
WH/COG/OPS

Coordinated by: L. Sulc
DC/WH/COG/OPS

Released by: DC/WH/COG W. Lang

SECRET TELEPOUCH UFAW-731 PAGE 1

RECEIVED

2 33

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, WH/Miami

Chief, WH; Chief, EUR

Chief of Station, Ottawa

[illegible] TYPIC SHABOVE

Operations Against AMCHOST Representatives in Canada

Neil, — Best

Reference: A. UFAW 671, 1 December 1969
B. UFAW 673, 1 December 1969

1. After his return to Ottawa from Montreal for the AMCHALK/5 -AMCHOST meeting, KOLTHAN had a number of extended discussions with SHABOVE Headquarters' officers on the general subject of operations against AMCHOST in Montreal. They had one complaint about the AMCHALK/5 meeting that we believe is logical and warranted on their part. At our request they had more or less reserved the services of their two surveillance teams in Montreal to cover the AMCHALK/5 operation. This was based on our early request which in turn was based on the Headquarters' cabled request that SHABOVE give as much coverage as possible to the meeting. When it turned out that it would be impractical to cover the meeting at all with surveillance, SHABOVE felt that they had "reserved" their team for nothing. As you may know, SHABOVE was especially pressed during that period. The Grey Cup football game - an event that compares to our Rose Bowl - was scheduled for the following weekend and they expected trouble from militant separatists, etc. In other words, they were not too happy that we asked for support and then did not use it.

2. Looking back over various records, we find that this situation is not entirely new. We do, however, want to avoid this in the future. In future cases we will have to reach a firm decision on what we want SHABOVE to do for us well before we go to them and ask for support. Once this support is offered, then we should follow through and use it. If not, SHABOVE will soon stop offering to help us in this way. In order to get an operation such as this organized and presented to SHABOVE, we suggest that Headquarters make their views known well in advance. If a change is desired after the operation is launched, as happened in the case of the AMCHALK/5-AMCHOST meeting in Montreal, our liaison relationship with SHABOVE will surely suffer. We will watch this in the

(continued)

Distribution:
2 - WH/Miami
2 - WH
2 - EUR

OCOA 14904

19 Decemb

x-ref 19-120-50

file AMCHALK-5
201

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [illegible]

future and if we believe there is a danger of this happening again we will have to turn the operation over.

3. On a more hopeful note the SMABOVE officers in Ottawa are enthusiastic about the possibilities of launching operations against the AMCHOST group in Montreal. [illegible] explained that [illegible] intended to screen assets in the Miami area for agent candidates that could somehow be of use in Montreal. They were especially interested in creating what they have termed the [illegible] opportunity for AMCHOST types in Montreal. This would involve our placing a "Judas Goat" agent in Montreal. This agent would be known to the AMCHOST representatives there as a person who could, if approached, aid them in defecting to WOLADY or SMADD. Our present idea is that the agent would not need to be in Montreal full time. Having a commercial office there and making periodic trips to check on it should be enough. In this way we would not have to turn the agent over to SMABOVE to handle. His contact with us could be via New York or Miami. We would, of course, have to keep SMABOVE completely informed on his travel in and out of Montreal and any contact that he had with AMCHOST would have to be explained to them. As you know there is considerable travel between Miami and Montreal especially in the winter months and a suitable cover for an agent to open an office there should not pose too great a problem. We have noticed that orange juice is imported from the Miami area in great quantities. Possibly a small office to do market research on this commodity could be used as a suitable cover. As it is now the AMCHOST representatives in Montreal would probably not know how to go about defecting. We recall that [illegible] had problems in this regard before he finally decided to make his move.

4. SMABOVE said that they would like to see a simple provocation against AMCHOST in Montreal. They suggested that we select an agent to go there and simply walk into their office, explain that he is not satisfied with his lot in Miami, and ask for help. We are not sure where this would get us but it does show that SMABOVE is willing to entertain more aggressive ideas than we have given them credit for in the past.

5. We have for some time been attempting to pull our files together to determine just what we have in terms of AMCHOST representation in the country. This has been difficult since our files are not in good order. For this reason we were glad to learn, while NOLTHAN was visiting Headquarters on 12 December 1969, that the Headquarters desk is doing a study of AMCHOST and other PBRUMEN officers in SMADD. When this is received we would like to put it into a form of a target notebook. We will give this to SMABOVE and let them add what they can. With this start we should be able to jointly keep it up to date and complete.

6. We appreciate the references and will pass SMABOVE the material that is of interest to them.

Theodore D. Nolthan

3P.

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

MICROFILMED
DEC 4 - 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

DISP NO - UFAW-673
FILE NO - 201-307337
DATE - 2 DECEMBER 1969
INDEX - NO
TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI
FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
SUBJ - WH/MIAMI REPRESENTATIVE MEETING WITH SMABOVE IN MONTREAL/OTHER CANADIAN ITEMS - RYBAT/TYPIC/SMABOVE.
ACTION - FYI
REF - UFAW-671, 1 DECEMBER 1969

1. ON 26 NOVEMBER NEBECKER AND OTTAWA STATION CASE OFFICER NOLTHAM MET WITH SMABOVE OFFICERS DON BATSTONE AND NORMAN CYR OF THE MONTREAL COUNTER-SUBVERSIVE SECTION. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING ARRANGED BY NOLTHAM WAS TO BRIEF SMABOVE ON THE AMCHALK-5 OPERATION, DISCUSS THE CUBAN PROBLEM AS IT RELATED TO CANADA AND TO GENERAL ACQUAINT SMABOVE WITH WH/MIAMI INTERESTS. PRIOR TO MEETING WITH SMABOVE NEBECKER AND NOLTHAM AGREED THAT FRANKNESS WAS CALLED FOR AND THAT WITHIN SECURITY LIMITATIONS WE WOULD ATTEMPT TO ENGENDER INCREASED INTEREST ON THE PART OF SMABOVE FOR THE CUBAN TARGET.

2. THE OBVIOUS GOOD RAPPORT ESTABLISHED BY THE OTTAWA STATION HELPED IN ESTABLISHING A FREE AND EASY DISCUSSION. NEBECKER FULLY REVIEWED THE AMCHALK-5 CASE AND ALSO THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF WORKING AGAINST THE CUBAN TARGET EMPHASIZING OUR INTEREST IN INCREASED OPERATIONS AGAINST DGI PERSONNEL. WHILE THE SMABOVE OFFICERS EXHIBITED A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IT WAS APPARENT THEY HAD LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF THE TARGET. THEY DID ASK

PROFESSIONALLY PERTINENT QUESTIONS AND IMPRESSED NEBECKER AS KNOWING THEIR BUSINESS. IN QUESTIONING THEM THEY RE-VEALED THAT SMABOVE HAD FORTY TO FIFTY MEN IN THEIR COUNTER-SUBVERSIVE SECTION IN MONTREAL BUT THAT ONLY TEN PERCENT OF THEIR EFFORT WAS DIRECTED AT THE CUBAN TARGET. THIS WAS STATED HESITATINGLY AND IT IS DOUBTED THAT THEY SPEND THAT MUCH TIME ON THE TARGET. THEY DID ADMIT CONCERN AND DID MENTION THEIR WORRY ABOUT CUBAN-QUEBEC NATIONALIST TIES. NO SPECIFICS OF THIS RELATIONSHIP WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS APPARENT FROM THE OUTSET THAT THEY BOWED TO HEADQUARTERS IN OTTAWA IN DISCUSSING ANY OPERATIONS.

3. MR. CYR WAS CLEARLY THE PERSON MORE CONCERNED WITH THE CUBAN TARGET. HE TOOK WOLTHAM AND NEBECKER ON A TOUR OF CUBAN INSTALLATION SITES AND THE AREA WHICH ARROZ HAD EXPLORED IN PREPARATION FOR HIS MEETING WITH AMCHALK-5. HE LATER EXHIBITED A HIGH DEGREE OF FRIENDLINESS AND TOOK US TO SMABOVE HEADQUARTERS FOR CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS AND DRINKS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MEETINGS WITH CYR IN PARTI-CULAR WERE PROFITABLE AND THAT RVROCK COULD GET FURTHER COOPERATION OF AN OPERATIONAL NATURE IF SMABOVE HEADQUARTERS WOULD OPEN THE WAY FOR JOINT OPERATIONS IN MONTREAL. SINCE MONTREAL HAS PROBABLY THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF CUBAN OFFICIALS IN THE WORLD OUTSIDE OF HAVANA THE FIELD IS RIPE.

4. NEBECKER TOLD WOLTHAM THAT UPON HIS RETURN TO MIAMI HE WOULD LOOK FOR MIAMI AGENTS OR ASSETS THAT HAS CONTACTS IN CANADA AND WOULD WORK TOWARD THE OBJECTIVE OF FURTHER INTERESTING SMABOVE IN THE TARGET - A MOST TEMPTING ONE. IT WAS SUGGESTED IN THE INTERIM THAT PERHAPS COS, [illegible] INTRODUCE THE SUBJECT ANEW WITH SMABOVE AND GET THEIR REACTION TO JOINT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TARGET.

5. RE SMACT - NOLTHAM EXPLAINED TO NEBECKER THAT A CANADIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE DID NOT EXIST AND THAT REPORTING OF HAVANA WAS UNDERTAKEN BY CANADIAN FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS. IT WAS AGREED THAT REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE SENT TO OTTAWA FOR DISCUSSION WITH SMACT.

6. NOLTHAM TOLD NEBECKER THAT THE NEWLY ARRIVED CEYLONESE AMBASSADOR TO OTTAWA WAS ALSO ACCREDITED TO CUBA AND THAT HE HAD COOPERATED IN THE PAST WITH KUBARK. WHILE THE STATION IN OTTAWA HAD NOT YET RECONTACTED THE AMBASSADOR THEY WERE PLANNING TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE. A BRIEF DISCUSSION WAS HELD ON THE POSSIBLE UTILIZATION OF THIS PERSON. NOLTHAM WAS REQUESTED TO KEEP CUBA IN MIND DURING THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS WITH THE CEYLONESE AND PARTICULARLY ANY INFORMATION REGARDING HIS TRAVEL TO CUBA. HE WAS TOLD THAT WH/MIAMI WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH HIM PRIOR TO ANY TRAVEL TO CUBA.

7. A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE AND THE REFERENCE IS BEING GIVEN TO THE CANADIAN DESK FOR TRANSMITTAL TO OTTAWA. WE WOULD LIKE TO THANK BOTH THE OTTAWA STATION AND SMABOVE FOR THEIR COOPERATION ON THE AMCHALK CASE. THE OTTAWA STATION IS AUTHORIZED TO PASS TO THE SMABOVES THE COMMENTS ON [illegible] REGARDING THE CUBAN SITUATION AND TELL THEM OF THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE CONTACT. WE REQUEST HOWEVER THAT THE DETAILS REGARDING THE FREEING OF ROJAS AND FUTURE CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS NOT REPEAT NOT BE PASSED. IT IS BELIEVED THAT IT IS SUFFICIENT TO TELL THEM THAT THE DCI SAID THAT THE AMCHALK-5 OFFER OF COOPERATION WAS ACCEPTED CONDITIONED UPON APPROVAL OF HAVANA AND THAT HE WOULD BE CONTACTED SOMETIME AFTER CHRISTMAS.

JOEL N. NEBECKER

DISTRIBUTION BY TP - 3 - COS, WH/MIAMI

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

ORIGINATOR:

DCOS, WH/MIAMI Lawrence Sternfield

RELEASING:

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - RID
1 - Signal Center
1 - WH/COG Chrono
1 - O-WH/COG
1 - EUR/BC
1 - COS, Ottawa (copy pouched)
1 - WH/COG/OPS Info

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH UFAW-673 PAGE FOUR

OCS: Pouched one copy
To CI/OA

CC: EUR/BC

cc: AMCHALK-5 201

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFAW-671

FILE NO - 201-307337

DATE - 1 DECEMBER 1969

INDEX - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJ - RYBAT/TYPIC/AMCHALK - AMCHALK-5 MEETING WITH AMGHOST REPRESENTATIVE

ACTION - FYI

1. AMCHALK-5 WAS MET BY NEBECKER UNDER SECURE CONDITIONS IN NEW YORK CITY FROM 1800 TO 2230 ON 28 NOVEMBER FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH AN AMGHOST REPRESENTATIVE IN MONTREAL. THE FOLLOWING COVERS A-5'S NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE COVERS THE PREPARATION FOR THE MEETING.

2. A-5 ARRIVED IN MONTREAL AS SCHEDULED AND PROCEEDED TO THE PLAZA MOTOR HOTEL AS INSTRUCTED BY CUIS LETTER. HE CONFIRMED RESERVATIONS UPON ARRIVAL AT MONTREAL AIRPORT. THE HOTEL WAS LOCATED IN A COMMERCIAL/RESIDENTIAL AREA REMOVED ABOUT FIFTEEN MINUTES DISTANCE FROM THE CENTER OF THE CITY. /THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY NEBECKER AND NOLTHAM./ ACCORDING TO A-5 NO SPANISH SPEAKERS APPEARED TO BE EMPLOYED BY THE HOTEL. FRENCH WAS DOMINANT LANGUAGE WITH LITTLE ENGLISH SPOKEN. A-5 CHECKED INTO THE HOTEL AT 1600 ON 24 NOVEMBER. AT 0645 ON 26 NOVEMBER HE WAS CALLED BY PERSON IDENTIFYING SELF AS FRIEND OF ALBERTO /SIGNER OF LETTER WHICH MADE CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FOR MONTREAT/. CALLER IN CUBAN SPANISH SAID QUOTE CALLS ARE DIFFICULT TO MAKE. ALBERTO WILL CALL YOU BETWEEN SEVEN AND NINE UNQUOTE. AM OR PM WAS NOT SPECIFIED NOR DID A-5 HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK. AT TWENTY FIVE MINUTES TO EIGHT THAT SAME EVENING 26 NOVEMBER ALBERTO

CALLED. HE SAID HE WAS AT THE HOTEL CAPRI /FOUR BLOCKS FROM THE HOTEL AT WHICH A-5 WAS STAYING AND AS IS KNOWN THE ALTERNATE LOCATION FOR A-5'S RESIDENCE IN MONTREAL AS RECEIVED IN THE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION./ ALBERTO INSISTED THAT A-5 MEET HIM AT THE BAR OF THE CAPRI AFTER A-5 ASKED HIM TO COME TO HIS HOTEL. THIS WAS IN KEEPING WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN A-5 PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM MIAMI TO ASSUME THE INITIATIVE. A-5 AFTER APPROPRIATE DELAYS ACQUIESCED. HE SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE VOICE OF ALBERTO AS BEING THAT OF GUILLERMO WHOM AMGHOST-1 HAS SENT TO SPAIN FOR A MEETING WITH A-5 SEVERAL YEARS AGO. TWENTY MINUTES LATER A-5 ENTERED THE CAPRI BAR AND MET GUILLERMO /EDUARDO ARAOZ/. UPON ENTERING BAR WHICH WAS EMPTY EXCEPT FOR GUILLERMO HE NOTED ONE OTHER PERSON IN A CORNER BOOTH WATCHING HIM. THIS THROUGH A DEVICE HE LATER DISCOVERED TO BE ANOTHER CUIS OFFICER. THIS OFFICER HAD DARK THINNING HAIR COMBED TO SIDE AND APPEARED MORE ENGLISH OR AMERICAN LOOKING THAN CUBAN ACCORDING TO A-5. HE WAS OF MEDIUM HEIGHT AND BUILD AND CLEAN SHAVEN. THE FOLLOWING FOUR HOURS WERE SPENT WITH GUILLERMO ALONE ALTERNATING BETWEEN THE BAR, THE RESTAURANT AND A SMALL NITE CLUB IN THE CAPRI HOTEL. ENTIRE TAB PICKED UP BY A-5. GUILLERMO MADE NO OFFER TO PICK UP TAB AND JOKINGLY ON ONE OCCASION ALLUDED TO THE PROSPERITY OF THE BUSINESS OF A-5 IN MIAMI. SUSPICIONING THAT THE MAN IN THE BOOTH OF THE BAR WAS CUIS WHEN PASSING BACK THROUGH THE BAR FROM THE RESTAURANT ON THE WAY TO THE NITE CLUB A-5 SAID TO THE MAN IN SPANISH QUOTE YOU CAN GO TO DINNER NOW, YOU MUST BE HUNGRY AFTER YOUR LONG VIGILANCE. THE MAN APPARENTLY CAUGHT OFF GUARD ANSWERED SOMETHING RAPIDLY IN SPANISH AT WHICH TIME GUILLERMO BECAME FURIOUS AT THE MAN FOR FALLING

FOR THE PLOY OF A-5.

3. ACCORDING TO A-5 THE MEETING WITH GUILLERMO THROUGHOUT WAS FRANK AND FRIENDLY THOUGH RESERVED. EARLY IN THE MEETING GUILLERMO BLUNTLY QUERIED A-5 AS TO THE REASON HE HAD REQUESTED CONTACT. A-5 FOLLOWED THE SCENARIO AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED UPON IN MIAMI. HE CLEARLY EXPLAINED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES IN MIAMI AND FOR HIM PERSONALLY WERE MUCH DIFFERENT THAN WHEN THEY HAD MET IN SPAIN SEVERAL YEARS AGO. HE SAID THAT HE AND ALL HIS FRIENDS HAD BEEN TERMINATED BY [illegible], THAT HIS MOTHER WAS NOW DEAD AND THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY LOST HOPE THAT CUBA COULD BE LIBERATED. HE POINTED OUT HOWEVER THAT HE STILL OPPOSED FIDEL CASTRO AND NOW MERELY WANTED TO HELP NEGOTIATE THE RELEASE FROM PRISON OF HIS FRIENDS. GUILLERMO WAS NOT SURPRISED OR DISTURBED BY THIS APPROACH. GUILLERMO COUNTERED WITH THE STATEMENT THAT THE CUBAN REVOLUTION HAD SUCCEEDED AND THE ENTIRE MATTER OF RETAINING PRISONERS WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN HAVAN ANYWAY. AS CONVERSATION CONTINUED GUILLERMO SAID THAT WHILE HE NATURALLY WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS THE OFFER OF COOPERATION OF A-5 WITH AMGHOST-1 HE FELT QUITE CERTAIN THAT THE RELEASE OF FERNANDO DE ROSAS PENICHE, A RELATIVE OF A-5'S COULD BE ARRANGED EITHER IMMEDIATELY BEFORE OR SHORTLY AFTER CHRISTMAS, BUT THAT THE RELEASE OF PERSONS SUCH AS COMANDANTE GUIN WAS NOT CONVENIENT AT THIS TIME. TO THIS AGAIN KEEPING WITH THE PREARRANGED SCENARIO A-5 SAID THAT FIDEL WAS AN INGRATE SINCE GUIN HAD GIVEN FIDEL MUCH HELP IN MEXICO PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF ACTION AGAINST BATISTA. GUILLERMO REPEATEDLY BRISTLED WHEN FIDEL WAS ATTACKED. ONLY WHEN FIDEL WAS ATTACKED DID THE MEETING TAKE ON A LESS THAN FRIENDLY TONE.

4. TAKING THE INITIATIVE A-5 ASKED GUILLERMO WHY HE

HAD WAITED SO LONG TO ANSWER HIS LETTER SENT IN JULY. GUILLERMO PARRIED THIS QUERY BY ASKING A-5 WHY HE HAD NOT SENT THE RESPONSE CABLE TO HAVANA SOONER. A-5 SAID THAT HE HAD SENT THE REPLY AS SOON AS HE KNEW HE COULD TRAVEL TO MONTREAL SINCE THIS WAS HIS BUSY BUSINESS SEASON. GUILLERMO NEVER DID ANSWER WHY CUIS HAD DELAYED ANSWERING A-5'S LETTER. HOWEVER IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION GUILLERMO SHOWED A-5 HIS PASSPORT WHICH SHOWED THAT HE HAD ONLY RECEIVED A VISA FOR CANADA TWENTY FOUR HOURS PRIOR TO HIS TRAVEL TO CANADA. PASSPORT SHOWED ENTRY DATE OF 14 NOVEMBER. A-5 ASKED GUILLERMO IF AMGHOST-1 HAD SENT HIM. GUILLERMO REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY AND SAID HOWEVER THAT THERE WAS ONE MAN WHICH HE DID NOT IDENTIFY BETWEEN HIMSELF AND AMGHOST-1. A-5 ASKED WHETHER GUILLERMO HAD EVER GIVEN THE PACKAGE WHICH HE HAD GIVEN HIM IN SPAIN TO AMGHOST-1. GUILLERMO AGAIN REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY.

5. SINCE A-5 OFFERED TO COOPERATE REGARDING THE SUPPLY OF INFORMATION IN MIAMI WITHOUT IMPLICATING INDIVIDUALS, , THE CONVERSATION GRAVITATED TO THE CHE GUEVARA ADVENTURE IN BOLIVIA. GUILLERMO QUESTIONED A-5 REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTICIPATING OF AMCHALK-1 IN THE ACTION AGAINST GUEVARA. A-5 TOLD GUILLERMO ONLY THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT AMCHALK-1 HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE OPERATION AGAINST GUEVARA BUT THAT THIS WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE AMONGST MANY EXILES-- WHICH IS TRUE. GUILLERMO CONFIRMED THAT HE KNEW THIS TO BE THE CASE. IN ORDER TO WARM THE MEETING A-5 SAID THAT HE RESPECTED CHE AS A DEDICATED MAN DESPITE HIS DISAGREEMENT WITH HIS PHILOSOPHY AND ACTIONS. GUILLERMO SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT CHE HAD BEEN MURDERED BY BOLIVIANS AND THAT NO AMERICANS OR CUBAN EXILES HAD ACTUALLY PARTICIPATED IN THE

EXECUTION. ALONG THIS LINE GUILLERMO SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAD NO INCLINATION TO ASSASSINATE OR PHYSICALLY INJURE ANYONE SINCE THEY NO LONGER NEEDED TO ENGAGE IN THIS TYPE OF ACTION AND THAT A-5 NEED NOT FEAR ANY ATTEMPT ON HIM OR HIS FAMILY. GUILLERMO SAID THAT THE GREAT PREOCCUPATION OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT WAS ECONOMIC. IN THIS CONNECTION GUILLERMO SAID THAT THE CANADIANS WERE GREAT FRIENDS OF CUBA AND HAD HELPED AND WOULD CONTINUE TO HELP THEM. NO ELABORATION WAS MADE AS TO HOW THE CANADIANS WERE DOING THIS AND IN PURSUIT OF HIS MISSION A-5 DID NOT PROBE. GUILLERMO DID SAY THAT THE CUBANS HAD ABOUT FORTY-FIVE PEOPLE IN MONTREAL ALONE.

6. GUILLERMO SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAD CONSIDERABLE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILES AND QUERIED A-5 TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF MANUEL VILLAFANA WHO THEY KNEW TO BE IN COLOMBIA, PEDRO DIAZ TORRES IN MIAMI /DIAZ WAS INFIL GUIDE INTO NORTH MATANZAS/, PEPIN NARANJO AND OTTO GINER. GUILLERMO WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHAT GINER WAS DOING IN SOUTH AMERICA PRIOR TO HIS DEATH IN AN AIR CRASH. A-5 ANSWERED THAT HE THOUGHT HE WAS MIXED UP IN NARCOTICS TRAFFIC. REGARDING THE OTHERS HE SAID HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO FIND OUT ABOUT THEIR ACTIVITIES. THE ONLY IMMEDIATE TASK GIVEN A-5 WAS TO PROVIDE CUIS WITH A HISTORY OF KUBARK ACTIVITIES AGAINST CUBA FROM 1959 TO THE PRESENT. GUILLERMO SAID HE WANTED IT IN FOUR PARTS, 1959-61, 1961-63, 1963-65, 1966 TO PRESENT. A-5 REPLIED HE WOULD ATTEMPT THIS BUT IN KEEPING WITH SCENARIO HE WOULD NOT IMPLICATE INDIVIDUALS AND THAT HE WOULD NOT PROVIDE ANYTHING IF THE CUBANS DID NOT SHOW GOOD WILL AND MEET HIS DEMANDS. HE ALSO SAID THAT UPON THE RELEASE OF ROJAS HE WOULD CERTAINLY BE WILLING TO TALK AGAIN.

7. GUILLERMO INVITED A-5 TO CUBA SAYING HIS OLD

FRIENDS WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM AND THEY WOULD WELCOME HIM, THAT HE HAD LEFT CUBA TOO SOON AND THAT HE WOULD BE PROUD OF HIS COUNTRYMEN IF HE WOULD RETURN AND SEE THE PROGRESS MADE. A-5 THEN SAID THAT ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM THE ECONOMY WAS IN SHAMBLES AND PEOPLE WERE STARVING. GUILLERMO ALLOWED AS HOW THEY DID HAVE PROBLEMS BUT WAS NO HUNGER. CHILDREN /INCLUDING HIS OWN WERE VERY WELL FED/ AND THAT A REAL SPIRIT OF DEDICATION EXISTED IN THE COUNTRY. GUILLERMO SAID HE WAS RETURNING TO CUBA SOON AND WOULD THEN GO TO CUT CANE. GUILLERMO SUGGESTED THAT IF A-5 WOULD LIKE TO SEE CUBA RAMON DONESTEVEZ OF MIAMI OR OTHERS COULD EASILY BRING HIM TO THE ISLAND. HE ASSURED A-5 HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE AT WILL. HE ADDED THAT WHILE THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT COULD CARE LESS ABOUT RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN EXACERBATING TENSIONS SINCE THEIR GREAT PREOCCUPATION WAS THE SUGAR HARVEST. GUILLERMO SPOKE HIGHLY OF PRESIDENT NIXON AS A STATESMAN, INDICATING THIS WAS A WIDELY HELD VIEWPOINT. ONLY ONE THREAT WAS MADE DURING THE MEETING AND THAT WAS THAT ANY ATTEMPTS AGAINST CUBA BETWEEN NOW AND JUNE WOULD BE DEALT WITH HARSHLY. A-5 UNCLEAR AS TO THE REASON FOR THIS STATEMENT BUT SPECULATES THAT CUBAN GOVERNMENT WILL SPARE NO EFFORTS TO REACH THEIR ULTIMATE IN PRODUCTION.

6. REGARDING SECURITY GUILLERMO SAID THAT HE HAD WALKED EIGHT KILOMETERS THE DAY OF THE MEETING INORDER TO DETERMINE SURVEILLANCE SINCE HE BELIEVED THAT HE HAD BEEN WATCHED SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL. HE FELT CONFIDENT THAT HE NOW WAS NOT BEING WATCHES. ACTUALLY THE SMABOVES TOLD NEBECKER AND NOLTHAM THAT HE WAS NOT. GUILLERMO OFFERED TO SEND A GIRL WITH A BOX OF CUBAN CIGARS TO THE HOTEL OF A-5. A-5

DECLINED SAYING THAT HE WANTED THE RELATIONSHIP WITH CUIS TO BE HELD AS TIGHTLY AS POSSIBLE AND THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE CANADIANS MIGHT HAVE THE CUBANS IN MONTREAL PENETRATED. GUILLERMO SCOFFED AT THIS AND AGAIN SAID THE CANADIANS WERE FRIENDS. A-5 RETURNED TO HIS HOTEL WAS NOT FURTHER CONTACTED AND DEPARTED FOR NEW YORK CITY AT 1520 27 NOVEMBER IN PREPARATION FOR MEETING WITH NEBECKER. HE WAS TOLD THAT NO FURTHER CONTACT WOULD BE MADE WITH HIM UNTIL CUIS HAD HEARD FROM HIM USING THE CHANNEL ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE LETTER FROM BRONX. A-5 WAS INSTRUCTED TO WRITE TO THE HAVANA ADDRESS TO WHICH HE SENT CABLE ACKNOWLEDGING MEETING IN MONTREAL. A-5 SUGGESTED THAT THEY MIGHT HOLD NEXT MEETING IN MEXICO BUT THIS WAS IMMEDIATELY RULED OUT BY GUILLERMO CITING THE DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY THE LIZAGA CASE. HE ALSO RULED OUT SPAIN BECAUSE HE SAID HE WAS KNOWN THERE. KINGSTON WAS CHOSEN AS THE NEXT MEETING PLACE. A-5 TOLD GUILLERMO THAT DUE TO PRESS OF BUSINESS HE COULD NOT MEET IN KINGSTON BEFORE CHRISTMAS BUT DEPENDING ON THE RELEASE OF ROJAS HY WOULD WRITE WHEN HE COULD MAKE THE MEETING AND THEN AWAIT INSTRUCTIONS.

9. A-5 CALLED NEBECKER FROM MONTREAL AIRPORT AND MEETING TOOK PLACE NEXT NITE IN NEW YORK. A-5 TOOK EXCEPTIONAL PRECAUTIONS IN GOING TO MEETING SITE. HE HAD BONA FIDE REASON FOR GOING TO NEW YORK I.E. VISIT RELATIVES. WILL SEND SEPARATE MESSAGE RE MEETING WITH SMABOVES.

10. INTEND TO REVIEW ENTIRE MEETING WITH A-5 DURING NEXT CONTACT IN MIAMI ON 10 DECEMBER, IN ORDER TO DOUBLE CHECK HIS MEMORY AND DETERMINE ANY INCONSISTENCIES.

JOEL N. NEBECKER

DISTRIBUTION BY TP

3 - COS, WH/MIAMI

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

ORIGINATOR:

DCOS, WH/MIAMI Lawrence Sternfield

RELEASING:

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - RID
1 - WH/COG Chrono
1 - O-C/WH/COG Chrono
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - Signal Center
1 - COS, Ottawa (pouched)
1 - EUR/BC
1 - WH/COG/OPS

15

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

SECRET

ORIG: Larry Sternfield:jls
UNIT: WH/COG
EXT: 7451/1948
DATE: ~~1 December 1969~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 33 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR C/PI/SD C/EUR 5 C/CI C/FI 2 DDP ADDP CS/DO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

01 23 57 z Dec 69

CITE DIRECTOR 57910

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO: OTTAWA

Best
Mert,

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

REFERENCES: A. WH/MIAMI 5683 (IN 77898)

B. DIRECTOR 53109

C. WH/MIAMI 5784 (IN 84581)

File CAMK-5

FROM NEBECKER

1. FOLLOWING MEETING IN MONTREAL WITH AMGHOST REPRESENTATIVE, AMCHALK-5 AND NEBECKER MET IN NEW YORK FOR DEBRIEFING PURPOSES. DUE TO LENGTH OF DEBRIEFING OF AMCHALK-5, SUBSTANCE WILL BE FORWARDED LATER TODAY BY TELEPOUCH.

2. IN SUMMARY MEETING WITH AMGHOST REPRESENTATIVE, EDUARDO ARAOZ AKA GUILLERMO WENT SMOOTHLY, WAS FRIENDLY BUT RESERVED. NO APPARENT SECURITY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND BASIC APPROACH BY AMCHALK-5 WHICH WAS OUTLINED IN PREVIOUS TRAFFIC WAS ACCEPTED.

(Continued)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________ #________

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 57910

TO PAGE TWO

3. AMCHALK-5 WAS INSTRUCTED NOT TO MAKE CONTACT WITH STATION MIAMI UPON RETURN TO MIAMI WHICH WAS 29 NOVEMBER. HE WAS INSTRUCTED THAT NEXT MEETING WAS TO TAKE PLACE ON 10 DECEMBER AT 1000 HOURS AT SAME PLACE HE WAS PICKED UP AT LAST MEETING MIAMI. THIS PRECAUTION TAKEN SINCE ARAOZ MADE IT CLEAR TO AMCHALK-5 THAT THEIR FACILITIES IN MIAMI AREA WERE GOOD. FURTHER DO NOT BELIEVE THAT TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH AMCHALK-5 APPROPRIATE FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

4. FOR OTTAWA: APPRECIATE EXCELLENT COOPERATION OF STATION AND SHADOWERS IN CONDUCT THIS OPERATION. WILL PROVIDE YOU ALL DETAILS BY POUCH. ~~END OF MESSAGE~~

5. FILE: 19-136-1/3, 201-307337.

END OF MESSAGE

E/BC/C

C/WH/COG

WH/H

William V. Broe
C/WHD

J. J. Fieldhouse
C/E/BC

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIA DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____________ II

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____________

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

DISSEM BY 28 PER ________

ACTION UNIT C/WH8 INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD. C/EUR5, C/CI, C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 432

S E C R E T 012203Z DEC 69 CITE OTTAWA 6738

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR 95241

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE 1 DEC 69 IN 95241

REF: A. WH/MIAMI 5894 (IN 91428)

B. DIRECTOR 56696

1. AMCHALK-5 SIGNALED NEBECKER HE DEPARTING MONTREAL 27 NOVEMBER. NEBECKER DEPARTED 28 NOVEMBER TO MAKE SCHEDULED MEETING WITH AMCHALK-5 IN NEW YORK. HE WILL PROCEED HEADQUARTERS 1 DECEMBER. VIEW TIMING OF AMCHALK-5 SIGNAL, ASSUME HE MADE MEETING WITH DGI. NEBECKER WILL REPORT RESULTS UPON HIS RETURN.

2. FILE: 19-136-1/3, 201-307337

S E C R E T

ENDER WI HECK CLA ICATION TOP AND BOTTO

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/COG/Mertz		
2	DU-3		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Per our telcon - suggest cable ottawa in reference to two cables you ref in your attached cable stating something like"pouching comments re suggestion Ottawa 6713" and then send dispatch containing gist your cable, acknowledging that even tho' events have overtaken any possibility consider suggestions contained ref we would like for u to no . . . . see ur cable?????

many tnx.
louie

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
E/BC/C	25 Nov 69

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

(40)

14-00000

ORIG: JOHN MERTZ:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 5061 R. 1255
DATE: 24 NOVEMBER 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO: FILE. VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO OTTAWA INFO: WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC SMABOVE AMCHALK

REFS: A. OTTAWA 6713 (IN 86341)*
B. OTTAWA 6727 (IN 90746)**

1. ORDINARILY REF A TYPE OF PROPOSAL WOULD BE APPEALING, 9rF [redacted] HOWEVER, FOR FOLLOWING REASONS BELIEVE AMCHALK-5 OPERATION NOT THE PROPER VEHICLE.

A. POSSIBILITY OF DGI REVENGE AGAINST AMCHALK-5, HIS FAMILY, AND FRIENDS BOTH IN CUBA AND US.

B. POSSIBILITY THAT OPERATION WOULD JEOPARDIZE ANY FUTURE CONTACT BETWEEN RVROCK AND OFFICIAL CUBANS ABROAD, AS CUBANS NATURALLY WOULD REGARD ALL FUTURE CONTACT AS POSSIBLE PROVOCATIONS.

C. CUBANS WOULD PROBABLY MAKE PUBLIC PROTEST TO CANADIAN GOV SAYING ALL WAS RVROCK PLOT TO DAMAGE CUBAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS. COULD FURTHER MENTION THIS SECOND CASE, FIRST BEING LISAGA CASE IN WHICH CUBANS MAY SAY WE ALSO TRIED TO DAMAGE CUBAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS. CUBA MIGHT REINFORCE ITS CASE BY MENTIONING AMCHALK-5'S TRUE NAME AND WHAT CUBAN GOVERNMENT KNOWS OF HIS ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF RVROCK.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF:

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

PAGE TWO

2. FILE 19-136-1/3, 201-307337, 14-2-12.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG COMMENTS: *Suggested AMCHALK-5/DGI meeting could be used as basis for Canadian Gov to PNG a Cuban Officer in Montreal.

**Request Hqs comments on ref proposal.

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

E/BC/C

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/EUR FI CI

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

ORIG: JOHN [illegible]:nk
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144 R. 1819
DATE: 25 NOVEMBER 1960

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY [illegible] PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: [illegible] INFO: FILE, VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

2 23 22 NOV 60

CITE DIRECTOR 56038

TO PRIORITY OTTAWA INFO: WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REFS: A. OTTAWA 6713 (IN 86341)*
B. OTTAWA 6727 (IN 90746)** (not sent Miami)

1. ORDINARILY REF A TYPE OF PROPOSAL WOULD BE APPEALING, HOWEVER, BELIEVE AMCHALK OPERATION IS NOT SUITABLE VEHICLE. POUCHING DETAILS.

2. FILE 19-136-1/3, 201-307337, 14-2-12.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENTS: *Suggested AMCHALK-5/DGI meeting could be used as basis for Canadian Gov to PNG a Cuban Officer in Montreal.

**Request Hqs comments on ref proposal.

WH/FI

C/WH/COG

E/BC/C

~~[illegible]OOD~~
~~C[illegible]~~

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 10H

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1 50/65
2 [illegible]

PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: S AT: 2010 Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY: 12 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

ACTION C/WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO. FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

1/2 ADDP

S E C R E T 251947Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5312

IMMEDIATE OTTAWA INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

25 Nov 69 IN 92448

REF OTTAWA 6733 (IN92350)

1. NEBECKER EN ROUTE. ETA MONTREAL 1535 HOURS. WILL CONTACT NOLTHAM ON ARRIVAL. DEFER NEBECKER JUDGEMENT RE METHOD PROCEEDING.

2. FILE: 201-327337.

SECRET

BT

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

BY: 5 AT: 1700

DISSEM BY: 7 PER

ACTION UNIT [illegible]

FILE, VR. C/EPS C/FI C/CI C/FIO

ACTION NO. 035 ADDP

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 251615Z NOV 69 CITE OTTAWA 6732

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

25 Nov 69 IN 92950

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

(For record. Has been answered, as you know.

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 56569

B. OTTAWA 6729 (IN 91988)

C. WH/MIAMI 5928 (IN 92225)

1. CONFUSION REIGNS. REQUEST HQS AND WH/MIAMI GET TOGETHER AS WE DESIRE PROCEED ACCORDING TO SMABOVE SUGGESTIONS MADE IN OTTAWA 6728 (90989) AND HEADQUARTERS POSITION IN REFERENCE A.

2. AT 0800 THIS MORNING NOLTHAM DISCRETELY ATTEMPTED TO DETERMINE IF AMCHALK/5 AT HOTEL BUT WAS UNABLE TO CONFIRM HE ACTUALLY IN HOTEL. IN VIEW OF REF C INSTRUCTED NOLTHAM HOLD OFF ANY CONTACT WITH AMCHALK/5 AND PLACE BURDEN SQUARELY IN NEBECKER'S LAP. WE HAVE TO HOPE AND PRAY THAT DGI DOES NOT CONTACT AND ARRANGE MEETING WITH AMCHALK/5 BEFORE NEBECKER CONTACTS. BELIEVE NOLTHAM AND NEBECKER ON THE SCENE CAN COME UP WITH SOME MEANS OF CONTACTING SUBJECT WITHOUT BLOWING WHOLE OPERATION OUT OF THE WATER. REGARDLESS HE MUST BE CONTACTED AND ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO DETERMINE MEETING PLACE SO SMABOVE CAN GIVE PROTECTIVE COVERAGE. TO ATTEMPT TO PROCEED OTHERWISE IS SHEER FOLLY. CONTINUOUS SURVEILLANCE BY SMABOVES NOT POSSIBLE.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 OTTAWA 6730 S E C R E T

3. MONTREAL UNDER ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES IS A RATHER EXPLOSIVE PLACE. THIS WEEK IT WILL BE MORE THAN EVER AS THE TOWN PREPARES TO RECEIVE THE BOISTEROUS FANS FOR THE BIG GREY CUP GAME ON SATURDAY. THE TOWN WILL BE LOADED WITH FREE-WHEELING DRUNKS AND FRANKLY WILL BE THE IDEAL TIME TO PULL A KIDNAPPING WHICH COULD BE CARRIED OFF EASILY. SMABOVE IN MONTREAL BEING MOST COOPERATIVE BUT UNABLE TO DO ANYTHING UNLESS WE PROVIDE MEETING PLACE BEFORE HAND. AS OTTAWA 6728 POINTS OUT MEETING PLACE MIGHT WELL BE NOTRE DAME DE GRACE PARK.

4. AS HEADQUARTERS AWARE WE HAVE A LOT RIDING ON THIS SO-CALLED OPERATION. NOT ONLY POSSIBLE THREAT TO AMCHALK/5 BUT A MATTER OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH SMABOVE. IF THIS "JOINT OPS" GOES SOUR IT WILL BE BECAUSE OF OUR SHORTCOMINGS AND PERHAPS RUIN FOREVER OUR CHANCES FOR ANY FUTURE VENTURES. IN OTHER WORDS RYROCK PROFESSIONALISM, AT LEAST IN THE EYES OF THE SMABOVES, IS AT STAKE. THEREFORE, I WOULD RATHER ABORT THAN PROCEED ON A HOPE AND PRAYER. NEBECKER MUST CONTACT AECHALK REGARDLESS WHETHER BLOWS OPERATION OR NOT.

5. PLEASE ADVISE BY IMMEDIATE RETURN CABLE.

S E C R E T

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

RIG: John Mertz:jls
NIT: WH/COG/OPS
XT: 6820/1255
ATE: 25 Nov 69

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	Emmo	10	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y 35 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ON: C/WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR C/RI/SD C/EUR5 DDP ADDP CS/DO C/CI C/FI2

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 25 20 06 z Nov 69 CITE DIRECTOR 56696

IMMEDIATE OTTAWA, WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 56569

B. OTTAWA 6729 (91988)

C. WH/MIAMI 5908 (92225)

D. OTTAWA 6730 (IN 92350)

1. PER REF A, ~~HEADQUARTERS~~ HQS BELIEVES NECESSARY THAT NEBECKER ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH AMCHALK-5 UPON ARRIVAL IN MONTREAL SO THAT HE BE ABLE RELAY INFORMATION FROM AMCHALK-5 TO SMABOVE ON DGI-AMCHALK-5 MEETING SITE. THIS STEP NECESSARY BECAUSE FEEL PROTECTIVE SURVEILLANCE OF MEETING SITE BY SMABOVE REQUISITE FOR CONTINUING OPERATION. PLEASE ADVISE NEBECKER.

2. FILE: 19-136-1/3, 201-307337.

END OF MESSAGE

(Continued)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 56694

TO

PAGE TWO

WH Comment: Ref A says that Hqs desires that Nebecker initiate contact with AMCHALK-5 and that AMCHALK-5 should not make meeting with DGI without surveillance by SMABOVE. Ref B says that NOLTHAM, Ottawa Station Officer, will contact AMCHALK-5 at his hotel in Montreal to try delay operation. It adds that NOLTHAM and NEBECKER (DCOS WH/Miami) will consult with SMABOVE to assure coverage of meeting. Ref C requests no contact between NOLTHAM and AMCHALK-5 for fear that operation would be exposed to DGI. Ref D requests that operation proceed only if protective coverage can be given to AMCHALK-5-DGI meeting and that NEBECKER initiate contact with AMCHALK-5 upon arrival Montreal.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

E/BC/C L. Leas

James E. Flannery
C/WH/COG

J. J. Fieldhouse
C/E/BC
J. Fieldhouse

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: 5 AT: 1415 Z

DISSEM BY: PER

ACTION C/WH 5

062

☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOV 25 9 30 PM '69

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO FILE, VR. C/RI/SD, C/EUR 5, C/[illegible]

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	5	6	
2	[illegible]	7	
3		8	
4		9	

PRECEDENCE

SECRET 251401Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5908

25 Nov 69 IN 92225

IMMEDIATE OTTAWA, DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

REF OTTAWA 6729 (N91988)

1. REQUEST NO PHONE CALL BY NOLTHAM TO AMCHALK-5 SINCE IT POSSIBLE CUIS MAY CONTROL SWITCH BOARD AT HOTEL OF AMCHALK-5. IF THIS TRUE CUIS MAY NOT MAKE CONTACT AND OPERATION WILL ABORT BEFORE IT GETS OFF THE GROUND.

2. FILE: 19-136-1/3; 201-307337.

SECRET

ET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: 1 AT: 1015 Z

DISSEM BY 40 PER ____ #

ACTION UNIT C/WH3

ACTION NO. 2055

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 37

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

PRECEDENCE

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

INFO FILE, VR, C/RISD, C/EUR 5, DDP, ADDP, CSDO, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 250915Z NOV 69 CITE OTTAWA 6729

IN 91988

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI, DIRECTOR

25 Nov 69 [illegible] 91988

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

REF: DIRECTOR 56569

1. CONTACTED NOLTHAM WHO WILL CONTACT AMCHALK/5, ADVISING HIM POSTPONE ANY POSSIBLE MEETING WITH CUIS UNTIL AFTER NEBECKER ARRIVES. WILL THEN BE UP TO NEBECKER ADVISE AMCHALK/5 RE POINTS IN REFERENCE. NOLTHAM AND NEBECKER WILL CONSULT SMABOVE TO ASSURE COVERAGE OF MEETING. IF SMABOVE UNABLE COVER ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS SCRAP WHOLE THING.

2. PRESUME NEBECKER HAS SEEN REF. IF NOT PLEASE MAKE SURE HE AWARE OF CONTENTS AND THAT HE CONTACTS NOLTHAM IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL. NOLTHAM CAN BE REACHED AT QUEEN ELIZABETH HOTEL, AREA CODE 514-861-3511, ROOM 1258.

3. NOLTHAM WILL ADVISE US AT 0900 THIS MORNING THE RESULTS OF HIS CONTACT WITH AMCHALK/5.

4. FILE: 19-136-1/3 AND 201-307337.

S E C R E T

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: John Mertzila
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 6820/1255
DATE: 24 November 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____ PER ____ # ____

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 25 00 20 z NOV 69 CITE DIRECTOR 56569

TO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA WH/MIAMI

REFERENCES: A. WH/MIAMI 5878 (90657)

B. OTTAWA 6728 (90989)

C. WH/MIAMI 5894 (91428)

1. IN LIGHT POSSIBLE DANGER TO AMCHALK-5 RAISED BY REF A, DESIRE NEBECKER INITIATE CONTACT WITH AMCHALK-5 ON ARRIVAL MONTREAL. IN ADDITION, WHEN AMCHALK-5 KNOWS DETAILS OF MEETING WITH DGI, SURVEILLANCE SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM SMABOVE. ALTHOUGH UNDERSTAND FROM REF B SMABOVE CAN NOT PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SURVEILLANCE, ASSUME THEY CAN AT LEAST PROVIDE COVERAGE OF AMCHALK-5/DGI MEETING WHEN TIME AND PLACE HAVE BEEN SET.

2. AMCHALK-5 SHOULD NOT MAKE MEETING WITHOUT CONFIRMATION SURVEILLANCE CAN BE PROVIDED.

RI UW
AB X

WH/C/OP

(continued)

CS COPY

201-307337

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	12 PM '63	10	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT: NOV 26 9 35 AM '63
DATE:

DEC 2

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION RECEIVED RID/EDI
BY ______ PER ______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ...DED ...EDI

INFO: FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 56569

SECRET

TO PAGE TWO

3. AMCHALK-5 SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED NOT TO GET INTO CAR WITH CUBANS. IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED TO BY THE AGENT AND SMABOVE THAT SUCH A MOVE IS A SIGNAL FOR SMABOVE TO TAKE PREVENTIVE ACTION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/CI/OPS/WH Frank Hughes (in draft)

John R. Horton
AC/WHD

James E. Flannery
James E. Flannery
C/WH/COG

James E. Flannery
J. J. Fieldhouse by direction
C/E/BC

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ________ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR [illegible]

ACTION NO. 9104

IN 71428
9

SECRET 241500Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5894

PRIORITY OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

H
RYBAT TYPIC AMCEALK SMABOVE

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 5878 (490657)

B. OTTAWA 6728 (490989)

1. AMCHALK-5 WIFE NOT ACCOMPANYING HIM ON TRIP. AMCHALK-5 NOT GIVEN NUMBER OF BAISTONE OR CYR BUT PER REF A INSTRUCTIONS WILL ONLY MAKE CONTACT IN UNUSUAL OR EMERGENCY SITUATION. NEBECKER CAN THEN RAPIDLY GET IN TOUCH WITH SMABOVE OFFICERS.

2. WE CERTAINLY AGREE WITH SUGGESTIONS SMABOVE REGARDING SECURITY AND AMCHALK-5 HAS BEEN BRIEFED TO MEET ONLY IN PUBLIC PLACES.

3. FILE: 19-136-173; 201-807337.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH - C/D

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED

WH

BY: GK AT: 1722 - 22 NOV

DISSEM BY: 15 PER ____ # ____

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3	[illegible]	7	
4		8	

SE1

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR c/ci/so, c/eur 5, c/ci, c/ci 2

ACTION NO. 835

S E C R E T 221550Z NOV 69 CITE OTTAWA 6728

22 Nov 69 IN 90989

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REF WH/MIAMI 5878 (IN 90657)

1. SMABOVE SAID THEIR OFFICE MONTREAL HAS OBSERVED ARACZ CASING NOTRE DAME DE GRACE PARK WHICH CORNER SHERBROOKB STREET AND COTE STREET AND NOT FAR FROM PLAZA MOTOR HOTEL. FROM ARAOZ ACTIONS THEY FEEL HE MAY PLAN SELECT THIS PARK FOR MEETING. IN ANY CASE THEY SUGGEST AMCHALK-5 REFUSE TAKE RIDE IN CAR WITH DGI OFFICERS. THIS HAS BEEN THEIR USUAL PATTERN MEETING CONTACTS MONTREAL.

2. DUE OTHER COMMITMENTS MONTREAL, SMABOVE CAN NOT GUARANTEE PROTECTIVE SURVEILLANCE AMCHALK-5 ON CONTINUING BASIS. THEY FEEL IF ATTEMPT KIDNAP MADE IT WOULD BE DONE DURING MEETING. TO AID SMABOVE SURVEILLANCE OF MEETING THEY WOULD LIKE DETAILS OF MEETING PLACE ETC. IN ADVANCE. OTHERWISE THEY BELIEVE THEIR SURVEILLANCE TEAM WOULD POSSIBLY BE SPOTTED BY DGI COUNTER SURVEILLANCE. IF IT IS POSSIBLE FOR YOU

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 OTTAWA 6728 SECRET

TO WORK OUT METHOD WHERBY AMCHALK-5 CAN ALERT NEBECKER TO MEETING ARRANGEMENTS AFTER RECEIVING DGI CALL SMABOVE CAN MORE SECURELY MONITOR MEETING AND THUS PREVENT ANY KIDNAP ATTEMPT. HOWEVER, THEY ADVISE AGAINST CALL TO NEBECKER FROM AMCHALK-5 HOTEL ROOM IMMEDIATELY AFTER CALL FROM DGI. DGI IN PAST HAVE TELEPHONED BACK TO SEE IF LINE IS BUSY. SUGGEST, IF YOU FEEL IT NECESSARY, WORK OUT SOME METHOD SO THAT AMCHALK-5 OR HIS WIFE CAN INFORM NEBECKER OF MEETING DETAILS FROM PAY PHONE THAT CAN NOT BE OBSERVED.

3. CUBAN SHIP JIGUANI NOW IN PORT IN TORONTO. OTHER VESSEL IN ST. LAWRENCE AS WELL NUMBER SOVIET SHIPS. SMABOVE SAID THAT IF AMCHALK-5 KIDNAPED IT WOULD BE FAIRLY SIMPLE GET HIM ABOARD ANY SHIP IN AREA. WE WILL FOLLOW UP AND DISCUSS PROBLEM WITH THEM FURTHER. SMABOVE FURNISHED EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBER TO PASS AMCHALK-5 IN CASE HE GETS IN REAL TROUBLE. HE SHOULD ASK FOR MR. BATSTONE OR MR. CYR AT 879-6078. THIS IS SMABOVE MONTREAL NUMBER AND

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ____

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 OTTAWA 6728 SECRET

BATSTONE AND CYR ARE SMABOVE OFFICERS WHO KNOW DETAILS OF CASE. OFFICERS ARE THERE, HOWEVER, ONLY DURING WORKING HOURS 0830 TO 1730.

4. WE WILL LEAVE TO YOUR DISCRETION WHETHER NECESSARY TAKE THESE PRECAUTIONS. PLS ADVISE ON 24 NOV. IF YOU DO.

5. FILE: 19-136-1/3; 201-307337.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: 8 AT: 1931 Z

DISSEM BY: 1 PER

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 8

ACTION NO. 830

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INI.			
1	[illegible]	5	
2		6	
3	[illegible]	7	
4		8	

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

PRECEDENCE

INFO: FILE, VR C/RI/SD C/EUR 5 C/CI C/FI 2

S E C R E T 211844Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5878

PRIORITY OTTAWA, DIRECTOR

21 Nov 69 IN 90657

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 54949

B. WH/MIAMI 5851 (IN 88277)

C. WH/MIAMI 5848 (IN 88208)

D. OTTAWA 6716 (IN 87494)

1. FOLLOWING IS OPS PLAN FOR AMCHALK-5 TRIP:

(1) AMCHALK-5 (POSSIBLY WITH WIFE FOR COVER AND SECURITY REASONS) DEPARTING MIAMI 23 NOVEMBER VIA AIR CANADA 605 FOR TORONTO. HE OVERNIGHTING IN TORONTO AT KING EDWARD HOTEL; DEPARTING FOR MONTREAL 24 NOVEMBER VIA AIR CANADA 964. AMCHALK-5 HAS CONCOCTED PLAUSIBLE BUSINESS STORY FOR VISIT CANADA AND NEW YORK BASED UPON KNOWN EXPANSION OF HIS COMPANY.

(2) AMCHALK-5 WILL WAIT CALL OF CUIS AT LE DECARIE PLAZA MOTOR HOTEL AT TIMES CITED BY CUIS (0700 AND 1400 25 THRU 28 NOVEMBER). WHEN CONTACT MADE, HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ACT THE INITIATOR AND AGGRESSOR AND INSIST ON MEETINGS ONLY IN PUBLIC PLACES. HE INSTRUCTED NOT

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: 3

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 5878 S E C R E T

REPEAT NOT TO MAKE CONTACT WITH NEBECKER UNLESS MOST UNUSUAL OR EMERGENCY SITUATION ARISES. CONTACT PLAN GIVEN AMCHALK-5. HE WILL NOT MAKE CONTACT WITH NEBECKER IN CASE OF NO SHOW BY CUIS OR IF ONLY NORMAL MEETINGS HELD WITH CUIS.

(3) FOLLOWING MONTREAL TRIP, MEETINGS ARRANGED WITH NEBECKER ON 29 AND POSSIBLY 30 NOVEMBER IN NEW YORK CITY.

(4) AMCHALK-5 INSTRUCTED TO REPRIMAND CUIS FOR DELAY IN CONTACT AND INDICATE HIS FRUSTRATION AND EXTREME TIME LAPSE BETWEEN HIS LETTER TO HAVANA IN JULY AND REPLY IN LATE OCTOBER. HE WILL TELL THEM THAT WHEN HE WAS IN MEXICO IN OCTOBER ON BUSINESS HE WAS SORELY TEMPTED TO APPROACH CZECH OR SOVIETS WITH HIS PROPOSITION, I.E. THE RELEASE OF HIS FRIENDS IN RETURN FOR COOPERATION. IN PARTICULAR HE WILL CITE THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS HE WANTS RELEASED, ALL ARE OLD FRIENDS: RAMON GUIN, UNDRESS VARGAS GOMEZ, ROLANDO CUBELAS, FERNANDO ROJAS. ALL OF THE ABOVE HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO 30 YEARS FOR ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES. GUIN AND CUBELAS WERE ARMY OFFICERS ACCUSED OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST FIDEL. VARGAS WAS PICKED UP DURING INFILTRATION

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		
BY: ___ AT: ___ Z	INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO		
	CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ___		
	X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ___		
DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ # ___	☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ___		
ACTION UNIT	INFO FILE, VR		
ACTION NO.			

PAGE 3 WH/MIAMI 5878 SECRET

MISSION AND ROJAS IS A RELATIVE WHO WAS CHIEF FOR MANOLO RAY GROUP IN HAVANA AND MATANZAS, ALSO WAS HEAD OF CATHOLIC YOUTH RESISTANCE.

(5) WE CANNOT PRECLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT CUIS MAY ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP AMCHALK-5 WHILE HE IN CANADA. REQUEST OTTAWA DETERMINE IF ANY CUBAN OR SOVIET SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT WILL BE IN MONTREAL-HALIFAX AREA DURING PERIOD AMCHALK-5 WILL BE IN CANADA. REQUEST STAKE OUT OF MOTOR HOTEL WHERE AMCHALK-5 STAYING AND STAND BY FOR PROTECTIVE SURVEILLANCE IF NECESSARY. IT MOST IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT CUIS NOT BE SCARED OFF BY ANY HINT OF COVERAGE.

(6) RE REF A, NEBECKER WILL BE CARRYING VARIETY OF PHOTOS AND IDENTIKIT COMPOSIT OF ARAOZ.

2. FILE: 19-136-1/3; 201-307337.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

13 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/[illegible]

SUBJECT: AMCHALK/5 -- Use Against the DGI in a Counterintelligence Operation

1. The attached cables contain background information on a counterintelligence operation to be initiated in Montreal, Canada. Set forth below are several significant points, which have not been mentioned in the cable traffic. If these points have not been considered in the operational planning, then it is believed the overall risks are going to be far higher than planned.

Physical Danger to AMCHALK/5 and His Relatives in Cuba

2. It is believed AMCHALK/5 still has close relatives in Cuba. The DGI's first letter to AMCHALK/5 in 1967 carried an implied threat to these relatives. The writer does not know what happened to the relatives after AMCHALK/5 double crossed the DGI in the 1967 meeting. But they are surely going to be in jeopardy again if they are there, because the DGI, in the writer's opinion, will eventually discover this second double cross.

3. Furthermore, the DGI initiated an operation to assassinate AMCHALK/1 who participated in Bolivia in the GUEVARA roll-up. The DGI just might consider AMCHALK/5 as great an enemy as AMCHALK/1.

4. It is my recollection that when [illegible] and [illegible], the two DGI officers, met AMCHALK/5 in Madrid, they were armed; moreover they clearly displayed their holsters to AMCHALK/5.

AMCHALK/5's Participation in Sensitive Operations

5. AMCHALK/5 has been involved in Miami-based CIA Cuban operations since 1961. The AMCHALK Project Outline

states, "Although [illegible] of his experience prior to 1966 was in the [illegible] field, [illegible] has received a wide variety of training and he was [illegible] into [illegible] indicated roles [illegible] time." One such [illegible] role was in [illegible] he went to Buenos Aires and assisted the [illegible] a sensitive [illegible] audio operation [illegible]. [illegible]K/5's knowledge of CIA-connected [illegible], operations, modus operandi, and equipment [illegible] tremendous. He would be a real prize if [illegible] get him to Cuba.

[illegible]tion

6. [illegible] this operation involves our Canadian liaison [illegible] possible threat of violence, it is suggested that the [illegible] be checked out the [illegible]/OCG. It appears [illegible] Division may have some equities in [illegible]K/5's case and use against, the DGI because of his involvement in the KUDTOP/Buenos Aires operation. It is not know whether the [illegible] Division, [illegible]/OPS/[illegible], or [illegible]/4/Argentina have been consulted.

7. [illegible] the writer, on the basis on the information available, the risks in the operation appear to be unduly great re the operational objectives outlined. Futhermore, we are undoubtedly going to be immediately confronted with a problem of releasing information to the [illegible], because they undoubtedly are going to want to debrief him in full on his knowledge of CIA.

RICHARD [illegible] [illegible]
CI/OPS/AM

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
Transmittal of Letter to AMCHALK-5

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: WH/MIAMI-5683

Transmitted under separate cover hereto is a copy of the letter described in reference.

Frederick C. BRADSPIES

Attachment
Letter

2 DEC 69

Distribution:
3-C/WHD w/att u/s/c

Exclud [illegible]

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-1500	DATE NOV [illegible] 13 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-307337

MIGUEL:

RECIBIMOS TU CARTA DONDE EXPRESAS TUS DESEOS DE VOLVER A ENCONTRARNOS PROXIMAMENTE.

ACEPTAMOS TU PROPOSICION PARA VERNOS EN CANADA Y TE PROPONEMOS ENCONTRARNOS EN FECHA 25 DE NOVIEMBRE PROXIMO EN MONTREAL. HOSPEDATE EN CUALQUIERA DE ESTOS DOS HOTELES, CAPRI HOTEL, SITO EN 6445, DECARIE, O EN: LE DECARIE PLAZA MOTOR HOTEL, SITO EN 5900, DECARIE. ALLI ESPERA UNA LLAMADA NUESTRA; PARA FACILITARTE TUS MOVIMIENTOS LA COMUNICACION LZA HAREMOS A LAS 7 A.M. O A LAS 2 P.M. COMO TU CONOCES, EN ESTOS CASOS HAY QUE TOMAR CIERTAS MEDIDAS QUE PUEDAN HACER QUE NOS VEAMOS IMPOSIBILITADOS DE ASISTIR EXACTAMENTE EL DIA SEÑALADO, POR LO QUE PUDIERA SER EN LOS DIAS SUCESIVOS, PONIENDO COMO FECHA LIMITE EL 28 DE NOVIEMBRE.

RESPONDE POR CABLE A LA DIRECCION SIGUIENTE: RAMONA HERRERA , AVE 45, # II006, APTO 4, E/ IIO Y II2, MARIANAO, I5 CON UN TEXTO CONVENCIONAL SI ESTAS DE ACUERDO CON LA FECHA. EL CABLE DIRA: FELICIDADES, Y LO FIRMA ENRIQUE SI ESTAS CONFORME. O FELICIDADES Y LO FIRMA CARLOS SI HAY DIFICULTADES; EN ESTE CASO ESCRIBENOS DANDONOS TUS OPINIONES. REPITO: ENRIQUE QUIERE DECIR SI, CARLOS QUIERE DECIR QUE NO ESTAS DE ACUERDO.

SALUDOS:

ALBERTO.

C C.I.

S/C att to UFAA-1500

201-307337

R; Jose Roman,
69 Hmltn Ave, Yonkers, N.Y.

PM
30 OCT

Mr. MIGUEL DIAZ
[illegible], MIAMI
FLA.

201-307337

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,

WH/COG/OPS - D. Geisler

NUMBER
201-307337

SUBJECT
AMCHALK/5

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated

mss

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Subject's POA is reinstated herewith until 17 February 1970 for use as set forth in your memorandum, WH/COG 69-288. In the interim, please request the Field to submit an updated PRQ Part I and PRQ Part II; the original ones were prepared and submitted in 1961 and 1962 respectively. Please also run a new G.L. check on Subject and forward the results to CI/OA. With the results, please include a statement as to current Field, RI and Division Traces.

Field notified ufan 579, 15 Aug 69
orig req from Field ufga 1244, 21 Aug 69
Green List 9 Sept - no info

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/S/ John E. Howard

201 - 307337

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	**Date Issued: 17 November 1969** **Date Typed: 20 November 1969**

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(9)

SECRET

WH/COG 69-356

18 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, WH Division

THRU : C/WH/Support

FROM : Chief, COG

SUBJECT : Travel of DCOS WH/Miami from Miami to Montreal

1. Your concurrence is requested in the travel of DCOS, WH/Miami, from Miami to Montreal by Air Canada 603 on 25 November 1969

2. DCOS, WH/Miami has the following non-backstopped documentation in the alias of Lloyd M. Stanton: Illinois driver's license, Illinois birth certificate, Social Security card, Jamestown Insurance card, New York Insititute of Photography card, Chicago Public Library Card, vaccination certificate. The dispatch forwarding this documentation to Miami specified that the documents are for flash purposes only. DCOS, WH/Miami had requested backstopping for his alias documentation but the request was denied by Central Cover.

Field notified
19 NOV
Director 55499

SECRET

3. It has been suggested that DCOS, WH/Miami travel at least as far as Washington by rail from Miami. However, he must be in Miami on the night of 24 November for meetings with British liaison; this leaves him insufficient time to travel by rail.

James E. Flannery
Chief, WH/COG

Concur:

John R. Horton, AC/WHD

DDP/WH/COG/OPS/Glenn Brown:bjs

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/WH/Support
1 - WH/COG/OPS Chrono
1 - Originator

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ # ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/WH-8

INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD C/EUR-5, C/CI, C/FI-2

ACTION NO. 575

S E C R E T 182126Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5851 (NEBECKER ACTING)

PRIORITY OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

18 Nov 69 IN 88277

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REF: WH/MIAMI 5848 (IN 88208)

1. AMCHALK-5 HAS CONFIRMED RESERVATIONS TO STAY AT MOTOR HOTEL 5900 DECARIE. RESERVATIONS NOT AVAILABLE AT CAPRI HOTEL. AMCHALK-5 DEPARTING MIAMI VIA AIR CANADA 1335 HOURS 23 NOVEMBER, ARRIVING TORONTO 1630 HOURS. WILL STAY KING EDWARD HOTEL AND PROCEED MONTREAL 24 NOVEMBER ARRIVING AT 1515 HOURS. WILL PROCEED DIRECTLY TO PLAZA MOTOR HOTEL AND WAIT FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT FOLLOWING MORNING.

2. MEETING ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN NEBECKER AND AMCHALK-5 WILL BE FINALIZED PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE.

3. FILE: 19-136-1/3; 201-307337; 14-2-12.

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH (D)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED

BY: M AT: 2205 Z

DISSEM BY: 28 PER ____ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR C/CI/SD, CS/DO,

ACTION NO. 547

SECRET 182126Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5852 (NEBECKER ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

18 Nov 69 IN 88272
M

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

REF: DIRECTOR 54911

1. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED NEBECKER TRAVELING AS LLOYD MARTIN STANTON ON DOCUMENTATION ISSUED BY HEADQUARTERS PREVIOUSLY. SAME DOCUMENTATION HAS BEEN USED FOR TRAVEL TO BAHAMAS. WILL BE CARRYING ILLINOIS DRIVER'S LICENSE, ILLINOIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND INTERNATIONAL CERTIFICATE OF VACCINATION PLUS POCKET LITTER.

2. FILE: 19-136-1/3, 201-307337.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 7

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

DISSEM BY 30 PER ____ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

FILE, VR C/RI/SD C/EUR 5 C/CI C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 550

S E C R E T 181929Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5848 (NEBECKER ACTING)

PRIORITY OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REF: OTTAWA 6716 (IN 87494)

18 Nov 69 IN 88208

m

1. FOLLOWING MAY BE PASSED TO SMABOVE. AMCHALK-5 INSTRUCTED BY DGI TO STAY IN EITHER CAPRI HOTEL, 6445 DECARIE, OR LE DECARIE PLAZA MOTOR HOTEL, 5900 DECARIE. HE IS TO AWAIT A CALL FROM DGI REP. DGI STATED WILL INITIATE CALLS AT 0700 OR 1400. THEY ALSO STATED "AS YOU KNOW IN THESE CASES IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES IN THE EVENT THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO MEET YOU EXACTLY THE DAY SPECIFIED." THEY PROPOSED A MEETING ON 25 NOVEMBER BUT STATED THE CONTACT MAY BE MADE ON SUCEEDING DAYS, BUT NO LATER THAN 28 NOVEMBER.

2. AMCHALK-5 IS ARRANGING RESERVATIONS AT BOTH THE AFOREMENTIONED HOTELS BUT PLANS TO STAY AT MOTOR HOTEL. UPON OUR INSTRUCTIONS HE ARRANGING TO FLY FROM MIAMI TO EITHER OTTAWA OR TORONTO ON 23 NOVEMBER; OVERNIGHT, THEN CONTINUE ON TO MONTREAL ON 24 NOVEMBER. WE WILL ADVISE PRIORITY AS SOON AS RESERVATIONS FIRM.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY: ________ PER ________ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 5848 SECRET

3. NEBEKCER UNDER ALIAS STANTON HAS CONFIRMED RESERVATIONS AT CHATEAU-CHAMPLAIN HOTEL 25-28 NOVEMBER. TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS REMAIN AS STATED IN WH/MIAMI-5832. WILL CONTACT NOLTHAM AS INSTRUCTED ON 25 NOVEMBER. (IN 87339)

4. FILE: 19-136-1/3; 201-307337; 14-2-12.

SECRET

ORIG: Glenn Brown:bjs
UNIT: C/WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1823 R1163
DATE: 18 NOVEMBER 1969

S E C R [illegible]

12

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

Yrutz

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 24 PER ______

CONF: C/WH-8 | FILE, VR. C/RI/SD, C/CI

B

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

16 19 53Z NOV 69

CITE DIRECTOR 54011

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

REF: WH/MIAMI 5827 (IN 87155)

1. PLS ADVISE WITH WHAT TYPE DOCUMENTATION NEBECKER PLANS TRAVEL.

2. FILE: 19-136-1/3, 201-307337.

END OF MESSAGE

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: JOHN MERTZ:nk
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 5061 R. 1255
DATE: 18 NOVEMBER 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 35/ PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 8
FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

10 21 17z Nov 69

CITE DIRECTOR 54949

TO PRIORITY OTTAWA, WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REF: OTTAWA 6714 (IN 87376)

1. POUCHING ONLY PHOTO ARAOZ AVAILABLE HQS. PHOTO TAKEN JUNE 1967 AT TIME FIRST DGI/AMCHALK-5 MEETING. ALSO INCLUDED IS IDENTITY KIT COMPOSITE MADE BY AMCHALK-5.

2. AS PHOTO IS SIDE VIEW OF POOR QUALITY SUGGEST NEBECKER CARRY OTTAWA ANY OTHER ADDITIONAL PHOTOS AVAILABLE MIAMI.

3. PHOTO WILL ARRIVE OTTAWA 21 NOV ABOUT 2100 HOURS UNDER TM NO. 390875.

4. FILE 201-840126, 201-307337, 19-136-1/3, 14-2-12.

END OF MESSAGE

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

~~JOHN SHERWOOD~~
~~C/EUR-FI/CI~~
EURBC

E/BC/C

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

RETARIAT DISSEMINATION
T NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 25

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1	→ 5	5
2		6
3		7
4		8

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: 8 AT: 1905

DISSEM BY 7 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT:

INFO: FILE, VR c/ri/sd c/eur 5 c/ci c/fi 2 c/ci/ic

ACTION NO. 387 DDP ADDP C/TSD 3

S E C R E T 171830Z NOV 69 CITE OTTAWA 6714

17 Nov 69 IN 87376

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REF A. OTTAWA 6712 (IN 86290)

B. DIRECTOR 53109

1. PER SMABOVE EDUARDO ARAOZ EIRIN TRAVELED TORONTO TO OTTAWA ON 15 NOVEMBER. HAS NOT AS YET CONTACTED PBRUMEN EMBASSY.

2. SMABOVE REQUESTS PHOTO OF ARAOZ. CAN HQS POUCH PRIORITY. IF NOT SUGGEST NEBECKER HAND CARRY IF COPY OF PHOTO IN MIAMI.

3. FILE: 19-136-1/3, 201-307337, 201-840126, 14-2-12.

S E C R E T

RID/D&P
outgoing
mr. Sucy
5065

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT:

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR C/EUR 5, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 446

S E C R E T 172155Z NOV 69 CITE OTTAWA 6716

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

17 Nov 69 IN 87494

m

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REF A. WH/MIAMI 5832 (IN 27339)

B. WH/MIAMI 5683 (IN 77898)

1. AS NEBECKER NOT ARRIVING MONTREAL UNTIL 25 NOVEMBER, WISH PROVIDE SMABOVE WITH NECESSARY DETAILS OF AMCHALK/DGI MEETING ARRANGEMENTS PER REF B. SMABOVE NEEDS THIS ADVANCE NOTICE OF DATES AND TIMES OF DGI CONTACT WITH AMCHALK-5 IN ORDER SCHEDULE USE THEIR ASSETS IN MONTREAL AREA. THEY HAVE ONLY LIMITED RESOURCES AND CAN NOT PULL THEM OFF OTHER TARGETS ON QUICK NOTICE. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.

2. NEBECKER SHOULD TELEPHONE NOLTHAM (IDEN) AT QUEEN ELISABETH HOTEL IN MONTREAL. NOLTHAM WILL HANDLE INTRODUCTION OF NEBECKER TO SMABOVE.

3. FILE: 19-136-1/3; 201-307-337; 14-2-12.

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1	DI	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR C/EUR 5, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2,

ACTION NO. 445

SECRET 172155Z NOV 69 CITE OTTAWA 6717

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

17 Nov 69 IN 87495

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REF OTTAWA 6716 (IN 87494

IDEN: MR BRYAN MILLS, OTTAWA STATION OFFICER.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

CAB. SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION NO. 410

INFO FILE, VR C/WH/SD C/EUR 5 C/CI C/FI 2

17 Nov 69 IN 87339

S E C R E T 171717Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5832 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, OTTAWA

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REF: WH/MIAMI 5827 (IN 87155)

1. NEBECKER TRAVELING IN ALIAS LLOYD MARTIN STANTON VIA AIR CANADA FLIGHT 603 ON 25 NOVEMBER, ETA 1535. NO OBJECTION TO STATION OTTAWA INFORMING SMABOVE OF ALIAS. WILL ADVISE HOTEL WHEN KNOWN. PLEASE PROVIDE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

2. FILE: 19-136-1/3, 201-307337.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM ... CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: 8 AT: 1455 Z

DISSEM BY: 4 PER ____ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT: C/WH8, INFO: FILE, VR C/RI/SO, C/EVRS, C/CI, C/FI

ACTION NO. 346

SECRET 171404Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5827 (NEBECKER ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO OTTAWA

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

17 NOV 69 IN 67155

REF: DIRECTOR 54049

1. VISIT OF SMENCASE, JMZEBU-1 AND SMBUTTON FROM LONDON TO WH/MIAMI ON NIGHT 24 NOVEMBER PRECLUDES OPPORTUNITY TO TRAVEL BY RAIL AS SUGGESTED REF. EARLIEST AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY TO TRAVEL WILL BE VIA AIR CANADA DIRECT FLIGHT MIAMI TO MONTREAL 25 NOVEMBER. WILL ADVISE DETAILS AS SOON AS TRAVEL RESERVATIONS CONFIRMED.

2. WILL RETURN MIAMI VIA HQS. IN ORDER MAKE FIRM PLANS PLEASE ADVISE WHEN WH/MIAMI REPS NEBECKER AND SADELLY TO BE MEETING WITH JAGUAR REPS AT HQS. LITTLE SENSE FOR NEBECKER TO RETURN MIAMI IF MEETING WITH JAGUAR REPS TO TAKE PLACE FIRST WEEK IN DECEMBER.

3. FILE: 19-136-1/3, 201-307337.

SECRET

FORM 1520 USI MFG. 4-69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

WH

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

WL

S E C R E T 171408Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5827 (NEBECKER ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO OTTAWA

TYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE 17 Nov 69 IN 87155

REF: DIRECTOR 54849

1. VISIT OF SMENCASE, JMZEBU-1 AND SMPUTTON FROM LONDON TO WH/MIAMI ON NIGHT 24 NOVEMBER PRECLUDES OPPORTUNITY TO TRAVEL BY RAIL AS SUGGESTED REF. EARLIEST AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY TO TRAVEL WILL BE VIA AIR CANADA DIRECT FLIGHT MIAMI TO MONTREAL 25 NOVEMBER. WILL ADVISE DETAILS AS SOON AS TRAVEL RESERVATIONS CONFIRMED.

2. WILL RETURN MIAMI VIA HQS. IN ORDER MAKE FIRM PLANS PLEASE ADVISE WHEN WH/MIAMI REPS NEBECKER AND SADELLY TO BE MEETING WITH JAGUAR SMOTH? REPS AT HQS. LITTLE SENSE FOR NEBECKER TO RETURN MIAMI IF MEETING WITH JAGUAR REPS TO TAKE PLACE FIRST WEEK IN DECEMBER.

3. FILE: 19-136-1/3. 201-327537.

SECRET

Does not have backstopped alias documentation. He was
specifically excluded! He may have non-backstopped
alias docs.
Central Cover does not have copy of this.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 9

42

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 50 PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN EUR6 FI2 CI CI/OPS EI/IC2 CAS CA/PROP

ACTION NO. 287

S E C R E T 142100Z NOV 69 CITE OTTAWA 6713 (0170)

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

14 Nov 69 IN 86341

TYPIC SMABOVE AMROSE AMSPAWN AMCHALK

2P

REF WH/MIAMI 5748 (IN 81991)

1. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE AMCHALK/5 MEETING WITH DGI OFFICERS IN MONTREAL, AS OUTLINED IN REF, ARE WORTHY AND CERTAINLY WARRANT THE OPERATION. WOULD, HOWEVER, LIKE POINT OUT ANOTHER OPTION THAT APPEARS OPERATIONALLY WORTHWHILE. SUGGEST HQS AND WH/MIAMI CONSIDER WITH KNOWLEDGE OTTAWA NOT IN POSSESSION ALL FACTS OF CASE AND CAN NOT DETERMINE USEFULNESS THIS SUGGESTION TO OVERALL PBRUMEN PROGRAM.

2. BELIEVE STAGE SET FOR GOC TO PNG A PBRUMEN OFFICER IN MONTREAL. THIS APPARENT FROM STATEMENTS ALLUDING TO CUBAN SUPPORT OF SUBVERSIVES AND MILITANT SEPARATISTS IN QUEBEC BY HIGH GOC OFFICIALS AND IN FACT BY CHIEF/SMABOVE HIMSELF. THESE STATEMENTS WERE CARRIED IN PRESS AS APPARENT ATTEMPT BY GOC TO THROW BLAME FROM MONTREAL RIOTS ON OUTSIDE INFLUENCES. WE BELIEVE THAT SMABET WOULD AGREE USE AMCHALK/5 MEETING AS REASON FOR PNG ACTION AND GIVE IT HIGH DEGREE PUBLICITY. UNTIL MORE EXPLORATION DONE, WE COULD NOT SAY HOW MUCH

MICROFILMED
DEC 4 - 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

WH/FF

CS COPY

SECRET

D-19-126-62

14 Nov 69

201-307337

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

~~NOV 24 | 02 PM '6~~

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: RID/EDI

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 OTTAWA 6713 SECRET

AMCHALK/5 WOULD FIGURE IN PUBLICITY; WOULD ENVISION, HOWEVER, PUBLICIZING DETAILS ARAOZ TRIP CANADA UNDER CUBAN MFA COVER TO PURCHASE BOOKS, HIS PHOTO, ETC.

3. FROM OTTAWA STANDPOINT THIS WOULD NOT CAUSE GREAT LOSS OF OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGE. SMABOVE IS NOT OPERATING AGGRESSIVELY AGAINST DGI TARGET AND DOES NOT INTEND INCREASE THEIR COVERAGE. THEY HAVE SOURCE IN CONTACT AMDOCILE/1 BUT ARE NOT OBTAINING MUCH OPERATIONAL INFORMATION OF VALUE TO SUPPORT A LATER APPROACH TO HIM.

4. WE CAN NOT, OF COURSE, COMPARE OBVIOUS PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE OF PNG ACTION TO LOSS OF POTENTIAL GAIN FROM CONTINUED CONTACT BETWEEN AMCHALK/5 AND DGI. BUT, AS MENTIONED BEFORE, THE OPTION EXISTS.

5. FILE * 19-50-6'3, 201-307337.

SECRET

* BEING SERVICED.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 5   ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)   GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD C/EUR 5 C/FI 2 C/TSD 3 C/CI C/CI/TC

ACTION NO. 269

DDP ADDP

S E C R E T 141830Z NOV 69 CITE OTTAWA 6712   14 Nov 69 IN 26290

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT AMROSE AMCHALK SMABOVE

REF WH/MIAMI 5784 (484581)

1. IN LINE WITH REF WE ASKED SMABOVE TO HOLD BACK PREPARATIONS FOR AUDIO AND VISUAL SURVEILLANCE UNTIL MORE FACTS OF OPERATION KNOWN. THEY AGREE AND WILL COVER DGI IN MONTREAL ONLY WITH TELEPHONE TAP UNTIL JOINT DECISION MADE USE AUDIO OR OTHER MEANS SURVEILLANCE.

2. PER SMABOVE, ARAOZ WILL ARRIVE TORONTO 14 NOVEMBER WITH 21 DAY VISA.

3. SEE NO OBJECTION NEBECKER TRAVEL MONTREAL IN ALIAS.

4. FILE: 19-136-1/3; 201-307337.

S E C R E T

14-00000

24

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG: J. MERTZ:bly
NIT: WH/COG/OPS
XT: 1255
ATE: 13 November 1969

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-136-1/3, 201-307337, 14-2-12.

ONF: C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. [illegible], C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 54049

WH/MIAMI INFO OTTAWA 17 17z Nov 69

Mertz

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK SMABOVE

REFERENCE: A. WH/MIAMI 5784 (IN 84581)

B. OTTAWA 6702 (IN 84561)

1. APPROVAL GRANTED FOR TRAVEL JOEL N. NEBECKER (IDEN) TO MONTREAL PER REFS. SUGGEST ~~MAY BE DESIRABLE FOR~~ OTTAWA STATION OFFICER BE ON HAND MONTREAL ALSO.

2. PLEASE ADVISE NEBECKER'S MODE OF TRAVEL, HIS ALIAS, AND WHERE STAYING FOR CONTACT BY OTTAWA STATION REPRESENTATIVE. PREFER NEBECKER TRAVEL BY RAIL AS FAR AS WASHINGTON.

3. FILE: 19-136-1/3, 201-307337, 14-2-12.

END OF MESSAGE

John R. HORTON
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

EURBC
WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

James E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

2

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: J. MERTZ:bly
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 13 November 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 2 PER _____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-136-1/3, 201-307337, 14-2-12.

CONF: c/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, c/CI/SO, c/EUR 5, c/CI, c/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 14 17 07Z NOV 69 CITE DIRECTOR 54050

TO ~~MIAMI INFO~~ OTTAWA

RYBAT TYPIC ANCHALK SMABOVE

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 54048

IDEN - LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD, DCOS WH/MIAMI.

END OF MESSAGE

EURBC ✓

WH/FI

John R. HORTON
AC/WHD

James E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
WH
BY: dl AT: 2025 Z
DISSEM BY: 28 PER ____ #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.
X-REF TO CS FILE NO.
☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT: C/WH/5
INFO: FILE, VR C/FI/SD, C/EUR5, C/CI, C/FI2, DDP ADDP
ACTION NO. 007

SECRET 121930Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5784

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, OTTAWA

RYBAT AMROSE AMCHALK SMABOVE

REF WH/MIAMI 5742 (IN 81927)

12 Nov 69 IN 84581

1. MEETING HELD BY NEBECKER WITH AMCHALK-5 ON 12 NOVEMBER TO REVIEW AND LAY PLANS FOR OPERATION OF REF. AMCHALK-5 EAGER TO UNDERTAKE EFFORT TO EITHER (A) MAKE SELF ATTRACTIVE TO DGI FOR DOUBLE AGENT PURPOSES OR (B) PARTICIPATE IN POSSIBLE OPERATIONS FOR RECRUITMENT AND DEFECTION OF DGI PERSONNEL DEPENDENT UPON HOW MEETINGS GO IN MONTREAL.

2. FOLLOWING IS EXPLANATION WHICH AMCHALK-5 WILL PROVIDE DGI OFFICER AS EXCUSE FOR REINITIATION OF CONTACT, I.E. THAT HE TOTALLY DISILLUSIONED WITH ACTIONS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT VIS-A-VIS CUBA, THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AS IS WELL KNOWN IN THE MIAMI AREA, HAS TERMINATED ALL OF ITS MILITANT ACTION CAPABILITY AGAINST CUBA, AND THAT HE HIMSELF HAS BEEN DEFINITIVELY TERMINATED. THIS WILL BE MOST PLAUSIBLE TO DGI SINCE THEY UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE OF TALK IN EXILE COMMUNITY OF MASS TERMINATIONS. AMCHALK-5 WILL THEN EXPLAIN THAT SINCE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE COUNTED ON FOR ANYTHING HE HAS TAKEN IT UPON HIMSELF

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 5784 SECRET

TO ATTEMPT BECAUSE OF REASONS OF CONSCIENCE TO HELP GET RELEASED HIS COLLEAGUES AND FRIENDS WHO ARE CURRENTLY IN PRISON IN CUBA AND THAT HE IS WILLING TO COOPERATE WITHIN LIMITS TO DO THIS AND THUS HE HAS REQUESTED DISCUSSIONS WITH DGI. THIS IS A MOST PLAUSIBLE STORY SINCE DISILLUSIONMENT IS COMMON AMONG FORMER MILITANT EMPLOYEES OF RVROCK. WE PRESUME THAT THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WILL BE THAT THE DGI OFFICER MEETING AMCHALK-5 WILL THEN CONVEY THIS MESSAGE TO HIS HEADQUARTERS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF DGI PAST RELATIONS WITH AMCHALK-5, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO CONCRETELY TASK HIM AND HE MAY HAVE TO MAKE DECISIONS WHILE IN MONTREAL, THUS BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT A WH/MIAMI OFFICER BE PRESENT IN MONTREAL TO COVER THIS CONTINGENCY.

3. AMCHALK-5 HAS CONFIRMED TO HAVANA MONTREAL MEETING AND HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE RESERVATIONS FOR TRAVEL TO MONTREAL AND RESERVATIONS AT HOTEL DESIGNATED BY DGI. THIS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TRIGGER PREPARATION ON PART DGI FOR MEETING WITH AMCHALK-5. TRAVEL WILL BE BY AIR CANADA OR TRAIN.

4. NEBECKER WHO INTRODUCED TO AMCHALK-5 IN ALIAS AS HQS REP IS PREPARED TO TRAVEL TO MONTREAL ON 25 NOVEMBER FOR

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 WH/MIAMI 5784 SECRET

MEETINGS WITH SMABOVE IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN INNUENDOES OF OPERATION AND ARRANGE FOR ANY MEETINGS NECESSARY WITH AMCHALK-5. BELIEVE IT BEST TO NOT GIVE SMABOVES ANY MORE THAN BROAD OUTLINE OF OBJECTIVES OF OP UNTIL THAT TIME SINCE CIRCUMSTANCES MAY CHANGE IN INTERIM PERIOD. IN ADDITION, DO NOT BELIEVE IT ADVISABLE THAT SMABOVES TAKE ANY PREPARATORY ACTION OF TECHNICAL OR OTHER NATURE SINCE DGI HAS OBVIOUSLY CHOSEN MEETING SITE ON BASIS OF THEIR OWN SECURE KNOWLEDGE OF AREA.

5. REQUEST APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL IN ALIAS OF NEBECKER TO MONTREAL ON 25 THRU 28 NOVEMBER.

6. FILE: 19-136-1/3, 201-307337.

SECRET

BT

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIC
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIE 6

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

Mertz

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR C/EUR5, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI2, C/CI/TC, C/TSD3, ADDP, DDP, CS/DO

ACTION NO. 032

S E C R E T 121900Z NOV 69 CITE OTTAWA 6702
OTTA

WH/C/OP

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

REFS A. WH/MIAMI 5683 (IN 77898) 2P 12 Nov 69 IN 64561

B. DIRECTOR 53109

1. SMABOVE INFORMED ALONG LINES REF B AND ARE WILLING/ COOPERATE. THEY ARE CHECKING ALL SOURCES TO DETERMINE TIMING/ OF ARAOZ ARRIVAL. THEY PLANNING PLACE MAXIMUM COVERAGE ARAOZ AND OTHER DGI OFFICERS WITH BOTH VISUAL AND IF POSSIBLE AUDIO. SMABOVE ALSO WISHES COVER AMCHALK/5 HOTEL ROOM WITH AUDIO. FOR THIS REASON WISH PASS THEM GIST OF MEETING PLAN IN MONTREAL PER REF A.

MICROFILMED
DEC 01 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2. SMABOVE SUGGESTS IT MAY BE GOOD HAVE WH/MIAMI CASE OFFICER IN MONTREAL DURING CRITICAL TIME TO ASSURE EMERGENCY CONTACT WITH AMCHALK/5 IF NEED ARISES. IF WH/MIAMI CANNOT SEND OFFICER, OTTAWA CASE OFFICER CAN BE ON HAND TO HANDLE.

3. SUGGEST AMCHALK/5 MAKE RESERVATIONS AT BOTH HOTELS MENTIONED IN HIS MEETING INSTRUCTIONS ASAP. DIRECT DIAL TELEPHONE IS BEST WAY. FOR SEAWAY CAPRI HOTEL, DIA 514-739-2771 AND FOR DECARIE PLAZA HOTEL DIAL 514-735-6333. ADDRESSES

CS COPY 12 Nov 69

D, 19-136-1/3 SECRET 201-307337

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 OTTAWA 6702 SECRET

IN REF A ARE CORRECT. SMCHALK/5 SHOULD HOLD RESERVATIONS IN BOTH HOTELS UNTIL SMABOVE DETERMINES WHICH ONE MOST SUITABLE FOR THEM.

4. FILE 201-307337 AND 19-136-1/3.

SECRET

SECRET

ORIG: J. MERTZ:mamd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 7 NOV 69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: C/WH 8
INFO FILE, VR, C/CI/SA, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CI/TC, C/TSD 3, DDP, ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 10 17 57Z NOV 69 CITE DIRECTOR

TO WH/MIAMI OTTAWA

3P

RYBAT TYPIC SMABOVE AMCHALK

53109

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI-5683 (IN 77898) (BEING RELAYED OTTAWA)

B. OTTAWA-6633 (IN 68990)

MICROFILMED
NOV 25 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

WH/C/CP
index

1. CONCUR REF A PROPOSAL.

2. REQUEST OTTAWA STATION CONTACT SMABOVES IN ORDER OBTAIN PERMISSION AND SECURE COOPERATION. WOULD APPRECIATE BOTH VISUAL AND AUDIO SURVEILLANCE IF POSSIBLE. FOLLOWING BACKGROUND INFO FOR PASSAGE TO SMABOVES:

A. AMCHALK-5 (IDEN B) IS TRUSTED LONG-TIME RYROCK ASSET WHO INVOLVED IN VARIOUS OPERATIONS IN CUBA 1961-68. MAY 67 AMCHALK-5 COUSIN ARRIVED MIAMI VIA AIRLIFT WITH MESSAGE FROM MANUEL PINEIRO, DGI CHIEF. MESSAGE REQUESTED MEETING CANADA OR SPAIN WHERE CUBANS AND AMCHALK-5 COULD EXCHANGE OPINIONS. MESSAGE CARRIED IMPLIED THREAT AS IT MENTIONED AMCHALK-5 RELATIVES WHO ARRESTED AND PROOF AGAINST OTHERS ON WHOM GOC HAD NOT ACTED. JUNE 67 AMCHALK-5 MET TWO DGI OFFICERS IN MADRID. CUBANS

CS COPY

CONTINUED

10 Nov 69
201-307337

D. 14-2-12
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

HO:
NIT:
T:
ATE:

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 53109

IDENTIFIED SELVES AS DIRECTLY REPRESENTING PINEIRO AND ATTEMPTED RECRUIT AMCHALK-5. HE TURNED PITCH DOWN AND MEETING CONCLUDED WITH NO INDICATION OF FOLLOW UP. AMCHALK-5 HOWEVER RECEIVED ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FROM CUBANS TO RENEW CONTACT IF DESIRED.

B. TWO DGI OFFICERS WITH WHOM AMCHALK-5 MET IDENTIFIED AS PEDRO LUIS PINERO EIRIN (201-824376) CUBAN UN THIRD SECRETARY AND EDUARDO ARAOZ AGERO (201-840126) SUBJECT REF B. AT MEETING WITH AMCHALK-5 ARAOZ IDENTIFIED SELF AS "GUILLERMO" AND CONDUCTED ENTIRE MEETING WHILE PINERO CONDUCTED DISCREET CHECK FOR LISTENING DEVICES. AS POINTED OUT REF B, ARAOZ PLANS TRAVEL CANADA 13 NOV FOR TWO WEEK STAY.

C. FROM INFO PROVIDED BY RECENT DEFECTOR, AMBEDEW-1, IT EVIDENT CUBANS KNEW AT TIME CONTACT INITIATED AMCHALK-5 RVROCK AGENT.

D. CONTACT HAS BEEN REINITIATED UNDER DIRECTION RVROCK IN EFFORT TO EXPOSE DGI OPERATIVES AND MO IN WH AREA. THUS AMCHALK-5 LETTER REQUESTED MEETING IN WH AREA, BUT AS CUBANS

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

RIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET PAGE 3 CITE DIRECTOR 53109

WANT MEETING IN CANADA FEEL WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO AGREE.

3. FILE 201-307337, 14-2-12.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG

C/EUR/BC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: J. MERTZ:mamd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 7 NOV 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, C/CI/SA, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CI/IC, C/TSD 3, DDP, ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 10 17 57Z NOV 69 CITE DIRECTOR 53110

TO OTTAWA

RYBAT TYPIC SMABOVE AMCHALK

REF: DIRECTOR 53109

AN 52
PS 2
ABSTRACT
WH/C/OC
INDEX

MICROFILMED
NOV 25 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IDEN: MIGUEL ISALGUE DIAZ.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/EUR/BC

CS COPY

10 Nov 69
201-307337

D, 14-2-12

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIO'
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIE' 21

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUT NO AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

WH

BY: C AT: 1435 Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER ____ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

PRECEDENCE

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR C/R/SD DDP ADDP C/CI C/FI 2 C/EUR 5

ACTION NO. 671

SECRET 071356Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5742

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT AMROSE AMCHALK

REF: WH/MIAMI 5683 (IN 77898)

MICROFILMED
NOV 14 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

7 Nov 69 IN 81927

1. AFTER DISCUSSION REF CASE WITH RAGALIE, STATION CONTINUES TO FEEL WE SHOULD PROCEED WITH CASE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. BELIEVE FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD JEOPARDIZE VIABILITY AND LONG RANGE PROSPECTS. SEE NO NEED TO INFORM SMABOVES ON AMGHOST ASPECTS SINCE AMCHALK-5 UNAWARE RESULT HIS PAST EFFORTS AND FACT COMMO ESTABLISHED WITH AMGHOST. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD INFORM SMABOVES THAT AMCHALK-5 HAS HAD PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH DGI AND HIS GENERAL BACKGROUND. NO OBJECTIONS TO DETAILING ORIGINAL DGI APPROACH MADE MAY 67 BUT OP DORMANT SINCE MEETING IN SPAIN (MADRID 1832 (IN 96929) DTD 23 JUNE 67 AND JMWAVE 6942 (IN 83986) DTD 22 MAY 1967).

2. PLAN HAVE AMCHALK-5 SEND AFFIRMATIVE MESSAGE WHETHER HE MAKE MEET OR NOT. IF RVROCK BOGS DOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SMABOVES BELIEVE EASIER RETRIEVE OP BY ANOTHER AMCHALK-5 MESSAGE PROVIDING ADEQUATE EXCUSE AND REQUEST FOR NEW MEETING DATE. BELIEVE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE EXCUSE FOR NOT SENDING RESPONSE TO LETTER. LACK OF RESPONSE MERELY SIGNALS DGI THAT OP SUBJECT TO BUREAUCRATIC

7/20069

CS COPY

SECRET

201-307337

D, 19-136-1/3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ____

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 5742 S E C R E T

HANDLING BY SOME WOLADY ORGANIZATION.

3. LAST ALTERNATIVE IS TRY FORCE MEETING IN ANOTHER COUNTRY WHICH AT THIS POINT NOT LIKELY TO BE FRUITFUL.

4. FILE: 201-307337.

SECRET

SECRET

RIG: J. MERTZ:mamd
NIT: WH/COG/OPS
XT: 1255
ATE: 7 NOV 69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 0

SECRET

079 15

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y 15 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. C/EUR 5

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR [illegible]

TO CABLE SECRETARIAT

PLS RELAY WH/MIAMI-5683 (IN 77898) TO OTTAWA FOR INFO.

CY CABLE ATTACHED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG

C/EUR/BC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

Page 1 of 3

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 2 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT
C/WH 8

INFO

FILE, VR, C/CI/SA, DDP, ADDP, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/DO 4

ACTION NO.
165

S E C R E T 01135Z NOV 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5683

DIRECTOR

WMIAMI

1 NOV 69 IN 77898

WH/C/OP 3P

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

1. IN COURSE STATION CONTINUING EFFORT UNCOVER LOCAL CENTER DGI OPS, AMCHALK-5 SENT LETTER TO HABANA ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS GIVEN HIM AT OUTSET AMSTALK OPERATION. THAT LETTER MAILED APPROXIMATELY SIX WEEKS AGO.

2. FOLLOWING REPLY, MAILED FROM BRONX, NEW YORK 30 OCTOBER, RECEIVED BY AMCHALK-5 ON 31 OCTOBER:

MICROFILMED
NOV 13 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

"MIGUEL

"RECIBIMOS TU CARTA DONDE EXPRESAS TUS DESEOS DE VOLVER A ENCON GRARNOS PROXIMAMENTE.

"ACEPTAMOS TU PROPOSICION PARA VERNOS EN CANADA Y TE PROPONEMOS ENCONTRARNOS EN FECHA 25 DE NOVIEMBRE PROXIMO EN MONTREAL. HOSPEDATE EN CUALQUIERA DE ESTOS DOS HOTELES, CAPRI HOTEL, SITO EN 6445, DECA RIE, O EN: LE DECARIE PLAZA MOTOR HOTEL, SITO EN 5900, DECARIE. ALLI ESPERA UNA LLAMADA NUESTRA; PARA FACILITARTE TUS MOVIMIENTOS LA COMUNICACION LZA HAREMOS A LAS 7 A.M. O A LAS 2 P.M. COMO TU CONOCES, EN ESTOS CASOS HAY QUE TOMAR CIERTAS MEDIDAS QUE PUEDAN HACER QUE NOS VEAMOS IMPOSIBILITADOS DE ASISTIR EXACTAMENTE

D 19-136-1/3

SECRET

COPY

17 Nov 69

201-307337

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 5683 S E C R E T

EL DIA SENALADO, POR LO QUE PUDIERA SER EN LOS DIAS SUCESIVOS, PONIENDO COMO FECHA LIMITE EL 28 DE NOVIEMBRE.

"RESPONDE POR CABLE A LA DIRECCION SIGUIENTE: RAMONA HERRERA GIL, AVE 45, NO. 11096, APTO 4, E/110 Y 112, MARIANO, 15 CON UN TEXTO CONVENCIONAL SI ESTAS DE ACUERDO CON LA FECHA. EL CABLE DIRA: FELICIDADES, Y LO FIRMA ENRIQUE SI ESTAS CONFORME. O FELICIDADES Y LO FIRMA CARLOS SI HAY DIFICULTADES; EN ESTE CASO ESCRIBENOS DANDONOS TUS OPINIONES. REPITO: ENRIQUE QUIERE DECIR SI, CARLOS QUIERE DECIR QUE NO ESTAS DE ACUERDO.

"SALUDOS:

"ALBERTO".

3. TRANSLATION:

MIGUEL. WE HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER WHEREIN YOU EXPRESS YOUR DESIRE TO MEET WITH US IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ACCEPT YOUR PROPOSITION TO SEE US IN CANADA AND WE PROPOSE A MEETING ON 25 NOVEMBER NEXT IN MONTREAL. STAY IN EITHER ONE OF THESE HOTELS: CAPRI HOTEL, 6445 DECARIE, OR LE DECARIE PLAZA MOTOR HOTEL, 5900 DECARIE. THERE WAIT FOR A CALL FROM US. NOT TO TIE YOU DOWN WE WILL INITIATE OUR CALL AT 0700 OR 1400 HOURS. AS YOU KNOW IN THESE CASES IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES IN EVENT THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE

PAGE 3 WH/MIAMI 5683 S E C R E T

FOR US TO MEET YOU ON EXACTLY THE DAY SPECIFIED. HENCE, THE CONTACT MAY BE MADE ON SUCCEEDING DAYS BUT NO LATER THAN 26 NOVEMBER. REPLY BY CABLE TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS: RAMON HERRERA GIL, AVE 45, NO. 11006, APTO 4, E/110 Y 112, MARIANO, 15, WITH A CONVENTIONAL TEXT IF YOU ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE INDICATED MEETING DATE. THE CABLE SHOULD SAY CONGRATULATIONS AND BE SIGNED ENRIQUE IF YOU CAN MAKE IT; IF THERE ARE DIFFICULTIES, IT SHOULD BE SIGNED CARLOS. IN THE LATTER CASE, WRITE US GIVING YOUR THOUGHTS. REPEAT: ENRIQUE MEANS YES, CARLOS MEANS YOU ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. ALBERTO.

4. PROVIDING HQS CONCURS, STATION PROPOSES TO HAVE AMCHALK-5 MAKE MEET. ASSUME SMABOVES WOULD HAVE TO BE CUT IN. IN ORIGINAL LETTER JAMAICA OR MEXICO WERE THE PROPOSED MEETING SITES. UNDOUBTEDLY CUBANS PLAN TO USE DIPLOMAT IN CANADA OR FROM U.N.

5. FILE: 201-307337; X REF 19-136-1/3.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING MICROFILM

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;
Chief of Station, Madrid

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT Serafin PINEIRO Losada, aka "Fifo"
Transmittal of Correspondence

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached for the information of addressees are copies of a letter purportedly written by Serafin Pineiro Losada to Argelio Martinez del Toro, former mayor of Matanzas now resident in Miami. The original letter has been returned to AMCHALK-5. Most of the letter seems devoted to complaint that Serafin has been unjustly accused of being a member of the G-2. Of interest is the writer's reference to the death of "Pepito" (probably Jose Pineiro Losada, 201-735948) some three years ago.

Frederick C. BRADSPIES

Attachment:
Letter

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD w/att h/w
3 - COS, Madrid w/att h/w

OCT 2 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAA-1339	30 September 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-823664

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK

DATE 9 Sept 69

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME Daryl Geisler

OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/COG/OPS

ROOM, BUILDING 3D38

EXTENSION R1819

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)

☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED

☐ ADDITIONAL DATA

☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)

☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY

☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)

Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue (201-307337)

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

14 February 1937, Matanzas, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP

Cuba

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Miami, Florida

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Previous Green List Requested in March 1968		

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(9)

SECRET

4-00000

SECRET

TO: D. Giesler

11 Sept 69
DATE

FROM: F1/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN F1/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, F1/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

178 D. ☒ F1/D HAS NO ~~[illegible]~~ INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. except * IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

*Previous green list 6 Mar 68, NO RECORD

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO F1/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO F1/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP F1/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: F1/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

	FILE S	ARBITRARY NUMBER	INPUT NUMBER	NSP INPUT FORM
	FIELD 1	2	3	4
A	CHECK CHARACTERS	SUBJECT'S FILE NO. 201- 307337		
B	PSEUDONYM/CRYPTONYM AMCHALK/5	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE INITIAL	T
C	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	DOB DAY MO YR 14 Feb 37	CITIZENSHIP Cuban	SEX (M OR F) M
D	COUNTRY CURRENTLY RESIDES USA	CITY CURRENTLY RESIDES Miami	MARITAL STATUS Married	
E	OVERT OCCUPATION Consultant	LANGUAGE Spanish RWS	LANGUAGE English RWS	LANGUAGE
F	INTEL FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED PM, Training			CODE PM OTR
G	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL ~~Yes~~ CA	POA	MOC/MOA/CONTRACT MOC	POLYGRAPH-YR ~~Yes~~ PG
H	HOS DIVISION RESPONSIBLE WH	DESK RESPONSIBLE Cuba	FIELD STATION RESPONSIBLE WMIM	LOCATION USA
J	ENTRY ON DUTY DATE 15 Apr 68	YEARLY COS. $9600	RETIREMENT PLAN USSS ~~Social Security~~	PROJECT AMCHALK
K	DATE TERMINATED	REEMPLOYABLE		
L	REMARKS			

FORM 2-60 275!h SUPERSEDES FORM 2457 (4-65)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(0-22-91)

5. AMCHALK-5 may also be terminated within this fiscal year. He has managed to develop a successful, full-time business and is only slightly involved in operational activity. We are holding off on his termination because of the potentially interesting operational situation discussed in paragraph 12 of reference. AMCHALK-5 thinks the black marketeers referred to may be on the verge of another trip to Miami. It might be interesting from the JMROD standpoint to "piggyback" that channel and send in an incriminating package to a JMROD target. AMCHALK-5 as the source of the package is already well identified through the AMGHOST operation as affiliated with BVROCK. There are the two possibilities that the couriers themselves would open the package, inspect the contents and turn the whole package over to the DSE or that they would deliver it unopened to the target. In the latter case the target might either turn it over to the DSE, destroy it, or make use of the contents for his own benefit. Content of the package would of course have to be tailored to the target but it might purport to be an agent re-supply cache. Many possible avenues would have to be explored; for the moment we would appreciate consideration of the proposal by the Desk and JMROD staff. One of the first items to be resolved is whether or not there is an inherent "blow-back" feature of the situation which could cause too much embarrassment if exposed to press play. Specifically, is there a case for an allegation that BVROCK was using the international organization with which the "couriers" are affiliated for "subversive" purposes? The answer to that question probably lies somewhere in between what the contents of the package consists of and to what lengths the Cubans would be willing to go to "burn" the "loyal comrade" couriers.

AMCHALK/Project Status Report

File 201-307337

UFAA-1287

AMCHALK-5

11 Sep 69

-00000

SECRET

WH/COG 69-288

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMCHALK-5
(201-307337)

Please reinstate Subject's POA to include his use in the AMCHALK Project. Use of AMCHALK-5 while in Miami awaiting assignment to meet requirements of other WH Stations will be primarily in connection with development of leads for new on-island assets.

David A. Phillips
Chief, WH/COG

DDP/WH/COG/OPS/D/Geisler:mamd 10 September 1969

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - 201-307337

SECRET

201-3073

4-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: 3

30

DISSEM BY PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

( ) SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN 52 CI/OPS CI/OA

ACTION NO. 838

SECRET 052039Z SEP 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 5099

5 SEP 69 IN 38404

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

W

AKULE CIGOOBER AMCHALK

REF: HVCA-16655

1. FYI, CIGOOBER-1 TOLD AMCHALK-5 THAT HE PLANNING TRAVEL TO VENEZUELA 8 SEPTEMBER IN CONNECTION LAW SUIT HE WAS FILED AGAINST FORMER PARTNER AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS. CIGOOBER-1 SAID HE SEEKING $25,000 JUDGEMENT AND HIS LAWYERS HAVE REQUESTED HIS PRESENCE CARACAS. INDICATED WOULD STAY CARACAS IN EXCESS 30 DAYS. AMCHALK-5 BELIEVES CIGOOBER-1 IN FINANCIAL STRAITS AND ALTHOUGH CAN OFFER NOTHING SPECIFIC HE FEELS CIGOOBER-1 NOT BEING ENTIRELY TRUTHFUL ABOUT PURPOSE HIS TRIP. AMCHALK-5 PLANS SEE CIGOOBER-1 AGAIN PRIOR DEPARTURE; WILL ADVISE IF ANYTHING OF INTEREST REPORTED.

2. FILE: 201-763777.

SECRET

File.

AMCHALK-5

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, WH/MIAMI

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
AMCHALK/AMCHALK-5 - Reinstatement of POA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFAA-1224, 21 August 1969

AMCHALK-5's POA has been reinstated for six months. Because of the length of time that has elapsed since PRQ Part I and II were submitted, it is requested that Station complete a new PRQ Part I and II on AMCHALK-5 and forward them to Headquarters.

Joyce K. JAWGIEL

Distribution:
3 - WH/MIAMI

10 SEP 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAW-579

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE
10 September 1969

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-307337

1 - WH/COG/OPS

AN	JB
AB	X

3

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	D.Geisler	mamd	5061

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

DI . ATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING.

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
AMCHALK/
0 AMCHALK-5; Reinstatement of OA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. DIRECTOR 18422, 6 February 1963
B. UFGA-29702, 12 March 1968
C. UFAW-417, 23 May 1969

It is requested that the Operational Approval issued in Reference A for use of AMCHALK-5 be reinstated and amended to conform with his current use as an AMCHALK agent. Use of AMCHALK-5 while in Miami awaiting assignment to meet requirements of other WH stations has primarily been in connection with development of leads for new on-island assets. Specific activities of AMCHALK-5 since his return from Buenos Aires are related in Project AMCHALK quarterly status reports.

Frederick C. Bradspies
Frederick C. BRADSPIES

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

CS COPY

AUG [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAA-1224	19 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-307337

[illegible]

The Provisional Operational Approval on the below-listed individuals has expired on the dates indicated. If WH/Miami continues to have a current operational interest in any of these individuals, it is requested that a PRQ Part II be forwarded as soon as possible.

NAME	201 NUMBER	REQUESTED PER	CANCELLED
MARTIN Rojas, Alberto	825854	UFGA-[illegible]	24 Jul 68
[illegible], Julia	828906	WAVE-1027	24 Sep 68
[illegible]/6	746534	TOKYO-4572	8 Oct 68
AMOTIK/95	772361	WAVE-1723	27 Nov 68
AMCHALK/5	307337	WAVE-8143	16 Dec 68
SUAREZ SOLIS Loynda, Roberto	814019	MADRID-4999	7 Feb 69
AMCAMERA/1	835928	MADRID-5309	6 Mar 69

Newton H. [illegible]

CS copy filed in 201-825854

Distribution:
3 - WH/Miami
1 - Each 201 File

File in
201-307337

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAW-417	23 [illegible]
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	~~201-825854~~

21 May 1969

1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - WH/COG/CHRONO
1 - Each 201 File

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	G. Rothwell	cgl	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/OPS		Arthur T. Kane

RELEASING

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 16 December 1968 lc

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/COG/OPS

ATTENTION : O. A. Williams

201 307337
C

The file on AMCHALK/5 is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit update PRQ I and PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

WAVE 8143

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/s/ Edward P.

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

FORM 6-65 691a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(8)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, WH/MIAMI

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
AMCHALK/Report by AMBEDEW-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached for your information and retention is a report by AMBEDEW-1.

Joyce K. JAWGIEL

Attachment:
Report, h/w

Distribution:
3 - Miami

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAW-396

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE 16 MAY 1969
12 May 1969

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-307337

1 - WH/COG/OPS

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: H/COG/OPS
OFFICER: D.Geisler
TYPIST: mam
EXT. 5061

AN 6.4
AB X
~~IN~~
~~FS~~
~~EX~~
DES NID

COORDINATING
OFFICE SYMBOL: /WH/COG/OPS
DATE:
OFFICER'S NAME: T. Kamm

RELEASING

14-00000

\X

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

o: DARYL CEISLER:ak
IT: WH/COG/CPS
: 5061 P. 1457
TE: 1 MAY 1969

6

☐ FILE IN CP FILE NO.

c/WH 5 FILE, VR. c/R/SB, DDP, ADDP,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

98270

S E C R E T 02 13 22z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR

WH/MIAMI

~~[illegible]~~ TYPIC ~~[illegible]~~ AMCHALK AMBEDEW

REF: UFAA-781, 18 APR 69

WH/C/08

1. RE PARA 2 REF, WIFE OF GUSTAVO HART DAVALOS IS MERCEDES MARGARITA VEDURA BARRIOS.

2. NO HQS TRACES DAISY VEDURA OR DAISY MIGUEL.

3. FYI: ANTONIO (MASSIP) ISALGUE (201-70069) DEFECTED TO WEST GERMANY DECEMBER 67. WAS DEBRIEFED BUT CASE DROPPED FOR WANT APPARENT OPS PROSPECTS. TRAFFIC AVAILABLE MIAMI EXCEPT DEBRIEFING REPORT WHICH BEING POUCHED.

4. FILE 201-307337.

END OF MESSAGE

5 May 69
201-307337

Paul E. Oberst
for DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

Paul E. Oberst
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

S E C R E T RYBAT / TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFAA-781

FILE NO - 201-327337

DATE - 13 APRIL 1969

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NO

TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

SUBJECT - TYPIC/AMROSE/AMCHALK/AMBEDEW/JOSE MASSIP,
ANTONIO MASSIP AND DAISY MIGUEL

REFERENCE - WH/MIAMI 3586

1. SUPPLEMENTARY TO REF AMCHALK-5 SAID IN MEETING 13 APRIL THAT HIS COUSINS JOSE AND ANTONIO MASSIP HAD BOTH RECEIVED THEIR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES. IN 1950'S SARA AND SALVADOR MASSIP, THEIR PARENTS, WERE EMPLOYED IN TEACHING POSITIONS AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY. (NOTE COINCIDENCE THAT MARTA ALICIA PIEDAD GONZALEZ LOPEZ WAS REPORTED EMPLOYED HARVARD UNIV LIBRARY EARLY 1950'S). JOSE AND ANTONIO ARE BILINGUAL WITHOUT TRACE SPANISH ACCENT THEIR ENGLISH; ANTONIO ALSO SPEAKS GERMAN AND RUSSIAN. AMCHALK-5 UNDERSTANDS THAT ANTONIO DURING HIS ABSENCE FROM CUBA HAS LIVED ABOUT TWO YEARS EAST GERMANY AND FIVE YEARS POLAND.

2. (FNU) MIGUEL MENTIONED PARA TWO REF IS MARRIED NAME DAISY MIGUEL. DAISY IS DIVORCED, SISTER OF WIFE GUSTAVO HART AND CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS CLERK AIR CARGO COMPANY MIAMI (NOT EASTERN AIR LINES AS REPORTED REF). HER FAMILY IS FROM CIENFUEGOS AND FATHER, WHO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OF DAISY MIGUEL. INTERESTINGLY HOEVER, CHECK NAME VILA (MATRONYMIC MERCEDES GOMEZ VILA, WIDOW ENRIQUE HART) SHOWS TRACE TO DAISY GERTRUDIS VILA DOMINGUEZ. INFO OF TRACE WAS CONTAINED JMWAVE ZRKNICK FILES WHICH NOT AVAILABLE WH/MIAMI. AMCHALK-5 ATTEMPTING RECALL MAIDEN NAME DAISY; BELIEVES HE HAS CREDIT APPLICATION IN THAT NAME ON FILE HIS COMPANY RECORDS. HE WILL CHECK GOMEZ AND VILA. WOULD APPRECIATE HEADQUARTERS CHECK OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON GUSTAVO HART TO DETERMINE IF WIFE'S SISTER'S NAME ON FILE.

FREDERICK C. BRADSPIES

DISTRIBUTION

LVIA TELEPOUCH

3 - CHIEF, WHD

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

151

INFO FILE, VR. DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/CA-3, C/SB-5

S E C R E T 172212Z APR 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 3586
WMIM

DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE AMCHALK AMBEDEW

17 APR 69 IN 38469

REF: DIRECTOR 93268

1. AMCHALK-5 AFFIRMS HE HAS ONE SISTER ONLY, MERCEDES, WHO LEFT CUBA COUPLE YEARS AGO AND HAS SINCE MARRIED IN MIAMI. "SARA" IS AUNT AMCHALK-5 AND WIFE OF SALVADOR MASSIP, FORMER CUBAN AMBASSADOR POLAND. MASSIPS CURRENTLY LOCATED CUBA. THEY HAVE TWO SONS, JOSE AND ANTONIO. JOSE ABOUT TEN YEARS OLDER THAN ANTONIO, HAS BEEN ACTIVE MEMBER COMMUNIST PARTY ABOUT 20 YEARS AND HAS IMPORTANT REGIME PROPAGANDA POST. ANTONIO STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY JOSE WHO ENCOURAGED HIM JOIN CP ABOUT TEN YEARS AGO. AMCHALK-5 OPINES ANTONIO NOT ACTIVE MEMBER. ANTONIO HAS BEEN STUDYING ENGINEERING EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET UNION PAST TEN

SD
WH/C/RR

A

YEARS AND ALTHO WIFE AND CHILDREN HAVE SINCE RETURNED CUBA FOR SOME REASON UNKNOWN AMCHALK-5 ANTONIO HAS NOT BEEN PERMITTED RETURN CUBA. IT AMCHALK-5 UNDERSTANDING ANTONIO HAS FIVE DEGREES ENGINEERING INCLUDING ELECTRICAL,

17 Apr. 69

201-307337

CS COPY

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT. __________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. __________

X-REF TO FILE NO. __________

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 3586 SECRET

CIVIL, MECHANICAL AND AGRICULTURAL.

2. AMCHALK-5 RECALLS HAD GIRLFRIEND (FNU) MIGUEL (BIO DATA BELIVED FORTHCOMING) ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO WHO IS SISTER-IN-LAW ONE OF BROTHERS ARMANDO HART AND MAY HAVE SOME BLOOD RELATION MERCEDES GOMEZ DE VILA. AMCHALK-5 CLAIMS NOT KNOW GOMEZ DE VILA; BELIVES MIGUEL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR EASTERN AIR LINES MIAMI. WILL ADVISE RESULTS FOLLOW-UP.

3. FILE: 201-307337.

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
AMCHALK
Disposition of Unused Airline Ticket

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. DIRECTOR 64936
B. UFAS-172, 23 September 1968

Attached is a letter received from Pan American World Airways in response to one written by AMCHALK-5 in an unsuccessful attempt to secure a refund on the unused portion of an airline ticket. Although Pan American avers that the ticket has no value the fact remains that a person could use it to fly from Miami to New York during the period of validity (expiring 20 April 1969). The Station will hold the ticket until expiration in event that an opportunity arises where it can be used by an individual performing official travel.

Frederick C. Bradspies
Frederick C. BRADSPIES

Attachment
Letter

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD w/att h/w

CS COPY

APR 10 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-749	DATE 9 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-307337

14-00000

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

February 26, 1969

Senor J.H. Elizondo
c/o N. Terry
Box 1402
Hollywood, Florida 33022

Estimado Senor Elizondo:

Estamos devolviendo su boleto de Miami a Nueva York que no ha usado.

La tarifa de ida solamente de Nueva York a Buenos Aires es $340.00 y de Buenos Aires a Miami es $304.00, el total es $644.00. Como su boleto de ida y vuelta cuesta $630.00 el cupon de Miami a Nueva York no tiene valor alguno, a pesar de no ser usado.

Si podemos ayudarle para futuras reservaciones estaramos muy felices de asistirle.

Atentamente,

Stuart Wooster
Stuart Wooster
District Traffic/Sales Manager

SWMF:h
Enclosure:

H/wa21 UFAA-740

S COPY

201-307337

WORLD CENTER BUILDING 16TH & K STREETS N.W. WASHINGTON D.C. 20006

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET

ORIG: J. SEARS:mam
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 7 APR 69

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 4 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/WH-8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI-2, CS/DO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 08 01 11 7 APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 90508

TO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE AMBEDEW AMCHALK

REF: DIRECTOR-89999

1. MERCY GOMEZ MILA OF PARA 5 REF IDEN WITH MERCEDES GOMEZ VILA DE HART (201-329414). SUBJ'S HQS FILE, WHICH BRIEF AND INCOMPLETE, INDICATES SUBJ GRANTED POA 21 AUG 62, PRESUMABLY TO BE USED IN APPROACH TO ARMANDO HART. POA CANCELED 1 APR 63, SINCE SUBJ NO LONGER OF INTEREST.

2. IN SEPT 64, SUBJ AGAIN CONTACTED BY AMBLEAK-1, PURPOSE TO PITCH ARMANDO HART WHO THEN MEXICO. SUBJ REFUSED ON GROUNDS ARMANDO NOT RECRUITABLE.

3. SUBJ'S HUSBAND ENRIQUE HART KILLED BY OWN BOMB APR 58 WHEN PART OF ANTI-BATISTA FORCES. SUBJ CAME MIAMI SHORTLY THEREAFTER WITH TWO CHILDREN.

4. OF POSSIBLE INTEREST, IN AUG 65 REFUGEE SOURCE IN MEXICO REPORTED ARMANDO HART'S BROTHER IN U.S. WAS CASTRO AGENT. SOURCE COULD NOT IDENTIFY BROTHER, SAID INFO CAME FROM FRIEND

CONTINUED

B 201-815358
B 201-329414

8 Apr. 69
201-307337

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 90608

TO

IN CUBA WHO HAD SEEN LETTER FROM THE BROTHER TO HIS AUNT. LETTER PURPORTEDLY CLEARLY SHOWED THAT BROTHER CASTRO AGENT DESPITE HIS ANTI-CASTRO MANIFESTATIONS. HQS CHECK REVEALED HART HAD TWO BROTHERS IN NEW YORK AT THAT TIME.

5. FILE 201-307337, 201-815358, 201-329414.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG: J. SEARS: vab
NIT: WH/COG/OPS
XT: 5061
ATE: 4 APRIL 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
/ 5 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: c/wh8 INFO FILE, VR,

04 23 29 APR 69

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 89999

3P

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE AMBEDEW AMCHALK

REF: A. WH/MIAMI 3445 (IN 28887)

B. DIRECTOR 89258

wh/c/o1

MICROFILMED
JUN 3 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. IN ADDITION TO UFGA 25885, 201-789607 CONTAINS FIVE LENGTHY LNERGO REPORTS ON MARTA GONZALEZ, BRIEF SUMMARY OF WHICH FOLLOWS.

2. MARTA ALICIA PIEDAD GONZALEZ LOPEZ ARRIVED MIAMI FROM HAVANA 23 APR 62 AS REFUGEE WITH FRAUDULENT US VISA AND FRAUDULENT PASSPORT REVALIDATION, WAS ADMITTED AS PAROLEE. SUCCESSIVE ADDRESSES AS FOLLOWS:

a. 930 SW 22ND AVE., REAR (APR-MAY 62).
b. 2513 SW 10TH ST., APT 7 (JUN 62-MAY 63).
c. 2356 SW 8TH ST AND 2357 SW 9TH ST (MAY-AUG 63).
d. 23 WARE ST, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., APT 5 (SEP 63-AUG 64).

IN AUGUST 64 SHE AND HER HUSBAND (PEDRO PABLO AGUILERA PATTON) LEFT FOR MONTREAL IN ORDER OBTAIN "TRAVEL DOCUMENTS". LEFT SEVERAL POSSESSIONS IN APT AND DID NOT RETURN. WHILE IN CAMBRIDGE,

CONTINUED 4 Apr 69

CS COPY

B. 201-815358
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-307337
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

5
4
3
2
1

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ABSTG SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

PAGE TWO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 89999

MARTHA WORKED AT HARVARD UNIV LIBRARY. DURING TIME SHE EMPLOYED THERE APPARENTLY DEVELOPED LESBIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH TWO FELLOW EMPLOYEES.

3. PEDRO PABLO AGUILERA ARRIVED U.S. DEC 61, RESIDED 2185 SW 11TH TERRACE, MIAMI, UNTIL WIFE'S ARRIVAL. DESCRIBED BY ONE SOURCE AS "VEGETABLE," BY ANOTHER AS HOMOSEXUAL. SEVERAL ACQUAINTANCES BELIEVED THEY PROBABLY NOT REALLY MARRIED, AND THEY OFTEN LIVED SEPARATELY IN MIAMI.

4. MARTA GONZALEZ HAD BROTHER, DIEGO LUIS GONZALEZ LOPEZ, WHO EMPLOYED AT CUBAN REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, MIAMI. APPEARED BE ANIMOSITY BETWEEN DIEGO AND MARTA, HOWEVER, AND NO RECORD OF THEIR HAVING BEEN IN CONTACT. DIEGO LEFT FOR PUERTO RICO JOB IN MAY 65.

5. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST, DBB 19251 STATES THAT WHILE IN MIAMI, MARTA OFTEN LIVED IN HOUSE OF MERCY GOMEZ MILA, WIDOW OF ENRIQUE ARMANDO HART AND SISTER-IN-LAW OF (THEN) MINISTER EDUCATION ARMANDO HART. MERCY GOMEZ MILA LIVED AT SW 23RD AVE AT CORNER OF 10TH ST. PER PARA 3 REF B, THIS MAY BE ONE OF MARTA'S RECRUITED

5
4
3
2
1

CONTINUED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RIG:
NIT:
IT:
ATE:

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

_______ PER _______ # _______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. _______

ONF: INFO FILE, VR,

PAGE THREE

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 89999

O

AGENTS. WILL CABLE ANY TRACES.

6. SENDING LNERGO REPORTS VIA NEXT IURADIAL.

7. FILE: 201-307337, 201-815358.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/OPS _______

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

ACTION
c/WH8 ☐ RID COPY
650

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE, VR. C/RI/SD. DDP ADDP CSDO C/FI 2
dci

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 032206Z APR 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 3445 3 APR 69 IN 28887
WH/MIAMI

DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE AMBEDEW AMCHALK

1P

/SD

wh/c/op

REF: DIRECTOR 89258

1. MARTA GONZALEZ IS UNDOUBTEDLY IDEN WITH MARTA ALICIA PIEDAD GONZALEZ-LOPEZ, SUBJECT OF 201-789607. SEE ALSO UFGA-25885. PLS CABLE ANY PERTINENT INFO IN SUBJ'S 201 SINCE IT NOT AVAILABLE AT STATION.

2. REVIEW OF AMCHALK-5 FILE INDICATES HE HAS ONLY ONE SISTER, MERCEDES DIAZ ISALGUE, WHO REPORTEDLY IN U.S. WE CHECKING WITH AMCHALK-5 ON THIS POINT.

3. WE PREPARING LIST OF NAMES REQUESTED PARA EIGHT REF AND WILL ~~CABLE~~ CABLE.

4. FILE: 201-307337, 201-81538.

SECRET

MICROFILMED
MAY 21 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

COPY

3 Apr 69
201-307337

B-201-789607

SECRET

13-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET 16

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: J. SEARS:mam
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 3 APR 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/CI/SO, C/CI, C/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 89259

3 Apr 69 1P

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE AMBEDEW AMCHALK

REF: DIRECTOR 89258

IDEN A: COMANDANTE GUIN AMTRUNK-10

IDEN B: SARA

IDEN C: SARA ISALGUE ISALGUE

IDEN D: SARA ISALGUE DE MASSIP

IDEN E: SALVADOR MASSIP Y VALDEZ, AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE TO POLAND

IDEN F: PROFESSORSHIP IN GEOGRAPHY AT HAVANA UNIV SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

IDEN G: INSTITUTE OF GEOGRAPHY AND GEOLOGY

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

B, 201-815358

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

3 Apr 69
201-307337

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET 16

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: J. SEARS:mam
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 3 APR 69

CABLE SEC DISSEMINATION
BY 2 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/CI/SG, C/CI, C/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica)
(reference number)

SECRET APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 89258

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI 4P

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE AMBEDEW AMCHALK

REF: WH/MIAMI-3326 (IN 22810)

1. AMBEDEW-1 DEBRIEFED ON REF MATTER 2 APRIL. SAID BECAME AWARE OF PENETRATION IN AMCHALK-5 GROUP WHEN WORKING IN COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY SECTION. DGI COLLABORATOR WHO ACTED AS PRINCIPAL AGENT THIS OP WAS MARTA GONZALEZ, AUTHORESS OF "BAJO PAROLE." GONZALEZ CAME U.S. AS EXILE CIRCA 1963 AND LIVED MIAMI, WAS HANDLED BY "ROLO" MARTINEZ, DGI CASE OFFICER IN UNITED NATIONS WHO MET GONZALEZ NEW YORK AND MIAMI. AMBEDEW-1 SAID GONZALEZ "BI-SEXUAL."

2. GONZALEZ RECRUITED AT LEAST TWO AGENTS MIAMI, AT LEAST ONE OF WHICH WAS FEMALE. SHE HAD "INFINITY" OF CONTACTS MIAMI AND SENT DETAILED REPORTS TO HAVANA ON EXILE ACTIVITIES. HER MISSION WAS TO PENETRATE ALPHA 66.

3. AMBEDEW-1 RECALLS GONZALEZ LIVED IN HOUSE OF WOMAN SHE RECRUITED. CONZALEZ RETURNED HAVANA SOMETIME 1964-65 VIA MEXICO.

CONTINUED

3 Apr. 69

B. 201-815358

201-307337

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR.

(elite) (pica)
(reference number)
(classification) (date and time filed)

SECRET PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR

TO

4. AMBEDEW-1 RECALLS FROM REPORTS HE READ:

A. GONZALEZ KNEW PLACES WHERE RECEPTION TEAM WOULD MEET INFILTRATORS OF AMCHALK-5 GROUP.

B. GONZALEZ KNEW NAMES OF FISHERMEN WHO COMPRISED RECEPTION TEAM.

C. GONZALEZ KNEW THAT HOUSE OF AMCHALK-5 MOTHER WAS USED AS "CASA DE CONTACTO" AND THAT IDEN A WAS RECRUITED THERE.

5. AMBEDEW-1 FURTHER STATED THAT AMCHALK-5 HAS SISTER IN HAVANA NAMED IDEN B. DGI SUSPECTS IDEN B RECRUITED BY AMCHALK-5, BUT AMBEDEW-1 COULD NOT SUBSTANTIATE THIS OTHER THAN BY SAYING IDEN B ONLY AMCHALK-5 BROTHER OR SISTER LEFT IN CUBA. IDEN B VERY CLOSE TO AMTHUG-1 AND DGI DOES NOT DARE APPROACH AMTHUG-1 ON MATTER WITHOUT PROOF. AMBEDEW-1 SAID IDEN B RECENTLY WROTE REPORT ON "MICROCLIMA" WHICH INTERESTED AMTHUG-1.

6. FULL HQS TRACES TO FOLLOW, PRELIMINARY TRACES ON GONZALEZ AS FOLLOWS:

A. UFGA-1596, 16 MAY 61: MARTA GONZALEZ, 746 SW 2ND

CONTINUED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE 3 CITE DIRECTOR

TO

STREET, MIAMI, IS STUDENT AT MIAMI SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL REPORTED TO BE CASTRO SYMPATHIZER. (NOTE DOI THIS REPORT PRECEDES AMBEDEW-1 DATE FOR GONZALEZ ARRIVAL MIAMI.)

B. ONE MARTA GONZALEZ ABREU PEREZ TRAVELED HAVANA-PRAGUE-HAVANA JUL 62. ONE MARTA GONZALEZ DEPARTED PARGUE 12 MAY 62 FOR HAVANA VIA GANDER.

C. MARTA GONZALEZ SUAREZ MEMBER OF MILITIA ORGANIZED IN CUBAN MINISTRY EDUCATION (HKHA-6378, 18 MAY 60).

D. MARTA ADELAIDA GONZALEZ LEYVA APPLIED FOR AND DENIED U.S. VISA IN HAVANA (MASH-127 (SIC), 28 JUN 60).

E. NAME OF MARTA GONZALEZ LOPEZ (A 12906622) WAS GIVEN BY JMWAVE TO AMSHY-1 AS BEING OF INTEREST TO WOFIRM (UFGA-21600, 18 MAY 65). NO RECORD ANY FURTHER INFO.

7. ON IDEN B, HAVE FOLLOWING PRELIM TRACES:

A. IDEN C LEFT HAVANA FOR PRAGUE 22 JULY 62 ON PP D/60/460 (CCOA-5674, 11 SEP 62).

B. IDEN D LEFT PRAGUE FOR HAVANA 16 OCT 62 ON

CONTINUED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY ________ PER ________ # ________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET PAGE 4 CITE DIRECTOR

TO

PP D/30/466. ADDRESS ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS. (UFGT-5228, 21 MAY 63)

C. IDEN D IS WIFE OF IDEN E. FUROR OF IDEN D'S ATTEMPT TO RECLAIM HER IDEN F PLAYED A PART IN HUSBAND'S NEW ASSIGNMENT, AS WAS FELT THIS BEST WAY ELIMINATING DIFFICULTY (AMEMB HAVANA 1919, 27 JUN 60).

D. IDEN D ARRIVED SAO PAULO FROM MEXICO 3 AUG 61 (HEPA-5933, 20 SEP 61).

E. IDEN D IS MEMBER OF ADVISORY COUNCIL OF IDEN G (HOY, 30 MAR 62).

8. REQUEST WH/MIAMI PROVIDE LIST OF PEOPLE CLOSE TO AMCHALK-5 ON CHANCE AMBEDEW-1 CAN RECALL NAMES OF EITHER OF AGENTS MENTIONED PARA 2 ABOVE.

9. FOREGOING IS FULL EXTENT OF AMBEDEW-1 KNOWLEDGE OF CUBAN OPS IN MIAMI AREA. GAVE NO INDICATION KNOWING ANYTHING ABOUT AMSTALK-AMGHOST OP.

10. FILE 201-307337, 201-815358.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO

[illegible]
[illegible] PARIS

Answer to WH/Miami 3326 which was prompted by PARIS 7580

1. When AMBEDEW-1 was working for the counter revolutionary section, he became acquainted with the case of the penetration of Miguel Diaz Isalgue's group.

2. In this operation, the Cuban DGI collaborator who acted as principal agent was Marta Gonzalez, authoress of Bajo Parola. She came to the United States as an exile in 1963 (more or less) and lived in Miami. She was handled by "Bolo" Martinez, Cuban DGI Case Officer in the United Nations who would see Marta in New York and Miami.

3. Marta recruited two agents (at least), one of whom was a woman. He did not recall the sex of the other. She had an "infinity" of contacts in Miami and sent detailed reports to Habana on exile organizations and intra-mural exile politics. He does remember that Marta was living in the house of the woman she recruited. She used to send reports on Varona and Rey. Her mission was to penetrate Alpha 66.

4. AMBEDEW-1 remembers from reports that he read that:

Marta Gonzalez knew the places where the reception team would meet infiltrators of Isalgue's group.

Marta Gonzalez knew the names of fishermen who were members of the reception team.

Marta Gonzalez knew that Isalgue's mother's house was used as a "casa de contacto" and that Comandante Guin was recruited by Isalgue in the mother's house.

5. Can Miami supply a list of names of people close to Isalgue to see if AMBEDEW-1 can recall the agents names. AMBEDEW-1 thinks there is a good chance that they are still in place even though he has no info.

6. Marta Gonzalez is now back in Habana. She left the country via Mexico and in Mexico was helped by a Foreign Relations employee named "Flores" who was about 58 years old. The Center in Mexico was

FILE MIAMI

considering trying to recruit "Flores" using Gonzales. Gonzales returned to Habana in 1964-65.

In 1966, a sensational case involving Gonzales was the talk of the day in DGI Headquarters. Gonzales recruited a Spanish diplomat. Evidentally, the DGI tried to push the diplomat a little bit further than the diplomat wanted. The Latter got mad and refused to cooperate. (It appears that the DGI uses the words "agents" and "Recruit" loosely).

I asked AMBEDEW-1 if Marta used her sexual prowess for the sake of the cause. He said she had an added advantage, she is bi-sexual.

More on Isalgue. He has one sister in Habana, a woman named Sara. The DGI suspects her of being recruited by Isalgue even though AMBEDEW-1 could not substantiate this other than to say that she was the only brother or sister of Isalgue still in Cuba. Sara is very close to Fidel and the DGI would not dare approach Fidel with its suspicions without being able to substantiate their accusations. Fidel would blow up. The DGI has to be very careful when it approaches Fidel. Sara recently wrote a report on Microclima (?) which interested Fidel.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ISALGUE, MIGUEL
201-307337
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

201-815358
DIR -88723
01 APR 69

R 6906090436

FILE IN 201-30-7337

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

SECRET

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(7-46)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION / PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE / TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY Sn AT WH 1511 Z

DISSEM BY 7/7 PER

ACTION ofwh 5 ☐ RID COPY

648

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE, VR. DDP ADDP C/FI/SO C/EUR 5 C/CI C/FI/2

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 261730Z MAR 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 3325 (REBECKER ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PARIS

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE AMBEDEW AMGHOST

26 Mar 69 IN 22810

REF: PARIS 7599 (IN 20502)

1. SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION MENTIONED PARA 1E REF IS AMCHALK-5 IN WHOM STATION HAS CURRENT OPS INTEREST. APPRECIATE FACT THAT IN-DEPTH DEBRIEFINGS AMBEDEW-1 MUST NECESSARILY BE DELAYED, BUT IN INTEREST OPS SECURITY WOULD APPRECIATE HQS INCLUSION FURTHER EXPLORATION TOPIC OF INVESTIGATION NEXT REQUIREMENTS SENT PARIS. SPECIFICALLY WE MOST INTERESTED LEARNING WHETHER INVESTIGATION INVOLVED USE OF CONTACTS OR agents in Miami ASSETS MIAMI AREA AND IF SO THEIR IDENTIFICATION.

2. ALSO, WOULD BE INTERESTING DETERMINE WHETHER AMBEDEW-1 WITTING ANY ASPECTS OF APPROACH TO AMCHALK-5 WHICH FOLLOWED QUIN ARREST BY TWO OR THREE MONTHS AND THE EVENTUAL AMSTALK/ ANGHOST APPROACH TO AMGHOST.

3. FILE: 201-815358.

SECRET

Current req

AMCHALK-5

SECRET File: Miami

17 March 1969

MEMORANDUM TO: DC/WH/1

FROM : C. Schaefer

SUBJECT : Conversation with Mr. Scott

1. The concept and feasibility of the False Flag Approach targeted against both the PCM and the Cubans.

2. The possibility of using either AMCHALK/3 or AMCHALK/2 to inspect Guatemalan-Mexican border for indications of arms smuggling.

3. The possibility of using AMCHALK/5 as replacement for ROWTON.

Copy
AMCHALK/5

TOTAL COPIES 20

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

S E C R E T

RIG: MICHAEL OLEJARZ;pfd
NIT: WH/COG/OPS
XT: R1819
ATE: 19 FEB 1969

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
Y 3 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

ONF: C/WH 8 FILE, VR. C/RI/SD C/FE 4 C/FE/CO 4 C/CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T [illegible] CITE DIRECTOR 77664

TO WH/MIAMI INFO: TOKYO, HONG KONG, SEOUL

RYBAT TYPIC AMCHALK

REFERENCE: WH/MIAMI 2811 (IN 96440)* BEING RELAYED SEOUL

1. ACCORDING FBIS PUBLICATION DATED 4 JANUARY BASILIO (RODRIGUEZ) RODRIGUEZ RETURNED PYONGYANG JANUARY 1969. NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RODRIGUEZ.

2. FILE 201-766502; 19-136-1/3.

END OF MESSAGE

FE/JKO/K

CO/MO/2

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

AMCHALK-5

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ENNIS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 26 PER

ACTION c/WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, C/CI/SP, C/FE 4, C/FE/CI 4, C/CI, C/FI 2

477

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 181924Z FEB 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 2511

DIRECTOR, TOKYO, HONG KONG

19 Feb 69 IN 90440

RYBAT AMBROWN AMCHALK

1. HQS: PLEASE ADVISE IF THERE ANY INFO SUBSEQUENT JULY 1968 ON CURRENT WHEREABOUTS/ACTIVITIES BASILIO RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ (201-766502) WHO SHOWN IN LATEST LIST CUBAN DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ABROAD AS POSTED AMBASSADOR PYONGYANG. STATION EVALUATING POSSIBILITY EXPLOITING OLD AMCHALK-5 RELATIONSHIP FOR CURRENT ACCESS.

2. TOKYO AND HONG KONG: WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS STATIONS MAY HAVE ON ANY OBSERVABLE PATTERN REST AND RECUPERATION PROGRAM CUBAN DIP PERSONNEL KOREA AND OTHER DENIED AREA POSTS; I.E. DO THEY PERIODICALLY VISIT JAPAN, HONG KONG OR OTHER AREA FREE WORLD COUNTRIES, AND IF SO IS TRAVEL CLOSELY MONITORED BY STATIONS?

3. FILE: 201-766502. X REF 19-136-1/3.

SECRET

Answered by
DIR 77664
22 Feb 69

File AMCHALK-5

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY Y PER ______

ACTION C/WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

972

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE, VR. C/RI/SD, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/CI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 130835Z FEB 69 CITE ROME 8397

13 FEB 69 IN 92897

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC AMBROWN AMCHALK-5

REF WH/MIAMI 2710 (IN 91234)

F.I.: AMCHALK-5

1. FOLL IS SUMMARY DEVIGIL PROVIDED INFO ON SUBJ:

- 4 APR 68 ARRIVED ROME FROM MADRID ACCOMPANIED BY WIFE AND TWO DAUGHTERS;
- 20 APR 68 WENT TO LIVE AT VIA ORESTE TOMASINI 39 TEL. 4248645;
- 12 APR 68 WAS GUEST AT LUNCHEON GIVEN BY ONE HUGUE' OR HUGUES LUIS "FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE AT FAO WHO DEPARTED FOR PBRUMEN SAME EVENING". LUNCH ALSO ATTENDED BY MIGUEL GONZALES DE MOYA CUBAN OFFICIAL WITH FAO;
- 31 MAY 68 HAD CONTACT WITH MARIO RUIVO, PORTUGUESE FAO OFFICIAL IN ROME ON MATTERS RELATED TO EXTENSION OF STAY IN PBRUMEN OF FAO FISHING EXPERTS;
- 9 OCT 68 MOVED TO VIA TOMASINI 34;
- 11 NOV 68 PREPARED REPORT FOR PBRUMEN MINISTRY ON FAO REGIONAL OFFICES IN SANTIAGO AND RIO AZUL IN MEXICO;
- 13 NOV 68 RECEIVED FOLL TELEGRAM FROM VIENNA "GRIGORIEV SAYS PERSON SHOULD BE RESEARCHER OR TECHNOCRAT. URGENTLY NEED KNOW DESTINATION";

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 ROME 8397 SECRET

- 10 DEC 68 MET WITH AXEL CHARPENTIER FINNISH REP AT FAO IN LATTER'S OFFICE;
- 12 DEC 68 WAS GUEST AT LUNCHEON GIVEN BY SERGEY ALEKSANDROVICH KUZNETSOV (201-167752);
- 10 JAN 69 ALLEGEDLY LEFT FOR VIENNA;
- 13 JAN 69 WIFE EXPRESSED INTEREST MOVE TO NEW APARTMENT. INDICATED MIGHT REMAIN ROME THREE OR FOUR YEARS;
- 30 JAN 69 IBERIA AIRLINES ADVISED IT WAS HOLDING THREE CASES MARKED "FOR SUBJECT'S ATTENTION";
- 7 FEB 69 SUBJECT'S WIFE MET WITH FNU PRETELET "OF THE FRENCH TV NETWORK"

2. ALL ABOVE INFO FROM DEPOGO. IT WOULD APPEAR SUBJECT'S MAIN INTERESTS LIE IN FAO ACTIVITIES.

3. STATION COULD QUERY LIAISON FOR ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND ON SUBJ BUT BELIEVES THERE WOULD BE NOTHING MORE THAN ALREADY PASSED.

4. FILE: 201-745001.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 79

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: D. GEISLER:mam
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 10 JAN 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 26 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH 8, TSD 6, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 10 28 51 0 JAN 69 CITE DIRECTOR 64936

TO WH/MIAMI

AMCHALK

REF: UFAA-404, 9 DEC 68

1. UNABLE LOCATE AMCHALK-5 DOCUMENTATION AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, ACCORDING PAN AM, TICKET CAN BE MAILED FOR REFUND, MAKING USE OF FALSE DOCUMENTATION UNNECESSARY. MAIL TO PAN AMERICAN AIRLINES, 16TH AND K STREETS, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. STATE NAME TO WHOM CHECK TO BE MADE OUT. REGRET CONFUSION.

2. FILE 201-307337.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD/AB Pat Phalen (telecoord)

for Paul E. Oberst
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CS COPY

for Paul E. Oberst
DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

201-307337
10 Jan 69

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT AMCHALK
AMCHALK-5 Identity Documents and Accountings

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. UFAS-172, 23 September 1968
B. UFGA-30218, 21 June 1968

Reference A forwarded to JMCOBRA the unused portion of an airline ticket which had been sent to Headquarters by JMWAVE under cover of Reference B. This ticket was made out to Juan H. Elizondo. If the identity documents which were also sent to Headquarters under cover of Reference B are made out to Elizondo it is requested that they be forwarded to Chief of Station, WH/Miami so that AMCHALK-5 can try to get a refund of fare for unused portion of the ticket.

Identity [illegible] by TSD per [illegible]

Frederick C. Bradspies
Frederick C. BRADSPIES

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

DEC 9 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-404	DATE 5 December 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-307337

DISPA	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, WH/ Miami		MICROFILM
SUBJECT AMCHALK-5 Accounting		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFAW-92, 12 September 1968

Sterilized versions of the worksheets attached to Reference were shown to AMCHALK-5. The agent was unable to recall any additional expense items and said the balance of $341.87 would be refunded. It was agreed that the refund would be effected through payroll deductions at the Station at the rate of $100 per month for three months and $41.87 for one month. The agent has already refunded $100 from his salary for November 1968. Similar amounts will be withheld from salaries for December 1968 and January 1969, and $41.87 will be withheld from AMCHALK-5's salary for February 1969. The Station finance section will T/A refunds for credit to Headquarters Fan 8135-0635.

Frederick C. Bradspies
Frederick C. BRADSPIES

COPY given
TO WH/B&F
18 Dec 68
by [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-405	DATE DEC 9 1968 5 December 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-307337

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMCOBRA

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
AMCHALK-5 Accounting

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: See Paragraph 2

REFERENCE : JMCOBRA-0628

1. Forwarded herewith as an attachment are worksheets showing the accounting for AMCHALK-5's TDY to Buenos Aires. As you can see the advances and payments made to him total $2,343.23 while the accounting figure totals $2,001.36, thus leaving a balance of $341.87 to be repayed by AMCHALK-5.

2. It is requested that the Station review the attached accounting with AMCHALK-5 in order to find out if he incurred any expenses which are not included in the attached sheet and which can be credited against the balance due. If there are not, it is requested that the sum of $341.87 be collected from him and T/A'd to Headquarters FAN 8135-0635.

Sidney O. TOUSSAINT

Attachment:
As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
3 - JMCOBRA

201-307337

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAW-92

DATE
SEP 1968
4 September 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-307337

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: WH/COG/OPS
OFFICER: J.W. Mertz
TYPIST: mam
EXT. 5061

1 - WH/COG/ESEC
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - WH/B&F

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/PS		Arthur T. Kamm
WH/B&F		

AN
AB
~~IM~~
~~PS~~
~~B~~
~~D~~
~~FI~~

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WH/COG
DATE: 6 - S[illegible]
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: David A. Phillips

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, **WH/COG/OPS - O. A. Williams**	NUMBER 201-307337
	SUBJECT **AMCHALK/5**
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated **dt**

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Per your memorandum request of 29 July 1968, Subject's POA is amended herewith to authorize his use in audio transcription operations in various Latin American countries.

Responsibility for this case has been changed from WH/4/A to WH/COG/OPS.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ **Edward P. Brown**

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	**21 August 1968**

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

201-307337

(9)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

ORIG: J.W. MERTZ
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 20 AUG 68

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 33 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-307337 ✓

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR R/AN, WH 8,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO JMCOBRA 21 10 10Z AUG 68 26359

AMCHALK

REFS: A. DIRECTOR-09848

B. JMCOBRA-0340 (IN 53596)

C. DIRECTOR-25058

D. JMCOBRA-0628 (IN 72169)

AN	KB
AB	X
~~IN~~	
~~FS~~	
~~BX~~	
~~DR~~	
~~PI~~	
WH/[illegible]	

SORRY FOR CONFUSION AND ~~INCONVENIENCE~~ INCONVENIENCE CAUSED STATION THIS CASE. MISUNDERSTANDING AROSE OVER DESIRE TO INCLUDE ALL EXPENSES INCURRED BY AMCHALK-5 DURING HIS TDY. HQS WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF HE HAD ANY ADDITIONAL OUTSTANDING CLAIMS. AS REF D CLEARS UP THIS POINT ACCOUNTINGS CAN NOW BE MADE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG COMMENT: Refs concerned accountings for advance made to AMCHALK-5 (formerly AMSTALK-1) which are due September 1968.

201-307337
20 Aug 68

C/WH/4/A
WH/B&F

Paul E. Oberst
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

FORM G-325 A (REV. 6-1-68)

Form Approved
Budget Bureau No. 43-R436

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

(Family name) Diaz	(First name) Miguel	(Middle name) Angel	☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (Mo.-Day-Yr.) Feb 14/32	NATIONALITY Cubano	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (if any) A11-261-649
ALL OTHER NAMES USED			CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH Matanzas, Cuba			SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (if any) 265-72-074

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (if known)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	Diaz	Miguel	Mtz - Cuba	(D)
MOTHER (Maiden name)	Isalgue	Dolores	Guantanamo Cuba	(D)

SPOUSE (if none, so state) FAMILY NAME (For wife, give maiden name)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
de la Portilla	Fabiola	29/Aug/34	Mtz, Cuba	24 Apr 59	Matanzas

FORMER SPOUSES (If none, so state)

FAMILY NAME (For wife, give maiden name)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
1519 SW 1st	Miami	Florida	Dade	Dec	66	PRESENT TIME	
2326 NE 6 Ave	Miami	Florida	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Dec	66
1242 NE Northeast [illegible]	Miami	Florida	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Dec	63

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE. (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE.)

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS. (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
Plaza Electric 1795 SW 8 St	[illegible]	Jul	66	PRESENT TIME	
[illegible] Construction Co [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Jul	63
Air Cold Inc [illegible] Florida		[illegible]	62	Jul	63

LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE. (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE.)

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
☐ OTHER (SPECIFY):

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER

DATE 15 AUG 1968

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

IF YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IS IN OTHER THAN ROMAN LETTERS, WRITE YOUR NAME IN YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IN THIS SPACE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 21 PER

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☐ RID COPY

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-307337

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, WH-8

COBR

S E C R E T 162006Z AUG 68 CITE JMCOBRA 0628

16 Aug 68 IN 72169

DIRECTOR

AMCHALK

REF: A. DIRECTOR 25058

B. UFGA 30218

WHEN JMCOBRA INITIATED CONTACT WITH AMCHALK-5 ON 19 JULY AGENT SAID HE HAD TURNED IN ALL ACCOUNTINGS AND SUPPORTING RECEIPTS TO PREVIOUS (BUENOS AIRES AND JMWAVE) CONTACTS AND THAT NO ACCOUNTING MATTERS WERE OUTSTANDING. PLEASE ADVISE WHAT ACCOUNTING MATTERS CONSIDERED OUTSTANDING SINCE JMCOBRA CONSIDERING TERMINATION OF AGENT.

S E C R E T

BT

AN KB
AB ~~X~~
WH/REG C

CS COPY

SECRET

201-307337
16 Aug 68

O: J.W. MERTZ
T: WH/COG/OPS
: 5061
E: 15 AUG 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: (19)

36 SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 23 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

: WH/COG8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR .WH8, RI/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

JMCOBRA 1522 25z AUG 68 215058

AMCHALK

REFS: A. DIRECTOR-09848

B. JMCOBRA-0340 (IN 53596)

WISH REMIND STATION AMCHALK-5 ACCOUNTINGS DUE BY END THIS MONTH. WOULD APPRECIATE QUICK RESPONSE AS DUE DATES ON SEVERAL THESE ACCOUNTINGS HAVE ALREADY BEEN EXTENDED ONCE.

END OF MESSAGE

File AMCHALK-5

Paul E. Oberst
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Paul E. Oberst
for DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 7 PER #

ACTION
576 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.
FILE. VR. WH/COG 8 C/OA RI/AN

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	JP	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4	BS	9	
5		10	

SECRET 191354Z JUL 68 CITE JMCOBRA 0340

19 JUL 68 IN 53596

DIRECTOR

AMCHALK/AMSTALK

REF: DIRECTOR 09848

paramilitary training in other mil/areas

STATION INTENDS USE AMSTALK-1 UNDER AMCHALK PROJECT. PLEASE ASSIGN CRYPT AMCHALK-5 AND AMEND OA ACCORDINGLY. STATION PREPARING NEW MOC. WILL ADVISE FURTHER RE TAX AND ACCOUNTING MATTERS.

SECRET

BT

9/

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG.: FAMBRINI: gma
UNIT: WH/4/A
EXT: 6609
DATE: 19 JUNE 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET 34

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 55/29 PER ______ # ______

CONF. WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-307337

INFO: FILE, VR WH/COG8, CI/CA, OF2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

2020 43Z JUL 68

CITE DIRECTOR 09848

F.6 AMCHALK-5

TO JMWAVE INFO BUENOS AIRES JMCOBRA

AMSTALK

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0823 (IN 33569)*

1. PLEASE ADVISE IF STATION OR COVER COMPANY MENTIONED PARA 2, JMWAVE 1967 (IN 88230) WILL REPORT TAXES AND FICA TO PROPER AUTHORITIES.

2. REQUEST ALSO FORWARD AMSTALK-1 FINAL, SIGNED ACCOUNTING, INCLUDING ALL RECEIPTS, OR CERTIFICATION WHERE RECEIPTS NOT AVAILABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *AMSTALK-1 returned to the U.S. on 15 June 1968 following completion of an operational assignment in Buenos Aires.

C/WH/4

WH/B&F E. Burroughs (in draft)

Paul E. Oberst
for C/WH/COG

Calvin M. Smythe
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

29 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMCHALK-5 (Formerly AMTALK-1)
201-307337

Please amend Subject's POA to include his use in the ~~audio transcription operation being conducted in other~~ AMCHALK PROJECT, AN ACTIVITY TO SUPPORT Improvement of Counter-Intelligence capabilities of foreign security services in WH areas. Desk coordination effected per Mr. R. Fambrini, WH/4/A.

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - 201-307337

SECRET

c/WHD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO
Chief of Station, JMCOBRA

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AKULE PBRUMEN AMSTALK
Return of AMSTALK-1 Documentation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: As desired by Headquarters
Reference : DIRECTOR 08847

1. Forwarded under separate cover is an envelope containing the following identity and travel documents returned by AMSTALK-1 in accordance with Reference:

a. Nicaraguan passport

b. Nicaraguan immunization record

c. Form I-512 (was never shown)

d. Round-trip airline ticket (with portion Miami-New York unused)

e. Airline ticket envelopes

Olive S. Eckholm

Olive S. ECKHOLM

Attachment: UNDER SEPARATE COVER
Envelope, per above ([illegible]) Passed TSD
Passport [illegible] for Pol [illegible]
TSD

Distribution:
3 - C/WH w/att, u/s/c
3 - WH/COG w/o att
2 - COS/JMCOBRA w/o att [illegible] pouch

CS COPY

DATE TYPED 20 June 68	DATE DISPATCHED JUN 21 1968
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-30218
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-307337 201-307337

1 ail

FORM G-325 A REV. 4-1-67

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO 43-R436

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

(FAMILY NAME) DE LA PORTILLA	(FIRST NAME) FABIOLA	(MIDDLE NAME) PIRA	☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (MO-DAY-YR.) 8-29-37	NATIONALITY CUBAN	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (IF ANY) A12-445-501
ALL OTHER NAMES USED			CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH MATANZAS, CUBA			SOCIAL SECURITY NO (IF ANY) 264-13-3368

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	DE LA PORTILLA	ANGEL	7-11-06, MATANZAS, CUBA	1519 S.W. 19 STREET, MIAMI
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)	GARCIA	RAFAELA	4-10-06, MATANZAS, CUBA	1519 S.W. 19 STREET, MIAMI

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
DIAZ	MIGUEL	2-14-37	MATANZAS, CUBA	4-24-59	MATANZAS CUBA

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE)

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
1519 S.W. 19 STREET	MIAMI	FLORIDA	U.S.A.	12	66	PRESENT TIME	
2328 N.W. 6 AVE.	MIAMI	FLORIDA	U.S.A.	2	65	12	66
2852 S.W. 37 COT.	MIAMI	FLORIDA	U.S.A.	11	62	2	63
1343 N.W. 13 Cot.	MIAMI	FLORIDA	U.S.A.	2	63	2	65

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE)

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
CUBA ELECTRIC CO. 1795 S.W. 8 Street	TREASURER	1	68	PRESENT TIME	
	HOUSEWIFE				
201-307337					

LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE)

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
☒ OTHER (SPECIFY): Resident

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT

IF YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IS IN OTHER THAN ROMAN LETTERS, WRITE YOUR NAME IN YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IN THIS SPACE:

6-12-68
DATE

(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

AMSTRUCK-1

DIAZ Isalgue, Miguel	Angel	201- 307337

WH/4/A

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

FORM 7-58 44 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 30 73 37

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

5 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMOTIN-117 (Formerly AMSTALK-1)
201-307337

Please cancel immediately all clearances on Subject per JMWAVE-1929 (IN 85328).

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - 201-307337

201-307337

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

(TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)

Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue (201-307337)

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

14 Feb. 1937, Matanzas, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP

Cuba

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Miami, Fla.

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK Nº 187024

DATE 6 Mar. 1968

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME Phil Koblenz

OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/COG/OPS

ROOM, BUILDING 3E05

EXTENSION 5136

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)

☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED

☐ ADDITIONAL DATA

☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)

☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY

☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Previous Green List Requested in Sept. 1961		

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

All Pertinent Information

201-307337

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

TO:
Phil Koblenz

26 March 1962
DATE

FROM: F1/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN F1/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, F1/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ F1/D HAS NO ~~PERTINENT~~ INFORMATION ON SUBJECT, *except IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:
*Previous green list request from WH/4/PA-Prop, 27 Sept. 61, op, [redacted] OL#116726.
NOTE: Army, Cuban Intell. Service, Source: LA-II-S-2207, 4 May 1961.

IB

APR 9

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO F1/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO F1/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP F1/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: F1/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
AMSTALK-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See below

Forwarded as an attachment is one Form No. SD56490, Parts A and B. It is requested that AMSTALK-1 sign Part A in true name, and Part B in the name shown in paragraph 2.F., DIRECTOR 88444.

Wendel J. RAMOVA

Attachment:
One form, h/w

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE w/att h/w

201-307337

CROSS REFERENCE TO

M. B.
WH/COG

Distribution:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono
1 - Tempo
1 - WH/COG

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
UFGW-7016	8 April 1968
CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
SECRET	AMSTALK-1 201

ORIGINATING

OFFICE / / OFFICER Robert Fambrini TYPIST li EXT. 6609

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/4/A		Stephen G. Chaconas
C/WH/4	8 APR 1968	Raymond A. Warren

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
	/ /	

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 | 6
2 | 7
3 | 8
4 | 9
5 | 10

ORIG: J. KEIRLE/jd
UNIT: WH/4/A
EXT: 6067
DATE: 1 MAY 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 32 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-307337 ✓

CONF: WH8 ☒ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, SB8, WH/COG8, CI/OA, CI/IC2, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

SECRET MAY 2 17 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR 96246

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO JMWAVE

REDTOP BIOGENESIS

REF: DIR 86830

POA GRANTED 1 MAY 68 FOR AMSTALK-1 USE AS STATED REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Updated POA requested for AMSTALK-1's one time use in Buenos Aires in proposed audio ops [illegible] targeted against Soviet Bloc.

SB/O/WH [illegible]

CI/OA [illegible]

For WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Calvin M. Smith

for RAYMOND A. WARREN
C/WH/4

2 May 68
201-307337

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-307337

X-REF TO FILE NO 201-238687

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/COG/OPS BRANCH ✗

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 3 PER #

ACTION c/wh/cog 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR, c/wh, [illegible], c/ci

WAVE

S E C R E T 051957Z CITE JMWAVE 1938

5 APR 68 IN 86154

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC MHGUILE AMGHOST COMMO

ROUTE	✗	
RS	✗	WH/C/OPS
	✗	INDEX

1P

REFS: A. JMWAVE 7571 (IN
B. DIRECTOR 07993

1. IN LINE REF A, SIGNAL PLAN KIWAR ACTIVATED 7 JUNE 67. CHIEF JMPAGE REQUESTS ADVICE RE STATUS THIS PLAN SINCE NO ACTION SINCE ACTIVATION.

2. DEFER TO HEADQUARTERS DEACTIVATE OR CONTINUE PLAN.

S E C R E T

BT

MICROFILMED
MAY 2 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

5 Apr 68

B. 201-238687

SECRET

201-307337

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 30 PER

ACTION WHP ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In) 3

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-307337

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/COG P, C/OPS, WPS/BG 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 182202Z JUNE 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0823

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE JMCOBRA

18 JUN 68 IN 33588

AMSTALK

REF: DIRECTOR 08724

1. AMSTALK-1 PER DIEM ADVANCES TOTALING $815.87 TRANSFERRED HQS BUENOS AIRES T/A 155. AMOUNT INCLUDES 29 APRIL ADVANCE OF M$N 46,550, VOUCHER 692, RECEIPT FOR WHICH WAS FORWARDED AS ATTACHMENT TO T/A 137. OTHER RECEIPTS AND COPIES OF VOUCHERS WERE POUCHED WITH T/A 155.

2. NO OTHER PAYMENTS OR ADVANCES MADE AMSTALK.

SECRET

BT

~~AB~~ ~~PS~~ ABSTRACT ~~INDEX~~

201-307337

18 June 68

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG: Fambrini
FAMBRINI:gma
UNIT: WH/4/A
EXT: 6609
DATE: 17 JUN 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER
CONF: WH8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-307337 ✓

INFO: FILE, VR WH/COG8, TSD6, CI/OA, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 17 22 08z JUN 68 CITE DIRECTOR 08847

TO JMWAVE INFO JMCOBRA

AN/~~EI~~		
PS	~~DEST~~	bewalers
ABSTRACT X		~~INDEX~~

AMSTALK

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0794 (IN 31442)*

REQUEST JMWAVE PICK-UP AND POUCH TO HQS NICARAGUAN PASSPORT AND IMMUNIZATION RECORD ISSUED TO AMSTALK-1 PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR BUENOS AIRES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Reference advised that Subject passport was returned to AMSTALK-1 to allow him to return to the United States following his TDY assignment in Buenos Aires.

201-307337
17 June 1968

C/WH/4 J Warner

TSD/AB P Phelan (phone)

by J W Estes
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: R.FAMBRINI/jd
UNIT: WH/4/AR
EXT: 6600
DATE: 17 JUNE 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ____ #

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-307337

INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG 8 CI/OA MPS/BGZ

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (p

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 08724

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO JMWAVE JMCOBRA 17 19 37 z JUN 68

AN&L		
PS		WH/Ops
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

AMSTALK

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0803 (IN-31511)

1. REQUEST BUENOS AIRES POUCH ITEMIZED LIST ALL ADVANCES AND PAYMENTS, INCLUDING PER DIEM, TO AMSTALK-1.

2. AS OF 17 JUNE 68 HQS HAS RECEIVED ONE VOUCHER COVERING AMSTALK-1 EXPENSES. VOUCHER DATED 2 MAY 68 IN AMOUNT 21,475 PESOS. RECEIPTS ATTACHED TO VOUCHER TOTAL 68,025 PESOS. DIFFERENCE OF 46,550 PESOS BETWEEN VOUCHER TOTAL AND RECEIPT TOTAL SHOWN ON ONE RECEIPT FOR THIS AMOUNT SIGNED BY AMSTALK-1 ON 30 APRIL 68. ASSUME THIS WAS PER DIEM PAYMENT, AND WAS INADVERTENTLY ATTACHED TO VOUCHER ALONG WITH OTHER RECEIPTS. ADVISE.

201-307337
17 June 1968

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: AMSTALK-1 completed his TDY assignment in Buenos Aires. He departed that city on 15 June 1968. All accounting for his travel, expenses and per diem are charged to Project BIFFIN Headquarters account.

WH/B&F E. Burroughs (in draft)

WH/COG F. Ames (in draft) ... CONT'D

5
4
3
2
1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT: JUN 19 8 42 AM '68
DATE:

JUN 19 3 [illegible] '68

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY RID/EDI PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

FORWARDED
RID/EDI

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 08724

TO PAGE TWO

Calvin M. Smythe
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RAYMOND A. WARREN
C/WH/4

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 3 PER SB • 150

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION c/SB5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE. VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2, C/WH/COG 2.

EYES ONLY

S E C R E T 142212Z JUN 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0803

14 JUN 68 IN 31511

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR, JMCOBRA

M

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT ~~AZ-OOASK~~ AMSTALK

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0794 (IN 3442)

AMSTALK-1 DEPARTING FOR MIAMI 15 JUNE VIA PANAM 518.

WILL CALL JMWAVE C/O 17 JUNE.

S E C R E T

BT

CUCNCHOWSKI

4E32

AFTER 0930

TRUE - MIGUEL ANGEL DIAZ

ALIAS - Juan Hidalgo ELIZONDO ROMANO

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SB E 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5			

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: M AT: 2050 Z

DISSEM BY: 28 PER SB .1, EO

ACTION C/SB5 ☒ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PRECEDENCE

INFO:

FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH2, C/WH/COG 2

"EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 142014Z JUNE 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0794 14 JUN 68 IN 31442

IMMEDIATE JMWAVE INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR JMCOBRA M

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT PBRUMEN ~~AZOGALK~~ AMSTALK

REFS: A. JMWAVE 2751 (IN 30491)

B. DIRECTOR 07509 (NOT SENT JMWAVE)

RF

1. VIEW REFS AMSTALK-1 ATTEMPTING OBTAIN RESERVATION AT ONCE FOR FLIGT MIAMI. WE COLLECTING FROM HIM HIS LOCAL DOCUMENTATION AND RETURNING TO HIM HIS NICARAGUAN PASSPORT AS WELL AS INS ENTRY DOCUMENTATION AND RETURN AIRLINE TICKET. WILL ADVISE FLIGT AND ARRIVAL DATE. WILL ALSO INSTRUCT HIM CALL IN TO JMWAVE C/O.

OPS SECTION

2. VIEW REF B (WHICH REVEALS AUDIO OPERATION IN AIR CONDITIONERS NOT FEASIBLE) WE WILL NOT REQUIRE AMSTALK-1 TO RETURN. WISH HOWEVER COMMEND HIM FOR HIS PERFORMANCE HERE. HE FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS, WAS THOROUGH, AUDACIOUS AND DEVOTED TO JOB. FAILURE OF OP WAS NOT HIS FAULT.

3. WE INFORMING BIOGENESIS THAT AMSTALK-1 SURVEY COMPLETED AND THAT CHANCES OF AUDIO INSTALLATION APPEAR SLIM BUT OUR HQS CONTINUING STUDY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
(When Filled In)
TOTAL COPIES
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY 4 PER 53.1

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SBJ-A RID COPY

INFO. FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH/COG 2

C/WH 2

EYES ONLY

SECRET 131611Z JUN 68 CITE JMWAVE 2751

13 JUN 68 IN 30491

PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR, JMCOBRA

AKULE REDTOP AERONAUT PERUMEN AMSTALK

REF: HABT-4933

Sc

RF

1. PER JMWAVE/JMCOBRA AGREEMENT, AMSTALK-1 FILES TRANSFERRED JMCOBRA ON 7 JUNE. LETTER FROM AMSTALK-1 ATTACHED REF WAS POSTED TO HIS WIFE 12 JUNE.

2. AMSTALK-1'S WIFE CALLED STATION 13 JUNE IN DESPERATION. WAS ADVISED LETTER ENROUTE. WIFE SAYS WROTE AMSTALK-1 OF BUSINESS PROBLEMS WHICH SHE UNABLE HANDLE. CLAIMS WHIRLPOOL CORP IS DEMANDING FULL PAYMENT THREE THOUSAND DOLLAR DEBT OR THREATEN FORECLOSURE. OTHER CREDITORS ALSO DEMANDING PAYMENTS. WIFE SAYS CREDITORS HAVE VISITED SHOP AND SINCE AMSTALK-1 NEVER AROUND, AND WIFE CANNOT SAY WHERE HE IS, CREDITORS FEEL AMSTALK-1 HAS SKIPPED. BUSINESS HAS BEEN SLOW FOR PAST TWO MONTHS. WIFE CANNOT SPEAK ENGLISH AND UNABLE HANDLE CREDITORS OR MAKE PAYMENTS.

3. PLS ADVISE AMSTALK-1'S VIEWS. ALSO ANY MANNER JMWAVE MAY ASSIST.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 12

ORIG: Glenn Hunt clp
UNIT: LSN SB/O/PT
EXT: 6587
DATE: 11 June 1968

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 24 PER SB . 1(E.O.)

CONF: C/SB-5 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

EYES ONLY

INFO: FILE , VR , DDP, ADDP, C/WH-2, C/TSD

-S E C R E T- 12 20 6 40 z Jun 68

WH/4/A
Chief CITE DIRECTOR 07509
CA
FI/CI
Reports

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET AERONAUT TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0772 (IN 28173)

1. FEASIBILITY STUDY ON BOTH LOCAL AND WESTINGHOUSE PLUGS JUST COMPLETED. STUDY REVEALED LOCAL BAKELITE PLUGS NOT SUITABLE SINC INSIDE PLUG TOO EASILY CHECKED BY ANY FJSTEALER WITH SCREWDRIVER.

2. WESTINGHOUSE MOLDED PLUGS ADAPTABLE ONLY FOR NON-SWITCHED, UNMASKED XMITTER. SINCE PLAIN LANGUAGE SIGNAL WOULD BE ON AIR CONSTAN'LY, WE BELIEVE SUCH INSTALLATION WOULD BE RAPIDLY DISCOVERED BY FJSTEALERS. IN VIEW POSSIBLE POLITICAL FLAP, INCREASED FJSTEALER SECURITY, AND POSSIBLE JEOPARDY TO OTHER GOING AND POTENTIAL AUDIO OPS IN SOUTH AMERICA WHICH COULD RESULT FROM EARLY COMPROMISE OF ~~WESTINGHOUSE~~ MOLDED [illegible] PLUG, REGRET HQS CANNOT APPROVE ITS USE. OTHER FACTORS SUCH AS UNKNOWN TARGET AREAS WHERE MACHINES WILL BE INSTALLED AND POSSIBILITY THEY MAY BE LEFT UNPLUGGED FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME ALSO ARGUE AGAINST OP.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/PT E. Haefner
SB/O/WH
TSD/AOB E. BRENNAN - PHONE
FI/OPS
CI/R&A/TC
WH/4
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH William V. Broe
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DC/SB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 118

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 13

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	4	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4	2	9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT: ________ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 34 PER SB (6C)

ACTION C/SB 5 ☑ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2, C/TSD

* EYES ONLY *

S E C R E T 102212Z JUN 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0772

10 JUN 68 IN 28173

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET AERONAUT TECHS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 02247

B. HABA-19,520

1. ONLY PERTINENT JOB FOR CASTAGNA IN PAST 14 DAYS HAS BEEN REFRIGERATOR WORK AT NEW REDTOP CULTURAL OFFICE. ALTHOUGH AMSTALK-1 DID CREDIBLE JOB OF CASING, ETC., THIS TARGET ALREADY THOROUGHLY COVERED PER BUENOS AIRES 0608. (IN 10982)

2. NOW THAT HQS HAS PLUGS, ETC., WOULD APPRECIATE ESTIMATE AS TO WHEN WE MAY EXPECT DELIVERY AUDIO DEVICES. THIS PERTINENT TO OUR PLANS RE AMSTALK-1.

S E C R E T

BT

WH/4/A
Chief ____
CA ____
FI/CI ✓
Reports ____
____

RETURN TO [illegible]

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION WH/4/[illegible]
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, Quito		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Buenos Aires			MICROFILM
SUBJECT REDTOP/[illegible]/ Four Postcards			

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: BUENOS AIRES 0599, 14 May 1968

1. Thank you for your prompt forwarding of the postcards requested in Reference.

2. Attached please find four of these postcards utilized by subject of Reference. Please, at your convenience, place local stamps on them and mail them through international post.

Edwin W. SHROYER

Attachment:
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Quito w/att h/w
2 - C/WH w/o att

19 #58/[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABT-4931	4 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 74-120-221 (C)

4 June 1968

14-00000

PRIORITY

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT		PROCESSING ACTION MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, SB Division Chief, WH Division		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Buenos Aires			MICROFILM

SUBJECT RYBAT/REDTOP/AERONAUT/AETARGET/TECHS Air-conditioner Plugs

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. BUENOS AIRES 0624, 15 May 1968

B. DIRECTOR 01179, 19 May 1968

1. Attached please find the following (we have marked each in accordance with our lettering):

A. Two plugs which were actually cut off of the REDTOP air-conditioners by José CASTAGNA. You will note that one of these plugs is fused together to a local adaptor. This adaptor is the type utilized by the local FJSTEALERS on those air-conditioners which still have original plugs.

B. A locally produced plug which is utilized by the FJSTEALERS to replace the original plugs (A above). This locally produced plug (B) was actually taken by AMSTALK-1 from José CASTAGNA's workshop.

C. A locally produced plug which, though slightly larger than (B) above, can be placed on the target air-conditioners.

2. In accordance with Reference B, we hope Headquarters can install an audio device in either of the above three plugs or plug/adaptor units.

Attachment: (Continued)
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att h/w
2 - C/WH w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-19,520	DATE 28 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 74-120-221

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T / R Y B A T | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-19,520

3. As to the length of the cord (your question in Reference A), AMSTALK-1 tells us that the cords are between three and four feet long.

4. If you have any further questions, please--in the interest of time--cable us.

Edwin W. SHROYER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AERONAUT/AMSTALK-1 MOC

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR-02756

Forwarded herewith for JMWAVE is the approved copy of AMSTALK-1's MOC.

Wendel J. RAMOVA

Attachments:
- MOC - Herewith
- Identities - U/S/C - #1 + #2

Distribution:
- 3 - COS, JMWAVE, w/atts.
- 2 - COS, Buenos Aires, w/atts.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-7073	27 May 1968 28 MAY 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-307337

Distribution:
- 1 - RI
- 1 - Chrono
- 1 - Tempo
- 1 - WH/COG

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/4/Ar	Robert Fambrini	mr	6609

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/4/A		Stephen G. Chaconas
C/WH/4	27 May	Raymond A. Warren

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL | DATE | OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

P Fambrini

ORIG.: R. FAMBRINI/jd
UNIT: WH/4/AR
EXT: 6609
DATE: 23 MAY 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER SB 1(EO)

CONF: C/SB 2 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-207337

INFO: FILE , VR , C/SB 5, C/WH/COG 2, DDP, ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) "Eyes only" (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 02756

[illegible]

TO JMWAVE INFO BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT

REF: JMWAVE-2483 (IN-16516)

1. CHECK FORWARDED 22 MAY [illegible] TO MIAMI BANK FOR TRANSFER TO AMSTALK-1 BANK FOR DEPOSIT HIS ACCOUNT.

2. AS REQUESTED UFGA-29892 APPROVED COPY AMSTALK-1 MOC BEING POUCHED VIA HABS-3135. PLEASE INITIATE SALARY PAYMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref attached.

C/WH/4

SB/O/WH J. Noland (by phone)

Calvin H. Tennyth
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
/s/ C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY 30 PER SB 1(E 0)

ACTION C/SS 5 ☒ RID COPY

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE. VR. DDP ADDP C/WH2 "EYES ONLY"

C/WH/COG 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	WH	6	
2	AC	7	
3		8	
4	#3	9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 221951Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2433 22 MAY 68 IN 16516

DIRECTOR INFO BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT SGFLAG

REFERENCE: BUENOS AIRES 0614 (IN 11644) ✓

1. REF LETTERS DELIVERED TO AMSTALK-1 WIFE ON 22 MAY.

2. RE PARA 2 REF, PLEASE ADVISE DATE CHECK MAILED TO AMSTALK-1 BANK ACCOUNT.

S E C R E T

BT

[illegible] 22 May

~~Advised~~ paid transfer

No answer

CT-4

Allen Crawford - Flynn - Chalona
x 1069

~~R-1039~~

SECRET

SEC. CL.
ORIGIN

CONTROL NO.

DATE OF DOC
DATE REC'D
DATE OUT
SUSPENSE DATE

CROSS REFERENCE OR POINT OF FILING

TO
FROM
SUBJ.

[illegible]

CHARGED TO [illegible]

ADVANCE ACCOUNT

ACCOUNTING DATE 30 Sept. 1964

COURIER NO.
ANSWERED
NO REPLY

ROUTING	DATE SENT
	3

SECRET (When filled in)

REQUEST FOR ADVANCE OF FUNDS

NAME OF ADVANCEE: Robert C. [illegible]

DATE: 5/17/63

AMOUNT: 250.00

DATE & VOUCHER NO.:

PAYABLE TO: Same

ROOM: 3372

BUILDING: HQS

TELEPHONE EXT: 6609

PURPOSE:
Mr. Stalk/ Travel Advance TDY Buenos Aires
To be deposited to bank account see 1864 attached

STATUS OF OUTSTANDING ADVANCES

DATE	AMOUNT	UNACCOUNTED BALANCE

I agree that I will fully account for this advance by submission of vouchers and refund of any unexpended balance to the place of accounting stated and by the due date checked below. In the event of my failure to so account and refund any unexpended balance, I authorize deduction from my salary to effect settlement.

DUE DATE	✓
ON ARRIVAL AT DESTINATION ON OR ABOUT	
MONTHLY—ON THE LAST WORKDAY OF EACH MONTH	

PLACE OF ACCOUNTING: HQS 098

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ________ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE: SIGNATURE OF ADVANCEE:

DATE: SIGNATURE OF AGENT:

REQUESTING OFFICER

DATE: SIGNATURE:

APPROVED

DATE: SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER:

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.: COST-FAN ACCOUNT NO.: 8135-0635

DATE: SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER:

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE: AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER:

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS ADVANCED

I acknowledge receipt of funds in the amount stated hereunder to be used for the purpose stated and accounted for as shown above.

DATE: AMOUNT:

SIGNATURE OF ☐ ADVANCEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 / DESCRIPTION ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 VOUCHER NO. / SHIP. DOC. NO. / 32-33 DIV	34-39 STATION CODE / RECEIPT NO. / PROJECT NO.	40-41 E.C. CODE / F.D. CODE / N.E. D	42-47 O&C G. REF. NO. / ADVANCE ACCT. NO. / EMP. NO.	48-49 OBL. REF. SUB NO.	50 C L N C F	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	F.Y.	FUNDS	55-66 COST—FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL	61-66 CK. NO. X REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS / 68-70 DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	71-80 AMOUNT CREDIT

DATE: PREPARED BY: DATE: REVIEWED BY: TOTALS

FORM 7-65 281 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(38-49)

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance

Date: 5/[illegible]

FROM : C/WH/4

SENT TRANSFER ON 3.2[illegible]

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.) ______ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to MIGUEL ANGEL DIAZ , CA $ 266.00
NAME OF PAYEE (True) STATUS (e.g.) CASUALTY, INFORMANT AMOUNT

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1) ______ Devised Cover Check. Account No. ______
(2) X Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking below)

	ATLANTA		DALLAS*		KNOXVILLE		MINNEAPOLIS		RICHMOND		WASHINGTON*
	BOSTON		DENVER		LOS ANGELES		NEW ORLEANS		SAN FRANCISCO		WILMINGTON
	CHICAGO		DETROIT	X	MIAMI		NEW YORK*		SEATTLE		▨
	CLEVELAND		KANSAS CITY		MILWAUKEE		PHILADELPHIA		ST. LOUIS		▨

*Checks in any amount up to $25,000.00 from New York; $10,000.00 from Dallas; $2,500.00 from Washington are available for immediate delivery.

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc. to Payee's Bank Account:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer or Compensation and Tax Division)
Complete the following:
(1) Account Name: MIGUEL ANGEL DIAZ
(2) Account Number: ______
(3) Bank Name: BOULEVARD NATIONAL BANK
(4) Bank Address: ATTN: MR [illegible] GOMEZ
MIAMI, FLORIDA Zip: ______
(5) Transfer: ☐ via Mail ☐ Bank Wire or ☐ Cable
(6) Payment to be originated from ______
(SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
(7) Indicate remittor if desired: ______

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ______ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. Discuss details with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch, ext. 3523.

3. Payment by other means: Contact Monetary Division Banking Branch Officer, ext. 3493.
4. Check will be picked up at ☐ 6E29 Hdqs. or ☐ (Specify) ______
5. When transaction is complete notify ______ ext. ______
NAME

Robert L. Ambrose 6609 6668
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER EXT. SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER EXT.

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

METHOD OF PAYMENT	ACCOUNT NO.	CODE	NAME		
	CHECK ON - BANK		PAYABLE TO - BANK		
	ACTION BY BANK				
	CHECK	DEPOSIT	MAIL	WIRE	CABLE	TELEPHONE

FORM 5-66 1864 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(23)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIAL. SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: GLENN HUNT/rbo
UNIT: SB/O/PT
EXT: 6587
DATE: 22 MAY 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: ________ PER SB # 1 (EO)

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/SB 5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2, C/TSD

Eyes Only

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET MAY 22 22 15 Z CITE DIRECTOR 02247

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO: PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET AERONAUT TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0649 (IN 14798)

RF

file (201 [illegible])

1. RE PARA THREE REF PREFER NOT MIX DIFFERENT TYPES DEVICES IN THIS OP, I.E., ONE FOR UNILATERAL AND LESSER ONE AS SOP FOR BIOGENESIS. SINCE CASTAGNA WOULD BE OBVIOUS SOURCE OF INSTALLATION, COMPROMISE OF ONE (PROBABLY LESSER DEVICE) WOULD LIKELY LEAD TO COMPROMISE OF OTHER. THEREFORE, SUGGEST WE STICK TO YOUR ORIGINAL PLAN OF NOT REVEALING TRUE SITUATION TO BIOGENESIS RE INSTALLATION, AND PLAN FOR UNILATERAL OP.

2. RE PARA FOUR HQS CANNOT MEET TWO WEEK TIMETABLE. FEASIBILITY STUDY WILL TAKE ABOUT ONE WEEK AFTER RECEIPT PLUGS AND PREFABBING WILL TAKE AT LEAST THIRTY DAYS AFTER THAT. PLS NOTE WE CANNOT EVEN GUARANTEE THAT PLUGS ARE ADAPTABLE TO AUDIO DEVICE. MUST DEFERD DECISION UNTIL WE HAVE BOTH WESTINGHOUSE AND LOCAL PLUGS IN HAND.

3. AMSTALK-1 ACCEPTED BUENOS AIRES ASSIGNMENT FOR UP TO FOUR MONTHS, I.E., 15 AUGUST 1968. THERE NO HQS OBJECTIONS, HOWEVER, IF STATION REQUIRES HIS SERVICES OVER LONGER PERIOD, AND IF AMSTALK-1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________ #________

CONF:

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:

FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 02247

TO

PAGE 2

WILLING. THERE ALSO NO HQS OBJECTIONS HAVE AMSTALK-1 DEPART BUENOS AIRES AND RETURN AT LATER DATE. BELIEVE THIS DEPENDS ON STATION DETERMINATION THAT SUCH MOVE WILL NOT AFFECT AMSTALK-1 VIABILITY CASTAGNA SHOP AND IF AMSTALK-1 WILLING TO RETURN. PLS ADVISE. ONLY REQUIREMENT WOULD BE FOR BIOGENESIS TO OBTAIN NECESSARY ARGENTINE RE-ENTRY PERMIT AND VISA EXTENSION AS DO NOT BELIEVE WOULD BE POSSIBLE MAKE APPLICATION FOR ADDITIONAL VISA IN [illegible] U.S.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH J. NOLAND, IN DRAFT

TSD/AOB E. BRENNAN, BY PHONE

WH/4

CI/R&A/TC

C/WH

C/SB/AO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AERONAUT/ Letter to be Forwarded

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Please Forward Letter

Reference : HABT-4898, 14 May 1968

Attached please find a letter written by the Subject of Reference. Station Buenos Aires would appreciate if you would forward this letter immediately to Subject's wife.

Edwin W. SHROYER

Attachment:
Letter, h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, JMWAVE w/att h/w
2 - C/WH w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABT-4909	20 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-307337 FPN: 74-120-221

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
(When Filled In)
TOTAL COPIES
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
BY: ______ AT: ______ Z
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______
X-REF TO FILE NO. ______
DISSEM BY ______ PER SB /(E.O.) FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, ADDP, DDP, C/WH 2, C/TSD,

"EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 202022Z MAY 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0649

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

20 MAY 68 IN 14798

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET AERONAUT TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 01179

1. WE WILL PROCURE (UNILATERALLY) AND POUCH SAMPLES LOCAL PLUGS AND ADAPTERS. WILL ALSO OBTAIN (VIA AMSTALK-1 WITHOUT ALERTING CASTAGNA) DETAILED DATA AS TO LENGTH OF CORD. HOWEVER WISH REPEAT: AIR CONDITIONERS ARE ONLY IN USE 3 OR 4 MONTHS OF YEAR. THUS, ASSUMING UNIT WILL REMAIN PLUGGED IN ALTHOUGH NOT IN USE (WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE CASE) WE COULD RECEIVE 8 OR 9 MONTHS OF TAKE PER YEAR WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY SATISFY US AT THIS TIME.

2. SINCE GIMMICKED PLUG RESTRICTED TO UNILATERAL USE, CONVINCED WE CAN INSTALL IT WITHOUT CASTAGNA KNOWLEDGE.

3. ON OTHER HAND, AS PARTIAL SOP TO BIOGENESIS, IS THERE ANY SECURE BUT LESS SOPHISTICATED RELEASABLE DEVICE WHICH COULD BE INSTALLED IN AN AIR CONDITIONER UNIT WHICH TO BE UTILIZED BY EITHER TRADE MISSION OR POSADAS? ASSUMING HQS CAN COME UP WITH SUCH A DEVICE, WE WOULD INFORM BIOGENESIS OF INSTALLATION

Glen
Hunt
R1551

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
(When Filled In)
TOTAL COPIES
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY: ______ AT: ______ Z
DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #
ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______
X-REF TO FILE NO. ______
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG
INFO:
FILE, VR,

PAGE TWO BUENOS AIRES 0649 S E C R E T

AND THEY IN TURN WOULD OBTAIN AND MAN LP. IF THIS NOT FEASIBLE WE WILL EVENTUALLY ADVISE BIOGENESIS THAT WE UNABLE COME UP WITH SUITABLE DEVICE BUT "WE STUDYING UNITS" THEREBY PAVING WAY FOR FUTURE INSTALLATION OF GIMMICKED PLUG.

4. BELIEVE AMSTALK-1'S BASIC MISSION ACCOMPLISHED. HOWEVER SINCE WE EXPECT UNITS TO BE PULLED MOMENTARILY FROM POSADAS AND POSSIBLY OTHER UNITS FROM TRADE MISSION, WE PLAN KEEP HIM HERE FOR AT LEAST TWO MORE WEEKS. WHAT IS TIMETABLE FOR PRODUCING GIMMICKED PLUG? IT WOULD OF COURSE BE IDEAL IF AMSTALK-1 COULD PARTICIPATE IN INSTALLATION THIS TRIP. IF TIMING PRECLUDES THIS, PERHAPS HE COULD RETURN BUENOS AIRES ONCE DEVICE READY. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

AMSTALK-1
told he would remain
B.A. 3 to 4 weeks-
so he could stay there
until 15 July 67 if
needed.

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13

ORIG: GLENN HUNT/rbo
UNIT: SB/o/PT
EXT: 6587
DATE: 17 MAY 68

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	4	6	c
2		7	
3		8	
4	arg	9	
5		10	4

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 32 PER SC, 1 E.O.

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/SB5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2, C/TSD

"EYES ONLY"

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 18 1725Z CITE DIRECTOR

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO: PANAMA CITY

07179

RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET AERONAUT ~~INKK~~ TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0624 (IN 11762)

1. MUCH APPRECIATE REF REVIEW OF SITUATION TO DATE.

2. DUE AGE MACHINES AND PREVIOUS UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS UTILIZE EXACTLY SIMILAR TECHNIQUES ANOTHER AREA, BELIEVE MOST PROMISING ASPECT TO DEVELOP IS AIR CONDITIONER PLUG PROVIDING CORD IS OF SUFFICIENT LENGTH TO ISOLATE GIMMICKED PLUG FROM MACHINE NOISE. USING MODEL AND SERIAL NUMBERS CITED REF WILL ATTEMPT PROCURE SIMILAR WESTINGHOUSE PLUGS FOR FEASIBILITY STUDY. REQUEST YOU POUCH SOONEST SEVERAL SAMPLES LOCAL PLUG CITED REF. PLS NOTE GIMMICKED PLUG RESTRICTED TO UNILATERAL USE. THEREFORE ACQUISITION LOCAL PLUGS SHOULD BE DONE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE CASTAGNA/BIOGENISIS. LIKEWISE EVENTUAL USE PLUG WILL HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE ~~EXSTAXX~~ CASTANGA/ GN BIOGENESIS.

3. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES PLS ADVISE HOW MUCH LONGER YOU EXPECT AMSTALK/1 REMAIN BUENOS AIRES.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

661

COPY No.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY________PER________#________
CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 01179

PAGE 2

TO

SB/O/WH+
TSD/AOB E. BRENNAN - PHONE
CI/R&A/TC
WH/4
DC/SB/AO

5
4
3
2
1

C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER SR-1(E.O.)

ACTION
C/SB 5 ☒ R.I. COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE. VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2, C/TSD "EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 152207Z MAY 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0624 15 MAY 68 IN 11702

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

REFS: A. BUENOS AIRES 0546 (IN 05644)

B. HABT-4889

C. BUENOS AIRES 0606 (IN 10515)

WH/4/A
Chief ____
CA ____
PI/CI ____
Reports ____

1. THOROUGH REVIEW AMSTALK-1/CASTAGNA ACTIVITIES OVER PAST 4 WEEKS HAS PULLED TOGETHER FOLLOWING PERTINENT INFORMATION:

A. THERE ARE APPROX 20 AIR CONDITIONER UNITS USED BY FJSTEALERS. ALL ARE US MANUFACTURE AND WERE OBTAINED IN U.S. ALL UNITS ARE 5 YRS OLD OR OLDER. ALL ARE EITHER FRIGIDAIRE, WESTINGHOUSE, OR PHILCO AND ARE FOR COOLING ONLY (NO REVERSE CYCLE). MOST OF THEM HAVE REGULAR U.S. TYPE PLUGS. REMAINDER HAVE HAD U.S. TYPE PLUGS REPLACED WITH LOCAL TYPE. CAPACITY 14,000 BTU, WORKING VOLTAGE 230 OR 208. OF THESE UNITS 6 ARE UTILIZED BY EMBASSY, OTHERS SPRINKLED THROUGHOUT TRADE AND RESIDENCE SITES.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE, VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE TWO BUENOS AIRES 0624 SECRET

B. CASTAGNA HAS BEEN SERVICING ALL AIR CONDITIONERS FOR PAST 10 YEARS AND ALL SIGNS POINT TOWARD CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT. HE HAS BEEN COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE WITH AMSTALK-1 WHO CONSIDERS HIM ABLE, TRUSTWORTHY, AND COMPETENT.

C. SERVICING OF EACH UNIT IS DONE IN CASTAGNA'S SHOP WHERE HE KEEPS UNITS FOR PERIODS RANGING FROM 3 TO 7 DAYS. HE CAN AND IS WILLING TO EXTEND THIS PERIOD IF NECESSARY.

D. REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR UNITS ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN ARGENTINA. REPLACEMENT PARTS ARE JERRYRIGGED BY CASTAGNA. SAME HOLDS FOR REPAIRS TO SWITCHES, THERMOSTATS, CAPACITORS, ETC.

2. IT IS ALSO NOW APPARENT TO US THAT AMSTALK-1'S ACCESS TO EMBASSY (WHICH OUR PRIME TARGET THIS OP) IS LIMITED. UNLESS CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE DRASTICALLY (AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY WILL) AMSTALK-1'S ACCESS TO EMBASSY WILL BE LIMITED TO BASEMENT ROOM.

3. WHILE WE REALIZE AIR CONDITIONER UNIT NOT IDEAL FOR CONCEALMENT AUDIO DEVICE, BELIEVE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES OFFER UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY OVERCOME USUAL OBSTACLES. THEFORE

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR,

PAGE THREE BUENOS AIRES 0624 SECRET

REQUEST HQS CONSIDER FOLLOWING:

A. UNITS UTILIZED BY EMBASSY ARE ALL (OR ALMOST ALL) WESTINGHOUSE. THIS VERIFIED BY SHROYER/GUADET EXAMINATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF REAR OF TARGET PLUS THEIR RECENT STUDY FROM BIHYPO LP. THE 3 UNITS CHECKED AND PHOTOGRAPHED BY AMSTALK-1 (SEE REFS) ARE 7 YEARS OLD AND HAVE FOLLOWING MODEL NUMBERS: RWB75025; RWB150D25; SW100C825. SERIAL NUMBERS 18601419; 18LD4009; AND 18J01808. (ON OUR INSTRUCTIONS, ONE OF THESE WAS RIGGED BY CASTAGNA PRIOR TO RETURN TO EMBASSY AND ACCORDING CASTAGNA IT WILL BREAK DOWN AFTER 3 OR 4 HOURS USE. THIS WILL MEAN IT MUST BE PULLED AND EVENTUALLY RETURNED TO CASTAGNA SHOP.)

B. HQS SHOULD PURCHASE COMPARABLE WESTINGHOUSE UNIT AND INITIATE STUDY AND RESEARCH TO DETERMINE FEASIBILITY CONCEAL MASKED SWITCHED TRANSMITTER. IF THIS FEASIBLE, PRODUCTION OF 3 UNITS SHOULD BE INITIATED.

C. AS TO TIME FACTOR, IT NOW APPEARS NO AIR CONDITIONER REPAIR REQUIRED BY EMBASSY UNTIL POSSIBLY NOVEMBER 1968. ASSUMING AUDIO DEVICES BUILT AND READY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY: ________ PER ________ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE FOUR BUENOS AIRES 0624 SECRET

BY THIS TIME, THEY WOULD BE SENT TO STATION AND WHEN UNITS PULLED INSTALLATION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN CASTAGNA WORKSHOP.

4. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS, SUGGESTIONS OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

1404

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

[illegible]SSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

[illegible]UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 80 PER SB . 1/E(0.)

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2 "EYES ONLY"
C/WH/COG 2

S E C R E T 151912Z MAY 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0615

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT SGFLAG

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0614 (IN 11644)

IDENTITY: ACCOUNT OF:

MIGUEL ANGEL DIAZ
BOULEVARD NATIONAL BANK
MIAMI, FLORIDA
ATTN: MR MORALES GOMEZ

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

ACTION: 3 PER SB . (E)

SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE. VR. DDP ADDP C/WH 2 "EYES ONLY"
C/CI C/WH/COG 2

TIME AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

aug

SECRET 151908Z MAY 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0614 11044

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT SGFLAG

REFS A HABT-4898, 14 MAY 1968

B DIRECTOR 91947

1. PER REF A JMWAVE C/O TO DELIVER LETTERS TO WIFE AMSTALK-1. THESE LETTERS AMSTALK-1 TELLS WIFE HE FORWARDING $256.00 HER.

2. THEREFORE PLEASE DEPOSIT $256.00 TO IDENTITY ACCOUNT. SUM REPRESENTS EARNED PER DIEM AND SHOULD BE CHARGED AMSTALK-1 ADVANCE ACCOUNT TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR UPON RETURN HQS.

3. JMWAVE: WHEN LETTERS DELIVERED PLS TELL MRS. AMSTALK-1 MONEY TO BE DEPOSITED.

SECRET

BT

WH/4/A
Chief
CA
FI/CI
Reports

John Hurtz 4163

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 32 PER SB-1E0,

ACTION C/SB5 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2, C/TSD,

"EYES ONLY"

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 142020Z MAY 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0606

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

14 May 68 IN 10018

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0546 (IN 65644)

1. ON 13 MAY AMSTALK-1 ACCOMPANIED CASTAGNAS ON VISIT TO BIBANDIT-6. UNDER PRETEXT BUSINESS SLOW DUE COOL WEATHER, CASTAGNA ATTEMPTED DRUM UP BUSINESS FROM B-6. LATTER COOPERATIVE AND PLEASANT SAID FOLLOWING:

A. WITHIN 10 DAYS THREE AIR-CONDITIONER UNITS FROM POSADAS WILL BE TURNED OVER CASTAGNA FOR OVERHAUL.

B. TRADE DELEGATION PLANS BUY AROUND 20 REFRIGERATORS FROM CASTAGNA IN NEAR FUTURE.

C. THREE UNITS DELIVERED 6 MAY (SEE REF) ACTUALLY BELONGED TO EMBASSY BUT HAD BEEN LOANED TRADE DELEGATION.

D. SOV EMBASSY PRESENTLY HAS SOME NEW UNITS (PRESUMABLY NEVER USED) WHICH BELONGED EMBASSY OFFICER WHO COMMITTED SUICIDE TWO YEARS AGO (BORIS SUKHOMLINOV). THESE MAY BE USED IN TRADE DELEGATION. IF NOT, NEW UNITS MAY BE PURCHASED FROM CASTAGNA.

WH/4/A
Chief ____
CA ____
CI/CI ____
Reports ____

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO. BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE. VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 0606 SECRET

2. IF ABOVE CORRECT, MUST ASSUME OUR THOUGHT THAT SOV TECHS WISHED EXAMINE THREE UNITS PROBABLY INCORRECT. TECHS DEPARTED BUENOS AIRES 10 MAY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 2 PER ______ #

ACTION
C/SB 5

☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI

SECRET 141600Z MAY 63 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0599

QUITO INFO DIRECTOR

14 May 63 IN 10615

RYBAT REDTOP AMSTALK

PLEASE POUCH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SIX LOCAL POSTCARDS WHICH WE NEED FOR USE BY AMSTALK-1 IN SUPPORT HIS COVER LEGEND.

SECRET

BT

WH/4/A
Chief SC
CA
FI/CI X
Reports

SECRET

9 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/B&F

SUBJECT : Request for Extension of Due Date for Accounting of Operational Advance for AMSTALK-1

1. It is requested that the due date for accounting for a $200 operational advance made to AMSTALK-1 be extended from 31 May 1968 to 30 September 1968.

2. The above mentioned advance was made to AMSTALK-1 on 19 April 1968 just prior to his departure for TDY travel to Buenos Aires, Argentina. The advance was made to cover AMSTALK-1's expenses for travel and accommodations.

3. AMSTALK-1 is in Buenos Aires for the purpose of performing an operational task for the Station and is expected to remain there until August 1968. Upon the completion of his task in Buenos Aires, AMSTALK-1 will return to the United States where he will make an accounting for Subject funds.

Robert L. Fambrini
WH/4/A

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

STATEMENT OF ADVANCE ACCOUNT

FAMBRINI ROBERT L	02575[illegible]	1441	750000 [illegible]	30/04/76
EMPLOYEE NAME	ACCOUNT NUMBER	GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT	DIVISION	STATEMENT DATE

ACCOUNTING REFERENCE					DESCRIPTION SEE REVERSE FOR LEGEND OF ABBREVIATIONS	DUE DATE		ADVANCES	ACCOUNTINGS AND OR REFUNDS	BALANCE OF ADVANCE NOT ACCOUNTED FOR
DATE			VOUCHER NUMBER	TVL ORD NO OR CBL REF NO						
DAY	MO	YR				MO	YR			
23	04	6	506075	002547	HQ OPS ADV AMST ALK	05	6	20000		20000

NOTICE: This is a statement of your advance account. It is your responsibility to render complete accountings and refund to the Monetary Division, Office of Finance, any balances of funds a[illegible] by the last day of the month identi[illegible] by Calendar Month Numerical Indicator in the column headed "Due Date", or upon [illegible] of the purpose for which the funds were advanced, whichever date is earlier. [illegible] (See [illegible])

If an accounting and/or a refund has been made for the advance or [illegible] in this statement, no action on your part is required.

BALANCE 20000

FORM 676 USE PREVIOUS
7-67 EDITIONS

SECRET

Chief, SB Division
Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Panama City

Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

RYBAT/REDTOP/AERONAUT/AETARGET/TECHS
Photographs of Air Conditioners

1. Attached please find a series of photographs taken by AMSTALK-1 in José CASTAGNA's workshop of the two types (Frigidaire and Westinghouse) of air conditioners which were pulled from the local Soviet Embassy and Soviet Trade Mission.

2. Our detailed proposals as to possible audio installations in these air conditioned units will follow.

Edwin W. SHROYER

Attachment:
Photos, h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att h/w
2 - C/WH w/o att
2 - COS, Panama City w/att h/w

HABT-4889 8 May 1968

SECRET 74-120-221

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T / R Y B A T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
RYBAT/REDTOP/AERONAUT/AETARGET/
Signatures of AMSTALK-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGT-21785, 25 April 1968

B. DIRECTOR 94087

Forwarded under separate cover are the signatures requested in References.

Edwin W. SHROYER

Attachment:
As stated, UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Distribution:
2 - C/WH w/att U/S/C
2 - COS, JMWAVE w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABT-4888	DATE 8 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T / R Y B A T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-307337 FFN: 74-120-221

SECRET

№ SD 56490 A DATE

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE)

(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS:

SECRET

SECRET

№ SD 56490 B DATE

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

Juan H Elizondo

(SIGNATURE) [redacted]

(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

S E C R E T 071[illegible]Z MAY 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0546

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

REF: BUENOS AIRES [illegible] ([illegible])

BA.0546 7 MAY 68 IN 0564[illegible]
(05644)
7 May 68

1. ON 6 MAY AM[illegible]-1 ACCOMPANIED CASTAGNA TO SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION IN ORDER DELIVER REFRIGERATOR AND THREE AIR CONDITIONER UNITS. THEY RECEIVED BY VIKTOR NIKOL[illegible] SHPILEV (201-805[illegible]) WHO ESCORTED THEM TO FIRST FLOOR WHERE REFRIGERATOR INSTALLED. CASTAGNA PRESENTED BILL FOR 35,000 PESOS BUT SHPILEV SAID THIS TOO CHEAP AND RAISED COST TO 55,000 PESOS GIVING CASTAGNA 40,000 AND EVIDENTLY POCKETING 15,000. SHPILEV THEN SAID THREE AIR CONDITIONERS TO BE DELIVERED TO EMBASSY. (ALTHOUGH THEY PULLED BY CASTAGNA FROM TRADE DELEGATION.)

WH/
Chief ___
___
___
___
___
Rept ___

2. CASTAGNA AND A-1 THEN TRANSPORTED THREE UNITS TO SOVIET EMBASSY WHERE NIKOLAY VASILYEVICH KUZNETSOV (201-[illegible]) ESCORTED THEM TO BASEMENT OFFICE. AFTER SHORT DISCUSSION (A-1 BELIEVES AN ARGUMENT) BETWEEN KUZNETSOV AND SHPILEV (WHO HAD COME SOV EMBASSY) A THIRD SOVIET (AS YET UNIDENTIFIED BUT A-1 WILL RE-STUDY PHOTOGRAPHS) ARRIVED AND, AFTER SHORT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐

INFO

FILE

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 0546 SECRET

DISCUSSION WITH KUZNETSOV AND SHPILEV, DEPARTED. THREE UNITS THEN PLACED IN BASEMENT OFFICE. UNIT WHICH DELIVERED 30 APRIL STILL THERE.

3. CASTAGNA REPORTS THIS FIRST TIME HE HAS NOT RETURNED AIR CONDITIONERS DIRECTLY TO TRADE DELEGATION. WHILE WE AT PRESENT CAN ONLY SPECULATE AS TO CAUSE OF CHANGE IN ROUTINE, WE INCLINED BELIEVE VISITING SOV TECHS (ANDREY ROSHKIN AND YURIY KABATOV) WILL EXAMINE UNITS PRIOR THEIR INSTALLATION.

SCRET

BT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
REDTOP/Viktor Nikolayevich SHPILEV (201-805106)	2. FILE NO. 620
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HABA-19426
	4. DATE 6 May 68
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

2. Subsequent to the completion of the Attachment (SPR on Subject), we learned from AMSTALK that SHPILEV, in a recent transaction with a local service contact, was observed to add fifteen thousand pesos to the bill. The contact receipted for the total amount, and SHPILEV then returned five of the extra fifteen thousand pesos to him. This type of activity on SHPILEV's part appears to open up interesting operational possibilities. We plan to watch the situation carefully and will advise you.

Amstalk - 201

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
ON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 14

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	C
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 30 PER SB . 1(E.O.)

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION
C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE, VR, DDP ADDP C/WH 2 "EYES ONLY"
C/WH/COG 2

S E C R E T 032105Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2282

3 MAY 68 IN 03801

BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET

REFERENCE: BUENOS AIRES 0520 (IN 02898)

IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 3 MAY, AMSTALK-1 WIFE STATED THAT DAUGHTER RESPONDING WELL TO MEDICAL TREATMENT AND IN NO PAIN. FAMILY SENDS ITS LOVE.

S E C R E T

BT

SC

RF

SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3	CCASG	8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

DISSEM BY 28 PER SB/IED

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SB5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE, VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH 4, C/WH/COG 2, "EYES ONLY"

SECRET 022017Z MAY 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0520

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

2 MAY 68 IN 02098

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET

1. AMSTALK-1 HAS ASKED US IF WE COULD FIND OUT IF ALL WELL WITH HIS DAUGHTER WHO FELL DOWN AND CUT HER TONGUE ON THE DAY A-1 DEPARTED MIAMI.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE INFORMATION WHICH WE WILL RELAY PROMPTLY TO A-1.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

SECRET

2 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : Trace Results -
AMSTALK-1 (201-307337)

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 26 April 1968

The trace results requested in your memorandum were forwarded to your office on 24 April 1968

Raymond A. Warren
C/WH/4

DDP/WH/4/Ar:JKeirle:mr (2 May 1968)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - CI/OA
1 - 201-307337

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO.
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
AMSTALK-1 Reentry Documents

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: See below

Forwarded as a separate cover attachment are two copies of an LNYUMA document which should be turned over to AMSTALK-1 just prior to his departure from Argentina for WOLADY. AMSTALK-1 will need both copies of the document to re-enter WOLADY.

Wendel J. RAMOVA

Attachment:
Documents -- 2 cys (u/s/c)

Distribution:
3 - COS, Buenos Aires w/att (u/s/c)
2 - COS, JMWAVE w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABW-11,076	1 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET/RYBAT	201-807337

ORIGINATING

OFFICE | OFFICER | TYPIST | EXT.
A R. Fambrini/jd

Distribution:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono
1 - Tempo
1 - WH/COG
1 - OS/AAS

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
OS/AAS		Attn: Mr. L. Weinchowsky
WH/COG	2 MAY	David Phillips

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/4		/Raymond A. Warren

U ED STATI Under Separ Co r Att. to: HABW-1.
IMMIGRATION
Dated 1 May 1968

File Number: A11 264 049

AUTHORIZATION FOR P
ALIEN ENT

Name of Alien: Juan Hidalgo ELIZONDO-Romano (First) (Middle) (Last) Date of Birth: May 5, 1938

Place of Birth: Managua (City or Town) (State or Province) Nicaragua (Country)

U. S. Address: Airport International Hotel, Miami, Florida

Presentation of the attached duplicate of this document will authorize a transportation line to accept the named bearer on board for travel to the United States without liability under Section 273 of the Immigration and Nationality Act for bringing an alien who does not have a visa.

Presentation of the original of this document prior to October 17, 1968 will authorize an Immigration officer at a port of entry in the United States to permit the named bearer, whose photograph appears hereon, to enter the United States:

☒ as an alien paroled pursuant to Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

☐ as a conditional entrant pursuant to Section 203(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Remarks:

The beneficiary of this authorization has established a need to visit Argentina and several other South American countries and return on one occasion before October 17, 1968.

(Signature of Immigration Officer)
Deputy Associate Commissioner, Travel Control

Washington, D. C.
(Authorizing Office)



ATION &
IZATION
VICE

ARRIVAL STAMP

Form I-512 (Rev. 12-15-65)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: _____ AT: _____ Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER SB/EO

ACTION C/SB5 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____

X-REF. TO FILE NO. _____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH2, C/TSD

"EYES ONLY"

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 302230Z APR 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 0513

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AERONAUT AETARGET TECHS

1 May 68 IN 01395

m

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0480 (IN 99086)

1. AMSTALK-1 INTRODUCED TO CASTAGNA 29 APRIL AND BEGAN WORK AT FIRM. A-1 FIRST-HAND DEBRIEFING OF CASTAGNA SHEDS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT LIGHT ON CASTAGNA ACCESS AND IT APPARENT BIOGENESIS REPORT (REF) INACCURATE:

A. ONLY ONE AIR CONDITIONER FROM EMBASSY AND NO AGREEMENT AS YET WORK ON OTHERS IN EMBASSY. ELEVEN MENTIONED REF ARE FROM TRADE MISSION.

B. CASTAGNA ACCESS TO EMBASSY LIMITED OVER PAST FOUR MONTHS TO PICK UP AND DELIVERY UNITS TO DOWNSTAIRS ROOM IN EMBASSY. WITHDRAWAL AND INSTALLATION DONE BY SOVIETS. THIS NOT CASE WITH TRADE MISSION AND POSADAS WHERE CASTAGNA ALLOWED ENTER, PULL AND REINSTATE UNITS.

2. ON 30 APRIL AMSTALK-1 ACCOMPANIED CASTAGNA TO EMBASSY IN ORDER DELIVER REPAIRED UNIT. ACCESS LIMITED TO BASEMENT ROOM WHERE NIKOLAY KUZNETSOV ACCEPTED AND PAID FOR REPAIRED UNIT.

25565

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 0513 SECRET

3. AS IT NOW STANDS, IT APPEARS THAT WHILE AMSTALK-1 MAY HAVE GOOD ACCESS TO TRADE MISSION AND POSADAS, HIS ACCESS TO EMBASSY WILL BE PROBABLY LIMITED TO BASEMENT ROOM. AMSTALK-1 WILL ACCOMPANY CASTAGNA ON 6 MAY TO TRADE MISSION IN ORDER DELIVER THREE UNITS. OTHER UNITS WILL PROBABLY BE PULLED AT THIS TIME.

4. WE WILL FORWARD OUR VIEWS AND OPERATIONAL SUGGESTIONS ONCE WE ABLE DEBRIEF AMSTALK-1 IN DETAIL.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/4/A - J. Keirle

NUMBER
201-307337

SUBJECT
~~AMOTIN/117~~ Anstnk/1

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
18 April 1968 dt

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

As requested in 772 of 18 April 1968.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	1 May 1968

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(9)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: J. KEIRLE/jd
UNIT: WH/4/A
EXT: 6067
DATE: 1 MAY 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 32 PER ____ # ____

CONF: WH8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-307337

INFO: FILE , VR , SB8, WH/COG8, CI/OA, CI/IC2, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic

SECRET MAY 2 17 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR 96246

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO JMWAVE

REDTOP BIOGENESIS

REF: DIR 86830

POA GRANTED 1 MAY 68 FOR AMSTALK-1 USE AS STATED REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Updated POA requested for AMSTALK-1's one time use in Buenos Aires in proposed audio ops targeted against Soviet Bloc.

SB/O/WH ____

CI/OA ____

Calvin M. Smith
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RAYMOND A. WARREN
C/WH/4

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ~~MRK~~ PSYCH WARFARE GENERAL:
COUNTRY CHILE

INCLUSIVE DATES: FEBRUARY 1973-74

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SUBJECT

No.

FROM: (Files Control component)
C/FA/AB/6

TO:
C/IP/DSS

TO: (Station/Base)
Santiago, Chile

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Division)
C/LA

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12

ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND FIRST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE	2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER: COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
☒ SUBJECT ☐ PROJECT	015	126	003

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

Psych Warfare General

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION				5. DISPOSITION	
☐ OPEN FILE	☒ CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)	☐ RETAIN	☐ DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)
☐ AMEND FILE TITLE	☐ REOPEN		

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
015

FILES ACTION

9.
☐ HOLD IN CS FILES
☐ RESTRICTED
☒ UNRESTRICTED
☐ PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER
☐ CHANGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

Bx

11. ENDORSEMENT	12. COORDINATION	13. RID APPROVAL
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. #778	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)	REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

FORM 812 12-65 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

38 1--CS COPY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	CIN	ALP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI		PAGE OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24-2	01

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 052237Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 618080

CONF: LA 8   INFO: FILE IP/AN, SSS, PS/EG, DDC, DDO/DO, PS/EG-4, OPS/INT, WH/4 S[illegible]

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY: 38
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: CARACAS, GUAYAQUIL, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, BUENOS AIRES, QUITO INFO SANTIAGO, LIMA. Y

VWNUMBER MHSPAWN Y

REF: SANTIAGO 30693 (IN 404604) (BEING RELAYED ADDRESSEES) Y

1. REF BEING RELAYED ADDRESSEES IS REPORT 31 OCT ANNOUNCEMENT BY GENERAL PINOCHET DECLARING FREEDOM OF PRESS IN CHILE. SUGGEST RATHER THAN REPLAYING EL MERCURIO ARTICLE TRANSCRIBED IN REF YOU USE THAT MERELY AS BASIS FOR EDITORIAL COMMENT. PINOCHET'S STATEMENT PUTS EMPHASIS ON CONTENTION THAT PRESS CEENSORSHIP EHAS NOT EXISTED IN CHILE UNDER JUNTA NOR DOES IT NOW. THAT ARGUMENT UNFORTUNATELY WILL HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY OUTSIDE CHILE SO RECOMMEND EDITORIAL COMMENT EMPHASIZE THESE POINTS: Y

A. CHILEAN PRESIDENT HAS DECLARED THERE WILL BE NO PRIOR CENSORSHIP IN CHILE. Y

B. PINOCHET DECLARED THAT JUNTA IS WAIVING PRIOR CENSORSHIP OF PRESS DESPITE FACT THAT STATE OF EMERGENCY CONTINUES IN CHILE. Y

C. JUNTA ACTION APPEARS REEFLECT CONFIDENCE EEE IN ITS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN STABILITY OF POLITICAL SITUATION. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

Psych Fil

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED   E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	CH	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO	OCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
ONF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP:

CITE: DIRECTOR 618080

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 FILES #

~~[illegible] APPARENT CONTRAST OF THIS GESTURE OF CONFIDENCE WITH PERU'S CONFISCATION OF PRIVATELY OWNED PRESS TWO MONTHS AGO.~~ 4

2. BUENOS AIRES: CAN NTTHRIFTY-1 ARRANGE PICK UP FOR ANSA WIRE? Y

3. GUAYAQUIL, QUITO: SUGGEST YOU HAVE PJVANDYKE-1 OR PJNETWORK-1 TIME THEIR COMMENTS TO COINCIDE WITH OAS MEETING. Y

4. FILE: 200-120-356. E-2 IMPDET.

DATE: 5 NOVEMBER 1974
ORIG: E. JAMES MCTIGHE
UNIT: C/LA/CA
EXT: 1553

AC/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

D C/LA/CAM
C/LA/NU
C/LA/SB
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTCOING MESSAGE 21-1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

1

SECRET

STAFF 201821Z DIRECTOR 611733

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/[illegible], DDO, DDO/DO, C/S 3 [illegible] DISSEM BY: 9 35

C/PS/EG 3

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO ______

0 IP FILES

C/

C/

C/W

WH

B

TO: SANTIAGO. Y

RYBAT VUNUMBER Y

REF: SANTIAGO 30589 [IN 391383] Y

1. YOUR OBSERVATIONS CONFIRM THOSE COS. GIVEN NO NEED MAKE RADICAL CHANGE IN CURRENT POLICY AND PRACTICE SUGGEST GOC BE INFLUENCED TO ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENT DECLARING THAT JUNTA HAS RESTORED CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL STABILITY TO EXTENT THAT PRIOR CENSORSHIP OF PRESS NO LONGER DEEMED NECESSARY. TO GUIDE THE WARY AT HOME SPOKESMAN MIGHT ADD, LAWS GOVERNING CRIMINAL LIBEL WILL CONTINUE TO BE ENFORCED. Y

2. FOR FULL IMPACT, OF COURSE, IT WOULD BE IDLE FOR GOC TO ARGUE THAT UP TO THIS POINT THERE HAS BEEN NO PRIOR CENSORSHIP. FEEL STATUS QUO ANTE SHOULD BE IGNORED AND EMPHASIS PLACED ON FACT THAT CONDITIONS NOW SUCH THAT CONSTITUTIONALLY RECOGNIZED CONDITION OF PRESS FREEDOM CAN OBTAIN. Y

3. FILE: 200-120-356.H

Psych file

DATE: 21 OCT 74

ORIG: E. JAMES MCTIGHE:MK

UNIT: C/LA/CA

EXT: 1553

C/LA/SB/~~CH~~

C/LA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LAWRENCE C. LASER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER C/LA/SB

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 063457

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE CDF ELP TOO TPE MRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16-3 18

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 191616Z DIRECTOR 611750

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/D/OH C/EUR 6 C/SE 2 C/SS 2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 47
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 P FILE

PER

CI/SCH CT-4

TO: PRIORITY LONDON INFO SANTIAGO, ROME. Y

RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG Y

REF: LONDON 54017 |IN 390115| Y

1. ACCORDING AP RELEASE DATELINED MOSCOW 17 OCTOBER, SOVIETS HAVE DENIED VALIDITY OF STORY THAT RED CROSS EMPLOYEE IN CHILE TO NEGOTIATE PRISONER EXCHANGE. WISH USE THIS DENIAL AS PEG REVIEW PREVIOUS SOVIET PRISONER EXCHANGES {ABBEL COMES TO MIND} WHICH ALSO HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT IN STRICT SECRECY AND TO SPECULATE ON WHAT CORVALAN AND OTHERS KNOW THAT WOULD MAKE THEM SO IMPORTANT TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT. BELIEVE ROBERT MOSS, IF HE STILL HAS ACCESS TO LONDON MEDIA, WOULD BE GOOD CHOICE WRITE SUCH ARTICLE BECAUSE OF HIS KNOWLEDGE OF CHILE AND ABILITY USE HIS BACKGROUND FOR SPECULATION ON KINDS OF INFORMATION CORVALAN HAS THAT COULD EMBARRASS SOVIETS. CAN MENTION SOVIET CLANDESTINE FUNDING ALLENDE'S ELECTIONS, TACTICAL [illegible] PCCH ALLIANCE WITH SOCIALISTS, CUBAN AND SOVIET AID TO ARMED PCCH UNIONS, LONG-RANGE PLANS FOR EVENTUAL PCCH PUTSCH TO OVERTH~~OR~~ROW ALLENDE. Y

A. BUENOS AIRES TELAM {IN SPANISH} REPORTED 17 OCT THAT RED CROSS ENVOY IS DENIS FELDMEYER AND THAT HE CARRIED TO CHILE SOVIET

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

15-126-3
19 Oct 74
~~15-8-11~~

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION CI-4 LA/SOCH REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY:

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

411750

UNION'S ACCEPTANCE OF CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY JUNTA WHEREBY THE SOVIET UNION MUST FREE AN EQUAL NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AS FREED BY CHILE. WHEN BRUNO DOPPLER, INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE IN CHILE WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT FELDMEYER'S MISSION, HE DENIED THAT HE WAS ON THAT TYPE OF MISSION. BUT LATER WHEN ASKED WHETHER IT WAS TRUE THAT FELDMEYER CARRIED WITH HIM THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE, HE ANSWERED, "THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION. IT IS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. THE CHILEAN AUTHORITIES ARE THE OBNES TO CONFIRM IT." Y

B. AP, MOSCOW 17 OCTOBER: "THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DENOUNCED AS 'A FORGERY' A CHILEAN NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS APPARENTLY WILLING TO RELEASE SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS IN RETURN FOR RELEASE OF IMPRISONED LEFTISTS IN CHILE. Y

"SERGEI BULANTSEV, A COMMENTATOR FOR THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY TASS SAID THURSDAY THE LA SEGUNDA STORY HAD BEEN 'CONCOCTED' BY FASCIST-MINDED GENERALS' WHO SEEK TO DIVERT WORLD ATTENTION FROM THE ATROCITIES AND ARBITRARINESS THERE.' Y

"GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET, CHIEF OF STATE OF CHILE, SAID CHILE WOULD LIBERATE RELEASE ALL ITS PRISONERS IF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 3 OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

611750

AGREED TO LIBERATE AN EQUAL NUMBER OF THEIR PRISONERS. Y

"DESPITE DOCUMENTED CHARGES BY INTERNATIONAL GROUPS AND DISSIDENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION THAT PERSONS ARE PROSECUTED HERE FOR THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS, MOSCOW INSISTS THAT THERE ARE NO POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE SOVIET UNION." Y

2. PLS CABLE TEXT ARTICLE TO HQS FOR REPLAY. Y

4. FILE: DEFER. E-2 IMPDET.H

EUR/BC J Donaldson

E/I

E/CA ✓

C/LA/SB L. Lase

15-126-3

DATE: 18 OCTOBER 1974

ORIG: MARTIN MILLER

UNIT: LA/CA

EXT: 9011

C/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY:

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 32 PER TOTAL COPIES 22-3 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

ACTION UNIT C/EUR6

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/IP/AN, C/LA8, C/SE5, C/SS3, C/PS/EG3, C/CI/OP2, C/OSG/IC,

STAFF

T 499138 EIA362 PAGE 01 IN 392115

TOR:171812Z OCT 74 LOND 54017

S E C R E T 171537Z OCT 74 OCT 74 STAFF

CITE LONDON 54017

TO: DIRECTOR, ROME INFO SANTIAGO.

RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG

REF A. DIRECTOR 604965 15-126-3

B. DIRECTO 609942

1. REUTERS STORY DATELINED SANTIAGO IN 17 OCTOBER "TIMES" IS HEADLINED "RUSSIA RESPONDING TO CHILE CALL TO FREE PRISONERS." HIGHLIGHTS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARING TO RELEASE A LIMITED NUMBER OF TOP POLITICAL PRISONERS IN RESPONSE TO A CHALLENGE BY THE CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA, INFORMED SOURCES SAID TODAY.

"A RED CROSS EMMISSARY WAS DUE TO ARRIVE HERE TONIGHT FROM GENEVA WITH A LIST OF 100 CHILEAN PRISONERS THE RUSSIANS WANT RELEASED IN EXCHANGE FOR THE FREEDOM GIVEN TO ITS OWN DETAINEES, THE SOURCES SAID. THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OR DENIAL OF THE REPORT FROM EITHER GOVERNMENT OR RED CROSS OFFICIALS."

ARTICLE RECOUNTS PINOCHET CHALLENGE TO MOSCOW AND HAVANA AND

RECORD COPY

15-126-3

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6
ACTION #			

T 499138 E1A362 PAGE 02 IN 390115

TOR:1712122 OCT 74 LOND 54017

POINTS OUT CHILE HAS SINCE FREED MORE THAN 300 DETAINEES WITH "UNTIL NOW, NO APPARENT RESPONSE." ALSO ADDS LUIS CORVALEN LEADS THE KREMLIN LIST.

2. APART FROM NEW DIMENSION ADDED TO REF PROPOSALS BY ABOVE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (AI) COULD BE INDUCED TO TAKE UP ISSUE. AS NOTED REF AI HAS VERY PRESCRIBED APPROACHES AND TECHNIQUES WHICH IT USES TO HANDLE, VIA A CHAIN OF INDIVIDUAL SPONSORS0, INDIVIDUAL CASES. WHILE THEY MAY OCCASIONALLY USE PUBLICITY IF ALL ELSE FAILS THEY BASICALLY REGARD IT AS A DISTINCT INHIBITION TO THE SUCCESS OF THEIR BEHIND THE SCENES PERSON TO PERSON TECHNIQUE. AI'S POSITION ON THE CHILEAN CHALLENGE WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE NEGATIVELY INFLUENCED BY ITS HAVING ONLY VERY RECENTLY ACCEPTED A MOSCOW CHAPTER DESPITE THE STRONG OBJECTIONS OF SOME OF ITS KEY LEADERS. SINCE OUR ASSETS WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN FORCING THIS ISSUE THEY ARE NOT IN A SECURE POSITION TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THIS ONE ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE EXTREME UNPOPULARITY OF THE OVERALL CHILE STORY.

3. WE CAN CONTINUE TO BE ALERT TO OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOME FORM OF MEDIA PLACEMENTS TO ACCOMPLISH REF GOALS BUT WE HAVE TO ESTIMATE THAT CHANCES OF ANY OF OUR ASSETS BEING ABLE TO

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 499138 EIA362 PAGE 03-03 IN 390115

TOR:171812Z OCT 74 LOND 54017

CATALYZE ANY ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY BY GROUPS WHOSE VOICE WOULD COUNT ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED AND WOULD INVOLVE MORE RISKS THAN THE ODDS WOULD PROBABLY JUSTIFY. WE HAVE BROUGHT SCHWERSON'S ATTENTION TO THE SITUATION INCLUDING THE PARA ONE STORY. HE NOTED THAT AI EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAS RECENTLY VOTED IN NEW AND TO SOME EXTENT UNTRIED MEMBERSHIP. ALTHOUGH NEW COMPOSITON COMMITTEE MAY IN LONG RUN BE LESS INCLINED TO AVOID ACTION WHICH PUTS PRESSURE ON SOVIETS, SUCH ISSUES PRESENTLY ALL THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL WITHIN AI IN VIEW NEWNESS COMMITTEE AND NOT LIKELY RECEIVE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTENTION UNTIL COMMITTEE SHAKES DOWN. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

4. FILE DEFERM E2 IMPDET

SECRET

15-126-3

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACF CCN ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	152323Z	DIRECTOR	609942

CONF: c/LA8 INFO: FILE ~~C/TAFF~~ c/SES c/EUR6 c/SS3 C/PSEG3

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 43
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: ROME, LONDON, INFO SANTIAGO. Y

RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG Y

REF: DIRECTOR 604968S Y

1. GIVEN PERISHABILITY REF IDEAS, REQUEST YOUR COMMENT ON FEASIBILITY OF APPROACHES TO DEFLOWER AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AS OUTLINED. WELCOME ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS ON MEANS LIMIT FURTHER ANTI-8KHERALD PROPAGANDA IN RELATION TO CHILE AND ANTI-JUNTA PROPAGANDA ~~IN RELATION~~ CONNECTED WITH TO TREATMENT OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. Y

2. FILE DEFER. E-2 IMPDET.

(2)

14/51ZH

15-126-3

15 Oct 74

RECORD COPY

DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG: MARTIN E. MILLER
UNIT: LA/CA
EXT: 9011

C/E/BC

C/E/I

C/BEEEUR/CAS
RELEASING OFFICER

C/EUR/CA
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

CMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

31-3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 021507Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 604965

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/IR/AN, C/EUR6, C/SES, C/SS3, C/PS/EG3, C/OPS/INT2, C/OSG/IC,

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO

0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 38

PER

#

TO: ROME, LONDON, INFO SANTIAGO. Y

RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG Y

1. INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF CHILEAN JUNTA AND MORE RECENTLY OF BKHERALD HAVE BEEN ORCHESTRATED TO DRAMATIC PROPORTIONS. HQS BELIEVES EFFECTIVE EXPLOITATION OF GENERAL PINOCHET'S OFFER TO EXCHANGE A NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS FOR AN EQUAL NUMBER OF SOVIET AND/OR CUBAN PRISONERS IS OPPORTUNITY TO BLUNT HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. IF THE USSR AND CHILE CAN BE LUMPED TOGETHER IN POPULAR MIND AS EACH HAVING POLITICAL PRISONERS, THE SITUATION CAN BE EXPLOITED TO DIVERT SOME OF ATTENTION FROM JUNTA'S SUPPOSED MISDEEDS TO SOVIET HANDLING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. A REPORT FROM A SENSITIVE SOURCE INDICATES THAT THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE CONCERNED OVER THE PRESSURES THAT COUBLD DEVELOP FROM THE OFFER. Y

2. THE EXCHANGE OFFER HAS ASPECTS THAT WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO NUMEROUS GROUPS IN EUROPE BUT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE REACTION, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF CHILE'S EXTREME UNPOPULARITY AND THE LACK OF BOTH A NEUTRAL SPONSOR AND SUFFICIENT PUBLICITY. EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE OFFER TO RELEASE IMPORTANT CHILEAN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

15-126-3
2 Oct 74

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

624965

COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST LEADERS, WHATEVER THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE OTHER HALF OF THE EXCHANGE. LEFTISTS OF NUMEROUS SHADES INCLUDING THE BERTRAND RUSSELL GROUPS SHOULD ALSO FAVOR THE RELEASE OF THESE PRISONERS, YET BE LESS TROUBLED BY THE DISCOMFITURE OF THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. SECOND, THE OFFER IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR GROUPS LIKE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TO BRING DIRECT PRESSURE ON THE USSR TO RELEASE SOME PROMINENT INTELLECTUAL PRISONERS. FINALLY, THE OFFER SHOULD ATTRACT SOME HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FROM THOSE WHO FAVOR RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS ON PRINCIPLE. IN FACT, PROPERLY DEVELOPED, THE EXCHANGE IS POTENTIALLY ATTRACTIVE TO ALMOST THE ENTIRE POLITICAL SPECTRUM.

3. SUGGEST ROME APPROACH DEFLOWER TO SEE WHETHER HE CAN GET HIS GROUP INTERESTED IN TAKING PRACTICAL STEPS TO GET PRISONERS RELEASED FROM CHILEAN JUNTA ON EXCHANGE BASIS. PERHAPS IF HE CAN PICTURE HIMSELF AS SAVING THE PRISONERS (COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST LEADERS IN CHILE AND IMPORTANT INTELLECTUALS IN THE USSR) FROM A FASCIST REGIME ON THE ONE HAND AND FROM A STALINIST COUNTRY ON THE OTHER HE CAN BECOME SUFFICIENTLY INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE EXCHANGE. OBJECTIVE WOULD BE HAVE

Rel
Rel

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION OF   REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED   E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AUG CIN ALP TOO TPS MRO DCT

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF

DIRECTOR 604965

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

DEFLOWER DEVELOP MAXIMUM EUROPEAN INTERBEST IN THE POSSIBILITIES THAT THE EXCHANGE OFFERS AND MAXIMUM PUBLICITY OF HIS EFBFORTS. Y

4. FOR LONDON: REQUEST STATION SEEK MEANS OF INTERESTING AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL IN SOME ASPECT OF THE EXCHANGE IDEA. WHILE AMNESTY OPS SOMETIMES VERY QUIBETLY PURSUED, PUBLICITY IS IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE. PERHAPS LINKING SPECIFIC PRISONERS FOR EXCHANGE MIGHT CAPTURE PUBLIC IMAGINATION. Y

5. FILEB DEFER. E-2 IMPDET.A

for C/WH/4

E/ROG

EUR/CA

EUR/BC

EUR/I R.E. Drury

DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1974
ORIG: MARTIN MILLER
UNIT: WH/CA
EXT: 9011

C/EUR/CAS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WHD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE 23-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 1

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 162323Z

DIRECTOR

E50507

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, PCO, PDC/DD, C/SSS
C/PS/EG3, C/CI/OP2, C/OPS/INT2

Psych C/WH/4/P
WH/4 Sec'y

TO: SANTIAGO INFO CARACAS. Y

RYBAT VUNUMBER Y

REF: CARACAS 25759 (IN 385788) Y

1. RECOMMEND YOU CONSIDER ENLISTING SUITABLE VUNUMBER ASSET TO PERSUADE JUNTA TO RELAX ITS RESTRICTIONS ON FREE PRESS. OBJECTIVES OF SUCH MOVE WOULD BE THESE: Y

A. DEMONSTRATE TO WORLD THAT PINOCHET GOVT FIRMLY IN POWER IN CHILE AND THAT IT FUNCTIONS NOW WITH AT LEAST TACIT CONSENT OF MAJORITY OF CHILEANS;

B. GIVE SUBSTANTIAL DEMONSTRATION OF JUNTA'S COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND THEREBY DEFUSE ONE OF MORE EXPLOSIVE GRIEVANCES OF WORLD PRESS AGAINST CHILE REGIME. Y

2. TO AVOID APPEARING TO CAPITULATE TO PRESSURE FROM CUBANS PER REF, SUGGEST CHILEAN MOVE IN RESPONSE TO THIS INFLUENCE SHOULD NOT FOLLOW UPON CRITICISM EMANATING FROM CUBAN DOMINATED JOURNALISTS CONFERENCE IN CARACAS. GESTURE, IF ADDRESSED TO ANYONE, SHOULD BE MADE TO IAPA TO ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE THAT [illegible] ORGANIZATION AND THEREBY TO REINFORCE ITS LEVERAGE AV [illegible] HOSTILE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT
EXT:

DC/WH

E2 IMPDET
CL BY:

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES 2 2

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

SITE

DIRECTOR

610507

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 MORE DISSEM BY:
0 NO MORE
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

REGIMES, WHERE FREE PRESS REMAINS PROSCRIBED. Y

3. REQUEST STATION COMMENTS. E-2 IMPDET.Ø

DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG: E. JAMES MCTIGHE
UNIT: C/LA/CA
EXT: 1553

C/LA/NU

C/LA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/SB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOINC MESSAGE

21-10

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OM? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 102032Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 608503

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, SS5, PS/EG 4
OPS/INT ~~C/WH/4~~

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 35
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DC/W[illegible]4
C/W[illegible]A
~~[illegible]~~
C/WH[illegible]/UP
WH[illegible] Sec'y

Staff Bill C.
Al K. —
file, Dorothy
for PSYCH file

TO: LAS8. Y

PSYCH Y

REF: DIRECTOR 605601 Y

[illegible]

BOOK CABLE Y

1. FOLLOWING IS ANOTHER, APPARENTLY WELL-RESEARCHED ARTICLE BY DAVID F. BELNAP ON EROSION OF DEMOCRACY IN CHILE UNDER ALLENDE WHICH APPEARED IN LOS ANGELES TIMES ON 27 SEPT 74. SUGGEST YOU PASS FOLLOWING EXCERPTS TO LIAISON AND AGEENTS OF INFLUENCE FOR BACKGROUND. NOTE FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS ARE MERELY REHASH ALLEGED CIA COVERT FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PRESS AND PARTIES IN OPPOSITION TO ALLENDE REGIME. THEIR REITERATION NOT PARTICULARLY WORTHWHILE IN THIS CONTEXT. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSESSMENT REACTION THIS DATE WHEN USED. Y

9

ABRIDGED TEXT FOLLOWS: Y

A NO SER POR EL EXAGERADO VOLUMEN DEL VERBAL QUE CARACTERIZO LA ACTUACION DE LOS DOS BANDOS EN EL LARGO Y ENCONADO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CHRONO

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PAGE OF PAGES
3

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
608503

CONF: INFO: FILE

0
DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

ENFRENTAMIENTO CHILENO, LOS ATAQUES LANZADOS POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR CONTRA SUS ENEMIGOS EN LA POLITICA Y EN LOS MEDIOS DE DIFUSION RARAS VECES SE LLEVARON A CABO FRONTAL O ABIERTAMENTE. CASI SIEMPRE FUERON DE CARACTER ECONOMICO. Y EN LO TOCANTE A LOS MEDIOS INFORMATIVOS, CASI NUNCA SE LLEGO, POR EJEMPLO, AL EXTREMO DE LA CENSURA DIRECTA. Y

LA PRENSA OPOSICIONISTA PUDO ESCRIBIR Y DECIR LO QUE LE PARECIO DURANTE LOS CASI TRES ANOS QUE EL ALLENDISMO SE MANTUVO EN EL PODER. LA DUDA SIEMPRE FUE SI DICHOS MEDIOS LOGRARIAN O NO SOBREVIVIR ECONOMICAMENTE Y SEGUIR MANIFESTANDO SU CRITERIO. Y

SOLO TRES MESES DESPUES DE HABER ASUMIDO ALLENDE LA PRESIDENCIA, LA PRENSA ESCRITA OBTUVO UN PRESAGIO DE LO QUE PODRIA SUCEDERLE AL MONOPOLIZAR EL GOBIERNO LA IMPRESION DE REVISTAS Y LIBROS EN EL PAIS. ESTO SE CONSUMO MEDIANTE LA ADQUISICION DE UNA FIRMA EDITORBIAL QUE HABIA SIDO DEBILITADA PREVIAMENTE POR UNA PROLONGADA HUELGA DIRIGIDA POR LOS COMUNISTAS, Y POR UN ARBITRAJE EN EL QUE ACTUO COMO MEDIADOR OTRO COMUNISTA, CUYO FALLO COLOCO A LA EMPRESA AL EBORDE DE LA QUIEBRA. Y

ASIMISMO, LAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO, QUE SIEMPRE HAN SIDO UN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

43

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

DIRECTOR

605503

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 RF FILE #

DISSEM BY:

INSTRUMENTO POLITICO IMPORTANTE EN CHILE, TUVIERON UN INDICIO DE LO QUE LES AGUARDABA, INCLUSO ANTES DE LA TOMA DE POSESION DEL NUEVO PRESIDENTE. LOS PERITOS EN COMUNICACIONES DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA LES INDICARON QUE EFECTUARAN REBAJAS EN SU PERSONAL INFORMATIVO PARA DARLES CABIDA A LOS PERIODISTAS MARXISTAS DESIGNADOS POR EL PARTIDO, SO PENA DE PERDER MAS TARDE SUS LICENCIAS PARA TRANSMITIR. Y

~~(EN CHILE-- EL GOBIERNO ES EL ANUNCIANTE PRINCIPAL)~~ BAJO LA FERULA ALLENDISTA, LAS ENTIDADES ESTATALES-- Y LAS INDUSTRIAS PRIVADAS, A MEDIDA QUE IBAN CAYENDO EN MANOS DEL GOBIERNO-- LE DABAN PUBLICIDAD UNICAMENTE A AQUELLOS MEDIOS INFORMATIVOS QUE PERTENECIAN A LA UNIDAD POPULAR BO QUE APOYABAN AL REGIMEN. ENTRE ESTOS FIGURABABN, EN EL MOMENTO DE DESPLOMARSE EL ALLENDISMO, APROXIMADAMENTE LA MITAD DE LAS RADIOEMISORAS DEL PAIS (UNA DE LAS CUALES, LA MAYOR, ERA PROPIEDAD DE SALVADOR ALLENDE) Y CINCO DE LOS ONCE PERIODICOS DIARIOS QUE SE PUBLICABAN EN ESTA CAPITAL. Y

LA TELEVISION COMERCIAL CHILEBNA ESTA TOTALMENTE SOSTENBIDA POR EL ESTADO O POR EL SECTOR UNIVERSITARIO, DE MODO QUE NO DEPENDE POR COMPLETO DE LA PUBLICIDAD PARA SUBSISTIR. POR ANADIDURA, DURANTE UNA

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

34

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE

DIRECTOR

609503

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO

0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY:

PER

#

CONF:

INFO: FILE

GRAN PARTE DE LA GESTION PRESIDENCIAL DE ALLENDE CASI TODA LA TELEVISION DE CHILE ESTABA CONTROLADA POR LOS MARXISTAS O POR SUS SIMPATIZANTES. ESTA SITUACION CAMBIO SOLO CUANDO LA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE SANTIAGO LE ARRANCO EL DOMINIO DE SU CANAL DE TV A LOS ALLENDISTAS Y SE UNIO A LA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE VALPARAISO EN UN ESFUERZO POR LLEVARLE UNA PROGRAMACION NO-MARXISTA A TODA LA CIUDADANIA, UTILIZANDO ESTACIONES DE RELEVO DE MICROONDA DE ELABORACION CASERA. TRUNFARON EN ESTE EMPENO EN UNA MEDIDA ASOMBROSA MIENTRAS SALVABAN LOS OBSTACULOS DE TODO TIPO, AUN FISICOS, QUE EL REGIMEN LES INTERPONIA PARA IMPEDIRSELO. Y

EL MERCURIO, EL PERIODICO MAS GRANDE DEL PAIS, HABIA PERDIDO EL SESENTA PORCIENTO DE SU VOLUMEN PUBLICITARIO NORMAL A MEDIADOS DE 1971, Y CUALQUIER ESTACION RADIAL CORRIENTE, NO AFILIADA A LA UNIDAD POPULAR, PROMEDIABA UN OCHENTA PORCIENTO DE PERDIDAS SEMEJANTES. Y

ESTA EROSION PUBLICITARIA CONTINUO HACIENDO ESTRAGOS A MEDIDA QUE LAS PEQUENAS EMPRESAS INDEPENDIENTES FUERON SUSPENDIENDO SUS ANUNCIOS AL IRSE AGOTANDO SUS EXISTENCIAS DE MERCANCIAS O AL SOBREPASAR POR MUCHO LA DEMANDA A LOS ABSTECIMIENTOS DISPONIBLES.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUC[illegible] BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO[illegible]ITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COL ACP TOU TPE NHO DCI

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

65

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF

DIRECTOR

668503

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

Y A LO LARGO DE TODO ESTE PERIODO ELEVABANSE CONJUNTAMENTE LOS COSTOS DE PUBLICACION Y TRANSMISION, IMPELIDOS POR LA INFLACION DE DOS CIFRAS QUE ARRASABA AL PAIS Y QUE ASCENDIO A TRES A PARTIR DE 1972. Y

LAS AUTORIDADES GUBERNAMENTALES NEGABAN ENTRETANTO TODAS LAS SOLICITUDES DE LICENCIA PARA IMPORTAR PIEZAS DE REPUESTO Y EQUIPOS DE REEMPLAZO PARA LAS PLANTAS QUE SE DETERIORABAN, Y EN EL CASO DE LAS RADIOEMISORAS, DE ELEMENTOS TAN ESENCIALES COMO SON LAS UNIDADES GRABADORAS Y LAS CINTAS MAGNETOFONICAS. Y

EN CUANTO A EL MERCURIO Y A MUCHAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO, LOS SINDICATOS MANEJADOS POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR TRATABAN DE INVENTAR PRETEXTOS PARA QUE EL GOBIERNO PROCEDIERA A ADUENARSE DE SUS EMPRESAS RECTORAS. LA DE EL MERCURIO, QUE PUBLICA TRES ROTATIVOS DIARIOS EN ESTA CAPITAL Y OTROS CINCO EN DISTINTAS PARTES DE LA NACION, FUE OBJETO DE INVESTIGACIONES FISCALES, DE ACUSACIONES DE NEGOCIAR ILEGALMENTE EN DIVISAS Y DE INSULTOS PERSONALMENTE LANZADOS CONTRA ELLA POR ALLENDE. Y

PERO EL ESFUERZO MAS VIGOROSO QUE REALIZARA EL REGIMEN PARA TRATAR DE MANIPULAR A LA PRENSA ESCRITA OPOSICIONISTA FUE LAS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE CO1 ALP TOB TPR NRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

QMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 8

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

604503

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

INCESANTES TENTATIVAS DE APODERARSE DE LA UNICA ENTIDAD PAPELERA INDEPENDIENTE, PROVEEDORA DE PAPEL PERIODICO PARA TODAS LAS PUBLICACIONES NO PERTENECIENTES A LA UNIDAD POPULAR, ASI COMO TAMBIEN PARA LAS QUE SEGUIAN LOS DICTAMENES DE LA COALICION GOBERNANTE. Y

EL GOBIERNO TRATO PRIMERO DE ADQUIRIR LA MAYORIA DE LAS ACCIONES DE LA EMPRESA, COMPRANDOSELAS A SUS 16,000 ACCIONISTAS. LUEGO INTENTO PERSUADIR AL CONGRESO PARA QUE ESTABLECIERA UN MONOPOLIO ESTATAL SOBRE EL PAPEL PERIODICO, Y FINALMENTE ENSAYO LA ELABORACION DE UN PRETEXTO PARA DECRETAR LA EXPROPIACION DE LA COMPANIA, TACTICA QUE HABIA FUNCIONADO CON OTRAS INDUSTRIAS. Y

7

UNA VEZ FRACASADAS TODAS ESTAS INICIATIVAS, EMPRENDIOSE LA DEL ASEDIO ECONOMICO. NO SE MITIGARON LOS CONTROLES DE PRECIOS IMPUESTOS A LOS ARTICULOS DE PAPEL PARA MANTENER EL EQUILIBRIO ALTERADO POR EL ALZA DE LOS COSTOS DE PRODUCCION. ELLO HIZO QUE LA FIRMA PAPELERA DECLARA UNA PERDIDA DE 9,100,000 DOLARES DURANTE LOS DOCE MESES QUE FINALIZARON EL 30 DE JUNIO DE 1972, PERDIDAS QUE AUMENTARON A UN RITMO DE 120,000 DOLARES DIARIOS MAS TARDE EN ESE MISMO ANO. Y

SEGUN MANIEFESTARON LOS SINDICATOS DE LA PROPIA EMPRESA, LA

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

OUTGOINC MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COM ACP TOO TPE WHO DCI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
07

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

608503

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

AUTORIZACION PARAB SUBIR LOS PRECIOS CONCEDIDA POR EL REGIMEN EN OCTUBRE DE 1972 PROPORCIONO MENOS DE LA MITAD DEL ALIVIO ECONOMICO QUE SE NECESITABA. Y

POR OTRA PARTE, AL COMENZAR EL ANO 1972, LA SITUACION DE LAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO NO-ALLENDISTAS ERA DESEPERADA. DOS VECES DURANTE ESE ANO EL CONGRESO APROBO UN IMPUESTO ESPECIAL PARA AYUDAR A COSTEAR TODAS LAS EMISORAS, VETANDO AMBAS INICIATIVAS EL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA. Y

EN SEPTIEMBRE, DESPUES DEL SEGUNDO DE EBSTOS VETOS, PARECIA QUE LAS CUATRO ESTACIONES MAS IMPORTANTES DE ESTA CAPITAL NO ADSCRITAS A LA UNIDAD BPOPULAR SUCUMBIRIAN. NO OBSTANTE ESTO, SOBREVIVIERON Y FORMARON PARTE DE UNA RED VOLUNTARIA DE EMISORAS APODADA "CADENA DEMOCRATICA," LA CUAL LE BRINDO A LA OPOSICION ABNTIALLENDIBSTA UNA TRIBUNA DE EXPRESION PARA COMPETIR CON EL FRENTE DE ESTACIONES ORGANIZADO SIMILARMENTE POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR A TRAVES DE TODA LA NACION. Y

SALVARONSE IGUALMENTE LA EMPRESA PAPELERA INDEPENDIENTE Y EL MERCURIO. TAMBIEN ESCAPARON CON VIDA EL DIARIO LA PRENSA,

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES
48

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
608503

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE .

ADQUIRIDO POR INTERESES DEMOCRATACRISTIANOS DESPUES DE LA ELECCION DE ALLENDE PERO ANTES DE SU TOMA DE POSESION, Y EL ROTATIVO TRIBUNA, FUNDADO POR EL PARTIDO NACIONAL EN LOS COMIENZOS DE LA PRESIDENCIA ALLENDISTA. ES DE PRESUMIRSE QUE AMBOS ORGANOS OBTUVIERAN RESPALDO ECONOMICO DE SUS PARTIDOS RESPECTIVOS O A TRAVES DE ELLOS, YA QUE NINGUNO DE LOS DOS PUBLICABA MUCHOS ANUNCIOS. (TANTO LA PRENSA COMO TRIBUNA FUERON CLAUSURADOS POR LA JUNTA QUE DESALOJO DEL PODER A ALLENDE, COMO PARTE DE SU DECISION DE DECLARAR EN "RECESO" A LA POLITICA.) Y

LA UNIDAD POPULAR EMPLEO TAMBIEN LAS TECNICAS DE HOSTIGAMIENTO ECONOMICO Y DE DIVIDIR PARA CONQUISTAR CONTRA LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS DE OPOSICION, DIEZMANDO CON ESTA ULTIMA TECTICA AL TRADICIONAL PARTIDO RADICAL CHILENO, Y ESFORZANDOSE POR HACER ZOZOBRAR AL PARTIDO NACIONAL, DE TENDENCIA DERECHISTA, DESTRUYENDO EL PODERIO ECONOMICO DE SUS ELEMENTOS PRINCIPALES. Y

COMO EN CHILE LA LEY NO EXIGE QUE SE DE CUENTA DEL APOYO ECONOMICO DESTINADO A LA POLITICEA, RESULTA DIFICIL AVERIGUAR COMO SE DESENVOLVIERON ECONOMICAMENTE BAJO EL ALLENDISMO LOS PARTIBBDOS EN SI.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUC N BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PI BITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOIN^ MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ROS CIH ACP TOO TPE MRU OLT

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

948

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

609503

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

EN LA ESFERA POLITICA, EL OBJETIVO PRIMORDIAL DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR ERA EL PARTIDO DOMOCRATA-CRISTIANO, EL MAS GRANDE DE TODOS LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS DE LA NACION. DE LAS SEIS AGRUPACIONES INTEGRANTES DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR, LOS CUMUNISTAS SOBRE TODO SE PERCATARON DE LO ESENCIAL QUE RESULTABA PARA ESTABILIZAR AL GOBIERNO MINORITARIO DE ESA COALICION GANARSE EL APOYO DE LA DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA, O SI NO DIVIDIRLA. Y

PERO A NO SER POR LA PEQUENA FRAGMENTACION OCURRIDA POCOS DIAS DESPUES DE LAS ELECCIONES PRESIDENCIALES DE 1970, LOS DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANOS MANTUVIERON INTACTA SU UNIDAD, EVOLUCIONANDO GRADUALMENTE DE UNA POSICION DE ADVERSARIOS LEALES DEL GOBIERNO A OTRA DE OPOSICION IRREDUCTIBLE. Y

TRATANDO DE RESCATAR A ALLENDE, CUYO PROPIO PARTIDO SOCIALISTA, DE FILIACION MARXISTA, REPRESENTABA EL MAS NUTRIDO DE LOS ELEMENTOS IRRACIONALES QUE CONFORMABAN LA UNIDAD POPULAR, LOS COMUNISTAS LLEGARON INCLUSO A PEDIRLE AYUDA A LA IGLESIA CATOLICA, ROGANDOLE QUE MEDIARA CON LA DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA PARA CONTRIBUIR A APUNTALAR AL REGIMEN CUANDO ESTE SE VENIA ABAJO. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 10 11 1310

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF

DIRECTOR

609503

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PLR
0 IP FILES #

MAS ERA YA DEMASIADO TARDE. HACIA MUCHO TIEMPO QUE SALVADOR ALLENDE HABIA SELLADO SU SUERTE CON LOS DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANOS, AL FALTAR SISTEMATICAMENTE A TODAS LAS PROMESAS QUE LES HICIERA A CAMBIO DE LOS VOTOS QUE NECESITABA PARA QUE EL CONGRESO DETERMINARA SU ELECCION A LA PRIMERA MAGISTRATURA, Y AL CONFESARLE CINICAMENTE AL INTELECTUAL SOCIALISTA FRANCES REGIS DEBRAY EN UNA ENTREVISTA QUE HABIA FORMULADO ESAS PROMESAS EXCLUSIVAMENTE PARA ASEGURAR SU NOMBRAMIENTO COMO PRESIDENTE. Y

2. NO FILE. E-2 IMPDET.

DATE: 10 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG: E. JAMES MCTIGHE
UNIT: C/LA/CA
EXT: 1553

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUC N BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR 3ITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

70-7

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

~~OMF~~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

~~C/WH/~~

~~DC~~

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 102125Z

ORIG: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 08530

DISSEM BY: 29

CONF: SS5 INFO: FILE IP/AN, PS/EG4, EA4, EA/CO4, EA/UNO1, LA8, NE10, EUR8, AF8, SE8,

C/ 0

0

~~C/~~ 0

WH/ 0

PER #

TO: BANGKOK, JAKARTA, HONG KONG, MANILA, RANGOON, SAIGON, SEOUL, SURABAYA, TAIPEI, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, PORT AU PRINCE, RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO, COLOMBO, DACCA, NEW DELHI, BONN, BONN BASE, BRUSSELS, BERN, BERLIN, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, LISBON, LONDON, PARIS, ACCRA, ADDIS ABABA, KHARTOUM, LAGOS, LUSAKA, MONROVIA, NAIROBI.Y

BOOK CABLE Y

QRPEG 069 Y

Dmitty For PSYCH file

1. "WATERGATE" A COMMON PHENOMENON IN USSR. ("NY TIMES," 9 OCTOBER). SOVIET HISTORIAN AND POLITICAL DISSIDENT ROY MEDVEDEV HAS CHARGED SOVIET PRESS WITH SUPPRESSING NEWS ABOUT WATERGATE "BECAUSE REGIME FEARS REVEALING TO SOVIET PUBLIC HOW INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, FREE PRESS AND ELECTED LEGISLATIVE BODIES CAN RESTRAIN EXECUTIVE POWER...WATERGATE-TYPE ABUSES ARE COMMON IN USSR, BUT SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT IS SECURELY SHIELDED NOT ONLY FROM FALSE CHARGES BUT ALSO FROM LEGITIMATE INVESTIGATION OF REAL ABUSES OF POWER...FOR EXAMPLE...ABORTIVE ATTEMPT BY PROSECUTOR IN GEORGIAN REPUBLIC TO GET PERMISSION TO SEARCH APARTMENT AND INTERROGATE FAMILY OF REPUBLIC'S

DATE: 10 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG: BARNA SPRAGUE:SMF
UNIT: CAG/PSB
EXT: 1254

~~C/WH/6~~
DC/WH/6
WH/6/
WH/6/

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 011078

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

604538

FORMER LEADER MZHAVANADZE, WHO WAS TOPPLED IN SEPTEMBER 1972 AMID CHARGES OF WHOLESALE CORRUPTION AND GRAFT THAT CHARACTERIZED HIS RULE...ALTHOUGH THERE WAS MORE THAN ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THIS TYPE OF INVESTIGATIONS, HIGHER PARTY OFFICIALS WOULD NOT PERMIT IT."Y

2. EAST GERMANS REAFFIRM SEPARATION FROM WEST ON 25TH ANNIVERSARY. JOHN GOSHKO WRITES IN "WASHINGTON POST" OF 8 OCTOBER THAT EAST GERMANY'S "NEW SENSE OF ASSERTIVENESS" WAS DEMONSTRATED ON 7 OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF STATE BY LARGEST PARADE EVER STAGED BY EAST GERMAN PEOPLE'S ARMY: "THOUSANDS OF JACK-BOOTED TROOPS MADE STREETS OF EAST BERLIN ECHO TO THUD OF TRADITIONAL PRUSSIAN GOOSE STEP...SEEMINGLY ENDLESS WAVE OF SOLDIERS IN RIGIDLY DISCIPLINED RANKS...HOLDING OF PARADE IN EAST BERLIN CONSTITUTED DEFIANCE OF FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL OF BERLIN...IN PROTEST, 12 NATO NATIONS WHICH RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY, REFUSED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO CELEBRATIONS IN EAST BERLIN... EAST GERMAN STANDARD OF LIVING WHICH HIGHEST IN SOVIET BLOC IS STILL THIRTY PERCENT BELOW THAT OF ...WEST GERMANY...DESPITE LIVING STANDARDS EAST GERMANY IS [illegible] ONE OF MOST CLOSED SOCIETIES IN SOVIET BLOC -- MORE REGIMENTED IN

BSB

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 011078

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   PAGE OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR   DATE TIME GROUP   CITE   MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO   PER
0 IP FILES   #

CONF: INFO: FILE   WA534,

MANY WAYS THAN SOVIET UNION ITSELF...EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT OWES ITS PRESENT SUCCESS TO BERLIN WALL AND CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF WALL ALONG ITS 860-MILE BORDER WITH WEST GERMANY."Y

3. EGYPT CANCELS ORDER FOR SOVIET PLANES. CAIRO, 29 SEPTEMBER. WEEKLY NEWSPAPER "AKHBAR AL-YOM REPORTS THAT EGYPT HAS DECIDED TO CANCEL ITS ORDER FOR EIGHT RUSSIAN-BUILT TU-154 JET AIRLINERS, CITING "NUMEROUS AND MAJOR DEFECTS" IN AIRCRAFT'S PERFORMANCE THAT JEOPARDIZE SAFETY OF PASSENGERS. ONE OF PLANES CRASHED IN FLAMES DURING TRAINING FLIGHT 10 JULY, KILLING TWO EGYPTIANS AND FOUR SOVIET CREWMEN. EXACT CAUSE OF ACCIDENT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED AND OTHER PLANES OF THIS TYPE HAVE BEEN GROUNDED. NEWSPAPER SAID EGYPTIAN AVIATION ORGANIZATION WOULD FILE CLAIMS WITH THE SOVIET EXPORT FIRM, "FAVIA", FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF $7.5 MILLION ALREADY PAID ON THE $47.5 MILLION DEAL.Y

4. NO CUBAN/SOVIET RESPONSE ON SETTING PRISONERS FREE. NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG CARRIED AFP REPORT FROM SANTIAGO, 24 SEPTEMBER, THAT GENERAL PINOCHET, CHIEF OF CHILEAN JUNTA, HAD SAID NEITHER CUBA NOR SOVIET UNION HAD RESPONDED TO CHILEAN CHALLENGE OF 011 SEPTEMBER TO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION   REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED   E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 011078

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 4

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

609538

RELEASE SAME NUMBER OF PRISONERS AS CHILE WAS RELEASING. PINOCHET ALSO SAID FOREIGN MINISTRY AND CHILEAN EMBASSIES ARE RECEIVING HUNDREDS OF LETTERS DAILY FROM RELATIVES OF SOVIET PRISONERS, AND THAT THESE LETTERS WERE BEING FORWARDED TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS. HE ALSO REVEALED HE WOULD RECBEIVE DELEGATION FROM BUENOS AIRES OF UKRAINIANS-IN-EXILE WHO WOULD GIVE CHILEAN OFFICIALS INFORMATION ON SOME FIFTY UKRAINIANS WHO ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN USSR.Y

5. EDITORIAL IN MEXICO CITY INDEPENDENT DAILY, "LA PRENSA," 25 SEPTEMBER, ACCUSED KGB OF SPYING AND INTERVENING IN LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS. COMMENTING ON PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AGAINST CIA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA, EDITORIALIST WROTE THAT THE KGB SHOULD GET OUT OF LATIN AMERICA. "...THAT SINISTER RED POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS COMMITTED SO MANY DASTARDLY CRIBMES IN OUR COUNTRY SUCH AS THE ASSASSINATION OF TROTSKY. KGB HAS ESTABLISHED BOOK PUBLISHERS USED BY THE FASCIST LEFTISTS TO INFILTRATE PARTIES, MEETINGS AND LITERARY GATHERINGS. KGB USED THE PRESS AND GROUPS OF ARTISTS, INTELLECTUALS, WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS TO SING THE PRAISES OF A RED DICTATORSHIP. ...THE KGB SHOULD GET OUT WITH ITS THOUSANDS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 011078

OUTGOIN′ MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

604534

OF SPIES SPREAD THROUGHOUT OUR HEMISPHERE..." Y

85B

6. IPU COUNCIL RECOGNIZES REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM. TOKYO NEWSPAPERS OF 2 OCTOBER REPORT EXTENSIVELY ON OPENING OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL MEETING AND SAID HEATED DEBATE TOOK PLACE IN FIRST SESSION OVER SEATING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION. "MAINICHI" STORY SAID SOVIETS AND RUMANIANS IMMEDIATELY CHALLENGED "QUALIFICATIONS" OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND DEMANDED THAT LATTER BE EXPELLED FROM CONFERENCE AND THAT PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT {PRG} BE SEATED IN THEIR PLACE. "MAINICHI" SAID THAT ROLL CALL VOTE WAS HELD, AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WAS SELECTED "BY OVERWHELMING MAJORITY" TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE. EDITORIAL IN "ASAHI" SAID THAT BITTER CONTROVERSIES WOULD ARISE AT THIS SESSION OF IPU, WHICH HAS MORE THAN SIXTY NATIONS PARTICIPATING, INCLUDING BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA. BUT THAT "IT IS...SIGNIFICANT IN ITSELF THAT PARLIAMENTARIANS OF WORLD EXCHANGE UNRESERVED OPINIONS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS." Y

7. CAMBODIAN MOSLEMS APPEAL FOR HELP AGAINST COMMUNIST ATROCITIES. PHNOM PENH, 27 SEPTEMBER {SAIGON POST}: "TWO MOSLEM ORGANIZATIONS IN CAMBODIA, SPEAKING FOR ALMOST A MILLION KHMER MOSLEMS, HAVE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 011078

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

CONF: INFO: FILE

609538

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 #

APPEALED TO ALL ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES TO SEND DELEGATIONS TO CAMBODIA FOR FIRSTHAND VIEW OF THE 'INFERNO' CREATED BY INDOCHINESE COMMUNISTS. ACCORDING TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS, WHENEVER COMMUNISTS CAPTURED A VILLAGE, MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF MOSLEM FAITH WERE MARCHED TO A CONCENTRATION CAMP AND THEIR HOMES WERE BURNED TO THE GROUND. THE OLD AND WEAK WERE KILLED; THE HEALTHY WERE FORCED TO GIVE UP THEIR RELIGION AND WORK FOR THE COMMUNISTS. TO HELP DEFEND THEIR RELIGION AND THEIR ADOPTED COUNTRY AGAINST COMMUNIST DEPREDATIONS, KHMER MOSLEMS ORGANIZED A BRIGADE, NOW PART OF THE CAMBODIAN ARMED FORCES, AND MANY MOSLEMS HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES ON THE BATTLE FIELD. IN THEIR APPEAL, CAMBODIAN MOSLEMS BEGGED FELLOW MOSLEMS ALL OVER WORLD TO UNITE IN EFFORT TO COMPEL NORTH VIETNAMESE AND OTHER INDOCHINESE COMMUNISTS TO CEASE BLOODSHED IN INDOCHINA."Y

8. IRAN INCENSED BY NORTH KOREAN BEHAVIOR. TEHRAN, 9-12 SEPTEMBER (TEHRAN JOURNAL AND KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL): TWO OF TEHRAN'S LEADING NEWSPAPERS CARRIED REPORTS ON HOW NORTH KOREAN ROWDYISM HAD MARRED ASIAN GAMES, AND CRITICIZED THEIR ATHLETES' BEHAVIOR. ONE REPORT CARRIED HEADLINE, "WHENEVER THERE'S TROUBLE, THERE'S A NORTH KOREAN." AFTER

BsB

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 011078

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 7 7

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

C09534

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

NORTH KOREAN OLYMPIC SILVER MEDALIST BOXER LOST BOUT, NORTH KOREAN COACHES, MANAGER AND NEWSMEN ATTACKED INDONESIAN REFEREE, THEN ENGAGED IN BATTLE WITH POLICE AT MOHAMMED REZA SHAH STADIUM. RULES COMMITTEE UPHELD DECISION ON BOUT, THEN CENSURED NORTH KOREAN PROTESTERS FOR PUNCHING JUDGES AND BREAKING FURNITURE. SIX TRUCK-LOADS OF POLICE WERE NEEDED TO RESTORE ORDER. NORTH KOREAN FENCING AND SOCCER TEAMS REFUSED TO COMPETE AGAINST ISRAELIS, AND BOTH MEN'S AND WOMEN'S BASKETBALL TEAMS REFUSED TO PLAY SOUTH KOREANS. WHEN NORTH KOREA'S VOLLEYBALL PLAYERS DID CONSENT TO TAKE ON SOUTH KOREAN TEAM, NEWSMEN CONCLUDED NORTH KOREANS HAD AGREED ONLY BECAUSE THERE WAS TO BE A NET BETWEEN THEM! MOST SENSATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE CONCERNED NORTH KOREAN WEIGHTLIFTER WHO, STRIPPED OF HIS THREE AWARDS WHEN DRUG TESTS PROVED POSITIVE, OBJECTED VIOLENTLY AND REFUSED TO RETURN GOLD MEDALS. E2 IMPDET.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

C/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CAG/PSB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 011078

OUTGOING MESSAGE 24

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	102215Z	DIRECTOR	608611

CONF: C/LA5 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, DDO, C/SS3, C/PS/EG3, DDO/DO, C/OS6/IC, C/SE5, C/OPS

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 25

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER ~~C/WH/4~~

0 IP FILES DC/WH/4

C/WH/4/A

~~C/WH/4/C/A~~

C/WH/4/UP

WH/4 Secy

9

24 TO: BOGOTA, INFO SANTIAGO. Y

RYBAT VUNUMBER Y

REF: A. BOGOTA 24797 (IN 369247)

B. DIRECTOR 604965 Y

1. FOLLOWING FOR YOUR BACKGROUND USE IN BRIEFING PJFIFTYONE RE PRISONER EXCHANGE PROPOSAL: IS TEXT SANTIAGO [redacted] CABLE 6009, 2 OCT: Y EMBASSY/(IN 53640)

"1. RECENT PUBLIC LETTER TO CARDINAL RAUL SILVA REQUESTED HIS ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING RELEASE OF JURI GRIGOVIEVICH PRONIN, CURRENTLY DETAINED IN USSR. LETTER FROM DETAINEE'S WIFE, A CHILEAN CITIZEN NAMED MARIA ELIANA E. DE PRONIN, WAS GIVEN PROOMINENT LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE SEPT 26. TEXT OF LETTER WAS WRITTEN IN SOMETIMES IRONICAL TONE, APPEALING TO CADRDINAL'S "NOBLE CHRISTIAN HEART TOWARDS CHILEAN POLITICAL DETAINEES." CONTINUING, DETAINEEB'S WIFE SAID SHE BELIEVES AN AUTHORITY SUCH AS THE CARDINAL, "WHO HAS SO MANY TIMES DEFENDED THE DETAINEES OF THE LEFT," COULD INFLUENCE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO RELEASE HER HUSBAND, SAID MARRIED PRONIN IN JANUARY 1968, AND HUSBAND SINCE AUGUST 1968 DETAINED IN UJTA CAMP FOR HAVING TRIED TO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6

WH/6/

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY:

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

603641

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

LEAVE USSR ILLEGALLY. Y

"2. CARDINAL RESPONDED PUBLIC (OCT 1) IN FORM OF LETTER TO CONSERVATIVE "EL MERCURIO," REITERATING HIS INTENTION TO USE ALL HIS STRENGTH TO HELP THOSE WHO SUFFER," REGARDLESS OF OTHER CONSIDERATIONS." IN RESPONSE, CARDINAL ASSURED WIFE AND PUBLIC THAT HE WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE ON DETAINEE'S BEHALF, ALTHOUGH HE HAS NO RELATIONS WITH USSR AND IS NOT OPTIMISTIC. Y

¶3. COMMENT. PRESS COVERAGE OF LETTER EXCHANGE, AND PERHAPS REQUEST ITSELF, IS OBVIOUS CONTINUATION OF PRESS HARASSMENT OF CARDINAL FOR HIS CRITICISM OF GOC HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE, AND FOR HIS SILENCE DURING CHILEAN HUE AND CRY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN USSR AND CUBA. IN HIS RESPONSE, CARDINAL SOFTLY REBUKED CRITICS AND GOC BY STATING, "MOREOVER I BELIEVE IT IS CLEAR TO YOU (EL MERCURIO) THAT THE CARDINAL'S REQUESTS TO AUTHORITIES, EVENTHOSE WITH MORE INTIMATE TIES TO HIM, ARE NOT ALWAYS WELL RECEIVED." Y

4. NO FILE. E-2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 9 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG: E. JAMES MCTIGHE
UNIT: C/LA/CA
EXT: 1553

C/LA/SB

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/NW
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUC N BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR IITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

FORM 3020
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER
TOTAL COPIES 25-3 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED 9WH BY D AT 1700 Z
ACTION UNIT 9WH 8
ACTION #
INFO RF FILE VR C/HAN, DDO, OLC, 4SS3, 9PS/EG3, 9C/IOP2, 9OPSINT2, 9OS/G/IC
STAFF PRECEDENCE

T 422494 EIA951 PAGE 21 IN 362715
TOR:171642Z SEP 74 SAGO 30338

S E C R E T 171544Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 32338

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: SANTIAGO 32318 (IN 361362)

1. IN FEATURED EDITORIAL CAPTIONED "KENNEDY ON THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN" EL MERCURIO OF 16 SEPTEMBER DESCRIBES REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON AS SECOND (LUGARTENIENTE) OF SENATOR KENNEDY. EL MERCURIO OUTLINES OBJECTIVES OF HARRINGTON REVELATIONS AS: A) TO GIVE AMMUNITION TO THE POLITICAL INTERESTS OF (SENATOR) KENNEDY; B) TO CONTINUE THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN WHICH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM HEADS AND HAS GREATLY INFILTRATED THE ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL CIRCLES SUPPORTING KENNEDY; C) DIRECT FIRE AT THE CHILEAN DAILY WHOSE PUBLICATIONS AND OPINIONS SEEM TO HAVE THE STRONGEST IMPACT INTERNATIONALLY.

2. EL MERCURIO FURTHER COMMENTS THAT HARRINGTON ATTACK IS AN ATTEMPT TO IMPEDE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CHILE (SIC) AND DIRECTLY CONNECTS WITH WORLD-WIDE SOVIET CAMPAIGN "TO STRANGLE OUR GOVERNMENT EVEN AT THE COST OF (CAUSING) HUNGER FOR

RECORD COPY

15-126-3
17 Sep 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY ______

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED______ BY______ AT______ Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 422494 EIA951 PAGE 02 IN 362715

TOR:171640Z SEP 74 SAGO 30338

THE CHILEAN PEOPLE WHILE THE GRANERIES OF THE UNITED STATES ARE EMPTIED FOR RUSSIA."

3. AFTER TOUCHING SEVERAL OTHER BASES, EL MERCURIO CONCLUDES BY DENYING THAT THERE HAS EVER BEEN ANY "UNCONFESSABLE" INCOME IN ITS HISTORY. EL MERCURIO'S BOOKS WERE SUBJECT TO MOST THOROUGH AND HOSTILE SCRUTINY DURING THE MARXIST REGIME WITHOUT ANYONE BEING ABLE TO SPECIFY IRREGULARITEIES. THEREFORE, EL MERCURIO REJECTS "WITH LEGITIMATE DISDAIN THE IRRESPONSIBLE CHARGES MADE BY A CLOSE COLLABORATOR OF MR. KENNEDY AND FEELS AUTHORIZED TO CONJECTURE THAT THE ATTACK IS THE FRUIT OF JOURNALISTIC IRRESPONSIBILITY OR OF THE ANIMOSITY OF THE ADVISORS OF A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WHO IS STOPPED SINCE SEVERAL YEARS AGO IN HIS AMBITIONS BY THE MORAL EXAMINATION

~~PAGE 2 SANTIAGO 30338 S E C R E T~~

OF HIS ACTIONS TO WHICH HE HAS BEEN SUBJECTED IN HIS COUNTRY".

4. PRESIDENT FORD'S STATEMENTS ON CHILE FROM HIS 16 SEPTEMBER NEWS CONFERENCE WERE CARRIED IN FULL BY "EL MERCURIO" UNDER FRONT PAGE HEADLING "FORD: U.S. HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH FALL OF ALLENDE." THERE WAS NO EDITORIAL COMMENT IN "EL MERCURIO" AND NO NEWS OR EDITORIAL COVERAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT IN "LA TERCERA".

S E C R E T

FORM
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 422494 EIA951 PAGE 03-03 IN 362715

TOR:171640Z SEP 74 SAGO 30338

MRS. ALLENDE'S ATTACK AGAINST SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS CARRIED IN "LA TERCERA" BUT NOT IN "EL MERCURIO".

5. IN TAKING THE EXAGGERATED POSITION IT HAS ON THE REVELTIONS, EL MERCURIO HAS LEFT ITSELF VULNERABLE TO BEING EMBARRASSED AND CONTRADICTED BY STATEMENTS (SUCH AS THE PRESIDENT'S) THAT ARE MORE ACCURATE PRESENTATIONS OF WHAT WENT ON IN CHILE PRE-COUP. EL MERCURIO MAY WELL HAVE TAKNE THIS POSITION BECAUSE, BESIDES THEIR RIGHT-WING VIEWS, THE CURRENT MANAGEMENT IS GENUINELY IGNORANT OF THE FUNDING THAT TOOK PLACE WHEN FUBRIG-2 WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. FUBRIG-2 WHO SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO CHILE 18 SEPTEMBER, HAS TOLD COS THAT NO ONE CURRENTLY AT EL MERCURIO KNOWS OF FUNDING. EVEN CURRENT MINISTER OF ECONOMY LENIZ DOES NOT KNOW DETAILS BUT HAD SUSPICION ABOUT INFUSION OF FUNDS THAT TOOK PLACE IN U.P. ERA. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO MONITOR INTERNAL EL MERCURIO REACTION THROUGH FUBRIG-2.

6. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 32 PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 23-3 BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ___ S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ___ BY ___ AT ___ Z

ACTION UNIT WH/8

INFO RF FILE VR C/IP/AN, C/SS3, C/PS/EG3, C/OPS/INT2, DDO, C/OSG/IC, D secur4, C/CI/OPS,

STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

T 419128 , EIA568 / PAGE 01 IN 361362

TOR:161536Z SEP 74 SAGO 30318

S E C R E T 161510Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 30318

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 30293 (IN 358699)

B. SANTIAGO EMBASSY 5628 (#41039)

1. "EL MERCURIO" OF 14 SEPTEMBER 1974 DEVOTED ENTIRE PAGE 29 TO HARRINGTON REVELATIONS ABOUT CIA FUNDING IN CHILE UNDER HEADLINE "KENNEDY PLAN AGAINST EL MERCURIO". COVERAGE INCLUDED COMPLETE TEXT OF HARRINGTON LETTER TO MR. THOMAS MORGAN AND REPRINTS OF SEYMOUR HERSCH ARTICLE FROM "NEW YORK TIMES" AND AP DISPATCH FROM "WASHINGTON STAR", LATTER IDENTIFYING "EL MERCURIO" AS CHILEAN NEWSPAPER ALLEGEDLY RECEIVING FUNDS FROM CIA. ALSO INCLUDED A 13 SEPTEMBER AP ITEM DATE LINED WASHINGTON QUOTING DIRECTOR COLBY THAT "CIA WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY COUP".

2. DO NOT KNOW REASONS THT MOTIVATED "EL MERCURIO" TO PUBLISH EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF HARRINGTON REVELATIONS. SPECULATE THEY DECIDED TO TAKE OFFENSIVE TO ATTEMPT TO MITIGATE DAMAGING NATURE OF THE MATERIAL AGAINST "EL

WH/SBCH

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

15-126-3
16 Sep 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 419120 EIA668 PAGE 02 IN 361362

TOR:1615362 SEP 74 SAGO 32318

MERCURIO" ITSELF. THE HEADLINE AND A SHORT EDITORIAL COMMENT INTRODUCING ABOVE COVERAGE DESCRIBES THESE DEVELOPMENTS AS "NEW AND GROTESQUE EPISODE IN THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN" AND ATTEMPTS TO TIE REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON CLOSELY TO SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (WHO HAS SINCE THE COUP BEEN UNDER STEADY ATTACK HERE FOR HIS CRITICISM OF THE MILITARY INTERVENTION AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN CHILE). "EL MERUCIRO" MAKES CONNECTION WITH RECENT REVELATIONS ~~BE~~ by REP. HARRINGTON BY "EL MERCURIO"'s reprint OF ~~AN~~ ARTICLE FROM "MC CALLS" WHICH DEALT WITH CHAPPAQUIDICK IN A MANNER UNFAVORABLE TO SENATOR KENNEDY.

3. "EL MERCURIO" RESPONSE, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE NET EFFECT OF RAISING MORE QUESTIONS HERE THAN IT ANSWERS. THIS INCREASED PUBLICITY WILL INCREASE PRESSURE ON AND POSSIBLY SCRUITINY OF STATION ASSETS INVOLVED AND MAY AFFECT THOSE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED. ON 13 SEPTEMBER, FUPOCKET-1 WAS QUESTIOND BY NEWSWEEK REPORTER HERE ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF FUNDING. FUPOCKET-1 DENIED ALL KNOWLEDGE OF ANY FUNDING FROM FOREIGN SOURCES. DETAILS FOLL SEPARATE CABLE.

4. REQUEST HQS KEEP STATION UP-TO-DATE ON ANY PLANS OR CONCRETE ACTIONS TO CONTINUE INVESTIGATION OF REVELATIONS.

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

STAFF

1 ____ 4 ____
2 ____ 5 ____
3 ____ 6 ____

T 419106 EIA668 PAGE 03-03 IN 361362

TOR:161536Z SEP 74 SAGO 30318

5. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

7-71 MFG. 3/74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 21-5 RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

✓STAFF

ACTION UNIT
C/WH8
ACTION #

INFO
RF. FILE VR CI/PLAN C/SS3 PDO
C/PS/EG3 C/CI/OPZ

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 411313 EIA140 PAGE 01 IN 358699

TOR:121806Z SEP 74 SAGO 30293

SECRET 121711Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 30293

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 595482

B. SANTIAGO 30253 (IN 354910)

1. FOLLOWING STATION AGENTS WERE CONTACTED, PERIOD 8-10 SEPTEMBER, IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCE REVELATIONS. THEIR COMMENTS AND REACTIONS FOLLOW.

2. FUERMINE-1 CONCERNED BUT RELIEVED THAT NO NAMES WERE MENTIONED. COMMENTED THAT TIMING WAS EXCEPTIONALLY BAD SINCE IT COINCIDED EXACTLY WITH EDUARDO FREI'S ARRIVAL IN THE U.S. AND HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS HAD BEEN DELIBERATE. FUERMINE-1 ASKED WHETHER WE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE FURTHER INVESTIGATION OR MEDIA PLAY IN THE U.S. REPLIED THAT WE DID NOT KNOW BUT WOULD KEEP HIM INFORMED. HE IS TRAVELING TO GERMANY ON 22 SEPTEMBER AT INVITATION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION INSTITUTE (WEST GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS). DURING HIS TRIP HE WILL CHECK HIS NUMBERED ACCOUNT FOR THE ARRIVAL OF RECENT FUNDS. IN VIEW OF REF DEVELOPMENTS, HE

SECRET

RECORD COPY

15-126-3
12 Sep 74

7-71 MFG 3-74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	I	RF, FILE VR,	1		4
	N		2		5
ACTION #	F		3		6
	O				

T 411313 EIA140 PAGE 02 IN 359699

TOR:1218062 SEP 74 SAGO 30293

DOES NOT PLAN TO IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER MONIES INTO CHILE. HE RETURNING CHILE VIA NEW YORK AND CHICAGO AND PLANS TO MEET WITH FREI 15 OCTOBER IN NEW YORK. FUERMINE-1 EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE JUNTA WILL NEITHER RAISE THE MATTER WITH EMBASSY NOR PURSUE FURTHER SINCE IT IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST TO DO SO.

2. FUBRIG-2 RECEIVED NEWS CALMLY BUT WAS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT IMPLICATIONS OF EFFECTS OF THE REVELATIONS AND EXPRESSED OPINION THAT SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON SHOULD BE CHANGED TO PREV 0ENT SUCH LEAKS. HE WAS RELIEVED THAT EL MURCURIO WAS NOT MENTIONED BY NAME (BUT WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT IT WILL NOT BE EASILY IDENTIFIED IN ANY SUBSEQUENT COMMENTARY). FUBRIG-1 THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE JUNTA MAY WONDER IF USG STILL NOT IN SOME WAY SUPPORTING PDC, WHICH OF COURSE JUNTA WOULD FIND MOST UNACCEPTABLE.

4. FUERMINE-5 ALSO TOOK THE NEWS CALMLY ABOUT REVELATION OF $9,000 ITEM FOR TRAVEL OF PDC LEADERS. WHILE SHAKING HIS HEAD ABOUT THE LEAKING OF SUCH MATTERS, HE BELIEVES THAT THE REVELATION, UNLESS IT IS MADE MUCH MORE SPECIFIC BY SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS AND PUBLICITY, WILL NOT CAUSE HIM A PROBLEM.

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

T 411313 EIA140 PAGE 03 IN 358699

TOR:121806Z SEP 74 SAGO 30293

CONSIDERS THE FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE DELEGATION AS BEING PDC AND (INCORRECTLY) AS MAKING A TOUR OF LATIN AMERICAN RATHER THAN EUROPEAN CAPITALS WILL LEAD AWAY FROM PROPER IDENTIFICATION. SINCE THE FUNDS THAT PASSED THROUGH HIS HANDS WERE APPROXIMATELY $4,000 AT THE THEN LOCAL FREE MARKET RATE (AS OPPOSED TO STATION SPENDING RATE), HE FEELS THAT THIS WILL ALSO HELP HIDE PROPER IDENTIFICATION EVEN WITHIN THE PDC OF THIS FUNDING.

5. FUPOCKET-1 WAS INFORMED OF DISCLOSURE OF $25,000 FOR PURCHASE OF RADIO STATION ON 8 SEPTEMBER. WAS VISIBLY DISTURBED UPON HEARING NEWS AND COMMENTED "YOU PEOPLE NEED TO CHANGE YOUR SYSTEM SO THAT SUCH NEWS DOES NOT GET OUT." STATED THAT NO ONE WITHIN HIS GROUP KNEW THAT HE GAVE MONEY ON THE SIDE TO PURCHASE THIS RADIO STATION AND THAT NO RECORDS WERE MADE OF HIS PART IN THE DEAL. HE REMARKED THAT THE FORMER OWNER OF THE STATION IS A SOCIALIST AND UNLIKELY TO DISCUSS THE TERMS OF THE SALE SINCE ILLEGAL MONEY TRANSACTION INVOLVED. FUPOCKET-1 PROMISED TO KEEP US ADVISED OF ANY BLOW-BACK.

6. ON 10 SEPTEMBER? FUBARGAIN-1 SAID THAT GENERAL PINOCHET

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	STAFF	
			1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 411313 EIA140 PAGE 04 IN 358699

TOR1121626Z SEP 74 SAGO 32293

DID NOT SEEM VERY UPSET BUT COMMENTED IN FUBARGAIN-1'S PRESENCE THAT THE DISCLOSURE "SEEMED TO BE A DU~~ZY~~ME THING TO DO." FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH FUBARGAIN-1, HE SHOWED HIS UNHAPPINESS AT WHAT HE FEELS IS GROWING EVIDENCE OF USG INCOMPREHENSION OF GOC. SAID HE AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE TRAVELED TO STATES AND ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE WAY USG FINCTIONS COULD PARTIALLY UNDERSTAND CURRENT U.S.G. ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS. SAID MOST JUNIOR OFFICERS, HOWEVER, ARE INCREASINGLY UPSET AND CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY FEEL IS U.S. FAILURE TO BE A "GOOD FRIEND" OF CHILE DESPITE THE IMPORTANT SACRIFICES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE HERE IN THE WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUGGLE.

7. ACCORDING TO FUBARGAIN-1, MOST CHILEAN OFFICERS VIEW THE REVELATIONS AND THEIR TIMING AS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT BY A SECTOR OF U.S.G. (ALBEIT THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH) TO DELIBERATELY DAMAGE JUNTA AND FALSELY CAST DOUBT ON THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND ROLE IN BRINGING DOWN ALLENDE. OFFICERS HAVE ADDED THIS LATEST BLOW TO WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE U.S. FOOT-DRAGGING ON SUPPLYING CHILE ARMS URGENTLY NEEDED FOR DEFENSE

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 411313 EIA140 PAGE 05-05 IN 358699

TOR:121806Z SEP 74 SAGO 30293

AGAINST PERU AND U.S. FAILURE NOT ONLY TO ASSIST, BUT ACTUALLY TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS, PROBLEMS OF CHILEAN IMAGE ABROAD. SUM IS THAT CHILEAN OFFICER CORPS BECOMING INCREASINGLY BAFFELED AND RESENTFUL ABOUT U.S. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE.

8. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Frothy—

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA IN ALLENDE'S CHILE

For Psych Pol

HIGHLIGHTS

-- Since President Allende's electoral victory in 1970, the Government propaganda apparatus has mounted a coordinated campaign against the opposition communications media focusing on the prestigious El Mercurio newspaper chain and key opposition radios. The long-range goal is to create conditions that will insure Government control over the media so that an emasculated opposition will operate intuitively and through self-censorship within an approved framework.

-- The opposition radio stations bear the brunt of an array of legal and illegal devices designed to intimidate them. These devices include the threat of violence, favoritism in the distribution of essential Government advertising revenue, temporary closures, and Government-fomented strikes.

-- Chile's national television -- the only country-wide channel -- has become an important propaganda instrument for the Government. But it is being challenged by a Catholic University channel which is attempting to expand its service beyond the Santiago area.

-- A major confrontation between the Government and the opposition, lasting more than a year, has taken place at the Papelera, Chile's only important private newsprint producer, with the company supported by the opposition media stymying repeated Government efforts to take over the firm. The paper company claims that Government price policies have brought it close to bankruptcy.

-- Despite officially-sanctioned harassment, the opposition media have continued to function, taking advantage of the fluid political situation currently prevailing in Chile, and have become increasingly effective in exploiting the Government's economic failures and the growing dissension within the ruling Marxist coalition.

-- Nevertheless, the opposition's economic base that sustains its media is being slowly undermined as the Government expands its control over the Chilean economy. Many opposition media are reportedly already in difficult financial straits. The Chilean Communist Party, seeking to strengthen its voice in the March 1973 Congressional elections, has already purchased five beleaguered radio stations (one a former opposition station) in southern Chile.

CONFIDENTIAL

III. THE ALLENDE PROCESS - HOW THE MEDIA ARE TREATED

Allende's treatment of the opposition media and his utilization of the pro-Government media offer revealing insights into the unique claim that Chile will carry out a Socialist revolution within the framework of traditional bourgeois and democratic institutions without social cost.

Any Chilean government possesses wide powers that can be employed to control and intimidate media opponents given sufficient will power and cynicism to do so, despite the fact that media freedoms in Chile are twice-guaranteed, both in the 1925 constitution and in a statute of constitutional guarantees agreed to by Allende's Popular Unity coalition and the Christian Democrats (PDC) as a condition for PDC support for Allende in the congressional run-off held subsequent to the Presidential election in September 1970.

What are some of these powers? Any Chilean executive under provisions of the State Internal Security Law may establish emergency zones by decree headed by military commanders empowering the State to enforce news censorship and to restrict access to newsprint supplies. A law on publicity abuses empowers the government to petition the courts to suspend access to news and information. (Laws on the books that pose potential threats to freedom of radio information are more severe and more frequently utilized. See Section III. B. Radio.) Furthermore, through the judicious parceling out of advertising from State and autonomous State firms any government can discriminate against opposition media by denying or restricting this key source of revenue.

Unlike predecessor governments which utilized existing laws and accepted practices to reward political associates and benefit business partners, the Allende Government has consistently and frequently applied these measures to harass, to intimidate, and to undermine the morale of political and class opponents in the media. These tactics are applied throughout the country.

A basic organizational technique for the UP coalition has been the establishment of UP committees (CUP -- Comité de Unidad Popular) -- composed of newsmen who are militant members of parties belonging to the Government coalition or independent supporters of UP policies -- in newspapers, radios, magazines, and in journalistic bodies. The CUP's have been most active at the union level: demanding exorbitant wage increases, insisting that UP employees be given the right to express their opinion on editorial pages, disrupting legitimate union meetings, forming rump unions, and leaking internal company data to the leftist press and to the Government.

The goal of certain Unidad Popular militants regarding freedom of the press was most explicitly and revealingly stated by the organizing committee for a conference of leftist journalists which was held in Santiago in April 1971. The committee issued the following statement prior to the conference:

> ...we believe that we must fight for true freedom of the press, which will only be possible when there is true economic independence. We maintain that Chile will have true freedom of the press only when the means of mass communication are part of the area of social property, that is, (when they) belong to all Chileans. The press, radio, television, and the theater must be tools at the service of liberation and culture of our people and not a private business, an ideological battering ram of the national and foreign minority (the capitalists) as is presently the case.[7] (underlining added)

Another statement said "the mission of journalists is to support and defend the People's Government (the UP) together with all the workers." The declaration also underlined the support of UP newsmen for "Viet-Nam, Cuba, and all the people that are building Socialism," and threw a bouquet at Cuba's Prensa Latina agency for its "objective" reporting of the Chilean phenomenon. Allende himself lent legitimacy to the mission of UP journalists in a speech kicking off the conference when he stated that "committed" newsmen must act as the "vanguard" of the revolution by "elevating the political level of the people." Reiterating a theme expressed on many other occasions, Allende asserted that his Government would respect freedom of information while at the same time he lamented his Government's "excessive tolerance" for the opposition media.

A. Press

In the key Santiago metropolitan area, there are five major opposition daily newspapers and one important neutral daily, La Tercera de la Hora.

TABLE 2. MAJOR OPPOSITION AND NEUTRAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS

Title	Estimated Circulation	Political Orientation
El Mercurio	160,000	Independent, conservative
Las Noticias Ultimas	120,000	Part of the Mercurio chain
La Prensa	25,000	Christian Democratic (PDC)
La Segunda	60,000	Part of the Mercurio chain
La Tribuna	25,000	National Party (PN) interests
La Tercera de la Hora	190,000	Independent

A favorite target of the Government and its propaganda apparatus has been the conservative, independent daily El Mercurio, dean of the Chilean press and chief representative of the largest and most influential newspaper chain in the country. Tarred regularly as "pro-U.S." and as a "gringo newspaper written in Spanish" -- potent accusations in Chile -- El Mercurio has borne the brunt of every conceivable kind of pressure short of outright seizure.

On numerous occasions the paper has been implicated along with other opposition media in alleged seditious plots carried out in concert with foreign (i.e., U.S.) interests to overthrow the Government. Advertisers have been "requested" not to do business with the Mercurio chain,[8] which has been accused of foreign exchange irregularities by tax authorities, by Government supporters on the paper's own staff, and by Allende himself at public rallies. Allende, too, periodically reacts to critical Mercurio editorials with charges that Chile and the Presidential office have been "insulted," that the Mercurio chain indulges in "libertinism unprecedented in Chilean journalistic history."

and that the chain is "faithful to its tradition of infamy." The Government propaganda apparatus follows suit.

The PDC organ La Prensa and the National Party tabloid La Tribuna are secondary targets for the UP propaganda apparatus because their circulation is limited. Pressures employed against these dailies are aimed generally at the political parties behind them in contrast to the Mercurio chain where pressures are intended as a warning signal to the "free" media as an institution.

Independent La Tercera receives distinct treatment. The Government exerts minimal pressures on the paper in return for favorable editorial treatment of Allende policies (see Section VI. A. The Opposition Media Reaction). This tactic has paid dividends for Allende and for Tercera's owner, Germán Pico Cañas. Allende obtains favorable publicity in a mass-circulation paper that maintains comparative objectivity in its news columns, thus lending credence to Allende's claims that he will respect traditional Chilean freedoms while making the transition to Socialism. Freed from the need for the strident partisanship so characteristic of the rest of the press, Tercera steadily builds its circulation with a public seeking some relief from the verbal civil war. As a result Pico, who has been head of the Chilean newspaper association, has defended the Allende Government's press policies in international forums. The understanding with the Government, however, is an uneasy one; Tercera is not sufficiently malleable for the Socialist Party, the principal party in the Government coalition.[9]

B. Radio

Radio continues to be the most important medium of communication in Chile. The latest available figures compiled by the World Radio-TV Handbook give Chile a total of 137 stations, including 29 in the capital city, Santiago (See Table 3). The number of receivers is estimated at 3 million, or one for every third person. In a country 2,600 miles long radio's strategic importance is understood by both Government and opposition. The Government has resorted to a variety of devices designed to intimidate opposition radio stations: requests by Allende advisers that opposition stations hire designated leftist commentators; threats of violence; favoritism in the distribution of needed government advertising revenues; temporary closures; and strikes fomented by CUP committees.

TABLE 3. IMPORTANT RADIO STATIONS

Station	Political Orientation
Radio Agricultura	National Party (PN)
Radio Balmaceda	Christian Democratic (PDC)
Radio Cooperativa	PDC with PN elements
Radio Corporación	Socialist Party
Radio IEM	University of Chile station controlled by Marxists
Radio Luis Recabarren	Chilean labor federation (CUT) station; Communist-controlled (See Note No. 10)
Radio Magallanes	Communist Party
Radio Minería	Independent with PDC and PN elements.
Radio Pacifico	Radical Party (UP)
Radio Portales	Socialist Party
Radio Santiago	Catholic Church interests
Radio UTE	State Technical University station controlled by Communists

Partial blame for leftist infiltration of Chilean stations must rest with "bourgeois" radio owners. Long before Allende became president the Chilean businessmen and politicians who owned radio stations made it a practice to hire leftist commentators because they believed that leftists were superior professionals and helped to increase listenership. When the UP came to power it tapped an existing source of manpower.

In addition, the Government frequently utilized existing regulations to gain its ends. Radio concessions are granted by a Government entity (Servicios Electricos) attached to the Interior Ministry. The same entity can cancel or transfer such concessions.[10] Regulations promulgated during World War II state that "In case of internal disturbance, catastrophe or war radio stations are subject to the rules, control, and censorship that the Government may adopt." Under this type of emergency regulation, all radio stations were placed under an obligatory Government network -- not an unusual practice for the Allende Government -- when a modified martial law was decreed in 21 of Chile's 25 provinces during the October-

November 1972 truck drivers strike (See Note No. 18). Another regulation decrees that stations must interrupt their transmissions whenever the Interior Minister judges it to be necessary in the interest of the internal security of the State. Still another regulation authorizes the Central Bank to control the importation of equipment and spare parts for radio, television, and the press.

The Government moved quickly after the 1970 presidential election to obtain control of key stations. The Socialist Party gained control of Radio Portales, Chile's most popular station, and purchased Radio Corporación from El Mercurio (Portales has subsequently slipped in popularity). The Communist Party purchased Magallenes, an important Santiago station. The Communist Party recently also purchased Radio Simón Bolívar (formerly pro-opposition) in Concepción (as well as four other stations in southern Chile in preparation for the Congressional elections in March 1973). The rightist National Party daily La Tribuna quoted the former owner as saying that "the age of privately-owned mass media (in Chile) is over" with only the Government, strong economic consortiums, and the most powerful political parties capable of sustaining media operations. La Tribuna says the Communist Party is now the most powerful (single) broadcaster in southern Chile.

PDC-oriented Radios Balmaceda and Cooperativa, however, have to date successfully resisted Government enticements and pressures (see Section VI. A. The Opposition Media Reaction). Balmaceda -- a radio station which over the years had earned a reputation for objective newscasts -- has been the number one target of the UP in the radio field. It has suffered more temporary closures than any radio facility. The station was shut down, for example, 17 hours in June 1971 for broadcasting an alleged "alarmist" report during the State of Emergency decreed after the assassination of Perez Zujovic, a former interior minister in the Frei Government. At the same time a UP station, Portales, received nothing more than an admonition for transmitting "alarmist" news more acceptable to UP propagandists. During the August-September 1971 period Radio Balmaceda was shut down on three separate occasions under similar pretexts (see Note No. 10).

In radio as in the press the Government has used CUP committees to formulate exaggerated wage demands, to ferment strikes, and to form rump unions. CUP unions at Radio Pacifico, for example, forced the owner to sell out to a cooperative formed by employees when wage demands could not be met. The radio station subsequently was purchased by the Radical Party -- a member of the UP coalition.

The principal Government weapon, however, is its control over public service advertising, which traditionally has provided the bulk of revenues for Chilean radio stations. The Government has dangled the prospect of advertisements in return for favorable news treatment, but the bait has not been picked up by the major opposition radios which recognize that their independence is at stake. The economic squeeze makes the future of Chilean independent radios appear bleak.

C. Television

Since its inception in Chile in 1962, television has made great strides, but the medium still lags behind radio, especially in the provinces where technical conditions for viewing are poor. According to the best estimates available, there are 350,000 sets in Santiago and a total of 500,000 sets in the country. Chile is served by the following television channels: 1) A national network with some 21 outlets throughout the country; 2) the Catholic University channel in Santiago; 3) a separate Catholic University channel in Valparaíso; and 4) the University of Chile channel in Santiago.

The Government clearly recognizes television's importance as a propaganda vehicle, and under the direction of an Allende confidante, newsman Augusto Olivares (Socialist and a suspected member of the ultra-left MIR -- Movement of the Revolutionary Left), it has transformed Chile's only nationwide television channel into an outright political instrument of the Government coalition. Slanted commentaries favoring UP policies, character assassinations intended to smear political and class opponents, and a steady drumfire of Socialist propaganda in news and cultural programming became standard fare.

At the same time network authorities made it difficult under a variety of pretexts for opposition spokesmen to air their views in contravention of the State television statute. For example, the authorities frequently obliged all television channels and radios to carry official statements and denied opposition spokesmen equal time, resorting to the legal fiction that the official statements were transmitted voluntarily.

A popular political chat show "A Tres Bandas," in which opposition representatives freely debated UP representatives (the only such show carried nationally), was cancelled in August 1972 after two years of UP agitation against it. The Government defended the step by alleging that the program had poor listenership and by pointing to a ruling granting all political parties equal time to express their views on twice-weekly 20-minute slots. The original chat show format provided several hours of open-ended and frequent face-to-face confrontation, usually embarrassing to the Government.

The University of Chile station has consistently asserted the Marxist line since its inception, but the two remaining university channels have successfully fought Government control to date (See Section VI. C. University Confrontation and Television Freedoms). None of the university channels, however, is national in scope.

D. Magazines and Book Publishing

Early in 1971 the Government purchased the plant and equipment of the PDC-controlled Zig-Zag publishing empire -- one of the most modern in Latin America. The GOC announced the purchase after prolonged negotiations, provoked originally by the excessive demands of a Communist-led union. Under the terms of the accord the Government purchased Zig-Zag's plant and equipment, the company's national line of comics, and several magazines while Zig-Zag retained several mass-circulation magazines (Ercilla and Vea being the most important) under a two-year contract with the Chilean Treasury. The Zig-Zag infrastructure formed the basis for the newly-established Government-owned Quimantu National Publishing Enterprise. The accord with Zig-Zag has been scrupulously observed to date.

Quimantu quickly began turning out magazines, comic books, and textbooks pushing UP policies. Comic books like Firme were designed for mass consumption and aimed at adults with low cultural levels, while others like Ramona were aimed at the teen-age market. Cabrochico, another comic book, was geared to pre-teens. The format of some Quimantu products closely resembled competing Zig-Zag products. The weekly Ahora, for example, was designed to compete with Ercilla. After eight months Ahora collapsed, rejected in the market place by Chileans who were turned off by heavy-handed political propaganda.

E. Films

The Government's film production company, Chile Films, became the UP's principal propaganda arm in the film field. Rival Chilean private producers went out of business, squeezed by rising production costs and discriminatory tax and exchange rate treatment that denied them needed equipment and spare parts from abroad. Chile Films signed a comprehensive exchange accord in March 1971 with the Cuban Cinematographic Institute (ICAIC) (See Section V. C. Exchange of Persons, Visitors, and Exchange Agreements).

Chile Films also initiated agreements with the experimental film institute (leftist) at the University of Chile, the film institute at the Communist-dominated State Technical University (UTE), the Government information office, the film department of the Communist-dominated CUT (Central Unica de Trajabadores -- the major labor organization), the national television network, and the University of Chile television station. The stated purpose of the accords was to "develop the new Chilean film industry."

Its products are intended to glorify the roles of workers, peasants, and students in the march to Chilean-style Socialism, romanticize the proletarian role of the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, and attack the "bourgeoisie" and their "imperialist" allies. Despite an intense publicity buildup, however, few films actually appeared in the 1970-72 period. Most of the films that were produced appeared to be pieced together from newsreel film taken during the Allende presidential campaign or from post-election political rallies.

The Government's delay in making public the results of June 1972 elections for top posts in the Communist-dominated CUT labor federation also damaged Government credibility. The opposition media scored heavily in a barrage of charges of irregularities and vote fraud with a public that takes justified price in clean elections.

B. The Papelera Confrontation

The Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles Y Cartones (known as the Papelera), Chile's major private producer of newsprint, became another propaganda battleground cast by the opposition in terms of "freedom versus Marxist totalitarianism.".

In October 1971, the Government, carrying out a long-standing pledge, announced that CORFO (the Government Development Corporation) had opened negotiations to buy out the Papelera through the purchase of its stock. The opposition media immediately launched a campaign to warn the public that the free press would be crippled if newsprint distribution were placed at the mercy of Government suppliers. At the same time, the opposition media pleaded with private shareholders to refuse to sell to the Government. In addition, a "freedom fund" was created enabling private persons to buy up Papelera shares to prevent the company from falling into Government hands.

For several months pro- and anti-Government media carried out daily an intensive propaganda battle in advertisements, news stories, and editorials. Both sides resorted to the familiar numbers game: the pro-Allende media claimed that the Government was besieged by willing shareholders eager to sell out; the opposition asserted that shareholders were resisting temptation. Government propagandists argued that newsprint production was essential to the State and must be controlled by the State; the opposition said Papelera must remain in private hands as a patriotic duty.

Thwarted to date in its attempt to buy out Papelera shareholders, the Government has not hesitated to use other measures -- price controls, labor-induced production shortages, and strong-arm tactics -- to prevent the delivery of raw material to the plant. The Government press also circulated rumors that Jorge Alessandri (former President of Chile and a leading shareholder and board chairman of the Papelera) had made a deal with Allende to give the Government control over the Papelera to weaken the will of private shareholders and their supporters. That the Papelera still withstands these combined pressures a year later is a tribute to a determined defense of the firm by an opposition Congress, to the loyalty of the bulk of the Papelera employees, and to an aroused and alerted opposition media.

The battle for control of the Papelera will continue and the odds are not good for the company. Repeated requests for price increases sufficient to absorb cost increases -- forced on the firm in part by Government economic policies -- were not met, and the firm declared in September 1972 that it could not meet loan payments due to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Finally, in December 1972 the Government authorized new price increases averaging 45 per cent, which were, however, inapplicable to the price of newsprint. The Papelera gains some breathing space but Government pressures on the company are certain to continue. The price increase itself may be viewed as a form of pressure.

The battle has spilled over into the halls of the Chilean Congress. Partly to protect the Papelera's independent status, the PDC sponsored a "three areas" constitutional amendment designed to give Congress some control over which businesses can be incorporated as social property by the Government. (The Papelera is one of the firms appearing on the Government's original list of 91 firms to be absorbed by the Government as social property.) The amendment -- still a bitter bone of contention between the Government and the opposition -- would, among other points, declare null and void CORFO's attempted purchase of Papelera stock in the absence of Congressional approval.[13]

C. University Confrontation and Television Freedoms

Growing opposition confidence fed by an election victory at the University of Chile in April 1972 and by stiffening opposition attitudes at Santiago's Catholic University had important spill-over effects in television programming at two channels run by Catholic University. Increasing opposition effectiveness even raised the possibility that the Marxist-controlled University of Chile channel for the first time in its existence might be obliged to inject some objectivity into its output.

Incumbent University of Chile Rector Edgardo Boeninger, an independent with Christian Democratic sympathies, gained 51.9 per cent of the vote for rector in April against three other contenders representing the UP coalition and leftist splinter groups, including the MIR. An independent-PDC state also gained control of the previously Marxist-controlled Superior Normative Council. The victory was billed by the opposition media as another victory for democracy and pluralism over Marxist totalitarianism.[14] In the process Rector Boeninger became a hero of the opposition media and a symbol of "democratic" defiance of Government efforts to impose its will on an independent university. The opposition's rallying cry became "Defend a democratic and pluralist university." Translated into media terms it became "We want a democratic and pluralistic university TV channel."

Rallying behind that slogan, opposition supporters at the two Catholic Universities (Santiago and Valparaíso) began to ease out leftist influence in the news departments of the two university channels. UP supporters, however, remain at the technician level at the Santiago channel and can be expected to create problems for their opponents. Opposition authorities who now control the channel are proceeding cautiously against them.

A more significant indication of UP long-range attitudes toward television freedoms has been the Government's persistent refusal to permit university television stations to extend their networks throughout Chile. In September 1972, President Allende blocked the opposition's most recent attempt to obtain legislative sanction for such an extension by vetoing selected items in a PDC-introduced bill. The Government claimed that its own bill -- pending before Congress and allowing universities to establish stations only within the territory in which the seat of each university is located -- would create a national network for all recognized universities on an "equal and non-discriminatory" basis. What the Government did not say was that the bill if passed would preserve the State Network's position as the only single channel that can be viewed by a national television audience. Presumably the Government bill also would permit the Communist-dominated State Technical University to operate a television station in Santiago in competition with Santiago's Catholic University channel which, according to available public opinion surveys, is viewed by approximately 69 per cent of the capital's audience.[15]

Ercilla
October 5, 1972

Demonstrators Protest President Allende's Veto of Bill Permitting
University (Santiago) to Extend Its Television (Channel 13) Throughout Chile.

In subsequent developments the Catholic University at Santiago as nevertheless extended its television service to the Concepción etropolitan area, third most important in Chile, via a television epeater in Talcahuano. The Government has ordered that the epeater cease operation as the University lacks a concession under 1958 law to function in that area. The University has refused to omply, claiming that the 1970 National Television Act, which uthorizes the universities to operate television channels, is the overning statute and that it needs no additional concession to perate in any part of Chile. Meanwhile the repeater is still unctioning (as of February 15, 1973) while the legal (and political) ebate continues.

Allende in Retrospect

By Paul E. Sigmund

World attention has moved away from Santiago since the bloody overthrow of Salvador Allende last September, but the questions that were raised at that time still need answering. Where should the primary responsibility be placed for the tragic events on and after September 11, 1973? Was it, as the Left contends, the result of a fascist counterrevolution aided and abetted by the forces of imperialism? Was it, as the Right asserts, the only available response to Allende's attempt to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat by a mixture of guile and force? Did it mark the "death of a dream" of the establishment of socialism by democratic means, and was it thereby one more demonstration that Marxism must use force to accomplish its goals? Were there internal and external political and economic factors which made it impossible for Allende's experiment to succeed, or was the downfall of the *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity) coalition government the consequence of a series of ideologically-influenced analyses and mistaken policy choices which, if they had been different, might have produced another result? A review of the course of the Allende government with the aid of the considerable new material that has become available in recent months may help to answer these questions.

Allende's opponents never tire of pointing out that he was elected with only 36 percent of the vote in a three-way race.[1] What they do not mention is that in the congressional run-off between the two front-running candidates he was elected president by a lopsided majority vote of 135-35. He received the support of the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in the run-off in return for his agreement to the adoption of a Constitutional Statute of Democratic Guarantees protecting freedoms of expression, education and religion, and guaranteeing the independence of the military from political control. The text of the statute, which was added to the Chilean Constitution shortly after Allende's election, reflected the fears of non-Marxist groups that the new Marxist President would use the considerable power of the Chilean executive to undercut and eventually destroy all opposition to a Marxist takeover.

Political and Economic Strategy

When he took office, Allende promised that he would follow a "second model" of Marxism—the *vía Chilena* to socialism, "with meat pies and red wine." To prove that this model was "anticipated by the classics of Marxism," he quoted from Friedrich Engels on the possibility of

> *. . . a peaceful evolution from the old society to the new in countries where the representatives of the*

Mr. Sigmund is Professor of Politics at Princeton University. Among his published works are Models of Political Change in Latin America, *1970, and* The Ideologies of the Developing Nations *(2nd rev. ed., 1972). He has visited Chile nine times since 1963, most recently in January 1974 to do research on a forthcoming book dealing with Chilean politics.*

---

[1] Allende's supporters in the Popular Unity coalition consisted of his own Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista—PS*), the Communist Party (*Partido Comunista—PC*), the main body of the Radical Party (*Partido Radical—PR*), the leftist Catholic "Movement of Popular United Action" (*Movimiento de Acción Popular Unido—MAPU*), and two other smaller groups. The largest opposition groups were the centrist Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Democrata Cristiano—PDC*) and the rightist National Party (*Partido Nacional—PN*).

In retrospect, it is ironic that the Chilean Senate never acted on a constitutional amendment proposed early in 1970 to establish a second-round popular election, which would have provided the President thus elected (probably the right-wing candidate, *Jorge Alessandri*) with a clear popular mandate.

people have all power and in accord with the constitution can do what they desire when they have the majority of the nation behind them.[*]

Yet it was precisely the question of majority support that was Allende's central problem in his design to carry out a peaceful transition to "socialism with democracy, pluralism and liberty." The parties in his coalition were in a distinct minority in the Congress, and although there was no doubt about the legitimacy of his election by that body, his victory had only been possible because of the conditional support of the Christian Democrats. The PDC, it should be noted, included both Radomiro Tomic, the party's 1970 presidential candidate, who had gone to Allende's house to congratulate him the day after the popular election, clearly inferring his future support, and conservatives like Senator Juan de Dios Carmona, who had fought within the party to prevent it from voting for Allende in the run-off. In the immediate aftermath of the election the PDC was controlled by the Tomic forces, who claimed to be in favor of "communitarian" socialism, nationalization of copper, acceleration of agrarian reform, and reduction of Chile's *dependencia* on the United States. One way, then, for Allende to achieve his acknowledged goal of majority support for the transition to socialism would have been to try to arrive at an understanding with the Christian Democrats on the points in his program with which they were in agreement. This might have provoked the secession of some of the rightist members of the PDC, but if an accord had been reached with the party's leaders, it would likely have given Allende a majority in the Congress for at least part of his program.

Flushed with victory and unwilling to come to terms with the party which he had termed "the new face of reaction" during the campaign, Allende chose an alternative strategy. The next congressional elections were not scheduled to take place until March 1973, but the Chilean Constitution provided that in the event of a conflict with the Congress over the text of a constitutional amendment, the President could call a national plebiscite. The strategic course adopted by Allende was to attempt to expand popular support for his coalition and then propose a constitutional amendment which, in accordance with the Popular Unity electoral program, would replace the existing bicameral legislature with a unicameral house, to be elected immediately following the approval of the amendment. The Congress would be certain to reject the amendment, but if Allende had the support of a majority in the country, he could win the plebiscite and secure control of the unicameral legislature that would then be established.



Salvador Allende speaks of his plans for Chile at the 23rd Congress of the Socialist Party, held in January 1971, three months after his election as President of Chile.

—Photo by Santi Visalli for Photoreporters.

Allende's strategy for the expansion of electoral support was an economic one which drew as much from John Maynard Keynes as it did from Karl Marx. The Chilean economy, already operating below capacity, had gone into a profound recession as a result of Allende's election. The response of Pedro Vuskovic, Allende's Minister of Economics, was to "prime the pump" by adopting a deficit budget, increasing public expenditures, and redistributing income by skewing the annual wage readjustment for the preceding year's inflation (35 percent in 1970) in favor of the low-income sector of the population (the lowest income groups received a 40-percent increase). The utilization of unused industrial capacity, combined with strict enforcement of price controls, more stringent collection of taxes, and refusal to devalue the Chilean *escudo* in relation to the dollar, were expected to contain possible inflationary pressures which might result. (The Allende government also had a cushion of nearly $400 million in foreign reserves left to it by the Frei government as a result of high international prices for copper, Chile's principal export.)

The strategy also contained a Marxist element—

---

[*] *El Mercurio* (Santiago), Nov. 6, 1970, p. 23.

accentuation of the class struggle. At the same time that appeals were made to the pocketbooks of the lower-class Chileans, there was also to be an effort to increase their class consciousness *(concientización)* through government publications and the use of the media to remove the elements of "false consciousness" instilled by "bourgeois" propaganda. Expressing the diametric opposite of a claim often voiced by his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, Allende said in a press conference just after his installation, "I am *not* president of all Chileans." And in his first "State of the Nation" message to the Congress he asserted:

> *. . . the People's Government* (Gobierno Popular) *is inspired in its policy by a premise that is artificially denied by some—the existence of classes and social sectors with antagonistic and opposing interests.*[3]

Allende's economic advisers anticipated an additional source of revenue for the government from the "exploitative" profits of the industries that were to be nationalized by the new government. The partially American-owned copper mines were to be taken over by a constitutional amendment—both to lay to rest any legal doubts about the reversal of the Frei Chileanization agreements of 1967 and 1969, and because a general consensus in Chile favored nationalization.[4] Other companies were to be nationalized after a controlling interest was gained through the purchase of shares on the open market by the government development agency. The latter course seemed facilitated by the fact that the price of shares had been depressed since the elections, and further economic pressures could be created by allowing wage increases but forbidding any rise in prices. The legal adviser to the government, Eduardo Novoa, also outlined other "legal loopholes" in existing Chilean law which could be used for "temporary" takeovers of companies, including "intervention" because of labor disputes and "requisition" because of a "breakdown in supply of an article of prime necessity."

The takeover of large sectors of Chile's basic industry and trade, as promised in the Popular Unity program, was thus seen as an essential part of an economic and political strategy aimed at achieving and maintaining power. Combined with a rapid acceleration of agrarian reform (again using existing legislation—the 1967 agrarian reform law—but exploiting provisions such as one authorizing the expropriation of "abandoned or badly-farmed land," with one percent payment in cash and the rest in bonds), the planned takeover meant that even if the effort to create a unicameral left-dominated legislature failed, the Allende government could destroy the economic base of the "capitalist" opposition through a series of "irreversible" *faits accomplis (hechos consumados)* which would give the



A Chilean peasant guards the gate of a farm south of Santiago which was seized from its owners on the pretext that it was "operated unproductively" (mal explotada).

—Photo by Magal Castellos.

---

[3] Salvador Allende, "The Chilean Way to Socialism," in Paul E. Sigmund, Ed., *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, 2nd rev. ed., New York, Praeger, 1972, p. 450.

[4] Frei's Chileanization program had involved the purchase by the Chilean state of a controlling interest in the large copper mines owned by the Kennecott and Anaconda companies. The agreements had also provided that Chile's payments to the American companies were to be invested in the expansion of copper production and refining in Chile, earning the country additional revenue in the 1970's to pay back the loans contracted to finance the purchases.

government control of the economy and of the excess profits that the private sector had used for luxury consumption or had sent out of the country as profit remittances to foreign companies. At the same time, the fact that the policy remained within the letter, if not the spirit, of the law meant that intervention by the military was unlikely.

Allende's constitutionalist and legalist strategy was not universally accepted within his coalition. Most of his own Socialist Party—beginning with its newly elected General Secretary, Senator Carlos Altamirano—and several other groups further to the left, such as the MIR (*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and the VOP (*Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo*—Organized Vanguard of the People), were openly doubtful about the wisdom of relying on elections and "bourgeois legality" to achieve power and advised preparation for an armed confrontation with the forces of reaction, which they foresaw as inevitable. Allende's effort to portray the transition to socialism as peaceful in character was not assisted by the publication of his conversations with French revolutionary theorist Régis Debray in early 1971. In these, Debray declared that "in the last analysis and until further notice, political power comes out of the end of a gun," and Allende repeatedly stated that his differences with apostles of violence like Ché Guevara were only "tactical," because the Chilean situation required that he observe legality "for the time being." Allende himself organized an armed personal bodyguard, the so-called GAP (*Grupo de Amigos Personales*), and—we now know—as early as December 1971 received reports on the illegal importation and distribution of arms to the MIR and to his bodyguards.[*]

While there were thus intermittent hints of revolutionary alternatives, Allende's basic economic strategy was "socialist consumerism,"[*] combined with a rapid expansion of state control in industry, trade and agriculture, and his basic political strategy

---

[*] See Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende*, New York, Random, 1971, pp. 52, 77, 91, and 97. *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Feb. 18-24, 1974, p. 3, reproduces the report, found in the presidential palace.

[*] On "socialist consumerism" see Paul E. Sigmund, "Two Years of Popular Unity," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1972, pp. 38-51.



A Santiago rally in November 1970 celebrates the first anniversary of the Allende presidency—in the foreground, a picture of Latin revolutionary Ché Guevara.

—Photo by Claus Meyer for Black Star.

was an expansion of the electoral base of the Allende coalition by an appeal to the material interests and the class consciousness of the lower classes. It was the interaction of the various elements of this political and economic strategy that finally produced the breakdown of Chilean constitutionalism and the intervention of the armed forces that the extreme left of the Allende coalition had been predicting all along.

Initial Success

At the outset, the new economic policy was astoundingly successful, although it had within it the seeds of future disaster. Income redistribution stimulated demand, while price controls and an artificially low exchange rate kept prices down. As a consequence, a mini-boom ensued. By March 1971 the *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril* (Association for the Development of Manufacturing), representing Chilean business and industry, admitted that production had increased by 6.3 percent over the figure of 12 months before, and by May that figure had reached 13.5 percent. The Institute of Economics of the University of Chile later reported that unemployment in the Santiago area dropped from 8.3 percent in December 1970 to 5.2 percent in June 1971 and declined further to an unusually low 3.8 percent by the end of the year. The Consumer Price Index stopped climbing entirely in December 1970 and had only increased by 6 percent by the time of the municipal elections of April 1971—its lowest rise in many years. At the same time, salaries and wages increased by 27 percent in real terms.

This wave of economic prosperity—combined with the absence of the political repression that some rightists had predicted would result from a victory by the Marxists—led many, particularly in low income groups, to vote for the candidates of the Popular Unity coalition in the April municipal elections. Allende's own Socialist Party bettered its electoral showing in the 1969 congressional elections by nearly 100 percent (a jump from 12 percent to 22 percent of the total), and the candidates of all the parties supporting Allende received about 50 percent of the vote, as compared with the 36 percent which the President himself had received only seven months before. Yet, gratifying as the results were, the coalition was still a few votes short of the absolute majority that Allende required to win a plebiscite on a constitutional amendment. He was later criticized for not calling the plebiscite at the time when the regime's popularity was at its highest point,[7] but in retrospect it does not appear at all certain that he would have won—particularly since by the time that the constitutional prerequisites for such a vote had been fulfilled, the economic and political situation would have been much less favorable.

The period after the municipal elections now appears to have been crucial for the long-term survival of the regime. The Right was still in disarray, the Christian Democrats had elected a compromise leadership which was not committed to either of the party's wings, and the short-run economic and political indicators were favorable. Yet, instead of taking action on the economic front to stem the loss of foreign reserves and to dampen inflationary pressures—and on the political front to prevent the movement of the Christian Democrats into an alliance with the right-wing opposition parties—the regime continued its previous policies, confidently assuming that in the long run "the people" would support it and ignoring the warnings of "bourgeois" economists that the loss of foreign reserves, the expansion of demand, and the sharp decline in investment would produce disastrous consequences in the following year.

Political Polarization

The hardening of the Christian Democratic position began in mid-1971. It was accelerated in June by the assassination of the former Christian Democratic Interior Minister, Edmundo Perez Zujovic, by extremists, at least one of whom had been released from prison by Allende upon his accession to power. A month later in a by-election in Valparaíso, the victorious Christian Democratic candidate received the support of the Right. The tacit alliance with the Right led to the secession from the PDC of eight deputies and a number of other party leaders to form the pro-Allende *Izquierda Cristiana* (Christian Left). This was counterbalanced however, by a split in the other direction within the Allende coalition. Five of the seven Radical senators (including two former presidential candidates) and 7 of the 19 deputies left the Radical Party (PR), and formed the *Partido de la Izquierda Radical* (Party of the Radical Left—PIR) in protest against the Marxist orientation of a

---

[7] See, e.g., Paul M. Sweezy, "Chile: The Question of Power," *Monthly Review* (New York, London) December 1973, pp. 1-11.

PR policy resolution which the dissidents described as "completely removed from the characteristic and distinctive ideology of our party" and opposed to "the interest of the middle social strata" whom the party had always represented.[*] For a time, the PIR continued to support the Allende government, but within a year it had entered the ranks of the opposition.

In July 1971, the Christian Democrats had voted in favor of the constitutional amendment nationalizing the copper mines, but from that point forward, the pattern was one of polarization of Chilean politics and society into two opposing blocks. The Allende forces controlled the executive and pursued an increasingly vigorous ideological purge of those who were not entirely sympathetic to the government. The opposition controlled the legislature, and in October 1971 the Christian Democrats and the rightist parties attempted to assert legislative control over the expansion of the public sector by voting in favor of a constitutional amendment limiting the use of the intervention and requisition procedures and requiring that all transfers of private enterprises to the "social" or mixed sectors be carried out in accordance with specific legislation adopted by the Congress. This legislative act, referred to as an amendment on the "Three Areas of Property," became the focus of a continuing deadlock between the President and Congress that lasted until Allende's overthrow in September 1973.

Allende's refusal to accept the amendment or to call a plebiscite to resolve his differences with the Congress appeared to the congressional opposition to be a decisive indication of his determination to bypass the legislature in carrying out the Popular Unity program, and from the time of the adoption of the amendment onward, the Christian Democrats began to cooperate with the rightist parties in opposing the executive. One method was to impeach ministers for violation or (more often) nonenforcement of the law. The first of many such impeachments took place in January 1972. Another method was to present a united electoral front against the government. Informal cooperation between the rightist parties and the Christian Democrats led to striking victories in two by-elections in January 1972, and a month later these groups formed the Democratic Confederation (*Confederación Democrática*—CODE) to prepare joint lists for the 1973 congressional elections. A third area of cooperation was in marches and demonstrations against the government, the most famous of which was the March of Empty Pots in December 1971, in which thousands of housewives, mostly of middle-class background, marched, banging pots to protest food shortages.

Those shortages had developed because the predicted economic difficulties resulting from the Vuskovic policy began to emerge in late 1971. The balance-of-payments surplus had been depleted at such an alarming rate (in 1971 there was a deficit of $315 million, while in 1970 there had been a surplus of $91 million) that in November 1971 the Allende government called a moratorium on payment of its foreign debts. Chile had already experienced difficulties in securing loans from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank as a result of its failure to compensate the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies for the nationalization of their major mines. The debt moratorium was bound to make it considerably more difficult for Chile to secure foreign credits, particularly for the short term.[*] In December 1971, the Chilean government finally permitted a partial devaluation of the Chilean *escudo* so as to decrease the distortions created by its overvaluation, but this created pressure on prices of goods manufactured with imported components. Shortages of certain food items—especially cooking oil, detergents, sugar, toothpaste, and cigarettes—were ascribed by the government to upper-class hoarding and to increased consumption by low-income groups; however, the dislocations in the countryside associated with the very rapid expansion of the agrarian reform (Allende took over almost as much land in his first year in office as Frei had in six years) clearly had something to do with the problem as well, and the situation could be expected to get worse with the harvest in early 1972. A 100-percent increase in the money supply as a result of the government's deficit spending was also beginning to produce inflationary pressures now that the unused capacity of Chilean industry had been taken up by the 1971 expansion. Most important, a sharp drop in investment (Allende said it had declined by 7.7 percent, but opposition economists claimed it had fallen by 24.2 percent) meant that the spectacular growth rate achieved in 1971 would be sharply reduced in 1972.

Yet the degree of the incipient crisis was not

---

[*] *El Mercurio*, Aug. 8, 1971, p. 37.

[*] On the inaccuracy of the term "invisible blockade" to describe the Allende government's credit problems, see Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1974, pp. 322-40.



Workers occupying a plant outside of Santiago proclaim their intention to hold it to the death. The initials of the Unidad Popular *(Popular Unity) are painted on the wall by the gate.*

—Photo by Maggi Costello.

immediately evident from the figures for 1971. Industrial growth had reached 8.3 percent, agrarian production (based on plantings before Allende's accession to power) had increased by 5.3 percent, and unemployment had dropped to record lows. The Communist Party in a report to a Popular Unity "conclave" in early 1972 warned that "very strong inflationary pressures could make our situation acute," but the government took no action to deal with the problem. The continuing optimism of government policymakers at this time was expressed at a Round Table in Santiago sponsored by the University of Sussex and the Chilean Planning Office in March 1972. In the course of discussion Radomiro Tomic, the defeated Christian Democratic presidential candidate, asserted that the Allende government had committed a "fatal political error" in failing to establish an "institutional majority" in the Congress through a "far-reaching agreement between socialists inspired by Christianity and those inspired by Marxism—that is, between the Christian Democrats and Popular Unity—in the period following the 1970 presidential election." Allende's representatives confidently replied that "with a gradual heightening of the political consciousness of the proletariat, there seemed to be no obstacles in the internal logic of the Chilean bourgeois state to prevent the workers' winning sufficient strength to gain control of the legislature as well as the executive."[10]

On the political front, there were individuals and groups on both sides who attempted to stem the movement toward polarization, which they correctly foresaw would lead to the breakdown of Chilean institutions. Two important efforts to arrive at a compromise on the issue of the constitutional amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" were made in the first part of 1972. In April the Left Radicals, who had entered the Allende government in January, carried on lengthy negotiations with the Christian Democrats to hammer out a satisfactory agreement on this issue, only to have it rejected by the top command of the Popular Unity coalition parties. The Left Radicals responded by leaving the government and joining the opposition, a move Allende described as "a stab in the back."[11] A second set of negotiations in June between the head of the Christian Democratic Party and Allende's Minister of Justice broke down when the time limit set by the Christian Democrats expired and the PDC leadership refused to extend it.

The two sets of negotiations seem to have collapsed for related reasons. In April the left wing of the Popular Unity coalition was unwilling to accept a compromise which would slow down or stop the forward movement of the government nationalization program, while in June the right wing of the Christian Democrats could point to an impending by-election in mid-July as a reason for discontinuing discussions. Both cases illustrated a general problem posed by the Chilean multiparty system. Once political conflict became polarized, the extremes held the rest of the opposing coalitions hostage and prevented what could have been a convergence of views in the center.

The negotiations were interspersed with a series of demonstrations and counterdemonstrations by the government and the opposition which always stopped just short of open violence. Several observers, including the American Ambassador to

---

[10] J. Ann Zammit and Gabriel Palma, Eds., *The Chilean Road to Socialism*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1973, pp. 38, 247; The Communist Party report appears in *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 1972, p. 4.

[11] Partido Izquierda Radical, *Trayectoria Política del PIR* (Political Path of the PIR), Santiago, 1972, p. 79.

Chile, Nathaniel Davis, remarked on the pattern of "brinkmanship" that the Chileans exhibited." Social and political tensions increased—but as long as economic deterioration was not reflected in runaway inflation, the Chilean political system seemed able to contain them.

The Turning Point

The strains in the system only became unmanageable in mid-1972, when the lid blew off the fragile Chilean economy and let loose the pressures that had been building up for at least a year. As the deficit in government spending rose, particularly because of its subsidies to the "social area," its foreign reserves dropped nearly to zero, and the growth of industrial output slowed down. Allende replaced Economics Minister Vuskovic with Carlos Matus and appointed Orlando Millas as Finance Minister. The Matus-Millas team sought to "find stability at another level," ordering a drastic currency devaluation, raising prices in the nationalized sector, and permitting limited agricultural price increases. The result was a sharp jump in the cost-of-living index, which climbed from 27.5 percent at the end of June to 99.8 percent at the end of September. A wage readjustment to compensate for the increase in the cost of living only accelerated the inflation, so that by the end of the year the official consumer price index had reached 163 percent (see Table 1). In September, industrial output began to drop in absolute terms (*i.e.*, not merely in terms of the rate of increase)—a drop that continued every month thereafter until the September 1973 coup." Agricultural production (excluding livestock) also commenced to decline, and mineral production registered precipitous drops, although copper production rose by 1.3 percent for 1972 owing to the fact that a number of new mines came into operation. (On other elements of the worsening economic situation, see Table 2.)

Chile's economic problems were paralleled in the political arena. Several additional ministers were impeached, including the Minister of Interior, who was charged with abetting the illegal importation of arms from Cuba in March. (The Allende government claimed that suspect shipments from Cuba—"*bultos Cubanos*"—were "works of art," but after the September 1973 coup, the government White Book published an inventory of over 2,000 pounds of arms sent from Cuba in 13 crates which customs

Table 1: Monthly Fluctuations in Consumer Prices and Industrial Output under Allende

	Month	Consumer Price Index	Industrial Output *
1970	Oct.	35.6	−8.0
	Nov.	35.3	4.3
	Dec.	34.9	−0.3
1971	Jan.	28.1	−4.5
	Feb.	22.8	−7.3
	March	20.1	6.3
	April	20.2	1.6
	May	21.0	13.5
	June	21.1	10.7
	July	19.1	6.7
	Aug.	17.4	10.7
	Sept.	15.6	25.5
	Oct.	16.5	22.6
	Nov.	18.8	22.1
	Dec.	22.1	19.5
1972	Jan.	24.8	18.5
	Feb.	32.0	11.9
	March	34.0	10.2
	April	38.1	12.6
	May	40.0	11.4
	June	40.1	2.5
	July	45.9	5.0
	Aug.	77.2	3.6
	Sept.	114.3	−7.8
	Oct.	142.9	−7.7
	Nov.	149.9	−8.1
	Dec.	163.4	−11.1
1973	Jan.	180.3	−6.8
	Feb.	174.1	−4.7
	March	183.3	−2.8
	April	195.5	−11.3
	May	233.5	−11.0
	June	283.4	−14.8
	July	323.2	−10.7
	Aug.	303.6	−11.9
	Sept.	286.0	−22.9
	Oct.	528.4	18.0
	Nov.	528.9	5.1

* *Percentage of change from the same month of the previous year.*

SOURCE: *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas* (*National Institute of Statistics*), Santiago; *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril.* (Association for the Development of Manufacturing), Santiago.

A secret cable from US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis to the State Department, published in Jack Anderson's column in *The Washington Post* (Washington, DC) on March 28, 1972, commented that "the Chileans have a great ability to rush to the brink, embrace each other, and back off." On the same point see Mauricio Solaún and Fernando Cepeda, *Allende's Chile: On the Politics of Brinkmanship*, Bogotá, Universidad de Los Andes, 1972.

The Allende government blamed the drop in production on the October 1972 strike, but this ignored the fact that production declines began before October.

Table 2: Some Indices of the Chilean Economy, 1970-72

	1970	1971	1972
Gross domestic product (% change)	3.7	8.3	1.4
Investment (% change)	8 6	−24.2	−8.5
Real wages and salaries (% change)	13.0	30.0	−9.0
Exports ($ million)	1129	1045	853
Imports ($ million)	1020	1124	1287

SOURCE: Department of Economics, University of Chile.

had been forbidden to inspect.") The judiciary joined in the conflict, protesting the failure of the Ministry of Justice to carry out court orders, while progovernment demonstrators denounced the *viejos de mierda*—"filthy old men"—in the Supreme Court. As it became apparent that there was no real possibility of resolving their differences, the two sides turned to the armed forces as impartial arbiters, and the national holidays in mid-September 1972 were marked by rival efforts of the Congress and the President to ingratiate themselves with the military.

The political involvement of the military was accelerated by the next step in the Chilean tragedy—the October 1972 strike. Respectively termed the "employers' lockout" and "the national strike" by pro- and anti-Allende forces, it began far from Santiago, in the remote southern province of Aysen, with a strike by small truckers. (Referred to by the government press as the "truck-owners," the membership of the truckers' *gremio*—guild—was almost entirely composed of owners of one or two trucks who feared an announced plan to establish a state trucking agency which would have had priority access to new trucks and spare parts). The strike quickly spread across the nation, as the truckers were joined by bus and taxi drivers, shopkeepers, doctors, nurses, dentists, airline pilots, engineers and part of the peasantry. The Christian Democrats and the rightist parties supported the strikers, and the work stoppage dragged on for over a month resulting in an estimated loss of $150-200 million in production. Agriculture was particularly hard hit because the strike took place in the midst of the planting season; indeed, there is no doubt that part, though not all, of the 25-percent drop in the 1973 harvest was the consequence of the strike. Industry was not as adversely affected, since workers attempted to keep factories going despite management's efforts to cease production—and the October strike saw the emergency of "Industrial Belts" *(Cordones)* and "Communal Commands," which seemed to embody the type of spontaneous "popular *power*" that leftist theorists had spoken of as the basis of a genuine revolutionary class consciousness to replace the materialistic "economism" that had characterized Chilean workers until this time."[19] When the workers seized closed factories, the plants were usually "intervened" by the government, so that an important result of the October strike was a considerable expansion of the government-controlled sector of industry and trade.

The most important outcome of the strike, however, was the direct involvement of the military in the Allende cabinet. A condition of the settlement of the strike was that the military take over key cabinet posts. This resulted most notably in the assignment of the Ministry of the Interior to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Carlos Prats, so as to assure that the congressional elections scheduled for March 1973 would be carried on freely and impartially.

The involvement of the military and the preparations for the March elections brought about a lull in the escalation of political conflict in Chile. Inevi-

---

[18] Secretaria General del Gobierno, *Libro Blanco* (White Book), Santiago, 1973, pp. 103-08.

[19] The *Cordones* were more or less spontaneously organized committees of workers from seized factories which coordinated production and distribution in a given industrial area. The Communal Commands *(Comandos Comunales)* were organized by the *Cordones* to mobilize the local population in the surrounding area. They included representatives of neighborhood committees *(juntas de vecinos)*, mothers' groups *(centros de madres)*, price control and distribution committees *(juntas de abastecimiento y precios)*, and other groups. On the persistence of worker "economism," see James Petras, "Chile: Nationalization, Socioeconomic Change and Popular Participation," *Studies in Comparative International Development* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), Spring 1973, pp. 24-51, also available in James Petras, Ed., *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution*, New York, Wiley, 1973, Chap. 2.

Symptomatic of leftist attacks on Chilean institutions, a Santiago wall poster denounces the country's Supreme Court as "Protectors of Fascist Sedition."

—Photo by Juan de Onís for The New York Times.

tably, however, it also produced political divisions within the military itself, which had hitherto been relatively aloof from the process of polarization. It was soon apparent, for instance, that General Prats was willing to give the government the benefit of the doubt in nearly every instance that its decisions or actions were challenged. Conversely, the Navy was noticeably less enthusiastic, and in January Admiral Ismael Huerta resigned from the cabinet over plans for the initiation of what he took to be a food-rationing system. It is now also known that the first plans for a possible coup were made by intermediate-level officers at the end of 1972.[14]

Food distribution became a critical issue as the black market continued to expand, with much of Chile's agricultural production going into illegal channels because of the government's refusal to increase the official prices paid for agricultural produce. The result was, in effect, two separate price systems—a subsidized, state-owned distribution system oriented primarily toward the low-income groups and a flourishing black market aimed at middle- and upper-income groups. The expansion of the powers of government-appointed Supply and Distribution Committees (JAPs) to deal with the black-market problem led the opposition to charge political manipulation of food distribution; nonetheless, the government seemed powerless to combat black-market operations.

The March 1973 Elections

The congressional elections in March did not resolve anything. Chile's right-wing parties had hoped that food shortages and economic difficulties would produce a two-thirds majority against the government, which might in turn permit the impeachment of the President, but the results, while showing an anti-government majority of 56 percent, gave the Allende regime 44 percent—a larger vote than most observers had predicted. The opposition pointed out that the vote of the pro-government forces had declined from the 50 percent they had registered in the 1971 municipal elections, while the government compared its 44 percent with the 35 percent that Allende had received in 1970. In fact, the only proper basis for comparison was the

---

[14] *The New York Times* (New York), Sept. 27, 1973.

Apprehensive middle-class homeowners man a watchtower along a security wall built around their Santiago neighborhood; a Socialist slogan on the outside of the wall counters with "We Will Win."

—Photo by Santi Visalli for Photoreporters.

1969 congressional elections. On that basis, the leftist parties had suffered a slight loss in votes but had achieved a slight gain in seats. Certain oppositionists later argued that the Left would have suffered much greater losses had it not been for a government-assisted electoral fraud involving some 200,000-300,000 votes, but the statistics presented in support of the argument are unconvincing.[1]

While the government's interpretation of the elections as proof that it was expanding its popular support was not accurate, the election results indicated that at least it had not lost popularity as rapidly as previous governments faced with similar economic reverses. Despite a wage readjustment in October, real wages had declined 7 percent in 1972, and raging inflation continued to consume the wage increase in early 1973. However, the combination of discriminatory distribution of government-produced goods and appeals to class consciousness seemed to have stemmed the erosion of support, at least among the masses of the poor.

Unfortunately for the government's longer-range interests, the deliberate accentuation of class consciousness had an opposite effect on the middle class, driving middle-class areas to organize themselves into "Neighborhood Committees" to defend themselves. It also, for the first time, led many to arm themselves for a possible confrontation, which seemed more likely now that the safety valve of an impending election was no longer present. A government proposal to limit full wage readjustments to those making less than three times the minimum wage did nothing to reassure the hostile middle-income groups.

Before the elections, it had been rumored that there might be another attempt in March at an accommodation between the regime and the opposition forces, possibly under the auspices of the military. Any possible accord of this type was quickly prevented by the publication, two days after the elections, of a government decree calling for the initiation in June of a single national unified school system, which would follow a common curriculum including compulsory courses in socialism and work periods in factories. The ensuing uproar involved the Catholic Church for the first time in formal opposition to the government and mobilized thousands of secondary school students in violent demonstrations in downtown Santiago. Stories of fierce arguments over the school proposals among the top military officers (the military had left the cabinet after the elections) filtered into the national press, and a military delegation held a formal meeting with the Education Ministry to express their opposition. The controversy subsided only when the government announced that the proposal had been postponed, pending further discussion.

---

[1] See report of the Investigating Committee of the Catholic [illegible] Law School, reproduced in the Libro Blanco, pp. [illegible]-30. The statistics on new voters in 1973 omit the 21-to-24 year-old group [illegible] have been too young to vote in 1970. They comprised almost exactly the number of "fraudulent" voters estimated in the report.

Within the government, the debate continued on whether to "consolidate in order to advance" (the Communist position) or to "advance without compromise" (the Socialist stance). One indication of how the debate was resolved was the decision by the government to use a constitutionally-authorized "decree of insistence" allowing the cabinet to override the rulings of the Controller General of Chile, Hector Humeres, who had disallowed the requisitioning of some of the factories taken over during the October 1972 strike. Conflicts also continued with the judiciary over the executive's refusal to obey court orders to return seized properties. On May 26, the Supreme Court sent a public letter to the President denouncing

> *. . . the illegal attitude of the administration . . . [its] open and continual rebellion against judicial orders . . . which signifies a crisis of the rule of law [and] the imminent breakdown of the juridical structure of the country.*[18]

The stalemate between the executive and the Congress over the constitutional amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" was compounded when the Constitutional Tribunal refused to take jurisdiction over the disputed question of whether, in the absence of a plebiscite, the Congress could override the President's item vetoes by a majority or by a two-thirds vote.[19] A second constitutional conflict along the same lines developed when the opposition majority in Congress voted in favor of an amendment to give farms under 40 hectares (about 100 acres) in size an absolute guarantee against expropriation and to compel the distribution of land in the "reformed" sector to the peasantry after a transitional period of two years. (The government had once again used a loophole in the 1967 law to postpone indefinitely the distribution of expropriated land by individual title.)

In May the official price index jumped 20 percent, indicating that the inflation was moving into a new hyperinflationary stage. The one effort that the government had made to hold the line—its refusal to grant a full cost-of-living wage increase to the El Teniente copper miners on the grounds that under their contract they had already received partial cost-of-living increases—led to a bruising two-and-a-half month strike, which included a miners' march on Santiago, mass rallies, and simultaneous one-day general strikes for and against the government in mid-June. By that time, Allende was once more ready to resort to military involvement in the cabinet to restore social peace.

Last Stage—Decline and Fall

On June 29, the last act of the Chilean tragedy began with an abortive revolt by the Second Armored Regiment in Santiago. Apparently, several army units had been in contact with *Patria y Libertad*, a right-wing political organization, and had planned to seize President Allende at his residence and to occupy the presidential palace. The revolt was canceled one day before it was to occur, but when one of the officers of the Second Armored Regiment was arrested and held in the Defense Ministry, the Regiment decided to free him and in the process to seize the presidential palace as originally planned. General Prats, the Army Commander, used the other military units in Santiago to put down the revolt in a few hours—most of which were spent in negotiation rather than shooting—but not before President Allende had gone on the air to urge "the people" to take over all industries and enterprises as a response to the uprising of "a small group of rebellious military men." The Central Labor Federation also urged the workers to occupy the factories, and in one day the number of companies taken over by the government rose from 282 to 526. The "Industrial Belts" that had sprung up at the time of the October strike now achieved new importance. The spread of "people's power (*poder popular*) had been seen by Allende as a deterrent to a possible future coup, but it created many additional problems for the

---

[18] *Libro Blanco*, p. 215.

[19] The term "item veto" reflects the fact that the Chilean president, unlike his US counterpart, can veto or even rewrite individual sections of proposed laws.

Workers in hardhats and bearing pitchforks march in Santiago in support of the Allende administration during brief nationwide strikes by pro- and anti-Marxist elements in mid-June 1973.

—*Wide World Photos*

government. Production declined sharply after the takeovers, the opposition got fresh fuel for its claim that the expansion of state control of industry was being carried out through extralegal channels, and "*poder popular*"—as expressed in the worker occupations—appeared to some extent to pose a possible threat of an alternative to the power of the central government.

After the June 29 revolt, Allende made new efforts to secure military involvement in the government, but his negotiations with the armed forces were unsuccessful.[20] Instead, they embarked on a policy of vigorous enforcement of the Arms Control Law, a measure which had been adopted in October 1972 but only sporadically enforced thereafter. This law authorized any military or police commanders to carry out arms searches if there was "a presumption of the clandestine existence of illegal firearms."[21] The right wing *Patria y Libertad* organization had now announced publicly that it was going underground in an attempt to overthrow the government by force, and military intelligence was also aware of the initiation of arms training by all the government parties, even the centrist Radicals.[22] In the course of their crackdown, the military found arms caches in factories in Santiago and Concepción, and the killing of a worker in one such arms raid provoked protests from the leftist parties.

At this point, the Chilean Communist Party and the Catholic Church both concluded independently that the only solution to the impasse in Chile was one more attempt at an agreement between the Allende government parties and the Christian Democrats. The Communists initiated a campaign against civil war almost simultaneously with a statement by the Chilean hierarchy calling for a renewal of dialogue. Probably in response to these pressures on both sides, two lengthy discussions took place on July 31 between UP and PDC representatives. Both Allende and the Christian Democrats agreed on the necessity of enforcement of the Arms Control Law, but disagreement continued on the constitutional reforms. Allende offered to sign the amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" in return for a constitutional amendment specifying that the Congress could only override presidential vetoes of constitutional amendments by a two-thirds vote. He also proposed the establishment of joint committees to work out further agreements. However, the Christian Democrats denounced these proposals as "dilatory" and broke off the negotiations.

A few days before the dialogue was initiated, the truckers began another strike, which was to last from July 26 until the coup on September 11. As in October, the truckers were joined by the other *gremios*. Coming at a time when the 12-month inflation rate, fueled by massive government budget deficits and subsidies to the nationalized industries and agriculture, had reached 323 percent—and in a situation where inventories had not yet been built up from the October strike—the truckers' action created much more serious problems for the government than the earlier strike. This new crisis once again raised the question of military participation in the cabinet, and General Prats persuaded his fellow commanders that it was their patriotic duty to re-enter the cabinet in order to settle the strike.

---

[20] Two conflicting accounts of those negotiations appear in *Ercilla* (Santiago), July 11-17, 1973, pp. 7-10.

[21] Law No. 17,798, *Diario Oficial* (Santiago), Oct. 21, 1972. By a quirk of fate the law had come to Allende's desk in the midst of the October strike, and since it had the strong support of the armed forces he was compelled to sign it despite the opposition of the Socialist Party and the MIR.

[22] Allende's personal bodyguard had organized courses in arms-training at his vacation house outside of Santiago. The MAPU began arms-training in December 1972, and the Radicals did so in July 1973. The armed forces were aware of this at least by the end of July. See documents in *Libro Blanco*, pp. 43-45, 192-93, 196-200.

Trucks stand idle outside Valparaíso, Chile on September 8, 1973, the 44th day of a paralyzing transportation strike.

—UPI.

On August 9 Allende swore in what he called a "national security cabinet," with General Prats as Defense Minister, Air Force Commander César Ruiz as Minister of Transport (the ministry which would deal with the striking truckers), and the heads of the Navy and of the National Police in other cabinet posts.

Almost coincident with the entrance of the military into the cabinet, the naval establishment became involved in a serious conflict with the left wing of the Allende coalition. On August 7, the naval intelligence arm announced the discovery of a plot to carry out an enlisted men's revolt on August 11 in Valparaíso and Concepción. The announcement accused PS Secretary General Carlos Altamirano, MAPU leader Oscar Garreton, and Miguel Enriques, head of the MIR, of being the "intellectual authors" of the revolt and demanded the lifting of the congressional immunity of the first two, who sat respectively in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Two days before the September coup, Altamirano admitted that he had encouraged navymen to resist their coup-minded *(golpista)* officers."[13]

This attempt to subvert the hierarchy of a service command from below was combined with maneuvers by Allende to replace officers unsympathetic to him. When General Ruiz resigned his cabinet post on August 17 in protest against his lack of sufficient power to settle the strike, Allende compelled him to add that his departure from the cabinet "implicitly" carried with it his retirement as Air Force Commander. This was correctly seen as an Allende tactic to remove an officer opposed to him, and it met serious resistance from within the Air Force, provoking a series of actions which ultimately led directly to the September 11 coup.

On August 20, top Air Force officers met to decide whether to resist Allende's action. By evening, Ruiz had persuaded them to accept it on the condition that Allende appoint the second-ranking officer, General Gustavo Leigh, as Air Force Commander and name another Air Force general to the cabinet (so that Allende could not repeat the same maneuver with Leigh). The next night the wives of high-ranking military officers, including those of six generals, gathered in front of General Prats' house to present a letter asking for his resignation. When the demonstration was broken up by police tear gas, it provoked such dissension in the armed forces that on the following day General Prats decided to resign both as Defense Minister and Army Commander. He was joined by two other generals who, with Prats, had led the military forces that had quelled the tank-regiment revolt in June.

The resignation of what appeared to be the last defenders of Allende in the army now meant that all three services were opposed to the President. It coincided with the adoption on the same day of a "sense of the house" *(acuerdo)* resolution by the Chamber of Deputies directed at the President and the military ministers, drawing their attention to "the serious breakdown of the constitutional and legal order."[14] The resolution criticized the Allende government for repeatedly bypassing the legislature through the use of legal loopholes and for refusing to promulgate the constitutional reforms voted by the Congress. It accused Allende of ignoring judicial orders, encouraging illegal seizure of property, persecuting opposition labor groups, and supporting illegal paramilitary organizations. In conclusion, it stated that the listed actions constituted a "serious breakdown of the constitutional and legal order of the Republic" and urged the military ministers to "put an end to the *de facto* situations listed above which violate the Constitution and the law" or be guilty of "compromising the national and professional character of the armed forces."

---

[13] It was an indication of the continuing press freedom in Chile that newsstands in downtown Chile at this time contained a left-wing publication headlined, "Soldiers, Disobey Your Officers," and a magazine of the extreme Right with the headlines, "The Right of Rebellion," "Rebellion and its Goals," and "Resistance to the Tyrant."

[14] *Libro Blanco*, pp. 239-42.

In its original form, the resolution had declared the Allende government to be illegitimate, but the *acuerdo* had later been softened in order to secure the support of the Christian Democrats. Yet its effect was still to give a congressional green light to the military, and Allende immediately so interpreted it. He replied to the motion by accusing the Congress of "promoting a *coup d'État* by asking the military forces to make governmental judgments independently of the authority and direction of the President"; he also pointed out that according to the Constitution the only way that the Congress could decide on the legality of the President's conduct of his office was through impeachment by a two-thirds vote.

The congressional vote was echoed by several professional associations. The Medical Association called on their "colleague" Allende to resign—a request that was echoed by the Federation of Professionals (CUPROCH)—and resignation petitions were circulated in Santiago. The Lawyers' Association issued a declaration which—"without attributing a malevolent intention" to the President—asserted an "incompatibility between the institutional framework within which he is supposed to exercise his office and the actions which he feels obliged to carry out in his program." Arguing that Allende "would appear to be incapacitated *(impedido)* in the exercise of his functions as he understands them," the statement suggested that he could be removed from office under Article 43 of the Constitution, which authorizes the Congress to declare presidential incapacity.

The Coup

Exactly when the decision to carry out the coup was made is not yet certain, but it evidently was reached in the days following Prats' resignation. The armed forces had contingency plans for the control of vital points throughout the country in case of any emergency, and it only required a signal to put them into operation. Hence the actual seizure of control required little preparation.

After the resignations of the third week of August, Allende restructured his cabinet without the top military commanders but still retained representatives of the armed forces in ministerial posts. Over the opposition of other PS leaders, he appointed as Minister of the Interior his Socialist colleague Carlos Briones, who was known to be interested in another attempt at accommodation with the Christian Democrats. The president also canceled a projected trip to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Algiers. The government and the opposition again staged rival demonstrations in connection with the third anniversary of the 1970 presidential elections.

On the weekend before the coup, the Christian Democrats called all provincial party leaders to a meeting at which a proposal was adopted for the simultaneous resignation of the Congress and the President and for new elections to resolve the con-

Gen. Carlos Prats, then Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army and Minister of Defense, leaves the President Palace on August 15, 1973, after a conference on the transport crisis.

El Mercurio (International Edition) Aug. 20-26, 1973, p. 5. The chairman of the Christian Democratic Party told the *New York Times* that "neither we nor the armed forces favor anything but a democratic solution to Chile's political crisis" but emphasized that the only way to avoid a breakdown of the Constitution was the appointment of military men in at least six cabinet posts, as well as in key undersecretary positions and as heads of the chief government agencies. *The New York Times*, Aug. 27, 1973, p. 12.

El Mercurio (International Edition), Aug. 26-Sept. 1, 1973, p. 7.



Salvador Allende hurries through the corridors of the Presidential Palace with his personal bodyguard on the morning of September 11, 1973, shortly before taking his own life during the military coup d'état.

—Photo by The New York Times.

flict between the executive and legislative branches. During the same weekend, Allende met with the leaders of his Popular Unity coalition and called for the holding of a plebiscite on his conduct of office. Although this step was reportedly opposed by the Socialists, Briones subsequently asserted that Allende planned to announce the plebiscite in a radio address at noon on the day of the coup.[17]

Meantime, after a stormy session with Allende on September 7, the military commanders proceeded on Sunday, September 9, to draft the text of the *pronunciamiento* issued on September 11. They did not secure the agreement of the National Police until early on the morning of the coup itself, and only after the fourth-ranking officer in seniority had taken over the position of police commander.[18]

On September 10, Navy units set sail from Valparaíso for previously scheduled maneuvers, but that evening they returned to port and by early morning of the 11th had seized control of that city. Concepción, the third-ranking city in Chile and a known center of leftist activism, was taken over without a hitch. Santiago required a few hours longer.

To justify their action, the military commanders broadcast a communiqué to the nation. While admitting that the Allende government had initially come to power by legal means, they announced that it had "fallen into flagrant illegitimacy" by violating fundamental rights, by "artificially fomenting the class struggle," by refusing to implement the decisions of the Congress, the judiciary and the Controller-General, by causing a critical decline in agricultural, commercial and industrial activity in the country, and by bringing about a state of inflation and anarchy which "threaten the internal and external security of the country." The coup leaders concluded:

> *These reasons are sufficient in the light of classical doctrine . . . to justify our intervention to depose a government which is illegitimate, immoral, and unrepresentative of the overwhelming sentiment of the nation.*[19]

At 9:30 a.m., when it was apparent that no one but the GAP, his personal bodyguard, was ready to defend him, Allende broadcast his last message to the Chilean people over the single pro-Allende radio station that had not yet been shut down by the military. He began:

---

[17] Information from the author's personal interviews with Patricio Aylwin, Jan. 11, 1974, and Carlos Briones, Jan. 14, 1974.

[18] Accounts of pre-coup military activities appear in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Sept. 17, 1973; *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Sept. 25, 1973. *Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 19, 1973, and Robert Moss, "Chile's Coup and After," *Encounter* (London), March 1974, pp. 72-80.

[19] *Libro Blanco*, pp. 248-49.

> *This is surely the last time that I will be able to speak to you. . . . My words are not spoken in bitterness but disappointment. In the face of these events I can only say to the workers, "I am not going to resign." At this historic juncture I will pay with my life for the loyalty of the people.*

Blaming "foreign capital, imperialism, and reaction" for persuading the armed forces to break with their tradition, he said:

> *History will judge them. . . . My voice will no longer come to you, but it does not matter. You will continue to hear it; it will always be among you. At the least, you will remember me as an honorable man who was loyal to the revolution.*[30]

At 11:00 a.m., the coup leaders permitted those who wished to do so to leave the building, and—except for his personal secretary—all the women, including Allende's pregnant daughter, left. The military also offered the President and his family safe conduct out of the country if he would surrender. Allende rejected the offer. The Air Force then sent in Hawker Hunter bombers, which repeatedly hit the palace with rockets and set fire to large portions of it. Finally, shortly after 1:30 p.m., Allende decided to discontinue the resistance, and the members who had been with him left the building in single file, led by the secretary carrying a white flag. Allende stayed behind and, sitting on a sofa in a reception room on the second floor, put two bullets into his head. The automatic rifle that he used was a gift from Fidel Castro.[31]

Conclusions

Since the coup, comments in the world press representing widely divergent political postures have cited the Chilean case as proof that the hope of achieving Marxist socialism through democratic means is a vain one. Yet most people have failed to note two fundamental errors of the Allende policy, neither of which was essentially related to the attempt to establish democratic socialism:

(1) As noted at the outset, the very quotation from Engels that Allende cited at the beginning of his administration to justify [illegible] course states as a prerequisite "the support of the majority of the people." Allende acted as if he had that support; but even at the highest point of his popularity in the April 1971 elections, he never achieved it. Moreover, his policy of deliberate class polarization, aimed at expanding his electoral base, was more successful in pitting professional and middle-class groups against him than in widening his support among workers, peasants and low-income groups.

2) Marxist economists and policymakers have always placed primary emphasis on investment and the expansion of the productive capacity of the economy. By contrast, the Allende policymakers emphasized increases in consumption and combined this with a headlong rush to take over industry and agriculture—a course far removed from the "two steps forward, one step back" of Lenin. The consequences of these policies after their deceptive initial success were massive government deficits, runaway inflation, and a near-breakdown of the economy. (The argument that Allende's economic problems were the result of a shortage of foreign credit does not really hold water, since they were caused by policies initiated before the foreign squeeze and since, in any event, Allende's regime managed to secure enough foreign credits from Latin American, European, Soviet and Chinese sources to increase the Chilean foreign debt from $2.6 billion to $3.4 billion in less than three years. Much of the new indebtedness was to Western Europe and other Latin American countries. Surprisingly, Chile's debt to the USSR, China and Eastern Europe increased only from $9 million to $40 million between 1970 and 1973.")

---

[30] Translated from the transcript of the tape recording of the speech published in Riccardo Boizard, *El Ultimo Dia de Allende* (The Last Day of Allende), Santiago, Editorial de Pacifico, 1973, pp. 53-55.

[31] On Allende's suicide, see the medical report in *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 1973, pp. 1 and 7. The eyewitness testimony of one of the President's personal physicians, who entered the room immediately thereafter, is published in *Ercilla*, Jan. 2-8, 1974 pp. 10-13. Allende's widow has asserted that witnesses told her they had seen bullet wounds in his chest and stomach. A supposed account by a personal bodyguard circulated in Mexico and elsewhere describing his murder contains numerous factual errors and describes events which could not have taken place because of the physical design of the building. On this and many other myths of Left and Right concerning the overthrow of Allende, see Paul E. Sigmund, "Allende through the Myths," *Worldview* (New York) April 1974 pp. 16-21.

[32] Secretaria, Comité Interamericano de la Alianza para el Progreso (CIAP), *El Esfuerzo Interno y las Necesidades de Financiamiento Externo para el Desarrollo de Chile* (Domestic Efforts and the Needs for External Financing for the Development of Chile), Washington, DC, 1974, p. V-9.

Specific aspects of the Chilean system also made the Allende experiment a particularly difficult one. He was able to come to power in the first place because of Chile's deeply-rooted commitment to the democratic system and because the Marxist parties were able to mobilize a part of the proletariat and the peasantry, and he had at his disposal many instruments for state control of the economy which had been developed by previous administrations since the 1930's. However, he was required to operate within an institutional system which included frequent and staggered elections, proportional representation, and a multiparty system which made majority rule very difficult and often gave veto powers to the extremes of Right and Left. The economy had been characterized for nearly a century by a chronic tendency to inflation, and successive governments had consistently ignored agriculture in the interest of securing urban electoral support. The most important systemic constraint of all, of course, was the existence of a professionalized and institutionally-loyal military which was unresponsive to the ideological blandishments of the Left.[11]

The immediate causes of the military intervention are apparent from the preceding account. In the last part of 1972, the military were drawn into Chilean politics by both sides and became as polarized as the rest of Chilean society—with the overwhelming majority joining the opposition to Allende. The conflict over education in March-April 1973 heightened that polarization just at the time the military were attempting to extricate themselves from political involvement. Then the expansion of arms searches in mid-1973 revealed the extent to which Chile was becoming an armed camp on the verge of civil war. Finally, the efforts to subvert the existing military hierarchy by a combination of leftist activity among enlisted men and presidential maneuvering with promotions and retirements provided the classis scenario for a *coup d'état.*

One can also relate Allende's difficulties to the inherent contradictions in the Marxist theory to which he appealed. At the same time that he proclaimed his faith in a democratic, pluralist and libertarian transition to socialism, many of his Marxist supporters spoke and acted on the basis of a belief in the inevitability of armed confrontation. With his knowledge, they armed themselves and—what was worse—talked incessantly about revolution. The repeated statements of Régis Debray and others that the observance of the rules of "bourgeois" legality was only a tactic until the balance of forces had improved was hardly likely to persuade doubters of the sincerity of Allende's commitment to democracy. When the importation and distribution of arms was combined with efforts to reorganize education along ideological lines, to subvert military discipline, and to rearrange the hierarchy of command, it is not altogether surprising that the military finally took action.

A positive evaluation of the Allende years would certainly credit him with a sincere effort to raise the living standards of low-income groups and to involve them actively in the determination of their own future. It would likewise stress the continued existence of freedom of expression for all points of view in Chile right up to the coup. A more negative assessment would ask whether the low-income groups in Chile genuinely benefited from an economic policy which after the first half of 1972 produced hyperinflation, a continuous drop in agricultural and industrial production, and a reduction in the real value of wages and salaries. Even more critically, one could inquire who has suffered the most in economic and in human terms as a result of the breakdown of the Chilean system—the Marxist politicians, many of whom were able to escape or go into exile, or the workers, peasants and slum-dwellers they claimed to represent, who are now paying the price of the Allende regime's mistakes in the form of the hardships imposed by sharply reduced consumption and the strictures of draconian military rule.

---

[11] The Socialists always believed that they could convert the military to their outlook. This is strikingly revealed in Socialist Party documents published in the *Libro Blanco*, pp. 124-30.

ASR
70c

Western Hemisphere

SOVIET ANALYST, London
15 August 1974

Kremlin's Hand in Allende's Chile

by JAMES THEBERGE

Why did Salvador Allende's revolutionary government end in a bloodbath despite Soviet support and the plaudits of the world's left-wing extremists, who saw in Chile a new path for Socialism's march to power?

James Theberge, who is Director of the Latin American Department of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, shows how Moscow, the "big brother", though eager to exploit this opening in Latin America to the full, disagreed with Allende's headlong methods, and while warning him of the growing economic chaos denied him enough financial aid.

In 1935, Moscow dispatched Eudocio Ravines, a brilliant Peruvian Communist organiser, to Chile to implement the "united front" and "anti-fascist popular front" strategy that had replaced the ultra-left strategy of the Comintern. Since that time the Chilean Communist party generally has followed a strategy of broad alliance and limited aims, although the Cuban revolution led to a radicalisation of party strategy.

The Chilean Communist party, one of the most loyal pro-Soviet parties in Latin America, gave unqualified support to the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. While its fortunes have shifted through the years as a result of domestic and international developments, it unstintingly supported the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy and repeated Moscow's themes of anti-imperialism and class warfare.

The party, at least prior to the military intervention of September, 1973, was the best organised and strongest in Latin America. Between 1956 and 1969 it formed an uneasy alliance for electoral purposes with the Socialist Party, its more militant Marxist rival on the Left. But in 1969 the Communists decided that a much more broadly based alliance of left-wing forces was necessary for the transformation of the country into a socialist state and they played a key role in the founding of the Popular Unity Front (a coalition of six leftist parties) at the end of that year. After the 1970 electoral victory of the Popular Unity Front under Salvador Allende the Communists became the single most influential force within the coalition. It was a far better organised and disciplined participant than its closest rival, the more ideologically unstable and militant Socialist Party.

The ultimate aim of the party did not waver throughout the Allende period. The Communists hoped to be able to take advantage of the weakness of the democratic institutions to install a "dictatorship of the proletariat" under their direction. Their Secretary-General, Eduardo Labarca, made this clear in his *Corvalan 27 Horas* (Santiago, Editorial Quimantu, 1972), in which he declared: "For us the pass from capitalism to Socialism necessarily requires that the proletariat be converted into the leading class, into the determining social force".

The Communist strategy, shared by Salvador Allende and the "moderate" wing of the Socialist Party, was to "overthrow" the bourgeois state and constitution, using the legal device of the plebiscite. In an interview with Régis Debray in 1971 Allende said: "As for the bourgeois state at the present moment, we are seeking to overcome it. To overthrow it!" (Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution, Conversations with Allende*, New York, Random House, 1971 p.82).

Mass mobilisation, infiltration of Chilean institutions and tactical alliances with the opposition were to be employed to generate sufficient popular support. Congress was to be replaced by a "popular assembly" and the existing legal system by "popular tribunals." President Allende's pledge to uphold the "Statute of Guarantees" (designed to commit his government to preserve Chile's democratic freedoms and institutions in exchange for Congressional support) was simply a "tactical necessity" to gain power, as he explained later.

The Chilean Communists and their allies in Moscow were uneasy about the ideological implications of the *via Chilena* as advocated by Salvador Allende (Debray, p.119). The Communist party refused to endorse the *via Chilena* as a uniquely Chilean path to socialism, which implied that it might not necessarily assume the leading role after complete power was gained by the Popular Unity coalition. The Chilean party supported Moscow's doctrine of the *via pacifica*, which accepted free elections and popular pluralism as a short-term tactical device under Chilean conditions but aimed in the long run at installing a Soviet-style Communist dictatorship. The *via pacifica* was not as "pacific" as the slogan implied: it embraced all forms of class conflict and violence short of armed insurrection and civil war in the process of establishing the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Misleading Image

The *via Chilena* proclaimed by Allende soon after his election was widely misunderstood in the West. The image that was officially propagated was that of a uniquely Chilean path to a new type of Marxist-humanist socialism, where basic liberties, economic pluralism and free elections were respected by all. Western liberals were led to believe that the Allende government was constructing a new Western-European type of democratic socialism in Chile. This image clashed with the reality of Salvador Allende's revolutionary ambition to use Chile's pluralist democracy to destroy it. He seemed to have abandoned the *via Chilena* formula during the last year of his government. Not only did he rarely employ it in his speeches but the importance of preserving "democracy, pluralism and liberty" was conspicuously absent.

The government's policy was very much to Moscow's liking: seizure of US investments, the espousal of the doctrine of "ideological pluralism" (relations with all states regardless of ideology and internal political character), closer relations with the socialist camp, and the fostering of an "anti-imperialist (anti-US) front in Latin America.

Under the Allende regime, foreign policy was reoriented, and the previously close ties with the United States were replaced by strong political, economic and scientific ties with the "socialist countries," above all with Cuba and the USSR. The first trip of the Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, outside of Latin America was to the USSR and Eastern Europe, in May-June, 1971. President Allende visited Moscow in December, 1972. Strong ideological and personal ties linked the Chilean Communist party leaders with the Soviet party leadership and Salvador Allende with Fidel Castro.

President Allende's description of the USSR as Chile's "big brother" (*hermano mayor)* was no mere figure of speech but reflected the expectation of his government that the USSR would become the most important socialist ally of the revolution and the main economic bulwark of the regime. Moscow did, in fact, become the most important source of socialist camp economic aid and credits to the Popular Unity government, totalling $620.0 million ($156.5 million in short-term bank credit and $463.5 million in project aid and supplier credits) in the 1971-73 period*. The USSR authorised $260.5 million in credits ($98.5 million in short-term credit and $162.0 million in economic aid) to the Allende regime, most of which was never utilised. This was far from the massive help Allende needed. But Moscow was under no illusion that its economic cooperation would decisively influence the immediate prospects for radical social and economic transformation, although it no doubt helped reduce Chile's dependence on the United States.

Soviet influence expanded rapidly as a result of the Chilean Communist party's loyalty to the USSR and the expansion of Soviet-Chilean economic, technical, scientific, cultural, and fisheries cooperation made possible by the victory of the Communist-Socialist regime. But Moscow became increasingly alarmed at the deterioration of the economic situation, the violent clashes of the ultra-left and the ultra-right, and the growing organisation of opposition forces, particularly after the Popular Unity government failed in the March, 1973, elections to obtain the majority electoral support required to transform the political and economic structure by peaceful, constitutional *means*.

Nevertheless, Moscow was not willing to provide the *massive* short-term commodity assistance (such as foodstuffs) or untied convertible currency credits which the regime needed to finance the import of food, spare parts, and machinery to alleviate local shortages. Moscow's $98.5 million in short-term bank credits was no doubt helpful but paled into insignificance before the need to finance Chile's import requirements, which, for food alone, were running at the rate of about $700 million a year when the Allende regime collapsed. The Soviet leadership told Chilean Communist and Popular Unity officials that the main effort to improve the economic situation would have to be made by the Allende government. *Moscow* repeatedly stressed that the Popular Unity government must reverse the calamitous decline in production and productivity to have a chance of winning over a majority of the Chileans to the cause of socialism.

Refusing to give Allende the hard currency credits he needed to improve his worsening chances for survival, Moscow contented itself with organising solidarity meetings at home and abroad in the hope that these demonstrations would "reach the ears of the Chilean people" (Moscow Radio 13 August 1973). Allende's loyal ally and "big brother" was willing to sell Soviet machinery and equipment to him—that is, expand Soviet exports financed by long-term credits —but denied him the short-term hard currency credits he desperately needed.

A combination of circumstances — Moscow's costly entanglement in Cuba, economic difficulties at home, shortages of grain and foreign exchange —led the USSR to eschew massive short-term aid to Chile and to counsel a policy of self-help to the Allende regime — a theme repeated frequently by the Chilean Communist party leadership when referring to Soviet assistance. In the final analysis *Moscow* watched idly while the *via pacifica* was destroyed by the disastrous economic policies, the circumvention of the laws, and the tacit encouragement of the ultra-left by President Allende and the Popular Unity government.

Moscow pursued a dual strategy in Chile. At the level of state-to-state relations it acted cautiously, adopted a non-interventionist posture, and encouraged anti-Americanism and independence from the United States. Since it realised that the internal balance of forces did not favour the armed struggle, the Popular Unity leadership was urged to maintain internal unity, reject the "provocative and adventurous" overtures of the ultra-left, avoid actions that might provoke a civil war or military intervention, adopt a more rational economic policy, and consolidate the initial gains of the revolution.

At the same time, Moscow did nothing to restrain direct Cuban involvement in the Chilean revolution. Protected by a friendly, Marxist-dominated government and its Marxist President, Cuba transported large quantities of Soviet and Czechoslovak-supplied weapons to the radical left in Chile on the Cuban airline and merchant ships.

---

*See *Deuda Externa de Chile*, Tomo V, Departamento de Créditos Externos, CORFO, Santiago, 1973, for full details.

It also established a guerrilla training base and coordinating centre in Chile. The large intelligence team in the Cuban Embassy in Santiago maintained liaison with the liberation movement in Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Cuba's Soviet-controlled intelligence service, Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), also had close ties with the Chilean ultra-leftist and other revolutionary exile groups, providing them with training, arms and funds for the armed struggle in Chile and other Latin American countries.

Revolutionaries Trained

Soviet army personnel were directly involved in the training of worker-revolutionaries for urban guerrilla warfare. This occurred during 1972-73 at El Belloto, near Valparaiso, where the USSR had installed a factory for the manufacture of prefabricated housing. The firm (KPD) employed sixteen Russians, four of whom were engineers and technicians; the remaining twelve were Soviet army officers. After working hours, these twelve officers instructed a hard-core of specially-selected worker-revolutionaries in the use of arms, street fighting and urban guerrilla tactics. The Russian-built factory was kept under constant surveillance by Chile's naval intelligence. On the morning of 11 September 1973, naval intelligence arrested the Russians and three days later expelled them from the country*.

This clandestine involvement in training guerrillas in Chile was an exception to Moscow's official line of giving full support to the legal and peaceful path to socialism. But the Soviet leadership operates on the principle that since every eventuality cannot be foreseen it is better to take advance measures which might "contradict" the official line than to be sorry later. In Chile there clearly were some advantages in having some armed revolutionaries under direct Soviet control: Moscow would be able to retain some measure of influence over the ultra-left, particularly important in the event that this faction was able to seize power. As it turned out, Russia's "united front" tactics failed, and the armed struggle was aborted by the Chilean military.

Soviet Industrial Espionage

The Soviet Union made every effort to extract the maximum advantage from its technical assistance programme. It assigned 46 technicians to the nationalised copper industry to help raise productivity, all of whom were engaged in industrial espionage. They were far more interested in gaining first-hand knowledge of the advanced US mining equipment and methods of operation than in assisting Chilean development. Andrés Zauschquevich, executive vice-president of the copper corporation, told me in December 1973 that the specialists during their two-year stay contributed nothing to the improvement of mining operations and were mainly occupied in gathering specifications of American equipment, obtaining information on mining techniques and organisation, and collecting data on costs and productivity.

Moscow was also especially interested in fisheries and fishery-related (oceanographic, hydrographic and marine biological research) assistance to Chile. Fisheries aid gave the Russian's access to Chilean ports for its fishing, oceanographic and other vessel [illegible] the Chileans with a Soviet maritime presence. The growing presence in Chilean waters, around the Cape and in sub-Antarctic waters provided a cover for gathering intelligence and oceanographic data of use to the Soviet navy.

The Soviet Union offered to supply $300 million in military equipment to Allende in 1971, but the military refused the offer and decided to continue to obtain arms from the United States and other Western suppliers. The anti-Communist military were disturbed by the deepening economic and political violence under the Popular Unity government, and were anxious not to weaken their military ties with the United States and Western Europe by turning to the Soviet Union for arms. Moscow had hoped to establish an important precedent for supplying arms to non-Communist countries in Latin America and further weaken Washington's already strained relations with the Latin American military. Despite the coolness of official US-Chilean relations, the United States continued to maintain friendly relations with the Chilean military.

The Kremlin was very much aware of the weakness of the Allende regime. Not only was it a minority government (in 1970, 36% and, in 1973, 43% of the electorate supported the Popular Unity coalition) but the armed forces and powerful national police were strongly anti-Communist. Since the "democratic forces" lacked full political and economic power, Moscow favoured a gradual take-over by the Communists and avoidance of civil war or military confrontation at all costs. Both the ultra-left and ultra-right opponents of Allende were attacked regularly in the Soviet press. But the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), an ultra-left group that pursued the armed path and hoped to defeat the opposition forces in a violent confrontation, was singled out for particularly scathing criticism. It was charged with "revolutionary adventurism", contributing to political instability and harming the prospects of survival of the Popular Unity government.

From mid-1972 onwards, Moscow realised that the opposition to the Allende government was growing and widespread. It was only the shrewd and dilatory personality of Allende—skilled in maintaining a balance between the disruptive forces within his own government—that held together the disintegrating fabric of society. There was Soviet criticism of the irrational economic management, declining agricultural and industrial production, accelerating inflation, and the worsening balance of payments.

Soviet observers advised a slower take-over of the economy, nationalising the large firms first but leaving the smaller and medium-sized firms alone for the time being. In the last months before the military coup they saw the handwriting on the wall and urged a consolidation of the economic gains already achieved, collaboration with the opposition political parties (especially the Christian Democrats), and avoidance of armed conflict.

**Ercilla* (Santiago), 10-16 October 1973, and author's interviews with the Chilean military high command, Dec-

Collapse of Socialist 'Model'

The Soviet policy *vis-à-vis* Chile emphasized cooperation in the political field, the forging of an anti-US front with Chile, Peru and Cuba, and expansion of trade and aid relations while refraining from polemics and interfering in Chile's internal affairs (mainly through its influence over the Chilean Communist Party). The Chilean Communists were given moral and material support for widening the base of support of the regime, but it made no difference to the final outcome. The weakness of the Allende regime, its fateful internal contradictions, official connivance in the arming and violence of the ultra-left, the Weimar-type inflation and food shortages, the growing political polarisation and violence, and the fateful alienation of the armed forces were the decisive conditions that triggered the *coup d'état* that led to Allende's downfall and replacement by a military junta on 11 September, 1973.

Moscow was deeply disturbed but not especially surprised. TASS admitted on 20 September 1973 that the "Chilean experience was bitter and dramatic," and Fidel Castro declared that he was 'very upset by events in Chile" (the new military junta had immediately broken off relations with Havana). Moscow severed diplomatic relations with Santiago and withdrew its ambassador and embassy staff because of alleged persecution of Soviet officials by the junta. After less than a week in power, Chile's new military government began to feel the full blast of Soviet displeasure and frustration, expressed in a well-orchestrated and sustained propaganda campaign aimed at isolating and discrediting the regime.

The Soviet media accused the junta of "persecuting left-wingers with unparalleled cruelty" (Moscow Radio, 18 September 1973). There were reports in *Pravda* on 26 September that "the streets of Santiago were flowing with blood" and the radio spoke of "tens of thousands of Chilean democrats" killed. Salvador Allende was alternatively reported to have been "murdered in cold blood" or to have died a hero's death, resisting the rebels to the very end. Allende's residence was alleged to have been "wiped off the face of the earth." The junta was shooting at women and children in an attempt to intimidate the people. On 29 October TASS indignantly blamed the CIA, Chilean "reaction" and "American monopolies" for organising the military *coup*. And according to a Moscow broadcast even Leonid Brezhnev, not known for his devotion to Western democracy, expressed horror at the "monstrous, completely open violation of a country's constitution, the unceremonious flouting of the democratic traditions of an entire nation."

The overthrow of the Allende government was a bitter but not entirely unexpected setback for Moscow's united front tactics in Latin America, and had adverse repercussions for Marxist parties elsewhere in the West. Communists and Socialists in France and Italy who had earlier pointed to Chile as a model of the peaceful transition to socialism moved to disengage themselves from the Allende disaster. Instead of leading to socialism, united front tactics in Chile ushered in a period of unparalleled political violence, enormous suffering for Chile's workers and middle class, and the worst economic crisis in its history.

Soviet designs for Chile to serve as the vanguard of the anti-US front in Latin America ended in a complete fiasco and left a deep impression on the non-Communist political parties and the armed forces in the region. It reminded them of the grave risks of entering into an alliance with totalitarian parties. Despite protestations to the contrary, Marxist governments are driven inexorably to violate pledges to uphold the constitution, to destroy the private sector of the economy, and ultimately to install a totalitarian dictatorship.

Authoritative statements of the Chilean Communist Party's position under the Allende regime can be found in Labarca's *Corvalan 27 Horas* and Luis Corvalan's *Camino de Victoria*, (Santiago, 1971).

WASHINGTON POST
28 August 1974

Argentine Manager Murdered

BUENOS AIRES—Gunmen killed the labor relations manager of a French-owned auto plant in Cordoba yesterday, and President Maria Estela Peron spoke out against the recent "cowardly and mercenary assassinations" in Argentina.

The extreme leftist Peronist Armed Forces claimed responsibility for the death of IKA Renault official Ricardo Goya, 55, saying it was "the Peronist workers' answer to the enemies of our class."

A two-month slowdown at the Renault plant climaxed Monday with ouster of leftist leaders of the auto union. Workers battled police last night on the streets of Cordoba.

Mrs. Peron, in her first speech from the palace balcony that her late husband, President Juan D. Peron often used as a rostrum, declared:

"Many people think that because I am a woman I cannot rule . . . but with this fragile appearance I have committed myself." Her denunciation of the political killings came in a talk earlier with provincial governors.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 August 1974

SPARSE AUDIENCE HEARS MRS. PERON

Only a Few Thousand Attend Her First Public Rally

By JONATHAN KANDELL
Special to The New York Times

BUENOS AIRES, Aug. 27—Only a few thousand trade unionists gathered today to hear President Isabel Martinez de Perón, in her first public rally since she took office, speak in the historic Plaza de Mayo, where her late husband, Gen. Juan Domingo Perón, had drawn scores of thousands of supporters on numerous occasions.

The event was marred by the Government's mounting problems with left-wing industrial workers in Cordoba, 430 miles northwest of the capital.

Early this morning, unidentified terrorists gunned down the labor relations manager of Ika-Renault, a leading car manufacturer in Cordoba, as he drove to the main plant that has been in the center of a bitter workers' strike.

The killing of the Argentine executive, Ricardo Goya, 55 years old, followed a clash last night between left-wing auto workers and policemen that left two trade unionists seriously wounded.

The rally was ostensibly called to publicize the Government's decision last week to nationalize the distribution and sale of petroleum products. Until now, Shell and Esso subsidiaries had shared the local sale of oil products with the State Petroleum Company.

Assertion of Leadership

But Mrs. Perón devoted most of her speech to defend her claim to leadership of the Peronist movement, which has been in growing disarray since General Perón's death on July 1.

"Do not doubt for a moment that Isabel Perón, his student and disciple, will faithfully comply with his doctrine, no matter who falls and no matter what the cost," said Mrs Perón.

During the two months she has been in power, she has sought to transform her image from that of a bereaved widow to a forceful chief executive able to guide a nation divided into numerous rightist, leftist and moderate factions.

She has held well-publicized Cabinet meetings and reunions with opposition politicians, Congressmen and military groups.

Many of her speeches are heavily laced with references made and slogans used by General Perón and his second wife, Eva Duarte de Perón, who gathered an enormous personal following before her death in 1952.

"I know that many think that because I am a woman, I cannot take over the helm," said Mrs. Perón, still dressed in one of the lengthy black dresses she has donned since her husband's death. "But I have two arms, and in one hand I have Perón and in the other Eva Perón."

At times her voice cracked with emotion and she shook her entended arms, recalling ges- entended arms, recallingHHH tures used by Eva Perón.

There have been rumors in the last three weeks that conservative Peronist leaders were urging Mrs. Perón to hold a major public rally to strengthen her image in the face of rising terrorist activity, labor unrest and economic problems.

Despite the poor turnout at today's rally, television announcers remarked that the crowds were "multitudinous," and at least one commentator spoke of "hundreds of thousands" of people on hand. But a walk through the plaza confirmed that only the street in front of the pink Government house was filled. The cameras of the television stations—which have recently been recently brought under state control—focused on trade unionists and avoided photographing the empty stretches.

One of the organizers of the rally asserted that it was successful considering that only two unions—the light and power union and the state petroleum workers—were supposed to attend. But he acknowledged that "Perón would never have addressed so small a crowd."

The chief focus of political unrest in the country has been Córdoba, the second largest city. Last February, a rightwing police coup, apparently backed by General Perón, removed the elected left-wing Peronist governor from power. During the upheaval, rightwing trade unionists also wrested control of the local labor federation from leftists.

Since then, Córdoba has been the scene of repeated incidents of political violence. A few days ago, the Labor Ministry decided to remove legal recognition from the leftist-controlled union at Ika-Renault—a concern with mixed Argentine and French capital — after labor leaders called a strike in support of higher wages.

The clashes with the police last night resulted when officers moved to dislodge labor leaders from the union headquarters.

BALTIMORE SUN
28 August 1974

Forecast is cloudy for Bolivia's Banzer

By RICHARD O'MARA
Rio de Janeiro Bureau of The Sun

Rio de Janeiro—Opposition is growing against the continuation in office of President Hugo Banzer of Bolivia. But observers are divided over whether General Banzer will end his tenure legally, through elections promised for next year, or by the usual mechanism for transferring power in Bolivia—the coup d'etat.

Last week, General Banzer celebrated the beginning of his fourth year in the presidency by dancing in the streets during a massive celebration of the coup d'etat that deposed Gen. Juan Jose Torres August 21, 1971.

Even as he was celebrating, making speeches about the durability of the Nationalist Popular Front—the civilian-military coalition through which he has governed—the powerful Bolivian Miners Union declared itself virtually at war with the regime. And the Front apparently was disintegrating.

This week one party in the coalition, the Nationalist Bolivian Falange demanded immediate elections. The Falange's declaration repudiated immediately by another member party of the Front, a smaller group named after the late president, Rene Barrientos.

Even as the civilian elements that have supported President Banzer's distinctly rightwing and intensely anti-Communist regime were falling out, there were reports of dissension within the military.

Although President Banzer received the perfunctory support of the commanders of the armed services during last week's fete, it is evident to sources here, and from reports from Bolivia, that the military is divided over the president and his policies.

It is believed that the younger officers are being alienated increasingly by the president. Specifically, they oppose his refusal to grant amnesty to these officers who plotted and executed the unsuccessful coup against his government June 5.

A pamphlet was circulated recently to all military units in La Paz, allegedly produced by a group of young officers who have taken inspiration from their counterparts in Portugal who last April led a successful coup against the authoritarian regime there.

The pamphlet read, in part, "Banzer's repression against his own institution [the Army] has persuaded those democratic officers to fight beside campesinos miners, workers and students. . . ."

After the attempted coup of June 5, many of the officers involved were either jailed or sent into exile to Paraguay and Argentina. According to reports from Argentina, many of these officers have been returning to Bolivia clandestinely.

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Aug. 28, 1974

Argentine Left Clings to Hold On University

By Joseph Novitski
Special to The Washington Post

BUENOS AIRES—The entrances and hallways of the University of Buenos Aires

by a Cultural Revolution

Wall newspapers full of

meetings" hang from the high ceilings to the floors. Corners and columns are plastered with posters that urge the defense of the revolution or quote Gen. Juan D. Peron, the Argentine populist leader who died in office as president on July 1.

Outside, people walk past without seeming to notice. But inside, behind the posters, the young people who believed Peron's return to power in Argentina last year meant a giant step toward socialism are trying to hold on to their last stronghold, the university.

Slowly, but inexorably, the government left, behind

university administration and student body. Peronist professors say that President Maria Estela Peron, the leader's widow and successor, is following a line laid down by Peron: To ease the Marxist left out of the Peronist movement. This means winning back control of the University of Buenos Aires—whose student body of almost 200,000 makes it by far the largest in the country—from the Peronist leftwing.

The university has been a sectarian political battleground for more than a year. Entrance policies, the curriculum, [illegible]

The university, an urban campus with old and semimodern buildings scattered throughout the city, is organized along European lines. Eleven separate faculties, like separate colleges, educate lawyers, doctors, agronomists and liberal professionals. Each gives two years of basic college education. Seven years ago, after a violent university purge by Argentina's military government, many parts of the separate curricula were shaped to American models.

When the Peronists returned to power last May, young leftist leaders loyal to Peron were given the university as their share of the new government. It changed almost overnight.

Entrance examinations were abolished and all high school graduates were offered admission. One year later, 85,000 new students had entered and the enrollment had doubled.

"There are so many people now, it seems that even the rats from the basement take exams," said a fourth-year philosophy student.

Professors with connections to the military government or foreign companies were dismissed. Fourteen were fired from the faculty of economics alone. The university broke off assistance and exchange agreements with the Ford Foundation, the University of California and Rutgers, and opened new programs with universities in Peru, Algeria and Mexico.

Courses of study were changed. Traditional philosophy courses were replaced, in part, by studies of South American politicians and Peron's doctrine. In an introductory architecture course, a slide show alternates views of a new Sheraton hotel here with pictures of the capital's shantytowns and is followed by a discussion of American imperialism in Argentina.

"Last year we had Samuelson, this year we had Lenin," said a second-year student of economics. "It's really interesting. We learned how Samuelson's book (An Introduction to Economics by Paul A. Samuelson, an introductory text widely used in the United States and some foreign countries) used all those graphs and curves to prove that imperialism was necessary. Oh, not directly, but subtly, you know."

"We took out Samuelson but we did not replace him with Lenin or Marx," Oscar Sbarra Mitre, the 33-year-old dean of the economics faculty, said during an interview. He explained that there is now no single textbook for the two-year introductory course, but rather a reading list with a majority of Latin American authors. Marx—as well as John Maynard Keynes—shows up as an individual theorist, but not as the last word.

The shift from studies designed to produce executives for giant companies to a more populist and national outlook, Sbarra Mitre said, is better exemplified by the course called "History of the Union Movement and Labor Relations," which replaced a course on personnel management.

It was not educational policy, however, but pure politics that turned the university into a left-wing redoubt defying the Peronist government. A basic university law, laying down the rules for Buenos Aires and the eight other campuses of the national university system, passed congress by a large majority late last year with the support from non-Peronist parties. The law embodied the basic changes that had begun at Buenos Aires.

Meanwhile, a majority faction in the Peronist youth movement backed by two urban guerrilla groups that had fought the military government under Peron's banner, had made the university here their power base. They proclaimed a government program that smacked heartily of Marxism-Leninism and, in effect, challenged Peron for leadership of his movement.

"Look, these people are anything but Peronists," Gen. Peron said last February, when he first began trying to separate his movement's youth wing from the leaders born of the guerrilla movement who call themselves Montoneros.

"Before thinking about getting organized, we've got to think how it can be a true organization and not a sack full of cats who will start showing their claws pretty soon," Peron told leaders of the youth wing. He asked them to reorganize themselves and expel the Marxists. "That's why this purification is necessary," he said.

The purification Peron wanted has been thwarted, in part by government reluctance to drive the whole youth wing into open revolt, and in part by students from the University of Buenos Aires. Twice, since April, they have marched into the streets to protest the appointment of new deans and have forced the government to back down.

A week ago they took over 10 of the 11 faculties in a move to hold onto the temporary university rector, Raul Laguzzi, 32, a professor of pharmacy who is loyal to the Montoneros. And, inside the faculties, it often seems as if one is inside Peron's "sack of cats."

At the medical faculty recently, students who still proclaim loyalty to Peron started playing the Peronist marching song on a loudspeaker system. A faction that stands further to the left put on the Internationale, the Communist hymn, and turned up the volume on their own sound system. The Peronists turned up their volume, and so it went, to ear-shattering levels.

"It isn't bad once you get above the second floor," a professor of neurobiology said.

Slowly the university crisis seems to be heading for some kind of resolution. A week ago, President Maria Estela Peron named a new minister of education. He is expected to name a new rector. Student street demonstrations have been quickly and sharply put down by police. The same demonstrations were tolerated by her late husband.

There have been some hints that the government will try to defuse the crisis by unraveling Peronist politics and the quarrel with the Montoneros from university policies.

"We're waiting to see who the new rector will be," said a young professor. "That should clear up something. In the meantime, if you're thinking of building a house in Argentina, get an old architect."

Western Hemisphere

ENCOUNTER, London
January 1974

Allende & the Myth Makers

David Holden

Political Realism & Revolutionary Romance

UNFITTING AS IT MAY SEEM to say so when the bloodshed of the Chilean *coup d'état* is still so keenly remembered and the generals who made it are riding unpleasantly high, the fact remains that Salvador Allende died a lucky man. In life he was a failure. Both his policies and his country were shattered long before the end. But in death he achieved success beyond his dreams. Instantly canonised as the Western world's newest left-wing martyr, he became overnight the most potent political cult-figure since his old friend, Che Guevara.

To some extent, of course, the congregation had already been prepared for this posthumous elevation. In the three years of Allende's administration the "Chilean experiment" and the "Chilean road to socialism" had become favourite topics of discussion among left-wing groups in Europe, where Chile's supposed resemblance to Italy or France had encouraged the belief that Europe might, for once, follow in Latin America's footsteps instead of the other way about. Many aspiring revolutionaries from Europe and the United States had actually joined their Latin American counterparts in Chile in much the same spirit as their dropped-out contemporaries had hitch-hiked to Nepal hoping for a glimpse of Paradise in action. By the time of the September *coup* the military junta claimed there were as many as 15,000 foreigners of all kinds in Chile, actively supporting—sometimes with violence—the "socialist revolution."

DAVID HOLDEN *has travelled in Chile on several recent assignments as Chief Foreign Correspondent for the "Sunday Times." Among his regular contributions to* ENCOUNTER *are "South African Notebook" (August 1970), "Day Trip to Zanzibar" (September 1972) and "Ethiopia—Forty Years On" (February 1973).*

These specially interested groups or individuals obviously provided a ready network for international propaganda in the aftermath of Allende's death. But the shocked and, at times, almost hysterical reaction to the *coup* went far beyond such committed parties to embrace many of the West's ordinary liberals and social democrats. For them, as much as for the self-styled revolutionaries, it seemed, a bright light of world-wide hope had been extinguished in Santiago; and from Washington to Rome, via Paris, Bonn and London, anguished cries of "Foul!" rent the air.

THE OUTCRY IN BRITAIN was typical—and instantaneous

Revolt Against the Ballot Box" for which the Chilean armed forces could offer no excuse (*The Guardian*, 12/9/73); as a "Disaster in Chile" that would "set back the cause of socialism and democracy everywhere" (*New Statesman*, 14/9/73); and as "The Death of a Hope" comparable, even, to the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia that ended Alexander Dubcek's *régime* in 1968 (*The Observer*, 16/9/73).

Within 24 hours of the first, bare news of the *coup* the General-Secretary of the British Labour Party, Mr Ron Hayward, was writing officially to one of Allende's former colleagues to say that it was difficult to express the sense of horror and anger felt by the British Labour movement "as the aspirations of the working people of Chile—shared by so many others around the world—are destroyed at the hands of a few arrogant and ignorant officers acting at the behest of those who believe their right to rule is unchallengeable" (*The Times*, 13/9/73). Mr Len Murray, General-Secretary of the Trades Union Council, expressed his shock and abhorrence with equal speed and vigour. And Mrs Judith Hart, speaking as a member of the Labour Party's National Executive, unleashed a torrent of assertions so passionate as to suggest that her mind had come close to being overthrown with Allende's government. They ranged from the declaration that "the democratic will of the people of Chile" had been defeated by capitalist "collusion" (*The Guardian*, 17/9/73) to "for Socialists of this generation Chile is our Spain" and "This is the most vicious fascism we have seen in generations" (*The Guardian*, 19/9/73).

When the Labour Party Conference met at Blackpool three weeks later these instant reactions had hardened into established orthodoxy. The former Chilean Ambassador in London was given a standing ovation when he became the first non-delegate to address a Party Conference since two Spanish Republicans were allowed to do so in the 1930s. Resolutions were then carried utterly condemning the military *coup* and the precipitate action of the British Government in recognising the military junta; demanding the recall of the British Ambassador from Santiago and the withholding from the military régime of all aid, loans, and credits; and calling on the Labour Movement to campaign for the restoration of democracy in Chile and to offer financial *and other* assistance to the Popular Unity (Allende's) movement (*The Times*, 5/10/73). My italics.

§ AN ILLUSTRATION of the [illegible] the

the reasons for this fierce reaction would repay study. Probably they included a happy chance of timing. Several of the most fashionable matters of Western political protest had passed into history or been shadowed by disillusionment in the year or two before Allende's downfall, from Viet Nam and Greece to Black Power and the Student Movement. Allende's dramatic end supplied a new cause just when it was wanted. Familiar double standards were certainly involved. Nobody at the Labour Party Conference, for example, thought it necessary to ask why such a royal welcome should be offered to the representative of a government which had included one of the very few Communist parties outside Eastern Europe to approve the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. A Pavlovian response to the very idea of "revolution" was also clearly in evidence—and made all the more eager, it seemed, by the fact that this particular revolution had been taking place at such a safe distance in such sublimely foreign parts. There was, perhaps, a characteristic love of worldly failure, too—for it was difficult to read some of the more extravagant expressions of grief at Allende's death without sensing a touch of gratification at the idea that Good had once more succumbed to Evil and so delivered another martyr unto Heaven before he could be corrupted by the practical demands of life on Earth. But most of all, perhaps, the response seemed to stem from ignorance and wishful thinking—always the two most powerful sources of political romanticism—which left the facts of life in Allende's Chile either unknown or ignored and the field wide open, therefore, to the creation of instant myth. Hence the composite picture, now accepted throughout a wide spectrum of Western liberal and left-wing opinion, of Allende as a genuine social democrat of impeccable constitutional propriety who met his end at the hands of a fascist conspiracy on behalf of a minority "ruling class" aided and abetted by the United States of America.

To replace this romantic vision with something approaching reality may already be impossible, for myths undoubtedly possess a life of their own immune to rational challenge. To attempt to do so also may entail some risk of abuse, for it seems to be a common assumption nowadays that anyone who seeks a rational explanation of a military *coup d'état* (unless it happens to represent a left-wing interest) is necessarily a fascist beast.

I SHOULD MAKE IT PLAIN, therefore, that I am concerned here with Allende's Chile and not with what has taken its place. I hold no brief for military juntas, nor for the summary executions, mass imprisonments, censorship or whatever that the Chilean junta may have inspired or tolerated during its early months of power. Indeed, because I happen to know and like Chile as a country and count a number of Chileans among my friends I feel some personal sadness at the country's present plight. But I feel no surprise nor, I am afraid, much moral shock. Military men will be military men, the world over; and in any case Chile was left in such a mess by Allende that some vindictiveness, alas, was only to be expected when he fell.

Nor am I concerned with Chilean might-have-beens. I accept that the country needed genuine social reform and I believe that it could have been achieved without violence by a democratic government that was ready to work pragmatically within the constitution and with a *proper* respect for what the economic and political fabric of Chile would stand.

But that is not the point *any more*. What I am concerned about is how the *country* came to its present pass. And without wishing to speak ill of the dead, it seems to me necessary to say outright for the sake of the living that the Chilean *coup* was largely Allende's own fault and that the myths with which it has been surrounded on the Left are not merely a falsification of Chilean history but a potential danger to the future of liberal and social democratic politics in the Western world as well. Indeed, what is most disturbing to me about the fashionable Western reactions to events in Chile is their revelation of the degree to which revolutionary romanticism has combined with left-wing cynicism in recent years to corrupt our own politics. It is certainly "no accident" that, for example, the British Labour Party which so uncritically adopts Allende's cause is also the party which has permitted its self-avowed Marxists and utopian socialists to gain factional positions of unprecedented power.

I will leave others to pursue that theme, however. All I want to do is to try to set some of the Chilean record straight—or at any rate, straighter—by looking in some detail at three of the main myths that now surround the end of Allende and his famous experiment.

1. The American Intervention Myth

THIS FOUND its most virulent expression in the equation of Allende's downfall with that of Dubcek. Yet in the absence of any American armed assault to compare with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—let alone the fact that whereas Dubcek's Parliament supported him against the Russians, a majority of Allende's Congress invited him to resign—there were only stereotype suppositions to sustain it.

In general, the American intervention myth seemed to derive from that characteristic Latin American and left-wing scapegoat complex which insists that the *Yanquis* are responsible for everything (except, of course, anything good). Garnished with historical fact (Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, etc.) this is frequently transmuted in Latin American affairs into a plausible anti-American smear; and the state of Washington politics in 1973 was, of course, guaranteed to give such a smear extra credence this time. The *New Statesman* offered a fine example. "The likelihood is that the trail will lead back to the Pentagon", it assured its readers, "if a proper investigation can ever be mounted. But in default of this it does seem possible to say that Nixonism and its allies were already too heavily implicated in the

---

[2] Addicts of the ITT conspiracy theory might like to work out, incidentally, why ITT in Chile was never taken over by Allende, even after the notorious memorandum became public property. Was it, perhaps, because its operations there were mostly losing money and Allende did not want to share its financial embarrassments? Or was it that he knew the company had given him an effective political stick to beat his opponents with and he did not want to throw it away by kicking the company out? Either way, ITT's apparent immunity from reprisal did not suggest that he took its challenge very seriously.

subversion of Allende for them to be exonerated now" (14.9.73). The charge is almost ectoplasmically vague yet simultaneously all-embracing. But what does it actually rest on?

First, presumably, the celebrated memorandum of ITT which suggested ways of preventing Allende from assuming the Presidency in 1970 and of toppling his régime if he did so. There is, of course, no doubt of this memorandum's authenticity, nor of its appalling folly; and with such organisations admittedly pushing their conspiratorial notions at the heart of American politics it is not surprising that suspicions of *Yanqui* skulduggery were aroused. But there is a major snag for anyone who sees the memorandum as evidence of actual dirty work: simply, that all. Inquiries so far indicate that its recommendations were never adopted. They were studied by the CIA, where one department produced a contingency plan based upon them: But neither the memorandum nor the plan seems to have received assent at any higher level; and given the kind of public exposure to which the workings of the White House, the CIA and most other things in Washington have been treated during the Watergate crisis (including the allegations of Nixon's personal involvement with ITT), I am hard-pressed to believe that if such assent had been given it could have been kept quiet until now.[1]

Secondly, in support of the American intervention theory, it is pointed out that the U.S. maintained its contacts with the Chilean armed forces and continued to supply them with arms when other American aid to Chile was suspended. Therefore, so the implication goes, the Pentagon was deliberately keeping open the option of inspiring a military *coup* against an unwelcome government. But this is obviously a two-edged argument. For one thing, an army that is still getting its toys to play with is usually rather more than less likely to endure the follies of its ruling politicians gladly. And for another, what would have been said if the Americans had actually suspended arms shipments to forces whose commanders were serving in Allende's cabinet? The outcry about "*Yanqui* imperialism" and "Pentagon politics" may easily be imagined.

Thirdly, the strangulation of foreign aid and credit is laid at Washington's door as a major weapon in a cold war against Allende from the start. At first glance this has more substance to it. The U.S. certainly suspended further commercial credits of its own to Chile after Allende had nationalised the American-owned copper mines on terms amounting to confiscation. As the major power in the World Bank and the IMF the U.S. also argued there against further aid for Chile; and to the extent that it was successful it must have added to Allende's financial difficulties. But it was not able to prevent other Western countries (*e.g.* Holland and Sweden) from continuing to offer credit; it never persuaded Britain to close down its small aid programme; it did not exclude the re-scheduling of most of Chile's foreign debt repayments in 1972, and it had not prevented the discussion (incomplete at the time of the *coup*) of a similar re-scheduling for 1973. In short, the U.S. influence may have limited Western aid and credit but it was far from being able to condemn Allende's Chile to economic purdah. In any case, Chile was not one of the under-developed world's hard cases, totally dependent on external aid and credits for its survival. The wealth of its copper mines alone ensured that in normal times it was not more than marginally "aid-worthy", and with sensible economic management it ought to have been able to withstand a good deal of external pressure. Unfortunately, nobody with even a nodding acquaintance with economics could have classified the management of the Allende government as anything but disastrous. To a great extent it placed itself beyond the pale for any but the most trusting—or dedicated—of creditors. But even if that had not been so, and if the blame for Chile's economic difficulties could have been laid fairly and squarely at Washington's door, Allende would surely have had small cause for complaint. It was, after all, his administration which announced its immediate determination to "expropriate imperialist capital . . . realise a policy of self-financing . . . and review, denounce and repudiate, as the case may be, treaties or agreements limiting our sovereignty, specifically the reciprocal assistance treaties, the mutual aid pacts, and others, between Chile and the United States" (*The People's Unity—Basic Programme of Government, 1970*).

It was also his administration which promised to "repudiate the agreements between us and the International Monetary Fund" (*The People's Government—First 40 Steps, 1970*). These bold intentions were never fully realised, it is true; but they were expressed as official policy before the United States or any other "imperialist" power had actually done anything to embarrass Allende's government. In other words, it was Allende who decided to pick the quarrel. It seems naïve, to say the least, to complain that his chosen opponents took defensive measures. What else were they expected to do?

* * *

THOSE WHO DO COMPLAIN of American action, nevertheless, might be better employed in asking why Allende got so little support from most of the governments which professed to be his friends. Except for Cuba, which offered enthusiastic (but not always practical) advice to Allende, as well as supplying arms and training for his militant Left, the world's established Marxist governments were consistently cool to the "Chilean experiment." The farthest the Soviet Union would go to show its approval was to open a 12-year credit in roubles for Chilean imports of Russian industrial goods and to agree to take a limited amount of Chilean copper for a year or two in repayment. But the hard currency loans that Chile really needed to plug the gaps that quickly opened between Allende's economic promises and performance were never forthcoming from any Marxist source. Nor was that surprising. In the nature of things, Marxist countries rarely have hard currency to spare and they were unlikely to devote what little they might have to bailing out a régime which seemed intent upon over-reaching itself in every direction.

Conceivably, Allende would have done better for himself and his country if he had simply abandoned the "free" world market altogether and taken Chile at once into the controlled trade bloc of the Communist world in the hope of getting total Soviet support. But that would have meant imposing a completely centralised economy and strict political control inside Chile—in short, abandoning the romantic pretence of "constitutional revolution" for the more customary revolution by decree. To his credit, perhaps, Allende was unwilling (or unable) to do that;

but even if he had, it might not have worked. To support Castro's Cuba is believed to have cost Moscow the equivalent of about $1 million a day for many years. To support a similar regime in Chile would probably have cost even more. There was never the slightest sign that Mr Brezhnev, or anyone else in the Kremlin, was ready to accept such a burden.

To sum up, then, it seems to me that the idea of an American conspiracy to overthrow Allende is both unproven and unnecessary to explain his downfall. I am not saying, of course, that Washington was not relieved to see him go; although I think some American officials would have preferred to see him stumble on for some time longer in the hope that growing disillusionment would infect even his stoutest supporters and accordingly diminish the chances of his being made a martyr when nemesis finally overtook him. But in general the American attitude seems to have been a predictably cautious one:

> *Thou shalt not kill, but need'st not strive*
> *Officiously to keep alive....*

A realistic Chilean government embarked on its "road to socialism" would surely have bargained for that much, and (on a truly Marxist analysis such as Allende professed) it should have expected much more—that America would move in for the kill as soon as possible. Yet while adopting a deliberately provocative stance, Allende took no steps to protect himself against possible American reprisals, declined to compromise for the sake of other Western help, and failed to provide grounds even for his supposed Marxist friends to help him.

It was magnificent, perhaps, but it was not politics. At the very least, Allende must be convicted here of a lack of realism that would probably have been fatal to any statesman anywhere.

2. The Ruling Class Conspiracy Myth

THE PICTURE of Allende being overthrown by what has been variously described as a "revolt of the privileged," a series of "bosses' strikes" or a "conspiracy of the traditional ruling class" contains so many misconceptions that it is hard to know where to begin to sort them out. One idea, however, seems basic to them all: that Allende and his Popular Unity coalition were somehow the uniquely legitimate representatives of "the People's Will." That such an odd belief should have gained any currency whatever outside purely propagandist circles is a mark of the confusion that surrounds the Chilean experience in the minds of many non-Chileans. To judge from published comments, such as those referring to the "defeat of the democratic will", some of Allende's sympathisers abroad seem even to believe that he not merely enjoyed a massive popular majority of the vote but was also the first President of his country to do so.

Yet the facts are beyond dispute. Chile was and had been for many years a functioning democracy with a constitution which vested executive power in the President and legislative power in Congress. Both in theory and in practice, no doubt, there were serious weaknesses—as revealed, for instance, in the inability of previous governments to press through social reforms as swiftly as many Chileans would have wished. But by common consent the system was the best and most stable in Latin America and it had enabled Allende himself to contest the Presidency unsuccessfully three times before he finally won it at his fourth attempt in 1970. There was no doubt of the legitimacy of that victory. But, unfortunately for those who saw it as a unique expression of "the people's will", it was gained only through a narrow plurality in which Allende obtained just over 36% of the poll. His nearest rival, only a couple of percentage points behind, was the candidate of the conservative National Party, whose members in Congress opposed Allende from the start. Another 28% went to the third candidate, a radical reformist from the Christian Democrat party, many of whose members in Congress at first gave Allende the benefit of the doubt, hoping he would modify his avowed Marxism in practice to a kind of reformism compatible with their own ideas and the existing constitution.

In the mid-term Congressional elections of March 1973, the Popular Unity coalition raised its share of the vote to 44% (although this time the "legitimacy" was suspect owing to opposition allegations of substantial electoral fraud). But the opposition parties retained a large majority in Congress where, by that time, most of the Christian Democrats had joined the Nationalists in outright antagonism to the President. On these facts it seems plain that, so far from representing "the People's Will", Allende never actually represented more than a substantial minority interest. Only if "the People" are identified as being those who voted for Allende, while the rest—the majority—are relegated to the status of "non-people" can any other interpretation be sustained. But that, of course, is just what is implied by the myth of the "ruling class conspiracy."

IF THERE WAS a "ruling class" in Chile it was that of the politicians and the surrounding establishment drawn mostly from the narrow upper end of Chile's prosperous middle class. Allende himself and many of his ministers and leading supporters were as much part of that group as were their political opponents. But, ironically, it was a group that often suffered less than others from Allende's socialism because its members on both sides generally possessed enough cash or property to exploit the black market at home or slip into agreeable exile if things got too rough—in any case, to survive (like Allende himself until his death) in very reasonable comfort. But the people who did most to overthrow Allende were rarely of this group at all. With the possible exception of some naval officers, the armed forces were very much apart from the establishment of any political colour; and even after Allende brought the service commanders into his government they remained aloof from, and remarkably little known by, those relatively small circles in Santiago which were accustomed to set the country's political tone.

Indeed, as events since the *coup d'état* have shown, Chile's military men—like their counterparts elsewhere—were probably as contemptuous of the politicians (and as ignorant of politics) as the politicians were of them. They had stayed outside politics for nearly 40 years, and if Allende himself had not dragged them into the whirlpool they might have been content to remain that way. But their position was made intolerable by the President's own decisions. On the one hand they were encouraged to turn a blind eye to the steady growth of illegal, para-military forces under the command of the President's friends or others who were more extreme in their revolutionary commitment. On the other hand they were required to serve in his cabinet to maintain "law and order" and reassure the country of the President's constitutional propriety. On top of that they were threatened by attempts from within the President's own circle to subvert their authority within their own forces, as in the naval conspiracy uncovered in July 1973, and the public call for a naval insurrection by Allende's friend and fellow-leader of the Socialist Party, Senator Carlos Altamirano, made only three days before the *coup*.

A surer way can hardly be imagined of provoking mutiny among responsible officers, and it is only surprising, in retrospect, that it did not happen sooner—as in most Latin American countries it surely would have done. To ascribe the mutiny* thereafter to the machinations of "the ruling class" is to understand nothing, either of military men in general or of Chile's military in particular.

SIMILARLY, THE SO-CALLED "bosses' strikes" which preceded the military *coup* were, in fact, nothing of the kind. The lorry-men who paralysed half, or more, of Chile's transport by their month-long strike in September-October 1972, and their even longer strike in July-September 1973, were mostly owner-drivers who would have fitted fairly readily into the Teamsters' Union in the United States. They displayed the fierce economic and social protectionism typical of what in Europe or North America would be called the lower middle class, and they saw themselves threatened by galloping inflation and by what they believed to be the Government's intention to destroy their way of life through state control or ownership of their services. Along with the small shopkeepers who supported them—not forgetting the queue-weary housewives whose famous "Saucepan March" in Santiago was the most dramatic early sign of revolt—they might be classed as the *Poujadistes* of Chile. But by no stretch of the imagination could they be described as representatives of a "boss" or "ruling" class, or even as being especially "privileged" in a social or economic sense. Moreover, they owed little, if any, allegiance to the traditional political groupings of Chilean politics, although they obviously welcomed any support they could get from them. On the contrary, they tended to cut across the traditional spectrum and look to new leaders, whether of right or left. Thus, their principal spokesman, Senor Leon Vilarin, was actually a member of Allende's Socialist Party while others of the leadership came from the Nationalist Party ranks or from no party at all.

The members of the various professional associations, like doctors, dentists, lawyers and airline pilots, which joined the second transport strike, were likewise not "bosses" although they were certainly, in Chilean terms, rather more "privileged." Their protest was probably more ideological than that of the lorry-men and the shopkeepers—it was usually their wives, for example, who objected most forcibly to the Government's politically-inspired changes in the school curriculum—but it was also provoked by sheer exasperation and fear at the growing threat to their professional status posed by the Government's combination of administrative inefficiency and dubious social priorities. For example, Chile's economic collapse and inflation not only threatened many doctors financially but seriously frustrated their work. Some early reports from Santiago after the *coup* made the point that hospitals were appealing urgently for bandages and drugs to treat the wounded, as if that indicated that the number of casualties must be overwhelmingly high. But bandages, drugs, and other medical supplies had been only sporadically obtainable in Chile for many months beforehand. The daily round of the pharmacies in search of the simplest medicines had become a regular feature of Santiago life; and foreign embassies had been driven to stock-pile their own supplies, imported through the diplomatic bag, for the treatment of the most normal ailments among their staffs. It was partly in the hope of ending that situation that many otherwise conscientious doctors finally joined the movement to get Allende out.

NOR SHOULD IT BE FORGOTTEN that some of the most damaging strikes of all were those of Chile's most influential blue-collar workers—the copper-miners. The last lorry-men's strike was immediately preceded by a two months' strike for higher wages by miners at El Teniente, the country's biggest mine. Because copper accounts for three-quarters of Chile's foreign earnings, that strike probably cost the country far more in real terms than the transport strike, whose costs to a great extent could be absorbed internally. Indeed, as one West European diplomat remarked to me in Santiago, the money lost in those two months at El Teniente would have more than repaid Chile's entire debt to his government—a debt which Allende at that moment was trying to reschedule for the second consecutive year.

It is true that the copper-miners were the élite of Chile's blue-collar class and, no doubt, wanted to keep it that way. To that extent, perhaps, they may be deemed "privileged"—like, say, coal miners or motor car workers in Britain; although I doubt if that is what members of the British Labour Party, or the *New Statesman*, can have had in mind in embracing the "privileged" thesis. But a more important reason for the miners' restiveness, I believe, is that although they were the most vital of all Chile's manual workers they suffered far more than most of their erstwhile comrades from the country's shattering economic decline under Allende. Unlike farm and factory workers, they could not supplement their official wages by selling the fruits of their labour on the black market. The farm worker who could take home a sack

---

*Although even that was not unthinkable towards the end, such was the chaos the economy had fallen into. The last time I left Chile, a week or so before the *coup*, I drove over the Andes to Argentina and at the Chilean customs post at the summit of the pass I found officials taking a large American car to pieces and laying upon the snow-covered ground around it *one ton* of copper ingots that had been hidden in various nooks and crannies of the chassis. It would have been worth around U.S. $2,000 in cash in Argentina—a fortune, by then, in Chilean terms, of about *four million* escudos on the black market.

potatoes, a few chickens, or even a side of beef, could make a good living on the black market even if his official wages remained stationary while inflation roared ahead. The factory worker who was entitled to buy a proportion of his factory's output at official fixed prices could (and did) sell that at six or ten times what he had paid as soon as he left the factory gate. But miners could hardly find ready buyers for a stolen truck-load of copper ore.[8]

Thus the copper-miners were thrust, in effect, into the same position as the lorry-men, the shopkeepers, and virtually all of Chile's salaried professional men and women: they were left more or less defenceless against the most vicious inflation the country had ever experienced.

SOME APOLOGISTS for Allende have maintained that the degree of inflation was exaggerated or, at any rate, little worse than was customary in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America. The truth is that it was far beyond anything normally endured in that continent. As little as nine months after Allende came to power, when I first visited Chile, the escudo had already fallen from 20 to 40 against the U.S. dollar on the free, or black, market. Eighteen months later, on my second visit, the Government's own figures put the rate of inflation at 130% in a year, the money issue was going up by 10% a month and the escudo had fallen to about 350 to the black U.S. dollar. By August 1973, the official inflation rate was 323% and rising fast, and the escudo was worth only 2,000 to the dollar—an effective devaluation in less than three years of 10,000%!

Nor is it enough to attribute these catastrophic rates to such adventitious or malicious factors as—and again I refer to published arguments—falling world copper prices, the normal difficulties of maintaining industrial and farm output in a time of radical political change, or deliberate American intervention.

On the last of these three I have already said enough, I hope, to show that it was far from decisive and that it was, anyway, largely self-invited. As to falling copper prices, the fact is that after a fall in the first year of Allende's Government, prices recovered until by the time of his overthrow they were 80% above the level at the time of his election. Had they not risen so steeply he would almost certainly have fallen sooner and probably would not have secured his relative, short-lived success in the mid-term elections of March 1973. The difficulties of maintaining output in a time of change, however, were real—unfortunately, far more so than Allende ever seemed to realise.

To take just two examples: copper and milk. Expropriation of the copper mines from their American owners would, no doubt, have led in itself to the withdrawal of American technicians as well as of American management with some consequent risk of losing production temporarily, at least. But this might have been overcome by the promotion of trained Chilean managers and technicians, of whom there was no shortage.

Alas, for Chile's national income, Allende not merely nationalised but deliberately politicised the mines as well. Jobs for the party boys were handed out in thousands while trained Chileans emigrated so that, after three years of Popular Unity Government, mining manpower and costs had risen by more than a third while mining output was down by about the same amount.

I take milk as the second example because it was specifically mentioned in Popular Unity election literature, which guaranteed "every Chilean child half-a-quart of milk daily." Here again, the government's programme of land reform, intended to break the power of Chile's remaining landlords and open the way to co-operative or state farming, might have been expected to result in some shortfall in dairy production for a year or two while the teething problems were sorted out. In fact, however, milk production dropped as if someone had simply punched a hole in the bottom of every churn in the land. At one large cooperative dairy in Temuco, one of the main milk-producing areas of Chile, the average daily winter intake of milk was about 90,000 gallons in 1970. By 1973 it was down to 7,000. Nor was this surprising. Apart from the fact that legal land reform had been accompanied by widespread and unchecked illegal land seizures so that too many farms were in the hands of people utterly without experience, the prices established for milk—as for most other farm products—were simply economic nonsense. Presumably in the hope of getting half-a-quart of milk for every child on the cheap, the government decreed that a gallon of milk would fetch less than half the price of one egg. Inevitably, nobody was interested in producing milk and cows were slaughtered wholesale for beef—legally or illegally—or driven over the mountains to Argentina while Allende was forced to scour the world for dried milk imports that, thanks to his policy in the copper mines, he no longer had foreign currency to pay for.

SUCH FOLLIES were repeated everywhere as the romantic gestures of self-styled revolution were preferred to facing the facts of life. While overall production in both agriculture and industry fell disastrously, Allende simultaneously attempted to redistribute the national wealth by giving Chile's poorer classes more money to spend. They were his constituency and they were properly grateful, for many of them certainly had never had much before. But you can't redistribute what you have already thrown away; and as output vanished, so domestic queues grew longer, foreign debts piled up, and the budget deficit expanded like a hydrogen balloon. A year before the final collapse I asked one of Allende's chief economic advisers what they were going to do to control a situation that was already looking critical. He replied, with commendable candour, that he really didn't know. "I know," he said, "what we ought to do—we should impose an austerity régime tomorrow, freeze wages, and ration essential supplies. But how can we? We would destroy our own political base. . . ."

Precisely. In the end, rather than do that they plunged on down the primrose path of promises and illusions and practically destroyed the country. The "ruling class conspiracy" was the gloss that they and their supporters put upon the reality of their own miscalculations.

3. The Myth of the Constitutional Revolutionary

HERE WE COME to the crux of Allende's policies and character about which, finally, all the other arguments revolve. Was he a genuine constitutionalist? Was he a true revolutionary? Was he—could he ever have been—both?

Allende himself, of course, admitted no doubts. Repeatedly, he insisted that he was a revolutionary and a Marxist, and that he intended to establish at least the preconditions for what he told Régis Debray would be "total, scientific Marxist socialism." Equally repeatedly, he proclaimed his faith that he could achieve this end by constitutional means, through the ballot box and all it implied. That was, after all, to be the distinctive "Chilean road to socialism" of which so many people outside Chile cherished such high hopes.

But no hindsight is required to see that both theory and practice were riddled with contradictions. Revolutions are born of, or generate, sectional conflict—a fact of political life that Allende acknowledged every time he spoke of "overthrowing" what he called the "bourgeois" state. But a democratic constitution rests upon consensus—a basic acceptance of the fact that the State represents more than a merely sectional interest. The second permits reform, but the first denies it; and there is no way of reconciling the two.

All Allende's practical difficulties followed from this simple distinction. Taken seriously, his constitutionalism meant that his programme could only succeed if a majority would actually vote for it. But, elected as he was with only just over a third of the popular vote and with a large majority of Congress against him, Allende had neither a democratic nor an administratively effective mandate for his revolution. Indeed, in a parliamentary rather than a presidential democracy, he would probably never have been able to begin.

If he was to succeed within his six-year term of office even in opening the door to revolution, let alone establishing it as accomplished fact, he had to transform his minority into a majority. But how to do it? For, if words meant anything, Allende's had to mean that he intended to replace the existing, reformable constitution of Chile with another that would be, of its Marxist nature, irreversible. In other words, a system that was admittedly democratic was to be used to build another that would be effectively dictatorial. This was asking the majority to hang itself from its own gallows; and, not surprisingly, it declined.

ALLENDE'S ATTEMPTS to overcome this basic illogicality in his position were precisely what ensured his ultimate downfall. Refusing to abandon either his revolutionary rhetoric or his professed constitutionalism he was forced to rely more and more upon political illusionism. His sleight-of-hand was often remarkable, as he sought to outwit the opposition majority in Congress by exploiting the letter of the constitution, using every legal loophole to force upon them measures they did not want. But in the process, inevitably, he destroyed the constitution's spirit, so that his opponents became as ruthless as he was. At the start he won considerable opposition support in Congress for needed changes like the nationalisation of the copper mines, land reform, and the state's takeover of banks and major industries—evidence that the democratic consensus could and would work within the existing constitution. But, at the end, not a single member of the opposition majority would cast a vote in his support. They voted unanimously to condemn his "habitual illegalities" and were even joined by the Supreme Court in accusing him of disregarding the rule of law. He had cut away the middle ground of Chilean politics, wrecked the democratic consensus, and begotten the reality of counter-revolution through his own addiction to revolutionary slogans.

Equally inevitable was the economic breakdown, which came from Allende's attempts to enlarge his popular base outside the political institutions. Here his plan was two-fold: to buy political support among "the People" through massive wage increases and other benefits and at the same time to squeeze the middle class into submission, or even flight from the country, through wholesale nationalisation of their interests and the appointment of his own men to all significant civil-service jobs. The two simply cancelled each other out; for while the first part of the plan raised vast new expectations and demands, the second diminished the country's capacity to meet them. The whirling spiral of inflation followed as a *necessary* result of Allende's political confusions.

THESE BASIC CONTRADICTIONS were compounded by the fragmented nature of Allende's support. His Popular Unity coalition was far from united. Its majority element was Allende's own Socialist Party—a body that bore little resemblance beyond its name to most of the democratic socialist parties of Europe which so enthusiastically espoused its cause. It was, in fact, a revolutionary Marxist party that began as a splinter of the more bureaucratic and Stalinist Chilean Communist party in the 1930s, and in recent years had acquired a fiery "New Left" wing as well. Several of its leaders, like Senator Altamirano, and many of its rank and file, constantly urged Allende to "speed up the revolution" without much regard for consitutional niceties. The smallest element of the coalition was the Christian radicals of various persuasions, some of whom hoped to offer a bridge to the centre of Chilean politics by cooperating with the left wing of the Christian Democrats, but none of whom ever attained positions of real influence. The coalition's sheet anchor was the Communist Party which, as business and administration slipped into chaos, became increasingly important as a source of discipline and strategic thinking.

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN hard enough to drive this *troika* anyway without either overstepping the constitutional limits of government or antagonising one or other of its elements and thereby jeopardising the only "democratic" base the revolution had. But Allende had also to contend with the still more militant left outside the coalition, led by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which insisted on revolution now, and by violence if necessary—as, in MIR's view, it was.

Here Allende's professed constitutionalism was

---

[*] Indeed, as I discovered for myself on a visit to southern Chile nine months after Allende's elections, local police forces there were under specific instructions not to attempt to restore the farms to their legal owners. See also Robert Moss's report in ENCOUNTER, "Allende's Chile", August 1973, and Alistair Horne's "Commandante Pepe", July 1973.

revealed as, at best, equivocal. He officially rejected MIR's violence, yet he never permitted the Army to root out their para-military groups. When they stigmatised his land-reform programme as "inadequate" and seized hundreds of farms at gun-point he rebuked them in occasional speeches but did nothing to reverse their actions.[8]

When they hi-jacked lorry-loads of valuable manufactures, to raise funds by selling them on the black market, he rarely tried to redress the crime. The Left said this was because the MIR truly represented "the People" against whom Allende dared not act. But the truth, I fear, was more squalid. For one thing, the MIR had close friends in the Socialist Party and in Allende's own entourage whom the President did not want to offend. For another, as long as their activities did not actually split the Popular Unity coalition, it was often convenient to see them pushing along the revolution by unconstitutional means while Allende denounced them in his role as a constitutionalist.

It was not as if Allende was unable to deal with the MIR when he had to. For example, when a *Mirista* force blockaded the Philips television factory in Santiago in 1973 after an unsuccessful attempt to hi-jack a lorry-load of TV sets, they were allowed by the Government to remain unmolested for ten days, although a police post was just across the road. Yet when diplomatic representations were made by the Dutch *chargé d'affaires* with the hint that his country's financial aid might have to be reconsidered if this harassment of a Dutch enterprise continued, the *Miristas* were hustled away without a shot in 24 hours.

A SIMILAR EQUIVOCATION was evident in Allende's adoption of a personal armed bodyguard—the first in memory to accompany a Chilean President. It is true that the extreme Right in Chile was quick to threaten violence as a response to Allende's proclaimed revolution, and Allende himself always maintained that he needed protection. But right-wing para-military groups were never as big or as highly organised as those on the Left; and, in any case, the proper reaction of a constitutionally-minded President would surely have been to call upon his state security forces to protect him.

Instead, Allende formed a personal unit, known as "the Group of Friends of the President." Trained, armed, and partly manned by Cubans, it was led by known revolutionaries, sympathetic to the MIR, including Allende's son-in-law. The existence of such a group at the very centre of the State was not merely a provocation to the established security forces and an affront to Chilean tradition, it was also an implied rejection of the principle of constitutional rule.

DOUBTS ABOUT the real depth of Allende's constitutionalism were raised also by his personal history and his language, both of which suggested a romantic attachment to violence. He was, after all, a founder and first president of the Latin American Solidarity Organisation, created in Havana in the 1960s and dedicated to the encouragement of armed insurrection throughout the continent. He promised to "paint Santiago with blood" in 1970 if Congress declined to ratify his election as President, and he repeatedly tried to intimidate the opposition, inside and outside Congress, with the threat of civil war. These were not the actions or the sentiments of a man dedicated to constitutional change, except as a matter of expediency.

On the other hand, it was hard to see Allende as a genuine revolutionary. He never looked anything but the complete bourgeois gentleman. A *bon viveur*, florid but well-groomed, a snappy dresser, with a twinkling eye for the ladies and a good deal of personal charm, his strongest political card was his skill in tactical manoeuvre. But as a strategist, a thinker, a man with a real message, he was unconvincing. Towards the end, as he appeared with increasing frequency on the presidential balcony in Santiago to address chanting crowds of his supporters with revolutionary platitudes, he seemed to me to lose all contact with reality, to have become an actor in love with his revolutionary part rather than a serious leader who knew where he was going.

IN RETROSPECT, I am inclined to think this was always the truth of the matter with Allende. Basically, he was a political romantic, dealing in sensations rather than sense. He enjoyed his hour upon the stage but he never properly assessed the forces he was dealing with, either for or against him. He raised expectations on his own side without commanding the means to satisfy them, and he encouraged opposition on the other side by his use of a revolutionary rhetoric whose threats he also could not fulfil.

At best he was muddle-headed; and time may show that he was deliberately deceitful. Certainly he managed to deceive a lot of people, including himself. But in the end reality taught its own, hard lessons. That you can't be a democrat *and* a revolutionary—at least, not in a society that is already admittedly democratic. That you can't be anti-American *and* expect the Americans to help you. That you can't pose as the people's leader *and* kick most people in the teeth. That you can't conscript soldiers into politics *and* expect them to remain apolitical. That you can't have inflation roaring out of sight *and* maintain a base for social welfare. That, in short, the real world is not Cloud-cuckoo-land. Down here, you just can't have your cake *and* eat it.

It is sad that such elementary lessons should have to be taught yet again at such tragic cost in Chile. But it is alarming that so many people elsewhere should evidently fail to grasp that they are the lessons.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ~~MFR~~ FUOMEN / RSHOPS CHILE

INCLUSIVE DATES: SEPT. 1973 - MAY 1974

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

FUOMEN

BOL. IX

TO: (Headquarters component)

C/LA/AN/C

C/IP/DMS

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

TO: (Station/Base)

Santiago, Chile

FROM: (Division)

C/LA

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS, AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE FILED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE		2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER		
		COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
☒ SUBJECT	☐ PROJECT	015	124	052

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

FUOMEN

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION		5. DISPOSITION	
☐ OPEN FILE	☒ CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)	☐ RETAIN	☐ DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)
☐ AMEND FILE TITLE	☐ REOPEN		

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)

HCS

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)

015

9. FILES ACTION

☐ HOLD IN CS FILES	☐ RESTRICTED	☒ UNRESTRICTED	☐ PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER	☐ CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT	12. COORDINATION	13. RID APPROVAL
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. 1748 C/LA/AN	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)	REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

FORM 812 12-65 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFS 12-65

SECRET

38

1—CS COPY

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ff PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 12-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT 555	INFO	RF FILE VR	~~RPAN~~ EUR8 SB8 C/H8
ACTION #			

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 375103 EIA916 PAGE 01-01 IN 345816

TOR:281628Z AUG 74 HAMB 25462

S E C R E T 281611Z AUG 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 25462

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE.

MHCRUNCH FUOMEN REDLEG

REF: EGGA-6103, 12 AUG 74

WH/6

10-301

1. ARTICLE BY PROF. JAMES THEBERGE, PUBLISHED IN SOVIET ANALYST, VOL. 3, NO. 17, 15 AUG, ENTITLED: "KREMLIN'S HAND IN ALLENDE'S CHILE" IS IDEAL FOR PURPOSES OUTLINED IN REF. WE ATTEMPTING TO PLACE, WILL ADVISE. SUGGEST HQ INCLUDE ARTICLE IN PRESS COMMENTS.

2. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

RECORD COPY

28 Aug 74

15-124-52

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

TO: Chief, EUR Division

FROM: COS, Helsinki

No. 669923

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	REMARKS
	Newspaper article	FUOMEN/PSYCH Ref: HELSINKI
		22455
	Hold for Record	
		E2 IMPDET

FORM 1236a. Obsolete Forms 1236 and 1236a (2-64), which may be used.
5-69

SECRET

(13-47)

Allendes misstag

— Den svenska debatten är ensidig. Man har på ett lysande sätt dokumenterat juntans grymheter men man drar ingen lärdom av utvecklingen i Allendes Chile. Det är viktigt att kunna kritisera det som var fel i utvecklingen, annars kan man inte lära sig någonting. Om man tystar ner varje form av debatt om det som var före kuppen, använder man sig av ett censurtänkande som är på samma linje som juntans, säger *Andres Küng*, journalist och författare som besökt Chile före, under och efter Allendes tid. Han har nu också givit ut en debattbok, *Att så socialism och skörda fascism*.

— Salvador Allende och "folkregeringen" Unidad Popular (folklig enhet) emotsågs med stort intresse även utomlands. Man skulle äntligen få svar på flera grundläggande frågor. Kan socialismen genomföras på fredlig väg i Latinamerika? Är marxismen i praktiken förenlig med politisk demokrati? Kan en social revolution genomföras med bevarad politisk demokrati?

— Folkfrontens program hade fyra naturtillgångar, främst kopparn, 2) ökad takt i jordreformsarbetet, 3) förstatligande av de största bank- och industriföretagen och 4) snabb ekonomisk tillväxt och omfördelning av inkomster och förmögenheter samt kamp mot inflationen.

Koppar viktig

— Kopparn svarar för upp till fyra femtedelar av landets export och mellan en femtedel och en tredjedel av statsintäkterna. Under åren före första världskriget gick gruvorna över i nordamerikansk ägo. I slutet av 1960-talet nationaliserades de till hälften av den kristdemokratiska Frei-regimen. Staten övertog 51 procent av aktierna. Men Freis "chilenisering" av kopparn visade sig slutligen ändå mest lönsam för de amerikanska företagen. Kopparn förstatligades genom ett tillägg till grundlagen 1971. Frågan om ersättning till de forna amerikanska ägarna hänsköts till högste statsrevisorn — men Allende och hans regering ansåg att de inte hade råd att betala kontant ersättning i dollar.

— Jordbruket svarar för mindre än en fjärdedel av sysselsättningen, vilket är mindre än i de flesta latinamerikanska och andra u-länder. Flera jordreformlagar antogs före Allende en av dem 1967 då man bestämde att alla jordegendomar över 80 "bashektar" kunde tvångsinlösas. (en bashektar = en hektar förstklassig konstbevattnad jord).

— Takten i jordreformarbetet ökade under Allendes presidenttid. Under hans första år tvångsinlöstes nästan lika mycket jord som under hela den föregående sexåriga presidentperioden. Alla stora jordegendomar uppgavs ha förstatligats 1973.

En följd av jordreformen var att lantarbetarna organiserades fackligt. En annan var jordockupationerna. De ökade nio gånger redan under Allendes första år jämfört med under Freis tid. Jordägarna började gå till motangrepp.

— Produktionen sjönk — de exproprierade gårdarna hade inte tillräckligt med maskiner, redskap, kreatur och utsäde. Den sjunkande tillgången på livsmedel och den stigande efterfrågan ledde till försörjningsproblem och prisstegringar.

— I början genomförde Allende en rad åtgärder för att skapa en jämnare fördelning av förmögenhe-

Andres Küng, journalist och författare, säger att Chile-debatten är ensidig. "Det är viktigt att även kunna kritisera det som var fel på Allendes tid annars kan man inte lära sig någonting".

svarta börsaffärer och hamstring. Penningvärdet sjönk med 163 procent.

— Under min vistelse i Santiago i början av 1973 var enbart cigarettköerna i centrum ett par kvarter långa, berättar Andres Küng.

Förlorade stödet

— De ekonomiska problemen medförde politiska problem. Allende förlorade medelklassens stöd och arbetarklassens stöd minskade. I kongressvalen behövde han majoritet — det var en nödvändig förutsättning för att han skulle kunna fortsätta att genomföra sitt program och stifta sina lagar. Han fick bara 44 procent. Maktkampen kongress — parlament — president fortsatte. Ingen ville ge vika för den andre. Allende drevs till åtgärder som inte var förenliga med demokratiska principer och gällande lagar.

— Denna utveckling tyder på att varje försök att mot flertalets vilja tvinga fram en extrem politik medför risker för polarisering av samhället som bara skulle gynna odemokratiska riktningar. En aggressiv klasspolitik, vare sig den är reaktionär eller revolutionär, kan framkalla en utveckling mot en socialistisk eller fascistisk diktatur, konstaterar Andres Küng.

— Men inga missförhållanden och misstag under Allendes tid kan användas som ursäkt för kuppen och det blodbad som sedan följde. Man kan ha olika uppfattningar om Allendes politik, men varje sann demokrat måste känna avsky för den nuvarande militärjuntan.

Flitig författare

Andres Küng är född i Gävle

2

25-1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

STAFF

LURS

HVM, WH8, 555,

P 072141 EIA232 PAGE 01 IN 339973

TOR:221103Z MAY 74 HELS 22459

C O N F I D E N T I A L 220949Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE HELSINKI 22459 [illegible]

TO: DIRECTOR INFO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO, [illegible]

SUOMEN PSYCH [illegible]

1. IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES, CALL ATTENTION TO NEWLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/AUTHOR ANDRES KUNG (UMLAUT "U") ENTITLED "TO SOW SOCIALISM AND REAP FASCISM", WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING FROM YOUNG SWEDE. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS". KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION #

* 277141 EIA230 PAGE 02-02 IN 239973

TOR:0211032 MAY 74 HELS 23493

AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".

2. [illegible]UNG (DPOB: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72) EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO. HAS PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC STATES.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

CONFIDENTIAL

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

TOTAL COPIES 28 RUN BY ZK

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/LA/ON C/EUR6 C/SS3 C/PS/EG3 C/OSG/IC C/OPS

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 172681 EIA126 PAGE 01-01 IN 274496

TOR:071631Z JUN 74 SAGO 29396

S E C R E T 071544Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29396

TO: DIRECTOR INFO PARIS.

RYBAT HYSAGE

REFS: A. PARIS 48989 (IN 273492)

B. DIRECTOR 559514

1. STATION CONCURS WITH PARIS ASSESSMENT. IF ALLENDE ACTUALLY DID WANT TO SURRENDER, JUNTA COULD ONLY SUFFER FROM PUBLICIZING FACT.

2. FILE: 56-6-42/3, 201-927906. E2 IMPDET

(2)

T.L. Fuomen

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY Ch PER TOTAL COPIES 27-1 RUN BY ZX

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T[illegible] ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI[illegible]

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/FIDAN C/GIRG C/OPSINT2 C/SS 3 C/PS/EG 3

1 SP 2 3 6 4 5 6

T 169854 EIA366 PAGE 01 IN 273492

TOR:062019Z JUN 74 PARI 48989

C/WH/6 Tc

DC/WH/6

WH/6/

WH/6/

WH/6/

WH/6/

S E C R E T 061624Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48989

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO.

Tab - TUCMEN

RYBAT HYSAGE

REF: DIRECTOR 559514

1. DEFER SANTIAGO RE PARA 5 BUT WE FEEL THERE LITTLE TO BE GAINED IN PSYCH TERMS FOR EUROPEAN AUDIENCE TO ATTEMPT CLARIFY WHETHER ALLENDE KILLED WHILE FIGHTING OR ATTEMPTING SURRENDER. JUNTA'S PRESTIGE SO LOW IN EUROPEAN EYES THAT SUCH HAIR SPLITTING WOULD NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE OR COULD ACTUALLY REBOUND AGAINST JUNTA SHOULD IT EMERGE HE DIED WHILE WANTING SURRENDER.

2. SHOULD IT DEVELOP THAT FANATICS AROUND ALLENDE REFUSED ALLOW HIM SURRENDER, THEN THIS MIGHT BE ANOTHER STORY BUT THIS NOT CLEAR FROM REF AND ALSO NOT KNOWN IF GARCES COULD MAKE SUCH VERSION STICK BECAUSE OF HIS EARLY DEPARTURE FROM NATIONAL PALACE.

3. FILE: 56-6-42/3; 201-907906. E2, IMPDET

S E C R E T

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Helsinki

INFO.
C/WH Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Santiago

SUBJECT
FUJMEN Psych

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HELSINKI 22455

If available, we would appreciate receiving four copies of Andres Kung's book mentioned in reference. E2 IMPDET.

Leslie H. BERBERIAN

Distribution:
2 COS Helsinki – To out pouch
1 C/WHD

[illegible]

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HCSA-18904	3 May 1974
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 15-124-52 Defer

NETHERLANDS

CHILEAN REFUGEES IN NETHERLANDS POINTED OUT AS FUGITIVES

/Editorial by N. van Nieuwenhuysen; Reformatorisch Dagblad, Dutch, 19 April 1974, p 5/

The Chilean refugees in the Netherlands seem to be having adjustment problems. These rather prolonged symptoms seem to be caused among other things by the fact that they still find it hard to accept that the socialist dream of their Marxist president is definitely over and that their country is now being ruled by a small group of reactionaries who are trying to keep the people under control through terrorism, repression, and torture. Such problems will take you quite a ways in the Netherlands and those idealists were quick to take advantage of it.

Welfare

What is the situation? Most of the approximately 250 refugees with a high school or university education do not work. About half of them have been housed at the "Huis ter Schie" in Overschie, where they enjoy the sunshine on the terrace or play volleyball in the yard. Board and lodging are free and at the end of the week they pick up another 25 guilders pocket money. In addition they receive free language instruction, commuter tickets for the bus, and compensation for each trip they have to take.

Do you get the idea that they are better off than many old people in the Netherlands? You are probably right, because the Chilean exiles do not have to live on welfare; they are being paid from the frozen funds which had been allocated for development aid to their fatherland, Chile. So you can see how well our tax money is being spent.

Considering that this small group of pampered exiles is preaching revolution even here and with a full stomach, it may be useful to point out a few facts. These are facts which are well known in the Ministry in The Hague but for some reason never made it to the Netherlands press.

Facts

The great majority of the refugees are not even Chilean nationals. They are natives of Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay. They came to Chile as a result of illegal and revolutionary activities in which they had been involved in these South and Middle American countries, the ultimate consequences of which they did not wish to suffer.

They felt at home in Allende's Chile because Allende showed sympathy for their situation. His first action as president, after his inauguration in November 1970, was to declare amnesty for all those who "were members of terrorist underground organizations," those who during the last months of his predecessor's regime had been charged with bank robbery, the armed robbery of self-service stores, the theft of weapons from military arsenals, kidnapping, and attempted murder.

The fact that some of those revolutionaries received Chilean diplomatic status was due to Allende's policy of granting residence permits to this type of revolutionaries. These refugees with a high school or higher level education seemed to have no adjustment problems in Chile. As a result they soon found their way to important key positions in the government.

The fugitives didn't suffer any sleepless nights in Chile either, because they felt protected by a militant Marxist army, armed to the teeth. Some 10,000 revolutionaries, from all points of the compass, were at their disposal.

Definition

In the Berner Tageblatt, a Swiss newspaper which is known for not exaggerating, Dr. Mario Puelma, from the University of Freiburg, wrote the following: "The concept of political refugee is only of limited value when applied to Chile. Whatever one's attitude toward the military junta may be, one thing is certain: the Chilean refugees were not pursued only because of their ideology, their status, or their origin. This is the traditional, humanitarian definition for a refugee. For the most part they are people who, in their own country, could be legally charged with crimes which are punishable under any judicial system.

These refugees carried out activities in Chile which were against the constitution. As a matter of fact, they are specialists in violence. This is why they sought asylum in the foreign embassies in Santiago and why there are so many foreigners among them."

8463
CSO: 8014/2087-W



Francisco heeft
aangekondigd tij-
'e negers zullen
, en gefouilleerd
het spoor te ko-
rden op voetgan-
) mijf maanden.
len zonder par-
het trottoir neer-
-montage is aa-
leiding van ver-
:klaringen.

! te zijn beland.
betere verhou-
gesprek tussen
scu bericht het
AP slechts dat
in partij-sfeer".
Brezjnjevs ont-
dere communis-
de kwalificaties
k en vriend-
Roemenië ver-
an mening over
militaire bond-
egermanoeuvres
n het Russische
isoleren.

Het Ameri-
n buitenlandse
lag exportver-
urd krachtens
dochteronder-
grote Ameri-
brieken auto's
Cuba. Deze
waarschijnlijk
eking van het
: de organisatie
en tegen Cuba
mbargo.

V.S.-economie loopt terug

WASHINGTON — De Amerikaanse regering heeft donderdag bekend gemaakt dat de nationale economie veel krachtiger is teruggelopen, in het eerste kwartaal van dit jaar, dan was verwacht. Prijzen stegen bovendien met meer dan tien procent.

Het bruto nationale produkt verminderde in het eerste kwartaal met een jaar-percentage van 5,8 Dit is de eerste keer sinds 1970 dat het bruto nationale produkt is verminderd en het is de scherpste daling in 16 jaar. De vermindering van het bruto nationale produkt met 5,8 procent moet vergeleken worden met een schatting van tussen de 3 en 4 procent, zoals die door de regering was gedaan. In het laatste kwartaal van het vorig jaar nam het bruto nationale produkt toe met 1,6 procent.

MINISTERS KRIJGEN HUISARREST

Ethiopische leger uit scherpe verwijten

ETHIOPISCH LEGER

ADDIS ABEBA — Premier Endalkachew Makonnen van Ethiopië heeft donderdag bekendgemaakt dat de leden van de regering die eind februari door de strijdkrachten gedwongen werd af te treden, huisarrest hebben egen;

Volgens de Ethiopische radio heeft Makkonen dit gezegd op een bijeenkomst in Addis Abeba van rond 2.000 officieren en manschappen. De premier zou naar de bijeenkomst ontboden zijn door de strijdkrachten die hem hadden laten weten dat het leger gedwongen zou zijn in te grijpen als er niet onmiddellijk tegen de ministers werd opgetreden.

Het leger verwijt de ministers dat zij het land in een economische chaos hebben gestort, zich op onwettige wijze verrijkt hebben en na hun aftreden hebben samengezworen om verdeeldheid te zaaien.

PLANNEN

Makonnen gaf op de bijeenkomst een uitvoerige uiteenzetting van de hervormingsplannen van zijn regering. Hij prees de strijdkrachten voor hun voorbeeldig gedrag en deed een beroep op hen een voorbeeld te geven van de tucht die nodig is voor het land in de moeilijke dagen die nog zullen komen. De premier zou het huisarrest van de voormalige ministers bekend hebben gemaakt toen hem de vraag werd gesteld waarom een arme Ethiopiër die een brood heeft gestolen, onmiddellijk de gevangenis ingaat, terwijl de ex-ministers die ernstige misdaden zouden hebben begaan, niet voor de rechtbank worden gedaagd en maar ongehinderd op straat rondlopen.

Makonnen zei dat er een commissie is benoemd die een onderzoek moet instellen naar het gedrag van de voormalige ministers.

POLITIE

In de stad Asmara heeft de politie bekendgemaakt dat zij geen routinewerk meer zal verrichten, omdat haar eis tot ontslag van het landelijke hoofd van de politie, luitenant-generaal Yilma Shibeshi, niet is ingewilligd. Voorts hebben de 1.200 spoorwegmannen die woensdag in staking zijn gegaan, de vrachtauto's tegengehouden die goederen van Asmara naar de haverstad Massawa zouden brengen.

Liberaal Kennedy aan het woord

Arbeidsonrust in Canada

OTTAWA — De posterijen, het commerciële luchtverkeer en het scheepvaartverkeer op de St.-Lawrence rivier in Canada zijn verlamd door een staking die het land dagelijks enkele miljoenen dollars kost. De arbeidsonrust duurt nu al meer dan een week en zal volgens de Canadese parlementaire oppositie de inflatie, die momenteel jaarlijks 10 procent bedraagt, bevorderen.

Door wilde stakingen is de helft van alle postkantoren in het land gesloten ten gevolge van solidariteitsstakingen. De moeilijkheden be-

Opgemerkt

Chili

De Chileense vluchtelingen in Nederland schijnen „aanpassingsproblemen" te hebben. Dit nogal langdurige verschijnsel blijkt ondermeer veroorzaakt te worden doordat zij het nog steeds niet kunnen verkroppen dat de socialistische droom van de Marxistische president definitief voorbij is en dat hun land nu beheerst wordt door een kleine groep reactionairen die met terreur, onderdrukking en folteringen probeert het volk onder de duim te houden. Met zo'n lange volzin kom je een heel eind in Nederland en dit hadden deze idealisten al gauw in de gaten.

VERZORGING

Want wat is het geval? Werken doen de meeste van de ongeveer 250 vluchtelingen van middelbaar en universitair niveau niet. Ongeveer de helft van hen is ondergebracht in het „Huis ter Schie" in Overschie, waar zij op het terras genieten van de zon of volleybal spelen in de tuin. Kost en inwoning zijn gratis en aan het einde van de week vangen zij ook nog eens vijfentwintig gulden zakgeld. Daarbij krijgen zij nog gratis taalcursussen, een rittenkaart voor de bus en een vergoeding voor elke reis die zij moeten maken.

Door

N. van Nieuwenhuysen

U vindt dat zij het beter hebben als menig Nederlands bejaarde? Waarschijnlijk hebt u gelijk, want de Chileense ballingen behoeven niet van de bijstand te leven; zij worden namelijk gefinancierd door de geblokkeerde gelden voor ontwikkelingshulp aan hun vaderland Chili. Zo ziet u maar hoe goed ons belastinggeld wordt besteed.

Daar dit in de watten gelegde groepje ballingen zelfs hier nog met volle maag de revolutie predikt is het misschien nuttig enige feiten te noemen. Feiten die op het ministerie in Den Haag welbekend zijn, maar om de een of andere reden nooit de pers in Nederland halen.

FEITEN

De vluchtelingen hebben voor het overgrote deel niet eens de Chileense nationaliteit. *Zij zijn* afkom-



BELGRADO — De Amerikaanse senator Edward Kennedy heeft donderdagavond op een persconferentie in de Zuidslavische hoofdstad Belgrado de vlootoefeningen van de NAVO veroordeeld die onlangs in het noorden van de Adriatische Zee zijn gehouden.

Deze oefeningen hebben het geschil tussen Italië en Zuidslavië over de zogenaamde „zone B" ten zuiden van Triëst verscherpt. Kennedy noemde het geen afdoende reden dat de oefening niet kon worden afgelast omdat ze al verscheidene maanden tevoren in voorbereiding waren genomen. De Amerikaanse senator is donderdag na een bezoek van drie dagen, tijdens hetwelk hij besprekingen voerde met onder meer president Tito, naar de Sovjet-Unie doorgereisd. Hij zei „zeer onder de indruk" te zijn van zijn gesprekken met het Zuidslavische staatshoofd.

20 werknemers schorste omdat zij T-shirts droegen, waarop het publiek werd verzocht de Canadese posterijen te boycotten. De werknemers willen looneisen stellen, maar de overheid weigert te onderhandelen totdat iedereen weer aan het werk is.

138 loodsen op de St.-Lawrence rivier, die voor alle scheepvaartverkeer zorgen tussen Montreal en Quebeck zijn al een week in staking omdat zij een onmiddellijke loonsverhoging eisen van 20.000 tot 38.000 dollar per jaar. De regering heeft hen 35.000 dollar geboden over een periode van drie jaar en zoekt momenteel naar mogelijkheden om de loodsen te dwingen het werk te hervatten.

Ook het luchthaven personeel eist loonsverhoging van rond de 3000 dollar. De acht grootste luchthavens van het land hebben de afgelopen week op halve kracht gewerkt. Verder dreigt een staking van de verkeersleiders.

---

lijk halfrond

ver Cuba

ington

oen donder-
an ministers
halfrond in
genodigd op
olgend jaar

en van het wes-
exico-stad twee
jaar had zich niet
uw in de prul-
. Minister Kis-
lijk zeker van
igde Staten in
te zijn in verle-
vragen omtrent
bijeenkomst te
enkomst wordt
n de organisatie
ën op vrijdag in

EMBARGO

ué waarmee de
omst hebben af-
over Cuba ge-
hts economische
eden. Niettemin
memers dat het
ultaat van de
ington is, dat de
eld lijken te zijn
rgobeleid tegen
matigen. Wat de
en de verschillen
erika en de La-
den gebleven te

van afschaffing
mmeringen maar

nalaten te voorkomen dat de invoer uit Latijns-Amerika nog meer aan beperkingen onderhevig wordt gemaakt.

Irak krijgt parlement

BAGDAD — Irak krijgt voor het eerst sedert de revolutie van 1958 een volksvertegenwoordiging. Het presidium van het „progressieve nationale front" heeft hiertoe besloten, zo is donderdag bekendgemaakt. Wanneer de volksvertegenwoordiging er komt en of die tot stand zal komen voor algemene verkiezingen, is nog niet besloten. In Bagdad staat een groot gebouw voor een nationale vergadering maar het is nog nooit gebruikt. De socialistische Baas-partij en de communisten werken samen in het progressieve nationale front.

GOUDPRODUKTIE ACHTERUIT

Grote onrust onder mijnwerkers in Z.-Afrika

JOHANNESBURG — In de afgelopen weken is moord en doodslag in de Zuidafrikaanse goudmijnen onder de zwarte mijnwerkers tot een zorgbarende omvang uitgegroeid. De jongste balans van bloedige stamtwisten tussen gastarbeiders uit Lesotho en de Xhosa's in de goudmijn Carletonville, bij Johannesburg, luidt: tien doden en drie en zestig gewonden.

De meeste slachtoffers waren gruwelijk verminkt. Slaapplaatsen werden vernield, met benzine overgoten en in brand gestoken. Vluchtende mijnwerkers zijn volgens ooggetuigen doodgeschoten.

Tienduizend Basotho's hebben sinds februari hun werkterrein in Zuid-Afrika in de steek gelaten en zijn naar hun veilige bergachtige vaderland Lesotho teruggekeerd. Vele andere zijn van plan ook naar Lesotho terug te gaan. Na de Basotho's vrezen thans de mijnwerkers uit Malawi aan de beurt te zijn.

INSPRAAK

Woordvoerders van de zwarte mijnwerkers verklaren, dat de mijnwerkers niets in te brengen hebben tegenover de blanke leiding van de mijnen en niets aan de arbeidsom-

zegt te weten waarom de mijnwerkers elkaar doodslaan. „Hun vertegenwoordigers weten het niet en ik betwijfel, of de arbeiders zelf het wel weten", aldus de bedrijfsleider.

Velen menen, dat ingewortelde stammen-vijandschap de oorzaak is van de onlusten. Daarbij komt dat bij de huidige woningnood een nietige aanleiding voldoende is om de haat tegen de gastarbeiders tot een explosie te brengen. De mijnmaatschappijen hebben zich tot dusver verzet tegen de eis, de zwarte mijnwerkers te groeperen naar de streken waar zij vandaan komen. Zij menen, dat dan nog grotere onlusten zouden ontstaan. Het zou zelfs tot „slachtpartijen" kunnen komen. Intussen gaat de goudproduktie achteruit. In Lesotho zit de regering met het probleem van de brodeloos geworden teruggekeer-

---

zich in deze Zuid- en Midden-Amerikaanse landen hadden bezig gehouden met onwettige en revolutionaire gedragingen waarvoor zij de uiteindelijke consequenties niet wensten te dragen.

In het Chili van Allende voelden zij zich thuis omdat Allende begrip toonde voor hun gedrag. Zijn eerste daad als president, toen hij in november 1970 geïnstalleerd was, bestond namelijk uit het afkondigen van amnestie voor al diegenen, die „lid waren van een terroristische ondergrondse organisatie", voor hen die in de laatste maanden onder zijn voorganger waren aangeklaagd voor het beroven van banken, gewelddadige overvallen op zelfbedieningswinkels, diefstal van wapens uit militaire depots, ontvoeringen en moordaanslagen.

Dat sommigen van deze revolutionairen Chileens diplomatieke status kregen is ook verklaarbaar als men weet dat de regering van Allende een beleid voerde dat er op gericht was om juist verblijfsvergunningen te geven aan dit type revolutionairen. Deze vluchtelingen van middelbaar en hoger niveau bleken namelijk in Chili geen „aanpassingsmoeilijkheden" te hebben. Zij vonden dan ook weldra hun weg naar belangrijke sleutelposities in de regering.

Slapeloze nachten hadden de "vervolgden" in Chili ook niet, omdat zij zich beschermd voelden door een tot de tanden gewapend militant-Marxistisch soldatenleger. Zo'n 10.000 revolutionairen uit alle windstreken stonden hen ter beschikking.

DEFINITIEF

In het „Berner Tageblatt" een Zwitserse krant die zich niet aan overdrijving schuldig maakt, schrijft dr. Mario Puelma van de Freiburgse Universiteit: „Het concept van de politieke vluchteling kan met betrekking tot Chili slechts in zeer beperkte mate gelden. Hoe men ook mag staan tegenover de militaire junta, een ding is zeker: de Chileense vluchtelingen werden niet alleen vervolgd voor hun ideologie, status of afkomst. Dit laatste is de traditionele humanitaire definitie van een vervolgde. Voor het grootste deel zijn het mensen die in hun eigen land wettelijk aangeklaagd kunnen worden voor misdaden die onder elk rechtsbestel strafbaar zijn.

Deze vluchtelingen voerden in Chili daden uit die in strijd waren met de grondwet. In feite zijn het specialisten in geweld. Om deze redenen zochten zij asiel op de buitenlandse ambassades in Santiago en daarom bevinden zich zoveel buitenlanders onder hen."

OUTGOING MESSAGE
35-3

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 302240Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 556999

CONF: EUR T INFO: FILE IP/AN, WH 7, SS 5, OS/INT, PS/EG 4, OSG/IC, OPS/ITG 5

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 46 kk

C/WH/6
DC/WH/6
WH/6/SA
WH/6/FI
WH/6/RR
WH/6/Secy T. d. Fuqua

TO: BONN BASE INFO BONN, SANTIAGO, HAMBURG.Y

FUONYX CASUARRY TOFOCUS Y

REFS: A. BONN BASE-31991 [IN 262014]

B. DIRECTOR 518657 Y

1. FOR REF A FEATURE, SUGGEST BASE PROVIDE CASUARRY WITH APPROPRIATE INFO ON REB8FUGEES AVAILABLE IN NUMEROUS HQS TRACE CABLES SENT BONN. WE ARE UNABLEB IDENTIFY ANY REFUGEES LIVING IN GERMANY UNDER FALSE IDENTITY.Y

2. AIRMAILING TO BBROUTSAS BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON LEFTIST BBBBB EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME, INCLUDING:Y

A. LCBEFORE PRESS SUMMARIES OF FRONT ACTIVITIES.Y

B. NEWS BULLETINB PUBLISHED BY BRITISH CHILE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE, WHICH CONTAINS "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION AND A SECTION GIVING CHILEAN REFUGEE QUOTAS BY COUNTRY.Y

C. ARTICLES RE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON CHILE, HELD ROME, APRIL 74.Y

D. MAY 1974 WIENER TAGEBUCH ARTICLE ON CHILE BLACK BOOK.Y

B EBB. APRIL 1974 FRANKFURT-STADT RUNDSCHAU ARTICLE RE CHILEAN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

556979

SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL.

3. WE ARE UNABLE SUGGEST KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSON OF STATURE FOR INTERVIEW ON LEFTIST EFFORT DISCREDBIT REGIME. AS ALTERNATIVE, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR NETWORK REPORTER MIGHT SEEK INTERVIEW OF DR. MARIO PUELMA, PROFESSOR OF CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY AT FREIBURG UNIVERSITY, WHO WROTE TWO-PART ARTICLE IN 15-16 JANUARY ISSUES OF BERN DAILY BERNER TAGBLATT ON SUBJECT CHILEAN REFUGEES. IN ARTICLES PUELMA GIVES BACKGROUND OF TERRORIST MOVEMENT IN CHILE AS IT DEVELOPED AS RESULT OF ALLENDE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CITES EXAMPLES OF "REFUGEES" AND THEIR ACTIVITIES TO SHOW THAT "TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF POLITICAL REFUGEE, WITH RESPECT TO CHILE, CAN BE APPLIED ONLY IN VERY LIMITED SENSE..." (SEE QRPEG 0026, REF B, FOR ~~SUMMARY OF~~ QUOTES FROM ARTICLES.)

4. SUGGEST FEATURE INCLUDE POINT THAT EFFORT TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME IS ENCOURAGED, IF NOT ORCHESTRATED, BY SOVIET FRONTS AND THAT PUBLICITY GENERATED BY "SOLIDARITY" CAMPAIGN (E.G., "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION OF BRITISH COMMITTEE BULLETIN) HAS INTIMIDATING EFFECT PRECLUDING OBJECTIVITY. BENEATH SUPERFICIAL SHOW OF "SOLIDARITY," EUROPEAN LEFTISTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING CRIMINAL/

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB. E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

556999

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

TERRORIST "REFUGEES" IN EUROPE, AND COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN CRITICALLY ANALYZING EVENTS LEADING TO CHILE COUP AND REASSESSING THEIR OWN PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY DEALING WITH NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES AND ASSUMING POWER BY NON-VIOLENT MEANS. MIGHT ALSO MAKE POINT THAT WITH VIETNAM NO LONGER AN ISSUE, CHILE REPRESENTS ONE FOCUS FOR ENGENDERING UNITY BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST LEFT IN WESTERN EUROPE.Y

5. FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON EXTREME LEFTIST VIEWS/ACTIVITY, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR ZDF REPORTER MIGHT CONTACT "SOCIALIST BUREAU," SPONSOR OF SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL. (SEE BONN 31174 AND BONN 31869). (227179) (257016) FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON JUNTA VIEWS, SUGGEST CONTACT DEUTSCH-CHILENISCHER BUND [redacted] (SEE BERLIN 21306, OCT 73). (676994)

6. FILE: 200-126-107/11. E2 IMPDET.

for AC/SS/CAG/PSB Barbara Baldwin
E/ROG
E/G
WH/6
WH/CA

DATE: 30 MAY 1974
ORIG: CONNIE MOORE:SRM
UNIT: E/CAG
EXT: 66408/1389

E/EUR

C/E/CAG

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 004244

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY: 9 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 28 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT EA4

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR SB8, OSG/OC, C/OPS OSG/IC C/S1 WH/8 P/AN

T 149793 E1A650 PAGE 01 IN 265992

TOR:301144Z MAY 74 BANG 59314

S E C R E T 301122Z MAY 74 STAFF

C/WH/6 ____

DC/WH/6 ✓

WH/6/SA ____

WH/6/FI ____

WH/6/RR ____

WH/6/Sec'y Fd FUSMAN

CITE BANGKOK 59314

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO.

REDLEG AEFISH

REFS: A. BANGKOK 59065 (in 260348)

B. DIRECTOR 554557

1. MILTON C. REPOUSH AND RALPH K. TOLGIEN MET WITH EMILIO GALETZKI ON 25 MAY AND PASSED REF B INFO. TOLGIEN HAD FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH GALETZKI ON 29 MAY TO DISCUSS HIS ENCOUNTER WITH ARTHUR CUNNING.

2. GALETZKI MET CUNNING AT HOME OF ROBERT B. HARTFORD, U.S. CITIZEN EMPLOYED IN POPULATION DIVISION OF ECAFE. HARTFORD IS PRO-ALLENDE AND ORGANIZED SMALL SOCIAL GATHERING OF INTERESTED PERSONS TO MEET CUNNING AND DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE. CUNNING IS DESCRIBED AS ABOUT FORTY YEARS OLD, BLACK HAIR, FULL BEARD AND AVERAGE BUILD. HE IS A DEMOGRAPHER EMPLOYED BY UNITED NATIONS AT CENTRO LATINO AMERICANO DE DESARROLLO (CELADE) IN SANTIAGO. HE ARRIVED CHILE IN OCTOBER 1970 WITH HIS WIFE. CUNNING DEPARTED BANGKOK 27 MAY FOR DELHI, KATHMANDU AND NEW YORK AND PLANNED RETURN SANTIAGO APPROX 22 JUNE.

3. CUNNING TALKED VERY LITTLE ABOUT ALLENDE REGIME AND

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 149795 EIA650 PAGE 02 IN 265992

TOR:301144Z MAY 74 BANG 59314

CONCENTRATED ON DISPARAGING PRESENT REGIME. CLAIMED THERE THOUSANDS OF REPRISAL KILLINGS BY ARMY, RUN AWAY INFLATION, SHORTAGE OF GOODS AND GENERAL REPRESSION BY REGIME. CUNNING VERY SUBJECTIVE IN STATEMENTS AND HAD FEW FACTS TO BACK UP STATEMENTS. WHEN GALETZKI ASKED CUNNING HOW HE KNEW THERE "THOUSANDS OF KILLINGS", CUNNING CLAIMED "THERE IS CIA REPORT WHICH STATES OVER TWENTY THOUSAND HAD BEEN KILLED." GALETZKI FOUND PORTIONS OF REF B INFO USEFUL IN REFUTING CUNNING STATEMENTS. HOWEVER GALETZKI'S TEMPER GOT THE BEST OF HIM HALF WAS THROUGH MEETING AND FRIEND SUGGESTED THAT HE REFRAIN FROM ARGUING WITH CUNNING LEST THE SITUATION BECOME VIOLENT.

4. GALETZKI TELEXED REPORT ON CUNNING TO HIS EMBASSY IN TOKYO. HE TOLD TOLGIEN WOULD PASS HIM ANY FEED BACK INFO ON CUNNING HE MIGHT RECEIVE.

5. REQUEST POA AND 201 ON GALETZKI TO DEVELOP AND RECRUIT AS MOLIMBER ASSET TARGETTED PRIMARILY ON AEFISH. TOLGIEN WILL UTILIZE COVER AS AIR FORCE CIVILIAN ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY AS ANALYST DURING DEVELOPMENT.

6. FILE: 201-795277, 201-GALETZKI. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 38 PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 20 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ___ BY ___ AT ___

ACTION UNIT C/WH8 | RF, FILE VR c/fi/int, c/ss3, c/cs/sg3.

INFO DDO.

ACTION #

STAFF 1 2 3

T 148171 EIA272 PAGE 01-01 IN 26591

TOR:292150Z MAY 74

C/WH/6 ___

DC/WH/6 ___

WH/6/SA ___

WH/6/FI ___

WH/6/RR ___

WH/6/Sec'y ___

S E C R E T 292140Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29514

Return to K.

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PSYCH

Fil. FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 553537

1. FUERMINE-3 HAS CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONTACT WITH LOCAL OFFICES OF MAJOR WIRE SERVICES. WE TASKING HIM WITH COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF REPS HERE AS WELL AS SPOTTING AND ASSESSMENT INFO ON WHO MIGHT BE DISPOSED TO COLLABORATE WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT.

2. STATION ALSO EXPLORING REF WITH FUTRUNK-1 AND FUACME-16.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

MFG. 11-73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 22 PER

TOTAL COPIES 5 - 1

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT EUR8	INFO	RF. FILE VR PLAN, WH8, SS5,	1 2 3		4 5 6
ACTION #					

T 142756 EIA997 PAGE 01-01 IN 263354

TOR12809552 MAY 74 HELS 22538

CONFIDENTIAL 282851Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE HELSINKI 22538

TO: SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

FUOMEN PSYCH

REF: HCSA 18904

1. LARGEST LOCAL BOOK STORE HAS BOOK ON ORDER. WHEN RECEIVED, STATION CAN BUY AND POUCH COPIES PER REF. HOWEVER, WISH POINT OUT, IF SANTIAGO NOT ALREADY AWARE, THAT BOOK IN SWEDISH. IF COPIES STILL DESIRED AND SANTIAGO WISHES OBTAIN EARLIER, SUGGEST STOCKHOLM STATION BE ASKED BUY SINCE BOOK SHOULD BE READILY AVAILABLE IN SWEDEN.

2. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

RPK

X

WH/C

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
28 May 74

CONFIDENTIAL

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY Fy PER TOTAL COPIES 30-2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT EURB

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IDTAN WH8 SS6 PSIEG4 OPSINT

T 137606 EIA065 PAGE 01 IN 262014

TOR:241716Z MAY 74 BNNB 31991

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6 Lu

WH/6/CA

WH/6/FI

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

S E C R E T 241627Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE BONN BASE 31991

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN, HAMBURG.

FUONYX CAQUARRY TOFOCUS

REF BONN BASE 31516 (IN 241838)

FI. FUOMCIV

1. CAQUARRY ADVISED ZDF MAGAZIN PLANNING ANOTHER FEATURE ON CHILE FOCUSING ON CHILEAN POLITICAL REFUGEES IN WEST GERMANY. CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE EXPOSE REVOLUTIONARY/CRIMINAL BACKGROUND OF SOME OF REFUGEES AND IDENTIFY ANY LIVING IN GERMANY UNDER FALSE IDENTITY. ALSO INTERESTED FOCUSING ON WORLD-WIDE LEFTIST EFFORT DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME. AS PART FEATURE CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ZDF INTERVIEW A PERSON KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOVE. IDEALLY SUBJECT SHOULD BE PERSON OF SOME STATURE. INTERVIEW CAN BE MADE LATIN AMERICA, NORTH AMERICA, OR IN EUROPE. SECURITY NOT A PROBLEM AS CAQUARRY WILL SIMPLY ASSIGN NETWORK REPORTER TO MAKE INTERVIEW ON NONWITTING BASIS USING QUESTIONS CAQUARRY WILL PROVIDE.

2. ALSO APPRECIATE ANY BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO CAQUARRY. GERMAN LANGUAGE MATERIAL MOST USEFUL SINCE CAQUARRY HAS NO ENGLISH OR SPANISH CAPABILITY.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES ____ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____

ACTION UNIT

I N F O RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 137606 EIA065 PAGE 02-02 IN 262014

TOR:241716Z MAY 74 BNNB 31991

3. RE PARA 2 REF, STILL ON "PER DU" BASIS MATTHOEFER RECENTLY CONTACTED CAQUARRY TO ASK HIM MAKE PUBLIC RETRACTION OF PARA 2 STATEMENT. CAQUARRY REFUSED AND SUGGESTED MATTHOEFER INSTITUTE LIBEL SUIT. MATTHOEFER QUICKLY BACKED DOWN. INCIDENTALLY, IN APPARENT BONE TO LEFT-WING SPD, HQS WILL NOTE THAT MATTHOEFER HAS BEEN APPOINTED MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER NEW GOVERNMENT.

4. FILE: 201-0230705; X-REF 201-0903816. E2-IMPDET.

SECRET

FORM [illegible]
[illegible] 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER TOTAL COPIES 33-1 RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT
EUR 8

INFO RF FILE VR IAN, SSS, SB8, WH6

ACTION #

T 125861 EIA160 PAGE 01-01 IN 251122

TOR:141020Z MAY 74 STOC 15691

S E C R E T 142938Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE STOCKHOLM 15691

TO: DIRECTOR INFO HELSINKI.

FUOMEN PSYCH

REF: A. DIRECTOR 549305
B. HELSINKI 22455 (IN 239973)

1. NO STATION TRACES KYUNG.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

Fil FUOMEN

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6

WH/6/SA

WH/6/FI

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 38 PER

TOTAL COPIES 33-2 RUN BY Z

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1	6	4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT WR8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR iplan, WH8, SSS, C/OPS2, PS/EG4, OSG/OC, C/OPS.

T 103782 EIA146 PAGE 01 IN 250476

TOR:131851Z MAY 74 SAGO 29117

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6

WH/6/SA

WH/6/FI

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Secy

S E C R E T 131621Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29117 (JABAUT ACTING)

TO: PARIS INFO DIRECTOR,

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: A. DIRECTOR 549348

B. PARIS 48390 (IN 250170)

Fl. FUOMEN

1. AGREE WITH REF B RECOMMENDATION TO AWAIT OUTCOME OF FRENCH ELECTION BEFORE DECIDING IF AND HOW TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1. IN MAKING THAT DECISION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED:

A. WHILE STATION HAS CAPABILITY VIA FUTRUNK-1 (IDEN FOR PARIS), RECENTLY RECRUITED SALARIED AGENT, TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1 IN OBTAINING INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT OUR INTERVENTION, NO MATTER HOW SUBTLE, WOULD VERY PROBABLY IDENTIFY UNSOBER-1 TO FUTRUNK-1 AS AGENCY COLLABORATOR.

B. THE CHILEAN GOVT IS VERY SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN PRESS CRITICISM AND WOULD LOOK UNHAPPILY ON ANY T.V. PROGRAM WHICH REFLECTS BADLY ON GOVT, REGARDLESS OF HOW SLIGHT THE CRITICISM MIGHT BE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO OBTAIN

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 103782 EIA146 PAGE 02-02 IN 250476

TOR:131851Z MAY 74 SAGJ 29117

FUTRUNK-1'S ASSISTANCE FOR ANY PROGRAM WHICH COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING TO HIM.

2. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

30-2

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 102248Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 549348

CONF: EUR8 INFO: FILE 1PAN, WH8, SS-5, PS/EG4, C/R-2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 49
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: SANTIAGO INFO PARIS.Y

TOFOCUS UNSOBER Y

REF: OFAA-2356, 9 APRIL 74 (NOT NEEDED SANTIAGO)Y

1. TOFOCUS ACTIVITY SEEKS TO DEVELOP ASSETS TO INFLUENCE NEWS AND OTHER PROGRAMMING WITH POLITICAL CONTENT IN EUROPEAN TV SERVICES. IN FRANCE THIS HAS BEEN PARTICULARBLY TOUGH NUT TO CRACK, BUT PARIS STATION HAS MADE RECENT PROGRESS WITH UNSOBER/1. THIS FORMER STAFF JOURNALIST FOR PRESTIGIOUS FRENCH NEWS WEEKLY L'EXPRESS RECENTLY COMPLETED A 30-MINUTE REPORTAGE ON CURRENT EVENTS IN WEST GERMANY. IT WAS WELL RECEIVED AND RESULTED IN HIS BEING TAPPED TO DO SECOND 30-MINUTE PROGRAM. AS UNSOBER/1 APPEARS TO BE ON WAY TO POSITION OF SUBSTANCE WITHIN FRENCH TELEVISION, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST HIS RISE AND INSURE THAT PARIS STATION'S MOST PROMISING TOFOCUS ASSET ACHIEVES MOST INFLUENTIAL STATUS POSSIBLE. TO THIS END IT WOULD BE OF VALUE IF UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE.Y

WH/6/CA ______
WH/6/FI ______
WH/6/RR ______
WH/6/Copy ______

Fil.
FUCHEN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	ROG	COL	ACP	TOG	TPE	SRO
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
549348

CONF:

INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: #

2. THE REPORTAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE DESIGNED FOR 30-MINUTE AIRING, AND WOULD HOPEFULLY CONTAIN FILMED INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND VISIT TO DAWSON ISLAND. WHILE WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE FIRST INTERVIEW GRANTED TO FRENCH JOURNALIST BY THE HEAD OF RULING JUNTA (THUS BIG BOOST FOR UNSOBER/1), WE UNDERSTAND PINOCHET HAS GRANTED OTHER INTERVIEWS AND ALLOWED FILMING ON DAWSON ISLAND. PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CAREFULLY DISCUSSED WITH UNSOBER/1, AND HE HAS SAID REPORTAGE WOULD BE FAVORABLE BUT NOT TOTALLY UNCRITICAL--BEST TREATMENT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT COULD HOPE FOR IN FRANCE.Y

3. TO OBTAIN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND OTHER JUNTA LEADERS AND/OR PERMISSION ~~BBBB~~FILM CONDITIONS ON DAWSON ISLAND AND ELSEWHERE IN CHILE, UNSOBER/1 HAS ASKED FOR BKHERALD ASSISTANCE. UNSOBER/1 IS CONFIDENT THAT SUPERIORS WOULD APPROVE PROGRAM IF UNSOBER/1 COULD ASSURE THEM THAT HE WOULD BE GRANTED INTERVIEWS, ETC.Y

4. PLEASE ADVISE WHAT ASSISTANCE SANTIAGO STATION CAN PROVIDE TO UNSOBER/1.Y

5. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET.d

DATE: 8 MAY 1974
ORIG: DAN WAGNER:LD
UNIT: E/F/INT
EXT: 9111

C/E/CA

C/WH Herbert W. Natzke
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/6
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/E/F
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 055747

OUTGOING MESSAGE 321

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES 1 1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP
102239Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
547305

6

CONF: EUR8 INFO: FILE 11/AN. SB8. WH5. 555

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: STOCKHOLM INFO HELSINKI, SANTIAGO. Y

FUOMEN PSYCH Y

REF: HELSINKI 22455 |IN 239973| Y

1. A FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICER {AECLUSTER} REPORTED THAT THE NAME OF ONE ANDRES ALEKSANDROVICH KYUNG, BORN 1945, NATURALIZED SWEDISH CITIZEN, APPEARED ON SOVIET VISA BLACKLIST AND HE TO BE DENIED VISA TO USSR. NO REASON GIVEN FOR THIS DENIAL BY MFA. {DOI: MID-1971}. NO OTHER TRACE HQS FILES. Y

2. STOCKHOLM: PLS FURNISH TRACES SUBJECT REF. Y

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.H

DC/W
WH/
W
WH/
WH

WH/6 {CHILE}- J. K.
SB/X/EU-

File FUOMEN

DATE: 10 MAY 74
ORIG: MARIA C. WALSH/JD
UNIT: E/SC/S
EXT: 1588

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/E/SC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 008234

14-00000

FORM 3020
7-71 MFG 11-73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

ACTION UNIT EUR8

INFO RF, FILE, VR, IP/AN, WH8, OSG/OC, C/OPS, SSS/

ACTION #

STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

T 123294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

C/WH/6 ______
DC/WH/6 ______
WH/6/C ______
WH/6/FI ______
WH/6/RR ______
WH/6/Sec'y ______

S E C R E T 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

F.b. FUOHEN

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HQS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

FORM 3020b
AUG. 11 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER TOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT
LUR8

ACTION #

INFO
RF. FILE. VR. IP/AN, WH8, OSG/OC
C/OPS SSS

T 133294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 253170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

S E C R E T 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HQS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

FORM 3020b
(7-71) MFG. 11-73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

			STAFF		
ACTION UNIT EUR8	I N F O	RF, FILE VR, IP/AN, WH8, OS6/OC	1		4
		C/OPS SSS	2		5
ACTION #			3		6

T 133294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

S E C R E T 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HOS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

14-00000

FORM 3070b
7/1 MIG 11 73

24838

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 35 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 30·2 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT EUR 8	INFO	RID. FILE VR IP/AN, SSS, PS/EG-4 OPS/INT, WH8	STAFF 1 2 3		4 5 6
ACTION #					

24838-A

T 100017 EIA020 PAGE 01 IN ~~240240~~

TOR:110024Z MAY 74 BNNB 31516

S E C R E T 031429Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE BONN BASE 31516

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, PARIS.

CATHATCH CAQUARRY TOFOCUS FUOYNX

REF: BONN BASE 31234 (IN 230053)

C/WH/6 ______

DC/WH/6 ______

WH/6/3 ______

WH/6/SI ______

WH/6/RR ______

WH/6/Soc'y ______

#132 DUPE & CORRECTED FOR WASH S/C NOTE.

To OMEN

FU~~[illegible]~~

1. 1 MAY ZDF MAGAZIN WITH CAQUARRY AS MODERATOR CARRIED 15 MINUTE FEATURE ON CHILE, A THEME LONG DISCUSSED WITH CAQUARRY. MAIN PART FEATURE WAS INTERVIEW WITH SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN, FRIEDRICH BEERMANN (SUBJECT REF) WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM VISIT CHILE AND SPOKE WITH GENERAL PINOCHET. BEERMANN STRESSED THAT ALLENDE GOVERNMENT HAD RULED ILLEGALLY, CONDITIONS NOT AS BAD AS THEY SEEM AND THAT OVERALL CHILEAN POPULATION FAVORED ALLENDE'S OVERTHROW. SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT INTERVIEW WITH SPD POLITICIAN AND SPD, AS INFLUENCED BY ITS LEFT WING, HAS BEEN STRONGLY ANTI-JUNTA.

2. HANS MATTHOEFER, LEFT WING SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN AND STATE SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION, HAS BEEN LEADING GERMAN OPPOSITION TO JUNTA AND ALSO TRYING BLOCK ECONOMIC AID. DRAWING ON FUAWL/5 BACKGROUND INFO (SEE EGN-5363, NOV 73) WE HAVE DISCUSSED MATTHOEFER IN DETAIL WITH CAQUARRY

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 3070
1 71 MIG. 11 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 122217 EIA020 PAGE 02-02

IN 241838

~~IN 24[illegible]48~~

TOR:111024Z MAY 74 BNNB 31516

QUESTIONING HIS MOTIVATION IN STRONG SUPPORT ALLENDE AND EVEN STRONGER CONDEMNATION OF JUNTA. BY COINCIDENCE CAQUARRY ON PER "DU" BASIS WITH MATTHOEFER (NOT FOR SAME POLITICAL IDEALS) AND WELL AWARE MATTHOEFER BACKGROUND INVOLVMENT LEFT WING ACTIVITIES. END OF CHILE FEATURE CARRIED STATEMENT BY CAQUARRY THAT IT STRANGE MATTHOEFER CONDONED ALLENDE GOVT USE OF FORCE AS NECESSARY WHILE HE IS PRESENTLY VOCIFEROUS IN CONDEMNING JUNTA ACTIVITIES. STATEMENT SERVED EMPHASIZE SPD NON-OBJECTIVITY IN DEALING WITH CHILE.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON MATTHOEFER. SUGGEST OPEN 201 SINCE HE ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL LEFT WING SPDERS AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE INVOLVED IN ANY FUTURE POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN RIGHT AND LEFT WINGS OF SPD.

4. FILE: 201-0230705 X-REF 201- , E2 IMPDET

WASH S/C NOTE: PARIS ADDED INFO ADDEE PER HQS REQUEST.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 25-1 RUN BY ______ Chile

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

C O N F I D E N T I A L

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

EUR8

ACTION #

INFO RF, FILE VR, PLANS, WH8, SSS,

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 077141 EIA232 PAGE 01 IN 239973

TOR:021103Z MAY 74 HELS 22455

C O N F I D E N T I A L 020949Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE HELSINKI 22455

TO: DIRECTOR INFO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH

1. IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES, CALL ATTENTION TO NEWLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/AUTHOR ANDRES K U N G (UHLAUT "U") ENTITLED "TO SOW SOCIALISM AND REAP FASCISM", WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING FROM YOUNG SWEDE. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS". KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP

SDR

[illegible]		[illegible]
	X	[illegible]
		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
WH/16		

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
2 May 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 077141 EIA230 PAGE 02-02 IN 239973

TOR:021103Z MAY 74 HELS 22455

AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".

2. KUNG (DPOB: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72) EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO. HAS PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC STATES.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3020b
(7) MIG. 11-73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 16 PER

TOTAL COPIES 25-1

RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT WH 7

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR WH/CA, EUR 8, SSS,

T 352272 EIA036 PAGE 01 IN 231132

TOR:231149Z APR 74 HAMB 24795

S E C R E T 230953Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 24795 (SWARZCHILD ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

REF: DIRECTOR 540262

1. WELCOME RECEIVING SPECIAL BRIEF FOR PURPOSES INDICATED IN REF.

2. RELUCTANT TO LEAVE MEDIA FIELD ON CHILE TO SOVIETS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. SUGGEST THEREFORE HQS KEEP OPEN MIND ON SELECTIVE PLACEMENTS SHORT OF GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME.

3. SINCE WOMEN LIKELY TO CONTINUE PLAYING PIVOTAL ROLE IN FURTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, BELIEVE THEIR VIEWS AND REACTIONS OUGHT BE GIVEN MORE PLAY. AS AN EXAMPLE, COULD POSSIBLY ENGINEER ARTICLE IN GERMAN MAGAZINE "DER STERN" (CIRCULATION 1,500,000), WHICH THUS FAR IN VANGUARD OF ANTI-JUNTA PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, THROUGH MRS. VERA VACEK.

4. FILE: 15-124-46/3. E2 IMPDET.

[illegible]
H/6

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
23 Apr 74

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

ACTION UNIT SS6

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. IPAN, EUR8, WH8, OSG/IC, S38, PS/EG4, C/OPS

T 724892 PAGE 01 IN 104043

TOR 041011Z DEC 73 HAMB 23918

WH/6

S E C R E T 040921Z DEC 73 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 23918

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.

MHCRUNCH CASPECIAL FUOMEN TOWITTY

1. BASE INTERESTED IN "DOS ANOS DE PENETRACION SOVIETICA EN CHILE" (PORTADA 39) AS VEHICLE TO ENLIGHTEN GERMAN AUDIENCE RE EXTENT OF SOVIET/CUBAN INFILTRATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FABRIC OF CHILE.

2. STUDY COULD BE FLESHED OUT TO ENCOMPASS POLITICO/MILITARY ASPECTS THIS PENETRATION, ESPECIALLY PERCEPTIONS GAINED BY TWO NAVAL PURCHASING MISSIONS, THE LAST VISITING USSR JUST PRIOR TO ALLENDE'S DOWNFALL WHEN CHILEAN NAVY REPS GIVEN RUNAROUND AND TREATED WITH BARE CIVILITY. IT MAY ALSO BE USEFUL TO MENTION THAT SOVIETS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE OFFERED TO SUPPLY ALLENDE (NOT CHILEAN ARMED FORCES) WITH ARMAMENTS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF DEFENDING HIS REGIME. ALLENDE'S MOSCOW VISIT AND UNAVAILING PLEA FOR SOVIET SALVAGING OPERATION IS CRUCIAL ASPECT OF AMBIGUOUS SOVIET ROLE WHICH EUROPEAN LEFT HAS CONVENIENTLY SWEPT UNDER THE RUG.

3. REQUEST HQS COMMENTS RE FEASIBILITY OF TURNING OUT FINISHED PRODUCT TO MEET EUROPEAN REQUIREMENTS WHICH AT PRESENT PREEMPTED

04 DEC 73

SECRET

RECORD COPY

15-12-52

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

T 724892

PAGE 02-02

IN 104043

TOR 041011Z DEC 73

HAMB 23918

BY LEFTIST-GENERATED COPY ON CHILEAN DEVELOPMENTS. IF AFFIRMATIVE, SHALL TAKE SOUNDINGS ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE DISTRIBUTION VEHICLE.

4. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF · 0 0 0 0 0 0

51

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 121734Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 466010

CONF: WH/8

INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY: 07

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, LCPIPIT, LONDON, BERN INFO SANTIAGO.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 1 1973
MICROFILMED

3P

RYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE

REF: DIRECTOR 465768

1. FOLLOWING OF INTEREST AS FOLLOW-UP TO REF.

2. ACCORDING WASHINGTON POST 12 OCTOBER, "THE BITTERNESS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND CHILE ERUPTED INTO A BATTLE OF OBSCENITIES AND THREATS LAST NIGHT, DISRUPTING A LATE SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AT HEIGHT OF THE DISTURBANCE, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA CALLED THE CHILEAN REPRESENTATIVE A 'SON OF A WHORE,' AND ANOTHER CUBAN DIPLOMAT REPORTEDLY DISPLAYED A PISTOL.

3. "DISPUTE BEGAN WHEN ROA DEVOTED MORE THAN HALF OF HIS SPEECH IN GENERAL DEBATE EARLIER IN THE DAY TO AN ATTACK ON THE NEW CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA. CHILEAN AMBASSADOR RAUL BAZAN DAVILA TOOK PODIUM DURING THE NIGHT-TIME SESSION TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT OF REPLY. BAZAN INSISTED THAT LATE PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE HAD COMMITTEED SUICIDE AND SAID 'CASTROISM' MUST TAKE A LARGE PART OF THE BLAME. HE AD-

4
C/S
3
WH/6 C/ 4

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

D-15-124-53

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
12 OCT 73

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES 2

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

DATE TIME GROUP 121736Z

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 466010

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

MITTED AND REGRETTED AN OFFICIAL FIGURE OF 551 DEATHS IN CONNECTION WITH CHILEAN COUP, BUT ADDED THAT CHILEANS RESPECTED HUMAN LIFE, WHILE 'IN CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF HAD, AS HIS DAILY PASTIME, THE WATCHING OF EXECUTIONS BEFORE THE FIRING SQUAD WALL, TO WHICH HE EVEN INVITED SOME OF THE DIPLOMATS...'

4. "AT THAT POINT ROA ROSE FROM HIS SEAT AND DASHED DOWN THE AISLE TOWARD THE ROSTRUM, SHOUTING 'FAG', 'SONS OF A WHORE' AND OTHER INSULTS AT BAZAN, IN SPANISH. OTHER CUBANS FOLLOWED HIM. NICARAGUAN DELEGATION, SEATED IN FRONT NEAR ROSTRUM, ROSE TO BLOCK THE CUBANS. OTHER LATINS FLOCKED TO FRONT OF THE HALL. A DIPLOMAT WHO WAS THERE SAID A CUBAN SHOWED HE WAS CARRYING A PISTOL IN A CONFRONTATION WITH PARAGUAYAN AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO BARREIRO....

5. " U.N. GUARDS SWARMED TO THE ROSTRUM AND THE CUBANS DISPERSED. ROA RESUMED HIS SEAT LATER. FIVE LATIN AMERICANS CAME TO THE ROSTRUM LATER TO CALL THE CUBANS 'GANGSTERS' AND CHALLENGED THE RIGHT OF A DICTATORSHIP TO CRITICIZE THEIR GOVERNMENTS. U.S. AMBASSADOR JOHN A. SCALI SAID ROA 'HAS ONCE AGAIN SUNK TO HIS USUAL LEVEL OF GUTTER VULGARITY...THE OUTMODED VITUPERATION OF AN EARLIER ERA.'"

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
AUT CSI ACP TOG IPE MRO
OMF 0 0 0 0 0 -0

PAGE OF PAGES
3 3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE TIME GROUP
121737Z

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
466010

DISSEM BY:
0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

6. FILE: 15-124-52; 15-124-53. E2, IMPDET.

*REF ATTACHED.

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1973 W. Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/7155

15-124-52

C/WH/SA

James E. Flannery
C/EUR
C/WHD/for

EA/JK/J
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
C/WH/6

RELEASING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 1 1973
MICROFILMED

50

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 112254Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 455768

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 32
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, LCPIPIT, LONDON, BERN INFO SANTIAGO.

HP

RYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE

1. SINCE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S APPEARANCE BEFORE UNGA HAS RECEIVED LIMITED PRESS PLAY, BELIEVE FOLLOWING MAY BE USEFUL TO ADDRESSEES FOR BRIEFING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MEDIA AND OTHER CONTACTS WHO MAY BE INTERESTED IN CHILEAN SITUATION. MATERIAL IS LARGELY OVERT, THEREFORE NO OBJECTION TO ITS USE BY PRESS ASSETS SO LONG AS STORY NOT PASSED OR USED VERBATIM.

2. ON 9 OCTOBER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER VICE-ADMIRAL ISMAEL HUERTA APPEARED FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR PRESENTATION BEFORE UNGA TO EXPLAIN "FACTS WHICH OBLIGED ARMED FORCES AND POLICE TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND TO ESTABLISH A REGIME OF NATIONAL RESTORATION," AND TO CHARGE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME VICTIM OF A "MOST FALSE, MOST MALEVOLENT, MOST VICIOUS AND VERY WELL-ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN."

3. HUERTA'S SPEECH STRESSED THAT ALLENDE'S MINORITY REGIME HAD

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

4
015
3
WH/6 CT4
11 Oct 73

D-15-124-53
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

15-124-52
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

445748

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

BEEN STEERING COUNTRY IN DIRECTION OF A TOTALITARIAN TAKEOVER INSTIGATED AND SUPPORTED LARGELY BY CUBA; THAT CUBA INTERVENED IN CHILEAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS WHILE SECRETLY INFILTRATING ARMS, INSTRUCTORS AND PERSONNEL FOR PARAMILITARY GROUPS, INTENDED TO BECOME A "PARALLEL"ARMY TO OPPOSE ARMED FORCES; THAT CHILEAN MILITARY ACTED✓ ONLY AFTER FAILURE OF ALL OTHER EFFORTS BY PARLIAMENT, JUDICIARY, PROFESSIONALS AND WORKERS TO BLOCK DRIFT TOWARD CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS. HE STRESSED THAT HIS GOVT IS NOT POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS AND ITS GOAL IS TO SET CHILE BACK ON ITS HISTORIC PATH; AFTER GOAL ACHIEVED, "WE WILL NOT HESITATE TO RETURN TO OUR BARRACKS AND TO OUR SHIPS."

4. HUERTA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALLENDE REGIME, THE FIRST ELECTED MARXIST GOVT IN WESTERN HEMISPEHERE, HAD AROUSED ENTHUSIASM IN MANY, BUT "IT IS ONE THING, GENTLEMEN, TO EVALUATE A FOREIGN EXPERIENCE FROM AFAR, SEATED IN COMFORTABLE ARMCHAIRS OR IN DISCUSSION AROUND A WELL-SERVED TABLE. IT IS QUITE ANOTHER TO LIVE IT." HE DETAILED A HISTORY OF EVENTS OF LAST THREE YEARS, POINTING OUT THAT DESPITE AGREEMENTS BY ALLENDE REGIME, LATTER MOVED TO UNDERMINE EXISTING JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL MACHINERY OF COUNTRY, ATTEMPTING DO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

465748

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

AWAY WITH DEMOCRATIC IDEALS FOR WHICH COUNTRY STOOD. HE SAID MEDIA WAS HARASSED, THERE WERE ILLEGAL INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN TAKEOVERS, POLITICIANS AND VILLAGERS WERE ASSASSINATED. HE CHARGED THAT FOREIGN AGENTS, SENT PRINCIPALLY BY CUBA, HAD SECRETLY BROUGHT ENOUGH WEAPONS TO CHILE TO EQUIP 20,000 MEN. HE DECLARED THAT SOVIET-MADE SIDEARMS, MACHINE GUNS, ANTITANK GUNS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, CANNONS AND EXPLOSIVES HAD BEEN SHIPPED IN -- SOME PACKED AS WORKS OF ART AND SOME DISGUISED AS GIFTS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

5. AT ONE POINT, TO SUPPORT CLAIM OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, HUERTA READ TEXT OF 29 JULY 1973 HAND-WRITTEN LETTER FROM CASTRO ADDRESSED TO "DEAR SALVADOR." LETTER ASSURED ALLENDE THAT CHILEAN WORKING CLASS HAD BEEN FOREWARNED AND WAS "READY FOR ACTION" IF HIS REGIME WERE THREATENED. HUERTA SAID THAT LETTER CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS AND HER SUPPORT OF THE "ILLEGAL METHODS" OF THE ALLENDE REGIME.

6. IN VITRIOLIC REPLY TO HUERTA, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA CALLED HUERTA "TRAITOROUS EX-MINISTER OF ALLENDE AND SERGEANT OF GOEBBLES." SIMILAR LIES AND DISTORTIONS OF FACT CAN BE FOUND IN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: ------

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO	PAGE	OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

465768

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

CONF: INFO: FILE

HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY, HE DECLARED. THEN, SURPRISINGLY, HE WENT ON TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO HUERTA'S CHARGES BY ADMITTING THAT CUBAN GUNS HAD IN FACT BEEN SENT INTO CHILE BUT THAT THEY HAD BEEN SENT AT ALLENDE'S REQUEST. NOR DID ROA DENY THE AUTHENTICITY OF CASTRO'S LETTER TO ALLENDE WHICH HUERTA HAD PRODUCED; ROA SAID THAT THE LETTER WAS NO SECRET.

7. FILE: 15-124-52; 15-124-53. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 11 OCTOBER 1973 W Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

C/EUR
C/WHD EA/JK/J C/WHD/6

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

CUTGOING MESSAGE

15-1

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

S E C R E T

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 181508Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 456203

CONF: C/WH8

INFO: FILE EI/PLAN, DDC/DO, C/SS3, C/PS/EG3

DISSEM BY: 29

PER: #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO

0 IP FILES

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 26489 [IN 031350]

B. SANTIAGO 26512 [IN 031722]

1. PROPOSE USE REFS FOR FUOMEN. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

*REFS ATTACHED.

WH/6 CT-4

WH/6 CT-4

~~15-124-32~~

18 SEP 73

15-124-52

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1973

ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB

UNIT: ADC/WH/6

EXT: 6556/9155

W. M. Kent

C/WHD

REC COPY

C/WH/6

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY:

S E C R E T

14-00000

A4 —— ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX. TYPE THE WORD ALIGN TO REGISTER HERE ——> ALIGN

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO		PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	26-5	1		

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
131911Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
454507

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE (IP/AN) SSS, PS/EG4, OSG/IC2, CI, CI/CP, OPS/INT, DDO,

DISSEM BY: 38

PER ____ # ________

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO ________

0 IP FILES

TO: IMMEDIATE ARGENTINA, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, MIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY, GEORGETOWN, PORT AU PRINCE, TEGUCIGALPA, KINBGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, PORT AU SPAIN, MBONTEVIDEO, CARACAS INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

WH/6

BOOBK CABLE

FUOMEN SUMMARY OF COUP EVENTS

1. FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND AND FOR PASSING LOCA AUTHORITIES AS YOU SEE FIT:

2. FOUR-MAN MILITARY JUNTA THAT REVOLTED AGAINST MARXIST REGIME OF SALVADOR ALLENDE ON 11 SEPTEMBER HAS GAINED FULL CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, WITH EXCEPTION OF POCKETS OF RESISTANCE IN CAPITAL. ON 12 SEPT THERE WAS FIBGHTING IN DOWNTOWN SANTIAGO BETWEEN TBBROOPS AND SNIPERS HOLED UP IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND IN INDUSTRIAL AREAS WHERE ALLENDE SUPPORTERS WERE BARRICADED IN FACTORIES. SPORADIC FIRING AND EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD THROUGHOUT DAY AND NIGHT BUT STRICT CURFEW KEPT OBSERVERS FROM WITNESSING ACTION. CURFEW EXTENDED TO NOON 13 SEPT.

3. AUTHORITIES ESTIMATED DEATH TOLL TO BE OVER 250 MILITARY

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
13 SEP 73

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

454587

CONF:
INFO: FILE

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 FILES

DISSEM BY:
PER #

AND CIVILIANS. THEY EXPECTED TO ELIMINATE LAST POCKETS RESISTANCE BY 14 SEPTEMBER.

3. JUNTA-CONTROLLED RADIO STATIONS AND ONE TV STATION OPERATING. PUBLIC UTILITIES ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY. NEWSPAPERS PLANNED RESUME LIMITED EDITIONS 13 SEPT BUT ARE SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP.

4. JUNTA ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT ALLENDE COMMITTED SUICIDE IN LA MONEDA AND TROOPS ENTERING THE BUILDING FOUND HIS BODY IN A DINING ROOM.

5. JUNTA TV PROGRAM SHOWED LARGE QUANTITIES OF SOVIET MADE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS COLLECTED AT LA MONEDA AND AT ALLENDE RESIDENCE ON TOMAS MORO STREET AFTER FIGHTING.

6. JUNTA PRESIDED OVER BY GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET (ARMY), AN INTELLIGENT, PROFESSIONAL OFFICER WITH NO KNOWN POLITICAL TIES; ADMIRAL JOSE MERINO (NAVY), WHO IS INCLINED TOWARDS NATIONAL PARTY (CONSERVATIVE); GEN. GUSTAVO LEIGH (AIR FORCE), A STRONG LEADER WHO FORMER SUPPORTER OF RADICAL PARTY AND KNOWN TO DISLIKE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS; AND GENERAL CESAR MENDOZA, (CARABINERO CHIEF) WHO HAS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054755

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

454587

CLOSE TIES TO MILITARY AND APPARENTLY HELPED PLAN COUP.

7. JUNTA NAMED FOLLOWING CABINET 12 SEPT:

MINISTER OF INTERIOR - MAJ GEN OSCAR BONNILLA (ARMY), WHO SERVED AS PRESIDENT FREI'S SENIOR MILITAGRY AIDE FOR TWO YEARS.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS - REAR ADMIRAL ISMAEL HUERTA (NAVY), HIGHLY RESPECTED IN NAVY AND ONE OF INTELLECTUAL LEADERS OF COUP.

MINISTER OF ECONOMY - MAJ GEN ROLANDO GONZALEZ (ARMY), REPORTED TO BE A U.P. SUPPORTER ABOUT 1971.

MINISTER OF EDUCATION - JOSE NAVARRO TOBAR, A CIVILIAN BIOLOGY AND BOTANY PROFESSOR OF UNKNOWN POLITICS.

MINISTER OF JUSTICE - GONZALO PRIETO GANDARA, CIVILIAN LAWYER.

MINISTER OF DEFENSE - VICE ADM. PATRICIO CARVAJAL, FORMERLY CHIEF OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SSTAFF, REPORTED INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1971.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION - BRIG

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 4 OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

DISSEM BY:

PER ___ #

CONF: INFO: FILE

454587

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 FILES

GEN SERGIO FIGUEROA (AIR FORCE), REPORTED IN EARLY 1972 TO BE AMONG ANTI-U.P. AIR FORCE COLONELS.

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE - COL SERGIO CRESPO (RET. AIR FORCE), AGRICULTURAL AND CIVIL ENGINEER.

MINISTER OF LABOR - GEN MARIO MACKAY (CARABINEROS), ANTI-U.P. OFFICER NAMED IN JULY AS COMMANDER IN CONCEPCION.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH - COL ALBERTO SPOERER (AIR FORCE), FORMER CIVILIAN SURGEON DESCRIBED AS HARD WORKER.

MINISTER OF MINING - GEN ARTURO YOVANE (CARABINEROS), WHO WAS SCHEDULED TO BE RETIRED BY ALLENDE IN AUGUST, CLOSE TO MILITARY.

MINISTER OF HOUSING - BRIG GEN ARTURO VIVERO, HARD-WORKING STAFF OFFICER WHOSE PERFORMANCE UNDER PRESSURE SOMEWHAT WEAK.

SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT - COL PEDRO EWING (ARMY), DESCRIBED AS INTELLIGENT, PATRIOTIC, CONSERVATIVE.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACE	COL	MIP	TOO	TPE	BRD	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	5

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET.

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE DISSEM BY:________

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO ________

0 IP FILES

454587 PER ___#________

UNDERSECRETARY OF INTERIOR - LTH COL ENRIQUE MONTERO {AIR FORCE} FORMER LEGAL OFFICER IN AIR FORCE.

MINISTER OF LANDS AND COLONIZATION - GEN DIEGO PARRA RETIRED CARABINERO OFFICER, ON WHOM LITTLE IS KNOWN.

MINISTER OF FINANCE - REAR ADM LORENZO ORTUZAR, LITTLE KNOWN OFFICER.

8. JUNTA HAS BROKEN RELATI■ONS WITH CUBA AND WILL PROBABLY ■■■ BREAK WITH OTHER SOVIET BLOC STATES. IT WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR ■ STRENGTHEN TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY TIES WITH U.S. AND SEEK AID AND DEBT RELIEF FOR INTERIM.

9. JUNTA WILL PROBABLY DECLARE COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST AND SMALL LEFTIST PARTIES SUCH AS MIR ILLEGAL AND DISSOLVE CUT LABOR CONFEDERATION. THEY DO NOT PLAN WORK WITH POLITICAL PARTIES BU■T MAY CONSULT WITH THEM. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS EXPECTED TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE JUNTA AS IS THE OTHER MAJOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL GROUP, NATIONAL PARTY. STRI■KING TRUCKERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUILDS HAVE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH COUP AND CALLED OFF STRIKE.

10. FILE: 15-124-52. E 2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1973

ORIG: WILLIAM CLYONE-DSO

UNIT: C/WH/6/RR

EXT: 7710/1069

15-124-52

C/WHD C/WH/6

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

05 /

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

OMF 6 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 172044Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 540262

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE 1P/1DN, EUR8, 555

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 6

TO: HAMBURG INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.Y

FUOMEA PSYCH CASPECIAL Y

REF: HAMBURG 24759 (IN 225831) Y

1. AT THIS POINT DO NOT BELIEVE OKHERALD ATTEMPT IMPROVE CHILEAN IMAGE IN GERMAN MEDIA STANDS MUCH CHANCE OF SUCCESS. PREFER LET DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN RUN ITS COURSE. [illegible] WE WOULD BE WILLING SUPPLY SPECIAL BRIEF DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE CAREFULLY SELECTED INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE OPEN TO PERSUASION AND WHOSE VIEWS WOULD CARRY REAL WEIGHT, BUT WE DO NOT FEEL BKHERALD SHOULD ENGAGE IN GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME SINCE LATTER APPROACH BOTH INEFFECTUAL AND MIGHT WELL BACKFIRE.Y

2. FILE: 15-124-46/3. E2 IMPDET.H

RDK

WH/6

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
19 Apr 74

DATE: 18 APRIL 1974
ORIG: KEITH GARDINER:NO
UNIT: DC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

E/G/W

DC/WH/6 J.K.

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/CA
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER
TOTAL COPIES 30-1 BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

1	6	4	
2		5	
3		6	

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT EUR8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR SS5, I/AN, WH8, PS/EG4

T 037629

PAGE 01

IN 225831

TOR:171326Z APR 74

HAMB 24759

S E C R E T 171253Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 24759

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

1. CHILE'S IMAGE AS REFLECTED IN WEST GERMAN MEDIA COMMENTARIES HAS REACHED ALL-TIME LOW AND EVEN CONSERVATIVELY INCLINED OUTLETS BY AND LARGE, NO LONGER BOTHER TO TELL "THE OTHER SIDE." EASTERN RADIO STATIONS MAINTAIN RELENTLESS DRUMFIRE OF ANTI-CHILEAN PROPAGANDA AND THERE NO APPARENT DEARTH OF INFO TO SUSTAIN RATHER EFFECTIVE DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN.

2. IN SPITE OF DISMAL AUSPICES TO TURN TIDE, (UNLESS JUNTA DECIDES TO SHOW SOME DECENT REGARD FOR OPINIONS OF MANKIND), WE CAN STILL PROMOTE FAIRER UNDERSTANDING OF IMPERATIVES OF CHILEAN SITUATION TO WHICH JUNTA APPARENTLY FEELS IMPELLED TO RESPOND. TOWARD THAT END, REQUIRE SOME TYPE OF OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OF PREDICTABLE TRENDS.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

File ~~[illegible]~~
FUOMEN

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER

TOTAL COPIES 17-[illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH C/D

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED WH

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT Chile 8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. [illegible] c/CA3 c/FI2

T 144267 [illegible] PAGE 01-01 IN 880779

TOR:042140Z APR 73 SAGO 24516

AN	Ko
AB	Y
IN	
PG	
BX	
DES | BSD	
FI	

SECRET 042118Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 24516

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 24477 (in 878105)

B. DIRECTOR 391223

1. IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS REF A INFO IF IT WERE SURFACED OR IF IT CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE U.P. GOVERNMENT, STATION RECOMMENDS AGAINST FUOMEN EXPLOITATION AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

RECORD COPY

SECRET

15-124-52
04 APR 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ly PER

TOTAL COPIES 8

RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	I N F O	RF FILE VR CI/PLANS [illegible] [illegible]	STAFF	
C/WH8		9044 [illegible]	1	4
ACTION #			2	5
			3	6

T 627548

PAGE 01

IN 136804

TOR:141717Z JAN 74

SAGO 27899

S E C R E T 141550Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 27899

TO: DIRECTOR, PARIS, HELSINKI, BONN, TOKYO, LONDON.

RYBAT FUUMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 499469 - 15-124-52

1. WISH TO OFFER FOLLOWING SUGGESTED CHANGES IN REF WHICH BASED ON LATEST INFO AVAILABLE LOCALLY. PARA 3: "...CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO FOR IMPORTS/EXPORTS BY SLIGHTLY OVER 100 PERCENT IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND, ENCOURAGE EXPORTS AND EASE PRESSURES..." "...OTHER PRICE RISES BROUGHT INFLATION FOR THE YEAR TO 508 PERCENT..." (FOR DIRECTOR: WHILE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES BY BOTH EMBASSY AND IMF IN NOVEMBER PLACED INFLATION FOR THE YEAR AT PROBABLY BETWEEN 750 AND 800 PERCENT, THE END-OF-THE-YEAR FIGURE OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE WAS 508.1 SEE SANTIAGO EMBASSY TELEGRAM 0173 OF 11 JANUARY.)

2. PARA 4 LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ "THE MASSIVE 3.5 BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT..." PARA 7: "MONTHLY COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OVER THE AVERAGE DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1973 AND PRODUCTION/

B

[illegible]		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
		C7-4

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

15-124-52

14 Jan 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 307548 PAGE 02-02 IN 136804

TOR:141717Z JAN 74 SAGO 27899

WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD OF AT LEAST 850,000 TONS IN 1974..."

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 07-8

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	ROG	COI	ACP	YOG	TPE	NRO		PAGE OF PAGES
ONF	0	0	0	0	0	0		1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	111951Z	DIRECTOR	499169

CONF. C/WH8 INFO: FILE C/NC/PN, C/EUR6, C/EA4, C/SS3, C/PS/EG3

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 50
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PARIS, HELSINKI, BONN, TOKYO, LONDON INFO SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CHILE AT BEGINNING OF 1974 MAY BE USEFUL FOR ORAL BRIEFINGS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS WHO INTERESTED IN CHILE. STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION.

2. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. THE NEW MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS AVOIDED MAJOR INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND HAS MOVED AGGRESSIVELY TO REORGANIZE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES MORE EFFICIENTLY, TO CREATE AN APOLITICAL CIVIL SERVICE, AND TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. ITS ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH AUSTERE, ARE SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE STRICT SECURITY MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE JUNTA HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING ANY LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE OR TERRORISM AND ARE LIKELY TO BE CONTINUED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

24

C 7-Y

B

3. THE JUNTA MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP OF 11 SEPTEMBER TO REMOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

11 Jan 74
15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

499969

CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON THE COUNTRY'S MEAGER FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88% IN OCTOBER, AND OTHER PRICE RISES PUSHED INFLATION TO SOME 770% FOR THE YEAR.

4. THE JUNTA HAS NOW AGREED TO FOLLOW THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM PROPOSED BY AN IMF TEAM WHICH VISITED CHILE IN LATE 1973. THIS PROGRAM CALLS FOR TIGHTER FEDERAL SPENDING AND FOR LIMITING INFLATION TO 100% IN 1974. THIS IMF PROGRAM IS FEASIBLE BUT MAY BE SOMEWHAT OVER-OPTIMISTIC, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE WORLD-WIDE ENERGY CRISIS WILL SOON FORCE CHILE TO RAISE FUEL PRICES, THUS EXACCERBATING THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING INFLATION. ADHERENCE TO THE IMF PROPOSAL HAS, HOWEVER, IMPROVED CHILE'S CCREDIT RATING, AS HAS THE SIGNING OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES ON CHILE'S 1971-1972 DEBT. CHILE IS THUS IN A RELATIVELY GOOD POSITION FOR THE OPENING OF THE PARIS CLUB TALKS IN FEBRUARY. THE MASSIVE $4 BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT, HOWEVER, WILL CAUSE CHILE BALANCE OF BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS FOR SOME TIME.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

419469

0 IP FILES #

7. COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50% OVER LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AND PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD 750,000 TONS IN 1974 DESPITE SPORADIC SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND SERVICEABLE VEHICLES. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EXPECTED TO RECOVER FULLY UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SO THAT AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS, PARTICULARLY GRAIN, WILL CONTINUE TO BE A DRAIN ON CHILE'S FOREIGN RESERVES.

8. THE JUNTA HAS DEMONSTRATED GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN EQUITY AND HAS LINED UP SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION CLAIMS EMANATING FROM ALLENDE NATIONALIZATIONS, STATING THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, OR AS IN THE CASE OF LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE PREVIOUS OWNERS. FORMER PRIVATE BANKS WILL ALSO BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, BUT PROBABLY WITH SOME FORMULA INVOLVING WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BANK MANAGEMENT. THERE ARE ALSO STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, AND PRIVATE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 4

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

499469

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW SUBSTANTIALLY DURING 1974.

9. INTERNALLY, THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF EXCHANGE RATE HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, THE BURDEN OF AUSTERITY ON CHILEAN CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE HEALTHY INCREASES IN WAGES AND RENEWED CONFIDENCE BY BUSINESSMEN, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST NECESSITIES, AND WORKING CLASS LABOR IS TAKING A WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA OR ITS PROGRAMS. SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) ARE GRUMBLING, BUT THIS DISSATISFACTION IS LARGELY DUE TO GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO SET UP NEW NON-POLITICAL-PARTY MECHANISMS FOR REACHING THE PUBLIC.

10. GOVERNMENT "RECESSING" OF CONGRESS AND ALL POLITICAL PARTIES HAS CREATED A POLITICAL VACUUM IN CHILE. THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH HOLDS THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAURGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR CHILE'S CURRENT PLIGHT, IS TRYING TO FILL THIS VOID BY AN INTENSE USE OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

5

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

499469

CIVILIAN ADVISERS TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES. THIS PHENOMENON IS MOST APPARENT IN THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND IN SUCH TECHNICAL FIELDS AS PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOUSING. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GROUP OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS HEADED BY RAUL SAEZ, FOR EXAMPLE IS WELL KNOWN. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS AN ADVISORY BOARD DOMINATED BY THE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING'S BOARD IS LARGELY CONTROLLED BY THE ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION FIRMS. SIMILARLY, ALMOST EVERY MINISTRY AND MANY AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES HAVE PERMANENT CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF GROUPS WHOSE WELFARE IS AFFECTED BY THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES.

11. IN ADDITION TO THESE CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS, THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF "STUDY COMMISSIONS" THROUGH WHICH CIVILIANS CAN EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE. BEST KNOWN OF THESE IS THE GROUP ~~IF~~ O INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS WHICH IS DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION, BUT THERE ARE OTHER GROUPS WORKING ON A NEW MINING CODE, STUDYING THE EDUCATIONAL SSYSTEM, COLLECTING INFORMATION ON UNEMMPLOYMENT, WRITING A STATUTE FOR WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, AND

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES 6

	AGE	COI	ALP	TOG	TPE	MRO
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
499469

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DELVING INTO A DOZEN OTHER TOPICS.

12. ALTHOUGH SOME CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HOLD INFLUENTIAL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, MOST CIVILIAN ADVISERS ARE EITHER CONSERVATIVE OR APOLITICAL. LACK OF MORE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION BY CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS MAY CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THE FUTURE, ESPECIALLY SINCE ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING WORKERS, CAMPESINOS AND POBLADORES (WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED EITHER THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) OR THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT) ARE SO FAR INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED ON ADVISORY COUNCILS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED UNITS ADDRESSED TO YOUTH, WOMEN, GUILDS AND NEIGHBORHOOD CIVIC GROUPS IN THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT, AND HOPES THAT THESE WILL SERVE AS VEHICLES FOR GOVERNMENT-TO-PEOPLE COMMUNICATION.

13. THE JUNTA LEADERS VIEW WITH DISTRUST ALL PDC EFFORTS TO WIN NEW POLITICAL ADHERENTS FROM THE WORKING CLASSES WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED ALLENDE'S UP COALITION AND REPORTEDLY BELIEVE THAT THE PDC IS NOT RESPECTING THE POLITICAL RECESS. THE JUNTA IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PDC'S LEFT WING

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AUE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO
ONF 0	0	0	0	0	0	

PAGE 7 OF PAGES 8

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

CONF: INFO: FILE

199469

WILL AID THE FORMER UP PARTIES IN RETURN FOR FUTURE ELECTORAL SUPPORT.

14. ONE PROBLEM OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE JUNTA IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT PERU MAY ATTACK CHILE SOME TIME PRIOR TO 1979, THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR BETWEEN CHILE AND PERU, IN ORDER TO REGAIN SOME OF THE TERRITORY LOST IN THAT WAR. THE CHILEANS ARE WORRIED BY THE SOVIET SALE OF ARMS TO PERU AND FEAR THAT THE USSR MAY BE TRYING TO CREATE ANOTHER UNSTABLE "MIDDLE EAST TYPE" OF CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA.

15. THE JUNTA IS ALSO CONCERNED BY COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO CREATE INTERNAL DISCONTENT AND TO MOUNT AN INTERNAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. THE JUNTA EXPECTS THAT THE FORMER UP PARTIES, LED BY THE COMMUNISTS, WILL SET UP A UNIFIED FRONT FOR CAUSING CIVILIAN DISTURBANCES AND POLITICAL DISCONTENT, AND WILL TRY TO MANIPULATE THE PDC INTO OPPOSING THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT. TWO FRONTS FOR CHILEAN RESISTANCE ARE BEING ORGANIZED IN ARGENTINA AND SEVERAL ARE BEING SET UP IN EUROPE.

16. DESPITE THE PROBLEMS NOTED ABOVE, THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT IS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COF	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO
0	0	0	0	0	0

OMF

PAGE 8 OF PAGES 8

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

999469

IN FIRM CONTROL IN CHILE AND HAS MADE IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS IN REORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT AND IN ENLISTING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ITS PROGRAMS. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT ARE THE BEST WHICH COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED FROM A COUNTRY WHOSE ENTIRE ECONOMY WAS A SHAMBLES IN SEPTEMBER 1973.

17. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 10 JANUARY 1974
ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:LSS
UNIT: C/WH/6/SA
EXT: 6609/1069

WH/EICO - BILL KENT (IN DRAFT)
C/WH/6
EA/JK/J -

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

14-00000

SIGNAL CENTER USE

OMF C 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 052118Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 487650

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE XP/AN, EU18, 555 PS/EG4

0 RID: 0 NO RID: 0 RETURN TO PER 0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 60

WH/6

TO: HAMBURG INFO BONN, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN CASPECIAL CAFECET

REF: HAMBURG 23881 (IN 096923)

1. FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF CHILEAN ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OF RISK FACTORS INVOLVED IN MAKING INVESTMENTS IN CHILE PREPARED FOR PASSAGE TO HERMES BANK PER REF PARA 1 REQUEST.

A. THE RULING JUNTA IN CHILE IS MOVING AGGRESSIVELY TO REBUILD THE ECONOMY BY ADOPTING A HARSH AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND INSTITUTING POLICIES DESIGNED TO RETURN CHILE TO A MARKET ECONOMY.

B. SANTIAGO MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP TO REMOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE CENTRAL BANK EFFECTIVELY DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON SANTIAGO'S MEAGER FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVBES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88% IN OCTOBER, BRINGING INFLATION TO NEARLY 450% FOR THE FIRST TEN MONTHS OF THE YEAR. ANTICIPATED PRICE RISES DURING THE REST OF 1973 IS EXPECTED TO PUSH INFLATION TO SOME 750% FOR THE YEAR.

C. THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

04 DEC 73
15-124-52
~~15-126-52~~

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP SITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

487650

EXCHANGE RATES HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. WHILE EXCHANGE RATES CHANGED AND PRICES ROSE, THE GROWTH IN THE MONEY SUPPLY HAS BEEN SHARPLY CURTAILED, CAUSING A RELATIVE SCARCITY OF LOCAL CURRENCY AND A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH FOR BUSINESSMEN.

D. THE BURDEN ON CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE A HEALTHY INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS ARE FINDING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST NECESSITIES. AUSTERITY HAS BEEN EXACERBATED IN MANY CASES BY DISMISSALS OF RELATIVELY UNPRODUCTIVE AND POLITICALLY SUSPECT EMPLOYEES HIRED UNDER THE ALLENDE REGIME. AN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED AND AN EXTENSIVE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

E. THE JUNTA IS ATTEMPTING TO ENLIST PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND BUSINESS IS SHOWING RENEWED CONFIDENCE. CONSUMERS AND LABOR, HOWEVER, ARE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA OR ITS PROGRAMS HAS MATERIALIZED, EVEN THOUGH SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE GRUMBLING AND PREDICTING

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUC BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO ITED E 2 IMPDET
S E C R E T CL BY: 057556

SIGNAL CENTER USE
PAGE OF PAGES
OMF 0 0 0 0 0
3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DATE-TIME GROUP
CITE
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

457650

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

FAILURE FOR THE JUNTA.

F. CHILE STILL FACES LARGE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICITS IN BOTH 1973 AND 1974 EVEN IF DEBT REPAYMENTS ARE RESCHEDULED IN BOTH YEARS. WITH A MASSIVE $4 BILLION FOREIGN DEBT HANGING OVER SANTIAGO'S HEAD, IT WILL AT LEAST BE SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE CHILE'S BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS POSITION IMPROVES SIGNIFICANTLY.

G. HOWEVER, COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50% ABOVE LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AS A RESULT OF A 9% LENGTHENING OF THE WORK WEEK AND IMPROVED MINE MANAGEMENT. PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD 750,000 TONS NEXT YEAR DESPITE CONTINUING SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND SERVICEABLE VEHICLES.

H. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS CONTINUE TO BE THE LARGEST DRAIN ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE RECOVERY OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IS A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE OF THE JUNTA. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EXPECTED TO FULLY RECOVER UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SINCE MOST CROPS ALREADY ARE PLANTED AND ARE WELL INTO THEIR GROWING SEASONS. THUS, CHILE WILL CONTINUE TO IMPORT GRAIN IN LARGE QUANTITIES DURING 1974.

I. ALTHOUGH THE PROBLEMS OF ADEQUATE SHORT RUN SUPPLIES

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

FORM USE PREVIOUS

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

PAGE OF PAGES
4

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

187650

OF RAW MATERIALS AND SPARE PARTS MUST BE SOLVED TO BOOST PRODUCTION QUICKLY, LONG RUN GROWTH WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON CHILE'S ABILITY TO ATTRACT ADEQUATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT. ATTRACTION OF SUBSTANTIAL NEW INVESTMENT WILL DEPEND ON THE JUNTA'S ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN EQUITY AS WELL AS THEIR ABILITY TO INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN CHILE'S PROSPECTS FOR STABLE RECOVERY AND GROWTH. A CRITICAL FIRST STEP IS TIMELY SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION CLAIMS EMANATING FROM THE ALLENDE NATIONALIZATIONS. THE JUNTA HAS STATED THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR OR, AS IN THE CASE OF THE LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE THE PREVIOUS OWNERS. SOME 90 FIRMS ARE ALREADY IN THE PROCESS OF REVERSION.

J. THUS FAR THE JUNTA HAS SUCCEEDED IN LINING UP SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE ESSENTIAL CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFICEN~~C~~DE, AND PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW DRAMATICALLY DURING THE NEXT 12 MONTHS.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 5

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

CONF: INFO: FILE 487650

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

K. THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR CHIBLE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC AS THE JUNTA TAKES STEPS TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. THE PROGRAMS, THOUGH AUSTERE, ARE ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE MAJOR POLICY CONFLICTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE OVER THE DEGREE AND TIMING OF SPECIFIC MEASURES RATHER THAN PROBLEMS OF BASIC POLICY ORIENTATION.

L. THE EMERGING DOMINANCE OF RAUL SAEZ AS SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISOR IS PROBABLY FOR THE BEST SINCE THE JUNTA'S AUSTERITY PROGRAM MUST BE TEMPERED IF POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND STABILITY IS TO BE ACHIEVED. MEANWHILE, CHILE IS PREPARING TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION ISSUES AND COMPLETE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON 1971/72 DEBT SERVICE IN ACCORD WITH THE 1972 PARIS CLUB AGREEMENTS. TIMELY RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES WILL GO FAR IN IMPROVING INVESTOR AND CREDITOR CONFIBDENCE IN CHILE.

2. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUGGESTED TO ELICIT HERMES' VIEWS ON CHILE'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AS REQUESTED PARA 3 REF.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

15-124-52
~~15-126-52~~

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ALP	TOO	TPE	MRO
0	0	0	0	0	0

OMF

PAGE 6 OF PAGES 6

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

487650

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

A. HOW MUCH AND WHAT KINDS OF PRIVATE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT FROM GERMAN AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN SOURCES IS EXPECTED TO ENTER CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHS?

B. DO BANK OFFICIALS EXPECT SUBSTANTIAL PRIVATE AND/OR OFFICIAL GERMAN CREDITS TO BE EXTENDED TO CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHS? WHAT TYPES OF CREDITS WOULD THESE BE, I.E. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS RELIEF, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, TIED AND UNTIED TRADE CREDITS?

C. DO BANK OFFICIALS SEE THE WIDESPREAD ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION IN EUROPE TO THE NEW CHILEAN GOVERNMENT AS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING FUTURE INVESTMENT AND AID DECISIONS FOR CHILE?

3. HERMES' REACTION TO ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WILL BE OF INTEREST.

4. FILE: 15-126-52. E2, IMPDET.#

*REF ATTACHED.

DATE: 4 DECEMBER 1973
ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:SMB
UNIT: C/WH/6/SA
EXT: 6609/1069

C/WH/6

C/E/G

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

for AC/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 261539Z DIRECTOR 459557

CONF: C/WH 6 INFO: FILE C/[illegible], C/SS 3, C/CI, C/SB 5

0 DISSEM BY: 35

0

0 PER

0 #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZ, QUITO, BOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS AIRES, GUATEMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR, MANAGUA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR-458246

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN LIMA.

2. SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SUPPORT BY LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES FOR RESISTANCE IN CHILE.

3. BACKGROUND: IT WAS INDICATED IN AN EARLIER BRIEFING {REF} THAT SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU {PCP/SOVIET} INTENDED TO SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN ANY RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN CHILE.

4. THE FIRST WORD OF CHILEAN COUP WAS RECEIVED BY PCP/SOVIET FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN LIMA. CENTRAL COMMITTEE CALLED AN EMERGENCY MEETING WHEN IT APPEARED THAT EVENTS IN CHILE WERE GOING AGAINST

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

26 Sep 73

RECORD COPY

WH/6 CI-7 15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

0 0 0 0 0 0

2

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF. INFO: FILE

454557

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 FILES #

ALLENDE REGIME. WHILE WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW, CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECIDED TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES SUCH AS SENDING SIX ORGANIZERS INTO CHILE. THESE ORGANIZERS WERE MEMBERS OF PERUVIAN COMMUNIST YOUTH, WHO USED PASSPORTS OBTAINED EARLIER FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN CASE OF SUCH AN EMERGENCY. PASSPORTS WERE LEGITIMATE, BUT DATA IN THEM, INCLUDING NAMES, WERE FALSE. THE PERUVIANS WERE TO CROSS INTO CHILE AT THE TACNA/ARICA BORDER POINT AND WERE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NUMBER OF BOLIVIANS AND BRAZILIANS.

5. ON 15 SEPTEMBER, TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEN WHO WERE LATIN AMERICANS BUT NOT PERUVIANS BROUGHT TO PCP/SOVIET HEADQUARTERS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION {CPSU}. INSTRUCTIONS WERE DELIVERED TO MEMBERS OF PCP/SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND IMMEDIATELY DISCUSSED BY PARTY LEADERS INCLUDING JORGE DEL PRADO CHAVEZ {PCP/SOVIET SEC GEN}, FELIX ARIAS SCHREIBER {PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION MEMBER}, GUILLERMO HERRERA MONTESINOS {ALSO MEMBER OF PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION}, AND ONE OF THE TWO COURIERS DELIVERING THE INSTRUCTIONS ( ) WHO USED THE ALIAS "FIGUEROA." FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, THESE PARTY LEADERS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CHF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 3

S E C R E T

STAFF

CONF: INFO: FILE

DIRECTOR 459557

0 NONE 0 NO INDEX 0 RETURN TO PER 0 FILE IN CS FILE NO. #

DISSEM BY:

BEGAN PREPARING INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTY MEMBERS TO AID IN SUPPORT THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE (PCCH). INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PCP/SOVIET MEMBERS WERE TO ARRANGE FOR LODGING FOR MEMBERS OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WHO WERE ARRIVING IN LIMA, TO OBTAIN MAPS OF CHILE, FALSE DOCUMENTATION, ETC.

6. SECOND STAGE OF SUPPORT TO CHILE WAS TO BEGIN DURING WEEK OF 23 SEPTEMBER WHEN COMMUNISTS AND OTHERS WERE TO ARRIVE FROM VENEZUELA, PANAMA, COLOMBIA, CUBA AND OTHER COUNTRIES, [illegible] ALL WERE TO BE LODGED IN LIMA, AND, LATER, GIVEN FALSE DOCUMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION TO CHILEAN BORDER. THEIR PRINCIPAL TASK IN CHILE WAS TO ASSIST IN REORGANIZATION OF PCCH FOLLOWING COUP D'ETAT, AS WELL AS IN PRODUCTION OF CLANDESTINE PROPAGANDA. THEY ALSO WERE TO STUDY POSSIBILITY OF AIDING IN MOUNTING CONCERTED ARMED RESISTANCE TO MILITARY REGIME, PRINCIPALLY THROUGH URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE. THERE WAS NO NEED TO SEND ARMS, SINCE THERE STILL ENOUGH WEAPONS HIDDEN IN CHILE TO MAKE SUCH RISK UNNECESSARY.

WH

7. CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WERE TO MEET IN LIMA ON 25 SEPTEMBER TO CONSIDER SENDING PERSONS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 4 OF PAGES 4

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR 455557

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER

#

GUERRILLA GROUPS THERE AND TO AID CHILEAN COMMUNISTS. SOME DELEGATES TO MEETING ARRIVED EARLY IN ORDER ATTEND REGIONAL MEETING OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) WHICH BEGAN 19 SEPT. JUAN CAMPOS CAMPOS, CHILEAN, SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS OF WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (WFTU), WHO IS IN LIMA FOR ILO MEETING, HELD PRESS CONFERENCE ON 18 SEPTEMBER DURING WHICH HE CALLED ON ALL WORLD TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS TO MOUNT PUBLIC OPINION CRUSADE AGAINST CHILEAN JUNTA.

8. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.#

DATE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1973 W Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/5355

James E. Flannery C/WH/SA
C/WHD

C/WH/6

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1

SECRET

STAFF

2515242

DIRECTOR

459023

CONF: C/WH/6 INFO: FILE C/SS 5, C/CI/AN

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 9
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

TO: PRIORITY LIMA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 25754 (IN 035309)

B. LIMA 26010 (IN 038180)

1. REF A WAS USED FOR FUOMEN. AS FOLLOW-UP WOULD LIKE USE REF B, LIMA 26010, SUBJECT YOUR CONCURRENCE AND CAVEATS. WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN EXILE IN LIMA AND DELETE REFERENCES TO SOURCES IN REPORT (PIP PENETRATION AGENT AND HIGH LEVEL OFFICIAL OF PERUVIAN SERVICE WHO IS PROFESSIONAL INTEL OFFICER) AND ALTER TEXT ACCORDINGLY. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.

*REFS ATTACHED.

WH/6 CI-4

15-124-52
25 Sep 73

DATE: 25 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

WH/SA/7

RECORD COPY

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/6
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

24-1

OHF 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

S E C R E T

STAFF 242218Z DIRECTOR 458840

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE, ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] [illegible]

0 INDEX DISSEM BY [illegible]
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: BONN 26475 [IN 037592]

1. IN GENERAL TERMS BUSINESSES LEGALLY NATIONALIZED SUCH AS COPPER COMPANIES, BANKS AND ITT HAVE BECOME GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND WILL NOT BE RETURNED, WHILE BUSINESSES WHICH WERE INTERVENED, INCLUDING MOST DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING FIRMS, MAY BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS. THE SAME GENERAL CRITERIA APPLY TO PROPERTY: LARGE FARMS LEGALLY EXPROPRIATED WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, WHILE FARMS ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED PROBABLY WILL BE RETURNED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE NO LIST EXISTS WHICH SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES WHICH BUSINESSES OR PROPERTIES FALL INTO WHICH CATEGORY. WE HAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS THIS SUBJECT.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

24

15-124-52
WH/6 CI-X 24 Sep 73

DATE: 24 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:LSS
UNIT: WH/6/SA
EXT: 6607/1069

RECORD COPY

C/WHEUR
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/6
COORDINATING OFFICERS

James E. Flannery
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER TOTAL COPIES [illegible] RUN BY Chill

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED ~~SLOTTED~~ 20/JH CLERK BY D AT 1520 Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. C/IAN, C/EUR6, C/SS 3, C/PS/EG 3

T 551709 PAGE 01 IN 037590

TOR:241450Z SEP 73 BONN 26475

S E C R E T 241415Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE BONN 26475

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: A. DIRECTOR 458535 ○ Legal property of govt

B. DIRECTOR 456615

C. BONN 26432 (IN 035549)

1. PARA 3B REF B STATES PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH HAVE BECOME QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT BE RETURNED OWNERS. REF C REQUESTED IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC PROPERTIES INVOLVED. NOT CLEAR FROM REF A WHETHER EXPROPRIATED AND REQUISITIONED PROPERTIES CONSIDERED QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE PROPERTIES OF GOVT SUBJECT TO PROVISIONS PARA 3B REF B. IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT IF ANY FIRMS IN SOCIAL AREA HAVE NOT BECOME LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVERNMENT AND WHAT FIRMS HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER OR INTERVENED WITHOUT BECOMING LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVERNMENT.

B

2. PLS CLARIFY AND IF POSSIBLE PROVIDE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF FIRMS INVOLVED.

SECRET

RECORD COPY

15-124-52

24 Sep 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	1		4
			2		5
ACTION #			3		6

T 551709 PAGE 02-02 IN 037592

TOR:241450Z SEP 73 BONN 26475

3. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACE COI ALP TOO TPE MAO

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 221721Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 458535

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE C/LA/DN. C/EURG. DDI/DC. C/SSS. C/PS/EG3.

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER 38

0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CDARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT FUOMEN CAGER

REFS: A. BONUMN 26432 |IN 035549| |*|

B. DIRECTOR 456615 |**|

1. "SOCIAL AREA" IS TERM DFOR STATE-CONTROLLED SECTOR OF ECONOMY. STATE CONTROL OVER WIDE VARIETY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES WAS SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED DURING ALLENDE REGIME. THROUGH PURCHASES, EXPROPRIATIONS, REQUISITIONS, AND INTERVENTIONS OF PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES, THE GOC BY MID-1973 HAD CONTROL OVER [illegible] PRODUCTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES ACCOUNTING FOR ALMOST HALF OF CHILE'S GDP, COMPARED TO AN ESTIMATED 20% AT [illegible] END OF THE FREI ADMINISTRATION IN 1970.

2. SINCE TAKING OFFICE, ALLENDE GOVT HAD TAKEN OVER AT LEAST 400 FIRMS. THE EXECUTIVE HAD SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS BILLS THAT WOULD AUTHORIZE INCREASES IN SCOPE AND RANGE OF GOVT-CONTROLLED SECTOR, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON WHAT SECDTOR'S LIMITS SHOULD BE. ALLENDE GOVT, THEREFORE, HAD CONTINUED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

15-124-52

22 Sep 73

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 . 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

DIRECTOR 458535

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

TO REQUISITION AND INTERVENE PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES AS IT CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED.

3. FILE: 15-1204-52. E 2, IMPDET.H

*INTEND USE (REF B) [redacted] FUOMEN. PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA" PROPERTIES.

**FUOMEN ON ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA.

DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM KENT;DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/8
EXT: 6556/9155

ADC/WH/6 William M. Kent

AC/EUR/3A
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 75-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACF TOO TPE NRO

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 221719Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 458522

CONF: C/WH8 INFO: FILE C/F/AN, C/EA4, C/EUR6, ~~DDO~~ C/SS3, C/CPS/INT 2

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER 78

0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, BRASILIA, LIMA, PARIS, LONDON, BONN, BERN, MONTEVIDEO, TOMKYO, ROME.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: MEXICAN JOURNALIST WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES.

2. SUBJECT: REMARKS BY CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN MEXICO AFTER THE 11 SEPTEMBER COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE.

3. SHORTLY AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE, A CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICER WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE CUBAN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) IN MEXICO SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOVT WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE GOOD ORGANIZATION OF CHILEAN MILITARY'S SUCCESSFUL OVERTHROW OF THE ALLENDE REGIME ON 11 SEPTEMBER.

4. HE SAID THE CUBAN GOVT AND CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO WERE NOT SURPRISED, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ALLENDE GOVT WAS MADE BECAUSE THEY HAD LONG PERCEIVED THAT ALLENDE, WHILE A GOOD MARXIST, LACKED SUFFICIENT AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD HIS ENEMIES.

5. HE SAID THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO HAD PLANS PREPARED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

22 Sep 73

WH/6 CI-4 75-124-52

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

								PAGE OF	PAGES
								2	2

	ADF	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0

CLASSIFICATION
S E C RET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

458522

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

DISSEN BY:
PER
#

CONF:

INFO: FILE

IN CASE OF ALLENDE OVERTHROW. LONG BEFORE 11 SEPTEMBER CUBAN EMBASSY BEGAN DISTRIBUTING LATEST MODEL AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, AND EVEN ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO CHILEAN WORKER CADRES WITH WHOM CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS HAD BEEN WORKING FOR LONG TIME. MUNITIONS ALSO HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO CUBAN CADRES IN CHILE WDHO HAD BEEN ACTIVE AMONG WORKERS. IT IS THEY WHO NOW MUST BEAR MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREPARING THE INEVITABLE COUNTER-COUP AGAINST MILITARY JUNTA. THIS IS EXPECTED TO TAKE TIME AND TRAINING, BUT MEANS ARE AVAILABLE AND CUBAN WEAPONRY IS FAR SUPERIOR TO THAT OF CHILEAN ARMED FORCES.

6. FILE: 15-124-52B. E 2, IMPDET.H

C/WH/COG O. Butler

C/EUR/SA J. Gensler

EA/JKO/J

C/WH/SA

William M. Kent
C/WH/6

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILDRLLIAM KENT:DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 5515/9Π192

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTIC Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROH ED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: Π057556

S E C R E T

20

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TI TPE MRO

OMF 0 . 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES

1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

2122502

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

458246

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE C/LA/HN, ADD/DO, C/SS 3 C/OS/ALIC 2 C/OPS

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 43

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZ, QUITO, BOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS BAIRES, GUATBEMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR, MANAGUA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN LIMA.

2. SUBJECT: MEETING IN LIMA OF LATIN AMERICAN SUBBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS TO MAKE PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE.

3. ON OR ABOUT 22 SEPTEMBER A MEETING IS TO BE HELD IN LIMA BB OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMBERICAN SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA GROUPS AND TO HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

4. THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU IS DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING GROUPS TO CHILE TO FIGHT ALONGSIDE ANY CHILEANS WHO ARE STILL OFFERING RESISTANCE TO THE NEW MILITARY JUNTA. THE PARTY INTENDS TO SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN RESISTANCE FORCES BIN CHILE.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CHILE CI-4

15-124-52
21 Sep 73

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

458246

5. FILE: 15-124-52. E 2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973 W Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM KENT:DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 5515/9192

DC/WH/3

J.D. Kalaris
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W.M. Kent
for C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER [illegible] TOTAL COPIES [illegible] RUN BY

24

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY [illegible] WH CD BY M AT 1935

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR [illegible] [illegible]/533 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

9/26/68

ACTION

857

AGENCY MESSAGE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 547408 PAGE 01-01 IN 036120

TOR:211917Z SEP 73 PACY 25771

S E C R E T 211911Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 25771

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF A. DIRECTOR 457922

B. PANAMA CITY 2575 (035309)

1. CONCUR REF A.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

B

3t

W11/6 C7 : 4

15-124-52

21 Sep 73

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY / PER

TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED WH BY AT 1841 Z

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION 853

INFO RF. FILE. VR. 4 IP/AN

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 547303 PRECEDENCE PAGE 01-01 IN 036065

TOR:211811Z SEP 73 MEXI 25263

S E C R E T 211808Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25263

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF DIRECTOR 457888

1. CONCUR. NO CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

WH/6 C7-4

15-124-52

21 Sep 73

RECORD COPY

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 23

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP
211725Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
457922

DISSEM BY: 12

PER ___ # ___

CONF: C/WH/8 INFO: FILE C/WH/CA DDO/DO C/ISS C/PS/EG2 C/CI/INT2 C/IW

0 MORE 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO ______
0 OTHER

TO: PRIORITY PANAMA CITY.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: PANAMA CITY 25754 (IN 035309)

1. PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN, WILL ALTER TEXT TO SHOW LIMA AS PLACE ACQUIRED, OMITTING REFERENCE TO TRAVEL OF QUIJADA OR HIS PARTICIPATION AT MEETING. WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN EXILE IN LIMA, SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND ANY CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.#

*MEETING IN LIMA OF LATAM SOCIALIST ORGS TO MAKE PLANS SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA GROUPS AND HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

WH/6 CI-4

15-124-52

21 Sep 73

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

RECORD COPY

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/6
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE

ONF	ACE	COM	ALP	TOA	TPE	MAD
ONF	0	0	0	0	0	0

20-1

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1 cc

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	211612Z	DIRECTOR	457088

CONF: [illegible] INFO: FILE [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] C/CI DDC/DO

DISSEM BY: [illegible]

PER #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO

0 IP FILES

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 25260 (IN 035305)

1. PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN. WILL ~~OMMIT~~ OMIT NAME OF MANUEL CORTINA AND REFER TO HIM ONLY AS OFFICER IN CUBAN EMBASSY WHO MEMBER OF DGI. WILL SOURCE TO MEXICAN JOURNALIST WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES, SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND ANY CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.

WH/6 CI-4

15-124-52

21 Sep 73

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973

ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS

UNIT: ADC/WH/6

EXT: 6556/9155

C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

C/WH/6

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/WH/SI

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 1 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 2 4 -1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______ S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED EUR BY 7 AT 1111 Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT C/EUR6

INFO RF. FILE. VR. C/IPAN, C/SS3 C/WH8

ACTION # 097

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 546182 PAGE 01-01 IN 235549

TOR:211012Z SEP 73 BONN 26432

S E C R E T 210956Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE BONN 26432

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 456615

1. INTEND USE FUOMEN INFO REF, TO INCREASE USEFULNESS, PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA" PROPERTIES REFERRED TO PARA 3B REF.

2. FILE 15-124-52. E2-IMPDET

AE

WH-6 CT-4

15-124-52
21 Sept 73

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
182334Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
455515

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE [illegible] -/SS 3

0 INDEX DISSEM BY 43
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, BONN, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN BUSINESSMAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN MILITARY JUNTA GOVERNMENT.

2. SUBJECT: ~~ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA.~~

3. ON 15 SEPTEMBER GENERAL SERGIO NUNO, MINISTER VICE PRESIDENT OF CHILEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (CORFO), OUTLINED MILITARY JUNTA'S ECONOMIC PLANS AS FOLLOWS:

A. ALL OF FIRMS AND COMPANIES WHICH HAVE BEEN EITHER TAKEN OVER OR INTERVENED BUT WHICH ARE NOT LEGALLY OWNED BY GOVERNMENT, WILL BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL OWNERS;

B. THOSE PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH HAVE BECOME LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO PREVIOUS OWNERS. NUNO SAID HE BELIEVES THAT A GIVEN PERCENTAGE OF OWNERSHIP OF THESE PROPERTIES, PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 40 OR 50%, SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE WORKERS, AND REMAINING PERCENTAGE SHOULD BE SOLD AS SHARES TO THE PUBLIC.

B

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

wh/6 cT-4 18 SEP 73
15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RECORD COPY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

457615

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO THE PUBLIC.

4. ACCORDING TO NUNO, PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF THESE INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BEGIN WORKING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY ARE TO REQUEST ANY HELP THEY NEED FROM ARMED FORCES, AND IN EVENT OF ANY PROBLEMS, THEY ARE TO CONTACT GENERAL NUNO, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO HELP THEM.

5. GENERAL NUNO SAID THAT CORFO HAS IN EFFECT ASSUMED THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. GENERAL NUNO AND CORFO WILL WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOFA), WHICH HAS APPOINTED EUGENIO HEIREMANS AS SOFOFA COORDINATOR WITH CORFO.

6. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1973 W. Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

C/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

SA/WH/EICO

C/WHB/L

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WHD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTI[illegible] Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR[illegible]

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 21 31

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ___

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY [✓ ISSUED]/SLOTTED WH CD BY M AT 2000 Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

C/WH8

ACTION #

732

INFO RF. FILE. VR. C/CI/OA, C/SS3, C/PS/EG3
C/OPS/INT 2.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 538842 PAGE 01-01 IN 032783

[illegible] TOR:181935Z SEP 73 SAGO 26529

SECRET 181856Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26529

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 456203

1. CONCUR USE OF SANTIAGO 26489 (HCS 9836) FOR FUOMEN. NO SPECIALCAVEATS. (IN 031351)

2. PREFER NOT USE SANTIAGO 26512 (HCS 9839) BECAUSE OF SOURCE SENSITIVITY. INFO WAS GIVEN DIRECTLY AND PRIVATELY TO FUERMINE-3 BY FUABLE-2. (IN 031722)

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

7A

B

WH/6 CT-4

SECRET

RECORD COPY

18 SEP 73

15-124-52

DISSEM BY IW PER 13 JFB TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 007622

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT
WH 11

INFO FILE, VR, DDO, DDO/DO, IP/AN, IW, OPS/INT 5, SS 4, PS/EG 2, CI, CI/OP, FR 4, SS/SOG 3

ACTION #
179

PAGE 01

TOR:172145Z SEP 73

SAGO 26512

S E C R E T 171950Z SEP 73 INTEL

TDFIR-314.07571-73
HCS-9839

CITE SANTIAGO 26512

TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE: FUERMINE-3 FROM IDEN. NO INDEX. FILE: 15-9-4, CL BY 009560.

FILED: 171950Z

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF
OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR NMCC/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA TREAS SDO ONE CRS

IN 031722

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

NSC/S

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR -314/07571-73

DIST 17 SEPTEMBER 1973

COUNTRY: CHILE

DOI : 15 SEPTEMBER 1973

SUBJECT: PLANS OF EDUARDO FREI, FORMER PRESIDENT OF CHILE AND LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO LEAVE CH

ACQ : CHILE, SANTIAGO (16 SEPTEMBER 1973) FIELD NO. HCS-9839

SOURCE: AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY WHOSE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY PLACES HIM IN THE CENTER OF THE PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM. HE HAS GOOD ACCESS TO BOTH THE RIGHT- AND LEFT-WING SECTORS OF THE PDC. MUCH OF HIS PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND SOURCES.

1. ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1973 FORMER PRESIDENT EDUARDO FREI, A LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC), TOLD OTHER PDC LEADERS THAT HE CONSIDERED IT WISEST FOR HIM TO LEAVE CHILE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND FOR HIM TO REMAIN ABROAD UNTIL THE DIRECTIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BECOME CLEARER AND THE SECURITY

SITUATION BECOMES MORE STABLIZED.

2. (SOURCE COMMENT: MOST OF THE PDC LEADERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY SINCE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE TARGETS FOR ASSASSINATION BY LEFTIST EXTREMISTS AND THAT THEY MAY BECOME THE POLITICAL TARGETS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE CONCERNED PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFERING OF IMPORTANT POSTS TO RIGHTISTS SUCH AS ORLANDO SAENZ, THE PRESIDENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOFA), WHO HAS BEEN NAMED AS ECONOMIC ADVISOR TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS; AND LEON VILARIN, HEAD OF THE TRUCK OWNERS FEDERATION, WHO WAS OFFERED THE POST OF MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS, WHICH HE REFUSED. WHILE SAENZ HAS A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH PDC MEMBERS, HE IS REGARDED BY THE PDC LEADERS AS BASICALLY OPPOSED TO THE PDC AND INTERESTED IN ITS ELIMINATION AS A VIABLE POLITICAL ENTITY.)

3. FREI SAID THAT WHILE HE IS CONSIDERING LEAVING THE COUNTRY OF HIS OWN WILL, HE WOULD PREFER TO BE REQUESTED TO LEAVE BY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO PROTECT HIS POLITICAL FUTURE. HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND HE WOULD PREFER THAT HIS DEPARTURE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE

IN 031722

TDFIR -314/07571-73

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

IN FEAR FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY.

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFATT AT SANTIAGO.

REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.9. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEOGRY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 31-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION # 184

INFO RF. FILE . VR IP/AN. SSS, PS/EG 4

1		4	
2	6	5	
3		6	

T 535956 PAGE 01-01 IN 031535

TOR:171843Z SEP 73 SAGO 26500

S E C R E T 171814Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26500

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

FUORACLE FUOMEN

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 25196 (IN 031341)

B. SANTIAGO 26464 (IN 030951)

1. CONCUR PARA ONE REF A REQUEST.

2. FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET

C/WH/6 ______

DC/WH/6 ______

WH/6 ______

WH/6/FI ______

WH/6/RR ______

WH/6/Sec'y ______

file Fuomen

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 10-1 ___ BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ___ BY ___ AT ___ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION # 138

INFO: RF. FILE. VR 10/AH 535 C/E34

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 535509 PAGE 01-01 IN 031341

TOR:171558Z SEP 73 MEXI 25196

S E C R E T 171541Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25196

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

FUORACLE

REF. SANTIAGO 26464 (C 030451)

1. BELIEVE GIST OF REF WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF PASSED TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA AS IF IT WERE A FUOMEN ITEM. REQUEST SANTIAGO CONCURRENCE.

2. FOR DIRECTOR: OFFICIAL MEXICAN GOVT POLICY IS COMPLETE SYMPATHY FOR ALLENDE. PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA MET MRS. ALLENDE AT AIRPORT 16 SEPT AND HAD ALREADY DECREED THREE DAYS OF OFFICIAL MOURNING FOR DEATH OF PRESIDENT ALLENDE 17-19 SEPT. UNLESS WE CAN GET INFORMATION ON TRUE FACTS IN CHILE TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA DIRECTLY, THE LITTLE MEDIA PLAY WHICH MEXICO CITY PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF MUSTERING WILL BE LOST IN AVALANCHE OF SPONTANEOUS, PLANTED AND GOVT APPROVED PRO-ALLENDE MATERIAL APPEARING LOCALLY. THE CONSENSUS OF MANY MEXICANS IS THAT THE U.S. AND CIA IN PARTICULAR MASTERMINDED THE COUP.

3. FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

fi FUORACLE

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 55 PER TOTAL COPIES 13 RUN

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSA

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION # Ø38

INFO RF. FILE. VR [illegible] C/S/INT

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 532968 PAGE 01-01 IN 032412

TOR:151547Z SEP 73 MEXI 25191

[illegible]

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Secy

RO

S E C R E T 151536Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25191

TO: DIRECTOR.

KDOBELISK FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 454587

1. GIST OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REF WAS PASSED TO KDOBELISK-1 THROUGH KDGLACIER-3 ON 13 SEPT 73. ON 14 SEPT KDGLACIER-3 TOLD GRANDGENT THAT KDOBELISK-1 WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THIS REPORT. KDOBELISK-1 IS RECEIVING NO INFORMATION FROM HIS EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO AT THIS TIME AND HAS TO DEPEND ON NEWS RELEASES FROM CHILE AND ARGENTINA WHICH HE CONSIDERS TO BE OF DUBIOUS ACCURACY.

2. FILE: 50-6-91/3. E2. IMPDET.

fi Fuomen

(2)

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 25-0

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______ SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO		AGENCY MESSAGE			
WH8	I	RF. FILE . VR Eur8 ISS	1		4	
	N		2		5	
ACTION #	F		3		6	
683	O					

T 527885

PRECEDENCE

PAGE 01

IN 028495

TOR:132324Z SEP 73

SAGO 26421

S E C R E T 132233Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26421

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, WH/MIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY, GEORGETOWN, TEGUCIGALPA, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, MONTEVIDEO, CARACAS, LONDON, PARIS, LCPIPIT, BONN.

1. EL MERCURIO, A MAJOR CONSERVATIVE SANTIAGO DAILY, APPEARED TODAY (13 SEPTEMBER) CARRYING FOR MOST PART OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS BY THE CHILEAN JUNTA. THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL AND ARTICLES, HOWEVER, APPEAR WORTH REPLAYING:

A. HACIA LA RECUPERACION NACIONAL

CON DISTINTOS LENGUAJES Y CRITERIOS, LAS PERSONALIDADES POLITICAS, LOS DIRIGENTES GREMIALES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES MAS INFLUYENTES RECLAMABAN UN CAMBIO PROFUNDO EN LA DIRECCION DEL PAIS. TANTO LA OPINION PUBLIC NACIONAL COMO LA EXTRANJERA HABIAN LLEGADO A LA EVIDENCIA DE QUE CHILE ENTRABA EN UN PROCESO FATAL QUE DEBIA LLEVARLO A LA DICTADURA MARXISTA O A LA GUERRA CIVIL.

LA INTERVENCION DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS, VINO EN ESTE CASO A LIBERAR A LA CIUDADANIA DE LA INMINENTE DICTADURA MARXISTA

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

15-124-52

13 SEP 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PER__________ TOTAL COPIES __________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED __________ BY __________ AT __________ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	1		4
			2		5
ACTION #			3		6

T 527885 PAGE 02 IN 028495

TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

Y A SALVAR A CHILE DEL ANIQUILAMIENTO POLITICO, SOCIAL, Y ECONOMICO.

SE ABREN AHORA PERSPECTIVAS DE RECUPERACION MEDIANTE UN INTENSO Y DISCIPLINADO ESFUERZO QUE RESTABLEZCA EL HABITO DEL TRABAJO, NORMALICE LAS FAENAS, DETENGA LA DESTRUCCION DEL PATRIMONIO NACIONAL Y REINICIE EL PROCESO DE CAPITALIZACION INDISPENSABLE AL FUTURO BIENESTAR.

CON INNEGABLE SACRIFICIO Y ABNEGATION, LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS HAS CUMPLIDO SU PAPEL DE SALVAGUARDIA ULTIMA DE LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD. PERO LA DURA TAREA QUE IMPONE RESTANAR LAS HERIDAS Y REANUDAR LA MARCHA DE LA NACION EXIGE EL APOYO RESUELTO DE AQUELLA MAYORIZ CUIDADANA QUE, EN TODOS LOS TONOS, HA PEDIDO UNA HONDA RECTIFICACION.

EL QUEBRANTAMIENTO CONSTITUCIONAL PROVOCADO POR EL MARXISMO NO PUDO SOLDARSE CON LAS SOLAS INICIATIVAS DE LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS. LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS NO DESEABAN NI HAD DESEADO NUNCA TOMAR SOBRE SI LA RESPONSIBILIDAD DE CONDUCIR LOS DESTINOS DE LA NACION, PERO EL DRAMATICO FRACASO DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR Y LAS LIMITACIONES DEL CUADRO POLITICO OPOSITOR PARA CONSEGUIR EL INDISPENSABLE CAMBIO DE RUMBO FORZARON LA SITUACION HASTA EL PUNTO EN QUE SE ENCUENTRA.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

AGENCY MESSAGE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 527885 PAGE 03 IN 028495

TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

CHILE TIENE UN GOBIERNO MILITAR, FORMADO POR LOS SENORES COMANDANTES EN JEFE DE LAS TRES RAMAS DE LA DEFENSE NACIONAL Y EL SENOR GENERAL DIRECTOR DE CARABINEROS. LA JUNTA MILITAR HA ASUMIDO EL MANDO SUPREMO, RESPETANDO EXPRESAMENTE LAS ATRIBUCIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL, CONTANDO CON LA ASESORIA DE LA CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA Y DISPONIENDO EL RECESO DEL PARLAMENTO. DE ESTE MODO LA JUNTA CREE ENCONTRAR EL CAMINO ADECUADO PARA INSTAURAR LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD QUE SE REQUIERE.

LAS RESERVAS QUE ESTA POSICION DE LA JUNTA PUEDAN INSPIRAR A CIERTOS SECTORES POLITICOS NO PUEDEN SER TAN ABSOLUTAS QUE LLEGUEN HASTA NEGAR EL CONCURSO DE TODOS LOS CHILENOS AL ESFUERZO DE RECONSTRUCCION DE SU PATRIA. POR EL CONTRARIO, A TRAVES DE LA JUNTA, ES CHILE MISMO EL QUE JUEGA LA CARTA DEFINITIVA PARA TRIUNFAR DEL ODIO, DE LA DESUNION, DEL DESALIENTO Y DE LA DECADENCIA. LA LABOR IMPONE LA ACCION DE TODAS LAS CAPACIDADES Y LA COLABORACION DE TODA LA CUIDADANIA, ESPECIALMENTE DE AQUELLOS CHILENOS QUE POR SU INDIFERENTISMO, SU INDECISION, SU EGOISMO O SU PEREZA HAN GENERADO LAS CONDICIONES QUE PERMITIERON EL DESARROLLO DE LA IDEOLOGIA MARXISTA Y SU LLEGADA AL PODER EN 1970 GRACIAS A LA DIVISION DE LAS FUERZAS DEMOCRATICAS.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________ BY____ AT____ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR.	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 527885 PAGE 04 IN 028495

TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

EL PAIS HA VIVIDO VIRTUALMENTE AL MARGEN DE LA CONSTITUCION Y ABSORBIENDO GRANDES DOSIS DE IDEOLOGIA EXTRANJERA ACOMPANDA TAMBIEN DE GUERRILLEROS EXTRANJEROS. A NADIE PUEDE SURPRENDER QUE EL REMEDIO A TAN DESESPERADA SITUACION SEA DE CARACTER EXTRAORDINARIO Y SE LE ADMINISTRE PROPORCIONADAMENTE A LA VIOLENCIA QUE OPONGA EL MAL ANTE DE SER DOMINADO.

EN MEDIO DE LAS DIFICULTADES, LO UNICO QUE RECLAMA EL PATRIOTISMO ES TRABAJO. ESPIRITU DE SOLIDARIDAD Y COLABORACION PARA EL ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL ORDEN INSTITUCIONAL.

B. EXPRESO PRESIDENTE DE CORTE SUPREMA -- COMPLACENCIA DEL PODER JUDICIAL.

EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREME, ENRIQUE URRUTIA MANZANO, ENTREGO LA SIGUIENTE DECLARACION:

"EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA, EN CONOCIMIENTO DEL PROPOSITO DEL NUEVO GOBIERNO DE RESPETAR Y HACER CUMPLIR LAS DECISIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL SIN EXAMEN PROVIO DE SU LEGALIDAD, COMO LO ORDENA EL ARTICULO 11 DEL CODIGO ORGANICO DE TRIBUNALES, MANIFIESTA PUBLICAMENTE POR ELLO SU MAS INTIMA COMPLACENCIA EN NOMBRE DE LA ADMINISTRACION DE JUSTICIA DE CHILE, Y ESPERA QUE EL PODER JUDICIAL COMPLA CON SU DEBER, COMO LO HA HECHO LASTA

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

T 527885 PAGE 05 IN 028495

TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

AHORA, SANTIAGO, 12 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1973. FIRMA: ENRIQUE URRUTIA MANZANO, PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA".

C. ACTIVIDADES DE FF.AA. Y CARABINEROS --

150 CUBANOS EXTREMISTAS EXPULSADOS AYER DEL PAIS

ALLANADA UNIVERSIDAD TECNICA DEL ESTADO. TENDICION DE 600 PERSONAS.

REDUCCION DE EXTREMISTAS.

INCAUTACION DE ARMAS EN INDUSTRIAS E INSTITUCIONES BANCARIAS.

CONTROL DE LA MONEDA, TOMAS MORO Y "CANAVERAL" EN EL ARRAYAN.

CIENTO CINCUENTA CUBANOS EXTREMISTAS FUERON EXPULSADOS AYER DEL PAIS POR LA JUNTA MILITAR DE GOBIERNO, SEGUN EL BANDO NO. 26 QUE DETALLA LAS ACTIVADES PRINCIPALES DESARROLLADAS POR LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS EN LAS ULTIMAS HORAS EN LA GUARNICION DE SANTIAGO.

LA COMUNICACION SENALA QUE FUE ALLANADA LA UNIVERSIDAD TECNICA DEL ESTADO. DONDE SE RINDIERON 600 PERSONAS, Y SE ENCONTRO GRAN CANTIDAD DE ARMAMENTO, ASI COMO INDUSTRIAS, ENTIDADES BANCARLAS Y OTROS RECINTOS EN LOS CUALES LOS EFECTIVOS MILITARES SE INCAUTARON DE ARMAS Y EXPLOSIVOS...

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

15-124-52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE in Turkey

ACTION NECESSARY: Will you please decide or cause to be decided the following question: Should the National Committee for a Free Europe in its approach to Turkish authorities exploring the possibility of creating an RFE station in Turkey contact Turkish authorities as a non-governmental private Committee or as a CIA-financed institution?

Background

1. The State Department has asked that RFE not approach Turkish authorities until VOA's attempt to get into Turkey has been accepted or refused by the Turks. The Department has now given the Voice of America until 15 January to conclude its negotiations with the Turkish Government. These negotiations appear to be leading nowhere and, on the assumption that VOA will not gain entrance to Turkey, the Department has authorized RFE to begin negotiations on the above date.

2. Bob Lang, Bill Durkee and Mr. Wadsworth, former Ambassador to Turkey, as well as the NE Division have all been in on discussions as to how NCFE should approach the Turks. Mr. Wadsworth counsels that all cards be laid on the table, and he bases his reasoning on his belief that the Turks will know about it anyhow and that RFE is likely to get further if it comes clean. The NE Division on the other hand hopes that the approach can be that of a private committee and that no mention need be made of CIA's interest.

3. Your advice on the above question will not constitute approval of the building of a Turkish station or of operations from Turkey. By PRC decision at the last hearing on NCFE's budget these questions in Turkey must be brought back here for approval if the attitude of the Turks is favorable.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FUOMEN
VOL. IV

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ~~MFR~~ FUOMEN / PSYOPS CHILE

INCLUSIVE DATES: SEPT. 1973 - MAY 1974

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

TO: (Headquarters component)

C/LA/AN/C

C/IP/DMS

TO: (Station/Base)

Santiago, Chile

FROM: (Division)

C/LA

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3—ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6—ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8—USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10—ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11—A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE

☒ SUBJECT ☐ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
015	124	052

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

FUOMEN

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION

☐ OPEN FILE
☒ CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
☐ AMEND FILE TITLE
☐ REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION

☐ RETAIN
☐ DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)

HCS

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)

015

9. FILES ACTION

☐ HOLD IN CS FILES
☐ RESTRICTED
☒ UNRESTRICTED
☐ PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER
☐ CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.

A748

C/AN/C

12. COORDINATION

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL

REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

FORM 12-65 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFS 12-65

SECRET

38

1—CS COPY

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ TOTAL COPIES ___ RUN BY ___

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___ SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ___ BY ___ AT ___ Z

ACTION UNIT			STAFF			
SSS	I	RF FILE VR EUR8 588 WH8	1		4	
ACTION #	N		2		5	
	F		3		6	
	O					

T 375103 EIA916 PAGE 01-01 IN 345816

TOR:281628Z AUG 74 HAMB 25462

S E C R E T 281611Z AUG 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 25462

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE.

MHCRUNCH FUOMEN REDLEG

REF: EGGA-6103, 12 AUG 74

1. ARTICLE BY PROF. JAMES THEBERGE, PUBLISHED IN SOVIET ANALYST, VOL. 3, NO. 17, 15 AUG, ENTITLED: "KREMLIN'S HAND IN ALLENDE'S CHILE" IS IDEAL FOR PURPOSES OUTLINED IN REF. WE ATTEMPTING TO PLACE. WILL ADVISE. SUGGEST HQ INCLUDE ARTICLE IN PRESS COMMENTS.

2. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

WH/6

SECRET

RECORD COPY

28 Aug 74

15-124-52

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

No. 669923

TO: Chief, EUR Division

FROM: COS, Helsinki

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	REMARKS
	Newspaper article	FUOMEN/PSYCH Ref: HELSINKI
		22455
	Hold for [illegible]	
		E2 IMPDET

FORM 1236a. Obsolete Forms 1236 and 1236a (2-64), which may be used.
5-69

SECRET

(13-47)

Allendes misstag

— Den svenska debatten är ensidig. Man har på ett lysande sätt dokumenterat juntans grymheter men man drar ingen lärdom av utvecklingen i Allendes Chile. Det är viktigt att kunna kritisera det som var fel i utvecklingen, annars kan man inte lära sig någonting. Om man tystar ner varje form av debatt om det som var före kuppen, använder man sig av ett censurtänkande som är på samma linje som juntans, säger *Andres Küng*, journalist och författare som besökt Chile före, under och efter Allendes tid. Han har nu också givit ut en debattbok, *Att så socialism och skörda fascism.*

— Salvador Allende och "folkregeringen" Unidad Popular (folklig enhet) emotsågs med stort intresse även utomlands. Man skulle äntligen få svar på flera grundläggande frågor. Kan socialismen genomföras på fredlig väg i Latinamerika? Är marxismen i praktiken förenlig med politisk demokrati? Kan en social revolution genomföras med bevarad politisk demokrati?

— Folkfrontens program hade fyra naturtillgångar, främst kopparn, 2) ökad takt i jordreformsarbetet, 3) förstatligande av de största bank- och industriföretagen och 4) snabb ekonomisk tillväxt och omfördelning av inkomster och förmögenheter samt kamp mot inflationen.

Koppar viktig

— *Kopparn* svarar för upp till fyra femtedelar av landets export och mellan en femtedel och en tredjedel av statsintäkterna. Under åren före första världskriget gick gruvorna över i nordamerikansk ägo. I slutet av 1960-talet nationaliserades de till hälften av den kristdemokratiska Frei-regimen. Staten övertog 51 procent av aktierna. Men Freis "chilenisering" av kopparn visade sig slutligen ändå mest lönsam för de amerikanska företagen. Kopparn förstatligades genom ett tillägg till grundlagen 1971. Frågan om ersättning till de forna amerikanska ägarna hänsköts till högste statsrevisorn — men Allende och hans regering ansåg att de inte hade råd att betala kontant ersättning i dollar.

— Jordbruket svarar för mindre än en fjärdedel av sysselsättningen, vilket är mindre än i de flesta latinamerikanska och andra u-länder. Flera jordreformlagar antogs före Allende en av dem 1967 då man bestämde att alla jordegendomar över 80 "bashektar" kunde tvångsinlösas. (en bashektar = en hektar förstklassig konstbevattnad jord).

— Takten i jordreformarbetet ökade under Allendes presidenttid. Under hans första år tvångsinlöstes nästan lika mycket jord som under hela den föregående sexåriga presidentperioden. Alla stora jordegendomar uppgavs ha förstatligats 1973.

En följd av jordreformen var att lantarbetarna organiserades fackligt. En annan var jordockupationerna. De ökade nio gånger redan under Allendes första år jämfört med under Freis tid. Jordägarna började gå till motangrepp.

— Produktionen sjönk — de exproprierade gårdarna hade inte tillräckligt med maskiner, redskap, kreatur och utsäde. Den sjunkande tillgången på livsmedel och den stigande efterfrågan ledde till försörjningsproblem och prisstegringar.

— I början genomförde Allende en rad åtgärder för att skapa en jämnare fördelning av förmögenhe-

Andres Küng, journalist och författare, säger att Chile-debatten är ensidig. "Det är viktigt att även kunna kritisera det som var fel på Allendes tid annars kan man inte lära sig någonting".

svarta börsaffärer och hamstring. Penningvärdet sjönk med 163 procent.

— Under min vistelse i Santiago i början av 1973 var enbart cigarettköerna i centrum ett par kvarter långa, berättar Andres Küng.

Förlorade stödet

— De ekonomiska problemen medförde politiska problem. Allende förlorade medelklassens stöd och arbetarklassens stöd minskade. I kongressvalen behövde han majoritet — det var en nödvändig förutsättning för att han skulle kunna fortsätta att genomföra sitt program och stifta sina lagar. Han fick bara 44 procent. Maktkampen kongress — parlament — president fortsatte. Ingen ville ge vika för den andre. Allende drevs till åtgärder som inte var förenliga med demokratiska principer och gällande lagar.

— Denna utveckling tyder på att varje försök att mot flertalets vilja tvinga fram en extrem politik medför risker för polarisering av samhället som bara skulle gynna odemokratiska riktningar. En aggressiv klasspolitik, vare sig den är reaktionär eller revolutionär, kan framkalla en utveckling mot en socialistisk eller fascistisk diktatur, konstaterar Andres Küng.

— Men inga missförhållanden och misstag under Allendes tid kan användas som ursäkt för kuppen och det blodbad som sedan följde. Man kan ha olika uppfattningar om Allendes politik, men varje sann demokrat måste känna avsky för den nuvarande militärjuntan.

Flitig författare

Andres Küng är född i Gävle

14-00000

FILE TO DISSEM BY 2 TOTAL COPIES 25-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY: AT:

EUR 8 RF FILE MMS, WH8, SSS,

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 077241 EIA232 PAGE 01 IN 239973

TOR:021103Z MAY 74 HELS 22455

C O N F I D E N T I A L 020949Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE HELSINKI 22455

TO: DIRECTOR INFO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO.

FUMEN PSYCH

1. IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES, CALL ATTENTION TO NEWLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/AUTHOR ANDRES K[illegible] (UMLAUT "U") ENTITLED "TO SOW SOCIALISM AND REAP FASCISM", WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING FROM YOUNG SWEDE. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS". KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

ACTION UNIT

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 277141 EIA230 PAGE 02-02 IN 239973

TOR:021103Z MAY 74 HELS 22455

AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".

2. KUNG (DPOB: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72) EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO. HAS PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC STATES.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER TOTAL COPIES 28 RUN BY ZX

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR C/LP/ON C/EUR6 C/SS3 C/PS/EG3 C/OSG/IC C/OPS

STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

T 172681 EIA126 PAGE 01-01 IN 274496

TOR:071631Z JUN 74 SAGO 29396

S E C R E T 071544Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29396

TO: DIRECTOR INFO PARIS.

RYBAT HYSAGE

REFS: A. PARIS 48989 (IN 273492)

B. DIRECTOR 559514

1. STATION CONCURS WITH PARIS ASSESSMENT. IF ALLENDE ACTUALLY DID WANT TO SURRENDER, JUNTA COULD ONLY SUFFER FROM PUBLICIZING FACT.

2. FILE: 56-6-42/3, 201-927906. E2 IMPDET

②

T.L. FUOMEN

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY Ch PER TOTAL COPIES 27-1 RUN BY ZX

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR C/EPAW C/GRG C/OPSINTE C/SS 3 C/PS/EG 3

STAFF SP 6

T 169854 EIA366 PAGE 01 IN 273492

TOR:062019Z JUN 74 PARI 48989

C/WH/6
DC/WH/6
WH/6/
WH/6/
WH/6/
WH/6/

S E C R E T 061824Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48989

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO.

File - Tuchmen

RYBAT HYSAGE

REF: DIRECTOR 559514

1. DEFER SANTIAGO RE PARA 5 BUT WE FEEL THERE LITTLE TO BE GAINED IN PSYCH TERMS FOR EUROPEAN AUDIENCE TO ATTEMPT CLARIFY WHETHER ALLENDE KILLED WHILE FIGHTING OR ATTEMPTING SURRENDER. JUNTA'S PRESTIGE SO LOW IN EUROPEAN EYES THAT SUCH HAIR SPLITTING WOULD NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE OR COULD ACTUALLY REBOUND AGAINST JUNTA SHOULD IT EMERGE HE DIED WHILE WANTING SURRENDER.

2. SHOULD IT DEVELOP THAT FANATICS AROUND ALLENDE REFUSED ALLOW HIM SURRENDER, THEN THIS MIGHT BE ANOTHER STORY BUT THIS NOT CLEAR FROM REF AND ALSO NOT KNOWN IF GARCES COULD MAKE SUCH VERSION STICK BECAUSE OF HIS EARLY DEPARTURE FROM NATIONAL PALACE.

3. FILE: 56-6-42/3; 201-907906. E2, IMPDET

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Helsinki

INFO.
C/WH Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Santiago

SUBJECT
FUJMEN Psych

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HELSINKI 22455

If available, we would appreciate receiving four copies of Andres Kung's book mentioned in reference. E2 IMPDET.

Leslie H. BERBERIAN

Distribution:
2 COS Helsinki — To out pouch
1 C/WHD

[illegible]

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HCSA-18904	DATE 3 May 1974
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 15-124-52 Defer

NETHERLANDS

CHILEAN REFUGEES IN NETHERLANDS POINTED OUT AS FUGITIVES

/Editorial by N. van Nieuwenhuysen; Reformatorisch Dagblad, Dutch, 19 April 1974, p 5/

The Chilean refugees in the Netherlands seem to be having adjustment problems. These rather prolonged symptoms seem to be caused among other things by the fact that they still find it hard to accept that the socialist dream of their Marxist president is definitely over and that their country is now being ruled by a small group of reactionaries who are trying to keep the people under control through terrorism, repression, and torture. Such problems will take you quite a ways in the Netherlands and those idealists were quick to take advantage of it.

Welfare

What is the situation? Most of the approximately 250 refugees with a high school or university education do not work. About half of them have been housed at the "Huis ter Schie" in Overschie, where they enjoy the sunshine on the terrace or play volleyball in the yard. Board and lodging are free and at the end of the week they pick up another 25 guilders pocket money. In addition they receive free language instruction, commuter tickets for the bus, and compensation for each trip they have to take.

Do you get the idea that they are better off than many old people in the Netherlands? You are probably right, because the Chilean exiles do not have to live on welfare; they are being paid from the frozen funds which had been allocated for development aid to their fatherland, Chile. So you can see how well our tax money is being spent.

Considering that this small group of pampered exiles is preaching revolution even here and with a full stomach, it may be useful to point out a few facts. These are facts which are well known in the Ministry in The Hague but for some reason never made it to the Netherlands press.

Facts

The great majority of the refugees are not even Chilean nationals. They are natives of Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay. They came to Chile as a result of illegal and revolutionary activities in which they had been involved in these South and Middle American countries, the ultimate consequences of which they did not wish to suffer.

They felt at home in Allende's Chile because Allende showed sympathy for their situation. His first action as president, after his inauguration in November 1970, was to declare amnesty for all those who "were members of terrorist underground organizations," those who during the last months of his predecessor's regime had been charged with bank robbery, the armed robbery of self-service stores, the theft of weapons from military arsenals, kidnapping, and attempted murder.

The fact that some of those revolutionaries received Chilean diplomatic status was due to Allende's policy of granting residence permits to this type of revolutionaries. These refugees with a high school or higher level education seemed to have no adjustment problems in Chile. As a result they soon found their way to important key positions in the government.

The fugitives didn't suffer any sleepless nights in Chile either, because they felt protected by a militant Marxist army, armed to the teeth. Some 10,000 revolutionaries, from all points of the compass, were at their disposal.

Definition

In the Berner Tageblatt, a Swiss newspaper which is known for not exaggerating, Dr. Mario Puelma, from the University of Freiburg, wrote the following: "The concept of political refugee is only of limited value when applied to Chile. Whatever one's attitude toward the military junta may be, one thing is certain: the Chilean refugees were not pursued only because of their ideology, their status, or their origin. This is the traditional, humanitarian definition for a refugee. For the most part they are people who, in their own country, could be legally charged with crimes which are punishable under any judicial system.

These refugees carried out activities in Chile which were against the constitution. As a matter of fact, they are specialists in violence. This is why they sought asylum in the foreign embassies in Santiago and why there are so many foreigners among them."

8463
CSO: 8014/2087-W

Francisco heeft
angekondigd tij-
e negers zullen
en gefouilleerd
het spoor te ko-
den op voetgan-
vijf maanden.
len zonder par-
het trottoir neer-
montage is aa-
leiding van ver-
klaringen.

te zijn beland,
betere verhou-
gesprek tussen
scu bericht het
AP slechts dat
in partij-sfeer",
Brezjnjevs ont-
dere communis-
de kwalificaties
k en vriend-
Roemenië ver-
an mening over
militaire bond-
egermanoeuvres
a het Russische
isoleren.

Het Ameri-
n buitenlandse
lag exportver-
urd krachtens
dochteronder-
grote Ameri-
brieken auto's
Cuba. Deze
waarschijnlijk
aking van het
de organisatie
en tegen Cuba
mbargo.

V.S.-economie loopt terug

WASHINGTON — De Amerikaanse regering heeft donderdag bekend gemaakt dat de nationale economie veel krachtiger is teruggelopen, in het eerste kwartaal van dit jaar, dan was verwacht. Prijzen stegen bovendien met meer dan tien procent.

Het bruto nationale produkt verminderde in het eerste kwartaal met een jaar-percentage van 5,8 Dit is de eerste keer sinds 1970 dat het bruto nationale produkt is verminderd en het is de scherpste daling in 16 jaar. De vermindering van het bruto nationale produkt met 5.8 procent moet vergeleken worden met een schatting van tussen de 3 en 4 procent, zoals die door de regering was gedaan. In het laatste kwartaal van het vorig jaar nam het bruto nationale produkt toe met 1,6 procent.

MINISTERS KRIJGEN HUISARREST

Ethiopische leger uit scherpe verwijten

ETHIOPISCH LEGER

ADDIS ABEBA — Premier Endalkachew Makonnen van Ethiopië heeft donderdag bekendgemaakt dat de leden van de regering die eind februari door de strijdkrachten gedwongen werd af te treden, huisarrest hebben egen.

Volgens de Ethiopische radio heeft Makkonen dit gezegd op een bijeenkomst in Addis Abeba van rond 2.000 officieren en manschappen. De premier zou naar de bijeenkomst ontboden zijn door de strijdkrachten die hem hadden laten weten dat het leger gedwongen zou zijn in te grijpen als er niet onmiddellijk tegen de ministers werd opgetreden.

Het leger verwijt de ministers dat zij het land in een economische chaos hebben gestort, zich op onwettige wijze verrijkt hebben en na hun aftreden hebben samengezworen om verdeeldheid te zaaien.

PLANNEN

Makonnen gaf op de bijeenkomst een uitvoerige uiteenzetting van de hervormingsplannen van zijn regering. Hij prees de strijdkrachten voor hun voorbeeldig gedrag en deed een beroep op hen een voorbeeld te geven van de tucht die nodig is voor het land in de moeilijke dagen die nog zullen komen. De premier zou het huisarrest van de voormalige ministers bekend hebben gemaakt toen hem de vraag werd gesteld waarom een arme Ethiopiër die een brood heeft gestolen, onmiddellijk de gevangenis ingaat, terwijl de ex-ministers die ernstige misdaden zouden hebben begaan, niet voor de rechtbank worden gedaagd en maar ongehinderd op straat rondlopen.

Makonnen zei dat er een commissie is benoemd die een onderzoek moet instellen naar het gedrag van de voormalige ministers.

POLITIE

In de stad Asmara heeft de politie bekendgemaakt dat zij geen routinewerk meer zal verrichten, omdat haar eis tot ontslag van het landelijke hoofd van de politie, luitenant-generaal Yilma Shibeshi, niet is ingewilligd. Voorts hebben de 1.200 spoorwegmannen die woensdag in staking zijn gegaan, de vrachtauto's tegengehouden die goederen van Asmara naar de havenstad Massawa zouden brengen.

Arbeidsonrust in Canada

OTTAWA — De posterijen, het commerciële luchtverkeer en het scheepvaartverkeer op de St.-Lawrence rivier in Canada zijn verlamd door een staking die het land dagelijks enkele miljoenen dollars kost. De arbeidsonrust duurt nu al meer dan een week en zal volgens de Canadese parlementaire oppositie de inflatie, die momenteel jaarlijks 10 procent bedraagt, bevorderen.

Door wilde stakingen is de helft van alle postkantoren in het land gesloten ten gevolge van solidariteitsstakingen. De moeilijkheden be-

Liberaal Kennedy aan het woord

Opgemerkt

Chili

De Chileense vluchtelingen in Nederland schijnen „aanpassingsproblemen" te hebben. Dit nogal langdurige verschijnsel blijkt ondermeer veroorzaakt te worden doordat zij het nog steeds niet kunnen verkroppen dat de socialistische droom van de Marxistische president definitief voorbij is en dat hun land nu beheerst wordt door een kleine groep reactionairen die met terreur, onderdrukking en folteringen probeert het volk onder de duim te houden. Met zo'n lange volzin kom je een heel eind in Nederland en dit hadden deze idealisten al gauw in de gaten.

VERZORGING

Want wat is het geval? Werken doen de meeste van de ongeveer 250 vluchtelingen van middelbaar en universitair niveau niet. Ongeveer de helft van hen is ondergebracht in het „Huis ter Schie" in Overschie, waar zij op het terras genieten van de zon of volleybal spelen in de tuin. Kost en inwoning zijn gratis en aan het einde van de week vangen zij ook nog eens vijfentwintig gulden zakgeld. Daarbij krijgen zij nog gratis taalcursussen, een rittenkaart voor de bus en een vergoeding voor elke reis die zij moeten maken.

Door

N. van Nieuwenhuysen

U vindt dat zij het beter hebben als menig Nederlands bejaarde? Waarschijnlijk hebt u gelijk, want de Chileense ballingen behoeven niet van de bijstand te leven; zij worden namelijk gefinancierd door de geblokkeerde gelden voor ontwikkelingshulp aan hun vaderland Chili. Zo ziet u maar hoe goed ons belastinggeld wordt besteed.

Daar dit in de watten gelegde groepje ballingen zelfs hier nog met volle maag de revolutie predikt is het misschien nuttig enige feiten te noemen. Feiten die op het ministerie in Den Haag welbekend zijn, maar om de een of andere reden nooit de pers in Nederland halen.

FEITEN

De vluchtelingen hebben voor het overgrote deel niet eens de Chileense nationaliteit. *Zij zijn afkom-*



BELGRADO — De Amerikaanse senator Edward Kennedy heeft donderdagavond op een persconferentie in de Zuidslavische hoofdstad Belgrado de vlootoefeningen van de NAVO veroordeeld die onlangs in het noorden van de Adriatische Zee zijn gehouden.

Deze oefeningen hebben het geschil tussen Italië en Zuidslavië over de zogenaamde „zone B" ten zuiden van Triëst verscherpt. Kennedy noemde het geen afdoende reden dat de oefening niet kon worden afgelast omdat ze al verscheidene maanden tevoren in voorbereiding waren genomen. De Amerikaanse senator is donderdag na een bezoek van drie dagen, tijdens hetwelk hij besprekingen voerde met onder meer president Tito, naar de Sovjet-Unie doorgereisd. Hij zei „zeer onder de indruk" te zijn van zijn gesprekken met het Zuidslavische staatshoofd.

20 werknemers schorste omdat zij T-shirts droegen, waarop het publiek werd verzocht de Canadese posterijen te boycotten. De werknemers willen looneisen stellen, maar de overheid weigert te onderhandelen totdat iedereen weer aan het werk is.

138 loodsen op de St.-Lawrence rivier, die voor alle scheepvaartverkeer zorgen tussen Montreal en Quebeck zijn al een week in staking omdat zij een onmiddelijke loonsverhoging eisen van 29.000 tot 38.000 dollar per jaar. De regering heeft hen 35.000 dollar geboden over een periode van drie jaar en zoekt momenteel naar mogelijkheden om de loodsen te dwingen het werk te hervatten.

Ook het luchthaven personeel eist loonsverhoging van rond de 3000 dollar. De acht grootste luchthavens van het land hebben de afgelopen week op halve kracht gewerkt. Verder dreigt een staking van de verkeersleiders.

zich in deze Zuid- en Midden-Amerikaanse landen hadden bezig gehouden met onwettige en revolutionaire gedragingen waarvoor zij de uiteindelijke consequenties niet wensten te dragen.

In het Chili van Allende voelden zij zich thuis omdat Allende begrip toonde voor hun gedrag. Zijn eerste daad als president, toen hij in november 1970 geïnstalleerd was, bestond namelijk uit het afkondigen van amnestie voor al diegenen, die „lid waren van een terroristische ondergrondse organisatie", voor hen die in de laatste maanden onder zijn voorganger waren aangeklaagd voor het beroven van banken, gewelddadige overvallen op zelfbedieningswinkels, diefstal van wapens uit militaire depots, ontvoeringen en moordaanslagen.

Dat sommigen van deze revolutionairen Chileens diplomatieke status kregen is ook verklaarbaar als men weet dat de regering van Allende een beleid voerde dat er op gericht was om juist verblijfsvergunningen te geven aan dit type revolutionairen. Deze vluchtelingen van middelbaar en hoger niveau bleken namelijk in Chili geen „aanpassingsmoeilijkheden" te hebben. Zij vonden dan ook weldra hun weg naar belangrijke sleutelposities in de regering.

Slapeloze nachten hadden de "vervolgden" in Chili ook niet, omdat zij zich beschermd voelden door een tot de tanden gewapend militant-Marxistisch soldatenleger. Zo'n 10.000 revolutionairen uit alle windstreken stonden hen ter beschikking.

DEFINITIEF

In het „Berner Tagblatt" een Zwitserse krant die zich niet aan overdrijving schuldig maakt, schrijft dr. Mario Puelma van de Freiburgse Universiteit: „Het concept van de politieke vluchteling kan met betrekking tot Chili slechts in zeer beperkte mate gelden. Hoe men ook mag staan tegenover de militaire junta, een ding is zeker: de Chileense vluchtelingen werden niet alleen vervolgd voor hun ideologie, status of afkomst. Dit laatste is de traditionele humanitaire definitie van een vervolgde. Voor het grootste deel zijn het mensen die in hun eigen land wettelijk aangeklaagd kunnen worden voor misdaden die onder elk rechtsbestel strafbaar zijn.

Deze vluchtelingen voerden in Chili daden uit die in strijd waren met de grondwet. In feite zijn het specialisten in geweld. Om deze redenen zochten zij asiel op de buitenlandse ambassades in Santiago en daarom bevinden zich zoveel buitenlanders onder hen."

lijk halfrond

ver Cuba
ington

oen donder-
n ministers
alfrond in
genodigd op
olgend jaar

en van het wes-
exico-stad twee
ar had zich niet
uw in de prul-
. Minister Kis-
lijk zeker van
nigde Staten in
te zijn in verle-
vragen omtrent
bijeenkomst te
enkomst wordt
n de organisatie
en op vrijdag in

EMBARGO

ué waarmee de
omst hebben af-
over Cuba ge-
hts economische
neden. Niettemin
memers dat het
ultaat van de
ington is, dat de
eld lijken te zijn
rgobeleid tegen
matigen. Wat de
en de verschillen
erika en de La-
den gebleven te

voor afschaffing
mmeringen maar

nalaten te voorkomen dat de invoer uit Latijns-Amerika nog meer aan beperkingen onderhevig wordt gemaakt.

Irak krijgt parlement

BAGDAD — Irak krijgt voor het eerst sedert de revolutie van 1958 een volksvertegenwoordiging. Het presidium van het „progressieve nationale front" heeft hiertoe besloten, zo is donderdag bekendgemaakt. Wanneer de volksvertegenwoordiging er komt en of die tot stand zal komen voor algemene verkiezingen, is nog niet besloten. In Bagdad staat een groot gebouw voor een nationale vergadering maar het is nog nooit gebruikt. De socialistische Baas-partij en de communisten werken samen in het progressieve nationale front.

GOUDPRODUKTIE ACHTERUIT

Grote onrust onder mijnwerkers in Z.-Afrika

JOHANNESBURG — In de afgelopen weken is moord en doodslag in de Zuidafrikaanse goudmijnen onder de zwarte mijnwerkers tot een zorgbarende omvang uitgegroeid. De jongste balans van bloedige stamtwisten tussen gastarbeiders uit Lesotho en de Xhosa's in de goudmijn Carletonville, bij Johannesburg, luidt: tien doden en drie en zestig gewonden.

De meeste slachtoffers waren gruwelijk verminkt. Slaapplaatsen werden vernield, met benzine overgoten en in brand gestoken. Vluchtende mijnwerkers zijn volgens ooggetuigen doodgeschoten.

Tienduizend Basotho's hebben sinds februari hun werkterrein in Zuid-Afrika in de steek gelaten en zijn naar hun veilige bergachtige vaderland Lesotho teruggekeerd. Vele andere zijn van plan ook naar Lesotho terug te gaan. Na de Basotho's vrezen thans de mijnwerkers uit Malawi aan de beurt te zijn.

INSPRAAK

Woordvoerders van de zwarte mijnwerkers verklaren, dat de mijnwerkers niets in te brengen hebben tegenover de blanke leiding van de mijnen en niets aan de arbeidsom-

zegt te weten waarom de mijnwerkers elkaar doodslaan. „Hun vertegenwoordigers weten het niet en ik betwijfel, of de arbeiders zelf het wel weten", aldus de bedrijfsleider.

Velen menen, dat ingewortelde

stammen-vijandschap de oorzaak is van de onlusten. Daarbij komt dat bij de huidige woningnood een nietige aanleiding voldoende is om de haat tegen de gastarbeiders tot een explosie te brengen. De mijnmaatschappijen hebben zich tot dusver verzet tegen de eis, de zwarte mijnwerkers te groeperen naar de streken waar zij vandaan komen. Zij menen, dat dan nog grotere onlusten zouden ontstaan. Het zou zelfs tot „slachtpartijen" kunnen komen. Intussen gaat de goudproduktie achteruit. In Lesotho zit de regering met het probleem van de broodeloos geworden teruggekeer-

OUTGOING MESSAGE
35-3

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 302240Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 556999

CONF: EUR 7 INFO: FILE IP/AN, WH 7) 555, OPS/INT
PS/EG 4, OSG/IC, OPS/ITG 5

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 46 (66)

C/WH/6
DC/WH/6
WH/6/SA
WH/6/FI
WH/6/RR
WH/6/Secy T. A. Fugmeir

TO: BONN BASE INFO BONN, SANTIAGO, HAMBURG.Y

FUONYX CAQUARRY TOFOCUS Y

REFS: A. BONN BASE 31991 (IN 262014)

B. DIRECTOR 518657 Y

1. FOR REF A FEATURE, SUGGEST BASE PROVIDE CAQUARRY WITH APPROPRIATE INFO ON RE██FUGEES AVAILABLE IN NUMEROUS HQS TRACE CABLES SENT BONN. WE ARE UNABLE█ IDENTIFY ANY REFUGEES LIVING IN GERMANY UNDER FALSE IDENTITY.Y

2. AIRMAILING TO █2ROUTSAS BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON LEFTIST █████ EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME, INCLUDING:Y

A. LCBEFORE PRESS SUMMARIES OF FRONT ACTIVITIES.Y

B. NEWS BULLETIN█ PUBLISHED BY BRITISH CHILE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE, WHICH CONTAINS "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION AND A SECTION GIVING CHILEAN REFUGEE QUOTAS BY COUNTRY.Y

C. ARTICLES RE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON CHILE, HELD ROME, APRIL 74.Y

D. MAY 1974 WIENER TAGEBUCH ARTICLE ON CHILE BLACK BOOK.Y

█ E██. APRIL 1974 FRANKFURT-STADT RUNDSCHAU ARTICLE RE CHILEAN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

556999

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL. ↲

3. WE ARE UNABLE SUGGEST KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSON OF STATURE FOR INTERVIEW ON LEFTIST EFFORT DISCRE■D■IT REGIME. AS ALTERNATIVE, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR NETWORK REPORTER MIGHT SEEK INTERVIEW OF DR. MARIO PUELMA, PROFESSOR OF CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY AT FREIBURG UNIVERSITY, WHO WROTE TWO-PART ARTICLE IN ■■15-16 JANUARY ISSUES OF BERN DAILY BERNER TAGBLATT ON SUBJECT CHILEAN REFUGEES. IN ARTICLES PUELMA GIVES BACKGROUND OF TERRORIST MOVEMENT IN CHILE AS IT DEVELOPED AS RESULT OF ALLENDE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CITES EXAMPLES OF "REFUGEES" AND THEIR ACTIVITIES TO SHOW THAT "TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF POLITICAL REFUGEE, WITH RESPECT TO CHILE, CAN BE APPLIED ONLY IN VERY LIMITED SENSE..." (SEE QRPEG ■026, REF B, FOR ~~SUMMARY OF~~ QUOTES FROM ARTICLES.) RSR

4. SUGGEST FEATURE INCLUDE POINT THAT EFFORT TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME IS ENCOURAGE■ D, IF NOT ORCHESTRATED, BY SOVIET FRONTS AND THAT PUBLICITY GENERATED BY "SOLIDARITY" CAMPAIGN (E.G., "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION OF BRITISH COMMITTEE BULLETIN) HAS I■NTIMIDATING EFFECT PRECLUDING OBJECTIVITY. BE■NEATH SUPERFICIAL SHOW OF "SOLIDARITY," EUROPEAN LEFTISTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING CRIMINAL/

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB.

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AUG	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO
0	0	0	0	0	0

OMF

PAGE OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
556999

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 DISSEM BY:
0
0 PER
0 #

TERRORIST "REFUGEES" IN EUROPE, AND COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN CRITICALLY ANALYZING EVENTS LEADING TO CHILE COUP AND REASSESSING THEIR OWN PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY DEALING WITH NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES AND ASSUMING POWER BY NON-VIOLENT MEANS. MIGHT ALSO MAKE POINT THAT WITH VIETNAM NO LONGER AN ISSUE, CHILE REPRESENTS ONE FOCUS FOR ENGENDERING UNITY BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST LEFT IN WESTERN EUROPE.

5. FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON EXTREME LEFTIST VIEWS/ACTIVITY, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR ZDF REPORTER MIGHT CONTACT "SOCIALIST BUREAU," SPONSOR OF SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL. (SEE BONN 31174 AND BONN 31869). (227179) (257016) FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON JUNTA VIEWS, SUGGEST CONTACT DEUTSCH-CHILENISCHER BUND [redacted] (SEE BERLIN 21306, OCT 73). (276994)

6. FILE: 200-126-107/11. E2 IMPDET.

for AC/SS/CAG/PSB Barbara Baldwin
E/ROG
E/G
WH/6
WH/CA

DATE: 30 MAY 1974
ORIG: CONNIE MOORE:SRM
UNIT: E/CAG
EXT: 6640/1389

E/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/E/CAG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 004244

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER

TOTAL COPIES 28 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT EA4

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR SB8, OSG/OC, C/OPS, OSG/IC C/SI WH8 PLAN

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 149793 E1A650 PAGE 01 IN 265992

TOR:321144Z MAY 74 BANG 59314

S E C R E T 321122Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE BANGKOK 59314

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO.

REDLEG AEFISH

REFS: A. BANGKOK 59065 (IN 260348)

B. DIRECTOR 554557

C/WH/6
DC/WH/6 w
WH/6/SA
WH/6/FI
WH/6/RR
WH/6/Secy Fil FUSMEN

1. MILTON C. REPOUSH AND RALPH K. TOLGIEN MET WITH EMILIO GALETZKI ON 25 MAY AND PASSED REF B INFO. TOLGIEN HAD FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH GALETZKI ON 29 MAY TO DISCUSS HIS ENCOUNTER WITH ARTHUR CUNNING.

2. GALETZKI MET CUNNING AT HOME OF ROBERT B. HARTFORD, U.S. CITIZEN EMPLOYED IN POPULATION DIVISION OF ECAFE. HARTFORD IS PRO-ALLENDE AND ORGANIZED SMALL SOCIAL GATHERING OF INTERESTED PERSONS TO MEET CUNNING AND DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE. CUNNING IS DESCRIBED AS ABOUT FORTY YEARS OLD, BLACK HAIR, FULL BEARD AND AVERAGE BUILD. HE IS A DEMOGRAPHER EMPLOYED BY UNITED NATIONS AT CENTRO LATINO AMERICANO DE DESARROLLO (CELADE) IN SANTIAGO. HE ARRIVED CHILE IN OCTOBER 1972 WITH HIS WIFE. CUNNING DEPARTED BANGKOK 27 MAY FOR DELHI, KATHMANDU AND NEW YORK AND PLANNED RETURN SANTIAGO APPROX 20 JUNE.

3. CUNNING TALKED VERY LITTLE ABOUT ALLENDE REGIME AND

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 149793 EIA650 PAGE 02 IN 265992

TOR:221144Z MAY 74 BANG 59314

CONCENTRATED ON DISPARAGING PRESENT REGIME. CLAIMED THERE THOUSANDS OF REPRISAL KILLINGS BY ARMY, RUN AWAY INFLATION, SHORTAGE OF GOODS AND GENERAL REPRESSION BY REGIME. CUNNING VERY SUBJECTIVE IN STATEMENTS AND HAD FEW FACTS TO BACK UP STATEMENTS. WHEN GALETZKI ASKED CUNNING HOW HE KNEW THERE "THOUSANDS OF KILLINGS", CUNNING CLAIMED "THERE IS CIA REPORT WHICH STATES OVER TWENTY THOUSAND HAD BEEN KILLED." GALETZKI FOUND PORTIONS OF REF B INFO USEFUL IN REFUTING CUNNING STATEMENTS. HOWEVER GALETZKI'S TEMPER GOT THE BEST OF HIM HALF WAS THROUGH MEETING AND FRIEND SUGGESTED THAT HE REFRAIN FROM ARGUING WITH CUNNING LEST THE SITUATION BECOME VIOLENT.

4. GALETZKI TELEXED REPORT ON CUNNING TO HIS EMBASSY IN TOKYO. HE TOLD TOLGIEN WOULD PASS HIM ANY FEED BACK INFO ON CUNNING HE MIGHT RECEIVE.

5. REQUEST POA AND 201 ON GALETZKI TO DEVELOP AND RECRUIT AS MOLIMBER ASSET TARGETTED PRIMARILY ON AEFISH. TOLGIEN WILL UTILIZE COVER AS AIR FORCE CIVILIAN ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY AS ANALYST DURING DEVELOPMENT.

6. FIL: 201-795277, 201-GALETZKI. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 3B PER

TOTAL COPIES 30 RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR c/elnin, c/ss3. c/ss/sg 3.

DDO.

STAFF 1 2 3

IN 28551

T 148171 EIA272 PAGE 01-01

TOR:292152Z MAY 74

C/WH/6 TC

DC/WH/6 [illegible]

WH/6/SA

WH/6/FI

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

File. FUOMEN

Return to K.

S E C R E T 292140Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29314

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PSYCH

REF: DIRECTOR 553537

1. FUERMINE-3 HAS CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONTACT WITH LOCAL OFFICES OF MAJOR WIRE SERVICES. WE TASKING HIM WITH COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF REPS HERE AS WELL AS SPOTTING AND ASSESSMENT INFO ON WHO MIGHT BE DISPOSED TO COLLABORATE WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT.

2. STATION ALSO EXPLORING REF WITH FUTRUNK-1 AND FUACME-16.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

14-00000

71 MFG. 11-73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 22 PER   TOTAL COPIES 26-1 RUN

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED   BY   AT   Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT EUR8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR PLAN, WH8, SS5,

T 142756 EIA997 PAGE 01-01 IN 263354

TOR:280955Z MAY 74 HELS 22538

CONFIDENTIAL 280851Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE HELSINKI 22538

TO: SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

FUOMEN PSYCH

REF: HCSA 18904

1. LARGEST LOCAL BOOK STORE HAS BOOK ON ORDER. WHEN RECEIVED, STATION CAN BUY AND POUCH COPIES PER REF. HOWEVER, WISH POINT OUT, IF SANTIAGO NOT ALREADY AWARE, THAT BOOK IN SWEDISH. IF COPIES STILL DESIRED AND SANTIAGO WISHES OBTAIN EARLIER, SUGGEST STOCKHOLM STATION BE ASKED BUY SINCE BOOK SHOULD BE READILY AVAILABLE IN SWEDEN.

2. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

RDR

X

WH/6

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
28 May 74

CONFIDENTIAL

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 302

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT EUR8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR ITAN WH8 SS6 PSIEG4 OPSINT

T 137606 EIA065 PAGE 01 IN 262014

TOR:241716Z MAY 74 BNNB 31991

C/WH/6 ____

DC/WH/6 ____

WH/6/SA ____

WH/6/FI ____

WH/6/RR ____

WH/6/Sec'y ____

SECRET 241627Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE BONN BASE 31991

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN, HAMBURG.

FUONYX CAQUARRY TOFOCUS

REF BONN BASE 31516 (IN 241838)

F2.
FUOMEN

1. CAQUARRY ADVISED ZDF MAGAZIN PLANNING ANOTHER FEATURE ON CHILE FOCUSING ON CHILEAN POLITICAL REFUGEES IN WEST GERMANY. CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE EXPOSE REVOLUTIONARY/CRIMINAL BACKGROUND OF SOME OF REFUGEES AND IDENTIFY ANY LIVING IN GERMANY UNDER FALSE IDENTITY. ALSO INTERESTED FOCUSING ON WORLD-WIDE LEFTIST EFFORT DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME. AS PART FEATURE CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ZDF INTERVIEW A PERSON KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOVE. IDEALLY SUBJECT SHOULD BE PERSON OF SOME STATURE. INTERVIEW CAN BE MADE LATIN AMERICA, NORTH AMERICA, OR IN EUROPE. SECURITY NOT A PROBLEM AS CAQUARRY WILL SIMPLY ASSIGN NETWORK REPORTER TO MAKE INTERVIEW ON NONWITTING BASIS USING QUESTIONS CAQUARRY WILL PROVIDE.

2. ALSO APPRECIATE ANY BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO CAQUARRY. GERMAN LANGUAGE MATERIAL MOST USEFUL SINCE CAQUARRY HAS NO ENGLISH OR SPANISH CAPABILITY.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 137606 EIA065 PAGE 02-02 IN 262014

TOR:241716Z MAY 74 BNNB 31991

3. RE PARA 2 REF, STILL ON "PER DU" BASIS MATTHOEFER RECENTLY CONTACTED CAQUARRY TO ASK HIM MAKE PUBLIC RETRACTION OF PARA 2 STATEMENT. CAQUARRY REFUSED AND SUGGESTED MATTHOEFER INSTITUTE LIBEL SUIT. MATTHOEFER QUICKLY BACKED DOWN. INCIDENTALLY, IN APPARENT BONE TO LEFT-WING SPD, HQS WILL NOTE THAT MATTHOEFER HAS BEEN APPOINTED MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER NEW GOVERNMENT.

4. FILE: 201-0230705; X-REF 201-0903816. E2-IMPDET.

14-00000

FORM [illegible]
[illegible] 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 33-1 RUN BY

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT: EUR 8

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR IPAN, SS5, SB8, WH8

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 125861 EIA160 PAGE 01-01 IN 251122

TOR:141022Z MAY 74 STOC 15691

S E C R E T 142938Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE STOCKHOLM 15691

TO: DIRECTOR INFO HELSINKI.

FUOMEN PSYCH

REF: A. DIRECTOR 549305

B. HELSINKI 22455 (IN 239973)

1. NO STATION TRACES KYUNG.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

Fil FUOMEN

C/WH/6 ______

DC/WH/6 ______

WH/6/SA ______

WH/6/FI ______

WH/6/RR ______

WH/6/Sec'y ______

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 3B PER

TOTAL COPIES 33-2 RUN BY 2

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IPLAN, WH8, SSS, C/OPS, PS/EG 4, OSG/OC, C/OPS.

IN 250476

T 103782 EIA146 PAGE 01

TOR:131851Z MAY 74 SAGO 29117

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6

WH/6/SA

WH/6/FI

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

S E C R E T 131621Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29117 (JABAUT ACTING)

TO: PARIS INFO DIRECTOR,

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: A. DIRECTOR 549348

B. PARIS 48390 (IN 250176)

Fl. FUOMEN

1. AGREE WITH REF B RECOMMENDATION TO AWAIT OUTCOME OF FRENCH ELECTION BEFORE DECIDING IF AND HOW TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1. IN MAKING THAT DECISION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED:

A. WHILE STATION HAS CAPABILITY VIA FUTRUNK-1 (IDEN FOR PARIS), RECENTLY RECRUITED SALARIED AGENT, TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1 IN OBTAINING INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT OUR INTERVENTION NO MATTER HOW SUBTLE, WOULD VERY PROBABLY IDENTIFY UNSOBER-1 TO FUTRUNK-1 AS AGENCY COLLABORATOR.

B. THE CHILEAN GOVT IS VERY SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN PRESS CRITICISM AND WOULD LOOK UNHAPPILY ON ANY T.V. PROGRAM WHICH REFLECTS BADLY ON GOVT, REGARDLESS OF HOW SLIGHT THE CRITICISM MIGHT BE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO OBTAIN

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 103782 EIA146 PAGE 02-02 IN 250476

TOR:1318512 MAY 74 SAGO 29117

FUTRUNK-1'S ASSISTANCE FOR ANY PROGRAM WHICH COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING TO HIM.

2. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACS	COI	ACP	TOD	TPS	MRO
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0

30-2

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 102248Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 549348

CONF: EUR 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, WH 8, SS-5, PS/EG 4, C/PR-2

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 49

TO: SANTIAGO INFO PARIS.Y

TOFOCUS UNSOBER Y

REF: OFAA-2356, 9 APRIL 74 (NOT NEEDED SANTIAGO)Y

1. TOFOCUS ACTIVITY SEEKS TO DEVELOP ASSETS TO INFLUENCE NEWS AND OTHER PROGRAMMING WITH POLITICAL CONTENT IN EUROPEAN TV SERVICES. IN FRANCE THIS HAS BEEN PARTICULARBLY TOUGH NUT TO CRACK, BUT PARIS STATION HAS MADE RECENT PROGRESS WITH UNSOBER/1. THIS FORMER STAFF JOURNALIST FOR PRESTIGIOUS FRENCH NEWS WEEKLY L'EXPRESS RECENTLY COMPLETED A 30-MINUTE REPORTAGE ON CURRENT EVENTS IN WEST GERMANY. IT WAS WELL RECEIVED AND RESULTED IN HIS BEING TAPPED TO DO SECOND 30-MINUTE PROGRAM. AS UNSOBER/1 APPEARS TO BE ON WAY TO POSITION OF SUBSTANCE WITHIN FRENCH TELEVISION, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST HIS RISE AND INSURE THAT PARIS STATION'S MOST PROMISING TOFOCUS ASSET ACHIEVES MOST INFLUENTIAL STATUS POSSIBLE. TO THIS END IT WOULD BE OF VALUE IF UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE.Y

WH/C/CA ______
WH/C/FI ______
WH/C/RR ______
WH/C/Cosy ______

File -
FUCHEN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
2 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
549348

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

2. THE REPORTAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE DESIGNED FOR 30-MINUTE AIRING, AND WOULD HOPEFULLY CONTAIN FILMED INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND VISIT TO DAWSON ISLAND. WHILE WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE FIRST INTERVIEW GRANTED TO FRENCH JOURNALIST BY THE HEAD OF RULING JUNTA (THUS BIG BOOST FOR UNSOBER/1), WE UNDERSTAND PINOCHET HAS GRANTED OTHER INTERVIEWS AND ALLOWED FILMING ON DAWSON ISLAND. PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CAREFULLY DISCUSSED WITH UNSOBER/1, AND HE HAS SAID REPORTAGE WOULD BE FAVORABLE BUT NOT TOTALLY UNCRITICAL--BEST TREATMENT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT COULD HOPE FOR IN FRANCE.Y

3. TO OBTAIN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND OTHER JUNTA LEADERS AND/OR PERMISSION [illegible]FILM CONDITIONS ON DAWSON ISLAND AND ELSEWHERE IN CHILE, UNSOBER/1 HAS ASKED FOR BKHERALD ASSISTANCE. UNSOBER/1 IS CONFIDENT THAT SUPERIORS WOULD APPROVE PROGRAM IF UNSOBER/1 COULD ASSURE THEM THAT HE WOULD BE GRANTED INTERVIEWS, ETC.Y

4. PLEASE ADVISE WHAT ASSISTANCE SANTIAGO STATION CAN PROVIDE TO UNSOBER/1.Y

5. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 8 MAY 1974
ORIG: DAN WAGNER:LD
UNIT: E/F/INT
EXT: 9111

C/E/CA

C/WH Herbert W. Natzke
RELEASING OFFICER

DC/WH/6
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/E/F
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPROC ION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS HIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 055747

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 321

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COT	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

6

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE TIME GROUP: 102239Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 549305

CONF: EUR8 INFO: FILE 11/AN. SB8. WH8. 555

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: STOCKHOLM INFO HELSINKI, SANTIAGO. Y

FUOMEN PSYCH Y

REF: HELSINKI 22455 (IN 239973) Y

1. A FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICER (AECLUSTER) REPORTED THAT THE NAME OF ONE ANDRES ALEKSANDROVICH KYUNG, BORN 1945, NATURALIZED SWEDISH CITIZEN, APPEARED ON SOVIET VISA BLACKLIST AND HE TO BE DENIED VISA TO USSR. NO REASON GIVEN FOR THIS DENIAL BY MFA. (DOI: MID-1971). NO OTHER TRACE HQS FILES. Y

2. STOCKHOLM: PLS FURNISH TRACES SUBJECT REF. Y

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.H

DC/WH
WH/6/SA
WH/[illegible]
WH/[illegible]
WH/[illegible]

WH/6 (CHILE)- J. K.
SB/X/EU- Joe Herman

File: FUOMEN

DATE: 10 MAY 74
ORIG: MARIA C. WALSH/JD
UNIT: E/SC/S
EXT: 1588

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/E/SC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 008234

FORM 3020
2-71 MFG. 11-73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____

STAFF

ACTION UNIT EUR8

INFO RF, FILE VR IP/AN, WH8, OSG/OC
C/OPS SSS

ACTION #

T 123294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6

WH/6/C

WH/6/FI

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

S E C R E T 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

F.b.
FUOHEN

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HQS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

14-00000

FORM 3020b
21 AUG. 11 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT
EUR8

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR IP/AN, WH8, OSG/OC,
C/OPS SSS

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 103294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

SECRET 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HQS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

SECRET

FORM 3020b
2/71 REV. 11 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER TOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT

ACTION UNIT	INFO			STAFF			
EUR8		RF FILE VR	IP/AN, WH8, OSG/OC	1		4	
			C/OPS SS5	2		5	
ACTION #				3		6	

T 133294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

S E C R E T 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HOS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

FORM 30706
7/1 MFG. 11 73

24/838

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 35 PER TOTAL COPIES 30·2 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT EUR 8

INFO RID FILE VR IP/AN, SSS, PS/EG4 OPS/INT, WH8

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

24/838-A

T 100017 EIA220 PAGE 01 IN ~~249248~~

TOR:110024Z MAY 74 BNNB 31516

SECRET 031429Z MAY 74 STAFF

C/WH/6
DC/WH/6
WH/6/3
WH/6/SI
WH/6/RR
WH/6/Soc'y

#132 DUPE & CORRECTED FOR WASH S/C NOTE.

FUTOMEN

CITE BONN BASE 31516

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, PARIS.

CATHATCH CAQUARRY TOFOCUS FUOYNX

REF: BONN BASE 31234 (IN 230053)

1. 1 MAY ZDF MAGAZIN WITH CAQUARRY AS MODERATOR CARRIED 15 MINUTE FEATURE ON CHILE, A THEME LONG DISCUSSED WITH CAQUARRY. MAIN PART FEATURE WAS INTERVIEW WITH SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN, FRIEDRICH BEERMANN (SUBJECT REF) WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM VISIT CHILE AND SPOKE WITH GENERAL PINOCHET. BEERMANN STRESSED THAT ALLENDE GOVERNMENT HAD RULED ILLEGALLY, CONDITIONS NOT AS BAD AS THEY SEEM AND THAT OVERALL CHILEAN POPULATION FAVORED ALLENDE'S OVERTHROW. SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT INTERVIEW WITH SPD POLITICIAN AND SPD, AS INFLUENCED BY ITS LEFT WING, HAS BEEN STRONGLY ANTI-JUNTA.

2. HANS MATTHOEFER, LEFT WING SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN AND STATE SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION, HAS BEEN LEADING GERMAN OPPOSITION TO JUNTA AND ALSO TRYING BLOCK ECONOMIC AID. DRAWING ON FUAWL/5 BACKGROUND INFO (SEE EGN-5363, NOV 73) WE HAVE DISCUSSED MATTHOEFER IN DETAIL WITH CAQUARRY

SECRET

FORM 3020b
1 71 MFG. 11 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________BY____AT________Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

IN 241838

~~IN 247248~~

T 100217 EIA000 PAGE 02-02

TOR:110024Z MAY 74 BNNB 31516

QUESTIONING HIS MOTIVATION IN STRONG SUPPORT ALLENDE AND EVEN STRONGER CONDEMNATION OF JUNTA. BY COINCIDENCE CAQUARRY ON PER "DU" BASIS WITH MATTHOEFER (NOT FOR SAME POLITICAL IDEALS) AND WELL AWARE MATTHOEFER BACKGROUND INVOLVMENT LEFT WING ACTIVITIES. END OF CHILE FEATURE CARRIED STATEMENT BY CAQUARRY THAT IT STRANGE MATTHOEFER CONDONED ALLENDE GOVT USE OF FORCE AS NECESSARY WHILE HE IS PRESENTLY VOCIFEROUS IN CONDEMNING JUNTA ACTIVITIES. STATEMENT SERVED EMPHASIZE SPD NON-OBJECTIVITY IN DEALING WITH CHILE.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON MATTHOEFER. SUGGEST OPEN 201 SINCE HE ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL LEFT WING SPDERS AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE INVOLVED IN ANY FUTURE POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN RIGHT AND LEFT WINGS OF SPD.

4. FILE: 201-0230705 X-REF 201- . E2 IMPDET

WASH S/C NOTE: PARIS ADDED INFO ADDEE PER HQS REQUEST.

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER

TOTAL COPIES 25-1

RUN BY

Chile

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

EUR 8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR Plans, WH8, SS5,

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 077141 EIA230 PAGE 01 IN 239973

TOR:021103Z MAY 74 HELS 22455

C O N F I D E N T I A L 020949Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE HELSINKI 22455

TO: DIRECTOR INFO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH

1. IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES, CALL ATTENTION TO NEWLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/ AUTHOR ANDRES (Kung!) K U N G (UHLAUT "U") ENTITLED "TO SOW SOCIALISM AND REAP FASCISM", WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING FROM YOUNG SWEDE. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS". KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP

DOR

		[illegible]
[illegible]	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
WH/6		[illegible]

C O N F I D E N T I A L

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
2 May 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________	TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY	REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________	CONFIDENTIA.	STAFF
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED	BY AT Z	1 4
ACTION UNIT	INFO RF FILE VR	2 5
ACTION #		3 6

T 077141 EIA230 PAGE 02-02 IN 239973

TOR:0211032 MAY 74 HELS 22455

AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".

2. KUNG (DPOB: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72) EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO. HAS PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC STATES.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3020b
7/71 MFG. 11/73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 16 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 25-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT
WH 7
ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR WH/COG EUR 8, 555,

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 252272 EIA036 PAGE 01 IN 231132

TOR:231149Z APR 74 HAMB 24795

S E C R E T 230953Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 24795 (SWARZCHILD ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

REF: DIRECTOR 540262

1. WELCOME RECEIVING SPECIAL BRIEF FOR PURPOSES INDICATED IN REF.

2. RELUCTANT TO LEAVE MEDIA FIELD ON CHILE TO SOVIETS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. SUGGEST THEREFORE HQS KEEP OPEN MIND ON SELECTIVE PLACEMENTS SHORT OF GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME.

3. SINCE WOMEN LIKELY TO CONTINUE PLAYING PIVOTAL ROLE IN FURTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, BELIEVE THEIR VIEWS AND REACTIONS OUGHT BE GIVEN MORE PLAY. AS AN EXAMPLE, COULD POSSIBLY ENGINEER ARTICLE IN GERMAN MAGAZINE "DER STERN" (CIRCULATION 1,520,000), WHICH THUS FAR IN VANGUARD OF ANTI-JUNTA PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, THROUGH MRS. VERA VACEK.

4. FILE: 15-124-46/3. E2 IMPDET.

B: H/6

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
23 Apr 74

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT SS6

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. I/AN, EUR8, WH8, OSG/IC, S38, PS/EG4, C/OPS

T 724892 PAGE 01 IN 104043

TOR:041011Z DEC 73 HAMB 23918

S E C R E T 040921Z DEC 73 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 23918

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.

MHCRUNCH CASPECIAL FUCMEN TOWITTY

1. BASE INTERESTED IN "DOS ANOS DE PENETRACION SOVIETICA EN CHILE" (PORTADA 39) AS VEHICLE TO ENLIGHTEN GERMAN AUDIENCE RE EXTENT OF SOVIET/CUBAN INFILTRATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FABRIC OF CHILE.

2. STUDY COULD BE FLESHED OUT TO ENCOMPASS POLITICO/MILITARY ASPECTS THIS PENETRATION, ESPECIALLY PERCEPTIONS GAINED BY TWO NAVAL PURCHASING MISSIONS, THE LAST VISITING USSR JUST PRIOR TO ALLENDE'S DOWNFALL WHEN CHILEAN NAVY REPS GIVEN RUNAROUND AND TREATED WITH BARE CIVILITY. IT MAY ALSO BE USEFUL TO MENTION THAT SOVIETS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE OFFERED TO SUPPLY ALLENDE (NOT CHILEAN ARMED FORCES) WITH ARMAMENTS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF DEFENDING HIS REGIME. ALLENDE'S MOSCOW VISIT AND UNAVAILING PLEA FOR SOVIET SALVAGING OPERATION IS CRUCIAL ASPECT OF AMBIGUOUS SOVIET ROLE WHICH EUROPEAN LEFT HAS CONVENIENTLY SWEPT UNDER THE RUG.

3. REQUEST HQS COMMENTS RE FEASIBILITY OF TURNING OUT FINISHED PRODUCT TO MEET EUROPEAN REQUIREMENTS WHICH AT PRESENT PREEMPTED

04 DEC 73

SECRET

RECORD COPY

15-12-52

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 724892 PAGE 02-02 IN 104043

TOR:041011Z DEC 73 HAMB 23918

BY LEFTIST-GENERATED COPY ON CHILEAN DEVELOPMENTS. IF AFFIRMATIVE, SHALL TAKE SOUNDINGS ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE DISTRIBUTION VEHICLE.

4. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF · 0 0 0 0 0 0

51

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 121736Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 466010

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 07

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, LCPIPIT, LONDON, BERN INFO SANTIAGO.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 1 1973
MICROFILMED

3P

RYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE

REF: DIRECTOR 465768

1. FOLLOWING OF INTEREST AS FOLLOW-UP TO REF.

2. ACCORDING WASHINGTON POST 12 OCTOBER, "THE BITTERNESS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND CHILE ERUPTED INTO A BATTLE OF OBSCENITIES AND THREATS LAST NIGHT, DISRUPTING A LATE SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AT HEIGHT OF THE DISTURBANCE, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA CALLED THE CHILEAN REPRESENTATIVE A 'SON OF A WHORE,' AND ANOTHER CUBAN DIPLOMAT REPORTEDLY DISPLAYED A PISTOL.

3. "DISPUTE BEGAN WHEN ROA DEVOTED MORE THAN HALF OF HIS SPEECH IN GENERAL DEBATE EARLIER IN THE DAY TO AN ATTACK ON THE NEW CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA. CHILEAN AMBASSADOR RAUL BAZAN DAVILA TOOK PODIUM DURING THE NIGHT-TIME SESSION TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT OF REPLY. BAZAN INSISTED THAT LATE PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE HAD COMMITTEED SUICIDE AND SAID 'CASTROISM' MUST TAKE A LARGE PART OF THE BLAME. HE AD-

4
CS
3
WH/6 CT 4

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

D-15-124-53

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
12 OCT 73

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP 121736Z

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 466010

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

MITTED AND REGRETTED AN OFFICIAL FIGURE OF 581 DEATHS IN CONNECTION WITH CHILEAN COUP, BUT ADDED THAT CHILEANS RESPECTED HUMAN LIFE, WHILE 'IN CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF HAD, AS HIS DAILY PASTIME, THE WATCHING OF EXECUTIONS BEFORE THE FIRING SQUAD WALL, TO WHICH HE EVEN INVITED SOME OF THE DIPLOMATS...'

4. "AT THAT POINT ROA ROSE FROM HIS SEAT AND DASHED DOWN THE AISLE TOWARD THE ROSTRUM, SHOUTING 'FAG', 'SONG OF A WHORE' AND OTHER INSULTS AT BAZAN, IN SPANISH. OTHER CUBANS FOLLOWED HIM. NICARAGUAN DELEGATION, SEATED IN FRONT NEAR ROSTRUM, ROSE TO BLOCK THE CUBANS. OTHER LATINS FLOCKED TO FRONT OF THE HALL. A DIPLOMAT WHO WAS THERE SAID A CUBAN SHOWED HE WAS CARRYING A PISTOL IN A CONFRONTATION WITH PARAGUAYAN AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO BARREIRO....

5. " U.N. GUARDS SWARMED TO THE ROSTRUM AND THE CUBANS DISPERSED. ROA RESUMED HIS SEAT LATER. FIVE LATIN AMERICANS CAME TO THE ROSTRUM LATER TO CALL THE CUBANS 'GANGSTERS' AND CHALLENGED THE RIGHT OF A DICTATORSHIP TO CRITICIZE THEIR GOVERNMENTS. U.S. AMBASSADOR JOHN A. SCALI SAID ROA 'HAS ONCE AGAIN SUNK TO HIS USUAL LEVEL OF GUTTER VULGARITY...THE OUTMODED VITUPERATION OF AN EARLIER ERA.'"

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 -0

PAGE 3 OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP 121737Z

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 466010

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: #

CONF:

INFO: FILE

6. FILE: 15-124-52; 15-124-53. E2, IMPDET.H

*REF ATTACHED.

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1973 W. Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

15-124-52

C/WH/SA

C/EUR James E. Flannery
C/WHD for

EA/JK/J

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/6

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

RELEASING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 1 1973
MICROFILMED

50

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 112254Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 465768

CONF: C/WH/8 INFO: FILE [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] C/533 [illegible]

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 32
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, LCPIPIT, LONDON, BERN INFO SANTIAGO.

HP

RYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE

1. SINCE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S APPEARANCE BEFORE UNGA HAS RECEIVED LIMITED PRESS PLAY, BELIEVE FOLLOWING MAY BE USEFUL TO ADDRESSEES FOR BRIEFING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MEDIA AND OTHER CONTACTS WHO MAY BE INTERESTED IN CHILEAN SITUATION. MATERIAL IS LARGELY OVERT, THEREFORE NO OBJECTION TO ITS USE BY PRESS ASSETS SO LONG AS STORY NOT PASSED OR USED VERBATIM.

2. ON 9 OCTOBER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER VICE-ADMIRAL ISMAEL HUERTA APPEARED FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR PRESENTATION BEFORE UNGA TO EXPLAIN "FACTS WHICH OBLIGED ARMED FORCES AND POLICE TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND TO ESTABLISH A REGIME OF NATIONAL RESTORATION," AND TO CHARGE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME VICTIM OF A "MOST FALSE, MOST MALEVOLENT, MOST VICIOUS AND VERY WELL-ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN."

3. HUERTA'S SPEECH STRESSED THAT ALLENDE'S MINORITY REGIME HAD

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

4
C/S
3
WH/6 CT4

11 Oct 73

D-15-124-53
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

15-124-52
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

445768

BEEN STEERING COUNTRY IN DIRECTION OF A TOTALITARIAN TAKEOVER INSTIGATED AND SUPPORTED LARGELY BY CUBA; THAT CUBA INTERVENED IN CHILEAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS WHILE SECRETLY INFILTRATING ARMS, INSTRUCTORS AND PERSONNEL FOR PARAMILITARY GROUPS INTENDED TO BECOME A "PARALLEL"ARMY TO OPPOSE ARMED FORCES; THAT CHILEAN MILITARY ACTED ONLY AFTER FAILURE OF ALL OTHER EFFORTS BY PARLIAMENT, JUDICIARY, PROFESSIONALS AND WORKERS TO BLOCK DRIFT TOWARD CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS. HE STRESSED THAT HIS GOVT IS NOT POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS AND ITS GOAL IS TO SET CHILE BACK ON ITS HISTORIC PATH; AFTER GOAL ACHIEVED, "WE WILL NOT HESITATE TO RETURN TO OUR BARRACKS AND TO OUR SHIPS."

4. HUERTA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALLENDE REGIME, THE FIRST ELECTED MARXIST GOVT IN WESTERN HEMISPCHERE, HAD AROUSED ENTHUSIASM IN MANY, BUT "IT IS ONE THING, GENTLEMEN, TO EVALUATE A FOREIGN EXPERIENCE FROM AFAR, SEATED IN COMFORTABLE ARMCHAIRS OR IN DISCUSSION AROUND A WELL-SERVED TABLE. IT IS QUITE ANOTHER TO LIVE IT." HE DETAILED A HISTORY OF EVENTS OF LAST THREE YEARS, POINTING OUT THAT DESPITE AGREEMENTS BY ALLENDE REGIME, LATTER MOVED TO UNDERMINE EXISTING JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL MACHINERY OF COUNTRY, ATTEMPTING DO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTI[illegible] BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

465748

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

AWAY WITH DEMOCRATIC IDEALS FOR WHICH COUNTRY STOOD. HE SAID MEDIA WAS HARASSED, THERE WERE ILLEGAL INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN TAKEOVERS, POLITICANS AND VILLAGERS WERE ASSASSINATED. HE CHARGED THAT FOREIGN AGENTS, SENT PRINCIPALLY BY CUBA, HAD SECRETLY BROUGHT ENOUGH WEAPONS TO CHILE TO EQUIP 20,000 MEN. HE DECLARED THAT SOVIET-MADE SIDEARMS, MACHINE GUNS, ANTITANK GUNS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, CANNONS AND EXPLOSIVES HAD BEEN SHIPPED IN -- SOME PACKED AS WORKS OF ART AND SOME DISGUISED AS GIFTS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

5. AT ONE POINT, TO SUPPORT CLAIM OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, HUERTA READ TEXT OF 29 JULY 1973 HAND-WRITTEN LETTER FROM CASTRO ADDRESSED TO "DEAR SALVADOR." LETTER ASSURED ALLENDE THAT CHILEAN WORKING CLASS HAD BEEN FOREWARNED AND WAS "READY FOR ACTION" IF HIS REGIME WERE THREATENED. HUERTA SAID THAT LETTER CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS AND HER SUPPORT OF THE "ILLEGAL METHODS" OF THE ALLENDE REGIME.

6. IN VITRIOLIC REPLY TO HUERTA, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA CALLED HUERTA "TRAITOROUS EX-MINISTER OF ALLENDE AND SERGEANT OF GOEBBLES." SIMILAR LIES AND DISTORTIONS OF FACT CAN BE FOUND IN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF	AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	WRO	PAGE	OF	PAGES
	0	0	0	0	0	0	4		4

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

465768

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY, HE DECLARED. THEN, SURPRISINGLY, HE WENT ON TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO HUERTA'S CHARGES BY ADMITTING THAT CUBAN GUNS HAD IN FACT BEEN SENT INTO CHILE BUT THAT THEY HAD BEEN SENT AT ALLENDE'S REQUEST. NOR DID ROA DENY THE AUTHENTICITY OF CASTRO'S LETTER TO ALLENDE WHICH HUERTA HAD PRODUCED; ROA SAID THAT THE LETTER WAS NO SECRET.

7. FILE: 15-124-52; 15-124-53. E2, IMPDET.

DATE: 11 OCTOBER 1973 W Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

C/EUR
C/WHD EA/JK/J C/WHD/6

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

15-1

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 181508Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 456203

CONF: C/WH8 INFO: FILE CI/PLAN, DDO/DO, C/SS3, C/PS/EG3

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO

0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 29

PER #

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 26489 (IN 031350)

B. SANTIAGO 26512 (IN 031722)

1. PROPOSE USE REFS FOR FUOMEN. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.

*REFS ATTACHED.

WH/6 CT-4

WH/6 CT-4

~~15-124-32~~

18 SEP 73

15-124-52

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1973 Kent

ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB

UNIT: ADC/WH/6

EXT: 6556/9155

C/WHD

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: [illegible]

SECRET

A ← ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX. TYPE THE WORD "ALIGN" TO REGISTER HERE → ALIGN

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0

26 - 5

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 131911Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 454587

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, SSS, PS/EG 4, OSG/IC 2, CI, CI/CP, OPS/INT, DDO,
DISSEM BY: 38
PER ___ # ________

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO ________
0 IP FILES

TO: IMMEDIATE ARGENTINA, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, MIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY, GEORGETOWN, PORT AU PRINCE, TEGUCIGALPA, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, PORT AU SPAIN, MONTEVIDEO, CARACAS INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

TRAVEL PROGRAM
WH/6

BOOK CABLE

FUOMEN SUMMARY OF CURR EVENTS

1. FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND AND FOR PASSING LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS YOU SEE FIT:

2. FOUR-MAN MILITARY JUNTA THAT REVOLTED AGAINST MARXIST REGIME OF SALVADOR ALLENDE ON 11 SEPTEMBER HAS GAINED FULL CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, WITH EXCEPTION OF POCKETS OF RESISTANCE IN CAPITAL. ON 12 SEPT THERE WAS FIGHTING IN DOWNTOWN SANTIAGO BETWEEN TROOPS AND SNIPERS HOLED UP IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND IN INDUSTRIAL AREAS WHERE ALLENDE SUPPORTERS WERE BARRICADED IN FACTORIES. SPORADIC FIRING AND EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD THROUGHOUT DAY AND NIGHT BUT STRICT CURFEW KEPT OBSERVERS FROM WITNESSING ACTION. CURFEW EXTENDED TO NOON 13 SEPT.

3. AUTHORITIES ESTIMATED DEATH TOLL TO BE OVER 250 MILITARY

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
13 SEP 73

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

454587

DISSEM BY:

PER ____ #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO

0 IP FILES

AND CIVILIANS. THEY EXPECTED TO ELIMINATE LAST POCKETS RESISTANCE BY 14 SEPTEMBER.

3. JUNTA-CONTROLLED RADIO STATIONS AND ONE TV STATION OPERATING. PUBLIC UTILITIES ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY. NEWSPAPERS PLANNED RESUME LIMITED EDITIONS 13 SEPT BUT ARE SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP.

4. JUNTA ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT ALLENDE COMMITTED SUICIDE IN LA MONEDA AND TROOPS ENTERING THE BUILDING FOUND HIS BODY IN A DINING ROOM.

5. JUNTA TV PROGRAM SHOWED LARGE QUANTITIES OF SOVIET MADE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS COLLECTED AT LA MONEDA AND AT ALLENDE RESIDENCE ON TOMAS MORO STREET AFTER FIGHTING.

6. JUNTA PRESIDED OVER BY GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET (ARMY), AN INTELLIGENT, PROFESSIONAL OFFICER WITH NO KNOWN POLITICAL TIES; ADMIRAL JOSE MERINO (NAVY), WHO IS INCLINED TOWARDS NATIONAL PARTY (CONSERVATIVE); GEN. GUSTAVO LEIGH (AIR FORCE), A STRONG LEADER WHO FORMER SUPPORTER OF RADICAL PARTY AND KNOWN TO DISLIKE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS; AND GENERAL CESAR MENDOZA, (CARABINERO CHIEF) WHO HAS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY [illegible]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE DISSEM BY:

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

454587 PER #

CLOSE TIES TO MILITARY AND APPARENTLY HELPED PLAN COUP.

7. JUNTA NAMED FOLLOWING CABINET 12 SEPT:

MINISTER OF INTERIOR - MAJ GEN OSCAR BONNILLA (ARMY), WHO SERVED AS PRESIDENT FREI'S SENIOR MILITAORY AIDE FOR TWO YEARS.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS - REAR ADMIRAL ISMAEL HUERTA (NAVY), HIGHLY RESPECTED IN NAVY AND ONE OF INTELLECTUAL LEADERS OF COUP.

MINISTER OF ECONOMY - MAJ GEN ROLANDO GONZALEZ (ARMY), REPORTED TO BE A U.P. SUPPORTER ABOUT 1971.

MINISTER OF EDUCATION - JOSE NAVARRO TOBAR, A CIVILIAN BIOLOGY AND BOTANY PROFESSOR OF UNKNOWN POLITICS.

MINISTER OF JUSTICE - GONZALO PRIETO GANDARA, CIVILIAN LAWYER.

MINISTER OF DEFENSE - VICE ADM. PATRICIO CARVAJAL, FORMERLY CHIEF OF NATIONAL DEFENSE BSTAFF, REPORTED INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1971.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION - BRIG

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
4

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DATE-TIME GROUP
CITE
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

454587

DISSEM BY:
PER #

GEN SERGIO FIGUEROA (AIR FORCE), REPORTED IN EARLY 1972 TO BE AMONG ANTI-U.P. AIR FORCE COLONELS.

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE - COL SERGIO CRESPO (RET. AIR FORCE), AGRICULTURAL AND CIVIL ENGINEER.

MINISTER OF LABOR - GEN MARIO MACKAY (CARABINEROS), ANTI-U.P. OFFICER NAMED IN JULY AS COMMANDER IN CONCEPCION.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH - COL ALBERTO SPOERER (AIR FORCE), FORMER CIVILIAN SURGEON DESCRIBED AS HARD WORKER.

MINISTER OF MINING - GEN ARTURO YOVANE (CARABINEROS), WHO WAS SCHEDULED TO BE RETIRED BY ALLENDE IN AUGUST, CLOSE TO MILITARY.

MINISTER OF HOUSING - BRIG GEN ARTURO VIVERO, HARD-WORKING STAFF OFFICER WHOSE PERFORMANCE UNDER PRESSURE SOMEWHAT WEAK.

SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT - COL PEDRO EWING (ARMY), DESCRIBED AS INTELLIGENT, PATRIOTIC, CONSERVATIVE.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
5

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T.

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

454587

DISSEM BY:
PER #

UNDERSECRETARY OF INTERIOR - LTH COL ENRIQUE MONTERO (AIR FORCE) FORMER LEGAL OFFICER IN AIR FORCE.

MINISTER OF LANDS AND COLONIZATION - GEN DIEGO PARRA RETIRED CARABINERO OFFICER, ON WHOM LITTLE IS KNOWN.

MINISTER OF FINANCE - REAR ADM LORENZO ORTUZAR, LITTLE KNOWN OFFICER.

8. JUNTA HAS BROKEN RELATIBONS WITH CUBA AND WILL PROBABLY ■■■ BREAK WITH OTHER SOVIET BLOC STATES. IT WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR ■ STRENGTHEN TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY TIES WITH U.S. AND SEEK AID AND DEBT RELIEF FOR INTERIM.

9. JUNTA WILL PROBABLY DECLARE COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST AND SMALL LEFTIST PARTIES SUCH AS MIR ILLEGAL AND DISSOLVE CUT LABOR CONFEDERATION. THEY DO NOT PLAN WORK WITH POLITICAL PARTIES BUBT MAY CONSULT WITH THEM. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS EXPECTED TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE JUNTA AS IS THE OTHER MAJOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL GROUP, NATIONAL PARTY. STRIDKING TRUCKERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUILDS HAVE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH COUP AND CALLED OFF STRIKE.

10. FILE: 15-124-52. E 2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM CLYONS DSO
UNIT: C/WH/6/RR
EXT: 7710/1069

15-124-52

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

05-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

							PAGE	OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0		1	1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	192044Z	DIRECTOR	540262

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, EUR8, 555

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 6
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: HAMBURG INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

REF: HAMBURG 24759 (IN 225831)

1. AT THIS POINT DO NOT BELIEVE BKHERALD ATTEMPT IMPROVE CHILEAN IMAGE IN GERMAN MEDIA STANDS MUCH CHANCE OF SUCCESS. PREFER LET DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN RUN ITS COURSE. [illegible] WE WOULD BE WILLING SUPPLY SPECIAL BRIEF DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE CAREFULLY SELECTED INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE OPEN TO PERSUASION AND WHOSE VIEWS WOULD CARRY REAL WEIGHT, BUT WE DO NOT FEEL BKHERALD SHOULD ENGAGE IN GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME SINCE LATTER APPROACH BOTH INEFFECTUAL AND MIGHT WELL BACKFIRE.

2. FILE: 15-124-46/3. E2 IMPDET.

ZDF

WH/2

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
19 Apr 74

DATE: 18 APRIL 1974
ORIG: KEITH GARDINER:NO
UNIT: DC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

E/G/U

DC/WH/6 J.K.

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/CA
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER
TOTAL COPIES 30-1 BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT EVR8
ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR SSS, I/AN, ~~[illegible]~~ WHA, PS/EG-4

STAFF

1	6	4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 037609 PAGE 01 IN 225831

TOR:171326Z APR 74 HAMB 24759

S E C R E T 171253Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 24759

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

1. CHILE'S IMAGE AS REFLECTED IN WEST GERMAN MEDIA COMMENTARIES HAS REACHED ALL-TIME LOW AND EVEN CONSERVATIVELY INCLINED OUTLETS BY AND LARGE, NO LONGER BOTHER TO TELL "THE OTHER SIDE." EASTERN RADIO STATIONS MAINTAIN RELENTLESS DRUMFIRE OF ANTI-CHILEAN PROPAGANDA AND THERE NO APPARENT DEARTH OF INFO TO SUSTAIN RATHER EFFECTIVE DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN.

2. IN SPITE OF DISMAL AUSPICES TO TURN TIDE, (UNLESS JUNTA DECIDES TO SHOW SOME DECENT REGARD FOR OPINIONS OF MANKIND), WE CAN STILL PROMOTE FAIRER UNDERSTANDING OF IMPERATIVES OF CHILEAN SITUATION TO WHICH JUNTA APPARENTLY FEELS IMPELLED TO RESPOND. TOWARD THAT END, REQUIRE SOME TYPE OF OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OF PREDICTABLE TRENDS.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

File ~~[illegible]~~

FUCMEN

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 17-1 BY ____

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH C/D

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED WH BY ____ AT ____ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT c/WH 8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR c/PLAN c/CA3 c/FI2

T 144267 PRECEDENCE PAGE 01-01 IN 880779

TOR:042140Z APR 73 SAGO 24516

AN	Ko
AB	X
~~IN~~	
PG	
BX	
DES | BSD	
FI	

S E C R E T 042118Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 24516

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 24477 (in 878105)

B. DIRECTOR 391223

1. IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS REF A INFO IF IT WERE SURFACED OR IF IT CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE U.P. GOVERNMENT, STATION RECOMMENDS AGAINST FUOMEN EXPLOITATION AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

15-124-52
04 APR 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 8 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

ACTION UNIT C/WH8	I N F O	RF FILE VR C/CLAD C/EURG C/SS3 C/OH4 C/PS/EG3	STAFF
ACTION #			1 / 4 2 / 5 3 / 6

T 627548 PAGE 01 IN 136804

TOR:141717Z JAN 74 SAGO 27899

S E C R E T 141558Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 27899

TO: DIRECTOR, PARIS, HELSINKI, BONN, TOKYO, LONDON.

RYBAT FUUMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 499469 -15-124-52

1. WISH TO OFFER FOLLOWING SUGGESTED CHANGES IN REF WHICH BASED ON LATEST INFO AVAILABLE LOCALLY. PARA 3: "...CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO FOR IMPORTS/EXPORTS BY SLIGHTLY OVER 100 PERCENT IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND, ENCOURAGE EXPORTS AND EASE PRESSURES..." "...OTHER PRICE RISES BROUGHT INFLATION FOR THE YEAR TO 508 PERCENT..." (FOR DIRECTOR: WHILE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES BY BOTH EMBASSY AND IMF IN NOVEMBER PLACED INFLATION FOR THE YEAR AT PROBABLY BETWEEN 750 AND 800 PERCENT. THE END-OF-THE-YEAR FIGURE OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE WAS 508.1 SEE SANTIAGO EMBASSY TELEGRAM 0173 OF 11 JANUARY.)

2. PARA 4 LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ "THE MASSIVE 3.5 BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT..." PARA 7: "MONTHLY COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OVER THE AVERAGE DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1973 AND PRODUCTION

B

34

[illegible]		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
[illegible]		PREPARE FOR FILMING
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible] (2, 3, 4)
		[illegible]
		CABLE [illegible] (11)
		[illegible] (8)
[illegible]		FOR [illegible]
[illegible]		C7-4

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

15-124-52

14 Jan 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________ BY________ AT________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 307548 PAGE 02-02 IN 136804

TOR:141717Z JAN 74 SAGO 27899

WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD OF AT LEAST 850,000 TONS IN 1974..."

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE 07-8

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 111951Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 499169

CONF. C/WH8 INFO: FILE C/WOMA, C/EUR6, C/EA4, C/SS3, C/PS/EG3

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 50

TO: PARIS, HELSINKI, BONN, TOKYO, LONDON INFO SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CHILE AT BEGINNING OF 1974 MAY BE USEFUL FOR ORAL BRIEFINGS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS WHO INTERESTED IN CHILE. STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION.

2. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. THE NEW MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS AVOIDED MAJOR INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND HAS MOVED AGGRESSIVELY TO REORGANIZE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES MORE EFFICIENTLY, TO CREATE AN APOLITICAL CIVIL SERVICE, AND TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. ITS ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH AUSTERE, ARE SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE STRICT SECURITY MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE JUNTA HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING ANY LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE OR TERRORISM AND ARE LIKELY TO BE CONTINUED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

3. THE JUNTA MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP OF 11 SEPTEMBER TO REMOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE

24

WH/6 C7-4

B

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

11 Jan 74
15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF	ACE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPS	MRO
ONF	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

499969

CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON THE COUNTRY'S MEAGER FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88% IN OCTOBER, AND OTHER PRICE RISES PUSHED INFLATION TO SOME 770% FOR THE YEAR.

4. THE JUNTA HAS NOW AGREED TO FOLLOW THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM PROPOSED BY AN IMF TEAM WHICH VISITED CHILE IN LATE 1973. THIS PROGRAM CALLS FOR TIGHTER FEDERAL SPENDING AND FOR LIMITING INFLATION TO 100% IN 1974. THIS IMF PROGRAM IS FEASIBLE BUT MAY BE SOMEWHAT OVER-OPTIMISTIC, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE WORLD-WIDE ENERGY CRISIS WILL SOON FORCE CHILE TO RAISE FUEL PRICES, THUS EXACCERBATING THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING INFLATION. ADHERENCE TO THE IMF PROPOSAL HAS, HOWEVER, IMPROVED CHILE'S CCREDIT RATING, AS HAS THE SIGNING OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES ON CHILE'S 1971-1972 DEBT. CHILE IS THUS IN A RELATIVELY GOOD POSITION FOR THE OPENING OF THE PARIS CLUB TALKS IN FEBRUARY. THE MASSIVE $4 BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT, HOWEVER, WILL CAUSE CHILE BALANCE OF BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS FOR SOME TIME.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 3

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

199469

7. COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50% OVER LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AND PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD 750,000 TONS IN 1974 DESPITE SPORADIC SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND SERVICEABLE VEHICLES. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EXPECTED TO RECOVER FULLY UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SO THAT AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS, PARTICULARLY GRAIN, WILL CONTINUE TO BE A DRAIN ON CHILE'S FOREIGN RESERVES.

8. THE JUNTA HAS DEMONSTRATED GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN EQUITY AND HAS LINED UP SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION CLAIMS EMANATING FROM ALLENDE NATIONALIZATIONS, STATING THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, OR AS IN THE CASE OF LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE PREVIOUS OWNERS. FORMER PRIVATE BANKS WILL ALSO BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, BUT PROBABLY WITH SOME FORMULA INVOLVING WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BANK MANAGEMENT. THERE ARE ALSO STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, AND PRIVATE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

499469

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW SUBSTANTIALLY DURING 1974.

9. INTERNALLY, THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF EXCHANGE RATE HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, THE BURDEN OF AUSTERITY ON CHILEAN CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE HEALTHY INCREASES IN WAGES AND RENEWED CONFIDENCE BY BUSINESSMEN, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST NECESSITIES, AND WORKING CLASS LABOR IS TAKING A WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA OR ITS PROGRAMS. SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) ARE GRUMBLING, BUT THIS DISSATISFACTION IS LARGELY DUE TO GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO SET UP NEW NON-POLITICAL-PARTY MECHANISMS FOR REACHING THE PUBLIC.

10. GOVERNMENT "RECESSING" OF CONGRESS AND ALL POLITICAL PARTIES HAS CREATED A POLITICAL VACUUM IN CHILE. THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH HOLDS THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAURGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR CHILE'S CURRENT PLIGHT, IS TRYING TO FILL THIS VOID BY AN INTENSE USE OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 5

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: #

499469

CIVILIAN ADVISERS TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES. THIS PHENOMENON IS MOST APPARENT IN THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND IN SUCH TECHNICAL FIELDS AS PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOUSING. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GROUP OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS HEADED BY RAUL SAEZ, FOR EXAMPLE IS WELL KNOWN. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS AN ADVISORY BOARD DOMINATED BY THE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING'S BOARD IS LARGELY CONTROLLED BY THE ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION FIRMS. SIMILARLY, ALMOST EVERY MINISTRY AND MANY AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES HAVE PERMANENT CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF GROUPS WHOSE WELFARE IS AFFECTED BY THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES.

11. IN ADDITION TO THESE CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS, THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF "STUDY COMMISSIONS" THROUGH WHICH CIVILIANS CAN EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE. BEST KNOWN OF THESE IS THE GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS WHICH IS DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION, BUT THERE ARE OTHER GROUPS WORKING ON A NEW MINING CODE, STUDYING THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, COLLECTING INFORMATION ON UNEMPLOYMENT, WRITING A STATUTE FOR WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, AND

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ACE COI ALP TOO TPE MNO

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 6

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

499469

DELVING INTO A DOZEN OTHER TOPICS.

12. ALTHOUGH SOME CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HOLD INFLUENTIAL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, MOST CIVILIAN ADVISERS ARE EITHER CONSERVATIVE OR APOLITICAL. LACK OF MORE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION BY CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS MAY CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THE FUTURE, ESPECIALLY SINCE ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING WORKERS, CAMPESINOS AND POBLADORES (WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED EITHER THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) OR THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT) ARE SO FAR INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED ON ADVISORY COUNCILS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED UNITS ADDRESSED TO YOUTH, WOMEN, GUILDS AND NEIGHBORHOOD CIVIC GROUPS IN THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT, AND HOPES THAT THESE WILL SERVE AS VEHICLES FOR GOVERNMENT-TO-PEOPLE COMMUNICATION.

13. THE JUNTA LEADERS VIEW WITH DISTRUST ALL PDC EFFORTS TO WIN NEW POLITICAL ADHERENTS FROM THE WORKING CLASSES WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED ALLENDE'S UP COALITION AND REPORTEDLY BELIEVE THAT THE PDC IS NOT RESPECTING THE POLITICAL RECESS. THE JUNTA IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PDC'S LEFT WING

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOB	TPE	MRO
0	0	0	0	0	0

ONF

PAGE 7 OF PAGES 8

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF:

INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY:

PER

#

499469

WILL AID THE FORMER UP PARTIES IN RETURN FOR FUTURE ELECTORAL SUPPORT.

14. ONE PROBLEM OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE JUNTA IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT PERU MAY ATTACK CHILE SOME TIME PRIOR TO 1979, THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR BETWEEN CHILE AND PERU, IN ORDER TO REGAIN SOME OF THE TERRITORY LOST IN THAT WAR. THE CHILEANS ARE WORRIED BY THE SOVIET SALE OF ARMS TO PERU AND FEAR THAT THE USSR MAY BE TRYING TO CREATE ANOTHER UNSTABLE"MIDDLE EAST TYPE" OF CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA.

15. THE JUNTA IS ALSO CONCERNED BY COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO CREATE INTERNAL DISCONTENT AND TO MOUNT AN INTERNAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. THE JUNTA EXPECTS THAT THE FORMER UP PARTIES, LED BY THE COMMUNISTS, WILL SET UP A UNIFIED FRONT FOR CAUSING CIVILIAN DISTURBANCES AND POLITICAL DISCONTENT, AND WILL TRY TO MANIPULATE THE PDC INTO OPPOSING THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT. TWO FRONTS FOR CHILEAN RESISTANCE ARE BEING ORGANIZED IN ARGENTINA AND SEVERAL ARE BEING SET UP IN EUROPE.

16. DESPITE THE PROBLEMS NOTED ABOVE, THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT IS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 8 OF PAGES 8

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

499469

IN FIRM CONTROL IN CHILE AND HAS MADE IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS IN REORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT AND IN ENLISTING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ITS PROGRAMS. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT ARE THE BEST WHICH COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED FROM A COUNTRY WHOSE ENTIRE ECONOMY WAS A SHAMBLES IN SEPTEMBER 1973.

17. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 10 JANUARY 1974
ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:LSS
UNIT: C/WH/6/SA
EXT: 6609/1069

WH/EICO - BILL KENT (IN DRAFT)

C/WH/6

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

EA/JK/J
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

SIGNAL CENTER USE
20 10
PAGE 1 OF PAGES

OMF C 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
0521182

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
487650

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, EU18, 555
PS/EG4

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 60

WH/6

TO: HAMBURG INFO BONN, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN CASPECIAL CAFECET

REF: HAMBURG 23881 (IN 096923)

1. FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF CHILEAN ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OF RISK FACTORS INVOLVED IN MAKING INVESTMENTS IN CHILE PREPARED FOR PASSAGE TO HERMES BANK PER REF PARA 1 REQUEST.

A. THE RULING JUNTA IN CHILE IS MOVING AGGRESSIVELY TO REBUILD THE ECONOMY BY ADOPTING A HARSH AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND INSTITUTING POLICIES DESIGNED TO RETURN CHILE TO A MARKET ECONOMY.

B. SANTIAGO MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP TO REMOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE CENTRAL BANK EFFECTIVELY DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON SANTIAGO'S MEAGER FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVBES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88% IN OCTOBER, BRINGING INFLATION TO NEARLY 450% FOR THE FIRST TEN MONTHS OF THE YEAR. ANTICIPATED PRICE RISES DURING THE REST OF 1973 IS EXPECTED TO PUSH INFLATION TO SOME 750% FOR THE YEAR.

C. THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

04 DEC 73
15-124-52
~~15-136-52~~

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP SITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: INFO: FILE

487650

EXCHANGE RATES HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. WHILE EXCHANGE RATES CHANGED AND PRICES ROSE, THE GROWTH IN THE MONEY SUPPLY HAS BEEN SHARPLY CURTAILED, CAUSING A RELATIVE SCARCITY OF LOCAL CURRENCY AND A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH FOR BUSINESSMEN.

D. THE BURDEN ON CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE A HEALTHY INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS ARE FINDING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST NECESSITIES. AUSTERITY HAS BEEN EXACERBATED IN MANY CASES BY DISMISSALS OF RELATIVELY UNPRODUCTIVE AND POLITICALLY SUSPECT EMPLOYEES HIRED UNDER THE ALLENDE REGIME. AN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED AND AN EXTENSIVE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

E. THE JUNTA IS ATTEMPTING TO ENLIST PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND BUSINESS IS SHOWING RENEWED CONFIDENCE. CONSUMERS AND LABOR, HOWEVER, ARE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA OR ITS PROGRAMS HAS MATERIALIZED, EVEN THOUGH SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE GRUMBLING AND PREDICTING

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

SECRET CL BY: 057556

SIGNAL CENTER USE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE OF PAGES
3

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

457650

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: #

FAILURE FOR THE JUNTA.

F. CHILE STILL FACES LARGE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICITS IN BOTH 1973 AND 1974 EVEN IF DEBT-REPAYMENTS ARE RESCHEDULED IN BOTH YEARS. WITH A MASSIVE $4 BILLION FOREIGN DEBT HANGING OVER SANTIAGO'S HEAD, IT WILL AT LEAST BE SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE CHILE'S BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS POSITION IMPROVES SIGNIFICANTLY.

G. HOWEVER, COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50% ABOVE LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AS A RESULT OF A 9% LENGTHENING OF THE WORK WEEK AND IMPROVED MINE MANAGEMENT. PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD 750,000 TONS NEXT YEAR DESPITE CONTINUING SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND SERVICEABLE VEHICLES.

H. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS CONTINUE TO BE THE LARGEST DRAIN ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE RECOVERY OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IS A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE OF THE JUNTA. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EXPECTED TO FULLY RECOVER UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SINCE MOST CROPS ALREADY ARE PLANTED AND ARE WELL INTO THEIR GROWING SEASONS. THUS, CHILE WILL CONTINUE TO IMPORT GRAIN IN LARGE QUANTITIES DURING 1974.

I. ALTHOUGH THE PROBLEMS OF ADEQUATE SHORT RUN SUPPLIES

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

FORM

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

PAGE OF PAGES

4

CONF: INFO: FILE

187650

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

OF RAW MATERIALS AND SPARE PARTS MUST BE SOLVED TO BOOST PRODUCTION QUICKLY, LONG RUN GROWTH WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON CHILE'S ABILITY TO ATTRACT ADEQUATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT. ATTRACTION OF SUBSTANTIAL NEW INVESTMENT WILL DEPEND ON THE JUNTA'S ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN EQUITY AS WELL AS THEIR ABILITY TO INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN CHILE'S PROSPECTS FOR STABLE RECOVERY AND GROWTH. A CRITICAL FIRST STEP IS TIMELY SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION CLAIMS EMANATING FROM THE ALLENDE NATIONALIZATIONS. THE JUNTA HAS STATED THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR OR, AS IN THE CASE OF THE LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE THE PREVIOUS OWNERS. SOME 90 FIRMS ARE ALREADY IN THE PROCESS OF REVERSION.

J. THUS FAR THE JUNTA HAS SUCCEEDED IN LINING UP SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE ESSENTIAL CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFICEN~~C~~DE, AND PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW DRAMATICALLY DURING THE NEXT 12 MONTHS.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGS	COI	ACP	TCO	TPE	MRO		PAGE OF PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0		5

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

487650

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

K. THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC AS THE JUNTA TAKES STEPS TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. THE PROGRAMS, THOUGH AUSTERE, ARE ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE MAJOR POLICY CONFLICTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE OVER THE DEGREE AND TIMING OF SPECIFIC MEASURES RATHER THAN PROBLEMS OF BASIC POLICY ORIENTATION.

L. THE EMERGING DOMINANCE OF RAUL SAEZ AS SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISOR IS PROBABLY FOR THE BEST SINCE THE JUNTA'S AUSTERITY PROGRAM MUST BE TEMPERED IF POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND STABILITY IS TO BE ACHIEVED. MEANWHILE, CHILE IS PREPARING TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION ISSUES AND COMPLETE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON 1971/72 DEBT SERVICE IN ACCORD WITH THE 1972 PARIS CLUB AGREEMENTS. TIMELY RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES WILL GO FAR IN IMPROVING INVESTOR AND CREDITOR CONFIDENCE IN CHILE.

2. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUGGESTED TO ELICIT HERMES' VIEWS ON CHILE'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AS REQUESTED PARA 3 REF.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

15-124-52
~~15-126-52~~

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	6		6

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR   DATE-TIME GROUP   CITE   MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE   487650

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY:
PER
#

A. HOW MUCH AND WHAT KINDS OF PRIVATE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT FROM GERMAN AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN SOURCES IS EXPECTED TO ENTER CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHS?

B. DO BANK OFFICIALS EXPECT SUBSTANTIAL PRIVATE AND/OR OFFICIAL GERMAN CREDITS TO BE EXTENDED TO CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHS? WHAT TYPES OF CREDITS WOULD THESE BE, I.E. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS RELIEF, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, TIED AND UNTIED TRADE CREDITS?

C. DO BANK OFFICIALS SEE THE WIDESPREAD ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION IN EUROPE TO THE NEW CHILEAN GOVERNMENT AS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING FUTURE INVESTMENT AND AID DECISIONS FOR CHILE?

3. HERMES' REACTION TO ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WILL BE OF INTEREST.

4. FILE: 15-126-52. E2, IMPDET.H

*REF ATTACHED.

DATE: 4 DECEMBER 1973
ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:SMB
UNIT: C/WH/6/SA
EXT: 6609/1069

C/WH/6

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

C/E/G - Wm

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for AC/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUC... BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR... ITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1

SECRET

STAFF

2615392

DIRECTOR

459557

CONF: C/WH6 INFO: FILE C/WHDN, C/SS 3, C/CI, C/SB5

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 35

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZ, QUITO, BOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS AIRES, GUATEMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR, MANAGUA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR-458246

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN LIMA.

2. SUBJECT: "POSSIBLE SUPPORT BY LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES FOR RESISTANCE IN CHILE.

3. BACKGROUND: IT WAS ~~[illegible]~~INDICATED IN AN EARLIER BRIEFING (REF) THAT SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU (PCP/SOVIET) INTENDED TO SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN ANY RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN CHILE.

4. THE FIRST WORD OF CHILEAN COUP WAS RECEIVED BY PCP/SOVIET FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN LIMA. CENTRAL COMMITTEE CALLED AN EMERGENCY MEETING WHEN IT APPEARED THAT EVENTS IN CHILE WERE GOING AGAINST

DATE: [illegible]
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

B

26 Sep 73

RECORD COPY

WH/6 CI-7 15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 2

SECRET

STAFF DIRECTOR 454557

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 FILES #

ALLENDE REGIME. WHILE WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW, CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECIDED TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES SUCH AS SENDING SIX ORGANIZERS INTO CHILE. THESE ORGANIZERS WERE MEMBERS OF PERUVIAN COMMUNIST YOUTH, WHO USED PASSPORTS OBTAINED EARLIER FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN CASE OF SUCH AN EMERGENCY. PASSPORTS WERE LEGITIMATE, BUT DATA IN THEM, INCLUDING NAMES, WERE FALSE. THE PERUVIANS WERE TO CROSS INTO CHILE AT THE TACNA/ARICA BORDER POINT AND WERE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NUMBER OF BOLIVIANS AND BRAZILIANS.

5. ON 15 SEPTEMBER, TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEN WHO WERE LATIN AMERICANS BUT NOT PERUVIANS BROUGHT TO PCP/SOVIET HEADQUARTERS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (CPSU). INSTRUCTIONS WERE DELIVERED TO MEMBERS OF PCP/SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND IMMEDIATELY DISCUSSED BY PARTY LEADERS INCLUDING JORGE DEL PRADO CHAVEZ (PCP/SOVIET SEC GEN), FELIX ARIAS SCHREIBER (PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION MEMBER), GUILLERMO HERRERA MONTESINOS (ALSO MEMBER OF PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION), AND ONE OF THE TWO COURIERS DELIVERING THE INSTRUCTIONS ( ) WHO USED THE ALIAS "FIGUEROA." FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, THESE PARTY LEADERS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET REPRODUC I BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR BITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 3

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR 469557

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

BEGAN PREPARING INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTY MEMBERS TO AID IN SUPPORT THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE (PCCH). INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PCP/SOVIET MEMBERS WERE TO ARRANGE FOR LODGING FOR MEMBERS OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WHO WERE ARRIVING IN LIMA, TO OBTAIN MAPS OF CHILE, FALSE DOCUMENTATION, ETC.

6. SECOND STAGE OF SUPPORT TO CHILE WAS TO BEGIN DURING WEEK OF 23 SEPTEMBER WHEN COMMUNISTS AND OTHERS WERE TO ARRIVE FROM VENEZUELA, PANAMA, COLOMBIA, CUBA AND OTHER ~~[illegible]~~ COUNTRIES. ALL WERE TO BE LODGED IN LIMA, AND, LATER, GIVEN FALSE DOCUMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION TO CHILEAN BORDER. THEIR PRINCIPAL TASK IN CHILE WAS TO ASSIST IN REORGANIZATION OF PCCH FOLLOWING COUP D'ETAT, AS WELL AS IN PRODUCTION OF CLANDESTINE PROPAGANDA. THEY ALSO WERE TO STUDY POSSIBILITY OF AIDING IN MOUNTING CONCERTED ARMED RESISTANCE TO MILITARY REGIME, PRINCIPALLY THROUGH URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE. THERE WAS NO NEED TO SEND ARMS, SINCE THERE STILL ENOUGH WEAPONS HIDDEN IN CHILE TO MAKE SUCH RISK UNNECESSARY.

7. CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WERE TO MEET IN LIMA ON 25 SEPTEMBER TO CONSIDER SENDING PERSONS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER · COORDINATING OFFICERS · AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 057256

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 4 OF PAGES 4

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR 459557

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER

#

GUERRILLA GROUPS THERE AND TO AID CHILEAN COMMUNISTS. SOME DELEGATES TO MEETING ARRIVED EARLY IN ORDER ATTEND REGIONAL MEETING OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) WHICH BEGAN 19 SEPT. JUAN CAMPOS CAMPOS, CHILEAN, SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS OF WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (WFTU), WHO IS IN LIMA FOR ILO MEETING, HELD PRESS CONFERENCE ON 18 SEPTEMBER DURING WHICH HE CALLED ON ALL WORLD TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS TO MOUNT PUBLIC OPINION CRUSADE AGAINST CHILEAN JUNTA.

8. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.#

DATE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1973 W Kent

ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS

UNIT: ADC/WH/6

EXT: 6556/7155

James E. Flannery C/WH/SA

C/WHD

C/WH/6

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E2 IMPDET

CL BY: 057556

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

SECRET

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 2515242

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 459023

CONF: C/WH6 INFO: FILE C/SS 3, C/CI/AN

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 9
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES $

TO: PRIORITY LIMA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 25754 (IN 035309)

B. LIMA 26010 (IN 038180)

1. REF A WAS USED FOR FUOMEN. AS FOLLOW-UP WOULD LIKE USE REF B, LIMA 26010, SUBJECT YOUR CONCURRENCE AND CAVEATS. WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN EXILE IN LIMA AND DELETE REFERENCES TO SOURCES IN REPORT (PIP PENETRATION AGENT AND HIGH LEVEL OFFICIAL OF PERUVIAN SERVICE WHO IS PROFESSIONAL INTEL OFFICER) AND ALTER TEXT ACCORDINGLY. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.

*REFS ATTACHED.

WH/6 CT-4

15-124-52

25 Sep 73

DATE: 25 SEPTEMBER 1973 J. Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

RECORD COPY

WH/SA/O

James E. Flannery
C/WHD for

C/WH/6

C/WH/3

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

24-1

	AUE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE		PAGE	OF	PAGES
ONF	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	242210Z	DIRECTOR	458840

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE, IDAN, EUR6, C/CPS/IT 2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: [illegible]
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: BONN 26475 (IN 037592)

1. IN GENERAL TERMS BUSINESSES LEGALLY NATIONALIZED SUCH AS COPPER COMPANIES, BANKS AND ITT HAVE BECOME GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND WILL NOT BE RETURNED, WHILE BUSINESSES WHICH WERE INTERVENED, INCLUDING MOST DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING FIRMS, MAY BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS. THE SAME GENERAL CRITERIA APPLY TO PROPERTY: LARGE FARMS LEGALLY EXPROPRIATED WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, WHILE FARMS ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED PROBABLY WILL BE RETURNED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE NO LIST EXISTS WHICH SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES WHICH BUSINESSES OR PROPERTIES FALL INTO WHICH CATEGORY. WE HAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS THIS SUBJECT.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

24

DATE: 24 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:LSS
UNIT: WH/6/SA
EXT: 6607/1069

15-124-52
24 Sep 73

WH/6 CI-4

RECORD COPY

C/WHEUR
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/6
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 14 RUN BY ______ Chile

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______ SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED CC/WH C/CR BY D AT 1520z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. C/IAN, C/EUR6, C/SS3, C/PS/EG 3

T 551709 PAGE 01 IN 037590

[illegible] TOR:241450Z SEP 73 BONN 26475

S E C R E T 241416Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE BONN 26475

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: A. DIRECTOR 458535 o Legal property of govt

B. DIRECTOR 456615

C. BONN 26432 (IN 035549)

1. PARA 3B REF B STATES PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH HAVE BECOME QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT BE RETURNED OWNERS. REF C REQUESTED IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC PROPERTIES INVOLVED. NOT CLEAR FROM REF A WHETHER EXPROPRIATED AND REQUISITIONED PROPERTIES CONSIDERED QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE PROPERTIES OF GOVT SUBJECT TO PROVISIONS PARA 3B REF B. IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT IF ANY FIRMS IN SOCIAL AREA HAVE NOT BECOME LEGAL PROPERITY OF GOVERNMENT AND WHAT FIRMS HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER OR INTERVENED WITHOUT BECOMING LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVERNMENT.

B

3B

WH/6 C7-4

2. PLS CLARIFY AND IF POSSIBLE PROVIDE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF FIRMS INVOLVED.

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

15-124-52

24 Sep 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 551709 PAGE 02-02 IN 037592

TOR:241450Z SEP 73 BONN 26475

3. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 221721Z DIRECTOR 458535

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE C/CI/DN. C/EURG. DDC/DO. C/SSS. C/PS/EG3.

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: PER 38 #

TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT FUOMEN CAGER

REFS: A. BONN 26432 (IN 035549) (*)

B. DIRECTOR 456615 (**)

1. "SOCIAL AREA" IS TERM FOR STATE-CONTROLLED SECTOR OF ECONOMY. STATE CONTROL OVER WIDE VARIETY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES WAS SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED DURING ALLENDE REGIME. THROUGH PURCHASES, EXPROPRIATIONS, REQUISITIONS, AND INTERVENTIONS OF PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES, THE GOC BY MID-1973 HAD CONTROL OVER PRODUCTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES ACCOUNTING FOR ALMOST HALF OF CHILE'S GDP, COMPARED TO AN ESTIMATED 20% AT END OF THE FREI ADMINISTRATION IN 1970.

2. SINCE TAKING OFFICE, ALLENDE GOVT HAD TAKEN OVER AT LEAST 400 FIRMS. THE EXECUTIVE HAD SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS BILLS THAT WOULD AUTHORIZE INCREASES IN SCOPE AND RANGE OF GOVT-CONTROLLED SECTOR, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON WHAT SECTOR'S LIMITS SHOULD BE. ALLENDE GOVT, THEREFORE, HAD CONTINUED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

15-124-52

22 Sep 73

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

	AGE	CDI	ACF	TOO	TPS	MRO
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
458535

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO REQUISITION AND INTERVENE PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES AS IT CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED.

3. FILE: 15-1204-52. E 2, IMPDET.#

*INTEND USE (REF B) [redacted] FUOMEN. PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA" PROPERTIES.

**FUOMEN ON ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA.

DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM KENT:DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/8
EXT: 6556/9155

ADC/WH/6 William M. Kent

AC/EUR/SA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 28-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACF	TOG	TPE	MRO	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	221719Z	DIRECTOR	458522

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE C/F/AN, C/EA 4, C/EUR 6. DDO. C/SS 3. C/CPS/INT 2

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER 78
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, BRASILIA, LIMA, PARIS, LONDON, BONN, BERN, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, ROME.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: MEXICAN JOURNALIST WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES.

2. SUBJECT: REMARKS BY CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN MEXICO AFTER THE 11 SEPTEMBER COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE.

3. SHORTLY AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE, A CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICER WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE CUBAN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) IN MEXICO SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOVT WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE GOOD ORGANIZATION OF CHILEAN MILITARY'S SUCCESSFUL OVERTHROW OF THE ALLENDE REGIME ON 11 SEPTEMBER.

4. HE SAID THE CUBAN GOVT AND CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO WERE NOT SURPRISED, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ALLENDE GOVT WAS MADE BECAUSE THEY HAD LONG PERCEIVED THAT ALLENDE, WHILE A GOOD MARXIST, LACKED SUFFICIENT AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD HIS ENEMIES.

5. HE SAID THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO HAD PLANS PREPARED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

22 Sep 73

WH/6 CT-4

15-124-32

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ADS CO ACP TOO TPE MRO

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
2 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C RET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

458522

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEN BY:
PER
#

CONF: INFO: FILE

IN CASE OF ALLENDE OVERTHROW. LONG BEFORE 11 SEPTEMBER CUBAN EMBASSY BEGAN DISTRIBUTING LATEST MODEL AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, AND EVEN ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO CHILEAN WORKER CADRES WITH WHOM CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS HAD BEEN WORKING FOR LONG TIME. MUNITIONS ALSO HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO CUBAN CADRES IN CHILE WDHO HAD BEEN ACTIVE AMONG WORKERS. IT IS THEY WHO NOW MUST BEAR MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREPARING THE INEVITABLE COUNTER-COUP AGAINST MILITARY JUNTA. THIS IS EXPECTED TO TAKE TIME AND TRAINING, BUT MEANS ARE AVAILABLE AND CUBAN WEAPONRY IS FAR SUPERIOR TO THAT OF CHILEAN ARMED FORCES.

6. FILE: 15-124-52█. E 2, IMPDET.H

c/WH/COG O. Butler

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILDDLLIAM KENT:DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 5515/98192

C/EUR/SA
EA/JKO/J
C/WH/SA

William M. Kent

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTIC Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROH ED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 8057556

SECRET

14-00000

20

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 . 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP
2122580Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
458246

CONF: c/WH 8 INFO: FILE c/IAHN ADD/AO c/SS 3 c/OSA/IC2 c/OPS

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 43
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZ, QUITO, BOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS BAIRES, GUATBEMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR, MANAGUA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN LIMA.

2. SUBJECT: MEETING IN LIMA OF LATIN AMERICAN SUBBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS TO MAKE PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE.

3. ON OR ABOUT 22 SEPTEMBER A MEETING IS TO BE HELD IN LIMA BB OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMBERICAN SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA GROUPS AND TO HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

4. THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU IS DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING GROUPS TO CHILE TO FIGHT ALONGSIDE ANY CHILEANS WHO ARE STILL OFFERING RESISTANCE TO THE NEW MILITARY JUNTA. THE PARTY INTENDS TO SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN RESISTANCE FORCES BIN CHILE.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

WH/L CI-4

15-124-52
21 Sep 73

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

MSG	CIN	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

458246

5. FILE: 15-124-52. E 2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973 W Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM KENT:DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 5515/9192

DC/WH/3

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for W. M. Kent
C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

SECRET

24

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER TOTAL COPIES [illegible] RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY [illegible] WH CD BY M AT 1935

ACTION UNIT

9/12/73

INFO RF, FILE VR [illegible] 7D 9/20 [illegible]/533 [illegible] [illegible] C/[illegible]

ACTION 857

T 547408 PAGE 01-01 IN 036120

TOR:211917Z SEP 73 PACY 25771

S E C R E T 211911Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 25771

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF A. DIRECTOR 457922

B. PANAMA CITY 25754 (035309)

1. CONCUR REF A.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

WH/6 C7-4

15-124-52

21 Sep 73

RECORD COPY

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 12 ______ RUN BY ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED WH BY ______ AT 1841 Z

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION 853

INFO RF. FILE. VR. 4 IP/AN

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 5473[illegible] PRECEDENCE PAGE 01-01 IN 036065

TOR:211811Z SEP 73 MEXI 25263

S E C R E T 211808Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25263

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF DIRECTOR 457888

1. CONCUR. NO CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

WH/6 CI-4

15-124-52

21 Sep 73

RECORD COPY

OUTGOIN^ MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 23

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP
211725Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
457922

DISSEM BY: 12

PER ___ # ___

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE C/WH/6 DDO/DDO C/SS 2
C/PS/EG 2 C/FI/INT 2 C/IW

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO ___
0 FILES

TO: PRIORITY PANAMA CITY.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: PANAMA CITY 25754 [IN 035309]

1. PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN, WILL ALTER TEXT TO SHOW LIMA AS PLACE ACQUIRED, OMITTING REFERENCE TO TRAVEL OF QUIJADA OR HIS PARTICIPATION AT MEETING. WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN EXILE IN LIMA, SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND ANY CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

*MEETING IN LIMA OF LATAM SOCIALIST ORGS TO MAKE PLANS SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA GROUPS AND HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

WH/6 CI-4

15-124-52

21 Sep 73

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

RECORD COPY

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/6
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

30-1

PAGE OF PAGES
1 1 Cab

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
211612Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
457888

CONF: [illegible] INFO: FILE [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] DDC/DO

DISSEM BY: [illegible]

PER #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 25260 (IN 035305)

1. PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN, WILL OMMIT NAME OF MANUEL CORTINA AND REFER TO HIM ONLY AS OFFICER IN CUBAN EMBASSY WHO MEMBER OF DGI. WILL SOURCE TO MEXICAN JOURNALIST WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES, SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND ANY CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

B

WH/6 CT-4
15-124-52
21 Sep 73

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

C/WH/6
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/WH/31
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 2 RUN V

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED EUR BY 7 AT 1115 Z

ACTION UNIT c/EUR6

ACTION # 097

INFO RF. FILE. VR c/IPLAN, C/SS3 C/WH8

T 546182 PAGE 01-01 IN 235549

TOR:211012Z SEP 73 BONN 26432

S E C R E T 210956Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE BONN 26432

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 456615

1. INTEND USE FUOMEN INFO REF. TO INCREASE USEFULNESS, PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA" PROPERTIES REFERRED TO PARA 3B REF.

2. FILE 15-124-52. E2-IMPDET

AE

WH-6 CI-4

SECRET

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
21 Sept 73

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COL	ACP	TOG	TPE	MNO
0	0	0	0	0	0

OMF

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	182334Z	DIRECTOR	456615

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE -/553

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 33
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 FILE #

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, BONN, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN BUSINESSMAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN MILITARY JUNTA GOVERNMENT.

2. SUBJECT: ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA.

3. ON 15 SEPTEMBER GENERAL SERGIO NUNO, MINISTER VICE PRESIDENT OF CHILEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (CORFO), OUTLINED MILITARY JUNTA'S ECONOMIC PLANS AS FOLLOWS:

A. ALL OF FIRMS AND COMPANIES WHICH HAVE BEEN EITHER TAKEN OVER OR INTERVENED BUT WHICH ARE NOT LEGALLY OWNED BY GOVERNMENT, WILL BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL OWNERS;

B. THOSE PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH HAVE BECOME LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO PREVIOUS OWNERS. NUNO SAID HE BELIEVES THAT A GIVEN PERCENTAGE OF OWNERSHIP OF THESE PROPERTIES, PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 40 OR 50%, SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE WORKERS, AND REMAINING PERCENTAGE SHOULD BE SOLD AS SHARES TO THE PUBLIC.

B

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

WH/6 CL-4 18 SEP 73
15-124-52

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RECORD COPY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

457615

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

TO THE PUBLIC.

4. ACCORDING TO NUNO, PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF THESE INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BEGIN WORKING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY ARE TO REQUEST ANY HELP THEY NEED FROM ARMED FORCES, AND IN EVENT OF ANY PROBLEMS, THEY ARE TO CONTACT GENERAL NUNO, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO HELP THEM.

5. GENERAL NUNO SAID THAT CORFO HAS IN EFFECT ASSUMED THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. GENERAL NUNO AND CORFO WILL WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOFA), WHICH HAS APPOINTED EUGENIO HEIREMANS AS WSOFOFA COORDINATOR WITH CORFO.

6. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.#

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1973 W. Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

SA/WH/EICO

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WHD/6

C/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTI[illegible] Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS P[illegible]

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 21

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY [✓ ISSUED]/SLOTTED WH CD BY M AT 2000 Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT c/WH8

ACTION # 732

INFO: RF. FILE. VR. c/IC/OA. c/SS3. c/PS/EG3 c/OPS/INT2.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 538842 PAGE 01-01 IN 032783

[illegible] TOR:181935Z SEP 73 SAGO 26529

S E C R E T 161856Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26529

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 456203 (IN 031351)

1. CONCUR USE OF SANTIAGO 26489 (HCS 9836) FOR FUOMEN. NO SPECIALCAVEATS. (IN 031722)

2. PREFER NOT USE SANTIAGO 26512 (HCS 9839) BECAUSE OF SOURCE SENSITIVITY. INFO WAS GIVEN DIRECTLY AND PRIVATELY TO FUERMINE-3 BY FUABLE-2.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

WH/L CT-4

B

SECRET

RECORD COPY

18 SEP 73

15-124-52

DISSEM BY IW PER JFB TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 007622

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT
WH 11

ACTION #
179

INFO FILE, VR, DDO, DDO/DO, IP/AN, IW, OPS/INT 5, SS 4,
PS/EG 2, CI, CI/OP, FR 4, SS/SOG 3

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE 01

TOR:172145Z SEP 73

SAGO 26512

SECRET 171950Z SEP 73 INTEL

TDFIR-314/07571-73
HCS-9839

CITE SANTIAGO 26512

TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE: FUERMINE-3 FROM IDEN. NO INDEX. FILE:
15-9-4. CL BY 009560.

FILED: 171950Z

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

IN 031722

STATE/INR NMCC/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA TREAS SDO ONE CRS

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

NSC/S

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR -314/07571-73

DIST 17 SEPTEMBER 1973

COUNTRY: CHILE

DOI : 15 SEPTEMBER 1973

SUBJECT: PLANS OF EDUARDO FREI, FORMER PRESIDENT OF CHILE AND LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO LEAVE CH

ACQ : CHILE, SANTIAGO (16 SEPTEMBER 1973) FIELD NO. HCS-9839

SOURCE: AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY WHOSE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY PLACES HIM IN THE CENTER OF THE PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM. HE HAS GOOD ACCESS TO BOTH THE RIGHT- AND LEFT-WING SECTORS OF THE PDC. MUCH OF HIS PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND SOURCES.

1. ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1973 FORMER PRESIDENT EDUARDO FREI, A LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC), TOLD OTHER PDC LEADERS THAT HE CONSIDERED IT WISEST FOR HIM TO LEAVE CHILE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND FOR HIM TO REMAIN ABROAD UNTIL THE DIRECTIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BECOME CLEARER AND THE SECURITY

SITUATION BECOMES MORE STABLIZED.

2. (SOURCE COMMENT: MOST OF THE PDC LEADERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY SINCE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE TARGETS FOR ASSASSINATION BY LEFTIST EXTREMISTS AND THAT THEY MAY BECOME THE POLITICAL TARGETS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE CONCERNED PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFERING OF IMPORTANT POSTS TO RIGHTISTS SUCH AS ORLANDO SAENZ, THE PRESIDENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOFA), WHO HAS BEEN NAMED AS ECONOMIC ADVISOR TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS; AND LEON VILARIN, HEAD OF THE TRUCK OWNERS FEDERATION, WHO WAS OFFERED THE POST OF MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS, WHICH HE REFUSED. WHILE SAENZ HAS A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH PDC MEMBERS, HE IS REGARDED BY THE PDC LEADERS AS BASICALLY OPPOSED TO THE PDC AND INTERESTED IN ITS ELIMINATION AS A VIABLE POLITICAL ENTITY.)

3. FREI SAID THAT WHILE HE IS CONSIDERING LEAVING THE COUNTRY OF HIS OWN WILL, HE WOULD PREFER TO BE REQUESTED TO LEAVE BY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO PROTECT HIS POLITICAL FUTURE. HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND HE WOULD PREFER THAT HIS DEPARTURE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE

IN FEAR FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY.

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFATT AT SANTIAGO.

REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.9. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEOGRY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER
TOTAL COPIES 31-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION # 184

INFO RF. FILE. VR IP/AN SS5, PS/EG 4

1	6	4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 535956 PAGE 01-01 IN 031535

TOR:1718432 SEP 73 SAGO 26500

S E C R E T 171814Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26500

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

FUORACLE FUOMEN

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 25196 (IN 031341)

B. SANTIAGO 26464 (IN 030951)

1. CONCUR PARA ONE REF A REQUEST.

2. FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET

C/WH/6
DC/WH/6
WH/6
WH/6/FI
WH/6/RR
WH/6/Sec'y

file Fuomen

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 20-1 ___ BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ___ BY ___ AT ___ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT WH8	INFO	RF. FILE. VR. WH/AV 555	1 ___ 4 ___ 2 ___ 5 ___ 3 ___ 6 ___
ACTION # 138			

T 535509 PAGE 01-01 IN 031341

TOR:171558Z SEP 73 MEXI 25196

S E C R E T 171541Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25196

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

FUORACLE

REF. SANTIAGO 26464 (030451)

1. BELIEVE GIST OF REF WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF PASSED TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA AS IF IT WERE A FUOMEN ITEM. REQUEST SANTIAGO CONCURRENCE.

2. FOR DIRECTOR: OFFICIAL MEXICAN GOVT POLICY IS COMPLETE SYMPATHY FOR ALLENDE. PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA MET MRS. ALLENDE AT AIRPORT 16 SEPT AND HAD ALREADY DECREED THREE DAYS OF OFFICIAL MOURNING FOR DEATH OF PRESIDENT ALLENDE 17-19 SEPT. UNLESS WE CAN GET INFORMATION ON TRUE FACTS IN CHILE TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA DIRECTLY, THE LITTLE MEDIA PLAY WHICH MEXICO CITY PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF MUSTERING WILL BE LOST IN AVALANCHE OF SPONTANEOUS, PLANTED AND GOVT APPROVED PRO-ALLENDE MATERIAL APPEARING LOCALLY. THE CONSENSUS OF MANY MEXICANS IS THAT THE U.S. AND CIA IN PARTICULAR MASTERMINDED THE COUP.

3. FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

file FUOMEN

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 53 PER TOTAL COPIES 13 RUN

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSA

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION # 038

INFO RF. FILE. VR. [illegible]

T 532968 PAGE 01-01 IN 032412

TOR:151547Z SEP 73 MEXI 25191

C/WH

D

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Secy

RO

S E C R E T 151536Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25191

TO: DIRECTOR.

KDOBELISK FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 454587

1. GIST OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REF WAS PASSED TO KDOBELISK-1 THROUGH KDGLACIER-3 ON 13 SEPT 73. ON 14 SEPT KDGLACIER-3 TOLD GRANDGENT THAT KDOBELISK-1 WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THIS REPORT. KDOBELISK-1 IS RECEIVING NO INFORMATION FROM HIS EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO AT THIS TIME AND HAS TO DEPEND ON NEWS RELEASES FROM CHILE AND ARGENTINA WHICH HE CONSIDERS TO BE OF DUBIOUS ACCURACY.

2. FILE: 50-6-91/3. E2. IMPDET.

fi Fuomen

(2)

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 24 PER TOTAL COPIES 25-0

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION # 683

INFO RF. FILE . VR

T 527885 PAGE 01 IN 028495

PRECEDENCE

TOR:132324Z SEP 73

SAGO 26421

S E C R E T 132233Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26421

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, WH/MIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY, GEORGETOWN, TEGUCIGALPA, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, MONTEVIDEO, CARACAS, LONDON, PARIS, LCPIPIT, BONN.

1. EL MERCURIO, A MAJOR CONSERVATIVE SANTIAGO DAILY, APPEARED TODAY (13 SEPTEMBER) CARRYING FOR MOST PART OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS BY THE CHILEAN JUNTA. THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL AND ARTICLES, HOWEVER, APPEAR WORTH REPLAYING:

A. HACIA LA RECUPERACION NACIONAL

CON DISTINTOS LENGUAJES Y CRITERIOS, LAS PERSONALIDADES POLITICAS, LOS DIRIGENTES GREMIALES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES MAS INFLUYENTES RECLAMABAN UN CAMBIO PROFUNDO EN LA DIRECCION DEL PAIS. TANTO LA OPINION PUBLIC NACIONAL COMO LA EXTRANJERA HABIAN LLEGADO A LA EVIDENCIA DE QUE CHILE ENTRABA EN UN PROCESO FATAL QUE DEBIA LLEVARLO A LA DICTADURA MARXISTA O A LA GUERRA CIVIL.

LA INTERVENCION DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS, VINO EN ESTE CASO A LIBERAR A LA CIUDADANIA DE LA INMINENTE DICTADURA MARXISTA

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

15-124-52

13 SEP 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE . VR .	1 ☐ 4 ☐
			2 ☐ 5 ☐
ACTION #			3 ☐ 6 ☐

T 527885 PAGE 02 IN 028495

TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

Y A SALVAR A CHILE DEL ANIQUILAMIENTO POLITICO, SOCIAL, Y ECONOMICO.

SE ABREN AHORA PERSPECTIVAS DE RECUPERACION MEDIANTE UN INTENSO Y DISCIPLINADO ESFUERZO QUE RESTABLEZCA EL HABITO DEL TRABAJO, NORMALICE LAS FAENAS, DETENGA LA DESTRUCCION DEL PATRIMONIO NACIONAL Y REINICIE EL PROCESO DE CAPITALIZACION INDISPENSABLE AL FUTURO BIENESTAR.

CON INNEGABLE SACRIFICIO Y ABNEGATION, LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS HAS CUMPLIDO SU PAPEL DE SALVAGUARDIA ULTIMA DE LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD. PERO LA DURA TAREA QUE IMPONE RESTANAR LAS HERIDAS Y REANUDAR LA MARCHA DE LA NACION EXIGE EL APOYO RESUELTO DE AQUELLA MAYORIZ CUIDADANA QUE, EN TODOS LOS TONOS, HA PEDIDO UNA HONDA RECTIFICACION.

EL QUEBRANTAMIENTO CONSTITUCIONAL PROVOCADO POR EL MARXISMO NO PUDO SOLDARSE CON LAS SOLAS INICIATIVAS DE LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS. LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS NO DESEABAN NI HAD DESEADO NUNCA TOMAR SOBRE SI LA RESPONSIBILIDAD DE CONDUCIR LOS DESTINOS DE LA NACION, PERO EL DRAMATICO FRACASO DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR Y LAS LIMITACIONES DEL CUADRO POLITICO OPOSITOR PARA CONSEGUIR EL INDISPENSABLE CAMBIO DE RUMBO FORZARON LA SITUACION HASTA EL PUNTO EN QUE SE ENCUENTRA.

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 527885 PAGE 03 IN 028495

TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

CHILE TIENE UN GOBIERNO MILITAR, FORMADO POR LOS SENORES COMANDANTES EN JEFE DE LAS TRES RAMAS DE LA DEFENSE NACIONAL Y EL SENOR GENERAL DIRECTOR DE CARABINEROS. LA JUNTA MILITAR HA ASUMIDO EL MANDO SUPREMO, RESPETANDO EXPRESAMENTE LAS ATRIBUCIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL, CONTANDO CON LA ASESORIA DE LA CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA Y DISPONIENDO EL RECESO DEL PARLAMENTO. DE ESTE MODO LA JUNTA CREE ENCONTRAR EL CAMINO ADECUADO PARA INSTAURAR LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD QUE SE REQUIERE.

LAS RESERVAS QUE ESTA POSICION DE LA JUNTA PUEDAN INSPIRAR A CIERTOS SECTORES POLITICOS NO PUEDEN SER TAN ABSOLUTAS QUE LLEGUEN HASTA NEGAR EL CONCURSO DE TODOS LOS CHILENOS AL ESFUERZO DE RECONSTRUCCION DE SU PATRIA. POR EL CONTRARIO, A TRAVES DE LA JUNTA, ES CHILE MISMO EL QUE JUEGA LA CARTA DEFINITIVA PARA TRIUNFAR DEL ODIO, DE LA DESUNION, DEL DESALIENTO Y DE LA DECADENCIA. LA LABOR IMPONE LA ACCION DE TODAS LAS CAPACIDADES Y LA COLABORACION DE TODA LA CUIDADANIA, ESPECIALMENTE DE AQUELLOS CHILENOS QUE POR SU INDIFERENTISMO, SU INDECISION, SU EGOISMO O SU PEREZA HAN GENERADO LAS CONDICIONES QUE PERMITIERON EL DESARROLLO DE LA IDEOLOGIA MARXISTA Y SU LLEGADA AL PODER EN 1970 GRACIAS A LA DIVISION DE LAS FUERZAS DEMOCRATICAS.

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	1 / 4
			2 / 5
ACTION #			3 / 6

T 527885 PAGE 04 IN 028495

TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

EL PAIS HA VIVIDO VIRTUALMENTE AL MARGEN DE LA CONSTITUCION Y ABSORBIENDO GRANDES DOSIS DE IDEOLOGIA EXTRANJERA ACOMPANDA TAMBIEN DE GUERRILLEROS EXTRANJEROS. A NADIE PUEDE SURPRENDER QUE EL REMEDIO A TAN DESESPERADA SITUACION SEA DE CARACTER EXTRAORDINARIO Y SE LE ADMINISTRE PROPORCIONADAMENTE A LA VIOLENCIA QUE OPONGA EL MAL ANTE DE SER DOMINADO.

EN MEDIO DE LAS DIFICULTADES, LO UNICO QUE RECLAMA EL PATRIOTISMO ES TRABAJO, ESPIRITU DE SOLIDARIDAD Y COLABORACION PARA EL ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL ORDEN INSTITUCIONAL.

B. EXPRESO PRESIDENTE DE CORTE SUPREMA -- COMPLACENCIA DEL PODER JUDICIAL

EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREME, ENRIQUE URRUTIA MANZANO, ENTREGO LA SIGUIENTE DECLARACION:

"EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA, EN CONOCIMIENTO DEL PROPOSITO DEL NUEVO GOBIERNO DE RESPETAR Y HACER CUMPLIR LAS DECISIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL SIN EXAMEN PROVIO DE SU LEGALIDAD, COMO LO ORDENA EL ARTICULO 11 DEL CODIGO ORGANICO DE TRIBUNALES, MANIFIESTA PUBLICAMENTE POR ELLO SU MAS INTIMA COMPLACENCIA EN NOMBRE DE LA ADMINISTRACION DE JUSTICIA DE CHILE, Y ESPERA QUE EL PODER JUDICIAL COMPLA CON SU DEBER, COMO LO HA HECHO LASTA

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PER_____ TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE . VR .

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 527885 PAGE 05 IN 028495

TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

AHORA. SANTIAGO, 12 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1973. FIRMA: ENRIQUE URRUTIA MANZANO, PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA".

C. ACTIVIDADES DE FF.AA. Y CARABINEROS --

150 CUBANOS EXTREMISTAS EXPULSADOS AYER DEL PAIS

ALLANADA UNIVERSIDAD TECNICA DEL ESTADO. TENDICION DE 600 PERSONAS.

REDUCCION DE EXTREMISTAS.

INCAUTACION DE ARMAS EN INDUSTRIAS E INSTITUCIONES BANCARIAS.

CONTROL DE LA MONEDA, TOMAS MORO Y "CANAVERAL" EN EL ARRAYAN.

CIENTO CINCUENTA CUBANOS EXTREMISTAS FUERON EXPULSADOS AYER DEL PAIS POR LA JUNTA MILITAR DE GOBIERNO, SEGUN EL BANDO NO. 26 QUE DETALLA LAS ACTIVADES PRINCIPALES DESARROLLADAS POR LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS EN LAS ULTIMAS HORAS EN LA GUARNICION DE SANTIAGO.

LA COMUNICACION SENALA QUE FUE ALLANADA LA UNIVERSIDAD TECNICA DEL ESTADO, DONDE SE RINDIERON 600 PERSONAS, Y SE ENCONTRO GRAN CANTIDAD DE ARMAMENTO, ASI COMO INDUSTRIAS, ENTIDADES BANCARLAS Y OTROS RECINTOS EN LOS CUALES LOS EFECTIVOS MILITARES SE INCAUTARON DE ARMAS Y EXPLOSIVOS...

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

15-124-52

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
[illegible] RYBAT

ACTION
WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, SECUR-4, CCS 3, (C/KB), C/OPS

S E C R E T 052311Z CITE JMWAVE 4483

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMMUG

REFERENCE DIRECTOR 57011

6 DEC 65 IN 54041

1. JMWAVE RECORDS SHOW FROM ARRIVAL JMWAVE LATE 64 THROUGH DECEMBER 65 AMMUG/1 USED AS STATUS COVER INTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION, WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY HEADQUARTERS. JOB TITLE WAS RESEARCHER WITH SALARY $600 PER MONTH. AMMUG/1 CLAIMS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE BALTIMORE COMPANY, AND SEARCH JMWAVE FILES FAILS PRODUCE ANY INFO THAT AMMUG/1 CONNECTED WITH ANY SUCH COMPANY. REQUEST HQS CLARIFY.

2. AS IN CASE NUMBEROUS OTHER PBRUMEN AGENTS, JMWAVE REVISED AMMUG/1 COVER 1 JAN 66 TO MEET TAX REQUIREMENTS AND TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE STATUS COVER. STATION NEGLECTED INFORM WOGAME RE THIS CHANGE. SCHEAFFER EMPLOYMENT THUS BEGAN 1 JAN 65. THERE WAS NO INTERIM EMPLOYMENT.

3. SEVERAL OTHER CREDIT CHECKS SINCE AMMUG/1 EMPLOYED BY SCHEAFFER HAVE WORKED SMOOTHLY. AMMUG/1 ATTEMPTING PURCHASE HOUSE LOCALLY WHICH APPEARS BE REASON FOR PRESENT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 4480 S E C R E T

CHECKS. APPRECIATE EARLY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT INQUIRIES TO EXPEDITE CLOSING PURCHASE.

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

SECRET

21 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. The DDP and Chief, SR met with Ambassador Thompson in his office to advise him of our plans to proceed to hostile interrogation in order to clarify the NOSENKO case. The DDP explained that while we had reached a firm conclusion late last year that NOSENKO was a provocateur and that hostile interrogation was in order, we decided to review these conclusions with representatives of the FBI. After some unavoidable delay, a series of meetings was held with the FBI at the level of Deputy Director for Security, Mr. William C. Sullivan. The findings of the FBI, which agreed generally with our own views, were formulated in a letter to the Director signed by John Edgar Hoover. A copy of this memorandum was shown to Ambassador Thompson by the DDP with the comment that the FBI and ourselves now have a common understanding on the case which was something both the DCI and the Director, FBI, agreed would be necessary.

2. DDP went on to say that we would hope to begin hostile interrogations in the near future but before we did, we wanted to discuss the case with Ambassador Thompson in light of the various contingencies which might arise during the course of these interrogations. DDP felt that it was preferable to advise Ambassador Thompson well in advance of our intentions so that if consultations with the State Department became necessary on a contingency basis, Ambassador Thompson would be in possession of the background. Ambassador Thompson first asked if we were sure that NOSENKO could not escape and turn himself into the Soviet Embassy. We told him that we had established him in a country house with a large security guard which we felt made escape improbable. Ambassador Thompson then asked if there was a possibility that NOSENKO might commit suicide. We said psychiatrists did not believe he was the type to do so and that our security surveillance was such that we were alert to this possibility and would try to prevent it. Ambassador Thompson also wondered if there had been any communications concerning NOSENKO from the

Soviet side. We replied there had been none since the confrontation last year following NOSENKO's arrival in this country. We then mentioned the attempts on several occasions by NOSENKO's wife and mother to contact him through the Embassy in Moscow but added that these attempts ceased in March 1964 and nothing has been heard from them since.

3. Ambassador Thompson then asked if NOSENKO had provided information which would discredit any American officials. We answered in the negative, pointing out that he had reported on former French and Canadian ambassadors. We later qualified the statement on Americans, pointing out that NOSENKO did provide information on a few Americans of lesser rank as well as private citizens.

4. The DDP then noted that after we reached a point of no return in our interrogations, we might decide that NOSENKO would have to be turned back. Ambassador Thompson expressed concern that the Soviets might use this action to discourage defections. We explained that when we came to the point that a turn-back appeared desirable, we would hope that a statement could be made by the U. S. Government which would establish NOSENKO as a provocateur. The DDP then described the AEJOYFUL case in brief terms to Ambassador Thompson, emphasizing the parallel planning and the possibility that a quadripartite statement by the governments might be considered. The DDP did note, however, that AEJOYFUL was in British hands and that they have the major responsibility even though we and other security and intelligence services had agreed on the handling of the case. The DDP then noted that in past cases where we had turned back people with intelligence backgrounds at their own request, the Soviets had not made publicity capital of these actions.

5. The earlier mention of our discussions with the FBI recalled to Ambassador Thompson some of the material on Soviet political issues which he has been receiving recently from the FBI. He commented that it was his very strong impression that the information was being fed to us by the Soviets. He said that it either consisted of information we already knew or that which the Soviets would not object to our having. He asked our views on this. The DDP com-

mented that it was the opinion of several officers in the Clandestine Services that some of these FBI sources were under Soviet control whereas the FBI believed them to be genuine.

6. In summing up our position on the NOSENKO case for Ambassador Thompson, the DDP referred to the kinds of information the Soviets had given up through NOSENKO. He made particular reference to the Johnson case and observed that if the Soviets were prepared to provide this kind of build-up to insure the success of NOSENKO's mission, it must then be very important to them. In conclusion, the DDP said that he would send a letter for the record to Mr. Hughes on the topic of NOSENKO to which Ambassador Thompson agreed.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

6 Apr 61

19-120-26

THIS — UR

6 April 1961

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support

Chief, Miami Office

Memorandum of Visit to: Julio Pablo [illegible]
[illegible] N.W. [illegible] Avenue
Miami, Florida

1. Mr. Frank Watterson, representative of the US State Dept. in Miami, advised this office that Subject arrived in the US on 31 Mar 61 as an exile and that he might have information of interest to this office.

2. On 6 Apr 61, Luis JC. Rodriguez interviewed Subject in Watterson's office. An examination of Subject's passport disclosed that he was born on 23 Jan 1943 in Havana, Cuba.

3. Subject stated that he is a member of a clandestine organization named Unidad Revolucionaria (UR), which is composed of 26 underground groups. The Coordinator for military operations of UR was Major Humberto SORI Marin, who was arrested recently. Among the leaders of UR are Rogelio GONZALEZ better known by his name de guerre of "Francisco"; and Rafael DIAZ aka "Ralph". All these individuals were arrested recently and UR is completely disorganized as a result.

4. Subject also stated that his mission with UR was to serve as courier between the organization and the Catholic Chaplain at the Cabana fortress. The liaison between the Chaplain and Subject was Fray [illegible], who is the sexton at the Jesus de Miramar Church, in the suburb of Miramar, near Havana.

5. Subject also made a trip to Sancti Spiritus in the Province of Las Villas bringing a radio transmitter for the anti-Castro guerrillas operating in the Escambray. Through the above mentioned priest, Subject obtained some information furnished by prisoners held in the Cabana fortress which is being forwarded in report form.

6. Subject intends to remain in the US indefinitely and has been instructed to contact a Cuban national named "Ernesto", who resides at [illegible], Miami. Ernesto is the UR representative in Miami.

7. No further contacts with Subject are anticipated.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

LCRodriguez/emb

[illegible] Pablo [illegible] — [illegible] Cuban chief in Havana presumably [illegible] Considered a security risk (re discipline) by [illegible]

US RECORD MATERIAL

DOC DATE

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM ~~[illegible]~~ ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION [illegible]

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

---

3 0024			
[illegible] CA/HQ	12 MAR 78		
4 S. Corlat OG/CFR			
5.			
6.			
7			
8			
9			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14 RETURN TO CA-50			
15 IP/ARD			

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

78-1129
432393

~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~

FILE NO. [illegible] CIA HD 37

DOCUMENT:

FOLDER: 9

PAGE:

BOX: 5 2

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

RECORDS CENTER

21

2[illegible] March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation at the Department of State on 21 March 1952. Present were Messrs. Joyce, Kretzmann and [illegible] from State and Wisner, Lloyd and Braden from CIA.

Mr. Kretzmann had just returned from a trip abroad and said that he had three caveats to make about RFE. In order they were as follows:

1. He said that in the Greek Embassy, [illegible] Post and others complained of the activities of the stringers of RFE. These stringers, he said, sometimes posed as Government employees and went to embassies of other countries getting in touch with refugees without clearing with the U.S. Embassy. At this point Mr. Wisner spoke strongly, saying that he had told [illegible] several times that the RFE reporters must keep in line. He said that he would repeat these warnings and that the views of CIA and of State were identical on the problem. Kretzmann [illegible] the discussion saying that of the two reporters in Greece who were involved -- Landowski and Hanft -- [illegible] had now [illegible] so that at least the specific problem, if not the issue, was solved for the moment.

2. Kretzmann then said that he had heard from several sources around Europe increasing rumors that there were Communists and Fascists within RFE [illegible] to the [illegible] of our security. The manner in which [illegible] security [illegible] was outlined to Mr. Kretzmann and Mr. [illegible] Mr. Wisner, however, instructed Mr. Lloyd to consult with [illegible] and to instruct him to warn the key Czechs, Hungarians, etc. [illegible] Munich operation to put them on guard [illegible] was [illegible] to infiltrate the organization.

3. Mr. Kretzmann said that he had recently met with Harry [illegible] and [illegible] policy guidance, at least they said [illegible] wondered whether it would be in order for [illegible] to [illegible] guidance. Mr. Wisner

replied that in fact RFE did receive constant and frequent policy guidance but that the members of the top staff of RFE were looking for the type of policy guidance which did not exist — a kind of overall global strategy covering specific incidents and eventualities, a kind of policy guidance which probably neither would nor could be written. Specifically he had no objection to showing the top people VOA policy line.

Finally, Mr. Kohler questioned the advisability of putting the new Russian Committee under the Crusade. He pointed out his fear that, what with RFE and RFA already under the Crusade, the Congress would soon believe there was nothing left for VOA to cover. Mr. Joyce rose to this question explaining the necessity of helping Admiral Kirk to find some cover. He pointed out that Messrs. Braden and Devine had been detailed to assure that Crusade publicity did not give the impression that RFE and RFA and any new " private" radio would obviate the necessity for the Voice, and assured Kohler that all Crusade publicity, posters etc. would avoid this possibility. Wisner mentioned his desire to find better cover for the new Committee and there was some talk of Foundations. No better cover had, however, been found at the moment and it was apparent that Admiral Kirk must have some answer to questions which are submitted to him. Mr. Kohler answered this argument by reiterating his fears.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDCI (thru ADPC & [illegible])
1 cc - DD/P
1 cc - FI (Mr. Poor)
1 cc - [illegible]
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

C-22

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : S/P - Mr. Joyce

DATE: February 19, 1952

FROM : EE - Mr. Barbour

SUBJECT: Fund Memorandum No. 562 of December 31, 1951 attaching copies of documents regarding the activities of the Central and Eastern European Conference (Slavik-Major Group)

Your attention is invited to subject memorandum which quotes a speech by Jerzy Lerski, Vice Chairman of the Polish Political Council's Working Committee in the United States, proposing the formation of a domestic political pressure group of American residents of Eastern European stock. In the course of his speech, Mr. Lerski repeats and endorses the official statement of Aims and Principles of Federation of Americans of Central and East European Descent. This statement, particularly in its paragraph No. 3, proposes that their objectives should be obtained through "unified political action."

The Department is obviously in complete support of their basic objective, namely, the overthrow of Communism. However, we do perceive real harm in the utilization of NCFE funds to promote domestic political pressure groups; especially, when such groups will self-avowedly engage in political and election contests in the United States in order to further their objectives abroad.

Accordingly, we would suggest that steps be taken to ensure that groups which are sponsored by or supported through affiliation with NCFE be restrained from participating in or assisting such domestic political pressure groups as is proposed in subject Fund Memorandum. Such groups should be cautioned, in any event, to avoid any public declarations of intent to intervene in domestic American politics.

EE: [illegible]Pell[illegible]:lc
2/19/52 Hd

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible] 1952

C-22

MEMORANDUM NO. 152

SECRET

PRIVATE

December 31, 1951

Attached to this memorandum are copies of documents regarding the activities of the Central and Eastern European Conference (Slavik-Majer Group).

(Perski)

SECRET

JAN 5 1952

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

On behalf of Mr. A. Cretzianu, Chairman of the last conference, and Dr. Constantine Fotitch, Chairman of the Serbian National Committee, Chairman of the next meeting of the Central and Eastern European Conference, I am inviting you and your political friends to a meeting of the CEEC, which will be held on Tuesday, December 18, 1951 at the Hotel Willard, Executive Room, Pennsylvania Ave. and 14th St., Washington, N.W., at precisely 3 P.M.

The Agenda of the meeting will be:

1. Report of the Secretary General on the meetings of the General Committee on the action of the CEEC on deportations, in Washington, New York, Paris, about the press conference in Washington, etc.

2. Report of Mr. Jerzy Lerski (Vice Chairman of the Polish Political Council, Working Committee in the U.S.) on collaboration with Americans of Central and East European Descent.

3. Report of Mr. V. Stanka on World University.

The report of Mr. Lerski is attached to this invitation.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) Dr. Juraj Slavik
Secretary General

* * * *

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

(On Americans of Central and East European Descent)

From Jerzy Lerski, Vice Chairman of the Polish
Political Council's Working Committee in the
U.S., 618 A Street, S.E., Apt. 15, Washington 3, D. C.

The last three decades of the past century and the first two of the present one, mark the period in which millions of the impoverished peasants of Central and Eastern Europe came to the happy shores of free America. There are now at least twelve million U.S. citizens of Central and East European descent. This is, of course, a most careful estimate. Congressman Kenneth B. Keating of Rochester, N. Y., in his

Extension of Remarks in the Congressional Record on September 15th, 1951, gives the total number of those "loyal Americans" as 20,000,000.--I think it is rather too high an estimate. Even if we would include all Jews from those areas the number could hardly be higher than 15 million; this would be 10% of the total population of the United States. This work seeking, economic emigration from our countries was mainly concentrated in the big cities and the great industrial or mining areas, of the sixteen East and Mid-Western states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin and Minnesota. In some of those states these Europeans comprise about one third of the population. This applies especially to big cities such as Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Toledo, Pittsburgh, Scranton, Buffalo, Wilkes Barre, Trenton, Newark, Camden, New Britain, etc. One should also mention that not less than one fifth of this big emigration managed to find work on farms--in such states as Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska, Massachusetts, and New York.

The political importance of this great segment of American population is steadily increasing in the last twenty years. Nearly all the respective groups were concerned about the homelands of their fathers and grandfathers and became very active during World War II. Although, with the succeeding generations, third or even fourth, this interest has waned, due to the natural weakening of ties with the "old countries"--these new Americans, the sons and grandsons of the poor Central and Eastern European peasant emigrants are conscious of their ancestry. Educated in American colleges and universities, they are gradually emerging in American public life; their old inhibitive inferiority complex is rapidly disappearing. Let us study the Washington Telephone Directory. It is astonishing that at least every twelfth name is of Central Eastern European descent. I am not as familiar with other national groups and their achievements, but as far as Poles are concerned, we are proud to have Mr. Szymczak as one of the Governors of the Federal Reserve, Peter Bukowski the newly appointed Deputy Director of RFC, Mr. Mruk the Mayor of Buffalo and Mr. Czelusta Mayor of Toledo. I am sure similar successes can be claimed by other groups of our Central and Eastern European bloc. Most of these Americans are very helpful if properly approached. We have heard recently at a reception of General Bor-Komorowski a statement made by Major Alfred D. Sieminski a Democratic Congressman from New Jersey who offered his willingness to help the exiled leaders of all of our groups, in our efforts to liberate our part of the world. Similar statements have been made by other Congressmen of Polish descent.

The social advancement of our American brethren is visible nearly in all spheres of American life, with the sole exception of propaganda i.e. Press, radio, television, Hollywood, though even there some progress is to be noticed. In such fields as Church, Universities, and Politics the process of advancement is remarkable. Americans of Central and Eastern European descent have proved to be a first class reliable element as soldiers and citizens of the United States during the two world wars and the present most dangerous ideological struggle with Communism.

There are about six million Americans of Polish descent in the United States. They consist approximately one half of the estimated total of the Central and Eastern European group. Slovaks and Ukrainians compete for second place, having about one million each, in the United States and Canada, Lithuanians and Hungarians seem to be next in line. It may be taken for granted that all of our national groups have at least a hundred thousand American brothers in this country. It is, and it should be a tremendous asset in our struggle for liberation. To take my own Polish group for example it is encouraging to know that there are already ten Congressmen of Polish descent (seven Democrats, three Republicans). Tadeusz Machrowicz Democrat of Michigan, speaking at the Pulaski rally in Detroit declared a few weeks ago that "all congressmen of Polish descent, regardless of party affiliations, are united in so far as the cause of Free Poland is concerned." According to him, as reported by the Polish American Journal No. 47--Vol. XL of November 24th, 1951--"the Polish American solons are working together to invalidate the Teheran and Yalta agreements and to persuade the United States Government to go on record favoring the present western boundaries of Poland." Of other groups Slovenians have one Congressman of their descent--young and prominent Mr. Blatnik from the fourth District of Minnesota. Our Czech friends can claim an old experienced member of the Foreign Affairs Committee Mr. Sabbath--Democrat from Illinois, born in Prague, and another Congressman Mr. Stefan died recently. Up to now there never was any U.S. Senator who could claim Central or Eastern European ancestry, although Senator Langer was born of Czechoslovak German parents. Former Governor Stassen claims Czech ancestry and Governor Lausche Slovenian ancestry. There are several Congressmen of Jewish extraction who were either born in our part of the world or are of the Eastern European parentage. Some of them may be also considered as potential friends of our cause.

A typical organisation in which we should be interested in our work is that of Polish American Congress, established early in 1944 with the main purpose to help Poland in regaining her liberty and at the same time to serve in the best way the long range interests of the United States by pointing out the dangers of Communism and Russian imperialism. By taking such a determined stand at the time when the close friendship with the so-called great Eastern Ally was preached in Washington, they have rendered a valuable service to this country. Polish American Congress is a sort of federation of all types of Polish American organizations, most of them being of course insurance companies with Polish National Alliance ([illegible] members and 75 million of capital) as the most powerful. Others are cultural, educational, or church and veteran groups. They joined together in a struggle for Justice for Poland. Polish-American Congress has the cooperation of about 50 Polish-American newspapers in this country.

Studying the problem I found that there exist parallel organisations of other national groups. Their structural basis are also very similar. I became better acquainted with the American Hungarian Federation. Though organised as long ago as 1906 at Cleveland Convention, it now has among its principal aims and purposes: "To support--within the Constitution and laws of the United States--with all its influence movements aiming to bring about independence for Hungary as well as liberty and well being for its people and to do everything possible to protect the human rights and citizenship of the Hungarian displaced persons outside of Hungary." As the Polish organisation is dominated by the vigorous and colorful personality of Charles Kosmarek from Chicago so is the Hungarian Federation by its energetic executive secretary Stephen E. Balogh from Washington, D.C. The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America is another very active body under the chairmanship of young economist Dr. Lev Dobriansky from Georgetown University.

The above mentioned three organizations together with the Byelorussian - American Association, American Carpatho-Rus Congress, United American Croatians, and the Slovak League of America are sponsoring a Federation of Americans of Central and East European Descent, with the Headquarters at 1624 Eye Street, N.W., Washington D.C., which is at the same time the H.Q. of the American-Hungarian Federation. It is a young organization in its initial period of ambitious activities. Its officers elected on April 1951 at the Hudson Hotel - New York Conference are Stephen M. Tkatch (Carpatho-Ruthenian)--President, Dr. Lev Dobriansky (of Ukrainian descent)--Vice President, Charles Kosmarek (of Polish descent)--Treasurer. Members of the Board of Directors: Stephen E. Balogh (of Hungarian descent), John Michayonack, Philip Hrobak--Recording Secretary, Mr. Lesins (of Latvian descent), Rev. Silvije Grubisic (of Croatian descent) and Stephen J. Skubik (of Ukrainian descent)--Bureau Manager. Joseph A. Jackovics (of Slovak descent) was Federation's Secretary General but accused by other officers for his tendency to turn the Federation into a mere tool of Republican Party machine he was forced to resign. It is not to be overlooked that the Federation is at the moment under strong Ukrainian influence. The officers of the Board of Directors complain that Mr. Kosmarek never attended a meeting of theirs and that Mr. Charles Burke from the Washington Office of the Polish American Congress deputises only in the character of an observer. This absence de facto of the Polish-American Congress apparently hampers to a large extent the Federation's activities. (The reason for this absence will be explained orally).

According to an official Statement of Aims and Principles of Federation of Americans of Central and East European Descent adopted at the Board of Directors Meeting held in Washington on August 17, 1951 there are as follows:

1. To exert every effort to defend the Constitution of our American way of life. To engage and exercise every measure of effort and resource toward the decisive defeat of Russian communist imperialism which in its venomous essence poses a mortal threat to the moral and intellectual Christian foundations of western civilisation in which is posited our priceless American way of life.

2. To coordinate and implement the common and mutual activities of the numerous member organizations represented herein within the scope of a unified political action oriented toward the systematic realisation of this basic objective and the simultaneous world-wide extension of the spiritual and hence, any continuation of the serving of complaints will be simply a gesture of dematerial blessings engendered in our Bill of Rights, the formula of self-determined freedom and the Atlantic Charter.

3. To serve and assist through such unified political action the appropriate agencies of our Government and various collaborating American anti-Communist organizations in the dissemination of authentic information on Soviet Russian tyranny and atrocity behind the iron curtains of Central Europe and Asia, in the promulgation of necessary steps aimed at the formation of a global network of anti-Communist alliances, notably within the Soviet empire, in the formulation of political objectives adapted to the historic requirements and aspirations of the peoples available as our natural allies, and in the persistent counteraction of sinister Communist and other anti-democratic influence and groups in our domestic environment.

4. To promote the security and welfare of the United States by insisting upon policies which are shaped in terms of a scrupulous and forthright observance of the sacred principles embodied in the aforementioned monuments to the liberal human spirit and which will insure lasting peace to all the nations of the world, including those of Central and Eastern Europe, numbering approximately 150,000,000 people.

5. To urge our Government to seek the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to the nations which have been forcibly deprived of them and to secure the exercise of the fundamental right of self-determination for those nations which have not in the past been accorded this right, particularly in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

6. To impel, on the happy occasion of the liberation of all peoples from the yoke of Soviet Russian imperialism, governmental action to fulfill the guaranty of free and unfettered elections in these countries under the supervision of the United Nations and with strict regard for conditions of population distribution existing prior to the institution of the Russification policy bent on the extinction of the national identities of the respective enslaved countries.

7. Recognising the twofold need, viz: ridding all countries involved of implanted Soviet influence, together with ultimate solution of territorial boundary disputes, it is urged that strict priority of action be extended to the former consideration.

8. To abet forcefully the realisation of the preceding objectives and concomitantly contribute to the prevention of a generally disastrous world war III through the vigorous advancement of psychological warfare, with particular emphasis on substantial improvements in the status and function of the Voice of America, resounding proclamation of American friendship and support of the liberating movements simmering throughout the wide peripheral European and Asiatic area of non-Russian peoples imperialistically subjugated in the Soviet empire, and demands for true representation of these enslaved peoples in the councils of the United Nations.

9. To secure maximum and unstinting aid on the part of our Government for the manifold operations and the potentially unlimited expansion of the underground movements behind the iron curtains of Europe and Asia.

Though many of the proclaimed aims seem to be identical with those of ours there are also at the moment several serious obstacles for our close cooperation between our [illegible] and the Federation. Our two bodies consist of different national groups. Some of the nationalities present in [illegible] have not their counterparts in the Federation as is the case of Czechs, Estonians, Roumanians and Serbs. The efforts are made to bring these national groups within the scheme of the Federation. On the other side Ukrainians, Carpatho-Ruthenians, Byelorussians, and Slovak autonomists are not represented in our Committee. It should be stressed also that some of the corresponding new emigration groups, of the last mentioned nationalities are being considered by our friends from [illegible] as uncooperative due to their separatistic tendencies. I realise that the thorny problem of the independence of the some of the mentioned nationalities could hardly be at the present moment introduced in [illegible]. I would be inclined to suggest that as many of our immediate aims are similar to those of the Federation, regardless of some substantial differences we should take advantage of such a large body of organised American friends eagerly interested in the liberation of our respective countries within the whole area of Central-Eastern Europe. The same would apply of course to all component national organizations of the Federation such as for instance Polish American Congress which is not yet closely linked with the Federation. I would suggest that as all our groups have already established their liaison officers to appoint a liaison to The Federation of Americans of Central and East European Descent in order to be informed about their activities and to represent there our point of view. Such a cooperation may be of a great importance in many fields. I am sure that all these American organisations would be willing to help us in rising before the free world the problems of Deportations and forced labour in our part of the world, as our Polish American Congress was very helpful in bringing the Katyn Forest massacre into the light of the free opinion. Let us use our American brothers not only in such otherwise vital services as sending millions of food and clothing parcels behind the Iron Curtain or signing tens of thousands of affidavits and job assurances for Displaced Persons. Let us cooperate with them as close as possible in the most important political problems of our struggle for freedom.

The principal political issue facing us in that respect is that of pressing for a "Liberation Policy" of the United States and other Western Powers. With the approach of November 19[illegible]2 elections it is becoming obvious to all of us that it will be of extreme importance for the cause of our Area who will be elected as the new legislators of the United States. As Aliens we are not allowed to interfere into American domestic politics, as representatives of our countries we are deeply interested in whose hands the fate and the future of the world events is going to lie in the years to come. It is now a commonplace to state that Soviet Russia and the United States will decide the fundamental, universal issues in which our countries are so much concerned--liberty or slavery. We believe deeply that this should be a matter of common interest to us and to the citizens of the United States. It would be more than just a shortsightedness not to realise that in this decisive struggle for the very existence of our nations we are lucky to possess here powerful and understanding Allies in at least 1[illegible] million American voters of Central-Eastern European descent. They are equally eager as ourselves in bringing freedom back to our part of the world. As good American citizens, tax-payers, soldiers and workers they are fully entitled to sustain us in our efforts to liberate our countries. Regardless of party affiliations we should support our faithful friends and to watch our enemies. Such a policy was applied mutatis mutandis by American Labour Unions in the case of the Taft Hartley Act, when all candidates for the seat in the House of Representatives or Senate and state Governorships, regardless of their party competency, have been asked for their stand in that matter and their record of voting was checked from that point of view. Such is the basic technique of the pressure policy in this country. Applied to foreign affairs it won't be either a new thing in the United States. It is a well known fact that the organised Jews of New York and other big American cities have mostly contributed to the miraculous re-emergence of the free state of Israel. Irish-Americans sustain vigorously the national claim for a United Ireland. The three "hyphenate" groups of American-Germans, Irish and Italians are mainly responsible for the eventful abolition of Wilsonian League of Nations policy. But, in our case,--we do not want to destroy anything; our aim is constructive. We need our American friends and relatives to cooperate with us for a positive purpose of Liberation. This may be in the United States the most powerful way of changing the catastrophic trend of American policy in respect of Eastern European problems. I see no reason why millions of Americans of Central Eastern European descent should not demand openly from their future legislators what stand have they taken in regard of liberation of our countries; (Are you for, are you against, or are you just neutral?)--what have they done to materialise such a liberation in their past activities, what and in which way do they intend to do in future? Such a questionnaire may be very useful in reviving our issue before American political circles and the wide public opinion. To some of us it may seem too bold an initiative. However if we really are of the opinion that without the speedy liberation of Central-Eastern Europe--this magnificent country of the United States cannot survive either as a happy and free land then by the raising of the Liberation cause we are in this respect not only fulfilling our duties towards our respective countriesbut also a worthy service for the free people of America.

14-00000

20 March 1952 W

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Southeastern Europe Division
Chief, Eastern Europe Division

SUBJECT: Future of Strasbourg Free Europe
University Students

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a letter I am forwarding to Mr. Tyson on this subject.

2. Chief EE is on record as having advised the former case officer of TPT[illegible]NIC that EE should be afforded an opportunity for evaluation and covert screening of students of EE origin for future potential operational use, on the understanding that no student would be approached for this program during his scheduled term at the University. SE probably has a similar interest in this matter.

3. This memorandum is to ask that you keep us informed on a continuing basis of your views on this subject, and also to let you know that you can expect from us the information which shall come to us in reply to the attachment.

4. Any comments which you now have on this subject and would give to me either informally or by memorandum, by 15 April, would be appreciated.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

CIO/[illegible]V:blj
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressees
1 - CIO
2 - RI
1 - Project file

In reply refer to: W-1927

20 March 1952

Dear Levering:

I have read with much interest the account you recently sent to Mr. Hadwood on the University in Strasbourg.

I have also noted that in a recent Fund Memorandum (No. 365), the question was raised as to what should be done with the Strasbourg students after they have completed their studies, should no opportunity present itself for their return to "liberated" countries of their origin.

In any case, this question will be of continuing concern to both your organization and ours, and I hope that we may be mutually helpful in planning how we can make use of these students after the completion of their studies in Strasbourg. Towards this effort we should appreciate receiving from you a list of the present student body at Strasbourg together with biographical data and expected completion of study dates for each. We should also like to have a statement as to the type of contract entered into with the students and as to any obligation imposed upon those who enroll. I should like to discuss this question with you from time to time and particularly after receiving the information herein requested.

My continued best wishes

Sincerely,

Oliver Hadwood

CIO/N V:blj
Distribution:
Addressee - Addressee - 1
1 - CIO
2 - RI
1 - Project file ✓

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Miss Viccellio		
2			
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	18 Mar
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS: Are any of the officers of this organization on our cleared consultants list? I believe you understand the situation, which is that it may be a good thing to try a direct approach to this group on behalf of NCFE.

Mr. [illegible]

No, Sir. Nancy

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

SECRET
INFORMATION

19 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom and National Information Bureau

1. On January 10th I called your attention to the fact that the National Information Bureau, a reputable investigation agency which conducts inquiries into charitable organizations and advises large donors, had given an adverse recommendation on the Crusade for Freedom (see Attachment 1). This matter has now risen again. It may be that it would be wise to undertake a high-level approach to the Bureau through yourself or General Smith, for the following reasons:

According to an agreement with us and with the State Department at our recent meetings, Crusade for Freedom will bank heavily this year on donations from corporations. They have now discovered that these corporations rely to a great extent on the National Information Bureau's advice. Several corporations have indicated that, according to their practice, they cannot give to the Crusade unless it has the blessing of the Bureau, and you will note in Attachment 2 that one such corporation -- Barnes Manufacturing Company of Mansfield, Ohio -- has written to the Crusade citing its doubt.

2. Meantime, members of the Crusade have had conversations with D. Paul Reed, Executive Director of the National Information Bureau (see Attachment 3) and he has insisted that he cannot report that the Crusade has met the basic standards in philanthropy until his Standards 7 and 8 are met. These are the publication of an annual audit and of a detailed annual budget, the prime requirement being the disclosure of totals.

3. You may want to read this Attachment 3 with care but I cannot myself see any manner in which we can meet these standards. Therefore, I believe that it may be necessary to make the approach to the National Information Bureau described above.

4. The officers of the National Information Bureau are as follows:

Board of Directors

Allen Wardwell, Honorary Chairman
Paul L. Feiss, Honorary President
Valentine E. Macy, Jr., President
Ralph H. Blanchard, Vice-President
Randall J. LeBoeuf, Jr., Vice-President
Craig R. Smith, Secretary
Ellis Russell, Treasurer

Edward K. Bachman
James G. Blaine
Mrs. Sidney C. Borg
Allen T. Burns
Harry M. Carey
Homer Folks
Maxwell Hahn
Mrs. John B. Henneman
Edward J. Keyes
Hugh Knowlton
Alexander Lindey
Arch Mandel
Miss Adele W. Morrison
John B. Niven
John M. Shaw

D. Paul Reed, Executive Director
B. D. Burhoe, Research & Advisory
Mrs. E. R. Goodwin, Research & Advisory

Do you know any of them?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee (thru ADPC & DD/P)
1 cc - CIC
2 cc - RI

3 Attachments
1- NIB recommendation on Crusade.
2- Ltr from Barnes Mfg. Company.
3- NCFE memo on NIB.

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

Executive Registry
2-4902

10 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: National Information Bureau, Inc.

1. Attached are two surveys from the National Information Bureau, Inc. The National Information Bureau is a reputable investigation agency conducting inquiries into American organizations which request funds from the public. It advises donors on whether the organizations are worthy of support.

2. The attachments contain the results of an investigation into the Crusade for Freedom and the American Committee for a United Europe. Note that the Bureau's recommendation in respect to the Crusade is adverse. The American Committee for a United Europe on the other hand gets the Bureau's blessing.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Branch

SECRET

NATIONAL INFORMATION BUREAU, Inc.

IMPORTANT

This report is a privileged communication and is strictly for the confidential information of the person or organization to whom it is addressed.

April 27, 1951

AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON UNITED EUROPE, INC.

537 Fifth Avenue
New York 17, New York

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE: American Committee on United Europe, Inc. was incorporated in New York, February 16, 1949. Stated purpose of the Committee is two-fold:

> In Europe to "1. encourage the idea of unity and lend assurance that a unified Europe will have the support and friendship of the people of the United States; 2. give desperately needed financial support to groups - such as the European Movement - working in Europe on behalf of unity."
>
> In America to "1. give Americans a better understanding of the steps toward unity which Europe has already undertaken; 2. encourage civic, educational and other groups to study their implications and the means by which American policy can further the work; and finally, 3. as specific issues arise, the Committee will point out what we Americans can do, as individuals and as a nation, to help Europe unite and thus to help themselves."

By way of background information, the Committee stated in its early days:

> "Despite Europe's recuperation from the visible effects of wartime devastation, antiquated national barriers to unity and progress still invite disaster for all countries. A continent divided into seventeen separate, conflicting political and economic pockets presents a weak and vulnerable flank, perilous to world peace and security.
>
> "Four decades of bloodshed and economic deterioration have taught the peoples of Europe that survival is impossible without unity. As never before, they have banded together - statesmen, trade unionists, business leaders, churchmen and educators in a dozen nations - in the movement for European unity. Although determined to accomplish Union, they face many obstacles.
>
> "Convinced of our stake in the success of their work, the American Committee on United Europe believes that American support and encouragement can be decisively helpful to the realization of this objective. Leaders in Europe have confirmed this belief, and insist that the time for maximum effort is at hand."

PROGRAM AND ACTIVITIES: The American Committee on United Europe describes itself as "in thorough agreement with Winston Churchill's assertion that 'We must spread the knowledge that this thing is really possible...We must create a climate of opinion.'" It will also "seek to avoid pleading for any single preconceived scheme or precise pattern for European Union, conscious that the nature of Union must evolve from the needs and aspirations of the peoples who will unite."

NATIONAL INFORMATION BUREAU, Inc.

IMPORTANT

This report is a privileged communication and is strictly for the confidential information of the person or organization to whom it is addressed.

AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON UNITED EUROPE, INC. April 27, 1951

Grants have been made to private groups in Europe working for European union. Groups have been selected which have, in the opinion of the American Committee on United Europe, concrete programs for (1) strengthening the Council of Europe as a political authority; (2) supporting basic aims of the Marshall Plan and the Military Aid Program within the Atlantic Pact; (3) inclusion of Western Germany in a unified Europe.

The major group receiving Committee support is The European Movement, an overall organization composed of six organizations of private citizens in Europe, which claims to have helped influence the governments of Western Europe to establish the Council of Europe in 1949. European Movement has initiated conferences and research on economic, cultural and legal questions bearing on union.

In the United States the Committee has published statements on European union by European leaders, a Newsletter with a circulation of some 2,500 copies, summaries of proceedings at meetings of various European groups, and public opinion polls.

The Committee also sponsored lecture tours by Paul Reynaud, Lord Layton, Sir Harold Butler and Paul-Henri Spaak and single lectures by Winston Churchill, Robert Schuman and Paul Van Zeeland.

The Current program is as follows:

Continued fund-raising for support of European groups, particularly the European Movement as a center of work in Europe for a Union.

Publication and distribution of addresses, studies and reports, and sponsorship of meetings at which European statesmen may give Americans a first hand account of the work abroad.

PERSONNEL: The officers and Board of Directors include the following: Chairman, *William J. Donovan; Vice Chairman, *Allen W. Dulles; Secretary, *George S. Franklin, Jr.; Treasurer, Emmett F. Connely; Executive Director, William P. Durkee;

Raymond B. Allen
Charles S. Cheston
Lucius D. Clay
E. F. Connely
E. P. ~~[illegible]~~
*David Dubinsky
*Arthur J. Goldberg
A. Crawford Greene
*Charles R. Hook
David E. Lilienthal
Herbert S. Little
Robert F. Maguire
*Walter H. Maguire
Stacy May
*George Nebolsine
Carl T. Nixon
*Frederick Osborn
Kurt F. Pantzer
*Robert P. Patterson
Walter Bedell Smith
*Arnold J. Zurcher

* Members of Executive Committee

AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON UNITED EUROPE, INC. April 27, 1951

FINANCES: A financial audit for the nearly twenty-one month period from inception, February 16, 1949, to October 31, 1950 shows: cash contribution income, $210,919; disbursements, $193,072. Disbursements include: grants to European groups, $96,651; European conferences, $11,963; Popular education, $19,674; fund-raising expenses, $26,201; and administrative expenses, $38,583. Cash balance, October 31, 1950, was $17,846.

Contributions to the American Committee are reported to be exempt for income tax purposes.

Budget for the year to October 31, 1951 totals $150,000, of which $100,000 is for European operations.

COMMENT AND CONCLUSION: It is difficult to measure the influence of organizations undertaking to influence the mass public; however, we can report that the Bureau knows of no reason why those interested should not contribute to this Committee.

NATIONAL INFORMATION BUREAU, INC.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

LETTER OF CONFIRMATION

In reply refer
to: W-1923

13 March 1952

Dear Fred:

Thank you for your report of 5 March 1952 on Horvat. Attached hereto are copies of the original correspondence.

We should appreciate your making a direct acknowledgment to Horvat on behalf of Mr. Dewey as requested in his 20 February letter. We have acknowledged the receipt of Mr. Dewey's letter and have indicated to him that we were referring the matter to appropriate hands.

We should appreciate receiving a copy of the reply which you send to Horvat.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Hadwood

Attachments
Attachment was handed to John on 12 March 1952.

CIO/[illegible] memo from ADPC to DD/P of 13 March 1952)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - PY/Ex Asst
1 - CIO✓
2 - RI

March 5, 1952

HORVAT, Pavle

Pavle Horvat is of Slovenian origin, about 50 years old and was born in the Prlekija district near the Hungarian border (formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy).

Horvat became known during the thirties through his numerous manifestos and posters by which he attempted to organize his own political movement. This "movement" was labeled various names at different times. At one time it was simply referred to as a "peasant movement," at another time as the "Slovenia Section of the Croatian Peasant Party," and still later as an "independent Slovenian peasant movement." He never had, however, any following and never set up his own electoral lists. On the other hand, it is true, that the Croat Peasant Party of Dr. Macek considered him as one of its trustees in Slovenia for a short period.

He earned his living as a farmer. He also had a small village grocery shop and occupied himself in his district with "interventions," that is, performing all types of secretarial services for the peasants of the area. Among other things, he undertook to organize the transportation of the seasonal workers who went to France and Germany during the harvesting months. He had difficulties with the home authorities and police in this respect and had to appear before the courts on a number of occasions.

At the beginning of the war he fled to Zagreb, Croatia, at that time the Independent Croat State (Nazi puppet regime) of Dr. Pavelic. There he set up a small office for the relief of Slovenian refugees but it never reached any large proportions. He was not connected with the Refugee Committee which handled the main relief work (One source pointed out that the mere fact that he was able to establish an office and function in Zagreb during the period meant that he was at least passively acceptable to the Nazi regime.

As far back as 1935 he is known to have misrepresented himself as a "peasant leader."

After the war Pavle Horvat fled to Austria where he again claimed to be a Slovenian peasant leader and attempted to whip up propaganda for the creation of a special "peasant group," among the Slovenian refugees; he failed completely. He was unable to find followers in a single camp to form such a group, and the refugees refused to attend his meetings. In addition he is known to have boasted that he was acting on behalf of Mr. Macek and the International Peasant Union, though he was mandated by neither. The Allied authorities were finally forced to intervene and bring a stop to his activities since they were causing discontent among the refugees and disorders in the DP camps.

In July 1949, Horvat wrote the Honorable Joseph C. Grew in care of the National Committee for a Free Europe introducing himself as the Representative of the Democratic Slovenes and President of the International Peasant Union for Europe, and suggesting that he join forces with the Committee in the common struggle against Communism. In return for a trip to the United States he offered to bring a large confidential report on his activities to date and present a scheme for successfully suppressing communism and delivering the subjugated nations in the shortest possible time. He was informed that the Fund was confining its activities to refugee leaders already residing in the United States and that the proposed visit was impossible at that time.

Horvat has recently announced his forthcoming arrival in the United States. Several Slovenian and Croatian newspapers in this country have received articles (which he wrote himself) glorifying his past and present activities. None of them, so far, have taken any notice of these articles with the exception of the Croat separatist (pro-ustashi) paper, "DANICA," published in Chicago. Supposedly Dr. Macek was highly amused on reading the article describing the great "Slovene peasant leader."

Nobody in Slovenia in pre-war days would have considered Pavel Horvat as a person to be taken seriously in public life. He is considered by a number of sources a political impostor and as personally unethical. Neither the International Peasant Union for Europe, of which he claimed to be president, nor the Democratic Slovenes, of which he is a representative, is considered a legitimate organization. The Director of the Fund's Yugoslavian Research and Information Desk was the editor of a daily paper in Slovenian for eleven years before the war. He never met Horvath, seldom heard of him and his paper, as far as he knew, never took notice of him or his activities.

FOR THE RECORD: This report (on Pavle Horvat dated 5 March 1952) was forwarded to us by Mr. John Leich, assistant to Mr. Dolbeare, Director of the National Councils Division of NCFE.

NBV

SECRET
Security Information

ER-2-6803

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCPW/PY/OPC

VIA: CPY/OPC

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Attacks on the Soviet Myth of "Prior Inventions"

1. I understand that your office has already addressed itself to the opportunity which was offered by the increasing absurdities of Russian claims to have been the inventors of a list of discoveries, explorations, and inventions which by now comprise the bulk of such discoveries and inventions important to modern life. This is, of course, an extremely vulnerable series of claims and one which exposes itself to ridicule so readily as to render it an excellent target for attack. There has been some play on this seen in the American press but I feel that it would be more effective if the European press and Radio Free Europe should handle the job.

2. In the Sunday edition of the Washington Post, there was a very good summary of the Russian "firsts." The article was written in just the right vein, although a more dead pan approach would perhaps be more effective in certain places. If you do not have this article, I suggest that you get someone to clip it for you--as well as I recall, it is to be found in the magazine section or the editorial (news review) part of the paper. I heard one on the radio this morning which would fit in nicely with this general line. I do not know the author of the crack, but it is certainly a "first" that the Russians should surely be given all the credit for. The crack was that "the Kremlin was the first to put peace on a war basis."

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER

cc: AD/PC
Chief, ER
CIO/OPC ✓

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

In reply refer
to: ~~W-1592~~ W-1904

28 March 1952

Dear Tom:

With reference to the Stephen Maincsyk case which Sam discussed with you during your recent visit, several questions have arisen concerning the broader aspects of the type of activity Mainczyk was undertaking in addition to his RFE duties.

Specifically, we would like to know what sort of employment contract RFE employees enter into with RFE. If possible, we would like a copy of a typical contract. We are interested in knowing what restrictions, if any, are placed on employees' outside interests or activities while employed with RFE, particularly as they would apply to a case such as Maincsyk's. We would also like to have information on the type of security agreement presently in use between RFE and its employees.

There are attached several papers bearing on the Mainczyk case, forwarded with a report on the matter, which was prepared for our friends across the street. This report was to the general effect that the American manager of the Salzburg office of Radio Free Europe has been deeply concerned over events arising from Maincsyk's recent death. While looking through the personal effects of the deceased, he found evidence that Maincsyk had accepted money for the purpose of assisting individuals to escape from behind the Iron Curtain to the U.S. Zone of Austria. The RFE manager was further disturbed to find that the entrusted funds were not listed among the assets of the deceased or deposited with the American Express Company at Salsburg.

Sincerely,

[illegible] 1102 [illegible]

SIG [illegible]

Three enclosures

CIO/NEV:blj
Distribution:
2 - RI
Orig - Addressee
1 - PY/Px Asst
1 - CIO

SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY

January 21, 1952

American Consulate
Munich
Germany

Gentlemen:

The undersigned, Dr. Bela Gyorky of 21 East 92nd Street, New York City and Mr. Alexander A. Back of the above address wish to request your assistance in connection with consequences resulting from the sudden death of Mr. Steven W. Kaincsyk of Radio Free Europe in Salzburg, Austria.

The said gentleman was holding our money as a trustee, which money was sent to him to be paid out under certain conditions; we were trying to save our family from behind the Iron Curtain and we were negotiating with different people who were willing to undertake this task and we needed someone who would pay these persons the agreed amount in question when the operation was properly concluded. Through the said gentleman's secretary we received word that Mr. Maincsyk was seriously ill for the past few months and suddenly passed away, and to make certain that our interests are properly protected we are taking the liberty of writing you this letter in connection with the above matter.

The total amount sent to AMEXCO, Salsburg was $3,800. - out of which Mr. Kaincsyk paid altogether $300. - thus leaving $3,500. - in Mr. Kainczyk's name. Of course, if it is necessary we would both be glad to furnish additional proof to support this present letter and we would greatly appreciate your kind assistance. We would also thank you to advise us as to what additional steps you deem it necessary for us to take in this matter.

We thank you in advance for your kind assistance and courtesy and remain

Very truly yours,

Alexander A. Back

Dr. Bela Gyorky

AAB/mak

Signed

14-00000

SECRET

COPY

BACK EXPORT & IMPORT CO.
215 Fourth Avenue
New York 3, N.Y., U.S.A.

Member of Commerce & Industry
Association of New York

Cable Address
"Backexport"
Telephone
ORchard 4-5507

January 22, 1952

American Consulate
Salzburg
Austria

Gentlemen:

We just received the following cable from Dr. Emi Ehm, secretary of the deceased Mr. Steven Mainzcyk:-

"MAINCZYK DIED INTESTATE EFFECTS IN CUSTODY OF AMERICAN CONSULATE SALZBURG SUGGEST CONTACT THEM LETTER FOLLOWING. DR. EMI EHM"

It so happens that yesterday we erroneously wrote to the American Consulate in Munich, Germany and we are enclosing herewith a copy of the said letter from which you will see all particulars of our problem.

Your prompt attention and kind assistance in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

Alexander A Back

Dr. Bela Gyorky

AAB/sak

American Consulate,
Salzburg, Austria
February 7, 1952

Mr. Alexander A. Beck,
Dr. Bela Gyorky,
Back Export & Import Company,
215 Fourth Avenue,
New York 3, New York.

Sirs:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 22, 1952 together with a copy of the letter addressed to the American Consulate General in Munich regarding certain private transactions you appear to have had with the late Mr. Stephen Maincsyk, an American citizen who died in Salzburg on January 1, 1952.

In accordance with its standing instructions and pending the decision of the appropriate local authorities, the Consulate is acting as provisional conservator of the effects of the deceased. It would appear that Mr. Maincsyk died intestate and the Consulate has been endeavoring to obtain instructions from the deceased's brother, Mr. Charles Maincsyk, 4119 Seeley Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the nearest known kin for advice concerning his interest in the estate.

Under these circumstances you will recognize that the Consulate has no authority to take cognizance of any claim you may have against the estate excepting to bear in mind your interest and to refer you to the Court that will have jurisdiction over the matter when the estate will have left our hands.

At such time as an executor is appointed, you will be informed and requested to address yourself to that party.

Sincerely yours,

Robert G. McGregor
American Consul

2 [illegible]
RGMcGregor:gw

To John Shield
Dick Umsiza } 6 Mar 52

1. I have discussed this with Myers who asks that he receive the full report.

Therefore suggest that you prepare: 1) a sterile letter to be sent to Tom Myers giving all essential facts and a copy of the unclassified letter. On this basis, he will cable Munich and info us of results for our transmittal to State.

2. Think interim reply to State should say: the matter is being investigated at source in connection settlement Mairucyk estate via RFE.

NBV

What sort of employment
~~contract~~ RFE employees
enter into with RFE
— specifically any
restrictions on their
outside interests
while employed with
RFE. Also particularly
this in regard to
M., if his case his
is particular
Type of security
agreement which RFE
employees sign.

14-00000

Letter to [illegible]

W-1792

Dear Tom:

With reference to the Stephen Mainczyk case which ~~I~~ Sam discussed with you during your recent visit, several questions have arisen concerning the broader aspects of the type of activity Mainczyk was undertaking ~~on his~~ in addition to his RFE duties.

Specifically, we would like to know what sort of employment contract RFE employees enter into with RFE. If possible, we would like a copy of a typical contract. We are interested in knowing what restrictions, if any, are placed on employees' outside interests or activities while employed with RFE, particularly as they would apply to a case such as Mainczyk's. We would also like to have information on the type of security agreement presently in use between RFE and its employees.

There are attached several papers bearing on the Mainczyk case, which ~~which might be of interest to you. They were~~ forwarded with a report on the matter, which was prepared for our friends across the street. ~~In substance~~ This report was to the general effect that the American manager of the Salzburg office of Radio Free Europe has been deeply concerned [illegible] over events arising from MAINCZYK'S ~~from~~ recent death ~~of Stephen Mainczyk~~. While looking through the personal effects of the deceased, he found evidence that MAINCZYK [illegible] for the purpose of assisting individuals to escape from behind the Iron Curtain to the U.S. Zone of Austria. The RFE manager was further disturbed to find that the entrusted funds were not listed among the assets of the deceased or deposited with the American Express Company at Salzburg.

Sincerely

Oliver Hadwood

3 enclosures

11 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Photostats in re International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, Paris

The attached photostats were made from accounting documents, while they were in transit through us from a ① TONIC representative, Paris, to TONIC headquarters. They are forwarded, as indicated below, to provide information as to individuals associated with the subject organisation.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment (6 pages)

CIO/MDV:blj

Distribution:
Orig - EE (EE/W-Mr. Minott; EE/3-Mr. Freeman) (with attachments)
1 - FE (Mr. Overton); SE (Mr. Krane) (with attachments)
1 - IO (Mr. Wiesner; Miss Stern) (with attachments)
1 - Project [illegible] file (with attachments)
2 - RI (with attachments)
1 - C/IO (without attachments)

① NCFE

SEC

[illegible]

			SALARY		
No.	NAME	HOURS	PER HOUR	TOTAL	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	37	30	[illegible]	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	12	30	[illegible]	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	[illegible]	30	[illegible]	[illegible]
5	[illegible]	23	30	1,000	[illegible]
6	[illegible] Jeronimo	10	700	7,000	[illegible]
7	Jacob [illegible]	37	200	[illegible]	Jacob [illegible]
	Total:	297		[illegible]	

SECRET

[illegible]	HOURS	PER HOUR	TOTAL	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] 1/2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	120	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	120	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	54	120	6.400	Paul Andrei
[illegible]	20	300	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	70	200	14.000	[illegible]
TOTAL	[illegible] 1/2		23.040	

(3)

[illegible]

NO.	NAME	HOURS	PER HOUR	TOTAL	SIGNATURE OF PAYEE
1	[illegible]	2	.50	1.00	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	[illegible]	.50	[illegible]	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	[illegible]	.50	[illegible]	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	[illegible]	.30 x	[illegible]	[illegible]
5	[illegible]	[illegible]	.30	[illegible]	[illegible]
6	[illegible]	[illegible]	.20	[illegible]	[illegible]
7	[illegible]	[illegible]	.20	[illegible]	[illegible]
8	[illegible]	6	.20	[illegible]	[illegible]
9	[illegible]	[illegible]	.20	[illegible]	[illegible]
10	Paul [illegible]	7	.20	[illegible]	[illegible]
11	[illegible]	10	300	3.000	[illegible]
12	Jacob [illegible]	[illegible]	200	[illegible]	[illegible]
	TOTAL	[illegible]		[illegible]	

[illegible] (CONSTRUCTION OF NEW OFFICES).

NO.	NAME	HOURS	PER HOUR	TOTAL	SIGNATURE OF RECEIPT
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	60	[illegible]400	Lomati Silvau
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	50	[illegible]650	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	20	[illegible]120	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	50	[illegible]400	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	20	[illegible]160	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	250	7,800	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	20	1,960	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	50	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	20	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	12	70	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	10	100	1,000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	200	22,800	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]		760	

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

Nr.	NAME	FUNCTION	AMOUNT FRENCH FRANCS	SIGNATURES OF [illegible]
1	[illegible]	Gen. Secretary	40,000	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	Assist. Secretary	40,000	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	Treasurer	40,000	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	[illegible] Free Europe	40,000	[illegible]
5	[illegible]	Polish corresp.	40,000	[illegible]
6	[illegible] V.	Rumanian corresp.	40,000	[illegible]
7	[illegible]	Hungarian corresp.	40,000	[illegible]
8	[illegible]	Bulgarian corresp.	40,000	N. [illegible]
9	[illegible]	Yugoslav corresp.	40,000	[illegible]
10	[illegible]	Estonian corresp.	10000	[illegible]
11	[illegible]	English translator	10,000	[illegible]
12	[illegible]	Typist	10,000	[illegible]
13	[illegible]	[illegible]	10,000	[illegible]
14	[illegible]	Editor	10,000	[illegible]
15	[illegible]	Polish corresp.	10,000	[illegible]
16	[illegible]	Hungarian corresp.	10,000	[illegible]
17	[illegible]	Bulgarian corresp.	10,000	[illegible]
18	[illegible]	Rumanian corresp.	10,000	[illegible]
19	[illegible]	Yugoslav corresp.	10,000	[illegible]
20	[illegible]	Estonian corresp.	10,000	[illegible]
21	[illegible]	English translator	10,000	[illegible]
22	[illegible]	Typist	10,000	[illegible]
23	[illegible]	[illegible]	10,000	[illegible]
			[illegible],000	

[illegible]

NAME	POSITION	AMOUNT FRENCH FRANCS	SIGNATURE OF [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] Secretary	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] Secretary	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Treasurer	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] [illegible] Free Europe	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Polish corresp.	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Rumanian corresp.	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Bulgarian corresp.	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Hungarian corresp.	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] corresp.	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Yugoslav corresp.	40.000	B. [illegible]
[illegible]	English translator	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Typist	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Polish corresp.	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] corresp.	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Bulgarian corresp.	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Rumanian corresp.	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Yugoslav corresp.	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] corresp.	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	15.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	Total	795.000	

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

21 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Admiral H. B. Miller on 21 March.

Admiral Miller called me today and asked me to pass along two warnings:

1. He objects to what he has heard is the "approval" of CIA officials of the plan to put Admiral Kirk's Committee under the Crusade for Freedom. He said he thought the cover of the Crusade was by now almost non-existent and cited a recent meeting of an advertising group of which he is a member where, he said, various members turned to him and asked him to quit kidding. I said to Admiral Miller that I thought that the "approval" to which he referred was a matter of policy as between the State Department and CIA and that I thought it probable that if there had been any such approval the CIA officials who gave it had in mind the necessity of securing his views before putting the plan into effect. He replied that he wanted to be as helpful as possible and that if all Admiral Kirk had to fall back on was the Crusade for Freedom then perhaps he would have to yield, but he said that in any event if Admiral Kirk's Committee were to be added to the Crusade, the Crusade would have to be expanded. He could not possibly attempt to furnish cover under the present agreement with the State Department to cut down the activity of the Crusade.

2. He said that he wanted to issue a warning to all here that heads would shortly roll within NCFE. He said that he had recently had a talk with Fred Dolbeare and gone over Dolbeare's organization and that as a result of this talk his previous conviction as to the necessity for reorganization was emphasized tenfold. He said he thought there were too many jobs held by people whose qualifications were that they wore the old school tie or that they had relatives who already held jobs, and he said he intended to clean house to such a degree that he might soon be able to rent a floor in the New York building. He said that there may be some resignations as a result and that we should be prepared for them, but he said that he assumed we wanted him to conduct efficient operations and therefore he had a green light to do so until we called him off. I assured him that this was a fact.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - ADPC--DD/P--DDCI
1 cc - IO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
2274

Noted by D/DCI

21 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Committee for Russian Liberation

1. I called Bob Joyce in the State Department yesterday and asked him whether in his view the State Department would object to placing the new Committee for Russian Liberation under the Crusade for Freedom. I mentioned particularly a possible caveat of the State Department -- that we might be expanding the Crusade at the very time we had agreed at a series of meetings held recently that we would cut down its activities.

2. Joyce said that the agreement with State was as to method and scope of Crusade publicity and activity and that the addition of the new Committee under Crusade cover would not by any means abrogate this agreement. He said that we could go ahead and count upon the State Department's approval. I asked him whether he would like a memorandum to this effect or whether he would like to consult others in the State Department and he said no, that this was unnecessary, that we should go ahead.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Orig: DD/P (thru ADPC)
1 cc: EE (Mr. Poor)
1 cc: C/IO
2 cc: RI

20 March 52

Mr. Braden

Miss Stern today asked Mr. Leich to send a copy of the reply to her and also to give her any background on this he can obtain.

TBV

Mr. Braden:

John said he had an "explanation" of this letter which he will mail today. Also will report after he has had dinner.

UNCLASSIFIED .ESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1			
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS:

with Nagy tonight.
Ellen

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

10/52

Mr. Wisner --

an information copy of letter sent
by Mr. Jackson today. Mr. Damewood
is receiving a copy via regular channels.

M. McCrum

2-6811

March 10, 1952

Dear Monsignor Varga:-

As I wind up my year with the National Committee for a Free Europe, I thought it appropriate to send you a letter -- not a letter of farewell, but rather some thoughts on the Hungarian National Council as I have observed it during the year.

In the first place, I would like to congratulate you and your associates on having done an extraordinary job of holding a very volatile situation together. In fact, it was a unique job, and one whose value we may never fully appreciate because so many of the benefits are intangible.

I hope, therefore, that you will continue to work with undiminished will to hold the Council together, as it would present a very serious problem to Admiral Miller if the Hungarian group were to fall apart.

I would also like to congratulate you on the effective work the representatives of the Hungarian National Council have done abroad, particularly in France and Germany. You know how important I consider this work. It seems to me that the real task and duty of a National Council is to help the exiles, and the front lines of this work are in Europe.

Aside from the obvious necessities of food, clothing, shelter, the most important aspect of the work is what I would call a "consular" service, as these poor people do not know where or how to turn. In this consular-type work, I think that General Hennyey and Mr. Auer have been doing an excellent job, and my personal feelings in this matter are completely confirmed by reactions I have received from the International Refugee Organization and the official foreign and American administrations in these countries.

To my way of thinking, exile political matters in New York and Washington should take a definitely second place to helping human beings in distress, and although there are some who do not agree with this order of priority, I am delighted and grateful that the work of the Hungarian National Council indicates that you share these ideas.

Since this is an honest letter, and not just pro-forma appreciation by a retiring President, I must also, unfortunately, include some observations that are not so pleasant.

I remember very early in my work with NCFE, that you taught me the political meaning of the word "polarization", and since then I have had ample opportunity in the Hungarian National Council to see polarization at work.

NCFE has grown in the past year into a large organization engaged in serious work, and frequently proving its effectiveness behind the Iron Curtain. To put it another way, during the past year NCFE has evolved from just a hope into a professional weapon in the war against the enemy. Therefore, activities which a year ago were deplorable but pardonable, are today inexcusable and intolerable.

Admiral Miller agrees with me completely on this point, and intends to take such action from time to time as may be necessary to counter such activities when they occur.

However, I recognize that it is not enough for NCFE to take unilateral action. We must be assisted by you and those of your associates who understand who the real enemy is, and are willing to subordinate fratricidal strife, polarizing attempts, and disloyal activities.

* * *

I fully realize that these are nothing but big words unless I can illustrate them more specifically.

I have in my possession enough illustrations to fill a volume, but I would like to select three in particular to mention in this letter, not because I have any particular desire to single out the individuals concerned for censure, but rather because what they have done not only illustrates the point I am trying to make, but also reveals an attitude of mind which is practically incomprehensible to an American working for a great cause.

The first case that I have in mind is that of Mr. Ferenc Nagy.

Last February, Mr. Nagy wrote a letter to Mr. Frank S. Land of Kansas City, Missouri, complaining bitterly about the National Committee for a Free Europe, accusing it of "supporting outmoded and old-fashioned reactionary political ideologies", and asking Mr. Land to advise him as to how this situation could be brought to the attention of President Truman in order to have him do something about it. As a result of that letter, Mr. Land wrote to the White House, and in the normal course this full correspondence came to me.

I asked Mr. Nagy to come to the office, and tried to explain to him that what he had done was not only a bad, but a very silly thing. It was bad in the sense that he had violated our hospitality by secretly attempting to conspire against the organization which was supporting him. It was silly in assuming that he could carry on this kind of intrigue without my knowing about it — in fact, without having the White House check with NCFE, an American organisation, as to what action should be taken.

Mr. Nagy seemed to understand what I tried to explain to him, and with what I considered complete honesty and sincerity, expressed his regrets and said that it would not happen again. In return for this frank understanding on his part, we shook hands, and I promised that the correspondence would be put away in our files and never referred to again. And as you know, I have never even mentioned it to you.

Mr. Nagy has once again written to President Truman — this time directly. And once again the White House has sent me the memorandum.

I consider that Mr. Nagy has broken his pledge, and therefore I am free to tell you about the incident.

This time, although the words of Mr. Nagy are more temperate, the melody is the same — dissatisfaction with what NCFE has done; dissatisfaction with the Hungarian National Council. Let me quote a passage:- "The existing National Committees are not in themselves suitable for this task, partly because of the general intra-Committee controversies between Democrats and reactionaries, and partly because these Committees are not considered by the peoples behind the Iron Curtain as international guarantee that promises would be carried out."

I cannot help commenting at this point that in the Hungarian National Council there is probably no one who has contributed more to "intra-Committee controversies" than Mr. Nagy himself. Furthermore, an analysis of Mr. Nagy's definition of "Monocrats and reactionaries" would be extremely interesting. It might have been more accurate had he said "people who supported my Government in 1947 and everybody else".

As to the matter of any exile committee, whether the Hungarian National Council or Mr. Nagy's Central Eastern European Committee, being able to "guarantee" to the people behind the Iron Curtain that promises would be carried out, Mr. Nagy's statement is either frivolous or preposterous.

Mr. Nagy winds up with a request that the President give his blessing to Mr. Nagy's proposed super-committee -- the Central Eastern European Committee -- which represents "a total majority of 70 to 80% of the entire population of Central Eastern Europe."

I am frankly fascinated by the processes of Mr. Nagy's mind. I cannot believe that all he thinks about is the promotion of Leftish Hungarian politicians in exile. I cannot believe that as a human being he does not feel some sense of responsibility toward NCFE and the Hungarian National Council, who have month after month helped him. I do not wish to sound dramatic, I do not ask for thanks, and I am not suggesting that in return for our help we impose an obligation of a quid pro quo. But I do say that the question of loyalty does arise, and the question of responsibility is very real.

Furthermore, Mr. Nagy has been in this country long enough now to understand that this kind of intriguing is a distressing irritation to everyone, including the White House.

* * *

My second illustration also concerns Mr. Nagy. Mr. Nagy recently sent a telegram to Mr. Dessewffy, of which the following is a translation. I have the original Hungarian if you care to see it:

> "YOU HAVE SUBMITTED TO THE BOARD OF THE NEW YORK RADIO FREE EUROPE NAMES OF NEW STAFF MEMBERS: HEAD: ANDREW GELLERT, STAFF: KAROLY [illegible], LAJOS HALASZ, [illegible] SAIN, [illegible], MRS L VARGA STOP CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THIS RADIO STATION BROADCASTS IN THE NAME OF THE DEMOCRATIC HUNGARIAN EXILES, I AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEASANT FEDERATION CALL THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE TO IMMEDIATELY VOTE WHETHER THIS SOLUTION IS ACCEPTABLE TO US"

Again I would like to know what is going through Mr. Nagy's mind.

NCFE, an American organization, hired Mr. Dessewffy to be the responsible head of its Hungarian Desk in Munich. Mr. Dessewffy was a very careful choice after weeks of consultation on both sides of the Atlantic. His specific instructions were that the Munich Desk should be staffed by people selected for functional competence, excluding, of course, Communists and Fascists.

At the same time, it was felt that the NCFE had permitted political affiliation to overshadow functional competence in the New York Hungarian Desk, and the New York Desk simply wasn't any good. Therefore, the New York Desk and the Munich Desk had to be brought into alignment. So Mr. Dessewffy was sent to America and was given the responsibility of hiring the necessary personnel — and in New York was instructed to apply the same yardstick that he applied in Munich.

When Mr. Dessewffy had fulfilled his New York task, again after the most serious consideration of all the angles involved in each one of his choices, Mr. Nagy sent him the telegram quoted above as though Mr. Nagy were in the position to control, or at least to veto, the membership of the Desk.

Does Mr. Nagy really believe that he is in that position? Or is this pure polarisation. As we all know, this is a move directed against Mr. Gellert, who does not happen to have the same political coloration as Mr. Nagy. In a recent conversation with Mr. Nagy, I asked him if the telegram would have been sent if Mr. Gellert had not been selected, and he admitted that it would not have been sent.

There is an additional interesting element in this, in that Mr. Nagy calls for a vote as the President of the Hungarian Peasant Union. Doesn't Mr. Nagy know that the Hungarian Peasant Union does not exist as a viable political party; it only exists in the individual persons in exile who happen formerly to have been members of the Hungarian Peasant Union. Mr. Nagy is not a member of a government-in-exile, or even of a parliament-in-exile, so that this action of his is totally unreal, indicating unwillingness to recognise the world as it exists.

Doesn't Mr. Nagy realize that the only way that exile politicians can achieve political reality is through national and international unity in order to bring about the liberation of their countries, and therefore the day when they can once again start legitimate and real party rivalry to appeal to a free electorate?

* * *

The third case I would like to mention concerns Mr. Zoltan Pfeiffer.

After Mr. Dessewffy made his selections for the New York Desk, Mr. Pfeiffer got in touch with him to protest against the fact that in selecting Mr. Gellert, Mr. Dessewffy had been unfaithful to the Smallholders Party, which because Mr. Dessewffy had formerly been a member of that party, expected a clean sweep of the New York Desk, irrespective of functional competence. Mr. Pfeiffer further stated -- and this is the really important point -- that because of the appointment of Mr. Gellert, Mr. Pfeiffer would have to "attack" Mr. Dessewffy from now on, wherever and whenever possible; in short, a declaration of war.

Again, I would like to understand Mr. Pfeiffer's mental processes. Who does he think he is? Where does he think he is? This is a very serious world, and not a Rudolf Friml operetta. Mr. Pfeiffer is not in Budapest conducting a political campaign against a wayward member of a Left-wing party. Mr. Pfeiffer is in New York, an associate of NCFE, with every opportunity to have his opinion heard and his influence felt. But after a decision has been made, in good faith and after long consideration, to employ a man because of his competence to do a job, it is Mr. Pfeiffer's responsibility as an associate of the same organization to help that man do his work, and not to indulge in declarations of war in order to disrupt the operation.

* * *

I am sorry to have had to go into this unpleasant detail, but after a year of patiently observing and listening, I feel that I have earned the right to speak plainly.

I hope that somehow or other, it will be possible for you to explain to your membership that NCFE does not intend to be hampered or sabotaged by exile political maneuvering.

I also hope that you will be able to persuade your compatriots that insofar as NCFE can interpret U.S. policy, it believes that the Government of the United States, looking forward to the eventual liberation of Hungary, will not permit any political group or individual in exile, to set up a monopoly for himself, his group, or his party.

With renewed thanks for your highly successful work in the past, and the fervent hope that you will be equally successful in the future, I am

Sincerely yours,

C. D. Jackson

Monsignor Bela Varga
227 East 72nd Street
New York, N. Y.

SECRET

7 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: NCFE

1. For quite some time the staff officers of this division concerned with utilising the facilities of the NCFE and with exploiting the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian emigrations have been aware of a lack of adequate coordination between our own activities and those of the NCFE staff. In conjunction with those PY Division officers responsible for handling our relations with that organisation, we have attempted to explore the problem in order to find a solution which could be considered realistic and practical.

2. The difficulty lies not only in the communication system between OPC and NCFE, which does not always transmit, at exactly the right time, the right ideas from one organisation to the proper individuals at the right level in the other. Although we have maintained very close contact both informally and through formal channels, only too often we have not been in a position to learn why NCFE staff officers have made a given decision in regard to some emigre organisation in which we had an interest; and on the other hand, our desires and needs have not always been fully understood or accepted in New York. Again, it has happened that we were ignorant of developments that closely affected our operations until it was too late for us to make our influence felt, and, correspondingly, it must be admitted that we have ourselves pushed ahead with courses of action without adequately briefing the NCFE. The most extreme case in point known to us concerns the Rumanian emigration, where we and NCFE are now pursuing conflicting policies. The upshot of this has been the gradual development of a situation wherein OPC is supporting an organisation, the NCFE, which is not fully responsive to it.

3. This situation is not regarded by us as reflecting any fundamental inadequacy in NCFE, or as presenting any insoluable difficulty. There exists a problem in staff interrelationship which can and should be resolved by a reform in our organisational approach. The goal toward which we believe we should work is one where OPC communication with NCFE would be channelled directly along a single high-level line which would firmly tie in ADPC's office with that of the head of the other organisation. Ideas, suggestions, information, etc. would flow, in the regular channels, up from the OPC working level to ADPC's office for review and transmission to the top office of NCFE, and flow down from there through NCFE's usual channels to the proper individuals in its operational machinery. Personal contacts between individuals at a lower level in the two organisations would frequently occur to supplement this usual channel, when security permitted, but should be in the hands of responsible personnel who understand the OPC policies involved.

4. As the first

4. As the first and principal step toward this arrangement, it is recommended that an experienced, knowledgeable, high-level CIA officer responsible to ADPC be stationed in the NCFE organization to work directly with Admiral Miller. For cover purposes he would carry the title of Deputy to the President, but there should be no doubt in the minds of the NCFE top echelon as to his complete identity with CIA. Because his sole task would be to represent ADPC's interests, he should not normally be in the NCFE chain of command, should not be paid by that organization, and should not be made responsible for any given NCFE function or activity. We visualize his function a that of a representative charged with explaining and representing CIA's interests, functioning as a channel of information about the organization to which he is accredited, and controlling all liaison between the two. In our opinion, the establishment of this post, with a suitable individual assigned to the job, would immediately correct most of the present difficulties, and would provide the necessary machinery within which a fully satisfactory relationship between CPC and NCFE could develop.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SB

SB/PC/DGY:rej

Distribution:
Addressee - Orig. & 1
SD/RS - 2
SB/PC - 2
✓ PY - 1 (Mr. Bulow)

1. Intricacies of Balkan politics
2. CIA's failure to provide continuing policy guidance to the Exec. Com. in N.Y.
3. No final locus of responsibility for National Council policy in Wash.
4. An office in N.Y. which is poorly staffed has made itself virtually independent of CIA guidance.

Mature
Savoir-faire
Broad background in Balkan politics.

Policy Recs.

a. Maintenance of National Councils
b. Expansion of NCFE activities in Paris
* c. Support of Horizontal Groups.
    IPU
    CDU
    Slavik - Mayer / Nagy Groups etc.

Admin. Recs. : Emigre Affairs

a.) formulate policy on emigre matters
    w/ views of CIA line divisions
    Dept of State
    &
    other US Govt
b.) provide direct policy guidance & control over NCFE offices.

Rel. w/ other CIA offices

Adviser. Rel. —

- Office of I.O. should be kept informed of all transactions undertaken betw. the line divisions & NCFE

W/ Dept. of State

a. Close contacts w/ area desks of Dept of State

b. Meet jointly w/ members of Dept. in a CIA – State Coord. Com. to formulate policy on emigre matters.

W/ NCFE

Close supervision & control over NCFE in N.Y. & Paris.

Integrate in NCFE's offices one or several high level individuals working directly for CIA.

Purpose

Discussion

Orig. Objectives

Status of Comms

Reasons for Failure

Possible Courses of Action

Recs

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

7 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas W. Braden

SUBJECT: Relations with National Councils

1. Attached hereto is a study concerning the National Councils, with certain conclusions and recommendations.

2. I have deliberately delayed submitting this study because I wanted to be sure of the validity of my criticism and recommendations. To this end, I discussed this paper at several stages of its development with various officers in the line divisions concerned and also with individuals who have been in close touch with the National Councils Division of NCFE. As a result, I feel that what is submitted in the attached study reflects not only my own views, but also those of the responsible area experts.

3. I feel you will agree that, under existing conditions, it is impossible to carry out effectively any of the functions related to national council matters with which we are charged. The recent "Nagy Affair" and the resultant embarrassment serves as a good illustration.

4. In view of the interest that has been demonstrated in this paper by SE and EE-2, it is suggested that copies of the study be sent to them.

5. This whole matter, I believe, is of such importance as to warrant further discussion, and I should appreciate having the opportunity of talking to you.

Ellen Stern
ELLEN STERN

Attachment
  As stated above

cc: DCFY

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RELATIONS WITH NATIONAL COUNCILS

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to 1) review briefly the accomplishments of the National Councils Division of NCFE, 2) attempt to point out the reasons why the National Councils have not accomplished what they set out to do and 3) make certain recommendations with respect to policy and administration to remedy the present unsatisfactory and unworkable situation. This last assumes that CIA must continue to sponsor the National Council complex. However, it can do so only if certain basic changes are made and if it is recognized that it is incumbent on CIA to regain control of the important personalities of the Eastern European emigration.

DISCUSSION

I Original Objectives of National Councils Division

The National Councils Division of the National Committee for a Free Europe was created on 3 April 1950 by resolution of the Board of Directors. The underlying principle, as stated in the Declaration of Policy in June 1950, was to aid the "non-Fascist and non-Communist leaders in their peaceful efforts to prepare the way toward the restoration in Eastern Europe of the social, political and religious liberties in which they and we believe." The councils were to function as "representative, harmonious and effective groups" and, as such, to play a part in the struggle against Communism in Eastern Europe. They were not to be considered as governments in exile nor as ends in themselves.

National Committees and Panels,* as supported by NCFE, were to fulfill a two-fold function: as 1) overt instruments, they were to a) serve as a symbol of unity both in this country and abroad, b) provide a reservoir of "name" manpower for propaganda use, c) supply general propaganda policy advice, and d) supply NCFE with both general and specific intelligence with respect to homeland activities and personalities. As 2) covert instruments, they were to serve as a cover for operations undertaken by CIA aimed at combatting Soviet oppression in the satellite states.

---

*These are: the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Panels, which were set up with the help of NCFE and which function well.

SECRET

II Status of Committees

During the course of the past year, it has become increasingly apparent that national committees have failed to operate as "representative, effective and harmonious groups." Out of the six groups of emigres supported financially by NCFE,* only three have any sort of a working council (the Albanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian) and only one--the Hungarian--operates with any degree of harmony. The Czech and Rumanian Councils have split into two opposing factions. The Czechs have recently affected a reconciliation which, to date, is merely a paper "agreement" and is still awaiting implementation. No attempts at bringing together the Rumanian Association and the Rumanian Committee have succeeded. The Bulgarian Committee, while not split, has been handicapped by the dictatorial methods of its Chairman, Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, and has therefore been of little value as an organization. Attempts to offset this situation by an enlargement of the Committee are now under way. An enlargement of the Albanian Committee is also considered to be necessary, but here disagreement with the British is a complicating factor. The Poles, after long years of dissension, finally seem to have agreed on the formation of a Council of National Unity. Additional information regarding each of these committees is appended hereto.

III Reasons for the Failure

The reason for the failure of the national councils to fulfill the stated objectives has often been attributed to intrigue, rivalry and jealousy among emigre politicians. While this is certainly a contributing factor, it is one which should be expected in any dealings with leaders reared in the intricacies of Balkan politics. A more important and far more basic cause for the present shortcomings of the national councils has been CIA's failure to provide continuing policy guidance to, and appropriate control over, the Executive Committee of NCFE in New York. This failure has in large part resulted from the lack of a clearly defined mechanism within CIA through which to perform these functions.

At present a situation exists in which there is:

1) No final focus of responsibility for national council policy in Washington. Various individuals throughout CIA and the Department of State are meddling in national council and related emigre matters owing to the vacuum which CIA has permitted to develop and because no one is charged with final responsibility. Furthermore, members of the

---

*The six groups are: the Albanian, Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Rumanian.

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

Executive Committee in New York often confer, and reach certain agreements, with high ranking individuals in CIA and the Department of State without consulting, or even informing, anyone else. This has led to a great deal of confusion, duplication of work and, of course, embarrassment.

2) An office in New York which is poorly staffed and which has made itself virtually independent of CIA guidance. (Due probably to the lack of proper guidance and control in the past, there is at present a great amount of free wheeling in the New York office. The members of the Executive Committee seem to feel that they are an autonomous unit rather than agents of their sponsoring office.) Furthermore, dealings with the experienced politicians in exile from the satellite states require a staff which is mature, has savoir-faire and a broad background in Balkan politics. This is not presently the case.

3) A feeling among emigres that the promises and threats made by NCFE are meaningless and that money will be forthcoming under almost any conditions.

IV Possible Courses of Action

Confronted with the situation sketched above, it would appear that insofar as CIA is concerned, the following alternative courses of action are possible: 1) Keep the present set-up; 2) withdraw support from emigre affairs; 3) ask the Department of State to take over; or 4) make certain changes along lines recommended below.

Since the present set-up is unsatisfactory for the reasons indicated above, obviously the first alternative may be immediately dismissed. The second alternative is not feasible because the peoples of the satellite countries are important allies of the United States in the cold war and it is to our interest to afford assistance to the principal Eastern European refugees and their major organizations. The State Department cannot take over relations with the emigres because of the official recognition given by the United States to the "Democratic Republics" of Eastern Europe. The logical, indeed inescapable course for CIA to follow, therefore, is to continue to deal with the most important Eastern European emigres on the basis of ~~certain~~ the premises which follow:

1) NCFE is an organization, set up by and subordinate to CIA, charged with emigre affairs as directed by the sponsoring office.

2) The emigre groupings in this country do not constitute governments in exile, but merely units useful for the following functions:

a. Prestige Use

To serve as a symbol of resistance to the subjugated peoples behind the iron curtain. To provide speakers at various meetings in this country and at gatherings, such as the European Movement, abroad.

b. Psychological Warfare

To engage in all sorts of activities which will encourage the spirit of resistance of the peoples of Eastern Europe and keep the story of Eastern Europe's struggle for liberation before the people of the West by appropriate publicity.

c. Research, Analysis and Planning

To organize and carry on long-range research analysis and planning projects which will utilize the talents of the Eastern European refugees. This area includes the Library of Congress and other research projects and the activities of the horizontal international organizations, such as the Slavik-Mayer/Nagy Groups.

3) National Councils Will Not Control RFE. Notwithstanding the State Department's views, it is wise at present to maintain the separation between the national councils and RFE. While emigres should continue to have an opportunity to speak to the peoples behind the iron curtain, they should do so as individual patriots and not as representatives of a council or of a political party. RFE, if it is to be an effective "voice" to the satellite peoples, must necessarily keep free from petty intrigues and political "empire building" currently being exhibited by the national councils. Should the national councils become the real symbols they were intended to be, they could then play a significant role in RFE.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following policy and administrative recommendations are submitted as essential to the successful operation of emigre affairs:

1) Policy Recommendations

a. Maintenance of National Councils

During the foreseeable future, the structure of the national councils will have to be maintained. It is suggested, however, that their activities in this country be limited to the functions mentioned above.

on b, I'd like to
see this potential
assessed further.
For instance, do we
have collected information
on the reservoir of
emigre manpower in
Paris — or do we
have to rely on
independent WE3
for this.
on c. How?

3 b. ~~Expansion of NCFE Activities in Paris~~

It is further recommended that a greater degree of US control be effected over the vast reservoir of emigre manpower now concentrated in Europe. The expansion of, and tightened supervision over, the NCFE office in Paris would provide this control. ~~It would additionally 1) provide a much-needed outlet for the younger elements of the emigration, 2) offset the attempts made by the French and the British to use these elements, 3) be useful from the psychological warfare aspect and also in long-range planning of the liberation of the satellite states.~~ It would also prepare the way for those liaisons which must be maintained, which as seems probable the French, the British and the Council of Europe are ~~running~~ contemplating

insert

4 c. ~~Support of Horizontal Groupings~~

Delete in the activities

It is recommended that the activities of horizontal groupings, such as the International Peasant Union, the Christian Democratic Union, the Slavik-Mayer/Nagy Groups, etc. be encouraged. Constructive work on the part of the exiles from the satellite states that would cut across national lines should be viewed favorably and may well become the most constructive element in the emigre political complex.

2) Administrative Recommendations.

There should be, in CIA, an office charged with the responsibility for all emigre matters. While it is recognized that this entails a vast amount of administrative work (budget, personnel, security, etc.), the discussion that follows will be devoted only to the political aspects of the work.

The terms of reference of this office for "Emigre Affairs" should be, inter alia, to 1) formulate policy on emigre matters, soliciting and bearing in mind the views of the CIA line divisions, the Department of State and other offices of the United States Government, and 2) provide direct policy guidance and control over the NCFE offices.

a. Relationship with Other CIA Offices

The office for "Emigre Affairs" should act as an advisory body and serve as a functional link providing the necessary liaison between the CIA line divisions and the National Councils Division of NCFE. The office of "Emigre Affairs" should likewise be kept regularly informed of all transactions undertaken between the line divisions and NCFE.

b. Relationship with the Department of State

The office for "Emigre Affairs" should 1) maintain close contact with the area desks of the Department of State and 2) meet jointly with members of the Department in a CIA-State Coordinating Committee, (see chart attached) for the purpose of formulating policy on emigre matters.

c. Relationship with NCFE

The office for "Emigre Affairs" should maintain close supervision and control over the NCFE office in New York and in Paris. This can be achieved only by having integrated in NCFE's offices one or several high level individuals working directly for CIA.

Detailed recommendations on the structure of the Office for "Emigre Affairs" is appended hereto.

ELLEN STERN

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED OFFICE FOR "EMIGRE AFFAIRS".

I. Organization

Chief
Deputy Chief
Two Staff Assistants
Two Secretaries

II. Functions

The overall function of the office for "Emigre Affairs" should be the formulation and coordination of policy on national council and other emigre affairs and the transmittance of such policy to NCFE.

1. Liaison and coordination with other CIA Offices.

   a. Transmission of material from NCFE offices to line divisions.
   b. Transmission of material from line divisions to NCFE.
   c. Coordination with the line divisions on all emigre matters in which they have an interest. If the office for "Emigre Affairs" is kept informed on the needs of the line divisions, the NCFE should be able to perform functions useful to the divisions.
   d. To facilitate the dealings between the Office for "Emigre Affairs" and the line divisions, there should be one person in EE-2, SE and WE-3 designated as liaison officer on emigre matters.

2. Liaison and coordination with the Department of State.

   a. There should be a CIA-State Coordinating Committee, which should meet regularly to discuss matters pertaining to the national councils and emigre affairs.
   b. Although a member of the NCFE may occasionally be present at a meeting of the Coordinating Committee, regular sessions should be attended only by members of CIA and the State Department. The system, which has been in effect during the last four months, under which bi-weekly meetings have taken place between a representative of the NCFE in New York and the Department must be discontinued.

3. Supervision of the activities of the NCFE.

   a. The office for "Emigre Affairs" should be charged with the supervision of the NCFE office in New York and in Paris.

SECRET

b. One or more high level individuals in the NCFE offices should be CIA agents. While having authority for certain spot decisions, they should be responsible for all actions to headquarters in Washington. There should be regular contact between the NCFE offices and headquarters.

4. Handling of all other work related to emigre matters.

   a. Sterilizing and distributing Zinnia reports.
   b. Preparing memoranda on emigre matters.
   c. Coordinating action cables with line divisions.
   d. Maintaining extensive files on national council and related emigre affairs.

Think we should superimpose NCFE as a whole and fit this "office of emigre affairs" into the picture, as one arm.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA, STATE AND NCFE


DCI
ADPC
CIO
Dept. of State
EE
CIA-STATE Coordinating Committee
Office for "Emigre Affairs"
WE-3
EE-2
SE
N C F E
Paris Office
New York Office
Natl Councils
Horiz. Groups
etc.
Control
Coordination

6 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: RAY E. MILLARD

FROM: THOMAS MYERS

SUBJECT: Herman Moschner - Convicted Spy

1. Pursuant to our conversation, you are advised that the captioned individual was convicted in the U. S. Court at Nurnberg on 31 January 1952 on a charge of espionage. U. S. Attorney developed information which was turned over to us indicating that among other things Moschner had been directed by the Czech intelligence service to procure information about Radio Free Europe, especially bearing on the guarding of the installations and the consequences of an act of sabotage. Moschner was not an employee of RFE and the basis of the espionage charge against him was that he had endeavored to obtain information concerning personnel and activities of the CIC.

2. Through the courtesy of a friendly U. S. agency, we have been provided with a copy of the targets which Moschner had been given by the Czech intelligence service. I am attaching a copy of the list of such targets and you will note that the activities of this individual clearly reflect the interest of Czech intelligence in possible sabotage of the physical installations of RFE in Munich. Further information is being developed in this matter and I will advise you when I receive same.

THOMAS MYERS

STRICTLY PRIVATE COPY

APPENDIX "A"

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION REGARDING RADIO FREE EUROPE ISSUED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

The following are essential elements of information:

1. Plans of all RFE buildings and RFE transmitter stations.
2. Dimensions of antenna used and distance between antenna towers.
3. Phone numbers of transmitter stations.
4. Plans of all telephone lines, specifically lead-ins and terminals.
5. Relationship of one RFE building to another in an operational sense.
6. Addresses and telephone numbers of all individuals connected with RFE.
7. Details of functions and operations of each transmitter.
8. The number of guards at each RFE installation, nationality of such guards, and duty assignments and locations, whether accompanied by police dogs.
9. Number of civilians usually in RFE buildings at night.
10. How and what transmission operations are conducted at night.
11. Complete plans of electrical power lines and power supply at each transmitter station.
12. How many rural policemen are located in the area of each transmitter station, addresses.
13. Addresses and details concerning guard personnel at each transmitter station.
14. Number and identity of persons working in all of RFE and their addresses.
15. Distance of transmitter stations from rural police headquarters.

NOTE: A certain amount of repetition in the above essential elements of information may exist. However, they were submitted to me only as notes taken from a highly classified report and therefore may not be as exact as given by Moschner during his interrogation. On Monday we shall attempt to get the entire report of Moschner's statements regarding RFE and shall submit further pertinent details.

2/15/52

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P		
2	DDCI		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		**INITIALS**	**DATE**
1	CIO	TWB	24 Apr
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCORRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

REMARKS:

This story of the Nagy affair as it was related to OO by Contact is pretty old hat, but you might nevertheless find material of interest in it.

TWB
TWB

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

SECRET

RITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
2-8541

Chief, Operations Division, OPC
Attention: Mr. W. F. Rowland
Chief, Contact Division, OO

29 February 1952

HH-196

Hungarian Exile Activities

1. A Hungarian Government-in-Exile which feels that it can "awaken the spirit of resistance and result in piercing the Iron Curtain and liquidating the Communists in Hungary" has been formed under the direction of Ferenc Nagy. This group came to our attention when Louis Goldstein, a New York jeweler, suggested that a representative of this Agency call on Paul Weiss and Leo Weiner, New York lawyers, who had been approached by Ferenc Nagy regarding the organization of this group. Mr. Weiss furnished our New York office with information regarding Mr. Nagy's organization.

2. Members of this group other than Nagy are Geza Teleki, Karolyi Peyer, Zoltan Pfeiffer, Dezso Sulyok, Zoltan Bay, Istvan Barankovics, Albert Bertha, Paul Auer and Aladar Szegedy-Maszak. The objective of this group is to form a government-in-exile which would combat Communism in Hungary, strengthen resistance, develop the underground, ship radio parts and transmitters as well as arms, revive a good propaganda campaign, raise troops and fan resistance in the event of war, and set up a temporary de facto government in Hungary if the West wins. This group, which claims to represent 83 per cent of the Hungarian people as of the last free elections, would hold free elections as soon as possible and let the people choose a new government. They want official recognition as a government-in-exile and US Government financial support with the control of funds handled by the US Government. (Our field representative comments that: "This is the first of many groups probably being formed in the hope of getting some of the Mutual Assistance $100,000,000.")

3. This group says that Radio Free Europe is a joke and a travesty on the term "democracy", and that something should be done about it. Members of the organization claim that Communist propaganda is beamed out by RFE and that the Munich office is staffed with the following Nazis: Emile Csonka; (fnu) Maori (phonetic); Aladar Kovacs; Laszlo Beroi; Andras Szekely; (fnu) Zalaberi (phonetic); Mejo Poharnuk and his wife. Also, the following Communists are on the Munich staff: Josef Kemeni (phonetic); Zoltan Szabo; (fnu) Mikes; Laszlo Szabo.

SECRET

4. The Hungarian group hopes to be a member of the Central and Eastern European Committee which will be something of a coordinating committee for the various yet-to-be-formed Satellite governments-in-exile. A partial list of the members of this large Committee (all of whom also seem to claim that RFE is rotten) follows:

Ferenc Nagy, President
Istvan Barankovics
Josef Cerny
George Dimitroffe
Hasan Dosti
Cornel Filo
Mihai Krek
Vlatko Macek
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk
Stefan Osuski
Augustin Popa
Vaclovas Tsidzikaukas
Constantin Visoianu

5. Mr. Weiss is getting the political plans of the Hungarian Group and the Central and Eastern European Committee and will give them to us when he receives them. Once he has given us this material, he hopes to let our field men deal directly with the national group leaders. These leaders hope to sell themselves and their ideas to CIA and have expressed their willingness to supply CIA exclusively with intelligence information. (We assume that this group's cooperation will be commensurate with the amount of financial support which CIA gives them).

6. Our field representative has commented that this group may also try to discredit RFE although "...most of these bums would be starving if it were not for RFE help. They already have Lawyer Weiss believing that RFE is one of the most evil things going." ..."We told these two [Mr. Weiss and Mr. Weiner] that we were interested in getting all possible information on these groups and impressed upon them the fact that we could guarantee no favorable action. It was also necessary to persuade them that Radio Free Europe is not supported by our agency."

7. Paul Weiss maintains a New York law office at 369 Lexington Avenue. He was born on 29 November 1911 in New York City and served in the Infantry during World War II. Later, he was in Military Government in Korea. His partner, Mr. Weiner, was born 20 April 1913 and attended Harvard Law School.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

8. We shall follow up on this and shall keep you advised. If you have particular points which you would like us to discuss with Mr. Weiss, please let us know.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

cc: AD/O (1)
Chief, Pyschological Warfare Division, OPC (1) ✓
Chief, Cover Division/PLANS/OSO (2)

SECRET

cc: Mr. Jackson
Mr. Lang

EXCERPT FROM LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 1952, FROM SPENCER PHENIX TO CLAYTON [illegible]:

Second, my own plans; until I know when we are to see Dr. Lenz and what the consequences of that interview may be, I can of course make no definite travel arrangements. I should like to go to Strasbourg and talk with them there about the enlargement plans for the College de L'Europe Libre; I want to have a few days in Paris, if possible, to catch up on developments in Royall's areas; ~~and I feel it~~ important to have about a week in Lisbon. Forgetting the question of dates my itinerary would probably be Strasbourg, Paris, Lisbon, New York, and if there is to be any considerable delay before we can see Dr. Lenz I shall plan to go to Strasbourg from Frankfurt, then return to Frankfurt and then go direct to Paris. It would please me if I were able to go back to New York in time to go to New Hampshire to vote in the primaries on March 11, but this may be an idle hope.

Third, our Frankfurt negotiations; as I cabled C.D. we reached complete agreement on the technical basis, covered by the draft licensing-agreement. Throughout our discussions we were treated with the utmost courtesy and consideration. The original draft submitted for our study contained several ambiguities and specific provisions which, if literally construed would defeat the purpose which both sides seemed to have in mind. Our suggestions for changes and modifications were accepted after a minimum amount of discussion. Whenever we made a valid point, the fact was recognized at once by the others. Dick agrees with me that one could not expect to receive any more courteous or considerate treatment, and we were all very much pleased by the atmosphere at the Ministry. You realized, of course, that the technical side of the question is by no means the complete picture, and it remains to be seen how rapidly we can clear up the non-technical aspects. If we can have our Bonn appointment again tomorrow, I ought to be able to have a cable in New York for your opening Monday, indicating the prospects, but if our appointment is delayed until some time next week - one of the local handicaps we are encountering - is a Karneval-period or "Fashing" which reaches its climax Monday. Fashing is much more of a celebration than George Washington's birthday, so Dick and I are willingly sacrificing our holiday tomorrow (strike out Dick from the preceding clause because he tells me that the German operation does not recognise G. Washington's birthday. When I asked him if they had selected Fashing instead because it lasted longer, he avoided a direct answer.) so as not to get involved in a possibly long post-Fashing hangover period. Seriously, very little work is done in Germany the day after the principal Fasching celebration and we hope we can get matters more or less cleared up tomorrow, but I shall not know until I get a telephone call this evening after return to Frankfurt.

EXCERPT FROM LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 1952, FROM SPENCER PHENIX TO CLAYTON [illegible]:

P.S. The Bonn telephone message came through. Lens cannot see us tomorrow, or Monday or Tuesday--or, perhaps, anytime. Fritz got on the war path and said we could not take that kind of brush-off and Lens, through his assistant Herr Dr Whippersnapper finally said he had turned full responsibility over to a Foreign Office official, a Min. Dr. Strohm whom Fritz knows. Fritz then tried to reach Strohm but he was allegedly unavailable; Fritz demanded that word be got to him and finally it was, Strohm remarking, "Why, there is no hurry about this, is there?" Strohm told Fritz he couldn't see us before Thursday. An appointment has therefore been made for us at the Foreign Office in Bonn at 10 A.M. next Thursday the 28th. I haven't worked out my schedule between now and then but shall probably do Strasbourg and Paris and then proceed from Frankfurt to Lisbon assuming that to be possible which I don't yet know. Please inform C.L. of the foregoing and Bob Lang will ask to see this letter as Dick has just telephoned to Munich a teletype message for Bob referring to this letter.

I am, I confess, rather concerned about these recent developments. The "agreement" we reached with the Bundespost on technical points has no significance without a parallel political clearance in Bonn, so speed with the former has no meaning in the face of delay in the latter. Tell C.L., therefore, that my ten-watt green light has gained no wattage.

cc: Mr. Jackson
Mr. Lang

SECRET

[illegible] February 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT: TELEGRAM FROM THE HONORABLE JOSEPH C. GREW
TO CONGRESSMAN O. K. ARMSTRONG.

I keenly regret to inform you that, upon further reflection and upon the basis of information which has recently come to my attention, I consider it inadvisable for me to address your Psychological Strategy Conference, and that I find it necessary to ask you to release me from speaking at your meeting on Saturday. When I was first asked to speak about the significance of National Committee for a Free Europe and the activities of Radio Free Europe, I understood that the Conference would discuss propaganda and psychological warfare. I ~~[illegible]~~e from the release Note issued by your office, that among the purposes of the conference are the presentation of definite plans of action to increase resistance movements, and to aid the peoples of the Soviet nation and the Satellite States to overthrow their regimes, as well as to establish a continuing organization to carry out the programs developed at the conference. This release also indicates that there will be full and open discussion of such matters and that persons purporting to represent underground movements in Poland, the Baltic States, Russia, China, Korea, etc., will take part in discussions.

It is my personal view that it would be unwise to discussmatters of this sensitive and provocative character in open meetings, particularly where programs of specific action are considered. It seems to me that public discussions of such matters and revelations of plans and programs would not only expose and thus jeopardize the existence of any resistance movements which may be identified and described, as well as the lives of the people participating, but would also provide quantities of adverse propaganda material for use by Soviet and satellite propaganda machines. It is my conclusion that my position and responsibilities as Chairman of the National Committee for a Free Europe make it inappropriate for me to speak before or lend my name to such a gathering because of the significance which might be attributed to such appearance. I want to express my full sympathy with the motivation of yourself and your co-sponsors, and to point out in this connection that the aims and objectives of the National Committee for a Free Europe, of which I am Chairman, are to keep hope alive among the prisoner peoples of the slave states and to provide assistance to fugitives from Soviet tyranny. I especially desire that my decision against appearing shall not be a cause of embarrassment to yourself or the others concerned. I therefore suggest that you inform those who you believe should know, thatdue to unforeseeable circumstances I have found myself unable to attend.

Orig:

DC/PY - for files ✓
DD/P - chrono - 1
ER - -1
Henry Poore - for use as guide.

Mr. Wisner read to
Mr. Grew over long-
distance telephone
today and the
latter said he would
send ~~use~~ the message from
Princeton.

SECRET

For Prelim. text license negot. between
NCFE and Bundespost subj. to Ger. polit. approval ,
see: Bonn to State 1688 of 25 Feb. '52, C VR-265,
Confid Sec. Info., copy being retained by DCPY.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

18 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: "The 'Voice' and Radio Free Europe Complement Each Other"

1. The attached leaflet was inserted as a supplement in the January "Crusader", a newsletter which is sent out to the 8,000 regional chairmen of the Crusade for Freedom organization. It was prepared with the cooperation of the Voice of America officers in New York and was reviewed by the P Area of the Department of State.

2. It is intended to acquaint the regional Crusade organizations with the facts about VOA and offset any criticism or unfortunate comparisons that may have sprung up during the 1951 campaign.

H. OATES LLOYD
Deputy Chief
Psychological Staff Division

Attachment:
As described above

Distribution:
Addressee - Original
DD/P - 1
ADPC - 1
C/EE - 1
C/SE - 1
C/WE - 1
CIO - 1
DCPY - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

THE "VOICE" AND RADIO FREE EUROPE COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER

Both Are Indispensable

"What's the difference between the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe?" "Why is it necessary to have both the Voice and Radio Free Europe?" These are frequent questions asked of General Clay and the other leaders of the Crusade for Freedom.

The Voice and Radio Free Europe are both vitally needed if we are to win the Cold War.

They are completely separate organizations. Each performs a distinct function in the fight against the gigantic Soviet propaganda machine.

The Voice speaks with the authority of the U. S. Government. It is financed by Government funds.

Radio Free Europe was set up by private citizens. It is financed by millions of individual contributions to the Crusade for Freedom.

Voice is World Wide

The Voice is a worldwide network, broadcasting in 46 languages over 75 transmitters. It is the only American voice heard in the Soviet Union. Its 120 individual daily programs of news, music, roundtables, commentaries, documentaries, service programs, etc., have a potential audience of 300,000,000 listeners.

Radio Free Europe is much smaller. It concentrates on the captive countries behind the Iron Curtain: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania. Its transmitters are in Western Europe.

The Voice speaks for the American people, spreading the truth about democracy, giving a true picture of life in the United States, and spiking Moscow's lies about us. It reports in full on official American acts and documents, presents news and world developments from our point of view.

But Voice is not limited to Government pronouncements; it regularly reflects American opinion as expressed in our press and radio. In a friendly way—with programs of information and service—it promotes a better understanding of the United States in Europe, in Latin America, the Far East and the Near East.


The VOA Around the World and Around the Clock
SAN FRANCISCO
USA
NEW YORK
CINCINNATI
WOOFFERTON
MUNICH
SALONIKA
TANGIER
COLOMBO
MANILA
HONOLULU
MEDIUM WAVE
SHORTWAVE
-6
-7
-8
-9
-10
-11
-12+
+11
+10
+9
+8
+7
+6
+5
+4
+3
+2
+1
GMT
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

NOTE: To determine Greenwich Mean Time
local time zone, add or subtract the
at the base of map from your loca

The Voice of America's Global Network of Broadcasting Facilities

This visualization of the world, on Mercator's Projection, aims to show at a glance how a vast array of transmitters and relay stations carries Voice of America programs in 46 languages to listeners everywhere.

For European countries the programs are transmitted from stations in the United States located near New York City, Boston and Cincinnati, via directional antennas and with transmitters ranging in power from 20,000 to 200,000 watts.

The transmissions are beamed toward Europe, where a network of relay stations picks up and rebroadcasts the programs within dotted areas on the map. Shortwave relay stations are located at Tangier, North Africa, and Woofferton, England, while medium-wave transmitters are located in Munich, Germany, and Salonika, Greece.

Latin American programs are transmitted from shortwave stations located near New Yo
Boston, Cincinnati and San Francisco to all countries south of the United States.

To Far Eastern countries the programs are broadcast from high-powered transmitters
near San Francisco, then relayed by shortwave transmitters at Honolulu, Manila and Co
(Ceylon) and by a medium-wave transmitter at Manila.

The map indicates a considerable overlap of radio coverage from the various transmitters.
times the overlapping areas indicate different language programs, and sometimes they indica
a single language program is broadcast on several wavelengths, in order to give listeners a ch
the clearest signal in a locality. Vertical lines indicate Time Zones, with GMT at Noon a
International Date Line as a dotted line.

Exiles Speak Over RFE

Radio Free Europe, on the other hand, does not portray America. It concentrates largely on what is taking place within the slave countries. Over its transmitters Poles speak to Poles, Hungarians to Hungarians, etc. They speak as "the voice of Free Poland," "the voice of Free Hungary," etc. They look at their people's problems through their own eyes.

RFE programs specialize in identifying and denouncing Communist informers and collaborators, sending back messages from escapees, and exposing the corruption and crimes within the Red regimes.

In their broadcasts to behind the Iron Curtain, the Voice and Radio Free Europe have essentially the same aims: to keep alive the hope of liberation; to let listeners know that they have not been forgotten; to stiffen their resistance against their Communist oppressors; to expose the fraudulent basis of authority upon which the Moscow-dominated regimes rest.

Both combat Communism and the persecution of religion and denial of human rights. Both report the superior industrial power and fighting potential of the free world over the Soviet-enslaved world.

1951 Year of Progress for "Voice"

During the past year the Voice of America:

1. Stepped up daily programming from 30 to 50 hours daily.
2. Made progress in overcoming Soviet jamming.
3. Increased its broadcasts to behind the Iron Curtain, adding the "splinter" languages of Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Tatar, Turkestani, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian.
4. Inaugurated programs to Albania, Finland, Israel and Portugal in their respective languages; to China in two additional dialects, Swatow and Amoy; to Japan and South and Southeast Asia in Hindi, Urdu, Thai, Burmese and Malayan.
5. Became more outspoken and hard-hitting. One of the principal themes was the support of the UN effort to repel the Chinese and North Korean Communist aggression in Korea. Major attention was given to exposing the fraudulent Soviet "peace" drive.
6. Began work on the "Ring Plan" approved by Congress, which calls for a network of powerful relay bases girdling the globe.
7. Created "Vagabond"—a ship equipped with a transmitter, so that radio broadcasts may be relayed from shipboard.
8. Received 318,000 letters from overseas listeners—an increase of 35% over 1950.
9. Needled the Communists so successfully that Radio Moscow and Soviet regional stations doubled their attacks against the Voice.

RESTRICTED

In reply refer to W-1851
R

15 February 1952

Mr. Abbott Washburn
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.
110 West 57th Street
New York, New York

Dear Abbott:

Our friends across the street have reviewed and approved the proposed issue of the "Crusader" which is attached.

They request that the following minor corrections be made:

Item 3 on page 2, Latvian should be added after Estonian.

Item 4 on page 2, Israel should be added after Portugal.

Sincerely,

John L. Damewood

Attachment
The Voice and Radio Free Europe Complement each other
both are indispensable

PY/IS/AGL:cve
Distribution:
Addressee - Orig.
DCPY - 1
CIO - 1
PY/Ex- 1
PY/IS- 1
SD/RE- 2

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY

Confidential

January 24, 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Tom Braden

FROM: John Devine

SUBJECT: "Crusader" Article on VOA

The copy for the proposed issue of the "Crusader" dealing with the Voice of America has been reviewed in the Department of State and has been approved. There are only two minor corrections which are as follows:

1. Item 3 on page 2, Latvian should be added after Estonian.
2. Item 4 on page 2, Israel should be added after Portugal.

This is an encouraging move on the part of RFE and should be very useful in getting VOA's story to a large segment of the American public.

INCOMING TELEGRAM
COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

52 14

A TRUE COPY OF
THE SIGNED ORIG-
INAL.

ACTION

CONTROL: 2805

[illegible] FROM: Ankara

Rec'd : February 7, 1952
1:12 a.m.

INFO TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 717, February 6, 8 p.m.

G
E
P
[illegible]
[illegible]

In view well-known Turk sensitivity (DEPTEL 642, Jan 31) EmB doubts that RFE proposal wld be favorably acted upon by Turk Govt.

We also believe any such approach as contemplated by RFE might seriously jeopardize possibility Turk acceptance VOA relay base proposal.

Regret delay in reply caused by garble in DEPTEL requiring service.

MCGHEE

JT:RO

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

7 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project TPTONIC: Mid-European Studies Center,
American Personnel

Attached hereto is a copy of subject list as of 20 November 1951.

JWB
per nBV
THOMAS W. BRADEN

Attachment on original only

[illegible]

d.

MID-EUROPEAN STUDIES CENTER
American Personnel
November 29, 1951

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE HEAD OF MESC - responsible to Director for exile research program, textbook program, American education program, Editorial Department, and administrative operations for Studies Center located at 4 West 57th Street, N.Y.C.

Name: Stetson S. Holmes

Qualifications: AB Rutgers; Marine Corps, Major; Comptroller, Pope-Brooks Foundation, Inc.

Salary: $6,500

DIRECTOR OF DANUBIAN INQUIRY; RESEARCH SUPERVISOR - supervises and controls the research efforts of approximately 40 exiles.

Name: Jacob Hoptner

Qualifications: AB University of Pennsylvania; MA and Ph.D. candidate, Columbia; chief of American Red Cross Mission to Yugoslavia.

Salary: $5,000

RESEARCH SUPERVISOR - supervises and controls the research efforts of approximately 20 exiles.

Name: John H. Woodall

Qualifications: BA and MA, Duke University; Ph.D. candidate, Columbia; CIC, France.

Salary: $4,200

PROJECT MANAGER FOR AMERICAN SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM and temporary supervisor of textbook project -- as scholarship project manager screens applicants and supervises the activities of 39 exile scholarship students in American universities and colleges. Temporarily in charge of 14 exiles doing preliminary work on textbook project. Supervises the research efforts of 7 exiles.

Name: Maurice J. Downey

Qualifications: AB, MA, and Ph.D. candidate, NYU, majoring in education; infantry, U.S. Army.

Salary: $5,000

MESC EDITOR -- responsible for the translating, rewriting, and editing for publication of all manuscripts produced by exile researchers.

Name: Hugh Corbett

Qualifications: BA Oxford; Major, British Army; intelligence officer in Yugoslavia and Albania; former editor, Rinhard and Henry Holt; former editor and chief, Office of Military History, the Department of the Army.

Salary: $7,000

CHIEF OF THE ADMINISTRATION SECTION - responsible for the fiscal control, supply, file control, and general administration.

Salary: $4,000

4 TYPISTS - total salaries -- $10,660

4 SECRETARIES - total salaries -- $13,780

1 CLERK-TYPIST - Salary -- $2,600

1 LIBRARIAN - Salary -- $3,120

1 RECEPTIONIST & ASSISTANT LIBRARIAN - salary -- $3,120

1 OFFICE BOY-MESSENGER - salary -- $2,340

1 SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR - salary -- $2,360

3 EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS - rewriters, script typists, etc. - total salaries -- $10,720

Positions not yet filled:

1 RESEARCH SUPERVISOR

1 PROJECT MANAGER for the Textbook program -- in charge of collecting, evaluating, and revising existing Iron-Curtain country pre-1939 textbooks for post-liberation use. Supervising preparation of new texts where revision of old ones would be insufficient.

1 PROJECT MANAGER for American education section -- responsible for promoting knowledge of and interest in European satellite

countries by working through American education system on all levels, coordinating research in this field.

2 SECRETARIES

4 Feb 52

Tom:

Loose ends are here as on a clipped skein of yarn, but:

Recommendations are certainly sound — and the clue to the trouble seems to be in para 8 first then in para 9.

Para 8: No one, I'd guess, was on the job in Munich when Frank Lindsay's priority cable (I checked) of 4 Jan arrived there either Fri 4 Jan or Satday 5 Jan. If so, I'll bet RFE would have done one of 2 things: 1) accepted the advice

or

2) delayed in order to check with RFE hdq NY

Para 9: Of course EE should clear cables on RFE with a particular person here. And that person with RFE N.Y. in necessary cases like this.

Nancy

30 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR INSPECTION AND REPORTS

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe Broadcasts Regarding the Czech Currency Reform

REFERENCE: DD/P Memorandum to DCPY of 16 January 1952, Same Subject

1. At the risk of making this memorandum overly long, a review of the cable traffic on the above subject appears desirable. According to information available to this office, the campaign to take the psychological initiative in connection with the rumored reform of currency of Czechoslovakia was first proposed by FE Division on 30 December 1951 in cable to Frankfurt and Munich (OUT 96920) as follows:

"a. Persistent rumors claim Czech currency reform imminent. Hungary allegedly printing new Czech currency. Long New Year holiday appears suitable for reform.

b. Request all information this subject forwarded to Fran and Muni.

c. Believe general knowledge rumored reform to Czechs would harass government, cause excessive buying.

d. Suggest Czech operation out of Germany exploit theme soonest in SVOBODNE HLASY and/or pamphlets or other media emphasizing:

(1) Economic and political dependency Czechs on Russians and consequent disadvantages.

(2) Instability Czech economy.

(3) Advisability population unload cash for goods.

e. If White Legion prepared suggest exploit theme along lines paragraph d.

f. Muni: Suggest you request Radio Free Europe also exploit theme."

2. On 2 January 1952, OPC/OSO Munich wired Frankfurt (IN 10446) the following message from William Griffith, Policy Advisor for Radio Free Europe at Munich:

"a. Radio Free Europe

SECRET

"a. Radio Free Europe reports indicate probably Czech currency reform scheduled for early 1952 affecting larger notes and with at least 50% devaluation.

b. MOB concurs this estimate situation.

c. Request comments on plan which propose submit Radio Free Europe New York for approval; Large campaign reporting above as information from inside stating it latest regime attempt defraud inhabitants telling listeners they can themselves force postponement or abandonment reform by:

(1) Changing all 1,000, 500, 100 notes for smaller.
(2) Buying goods getting rid money.

d. Estimated result buying panic flight from crown.

e. Advantages:

(1) Increase economic crisis.
(2) Disrupt regime plan.
(3) Guaranteed propaganda success (if reform Radio Free Europe helped evade if none helped postpone.)

f. Risk: Must be sure estimate situation as planned campaign only possible once."

Later that same day, another cable (IN 10526) quoted Griffith as follows:

"a. Intend all-out one week campaign beginning 4 January.

b. Requesting National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. approval Radio Free Europe channels.

c. Time element forbids waiting.

d. Pass to C. D. Jackson."

Mr. C. D. Jackson in New York on 2 January 1952, received a similar message direct from his people in Munich who had been alerted in response to paragraph f. of EE Division's cable of 30 December 1951 above. The undersigned happened to be with Mr. Jackson in New York that day, and at his request obtained telephonic confirmation regarding the above exchange of messages. Accordingly, Mr. Jackson told his people to go ahead with their operation.

3. On 3 January 1952, OPC/OSO Frankfurt cabled (IN 10728) their concurrence of the all-out exploitation of the suggested theme as follows:

"a. RE MUNI 6280 (IN 10446) concur all-out exploitation theme as another regime attempt defraud Czechs, best approach. Should stress Soviet guidance planned reform in need bring Czech

economy

"economy closer own and continuing deterioration economic structure Czechoslovakia.

b. Believe methods aimed force postponement or abandonment should be confined suggestions and left discretion populace. Possibility rebuttal campaign and dissafection people seen if plan abandoned following unloading cash and huge buying spree."

4. On Friday 4 January 1952, OPC cabled Munich (OUT 97623):

> "Suspend action outlined reference pending instructions which follow soonest."

5. On 5 January 1952 this suspension was amplified as follows to Frankfurt (OUT 98089) with copy to Munich:

> "While considerable evidence currency reform may develop do not wish embark on operation until more certain of facts and know more about your plans for handling it. Advise any additional information you able obtain possibility currency reform and send outline contemplated operational program including channels dissemination and themes."

6. On Monday 7 January 1952, the following cable was received from Munich (IN 11619):

> "a. Reference too late. Program began 0500 7 January.
> b. Instruct."

7. On 9 January 1952 at the request of EE Division, we called Mr. Mahool, Assistant Director of RFE in New York, who advised that he had had no instructions to suspend the Czech currency program. He said that Mr. C. D. Jackson had cabled to RFE, Munich on Saturday, 5 January 1952, to go ahead with the program if they were satisfied it was a bona fide theme and would not backfire. At our request, Mr. Mahool sent the following teletype message to Munich, RFE:

> "Did you continue Czechoslovakia currency (program) beyond January 7th as outlined teletyped program content PA. Our friends advise - one - considerable doubt on part information gathering friends here that it happened or will happen. Two - that information gathering friends advised Munich representative to tell RFE Munich to hold off. Assume you only went ahead 7th on Munich information gathering friends advice and okay."

To the foregoing

SECRET

To the foregoing he received the following reply:

"Czechoslovak currency (program) is continuing in a restrained manner. We are prepared to take credit if it doesn't happen. Munich representative did not advise us postpone until after mid 7th. Went ahead on Munich information gathering friends local rep. But we had their best advice and blessing on this one."

8. According to the foregoing teletype exchange, RFE Munich were not advised until after mid-day Monday, 7 January 1952, of the contents of OPC's cable of Friday, 4 January 1952, suspending the action pending further instructions. It would also appear that OPC, Munich, advised RFE to proceed.

9. The undersigned would like to point out that none of the three outgoing cables (OUT 96920, OUT 97623, OUT 93083) quoted above, were coordinated with the Psychological Staff Division who have the primary responsibility for all matters concerning NCFE and RFE. Had we known about the decision to suspend on 4 January 1952, we would have been able to advise RFE in New York in plenty of time to call off the operation. In this connection, a subsequent message from Munich states that RFE does not consider that their overseas staff is subject to commands of OPC stations, the command channel running only from NCFE New York.

10. DD/P's memorandum of 16 January 1952 on this subject refers to the Director's recommendation that RFE be prepared to play this theme either way, taking credit for either having prevented the reform by premature exposure if nothing is done, or having warned the people in time to protect themselves if their currency is devaluated. As indicated in Griffith's message of 2 January 1952, RFE was aware of this double approach from the start , and has been taking the "we prevented it" line in the occasional references which have been made to the currency problem in the past three weeks.

11. To avoid such confusion in the future, it is recommended that:

a. Before a theme is referred to RFE overseas for exploitation, or even brought to their attention for consideration, it be given to PY Division not only for review here in OPC but also for discussion with the interested people in RFE's New York office.

b. All cables

SECRET

b. All cables bearing on the subject be coordinated with PY Division, or that branch having responsibility for NCFE problems.

c. Coordination and clearance with the Department of State be arranged by the area division before any suggestion for exploitation gets out to the field.

d. The command channel for giving instructions to RFE be clarified so that messages intended for their overseas staff will first be cleared with their New York office, which clearance will then be indicated in any messages going out over OPC facilities.

12. In view of the interest taken in this matter by the DD/P's office, it is suggested that this memorandum be forwarded to DD/P with any comments you care to make.

H. GATES LLOYD
Deputy Chief
Psychological Staff Division

DCPY/HGL:ml

Distribution:
Addressee - Original
PY/CIO - 1
PY/IS - 1
DCPY - 1
RI - 2

# 11

[illegible]

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

January 29, 1952

To: Mr. O. E. Hadwood

From: N. N. Prunty

The enclosed letter copy is self-explanatory. It confirms, in my mind, all the worst suspicions that I have had regarding this public relations firm in connection with the Crusade for Freedom. That is one thing.

The fact that they would proceed, even if they had been commissioned to call this meeting for the Crusade for Freedom, without consulting the National Committee office, on whose behalf they are supposed to act, is, in my opinion, assuming alarming proportions.

Either the Crusade for Freedom works on behalf of the National Committee, or it does not.

This is the sort of thing that will really kill the Crusade for Freedom in this city, and is the finale on a whole series of similar incidence.

N.P.

JAN 31 1952

SECRET

January 29, 1952

Dear Abbott:

I have just been informed over the telephone that Earle Rogers, of Counsel Services, Inc., has called a meeting of the Crusade for Freedom Committee in this city, and has failed to consult me in any way in this matter.

This has resulted, as usual, in causing utter confusion in the minds of everyone, and bodes no good for the Crusade in this city nor for the sponsoring organization - the National Committee for a Free Europe, for which the Crusade is operating. In your letter of December 7, 1951, to Mr. Hulbert T. Bisselle, Chairman of the Crusade for Freedom in the District of Columbia, you designated me as, Director of the Washington, D.C. office. As I have received no instructions from you to the contrary, I have presumed this situation to be continuing.

The fact that Mr. Rogers would proceed in a matter of this kind without consultation with this office, and without being commissioned by you to undertake such a meeting, is most disturbing. This is the sort of thing that will really kill the Crusade for Freedom in this city.

I shall hope to discuss this matter with you when in New York on Thursday.

Sincerely yours,

Robert J. Moore

Mr. Abbott Washburn,
Executive Vice-Chairman
Crusade for Freedom,
4 West 57th Street,
New York, N.Y.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Executive Registry
52-7786

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: CIO

NO.

DATE 3 April 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. WP/PM | Mr Brown Mr Augustine		1 Apr. Both have seen. Mr A. initialed for both.			Coordination to be indicated on greens.
2. EE | Mr Pillsbury Mr. Droller		1 Apr.	[illegible]	WP [illegible]	(Incoming ltr 28 Jan. attached) Original of attachment (ltr to Min Miller) will not be dispatched until notification that John Hughes letter has been signed.
3. Mr. Fredericks Mr. Schrayer				JWD TC	
4. ADPC	[illegible]	9		JMW	
5. DD/P	6	8 april	8 april	CWJ	Has been signed
6. DDCI			8/Apr	AWD/[illegible]	Ltr has been sent to "Min."
7. CIO					JBV 10 April 52
8.					
9.					
10.					See Chrono reply
11.					9 Apr.
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					JL6197

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

P-2215

Executive Registry
2-7786

January 28, 1952

Dear Allen:

This letter concerns the matter which I discussed with you briefly last week.

For some months past both the officers and directors of the NCFE have been concerned as to what protective steps could be taken in behalf of foreign nationals working for Radio Free Europe in Germany under conditions which might arise in certain eventualities.

I attach copy of a letter bearing on this matter which was written by Lang to Gates Lloyd on November 5, 1951. It gives a concise outline of the problem and suggests a solution of the same. To date, as far as I know, we have not been able to secure any assurances that this is being taken care of. If, as we have been informed, the Army authorities in Germany are willing to help upon receiving clearance from the Department of Defense, we feel every effort should be made to implement this promptly.

Apart from the very real present and potential future value of the foreign nationals in the group, the Committee feels that it has a definite moral obligation to seek the same degree of assistance and protection for them as would be afforded United States citizens under the conditions referred to.

Personally, I feel this obligation is a broader one which extends to this Government as well.

Last Thursday when we were discussing this question in New York, Joe Grew was much interested and said he would be glad to assist in any way possible. We all felt, however, that this is not a matter which the Committee can take up direct with the Defense Department or other Government agencies here and that it can only be brought to a proper solution through action on the part of the Director or yourself.

Please be good enough to take this matter under consideration and give us the benefit of your advice.

Yours,

John C. Hughes

STRICTLY PRIVATE

5 November 1951

Dear Mr.________________

As you know, RFE has, at the present writing, some 1000-1100 people in Germany. They are largely concentrated in Munich and its environs, although some are scattered in and around the Frankfurt and Heidelberg region. The staff is composed of Americans, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles (at an early date), large numbers of German housekeeping and engineering personnel, plus a few French, Swiss, Belgians, British, etc. Full details on the disposition of the staff are available in Munich and have been turned over to EUCOM in an effort to interest EUCOM in the most serious problem which faces us today - that of evacuation in the event of a move by any of the Russian armies.

Through Lt. Co. Ciccolella we have been fortunate enough to have our American personnel included in the evacuation plan of the Munich Post Command. At this writing, however, we stand to lose our extraordinarily capable, well trained and completely western-oriented foreign staff.

EUCOM, on its own, has done all that it can but needs a directive from the Department of Defense in Washington to the effect that the RFE staff is to be considered a "war asset" and given a high priority on the evacuation schedule. This priority should include the foreign nationals who have been trained into the RFE effort since without them whatever agency which would take over the RFE staff would be completely lost.

Our investigations, and very considerable work done in the field on this subject, prove that EUCOM is more than willing to take upon itself this additional evacuation burden if so directed by the Department of Defense.

This is a matter of extreme importance not only to us but to whoever will inherit the task of influencing the satellite areas when and after the Russian armies have moved into western Europe. RFE has proved that it is the Czechs, Hungarians and the Poles who can best do a psychological warfare job. Without their complete participation we would be lost in this "peacetime" effort, and without their future participation whoever inherits our task in time of war would be equally lost.

STRICTLY PRIVATE

STRICTLY PRIVATE

May I therefore request that this matter be given your immediate and urgent attention. So far as we can tell, and we have gone into this subject very exhaustively, all that is needed from this side is a declaration of interest in the entire staff on the part of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Friend

EE-3.

2004K

13 Nov 52

Evacuation Problem

① RFE EC 1100 is twice as many people as rest of CPA.

② Get break down of employees into various nationalities — at least as to ⓐ $\overset{\text{autom}}{\text{US Nats}}$ ⓑ Exiles & ⓒ Indigenous Germans —

③ What about method for issuing passes on D-Day? Will not be sent out ahead —

④ Will need some sort of priority — what order of departure?

NSC 123

Plans for civilians — same

Number cleared w/ ~~[illegible]~~ U.S. Chiefs

Sty; or State Chiefs of Missions

NCE Paper thru Tomorrow –
Reassure J Hughes – they are on track –

Get plans up –

Cut down number.

Get Augustine –

---

7 March '52 – Augustine – Plans Div –
N.S.C. paper has been passed – Directive 123
Take up with EE to have our people included in their Plans –
Coordinator is under Plans Div.
EE – Wayne Fredericks or T. Schreyer are the ones to see –
Sell them on who should be included – US, Emb & Gen – & they contact the Military

Weeks   Evacuation   13 Dec

N.S.C Junior Section has accepted paper & its going to Senior Section where no trouble is anticipated —

10 Jan 52

Wayne Fredericks — ~~will call back~~ ~~20 Jan~~

Paper ran into a snag at last NSC meeting & will take 2 to 4 weeks to get back on the agenda — (Not many)

Reginald Augustine 3251 knows most about this —

Saw Augustine 10 Jan — He will keep us posted

Mil Evac. Order all leaders

① NEO

Noncombattant Evac Order

② J.(oint) A.(lert) O(rder)

Effective at 340.

OBC has special passes - red wh. blue.
for Am personnell - case
officers + anybody with them

Adoption of the Pass - or
the pass itself - ought do -
But - this is in Combattant
Columns -

Everybody in CRO. is concerned with this
problem - Part must be essential people -
[illegible] - and they had to be there - [illegible]

Every consideration should be
given to how our positions
could be performed further
back from frontier

S.P. Phone 28 Nov 51

Evacuation Plans

John Taylor Z+G. - is in Paris - unemployed -

S.P. thinks he would be a good man to plan evacuation procedures - as soon as we get green light on

Curriculum vitae of:

JOHN S. TAYLOR, JR.
95 rue de la Faisanderie,
Paris XVI. France
Phone number: TROcadero 08-66

43 North Linwood Avenue
Pittsburgh 5, Pennsylvania

Date and Place of Birth: 28 October 1912, Wilkinsburgh, Pennsylvania
USA Passport No: 453792 Carte d'identite No: AH 62011
Marital Status: Married (no children)
Height: 6'3'' Weight: 210 lbs Health: Good
Education: Grade School 8 years College 4 years
High School 4 years Degree B.A. (Liberal Arts)
The Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pennsylvania

Important Civilian and Military Experience:
Employer: US Army
Position: Entered on Active Duty as Second Lieutenant, Infantry-Reserve
Length of Employment: June 1937 - March 1939
Employer: Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., Kansas City 6, Missouri
Positions: Traffic and Reservation Sales Representative)
Representative Traffic and Sales) at Pittsburgh, Pa.
Manager, City Office
Length of Employment: May 1939 - February 1941
Employer: US Army
Position: Enetered on Active Duty as First Lieutenant, Infantry-Reserve
Stationed at: New York, N.Y. Noumea, New Caledonia
Washington, D.C. Norfolk, Virginia
Honolulu, T.H. Le Havre, France
Separated from Active Duty as Lt.Col., Transportation Corps-Reserve
Length of Employment: February 1941 - February 1946
Employer: Transcontinental and Western Air Inc., Kansas City 6, Missouri
Positions: Assistant to Traffic Manager, Int'l Division, New York, N.Y.
Assistant to Traffic Manager for France, Paris, France
Length of Employment: February 1946 - August 1946
Employer: US Army
Position: Entered on Active Duty as Lt. Col., Transportation Corps, US Army
Stationed at: Paris, France Bremerhaven, Germany
Antwerp, Belgium New York, N.Y.
Cardiff, Wales Washington, D.C.
Resigned from Active Service with same rank

Other Information:
Speak French moderately well.
Have lived in France a total of three (3) years and am now a resident.
Practically all of my experience in civilian and military life has been office management and direction in outside activities.

References:

Mr. Alexandre de Bondini
Vice-President, Int'l
Automatic Electric Corp.
of Chicago, 2 rue Chartran
Neuilly-sur-Seine
Telephone: MAI 76-22

Mr. Philippe Hottinguer
Hottinguer et Cie.,
Banque, 38 rue de Provence
Paris, IX.
Telephone: TRI 28-84

Monsieur Jean Monnet
Commissaire General
au Plan de Modernisation et d'Equipement
18 rue de Martignac,
PARIS VI
Telephone: INV 75-70

25 Jun 52

Mr. Braden:

In collating these 2 reports, I find some slight differences. The only one which seems significant is marked in red * below, but, I've listed some others for your possible convenience. Does point 4 require a mem. or is it carelessly written — or is the method of collaborating understood?

Devine	Braden
1. page 1, line 2 "but in a considerably lower key"	1. not included as an agreed item — committed, instead.
2. page 3, para beginning "Mr. Dulles..." "in close coordination with VOA"	2. page 3, last para page 5, para beginning "Dulles.." "to include the Committee of the Voice"
3. page 3: the points Point 2: "and not last more than 2 weeks"	page 5 Pt 2. "of short duration"
Point 3: "an explanation of VOA-RFE relationships	Pts 3 & 4 Pt 3: "including the work of the Voice"
* Point 4: q. v. Different	Pt 5 q. v

Nancy

18 January 1952

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Present were Messrs. Jackson and Washburn of NCFE, Messrs. Barrett, Joyce, Devine, Sargeant and Kohler from State, and Messrs. Dulles, Wisner, Lloyd and Braden from CIA. The meeting was held in Mr. Barrett's office on 17 January at 4:30 pm.

CONCLUSION: That the Crusade for Freedom organization should continue.

The following is a transcript of Mr. Braden's notes of the meeting.

C. D. led off, admitting the frustrations that a long campaign on the Crusade for Freedom caused to the State Department and suggested the following program:

1. A 1-day bell-ringing campaign in all cities.

2. Direct mail to corporations.

At this point, Mr. Washburn interjected to say that he would need about two weeks of "low drums" promotion before the 1-day campaign. Jackson went on to say that under such a scheme there would be no time on the part of the chairman for a build-up of invidious comparisons in the press. At Jackson's request, Mr. Washburn passed around a Crusade publication entitled "The Voice of America - 1951 - A Year of Progress". This brochure, which in four pages praises highly the work of the Voice of America, is to be mailed by the Crusade to its chief contributors.

Mr. Barrett then made the following points:

1. The National Committee for a Free Europe grew out of the idea of helping refugees and of giving them a voice. It has changed over the years to a huge operation with many new ideas, and the Crusade for Freedom came along as a cover necessity.

2. He asked whether the demands of fund-raising had not begun to make less effective the primary job of helping refugees, whether

the tail -- Crusade for Freedom -- is not wagging the dog. He remarked that in a conversation with Alan Valentine he had found that Valentine is inclined to agree with him.

3. Against Mr. Washburn and the Crusade for Freedom, he had only one complaint. They were too good, too big-time. They made such an effective appeal that the recipients could not avoid running down the competitor. He stated as his opinion that the Crusade was jeopardizing a multi-million dollar operation -- the Voice of America -- and might even be jeopardizing another multi-million dollar operation -- Radio Free Europe -- for the sake of raising three million dollars.

4. He thought balloons and some other operations done by the Committee were best done by private means.

5. He leaned toward going back to the beginning and looking at the Crusade as purely a cover operation and not an attempt to raise large funds and making a lot of hoopla. He suggested that the Crusade should raise only enough money and make only enough of a campaign to provide a dignified cover. He suggested mail solicitation, magazine advertisements, the publicizing of two or three large anonymous gifts, all without high-pressure. Then he said, "Let's get on with the main job of radio and refugees."

Mr. Dulles asked whether this danger to the Voice was so great. "Didn't you get more money this year?" Barrett's answer was "No" and he pointed out that there was no damage done to the Voice by the Crusade this year insofar as funds were concerned but he feared the future. Dulles asked whether we couldn't work out the timing of the Crusade so that there would be no interference on the hill. Mr. Barrett did not directly answer the question. He said the cover was bad. Too many people already know the truth about the Crusade and he is worried about it. He said it surprised him that it worried him more than it worried Mr. Dulles. A large campaign raises the question, he said, of how all the work is done on such a small amount of money. He thought the Crusade called attention to itself as cover.

Howland Sargeant asked Jackson to answer this question, "Of what various uses are the Crusade?" Jackson listed them as follows:

1. Cover. He agreed with Mr. Barrett that the Crusade both increased and decreased the security danger.

2. It brings in money.

3. It educates and interests Americans in the whole problem of psychological warfare and propaganda and does so more than anything else that is managed by the Government or by private funds. He thought this was greatly important and said that although he

realized that mistakes had been made and the Crusade had criticized the Voice, strategically the Crusade could be of enormous help to the Voice by publicizing the need for communicating to people in slavery.

Sargeant thought point 3 was the most important. He asked whether the Crusade couldn't be tied in with this point. Jackson said, "Yes, and we are starting with this issue of the Crusader publicizing the Voice." Washburn added that 25 million contributors, counting this year's and last year's contributions, may prevent cutting down the operation as Barrett suggests. They will raise a lot of questions. Barrett disagreed and repeated his suggestion of a one-month operation confined to magazine advertising and direct mail. Jackson asked about the magazine advertising. He said you had to write copy for magazine advertising and the copy would have to advertise Radio Free Europe. Barrett answered, "You can control the copy on magazine ads. There is a lot of time allowed for going over them carefully before they get into print."

Washburn repeated several times that it would be a great shame to let the Crusade go. Jackson said the Crusade gave a real lift to exiles not only here but abroad.

Kohler said he had been thinking about the problem and had two suggestions to make:

1. Could we exhort people to give a dollar to Radio Free Europe and at the same time to write a letter to their Congressmen backing up the Voice of America?

2. Could the Radio Advisory Committee of the Voice of America team up with the Crusade to help with general publicity?

Jackson answered the first question "No". He thought that would be dangerous. To the second question, he said "Yes". He again outlined his idea for a campaign calling for education on a general psychological warfare program with a final request to contribute to the Crusade.

Mr. Dulles again asked Mr. Barrett about his financial problems and the timing of his request to the hill. Barrett said he would have the most difficulty from January to July. Washburn said, "Then we'll run a campaign in September only and there'll be no horn-blowing until then."

Dulles said that he thought that if the Crusade could be limited to September he doubted that it would interfere with Mr. Barrett's fund-raising problems. That, coupled with a better degree of coordination, with the use of Mr. Kohler's private advisers, and with a great effort on the part of the Crusade toward psychological warfare education would give the Voice much invisible support. Sargeant said he agreed with Mr. Dulles' view of the Crusade giving invisible support and wondered whether we could not make the invisible aspects visible. He thought that to hold the whole Crusade organisation together for a year merely to conduct a two-week campaign would waste many good men's time. Barrott agreed that a two-week campaign wouldn't keep the organisation alive.

Sargeant asked if there were not other ideas which could be fed through the Crusade machinery, thus making more constructive use of it.

Barrett raised the question of internationalizing the Crusade effort. Jackson replied that there was an abortive French project which he thought would shortly fall flat on its face. The British, he thought, would shortly make a final decision as to whether to go ahead with an exile program or not. He seemed dubious that they would decide to do so. He mentioned Jean Paul David and Paix et Liberte as the only foreign operation in this field which had any spark to it. Barrett agreed but asked whether or not some Europeans couldn't be put on the Board of Directors. Dulles replied that this was very difficult, that they couldn't attend meetings for one thing. Barrett said, "Couldn't there be an annual meeting simply as a front, as camouflage?"

Jackson said that NCFE did get involved in European organisations, that they had close affiliations with the European Movement, with the Free Trade Union Committee in Exile, with the International Journalists, with Strasbourg University, and all the radio programs were reaching the point where they were thought of as programs belonging to the people to whom they were broadcast. NCFE had, he thought, internationalized a great deal and in a very natural way. A board of foreign directors would spoil that natural process by setting up an obvious phoney.

Washburn again raised the argument of timing the campaign to take place only in September. There was no direct response to this suggestion.

Sargeant, referring again to the use of the invisible assets mentioned by Dulles, thought that if the Crusade continued it should be planned not primarily to raise funds except as cover. Attention should be focused on:

1. The development of understanding; the battle for the minds of men.

2. Two or three concrete things which private citizens could do in this battle.

14-00000

Barrett took this up at once and mentioned letter writing. Turning to Washburn he said, "Abbott, put your mind to work." He thought we should be able to find something. He suggested we ask Washburn to look into other projects like the letter-writing campaign that was done for Italy. He mentioned the Common Council for American Unity and Mr. Dulles suggested the Friendship League run by Christian Herter.

Dulles asked for agreement of the group to do the campaign on a modest basis for the month of September only, to keep the organization together, to include the Committee of the Voice, to assure full coordination of all publicity and to work hard on the specific ideas mentioned by Sargeant. Devine asked if such a campaign would not mean playing Radio Free Europe down to, say, fourth place? Jackson said, "No, it would not mean that; Radio Free Europe would simply be one of the themes that was played, sometimes at the top of the ladder and sometimes down the ladder, it would depend."

Barrett again raised the cover problem and his dissatisfaction with the Crusade as cover. Dulles explained that this was a problem that had to be lived with.

Jackson once more attempted to get agreement of the group on the following points:

1. The Crusade to continue.

2. To begin not earlier than September and to be of very short duration.

3. The whole organization to devote itself to education in psychological warfare, including the work of the Voice.

4. To study means of civic action on local and national levels.

5. That everybody agree to this program and work out the details as soon as possible.

Barrett asked first Joyce and then Devine whether they agreed to this program. Both did agree.

Barrett said that he could not commit himself to this program. He said he was leaving shortly and felt that he could not commit the Department of State under these circumstances. He said he would agree on one point only -- that the Crusade should not disband -- but he reiterated his conviction that it ought to be of a much lower pressure than the discussion so far outlined seemed, and he again mentioned magazines and direct mail. Jackson said that it was all very well to tell the group that they were not to disband but he said the first question the group would then ask is "What shall we do?" He said that question had to be answered. Barrett said, "We have a coordinating committee of Braden and Devine to work this problem out."

There followed some discussion of the balloon project which is the subject of a separate Memorandum for the Record by Mr. Oates Lloyd.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief, International Organizations Branch

PY-CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - DDCI (thru ADPC and DD/P)
1 cc - PY
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

TONIC

SECRET

17 January 1962

Dear Mr. Minott:

Enclosed please find six copies of pamphlet entitled "Unconquered". As you requested, they are being forwarded to you for delivery to Teslore.

Sincerely,

Frank C. Kilday

JAN 17 1962

SECRET

UNCONQUERED



Social worker, lawyer, humanitarian, enemy of dictatorship, devoted to social justice and equal rights—Milada Horakova fought . . . and died . . . for a better way of life for all. Her resistance to the Nazis and the Communists has already become part of the history of the Czechoslovakian fight for freedom.

This is the story of her fight.

Copyright 1951 by
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc

National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.
350 FIFTH AVENUE • ROOM 301 • NEW YORK 1, N. Y. • TELEPHONE BRYANT 9-2100
CABLE ADDRESS: NATFECOMM

OFFICERS
Joseph C. Grew
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
DeWitt C. Poole
VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
John C. Hughes
CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
C. D. Jackson
PRESIDENT
Frederic R. Dolbeare
VICE PRESIDENT
Spencer Phenix
VICE PRESIDENT
Frank Altschul
VICE PRESIDENT AND TREASURER
Theodore C. Augustine
SECRETARY AND ASS'T TREASURER

MEMBERS
Clarence L. Adcock
Raymond Pace Alexander
Laird Bell
A. A. Berle, Jr.
Francis Biddle
Robert Woods Bliss
Robert F. Bradford
Harry A. Bullis
James B. Carey
Harry Woodburn Chase
Lucius D. Clay
William L. Clayton
Clark M. Clifford
Cecil B. DeMille
Frank R. Denton
William J. Donovan
Hugh A. Drum
Allen W. Dulles
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Mark F. Ethridge
James A. Farley
Virginia C. Gildersleeve
William Green
Charles R. Hook
Palmer Hoyt
Arthur Bliss Lane
Henry R. Luce
Joseph V. McKee
Web Maddox
Frederick Osborn
Arthur W. Page
Robert P. Patterson
Reuben B. Robertson
John A. Sibley
Spyros Skouras
Charles P. Taft
DeWitt Wallace
Abbott Washburn
W. W. Waymack
Walter H. Wheeler, Jr.
Matthew Woll
Mrs. Quincy Wright
Darryl Zanuck

October, 1951

The National Committee for a Free Europe is happy to send you a copy of its illustrated booklet, UNCONQUERED, the story of the outstanding Czechoslovakian patriot, Milada Horakova.

Milada Horakova was unbelievably courageous during her imprisonment under both the Nazi and Russian-dominated Communist dictatorships in Czechoslovakia. She was a true defender of democracy, and sacrificed her life for those principles of liberty which all free men everywhere hold dear.

I cannot urge you strongly enough to read UNCONQUERED and learn the story of this brave woman who dared to oppose the Bolshevist conspiracy to destroy democracy in Czechoslovakia.

I ask you to join us in working to preserve peace with freedom for all mankind. If you wish further information about the National Committee, please write me.

Sincerely yours,

C. D. Jackson
President

Additional copies of UNCONQUERED, while available, are 15¢ per single copy; bulk shipments of 100 copies or more are 12¢ a copy.



The courtroom in Prague had a festive air. Jammed with spectators – rare in Communist Czechoslovak court – it seemed more like a celebration than a monster trial of 13 of Czechoslovakia's freedom-loving patriots. Chief defendant in this mock trial was Milada Horakova. This began the liquidation of Czech democratic leaders by the Communist regime.



Doctor of Law, former worker for the municipal administration of Prague, Member of Parliament . . . the 48-year old Czech patriot stood firm against the verbal lashings of the Red prosecutor. "Milada Horakova you are a traitor to the Peoples' Democracy of Czechoslovakia. What is your defense?"

Defense? Milada smiles. There is so much to say. But where to begin? Almost 25 years ago . . .

[illegible] by The Mercer, Howard Company

Though graduated with a Law degree, Milada Horakova's love for people brought her to head the Children's Bureau of the Public Welfare Department in Prague. Here she established a system of foster homes and proper adoption procedure. Her legal training assisted her in solving juvenile delinquency and the establishment and administration of homes and hospitals for orphans and mentally retarded children.





Her fight for freedom and social justice found expression through the National Council of Women. Happily at work in social welfare and the Council, she devoted her energies towards helping others

During the next 15 years, Milada worked tirelessly in the preparation of important legislation for the Czechoslovak Parliament. She worked on the laws regulating the work day to 8 hours, suppressing prostitution, protecting home workers, restricting child labor . . . and much other social legislation.





Executive Secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council of Women, she was a member of the International Women's Organization, too. She travelled to many countries representing the Czechoslovakian women. And thus she foresaw the threat of the Hitler dictatorship's greed and power.

[illegible] her countrymen that Hitler could not be [illegible] war was imminent. While Hitler talked peace, [illegible] Nazi war machine rolled across the border into [illegible] on March 15th, 1939. When the Germans [illegible] theories and raped the leading democracy of [illegible] Europe, Milada pledged to help destroy the German [illegible]



[illegible] organized the Women's [illegible] Movement. Popular with [illegible] social welfare groups, [illegible] Horakova was known and [illegible] Thus she was able to recruit [illegible] underground army of former [illegible] social workers to fight the Nazi aggression.



She organized an underground that baffled the Germans. Instead of large meetings, she set up a chain of small groups. Only the head of each group knew the other members. These group heads would meet in different homes or in a doctor's office. Thus, when the Gestapo arrested a woman underground worker, they would be unable to make a mass arrest.





Milada and her resistance w constantly embarrassed the mans. They arranged hiding and fed the partisans, helped Jews to escape the clutches Gestapo, set up an intelligen spy network and distributed pamphlets to steel the pe resistance.

At the same time, Milada helped to write a new constitution to be used when the Nazis were destroyed. She was in constant contact, via secret radio, with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London. Thus she transmitted the progress of her work on the post-war constitution.



The Nazis had long wanted to arrest Milada. Having learned of her work on the new constitution for a liberated Czechoslovakia, they hoped to catch her with this evidence. One afternoon three Gestapo agents burst into her country home and arrested her and her husband.



But Milada had hidden the notes for the proposed constitution in a box of her daughter's candy. While kissing the child goodbye, she whispered the secret to the youngster, who later burned the notes.



Milada and her husband were separated, and she was taken to the Gestapo's investigations center, Petchek Palace. Here, even brave men broke under the ruthless questioning. But, though she was questioned often, she was not frightened. Her answers — all lies — seemed so logical to the Gestapo, that she did not betray even one of her co-workers in the resistance.





For 15 months the Gestapo questioned her, shipped her from one prison to another. Never once did she give them the slightest shred of evidence. Not until 1911, when Hitler's armies defeated France and arrested some of her escaped co-workers, did they associate the escape with Milada.



Though forced to wor
munition factory und
ground, labor in m
mosquito-infested f
and clean house for the
tapo . . . Milada never
plained. Her ready
was a constant anno
to the Nazis. Her opti
and hope was a sour
encouragement for he
low prisoners.

[illegible] prison of Terezin, she spent 16 months in solitary confinement, another 6 months in [illegible] Never permitted to get fresh air, scarred by her chains, gnawed by giant [illegible] bare minimum of soup and water . . Milada, nevertheless, refused to knuckle under



The many months in solitary confinement shattered Milada's health. But, when finally released to the prison proper, without regard for her own safety she bathed and cared for sick, elderly prisoners. Her unconquerable spirit was a shining example for other less stalwart prisoners to carry on.





Finally, brought to Dr
to stand trial before
man court, she fac
death penalty. But he
eloquent appeal
Germans' fear of m
her a martyr re
sentence of hard labor



After a year in the German concentration camp she was freed by the victorious Americ
When leaving to return to Czechoslovakia, Milada pledged herself to continue the struggl
human rights and social welfare, and to help those who suffered under the Nazis



Returning home after 5 horrible years of prisons and concentration camps and torture chambers . . . Milada was joyously reunited with her invalided husband and grown daughter. Both had miraculously lived through the German tyranny.

"I believe in freedom and equality for all. Does that make me a traitor?" A whisper runs through the crowd watching the trial. Milada Horakova now has stood up to the Communists, the new masters of Czechoslovakia.





The Communist prosecutor is in a rage. He knows that Milada has bested him. Furiously he screams, "You are a traitor to the Peoples' Democracy of Czechoslovakia."
"I will prove that Milada Horakova was paid by the capitalists; a spy for the Western powers; a war-monger; bombardment of Prague was her aim; she wanted death for women and children; she wanted the Germans to rule Czechoslovakia." There were many other ridiculous charges. The trial continues . . .

Apprehensive of Czechoslovakia's new-won freedom and to guard against another imperialistic power's conquest of her country, Milada successfully ran for Parliament. After organizing a fund for political prisoners, she introduced a bill providing pensions for the families of Nazi victims.





She told her friends that a new
faced Czechoslovakia. Russian
munism was infiltrating into
ernment and though they made
tive promises to workers and
. . . intended to "take over"
tually destroy the rights of free

Running for reelection, Milada campaigned on a platform of freedom of press, freedom of the right to work, freedom of assembly, and all other individual freedoms. She warned the people of the treachery of Stalinists . . . who are motivated only by the interests of Russian imperialism.



The Communists realized the love the people had for Milada Horakova. And so they approached her, asking her to join them in promoting social welfare legislation. Seeing through their trickery she refused.





Having infiltrated into the cabinet, and after gaining control of important labor unions as well as the police and Army, the Communists staged a coup. In February of 1948, with the threat of the nearby Soviet Army, they successfully overthrew the democratic government in Czechoslovakia. For the second time in less than a decade, the Czechoslovaks lost their freedom.



To suppress opposition and strengthen their grip on the people, the Communists resorted to nighttime arrests without warrants or legal charge. Their campaign of terror struck horror in the hearts of all.

Those in Parliament who had fought for human rights and social welfare were appalled by the new regime's tactics. They asked Milada for advice. She replied, "I have resigned. I shall not give in. I have chosen a straight path, and this I shall follow."



Returning to a subordi
job in the Social Servic
Prague, Milada never
less continued to fight
Communists. At every
portunity she talked
people compared the "P
ples' Democracy" with
Germans, found no dif
ence in their drive
world power. Both form
dictatorship deceitfu
hide behind slogans
peace . . . and prepare
war



When she refused to compromise, the Communists marked her as their #1 enemy. Though friends warned her to flee the country, Milada refused to leave. Her telephone conversations were listened to. Her servant was actually a spy. She was threatened and arrested.



Since they were unable to get evidence against her, the Communist Secret Police brutally tortured an innocent man, forced him to sign a "confession" which would implicate Milada Horakova.



One afternoon, the Secret Police arrested Milada brought her to their headquarters questioned her increasingly for 36 hours. Though they refused her food and water, she would not relent in her plea of innocence. Finally she was doped, and forced into a false confession of guilt.



Now, after six months in prison — beaten and tortured — Milada bravely faces the Communists. Fearlessly, she concludes, "I oppose the so-called Peoples' Democracy in the Czechoslovak Republic, for I hold that it not be democratic. I have worked against it. Should the miracle occur and the court find me not guilty and I be released, I should work against it anew."

The "fixed" judges sentenced her to death. All Czechoslovakia is horrified. A wave of revulsion sweeps the free world. Protest meetings are held and petitions directed even to Stalin.



The Communists did what the Nazis never dared to do. On June 27th, 1950 Milada Horakova was hanged.



THAT THIS WORLD UNDER GOD SHALL HAVE A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE, INC., is a group of private citizens who have drawn together to carry out concrete and direct action to restore and strengthen man's most valued possession—freedom.

The Committee has as its active allies numerous exiled democratic leaders who have found haven in the United States from the Communist tyranny of Eastern Europe. Radio Free Europe, of the National Committee for a Free Europe, is setting up facilities that will enable these trusted patriots to be heard again by their own people. Not only does Eastern Europe hear the exiles' impressions of the United States, but American messages of hope and encouragement are transmitted, and, above all, the truth which totalitarian governments forbid their enslaved peoples to hear.

Freedom or the enslavement of men's minds and souls, is the vital issue. What shall we pass on to our children—their rightful heritage of freedom, or the spiritual devastation of Communism? At this very moment the kind of world they will inherit hangs in the balance. The issue is for you to decide. In the vital conflict for the preservation of freedom, the National Committee for a Free Europe offers every single citizen the opportunity to throw in his weight.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE, INC.
301 Empire State Building
350 Fifth Avenue
New York 1, N. Y.

#10

SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL

January 25, 1952

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. F. R. Dolbeare
Mr. J. F. Leich

From: R. J. Moore

SUBJECT: Report of meeting at State Department, Wednesday, January 23, 1952.

PRESENT: Miss Mary Augustine representing Mr. J. F. Leich in his absence.
Mr. Harold C. Vedeler
Mr. Gates Lloyd
Mr. John Campbell
Mr. Robert Lang, Radio Free Europe, New York
Mr. Charpentier
Mr. Robert J. Moore

CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIRS

Miss Augustine reported that the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia, composed of 17 and 13 persons respectively, had signed an agreement in New York City on January 15, 1952, which bear the signatures of Messrs. Heidrich, Klimek, Lettrich, and Zenkl.

(Copy of this agreement is herewith attached).

Miss Augustine advised that Mr. Klimek had represented Mr. Papanek in signing the agreement. The agreement, Miss Augustine pointed out, sets up a provisional management of Czechoslovak affairs consisting of two administrators - one from each group. Mr. Heidrich represents the 17 of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, and Mr. Papanek will represent the 13 of the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia. The provisional management also consists of a body of 24 persons - 12 from each side and which, Miss Augustine reported, might be called a "caretaker body".

Miss Augustine also presented another document which is a protest of the Council's 17 against the Committee's 13, insisting on the exclusion of Dr. Osusky from any major function. However, at a subsequent meeting of NCFE's Subcommittee with representatives of both groups, Mr. Zenkl categorically advised that he and the Committee of 13 had no question whatsoever over the

JAN [illegible] 1952

inclusion of Dr. Osusky, or any other person, as one of the 12 representatives of the National Council, who, together with the 12 representatives of the National Committee are to carry on the discussions leading to the formation of a permanent body to represent Czechoslovak exiles.

Further, Dr. Zenkl stated that when a final program had been agreed to, in his opinion, the only bar to holding any office in a unified organization would be the unwillingness of any individual to accept the over-all program to which the agreement had been accorded through democratic procedure. Apparently, he also advised that he considered this policy to apply to himself as well as to any others. Agreement was accorded on this point by the representatives of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia.

Miss Augustine also presented the rules which have been adopted for the discharge of the administration of Czechoslovakian affairs in exile. She called the attention of the meeting particularly to Items #3 and #5 of these rules wherein it is stated that:

3) The Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia make available to the provisional administrators the requisite financial resources.

5) The provisional administrators deposit the funds made available to them in a joint account which they handle jointly and prior to the cessation of the provisional administration, they shall jointly account for the use of said funds.

After the meeting Miss Augustine made available the following two lists of 12 persons, from each group, in accordance with the final agreement for the provisional administration:

Papanek
Zenkl
Ripka
Kocvara
Blaho
Hieska,
Tucek (middle class)
Bauir (National democrat)
Feierabend
Klimek
Firt

Taborsky

Busma
Cerny
Franek
Heidrich
Lettrich
Major
Hodza
Osusky
Prochazka

Silva
Peroutka
Slavik

At this time, Miss Augustine advised, the Czechoslovaks are still meeting in separate groups, but that the merger is expected to take place very shortly. She further advised that Mr. Zenkl had announced his Committee's indebtedness to the tune of 2 to $3,000; whereupon Mr. Vedeler advised that he had received no confirmation of the allegation that the Zenkl Committee had disposition of independent funds in Switzerland.

Miss Augustine advised that NCFE's Subcommittee will continue in existence, and that it will be available for advice and assistance to the Czechoslovak provisional administrators, and the body of 24.

Miss Augustine also advised that the new financial arrangements were left to the decision of NCFE's Subcommittee, and that no new move in this regard would be made by the Subcommittee until an accounting of all funds had been given, and that financial aid will be allocated on the merits of the case at that time.

Mr. Vedeler raised the question of the individual stipends, and the meeting was informed that unless there is some further change of policy, these stipends are continuing and will continue as in the past.

The meeting was informed that the so-called Czechoslovak Middle Class party representatives have been excluded from the provisional body of 24, and advised that the exile leader, Mr. [illegible], was likely to raise a good deal of noise about the whole thing. Miss Augustine suggested that, as a member of the Knights of Malta, he was more or less expected to stir up the whole hierarchy.

Mr. Moore raised the issue as to the duration of the provisional agreement, and questioned as to whether any time limit had been set within which the administrators and the body of 24 would settle their differences and establish a permanent organization. Miss Augustine replied that it was the opinion of the National Council's division that this issue should not be forced at this time, but rather developments would be allowed to crystalize, and that we should wait to see what actual progress is made.

RUMANIAN AFFAIRS:

Miss Augustine reported that Messrs. Gafencu and Visoianu had met and had retained earlier views on the type of organization to be established for the representation of Rumanian affairs in exile; their agreement appears not to be within the realm of possibility at the present time. Miss Augustine also made known to the meeting the contents of a letter written by Mr. Gafencu to one of his friends in which he charged that Mr. Visoianu desired only one political and national body which should represent the Rumanian cause abroad, and that this body should be the present National Committee, under Mr. Visoianu's presidency. Mr. Gafencu's letter also advised that Mr. Visoianu is opposed to a large National Council, although he would agree to setup a special commission composed of persons outside the Committee. Mr. Gafencu on the other hand claims that he seeks an organization in exile within a wide framework, which would have a representative character, and be headed by an elected chairman. Mr. Gafencu indicated that he was not opposed to the King's cause and that, in fact, he wished to see the Royal question intimately bound to that of the whole exile community. Gafencu charged that Visoianu and his group, by negotiating only on the basis of the King's approval, instead of reaching agreement prior to the King's approval, invited criticism not only of themselves, but places the King's position in jeopardy.

Miss Augustine herself also advised that the meeting of January 23 between Visoianu and Gafencu was such as Gafencu had indicated; i.e., with regard to the chairmanship, Radescu would be the honorary chairman, Visoianu the chairman, and perhaps Gafencu the vice-chairman. Visoianu had also offered unification of the two groups on a 7 to 5 basis - the 7 coming from Visoianu's Rumanian National Committee. No reference was made of the funds which had been one of the main bones of contention in the split.

Miss Augustine advised of a meeting between Mr. C. D. Jackson and General Radescu in which, among other things, the General complained that he was being excluded from Rumanian discussions in NCFE circles, and questioned the advisability of sending Visoianu to London along with Gafencu. Radescu claims that his Free Rumanian League is having great success. The General was informed that the invitation to go abroad to Visoianu and Gafencu had emanated from the European Movement Conference itself, and that, in NCFE conversations with representatives of Rumanian groups, there had never been any question of eliminating Radescu. The importance of unity among exiles was pointed out to Radescu, and he was informed that something had to be done about the situation of the Rumanians-in-Exile.

Miss Augustine advised the meeting that due to circumstances, Visoianu and Gafencu had found themselves scheduled to fly on the same plane to London; Gafencu had protested this arrangement bitterly, on the grounds that Visoianu would represent this situation as one in which he (Visoianu) had been able to bring Gafencu along, on the former's insistence.

Mr. Campbell raised the question as to what can be done about this. He pointed out that in this Rumanian split Visoianu considers that his friends are in the State Department, and goes to State for advice and support, whereas Gafencu sends in letters to State, but carries his cause to NCFE in New York, where he believes his friends to be.

Mr. Lloyd interjected that he considers some very stringent action must be done about this whole Rumanian situation, and that unity somehow must be achieved. He suggested that with the coming into office of Admiral Miller as the new President of NCFE, it might be the time to take up the matter again with a new personality fresh on the scene, and that in such a way it could conceivably be possible to get over the hump of the present deplorable situation. Mr. Campbell assented thereto.

BALTIC AFFAIRS:

Mr. Vedeler advised the meeting that the original decision regarding the future of the Baltic broadcasts must stand, and that it was out of the questio n that we should become involved in any further proposals regarding RFE broadcasts to that area. This was explained to Mr. Lang, who has had some definite reservations on RFE broadcasts to the Baltic countries.

Mr. Vedeler pointed out that he considered the Baltic panels, however, must be maintained and that to proceed now with the dissolution of these panels would have a most serious effect on our Baltic friends.

Mr. Campbell raised the question as to what should be told the Baltic diplomats, and what had already been told them. After tossing this subject around for some time it was agreed that the Balts would be told simply that the Voice of America is going to accept full responsibility for broadcasts to their country, and very simply that RFE had agreed that this is the way it should be done.

POLISH AFFAIRS:

Miss Augustine advised that Mr. Leich would shortly be back from Europe, and could be able to report first-hand to the meeting of developments at the Polish conferences in England. She advised that the Polish Socialists had adopted a broad resolution wherein the principal of cooperation with the Polish Political Council was accomplished, and wherein the door had been left open to work with Mikolajczyk.

Miss Augustine advised that Mr. Leski had, contrary to the original plan, finally been sent to the Conference of the Polish Political Council.

BULGARIA:

Finally, it was agreed that ~~if~~ Mr. Hodengol's reorganization plan of the Bulgarian National Council was ready, it would be presented at the next meeting.

TRADE UNIONS:

Miss Augustine reviewed in the following terms, the situation of the Socialist Parties and Trade Unions-in-Exile and the Christian Democratic parties of the Trade Unions-in Exile; and advised of the ambiguities in this situation. She indicated that in this present situation:

1. There are in existence:

   a) On the Socialist Side:

      (1) The political-party organization:
      the Socialist Union of Central and Eastern Europe.

      (2) The professional-trade union organization:
      the International Center of Free Trade Unionists-in-Exile.

and that

   b) On the Christian Democratic Side there are:

      (1) The political party organization:
      the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe.

      (2) The professional-trade union organization:
      the Central European Federation of Christian Trade Unions.

She pointed out that

2. NCFE gives financial support and "recognition" to the Socialists on the professional and trade union level through the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile and has done so since September 1951. NCFE gives financial support and "recognition" to the Christian Democratic element on the political-party level through the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe which it has supported since January, 1951

Miss Augustine advised that

3. so far as she knows the Socialist Union of Central and Eastern Europe (founded in June, 1951) has never approached NCFE for support and for recognition. In October 1951 the Central European Federation of Christian Trade Unions was formed and soon after approached NCFE for support.

4. Prior to this approach, and just prior to his departure for Europe, Leon Dennen, who is NCFE's representative of labor and trade union affairs , and who is in Paris where he has responsibility for the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, stated that it was his impression that the Polish Christian Trade Unions were the only Christian Trade Unions of any prewar significance in the countries now behind the Iron Curtain and that if further investigation justified this view, he thought modest support ought to be extended abroad to the Polish Christian Trade Unions. He admitted to little knowledge of Christian Trade Unions.

That the Central European Federation of Christian Trade Unions is composed of exiles residing in the United States or Canada and not abroad, which throws another monkey wrench into the situation. At time of the approach to NCFE of the Christian Trade Union Federation their representative was told of Dennen's existence and his existence abroad, and of his need for statistics, information, and of Dennen's initial view that support should be abroad and not here. No statistics were forthcoming, but Sieniewicz (Secretary-General of the Christian Democratic) was active, apparently stirring up American Catholic circles by harping on the theme that NCFE allowed Socialists to monopolise trade union field.

(Sieniewicz)

Miss Augustine advised that we do know he approached George Donahue of American Catholic Trade Unions (who else, if anyone we do not know), and that he apparently stirred Donahue up quite a bit, but Donahue contacted Ed. McHale, on the Crusade, who managed to save the situation. Sieniewicz apparently remembered the effect on NCFE of attacks from certain Catholic circles. NCFE was at one time in bad situation vis-a-vis hierarchy. Miss Augustine summed up Mr. Dennen's views in his letter of December 28, 1951, as follows:

a) We should aid Polish Christian Trade Unions, but not Central European Federation of Christian Trade Unions.

1. Another Christian Democratic Exile Trade Union international is already recognized by International Federation of Christian Refugee Exiled Workers, not Confederation of Christian Trade Unions.

2. Question of basic policy contends probably no Christian Trade Unions of any significance (except Polish) in Eastern European countries prior to Soviet occupation. Mr. Dennen raised the question of why help refugees establish organizations-in-exile which have no counterparts in their own countries.

3. Another Polish Exile Christian Trade Union group (Feliks Mikolajczyk) recognized by CFTC (French approval of JCCTU).

##

COPY

The delegation of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia, aware of the great importance for the Czechoslovak cause of a united political leadership of the Czechoslovak democratic exile, have discussed in a number of meetings a complex of political and organisational matters and have agreed unanimously on the following:

1) the statutory organs of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia respectively will suspend all their activities by January 15, 1952;

2) effective the same day, a provisional two-member management of the affairs of the unified Czechoslovak democratic exile will be established;

3) simultaneously, a body will be set up with the duty to discuss and prepare, on the basis of the results of deliberations between the two delegations, the formulation of the political program and the organisation of the unified Czechoslovak democratic exile. The said body will be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia respectively;

4) the function of the delegations of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia respectively will cease with the establishment of the provisional management of the unified Czechoslovak democratic exile.

New York, N.Y., January 15, 1952

Signed by: Heidrich, Lettrich,
Klimek, Zenkl

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

S/P Mr. Joyce

A-58

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 25, 1952

SUBJECT: Question of RFE Broadcasts to the Baltic Countries

PARTICIPANTS: Lithuanian Minister Povilas Zadeikis
Mr. Anatol Dinbergs, First Secretary of the Latvian Legation
Mr. Harold C. Vedeler - EE
Mr. Willard Allan - EE

COPIES TO:
P - Mr. Sargeant
Mr. Devine
OIB/NY - Mr. Kohler
S/P - Mr. Joyce ✓
EE - Mr. Barbour

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—61130-1

In accordance with the conclusions reached at the meeting of Messrs. Kohler, Devine and Vedeler on January 18, an effort had been made earlier this week to call in the Lithuanian Minister and the Latvian Chargé d'Affaires at the same time. Since the illness of the latter prevented, it was finally necessary to have the First Secretary of the Latvian Legation to come rather than Mr. Feldmans.

It was explained that the visitors had been asked to come to the Department so that the matter of Baltic language broadcasts might be discussed in response to their recent notes (Lithuanian note No. 2433 dated December 31, 1951; Latvian note unnumbered dated January 3, 1952, and Estonian note No. 772 dated January 8, 1952) and oral representations on this subject. Mr. Vedeler said that the problem had been reconsidered from every standpoint by all officers with a direct interest in it and the various points raised by the Baltic diplomatic representatives had been carefully studied. As a result of this review the Department could see no other course but to reaffirm its previous position. The Department therefore had reached the definite conclusion that in the interests of the most efficacious overall effort so far as broadcasting to the Baltic countries with which Americans were connected was concerned, it should be confined to a single operation in VOA. The reasons for this conclusion were reviewed and the painstaking efforts of the

Department

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

JAN 2 3 195

Department to proceed fairly and in the best interests of the common struggle against Communism in the Baltic countries were stressed. It was indicated that since the NCFE had asked the Department for its opinion on the advisability of proceeding with plans for RFE broadcasts, the Department had conveyed these views to NCFE. It was our understanding that NCFE had also come to this conclusion.

Minister Zadeikis expressed his regrets and those of the Baltic Panels that this was the decision reached. He was still concerned that the Baltic exile leaders would have no opportunity to speak to their homelands and that this denial in view of the availability of RFE facilities to exiles of the satellite countries of Eastern Europe represented a change in US policy toward the Baltic states. Mr. Vedeler strongly emphasized that our policy toward the Baltic countries remained unchanged and that no political significance whatsoever could justly be read into the Department's desire to see the Baltic language programs carried only by VOA in the endeavor to make the broadcasting activities for the Baltic countries as forceful and effective as possible. It was suggested (in accordance with the possibilities pointed out by Mr. Kohler in the meeting on January 18) that there would be opportunities for Baltic exile leaders to speak over VOA.

Minister Zadeikis asked what provision had been made or might be made for the employment of persons already engaged for RFE radio work and for the use of radio material already prepared by the Baltic Panels. In response to direct questions it was suggested that probably something could be done to take care of these matters through discussions between NCFE and VOA representatives in New York. The question of cooperation between VOA and exile leaders and between VOA and the Baltic Panels was discussed at some length. VOA's sincere desire to receive and make use of helpful comments and suggestions, to the extent that these might fit into the planned programs, was reiterated. It was agreed that these various questions could best be pursued further if the Baltic representatives took them up directly with the VOA in New York.

A letter has also been sent to Mr. Kiev, Acting Consul General in charge of Legation at New York, informing him of our wish to discuss this matter on the next occasion when he comes to Washington.

EUR:EE:HCVedeler/ml
January 28, 1952

4181

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: PY-CIO

NO.

DATE 31 January 1952

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. EE - Mr. Poor			13 Feb.	HP
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8. PY-CIO				TWB
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

Henry:

You will remember that, as Gates Lloyd points out in his transmittal slip that Lang agreed to the use of facilities.

I take it that somebody didn't do a very good job of explaining to the Executive Committee of NCFE precisely what was wanted, and you may wish to be certain that a little preparatory work is done by McClury or others before a formal request is made.

Will you send the enclosures back to me.

Tom

TWB

Tom -

Returned per our 'phone talk today. Unless I hear to the contrary, I will assume that our Russian Committee is free to proceed as agreed with the use of the Lampertheim site and other RFE facilities as individually negotiated, always short of use of similar premises. - Henry

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

29 Jan 52
DATE

TO: T. W. Braden

BUILDING

ROOM NO

REMARKS: Re #2 - Amcomfree -
Bob Lang agreed with H. Poor
in my presence that Amcomfree could
have R.F.E.'s 10KW station at
Lampertheim, no longer useful to
R.F.E. — or could use some other
RFE transmitter provided the frequency
was changed & RFE not identified
with Amcom. Perhaps H. Poor should
see this —

FROM: JH

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO 36-8
SEP 1946

SECRET
Security Information

ER-2-5236

24 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : N.C.F.E.

1. I attach a letter I have just received from John Hughes, Chairman of the Executive Committee of N.C.F.E., with regard to certain decisions of the Executive Committee which he felt were of interest to their sponsors.

2. After you have read this, will you kindly pass it on to Gates Lloyd and Tom Braden?

ALLEN W. DULLES

Attachment (1) Letter to Mr. Dulles
from John Hughes dtd 18 Jan 52
(2 pages)

SECRET
Security Information

January 18, 1952

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
P. O. Box 1513
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of N.C.F.E. held on January 3rd last, the members felt that two of the subjects discussed at that time should be called to your attention so that you might know the views of the Committee in the event these matters were brought before you at a later date.

The first concerns a suggestion which apparently came informally from McCluny and others in Amcomfree, that if means could be found to do so, they be allowed to use some of the R.F.E. facilities in Germany for certain of their broadcasts. Since this matter was not brought up as a formal request, no action was taken by the Committee, but the individual members unanimously expressed the opinion that this would be most inadvisable and that they would be opposed to the use of R.F.E. facilities for this purpose even if time and frequencies were available, which is not at all certain. Since Amcomfree is an organization in which you have direct interest it seems advisable to acquaint you with our feelings in the matter should you or your organization be approached by McCluny or others on this subject. Without going into details at this time as to the reasons for our feeling in the matter, our main concern is that Amcomfree's targets are entirely different from those in which we are interested, and from the standpoint of operation from German soil they are far less likely to be agreeable to BONN. We are fearful of putting in jeopardy a presently successful operation and four to five million dollars of equipment by the introduction of a project which we feel should be kept separate and apart.

The other matter which came up for formal action involved the advisability of undertaking Polish programing in Germany, and the Executive Committee unanimously agreed that R.F.E. should proceed with the plans presented. In brief, such plans call for the origination of from three to four hours daily of Polish programing from Munich beginning on or about May 1, 1952, and the introduction of some 50 to 60 Poles into the city of Munich for work with R.F.E. to carry out this schedule.

Since this is a major step in the development of R.F.E. programing and more particularly because of the forthcoming negotiations between representatives of N.C.F.E., HICOG, and BONN, it was felt that you should be formally advised of this decision. The Executive Committee also wanted to go on record to the effect that while they realized the risks involved, affirmative action was taken as a result of opinions given by Messrs. Byroade, Kellermann and Strauss of the German Desk, Department of State, and by Messrs. Stone, Lewis and Boerner of HICOG. In answer to the specific question "Would in your judgement the introduction of Polish broadcasting with all of its

Mr. Allen W. Dulles (continued)

political implications, in any way harm the current Munich operation of R.F.E. or the BONN contract negotiations in the eyes of the BONN government", we were assured by all that it would not.

For your further information, the operating officers of R.F.E. in charge of the project for this Polish programing, have been directed to proceed slowly in implementing the action of the Executive Committee and watch the situation most carefully until such time as Phenix and Kempner have had time to receive proper assurances that negotiations with BONN will progress satisfactorily.

Sincerely,

John C. Hughes

JCH:PM

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
2-5212

24 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, PP/OPC

FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : CRUSADE budget

Please see attached letter from Abbott Washburn with his attached budget. I imagine that the Project Review Committee should go over the figures for the balance of the fiscal year and for 1952-1953 as soon as possible.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Attachment (1 w/1 attachment)

Budget included with Staff Study
3/21/52

January 23, 1952

Dear Allen:

At the Crusade Board Meeting last Friday, C.D. reported in detail on our meeting in Ed Barrett's office.

This was followed by a general discussion of the nature and scope of the 1952 Crusade program. Briefly, there was agreement that the program in 1952 should be considerably reduced in scope, that the emphasis should be taken off publicity and placed on fund-raising with the promotional period being reduced from two months to two or three weeks. It was felt that a direct mail campaign to our present list of givers -- plus a thorough solicitation of corporations -- would be desirable.

There was discussion also of a one-night house-to-house canvass, nation-wide, on Constitution Day next September. Mr. Poole suggested that, in addition to Radio Free Europe, the 1952 Crusade might place emphasis on the newly formed Free Europe University in Exile at Strasbourg, France. General Clay recommended that the Advertising Council's assistance in the new campaign be sought at the earliest moment.

I have reported the above to John Damewood -- also your instructions on the submission of a budget.

$450,000 was the estimated figure which we mentioned to you as adequate to cover the entire operation. After careful study and all possible paring, the total budget submitted herewith amounts to $488,991 . . . this to be spread over the eleven remaining months of 1952.

Of this total, $222,270 would fall in the present fiscal year (5 months at $44,454 per month).

The total budgeted figure is slightly more than a quarter of the cost of the 1951 campaign. With the ground work that has been laid during the past two drives, it should realize at least as much as the campaign just completed, although this, of course, is difficult to estimate.

We have had further talks with the VOA people, and the "Crusader" supplement devoted to the Voice will appear next week. They seemed very pleased about it.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Meeting to Discuss the Crusade for Freedom held in Mr. Barrett's office 17 Jan 52	2. RI FILE NO. 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. Dept. of State 4. DATE 21 Jan. 52 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14\.

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED AT THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY TS 168189

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

2-5372

January 21, 1952

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

Dear C.D.:

Following up our meeting, we are going to name John Devine to represent us in discussing further plans for the Crusade of Freedom.

As I understand it, all parties feel that the Crusade should be continued, that the next campaign should be of a low-pressure and short duration type, and that joint efforts will be made to find other useful activities that the Crusaders can perform for the total U.S. propaganda effort.

It was good seeing you the other night, and both Mason and I enjoyed that long talk. Please remember me to Min Miller and tell him I wish him the best in his difficult but fascinating assignment.

All the best to you.

Cordially,

cc: Mr. Wisner
P - Mr. Devine
S/P - Mr. Joyce

Edward W. Barrett

P.S. As I understand it, it is tentatively proposed that the two individuals working with John Devine will be Jim Lambie and Tom Braden.

Mr. C.D. Jackson,
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.,
350 Fifth Avenue - Room 301,
New York 1, New York.

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

P:EWBarrett:mbv

CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED FREE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS.—Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: ID/COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION BRANCH

NO.

DATE 10A [illegible]

TO—	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. W3	Knott			SB	
2. EE/S	MAR .	1952			
3. EE-2	MAR	3 - 1952			
4. EE/1S				ma	Balldridge
5. EE/PW				LB	EM albania Bulgaria Rumania Yougoslavia
6. SE/PC	11 MAR	1952			
7. Py/U					Braitweiser NH
8. Py/BoL					
9. Py/Bud				M.W.B.	
10. Py/10					
11. U in Exile File (Bros)					
12.					Suggest 20 (?? BV) retain this in files - NH
13.					
14.					
15.					

NOTE: ID/CD does not retain this document on file. Any interest in retention should be noted on this routing and it will be returned to you.

Lacking request for return, THIS DOCUMENT IS TO BE DESTROYED BY THE LAST NAMED RECIPIENT.

FORM JAN 1950 51-9 FREE RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED
(Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
840.../11-1551
XR 740.00

FROM AmConsulate, Strasbourg. 136 DESP. NO. November 15, 1951 DATE

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. AIR POUCH PRIORITY

692312

REF None.

25 For Dept. Use Only

SUBJECT Founding of "Le Collège de l'Europe Libre" at Strasbourg by the National Committee for a Free Europe.

RECD NOV 19
ACTION EUR
INFO DCR
OLI
IE
UNA
USUN
Cadel-Paris

As the Department is aware, the National Committee for a Free Europe has founded at the Château de Pourtalès, Strasbourg Robertsau, "Le Collège de l'Europe Libre" (College of Free Europe) in which students of nine different nationalities, all of them from the Satellite countries, are lodged and fed. All of the students are taking courses in the University of Strasbourg and in future there will be additional courses at the "Collège de l'Europe Libre" conducted by professors-in-exile in the languages of the various countries represented. The purpose of the College is to train political leaders, doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc., for service in the Satellite countries when and if these countries are ever liberated from Soviet Russian domination. So far there are no students from Russia or East Germany in the College.

On November 12 Mr. Roudybush and I attended the opening ceremony of the College, which was informal but impressive; other persons attending included Mr. C. D. Jackson, President of the National Committee for a Free Europe, three officials of the Council of Europe, Professor Robert Redslob, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Strasbourg (representing the Rector of the University, who was ill), personnel from Radio Free Europe at Munich, and the student body. Speeches were made by Mr. Malcolm Davis, Dean of the College, Monsieur Redslob, and Mr. C. D. Jackson.

There follow tables showing the distribution of the students by nationalities and by ages, as of October 20, 1951, (8 men and 1 woman students have been enrolled since then, but their nationalities and ages are not known):

Nationality	Men	Women	Total
Czechoslovak	20	2	22
Polish	14	5	19
Rumanian	13	1	14
Yugoslav	11	2	13
Hungarian	7	0	7
Lithuanian	3	1	4
Bulgarian	4	0	4
Albanian	2	0	2
Latvian	2	0	2
Totals	76	11	87

/les
DRAFTED BY

RESTRICTED

PREPARATION TIME

INFORMATION COPY

14-00000

RESTRICTED
(Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM :

DESP. NO.

DATE

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

PRIORITY

REF :

SUBJECT:

For Dept. Use Only

RECD

ACTION

INFO

2 Strasbourg 136

Age	Men	Women	Total
18	2	1	3
19	0	0	0
20	2	2	4
21	3	1	4
22	8	0	8
23	5	0	5
24	6	0	6
25	9	3	12
26	8	0	8
27	12	1	13
28	11	2	13
29	4	0	4
30	3	1	4
31	3	0	3
Totals	76	11	87
Average Age	25.5	24.3	

As of possible interest there are enclosed copies of the first two pages of the interim report of the Committee on Awards and Placements to the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, The Free Europe University in Exile, New York, N. Y., which was furnished to me confidentially by Mr. Malcolm Davis.

George D. Andrews

George D. Andrews
American Consul

Enclosure: As Stated

Distribution:
AmEmbassy, Paris

REPORTER(S)

RESTRICTED

PREPARATION TIME

INFORMATION COPY

RESTRICTED
(Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FROM :
DESP. NO
DATE

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
PRIORITY

REF :

SUBJECT:

For Dept. Use Only

RECD

ACTION

INFO

Enclosure to
despatch 136 from
American Consul,
Strasbourg,
11/15/51 - p. 1

COPY

Paris, October 29, 1951

To the Chairman of the Board of Trustees,
The Free Europe University in Exile,
New York, N. Y.

Interim Report of the Committee on Awards and Placements

The Committee, having sent out 3530 application forms to individuals and organizations, first examined applications duly completed by candidates for Strasbourg and set aside those, out of 626 received, that had been filed by persons who turned out to be ineligible, e.g. as being over 32 years of age (with a few exceptions), or already having university degrees and needing to finish elsewhere, or wishing to study a subject not taught at Strasbourg, or not possessing qualifications required by the university, or not knowing enough French to profit by the Strasbourg university courses, or not having refugee status. Candidatures which appeared eligible were then shared out between the members of the Committee for personal interview, mostly in Paris, visits however being made for this purpose to England, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Turkey, and Switzerland.

With applications and notes on interviews before it, the Committee then held numerous meetings, at which the cases of all eligible candidates were examined and discussed. Mr. Royall Tyler, as President of the Association for the College of Free Europe, also attended most of the meetings held by the Committee and assisted it by his advice. The records showed that a high percentage of the candidates, and especially some of the more promising cases, did not wish primarily to go to Strasbourg but hoped instead to obtain scholarships enabling them to remain in Paris (in most cases), or at some other university. Certain problems arising in this connection will be dealt with below, together with recommendations.

Selections for Strasbourg

To date, 87 candidates wishing to go to Strasbourg have been accepted: 76 men and 11 women. (Note: 8 additional men and 1 woman have been enrolled,

[illegible] RESTRICTED [illegible]

INFORMATION COPY

RESTRICTED
(Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM :

DESP. NO.

DATE

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

PRIORITY

REF :

SUBJECT:

For Dept. Use Only

RECD

ACTION

INFO

Enclosure to
despatch 136 from
American Consul,
Strasbourg,
11/15/51 - p. 2

making a total, as of Nov. 12, 1951, of 84 men and 12 women). Notification of non-acceptance is being sent to 349 candidates. The Committee has had in mind the advance estimate that five women were to be accepted for Strasbourg, and that five theological students might be accepted for the College des Clercs. However, only one theological student has qualified for a scholarship, and suitable arrangements can be made to lodge as many as 10 or 11 women, possibly even 13, (Note: total accepted 12, as of Nov. 12), either in the Student Home for Girls or in a pension (for the older girls). In view of the quality of these women candidates, the Committee feels justified in selecting a number larger than that originally contemplated, and after consultation with Mr. DeWitt Peale and Mr. Royall Tyler does so unanimously.

The grand total of male students already accepted for Strasbourg, and accordingly notified, is thus 76 to date, as against 100 originally contemplated. The Committee has thought it preferable to maintain a high quality, rather than to make filling a quota the first consideration, especially as applications are still coming in and some promising applicants remain to be seen. Since the French university year begins only in the first week of November, a good many students were away when the application forms were sent out and their addresses unknown to anyone who could be reached. Arrangement can be made to enter late-comers for the Strasbourg university courses, and so it seems wise to allow for the probability that some high-quality candidates will still appear, none of whom could be accepted if the quota had been filled up in a hurry regardless of the advisability of maintaining a standard. Applicants can be received and registered in the university as late as Nov. 21.

It is of interest to note that all candidates so far submitted to deans of faculties at Strasbourg have been considered acceptable.

123

REPORTER(S)

RESTRICTED

PREPARATION FILE

INFORMATION COPY

17 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Plans for Enlargement of the Free University in Exile

REFERENCE: Letter from Royal Tyler to DDCI of 15 December 1951

1. At a meeting at the DDCI's house, Washington, D. C., on Sunday morning, 13 January 1952, Mr. Royal Tyler discussed with Messrs. A. W. Dulles, R. Gates Lloyd and Thomas W. Braden, the present plans of the Trustees of the FUIE as presented at their meeting in New York last week.

2. Regarding the administration of the University, Mr. Tyler reported that Mr. Dewitt C. Poole's resignation effective 31 March 1952 had been formally accepted by the Trustees and Dr. Levering Tyson had been elected Vice President with full executive powers as of the present. Dr. Malcolm Davis has not, according to Dr. Tyson, proved an effective administrator and has been relieved of all non-academic duties as well as membership on the Awards Committee.

3. Regarding the future expansion of the University which Mr. Tyler had reviewed at some length in the referenced letter, the Trustees gave conditional approval to doubling the number of students during the academic year of 1952-53. There are now 83 male students living at the chateau and 13 women boarding outside. In addition, 31 students have been awarded scholarships at other universities. Dr. Tyson estimates that approximately 1/3 of the 96 students at Robertsau will leave at the end of this academic year for various reasons, and the Trustees expect to recruit about 35 students to restore the number in residence to approximately 100. In addition, if money is obtained for the necessary temporary housing, they propose to recruit an additional 100, making 200 in residence at Robertsau. They also suggest increasing the scholarship appointments at other institutions to a total of 50.

4. Any such program would involve a capital outlay of $250,000 on a 100-bed dormitory and necessary study hall or auditorium. Mr. Tyler understood that the present kitchen and other facilities will serve a total of 200 residents.

5. Mr. Tyler

5. Mr. Tyler expressed concern, in which those present concurred, that the University was making plans for expansion without having definite information regarding the number of acceptable students who would be available in future years. Of the several hundred applicants who were rejected last year, there were few, if any, who would have been admitted under any circumstances. It was agreed that a survey should immediately be made to determine with as much accuracy as possible how many students can be expected to be available for the University in the next few years. It was recommended that Dr. Tyson get in touch with Mr. Lawrence Dawson of the Department of State regarding the number and academic caliber of escapees currently coming through the Iron Curtain.

6. It was understood that Dr. Tyson would forward to Washington in the near future detailed estimates covering:

a. Capital outlay required for the proposed expansion.

b. The operating budget of 1952-53 on the basis of 200 students.

(In this connection, it should be noted that Mr. C. P. Jackson has just returned from a trip to visit the officials of the Ford Foundation which he made for the purpose of proposing that the Foundation take over the FUIE. The Foundation is giving this serious consideration but Mr. Jackson was reported unwilling to estimate how successful his trip had been.)

7. Mr. Tyler urged that a decision be reached with regard to capital improvement at Robertsau by the first of February. If delayed beyond that date, the University will be at the mercy of French contractors working on an emergency schedule to meet the opening date for the expanded University next Fall.

8. However, before any conclusions can be arrived at, it would appear most essential to carry out the survey of available candidates referred to in paragraph 5. above. Furthermore, Dr. Tyson is arranging to bring his detailed plans to Washington on 22 January, after which it will be possible to make a more detailed report as to the costs involved. At this meeting, the point raised by DD/P regarding the increased dangers of penetration by Communists will be discussed.

H. GATES LLOYD
Deputy Chief
Psychological Staff Division

DCPY/HGL:ml

Distribution:
Addressee - Original; PY/CIO - 1; DCPY - 1; RI - 2

The RI Copy of TOP SECRET
document— 62962
dated 15 Jan 1952
which was removed from this
file, is filed in the RI
TOP SECRET CONTROL SECTION
1305 "L" Bldg.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT Meeting at Mr. Barrett's Home on Tues. Eve. Nov. 20, 1951 to discuss USIE & OPC Relationships	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY TS# 67871

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

SECRET

[illegible] RMATION

17 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Devine
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting at Mr. Barrett's Home on November 20, 1951 to discuss USIE and OPC Relationships

1. Your memorandum of conversation of November 20, 1951, was mentioned to me by Mr. Dulles this morning with particular reference to paragraph 2 of the conclusions.

2. Mr. Dulles does not believe that the meeting was quite so definite on this point as you indicate, and I suggest, therefore, an amendment as follows:

> "2. That possibilities for toning down the Crusade for Freedom to a somewhat less high-pressure and spectacular campaign be carefully explored by all concerned."

THOMAS W. BRADEN

PY-CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - ED/DD/P (Mr. Hulick)
1 cc - PY/IS
1 cc - PY
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRE

#6

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

January 16, 1952

SUBJECT: Report on Slavik-Major Conference as outlined by Miss Mary Augustine at January 9, 1952 meeting with State.

From: R.J. Moore

Miss Augustine advised that the Slavik-Major Conference had been placed on the Agenda, as a result of Mr. Vedeler's comment (made at a meeting during December, 1951) to the effect that it would be desirable to give encouragement and moral support to the Slavik-Major group.

Miss Augustine explained that Nagy had received some encouragement from NCFE when (during January 1952) he initially broached his plan for the establishing of an over-all international grouping of exiles from Central and Eastern Europe. However, when it became clear to NCFE that Nagy's group was to be formed on exclusively political party lines, and would be dominated by Agrarian (Peasant) Party leaders and thus, in effect, a duplication of the International Peasant Union and other such organizations already in existence who are already receiving NCFE support, that it could not, therefore, be broadly representative. NCFE, therefore, indicated to Nagy that it could not provide financial support for an organization set upon such a basis. Nagy's reaction to NCFE's policy was consequently strong and critical.

At about this same time the Slavki-Major group (now known as the Central and Eastern European Conference) began to emerge and to become active. It was composed officially of the so-called "bureaucrats", "diplomats", and "nonpartisan personalities" which were so despised by Nagy and his colleagues from the Agrarian parties and other political party leaders who took their cue from the Peasant Party politicians. This new group began actually to meet and to perform genuine work.

SECRET

JAN [illegible] 1952

Apparently, as the result of the emergence of the Slavik-Major Conference, as an embryo but functioning body, the Nagy group sprang into action, and leaving the planning and organizational stage behind, launched itself finally into a big press conference and much fanfare. This Nagy group, just to confuse an already confusing situation further, is known as the Central-Eastern European Committee, Miss Augustine advised.

NCFE was disquieted by this almost simultaneous emergence of two potentially competing organizations and made it clear to both groups that financial support was out of the question until a merger or some clear and acceptable agreement between the two groups, which would bar their competing with each other, should be effected. The Slavik-Major Conference, Miss Augustine indicated, agreed to seek no large amount of publicity for a time in order that the unfortunate and undesirable aspect of competition might be played down as much as possible in the hope that a merger or acceptable agreement might be forthcoming.

After its initial plunge into the publicity spotlight, the Nagy Committee seemed to become completely quiescent, while the Slavik-Major Conference became increasingly active, performing some genuinely useful work.

Miss Augustine informed the meeting that NCFE had paid for the booklet on deportations, entitled "Human Freedom is Being Enslaved", and that Frank Wright, NCFE Press Officer, having spoken in Paris with Chester Williams of the U.S. Mission to the U.N., who urged that this booklet and its exposition of the subject of deportations be given as much publicity as possible in the minority press of the U.S., especially the N press, the labor press, and the press of other nationality groups thru Central-Eastern European, so that this would be given the aspect of a broadly-begun protest, not merely the protest of a few Central and Eastern European exiles. In this way members of our U.S. Mission would be enabled to cite before the U.N. Assembly the protest which deportations have elicited from the U.S. minority press, quoting articles, etc., which have more of a propaganda impact than the booklet itself.

Originally, Miss Augustine pointed out, the Slavik-Major Conference had approached NCFE with a proposal that NCFE arrange and finance a luncheon or a dinner to which various representatives of influential American organizations, labor, church, educational, etc., would be invited, and at which the exiles would have an opportunity to present the facts and their views regarding deportations. NCFE had at first agreed to this, in principle, Miss Augustine advised, but in view of the probable recriminations from the Nagy group (which would, in fact, have some basis of justification) and also in view of the propaganda approach suggested by Williams, the Committee had dropped this idea and was working instead along the lines suggested by the U.S. Mission.

Miss Augustine added that in the absence of a merger, or an agreement, regarding division of fields of competition (the Nagy Committee, concentrating on long-range planning and post-liberation problems; the Slavik-Major Conference focusing its efforts upon the immediate problems confronting exiles in the pre-liberation period) NCFE had steered clear of providing financial support on any continuing basis.

Mr. Barbour inquired as to the prospects for merger, and whether it had been made clear to all exile groups involved that the withholding of NCFE support was predicated upon the lack of any unified and broadly representative grouping.

Miss Augustine advised of two recent conversations she had had with Sidzikaukas, and said that when pressed by him for the reason why the luncheon plan had been dropped, she had at first tried to put this on a practical basis and on Mr. Wright's Paris conversations and the consequent change of tactics. However, when pressed further, and told by Sidzikaukas of the rumors of drastic changes of [illegible] policy, etc., which would attend the abandonment of this plan, Miss Augustine advised that gentleman unofficially that, along with the practical reasons, we had been motivated by a desire to avoid the inevitable recriminations from Nagy, and that the lack of a merger or satisfactory agreement between the two groupings would continue to prevent our material support of their activities on any consistent or permanent basis. Miss Augustine added that very recently Sidzikaukas had informed her briefly of a meeting of the Nagy Committee held within the last few days. This meeting was attended by, among others, Visoianu, Sidzikaukas and Osusky, who have sat on the fence between these two groups and have attended the meetings of both groups. Sidzikaukas believes that agreement to divide fields of competition, rather than a merger, is shaping up.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

In reply refer to W-1771
S
11 January 1952

Mr. C. D. Jackson
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.
110 West 57th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear C. D.:

As promised at our last meeting, here is the text for a new paragraph 3 of the Minutes of the Meeting Held in Washington on 14 December 1951. This was dictated by Oliver E. Hadwood.

> "3. Jackson advised that he had a tentative date to call on the Ford Foundation people in Pasadena on January 8th. Braden advised that it would be appropriate at that time to make a strong pitch on the Iron Curtain refugee problem with the idea that the government was tackling this problem but needed substantial help from private agencies, and that if Ford would give a sizable sum to NCFE, which it in turn could farm out to IRC, it would help to get the ball rolling on a major psychological warfare problem. Braden stressed that private initiative was extremely important that if a private agency acted now, it would speed up the governmental machinery. He also said that the maximum estimated governmental contribution toward this problem was not expected to be more than half the cost.
>
> "Braden also advised that IRC had agreed with David Martin for Martin to step down from his post as Executive Director and that the Committee was considering the appointment of a well-known university president to assume the job. He said that Martin had agreed to step out of the picture altogether if the Committee wished him to do so but that in any case his role from now on would be minor.
>
> "It was also agreed that this discussion of refugees and IRC could include the plan worked up by Berle and Dolbeare to turn over to IRC NCFE "non-productive exiles at a cost to NCFE of approximately $1,000 a head."

Sincerely yours,

John L. Danswood

SECRET

DCPY/HOL:ml
Distribution:
Addressee - Original; DCPY - 1; PY/Exa - 1; PY/GTO - 1;

SECRET

3.

TONIC

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

January 10, 1952

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. F. R. Dolbeare
Mr. J. F. Leich

From: R.J. Moore

SUBJECT: Report of meeting at State Department, Wednesday, January 9, 1952.

PRESENT: Miss Mary Augustine, Mr. Gates Lloyd Mr. Walworth Barbour, Mr. Harold C. Vedeler, Mr. John Campbell, Mr. Thomas [illegible], Mr. Robert J. Moore.

NOTE: Miss Mary Augustine represented the New York office at the meeting in the absence of Mr. John F. Leich, who is in Europe attending the European Movement Conference.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

It was recalled that at the meeting on December 26, 1951, discussion of the Czechoslovak problem had ended on a note of optimism. Miss Augustine advised that this optimism had been obliterated due to certain unfortunate circumstances which had developed in negotiations between the Czechoslovak Council majority of 17 and the Zenkl minority of 13. Miss Augustine indicated that one of the principal stumbling blocks in the Czech situation is the question of the co-equal chairmanship in the new setup of two persons, one appointed from each group. She further advised that a body of 20 persons divided equally between the two opposing groups would act as an *ad hoc* committee to establish a new Czechoslovak National Council, and that, whereas the 13 wished to appoint Dr. Zenkl as one of the two chairmen, they had at the same time expressed their opinion that Dr. Osusky would not be acceptable to them as the other co-chairman, or indeed, that he should not exercise any major function. Such an ultimatum appeared unacceptable to the 17 who contended that negotiations could not be carried on under these circumstances.

Upon receipt of this news, Miss Augustine pointed out, Mr. Dolbeare of NCFE advised the Czechoslovak delegation that he would place the whole problem before the Board of Directors of NCFE. This was done, and a

JAN 15 1952

SECRET

subcommittee was appointed to examine the situation; this committee is composed of Mr. F. R. Dolbeare, Dr. Levering Tyson and Mr. Frank Altschul. The subcommittee was informed by the Board of Directors that, should the Czechoslovaks fail to overcome their differences by the end of January, all payments to the Czechoslovak National Council would cease as of that time. The Board had agreed, however, that a credit of $25,000, appropriated to the Council, would remain with it and could be used for support during the course of the following month. It was considered that these funds would act as a hedge against other outside funds to which Dr. Zenkl appears to have access.

The subcommittee met on January 8 with Messrs. Lettrich, Heidrich and Osusky, at which time the principle of the co-equal chairmanship appears to have been dropped in favor of a system of referees, including Messrs. Papanek and Heidrich - one from each group. Miss Augustine advised that the subcommittee was to meet on January 10 with Dr. Zenkl and company, and on Friday with the delegation from both groups. Miss Augustine advised that of the three members of the subcommittee only Mr. Altschul appeared to carry any optimism as to the outcome of the negotiations. Miss Augustine informed the meeting of Mr. Dolbeare's opinion that, should negotiations fail:

a) all financial ties would cease with organised Czechoslovak exile groups,

b) NCFE would be obliged to select individuals as advisers in various functional capacities.

Miss Augustine made reference to a 22-page Czechoslovak memorandum which had recently been presented on the whole situation of Czechoslovakia, past and present. She advised that Messrs. Osusky and Papanek had not signed the document and that NCFE's analysis of the memorandum had been unfavorable.

Mr. Vedeler interjected that should current negotiations fail some consideration should be given to allotting financial aid to both the

Czechoslovak groups in the controversy.

Mr. Barbour interposed that should the negotiations indeed fail, and we be faced with a Czechoslovak situation in which there would be no Czechoslovak Council, the whole situation of the National Councils and NCFE might well need to be reviewed. He pointed out that the NCFE was based very much on the National Council idea, and that it is constituted to work on this basis. Therefore, should this concept fail, it might be expedient to have a system of some kind of national panel whose members would be appointed by NCFE to work on the problems of their respective nationalities (presumably within the dictates and needs of American foreign policy). Mr. Barbour advised that such persons would have to be chosen on the basis of their ability to work together, thus avoiding the issues of political strife and partisan interests.

Mr. Moore suggested that the meeting might wish to consider the procedure which should immediately follow in the wake of the possible breakdown of Czechoslovak negotiations.

Mr. Lloyd proposed that the matter be referred to Washington for consideration by his office and the State Department before the Czechoslovaks were formally advised of the drastic action contemplated by NCFE's Board of Directors and the subcommittee. There was general agreement that this should be the case.

BALTIC BROADCASTS:

Miss Augustine reviewed the situation of the Baltic panels in New York as regards broadcasts by Radio Free Europe. She advised that the Baltic countries would be represented at the European Movement Conference by heads of the New York Baltic panels, and specifically - Messrs. Massens, Sidzikauskas and Wahter - and that thus funds had been found to carry out the original plan of sending a representative from each Baltic country to the Movement Conference.

Mr. Vedeler indicated that he considered this move to be fortunate and appropriate, in view of the upheaval which has occurred in the matter of the Baltic broadcasts. He indicated his belief that if NCFE is to continue, it is necessary that some form of Radio Free Europe broadcasts to Baltic countries be considered. He advised that the Baltic countries considered there had been discrimination against them, and they feel that it is only through RFE broadcasts that they can really speak to their own people; he advised that he considered the general situation most regrettable.

Miss Augustine indicated that in New York there was considerable hope that once the Baltic broadcast question was straightened out, such situations be avoided in the future, as it has been most embarrassing to all concerned, and has placed the good faith of NCFE towards the Balts in jeopardy.

Mr. Barbour advised that we must consider the Baltic broadcasts to be currently ruled out. However, he advised further that the matter will be taken up on the basis of the formal protests lodged with the State Department by the Baltic diplomatic Missions in this country. He inferred that the whole situation had become confused due to the unfortunate light in which the Voice of America broadcasts had been thrown, as a result of Radio Free Europe's activities. He made reference to the Crusade for Freedom on behalf of Radio Free Europe, and indicated that the Crusade in this instance had done a great deal to stir up the public's mind in favor of RFE, to the discredit of the Voice of America. Finally, he advised, however, that the merits of the case for broadcasts to Baltic countries by RFE would be reconsidered.

RUMANIA:

Miss Augustine advised that there was not a great deal to report on the Rumanian situation, but that Mr. Gafencu had received advice that Mr. Visoianu would meet with him prior to the latter's departure to attend the

European Movement Conference. It was hoped that the meeting would actually take place, but that assurances could not be forthcoming. However, it seemed reasonable that Mr. Visoianu might make the move before going to London where he would have further consultations with the King. Messrs. Visoianu and Gafencu were reported to have come to some basic agreements for the purpose of reaching an understanding between the two factions. Advice was given that General Radescu would be brought into the consultations eventually.

Mr. Moore advised of the opinion held by the National Council division of NCFE that the Rumanians should avoid bringing the King into the negotiations, and rather that an agreement in the form of a _fait accompli_ should be presented to the King for his approval.

Mr. Campbell interjected that he had an appointment at that time with Mr. Visoianu, and that in the light of this information, he would advise that gentleman not to try to pull "any contemplated schemes which might disrupt the efforts so far taken". Mr. Barbour requested that Mr. Visoianu be informed, in strong terms, to avoid further intrigue or unnecessary protracted discussions. In other words "read him the riot act".

HUNGARIAN AFFAIRS:

Miss Augustine advised the meeting that it had been necessary to make some drastic changes among the Hungarian personnel working for Radio Free Europe in New York, as their output was considered to be inadequate. She advised that efforts were being made to reestablish the Hungarian desk on a more effective basis.

BULGARIAN AFFAIRS:

Miss Augustine advised that Mr. Dimitrov is departing for Europe to join the European Movement Conference, and that he was being obliged to come to NCFE headquarters to pick up his check for the purpose of the trip.

Mr. Barbour advised that he had met with Mr. Dimitrov and had given the Bulgarian the impression that State did not consider his conduct of affairs to be in the state of perfection which the gentleman himself so claims. Mr. Barbour further advised that he recognized the feeling against Dimitrov among others working on Bulgarian affairs, and that he understands the basis for this criticism. However, he advised that he does consider Dimitrov to be the representative of an important peasant element in Bulgaria, and that he did not consider this fact should be ignored.

Miss Augustine advised that there appeared to be some difficulty with Mr. Shipov's papers, a fact which is retarding his arrival in this country. She further advised of the need for a quorum on the Bulgarian National Council, in order to deal with the political situation which has developed there.

The meeting received a visit from Mr. Heckragel who advised that he was working on a new plan for the reform of the Bulgarian National Committee. He advised that he expected to have the report ready at the time of the next meeting and requested that the members of the meeting consider the Bulgarian question in the meantime, and should they have any specific ideas which they should wish to present, they should contact him in the interval. He advised that he was attempting to draw up a plan whereby membership in the Bulgarian Committee would be established on an elective basis, and suggested that this might be a good time to teach them some of the concepts of democratic procedure.

Mr. Barbour advised of his interest in the Bulgarian political leader known as Muslarov, and suggested that some consideration be given to bringing this man into Bulgarian exile affairs.

SLAVIC-MAJOR CONFERENCE:

Mr. Vedeler advised that NCFE should consider the Slavic-Major Conference organization within the light of its own activities and purposes.

(Miss Augustine outlined the history of the Slavik-Major Conference and the conditions which are currently existing therein. A copy of Miss Augustine's report will shortly follow this report of the meeting with State).

In reply to Miss Augustine's statement that she understood Mr. Vedeler to believe NCFE should give support to the Slavik-Major Conference, Mr. Vedeler advised that he considered this support should take the form of assistance to special projects, but that he did not advocate that assistance should be given to the Conference on an all-out basis.

Mr. Barbour advised of his approval of this procedure, and requested that precautions be taken in order that Macy not be aroused.

POLISH AFFAIRS:

Miss Augustine advised there was little to report on Polish affairs, other than to advise of a cable which had been received in New York to the effect that General Anders had solicited the aid of Count Raczynski to assist in the formation of the Polish Council of National Unity.

Mr. Vedeler advised that he had spoken to Mr. Joyce regarding a conversation which the latter was presumed to have had with the British in London on cooperation with the U.S. in exile affairs.

Mr. Barbour indicated that he also had a report of Mr. Joyce's discussions with the Foreign Office, and that the former had found little British desire to become involved in the matters of exiled groups. He suggested that the British considered this to be an extremely complicated and undesirable situation which they had wished to avoid.

Mr. Barbour advised that in view of our own record of involvement and disappointments in this policy, we were hardly in a position to advise the British that they should follow our example. However, he indicated that within the next few months the Department will return to further discussions of this matter with the British, and indicated that he had hopes of achieving a greater degree of cooperation and coordination of policies.

(The next meeting will take place on January 23rd.)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

9 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe Operations

REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 15 November 1951 from
F. H. E. Nesbitt to Robert Hooker

1. Regarding the project mentioned in the referenced memorandum to transfer approximately 100 Polish exiles to Portugal for the purpose of conducting Polish programs from that country, Mr. Robert E. Lang, Director of Radio Free Europe, has advised us that on 3 January 1952, the Board of Directors of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. decided that at least for the present, it would be advisable to do all Polish programming in Munich. He stated that on Mr. C. D. Jackson's last trip to Portugal, the authorities there advised him that any Polish exiles brought in under the ~~above-mentioned~~ circumstances would have to live under conditions approximating "house arrest," since the Portugese government would not tolerate their circulating freely within the country.

2. Later Mr. Spencer Phenix stated that he and Mr. Gregory Thomas believed that some few Poles could be brought in without such drastic action by the Portugese authorities. He also expressed concern that the short wave communications between Munich and Lisbon were not 100% satisfactory for transmitting the Polish programs, which are then relayed out of Lisbon to Poland. He felt that programming in Portugal would be the best way to handle the problem but admitted that approximately 100 people would be needed, and, under the circumstances, he agreed that it was better to keep the entire program staff all in one place.

3. We are asking

3. We are asking Mr. Lang to keep us posted on any future plans that may develop to send any of these people to Portugal so that we may advise the Department of State in advance of any such project.

H. Oates Lloyd

DCPY/HOL:ml

Distribution:
Addressee - Original and 1
DCPY - 1
CIO - 1
RI - 2

vr NCFE File

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

In reply refer to: W-1766
S
January 9, 1952

Mr. Frederic R. Molbeare
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Fred:

I am enclosing, for your confidential information, a translation of a letter received by the Austrian Minister in Washington, which has been brought to the attention of our friends. In discussing this matter the Austrian Embassy pointed out that Austria was an occupied country in which were stationed, among others, Soviet troops and expressed the hope that NCFE would refrain from taking any action which might put Austria in an embarrassing position.

I am confident that we can count upon your cooperation in preventing the development of any situation which would embarrass the Austrian Government.

Sincerely,

Travis A. Albery

Attachment 1
As stated above

cc: Miss Viccellio ✓

SECRET

5 January 1952 W-1761

Dear Abbott:

Thank you for reminding me that Ed McHale may soon be available. As you say, I know him, though slightly, but I have always heard excellent things about him.

I have made an attempt to find out who expressed interest in him to Tom Myers but cannot do so. Perhaps, therefore, you would pass this note on to Tom and ask him to let me know sometime soon who expressed the interest. That would help me ascertain whether we will want to try to bring him down here.

My very best wishes to you for the New Year.

Sincerely,

Mr. Abbott Washburn
National Committee for a Free Europe
808 - 7th Avenue
New York, New York

PY-CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - PY/Exec Asst.
1 cc - PY
1 cc - CIO✓
2 cc - RI

Ken 5 Jan 52

Cord hesitates to express any interest in this man ("an operator"; "a friend of Gil Harrison's"; a person whom Cord knew on Am Vets Com) until overall situation is settled. His interest, in any case, is only mild. No one else, so far as I can determine, is interested.

Routine would be to refer to personnel through Mr. Millard, and on basis of his report as to personnel's interest, let Mr. Washburn know whether or not we are trying. (There is clearly no effort being made now and the procedure I see us bound by could involve considerable time and unpredictable results.)

But here is a draft. Nancy

472-4

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: PP/Ela

NO.

DATE 28 Dec. '51

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Millard			12/28	REM	
2. Braden			1/2	TWB	For action or advice as to your present slant on matters of this kind MBV Cord Meyer might like to have him in mind. I'd like to write Abbot & say we're trying.
3. Braden					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

December 19, 1951

Dear Tom:

As mentioned to you last Friday, our mutual friend Ed McHale has done a good job here on the New York City Crusade campaign in spite of numerous handicaps and obstacles.

The present clean-up operations will be completed next month, and in view of the somewhat uncertain future of the Crusade I have had a little talk with Ed so that he can be thinking about moving to another assignment.

At the time Ed joined us, Tom Myers indicated that your shop had expressed considerable interest in him. Would you be good enough, Tom, to see whether such interest still exists or whether there are any other slots that might be filled by someone of his ability and forcefulness.

Many thanks,

Yours,

Abbott

DE [illegible]

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)

FROM | EXTENSION | NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				PLEASE INITIAL AFTER REVIEWING DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.
3. 2D24 D Boulier CA/IIC	12 Mar 73		DWB	
4. S. Corbat OG/EFR				78-1129 432343 ~~[illegible] 718~~ ~~[illegible] 1589~~
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				FILE NO. [illegible] CIA AD 37
12.				DOCUMENT:
13.				FOLDER: ~~[illegible]~~ 10
14. RETURN TO CA-56				PAGE:
15. IP/ARD ~~Rm GL-58~~				BOX: ~~3~~ 2

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Folder #

NCFE

March 1952-June 1952

30 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SUBJECT: Preparation and Distribution of a Newsletter in the Serbian Language by Mr. Lazar Radivojevich.

1. This office is interested in a project of facilitating Mr. Lazar Radivojevich, a beneficiary of the NCFE, to prepare (mimeograph) and distribute a small newsletter in the Serbian language, among the former Serbian Officer prisoners of war, who were detained in the camp at St. Johann i Pongau, in Austria, of which camp Mr. Radivojevich was the chief, elected by the members of the camp. About 300-400 members of this camp are now in the United States, having emigrated under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act.

2. Aside from bolstering the morale of these people and assisting them to adjust themselves to their new surroundings, the newsletter is calculated to make it possible for Mr. Radivojevich to maintain contact with them so that this office may be in a position to know their addresses and be informed of their whereabouts at all times. For your information, this office believes that, under certain circumstances in the future, this group or members of it might be useful, and desires to see it maintain its ties through Mr. Radivojevich.

3. The newsletter would have no political character whatsoever. It would contain social and personal news of interest to the group; new arrivals of former colleagues; news of the whereabouts and doings of members of the group; questions and answers for the emigration; something about the history and customs of the United States, and such other items as might help them orient and adjust themselves in their new surroundings.

4. The Deputy for SE/PC has presented this project to Mr. Campbell of the State Department and secured his approval.

5. We believe this project should be implemented under the sponsorship of the NCFE and, to this end, we request you to be good enough to take the matter up with them. This office will be glad to

cooperate with the NCFE with a view to establishing means for control of the contents of the newsletter.

6. To set up this project Mr. Radivojevich would need a typewriter with Cyrillic letters, a hand press and a masthead for the paper, which would represent a total investment of approximately $198. He figures that he could then print his newsletter twice a month, about 400 copies of each edition, for a monthly amount of $180.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

26 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO/TOMIC

SUBJECT: Stanislaus Oskierka

1. Walter Pforzheimer called me to say that a Congressman with whom he is in touch had asked whether we were taking on a Mr. Stanislaus Oskierka. He was informed by the Congressman that Tom Myers told him that there was no job for him in NCFE but that he might be able to get a job in CIA in Washington.

2. This is the kind of thing Myers shouldn't do, and I think he should be called on it.

3. I find, incidentally, that Oskierka has not requested employment through Myers to John Shields and I will tell Mr. Pforzheimer that he should check with CIA Personnel.

TWB
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - Mr. Pforzheimer
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

26 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THROUGH: A[illegible]C & [illegible]/P

SUBJECT: Robert J. Moore

1. On 2 June 1952 you told me of your interview with Robert J. Moore and of his grievances on his dismissal from NCFE. Mr. Moore was dismissed from NCFE on security grounds and his dismissal was initiated by this Agency.

2. Subsequently Moore interviewed Bill Durkee in New York for a job in the American Committee on United Europe but there was none available. During the course of this interview, Moore, though not knowing Durkee was an employee of CIA, divulged security information about NCFE-CIA relationships, and our security people have been notified of this fact.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO;TWB/hka

Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - IO/T-HIC
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

25 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Complaint of Yugoslav Counselor

1. Wally Barbour told me today that the Counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy had called upon him to complain about the presence of Yugoslav delegates at the NCFE Williamsburg Conference and the signing of the Williamsburg statement by Yugoslav delegates.

2. Mr. Barbour said that the Counselor prefaced his remarks with a statement that he knew Mr. Barbour would reply that he had no influence over NCFE and no connection with it. Mr. Barbour said that that was what he had said and that his statement was received by the Counselor with a polite shrug.

3. Barbour did not seem unduly worried, but I told him that we would shortly ask him for a review of State policy in respect to the national councils and exiles with whom NCFE is dealing and he said he would welcome the opportunity to make such a review.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDCI (thru ADPC & DD/P)
1 cc - EE - (returned to C/IO 9 July & destroyed. Initialed by Brosso (Macomber & Hurley have seen RHM. -
1 cc - TDMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

24 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Current NCFE Discussions with Rumanian National Peasant Party Members

REFERENCE: Memorandum to Chief, IO Division, Subject: SE Division Plan for Rumanian Emigre Organization, dated 28 May 1952

1. In a telephone conversation with Mr. Prichett on 23 June, Mr. Dolbeare informed us that the NCFE discussions with members of the Rumanian National Peasant Party had been held with the emigres by pairs rather than in a group as planned. On Wednesday, June 18, Altschule held meetings as follows:

Rautu and Bunescu
Botosani and Radovan
Ghilezan and Venetu (did not attend)

2. A meeting is scheduled for this week with Popa and Bianu. Meetings between Ghilezan and Rautu and between Botosani and Venetu have been arranged.

3. According to Mr. Dolbeare, the National Peasants have been asked by NCFE to formulate a plan for a new committee. Mr. Dolbeare did not indicate whether NCFE suggested the form outlined in the SE Division Plan.

4. The arrangements for the discussions with the National Peasants differ, as follows, from those agreed on by CIA and Mr. Leich in the discussion of the implementation of the SE Plan:

a. A general meeting of the National Peasants, listed in paragraph 3 b of the Plan, was suggested in the Plan. The general meeting was requested for the specific purpose of bringing National Peasants of both groups together and emphasizing party unity.

b. It appears that neither Crihan nor Manuila has been included in the discussions.

c. The addition of Rautu to the discussions is not opposed, however the addition of Venetu is.

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

5. It is requested that NCFE be informed that the discussions were not carried out in accordance with the original plan nor with the agreement between CIA and NCFE. It is further requested that the following action be taken by NCFE to rectify actions taken so far:

a. That CIA be informed prior to, not after the event, when substitutions, changes, or additions are made to the accepted plans.

b. That NCFE inform us promptly of action taken in connection with this current plan.

c. That NCFE arrange, as soon as possible, to meet with Popa, Bianu and Crihan.

d. That NCFE forestall formal meetings, outlined in paragraph 2 above, between the members of the New York group.

e. That NCFE send letters to the following National Peasants, Popa, Bianu, Crihan, Ghilezan, S. Manuila, Rautu, Bunescu, Fotosani and Radovan indicating that a general meeting of the National Peasants will be held in the near future to discuss party responsibility in forming an emigre organization. The NCFE officer conducting the meeting should be briefed on the SE Division Plan by an officer of this division.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

23 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WE

SUBJECT: Debriefing of Harry Sperling by L. de Neufville

1. L. de Neufville recently cabled that H. Sperling, who is to be relieved as Chief of RFE information gathering in Munich, was talking freely of his removal and making comments about his replacement.

2. De Neufville suggested that Sperling be sent back to Washington for a debriefing. For many reasons, including our relations with NCFE, we would prefer it to be done in the field.

3. I therefore suggest that de Neufville be allowed to do this for us and would appreciate your approval of my sending him the attached message.

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment 1
As stated above.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

TO: GEARING

Regarding Sperling. His debriefing for many reasons should not be done here. Would appreciate your doing with object of getting as complete a story as possible but with special attention to:

1. Method of programming, control exercised in Munich and control of Munich by New York in as detailed form as possible.
2. What emigre groups are favored if any.
3. What relations are with our people, British and Germans.
4. What is set-up of news gathering?
5. What security procedures are followed in Munich.
6. What has been or is being done to determine effectiveness of programs from all angles (1) technical, (2) content, (3) audience reaction, etc.

SECRET

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

90/731

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	MR. BRADEN		
2	MR. EAKMAN		
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	DEPUTY DIRECTOR	AWD	6/17/52
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE
☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS: DDCI has asked to see copy of the paper we have for use in the event something of this nature happens.

JSE

1-9306

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 30-4
SEP. 1947

16—67704-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
3-0377

21 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Statement on NCFE

1. Here is my proposal for the final draft of the NCFE emergency statement. It is the result of changes suggested in my own second draft by Frank Wisner, yourself and Spencer Phenix.

2. Note that not all of the changes suggested by you have been adopted. All changes were considered by Wisner, Phenix and myself, and I would be glad to tell you the comments that were made and the reasons why we felt the attachment should be approved.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

4 Attachments
Final statement and
Drafts 3, 4 & 5

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - DD/P (thru ADPC)
1 cc - IO/EDMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

PROPOSED STATEMENT

The National Committee for a Free Europe is an organization of private American citizens whose purpose is to encourage the spread of freedom behind the Iron Curtain in Europe. It is a membership corporation, chartered under the laws of the State of New York.

In spreading the doctrine of freedom and combatting Soviet totalitarianism, the Committee operates radio stations which pierce the Iron Curtain; in close cooperation with the French authorities and the University of Strasbourg, it operates an educational centre at Strasbourg for young men and women who have escaped from behind the Iron Curtain; it attempts by other means than radio to carry messages of hope and of the possibility of eventual liberation to the nations which are now enslaved; it conducts studies of the laws, customs and cultures of these nations as they existed prior to Soviet occupation; and it documents the changes which have been imposed by the Soviet so that if the time should come when the people rise against their conquerors, they may more easily establish continuity with their past.

In all of this work the Committee draws information and support from many sources -- from those who have escaped and who must remain anonymous for fear of reprisals on their families at home, from those in this country who wish to work voluntarily for the cause of freedom abroad, from the American people at large, and from government agencies which, in the American tradition, give all possible aid to private citizens engaged in a worthwhile public cause.

Fund raising for the Committee is done by a subsidiary, the Crusade for Freedom which, in the course of raising money, also helps to keep before the American people and people throughout the world the need for spreading the idea of freedom. For example, the Freedom Bell, which now rings regularly over the city of Berlin, was the gift of sixteen million Americans who contributed to the Crusade for Freedom. All in all, signatures and voluntary donations from more than twenty-five million Americans have come to the Crusade for Freedom to date. Generous contributions have also been made to the Committee by private foundations; and at the request of Government agencies, certain specific research and other projects have been undertaken and carried on with the assistance of funds provided by the departments or agencies concerned.

A Board of Directors consisting of prominent American citizens from all walks of life pass upon the policies and supervise the operations of the Committee. The work of the Committee is carried forward under the direction of its President, Rear Admiral Harold B. Miller, USN Retired, who is on leave of absence from the American Petroleum Institute. On March 1, 1952, he succeeded Mr. C. D. Jackson, who has returned to resume his position with TIME-LIFE, Inc.

CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
(Attachment)

June 25, 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Braden

FROM: Jesse MacKnight

SUBJECT: 1952 Crusade for Freedom

Please see that the attached memo gets to Mr. Walsh through secure channels.

Attachment:
Memo to Walsh from
MacKnight dtd. 6/23/52
Copy of this Memo for
Mr. Braden

CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information

June 23, 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Richard Walsh

FROM: Jesse M. MacKnight

SUBJECT: 1952 Crusade for Freedom

Your memorandum of June 21 has been reviewed and the following comments represent a consensus of our opinion:

1. Phase One - The balloon idea as a fund raising device is satisfactory, provided substantial emphasis is also given to the use of RFE and other vehicles as methods of delivering the messages behind the Iron Curtain.

2. Phase Two - The idea of a message based on the Christmas theme is satisfactory subject to agreement on the precise text.

3. Phase Three - Subject to review, in light of any future developments in Europe which might affect the tentative decision, there is agreement on the use of a small number of balloons as a symbolic operation.

4. Phase Four - The gift idea as part of a balloon project is considered undesirable.

CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

17 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Braden, PY/IO

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe

1. For your information the following report on Radio Free Europe Hungarian broadcasts was received here recently, although the information was obtained last March:

"a. Radio Free Europe broadcasts from MUNICH, Germany, are more popular than the Voice of America programs and its news coverage is considered both current and based on authentic sources. However, its commentaries on foreign politics are severely criticised and allegedly the general opinion in Hungary is that whoever writes this program has not the slightest idea either of the conditions in Hungary or of the general needs of the people.

"b. There are also objections to the program of News Briefs (ROVAT ADASOK). This program is considered a nuisance and isn't even listened to by those for whom it is intended. By scheduling 15 and 30 minute programs specifically beamed to different segments of the population, such as: the women's program, the church program, the farmer's program, book and movie reviews, etc., Radio Free Europe reduces its listening audience to those who might be interested in the specific program, while the majority of the listeners are forced either to cease listening to their radios or change to another broadcasting station. As a result, Radio Free Europe has been losing its audience and the decline is especially noticeable during the program of News Briefs when the majority of the listeners allegedly change over to the BBC program.

"c. The workers are particularly interested in political news and are in an excellent position to spread the news throughout the factories. Again the BBC appears to be the most popular station. Informant learned of the fate of one Imre HORVATH, a group leader in a Textile Mill in SZEGED. HORVATH passed on some news concerning the activities of the "Political Police" of SZEGED which he had originally heard on one of these foreign broadcasts. This resulted in HORVATH being immediately transferred to DUNAPENTELE and his "group" was disbanded.

"d. The necessity for special programs beamed at the youth of Hungary is very acute. The youth of today which has passed its 16th year of age does not listen to children's programs any longer but is interested in broadcasts on the subject of anti-Communist ideologies. This is the age group that the Communists are especially interested in and on whose education in the Communist spirit special emphasis is placed. All of this age group, without exception, attends Communist Party schools and Marxist seminars and also receives pre-military training. To aid in this thorough indoctrination in Marxism as presented to them, special newspapers and magazines full of Communist ideological material are being published. It is therefore highly desirable that special programs aimed at this youth group be prepared so that they will be able to judge for themselves the true conditions in comparison to the propaganda that is fed to them by the Communist regime of Hungary."

2. The comment of the field accompanying this report states:

"An effort is being made to ascertain the basis of the above critique of foreign radio broadcasts by asking Informant if this critique represents his own opinions or the opinions of one or more friends or casual contacts, and whether it is an observation of the programs which were heard during his short visit in BUDAPEST or based on a longer period of time. Inasmuch as Informant cannot be contacted directly, we have no assurance that this information will be forthcoming in the near future, and it is deemed best to submit the above critique as is, for the time being."

GEORGE WEISZ

EE/PC/H/GW/rwp
Distribution:
1,2 - Addressee
3,4 - EE/PC/H
5,6 - RI/FI

Sent to N.Y. 26 June 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Return to
[illegible]

17 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Vespasian V. Pella

1. With reference to your note of 2 June transmitting various papers regarding the employment of Vespasian V. Pella by the Mid-European Studies Center, this matter was taken up with Admiral Miller on 13 June.

2. I agree with Mr. Campbell that Dr. Pella has received unfair treatment by the Fund and that if it was not the intention of the Mid-European Studies Center to provide remuneration for his services, no promises to him should have been made in the first place. We have asked the Fund to reconsider its decision and to try to make some arrangements for employing him.

3. We are awaiting an answer from the Fund and shall inform you of its decision.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

IO/TOMIC:ES/eh

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee (thru ADPC)
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - IO/TOMIC
2 cc - RI

10 June

BILL:

My opinion on this matter is the same as Campbell's: that Pella has not gotten a square deal from NCFE.

Have talked to Mary Newsom (acting chief of Rumanian desk, PC) on this and she 1) agrees that Pella should get renumeration for his work and 2) thinks that his background is O.K.

Also talked to Wilson Pritchett. He doesn't want to give an o.k. on this, unless and until a name check has been done.

Question: Do we meet the "suspense" and get a name check or do we go ahead. I'd be in favor of the latter---and of informing SE afterwards.

Has a name check!!
1950

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: IO/Tonic

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/TO				JWB
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

Tonic to 1

Walsh is preparing 2 copies of paper detailing complete plans of campaign.

McKnight will pass one around then we can consider the other at same time.

At Conference I indicated no balloon operations possible but indicated question of whether Am. public could be told balloons etc would be used to deliver the message could be considered separately.

I will confer with McKnight Tuesday on this. Plan as a whole seems much better than Fred Smith operation. Walsh is also thinking [illegible] this in terms of [illegible] rising – "Peasant [illegible]" etc. [illegible] in spite of [illegible] about [illegible]

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

Bill. How did you leave this matter?

Memo to: Admiral Miller June 13, 1952

From: Richard Walsh

Subject: Crusade for Freedom Campaign

I have studied very carefully the plan for the fund raising campaign this fall submitted by Fred Smith. A series of discussions have been held with the staff of Crusade for Freedom, and the following conclusions are the consensus of all who have studied the proposed program.

First, it is felt that because of the nation-wide acceptance of the Crusade and its recognized success during the past two years it would be a mistake to substitute the "Dimes for Freedom" slogan for Crusade for Freedom. The Advertising Council concurs with us in our reluctance to use the word "Dimes" for several substantial reasons. Foremost among them is the fact that our drive for funds will end on December 15th, and the March of Dimes, which the Advertising Council will also assist on, will start about January 1st. Another important factor to be considered is the difficulty of selling a new slogan, such as Dimes for Freedom, to a public which has already contributed $3,500,000 to support Crusade for Freedom, Freedom Bell, Winds of Freedom, Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Asia.

The Dimes for Freedom program not only loses the effect of the last two campaigns which gave acceptance to the name Crusade for Freedom, but also takes no apparent thought of the future of the organization. What happens in 1953? Do we start from scratch again with some completely new promotional idea? By changing emphasis every year we build up no continuing and increasing acceptance of the Crusade for Freedom.

Another danger inherent in the plan is the drive for 40,000,000 signatures. Even with the Freedom Train and Freedom Bell, which people could see, hear, touch and ring, 16,000,000 signatures were obtained. It is highly improbable that we could secure 40,000,000 signatures with nothing more tangible than the "We don't like Communism" statement.

Except for the Dimes for Freedom slogan and the usual outline of state and local organizations, the plan itself does not lend itself to execution. Perhaps the most difficult operation would be that of the trucks with the proposed huge scrolls. Their cross-country trek would be extremely hard to operate and coordinate. The weather would cause great difficulties, particularly crossing the northern Midwest. We could not depend on any truck holding to a schedule across the Dakotas, Nebraska, or half a dozen other states during the blizzard season.

Another factor to be considered is that every town in the country would not be visited.

The idea of having the trucks converge on Washington is one which I think should be given a great deal of consideration. I have no doubt but that the Department of State and specifically the Voice of America would protest vigorously to any approach that might be made to Congress.

We have come up with another idea which we feel would lend itself to the greatest possible psychological warfare usage. It would also enable us to coordinate our campaign with the objectives and program of the Voice of America.

Tying in the previous accomplishments of the Crusade, namely, facilities for Radio Free Europe, the Freedom Bell and the balloon operation, we feel that we could distribute through our state and local organizations millions of thin paper leaflets, such as those used in the Winds of Freedom operation. These would carry a message based on the Christmas theme of peace on earth, good will to men; the Freedom bell would be printed at the top, and beneath the foreign language messages would be space at the bottom for personal signatures and addresses. And the signatures would be promoted throughout the country on the basis that these messages of good will would be flown in balloons behind the Iron Curtain during the Christmas season. The basic approach to the American people would be that their contributions to this year's campaign would not only go to purchase balloons that would carry their personal message behind the Iron Curtain (we now have stored in Munich 55,000 unmarked P-20 balloons and 5,000 balloons marked "Wolnosc"), but would also go to improve and increase the facilities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Asia.

The focal point of this campaign would be a balloon itself. We have 20,000 P-20 balloons in Minneapolis. These balloons could be distributed through state chairmen to cities and towns where they could be inflated and placed in front of city hall or public square. Beneath the balloons, receptacles would be placed where both the leaflets and contributions could be collected. For example, each city committee could letter its balloon to read "From the Citizens of Peoria, Illinois, U.S.A."

Actually, none of these balloons would be shipped to Europe, but the leaflets could be air-mailed to New York on December 15th and be forwarded to Munich to arrive before Christmas Day.

Another possibility to be considered is the "gift" from American people idea. We now have in Munich 100,000 razor blades, 75,000 needles, 150,000 cakes of soap and 100,000 zippers. These might be included in the balloons. I think this idea has much to commend it. For one thing, this would give something besides words to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain who are likely to get fed up on too many messages which tell them to keep their chins up. Secondly, it provides an excellent way of countering Red propaganda against the balloon operation: Radio Free Europe will then be able to ask, "Don't your masters want you to receive gifts? Don't they want you to ask why it is so difficult to get razor blades in your country and why the free world has enough of them that it can send them to you?"

I presume that the question will be raised as to what the Communists would do with advance knowledge of the operation. I feel that the answer to this lies in the joint operation of both RFE and VOA, continually reporting during the month of the Crusade of the great drive throughout America to secure these messages of friendship and hope for the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. By thus taking the offensive and putting the Communists on notice that this is a great expression of unanimity on the part of the American people — any attempt on the part of the Communists to deprecate or interfere with the program would lend itself to psychological warfare use. This coincides with General Clay's statement in his letter of February 14th to the various state chairmen.

We are not underestimating the magnitude of such an operation here or abroad. To gain the maximum psychological benefit, at least 100,000 balloons should be used. It could be a hard-hitting demonstration of the effectiveness of the Crusade for Freedom.

Every member of the Crusade staff, including the field organization, hopes that this idea may be approved. Seeing the balloons in their home towns and knowing that their messages could reach the peoples behind the Iron Curtain should inspire millions of Americans to support the campaign financially and would serve to remind them constantly throughout the campaign of the tremendous accomplishments achieved during the last two years as a result of their personal contributions.

It is most important that we secure positive and unalterable clearance of this idea within the next ten days.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NCFE-CFA

1. I am attaching two memoranda having to do with NCFE on which it is unnecessary for you to take action. They point nevertheless to the inevitable difficulties we have in dealing with large and necessarily somewhat autonomous organizations such as NCFE and CFA. We are, as you know, charged by directive with exercising control over these organizations, and the memoranda indicate that maintaining this control is a difficult day-to-day job requiring considerable tact and determination as well as efficiency and a high spirit of cooperation. In both NCFE and CFA there is a pride in independence which ought to be encouraged, but there is also a sense of irritation with having to inform anyone in Washington about anything and the tendency to regard anyone below the level of General Smith and yourself (and with NCFE, Mr. Wisner) as in the way.

2. With NCFE, this irritation probably goes back to another era. As I read the history, the operation at that time was a backstopping operation pure and simple, and I think it was not an efficient one; certainly it had no respect in New York. We have worked hard to resolve past tangles, to make our relationships orderly and clean, and eventually to move to the point at which it may be possible to do more than backstop. I do not mean that we have any impression that it is possible to run these large organizations from Washington, but I have had in mind to build the kind of Division and to get the kind of people who would of their own abilities and efficiency be respected in a manner which would enable them to give guidance and real help in the field of ideas and policy coordination.

3. We now have Bill Durkee, Emmons Brown and Cord Meyer as Branch Chiefs in IO and we are getting some very good people to work with them. I think we are well equipped to handle the difficulties which the memoranda indicate, providing we have firm backing from the Hill. The necessity of getting this backing leads me to ask you to review here the recent Valentine incident.

SECRET

4. On 10 June, Alan Valentine remarked to Emmons Brown that you had agreed that I should be rebuked for my letter to him of 22 May. This was an unsolicited comment from Valentine, and Brown made no reply.

5. I have gone over the record of letters to and from Valentine since he assumed his duties and I have also carefully gone over the record of all the activities which CFA has undertaken on which liaison, backstopping and policy guidance from us were involved, and I find to my own satisfaction that we have done an effective job for Valentine. I find memoranda and records indicating that I have on several occasions, as in the letter to which he referred, asked for his comment and criticism and assured him that my sole purpose was to be helpful to him in doing his job. I would be glad to go over these records with you. Despite this, however, Valentine has told me that neither Brown nor I are high level enough for him to talk to and that in the future he will get his policy guidance directly from you or from General Smith.

6. At my express suggestion Valentine began writing letters to you. I realized that he was a difficult person and I knew that writing to you and receiving letters from you would give him the sense of importance that he wanted. When he wrote you, however, to protest my appointment of Emmons Brown as Executive Officer of the IO Division and to suggest to you personnel arrangements in IO that should, in the first instance at least, and in any spirit of friendly cooperation have been made to me, it seemed to me that I ought to be fairly firm. I do not think my letter in reply was in error. Even if it was, I think you should have backed me up on it. If I make mistakes, you can fire me. Until you do fire me, you ought to back me. As matters now stand, you have put me in a position where, in dealing with the situation I have tried to outline above, I shall have greater difficulty than before.

7. I have thought about all of this carefully and feel it right to tell you that I think you let me down.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments
2 Memos for the Record
dtd 12 June 1952.

CIO:TWB/eh
Orig - Addressee
~~1 cc - DCI-C~~
~~1 cc - DDI-C~~
1 cc - CIO
~~2 cc - RI~~

10 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

ATTENTION: Mr. Rick Deane
Operations Division

SUBJECT: MB 50 Transmitters

1. This is to confirm our conversation to the effect that both DTPILLAR and TPTONIC are interested in the MB 50 mobile transmitting equipment. Both feel that they can use that equipment profitably in their radio operation. We shall need a little time to reach a judgment as to which of these projects should receive the equipment and to determine its best utilisation.

2. We should like to request that this equipment be transferred to the IO Division for later determination as to whether it may best be utilized by DTPILLAR or TPTONIC.

3. It is our understanding that this will be transferred to us without reimbursement and that this will not involve the IO Division in the so-called M 50 project which has been discussed at length with Mr. Lindsey and others of your staff.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/EBB:blj
Distribution
Orig - Addressee
1 - IO/ExO
1 - CIO
2 - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
2-9832

5 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Truman Speech to American Action Committee Against Mass Deportations in Romania

1. May I urge you to read the attached commentary by RFE on President Truman's statement the other day to the Romanian exiles, which was the subject of considerable concern to RFE and to VOA.

2. Please note the manner in which RFE handled this job. The President spoke words which RFE has for months urged that it be allowed to speak. Because the President had departed from his text, it was not possible to give RFE any guidance to say they should play the President's words strongly or that they should play them down. The State Department at first gave orders to the Voice to play the speech up, and only later was this countermanded. Meantime, however, RFE, acting without guidance from us, broadcast the attached which I think might well be shown to Mr. Joyce and others in State as an example of RFE responsibility and judgment.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru ADPC)
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

2-9795

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

4 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Project TPTONIC

1. On 18 April 1952 the Project Review Committee recommended to the DCI approval of Project TPTONIC calling for the payment of $438,991 to the Crusade for Freedom for 1953. As a rider to its recommendation for approval of the project, the Committee made the following provision: that a consulting firm be employed by CIA at a consultant's fee to investigate the Crusade operation, both from the standpoint of substance and administration with particular attention to cost.

2. This proviso was made at the instance of Mr. Hedden, Inspector General. I argued at this meeting that since the Crusade itself was a fund-raising agency and employed another fund-raising agency to help it, the employment of a third fund-raising agency as consultant was comparable to placing an advertising contract with N. W. Ayer and then placing another contract with Young & Rubicam to investigate N. W. Ayer's conduct under the contract. Mr. Hedden insisted in response that this was reasonable business practice and his view carried the day.

3. Several weeks ago, with all the tact that I could muster, I conveyed to Admiral Miller, the President of NCFE, my intention to employ the firm of Harold Oram or some other fund-raising agency or individual whom he might care to suggest as a consultant to me and the Crusade operation. Admiral Miller said he would like time to think about this.

4. With kindly intent but considerable firmness, Admiral Miller told me on 3 June that after thinking it over he had decided that if this step were taken he would resign as President of NCFE. He went on to say that he had taken this job at our request and because he had been told that we placed confidence in him to run an efficient operation. He had worked hard trying to make the operation efficient; he had particularly noted that the Crusade was not run according to

SECRET

his standards of efficiency; he had made several changes in the Crusade and was about to make more; he had himself employed people whom he regarded as expert who were responsible to him to give him advice on the Crusade problem and he simply could not tolerate a system of inspection which was not responsible to him; if we had any lack of confidence in him as an efficient manager, he would be glad to return to his former employment immediately.

5. We discussed the whole problem in friendly terms for some ten minutes and it was apparent that nothing I could say would alter his position. I therefore ceased to press him.

6. May I have a decision as to whether higher authority wishes to take this up with Admiral Miller or whether the PRC wishes to strike its instructions to me.

Thomas Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru ADPC)
1 cc - IO/IONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI
1 cc - PRC file

The RI Copy of TOP SECRET
document 63466
dated 21 Oct 1952
which was removed from this
file, is filed in the RI
TOP SECRET CONTROL SECTION
1305 "L" Bldg.

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

2 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: C[illegible], [illegible] STATION

SUBJECT: Reactions of [illegible]-III on the Proposals outlined in the Hull Report.

REFERENCE: Memo of 27 January 1952 (The Hull Report)
Memo from C/IO dated 16 April 1952

1. [illegible]-III considers that the proposals made by the Hull Report should receive favorable consideration by CIA. Rehabilitation work and the semi-consular activities of these various Refugee Committees are a highly instrumental means of combating Communist influences among disillusioned emigres in France, and will help give unity to the various emigre groups in France.

2. However, [illegible]-III does not believe that this work should be undertaken by an overt American organization. The following are the reasons for [illegible]-III's position:

(a) The French public as a whole, already touchy about "Americans in France", would resent this unnecessary interference in French domestic affairs by an American organization.

(b) Should a large American organization, such as NCFE, undertake such work, the Quai d'Orsay, the Ministry of Interior and the French Services would conclude that this was done with the semi-official endorsement of the US Government. It is believed that these governmental departments would conclude that the US favored expanding NCFE in France at the expense of the newly formed French Committee for Free Europe, which has the general approval of the present French Government. This might have an adverse effect on State Department's relations with the Foreign Office, and might well jeopardize CIA's own position with the French Intelligence Services, seriously compromising CIA's present attempts to obtain permission to recruit emigres in France for operational use.

(c) It is also believed that an indigenous French Committee is in a better position than an American group to deal with the particular problems that emigres face in France, and to give leadership and unity to the emigre movement in France. At present the

SECRET
Security Information

present the

French Government is organizing a special office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to act as a sort of General Consulate for Refugees. Both the Bull Report and a report of Dr. Osusky's ([illegible] Memorandum #20, dated April [illegible], 1952), indicate that this office will remain small, and the actual rehabilitation and consular work would be turned over to a non-governmental agency. WE-III's contact with the French Committee and Dr. Osusky's report both indicate that the French Committee is to be chosen to handle this problem. Obviously, in the face of developing French policy, and the particular situation now existing in France, it would be unwise for OPC to encourage NCFE to compete and duplicate a function which the French Government has already earmarked for an indigenous organization. However, in view of the present position of NCFE in France, and its far-reaching influence throughout the emigre field, it is believed that NCFE should continue its activities in emigre affairs in France through its present Paris office, and should extend them to include some limited overt financial support to the French Committee to be used along the lines suggested in the Bull Report.

3. WE-III believes that US interests can best be served through OPC cover support of the French Committee. By properly developing the present initial covert contacts with the French Committee, it is believed that OPC can maintain effective operating relationships with the Committee, and insure that its actions and policies will conform to our objectives and be properly co-ordinated with those of NCFE. Thus OPC would seek to exert control over emigre groups and activities in France, without openly interfering in French domestic affairs.

4. For the reasons stated above, WE-III reiterates its position as outlined in a memorandum for ADPC (dated 5 May 1952) which has been approved by the [illegible], and in which it was recommended that WE-III be responsible for covertly directing and supporting emigre activities in France, tentatively using at present the French Committee for Free Europe.

[illegible] . CH[illegible]
WE-[illegible]C

WE-III/FC/G B/pl

Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
2 - WE-III
1 - ADPC
1 - WE-Chrono
2 - FI Analysis
2 - G.

SECRET
Security Information

MAY 28 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Request by NCFE for Gearing

1. Messrs. Miller and Braden met with me on 22 May for discussion of the above subject.

2. Taking into account the need of NCFE for a political advisor, the qualifications and personality of Gearing, and the availability of qualified personnel, the following course of action was fully discussed and adopted.

a. Mr. Braden will attempt to recruit Bolte to serve initially with NCFE as political advisor and join the Agency at some later date.

b. Gearing will return to Headquarters later this year and assume the duties of the Labor Desk in the IO Division. In coordination with WE, Mr. Braden will follow up with Gearing, possibly in connection with a trip to Europe in the near future.

c. Richard Aldrich will replace Gearing in Paris. Mr. Miller, who already has had one tentative conversation with Aldrich, will follow in coordination with WE.

Gerald E. Miller
for
KILBOURNE JOHNSTON
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

DADPC/GEM/mgb
27 May 1952

Distribution: Addressee - Orig.
CIO - 1
CWE - 1
RI/FE - 2
~~DADPC - 1~~

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

C
O
P
Y

27 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Statements by Ronald D. Jeancon, RFE, London

REFERENCE: My memorandum to you dated 23 April 1952

1. On 23 April 1952 I wrote you stating that Admiral Miller was going to discuss with Ronald D. Jeancon statements accredited to Jeancon which appeared in an interview in the London Daily Worker, and that I would let you know the results of this conversation.

2. Admiral Miller, after an interview with Jeancon, informs me that a correspondent for the Worker interviewed Jeancon and that subsequently a story appeared in the Worker which was completely unfactual, the fact of the interview being used as a peg on which to hang Jeancon, and RFE.

3. The charges made against Jeancon have therefore been dropped.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

CIO;TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - DD/P (thru ADPC)
1 cc - IO/[illegible]
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

Carbon copy of above returned by State - Mr. Joyce on 4 June with comment:

"Why did he get mixed up with a Daily Worker man? Such naivete makes one wonder about his usefulness.
RPJ

[redacted] SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

23 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Statements by Ronald D. Jeancon, RFE, London

REFERENCE: Letter 9 April 1952 Robert G. Hooker, Jr. to Robert P. Joyce

1. Frank Wisner passed on to me the note from Bob Hooker about the article in the Daily Worker on Wednesday, April 2, quoting Mr. Jeancon.

2. I had learned of Mr. Jeancon's outburst within a few days after he made it and I passed the information on at once to Admiral Miller of NCFE. Admiral Miller was greatly disturbed by Jeancon's remarks and corroborated Hooker's suggestion that he had done this type of thing before.

3. Admiral Miller promised to put the Jeancon affair high on his agenda for his present trip abroad. He will discuss the incident with Jeancon and he contemplates dismissing him. I will let you know the result of Admiral Miller's conversation with Jeancon as soon as I get word.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Enclosure
Reference letter and
newspaper clipping.

CIO:TWB/eh

Copies 1 & 2 - Addressee
Copy 3 - DD/P (thru ADPC)
Copy 4 - CIO
Copy 5 - IO/TOPIC
Copy 6 - RI

[redacted] SECRET

SECRET

In reply refer to: W-2062
S
22 May 1952

Dear Leonard:

In order to continue our practice of putting things on paper, I want to tell you by this note that I have been instructed by the Director to hire the services of Harold Oram as a fund-raising consultant on the Crusade for Freedom. At some time in the near future I hope you will permit Nelson Alcander to bring Oram and yourself, or anyone else with whom you care to deal, together to discuss means by which we can fulfill this requirement.

In addition, I have been instructed to notify you that after this year's program, the Crusade for Freedom budget should be substantially cut.

You will gather from the foregoing that, like yourself, we have been giving careful consideration here to the whole Crusade program and we have some ideas about strengthening the Crusade that I personally feel Oram is by all means the best man to put into effect. I have asked Nelson to outline these to you and get your thoughts. Provided you agree, I should like to get started with Oram on this particular job, a part of the Crusade program — as Nelson will explain to you, right away.

Sincerely,

Oliver F. Hadwood

CIO: TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/Log
2 cc - IO/ECMC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - EE

SECRET

[illegible]

22 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR INSPECTION AND REPORTS

SUBJECT: Suspension of Balloon Operations by Order of DCI

1. The Crusade for Freedom proposed launching about 60,000 balloons toward Hungary during Easter Week, 1952, each carrying a traditional Hungarian Easter Greeting together with a package of scarce household articles such as razor blades, needles, soap, zippers, bouillon cubes, vitamin pills, etc. This project was known as "Operation Easter Bunny."

2. At their meeting on Friday, 7 March 1952, the Project Review Committee withheld approval of this project pending discussion with the Director of two unresolved points:

a. Approval by the British of launchings from their Zone of Austria.

b. The question of including packaged items with the Easter Greetings.

3. On or about Tuesday, 11 March, DD/P telephoned to T. W. Braden, CIO, in the temporary absence of DCPY, and advised substantially as follows:

> "Operation Easter Bunny is off by the personal decision of DCI. This decision to cancel has been reached for an entirely new reason that you can find in an article on the 3rd page of today's NEW YORK TIMES."

The article cited by DD/P was a report of continued Communist accusations that Germ Warfare was being waged by UN forces in Korea.

4. The Crusade people in New York were advised that their project was cancelled and no further amplification of DCI's ruling was received.

H. GATES LLOYD
Deputy Chief
Psychological Staff Division

DCPY/HGL:sal

Distribution:
Addressee - Original; CIO - 1; CPY - 1; DCPY - 1; RI - 2

[illegible]
[illegible] INFORMATION

21 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Statement on NCFE

I feel that Attachment A, the statement handed to us by Admiral Miller, is apologetic in tone and I have drafted Attachment B which I believe is more positive and would be a better press release for NCFE in the unhoped for event that a press release is called for.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments

CIO:TWB/ch

Orig - DDCI (thru DD/P)
1 cc - IO/TOHIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

PROPOSED STATEMENT

(Draft #4, 20 May 1952)

The National Committee for a Free Europe is an organization of American citizens whose purpose is to encourage the spread of freedom in Europe. It is a membership corporation, chartered under the laws of the State of New York.

In its attempt to spread the doctrine of freedom and consequently to combat Soviet totalitarianism, the Committee operates radio stations which pierce the Iron Curtain; it operates a university at Strasbourg for young men and women who have escaped from behind the Iron Curtain; it attempts by other means than radio to carry messages of hope and of the possibility of eventual liberation to the nations which are now enslaved; it conducts studies of the laws, customs and cultures of these nations as they existed prior to Soviet occupation; and it documents the changes which have been imposed by the Soviet so that if the time should come when the people rise against their conquerors, they may more easily establish continuity with their past.

In all of this work the Committee draws information and support from many sources -- from those who have escaped and who must remain anonymous for fear of reprisals on their families at home, from those in this country who wish to work voluntarily for the cause of freedom abroad, from the American people at large, and from government agencies who, in the American tradition, give all possible aid to private citizens engaged in a public cause.

Fund raising for the Committee is done by a subsidiary, the Crusade for Freedom which, in the course of raising money, also helps to keep before the American people and people throughout the world the need for spreading the idea of freedom. For example, the Freedom Bell, which now rings regularly over the City of Berlin, was the gift of sixteen million Americans who contributed to the Crusade for Freedom. All in all, signatures and voluntary donations from more than twenty-five million Americans have come to the Crusade for Freedom to date. Generous contributions have also been made to the Committee by private foundations, and payments have been received from interested government agencies for which the Committee has undertaken special projects.

A Board of Directors consisting of prominent American citizens from all walks of life determine the policies and supervise the operations of the Committee.

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

ER-2-8556

30 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations

FROM: Deputy Director Central Intelligence

Attached is the proposed statement to be issued by NCFE in the event that their cover is blown. I am not very happy with it and suggest that we try to improve it. I have sent a copy to Frank Wisner.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Encl.

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

19 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe

1. I am naturally disturbed by the report which has reached me as to your attitude on the National Committee for a Free Europe, as expressed to the Inspector General at a meeting last week which I was unable to attend because of absence from the city.

2. This attitude, as described to me, was that you knew very little about NCFE but that you had the general impression that it was rather loosely handled from an administrative and policy control standpoint. I do not wish to go into the history of NCFE control by CIA and be accused of casting aspersions on its handling in the past. I do think, however, that your allegations may be correct so far as the past is concerned.

3. As of the present, however, I want you to know that Mr. Durkee and I, with very able assistance from members of Mr. Durkee's staff, are doing our level best to set up agreed upon procedures for administrative, financial and policy control and reporting. With the best objectivity I can muster, I think that your responsibility over the National Committee for a Free Europe is now being ably discharged.

4. I would like at your convenience to go over the new arrangements that have been made and to bring you completely up to date on the activities of the Committee, as well as to get your instructions as to a system of making such periodic reports to you in the future. This briefing might well take the form of a preliminary budget review and I suggest that the division heads of NCFE might be brought down to make progress reports to you in the briefing room. I am hopeful that after such a meeting you will feel not only conversant with the present arrangements and activities of the Committee but that they will, with modifications you may wish to

0L
14

suggest, have your full approval, and that consequently you will wish to make some statement at an early staff meeting indicating your satisfaction with these plans. Otherwise, I very much fear that the prevalent attitude within OPC which is one of general dissatisfaction with NCFE based largely on inadequate understanding of what the Committee is doing may prejudice the work that with your concurrence I brought Bill Durkee here to do.

Thomas Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
2-1200

19 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

You will be interested in the attached letter from Matthew Woll resigning from NCFE. We were forewarned of this some weeks ago by Jay and others.

We will be in touch with NCFE with respect to the form of their answer if they decide to make one.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Encl.

cc: DD/P
C/IO

C
O
P
Y

FREE TRADE UNION COMMITTEE
Labor League for Human Rights
Box 65, Radio City Station
New York 19, N. Y.

May 13, 1952

Admiral H. B. Miller, President
National Committee for Free Europe, Inc.
110 West 57th Street
New York City

Dear Admiral Miller:

Your Committee has decided that "its interest and work lie in labor relations chiefly in Europe and not in the United States."

We disagree with your policy which we are convinced is wrong.

You have translated your new policy into action by dismissing our active representative, Henry Kirsch, whose work had won your own as well as general hearty acclaim and brought great credit to your organization. I might add that this dismissal came after an agreement in Paris by your former President and now Vice-Chairman with our European representative, Irving Brown, and your own European representative, Leon Dennen, to have Mr. Kirsch head your Labor Division.

Furthermore, we had been assured by Mr. Berle that Mr. Kirsch would not be dismissed without first giving us an opportunity to study specific complaints and cause for said discharge. This promise has likewise not been kept.

In view of the above, there can be no point in my continuing membership in your body. I, therefore, herewith tender my resignation to take effect immediately.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED
MATTHEW WOLL, Chairman
International Labor Relations
Com. and Free Trade Union
Committee, AFL

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM TO: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Albanian Students at the Free Europe University

REFERENCE: Secret Memorandum dated 24 April 1952 to Deputy Chief, SE/PC from Chief, IO, subject: Future of Strasbourg Free Europe University Students

1. We appreciate receiving the information on the two Albanian students now attending the Free Europe University at Strasbourg which was forwarded in reference.

2. We have now received a report from the field which indicates that Koste Xhajanka is connected with the Albanian Legation in Paris.

3. We would like very much to know the background of this man's acceptance at the Free Europe University, including how and where his application was made; whether his acceptance was on the basis of his scholastic record alone or on the basis of recommendations; if the latter, whose; and any other details available. It would be appreciated if you could inquire into this matter for us.

4. Since requesting that favorable consideration be given to the application of Ramis Qira, we have received a report which indicates that he too has been connected with the Albanian IS. It is requested that steps be taken to ensure that his application be disapproved.

5. It has also been reported that a Kalem Golemi, also covertly employed by the Albanian Legation in Paris, has applied for admission to the Free Europe University.

6. All of these reports appear to indicate that an effort is being made by the Albanian Government to place their agents in the Free Europe University. If this is true, no doubt other satellite countries will follow the same policy. It is suggested that the authorities of Free Europe University be warned and advised to screen carefully the students being admitted and to refuse admission to people about whom there is any question.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

14 May

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Albanian Desk of RFE

REFERENCE: Secret Memorandum dated 1 April 1952, to Mr. Campbell, EE, from Mr. Marcy, EE, same subject. (Attached)

1. It may be that Mr. Dosti was aware that there was little possibility that either Mr. Skendi or Mr. Chekrezi would be willing to become head of the Albanian Desk of RFE and that he hoped his third choice of one of the Jakovas would therefore be accepted. However, we do not consider that this is any proof that Mr. Dosti has sold out to Zog.

2. Mr. Dosti is rather easily influenced and has been impressed by the Jakovas and their position in emigre circles in New York City. Consequently, there is no doubt he would like to be in the position of sponsoring the Jakovas and we believe he sincerely felt one of them would make a good head for the Albanian Desk of RFE.

3. We agree with EE/State that no consideration should be given to offering either Jakova a position with RFE and with their description of the couple; our attitude has been made known to RFE on several occasions during the past six months.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

Director's original

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

14 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe

The following may be helpful in today's briefing of Mr. Hedden.

1. RFE is presently broadcasting about 135 hours a week to Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Hungaria, and Czechoslovakia.

2. To date approximately $8,500,000 have been invested in capital radio facilities including housing. About $10,000,000 have been spent in radio operations to date over and above capital costs.

3. About 1144 people are presently employed in Munich and 226 are presently employed in Portugal at the relay facility.

a. A technical operating survey of these facilities was recently conducted by Westinghouse radio and technical experts. They evaluated as excellent both the facilities and the operating program. A copy of this report is attached.

b. The effectiveness of broadcasts from a psychological warfare point of view is considerable, as far as can be determined with interviews with escapees, State Department officials behind the Curtain, and Soviet attacks including jamming. RFE has also been surveyed by a key official of the Psychological Strategy Board with the conclusion that it is one of the most effective U.S. psychological warfare efforts and should without question be continued.

c. The risk taken to invest several million dollars in capital facilities in Germany is a calculated one -- fully recognized and discussed, at length at a recent PRC meeting. It is considered a reasonable risk under the circumstances. The understandings reached with representatives of the German government are considered to be as good as can be worked out at this time.

4. Mr. William Durkee, Chief of the National Committees Branch/IO, plans to make an inspection trip to Europe leaving May 23 to visit RFE facilities. On his return it is expected that we will have additional first hand information to report to you.

EMMONS B. BROWN
Executive Officer
International Organizations Division

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Communist Infiltration of RFE

REFERENCE: Confidential Memorandum dated 24 October from Al Freeman to Foy Kohler

1. On 2 November 1951 you told us of certain charges you had heard that RFE was being infiltrated.

2. Similar charges have been made by others. We therefore asked NCFE to investigate these charges and we also turned them over to our own Security Officers. I am attaching for your information a letter which contains the results of the investigation made by NCFE. You will observe that the specific charges made against Ingenieur Halik and Kristina Kamlerova are not answered but we believe the enclosed constitutes an answer to the general charge of infiltration of the Czechoslovakian desk, as the major figures involved are dealt with fully.

3. If, subsequently, our own investigation in which Halik and Kamlerova will be dealt with brings to light any new facts or fails to corroborate any of the facts stated in the enclosure, we will take action immediately and will also keep you informed.

FRANK G. WISNER

Enclosure
Ltr 25 Apr with
Exhibits from NCFE

CIO:TWB/oh
(8 May 1952)

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TONIC
2 cc - E.R. (1 for DD/P)
1 cc - EE
1 cc - I&S (Mr. Cotter)
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

10 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/TOMIC - Miss Stern

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Reorganization of Bulgarian
National Committee dated April 23, 1952

1. I am disturbed by the fact indicated in this memorandum that the State Department, namely Campbell, is attempting to lay down the line almost to the precise language which Admiral Miller uses with the political refugees.

2. It seems to me at some time or other that somebody will have to tell Campbell that while it is the State Department's job to make policy, the only way NCFE can possibly conform to Campbell's ideas is to appoint Campbell to deal with exiles and ask him whether he wants a job.

3. I have a feeling that this is going to come to a head one of these days and I wish you would build up a little file on Campbell and his efforts in this direction.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Subject memo.

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
2 cc - CIO

6470

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

9 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Letters of Mr. C. D. Jackson Concerning Possible Communist Disturbances Among Hungarian Emigres.

REFERENCE: Your memorandum, above subject, 25 April 1952.

1. In compliance with your request, the allegations contained in Mr. Jackson's letters pertaining to Az Embor and Ferenc Göndör have been forwarded to the FBI.

2. On the Hennyey case, it has been ascertained that the files of this Office contain considerable data relative to Hennyey's background and activities. There is no information of a derogatory nature in these files, however, to explain a refusal to issue a visa. No record appears of information being furnished either to the State Department or to the Immigration and Naturalization Service by CIA on Hennyey. OSO is now in process of preparing a reply to a query from the Immigration and Naturalization Service on him. OSO is, therefore, at a loss to offer an explanation of Hennyey's visa difficulties.

[illegible]

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
Assistant Director
Special Operations

SECRET

Durkee has original

2-9187

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
708 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington 25, D.C.

May 7, 1952

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PRESENT: Mr. W. J. Scripps, Detroit News
Dr. Allen
Mr. Norberg
Mr. Korns

After arranging an appointment through his cousin, Senator Moody, Mr. Scripps called on the Director to discuss his proposal for a "Friendship Balloon Lift." Certain materials relating to this proposal had previously been transmitted to the Director by Mr. Allen Dulles.

In reply to questioning, Mr. Scripps asserted that he was well acquainted with the NCFE Winds of Freedom campaign, in which he had participated, but that he had not discussed his present proposal with NCFE. He said he had talked to many American business men, who were all enthusiastic and were prepared to donate the variety of products which he proposes should be included in the payloads. He said that his father was an ardent supporter of the project, along with a Mr. Fletcher, Vice President of the Caterpillar Tractor Company and Dr. Barnett. Mr. Fletcher spent some time in Russia, he said. When asked whether Caterpillar was in the balloon business, Mr. Scripps said no.

Other names mentioned by Mr. Scripps as being familiar with his proposal included Nick Naradi, identified as an ex-minister of the Hungarian Government; Frank Jewitt of General Mills (which holds a balloon research contract with the Office of Naval Research), who has given him a letter to an admiral; an Admiral Miller; and a Mr. Frank of CIA. (see below) Mr. Scripps also mentioned a Psychological Equipment Development Office located in the old Post Office building. (see below)

Mr. Scripps was troubled by security problems. It was apparent that he felt he had obtained confidential information from certain government sources which he could not disclose. At the same time, he stated that in order to work out his proposal in any detail, he would need access to information presently denied him. Therefore, he suggested that he be cleared for security by the appropriate agency.

As a result, it proved impossible to nail down the technical aspects of Mr. Scripps' proposal. In his formal presentation, he had described a balloon capable of carrying a 40-pound payload and costing $5. In his conversation, he mentioned a vehicle capable of carrying 300 to 800 pounds, together with a staggered release mechanism--without

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

price. To questions as to whether either type was in existence, Mr. Scripps replied that he was bound by confidences. In general, however, he did not foresee any technical barriers.

When asked how he would finance his proposal, Mr. Scripps said that he would begin with private contributions, with the thought that eventually the program would be taken over by the government. He laid stress on the need for early organization (e.g. fund raising, balloon stockpiling, crew training, selection of launching sites) in order that operations could be started immediately following a decision as to their desirability. He stated that 90 days would be sufficient to prepare for operations, once he got the "green light".

Dr. Allen expressed his personal interest in the proposal, but reminded Mr. Scripps that PSB's field was strategic rather than operational, and that in an operational proposal of such complexity, PSB could only give the matter a cursory review. Therefore, Dr. Allen stated his intention to forward the proposal to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, which was the proper body to give the project the detailed screening to which it was entitled. Dr. Allen also suggested that Mr. Scripps see C. D. Jackson.

Mr. Norberg then suggested that as an additional aid Mr. Scripps prepare a brief but fairly specific description of what he personally was prepared to do, along with an outline of the organization which would be needed to carry out the project. Mr. Scripps said that he would do so within the next week.

COMMENT

Joe Frank, when asked about Mr. Scripps, said he had met him several times between December 1950 and February, 1951. During this period of early planning for balloon operations, Frank said that Scripps proved quite helpful by quieting certain private enthusiasts, in addition to maintaining a discreet silence himself. Frank did not know for a fact that Mr. Scripps participated in the August operation, but judged that it was likely. In Frank's opinion, Scripps is a capable person with valuable connections in the business world and sufficient financial independence to be able to devote most of his time to good works. Frank thinks it would be a good idea to have him cleared as a consultant.

The Psychological Equipment Development Office mentioned by Mr. Scripps is believed to be the Physical Security Equipment Agency, a military development agency operated by the Air Force under an OSD charter. Its director is Col. H. M. McCoy. This agency is prepared to talk with anyone who has been cleared for security; otherwise individuals are asked to approach the services first.

Distribution:
Dr. Allen
Mr. Sherman
Mr. Norberg
Mr. Gates Lloyd ✓

C:WAKorns:ms

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
2-8852

7 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Plans

FROM: Deputy Director Central Intelligence

1. In the course of a long conversation with C. D. Jackson and John Hughes on Thursday evening, 1 May, they raised a number of questions about NCFE, including the question as to whether Gearing could be made available for their work. Confidentially, they feel that Miller who is excellent on the administrative side will be badly in need of someone at his right hand who knows the political situation in Europe and the type of thing that cannot be learned by a few trips or a few books.

2. I told them that the Gearing problem was difficult, that we were considering it and hoped to come up with some answer in the near future.

cc: Mr. Braden ✓

SECRET
Security Information

6 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden

SUBJECT: Liaison with NCFE

1. This memorandum will confirm the discussion between Mr. Thomas Braden, Chief, IOD, Mr. William Durkee, IOD and Mr. Prichett of SE/PC, on Thursday, 1 May, wherein it was agreed that shortly after Admiral Miller's return from Europe on or about 7 May, Mr. Braden would work out with NCFE the details of establishing limited liaison between the Chiefs of the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian Branches of SE/PC, and their opposite numbers at the New York office of NCFE. The above arrangement would be only a complement to the main liaison channel with NCFE which will remain through Mr. John Leich. It would, however, expedite action in situations where minor guidance is required in matters relating to the handling of the Albanian, Bulgarian and Rumanian Committees and where a precipitate unilateral decision on the part of the NCFE desk officer concerned might affect adversely CIA plans or operations.

2. It was generally agreed that to establish the relationship only the following need be arranged:

a. A brief covert introductory meeting between the respective country desk Chiefs during which the SE/PC Branch Chief could outline, in as far as was appropriate, the aims of the CIA program and after which mutual difficulties could be discussed and joint courses of action determined.

b. Establishment of an emergency link through a sterile CIA telephone which would permit secure liaison in special situations.

c. Institution of a system of preparing detailed Memoranda of Conversation for Mr. Braden's office in every instance where there was contact between an NCFE desk officer and his SE/PC opposite number.

3. Should any assistance be required from SE/PC in establishing this relationship Mr. Prichett, SE/PC/PO (Extension 3974) may be called.

Gratian M Yatsevitch
GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

SECRET
Security Information

6 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/IO

SUBJECT: Termination of Contract between Mr. Henry F. Landowski and the National Committee for a Free Europe.

1. It would be appreciated if IO would assist this division by requesting from the National Committee for a Free Europe an agreement terminating the contract between the NCFE and Mr. Henry F. Landowski, signed 1 October 1951. Mr. Landowski's employment with CIA is being terminated and it is desired that for reasons of administrative regularity and considerations of security his contract with NCFE also be terminated.

2. In working out the phrasing of the termination agreement it is desirable that the following points be included:

a. The contract being terminated is that signed 1 October 1951 by Mr. Landowski on the one hand and Mr. Spencer Phenix for the NCFE.

b. It should be stated that the contract is being terminated "by mutual agreement" and that all benefits and obligations devolving upon the two parties are cancelled.

c. It is very desirable that this document also be signed by Mr. Phenix, who signed the original contract agreement for the NCFE.

3. If three copies of this termination agreement signed by the NCFE are returned to this office we will have Mr. Landowski sign and return a copy for the NCFE files.

4. It is our understanding that there is only one contract between Mr. Landowski and the NCFE, namely that of 1 October 1951. Mr. Landowski assures us that this is the only contract he has signed with the NCFE. However, it is possible that there may be a misunderstanding on this point by NCFE. Therefore it might be well to ask NCFE if they believe Mr. Landowski

to have

SECRET
Security Information

Orig to Durkee 5 May

to have any other written obligations to them and if so, specifically to include all such in the termination agreement.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination,SE

1229553

McCAMPBELL & COMPANY
INCORPORATED
Forty Worth Street
New York 13, N.Y.

April 28, 1952

Dear Frank,

I found the attached memorandum of real interest as providing a clear-cut explanation of a matter relating to N.C.F.E. which you are doubtless asked about from time to time. It occurred to me that you might like to have this as covering the basic policy used in the selection and employment of exile personnel for various branches, particularly for the work of Radio Free Europe. To my mind it provides an answer to inquiries which come to us and others as to how and why such personnel is chosen.

Since Mr. Miller is away and won't be back for several weeks I am taking the liberty of sending this copy to you in his absence. He and others at 57th Street read it before he went away and endorsed it.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

John Hughes

NCFE EXILE PERSONNEL SELECTION IN RELATION TO
(1) EXILE POLITICS,
(2) RFE BROADCAST POLICY, AND
(3) EXTERNAL CRITICISM

- I -

INTRODUCTORY HISTORY

A. *Formative Stage*

At its inception, the National Committee for a Free Europe believed that its Iron Curtain broadcasting operation, Radio Free Europe, could and should be developed and pursued through the medium of "National Councils" or "Committees of Liberation" composed of exile groups from the target countries. It was considered that prominent exile leaders and personalities of each nationality group could express to their captive countrymen, entirely without American advice and guidance, the message of hope which NCFE proposed to send. This concept was not fulfilled. Experience in attempting to weld a talented, dedicated group of exiles into a non-partisan broadcasting operation early demonstrated that without American control the mission of RFE would be lost in the jungle of exile-world politics. It soon became evident that the leadership among the exiles was neither sufficiently strong nor personally willing to rise above the political cross currents, factional rivalries, and splinter-group weaknesses characteristically reminiscent of the political affairs of all Eastern European countries. These factors militated against the original plan of permitting exiles, through their loosely organized Councils or Committees, to wholly develop, manage, and control RFE broadcasting.

Since the advent of RFE was the most important development affecting the exiles which had occurred since their flight from home, they quickly understood and applauded its implications and potential effect on their futures. Through this instrument they could once again become prominent and powerful in the affairs of the homeland; once more they could contend for place and power.

Selection of personnel for the purpose at hand quickly became a political football of rival leaders, personalities, and groups. Rightists, Leftists, Centrists, Labor Elements, and Splinter-groups argued with us for advancement of their particular personal or political views. Sponsorship of their own adherents as RFE employees through whom such views would be broadcast to their captive countrymen became the pattern of their pseudo cooperation. This pattern was followed to such an extent that ordinary progress and sensible development of our basic purpose of truly free broadcasts under exile control soon appeared to be not only impracticable, but dangerous. For example, the National Councils Division attempted to inaugurate broadcasts to Czechoslovakia under the auspices of a Czechoslovak National Council. The Council was and is made up of exile personalities of differing political views and parties. Its factions proceeded to engage in endless disputes and irreconcilable claims for control of script production and program content. Slovak "Separatists" arguing for the total independence of Slovakia sought that objective, while Czechs desired opposite views to be aired and advocated the rebirth of pre-war Czeshoslovakia. Each group sponsored and insisted upon employment of its own more or less qualified adherents upon the assumption that its special views would be thereby expressed to the captive Czechoslovak audience of RFE. Similar activities were pursued by Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Poles until the futility of permitting the exile Councils to control the destiny and broadcasting policies of RFE was made clear beyond refutation. It became tragically obvious that uncontrolled exile-world Councils and professional politicians could not agree on personnel selection or program content.

In spite of every effort to induce harmony in and obtain proper cooperation from the "Councils", "Committees", and individuals, RFE was confronted with an impasse. The alternative theory and present policy of American selection of non-political exile personnel was the only way out. It has worked. Technically qualified personnel produce properly oriented programs -- and have been doing so with documented success since July, 1950. Disappointed exile politicians, professional exile camp followers, disturbed American special pleaders, and alarmed Communist Agents all scream, snipe and snivel -- but RFE programs are doing the job.

NCFE-RFE records of this stage can be supplied by Frederic R. Dolbeare, Vice-President, National Councils Division, and Robert E. Lang, Director, RFE. The current policy has the complete endorsement of these officers and of the Board of Directors of NCFE.

B. Development Stage

Upon the collapse of the original concept of broadcasting under exile auspices, RFE necessarily utilized some exile personnel endorsed and recommended by the leaders of the various nationality groups. As technical radio facilities came into being, exiles with radio background or writing talent were required for the production of programs. This involved using individuals eminently qualified by experience to do a radio job of script writing, announcing, acting, etc. without regard for the fact that such individuals might be at odds with one or another political faction or leader of an exile "Council". It also involved elimination of proven inefficient, inept or unworthy individuals without regard for their exile "Council" sponsorship. In either instance criticism of RFE was predictable and indeed was always forthcoming -- often in virulent and dishonest form.

The day to day operation of RFE developed new techniques and long range plans which made it impossible to employ non-entities of no political color or conviction. The best people to produce programs in harmony with NCFE-RFE purposes and policies necessarily were persons known in their own countries for their views on domestic political affairs and their anti-Communist activities. Hard-hitting propaganda required hard-hitting personalities whose known association with RFE and its programs would add validity and significance for our captive audiences. Gradually, therefore, the nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich were staffed with tested, qualified exiles who had been identified publicly with domestic political philosophies at issue in their own countries. Many, in fact most of the staff people are controversial figures among their own countrymen in exactly the same way that prominent Americans are controversial in our political arena. Many indeed are members of the Councils, but are men of sufficient stature to give their primary allegiance to the non-partisan policy of RFE. The decisive factor is that there be no controversy or question about their anti-Communist convictions and records.

At this point, it must be noted that our target countries have been subject to repetitive political ferment prior to and following World War II, as well as the successive occupations of Nazi and Communist Armies.

The temper of the times, therefore, in which these exiles have lived for the past fifteen years has been one of excitement, bitterness, recrimination, rivalries, and personal turmoil -- all stemming from both domestic and foreign struggles for power. The times have produced a bumper crop of refugee traitors, collaborators, and opportunists and at the same time have developed pure Western style democrats, true national patriots, and unselfish honest men. The exile who stood by placidly through the era is not much good, however talented, as a militant messenger of hope via RFE; exiles who were honorably active in public affairs at home and who had radio talent were, therefore, the only kind of personnel suitable for RFE purposes.

As the necessity for American operational control of nationality desks became self-evident, the only feasible personnel policy was to employ properly qualified individuals, regardless of exile politics. In the execution of this policy individuals who were useless were eliminated without regard for political sponsors. This process still goes on. Similarly, talented exile personalities recruited from any source were employed wherever needed. This process still goes on. Both processes are in vogue with a healthy disregard for exile political nuances and protests. Neither process is satisfactory to self-styled exile leaders, since it follows that the appointment of an individual sponsored by one faction as a representative of its views inevitably will evoke howls of rage and criticism from the opposite faction. This is an accepted fact of exile life. We have to live with it and get on with the job.

C. Summary

Our formative and development experiences evolved the present and continuing exile personnel policies of RFE. Exile desk employees, whether at New York or Munich, must respond to three tests:

(a) Security clearance,
(b) Endorsement of technical proficiency,
(c) Sufficient stature to eliminate exile partisan interests from program content.

- II -

CRITERIA AND METHODS OF PERSONNEL SELECTION

A. Recruitment — General Principles

The best source of exile personnel is referral by "non-professional" exiles themselves. Among all nationalities there are many talented refugees who need employment and who can supply RFE's need for script writers, actors, announcers, etc. Accordingly, desk staffing has been accomplished by examining the qualifications of duly recommended individuals, whether the recommendations come from political personalities or otherwise. Selection is based on the ability of the individual to fill a need efficiently in turning out or participating in planned programs. Recruitment is determined only by ideological security, independence of exile politics, and personal ability. This is not to say that many individual exiles having decided personal convictions and well-known political records are not employed, but a positive statement is made that those exile employees now produce RFE programs reflect the policies and guidance of RFE rather than promotion of partisan objectives and personalities.

B. Recruitment -- Detailed Procedures

The personnel complement of each RFE nationality desk is founded on a hard core of dependable individuals, usually two or three people, including the chief of the desk. "Dependability" is established by exhaustive inquiry at all available sources to establish the desirability, reliability, technical proficiency and security of the working core of the desk. Sources used are:

(a) Exile political personalities in the United States,
(b) Exile references of high standing and known impartiality in the United States and Overseas,
(c) Overseas contacts and personal knowledge of our American representative in Europe (Royall Tyler-Paris),
(d) Checks and balances of our political advisor at Munich (W.E. Griffith),

(e) British Broadcasting Corporation, where applicable,
(f) Voice of America, where applicable,
(g) Special confidential sources.

These tests having been applied, confidence is placed in these initial personalities, and particularly in the Desk Chief, to carry forward recruitment of additional personnel as needed in collaboration with the American Director of RFE (Robert E. Lang, New York) and his associate officials. The leading personalities of each desk know what is expected of them and since they respond to the established criteria, the resulting full personnel complement is a group of exiles who, notwithstanding their personal political views, are suitable and capable program production people. They meet our basic requirement of daily production of truly free and properly constructed propaganda broadcasts capable of evoking the widest possible audience response in our target countries.

In brief, the mission of RFE being conceived as a marketing problem, the best available salesmen are procured, trained, and utilized to sell the market.

C. Recruitment -- Special Security Measures

Since RFE, although a private enterprise, is by extension a collateral instrument of American national policy, special precaution is exercised to insure the ideological security of all employees, including exiles. In the case of exile personnel specifically, the additional approval of the Personnel Director of NCFE is required before employment either at New ~~York or~~ Munich. Thus, even if a proposed exile employee meets all the described criteria, he may not be employed without this ultimate approval.

The Personnel Director of NCFE utilizes appropriate and dependable sources of information to determine the acceptability of personnel from a security standpoint. His sources are investigative in nature and are conclusive as to the ideological record and security acceptability of the proposed employee. In doubtful cases the Personnel Director consults with the Vice-President in Charge of the National Councils Division and with the Director of Radio Free Europe. These three officers of NCFE jointly follow a policy of rejecting candidates about whom there is the slightest doubt. It is to be clearly understood that in making decisions of this kind the conflicting interests and frantic representatiions of politically-minded exile leaders and groups are ignored. Acceptance or rejection of candidates is wholly based on ideological security and talent value.

D. Summary

(1) All nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich are staffed by individuals who have passed all tests described above.

(2) All programs produced and aired by the nationality desks are checked and scrutinized by American supervisory personnel for ideological content, audience acceptance and conformity to basic NCFE-RFE policies.

(3) These conditions have been progressively in force since July, 1950.

III

RFE POLICY GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL

A. General Comment

The programs aired by RFE are not left to whim or chance. All programs and the personnel responsible for them are controlled by a written policy manual. The manual sets forth in minute detail the position and policy of RFE on every topic beamed to our target countries. The manual is the daily guidance of all employees, both American and Exile; deviation from its rules is not permitted. Continuous scrutiny of manuscripts and resultant broadcasts is maintained by American employees to insure that there are no deviations.

The policy manual of RFE represents the considered views of the responsible officials, including the Board of Directors, of NCFE. It is a statement of the principles and purposes of NCFE expressed in operational form. It is considered and maintained as strictly confidential document, but it is of course available for examination by any proper authority.

The policy manual is in strict conformity with current American national policies as evidenced by the following quotation from Article One:

> "As a non-governmental radio station responsible to the millions of American citizens who support it, RFE cannot take a line contrary to United States Government policy or to the beliefs of the American people reflected in the Constitution of the United States and in American Institutions.".

The above quotation is understood by exile personnel particularly to be a solemn injunction against ideological program content which in any way violates the letter and spirit of American policy and ideals. It is a guarantee to the American people and to our captive listeners that RFE and the men who make its programs are uncompromisingly opposed to the Communist regimes now in power in Soviet Russia and the satellite countries.

B. RFE Policy Defined by Handbook (Direct Quotations)

1. The purpose of RFE is to contribute to the liberation of the Nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by sustaining their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-dominated regimes by which they are, for the time being, ruled.

2. The central characteristic of RFE is that it is the instrument of men who are engaged in fighting for freedom and justice. As such, it encourages resistance to every tyrant, great and small, in the countries it addresses. Its speakers speak -- as men of good will who seek to contribute to the elimination of old enmities and the building of an enduring European democratic order.

3. As a free forum in which exiles speak to their own poeple RFE is particularly dedicated to arguments by which exiles seek to persuade their listeners of all devouring ambitions of Soviet Imperialism, the cruelty and unworkability of Communist Institutions,

and the proven advantages of the democratic way of life for the worker, and the peasant, the administrator, and the business and professional strata of society.

4. RFE takes counsel with exile leaders and is respectful of their views, but its policy is not designed to further the aspirations of any single exile leader or party.

5. RFE policy is further based upon acceptance of the principle that each of the liberated peoples shall be free to determine for itself the political and social institutions under which it will live once it has been liberated.

6. Finally, the following summary in the nature of a specific limitation on program content is quoted:

> "It is indispensable that all concerned grasp clearly that RFE is a multi-national station established to contribute to the liberation of all the peoples it addresses, and not merely of one of those peoples. RFE policy is therefore commanded by the limitation that nothing may be said over its facilities to one national audience which will destroy the confidence in RFE of its other audiences or which is likely to induce any of its audiences to prefer communist rule to a liberation which might appear to promise domination by a neighboring people."

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

28 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed NCFE Support on the Exile Organized Refugee Aid Committee in France

REFERENCE: Letter Dated 20 March 1952 from Marc to Willa, Enclosing 27 January 1952 Report on the Exile Organized Refugee Aid Committee in France, from Roger L. Bull.

1. The reference, recently forwarded to us by NCFE, recommends NCFE support for organized refugee relief committees in Paris. As a follow-up, Miss Mary Augustine, of NCFE's New York staff, is currently surveying refugee organizations in Western Europe. When the results of this survey have been given to us, we plan—in conjunction with the interested area desks—to prepare a study with recommendations concerning the utilization of exile committees in Europe.

2. In the meantime, the reference is forwarded for your information.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment 1
As stated above

Distribution:
Addressees - original
CIO - 1
IO/TONIC - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

28 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Future Balloon Operation

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.

2. Will you advise me as to (a) whether you wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether you want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr from Min Miller
dtd 1 Apr 52

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TCXI C
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

In reply refer to: W-2016

28 April 1952

Dear Spencer:

Here is a brief of the material that is wanted in respect to the slave labor issue.

This is of great importance, as you can well imagine, but for your information we find ourselves in something of a box on this because having pressed for the hearings, it is essential to gather good evidence and not be embarrassed by something we have fought to obtain.

I hope, therefore, that you will give it your top consideration and let me know if you can come up with anything. In addition to the kinds of evidence listed here, you will note that private organisations may testify.

Sincerely,

Oliver E. Hadwood

Enclosures
2 Memoranda 14 Apr 52

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Spencer Phenix
1 cc - IO ExO.
1 cc - IO/TOMIC
2 cc - CIO ✓
2 cc - RI

see chrono for 2d enclosure

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

14 April 1952

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Gathering Evidence on Slave Labor Issue - to be presented Ecosoc Hearings

A. Type of evidence that is desired:

1. Scholarly studies - Laws, administrative regulations showing the de jure and de facto application of laws pertaining to labor.

2. Documentary evidence - Passes, identity cards, ration cards, release papers, etc. Anything indicating the place, name of camp, administrative documents, etc. Photostatic copies accepted if the original is unavailable for retention. Seals, stamps, and signatures desirable.

3. Testimonial

   a. Written testimony - probably in the form of answers to a questionnaire. These testimonials may be either:

      (1) Anonymous. (As few as possible)

      (2) Authorized use of the name, either confidentially, for release only before the court, where many sessions will be closed to the public, or the name may be released to the public.

   b. Tape recordings - Some excellent testimonials could perhaps be tape recorded.

   c. Statistical form - The bulk of this testimonial can also be reduced to a statistical form.

   d. No hearsay testimony is wanted.

4. Witnesses - A few of these should be presented by each group. However, the witnesses should be most carefully chosen to insure that they are really genuine, really were in a concentration camp, and not in some internment or intermediate camp, and that they spent a considerable amount of time there, without having been convicted by due process of law. Furthermore, these witnesses should be men of high caliber, highly literate, capable of presenting their story clearly, and standing up to close cross-examination, without having to alter their story.

B. **Principal targets to hit:** State is especially anxious that we assist by reaching those persons, and those areas hardest to reach, and on which there exists the least evidence.

1. Individuals: The persons that present the greatest interest are civilians, who have been in Soviet Concentration Camps since the last war. Soldiers are considered secondary evidence, as with them a difference must be made and clearly drawn between PW camps, and concentration camps, where soldiers and civilians both were put to work at hard labor. Well known persons who have testified before should not be used. The effort must concentrate on new evidence of recent date.

2. Areas: In order to establish clearly that the concentration camp forms an integral part of the Soviet Communist political and economic system, it is vital to prove conclusively the existence of concentration camps in all countries which have fallen under Soviet domination. Thus evidence is especially needed on the following areas:

   Poland
   Baltic nations
   East Germany
   Hungary
   Rumania
   Bulgaria
   Albania
   China
   N. Korea
   Russia (Material on Russia, if gathered,
   should be of very recent date.)

   The areas in which to operate most successfully, are the following:

   Sweden (Balts, Poles, Russians)
   Germany (All kinds)
   Trieste area (Central European refugees)
   Northern Greece (Bulgarians, Rumanians)
   Yugoslavia??? (They have evidence - will they cooperate?)
   Eastern Turkey???
   Iran (Reportedly, there are a good number of escapees, from Soviet Russia. These might be Azerbaijani, Armenians, Georgians, even Persians, providing an entirely new source of evidence.)
   Hong Kong
   Formosa (Reportedly a groups of former inmates here)
   S. Korea (N. Korean PW's, Chinese PW's - might locate existence of camps in Korea and China).
   Japan (Former PW's. Some were in Siberian Slave Labor camps.

C. **Organizations which should do the work:** These organizations need not have any special qualifications just so long as they are bona fide organizations. State recommends that we try to get a diversity of such organizations to present evidence. Twenty different organizations would be an optimum to aim for. They should represent different interests, such as labor groups, veterans organisations, emigre organizations, church groups, and several of them should have an international character.

D. Your capabilities: What type of organizations do you have that could organize interrogation teams, draw up lists of persons to interview, and go out and gather the material for presentation to the hearings?

What areas could the organizations you have in mind, work in?

What national groups could they concentrate on?

How much operational support would they require from us? (Money, intelligence support)

How largeare their capabilities: types of material that they can present, how thoroughly can they be expected to cover the field they are assigned? How many former inmates can they contact? 100? 200? 500?

Do they have U. S. State Department representatives in their areas to which they can turn, who would assist them in complying with all the regulations and requirements, which must be met to be accepted by the Economic and Social Council as a groupwhich will present testimony. (It might be best if we obtained a sort of form application, which we could disseminate to the field, where necessary.)

The choosing of the organisation must be done at an early date. Applications were to be in on the 31st of March, but State is certain that if they aresubmitted without undue delay (by mid-May) they would be accepted.

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

25 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Continuance of Project FJSCOPE

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 21 April 1952 regarding the desirability of continuing Project FJSCOPE, which provides a monthly allotment of $75.00 to Walter F. Kammerer for services rendered to this division.

2. Although Mr. Kammerer is used as a consultant for SE, he is called upon from time to time to furnish information outside his capacity of consultant which would not justify the payment of consultant fees.

3. It is felt that the monthly stipend of $75.00 covers these extra activities, and we should like to have Project FJSCOPE continued.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

Orig to Dunker
2 May rec'd

SECRET

[illegible]

24 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF EASTERN EUROPE

ATTENTION: Mr. O'Meara

SUBJECT: Future of Strasbourg Free Europe University Students

REFERENCE: C/IO Memorandum to C/EE of 20 March 1952,
Same Subject as Above.

1. There are attached hereto lists of students, together with biographical data, of the Free Europe University, according to the national groups of your interest (Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Hungary), as submitted to us on 14 April 1952.

2. When this information was given to us the following caveat accompanied it:

> "You realize that the families of most of these students are in most vulnerable positions behind the Iron Curtain and the information we secured from them we promised to keep strictly confidential. Of course, some of the cases can be camouflaged for public consumption but we have to keep faith with these youngsters and for that reason names can not be identified with even skeleton outlines of their careers."

3. The individual responsible for the administration of the Free Europe University has explained to us that:

> "The date of the completion of their studies in each case is impossible to furnish with any accuracy for the simple reason that French university courses are not arranged with the same exactness that characterizes the custom of American colleges and universities. On this point I can give you two bits of information. First, that in no case is it expected that any student would continue as a member of the College de l'Europe Libre for more than a maximum of three years. Also, of the present student body it is expected that 25-40 will finish their academic work at the University of Strasbourg at the end of the current university year."

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

Accordingly, we have requested that we be provided with a list, together with any available information regarding the political orientation and plans for the future, of the estimated 25 to 40 students who expect to complete their academic work at the end of the current University year. When this list is available we shall transmit the information to you.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Distribution:
- Addressee - Original & 6
- CIO - 1
- IO/DOTO - 1
- IO/NBV - 1✓ (1 cc given Nancy)
- RI - 2

CIO/NBV:bw

SECRET

24 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contact Division, OO

SUBJECT: Your Memorandum 29 February 1952 on "Hungarian Exile Activities"

I was interested in your report on Nagy and his efforts to set up a Hungarian Government-in-Exile. I note in paragraph 5 that you say your contact is hoping to receive more information from them. Since I think this situation has been cleared up by other events, I would not want you to press your contact to stir Nagy to further action by a request for more information. If, however, Nagy does give you more information, we should very much like to see it.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - COD/OPC
1 cc - IO/DDIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: State Department Paper on "The Functions of NCFE and RFE"

1. Thank you for forwarding to us the State Department memorandum on the functions of NCFE and RFE. I am sorry that there has been a delay in replying to it. The chief reason has been our effort to obtain a written statement of position from the NCFE Executive Board, and particularly from Robert Lang, the Director of RFE. After long considering the matter, Lang has expressed a desire to talk personally with you about the subject, and I understand that since the elapsed time he has had one opportunity for a conference with you on the problem. I agree with the view you expressed to him -- that there ought to be further conferences -- but nevertheless want you to know our own views without further delay.

2. I think that there is a basic element of misunderstanding in the State Department paper. That is the idea which seems to me to be implicit in it that the exiles do not broadcast. In fact, the exiles do all the broadcasting. By and large, these men are not political figures but technicians, writers and newsmen having somewhat the same training and point of view as those who do similar work for American companies. Frequently, also, exile leaders from within the National Councils are asked to make personal broadcasts. This practice will continue. All in all, so great is the exile domination of RFE broadcasts that in many instances these broadcasts have taken on the tone and coloration of indigenous radio in the countries to which they are aimed. Wherever possible, that is the aim of RFE -- to compete within each country as an indigenous national station.

3. In addition, even allowing, however, for this misunderstanding, as I believe it to be, the State Department paper presents a point of view with which I cannot agree. This is that the National Councils could in practice be placed in charge of RFE. I am almost

certain they could not be. No statement made by RFE, no line of policy that RFE could pursue, no suggestion or propaganda line that RFE could follow could be done in the name of the National Councils so long as the members of each Council are incapable of reaching a group decision or of reaching a majority decision which the minority would not attempt to subvert. It seems to me that there is only historical value in talking about what the original concept of the National Councils was. The concept has changed, and the change was necessary to correspond to the fact. The fact is the inability of each National Council to speak as a single voice.

4. Without further discussion, therefore, I am unprepared to ask RFE to make a major change in its policy such as the State Department paper suggests. I understand that you and Mr. Braden have agreed with Admiral Miller and Mr. Lang to discuss this problem thoroughly with the people who are concerned in the State Department and I hope that after these discussions we may reach an agreement on the matters which the paper raises.

FRANK G. WISNER

CIO:TAB/eh
(24 Apr 52)

Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 cc - S.R. (1 for DD/P)
1 cc - ADPC
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/[illegible]
1 cc - EE/OPC
1 cc - SE/OPC
2 cc - RI

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert P. Joyce
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Testimony of Adolph A. Berle, Jr.
on behalf of Nicolae Malaxa

1. Thank you for your memorandum of 14 March 1952 transmitting to us Mr. Campbell's memorandum of 13 March regarding the testimony of Adolph A. Berle Jr. on behalf of Nicolae Malaxa. This is to inform you that we are in complete agreement with the views which you and Mr. Campbell have expressed.

2. We feel that it is indeed most regrettable that Mr. Berle in his testimony made certain remarks offensive to the Cretzianu-Visoianu group. In March, Mr. Grew received Mr. Cretzianu in an attempt to disclaim any responsibility on the part of NCFE for Mr. Berle's statements and also to persuade Mr. Cretzianu that Mr. Berle had spoken in a private capacity and as attorney to Mr. Malaxa. This interview was followed by a letter from Mr. Grew to Mr. Cretzianu on 26 March, in which these same views were set forth.

3. We shall make a serious attempt to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in the future. We are returning your file as you requested.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Enclosure
CIO/P-D/W V:tlj (17/4, re-typed 21/4)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CIO
1 - IO/DDTO
1 - A[illegible]C
1 - [illegible]P
2 - RI
1 - [illegible]

NBV — 15 March

Mr Dulles told me this am that Cretzianu sent a copy of this testimony to Mr Grew together with a letter inquiring "how come?" — Grew & AWD lunched yesterday & agreed that Berle was way off base and Grew is preparing a letter to Cretzianu telling him that Berle had no right to attack C. as he did; a draft copy of this letter will go to Berle prior to mailing for his comments.

As AWD put it to me — 'It's in the works & there's nothing more for us to do about it at this time' —

[Gave Mr Washburn the above by phone.]

Mr Lloyd 1 March 52

Mr. Fishburne C/SE/PC5 X 3091, X 495 brought this in today: He said ~~that~~ the DD/P is concerned about it. Ellen was not in, but called in at 5 and was transferred to Mr Fishburne.

Mr. Fishburne stated that Malaxa is a Rumanian industrialist, a crook and an opportunist, who cooperated with the Communists and supported the Nazis (Search) OSO files is in progress ~~and~~ will be in Mr. Fishburne's hands.) Berle's unilateral action (~~the~~ identifying NCFE with this cause) involves a violation of State policy, will stir up the exiles who will think this does represent US policy and is generally very bad.

What appears needed is:

(a) High-level rapping of Berle's knuckles

(b) Official denial or

(c) NCFE denial of this as NCFE position

P.S. Berle is wrong in identifying Malaxa as a partisan of Radescu.

Nancy

17 March

Mr. Braden:

This is another example of interference and partiality on the part of NCFE. Mr. Berle had 1) no right in testifying in this case and 2) no business endorsing the Radescu faction as against the Cretzianu-Visoianu Group.

Major Fishburn would like the document back today, room 1201 J.

Ellen

SECRET
Security Information

2-7043

MAR 20 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Testimony of Adolph A. Berle, Jr., on behalf of Nicolas Malaxa; Complaint of the State Department.

1. Please note the attached memoranda from Bob Joyce and John Campbell, dated March 14 and March 13, respectively. Will you please prepare a brief memorandum for Messrs. Joyce and Campbell informing them that we are in complete agreement with their views concerning Adolph Berle's statements, and moreover that action has been taken to inform the Cretzianu-Visoianu group that Mr. Berle had no right whatsoever to make remarks of this kind in his capacity as a member of the Board of NCFE. You can obtain the details of what has been said from Mr. Grew and Mr. Dulles in order to strengthen and round out your memorandum to Messrs. Joyce and Campbell. (It is my understanding that Mr. Grew received Mr. Cretzianu for the purpose of denying any responsibility on the part of NCFE for Mr. Berle's remarks, which he made in his private capacity and incidentally as attorney for Malaxa.) Will you please let Mr. Horton see the memorandum which you write to Messrs. Joyce and Campbell.

2. For your information, I have recently been informed by a very knowledgeable Rumanian that, in his opinion, some good has resulted out of this highly improper and messy business of Berle's. This Berle attack on Cretzianu was partially responsible, in the judgment of my informant, for Cretzianu's sudden turn-about and agreement to shake hands with and sit down beside Messrs. Gafencu and Davila. "It's an ill wind ...", etc.

Although the following question may not be entirely in your field, I should appreciate your getting up a statement for my information concerning the present status of and our proposed future use, if any, of Julius Fleischmann. I have just heard through the grapevine that he considers his usefulness to us at an end and that he is severing all connection with this Agency. This disturbs me, as I consider Mr. Fleischmann to be an intelligent and able man who has already gained enough experience in our line of endeavor to be of value to us. If my information is by any chance correct, then I do not understand why we so lightly cast him aside. I hope that I am wrong and that he may be severing official connections only to continue his work in a more subtle manner.

(SIGNED) FRANK G. WISNER

Frank G. Wisner

cc: DDCI
ADPC
C/SE

Attachment: Described memoranda and transcript of Berle testimony.

SECRET
Security Information

14-00000

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

In reply refer to: W-2003

18 April 1952

Dear Min:

When you were here Wednesday, you handed me a letter from Michael E. Thompson about General Hennyey.

I have looked into this and find that Thompson promised on his last trip to Washington that he would give us certain facts about Hennyey's new visa application which were necessary when the old visa application expired on 21 March. We never have received these facts from Thompson.

Will you kindly, therefore, ask Thompson to get together for you the facts on the new visa application -- its number, where it was made, etc. -- and we will go ahead and act as we said we would. We can't act without them.

Sincerely,

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/Exec Off.
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - HI

TWB Mentioned above to Adm. Miller by telephone on 17 Apr 52.
eh

SECRET

April 15, 1952

Dear Oliver:

When I last saw you, I spoke of the General Hennyey matter explaining the great importance that the Fund places on expediting the arrival of General Hennyey in this country for Fund purposes. I later mentioned this matter in detail to one of your liaison associates who has these matters in hand. I explained that it is considered imperative that all possible assistance be developed looking toward the sponsored arrival of General Hennyey in the shortest possible time. I now refer you to our letter of March 2, 1952, which I delivered in person to Mr. Abramson. That letter contains all of the necessary data for action in the case.

We have just been informed that the unconscionable delay in the processing and approval of General Hennyey's entry presently will be made the subject of public protest by elements of the Hungarian National Council. The details of this situation will be more fully explained by Leonard L. Stamm who will hand you this letter. For your convenience, I am attaching a copy of our letter of March 2 above cited, and I would further state that we believe that extraordinary action should be taken to affect the immediate processing of General Hennyey by entry permit or otherwise. Our representatives in Munich are in daily contact with General Hennyey and can be of particular assistance in the event you desire to use extraordinary means to expedite his departure for the United States.

Sincerely,

Michael E Thompson

C O P Y

March 2, 1952

Dear Mr. Minett:

General Gusztav Hennyey is Representative of the Hungarian National Council in Western Germany and a person in whom the Fund places trust and confidence in its dealings with the problems of the Hungarian National Council. The Fund has been desirous for some time that General Hennyey come to the United States, and believes that his visit here would be most helpful to the present activities and future of the Hungarian National Council.

An opportunity presented itself last fall for General Hennyey to emigrate to the United States as a displaced person. He was granted a visa by the Consul General in Munich on November 21, 1951, EC Number 256411, D.P. Commission Validation Number A-7037, Sponsor Mr. Louis Rado, 182 Main Street, Poughkeepsie, New York. Subsequent to the issuance of his visa his file was sent by the local representative of the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Services in Munich to the Office of the Attorney General in Washington for special consideration under No. 8-CFR 17557. Neither General Hennyey nor the National Council have been able to determine why his case has been held in suspense, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Indeed, in response to one inquiry General Hennyey was told that the file in question had been lost. As stated above, the Fund attaches great importance to General Hennyey's visit to the United States, and considers this visit to be of high operational importance, since it will deeply affect the work of the Hungarian National Council. We shall be very grateful for any assistance which you can render in the expedition of the decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. I may add that General Hennyey's visa will expire on the 21st of this month, and he also will lose his rights owing to the expiration of the Displaced Persons Act in the near future should he not be able to emigrate promptly.

Sincerely yours,

Abu. Miller
Notes:

1. "Liason associate is Bill Knott, Alien Control Chief. — Security Branch.

2. ¶2:
Bela Fabian of the Hungarian Nat. Counil is about to write a rough letter to the NY Times.

Tom.

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. At a meeting in John Devine's office at noon on 16 April at which were present Messrs. Devine, Smith, Lang, Lambie, Braden and Admiral Miller, Mr. Smith presented the program for the Crusade for Freedom for next year, which I attach. The budget estimate is just over $500,000 and the central idea is to campaign across the nation for signatures and dimes on behalf of a pledge to preserve, maintain and spread freedom.

2. There are other ideas connected with this, namely a freedom train which will carry the scroll and dimes of the people of the United States from point to point and which eventually will come to Washington where the signatures attached to the scroll will be presented to the new Congress and the new President. Essentially, however, and in terms of our relations with the State Department, the program is intended to avoid specific mention of what the money is being raised for; thus, for example, there will be no publicity about what transmitters cost and how important it is to raise the money. Instead, the campaign will be kept very general and RFE-RFA and VOA will be mentioned only incidentally as one means of spreading the idea of freedom.

3. Mr. Devine presented the program to Messrs. Sargeant, Kohler and Compton and received their approval. I have therefore notified Admiral Miller that there is no objection on behalf of the State Department to the plan presented for the 1953 Crusade for Freedom.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Program for Crusade

CIO:TWB/eb

Orig - DDCI (thru DD/P)
1 cc - ADPC
1 cc - DDCI ✓
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET

Executive Registry
2-8530

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Conference at Princeton Inn

You asked me to remind you of Admiral Miller's request that you speak to David Bruce about his attendance at Admiral Miller's proposed conference at the Princeton Inn on Saturday, 10 May at 10:30 AM. You will recall Admiral Miller's mention of the fact that the idea of the conference is attributed to Mr. Bruce, dating back to a luncheon conversation that he had in Paris with C. D. Jackson and the Admiral.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/ea

Orig - DDCI
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

SUBJECT: Bulgarian National Committee

1. This is to confirm our oral report to you of the President of NCFE's report to us of his 15 April 1952 conference with Dimitrov on this subject.

2. Admiral Miller reported that he had presented the agreed upon plan to Dimitrov, without threatening to cut off funds. Dimitrov's first reaction was that the plan was a maneuver to oust Dimitrov. The end result, however, was that Dimitrov was to think the plan over and give his views on it in return. It was further suggested that a council meeting would be held on 30 April or as soon thereafter as possible. However, Admiral Miller stated that this meeting would probably not occur before mid-May, since the two members coming from Paris would probably not arrive before that time. A quorum would not be possible without them.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO/NBV:bw

Distribution:
- Addressee - original
- CIO - 1
- IO/DOTO - 1
- IO/Ex.Asst. - 1
- RI - 2

SECRET

Note to DDCI: I just talked to Min Miller about the Dennen situation. He would like to withdraw his objections to his overt use of Dennen.

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Reports of Leon Dennen

1. Almost without exception, the Dennen reports, of which thirteen have been examined to date, duplicate reports already received, but do not contain as much information as the reports being obtained from other sources or from the same sources as those used by Dennen. Of the reports, only one has been disseminated. The Department of State's comment on that report was that a similar one had been received.

2. For your convenience, a brief analysis of the thirteen reports is presented below:

Hungary

1. Csepl Arsenal in Hungary

Comment: This report, consisting of a list of names of directors or top officials in various Hungarian industrial enterprises, was considered of marginal value. The persons listed were identified with overt positions and have been mentioned in a number of overt Hungarian publications.

2. Report on the Activities of the Hungarian Embassy and Consulate in Paris.

3. Report on Hungarian Socialist Group in France.

Comment: Information is thin and overt. These reports duplicate in part reports already received in greater detail.

This material probably comes from persons who have contact or knowledge of the Hungarian Legation, but who have not actually "penetrated" the Legation.

4. Survey of Political Conditions in Hungary from 1951 through the Early Part of 1952.

Comment: Frankly overt material, obtained (or could have been obtained) from a close reading of published material. Of marginal value as representing the viewpoints of former Hungarian industrialists.

SECRET

5. Hungary's Productive Capacity in Relation to Hungarian Plan for 1952.

   Comment: Report was thin. Information on mines and factories was already known.

Overall Comment: Continuation of reports similar to the above is not recommended.

Poland

1. Polish Industry Gears for War Production.
2. Polish Coal Production.
3. Poland is Preparing Reserve Industrial Staff with Knowledge of Languages.
4. Report on Poland.

   Comment on the 4 reports:

   Most, if not all of this information, had been previously received through our regular channels.
   The material is not disseminated to customer agencies who have overt access thereto.

5. WIN Report

   Comment: A verbatim extract (42 pages) of a 100 page report which we had already received. (In this connection, please note CEE's memorandum of 28 January 1952, which is attached).

Rumania

1. Zhdanov Cadre School in Bucharest

   Comment: Evaluation here F3. Evaluation by State A2, but State had previously received the information.

Estonia

1. Elections of People's Judges and Lay Assessors in Estonia.
2. Some More Important Developments in Soviet Estonia in 1951.

   Comment: These reports duplicate information we have received. This is true, primarily because Johannes Mikhelson is the source. Mikhelson is a WE-1 agent, is also used by Mr. Angleton, and is on [illegible]ennen's ICFTU-in-exile payroll.

Sweden

1. Soviet Propaganda in Sweden

Comment: This report is also a duplicate. (See preceding comment).

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Distribution:
Addressee - original
WE - 1
EE/SO - 1
EE/PC - 1
SE - 1
CIO - 1
IO/DOTO - 1
RI - 2

7 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Leon Dennen

1. We provided for Leon Dennen $71,000 for the period 1 August 1951 to 30 June 1952 for a project to be operated by NCFE in Europe. (Dennen did not, as I understand it, assume his work in Europe until c. 1 October 1951.) The $71,000 included an allotment of $6,000 for ten monthly payments of $600.00 for special intelligence activities. Otis recently informed us, however, that of the $600.00 per month allotments, Dennen had asked for and received a total of only $250.00 all told.

2. On 2 April, Admiral Miller stated that Dennen's work was absolutely worthless as far as NCFE and RFE were concerned.

Dennen's intelligence reports have been evaluated as having practically no usefulness; and, as you know, in his intelligence "gathering", he has crossed some of EE's wires. In both OPC and OSO, there is such suspicion of Dennen, that no one has been willing to give him direct guidance for fear that it would merely enlarge Dennen's knowledge of our operations.

3. When Dennen returns, my recommendation is that we tell him that while we may discontinue support to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, we feel that, since we have a Paris NCFE representative, we should use this channel—or some other channel not involving additional expense.

4. Meanwhile, since the ICFTU in exile is of primary interest to EE, and of some interest to SE and WE, I have asked Mr. Bross, Mr. Horton, and Mr. Scott their views on continued support to the organization and, after a go-round with them, I will send up a further report to you.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO/KGV:bw

Distribution:
Addressee - original
CIO - 1
IO/DOTO - 1✓
RI - 2

URITY INFORMATION

SECRET

In reply refer to: W-1995
S
16 April 1952

Dear Min:

We have a 2 April report from our friends across the street documenting certain criticisms which Mr. Visoianu has made of NCFE. Some of this criticism stems directly, I believe, from his reaction to Mr. Berle's testimony in the Malaxa case. Another of his complaints stems from the appointment of Comarniciu to a position with the Free Europe University at Strasbourg.

This report raises several questions with me. I should consider it a great favor if you would have prepared for me a review of the whole Rumanian National Committee as to factions, alignments and with recommendations regarding what might be done to improve the Rumanian Committee.

Sincerely,

Oliver Radwood

CIO/NBV:bw

Distribution:
- Addressee - original
- CIO - 1
- IO/Admin. Off. - 1
- IO/DOTO - 1
- RI - 2

SECRET

April 2, 1952

Mr. Visoianu called at his request to inform us of the high lights of his recent trip to Europe. He had first attended the meeting of the Eastern European Section of the European Movement in London, then visited France, Germany and Italy.

Mr. Visoianu said that in Germany he had talked with Chancellor Adenauer, Secretary of State Hallstein, and other officials of the Bonn Government, as well as with Mr. Rober and other Allied officials. He said that the Germans were sympathetic to his discussion of Rumanian affairs and showed some interest in the problems of Eastern Europe. They, emphasized, however, that Germany's present position did not enable them to speak in terms of any positive policy at this time. Mr. Visoianu got the impression that the Germans were now, and would be in the future, even more actively interested in Rumania and other Eastern European countries than were France and Italy. Mr. Visoianu felt that France had completely abdicated its position in Eastern Europe and was entirely wrapped up in its own domestic problems and relations with Germany.

Mr. Visoianu also discussed in Germany the question of Rumanian refugees there (most of whom are Iron Guardists) and of the rather large community of Volksdeutsche who came to Germany from Rumania at the close of the war. He said that the German authorities would like to have this group returned to Rumania at such time as the country might be liberated, both because they contributed to Germany's over-population problem and because they would represent, as they have in the past, a possible instrument for German policy in Rumania. As a Rumanian, Mr. Visoianu was not over anxious to add to the numbers of the German minority but felt that a free Rumanian Government would not deny the right of return to those who wished to do so.

Mr. Visoianu talked at length with Mr. Tyler in Paris. He retains his distrust and dislike of the NCFE, which he says can never assist effectively in bringing about unity in the Rumanian emigration since it supports one group 100% and persecutes the other group 100%. He was particularly incensed about Mr. Berle's recent intervention in the Malaxa case. He said that he regarded the situation as having very serious implications not only for the emigres but also for the future of the country itself. He denounced Radescu's conduct, giving numerous examples, as detrimental to the true interest of Rumania. One of his more specific complaints against the NCFE was the appointment of Comarniciu as head tutor (or some such title) at the Free Europe University in Strasbourg. He said that Comarniciu had no education and no qualifications for the post but was there merely because he was of the Radescu faction which NCFE favored.

Mr. Visoianu saw King Michael in England but he did not indicate whether there were any new developments with respect to the King's position toward the present disunity in the Rumanian emigration.

[illegible]

In reply refer to: W-1970

15 April 1952

Dear Min:

Looking through the recently inherited files, I notice a special fund which has its origin in the Poole era. For the present fiscal year $10,000 has been drawn and accounted for, as a John Waterfield accounting statement dated 27 January 1952 indicates. You will note there is a cash balance as of 27 January of $5,578.

This is one of those things that questions will always be raised about. I know there is good precedent for it, however, in business firms and maybe we should continue it. In any event, I wanted to bring it to your attention and to be sure you knew of its existence.

Sincerely,

Oliver F. Hadwood

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/ExOff.
2 cc - CIO ✓
2 cc - RI

In reply refer to: W-1984

15 April 1952

Dear Min:

One of your employees, Miron Buterin, prior to accepting employment with your firm, was interviewed by us. With your permission we should like to continue processing papers for his employment. If you wish to keep him, we should like to know that so that we can close out the case.

Sincerely,

Oliver E. Hadwood

CIO:NBV/eh

Orig - Addressee
2 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/Ex.Off.
2 cc - RI

SECRET

COPY

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: SE/PC

NO.

DATE 10 Apr 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. CIO			12 Apr	TWB	Forwarded per your request of 2 April 1952. TWB
2. DD/P			16 Apr	CVH	
3. ADPC				CDGB	Noted - I hope we have heard the last of complaints about this lovely handled affair from RFE, NCFE, Embassy Attache etc. etc. etc. I regret what I have said before - it is wrong for us to try to use NCFE RFE as cover for covert opr. FGW 12 April 52
4. CIO				TWB per NBV	
5. SE/PC Mr. Watson					
6. Mrs. Bailey					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

Tom: 10 April

I think if I were you I would forward this to DDP with a note on cover sheet:

Forwarded per your request of 7 April 195~~2~~8

JWB

done 12 apr
eh
[illegible]

Note para 10. FGW will understand the main trouble.

N.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

13 APR 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SUBJECT: Henry Landowski

1. Attached is a detailed summary of the events surrounding the attempted utilization by OPC of Henry Landowski as a contract agent in Athens. Landowski was stationed in Athens by SE/PC with the cover of a journalist under contract with RFE to provide that organization with news of refugees coming into Greece from certain countries. Landowski was not integrated into RFE; he was associated with RFE under a contractual arrangement meant to provide him with a reasonable explanation for his income and office.

2. The relationship was not a successful one for several reasons:

a. Landowski himself was poorly suited for the assignment, and did not bring the necessary experience and skill required to maintain smooth working relations with RFE.

b. The Landowski assignment was not, in fact, compatible with RFE's decision to station a regular staff officer of its own in Athens. Since the functions of the two men appeared to overlap to an unreasonable degree, both were put in an awkward position.

c. RFE is not organized or designed to maintain covert relationships with contract agents notionally associated with it.

d. The liaison between CIA/OPC and RFE was not, during the period under consideration, fully satisfactory in this instance. Quite minor problems became serious because of a lack of complete understanding between the two organizations.

3. This division concludes from the case that neither RFE nor (by inference) its parent, NCFE, is suitable for use as a cover instrument. An agent under cover is seen in the Landowski instance as raising staffing and organizational problems RFE has not been set up to handle. Because of the unsuitability of the arrangement, and because of the security risks involved, Landowski is being recalled from Athens, and will be disposed of as securely as possible.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Chief for Policy Coordination, SE

Attach: (1)
1. As stated in para. 1
Distribution: (See mr. 2)

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

13 APR 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SUBJECT: Henry Landowski

1. Attached is a detailed summary of the events surrounding the attempted utilization by Opc of Henry Landowski as a contract agent in Athens. Landowski was stationed in Athens by SE/PC with the cover of a journalist under contract with RFE to provide that organization with news of refugees coming into Greece from certain countries. Landowski was not integrated into RFE; he was associated with RFE under a contractual arrangement meant to provide him with a reasonable explanation for his income and office.

2. The relationship was not a successful one for several reasons:

a. Landowski himself was poorly suited for the assignment, and did not bring the necessary experience and skill required to maintain smooth working relations with RFE.

b. The Landowski assignment was not, in fact, compatible with RFE's decision to station a regular staff officer of its own in Athens. Since the functions of the two men appeared to overlap to an unreasonable degree, both were put in an awkward position.

c. RFE is not organized or designed to maintain covert relationships with contract agents notionally associated with it.

d. The liaison between CIA/ops and RFE was not, during the period under consideration, fully satisfactory in this instance. Quite minor problems became serious because of a lack of complete understanding between the two organizations.

3. This division concludes from the case that neither RFE nor (by inference) its parent, NCFE, is suitable for use as a cover instrument. An agent under cover is seen in the Landowski instance as raising staffing and organizational problems RFE has not been set up to handle. Because of the unsuitability of the arrangement, and because of the security risks involved, Landowski is being recalled from Athens, and will be disposed of as securely as possible.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Chief for Policy Coordination, SE

Attach: (1)
1. As stated in para. 1
Distribution: (See pg. 2)

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Distribution:
Addressee - Orig. & 1

SECURITY INFORMATION

The Case of Henry Landowski

1. On 10 January 1951, at the request of Ops Athens, SB/PC (thru EE-1) requested an operational clearance on Henry Landowski, then residing in Athens. Landowsky, a Polish citizen by birth, was naturalized a US citizen on 25 July 1950. He is now 33 years old. The PC Field Station wished to use him as a contract agent under cover in Greece, engaged principally in PW work and in recruiting and handling other agents. The clearance was granted on 30 May 1951, and on 15 June Landowsky signed a contract in Athens.

2. The field dispatch outlining Landowsky's capabilities and the work envisaged for him described him as a free-lance journalist, resident of Greece for several years (his mother was married to a Greek), familiar with the Greek language and fluent in Polish and German, and having certain contacts in Greek government circles. His success in interviewing refugees from the satellite countries had come to the station's notice, and it was believed that under cover of such interviews he would be useful in gathering material for propaganda use and in spotting and recruiting agents.

3. The field station suggested that a cover organization be established to operate as a news agency in Athens with ostensible headquarters in New York. This agency would notionally specialize in refugee news for press and radio, and would appear to draw its main financial support from a contract with Radio Free Europe for the supplying of broadcast material on refugee topics. It was the field's plan that this news service would also furnish cover to other Ops personnel in the future, when it might plausibly expand as a business enterprise. To forward this idea, SB/PC called on Mr. Thompson, Chief of SP, on 11 July 1951 for his assistance in

obtaining RFE's

obtaining RFE's cooperation. Mr. Thompson later informed this division that a Mr. Phenix of RFE agreed to the contractual relationship proposal, but wished it made clear that RFE would not give cover to Landowski in the guise of a regular RFE employee. This was understood and agreed to by this office.

4. During Landowski's covert training in Washington, in July and August, the Commercial Division was consulted regarding the various aspects of creating a fictitious corporation, Europe News Service, along the lines outlined above. The difficulties of legal incorporation and of maintaining plausible US headquarters for such a firm, according to the Commercial Division, made this inadvisable. It was therefore decided, after consultation with the Legal Division, that a personal contract between Landowski, supposedly representing the "Europe News Service," and RFE would be sufficient and would obviate the risks of building a cover firm out of nothing.

5. During a brief conversation between Mr. Lang of RFE and SI/PC's case officer for the Landowski matter, the following points were covered: Mr. Lang was particularly interested in whether Landowski could actually provide useful material to RFE, and was told that this was the case. Mr. Lang said the desired contract could be arranged merely by his requesting it at an Executive Committee meeting of NCFE. In answer to an inquiry, Mr. Lang said no standard RFE contract form existed, but that in drawing the Landowski contract he would use the noncommittal phrasing of the RFE/Free Federation of Journalists contract, in which a definite monthly payment was stipulated without any mention of specific returns from FFJ (which, Mr. Lang said, is a subsidized organization). He was reassuring as to whether RFE's

accounting mechanism

accounting mechanism was secure enough to permit large ($1000) monthly payments to Landowski without questioning the extent of his services. Mr. Lang stated that there was no security risk from RFE's internal accounting or contracting procedure. He then mentioned that RFE planned to send one of their own employees to Athens later, probably "around the end of the year." Although surprised, since this plan had not been mentioned to Mr. Thompson by Mr. Phenix during the original discussion of Landowski in July, the case officer did not go further into this, feeling that Landowski would have three months to establish his cover in Athens prior to the arrival of the RFE man.

6. In accordance with arrangements made with Mr. Lang, Landowski was instructed to report in New York for a week's briefing in RFE affairs, and on 24 September called at RFE's offices and asked for Mr. Lang's assistant, Mr. Weld. Their meeting was most unsatisfactory, as Mr. Weld was not familiar with Landowski's background and standing with RFE, had arranged no training for him, knew of no contract, and was himself busy with preparations for a trip to Europe. Upon receiving this information in a phone call from Landowski, the division requested Mr. Lazarus of PY to phone RFE and inquire into the status of the contract, and to urge that a preliminary draft be submitted to us. After several days delay, during which one contract was drawn by RFE, submitted to Landowski who signed it, and then withdrawn and destroyed by RFE officials, a new contract was finally executed by both parties without this office knowing its terms. Landowski later stated that he had felt it imperative to sign what was given him in order to end his conspicuous position in RFE's offices, where he had spent the better part of several days in the waiting room. His training consisted of little more than a tour of RFE's installation.

7. While Landa ab

SECRET

7. While Landowski was in New York, the SE/PC case officer was informed that Mr. Sperling, who is in charge of RFE's European headquarters at Munich, was in Washington for debriefing and would be available for a few minutes discussion relative to Landowski. In this discussion Mr. Sperling advised that Mr. Rampft, the regular RFE employee mentioned by Mr. Lang as going to Greece "around the end of the year," was actually leaving in a week. As this would of course make it more difficult if not impossible for Landowski to explain his activities, on arriving in Athens several weeks after Rampft had installed himself as the RFE representative, the case officer protested that this was counter to the spirit of the existing agreement. Mr. Sperling, however, said the Rampft assignment to Greece had been planned a year earlier, and that it was not possible to change it. He added that he would help Landowski in every possible way, however, and asked that Landowski visit his office in Munich prior to starting work in Athens, for a thorough grounding in RFE's European programming operations.

8. At this point, the question of Landowski's cover was carefully reviewed by this division, and a decision was made not to attempt to put the man into Athens under an RFE contract if Rampft were going out as the regular representative of that organization. It seemed certain that both men would be awkwardly placed, and that their ostensible functions would overlap unreasonably. The assignment of one or the other would have to be withdrawn, and, through the division's channel to RFE (Mr. Lazarus), the withdrawal of the Rampft assignment was requested. RFE's reply was affirmative and the division was informed that Rampft was to be sent to Trieste instead.

9. However, upon

SECRET

[illegible]

9. However, upon Landowski's arrival in Athens on 16 October, he found that Rampft was already there, contrary to the above understanding. Landowski consequently found himself obliged to justify his position, and particularly his requests for access to refugees, as Rampft had already presented his credentials to the Greek authorities, the American Embassy, the American military authorities, and the international press representatives in Athens.[1] Landowski flew to Munich to confer with Mr. Sperling, who in an effort to resolve the problem, suggested that Landowski change the name of his supposed firm from "Europe News Service" to "Radio News and Recording Service" and that he specialize in wire recordings of refugee interviews. A new contract was therefore drawn in Munich, using the suggested title.

10. On 18 October a cable was received from Mr. Wisner in Athens relative to Rampft's presence there. This cable (IN 35284), for relay to Mr. Jackson of NCFE and Mr. Lang of RFE, stated that the Athens station was concerned lest Rampft prove as troublesome as one Ira Hamilton in Turkey. On the same date an Opc Athens cable (IN 34940) inquired if Rampft were cleared and if he knew Landowski's CIA affiliation. Upon requesting PY to obtain this information, this office was informed that Rampft was cleared and that he had gone to Athens on personal orders from Mr. Lang. On

6 November a

---

[1] In a subsequent intelligence report to Defense, the US Military Attache in Athens referred to the peculiar Rampft/Landowski situation, the obvious hostility between the men, the johnny-come-lately status of Landowski contrasted to Rampft's prior arrival, and the MA's own reluctance to agree to Landowski's access to refugees in the face of Rampft's attitude and the apparent lack of official sponsorship for Landowski.

SECRET

6 November a cable (IN 39122) was received from Opc Athens referring to the unsatisfactory situation resulting from Rampft's appearance in Athens and stating that, if a permanent RFE representative were actually necessary in Athens, it should be someone other than Rampft, who was reportedly lacking in security sense and said to be a heavy drinker. Through the case officer assigned to this matter, this division thereupon requested Mr. Braden's help in learning from RFE how much Rampft knew of Landowski's covert activities, whether Rampft would conduct his own work in a manner acceptable to the CIA Senior Representative in Athens, Mr. John Baker, and whether Rampft had been instructed to cooperate with Landowski without attempting to oversee his activities. No answer has been received to these queries.

11. Late in November the division was advised by Security that unspecified derogatory information had been received regarding Landowski; the field station was consequently instructed to hold up his use pending fuller information. Early in January, upon receiving an adverse completed report from Security, the field was instructed to return Landowski to Washington for termination. It was considered unwise to inform Landowski, while still in Greece, of the reason underlying his recall; he has consequently been told that the dual RFE representation in Athens (Rampft and Landowski) was no longer workable and that RFE had insisted on keeping its own man. He believes that a new RFE assignment may be possible for him after his return here late this month (his trip has been delayed by his mother's recent death in Athens).

12. The Landowski problem has now become one of recall and disposal. Quite aside from the RFE relationship, the man has not performed well,

SECRET

has not

has not handled his affairs in a secure or professional manner, and is not wanted by the field station. The division plans to terminate him, read him out of any connection with RFE, and arrange that he be placed with a commercial firm for employment as a junior public relations man. Simple dismissal is not regarded as secure; continued employment by the Agency is undesirable, hence the need to find him employment of sorts until his familiarity with CIA activities has cooled.

SECRET B147 P-582 L-217

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

2-7861

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: CIO

NO. 20/959 68829

DATE 8 April 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DD/P Col. Taylor.		10 April		Taylor
2. [redacted]				
3. ER				
4. ~~GPY/OPC~~				
5. DCPY		17 April	18 April	JHK
6. C-20				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

[redacted]

[redacted]

Mr. Brewer:
George:

FGW asks that you attempt to get from State the information which Tom braden asks for. He asks that I bring to your attention the following 2 points:

a. The Director does not feel it would be advisable to launch any balloon operations until after the BW campaign has died down a bit.

b. The British, through Adam Watson. have raised the question of balloon operations with FGW and want to discuss these operations during the fortcoming PC-State meetings on policy.

P. Taylor, 3rd

5&6- Cofer me talk - JHK

I will call O'Meara

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

P-2232

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
2-7861

8 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Letter from Admiral Miller

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.

2. Can you take the time to get a policy decision from the State Department as to (a) whether they wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether they want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time?

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr from Adm Miller 1 Apr 52.

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressees
1 cc - ADPC
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

April 1, 1952

Dear Oliver:

We need to get a firm commitment with respect to the Crusade's next balloon operation.

Our best target from the point of view of geography and RFE radio coverage is Czechoslovakia. We can go into Poland and Hungary somewhat less efficiently. If Hungary should be the target, we will presumably still have the problem of clearance from the British to launch from their Zone, and failing that should have to back up to our Zone.

We need an absolute minimum of three months to prepare a balloon operation; the longer notice the better. A date of special significance to the target country is perhaps of some slight additional desirability from the psychological point of view. It is, however, not essential. From the point of view of our campaign schedule, an initial launching date of about August 20th would be ideal. This would allow the story on the operation and its effect to become known at the opening of our September campaign.

We have in storage in Munich 50,000 packages (of two each) of razor blades, 100,000 zippers, 72,000 packets of needles (five to the packet), and 150,000 cakes of soap (1/2, 3/4 and one ounce sizes). All of the above except needles were donations to the Crusade, and the needles were at cost. We have had to tell Gillette and Talon twice (at Christmas and at Easter) that the operation for which they supplied their products had been delayed. We should very much regret having to do this again.

I do not know what keeps putting this off the track. It is my information that the boys in the big house were initially enthusiastic about the idea, and the record will show that Ambassador Briggs thought it most valuable in Czechoslovakia, witness his special request that this means of communication be used at the time of the Czech Freedom Train break-out.

I would appreciate your getting us as soon as possible a positive and (barring an act of God) irrevocable approval for a balloon operation into a specified target country at a certain date, with agreement in principal on the nature of the operation -- i.e., of an order of magnitude of 60,000 to 75,000 vehicles, bearing the above mentioned materials together with messages. To repeat, by far the best target is Czechoslovakia; our preferred date: around August 20th.

Let us not make this approval in principle (with firm date and target) contingent on a budget, except in a general way. With an approval in hand, we can proceed with plans and supply a fairly accurate budget, which will depend somewhat on such things as whether we can use the P-20 balloons on hand for the short flight to Prague or whether we will have to resort to P-50's for the longer flight into Poland or from the U.S. Zone of Austria into Hungary.

Sincerely,

/s/ Leonard

[illegible]

Very hard to figure [illegible] by Sept [illegible]

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

28 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, EE-2

SUBJECT: Future Balloon Operation

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.

2. Will you advise me as to (a) whether you wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether you want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr from Min Miller
dtd 1 Apr 52.

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TOMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

7 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Labor Service Companies

The exact text of a 27 March 1952 letter from the Political Advisor of RFE at Munich to the President of NCFE is supplied below for your information.

"This is in respect to the various Labor Service Companies made up of Eastern European exiles now existing in Germany.

"There have been Polish Labor and Guard Companies ever since the war and these are what their name implies. There have been set up, however, within the last year Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Labor Service Companies here. These latter two represent an activity with which our friends are directly involved. I have been informed by them upon my inquiry that should any reference be made by satellite propaganda to these companies it is desired that in any RFE comment upon it that these companies should be treated as being what their name implies.

"The Czechoslovak Company included both Czechs and Slovaks, although I understand that the Slovak Separatists here make violent efforts to have a separate one for themselves. The Bulgarian Company is at present made up almost entirely of adherents of Dimitrov. Further recruiting, however, in this respect is now going on with a policy of barring both Bulgarian National Front and Dimitrov followers.

"I am also informed by my friends here that active planning is now under way in respect to the Kersten Amendment. I should much appreciate it if we could keep informed of any developments in this respect here for possible use in RFE broadcasts and for conversations with friends."

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

cc: SE
EE

CIO/MEV:bw
Distribution:
Addressee - 1 IO/DOTO - 1
CIO - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

C
O
Y

STRICTLY PRIVATE

27 March 1952

Dear Admiral Miller:

This is in respect to the various Labor Service Companies made up of Eastern European exiles now existing in Germany.

There have been Polish Labor and Guard Companies ever since the war and these are what their name implies. There have been set up, however, within the last year Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Labor Service Companies here. These latter two represent an activity with which our friends are directly involved. I have been informed by them upon my inquiry that should any reference be made by satellite propaganda to these companies it is desired that in any RFE comment upon it that these companies should be treated as being what their name implies.

The Czechoslovak Company included both Czechs and Slovaks, although I understand that the Slovak Separatists here make violent efforts to have a separate one for themselves. The Bulgarian Company is at present made up almost entirely of adherents of Dimitrov. Further recruiting, however, in this respect is now going on with a policy of barring both Bulgarian National Front and Dimitrov followers.

I am also informed by my friends here that active planning is now under way in respect to the Kersten Amendment. I should much appreciate it if we could keep informed of any developments in this respect here for possible use in RFE broadcasts and for conversations with friends.

Sincerely,

/s/ BILL

W. E. Griffith

cc: Mr. Leich
Mr. Galantiere

SECRET
Security Information

ER-2-7715

5 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

FROM : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : National Committee for a Free Europe - Radio Free Europe - Miscellaneous Recommendations for Action

REFERENCE : Memorandum from C/IO to D/DCI, DD/P and ADPC dated 27 March 1952

1. I have read the reference memorandum which I note contains quite a number of recommendations for action, some of which apply to the undersigned.

2. I would like to participate in the Princeton bull session but believe it unnecessary for CIA to be represented by so many people. If Mr. Dulles is going I should prefer to drop out. A further reason for reluctance on my part to attend this meeting is that I have already passed on to the NCFE people interested all of the ideas and information which I have on the principal theme of this discussion. I therefore feel that, until after the forthcoming meeting with the British or the development of the Psychological Strategy Paper, which is being laboriously ground out by Admiral Stevens' Ad Hoc Committee, I would have nothing new to contribute. However, if Mr. Dulles is unable to attend and you feel that I should go, I would be willing to do so.

3. Concerning your report of Frank Altschul's feeling of grievance, I should be glad to sign a letter to him if Mr. Dulles agrees that I am the proper person to do this. Pending Mr. Dulles' consideration of this matter, will you please prepare in draft form for my signature a friendly letter to Mr. Altschul in which you might comment upon the fact that NCFE-RFE now represents one of the most potent weapons in our entire arsenal, and following with an acknowledgement of the very important contribution which Mr. Altschul made toward the development and shaping of this instrument.

~~Nancy - will you [illegible]~~

Overtaken by Mr. Dulles's letter of 31 March 52 a copy of which you have.

SECRET
Security Information

4. I am somewhat confused by the contents of the action paragraph following paragraph 3, in which you indicate that we are continuing to urge NCFE to extend cover assistance to the Kirk Committee. On the basis of our most recent conversations with Mr. Dulles and Admiral Miller, I was under the impression that you were trying to dig up some other forms of cover - particularly in view of the reluctance of the NCFE Board to extend the Crusade cover to the Kirk Committee. Perhaps this paragraph of the reference memorandum has been overtaken by events. — yes.

5. I understand that you are getting up a memorandum on the Landowsky case. I am relieved to hear that Landowsky has been recalled from Greece and that it is not intended to have him return.

\ N.B.V.

Done 11Apr52 nb ✓

Frank G. Wisner
FRANK G. WISNER

cc: DDCI (with reference memorandum)

This comes up
at PRC – or
is scheduled on
Friday. After
that, we need
to advise Admiral
to apply to 1848
– if PRC
approves, that is

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PROCEDURE FOR TPMEDIC TRANSFERS

2 April 52

Step 1.

a. Facility (TPTONIC, PILLAR or what have you) sends letter of request to MEDIC.

b. Facility sends certified true copy of request (1a.) to IO (via area division involved if not for TPTONIC as set forth in Step 2 below).

Step 2. FOR TPTONIC only (Includes BGCAKEBOX)

a. IO prepares letter for ADPC's signature, addressed to MEDIC, authorizing MEDIC to transfer funds requested by TONIC to TONIC on basis of 1a. above if request is in order.

b. MEDIC receives letter of authority (2a.).

c. MEDIC transfers funds to TONIC on basis of 2b. and at the same time prepares a letter of transmittal addressed to TONIC, copy to IO.

d. TONIC, upon receipt of funds from MEDIC (2c.), prepares a letter of acknowledgment addressed to MEDIC, certified true copy to IO.

e. IO prepares letter addressed to CFD, signed by IO, transmitting receipts 2d. together with certified true copy of letter 2a. (See 2f below).

f. IO prepares letter addressed to CFD, signed by CIO, requesting CFD to reimburse MEDIC for the total amount of receipts 2e. Note: Letters 2e and 2f are hand carried to CFD together.

g. CFD, on basis of 2f transfers funds to MEDIC.

h. MEDIC acknowledges receipt of 2g by letter to IO.

Step 3. FOR OTHER THAN TPTONIC and BGCAKEBOX (after Step 1)

a. Area division authorizes CFD to transfer funds from "XXX" Project to MEDIC for transfer to facility by letter, signed by appropriate area division chief. (Note: This letter comes to IO whose responsibility it is to determine that funds are available in "XXX" Project).

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Step 3. FOR OTHER THAN TPTONIC AND BGCAKEBOX (CONTINUED)

b. IO prepares letter to CFD with letter 3a attached for ADPC's signature requesting CFD to transfer funds to MEDIC. (See 3c. below).

c. At same time letter 3b. is prepared, a letter for ADPC's signature is prepared by IO authorizing MEDIC to transmit the funds to facility(addressed to MEDIC).

d. MEDIC receives letter of authority 3c.

e. MEDIC acknowledges receipt of funds which CFD transmits(3b)

f. MEDIC transfdrs funds to facility on basis of 3d and at the same time sends letter of transmittal to facility, copy to IO.

g. Facility, upon receipt of funds from MEDIC, prepares a letter,addressed to MEDIC, acknowledging receipt of funds 3f., certified true copy to IO.(See 1b.)

h. IO upon receipt of letter 3g. prepares letter addressed to CFD and transmitts same together with copy of letter (certified true copy) 3c.

NOTE: It will be the responsibility of the Administrative Office/IO to verify that funds are in fact allotted for each project before preparing the above papers.

PAM

Distribution:
EXO/IO - Original
Adm O/IO - 1 copy
PY/Maggio - 1 copy

SECRET

SECRET

Provisions of Proposed Agreement Between NCFE and CIA

It is proposed that an agreement which will include the following be entered into by NCFE and CIA.

1. A statement to the effect that subject to the security, program, budgetary, and policy controls and the veto authority of CIA set forth below, NCFE has administrative and operational responsibility for the conduct of its operations.

2. A provision that NCFE will submit to CIA an annual operating plan and supporting budget for the programs which it plans to undertake during each fiscal year. The approval of such operating program and budget by CIA will include authority to NCFE to proceed as necessary in their judgment to accomplish the objectives set forth in the approved program, subject to controls set forth below.

3. A provision that NCFE will maintain adequate accounting and fiscal controls.

4. A provision that NCFE will undertake only those programs which have been approved by CIA.

5. A provision that CIA will provide funds to NCFE for approved programs.

6. A provision that CIA will furnish national policy guidance to NCFE for the conduct of such programs and that NCFE will conform to such policy.

7. A provision that NCFE will conform to security regulations to be prescribed by CIA. These will include the security clearance of necessary personnel, obtaining of security agreements from all witting personnel, and necessary physical security measures.

8. A provision to the effect that the general organizational structure and salary scales including allowances will be approved by CIA.

9. A provision that the president and vice-presidents of NCFE will be employed subject to the concurrence of CIA.

SECURITY INFORMATION

10. A provision that CIA we will have veto authority over activities to be undertaken by NCFE which are contrary to other of CIA our or national policies. (it is expected that this would seldom if ever, have to be exercised)

11. A provision with respect to the termination of operations under this agreement.

12. A provision with respect to indemnification of NCFE your directors, officers, and employees by CIA us.

13. A provision that defines the our liability ~~of CIA~~ to each director, officer, and employee of NCFE your.

14. A provision to the effect that NCFE you will provide CIA us with regular progress and financial reports.

15. A provision that CIA we will have authority to conduct such surveys and audits of NCFE your activities as it deems necessary.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE

Problem

To clarify the relationship of NCFE to CIA and the respective responsibilities and authorities of each for the conduct of NCFE operations.

Background

There is no currently effective clear statement as to the respective responsibilities and authorities of NCFE and CIA for the conduct of operations. This has resulted in a number of misunderstandings and problems with respect to the administration of this project by CIA.

Discussion

In order to define the respective responsibilities and authorities of NCFE and CIA, it is proposed that an agreement be entered into between NCFE and CIA which will in effect provide for:

a. Policy, program, budgetary, security control, and veto power by CIA.

b. Subject to such general controls direct administrative and operational control over its operations by NCFE.

c. The working out of machinery for submitting annual operating programs and supporting budgets by NCFE for approval by CIA (and major subsequent additions thereto)

d. Adequate progress, financial, and other reports by NCFE to CIA.

An outline of the principal provisions of such an agreement is set forth in Attachment A.

It is the consensus of all concerned in CIA that something like the above is essential. There is one technical point of difference, however, between the IO Division and the Administrative Staff Special. This is the matter of a CIA regulation (Memorandum for All Staff and Division Chiefs

Subject: Categories of Personnel (From: John W. Corris) to the effect that all witting personnel of CIA proprietary organizations must have a contract relationship with CIA. The underlying reasons for this requirement are (1) general control, (2) security control, and (3) to provide a basis for establishing a legal liability to such personnel in the event of a claim of any kind. It is the view of the IO Division that the above three requirements could be better and more cleanly met by one agreement between CIA and NCFE, rather than by several separate agreements between witting individuals and CIA.

The office of the General Counsel, CIA, has indicated informally that there is no legal objection to such an agreement between NCFE and CIA. He also concurs informally that one contract between NCFE and CIA is preferable to several contracts between individuals and CIA.

Recommendation

1. It is therefore recommended that the IO Division be authorized to negotiate an agreement with NCFE in coordination with the office of General Counsel and other CIA units which will incorporate the substance of the provisions in Attachment A.

2. It is also recommended that the DCI or other appropriate CIA authority set aside the agency regulation requiring that all witting personnel of proprietary projects be required to execute a contract with CIA.

Mr Braden —

At last — here's the answer to the State Paper on RFE. Sorry for the delay. Please let me know if it's OK w. you —

I do think that our difference w. State on this is very basic — and that we can't continue to operate on 2 different premises. May be this should be thrashed out in a high level policy meeting.

Ellen

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

C
O
P
Y

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Joyce January 23, 1952.

FROM: EE - Mr. Barbour

The Functions of NCFE and RFE

In our experience with NCFE and RFE two interpretations of their functions, between which the pendulum swings from time to time, have developed. One which is set forth in the paper in the mission of NCFE and RFE, gives dignity and importance to the National Councils as the leadership organs of the Eastern European peoples in their struggle against the respective Communist dictatorships and defines the principal function of RFE as providing a way of communication between these councils and the homelands in conducting the liberation struggle. In the other view, which tends to govern RFE operations at the present time, the RFE is apparently considered a predominantly American enterprise with the objective of achieving a bigger, better, more hard-hitting, and more publicized propaganda program than the VOA but not differing fundamentally from the character and course that VOA has already marked out. The latter interpretation reduces the position of exiles connected with the RFE to that of professional employees engaged by the Americans, and the National Councils are given no direct responsibilities.

As between these two theses, EE agrees generally with the first. If RFE continues along its present course it will in our opinion become in the end simply another VOA (in fact the programming of the two organizations tends already to seek a common denominator) and disappoint the exiles and the peoples in their homelands. This will lead to competitive issues with VOA as is already the case with the Baltic language programs. If RFE is to achieve its first promise and full justification it must become the Voice of Eastern European freedom speaking through the mouths of the Eastern European leaders themselves.

EE believes that unless the RFE broadcasts are made in the name of the National Councils and the free exile leaders of Eastern Europe can speak regularly to their people by this medium the National Councils will never become more than creatures of arrested development and, deprived of the possibility of realizing one of their most important functions, will preoccupy themselves with sterile partisan rivalry and internal differences.

As the reference memorandum points out, if the National Councils are to assume this important responsibility in relation to the RFE they must become effective organizations. EE likewise agrees that the

Hungarian National Council, being the only National Council which is active in any degree as a unified and effective leadership group, should be given the proposed RFE responsibilities at once and that as soon as the other national groups become effective organizations RFE facilities should be made available to them.

Such a course raises two problems which do not seem sufficiently treated in the reference paper, namely (1) the means of bringing about the formation of unified and effective National Councils, and (2) the extent and character of supervision to be exercised over National Councils once they undertake RFE activities.

EE concurs that NCFE should devote itself as a priority and primary function to fostering the creation of effective National Councils. The reference paper suggests that to this end NCFE give more attention to the problem and take more positive measures in the nature of intervention in assisting the national groups to solve their difficulties. It seems to EE that by the very nature of the arrangement whereby the National Councils operate in the American milieu and receive financial assistance from the NCFE intervention is inevitable and that the NCFE has not refrained from intervening. The problem apparently is not whether the NCFE should intervene in the affairs of the National Councils but what kind of intervention should prevail. EE continues to believe that the ideal situation obtains when a National Council operates effectively with the least possible intervention, and that a national group should be encouraged to achieve effective organization and operations through its own efforts. Excessive intervention and certain types of intervention can produce such harm as to defeat the very purpose we seek to realize, that is, the development of strong, dignified, and important leadership organizations to conduct the national liberation effort from abroad. The wrong types of intervention inimical to this objective include actions which are widely construed as(1) being in favor of, or in opposition to, one candidate or party as against another in the organization of a National Council, (2) representing an attempt to impose a policy with respect to the future constitutional organization of a state or in relation to foreign states or foreign population groups, or (3) relegating exile leaders to a subordinate position of being employees of the Americans. Intervention of the foregoing types must be avoided by all means, yet on the other hand it is essential to assure, by intervention if necessary, that no National Council falls under dictatorial rule and that individuals are held to accountability so that our undertaking does not degenerate into simply a pensionary system for subsidizing the conduct of party politics.

The strongest force in inducing the national exile groups to pull themselves together into some kind of unified and active councils may well be our insistence that until they do so they will not become eligible to take over the proposed RFE responsibilities. If one National Council receives access to RFE facilities this should prove an incentive to the others without our intervention to put themselves in order so that they may do the same.

As to the supervision to be exercised over the National Councils which have taken charge of the broadcasting efforts to their respective homelands, it is obvious that they will need extensive professional assistance, whether by Americans or by their own nationals, in preparing the day-to-day programs. The councils will probably wish of their own initiative, after they have discovered what daily programming involves, not to go behond (a) policy determination as to type of programming, (b) utilization by the political and intellectual exile leaders of the opportunity to speak from time to time to their people, and (c) decision on selection of certain program items. If this assumption is correct then our controls might properly be limited to (1) providing each group a recorded outline of American foreign policy for guidance if they discuss any phase of this subject or its implications, (2) preventing partisan abuses such as the disproportionate use of the RFE by one party although making sure that the representatives of each may have access to RFE facilities if ~~[illegible]~~ party representatives so wish, and (3) conducting an ex post facto review of programs in avoiding abuses of any type. In general it would be desirable to allow the councils the maximum scope of activity and responsibility in the RFE effort they are capable of undertaking in order to nurse the health and vitality of these councils as leadership organizations in the liberation struggle.

EUR:EE:HCVedeler/nl
January 23, 1952

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONF TIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Mr Braden	JNB	
2	[illegible]TONIC- Personnel		
3	File Our Office		
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1			
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

REMARKS: Tom: Adm H. left this with us. We have all read. Also John Shields has read. He suggested that we keep - instead of his retaining it in his file. Nancy

O.K. It's a good paper.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

April 1, 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Admiral Miller

FROM: Mr. Myers

Attached is presentation describing our exile personnel policy. This paper is prepared in two parts, the second part of which is not yet in type. The part delivered herewith is, I feel, a precise rebuttal of any overall uninformed criticism to which we have been subjected.

In every instance where there has been specific criticism involving individuals employed at New York or Munich we are in a position to rebut charges of Communist infiltration and to defend every member of the staff thus attacked.

Upon the impression that it is an adequate statement in writing, it can be delivered, if you so desire, to Mr. Ehrans for a study and contrast with the supposed allegations he presumably has under scrutiny. Should Ehrans ask for information of a specific nature, Part Two of this paper can then be furnished him if you wish to do so.

NCFE EXILE PERSONNEL SELECTION IN RELATION TO
(1) EXILE POLITICS,
(2) RFE BROADCAST POLICY, AND
(3) EXTERNAL CRITICISM

- I -

INTRODUCTORY HISTORY

A. Formative Stage

At its inception, the National Committee for a Free Europe believed that its Iron Curtain broadcasting operation, Radio Free Europe, could and should be developed and pursued through the medium of "National Councils" or "Committees of Liberation" composed of exile groups from the target countries. It was considered that prominent exile leaders and personalities of each nationality group could express to their captive countrymen, entirely without American advice and guidance, the message of hope which NCFE proposed to send. This concept was not fulfilled. Experience in attempting to weld a talented, dedicated group of exiles into a non-partisan broadcasting operation early demonstrated that without American control the mission of RFE would be lost in the jungle of exile-world politics. It soon became evident that the leadership among the exiles was neither sufficiently strong nor personally willing to rise above the political cross currents, factional rivalries, and splinter-group weaknesses characteristically reminiscent of the political affairs of all Eastern European countries. These factors militated against the original plan of permitting exiles, through their loosely organized Councils or Committees, to wholly develop, manage, and control RFE broadcasting.

Since the advent of RFE was the most important development affecting the exiles which had occurred since their flight from home, they quickly understood and applauded its implications and potential effect on their futures. Through this instrument they could once again become prominent and powerful in the affairs of the homeland; once more they could contend for place and power.

Selection of personnel for the purpose at hand quickly became a political football of rival leaders, personalities, and groups. Rightists, Leftists, Centrists, Labor Elements, and Splinter-groups argued with us for advancement of their particular personal or political views. Sponsorship of their own adherents as RFE employees through whom such views would be broadcast to their captive countrymen became the pattern of their pseudo cooperation. This pattern was followed to such an extent that ordinary progress and sensible development of our basic purpose of truly free broadcasts under exile control soon appeared to be not only impracticable, but dangerous. For example, the National Councils Division attempted to inaugurate broadcasts to Czechoslovakia under the auspices of a Czechoslovak National Council. The Council was and is made up of exile personalities of differing political views and parties. Its factions proceeded to engage in endless disputes and irreconcilable claims for control of script production and program content. Slovak "Separatists" arguing for the total independence of Slovakia sought that objective, while Czechs desired opposite views to be aired and advocated the rebirth of pre-war Czechoslovakia. Each group sponsored and insisted upon employment of its own more or less qualified adherents upon the assumption that its special views would be thereby expressed to the captive Czechoslovak audience of RFE. Similar activities were pursued by Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Poles until the futility of permitting the exile Councils to control the destiny and broadcasting policies of RFE was made clear beyond refutation. It became tragically obvious that uncontrolled exile-world Councils and professional politicians could not agree on personnel selection or program content.

In spite of every effort to induce harmony in and obtain proper cooperation from the "Councils", "Committees", and individuals, RFE was confronted with an impasse. The alternative theory and present policy of American selection of non-political exile personnel was the only way out. It has worked. Technically qualified personnel produce properly oriented programs -- and have been doing so with documented success since July, 1950. Disappointed exile politicians, professional exile camp followers, disturbed American special pleaders, and alarmed Communist Agents all scream, snipe and snivel -- but RFE programs are doing the job.

NCFE-RFE records of this stage can be supplied by Frederic R. Dolbeare, Vice-President, National Councils Division, and Robert E. Lang, Director, RFE. The current policy has the complete endorsement of these officers and of the Board of Directors of NCFE.

B. Development Stage

Upon the collapse of the original concept of broadcasting under exile auspices, RFE necessarily utilized some exile personnel endorsed and recommended by the leaders of the various nationality groups. As technical radio facilities came into being, exiles with radio background or writing talent were required for the production of programs. This involved using individuals eminently qualified by experience to do a radio job of script writing, announcing, acting, etc., without regard for the fact that such individuals might be persona non grata with one or another political faction or leader of an exile "Council". It also involved elimination of proven inefficient, inept or unworthy individuals without regard for their exile "Council" sponsorship. In either instance criticism of RFE was predictable and indeed was always forthcoming -- often in virulent and dishonest form.

The day to day operation of RFE developed new techniques and long range plans which made it impossible to employ non-entities of no political color or conviction. The best people to produce programs in harmony with NCFE-RFE purposes and policies necessarily were persons known in their own countries for their views on domestic political affairs and their anti-Communist activities. Hard-hitting propaganda required hard-hitting personalities whose known association with RFE and its programs would add validity and significance for our captive audiences. Gradually, therefore, the nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich were staffed with tested, qualified exiles who had been identified publicly with domestic political philosophies at issue in their own countries. Many, in fact, most of the staff people are controversial figures among their own countrymen in exactly the same way that prominent Americans are controversial in our political arena. Many indeed are members of the Councils, but are men of sufficient stature to give their primary allegiance to the non-partisan policy of RFE. The decisive factor is that there be no controversy or question about their anti-Communist convictions and records.

At this point, it must be noted that our target countries have been subject to repetitive political ferment prior to and following World War II, as well as the successive occupations of Nazi and Communist Armies.

The temper of the times, therefore, in which these exiles have lived for the past fifteen years has been one of excitement, bitterness, recrimination, rivalries, and personal turmoil -- all stemming from both domestic and foreign struggles for power. The times have produced a bumper crop of refugee traitors, collaborators, and opportunists and at the same time have developed pure Western style democrats, true national patriots, and unselfish honest men. The exile who stood by placidly through the era is not much good, however talented, as a militant messenger of hope via RFE; exiles who were honorably active in public affairs at home, and who had radio talent were, therefore, the only kind of personnel suitable for RFE purposes.

As the necessity for American operational control of nationality desks became self-evident, the only feasible personnel policy was to employ properly qualified individuals, regardless of exile politics. In the execution of this policy individuals who were useless were eliminated without regard for political sponsors. This process still goes on. Similarly, talented exile personalities recruited from any source were employed wherever needed. This process still goes on. Both processes are in vogue with a healthy disregard for exile political nuances and protests. Neither process is satisfactory to self-styled exile leaders since it follows that the appointment of an individual sponsored by one faction as a representative of its views, inevitably will evoke howls of rage and criticism from the opposite faction. This is an accepted fact of exile life. We have to live with it and get on with the job.

C. Summary

Our formative and development experiences evolved the present and continuing exile personnel policies of RFE. Exile desk employees, whether at New York or Munich, must respond to three tests;

(a) Security clearance,
(b) Endorsement of technical proficiency,
(c) Sufficient stature to eliminate exile partisan interests from program content.

- II -

CRITERIA AND METHODS OF PERSONNEL SELECTION

A. Recruitment -- General Principles

The best source of exile personnel is referral by "non-professional" exiles themselves. Among all nationalities there are many talented refugees who need employment and who can supply RFE's need for script writers, actors, announcers, etc. Accordingly, desk staffing has been accomplished by examining the qualifications of duly recommended individuals, whether the recommendations come from political personalities or otherwise. Selection is based on the ability of the individual to fill a need efficiently in turning out or participating in planned programs. Recruitment is determined only by ideological security, independence of exile politics, and personal ability. This is not to say that many individual exiles having decided personal convictions and well-known political records are not employed, but a positive statement is made that those exile employees who now produce RFE programs reflect the policies and guidance of RFE rather than promotion of partisan objectives and personalities.

B. Recruitment -- Detailed Procedures

The personnel complement of each RFE nationality desk is founded on a hard core of dependable individuals, usually two or three people, including the chief of the desk. "Dependability" is established by exhaustive inquiry at all available sources to establish the desirability, reliability, technical proficiency and security of the working core of the desk. Sources used are:

(a) Exile political personalities in the United States,
(b) Exile references of high standing and known impartiality in the United States and Overseas,
(c) Overseas contacts and personal knowledge of our American representative in Europe. (Royall Tyler-Paris),
(d) Checks and balances of our political advisor at Munich (W. E. Griffith),

(e) British Broadcasting Corporation, where applicable,
(f) Voice of America, where applicable,
(g) Special confidential sources.

These tests having been applied, confidence is placed in these initial personalities, and particularly in the Desk Chief, to carry forward recruitment of additional personnel as needed in collaboration with the American Director of RFE (Robert E. Lang, New York), and his associate officials. The leading personalities of each desk know what is expected of them and since they respond to the established criteria, the resulting full personnel complement is a group of exiles who, notwithstanding their personal political views, are suitable and capable program production people. They meet our basic requirement of daily production of truly free and properly constructed propaganda broadcasts capable of evoking the widest possible audience response in our target countries.

In brief, the mission of RFE being conceived as a marketing problem, the best available salesmen are procured, trained, and utilized to sell the market.

C. Recruitment -- Special Security Measures

Since RFE, although a private enterprise, is by extension a collateral instrument of American national policy, special precaution is exercised to insure the ideological security of all employees, including exiles. In the case of exile personnel specifically, the additional approval of the Personnel Director of NCFE is required before employment, either at New York or Munich. Thus, even if a proposed exile employee meets all the described criteria he may not be employed without this ultimate approval.

The Personnel Director of NCFE utilizes appropriate and dependable sources of information to determine the acceptability of personnel from a security standpoint. His sources are investigative in nature and are conclusive as to the ideological record and security acceptability of the proposed employee. In doubtful cases the Personnel Director consults with the Vice-President in Charge of the National Councils Division and with the Director of Radio Free Europe. These three officers of NCFE jointly follow a policy of rejecting candidates about whom there is the slightest doubt. It is to be clearly understood that in making decisions of this kind the conflicting interests and frantic representations of politically minded exile leaders and groups are ignored. Acceptance or rejection of candidates is wholly based on ideological security and talent value.

D. Summary

(1) All nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich are staffed by individuals who have passed all tests described above.

(2) All programs produced and aired by the nationality desks are checked and scrutinized by American supervisory personnel for ideological content, audience acceptance and conformity to basic NCFE-RFE policies.

(3) These conditions have been progressively in force since July, 1950.

III

RFE POLICY GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL

A. General Comment

The programs aired by RFE are not left to whim or chance. All programs and the personnel responsible for them are controlled by a written policy manual. The manual sets forth in minute detail the position and policy of RFE on every topic beamed to our target countries. The manual is the daily guidance of all employees, both American and Exile; deviation from its rules is not permitted. Continuous scrutiny of manuscripts and resultant broadcasts is maintained by American employees to insure that there are no deviations.

The policy manual of RFE represents the considered views of the responsible officials, including the Board of Directors, of NCFE. It is a statement of the principles and purposes of NCFE expressed in operational form. It is considered and maintained as a strictly confidential document, but it is of course available for examination by any proper authority.

The policy manual is in strict conformity with current American national policies as evidenced by the following quotation from Article One:

> "As a non-governmental radio station responsible to the millions of American citizens who support it, RFE cannot take a line contrary to United States Government policy or to the beliefs of the American people reflected in the Constitution of the United States and in American Institutions".

The above quotation is understood by exile personnel particularly to be a solemn injunction against ideological program content which in any way violates the letter and spirit of American policy and ideals. It is a guarantee to the American people and to our captive listeners that RFE and the men who make its programs are uncompromisingly opposed to the Communist regimes now in power in Soviet Russia and the satellite countries.

B. RFE Policy Defined by Handbook (Direct Quotations)

1. The purpose of RFE is to contribute to the liberation of the Nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by sustaining their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-dominated regimes by which they are, for the time being, ruled.

2. The central characteristic of RFE is that it is the instrument of men who are engaged in fighting for freedom and justice. As such, it encourages resistance to every tyrant, great and small, in the countries it addresses. Its speakers speak ... as men of good will who seek to contribute to the elimination of old enmities and the building of an enduring European democratic order.

3. As a free forum in which exiles speak to their own people RFE is particularly dedicated to arguments by which exiles seek to persuade their listeners of the all devouring ambitions of Soviet Imperialism, the cruelty and unworkability of Communist Institutions

and the proven advantages of the democratic way of life for the worker, the peasant, the administrator, and the business and professional strata of society.

4. RFE takes counsel with exile leaders and is respectful of their views, but its policy is not designed to further the aspirations of any single exile leader or party.

5. RFE policy is further based upon acceptance of the principle that each of the liberated peoples shall be free to determine for itself the political and social institutions under which it will live once it has been liberated.

6. Finally, the following summary in the nature of a specific limitation on program content is quoted:

> "It is indispensable that all concerned grasp clearly that RFE is a multi-national station established to contribute to the liberation of all the peoples it addresses, and not merely of one of those peoples. RFE policy is therefore commanded by the limitation that nothing may be said over its facilities to one national audience which will destroy the confidence in RFE of its other audiences or which is likely to induce any of its audiences to prefer communist rule to a liberation which might appear to promise domination by a neighboring people."

SECRET

In reply refer W-1968
to:

31 March 1952

Dear Kim:

On one of the matters which we discussed on Wednesday, i.e., the matter posed in Mr. Hughes' letter, we require some assistance from you. We have gone over this topic thoroughly and find that this is the situation.

a. The number of indigenous people which [illegible] will agree to include in their plan on our behalf is very limited.

b. This being the case, we require from you a compilation of names of indigenous people, not to exceed thirty, whom you would consider indispensable for the re-establishment of an operation similar to that of Kenneth's firm in another area, in time of real heat. It is possible, but not absolutely certain, that we can arrange to include this group of thirty in our provisions for time of trouble.

c. Moreover, we feel that it would be unwise for us to approach the Department of Defence officials at this time.

e. We, therefore, suggest that you approach the Department of Defense directly and independently with no reference to the fact that we have an interest in the matter as a whole, and with no reference to our interest in any part of it (e.g. the number thirty above). We feel that General Clay and other influential citizens who are concerned with your organization may be of assistance in the direct approach which we have recommended.

I need not assure you that this cause is one of special interest on our part; nor do I need to stress the practical considerations within the assisting Department which compel us to declare our own limitations and to suggest the direct independent approach, for you are, I am sure, the first to understand a problem of this type.

In compiling the list of thirty names, you should I believe, choose individuals who fit into the "indispensable" category by virtue of their programming and idea generation capabilities rather than because of engineering or other technical background.

You will perhaps wish to know that a copy of this letter is being sent by Allen to Mr. Hughes to whom Allen has recently sent a belated interim reply.

I hope that we may hear from you in regard to this list at an early date. While we require the names, for your own information, those names—according to present arrangements—would be made known only to our own people, not to the military authorities. For the latter, numbers we hope will suffice.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Oliver Hadwood

CIO/NBV:blj
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - Hughes (as stated above)
1 - CIO
2 - RI

1 - TONIC CHRONO

In reply refer
to: W-1954

11 March 1952

Dear Miss:

I should appreciate your discussing a matter of some interest to us with Kenneth Walters. If agreeable to him and to you, we should like to have from you a few sheets of Radio Free Europe stationery to use for a letter, along the lines of the attached draft, to an individual in Panama City who has a radio station useful to our purposes. The draft is, I believe, self-explanatory, although not necessarily in the final form the letter will take. In case you are willing to assist us as suggested, we would handle the money and accountings for it. You will note, however, that the possibility exists that the funds will be attributed to Kenneth's organization.

Please return with your reply the enclosed draft. We will provide you with a copy of the letter which is sent, if the plan is carried out.

Sincerely,

Oliver Haywood

CIO/[illegible]:blj
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - CIO
2- RI
1 - [illegible] Chrono
1 - IO/[illegible]TO

New York
10 December 1951

Mr. James Clarendon
Radio Station Continental
Panama City

Dear Jim,

Following up our talk of last summer, I believe I am now in a position to assist you in your efforts to combat international communism in the Panama area. During the past few months I could not help but think of your experience with the French Underground after you were shot down and of how you no doubt have a personal interest in letting people in Panama know what must be done to keep the western world free.

Unfortunately, Radio Free Europe, by the very nature of its charter, cannot engage in activities within this hemisphere. But in the course of our campaign, I have been approached by a group of persons, representing an international religious denomination and several large business firms, who would like to invest in keeping our hemisphere free of the communist menace.

I am, therefore, [illegible] to this group that they send you the sum of $500.00 per month for an indefinite period with which to have you support any programs of a sort that you consider effective in explaining and backing up the program of freedom in the Americas. Possibly a radio program run by a local organization would accomplish this purpose.

There is no reason why such a local organization should not get credit for the program, but, of course, if need arises there would be no objection to your explaining the source of the funds.

In order to satisfy its members, the group would appreciate receiving a simple monthly accounting indicating station symbols, wave lengths, broadcast time and hours, copies of scripts, and salaries of personnel.

Please let me stress once again, Jim, that I am acting as middleman in this matter privately and individually, and not in behalf of Radio Free Europe with which I am affiliated.

By the way I met Bud Baker recently. He has quite a family now.

Let me hear whether you will be able to take this on.

Yours,

Constance [illegible]

(All names except that of Clarendon are fictitious.)

14-00000

Tom: 11 April 52

Mr. Dulles has taken care of para 3. Assume we are relieved of this one.

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED NTIAL [✓ SECRET]
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Deputy Director, Plans	FGW	
2	Chief, International Org.		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		**INITIALS**	**DATE**
1	Deputy Director	A.W.D.	4/9/52
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☒ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS: To Mr Braden -
This was done in line with one of your recent

31 March 1952

Dear Frank:

I have been hoping to see you here in Washington or in New York for some time past as I want to take the opportunity to tell you how much we all appreciate the outstanding work you did in connection with NCFE. When we get together, I shall have an opportunity to express this appreciation more fully.

Meanwhile, please let me know if you plan to come to Washington and I will do the same if and when I get up to New York. Unfortunately, recently I have been tied down here with very little opportunity to see my friends in New York.

Sincerely,

Frank Altschul, Esq.
40 Wall Street
New York, N. Y.

AWD:leb
Distribution
Orig. - Add.
1 cc - Chrono
1 cc - Pers
1 cc - NCFE file

14-00000

C O P Y

FRANK ALTSCHUL
730 Fifth Avenue
New York 19, N. Y.

Room 1701
Tel. Judson 6-5526

April 3, 1952

Dear Allen,

Thank you for your letter. I have no present intention of coming to Washington as for the past week I have been knocked out by this virus infection that has been going around. However, I look forward to seeing you whenever you find it convenient to drop in.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Frank

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
1308 - 29th Street, N.W.
Washington 7, D.C.

SECRET
Security Information

9-7715

5 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

FROM : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : National Committee for a Free Europe - Radio Free Europe - Miscellaneous Recommendations for Action

REFERENCE : Memorandum from C/IO to D/DCI, DD/P and ADPC dated 27 March 1952

1. I have read the reference memorandum which I note contains quite a number of recommendations for action, some of which apply to the undersigned.

2. I would like to participate in the Princeton bull session but believe it unnecessary for CIA to be represented by so many people. If Mr. Dulles is going I should prefer to drop out. A further reason for reluctance on my part to attend this meeting is that I have already passed on to the NCFE people interested all of the ideas and information which I have on the principal theme of this discussion. I therefore feel that, until after the forthcoming meeting with the British or the development of the Psychological Strategy Paper, which is being laboriously ground out by Admiral Stevens' Ad Hoc Committee, I would have nothing new to contribute. However, if Mr. Dulles is unable to attend and you feel that I should go, I would be willing to do so.

3. Concerning your report of Frank Altschul's feeling of grievance, I should be glad to sign a letter to him if Mr. Dulles agrees that I am the proper person to do this. Pending Mr. Dulles' consideration of this matter, will you please prepare in draft form for my signature a friendly letter to Mr. Altschul in which you might comment upon the fact that NCFE-RFE now represents one of the most potent weapons in our entire arsenal, and following with an acknowledgement of the very important contribution which Mr. Altschul made toward the development and shaping of this instrument.

SECRET
Security Information

4. I am somewhat confused by the contents of the action paragraph following paragraph 3, in which you indicate that we are continuing to urge NCFE to extend cover assistance to the Kirk Committee. On the basis of our most recent conversations with Mr. Dulles and Admiral Miller, I was under the impression that you were trying to dig up some other forms of cover - particularly in view of the reluctance of the NCFE Board to extend the Crusade cover to the Kirk Committee. Perhaps this paragraph of the reference memorandum has been overtaken by events.

5. I understand that you are getting up a memorandum on the Landowsky case. I am relieved to hear that Landowsky has been recalled from Greece and that it is not intended to have him return.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER

cc: DDCI (with reference memorandum)

SECRET

31 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe

1. As of April 1st, this Division plans to discontinue its routine informational support to Radio Free Europe. This support, which has been carried out by a staff of about fourteen people, originated in the necessity for RFE to have access to Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Summaries, State Department information, and other overt information which came into CIA. It became apparent sometime ago there was not enough of this material to fill out RFE broadcasts and, as you know, RFE hired the so-called stringers to do the chief *news-gathering* job. The information sent RFE by us has for some time been accessible to RFE directly from the agencies which publish it. Our decision to cut out this service has the concurrence of RFE and makes possible the assignment of fourteen people elsewhere.

2. To take the place of this staff, IO Division proposes to have one or two people concentrate on developing ideas and policy and theme guidance for RFE along the lines which the DDCI has suggested in conversation with me. One good man of necessary talent and experience will concentrate on this full time, pulling together matters from PY Division, State and other sources. He will continue to give RFE such intelligence summaries as can be made sterile, but his principal task will be to ride herd generally on the RFE programs as our chief point of information and liaison.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/EXO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

14-00000

COPY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON, W.1.

29 March 1952

Dear Allen:

This is a somewhat belated acknowledgment to your note of 7 March. I expect to be back at 15 Broad around the middle of May.

C. D. wrote me about going back on the Board of the National Committee several weeks ago, and I have told him that I am favorably disposed, but would like to defer decision until I get back and have a chance to talk with him and see what my general commitments promise to be. This is one which I should like to stay with because of my early association with you and the others in setting it up. I also was very much impressed by the layout in Portugal, which I went out to see after the Lisbon meeting.

I hope all goes well with you.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Chuck

Allen W. Dulles, Esq.
1308 29th Street, N. W.
Washington 7, D. C.
U. S. A.

Copy of this given to Nancy 14 Apr 52

Tom: 3 Apr 52

Suggest you tel Adm Miller in re 28 March letter on Easy Picker to say foresee no difficulty in getting approval of funds for expenses incurred or committed (21,879.39) Is this right? However, full explan of Expenses paid as of 21 Mar 52 and of Commitments as of 21 Mar 52 would be helpful. (In latter case, P.O. nos. do not identify entries)

~~As for rest — we would be on that~~

As for the rest, we'd be willing to work on it, if we had def. estimates. We would have to have these from you.

March 28, 1952

Dear Oliver:

Wearing my Crusade hat at this juncture, let me fill you in as best I can on the history and development of the Crusade operating budget. This is no mean job, since practically all of the transactions concerning it were verbal — a situation I hope to correct in the future, starting now. So here goes. I will make the special budget the subject of a separate letter.

In December, Abbott got the General's verbal approval of a Crusade budget for 1952 of approximately $1,000,000 if Abbott would stay on. Before any progress toward firming up this commitment had been made, difficulties arose in connection with our position vis a vis VOA. On January 17th, CD and Abbott met with everyone concerned in the problem in Ed Barrett's office. Out of this meeting came general agreement that the 1952 Crusade program should be considerably reduced in scope, which was duly reported to the Crusade Board the following day. Allen instructed Abbott to draw up a proposed budget for something under $500,000. This Abbott did under date of January 21st and transmitted it to Allen with a letter dated January 23rd.

The budget submitted, which I believe is in your hands, amounted to $488,991, covering the eleven months from February 1st to December 31st, 1952. (The Crusade had meanwhile received on January 11th, on special request, funds covering the months of December and January.)

It was initially contemplated that the total sum of $488,991 should be transferred to the Crusade in a lump. It then developed that because of fiscal year problems five-elevenths, or $222,270, would be transferred immediately.

Within a week or so from January 23rd, Abbott received telephonic approval from Allen of the $488,991 over-all, with $222,270 to be transferred in a lump sum.

Early in February, Crusade was advised it would be more convenient for you to transfer just the February allotment and postpone the lump sum payment until March. On advice, we therefore made formal request for $44,454 for February on February 19th. This payment was received by us on March 3rd. It is the only installment we have received against the total (eleven-month) Crusade 1952 budget. During my trip before last, I received verbal reassurance that the balance of the five-month figure would be forthcoming. This then is to urge you to put this in line for attention as soon as possible.

To recapitulate, this is a request specifically for $177,816, representing $44,454 a month for March, April, May, and June.

Sincerely yours,

Leonard

March ~~28, 19~~52

Dear Oliver:

This is an attempt to give you the background of our special EASY BAKER budget. This is the balloon project, initiated last fall after the first Winds of Freedom one and scheduled for Christmastime. It was then known as Santa Claus or SUGAR CHARLIE. After definite cancelation for Christmas and postponement to Easter, it became known in our accounts as Easter Bunny or EASY BAKER.

In a memorandum to John Damewood, dated December 5, 1951, Abbott said: "Attached, also, is request to cover costs of operation Santa Claus to date. Except for some continuing preparations in the field, this too is being kept on ice pending further word from you. You will recall that AWD authorized the purchase of vehicles, etc., at our conference in his office in October. We estimated at that time that the total project would run approximately $175,000."

Formal request to the Foundation for the $51,500 was made January 3rd, together with request for December and January operating expenses. All these sums were received by Crusade January 10th.

On one of Abbott's January or February trips to your city, he received a promise to transfer to us the balance of the EASY BAKER budget ($123,500). I would strongly recommend that this would be the neatest way of handling this account. ✓ We naturally keep separate accounting for this budget and could give you an accounting to date at any time on request. To make such a transfer now would also enable you to dispose of this budget in your current fiscal year, in which an allocation for it has presumably been made.

I should perhaps set down for the record that it cannot be guaranteed that an EASY BAKER type operation, when and if it should be definitely put on the schedule, can be carried off for the original budget of $175,000. There are too many variables. And, while the major part of the budget spent or to be spent goes for quasi capital equipment, some of it goes or will go for expendable operation (publicity, communications, and the like) which would have to be repeated in connection with another balloon operation.

Attached is a schedule of expenses and commitments as of March 21st against the EASY BAKER budget. From this you will see that we have had to use general operating funds of about $21,000 for EASY BAKER as of that date. A rough estimate of additional costs of the prayer operation, which belongs to EASY BAKER, is $9,500. (I also attach for your information a mimeographed report indicating the acceptance of the prayer operation among the churches.)

To recapitulate, this is a request for transfer of the balance of $123,500 of the EASY BAKER special budget.

Sincerely yours,

EASY BAKER BUDGET

Cash balance as of March 21, 1952	1,431.91	
Paid expenses as of March 21	50,068.09	
Total cash received against budget..................		51,500.00

Committments as of March 21, 1952:

P.O. 790	45.00	
" 780	30.50	
" 779	37.00	
" 749	333.20	
" 747	16,500.00	
" 743	757.60	
Robert Jordan (Dir. Church Prom.)	1,200.00	
German Accounting #5	1,465.00	
" " #6	1,943.00	
Total commitments		22,311.30

Total expenses and commitments	72,379.39
Total cash received on budget	51,500.00
Budget deficit as of 3/21/52	21,879.39

EXCERPTS FROM LETTERS RECEIVED IN RESPONSE TO CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM'S SUGGESTION OF A PRAYER MOVEMENT

(Early in March the Crusade sent letters to every house of worship in the United States, Councils of Churches, Ministerial Associations, Councils of Church Women, as well as to a few national secular organizations. These letters urged people to offer special prayers for those whose religious freedoms have been restricted because of Communist domination. The Crusade undertook to make known to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain this movement on the part of Americans and to request their prayers for us in exchange. The quotations herein which are of a congratulatory nature to the Crusade are included not out of vainglory, but because they tell part of the story: the acceptance by the First Estate of this proposal from a lay organization. On reflection it may be judged that only a lay organization could successfully make such a proposal.)

IVANHOE, MINNESOTA -

"This is a step in truly proper procedure in the struggle...between the free countries of the world and those enslaved by Marxian doctrines and practices. May God speed the plan."

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND -

"We feel here...that the Christian Church is in a period of greatest opportunity in light of recent persecutions and restrictions throughout the world. History has shown that in periods similar to these, the Church has grown large enough for the task ahead of it. ...prayers for those who are under persecution and restriction throughout the world are offered... every Sunday...

"After a full year of such a program for the peoples of the enslaved areas, our own people have grown more acutely conscious of the problem facing the Christian Church. ...enlightenment upon Christianity's greatest competitor, Communism, is necessary for those of us who are still gripped with complacency. Besides enlightenment, it would be of help to our own people that prayers and thoughts of those people behind the Iron Curtain are for our strength to help them conquer their enslaving ideologies.

"We will make public this letter and renew our efforts to make our own people more conscious of the need. Our prayers will be for the people of the world and the persecution that they might have religious freedom and, above all, be worthy of that freedom when it comes. We ask their prayers for our strength in a fight against a deadly enemy called 'complacency and religious pride.' I would like to recall that prayer cannot be separated from action and that our prayer is for the Crusade for Freedom and that our action will be in helping you."

WESTFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS

"...hope that you will be able to get behind the Iron Curtain with the specific information that Christian people are united in praying for this freedom for all. It is my intention to include...a special prayer in which the entire congregation will unite as a part of the Crusade for Freedom."

TUTTLE, NORTH DAKOTA

"I think God for the Crusade for Freedom, and for the leaders who give of their time and strength for such a worthy cause. I can assure you of my support."

DRESDEN, TENNESSEE

"God grant that the common effort of all toward this campaign shall not be in vain, but shall eventually lead to the lasting peace and freedom that all peoples cherish so much."

CENTERMORELAND, PENNSYLVANIA

"...pledge my support in your prayer campaign... On each Sunday special intercession will be made. We shall ask not only that their...freedom... be restored but that the...gospel may make easier the burdens of oppression which they now carry.

"Our prayers shall be with the Crusade for Freedom as it continues its splendid efforts in behalf of a great cause. May we be always of the side of God in the battle for right and truth."

CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA

"...will begin special prayers on Sunday, March 23... By prayer, by daily acts of self denial and by constant expressions of material charity, the members of this congregation are doing, and will continue to do, everything in their power to assist the Crusade. May God bless and prosper your work."

MANCHESTER, GEORGIA

"It is indeed gratifying to know that there are yet God fearing men... who are willing under God to promote such a worthy cause as the Crusade for Freedom. May God richly bless you and give you spiritual courage to carry on as a clarion in this dark hour of spiritual need."

DENVER, COLORADO

"We shall be most happy in this parish to do something specific in a spiritual way for the restoration of freedom of religion in the satellite countries. It will be announced to our congregation on Sunday, March 16th, that a special Mass will be offered on the fourth Sunday of Lent, on Passion Sunday, on Palm Sunday and again on Easter Sunday for religious freedom behind the Iron Curtain. I can assure you that in this parish many hundreds of prayers and Holy Communions will be offered to Almighty God for our distressed brothers and sisters behind the Iron Curtain. God grant that your request will receive the response that it so richly deserves. Humble prayers will be more potent than the most effective bomb."

HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

"This silent prayer was inserted in our order of worship yesterday in response to your request.

> "Father, we thank Thee for the privilege of worship, and for the freedom to listen, to think, and to speak as Thy Spirit directs. Make us deeply sensitive to the sufferings of the peoples of Eastern Europe and of Asia, to whom this freedom is now denied. Open their hearts and lives as well as ours, we pray Thee, to the message of the Gospel of Christ."

NEWCASTLE, MAINE

"I am very happy to cooperate...it is often difficult to make people understand that...we are part of a great world movement. If only each individual in each tiny place could and would realize he...can in a small way further the cause of peace and justice..."

ROSEBURG, OREGON

"...our congregation has been much aware of the needs and the available power through prayer. We shall continue to do everything we can. Thank you for encouraging the Church people to broaden their vistas and horizons of the prayer experience."

SPRINGFIELD CENTER, NEW YORK

"...sincerely trust the response to your appeal will prove so universal that the prayers of millions of earnest and loyal Christians will prove so overwhelming that with God's help we shall be miraculously successful in bringing to naught the diabolical machinations of the godless Soviet Tyrants..."

CONCEPTION, MISSOURI

"On March 23, I shall conduct a Day of Recollection and direct it toward the aims and purposes of the Crusade. The Seminarians will be asked to continue their prayers on the following Sundays for this purpose. If there is any other way in which we can be of help, please call on us."

ONEONTA, NEW YORK

"It was most gratifying to learn that you ... in the Crusade for Freedom recognize the value of prayer to the extent that you are willing to solicit the prayers of God's people for those who are in need.

"Be assured of the prayers of the members of my Church ... over eight hundred members and myself in this worthy endeavor. I am persuaded that the God that controls all the wealth of this world is going to honor you and your colleagues materially and spiritually because of your approach to this matter."

DURANT, OKLAHOMA

"...I promise that we ... in this area will cooperate in prayers for peace and freedom ..."

YORK, PENNSYLVANIA

"We shall print on our Bulletin the following prayer, on the four Sundays beginning with March 23rd, and shall ask our people to use it as a congregation and personally. The prayer follows:

"Almighty God, Thou who are truth and love, in whom is justice, righteousness, and liberty, we bow in sincere and earnest prayer that Thy power may bring the blessings of full freedom to worship Thee and serve Thee, to all Thy children who dwell in lands where men know not this freedom. Grant unto them that through Thy grace they, and we, may rejoice to know Thee, to worship Thee, and to serve Thee. We ask this through Him who died that men might live in Thee, the only true God and Father of us all. Amen."

ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

"On Sunday, March 23rd ... will offer special prayers ... will repeat these prayers from time to time thereafter ..."

BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

" I enclose a copy of a prayer...

"Almighty God, our Heavenly Father, we beseech thee to bring a righteous and just peace into our world. Cleanse the hearts of the men of all nations of petty provincialism, of envy and of hatred and endow all their leaders with humility and courage to know and to do thy will. And more especially we pray for the people of Russia and their leader, Josef Stalin, that they and he, being cleansed from False Doctrine, may be brought to the light of thy truth and may seek peace and understanding rather than discord and war. Grant to our own nation a deeper sense of responsibility in using the power thou hastgiven her,

"...and enlighten those we have set in authority over us so that they may honestly try to further thy will. Finally, we pray for thy Holy Church. Wherever she may be, that she may be revived by thine indwelling spirit and made the sure instrument of union for all men in our divided world. Pardon the imperfection of this our prayer and in all things thy will be done. Through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen."

MINONK, ILLINOIS

"Please put us down as another church with a world view and ... a concern for religious liberty ... of our Christian brethren behind political curtains in Europe and Asia. All good success to you in 'our' campaign to overcome evil with good, to fight the big lie of communism with the big truth of universal freedom, freedom 'in Christ', which we in God-blessed America so enjoy today."

FROM A CITY COUNCIL OF CHURCH WOMEN

"We rejoice in this gesture from Crusade for Freedom and join with you in special prayers."

TUNICA, MISSISSIPPI

"We think the idea is a good one, and we shall join with you, using the following prayer:

"O Almighty God, whom to know aright is life eternal, whom to serve aright is perfect freedom, grant, we beseech thee, the restoration of religious freedom to oppressed peoples everywhere, but particularly to those in the subjugated nations of Eastern Europe. Give them hope, fill them with courage, strengthen their determination until the iron yoke of Communism is broken by the power of Christ, in whose name we pray. Amen."

BINGHAMTON, NEW YORK plans to use the following prayer which came from "Prayers for Men in Service":

"For the Oppressed: O God, The Creator of men and of nations, we implore Thy fatherly care and protection in behalf of all Thy children everywhere who suffer persecution. In all their trials and tribulations be Thou their Refuge and Strength. Impart to them Thine own comfort and courage. Turn the hearts of the oppressors from evil to good. Stop the hands and convert the wills of those who would array brother against brother in racial strife. Restore to all men everywhere the blessing of religious freedom. Fill our hearts and inspire our minds with a desire firmly to establish peace and justice, liberty and fraternity throughout the world; for His sake, who suffered for all mankind, Thy Son, Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen."

DULUTH, MINNESOTA

"...pleased to join all Christians of this country in a Crusade for Freedom. Daily we are praying for the restoration of religious freedom to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. May God bless your effort in promoting Christian freedom and peace in this world."

WHEELING, WEST VIRGINIA

"With deep emotion we ... assure you of our wholehearted cooperation .... Religious liberty throughout the world has long been a special intention remembered here. We shall not fail to ask Him to inspire Pastors to encourage their congregations to do all possible to cooperate."

CHAMBERSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA

"...it is planned in our congregation to place special emphasis in our Sunday Bulletin on March 23 upon the matter of prayers, personal and corporate, for restoration of religious liberties to repressed people. We shall, also, make a personal announcement calling attention to the printed program and trust that in this way, we may share in the 'Crusade for Freedom.' Your move seems to be one that should enlist the thinking and efforts of all Christian people."

FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS

"...we conduct a Novena here ... every Sunday night using the booklet, 'Crusade for Peace.' During this Novena we include all the intentions of the entire world and in a special way the intentions for your Crusade for Freedom."

GRANVILLE, NORTH DAKOTA

"In response to your letter, I included special prayers in my pastoral prayers today. It will be good of you to ask the peoples of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and other lands under the oppression of Russia to pray for us. We need to understand them and to receive their understanding. God help us all.

"How can we possibly retain our own freedoms unless we desire freedom for these others? One of the greatest freedoms surely must be freedom from self-righteousness. Will they pray for this freedom for us?

"'Blessed are they who feel their spiritual need,' Goodspeed translates it."

HOBOKEN, NEW JERSEY

"... constructive suggestion of prayer ... We will join other Christian churches in this program. We will begin at once. Your letter will be ... posted ... Prayer changes things ... Count on us."

PINE BLUFF, ARKANSAS

"Will be glad to cooperate.. Beginning Sunday, March 23 and every Sunday thereafter the congregation ... will pray for your intention. ... A very fine idea."

COLUMBUS, OHIO

"We are glad to have a chance to share in this great crusade."

CHUGWATER, WYOMING

"...was glad to learn that the Crusade for Freedom is looking for help to The Almighty God, and He indeed can help the people behind the Iron Curtain.

"I have been praying daily not only for my own dear ones who are behind the Iron Curtain but for all people who are enslaved by Communists. God's gracious Hand had lead me out from the Iron Curtain and how glad I am to be in free America."

PASCOAG, RHODE ISLAND

"You may include (us) ... as spiritual contributors to your worthy cause."

CONVERSE, INDIANA

"My sincere congratulations and gratitude that you are presenting the matter of united prayer for freedom ... I assure you also that I will present the challenge ... to our people and that we'll join with you and all churches of America in praying for the freedom that we believe is the natural right of all men."

ENDICOTT, NEW YORK

"Starting March 23rd we will have a public prayer every Sunday ... May God bless you and your great work for freedom. I am sure that with the prayers of Our great Nation and all Freedom-loving people, Almighty God in his infinite goodness and love will answer our prayers and all the things you are trying to accomplish in the Crusade for Freedom will be fulfilled."

LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA

"To establish such a prayer chain from the concerned peoples of this nation to the concerned peoples behind the Iron Curtain, in fact, to the Christian peoples behind any curtain in the world, will create a pool of resources that will strike fire in the hearts of believing Christian people. It is certainly one of the most important things to do alongside other preparation for World Peace."

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA - From a Church bulletin

"Beginning Sunday, March 23, and continuing, the Crusade for Freedom, which encourages those behind the 'iron curtain' in their desperate struggle for religious liberty, asks for our earnest prayers for those who have been deprived of their freedom to worship according to the dictates of conscience. PRAY."

The president of a Lutheran STATE SYNOD, in addition to acquiring newspaper notice, wrote the following letter to his confreres:

"Dear Brethren, Seeking to abide by the request of the Crusade for Freedom that each church in America have special prayers beginning Sunday, March 23, and each Sunday thereafter for the 'restoration of religious liberties to the peoples in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe,' and to strengthen the power of praying peoples for the advancement of God's Kingdom, I hereby request that each pastor write out a prayer that may be used in conjunction with the General Prayer in my service each Sunday morning, and as a special collect for the Vesper Services.

(continued)

CHESTER, CONNECTICUT

"In addition to making special note each Sunday morning service, we shall see to it that some space is allotted in our monthly pastoral letter for a suggestion of prayer for other men who are denied corporate worship."

ELLICOTT CITY, MARYLAND

"We feel sure that they know of our concern, and we know in our hearts they are praying that our faith fail not. Anything that the Crusade for Freedom can do to carry the message of our continued concern, will be appreciated."

SAN BRUNO, CALIFORNIA

"We shall be more than happy to continue to remember this great effort in prayer and ask God's blessing upon you who direct this undertaking."

* * * * * * * * * * *

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTERS

"The Crusade's plan for mass prayers...for the people behind the Iron Curtain who have been denied freedom of religious worship certainly is a commendable one. The need for faith throughout the world has never been greater, and that there should be freedom to worship as one wishes is fundamental to the principles by which we in America live. Members of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters...will...demonstrate their friendship for the world's oppressed people by supporting...the Crusade for Freedom."

PILOT CLUB INTERNATIONAL

"The Crusade for Freedom is doing a wonderful work and it is a privilege to cooperate in every way possible."

VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

"As Commander-in-Chief...I happily endorse this Crusade for Freedom movement with a pledge of our complete sympathy, cooperation and support."

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES

"Prayer is a mighty force, a mighty unused power. Let us all, here in America and elsewhere in the world put this mighty power to work."

AMVETS

"AMVETS wholeheartedly endorse the Crusade for Freedom sponsored movement for mass prayers...for the people behind the Iron Curtain who have been denied the freedom of religious worship which is the proud heritage of every American.

"There is a great need for a spiritual rebirth in this world torn with hatred and fears. The unity of peoples under a common God will do much to wash away the causes of unrest which haunt us today and will lead to the mutual objectives of peace-loving people everywhere.

"We are proud to call upon our members throughout the nation to participate...

AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION

"...the American Dental Association...endorse your plan for mass prayers...for the people behind the Iron Curtain.

"The members of this Association long have supported the Crusade for Freedom and...will be pleased to participate in this demonstration of the freedom of religious worship."

BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES DEPARTMENT - AFL

"We will send out a circular letter to our local...Councils throughout the country asking them to join in the mass prayers..."

NEW YORK STATE BANKERS ASSOCIATION: ...pleased to cooperate...and urge our membership to participate.....THE AMERICAN LEGION: ...your efforts will receive our wholehearted support.....BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA: ...joins with the Crusade...and all religious faiths in praying.....KIWANIS INTERNATIONAL: ...a splendid idea.....UNITED STATES JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: ...will certainly do everything we can...to get our organizations to assist in any way.....AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION: ...sending copies of your letter to all of our state organizations, with a note encouraging their participation.....THEATRE OWNERS OF AMERICA: ...action on our part...will strengthen...religious faith...and keep alive the hope of ultimate freedom from all oppression.....SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS: ...your program...for mass prayers...is indeed commendable.....DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING ASSOCIATION, INC: ...in complete accord with this movement...

March 21, 1952

BEAVER, OKLAHOMA

"Thanks for promoting this thought."

WHEELING, WEST VIRGINIA

"Every day (we) join in prayer for Peace and the welfare of those behind the Iron Curtain. ... We feel privileged to join all Christians on this day of prayer."

VAUX HALL, NEW JERSEY

"It is a worthwhile gesture ... We know God is pleased with it and certainly pray that all churches will comply with this request; we certainly shall."

DENVER, COLORADO

"Our church shall gladly remember this very important program in prayer, and we will greatly appreciate the prayers of our Christian friends everywhere."

PIKEVILLE, KENTUCKY

"This is a very small parish, but I will urge all to cooperate in this worthy cause. I will not exempt myself of the same obligation."

DUPREE, SOUTH DAKOTA

"... together we shall pray for our brethren who have lost their freedom..."

BLOOMFIELD, IOWA

"Grateful to you for this move and hoping for great success ..."

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE

"May God bless you in this effort; and those unfortunate ones for whom we pray."

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

"It is a pleasure to cooperate in your request for prayers starting Sunday, March 23. In fact, we will start tomorrow ... God bless you and your confreres in your work."

OSHKOSH, NEBRASKA

"I appreciate your getting word to them of our interest in their welfare, and believe that such a plan is a real forward step ..."

CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA

"... our church will gladly join you in praying for these our brothers and sisters. I am glad to know that you consider prayer as having a major place in the affairs of the world. ..."

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

"Congratulations upon your forward step in seeking cooperation and freedom through prayer. You may count on us and our two churches ..."

PEABODY, KANSAS

"We shall take this matter seriously and make it a definite part of the Morning Worship Period ... we shall make PRAYERS FOR FREEDOM a part of our thought."

ASHVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA

"The student body ... enthusiastically endorse your plan for special prayers ... and will not only participate themselves but will do everything in their power to increase the knowledge of the movement and gain widest participation from others."

PUTNEY, VERMONT

"The students ... wish to join in this crusade. Beginning on Sunday, March 23, we shall say each day a decade of the Rosary for the intentions you recommend."

DELCAMBRE, LOUISIANA

"That we all recognize the necessity of turning to God for help and guidance in restoring the world to Christian ideals is the most hopeful sign of the times."

HOUSTON, TEXAS

"There is power in prayer. Our congregation will join you and others in your prayer plan, ..."

LAWRENCE, KANSAS

"... beginning March 23 we shall make special mention in the morning bulletin and give definite place in the program for the fellowship of prayer."

SOUTH CAYUGA, ONTARIO

"... let me assure you that we are with you in this great Crusade of Prayer."

LAKELAND, FLORIDA

"... want to encourage you in your Crusade for Freedom, and remind you that we who are of grass roots ... are ringing the bell."

ROCK HILL, SOUTH CAROLINA

"I think this is a very fine thought and trust that ministers and congregations throughout our nation will undergird your labors with prayer and faith."

FROM AN ARCHDIOCESE

"In conformity with the request of the Crusade for Freedom we are asking all the Catholic Churches in the Archdiocese to continue to recite prayers for those ... under Communist domination."

MT. GILEAD, NORTH CAROLINA

"We will join in the continuing prayer for Religious Freedom."

BUNKER HILL, INDIANA

"This world under God can have a new birth of freedom by the very method you are suggesting. Praying for each other is the real method to bring our world out of its darkness and fear."

BROKEN BOW, NEBRASKA

"Our morning congregation ... voted almost unanimously to share your prayers for the peoples in the satellite countries ..."

MILLVILLE, NEW JERSEY

"I presented the matter to my congregation ... and our people pledge their prayers beginning with Sunday, March 23, to the oppressed peoples ..."

NEW YORK, NEW YORK

"... most happy to cooperate. May God bless you and your associates with wisdom and insight as you strive to free both the bodies and the minds of the people from dictatorships of all kinds."

BIRCHWOOD, WISCONSIN

"Realizing the importance of this work, I do promise to ask the continuing prayers of our people for all our brothers and sisters in Christ who are presently suffering religious persecution."

SPOKANE, WASHINGTON

"Be assured we are most happy to join in this crusade of prayer on week days as well as on Sundays."

PETOSKEY, MICHIGAN

"... Ministerial Association in meeting on March 10 voted to have its Secretary send you word that we will continue our support of your program as in the past. Beginning with March 23, we will make sure that prayers are given in each church."

COLLEGEVILLE, MINNESOTA

"I endorse most heartily your Crusade for Freedom ... and hope that it will receive an enthusiastic response throughout America."

GIBON, NORTH CAROLINA

"I shall count it a privilege to call upon my people to pray thus, and will myself make this an object both of my personal prayers and those made publicly."

LIBERTY, MISSOURI

"May God bless you and your earnest efforts for these people. ... we have a family in our church who were D.P.'s and whom our people have helped. They are ... proving well worth any help and prayer. Therefore, we are close to this problem and understand it somewhat. God guide you and may He give to these wounded and gentle people their freedom again."

MONROE, LOUISIANA

"Our people are sharing in the Crusade for Freedom by prayer for our friends behind the Iron Curtain as well as for the forces of righteousness engaged in the propagation of the Truth ..."

ADA, OKLAHOMA

"In my judgment this is one of the most real ways in which Christians can combat the menace of communism in our world."

GREEN SPRINGS, OHIO

"Thank you for inviting the people of our churches to share in the special prayers ... we are happy to have a part in this great Christian enterprise. Yes, and in turn we will be glad to have the Crusade ask these people for their intercessory prayers for us. Surely God will bless this concern."

ELGIN, ILLINOIS

"May God multiply and fulfill your greatest hope and prayers, in which I shall be glad to join."

MANHASSET, NEW YORK

"Your challenge to pray for those who have been deprived of their spiritual freedom is timely and greatly needed. The religious liberty which we enjoy in America should be a cherished heritage, and one which we seek to share with the peoples of the world. I trust that the Crusade for Freedom will be successful in many parts of the world."

DUBLIN, TEXAS

"I think this is a most worthy and wise enterprise, and I wish for it the greatest success. I am greatly interested in the world situation and think there ought to be done much more concerted praying in the nation today. I see little hope for us otherwise."

WATERFORD, VIRGINIA

"We promise to join you in special prayers for them beginning Sunday, March 23rd, and shall continue praying until these people are granted religious liberty. Thank you for your interest. May God crown your efforts with success -- and soon."

BURLINGAME, CALIFORNIA

"We will remember them in our prayers particularly on March 23rd ..."

JOHN DAY, OREGON

"...we will be very glad to do our share ..."

LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

"The world needs a greater faith in God today and all religious leaders should have a part in this prayer effort."

BRISTOL, VIRGINIA

"We shall not only support this Crusade in our own church but also expect to sponsor special radio programs over our best radio station. Be assured of our interest and prayers."

(continued)

"Hoping that you will comply with my request and the request of the Crusade for Freedom to remember at the Throne of Grace, those whose opportunities to worship our God and Father, are not as great as those of the peoples of America,

I am,

Yours in the Master's Service ..."

COLUMBUS, GEORGIA

"We shall pray, as you suggested, during these ... meetings, during the pastoral prayers, and 'at' other services in our church. You are on the right track. God will richly bless your efforts, the prayers of the peoples of the world."

CINCINNATI, OHIO

"The ... boys and young men preparing for the priesthood ... will be glad to join with thousands, and I hope millions, of other spiritual-minded Americans in praying."

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

"You may be assured that you will have our prayers for all the things which the Crusade for Freedom is endeavoring to accomplish."

MINISTERIAL ASSOCIATION, INDIANA

"We, are grateful for this opportunity to express our conviction that this spiritual relationship between peoples is a vital part of the progress toward freedom."

BISHOP, TEXAS

"There are many Catholics in the satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain. They will understand this language. Much simpler still, if you only let them know that here in this parish of Mexican farm-laborers as in many another Catholic church in America we are feverously trying to put into action the peace plan of Our Lady of Fatima. I am sure they will be greatly comforted by this message."

[illegible] INFORMATION

SECRET

Mr. John C. Hughes,
c/o McCampbell & Co.,
40 Worth Street,
New York 13, New York.

Dear John:

My promised thoughts on a matter of our mutual concern, raised in your 28 January letter, are given in the enclosed copy of a letter being sent concurrently to Min Miller. You will note from the enclosure that Min knows we are forwarding you a copy of the letter to him. Min will certainly welcome your advice in planning the approach to the Defense Department. While the Director and I should, of course, like very much to assist in the effort to obtain the directive from Defense which Lucom explained to Lang was necessary, we feel that, for reasons of security, we should not do so initially and, for the same reason, we would rather have you carry the ball all the way, if possible.

Min will undoubtedly keep us both advised of such efforts as he and Lang shall plan, and if in the course of their negotiations, an opportunity presents itself for either the Director or me to be of assistance, you know that you may count on us to do so. A copy of this letter is also attached, in case you have an opportunity to hand it to Min.

My kindest personal regards to you.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

Attachments 2
As stated above

CIO/NBV:bw (date ?)

Distribution:
Addressee - original and 1
DDCI - 1 ✓
ER - 1
CIO - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL **RESTRICTED** (34-356 **FREE**

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS.—Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: SAR/R.J. Smith

NO

DATE 27 March 1952

TO—	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SPC/Von Kann	K 2044		29 MAR	VK
2. C-PY				
3. CIO				JWB
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

29 March 52

Bailey phoned me about this case a day or so ago and it seems that there is considerable pressure abuilding on the part of Mr. Scripps to be allowed to use the large balloons overtly. He is hoping to be able to get an answer to these people prior to the April 2nd meeting. Whether this is possible or not, I do not know.

It may be that this question must be raised again with the POCC since they were in on it at the beginning. Actually this may be an opportunity to have some overt agency do a job for us and the request should be evaluated on that basis.

VK

Was discussed informally at P.S.B. Luncheon on March 27th. Present Dulles. Wisner - Foster - Sargeant Brown, Barnes & Allen Pierce,

EXT 765

27 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPC

SUBJECT: Leaflet Balloons for use in Psychological Warfare

1. On at least four occasions Mr. William Scripps, Detroit News, directly or indirectly has approached the Government with proposals for utilization of balloons for psychological warfare. Following is a list of the dates and method of these approaches:

a. 12 October 1950 - Letter from General W. J. Donovan to DCI enclosing "Operation Ballast." On 1 November 1950 William H. Jackson responded to this memorandum to the effect that this suggested operation was being referred to the appropriate persons and suggesting a subsequent meeting with Donovan to discuss this and other matters.

b. In November 1950 as we were undertaking planning for development of balloons with General Mills, we were informed that Mr. Scripps planned a general meeting to be held in Washington to discuss balloons. Through the General Mills Washington Representative Mr. Scripps was persuaded to keep his meeting general and was informed that the various agencies of the Government had the matter under consideration and considered that it would not be in the public interest at this time to disclose the nature of their findings. Consequently, Mr. Scripps forwarded us on 1 December 1950 a proposal "The Use of Free Balloons for Load Carrying Purposes" which we acknowledged on 11 December 1950.

c. On December 26, 1950 General Smith received a letter from Blair Moody summarizing a suggestion from Mr. William Scripps for encouraging defection of Chinese Communist troops. A routine response to his letter was sent 6 January 1951 from Mr. Jackson. I believe also Mr. Moody called upon the Director in early February of 1951 to discuss use of balloons for psychological warfare. ADPC addressed a briefing memorandum to DCI on 12 February 1951, Subj: Balloons for Carrying PW Material to Soviet Areas.

2. In September 1950 the NPSB requested that CIA should represent all interested agencies of this Government and should accordingly take steps to develop, procure and stockpile an appropriate number of scientifically designed balloons for future propaganda use in conditions of international emergency. At meetings of the NPSB on 13 February 1951 and 11 June 1951 it was agreed that OPC would procure and stockpile 1,000 large leaflet balloons for use by the appropriate agency when and if such use was authorized. The Board also agreed that inquiries which the various govern-

mental agencies

mental agencies might receive concerning use of balloons would be answered to the effect"that the matter is under continuous study by agencies of the Government but disclosure of results at this time would not be in the public interest."

3. A perusal of the NPSB minutes since June 1951 did not indicate further consideration by that group of the subject of balloons. From this we must infer that CIA still bears the responsibility of the commitment made by Mr. Wisner for procurement.

4. For your information this research and development has been conducted for CIA by General Mills with ONR serving as the cut-out. An existing project "Skyhook" which ONR had with General Mills was accelerated to cover development of leaflet balloons continued along with ONR's program of cosmic ray research. We/are obligated to ONR to deny a newspaper access to these drawings, specifications, movies and reports which bear a SECRET classification.

5. I might make one small suggestion that since Mr. Blair Moody is now a Senator and running for re-election in the next election, it might be possible to solicite his aid in bringing Mr. Scripps in line with adopted policy regarding balloons should it become necessary.

R Smith
ROSALYN J. SMITH

73557

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

RDD/TSS

ACCESSION NO

DATE RECEIVED IN S A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1 Col. VonKann	2044 K	MAR 26 1952		VC
2 SAR				RSmith
3				
4 Col VonKann				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				

COMMENTS

Attached is the Memorandum for the Record mentioned in our telephone discussion 25 March 1952. Drawings and specifications of this item are in the possession of RDD, although the information is also on hand at General Mills. It carries a SECRET classification under our contractual arrangements with the U. S. Navy. Questions:

1. Does CIA still have the commitment made by Mr. Wisner to the National Psychological Strategy Board for procuring 1,000 of these balloon units for stockpile and use by any agency deemed advisable by that group?
2. Should RDD release the SECRET drawings and specifications, movies and reports on trial operations for use by the Detroit News?

L. R. Dailey

FORM NO. 51-9
SEP 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

(6141)

cc: G. O. Haglund

Mr. F. B. Jewett, Jr. 3/18/52

C. B. Moore

TELEPHONE CALLS, WILLIAM SCRIPPS, DETROIT NEWS CONFIDENTIAL

On 7 March, William Scripps of the Detroit News, called and asked for price estimate in lots of 100,000 of a carrier balloon system which would carry 300 pounds great distances. On discussion, it appeared that he was interested in something equivalent to our interim system, so I told him we had made a quotation on such a piece of equipment in quantities for prices in the range of $350 a unit. This piece of equipment under the expected wind condition, should carry 150 pounds 1500 miles and deliver it with the best possible accuracy from a balloon vehicle.

I asked him if he wanted specifications, but he said he would get these later. He was working with a group who would use them to carry propaganda, and he would see us in two weeks, and then would discuss and obtain exhibits. It was pointed out to him that this equipment and polyethylene were well controlled by the government. This appeared to be no problem to him.

Scripps called again on 18 March, and asked if we could attend a luncheon in Detroit Wednesday noon, the 2nd of April, and then go on to New York for a luncheon Thursday noon. He asked that we bring along data, cost estimates, exhibits, and all sales data, as well as movies, to this meeting. I asked if this had been cleared with Abbott's friends, and he didn't appear to know what I was talking about. I told him that some clearance would have to be obtained before either the gear was shown, or before it would be permitted to leave the country. Scripps is most enthusiastic about support forthcoming to carry such an operation forward, and felt that the State Department would interpose no objections for the program planned.

Scripps asked that we confirm on 19 March whether or not you and I would be able to attend. This I promised to do. I would also like your guidance as to what course should be pursued in this. It is believed that certainly Dailey or Gates Lloyd should be made aware of this effort, so that we may deport ourselves accordingly. Incidentally, Dewey and Almy will be at both meetings, in New York and Detroit. Upon asked if we had any objections, I said, "Of course not."

CBM:he
cc: J. R. Smith
G. O. Haglund

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

20 ~~56~~ 44

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2-7693

[illegible] by D DCI

27 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Deputy Director (Plans)
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Conversation with Admiral Miller

I shall make a practice of bringing to your attention current matters for discussion between Admiral Miller and me, the first of which took place today and covered the following items:

1. At the suggestion of Bob Lang, seconded later by NCFE's Chairman, Joseph Grew, Admiral Miller wants to hold at the Princeton Inn on the 10th and 11th of May a general discussion of United States policy toward Iron Curtain countries, with particular emphasis upon what new lines, if any, Radio Free Europe should take. The background of this, according to Admiral Miller, is that Lang and others within RFE feel that the time is running out behind the Iron Curtain, that the people are ready for revolution and that we cannot continue much longer the "hold everything" line. They want to gather a group of experts, including Messrs. Wisner and Dulles, to discuss what policy we should now adopt.

Action

I see no reason why we shouldn't have such a general bull session and I will not attempt to discourage it unless instructed.

2. Admiral Miller recently had a talk with Frank Altschul who complained somewhat of his treatment at the hands of NCFE and CIA, saying that he had never even had so much as a word of thanks for the work he did. Miller suggested that the DDCI might want to write such a letter and that, if so, a similar letter should go to Dewitt Poole.

Action

For the DDCI to write a letter might smack a little of thanking himself since he was engaged in the Altschul regime in the New York operation. I therefore suggest that the DD/P, when he finds an early opportunity to write to Altschul on some matter, mention his gratitude.

SECRET

3. Miller hopes that no decision has been made to put Admiral Kirk and his Committee for the Liberation of the Russian People under Crusade for Freedom cover. He thinks this would be a great mistake because it would further stretch the already too thin cover of the Crusade and he further says that if it has to be done, he cannot agree that the Crusade effort should be lessened according to the agreement with the State Department.

Action

?

I understand that subsequently Admiral Miller talked to Mr. Dulles who made it clear that no decision had been made to put Admiral Kirk and his Committee under the Crusade but that we here in CIA would much appreciate it if NCFE could see its way clear to doing so. Admiral Miller agreed that he would take the matter up with the Board of Directors and if they were favorably inclined, CIA would take up with State the possibility of amending to some extent the decision to cut down on the Crusade in order to try to furnish better cover for this operation.

4. Admiral Miller said that Landowsky and Ranft were still in Greece, that the situation was impossible and that one of them must go. He said that his advice from Bob Lang was that the NCFE man was the better of the two and therefore it should be Landowsky who must go.

Action

The history of this problem is involved and long. Landowsky has been called home, however, and will not go back to Greece so that it no longer remains a problem. I have told Admiral Miller.

5. Admiral Miller has been talking to the Ford Foundation on the subject of the Hildebrand operation in Berlin. The Board had taken a dim view on the accountings, a matter which he straightened out by promising better ones. Ford raised the question of whether or not NCFE wanted Ford to spend the additional $50,000 pledged after the payments of the present $50,000 eight months from now. C. D. Jackson was present at this meeting and told Ford he did not feel the operation was worth an additional $50,000. Miller reserved judgment, however. He wanted to know whether CIA wished him to hold Ford to its pledge of an additional $50,000 or not.

Action

I have checked this with the EE Division, which has cabled the field and come to the view that this operation is still very important. They want to urge Admiral Miller to hold Ford to its agreement. I passed this on to Admiral Miller.

6. On 28 January John Hughes wrote a letter to Mr. Dulles asking CIA's view of the problem of the evacuation of RFE employees in Munich and elsewhere in the event of war. He said he thought this problem was extremely important and there had been no answer to the letter.

Action

This Division received this letter last week and we are working on it. Meantime I suggest Mr. Dulles sign the attached note to John Hughes.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Draft ltr to John Hughes.

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDCI (thru DD/P & ADPC)
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

27 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

Today the Director discussed with Mr. Henry Ford, II the possibility of his assuming the Chairmanship of the Crusade for Freedom next year. I understand that Mr. Ford is warm.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET

In reply refer to: W-1939

26 March 1952

Dear Min:

A little incident has caused a bit of trouble and a flurry of cables here that I think you can correct very quickly. Spencer Phenix's assistant, Mr. Miller, has written to Leon Dennen telling Dennen that Miller has been called in by our shop and questioned in detail about recent Dennen accounting.

Whether or not he was questioned in detail is a matter on which he and I might disagree but is really of no consequence since the accounting by Dennen should normally go through us to Miller, and I think you would agree that we had a right to ask questions about it. What bothers me a little, however, is Miller's writing to Dennen, giving details of how our two offices work together. Dennen, it turns out, was annoyed by the content of Miller's letter, not so much at Miller as at us. His annoyance is misplaced but if there had been no mention by Miller of details of our relationship there would have been no annoyance.

I presume you know of Dennen's close affiliation with Lovestone and the possibility that this small thing will reverberate around and around the usual vicious circle. Can you explain to Miller how these little incidents can get blown up into big issues and ask him to use a little more discretion in the future?

Sincerely,

Oliver E. Hadwood

Admiral H. B. Miller
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.
110 W. 57th Street
New York 19, New York

CIO:TWB:eh
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - Executive Off.
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

Executive Registry
2-2486

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:
CIO

NO. 00441 Q-J / 7347

DATE 27 March 1952

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. ADPC		MAR 29 1952	1 April	FAL-13	I am attaching a memorandum which I received today, the subject of which may be of general interest to you. RWB RWB
2. DD/P Col. Taylor		2 April			
3. DDCI			4/4	Noted by O/DCI 4/4/52	
4. ~~CID~~ →					Thayer for comment [illegible]
5. CIO					
6.					Mr. Dulles suggests sending this to Thayer for comment REL 4 Apr 52
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

P-2166

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

Executive Registry
2-7316

25 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: EE-2
WE-3

SUBJECT: Establishment of a "Propaganda Section" in SHAPE under Control of an Hungarian Refugee.

Summarized below is a report from a reliable source in Paris with regard to the reported establishment under the control of an Hungarian refugee of a "propaganda section" in SHAPE:

> "The first rumors are somewhat vague with regard to a new propaganda service which will be established in Eisenhower's Headquarters. It is a Supreme Direction of propaganda as was the case during the last war. This service will comprise military sections for propaganda on the other side of the Iron Curtain including parachute activities; also sections for classic propaganda.
>
> "According to source's information, the head of the section for the countries of Eastern Europe will be Mr. Mihaly Zoldheyli, an Hungarian who is a Colonel of the Reserve in the French Army. Mr. Zoldheyli, about 50 years old, has had an interesting career. He left Hungary after the first revolution, he lived several years in the United States, he enjoyed, as a socialist, support of American labor, and it was at their initiative that he joined the front in Spain. Of the left, but anti-Communist, he was one of the chiefs under the pseudonym of General Santiago. Returning to France he was interned, then liberated from the camp at the personal intervention of Jules Moch, a leading French socialist politician (recently Minister of Defense). Under the pseudonym of Major Michel, he was one of the heroes of the anti-Nazi resistance in Southern France. He appeared to be the only officer in the French Army who did not have French nationality. He is married to a Frenchwoman and has one child. He now works in Paris in the office of the Force Ouvriere. He appears to be a man of confidence to both the Americans and the French."

Ellen Stern
ELLEN STERN
IO

SECRET

cc: ADPC
DD/P
DDCI

SEC

SECURITY INFORMATION

25 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF FINANCE DIVISION

SUBJECT: TPTONIC and TPHEDIC

It is requested that the $4,000,000 revolving fund for TPTONIC be replenished by a total of $1,302,004 to cover disbursements from TPHEDIC to TPTONIC under date of 18 March 1952 in the amounts of $924,504 and $377,500. Receipts for these disbursements from TPTONIC are being forwarded to the Finance Division, attention Mr. Edward Downey, this date, under separate cover.

GEORGE E. BREMER
Chief
Psychological Staff Division

Approved:

Thomas W. Braden
Chief, International Organizations Division

PY/Exo/REM/PAM;mb

Distribution:
- Addressee - Orig & 2
- CPY - 1
- CIO - 1✓
- RI - 2
- PY/Exo - 1

SECRET

Executive Registry
2-2187

Noted by D/DCI
4/14/52

In reply refer to:

25 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Deputy Director (Plans)
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Attached Letter from Spencer Phenix

Attached is a letter from Spencer Phenix to Bob Lang in which Phenix details the story of his efforts to reach agreement with the German authorities on the status of RFE under the new post-HICOG government. I would judge that Spencer has done a wonderful job to date and that things are on the track, but I think you would be interested in reading his letter and the second attachment, which is the memorandum of understanding with the German Government on which he is now working.

Thomas Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr 3 Mar 52 to Bob Lang.

SECRET

Paris, March 3, 1952

Dear Bob,

I have not done much reporting on our German negotiations for several reasons; first, there was not much to report and, second, whatever there was Dick Condon undertook to forward from Munich. I did write C.D. a couple of letters outlining our delays and some of our uncertainties, and last week I cabled him that I would send a more detailed narrative when I got to Paris. As he is now technically no longer President of NCFE, and as Admiral Miller may not have been completely informed of all that we are trying to do, I am addressing this to you, with copy to each of them.

In the first place, let me say that progress during the last half of last week was surprisingly speedy and encouraging. There are still many opportunities for the well known "slip 'twixt the cup and the lip", and local German political considerations could rear their ugly heads at any moment. I think it must also be understood that, as Dick Condon puts it, no matter how many nor how good written agreements we may have covering our operations, the whole RFE enterprise in Germany will have to be played pretty much by ear once the contractual agreements take effect. I regard this, however, as an inescapable risk, and I mention it now only to emphasize the paramount importance of the utmost care in programming and in conduct to avoid a boner which could upset our entire apple-cart. The very favorable report which your friend Asher Lee made after his hurried inspection of Munich underlines the need for regular spot check on program output to avoid howlers, and the need for this once our relationship with the Germans is no longer through the Occupation Authorities or HICOG is even more imperative.

Dick Condon sent you from Munich the text of the proposed Bundespost license which we agreed on with Dr. Schuster on February 19, 1952, and this should long since have reached you.

Our Bonn negotiations resulted in the acceptance of this text, with two exceptions;

1) Sub-clause 2 of Article II is eliminated. You will remember that the Bundespost wished to insert a provision authorizing license cancellation if RFE should broadcast anything which "it will be the opinion of the Federal Government that the transmissions will prejudice

the interest of the Federal Republic". We objected to this on two grounds;

a) that such provision had no logical place in a technical license, and

b) that it made our position far too precarious since it exposed us to license cancellation practically at the whim of any German bureaucrat,

and we persuaded Dr. Schuster to leave it out of the license and let us discuss the problem at Bonn. At Bonn, we were fortunately able to persuade the Foreign Office officials that such a provision had no technical place in the license, and that whatever should be said on the subject should be said in an exchange of letters, or the equivalent, between the Foreign Office and ourselves. Accordingly, Article II now contains but one clause.

2) Question was raised by the Foreign Office officials at Bonn regarding the length of the license. The text Dick sent you provides for validity until August 31, 1960. The reason I chose that date was that it is the expiration date of our lease on the Holzkirchen transmitter site, and I thought that if an arbitrary term were to be fixed that tying it in with the Holzkirchen lease gave it a plausibility which would help acceptance - and that proved to be the case so far as the Bundespost was concerned.

The Foreign Office people told us, however, that numerous questions had been asked in the Bundestag regarding RFE and its programs, and that for the Government to give us a license for as long as eight years would cause serious criticism. We are a peculiar sort of animal, anyway, and for our irregular activities to be blessed with such long term approval would, they thought, be unwise for both their and our points of view. Accordingly, they suggested a four-year period; I countered with five, dating from the date of license issuance which (since it cannot take place before the contractual agreements become effective, may well be late in 1952) will give us considerably more than five years life expectancy. My own feeling is that if we have not done our job within five years, we might as well pull down the shade and go home. In any case, my counter proposal was, as I said, accepted, and Article III of the license will now read;

"This license shall be valid for a period of five years commencing with the date of its issuance and will be automatically extended thereafter from year to year unless written notice of termination is given by one party to the other not less than 90 days prior to the next expiration date."

So much for the license, the terms of which were shown to our HICOG friends and regarded by them as highly favorable.

Our political discussions suffered from a variety of frustrations. We agreed on the license terms with the Bundespost on February 19th, and an appointment was made for us to see Dr. Lenz - the official to whom Doctor Adenauer had referred our problems - at noon on Thursday, February 21, 1952. Dick and I, therefore, took an early train from Frankfort and were met at the Bonn station by Fritz Kempner who told us that the appointment had been cancelled as Dr. Lenz had been called to the Chancellery on an urgent matter. Fritz said that he had been told that if we went to Dr. Lenz's office, his assistant would make a definite appointment for us later. We did this, and were received by a smooth and non-committal individual, who said he would not be in touch with Dr. Lenz until nine o'clock that evening, and could not make any definite date until after he had spoken with Lenz.

I had the very uncomfortable feeling that we were being given a run-around, and Fritz was very much annoyed. We finally got the young chap to agree that he would try to reach Lenz before evening, and that we would telephone him during course of the afternoon to know what information he had been able to obtain. We telephoned repeatedly, but the answer was always the same; "nothing to report". Dick and I, therefore, took the train back to Frankfort, while Fritz stayed in Bonn and, in the evening, he telephoned that he had finally got some information from Lenz' young assistant that Lenz had turned the entire matter over to a regular Foreign Office official named Strohm, and that we were to make arrangements to see Strohm. Fritz said that he had endeavored to do this, but had been told by Strohm's office that he could not be sure to see us until Thursday, the 28th, although Wednesday, the 27th, was a slight possibility.

As I think I wrote C.D., the Fasching celebrations were reaching their climax over that weekend, and the first two days of the next week, and I have no doubt that Strohm's unavailability was, to a certain extent, related to Fasching. Fritz said that during his visit to the Foreign Office building he noticed that the rooms were all decorated with Fasching decorations, so that even the highest officials apparently take Fasching seriously. Not wanting to make another fruitless trip to Bonn, I decided we would accept Strohm's appointment for Thursday, February 28th.

At 10.30 AM on Thursday, February 28th, Dick, Fritz and I presented ourselves at Strohm's office. We were met by a sober and not too effusive individual, named Bruckner, who informed us that, unfortunately, Dr. Strohm had been called away from his office, that he would return as soon as he could and that, meanwhile, he - Bruckner - would be glad to start preliminary discussions.

Again, I placed a somewhat sinister interpretation on what appeared to be a chronic tendency on the part of the German officials authorized to negotiate with us to be absent whenever we put in an appearance for the purpose of negotiating with them. My pessimism was increased by the very rigid and uncooperative attitude of Bruckner, although I realized that having no authority and probably having been insufficiently briefed he was, naturally, keeping his neck well within the protection of his collar. In any case, he brought up some of the stickiest questions connected with our operation, talked of parliamentary interpellations, of the responsibility of the German authorities for anything broadcast from German soil, of the importance of German participation in determining program content, of the dangers of arousing refugee antagonism, and so on and so forth.

After an hour of this, I was ready to call it a day and suggest that we come back when we could talk to Strohm but, fortunately, at that moment Strohm came in and the entire atmosphere changed. He apologized profusely - and apparently sincerely - for the delay, expressed himself anxious to co-operate in every possible way to meet our requirements, brushed aside some of the technicalities raised by Bruckner, and got down to the essentials very rapidly. We went over the ground we had previously gone over with Bruckner, we explained our purpose and kept our feet fairly firmly planted on the principles which we regarded as basic. The result of our long discussion was substantial agreement on the two things that mattered most:

a) license term of five years, and

b) no unqualified cancellation right of the kind first suggested by the Bundespost, and more or less insisted upon by Bruckner.

The area of agreement was so broad that we suggested an adjournment to permit us to put in writing the agreement we had reached, return with it to the Foreign Office, and agree upon a final text.

Fritz was a little too optimistic regarding the task that lay before us, and it was clear an hour or so before the time fixed for our afternoon appointment that we would not be ready, so we telephoned to Strohm and postponed the appointment until the next day at noon. We worked all afternoon at HICOG, and until after midnight in our Cologne hotel. We had talked about an exchange of letters as the vehicle for the agreement, but it became difficult to determine who was writing what to whom since the Germans could not very well offer to give us something we had not asked for, and we, the New York State Corporation, could hardly demand certain rights from the German Government.

Nothing that we were able to compose satisfied my requirements until shortly before midnight the use of a new formula, namely, a memorandum of understanding between me, representing NCFE, and Dr. ________ (whether Strohm, Lenz, or Hallstein -which I do not know) representing the German Government, could be initialed and made the basis for agreement. This formula broke the mental log-jam, and we did a paper, a copy of which is enclosed.

Friday morning, we went back to HICOG, Dick typed the manuscript which Fritz and I had prepared, and we took a copy in to Sam Reber. Sam raised a few questions which we were easily able to answer, made one suggestion, namely, the insertion of the word "basic" in the 8th line on page 3, then expressed himself as completely satisfied. He attached the very greatest importance to getting from the Germans the endorsement of RFE's objectives, which they had given to us orally and which we expressed in the paragraph commencing at the bottom of page 2. He thought we would have accomplished the almost impossible if we obtained such written endorsement.

From HICOG we went direct to Dr. Strohm's office, showed him the memorandum (Fritz had not had time to prepare a German translation and we were afraid this might delay matters, but Strohm said he found the text entirely clear) and got from him immediately a practically complete approval. Bruckner joined us a little later, and he followed Strohm's lead. There were only two points of difference between us, and neither of them did I regard as substantial. You will see that on page 4 I asked for agreement that the German Government would cooperate with us to the fullest possible extent in respect of three items, only one of which, namely, (c) was within the competency of the Foreign Office. Strohm and Bruckner argued very logically that the Foreign Office could not bind the Finance Ministry or any other Ministry of the German Government and advised very earnestly against seeking in advance to obtain the approval of the Finance Ministry. I recognized the validity of both these points. I incorporated items (a) and (b) in the paper because I did not know who would sign on the part of the German Government. Had it been Adenauer or, by his instructions, Hallstein, it could be argued that their signatures did in effect bind the entire Government. If, however, it was to be Strohm, as he indicated it would be, then, obviously, he was without power in the premises. It was agreed, therefore, that (a) and (b) would be omitted, and that instead thereof Strohm would draft a general clause binding the Foreign Office to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with NCFE in reaching satisfactory solutions of any problems arising between NCFE and any

Ministries of the German Government.

Item (c), obviously, was intended to cover particularly the question of visas for Poles now in London who had been recruited for program work in Munich. In our talks on Thursday, Strohm had promised to facilitate the entry of these Poles, and said that if Dick would send in their names, birth dates and any other identifying information we had he would instruct the German Consul in London to issue the visas, and that general instructions would, if we wished, be sent out to the effect that possession of an employment letter from NCFE would be sufficient justification for the issuance of a visa, subject only to the security question. On that point, Strohm expressed the wish that our recruits be screened for us by CIC. We pointed out the impracticability of this.

I call your particular attention to the language of the two full paragraphs on page 3. This was very carefully devised, and I am convinced that it is more favorable to us than we had any reason to expect. As I told you, Reber accepted it with the single change mentioned above. Nelson and Thurston thought it excellent, and Charley Lewis, to whom I showed it Friday, said it was "the optimum".

The Germans had indicated a desire for some kind of a pre-scrutiny of our programs to avoid political conflict. This would, of course, have fatally crippled our effectiveness, so the language that I drafted was drafted for the purpose of emphasizing the post-broadcast nature of any German scrutiny. In order to avoid frivolous complaints from any German official, I stipulated that any protest must reach NCFE through the Foreign Office. This, also, places NCFE in a position to put any such controversy before the State Department, and if the issue involved is a substantial one to have State do the necessary vis-a-vis the Foreign Office. If, notwithstanding the German protest, and notwithstanding the intervention of the State Department, should the latter wish to become involved, RFE continued to violate the German request, I phrased the next step as involving the surrender by us of the license rather than its cancellation. This may be a fine point, but I felt it interposed one more step between the fall of the guillotine axe and the dropping of the head in the basket. I found, to my relief, that the use of the Portuguese formula, namely, the filing of the broadcast tapes for thirty days to permit examination by the Germans was a completely acceptable device, and you will note that I based this procedure on the desirability of providing a "factual basis for the consideration of any question".

We left with Dr. Strohm a copy of this memorandum of understanding, and he undertook to prepare and forward to me in Paris a draft of a letter incorporating our agreement as set forth in the memorandum, with the modifications outlined above, which the Foreign Office would be prepared officially to address to NCFE immediately upon the coming into effect of the contractual agreements, and which would have attached to it a copy of the license which would be granted by the Bundespost as of the date of the coming into effect of the contractual agreements. This letter, when acknowledged and accepted by NCFE, would constitute, with the license, the agreement between the parties. Dr. Strohm promised to have the draft in Paris by Wednesday or Thursday of this week.

Fritz is in London this week in connection with the German debts negotiations, but will return for the week-end at which time he and I will go over the draft together. It seems to both of us unlikely that we shall be able to accept Dr. Strohm's draft without any change whatsoever, and it will, therefore, probably be necessary for us to go back to Bonn for one or perhaps two days to iron out any remaining difficulties to agree on a final text and to initial such text with the Germans for the purpose of recording our agreement.

Both Fritz and I are astonished at the apparent ease with which our negotiations progressed. We were able to reach agreement on the most important questions concerned, but we are both cautious and we both realize that between last Friday's agreement and next Thursday's draft letter there may be some vast divergencies, but certainly if the spoken word can be relied upon, and if a friendly, cooperative and even generous attitude on the part of the principal German officials of the Bundespost and Foreign Office to whom we spoke is significant, the German authorities are genuinely anxious to make it possible for RFE to continue to operate effectively, I think that we are all justified in feeling very much encouraged by what it has been possible to accomplish in the past two weeks.

If the above time schedule can be observed, and if not later than Tuesday of next week we can have the documents in final shape and duly initialed, I plan to leave Paris for Lisbon, via Panair do Brasil, on Thursday, the 13th, stay in Lisbon not more than one week, and be back in New York around the 21st.

I enclose a copy of the English translation of the proposed Bundespost license as agreed upon on February 19th, with the new Article III referred to above, and a copy of the draft Memorandum of Understanding dated February 29, 1952, so that you may have before you all the relevant papers.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Robert E. Lang,
Director, RFE,
110 West 57th Street,
New York 19, N.Y. - U.S.A.

cc Mr. C.D. Jackson, Admiral Miller, Mr. J.C. Hughes,
Mr. F.C. Kempner

I. The Bundesminister fuer das Post- und Fernmeldewesen hereby grants to the NCFE, a membership corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York (USA) recognized in the Federal Republic as a foreign "Verein", a licence to operate the radio installations listed and specified in the Annex as foreign radio station on German territory on the following conditions.

1. In operating the radio installations the NCFE will use only the frequencies and call signs allocated to it from time to time by the competent authorities of the USA, and duly notified by said authorities to the competent organs of the International Telecommunications Union.

2. The radio installations may be only operated for broadcasting purposes (Radio Regulations Chapter I Article I Section II n. 21 and 22)* of the NCFE; international point to point connections for broadcasting purposes are also permitted subject to the consent of interested foreign administrations; for purposes of third parties the radio installations may not be used without prior written consent of the BPMin.

3. Without prior written consent of the BPMin NCFE is not permitted to change the technical specifications of the above mentioned radio transmitting installations or to put additional radio transmitting installations into operation; changes in frequencies and call signs used must be notified to the BPMin in advance.

---

* Broadcasting Service:

21 a) A radiocommunication service of transmissions to be received directly by the general public.

22 b) This service may include transmissions of sounds or transmissions by television, facsimile or other means.

4. The radio installations will be operated in accordance with the provisions of the International Telecommunications Convention presently in force (Atlantic City 1947) and the Radio Regulations annexed to said convention and any conventions or Regulations, to which the Federal Republic is a party which may take their place.

5. In the event of interference by NCFE radio installations with German radio services NCFE in consultation with the DBP will tak necessary measures to eliminate the interference as rapidly as possible.

6. Duly accredited representatives of DBP shall be accorded free access to all technical installations of NCFE's radio stations in Germany during office hours as well as outside office hours, the latter only upon prior notification.

7. NCFE shall reimburse DBP for all sums which DBP is obliged to expend as a result of accidents suffered by any of its employees in the performance of their duties on the premises of NCFE.

8. The license fee for the above-mentioned radio installations is fixed at $ 10,000.-- per year, payable in advance in quarterly instalments on the first of each quarter by remittance to Bank Deutscher Laender in favor of the Generalpostkasse of DBB, except that as a first installment there shall be paid an amount computed pro rata temporis from the date of the license to the first of the next following quarter.

II. This license is not transferable. It can be revoked at any time without notice if

1) one of the conditions of the license (I) should be violated and such violation should continue despite request to desist;

III) This license shall be valid for a period of five years commencing with the date of its issuance and will be automaticall extended thereafter from year to year unless written notice of termination is given by one party to the other not less than 9o days prior to the next expiration date.

IV) In the event of revocation (II) or of expiration (III) of the license the operation of the radio installations shall be discontinued at once.

Draft 29 Feb 1952

Memorandum of understanding between Mr. Phenix, representing the NCFE and Dr. ______________, representing the Federal German Republic

Mr. Phenix stated that the NCFE had been founded in 1949 by a group of private American citizens animated by the desire to encourage by positive measures the eventual liberation from the communist yoke of the peoples of the enslaved countries of Central and Eastern Europe. He explained that with the help of endowments and public contributions to the Crusade for Freedom, the Committee had undertaken, among its other activities, the operation through Radio Free Europe of radio broadcasting installations through which it disseminated to listeners in the Iron Curtain countries programs especially prepared by the Committee for the furtherance of its objectives. He pointed out that Radio Free Europe had constructed and was presently operating transmitter stations at Holzkirchen and Biblis, had erected a large studio and office building in Munich and maintained a large monitoring establishment at Schleissheim and that its programs were prepared with the help of leading scholars, journalists, administrators and economic experts, and men of letters who have escaped from the communist control of their native land.

Mr. Phenix explained that the installation of RFE facilities in the United States Zone of Germany had been effected by the NCFE during the occupation of that Zone by the U.S. Army and that the operations of RFE had been, and were being facilitated by the U.S. Army authorities because of RFE's status as an accredited American information agency. He observed that the NCFE was concerned lest the termination of the Occupation Status would, in the absence of specific agreement with the Federal German Republic, result in hampering the work of RFE and impairing its effectiveness, and that, with the approval of the Department of State, negotiations had been carried on with the BPMin which had resulted in agreement as to the terms of a license which would be granted by the BPMin to NCFE immediately upon the termination of the Occupation Statute. A copy of that license is appended hereto.

Mr. Phenix called attention to the fact that this license dealt with the technical aspects of RFE's radio broadcast operations and that there were several non-technical matters which required clarification before the NCFE would feel justified in undertaking the long range program it has under consideration.

Dr. __________stated that the objectives and purposes of NCFE, in the realization of which RFE was engaged, were objectives and purposes to which the Federal Government itself was unalterably committed. The negotiations for a BPMin license had been conducted with his full knowledge and approval. He was well aware that by licensing RFE's operation in Germany, fully cognizant of the objectives and purposes of that operation, the Federal Government was on the one hand encouraging the expenditure by NCFE for that operation of large sums of money contributed by the American public and on the other was giving NCFE an assurance that RFE's operation in Germany would not be interfered with, but on the contrary would be facilitated and helped by the Federal Government.

From his viewpoint there was only one reservation he had to make: RFE would be expected to refrain from using its broadcast facilities on German soil for the purpose of advocating and promoting political ends which the Federal Government considered in conflict with its own basic policies. Hence, the Federal Government would have the right, officially to notify NCFE through the Foreign Office of any such conflict. Should the German stations of RFE thereupon not refrain from advocating and promoting the policies to which the Federal Government had objected, the Federal Government would have no choice but to require the surrender by NCFE of its license and the discontinuance of its broadcast operations from German territory.

Mr. Phenix stated that he understood the reasons for the views expressed by Dr. _________, accepted his reservation, and agreed to the procedure outlined, and that to provide a factual basis for the consideration of any question which might arise in respect of RFE broadcasts the latter would keep on file for a period of 30 days from the date of use all tapes recording programs broadcast from RFE transmitters in Germany so that any questioned program would be available to the appropriate German authorities when requested by them. Mr. Phenix then emphasized the importance attached by NCFE to certain other aspects of the operating problems of RFE, for example:

(a) that property of NCFE brought into Germany prior to the termination of the Occupation Statute be recognized as legally within Germany and subject to the free disposition of NCFE.

(b) that NCFE be recognized as a non-profit organization of public interest and that in respect of its operations in Germany it and its employees are entitled to no less favorable treatment than any comparable German non-profit corporation or entity.

(c) that the non-German personnel now employed by NCFE in Germany be permitted to remain in Germany while so employed and that additional non-German employees be permitted to enter Germany for such employment subject only to the right of the competent Germany authorities to deny entry to any individual whose presence in Germany would in their opinion prejudice German internal security.

Dr.__________ stated that he recognized the importance of these elements in the operation of RFE in Germany and that the Federal German Republic would cooperate with NCFE to the fullest possible extent in meeting its requirements with respect thereto.

DD RECORD MATERIAL

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.

2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES, RM GA-50, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.

3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4598.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

3. IP/FS GA-10 S. Corbat			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. RETURN TO: IP/ARD/PSU GA-50			

To Requester:

Please return this reference to IP/ARD/PSU immediately after use.

RECORDS CENTER

JOB NO. 78-2777

SPACE NO. 433936

FILE NO.

DOCUMENT

FOLDER NO. 3

BOX NO. 2

E2 IMPDET CL BY: 062147

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AMSCROLL
1 JAN 67 thru FEB. 1968

19-120-26
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIO PART VI

TO RECORDS CENTER
ATELY AFTER USE
2777 BOX 2
CENTER
USE
X P19

433936

FOLDER #3

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO RID/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

Amscroll 2P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

XX MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMSCROLL
Termination of AMSCROLL Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
AR: See paragraph 3.

1. The AMSCROLL activity was terminated 31 August 1967 and all operations ceased at that time.

2. The following AMSCROLL employees were terminated effective 31 August 1967 and were given a termination settlement of three months' salary.

a.	Fernando ALLOZA (radio script writer)	201-286580
b.	Miss Diana FERNANDEZ-RUBIO Moller (secretary)	201-753918
c.	Juan Manuel ESPINOSA-CONDE (clerk)	201-754327
d.	Dr. Luis Antonio RODRIQUEZ-CACERES (stock clerk)	201-754907
e.	Alfredo HERNANDEZ-LOVIO (messenger)	201-789623
f.	no 201 Dr. Manuel *MARINAS, Carmona DPOB: 26 December 1920 Manzanillo, Oriente (radio script writer)	no 201
g.	no 201 Mrs. Ana Maria *BARROSO, Gomez DPOB: 19 June 1938 Cienfuegos, Las Villas, Cuba (typist)	no 201
h.	no 201 Rene *GALIS-MENENDEZ DPOB: 23 June 1923 Matanzas, Cuba (clerk)	no 201

MICROFILMED
MAR 8 1968
DOC MICRO. SER.

CONTINUED

Distribution:
7 - WH/COG

CS COPY

FEB 22 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-286580
201-754907
201-789623
201-754327 201-753918

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-29593

DATE
23 February 1968

HQS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

19-120-26/3

All of the persons on this list have been with AMSCROLL in excess of three years except Alfredo HERNANDEZ-LOVIA who was terminated in October 1965. He was paid the full three months termination due to the unusually faithful service he has rendered for a very small salary. He worked full time for $90.00 per month.

3. None of those listed in paragraph two has an MOC or an OA with the exception of HERNANDEZ-LOVIA who was granted an OA on 29 May 1967. The Station requests that this OA be cancelled.

4. All of the above AMSCROLL personnel were amicably terminated and the personnel have since been re-employed in the local community. So far as the Station is aware, there have been no security, personnel, or other problems of interest to the Station resulting from the termination of this activity.

5. There were four Station agents involved in this operation at the time of its termination. They were AMWORD-1, AMWORD-2, AMWORD-3, and AMFRAME-1. All but AMFRAME-1 were terminated and individual termination dispatches are being forwarded as appropriate.

Roger E. Marchbank

Roger E. MARCHBANK

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Administrative/TYPIC/Amendment of MOC's

REFERENCE A. UFGT 20355
B. UFGA 28653
C. UFGW 6778

1. Action on the Reference A (AMFRAME-1) and Reference B (AMSCROLL-3) requests for amendment of MOC's is being held in abeyance pending receipt of your comments on the AMFRAME activity as requested in Reference C.

2. In the meantime we would appreciate additional information explaining the increased compensation for AMSCROLL-3. Reference A adequately explained the increase for AMFRAME-1, but Reference B contained none of the comments normally submitted with this type of request.

George L. TRANGER

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

UFGS 10024 03 November 1967

SECRET

1 - WH/C/REG
1 - Chrono
1 - WH/6 (Admin)
1 - AMFRAME-1
1 - AMSCROLL-3
1 - WH/Contracts

WH/Contracts

14-00000

AMSCROLL 041

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

LNLOFT Approval of Modified CA Program

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paragraph 2

1. On 8 September 1967 LNLOFT approved a status report on U.S.-based WOFACT-supported Anti-Castro Operations. The report contained the following specific proposals:

a. Termination of support to AMSCROLL by 31 December 1967 (with responsibility for production of economic data for distribution abroad to be assigned to another project).

b. Termination of support to AM[illegible] prior to 31 December 1967 but with a proviso authorizing retention of "two or three" agents in order to maintain access to and influence among Latin American labor leaders and organizations.

c. Termination of support to AM[illegible] on or about 31 August 1967 but with a proviso for retention of contacts with two principal agents in order to maintain access to important sports officials and organizations.

d. Termination of support to AMRATIO on 30 September 1967.

e. Continuation of support to AM[illegible] for the production of Spanish language materials aimed primarily at [illegible] outside the U.S. The following extract from the report contains a specific action requirement:

"The AM[illegible] is registered as a profit-making commercial enterprise and has a legitimate monthly income of about $[illegible]; however, the Cuban makeup of its staff, the nature of its output, and its modest income from non-WOFACT sources would strongly

UFGW 6620 21 September 1967

S E C R E T 10-1?-68

1 - RI
1 - Chrono C/WH/COG/CA Paul E. Oberst po 6796
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/CA
(chrono)

1

[illegible] to [illegible] will [illegible] therefore [illegible] to [illegible] his [illegible] way."

f. Continuation of support to [illegible]. The following quote is of particular interest:

"...the political content of the programs [illegible] of [illegible] would definitely [illegible] and that this is a good commercial enterprise. Although this operation is vulnerable to further allegations of [illegible] sponsorship, the risks are believed to be acceptable in order to continue these exile broadcasts to Cuba. [illegible] to improve the commercial cover of the operation by [illegible] commercial sponsors, but it must be candidly recognized that these steps will not produce completely dependable cover. Since publication of 'The Invisible Government' there has not been any major publicity concerning [illegible] support of [illegible], probably because [illegible] involvement is more or less accepted as a fact and the story is no longer newsworthy."

g. Continuation of support to [illegible]-2 but termination of support to her foundation. The following quote describes required follow-up action:

"In order to minimize the possibility of embarrassment to [illegible], [illegible] proposes the following actions: prior to 31 December 1967 the Foundation will be provided with a final separation settlement of approximately [illegible] with the understanding that this payment terminates all [illegible] financial support to the Foundation and that the Foundation henceforth will pay the rent, salaries, and other expenses that have been underwritten by [illegible]. These funds, together with those on hand ([illegible]) should permit the Foundation to continue its activities for approximately three years. From [illegible]'s standpoint, the assured existence of the Foundation will enable [illegible]-2 to continue her varied and useful activities in the refugee community and thereby keep her active in a productive way--both important factors in view of her psychological make-up and essential in preventing her from becoming disenchanted with her exile status.

"Despite the intention to terminate [illegible]'s relationship with the Foundation, [illegible] intends to retain a direct contact with [illegible]-2 due to her importance... and to the need to maintain control over her activities as distinct from those of the Foundation. Future payments to [illegible]-2 for salary and personal expenses will be made directly but restricted to those covering her weekly [illegible] program, speaking engagements, and her writings and publications. This payment is expected to approximate [illegible] annually."

4. Please let us know as soon as possible how you plan to implement the authorized [illegible] funding of the [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]

DISPATCH

SECRET

09
10483

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT Operational/Proposed AMFRAME Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. AMSCROLL Quarterly Progress Report for period 1 July - 30 September 1967
B. UFGW-6699

1. Please pouch additional information about the proposed development of "the new AMFRAME organization" in order to enable Headquarters to determine if there is any conflict with the intent of the LNLOFT action approving the termination of AMSCROLL.

2. As you may recall, it was originally thought that distribution of economic data might be handled by AMHIM, after termination of AMSCROLL, possibly by creation of an AMHIM economic desk staffed by former AMSCROLL employees. In any event, neither Headquarters nor LNLOFT anticipated that the termination of one organization would be followed by development of another conducting the same operational activities. On the contrary, our presentation to LNLOFT emphasized further reductions of organizational support.

3. In addition to a detailed description of the proposed organization and related administrative and operational cost estimates, please forward more information about plans for distribution of the new series.

Michael C. CHOADEN

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

MICROFILMED
NOV 18 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

19-120-26

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-278758	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW-6778	DATE 2 NOV 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

30 October 1967

Distribution:
1 - WH/Reg/C
1 - WH/COG/CA
1 - WH/COG
1 - 201-278758

ABSTRACT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/CA	P.Oberst	jmg	5003

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG		David A. Phillips

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
[illegible]	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMSCROLL
Economic Intelligence Report Publication

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: MEXICO CITY 2578

We forward under separate cover three copies of the Spanish Edition of the current AMSCROLL Economic Report and in the future will send one English and three Spanish copies as requested in the reference.

Roger E. MARCHBANK

Attachment:
Spanish edition Economic Report, 3 copies, U/S/C

Distribution
✓ 2 - COS, Mexico City, w/att, U/S/C
✓ 2 - C/WH, w/o att
2 - WH/COG, w/o att

2cc to WH/1

CS COPY

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

19-120-26

DATE TYPED 23 Aug 1967	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 28357	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26/4	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

14-00000

23

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26

X REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO [illegible] BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. 19

DISSEM BY 30 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐

ADV. COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION

WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE. VR, WH8, C/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 242240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2578 HXI

24 AUG 67 IN 38580

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSCROLL

IF AMSCROLL ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT IS PUBLISHED IN SPANISH AS WELL AS ENGLISH PLEASE SEND ONE ENGLISH COPY AND THREE SPANISH COPIES OF EACH ISSUE TO MEXICO STATION IN FUTURE.

S E C R E T

BT

AN ☒	~~SS~~	WH/C/A
~~PS~~	~~DIRECT~~	
ABSTRACT ☒	~~INDEX~~	

19-120-26

24 Aug 67

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

30

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, DO 4.

S E C R E T 242133Z CITE [illegible]WAVE 8963 STEADMAN ACTING 24 Aug 67 IN 38564

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC MHVIPER LIETHIC

REF MEXICO CITY 2549 (IN 36929)

AN	IP	WH/CA
BS	[illegible]	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

1. IN EVENT UPI DOES NOT PUBLISH REF STORY SUGGEST JMWAVE REWORK THIS AND OTHER SUGAR INFO AVAILABLE HERE INTO NEW STORY FOR SURFACING VIA AMSCROLL. WILL ATTRIBUTE TO AMSCROLL COMMERCIAL SOURCES.

2. IF UPI STORY PUBLISHED STATION WILL PICK UP IN AMHIM BULLETIN.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

19-120-26
24 Aug 67

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
DISSEN BY 30 PER #
ACTION
WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL C

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
NOTIFICATION TO
ADV. COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:
INFO:
FILE. VR WH8, C/OPS

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
CA
MO
RS
FI
RS
6 OS
7
8 T
9
10
ESEC

P/20

SECRET 242240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2578

24 Aug 67 IN 38580

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSCROLL

PP

IF AMSCROLL ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT IS PUBLISHED IN SPANISH AS WELL AS ENGLISH PLEASE SEND ONE ENGLISH COPY AND THREE SPANISH COPIES OF EACH ISSUE TO MEXICO STATION IN FUTURE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Santiago

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT LYVOUR/MHSPAWN
○ AMSCROLL Material for Passage to Chilean Foreign Office

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References:
A. SANTIAGO-4858
B. DIRECTOR-29269
C. JMWAVE-8917

1. Station JMWAVE forwards by separate cover material that we believe will be useful for paragraph 1.A. of reference A. We are forwarding only the basic material from which Santiago can make selections and can re-work into any desired format. Included is a collection of AMSCROLL economic studies which heavily emphasizes and documents Cuban mismanagement of its sugar industry--which of course is Cuba's principle source of foreign currency. In addition, there are analyses of other foreign trade problems such as the difficulties in obtaining adequate shipping, problems with products other than sugar sent to Canada and Europe for sale, as well as internal production and distribution difficulties. Also included are the texts of statements to the press given by senior defectors from the Cuban regime who were surfaced by the AMSCROLL organization. All of these statements discuss, often in considerable detail, the economic problems facing Cuba with which these individuals were personally knowledgeable. Also included is a folder concerning studies of Free World shipping with Cuba.

2. Though some of this material has been released to the press and all of it provided to AMSCROLL's mailing list of commercial, shipping, and financial firms that are interested in or are dealing with Cuban commercial organizations, it is accurate to say that this material has not received widespread publicity and therefore we believe that it should be helpful for your purposes. For the immediate future we will air mail additional information of this kind to Santiago's overt mailing address as such items come to our attention.

3. Santiago may or may not attribute these studies to AMSCROLL as it wishes.

Roger E. MARCHBANK

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

19-120-26

Attachments:
A/S/A, U/S/C

CS COPY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Santiago, w/atts, U/S/C
✓2 - C/WHD, w/o atts
2 - WH/COG, w/o atts
2cc to WH/4/CH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
23 Aug 1967

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 28341

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26/3

"UNIDAD" MONTHLY, ISSUE No. 39, JULY, 1967.

FRONT PAGE:

a) RUSSIA PENETRATES ARABS' OIL MARKETS: A complete re-print of our own news release on Soviet offers of oil to Spain, Great Britain, Switzerland, and other free-world countries. This is related to Soviet resales of Cuban sugar in the free world market, which provides the USSR with some hard currency at the expense of Cuba.

PAGE TWO:

a) CUBA: FIRST TERRITORY OF THE AMERICAS THAT DEPENDS ON THE USSR: The nerve of the Reds, who claim that Cuba is the first "free" territory of the Americas. Cuba is, in fact, the first territory of the Americas that depends almost completely on the Soviet Union, economically speaking. Economic dependency can be illustrated in terms of foreign trade, and Cuba's trade with the Soviet Bloc has increased as follows: Exports, from 2.2% in 1959 to 80% in 1966; Imports, from 0.1% in 1959 to 78.6% in 1966. Cuba has also mortgaged her sugar production to the Soviets, and, as a result from this dependency, has lost her trading power in the free-world market, thus becoming still more dependent of the Soviet Bloc. No wonder Kosygin travelled to Cuba to scold his bearded puppet.

b) CARTOON: Sign reading "Arab boycott" is hung on Arab's oil pump, while the Russian happily collects from a free-world customer the price of the oil he has just sold him.

PAGE THREE:

a) Continuation of front-page story on Soviet penetration of Arab oil market.

b) A MESSAGE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE "ECUADOR" SUGAR MILL: We take the problems faced by the "Ecuador", as outlined in the EIR, and ask the management of the mill whether they have been able to solve each and everyone of those problems.

c) Box: CUBAN: Cooperate with the struggle against the Red tyranny. Circulate this issue of UNIDAD after you have read it. Also send your comments and suggestions to our P.O. Box.

d) Boxed Slogan: DOWN WITH THE COMMUNIST REGIME!

DIOS
PATRIA
LIBERTAD
10 S.E. 9 st. MIAMI

UNIDAD

JULIO DE 1967 No. 39

Organo de
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
Especial para el pueblo de
Cuba

PENETRA RUSIA EL MERCADO PETROLERO DE LOS ARABES

La URSS trata de captar compradores en dicho mercado. Ocurrirá lo mismo con los mercados cubanos?

Este Buró de Investigaciones Económicas ha podido conocer que la Unión Soviética no ha perdido tiempo en penetrar el vacío comercial dejado por la actual dislocación del mercado petrolero de las naciones árabes en Europa. Existen numerosos ejemplos.

Primero: La URSS ha convenido en enviar un millón de barriles adicionales de petróleo soviético a España, además de los 3.5 millones de barriles contratados con anterioridad a la crisis del Medio Oriente. Los soviéticos no sólo ofrecieron suministrar productos petroleros, sino también los buques-tanque para transportarlos. Es más, hemos sido informados de que un buque-tanque italiano de 40,000 toneladas estaba ya en el puerto de Tuapse, URSS, en el Mar Negro, tomando a bordo el petróleo que conduciría a España.

Segundo: La Junta de Comercio británica anunció que varias firmas británicas han solicitado autorización para importar petróleo crudo soviético desde el inicio de la crisis del Medio Oriente. En el caso de la Imperial Chemical Industries, Inc., de Londres, la solicitud recaba autorización específica para importar nafta rusa.

Tercero: Fuentes situadas en Suiza y Alemania Occidental informan que los consumidores de petróleo en ambos países han recibido ofertas de los vendedores soviéticos del producto. Como en el caso de España, los soviéticos están ofreciendo los productos del petróleo y los buques para transportarlos.

Mientras esto ocurría, y mientras el Premier Soviético acusaba a Israel de agresión ante la Asamblea General de la O.N.U., recabando que se condenara a la nación judía, la Unión Soviética seguía suministrando petróleo a Israel.

Es bien conocido que durante los últimos años las naciones de Europa Occidental han estado aumentando sus importaciones de petróleo soviético a costa de los países árabes. Los soviéticos, en cada caso, han intentado maniobrar para desplazar a sus "aliados" árabes mediante el expediente de vender el petróleo a precios más bajos. En época tan reciente como 1963, la Europa Occidental no importaba petróleo alguno de la Unión Soviética. En 1965, el 7% del petróleo destinado a la Europa Occidental procedía de la URSS, y durante esos dos años (1963-1965) la pérdida de mercados por parte de los países árabes en Europa Occidental fue de un 4% (al 51%). Dicha tendencia continúa, ya que las exportaciones totales de petróleo soviético aumentaron de 838.000 barriles diarios en 1965 a 953.000 barriles diarios en 1966, calculándose que actualmente ascienden a 1,000.000 de barriles diarios. Además de España, Gran Bretaña, Suiza, y Alemania Occidental, la Unión Soviética cuenta entre sus principales clientes a Italia Francia y los países escandinavos.

Así, pues, como vemos, la Unión Soviética, durante los últimos tiempos, ha mostrado gran agresividad para robarles sus clientes en el mercado petrolero a sus aliados árabes, no obstante su apoyo político a esas naciones. Actualmente, la URSS tiene una nueva oportunidad de hacer nuevas penetraciones en el mercado árabe... y la está aprovechando.

Pasa a la página No. 3

CUBA: PRIMER TERRITORIO ECONOMICAMENTE DEPENDIENTE DE LA URSS EN AMERICA

Dicen los comunistas que Cuba es "el primer territorio libre de America", y que se ha "independizado" del poderio económico de las grandes potencias. La realidad, empero, es totalmente la contraria.

En efecto, Cuba depende hoy día de la Unión Soviética y de sus demás satélites comunistas como no dependió jamás de ningún otro país o grupo de paises.

La dependencia económica de un país con respecto de otro se puede medir en función del comercio entre ambos, ya que dicho comercio indica hasta que punto el uno necesita del otro como mercado para sus exportaciones y como fuente de abastecimiento de sus importaciones.

Pues bien, en el caso de Cuba y el bloque soviético, las exportaciones de nuestra patria hacia Rusia y sus satélites han aumentado del 2.2% en 1959 al 80% en 1966. En parecida forma, las importaciones que recibe Cuba procedentes del bloque soviético han aumentado de un 0.1% en 1959 al 78.6% en 1966.



Los números no mienten. Y los números arrojan la verdad irrefutable de que, durante 8 años de dominación comunista, nuestra infortunada Isla se ha hecho cada vez más dependiente de la metrópoli rusa, estrechándose cada día más las ligaduras de dicha dependencia.

Por si todo esto fuera poco, Cuba le ha hipotecado a la URSS su producción azucarera.

Cuba, también, ha agotado sus reservas de divisas, calculándose que en 1964 apenas excedian éstas de la irrisoria cifra de $20 millones.

Como consecuencia de esta falta total de divisas, Cuba no puede comerciar más que con los paises comunistas, ya que con éstos realiza trueques de azúcar y otros productos por chatarra procedente del campo socialista, sin que de esos convenios comerciales reciba metálico alguno.

En el período comprendido entre los años 1963 y 1966, Cuba sufrió un déficit de $1,132,000.000 en su comercio con los países comunistas. Y esta cifra no incluye la asistencia técnica comunista, ni los equipos militares, las becas, y demás.

Como resultado de esta relación de sujeción con el bloque rojo, Cuba ha perdido su vigencia comercial con los más ventajosos mercados del mundo libre, lo cual, a su vez ha aumentado dicha relación de dependencia, produciéndose el clásico círculo vicioso.

No en balde Kosygin se gasta el lujo de viajar a La Habana como un procónsul para regañar a Fidel Castro y darle instrucciones.



PENETRA... (Viene de la pág. 1)

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, durante un tiempo, ha tenido interés en intentar establecer una relación entre la acción politica de la URSS y su acción económica, y aplicar las conclusiones al caso cubano, toda vez que Cuba, después de todo, depende de la Unión Soviética para su supervivencia politica y económica.

Ya hemos visto y reportado, sobre la base de casos previos, las reventas en el mercado europeo de azúcar cubano exportado a la URSS al amparo del convenio comercial cubano-soviético. El resultado de estas reventas, desde luego, ha sido el de proveer de dólares a la URSS en perjuicio de Cuba. Cuba se ha beneficiado con esta maniobra sólo en la medida en que le ha sido posible utilizar los productos que se le han entregado al amparo del convenio, los cuales son, con frecuencia, de inferior calidad e imposibles de adaptar, al clima tropical de nuestra patria. El yugo soviético sobre la economia cubana nunca se ha hecho más evidente que ahora que se le ve a la luz del trato económico que da Rusia a sus aliados árabes en el caso del petróleo.

! ABAJO EL REGIMEN COMUNISTA !

Recados a la Administracion del Central "Ecuador"

Hemos podido saber que en el Central "Ecuador", antiguo "Baraguá", se está confrontando una serie de dificultades que son típicas de las que hoy encara la industria azucarera cubana en general. Lo que no sabemos es en qué han parado las susodichas dificultades. Tal vez la administración ñángara del "Ecuador" nos pueda contestar estas pregunticas que hacemos sólo por saber, y sin ánimo de fastidiar.

¿Ya consiguieron en México o en Canadá las bandas de frenos para las centrífugas "Roberts"?

¿Qué hubo de las piezas para los "Caterpillar"? Hasta hace poco, no había ninguna en el ingenio.

¿Qué nos dicen de los repuestos para los motores de las diesel G.E.? ¿Por fin pudieron conseguirlas?

¿Ya "ligaron" las cajas de bolas que tan desesperadamente se necesitaban para las bombas de guarapo, las centrífugas y los motores de reducción?

Y de las tuberías de cobre que hacían falta, pero que no se conseguían en el bloque comunista, ¿qué?

¿Qué han podido hacer con el sistema de esteras transportadoras de la refinería? Había que renovarlo, pero no se sabía como...

¿En qué paró la nueva planta eléctrica auxiliar que iban a traer de Alemania Comunista? ¿Se "trabó" el negocio?

¿Cómo han resuelto el grave problema de los lubricantes ligeros? ¿Hay divisas para pagarle a Inglaterra por las bombas inyectoras "Allen" que se necesitan?

¿Por fin habrá que esperar hasta 1969 para que los soviéticos instalen las dos calderas que requiere el central?

CUBANO:

Coopera al derrocamiento de la tiranía. Circula este número de UNIDAD. Cuando lo hayas leído, dáselo a alguna persona de tu confianza, o envíalo por correo a algún amigo tuyo dentro de Cuba. Colabora también con su publicación. Reporta este número a cualquier nombre (por ejemplo, "Juana González"), P.O. Box 3940, Miami, Florida. Envíanos informes sobre sucesos de interés que ocurran dentro de Cuba. Tus críticas y sugerencias también son bienvenidos.

Cubano:

A ti nadie te engaña con la propaganda que Fidel hace en Cuba de que no se cae, de que tiene divisas, de que los rusos lo apoyan y todos esos cuentos que te repiten todos los días en los periódicos, en el radio y en la televisión.

Fidel está mucho peor de lo que nadie se imagina. No tiene divisas, no tiene créditos, las compañías del Mundo Libre se van retirando del comercio con Cuba comunista, los obreros de todo el Hemisferio apoyan el boicot en contra de los países que quieran seguir comerciando con Fidel y los rusos quieren exprimir al pueblo de Cuba para cobrarse lo que Fidel le debe.

Así, pues, cubano: permanece alerta, distribuye noticias o propaganda, envía informes de lo que pasa en tu centro de trabajo, da nombres de chivatos, etc. como ya lo hacen miles de cubanos cómo tú y el G-2 no los coge ni los Comités se enteran, pues lo cierto es que milicianos, soldados rebeldes y funcionarios del régimen esperan el momento de la liberación que te aseguramos llegará!

ESCUCHA TODOS LOS PROGRAMAS DE U.R. Y REPORTALOS AL P.O. BOX 3940, MIAMI, FLA.

"HABLA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA", por Radio Américas, 1160 kcs., onda larga, de lunes a domingo a las 9:30 P.M.

Pepita Riera en "CONOZCA A LOS CHIVATOS", por Radio Américas, 1160 kcs., onda larga, los martes y jueves a las 11:00 P.M.

14-00000

.. 3010

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

FROM WH/COG/CA/PE

24

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 63

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, SB-8, DDP, ADDP, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA/O-4, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FE-8, FI, NE-8, AF-7

SAGO

S E C R E T 282031Z CITE SANTIAGO 4743

28 JUL 67 IN 21361

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, RIO DE JANEIRO, JMWAVE

AN ££	BF	
[redacted]	[redacted]	WH/C/CA
ABSTRACT X		[redacted]

TYPIC REDCOAT AMSCROLL

1. PEC 28 JULY CENTER SPREAD CARRIES JMSCROLL STUDY CUBAN TOTAL DEPENDENCE SOVIET UNION. SUBTITLES "FIDEL CASTRO HAS MADEHDOUNTRY OF MARTI COLONIAL NATION SUBJECTED SOVIET IMPERIALISM", "FOREIGN TRADE MONOPLIZED BY NATIONS SOVIET ORBIT". CLIPPING TO JMWAVE. HENCEFORTH POUCHING PEC JMWAVE REGULARLY.

2. SAME ISSUE HAS GOOD ITEMS OLAS, NASSER AND POISON GAS, ANTI-SEMITISM SOVIET UNION, BATTLE FOR POWER COMCHINA, HARRISON SALISBURY ARTICLE SOVIET CENSORSHIP.

S E C R E T

ET

19-120-26
28 July 1967

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

10 July 1967

WCA 1395

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : CA/Roger E. MARCHBANK

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMSCROLL Progress Report
1 April - 30 June 1967

Distribution:
3 - COS
1 - CA/MARCHBANK
1 - CA Chrono
1 - RI Chrono

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. During the quarter under review AMSCROLL continued with its program to discredit the Cuban regime's economic management (or mismanagement) and to seek to discourage Free World trade with Cuba. To this end AMSCROLL continued publishing its serious economic studies and comment of the Cuban economic area. This material is made available to selected firms engaged in international trade and shipping, to commercial and technical journals, and to sugar brokers including certain banks and others interested in the sugar trade. AMSCROLL also continued with its radio program which is beamed to the Cuban audience and which is increasingly attempting to provide serious comment upon economic developments in Cuba or those areas of economic activity outside of Cuba which would have an interest among the Cuban listeners. During this quarter AMSCROLL received 15 letters from Cuba which compares with 18 received during the previous quarter. The monthly count was: April - 6, May - 5, June - 4.

2. On 30 April AMSCROLL ceased broadcasting over AMTHIGH. Effective 1 May the program was presented over JMHOPE. This change in station (and a consequent change in time) has perhaps effected the listenership in Cuba; however, we expect that any unfavorable developments will be overcome and that this program will at least re-gain its previous level of listeners. Typical themes included discussions of Cuba's housing problem, its actual sugar production measured against Castro's earlier claims of what the production would be, breakdowns and stoppages at the Cuban refineries, activities with the Soviet Union and the world sugar market, reporting the progress of the Venezuelan dock workers boycott of ships of those nations that also trade with Cuba, the fight against bureaucracy, and economic aspects of the Middle East crisis.

3. A main AMSCROLL effort continued to be an analysis of the current sugar crop. As early as 13 February AMSCROLL predicted a harvest within the range of 6,100,000 and 6,400,000. By 6 May AMSCROLL was able to refine the harvest estimate from 6,047,000 to 6,101,000 tons. This estimate was further pinpointed to 6,100,000 tons in a release dated 16 June. These studies received newspaper attention and AMSCROLL has received favorable comment from sugar brokers and other technicians engaged in this business. As events

[illegible]

SECRET

are turning out, these estimates appear to have been sound indeed. The AMHIM bulletin continues to give good replay to those studies which results in their dissemination throughout Latin America.

4. AMSCROLL continued with its monthly release which lists the Free World ships that trade with Cuba. Both AP and AFP continued to file this information which results in its being published in the press and used on radio news broadcasts.

5. AMSCROLL continued its mailing program to Cuba, and during this quarter mailings approximated 5,000 which is the same level as the previous quarter.

B. ADMINISTRATION

6. The amount budgeted for the quarter under review was $33,500.00 of which $13,332.45 was spent. This significant decline in expenses was in large part due to the savings caused by the cancellation of the AMTHIGH radio program and by continued attention to economies of operation within AMSCROLL itself.

C. PROBLEMS

7. The Station is not aware of any specific problems having to do with the AMSCROLL organization. Mention might be made in passing of the ever present morale problem (which is by no means limited to AMSCROLL) engendered by increasing economies and restrictions in operations.

D. PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER

8. A major effort is being made to revamp the AMSCROLL radio program to increase its effectiveness as a reporter of economic developments of interest to the Cuban listener. Too often these programs spill over into the field of political reporting or uninformed comment upon developments in economic areas of which the script writers are largely ignorant. Our aim is to devise a program of economic reporting that will conform to the new guidelines being developed by the Station for all its radio programs.

UNIDAD Monthly, ISSUE No. 38, June, 1967.-

FRONT PAGE:

1) EDITORIAL: "The Arab Teaching": Arab proverbs show that Arabs are wise. They were not too wise, however, when they took the Soviets as allies and protectors. For years, the Russians supplied the arsenal the Arabs were building up to wage holy war against the tiny Jewish enclave. Furthermore, they reiterated their unconditional support to the Arabs. But when the "hour of truth" came, the Israelis made piecemeal of the Arabs and their Soviet Military hardware. The Russians failed to come to the assistance of their allies, and both were ridiculed to the fullest extent. This should be a lesson for Fidel Castro, who relies on the Soviets' military junk as much as on their support as "allies".

2) CASTRO HIMSELF PROPITIATES "BUREAUCRATISM": After a brief recess caused by the mobilization in the cane fields, the 'war of bureaucratism' was renewed with full vigor by the Havana régime. Two Ministers were fired, whole Ministries were "rationalized", and payrolls were trimmed to the core. However, the same régime that voiced threats of prison terms against those that failed to comply with anti-bureaucratic instructions, creates new sources of bureaucratism, such as, for example, the Book Institute and the National Institute for Forestry Developmen and Products.

PAGE TWO:

1) SUNSHINE, AIR, AND WATER.... BUT NO ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS: The MININDUS Vice-Ministry for Technical Development has several fantastic projects in hand, such as the harnessing of solar energy and of the force of the wind, the employment of energy from tides in southern Pinar del Río, and the desalinazation of sea water. But, on top of their intrinsically fantastic character, these projects are paralyzed due to the lack of technicians and of technical handbooks. What great men Marx, Lenin and Castro! (Based on material by same title in E.I.R.).

2) CARTOON: Headline: BOYCOTT OF CUBA-TRADING SHIPS TO BE STEPPED UP: Castro faces a sinking vessel named "Maritime Trade With Cuba" and says: "It seems we have sprung a leak!"

PAGE THREE:

1) MOROCCO SEEN DRIFTING AWAY FROM CUBA: A brief story on the sale to Morocco of 160,000 tons of Brazilian sugar. It seems, we point out, that Morocco is determined to quit Cuba as a sugar supplier. First she develops her own sugar industry, then buys from Cuba's competitors. (Based on a report carried by the E.I.R.).

2) CARTOON: Castro was carrying a bag (The Moroccan sugar market), but stumbled on his own "Ineptitude" and the bag "fell from his hands".

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Request for Reference Attachments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGA 27811, 15 June 1967

Please forward Headquarters a copy of the attachment which went under separate cover to addressee only, on Reference dispatch.

Otis C. VIGKANT

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

26 JUN 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGS-9645	DATE 26 JUN 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26/3

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	EXT
C/WH/COG/CA/EW/William Sturbitts: jll		4163

21 June 1967
Distribution:
1 - WH/Reg/C
1 - WH/COG/MO
(1)- WH/COG/CA/EW

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG/MO	22 June 67	
[illegible]	[illegible]	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/COG	[illegible]	

(40)

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MPO 1-60

DISPATCH

C/WH

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Santiago XXX

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JMWAVE
DYVOUR/AMSCROLL
○ Study of Cuba/USSR Commercial Relations

Reference: SANTIAGO 4468

Use : For use as determined by Santiago.

We forward under separate cover for station Santiago the AMSCROLL study in Spanish of economic relations between the USSR and Cuba as requested by the reference.

Roger E. MARCHBANK

Attachment:
Study in Spanish, U/S/C

Distribution:
✓ 3 - COS, Santiago, w/att, U/S/C — To out Pouch
✓ 2 - C/WH, w/o att [illegible]
2 - WH/COG, w/o att

JUN 15 1967

Removed from ~~Project~~ Sub. file
CS Classification: 19-120-26
JOB #68-644/43
Box: 19 Fold: 3

UFGA 27811

14 June 1967

S E C R E T

19-120-26/3
19-120-26
~~19-120-26/3~~

CS COPY

DIOS
PATRIA
LIBERTAD

UNIDAD

Organo de
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
Especial para el pueblo de
Cuba

19 S E. 9st. MIAMI
Mayo de 1967 · No.37

LAS INTERIORIDADES DE CUFLET

Editorial

UNA VERDAD COMUNISTA

Victor Volsky, Jefe de la Delegación Observadora Soviética al XII periodo de sesiones de la Comisión Económica de la O.N.U. para America Latina, declaró recientemente en Caracas que "Cuba Comunista es la hija menor de la Unión Sovietica, y a las hijas menores hasta se les mima".

Palabras son éstas que tienen la virtud de enardecer al más indiferente de los cubanos, ya que las mismas reflejan el aire de superioridad con que estos arrogantes comunistas eslavos tratan a nuestra Patria. Sin embargo, no puede negarse que el insolente Volsky dijo una verdad en Caracas, al menos en cuanto se refiere a la primera parte de su aserto.

Ciertamente, los hijos menores dependen de sus padres. Son ellos quienes les proporcionan todo lo necesario para su subsistencia; son ellos quienes determinan, con la inapelabilidad que supone la patria potestad, el rumbo que han de tomar los pasos de su adorable retoño; y son ellos quienes se benefician del producto de sus labores.

Siendo así, no cabe duda de que Cuba es la hija menor de la Unión Soviética. La URSS y sus satélites, en efecto, venden a Cuba el 78.6% de sus importaciones; la URSS es quien determina la politica que ha de seguir el régimen de La Habana, y es la URSS quien recibe, conjuntamente con sus títeres de Europa Oriental, el 80% de los productos que exporta nuestra Patria. Ante los datos de este brutal monopolio comercial, y ante la suprema autoridad que ejerce la metrópoli sobre su pseudo-colonia del Caribe, ¿quién puede negar que Cuba es, a todos los efectos prácticos, la hija menor de la Unión Sovietica?

Hasta aquí la verdad. La mentira estriba en el aserto de que Cuba es la hija "mimada" de la URSS. Porque, como todo el mundo sabe, lo que es en realidad es una hija oprimida, explotada, maltratada, y prostituida por esta "madre" desnaturalizada que es la Rusia Soviética.

Por I. Andres Collazo

NOTA DE LA REDACCION: El autor de este trabajo ocupó el cargo de representante en Londres de la Empresa Cubana de Fletes (CUFLET) hasta el pasado mes de Marzo de 1967, en que decidió abandonar al regimen comunista de Cuba y solicitar asilo politico en el mundo libre.

----Mi mision en Londres era la de fletar naves del mundo libre para el comercio marítimo con Cuba, a fin de cubrir el deficit resultante de la escoses de buques cúbanos y del bloque comunista que pudieran manipular el volumen comercial. Mi tarea no era nada fácil.

----El trafico marítimo del mundo libre con Cuba ha disminuido en un 41.6% entre 1963 y 1966. Las razones de esta caída en el tráfico maritimo del mundo libre con Cuba son, a mi entender, las siguientes. la "Lista Negra" del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos; las prohibiciones decretadas por diversos Gobiernos, tales como el de Grecia, el del Libano, y otros, y la acción del boicot emprendido por los trabajadores portuarios del hemisferio a traves de la ORIT, a cuyo frente marchan los miembros de la Federacion Portuaria de Venezuela.

----Tan pronto como se inició el boicot, algunas firmas navieras británicas que en aquel momento estaban considerando la entrada en el trafico maritimo con Cuba, pero que tambien mantenían rutas regulares con America Latina, cancelaron sus planes respecto a Cuba. Otra razon es la de los informes referentes a la situación economica y al tráfico maritimo de Cuba que publican las Organizaciones de exiliados cubanos. Yo tuve, por ejemplo, la oportunidad de ver alguno de los boletines y

Continúa en la pág. 2

Las Interioridades

Continuacion)

[illegible] de UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA ESPECIALMENTE [illegible] CONCERNIENTES AL TRAFICO MARITIMO

[illegible] los cosas, quie[illegible] que, aunque los bu[illegible] han encabezado [illegible] que UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA ha [illegible] con [illegible] de Quinta Columna Mari[illegible] [illegible] Empresa [illegible] Cuba. Los [illegible] se retiraron [illegible] vencieron sus contratos de [illegible]. La excepcion a que [illegible] es la ATHEL LINE, [illegible] transporta todas las mieles [illegible] que adquiere la [illegible] UNITED MOLASSES.

[illegible] sigue siendo un he[illegible] diversos buques de ban[illegible] siguen viajando a Cu[illegible] se mantienen al frente de lista [illegible] ¿Cuales son las empresas [illegible] estos buques? La mayo[illegible] pudiera decir [illegible] y asi son lo que pudiera [illegible] de piratas modernos [illegible], tales como TSAV[illegible], los cuales solicitan la [illegible] y obtienen una tem[illegible] meses.

As[illegible] un puñado de pira[illegible] que se encuen[illegible] maritimo [illegible]. Estos armado[illegible] son los siguientes: [illegible] (Griego) TSAVLIRIS [illegible] pasaporte britanico), [illegible]OPULOS (Griego) LIVANOS [illegible] tres pequeñas firmas [illegible] las PURVIS SHIPPING, [illegible]ALTER RUNCIMAN, y D GROSS [illegible] SONS, [illegible] de Inglaterra.

[illegible] interesante [illegible] forma en que [illegible] hacen negocios con CUFLET. [illegible] error suponer [illegible] comerciales en[illegible] y el Gobierno Cuba[illegible] por CUFLET, se [illegible] en una atmosfera de [illegible]. La realidad es que [illegible] contratos de fletamento [illegible] una verdadera selva de [illegible] veces los armado[illegible] a CUFLET y a [illegible] lo que prevalece sobre los armadores.

....Comencemos con el Sr. Aquiles **FRANGISTAS**. Este caballero, conjuntamente con Stematis Manessis y Efthimios Athanasiou, opera la linea griega de **FRANCO SHIPPING CO.** Sus oficinas principales se encuentra en Atenas. A fin de evadir las responsabilidades, **FRANGISTAS** manipula sus negocios a traves de **FRANCO SHIPPING COMPANY** y sus nueve subsidiarias que son: **A. FRANGISTAS & S. MANESSIS, A. FRANGISTAS & PARTNERS, STAVLE COMPAÑIA NAVIERA, DALIA COMPAÑIA NAVIERA S.A. COMPAÑIA DE NAVEGACION SKIATHOS S.A., PURVIS SHIPPING Co.** (una firma inglesa que administra los asuntos de **FRANGISTAS** en Londres).

....**FRANGISTA** ha estado haciendo negocios con los comunistas desde hace tiempo, A fin de corresponder a sus servicios, la **URSS** comenzo en 1965 a construir una flota de ciento cinco millones de dollares para **FRANGISTAS**. La flota se componia de diecisiete buques de carga de distintos tipos, cinco embarcaciones pesqueras y tres buques frigorificos. **FRANGISTAS** esperaba utilizar sus carqueros para desplazar a **TSAVLIRIS, VLASSOPULOS** y **LIVANOS** del comercio maritimo con Cuba.

....Yo era quien manipulaba los negocios con **FRANGISTAS** a traves de la oficina de **CUFLET** en Londres, debido a que a **FRANGISTAS, EN CIERTO MODO**, le heredó el gobierno cubano de la Union Sovietica. Antes de 1966, la mayor parte de los viajes a Cuba realizados por las naves de **FRANGISTAS** se hicieron bajo contratos de fletamento con el gobierno soviético y no con **CLUFET**. Pero **FRANGISTAS** queria ampliar sus negocios con Cuba de modo que viajo directamente a La Habana a fin de mejorar su situacion respecto de los demas piratas y poder efectuar sus tratos directamente con la oficina principal de **CUFLET**.

....**FRANGISTAS** prometió que pondria los buques de carga que recibiria de la **URSS** a la disposición del comercio maritimo de Cuba, y, para comenzar fleto el **EFTYCHIA** a **CUFLET**.

....**FRANGISTAS** se jactaba que no tendria problemas con el gobierno griego ya que tenia amigos en altos puestos. Llego inclusive al punto de decir que tenia sobornados a varios funcionarios de ese gobierno. En noviembre de 1966 una delegación de **CUFLET** que habia visitado Moscu viajo a Atenas a tratar de negociar con **FRANGISTAS**. La delegación se componia de Fernando Hernandez, Gerente General de **CUFLET** y Salvador Farraguera, de la Oficina de **CUFLET** en La Habana. Estando en Atenas esta delegacion, **FRANGISTAS** le dijo que no habia podido poner sus nuevos buques a la disposicion de **CUFLET** porque estaba teniendo problemas con el gobierno provisional, pero que el esperaba que en un futuro inmediato algunos de sus amigos volverian a ocupar puestos claves y las cosas podian volver a su estado anterior.

....Por lo visto, **FRANGISTAS** estaba equivocado. En estos momentos, los armadores y capitanes de los siguientes buques de **FRANGISTAS** están sometidos a un proceso judicial en Grecia: **IRENE, BARBARINO, ALICE, PANTANASSA, SOFIA, TINA EFTYCHIA, ANDROMACHI, KIRA HARIKLIA** y **NIKOLAS F.**

*....Otro de los piratas que se aprovechan lucrativamente del comercio maritimo cubano al cobrar por los fletes un sobreprecio de un 20% a un 30% sobre la tarifa usual del mercado es Giorgio **TSAVLIRIS**.*



--¿Y ese quién es? ¿Algún gusano?

--¡No, hombre! ¡Es un comunista latinoamericano pro-soviético!

Las Interioredades

(Continuacion)

*Antes de penetrar en las operaciones de **TSAVLIRIS**, quisiera mencionar que el mismo se encuentra actualmente en desgracia con **CUFLET**, y él lo sabe.*

....En 1963, **TSAVLIRIS** operaba dos o tres barcos solamente. Gracias a los sobreprecios que le cobran al gobierno cubano, pudo levantar una flota de 18 buques, numero, empero, que ha disminuido debido a las roturas y naufragios. **TSAVLIRIS** utilizaba los contratos de fletamento con **CUFLET** para solicitar financiamientos de bancos britanicos y adquirir asi su flota de barcos de la segunda Guerra Mundial.

....Por supuesto, el gobierno cubano considera que **TSAVLIRIS** es un oportunista, y la oficina principal de **CUFLET** en La Habana se ha convertido en objeto de chistes debido a los numerosos enredos en que se han visto envueltos dicho armador y el régimen durante sus cuatro años de relaciones.

....Yo recuerdo un caso ocurrido durante el verano de 1964. **TSAVLIRIS** negoció un contrato en La Habana en virtud del cual sus buques debian transportar 120.000 toneladas de fertilizantes durante un periodo de doce meses que se vencía en diciembre de 1965. Poco después, el Gobierno cubano no pudo cerrar la negociacion de los fertilizantes y entonces trataron de cancelar el contrato con **TSAVLIRIS**. Esta compania se nego y viajo a La Habana donde el contrato se volvió a negociar y su terminación se prorrogo para diciembre de 1966. Ademas, se le permitió al gobierno cubano transportar carga general ademas de los fertilizantes. Pero ni aun así pudo el gobierno cubano conseguir la carga para los buques y lo que hizo fue dar largas a base de posponer la seleccion de los buques de esa compañia que iba a utilizar. Finalmente, **TSAVLIRIS** se vio precisada a efectuar una nueva negociación y en esta ocasión el vencimiento del contrato se pospuso para junio de 1967.

....Otro problema con **TSAVLIRIS** surgió mas o menos al mismo tiempo que los hechos anteriores con motivo del fletamento de otros dos de sus buques. **CUFLET** fletó el **NEWHEATH** y el **NEWGLADE** para transportar azúcar cubano al Japón. Los viajes de retorno se harian bajo fletamento por tiempo. En otras palabras, a la ida, los buques estaban fletados por viajes, y a la vuelta, estaban bajo fletamento mensual. Cuando el **NEWGLADE** llegó al Japón con el primer cargamento de azúcar los japoneses protestaron, pues el azúcar estaba manchado de oxido y ademas contenia particulas de metal debido al pesimo estado de las bodegas del buque. **CUFLET** le presento las quejas a **TSAVLIRIS** pero este alego inmediatamente que los cubanos habian inspeccionado y aprobado los buques antes de cerrar el contrato. Despues de numerosa correspondencia intercambiada entre ambas partes, **CUFLET** accedio a cancelar el contrato del **NEWGLADE** y utilizar solo el **NEWHEATH** para los viajes al Japon. Esto parecia ser el final del asunto, pero no fue asi. Los cubanos recapacitaron y se dieron cuenta que con la pérdida del **NEWGLADE** las entregas demorarian prácticamente el doble así es que se dirigieron a **TSAVLIRIS** solicitando cancelar el contrato de todos modos. La reaccion de **TSAVLIRIS** es de imaginar, pero tuvo que acceder a la solicitud de **CUFLET**, aunque puso como condición que en el futuro todo contrato tendria que ser confirmado de inmediato por escrito.

....Si detengo la narración aquí, puede parecer que a **TSAVLIRIS** le toco perder y que los cubanos se salieron con las suyas, sin embargo, estos dos casos que he relatado le costaron el puesto a Manuel Novoa, quien era a la sazón el Gerente de **CUFLET**.

....Abundando en el tema paso a citar otro ejemplo. En 1965, **CUFLET** fletó el buque **MAGISTER** (pabellón britanico) operado por **CAYMAN ISLANDS LTD** de (Jamaica) con el objeto de que transportara frutas y vegetales al Canada. Despues de fletar el buque, los cubanos no pudieron obtener suficientes frutas y vegetales y cancelaron el contrato de fletamento.

....De acuerdo con mi experiencia, el gobierno cubano confronta dos graves problemas en lo referente al mercado de fletes-mercado al cual tiene que recurrir para cubrir el déficit en el transporte maritimo debido a la escasez de buques cubanos y del mundo comunista. Los dos problemas son los siguientes: primero encontrar buques que fletar, problema que resulta dificil de resolver como Uds habran podido apreciar, pues hay que recurrir a los armadores piratas, quienes a su vez se aprovechan de la situacion.

....El segundo problema es conseguir las divisas para pagar los fletes. El gobierno cubano confronta una crisis tremenda en relacion con las divisas, pues desde 1965 la situación del mercado mundial azucarero en baja le ha limitado a un minimo la entrada de divisas por concepto de las exportaciones de azúcar. Sin embargo el gobierno cubano tiene que buscar la moneda convertible para pagar puntualmente a los armadores piratas.

....**CUFLET** tiene arrendados o fletados por tiempo en estos momentos 5 buques britanicos, 3 griegos y una chipriota, por los que paga unos $394.563.00 mensuales. **CUFLET** tiene arrendados ademas dos buques yugoeslavos y parte de los pagos son en divisas (en la lista anterior no aparecen los buques fletados por viajes).

....Mi consejo para los armadores que aun se encuentran envueltos en trafico maritimo con Cuba comunista es que se retiren de dicho comercio, pero aun para aquellos que se nieguen a seguir este consejo, creo tener algunas sabias palabras.

....Mi sugerencia es que hagan lo que hizo la **CIE D'ARMEMENT MARITIME S.A.** En abril de 1966 esta compañia le fleto por seis meses a **CUFLET EL BUQUE TANQUE SENANQUE**, para que transportara mieles cubanas a Japon. En cuanto el **SENANQUE** se hizo a la mar, **CUFLET** notifico al armador francés que en cuanto el buque llegara al Japon y fuera descargado, **CUFLET** rescindiria el contrato de fletamento. La **CIE D'ARMEMENT MARITIME S.A.** protesto de inmediato y le comunicó a **CUFLET** que si no depositaba en un plazo dado la suma de 100,000 francos en un banco francés se le darian órdenes al **SENANQUE** para que se dirigiera a un puerto europeo de donde se confiscaria el cargamento de mieles y con el producto de la venta de las mismas, la Compañia se cobraria lo estipulado en el contrato de fletamento por seis meses.

....En esta ocasion le toco perder a **CUFLET**. Los armadores tienen la palabra.

Cubano:

A ti nadie te engaña con
la propaganda que Fidel hace
en Cuba de que no se cae de
que tiene divisas de que los
rusos lo apoyan y todos
esos cuentos que te repi-
ten todos los días en los
periódicos, en el radio y
en la televisión.

Fidel está mucho peor
de lo que nadie se imagina
No tiene divisas, no tiene
créditos, las compañías
del Mundo Libre se van
retirando del comercio con
Cuba Comunista, los obre-
ros de todo el Hemisfe-
rio apoyan el boicot en
contra de los países que
quieran seguir comerciando con Fidel y los
rusos quieren exprimir al pueblo de Cuba
para cobrarse lo que Fidel le debe.
así, pues, cubano: Permanece alerta distribu-
ye noticias o propaganda, envía informes
de lo que pasa en tu centro de trabajo, da
nombres de chivatos, etc. como ya lo ha-
cen miles de cubanos como tú. y el G-2
no los coge ni los Comités se enteran
pues la cierta es que milicianos sol-
dados rebeldes y funcionarios del régimen
esperan el momento de la liberación que
te aseguramos llegará.

ESCUCHA TODOS LOS PROGRAMAS DE U.R. Y REPORTALOS AL P.O. BOX 3940, MIAMI, FLA.

"HABLA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA", por Radio Américas, 1160 kcs., onda larga, de lunes a domingo a las 9:30 P.M.

Pepita Riera en "CONOZCA A LOS CHIVATOS", por Radio Américas, 1160 kcs., onda larga, los martes y jueves a las 11:00 P.M.

N.R.KINSMAN:fph
WH/COG/CA/EW
4163
1 JUNE 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 8 PER

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO C/I/FF BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-120-26 ✓

INFO: FILE, VR, FI, WH 8

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

2 14 31 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 06662

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMSCROLL AMOT

REF: UFGA-27507 (4 MAY 1967)

PLS RETRANSMIT COPY AMOT PROPOSAL FORWARDED BY TM-928258. HQS COPY INADVERTANTLY DESTROYED.

END OF MESSAGE

19-120-26
1 June 67

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WH/COG/MO

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.
Chief, WH; Chief, NE

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Athens

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSCROLL/THUNIFORM
Revised Mailing List for Greece

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

REF : UFGA-26541, 8 December 1966

1. Per Para two of Reference, we are forwarding under separate cover a revised mailing list for AMSCROLL's use. We have no additions or deletions to those addressees listed in Reference with the indicator "(bl.)"; they should continue receiving copies of the economic reports issued by AMSCROLL. The addressees forwarded with this dispatch should receive copies of economic reports, of releases concerned with maritime matters, and of any other newspaper clippings and editorials which are considered appropriate by AMSCROLL and/or Station JMWAVE; these addressees replace those listed in Reference with the indicators "(econ)" and "(mar.)".

2. We believe the above revision will ensure a more effective MHSPAWN use of AMSCROLL's materials during this period of press censorship imposed by the present Greek coup leadership.

ARNOLD B. TYMMERHAUS

WALTER D. NEWBY

Attachment:
As stated above USC(att)

Distribution:
2 - COS/JMWAVE w/att
2 - C/WH w/att
2 - C/NE w/att
See [illegible] 10 w/att

CS COPY

[illegible]

19-120-26

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	EKAA-16273	12 June 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26/3

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: EKAA-16273

MAILING LIST

1. Mr. Athanasios Kanellopoulos
   Economikos Tachydromos
   3 Christou Lada Street
   Athens, Greece

2. Mr. Haralambos Klaras
   Editor, Vradyni
   9-11 Piraeus Street
   Athens, Greece

3. Mr. Christoforos Bitsides
   "Athens News Agency"
   Athens, Greece

4. Mr. Athanasios Paraschos
   Ethnikos Kyrix
   1 Christou Lada Street
   Athens, Greece

5. Mr. Leonidas Karapanayiotis
   To Vima/Ta Nea
   3 Christou Lada Street
   Athens, Greece

6. Mr. Andreas Dimakos
   To Vima/Ta Nea
   3 Christou Lada Street
   Athens, Greece

7. Mr. Savvas Konstantopoulos
   Eleftheros Kosmos
   8 Pezmatzoglou Street
   Athens, Greece

8. Mr. Kyros A. Kyrou
   Estia
   Athinou Gazi 7,
   Athens, Greece

9. Mr. Dimitrios Zannides
   23 Sisini
   Athens, Greece

CS COPY

S/c att. 1 EKAA-16273

19-120-26

10. Mr. Ioannis Vellidis
Makedonia
Thessaloniki, Greece

11. Mr. Solon Grigoriadis
Akropolis
12 Feidiou Street
Athens, Greece

12. Naftilia Nea
Athens, Greece

13. Naftiki Hellas
Athens, Greece

14. Naftemboriki
Athens, Greece

15. Naftiliaki Naftergatiki
13 Chalkokondyli Street
Athens, Greece

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F

TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted]

#2

ACTION WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8

S E C R E T 121508Z CITE SANTIAGO 4466 5460 (THILLEN ACTING)

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

12 Jun 67 IN 87649

TYPIC AMSCROLL (12 64432)

REF: JMWAVE 7103, 10 MAY

SPANISH TRANSLATION REF STUDY, NEVER RECEIVED SANTIAGO.

PLS POUCH ANOTHER SET.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

AN 19	FI	REC
RS	DEST	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

19-120-26
12 June 67

UNIDAD MONTHLY, ISSUE, NO. 37, May, 1967

This issue has been almost entirely devoted to a reprint of I. Andrés Collazo's statement concerning his experience as a CUFLET representative in London. We have reprinted most of the contents of the statement in the form of a signed article entitled "INSIDE CUFLET".

As is known, Collazo tells of the "dog fights" that have risen between the privateers (such as FRANCISTAS) and CUFLET over violations of contracts, bad condition of the ships, etc.

He also discusses the decline in free-world shipping to Cuba and its causes, as well as the nature and background of the shippers that participate in the Cuban trade.

Besides the above, the following is included in this issue:

PAGE 1:

EDITORIAL: "A COMMUNIST TRUTH": Volsky, the Chief of the Soviet observing delegation to the CEPAL meeting in Caracas, said that "Cuba is the minor daughter of the USSR, and minor daughters are pampered". The Russian's insolence has roused the anger of all well-born Cubans. Yet, there's a lot of truth in what the Russian said.

Indeed, minor daughters depend on their parents, get everything they need from them, and are subject to their supreme authority. If the daughter works, she must also turn a good part of the fruits of her toil over to her parents.

This is what happens with Cuba and the USSR. The Soviets and their satellites sell Cuba 78.6% of her imports, dictate the policy of the Havana régime, and take 80% of her exports.

In view of this dependence, who can deny that the relation between Cuba and Russia is that of a minor daughter with respect to her parents?

The Russian only lied when he spoke of "pampering". Cuba is not pampered by Mother Russia: she is oppressed, exploited and corrupted by her.

PAGE 2:

CARTOON: (By Luis R. Cáceres, Jr.): A shabby-looking character faces Castro and tells him: "You're a nosy liar and an adventurer!". A Cuban in the foreground asks a friend: "Who is that, a "gusano"?" "No", replies the friend. "That's a Latin American pro-Soviet Communist".

SECRET

Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro XX

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JMWAVE
DYVOUR/PBRUMEN/MHVIPER
Material on Trading with Cuba

References: A. DIRECTOR 03837
B. RIO DE JANEIRO 3756

Per reference A we forward by separate cover material produced and released by the AMSCROLL organization which we hope will be helpful in meeting your requirement to provide ALTEPID-1 with information on the negative aspects of commercial trading with Cuba.

Roger E. MARCHBANK

Attachments:
1. Maritime 5th Column press releases (U/S/C)
2. Defectors statements (U/S/C)
3. AMSCROLL Economic Reports (U/S/C)

Distribution
3 - COS, Rio de Janeiro, w/atts, USC out pouch
✓2 - C/WH, w/o atts [illegible]
2 - WH/COG, w/o atts

MAY 29 1967

26 May 67

UFGA 27672

CS COPY

SECRET

19-120-26/3

19-120-26

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: ~~24~~ 30

SECRET

K.W. MURPHY:fph
WH/COG/CA/EW
4163
DATE: 23 MAY 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 21 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-120-26 ✓

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR WH 8 CA 2 CA/PROP

CI/IC 2 D 17

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

24 1941Z CITE DIRECTOR 04241

TO SANTIAGO INFO JMWAVE

:TYPIC MHSPAWN AMSCROLL

AN 4	IB	WH/C/CH
~~RB~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT X		

REFS: A UFGA-27416 (20 APRIL 1967)
B. SANTIAGO 4230 (IN 58430)

HQS DEFERS TO STATION JUDGEMENT AS TO VALUE PROP PLAY IN CHILE OF REF A PAPER. HOWEVER, WISH TO POINT OUT THAT PAPER QUOTES FIGURES AND ARRIVES AT CONCLUSION ALREADY WELL KNOWN AND ACCEPTED BY INDIVIDUALS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF SUGAR INDUSTRY.

END OF MESSAGE

19-120-26
23 May 67

by
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DC/WH/4

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 30

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, ADDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2,

S E C R E T 161529Z CITE JMWAVE 7202

DIRECTOR

TYPIC MHVIPER

REF: RIO DE JANEIRO 3756 (IN 67134)

16 MAY 67 IN 68222

IN SELECTING INFO REQUESTED PARA 2 REF ON NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF TRADING WITH CUBA HQS MAY WISH CONSIDER AMSCROLL SERIES OF ECONOMIC REPORTS ESPECIALLY VOL II NO. 2 OF 3 MARCH AND VOL II NO. 5 OF 19 DECEMBER WHICH DISCUSS IN DETAIL SUGAR PRODUCTION PROBLEMS. ALSO STATEMENTS TO PRESS BY DEFECTORS SUCH AS AMRIVER-1, AMRAIN-1 AND AMSNAKE-1 MAY BE HELOPUL. IF DESIRED JMWAVE CAN POUCH THIS MATERIAL TO RIO.

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM 24

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CA-2, CA/PROP, FI

S E C R E T 122151Z CITE JMWAVE 7155

WAVE

12 May 67 IN 66356

DIRECTOR INFO RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO

TYPIC MHCHAW AMSCROLL AMOT

REF JMWAVE 7135 (IN 65400)

STORY BASED UPON STUDY DISCUSSED REF PUBLISHED MIAMI HERALD 12 MAY ENTITLED "SUGAR HARVEST IN CUBA MAY BE BEST SINCE '61. ALSO AP FILED STORY WITH ITS NEW YORK OFFICE IDENTIFIED AS FL059PED MAY 11. AIRMAILING ADDRESSEES BOTH ACCOUNTS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

19-120-26
12 May 1967

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION	
MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
ABSTRACT	
MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
Receipt of Information from Unidentified Source within Cuba

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: None

1. On 27 March 1967, a letter from Cuba was received at the postal address given by the radio program of AMSCROLL. The letter had been mailed in Habana on 4 March 1967 and the contents included three photos of an unidentified individual and one photo each of individuals identified as Reynaldo IRSULA Brea and Antonio FERNANDEZ Fernandez. A note which was included stated that henceforth the sender would identify himself as "Pancrasio". He indicated that if it was desired receipt of his letter could be mentioned on the AMSCROLL radio program but that never should any mention of the contents be mentioned as this could reveal his identity to the DSE. Pancrasio stated his help would not be much but that his letters might contain information which could be of value. He wrote that he could not go into detail as he was unable to spend much time at the typewriter. Pancrasio concluded by saying the photos of Antonio and Reynaldo were in the hands of a security agent who had orders to find them. They had both been fugitives for a long time. The other photo (in triplicate) was of a Canadian citizen whose passport was retained by the DSE and was reported as lost for an unexplained motive.

2. On 10 April 1967, the message from Pancrasio was acknowledged by radio and he was thanked for his letter and told to continue his correspondence.

3. On 21 April 1967, a second letter from Pancrasio was received via Key West, Florida. The letter had been

Attachment-U/S/C (2 a/w)
Copies of info received

Stanley B. JERSAWIT

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 May 67	MAY 11 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27543

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

UNIDAD MONTHLY, ISSUE, NO. 37, May, 1967

This issue has been almost entirely devoted to a reprint of I. Andrés Collazo's statement concerning his experience as a CUFLET representative in London. We have reprinted most of the contents of the statement in the form of a signed article entitled "INSIDE CUFLET".

As is known, Collazo tells of the "dog fights" that have risen between the privateers (such as FRANGISTAS) and CUFLET over violations of contracts, bad condition of the ships, etc.

He also discusses the decline in free-world shipping to Cuba and its causes, as well as the nature and background of the shippers that participate in the Cuban trade.

Besides the above, the following is included in this issue:

PAGE 1:

EDITORIAL: "A COMMUNIST TRUTH": Volsky, the Chief of the Soviet observing delegation to the CEPAL meeting in Caracas, said that "Cuba is the minor daughter of the USSR, and minor daughters are pampered". The Russian's insolence has roused the anger of all well-born Cubans. Yet, there's a lot of truth in what the Russian said.

Indeed, minor daughters depend on their parents, get everything they need from them, and are subject to their supreme authority. If the daughter works, she must also turn a good part of the fruits of her toil over to her parents.

This is what happens with Cuba and the USSR. The Soviets and their satellites sell Cuba 78.6% of her imports, dictate the policy of the Havana régime, and take 80% of her exports.

In view of this dependence, who can deny that the relation between Cuba and Russia is that of a minor daughter with respect to her parents?

The Russian only lied when he spoke of "pampering". Cuba is not pampered by Mother Russia: she is oppressed, exploited and corrupted by her.

PAGE 2:

CARTOON: (By Luis R. Cáceres, Jr.): A shabby-looking character faces Castro and tells him: "You're a nosy liar and an adventurer!". A Cuban in the foreground asks a friend: "Who is that, a "gusano"?" "No", replies the friend. "That's a Latin American pro-Soviet Communist".

SECRET

Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro XX

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JMWAVE
DYVOUR/PBRUMEN/MHVIPER
Material on Trading with Cuba

References: A. DIRECTOR 02887
B. RIO DE JANEIRO 3756

Per reference A we forward by separate cover material produced and released by the AMSCROLL organization which we hope will be helpful in meeting your requirement to provide ALTEPID-1 with information on the negative aspects of commercial trading with Cuba.

Roger B. MARCHBANK

Attachments:
1. Maritime 5th Column press releases (U/S/C)
2. Defectors statements (U/S/C)
3. AMSCROLL Economic Reports (U/S/C)

Distribution
✓3 - COS, Rio de Janeiro, w/atts, USC out pouch.
✓2 - C/WH, w/o atts 2cc [illegible] w/o att
2 - WH/COG, w/o atts

MAY 29 1967

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

26 May 67

UFGA 27672

CS COPY

SECRET

19-120-26/3

19-120-26

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: ~~24~~ 30

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: K.W.MURPHY:fph
UNIT: WH/COG/CA/EW
EXT: 4163
DATE: 23 MAY 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 27 PER ____ #
CONF: WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY
C/ICG 2 D17

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO RP BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-120-26
INFO: FILE , VR WH 8 CA 2 CA/PROP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

24 1941Z CITE DIRECTOR 04241

TO SANTIAGO INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC MHSPAWN AMSCROLL

REFS: A UFGA-27416 (20 APRIL 1967)

B SANTIAGO 4230 (IN 58430)

RP

AN ✓	~~RE~~	WH/C/CA
~~RS~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

HQS DEFERS TO STATION JUDGEMENT AS TO VALUE PROP PLAY IN CHILE OF REF A PAPER. HOWEVER, WISH TO POINT OUT THAT PAPER QUOTES FIGURES AND ARRIVES AT CONCLUSION ALREADY WELL KNOWN AND ACCEPTED BY INDIVIDUALS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF SUGAR INDUSTRY.

END OF MESSAGE

19-120-26
23 May 67

by J D Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DC/WH/4

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 30

ACTION WH/CC 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, ADDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2,

SECRET 161529Z CITE JMWAVE 7202

DIRECTOR

16 MAY 67 IN 68222

TYPIC MHVIPER

REF: RIO DE JANEIRO 3756 (1-67134)

IN SELECTING INFO REQUESTED PARA 2 REF ON NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF TRADING WITH CUBA HQS MAY WISH CONSIDER AMSCROLL SERIES OF ECONOMIC REPORTS ESPECIALLY VOL II NO. 7 OF 3 MARCH AND VOL II NO. 5 OF 19 DECEMBER WHICH DISCUSS IN DETAIL SUGAR PRODUCTION PROBLEMS. ALSO STATEMENTS TO PRESS BY DEFECTORS SUCH AS AMRIVER-1, AMRAIN-1 AND AMSNAKE-1 MAY BE HELOPUL. IF DESIRED JMWAVE CAN POUCH THIS MATERIAL TO RIO.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 24

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CA-2, CA/PROP, FI

WAVE

S E C R E T 122151Z CITE JMWAVE 7155

12 MAY 67 IN 66356

DIRECTOR INFO RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO

TYPIC MHSPAWN AMSCROLL AMOT

REF JMWAVE 7135 (IN 65400)

STORY BASED UPON STUDY DISCUSSED REF PUBLISHED MIAMI HERALD 12 MAY ENTITLED "SUGAR HARVEST IN CUBA MAY BE BEST SINCE '61. ALSO AP FILED STORY WITH ITS NEW YORK OFFICE IDENTIFIED AS PL759PED MAY 11. AIRMAILING ADDRESSEES BOTH ACCOUNTS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

19-120-26
12 May 1967

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

Amscroll 10483

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE Art

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational
0 Receipt of Information from Unidentified Source within Cuba

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: None

1. On 27 March 1967, a letter from Cuba was received at the postal address given by the radio program of AMSCROLL. The letter had been mailed in Habana on 4 March 1967 and the contents included three photos of an unidentified individual and one photo each of individuals identified as Reynaldo *IRSULA Brea and Antonio *FERNANDEZ Fernandez. A note which was included stated that henceforth the sendor would identify himself as *"Pancrasio". He indicated that if it was desired receipt of his letter could be mentioned on the AMSCROLL radio program but that never should any mention of the contents be mentioned as this could reveal his identity to the DSE. Pancrasio stated his help would not be much but that his letters might contain information which could be of value. He wrote that he could not go into detail as he was unable to spend much time at the typewriter. Pancrasio concluded by saying the photos of Antonio and Reynaldo were in the hands of a security agent who had orders to find them. They had both been fugitives for a long time. The other photo (in triplicate) was of a Canadian citizen whose passport was retained by the DSE and was reported as lost for an unexplained motive.

2. On 10 April 1967, the message from Pancrasio was ac nowledged by radio and he was thanked for his letter and told to continue his correspondence.

3. On 21 April 1967, a second letter from Pancrasio was received via Key West, Florida. The letter had been

Attachment-U/S/C (dual)
Copies of info received

Stanley B. JERSAWIT

CS COPY

Distribution:
1 - WH/COG

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 May 67	MAY 11 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27543

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27543

mailed from Habana on 13 March and was directed to Guillermo ALFONSO, 649 William Street, Key West. Typed on one of the two sheets of paper forwarded by Pancrasio was a note saying this was letter number four from Pancrasio and requesting Guillermo ALFONSO to forward the papers to the same postal address which he had previously utilized. Copies of the contents of this letter are attached under separate cover. The one paper, dated 27 September 1961, appears to be a list of Costa Ricans who visited Cuba under the auspices of ICAP. The second paper appears to be a list of Brazilians who visited Cuba, probably in mid 1960 when Janio QUADROS made a visit to Cuba as part of his presidential campaign in Brazil.

4. On 2 May 1967, a JMWAVE Officer visited Guillermo ALFONSO in an effort to identify Pancrasio and develop sufficient information to evaluate his information and determine the extent of his access. ALFONSO claimed he had no idea as to the identity of Pancrasio and was unable to suggest possible candidates from his relatives in Cuba, former work associates, classmates or neighbors. ALFONSO had retained the envelop from Cuba which contained Pancrasio's second message and a short message to ALFONSO. The note to ALFONSO stated that Pancrasio had received ALFONSO's name and address from some unidentified individual and that it was requested that ALFONSO forward the contents of the letter to the AMSCROLL address which was enclosed. ALFONSO was cautioned not to mention anything concerning the matter to anyone, especially to relatives in Cuba. Pancrasio stated this was his second letter (not fourth as indicated on the material which was forwarded on by ALFONSO) and that the first had been sent direct to the AMSCROLL address. It was stated this was the first letter by which ALFONSO would serve as intermediary and that other letters would come at infrequent intervals. Pancrasio had decided to use an intermediary address as the AMSCROLL address was too well known. Pancrasio concluded his note by saying that he preferred to remain anonymous and that he would be remaining in Cuba for two more years. In addition to the above cited message, the letter to ALFONSO contained a calling card with the name Dr Luc B. INNOCENT, President of the Haitian Revolutionary Movement. On the back of the card was typed in Spanish "without comment".

5. JMWAVE traces on FERNENDEZ, IRSULA and ALFONSO are negative. INNOCENT, according to HZPA-12507, dated 2 August 1962, is a Haitian terrorist, Fidelista, who was planning to enter Panama from Columbia.

6. ALFONSO was instructed to forward any mail received from Pancrasio in an expeditious manner and JMWAVE will follow any leads obtained which might help to identify Pancrasio in order to develop him into a more productive source of information.

Stanley B. JERSAWIT

Sept. 27, 1961

RELACION DE GRUPO DEL ICAP EN COSTA RICA

Maria E. Figueroa - Felicia Rojas	1920
Alicia Campos -Elida de la O.-Ivette Barrantes	1606
Julia Rodriguez-Ma. L. Garcia	1601
Luz Ma. Hernandez -Rosa Mena	1602
Elena Mora e Hijos	1603
Luis Acevedo - Ramon Blanco	1604
Misael Barrantes - Francisco Bolaños	1605
Edwin Calderon - Luis Campos	1607
Manuel Campos - Gustavo Cardenas	1608
Mariano Campos - Rigoberto Carmona	01609
Fernando Chaves - Gonzalo Sierra	1610
Luis Cordas - Luis Hernandez	1611
Gabino Fallas - Fernando Fonseca	1612
Rafael Grandes - Honorio Montero	1613
Wilfredo Johnson - Alfonso Rodriguez	1614
Mariano Monje - Jorge Monje	001616
Felix Quesada - Walter Rivero	1615
Arnaldo Mendoza - Alfonso Santamaria	1617
Hugo Mora - Rodolfo Solano	1618
Manuel Romero - Tito Villalobos - Rigoberto Pravia	1619
Rigoberto Ruiz -Hector Zamora	1620
Anibal Porras - Manuel Solis	1627-1621
Manuel Sanchez - Perez Tibell	1622
Hernan Murillo -Jorge Rodriguez	1623
Marco Tulio Herrera - Jorge Coto	1624

Marzo 2[illegible], 1967

ATENCION GUILLERMO

Carta no 4 de Pancrasio, me imagino que habra Ud recibido las anteriores. por favor remiralo a la siguiente direccion:

Alfredo Jimenez
Apartado Postal 3940
Miami FLA

Por favor Guillermo no me vaya a fallar y perdone la molestia.

ATENCION UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

Informes sin comentario

CS COPY

S/C OOT.1 UFGA-27543

19-120-26

14-00000

cuba 010060

DELEGACION DEL BRASIL

Capt. Vicentre Ricalo Palais	1509
Dr. Janio Quadros, D. Eloa Quadros, Srta. Dirce Maria Quadros, Sra. Leonor Quadros	1510/11/12
Senador Alfonso Arinos e Senhora	1513/14
Deputado Paulo de Tarso e Senhora	1506
Deputado Adaucto Lucio Cardoso	1520
Deputado Seixas Doria	1521
Deputado Francisco Juliao e Senhora	1503
Deputado Castilho Cabral	1516
Sr Augusto Marzagao	1508
Dr Joao Dantas	1507
Sr Helio Fernandez	1519
Sr Muniz Bandeira	1212
Sr Murilo Melo Filho	1508
Sr Luis Antonio Villas Boas	1522
Sr Pinheiro Lemos	1722
Sr Rui Marcucci	1705
Sr Marcio Alves	1720
Sr Carlos Castelo Branco	1515
Sr Ruben Braga	1720
Sr Carlos Mesquita	1110
Sr Clodomir Morais	1706
Deputado Murilo Costa Rego e Senhora	1502
Sr Jesuino Antonio Dávila	1008
Sr Emir Nogueira	1108
Sr Jose Passos	1008
Sr Elias Raid	1109
Sr Jose Costa	1213
Sr Saulo Ramos	1108
Sr Fernando Sabino	1501
Sr Jao Batista Costejon	1518
Dr Milton Fernandez	1109
Sr Milton Santos	1517
Deputado Juracy Magalhaes Jr	1517
Sr Oswaldo Pereira Legey	1001
Sr Carlos Kerr	1001
Sr Joao Manoel Conrado Ribeiro	1[illegible]2
Sr Jose Carlos de Moraes	1[illegible]5
Sr Walter Barboza	1706

TRIPULACION

Sres Arthur Portofe e Heitor Tider	1719
Sres Antonio Jose Schittini Pinto e Gilberto A Salomoni	1709
Srta Marly Moreira Peter	1721
Sres Paulino Lira e Jose Imperator	1208
Sres Leonardo ;Spitzer e Beniamin Bondarczuk	1220
Sres Lindolfo Montenegro e Aldo Rodriguez Neto	1223

Dr. Luc. B. Innocent
PRESIDENT
DU MOUVEMENT REVOLUTIONNAIRE HAITIEN

14-00000

SIN COMENTARIO

E

P20

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES (3)

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCT[ION] PROHIBITED

CA, MO, RR —, FI —, RS, CICS, CHOS, C/PT, SS, ESEC

FROM 3

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBE

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CA2, CA/PROP, 6

S E C R E T 112305Z CITE JMWAVE 7135

DIRECTOR INFO RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO

ACTION

11 MAY 65400

TYPIC MHSPAWN AMSCROLL AMOT

REFERENCE JMWAVE 6970 (59428)

1. STUDY DISCUSSED PARA 1 REF RELEASED 5 MAY. ONLY PICK UP SEEN BY STATION WAS STORY IN DIARIO LAS AMERICAS 9 MAY. CLIP AIRMAILED TO ADDRESSES. HOWEVER AFP FILED STORY WITH NEW YORK OFFICE 9 MAY. WILL FORWARD COPY TEXT WHEN AVAILABLE TO STATION, AMFRAME-1 ASSURED BY LOCAL AP OFFICE THAT STORY WRITTEN BUT AS OF 11 MAY NOT FILED.

~~Ken Murphy~~

~~Ac IIF CA 27652~~

Ap Fl LR

2. COPIES AMSCROLL STUDY POUCHED HQS BY TM-928341 ON 10 MAY. AIRMAILING COPY TO INFO ADDRESSES.

S E C R E T

T

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. pmg

38

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 2d R, Fuller

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PROP

AN 14	~~[illegible]~~	~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~	~~[illegible]~~	
ABSTRACT X		~~INDEX~~

S E C R E T 102137Z CITE [illegible]WAVE 7103

10 MAY 67 IN 64432

SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSCROLL

REFERENCE SANTIAGO 4230 (IN 58340)

1. JMWAVE PROCEEDING PER PARA 3 REF. STUDY BEING DISTRIBUTED TO AMSCROLL LIST 10 MAY. WILL AIRMAIL SANTIAGO SPANISH TRANSLATION WITH CHARTS. WILL APPRECIATE CLIPS INCLUDING EDITORIALS YOU MAY BE ABLE ARRANGE.

2. REQUEST YOU DEFER PASSING MATERIAL UNTIL 17 MAY OR LATER IN ORDER ALLOW TIME FOR ARRIVAL OF AMSCROLL MAILING.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

19-120-26
10 May 67

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 41

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

25/2

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR WH8, FI, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI/INT2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, SB 8,

WAVE

S E C R E T 032225Z CITE JMWAVE 6970

DIRECTOR INFO RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO

4 MAY 67 IN 59428

AN	~~PF~~	
~~PS~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

TYPIC MHSPAWN AMSCROLL AMOT

REF DIRECTOR 97866

1. RE REQUEST PARA 2 REF CURRENT STATISTICAL AMSCROLL STUDY COMPLETED 3 MAY INDICATE 1967 HARVEST TO BE MORE IN NEIGHBORHOOD 6.1 MILLION METRIC TONS WHICH IN LINE WITH RESPONSIBLE ANALYSES (CF, CZARNIKOW-RIONDA) AVAPLABLE TO AMSCROLL. HENCE PREFER USE THEIR CONCLUSIONS BUT IN DISCUSSION SECTION WILL REFER FAVORABLY TO SUMMARY SECTION OF UFG-8867. THIS WILL ALSO AVOID SECURITY FACTOR OF USING PRECISE AMOT CONSLUSIONS. THIS STUBY WILL BE RELEASED BY AMSCROLL 5 MAY. WILL ADVISE PER REF OF WIRE SERVICE AND OTHER PICKUP.

2. AMOT STUDY OF 25 APRIL OF RECENT RISE OF SUGAR PRICE AND THEIR PROPOSALS TO COUNTER ROLE OF SPECULATORS FORWARDED TM928256 ON 2 MAY. DRAFT OF AMSCROLL STUDY DISCUSSED ABOVE BEING FORWARDED PRIORITY POUCH 4 MAY. ALSO FORWARDING PERTINENT EXTRACTS OF SUGAR LETTERS FROM MERRILL LYNCH, CZARIKOW-RIONDA AND C. CZARNIKOW, LTD WHICH GERMAINE TO AMOT PROPOSALS.

3. AS THESE AND OTHER STUDIES REACH DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS ON SECRE

19-120-26
4 May 1967

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 6970 S E C R E T SECRET

SIZE OF SUGAR CROP AND DUE ABSENCE HERE OF RELIABLE INFO ON SUCH KEY FACTORS AS EXTENT, IF ANY, TO WHICH SOVIET UNION WILL RELEASE CUBA FROM ITS COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE USSR WITH 4,000,000 TONS THIS YEAR (JMWAVE IN NO POSITION TO EVALUATE MERITS OF EITHER CONCLUSION) WE DEFER TO HQS FOR EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTING AMOT PROPOSALS.

IN ADDITION SUCH ASSETS AS AMSCROLL, AMHIM, ETC.

AMRAIN-1 OR AMSNAKE-1 MIGHT PREPARE STUDIES ATTRIBUTING THEIR INFO TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE ANB RECENTLY ARRIVED REFUGEES.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

INGTON 027

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - FCOT-13169

FILE NO - NONE

DATE - 3 MAY 1967

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

INFO - CHIEF, FE DIVISION CHIEF, WH DIVISION

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, OKINAWA

SUBJECT - TRANSFER OF JMWAVE ADVANCE TO OKINAWA FOR ACCOUNTING

ACTION - SEE PARA 3

REFERENCE - UFGT-19178, DTD 10 APRIL 67

1. CONTENTS REF AND ATTACHMENTS NOTED AND REFERRED TO REBHOLTZ WHOSE COMMENTS FOLLOW--

A. BOTH AMOUNTS ON VOUCHER 8511 PROBABLY PASSED AS ONE SUM TO AMBLEAK/1 WHO MAY HAVE SIGNED SINGLE RECEIPT FOR $1,500.00 RATHER THAN RECEIPTING $1,000.00 AND $500.00 SEPARATELY. RE-EXAMINATION APPROPRIATE FILES ON THIS ASSUMPTION MAY SOLVE MYSTERY.

B. ANY OUTSTANDING ADVANCES THIS MATTER WOULD HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO SUCCEEDING CASE OFFICER GORDON R. HAWLOTT THROUGH FORMAL MEMO WHICH JMWAVE FINANCE MUST HAVE HAD PRIOR REBHOLTZ' CLEARING STATION. EXTRA COPY MAY BE IN AMSCROLL FILES.

C. SINCE AMBLEAK/1 WOLADY CITIZEN /ALTHOUGH THOUGHT BY SOME ASSOCIATES A PBRUMEN EXILE/, HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED DIRECTLY TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT AND DETAIL EXPENDITURES MADE WITH FUNDS IN QUESTION.

D. REBHOLTZ' RECOLLECTION PURPOSE OF ADVANCE, WHICH WAVE 1702 CITED ON VOUCHER AS AUTHORIZATION MAY CONFIRM, WAS DEPOSIT ON LEASE, RENOVATION AND REPAIRS HEIRLOOM COVER OFFICE IN FASHIONABLE AREA OF CITY. CLEARED WOLADY REALTOR WHO MADE ARRANGEMENTS, COPY OF LEASE IN JMWAVE FILES, PERSONAL OBSERVATION

SECRET [illegible]

DELLING IN PROCESS BY HAWLOTT AND REBHOLTZ /INCLUDING INSTALLATION AIR CONDITIONER THROUGH WALL/, AMBLEAK/ UTILIZATION OFFICE AND POSSIBLE VISITS BY CLEARED WOLADY ATTORNEY AS CONSULTANT ON HEIRLOOM ACTIVITY PLUS OTHER SUCH INDICATIONS SHOULD PROVIDE AMPLE EVIDENCE MONEY PASSED AND EXPENDED AS AUTHORIZED.

2. IF ABOVE LEADS CANNOT BE FOLLOWED UP EFFECTIVELY, SUGGEST REBHOLTZ' CERTIFICATION BE ACCEPTED THAT TO BEST HIS KNOWLEDGE FUNDS PASSED AMBLEAK/1 FOR APPROVED OPERATIONAL PURPOSE. NOTE ADVANCE MADE 11 MAY 65 FOR ACCOUNTING ON OR BEFORE 11 JUNE 65, AND THAT REBHOLTZ ON ACTIVE DUTY AT JMWAVE UNTIL 31 JULY/ ALTHOUGH REF STATES DEPARTURE APPROX 1 JUNE/. TIME FACTOR SUGGEST SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNTING RENDERED WITHIN NORMAL DATE LIMIT SINCE OVERDUE NOTICE EVIDENTLY NOT ISSUED EVEN 45 DAYS BEYOND DUE DATE /WHICH REBHOLTZ SAYS WAS FIRM SOP AT JMWAVE/.

3. PLS ADVISE ASAP SINCE REBHOLTZ ETA 8 JUNE PCS TOKYO STATION AND WISH TO CLEAR THIS ITEM RATHER THAN TRANSFER IT AGAIN.

VICTOR J. SANDVOLD

END

DISTRIBUTION

2 - COS, JMWAVE/VIA TELEPOUCH/

1 - CHIEF, FE DIVISION/VIA TELEPOUCH/

1 - CHIEF, WH DIVISION/VIA TELEPOUCH/

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM 26

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA/O-4

AN	FI
PS	
ABSTRACT	

S E C R E T 022125Z CITE SANTIAGO 4230 (THILLEN ACTING) SA/SO

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR 2 MAY 67 IN 58340

TYPIC MHSPAWN AMSCROLL

REF: UFGA 27416 (20 APRIL 1967)

1. REFERENCE IS AN EXCELLENT PAPER THAT SHOULD SERVE OUR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES WELL IN CHILE ESPECIALLY SINCE THE GOC SEEMS TO DESIRE A SOFTENING OF ITS PREVIOUSLY HARD ANTI-CUBA LINE.

2. WE CAN REPLAY THE ARTICLE IN ITS ENTIRITY IN FUNERAL-1 OR PROBABLY PLACE A SUMMARY OF IT IN THE FUAMBER-1 SUNDAY SUPPLEMENT. (A MORNING TABLOID OF SOME 200,000 CIRCULATION ON SUNDAYS, VERY BIG FOR CHILE). IN EITHER CASE ATTRIBUTION IS NO PROBLEM SINCE EITHER OF THEM WILL PLACE IT WITH OR WITHOUT ATTRIBUTION.

3. THUS, IF IT SERVES YOUR PURPOSES WOULD SUGGEST THAT AMSCROLL PUBLISH IT FOR PRIVATE DISTRIBUTION AFTER WHICH YOU CAN SEND US THE SPANISH VERSION WITH THE CHARTS TOGETHER WITH A LIST OF CHILEAN FIRMS IT WAS SENT TO AND WE WILL ARRANGE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION AS NOTED ABOVE. MIGHT ALSO BE POSSIBLE SPIN OFF SOME EDITORIALS BY OTHER ASSETS EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER GIVING IT FULL TREATMENT.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

19-120-26

2 May 67

14-00000

C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere

INFO.
Chief of Station, Athens
Chief, NE

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE KNF

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSCROLL
Request from Greek and Spanish Embassies for AMSCROLL Publications on Shipping

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

1. We forward by separate cover a copy of a letter from the Royal Greek Embassy in Washington addressed to AMSCROLL together with a copy of the requested publication. AMSCROLL answered the request by return mail and took the opportunity to include more recent material published by AMSCROLL which discussed Greek ships and Cuba. All of this material had earlier been sent the addressees and, further, had been sent the list discussed in UFGA-26541 (8 December 1966). We are also including in the separate cover attachment an article based upon AMSCROLL material that appeared in the American Marine Engineer.

2. On 27 April the Spanish Embassy in Washington telephoned AMSCROLL to request one copy each of the January and February 1967 AMSCROLL Studies of Free World Shipping with Cuba. The Embassy explained that its file of this publication was complete except for these two issues.

Roger E. Marchbank
for MARK F. EFFIELD

Attachment:
As stated, usc(att.)

Distribution
3-C/WH, w/att, usc
2-COS, Athens, w/att. usc — To out Pouch
2-WH/COG, w/att. usc
2-C/NE, w/o/att. 2cc [illegible] w/o att.

CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
28 April 67	MAY 1 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27447

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26
19-120-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 att.

SEP. COV. ATT:
UFGA-27447
26 Apr '67

ROYAL GREEK EMBASSY
WASHINGTON. D. C.

April 17, 1967

Movimiento Unida Revolucionaria
10 S.E. 9th Street
Miami, Fla. 33131.

Dear Sirs,

Would you kindly send us 2 copies of your number 6 Political Notebook Series The Maritime Fifth Column (Suplement).

Thanking you in advance,

Truly yours,

I Kerasidis

I.Kerasidis
Secretary.

S/C att. 1 UFGA-27447

CS COPY

19-120-26

SEP CPU ATT: UFGA-27447
26 Apr '67

AMERICAN MARINE ENGINEER March, 1967 p.- 19

who have been employed 25 years or more be established at $100.

"Escalator Clause"

The AFL-CIO has proposed that an "escalator" clause be incorporated into Social Security so that a re- I believe that the United States, now surpassed by 13 Western European nations in the field of social welfare, can and should provide its citizens with a realistic and sound Social Security system consistent with our resources."

Greeks Discipline Cuba Traders

Fourteen ship owners and merchant marine Captains were recently indicted by Greek authorities for sailing transports to Cuba in violation of existing regulations.

The Minister of the Merchant Marine has reportedly sent to the proper prosecution authorities the files against the owners and captains of S.S. Irene, S.S. Barbarino, S.S. Alice and S.S. Pantanassa. All the vessels are registered in Piraeus.

Charges for similar violations are to be brought soon against the owners and Captains of the S.S. Tina, S.S. Eftychia, S.S. Andromachi, S.S. Kyra Ilarikleia. S.S. Nikolas F., S.S. Nikolas M., S.S. Roulamaria and S.S. Sofia.

The courts and the Merchant Marine Disciplinary Board are reportedly investigating charges against other owners and captains.

The steamer LOUISE LYKES (Lykes Bros.) and the Yamashiro Maru recently collided during heavy weather at Keelung.

Illness At Sea Rate Declines

Reported illnesses and injuries among seagoing personnel in 1966 in relation to the average number of seafaring jobs dipped to a new low for the last decade.

Recently announced figures stated that the combined percentage of illness and injuries, based on an average of 54,000 jobs last year, declined to 73.7 per cent from the 85.5 per cent reported on 46,000 jobs in 1965.

The respective percentages of injuries and illnesses also declined. The ratio of injuries last year dropped to 42.4 per cent from 45.5 per cent in 1965, and that of illness was down to 37.3 per cent from the flat 40 percent registered the previous year.

The percentage of injuries is the lowest recorded since 1961, and that of illness is the lowest since 1957.

All told, in 1966 licensed and unlicensed U. S. merchant marine personnel were reported as injured or ill 43,045 times. Reported injuries totaled 22,923 and reported illnesses totaled 20,122.

(Continued from Page 1)

icy which has led since the end of World War II to neglect and abuse of the American merchant marine by government agencies.

"President Johnson announced more than two years ago that he would offer a new maritime policy but this still has not been put forward. In the meantime, pressures have been increasing within government to abandon entirely the idea that our country needs a strong American merchant marine.

"It is against this background that we have examined the proposals advanced by Secretary of Transportation Alan Boyd.

"We find many shortcomings in this program. Most of its goals are far from adequate to meet the nation's needs. It contains provisions which would damage rather than strengthen the effectiveness of our merchant marine. It leaves many questions unanswered.

"However, in view of the present desperate condition of the U. S. merchant marine, we must regard the fact that a program is being proposed and that it is positive even to the degree that this one

is, as a ho
"The p
stands is a
It should
wards and
make ever
that the
guards are
"We be
labor and
the mari
must aban
manger ar
feating at
ite behind
is practic
obtainable
"We be
ernment
abandon w
gerous sc
the FDL
are advan
tutes for
range m
policy. It
to weaken
sea-power.
FDL prog
lined appe
separate
from co
need. This
unrealistic
all lessons
end result
imical to
terest, un
defense an
abilities.
"For th
devices su
ed "effecti
ory whic

SECRET

Amscroll

"UNIDAD" MONTHLY, ISSUE No. 36, APRIL, 1967.-

FRONT PAGE:

(1) ANOTHER REGIME OFFICIAL DEFECTS IN GREAT BRITAIN: A brief story on the Collazo defection, followed by excerpts from his original statement. Excerpts include: reasons why free-world sea trade with Cuba is declining (U.S. Black List, Latin workers' boycott, etc.); Cuba-trading shipowners take advantage of Castro and overcharge him for charters; the personnel problem in "Mambisas"; the planned deception for Expo 67 (exhibiting console record players made up of foreign components and wood as Cuban-made); general conclusion: régime officials don't know where they are headed for.

(2) EDITORIAL: HATED BY FRIEND AND FOE: The Russians hate Castro because he has two-timed them in the Sino-Soviet rift; the Chinese loathe him because they regard him as a mercenary who has sold out to the Soviets. Latin American Reds hate him as well, because, as they say, he has promoted fractionalism in their ranks. Anti-Communists throughout the Americas hate him too, as there is not a country in the hemisphere where mothers and wives are not mourning the loss of a dear one to Castroite terrorists. And anti-Red Cubans would not touch Castro with a ten-foot pole. Hated by friend and foe alike, how could anyone think that Castro may eventually survive a chronic economic crisis that his own ineptitutde has wrought on the nation?

PAGE TWO:

(1) MOROCCO BREAKS DEPENDENCE ON CUBAN SUGAR: From the EIR we take the story on the Moroccan plan to develop their own sugar industry at the expense of purchases from Cuba. This plan, we stress, is receiving Polish financial and technical aid, which shows to what extent Castro's Red comrades are concerned with his sugar interests.

(2) DO THE SOVIETS SEND 'REJECT' PARTS TO CUBA?: Also from the EIR, this is the story on the "coincidence" that poor-quality or defective parts began to arrive in Cuba, under Soviet-Cuban barter agreements, right after the price of sugar dropped.

(3) WHERE IS RAUL?: A humorous poem by Luis R. Cáceres, Jr. It goes like this

(it rhymes in Spanish, of course): Where would Raúl be? - Is he out cutting cane - or viciously murdering Cubans - or hiding inside a trunk? Where might he be? - what could have happened to Raulito? - maybe he's got the "shakes" - or was abducted by (eloped with) a Congolese? (This is a reference to the old Cuban joke about Raúl being a homosexual and having a preference for husky Congolese).

(4) Box: CUBAN! Help the fight against the tyranny. Pass this issue on to your friends and trusted acquaintances. Report to us any news that might be interesting (we give our P.O. Box No.). We welcome your criticisms, comments and suggestions.

PAGE THREE:

(1) Continuation of front-page story on Collazo.

(2) CASTRO TO BE ACCUSED BY REDS: a brief story on the announced plans of the Venezuelan Communists to charge Castro with meddling and promoting fractionalism, at a forthcoming Communist meeting in Prague.

C/Hall P3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Santiago

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/MHSPAWN/AMSCROLL
Study of Cuban/USSR Trade Relations

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: See paragraphs 3 and 4.

REFERENCES: A. SANTIAGO-3885

B. DIRECTOR-86882

C. JMWAVE-6430

1. JMWAVE forwards herewith a study entitled Economic Relations Between Cuba and the Soviet Union: How Much Dependency? Both Santiago and Headquarters are being provided with an original and one copy of the study in English and an original and one copy in Spanish. Two sets of the one table and the six charts that support the study are also being forwarded each addressee. This is an AMSCROLL prepared study; the author is AMFRAME-1 in collaboration with AMSNAKE-1. It was prepared in response to references A and B.

2. We have limited this study to an attempt to prove statistically the very rapid rise of Cuban economic dependency upon the Soviet Union. We have intentionally avoided editorializing as the facts speak for themselves; thus we have drawn no political conclusions, nor have we attempted to establish that this economic dependency carries with it an implicit policy control on the part of the Soviets (partly because policy control does not necessarily follow and, in any event, the reader is free to draw his own conclusions).

3. If it does not run counter to Station Santiago's plans, we suggest that AMSCROLL - a JMWAVE asset that studies and comments upon the Cuban economic scene--reproduce this study under its name for private distribution to its list of sugar brokers, trading firms, and international organizations that deal

19-120-26
~~19-120-26/3~~

1 ATT

Attachments:
As stated, h/w

CS COPY

Distribution
3 - COS, Santiago, w/atts., h/w
(2) - C/WH, w/atts., ~~h/w~~ 3cc to WH/4/EH
2 - WH/COG w/o atts.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic [illegible]

Removed from ~~Project~~ Sub. file
CS Classification: 19-120-26
JOB #68-644/93
Box: 19 Fold: 3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
20 APR 67	

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA - 27416

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA - 27416

with or are interested in following the Cuban economic picture. We would particularly like to bring this presentation to the attention of European firms and organizations with which AMSCROLL is in contact and which are a factor in Cuban trade. We believe that this will also give a basis for attribution to Santiago should the Station desire it; if not, the facts and figures could be used by Station Santiago without attribution and without sourcing, for that matter, as we believe that the figures will stand.

4. JMWAVE will appreciate comments on the value of this paper from Headquarters and Santiago. We also request a cabled response from Santiago to the suggestion in paragraph 3 that AMSCROLL reproduce this study.

Mark F. EFFIELD

Comments cabled 23 May 67.
Pko

19-120-26

ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION: HOW MUCH DEPENDENCY?

Cuba's dependency on the Soviet Union is known. The question is: how much dependency? In order to arrive at some conclusion we have chosen Cuba's foreign trade statistics for the 1959-1966 period.

We will work under the following economic assumption: Economic dependency of one country on the other can be indicated to a considerable extent by their trade as this indicates the need one country has of the other as a market for its exports and as a supplier for its imports.

What we will do is to analyze the Cuban Trade Balance for the 1959-1966 period. *

1) According to the assumption we established regarding trade dependency, we can say that during 1959 Cuba was dependent upon the Free World for its markets as total trade value for that year amounted to $ 1,305,700,000 and trade value with the Free World represented $ 1,289,000,000 (or 98.8% of the total trade).

Broken down into exports and imports we see that in 1959 Cuban exports totaled $ 637,700,000 while total imports were $ 688,000,000. Thus, the trade balance showed a $ 26,500,000 deficit, which was a reflection of the trend started in 1958 due to

---

* Every figure in this paper will be given in U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated. The sources for the figures used throughout the analysis, the table, and charts were: "The Economist", "The New York Times", UN's Economic Reports on Latin America, "Cuba Comercio Exterior" magazine, "Visión" magazine, "US News & World Report", and The Economist Intelligence Unit's "Quarterly Economic Review".

It should be remembered that the figures refer only to the Cuban Trade Balance; i.e., imports and exports, and not to the Cuban Balance of Payments which would reflect loans and financial arrangements, plus the Soviet military and techical assistance; figures which do not appear in the balance of trade and which are not available to us with sufficient authenticity to warrant their use.

Removed from Subj file
CS Classification: 19-120-26
JOB #68-644/93
Box: 19 Fold: 3

20 april 1967
att. #1 to UFGA - 27416

19-120-26

the unstable political situation under the Batista regime and the economic insecurity of the new Castro regime.

Of the above mentioned exports, 97.8% were to Free World countries and only 2.2% to Communist countries. Import~~-wise,~~ 99.9% of the imports were ~~made~~ from Free World countries, while 0.1% were ~~made~~ from Communist countries.

~~Thus,~~ we ~~can~~ conclude that Cuba was ~~still very much~~ dependent upon the Free World as a trading partner ~~- trade wise~~ - during 1959, but ~~Further~~, at least $ 623,800,000 (97.8% of total exports) was collected in hard currency.

2) In 1960, Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba and the Cuban-Soviet trade agreement was signed. The effect of this agreement is immediately apparent when viewed through Cuba's foreign trade figures.

Total trade value ~~decreased~~ decreased in 1960 to $ 1,168,000,000 from $ 1,305,700,000. Free World participation decreased more than proportionately, ~~as~~ the value of Cuban trade with the Free World was $ 897,000,000, while trade with Communist countries increased to $ 271,000,000 (or 23.3% of total trade) versus $ 1,289,900,000 and $ 15,800,000 (or 2.2% of total trade) respectively in 1959.

The trade balance was in favor of Cuba in the amount of $ 68,000,000 as control ? of imports, especially from the Free World, established in 1959 was having its effect.

3) In 1961 the whole foreign trade picture was transformed. It was almost the reverse of 1960. Total trade amounted to $ 1,253,600,000, of which Free World participation represented $ 348,600,000 (or 27.8%) and Communist trade $ 905,000,000 (or 72.2%).

We can look at this another way. In 1960, Cuban exports earned $ 467,000,000 in hard currency. In 1961, the hard currency earnings amounted to $ 166,800,000 since the $ 458,100,000 value of Cuban exports to the Communist countries represented "agreement value" or "nominal hard currency value" as the trade was conducted under barter agreements, with the Soviet Union providing about 10% to 20% of the total Cuban export value in convertible currency.

Cuba was now dependent, economically, upon the Communist World, especially the Soviet Union. The fact that little hard currency was obtained from its new trade partners further committed Cuba's economy to the Communist Bloc.

4) In 1962, the trend continued. Total trade was $ 1,257,000,000, of which $ 1,031,000,000 (82.1%) was with the Communist Bloc and only $ 226,000,000 (17.9%) with Free World countries.

Another phenomenon appeared during 1962. The Soviets, who had been careful not to press Cuba during 1960 with regards to their trade balance (which was favorable to Cuba by $ 31,000,000), were shrewd enough to close the gap during 1961. The balance was favorable to Cuba by $ 11,200,000.

Clearly, the Soviet pressure was on. In 1962, Cuba faced a $ 227,000,000 deficit with the Communist countries. Compounding this is the fact that by 1962 Cuba had spent 30.6% of its hard currency reserves in Free World markets.

Dependency upon the Soviet Union arrived to stay as trade with the Communist World represented 82.1% of total trade and imports from the Communist area ~~had~~, for the first time, surpassed Cuban exports to the Bloc.

5) Two interesting developments occured in 1963. First of all, total trade with the Communist countries maintained the 1962 level ($ 1,031,000,000 in 1962 and $ 1,054,900,000 in 1963). But, the Soviet Union tightened the grip by increasing its exports to Cuba to $ 688,900,000 (in 1962 they represented $ 629,000,000), while Cuban exports to the Communist Bloc decreased to $ 366,000,000 (in 1962 they represented $ 402,000,000). Thus, the imbalance for Cuba increased to $ 322,900,000 (in 1962 it was $ 227,000,000).

At the same time, Cuba attempted To recoup in an approach to the Free World markets by taking advantage of an increase in the price of sugar in the world market (sugar averaged 8.48 cts. per pound during this period). Cuba's total trade with the Free World increased to $ 354,300,000 (in 1962 it had been $ 226,000,000).

Nevertheless, the 1963 Cuban trade balance ~~worsened for Cuba as it~~ showed a $ 323,200,000 deficit. ~~The Free World countries were able to turn the tables~~ on Cuba (as in 1962

~~they~~ the Free World had a $ 12,000,000 deficit on the trade balance with Cuba and now Cuba ~~was~~ had a $ 300,000 ~~short).~~ deficit with the Free World.

6) For 1964, a favorable world sugar market (average price of 5.86 cts. per pound) encouraged Cuba to continue its flirtation with the Free World. The Cuban treasury was able to handle some hard currency for the first time in the Castro era and Cuban commercial missions were sent to Europe and Japan to purchase items no longer available in Cuba.

Total trade increased to $ 1,722,000,000 and the Free World participation increased from $ 354,300,000 (25.2%) in 1963 to $ 612,000,000 (35.6%). The Free World spending spree took its toll as the trade balance with the Free World showed a $ 30,000,000 deficit for Cuba. And here, we are speaking of a hard currency loss.

Not even in the midst of Cuba's affair with the Free World did the Soviet Union ~~loose~~ Lose control of the situation. On January 20, 1964, Cuba was signing a trade agreement with the Soviet Union by which it was commiting about half of its planned future sugar production to the Soviet Union for the next six years. The amounts Cuba agreed to deliver to the Soviet Union were: 2,100,000 metric tons in 1965; 3,000,000 in 1966; 4,000,000 in 1967; 4,000,000 in 1968; 5,000,000 in 1969; and 5,000,000 in 1970. The Soviet Union did agree to fix the price of Cuba's sugar at 6 cts. per pound, which perhaps seems generous in 1967, but hardly a good offer on January 20, 1964, as the price of sugar on January 19, 1964 was 9.50 cts. per pound. Adding insult to injury the Soviet Union did not include in the 1964 trade agreement its previous commitment to provide Cuba with 10% or 20% of the payments in hard currency as it had done in the 1960 agreement.

7) By 1965 Cuba was sending few trade missions abroad, ~~virtually ceased its hard currency purchases, and found itself with~~ because it had almost no hard currency (the average price of sugar had dropped to 2.12 cts. per pound) and During 1965 Cuba faced the Soviet Union more empty handed than before and the general trade situation returned to 1963 levels, except that by now the Communist countries had more participation and the Free World

had less. Total trade amounted to $ 1,551,000,000 (compared to $ 1,410,200,000 in 1963), but trade with Communist countries reached $ 1,195,000,000 (compared to $ 1,054,900,000 in 1963). Trade with the Free World remained at the same level - $ 354,300,000 in 1963 and $ 356,000,000 in 1965, but with a difference - the Cuban deficit in its trade balance with the Free World rose from $ 300,000 in 1963 to $ 60,000,000 in 1965.

So, the Soviets continued in control as trade with the Communist countries represented more than three quarters of Cuba's total trade for that year. The sugar production had already been mortgaged, the sugar market was depressed, and Cuba was more and more dependent upon the Soviet Union.

8) Then came 1966. Sugar prices decreased to an average of 1.86 cts. per pound. Total trade decreased to $ 1,465,000,000 as compared with $ 1,551,000,000 in 1965. Trade with Communist countries also decreased (from $ 1,195,000,000 in 1965 to $ 1,160,000,000 in 1966) and the Soviets were able to push a little further and increased Cuba's deficit in the trade balance from $ 119,000,000 in 1965 to $ 200,000,000 in 1966.

Free World countries also gained. Total Free World trade decreased to $ 305,000,000 (from $ 356,000,000 in 1965), but the Cuban deficit increased from $ 60,000,000 in 1965 to $ 65,000,000 in 1966.

Our conclusions follow:

FIRST: Cuba is economically dependent upon the Soviet Union.

SECOND: This dependency is increasing. It has risen from 1.2% in 1959 to 79.2% by 1966.

To buttress this conclusion we point out that:

A) Cuba has mortgaged its sugar production to the Soviet Union.

B) Cuba has exhausted its hard currency reserves. While an exact figure is not available we estimated it to be about $ 20,000,000 in December 1964.

C) Cuba does not receive hard currency from its trade with the Communist countries under the present barter agreements.

D) Cuba has a $ 1,132,000,000 trade deficit with the Communist countries for the 1963 - 1966 period. Nor does this figure include Communist technical assistance, military equipment, scholarships, and the like.

THIRD: Cuba has lost its position as a meaningful trader in the Free World, which in turn has increased its dependency upon the Soviet Union.

Note.- For a statistical summary on Cuban Foreign Trade for the 1959 - 1966 period and for a graphic presentation of the above analysis see attached Table No. 1 and Charts Nos. 1 to 6.-

CHART NO.1
CUBAN FOREIGN TRADE
1959-1966
Expressed in Million US Dollars



SOURCE: TABLE NO.1

14-00000

69

CHART NO. 6
CUBAN TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1959-1966



SOURCE: TABLE NO. 1

14-00000

TABLE NO. 1

CUBA: FOREIGN TRADE
1959 - 1966
(Expressed in million US$)

	YEAR	EXPORTS	%	IMPORTS	%	TOTALS	%	BALANCE
Communist countries	1959	13,9	2,2	1,9	0,1	15,8	1,2	15,8
Non-Communist countries	1959	623,8	97,8	666,1	99,9	1289,9	98,8	- 42,3
Total	1959	637,7	100,0	668,0	100,0	1305,7	100,0	- 26,5
Communist countries	1960	151,0	24,4	120,0	21,8	271,0	23,3	31,0
Non-Communist countries	1960	467,0	75,6	430,0	78,2	897,0	76,7	37,0
Total	1960	618,0	100,0	550,0	100,0	1168,0	100,0	68,0
Communist countries	1961	458,1	73,4	446,9	70,0	905,0	72,2	11,2
Non-Communist countries	1961	166,8	26,6	181,8	30,0	348,6	27,8	- 15,0
Total	1961	624,9	100,0	628,7	100,0	1253,6	100,0	- 3,9
Communist countries	1962	402,0	77,1	629,0	85,5	1031,0	82,1	-227,0
Non-Communist countries	1962	119,0	22,9	107,0	14,5	226,0	17,9	12,0
Total	1962	521,0	100,0	736,0	100,0	1257,0	100,0	-215,0
Communist countries	1963	366,0	67,4	688,9	79,5	1054,9	74,8	-322,9
Non-Communist countries	1963	177,0	32,6	177,3	22,5	354,3	25,2	- 0,3
Total	1963	543,0	100,0	866,2	100,0	1410,2	100,0	-323,2
Communist countries	1964	423,0	59,2	687,0	68,6	1110,0	64,5	-264,0
Non-Communist countries	1964	291,0	40,8	321,0	31,4	612,0	35,5	- 30,0
Total	1964	714,0	100,0	1008,0	100,0	1722,0	100,0	-294,0
Communist countries	1965	538,0	78,4	657,0	75,9	1195,0	77,1	-119,0
Non-Communist countries	1965	148,0	21,6	208,0	24,1	356,0	22,9	- 60,0
Total	1965	686,0	100,0	865,0	100,0	1551,0	100,0	-179,0
Communist countries	1966	480,0	80,0	680,0	78,6	1160,0	79,2	-200,0
Non-Communist countries	1966	120,0	20,0	185,0	21,4	305,0	20,8	- 65,0
Total	1966	600,0	100,0	865,0	100,0	1465,0	100,0	-265,0
Totals	--	4,344.6	--	6,186.9	--	11,132.5	--	-1,238.9

CHART NO.5
CUBAN TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
1959-1966


EXPRESSED IN MILLION AGREEMENT US DOLLARS

EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES. TRADE VALUE = 100%

SOURCE: TABLE NO.1

CHART NO.4
CUBAN IMPORTS
1959-1966

IMPORTS FROM SELECTED AREAS EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES. TOTAL IMPORTS = 100.0 %



SOURCE: TABLE NO.1

CHART NO.3
CUBAN EXPORTS
1959-1966

EXPORTS TO SELECTED AREAS EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES, TOTAL EXPORTS= 100.0%



SOURCE: TABLE NO.1

CHART NO. 2
CUBAN FOREIGN TRADE
1959-1966

TRADE WITH SELECTED AREAS EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES. TOTAL TRADE = 100.0%



SOURCE: TABLE NO. 1

19-120-26

amscroll D+P

MEMORANDUM 4 April 1967

TO : Chief of Station, JMWAVE WPW-1333

FROM : PW/MARCHBANK

Distribution
3 - COS
1 - PW/MARCHBANK
1 - PW/Chrono
1 - REG

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMSCROLL Progress Report
1 January - 31 March 1967

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. During the quarter under review AMSCROLL continued its campaign to discredit the Cuban regime's economic management. As before, the campaign was conducted by the AMSCROLL radio program and by serious economic studies and comment that were provided its mailing list of sugar brokers, selected firms engaged in international trade and shipping, and commercial and technical journals. The Station continues to be encouraged by evidence of increased acceptance of the AMSCROLL efforts. For example, AMSCROLL received eighteen letters from Cuba during this quarter, all of which were in direct response to the radio program. Of these, twelve were received in March which represents the highest monthly total since initiating the program. This compares with eleven the previous quarter and only three in the corresponding quarter of 1966. In January, the Vice President of the Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico called upon the AMSCROLL offices to request AMSCROLL's assistance in preparing a chapter on Cuban sugar production problems to be included in a book this person is writing. AMSCROLL received requests from four universities or colleges requesting written material, from a graduate student preparing a thesis on the lot of the Cuban peasant, from the U.S. Army Special Warfare School Library, and others. The wire services, particularly Associated Press and Agence France Presse, continued to file stories based upon AMSCROLL releases.

2. The AMSCROLL radio program continued as reported for the last quarter--daily except Sunday for ten minutes over AMTHIGH. In addition, on 1 January AMSCROLL began a thirteen minute program each Sunday on AMTHIGH. These programs are in large part confined to subjects of an economic nature with the time on Sunday devoted to an in-depth analysis of what has occurred in this area since the previous Sunday. Typical themes hit throughout this quarter were: Economic and sociological aspects of Castro's "San Andres" speech of 28 January, an unfavorable balance of trade with Spain of $30,000,000, significance of Soviet trade with Chile as compared with Cuba, an analysis of a UN economic study of Cuba which shows that rice production in Cuba has declined 50% since 1960, the Royal British Institute's finding that Cuba's economy makes her a poor trading risk, and a report that Greek ship owners that persist in trading with

Cuba are being brought to trial. Throughout this period and whenever possible a particular effort was made to relate developments in China to present or possible developments in Cuba. The difficulties of the Chinese economy provided examples to which a Cuban "twist" could be put; e.g., the Chinese and Cuban economic failures demonstrate the failure of applied communism in the economic area.

3. AMSCROLL is continuing its analysis of the current sugar crop. Its releases on this subject continue to generate interest and the Station has seen coverage in The Miami Herald, El Universal (of Caracas), The Times of The Americas, and Diario Las Americas. The AMSCROLL releases on Free World shipping to Cuba were picked up by both AP and AFP and were published in the newspapers listed in the previous sentence as well as The Montreal Star. The AMHIM Bulletin also carries the bulk of these releases and we can therefore presume coverage of at least some of this information in Latin America. An interesting study was an analysis of British/Cuban trade which demonstrates that Great Britain is now getting the better part of the bargain; this story was filed by AFP as was a story of the poor quality of molasses being sold by the Cubans to British firms. Finally, AMSCROLL continued to get mileage from the Damlier-Benz story by reporting that this German firm has finally refused to sell spare parts to Cuba; the story was filed by AFP and published at least by Diario Las Americas.

4. AMSCROLL continued its mailing program to Cuba, but on a further reduced scale. During the quarter about 5,000 were mailed versus 5,600 during the previous quarter. We count a distribution during this quarter of 7,127 press releases and economic studies to places other than Cuba.

5. A recent development which may have an interesting operational potential was a telephone call to AMSCROLL from Czarnikow-Rionda, the New York sugar brokers, which was triggered by an AMSCROLL "case study" of the problems being faced by a Cuban sugar mill. The firm told AMSCROLL that it has for some time suspected Cuban sugar production figures and wondered if AMSCROLL had any such suspicions. AMSCROLL (through AMFRAME-1) has written to say it would be most interested in following any leads from Czarnikow-Rionda that could support a conclusion that Cuban production figures are false, which is where this matter now lies. The officials of Czarnikow-Rionda are well known to AMSCROLL and we shall be interested in seeing what the firm developes for AMSCROLL.

B. ADMINISTRATION

6. The amount budgeted for the quarter under review was $36,750 of which $33,700.72 was spent. Of this amount, $9,728 was for salaries and $23,972.72 for operations and office expenses.

7. Funding is handled as follows: AMSCROLL operational and administrative expenses are reimbursed monthly by the case officer to the treasurer after submission of an accounting of funds spent. Funds for salaries are also given the treasurer by the case officer which for tax purposes are paid by a local cover company.

C. PROBLEMS

8. The Station is not aware of any problems during this quarter worthy of comment.

D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER

9. AMSCROLL broadcasting via AMTHIGH will cease 20 April and AMTHIGH has been so informed by letter dated 13 March. The AMSCROLL programs will thereafter be carried by JMHOPE. The Station expects that this move will result in a substantial saving.

DTP

SECRET   IV QUARTER

PART 3

ACTIVITY AMSCROLL
PROGRAM Press & Publications

1. What contribution or progress did activity make during quarter toward established objectives?

The AMSCROLL organization continued to make progress to establish itself as a reputable analyst of Cuban economic developments. Once again it has accurately forecast the final sugar harvest weeks in advance of other authorities of which AMSCROLL is aware.

2. What progress is the activity expected to make during the forthcoming quarter toward its objectives?

A revamping of the AMSCROLL radio program to make it more objective will be a major effort of the forthcoming quarter.

3. Has the activity produced intelligence? Cite quantity and quality.

No. This activity is not designed to produce intelligence.

4. Is continuation recommended?

YES

5. Funds budgeted for FY 67 $ 134,000

Expended (estimate) during IV Quarter $ 23,120

Total expenditures (estimate) for FY 67 $ 123,038.41

SECRET

The M ni Herald
22-A Sunday, April 23, 1967

First Work Scheduled On Capital

British Honduras Plans Inland City

Compiled by Our Latin America Staff

BELIZE, British Honduras — Construction on a long awaited new capital in the interior for this British Central American possession is expected to begin within six weeks.

Total cost is estimated at $14 million. It will include roads, drainage, water supply, electricity, sewage disposal, public buildings and 740 houses of various types.

The public buildings will include a legislative assembly building, two multistory government office buildings, a post office, magistrate's court, 42-bed hospital, two primary schools and one comprehensive secondary school.

Focus On
LATIN
AMERICA

The new capital site is about 30 miles inland from the hurricane-susceptible coastal city of Belize where about one third of the territory's 110,000 population lives.

* * *

Grenade Injures 12 In Costa Rica Crowd

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica — A fragmentation grenade thrown into a crowd paying tribute to defeated presidential candidate Daniel Oduber injured 12 persons, including a six-year-old child, police reported Saturday.

Police said three people had been arrested in connection with the grenade blast.

* * *

Argentina Students Lose School Role

BUENOS AIRES — The Argentine military government of Lt. Gen. Juan Carlos Ongania has banned students from ruling bodies of the nine state universities and warned students and professors to stay out of politics.

* * *

One-Day Halt OKd In Refugee Flights

U.S. OFFICIALS Saturday announced that two Cuban refugee flights for Monday, May 1, will be suspended at the request of the Cuban government. Communist May Day activities are scheduled on the island that day.

The U.S. financed flights, which have brought more than 60,000 refugees to this country since they were initiated 17 months ago will be resumed May 2 on a twice-a-day, five-day-a-week basis.

* * *

Venezuelan Reds 'Condemn Terrorism'

CARACAS — Venezuela's outlawed Communist Party made an about face at its latest secret meeting, rejecting the thesis of armed insurrection and favoring participation in elections, a Communist informant said here.

The Eighth Plenum of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), "held somewhere in Venezuela, agreed to do without armed insurrection, condemn terrorism and participate in the next election," the Communist source reported.

The PCV was outlawed by former President Romulo Betancourt in 1962 and if the government does not permit legalization now, the party will negotiate its voting strength with leftist parties that operate legally in the country.

* * *

19 Western Ships Call at Cuban Ports

NINETEEN vessels from Western countries, including 10 flying the British flag, called at Cuban ports in March, a Cuban exile group in Miami reported Saturday.

The exile Revolutionary Unity (UR) organization, which keeps tabs on western world shipping to Cuba, said the 19 ships also included two each from Lebanon, Cyprus and Italy; and one each from Greece, Finland and Panama. The Panamanian vessel was the first flying that country's flag to call on a Cuban port since April 1963.

* * *

Colombia Denies Using U.S. Troops

BOGOTA — Colombian Army Commander Gen. Guillermo Pinzon Saturday denied charges from Havana that U.S. troops are aiding the Colombian Army in its anti-guerrilla campaign.

He said armed subversive activities in the country are "in a process of disintegration" due to action of Colombian Army units.

C/WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Kingston

INFO.: Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMSCROLL/Operational Letter from Rev. Henry Muir

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: KINGSTON-2818

We forward for your information a copy of a letter dated 15 January from Rev. Henry Muir in which he requests "a million different coppies" (sic) of AMSCROLL publications that he had previously seen. In view of the reference JMWAVE will instruct AMSCROLL to ignore this letter.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment:
copy of letter, USC (att)

Distribution
3 - COS, Kingston, w/att., USC
2 - C/WH, w/att., USC [illegible]
2 - WH/COG, w/att., USC

19-120-26

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 24 JAN 67

DATE DISPATCHED: [illegible] 25 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA - 26840

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-120-26/3

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

1 att

14-00000

UNITED LIBERAL PARTY

Founder & President:
REV. HENRY MUIR

SECRET

74½ Spanish Town Road
Kingston 13 P.O Box 9
Jamaica W.I.

15th Jan 1967

Mario Seiglie
Secretary General
Unidad Revolucionaria (U.R)
10 S.E 9th Street
Miami Fla.

Dear Sir

I wish you a prosperious 1967.
Give my respect to all your men for me.
I have return to Jamaica on the 16th Dec 1966.
You have promise to send me those leaflet
for me to give them out in Jamaica hear so that
people can read how wicked Communist
is and you have not send them Why?
Please what ever you are sending for me dont
put your address on them only put the United
Liberal Party on to it. I dont want them to know
where they came from. Please let me have
even a million different coppies. We are now
getting ready for the election soon.
I wish you all success in your undertaking

Yours Very truly
Rev Henry Muir President United Liberal Party.

CS COPY
SECRET

S|C GD 1 UFGA-26240

19-120-26

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
~~TYPIC/Operational~~
Quarterly Progress Reports Concerning Political Action Programs

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Transmitted herewith are seven progress reports, listed below, for the second quarter of FY 67 concerning the Political Action programs of the Station.

AMKNOT
AMSCROLL – filed 19-120-26
AMCROW
AMBASAL
AMLIRA
AMSTRUT
AMHOP

Philip G. Elmard

Attachments H/W
7 Progress Reports

Distribution:
2 - WH/C W/Atts.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE TYPED
6 Jan. 67

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN - 9 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26713

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MEMORANDUM 29 December 1966

TO : Chief of Station WPW - 1269

FROM : PW/MONESTIER

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMMOP - Progress Report
1 October - 31 December 1966

Distribution
4 - COS
1 - PW/MONESTIER
1 - PW/Chrono
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. AMMOP maintained contact with party leaders throughout the hemisphere during the quarter. The majority of the correspondence was handled by AMCRIB/1, the leader of the youth wing, who was informed by the JUDCA secretary-general, both during his October visit and in subsequent correspondence, that the AMMOP youth wing was performing effective work and that a JUDCA study on AMMOP activities would be forthcoming. The JUDCA secretary-general favors the incorporation of the AMMOP youth sector into his organization.

2. AMMOP youth published two bulletins on their activities along with an interesting summary on the activities of their counterparts in other countries, which was mailed to a list of contacts and correspondents. Several party officials in other countries have requested to be placed on the AMMOP mailing lists, an indication that AMMOP is becoming more widely recognized as a representative political movement.

3. The AMMOP youth group has also organized a series of seminars which attracted from 30-35 participants during the quarter. The purpose, in addition to offering discussions on such subjects as politics, labor and agriculture, was to promote more group unity and to draw new sources of talent.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE

4. During the quarter, expenses totaled $2,075.77. This sum included monthly support to AMMOP, and salary and operational expenses of AMCRIB/1. This compares with a budget allocation of $3,750 for the reporting period.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and [illegible]

C. PROBLEMS

5. The difficulties in the operation of the AMMOP project are due largely to the lack of effective leadership and initiative. The AMMOP youth wing is operating with reasonable effectiveness within its sphere but is hampered by the lack of active JUDCA membership.

D. FUTURE PLANS

6. Additional seminars are projected for the next quarter. Both AMMOP and its youth sector will maintain active correspondence to gain recognition as knowledgeable and active groups. In addition, future AMMOP activities will be aimed at creating a more cohesive organizational structure, attracting responsible leadership talent to the organization, and gaining greater recognition and possible financial support and guidance from the Parent International Movement.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

23 December 1966

WPW - 1265

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : PW/MARCHBANK

SUBJECT : TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMKNOT - Progress Report
1 October - 31 December 1966

Distribution
4 - COS
1 - PW/MARCHBANK
1 - PW/Chrono
1 - RI Chrono

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. The AMKNOT organization continued during the quarter under review with its program of assisting Cuban merchant mariners who have defected from their service. Fifteen different cases were handled during this period which included five resettlement cases in areas other than JMWAVE. Billets at sea were found for two more--one as a first mate and one as a third mate. The remaining eight received assistance in obtaining employment or what might be called administrative aid-assistance in obtaining social security numbers, etc.

2. Processing continued for those interested in employment by the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS). Progress in obtaining the necessary U.S. Coast Guard certification is slow and of the four that applied for this during the previous quarter only two had received the certification by the end of the current quarter. During this quarter two more former Cuban merchant officers sought through AMKNOT this certification as they expressed interest in MSTS employment. The current status is: In process--6; Coast Guard certifications received--2; physical examinations given (and passed)--4. In addition, applications for employment together with the Coast Guard certifications and completed physical examination forms were forwarded 28 December to the cover company in Baltimore for 2. The remainder will be forwarded as the Coast Guard certifications are received.

3. The activities of the AMKNOT organization continue to receive publicity. The Station has four clips from different papers including one from El Universal of Caracas. AMKNOT issued one press release during this quarter which was an "eyewitness" account of the attempt of four Cuban sailors to obtain political asylum in the Canary Islands. In fact, this was a letter mailed to AMKNOT by USPOT-2 and signed in pseudonym. The story was picked up by Diario Las Americas in its 15 December issue.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

B. ADMINISTRATION

4. The AMKNOT organization remains constituted as reported in the previous Quarterly Report. However, in December AMASK-1 was offered a permanent position as personnel director of a local shoe company that employs some four hundred people. His starting salary will be $475.00 per month which will be increased after the first three months and increased again after the second three months. The Station concurred with AMASK-1 that he accept for these reasons: (1) The AMKNOT position is not permanent, (2) it appears that AMASK-1 will be terminated when AMKNOT is closed, (3) this position should solve AMASK-1's personal financial problems, and (4) AMASK-1 has agreed to remain as chairman of AMKNOT without salary and to continue to lend his name to the organization. The Station expects to replace AMASK-1 with AMPOLISH-1 who appears qualified to handle the hand-holding and housekeeping aspects of AMKNOT. AMPOLISH-1 is presently employed by a local automobile dealer and is able to take the necessary time off to handle the AMKNOT matters. We see three advantages to this development: (1) The Station will be spared a possible disposal situation when AMKNOT is closed (it has been made clear to AMPOLISH-1 that this is a temporary assignment that at the most will last for a few months), (2) We have offered AMPOLISH-1 $200.00 per month versus $390.00 for AMASK-1, and (3) AMASK-1 should be in an excellent position to offer at least temporary employment in the shoe factory to mariners to come.

5. An estimated total of $2,505.00 was spent during this quarter. This amount represents AMASK-1's salary and allowances, office expenses, and English instruction for those seeking MSTS employment. Expenses by month were: October, $855.00; November, $825.00; and December (estimated), $825.00. The allotment for this activity for the quarter was $3,000.00.

C. PROBLEMS

6. The chief problem of the period was caused by the antics of Raul QUINTANA Ruiz who jumped ship in New Orleans after a run-in with the ship's captain and after difficulties with the Immigration and Naturalization Service over the lack of proper documentation to re-enter the country. QUINTANA has been resettled in California, though we may not have heard the last from him; AMASK-1 recently received a letter from QUINTANA which said that QUINTANA was about to sue the shipping line that had employed him for back salary and loss of personal effects that QUINTANA claims the captain had locked up. AMASK-1 was advised to ignore the letter in view of the difficulties already caused and in view of his potential for further trouble (see paragraphs 2 and 3 of JMWAVE-3990).

D. **PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER**

7. The Station currently plans that AMPOLISH-1 will assume his duties with AMKNOT on 2 January 1967 as this is the date AMASK-1 will join the shoe company. AMKNOT will continue processing applications of those interested in MSTS employment and will encourage additional applications from those that appear qualified and interested. Also, AMKNOT, of course, will receive all defecting mariners that appear in the area and will continue to encourage, where it can, additional defections.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM 19 December 1966

TO : Chief of Station WPW-1261

FROM : PW/MARCHBANK

SUBJECT : TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMCROW - Progress Report
1 October-31 December 1966

Distribution
~~4-COS~~
1-PW/MARCHBANK
1-PW/Chrono
1-REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. As reported in the previous Progress Report the AMCROW offices were closed and all personnel were terminated except for AMCROW-14. Thus there were no operational activities. However, the Station requested AMCROW-14 to send President Leoni of Venezuela a cable congratulating him upon the action the Venezuelan Government took against the leftists operating from the Central University of Caracas. The cable was sent 15 December and was signed by AMCROW-14 in his capacity as a former PBRUMEN cabinet officer. This was in response to paragraph 2 of Caracas 5482.

B. ADMINISTRATION

2. AMCROW-14 continued to receive his termination pay of $425 per month. The final payment will be made 31 December.

3. A total of $1,349.25 was spent by AMCROW for the quarter ending 31 December which represents salary for AMCROW-14 @ $425.00 per month plus a payment of $74.25 to the state unemployment fund.

C. PROBLEMS

4. There were no problems during this quarter. AMCROW-14 has apparently accepted the fact that he will be terminated 31 December.

D. PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER

5. There are no plans for the next quarter as this activity will cease with the final payment to AMCROW-14 on 31 December 1966.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM 30 December 1966

TO : Chief of Station WPW - 1273

FROM : PW/FABSIK

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMBASAL - Progress Report
1 October - 31 December 1966

Distribution
4 - COS
1 - PW/FABSIK
1 - PW/Chrono
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. Printed Propaganda - During the period under review this operation produced a total of 4,513 pieces of written propaganda for distribution as follows:

   a. Cuba : 500 copies of the AMBASAL newsletter;

   b. Latin America : 4,000 copies of the AMBASAL bulletin;

   c. Press Releases: 13 releases dealing with such subjects as the treatment of political prisoners, executions, violations of legal and human rights, etc. These releases were the bases for reports that appeared in Diario Las Americas and in the AMHIM bulletin.

2. Correspondence with International Organizations - Correspondence was maintained and exchanged with the International Commission of Jurists, the American Fund for Free Jurists, and the UN and OAS International Commissions of Human Rights. The subject matter of this correspondence was identical with the subjects mentioned in paragraph 1c above.

3. Impact - In an effort to focus attention on the Cuban political prisoners issue, AMBASAL/1 prepared a 15 page document on this subject which he presented in person in October 1966 to the Human Rights Commission of the OAS. The president of the commission told AMBASAL/1 that this document was the best he had seen on the subject and the commission, after discussion, agreed to continue efforts to get permission to travel to Cuba to investigate the charges contained in the document. AMBASAL/1 also visited the UN Human Rights Commission, the Interamerican Federation of Lawyers, the American Fund for Free Jurists, and the president of the International Red Cross. All in all, the effort to focus attention on the political prisoners issue was successful and resulted in wire service, radio, and press coverage. A total of 23 clippings, dealing with AMBASAL/1's activities in this regard, was sent to Headquarters.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

4. Radio - The weekly AMBASAL radio programs were carried by JMHOPE and tapes of each program were sent to SWBULL/1 for re-broadcast. The content of these programs was in line with the juridical nature of the AMBASAL organization, although editorial comment was frequently made on current themes not specifically related to the legal field.

B. ADMINISTRATION

5. The 1967 fiscal year budget for AMBASAL is $43,000.00. On a quarterly basis the allotted figure is $10,750.00. During this quarter AMBASAL expenses amounted to $11,760.72, a total of $1,010.72 in excess of the allotted figure. Of the overall quarterly expenses of $11,760.72, agent salaries accounted for $7,000.00, radio expenses amounted to $1,901.72 and $2,859.00 was spent on printed propaganda, operational travel, and miscellaneous office expenses. Total operational expenses for the first six months of FY 1967 were $23,987.28, an excess of $2,487.28 over the $21,500.00 allocated for the first half of the fiscal year.

C. PROBLEMS

6. Termination of the principal agent may be difficult. Consideration is being given to the possible future use of AMBASAL/1 as a singleton agent. The alternative is to assist him in finding suitable employment; a difficult task given his age (42), complete lack of English, and aspects of his personality and character.

7. We do not anticipate any other problems relative to the termination of this operation. The AMBASAL newsletters sent to Cuba were stopped with the October issue and the monthly bulletin with the November issue. Four of the AMBASAL personnel were terminated 31 December and the radio programs were stopped in December.

D. PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER

8. Three AMBASAL employees will be terminated effective 31 January 1967 and the AMBASAL office will be closed during that month. It is planned to permit AMBASAL/1 to retain some of the equipment now in his office to encourage him in his plans to continue to operate on a scaled-down, independent basis. We will continue to pay a monthly salary to AMBASAL/1 through March 1967 while attempting to solve his personal situation discussed in the preceding section.

MEMORANDUM 27 December 1966

TO : Chief of Station WPW - 1266

FROM : PW/RUBASH

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMLIRA - Progress Report
1 October - 31 December 1966

Distribution
4 - COS
1 - PW/RUBASH
1 - PW/Chrono
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. During the second quarter of FY 1967 the AMLIRA group compiled a file of newspaper clippings concerning the political occurrences involving the Cuban delegation during the tenth Central American and Caribbean games held in Puerto Rico during June 1966. This file was sent in October to Mr. Avery BRUNDAGE, president of the International Olympic Committee, with the request that the file be brought to the attention of the IOC at the next meeting of that body for whatever action might be deemed appropriate.

2. Significant AMLIRA correspondence included the following:

a. A letter to each member of the Special Consultation Committee on Security of the OAS pointing out the use made by Communist governments, specifically Cuba, of sports for propaganda and political ends.

b. A letter from the Argentine representative on the IOC in which he acknowledges receipt of a tape with recorded inflammatory remarks by Jose LLANUSA, the head of the Cuban delegation at the CA and Caribbean games in Puerto Rico. In the letter the Argentine representative deplores such action as a violation of Olympic principles. This ties in with the action taken as indicated in paragraph (1) above.

c. A letter to the Venezuelan Ministry of Interior protesting the visit of Venezuelan athletes to Cuba at the same time as Cuba is inciting terrorists to action inside Venezuela.

3. Approximately 5000 copies of the AMLIRA magazine were printed each month during the period under review. They were distributed by news stand sale in Miami, New York and Puerto Rico; through various sports organizations in Latin America and Spain and by distribution as reading material on several Latin American airlines. The AMLIRA magazine provides international sports editorials of MHSPAWN value which are of specific interest to Latin American readership. Articles of propaganda significance which

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

appeared during this past quarter included: A story on Negro athletes in the U.S. refuting a Cuban claim that there was discrimination in the selection of the U.S. Olympic team; an article on the disqualification of a Cuban woman athlete because "she did not conform to the revolutionary principles of the sports movement in Communist Cuba" and an article which refutes the Cuban claim that Cuba won the tenth Central American and Caribbean games.

4. During the quarter the AMLIRA group issued several press releases concerning sports-newsworthy events involving Cuba and continued the regular five minute radio programs which are heard thirty times each week on Radio Americas beamed to Cuba and on WMIE in Miami. In addition the AMLIRA organization provided recorded tapes of sports interviews and commentary to 58 independent radio stations in Puerto Rico and 14 countries in Central and South America.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE

5. During the second quarter of FY 67 the AMLIRA organization expended $17,300 and had income of some $600 from news stand sales and advertising. Both these figures are approximate projections because the final December figures are not recorded at this writing. The net figure for expenditures during the quarter (some $16,700) exceeds the budgeted amount by approximately $400. However, this overage will be absorbed in further budgetary cutbacks during the next reporting period.

6. The AMLIRA activity expenditures also exceeded the budget allowance during the last quarter. To remedy this situation the following specific economy measures will go into effect beginning 1 January 1967:

a. One salaried employee will be dropped.
Monthly saving....$250

b. Publication of monthly pamphlets with selected offprints from the AMLIRA magazine will be discontinued.... Approx. monthly saving....$400
$650

It is expected that there will be other savings which will bring the total quarterly reduction in spending to about $2500.

C. PROBLEMS

7. There are no major unresolved problems involving the AMLIRA activity.

D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER

8. It is probable that the next World Baseball Championships sponsored by the International Baseball Federation will be held in Colombia. An effort will be made by the AMLIRA group to mount an operation aimed at assuring the denial of an invitation to participate in these championships to the Cuban team.

9. The AMLIRA group is preparing propaganda materials for use in a campaign to try to influence the sports authorities in the Caribbean and Central American countries not to allow their national teams to attend the Weight Lifting Championships to be held during 1967 in Cuba.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

3 January 1966

WPW - 1276

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : PW/RUBASH

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMSTRUT-2 - Progress Report
1 October - 31 December 1966

Distribution
4 - COS
1 - PW/RUBASH
1 - PW/Chrono
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. On 9 October 1966 AMSTRUT-2 spoke in New York before an audience of approximately 2600 persons on the occasion of the anniversary of Cuban Independence (Grito de Yara). The gathering was sponsored by AMICE. The audience response was enthusiastic and the press services (AP,UPI, AFP) issued wire releases on the AMSTRUT-2 statements which included a denunciation of Fidel CASTRO as a "hangman of his own people" and a "lackey of international Communism".

2. During October AMSTRUT-2 was interviewed by Henry GOETHALS of the Copley News Service. The article resulting from the interview was a sympathetic recounting of the AMSTRUT-2 activities on behalf of the cause of a free Cuba with specific mention of the AMSTRUT-2 book which is in preparation and the constant readiness of AMSTRUT-2 to travel, speak and work for the cause.

3. During November the AMSTRUT-2 Foundation made a contribution of $464 for visa and medical costs involved in the travel of a group of Cuban exiles from Jamaica to the United States.

4. The AMSTRUT-2 weekly radio spot on AMTHIGH continued without schedule change during the quarter. Significant themes included: comments on the degraded role of women in the Communist state compared with that in the free world; reference to the myth of Communist unity as revealed by the split between the ChiComs and the USSR; mention of the possibility that Cubans will be sent to North Viet Nam to fight and die; comment on the treatment of prisoners in Cuba and the UMAP and editorial comment on the visit of Raul CASTRO and President DORTICOS to Moscow with the statement that Fidel CASTRO did not go because he did not dare leave the island. This latter comment inspired considerable press play locally as well as by the wire services.

SECRET

B. ADMINISTRATION

5. During the second quarter of FY-67 there were expenditures of approximately $19,000 by the AMSTRUT-2 activity. This figure includes an estimate for the month of December because the final figures have not been received at this writing. The budgeted amount for AMSTRUT-2 for the quarter is $24,000 and there is an excess of budget authorization over expenditures of approximately $5000. This figure, however, gives an unreal budgetary picture of the AMSTRUT-2 activity. This $5000 will remain as a part of the budget allotment and may well be expended in a flurry of AMSTRUT-2 travel, publication activity and/or promotion during the next quarter. In other words the excess does not represent budget "fat" since the bulk of the AMSTRUT-2 expenses are not figured as month to month constants but obligated as the operational situation demands.

6. During December AMSTRUT-2 moved into a smaller house with a lower rent which will mean a saving of $100 per month. In addition, it is anticipated that a further saving will be realized in maintenance and upkeep costs.

C. PROBLEMS

7. The basic agent-handling problem presented by AMSTRUT-2's mercurial disposition, excessive generosity and understandable emotional approach to the role which must be played before the public still exists. However, it seems to have lessened somewhat as AMSTRUT-2 gains confidence in the language and in dealings with the public. There is little question that a contributing factor to the lessening of this problem is the reliance placed by AMSTRUT-2 on AMLYRIC-1 who serves as business advisor, buffer and hand-holder.

8. The problem of projecting the image of the AMSTRUT-2 Foundation as an independent charitable organization remains. The application for tax exempt status to the state of registry is in the works and when this application is approved it is likely that there will be an increase of private donations which, because of the new status, will be tax deductible. The problem lies in the dilatory behavior of the state authorities.

9. AMSTRUT-2 continues to be attractive to certain extremist political groups whose patriotic claims of objectives would often appear to parallel those of AMSTRUT-2 and the Cuban exile community as a whole. AMSTRUT-2 has not always been able to sort out the "good guys" from the "bad guys" and the problem lies in fending off these extremist groups and preventing them from exploiting AMSTRUT-2 for partisan political ends.

14-00000

D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER

10. AMLYRIC-1 has been in negotiation with a group of organizations at Harvard University which wish to sponsor an AMSTRUT-2 appearance there. The tentative plan at this writing is for AMSTRUT-2 to appear during the first part of calendar 1967.

11. The ghost-written AMSTRUT-2 book on AMTHUG-1 should be ready for first reading at least sometime during the next quarter.

12. It is planned to have AMSTRUT-2 prepare a rebuttal (probably to be ghost-written by AMLYRIC-1) to the interview with Fidel CASTRO which appeared in the January issue of Playboy magazine.

13. Further speaking engagements and tours by AMSTRUT-2 are being planned for the next reporting period. It is also planned that, with the official approval of the tax-exempt status of the Foundation, an extensive fund raising campaign will be launched to provide working capital and funding cover for operational activities as well as humanitarian and social welfare programs in consonance with the AMSTRUT-2 Foundation charter.

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSCROLL
Possible Defection Lead

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

/11-201

cit. Cuba

1. We enclose herewith a reproduction of a letter dated Havana, 29 November 1966 that was received by AMSCROLL. We believe that the letter, signed "Carlos", was written by Jose *BREVIL, Manager of the International Department of the National Bank of Cuba. We say this as in early November AMSCROLL mailed a copy of its newsletter to BREVIL using as a return address the one used by the writer of this letter; this combination of name and return address was not used by AMSCROLL in its other mailings. The Station had obtained BREVIL's name and position in the National Bank from a refugee debriefing report.

potential ~~def~~
[illegible]

2. There are no Station traces of BREVIL. However, the tone of the letter is friendly and it might therefore be useful to index this information in the event that BREVIL should travel abroad.

3. The Station examined the envelope for evidence of tampering. None was found, though this is not conclusive.

MICROFILMED
JAN 13 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

for Philip G. Elmard

Attachment:
As stated, hw

Distribution:
3-WH/C, w/att, hw

19-120-26

~~19-6-119~~/3

~~19-120-26~~

CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
4 JAN 66	JAN - 9 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26689

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 att.

2p

MICROFILMED
JAN 13 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRANSLATION

Havana, November 29, 1966.

Mr. Rafael Brevil
P.O. Box 3940
Miami, Fla.

Dear friend:

Several days ago I received the book which you were so kind as to send me, something I am thankful for.

Although finding it interesting, I would appreciate that you stop sending me this type of literature to the Bank, since it might be harmful to me.

Accept appreciation from your friend,

"Carlos."

per abstract X

CS COPY

19-120-26

~~19-6-119/3~~

~~19-120-26~~

att. to UFGA-26689

La Habana, Noviembre 29, 1966

Sr. Rafael Brevil
P.O.Box 3940
Miami, Fla.

Estimado amigo:

Hace unos dias recibí el libro que tuviste la gentileza de remitirme, por lo que te doy las gracias.

No obstante lo interesante que lo encontré, te agradeceré no me envies más ese tipo de literatura al Banco, pués puede perjudicarme.

Recibe afectos de tu amigo,

Carlos

19-120-26

C/NE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Athens

INFO.
Chief, NE; Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC MHVIPER/AMSCROLL
Letters Regarding Greek Shipping and Cuba

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action: FYI

The economic research unit of AMSCROLL has throughout the past year received seven anonymous letters from Athens. These letters describe in detail Greek and Lebanese shipping with Cuba and appear to have been written by someone knowledgeable of his subject. The author apparently has access to AMSCROLL publications as he makes reference to "your circulars". We forward a set of these letters by separate cover as they may be of interest and of possible use. The AMSCROLL shipping studies have made a veiled acknowledgment of receipt of this material by referring to information received from friends in Greece; however, AMSCROLL has used only those facts that we can check out here. As indicated on certain of the letters, copies of various ones have been sent to the "Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Washington"; the U.S. Ambassador, London; or the U.S. Ambassador, Athens. A copy of the last letter received by AMSCROLL was sent all three.

Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution
3 - COS/Athens w/att USC
✓2 - C/NE w/o att 1cc w/o att fwd to NEAA/L & 1cc w/o att fwd to NEGTI/G
2 - WH/C w/att USC attd RI/AN

Attachment
Letters

19-120-26

1 att.

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
5 Jan 1967

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN - 6 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26699

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26/3

CUBAN TRADING

Economic Research Bu. 1,
Unidad Revolutionaria,
10 , S.E. 9th Street,
MIAMI , Fla. USA

Last week we wrote you few notes regarding illegal Cuban trading also that the Greek Authorities , no doubt through USA pressure (AT LAST), are now investigating... names of ships and Owners who have been trading with Cuba illegally since 1963. There is now quite a lot of propaganda going on that these investigations will be expedited through the Harbour Masters in Greece, and Consular Authorities in ports outside Greece. This news is of course to please USA, and to send to sleep those who know nothing about the business, ordinary public opinion. As we said before nothing much will be done, except some isolated, probably,cases, mostly of small Owners , to just please USA etc., In fact, nothing will be done, because the Greek Authorities will firstly have to punish THEMSELVES before they can punish the Owners, Captains etc., mainly for the following reasons:

I. The Greek Authorities know at all times where Greek ships are trading, through their special Departments. They knew and know where the ships were and are, and have never done anytning about it.

2. If in any special cases they did not know themselves , they knew it through your circulars, also through the Black lists issued by the USA Authorities.

3 Many ships arrived or sailed , or called for bunkers and supplies through Greek ports(or ports abroad with Greek Consular Authorities attending), and obtained clearance papers for Cuba or cleared having arrived from Cuba. Not a word was said about it .

4. AND MOST IMPORTANT.

Greek ships, by special law, pay Income Tax, nothing on profits as other industries ,but on each charter party voyage, whether ordinary voyage or timecharter. They pay a percentage ranging from 1½ to 4½% on the gross freight or hire, depending on the age of the ship (excluding new ships up to five years old paying nothing. Tax is payable in six monthly periods. When the Income Tax Return is submitted to the Inland Revenue, Collector of Taxes(under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance, the following Documents are submitted and attached to the Returns.

A/. The CHARTER PARTY (properly certified).
B/. Freight Statement showing exact details of freight rate, tons of cargo carried under that charterparty, and the total freight(gross) earned and upon which the tax percentage is payable .
C/ Sworn deposition of the Owners that all documents submitted are correct abid true, again confirming the gross earnings of the voyage, which voyage must be explained in detail, port loaded, port discharged, dates, duration etc.,
D/ MASTERS LOG BOOK , duly certified by the Harbour Master or Greek Consular Authority,if vessel abroad at the time,(this under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Mercantile Marine)

S/C att. 6 UFGA-26699

CS COPY

19-120-26

It will be observed that in addition to all other sources of information, the Ministry of Finance(Inland Revenue) , and the Ministry of

Mercantile Marine, were specifically advised, on each occasion, upon each voyage, by the Owners themselves, for the purpose of paying tax, the Authorities having been, and being very strict, in ensuring that no delay took p lace in submitting the Returns, and paying Tax. Anyone can, therefore, see who is the first and biggest lawbreaker. Obviously, the Greek Authorites first , and the Owners second. As we said previously, faboulous profits have been made by the lawbreakets-the Owners(mostly the friends of officials, and mainly Frangitas clique) but such profits were partly shared by the Govenment, through higher tax pernentage. If there was no illegal Cuban trading really permitted, these Greek ships would be employed in other trades, with small profits, and less tax to pay. We really feel that the USA is to blame because they were warned a very long time ago, alemost soon after the law breaking had commenced, and several times afterwards, and through you, but nothing was done about it and allowed the comedy to continue. Officials almost openly say here that the USA did not really think that trading ~~was~~ would stop because the prohibitive law was passed in 1963 and that they knew that the law was passed only for politics and not to ~~to~~ be enforced. Whether this is true or not, only the USA know. It is also said now , the Greek Authorities do not mind NOW starting enforcing the law, since Cuban trade has been restricted through the low price obtainalbe for sugar (about £14 per ton), and the economic difficulties of Cuba, thus also restricting imports into Cuba. Meantime of course millions and millions of dollars have been made from past trading, and for partly present trading, which enabled their chief partner and collaborators FRANGISTAS clique fo build a vast empire of ships, so not much harm can be done even if they stop it now. There is no doubt, the USA have been very unfair and unjust to law abiding citizens. The USA should either have demanded that both Greece and Lebanon(who made the laws in return no doubt of USA help to these countries) comply with their Agrement with the USA and enforce the prohibitive laws of their respective countries, or relieve them of the obligation and cancelling the laws, so that all Greek and Lebanon Owners had the same chance of trading. USA's attitude in doing nothing about it, really makes them as guilty as the other two countries. You will find , we are sure, that all the information we gave you in our previous and several reports, was correct and substantiated. All we have to say now is that any charters which alledgedly are still valid because they were made before the prohibitive laws are as fake , as the investigations and punishments the Greek Officials are supposed to be making againstthe law breakers. You will see how true also these will prove to be , unless the USA, if they want to, really investigate themselves the investigators, with all the precise details we have given you in past reports, and the present. We repeat, if nothing else, the USA owe it to the lawabiding Owners, to investigate the matter themselves, with their officials, and top men (including the examination of all Income Tax Returns as we said above), and see to it that law breakers, all of them small and big, are punished, and flags withdrawn, and all further trading is stopped immediately. It will, generally, do the USA good, if they were to prove to the World, people and Govenments, even their friends and Allies, that the USA sees to it that Agreements made with them must be kept and that they allow no doublecrossing and deceit.

cc Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Washington.

U.S.A. Embassy , London.

CUBAN TRADING

Economic Research Bureau,
Unidad Revolutionaria,
10 S.E. 9th Stsct,
Miami, Fla. Usa.

Last year we gave you information and full details of vessels under GREEK and LEBANON flags which continued, and still CONTINUE trading with Cuba, the biggest and most influential of them being FRANGISTAS, trading under both flags. We told you last year that we did not think Frangistas would stop trading. He has not. Only recently when a group of loyal and lawful Greek Owners took the matter to Greek Parliament, the U.S.A. Authorities appeared to wake up and demanded that the Minister of Foreign Affairs should ask the Minister of Mercantile Marine to produce a list of Owners still trading with Cuba. How come that a Greek Minister of Mercantile Marine should have a list, a very long list, of Greek ships still trading with Cuba, and yet he had done nothing about to stop the illegal trading, in contravention of his laws. Few months ago, few small Owners, the small fish of course, were asked to show where their ships had been trading, knowing of course they had been trading with Cuba. The local Courts were still " making enquiries". Nothing was done natuarally about Frangistas, whoeh is responsible for about 90% of the whole movements. How can he be prosecuted , by his partners , since it is more than obvious and clear that whatever he does has the blessing of the Authorities, both in Greece and in Lebanon. Frangistas has been openly boasting, and he has proved his point, that the laws of Greece and Lebanon, only apply to ordinary individuals, not to HIM. We do not know what the Minister's list is, but we shall not be surprised if that list contains only a fraction of his movements, and he will no doubt say that he has not fixed any ship at all since the law was passed in 1963 but that his contract was signed before the law. Of course he will. Any contact can be faked and back-dated, with the connivance of the Charterers. The only contract Frangistas had was with the Russians and the Russians never make contracts for more than one year. He has signed several contracts with the Russians since 1963. But let us forget about the Russians for a moment. Did he also have MANY years contracts with the Poles , with the Hungarians, the Chechoslovakians, Boulgarians , the Germans, the Chinese, the Syrians, the French, the Dutch, all Scandinavians , etc., All the sugar in the World, and hundreds of ships would not be enough to cover these, had there been contracts. No, all his cargoes to Cuba and from Cuba (with possibly few cargoes with the Russians carried latest few months after the law) were contracted after the law, and were fixed in the open markets a cargo or two or three at a time, either direct with the countries concerned or via London, and his ships have appeared in Freight lists on the day they were fixed, in competition with other Owners and flags. If you or the USA Authorities were to appoint a reputable Chartering Broker in London, he would tell you exactly upon which date, what quantity, what destination. what rate of freight, each cargo was contracted. Why do not you ask the Greek and Lebanon Authorities to demand that he produces a list of his 36 vessels with all their logbooks, the charter parties, the timesheets, the freight statements, and banking receipts and let all these be examined by the London Broker , not the Greek or Lebanon Authorities who cover his illegal trading. And what about the Cubans. Did Frangistas also have very long contracts with the Cubans, signed before the law in 1963, and are still valid and unexpired? Is this why Frangistas was in Havana at at end of last year, and again beginning of this year, when he fixed six liberties on timecharter for 9) 12 ~~xxxxxx~~ months, commencing early in 1966, and did he also fix the EFTHYCHIA for three years timecharter with the Cubans, during his visit in Havana as stated above, before the law was passed in 1963, bearing in mind that the vessel was built by the Russians at the end of 1965? Do you know that Frangistas is still negotiating with the Cubans, and Russians for the fixing of the 35 further ships the Russians will be building for him. Do you know that next January, the new sugar season starts, and that he already is in touch with private Charterers, not the Russians or Cubans, for the fixing of his older tonnage , the Liberties? This takes place at a time that Greek and possibly Lebanon Authorities are supposed to be prosecuting him for his past sins. This is how much notice he takes of the Authorities. Dozens of Masters, Officers etc., including Frangistas are supposed to be in prison, to have paid huge fines, and to have lost their flags, in accordance withe the provisions of the law. To our knowledge no one has been imprisoned, no one has paid fines, no flag has been withdrawn, and any time you want Frangistas do not look for him in his office. He will not be there. He has no time for office, he is too busy with the Authorities in Athens or Lebanon. Well , no one could ever imagine that the USA Authorities would continue to betaken for a ride , and to continue giving their aid to countries which use it against them. May be this is the American Policy, who knows. The USA did in fact say recently that unless Cuban trading is stopped, they would stop their aid. Firstly , is this enough, does it mean they do not mind for trading so far, so long as further trading is stopped, which will clear up and justify all Frangistas past sins? And secondly, we are certain , Frangistas, will find the way, to continue trading. Who is to stop him. The Americans obviously cannot , the Greeks and Lebanese will not, therefore the Show goes on. Which means CRIME DOES PAY, and stupid those who think otherwise. As before, it is regretted that we have to write to you again anonymously, and hope you forgive us. May be in your usual very informative circulars you can make your comments.

Economic Research Bureau,
Unidad Revolucionaria,
10 S.E. 9th Street,
Miami, Fla. U.S.A.

CUBAN TRADING

We expected by now some action from your end or from the American Authorities to whom we had sent our previous copied communication to you(Washington,Foreign Ministry, and U.S.A, Embassy,London), but regret that, at least to our knowledge, no action has been taken yet, and we assume this by virtue of the fact that the ships we mentioned previously just carry on the voyages for which have been fixed, and their Owners openly negotiate further similar business from Cuba, as most of the trade to Cuba is presently done by Red flag ships. However, we supplement our previous letter by giving you some additional information.

A. Some Merchants in Cuban Trading, but mainly D.'Enree, of Paris and Genev fix vessels or large contracts, with a long list of options as to where the cargo will/discharged, as often cargoes are shipped and not sold until after shipment and sailing of the vessel from loading port. These options start from Casablanca/Continent and continue into all Mediterranean/Red Sea/P.Gulf/India/Colombo/Malaya ports,sometimes as far as Japan, freight rate depending at which port cargo is discharged, and final orders are usually given seven days after sailing from Cuba. As stated, the Lebanon Authorities oestensibly allow Lebanon flag ships to carry these cargoes to Arab Countries only, always subject to license. Owners apply for such license for Arab countries, and then if the Merchant orders the ship to say Italy or Germany or Japan, the ship just carries the cargo. Some Owners just do not apply for a license at all, and the Lebanon Authorities know what goes on, but turns the other way.

B Greek and Lebanon flag ships just carry on trade in Cuba, and if you say they do not, then either you do not know about it, or they must camouflage their flags, or must fake (as regards eventual destination) their documents, such as charter parties, Bills of Lading, manifests etc., Even the number of ships trading in Cuba, given in your circulars, is not correct, it is much larger, may be you do this intentionally for political reasons or maybe because you do not know.

C. Both the Greek and Lebanon Governments are in a position, in accordance with their famous laws, to stop immediately any ship, to take the flag away, and to impose upon the Owners very heavy fines and if the Owners do not pay the fines, then the ship will be immobilised since the Government will refuse cancellation of registry certificate, meaning that the ship cannot be put in a nother flag, and thefefore, become virtually non-existent. They can do lots of thigs, those Governments, but only if they want to and only if they want to apply their laws. To our knowledge, and we can assure you, we arevery well informed, no such thing has taken place, no ship has been stopped and no one has been fined, and maybe, and mostly likely, will never be.

D. Whilst Owners we mentioned in our previous letter continue business as usual, and others, we notice with some surprise, that you are continuously campaining and mentioning the name of Tsavliris firm. Whereas we naturally condemn and deplore this firm's continuation of this trade, let us also be just and fair. This firm at least continues in a lawful manner, since they are sending only ships with flags whose Governments permit such trading in an unrestricted manner. So this firm are not law breakers, whatever else they can be accused of. On the contrary, you do not mention names of other Owners, who among other thigs are also Law breakers and amongst them the biggest and most influential ..

19-126-26

is Frangistas, of Lisbon and Athens, represented by Purvis,London, having at his disposal some 35 Greek and Lebanon flag ships, trading mostly in Cuba. Frangistas is also the sole importer of Russian timber into Greece, a huge trade. Also this same firm made an agreement with the Soviet Union few months ago and by virtue of this Agreement, the Soviet Union has commenced building for his fleet cargo ships , bulk carriers, tankers, and deepsea fishing Trawlers, at present worth $ 150.000.000, against Greek products, and some of these ships (Greek flag) will find their way to Cuba , we are almost sure.

E.Meantime some of the existing Greek and Lebanon flag Cuban traders were purchased with loans, through their Governments, and these Governments in turn received and receive help from the U.S.A. , so in a vicious circle, some of the American money has gone for the purchase of ships to help trade with Castro's Cuba, whilst millions of American money is spent to stop this trade. What a world we live in.

F.It must be very obvious to you that many people, watchful people, intelligent and influential , know what goes on, and will continue to watch things until, it is hoped , this mockery is stopped. It is also obvious that somewhere in one or more places, bribery and corruption are taking place, otherwise this state of affairs could not have started and cannot continue. We do not wish to believe that the American Authorities do not know what goes. If Greek and Lebanon officials are bribed to close their eyes, O.K. but who stops the American Authorities to"box the ears" of the Greek and Lebanon Authorities for allowing this stituation to continue, and in so doing, they breaking firstly the laws of their respective Countries, and breaking whatever agreement they have with the U.S.A. Government, and, what is more, with the American Taxpayers money.

G.We do not intend continuing these letters, we think we have said enough and that we have given you and American Authorities sufficient information which can be checked and verified. What we now want is results, namely, complete and instant stoppage of all Greek and Lebanon flag ships trading with Cuba, otherwise you will find that one after another many other Owners, small and large companies will re-enter, or enter Cuban trading with Greek and Lebanon flag ships, and no one should dare to condemn them. Also, do not forget that there are plenty of Companies which do not trade with U.S.A. anyway, therefore blacklisting is not of any importance.

Apologies again for the ananymity of this letter, and trust our reasons for it will be appreciated, especially when our facts are checked and found correct.

C.C

Ministry Foreign Affaiars, Washington.

U.S.A. Embassy, London.

American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc.
919 18th Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20006

ALVIN SHAPIRO
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

EARLE C. CLEMENTS
WASHINGTON CONSULTANT

296-4450

December 1, 1965

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vasquez
Secretary for Economic and
Professional Affairs
Movimiento Unidad Revolucionaria
10 SE 9 Street
Miami, Florida

Dear Dr. Rivas-Vasquez:

In response to your letter of November 19th, concerning Greek and Lebanese shipping to Red Cuba ports, I am enclosing some information I have obtained which should fulfill your requirements. In the case of the Lebanese Directives, you will note that no specific reference is made to shipping to Cuba.

Despite the fact that the enclosed information is not classified or restricted, it was obtained from a sensitive source and I would appreciate it if you would handle this matter discreetly.

We have been very pleased with the information your organization has been providing us concerning shipments to Cuba.

I hope that the data provided will be helpful to you.

Very sincerely yours,

Chester J Szychlinski

Chester J. Szychlinski
Director of Research

Attachment

14-00000

5 Nov.

CUBAN TRADING

Economic Research Bureau,
Unidad Revolucionaria,
IO , S. E. 9th Street,
Miami , Fla. USA.

We wrote you few days ago about the illegal cuban trading and we now enclose herewith cutting from todays , 5th November I966, Piraeus Newspaper " NAFTILIA EXPRESS " from which you will observe that action is now being taken (three years too late and after millions of tons of cargo has been carried to and from Cuba) against Owners, Captains etc., of Greek ships. The Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine are also instructing port Authorities to enquire and investigate which ships traded with Cuba since I963. You see , until now , or even now, the Ministry did not know... and now they will try to find out. No doubt owing to some half hearted pressure by the USA Authorities , the Greek Authorities are at last compelled to at least show that they are trying to find out , now , which ships traded, also no doubt they will find some ships which traded and will prosecute the Captains and the Owners, and perhaps carry out some sort of punishment and naturally it will be the small and unimportant Owners they will trace. The big and influential will not even be traced. If one has to be traced, like Frangistas, they will find all necessary excuses and reasons for not prosecuting. The job for enquiring , prosecuting, and punishing the offenders is left with those with whose connivance and knowledge trading continued since I963, and still continues, so anyone can imagine, what kind of a job they will do. We wonder why no enquiries were made during I963, I964 , I965. Simply because enquiries were not necessary. You do not enquire about something you already know. The latest excuse of Frangistas, as we think you already know, comes through his brother, who is a Professor in Salonica University, that the law prohibiting Cuban trading was Unconstitutional. This joke was as good as any, even better than the one about his false or fake contracts and charter parties. His other brother who is the real influence with the Russians and is a timber merchant having the monopoly of all Russian timber imports into Greece and some fruits from Greece to Russia, is the one who helped to secure the building in Russia of some 35 large liners and bulk carriers plus a huge fish trawling fleet, in exchange for Greek products, and part payment in cash from the vast profits they made out of their 35 second hand liberty vessels in Cuban trading. Even in this respect, do not forget that this privilege of building these fleets(and we understand further building contracts are cooking) was only given to the Frangistas clique by the Greek and Russian Authorities ,and not to any other Greek Owner. Do the USA Authorities really think that the Greek Authorities (and in a smaller degree the Lebanon Authorities) will prosecute Frangistas, and even if they do, for eyewash , they will find him guilty? You will see that nothing will happen. What we now have to say, as the only solution, may seem unpatriotic, but it is the only way to stop this rot. This is that the USA should discontinue immediately , and without any notice, all Military and Financial Aid to Greece and Lebanon, with intimation to them , that they will consider renewing same, as soon as firstly ALL trading with Cuba is stopped immediately disregarding any so called old contracts, and secondly AFTER they have prosecuted and punished peroperly all lawbreakers, small and big ones alike, and after all flags have been cancelled. This second action is a big debt the USA Authorities owe to all the Greek and Lebanon Owners who complied withe laws of their countries and executed the wishes of the USA. It is a moral debt. These people will gain nothing because they do not ask for any money for all fortunes they lost in not trading with Cuba, but the USA,as a country known as just and democratic, will have failed in their duty if they are content to just see discontinuation of further trading with Cuba , and no punishment for the past sinners. And talking of sins , we think that the Greek and Lebanon Authorities committed and still commit a bigger sin than the Owners, since the Owners are simply out for high profits, but it is the Authorities who broke their word and their agreement with the USA. Really it is the Authorities which deserve a bigger punishment. If the USA takes the suggested action, it will serve two purposes. One is that the question of Cuba will be settled , and the other , and probably more important , is that other Countries which also receive aid from USA will take notice and appreciate that same thing may happen to them , if they, some way or another, play the same games as Greece and Lebanon. The USA - if it is results that they want and not talk and excuses - must ACT first , and TALK afterwards. When this is done, the Authorities will trace in no time at all all the lawbreakers, will prosecute and punish them, and will stop at once all further trading. Simply because they already know all lawbreakers, andathey have all the powers to punish them, but will not do so until it hurts , and it is going to hurt , a lot , if the Aids were stopped.

c.c. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Washington.
U.S.A. Embassy , London.

NaFTILIA EXPRESS
Saturday 5-11-66

ΠΡΟΣΟΧΗ

Παραπέμπονται εἰς τὴν δικαιοσύνην οἱ συναλλασσόμενοι μετὰ τῆς Κούβας

ΑΙ ΑΝΑΚΡΙΣΕΙΣ ΕΠΙΣΠΕΥΔΟΝΤΑΙ ΗΔΗ

ΠΑΡΑΠΕΜΠΟΝΤΑΙ εἰς τὴν Εἰσαγγελίαν Πειραιῶς οἱ πλοιοκτῆται καὶ οἱ πλοίαρχοι τῶν ἑλληνικῶν πλοίων τὰ ὁποία προσεγγίζουν εἰς Κούβαν. Ἐπιπροσθέτως, οἱ πλοίαρχοι παραπέμπονται καὶ εἰς τὸ Πειθαρχικὸν Συμβούλιον.

Τὸ ΥΕΝ διέταξε τὰς προξενικὰς καὶ λιμενικὰς ἀρχὰς ὅπως ἐπισπεύσουν τὴν διεξαγωγὴν ἀνακρίσεων διὰ τὰ πλοῖα τὰ ὁποῖα διατηροῦν μεταφορικὰς συναλλαγὰς μετα τῆς Κούβας. Αἱ καταρτισθησόμεναι δικογραφίαι θὰ ἀποσταλοῦν εἰς τὴν Εἰσαγγελίαν Πειραιῶς ἡ ὁποία καὶ θὰ παραπέμψῃ ἁπάσας τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἐνώπιον τοῦ Τριμελοῦς Πλημμελειοδικείου.

Αἱ προβλεπόμεναι ποιναὶ εἶναι φυλάκισις μέχρις 6 μηνῶν, δι' ἑκάστην παράβασιν καὶ χρηματικὴ ποινή, διὰ δὲ τοὺς πλοιάρχους καὶ στέρησις τῆς ἐπαγγελματικῆς ἀδείας μέχρι 2 ἐτῶν.

Ἡ σύνδεσις Καλαμάτας

Ὁ ΟΛΠ παρέδωσε τὴν περιοχὴν

ΞΟΤ

'Απήρ
409 έπ
μελών
ρυμουλ

'Επραγμ
χίαν χθές ή
άπεργία τών
κών τού λιμ
412 μελών τ
γησαν τά 40.

Τὸ ΓΕΝ, πρ [illegible]

'Εν τῷ μετ. [illegible]

ΕΚΛΟΓ

19-120-26

Economic Research Bureau,
Unidad Revolucionaria,
10 S.E. 9th Street,
Miami, Fla. U.S.A.

Recd 18 Nov. 65

CUBAN TRADING

Your circulars regarding Cuban affairs and trading contain useful information but it seems that neither you nor the American Authorities are well informed. You know that, through American pressure, the Greek Government banned, several years ago, all trading with Cuba for Greek flag vessels, except few which were on timecharter and were allowed to run their charters, which finished a very long time ago. Similarly, the Lebanon Government banned all trading with Cuba for Lebanon vessels, few months ago, and only allow, subject special licence, their ships to carry goods from and and to countries of the Arab League. Both countries passed laws to this effect, and both state that infringement of the law carries very heavy fines against the Owners and Masters, and withdrawal of the flag. That is what the laws say, but what is actually happening is another matter. Greek and Lebanon flag vessels have continued, since banning, to be fixed, have carried and are carrying cargoes, through a number of Owners, such as Frankistas(Franco Shipping Co. of Lisbon and Athens, per Purvis Shipping Co. London, their U.K. Agents), owning about 35 Greek and Lebanon flag Liberties and similar vessels, also Vlassopoulo, Livanos, etc., also owning a great nunmber of ships with these flags. They simply say they do not care a damn about the ban, and continue to making fortunes in the Cuban trading, the reason being that as most other law abiding Owners with these flags do not go to Cuba, the market remains wide open for these people. They do not even try to hide, they just fix their ships, mostly in the Baltic Exchange, London, and Athens, but also direct with Charterers in Poland, Hungary, Boulrgaria, Russia, etc. and with Paris, and Geneve. The Governments of Greece and Lebanon, who made the laws, just look on, doing nothing about it, and this means that the laws were made, for paper value only. Some of these Owners fix their ships by name and flag, others just fix a contract to be carried by ships, to be nominated later, and later they nominate greek and Lebanon ships. Only the last few days, the following were fixed on the London market: Frankistas, 50.000 tons sugar from Cuba to England for sugar Merchants Tate and Lyle, London, to be carried in 2 or 3 months, and Frankistas has already nominated the NICOLAOS F.(Greek flag) and San Spyridon (Lebanon flag), for 20.000 tons and the remaining 30.000 tons are being nominated also for Greek and Lebanon flag ships. The same Owner just also fixed one cargo for Malmo(Sweden), and one to Gdynia, Poland. He is presently negotiating several other cargoes, for his large Greek and lebanon flag ships, with the aforementioned concerns, including another contract with D' Enree of Paris, via Geneve.
The AIS GIANNIS (Lebanon) was fixed with Dreyfus, London , few days ago, to carry a cargo of beans from Vera Cruz and Tampico to Cuba, and after for sugar to Europe . Another concern trading with Cuba is Tsavliris of London and Athens ,but this firm is not trading with Greek Lebanon flag ships.
The World thinks that you and American Athorities know all that goes on in Cuba. If so, it means that neither you nor American Authorities know and do not mind such trading with Greek and Lebano ships if they know. We have given you some details of the latest fixtures. You and American Authorities can check up without any thouble and when they verify the correctness, they will no doubt protest immediately to the respective Goverments, ask them to stop immediately the carriage of these cargoes and punish their Owners etc., as per their laws, and demand log books, freight accounts, etc to verify all past trading, a tremendous one. If they or you, do not do anything about it, it will mean that both you and American Government knew and know about this illegal trading and do not mind, in which case, we can more than assure you, that within the

next few weeks, the so far law abiding Owners of Greek and Lebanon flag vessels, will also re-commence or start trading to Cuba, for the simple reason that they will feel that they are breaking no laws, since they who asked the Governments of Greece and Lebanon to pass the laws, do not mind if they are not complied with. It remains,however , a great mystaery, because we cannot believe that the American Authorities do not know about this trading and why they have not protested to the Lebanon and Greek Governments,and if they do not know, then there is something very drastically wrong with their Intelligence.

Anonymous letters are not good things, in fact quite deplorable, but we trust you will understand the reason for anonymity in this case, and since you will no doubt like to know who wrote it, wecan tell you is written on behalf of some people who are very bitter and disappointed that their compliance with the law puts them in disadvantage, especially if it is proved that to comply with the law does not pay. We have given you sufficient information to check facts immediately and stop all the wrong doers. If they are not stopped, then your circulars will have to incrase,in the very near future; the number of Greek and Lebano ships trading with Cuba.

CUBAN TRADING

18th Nov. 1966

The Economic Research Bureau,
Unidad Revolutionaria,
10, S.E. 9th Street,
Miami, Fla. USA

On the 16th instant we wrote you about the Castro Delegation which arrived in Athens recently to conclude new chartering contracts. We can now report that,:the Delegation consisted of,

Mr. Hernandez, Chief General Manager of CUFLET,Havana.
Mr. Fornaguera,Chartering Dept. Cuflet,Havana, and that these two gentlemen arrived here at the invitation, and as guests of FRANGISTAS with whom they remained during their Athens stay. Faking of previous contracts discussed, new contracts negotiated and concluded, both for cargoes to Cuba, and sugar from Cuba for not only next year, but for longer periods, covering liberties and ships being built in Russia, and to be built, all new ships are and will be under Greek Flag, older vessels are either Greek or Lebanon. After Athens they went to Moscow where they covered that side of the business, and now they are in London, having further talks with Frangistas London partners PURVIS SHIPPING CO.

Mr. Fornaguera, was until early this year, the Manager of CUFLET, London(for three years) and is now again in Havana's Office. Both men are returning to Havana shortly.

When the Delegation asked Frangistas about the steps presently taken by the Greek Government in investigating(???) ships which have been trading with Cuba since 1963, and prohibition of further trading, Frangistas assured them they have nothing to worry about, the prohibition is a fake, so are the investigations and threatened punishment. He also reminded them that these investigations took place before,but all their cargoes were carried just the same, and numerous charters were fixed at various intervals by Frangistas through them, through Russia, and through many private charterers. He also assured them that whatever he does is done with the full knowledge of the Ministries, and particulalry his special partners, high officials.

Most of previous information in our reports, and the information contained in this report obtained direct, confidentially,from Frangistas own Athens Office. If you, or USA Government have any wish to check up,it is very easy, and simple. If you or USA do not care to check now, then you will see the accuracy of the report as time goes on. We are more than certain you are satisfied that all our previous reports proved accurate and were substetiated. We have to confess that we are now beginning to believe that even you and USA Authorities know all facts and truth and either do not care or cannot do anything about it. There is no other logical explanation. Except that USA who are fighting Communists and Dictators in the name of Democracy and freedom, it is this same USA who are creating a Dictator in the name of Frangistas, whom it is the USA who help him create vaste fleets (rumours have it that shortly Frangistas is going to Moscow to place further building contracts) , at the expense of democratic Greek Owners, who were compelled to either scrap and lay up their ships(many have done this) rather than go to Cuba,at the request of US

CUBAN TRADING 2nd December 1966.

The Economic Research Bureau,
Unidad Revolutionaria,
10 , S.E. , 9th Street,
Miami, Fla. USA.

Enclosed you will find cutting from yesterday's NAFTIKA CHRONIKA , which is the most influential and largest Magazine in Greece , on maritime affairs. We trust you will find some interesting.

FRANGISTAS clique meantime carry on the illegal Cuban trading, and negotiate further contracts, which the Greek Authorities are all out to punish Frangistas for his past sins. AND the U.S.A. just looks on. It is becoming obvious both USA, and Greece do not want Greek ships to carry on trade with Cuba, unless same is done by Frangistas, their hero.

c.c. U.S.A,Ambassador, Athens,
U.S.Ambassador, London.
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Washington

reporting and its wealth of data and figures. AMFOUND-1 added that he is quite certain that these reports had been forwarded to the home office in PBRUMEN, although he could not personally vouch for this. The Station is happy to have this indication that AMFOUND-1's former office continues to receive this publication; AMSNAKE-1 had reported shortly after his arrival here that he had read the first issue of this series prior to his defection.

Roy. E.

for PHILIP G. ELMARD

14-00000

SC Att. #1
UFGA 26348

economic intelligence report

FROM THE U.R. ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFFICE:
10 S.E. 9 St.
MAILING ADDRESS
Box 3940
Miami, Florida
PHONE:
373 - 8033

SC Att. #1 UFGA-26348

VOL. II

SPECIAL REPORT ON HURRICANE INEZ' EFFECTS ON CUBAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION.

SUGAR

Evaluation:

The ERB estimates that Cuba will lose a total of 307,000 metric tons of sugar in its 1967 harvest as a result of hurricane Ines.

Greatest damage was done to the caña quedada, the uncut cane left over from the previous year. When Ines struck the ERB estimates that there were about four million tons of caña quedada which should produce about 500,000 tons of raw sugar assuming a saccharose yield of 12.6%. The ERB arrives at this loss figure due the fact that fully 80%, or 3,200,000 tons., of the caña quedada was in the southern and central parts of Las Villas Province and the southern part of Oriente Province which is where Inez hit Cuba with its greatest force. In Cuba any hurricane usually destroys about 85% of the caña quedada that is hit. Thus the ERB estimates that Ines destroyed 1,360,000 tons. This will amount to a sugar loss of 171,000 tons, using the 12.6 saccharose yield figure.

The balance of the sugar loss will come from the damage to the ratoon cane, the cane that sprouts again after having been cut. The ERB estimates a total of 16,400,000 tons. of ratoon in Las Villas and Oriente provinces. The ERB's studies show that Ines struck 33% of this cane, or 5,400,000 tons. Historically, a conservative estimate of past damage to ratoon cane that is struck by hurricanes in Cuba would be 20%. Using this, Cuba's loss would be about 1,080,000 tons. Again, using the 12.6% saccharose yield figure, the raw sugar loss from the ratoon cane amounts to about 136,000 tons.

Available Information:

Pinar del Río Province: In 'Regional' Artemisa, 42 'caballerías' (state-owned) of sugar cane were damaged and 900,000 'arrobas' (*) of sugar cane, were also damaged.
200 sugar bags of "Eduardo García Lavandero" sugar mill, were damaged, specially from the rains.
50% of sugar cane areas, went down on account of the winds.
In 'Regional' Costa Norte, they reported serious damage in the sugar canes.

(*) 'arroba' equals to 25 pounds.

S/C att 1 UFGA-26348

CS COPY

19-120-26

Havana Province:	None.
Matanzas Province:	Sugar cane in Roque was heavily damaged. About 50% of the sugar cane was leveled, part of this will have a yield while other will dry up from root damage.
Las Villas Province:	Sugar cane in Valle de Trinidad, crop damaged. 'Regional' Sancti-Spíritus: Serious damages to the sugar crop. Tunas de Zaza: gap in a sugar warehouse, but it was empty. El Végano: 90% of the sugar cane was damaged (800 'caballerías' (*) crushed).
Camaguey Province:	In Baraguá, Venezuela, San Dimas, Majagua, 'Regional' Ciego de Avila, the sugar cane suffered damage from the winds.
Oriente Province:	Sugar cane suffered serious damages in the vicinity of Santiago. Near Yara, sugar cane fields were observed with two feet of water. In Boquerón 900 sugar bags were destroyed. In Caimanera, Boquerón, Guantánamo, the sugar plantations suffered serious damages. In 'Regional' Guantánamo 7 cane shelters were destroyed and 39 were affected. In 'Regional' Palma-San Luis 500 'caballerías' of sugar cane were destroyed.

The roofs were blown off from sugar warehouses #4 and #5 in Guantánamo and the 2,500 bags of raw sugar stored therein became wet.

TOBACCO

Commentary:

Strong winds and heavy rains affect the quality of this plant, as long as they damage the tobacco leaves. Besides this, the leaves get stained and some rot as a result of being in contact with the wet soil, thus affecting the quality in one case, and becoming a total loss in the other. If the area is flooded, most tobacco leaves will rot.

Pinar del Río Province:	In 'Julián Alemany' farm in Consolación del Sur and in "Hnos. Saiz" in San Juan y Martínez, the 10% of the tobacco seeds were damaged.
Havana Province:	None.

(*) A 'caballería' is a Cuban surface measure equal to: 33.162 acres.

Matanzas Province: None.

Las Villas Province: Tobacco production was destroyed.
Almost total loss of the tobacco crop.
5,000 houses of "curar tabaco" were destroyed in the following localities: Cabaiguán, Zaza del Medio, Placetas, Camajuaní, and Sancti-Spíritus.
93 houses full of tobacco (casas de tabaco), were destroyed, and 350 were partially destroyed.
7 houses of "curar tabaco" were partially destroyed in El Mógano and 9 were completely destroyed, another 31 houses suffered minor damages.

Camagüey Province: None.

Oriente Province: None.

COFFEE

Commentary:

The hurricanes during September and October cause considerable damage to the coffee crop, because it is precisely during these two months when the coffee is harvested. Besides the damage to the coffee plants, the hurricane scatters the coffee beans which rot quickly in contact with the wet soil.

Pinar del Río Province: None.

Havana Province: None.

Matanzas Province: None.

Las Villas Province: Coffee production was destroyed.
Almost total loss of coffee crop.

Camagüey Province: None.

Oriente Province: The ANAP (National Association of Small Farmers) called all the members of this association to pick up all the coffee crop that was seriously damaged.
Until October 1st., in Buey Arriba and Guisa, 472,000 full-cans of coffee were collected, that represents a 27% of the actual crop, that was calculated in 1,740,000 full-cans. They are sending workers of Jiguaní, Santa Rita and Cauto Cristo to Buey Arriba coffee plantantion.
In 'Regional' Baracoa the hurricane Ines ripped the coffee crop.
In 'Regional' Guantánamo 13,000 full-cans suffered serious damages.
In 'Regional' Palma-San Luis 122,000 full-cans went to the ground.

In the Yara region the coffee crop was 50% destroyed; the coffee beans had been ready for harvest and therefore easily shaken off by wind.
In Buey Arriba, 'Regional' Cauto-Bayamo-Jiguaní, 500 women picked up about 10,000 full-cans of coffee.

FRUIT

Pinar del Río Province: In 'Guane-Mantua' 1,000 banana plants were damaged.
In 'Regional' Pinar del Río 5,700 banana stubs were destroyed. In 'Regional' PR-2 the guava plantations were damaged by the winds.

Havana Province: None.

Matanzas Province: None.

Las Villas Province: In Valle de Trinidad, the banana plantations and the fruit crop were completely destroyed.
In El Mégano 120,000 banana stubs were destroyed.

Camagüey Province: None.

Oriente Province: Between the 80 and 90% of the fruit crop was destroyed. In 'Regional' Baracoa 40,000 banana stubs were destroyed.
In 'Regional' Palma-San Luis 14 'caballerías' of banana were damaged.
In "Josué País" farm 30% of the 80 'caballerías' of banana were destroyed.
In Buey Arriba, 'Regional' Cauto-Bayamo-Jiguaní, 300 'caballerías' of bananas were damaged, only 70 were destroyed.
All fruit in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba suffered serious damage.
Near Holguín banana plants were leveled by wind.
Near Yara, banana plants had been broken.
In 'Regional' Guantánamo 35 'caballerías' of coconut were destroyed.

VEGETABLES & "VIANDS"

Pinar del Río Province: None.

Havana Province: In 'Regional' Ariguanabo, losts in the agriculture; specially vegetables seed beds.

Matanzas Province:	Malanga fields were covered with water which will rot most of the plant root. Complete loss of corn crops were observed in the Malanga area.
Las Villas Province:	'Viands' crops were destroyed.
Camagüey Province:	2 % of the plantain, yucca and sweet potatoes crops were destroyed.
Oriente Province:	In 'Mabay' 1,400 bags of sweet potatoes and 160 quintals of yucca were collected. All vegetable crops in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba suffered serious damage.

BEANS AND RICE

Pinar del Río Province:	15 'caballerías' of rice were damaged from the wind and the heavy rains in 'Patricio Lumumba' farm.
Havana Province:	None.
Matanzas Province:	None.
Las Villas Province:	In the zone of Jatibonico to Sancti-Spíritus, serious damages in rice plantations. In El Mégano, 8 'caballerías' of beans were destroyed.
Camagüey Province:	20% of beans crop were damaged.
Oriente Province:	Rice fields near Yara had been leveled to the ground.

CATTLE, POULTRY AND DAIRY

Pinar del Río Province:	56 calves dead.
Havana Province:	None.
Matanzas Province:	None.
Las Villas Province:	Numerous animals were drowned. In El Mégano, 7 dairies were destroyed, and 19 suffered minor damages, and one was partially damaged.
Camagüey Province:	None.
Oriente Province:	30 poultry shelters were destroyed, and 9 were af-

fected.
22 dairies were partially affected, and 9 were destroyed.
Several goat-barns were damaged.
2 poultry yards were damaged.
In Buey Arriba, 'Regional' Cauto-Bayamo-Jiguaní 30,000 steers were seriously affected.

TRANSPORTATION

Pinar del Río Province:	None.
Havana Province:	Several portions of the highways running parallel to the railway had been washed away.
Matanzas Province:	None.
Las Villas Province:	None.
Camagüey Province:	None.
Oriente Province	In 'Regional' Palma-San Luis, 3 bridges were damaged. The railways bridge at Central Los Reinaldo, Alto Songo is unpassable. From Santiago de Cuba to Camaguey, railways were damaged.

NON-SPECIFIED INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

Pinar del Río Province:	None.
Havana Province:	The "Ñico López" refinery (former Esso-Belot), was seriously affected when the line of 110,000 volts went down. Outside of the Capital there was a two day power failure.
Matanzas Province:	None.
Las Villas Province:	In El Mégano, 6 workshops were damaged.
Camagüey Province:	None.
Oriente Province:	In 'Regional' Guantánamo 1 food store was destroyed. In 'Regional' Guantánamo, 7 workshops were damaged.

OTHERS

Pinar del Río Province:	In 'Regional' Pinar del Río, 14,800 houses were

	damaged, 3 warehouses were damaged in 'Regional' PR-2.
Havana Province:	Many houses were completely under water, crops and farm land were flooded.
Matanzas Province:	None.
Las Villas Province:	2 warehouses of fertilizers were damaged in El Mégano.
Camagüey Province:	Júcaro, Quince y Medio and Central Venezuela, 'Regional' Ciego de Avila, inundations and damages in Venezuela sugar mill.
Oriente Province:	In 'Regional' Guantánamo 77 kms. of fences were destroyed, and 8 pastures were damaged. Other damages caused by the rains were: 200 tons of hay and several pigpens, plus 3 warehouses, 260 bags of fertilizer, and 115 'quintales' (*) of cotton seeds In 'Regional' Palma-San Luis 60 houses were destroyed and 10 farm houses were also destroyed. Heavy rains affected 67 tons of fertilizer.

(*) One "quintal" equals 100 lbs., or 4 'arrobas'.

Note: All other crops suffered the regular damage caused by a hurricane, i.e., broken branches, scattered fruits, plants destroyed, and the known damage caused by heavy rains, strong winds, and flooding.



PATH OF HURRICANE "INEZ" - TRAYECTORIA DEL CICLON "INES
SOURCE: Cuban Official newspaper, Granma, Havana, Oct., 5, 19

GOLFO DE MEJICO
LA FLORIDA
GRAN BAHAMA
ABACO
ISLAS BAHAMAS
O C
C U B A
GRAN CAIMAN

EXPLANATION OF MAP - EXPLICACION DEL MAPA

- Sugar cane - Caña de azúcar.
- Produce - Frutos Menores.
- Coffee - Café.
- Cattle - Ganado.
- Tobacco - Tabaco.
- Bananas - Plátanos.
- Rice - Arroz.
- Citric & other fruits - Cítricos y otras frutas.
- Pine groves - Pinares.
- Henequen fiber - Henequén.
- Pineapple - Piña.
- Corn - Maíz.
- Beans - Frijoles.
- Potatoes - Papas.
- Cocoa - Cacao.
- Charcoal - Carbón vegetal.
- Pork - Ganado Porcino.

GRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND HOW
E AFFECTED BY HURRICANE "INEZ"

DUCTOS AGRICOLAS DE CUBA Y
LES AFECTO EL CICLON "INES"

CONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU

OFFICE
10 S.E. 9 St.

Miami, Florida

BULGARIA REJECTS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPMENT

Last month the Economic Research Bureau (ERB) reported the establishment of a Soviet-Cuban quality control organization to undertake steps to maintain the quality of Cuban sugar. This organization, which incidentally has been patterned along the administrative guidelines and regulations of the Soviet Union, has been made necessary by the increasing difficulties the Soviet refineries are having with Cuban raws. The phenomenon of declining quality of Cuban sugar is further pointed up by Bulgaria's rejection of the first Cuban sugar shipment to that country from the 1966 harvest. This rejection, which occured last August, was due to the high moisture content of the Cuban sugar. The source of this information is the Cuban Institute for Sugar Research.

CUBAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER RECOGNIZES MISTAKES

Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, one of the key figures of the Partido Socialista Popular (name under which the Cuban Communist Party operated from 1939 to 1962), former Head of INRA (Castro's National Agrarian Reform Institute), and presently a member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, was interviewed by Josef Timmer, correspondent for Budapest's NEPSZAVA, on September 16, 1966. The Economic Research Bureau has considered Timmer's statements a sound explanation of the real economic situation existing in Cuba. Therefore, we believe our readers will be interested in excerpts from NEPSZAVA's story of its interview with Timmer:

Sugar:

"We exert our greatest efforts in the sugar industry. Despite this --unfortunately-- we failed to attain our objectives this year and did not even come close to the 1965 results, primarily because of natural disasters, particularly a great drought. We would like to harvest 6.5 million tons of sugar cane next year and attain a record output by 1968." (*)

Industrial and agricultural productivity:

"Industrial and agricultural productivity diminished after the revolution. Many people think that one must work less under socialism than under capitalism and, consequently, do not fulfill the legal working time. It is also true that this is partly due to the fact that work is not organized with sufficient care, particularly in agriculture. Moreover, serious problems are caused by the fact that the working people are not paid according to their output. Remuneration according to output, is, nevertheless, applied in agriculture, but we have not managed to introduce it in industry yet."

Skilled personnel:

"The shortage of experts is a very great problem. Imagine what tremendous

(*) ERB note: This constitutes a contradiction of Castro's stated goals. The Perspective Sugar Plan called for a 7.5 million-ton mark for 1967 and Castro has stressed this figure in his speeches over and over again.

difficulties we must overcome in this respect when, for example, an aptitude test carried out in over 2,000 state farms two years ago revealed that 60 percent of the heads of farms and 80 percent of the heads of work brigades did not even have three years of elementary schooling."

Textile Industry:

"Cuba is a country badly off in raw materials, which are also very difficult to procure. The position of industry is closely linked to the disengagement of the United States. The Americans established factories and also provided raw materials before the revolution in Cuba. The factories belong to us today, but we must fend for ourselves with respect to raw materials. What this means is faithfully reflected by the fact that raw materials constitute 50 percent of our overall imports. Not even in this way can we meet our requirements, and, therefore, 40 to 60 of the capacity of our factories and plants lie idle."

Agrarian reform:

"We have not distributed land among the peasants but we have established state farms, so-called people's farms."

The ERB's comment is that a Cuban Communist talks more honestly to a Communist Hungarian correspondent than the régime talks to the world.

FREE WORLD SHIPPING TO CUBA DOWN 65.8%

A total of fourteen Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports during the month of August.

The August 1966 total represents a drop of 41.5% in Western shipping to Red Cuba when compared with the August 1963 total, and a drop of 65.8% when compared with the August 1964 total (*).

In August's list, Great Britain continued to lead the maritime fifth columists with eight vessels, followed by Greece with three, and Lebanon, France and Italy with one vessel each.

August 1963:	24 vessels
August 1964:	41 vessels
August 1965:	22 vessels
August 1966:	14 vessels (all time low for August)

878 FREE WORLD VESSELS PLEDGED OUT OF CUBA SEA TRADE

The Maritime Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce said on October 5, 1966, that ninety-six ships have been removed from MA's "Cuba Blacklist" on promises by controlling parties to keep out of the Cuba sea trade a total of 878 vessels, which are either owned or operated by these parties.

There are presently 254 ships in the MA's "Cuba Blacklist", representing 1,813,855 gross tons.

FRANCO SHIPPING CONTINUES IN THE CUBA SEA TRADE

Franco Shipping Company has been responsible for 18.1% of the total Free-World sea trade with Communist Cuba for the January-September 1966 period.

The ERB denounced the operations of Franco Shipping Co. and its nine subsidiaries in Greece and Great Britain in August 1966 (*) and now it wants to stress that FRANCO SHIPPING has continued engaged in the Cuba trade as ERB's statistics show:

January-September 1966

	Number of Trips	%
Free World vessels	177	100.0%
Franco Shipping vessels	32	18.1%

Note: Breakdown of Franco Shipping Co.'s vessels by registry:

a) Greek:	17
b) Lebanese:	9
c) 11,749 GRT Tanker Sword under Italian and Finnish flags :	5
d) ARETI under Cypriot flag:	1
Total:	32

(*) For full details see: Economic Intelligence Report Vol. II No. 1-A, Miami, Fla., August 26, 1966.

BRAND NEW 9,500 TON CUBAN FREIGHTER GOES AGROUND

The brand new 9,500-ton Cuban freighter MAFFO went aground on September 26th 1966 half-an-hour out of Casilda port in Cuba while en route to the south eastern Cuban port of Guayabal where she was scheduled to have loaded sugar for Japan. This was the first commercial voyage of the M/V MAFFO as she had made only one trip prior to this voyage which trip had been to deliver her to Cuba after her construction in Cadiz, Spain, on February 9, 1966.

Hurricane Inez, which hit this area with full force, probably contributed to the accident. By October 18, 1966, it was reported that the M/V MAFFO had been refloated.

During the last months, the Cuban government has had difficulty in keeping its vessels afloat. The M/V ARACELIO IGLESIAS suffered severe damages after crashing into the Norwegian M/V NIDAREID in the Panama Canal last June 11, 1965.

On April 8, 1966, the M/V ORIENTE was sunk after colliding with the Norwegian M/V ESTARFORT off the coast of Holland. And, on April 27, 1966, another newly-built Spanish vessel, the M/V LA PLATA, while on a trip to Japan, was involved in an accident, also in the Panama Canal, with the M/V HONG KONG AMBER of Liberian registry.

The ERB might comment that comrade Rodríguez's remarks to the Hungarian correspondent of problems affecting Cuban industry and agriculture might well have been applied to Cuban shipping as well.

Sources:

The above information has been obtained from reliable sources, both from Cuba and the Free World. For additional details address yourself to:

Economic Research Bureau
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
10 S.E. 9th Street
Miami, Fla. 33131, U.S.A.

Miami, Fla., October 27, 1966.-

[illegible] news at 1130

S/C Att. #2
UFGA 26348

AP

B33 (CEQ)

OCT 28 1966

(200)

MIAMI, FLA., OCT. 28 (AP)-CUBA'S VITAL, DOLLAR-PRODUCING SUGAR CROP WAS REDUCED BY SOME 300,000 METRIC TONS BY HURRICANE INEZ, SAYS A REPORT RELEASED TODAY BY EXILE ECONOMISTS.

THE ESTIMATE WAS CONTAINED IN AN "ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT" BY REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (UR), WHICH KEEPS AN EYE ON CUBA'S ECONOMY.

THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT ANNOUNCED HURRICANE ~~DAMAGE FIGURES.~~ IT HAD SET A 1967 SUGAR PRODUCTION GOAL OF 7.5 MILLION METRIC TONS. THIS YEAR'S HARVEST YIELDED 4.5 MILLION. A METRIC TON IS 2,200 POUNDS.

THE SURVEY, WHICH UR SAID WAS BASED ON INFORMATION FROM INSIDE CUBA, ESTIMATED INEZ DESTROYED 1,380,000 TONS OF RATOON. THAT IS CANE THAT SPROUTS AGAIN AFTER HAVING BEEN CUT. THIS DAMAGE REPRESENTS A 136,000-TON RAW SUGAR LOSS, THE REPORT SAID.

IN ADDITION, IT ESTIMATED, THE HURRICANE DESTROYED 1,360,000 TONS OF LEFTOVER, UNCUT CANE, KNOWN IN CUBA AS "CANA QUEDADA." THIS MEANS A LOSS OF 171,000 TONS OF SUGAR, UR CALCULATED.

INEZ SERIOUSLY DAMAGED THE QUALITY OF TOBACCO, CUBA'S NO. 2 CROP, THE REPORT SAID. IN ONE PROVINCE, LAS VILLAS, CENTRAL CUBA, MOST GROWING TOBACCO WAS DESTROYED, UR REPORTED. IN ADDITION, IT SAID, MORE THAN 5,000 TOBACCO CURING HOUSES WERE DEMOLISHED.

COFFEE CROP DAMAGE WAS EXTENSIVE, THE REPORT SAID, WITHOUT MAKING AN OVER-ALL ESTIMATE. THE HURRICANE HIT DURING THE HARVEST SEASON, AND MUCH COFFEE BLOWN OFF RECEIVED ROT DAMAGE BEFORE BEING RECOVERED, IT SAID.

28513AED

19-120-26

CS COPY

S/C Att. 2 UFGA-26348

S/C Att. #2 UFGA-26348

14-00000

Att. #3 UFGA-26348

economic intelligence

FROM THE U.R. ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

MAILING ADDRESS
Box 3940
Miami, Florida
PHONE:
373 - 8033

VOL. II No. 3-A

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT.

LOBSTER EXPORTS CONTINUE TO CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR CUBA

Commercial sources in Canada and confirmed by information obtained in New York report that the Canadian and French authorities have launched investigations into the receipt of bad lobster in both Canada and France. The ERB has now learned that a shipment of more than eight thousand cans of Cuban lobster arrived in France on October 6th aboard the S.S. KATHERINA. This shipment was consigned to "Fourchtein et Cie." and was impounded in its entirety by the French customs authorities who observed that this shipment contained swollen tins. Upon investigation, impurities were discovered, the lobster was found to have been overcooked, and in some cases gray spots were observed.

"World Seafood Distributors", a Montreal firm that imports Cuban lobsters for sale in Canada and for transshipment to Europe, continues to have its difficulties with CUBAEXPORT. ERB Cuban commercial sources in Europe report that Sam Beiner, an officer of "World Seafood", is complaining to CUBAEXPORT that CUBAEXPORT is undercutting Beiner's prices quoted to the Antwerp firm of "Hallewyck". "Hallewyck" appears to be a major European account for "World Seafood" and in order to protect this business Beiner was forced to tell CUBAEXPORT that "World Seafood" may be forced to quote "Hallowyck" cost prices for direct shipment of lobsters from Brazil unless CUBAEXPORT and Cuban commercial representatives in Paris and The Hague cease these antics. This dispute involves more than two thousand cartons of lobster.

"World Seafood" maintains a stock of Cuban lobsters in Antwerp. The ERB has learned that Cuban commercial authorities in Europe have issued written instructions that in effect claim that more than one thousand cartons of lobster in this stock are under the control of CUBAEXPORT. Upon learning this "World Seafood" informed CUBAEXPORT in Havana that it will cause the arrest of any person removing these lobsters without pre-payment. The person concerned with attempted removal of these lobsters is a Mr. J. M. Schwarz who appears to be releasing "World Seafood"'s lobsters by giving promissory notes which are not guaranteed by any bank or other institution. "World Seafood" is understandably seeking pre-payment or at least a guaranteed note of payment. By late September this dispute reached the point where "World Seafood" refused to assume responsibility for a sale of more than a thousand cartons of lobster made by Schwarz acting on CUBAEXPORT instructions. CUBAEXPORT counter-claims that Schwarz is "World Seafood"'s agent in these sales which, of course, "World Seafood" denies.

As if these were not enough problems, "World Seafood" realizes that it can buy similar lobster in New York at lower prices and is therefore insisting upon an additional discount from CUBAEXPORT in order to compensate for this difference.

S/C att. 3 UFGA-26348

CS COPY

19-120-26

One of the trade names being used in Europe is "Caribbean Queen". This particular label is for canned Cuban lobster and is being marketed by the firm of Jacques Fourchstein which is also having its difficulties in this business.

The ERB has looked into the background of Mr. Sam Beiner and of his company, "World Seafood Distributors". Regarding the company, little can be found other than the fact that its office is in Beiner's home in Montreal. The address is 890 Frazer Avenue, Montreal, PQ, Canada. Trade directories of Canadian firms and similar sources available here and in New York do not list this firm. Regarding Beiner, the ERB can state that Beiner has been engaged, at least since 1962, in commercial activities involving Cuba. Over the years his interests have been purchasing frogs' legs, lobster, shrimp, fruits, candies, and vegetables. He is known to think favorably of the Cuban regime and in late September 1962 Beiner was openly discussing economic and social progress being made in Cuba while on a visit to Miami. Beiner is characterized by people now in Miami and who have known him in the past in Cuba as being an opportunist who was active in the Havana black market.

Note: For additional information on this matter see: Economic Intelligence Report, Vol. II, No. 2, dated September 26, 1966.

U.R. · Economic Research Bureau.
Miami, Fla., October 31, 1966.-

14-00000

press release

A PRESS SERVICE FROM
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFFICE:
10 S.E. 9 St.
MAILING ADDRESS
Box 3940
Miami, Florida
PHONE:
373 - 8033

ALL-TIME-LOW

Att. #4 UFGA-26348

THE MARITIME FIFTH COLUMN

October 1966 total down 73.1%

A total of seven (7) Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports during the past month of October, U.R. learned from its underground and international maritime sources.

The October 1966 total (7) represents an all-time-low for the November 1962-October 1966 period. The previous all-time-low was the February 1965 total, when eleven (11) Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports.

The October 1966 total also represents a drop of 73.1% in Western shipping to Red Cuba when compared with the October 1963 total; a drop of 69.6% compared with the October 1964 total; and a drop of 66.7% when compared with the October 1965 total. (*)

In October's list, Cyprus continued to lead the maritime fifth columnists with three (3) vessels, followed by Great Britain and Greece with two (2) vessels each.

The following is the complete list for October:

NAME OF VESSEL	FLAG	PORT	DATE
FREE NAVIGATOR	Cypriot	Cárdenas	October 9
RUTHY ANN	British	Havana	October 12
EL TORO	Cypriot	Havana	October 21
VENICE	British	Stgo. de Cuba	October 22
ROULA MARIA	Greek	Isabela de Sagua	October 27
IRENA	Greek	Havana	October 30
NEWFOREST	Cypriot	Cárdenas	October 31

(*) October 1963: 26 vessels
October 1964: 23 vessels
October 1965: 21 vessels
October 1966: 7 vessels (all-time-low for this month and for the whole period).

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Miami, November 18, 1966

REF.: 216

CS COPY

S/Att 4 UFGA-26348

19-120-26

boletín informativo

UN SERVICIO DE PRENSA DEL
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFICINAS:
10 S.E. 9 St.
DIRECCION POSTAL:
Box 3940
Miami, Florida
TELEFONO:
373 - 8033

BAJA RECORD

QUINTA COLUMNA MARITIMA

Total de Octubre de 1966 representa baja de un 73.1%.-

Un total de siete (7) buques del Mundo Occidental tocaron en puertos cubanos durante el pasado mes de octubre, UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA supo hoy por sus fuentes en la clandestinidad cubana y en círculos marítimos internacionales.

El total de Octubre de 1966 (7) representa una baja record para el período Noviembre 1962 - Octubre 1966. La anterior baja record fue la correspondiente a Febrero de 1965, cuando sólo 11 buques del Mundo Occidental tocaron en puertos cubanos.

El total de Octubre de 1966 también representa una disminución de un 73.1% en buques del Mundo Occidental que atracaron en puertos de Cuba Roja, cuando se compara con el total de Octubre de 1963; un 69.6% cuando se compara con el total de Octubre de 1964, y un 66.7% cuando se compara con el total de Octubre de 1965. (*)

En la lista de Octubre, Chipre encabeza los quinta columnistas marítimos con tres (3) buques, seguida de Gran Bretaña con sólo dos (2) buques y Grecia también con dos (2) buques.

A continuación la lista completa del mes de Octubre:

NOMBRE DEL BUQUE	BANDERA	PUERTO	FECHA
FREE NAVIGATOR	Chipriota	Cárdenas	9 Octubre
RUTHY ANN	Británica	Habana	12 Octubre
EL TORO	Chipriota	Habana	21 Octubre
VENICE	Británica	Stgo. de Cuba	22 Octubre
ROULA MARIA	Griega	Isabela de Sagua	27 Octubre
IRENA	Griega	Habana	30 Octubre
NEWFOREST	Chipriota	Cárdenas	31 Octubre

(*) Octubre 1963: 26 buques
Octubre 1964: 23 buques
Octubre 1965: 21 buques
Octubre 1966: 7 buques (baja record para este mes y para todo el período).

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Miami, 18 de Noviembre de 1966
REF.: 221

EDITION 15

AM ____ PM ____

LEAD LIST

WESTERN UNION PRESS MESSAGE

W. P. MARSHALL PRESIDENT

1505 (R-11-52)

CHECK

TIME FILED

1966 NOV 18 PM 4 00

MIAMI, NOV. 18/66

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

WUX CD NEWYORK DAYLETTER COLLECT

61600 SOLAMENTE SIETE BUQUES ABANDERAS MUNDO OCCIDENTAL VISITARON CUBA DURANTE PASADO [redacted] OCTUBRE SIENDO ESTA CIFRA MAS BAJA REGISTRADA DESDE INICIOSE BOICOT MARITIMO REGIMEN CASTRO STOP ORGANIZACION ANTICASTRISTA MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA QUE MENSUALMENTE OFRECE NOMBRES BARCOS VISITAN ISLA OBTENIENDO INFORMACIONES DE CIRCULOS MARITIMO INTERNACIONALES AND FUENTES CLANDESTINAS CUBA DICE ESTA CIFRA ES MENOR REGISTRADA DESDE ELLOS LLEVAN ESTADISTICA 1962 STOP TAMBIEN SIDO [redacted] OCTUBRE PRIMERA VEZ GRAN BRETAÑA NO FIGURA CABEZA TRAFICO MARITIMO CON CASTRO STOP SIETE BUQUES TOCARON CUBA ESE MES TRES [redacted] ERAN CHIPRIOTAS DOS BRITANICOS AND DOS GRIEGOS STOP COMPARANDOLO IGUAL [redacted] MES ANTERIORES AÑOS DISMINUCION REPRESENTA 73%

ARROYO

21 NW 9na ave.
FR 9-8261

1.690

75

EDITION 19

DEADLINE

WESTERN UNION PRESS MESSAGE

W. P. MARSHALL PRESIDENT

CHECK

TIME FILED

MIAMI, NOV.25/66 1966 NOV 25 PM 5 03

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

WUX CD NEWYORK DAYLETTER COLLECT

61700 AIRADA PROTESTA OCASIONADO EXILIO CUBANO NEGATIVA AUTORIDADES ESPAÑOLAS CONCEDER ASILO POLITICO ESPAÑA CUATRO CUBANOS LLEGARON LAS PALMAS [redacted] COMO POLIZONES ABORDO BARCO GRIEGO FREE NAVIGATOR [redacted] STOP CUATRO CUBANOS FUERON OBLIGADOS [redacted] REEMBARCAR NAVE GRIEGA ENCUENTRASE ACTUALMENTE NAVEGANDO RUMBO ALEJANDRIA EGIPTO STOP PRINCIPALES ORGANIZACIONES CUBANOS ANTICASTRISTAS DIRIGIDOSE AUTORIDADES [redacted] NORTEAMERICANAS [redacted] PIDIENDOLE INTERPONGA BUENOS OFICIOS EVITAR CUBANOS POLIZONES SEAN DESEMBARCADOS ALGUN PUERTO COMUNISTA [redacted] ALEGANDO ESTO OCURRIERA QUOTE [redacted] SERIAN DEVUELTOS CUBA DONDE CONDENARIASELES TREINTA AÑOS CARCEL OR FUSILAMIENTO ANTE PAREDON UNQUOTE STOP [redacted] UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA REPORTA MENSUALMENTE MOVIMIENTO BARCOS TOCAN PUERTOS CUBANOS ASEGURA FREE NAVIGATOR ENARBOLANDO BANDERA CHIPRIOTA ESTUVO PUERTO CARDENAS COSTA NORTE CUBA PASADO 9 OCTUBRE STOP NAVIGATOR 8181 TONELADAS OPERALO PANCRISTO CHIPING COMPANY SUBSIDIARIA TSAVILIRIS PSA RADICA GRECIA, AND LONDRES AGOSTO PASADO AÑO [redacted] ENARBOLABA BANDERA [redacted] HAITIANA CUANDO FUE DENUNCIADO TRATAR CARGAR TRIGO ARGENTINO PARA LLEVARLO CUBA

ARROYO

21 NW 9na Ave.

FR 9-8261

120

EA10

NOV 19 1966

(110)

MIAMI, FLA., NOV. 19 (AP)-A SHARP DECLINE IN SHIPPING FROM NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TO CUBA WAS REPORTED TODAY.

ONLY SEVEN VESSELS FROM THESE AREAS TOUCHED CUBAN PORTS LAST MONTH, SAID REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (UR), AN EXILE ORGANIZATION WHICH WATCHES SUCH MOVEMENTS. UR ADDED THIS IS THE SMALLEST NUMBER SINCE IT BEGAN KEEPING COUNT FOUR YEARS AGO.

LISTED AS VISITING CUBA IN OCTOBER WERE THREE SHIPS FROM CYPRUS, TWO FROM GREAT BRITAIN AND TWO FROM GREECE.

THIS COMPARES WITH 17 SHIPS THE PREVIOUS MONTH. OTHER OCTOBER TOTALS: 21 IN 1965, 23 IN 1964, AND 26 IN 1963.

UR SAID IT DID NOT KNOW WHAT CAUSED THE DROP.

PL135AES

DIARIO LAS AMERICAS
FUNDADO EL 4 DE JULIO DE 1953
(Por la Libertad, la Cultura y la Solidaridad Hemisférica)
MIAMI, FLA., MARTES 22 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1966

Micronoticias

Por SALOMON
Medina Jr.

* * *

Un total de siete buques del mundo occidental tocaron en puertos cubanos en el pasado mes de octubre, según informa Unidad Revolucionaria, que lleva la estadística de ese movimiento marítimo.

El total de octubre representa una merma record, desde el año 1962 a la fecha, pues la otra caída más cercana se produjo cuando 11 barcos llegaron a Cuba en febrero del año pasado.

Esto representa una disminución del 78.1 por ciento en buques del mundo occidental que atracaron en puertos de Cuba Roja, comparado con octubre de 1963; un 69 por ciento con 1964 y un 66.7 por ciento con 1965.

Chipre encabeza la lista de los países que permiten a sus buques comerciar con Cuba, seguida por Gran Bretaña y Grecia.

Sin embargo, esta restricción creciente del tráfico marítimo del mundo libre con Cuba resultante de las medidas tomadas por el Gobierno de EE.UU. y de la acción libre de los trabajadores portuarios de varios países, está afectada en gran parte por la continua construcción de barcos en España para la flota mercante de Castro. . .

* * *

14-00000

S Att. #5 UFGA-26348

C13 (E)

MIAMI, FLA., NOV. 23 (AP)-A CUBAN DIPLOMAT WHO DEFECTED SAYS "CUBA'S ECONOMY IS WELL ON THE ROAD TO REACHING A CLIMAX AFTER SUFFERING ONE SETBACK AFTER ANOTHER."

RAUL VOLTA, WHO LEFT HIS POST AS TRADE COUNSELOR IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN LONDON AND CAME TO THE UNITED STATES FOR ASYLUM, TOLD NEWSMEN LAST NIGHT THAT GENERAL DISCONTENT REIGNED IN CUBA BECAUSE OF SCARCITIES AND ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT.

WHEN HE LAST WAS IN CUBA, IN JULY, VOLTA SAID, IT HURT HIM TO WITNESS THE "ECONOMIC CHAOS" THERE.

VOLTA, 36, WAS THE FOURTH PERSON TO DEFECT FROM THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN LONDON SINCE FIDEL CASTRO'S TAKEOVER IN 1959.

8AES

M

14-00000

[illegible]

BY THEODORE A. EDIGER

ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

NOV 24 1966

MIAMI, FLA., NOV. 24 (AP)-THE FRAGRANT SMOKE OF THE HIGHLY PRIZED HAVANA CIGAR IS SILENTLY FADING INTO OBLIVION IN THE ECONOMY-CLOUDED COMMUNIST STATE, SAYS A FORMER OFFICIAL OF CUBA'S TOBACCO INDUSTRY.

RAUL VOLTA, A DEFECTED ECONOMIC ENVOY, BLAMES HIS FORMER BOSS, FIDEL CASTRO, HIMSELF ONE OF THE MOST [illegible] OF CUBA'S FORMER NO. 2 PRODUCT.

"THE INDUSTRY APPEARS DOOMED TO TOTAL DESTRUCTION BECAUSE OF COMMUNIST MISMANAGEMENT," VOLTA, FORMER ASSISTANT MANAGER OF CUBATABACO, THE STATE TOBACCO EXPORTING COMPANY, TOLD NEWSMEN YESTERDAY.

CUBAN CIGARS ARE SCARCE IN CUBA AND SCARCER ABROAD, VOLTA SAID AFTER ARRIVING FROM LONDON, WHERE HE GAVE UP HIS POST AS TRADE COUNSELOR IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY.

THE QUALITY, ELEGANCE AND PRODUCTION VOLUME OF CUBAN CIGARS, VOLTA SAID, HAVE FALLEN VICTIM TO THINGS SUCH AS:

--USE OF LEAF TOBACCO WITHOUT PROPER AGING.

--SCARCITY OF MATERIALS SUCH AS ALUMINUM TUBES, RINGS AND CEDAR BOXES USED IN PACKAGING.

--A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF WORMY CIGARS.

--ALTERING OF THE TRADITIONAL BLENDS THAT GAVE CHARACTER TO CIGARS.

--"USE OF INEXPERIENCED PERSONNEL IN HANDICRAFTING TOP QUALITY CIGARS, RESULTING IN PRODUCTION OF UNDERSIZED, OVERSIZED OR TOO HEAVY CIGARS."

VOLTA REPORTED LEAF PRODUCTION HAS DECLINED FROM THE PRE-CASTRO AVERAGE OF 45,000 TONS ANNUALLY TO 32,000 TONS IN 1965.

HE ADDED THAT TOBACCO IN THE VUELTA ABAJO REGION, FAMED FOR WRAPPERS, "HAS DECLINED MORE THAN 70 PER CENT IN YIELD AND QUALITY DUE TO LACK OF FERTILIZER AND CARE."

HE SAID WORKERS TRAINED IN TOBACCO GROWING HAVE BEEN DIVERTED TO CUBA'S NO. 1 CROP, SUGAR, NEEDED TO PRODUCE DOLLARS TO BOLSTER WHAT HE CALLED CASTRO'S SHAKY ECONOMY.

THE EXILE ADDED THAT DUE TO LOW PRICES PAID TOBACCO GROWERS BY THE STATE, "MANY OF THE MOST EFFICIENT PRODUCERS HAVE DIVERTED THEIR LANDS TO OTHER CROPS."

IN ADDITION, THE EXILE ANTI-CASTRO ORGANIZATION, REVOLUTIONARY UNITY, REPORTED AFTER A SURVEY THAT HURRICANE INEZ SERIOUSLY DAMAGED THIS SEASON'S TOBACCO CROP. NOV 24 1966

[illegible]

14-00000

EDITION
AN
LEAD LINE

16

WESTERN UNION
PRESS MESSAGE

W. P. MARSHALL PRESIDENT

1575 (R-11-52)
CHECK

TIME FILED

1966 NOV 22 PM 3 20

MIAMI, NOV. 22/66

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

WUX CD NEWYORK DAYLETTER COLLECT

31520 SEGUNDO ULTIMO REGIMEN CASTRO STOP VOLTA 35 FUE PRESENTADO POR ORGANIZACION ANTICASTRISTA MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA REGULARMENTE PRESENTADO TODOS DIPLOMATICOS DEFECCIONADO CASTRISMO STOP ADEMAS DE SEÑALAR FRACASO INDUSTRIA AZUCARERA VOLTA ASEGURO IGUAL CAMINO PARA INDUSTRIA TABACALERA CUBANA SEGUNDA IMPORTANCIA ISLA REVELANDO PASADO AÑO REGIMEN QUOTE APENAS LOGRO COLOCAR EUROPA OCCIDENTAL DOSMIL TONELEDAS METRICAS TABACO CON INGRESO APROXIMADO MILLON MEDIO DOLARES STOP IGUALMENTE SEÑALO DIFICULTADES SUFRIDAS POR CASTRO SUS EXPORTACIONES LANGOSTA INCLUYENDO GRAN BRETAÑA ENTRE PAISES COMO CANADA FRANCIA AND POLONIA QUE HABIAN DEVUELTO MERCANCIA POR ESTAR MAL ESTADO STOP QUOTE SIN EMBARGO DIJO VOLTA ESA MERCANCIA DEVUELTA FUE PUESTA LUEGO VENTA MERCADO DOMESTICO CUBANO PRACTICA ESTA SEGUIDOSE INSOLO CON LANGOSTA SINO CON TODOS PRODUCTOS EXPORTACION [redacted] RECHAZADOS DESTINADOSE CONSUMO PUEBLO CUBANO UNQUOTE STOP EXDIPLOMATICO CUBANO FINALIZO ENTREVISTA ASEGURANDO QUOTE POLITICA AGRESIVA CASTRO IDO AUMENTO AND SEGUIRA POR ESE CAMINO HASTA ESTE SEA ELIMINADO UNQUOTE

ARROYO

21 NW 9na ave.
FR 9-8261

1965

135

14-00000

7C

WESTERN UNION
PRESS MESSAGE

W. P. MARSHALL PRESIDENT

1959 (R-11-52)
CHECK
TIME FILED

1966 NOV 22 PM 3 20

MIAMI, NOV. 22/66

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

WUX CD NEWYORK DAYLETTER COLLECT

8/5/15 REGIMEN CASTRO UTILIZA POCOS ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES DONDE TIENE REPRESENTACION PARA SUS DELEGADOS LLEVEN POLITICA SUBVERSIVA ESTABLECIENDO MEJORES RELACIONES POSIBLES CON DELEGADOS OTROS PAISES ESPECIALMENTE CON LATINOAMERICANOS STOP ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES FUERON IMPARTIDAS DELEGACION PARTICIPO CONFERENCIA CAFE CELEBRADA ELSALVADOR DONDE CUBA PODIA CONCURRIR POR MANTENER ELE ASIGNADA UNA CUOTA 194,000 SACOS CAFE PESAR HACER AÑOS CUBA CARECE ESE PRODUCTO PARA EXPORTACION REVELO HOY RAUL VOLTA LANDA QUIEN HASTA HACE POCOS DIAS ERA CONSEJERO COMERCIAL EMBAJADA CUBA LONDRES AND REPRESENTANTE GOBIERNO CASTRO ANTE ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES AZUCAR CAFE AND TRIGO AND DELEGADO OBSERVADOR ANTE GRUPO INTERNACIONAL DELA LANA STOP CONFERENCIA PRENSA CELEBRADA AQUI VOLTA ASEGURO QUOTE ECONOMICAMENTE REGIMEN COMUNISTA CASTRO ESTA LLEGANDO CLIMAX DESPUES SUFRIR UN FRACASO ECONOMICO TRAS OTRO UNQUOTE VATICINANDO [redacted] PARA [redacted] AÑO VENIDERO NUEVO FRACASO [redacted] PRODUCCION AZUCAR QUE REGIMEN CUBANO DIJO [redacted] INDICO HOY AL ANUNCIAR INICIO ZAFRA ESTA ALCANZARIA SIETE MILLONES TONELADAS STOP SIGUE ARROYO

21 NW 9na ave.
FR 9-8261

100

SC Att. #6 UFGA-26348

economic intelligence report

FROM THE U.R. ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU

MOVMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

MAILING ADDRESS
Box 3940
Miami, Florida
PHONE:
373 - 8033

VOL. II No. 4

On November 22, 1966, Mr. Raúl VOLTA Landa met with representatives of the press in Miami in order to discuss Cuban trade problems abroad and Cuban economic problems within. The ERB has felt that Mr. Volta's information will be of interest to all our readers, so therefore this issue of the Economic Intelligence Report contains the verbatim account of Mr. Volta's words.

STATEMENT

My name is Raúl VOLTA Landa, and until a few days ago I held the posts of Trade Counselor to the Cuban Embassy in London, Representative to the International Sugar Council, Representative to the International Coffee Organization, to the International Wheat Council, and Observer-Delegate to the International Wool Group.

On November 14th my wife and I were interviewed by the press in New York at which time we discussed the reasons that prompted our defection. The results of this conference have appeared in the press and therefore today I would like to discuss in some detail economic problems confronting Cuba today with which I am personally familiar and which, I hope, will be of interest to you gentlemen. In an effort to be brief and not take too much of your time, my friends here have been kind enough to reproduce some technical and detailed information on the following subjects: sugar, tobacco, the problem of convertible currency, problems with the lobster exports, and usurpation of registered trade marks. There is also attached a resumé of positions held since 1955.

From the economic point of view Castro's communist régime is well on the road to reaching a climax after having suffered one economic set-back after another. Today Cuba's leading cash crop, sugar, can be termed a failure in the sense that due to a number of factors and particularly mismanagement in Cuba plus the low world price, it is unable to support the Cuban economy. The second most important cash crop, tobacco, similarly has been so mismanaged that today it is an unimportant earner of critically needed foreign exchange.

This economic chaos has forced the Cuban régime to increasingly desperate measures in order merely to survive. For example, meat, tobacco, eggs, fruit, vegetables, coffee, preserves, and shoes are some of the products that today are exported from Cuba in an attempt to earn the hard currency to purchase heavy machinery, locomotives, fishing boats, and all the rest necessary to maintain any semblance of an economy. An unfortunate result of this is that today there is a serious shortage of the proper foods throughout all of Cuba. There is rationing. The people have insufficient rice. Even citrus fruits have had to be rationed. Milk is in critically short supply. There are not enough shoes to go around. Coffee, long considered a necessity by the people, is sometimes unobtainable and is always in short supply. Our beer, famous for years, is now hardly drinkable when it is available. These problems, which before the communist régime were totally unknown to Cuba, were brought painfully home to me each time I returned to Havana from my post in London.

S/c att. 6 UFGA-26348   19-120-26

For example, I was in Havana in July after hurricane Alma hit Western Cuba last June, a number of buildings and houses had to be repaired all over the city of Havana. Debris from demolitions and subsequent constructions was piled on the streets. Time passed, but the streets were still full of debris that gave the city the looks of a bomber target. This caused considerable disgust among the population of Havana.

Another example is that the food quota on the ration book is largely a "paper" reality. What I mean is that the food on the book is rarely available, and whole months pass without any meat, lard, oil, rice, beans, being distributed. At this precise time, in Havana, there are no seasoning ingredients available to the consumer. When the product is available again, the meager book quota is what each one gets, without any compensation for the time during which he could not even get that.

As a result of this, queues are longer every day, with people standing in line since the early morning hours to make sure that they won't be left out. There are often fights and even minor riots at the queues on account of the irritation that this situation causes.

Also I have seen that the régime is opening many new restaurants, allegedly to make recreation facilities available to the people. In reality, however, what they seek is to extract money from circulation, as the prices at these new places are extraordinarily high. Hence, only the members of the ruling "new class" may enjoy the new spots, as the working people could never afford them.

I will be happy to attempt to answer any questions that you may have regarding those areas of life or of events in Cuba today with which I am familiar.

Thank you.

SUGAR

As the Cuban representative to the International Sugar Council I was able to observe at first hand some of the problems facing the Cuban sugar industry. Some observations follow:

International Aspect:

It is well known that all countries that import or produce sugar are making efforts towards reaching a long-term Sugar Agreement that would stabilize and solve the critical situation in the world market of over-supply and low price. Castro's stand to that respect has been to boycott and undermine such efforts.

This has been clearly reflected in Castro's refusal to participate in the various work groups that have been created for that purpose under the sponsorship of the Secretary General of UNCTAD, Dr. Raúl Prebish.

Castro believes that by not participating in efforts to reach a Sugar Agreement he can cause the collapse of the sugar industries in the less efficient producer countries in order to bring economic hardship to those countries in Latin America to which sugar exports are important. Castro's ultimate end, of course, is to cause internal disturbances in these countries and thus to ripen them for Castro-communist subversion. This has been a boomerang to Cuba. The hoped-for economic disaster in the Latin American nations has not occured. Instead, it is occurring in Cuba. The régime is unable to meet its announced goals (the goal for the sugar year 1966 was 6,500,000 tons whereas 4,455,255 were actually harvested). To move its sugar, Cuba has been forced to grant special discounts, for example to Japan, and to Great Britain. This further compounds the chaotic economic situation in Cuba as the country obtains even less per pound that the current low price of .014 ¢.

Internal Aspect:

The blows received by Cuba's sugar economy from the hurricanes and droughts are nothing compared to the damage caused by the improvisation and incompetency of those who today mismanage our country's affairs. The shortage of manpower for cutting the cane, the enlistment of inexperienced "volunteer" cane cutters, the failure of combine machines from the USSR, and the deteriorating situation in the transportation of the cane crown the existing economic anarchy.

The régime has been committed by Castro to produce 10,000,000 tons of sugar in 1970, which figure sugar economists in and out of Cuba agree is most unlikely. However, the attempt to reach this goal is resulting in activities that amount to economic suicide. Cuba is buying generators in England costing more than one million dollars which will be used to provide power for the "Centros de Acopio" (reception centers). The concept of these centers was tried many years ago in Cuba and discarded as both inefficient and uneconomical. There is no reason to believe that anything has happened that will change this. So, what to do with the generators?

One might conclude a discussion of Cuba's sugar problems with the observation that never before in Cuba's economic history has so much discussion, so many speeches, and so much activity resulted in such a loss of effectiveness.

TOBACCO

I was associated with the tobacco exporting enterprise (Empresa CUBATABACO) for four years including three years as Assistant Manager. I am happy to make my first hand knowledge available.

Agricultural Aspect.-

This industry is another example of the administrative clumsiness of the Communists. Once the second industry of Cuba, and the source of great prestige for our country, it seems to be doomed to total destruction since the Communist régime took control of it.

Leaf tobacco production has declined by over 30% comparing the 1965 figure (32,000 M.T.) with the traditional production of over 45,000 M.T. yearly. The best tobacco fields of the famed Vuelta Abajo zone, which gave the best wrapper in the world, have experienced a sharp decline of over 70% in yield and quality, due to lack of fertilizers and the necessary care.

About 20% of the plantations are affected by the bug, as the fields and curing sheds are not sprayed. The INRA policy of very low prices paid and lack of incentives given to the most efficient producers has forced the producers to divert their lands to less risky and more profitable crops. This is particularly true of the Remedios and Cabaiguán zones. Peasants trained in tobacco growing have been absorbed by cane growing areas in order to remedy the critical manpower situation in the latter, but at the expense of inflicting grave damage to the tobacco economy. This has brought the incorporation of "volunteer" workers to the cropping of the leaf, which workers, due to their inexperience in such a specialized work, break the leaf, with the resulting damage to its quality.

Industrial Aspect.-

The industrial phase of the tobacco industry has not been better off, and in our opinion it has been the one that has suffered most from the incompetency of the régime. The quality, presentation, and production volume of Cuban cigars has been seriously affected, not only as far as production for national consumption is concerned, but also as regards the portion designed for export. It would be endless to list the wrongs that have been done, but they may be outlined thus:

1) Loss of quality due to the use of raw leaf tobacco and without the necessary aging.

2) Failure to deliver to foreign customers due to the lack of intermediate materials to finish the product, such as: aluminum tubes for packaging these cigars, aluminum cases, holders, rings, cedar boxes, etc.

3) Continuous complaints are received from foreign importers, due to the detection of high percentage of wormed cigars.

4) The traditional blends that gave character to each of the traditional brands have been changed and altered, which has resulted in the imaginable loss of quality and prestige.

5) Incorporation of inexperienced personnel to the preparation of "Alta Regalia", (top-quality, hand made) cigars, which affects the finish of the handicrafting cigars with the result that undersized, oversized, or too heavy cigars are produced.

These and many other irregularities take place today in our industry, without failing to mention that the climax of all this situation is caused by the lack of cigars for national consumption, something definitely unprecedented in the history of our country.

Trade Aspects.-

The Cuban Communist régime faces great difficulties in its efforts to make dollars through tobacco exports, and some of them have been pointed out already.

Nevertheless, I believe that the chief trouble is represented by the market limitations suffered by Cuban tobacco today. Castro has been unable to convince his Iron Curtain "friends" to purchase the volume that was formerly absorbed by the U.S.. He has only persuaded the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany to buy a total of approximately 5,000 M.T. The truth, however, is that these exports have been made with distrust, as there have been reports that Cuba's "friends", after buying this tobacco, re-export it to hard-currency countries at lower prices than those established by the "Empresa CUBATABACO" for the free world market.

I may cite a specific instance of this. Late in 1962, the Polish enterprise ROLIMPEX bought approximately 600 tons of tobacco. The contract specifically prohibited re-exportation by the Poles, and provided that any legal difficulties that might arise would be submitted for arbitration. After the deliveries were made to ROLIMPEX, reports began to arrive from the Free European market that Cuban tobacco leaf was being offered at a much lower price than that established by the Cuban exporting enterprise in its sale of tobacco to Free Europe. At first, it was thought that this was only a maneuver for lower prices by the European importers, but, as time passed and CUBATABACO could not place any sales, the reports, which were still coming in, were given more credence. As a result of this, I was sent to conduct an on-the-spot investigation in Europe, and, sure enough, I discovered that the Poles were indeed re-exporting our tobacco, with complete disregard of their signed agreement with Cuba. The violation was reported to the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade, which instructed CUBATABACO to institute proceedings to recover damages from the Poles. Cuba sued for $1 million and the Poles, having being caught red-handed, offered a settlement of $50,000 which was accepted. The payment was made in dollars, out of the Polish-Cuban clearing.

This "international solidarity" practiced by Communist countries kept Cuba for a long time (1962-1963) from entering Western European markets.

Dumping as practiced by these countries, the lack of adequate stocks for the Europeans' taste, difficulties and delays in deliveries (due to shortage of ships) have made the Europeans shy away from buying larger quantities of Cuban leaf, and, many European importers have learned that Cuba is not a reliable source of supply.

Due to the above stated reasons, the Communist régime can barely place 2,000 M.T. in Western Europe, for an annual revenue of about US$1,500,000.

PROBLEMS WITH THE LOBSTER EXPORTS

Upon my arrival here I was surprised to learn the extent of the detailed information possessed by UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA and its Economic Research Bureau. This information is accurate and I am able to add more information to that known by the U.R.

Cuba had been exporting lobster through Sam Beiner, of the Montreal firm "World Seafood Distributors". These exports were made by the Cuban concern ALIMPEX to "World Seafood", and the latter re-exported the lobster to European firms such as the Belgian "Hallewick" and the British "Young Seafood".

When ALIMPEX was replaced by CUBAEXPORT, the new Cuban concern tried to grab the European lobster market from Beiner and his Canadian firm. This was the objective for which CUBAEXPORT Director Rodolfo Shening was working during a recent European tour, and, to this end, he made contact with the British firm "Young Seafood", the French firm "Jacques Fourchtein et Cie.", and others in Western Europe. CUBAEXPORT was to a large extent successful in this effort to cut out Beiner.

The troubles of CUBAEXPORT and of all other Cuban foreign trade enterprises with free-world firms are due to the fact that Cuban concerns have no respect for international trade ethics. They take recourse to all sorts of maneuvers, as selling is their only concern; this in the long run alienates customers. In the case of the lobster exports lack of quality has been apparent. Through my office in London I learned of complaints of improper cooking, packing, and even crating of lobster exported to France, Poland, and England. Hundreds of cases have been rejected by health and customs authorities and by the importers themselves. The problems Beiner has encountered in Canada have been duplicated in Europe.

Naturally, the poor quality of the lobster has been the cause of probes by Canadian, French and British health authorities. Even the authorities of Communist countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia have been forced to look into the matter. These countries have returned lobster to Cuba as "unfit for human consumption". This merchandise, however, was subsequently placed in the Cuban domestic market, a practice that has been followed not only with the lobster, but also with all other exports that have been turned down by Cuba's customers abroad.

Perhaps less serious cases, but which also illustrate the régime's contempt for the Cuban people, are good instances of this policy. I refer to products which, although not quite unfit for human consumption, do not meet foreign quality standards, such as fruit preserves that have been turned down abroad because of their excessively high contents of sugar, and rum that was returned because of impurities. These items were retailed to the Cuban people after being rejected abroad.

There also are complaints about the presentation of the product and the packing, all of which has caused stern protests by the affected free-world firms, such as "Jacques Fourchtein et Cie.", which complained to ALIMPEX last year and to CUBAEXPORT this year.

USURPATION OF REGISTERED TRADE MARKS

As is known, the Castro régime, after monopolizing foreign trade and seizing private industries, arbitrarily decreed that all Cuban trade-marks had become the property of the government. However, with the lawful owners of these trade-marks scattered as exiles over the free world, Castro has met considerable legal difficulties in using the stolen brand names for his exports. Abroad, Castro has been unsuccessful, in most cases, in assigning these trade-marks to the régime's export enterprises, as, in most countries, the brands are registered in the names of their lawful owners.

Thus Castro violates international trade-mark regulations. This situation is particularly true with respect to the world-famous trade-marks of Cuban cigars. One of the best-known cases is the continued exportation of cigars bearing the "La Corona" and "Henry Clay" brands, which are the property of the American Tobacco Company. This firm was forced to take direct action in England, France, and Switzerland, countries to which Castro has had to halt exports.

Another example is the much-debated case of the "BACARDI" brand, which is now being contested and which will be brought before the courts of Great Britain by February or March next year.

In 1963, British authorities seized a shipment of Bacardi rum which was recently returned to Cuba, and, therefore, the régime has been unable to export this brand to England. The régime faces similar problems with Canada and Japan.

The first complications rising from this case took place right in Cuba, where there were even dismissals in juridical Direction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade early this year. Presently, Cuba is facing the following difficulties in this case:

1) Legal contradictions due to Cuba's very laws of expropriations and to the perennial "reorganizations" and "creations" of Cuban foreign trade concerns.

2) Restricted opportunities for the Cuban régime to present witnesses, as it fears that such witnesses will take the chance to defect.

3) Troubles between the Cuban régime and the very solicitor of the London "Seifert and Seddeley" case.

4) Financial limitations, as the Cuban régime has only US$ 42,000 to finance the expenses of the case through the London law firm "Clark Russel".

NAME: Raúl VOLTA Landa   Married, three children   **Age:** 35

Professional Information

1.- 1966: Cuban Representative in the International Sugar Council, International Wheat Council, International Coffee Organization; Observer-Delegate to the International Wool Group.

2.- 1965-1966: Trade Counselor to the Cuban Embassy in London. August-December 1965: Cuban Chargé D'Affaires in London.

3.- 1964: Member of the Trade Delegation to Spain. Tobacco Advisor.

4.- 1962: Member of the Trade Delegation to Spain. Tobacco Advisor.

5.- 1962-1965: Operative Assistant Manager, "Empresa CUBATABACO".

6.- 1961: Chief of the Leaf Tobacco Section of the "Empresa Cubana de Exportaciones".

7.- 1958-1960: Sales Manager "Minemar Televisión Co." and "Fedders".

8.- 1956: Sales Manager, Electronic Dept., "Electro Sales Co." (Sylvania)

U.R. Economic Research Bureau
10 S.E. 9th Street,
Miami, Fla., U.S.A.

Miami, Fla., November 25, 1966.-

14-00000

C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Bogota

INFO.
Chief, WH; Chief, FE; COS, Tokyo

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC AMSCROLL
Letter from Jose R. Mercado

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

On 15 October Jose R. Mercado, President of the Colombian Confederation of Workers (CTC), discussed with AMWORD-3, the Secretary General of AMSCROLL, the CTC's plans to do what it can to discourage Japan-Cuba trade by bringing influence to bear on the trade seminar in Tokyo that was to have begun on 19 October. Upon his return to Bogota, Sr. Mercado wrote a letter to the Japanese Ambassador to Colombia, a copy of which we forward together with a translation.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

Attachments: h/w
1. Letter (copy) as stated
2. Translation of letter

Distribution:
3- COS/Bogota, w/atts. h/w
②- C/FE, w/atts. h/w [illegible]
2- COS/Tokyo, w/atts. h/w
2- C/WH, w/atts. h/w
2- WH/C, w/o atts.

CS COPY

2att-

DATE TYPED 26 Oct 66	DATE DISPATCHED OCT 28 1966
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-26277	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26 19-120-26/3	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

UFGA - 26277

CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA

PERSONERIA JURIDICA NO. 271 DE 1937 FILIAL DE C.I.O.S.L. - O.R.I.T.

Bogotá, D.E. Octubre 17/66

Señor
EMBAJADOR DEL JAPON
EN COLOMBIA
E. S. D.

Excelentísimo señor Embajador:

Con ocasión a que durante los días 19 y 21 del presente mes se realizará un Seminario de Comercio en la ciudad de Toquio, con la participación de algunos países de América Latina, la CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA C.T.C., quiere reiterar por su conducto al Gobierno Democrático del Japón la solicitud que en otras ocasiones hemos formulado referente a que cese lo más pronto posible el permanente comercio con su país, el Japón, tiene establecido con el régimen Comunista de Cuba, al considerar que las divisas con el Gobierno de Cuba logra que la venta de sus productos, es utilizada para financiar la subversión y el terrorismo de la América Latina.

Nuestra solicitud la formulamos con miras a salvaguardiar los intereses del Sindicalismo Libre y Democrático y la integridad institucional de nuestro país, ya que Colombia como otros países de América está comprendida dentro del programa de infiltraciones que desde Cuba ha planificado el Gobierno Internacional, como lo confirmó el Periódico " EL TIEMPO " en uno de sus editoriales del 12 de Octubre.

Insistimos en hacer ésta petición porque consideramos que al continuar el Japón comerciando con Cuba Comunista, es tanto como contribuír a sostener un régimen en América que ha terminado con las libertades democráticas, ha fomentado el asesinato en masa y el encarcelamiento de Millares de Dirigentes y Trabajadores Demócratas. Al continuar ésta situación nos veríamos en la obligación de organizar con otros países de América el boicot a todos los productos japoneses como lo hemos hecho con los Barcos de los países que están negociando con Cuba.

En espera de sus gratas noticias nos suscribimos de Ud. atentamente.

CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA C.T.C.

[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
SECRETARIO GENERAL DE LA C.T.C.

APARTADO AEREO 10544 - TELEGRAFO Y CABLES (CETECE) BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

CS COPY

UFGA - 26277

19-120-26

att. # 2 - UFGA-26277

Bogotá, D.E., October 17, 1966

Excmo. Sr.
Embajador del Japon
En Colombia
E. S. D.

Excellence:

On account of the forthcoming Trade Seminar that will take place from the [illegible] to the 21st of this month in the City of Tokyo, with the participation of some Latin American countries, the CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF COLOMBIA, CTC, wishes to reiterate through you, to the Democratic Government of Japan, the request we have formulated in other ocasions, referent to the condition of the permanent trade that Japan has established with the Cuban Communist regime, considering that the currency obtained from the selling of your products is used by the Government of Cuba to finance the subversion and terrorism in Latin America.

We formulate our request in the hope of saving the interests of the Free and Democratic workers and the institutional integrity of our country, since Colombia, the same as other American countries, form part of the infiltration program that has been planned from Cuba by the International Government, as was confirmed in the newspaper "El Tiempo" in one of its editorials of October 12.

We insist in this petition because we consider that if Japan continues its trade with Communist Cuba, it would be the same as to contribute to the support of a regime in America which has put an end to the democratic freedom, has promoted the mass murder and the imprisonment of thousands of democratic leaders and workers. If this situation persist, we would be forced to organize, together with other countries of America, the boycott to all Japanese products as we have done with the ships of those countries that are holding trade with Cuba.

Hoping to hear from you soon, we remain,

Sincerely yours,

JOSE B. MERCADO
PRESIDENT

EUGENIO MOLINA BARRIOS
SECRETARY GENERAL IN CHARGE

CS COPY

Att 2 UFGA-26277

19-120-26

Amscroll
10483

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
Quarterly Progress Reports Concerning Political Action Programs

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

2F

1. Forwarded herewith are Progress Reports for the First Quarter of FY 67 concerning eight Political Action programs of the Station; these programs are listed under the Covert Action sector of the FY 67 budget:

AMSCROLL
AMCROW
AMBASAL
AMLIRA
AMSTRUT
AMWASP
AMKNOT
AMMOP

MICROFILMED
NOV 2 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2. The first quarter of FY 67 was a period of readjustment in the political action field, all of the above programs having been reduced in size and cost in the last quarter of FY 66. That the PW Branch has succeeded in reaching the initial projected goals with respect to economy of political action operations in FY 67 is demonstrated by the following tabulation of expenses:

Program	Projected 1st Quarter Cost	Actual 1st Quarter Cost
AMSCROLL	36,750	33,873
AMCROW	3,750	6,077
AMBASAL	11,500	12,226
AMLIRA	16,250	16,434
AMSTRUT	24,000	16,185
AMWASP	6,000	4,228
AMKNOT	3,000	1,986
AMMOP	3,750	2,225
Total	105,000	93,234

Attachment: h/w
Progress Reports, w/IDENS U/S/C(4pieces)
D-19-126-34/3

Distribution:
2 -WH/C, w/att.

2 all

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D-19-126-42/3
D-19-126-44/3
D-19-6-36/3
D-[illegible]-[illegible]-16/3

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
27 OCT 66	27 OCT 66

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26303

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-126-26

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

3. In the second quarter the Station will continue its cost reduction action aimed at achieving a substantial reduction in Covert Action costs prior to the spring of 1967, and at reaching by the beginning of FY 68 a level of expenditure much below that projected for FY 67.

Philip G. ELMARD

SECRET

20P

MEMORANDUM

19 October 1966

WPW-1207

TO : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM : PW/MARCHBANK

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMSCROLL Progress Report,
1 July - 30 September 1966

Distribution
4-COS
1-PW/MARCHBANK
1-PW/Chrono
1-REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. This quarter opened with an internal reorganization of AMSCROLL becoming effective. The reorganization had been undertaken in the interests of efficiency and economy. The Departments of Labor, Women, Foreign Affairs, Coordination, and Youth were abolished. This action got rid of largely ineffective people who had been receiving salaries and will prevent dissipation of AMSCROLL funds and energies. The new, stream-lined organization is better able to concentrate upon the field it knows best: economic action. With its present staff it is also able to undertake action in political, youth, and the other fields should this be desirable.

2. The major activities of AMSCROLL during this quarter fell into four categories. They are economic activities, Free World shipping to Cuba, dissemination of propaganda, and the AMSCROLL radio program.

a. In the economic field AMSCROLL continued its analysis of the 1966 sugar harvest that officially ended at 11:00 p.m. of 27 June--though wind-up activities continued into this quarter. The point of the post-mortem was to publicize why Cuba fell so far short (2,044,745 tons) of its announced goal of 6,500,000 tons, which goal was set by Castro in his May Day, 1965 speech. Sources of information were the daily production figures of Radio Havana; analyses conducted by other experts such as F. O. Licht, Czarnikow-Rionda, the Merrill Lynch Weekly Sugar Letter, etc.; information the Station was able to pass; and the background of such experts as AMSNAKE-1, AMRAIN-1, and AMWASP-1. The Station has seen stories based upon these releases in the Miami Herald; the Miami News; the Economic Intelligence Unit, a London publication; Alerta, a publication in Guatemala; the American Marine Engineer; the Times of America; and Diario Las Americas. In addition appropriate Station assets such as AMHIM replay much of this information. The point of this was to demonstrate to Free World commercial circles and to the Cuban radio audience that Cuban economic promises are not reliable and hence that Cuba is an unreliable nation with which to trade. In support of this theme this quarter also marked the beginning of the campaign

GROUP I: EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

CS COPY

SECRET

MICROFILMED
NOV 2 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Att. 1 UFGA-26302

19 [illegible] 6

against Cuban lobsters that are being sold in Canada and Europe. The first public surfacing known to the Station of this study was a story that appeared in the Miami News on 29 September. This story was prepared from an AMSCROLL press release that was mailed to the AMSCROLL list of business people, bankers, and traders in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. In addition, the local AFP correspondent filed a story based upon this release.

Also during this quarter AMSCROLL released other studies of an economic nature on such subjects as Cuban trade with Spain, the status of the Cuban oil industry, and the failure of mechanization of the Cuban sugar industry. The bases of these studies were provided by the Station, often from information provided by qualified refugees arriving via the air lift. In other cases, AMSCROLL personnel--particularly AMFRAME-1--would interview some of these refugees.

b. A continuing effort was made during the quarter to publicize Free World shipping with Cuba. Each month a list is compiled by the Station of those ships from the Free World that visited Cuba during the previous month which is passed to AMSCROLL for release to the press. In addition, a special study was made regarding the Greek firm Franco Shipping Company. The wire services regularly carry this information and 27 published stories on this subject in U.S., Canadian, and English publications came to the Station's attention during this period.

c. During this period 16,000 pieces of printed material were mailed to Cuba. This included 7,500 copies of AMSCROLL's miniature newspaper which contained condensed stories of such items as Castro's 26th of July Speech, quotations from earlier Castro speeches making promises that were not kept, the sugar deficit, and defections of Cuban seamen. Also, 7,500 copies were mailed to Cuba of a notice that publicizes the AMSCROLL radio program and which requests readers of the miniature newspaper to leave it in public places for others to read. AMSCROLL still has a supply of the soap sheets which carries an imprinted message for the recipients not to lose hope. One thousand of these were mailed to Cuba and we anticipate continuing mailings until the supply of these soap sheets is exhausted. About 4,350 copies of the economic studies described in 2.a. above were mailed to a carefully compiled list of banks, business firms, etc. in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. About 1,600 copies of these releases translated into Spanish were also distributed.

d. The AMSCROLL radio program is on the air over AMTHIGH for ten minutes each day of the week except Sunday. This program is increasingly addressing itself to the economic failure of communism in Cuba, the economic failure of Cuba abroad, and to the increasing political and economic isolation of Cuba from both the

Free and Communist worlds. To these ends, prominence was given to problems with the sugar crop, statements prepared especially for AMSCROLL by such defectors as AMBRAY-1, AMBINGO-1, and selected defectors from the Cuban merchant marine. The program ran a series of quotations from earlier Castro speeches that were pitted against official government statistics of a current nature that gave the lie to Castro's earlier promises. Also, the program sought to exploit such specific items as selling Cuban beef to Spain which increased the shortage in Cuba, sending medical equipment and drugs to the Congo though these are desperately needed in Cuba, etc.. During this period the program received 11 letters from Cuban listeners as follows: July, 2; August, 4; and September, 5. With one exception these letters were favorable in their response. As in the past AMSCROLL continued to front for AMSHADY-1's radio program over JMHOPE and AMTUMOR. Also, AMSCROLL continued to front for a musical program which it does not produce.

B. ADMINISTRATION

3. The amount budgeted for the quarter under review was $36,750.00; whereas, $33,873.00 was spent. Of this amount $11,217.00 was for salaries and $22,656.00 for operational expenses which included office maintenance. A determined and successful effort has been made to keep actual expenses under the budgeted amount. Important to this was the reorganization described in A.1. above which in salaries alone amounted to a monthly reduction of $1,200.00. Operational and housekeeping expenses have also been reduced over previous months with, the Station believes, an improved operational result.

C. PROBLEMS

4. The Station believes that it has overcome a source of potential trouble by pressing the reorganization of AMSCROLL that became effective 1 July in that persons who in the past had been trouble makers were eased out. The only remaining problem is the ever-present one of AMFRAME-1 who is capable of earning considerably more than the Station is paying. As an intelligent, aggressive person with a growing family he will sooner or later have to face up to this personal problem of his. He prefers to remain in the work he is now doing for WOFACT which, coupled with a recent salary increase to $450.00 a month should combine to retain him at least for the near future. His wife has recently received an impressive monetary prize of an academic nature and AMFRAME-1's family in Venezuela is currently supplementing his WOFACT pay, which factors also help.

D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER

5. Administratively we expect AMSCROLL to continue as reorganized and we are hopeful that we can effect additional

economies. Operationally the Station has these specific projects in mind which are in addition to the normal activities:

a. AMSCROLL will attempt to push further the Station-developed story of the spoiled Cuban lobster with the goal in mind of having it branded of dubious quality in Canada, France, and other countries.

b. The Station has begun its utilization of AMSCROLL to analyze the 1967 sugar harvest. As for the 1966 harvest, AMSCROLL's final projection of the results of the harvest was made on 23 May, some five weeks in advance of the 29 June official Cuban announcement. AMSCROLL predicted a harvest of 4,496,400 tons, only 41,145 tons over the actual figure. We know of no one who came this close. We have observed with interest how such forecasters as Merrill Lynch offered figures that came even closer to the AMSCROLL projections as the final harvest date approached. We hope to repeat this performance for the coming year.

c. At the close of this reporting period the Station began a campaign to discourage Japan-Cuban trade in favor of expanded Japanese trade with other Latin American nations. This campaign has the concurrence of Headquarters and Station Tokyo (DIRECTOR-36495 and TOKYO-9962). AMFRAME-1 and AMSNAKE-1 are being utilized to implement this campaign insofar as Latin American business organizations are concerned.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 0 TOTAL COPIES 50

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
Dissem By 25/4

ACTION
WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 2518072 CITE JMWAVE 3815

KINGSTON INFO DIRECTOR 26OC 20061

TYPIC AMSCROLL

1. ON 24 OCTOBER REV. HENRY MUIR, WHO SAID HE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED LIBERAL PARTY, CALLED UPON IDEN A WHO SECRETARY GENERAL OF AMSCROLL (IDEN B). MUIR ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE FOR HIS PARTY'S FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNIST FORCES IN JAMAICA. MUIR SAID HE FRIENDLY WITH CHIEF LNGOLD IN JAMAICA AND EXPLAINED HE HAS INSUFFICIENT "MEANS" FOR HIS PARTY. IDEN A RESPONDED THAT SMCROLL HARDLY HAS MEANS FOR ITS OWN EFFORTS AND THAT IT UNABLE RENDER SUPPORT OTHER GROUPS. IDEN A SHOWED MUIR AROUND AMSCROLL PREMISES AND GAVE HIM SAMPLES AMSCROLL PUBLICATIONS. MUIR EXPRESSED INTEREST IN AT LEAST ONE PUBLICATION AND SAID IN FUTURE HE WOULD LIKE ADDITONAL COPIES FOR DISTRIBUTION IN JAMAICA.

2. ON 25 OCTOBER MUIR TELEPHONED IDEN A TO ASK FOR "A FEW HUNDRED DOLLARS" TO FINANCE TRIP TO CALIFORNIA WHERE MUIR SAYS HE HAS JAMAICAN CONTACTS WHO WILL PROVIDE FUNDS IF MUIR CAN ONLY GET THERE. IDEN A DECLINED., MUIR SAID HE UNSUCCESSFUL RAISING FUNDS THUS FAR IN JMWAVE AREA AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 3815 S E C R E T

UNLESS HE HAS IMMEDIATE SUCCESS HE WILL RETURN JAMAICA 27 OCTOBER.

3. STATION PLANS NO FURTHER ACTION MUIR'S REQUESTS UNLESS ADDEES REQUEST OTHERWISE.

4. INDEX MUIR. NO JMWAVE TRACES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

~~FROM~~ Dissem by 30/A

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	FP—	5	MO
2		6	FI
3	CA	7	C
4	OS	8	D

S E C R E T 261809Z CITE JMWAVE 3816

KINGSTON INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSCROLL

26OCT 63 IN 26068

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3815 (IN 26061)

IDENTITY A. DR. MARIO SEIGLIE

IDENTITY B. UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

~~FROM~~

DISSEM BY 25/1

ACTION

WH/C 8

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 0 TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	MG
2		6	FI
3	SA	7	C
4	OS	8	D

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2

ACTION

26[illegible] 20061

S E C R E T 261807Z CITE JMWAVE 3815

KINGSTON INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSCROLL

1. ON 24 OCTOBER REV. HENRY MUIR, WHO SAID HE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED LIBERAL PARTY, CALLED UPON IDEN A WHO SECRETARY GENERAL OF AMSCROLL (IDEN B). MUIR ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE FOR HIS PARTY'S FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNIST FORCES IN JAMAICA. MUIR SAID HE FRIENDLY WITH CHIEF LNGOLD IN JAMAICA AND EXPLAINED HE HAS INSUFFICIENT "MEANS" FOR HIS PARTY. IDEN A RESPONDED THAT SMCROLL HARDLY HAS MEANS FOR ITS OWN EFFORTS AND THAT IT UNABLE RENDER SUPPORT OTHER GROUPS. IDEN A SHOWED MUIR AROUND AMSCROLL PREMISES AND GAVE HIM SAMPLES AMSCROLL PUBLICATIONS. MUIR EXPRESSED INTEREST IN AT LEAST ONE PUBLICATION AND SAID IN FUTURE HE WOULD LIKE ADDITONAL COPIES FOR DISTRIBUTION IN JAMAICA.

2. ON 25 OCTOBER MUIR TELEPHONED IDEN A TO ASK FOR "A FEW HUNDRED DOLLARS" TO FINANCE TRIF TO CALIFORNIA WHERE MUIR SAYS HE HAS JAMAICAN CONTACTS WHO WILL PROVIDE FUNDS IF MUIR CAN ONLY GET THERE. IDEN A DECLINED. MUIR SAID HE UNSUCCESSFUL RAISING FUNDS THUS FAR IN JMWAVE AREA AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 3815 S E C R E T

UNLESS HE HAS IMMEDIATE SUCCESS HE WILL RETURN JAMAICA 27 OCTOBER.

3. STATION PLANS NO FURTHER ACTION MUIR'S REQUESTS UNLESS ADDEES REQUEST OTHERWISE.

4. INDEX MUIR. NO JMWAVE TRACES.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO File amscroll/3

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

dissem by 23

CL IFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	RR
2		6	OS
3	CA	7	MO
4	EW	8	FHC

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY SD

INFO

FILE VR, EUR8, [illegible], CA2, CA/PROP, CI/IC2, [illegible]

ACTION

S E C R E T 071945Z CITE OTTAWA 3762

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR, PARIS

7 OCT 66 12409

TYPIC MHVIPER AMSCROLL

REF A JMWAVE 3352 (IN 68755)

B JMWAVE 3309 (IN 06419)

NO STATION TRACES BEINER OR WORLD SEAFOOD. SEARCH OF MONTREAL, OTTAWA, TORONTO, WINNIPEG DAILY NEWSPAPERS 26 SEPTEMBER THRU 6 OCTOBER HAS FAILED REVEAL ANY MENTION REF B STORY.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

C C ClWH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
[illegible]	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO
Chief, WH
Chief, WE

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/MHVIPER/AMSCROLL
C Cuban Lobster Sales

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paragraph 2.

REFERENCE: JMWAVE-3309

1. As indicated in the reference the AMSCROLL study on Cuban problems in marketing its lobsters in France and Canada as well as a clip of local press play were airmailed to the Paris Station on 29 September. The AFP account which was filed with its New York office is a much shorter and less complete version than the clip already airmailed you.

2. We are planning a follow-up story per Paragraph 3 of the reference and will very much appreciate being informed of any French reaction that may grow out of the AFP story or Station efforts. It would be particularly helpful if we could indicate that the French health authorities have found it necessary to inspect these shipments due to the inferior quality and improper cooking of the lobsters.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

Distribution:
3- COS/Paris
(2- C/WH
2- C/WE 2cc [illegible] E/F
2- WH/C

19-120-26

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE TYPED 3 Oct 66	DATE DISPATCHED OCT 5 1966
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-26099	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26/3	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

C C ①/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief of Station, Ottawa

INFO. Chief, WH

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT C TYPIC/MHVIPER/AMSCROLL
Cuban Lobster

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For COS, Ottawa to determine

REFERENCE: JMWAVE-3309

1. We forward by separate cover the AMSCROLL report, page 4 of which contains the study on Cuban-Canadian lobster trade discussed in the reference as well as a clip of the AMTAFFY-1 treatment of this study. It may be of interest to report that the mailing list routinely used for this and similar studies of this nature contains the following Canadian firms: Montreal Star; Canadian Intelligence Publications, P.O. Box 130, Flesherton, Ontario; Financial Times of Montreal; Financial Post, Toronto; Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Montreal; Canadian Press, a news agency located in Toronto; and the Ministry of Trade and Commerce.

2. As part of the follow-up play Station of course would appreciate any reaction from the Canadian press or other sources. We will particularly appreciate being informed if it comes to the attention of Station Ottawa that the health authorities inspect, condemn, or otherwise take any action on these shipments.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

Attachments: USC
1.Report
2.Clip

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
3- COS/Ottawa, w/atts. usc
2- C/WH, w/o atts.
2- WH/C, w/o atts.

CS COPY

19-120-26

DATE TYPED 30-Sep 66

DATE DISPATCHED OC. 5 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-26091

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26/3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO File Ingersoll
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP —	5	RA
2		6	HO
3	CA	7	CI
4	OS	8	FI-TC

FROM
DISSEM BY 33/22

ACTION
WH/C8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT EW TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, EUR8, DO4, DO/H3, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/IC2, ADDP

S E C R E T 051958Z CITE JMWAVE 3352

Swider
Cohen
Forsythe
Consales
Alvarez

OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR, PARIS

TYPIC MHVIPER AMSCROLL

REFERENCES: A. JMWAVE-3309 (IN 60419)
B. JMWAVE-3332 (IN 07355)
C. UFGA-26091 (30 SEPT)

3 Oct 66 IN 08755

1. NORTH AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ALLIANCE (NANA) WISHES DISTRIBUTE FEATURE ARTICLE BASED UPON AMTAFFY-1 STORY DESCRIBED REF A. PRIOR RELEASING ARTICLE NANA HAS ASKED AMTAFFY-1 CHECK FURTHER FOR MORE FACTS. IN ATTEMPTING THIS AMTAFFY-1 UNABLE REACH SAM BEINER THOUGH HAS SPOKEN TO MRS. BEINER AT REF B NUMBER WHO CONFIRMS BEINER HOME ALSO WORLD SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS' OFFICE. SHE SAYS BEINER NOT AVAILABLE. AS CONSEQUENCE BOTH NANA AND AMTAFFY-1 BELIEVE THEY ON TO BIG STORY AND NANA HAS DECIDED SIT ON MATERIAL IT NOW HAS UNTIL MORE BACKGROUND INFO ON BEINER, WORLD SEAFOOD, AND THEIR METHODS OF OPERATION CAN BE DEVELOPED.

2. REQUEST HQS AND OTTAWA TRACES BEINER AND WORLD SEAFOOD WITH INDICATION WHAT CAN BE PASSED AMTAFFY-1. FROM OTTAWA ALSO REQUEST ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON THIS SUBJECT,

SECRET

ESPECIALLY ANY OBSERVED LOCAL REACTION (REF C LISTS SEVEN CANADIAN FIRMS AND AGENCIES THAT RECEIVED ORIGINAL-AMSCROLL RELEASE ABOUT 23 SEPT WHICH MAY HAVE GENERATED CANADIAN PUBLICITY). THIS INFO WILL BE INCLUDED IN FOLLOW-UP STORY MENTIONED PARA 3 REF A. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS PLEASE DO NOT CHECK WITH LIAISON.

3. FOR PARIS: WILL BE HAPPY INCLUDE ANY ANGLE YOU PROVIDE RE JACQUES FOURCHTEIN & CIE, OR OTHERS THAT MAY BE DEALING IN CUBAN LOBSTERS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP —	5	MD
2		6	FI/TC
3	CA	7	6
4	EW	8	D

DISSEM BY 27/A

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, EUR 8, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3

30 SEP 66 IN 07286

SECRET 302025Z CITE OTTAWA 3739

IMMEDIATE JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR 3739

TYPIC MHVIPER AMSCROLL

REF JMWAVE 3320 (IN 07023)*

CHECK OF CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL REGISTERS, FRASERS TRADE DIRECTORY, DOMINION BUREAU OF STATISTICS COMPANY LISTINGS, FOOD PROCESSORS, SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS, PACKERS 1965-1966 AS WELL AS TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES INDICATE NO LISTING WORLD SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS. CHECK INCLUDED ALL ONTARIO AND QUEBEC.

SECRET

*REQUEST ADDRESS WORLD SEAFOOD DIST.

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE R TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP –	5	MO
2		6	FI/C
3	CA	7	C
4	EW	8	D

FROM
[illegible] 3-1M

ACTION
WH/C ~~8~~ ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VK, EUR 8, ADDP

S E C R E T 302212Z CITE JMWAVE 3332

OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

30 SEP 66 IN 07355

TYPIC MHVIPER AMSCROLL

REFERENCE: OTTAWA 3739 (IN 07986)

WORLD SEAFOOD OFFICE LOCATED IN MONTREAL HOME OF SAM GEINER WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF FIRM. TELEPHONE 748-7014.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

~~FROM~~ By 15

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	5	Eur
2		6	MO
3	CA	7	FI-TC
4	CI	8	C

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY D

INFO FILE, VR, ADDP, EUR 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DC/H 3

S E C R E T 301600Z CITE JMWAVE 3320

IMMEDIATE OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

30 SEP 66 IN 07023

TYPIC MHVIPER AMSCROLL

REFERENCE: WAVE-3309 (IN 05419)*

REQUEST BY IMMEDIATE CABLE EXACT BUSINESS ADDRESS WORLD SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE IN MONTREAL AREA OR POSSIBLY TORONTO. FYI MONTREAL TELEPHONE OPERATOR HAS INFORMED LOCAL NEWSPAPER ATTEMPTING TO CHECK REF STORY THAT THERE NO FIRM WITH THAT NAME IN MONTREAL.

S E C R E T

BT

*RE CUBAN SELLING OF LOBSTERS.

SECRET

14-00000

19-120-26

Fill
in roll

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP—	5	RI
2		6	IE
3	CA	7	MO
4	EU	8	FI

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, ADDP, EUR 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, DO 4, DO/H 3

SECRET 292327Z CITE JMWAVE 3309

29 Sept 66
IN 06479

DIRECTOR INFO OTTAWA, PARIS

TYPIC MHVIPER AMSCROLL

Snider
Cohen
Forsythe
Gonzalez
Alvarado

1. USING DISGUISED SENSITIVE SOURCE INFO AND OVERT DATA STATION PREPARED STUDY OF CUBAN MISADVENTURES IN SELLING TINNED AND FROZEN LOBSTERS TO WORLD SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS OF MONTREAL AND JACQUES FOURCHTEIN & CIE OF FRANCE. ARTICLE STRESSED LATE DELIVERIES, SHODDY CUBAN BUSINESS PRACTICES, IMPROPERLY COOKED MEAT, AND ENDED ON NOTE THAT LATEST SHIPMENT OF FROZEN LOBSTER TO WORLD SEAFOOD CONTAINED QUANTITY ROTTEN LOBSTER WHICH DISCOVERED ONLY AFTER SIX OR SEVEN HUNDRED CARTONS HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT CANADA.

2. STUDY RELEASED BY AMSCROLL 26 SEPT. AFP FILED STORY 26 SEPT AND AMTAFFY-1 PROVIDED EXCELLENT COVERAGE 29 SEPT. BELIEVE ADDITONAL PUBLICITY THESE FACTS ESPECIALLY ABROAD WILL FURTHER EXACERBATE AT LEAST CUBA/CANADA TRADE. RELEASE AND CLIP FORWARDED HQS. ALSO AIRMAILING PARIS, POUCHING OTTAWA.

3. FOLLOW-UP STORY IN PREPARATION.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP —	5	RN
2		6	RE
3	CA	7	MO
4	RW	8	FI

FROM

DISSEM BY 33 /M

ACTION WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY PM

INFO FILE, VR, EVR8, CA2, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H3, CI/IC2,

S E C R E T 292114Z CITE JMWAVE 3301 •

Swider

Cohen

Forsythe

Gonzalez

Alvarado

DIRECTOR

29 SEP 66 IN 06358

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 37778

1. AMSCROLL RADIO ON 21 SEPTEMBER REPORTED CUBAEXPORT WAS NEGOTIATING TO SELL CUBAN BEEF TO COMISARIA GENERAL IN TWO UNITS OF ONE THOUSAND TONS EACH. BROADCAST RECALLED DECEMBER SALE BEEF TO SPAIN WHICH UPON ARRIVAL WAS FOUND TO BE SHORT BY 135 PIECES. BROADCAST FOR 29 SEPTEMBER WILL UPDATE THIS REPORT USING INFO CONTAINED REF.

2. JMHOPE AND OTHER RADIO ASSETS WILL HIT THEME OF GOC EXPORTS OF MEAT WHILE CUBAN PEOPLE SUFFERING SEVERE SHORTAGE. WILL POINT OUT THAT HARD CURRENCY OBTAINED BY GOC IN TRADE WITH SPAIN AND OTHER FREE WORLD NATIONS USED BY GOC TO EXPORT SUBVERSION AND VIOLENCE ABROAD AND TO STRENGTHEN INTERNAL POLICE STATE MECHANISMS. THUS CUBANS LOSE BEEF AND GAIN MORE CONTROLS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED File Amscroll

1	EW	5	[illegible]
2		6	[illegible]
3	CA	7	[illegible]
4	FI-	8	CI

DISSEM BY 38

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, FE8, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, ADDP, CI/OA, CI/PS, CI/IC2

19 Sep 66 99102

S E C R E T 192151Z CITE JMWAVE 3106 (INGHURST ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO TOKYO

TYPIC MHVIPER

REFERENCE: TOKYO 9840 (IN 97101)

SUGGEST AMSCROLL THROUGH IDEN WRITE TRADE ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH IDEN IN CONTACT IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, COLOMBIA, MEXICO, AND PERU SUGGESTING THEY BRING PRESSURE THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO INCLUDE JAPAN-CUBA TRADE ITEM ON GROUNDS THIS TRADE PROVIDES CUBA WITH FUNDS FINANCE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES THESE COUNTRIES. PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

4-63 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF. TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 51

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	WH	5	RI
2		6	IO
3	CA	7	FI-TC
4	PP	8	CI

[redacted]

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION

WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, FE 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, ADDP, O/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 192151Z CITE JMWAVE 3107 (INGHURST ACTING) 19 SEP 65 [illegible] 99092

DIRECTOR INFO TOKYO

TYPIC MHVIPER

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3106 (IN 99102)

IDENTITY: MANAGEMENT BOYCOTT COMMITTEE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNNN

C/WH/C

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Kingston

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
C TYPIC/MHVIPER/AMSCROLL/Economic Intelligence Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: For Kingston to determine.

1. Per COS, Kingston's recent request we forward by separate cover twenty-five copies of the publication, Economic Intelligence Report. This is issued monthly in English and until we are informed otherwise we shall in the future forward twenty-five copies under a transmittal manifest. This publication is issued infrequently in Spanish; we shall forward five copies of these as they appear.

2. Station JMWAVE will appreciate any local reaction to this publication as well as suggestions for the inclusion of material that might be useful to a Kingston audience. As indicated by the edition being forwarded we attempt to keep the items in each Report factual on the grounds that in a publication of this nature facts constitute the best propaganda.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Attachment: usc
25 copies Report

Distribution:
3- COS/Kingston, w/atts. usc
2- C/WH, w/o atts.
2- WH/C, w/o atts.

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
7 Sep 66

DATE DISPATCHED
SEP 8 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-25925

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26
19-120-26

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO
Chief, European Division
Deputy Chief, WH/C

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
KEYWAY/PBRUMEN/MHVIPER - AMSCROLL Articles for Republication

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Act: For your infomration
Ref: UFGA-25559, 21 July 1966

1. Madrid Station appreciates the excellent support which JMWAVE Station has provided in referenced operation. It may be of interest that the publication of the articles cited in reference cost approximately $200.00

2. Through QUSPOT-2 Madrid Station made contact with Identity in an effort to establish on outlet for the publication of economic reports concerning Spain and PBRUMEN. It was agreed with the directors of Identity that the articles would be paid for at the same rate as paid advertisements; however they would appear as exclusive reports of Identity and bear no resemblance to a paid advertisement. Because of various legal ramifications, Identity agreed to publish only those articles which were signed.

3. QUSPOT-2's approach to Identity was made ostensibly under the auspices of a PBRUMEN exile group with whom he said he was affiliated, the headquarters of which are ostensibly in the JMWAVE area. It was agreed that the JMWAVE exile group would furnish the material directly to Identity, with a copy to QUSPOT-2, who, after receipt of the article, would then approach the directors of Identity to ascertain the price of the article and push for its publication. In this regard Madrid would appreciate continuing with this practice for the mailing of articles intended for publication (with a copy pouched to Madrid) as was established.

Attachment: UNDER SEPARATE COVER
Identity

(continued)

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 18-8-66

Distribution:
2-COS, JMWAVE, w/att, USC
2-C/EUR, w/att, USC
1-DC/WH/C, w/att, USC

Group I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

19-120-26

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA-21648	10 August 1966
1 att	CLASSIFICATION SECRET CS COPY	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26/3

4. With a view toward economy it should be noted that Madrid Station took the liberty of excluding some of the material which was included in the first report. We suggest that the reports be limited to one or two pages if feasible. In this manner we feel we will have a better chance at publication.

5. In the last several issues Identity has published various articles of a favorable nature towards the PBRUMEN economy. Station has reason to believe the primary purpose of the favorable articles is that the director of Identity is attempting to ingratiate himself with the PBRUMEN Government so that he will be well received by PBRUMEN officials if the Spanish Government nominates him as the Spanish commercial representative to PBRUMEN.

Leslie H. HENDRIQUE

SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER to
OSMA-21648, 10 Aug 66

Identity - "3E, Economia Espanola y Exterior"

SECRET

S/c att OSMA-21648

CS COPY

19-120-26

C/WE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Madrid

INFO.
Chief, WE; Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT KEYWAY/PBRUMEN/MHVIPER
O AMSCROLL Article for Republication

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

1. A result of QUSPOT-2's recent holiday in the JMWAVE area has been to establish a correspondence between him and AMFRAME-1, the signer of the Suplemento Especial of the AMSCROLL Economic Bureau, a copy of which is forwarded by separate cover. QUSPOT-2 has indicated that he could use AMSCROLL economic studies and that he could arrange for publication of at least some of these in Identity A. He suggested that the original of such publications be sent to Identity B with a copy to him. This was done in the case of a recent economic report which was shortly thereafter published in Identity A. QUSPOT-2 airmailed this story to AMFRAME-1 which arrived at about the same time as the copy the Madrid Station airmailed to the JMWAVE overt address.

2. We wish that the article being forwarded by separate cover also be surfaced in Identity A. The original has been airmailed to Identity B with a copy to QUSPOT-2 per QUSPOT-2's suggestion. JMWAVE feels that this is a useful mechanism and unless advised to the contrary we propose to forward additional AMSCROLL studies to Identity B for publication in Identity A. Should Madrid prefer we, of course, can in the future forward such articles directly to the Station for placement instead of airmailing them to Identity B.

3. Studies similar to the one being forwarded are regularly prepared in English on a number of economic subjects. They are distributed to shipping firms, certain banks engaged in international commerce, international trade organizations, international commodity houses, etc. They are translated into Spanish solely for use in Identity A; thus, in this sense, these reports are an "exclusive".

Attachments: usc
1. AMSCROLL Article
2. Identity Sheet (usc)

PHILIP G. ELMARD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
3- COS/Madrid, w/atts. usc - To OUT Pouch
2- C/WE, w/atts. usc
2- WH/C, w/atts. usc
2cc [illegible] w/sca(2)

2att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

19-120-26

DATE TYPED
18 July 66

DATE DISPATCHED
21 July 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-25559

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

SC Att. #1
UFGA 25559

economic intelligence report
FROM THE U.R. ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFFICE:
10 S.E. 9 St.
MAILING ADDRESS
Box 3940
Miami, Florida
PHONE:
373 - 8033

VOL. I No. 11-A (Suplemento Especial)

EXCLUSIVO PARA EL BURO DE INVESTIGACIONES ECONOMICAS DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA.-

LA CALIDAD ACTUAL DEL AZUCAR CUBANO

Por el Ingeniero Raúl Esparza Tabares
ex-Director de Investigaciones Tecnológicas del Ministerio del Azúcar (MINAZ) de Cuba Comunista

Este breve análisis de la calidad actual del azúcar cubano va dirigido tanto al perito en azúcares (como paso inicial de lo que podría convertirse en un estudio mas técnico y exhaustivo) como al lector ordinario, toda vez que, en Cuba, el azúcar es casi sinónimo de prosperidad económica, y así, la calidad del azúcar desempeña un papel de gran importancia en la situación económica global del país (1).

Sin mas comentarios o notas de introducción, ofrecemos a continuación el análisis de la calidad actual del azúcar cubano:

1.- Materias Extrañas:

a) Azúcar crudo: La industria azucarera cubana se caracterizaba por recibir para su procesamiento, la mejor calidad de caña de azúcar en cuanto a su contenido de materias extrañas (menos del 3%). Actualmente y por causa de los trabajadores " voluntarios" por un lado y por otro a la mecanización de la cosecha de la caña, las materias extrañas que acompañan a la caña al llegar al Central para su procesamiento ha aumentado al 8% en el caso de los voluntarios y al 19% en el caso de las máquinas de cortar caña soviéticas. Es de señalarse que dentro de la composición de estas materias extrañas está incluída la tierra, y como quiera que las tierras de Cuba tienen en su composición un alto contenido de arcillas, estas son muy difíciles de eliminar en el proceso tecnológico de purificación y afectan grandemente la calidad del azúcar crudo.

b) Azúcar Refino: Las materias extrañas, principalmente arcillas de las tierras llegan hasta el azúcar refino dándole color al mismo y dejando residuos insolubles al ser disueltas esta azúcar. Esto disminuye la calidad del azúcar refino no solamente para el consumo humano directo, sino que ocasiona graves perjuicios en los industrias de alimentos que utilizan el azúcar refino. Lo mismo sucede con las industrias de refrescos.

(1) No es necesario ensalzar la calidad del azúcar cubano que producía antes de Castro, ya que su prestigio en el mercado mundial es un hecho de sobra conocido. Lo mismo puede decirse de los técnicos cubanos en azúcar, con quienes los expertos internacionales han tenido amplia oportunidad de discutir los asuntos azucareros e intercambiar ideas y sugerencias libremente. Esta situación ya no existe.

CS COPY

S/C att. 1 UFGA-25559

19-120-26

2.- Polarización:

a) Azúcar crudo: En épocas anteriores al régimen comunista, Cuba no producía azúcares crudos con polarizaciones menores de 97.0 a 97.5 %, y para muchos mercados extranjeros se producían azúcares crudos con polarizaciones superiores a 98.0%. En la actualidad un porciento significativo de la producción no alcanza esos valores, dándose casos de azúcares crudos con polarizaciones de 96.0 y 95.0 %.

b) Azúcar Refino: Las calidades mejores de azúcares refinos o blancos se miden en los mercados internacionales principalmente por su grado de polarización, la cual deberá ser como mínimo 99.9%. Los azúcares refinos en la actualidad bajo el régimen comunista no alcanzan esa cifra, manteniéndose entre 99.70 y 99.80 %.

3.- Humedad:

a) Azúcar Crudo: Los azúcares crudos cubanos siempre se caracterizaban por su bajo contenido de humedad, lo cual los hacía de magníficas condiciones para resistir almacenamientos prolongados y manipulación segura a estos azúcares. Actualmente el contenido de humedad ha aumentado hasta un 200%, debido a varios factores como son, contenido de coloides producidos por las arcillas de las tierras, condiciones deficientes de las centrífugas de azúcar, mayor contenido de mieles en el azúcar, etc. Además, en muchas ocasiones, azúcares producidos en buenas condiciones se deterioran debido a la humedad existente a causa de deficiencias en el almacenaje en centrales y puertos de embarque.

b) Azúcar Refino: La deficiente tecnología y el mal estado de los equipos apropiados han dado como resultado un aumento del contenido de humedad en el azúcar refino de casi un 70%. Además azúcares producidos con bajo contenido de humedad en las refinerías, son alterados por el mal estado de los almacenes.

4.- Materias Insolubles:

a) Azúcar Crudo: El contenido de materias insolubles en el azúcar crudo ha aumentado aproximadamente en un 250% debido a la mala purificación de los jugos de caña durante el proceso tecnológico, y a la introducción de materias extrañas conjuntamente con la caña que van a parar hasta el azúcar.

b) Azúcar Refino: El uso de azúcares crudos de baja calidad, la deficiente calidad del Acido Fosfórico, la Tierra de Infusorios, y el Carbón Activado, productos éstos enviados por los países comunistas, han tenido como consecuencia un aumento del porcentaje de materias insolubles en los azúcares refinos de aproximadamente el 200%, reduciendo considerablemente la calidad de estos azúcares refinos.

5 .- Color:

a) Azúcar Crudo: El índice de color de los azúcares crudos ha aumentado casi en un 300%, lo que reduce proporcionalmente la calidad de estos crudos como materia prima en las refinerías.

b) Azúcar Refino: Este es uno de los factores importantes en la calidad de los azúcares refinos o blancos, y en los años recientes, debido a deficiencias tecnológicas, a la ausencia casi total de técnicos con experiencia, y a la baja calidad de los materiales decolorantes tales como el Carbón Activado suministrado por Polonia y la Unión Soviética, el índice de color, medido en Unidades ICUMSA, ha aumentado en un 200%. Es de señalar que ninguna refinería del país cumple las especificaciones en cuanto al índice de color establecidas por los Métodos Internacionales de Control de Calidad.

6.- Problemas Específicos del Azúcar Crudo:

a) Filtrabilidad: El índice de filtrabilidad que mide las propiedades precisamente de refinación del azúcar crudo, ha bajado en un 250% en los años recientes, afectando seriamente los costos de producción de las refinerías que emplean este azúcar crudo como materia prima.

b) Uniformidad del grano de Azúcar: Como consecuencia de la total ausencia de equipos automáticos para controlar la cristalización del azúcar, ya que la gran mayoría ha sido destruído y no reparado, la uniformidad de los cristales o granos del azúcar crudo ha disminuído a líderes inverosímiles. Es casi imposible observar azúcares crudos actuales que no tengan un alto índice de "conglomerados", "gemelos", y "Falso grano", lo que hace que la uniformidad de los cristales no se mantenga, ocasionando perjuicios a las refinerías que emplean esta azúcar como materia prima por la cantidad de mieles e impurezas que conllevan. Esto reduce la capacidad de las refinerías y aumenta considerablemente su costo de producción.

c) Aspecto Sanitario: La falta de cuidado en cuanto a la higiene con que debe ser producida el azúcar, así como las calidades de las aguas que se emplean para el lavado de los azúcares en las centrífugas, el poco cuidado y esmero con que son tratadas en los almacenes, han producido un descenso en cuanto al aspecto sanitario de los azúcares acusándose un aumento considerable en el contenido de hongos, bacterias, y levaduras. Todos estos elementos extraños afectan la calidad y producen fermentaciones secundarias en el azúcar destruyéndose parte de la sacarosa de las mismas, lo cual reduce los rendimientos en las refinerías de azúcar y aumenta considerablemente el costo de producción.

d) Envases: Los envases que viene utilizando el régimen comunista en los azúcares crudos, son en parte elaborados en la Unión Soviética. Estos envases de yute son de ínfima calidad y además como no tienen las medidas standards, el azúcar se compacta dentro de los sacos, produciéndose muchas roturas de los mismos.

e) Azúcar Endurecida: Como consecuencia de la deficiencia en la tecnología de producción, las materias extrañas, y las malas condiciones de los almacenes, el índice de azúcares endurecidos en almacenamiento ha aumentado casi un 200%. Esto trae como consecuencia grandes dificultades en las refinerías al disolver el azúcar y sacarla de los sacos. Además al aumentar el costo de manipulación, se aumenta el costo de producción.

7.- Problemas Específicos del Azúcar Refino:

a) Azúcares Invertidos: Debido a la deficiencia tecnológica y a la baja calidad de los azúcares crudos utilizados, el contenido de azúcares invertidos ha aumentado en un 150% en los últimos años con el resultado de la baja de calidad de este tipo de azúcar.

b) Cenizas: Como consecuencia de la gran cantidad de materias extrañas y la baja calidad de los azúcares crudos, así como la deficiente calidad de los Carbones Activados empleados en las refinerías, el contenido de cenizas ha aumentado en los últimos años en un 50%, afectando la calidad de estos azúcares.

c) Contenido de Azufre (SO_2): El contenido de azufre en los azúcares refinados debe ser extramadamente bajo ya que afecta la salud del consumidor y crea grandes dificultades en las industrias que usan el azúcar. Como consecuencia de la baja calidad del Acido Fosfórico Soviético que tiene un alt contenido de Azufre, los azúcares en los últimos años han sufrido un aumento del 100% en su contenido de azufre lo que afecta la calidad de los mismos.

d) Contenido de Arsénico: El Arsénico es una de las contaminaciones que mas afectan la calidad de cualquier producto alimenticio, y mucho mas significativo es en el azúcar. Los productos auxiliares usados en la refinación del azúcar tales como Acido Fosfórico suministrados por países comunistas, tiene un alto porcentaje de Arsénico los que contaminan el azúcar, habiéndose elevado esta cifra en un 70% sobre los valores normales.

e) Contenido de Plomo: La presencia de Plomo en los azúcares refinados debe ser significativo, pero en los últimos años el empleo de Tierras de Infusorios y Acido Fosfórico de países comunistas que tienen baja calidad y están contaminados con este elemento, ha producido un aumento del contenido de plomo en los azúcares refinos de un 50% sobre los valores normales.

f) Contenido de Cobre: Los azúcares de Cuba se caracterizaban por su ausencia de Cobre, sin embargo al usarse los productos contaminados y de baja calidad suministrados por los países comunistas, y por otro lado el mal estado de los equipos que tienen partes de Cobre, han dado como resultado un aumento en el contenido de Cobre llegándose a obtener valores de 2 a 3 % de Cobre en el azúcar refino.

CONCLUSIONES:

1.- Bajo el presente régimen, la calidad del azúcar cubano ha sufrido un tremendo deterioro.

2.- La industria azucarera cubana no ha sido una excepción al principio de que "el Comunismo es sinónimo de baja calidad".

3.- Los gobiernos, los pueblos y las firmas de los países que aún adquieren azúcar de Cuba deben tomar nota de este breve análisis.

Por el Buró de Investigaciones Económicas de U.R.

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez
Director

Miami, 7 de Julio de 1966

S E C R E T SC Attach. #2
UFGA-25559

IDENTITY LIST

A. "E-E" ECONOMIA ESPANOLA Y EXTERIOR.

B. Jose Ramon Aparicio Nunez
Director, "E-E"
Paseo Onesimo Redondo 22
Madrid, Spain

S E C R E T

S/c att. 2 UFGA-25559

CS COPY

19-120-26

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE BPV

SUBJECT
TYPIC/MHVIPER/Cable from Professor Torsten Gardlund

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Response from Headquarters to Reference Requested.

REFERENCE: UFGA-25367

We forward by separate cover a copy of a cable received by AMRAIN-1 from Professor Torsten Gardlund. This is in response to the interim reply sent the Professor by AMRAIN-1 after receipt of the questionnaire. We request a reply to ~~the~~ reference as soon as feasible in view of the considerable interest expressed in this cable.

for Ross E. Marchland
PHILIP G. ELMARD

Grant reclassified Aug 21, 1967
File
AMSCROLL
19-120-26/3
PROP

IN	FI	
ABSTRACT	X	

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Attachment: USC
Cable as stated.

Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/att. usc

1 ATT.

19-120-26

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DATE TYPED
5 July 66

DATE DISPATCHED
JUL 6 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-25445

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
~~19-120-26~~
19-120-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

CLASS OF SERVICE
This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION
TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

R. W. McFALL
PRESIDENT

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

1026P EST JUN 30 66 AA010   1966 JUN 30 PM 6 30

A CDU803 WUT0245 RMB3806 SWN0702 M014454 31 PD INTL CD MALMOE

VIA RRCA 30 1300

LT ING RAUL ESPARZA MADERA

290 VAPP 3 CORALGABLES (FLO)

MANY THANKS YOUR KIND LETTER OF JUNE 14 STOP WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR REPORT WITH GREAT EXPECTATIONS SINCERELY

TORSTEN GAARDLUND

CFM 290 3 14
(10).

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

SF1201(R2-65)

CS COPY

19-120-26 per [illegible]

~~19-120-[illegible]~~

~~200-120-58~~

ATT #1 TO UFGA 25445

COMITE PRO BOICOT EMPRESARIAL
Management Boycott Committee
P. O. BOX 3900
MIAMI, FLA. - 33101 - U. S. A.

CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE OFFICIALS, OFFICERS AND CREWMEMBERS WHO HAVE ABANDONED THEIR POSTS DURING RECENT MONTHS

The "Free Cuban Merchant Marine Committee" releases the "score" of Cuban merchant marine officials, officers, and crewmembers who have abandoned their posts during recent months, thus increasing the lack of qualified personnel in the merchant fleet, another problem presently faced by the Castro-Communist regime.

The "Free Cuban Merchant Marine Committee" has up-date the "score" since the first one it released the "score" contains full names of merchant fleet officials, officers, and crewmen, ranks, names of vessels, port where the defections occured and dates.

I.- SCORE.-

NUMBER OF VESSELS: 16
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: 29

Captain:	5
Chief Engineer:	9
First Officer:	2
Second Engineer:	1
Helmsman:	2
Radio Operator:	1
Others:	6
Supervisor:	3
	29

* Attached is the statement of Raul de la Rua Castro, former Chief Engineer of the MV SIERRA MAESTRA, who jumped ship in Murorán, Japan, on March 20, 1966.-

II.- LIST.-

NAME	POST	VESSEL	PLACE	DATE
RAUL DE LA RUA CASTRO	Chief Engineer	SIERRA MAESTRA	Muroran, Japan	March 20, 1966
ARNALDO GIL LOPEZ	Ass. Supervisor	1	Bilbao, Spain	March 14, 1966
DANIEL SOMOZA	First Official	MATANZAS	Barcelona, Spain	March 10, 1966
JOSE OYARZABAL J.	Chief Supervisor	1	Madrid, Spain	March 5, 1966
RUBEN HERRERA MARTINEZ	Steward	COMBATE DE PALMA MOCHA	St. John, Canada	March 4, 1966
MIGUEL FERNANDEZ GARCIA	Second Engineer	JIGUE	Tokyo, Japan	Feb. 4, 1966
SALVADOR VENEITO VAZQUEZ	Electrical Technician	PINO DEL AGUA	Bilbao, Spain	Feb. 4, 1966
ANTONIO DURAN GONZALEZ	Seaman	BAHIA DE TANAMO	Cadiz, Spain	Feb. 4, 1966
JOSE ANGEL SEARA RIVAS	Helmsman	13 DE MARZO	Madrid, Spain	February, 1966
ALCIDES LOYOLA MARQUEZ	Cook	FRUCUBA	St. John, Canada	Jan. 31, 1966
FRANCISCO DALTABUIT	Captain	RIO JIBACOA	El Ferrol, Spain	Jan. 20, 1966
MANUEL FERNANDEZ	Helmsman	RIO JIBACOA	El Ferrol, Spain	Jan. 20, 1966
MARCOS ESTRUCH	Radio Operator	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, Spain	Jan. 4, 1966
JESUS CRESPO	Steward	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, Spain	Jan. 4, 1966
HUGO LEY ACHON	Chief Engineer	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, Spain	Jan. 4, 1966
FRANCISCO FDEZ. SAN ROMAN	Chief Engineer	SIERRA MAESTRA	Antwerp, Belgium	Dec. 31, 1965
FRANCISCO COBAS OSES	Captain	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japan	Dec. 27, 1965
ANTONIO ARIAS	First Officer	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japan	Dec. 27, 1965
MARIO PEREZ GIRON	Chief Engineer	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japan	Dec. 27, 1965
HUMBERTO E. FERNANDEZ	Purser	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japan	Dec. 27, 1965
A. CESAR LOREDO GARCIA	Captain	CAMILO CIENFUEGOS	Madrid, Spain	Dec. 20, 1965
AUGUSTO GONZALEZ DUQUE	Captain	UVERO	Colombo, Ceylon	Dec. 18, 1965
F. ROBERTO SURROCA	Chief Engineer	UVERO	Colombo, Ceylon	Dec. 18, 1965
ALBERTO TORRES GOMEZ	Chief Gen. Inspector	2	Madrid, Spain	November, 1965
FELIX GONZALEZ ALPI	Chief Engineer	BAHIA DE TANAMO	St. John, Canada	Oct. 25, 1965
JORGE I. SALCEDO	Chief Engineer	HABANA	Barcelona, Spain	October, 1965
EMILIO LEAL VALDES	Captain	13 DE MARZO	Bilbao, Spain	Aug. 23, 1965
LUIS CASAS CAMPA	Chief Engineer	13 DE MARZO	Rotterdam, Holland	August, 1965
RAUL GONZALEZ	Chief Engineer	MATANZAS	Barcelona, Spain	March, 1965

(1) Naval construction supervisors stationed at Spanish shipyards.-
(2) Chief General Inspector for Mambisas (Official Cuban shipping enterprise) stationed in Spain.-

STATEMENT OF RAUL DE LA RUA CASTRO.-

My name is Raúl de la Rúa Castro, and I was the Chief Engineer aboard the Cuban MV SIERRA MESTRA until March 20, 1966, when I jumped ship in Muroran, Japan.

Working conditions in the Cuban Merchant Fleet also influenced my decision. I could not stand the intensified espionage on board by members of the G-2. It is worth mentioning that the plan to indoctrinate Cuban merchant crews was a complete failure. The regime has abandoned the project altogether, and is now trying to place loyal Communists as officers and crewmembers, even if they are not qualified for their jobs.

As a matter of fact, the lack of qualified personnel is an increasing problem, and another source of trouble aboard Cuban vessels. During the last months a total of twenty nine officials, officers and crewmembers of the Cuban Merchant Marine have defected (data of up-to-date merchant marine score). After I quit the SIERRA MAESTRA, for instance, there was not a single certified engineer on board, although there were several young fellows getting on the job training. This is a fact that should be taken into consideration by the insurance firms that underwrite Cuban vessels.

Most of the vessels are faced with all sorts of mechanical difficulties, due to lack of spare parts and a very faulty maintainance, situation that gets worse when consider the scarcity of qualified personnel just mentioned.

I am very happy to have joined those of my fellow Cuban officers who preceded me in this decision. I wish to thank the "Free Cuban Merchant Marine Committee" for all the attentions accorded me, and I hope to rejoin our merchant fleet soon, when our vessels again sail under the flag of a free country.

FREE CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE COMMITTEE
830 SOUTH MIAMI AVENUE
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130

Miami, April 1st, 1966.-

COMITE PRO BOICOT EMPRESARIAL
Management Boycott Committee
P. O. BOX 3900
MIAMI, FLA. • 33101 • U. S. A.

MIEMBROS DE DOTACIONES DE LA MARINA MERCANTE CUBANA QUIENES HAN ABANDONADO SUS BUQUES RECIENTEMENTE

El "Comité de la Marina Mercante Cubana Libre" da a conocer el total de funcionarios, oficiales y tripulantes de la Marina Mercante Cubana que han abandonado sus cargos durante los últimos meses, aumentando con ello la falta de personal calificado en la flota mercante, otro problema que el régimen Castro-Comunista afronta en el presente.

El "Comité de la Marina Mercante Cubana Libre" ha puesto al día el total de funcionarios, oficiales y tripulantes de la flota mercante desde la primera que se dió a conocer. Este total contiene los nombres completos, el rango, nombre del buque, puerto en el cual lo abandonó y fechas.

I.- SCORE.-

Número de buques:	16
Miembros de las dotaciones:	29

Capitán:	5
Jefe de Máquinas:	9
Primer Oficial:	2
Segundo Maquinista:	1
Timonel:	2
Radio Telegrafista:	1
Otros:	6
Supervisor:	3
Total:	29

NOTA:

Adjunto se encuentran las declaraciones de Raúl de la Rua Castro, ex-Jefe de Máquinas de la Motonave SIERRA MAESTRA, quién abandonó el barco en Murorán, Japón en Marzo 20 de 1966.

II.- RELACION.-

NOMBRE	CARGO	BUQUE	LUGAR	FECHA
RAUL DE LA RUA CASTRO	Jefe de Máquinas	SIERRA MAESTRA	Murorán, Japón	Marzo 20, 1966
ARNALDO GIL LOPEZ	Supervisor Asistente	1	Bilbao, España	Marzo 14, 1966
DANIEL SOMOZA	Primer Oficial	MATANZAS	Barcelona, España	Marzo 10, 1966
JOSE OYARZABAL J.	Supervisor-Jefe	1	Madrid, España	Marzo 5, 1966
RUBEN HERRERA MARTINEZ	Camarero	COMBATE DE PALMA MOCHA	St. John, Canadá	Marzo 4, 1966
MIGUEL FERNANDEZ GARCIA	Segundo Maquinista	JIGUE	Tokyo, Japón	Feb. 4, 1966
SALVADOR VEIEITO VAZQUEZ	Electricista	PINO DEL AGUA	Bilbao, España	Feb. 4, 1966
ANTONIO DURAN GONZALEZ	Marinero	BAHIA DE TAÑAMO	Cadiz, España	Feb. 4, 1966
JOSE ANGEL SEARA RIVAS	Timonel	13 DE MARZO	Madrid, España	Febrero, 1966
ALCIDES LOYOLA MARQUEZ	Cocinero	FRUCUBA	St. John, Canadá	Enero 31, 1.
FRANCISCO DALTABUIT	Capitán	RIO JIBACOA	El Ferrol, España	Enero 20, 1966
MANUEL FERNANDEZ	Timonel	RIO JIBACOA	El Ferrol, España	Enero 20, 1966
MARCOS ESTRUCH	Radio Telegrafista	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, España	Enero 4, 1966
JESUS CRESPO	Camarero	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, España	Enero 4, 1966
HUGO LEY ACHON	Jefe de Máquinas	MANUEL ASCUNCE	Bilbao, España	Enero 4, 1966
FRANCISCO FDEZ. SAN ROMAN	Jefe de Máquinas	SIERRA MAESTRA	Antwerp, Bélgica	Dic. 31, 1965
FRANCISCO COBAS OSES	Capitán	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japón	Dic. 27, 1965
ANTONIO ARIAS	Primer Oficial	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japón	Dic. 27, 1965
MARIO PEREZ GIRON	Jefe de Máquinas	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japón	Dic. 27, 1965
HUMBERTO E. FERNANDEZ	Sobrecargo	ARACELIO IGLESIAS	Osaka, Japón	Dic. 27, 1965
A. CESAR LOREDO GARCIA	Capitán	CAMILO CIENFUEGOS	Madrid, España	Dic. 20, 1965
AUGUSTO GONZALEZ DUQUE	Capitán	UVERO	Colombo, Ceylán	Dic. 18, 1965
F. ROBERTO SURROCA	Jefe de Máquinas	UVERO	Colombo, Ceylán	Dic. 18, 1965
ALBERTO TORRES GOMEZ	Inspector General	2	Madrid, España	Nov. 1965
FELIX GONZALEZ ALPI	Jefe de Máquinas	BAHIA DE TANAMO	St. John, Canadá	Oct. 25, 1965
JORGE I. SALCEDO	Jefe de Máquinas	HABANA	Barcelona, España	Octubre, 1
EMILIO LEAL VALDES	Capitán	13 DE MARZO	Bilbao, España	Ag. 23, 1965
LUIS CASAS CAMPA	Jefe de Máquinas	13 DE MARZO	Rotterdam, Holanda	Agosto, 1965
RAUL GONZALEZ	Jefe de Máquinas	MATANZAS	Barcelona, España	Marzo, 1965

(1) Supervisor de construcciones navales, prestando servicios en España.-
(2) Inspector General de la Empresa de Navegación Mambisa.-

DECLARACIONES DE RAUL DE LA RUA CASTRO.-

Mi nombre es Raúl de la Rúa Castro y hasta el 20 de marzo de 1966 desempeñé el cargo de Jefe de Máquinas de la Motonave SIERRA MAESTRA, cargo este que abandoné en Murorán, Japón.

Las condiciones de trabajo en la Marina Mercante Cubana fueron uno de los motivos que me llevaron a tomar mi decisión. Tampoco podía continuar soportando el espionaje y la vigilancia a bordo por miembros del G-2. Vale la pena mencionar que el plan de adoctrinamiento para los miembros de las dotaciones de la flota mercante cubana ha fracasado completamente. El régimen ha abandonado dicho plan y lo único que hace ahora es sustituir a los que abandonamos los buques por personal "políticamente apto", pero carente de capacidad técnica para desempeñar los cargos.

De hecho, el régimen confronta un serio problema ante la escasez de personal técnico capacitado y titulado, y ésto constituye otra fuente de problemas a bordo de los buques cubanos. Durante los últimos meses un total de veinte y nueve funcionarios, oficiales y tripulantes de la flota mercante cubana han abandonado sus cargos. Para que se tenga una idea sobre la gravedad de este problema resulta necesario señalar que después que yo abandoné el SIERRA MAESTRA no quedó a bordo un sólo maquinista con título, a pesar de que varios muchachos jóvenes se encontraban allí recibiendo entrenamiento, pero por supuesto, aún sin el debido título. Esta es una realidad que debe ser considerada seriamente por las firmas aseguradoras de buques cubanos.

La mayoría de los buques confrontan dificultades en lo referente al funcionamiento debido principalmente a la falta de piezas de repuesto y al mantenimiento defectuoso y poco eficiente y como es natural este problema se acentúa con la escasez de personal técnico capacitado en las dotaciones.

Deseo manifestar que estoy contento de encontrarme junto a tantos otros compañeros de la Marina Mercante que me han precedido y quiero agradecer públicamente al "Comité de la Marina Mercante Cubana Libre" las atenciones que ha tenido conmigo, así como la ayuda que me están prestando, y sinceramente espero poder volver a la Marina Mercante en un futuro próximo; cuando una vez más podamos navegar bajo el pabellón de una Patria libre.

COMITE MARINA MERCANTE CUBANA LIBRE
830 SOUTH MIAMI AVENUE
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130

Miami, 1ro. de Abril de 1966.

14-00000

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

CONFERENCIA DE PRENSA DE RAUL ESPARZA TABARES

Mi nombre es Raúl Esparza Tabares y hasta hace escasamente un mes me encontraba presidiendo la Delegación Cubana a la Conferencia Internacional de Expertos en Azúcares de la FAO (Food & Agriculture Organization de las Naciones Unidas) que se celebró en Londres del 1ro. al 3 de Marzo de 1966, al mismo tiempo que ocupaba el cargo de Director de Investigaciones Tecnológicas Azucareras del MINAZ y formaba parte de la "Comisión de Estudios del Plan Perspectivo Azucarero".

A mi lado se encuentra mi señora Josefa Reus y nuestros hijos Roberto, de 21 años y Raúl, de 22 años, ambos estudiantes de ingeniería de la Universidad de La Habana.

Antes de hacer un breve relato de la odisea de mi familia para abandonar el país, deseo agradecer a los compañeros de UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA las atenciones que han tenido para con nosotros y al mismo tiempo por darme esta oportunidad de hacer estas declaraciones a los periodistas del mundo libre.

Desde hace dos años todos nos encontrabamos tratando de abandonar el país pero nos había sido imposible. a mi no se me permitía salir debido al cargo que ocupaba y ni siquiera se le daba esta oportunidad al resto de mi familia. Cuando lo de Camarioca nos fué a recoger un barco y las autoridades cubanas ni nos avisaron de que dicha embarcación se encontraba allí. La única salida era abandonar el país en bote por la vía clandestina. La oportunidad se presentó durante mi estancia en Londres. Yo había salido de Cuba el 23 de febrero de 1966 dejando atrás a mi señora y a mis dos hijos, uno de los cuales, Raúl, se encontraba enfermo de hepatitis en La Habana.

Mi señora tuvo que tomar la decisión sin encontrarme yo a su lado, pero había que aprovechar la oportunidad que se presentaba y salir por la vía clandestina del país. De la odisea pueden dar detalles ellos mucho mejor que yo y posiblemente los miembros de la prensa desearán hacerles algunas preguntas al final de mis palabras.

Muy brevemente les diré que ellos se sometieron al mismo proceso que tantos otros cubanos se han sometido, es decir, lanzarse en bote a cruzar el "corredor de la muerte" con la confianza que Dios los ayudaría a arribar a tierras de libertad. Dos intentos fallaron pero por fin, el tercer intento fué un éxito y al menos el grupo completo, unas veinte personas, se montaron en el bote y pusieron proa a los Estados Unidos; el motor se rompió y la travesía fué la mayor parte del tiempo a vela. al cabo de casi dos días el agua y la escasa comida se habían agotado y en tonces apareció un buque griego que después de facilitarles agua y algunos alimentos lo comunicó al Servicio de Guardacostas de los Estados Unidos y poco después un avión Catalina volaba sobre el lugar y marcaba el sitio para facilitarle la tarea a una de sus unidades navales que ya se encontraba en camino.

La llegada del buque del Servicio de Guardacostas Norteamericano fué realmente providencial, pues mi familia y los otros tripulantes del bote observaban aterrorizados como por la popa se acercaba velozmente una lancha patrullera cubana, que al ver el buque norteamericano viró en redondo y regresó a Cuba.

Yo me encontraba en el hotel en Londres y una llamada de larga distancia me puso al corriente de la situación. Ellos se encontraban a salvo y ahora me tocaba el turno a mí.

Lallamada informándome del arribo de mi familia a los EE.UU. llegó precisamente cuando me encontraba reunido con el resto de los miembros de la Delegación. Estos me observaban atentamente, como queriendo adivinar lo que se me decía desde el otro lado de la línea. Por tanto, tuve que desplegar mis escasas dotes de actor teatral y simular que la llamada era oficial desde Cuba.

Ante esta situación, optó por informar, falsamente, a los restantes delegados que el gobierno cubano me había encargado el cuidado de otros asuntos, por lo que tendría que demorarme algunos días mas de los previstos en Madrid.

Los dije también que me reservaran pasaje a bordo del vuelo de la semana siguiente y les entregué una carta para mi familia. Llegué a Madrid el 4 de Marzo. Las autoridades españolas me brindaron toda clase de facilidades, incluso posteriormente la de ofrecerme hasta protección personal, puesto que cuando en el MINAZ se conoció mi desaparición, el gobierno notificó a las embajadas cubanas en Londres y Madrid que me encontraran y que me llevaran de regreso para La Habana aunque tuviera que ser a bordo de un buque cubano y por supuesto, en contra de mi voluntad.

No deseo tomar mas tiempo para anécdotas personales y si lo he hecho ha sido porque estimo que ayudan a comprender la verdadera situación que se vive en Cuba. La situación de los funcionarios que como en mi caso, desean la libertad de nuestra Patria, y que nos encontramos sujetos a vigilancia, a represión, mis hijos expulsados de la Universidad y sujetos a las mismas privaciones que el resto de nuestro Pueblo.

Pasemos ahora al tema principal de esta conferencia, que es a la vez la espina dorsal de la economía cubana y por tanto el factor determinante de la estabilidad o de la caída del régimen de Fidel Castro: el AZUCAR.

En relación con el estado de la industria azucarera en la actualidad es necesario comenzar por esbozar la situación en la que se encuentran los ingenios. Debido a la escasez de piezas de repuesto, la falta de materiales y la baja calidad del trabajo, los ingenios confrontan una situación que es necesario calificar de "caótica". La falta de personal técnico capacitado y de obreros especializados hacen que la operación de producción de los ingenios sea altamente deficiente. Por otra parte, la falta de abastecimiento de caña no permite que los ingenios funcionen a su capacidad normal, trayendo como consecuencia poca eficiencia en el trabajo y un alto consumo de combustible adicional, que ocasiona un aumento considerable en los costos de producción del azúcar. En relación con los medios de transporte, principalmente los ferrocarriles azucareros, deseamos aclarar que se encuentran también en pésimas condiciones, a pesar de la adquisición de locomotoras soviéticas, inglesas y francesas, pues las vías férreas no permiten el aprovechamiento de este material rodante. Por ejemplo, durante 1965 se debían de haber cambiado seis millones de traviesas en las vías férreas, mas sin embargo sólo había diponibles ochenta mil. El resultado es el incremento de los descarrilamientos que durante la zafra de 1965 alcanzaron un promedio de tres descarrilamientos diarios, produciéndose diez accidentes mortales.

Muchos me preguntan cual será la producción final de la zafra de 1966 y sobre este punto debo hacer los comentarios siguientes: Fidel Castro anunció que la meta azucarera de este año serían 6.5 millones de toneladas y ese anuncio no sólo fue hecho durante su discurso del 1ro. de mayo de 1965, sino que lo repitió durante su discurso del 7 de junio del mismo año. Sin embargo, se admite que dicha meta no será alcanzada. Ahora bien el estimado actual no excede de 5.1 millones de toneladas. ¿Por qué?

Primeramente se debe mencionar la falta de abono. Este año la aplicación de abono fue insignificante, pues el gobierno no tenía las divisas necesarias para adquirirlo, principalmente en Italia. El año pasado, sin embargo, se aplica-ron aproximadamente 450,000 toneladas.

En segundo lugar, resulta necesario hacer referencia a las siembras de caña. Las nuevas areas sembradas de caña lo han sido de forma deficiente y además se han utilizado areas destinadas con anterioridad a la siembra de otras cosechas para sembrar caña, como lo constituye, por sólo citar un ejemplo, el caso de la zona situada en los alrededores de Manzanillo y Bayamo, las cuales eran zonas arroceras y ahora han intentado convertirlas en zonas cañeras resultando todo esto en un fracaso pues la caña es de baja calidad al no ser adecuado el suelo. Otro factor menos importante pero digno de darse a conocer es la falta de cuidado en las tareas de cultivo y atención de los cañaverales debido a la escasez de mano de obra.

Con estos antecedentes es que hay que analizar el monto de la presente zafra. Durante 1965 el día 7 de abril se alcanzó el cuarto millón, pero este año el tercer millón se alcanzó el día 3 de abril lo cual ya significa un atraso de cerca de 900,000 toneladas. Creo que hay caña para llegar a 5.1 millones de toneladas ahora bien, lo que hay que preguntarse es si dicha meta, que ya está bastante por debajo de los 6.5 millones anunciados por Fidel Castro será alcanzada o no. El Partido está realizando una movilización masiva record hacia los cañaverales con el propósito de intentar cortar toda la caña pero eso hay que ver si en definitiva lo logran hacer.

Cabe hacer referencia en este momento a lo que se conoce en Cuba por el nombre de "Plan Perspectivo Azucarero", que es el único plan económico que tiene en estos momentos el gobierno de Cuba.

¿Qué es el "Plan Perspectivo Azucarero"? comprende tres puntos básicos que son los siguientes: primero, la "rehabilitación" de la capacidad industrial a niveles pre-Castro; segundo, la "ampliación" de la capacidad industrial; y tercero, la "concentración" de la industria azucarera en 70 modernos centrales.

Vamos a revisar brevemente los tres puntos a la luz de la presente situación. En relación con el primero, o sea, la "rehabilitación" de la capacidad industrial instalada, es necesario destacar que en 1952 la capacidad de producción de la industria azucarera era de siete millones de toneladas, pero debido a la escasez de piezas de repuesto, falta de materiales para las reparaciones, baja calidad de las reparaciones y la eliminación de seis ingenios - que fueron precisamente desmantelados para utilizar las piezas como repuestos lo cual se ha comprobado ha sido un error más - la capacidad industrial se ha reducido a sólo seis millones de toneladas, es decir, que la actual política ha resultado en la presente merma de la producción ¡qué progreso! Fidel Castro no ha podido ni alcanzar la capaci -

dad de producción azucarera que Cuba tenía hace quince años.

El segundo punto, que en cierto sentido debe atemperarse al primero, es ampliar la capacidad industrial instalada y además construir un nuevo ingenio. Esto significaría, o sea, para alcanzar esto sería necesario la importación de un núme mero considerable de equipos para los ingenios, cosa totalmente imposible de llevarse a cabo debido a la escasez de divisas -de por sí escasas para la adquisición de piezas de repuesto- y la falta de técnicos para hacerse cargo de supervisar y ejecutar dicha ampliación - también se debe decir que tampoco son suficientes los técnicos para realizar de por sí las labores ordinarias de la zafra con la actual capacidad. Este parte del plan supone una coordinación entre el INRA - que siembra la caña - y el MINAZ, pero lo que sucede en la realidad es que no están en coordinación ambos organismos y por consiguiente el INRA manda a sembrar caña en donde no existe capacidad industrial y por su parte el MINAZ está "rehabilitando" ingenios en donde a lo mejor ya no hay suficiente caña. Esto es sólo una muestra de la desorganización reinante, desorganización que unida a los factores mencionados imposibilitan el éxito del "Plan Perspectivo". Esto es una prueba más de la incapacidad de la planificación económica de las altas esferas en dicho gobierno.

(Por cierto que la construcción del nuevo ingenio es vital para el éxito del "Plan" y hasta el momento presente sólo una firma francesa ha hecho ofertas para dicha construcción, dicha firma es nada menos que la FIVES-LILLE, bien conocida en los círculos azucareros).

La tercera fase del "Plan", es decir, la "concentración" de la capacidad industrial azucarera en setenta ingenios después de 1970 es sólo un sueño en la mente de los planificadores. La regresión constante de la industria azucarera no puede permitir, económicamente hablando, el modernizar y automatizar plantas y equipos, hasta que los problemas económicos básicos de la producción no estén resueltos.

Los equipos soviéticos no son aptos para realizar estas tareas agrícolas en Cuba y su diseño y difícil operación impiden que cumplan su cometido. Además estas "cortadoras" introducen un 19% de materias extrañas en el ingenio, lo cual ocasiona gran desgaste a las máquinas y equipos del ingenio. Y es precisamente con estos equipos soviéticos con los cuales se contaba para cosechar 83 millones de toneladas de caña que serían necesarias para producir los 10 millones de toneladas de azúcar anunciados por Fidel Castro como los "10 megatones de azúcar" con los que iba a derrotar al "imperialismo" en 1970.

Las metas de producción del "Plan" son las siguientes: Para 1965: 6 millones de toneladas; para 1966: 6.5 millones; para 1967: 7.5 millones; para 1968: 8 millones; para 1969: 9 millones; y finalmente, para 1970: 10 millones de toneladas de azúcar. Estimo que el único en Cuba que aún creo en el "Plan" y en sus metas es Fidel Castro.

Me gustaría hacer una breve referencia en relación con otro problema básico - la baja calidad del azúcar cubano, tanto crudo como refino, actualmente en proceso de empeorarse. Esto no ha sucedido de casualidad sino como consecuencia de la falta y mala calidad de las piezas de repuesto, la ineficiencia en la operación de los ingenios, la falta de eficiencia de los trabajadores, y la baja calidad de los productos químicos auxiliares procedentes de países socialistas. Estos problemas están resultando en una decreciente polarización del azúcar, el envase deficiente del azúcar de exportación, el aumento de impurezas en el azúcar embarcada a granel, y las dificultades en cumplir los compromisos de entregas de azucares.

Otro tema de interés lo constituye la presencia de los "técnicos azucareros" soviéticos en Cuba. El régimen cuenta en la actualidad con unos 300 técnicos azucareros soviéticos quienes se supone que sean los sustitutos de los técnicos cubanos que han abandonado el país. Los técnicos soviéticos tienen muy poca experiencia en azúcar de caña y la forma en que dicha industria opera en Cuba. Además muy pocos hablan español y esto les hace aún más difícil su labor. Por lo tanto ni los técnicos soviéticos ni los equipos soviéticos constituyen una solución para el quebradero de cabeza azucarero de Fidel Castro.

Con esto deseo dar por terminada estas declaraciones. Dejo ahora la palabra a los miembros de la prensa para contestarles cualquier pregunta en relación, no sólo a mis palabras, sino a la situación política interna que es un interesante fenómeno de desintegración, la odisea de mi familia, el problema de la Universidad en donde desempeñaba una cátedra, así como cualquier otro tema que resulte de interés.

Muchas gracias.

Miami, 5 de Abril de 1966.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Nombre: RAUL ESPARZA TABARES Casado Edad: 46 años

Información Profesional:

* Químico Industrial (1938).
* Ingeniero Químico Azucarero (1943)
* Ingeniero Agrónomo (1943)
* Jefe de la Delegación Cubana a la Conferencia Internacional de Expertos Azucareros de la FAO (Naciones Unidas) celebrada en Londres, Inglaterra del 1ro. al 3 de marzo de 1966.
* Director de Investigaciones Tecnológicas del Ministerio de Azúcar (MINAZ) de Cuba (1964-1966).
* Miembro de la "Comisión del Plan Perspectivo Azucarero" de Cuba (1963-1966)
* Jefe Nacional de Producción del Ministerio de Azúcar (MINAZ) de Cuba (1961-1963).
* Auxiliar Ingeniero Asesor Alfred L. Webre (1950-1960).
* Superintendente de Fabricación del Central "Santa Lucía", Oriente, Cuba, (1949-1961).
* Jefe de Laboratorio del Central "Narcisa", Las Villas, Cuba (1943-1947).
* Jefe del Departamento Químico de la Estación Experimental de Santiago de las Vegas, Habana, Cuba, (1948-1949).
* Miembro del "International Society of Sugar Cane Technologists (1963).
* Vice-Presidente de la "Asociación de Técnicos Azucareros Cubanos" (1966).
* Ex-Presidente del "Rotary Club" de Santa Lucía, Oriente, Cuba.
* Profesor de la Facultad de Tecnología de la Universidad de La Habana, Cuba (1964-1966).
* Asesor Técnico de la Biblioteca Nacional de Cuba (1963-1966).
* Autor de varios artículos técnicos azucareros publicados en revistas azucareras cubanas e internacionales.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE BPV

SUBJECT
TYPIC/MHVIPER/AMRAIN/Answer to Questionnaire from Professor Torsten Gardlund

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Headquarters' Approval Requested per Paragraph 2.

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR-05058 -192515
B. STOCKHOLM-7068

1. Per reference A we forward by separate cover the draft of the proposed AMRAIN-1/AMFRAME-1 answer to the questionnaire sent AMRAIN-1 by Professor Torsten Gardlund requesting information on the Cuban sugar industry. The time was taken to prepare these answers carefully and to provide additional information of Cuban sugar export commitments in order to point up the problems facing the regime in reaching its 1970 goal. In addition, we hope that an exchange of correspondence will ensue as Professor Gardlund could be a useful European contact for AMSCROLL.

2. Please cable Headquarters comments. The station is retaining the originals which need only to be dated and signed prior to mailing. We shall pouch COS, Stockholm a copy of what we mail Professor Gardlund.

AN 69	FI	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
ABSTRACT X	[illegible]	

Roger E. Marchant
for Philip G. ELMARD

19-120-26/3 AMSCROLL
PROP
19-120-26 p'abstract
(~~[illegible]~~)

Attachments: usc (att)
1. Letter from AMRAIN-1
2. Answer to Questionnaire with Appendix I
3. Letter from AMFRAME-1

Distribution:
3 - WH/C, w/atts. usc

3att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY

DATE TYPED
21 June 66

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 24 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-25367

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Miami, June 10, 1966

Professor Torston Gardlund
Svenska Sockerfabriks Aktiebolaget
Huvudkontoret
Post Box 17050
Malmo
Sweden.

Dear Prof. Gardlund:

I am pleased to enclose the information that you requested in your kind letter of 5/5/66, which I hope will be useful to you in your studies of price and cost trends in the cane sugar industry.

As you probably know, the Cuban sugar industry ranked first place as a producer of cane sugar, not only with regards to large production volumes, but also as concerns high technical efficiency and low production costs.

Before 1959, the maximum production cost was of 3.5 cents a pound, excepting, of course, the smaller and more inefficient sugar mills that had not developed any technological advances since World War II. However, in 1965 the cost of production was as high as 5.25 cents a pound, even though, of course, this latter figure is carefully concealed by the Communist régime that rules my country.

I would like to acquaint you with the Economic Research Bureau of the UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA Movement. This organization is made up of true Cuban economists in exile. I am sure that you will find this a very valuable source of information concerning Cuba's economy.

I thank you very much for the kind and humane phrases that you have had for my family and for myself. Thank Heaven, after three long years we were able to escape, even if at the risk of our own lives, from the Communist hell. We have come to this free land in the hope that we can start our lives all over again under the kind hospitality of this great Nation, the free and democratic United States of America.

Please by assured, my dear Professor, that I am pleased to place myself at your service. Should you desire any information concerning the Cuban sugar industry, I will be more than glad to furnish it to you. I also hope that, very soon, a régime of liberty, justice and democratic economic development will prevail in my suffering Fatherland.

Sincerely yours,

Ing. Raul Esparza Sr.

S/C att. 1 UFGA-25367

CS COPY

19-120-26

~~200-120-65~~

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PROFESSOR TORSTEN GARLUND

SVENSKA SOCKERFABRIKS AKTIEBOLAGET

1.- TECHNICIANS IN CUBAN SUGAR INDUSTRIES:

Before Castro:	400
In 1966:	50

2.- TRAINING OF CUBAN SUGAR TECHNICIANS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA:

Before Castro:	Agricultural Engineer	(4 years)
	Sugar Chemical Engineer	(5 years)
	Sugar Chemist	(3 years)
In 1966:	Agricultural Engineer	(5 years)

QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO A POSSIBLE SWEDISH-CUBAN LONGTERM SUGAR AGREEMENT

A.- Present Cuban export arrangements:

I.- Total Exports: 4,880,000 MT (1966 sugar commitments)

II.- Thereof under long/term agreements: (*)

Country	Quantity	Price	Number of Years
Eastern Europe	600,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	On a yearly basis
Spain	130,000.0 MT	2.5 cts. lb.	1966
Marocko	270,000.0 MT	L.D.P.	1966
Egypt	100,000.0 MT (est.)	Free Mkt.	1966
Syria	30,000.0 MT (est.)	Free Mkt.	1966

(*).- Breakdown of Eastern Europe and additional information enclosed in Appendix I.

B.- Facts about the Cuban sugar production:

I.- Production:

	1966	1970 (planned)
a.- Acreage under cane acre, cab.	3,979,440 acres	4,642,680 acres
b.- Expected cane crops in ton/acre arr/cab.	994,860 acres	1,989,720 acres
c.- Expected cane crop in tons	37,500,000.0 MT	83,000,000.0 MT
d.- Expected sugar production in tons	4,500,000.0 MT(*)	10,000,000.0 MT
e.- Average sugar content in cane %	14.00%	14.50%
f.- Yield sugar in bag/ton cane %	12.00%	12.50-12.60%

17-120-26 per abstract

S/C att. 2 UFGA-25367

CS COPY

	1966	1970
g.- Number of factories operating, raw sugar	152	153
h.- Totally installed milling capacity, arrobas cane/day (24 hrs)	47,730,000 as	52,100,000 as

one arroba = 25,3525 lbs.

(*) 1966 production will range from 4,450,000.0 MT to 4,500,000.0 MT. Original goal set by Cuban government was 6,500,000.0 MT.

II.- Methods to reach the goal for 1970:

a.- Increase in acreage: acre, ha, cab.

i.- Increasing present acreage in: 663,240 acres

ii.- By replacing with newly planted cane the present fields maintaining an average age of five years for the cane. This means that each year 20% of the total cane area must be replaced which stated in figures means that from 1964 to 1969, a total of 829,050 acres of new cane will have to be planted a year.

The new plantations up to date have been:

1963	298,458 acres
1964	464,268 acres
1965	563,754 acres

b.- Increase in yield ton. of cane/acre
arr. of cane/cab, %

The project has taken into consideration an increase in the yield of metric tons per hectare from 24.924 MT in 1966 to 49.848 MT in 1970. This represents a 200% yield increase in only four years.

c.- Increase in yield sugar in bag/ton of cane %:

The project calls for an increase from the 12.0% in 1966 to 12.50 - 12.60% in 1970.

d.- Increase of installed milling capacity in factories, ton/24 hrs.

An increase of 50,300.0 MT of cane/24 hrs., equivalent to 6,300.0 MT of sugar/24 hrs. is planned.

e.- Increase in days of safra:

The days of safra (harvest) will increase from 120 to 140 days.

f.- Number of new factories:

A new sugar mill is programmed for 1970. This new mill will have a capacity of 13,800.0 MT of sugar cane per 24 hours and a total production of 200,000.0 MT of sugar in 120 effective days of safra.

III.- Fertilizers:

	1965	1970 (planned)
a.- Import of fertilizers:	450,000.0 MT	400,000.0 MT

The plan calls for the use of 400,000.0 - 450,000.0 MT of fertilizers for the following years: 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970.

b.- Domestic production of fertilizers:	50,000.0 MT	100,000.0 MT

IV.- Cost of production:

	1965 pesos per ton sugar	1970 (planned)
a.- Raw sugar:		
Raw materials incl. cane	45.00	?
Cost of production ex factory excl. of depreciation and interest (excl. raw materials and cane)	51.00	?
Depreciation - interest	21.00	?
- by-products	2.00	?
= price ex factory	115.00	?

b.- Refined sugar:

	1965 pesos per lbs.
Price ex factory	0.0625
+ marketing costs and profits	0.0175
= retail price	0.0800

c.- Cane:

Average price of cane at factory: 6.00 pesos per 1.15 MT of sugar cane.

d.- Labour:

Average working minutes per ton sugar produced (or per ton cane crushed) 30.00 metric tons of sugar per minute.

Average labour wage per 8 hrs. 6.50 pesos per man.

e.- Methods of depreciation:

	% for buildings (average)	% for machinery (average)
On original value	20	10
On recovery value	—	—

APPENDIX I

BREAKDOWN OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMITMENTS AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CUBAN SUGAR EXPORT COMMITMENTS, CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION

Country	Quantity	Price	Number of years
Eastern Europe			
Bulgaria	180,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	1966 (1)
Czechoslovakia	200,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	1966 (2)
East Germany	220,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	1966 (3)
U.S.S.R.	3,000,000.0 MT	5 cts. lb.	1966 (4)
Communist China	600,000.0 MT	?	1966 (5)
North Korea and North Viet Nam	30,000.0 MT	?	1966 (6)
Spain	130,000.0 MT	2.5 cts. lb.	1966 (7)
Morocco	270,000.0 MT	L.D.P.	1966 (8)
Egypt	100,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	1966 (9)
Syria	30,000.0 MT	Free Mkt.	1966(10)
Other free world commitments	120,000.0 MT		
Total Export Commitments:	4,880,000.0 MT		
Domestic Consumption:	450,000.0 MT		
Total 1966 Commitments:	5,330,000.0 MT		
1966 Sugar Production:		4,500,000.0 MT	
Possible 1965 standover:		500,000.0 MT	
Sugar available for 1966:		5,000,000.0 MT	
Deficit:			330,000.0 MT

(1) Bulgaria: 180,000.0 MT for 1966 at current free market prices under barter agreements in exchange for Bulgarian electrical and industrial equipments and plants. A 1967-1970 agreement calls for an increase in deliveries to 200,000.0 MT.

(2) Czechoslovakia: 200,000 MT for 1966 at current free market prices under barter agreement originally signed in June 1960 and revised during 1965.

(3) East Germany: 220,000.0 MT for 1966 at current free market prices under barter agreement signed early in 1965 which calls for an increase in Cuban sugar deliveries on a yearly basis until 1970.

(4) U.S.S.R.: 3,000,000.0 MT for 1966 at an original price of 6 cts. per lb. which is considered to be at the present time of 5 cts. per lb. under the January 20, 1964 barter agreement. Cuban sugar deliveries will increase as follows:

1967:	4,000,000.0 MT
1968:	4,000,000.0 MT
1969:	5,000,000.0 MT
1970:	5,000,000.0 MT

(5) Communist China: 600,000.0 MT under barter agreement in exchange for rice, foodstuffs, and machinery.

(6) North Korea and North Viet Nam: Estimates.

(7) Spain: 130,000.0 MT for 1966 at a new price of 2.5 cts. per lb. under the new trade agreement for 1966-1969 compared to 6.0 cts. per lb. paid by Spain under the previous agreement. Cuban sugar and tobacco will be exchange for Spanish vessels, vehicles, electrical equipment and industrial plants, foodstuffs (wine, brandy, nougat, oil), and textiles. Cuban sugar deliveries for the period -- (1966-1969) will be:

1966:	130,000.0 MT
1967:	140,000.0 MT
1968:	150,000.0 MT
1969:	160,000.0 MT

(8) Morocco: 270,000.0 MT for 1966 at L.D.P. 35% of 1966 deliveries will be paid in convertible currencies. Cuban sugar deliveries will increase to 295,000.0 MT in 1967.

(9) Egypt: 100,000.0 MT for 1966 at free market prices. Agreement originally signed in October 1959 for an indefinite period of time.

(10) Syria: 30,000.0 MT for 1966 at free market prices. No other details available.

LETTERHEAD ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

Miami, June , 1966

Prof. Torsten Gårlund
SVENSKA SOCKERFABRIKS AKTIEBOLAGET
Huvudkondoret
Box 17050
Malmo 17, Sweden.

Dear Prof. Gårlund:

We had the opportunity of cooperating with Ing. Raul Esparza in filling out the questionnaire you enclosed with your May 5, 1966 letter. The "Economic Research Bureau" is a branch of UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, which is an exile Cuban organization born in the underground and presently fighting to free our Homeland, both inside Cuba and in exile.

One of our weapons in this effort is what we have labeled as an economic offensive to deny the Castro regime the hard currency it so desparately needs. For this reason the "Economic Research Bureau" was organised. It puts a monthly economic newsletter, the "Economic Intelligence Report", and whatever other information we feel will aid our cause and at the same time provide accurate and reliable data to Free World countries and firms that still consider trading with the present Cuban regime.

Enclosed you will find some of our past newsletter which we expect will be of interest to you. At the same time, they will serve you as an example of the type of research work we have undertaken, its objectivity, and its accuracy.

It was our pleasure to cooperate with Ing. Esparza in filling out the questionnaire you sent and we avail ourselves for any additional information you could desire in the future, besides placing you in our regular mailing list.

Very sincerely yours,

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez
Director UR's
Economic Research Bureau

RRV/mm.

19-120-26 [illegible]

~~300-120-55~~

S/C att. 3 UFGA-25367

CS COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief of Station, Bogota

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE BPV

SUBJECT
TYPIC/MHVIPER/AMSCROLL

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI

REFERENCE: UFGW-6034

1. Station JMWAVE appreciates the reference and in implementation thereof AMFRAME-1 has written Jaime Lozano of the Colombian National Association of Sugar Cane Growers as suggested in paragraph 1 of the reference. AMFRAME-1 also enclosed certain statistics developed by AMSCROLL which we hope will be of use to Lozano. Copies of the letter and of the translation are forwarded by separate cover.

2. We shall keep the addressees informed of any developments.

Roger E. Marchbank
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments: usc (3 [illegible])
1-Letter
2-Memo of Statistics

Distribution:
(3- WH/C, w/atts. usc
2- COS/Bogota, w/atts usc
2- C/WH, w/o atts.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]
200-120-58

DATE TYPED
17 June 66

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 21 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-25349

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

2 atts.

Miami, 13 de Junio de 1966

Sr. Jaime Lozano
Presidente,
Asociación Nacional de
Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar
Edificio Suramericana de Seguros
Calle 12, Carrera 5a, 10o piso,
Cali, Colombia.

Estimado Sr. Lozano:

Nos dirigimos a Ud. en esta oportunidad con motivo del fracaso de la presente zafra azucarera cubana, fracaso del cual Ud. ya debe tener noticias, no sólo a través de nuestra hoja de información económica ("Economic Intelligence Report") sino a través de fuentes propias.

Por ejemplo, el boletín de la casa Merril-Lynch de fecha 10 de junio de 1966 fija el monto de la presente zafra cubana en 4,450,000 TM, es decir, mas de dos millones de toneladas métricas por debajo de la meta anunciada por Fidel Castro (6,500,000 TM). Esto se traducirá en una escasez que hará muy difícil que el presente régimen pueda cumplir sus compromisos azucareros con países del mundo libre tales como España y Marruecos y al mismo tiempo pueda copar un por ciento considerable del mercado azucarero del Japón. El memorandum adjunto contiene datos que le resultarán de interés.

La reciente operación en la cual el Brasil vendió 530,000 TM es una prueba palpable de la oportunidad existente para los países libres de la América en los actuales momentos debido al fracaso de la zafra cubana.

Sería sumamente eficaz para Colombia el explorar las posibilidades existentes en esos tres mercados de inmediato pues seguramente se podrían realizar algunas operaciones que redundarían en beneficio para su país al mismo tiempo - que bloquearían operaciones del régimen Castro-Comunista de por sí difíciles en vista de la escasez producida por el fracaso de la zafra de 1966.

Es muy posible que nosotros pudiésemos cooperar en este empeño de Colombia, tanto a través de informaciones que pudiésemos obtener de la situación de dichos mercados (España, Marruecos y Japón), así como a través de alguna gestión personal si se nos presentara la oportunidad.

CS COPY

[illegible]

Así mismo agradeceríamos que si Uds. tienen alguna publicación de su Asociación que nos pudieran enviar con regularidad nos la hicieran llegar y si logró utilizar las declaraciones del Ing. Esparza y del Dr. Tarrab en algún artículo nos interesaría obtener alguna copia.

Esperando tener noticias suyas y seguros que cualquier gestión suya representará una victoria tanto para Colombia como para los cubanos libres, quedamos de Uds.,

Muy atentamente,

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez
Secretario de Sectores
Económicos y Profesionales

P.D. Díganos si está recibiendo con regularidad nuestras informaciones.

RRV/amb

MEMORANDUM

AL : Sr. Jaime Lozano
Presidente,
Asociación Nacional de
Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar,
Cali, Colombia.

DEL: Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez
Secretario de los Sectores
Económicos y Profesionales,
Unidad Revolucionaria,
Miami, Florida.

REF.: Análisis Estadístico de los compromisos azucareros de Cuba para 1966. La producción y los mercados de España, Marruecos y Japón.-

CUADRO NO. 1

COMPROMISOS AZUCAREROS DE CUBA PARA 1966

1.- En base de acuerdos existentes:

A) Países Comunistas:

U.R.S.S.:	3,000,000 TM	
Bloque Comunista:	690,000	
China Roja:	600,000	
Corea del Norte y Viet Nam del Norte:	30,000	
		4,320,000 TM
B) Países del Mundo Libre*:	650,000	
		650,000 TM
2.- Consumo Doméstico:	450,000	
		450,000 TM
TOTAL:		5,420,000 TM

(*) Estimado conservador de compromisos con países tales como España, Marruecos, Ceylón, la República Arabe Unida y otros.-

CS COPY

CUADRO NO. 2

DEFICIT AZUCARERO CUBANO PARA 1966

1.- Azúcar necesaria para cubrir compromisos de acuerdo con Cuadro No. 1: 5,420,000 TM

2.- Azúcar disponible para 1966:

A) Producción de 1966 (estimado): 4,450,000 TM

B) Sobrante de 1965 (estimado): 500,000 TM

TOTAL: 4,950,000 TM

3.- Déficit: (5,420,000 TM - 4,950,000 TM): -470,000 TM

CUADRO NO. 3

EXPORTACIONES DE AZUCAR DE CUBA A MERCADOS SELECCIONADOS: ESPAÑA, MARRUECOS Y JAPON

(1961 - 1966)

	ESPAÑA	MARRUECOS	JAPON	TOTAL
1961	53,208	157,287	325,000	535,495 TM
1962	58,312	265,124	522,727	846,163 TM
1963	102,737	285,028	163,662	551,427 TM
1964	275,704	323,259	328,609	927,572 TM
1965	115,542	300,000	380,000	795,542 TM
TOTAL	605,503 TM	1,330,698 TM	1,719,998 TM	3,656,199 TM
1966 (*)	130,000 TM	270,000 TM	(hasta el momento no se ha cerrado negociación alguna)	

(*) España y Marruecos son compromisos de convenio.
Japón de acuerdo con negociaciones anuales.

Fuentes: "Sugar Year Book" de 1964, Convenios Comerciales de Cuba Comunista y estimados por el "Buró de Investigaciones Económicas" de UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA.-

Miami, 14 de Junio de 1966.

Miami, June 13, 1966

Mr. Jaime Lozano
President,
National Association of Sugar
Cane Growers
Edificio Suramericano de Seguros
Calle 12, Carrera 5a
Cali, Colombia.

Dear Mr. Lozano:

We address you now on account of the failure of the current Cuban sugar harvest, of which failure you must have heard not only through our "Economic Intelligence Report", but also from your own sources.

For example, the June 10, 1966 Merril-Lynch bulletin, sets the amount of the current Cuban sugar harvest at 4,450,000 MT, that is, over 2 million metric tons below the goal announced by Fidel Castro (6,500,000 MT). This will result in a scarcity of Cuban sugar, which scarcity will make it very difficult for the regime to fulfill its sugar commitments to free-world countries, such as Spain and Morocco, and at the same time to cope with a significant percentage of the Japanese sugar market. The enclosed Memo contains data that may be of interest to you.

The recent transactions whereby Brazil sold 530,000 MT is tangible evidence of the opportunity that exists for free countries in the Americas at this time, thanks to the failure of the Cuban sugar harvest.

It would be extremely rewarding for Colombia to explore the immediate possibilities that eixst in these three markets, as surely some transactions could be made that would benefit your country, and which, at the same time, would block some of the Castro-Communists' own transactions. The latter are in themselves difficult because of the scarcity brought about by the failure of the 1966 sugar harvest.

It is quite possible that we could cooperate with this Colombian endeavor, by informing you of facts we learn concerning the situation in such markets (Spain, Morocco and Japan), markets as well as by any personal undertaking, which we could be capable of.

Likewise, if you have any publication issued by your Association that you could mail to us regularly, we would appreciate your doing so, and if you were able to use the statements by Eng. Esparza and Dr. Tarrab in some article, we would like ot obtain a copy of it.

Hoping to hear from you soon, and with the certainty that any action on your part will mean a victory for Colombia as well as for the free Cubans, we are,

Yours very sincerely,

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez
Secretary for Economic
and Professional Affairs

P.S.: Please tell us whether you are regularly receiving our publications.

Encl.

RRV/amb

MEMORANDUM

TO: Sr. Jaime Lozano
President,
National Association of
Sugar Cane Growers
Cali, Colombia.

FROM: Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez
Secretary for Economic
and Professional Affairs
Unidad Revolucionaria
Miami, Florida.

REF.: Statistical Analysis of Cuban Sugar Commitments, Production, and the Spanish, Moroccan and Japanese Markets.

TABLE NO. 1

CUBAN SUGAR COMMITMENTS FOR 1966

1.- Commitments under existing agreements:		
A) Communist Countries:		
U.S.S.R.:	3,000,000 MT	
Communist Bloc:	690,000	
Red China:	600,000	
North Korea and North Viet Nam:	30,000	
		4,320,000 MT
B) Free World Countries*:	650,000	
		650,000 MT
2.- National Consumption:	450,000	
		450,000 MT
TOTAL:		5,420,000 MT

(*) Conservative estimate with countries such as Spain, Morocco, Ceylon, U.A.R., and others.-

TABLE NO. 2

CUBAN SUGAR DEFICIT
(1966)

1.- Sugar needed to keep commitment according to Table No. 1: 5,420,000 MT

2.- Available sugar for 1966:

A) 1966 Sugar Production (estimate): 4,450,000 MT

B) Carry over from the 1965 harvest (estimate): 500,000 MT

TOTAL: 4,950,000 MT

3.- Deficit: (5,420,000 MT - 4,950,000 MT): = 470,000 MT

TABLE NO. 3

CUBAN SUGAR EXPORTS TO SELECTED MARKETS: SPAIN, MOROCCO, AND JAPAN
(1961 - 1966)

	SPAIN	MOROCCO	JAPAN	TOTAL
1961	53,208	157,287	325,000	535,495 MT
1962	58,312	265,124	522,727	846,163 MT
1963	102,737	285,028	163,662	551,427 MT
1964	275,704	323,259	328,609	927,572 MT
1965	115,542	300,000	380,000	795,542 MT
TOTAL	605,503 MT	1,330,698 MT	1,719,998 MT	3,656,199 MT

1966 (*) Spain and Morocco are commitments under existing agreements. Japanese market subject to yearly negotiations.

Sources: "Sugar Year Book of 1964", Communist Cuba's Trade Agreements, and estimates by U.R.'s "Economic Research Bureau".-

Miami, June 14, 1966.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
CHIEF, WH XXX

INFO.

FROM
CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/MHSPAWN
STATUS REPORT RE JMWAVE PSYCH PROJECTS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES - A. DIRECTOR 11606
B. UFGT-15216
C. JMWAVE 1420

1. PER REFERENCE A REQUEST PARAGRAPHS BELOW GIVE BRIEF STATUS REPORT STATION'S MHSPAWN PROJECTS. REFERENCE B SHOULD BE USED AS SUPPLEMENTAL PAPER IN HEADQUARTERS REVIEW. BASIC PROPAGANDA LINES HAVE CONTINUED WITHOUT CHANGE, BUT WITH INCREASED EMPHASIS ON PERSONAL DENIGRATION AND HARASSMENT OF FIDEL CASTRO AND ON PROPAGANDA DESIGNED ENCOURAGE MILITARY AND OTHER POWER CENTERS IN CUBA TO CARRY OUT COUP D'ETAT AGAINST CASTRO. EMPHASIS IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT HAS BEEN ON CLOSER SCRUTINY AND CONTROL IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY OF OPERATION. ONE MARGINAL PROJECT /AMRUSTY/ HAS BEEN TERMINATED AND TWO PROJECTS /AMSPELL AND AMCROW/ ARE BEING SHARPLY CURTAILED DUE TO MARGINAL PERFORMANCE. THERE HAS BEEN OVERALL CUTBACK IN DISTRIBUTION PRINTED PROPAGANDA, ESPECIALLY TO LATIN AMERICA. PROPAGANDA MAILED TO CUBA HAS PLACED MORE EMPHASIS ON MILITARY TARGET IN PLACE OF MORE GENERAL PROPAGANDA THEMES TREATED. AMTHIGH RADIO PROGRAMMING HAS BEEN CUT FROM TWO HOURS DAILY TO ONE AND ONE HALF /THIS SHOULD ACHIEVE REDUCTION OF $60,000 - $70,000 PER YEAR IN OUR RADIO BUDGET/. HOWEVER RADIO CONTINUES TO BE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT MEDIUM FOR HITTING CUBAN TARGET.

2. AMSCROLL. PROJECT CONTINUES BE STATION'S MAIN PROPAGANDA MECHANISM IN MHVIPER AND DEFECTOR-SURFACING OPERATIONS AS DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE B. PROJECT PUBLISHES MONTHLY ECONOMIC BULLETIN IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH AND UNDERTAKES SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO DISCOURAGE TRADE WITH CUBA, E.G., IT IS CURRENTLY CORRESPONDING WITH COLOMBIAN SUGAR GROWERS GROUP IN ATTEMPT ENCOURAGE SALE OF

DISTRIBUTION
BY TAPE
3 - WH/C

/CONTINUED/

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-16628

DATE
20 JUNE 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

COLOMBIAN SUGAR TO JAPAN, MOROCCO AND SPAIN IN COMPETITION WITH COMMUNIST CUBA. PRODUCES TEN-MINUTE DAILY PROGRAM ON AMTHIGH SIX DAYS PER WEEK. PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES SUCH AS EXTENSIVE MAILINGS TO CUBA HAVE BEEN SHARPLY CURTAILED AND AMSCROLL EXECUTIVE BOARD HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM 13 TO 3 PERSONS AND PAID EMPLOYEES FROM 21 TO 16 AS OF 1 JULY 1966.

3. AMWASP-1. SEE REFERENCE B. HE IS A VALUABLE ELEMENT OF THE AMSCROLL PROJECT AND IS USED IN CONNECTION WITH APPROACHES TO DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT TARGETS. WE EXPECT TO TERMINATE HIM 31 DECEMBER 1966.

4. AMFRAME-1. SINGLETON AGENT WHO IS MAIN DRIVING FORCE BEHIND AMSCROLL OPERATION AND TOGETHER WITH AMASK-1 RUNS AMKNOT ACTIVITY.

5. AMKNOT. A NEW COMMITTEE FORMED AT HEADQUARTERS REQUEST TO HIT ZRWAGON DEFECTION TARGET. AMFRAME-1 AND AMASK-1 ARE WORKING VERY EFFECTIVELY AS PRINCIPAL AGENTS FOR THIS PROJECT AND LATTER HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE IN SECURING JOBS FOR ZRWAGON DEFECTORS.

6. AMCROW. PROJECT IS BEING SHARPLY CURTAILED. WE EXPECT TO REDUCE BUDGET TO APPROXIMATELY $1,000-1,500 MONTHLY IN FY 67. PROJECT LACKS AGGRESSIVE PRINCIPAL AGENT, AND THE COMBINATION OF INTERNAL PERSONNEL PROBLEMS IN AMCROW GROUP AND ITS MARGINAL PERFORMANCE HAVE LED TO DECISION TO CURTAIL. RADIO PROGRAM ON JMHOPE WAS TERMINATED 31 MARCH AND AFTER 31 JULY WE EXPECT TO REDUCE AMCROW PAID STAFF TO THREE PERSONS. WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE USEFUL TO PRESERVE AMCROW NAME AND CERTAIN AMCROW CONTACTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND TO CONTINUE AMCROW MAILING OPERATIONS ON MORE LIMITED BASIS.

7. AMMOP. NO MAJOR CHANGES. OPERATION IS VIEWED AS DEVICE FOR MONITORING AND INFLUENCING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND IS OF LONG-TERM INTEREST FOR ITS POTENTIAL AS A POLITICAL FORCE IN CUBA. HOWEVER PRINCIPAL AGENT LACKS MANY QUALITIES NEEDED TO MAKE HIM EFFECTIVE POLITICAL LEADER OR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCER AND WE ARE ASSESSING OTHER AMMOP MEMBERS AS POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT. AMMOP YOUTH SECTOR HEADED BY AMCRIB-1 MAINTAINS EXCELLENT CONTACTS WITH ITS COUNTERPARTS THROUGHOUT HEMISPHERE AND HAS BEEN USEFUL AS PRESS PLACEMENT MECHANISM.

8. AMSTRUT-2. NO CHANGES. SEE REFERENCE B FOR PROJECT DESCRIPTION.

9. AMLIRA. NO CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B FOR DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES. MONTHLY MAGAZINE STARTED JANUARY 66 WELL RECEIVED BY READERS AND EFFORTS TO MAKE MAGAZINE SELF-SUSTAINING HAVE RESULTED IN PAID ADVERTISEMENTS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE AS MAGAZINE BECOMES MORE WIDELY KNOWN. AMLIRA GROUP PREPARED TARGET STUDIES ON CUBAN ATHLETES ATTENDING REGIONAL OLYMPIC GAMES IN PUERTO RICO IN JUNE 1966 AND AMLIRA AGENTS ARE CURRENTLY WORKING WITH KUBARK TASK FORCE AT PUERTO RICAN GAMES.

10. AMBASAL-1. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES FROM REFERENCE B. AMBASAL-1 ''CARTA CIRCUALR'' NOW SENT ONLY TO CUBA AND MONTHLY BULLETIN SENT ONLY TO INTERNATIONAL ADDRESSEES - IN PAST BOTH PUBLICATIONS HAD BEEN SENT TO CUBA AND TO LATIN AMERICA. AMBASAL-1 PROGRAM ON AMTHIGH HAS BEEN DROPPED AS OF 1 JUNE BUT CONTINUES ON JMHOPE ONCE WEEKLY /SUNDAYS/.

11. YOYARD/JMHOPE. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES. MORE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON NEWS PROGRAMS AS RESULT OF REFUGEE DEBRIEFINGS INDICATING DESIRE FOR MORE NEWS. JMHOPE NOW GIVES FIVE MINUTE NEWS SUMMARIES EVERY HALF HOUR AS COMPARED PREVIOUS HOURLY REPORTS. MANAGERIAL CONTROL OVER PHILCO TECHREPS AT JMHOPE SITE HAS BEEN IMPROVED, AND PLANS ARE NOW UNDER WAY FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NEW UNITS TO REPLACE SUBSTANDARD HOUSING AT SITE. /CONTINUED/

4

12. AMCORE-2. EMPHASIS IN THIS PROJECT IN PAST HAS BEEN CHIEFLY ON AMCORE-2 DAILY HALF-HOUR PROGRAM ON AMTHIGH AND JMHOPE. THESE PROGRAMS CONTINUE, ALTHOUGH REDUCED TO 23 MINUTES DAILY FOR TECHNICAL PROGRAMMING REASONS. WE ARE EXAMINING POSSIBILITY OF ADDING MORNING PROGRAM ON JMHOPE TO EXPLOIT HIS HIGH AUDIENCE RATING AS REFLECTED IN REFUGEE AND JMHOPE REPORTS. WE ARE ALSO ATTEMPTING TO EXPLOIT MORE FULLY AMCORE-2'S AGGRESSIVE PERSONALITY AND HIS LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL IN EXILE COMMUNITY AND TO EXPAND HIS PROPAGANDA EFFORTS BEYOND THE RADIO PROGRAMS NOTED ABOVE. ONE RESULT OF THIS WAS HIS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO ORGANIZE THE DISPARATE REBEL ARMY ELEMENTS IN A UNIFIED APPEAL TO REBEL ARMY IN CUBA, AS REPORTED IN JMWAVE 1397. HE HAS ALSO ARRANGED FOR FREE AIR TIME FOR A TWELVE MINUTE DAILY PROGRAM ON STATIONS IN VENEZUELA, PERU AND PANAMA - AND HAS OBTAINED SPACE IN DIARIO LAS AMERICAS TO PUBLICIZE LETTERS HE RECEIVES FROM LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS IN SUPPORT OF THE ANTI-CASTRO CAUSE.

13. AMRAPT/AMPALM-4. AMPALM-4 ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS ON JMHOPE HAVE BEEN CUT TO ONE HOUR DAILY. DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED PROPAGANDA TO LATIN AMERICA HAS BEEN TERMINATED. SELECTIVE MAILINGS ARE MADE TO CUBA, WITH EMPHASIS ON MILITARY TARGET. SPECIAL STUDIES BY AMPALM-4 ARE NOW BEING PUBLISHED BY AMHIM IN PLACE OF TERMINATED AMPALM-4 BULLETIN. AS OF 1 MAY DIRECTION OF AMTWIST PROGRAM HAS BEEN PLACED UNDER AMPALM-4.

14. AMTWIST. AS NOTED REFERENCE B, THIS PROJECT WAS A MARGINAL EFFORT DUE LARGELY TO LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE PRINCIPAL AGENT. THE TWO AMTWIST AGENTS HAVE BEEN PLACED UNDER AMPALM-4'S DIRECTION AS OF 1 MAY AND ACTIVITY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A DEVELOPMENTAL OPERATION. AMTWIST RADIO PROGRAM IS CARRIED ON AMTHIGH /TEN MINUTES DAILY/ AND ON JMHOPE /15 MINUTES DAILY/.

15. AMSHADY-1. UNTIL MID-FERUARY 66 AMSHADY PROJECT CONSISTED OF RADIO PROGRAM ON AMTUMOR AND JMHOPE AIMED AT EXPOSURE AND DENUNCIATION OF CUIS AGENTS INSIDE CUBA. IN FEBRUARY SCOPE OF RADIO PROGRAM WAS BROADENED TO INCLUDE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF CUIS ACTIVITIES AND AGENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, AND OCCASIONAL DISCUSSION OF OTHER POLITICAL TOPICS NOT SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO CUIS TARGET. AMSHADY BOOK ON CUIS HAS RESULTED IN WIRE SERVICE REPORTS, PRESS INTERVIEWS, AND INCREASED PRESS COVERAGE AND LETTERS FROM AMSHADY AUDIENCE. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN MADE FOR SALE OF BOOK IN LATIN AMERICA THROUGH LEGITIMATE COMMERCIAL CHANNELS.

16. AMRAZOR-1. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B FOR DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ACITIVITES. AMRAZOR HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE OUTLET FOR OUR INCREASED ACTIVITY AGAINST MILITARY TARGET AND SEVERAL AMRAZOR ARTICLES ON THIS TARGET HAVE BEEN PUT IN LEAFLET FORM AND MAILED INTO CUBA.

17. AMLYRIC-1. NO CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B.

18. AMSCREAM-1. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B. AMTHIGH PROGRAMMING, HANDLED THROUGH AMSCREAM-1, HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM TWO HOURS DAILY TO ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS DAILY PER REFERENCE C.

19. AMRUSTY. TERMINATED 31 DECEMBER 1965. SEE REFERENCE B.

20. AMBASE. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B. MONTHLY AVERAGE OF MAILINGS INTO CUBA HAVE BEEN REDUCED. SEPARATE REPORT ON AMBASE STATISTICS WILL BE FORWARDED.

21. AMHIM. SEE REFERENCE B. STATION IS PLACING INCREASING EMPHASIS ON AMHIM AS MAIN MECHANISM FOR PRESS PLACEMENT AND MASS DISSEMINATION OF PRINTED PROPAGANDA. AMHIM BULLETIN NOW INCORPORATES MATERIAL FORMERLY PRODUCED AND DISTRIBUTED BY OTHER STATION ASSETS SUCH AS AMPALM-4 AND AMBASAL-1.

/CONTINUED/

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGT-16628 PAGE 4

22. AMRUBY. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B. PROJECT CONTINUES TO PRODUCE AVERAGE OF ONE PONY EDITION /30,000 COPIES/ EVERY THREE MONTHS FOR MAILING INTO CUBA. AS OF 1 JUNE TWO OF FOUR AMRUBY-SPONSORED SATIRE PROGRAMS ON AMTHIGH HAVE BEEN DROPPED.

23. AMICE. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES. AMICE CONTINUED EFFECTIVE BOYCOTT PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS AND SERVED AS A VEHICLE FOR LAUNCHING THE QUMALT-1 ''DOLCE VITA'' SERIES. REVIEW OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES RESULTED IN ECONOMIES ACHIEVED BY MODEST PERSONNEL CUTS, USE OF A MORE SELECTIVE MAILING LIST AND ELIMINATION OF TWO FOREIGN-LANGUAGE EDITIONS OF THE MONTHLY AMICE BULLETIN.

24. AMSPELL. AS REPORTED IN REFERENCE B FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO AMSPELL HAS BEEN CUT SHARPLY AND IS NOW LIMITED TO $1,000 MONTHLY. THIS PROVIDES FUNDS FOR BI-MONTHLY BULLETIN, PRESS RELEASES AND SPECIAL PRINTED PROPARFNDA. AMSPELL HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN STATION CAMPAIGNS REGARDING POLITICAL PRISONERS AND LATIN AMERICAN STUDENT MOVEMENT /CLAE/ AND PRINCIPAL AGENT HAS CONTINUED TO BE RESPONSIVE TO STATION GUIDANCE.

25. AMNON. NO MAJOR CHANGES IN PROJECT ACTIVITY. 'AMNON CARRIED OUT SPECIAL RADIO AND PRESS CAMPAIGN IN CONNECTION WITH FORTHCOMING CLAE MEETING IN HAVANA. SPECIAL PAMPHLET ON THIS SUBJECT IS BEING PREPARED BY AMNON FOR PUBLICATION BY AMHIM. AMNON IS ALSO STATION'S MAIN ASSET FOR AMBASE PROGRAM AND HAS TAKEN OVER AMBASE PERSONNEL FROM TERMINATED AMRUSTY PROJECT.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO Chief, Far East Division

FROM Chief of Station, Manila

SUBJECT TYPIC MPSHAWN/Information on Honorio Viray

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

File Amscroll

Reference: JMWAVE 1092

Action Required: See Below

1. The information which Honorio Viray* supplied AMSCROLL about himself is substantially correct. He has been in PBPRIME for nearly a year on a World Press Institute grant, undergoing practical training in different periodicals. Prior to this grant, he was provincial news editor of the Manila Times. He will probably rejoin the Times on his return to the Philippines in July, 1966. He was a director of the National Press Club, but he was defeated when he ran for reelection in February 1966.

2. Viray is a native of Tarlac and is about 30 years old. He is a graduate of the University of Santo Tomas. He studied for one year in Australia, working with a paper in Brisbane while going to school. He is a bachelor. He has no known leftist sympathies, and he appears to be popular with his fellow newspapermen.

3. Manila Station may be interested in contacting Viray once he returns to Manila and his job status is certain. Assuming that AMSCROLL will correspond with Viray, as suggested in reference, we would like to reserve for future determination a means whereby AMSCROLL could assist in arranging a contact with a Station officer. The Station anticipates the assignment here of an officer (Raymond E. ONOFREY) within the next ninety days whom we should want to place in contact with Viray. We will forward a dispatch suggesting a contact proposal. when this becomes appropriate.

Caroline R. KOCERHAN

Distribution:
2 - COS, JMWAVE
1 - C/FE

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER FPMA- 18451	DATE JU[illegible] 1966 6 June 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-124-38

W.H/C

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROC-ESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Manila

INFO
Chief, FE
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/MHVIPER/AMSCROLL
Forwarding of Economic Intelligence Report

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI

REFERENCE: JMWAVE-1092

1. We forward by separate cover the latest edition of the AMSCROLL economic report that paragraph 3 of the reference indicated would be pouched. Copies of this and prior issues as well as supporting statistical material were given Honorio J. Viray during the visit described in the reference.

2. This Station will appreciate receiving Manila's overt mailing address for direct mailing of material similar to this in the future. JMWAVE's address is Identity.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments: usc (ada)
1. VOL I;No. 10: Economic Intelligence Report
2. Identity (ada)

Distribution:
3- COS/Manila, w/atts. usc
(2)- WH/C, w/att. 2 usc
2- C/FE, w/atts. usc

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO [illegible]

19-120-26

DATE TYPED
26 May 66

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-25198

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 ax

14-00000

UFGA-25198

IDENTITY

Miss Grace Holmes
P. O. Box 1767
Coral Gables, Florida

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

S/C att. 1 UFGA-25198

19-120-26

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FILE NO.
RET. TO BRANCH ☐
☐ SIG.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED File Clemente
SIR.

1	PP —	5	OS
2		6	CE
3	CA-EW	7	FE
4	MO	8	RR

FROM DISSEM BY 25/3

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, ~~RI/AN~~, FE 8, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IA

ACTION

S E C R E T 240313Z CITE JMWAVE 1092 2[illegible] 23836

MANILA INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC MHSPAWN

1. ON 19 MAY ~~MR.~~ HONORIO I. VIRAY CALLED UPON KUBARK CONTROLLED AMSCROLL (IDEN A) SEEKING INFORMATION ON CUBA REFUGEE PROBLEMS AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING CUBA. SAID HE EMPLOYED BY MANILA TIMES AND CURRENTLY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF PHILIPPINES, IN STATES WITH GROUP 15 OTHER NEWSMEN STUDYING WAR ON POVERTY AND THAT HE BECAME INTERESTED IN REFUGEES WHILE PASSING THROUGH MIAMI. SAID WOULD USE INFORMATION ON REFUGEES IN ARTICLES HE WILL PREPARE FOR TIMES AFTER RETURN MANILA IN JULY.

2. AMSCROLL BRIEFED VIRAY 20 AND 21 MAY ON CASTRO'S SUGAR DIFFICULTIES INCLUDING PROBLEMS JAPAN HAVING IN DEALING WITH CUBA. AMWASP-1 (IDEN B) MADE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW 20 MAY WHO MADE POINT JAPAN IS NATURAL MARKET FOR PHILLIPPINE SUGAR. VIRAY TOOK EXTENSIVE NOTES AND ACCEPTED DOCUMENTATION OF STATEMENTS. HE ALSO BRIEFED ON RASH OF CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE DEFECTIONS AND MEANING OF THIS TO CASTRO AND AMSCROLL ARRANGED FOR HIM TO MEET A FORMER SHIP CAPTAIN WHO DEFECTED (QUSAILOR 13).

SECRET

SECRET

3. VIRAY SAID HE WISHED STAY IN TOUCH WITH AMSCROLL AND RECEIVE THEIR PUBLICATIONS. NEXT STEP WILL BE FOR AMSCROLL TO WRITE VIRAY AFTER HIS RETURN MANILA. REQUEST BY POUCH TRACES AND ANY SUGGESTIONS MANILA MAY HAVE SINCE OUTLET FOR AMSCROLL ECONOMIC INFORMATION IN MANILA WOULD BE USEFUL. POUCHING COPY LATEST AMSCROLL ECONOMIC REPORT FOR INFO STATION.

4. INDEX VIRAY.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CL[illegible]FIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
DISSEM BY 25/

ACTION
WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR RI/AN, FE8, DO4, DO/H3, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI/OPS, CI/OA

SECRET 242313Z CITE JMWAVE 1093 25 [illegible] 23843

MANILA INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF WAVE 0192 (IN 23837)

IDENS:

A. UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

B. GILBERTO R. ALEMANY, CUBAN TRADE COUNSELLOR, TOKYO, WHO DEFECTED AUGUST 1965.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

WH/C/P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief of Station, Bogota

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE RPV

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMSCROLL
Letter from the National Association of Sugar Cane Growers, Cali, Colombia

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For addressees to determine.

REFERENCE: DIR-03229

cit: Colombia

Regarding letter from subject, who is the

1. We forward by separate cover a copy of a letter (with translation) from Jaime *LOZANO, President of the National Association of Sugar Cane Growers of Cali, Colombia that was recently received by AMSCROLL which was in response to AMSCROLL's mailing the Association the text of public statement made by AMRAIN-1 and AMSNAKE-1. Needless to say, AMSCROLL will continue the Association on its mailing list and has responded to this letter with its own letter of appreciation.

2. It occurs to WAVE that this organization might be useful in implementing the reference, particularly in view of the fact that Colombia might have as much as 200,000 tons of sugar available for export this year (per paragraph 4 of the reference). WAVE will be happy to undertake any action requested of it by the addressees if this should be an exploitable lead.

3. There are no WAVE traces for either LOZANO or his organization.

Roger E. [illegible]
for Philip G. ELMARD

MAY 20 1966

Att'D RID/AN

Attachment: USC
Letter and translation

Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/att. usc
2- COS/Bogota, w/att. usc - To cut Pouch
2- C/WH, w/o att.
→ 2 cc to WH/3/CO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

19-120-26

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
16 May 66	MAY 18 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-25153

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 Att.

ASOCIACION NACIONAL DE CULTIVADORES DE CAÑA DE AZUCAR
CALI - COLOMBIA

EDIFICIO SURAMERICANA
DE SEGUROS
CALLE 12 CARRERA 5a.
10o. PISO

TELEGRAFO: "ASOCAÑA"
APARTADOS:
AEREO 44-40
NACIONAL 840
TELEFONO: 88-2-00

2P

Cali, Mayo 2 de 1.966

MAY 20 1966

Señor
Director del Economic Research Bureau
Box 3940
Miami (Florida).

Muy estimado amigo:

Por intermedio del Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales que funciona en Cali, tuvimos la oportunidad de recibir los Boletines Nos.9 y 9-A de ustedes que contienen las declaraciones de los señores Esparza Tabares y Tarrab Miranda sobre los problemas económicos de Cuba.

Estas declaraciones las hemos considerado de la mayor significación y les estamos dando amplia publicidad por medio de uno de los Boletines de nuestra Asociación que circula tanto entre la industria azucarera y medios económicos de este país, como en la prensa y radio nacionales.

Esperamos que esta publicidad cuente con el agrado de su organización y mucho apreciaríamos si incluyen el nombre nuestro para que nos sean enviados los Boletines o publicaciones de ustedes que tengan especial relación con las actividades cubanas en materia de azúcar. Nosotros representamos en Colombia la industria azucarera y somos la organización que integra las actividades de tan importante sector de nuestra economía.

Les damos nuestras gracias anticipadas por la atención que estas líneas les merezcan y los saludamos de la manera más cordial.

Atentos amigos,

ASOCIACION NAL. DE CULTIVADORES DE CAÑA DE AZUCAR

Jaime Lozano
Jaime Lozano
Presidente.

S/C ATT #1 TO UFGA 25153

CS COPY

JL/nc.

19-120-26

Translation:

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SUGAR GROWERS - CALI, COLOMBIA

Cali, May 2, 1966

Director
Economic Research Bureau
Box 3940,
Miami (Florida).

My very dear friend:

Through the Center for Economic and Social Research that operates in Cali, we had the opportunity to receive your Bulletins Nos. 9 and 9-A, which contain the statements made by Messrs. Esparza Tabares and Tarrab Miranda regarding the economic problems of Cuba.

We have considered these statements of the utmost significance, and we are giving them wide publicity through one of the Bulletins of our Association that circulates among the sugar industry and the economic circles of this country as well as among the national press and radio.

We hope that this publicity will be to the liking of your Organization and we would appreciate it very much if you would include our name so that we are sent those of your Bulletins or publications that are especially related to Cuban activities in matters of sugar. In Colombia, we represent the sugar industry and we are the organization that integrates the activities of such an important sector of our economy.

We thank you in advance for your kind attention to these lines and convey to you our most cordial greetings.

Your friends,

NATIONAL ASSN. OF SUGAR CANE GROWERS

(sgd.) Jaime Lozano, President

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING	
PROCESSED	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational/AMSCROLL/AMRAIN
Tapes of AMRAIN Press Conference Held 5 April 1966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

Under separate cover we are forwarding the tapes of the Press Conference held by AMRAIN on 5 April 1966 under the auspices of AMSCROLL.

for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments: USC (att)
3 tapes

Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/atts. usc

19-120-26

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
12 April 66	APR 1[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-24955

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-49/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO 19-120-26
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES

28
21

SECRET

C00000034

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WE 8, ADDP, C/OPS, RI/AN, DO4, DO/H3, CI/IC2, CA2, CA/PROP

MICROFILMED
MAR 31 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET 161808Z

DIR OTTA CITE WAVE 9650

16 Mar 66 IN 76425

28

TYPIC AMSCROLL MHVIPER

1. ON 15 MARCH WAVE ASSET AMSCROLL (IDEN) RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS JOHN WIES, AN OFFICIAL OF DELHI EXPORT AND SERVICE, LTD., DELHI, ONTARIO. SAID THAT DELHI HAD TRADED FOR TWO AND ONE HALF YEARS WITH CUBA UNTIL DECEMBER 64 WHEN TRADING SUSPENDED AS UNABLE COLLECT AMOUNTS DUE. WIES SAID HE THEN WENT CUBA IN ATTEMPT COLLECT. INSTEAD JAILED UNTIL FEB 65. AMONG CHARGES WAS HE KUBARK AGENT. UPON RETURN CANADA HE UNSUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT TO INTEREST CANADIAN GOVT HIS CASE. THEREAFTER RETAINED LAWYER AND NOW PREPARING SUIT. SAID HIS LAWYER ALSO REPRESENTS OTHER CANADIAN FIRMS WITH OUTSTANDING CLAIMS AGAINST CUBA AND HIS SUIT BEING PREPARED IN CONJUNCTION OTHERS. OBJECT IS TO IMPOUND CUBAN ASSETS TO OBTAIN SATISFACTION CLAIMS.

2. WIES SAID HE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING APPROACHING KUBARK OR OTHER ODYOKE AGENCY OFFICE IN CANADA TO FILE THIS CASE BUT DID NOT KNOW WHERE TO TURN. HE DECIDED INSTEAD TO CALL AMSCROLL AS HIS FIRM IS RECIPIENT ITS ECONOMIC BULLETIN.

SECRET

19-120-26
16 Mar 1966

IN 76425 2/2

ADDED THAT AS ANTI-CASTRO ORG AMSCROLL WOULD KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH INFO HIS EXPERIENCES. OFFERED GIVE FACTS TO AMSCROLL IF REP WOULD COME HIS OFFICE OR HE WOULD COME AMSCROLL OFFICE IF EXPENSES PAID. AMSCROLL CHIEF NON-COMMITTAL AND SAID WOULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH COLLEAGUES AND TELEPHONE WIES.

3. DELHI FIRM IS ON AMSCROLL MAILING LIST FOR ITS BULLETIN. SUGGEST WIES CLAIMS WORTH EXPLORING FURTHER. REQUEST TRACES AND ADDEES REACTIONS BY 18 MARCH IF POSSIBLE DUE FACT WIES EXPECTING CALL FROM AMSCROLL.

4. WAVE TRACES INDICATE WIES CANADIAN WHO MADE TRIPS HAVANA IN FEB, MARCH, APRIL, MAY AND APPARENTLY NOV 63 (AMLIST-1 AND AMCOVE REPORTS). IN FEB 64 SIGNED CONTRACT TO PROVIDE TWENTY FIVE MILLIONS DOLLARS WORTH OF CHEMICALS TO CUBA. (IN50337) OTTA 2207 OF 24 DEC 64 REPORTED WIES ATTEMPTING OBTAIN LETTER FROM GOVT OFFICIALS EXONERATING HIM FROM BLACKMAIL CHARGES.

5. INDEX WIES.

SECRET

CFN 9650 15 MARCH AMSCROLL JOHN WIES DELHI EXPORT AND SERVICE LTD DELHI ONTARIO CUBA DECEMBER 64 FEB 65 CANADA NOT KNOW AMSCROLL 18 MARCH NOV 63 AMLIST-1 AMCOVE FEB 64 2207 24 DEC 64

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE R
TOTAL COPIES 36

28/21 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WE8, ADDP, C/OPS, C/FI 2, RI/AN, CA2, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H3

FI

INDEXED AND CONTROL CODED
MATCHED NR

16 Mar 66 IN 76430

S E C R E T 161807Z

DIR OTTA CITE WAVE 9651

TYPIC AMSCROLL MHVIPER

REF WAVE 9650 C/IN 76425

IDEN: MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

S E C R E T

CFN 9651 9650 MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONACA

BT

19-120-26
16 March 1966

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Soviet Agricultural Problems

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Please provide Radio Free Europe study.

The Station has read the attached article from The Wall Street Journal with considerable interest. If readily available we will appreciate a copy of the RFE report on this subject which is mentioned in this article. Material of this nature is most useful in the AMSCROLL effort (via radio and written analysis) to support its thesis that if after forty-two years the Soviets have not solved their industrial and agricultural problems how can the Cubans hope to do so in less?

for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment: h/w
article

Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/att.

1 att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

19-120-26

DATE TYPED
14 Feb 66

DATE DISPATCHED
FEB 15 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-24517

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-49/3

14-00000

[illegible] fr CSCH 24517

Commodities

Soviet Grain Imports Expected to Continue Despite Big Plans to Boost Farm Output

By RAY VICKER
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

A drastic revision of the Soviet Union's agriculture is getting under way aimed at lifting farm production by improving the lot of the peasant. For 1966, Russian leaders are deliberately slowing industrial growth to the smallest increase in the postwar period, while they count on a sharp upsurge in agriculture to propel their economy forward.

Between 1966 and 1970, the Russians plan to pour an average of $13.5 billion a year in investments into agriculture, up from $11 billion in 1964 and slightly more last year. They're encouraging free marketing of fruits and vegetables from small private plots held by peasants. Farm pay is being increased. In summer or fall, the first Farmers' Congress since 1935 will be held to plan fresh ways of stimulating production.

Evidence indicates the Soviets have a tough job on their hands. The likelihood is that the Communist world will continue as a major importer of grains over the next few years.

The scope of the Russian agricultural overhaul is being analyzed in Munich by Soviet specialists of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which beam anti-Communist programs into Soviet bloc countries, and by authorities in foreign ministries in Western Europe and by American Government officials.

May Have Important Side Effects

The success or failure of the Soviet campaign may have an important bearing on world grain trade, American farm programs, the cold war and Soviet political attitudes toward the U.S.

Agriculture is the Achilles' heel of the Communist world. The Soviet government reported last week that grain output dropped 21% last year to 120.5 million metric tons from 152.1 million in 1964. The result is a continuing need for big grain imports. In the crop year ending June 30, more than 35% of the world's commercial movement of wheat—about 19 million metric tons—is expected to go into Communist lands. A metric ton is 2,200 pounds.

The U.S. has only a small portion of that trade. Canada, Australia, Argentina and France are major Communist bloc suppliers. But those bloc sales deplete their export stocks, reducing competition elsewhere for the U.S. Wheat stocks of major exporters may be under 30 million tons at the end of the current crop year, just over half the 1959-63 average. So the anticipated continuation of Communist grain purchases could lift world export prices. It also may result in an increase of production goals in U.S. farm programs.

How does the Soviet farm-uplift campaign fit into the future world trade picture for grain? Only Romania will have surpluses. The Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and possibly Bulgaria, will need imports, predicts Carl R. Zoerb, Radio Free Europe's top agricultural economist. A U.S. Department of Agriculture official says: "It should come as no great surprise if the Communist countries remained in the grain market, perhaps up and down, but in, for some years to come."

Outlook for 1966 Cloudy

Even as the new drive starts, the outlook for the 1966 crop is cloudy. Not long ago, I. Khoroshilov, a member of the collegium of

Markets at a Glance



COMMODITY INDEXES

Dow-Jones Futures, Friday—138.11, up 0.70; last year, 136.53.

Dow-Jones Spot — 143.91, up 0.36; last year, 143.42.

Reuters United Kingdom—474.1, off 1.5; last year; 449.5. (1931 equals 100.)

FUTURES PRICES

Higher — Wheat, oats, soybeans, soybean meal, soybean oil, cottonseed oil, potatoes, cattle, coffee, copper, lead, zinc, silver, wool, cotton, hides, Chicago rye and New York rubber.

Irregular—World sugar, corn and frozen pork bellies.

Lower—Cocoa, domestic sugar, eggs, platinum, flaxseed, Winnipeg rye, London and Singapore rubber.

---

average $32 a month for the collective farmer, as against $91 a month for the industrial worker, So peasants try by every means to leave the collective farm, he says.

In this situation, some analysts of the Communist world warn against being misled by grandiose plans of the Soviets. They note that former Premier Nikita Khrushchev launched equally impressive farm programs, raising farm investments from $6.6 billion in 1959 to $11 billion in 1964. Yet gross farm output rose only 10%.

V. Zhulin, a senior agronomist on a state farm in the Altai territory of Southern Siberia, put his finger on a key problem in one recent report. He said, "We must consider just how and what is necessary to make the peasant feel responsible for the harvest daily, hourly and for the whole year. No agronomic or social control can compensate for this lack of responsibility." So far the Russians are skirting this problem. Party bureaucrats aren't yet willing to surrender their power over the land to decision-making peasants.

• • •

the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture, warned that winter wheat seedings throughout the country were endangered as a result of the dry fall.

Says one Radio Free Europe report: "Thus it seems conservative to submit that only if optimum weather conditions prevail throughout the Soviet Union could the ambitious 1966 farm plan be achieved, which is highly unlikely."

At the Institute for the Study of Soviet Rus[illegible] some revolutionary technological innovation, there is no possibility of the Soviets attaining their main targets." Targets call for a rise in total farm output of nearly 10% this year alone. Yet Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev himself admitted that gross farm output increased by only 10% in the last six years.

Such a degree of stagnation is even greater than many Western observers had projected, says one Radio Free Europe report.

Evidence of Stagnation

Stagnation is evident. Peasants on 37,600 collective and 10,000 state farms lack incentives, since they receive only the residue of crops after state collections. Weather is grim. Distribution is outdated. Decisions are made by distant bureaucrats.

On the wide plains of the Ukraine, rutted wagon tracks connect isolated collectives, where the horse still is common. In Siberia, farm plots carved from scrub evergreens lie under snow most of the year. In Kazakhstan, where land stretches to far horizons like the sage brush country of the American West, brisk winds blow topsoil from "virgin lands" agricultural plots.

Statistics for 1960 show the Soviets harvested only 11.4 bushels of wheat an acre compared with the U.S. average of 26 bushels an acre. Yields haven't changed much since, and similar yield gaps exist for corn, sugar beets, oats, barley and other products. Farming still employs a third of Russian families. Crop land totals about 600 million acres, some 50% more than in the U.S., yet Russia must import grain.

This is prompting considerable soul searching in the USSR. Blasts from hinterland officials are surprisingly candid.

In Volgograd, one official complains: "On the farms in the region there exists an acute shortage of field tractors and grain combines. For every 2,500 acres of cropland we have two crawler-type tractors, and for every 2,500 acres of grain crops, only three combines."

From Bashkiria, a productive farm republic in the Urals, comes another complaint: Of 620 collective farms in the republic, only 150 are fully electrified. Of the inhabited centers in the republic, which has a population of more than 3 million, 60% don't use electricity at all.

Vasily F. Garbuzov, Soviet minister of finance, recently reported in a confidential document: Agricultural capital in the Soviet Union averages $2.200 a man, whereas in the U.S. it averages $11,000 a man, or five times larger.

Flight From the Land

A flight from the land currently is accentuating problems. From all parts of the country come reports of peasants abandoning farm life for the supposedly gay life of cities, even though the cities may be only Novosibirsk or Baku.

In the Pskov region, I. S. Gustov, party secretary, complains that in the last seven years the number of able-bodied farmers in his area has been halved from 200,000. Says he: "If the loss continues at the same rate, in 10 years there will be no able-bodied farmers left." He complains that in his area, wages

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMSCROLL —
Summary of Radio Broadcasts for the Period 19 October to 20 January 1966, inclusive.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. Beginning with the broadcast for 19 October 1965 the Station at its request began receiving a summary of each AMSCROLL AMTHIGH program. We forward by separate cover these summaries through the evening of 20 January 1966 (with the exception of the periods of 28-30 November and 2-4 January for which no summary was prepared). Henceforth these summaries will be forwarded on an at least bi-weekly basis.

2. The Station is attempting to improve both the punch and the quality of these programs. We believe, for example, that more emphasis should be placed upon regime failures and upon the needless economic mess. Further, we are trying to refine the "irritability" factor so far as Castro and the regime are concerned due to the sensitivity of Castro to this type of attack. Calling Castro (on 19 January) the "Soviets' barking hound dog" is a sally in this direction.

3. As usual with programs of this nature the size and reaction of the audience is most difficult to ascertain. It is some comfort to be able to record that during this period 10 letters have been received by AMSCROLL that have been inspired by this program. The President's uncle, Carlos Dorticos, told AMSCROLL-3 that he had been a frequent listener to this program and that he had listened to this program at his home the night before he left Cuba.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment: USC (att'd)
Broadcast summaries

Distribution:
3- C/WH, w/att., usc
2- WH/C, w/o/att.

CS COPY

19-132-26

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
27 Jan 66

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 31 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-24421

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-49/3

"HABLA.... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

November 1, 1965: "There will be no changes in the Blockade of Red Cuba".- A comment on the rumors that U.S. policy on Cuba will "soften". It is indicated that Washington, for humanitarian reasons, accepted Castro's parley to evacuate the spiritually wounded. We also comment on the statement of a Washington official who said that "the fear that the U.S. may alter its relations with Cuba is unfounded (and) there is no prospect for a change in our relations". We arrive at the conclusion that U.S. policy on the subject will no vary: Castro will be economically strangled and there is no future for Communism in this Continent.

"What About Political Prisoners?".- Fidel Castro has taken a series of steps that limit, by several means, the offer he made to allow dissatisfied Cubans to leave the Island. Even though no public statements have been made about the political prisoners, it may be expected that this matter has been considered in the negotiations, and that Fidel Castro must be forced to play fairly in order that he may not trade with the agony and the hope of 70,000 political prisoners and with the hope and the anguish of their relatives.

November 2, 1965: "Bureaucracy and Red Tape can be done away with".- A comment on the 20-year term given the "Responsable" of "Colective" 17, of Regional 2-33 of the Cuban Consolidated Enterprise of Grocery Stores, one Roberto Montes de Oca Ramos, and on the creation of the Ministry of Food Industries, as the typically Stalinist system to imprison officials in times of famine, and to create more bureaucratic agencies in an attempt to solve the problem. Cuba's administrative apparatus is a complicated spider-web: the Ministry for the Sugar Industry, the Industrial Dept. of the INRA, the Ministry of Domestic Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the National Bank, the Ministry for Agricultural and Cattle Affairs, the Consolidated Enterprise of Grocery Stores, the "Collectives", the Regionals, and now the Ministry of Food Industry. Lots of bureaucrats. Tons of paper. Miles of Red tape. But, still, no food!

"Intrigues about the Tri-Continental Conference".- Ben Barka, the mastermind of the Tri-Continental Conference scheduled for Havana, mysteriously disappeared in Paris. We remember that, when it was thought that this conference would be held in Algeria under Chinese sponsorship, its masterminds, Che Guevara and Ben Bella, disappeared. The character who took up Che's role in this Conference, Ben Barka, now vanishes in Paris. Could it be that what happened to Ben Bella is about to happen to Fidel?

November 3, 1965: "How Abject Can Castro Be!".- In his recent statement to three American and one Spanish journalists, Castro appears arrogant and acts as though he didn't care for an "aggiornamento' with the U.S. However, from the context of his statements it is quite obvious that he would like nothing better than being re-admitted to the Latin American community and getting the blessing of the U.S.

His attitude must have been a terrible disappointment to his followers, who must necessarily see it as evidence that the U.S.S.R. is in full retreat in its economic war with the U.S. over Cuba.

"Reticences That Reveal Insincerity, Caution and Fear".- At last, the Old Guard has spoken out through Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, following the devastating "purge" that it underwent in the hands of Fidel Castro. But fear of a second, bloody phase of the purge has kept Carlos Rafael Rodriguez from openly attacking Fidel Castro.. Instead, he has taken resource to veiled reticence and references to Fidel Castro's "petty-burgeois" past, mixed with insincere praises, in order to make it known that the "classics" of Marxism-Leninism still distrust Fidel. If their differences with the "new wave" are really a thing of the past, why does Old-Guard man Carlos Rafael now bring up the fact that Fidel was not one of them at the beginning, and that he was not a true Marxist-Leninist?.

November 4, 1965: "The Reaction to Camarioca: Castro's Resentment and Bitterness".- Castro's vow to let dissatisfied Cubans out was his own error of appreciation. President Johnson took the challenge and then Castro tried to sound out the U.S. for co-existentialist overtures. Hence his rejection of the Red Cross to mediate in the matter. His bitter reaction forbidding the departure from Camarioca shows the extent of his frustration. All these developments allow us to predict that Castro is in such bad shape that radical changes may soon be expected in Cuba.

"More on Carlos R. Rodriguez' Statements".- In his statements, Carlos R. Rodrigues has uncovered that Fidel Castro has created the objective conditions for fractional work within the Party with the exclusion of the Old Guard and of the Students Directorate from the executive bodies of the Party. This reveals a state of internal rift and decomposition, and such revelation, coming from a significant Old Guard source such as Rodriguez, foretells rather unpredictable consequences.

November 5, 1965: "Sitting Bull (Carlos Rafael) Has Spoken!" Emphasis on Carlos Rafael Rodriguez' personal features, on his ambition to become the Cuban Revolution's "Lenin", all of which dreams have been torn to pieces by Castro. Likewise, Carlos Rafael, strengthened by Moscow's backing, has pointed out, though in a rather subtle manner, the action of the unknown men of the Party in the struggle against Castroism. This he did when he indirectly charged that Castro was a petty-burgeois.

"Castro Caught his Fingers on the Door and the Door Slammed on his Nose".- Because his situation is more difficult every day, Castro hinted that his conversations on the Cuban exodus meant the beginning of deeper negotiations with the U.S. This is false. Cuban Communism is not negotiable. When President Johnson opened the doors of the U.S. to all Cubans, he left it well established that this was done because of humanitarian reasons, and that Cubans would be welcomed here until they could "return to their homeland and find it free from fear".

November 6, 1965: "Stop this Nonsense... Where is Che Guevara?".- Where is Che Guevara? This is a question that constantly hammers on Fidel's ears, whenever journalists, diplomats, etc., ask it to him. Besieged by this question, Castro one day told a correspondent for the Madrid daily "Pueblo": "I think that Guevara may never return to Cuba. He may be somewhere in Argentina". Castro, like Stalin did before him, begins by stating that Guevara will not return to Cuba. Such a question may only be answered by the murderer when he speaks of his victim. On the other hand, he is preparing the setting for the "discovery" of Guevara's corpse: it will be said that asthma killed him, or the imperialists, or the head-hunteres of South America.

"The Second Chapter of Marcos Rodriguez' Trial.- In his statements to American journalists, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez has dug out the issue of the trial against an informer, which trial was regarded as one against the "Old Guard". This trial has something more to it: the "dossier" on Joaquin Ordoqui, which Fidel keeps hidden in his sleeve in order to produce it whenever it may suit his purposes. Perhaps Carlos Rafael has desinterred this issue to signify that internal rifts are more acute than ever before.

x November 8, 1965: "The Red Tyrant is Beyond Himself with Rage".- Comments on Castro's TV appearance yesterday. Castro is furious over the Cubans' rush to get out of the Island, and over the fact that technicians and doctors are about to desert him. He reacts by pretending to dismiss the doctors: "the grapes are sour". We remember Hatuey, the Indian chieftain who rejected conversion because he said that if his Spanish tormentors were going to Heaven, then he didn't want to go to Heaven. Similarly, if Heaven is Castro's Red paradise, the doctors and technicians want out of it.

"What About the Tri-Continental Conference?".- The abduction and disappearance of Ben Barka seems to have suspended preparations for the Tri-Continental Conference that the Reds had scheduled for January in Havana. Judging by the kidnapping of the chief organizer, this Conference, which is rejected by China, is given the same treatment that forced the suspension of the Algiers' Conference that the Chinese sponsored. Let's wait for the second chapter and we will see whether the Conference is held after all or not.

x November 9, 1965: "What Goes From One Nov. 7th to the Other".- We recall that on Nov. 7, last year, Castro was interviewed by a correspondent for the New York Times. At the same time, he said that he would down whatever American U-2 planes he could with this surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles. He also said that he would use Soviet troops in the defense of his Communist regime, and that he would welcome a military alliance with the U.S.S.R.. Now, a year later; his heart bleeding over his parting with Red China, and under brutal Soviet pressure, Castro's Nov. 7 speech inaugurating a hospital sounds like that of a "constructive" ruler whose concern is for the welfare of the people, and who asks that same people "to march up the (socialist) path". He is no longer arrogant. He belatedly begs for the people's support.

"What About Latin American Communist Parties?".- Castro dismissed the fact that China did not greet the reorganization and change of the Cuban Communist Party, but spite and concern were obvious in the tone of his voice. Castro knows that he has betrayed China. On the other hand, the Communist Parties of Latin America have not addressed Castro any congratulatory messages either, which indicates that they are beginnning to turn their backs on him on account of his "purging" of the old guard. Under such conditions, Castro's subservience to Moscow is greater every day. Castro has entered the most unsurmountable phase of his crisis.

x November 10, 1965: "The Reason and Nature of the Economic Blockade".- From Castro's Nov. 7th speech it may be deducted that the U.S.S.R. has only been able to supply him with weapons, bullets and cannons. We state the reasons why the U.S.S.R. will not be able to invest more in Cuba, and that, at the same time, the nations of this Hemisphere will continue their economic boycott of Castro's Cuba. There can be no economic coexistence between Red Cuba and the rest of the Continent.

"Continental Resistance to Aggression".- Even though the Lima meeting of military chiefs from 17 American countries did not take up the question of the Inter-American Army, the assembled chiefs unquestionably took a step towards its establishment, which will be ultimately decided on by the O.A.S. Aggression to the Dominican Republic, and persistence in Cuba-drafted subversive plans against the rest of the Hemisphere, urgently demand that adequate continental security plans be adopted in order to face up to the threat and put an end to aggression.

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

November 11, 1965: "Coexistence Dreams Come Tumbling Down".- Thesis: There can be no coexistence between Castro and the U.S. After Castro returned from Moscow in 1963, and under pressure from Krrushchev, he began his first conciliatory overtures with the United States. Nikita had pleaded geographical and economic impossibility to maintain his commitments with the Castro tyranny. Result: The Soviet Union cannot continually support Castro and the U.S., on ~~their~~ its part, rejects Castro-Communism. In face of this situation, the men in the Cuban armed forces and in the government have only one dignified course of action: to remove the despot from power in order that Cuba may emerge from chaos and tragedy.

"The O.A.S. Should Not Postpone Its Meeting".- The same Castroite aggression that earlier forced the postponement of the O.A.S. Conference now warrants that the Conference no longer be postponed. The said aggression has created a situation that demands new instruments and agencies to put the O.A.S. in shape to face up to the subversive threat planned and executed in Cuba. The process that started at Punta del Este must be brought to a successful end: the re-establishment of democracy in Cuba so that the Pearl of the Antilles may rejoin the Inter-American system.

November 12, 1965: This program was entirely devoted to reading Dr. Sciglie's article entitled "There Will Never Be Coexistence Or 'Making Up' between Castro-Communism and the Free Peoples of the Hemisphere".

November 13, 1965: "Cuba's Internal Economic Front is Disastrous".- Castro, seeing that he'll never accomplish "coexistence" with the U.S., and that the USSR is gradually withdrawing its assistance to his regime, seeks refuge in the internal economic front, and tries to increase the agricultural production of the peasants. The open failure of said purposes became evident ever since Castro took 150,000 men from the countryside and turned them into soldiers, militiamen, informers, etc. There is no way to replace this rural labor force. If these men were returned to the country, they would plot against Castro. If they are not returned, they cannot work.

"The Fate of Communist Puppets".- The fate of Ben Bella in Algeria and of Sukarno in Indonesia show what Communist puppets can expect. Both men were intimate friends of Fidel Castro, both visited Cuba, and both served the same Red master whom Fidel Castro serves. The outcome in their cases constitute a writing on the wall for the bearded tyrant.

"HABLA.... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

November 15, 1965: "Fidel Castro's Grave Sugar Problem".- Following Moscow's promises and instructions, Castro plunged deep into overproduction of sugar in the hope that he would be able to sell the whole crop. Last year he turned out over 6,000,000 tons of sugar and about half of it is still in the warehouses. The Russians never purchased it. This year Castro is blowing his top in face of his dilemma: If he turns out 6.5 million tons, the USSR will not buy it. If he cuts production down, the cane crop will be lost. In face of such a dilemma, he escapes to the Sierra Maestra with the doctors and, from there, he puts the blame for all his woes on the U.S.

"Storm Airs Blowing on the Turquino".- The rally atop Mt. Turquino became a kind of a requiem for the tyrant's aspirations. He had hoped that the negotiations aimed at evacuating dissatisfied Cubans to the U.S. would pave the way for an 'aggiornamento' with the Americans, but his maneuver has turned on him like a boomerang. So, besides himself with rage, he lashed at the U.S. On top of all this, Cuban patriots showed that they are still active, and that the Malecón Drive is vulnerable to successful commando action.

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R U.L.)

November 16, 1965: "The Rio Meeting of Foreign Ministers".- A comment on the II Extraordinary Meeting of Inter-American Foreign Ministers, which will convene tomorrow, Nov. 17, in the city of Río de Janeiro, Brasil. The main points in the agenda: economic development, the Alliance for Progress, the strenghtening of the Inter-American system, the improvement of instruments for the peaceful solution of controversies, and the strengthening of representative democracy. Lastly, and even though this is not a concrete point in the agenda, special attention will be devoted to the struggle against communism throughout the Americas. To this respect, the VI Meeting of American Armies has just taken place in Lima, Perú, and in it concrete decisions, plans and formulas were adopted.

"Another O.A.S. Step".- The subject of subversion is unavoidable to the Río meeting. The Punta del Este declaration, the diplomatic isolation and the July, 1964, trade blockade sanctioning the aggression against Venezuela, put the Communist regime on the verge of collective military intervention. Subversion has continued, and sustained Castro-Communist interference in the Dominican Republic will force the O.A.S. to take further steps in sanctioning the aggressor.

"HABLA.... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

November 17, 1965: "War Drums on the Sino-Soviet Border".- On the basis of long-time difference between Red China and Russia, we agree with Vice-President Humphrey who, during a recent TV appearance, disclosed that Soviet and Chinese border garrisons were being beefed up lately. The motto "more cannons and less butter" is becoming fashionable again, with the consequent decrease of production and increase of military budget appropiations, as well as with a decrease of foreign aid to countries such as Cuba. From this, we may conclude that Castro's situation worsens day by day. Cuba's only solution is to get rid of Castro in order that it may once again enjoy peace and prosperity.

"Aspects of an Unsolved Rift".- The Communist Parties of the Americas are worried over the situation of their old Cuban comrades who live under a Damocles' sword in the hands of Fidel Castro. They have been unable to keep the trial of Marcos Rodriguez from having a second part in Ordoqui's case-file, which is also the second part of the "trial" against Cuba's old Commies. Latin Communists are having a clash with Fidel and with the Castroites of their respective countries, and they are engaged in fractional work to undermine Castro's designs and put their old comrades back in the leadership of the Cuban Party.

"HABLA.... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

November 18, 1965: "What Can Castro Get From The Russians?".- An analysis of Fidel's new stand, whereby he abandons neutrality between the USSR and Red China. In return for his "pledge of allegiance", the Kremlin has offered Castro an increase in economic and military aid. Perhaps the Russians will in fact give him guns, tanks and rockets once again in exchange for Cuban sugar. But as far as economic aid is concerned, Castro should know that Soviet-Bloc countries are firm about halting further investments in the Cuban failure. What is more, they are talking of demanding political, financial and economic reforms from the bearded despot that would permit minute inspection and guidance of Cuban affairs by his sponsors overseas. Will Castro tolerate such intervention? No one knows.

"The O.A.S. IN RIO".- The O.A.S., which convened yesterday in Rio, faces a continent-wide situation whose gravest problem is still Communist Cuban subversion and aggression. The process that began in Punta del Este and continued with the July 1962, meeting, must be brought to a successful end by taking more severe steps against the focal point of subversion and aggression: Communist Cuba.

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (V.R.U.L.)

November 19, 1965: "How the Anti-Communist Fight Goes".- A summary is made of the anti-Communist struggle in Asia, which is synthetized in the Indonesian events. There, anti-Communism is gaining force day by day. And in South Viet Nam, where the U.S. Army has just gained a great victory, restating the principle of defending the integrity of South Viet Nam. In the Americas, we can quote from the brave speech delivered by Brazilian President Marshall Castello Branco, who called for a revision of the old concepts of political intervention and creating that of counter-intervention against Communism. Lastly, we point out that the voice of arms rang out in Cuba with an attack against the Cuban coast line, which evidenced the Cubans' fighting spirit against Communism.

"Back to Popular-Front Tactics".- It is anounced that the Kremlin is returning to its policy of popular fronts, which was in vogue back in the 30s. Some of the results of this policy were Stalin's 'entente' with Hitler and Mussolini to put an end to the Spanish Republic. In France, after undermining its institutions and demoralizing the French People by means of the Popular Front, the Kremlin concocted the Nazi-Soviet agreement that unleashed the Second World War. This time, the whole thing is aimed at the Americas and the change is anounced in Havana. This is the new wrapping of continent-wide subversion and the purpose is to create an atmosphere of confidence and, eventually, to betray the (Communists') democratic and Catholic allies, as well and everyone else who is naive enough to join the Popular Fronts.

November 20, 1965: "A Tribute to Cuban Heroes".- A political, moral, military and revolutionary evaluation of the Cuban patriots' attack against the Eighth Police Precint, the Riviera Hotel and the house of puppet President Dorticos. In the article, it is indicated how Castro, even though he spends hundreds of millions of dollars to accomplish invulnerability, found out overnight that he is far from invulnerable to a naval attack perpetrated by a group of Cubans who wiled nearly inefficient weapons. Castro wrath over the failure of his spionage network knew no limits. We pay homage to the heroes who, with their action on Cuba, saluted the other heroes: the ones that shed their blood in Viet Nam.

"Counter-Intervention is Equivalent to Legitimate Self-Defense".- The stubborn, unwarranted interpretation of the doctrine of non-intervention has made it possible for the Communists to intervene themselves in the affairs of other countries, even militarily and on a large scale, as did the Castro forces in the Dominican Republic. The concept that hangs around the halls where O.A.S. meetings are held is that which allows for counter-intervention as a means of legitimate self-defense. This is equivalent to preventive action against subversion originated in Communist Cuba.

November 22, 1965: "Castro Lied About His Spanish Trade".- On the 21, Radio Havana told the Cuban people how beneficial trading with Spain was being. The bunch of Castroite lies must be exposed with facts and statistics in order to show that Spain's trade with Cuba, during the first eight months of 1965, has dwindled by 31% as compared with 1964. On the other hand, Spain has withdrawn its ships from the Cuban run, and does not seem very interested in Cuban orders for tuna fishing boats, since the productive capacity of its shipyards is already committed in advance till 1967. With false data, Castro tries to show that he has flouted the blockade, but the truth is that the blockade is flouting his own designs.

"Counter-Intervention: a Supplement to the Johnson Doctrine".- In Rio, Dean Rusk has proposed that the O.A.S. adopt what measures may be necessary to prevent another Communist regime from being established in this Hemisphere. This, essentially, was the doctrine that President Johnson stated when the aggression started against the Dominican Republic. Besides, among the Foreign Ministers, the concept of counter-intervention is gaining momentum as a way counter-attacking the aggressive forces. This means that the blockade and isolation imposed by the O.A.S. against the Communist regime, and the newly-issued Johnson Doctrine, are being supplemented in a manner that may be definitive towards ending the subversive threat that emanates from the focal point of aggression: Communist Cuba.

November 23, 1965: "New Shadows Over Cuba".- Dean Rusk's statements in Rio have superlative importance when he states the American stand regarding the defense of the Hemisphere from Communist aggression, whether with the concurrence of the other countries of the Continent, or unilaterally. On the other hand, we are informed of an epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease in Ukrania and European Russia which is affecting most of the Soviets' cattle production. All this indicates that the future holds no future in Cuba, if we may play with words, and that responsible men in the Castro Gvt. and armed forces have only one possible course of action left: to remove Castro and return Cuba to democracy and welbeing.

"The Great Maneuver of the Tri-Continental Conference".- The Kremlin leaders that boast the Tri-Continental Conference as a triumph over China, are using it at the same time for a far more dangerous maneuver against the American Continent. Subversive plans have failed, and now they are planning a tactical about-face to continue their subversive tasks through other means, i.e., the Latin American Popular Fronts. But the memories of that political epoch back in the 30s. and of its European consequences, are very much alive in the memory of the people for the new tactic to yield any fruits in the Americas.

14-00000

Radio Summaries

"HABLA.... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (U.R.U.L.)

December 1, 1965: "The Soviets Order The Sugar Harvest To Start".- While Raúl sought military and economic aid in the USSR, Fidel Castro defiantly warned that the sugar harvest would begin as late as Jan. 7. But back came Raúl from Moscow, not with a pledge of substantial aid, but with instructions to have the harvest begin immediately. That is why Castro changed his strategy and launched the harvest right away.

"What Is The Tri-Continental Conference?".- In the first place, the Tri-Continental Conference does not represent the countries of three continents, as its organizers claim, but rather the Communists and terrorists from the so-called "movements of national liberation" in those countries. In the second place, the Conference is a setting for the Sino-Soviet struggle for the leadership of the African and Asian Communist Parties, and the struggle goes on amidst intrigue, maneuvers, abductions and murders.

December 2, 1965: "Cuba Cannot Return To The Latin American World".- Once more Dean Rusk has clearly stated that, in order to be admitted back into the Inter-American community, Cuba must first severe its ties with the USSR and quit subversion and infiltration in this Continent. Castro's friends inside the O.A.S., who harboured hopes of bringing Cuba back into the Organization, should abandon them. Those "holier-than-thou" characters who pretend to defend self-determination and non-intervenvention in public, privately charge Castro-Communism and its aggressions.

"A Double-Play Against Peking And Castro".- By means of the Tri-Continental Conference, which summarizes a phase of maneuvering and counter-maneuvering within the Sino-Soviet rift, the Kremlin has managed to out-wit the Chinese, take control of African, Asian and Latin American Communist Parties, and deal a death blow to Castro's dream of becoming the sole leader of the Latin American Commies.

December 3, 1965: "France and Castroism".- Misfortunes never come alone, specially for Castro. Now, in view of his horrible financial crisis, his relations with France are obviously deteriorating. As evidence, we point out the French cancellation of a f. 75 million contract to build a quicklime, insecticide and fertilizer plant in Cuba.

"Castro Raises His Volume Again".- Castro's failure in his attempt to get the U.S. to change policy of extreme agitation, and he is promising arms to the subversive forces throughout the Americas. But there is one more reason: the Tri-Continental Conference, of which Castro wanted to be the center. However, he has been displaced to a secondary role. That is why his approach to subversion is closer to that of the Chinese than to that of the organizers of the Conference.

December 4, 1965: "Latin America Excludes Cuba From Its Plans".- As has been said, some characters in Latin America publicly encourage Castro's Cuba, but privately despise it and exclude it from their plans. An example is the Spanish plan to help in Latin America's industrialization, and its exclusion of Cuba. The 19 Latin American nations also banned Cuba from their U.N. plans for industrialization.

"Castro Is Moved By Dispair".- Rather than strength, Castro's speech of Dec. 2 denotes weakness and dispair. His bragging about arsenals with which he counts to help subversive froces throughout the Continent is a desperate provocation. There are three key pointes which corner Fidel Castro: One is the doctrine that subversion is aggression; the other one is the Johnson Doctrine, which became effective in the Dominican Republic, followed by Dean Rusk's Rio de Janeiro statement that the U.S., whether alone or accompanied, will intervene wherever aggression occurs.

December 6, 1965: "Castro's Economic Woes Grow: Now It's Mexico and Russia".- Recently, we talked of Cuba's difficulties in its relations with France. Now, we echo a report that Cuba's trade with Mexico is steadily dwindling. On the other hand, Russia's huge sales of gold to the world market in order to be able to pay for the wheat it has bought, brings the USSR's foreign exchange reserves down low, and this will mean further trouble for Castro.

"The Working Masses Against The Communist Regime".- With the dock workers of the U.S., Canada and Puerto Rico joining up, the labor boycott action is completed. Ships flying the flags of countries that trade with Castro will have a tough time at American ports, and the noose around Castro's neck is tightening.

December 7, 1965: "Death of Antonio Maceo".- This article was devoted to the glorification and remembrance of Gen. Antonio Maceo, the Supreme Commander of the Cuban Army of Liberation in the 1895 War of Independence, who was shot and killed in action on Dec. 7, 1896, near Punta Brava, Pinar del Rio. The Communists have attempted to erase the memory of this hero because Maceo was a halfbreed, of humble origin, and, nevertheless, Cuba's No. 1 soldier. Hence, to sustain their theories on class struggle, the Communists had to destroy the memory of the working-class hero of a burgeois nation.

"The Tri-Continental Challenge".- Aside from the meaning of the Tri-Continental Conference within the Sino-Soviet rift, the said meeting is a challenge to Inter-American law and security which comes from gangsters and Communist agents from three continents. Cuba, a satellite and the focal point of subversion and aggression to American countries, will be the setting.

December 8, 1965: "American Victory, Soviet Defeat".- We comment on America's great feat with the Gemini 7, while Russia's space thrust has suffered a severe set-back with its Luna-8.

"Castro Charged With Che Guevara's Murder".- Felipe Alvahuante, in the Mexican daily "El Universal", charges that Castro murdered Che Guevara on Soviet orders. Of course, the cheap novel concocted by Castro on Guevara can convince no one, and, in 9 months, no evidence has been produced that point to its truthfulness. Alvahuante's charge, therefore, is more acceptable than Fidel Castro's version.

December 9, 1965: "Sinkiang: Russians and Chinese on the Warpath".- Chinese-Soviet skirmishes near Sinkiang, while disguised as territorial differences, really respond to the ideological rift. The USSR increased its military budget by 5% at the expense of education, foreign aid and agricultural and industrial development, on the grounds that "American aggressiveness" force her to do so, but the truth is that it is the Chinese threat that promptes such a move. On the other hand, we can expect larger shipments of Soviet arms to Cuba, but a cut in economic aid.

"The Gemini 7".- The Gemini 7 flight and its scheduled meeting with the Gemini 6 will break all space flight records. The Soviet total of flying hours is tripled, and a similar advantage is reached over Soviet launchings. This is the exponent of the degree of development achieved by the West towards goals which the Communist world is not even approaching. Besides, it is a warning to Soviet leaders who seek to destroy the accomplishments of the West. If they were to attempt such destruction, they would be destroyed instead.

December 10, 1965: "A New Collapse of the Commie World".- The Marxist maxim that history is "irreversible" has collapsed once again, this time, in the Congo, Algeria, Indonesia and, more recently, in the Sudan. The African peoples are being reborn to political life, rapidly waking up from the Communist spell and taking an anti-Communist stand. The last country to do so is the Sudan, which has just outlawed the Sudanese Communist Party and warned all other parties having connections with the Reds that they may suffer the same fate.

"What's in and Behind the Agenda of the Tri-Continental Parley".- In the Tri-Continental Conference, the USSR will show off its triumph over the Chinese with respect to "liberation movements" in Africa. Taking advantage of Castro and Che Guevara, the Soviets managed to penetrate and divide several Parties in Latin America. There are several phases in the Kremlin's counter-maneuver: the 'coup' against Ben Bella, the suspension of the Algiers Conference, the vanishing of Che Guevara, the total submission of Castro and the change in Indonesia. Castro and Mao have been defeated by the Kremlin.

December 11, 1965: "We Forecast The Failure of the Forthcoming Sugar Harvest".- We go back to the subject of the Cuban "zafra" on the basis of Castro's June 8th statements, when he pledged the reconstruction of the Cuban sugar industry, the erection of a modern new sugar mill in the Cauto River valley, and a 6.5 million ton sugar harvest. What has been accomplished? The Cuban sugar industry is still in shambles, there is no new mill in the Cauto valley, and Castro, with pretexts and lies, is already attempting to justify that there will be no 6.5 million tons of sugar.

"The Bankruptcy of Cuba's Foreign Credit and the boycott".- Coinciding with the news issued by French fertilizer company was cancelling its Cuban contract due to Cuba's failure to pay for over $3 million's worth of merchandise, it was reported that the boycott would be extended. The dockworkers of Canada, the U.S. and Puerto Rico have joined the Latin American workers' boycott of vessels flying the flags of countries that trade with Red Cuba.

December 13, 1965: "A Explosive Power Struggle in Russia".- We analyze how the power struggle between Kosygin and Brezhnev is known through the stands taken by the Russian papers "Izvestia" and "Pravda", respectively the organs of the government and of the Communist Party. The Prime Minister's stand consists of pointing at the economic debacle and at the need to maintain the current level of military expenditures, while Brezhnev's position is one of advocating a strong-armed Red Army by increasing the military budget. The Army, in turn, has rewarded Brezhnev's support by causing the retirement of Mikoyan, so that 2nd Party Secretary Nikolai Podgorny could be kicked upstairs to the Presidency of the USSR. More changes are to come within the framework of this rift.

"Subversion in Uruguay and Monstruous terror in Venezuela".- The blueprint for violence in Uruguay is part of the general plans for Latin American subversion drafted in Cuba. The steps taken by the Uruguayan Government have checked the early dangers of Castro-Communist subversion, but it is significant that the Communists should have moved their target more to the south in order to provoke a Dominican-style civil strife. The abominable character taken by Venezuelan Red terror is also meaningful: a young housewife murdered by a bomb placed inside a Christmas present consistent of an image of the Virgin Mary.

December 14, 1965:"President Johnson: The Will of Freedom".- A comment on the statements made by President Johnson, who has reasserted U.S. determination to defend the freedom of South Viet Nam regardless of all possible consequences. We stress the sacrifice, in terms of wealth from the earth and human lives to which Red China forces North Viet Nam, while the Chines themselves laugh at peace efforts. This case is presented as an example to all other peoples, and what is bound to happen to Fidel Castro is also pointed out.

"They Talk Peace But Practice War".- Peace is a favorite subject of Communist propaganda. It is also one of the most deceitful ones, since, while the Commies talk of peace, they systematically reject all bona fide proposals to accomplish peace, such as in the case of Viet Nam. The Tri-Continental Conference schedulled for Jan. 3 bears the germ of violent conflict to create new Viet Nams in America and Africa.

--oOo--

Radio Scripts Summaries

"[illegible]... [illegible] [illegible]" (W.R.U.L)

December 15, 1965: "WHY THE CUBAN LEAVES THEIR BELOVED COUNTRY".- We rebuff an editorial published by the Havana newspaper "El Mundo" whereby the communists editorialists attack those Cuban whose leave for exile. We point at the real causes of the Cuban exodus, which we confirmed with the words of MAJ. Sergio del Valle, a prominent Castro officer, who in Ciudad Libertad, on Dec. 13 spoke of the harsh life of the peasants.

"TERRORIST TRAINING SCHOOLS AND ITS RESULTS".- It has been announced in Cuba that the number of graduates from the terrorists training schools of Minas del Frio will be increased to 8,000. This is the school where the Castroites trained Latin-American future guerrilla and terrorists in order to use them later in their respective countries. In Venezuela, one of Castro's favorite targets, a mountruous deed has just been perpetrated by the Communists, in the murder of Mrs. Pangol, who received a bomb mailed by some of the graduates from these Cuban schools.

December 16, 1965:

NEWS.- 1) U.S. bombers destroy huge power-plant in North Viet Nam.

2) Castro steps-up marihuana harvests for export.

"THE COMMUNISTS HAVE LOST THE CUBAN YOUTH".- In this article, we annalyze how Cuban youth, because of its natural thirst for knowledge, as first became interested in the scientific principles of Communism, thinking of the possibility of finding the answer to man's quest for happiness there. However, young Cubans are now disillusioned with the theory and practice of Marxist-Leninism, and they are obviously disassociating themselves from Castro-Communism. That is precisely why, a few days ago, the regime thought it convenient to call a national meeting of the Communist Youth. In this Red event, those leaders that failed in their task to indoctrinate the young were purged, and it was agreed that brain-washing would be a prerrogative of the political police of the State. Castro has lost the young. The young are fighting Castro. They must be helped.

"GEMINI 7 AND 6".- New records and goals have been accomplished by the U.S. with the rendez-vous of the Gemini 7 and 6 space capsules, specially as regards accuracy. We are inclined to think that there is no limit to scientific development in the conquest of space. The clean cut clarity of American reports on the space flight, contrasts with the obscure and somber secret surrounding Soviet experiments.

--oOo--

U.R. - WRUL Radio Scripts Summaries.

"[illegible]" (W.R.U.L.)

December 17, 1965:
NEWS.-

1) 11 Cubans sail to exile; 6 were conscripts, 4 draft-aged.

2) U.S. to bomb more industrial centers in North Viet Nam.

"Why Dr. Apel Killed Himself".- The story of Dr. Apel's suicide on account of the Soviet-East German Trade Agreement.

"The Bug in His Ear".- Carlos Rafael's new trip to Moscow, which has no official justification whatever, following a new article published in London, has put bug in Fidel's ear. Through articles and statements made abroad, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez seems to have been charged with the task of turning Communist Parties against Fidel and for the 'Old Guard'.

December 18, 1965:
NEWS.-

1) McNamara Outlines Effects of U.S. Raid on North Viet Nam Power Plant.

2) Ecuadorian Youth Congress Condemns Communism.

"Why Dr. Apel Killed Himself".- Continuation of above editorial. This part deals with similar difficulties confronted by Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Cuba.

"Precautions on the Eve of the 'Tri-Continental' Parley".- The Cuban regime has ordered a number of preventive arrests in order to head off the possibility of assassination attempts or kidnappings among the foreign delegates to the Tri-Continental parley. These steps are taken mostly against the pro-Chinese military. Castro, for his part fears that something may happen to him, as "something" happened to Ben Bella two days before the Algiers Conference, which then had to be called-off.

December 20, 1965:
NEWS.-

1) 28 New Refugees Sneak Out Of Cuba Aboard Small Vessel.

2) Spain To Send Medical Corps As Token Of Support to Viet Nam War.

EDITORIALS:

"Communist Must Fail In Cuba".- We echo reports by recent refugee arrivals concerning Castro's purchase of defective farming equipment. These purchases indicate why Castro-Communism is failing in Cuba thanks to the attitude of crooked merchants that still trade with Fidel, to the regime's own stupidity and to the resistance of the Cuban people.

"The Reds Want No Peace".- North Viet Nam has rejected all peace offers and made mockery of every approach attempted to put an end to the war. Moscow as well as Peiping keep their puppet from signing any truce and force him to maintain a war for which they give him no aid. Communism would have several more Viet Nams in other continents, in order to extend the conflict at the expence of the peoples.

December 21, 1965:

NEWS.-

1) Four More Cubans Slip Away To Freedom: Three Draft-Aged Youths And The Father Of One.

2) Juanita Castro And Dr. Carlos Dorticos, Relative of Cuban President, Talk About Cuban Situation In Miami.

EDITORIALS:

"Not Even Castro's And Dorticos' Relatives Want To Stay In Cuba".- Castro's efforts to prevent the Cuban exodus are in vain. Not even the close relatives of the Cuban President and Premier want to stay on the Red Island. Carlos Dorticos, an uncle to Pres. Osvaldo, has echoed the failure of the regime's backbone: economic planning. We stress his words that Cuban foreign-exchange reserves are low because sugar production uses more dollars than it will yield.

"The Unsolved Conflict And The Tri-Continental Parley".- The still unsolved crisis of the Dominican Republic has bounced back in so grave a manner as to have caused 40 dead in Santiago, and Castroite violence continues because the forces of subversion want to have a banner for agitation in the Tri-Continental Conference. The masterminds of subversion in Cuba provoke these acts of violence in the Dominican for this purpose.

December 22, 1965:

NEWS:

1) Russia Suffers As International Students' Union Parley Must Be Moved From Sudan to Czechoslovakia.

2) U.S. Troops Auth~~orized T~~o Pursue The Enemy In Cambodian Territory.

EDITORIALS:

"The Struggle Within The Communist Regime".- A continuation of the preceding article on Dr. Carlos Dorticos' statements concerning internal rifts among the Cuban Communists. According to Dr. Dorticos, the "Old Guard" is persecuted and the Army is growingly dissatisfied.

"How The Soviet Grip On Cuba Grows Tighter All The Time".- With the arrival in Cuba of 227 Soviet technicians to be assigned directly to the sugar mills, Russia gets direct control of Cuba's sugar production. The same thing happens with the minerals and the exploitation of the mines, whose products go directly to Russia since the mines came under the control of Soviet technicians. Politically, Russia has chosen Havana as the setting for its anti-Chinese "Tri-Continental Conference" in order to show off its triumph over Mao from the Cuban capital.

December 23, 1965:

NEWS:

1)Venezuelan Police Capture Gang of Reds Who Raised Funds Through Blackmail.

2)Skipper of Cuban Freighter "Camilo Cienfuegos" Makes Statement After Defecting; Ship Was Japan-Bound With A Cargo of Sugar.

EDITORIALS:

"New Steps By The U.S. Against North Viet Nam".- A comment on the activities of the U.S. in North Viet Nam, and on China's perfidy and Haoni's inability to draw its own course, which has forced the U.S. to take one further step in the war by destroying North Viet Nam economic complex.

"Fidel's Star Rapidly Declining".- Castro's about to enter his seventh year in power under bad omens. Dictators Machado and Batista fell precisely on their seventh year, and Castro's situation shows that his star is rapidly declining and that he's heading straight for the abyss.

December 24, 1965:

NEWS:

1) Wave Of Defections Continues In Castro's Merchant Fleet: Skipper and Chief Engineer of the Freighter "Uvero" Defect in Ceylon.
2) Britain, U.S. Approve $400 million Sale of Anti-Aircraft Artillery To Saudi Arabia to Deterr Red Aggression.

Editorials:

"Russia 'Intervenes' The Cuban Sugar Industry".- Under the guise of "technical assistance", the USSR will send 227 "sugar technicians" to the one country whose own technicians know all there is to know about sugar. The real purpose is clear; the Soviets want to take complete and final control of the Cuban sugar industry, as a new limitation to Castro's power.

"There Will Be No Merry Christmas For Cubans".- With its crimes and with the desperate situation to which it has taken the people, Communism has made it impossible for the Cubans to enjoy any happiness this Christmas. But amidst an environment of sadness, there will be faith and hope these days. Communism has been unable to kill either of these blessings, and there lies one of the weaknesses of Communist materialism.

December 25, 1965:

NEWS:

1) Venezuela Moves To Prevent Entry of Dollars To Pay For Subversion.
2) Inter-American Bank President Felipe Herrera Proposes Development Plan for Latin America; Cuba is Excluded.

Editorials:

"The Effects of the Maritime Blockade of Cuba".- A comment on the maritime blockade against Red Cuba, which is now reinforced by the dockworkers of Canada, the U.S. and

Puerto Rico. As a result of the choking effect of the blockade, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany had to meet in Rostock in order to discuss means of helping Red Cuba survive said effects.

"Algeria, Indonesia and Cuba".- China's main strongholds in Asia and Africa were Sukarno's Indonesia and Ben Bella's Algeria. The Afro-Asian conferences were an important point of Chino-Soviet clashes. Two days before the Algiers Conference was inaugurated, Ben Bella was ousted. Then, as a result of another 'coup', Sukarno staged an about face. China thus lost her two main points of support in the two Continents. Now Russia is masterminding the "Tri-Continental" and we wonder what Red China will do about it.

December 27, 1965:

NEWS:

1) The U.S. Has Not Considered Using Nuclear Weapons Against North Viet Nam, Says Ambassador Goldberg at the UN.
2) Soviet Artists Demand Freedom of Thought and Expression Through Art Critic Alexei Sidorov.

Editorials:

"Wave of Defections Greets Tri-Continental Conference".- The Cuban Communists have sent hundreds of thousands of self-addressed telegrams in which they congratulate themselves for the Tri-Continental Conference of Red punks that will convene in Havana. Yet, the Cuban people have not been told of a more democratic and manly greeting: the wave of defections by officers of the Cuban merchant fleet, such as Cesar Loredo García, from the SS "Camilo Cienfuegos"; Gonzalo González Duque de Estrada and Francisco López Surroa, from the SS "Uvero"; and, lastly, today, four officers, among them the skipper of the SS "Aracelio Iglesias", in Osaka, Japan.

"Cardinal Spellman In Viet Nam".- The Christmas visit to Viet Nam by Cardinal Spellman gives American catholicism a militant sense in defense of democracy and of the spiritual values of the Western World. Cardinal Spellman's words before the combatants put the

Viet Nam struggle in its proper place: one made necessary by Communist aggression that has the same characteristics as it has elsewhere, in Asia and the Americas and wherever Red subversion takes place.

--oOo--

[illegible] ([illegible].R.U.L.)

December 28, 1965:

NEWS:

1) U.S. Grants Political Asylum to Four Defecting Officers From The Cuban Freighter "Aracelio Iglesias".

2) Defecting Skipper and Three Officers Explain Their Decision.

EDITORIALS:

"Moscow Grieves Over Indonesian Failure".- A comment on Pravda's recent editorial threatening Indonesia over it's proscription of the Communist Party. These Pravda threats show how Moscow violates the principles of self-determination and non-intervention. Of course, Moscow's dismay is understandable, as it has lost the platform it used for aggression in S.E. Asia.

"Gangsters From Three Continents".- Gangsters and agents for International Communism who extend violence and terror throughout three continents are beginning to arrive in Havana. Cuba, the focal point of subversion for Latin America, will provide the setting for that meeting. The Sino-Soviet rift is being ventilated as part of this meeting, and Fidel Castro will be the losing party. The Chinese won't forget that Castro betrayed them.

December 29, 1965:

NEWS:

1) Havana Reds Shaky Over Tricontinental Parley, Take Steps To Prevent Physical Attacks Between Delegations.

2) "Cuban Foreign Trade Kept Dwindling In '65", Says U.S. Dept. Of Commerce.

EDITORIALS:

"Czechoslovakian Communism".- This article is based on newspaper reports on a document releases by the Czech Communist Party, whereby the misery and disaster wrought over the Czech nation by Communist are admitted. Communist leaders would like to take resource to the "Capitalist" world in order to emerge from such a dead-end alley.

"Viet Nam, Congo and the Dominican Republic".- There are the topics of world-wide Communist agitation. In all three countries, the plans of the Communists met failure, and China and Russia may be seen licking the wounds of their failures. In the Congo, 2,000 lives were saved from Communist ravagery. In Viet Nam, plans for aggression and dominance of South Eastern Asia have been held in check. And in the Dominican Republic, Inter-American forces guarantee the security of the Hemisphere.

December 30, 1965:

NEWS:

1) "Price of Sugar To Stay Down In '66", Says Brokerage Firm B.W. Dyer.
2) Red China to Boycott Tricontinental Parley; Violent Clashes Expected During Conference.

Editorials:

"Cuban Seamen Who Walked Out Of SS "Aracelio Iglesias" Speak In Miami".- We run the highlights of the statement made by Cpt. Francisco Cobas and comment thereon.

"The Year That Ends".- During the year that ends, all the woes of the Communist regime have been increased. Russia has tightened the screws of exploitation of its Caribbean colony. And Fidel Castro has stressed his terrorist methods and concentrated on his personal despotic power by "purging" the Party.

December 31, 1965:

NEWS:

1) Cuba Refused Credit By Non-Communist Countries.
2) Cuban Refugee Peasant Charges That Reds Forced Him Out Of The Country To Seize His Little Farm.

Editorials:

"Cuban Women Forced to Hard Labor In Farms".- Reports reaching U.S. indicate that the Cuban tyranny is secretely scheming to create women's auxiliary corps similar to U.S. "WACS", but with a compulsory character and for the purpose of forcing Cuban women to perform hard labor in State farms. We call on Cuban decency to do something to prevent this outrage from taking place.

"Questions To The Tricontinental Conference".- The Chinese delegation could be asked the whereabouts of Ben Barka. The Russians might be questioned as to Che Guevara's. They could all be asked about the Algerian "coup" and why it took place two days before the date set for the opening of the Algiers Conference. They could be asked what they think of the Indonesian about-face, and about Sukarno's fate, and about Chinese support, since the Bandung Conference, in Peiping's Afro-Asian Policy.

January 1, 1966:

EDITORIALS:

"Synthesis of The Down-Hill Course of Communism in Cuba".- A summary of the most important developments that took place during the past year and that marked it as an awful one for the Commies.

"The Year That Begins".- The year that begins holds little hope that anything good will happens to Fidel Castro and his thugs. Caught in the web of the Sino-Soviet rift, he will be the great loser in the game. On the other hand, the internal situation, discontent in the armed forces and the total collapse of his economy depict a horizon that is as somber to Fidel Castro as it is promising to the Cuban people.

Radio Scripts Summaries
U.R.-WRUL.

"HABLA.... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

JANUARY 5, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) VENEZUELAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR ASKS STRONG MEASURES AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION.

2) COMMUNIST CHINA ADVISES CITIZENS TO GO TO BED ON EMPTY STOMACH.

EDITORIALS:

"Somber Signs Over the Tri-Continental".- The secret character of the Tricontinental Conference constitutes evidence of the rift and troubles within the parley structure. On the other hand, Castro's and Dorticos' speeches calling for unity and quoting the example of North Viet Nam as to need for such unity, are further proof of the above assertion. We forecast the failure of the Tricontinental parley as a means to unify Communism in its projections for international struggle. We further forecast that the Sino-Soviet rift will become all the more violent.

"The Workers of the Americas and the Tricontinental".- The workers of this Continent have announced that the boycott against Red Cuba will be intensified as a reply to plans for Hemispheric subversion being drafted at the Tricontinental parley in Havana. The sensibility of the workers of the Americas is hurt by the fact that the Red terrorists of the Congo, the murderers of women and children from three continents, meet in the heart of the Americas to plot more bloodshed and destruction. The workers of the Americas are against Communist totalitarianism, as is the people of Cuba, by whose side they stand.

JANUARY 6, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) NEWLY ARRIVED EXILES TALK OF EXPANDING SLUMS IN CUBAN CITIES.

2) UNDISTURBED U.S. STEP UP PEACE OFFENSIVE.

EDITORIALS:

"What's Behind the Sino-Cuban Crisis".- Upon practically severing its economic relations with Cuba, Red China has shown up at the Tricontinental Parley for a three-fold purpose: a) to frustrate all attempts at unity around the USSR; b) to charge the USSR with "treason" to Marxism-Leninism; and, c) to initiate the Chinese's revenge against Fidel Castro. On this basis, we forecast a tough offensive against Fidel by pro-Chinese Communists in the Americas. First, they will seek to destroy the image that they had built up of Castro, or what's left of it.

"The Venezuelan Gvt. on the Alert".- Through the Minister of the Interior, the Venezuelan gvt. has issued a timely and accurate statement on the significance of the Tricontinental Conference in terms of serious threats to continental security. The Venezuelan gvt. points out that it is time to take resource to force to counter aggression and subversion. It is indeed time to reactivate the 5th Resolution of the O.A.S. meeting of 1964, whereby intervention is authorized in self-defense against aggression and to guarantee the security of the Hemisphere.

JANUARY 7, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) RED CHINA BLASTS SOVIETS AT TRICONTINENTAL PARLEY.

2) REFUGEE TOTS CELEBRATE ADORATION OF MAGI IN MIAMI.

EDITORIALS:

"China's Stand: A Threatening War-Monger".- Recent press reports tell us of movements of Chinese troops near the Soviet border, and of probable skirmishes between the Red Armies of Moscow and Peiping. This new sort of 'cold war' with occasional ringing of firearms forces the USSR to increase its military expenditures, to slow down its agricultural and industrial production, and to cut its foreign aid. Cuba will be one of the big losers.

"The Tricontinental and the Sino-Soviet Dispute".- All efforts to prevent the Sino-Soviet rift from coming out to the surface at the Tricontinental Conference have been to no avail: the Chinese delegate blasted the Soviets mercilessly. These, on the other hand, availed themselves of their Cuban puppet to present to the delegates a view of the breach of Cuban-Chinese trade relations. The Chinese were made to appear as the "villain" who wants to starve the Cuban people of their rice rations.

JANUARY 8, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) CHE'S FATHER REPORTED CLAIMING SON'S BODY.
2) RED GUERRILLA CHIEFF CAPTURED IN PERU.

EDITORIALS:

"We'll Tell the Reds What They Want To Know".- Cubans seeking to leave the country are subject to veritable "third degrees" by the G-2. They are asked whether or not they sympathize with the gvt., why they want to leave, wheter or not they approve of State control of all education, etc. The unfortunate applicants manage to give answers that will not jeopardize their chances of leaving. Yet, their interrogators are apparently satisfied with the outcome of the questioning. The reason for this is that Castro feels the need to give some explanation to the Communist world for the growing exodus of Cubans. However, if the Communists are really interested in knowing why the Cubans want to go, we will be glad to oblige... They are just running away from hunger, terror, oppression, and from the execution wall.

"A Strange Soviet Mission in Viet Nam".- After the British proposal for peace in Viet Nam was welcomed with seeming interest by Kremlin leaders, these have sent a strange mission to Viet Nam whose purpose is not known. Maybe they have gone to vouch for peace, or maybe, on the contrary, they have gone to Hanoi to pledge further Soviet aid to the puppet Ho Chi Minh. At any rate, the terms of the conflict remain unchanged. Rusk has stated that everything may be subject to negotiations except withdrawal of American forces from S. Viet Nam. And the Communist powers, on the other hand, far from accepting the peace overtures, step up their campaign of aggression, totalitarianism, etc.

JANUARY 10, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) RED CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICAN CAPITAL BOMBED.

2) THREE MORE CUBAN SEAMEN DEFECT IN SPAIN.

EDITORIALS:

"Sino-Soviet Differences Over N. Viet Nam".- Sino-Soviet differences over North Viet Nam have become evident lately. Nowadays, Russia is just as much interested in China's loss of prestige in Viet Nam as China is interested in Russia's loss of prestige in Cuba. Hence the "rice" economic aggression. We wonder whether the Soviet mission to Viet Nam, rather than pledge unlimited aid to Ho, may have gone there to tighten the screws of their Vietnamese puppet. This is indicated by recent Yugoslavian statements --which is tantamount to speaking of Russian statements-- charging China with keeping North Viet Nam from considering peace offers.

"The Tricontinental Conference: Action and Reaction".- The action: to coordinate plans for subversion, aggression and terror in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The reaction: particularly in Latin America, and as recommended by the Venezuelan Minister of the Interior: the use of force against Communist aggressors; the use of force against the focal point of aggression in Communist Cuba.

JANUARY 11, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) CHINA SCOLDS FIDEL OVER RICE ISSUE, CALLS HIM "LIAR".

2) PERUVIAN GVT. RAPS SOVIET AGGRESSION FOLLOWING RUSSIAN STATEMENT AT TRICONTINENTAL PARLEY.

EDITORIALS:

"Castro Goes Beserk, Helps Aggression Against South Viet Nam".- We comment on Castro's shameless intervention in the internal affairs of South Viet Nam by lending his transport vessels to transport war supplies for the Viet Cong. By doing this, he is trying to pose as a powerful warlord before the peoples of Latin America. He would like to be asked to take part in peace negotiations. Therefore, he is after a naval catastrophe that would put him in the headlines throughout the world as a victim of an "imperialism" that has attacked one of poor little Red Cuba's ships. So, he risks the lives of Cuban crews for this purpose. This wickedness explains the wave of defections by Cuban seamen.

"Soviet Aggression".- The Gvt. and press of Perú have labelled the statements made by the Soviet delegate to the Tricontinental Conference as aggression. Likewise, the Venezuelan Gvt. advised the use of force against Communist aggression. The aggressions are not just against Perú or Venezuela, but against the Continent as a whole. Therefore, the whole Continent should mobilize by declaring all Communist Parties ilegal and by applying the ultimate sanctions foreseen by the Inter-American system of self-defense against the Cuban Communist regime.

JANUARY 12, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) WASHINGTON, HANOI IN DIRECT CONTACT.
2) YUGOSLAVIAN PAPER BLAST TRICONTINENTAL PARLEY.

EDITORIALS:

"Chinese Reds Call Castro "A Liar".- On the eve of the Tricontinental Parley, Fidel Castro sought to strike a hard blow at the Chinese Communists. On Moscow's orders, he charged Red China with "economic aggression" against Cuba. With characteristic Asian phlegm, the Chinese have replied to Castro's perfidious attacks by calling him a liar. They claim that they never agreed to a long-term barter of rice for Cuban sugar. They only agreed, they say, to exchange these products in 1965. For once, we must agree with the Chinese Reds: Castro is indeed the biggest liar the world has known. Trade agreements are written, clarified and specified. We are inclined to believe the Chinese and to reject Fidel's candid explanation of a "misunderstanding".

"Sorcerer's Apprentice Ain't Nothin' But a Hound Dog".- From his dream role as the Lenin of the Americas rising high over the Andes, Castro has fallen down a long way. Today, he is nothing but the Soviet's barking, yelping hound dog in the Sino-Soviet rift. His opium dreams, which were once encouraged by a Peking-oriented Ché, led him to act as a sorcerer's apprentice in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The result: the Chinese regard him as a traitor and to the Soviets he ain't nothin' but a hound dog.

"HABLA.... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

January 13, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) SOVIET SKI INSTRUCTOR DEFECTS IN SWEDEN.
2) U.S. SEES CHANCES FOR WAR WITH CHINA, SAYS WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT.

EDITORIALS:

"Words of Hope for a Suffering Cuba".- In his State of the Union message, L.B.J. said that the U.S. is committed not to abandon Viet Nam because doing this would be tantamount to unleashing war in S.E. Asia. L.B.J. is obviously committed to defend democracy in general, and this includes the American Continent and, of course, Cuba. The President's speech is, therefore, a warm New Year's greeting to the struggling people of Cuba.

"Timely Restatements By L.B.J.".- After carrying his peace offensive to every corner of the world, to no avail because of the Communists' insistence in prolonging the war, L.B.J. has made a timely restatement of U.S. policy in Viet Nam: before Congress, the President repeated that the U.S. will not abandon Viet Nam, and he also reminded the legislators that the U.S. are committed to defend freedom in Cuba.

January 14, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) LUNAR NEW YEAR MAY BRING VIET NAM CEASE-FIRE.
2) CASTRO TURNS DOWN GUYANA RICE, HAS NO DOLLARS TO PAY IT.

EDITORIALS:

"Deep-Sea Drafts in the Tricontinental".- The Tricontinental was planned to have ended Jan. 12 and accomplish a common, united line of revolutionary policy, with common direction and funds. The Conference, however, has been extended, because things have not come out the way the Reds expected.

"Turmoil in the Armed Forces".- Castro is worried over the obvious discontent that is rampant in the Armed Forces, where a document that criticizes the regime and calls for open rebellion has been secretly but widely circulated. Fidel Castro is doubling his precautions and shifting officers and units, but he is doing so somewhat blindly, as he does not know exactly where the focal point of discontent may be, nor what effects it may eventually have.

January 15, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) 50,000 NEW MEN TO BE ADMITTED BY ARMY.

2) VIII LATIN COUNCIL OF WORKMEN BLASTS TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE.

EDITORIALS:

"Cuban Reds Moan Over Bitter Rice".- Pressed by the USSR, Castro denounced the Chinese Jan. 2 over the rice issue. The megalomaniac Castro went beyond all limits when he said that he would give up rice from the Cuban diet. But the Soviet advisors were frightened, and they forced the Cuban press to back out and apologize to China. In brief: the rice issue has been another Castroite failure in the propaganda field, as well as in the economic one.

"The Tricontinental Conference charged with 'Divisionism'".- Tito, by means of his organ "Borba", said that the Tricontinental marked a new division of World Communism, as Yugoslav and Western European Parties had been excluded. A result of maneuvering within the Sino-Soviet rift, the Havana parley has provoked a new clash, that between Tito and the fool Fidel Castro, the clown who gets all the punches at the circus arena: he is punished by China, despised by Russia and ignored by the Communists' "Third Front".

January 17, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) MEXICAN MEETS CUBAN COMMUNISM, RETURNS HOME DISAPPOINTED.

2) CUBANS SNEAK OUT OF ISLAND, COAST GUARD PICKS THEM UP IN CAY SAL.

EDITORIALS:

"A summary of Castro's speech at the Tricontinental".- Castro's speech revealed the deepening of the division between the Chinese and the Russians, whom he called on to unite. He violently charged the C.P. of Latin America with getting lost in a "sea of theories", interpretations and tactics, and with unwillingness to go out into the battlefield to face the dangers of open war. He attempted to answer charges that he had abandoned the revolutionists of Santo Domingo after exciting them to revolt, and justified himself with the fact that Cuba "is a small nation", lacking in nuclear weapons. Lastly, he acknowledged the deep effect of anti-Communist propaganda in Cuba and in Latin America, which propaganda he charges of slandering his regime.

"Fidel Castro at the closing of the Tricontinental".- Fidel Castro's desperate tone had defeatist overtones when he admitted what he had never admitted before: the possibility that he may lose all or part of Cuba's territory. This was a defeatist warning, perhaps made to insure a retreat without personal risks. As to Che, he added further confusion to the issue. He was not really replying to the "imperialists", as he said but to some of the delegates to the Tricontinental, who demanded a clarification of Guevara's mysterious disappearance.

January 18, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) British Catholic Cardinal Blasts Polish Reds.

2) Latin Christian unionists denounce Castro Regime.

EDITORIALS:

"It's Not Propaganda, Fidel, It's The Truth".- We answer Castro's complaints against democratic propaganda, pointing our that is consists not merely of propaganda, but of ~~the whole~~ infamous truth about his regime. We avail ourselves of the circumstances to connect the above with the statements made in Miami by Capt. Augusto M. González, the skipper of the Cuban merchant flagship "Uvero", and the Chief Engineer, Roberto Surroca, who defected in Ceylon because of the circumstances that prevail in Cuba.

"A Rival Within The Politburo".- Sergio del Valle, a Major of his Army and a member of the Politburo, delivered a speech on Dec. 26th before the Provincial Committee of the Party in Matanzas, and he openly contradicted what Castro constantly affirms. He criticized extensively and enumerated the many failures of the regime. He took a role as a national "guidance counselor" and pointed at that which he said should be the political guiding principle of the Party, thereby overlooking Secretary General Castro, who was hardly even mentioned. Few reports on this speech were carried by the Cuban press, as del Valle seems to be becoming a rival to Fidel Castro.

January 19, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) RED CUBA, TRICONTINENTAL PARLEY CRITICIZED BY PEIPING.

2) TWO MORE INTELLECTUALS TO BE PUNISHED IN THE USSR.

EDITORIALS:

"Rusk Answers the Threats of the Tricontinental".- In his speech last Saturday, Castro summarized the "accomplishments" of the Tricontinental, stressing the unanimity of the Communists in their will to conquer South Viet Nam. In the Philippines, Dean Rusk then said that if the U.S. peace offensive failed, the Americans would find themselves in the need to "crush North Viet Nam". This statement duly replied the Tricontinental threats. Fidel might do well to reconsider his offers of arms and "volunteers" to Viet Nam, as he might get in the way of American determination and suffer the consequences.

"The Daggers Hidden Behind the Tricontinental".- The sessions of the Tricontinental had hardly come to an end when the intrigues and rifts between the Communists came out to the surface. In their official press, the Chinese have charged the Soviets with having turned the Conference into an anti-Chinese plot. Castro, two days earlier, had taken the dagger out of his sleeve and acted as the Soviets' barking hound dog.

January 20, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) RED PLOT AGAINST COSTA RICA UNVEILED.

2) RED CHINESE ARMY POLITICAL BOSSES CALL FOR WAR READINESS.

EDITORIALS:

"The Americas Answer The Tricontinental Threats".- At the Tricontinental Conference, Castro challenged the stability of the Americas and took an open war path by arousing the Communists in a manner which he though would go unchallenged. Yet, representatives of Latin gvts., such as Cabinet Minister Barrios, of Venezuela, have shown the way to counter Castroite aggression. Precisely yesterday, it was Mr. Lincoln Gordon, the new Asst. Secy. of State for Latin American Affairs who said that Cuba constitutes a great threat to all American countries. This pronouncement may be said to represent American though in the struggle against Communism.

"A Great Threat".- When Ambassador Gordon took office as Asst. Secy. of State for Latin American Affairs, he reiterated that Cuba under Red domination means a grave menace to the countries South of the border, and that this is a primary concer for the U.S. This is still more the case after the Tricontinental Conference, and the peoples of Latin America are determined to shake off this menace once and for all, in order to put an end to aggression, terror, subversion, etc., all of which are planned and financed by Red Cuba.

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

October 19: "The Indonesian People Against the Communists".- This article breaks Cuban deadly silence concerning Indonesian events, and summarizes and comments such events, emphasizing that the people and the armed forces have performed the miracle of recovering democracy for Indonesia. HISTORIC DETERMINISM turns against Communism, first in the Dominican Republic, next in Algeria, now in Indonesia, and tomorrow in Cuba.

"Why Doesn't Fidel Talk of the Party's Reorganization?".- Right after the news on the reorganization of the Party were confirmed, Castro offered to let all dissatisfied Cubans out of the country. Among other things, this offer served as a smoke screen to cover the purge which he had carried out. Then, complete silence on the subject, so that no one would realize that the Party has been placed under his absolute personal control. He fears the reaction of the purged old Commies.

October 20: "Latin America Against Communism".- The Venezuelan Dockworkers' Convention in Caracas, which had an international character, put out Resolutions in which the workers of the Americas confirm their determination to fight communism.

"The Arrival of the Pro-Consul".- Gromyko's trip to Cuba is more than just a visit by the Soviet Foreign Minister: it is an unannounced inspection tour by the Pro-Consul to his Caribben colony. Of course, this trip can bring nothing good for Fidel.

October 21: "Why is Gromyko in Havana?".- Gromyko, breaking all rules of democracy, showed up in Havana. What for? Among the other problems faced by Cuba, he showed up to solve the crisis undergone by the Cuban Communist "Old Guard", who have been politically executed by Castro.

att. to UFGA-24421

19-120-26

"The Puzzled Cheat".- Castro's "open-door" offer, which was just a bluff which he hoped would not be accepted, has caught Fidel in a series of traps which he has laid himself. He has had to take resource to a thousand gimmicks and buts in order to keep Cuba from losing its entire population, but he has been unable to keep Camarioca from becoming a plebiscite of hostility against his regime.

October 22: "Fidel Castro's Despair".- After he was abandoned by the officers and soldiers of the Rebel Army, by the militia and by the people of Cuba in general, Castro tries to seek refuge in the support of the youth, which he flatters constantly to that end. If it is true that Cuba's young people support Castro, we challenge him to allow draft-age youths to leave the country if they wish.

"Che's Letter in Cuban Schools".- Castro has ordered that Che's letter be read and re-read in Cuban schools. The letter, which seems to have been dictated by Fidel while his victim stood with a foot in the grave, is a carbon copy of Stalin's procedures. Stalin also demanded that the "purged" leave letters which he himself dictated, in order to instill the cult to his personality in the minds of children and form the myth of his own genius. Castro forgets that such Stalinist methods are still too recent and much discredited.

October 23: "Gromyko and Castro's Woes".- This article emphasizes Castro's deep concern over Gromyko's sudden appearance in Cuba, which indicates that the Soviet Pro-Consul dropped in to tighten Castro-Communist screws economically as well as politically.

"Corvalan is Still Castro's Top Foe Within Pan-American Communism".- Traditionally, the Chilean Communist Party has been the center of opposition to Castro's brand of Communism among the old-line Parties in this Continent. While Castro has invested millions in subversion, Corvalan has patiently waited to capitalize on such investments and on Fidel's own activities. Today more than ever, the old-line Communist Parties throughout the Americas are in a hurry to displace Castro completely, and stage a counter-coup right in Cuba, where Fidel has made a devastating purge of the Old Guard.

October 25: "Castro's Memo to the Soviet Union".- A comment on the memo presented by Castro to Gromyko concerning Cuba's needs with respect to economy, oil, currency, sugar, transportation equipment, industrial units, etc., in order that Cuba's economy may get rolling again. Gromyko's crisp, cold reply was that he would forward the demands to the soviet government.

"Mikoyan-Gromyko".- Soon it'll be three years since Mikoyan, in his capacity as the Kremlin's Pro-Consul, travelled to Cuba to impose Soviet decisions on the notorious "missile crisis". Three years later, another Pro-Consul, Gromyko, shows up in Havana, also to impose Soviet decisions on the puppet. The Kremlin is making it plain for Fidel to understand that he can't last a week longer unless he fully abides by Moscow's orders.

October 26: "Not Even the Soviet Union Can Save Castro".- This article comments the internal situation of Cuba and Castro-Communism at the time of Gromyko's departure from the Island. Mention is made of growing discontent, of restlessness and dissatisfaction among Cubans, plus the destruction of Cuba's light industry and agriculture. Other woes of the Castroites are elaborated on, and, in the end, we call on those who form part of the Castro government, but who nevertheless love Cuba, to help put an end to the Red monster and to the anguish of the people.

"When the Present is Unbearable...".- In view of the unbearable, desperate reality faced by the people of Cuba under the Castro regime, the tyrant promises paradise in 20 years. In such vertigo, he goes as far as to promise laurel crowns for Cuban sportsmen in the 1972 Olympic Games. He has annihilated all the sports in Cuba and the country has been eliminated from all international competitions because it makes a means for subversion out of sports. Fortunately, by 1972 Fidel Castro will be mean no more to the Cubans than the bitter memory of a tyrant who no longer exists.

"HABLA..., UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

October 30, 1965: "Oil Worries the Havana Communist Regime".- A comment on the statement by Engineer Alberto Queralt, who just arrived from Cuba, who, in his capacity as a technician who held a high post in the Petroleum Consolidated, deducts the possibility that Soviet deliveries of oil to Cuba may decrease. These statements are confirmed by the interpretation of President Dorticos' own words, and by the presence of a Cuban mission in Great Britain.

"A Concentration of Gorillas, Thugs and Informers".- In the reorganization of the Party, Fidel Castro has undertaken the biggest concentration of gorillas, ever to have taken the political leadership of any country in the world. Besides, he has raised a good number of thugs and gorillas to leadership positions. Such are the men that Castro has found to lead the Party which he has made in his own likeness in order to exert absolute, despotic, personal power over a nation.

November 1st, 1965: "There Will Be No Changes in the Blockade of Red Cuba".- A comment on the rumors that U.S. policy on Cuba will "soften". It is indicated that Washington, for humanitarian reasons, accepted Castro's parley to evacuate the spiritually wounded. We also comment on the statement of a Washington official who said that "the fear that the U.S. may alter its relations with Cuba is unfounded (and) there is no prospect for a change in our relations". We arrive at the conclusion that U.S. policy on the subject will no vary: Castro will be economically strangled and there's no future for Communism in this Continent.(DIARIO de Las A. -OCT-31.)

"What About Political Prisoners?".- Fidel Castro has taken a series of steps that limit, by several means, the offer he made to allow dissatisfied Cubans to leave the Island. Even though no public statements have been made about the political prisoners, it may be expected that this matter has been considered in the negotiations, and that Fidel Castro must be forced to play fairly in order that he may not trade with the agony and the hope of 70,000 political prisoners and with the hope and the anguish of their relatives.-

"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (V.R.U.L.)

October 29, 1965: "Russia Rebuffs Castro".- A comment on the news that Cuba and the USSR have signed an agreement to send 7 engineers and 50 technicians to the Caribbean Island. It is pointed out that, substantially, such is the Soviet Union's reply to the request for technical and financial assistance for Cuba's reconstruction and for the sugar crop.

"Brazil and the Dominican Republic".- The situation in Brazil and the Dominican Republic shows that it is not enough to face up to Communist aggressions, but that energetic, precautionary measures must be taken as well to neutralize the subversive threat and guarantee democratic stability. On the other hand, the Hemisphere's problems must be focussed in their entirety, and action must be taken against the source of subversion in Communist Cuba.

2-B THE MIAMI HERALD

Friday, Dec. 31, 1965

Cuba Aid Given to N. Viets

Ship Weapons, Defector Says

By CARLOS MARTINEZ
Of Our Latin America Staff

A Cuban sea captain who walked off his ship with three of his officers at a Japanese port four days ago charged Thursday in Miami that Cuban vessels take weapons to North Viet Nam "three or four" times every six months.

The captain, Francisco Cobas Oses, 46, told a press conference called by Cuban exiles that "all Cuban ships have orders to carry war materiel to North Viet Nam to help the North Vietnamese effort."

The Cuban Embassy in Japan, said Cobas, is acting as coordinator for all Viet Nam-bound shipments taken at Communist ports in Asia.

The four Cuban defectors of the 7,900-ton freighter Aracelio Iglesias were flown to San Francisco last Tuesday. There they gave U.S. agents their account of how Fidel Castro's ships carry Red Chinese arms to the Viet Cong. They arrived in Miami Wednesday.

Shortly before Cobas' press conference, the Aracelio Iglesias sailed three days behind schedule for Communist China, reportedly to pick up military hardware for the North Vietnamese. It was being skippered by the second mate, on orders from Cuba.

"The Cuban Embassy in Tokyo had secretely arranged for the Aracelio Iglesias to take a shipment of war materiel from North Korea to North Viet Nam," charged Cobas.

Nevertheless he said plans were changed at the last minute and he was "hastily ordered" to pick up the shipment of weapons in Shanghai instead. It was then when the four decided to defect.

"The ships that sail from Cuba with sugar are ordered to pick up the weapons after unloading the sugar at Japan," said Cobas, adding that the pickups take place only at North Korean and Red Chinese ports "because of their geographical situation."

The short, articulate seaman also charged that the Cuban government keeps a small intelligence detail on each of its merchant ships. They are members of the G-2, Castro's dreaded secret police.

"For some reason, the G-2 man on board is usually the radio and telegraph operator. In the Aracelio Iglesias we had a second G-2 man disguised as the fourth engineer, even though he had no training or ability to perform his duty."

press release

A PRESS SERVICE FROM
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFFICE:
10 S.E. 9 St.
MAILING ADDRESS
Box 3940
Miami, Florida
PHONE:
373 - 8033

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

DEFECTING CUBAN SEAMEN EXPLAIN THEIR DECISION HERE.

Skipper, three officers left Cuban freighter in Japan. Cuban logistical support of Viet Reds denounced. Crewmen reluctant to transport war materials to North Viet. Role of Castro's Embassy in Tokyo. Cuban Reds withhold ship's itinerary to deceive the Japanese. Spying on board. Bureaucratic chaos results in damage to Cuba's foreign supplies.

A Cuban skipper who left his ship in Japan Dec. 26 confirmed today in Miami that Castro's logistical support of Viet Nam Reds was the main reason for his defection. In a press conference held at the Biscayne Room of the Hotel McAllister, Francisco Cobas, the defecting captain of the Cuban freighter "Aracelio Iglesias", told newsmen why he and three of his fellow officers decided to seek asylum in the United States.

The press conference was arranged by UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, a Miami-based Cuban group whom Cobas approached upon his arrival from Japan. Cobas said that he had asked the U.R. to help him get in touch with the press so that he and his shipmates could denounce Cuban maneuvers to help the Viet Cong.

During the conference, Cobas was flanked by Antonio Arias, Mario Pérez and Humberto Fernández, the three other defecting officers of the "Aracelio Iglesias". Cobas, introduced by U.R. Secretary General Mario Seiglie, spoke for the group. Said Cobas that he and his shipmates had refused to run the risks of transporting war materials to North Viet Nam, particularly since they were convinced that such transportation was wrong. Cobas added that all Cuban vessels have been ordered to take military supplies to North Viet Nam from other Asian Communist ports, and that the Cuban Embassy in Tokyo serves as coordinator for all such shipments.

Referring to his former ship, Capt. Cobas explained that the Embassy had ordered the "Aracelio Iglesias" to sail to a North Korean port and to await further instructions there. The Cuban diplomats withheld the ship's itinerary and declared that the "Aracelio" would return to the Japanese port of Yahata before proceeding to North Viet Nam. By pretending that the ship would come back to Japan, they hoped to deceive the crew and reassure the Japanese as to the cargo and the use to which the ship was being put. The truth was, however, that, while in North Korea, the "Aracelio" was to receive orders to load a cargo of war supplies and sail directly from there to North Viet Nam.

According to Cobas, this could not be done in the end because the Tokyo Embassy was warned at the last moment that the North Korean port of Chinnampo was blocked by ice. The "Aracelio" was now ordered to pick up another military shipment at Shanghai and take it to North Viet Nam. It was then that Cobas and his shipmates decided to walk out.

Cobas went on to explain that logistical support to the North Vietnamese was one of the two tasks assigned to the new Cuban envoy in Tokyo, a fanatically loyal Communist named Manuel Jorge Cuevo Menéndes, whose previous job was to run concentration camps in the Isle of Pines.

The Cuban skipper referred to ill-treatment of Cuban seamen by the Castro regime, mentioning among other instances the constant spying on board by G-2 men; preferential Customs treatment given Communist-Bloc sailors; and the ridiculously low local-currency allowance of $5 per week given to the Cubans while in foreign ports. Elaborating on the issue of espionage, Capt. Cobas revealed that the radio and telegraph operator is usually the G-2 man on board. As captain of the "Aracelio", Cobas himself was forced to surrender the mail of supposedly "disloyal" crewmen to one of the spies assigned to his ship.

As regards operation conditions of the Cuban merchant fleet, Cobas told newsmen that the two basic problems confronted by Cuban shipping are the obsolete Soviet equipment installed in most boats and the excessive bureaucratic red tape and disorganization. As example of the latter, he mentioned the fact that the Cuban buying agency seldom informs the shipping coordinating office of the dates on which the merchandise is to be picked up at a foreign port. Last-minute notices and subsequent efforts to find ships usually meet failure, with the result that the seller must pay higher warehouse costs. This has caused many foreign firms to either refuse to trade with Castro or to impose extremely harsh terms to protect themselves from the costly effects of the Communists' unreliability.

Capt. Francisco Cobas then revealed that he understood that a vast "reorganization" of the Cuban Navy was undertaken early this fall. Most officers, he said, were discharged on the grounds of suspected "disloyalty" to the government. Incidentally, added Cobas, some retired Army officers who have had no naval experience, have also been assigned to the merchant marine. Cobas assured his audience that their decision to quit was made of their own free will and that no one had pressured them into it. He denounced Communist oppression of his homeland and said that he and his three shipmates refused to keep serving under it.

Following Capt. Cobas' statement, the newsmen asked him numerous questions. Most of these referred to the issue of Cuban boats being used to carry war supplies to Viet Nam, which was quoted by the Cuban seamen as the chief reason for their defection. All journalists present showed great interest in this matter, as such Cuban assistance to Viet Nam Reds more or less directly results in the loss of American lives in that Asian country.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Ref.: 205

Miami, December 30, 1965.

boletín informativo

UN SERVICIO DE PRENSA DEL
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFICINAS:
10 S.E. 9 St.

DIRECCION POSTAL:
Box 3940
Miami, Florida

TELEFONO:
373 - 8033

MARINOS CUBANOS QUE DESERTARON EXPLICAN SU DECISION EN MIAMI

El capitán y tres oficiales abandonaron un carguero cubano en Japón.- Denuncian apoyo logístico de Cuba Roja a los Viet Cong.- Renuente la tripulación a transportar material bélico a Viet Nam.- El papel de la Embajada castrista en Tokyo. Ocultaron los rojos cubanos el itinerario para engañar a los japoneses.- Espionaje a bordo.- El desorden burocrático perjudica a los suministradores de Castro en el extranjero.

Un capitán cubano que abandonó su nave en Japón el 26 de diciembre confirmó hoy en Miami que el apoyo logístico de Castro a los rojos de Viet Nam había sido el principal motivo de su deserción. En una conferencia de prensa celebrada en un céntrico hotel de esta ciudad, Francisco Cobas, capitán del carguero cubano "Aracelio Iglesias" explicó a los periodistas por qué él y sus compañeros de oficialidad decidieron solicitar acilo en los EE.UU.

La conferencia de prensa fué convocada por UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, organización cubana radicada aquí a la que se dirigió Cobas a su llegada del Japón. Cobas dijo que habia solicitado la ayuda de U.R. a fin de ponerse en contacto con los periodistas y denunciar las maniobras de Cuba Roja en favor de los rojos vietnamitas.

Durante la conferencia, se encontraban junto a Cobas los otros tres oficiales asilados, nombrados Antonio Ruiz Arias (Primer Oficial), Mario Julio Pérez Girón (Jefe de Máquinas), y Humberto R. Fernández (Sobrecargo). El capitán Cobas fue presentado por el Dr. Mario Seiglie, Secretario General de UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA.

Dijo Cobas que tanto él como sus compañeros de tripulación se negaban a correr el riesgo que supone transportar material bélico a Viet Nam del Norte, máxime cuando abrigaban la convicción de que dicha actitud del gobierno cubano es altamente condenable. Añadió Cobas que todos los buques cubanos tienen órdenes de llevar suministros de guerra a Viet Nam del Norte desde otros puertos comunistas del Asia, y que la Embajada cubana en Tokyo funge como coordinadora de tales embarques.

Refiriéndose al "Aracelio Iglesias", que capitaneaba, Cobas reveló que la Embajada cubana en Japón había dispuesto que el "Aracelio" zarpara rumbo a un puerto norcoreano y aguardara allí nuevas órdenes. Los diplomáticos castristas retuvieron el itinerario del buque y declararon que el mismo volvería al puerto japonés de Yahata antes de seguir rumbo a Viet Nam del Norte. Al hacer ver que el buque regresaría al Japón, los comunistas se proponían engañar a la tripulación y tranquilizar a las autoridades japonesas respecto del cargamento del buque y del uso que se iba a dar al mismo. La realidad, empero, era que, durante la estancia del "Aracelio" en Corea del Norte, el mismo habría de recibir la orden de cargar un embarque de material bélico y zarpar directamente hacia Viet Nam del Norte.

Según Cobas, esto no pudo hacerse debido a que, a última hora, la Embajada recibió el aviso de que el puerto norcoreano de Chinnanpó estaba bloqueado por el hielo. En vista de ello, se ordenó al "Aracelio" levar anclas rumbo a Shanghai para recoger allí otro cargamento de material de guerra y conducirlo al Viet Nam. Fué entonces que Cobas y sus compañeros decidieron abandonar el buque.

A continuación, Cobas pasó a explicar que el apoyo logístico a los Viet Cong constituye una de las tareas encomendadas al nuevo embajador cubano en Tokyo, un comunista fanático nombrado Manuel Jorge Cuervo Menéndez que tuvo a su cargo la administración de varios campos de concentración en Isla de Pinos.

Refiriéndose a los malos tratos que reciben los marinos cubanos, Cobas mencionó la constante vigilancia a que están sometidos a bordo por el G-2 comunista, así como a las consideraciones especiales de aduana que se dan a los tripulantes de buques de otros paises comunistas y a la ridícula cantidad ($5 semanales) en moneda local que se da a los marinos cubanos para sus gastos en puertos extranjeros. Detallando la cuestión de la vigilancia, reveló el capitán Cobas que en la mayoría de los buques cubanos el G-2 de a bordo suele ser el radiotelegrafista. Como capitán del "Aracelio Iglesias", el propio Cobas se vio obligado a entregarlo a otro agente policíaco destacado a bordo toda la correspondencia de ciertos tripulantes supuestamente desleales al régimen.

También dijo Cobas a los periodistas que los principales problemas que confronta la navegación cubana los constituyen los equipos soviéticos anticuados instalados en muchos buques y las complicaciones y confusiones burocráticas. Como ejemplo de esto último, señaló Cobas que la agencia oficial de compras del régimen cubano casi nunca comunica a la coordinadora de fletes (CUFLET) la fecha en que deberá cargarse alguna mercancía en puerto extranjero. Dicha fecha no se avisa hasta última hora, fracasando así los intentos de CUFLET para conseguir buque. Como consecuencia de esto, el vendedor extranjero ve notablemente aumentados sus costos de almacén, y esto ha hecho que muchas firmas extranjeras bien se abstengan de comerciar con la tiranía roja o impongan términos leoninos de venta para precaverse de los costosos efectos de la irresponsabilidad comunista.

El capitán Cobas reveló que, según tenía entendido, la Marina de Guerra de Cuba Roja sufrió una amplia "reorganización" a principios del otoño. Según dijo, muchos oficiales fueron licenciados por su supuesta "deslealtad" al régimen. Los más afortunados fueron transferidos a la marina mercante, a la que también se ha incorporado a muchos oficiales retirados del Ejército que carecen por completo de experiencia naval. Los restantes oficiales licenciados de la Marina de Guerra han sido fusilados o recluidos en prisión.

El Capitán Cobas aseguró a los presentes que su decisión y la de sus compañeros era el producto de su libérrima voluntad, no habiéndose ejercido sobre ellos la menor presión. Cobas denunció la opresión comunista en su patria y añadió que ni él ni sus tres compañeros podían seguir sirviendo a la causa roja.

Luego de estas declaraciones, los periodistas presentes formularon al Capitán Cobas numerosas preguntas, la mayoría de las cuales se referían al uso de las naves de Cuba Roja para llevar suministros a los comunistas del Viet Cong. Todos los reporteros asistentes se mostraron vivamente interesados en este asunto, por cuanto dicha ayuda cubana se traduce más o menos directamente en la pérdida de vidas norteamericanas en ese país del Sudoeste asiático.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Miami, Diciembre 31, 1965

Ref: 210

My shipmates and I have requested political asylum from the United States because we are convinced that Cuban support of the Communist war in Vietnam is wrong and we refuse to run the risks of transporting war material to North Viet Nam.

All Cuban ships have orders to carry cargo to North Vietnam to help the North Vietnamese war effort. The Cuban Embassy in Japan is acting as the coordinator for all shipments of war material to North Vietnam via Cuban ships from Communist ports in Asia. The Cuban Embassy in Tokyo had secretly arranged for the Aracelio Iglesias to take a shipment of war materials from North Korea to North Vietnam. In order to hide their intentions, the Embassy arranged that the Aracelio itinerary be kept up in the air until the last possible moment; then to fool the crew and the Japanese they gave the story the ship would return to Japan to load tin cargo at Yahata and then proceed on route to North Vietnam. In reality, we were to receive instructions on itinerary while in North Korea telling us to proceed directly to North Vietnam after loading the war supplies.

At the last moment, however, the Embassy was informed that the port of Chinnampo was blocked by ice. The Cuban Embassy then hastily arranged for us to pick up a shipment of arms in Shangai previously scheduled for another Cuban boat about the end of January.

Logistical support to the North Vietnamese is one of the two tasks assigned to Mr. Manuel Jorge Cuervo, the new Cuban Ambassador to Japan. His other function is to erase the bad effects on Japanese-Cuban trade caused by the defection of the former trade Counselor to Japan, Gilberto Alemany. The Cuban government is very concerned about the prospect of declining trade since already some companies that formerly traded with Cuba, will no longer do so openly.

In general, I may say that members of the Cuban merchant marine live under unbearable conditions. The treatment we receive is so bad that no one feels like cooperating with the marine purposes of the regime, even in the few cases where there might be no ideological incompatibility involved.

As examples of this treatment I may mention the constant spying on board by members of the "G-2". For some reason, the "G-2" man on board is usually the radio and telegraph operator. In the "Aracelio" we had one by the name of Eduardo Sánchez who was a notorious spy. Aboard we had another man called Manuel Rúa Rodríguez who was imposed as the Fourth Engineer, even though he had no training or ability to perform such duties. As Captain of the "Aracelio", I was ordered by the government shipping concern "Mambisas" to give Rúa all possible cooperation in the fulfillment of his functions. Rúa then came to see me and asked, among other things, that I surrender to him the incoming and outgoing mail of certain specific crewmen who were suspected of being against the government.

Another instance of ill-treatment which Cuban seamen resent is the discrimination to which we are subject by the Cuban Customs as compared to the preferential treatment they accord to foreign sailors, particularly those from behind the iron curtain. Most everything we bring from abroad to alleviate the scarcity suffered by our families is confiscated at the Customs House.

Still other reasons for disgust are the many cuts and discounts made from our already low pay and, very especially, the ridiculously low amount of foreign currency that we are allowed when we sail abroad. For spending money in foreign ports, all we get in local currency is the equivalent of $5 per week which, of course, are deducted from our basic salaries. In applying this restriction, no distinction is made between the crewmen or the various officer ranks. It is $5 for everyone.

Because of all this, and because of the terrible conditions under which Communism keeps our homeland, most Cuban sailors and officers are staunch anti-Communists. The Government knows this, but nevertheless they must employ what they call "the reactionaries" because of the scarcity of other trained personnel to man Cuban boats. Their only choice is to spy on us constantly, as I have just explained.

As to the operating conditions of the Cuban merchant fleet, it is worth mentioning that Polish ships, which make up a sizable proportion of Cuban shipping, are supplied with Soviet-made equipment which the Russians have long discarded as obsolete. Again, my own ship is an example. The "Aracelio" was completed as recently as 1963 in a Polish shipyard. Yet, its radar equipment is so obsolete that it is simply not used, since we could never find the parts to repair it when it broke. A German technician told my Chief Mate here that it must have been a World-War II unit.

Excessive bureaucratic red tape and disorganization is another serious problem confronted by Cuban shipping and which often results in considerable damage to those firms that trade with the Castro tyranny. I will illustrate this. The Cuban government agency responsible for arranging maritime transportation for merchandise bought abroad is the "Empresa Cubana de Fletes" (CUFLET).

The government purchasing organization buys merchandise from foreign companies, but fails to inform CUFLET of the date on which the cargo is to be loaded. All attempts to establish this are to no avail. Then one day the buying agency serves last-minute notice that the merchandise will be ready for loading. CUFLET takes pains to find a vessel in time but, more often than not, its hasty efforts are in vain. In the meantime, the seller abroad grows impatient, as he has long fulfilled his part of the deal and must continue to pay warehouse costs because of a delay that is no fault of his.

This happens all the time, to the extent that many foreign firms refuse to deal with such an undependable customer as the Cuban government, or, foreseeing the damages they may come to them because of such inefficiency they impose the harshest selling terms.

The unrest and chaos that I have described is not peculiar to the merchant fleet. I do not know many details about this because I have been out at sea most of the time since I first heard of it, but I understand that the Cuban Navy was also in such turmoil that practically all its officers were discharged early this fall. It is said that some of the dismissed naval officers were assigned to the merchant marine, and my men and I know a few instances. It is even true that Army officers with no naval experience are being appointed to high naval positions. However, it is most likely that many of the purged officers will have been shot or imprisoned. Such is the Cuba of today.

Lastly, we wish to emphasize that our decision to seek asylum in the United States has been made of our own free will. We have been pressured into this decision by no one. Our consciences no longer permit us to serve the cause of a Communist Cuba. Like hundreds of Cubans before us, we who love Cuba deeply cannot longer endure the tyranny with which she is afflicted.

We appreciate with all our heart the help received from UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA and we also wish to thank the gentlemen of the Press assembled here, for the attention given us.

Francisco Cobas.

Miami, 30 de Diciembre de 1965.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 19-120-26

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ~~[illegible]~~

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ~~BRANCH~~ ☐

DESTROY ☒ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 35

31 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY
CS/DO	2010	D

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, FE 8, SAVA 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D4, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O4

WH/C/ES

ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 302349Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 8166

NO NIACT

31 DEC 65 IN 24377

TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF WAVE 8122

1. PRESS CONFERENCE PER PARA 1 REF HELD AS SCHEDULED

WITH THUS FAR FAVORABLE RESULTS. APPROX TWENTY REPS ALL MEDIA PRESENT INCLUDING AP, UPI, ABC AND TWO LOCAL TV STATIONS, VOA, AFP AND APPROPRIATE STATION ASSETS. TONE OF CONFERENCE FRIENDLY. WITHIN TWO HOURS STORY ON LOCAL RADIO WHICH STRESSED THREE POINTS: OFFICERS BROUGHT TO POINT OF DEFECTION DUE FACT IGLESIAS CARRYING MILITARY CARGOS TO NORTH VIET NAM, PRESENT MORALE AND CONDITION CUBAN NAVY VERY POOR DUE IN PART TO WHOLESALE OFFICER PURGE AND REPLACEMENT THESE OFFICERS BY "LAND-LUBBER" ARMY OFFICERS, MERCHANT MARINE IN SAME STATE DUE G-2 HARASSMENT OF CREWS AND POOR CONDITION OF SHIPS. THESE (AND OTHER POINTS INCLUDING PARA 2 REF) INCLUDED IN PREPARED STATEMENT WHICH HANDED PRESS REPS. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CONFERENCE OFFICERS MET IN PRIVATE WITH VOA REP TO TAPE AN

SECRET

19-120-26
31 Dec 65

RID/MIS

FEB 7 9 43 AM '66

INTERVIEW.

2. TEXT OF STATEMENT ALSO INCLUDED IN AMSCROLL PRESS RELEASE BEING ISSUED THIS DATE AND WHICH WILL BE AIR MAILED ITS LIST. VIA AMLYRIC-1, PRESS INTERVIEW AND EDITORIAL COMMENT ARRANGED FOR RADIO COVERAGE VIA AMTHIGH, AMBROTH, AMTUMOR EVENING 30 DEC. AMHIM PREPARING SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE FOR 31 DEC. AMSTRUT-2 WILL PREPARE TAPED INTERVIEW FOR 2 JAN PROGRAM.

3. LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE SHOULD APPEAR 31 DEC AS AFP, UPI AND AP HAVE FILED STORIES. WILL FORWARD CLIPS AVAILABLE HERE FOR REPLAY.

SECRET

CFN 8166 8122 1 AP UPI ABC TV VOA AFP IGLESIAS NORTH VIET NAM CUBAN NAVY G-2 2VOA AMSCROLL VIA AMLYRIC-1 VIA AMTHIGH AMBROTH AMTUMOR 33 AMHIM 31 AMSTRUT-2 2 31 AFP UPI AP

BT

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
~~X-REF TO FILE NO.~~ 19-120-26
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH/C

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME 1540 BY

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, FE 8, SAVA 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D 4, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4,

RI
WH/C/ES

S E C R E T 291931Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 8122

TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF: DIR 63111

29 DEC 65 IN 23377

1. RE PARA 1 REF BELIEVE AMSCROLL SPONSORSHIP MORE SUITABLE AND LOGICAL IN VIEW ITS DAILY EMPHASIS UPON MHVIPER ACTIONS, ITS BEING KNOWN TO DEFECTING OFFICERS, AND ITS EXPERIENCE WITH PRESS CONFERENCES AND PUBLIC EYE. AMSCROLL PARTICIPATION TO BE LIMITED TO ORGANIZING CONFERENCE AND PRESENTING OFFICERS. IT WILL NOT TAKE CREDIT FOR DEFECTIONS. AMWORD-1, -2 AND -3 HAVE BEEN BRIEFED RE AMSCROLL ROLE IN SURFACING AND HAVE ARRANGED FOR SPACE FOR PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1130 HOURS 30 DEC. LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS, RADIO AND TV (INCLUDING WAVE MEDIA ASSETS SUCH AS AMHIM, AMICE, AMLYRIC-1)

TO BE ALERTED EVENING 29 DEC A HIGH LEVEL DEFECTOR TO BE AVAILABLE. IDENTITIES WILL BE WITHHELD UNTIL CONFERENCE.

2. RE PARA 2 REF PRESENT PLAN CALLS FOR AMSCROLL REPS TO MEET WITH QUSAILOR-42 TO WORK OUT DETAILS STATEMENT TO BE READ AND GIVEN PRESS WHICH TO SOME EXTENT WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW STATEMENT ISSUED JAPAN. WILL USE MILITARY CARGOS RATHER THAN ARMS WHICH CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE THUS FAR. ASSUMING QUSAILOR-42 CONCURRENCE WILL

SECRET

19-120-26
29 Dec 66

PAGE 2 OF 7
IN 23377

SECRET

RECEIVED
RID/MIS
FEB 14 3 16 PM '66

AL
SO INCLUDE POINTS PARA 3 REF. ALSO WISH TO INCLUDE A SPECIFIC STATEMENT
FROM QUSAILOR-42 REGARDING UNRELIABILITY CUBAN SHIPPING DUE POOR MECHANICAL CONDITION, INADEQUATELY TRAINED CREWS AND INCOMPETENT DIRECION FROM HAVANA.

SECRET

CFN: 8122 68111 1 AMSCROLL MHVIPER NOT TAKE AMWORD-1 -2 -3 1103 30 DEC TV AMHIM AMICE AMLYRIC-1 29 DEC A 2 QUSAILOR-42 JAPAN -42 3 A -42 CUBAN HAVANA

SECRET

BT

NNNN

RID/AN
FEB 16 1 36 PM '66

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 19-120-26

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☒ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

25/30 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, NE 6

WH/C/ES

X

S E C R E T 291934Z

DIR INFO RIOD CITE WAVE 8123

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REFS: A. DIR 67579 *

29 DEC 65 IN 23371

B. TM 772926

C. UFGA 24163

PER PARA TWO REF A REQUEST, JMWAVE POUCHED REF B BULKY MATERIALS TO HQS FOR FORWARDING TO RIOD. SPECIAL AMSCROLL STUDY AND OTHER SELECTED MATERIALS POUCHED RIOD REF C.

S E C R E T * Requested WAVE CAGIE material

CFN: 8123 67579 772926 24163 A JMWAVE B HQS AMSCROLL C

BT

SECRET

19-120-26

29 Dec 65

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 13

19-132-49/5

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	EW	5	MO
2		6	FI
3	CA	7	TC
4	PP	8	RR

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CSDO TIME 2200 BY CI

INFO FILE VR, FE 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/D4, CDG, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, DO 4, DO/H 3, CS/DO

21994

S E C R E T 272355Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY TOKY CITE WAVE ~~3097~~

NO NIACT

TYPIC ZRWACON

REF A. TOKY 5937 (IN 21434)

B. TOKY 5941 (IN 21678)

1. WAVE PLANS MEET SUBJECTS REF A UPON ARRIVAL WAVE AREA AND REMOVE TO SAFEHOUSE FOR APPROX ONE DAY PRIOR SURFACING. PURPOSE TO GIVE TIME ORGANIZE PROPER SURFACING AND DETERMINE SUITABILITY AND WILLINGNESS MEET WITH PRESS, TV, ETC UNDER AEGIS AMSCROLL. DEPENDING ON NATURE PRESS COVERAGE IN SAN FRANCISCO, PLAN HAVE AMSCROLL SPONSOR SURFACING IN MANNER GIVE IMPRESSION IGLESIAS SUCCESS PART OF OVERALL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE. WILL TIE IN WITH OTHER RECENT MARITIME DEFECTIONS AND WILL INDICATE OTHERS TO FOLLOW. METHOD OF SURFACING WILL FOLLOW AMWASP-1 PATTERN.

2. FOR TOKY. PLEASE ADVISE IF REF OFFICERS AWARE OF AMSCROLL ACTIVITY THIS OP. DID THEY MEET AMFRAME-1 AND IF SO IN WHAT ROLE AND UNDER WHAT NAME? ARE THEY AWARE OF THE AMSCROLL PAMPHLETS? ALSO REQUEST YOUR ESTIMATE THEIR WILLINGNESS COOPERATE IN PROP PLAY.

SECRET

Page 2 of 2
N21994

SECRET

SECRET

CFN 8097 5937 5941 WAVE A TW ETC AEGIS AMSCROLL SAN FRANCISCO

IGLESIAS CUBAN AMWASP-1 CP AMFRAME-1

BT

SECRET

N
NNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	EW	5	HQ
2		6	FI
3	CA	7	TC
4	PP-	8	RR

FROM Tokyo

ACTION WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO TIME 0425 CI SP

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, FE8, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT, CDC, SAVA

S E C R E T 280710Z

PRIORITY WAVE DIR CITE TOKY 5955

28 DEC [illegible] 22090

TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF WAVE 8097 (IN 21994)

1. BELIEVE REF SUGGESTION GIVE IMPRESSION ARACELIO IGLESIAS (AI) OP PART OF OVER ALL OPERATION AGAINST CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE VIEW GIST PSYCH PLAY HERE. WE ATTEMPTING PUBLICIZE FACT AI CREW MEMBERS DEFECTED DUE OPPOSITION ORDERS CARRY MATERIAL NORTH VIETNAM AND CUBAN EMBASSY TOKYO IS FAR EAST COORDINATOR ALL SHIPMENTS WAR MATERIAL ON CUBAN VESSELS, THUS ACTING TO IMPLEMENT CASTRO PROMISE AID NORTH VIETNAM WAR EFFORT. BELIEVE ANY INDICATION THEY PREVIOUSLY IN TOUCH AMSCROLL OR OTHER GROUP WOULD CAUSE DOUBTS VERACITY THEIR PRESS STATEMENT.. REQUEST THEREFORE YOU NOT IMPLEMENT REF.

2. SUBJECTS AWARE AMSCROLL ACTIVITY BUT HAVE NOT MET AMFRAME 1. AMSCROLL PAMPHLETS NOT USED. BELIEVE SUBJECTS WILL COOPERATE FULLY IN ANY TYPE PROP PLAY DESIRED. PLEASE ADHERE LINE TOKY 5949.

S E C R E T

CFN 5955 8097 ARACELIO IGLESIAS AI OP CUBAN AI NORTH VIETNAM CUBAN FAR EAST CUBAN CASTRO NORTH AMSCROLL NOT IMPLEMENT AMSCROLL NOT MET

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 36

☐ ' .ROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING	HQ		
1	CA	5	FI
2		6	TC
3	Eu	7	RO
4	– FE	8	C

ORIG : D. Ronis/bh
UNIT : DC/WH/C/CA
EXT : 4148 (R-1464)
DATE : 28 Dec 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

8 SECRET

28 DEC 65 19 03 Z

19-132-44/5

D
L

TO : JMWAVE TOKYO

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, FE 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D 4, CDC, CA/D 4, CA 2, CA/PEG/F, SAVA 2

TO PRITY WAVE INFO TOKY CITE DIR

TYPIC ZRWAGON

68111

REFS: A. WAVE 8097 (IN 21994)
B. TOKY 5955 (IN 22090)

1. HQS CONCURS TOKY REQUEST THAT IGLESIAS DEFECTIONS CONTINUE APPEAR SPONTANEOUS AND WAVE NOT GIVE IMPRESSION DEFECTIONS PART OF OVERALL EXILE ORGANIZATION OP AGAINST MERCHANT MARINE. SINCE AMSCROLL WIDELY KNOWN ASSOCIATION WITH MHVIPER ACTIVITIES, SUGGEST WAVE RECONSIDER USE AMSCROLL. AMICE MIGHT BE MORE SUITABLE GROUP TO SPONSOR WAVE SURFACING. SINCE WE NOW HAVE AT LEAST SEVEN RECENT MARITIME DEFECTORS, PULLING ALL TOGETHER IN NEAR FUTURE FOR FURTHER PSYCH ACTIONS WHEN CURRENT PSYCH EXPLOITATIONS COMPLETED MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVELY ACCOMPLISHED UNDER AEGIS AMICE. ALL SURFACINGS SHOULD CONVEY IMPRESSION WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION IN MERCHANT MARINE.

2. ODACID EXPRESSING SOME CONCERN OVER DEFECTORS' STATEMENTS RE "ARMS" SHIPMENTS TO NORTH VIETNAM AND DESIRES ASSURANCE STATEMENTS CAN BE SUPPORTED AT LEAST BY LOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS, IF NOT OUTRIGHT FACT. OTHERWISE FEAR ENTIRE EFFORT, WHICH THEY FEEL IS MOST DESIRABLE, MAY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. WAVE SHOULD REVIEW STATEMENTS CAREFULLY WITH SUBJECTS AND BE CERTAIN THEY CONSISTENT AND CONVINCING SINCE IT ANTICIPATED THIS WILL BE SUBJECT TO SEARCHING QUESTIONS IN FORTHCOMING

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 38-3

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

CONF :

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 68111

PRESS CONFERENCE. SUGGEST MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO CITE MILITARY CARGOS RATHER THAN ARMS PER SE. PER NISTERN-1 STATEMENT MADR 6593, CARBIDE SHIPMENTS CLEARLY IN THIS CATEGORY. WOULD APPRECIATE TOKY COMMENT.

3. FURTHER SUGGEST WAVE HAVE Q-42 AND OTHERS INDICATE THAT GROWING SECURITY CONTROLS OVER CUBAN SHIPS MADE LIFE INTOLERABLE. EXCEPT FOR PRESENCE OF TWO OR THREE DSE MEN (HE MIGHT NAME A FEW) ON EACH SHIP, UNDOUBTEDLY MANY MORE SEAMEN WOULD DEFECT. Q-42 COULD FURTHER SUGGEST HE KNOWS OF AT LEAST ONE SECURITY TYPE (NOT NAMED) WHO HIMSELF THINKING OF DEFECTING. ANOTHER FACTOR HINDERING MORE DEFECTIONS IS FEAR OF REPRISALS AGAINST FAMILIES.

END OF MESSAGE

FE/JKO
WH/C/CA/EW
WH/C/MO ✓

COORDINATING OFFICERS

John T. Flynn
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN L. HART
for DCWHD/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED File Insect

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	MO
2		6	C
3	CA	7	7
4	FI	8	X

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR CA 2 CA/PROP CI/IC 2 EE 6 SR 8 FE 8

ACTION

23 DEC [illegible] 20854

SECRET 231726Z
DIR CITE WAVE [illegible]
TYPIC MHSPAWN

AP STORY FILED VIENNA AND PRINTED MIAMI HERALD 23 DEC REPORTING CZECH ADMISSION OF DISASTROUS ECONOMIC ERRORS BEING USED BY AMSCROLL RADIO AS ONE MORE EXAMPLE INHERENT WEAKNESSES COMMUNIST ECONOMIC THEORIES. COMBINING WITH RECENT RUMANIAN AND SOVIET ADMISSIONS AS PART OF BASIC THEME TO AMSCROLL AUDIENCE THAT FUTURE CUBAN ECONOMY BLEAK INDEED IF AFTER ALL THESE YEARS SOVIETS, SATELLITES AND CHINESE UNABLE SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. IF AVAILABLE WILL APPRECIATE PRECIS OF CZECH DOCUMENT.

SECRET

CFN

3862 AP VIENNA MIAMI HERALD 23 CZECH AMSCROLL RUMANIAN CHINESE

PRECIS

BT

SECRET

Howard Bowman — 9321
Czech reports ff
will call when
copy of newspaper
article is received —

Sent under HW
date: 7 Jan 66
TM Smith
6158

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 19-120-

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☒ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

23/30 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHI.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH/C/ES TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EE6, WE8, CA2, CA/PROP

S E C R E T 232153Z

PRIORITY ATHE INFO DIR MADR CITE WAVE 8075

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

23D[illegible]2101C

REF: A. ATHE 8031 (IN 17131)

B. WAVE 7921 (IN 16238)

1. MEETING WITH ECONOMIDES DID NOT RESULT ANY QUOTABLE MATERIAL. WHILE MEETING NOT EXPLICITLY STIPULATED CONFIDENTIAL IT WAS PRIVATE IN NATURE AND PURPOSE WAS TO RECEIVE "CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS" FOR

19-120-26

23 Dec 65

PA IN 21010 PAGE 2 of 2

MESSAGE TSIRIMOKOS. THUS WE RELUCTANT RELEASE FULL ACCOUNT AND THEREBY NEGATE WHAT APPEARS BE PROMISING CONTACT.

2. HOWEVER AMSCROLL WILL RELEASE AN ACCOUNT 24 DEC SAYING AMSCROLL HAS PRESENTED ITS STUDY OF SHIPPING AND GALBE CASES TO GREEK DIPLOMATS WHO MEMBERS TSIRIMOKOS UN ENTOURAGE. WILL REPORT DIPLOMATS STATEMENT GREEK GOVT IS AWARE SHIPPING PROBLEM BUT BELIEVES THIS WILL DECLINE AND DISAPPEAR IN FUTURE. RE GALBE, WILL SAY DIPLOMATS ACKNOWLEDGED GALBE BEHAVIOR AND STATED THIS A MATTER BEING CAREFULLY EXAMINED BY GREEK GOVT. THIS RELEASE WILL BE SEPARATE FROM THAT DESCRIBED PARA 7 REF B AND WILL BE AIRMAILED ADDRESSES PROVIDED BY ATHE.

3. FOR DIR AND MADR. RE PARA 6 REF B, RECHECK INDICATES ALABART WAS SPEAKING OF MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES LOPEZ BRAVO RATHER THAN COMMERCE MINISTER DEL BRAVO IN THIS CONTEXT.

SECRET

CFN: 8075 803; 792; ECONOMIDES NOT RESULT NOT EXPLICITLY TSIRIMOKOS AMSCROLL 24 DEC GALBE GREEK A 7 B 6 B ALABART LOPEZ BRAVO DEL BRAVO

BT

NNNN

RID/MIS
FEB 7 9 39 AM '66

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM JMWAVE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

19-132-49/5

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP—	5	MO
2		6	
3	CA	7	D
4	FI	8	X

ACTION WH/C 8

~~☐~~ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, WE 7, EE 6, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2

ACTION

10 Dec 65 IN 365

SECRET 101613Z

ATHE INFO MADR DIR CITE WAVE 7819

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF A. ATHE 7960 (IN 10615)

B. WAVE 7793 (IN 10801) *

RE PARA 5 REF A AMSCROLL WILL WRITE LETTER SUGGESTED PARA 4 UPON RECEIPT CLIPS. RE PARA 6: SEE REF B.

SECRET

CFN 7819 7960 7793 RE 5 A AMSCROLL 4 CLIPS RE 6 B

BT

SECRET

* LETTER AIRMAILED 9 DEC

14-00000

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM

XXXA XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TOTAL COPIES: 36

ORIG : S. CHACONAS/nea
UNIT : WH/C/CA/PP
EXT : 5518/9138
DATE : 17 DEC 65

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

6 S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	RQ		
1	PP —	5	FI
2		6	TC
3	CA	7	C
4		8	

17 DEC 65 15 [illegible]

TO : JMWAVE MADRID ATHENS

19-120-36/3

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, EE 6, WE 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, DO 4, DO/H 3

TO WAVE INFO MADR ATHE CITE DIR 66092

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF: WAVE 7921 (IN 16238)*

1. CONCUR PROP PROPOSAL PARAS 6 AND 7 REF. CONSIDER ALABART RESPONSE HIGHLY REVEALING AND UNDERSCORES PROPOSAL GIVE SPANISH/CUBAN TRADE THEME WIDEST AND CONTINUING PLAY L.A. PRESS AND RADIO AND ALSO EUROPEAN AREA. SUGGEST AMHIM CABLE SUMMARY AMSCROLL PRESS RELEASE PER PARA 7 REF TO SEVERAL OF ITS MORE RESPONSIVE OUTLETS INCLUDING ATHE, IN ORDER ASSURE FULLEST COVERAGE.

2. FOR MADR: REQUEST STATION CABLE HQS WAVE ANY GOS REACTION RESULT PROP PLAY ABOVE ALSO ANY STATION SUGGESTIONS FOR AMSCROLL USE IN PREPARATION PRESS RELEASE AND PAPER TO BE FORWARDED DEL BARRIO

END OF MESSAGE

* Concerns interview with Spanish Consul-General in N.Y.

DC/WH/C/CA
WH/C/MO
WE/C Les Raty (Phone)
WE/5 Les Raty (Phone)
EE/K Bob Stevens

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

5
4
3
2
1

17-5

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 35

Page 1

26 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ATHENS

ACTION

WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, EE6, WE8, CA2, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H3,

S E C R E T 171551Z

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR MADR CITE ATHE 8031 (BACHMAN ACTING)

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF: A. ATHE 8021 (IN 16297)*

B. WAVE 7921 (IN 16238)

* PLS ADVISE OUTCOME WAVE 7852 (IN 12973).

17 DEC 65 IN 17131

1. REF B DOES NOT INDICATE WHETHER MARKOS ECONOMIDES DISCUSSED PARA 2 REF B SUBJECTS IN QUOTABLE, OFF-THE-CUFF, OR BXFICIAL STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL MANNER.

WH/C/CS

ABSTRACT

2. IF CONOMIDES DID NOT STIPULATE REF B DISCUSSION A "CONFIDENTIAL" ONE, THEN SUGGEST PARA 7 REF B AMSCROLL PRESS RELEASE ALSO INCLUDE STATEMENT FROM "OFFICIAL GREEK GOVT (GOG) REPRESENTATIVE OF TSIRIMOKOS' UN ENTOURAGE INDICATED HIS DISAPPROVAL OF GALBE AND LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY TO AMSCROLL PRESENTATION". ALSO, GOG OPPOSED TO GREEK SHIPPING TO CUBA.

3. WE HAVE CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY TSIRIMOKOS REACTION TO ABOVE. ALTHO TSIRIMIKOS MAY DENY PERSON IN HIS ENTOURAGE MADE STATEMENT IT UNLIKELY HE WILL DENY GOG DISAPPROVAL OF GALBE CONDUCT. FURTHERMORE, IN EVENT A DENIAL IS ACTUALLY ISSUED, THIS WOULD SERVE AS USEFUL PEG KEEP STORY ALIVE AND ALLOW FURTHER EDITORIAL CRITICISM OF GOG INACTION IN

SECRET 19-120-26

17 Dec 65

SECRET

IN 17131 Page 2

BCLARING GALBE AS PERSONA NON GRATA.

JAN 17 '66

4. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

CFN 8031 8021 7921 B NOT INDICATE MARKOS ECONOMIDES 2 B ECONOMIDES NOT B A ONE 7 B AMSCROLL GOG TSIRIMOKOS' UN GALBE AMSCROLL GOG GREEK CUBA TSIRIMOKOS TSIRIMIKOS GOG GALBE A PEG GOG GALBE PERSONA NON GRATA NO INDEX

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	5	FE
2		6	RR
3	CA-EG	7	CS(S)
4	MO	8	C

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/C 5

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, ADDP, C/FE 8, C/WH 6, C/CI

ACTION

17 DEC 65 IN 17112

SECRET 171819Z

PRIORITY TOKY INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 7938

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

R F WAVE 7892 (IN 14727) +

AMFRAME-1 VENEZUELAN DOCUMENTATION COMPLETED. ARRIVING TOKY ALITALIA 772 AT 2240 ON 19 BEC TOKYO TIME.

+ A/1 BOOKED ALITALIA FLT 772 DEPART FM CARA 19 TO ARRIVE TOKYO 2200/19 DEC.

SECRET

VFN: 7938 7892 AMFRAME-1 VENEZUELAN ALITALIA 772 2240 19

BT

SECRET

14-120-26

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	
2		6	
3	CA	7	FI
4		8	

FROM

ACTION

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, EE 6, WE 2, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, DO 4, DCI

S E C R E T 161828Z

DIR INFO ATHE MADR CITE WAVE 7921

16 DEC 65 IN 16238

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF WAVE 7852 (IN 13973)

1. REF DELEGATION UNABLE SEE TSIRIMOKOS DUE PRESS UN BUSINESS. HOWEVER RECEIVED FOR HOUR AND HALF 12 DEC BY MARKOS ECONOMIDES WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS GREEK DIPLOMAT WHO AIDE TO AND TRAVELING WITH TSIRIMOKOS.

2. DELEGATION RAISED TWO SUBJECTS;

A. GALBE

B. GREEK SHIPPING TO CUBA

3. RE 2A ECONOMIDES INDICATED HIS DISAPPROVAL OF GALBE AND LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY TO AMSCROLL ARGUMENTS. MADE NO PROMISES BUT SAID WOULD GIVE AMSCROLL PREPARED PRESENTATION OF CASE TO TSIRIMOKOS. (THIS INCLUDED LATEST AMSCROLL LETTER DESCRIBED WAVE 7793.) ECONOMIDES DID NOT INDICATE ANY ACTION BEING TAKEN TO P.N.G. GALBE.

4. RE 2B SAID HE AND GREEK GOVT WELL AWARE PROBLEM AND OPPOSED TO THIS SHIPPING. EXPLAINED CONTINUATION DUE GREEK SHIP OWNERS

SECRET

WEALTHY AND POWERFUL. EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR AND COMMENTED ON THOROUGHNESS OF AMSCROLL FILE THIS SUBJECT PREPARED FOR TSIRIMOKOS AND LEFT WITH ECONOMIDES.

5. IN CONCLUSION ECONOMIDES SAID HE MOST SYMPATHETIC WITH AIMS AMSCROLL AND ADDED THAT PREVIOUS LETTERS TO TSIRIMOKOS ON GALBE HAD BEEN HELPFUL. URGED THAT AMSCROLL KEEP HIM AND TSIRIMOKOS INFORMED FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS PARA 2 SUBJECTS. WILL POUCH AMWORD-3 REPORT THIS MEETING WHEN PREPARED.

6. FOR MADR. WHILE IN NEW YORK AMSCROLL DELEGATION CALLED UPON SPANISH CONSUL-GENERAL MANUEL ALABART (WHO RELATED TO AMBLEAK-1) SEEKING ENTREE TO TSIRIMOKOS. CONVERSATION LED TO SHIPS BEING BUILT IN SPAIN FOR CUBA. POINT WAS MADE TO ALABART THIS ACTIVITY COULD BACKFIRE ON SPAIN PARTICULARLY IN VIEW RECENT INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN ASSOC (ILA) RESOLUTION TO BOYCOTT FREE WORLD SHIPS THAT TRADE WITH CUBA. ALABART RESPONDED THIS SUBJECT OF GREAT INTEREST TO SPANISH MINISTER COMMERCE LOPEZ DEL BARRIO ESPECIALLY IF TRADE WITH CUBA WOULD REFLECT UNFAVORABLY UPON SPAIN'S ANNOUNCED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR BALANCE LATIN AMERICA. SAID DEL BARRIO HAD LEFT NEW YORK FOR MADRID TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY AND HAD DISCUSSED WITH ALABART PROBLEM OF CUBAN TRADE AS IT RELATES TO PLANS FOR REST

SECRET

OF CONTINENT. IN CONCLUSION ASKED FOR AMSCROLL STUDY THIS MATTER PLUS INFO ON SHIPPING BOYCOTT AND COPIES ILA RESOLUTIONS IN ORDER FORWARD THEM TO DEL BARRIO. IDEN C OF REF NOW GATHERING MATERIAL TO COMPLY WITH REQUEST.

7. WAVE SUGGESTS AMSCROLL PREPARE PRESS RELEASE ON STUDY OF SPAIN/CUBA TRADE AND ITS POTENTIALLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON SPAINISH HOPES FOR REST OF LA. COULD ARRANGE PICKUP BY AMHIM AND POSSIBLY WIRE SERVICES FOR SUBSEQUENT REPLAY BY OTHER STATIONS. PURPOSE TO NEEDLE SPAIN TO DISCOURAGE ITS TRADE WITH CUBA. REQUEST DIR, MADR COMMENTS.

SECRET

CFN 7921 7852 TSIRIMOKOS 12 MARKOS ECONOMIDES GALBE 2A EMSCROLL NO PROMISES 7993 NOT INDICATE P N G 2B 2 AMWORD-3 MANUEL ALABART AMBLEAK-1 ILA LOPEZ DEL BARRIO ILA C LA AMHIM

BT

SECRET

14-00000

9-170-46

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 38

2/2 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP—	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	D
4	FI	8	X

FROM: ATHENS

ACTION: WH/C 2

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO: FILE, VR, WE 7, EE6, DO4, DO/H3, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/IC2

SECRET 161500Z

WAVE MADR INFO DIR CITE ATHE 8018. (BACHMAN ACTING)

[redacted]

ACTION

THUNIFORM

REF A. WAVE 7819 (IN 12365)

B. ATHE 6219, 28 MAY 65

ARTICLE

16 DEC 65 IN 16143

1. ATHE AFTERNOON PAPER VRADYNI IN FRONT-PAGE ARTICLE 15 DEC HEADLINED AMSCROLL REF A REQUEST TO FONMIN TSIRIMOKOS FOR DEPORTATION GALBE. PRINTED GIST AMSCROLL LETTER.

2. THUPRISE/12 (T/12) WILL NOW APPROACH TSIRIMOKOS UPON LATTER'S RETURN FROM U.S. AND CALL ATTENTION TO T/12'S 27 MAY INTERPELLATION IN PARLIAMENT PER REF B. T/12 WILL ASK WHAT ACTION TSIRIMOKOS INTENDS TAKE. IF TSIRIMOKOS ANSWER UNSATISFACTORY, T/12 WILL ADVISE HIM OF INTENT RE-RAISE ISSUE FROM FLOOR PARLIAMENT. WILL KEEP ADDEES ADVISED OF T/12 PROGRESS.

3. AIRMAILING CLIPS AND TRANSLATION TO WAVE AND HQS.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN

: 8018 7819 6219 28 65 VRADYNI 15 DEC REF A TSIRIMOKOS GALBE THUPRISE/12 (T/12) U.S. T/12'S 27 MAY T/12 T/12 T/12 HQS NO INDEX

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM: M. WAVE
ACTION: C/WH5
☒ RID COPY

14 Dec 36

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21/31

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AC

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	MO
2		6	FI
3	CA	7	TC
4	CW	8	CI/OS

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME

INFO: FILE, VR, ADDP, C/FE6, C/WH6, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/D4, CSC

SECRET 142340Z

TOKY INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 7892

15 DEC [illegible] IN 14727

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF WAVE 7843 (NOT SENT CARA) (IN 12663)*

* AMFRAME-1 DEPARTING FOR CARACAS 11 DEC.

1. AMFRAME-1 (IDEN) BOOKED ALITALIA FLIGHT 772 DEPARTING CARACAS 18 DEC TO ARRIVE TOKY 2200 ON 19 DEC. DELAY DUE JAPANESE EMBASSY REFUSAL ACCEPT PRESENT DOCUMENTATION THUS NECESSITATING HIS OBTAINING VENEZUELAN PASSPORT.

2. AMFRAME-1 IS CHIEF ECONOMIC WARFARE SECTION AMSCROLL AND HAS COLLABORATED WITH STATION AND AMWASP-1 ON JAPAN/CUBA TRADE OPS. HE PREPARED DISCUSS WITH OSCAR OR OTHER C/O HOW AMSCROLL MIGHT BETTER SUPPORT EFFORT REDUCE THIS TRADE.

3. FOR DIR: WAVE WILL T.A. CHARGES THIS OP TO YOPOLL/41.

4. FOR CARA: AMFRAME-1 ENROUTE TOKY ON SENSITIVE OP. ORIGINATING TRIP CARACAS TO HIDE WAVE AREA ORIGIN. AS NOTED ABOVE IT NECESSARY FOR HIM OBTAIN VENEZUELAN DOCUMENTATION WHICH HE ARRANGING THROUGH FATHER AND UNCLE WHO VENEZUELAN CITIZENS AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

CFN

IN 14727 Page 2 of 2

7892 7843 NOT SENT AMFRAME-1 ALITALIA 772 CARACAS 18 TOKY 2200 19 JAPANESE AMFRAME-1 AMSCROLL AMWASP-1 JAPAN/CUBA OPS OSCAR C/O AMSCROLL T.A. OP YOPOLL/41 -1 OP VENEZUELAN.

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28/31

SECRET

ACTION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	DDP	5	MO
2		6	FI
3	CA	7	TC
4	EW	8	CICS

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION ~~DC/WH/C~~ 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY 12

INFO FILE, VR, ADDP, C/FE 8, C/WH 6, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, CDC

S E C R E T 142340Z

TOKY INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 7893

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF WAVE 7892 (IN 4727)

14 DEC 63 IN 14707

IDEN: RAFAEL RIVAS VAZQUEZ

S E C R E T

CFN 7893 7892 RAFAEL RIVAS VAZQUEZ

BT

SECRET

N
NNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

22 SECRET

1-120-26/3

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP—	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	[illegible]
4	PI	8	[illegible]

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, EE3 WE8 CA2 CA/04 [illegible] CA/PRG [illegible]

S E C R E T 111831Z

DIR INFO ATHE MADR CITE WAVE 7853

11 DEC 65 IN 12980

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF: WAVE 7852 (IN 12973)

IDEN A. DR. MARIO SEIGLIE MONTORO, UR SECRETARY GENERAL.

IDEN B. DR. FERNANDO FERNANDEZ CAVADA, UR SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

IDEN C. DR . JOSE R ALVAREZ DIAZ, RECOGNIZED ECONOMIST, FORMER CUBAN CABINET MINISTER (OF HACIENDA).

S E C R E T

CFN 7853 7852 A DR MARIO SEIGLIE MONTORO UR B DR FERNANDO FERNANDEZ CAVADA UR DR JOSE R ALVAREZ DIAZ HACIENDA

BT

NNN

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-35/3
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 48

WH/C/KAPO

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, FE8, WH8, WE3, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/IC2, [illegible], DO/H3

S E C R E T 112005Z

11 Dec 65 IN 12999

DIR INFO TOKY MADR CARA CITE WAVE 7859

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF: A. WAVE 7625 (IN 07753)
B. WAVE 7631 (IN 05886) (NOT SENT TOKY)

AN | WH/C 85
ABSTRACT X

1. HEADLINE STORY 11 DEC DIARIO LAS AMERICAS FEATURED FRONT PAGE WAVE-INSPIRED AFP ARTICLE STATING JAPAN AND SPAIN TO BE PRINCIPAL TARGETS OF CONTINENT-WIDE BOYCOTT. ARTICLE REFERS TO BOYCOTT AGREEMENT BY PORTWORKERS OF US, CANADA AND PUERTO RICO AND TO EXPECTED INCREASE IN EFFECTIVENESS DUE TO ILA AND GLEASON SUPPORT.

2 IN ARTICLE, SPAIN CHARACTERIZED AS ONE OF MAJOR SUPPLIERS AND JAPAN AS PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF CUBAN FUNDS WHICH USED TO PROMOTE HEMISPHERIC SUBVERSION. FIGURES RE JAPAN/CUBAN TRADE PROVIDED BY UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR). ARTICLE ALSO PROMINENTLY MENTIONS CORREA AND FORDC.

3. AIRMAILING CLIPS TO ADDEES.

19-124-35/3
11 Dec 65

S E C R E T

CFN 7859 7625 7631 NOT SENT 11 DIARIO LAS AMERICAS AFP US CANADA

SECRET

19-120-26

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

43 SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP —	5	CICS
2		6	MO
3	CA	7	D
4	FI-TC	8	X

FROM TOKYO

ACTION C/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, ADDP, C/FE 8, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, CDC

SECRET 100921Z 10 DEC 65 IN 11951

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE TOKY 5725

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF: DIR 63721 *

1. PLEASE HAVE AMFRAME ONE COME TOKY TO ARRIVE 15 DECEMBER. PLEASE ADVISE AIRLINE AND FLIGHT. ASK AIRLINE RESERVE ROOM TOKYO HILTON HOTEL. HE WILL BE CONTACTED AT AIRPORT BY PERSON USING NAME OSCAR.

2. IF AIRPORT CONTACT ABORTS AMFRAME ONE SHOULD GO TO LOBBY OF TOKYO HILTON HOTEL AT 10 AM OR 10 PM WHERE HE WILL BE CONTACTED BY OSCAR.

3. PLEASE CABLE DESCRIPTION AMFRAME ONE.

4. ABOVE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS REPLACE OSAKA CONTACT CITED TOKY 5684.

SECRET

CFN: 5725 63721 15 OSCAR 10 AM 10 PM OSAKA 5684

BT

* HAS CONCURRED USING AMFRAME-1 TO ASSIST IN DEFECTION OPS

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 37 1-123-26

SECRET

43

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP —	5	HO
2		6	C
3	FI-TC	7	D
4	RR	8	X

FROM ATHENS

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO CI CA TIME 0152 BY A

INFO FILE VR, CS/CA, WE 8, FE 6, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 291453Z

PRIORITY DIR WAVE INFO MADR CITE ATHE 7970

TYPIC MHSPAWN [illegible]

REFS: A. ATHE [illegible] (IN 88125)

B. WAVE [illegible] (IN 10801)

C. ATHE [illegible] (IN 10615)

1. REFS B AND C CROSSED IN TRANSMISSION.

2. RE PARA 4 REF C, BELIEVE IT MAY BE HIGHLY PROFITABLE [illegible] STANDPOINT TO HAVE WAVE SEND DELEGATION FROM AMSCROLL OR OTHER SUITABLE KUBARK GUIDED GROUP, POSSIBLY FROM NEW YORK, TO SEE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER ILIAS TSIRIMOKOS WHO NOW IS NY FOR UN CYPRUS DEBATE. GROUP CAN USE PARA 3A REF C ARGUMENT AND OTHERS AGAINST GALBE TO DEMAND GALBE'S EXPULSION FROM GREECE, BREAKING CUBA-GREEK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, ETC. ALTHO WE HIGHLY DOUBT TSIRIMOKOS WILL ACCEPT THEIR DEMANDS AT THIS TIME BECAUSE HIS FEAR OF ALIENATING UN COMMIE VOTE ON CYPRUS ISSUES, WE CAN EXPLOIT ISSUE THRU MHSPAWN ASSETS. ALSO, TSIRIMOKOS, KNOWN FOR

SECRET

SECRET IN 11828 PAGE 2

HIS PERSONAL WIT AND SARCASM, MAY MAKE RELEASAFL 3 STATEMENT SIMILAR TO PARA 1 REF A. FYI: TSIRIMOKOS SCHEDULED DEPART US O/A 12 DEC. PLS ADVISE IF ACTION TAKEN.

3. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN 7970 7662 7793 7960 B C RE 4 C PSYCH AMSCROLL KUBARK NEW YORK ILIAS TSIRIMOKOS NY UN CYPRUS 5A REF C GALBE GALBE'S GREECE CUBA-GREEK ETC TSIRIMOKOS UN COMMIE CYPRUS MHSPAWN TSIRIMOKOS IREF A FYI TSIRIMOKOS US O/A 12 DEC ADVISE NO INDEX

BT [redacted]

✓ LETTERS MENTIONE PARA 2 ATHE 7662 (IN 85125) ✓✓

AIRMAILED 8 DEC.

SECRET

NNNN ✓✓ RYBAT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5 19-172 36

26 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP—	5	FE
2		6	TC
3	CA	7	MO
4	EW	8	D

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME X BY

INFO
FILE VR, ADDP, C/FE 8, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D4, CDC

SECRET 102330Z

PRIORITY TOKY INFO ROUTINE DIR CITE WAVE 7843

ACTION

10 DEC 65 IN 12663

NO NIGHT ACTION

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF: TOKY 5725 (IN 11951)*

1. AMFRAME-1 DEPARTING FOR CARACAS 11 DEC. BRIEFED PER REF. WILL CABLE ETA WHEN CONFIRMED.

2. PER PARA 3 REF AMFRAME-1 APPROX FIVE FEET EIGHT AND HEAVY SET. COMPLEXION FAIR. THOUGH FLUENT IN ENGLISH, ACCENT DISCERNABLE. AT AIRPORT WILL BE CARRYING UNDER ARM CURRENT ISSUE NEW YORKER OR READING SAME IF CONTACT ATTEMPTED IN HOTEL LOBBY.

SECRET

CFN 7843 5725 CARACAS 11 DEC ETA 3 AMFRAME-1 ENGLISH NEW YORKER

BT * REQUESTED AMFRAME/1 COME TOKY 15 DEC.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31 10-120-26

48 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	TC—	5	RI
2		6	CI
3	FI	7	CA
4	MO	8	FI

FROM Tokyo

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY DX

INFO FILE, VR, FE 8, WH 8, C/OA, C/OPS, C/IC 2, CA 2, CA/O 4

S E C R E T 080909Z

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE TOKY 5684

ACTION

TYPIC ZRWAGON

8 DEC 65 IN 10108

REF: WAVE 7755 (IN 09426)*

1. HOTEL RESERVATION WILL BE MADE FOR AMFRAME/1 AT OSAKA ROYAL HOTEL, OSAKA, JAPAN. AMFRAME/1 WILL BE CONTACTED AT HOTEL AFTER ARRIVAL BY PERSON USING NAME OSCAR.

2. ADVISE AMFRAME 1'S ETA OSAKA.

S E C R E T

CFN: 5684 7755 AMFRAME/1 OSAKA OSCAR 1'S ETA

BT

* Requested contact instruction plu hotel by Return cable in order pass AMFRAME-1 prior departure to Caracas.

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 35 9-1,20-26

T1 **SECRET** GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	TC—	5	CA
2		6	PP
3	EI	7	EW
4	MO	8	RR

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY CI S 2

INFO FILE VR, FE 8, WH 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CA 2, CA/04

S E C R E T 080047Z

PRIORITY TOKY INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7755

NO NIGHT ACTION

TYPIC ZRWAGON

[illegible] 09326

REF: A. TOKY 5663 (IN 09090) ✓

B. WAVE 7714 (IN 08803)

1. AMFRAME-1 IS AMSCROLL (IDEN) OFFICIAL IN CHARGE THEIR ECONOMIC WARFARE PROGRAM. MEETS REF A REQUIREMENTS.

2. SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY VISA AMFRAME-1 WILL BE PREPARED DEPART FOR JAPAN 13 DEC OR OTHER DATE AS DESIRED BY TOKY. IF ADDEES CONCUR PRESENT PLAN IS FOR AMFRAME-1 DEPART WAVE AREA FOR CARACAS 9 OR 10 DEC WHERE HE WILL OBTAIN JAPANESE VISA, TICKETS, AND DOCUMENTATION ATTESTING TO VENEZUELAN BUSINESS CONNECTIONS. WILL NOT DEPART CARACAS FOR TOKY UNTIL WAVE SO INSTRUCTS.

3. REQUEST CONTACT INSTRUCTION PLUS HOTEL BY RETURN CABLE IN ORDER PASS AMFRAME-1 PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR CARACAS.

S E C R E T

CONCUR AMFRAME/1 IF HE CAN LEGITAMATELY REPRESENT SELF AS CUBAN EXILE [illegible]

CFN: 7755 5663 7714 AMFRAME-1 AMSCROLL A AMFRAME-1 JAPAN 13 DEC AMFRAME-1 CARACAS 9 10 DEC JAPANESE VENEZUELAN NOT DEPART AMFRAME-1

BT

SECRET

19-132-26

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 37

SECRET

71

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	TC	5	RM
2		6	C/
3	EI	7	CR
4	MO	8	CW

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY PP

INFO FILE VR, FCI, WH8, C/CA, C/OPS, C/IC2, CA2, CA/O4,

S E C R E T 030047Z

PRIORITY TOKY INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7756

ACTION

NO NIGHT ACTION

TYPIC ZRWAGON

8 Dec 65 IN 09921

REF: WAVE 7755 (IN 09926)

IDEN: MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR)

S E C R E T

CFN: 7756 7755 MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA UR

BT

SECRET

SC

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19-120-26/3

21 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP—	5	RR
2		6	FI
3	CH	7	CI
4	FI	8	S

FROM ATHENS

ACTION WH/SA 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WE 5, FI 2, CA 2, [illegible], DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/IC 2,

ACTION

8 DEC 65 IN 10615

S E C R E T 081530Z

WAVE INFO MADR DIR CITE ATHE 7960

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF WAVE 7226 (IN 94157) ✓

1. 1 DEC GREEK DAILY VRADYNI IN FRONT PAGE ARTICLE ENTITLED "GREEK COMPANIES JOIN STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REDS" PUBLISHES LETTER FROM "DR. RAF. RIVAS VAZQEZ OF ANTI-CASTRO ORGANIZATION MOVIMENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (MUR)" (SIC). LETTER PRAISES AND THANKS UNIDENTIFIED GREEK FIRMS, SHIPPING COMPANIES, AND PEOPLE WHO TRADITIONALLY DEFEND DEMOCRATIC AND ANTI-COMMIE CAUSES FOR PROVIDING VALUABLE INFO TO MUR "ECONOMIC RESEARCH OFFICE." ALSO, "VERY FEW", SUCH AS TSAVLIRIS SHIPPING CO., DISHONOR GREEK FLAG AND PEOPLES RE ACTIVITIES TOWARDS CUBA.

2. 3 DEC COMMIE FRONT DAILY AVGI IN FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL "SPIES PRAISED IN PUBLIC" ANSWERS ABOVE VRADYNI ARTICLE. ACCUSES "COOPERATING"

SECRET

SECRET IN 10615 PAGE 2

GREEK FIRMS OF SPYING AGAINST CUBA, CALLS MUP "INTL SPY RING SERVING IMPERIALISTS PLANS AGAINST CUBA," CHASTIZES RIVAS FOR NOT NAMING GREEK FIRMS, ETC. SPYING AGAINST CUBA, AND STATES CIA'S CUBAN AGENTS DOING THEIR WORK. EDITORIAL ENDS AS FOLL: "SPYING AGAINST THOSE WHO OPEN THEIR COUNTRY AND PORTS TO GREEK SHIPS IS COMPLETELY IN CONTRAST WITH MORALS OF GREEK MERCHANT MARINE AND OPPOSED TO GREEK NATIONAL TRADITIONS."

3. PARA 1 ABOVE PLAYED BY OUR UNILATERAL MHSPAWN AGENT THUNIFORM/15 WHO WILL ANSWER AVGI EDITORIAL IN FOLL VEIN:

A. INTL COMMIE ORGAN AVGI DEFENDS COMMIE CUBA ETC BECAUSE OF INTL COMMUNISM'S DESIRE MAINTAIN MINORITY DICTATORSHIP (WITNESS RECENT EXODUS FROM CUBA). HOWEVER, AVGI HAS FAILED MISERABLY IN DEFENDING GREEK HONOR, TRADITIONAL DEMOCRACY ETC BY FAILING TO ASK FOR RECALL GALBE WHO VIOLATED MOST ELEMENTARY BASES DEMOCRACY, HUMAN DIGNITY, FREE SPEECH, ETC.

SECRET

SECRET

IN 10615 [illegible]

3. AVGI HAS CRITICIZED "IMPERIALISTS PLANS AGAINST CUBA" SINCE BEGINNING CASTRO REGIME, ESPECIALLY DURING ~~ING~~ PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S TENURE IN OFFICE. YET, ON 21 NOV 65 AVGI PRAISED KENNEDY, STATED WARREN COMMISSION REPORT UNTRUE USING OBVIOUSLY FALSE PICTURES AND STATEMENTS, AND CLAIMED KENNEDY KILLED BY "UNDEMOCRATIC DARK FORCES." HOW CAN AVGI TAKE THIS STAND UNLESS IT IS ACTING ON ORDERS FROM MOSCOW OR POSSIBLY PEKING TO DISCREDIT U.S.?

4. HAVE NO OBJECTION REPLAY PARA 1 AND 2 ITEMS BUT SUGGEST WAVE, THROUGH AMSCROLL OR OTHER SUITABLE ASSETS, REPLY TO AVGI EDITORIAL VIA LETTER TO ENTIRE GREEK PRESS (PER EKAA 13086) USING PARA 3 ABOVE ARGUMENTS PLUS ANY OTHER DEROG INFO PERTAINING TO THIS THEME, PARTICULARLY USE OF CASTRO BY INTL COMMUNISM TO SPREAD GERM OF TOTALITARIAN COMMUNISM TO OTHER DEMOCRATIC LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ETC.

5. AIRMAILING ABOVE CLIPS WITH TRANSLATIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TN 10615 PA1664

PLS ADVISE WHETHER PARA 4 ACTION AGREEABLE TO ALL. IF SO, REQUEST DIR FORWARD 21 NOV AVGI MATERIALS TO WAVE AND MADR ASAP.

6. FOR WAVE: HAS REF ACTION OCCURRED?

7. NO INDEX.

SECRET

WAVE PREPARING PAPER
(WILL FORWARD TO TSIKIMOROS)

CFN 79[illegible] 7225 1 VRADYNI DR. RAF. RIVAS VAZQEZ ANTI-CASTRO MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (MUR) SIC MUR TSAVLIRIS RE CUBA 3 DEC AVGI VRADYNI MUR NOT NAMING ETC CIA'S 1 MHSPAWN THUNIFORM/15 AVGI AVGI ~~ETC~~ AVGI ETC GALBE ETC AVGI CASTRO KENNEDY'S 21 65 AVGI WARREN AVGI MOSCOW PEKING U.S. NO OBJECTION 1 2 AMSCROLL AVGI EKAA [illegible]386 3 LATIN AMERICAN 4 21 AVGI NO INDEX

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CL ED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3 19-120-26

53/53 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM TOKYO

1	TC	5	RR
2		6	CI
3	FI	7	CA
4	170	8	C

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME

INFO FILE VR, FE 8, CI, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D 4, CDC, CA 2

ACTION

7 DEC 59 [illegible] 90

S E C R E T 0[illegible]654Z

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE TOKY 5663

REFS: A. TOKY 5639 (IN 07192)

B. WAVE 7714 (IN 08803)*

CONCUR AMFRAME ONE IF HE CUBAN AND CAN LEGITIMATELY REPRESENT SELF AS OFFICIAL CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION. IF POSSIBLE WOULD PREFER REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE. IF AMFRAME ONE MEETS THESE NEEDS SUGGEST HE MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS DEPART FOR JAPAN 13 DEC. PLS AWAIT FURTHER WORD FROM US HOWEVER BEFORE DISPATCHING HIM.

S E C R E T

CFN: 5663 5639 7714 AMFRAME 13 DEC PLS

BT

*Stated A/1 is Station Agent responsive to Kubark direction.

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

TT/nca
C/CA/PP
18/9138
7 DEC 65

☐ INDEX
XX NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

7 S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1	NP —	5	CICS
2		6	MO
3	CA	7	D
4	FI-TC	8	X

TO : JMWAVE TOKYO

8 DEC 65 17 49 G

19-120-26

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: DC/WH/C 5 INFO: VR . FILE ☐ RID COPY ADDP C/FE 8 C/CI C/FI 2 C/FI/D 4 CDC C/CA 2

WAVE TOKY INFO CITE DIR

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

63721

REF WAVE 7714 (IN 08803)*

1. HQS CONCURS USE AMFRAME-1.

2. FOR TOKY: STATION MAY WISH CONSIDER USE ADDITIONAL CASE OFFICER WITH PBRUMEN BACKGROUND SUCH AS HENRY P. REBHOLTZ.

END OF MESSAGE

* WAVE proposes sending AMFRAME-1 to assist TOKY in defection ops of Cuban seamen.

C/WH/C/CA
C/WH/C/MO
FE/JKO/J Stenger (JFS)

C/FE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 6-19

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

UR

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

Miami, December 7, 1965

H.E. Elias Tsirimokos
Foreign Minister
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Athens, Greece

Excellency:

In the past, we have addressed several letters to Greek Government officials concerning the case of José Luis Galbe, the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in Athens. We have informed the representatives of the Greek people of Galbe's notorious background as a gangster and Communist agitator, a background to which he lived up recently when he shot at a Greek bus driver at Thermopilae over a trivial traffic-argument and, instead, shot his wife.

We are, and proudly so, relentless enemies of the régime that Galbe represents in Greece. However, when we regret the indignity wrought over the Greek nation by its Government's failure to expel him, we are not acting out of political passion. Surely, you will agree that when the head of a diplomatic mission publicly fires his gun on the citizens of the country where he is accredited, he is acting with utmost disrespect for the laws of that country and, hence, for the country as a whole. The least he deserves is to be declared 'persona non grata', and that only if the offended government is so benevolent as to overlook the fact that the insult is really coming from the régime that selects the criminally insane as its representatives abroad.

We, as Westerners of Mediterranean origin, have always felt somewhat akin to the Greek people, whom we also admire as the direct descendants of the ancient fathers of Civilization. Therefore, we were honestly saddened to see that the past government of your country placed the personal friendship of two gangsters —Galbe and Andreas Papandreou— above the age-old dignity of the Hellenic nation. And we are saddened even more when those actions are described in detail in the press.

On the other hand, our insistence on the subject, somewhat unorthodox as it may be from the protocol standpoint, is definitely inspired by the friendliest of sentiments, while Galbe's failure to observe the most elementary diplomatic rules has been evidenced in a most hostile —and dangerous— manner.

Therefore, we are confident that you will excuse us if we provide further evidence of the Castro régime's and Galbe's personal contempt for free nations such as Greece. Immediately following is a summary of the 'dossier' that we have compiled on José Luis Galbe:

10 SE 9 ST. MIAMI, FLORIDA TELEFONO FR 3-8033

UR

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

H.E. Elias Tsirimokos
Page 2
December 7, 1965

He is a naturalised Cuban of Spanish origin. He left Spain because of the Spanish Civil War where he was organiser and Prosecutor of the Red Popular Tribunals.

He moved to Havana, Cuba in 1941 and worked on several newspapers and radio stations. He has always been outstanding for his violence and political scandals in favor of the Communists and lost several jobs due to his explosive, violent nature. He was named Professor of Penal Law in the University of Oriente in 1959, and became associated with a group known as "The Communist professors of the Santiago University".

The Castro brothers, Fidel and Raúl, began the final phase of their revolt in 1957 from the Sierra Maestra mountains. During this time, and from his home in Santiago de Cuba, Galbe was in clandestine contact with the revolt. His home was an essential link in the communication channel with the low-lands. During this period Vilma Espín (Raúl Castro's fanatically communist wife) and even Raúl himself were secret visitors to Galbe's home. And what was Galbe's reward for all of this support? Immediately after Castro occupied Havana (January 1, 1959) Galbe was named Havana's Director of Prisons -- an old training ground for the future diplomat. Next, Galbe was named Agregado Cultural (Cultural Attaché) in the Cuban Embassy to Rome and from there to his present position in Athens.

Galbe is a known schisophrenic and there is a history of mental disorder in his family. His brother, Pascual, committed suicide. His mother, who died in Cuba in 1954, was insane. Her brother, a former Canon of the Cathedral de La Seo de Zaragoza, also was insane.

On the point that concerns Galbe's role in the organisation and functioning of the Communist "Popular" Courts during the Spanish Civil War, it is interesting to note that his name is listed in the "Causa General" (General Cause), the Spanish Government's mass indictment of the most outstanding Red perpetrators of atrocities during the conflict. For the same reason, Galbe is among the few Spanish exiles who have been forever banned from his homeland by the authorities.

Yet, in a characteristic display of nerve, the Castro government last February issued a special diplomatic passport to Galbe so that this former undesirable Spanish citizen could enter the country that had banned him and attend a conference of Cuban Heads of Diplomatic Missions that met in Madrid.

H.E. Elias Tsirimokos
Page 3
December 7, 1965

Another Castroite affront to a Western European nation in which Calbe was instrumental!

Lastly, we wish to call your attention on the fact that the more decent and stable of Cuba's diplomatic representatives have shown that they cannot stand Castro's mockery of diplomacy and international law.

As examples, we can cite the very recent defections of Messrs. Luis R. Alonso Domínguez, Cuban Ambassador to Great Britain; Gilberto Alemany Vilar, Economic Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in Japan; Odón Alvares de la Campa, Economic Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in Spain; and Alberto Cabrera Infante, Economic Attaché of the Cuban Embassy in Spain.

Individually and collectively, the decent peoples of the world are disassociating themselves from the infamy of Castroism. Just now, the cream of Cuba's own population --professional men, businessmen, intellectuals, etc.-- is about to join the second part of the greatest mass exodus recorded by History since World War II.

Let us assume that the fact that a given régime is murderous and totalitarian were not reason enough for the nation with the oldest democratic tradition to break all ties with it. By any standard, Calbe's preposterous behaviour at Thermopilae is more than reason enough. And his continuing affronts to the Greek people give even more reason.

We are confident that this time, our advice, which is the advice of [illegible] affection, will not go unheeded.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Mario Seiglie Montoro
Secretary General

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23 19-120-26

7 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	TC —	5	CICS
2		6	CA
3	FI	7	EW
4	MO	8	D

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 5

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME X BY

INFO FILE ~~VR~~ ADDP C/FE 8 C/CI C/FI 2 C/FI/D 4 CDC

S E C R E T 061800Z

DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 7714

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF TOKY 5639 (IN07192)*

ACTION

6 DEC 65 IN 08803

1. WAVE PROPOSES AMFRAME-1 FOR REF OP IN VIEW ABILITY, JUDGMENT, FLUENCY ENGLISH AND IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY. HE HAS PARTICIPATED IN PREPARATION LEAFLETS SENT TOKY. DUE IMPORTANT FAMILY CONNECTIONS IN CARACAS (FATHER AND UNCLE ARE SENIOR VENEZUELAN GOVT EMPLOYEES) IT POSSIBLE AMFRAME-1 COULD OBTAIN VENEZUELAN PASSPORT AND AS MINIMUM SHOULD BE ABLE EASILY OBTAIN

P-2
IN 02103

SECRET

JAPANESE VISA IN CARACAS THUS ON SURFACE ORIGINATING TRIP THERE. WOULD TRAVEL AS TOURIST/BUSINESSMAN. THIS WOULD ADD TO PLAUSIBILITY DENIAL REQUIREMENT DESCRIBED REF. IF ADDEES CONCUR WILL NEED NAME HOTEL IN TOKY PLUS CONTACT PLAN.

2. FOR TOKY: AMFRAME-1 (IDEN) IS STATION AGENT REPSONSIVE TO KUBARK DIRECTION.

S E C R E T

CFN 7714 5639 AMFRAME-1 OP CARACAS -1 JAPANESE -1 KUBARK

BT

SECRET

* REQUESTED APPROPRIATE EXECUTIVE OF CUBAN EXILE ORIGIN READY FOR PROMPT DISPATCH TO JAPAN TO HANDLE CONTACTS WITH DEFECTORS FROM SHIP.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7 25 17-120 26

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	TC —	5	CICS
2		6	CA
3	FI	7	EW
4	MO	8	D

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/C 5

☒ ~~RID~~ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME X BY

INFO

FILE VR ADDP C/FE 8 C/CI C/FI 2 C/FI/D 4 C/S

S E C R E T 061800Z

6 DEC 65 IN 08781

DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 7715

RYBAT TYPIC ZRWAGON

REF WAVE 7714 (IN 08803)

IDEN: RAFAEL VIVAS-VAZQUEZ (201-278758)

ACTION

S E C R E T

CFN 7715 7714 RAFAEL VIVAS-VAZQUEZ 201-278758

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1 19-120-26

26/70 **SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP –	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	D
4	FL	8	X

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/OA

ACTION

1 DEC 65 IN 05849

SECRET 012209Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7627

TYPIC MHSPAWN AMWASP

REF: DIR 60778*

PREFER JOURNAL REQUEST INTERVIEW THROUGH AMSCROLL IN VIEW AMWASP-1 OVERT CONNECTION. LETTER SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO AMWASP-1 CARE OF IDEN. AMWASP-1 AVAILABLE GO NEW YORK ANY TIME.

SECRET

CFN 7627 60778 AMSCROLL AMWASP-1 -1 -1 NEW YORK

BT

SECRET

* STATED JOURNAL OF COMMERCE HAS NO REPRESENTATIVE WAVE AREA AMWASP/1 MUST TRAVEL NEWYORK

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFIED FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26 [illegible]

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP—	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	D
4	FI	8	L

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CAZ, CA/PROP, CI/OA

ACTION

1 DEC 65 IN 05843

S E C R E T 012209Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7628

TYPIC MHSPAWN AMWASP

REF: WAVE 7627 (IN 05849)

IDEN: C/O DR. MARIO SIEGLIE MONTORO, SECRETARY GENERAL,
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
10 SE 9 ST
MIAMI, FLORIDA

S E C R E T

CFN 7628 7627 C/O DR. MARIO SIEGLIE MONTORO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
10 SE 9 ST MIAMI FLORIDA

ST

SECRET

N
NNN

14-00000

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF. TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

1.9-170 M

SECRET

GROUP 1

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP —	5	HO
2		6	RR
3	CA	7	FI-TC
4	EU	8	C

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C/8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY K

INFO FILE, VR, FE 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, TSD 6, FI, FI/D 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, ODC

SECRET 261252

DIR INFO TOKY OKIE CITE WAVE 4506

ACTION

26 Nov 65 IN 02688

TYPIC MHVIPER ZRWAGON

REFS: A. DIR 60144

B. TOKY 5502 (IN 99160)

C. DIR 57871

1. PER REF A WAVE DECIDED AMSCROLL MOST LOGICAL ORG. IT NOW PREPARING 200 SMALL MIMEOGRAPHED FOLDED HANDOUT UNDER ITS NAME (BUT NOT ADDRESS). FRONT SAYS " MESSAGE TO OUR COMPATRIOTS ABOARD IGLESIAS." INSIDE TWO PAGES SAY "YOUR SHIP WHEN REPAIRED WILL SAIL FOR FRIGID AND INHOSPITABLE WATERS OF NORTH KOREA FOR MILITARY CARGO TO CARRY TO NORTH VIETNAM. THESE ARE DANGEROUS AND UNFRIENDLY WATERS AND NO MAN'S SAFETY CAN BE GUARANTEED HERE (WHAT WOULD YOU DO IF YOUR SHIP RAN AGROUND IN NORTH KOREA? OR HIT A MINE IN NORTH VIETNAM?) WHAT TO DO? FOLLOW PATH YOUR COUNTRYMEN. LEAVE WHILE YOU HAVE CHANCE. HOW TO DO THIS?". BACK PAGE FOLLOWS LINE PARA [illegible] 2 A REF B AND ENDS "IN THIS WAY YOU WILL AVOID CERTAIN AND UNNECESSARY DANGER".

2. WILL CABLE WHEN HANDOUTS POUCHED. LETTERS (IN ENGLISH) REQUESTED PARA 2 B, REF B WILL BE READY FOR MAILING WEEK 29 NOV. WILL NOT MAIL UNTIL ADVISED BY TOKY TO DO SO. HOWEVER, WILL POUCH

SECRI

SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2
IN 02688

COPIES WHEN IN FINAL FORM.

S E C R E T

CFN: 7506 50144 5502 57871 A AMSCROLL ORG 200 NOT ADDRESS IGLESIAS NORTH KOREA NORTH VIETNAM NO MAN'S A 2 A B ENGLISH 2 B B 29 NOV NOT MAIL TOKY

ET

SECRET

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-131-26

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM JMWAVE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

34 SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED Amscroll

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/C8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, FE8, CA2, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H3

16 Nov 65 IN 95100

S E C R E T 152323Z

DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 7263 (INGHURST ACTING)

MHVIPER AMSCROLL

REF: TOKY 5400 (IN 93257) *

AMWASP-1 NOW WORKING WITH AMSCROLL TO PREPARE REF MATERIAL WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED ON AMSCROLL LETTERHEAD TO REACH TOKY BY 15 DEC. ANY ADDITIONAL INFO HQS MAY HAVE SHOULD BE POUCHED FOR INCLUSION THIS PAPER.

SECRET

* RE: MATERIAL ON JAP.-CUBA TRADE

CFN 7263 INGHURST 5400 AMWASP-1 AMSCROLL 15 DEC

BT

SECRET

DI PATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/MHSPAWN/Operational
O Luiz GOMEZ Wanguemert Commentary

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
AR : FYI

REF: DIR-53981, 28 October 65

As Headquarters is aware, JMWAVE is refuting on a continuing basis and via all appropriate assets commentaries similar to that discussed in the reference. As for this particular GOMEZ broadcast the Station prepared a guidance for AMSCROLL use, primarily its radio, the point of which was that GOMEZ had become eligible for the "Foot 'n Mouth Club" due his admission on 21 October that Camarioca was a plebiscite and his statement on 22 October, no doubt as a result of a prod from his Communist superiors that "I think I made excessive concessions ..." explaining that the people are really leaving due to economic reasons. We agree and say that the economic reasons are to obtain three meals a day, to be able to walk into a market and buy eggs and milk. The guidance ends with this: "You may take your foot out of your mouth now, GOMEZ".

Roger E. [illegible]
for Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:
3 - WH/C

CS COPY

19-120-26 Extract

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE TYPED
10 Nov 65

DATE DISPATCHED
NOV 15 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23825

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-49/3

19-120-26

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

22 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP —	5	FI
2		6	CI
3	CA	7	RR
4	MO	8	C

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/C5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY D X

INFO

FILE, VA, ADDP, C/EE3 C/WE3 C/CA2 C/CI C/RI/SD C/FI2

SECRET 032229Z

3 Nov 65 IN 86558

ACTION

DIR INFO ATHE MADR CITE WAVE 7[illegible]28

RYBAT TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF A WAVE 6792 (NOT SENT MADR)

B ATHE 7529 (NOT SENT MADR)

(IN 79235)*
(IN 76839)

1. RE PARA 2 REF A AMBLEAK-1 HAS DEVELOPED FOLLOWING INFO FROM IDENTITY A WHO RADIO SCRIPT WRITER FOR AMSCROLL AND WHO FORMERLY WORKED IN SPAIN ON SAME PAPER AS GALBE: GALBE BORN ZARAGOZA, SPAIN OF PROMINENT AND WEALTHY PARENTS. MOTHER WAS INSANE AT TIME OF HER DEATH IN 1954 IN CUBA. HER BROTHER WHO AT ONE TIME CANONIGO (CANON) OF THE CATHEDRAL DE LA SEO DE ZARAGOZA ALSO INSANE AT TIME MOTHER'S DEATH. GALBE IS KNOWN TO HAVE INHERITED INSANITY TRAITS FROM MATERNAL SIDE AND IS SCHIZOPHRENIC.

2. GALBE EDUCATED AS LAWYER. DURING SPANISH CIVIL WAR HE ACTIVE IN CREATING "POPULAR COURTS" AND WAS PROSECUTOR (FISCAL DE LOS TRIBUNALES POPULARES) OF THOSE OPPOSED TO SPANISH REPUBLIC. BECAME FAMOUS DUE FEROCITY OF ATTACKS AGAINST DEFENDANTS. DUE THIS AND HIS COMMIE ACTIVITIES AT THAT TIME NOW LISTED IN THE CAUSA GENERAL REPEAT CAUSA GENERAL AND THEREFORE NOT PERMITTED RETURN TO SPAIN.

3. AFTER CIVIL WAR GALBE WENT FRANCE AND MARRIED FRENCHWOMAN. BOTH MOVED HAVANA WHERE SHE PROSPERED OWNING A BEAUTY SHOP. HE LIVED OFF FAMILY WEALTH AND HELD JOBS ON A NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS. NEVER STAYED LONG ANY ONE JOB DUE EXPLOSIVE NATURE AND ACTUALLY FIRED FROM INFORMACION REPEAT INFORMACION. IN EARLY FORTIES TURNED TO RADIO WORK AND IN 1944 FIRED FROM RADIO STATION OF CUBAN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION DUE VIOLENT ATTACK POPE PIUS XII. CIRCA 1952 GALBE OBTAINED JOB AS PROFESSOR OF PENAL LAW AT UNIVERSITY OF ORIENTE (IN SANTIAGO) WHERE HE ASSOCIATED WITH LEFTISTS. BEGAN INDOCTRINATING STUDENTS IN COMMUNISM. AMONG ATTENDEES WAS VILMA ESPIN (RAUL ROA'S WIFE). GALBE'S SANTIAGO HOME WAS RELAY CENTER FOR MESSAGES TO AND FROM FIDEL CASTRO THEN FIGHTING IN THE SIERRA MAESTRA.

4. IN JAN 59 NAMED PRISON DIRECTOR AND THEREAFTER CULTURAL ATTACHE TO ROME.

5. IDENTITY B, A CUBAN NATIONAL WHO KNEW GALBE DURING CUBA PERIOD CONFIRMED PARA 2 STATEMENTS AND TOLD AMBLEAK-1 THAT GALBE PARTICIPATED IN FAKE TRIALS OF ANTICOMMMUNITS AND AS PROSECUTOR ALWAYS DEMANDED DEATH PENALTY. IDENTITY B IS AN INFORMANT OF AM-

IN 8655 P3-3

[illegible] IS BROTHER OF SUBJ OF 201-352552 (FOR ADDITIONAL INFO SEE UFGA 21982 OF 23 MAY 63).

6. STATION CANNOT JUDGE ACCURACY ABOVE REPORTS ON GALBE BACKGROUND. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY CONFIRMATION OR ADDITIONAL INFO HQS AND MADR CAN PROVIDE. IF REPORTS ESSENTIALLY TRUE, COULD BE USED IN LETTERS TO GALBE THREATENING EXPOSURE OR SENT BY AMSCROLL TO GALBE AND PUBLICIZED PER PARA 2 REF B. PLS ADVISE.

7. INDEX GALBE.

SECRET

CFN 7022 6792 7529 2 A AMBLEAK-1 A AMSCROLL SPAIN GALBE ZARAGOZA SPAIN 1954 CUBA CANONIGO (CANON) CATHEDRAL DE LA SEO DE ZARAGOZA SCHIZOPHRENIC SPANISH FISCAL DE LOS TRIBUNALES POPULARES CAUSA GENERAL NOT PERMITTED FRA CE HAVANA INFORMACION 1944 PIUS XII 1952 ORIENTE SANTIAGO VILMA ESPIN RAUL ROA'S FIDEL CASTRO SIERRA MAESTRA JAN 59 ROME B 2 AMBLEAK-1 B AMBLEAK-1'S 201-352552 UFGA 21982 23 MAY 63 2 B

BT

* AMSCROLL SHOULD WRITE LETTER.

SECRET

[illegible]

DISPATCH

…ICATION
SE ET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	[illegible]
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AMSCROLL/Publication on Cuban Sugar Problems

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: **FYI**

1. We forward under separate cover subject publication which was recently sent to AMSCROLL mail recipients interested in economic material. In producing this study a particular effort was made to keep it objective and factual on the theory that in the case of sugar the facts speak for themselves and need only to be pulled together. We also believe that objective material similar to the attached should over a period of time enhance the reputation of the AMSCROLL economic section as a serious and objective outfit that seeks to discredit the Castro regime by publicizing the truth.

2. The Station would appreciate Headquarters' reaction to this publication. Additional copies are available should distribution via KMFORGET or other means be desired.

3. It may be of interest to report that a copy of the attached report has been mailed to Identity, currently in Geneva where he is representing his company at the sugar conference. This was done directly under the AMSCROLL economic section letterhead and via AMWORD-1's brother, an employee in the research department of Identity's company.

Roger E. Mandlbrook
for Philip G. ELMARD

19-120-26

Attachments:
1. Publication, USC (only)
2. Identity, USC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/att.,USC

[redacted]

DATE TYPED
8 Oct 65

DATE DISPATCHED
OCT 12 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23469

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-49/4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

2 atts

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER Seperate Cover Attachment #2; UFGA 23469

IDENTITY: ARTURO MANAS,
Vice-President, Czarnikow-Rionda Company,
New York. (Sugar Brokers)

CS COPY

S/c att #2
UFGA 23469

19-120-26

FORM 8-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. /

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
MHVIPER/Exploitation Cuban Trade Practices

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For use as Headquarters determines

REFERENCES: A. WAVE-5942.
B. DIR-45158

1. We forward by separate cover the article described in the references. It is the first item in the AMSCROLL economic report which can and should be attributed to AMSCROLL research. It may be of interest to record that the first paragraph of this item was developed from 0/27839-65 of 17 September as authorized by reference B. The second paragraph was developed from a lead obtained from 0/27842-65 of 22 September which sent us to two publications by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith. The last sentence of paragraph 3 was developed from information in the Wall Street Journal of 22 and 28 September.

2. The Station of course will be interested in any replay generated by Headquarters via AMPATRIN-1 or other asset.

for Philip G. ELMARD

MICROFILMED
OCT 2 0 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
AMSCROLL Economic Intel Report, USC (att'd)

19-120-26 per abstract

[redacted]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
3-WH/C, w/att., USC

DATE TYPED 7 Oct	DATE DISPATCHED OCT 12 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D 200-120-52

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23449

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-49/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CS COPY

1 att

USC Att. UFGA-23449
7 Oct 65

economic intelligence report

FROM THE U.R. ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

3P

OFFICE:
10 S.E. 9 St.

MAILING ADDRESS
Box 3940
Miami, Florida

PHONE:
373 - 8033

VOL. I No. 4

1.- Cuba continues desperate attempts sell sugar.- The Cuban sugar monopoly, CUBAZUCAR, on September 6 concluded a sale of 5,000 tons of raw sugar for October 1965 delivery to the Iranian sugar organization. The origin of this sugar was hidden in that it was declared to have originated in the Caribbean, including Peru, excluding Brazil. Market reports were correct in stating that the country of origin was in fact Cuba. The price agreed to was 18 pounds sterling per ton (C and F) less 5 shillings per ton to cover the expenses of the tender. This deal was engineered by Westzucker of Dortmund, an organization also selling Cuban sugar to Jordan and which wishes to keep its name out of these sales.

Another interesting development in Cuba's sugar selling activities during the month of September was quoting sugar for future delivery at or under the London spot price on the day the offer was made. In other words, Cuba is offering sugar under the world market value.

MICROFILMED
OCT 2 0 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Example of this were:

Country	Date of Sale	Amount	Selling Price Per Ton (in Sterling)	Market Price	Delivery
Iraq/Ceylon	Sept 9	10,000	16	22.50	Nov '65
Jordan	Sept 11	3,000	15-15-0	22.95	Nov
Scandinavia	Sept 7	10,000	18-2-0	24	Jan '66
Scandinavia	Sept 13	2,500	18	21.10	Oct
Sweden	Sept 9	10,000	16-16-0	22.50	Dec
Switzerland	Sept 9	10,000	18-10-0	24	Jan '66
United Kingdom	--	10,000	18-15-0	21.55	Sept

It is difficult to explain this curious behavior in terms other than Cuba's desperate need for foreign exchange. These sales at these prices can only result in a net loss to Cuba due to Cuba's inefficient sugar production. This loss will be compounded should the present upward trend of world sugar futures continue (the New York price for world sugar on Caribbean port basis has gone from \$1.60 on September 1 to \$2.10 on September 27).

2.- Free World Shipping drops 51%.- Twenty Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports during the past month of August. The trend continues downward; the August 1963 total was 24, and the one for August 1964 was 41, which means a decrease of 51%, when August 1965 (20 vessels) is compared to August 1964.
Great Britain led the "maritime fifth columnists" with 11 vessels, followed by Lebanon, Greece, France, and Italy with 2 vessels each, and Cyprus with one.

Already 852 vessels are being kept out of the Red Cuba trade by its owners or operators. The most recent example is "Rederiaktiebolatget Saly" of Mariehamm, Finland,

S|C ATT#1
UFGA 23449

CS COPY

19-130-26

which firm withdrew 11,691-ton tanker, VALMY, and the other vessels it owns and/or operates.

3.- "Tsavliris" privateers exposed.- TSAVLIRIS shipping firm, operating out of London and Piraeus, under the names of "Tsavliris Shipping", "Tsavliris Hellas Maritime", "Pancristo Shipping", "Waterloo Shipping", and "Trafalgar Shipping" is very active in business with the Castro-Communist regime.

From a total of 17 vessels, TSAVLIRIS has been using 12 in the Red Cuba trade. The 12 vessels are: FREE ENTERPRISE, FREE MERCHANT, NEW FOREST, NEW GATE, NEW GROVE, NEW GLADE, NEW HEATH, NEW HILL, NEW LANE, NEW MEADOW, MUSWELL HILL, CLAIRE, FREE TRADER, and FREE NAVIGATOR. TSAVLIRIS operates its vessels under British, Lebanese or Haitian flags, this last action being illegal according to a July 6, 1965 Haitian law. The FREE NAVIGATOR has changed its name seven times. The NEW HEATH has delivered two shipments of Cuban sugar to Japan, which have not been accepted by Japanese refineries, because stain and rust from vessel's hold has spoiled cargo. In mid-August the Lebanese 7,260 ton SAN SPYRIDON had arrived in the United Kingdom with 1,600 tons of Cuban sugar spoiled by sea water.

TSAVILIRIS' vessels have made 50 trips to Red Cuba during the last two years.

4.- Cuban Management Boycott Committee receives support.- Reports reaching this bureau indicate that the Cuban Management Boycott Committee has already received several letters support from Free World Chambers of Commerce. Details are expected to be known shortly.

5.- Free World dockworkers' boycott to receive boost.- The announcement of a Continental Dockworkers Congress to be held in Venezuela during the first two weeks of October confirm last month's report that an increase in boycott activities against vessels flying the flags of countries still trading with Communist Cuba.

6.- Japanese Trade Mission gets "chilly" reception in Latin America due to Red Cuba deals.- A Japanese Trade Mission, headed by Mr. Kazue Kitagawa, President of "Sumitomo Electrical Industries" came under fire while touring Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Peru. Latin Americans brought up matter that Japan was indirectly financing subversion by providing Castro with an average of $1 million dollars a month for the last 4 years. Japanese were told to choose between the Red Cuban market and the Latin American market.

Some examples follow: article by L. Rojas Ospina in "Excelsior", Mexico, Sep. 4, 1965; in Brazil, a speech by Congressman Flaviano Riberiro dated Sep. 4, 1965, and an article by Gustavo Corcao published in "Diario da Noticias", Rio de Janeiro, Sep. 2, 1965 issue, made the headlines. In Lima, Peru, a speech by Congressman Ricardo Temoche made the local Japanese embassy respond with a vague statement of justification. In Chile, an editorial of "El Mercurio" stressed this point to Japanese visitors.

7.- Cuban exiles block Castro's attempt to sell "treasure".- Cuban exile Committee for the Recovery of the Artistic and Cultural Heritage of their country was able to block Castro's attempt to sell art works and raise $2 million dollars. Cuban exiles inspected 104 cases containing art treasures during August 23, 24, and 25, in Milan, Italy, identifying 45 pieces as their own.

Although 103 cases were only worth US$16,000, the contents of case #107 were said to be worth US$600,000. The first 103 cases delivered to Castro's "partner" Mahmood Mowlazadeh, contained religious and funeral pieces, but case #107, forwarded from Switzerland, contained solid gold and silver objects.

Italian Customs have impounded Castro's "treasure".

8.- Castro's missions abroad "shaky" while rumors plague Island.- After the "defections" of Luis Ricardo Alonso - Ambassador to England -, Gilberto R. Alemany -Trade Councellor in Japan-, and several members of the Cuban "Music Hall" playing in Paris, the regime recalled its Ambassador to Prague, Armando Flores Ibarra, and the following members of the Cuban Embassy in London: Maria Fernandez, Osmani Martinez Vazquez, Moises Diaz, Mario Garcia, and Armando Lobeto.

Meanwhile, different rumors plagued Cuba (many of them stemming from official statements): attempts on Castro's life, internal dissention resulting from the "ultimatum" given to militiamen to return weapons; new boatloads of Cuban refugees arriving to Floridian shores; and Security Police Chief Valdes' statements zeroing-in against "terrorism, sabotage, and resistance".

Econ. Int.Rep. recommends: "A Depression in Russia?" published by US NEWS & WORLD REPORT in its September 13, 1965 issue. "Red Buying Snarled by Red Tape" by Miami Herald-Los Angeles Time Wire, published in "THE MIAMI HERALD", September 17, 1965, p.18-A.

Sources: The above information has been obtained from reliable sources, both from Cuba and the Free World. For further details related to the above items please address your correspondence to:

Economic Research Bureau
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
10 S.E. 9th Street
Miami, Fla., U.S.A.

Miami, October 1st., 1965.-

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief of Station, Caracas

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE E1

SUBJECT
AMSCROLL/European Shipping Organization

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Request comment

We attach herewith a reproduction of an article from the Caracas newspaper El Universal of 10 September describing the organization of a committee of European shippers to fight the discrimination these shippers fancy they suffer in Latin America. We are curious why such a group should be organized and to what purpose. Could this, for example, be a reaction to the efforts to boycott ships that trade with Cuba? The Station will appreciate Headquarters' comment if it appears that this group may become important and if it is or will be concerned with attempts to influence shipping to Cuba.

Roger E Marchbank
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment:
Newspaper article, USC (att'd)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/att.,USC
2- COS,Caracas,w/att, USC
2- C/WH,w/o/att.

1 att

19 - [illegible] - 26

CROSS REFERENCE TO
– To out Pouch

DATE TYPED
7 Oct 65

DATE DISPATCHED
OCT 11 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23448

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-49/3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

CS COPY

U-C Attachment; UFGA-23448
7 Oct 65

Armadores Europeos Constituyen Comité Contra Discriminaciones que les Hacen en Latinoamérica

LONDRES, septiembre 3 (AFP). -- Los representantes de los armadores de los nueve principales marinas mercantes de Europa han formado un Comité de acción contra la discriminación nacionalista practicada cada vez más, según ellos, en América del Sur en el terreno de los transportes marítimos.

La Cámara de Transportes Marítimos del Reino Unido precisó hoy en un comunicado que este Comité, cuya sede se encuentra en Londres, tendrá por objeto facilitar las consultas entre los armadores europeos y coordinar su acción a este respecto. El Comité pondrá asimismo sus servicios consultivos a disposición de los gobiernos a que pertenecen sus armadores.

El Comité está compuesto por representantes de las compañías marítimas cuyos servicios regulares sirven la América del Sur. Se trata de compañías domiciliadas en Bélgica, Francia, Alemania, Grecia, Italia, Países Bajos, Noruega, Suecia y Reino Unido. El comunicado agrega que "cierto número de países tanto de la costa occidental como de la costa oriental de América del Sur, practican discriminaciones bajo una forma u otra, en la elección de los pabellones y que otros parecen emprender la adopción de medidas de este género o de controles y restricciones suplementarios".

EL UNIVERSAL Sep 10/65

Shipbuilders

S/C att #1
UFGA 23448

CS COPY

19-120-26

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Andrew C. McLellan
Inter-American Representative
AFL-CIO
Washington, D.C.

FROM: Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez
Secretary for Economic and
Professional Affairs,
Unidad Revolucionaria,
Miami, Fla., U.S.A.

REF.: CONSIDERATIONS OF THE JAPAN-
CUBA TRADE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA.

I.- INTRODUCTION.-

The Japanese People, its businessmen, and its government have been able to make Japan occupy a leading place among the industrial countries of the Free World. In 1964, Japan was the leader in Free World shipbuilding, contributing 40% of the tonnage; in the electronic field, Japan came in second; in steel production and chemicals, Japan was able to occupy third place; and in automobile production, Japan was fourth, with 1.7 million vehicles produced.

The free-loving and democratic-oriented Cuban People are sympathetic with this effort the Japanese People are making; an effort which is well known and admired throughout the whole world. At the same time, the free-loving and democratic-oriented Cuban People -the ones within Cuba, and the ones living in exile- are astonished to watch Japan very much involved in trade relations with Communist Cuba, although Japan is aware that by so doing it is directly aiding a tyranny, and at the same time, providing this regime with the necessary funds to subvert its neighbors throughout Latin America.

It should be pointed out that Japan, based on its concern for human rights could very well consider that its present trade relations with Communist Cuba are completely negative, but this is not the only reason. Japan must be aware, that its trade relations with Communist Cuba will eventually, in a very near future, jeopardize Japan's trade relations with Latin America, and this is already beginning to happen.

II.- JAPAN-COMMUNIST CUBA TRADE RELATIONS.-

A.- Trade Balance.

Japan has always had a deficit in its trade balance with Cuba, i.e., not only in its present trade relations, but also during its trade prior to the establishment of the Castro-Communist regime.

10 SE 9 ST. MIAMI, FLORIDA
TELEFONO FR 3-8033

B.- Japan provides Castro of hard currency.

It is estimated that Japan provides Castro with 30% of its hard currency, due to the previously mentioned fact of a deficit in its trade balance with Cuba. The hard currency has averaged during the last four years the amount of US$1 million a month, in the following manner (estimates):

1962:	US$ 14 million
1963:	12 million
1964:	8 million
1965:	14 million

Total: US$ 48 million.

The hard currency is used by Castro for two things:

1.- Finance subversive activities throughout Latin America.

2.- Pay short term credits in European markets, thus remaining in business with countries other than Japan.

C.- Japan is leading buyer of Cuban sugar.-

Japan, together with Spain and Morocco, is one of the three leading Free World buyers of Cuban sugar, although Japan is the country that has become Castro's main source of foreign exchange.

1.- Cuban sugar purchased.

1959:	397,047 Ton.	
1960:	210,272	
1961:	325,539	2,699 Ton. (refined)
1962:	522,727	15,148 " "
1963:	163,662	
1964:	328,609	
1965:	300,000 (estimate)	

2.- Japanese firms involved:

The leading buyers of Cuban sugar are:

Iwai & Co., Ltd.
Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd.
Kanematsu & Co., Ltd.
Meiji Trading Co., Ltd.
Okura Trading Co., Ltd.
Nozaki & Co., Ltd.
Sumitomo
Nichimen Co., Ltd.

D.- Other trade operations.

Besides the said sugar purchases, Japan is very active in its trade relations with Communist Cuba; trade relations that totaled US$ 87 million for 1964, - which represented an increase of 240% over 1963.

Just to mention a few examples, the names of some of the other Japanese firms actively involved in trade operations with Communist Cuba follow:

Mitsui: through its "dummy", the Toho Bussan Kaisha.
C. Itoh: through its "dummy" the Kyodo Trading Co., Ltd.
Oki Electric: until recently through Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha's "dummy", the Moiwa Trading.
Toyo Rayon
Hitachi
Yawata Iron
Toyo Menka Kaisha: through the "dummy" Abo Trading Co., Ltd.

III.- JAPAN-LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS.-

A.- Japan's economic and trade interests in Latin America.

1.- Japan has 77% of its foreign investment placed in Latin America.

2.- Proof of Japan's increasing interest in Latin America has been the visit of two Japanese Trade Missions to this Hemisphere in less than one year — (March and September 1965).

3.- Japan has a deficit in its trade balance with Latin America, and although the trade volume with Latin America amounted to US$ 433.4 million for the period January-July 1964, Japan lost US$ 174.8 million for mentioned period due to the deficit in its trade balance:

Jan-Jul. 1964: Japan exports: US$ 179.3 million
Jan-Jul. 1964: Japan imports: US$ 354.1 million
Jan-Jul. 1964: Deficit for Japan in its trade balance: US$ 174.8 million

4.- Breaking down Japan's trade balance with each Latin American country the results are the following:

a.- Favorable trade balances: 8

Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Honduras
Panamá
Venezuela

b.- Unfavorable trade balances: 11

Argentina
Chile
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Mexico
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay

5.- The economic analyst has to conclude that the deficit in its overall trade balance plus the importance of Latin America with regards to Japan's foreign investment will make Japan increase its interest in this Hemisphere.

B.- Consequences of the Japan-Communist Cuba trade throughout Latin America.

The consequences of the Japan-Communist Cuba trade are beginning to be felt throughout Latin America, due to maintained "agit-prop" and subversive activities by the Castro regime, financed, partially, with foreign exchange resulting from its trade with Japan.

A highly illustrative example is the case of Venezuela.

1.- Venezuela: Trade Relations with Japan and Communist attacks.

a.- Japan was able to obtain US$ 133.5 million for the period 1958-1963 from its favorable trade balance with Venezuela. The favorable result in the trade balance for the Jan-Jul 1964 period totaled US$ 12.4 million.

Recently, C. ITOH and HITACHI closed important agreements with the Venezuelan Phone Co., and C. ITOH was able to get an important contract with "Corporation Venezolana de Petróleo".

b.- On the other hand, Venezuela is considered by all experts as a prime target of Communism. The important arms caché discovered in Paraguana towards the end of 1963, prompt the Venezuelan government to accuse the Castro-Communist régime during the IX Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Americas, on July 26, 1964. Since this incident, numerous subversive activities have caused great loses to both the People and the government of Venezuela, and to foreign -- firms as well.

Less than a month ago, another important arms cache was discovered in Los Teques, Miranda State; and once more the hand of Castro-Communism was traced and found.

c.- Then, when the situation is fully analyzed, it is a fact that -- Venezuelan hard currency goes to Japan, and from there it goes to Castro, in order to aid terrorism against the Venezuelan People, the democratic government, its -- businessmen, and even Japanese interests in that country. Isn't this a complete ilogic operation?

2.- The Organization of American States (OAS).

On July 26, 1964, the OAS, during the IX Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Americas, held in Washington, D.C., condemned the Castro-Communist regime and requested from its member-countries, and from all free world countries outside the Hemisphere, to cease diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba.

3.- The Inter-American Workers Organization (ORIT).

During its VI Continental Congress, held in Mexico City, on February 6, 1965, recommended the maritime boycott which was already in progress under the leadership of the Venezuelan dockworkers.

Recently, after 17 vessels have suffered the boycott, a statement, made by international labor leaders during the IV Congress of Venezuelan Dockworkers, held in Caracas from October 9 to October 13, 1965, reaffirmed the boycott. Japanese vessels have been boycotted due to this defensive measure of the workers of this Hemisphere.

4.- The Management Boycott.

The Chamber of Commerce of the Americas, during its XV Annual Convention held in Miami, Fla., U.S.A., adopted a resolution on June 16, 1965, along the same lines of the OAS and ORIT recommendations. Since then, a Management Boycott Committee has been formed, and already about three dozens of Latin American Chambers of commerce support this campaign.

5.- Public Opinion.

The Japanese Trade Mission that toured Latin America left behind the following reaction:

a.- Mexico: Article "América Latina, Japón y Castro" by doctor Leopoldo Rojas Ospiña, published by "Excelsior" on September 4, 1965.

b.- Brazil: Article "Japan Helps Fidel Castro" by Gustavo Corcao, published by "Diario de Noticias", on September 2, 1965.

Article "Japan and Latin America" by Mircea Buescu, published by Diario de Noticias", on September 9, 1965.

c.- Peru: Congressman Ricardo Temoche Benitez pointed out Japan's attitude, due to its trade relations with Communist Cuba during a speech made in Congress on September 1st., 1965. Congressman Temoche's statements received ample -coverage in the local press and were object of an "Agence France Presse" wire.

d.- Chile: The leading "El Mercurio" newspaper devoted one of its editorial articles during September 1965 to point out the same thing.

c.- Colombia: Mr. José R. Mercado, President of the Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC) delivered a memorandum to His Excellency the Japanese Ambassador to Colombia, dated October 29, 1965 on the same subject.

An increase of this reaction may be expected.

IV.- CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS.-

A.- Conclusions:

1.- Japan is presently aiding Castro-Communism.

2.- Japan is highly dependent of Latin America in order to achieve further economic prosperity.

3.- The Japan-Communist Cuba trade and the Japan-Latin America trade are in contradiction.

4.- Japan may suffer considerable losses in its Latin American markets if trade relations with Communist Cuba continue.

B.- Suggestions:

1.- The benefits derived from Cuban sugar purchases are no longer available to Japan, because, due to the drop of prices in the World Sugar Market, Castro cannot continue to give firms privileges that resulted of high prices, with enough margin to maneuver and still receive benefits.- After prices hitting a post-World War II low, Castro has no margin for those operations.

2.- Japan could very well substitute its purchases of Cuban sugar by increasing its purchases to Taiwan and Australia, and even better, to Latin American countries like Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Peru, as it used to do previous to the concentration of dealings with Castro-Communism. Purchasing more sugar from democratic Latin American would improve Japan's image and at the same time it would eliminate its present trade dangers due to its dealings with Cuba.

Miami, Fla., U.S.A., November 10, 1965.

* Copy of Memorandum sent to all Japanese Ambassadors to Latin America attending November-meeting in Tokyo.-

14-00000

☐ TROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 30

ORIG : D. ROHLFING:nlk

UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW

EXT : 1225

DATE : 1 OCT 65

☐ INDEX

☐ NO INDEX

☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1	Ew -	5	MO
2		6	FI-TC
3	[illegible]	7	D
4	rr	8	x

4 OCT 65 15 34z

TO : JMWAVE CARACAS

FROM: DIRECTOR SIG CEN

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR . FILE ☑ RID COPY CA/C 4, CA 2, CA/PROP, WH 8, FI FI/INT 2

TO WAVE INFO CARA CITE DIR 47534

to RP

REF: WAVE 6207 (IN 62333)*

1. NO OBJECTION PLANS OUTLINED PARA 2A REF..

2. AS BACKGROUND, RNLEPTOME (R) IN DIFFICULT POSITION VIS-A-VIS CORREA SINCE R UNABLE BROADEN U.S. BOYCOTT ON SHIPS IN CUBAN TRADE DUE CAVEATS IMPOSED ON AFL-CIO BY ODACID. ADDITIONALLY, LACK OF FUNDING FROM AFL-CIO AND CONFLICT OF SCHEDULE WILL PRECLUDE R ATTENDANCE AT REF CONVENTION.

END OF MESSAGE

UR 19-120-26

WH/C Comment: *Request approval send AMSCROLL and AMICE reps to boycott convention.

DC/WH/C/CA

WH/C/MO

WH/S

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

4-2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Athens

INFO
Chief, WH
Chief, EE

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AMSCROLL/Press Release and Jose Luis Galbe

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Athens to determine

REFERENCE: WAVE-5789 (15 September 1965)

1. We attach under separate cover a copy of the press release on Jose Luis Galbe that the reference indicated would be forthcoming. Also attached is a list of the newspapers and other organizations and individuals that were mailed a copy of the release. The so-called "Black List Firms" are those Greek firms that according to AMSCROLL have had or do have commercial contacts with Cuba. The letters that were mailed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Home Minister were, of course, originals and these two gentlemen were not provided with a copy of the press release itself.

2. WAVE is anxious to keep the Galbe pot boiling and we welcome any further suggestions to this end.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

19-120-26 w/o abstract
~~19-132-49/3~~

Attachments:
1. Press Release
2. List

Distribution:
3 - COS/Athens, w/atts, USC
2 - C/EE, w/atts, USC
2 - C/WH, w/atts, USC
2 - WH/C, w/atts, USC

2 atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

2 cc w/atts fwd EE/K

SECRET

DATE TYPED
24 Sep 65

DATE DISPATCHED
SEP 30 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 23284

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-49/3

14-00000

press release

A PRESS SERVICE FROM

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFFICE:
105 E. 9 St.
MAILING ADDRESS
Box 3740
Miami, Florida
PHONE:
373 - 8033

U.R. LETTER TO GREEK GOVERNMENT URGES GALBE OUSTER

Cases of real diplomats Alemany and Alonso cited as contrast to preposterous behaviour of the gangster Galbe.-

Here is text of letter sent to the Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministers of Greece:

Excellency:

"You may recall that, in mid-May this year, the Communist Cuban -- Charge d'Affaires in Athens, Jose Luis Galbe, was the object of world - attention after he shot a Greek bus driver over a trivial traffic argument near the town of Thermopylae. Newspapers throughout the world carried the story and it would not be exaggerated to label the incident as an international scandal -one which may be said to have damaged Hellenic dignity to the same extent to which the Castro regime ignores it by accrediting gangsters such as Galbe as its diplomatic representatives - before the Greek people."

"On that occasion, we wrote the Greek government calling their attention to the need to save the honor of Greece by severing all ties -- diplomatic and commercial-- with the Red government of Cuba. At that - time, we warned that the gangster Galbe was typical of the new promotion of Red Cuban "diplomats" --mostly undesirable Communists trained to perform tasks of espionage and agitation-- and substantiated our assertion with a quote from Odon Alvarez de la Campa, a defecting Cuban diplomat- who had charged Galbe by name during a press conference in Madrid."

"Today, two new defections from the Cuban Foreign Service prompt us to re-open the Galbe case. We refer to those of Mssrs. Gilberto R. Alemany Vilar, until recently, Trade Counselor to the Cuban Embassy in Tokyo, and Luis Ricardo Alonso Fernandez, until recently, Cuban Ambassador to Great Britain."

"Both former diplomats had always been regarded as competent, serious men even by us, the relentless opposers of the Castro-Communist tyranny. Before he took office as Cuban Ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1963, Luis R. Alonso Fernandez had also performed ambassadorial du - ties in Peru and Norway. A scholarly, well-mannered man, he is well remembered by all who knew him in his diplomatic office, even if they may have disapproved of the totalitarian regime that he represented. Eventually, he became disenchanted with Communism and publicly resigned his post in London only a few days ago. (In connection with Mr. Alonso's resignation, the Greek newspaper "Vradyni", in its September 6 issue, wonders precisely why Red Cuban Ambassador Galbe has not been ousted yet)."

"Gilberto R. Alemany, an equally able and well-bred trade specia - list, held his Counselor's position for three years in Tokyo. His re - cognition of the true nature of the Red Cuban government led him to defect secretly and become our own secret agent in Japan. Late last month, after fulfilling his dangerous mission, he made his feelings public in Miami."

"As you can see, those decent people, who are still active in Castro's diplomatic corps cannot stand it for a long time. These new defections show that the few that remain are abandoning the sinking ship to the "new wave" of Castroite diplomats --gangsters, spies and agitators in Galbe's fashion."

"But there is more: shortly after his defection, in an interview - with a leading Miami newspaper, Mr. Alemany made statements that con-- firm our assertions to this respect. The following are quotes from - this interview:

"" The Fidel Castro government chooses unemployed, uneducated young men to be trained and assigned to Cuban embassies abroad as spies. The patent

UR #1
UFGA 23284

CS COPY

19-120-26
~~19-132-4913~~

young spies are given a two-year course at a special Ministry of the Interior school to get them ready. The Minister of the Interior goes so far as to favor young boys from low social levels to work as agents in embassies. He dresses them up, teaches them a few things, gives them a gun and sends them overseas. The system is diabolic, but it works. -- These boys, whom they have made into powerful men, are proving to be the most fanatical agents. They never defect". "The two-year course on spying, Alemany said, includes a "little of everything, even elementary English. The graduates are assigned to Cuban embassies as untitled attaches"."

"Mr. Alemany has further told us, his workmates in UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, that he has knowledge of the Galbe case, and that he knows the Cuban Charge in Athens to be just the type of person of which he speaks in his interview --a definitely undesirable sort by any standard. He adds that, while in Japan, Galbe's preposterous behaviour was widely commented within Tokyo diplomatic circles. The unanimous impression was one of shock and concern, and it was expected that the Greek Government would react promptly and energetically."

"We all know, Cubans and Greeks alike, that Galbe is no credit to the Cuban people and is an insult to the Greek nation. Thus, we write with the thought that the facts forwarded in this letter will further unmask Galbe and show what he really is".

Sincerely,

Dr. Mario Seiglie Montoro
Secretary General

Miami, September 16, 1965

Ref: 195

press release

A PRESS SERVICE FROM
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFFICE:
10 S.E. 9 St.
MAILING ADDRESS
Box 3940
Miami, Florida
PHONE:
373 - 8033

U.R. LETTER TO GREEK GOVERNMENT URGES GALBE OUSTER

Cases of real diplomats Alemany and Alonso cited as contrast to preposterous behaviour of the gangster Galbe.-

Here is text of letter sent to the Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministers of Greece:

Excellency:

"You may recall that, in mid-May this year, the Communist Cuban -- Chargo d'Affaires in Athens, Jose Luis Galbe, was the object of world - attention after he shot a Greek bus driver over a trivial traffic argument near the town of Thermopylae. Newspapers throughout the world carried the story and it would not be exaggerated to label the incident as an international scandal -one which may be said to have damaged Hellenic dignity to the same extent to which the Castro regime ignores it by accrediting gangsters such as Galbe as its diplomatic representatives - before the Greek people."

"On that occasion, we wrote the Greek government calling their attention to the need to save the honor of Greece by severing all ties -- diplomatic and commercial-- with the Red government of Cuba. At that - time, we warned that the gangster Galbe was typical of the new promotion of Red Cuban "diplomats" --mostly undesirable Communists trained to perform tasks of espionage and agitation-- and substantiated our assertion with a quote from Odon Alvarez de la Campa, a defecting Cuban diplomat- who had charged Galbe by name during a press conference in Madrid."

"Today, two new defections from the Cuban Foreign Service prompt us to re-open the Galbe case. We refer to those of Mssrs. Gilberto R. Alemany Vilar, until recently, Trade Counseler to the Cuban Embassy in Tokyo, and Luis Ricardo Alonso Fernandez, until recently, Cuban Ambassador to Great Britain."

"Both former diplomats had always been regarded as competent, serious men even by us, the relentless opposers of the Castro-Communist tyranny. Before he took office as Cuban Ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1963, Luis R. Alonso Fernandez had also performed ambassadorial du - ties in Peru and Norway. A scholarly, well-mannered man, he is well remembered by all who knew him in his diplomatic office, even if they may have disapproved of the totalitarian regime that he represented. Eventually, he became disenchanted with Communism and publicly resigned his post in London only a few days ago. (In connection with Mr. Alonso's resignation, the Greek newspaper "Vradyni", in its September 6 issue, wonders precisely why Red Cuban Ambassador Galbe has not been ousted yet)."

"Gilberto R. Alemany, an equally able and well-bred trade specia - list, held his Counselor's position for three years in Tokyo. His re - cognition of the true nature of the Red Cuban government led him to defect secretly and become our own secret agent in Japan. Late last month, after fulfilling his dangerous mission, he made his feelings public in Miami."

"As you can see, those decent people, who are still active in Castro's diplomatic corps cannot stand it for a long time. These new defections show that the few that remain are abandoning the sinking ship to the "new wave" of Castroite diplomats --gangsters, spies and agitators in Galbe's fashion."

"But there is more: shortly after his defection, in an interview - with a leading Miami newspaper, Mr. Alemany made statements that con-- firm our assertions to this respect. The following are quotes from - this interview:

"" The Fidel Castro government chooses unemployed, uneducated young men to be trained and assigned to Cuban embassies abroad as spies. The young spies are given a two-year course at a special Ministry of the Interior school to get them ready. The Minister of the Interior goes so far as to favor young boys from low social levels to work as agents in embassies. He dresses them up, teaches them a few things, gives them a gun and sends them overseas. The system is diabolic, but it works. -- These boys, whom they have made into powerful men, are proving to be - the most fanatical agents. They never defect". "The two-year course - on spying, Alemany said, includes a "little of everything, even elementary English. The graduates are assigned to Cuban embassies as untitled attaches"."

"Mr. Alemany has further told us, his workmates in UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, that he has knowledge of the Galbe case, and that he knows the - Cuban Charge in Athens to be just the type of person of which he speaks in his interview --a definitely undesirable sort by any standard. He - adds that, while in Japan, Galbe's preposterous behaviour was widely commented within Tokyo diplomatic circles. The unanimous impression was one of shock and concern, and it was expected that the Greek Government would react promptly and energetically."

"We all know, Cubans and Greeks alike, that Galbe is no credit to - the Cuban people and is an insult to the Greek nation. Thus, we write with the thought that the facts forwarded in this letter will further - unmask Galbe and show what he really is".

Sincerely,

Dr. Mario Seiglie Montoro
Secretary General

Miami, September 16, 1965

Ref: 195

14-00000

NEWSPAPERS:

Mr. G. Grigoriadis
Editor,
ACROPOLIS
Athens, Greece.

Editors
APOGEVMATINI
Athens,
Greece.

The Editor
ATHENAR KURIER
Athens,
Greece.

Mr. G. Skouras
Editor,
ATHENS DAILY POST
Athens, Greece.

Mr. John Horn
Editor,
ATHENS NEWS
Athens, Greece.

Mr. E. Baklatzis
Editor,
ATHINAIKI
Athens, Greece.

Mr. P. Kokkas
Editor,
ELEFTHERIA
Athens, Greece.

The Editor,
ESTHERINOS THYPOS
Athens, Greece.

Ath. Paraschos
Editor,
ATHNIKOS KIRYX
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
ESTHEIA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. C. Economidis
Editor,
ETHNOS
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
HIMERISSIA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. H. Vlachou
Editor,
KATHIMERINI
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
MESSAGER D'ATHENS
Athens,
Greece.

Mr. Ch. Lambrakis
Editor,
TA NEA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. A. Domakos
Editor,
TO VIMA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. L. Bortolos
Director,
VRADYNI
Athens, Greece.

Mr. Dimitrios Dzoulakis
8 Seizani Sts.
Imittos
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
"The Atlantis"
521 W. 23rd St.,
New York 11, N.Y.

The Editor
"National Herald"
140 W - 26 St.,
New York 1, N.Y.

The Journal of Commerce
11 Tsami Karatassou St.,
Makriyanni
Athens, Greece.

BLACK LIST FIRMS:

Konstantinos Pinakoibakis
6 Polytechnoiou St.,
Athens,
Greece.

Ioannis Triantafyllis
9 Patission St.,
Athens, Greece.

Nikolaos Rombapas and Son
1 Streit St.,
Athens, Greece.

Dimitriades Textile Co.,
27 Praxitelous St.,
Athens, Greece.

Selcu Sason
c/o Transstokom
9 Aristeidou St.,
Athens, Greece.

Nea Agrex Co.,
28 Kapodistrious St.,
Athens, Greece.

Messinezis and Co.,
1 Karysti St.,
Athens, Greece.

Vasilios Eleisiaris
28 Emmanuel Benaki St.,
Athens, Greece.

Fotis Baptis
91 Adaminias St.,
Athens, Greece.

Franco Shipping Agency
65 Patission St.,
Athens, Greece.

Karagiannidis Travel Agency
11 Akti Miaduli St.,
Athens, Greece.

Esta Maritimo Agency
3 Dimitrio Coumari St.,
Piraeus, Greece.

Michael Karageorgis
Plateia Loudovikous,
Piraeus, Greece.

Helenic Shipyards
4 Akademias St.,
Athens,
Greece.

Livanos Company
Megaron Typaldou
Piraeus,
Greece.

GOVERNMENT:

Greek Delegation
United Nations
United Nations Bldg.,
New York City, N.Y.

Chamber of Deputies
House of Parliament
Athens, Greece.

H.E. Ambassador of Greece
Greek Embassy
Washington, D.C.

14-00000

SC Att. #2

NEWSPAPERS:

Mr. S. Grigoriadis
Editor,
ACROPOLIS
Athens, Greece.

Editors
APOGEVMATINI
Athens,
Greece.

The Editor
ATHENAR KURIER
Athens,
Greece.

Mr. G. Skouras
Editor,
ATHENS DAILY POST
Athens, Greece.

Mr. John Horn
Editor,
ATHENS NEWS
Athens, Greece.

Mr. E. Baklatzis
Editor,
ATHINAIKI
Athens, Greece.

Mr. P. Kokkas
Editor,
ELEFTHERIA
Athens, Greece.

The Editor,
ESTHERINOS THYPOS
Athens, Greece.

Ath. Paraschos
Editor,
ATHNIKOS KIRYX
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
ESTHEIA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. C. Economidis
Editor,
ETHNOS
Athens, Greece.

c. att#2

19-120-26.

The Editor
HIMERISSIA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. H. Vlachou
Editor,
KATHIMERINI
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
MESSAGER D'ATHENS
Athens,
Greece.

Mr. Ch. Lambrakis
Editor,
TA NEA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. A. Domakos
Editor,
TO VIMA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. L. Bortolos
Director,
VRADYNI
Athens, Greece.

Mr. Dimitrios Dzoulakis
8 Seizani Sts.
Imittos
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
"The Atlantis"
521 W. 23rd St.,
New York 11, N.Y.

The Editor
"National Herald"
140 W - 26 St.,
New York 1, N.Y.

The Journal of Commerce
11 Tsami Karatassou St.,
Makriyanni
Athens, Greece.

BLACK LIST FIRMS:

Konstantinos Pankoloakis
6 Polytechneiou St.,
Athens,
Greece.

Ioannis Triantafyllis
9 Patission St.,
Athens, Greece.

Nikolaos Rombapas and Son
1 Streit St.,
Athens, Greece.

Dimitriades Textile Co.,
27 Praxitelous St.,
Athens, Greece.

Solon Sason
c/o Trenkstokom
9 Aristeidou St.,
Athens, Greece.

Nea Agrex Co.,
28 Kapodistrious St.,
Athens, Greece.

Messinezis and Co.,
1 Karyati St.,
Athens, Greece.

Vasilios Kleisiaris
28 Emmanuel Benaki St.,
Athens, Greece.

Fotis Beptis
91 Adaminias St.,
Athens, Greece.

Franco Shipping Agency
65 Patission St.,
Athens, Greece.

Karagiannidis Travel Agency
11 Akti Miaduli St.,
Athens, Greece.

Zeta Maritime Agency
3 Dimitrio Coumari St.,
Piraeus, Greece.

Michael Karageorgis
Plateia Loudovikous,
Piraeus, Greece.

Helenic Shipyards
4 Akademias St.,
Athens,
Greece.

Livanos Company
Megaron Typaldou
Piraeus,
Greece.

GOVERNMENT:

Greek Delegation
United Nations
United Nations Bldg.,
New York City, N.Y.

Chamber of Deputies
House of Parliament
Athens, Greece.

H.E. Ambassador of Greece
Greek Embassy
Washington, D.C.

14-00000

☐ YES ☐ NO
SIFY TO FILE NO
EF TO FILE NO.
LE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
STROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

26

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	FP	5	SI
2		6	MO
3	CA	7	EW
4	RR-RE	8	C

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY D

INFO FILE VR, FI, FI/INT 2, FI/D 4

ACTION

SECRET 212122Z

DIR CITE WAVE 5942

21 SEP 65 IN 56628

TYPIC ZRPERUSAL

REF O/27339-65, 17 SEP

WISH USE VIA AMSCROLL ELEMENTS OF REF REPORT ON CUBAN SUGAR ACTIVITIES. AS RES WOULD USE END OF PARA 7 DESCRIBING CLOSING OF SALE AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN SPECULATION COMBINED WITH PARENTHETICAL INFORMATION ON PARA 3 RE IRANIAN 11 SEP TENDER. WOULD THEN EXPOSE WESTZUCKER (SEE PARA 6) AS GO-BETWEEN THIS DEAL. WOULD NOT USE SPECIFICS OF OFFERS AND COUNTER-OFFERS IN ORDER PROTECT SOURCE. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN 5942 O/27839-65 17 SEP AMSCROLL CUBAN 7 3 IRANIAN 11 SEP WESTZUCKER 6 GO-BETWEEN NOT USE COUNTER-OFFERS

BT

SECRET

.../c 1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
C/FE; COS, Tokyo; COS, Mexico; COS, Caracas

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMWASP/AMSCROLL/Operational
AMSCROLL Report of AMWASP-1 Defection

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
SEP 23 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REF: WAVE 5450, 31 August 1965

1. Subject report prepared by AMSCROLL presents a roundup of preparatory activities and subsequent publicity of the AMWASP-1 defection as sponsored by the AMSCROLL organization. Due to the number of MHSPAWN assets which interplayed in the particular operation, the report is attached under separate cover No. 1 in true names and identities without reference to the MHSPAWN assets involved.

2. Under separate cover attachment No. 2 contains samples of written propaganda and an AMSCROLL mailing list.

3. Also forwarded under separate cover, attachment No. 3, are the Spanish and English tapes of the AMWASP/1 statement.

Sylvia B. Moorstein
PHILIP G. ELMARD

Attachments:
1. Report, u/sc att
2. Prop and Mailing List, u/sc att
3. Tapes, u/sc att

Distribution:
3 - WH/C, w/attachs
2 - WH, w/No. 1 attach 2cc fwd. WH/1 w/att #1
2 - C/FE, w/No. 1 attach 2cc fwd. FE/... w/att #1
2 - COS, Tokyo, w/No. 1 attach
2 - COS, Mexico, w/No. 1 attach
2 - COS, Caracas, w/No. 1 attach → To out pouch

[illegible]

CS COPY

19-120-26

DATE TYPED 10 Sept 65	DATE DISPATCHED SEP 17 1965
CROSS REFERENCE TO B- 201-333974	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER LFGX-54 ~~UFGA 23,072~~
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-26/3

MICROFILMED
SEP 23 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

3P

Separate Cover Attachment to
No. 1 to --- UFGA-23072
UFGX-00054

SECRET

Unidad Revolucionaria Memorandum

The following steps have been taken in the defection and subsequent publicity of Gilberto Alemany, Trade Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in Tokyo, Japan:

1. A press conference was held on August 27th at 7 p.m. in the Biscayne Room of the McAllister Hotel, which was attended by most of the members of the Miami area press, (approximately 50 persons in total) in response to Unidad Revolucionaria (UR) invitation. Mr. Alemany read a statement prepared by him and by members of the UR, which was also mimeographed and distributed both in English and Spanish to the persons present at the Conference. Photos of the event were taken, to be later published in the UR publications. A recording of the proceedings was made.

2. Coverage by the press included the following items:

a. A front-page article by Mary Louise Wilkinson in the Miami News of August 28th. (Both editions).

b. An article by Don Bohning in the Miami Herald of August 28th.

c. A front-page story in the "Diario de las Americas" of August 29th by Benjamin de la Vega.

d. An editorial in the Miami News of August 30th.

e. An article by Humberto Medrano in the "Diario de la Americas" of September 1st.

f. A story in the "El Universal" of Caracas, Venezuela, of September 1st.

g. TV stations Channel 4 and Channel 7 broadcast filmed stories of the press conference on August 27th and 28th.

h. Radio stations WRUL and Radio Americas taped interviews with Mr. Alemany on August 31st.

i. Radio program "La Voz de Cuba" also taped an interview on August 31st.

j. A.I.P. interviewed Mr. Alemany (Jose M. Illan) on September 1st for a cover story in that publication.

k. The "Voice of America" taped an interview on September 2nd (Manolo de la Torre).

S/c att. 1 UFGX-00054　　CS COPY　　19-120-26

l. Mr. Al Burt, Latin editor of the "Miami Herald", interviewed Mr. Alemany on September 2nd for a subsequent story.

SECRET

m. Radio Tropical of Caracas, Venezuela also broadcast the story on September 1st.

3. Mr. Alemany's defection statement was sent to the following addresses:

a. On August 28 and 31, to the attached list of Japanese newspapers in Tokyo. (

b. On August 31st, to 110 Japanese firms on the UR blacklist.

c. On September 1st, to the UR economic mailing list in the United States and Canada, which includes sugar brokers, business concerns, economic publications such as "Journal of Commerce", etc.

d. On September 2nd, the Spanish version was sent to 148 addresses in Spain, which includes Spanish firms, newspapers and government offices.

e. To 100 Latin American newspapers and Japanese embassies, including the Japanese embassy in Washington.

f. To 150 shipping firms in the United States and Canada.

g. To economic publications throughout Europe.

h. To the members of the Japanese Trade Mission which toured Latin America during March, with personal letters from Dr. Cavada.

i. The UR is currently completing the mailings to the other addresses on its blacklist in other countries.

4. The UR has prepared a summary of Alemany's original statement which is being sent to the addresses not yet covered. (Copy attached)

5. Dr. Rivas-Vasquez of the UR propaganda section contacted Mr. Martin Correa, Secretary General of the Venezuelan Dockworkers for further steps in that area. Rivas-Vasquez also spoke to Mr. Salvador Romani, of the Movimiento Anti-Comunista Femenino de Venezuela, and Mr. Carlos Andres Perez, former Venezuelan Cabinet member and future presidential candidate. Mr. Martin Correa also requested, and was granted, a private interview with Mr. Alemany on Saturday, August 28, which was also attended by Dr. Seiglie, president of the UR.

6. Additional follow-up action is listed below:

a. Mr. Enrique Lindner, the UR delegate in Washington, D.C., was instructed to try to get Mr. Alemany's statement into a leading national magazine or publication, for which he was sent copies plus photostats of the confidential documents brought by Mr. Alemany during his press conference. Mr. Lindner was hopeful of arranging insertion of the statement in the magazine "U.S. News and World Report."

SECRET

b. The NBC television program, "The Today Show", was approached and offered an interview with Mr. Alemany through Mr. Paul Cuningham, associate producer of that program.

c. Mr. Alemany has drawn up a plan which includes the writing of personal letters by him to a number of directors of Japanese firms with which he dealt in Tokyo.

d. Mr. Jose Alvarez Diaz, a trade specialist and Cuban economics professor at the University of Miami is preparing an analysis of Mr. Alemany's defection statement, which he will try to have published in a leading economic publication.

e. An attempt is being made to arrange for a television panel show on one of the local stations.

Tim Titus
1881

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

42

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED File to action

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	MO
2		6	FI/I
3	CA	7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, DO 4, DO/H 3, FE 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT, CA/PEG

S E C R E T 111700Z

DIR INFO CARA CITE WAVE 5655 11 SEP 65 IN 50224

TYPIC MHSPAWN MHVIPER

1. MARTIN CORREA, VEN AD DEPUTY, PRES OF PORTWORKERS FEDERATION OF VEN, MEMBER CUBAN TRADE BOYCOTT COMMITTEE, AND CLOSE COLLABORATOR AMICE AND AMSCROLL, NOW ORGANIZING CONTINENTAL CONVENTION OF PORTWORKERS TO BE HELD CARACAS 8-10 OCT 65. IN ADDITION REGULAR CONVENTION AGENDA WHICH INCLUDES ELECTION OF NEW EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL FEDERATION AND REVISION FEDERATION STATUTES, MAIN PROGRAM OF CONVENTION AIMED AT OBTAINING UNIFIED INTERNATIONAL ACTION RE CUBAN TRADE BOYCOTT. DURING CORREA VISIT 18-31 AUG TO JMWAVE AREA, CORREA DISCUSSED CONVENTION PLANS WITH AMICE AMSCROLL AS FOLLOWS:

UR

19-120-26

A. CONVENTION AND ITS AGENDA APPROVED AND SUPPORTED BY CTV AND LABOR SECTION OF AD.

B. WILL INVITE INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND CONVOKE ROUND-TABLE MEETING OF MEMBERS OF "JOINT COMMISSION AGAINST COMMUNIST TYRANNY OF CUBA" FOR PURPOSE CLARIFY AND APPLY COORDINATED CUBAN TRADE BOYCOTT ACTIONS.

SECRET

WRABLY
5712

C. COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CONVENTION WILL TOTAL APPROX $12,000, IN ORDER DEFRAY ROUND-TRIP TRAVEL AND LODGING EXPENSES 25-30 INTERNATIONAL DELEGATES, RADIO/TV COVERAGE, AND COSTS OF SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, ETC.

2. CORREA PLANS ATTEMPT RAISE PORTION NECESSARY FUNDS FOR CONVENTION FROM LOCAL VEN SOURCES SUCH AS CTV, AD, AND SPECIAL LOTTERY AND FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN AMONG VEN/CUBAN EXILE PUBLIC. SIMILARLY, AMICE AND AMSCROLL HAVE BEEN ASKED ATTEMPT RAISE PARTIAL FUNDS BY PUBLIC FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN IN JMWAVE EXILE COMMUNITY.

3. ACCORDING AMICE, CORREA HAS OBTAINED RNBEING'S AND RNLEPTOME'S APPROVAL RE PARA 1 ABOVE PLANS. WHILE NO COMMITMENTS OF CLOSE COLLABORATION OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FORTHCOMING FROM EITHER, RNLEPTOME WILLING PARTICIPATE IN CONVENTION AND PLANS ARRIVE CARACAS 7 OCT.

4. IN VIEW NEED INTRODUCE MORE COORDINATED HEMISPHERE EFFORTS AND COMMON VITALITY IN BOYCOTT CAMPAIGN, ABOVE MEETING WOULD APPEAR ABLE SERVE USEFUL PURPOSE STIMULATE MHVIPER PROGRAM. IT ALSO MAY BE POSSIBLE GAIN ADDITIONAL MHSPAWN MILEAGE DUE ITS TIMELINESS AND TIE-IN RECENT AMWASP-1 DEFECTION AND CURRENT HEMISPHERE TOUR JAPANESE TRADE DELEGATION. STATION FEELS CONCENTRATION OF CUBAN

EXILE SUPPORT AT MEETING MAY DETRACT ITS OVERALL IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS, THUS PREFERABLE STIMULATE MORE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FROM AMONG THOSE ORGS WITHIN CUBAN BOYCOTT/IPHOODCAP FRAMEWORK. STATION WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE HQS VIEWS AND POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL PLANS RE ABOVE MEETING IN ORDER PROVIDE GUIDANCE AND POSSIBLE SUPPORT THROUGH LOCAL ASSETS.

SECRET

CFN 5655 MARTIN CORREA VEN AD AMICE AMSCROLL 8-10 OCT 65 18-31
CTV AD ORIT $12,000 25-30 IV CTV AD RNBEING'S RNLEPIOME'S 1
7 OCT AMWASP-1 TPHOODCAP
BT

SECRET

Question use of AMWASP in the op.

E.I.Harrison/sp
WH/C/CA/PP
6678
18 Aug 65

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

84 SECRET

☐ INDEX
XX NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1	PP	5	CA-EW-
2		6	C
3	MO	7	
4	FI-7C	8	

18 AUG 65 20 05z

TO: JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY CA 2, CA/PROP, SOD 6 WE 8

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 36520

TYPIC MHVIPER MHSPAWN

REF: WAVE 5061 (IN 34271) *

HQS HAS NO OBJECTION AMSCROLL PLAY REF "FREE NAVIGATOR" STORY. HOWEVER, KUCLAM REPORT 16 AUGUST STATES SHIP LEFT FOR ROTTERDAM 11 AUGUST.

END OF MESSAGE

* Requested approval AMSCROLL play of "Free Navigator" story.

DC/WH/C/CA

C/WH/C/MO

5croll 19-120-26

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

JOHN T. FLYNN
ADCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER 18-8 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

Nº 275956

TO
Chief, WH
Attn: WH/C
Peter S. JASUTIS

FROM
COS, JMWAVE

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	USE
	U.R. Memo #1096-SovFishingBase	Ref: WAVE 4039

Hold for Chaconas

SC

[illegible] 120-26 [illegible]

DATE
26 July 65

SIGNATURE

RM
10 1236 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(13-47)

UR

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

MEMORANDUM 1076

TO: Dr. Mario Seiglie Montoro

FROM: Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vasquez

REF.: News Coverage of Press Release on Soviet "Fishing" Base.

Press Coverage on U.R.'s press release regarding Soviet "Fishing" Base follows:



July 20, 1965:

Norman Diaz
W.M.E.T.

Manolo Reyes
W.T.V.J. Channel 4

Wayne Farris
W.C.K.T. Channel 7

Tony Solar
"Noticias en Espanol"
Miami News p. 9-A

JULY 21, 1965:

Radio-Hora
W.M.E.T.

JULY 22, 1965:

Diario Las Americas
"Micronoticias" p. 16

JULY 24, 1965:

Agencia de Informaciones Periodisticas
(A.I.P.) No. 324

UR

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

"Novedades" (will forward date)
Mexico, D.F.,
Mexico

Vida del Litoral (will forward date)
"El Universal"
Caracas, Venezuela



Miami, July 22, 1965

10 SE 9 ST. MIAMI, FLORIDA

TELEFONO FR 3-8033

press release

A PRESS SERVICE FROM
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFFICE:
10 S.E. 9 St.
MAILING ADDRESS
Box 3940
Miami, Florida
PHONE:
373 - 8033

U.R. REPORTS

SOVIET "FISHING" BASE IN HAVANA

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) has learned from its underground sources in Cuba the following information:

The Russians are constructing docks, warehouses, freezers, dry docks, buildings with communication equipment and other necessary installations for the operation of a fishing fleet in the east coast of the port of Havana, according to the Cuban-Soviet agreement of September, 1962.

These constructions are directed and supervised by Soviet technicians with the collaboration of Cuban "slave work". The Soviet Union furnishes all the necessary equipment and machinery, in addition to the above mentioned supervision and technical assistance; Cuba offers the labor as well as the basic construction materials.

It was stipulated that the Soviet Union and Cuba would share in equal parts this fishing terminal which original cost was $12 million "pesos" but now it has come up to $30 millions and is expected to be finished by the beginning of 1966.

However, it has been learned that due to the large sum owed by the Castro-Communist regime to the Soviet Union, the Russians have decided that these facilities will be for their exclusive use once they are concluded.

All the fish caught will be taken to this terminal, processed and exported to the Soviet Union and Europe in Russian vessels, without any profit for Cuba, nor the Cuban fishing vessels will be allowed to use said installations.

This area of the east coast of the port of Havana will be closed as soon as installations are finished and only Soviet personnel will have access to that zone.

This absolute control of the Soviets in the same port of Havana has led many to think that said installations will not only serve for operating Soviet trawlers - which activities in espionage, infiltration of subversive and terrorist agents are well known - but that it might hide military constructions, submarine pens, and other installations that could threaten the security of the Hemisphere.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR)

Miami, July 19, 1965
Ref: 190

UR boletín informativo

UN SERVICIO DE PRENSA DEL
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

OFICINAS:
10 S.E. 9 St.
DIRECCION POSTAL:
Box 3940
Miami, Florida
TELEFONO:
373 - 8033

U.R. Informa:

BASE "PESQUERA" SOVIETICA EN LA HABANA

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) ha podido conocer a través de sus fuentes clandestinas en Cuba los siguientes informes:

Los rusos están construyendo muelles, diques secos, naves refrigeradas, plantas de comunicaciones y demás instalaciones necesarias para las operaciones de una flota pesquera en la costa este del puerto de La Habana, conforme a lo estipulado en el acuerdo Soviético-Cubano de Septiembre de 1962.

Estas construcciones se llevan a cabo bajo la dirección y supervisión de técnicos soviéticos, con la colaboración de "trabajo esclavo" cubano. La Unión Soviética facilita todos los equipos y maquinarias, además de la mencionada supervisión y asistencia técnicas, y Cuba pone la arena, piedras y materiales básicos de construcción, aparte de la mano de obra.

Se había estipulado que la Unión Soviética y Cuba usufructuasen a partes iguales esta terminal pesquera de vastas proporciones, cuyo costo original era de $12 millones de "pesos", pero que ya asciende a $30 millones y que se espera estará terminada para principios de 1966.

Sin embargo, se ha podido conocer que debido a la cuantiosa suma que el régimen Castro-Comunista adeuda a la Unión Soviética, los rusos han determinado que estas instalaciones serán para su uso exclusivo una vez terminadas.

Toda la pesca será llevada a esta terminal, procesada y exportada para la Unión Soviética y Europa en mercantes rusos, sin que se derive provecho alguno para Cuba y sin que los pesqueros cubanos puedan hacer uso de dichas instalaciones.

Esta área en la costa este del puerto de La Habana será cerrada en cuanto se terminen las instalaciones y sólo el personal soviético tendrá acceso a esta zona.

Este control absoluto soviético en el propio puerto de La Habana ha hecho pensar a muchos que dichas instalaciones no sólo servirán para las operaciones de los "pesqueros" rusos -cuyas actividades de espionaje, infiltración de agentes subversivos y terroristas son harto conocidas- sino que pueden esconder construcciones militares, bases para submarinos y otras instalaciones que amenacen la seguridad del Hemisferio.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR)

Ref.: 194

Miami, 19 de Julio de 1965

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CA 2, CA/PEG, CI/IC 2, [illegible]

16 Jun 65 IN 92094

SECRET 162345Z

DIR CITE WAVE 3048 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC MHVIPER

1. AMSCROLL SECGEN REPORTS FINAL SESSION CHAMBER COMMERCE OF AMERICAS UNANIMOUS PASSAGE RESOLUTION DRAFTED BY AMSCROLL DENOUNCING CASTRO REGIME AND RECOMMENDING MEMBER NATION FIRMS DESIST TRADE WITH CUBA DIRECT OR INDIRECT, AND USE INFLUENCE OTHER FREE WORLD FIRMS DO SAME. CURACAO, SURINAM AND ARUBA ABSTAINING LACKING AUTHORITY FROM DUTCH ~~VOGT~~ GOVT BUT EXPRESSED SYMPATHY.

2. MOTION INTRODUCED BY MANUEL CASTILLO, FORMAER PANAMANIAN CONSUL MIAMI, WHO ALSO TAPING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT PANAMA TO CUBAN PEOPLE FOR AMSCROLL RADIO PROGRAM. AMSCROLL ISSUING PRESS RELEASE, CARRYING RESOLUTION AMTHIGH 17 JUNE. POUCHING DETAILS.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

C/EE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief of Station, Athens

INFO Chief, EE; Chief, WH

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT NYXIS/PBRUMEN/Operational
Letter from "Nation" Reporter to AMSCROLL

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: Pls advise of any operational interest.

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a copy of a letter received by AMSCROLL from an individual who claims to be a reporter for Nation, and who says that he is planning to visit New York and Miami in the near future. He expresses sympathy with the cause of Cuban freedom, based on his following of the AMSCROLL publicity in the Galbe affair, and asks to meet AMSCROLL principals to work out some ideas presumably for a subsequent anti-Castro campaign.

2. Please advise if you have any specific operational interest in this individual, or if you have any preferences in the matter of AMSCROLL's dealing with him. AMSCROLL is replying with thanks for the writer's interest and with anticipation of future close and friendly cooperation.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

Attachment:
Letter, zerox copy, u/sc (att'd)

Distribution:
3 - COS, Athens, w/attach, u/sc
2 - C/EE, w/attach, u/sc
2 - C/WH, w/attach, u/sc 2cc w/att fwd WH/C/ES

19-120-26

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
14 June 65	JUN [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 22,012

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

late

Athens 5-6-65

Mr. Seigle,

First, sorry for my bad English. In the Athenian newspapers I read your letter you sended to the Greek prime minister mr Papandreou. I agree that Greek premier must set out of this country mr Galbe, the Cuban chargé d" affaires in Athens. Many readers of the Athenian newspapers asked to take your adress. They want to express you their feelings. Many of them wrote that they want to go to Cuba "to set out in 3(!) days Fidel Castro".

Anyway, this is the preface of my letter. What I want to tell you is that I am a reporter of a great and old Athenian newspaper~~s~~. I should like very much to be in tuch with you, since I intend to came in a couple of months to the World's Fair of New York - as I went again last year - and then, to came in Miami. So, I want very much to meet you and have an interesting interview with you and your revolutionary army, for my newspaper

16 June 1965
att. #1 to UFGA-22012

19-120-26

[illegible]

So, I am waiting your letter and details about your adress there, so that I can find you easily. I will write you then some interesting suggestions about our meeting, interview, revolutionnary movement etc. A Greek has always good ideas. Good by untill I will have news from you. Thank you very much.

Sincerely yours
Dimitrios Drouboukis
Journalist
member of the Union
of Athenian press.

My adress:
D. Drouboukis
8 Seizani Str.
Ymittos
Athens
Greece

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSCROLL/Operational
Progress Report 1 January - 31 March 1965

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 19537, 1 February 1965

A. OPERATIONAL

1. During the reporting period AMSCROLL continued to function as Station JMWAVE's MHVIPER action and propaganda vehicle. Toward the end of March AMSCROLL also assumed the bulk of the heirloom operation which is now being taken over by a separate committee. Some of the more significant activities, which have been covered in other correspondence, were "black list" letters to specific firms in Japan and Greece, sent at the behest of and according to guidance from Tokyo and Athens Stations, AMBLEAK-1's "truth squad" tactics against the Japanese trade mission touring Latin America and the initiation of regular reports to Spanish officials, in a list provided by Madrid Station, on the anti-Spanish contents of broadcasts from Havana by the Cuban-Spanish Friendship Association.

2. Although there were some petty disagreements among AMSCROLL personnel, reported in detail by our unilateral penetration, AMFRAME-1, there was relative calm during the period, and occasional manifestations of esprit de corps were noted in AMSCROLL despite the general flagging of morale in the exile community at large.

3. The only change in the AMSCROLL executive committee took effect in March when the Secretary of Finance, Identity, resigned to take a position in an Ecuadorian commercial firm. Other personnel changes were made with only minor significance.

B. PRODUCTION

4. Propaganda to Cuba (samples in Attachment 2) included the pony-sized monthly bulletin; a leaflet on personal security, this being a new issue showing that the greatest danger to self and family is to do nothing while Castro-Communism tightens its grip on the whole of Cuban

(Continued)

Attachments:
1. Identity, USC
2. Prop Samples, Cuba, USC
3. Prop Samples, LA, USC
4. Press Release, USC

u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
3 - WH/C
4 atts

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
28 May 65

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 9 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 21797

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26
19-120-26/3

society; "handwritten" cover letters, which are actually printed script to make the propaganda envelopes appear to contain personal letters when put to the light test by censors; and receipt acknowledgement forms, a simple slip of paper now attached to all propaganda mailings requesting the recipient to send the form back to AMSCROLL's post offic box, or to any other address in the free world for forwarding to AMSCROLL, as a check on how much propaganda is getting through. During the period AMSCROLL sent out 58,000 envelopes containing 130,000 items.

5. To Latin America primarily, with a scattering of items to Europe, Asia and the United States, AMSCROLL sent out 30,000 items indluding its tabloid house organ (which is now cut down to 4 pages from its former 8, and is published only once a month instead of twice), several booklets reprinted by continued request of correspondents (one of the largest orders having come from Dominican General Wessin y Wessin shortly before the rebellion) and a map showing training sites in Cuba for Latin American guerrillas (samples in Attachment 3).

6. News releases were issued on a number of current topics, AMSCROLL as usual taking the economic warfare angle on the news of the day as it effected Cuba. The 17 releases of this period were sent to newspapers, wire services, magazines, radio and TV stations throughout the free world in approximately 350 copies each. The local public media made use of approximately 65% of AMSCROLL's press releases. Although occasional indications are received that AMSCROLL materials are used in other newspaper and magazine articles, radio programs and the like, there is no way of making a good estimate of the amount of such replay. Among the more important titles were the following (copies in Attachment 4):

a. Free-World Ships Continue Aid to Cuban Economy.
b. Cuban Budget Includes Proof Economy Crumbling -- an Analysis
c. Possible Soviet Curtailment of Cuban Aid Seen
d. Greek Firm Bilked in Cuban Trade Negotiations
e. Japan Seeks Expansion of LA Trade While Defying OAS in Cuban Trafic
f. Sovbloc Undermining Castro Sugar Markets
g. Castro Auctioning Heirlooms Taken from Fleeing Refugees

7. Other political action and propaganda moves noted in paragraph 1, above, were reported separately in detail, and a full set of "black list" correspondence was forwarded to Headquarters in UFGA 21616 with a request for any further MHVIPER leads which might contribute to the further effectiveness of this campaign.

8. AMSCROLL radio programs, 15 minutes daily over both WMIE and AMTHIGH, carried much the same themes as the AMSCROLL press releases, but with adjustments as necessary for the Cuban audience, e.g., while AMSCROLL press releases might complain about continued free-world trade with and shipping to Cuba, the radio program would emphasize any decreases in the number of ships.

9. Reactions to AMSCROLL propaganda continue to arrive from Cuba, but at a slow pace. The 24 letters received during the past period contained 7 newspaper clippings and three pages torn from telephone books, as requested in AMSCROLL radio programs. Nine of the letters mentioned the AMTHIGH broadcasts, one noted receipt of the pony-sized bulletin and two remitted the small acknowledgement forms which accompany all AMSCROLL propaganda mailed into Cuba. Detailed statistics on these are submitted in a separate report from JMWAVE.

C. FINANCIAL

Salaries (January - March)	$ 15,360.00
Operational Expenses (January-March	36,500.00
TOTAL	$ 51,860.00

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 21797

D. FUTURE PLANS

No substantive changes are contemplated in the handling of this activity. Efforts will be continued to judge the efficacy of current programs, and to adjust the amount and type of propaganda produced as necessary.

for

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

FORM 5-60 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT NO. 1 TO UFGA 2179

IDENTITY: Reinaldo MIYARES Lopez

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

14-00000

UFGA-21616
20 May 65
19-120-26

9 OCT 1968 [illegible]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible] and [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible] was DEFERRED
[✓ 5.] [illegible] was classified into file # 19-132-49/3
6. [illegible]
○ For filing with attachment.

---

w/s/c/att. 5

REMOVAL SLIP
DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER UFGA-21552
DOC. DATE 19 May 1965

THE CS COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS REMOVED FROM THIS FILE #19-120-26
BY RID/AED RPU ON 9 OCT 1968 AND FORWARDED TO [✓ RID FILES]
RID/AN
RID/MIS
RID/PS

1. It was KAPOK and unprocessed.
2. It was RYBAT and unprocessed.
3. It was EYES ALONE and unprocessed.
4. It was DEFERRED.
[✓ 5.] It was classified into file # 19-126-34/3
6. It is an indexed document.
○ For filing with atts. 1,2,3+4.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 22

SECRET

ORIG : JLHart:dap
UNIT : DCWHD/C ☐ INDEX
EXT : 7264 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 28 April 65 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1742

ROUTING			
1	PP	4	mmo
2		5	D
3	DC WHD/K CA-EW	6	K

TO : JMWAVE MADRID

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH/C 8

INFO : DDP, WE 6, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS CI/OA, VR, FILE

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO MADR CITE DIR 05230

TYPIC KEYWAY MHVIPER

REF: DIR 04886

PARA 2 REF SHOULD READ: "HOPE AMSCROLL CAN SET UP NON-POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF REPUTABLE CUBANS AND ACT AS ITS EXECUTIVE AGENT."

END OF MESSAGE

Desmond FitzGerald
C/WHD

WE/5

John L. Hart
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

28-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

J. HART File Amscroll 22

ORIG : ~~R. Rastetter~~/bh
UNIT : C/WH/C/~~CA~~
EXT : 6567
DATE : 27 Apr 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM

15 SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

27 APR 65 18 10z

SIG CEN

TO : JMWAVE MADRID

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WE 6, C/OPS, C/OA, CA 2, CA/PROP

TO WAVE INFO MADR CITE DIR 04886

TYPIC KEYWAY MHVIPER

REFS: A. MADR 3992 (IN 52779)
B. WAVE 1064 (IN 51819)

1. CONCUR REF A. DO NOT DESIRE COMMITTEE BE SET UP MADR; FOR MAXIMUM CONTROL, FEEL THIS BEST DONE WAVE AREA.

2. MOST PLEASED EFFECTIVE ROLE PLAYED BY AMSCROLL TO DATE. HOPE AMSCROLL CAN SET UP NON-POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF REPUTABLE CUBANS WHICH WOULD ACT AS ITS EXECUTIVE AGENT.

END OF MESSAGE

John L Hart
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

WE/5 L. RAJI

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

5 4 3 2 1

RELEASING OFFICER 27-9

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

31

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

[illegible] 10-124-26

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

27 SECRET

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	CA-CW
2		6	FI-TC
3	MD	7	3
4		8	X

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WE6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, F.

ACTION

S E C R E T 242049Z

MADR INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1064

24 APR 65 IN 51819

TYPIC KEYWAY MHVIPER

U

REFS: A. WAVE 0150 (IN 35346)

B. DIR 04279

C. MADR 3910 (IN 45141)

D. WAVE 1049 (IN 51462)

SC

1. VIEW APPARENT SENSITIVITY RE USE AMSCROLL NAME THIS OP, SUGGEST MADR HAVE MUSSO REPLY TO AMSCROLL LETTER AS SUGGESTED PARA 7 REF A, STATING HE SETTING UP INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE AND ASKING AMSCROLL PARTICIPATION. MUSSO COULD THEN PLACE ADS PER REF B WHICH WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE COMING FROM EUROPEAN LOCATION.

2. IF ABOVE NOT FEASIBLE PLS ADVISE AND WAVE WILL ESTABLISH COMMITTEE AND PLACE ADS.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, San Jose

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
Forwarding of Counterrevolutionary Handbook Studies

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
REFERENCE: UFGA-18641, para 3, dated 17 November 1964

ACTION : See paragraph 2.

1. Forwarded herewith is one copy of each of the following Counterrevolutionary Handbook Studies:

AAM - Asociacion Amigos del Mar (AAM) and Fraternidad de las 90 Millas
ACCE - Asociacion de Colonos Cubanos en el Exilio
ANAC - Alianza Nacional Anti-Comunista
ANC - Asociacion Nationalista Cubana
FJC - Frente de Juventudes Cristianas
FJR - Frente de Juventudes Revolucionario (The FJR, being a newly formed organization, is not listed in the Index to the Counterrevolutionary Handbook. It is suggested that it be "written in" until a new Index can be completed.)
JURE - Junta Revolucionaria Cubana
MAPA - Movimiento Accion Patriotica Americana
MIRR - Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
MRN - El Movimiento de Resistencia Nacional
MRTN - Movimiento Revolucionario 30 de Noviembre
OAS - Operacion "Alpha 66"
RCCE - Radio Club de Cuba en el Exilio
RDR - Rescate Democratico Revolucionario
SFNE - Segundo Frente Nacional de Escambray
UND - Union Nacional Democratica "Movimiento 20 de Mayo"

2. The above listed studies should be filed alphabetically in Part II of the Counterrevolutionary Handbook forwarded under reference.

for ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

19-120-26

Attachment: CR Handbook Studies, h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 2-COS, San Jose - w/att.
2-Chief, WH, w/o att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
13 April 65	APR 20 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-21009

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-9-12

14-00000

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

55/50 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	FP—	5	CA-Ew
2		6	C
3	FI-TC	7	D
4	[illegible]	8	[illegible]

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION (WH/C8)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME RR-05 201

BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

file Amscroll R.I.

ACTION

10 Apr 65 IN 42315

SECRET 100141Z

DIR CITE WAVE 0574

TYPIC MHVIPER

IN REPLY CASTRO CLAIMS REPORTED LOCAL NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO CUBAN SUGAR PRODUCTION GOALS BEING REACHED, AMSCROLL PREPARING PRESS RELEASES AND RADIO PROGRAMS 12-14 APR USING FOLL THEMES: SUGAR DISCRETION STILL STRICTLY ENFORCED. WHY NECESSARY IF SITUATION ACTUALLY GOOD AS CLAIMED? CASTRO PROHIBITION PUBLICATION ANY STATISTICS DURING HARVEST GAVE AMPLE WARNING BIG LIE TO COME. AMSCROLL UNDERGROUND REPORTS WIDESPREAD CANE BURNING, SABOTAGE MILLS AND TRANSPORT FACILITIES, SHORTAGE JUTE BAGS, ADMINISTRATIVE BUNGLING, LOW WORKER MORALE COMBINING PUT 65 CROP IN JEOPARDY. GOC REFUSAL CANE CUTTERS TRADITIONAL HOLY WEEK VACATION INDICATES PANIC MORE THAN CONFIDENCE. CONCERN PROBABLY HEIGHTENED BY CONSIDERATION REGIME'S SLIM MARGIN PROFIT EVEN FROM FAIRLY GOOD HARVEST AT CURRENT WORLD PRICES AND COMPETION FROM NEW SUGAR PRODUCING NATIONS. FINAL CRITERION CASTRO BRAVADO. HE ALWAYS TALKS BIGGEST WHEN IN TROUBLE.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

UR

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-120-26
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE
ACTION WH/C 8
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY
INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, RI/AN

AN ~~RI~~
~~PS~~ ~~DUST~~
ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~
WH/C/29

SECRET 131940Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE WAVE 0663

TYPIC MHVIPER

13 APR 65 IN 44335

REF A DIR 00695
B MEXI 3082 (IN 43463) +

1. AMSCROLL WILL DISTRIBUTE ENGLISH LANGUAGE HANDBILL SIX MAJOR THEATERS WAVE AREA 15-17 APR. EXPECT RADIO PRESS AND TV COVERAGE. JMHOPE AND OTHER RADIO ASSETS WILL PLAY STORY INTO CUBA AND AMHIM WILL INCLUDE IN REGULAR BULLETIN FOR LATIN AMERICA.

2. MEXI: RE PARA 3 REF A PLS ADVISE IF WAVE PRINTING DESIRED. CAN PRINT SPANISH LANGUAGE HANDBILLS ATTRIBUTED AMSCROLL. ASSUME ANONYMOUS HANDBILLS WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS WITH MEXICAN AUTHORITIES. ALSO ADVISE FASTEST METHOD MAILING MATERIAL TO MEXI AND ANY CENSORSHIP PROBLEMS IF OPEN MAIL USED. RE PARA TWO REF B WAVE TRYING ARRANGE COMMERCIAL TV AND NEWSREEL COVERAGE OF PARA 1 ACTIVITY THROUGH IDENTITY. IF SUCCESSFUL, SUGGEST MEXI ASSETS TELEPHONE IDENTITY AND PURCHASE [redacted] CLIPS. WILL ADVISE MEXI WHEN IDENTITY SHOULD BE CONTACTED.

3. INDEX IDENTITY. 4 RE WAVE ASSETS PROVIDING PRIOR PLAY

SECRET

SECRET

19-120-26
13 apr 65

RI COPY

"'ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

43

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP —	5	MHO
2		6	CA-EW
3		7	D
4	FI-TC	8	✗

UR

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, EE4, DO4, DO/H3, CA2, CA/PROP, FI

S E C R E T 070015Z

DIR INFO HAMB BRLN FRAN GMNY CITE WAVE 0415

TYPIC MHVIPER

7 Apr 65 IN 39642

REF DIR 95998 ✓

AMSCROLL SENT LETTER 5 MAR TO WIKING, COPIES TO GERMAN FORMIN BONN, GERMAN EMBASSY WASH, GERMAN DELEGATION TO UN, US SECY OF COMMERCE. CONTENTS LETTER IN PRESS RELEASE 6 MAR DELIVERED LOCAL MEDIA OUTLETS AND SENT LARGE NUMBER EUROPEAN PRESS REPS INCLUDING JOURNAL OF COMMERCE CORRESPONDENTS NEW YORK AND EUROPE AND GERMAN NEWSPAPERS.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 71

SECRET

37

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	EW	5	(CA) PP-
2		6	C
3	FI-TC	7	D
4	Mis	8	L

FROM JM WAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME RR-RE DO1

BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, CI/IC 2, CA/PROP, FI, CA 2

S E C R E T 062225Z

DIR CITE WAVE 0397

TYPIC MHVIPER

REF A DIR 95219

B DIR 98577 *

File Amscroll N.R.

Mr. Chaconas

Mr. Fasison

~~Mr.~~

6 Apr 65 IN 39527

AMSCROLL ISSUING RELEASE TO LOCAL PRESS RADIO AND WIRE SERVICES 6 APR AND BROADCASTING TO CUBA. RELEASE BASED REFS SUMMARIZES AS FOLLOWS: ONE OF OUR UNDERGROUND UNITS REPORTS SPECTACULAR CONTINUING SUCCESS SABOTAGE AGAINST RICHARD CONTINENTAL TRACTORS IMPORTED FROM FRANCE. SINCE SUMMER 64 WHEN TWO SHIPMENTS TOTAL 30 TRACTORS VARIOUS MODELS CONTAMINATED WITH ABRASIVES, THIS GROUP PLAYING HAVOC CUBAN HEAVY DUTY MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT. ONE ACTION AUG 64 PUT 70 OF 160 RICHARD TRACTORS OUT OF USE, 7 BEYOND REPAIR, THROUGH SPECIALLY PREPARED LUBRICANTS WHICH MINCONS INVESTIGATORS DISCOVERED TOO LATE. DESPITE INCREASED SURVEILLANCE, SAB GROUP USING NEW MORE SOPHISTICATED METHODS REGULARLY SABOTAGING EARTH MOVERS ETC, GIANT BULLDOZERS, ETC.

S E C R E T

CFN + REF RYBAT

SECRET

FYI —

This could cause flap & flop of NIFASH. We must be constantly alert to dangers of putting our Prop. foot so far into our mouths that we plug the windpipe. R

- Suggested cable to WAVE

SECRET

REFS: A. WAVE 0397 (IN 39527)
B. DIR 95219
C. DIR 98577

Regret misunderstanding derived from refs B and C. Primary importance in such propaganda is not to bring scrutiny to lubricants which are basis of large and sensitive NIFASH operation. Also imperative that exploitation of sabotage make it appear to have been done inside PBRUMEN. Request WAVE cancel all uncompleted action which may have bearing on this problem.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : F. SHERRY/mak
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW
EXT : 6957
DATE : 1 APRIL 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF. DC/WH/C5 INFO VR, FILE, DDP, C/FI, C/FI/D 4, ADDP

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR ~~[illegible]4~~

RYBAT TYPIC ZRPERUSAL

98577

FRENCH FIRM RICHARD FRERES HAS SUPPLIED SEVERAL HUNDRED TRACTORS TO CUBA IN LITTLE OVER ONE YEAR. THESE INCLUDED FOUR OR FIVE TYPES OF WHICH CD10 PROBABLY HEAVIEST. MAIN UNLOADING PORT FOR THESE TRACTORS APPEARS BE HAVANA. TWO SHIPMENTS INVOLVING ABOUT 30 TRACTORS OF DIFFERENT TYPES WERE CONTAMINATED WITH ABRASIVES IN MAY AND JUNE 1964.

END OF MESSAGE

Wave 0397
6 APRIL 65

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

C/WH/C/CA

C/WH/C/MO

JOHN L. HART
/DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER 2-24 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM 25

ORIG: F. CHERRY/mak
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 6957
DATE: 23 MARCH 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-38

78 SECRET

R ROUTING
1		5	X
2		6	
3	CA	7	
4	D	8	

TO JMWAVE

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/C 5 INFO DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, C/CA 2, C/SIO 4, C/WE 3, VR, FILE

TO WAVE INFO FID CITE DIR 95219

WAVE 0015 31 MAR 65

RYBAT PBRUMEN MHVIPER ZRPERUSAL

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE RELAYED: 15 MAR 65, FROM BOSQUE, MINCON, HAVANA TO RICHARD CONTINENTAL, FRANCE. SEND IMMEDIATELY HIGHLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL FOR BULLDOZERS C-D10. CONSTANTLY BREAKING DOWN DUE TO DEFECTS IN MANUFACTURE.

2. WAVE PLEASE EXPLOIT. SEVERAL ACTS OF SABOTAGE WERE CARRIED OUT AGAINST RICHARD TRACTORS IN 1964 USING ABRASIVE IN ENGINE BLOCKS. SINCE ABRASIVE WAS DISCOVERED BY CUBANS, LINE SHOULD NOW BE, "HOW DO YOU LIKE OUR MORE SOPHISTICATED METHOD? TRACTORS OUR SPECIALTY, THE HEAVIER THE BETTER."

3. IMPLICATION SHOULD NATURALLY BE THAT ACTS ACCOMPLISHED BY ANTI-CASTRO GROUP WHOSE STRENGTH LIES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CUBA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA

C/WH/C/MO

RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

23-37

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 42

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WE6, EE4, WH7, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H3, CI/OPS, CI/IC2

1	PP—	5	CA-EW
2		6	C
3	F	7	D
4		8	x

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

SECRET 010220Z

DIR INFO MADR BERN GNVA HAGU ZURC CITE WAVE 0150

TYPIC MHVIPER (IN 32451)

ACTION

REFS: A. WAVE 9987 (NOT SENT INFO ADDRESSEES)

B. DIR 91885 *

C. MADR 3677 (IN 33120)

D. BERN 4931 (IN 33756)

1. PRIOR RECEIPT REF B HAD ASSIGNED AMSCROLL (IDEN) TASK OF SPEARHEADING WAVE AREA PROP ACTION RE CUBAN ART SHIPMENTS EUROPE. AMSCROLL WELL SUITED FOR THIS ROLE IN WAVE AREA DUE ITS ESTABLISHED PRESS OUTLETS, REPUTATION FOR ACCURATE REPORTING AND FACT IT CENTER ORIENTED POLITICAL GROUP WITH EASY ACCESS THOSE EXILE CIRCLES OF CONSERVATIVE PERSUASION WHO OWNED ART OBJECTS WHICH CONFISCATED BY GOC. INTEND CONTINUE USING AMSCROLL IN THIS OP PARTICULARLY DURING FORMATIVE STAGES.

2. REF A PRESS RELEASE 27 MAR BY AMSCROLL CALLED FOR ALL EXILES WAVE AREA TO FORWARD ALL INFO RE CONFISCATED ART OBJECTS TO AMSCROLL FOR CATALOGING AND USE IN ATTEMPTS IMPOUND ART CARGO EUROPE BEFORE IT GOES ON SALE. LOCAL RADIO STATIONS PICKED UP THIS

SECRET

RELEASE AND GAVE IT FULL COVERAGE. AFP WIRED STORY TO NEW YORK. ALSO PICKED UP BY UPI AND AP.

3. AMSCROLL NOW IN PROCESS PLACING ADS IN ABC, MADRID; JOURNAL DE GENEVE, GENEVA; DAILY TELEGRAPH, LONDON; LE MONDE, PARIS; IL COVIESE, ROME; POST, WASHINGTON (DC); LA PRENSA & TIMES, NEW YORK; EL MUNDO, PUERTO RICO; EXCELSIOR, MEXICO, AND EL UNIVERSAL, CARACAS ASKING EXILE ART OBJECT OWNERS TO FURNISH AMSCROLL COPIES SUPPORTING DOCS SHOWING WHAT ITEMS OWNED AND CONFISCATED. AMSCROLL STATES IT WILL CATALOGUE THESE CLAIMS AND TAKE ACTION TRY STOP SALES IN EUROPE. SHOULD THIS FAIL AMSCROLL POINTS OUT IT INTENDS WARN ART DEALERS AND POTENTIAL BUYERS AROUND WORLD THAT CATALOGUED ITEMS WILL BE RECLAIMED BY FREE CUBAN GOVT.

4. AMSCROLL SENT CABLES SWISS EMBASSY WASHINGTON AND SWISS DELAGATION UN WITH COPIES MAJOR SWISS DAILIES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION JURISTS PROTESTING SHIPMENT HEIRLOOM CARGO TO EUROPE FOR SALE UNDER GENEVA CONVENTION PROHIBITION LOOTING OR PLUNDERING IN WAR OR PEACE.

5. AMSCROLL WILL START CABLE CAMPAIGN ALONG LINES SUGGESTED BY REF D PARA 2 ON 2 APRIL.

6. INITIAL WAVE AREA EXILE RESPONSE TO ART OBJECT CAMPAIGN

INDICATES INDIVIDUALS WHO OWNED ART OBJECTS MORE THAN WILLING LET AMSCROLL RUN WITH BALL AS INDIVIDUAL EXILES DON'T WANT GET INVOLVED IN PUBLICITY ACTIONS, POSSIBLE LITIGATION, ETC.

7. REQUEST MADR CABLE ADDRESS WHERE MUSSO CAN BE REACHED IN SPAIN. SUGGEST AMSCROLL CONTACT MUSSO BY AIRMAIL AT THIS ADDRESS AND OFFER WORK IN COORDINATED FASHION WITH MUSSO ON ART SHIPMENT PROBLEM. MUSSO COULD COUNTER WITH OFFER SET UP INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE IF MADR FEELS AMSCROLL CONTINUATION IN OP WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY EFFECT SENSIBILITIES OF EXILE LEADERS EUROPE WHO HAVE SOMETHING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS OP.

SECRET * APPARENTLY WRONG REF. POSSIBLY DIR 96585 **

CFN ** GAVE GUIDANCE FOR PSYCH OP RE SHIPMENT CUBAN HEIRLOOMS TO EUROPE.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

55/4 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ☒ COPY ☐

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP —	5	CA-EW
2		6	C
3	MID	7	D
4	FI-TC	8	+

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WE6, EE4, WH7, CA2, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H3, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CA/PEG

S E C R E T 010226Z

DIR INFO MADR BERN GNVA HAGU CITE WAVE 0151

ACTION

1 Apr 65 IN 35336

TYPIC MHVIPER

REF WAVE 0150 (IN 35346)

IDEN: UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, 10 SE NINTH STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA.

S E C R E T

CFN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1 EW
3 FI
4 TC

5 MO
6 CA/PP
7 D

FROM WAVE
ACTION WE-8
INFO
VR. FILE, DDP, WH/C-8, CH-2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS

SECRET 252221Z

PRIORITY HAGU INFO DIR MADR PARI CITE WAVE 9906

Request WAVE have local Cubans [illegible] CIA to part of shipment

25 MAR [illegible] 125

U

[illegible]WAY PBRUMEN MHVIPER

REF A DIR 95371

B MADR 3924 (230088)

1. 24 MAR AMSCROLL SECGEN (IDEN) CONTACTED FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS ON REF MATTER: ALFONSO FANJUL, CARLOS GARCIA BELTRAN [illegible] MENDOZA, MARIO SEIGLIE (SR), AND HEIRS DON PEDRO SANCHEZ [illegible]STA. THEY IN TURN CONTACTING FRANCISCO ZAYAS, CIRO SOSA [illegible]MADA, LILIAM GOMEZ MENA, NORBERTO AZQUETA, SAHARA JOHNSON DE [illegible]ERA MANUEL ASPURU, ENRIQUE MENDOZA, GUILLERMO SALDO AND MEMBERS [illegible] SARRA FAMILY.

2. ABOVE PERSONS PREPARING TEXT NIGHT LETTERS WHICH MOST [illegible] SEND 25 MAR. WILL ADVISE WHEN FURTHER DETAILS KNOWN.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

[illegible] WAVE

[illegible] E-9

EW #1 TK

MO CA-(P) D

FILE, DDP, WH/C-2, CA-2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS

25 [illegible]

S E C R E T 252221Z

[illegible] MAGU INFO DIR MADR PARI CITE WAVE 9907

[illegible] MHVIPER

REF WAVE 9901 (IN 31125)

[illegible] MARIO SEIGLIE (JR), UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA.

S E T

V.R. Fine

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 8

84 SECRET

GROUP 1

BY [illegible] COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP	5	(A-F)
2		6	C
3	RR-RE	7	D
4	MD	8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME 001

BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH 7, FE 6, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3 CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 102334Z

RIOD INFO SAOP DIR TOKY CITE WAVE 9406 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC MHVIPER PSYCH

REFS: A. RIOD 7545 (NOT SENT SAOP) (IN 18375)

B. DIR 90763

C. WAVE 9256 (NOT SENT SAOP) (IN 17647)

1. RE REF A, AMSCROLL (IDEN) SENDING CABLE 10 MAR GOB FINANCE, COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES MINISTRIES, GENERAL BRAZ BRANCATO (WHO ONCE WROTE AMSCROLL FROM PORTO ALLEGRE WITH FAVORABLE COMMENTS ON PROP LEAFLETS), GOVERNOR LACERDA OF GUANABARA, INDUSTRIAS REUNIDAS F. MATARAZZO (SAOP), S.A. VOTORANTIN (SAOP), FUDICAO TUPY S.A. (SANTA CATARINA), AMERICA FABRIL, S.A. (RIOD), FABRICA TECIDOS BANGU (RIOD), MESBLA S.A. (RIOD), JORNAL DO BRAZIL, JORNAL DO COMERCIO, O BLOBO, O ESTADO DE SAO PAOLO, GAZETA ESTADO SAO PAOLO, FOLHA DE SAO PAOLA, O CRUZEIRO, CONJUNTURA ECONOMICA AND TRIBUNA DA IMPRESA. SUMMARY CONTENTS FOLL: CONNECTION VISIT JAPANESE TRADE MISSION WISH CALL ATTENTION SEVERAL ASPECTS CURRENT JANANESE TRADE POLICIES WHICH SHOULD INFLUENCE ANY DEALINGS: JAPAN-CUBA TRADE AMOUNTED 87 MILLION DOLLARS LAST YEAR FOR INCREASE 340 PERCENT; THIS YEAR JAPAN

SECRET

IN 20328
PAGE 2

BOUGHT 185,000 TONS CUBAN SUGAR AND WILL BUY 200,000 TONS MORE; JAPAN ALSO DELIVERING LARGE NUMBER FISHING VESSELS AND PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CUBAN FISHING INDUSTRY. DETAILS ABOVE MEXICO'S EXCELSIOR, NEW YORK JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND JAPAN'S OWN ECONOMIC JOURNAL.. THESE ACTIVITIES DIRECT OPPOSITION TO OAS RESOLUTION JULY 64 WHICH BROKE DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES BETWEEN CUBA AND AMERICAN STATES AND URGED ALL OTHER COUNTRIES OF SIMILAR IDEALS ACT ACCORDINGLY. THEREFORE OBVIOUS THAT INCREASE JAPAN'S TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CUBA UNFRIENDLY ACT TOWARD OAS MEMBER NATIONS AND JAPAN AIDING AND ABETTING ENEMY BY SUPPORTING MAINTENANCE BASE FOR COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND SUBVERSION OUR HEMISPHERE. SINCE BRAZIL ONLY RECENTLY AVERTED NEAR DISASTER COMMUNIST TAKEOVER, BRAZILIANS KNOW FULL AND ACTIVE COOPERATION NEEDED IF OUR CONTINENT TO REMAIN FREE COMMUNIST TOTALITARIANISM. WE EXPECT BRAZIL'S PEOPLE, PUBLIC MEXIA, BUSINESS MEN AND GOVT TO INSIST THIS TRADE MISSION WHICH SPONSORED BY JAPANESE GOVT PROMISE CURTAIL TRAFFIC WITH COMMUNIST CUBAN ENEMY AS PREREQUISITE FOR NEGOTIATIONS BRAZIL.

2. AMSCROLL ALSO RELEASING CONTENTS LOCAL PRESS AND WIRE REPS.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

44 SECRET

RID ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP —	5	CA-EW
2		6	C
3	RR-EE	7	D
4	MO	8	X

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME DOI

BY

INFO VR. FILE, ~~DDP~~, WH 7, FE 6, CA 2, CA/PROP, DC 4, DO/H 3, CI/IC 2

IN 20317

S E C R E T 102334Z

RIOD INFO SAOP DIR TODY CITE WAVE 9407 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC MHVIPER PSYCH

REF: WAVE 9406 (IN 70321)

IDEN: UNKDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

File Amscroll

Rone

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

24/2 SECRET

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUM

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/SA-8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, FE-6, CA-2, CA/PROP

IN 06231
Dm

S E C R E T 232319Z

DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 3633

TYPIC MHVIPER

REF UFGW 4774

1. AMSCROLL SENT LETTER 17 FEB BASED REF GUIDANCE REQUESTING ASSURANCES FROM NIIGATA THAT SPARE PARTS WILL NOT BE SOLD IF ORDERED BY GOC.

2. AMSCROLL USUALLY ISSUES PRESS RELEASE TO COINCIDE WITH RECEIPT SUCH LETTERS BY ADDEES, BUT THIS CASE WILL ALLOW AMPLE TIME FOR REPLY AND BASE PUBLICITY ON TONE OF RESPONSE.

3. POUCHING LETTER.

S E C R E T

SECRET

~~MOB~~	~~INT~~	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
[✓ [illegible]]	RPTS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	EF	HH
☐		SEC	NS

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE 3-15

SUBJECT
TYPIC/MHVIPER/AMSCROLL/Operational
Forwarding of Propaganda Leaflet

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

Under separate cover is the latest AMSCROLL propaganda item in support of the MHVIPER program. It exploits an actual case of a firm which literally laughed in the face of AMSCROLL protestations, and shortly thereafter fell afoul of ODMARK with the result that it lost its import-export license. AMSCROLL reproduced the pertinent correspondence in sequence with the comment that this is one of several things which can happen to those who trade with Communist Cuba.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

Attachment:
Propaganda, USC

Distribution:
3- DC, WH/SA, w/att., USC

[illegible]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

19-120-26

DATE TYPED
9 Feb 65

DATE DISPATCHED
FEB 12 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 19788

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA continues its research in reference to the firms that are still trading with Communist Cuba. We are making a thorough investigation in order to avoid mistakes, but as soon as completed, the "Black List" will be published and distributed throughout the Free World.

Many firms have already realized what trading with Communist Cuba means, and have also taken into consideration Cuba's credit unworthiness - ONE BILLION DOLLARS of foreign debt. Therefore, these firms have backed away from this shameful and riskful market.

Besides, the people of the Countries of the Free World are sympathetic with our cause; take as an example the boycott started by the Venezuelan Federation of dockworkers in accordance with the first resolution of the "Fifth Congress of Venezuelan Workers", labor unions of other nations have already followed suit.

Or take the case of Mr. Shepherd, from Great Britian, which is illustrated in this pamphlet.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
10 S.E. 9 St. Miami, Fla.

s/c att. to UFGA-19788

19-120-26


this is one of several
things that can happen
Castro
Soviet masters
I have an
how heav
tyrant is in
its satellites
denied all U.S. export privileges
to those who trade
with Communist Cuba.

① **UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA** sent Shepherd this letter regarding the "Black List".



UR

MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA



Shepherd Export & Trading Company

4 CHICHESTER ROAD · CROYDON
SURREY · ENGLAND

② **SHEPHERD** continued trading with Castro . . .



③ **the outcome . . .**



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of
International Commerce

TOTAL COPIES 34 RI ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3/2 SECRET

FROM JMWAVE	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1 2 3 4	5 6 7 8
ACTION WH/SA 8	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	TIME	BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, CI 2, WE 6, DD 4, DDI 3, [illegible] 2, FI, CA/PROP, SR 7,

CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 052150Z

DIR INFO PARI COPE LOND CITE WAVE 7986

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF: A. DIR 82382

B. DIR 78938

5 FEB 65 IN 74970

1. ASSUMPTION PARA 1 REF A CORRECT. SUMMARY RELEASE FOLL: UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) IN RECEIPT CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE FROM NUMBER SOURCES THAT SOVS MAY ANNOUNCE WITHDRAWAL ECONOMIC AID TO CUBA AFTER PARTY MEETING 1 MAR MOSCOW AND THAT SOVBLOC OFFICIALS STUDYING WAYS DISENGAGE ASAP SINCE CUBA NOW COSTS BLOC $2 BILLION YEAR WHICH MORE THAN IT WORTH. RUSS LEADERS HAVE TO CONSIDER (1) SOV UNION INTERNAL PROBLEMS WHICH NEGATIVE TO CASTRO SINCE ACCORDING STATEMENTS BY KOSYGIN, MIKOYAN AND BREZHNEV DEC 64 USSR FAR FROM REACHING FARM, CATTLE AND INDUSTRIAL GOALS; (2) ATTITUDE EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES WHICH ALSO UNFAVORABLE TO CASTRO JUDGING FROM ARTICLES IN CZECH "LITERARNI NOVINY" AND "KULTURNI ZIVOT" AND BRITISH "FINANCIAL TIMES" WHICH INDICATE COMECON CONSIDERS FURTHER AID TO CUBA BEYOND BLOC CAPABILITIES; (3) CASTRO'S OWN PROBLEMS, E.G. LACK DOLLAR CREDITS AND DEPRESSION IN WORLD SUGAR MARKET WITH PRICE DROPPING FROM DEC 63 PEAK 12.6 TO 2.35 CENTS POUND

SECRET

ON 25 JAN 65.

2. LOCAL PLAY LIMITED TO MIAMI NEWS SPANISH-LANGUAGE SECTION, NORMAN DIAZ (WMET) AND MANOLO REYES (CHANNEL 4 TV), BUT TIME MAGAZINE'S J. MALLIN REQUESTED COPY OF RELEASE AND ASKED UR KEEP HIM POSTED DEVELOPMENTS THIS FIELD.

3. AIRMAILING COPIES PER REFS.

SECRET

y ATTRIBUTED STATEMENT RE SOV DISENCHANTMENT CUBA.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 19-[illegible]

X REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 35

RI COPY DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

FROM [illegible]	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1 2 3 4	5 6 7 8
ACTION [illegible]	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	TIME	BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP [illegible] FE 6 [illegible]

PROP

Secret 115

Jms

R I COPY

S E C R E T 041533Z

DIR INFO ATHE PARI LOND MADR CITE WAVE 7922 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC MHVIPER

4 FEB 65 IN 73733

REF: A. DIR 77508

B. DIR 81025

1. AMSCROLL PRESS RELEASE IN ENGLISH AND SPANISH SURFACING REF A MATERIAL ISSUED 3 FEB ALL LOCAL OUTLETS INCLUDING WIRE SERVICES. UNDER TITLE "GREEK FIRM LEARNS LESSON FROM TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CUBA" WITH SUBHEAD "LOSES $180,000 AND HELD FOR DAMAGES BESIDES," RELEASE ATTRIBUTED "HIGHLY RELIABLE UNDERGROUND SOURCES."

2. BEING MAILED 17 ATHE NEWSPAPERS, 2 GREEK PAPERS NEW YORK CITY AND SEVERAL HUNDRED FREE WORLD FIRMS TRADING WITH CUBA. LOCAL AFP STRINGER ADVISES HE CABLING GIST HIS NEW YORK OFFICE.

3. POUCHING PRESS RELEASE ALL ADDEES. WILL AIRMAIL CLIPS HQS.

S E C R E T

CFN

AN	PI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

4 Feb 65

19-126-26

SECRET

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/Operational
AMSCROLL Progress Report, December 1964

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 19181, dated 21 December 1964

A. OPERATIONAL

1. During December there was considerable pressure on AMSCROLL to join political groupings being formed by ex-Presidents Urrutia and Prio. Fortunately, AMSCROLL was able to stay out of both without incurring the wrath of either.

B. PRODUCTION

2. Although a number of new propaganda ideas were submitted by AMSCROLL for approval, the only new item for Cuban consumption actually printed during the month was the pony bulletin. This and other items already on hand, including 5,000 Christmas cards, totalled 47,000 pieces which were sent in 20,000 covers to Cuba. Another 10,000 items were distributed to Latin America and Spain, and 13,700 to addressees in the U. S. Most of the two latter categories were based on requests from religious, social, and civic organizations. Samples of the items and a breakdown of the actual numbers of each distributed are in the attached AMSCROLL Propaganda Section report.

3. AMSCROLL broadcasts continued as scheduled. Chief among the themes, which also pervaded the two issues of the AMSCROLL house organ published during the month and the above-mentioned pony bulletin for Cuba, were as follows:

a. The Congo in lurid detail with outrage at the Communist hand behind the atrocities, and with scorn for the so-called neutralists for their attitude for the rescue mission. AMSCROLL editoralized that except for the canibalism, Congo tactics including ravage and wanton murder are what brought Stalin, Tito, Mao, and Fidel to power.

(Continued)

Attachment:
1. Report & Propaganda Samples, USC

Distribution:
3- DC,WH/SA, w/att., USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 20, Jan, 65

DATE DISPATCHED: FEB 1 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA 19537

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-120-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

b. AMSCROLL optimistically sees the start of a counter offensive against the rampages of Communism in Latin America. Examples cited were Castello Branco's action in Goaiz Province, Brazil; Venezuelan Army operations in the Andes; Panamanian preparations to control agitation on the anniversary of the Canal riots; Argentine Foreign Minister Zavala's public denunciation of Soviet colonialism in Cuba; Jagan's defeat at the polls in Guiana; and "Operation Ayacucho," a seven-nation military maneuver against an "imaginary" target which has Latin American Communists screaming "foul!"

c. "Che" Guevara's statements before the UN and during his television interview contrasted with quotations from previous speeches, especially his current whining for trade openings with the U. S. as opposed to past claims that U. S. sugar purchases kept Cuba in a state of colonialism. Much was made of the remark of the Nicaraguan delegate to the UN that Guevara's address on behalf of Cuba was a Russian speech with an Argentine accent. It was also noted that "Che" admitted Cuba's support of the terrorism in Venezuela.

d. Cuba's worsening economic situation was, as heretofore, a constant theme. Featured this month were the obvious failures of the foraging trips of Carlos Rodriguez and "Che" Guevara, and a host of specific examples of material shortages admitted by Cuban public media.

e. The Martinez Sanchez suicide and the lack of precise details, expecially in its aftermath, got considerable attention in AMSCROLL propaganda, along with other notes on GOC strife.

f. The Sino-Soviet rift was expected to continue, according to AMSCROLL, and the situation does not bode well for Castro's relations with the new Kremlin leaders. Examples taken from press clippings.

g. The CTV boycott against free-world ships trading with Cuba was favorably noted as another facet of the tightening of the noose around Fidel's neck.

h. End-of-year broadcasts centered on the decline of Communism: after a half century it still fails to improve the living standards of the peoples engulfed, but instead increases terror and oppression to forge the populations into automatons for use in the realization of its mad dream of world conquest.

4. Among letters received during the month was a request from Palo Alto, California for a complete set of AMSCROLL publications for the Hoover Institute's archives on world revolutions.

5. AMFRAME-1, who is now second man in the AMSCROLL Propaganda Section by dint of his demonstrated imagination and initiative, came up with a proposal during the month to test reaction to printed materials being sent to Cuba. Implemented immediately, it consists of a small coupon which accompanies each item mailed to 15,000 addressees on a rotating basis each month. The total is divided into four groups for sample purposes, each group being asked to respond to requests for general, readily available information on the basis of different stimuli, either to have the respondent's code name announced over the radio or just listed among the "many" others who are contributing to the effort to overthrow the Castro regime. Theoretically, the assistance would be more fully acknowledged after the liberation. On the basis of results achieved during the first few months, the system will be refined until the most successful method for testing Cuban audience reaction is found. A report will be submitted when sufficient returns are in. The AMSCROLL Propaganda Section report, attached, contains further details and a sample of the coupon.

6. We were pleased to receive EGFA 43043 which credited AMSCROLL propaganda with a minor MHVIPER score on a West German firm which was doing business with Cuba. Evidently a number of free-world firms are disturbed in the same way by AMSCROLL's sabre-rattling letters on the possibility of a black list. A report is being prepared analyzing replies from target firms.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA 19537

III. FINANCIAL

Salaries........................	$4,745.00
Operational expenditures	9,180.75
TOTAL	$13,925.75

IV. FUTURE PLANS

7. In process at month's end were a two-year analysis of the campaign against free-world shipping to Cuba, noting gains made and the job still to be done, for publication in booklet form; a new leaflet for Cuba showing how personal and family security are endangered more by not doing anything than by taking whatever steps against the regime are possible depending upon the opportunities which arise; and a leaflet for Latin American distribution showing on a map of Cuba the reported sites for the training of terriorists. A new departure in propaganda to Cuba will be the printing of the backs of all future leaflets in script form so that they will appear to be handwritten letters if viewed through the envelopes. Heretofore AMSCROLL has been enfolding other printed material in a simulated handwritten wrapper, but now each item will have its own "personal letter" built in to save valuable weight and bulk in the covers while still hopefully deceiving Cuban postal authorities.

for Andrew K. REUTEMAN

19-120-26

SECRET

4 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Mr. Maurice Oldfield, MI-6, by WH/4, Clark Simmons

1. In view of the request of Mr. Maurice Oldfield, MI-6 representative, for identities and further particulars regarding the Robert Morton Geddes case a meeting was held on 2 May 1961 with WH/4/CI, Clark Simmons, with Mr. Cleveland C. Cram and John C. Roberts of WE/6 also present.

2. At the outset Mr. Oldfield provided the following information:

a. Robert Morton Geddes is a British subject born in Lima, Peru, on 7 April 1932. He holds British passport No. C-34880, issued at Managua on 14 June 1956. He was not registered at the British Consulate in Havana and was regarded as being American or Canadian.

b. Two employees of the British Embassy, Havana, had visited Geddes in the Havana jail (military G-2 section) on Sunday evening, 30 April 1961, and had a 15-minute conversation with Geddes alone under circumstances which they felt were not monitored. Geddes stated to them: (1) On 19 April he was arrested by the militia (in civilian clothes) at his hotel; (2) He had been interrogated three times and gave the impression that he had not disclosed anything of importance; (3) He was accused of being a CIA agent and told that he could be shot because of the existence of civil war; (4) During the third interrogation Geddes was shown ~~that they have~~ a message in Spanish signed by Geddes which was sent allegedly by him by radio-transmitter asking that CIA send arms to Cuba.

c. The British Embassy in Havana learned on Saturday, 29 April 1961, that Geddes had regularly been "picked up" at the Havana airport on his trips to and from Miami. (Mr. Oldfield was not certain what exact interpretation could be given to the term "picked up").

3. After relating the above, Mr. Oldfield stated that his service is interested in obtaining an estimate of the sort of story the Cubans might use against Geddes or in provocation against the British Embassy, perhaps to prove that the British Embassy had been in collusion with the U. S. He referred to the following specific questions which he had submitted earlier on 2 May and which were relayed by WE/6 to WH/4; R. Hopkins for answers to be given in the afternoon session by Clark Simmons:

SECRET

a. What was the identity of the agent inside Cuba who gave GEDDES the message he brought to the CIA contact in Miami on 11 March 1961;

b. What was the identity--or name or names--used by the CIA case officer in Miami;

c. Was Geddes given any means of clandestine radio-transmission;

d. What were the instructions given to GEDDES by his case officer.

4. Mr. Simmons replied as follows:

a. The only means of communication given to Geddes, besides his open code phone contact with his wife in Boca Raton, was a very simple SW system. Geddes was not given any means for clandestine radio-transmission.

b. Simmons then read and related the following chronology of Geddes' activities from WH/4 files:

11 March: Geddes came to Miami on the night of 11 March and made contact with Cabbage/4, a Cuban in Miami who was in contact with the CIA office. Geddes had a message from Cabbage/1 a CIA contact inside Cuba. C-4 put Geddes in contact with a CIA case officer in Miami on 12 March. Geddes claimed to be an active member of the Unidad Revolucionaria, a resistance group inside Cuba of which C-1 was a member. At the [illegible] Geddes said the Cuban Navy has a plan to attack all pro-Castro facilities and then flee Cuba on or about 22 March. Geddes did not ask for any money. His motivation was not known. The case officer instructions to Geddes were related solely to Geddes' report that the Cuban Navy would defect. Geddes returned to Havana.

16 March: Geddes departed for Havana.

20 March: We heard indirectly - Geddes had phoned his wife and indicated that the individual (C-1) with whom he had been collaborating in Unidad Revolucionaria was in trouble. The fact behind this was that one of our agents (member of the UR) inside Cuba had against instructions visited his wife in Cuba. As a result a UR net of seven persons was arrested including C-1. Besides C-1, none of the others of this net knew of Geddes' activities.

21 March: Geddes returned to Miami.

26 March: Geddes came to Havana. He was given a simple SW system. Beginning about 28 March we had reason to suspect Geddes as a possible provocateur since the defection had not come off and possibility of keeping the defection of the Navy secret in itself was implausible.

27 March: Geddes sent a SW message to Miami regarding the possible Cuban Naval defection.

28 March: Through open code telecon with wife said defection of Navy set for 3 to 4 April.

29 March: Geddes called wife on telephone.

1 April: Geddes sent an SW message which was hand-carried to Miami by a courier. Geddes also had a telecon with his wife on this day.

2 April: Geddes said in telecon to wife that Naval conspirators would meet on 3 April and Geddes would give us on 5 April a final date for the defection.

4 April: Geddes indicated in telecon to wife that the Naval defection would take place "any day" now.

7 April: We received a message from Geddes delivered by a third party (courier) that the Navy plans to defect on 6 or 7 April. Geddes returned to Miami and said the date was now set for 8 or 9 April.

10 April: Geddes returned to Havana.

11 April: Geddes telephoned his wife that the defection could take place on 13 or 14 April.

16 April: Geddes in telecon with wife reported that the defection would be on 17 or 18 April.

c. During the account of the above chronology, Simmons made the following comments:

(1) The CIA agent inside (C-1) vouched for Geddes but we here in Headquarters do not know to what extent C-1 had probed into the background of Geddes and his contacts. We here did advise Miami not to take any action until we had obtained British concurrence but by that time Geddes had already returned to Havana. He reiterated that Geddes was a walk-in and was never treated as an agent.

(2) Geddes and his forecast regarding the defection of the Cuban Navy were suspect from the outset. He claimed to be a British citizen but was already performing for the U.S.

(3) To Mr. Oldfield's question as to whether Geddes had any access to a W/T man, Simmons replied that to his knowledge Geddes only had phone contact with his wife, SW and use of courier.

(4) No arms deliveries were involved in the contact with Geddes.

(5) Simmons said he would look into whom Geddes could contaminate or put the finger on.

(6) To Mr. Oldfield's ~~question~~ repeated request for identities of C-4, C-1, the Miami case officer, and the net that was arrested on 18 March, Simmons replied that only the DCI has the authority to release such information.

(7) The Miami case officer never served inside Cuba.

5. After Mr. Oldfield had put a number of questions to Simmons the latter asked Oldfield whether Geddes is possibly a British agent which Oldfield emphatically answered in the negative.

6. Mr. Oldfield said that he would now send off a communication to his service indicating that Geddes might be a phoney—a provocateur. However, he asked that he be provided with the following:

a. CIA appreciation of the Unidad Revolucionaria;

b. Identities of C-1, C-4 and members of the net with whom C-1 was arrested on March 18 (Note: Simmons acknowledged that besides C-1 conceivably several other members of this net might have known of Geddes and his activities.)

c. Identities of the couriers who had contact with Geddes

d. The identity of the CIA case officer--the name or names used by him in contacts with Geddes;

e. Chronological summary of the visits of Geddes to Miami and returns to Havana; also a list of the nature of his communications to Miami (by telecom, courier, etc.) and communications sent to him in Havana.

John G. Roberts
DC/WH/4

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/TIPIC/Operational
Reactions from WH to UR Propaganda and Desire to Concentrate UR Efforts on PERUMEN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: As Indicated

RSF: UFGA 9274, 27 May 1963

1. Paragraph 3 of ref: Concerned elements at headquarters studied the attachments with interest; however, the material was not considered of special operational import to merit specific guidance to witting contacts in the UR.

2. Any additional effort by the UR to reach and influence PERUMEN audiences will be highly valued.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - Addressee

19-120-26

DATE TYPED
18 June 63

DATE DISPATCHED
21 JUN 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW - 277

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26

ROUTING / INITIAL

Distribution:
1 - SAS/[illegible]
1 - SAS/HOB/PA-PROP
1 - SAS/[illegible]
1 - C/WH/CA

RID/[illegible]

RID/FI

DESTROY

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SAS/HOB/PA-PROP	Bruce MacMaster	eel	5055

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SAS/HOB		A. K. [illegible]
C/WH/CA	18 JUN 63	[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/SAS		[illegible]

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION 255 SECRET (When Filled In) 255

ORIG.	Jane S. Ingle::jg	ROUTING	Aug 28 13 44 '62
UNIT	TFW/Intel/Reports	1 / 4	
EXT.	5547	2 / 5	
DATE	27 August 1962	3 / 6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES
TFW 12

TDCS -3/520,846 [illegible]

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/OPS , CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 5, IW 2, CA 2, CA/PRG, OS, WH 6, WE 4,

DATE DISTRIBUTED
27 August 1962

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

TFW/FI	2	TFW/PROP-PA 1		WH/R	1
TFW/Int	2	TFW/SI	1	WE/3	3
TFW/R	2	TFW/WAVE	1	WE/R	1
TFW/CI	2				
TFW/PM	1	WH/PACY 2		OS/SSD/Bauman 1	

BASED ON (Fld. Rpt., Proj.)
WAVE-7632 (IN-11670)
WAVE-7114 (IN-46173)
UFG-1396
UNION (UNION-11)
Liaison: G

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Thorpe

UR

DD/P INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

[illegible]

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
W. S. Compton
WE/3/RE (in draft)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(When Filled In)

RELEASING OFFICER
John W. Koppel
for C/TFW/Intel

COPY NO.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	CUBA	**REPORT NO.**	TDCS -3/520,846
SUBJECT	PLANNED UPRISING BY OPPOSITION GROUPS IN CUBA	**DATE DISTR.**	27 AUGUST 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	AUGUST 1962	**REFERENCES**	IN -46173 -11670
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	FRANCE, PARIS (25 AUGUST 1962)		RD-ACQ-01258 RD-W-2107
APPRAISAL	6	**FIELD REPORT NO.**	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL FRENCH SERVICE.

1. MEMBERS OF THE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) REPORTED TO THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN HABANA THAT ON 10 AUGUST THEY WERE INVITED TO ATTEND A MEETING ON 14 AUGUST ORGANIZED BY THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE) AND THE MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP). THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS FOR THE THREE GROUPS TO PLAN A STAGE OF ACTIVE WARFARE. THE UR WAS ADVISED BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY NOT TO PARTICIPATE, BUT THE UR COULD NOT CONVINCE THE DRE AND THE MRP TO REVERSE THEIR DECISION FOR AN UPRISING SCHEDULED FOR THE LAST DAYS OF AUGUST, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A GENERAL UPRISING OF ALL INTERNAL RESISTANCE GROUPS.

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCARIB

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible]

STATE | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | USIA | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | OO DIA, INS

REPCINCLANT EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

3. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS, TELEGRAM NO. 984, DATED 26 AUGUST 1962, REPORTED INFORMATION FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN HABANA ON THIS AGREEMENT FOR A GENERAL UPRISING DURING THE LAST DAYS OF AUGUST.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION: TFW 10 (MR. KAPPEL, TFW ISSUED TEMPO COPY 2315, 30 AUG)
INFO : DCI, DD/P, ADDP, SOD-5, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW 2, WH 7, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2

AUG 31 03102 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 14497

OPIM DIR CITE WAVE 7916

IN14497

GYROSE INTEL

REF A. WAVE 7985 (IN 14407)

B. WAVE 7886 (IN 14220).

1. REFS REFLECT MOST RECENT ACQUISITION INTEL RE TIMING GENERAL UPRISING. DISTURBING ASPECT RECEIPT THIS INFO IS FACT IT REACHING KUBARK VIA WIDE VARIETY SOURCES BUT ULTIMATE END SOURCE ALWAYS UR. ANALYSIS THIS INFO INDICATES IT HANGS TOGETHER RATHER WELL AND IN MANY INSTANCES VARIETY OF CHANNELS VIA WHICH IT RECEIVED WOULD NORMALLY TEND SERVE AS CROSS CHECK OR CONFIRMATION. WE CONFIDENT THIS INTEL COMING FROM UR CHANNELS WHICH EXILE UR REGARDS AS BONA FIDE. WAVE INITIALLY REGARDED INFO AS ACCURATE REFLECTION WHAT UR EXPERIENCING IN CUBA. HOWEVER INVESTIGATION AND REAPPRAISAL THIS INFO LEADS CONSLUSION INFO NOT ACCURATE AND MAY BE REFLECTION G-2 DECEPTION OR PROVOCATION OP.

2. COLLATION ALL INTEL WHICH OBTAINED FROM UR SOURCES RE UPRISING CUBA HAS IDENTIFIED FOLLOWING GROUPS AS SCHEDULED PARTICIPATE THIS REVOLT. OUR COMMENTS RE INQUIRIES WITH THESE GROUPS REVEALS FOLLOWING.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

A. DRE REPEAT DRE. PEDRO YNTERIAN GARCIA STATES DRE HAS NO INFO RE SCHEDULED REVOLT.

B. MRP REPEAT MRP. AMRAZZ-1[2] CLAIMS HAS NO INFO RE INTERNAL REVOLT.

C. 30 NOV REPEAT 30 NOV. AMICE-8[3] REPORTS HIS FACTION RECEIVED CODED CABLE 30 AUG FROM CUBA WHICH REQUESTED ARMS AS SITUATION DESPERATE AND THEY NEED HELP. AMICE-8[3] SENT CODED REPLY 30 AUG STATING HOLD OFF FROM ANY PRECIPITOUS ACTION. AMICE-8[3] HAS NO INFO RE TIMING ANY REVOLT.

D. JUVENTUD ANTICOMUNISTA CATOLICA REPEAT JUVENTUD ANTICOMUNISTA CATOLICA. (CATHOLIC ANTI-COMMUNIST YOUTH) AMPAN-4[4] REPORTS THIS GROUP HAS NO INFO RE REVOLT.

E. MRR REPEAT MRR. CESAR BARO INDICATES HE HAS HAD COMMO FROM CUBA LAST FEW DAYS BUT NO MENTION MADE ANY REVOLT.

F. ELN REPEAT ELN. (EJERCITO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL). WE TRYING OBTAIN INFO FROM THIS GROUP.

G. FND REPEAT FND. WE TRYING OBTAIN INFO FROM THIS GROUP.

H. FAL REPEAT FAL. HAVE NO INFO OR READY ACCESS THIS GROUP.

I. SEGUNDO FRENTE ESCAMBRAY REPEAT SEGUNDO FRENTE ESCAMBRAY. WE TRYING OBTAIN FROM THIS GROUP.

3. VIEW PARA 2 INFO PLUS GENERAL KNOWLEDGE INTERNAL CUBAN SCENE WHICH STEMS FROM DAILY CONTACT REFUGEES, RECEIPT AGENT TRAFFIC, ETC. MUST CONCLUDE THAT BALANCED JUDGEMENT CONTINUES INDICATE BONA FIDE POPULAR UPRISING NOT LIKELY AT THIS TIME.

4. HAVE NOT EXCLUDED PROVOCATION POSSIBILITY THEREFORE HAVE ARRANGED FOR AMCORE-2[5] BROADCAST FOLLOWING STATEMENT 2000

HOURS OVER VRUL. VILL SUBSEQUENTLY REPLAY OVER ALL SPANISH PRORGRAMS WMIE, VGBS, AND WMET. STATEMENT VILL READ AS FOLLOWS: "RELIABLE REFUGEE SOURCES AND INFO COMING OUT OF CUBA AS VELL AS CUBAN RADIO REPORTS INDICATE CLEARLY THAT CASTRO FORCES HAVE BEEN ON A VAR FOOTING UNDER CONSTANT ALERT EVER SINCE THE DRE ATTACK OF 24 AUG. THEY ARE PREPARED TO CRUSH ANY SIGN OF UPRISING, RESISTANCE OR CUBAN INVASION FROM OUTSIDE. ALL TRUE CUBAN PATRIOTS ARE URGENTLY WARNED NOT TO UNDERTAKE AT THIS TIME AN UPRISING AS THIS IS DESIRED AND EXPECTED BY THE CASTRO COMMUNIST FORCES. LOYAL PATRIOTS MUST FEAR AND EXPECT PROVOCATIONS. LIBERATION VILL COME BUT NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO REVOLT."*

END OF MESSAGE

CS Comment: *Reported a general uprising in all of the Provinces of Cuba is scheduled for 4:00 a.m. on 31 August.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 100-5-1

INCLUSIVE DATES: AUG. 62 - DEC. 63

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

Pre-dates
HSCA request

(All 3rd Agency)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

5VIR[illegible]

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: DC/OS/JPriebe

EXTENSION: 3441

NO.

DATE: 30 July 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/SR		30/7		
2. DO/SAT SR/CI/BBright	AUG 8 1963			2- This information was sent to CI Staff recently and has probably been forwarded to you for reply. Though you might be able to use this extra copy.
3. Joan				
4.				
5.				
6. CSR/CI/K			cu	CHARGED FROM RID/FI
7. Dolores			DR	
8. EE/G/CE-Wagner		19/8		6-8 note in memo [illegible] Schroeder apparent BND approach & subsequent Sov. approach. Could Felfe have spotted for KGB?
9. SR/CI/K				8 to 9: Looks like RIS was on him first, but they may have sent Felfe (or another) at him for a false flag recruitment attempt.
10.				
11. SR/CI/A	AUG 20 1963			
12. Joan				
13. RID/AN			(KS	
14. RI/MIS				
15. RID/Files				File in 201; [illegible]

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

100-5-1

14-00000

SECRET SENSITIVE

/10571

Chief, CI Staff/L
2 C 42 Hqs

5 July 1963

Chief, Contact Division, OO

Attempted RIS Penetration of Bell Telephone Laboratories - MH-10612

1. Attached are two memoranda, dated 26 June 1963, from our New York Field Office concerning apparent RIS interest in Manfred R. Schroeder and Donald E. Thomas, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey. We believe this information should be passed to the FBI immediately. We would appreciate being advised the date this information is forwarded to the Bureau.

2. For your information, permission to brief Dr. Schroeder prior to his trip to the USSR was requested by our New York Office but refused by FI Staff. In view of his employment, however, and previous CD/OO contacts with him, FI recommended he be provided with a strong defensive and realities briefing.

3. Further inquiry may be directed to Mrs. Shirley Stetson, CD/OO, Support Branch, Room 413, 1717 H Street, N. W., extension 2258.

7/22 George Nagle [illegible] 3761 [illegible] Schroeder [illegible] 18 [illegible] 63

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Encls: As stated above

SStetson/mm
CC: OS
FI [illegible]

100-5-1
ABSTRACT X INDEX X
30 JULY 63

CS COPY

100-5-1

SECRET SENSITIVE [illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division DATE: 1 July 1963

Attn : Mc Connell/Czajkowski/Lincoln Staff

FROM : Chief, New York Office

SUBJECT: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs

Ref: NY Reports 2988-3 and 2989-3

1. We thought the attached reports would be of interest to Lincoln Staff from a Soviet realities standpoint. We also felt that they should be brought to the attention of Division management because the M.O. outlined therein is becoming a major factor in dealing with sources who have contact with Sovbloc nationals. It has been our experience that the type of activity outlined has been on a marked increase, particularly since the establishment of the KGB 10th Directorate. Although such activity by Sov legals is taking place throughout the continental U.S., undoubtedly its greatest impact is being felt in the New York and Washington, D.C. areas because of the large Soviet Government establishments in both of these cities. For this reason it would seem imperative that both WAFO and NYFO be extremely vigilant for such activity in companies and institutions with which they are dealing in order that it may be recognized in its earliest stages and appropriate CI/CE countermeasures instituted. In order to assist other offices in this respect, we plan to write in the near future an article for the Division Newsletter, outlining some of our experiences along these lines.

2. We were somewhat disappointed in CI Staff's reaction to our recent request for assistance in defensive briefing of the subject of one of the attached reports. It seems to be quite clear now that our original assumption concerning his being R.I.S. targeted was quite correct and that there is a strong likelihood that his current trip behind the Curtain will be utilized by the opposition for provocation and/or an actual recruitment attempt. We wonder in future cases of this nature exactly what support we may expect from Angleton's shop. Although we feel that we have a fair capability for handling such matters here in New York, we do admit that, at least on this one, we would have felt slightly more comfortable had a CI specialist been along, if for no other reason than to preclude any possible Monday morning quarterbacking by the "old pros."

10612

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Subject: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs

3. Judging by the attached material, it would appear that, despite established Bell policy (see our 16 May memorandum re Case 39,790), the opposition has seen fit to deflower at least two of Bell's scientific virgins. We seriously wonder at this point just how many other Bell people might be in the same boat. Perhaps, as a result of all this, some representation by Bell management to the KGB will be forthcoming, spelling out to that organization, as was spelled out to our own, established company policy pertaining to such matters. In any event, it would appear that at least one or two Bell scientists, and there are probably more, have been giving the R.I.S. more cooperation and reporting than the Agency. Let's hope that in the near future Bell management takes some effective steps to rectify this rather ludicrous, and patently dangerous, situation.

JAY B. L. REEVES

Attachments: NY Reports 2988-3
and 2989-3

GHagle/mg

10612

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : Support (Shirley Stetson)
FROM : Chief, New York Office

DATE: 26 June [illegible]

SUBJECT: <Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. ZR Schroeder, (201-734194)
Bell Telephone Labs>

201-734194

1. 0930-1230 hours 14 June, Manfred R. Schroeder of Bell Labs received a strong defensive briefing in connection with his June-July trip to the USSR and Bulgaria (see our 7 May Coordination Outline for subject).* During Schroeder's briefing, Nagle elicited from him that prior to a trip to the USSR in 1959 he had been contacted by an individual who represented himself as a West German Intelligence Officer. More important, we also learned that, at about the same time, RIS cultivation of Schroeder apparently began.

2. Concerning the West German approach, Schroeder indicated that his mother, who resides in Hamburg, was telephoned in 1959 by an individual who claimed to be an old acquaintance of her son's and who was interested in contacting him concerning employment in the US. The caller left a phone number and said that he would appreciate it if Schroeder could call him next time he was in Hamburg. Schroeder's mother relayed the message to her son, and, as requested, he telephoned the caller just prior to his 1959 USSR junket. The individual he called identified himself as a West German Intelligence Officer and said that he would like to meet Schroeder as soon as possible. Schroeder agreed. When they met, the individual in question (Schroeder does not recall his name) presented suitable credentials and expressed interest in Schroeder's trip to the USSR. According to Schroeder's account, the West German Intelligence Officer gave him the old "keep your eyes and ears open" pitch, and told him that he would contact him in the first West German city in which he touched down after his USSR trip. Schroeder was contacted in Stuttgart promptly after returning to Germany from the USSR on his way back to the US. Because of his US employment and the fact that Bell paid for his trip, Schroeder became very apprehensive about any further contact with the West German service and at the time of the call indicated that he had nothing to say and wanted no further contact. Other than the cursory examination of credentials (as reported above), Schroeder made no attempt to establish the bona fides of the German who made the approach. We pointed out to Schroeder the unlikely possibility that the approach might not have been bona fide and might, in fact, have been a provocation.

* copy attached.

SECRET
SENSITIVE

10612

Subject Apparent [illegible] Interest in [illegible]
Telephone [illegible]

3. Apparently R.I.S. cultivation of Schroeder [illegible] prior to the above incident. According to his account, he had received what appeared to be a routine invitation to visit Soviet acoustics facilities in Moscow and Leningrad in August [illegible]. In connection with the invitation, he wrote to the Sov [illegible] that during his visit he would like to meet [illegible] a leading Sov acoustics engineer who was very interested in [illegible] and had done several Russian translations of [illegible]. As a result of this correspondence, Schroeder received a telephone call at his home a couple of days prior to his departure on this trip from an individual who claimed to be a Sov [illegible] representative in New York. The caller told Schroeder that he [illegible] from Moscow for delivery to him a special invitation from [illegible] of the State Committee for Coordination of [illegible]. The caller, whose name Schroeder could not recall, said that he would like to deliver the invitation to him personally [illegible] departure. Schroeder indicated that he was very busy with the last minute details which he had to [illegible] in order [illegible] trip and [illegible] the invitation couldn't [illegible] to him. When the caller insisted that his instructions were to deliver the invitation personally, Schroeder finally agreed to have his wife meet the [illegible] pick up the invitation. Incidentally, at one point in the conversation Schroeder invited the Sov to deliver the invitation to his home; the latter declined, however, saying that Schroeder's home was in an area closed to travel by Sov diplomatic personnel. In any event, the Sov arranged to meet Schroeder's wife on a street corner in Chatham, New Jersey, and at that time turned over to her the invitation for her husband.

4. Schroeder said that his 195[illegible] visit to the USSR was quite routine and that he could recall nothing but the ordinary happenings during the trip. During the visit, his Sov counterpart, Furduev, who speaks fluent German, acted as his host and was at his side almost continually.

Identified from USA
KGB Sat [illegible]

(201-[illegible])

5. Sometime in 19[illegible] Schroeder received a phone call at his home one evening from Vladimir Volgin, who identified himself as a representative of Amtorg ([illegible]). Volgin said that Schroeder's old friend Furduev had just completed a visit to New York and before leaving the city had asked him to deliver a present to Schroeder for him, hence the phone call. Volgin insisted on delivering the present to Schroeder in person, and the two made arrangements to have lunch together the following week in Manhattan. This began a series of approximately six

Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. Schroeder,
Bell Telephone Labs

or more contacts with Volgin which lasted until late [illegible] when Schroeder received a note from Volgin stating that he and his family were returning to the USSR in order that his wife could undergo medical treatment there. Incidentally, Schroeder's only other contact with [illegible] was in 1962 when he met him in Copenhagen at a professional meeting.

6. Schroeder said that most, if not all, of Volgin's phone calls to him were to his home and usually appeared to have been made from pay phones. Schroeder said that his meetings with Volgin included lunches and dinners in Manhattan, socializing at a New York I.R.E. Meeting, theater, and entertainment of each other in their respective homes. Schroeder claims that his wife accompanied him during most of his contact with Volgin. Other than to his own family, Volgin never introduced Schroeder to any other individuals.

7. Schroeder claims that on a couple of occasions he turned over unclassified technical papers to Volgin, who claimed to be an electrical engineer. Schroeder can't recall whether Volgin specifically requested the information or whether he turned it over to him on his own initiative. At one point during their relationship, Volgin asked Schroeder to write an article on US acoustics work for publication in a Soviet Technical Journal. Schroeder declined.

8. In retrospect Schroeder admitted that he had been quite naive about his relationship with Volgin and expressed some concern that Bell security hadn't been more active in admonishing him against development of relationships with Sov Government representatives. His view of his experiences now completely coincides with ours as a result of our discussion.

9. Another factor which obviously enters into Schroeder's R.I.S. picture is his wife's Bulgarian extraction. Schroeder claims that neither he nor, to the best of his knowledge, his wife have ever been approached by Sovbloc representatives in this country concerning his wife's family in Bulgaria. His wife's mother, Iwanalia Menschik, immigrated to the US in April 1960 and lived with Schroeder and his wife until November 1962 when she returned to Sofia, apparently because she was homesick and couldn't adjust to the new language and life in the US. Schroeder said that his mother-in-law's original exit visa request was rejected in 1958 by the Bulgarian Government, but after he and his wife wrote several letters to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry she was finally granted permission to leave in 1960.

10612

Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. Schroeder, Bell Telephone Labs

10. After Schroeder visits the USSR on his current trip, he plans to fly to Sofia to spend approximately a week with his wife's family there. Schroeder had not mentioned the Bulgarian visit in outlining his original itinerary to Bob Martin of this office, therefore, it was not mentioned in Schroeder's Coordination Outline.

11. All of the above would seem to indicate quite strongly that Schroeder, as we originally surmised, has been targeted by R.I.S. In briefing Schroeder, we ran through some of the typical entrapment situations fabricated by the opposition, e.g., women, homosexuals, purchase of drugs for Sov citizens, black market activity, acceptance of letters to mail outside the USSR, commitments to disaffected Sovs, etc. In addition, we stringently admonished Schroeder against any notetaking or photography which could in any way be construed as compromising. We also alerted Schroeder to the fact that some attempt might be made to use his wife's family as leverage in a recruitment attempt. In this connection, we pointed out to Schroeder that there was a strong likelihood that the R.I.S. and/or Bulgarian service would make an approach to him during his forthcoming visit to Sofia. An approach in Bulgaria would give the Sovs an opportunity for disavowal and also would provide the proper setting for maximum utilization of relatives. When Schroeder mentioned that his sister-in-law, FNU Menackik, had indicated several times in the past that she would like to leave Bulgaria, we strongly admonished him against making any commitments to her, pointing out that she may possibly be co-opted by the opposition. We told Schroeder that any representations to gain an exit visa for his sister-in-law should be channeled through the US Legation in Sofia. Schroeder was told that, if any pressure were applied concerning his wife's family, his best reaction would probably be a noncommittal, "I'll think it over when I get home!" All in all, we alerted Schroeder as best we could to the opposition M.O. and prepared him on how best to avoid some of the not so obvious pitfalls which might be in store for him.

12. Prior to our briefing of Schroeder, Bob Martin alerted Bell management to all of the ramifications of Schroeder's travel behind the Curtain. The management was informed by Martin that we felt it our obligation to point out to them the strong possibility that Schroeder had been targeted in order that they would have all of the facts available before signing off on his trip.

10612

SECRET
SENSITIVE

Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. Schroeder,
Bell Telephone Labs

13. Assessment of Schroeder: Subject, a very accomplished scientist, heads up all acoustics research at Bell. He reads Russian and is fluent in German, French, Spanish, Italian, Dutch, and English. He impresses us as being a rather savvy, discreet, cooperative, mature, stable, well motivated individual. We attribute Schroeder's apparent lack of discretion in his dealings with the Sovs more to the subtlety of the Sov approach than to his own naivete. It has been our experience that most US businessmen and scientists are very susceptible and vulnerable to the opposition approach mainly due to somewhat of a lack of realistic public education concerning contacts with Sovbloc nationals. We feel that Schroeder's degree of cooperativeness with US services has been enhanced considerably by his feeling that he has really been taken for a ride by the opposition.

Incidentally, when we asked subject for permission to release this information with source disclosure to the FBI, he was at first somewhat apprehensive and expressed the desire to talk it over with one of his Bell superiors before he made any commitments. He finally agreed, however, when we convinced him that it would certainly be in his best interest to get on record with the FBI as soon as possible. Most of his apprehension about the FBI seemed to be attributable to the fact that he has just been granted US citizenship and, in addition, is now somewhat concerned that his activities with the Sovs in some way may effect his security status which in turn could be very detrimental to his career.

Based on our limited contact with Schroeder, we have every reason to believe that he would be suitable for operational use, should the Bureau choose to pursue such a course.

14. We would strongly recommend that all of the above be passed to the Bureau ASAP in order that that organization may effect contact with Schroeder and provide him with proper guidance concerning any further approaches by Sov or Bloc nationals in this country.

JAY B. L. REEVES

GNagle/mg

SECRET
SENSITIVE

10612

1. **Name:** [illegible]

2. **DOB, POB, Citizenship:** [illegible] 1926, Ahlen, Germany. Current Citizenship - West German. US citizenship pending, application for same made 22 January 1963.

3. **Home Address:** [illegible] Gates Avenue
Gillette, New Jersey

4. **Place of Employment and Position**

Technical Staff
Bell Laboratories
Murray Hill, New Jersey

Head of Acoustics Research

5. **Itinerary:** Subject will tentatively depart US 18 May, arriving Moscow 19 May. He will spend two weeks visiting labs in Moscow and Leningrad at the invitation of D. Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman, State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research. If the 19 May arrival date is not acceptable to the Soviets, subject will make the trip in June or July.

6. **Reason for Trip:** During November 1962, while in Europe, subject received an invitation from the USSR Academy of Sciences to visit various Soviet acoustic laboratories. Because of a tight schedule at the time subject declined the invitation. In early March of this year he received the invitation from Gvishiani mentioned above.

During his trip, subject will discuss with Soviet counterparts various aspects of voice communications research, electroacoustics, and architectural acoustics. He will also visit Soviet laboratories involved in research in these fields.

7. **Security Status:** Subject was granted Secret clearance by Middletown Air Materiel Command 30 July 1956 in anticipation of his being used on classified project at Bell Laboratories. Alien name check on subject pending.

8. **Previous Intelligence Activities:** In 1959 subject was contacted twice by CI/OO New York Field Office for debriefing after a trip to the USSR. At the time he was generally cooperative,

10612

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic [illegible]

but somewhat apprehensive. He was again contacted in 1962 for debriefing subsequent to a US visit of a Soviet counterpart.

9. Relatives or Close Friends in Denied Areas. Subject's wife was born in Sofia, Bulgaria. She now reportedly holds US citizenship. In November 1962 subject managed to arrange for immigration to the US of his mother-in-law, Ivanalia Venechkie. After a short stay in this country, however, she returned to her home in Sofia in March 1963. In addition to his mother-in-law, presumably there are other relatives of his wife still living in Bulgaria.

10. Extent of Previous Trips to Denied Areas: 13-18 August 1959 subject visited acoustics laboratories in Moscow and Leningrad.

11. Analysis of Subject's Competence: Subject is a very competent acoustics scientist. He reads Russian and is fluent in German, French, Spanish, Italian, Dutch and English.

12. Degree of Personal Assessment: During our somewhat limited relationship with subject he has given every indication of being discreet, security conscious, mature, and cooperative.

13. Nature of Substantive Briefing Proposed and Requirements to be Levied: None. Subject will not be briefed on operations of any kind. No photography or incriminating note taking will be requested of him.

14. Defensive and Realities Briefing: Subject will receive routine defensive and Sovbloc realities briefing.

15. Briefing Office and Participants: Briefing will be conducted by CD/OO New York Field Office personnel.

16. Funding of Trip: Subject's trip will be funded by his company.

17. Consideration Deadline: 15 May 1963.

14-00000

SECRET
SENSITIVE

439

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : Support (Shirley Stetson)
FROM : Chief, New York Office

DATE: 26 June 1963
00-A-3266992
(NY-29883)

SUBJECT: OE Apparent RIS Interest in Donald E. H Thomas, Bell Laboratories

DIT USA
OTC Scientist
Bell Laboratories

1. During routine debriefing of Donald E. Thomas of Bell Laboratories in connection with his recent USSR visit to attend the Popov Society Meeting, 5-14 May, Moscow (see NYOR 8878 for Coordination Outline)* subject mentioned having had recent contact with a Soviet Government representative in this country. The Soviet in question identified himself to Thomas as Gleb Aleksi Pavlov and gave his address as 1216 First Avenue, Manhattan.

2. According to Thomas, his initial contact with Pavlov took place in late March following the International Convention and Show of the I.E.E.E., 25-29 March, New York City (see Case 39843). At the convention Thomas became friendly with two Soviet counterparts in attendance, A. V. Tiel and Anatole Trutka, both of whom Thomas invited to his home for a social visit during their US stay. When the Sovs departed for home following the convention, Thomas saw them off at New York International Airport. It was at the airport that he first met Pavlov, who apparently was seeing off all of the Sov I.E.E.E. delegates. After the Sov delegation had departed, Thomas and Pavlov returned to Manhattan together and, on parting, exchanged addresses.

3. A couple of weeks after their initial meeting, Pavlov telephoned Thomas at his home and told him that Tiel and Trutka had asked him to send their warmest regards to Thomas and thank him for the hospitality which he showed them during their trip to this country. During the conversation, Pavlov expressed an interest in renewing his acquaintance with Thomas, and suggested that he would enjoy visiting him at his home in Madison, New Jersey. Thomas said that he would enjoy seeing Pavlov, but that he was currently preparing to leave on a trip to the USSR and Europe and was not scheduled to return to the US until late May. Thomas suggested that, in view of this, perhaps early June would be a good time for them to plan on getting together. Pavlov replied that he, himself would be in the USSR then, but would contact Thomas when he returned in early July. Incidentally, Pavlov's

* copy attached

SECRET
SENSITIVE

10612

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and

Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Donald E. Thomas,
Bell Laboratories

phone call to Thomas was made on a pay phone. In fact, when the operator cut in for overtime, Thomas called Pavlov back at the pay phone. Thomas mentioned that he possibly might have the phone number written down somewhere.

4. Soon after the phone call from Pavlov, Thomas called John McVicker of the State Department and inquired if any clearance of Pavlov's proposed trip to his home in Madison would be necessary. McVicker told Thomas that any such clearances were Pavlov's worry and that he need not be concerned about same.

5. During his recent trip to the USSR, it would appear that Thomas was exposed to two incidents which possibly could have been of opposition fabrication. One involved an approach by a Soviet interpreter by the name of FNU Petrov, who took Thomas aside and asked him if he could do him a personal favor by getting him a subscription to National Geographic Magazine for which he, Petrov, would reimburse Thomas in rubles. Thomas politely refused. D Moscow USSR

sent CIT USSR

6. The other incident involved Thomas being photographed with an attractive young female cit interpreter, Ludmilla Oshkina. According to Thomas, when one of the Soviets in their party was about to take a picture of him standing next to Ludmilla, another individual standing nearby was pushed out of the way apparently so that he would not be included in the photograph. In addition, Ludmilla attempted to strike an affectionate pose with Thomas for the photograph by slipping her arm through his. Thomas claims to have pushed her arm away just as the photo was being snapped. h:201

7. Assessment of Thomas: Subject strikes us as being extremely naive and unrealistic. He appears to be more apprehensive about his dealings with CIA than his dealings with Soviets. In fact, when Thomas was asked if he would mind if a tape recorder were used for debriefing, he became very nervous and expressed a fear that, if such a tape were made, perhaps the Soviets might gain access to it and use it against him in some way at a future date.

Thomas had an outline in his own handwriting of the sessions of the Popov Society Meeting. When we asked for a photostat of same, he again expressed misgivings and indicated that he would prefer to have a typewritten copy prepared for us instead of a copy in his own handwriting because he was fearful that it might fall into Soviet hands.

SECRET
SENSITIVE

Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Donald E. Thomas,
Bell Laboratories

We inquired of Thomas why he had not mentioned Pavlov to us during our defensive briefing of him before his trip. He replied rather nebulously that it was his understanding that it was company policy that our only function in seeing him before his trip was to give him a defensive briefing, and that, since no debriefing was involved at the time, he felt no obligation to volunteer the information concerning Pavlov.

It is our opinion that Thomas's obvious naivite, apparent lack of sophistication, and extreme apprehension concerning dealings with our Agency would make him most unsuitable from the standpoint of operational utilization by the Bureau.

8. We would strongly reccommend that all of the above be passed to the Bureau ASAP in order that that organization may effect contact with Thomas in time to provide him with proper guidance concerning any further approaches by Pavlov or other Sov legals in US.

J. J. Conna
JAY B. L. REEVES

GNagle/mg

SECRET
SENSITIVE 10612

SECRET

1 May 1963

SUBJECT: Coordination Outline - Donald E. Thomas, Bell Labs

FROM: New York Field Office

Following is coordination outline for D. E. Thomas. Dr. W. O. Baker requested that Thomas be given defensive briefing by us before going behind Curtain. As you are already aware, Baker is Vice President at Bell Labs and member of President's Scientific Advisory Council and President's Intelligence Board.

1. Name: Donald Edgar Thomas
2. Date and Place of Birth: 12 May 1907, Hanover Township, Penna.
3. Home and Address: 48 Fairview Avenue, Madison, New Jersey.
4. Place of employment and position: Bell Labs, Murray Hill, New Jersey; Electronics Engineer.
5. Itinerary: Subject departs US 3 May for Moscow to attend Popov Society meeting, 5-14 May. Following Moscow meeting he will visit labs in Western Europe for approximately one week.
6. Mission and reason for trip: Subject was invited to give paper at Popov meeting by USSR Academy of Sciences via I.E.E.E. (International Electronic and Electrical Engineers).
7. Security Status: We hold favorable NAC completion on subject dated 22 Jun 59.
8. Previous Intelligence Activities: Subject was contacted by OO/C 1958-59 concerning info on Soviet work in his field which he acquired from contacts with Soviet scientific counterparts attending international meeting in US.
9. Relatives or close friends in denied areas: None.
10. Extent of previous trips to denied areas: None.
11. Analysis of Subject's Competence: Pa. State College, B.S., E.E., 1929; Columbia University, M.A., 1932; US Army Signal Corps, 1942-44; USAAF, 1944-46, on radio countermeasures, 1946-55; Retired Lt.Col. USAFR; Member (Civilian)panel on Electronic Countermeasures R&D Board, Dept of Defense, 1948-53.
12. Resume of personal assessment: During our limited relationship with subject, he has given every indication of being discreet, security conscious, cooperative, well motivated, mature. He is well regarded in his particular field of competence.
13. Nature of substantive briefing proposed and requirements to levied: None. Subject will not be briefed on operations of any kind. No photography or incriminating note taking will be requested of him.
14. Defensive and realities briefing: Subject will receive routine defensive and Sovbloc realities briefing.
15. Funding for trip: Subject's trip will be funded by his company.
16. Briefing office and participants: Briefing will be conducted by OO/C New York Office personnel.
17. Coordination deadline: 2 May 1963.

SECRET

10612

14-00000

1651

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY USSR

REPORT NO. OO- [illegible]

SUBJECT Alleged House Arrest of Soviet Scientist, L Chistovich

DATE DISTR [illegible]

NO. PAGES [illegible]

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. July 63

PLACE & DATE ACQ. -- July 63

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, professor in a US university.

He is an authority on acoustics.

1. I attended the Third International Congress on Acoustics, 1-8 Sept 59, Stuttgart, West Germany.

2. While at this Congress I met a Soviet female scientist, L Chistovich, who is connected with the Pavlov Institute of Physiology, Leningrad. One day during the Congress I took a walk in the Black Forest with L Chistovich and another Soviet scientist. After a short time, the other Soviet scientist excused himself saying that he had to rejoin his colleagues.

3. In June 1963 Manfred Schroeder, an acoustician with Bell Telephone Laboratories, was in the USSR. On his return to the US he told me that he had heard while in the USSR that L Chistovich, on her return from the 1959 Stuttgart Congress, had been placed under house arrest. He also said that he had seen L Chistovich while he was in the USSR, and he had asked her whether it was true that she had been placed under house arrest on returning from the Stuttgart Congress. He said Chistovich's only reply was to blush.

4. I suspect that the individual who reported L Chistovich to the authorities was Yuriy Pavlovich Lysanov. He is connected with the Acoustics Institute in Moscow. He publishes very little and his conduct has seemed strange to me. He was in the United States in 1956-1957. I suspect that the fact that L Chistovich took a walk with me alone may well have been the reason she was placed under house arrest.

- end -

File

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NO DISSEM ABROAD

Dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the member agencies and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the final [illegible]. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

FBI report dated 22 Oct. 62 (Wash. D.C.)
Memo for Secretary, USIB Special Committee

FBI report dated 25 Oct. 62 (Wash. D.C)
Re: Exchange of Information Regarding Soviet & Satellite Diplomats

FBI report dated 31 Oct. 62 (N.Y., N.Y.)

FBI Memo dated 24 Jan. 63 (Wash. D.C.)
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 24 Feb. 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-6347
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 21 March 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 25 April 63 (Wash. D.C) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 24 May 63 (Wash. DC) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 20 June 63 (Wash. DC) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 22 July 63 (Wash. D.C) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S

FBI Report dated 19 Aug 63 (Wash. DC) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Analysis dated 4 Sept 63 (Wash. DC)
Re: Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 4 Nov. 63 (Wash. D.C.)
Re: Unknown Subjects (Two); Observed Taking Photographs in Direction of U.S. Naval Station, Wash. D.C.

FBI Report dated 25 Nov. 63 (Wash. D.C) filed 4(S) 65-63478
Re: Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 27 Dec 63 (N.Y. N.Y)

TOP SECRET CROSS REFERENCE SHEET (FBI Report 22 May 63)
Re: Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: TS Material from Deryabin Safe

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Rodger S. Gabrielson OLC/C&R	EXTENSION 1133	NO. REF TO: Con. No. TS191722 thru C DATE 12 June 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Mr. N. Shepanek 1. ~~MKX DNNXGXXXK~~ SA/DO/O Tube: ~~DX6 Green~~				Attached is a letter from the House Select Committee on Assassinations dated ________. Please respond as soon as possible. Shep: Please have CI look at this. It's the T.S. material from Deryabin's safe - requested by Blakey. Thanks, Rodge (1t 7: CI Staff says they may be shown to Blakey
2. ~~Mr. Jack Sullivan~~ ~~OS Tube: EW~~				
3. ~~Mr. Youn~~g ~~OGC Tube: [illegible] Green~~				
4. ~~Mr. [illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~				
5. ~~[illegible]~~dt ~~[illegible] Tube [illegible]~~				
6. ~~Mr. Hub[illegible]~~y ~~[illegible]~~				
7. Rodger Gabrielson OLC				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Source SR/CI/K
Doc. No. XAAZ-17241
Doc. Date 20 APR 1964
Copy No. # Repro 2
Number of Pages 38
Number of Attachments

REGISTRY

CIA Control No. TS# 191722
Date Document Received 15 JUN 1979
Logged By B

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B. Bigg	15 JUN 1979		15 JUN 1979				
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1025	B. Bigg	19 JUN 1979		19 JUN 1979				
[illegible] DDO/D	[illegible]	19 June 79		19 June 79				
AC/CI/[illegible]								
DDO/TSCO	B. Bigg	20 JUN 1979		20 JUN 1979				
DCI/OLC Breckinridge or Hadilson	20 Jun 79							
DDO/TSCO								

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this fo… mitted to Central Top Secret Control for r… …are completed in the appropriate spaces below and trans-

DOWNGRADED	
TO	
By (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP I)

When finished with these documents return them to DDO/TSCO as we are the control Office for these documents.

TS# 191722
TS# 191722A
TS# 191722B
TS# 191722C

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET [redacted] EYES ONLY

(40)

LATEST VERSION

1927 to 1934 Lived in Nikol

Fall 1934 Entered "zero"

1935 to 1939 Moved to Lening
and then direct
then director c
cessively on Ul
Pr. Maksima Gor
(different ones

1938 Father appointe
missar of Shipt
Commissar. Fam
at Ul. Serafimo
year school No.
Polyanka.

June 1941 Completed 6th
with parents whe

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Source SR

Doc. No. XAAZ-17241/1

Doc. Date 11 MAY 1964

Copy No. # Repro 2

Number of Pages 28

Number of Attachments

REGISTRY

CIA Control No. 191722A

Date Document Received 15 JUN 1978

Logged By B

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B. Swigg	13 JUN 1978		1[illegible] JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	[illegible]							
DDO/TSCO 1015	B. Swigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
[illegible] SA/DO/O	[illegible]	19 Jun 78		19 Jun 78				
PK/CI ([illegible])								
DDO/TSCO	B. Swigg	20 JUN 1978		20 JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Breckinridge	Gabrielson							
DDO/TSCO								

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
By (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

TOP SECRET

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP-1)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	
Source	SR/CI/K
Doc. No.	XAAZ-17241/2
Doc. Date	19 MAY 1964
Copy No.	#Repro 2
Number of Pages	22
Number of Attachments	

REGISTRY	
CIA Control No.	TS# 191722B
Date Document Received	15 JUN 1978
Logged By	B

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B Swigg	15 JUN 1978			15 JUN 1978			
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	SKoder 15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1Q 15	B. Swigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
Shepanek SA/DO/O	M Shepanek	19 Jun 78		19 Jun 78				
AC/CI (McCoy)								
DDO/TSCO	B. Swigg	20 JUN 1978		21 JUN 1978				
DCI/OCC Breckinridge or Gabrielson								
DDO/TSCO								

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
By (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

TOP SECRET

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP 1)

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

14-00000

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Source C/SR
Doc. No. CSCI-3/781,491
Doc. Date 19 May 1964
Copy No. # Repro 2
Number of Pages 2
Number of Attachments

REGISTRY

CIA Control No. TS# 191722C
Date Document Received 15 JUN 1978
Logged By B

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B. Twigg	15 JUN 1978		15				
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge								
DDO/TSCO 1515	B. Twigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
SA/DO/O	McLepanic	19 Jun 78		19 June 78				
ALC (McCoy)								
DDO/TSCO	B. Twigg	20 JUN 1978		20 JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Breckinridge or Gabrielson								
DDO/TSCO								

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for records.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
By (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP-1)

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

TOP SECRET

DEFECTORS - NOSENKO

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Report on: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, Soviet	2 Apr 64
	Attachments: 1. Memo for Record from David E. Murphy, Subject: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case	2 Apr 64
	2. Memo for Director of Security from Lawrence R. Houston, Subject: Parole Status of Defectors	3 Apr 64
	3. Memo, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO	Jan 75
	Letter for Mr. Richard Helms from J. Walter Yeagley, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	20 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Richard Helms, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Forms I-125 and background data attached)	9 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Louis Wienckowski from Frank E. Bartos, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko	24 July 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Victor R. White, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO	18 Jul 69
	Routing Sheet from Chief, SR Division to DD/OS	13 Feb 64
	Memo for Mr. McGeorge Bundy from Thomas H. Karamessines, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	11 Feb 64
	Memo for US Intelligence Board Members from Marshall S. Carter, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
	Newspaper clipping: Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet	
	Newspaper clipping: U.S. Lets Swiss and Red Envoys talk to Defector	15 Feb 64
	4. Memo for Acting Chief, Support Branch from Jack M. Bauman	12 May 64
	5. Memo for Special Agent in Charge District Field Office from Victor R. White, Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)	10 Jul 64

TAB	TITLE	DATE
	Memo for Headquarters from John D. Noble, Jr., Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of) with Attachment: Emergency Instructions (2)	1 Jul 64
	6. Memo for the Record from John M. Maury, Subject: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case w/att	5 Aug 69
/ 2	Nosenko's Request for Political Asylum	4 Feb 64
2	Secrecy Agreements and Financial Arrangements Between the CIA and Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko	21 Apr 69
3	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Office of Security Reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD	31 Dec 74
4	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Nosenko	13 Jan 75
✓	Attachments: 1. Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subject: Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko;	9 Jan 75
	1A. Memo for USIB Members from M. Carter, 12 Feb 64, Subject: Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
5	Questions and Answers Concerning the Treatment of Soviet Defector Nosenko	
5	Memo for the IG, Subject: The Nosenko Case	67
	Attachment: 1. Summary of 1967 Document Which Outlines the Nosenko Case	

[illegible]

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

SECRET
EYES ONLY

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case

1. Mr Helms, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.

2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what we at least considered to be two problems on which we would like the advice of the Department of Justice. First, we would soon feel compelled to begin hostile interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered what the legal position would be in circumstances in which we detained Nosenko against his will for this purpose. Second, we would have to be ready after determining that we could obtain no additional information from Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to Germany and transferring him to Soviet custody in Berlin where this has been done a number of times in the past.

3. There was some discussion of whether deportation to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms explained we would probably face publicity problems in deporting to a third country of the kind we would encounter if he were free in the U. S. Mr. Helms noted there were many items of information which we and the FBI realize are of no significance because of the file holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best place.

4. The question of the basis for detention was again raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "exclusion and parole case" which means he has not been admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is responsible for him while he is in this country. This

SECRET
EYES ONLY

parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further. In this event, we would be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest and deportation was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston. Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA Office of Security officials to get the background of their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helms thanked Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall" in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

SECRET

C/SB

OGC 64-0903

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states: "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status." This means that the responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word "minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.

3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed departure.

Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

cc: DD/P
C/SR

SECRET

January 1975

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media.

2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet officials in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in the United States.

14-00000

SECRET

Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

Department of Justice
Washington 20530

gw

R

October 20, 1969

Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms: Re: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
(ER 69-5003/1)

Reference is made to your letter dated October 9, 1969, concerning the above case, in which you urge the concurrence of the Attorney General in your proposal to have the above-named alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, as amended.

The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has informed me that on the basis of the records of his Service and the information furnished by you, and in the absence of any other evidence adverse to the alien, he concurs in your proposal that the alien be permitted to enter the United States for permanent residence under the authority of the foregoing statute.

Upon the basis of all the evidence received for consideration and your statement of recommendation and approval which carries with it your determination that the entry of the individual concerned is in the interest of national security and in the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, I concur in your recommendation that the admission for permanent residence of the subject alien be authorized under the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended.

Respectfully,

For the Attorney General

J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

9 OCT 1969 ER 69-5003/1

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrell:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance of subject into the United States for permanent residence since his entry is in the interest of the national security and ~~essential to the furtherance of~~ the national intelligence mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject has provided valuable information to this Agency and he will continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a period of five years and has submitted to a technical interrogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and should any information be developed definitely disproving his bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the Attorney General.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

There are enclosed Forms I-125 and background data, in duplicate, concerning the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/

Richard Helms
Director

Enclosures.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/ H. J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

8 October 1969
Date

Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Signer's copy
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - SB Div.
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP
1 - OGC
2 - OS Files

SECRET

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)

30 October 1927 Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

Male Divorced Brown Blue/Gray 5ft. 11 inches

Soviet Caucasian --

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SUBJECT:	Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
AKA:	Yuri NOSENKO
DPOB:	30 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR
MARITAL STATUS:	1946 - Married and divorced Flavia NOSENKO (Nee: SHISHOV). 1946 - Married Augustina K. NOSENKO (Nee: TELEGIN), 1949 - separated and 1951 - divorced. 23 June 1953 - Married Ludmila Yulianovna NOSENKO (Nee: KOZHEVNIKOVA), January 1964 - separated and 1969 - divorced.
CHILDREN:	Daughters - Oxana NOSENKO, born 21 August 1954, Moscow; Tamara NOSENKO, born 13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USSR)
EDUCATION:	1942-1945 - Attended various USSR Naval Schools. 1945-1950 - Attended Institute of International Relations, Moscow.
EMPLOYMENT:	March 1951-March 1953 - Soviet Naval RU (Naval Intelligence). March 1953-February 1964 - Officer in KGB (The Committee for State Security).
MILITARY:	Lieutenant in USSR Navy while in school and during RU service.
NATIONALITY:	Soviet
PRESENT AND PAST POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS:	1943-1954 - Member Komsomol, USSR 1956 - Candidate Communist Party 1957-1964 - Member Communist Party, USSR

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET SP-1687

18 JUL 1969

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO

Reference is made to previous correspondence in this case.

Subject continues to be of operational interest to this Agency. Therefore, it is requested subject's parole to this Agency be extended for an additional period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of his stay of 16 August 1969.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20536

IN CASE ADDRESS REPLY TO
AND REFER TO THIS FILE NO.
A13 724 817

July 24, 1969

Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Louis Wienckowski

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko,
Your SP-1687.

Dear Sir:

As you requested in your letter dated July 18, 1969, the subject ~~has been given a further~~ period of stay to expire on February 16, 1970.

Sincerely,

Frank E. Bartos

Frank E. Bartos
Chief Intelligence Officer
Field Inspection and Security Division

c.n. 16 Jan. 1970

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

11 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with those contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

TOP [illegible]
EYES ONLY

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans

CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
2 cc - SR/CI/K-Downey
1 cc - C/CI
1 cc - CSR
1 cc - DD/OS

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed those officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

Defection Preceded Report to Swiss Police, Apparently Ruling Out Negligence

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 — Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place in Washington at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public. The department said that a Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Soviet Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 9.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressures.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities. Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.

196

U.S. Lets Swiss And Red Envoys Talk to Defector

Nosenko Again Voices Desire For Asylum

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Soviet secret police defector Yuri I. Nosenko is in the United States where he was interviewed yesterday by officials of both the Russian and Swiss Embassies.

The State Department said each interview lasted less than an hour and that a Department official was present each time. Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier request for asylum in the United States and it will be granted..

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips, in giving out this information, declined to say where the interviews took place or to give any details. Earlier he had said it was possible that newsmen here will be allowed to talk with Nosenko.

Soviet Kicks up Fuss

These developments came as the Soviet Union kicked up a diplomatic fuss over the disappearance of Nosenko on Feb. 4, from Geneva, where he had been assigned as an "expert" in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. Phillips said he was "on temporary duty from KGB (secret police) headquarters in Moscow."

Up to yesterday Moscow had been directing its public diplomatic wrath at the Swiss, charging them with loose security. The provision for a Swiss diplomat to interview Nosenko was to assure the Swiss that the United States had taken part in no illegal act on their soil.

/The Swiss already had strongly rejected the Soviet charges.

On Wednesday, Phillips re-

See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1

Wash Post
2/15/64

Swiss, Soviets See Defector

ported yesterday, a Soviet Embassy messenger brought a message to the State Department asking for information "as to the manner in which Mr. Nosenko presented himself to the U.S. authorities and requested an opportunity to interview him." The Department agreed to the interview with American officials present, and said Nosenko also was "agreeable." A reply about the defection also was given to the Soviet Embassy.

Also on Wednesday, in Geneva, Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin gave newsmen an angry statement aimed at the Swiss and charging "provocative activity" by unspecified Western agents. Up to then Tsarapkin had been saying both privately and publicly that the Nosenko defection would not affect the disarmament talks.

Yesterday the Soviets stepped up their protest in two places, Moscow and Geneva.

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called in American Ambassador Foy Kohler and charged the United States with "impermissable acts" in the case. He stopped short of a kidnaping charge, however. Kohler replied that on behalf of the United States he rejected any implication of American wrongdoing.

Serious Effects Hinted

In Geneva, Soviet officials, including Tsarapkin himself, privately spread to the press hints of serious consequences. Soon there were rumors that Moscow would pull out its delegation, but up to last night no such threat had actually been made, according to word reaching Washington.

In public Tsarapkin said only "I have nothing to say. I am not in the position to tell you anything."

At some so far unspecified date, Nosenko, who had apparently crossed from Switzerland to France, was flown to the United States. It is assumed he is in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency, the normal course for defectors.

Officials here yesterday were knocking down the idea that he was a particularly big fish, that he knew any atomic secrets or that he knew anything about Soviet disarmament strategy. Rather, they said, he was a KGB staff officer, a security man operating, as is the Soviet practice, in a tight compartment. That would mean he would have useful and perhaps important knowledge of part of the KGB but probably not much more.

Believed Genuine

It is assumed here that the 36-year-old Nosenko is a genuine defector though the possibility of his being a double agent has not been overlooked. It also is felt here that the Soviet protest was no stronger than could be expected. The request for an interview, rare but not unprecedented, was granted in hopes of reciprocal treatment should the occasion arise.

Moscow dispatches said there had been no word up to last night of the defection on the Soviet radio or in the press though word of mouth reports had spread through the capital.

It was felt here that Moscow might have stepped up its protest after Tsarapkin had publicly downgraded the case in Geneva. At any rate U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster and Tsarapkin held another business session in Geneva yesterday at which they said the case was not discussed.

It also was noted here that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has been meeting in Moscow all this week. But whether the Nosenko case was discussed was not known.

folio

Wash Post 2/15/64

T4-00000

SECRET

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch YAF

FROM : Chief, Operational Support Division

SUBJECT : AEFOXTROT
#262 622

1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May 1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane, Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs. Bagley, Karpovich ~~[illegible]~~, McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

> Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the Subject:
>
> (1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings," but may have the necessary silverware with which to eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be exercised with regard to controlling the silverware, and it was suggested that at least two of the guards be required to count the silverware in and out; that the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)
>
> (2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is understood that there is quite a bit of equipment available through Logistics channels.)
>
> (3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear; change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.

	[illegible]/IOS
	ADD[illegible]/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]B
1	C/[illegible] YAF
2	Cuja
	ALTS
	FILES

SECRET

(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.

(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.

(NOTE--These changes with regard to the bath, haircut, cigarette are not to be considered as something to be done on a regular schedule. We will await specific instructions from SR Division as to when these items are to be accomplished in the future.)

(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the Subject only on Tuesday each week.

(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely the same, and our security procedures, including searches, will continue to be at maximum control.

3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed as to their responsibilities in this matter.

Jack M. Bauman

Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)

ADMINISTRATIVE

Headquarters

10 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR : Special Agent in Charge
District Field Office

SUBJECT : LESNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)
#262 622 C - SD/1

1. Reference is made to the outline of emergency instructions submitted by you on 1 July 1964 for Headquarters approval.

2. The plan as outlined is approved and should be implemented immediately.

Victor R. White

TOBIASSEN:dr
JULY 1964
SUPPLEMENTAL

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/OSD
	DC/OSD
	C/SRD
	C/S 3
/	C/S3
	C/ID/
	Files
	AATS

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters

SUBJECT : LESNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of)
#262 622 C SD/1

1. Attached are instructions and procedures to be followed in the event of emergency situations affecting the SUBJECT's health, safety and custody, as well as the security of the safehouse where SUBJECT is currently being held.

2. This is to formalize instructions which, for the most part, are already in effect and have been briefed to the personnel of the ~~District Field Office who are concerned~~ with this case.

3. Dissemination of copies of these instructions to members of the Special Security Detail will be made upon notification of Headquarters approval.

for JOHN D. [illegible], Jr.
Special Agent in Charge
2 July 64

Attachment:

Emergency Instructions (2)

[illegible]

JUL 2 4 29 PM '64

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions and procedures are set forth below for the handling of emergency situations such as fire, the escape or attempted escape of SUBJECT, and the sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT. Should such situations arise, it might be necessary to call on the Police, the Fire Department, or outside medical facilities for assistance. It is possible that in such an event representatives of the press or curiosity-seekers in the local community might be attracted to the site, thereby creating security problems with respect to the custody and protection of the SUBJECT from a publicity standpoint.

In view of the above, it is therefore imperative that these instructions be thoroughly understood and memorized by all personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on this case.

FIRE
(Main House)

1. In case of fire in the Main House, the person discovering the fire should apply the nearest fire extinguisher, unless, in his judgment, the fire has reached such proportions where available equipment would be useless. Simultaneously, he should dispatch another member of the Security Detail to alert the Senior Security Agent (SSA) and the other occupants of the house. If no one is available in the immediate vicinity, the person discovering the fire should alert others in the house by shouting "FIRE".

2. Upon being notified of a fire, the SSA shall be responsible for directing the fighting of the fire, protecting classified and sensitive documents and equipment on the premises, calling the local Fire Department if circumstances warrant, and evacuating personnel. Also, at the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

3. In utilizing members of the Security Detail in fighting a fire, it should be borne in mind that two guards must be maintained on the third floor at all times, so long as the SUBJECT remains confined to his quarters. If it should become necessary to remove the SUBJECT from his quarters during an emergency, a minimum of four guards should be present unless circumstances are such as to make this infeasible. In

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

any event, every possible security precaution should be taken during the movement of SUBJECT, including the use of handcuffs or any other restraining devices deemed necessary in order to maintain proper custody and control over the SUBJECT and prevent his escape.

4. If, in the judgment of the SSA, a fire has reached, or is likely to reach proportions that it could not be controlled by firefighting equipment on the premises, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department. In this event, the Security Detail should move with dispatch to remove the SUBJECT from the premises prior to arrival of the Fire Department. The SUBJECT should be placed in an automobile, accompanied by four members of the Security Detail, and driven away from the premises. At appropriate intervals, telephone calls should be made to the safehouse. If no answer is received, the cognizant DEO official should be contacted for instructions as to whether to return to the safehouse or proceed to an alternate site.

FIRE
(Tenant House)

1. In case of fire in the Tenant House, the occupants thereof should be instructed to immediately notify the Main House and to use any available means to combat the fire until assistance arrives, unless the fire is out of control, in which case all efforts should be directed towards the evacuation of the occupants of the premises. It should be clearly understood that in no case should any of the occupants of the Tenant House call the Fire Department. This decision is the sole responsibility of the SSA.

2. Upon notification of a fire in the Tenant House, the person notified should immediately inform the SSA and assist in the dispatching of available personnel and fire extinguishers to combat the fire. If, in the judgment of the SSA, the fire has reached, or is likely to reach, proportions that it could not be controlled by the available firefighting equipment, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department and to take necessary precautionary measures to prevent the observation of the SUBJECT by firemen or other unauthorized persons who might be attracted to the scene.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

3. At the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

ESCAPE OR ATTEMPTED ESCAPE

1. Strict vigilance and security should be maintained on a 24 hour basis in accordance with established procedures in order to discourage and prevent the SUBJECT's escape. If SUBJECT should make an attempt to escape, sufficient force should be used as is necessary under the circumstances in order to subdue the SUBJECT and maintain custody and control over him. However, unnecessary brutality and the indiscriminate use of force will not be condoned.

2. All personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on duty at the site shall be alerted by means of the emergency alarm and/or other appropriate means, and brought into play on any escape attempt. Should the SUBJECT succeed in escaping from the house proper, the SSA shall be responsible for coordinating and directing a hot pursuit of the SUBJECT by all means available.

3. The use of firearms should be scrupulously avoided except in extreme circumstances of self-defense. However, the SSA under circumstances that indicate there are no other means of preventing SUBJECT's total escape, may direct a qualified firearms-trained agent to fire shots over SUBJECT's head followed by verbal warning to halt. In no event, except in self-defense as stated above, will an agent shoot directly at the SUBJECT.

4. At the first available opportunity, the SAC/DFO, or in his absence, one of the ASACs, should be telephonically advised of all the circumstances surrounding an escape attempt. In no case shall the Police be notified unless authorized by the SAC or ASAC.

ILLNESS OR INJURY

1. In case of sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT, Dr. Charles BOHRER, or other physician designated by him in the event

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

of his absence, should be immediately notified and advice obtained as to any emergency action which should be taken pending his arrival. Likewise, the SAC or ASAC/DPO should be notified immediately after talking to the doctor in order that he might be apprised of the situation and any instructions or treatment prescribed by the doctor. Regardless of any instructions given by the doctor, no action shall be taken to remove the SUBJECT from the premises or to communicate with any hospital or ambulance service without the prior authorization of the SAC or ASAC.

2. Should it become necessary to remove the SUBJECT to a hospital or other location away from the premises, every possible precaution should be taken to maintain close custody and control over him, and to prevent disclosure of his true identity and status to unauthorized persons.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION

1. Two men on duty on third floor who will keep SUBJECT under constant observation twenty-four hours a day.

2. Four men in attendance whenever SUBJECT leaves cell while confined to third floor.

3. Six men in attendance whenever SUBJECT is taken to interrogation room on second floor, all to remain available in adjoining room for removal signal from visitors.

4. Coveralls taken from SUBJECT at 2200 hours and returned the following morning at 0700 hours daily, leaving SUBJECT in shorts and undershirt overnight.

5. Military appearance and prompt shift schedules maintained at all times when in presence of SUBJECT.

6. Careful room search, including clothes and bunk, to be conducted every time SUBJECT leaves cell.

7. SUBJECT must stand in West corner of cell facing wall whenever anyone but Dr. BOHRER enters cell.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

8. Windows in cell to remain blacked out and doors to other rooms on 3rd floor to be closed and locked when SUBJECT leaves cell, in order to prevent his becoming oriented to surroundings.

9. No unnecessary conversation shall be conducted with SUBJECT or among agents, nor shall any mention of last names be made within SUBJECT's hearing.

10. SUBJECT is not to have access to newspapers and magazines, nor permitted to hear radio or television, nor shall there be any discussion of news events within his hearing. He may be provided selected reading material upon authorization of Headquarters personnel concerned with the case.

11. Recording devices to be promptly activated in order to pick up any comments by SUBJECT or conversation between him and the doctor or other operational personnel.

12. Any unusual or significant comments, movements or activities of SUBJECT to be promptly brought to the attention of the SSA.

13. Telephone numbers of key Security and Operational personnel, as well as photographs and physical description of SUBJECT to be maintained in a secure place for ready reference by the SSA.

14. Should it become necessary to answer questions by the Police or Fire Department regarding the site, personnel at the site, or with specific reference to the SUBJECT, such inquiries should be handled by the SSA with the senior Police or Fire Department official on the scene. The SSA should converse in private with such official, and identify himself by utilizing his DODD credential. He should explain briefly, and only to the extent necessary, that the property is leased and that it is used occasionally for training purposes. All inquiries concerning the SUBJECT should be parried, if possible. However, if necessary, it may be explained that the SUBJECT has a mental disorder which sometimes requires special treatment. He should not be identified under his alias or otherwise. The SSA should tactfully but firmly request that his own identity, plus his DOD affiliation, be held in strict confidence, especially with regard to the press. Inquiries by members of the press or members of the civilian population should be answered by stating that the site is rented by a private group who meet periodically for recreation.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

SPECIAL CONTACTS

1. George PANAGAULIS, Chief of Police, Prince Georges County. (Personally known to SNODDY under GOLIATH)

2. Lieutenant MOON, Commanding Officer, Barracks H, Waldorf, Maryland, Maryland State Police. (Personally known to FERRALL under GOLIATH)

3. Emergency Ambulance - Greenbelt Volunteer Fire Department. (Can be obtained through SNODDY)

Above not to be contacted unless authorized by SAC or ASAC.

SECRET

OLC 69-0675

5 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the
Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case

1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft memo of 17 June 1969 (copy attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosekno case, I have briefed the following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcommittees along the lines proposed on the dates indicated:

Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee -- 23 July 1969

William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee -- 24 July 1969

Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee -- 24 July 1969

Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations Committee -- 29 July 1969

2. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective chairmen when and if they thought it appropriate. None of the staff officers registered particular concern or curiosity about the case and I think it doubtful that all of our chairmen have been informed. Nevertheless, I think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it further at this time.

JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

Attachment:

Distribution:
Original - OLC Subject File
1 - DDP
1 - Chief, CI Staff
1 - Chief, SB Division
1 - D/Security
1 - OGC
1 - OLC Chrono

SECRET

SECRET EYES ONLY 1-9-125/2

DRAFT:JMM - 19 June 1969

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko Case

The following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case. They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees be briefed along the lines indicated.

---

1. This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has received press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.

2. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Staff Officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. He was then brought to the United States where he has since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debriefings by officers of the Agency and the FBI.

SECRET EYES ONLY

3. Nosenko had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years at the time of his defection. Nosenko has provided a large quantity of counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence. For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and foreign liaison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing investigative activity. In addition, Nosenko identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and its techniques and methods.

4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Nosenko, the privileged and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government, was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were made to accommodate Nosenko under highly secure conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases at least, by the additional need to provide Nosenko with continuing personal protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB officer,

he would be targetted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts. With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Nosenko's situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning his bona fides.

5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining alert to the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his stay in the United States Nosenko has cooperated with his interrogators and with the other officers responsible for his safety and welfare, and our current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal, independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance.

6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the fact that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosenko is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences, particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this calculated risk in an attempt to steer him toward a reasonably normal life.

NOSENKO

Question #1 - Conditions under which Nosenko was held while at Clinton? Locked in? Let outside for entertainment? Prisoner? Treatment?

Answer:

During the period of 4 April 1964-13 August 1965, Nosenko was held in strict confinement under the following conditions:

a. Confinement in single room except for periods of interrogation.

b. Constantly under guard and subject to 24 hour visual observation with regular room search.

c. Dress was coveralls and food was of sufficient quantity but limited in variety.

d. No unnecessary conversation was permitted, radio and television were not allowed, newspapers or any information concerning current events were forbidden and reading material was extremely limited.

Question #2 - Conditions at ISOLATION. Same as above.

Answer:

During the period of 13 August 1965 to 25 October 1967, conditons cited above were basically maintained with the following additons or changes:

a. From February 1966 to May 1967, Nosenko was furnished no reading material.

b. After May 1967, Nosenko was periodically given a different volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica to read.

c. From February 1966 to October 1967, Nosenko was not permitted cigarettes.

d. Subject was permitted daily exercise in a small confined area outside the building when weather permitted.

Question #3 - Did McCone or Raborn have any information on this: What?

Answer:

Office of Security records contain only limited information in regard to this question. The SE Division (then SR) was the responsible office for the confinement of Nosenko until late October 1967 when total responsibility was transferred to the Office of Security by the DCI. It is presumed that the DCI was at least generally aware of the confinement of Nosenko and the conditions of confinement, but any definite statement must be based on SE records.

Question #4 - Where is Nosenko working now?

Answer:

Nosenko is currently employed at his personally owned residence in North Carolina. He is engaged in research and analytical work based on his previous knowledge of the KGB and other Soviet matters. He is in the Washington, D. C. area for several days approximately every six weeks for direct interviews by the FBI and Office of Security personnel.

Question #5 - Is he working for CIA?

Answer:

Nosenko has been employed by the Agency on a full-time contractual basis since 1 March 1969. The original contract has been periodically amended to reflect additional remuneration, primarily to compensate for cost of living increases. In late 1972, Nosenko was compensated by mutual agreement for salary not received during the 1 April 1964 to 1 March 1969. In addition, on 12 July 1973 Nosenko signed an acknowledgement and release of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency from any claims prior to that date.

Question #6 - What is his legal status?

Answer:

Nosenko was naturalized as a United States citizen in April 1974.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

SUBJECT : The Nosenko Case

Attached please find a summary of a document written in 1967 to the General Counsel outlining the Nosenko case and explaining to him actions which had been taken with regard to Nosenko. As noted in the first paragraph, in October 1967 Nosenko took up residence in the Washington area and was advised that, should he wish to leave the apartment for any location whatsoever, he was free to so do. In other words, from that date, Nosenko was essentially a totally free man. That he chose not to flee in any way may be indicative of his attitude toward the manner in which he was handled prior to October 1967.

While one can criticize the fact that Nosenko was kept incommunicado for approximately three years, and therefore presumably denied full civil rights, the attached document does indicate, we believe, that the Agency was on the horns of a dilemna in this regard. There were legitimate doubts about Nosenko's bona fides and concern that he was a Soviet plant. There was no country to which he could be deported save the Soviet Union, and Nosenko himself refused to return there. Yet, in the United States, save when isolated from society, he was considered to be a continuing threat to national security.

Recognizing that only legal experts can judge definitively the merits of the case, it seems to the writer that the Agency had no choice but to hold Nosenko incommunicado pending resolution of his bona fides. He was admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely as a parolee to the Agency. As a parolee, Nosenko de facto from the date of his entry to the United States did not enjoy the full civil rights of the normal citizen. He was a ward of the Agency, in a sense, and the Agency was ultimately responsible for his

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018307

SECRET

conduct. There were at the time very legitimate reasons to believe that full and total release of Nosenko would be an abrogation by the Agency of its legal responsibility. To gainsay that decision in retrospect is, we believe, an error. In sum, the act of defection places the defector at the mercy of the laws of the country to which he defects. It is the obligation of the accepting country to see to it that the laws are followed. In the Nosenko case, it seems to us that the Agency acted in a fully responsible manner to ensure that its responsibility for the defector was met. While it was unfortunate that it took so long to resolve the matter, we can find no fault with the fact that the Agency met its responsibility to both the United States and to Nosenko himself.

Attachment: A/S

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency's legal basis for its handling of Nosenko through that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposition of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this memorandum to the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967 in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime. He gradually created a new life for himself in the United States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.

Background

Nosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA representatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place and debriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetings in Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Geneva again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with his CIA handlers he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretly taken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity documents. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt, Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting political asylum from the U.S. Government.

Because serious doubts about Nosenko's bona fides had arisen on the basis of the information he had provided both in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was originally planned to do a detailed bona fides debriefing and assessment in Germany before making any decision about moving Nosenko to the United States. However, unprecedented action by the Soviet Government in respect to the defection of one of its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February, unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the press that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had disappeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected.

Because of mounting pressure from the press, which included much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department would make a brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 February, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and requesting an immediate interview with him and his release. On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Conference TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recommended that Swiss authorities be allowed to interview Nosenko to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of his own free will.

On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director, Nosenko was brought to the United States. He travelled by commercial air, again using alias U.S. Army identification, and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

On 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and Soviet Embassies in Washington advised the State Department that they desired interviews with Nosenko. On 14 February, in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in Ambassador KOHLER and protested "impermissable activities" on the part of the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen took an even harder line to Western correspondents, and accused the U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 September, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to Swiss Embassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. At these interviews, which were also attended by State Department and INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerland of his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition, he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representative to the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship. On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department made a brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued a brief statement to the press noting that the interviews had been held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remain in this country.

From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenko was housed in the Washington area. During this period, regular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko was made available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all times accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, he took a two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case officers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen without changing the conditions in which he was being held. Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in accordance with Agency local responsibility. It was clear that it was only a matter of time before he created a public scandal. More importantly, he was in a position to communicate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.

On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph examination. The results of this examination indicated deception on a number of critical points indicating that he was sent by the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involved his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was decided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko's stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if the Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsibilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement. As a result, he was moved to quarters where his movements could be more easily controlled, and his outing privileges were suspended pending resolution of bona fides.

It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action but accepted Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible that we would have proceeded with a series of operational actions on the basis of his information. The results of some of these actions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Government politically and damaging to U.S. national security. For example, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one that he was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately, involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.

Bona Fides

Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devoted to interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated) and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral investigations. We concluded that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB instructions, and that he came to the United States on a deception mission. The implications of this mission had a grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissable in a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgression of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable means of communication with the KGB.

Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders or that he came to the U.S. on a KGB mission. He has admitted, however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials, both before and after arriving in the United States.

Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies

USIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was discussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an

14-00000

ad hoc basis. Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On 5 February 1964, General Carter reported the defection to an executive session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to USIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that Nosenko's bona fides had not yet been established. It was agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the community.

The President was informed of the full extent of our suspicions about Nosenko's bona fides by the then Director, Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing by Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964.

Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also subsequently informed of the problems about Nosenko's bona fides.

The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other senior officials in the Department of State were informed of our reservations about Nosenko's bona fides and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction that such a move might have on other potential defectors.

The Director of Security, State Department, was informed of the bona fides problem at an early date. We have worked closely with this office since then on the problem of evaluating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects the security interests of the State Department.

Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S. internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was a KGB plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views about Nosenko's bona fides and our progress in interrogating and investigating him from the moment of his defection. The FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's bona fides as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan, were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major aspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review Nosenko's case on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objections to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI formally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the extent that "On considering carefully the results of your interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent provocateur."

The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach (and several members of his staff) were apprised of our reservations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this country.

Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of Nosenko's True Status

From the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential that we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awareness of Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledge of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, and the implications thereof, was restricted to a very few people in the Agency and the intelligence community. Nonetheless, we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intelligence community, even though this carried the inevitable risk of leakage.

Soviet Inspired Inquiries

In 1966 there were several indications that the Soviets were making a serious effort to find out what happened to Nosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatant and unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist, Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine Paris Match with an offer to provide photographs and materials for an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. According to Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to an international juridicial organization in an effort to obtain compensation from Nosenko for damages caused by his abandonment of her and her children. In responding to this approach we quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself, to the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to represent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGB and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing to an interview or in any other way.

Nosenko's Status

To recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on 12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by the Attorney General under the terms of an agreement executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955, which states:

> "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervison and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status."

In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we ensured that he was under our direct observation and control at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United

States. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain amount of movement and of contact with the outside world. After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Although his freedom of movement had been severely restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no complaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several written statements from him in which he stated that our handling of him was justified and even beneficial.

Disposal

From the time that Nosenko was brought to this country we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time, however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what

14-00000

this implied, it was apparent that great practical problems stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a third country.

USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR, and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death, etc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for the adverse effect this might have on other potential defectors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession" by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.

Third Country: Although we believed it likely that Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country, there is certainly no country in the free world on which we could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first informing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplicity on the basis of the political risks involved.

File under
Nosenko

SECRET

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

NOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the U.S., and after a short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and relatively austere conditions for a period of approximately three years. Commencing in 1967, he was given increasing amounts of freedom until he was allowed total freedom in 1969. He subsequently married a U.S. citizen, settled in the Southeastern United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1974. He is presently under contract to the Agency, providing consultative services and information on subjects germane to his background.

NOSENKO was confined when as a result of his debriefing substantive questions were raised concerning his bona fides, and his general behavior raised further concern about his emotional health and general safety. NOSENKO's debriefing and confinement were ended when it was concluded that he was not a threat to national security. The advice of the Justice Department was obtained at the time of his confinement, and the FBI participated in his subsequent debriefing. NOSENKO's initial entry into the U.S. was coordinated with the Department of State, and they were periodically advised of his status during his confinement up to the time of his final settlement.

The strict conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were intended to convey to him the seriousness of his position as a suspected disinformation agent and to make clear to him that his free settlement in the U.S. was precluded as long as this issue was unresolved. It was understood, however, that at any time he could have elected to end his confinement and return to the Soviet Union. OS files do not document that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to NOSENKO, however, it is the recollection of senior staff officers (ADD/O and D/OS) that such was the case, and further that it was a condition routinely applied to other defectors whose bona fides were in doubt.

SECRET

SECRET

1 9 [illegible] 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Nosenko

Attached is a report from the Office of Security concerning the awareness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FBI, and I&NS). We have been advised by ADD/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could elect to leave the U. S., but that he could not be ensured of immediate liberty if he elected to stay; in a sense, we are told, he elected to stay under the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on this latter point, other than as shown in the attachment.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment: a/s

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~ SECRET

already added

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account .

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET
~~EYES ONLY~~

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 063344
HR 10-23
9 January 1975

of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, ~~and he therefore is not expected to be~~ able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

EYES ONLY 13 74-0130

31 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Office of Security reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD

1. Forwarded herewith is a 31 December 1974 memorandum from the Acting Director of Security on subject activities. The material represents responses to questions posed by your office. Obviously, the next phase of the investigation will require more detailed reviews of each activity.

2. Questions that occur to us in reading the attached, are:

PARAGON

We should spell out what is meant by the statement that the FBI "deferred further coverage to the Office of Security," how it was expressed and what form it took.

The taping of two conversations does not seem to constitute "electronic surveillance" in the usual sense. It certainly is not trespatory surveillance. A little more detail on the equipment will be wanted.

NOSENKO

We will go to the DDO for any record of DCI knowledge, and report such information as we get.

AELADLE

We will want to verify DDCI's approval of entry.

[illegible] ONLY

2 [illegible] 0310

SECRET
EYES ONLY

CELOTEX I

We will want more detail on the actual surveillance, including possible higher approval.

This is responsive to the DCI's request for newspaper articles that led to the surveillance.

CELOTEX II

Questions similar to CELOTEX I.

We may want actual copies of newspaper stories for display, in addition to memos, should DCI wish to use it.

MOCKINGBIRD

No recorded (in CIA) formal approval by Attorney General. It may be that Justice will have a copy.

Does this raise a question of surveillance of congressmen if one is contacted by someone under surveillance?

3. Security experts to have reports on Maheu, SIESTA, REDFACE I, surveillance trucks, and Israeli COMINT by COB Thursday.

S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments a/s

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET

EYES ONLY

31 DEC 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : PARAGON
NOSENKO
AELADLE
CELOTEX I
CELOTEX II
MOCKINGBIRD

1. Attached is a report concerning Subject topics which was requested by Mr. Scott Breckenridge of your office. As you will note, the report is in a question and answer format with attachments.

2. This Office is still gathering material in regard to the SIESTA Project and REDFACE I. In addition, other files are being culled to provide more details, if they exist, on the above mentioned projects.

Sidney D. Stembridge

Sidney D. Stembridge
Acting Director of Security

Atts

Distribution:
Original - Adse
1 - DDA

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010249

EYES ONLY

REQUEST

I, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, request the Government of the United States of America to grant me political asylum in the United States of America. This decision has been taken by me as the result of considering this question over the course of several years without any pressure on the part of anyone whosoever. I absolutely do not believe in the truth of the Socialist system. Working in the KGB and knowing more than the ordinary Soviet citizen about the internal situation, the mood of the people and the policies of the Soviet Government, I became convinced that in the USSR there is not and never will be truth and real freedom as long as the country is governed by the Communist Party. Travelling on official trips abroad to the countries of the West, I was able correctly to understand and become aware of the existence of a real and actual free world. The events in Hungary and East Berlin and the split of the Communist movement are for me vivid examples and confirmation of the correctness of my own decision to break forever with the Soviet Union. I want to assure the Government of the United States of America that I will devote all my strength and knowledge to the Government and people of the United States of America.

/s/ Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

4 February 1964

[illegible] To [illegible]

Заявление

Я, Носенко Юрий Иванович, прошу Правительство США предоставить мне политическое убежище в Соединенных Штатах Америки.

Это решение мною принято в результате обдумывания этого вопроса в течение длительного времени, без какого-либо давления кого бы то ни было.

Я воспитан и вырос в социалистическом коммунистическом обществе. Работая в КГБ и зная многое, зная реальное положение вещей, о внутреннем положении, настроении народа и политике советского правительства я убедился, что в СССР нет и не будет правды и настоящей свободы до тех пор пока руководит страной коммунистическая партия. Находясь в командировках в странах Запада, я имел возможность видеть и сравнить существование различных и действительно свободного мира. События последних лет в Венгрии и Восточной Германии, развитие антикоммунистического движения [illegible] для меня причины презрения и недоверия к правительству [illegible] решения [illegible] в Советском Союзе.

Могу заверить Правительство США, что я отдам все свои силы и знания Правительству и Народу Соединенных Штатов Америки.

4 февраля 1964 года.

UNDERTAKING REGARDING OBLIGATIONS AND SECRECY

In consideration of arrangements being made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY for my future employment and welfare, I freely acknowledge that I have no outstanding claims of any nature against the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I further acknowledge that there are no commitments to me on the part of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY which remain unsatisfied arising out of any of my prior associations with the Agency. I fully understand that the current arrangements between myself and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY are intended to completely encompass all obligations of any nature whatsoever made to me by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

I acknowledge my desire to serve the interests of the United States by fulfilling the obligations which I have accepted in the current arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I assert under oath, as indicated by my signature below, that I have completely, totally and permanently severed any and all relationships with any other government, its agencies, organs or functionaries including the Communist Party; that I will not in the future advocate, teach, or become a member of or become affiliated with any organization which advocates or teaches opposition to all organized government; that I will not in the future become a member of or become affiliated with the Communist Party or any other totalitarian party; and that I do not now nor will I in the future advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism.

I understand fully the need for secrecy regarding my past, present and future relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and I agree to keep forever secret these relationships and my arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY including all information which I may obtain by reason of any associations with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject me to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws (18 U.S.C. 793, 794) and other applicable laws and regulations. I understand that this is a solemn and permanent undertaking which I must observe even after termination of any contracts or other arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. In addition, I understand that I may not discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it any information concerning the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, its activities, or intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it.

I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 21 day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1
(L.S.)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 7
Notary Public

(SEAL)

My commission expires September 24, 1969

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required

to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. To assist you in establishing yourself, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will assist you in procuring an automobile and necessary household furnishings, providing funds therefor, up to a maximum of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00). Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. PLACE OF RESIDENCE. In the interests of security, you will be required to live in such State, area, and house or apartment as is specifically approved by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY after mutual discussion and due consideration of all circumstances. All of the expenses of such leased house or apartment will be borne by you and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will not be obligated to pay any such expenses.

6. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

7. HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL CARE. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will provide you with reasonable insurance covering medical care and hospitalization equivalent to that which could be obtained through standard insurance policies; or, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY may provide directly such medical care and hospitalization.

8. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such

secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

9. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

10. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1969 and shall be for a term of one (1) year. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance of the elapse of one (1) year. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations

imposed on you by paragraph 8 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

Contracting Officer

Date:

ACCEPTED:

21 April, 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 1

WITNESS:

21 April 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 7

IDEN I

Dear IDEN I

Reference is made to your contract with the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, effective 1 March 1969. Effective 1 March 1970 said contract is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($18,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

6. NEGOTIATED BENEFITS.

a. You presently have a private health insurance plan for yourself and your wife paid until late December 1970. Prior to the expiration date of the current policy the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has the option of paying premiums on the current policy until 1 March 1972 or enrolling you in a health insurance program for selected contract individuals of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will pay the premiums on either insurance coverage until 1 March 1972. However, any new contract will include an appropriate clause providing that this organization will bear a portion of the total premium cost of any health insurance and you will bear the remainder.

b. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will endeavor to arrange for you to secure a term life insurance policy with a face value of $15,000.00. This policy contains no additional accidental death benefits. The premiums for the policy will be your personal responsibility. The current premium charge is $12.00 per month.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. (1) Subject to the priorities of work you are herein authorized twenty-one (21) work days vacation with pay per contract year to be taken only at times and places approved in advance by the Authorized Government Representative. Vacation time is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Payment for unused vacation time will not be authorized.

(2) If incapacitated for work due to illness, injury and the like, your compensation may be continued for periods not to exceed a total of thirteen (13) working days per contract year. Periods of absence in excess of three (3) consecutive days will require a doctor's certificate. Like vacation time, this benefit is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Cash payment in lieu of this benefit will not be authorized.

7. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

8. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

9. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1970 and shall be for a term of two (2) years. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of

14-00000

this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations imposed on you by paragraph 7 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

IDEN 6

Contracting Officer

Date:

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1
Date: March 6, 1970

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2
Date: 6 March 1970

25 October 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative three Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#AI 25-349	Schroder Trust Company	$15,000.00
#FE 54779	Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.	10,000.00
#A593613	Harris Trust & Savings Bank	10,000.00

This is an advance against a back salary payment covering the period April 1964 to March 1969 which was approved on 18 October 1972. I understand that this advance, $35,000.00, will be deducted from the total back salary payment covering the specified period when the finalization of this payment is made in the near future.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness /s/ IDEN 5

Date: October 25, 1972

16 NOV 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative four Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#155784	Riggs National Bank	$15,000.00
#01-028564	Union Trust Company	15,000.00
#0661511	American Security & Trust	15,000.00
#2-442275	The National Bank of Washington	7,052.00

The above amount, $52,052.00, together with the $35,000.00 advance received on 25 October 1972, constitutes full payment for back salary covering the period April 1964 to March 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness: /s/ IDEN 5

Date: November 16, 1972.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 13 July 1973

FROM : IDEN 2

SUBJECT: IDEN 1

1. On 12 July 1973, the attached Acknowledgement and Release which was prepared by the General Counsel was signed by the Subject in the presence of IDEN 5 and witnessed by the undersigned. There were no problems involved in obtaining the signature of the Subject who had previously voluntarily stated he would sign such a document if he would receive the $15,000.00 which Subject considered was the fulfillment of an Agency promise in 1964 before his defection.

2. Subject understood that the attached did not affect the existing contractual agreement with Subject and that all stipulations in that contract were valid and continuing.

3. Also attached is a copy of the $13,000.00 Cashier's Check given to Subject on 12 July 1973 which completed the agreed sum of $15,000.00, the Subject having previously received $2,000.00 which was a part of the agreed sum.

/s/ IDEN 2

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RELEASE

WHEREAS, IDEN 1, a former citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and an employee of the Committee for State Security (KGB), first cooperated with Officers of the United States Government and then, subsequently, defected to the United States; and,

WHEREAS, IDEN 1, was promised certain sums of money for his cooperation and defection, only part of which have previously been paid to him; and,

WHEREAS, there remains a certain balance of money agreed upon by IDEN 1 and Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, IDEN 1 for himself and for his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, hereby releases and forever discharges the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency and all of its employees and representatives from any claim for money promised to him for, and/or at the time of his defection, and from any and all other claims demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with his cooperation and association with the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency prior to the date of this document, 12 July 1973.

WITNESS THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE AND SEAL:

/s/ IDEN 1 (SEAL)
IDEN 1

WITNESS;
On Behalf of the United States Government

/s/ IDEN 2

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 March 1974, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> "You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($23,750) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY /s/ IDEN 3
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1 — May 9, 1974
George Martin Rosnek — Date

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2 — 9 May 1974
Date

APPROVED:

/s/ IDEN 4 — 17 May 74
Date

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

DEFECTORS

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Memo for Mr. Garrison from S. D. Breckinridge, Subj: Information on Detention of Defector	30 Jan 75
2	Memo for IG from Jerrold B. Brown, Subj: Request for Information (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	18 Jun 75
	MFR from Walter Elder, Subj: Rockefeller Commission Contact (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	23 Jun 75
	Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subj: Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject -- Alleged Abuse of Defector)	27 Jun 75
3	Routing Slip to S. Breckinridge from F. Bucci	22 Jan 75
	Att: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General of the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency for the Entry of Aliens of Interest to the Central Intelligence Agency under Specific Circumstances	10 Feb 55
4	Memo for Inspector General from Jerrold B. Brown, dated 18 June 1975, Subject: Request for Information (re- DCI firing an employee for abusing a defector)	18 June 1975

Defector

SECRET

Review Staff: 75/880

Mr. Ryan

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-[illegible]

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security.)

JBB
Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

neil

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

EXHIBIT 2

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE ENTRY OF ALIENS OF INTEREST TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDER SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES

The Central Intelligence Agency has frequent need for the covert temporary entry of aliens into the United States for intelligence and operational purposes within its jurisdiction.

To effectuate entry in such cases, the Central Intelligence Agency will submit each such alien's case in writing to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with the request to defer inspection of the subject upon arrival and parole to the Central Intelligence Agency under the authority of Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In order that the intelligence benefits to be derived from such entries not be outweighed by the dangers, if any, to the internal security of the United States by the presence of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency agrees that it will take all necessary steps to establish the bona fides of each prospective entrant prior to submittal to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. It further agrees: (a) That this method of entry will only be utilized where it is strictly in the national interest; (b) That each request will be accompanied by a summary of pertinent background and biographical data with particular emphasis on aspects bearing on internal security and admissibility under the immigration laws, as well as the results of a current check of the FBI file; and (c) That the place, time and manner of arrival will be coordinated with the Service in advance thereof.

Each alien whose entry is authorized by the Commissioner under the foregoing procedure will be paroled for such period of time as may be agreed on by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service, in no instance to exceed one year. Further extensions of parole, similarly limited, may be authorized thereafter on a written statement of need, which include the results of a current security check.

Upon arrival each alien will execute an agreement acknowledging parole status in a form satisfactory to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service.

After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status. Further, in the case of any alien whose physical custody is not to be maintained or is to be terminated, the Central Intelligence Agency will arrange for presentation of each alien for registration pursuant to law at a time and place satisfactory to the Service.

EXHIBIT 2

S-E-C-R-E-T

Upon completion of their intelligence or operational purposes in the United States, or if internal security reasons so require, these aliens will be removed therefrom through the arrangements and at the expense of the Central Intelligence Agency, except in those cases in which other disposition is made of a nature satisfactory to the Service. Also, the Central Intelligence Agency will inform the Service sufficiently in advance of each proposed departure as to permit verification thereof if the Service so elects.

In accordance with past practice, the Service will apprise the FBI of the entry and departure or other disposition of these aliens.

The Service will maintain separate and secure files under this agreement.

S/S
Herbert Brownell, Jr.
Attorney General

S/S
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
(Feb 10 1955)

S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Alleged Illegal Activities
(Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)

FROM:
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

EXTENSION: 6777

NO.

DATE: 27 JUN 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDA	30 JUN 1975			
2.				
3. Inspector General Att: Mr. Ainslie	[illegible]			3-5: Attached was prepared in response to an 18 June request from Jerry Brown. Per 23 Jun, MFR by Walt Elder, source of the story is a deposition by Mr. Helms.
4.				
5. Dr. Chamberlain SUS				
6. ~~Mr. Knoche~~ [illegible]	7-3-[illegible]			This requires editing before passing to Mr. [illegible]
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL
[illegible]

[illegible] JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

ATTENTION : Mr. Neil Ainslie

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)

1. Reference is made to Mr. Ainslie's verbal request for a review of Office of Security files in an effort to provide information pertinent to a case mentioned on page 170 of the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA activities within the United States.

2. The case in question from page 170 of the Commission Report is quoted as follows: "In one other case, a defector was physically abused, although not seriously injured. The Director of Central Intelligence discharged the employee involved."

3. A search of Office of Security file resources has reflected information pertinent to a case in which a defector was physically abused at an overseas location, and the Agency employee was later terminated by the DCI. It is not known whether the following case is identical to the referenced case on page 170 of the Commission Report, but the facts appear to be quite similar.

4. Information developed by this Office of possible interest to the Inspector General, pertains to one John Torpats, an ex-CIA employee, and one Eduard Oun, an Estonian defector.

5. Torpats was born in 1898 in Estonia, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1926. Torpats was employed by CIA in February 1949 and was terminated 30 January 1961. The file information reflected that in July 1956, Torpats was found guilty of mistreatment of an alien by a Special Inquiry Board

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 011018

SECRET

in Frankfurt, West Germany. The alien involved was Eduard Oun, an Estonian who defected from Estonia through Sweden in 1955.

6. The incident in Frankfurt involved mistreatment of Oun during interrogations directed by Torpats. The charges of physical abuse included the striking of Oun with the fist; application of turpentine and ointments to various parts of the body, the scrubbing of Oun's body with a brush, and forcing Oun to stand in the nude as long as eight days during interrogations with only very brief rest periods.

7. Torpats was returned to Headquarters and was brought before an Employment Review Board for consideration of separation from the Agency. The Board's recommendations initially were that Torpats be "transferred to an area outside the Clandestine Services." Torpats appealed the decision, and a later recommendation included reduction in grade from GS-14 to GS-13. Torpats later received unsatisfactory fitness reports and engaged in various "in house" battles with Agency officials concerning his employment.

8. Torpats was later terminated in accordince with the authority granted the DCI under Section 102(C) of the National Security Act of 1947, as ammended, effective 30 January 1961. Later in 1961, Torpats filed suit against the DCI contesting his dismissal, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government's motion for summary judgment against Torpats. Torpats appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals, in 1962, upheld the lower court's ruling that Torpats' termination was legal.

9. The Office of Security file of Eduard Oun contained little information other than interrogation reports dated 1956. It was not clear from file information whether Oun entered the United States after the Frankfurt incident. The most recent document contained in the Oun file was dated 17 September 1956 and noted that Oun had been psychiatrically examined and found qualified for Agency sponsored immigration to the U.S. under Public Law 203.

10. It is noted that Office of Security files contained only fragmentary information in regard to certain areas of the Torpats' case. File review indicated, however, the DDO, OGC and the Inspector General's office will probably have additional information concerning this matter.

Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

SECRET

Executive Registry
75-1942

75-2244 6-24
[illegible]

Review Staff: 75/1008
23 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rockefeller Commission Contact

Mason Cargill told me today that the reference in the Commission report to an employee who was fired because he abused a defector came from a deposition by Dick Helms. Helms could not remember an exact name, but from the description which he gave on his deposition, it is clear that the employee who was fired was John Torpats. He was discharged by Allen W. Dulles in 1960.

Torpats, himself a Lithuanian refugee, was working in the Defector Reception Center in Frankfort, Germany. In the course of interrogating another Lithuanian defector, Torpats beat him. After Torpats was fired, he sued the Director (then McCone). He lost the case.

Walt Elder
Walter Elder

cc - DCI
✓cc - IG
cc - OGC

CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET

SECRET

Review Staff: 75/880

Mr. Ryan

SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-2276

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security)

JBB

Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

Alec Mardirosian SE/DDO

Dist Staff 3 C/SE

SECRET

SECRET

IG 75-C 335

30 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Garrison

SUBJECT : Information on Detention of Defector

1. The Deputy General Counsel has requested documents bearing on the decision to confine a defector, particularly the considerations at the time such decisions were made and reviewed, as may be reflected in memoranda for the record, staff studies, etc., leading to the initial confinement, the later decisions to continue that confinement, the decision to move to a new facility in Virginia, and eventually to release him.

2. The assumption is that following the initial decision this matter was reviewed formally from time to time, and that those reviews are reflected in some way in the records of the Agency.

/s/ S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

Original - Addressee
1 - SDB Chrono
1 - Judy for QA files

SECRET

2 [illegible] CL BY [illegible]

Excerpts from Meeting No. 2 with Nosenko

Reel No. 1, 11 June 1962 (The quality of the tape is very poor.)

Translated from Russian by P. D.

(N. talks about surveillance of Soviet personnel in the United States.)

Nosenko: Let me tell you - I (---) I was also in the States, although under another name. I had a certain business there . . .

O. This was (?) in Washington (?)?

Nosenko: Yes, I was there.

Q: On TDY?

Nosenko: 19 days, 19 days only.

Q: Under what name?

Nosenko: NIKOLAYEV.

O: NIKOLAYEV?

Nosenko: In England I was NIKOLAYEV and in your country I was NIKOLAYEV.

Q: ---first and middle name?

Nosenko: Yes, Yuriy, Yuriy, also Yuriy.

Q: And in England you also were for a short time?

Nosenko: In England I was for ten and fifteen days . . .

Note: During the interrogation of Nosenko in 1964, he denied that he ever said that he was in the United States.

2. You stated previously that while traveling to England and Cuba, you were documented as Nikolayev. Under what cover did you travel to those countries? What was your Legend-Biography?

> Note: Any KGB officer going abroad under another name and under cover prepares a Legend-Biography to cover up his real identity. If Nosenko travelled as Nikolayev, then his legend omitted "the fact" that he was a son of a Minister because there was no Minister of Shipbuilding Industry with the name of Nikolayev, etc., etc.)

3. You stated previously that in January 1960 you were processed to go to the US with the Soviet Automotive Delegation. You obtained a passport in your true name, Nosenko, but the date was postponed, then cancelled. Who selected your candidacy for the trip? What were you supposed to do in the USA? Why was the trip postponed? Why were you processed in your true name, Nosenko, and not under the name Nikolayev, under which you visited England or [illegible]?

4. In 1962 you stated that while working with the KGB, you personally recruited ten Americans. Please give us their names and how you recruited them.

Note: Nosenko was asked why he was chosen to go to Geneva in 1962 instead of an officer from the Department (KGB) Delegation. Answering this question he mentioned the recruitment of ten Americans.

Excerpts from Meeting No. 2 with Nosenko

11 June 1962

Nosenko: Gribanov, the chief of the whole counterintelligence. (His name) Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov . . . so, Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov decided you go, that I must be here (in Geneva). I said, "Be my guest, Oleg Mikhaylovich. I am not saying no. . ." So Gribanov decided "You will go. That's all" (Nosenko knocked on the desk). . . Well, what am I? . . . Who have I recruitted? . . . Ten Americans, no more than that . . . (and Gribanov said) "You will go! You must go!"

III. Soviet visas and other regulations for tourists traveling to the USSR.

✓ 1. Didn't you know or remember how Oswald's visa was processed and from what country Oswald entered the USSR? Is it possible that he entered the USSR on a "podvisnaya" visa?

✓ 2. You previously said that you saw Oswald's visa application, but you could not say from what country Oswald came to the USSR. In your opinion, is it possible that Oswald received his visa application in some other European country, then went to Finland and through Finland entered the USSR without contacting the Soviet consulate in Helsinki? Did you hear any talk about the possibility that is described above? If so, when did you hear it and from whom?

✓ 3. On 3 July 1964 you stated that you have seen Oswald's anketa (visa application). Do you remember what was in that anketa? Did you read the anketa? What did you mean that you saw the anketa? Was it in the name Lee Harvey Oswald, or was there another name? Did you see the name of the person who signed the anketa?

4. Do you have any information to the effect that Oswald might not have come to the Soviet consulate or to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki to obtain his visa? Could he have obtained a visa in Switzerland or Sweden, then have come to Helsinki and, without reporting to the Soviet consulate in Helsinki, have taken a train to Leningrad and then to Moscow?

5. According to your previous information, "any tourist - he buys a tour to the Soviet Union, makes out the anketa, and then comes to Moscow." In what country did Oswald buy a tour to the USSR? In what country did Oswald fill in the anketa? If the anketa goes to Moscow, to what office in Moscow does it go? To MID, KGB? Is it possible that all the data on Oswald from his anketa was sent to Moscow by a cable? Did you see and read Oswald's anketa or a telegram that Oswald is coming to Moscow? If you did not read the anketa, who among the KGB officers of the Second Chief Directorate or the First Chief Directorate read the anketa or had access to it? Who would logically have access to the anketa?

✓ 6. According to your previous information, any person who wants to visit the USSR has to buy a tour in a foreign tourist firm in his home country or any other country, and the tourist firm will make arrangements for his stay in the USSR. It is understood that he must fill in the anketa, and in addition to the general questions, the common tourist should make requests for the cities he intends to visit and for the accommodations he wants. The tourist would know in advance when he receives his visa his date of arrival in Moscow, in what hotel he is going to stay, and what kind of accommodations he would be given. The question, then, is do you know when Intourist received Oswald's request and application and when it answered him that his demands are met and that he is welcome in Moscow?

✓ 7. From your knowledge, when Oswald arrived in Moscow, was he handled by the Intourist Agency or by Sputnik, the Youth Tourist Bureau of the USSR, or by the Central Council for Tourism of the Soviet Trade Unions?

Note: The Central Council for Tourism of the Soviet Trade Unions organizes exchanges of tourists between trade unions of the USSR and other countries. Sputnik was organized in June 1958 for the exchange of of tourists (students and other youths).

8. What is the procedure after a tourist applies for a Soviet visa? Do you know at what tourist agency or in what foreign country Oswald applied for a visa to the USSR or bought a tour to the USSR? Who was the Soviet Intourist representative in that country who took Oswald's visa application to the Soviet Embassy?

✓ 9. You stated previously that Oswald was not considered a defector. If he was not a defector, then what was he?

Note: If the KGB did not consider Oswald to be a defector, then it is possible that Oswald was known to the KGB long before his arrival in the USSR as a tourist and Oswald was assured that when he arrived in the USSR he would be given Soviet citizenship or at least a permanent residence permit. Although he would be a defector anyway, it could be that Oswald did not like the word defector and the KGB decided not to call him a defector but, let us say, a volunteer. The Soviet Constitution states that the USSR grants the right of asylum to all foreign citizens "who are persecuted for safeguarding the interests of the working class or who are persecuted for scientific activities, for national-liberation struggle." (Article 129 of the USSR Constitution of 1936.)

✓ 10. You stated previously that "since about 1960, every Soviet ambassador can give a visa in three to five days. If so, what was so special for the Soviet government that the ambassador would be personally involved in issuing a visa to Oswald?

Note: It is known that in 1957 the Soviet government adopted some measures to improve travel for foreign tourists in the USSR. They mostly concerned currency exchange. The 1957 regulations said nothing about visas. Nosenko should be questioned about the 1957 decision of the Soviet government to determine if he is not mistaking the 1957 decision with that of 1960.

✓ 11. You stated previously that since about 1960, every Soviet ambassador can give visas in from three to five days. The available information published by the Soviets unmistakenly states that a visa cannot be obtained in less than seven days (in some cases it takes five to seven days). Following are excerpts from a book entitled Moscow, A Tourists Companion, published in Moscow in 1969, and from the magazine Soviet Life, May 1978, p. 59. Soviet Life stated that "visas are issued within 10 days of receipt of application at a Soviet consulate."

[illegible]
Moscow, 1967.

Formalities

All you need for a [illegible] trip to the Soviet Union is your national passport and a [illegible] indicating the time of your visit and the itinerary.

Visa. As a rule, visas are obtained for travellers by tourist firms and travel agencies. But you can get your visa yourself. Visas are issued by Soviet consular offices in every country five to seven days after [illegible]. The visa is valid for the indicated time of [illegible] points of entry and exit on the Soviet border [illegible] depending on your route.

If you decide to extend your visit or alter the itinerary, apply to the service bureau at your hotel. If Intourist is able to provide the necessary accommodation, your visa will be altered accordingly. Visas, and subsequent alterations in them, are free of charge.

Visas for transit travel via the U.S.S.R. by railway or motor are issued if you have the pertinent visa of the country neighbouring on the U.S.S.R. You need no Soviet visa if you travel

via U.S.S.R. by air, provided you do not stay in Soviet transfer towns for more than 24 hours.

Intourist does not service travellers who come on visits to relatives in the Soviet Union. Neither does it offer services in towns where Intourist agencies are unavailable. In such cases, apply to a Soviet consulate abroad.

Under reciprocal agreements between the Soviet Union and some other countries, no visas are necessary for nationals of these countries for travel in the U.S.S.R. and for Soviet tourists visiting these countries.

Medical Formalities. An international smallpox inoculation certificate is required for entry to the Soviet Union from African, Asian and South American countries, and, in addition, a cholera certificate for entry from India and Eastern Pakistan.

Customs. Personal belongings—garments, shoes, tourist and sports gear, perfumery and cosmetics, etc. in quantities necessary for the time of stay in the Soviet Union depending on the season, are duty-free. Besides, travellers may bring duty-free (per person) two cameras, one amateur cine-camera and a reasonable (non-commercial) amount of souvenirs. Persons coming to the Soviet Union on a hunting tour (provided they have a certificate issued by Intourist or a foreign travel firm confirming this purpose of their trip) may bring sporting rifles.

To make sure passage home is unhindered, please register the foreign currency you have brought with you with the customs, which will issue you a pertinent certificate.

It is prohibited to bring to the U.S.S.R. Soviet currency, Soviet government bonds, annulled securities, arms, opium and hashish and appliances for smoking them, obscene materials and books, films, records, etc., politically and economically prejudicious to the U.S.S.R.

All objects and articles (except those prohibited by law) may be shipped out of the U.S.S.R. in any quantity, provided they have been purchased with Soviet money exchanged at the Vneshtorg Bank of the U.S.S.R. or the other agencies of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. (Gosbank) and purchased with foreign convertible currency. For the unhindered passage of such goods make sure you have the pertinent bank certificates or shop's bills.

It is prohibited to ship out of the USSR arms and so-called securities. Antiques and [illegible] art may be shipped out provided you obtain [illegible] from the Ministry of Culture and have paid [illegible] duty amounting to 100 per cent of the price [illegible].

Detailed cust[illegible] on the *Tourist's Memo* [illegible]

Currency Exchange. [illegible] available at all border points [illegible] and most hotels. Service bureaus at hotels will [illegible] address and office hours of money-changing offices [illegible] exchange.

Rules for Photographers and Cine-camera Fans. It is a rare tourist who foregoes the pleasures of ph[illegible]aphy in a foreign country.

In the Soviet Union [illegible] may photograph everything and everywhere save objects coming under the head of the nation's defence. This applies to all types of military technology, seaports, major hydrotechnical objects, railway junctions, tunnels, railway bridges, industrial enterprises, and the like. Aerial photography and terrestrial panoramic photography, and photography within 25 kilometres from the frontier are prohibited. Ask for permission of the administration before you [illegible] your camera inside factories, research in[illegible] and the [illegible]. It stands to reason, too, that when you [illegible] must first obtain their consent.

If you intend to make a film [illegible] commercial purposes (for subsequent showing at cinem[illegible] television, etc.) apply to Sovexportfilm (7, Maly [illegible]kovsky Pereulok, Moscow), tel. 22[illegible]-32 02. Bear in mind [illegible] sensitive colour materials (films, paper, etc.) on sal[illegible] Union are adapted solely for Agfa and [illegible]

Intourist Se[illegible]

Every hotel [illegible] elsewhere in the Soviet Union) has an Intourist [illegible] Bureau. It is very useful to tourists and we advise you [illegible] it on arrival. The service bureaus are staffed with people who speak foreign languages and you will have no difficulty communicating with them.

One of their major functions is to exchange the vouchers issued to you by your travel agent for Intourist coupons, and to provide all other services.

The service bureau will relieve you of all travel cares and book tickets for you on internal and international railway and airlines. It will help you extend your visa and perform all other pertinent formalities.

The service bureau books tickets to theatres, concerts, cinemas and sports contests. Make sure that you book tickets well in advance, for every Muscovite is an avid theatre-goer and sports-fan and tickets are scarce.

The price of a theatre and concert ticket is 2 to 3.50 rubles, and of a cinema ticket 40 to 70 kopeks.

The service bureau will tell you what is showing at Moscow's theatres, concert halls and cinemas.

If your tour does not cover excursions and you wish to see the sights of Moscow, the service bureau will be glad to recommend the best sightseeing itineraries.

If you need a guide interpreter, the service bureau will be happy to provide one. Intourist guides speak English, Bulgarian, Spanish, Italian, Chinese, Hungarian, German, Polish, Portuguese, Rumanian, Serbo-Croatian, Finnish, French, Czech, Swedish and Japanese. The services of a guide-interpreter cost up to 3 hours—[illegible] rubles, for every subsequent hour—1 rubl[illegible] [illegible] kopeks.

You can hire a car for a sightseeing tour of Moscow and [illegible] environs or order a long-distance telephone call through [illegible] service bureau.

If you are unwell, the service bureau will summon a doctor [illegible] you. As you know, medical services in the Soviet Union are [illegible] of charge.

Approach your hotel service bureau with anything that [illegible] interest or trouble you. The receptionist will be glad [illegible] advise you and to render all the necessary assistance.

If You Are Passing Through Moscow

If you are passing through Moscow and have only a day [illegible] is what we recommend you to see:

1. *Excursion by car or tourist coach.* A three-hour tour wh[illegible] will give you a general idea of old and new Moscow. The [illegible] starts from Hotel National in the heart of the city and fo[illegible]

the Maurice Thorez Embankment (formerly Sophiiskaya), Red Square, Sverdlov Square, along Gorky Street, Sadovoye Koltso, Kutuzovsky Prospekt, Leninsky Prospekt, past Moscow University on the Lenin Hills back to the National.

2. *Tour of the Kremlin and Red Square.* A visit to the Kremlin cathedrals and the Armoury. The tour takes three hours.

If you have another day in Moscow, be sure to visit the *Exhibition of Economic Achievement of the U.S.S.R.* (see p. 60), which will give you a good idea of contemporary Soviet life and the cultural and economic achievements of Moscow and the rest of the Soviet Union. The excursion takes four hours. In the afternoon, pay a visit to the famous *Tretyakov Art Gallery* (see p. 150), the treasure trove of Russian fine art. The excursion there takes something like three hours.

Do your best, too, to see Moscow's glorious *Bolshoi Theatre ballet.*

If you have a few more days in Moscow, pick tours to suit your taste and inclinations.

Continue Your Trip

From Moscow you can make a tour of the Soviet Union—the subtropics of the Black Sea coast and the Siberian taiga, the Ukrainian steppelands, the mountains of the Caucasus, and the ancient towns of Russia and Central Asia.

Here is the list of cities where Intourist offers its services:

Leningrad, cradle of the Russian revolution, a city of magnificent architecture;

Black Sea health resorts of Batumi, Odessa, Sochi, Sukhumi and Yalta;

Siberian and Far Eastern cities:

Novosibirsk—the largest industrial centre and city of science in Western Siberia;

Bratsk, a new Siberian town neighbouring on the Bratsk Hydro-Power Station on the Angara, which is one of the world's largest;

Irkutsk, the city near the legendary Lake Baikal;

Khabarovsk, a major Soviet Far Eastern city.

Additional information on Visas

QUESTION: I would like to see an article about Intourist services, prices, etc. (C. C. Krause, Minneapolis, Minnesota; M. Suparoff, Foxboro, Massachusetts; and many other readers)

ANSWER: Intourist is our state-operated commercial travel agency. It works with some 700 firms and transport companies in nearly 100 countries, including about 100 in the United States. Intourist arranges tours for Soviet citizens abroad and for foreigners in the Soviet Union. We estimate that 25 million foreign travelers will visit our country between 1976 and 1980 and that 18 million Soviet people will go abroad.

We will deal here only with Intourist services for foreign travelers. They include sightseeing excursions, trips to museums and theaters, meetings with Soviet workers at factories and farms and with Soviet students, round table discussions and other affairs.

Intourist offers almost 30 different kinds of group or individual tours: motoring, [illegible] hunting, fishing, international competitions, [illegible] congresses and symposiums, excursions for schoolchildren and youth, cruises, art festivals and more.

Many visitors come for rest and medical treatment at spas in the North Caucasus (Essentuki, Zheleznovodsk, Kislovodsk, Pyatigorsk) or on the Black Sea (Sochi, Yalta, Odessa). Such a tour includes a room at a sanatorium, special diet meals, medical care and other services.

A new tour called the Russian Language Seminar is rapidly gaining popularity. Besides seeing the country, the traveler has a chance to brush up on Russian with special courses.

Cost depends on the class and type of the tour, distance, season and number of services. Intourist offers a discount on off season tours, frequently as low as one-fourth of the full price. There are special cut rates for youth and student groups, as well as for children.

Entry visas are issued within 10 days of receipt of applications at a Soviet Consulate. Foreign currency formalities are limited to declaring your currency at customs. Intourist also accepts credit cards from foreign banks and firms.

Itineraries include 135 cities of the country and are designed to suit all tastes. You can choose a separate republic or the whole country, the Caucasus, Siberia, Central Asia, the Far East, the leading cultural centers, health resorts or ancient [illegible] sites.

For instance, General [illegible], one of Intourist's major U.S. partners, offers the following tours:

1) "Spotlight on Russia and the Crimea"--16 days, Moscow--Kiev--Yalta--Leningrad, price 999 to 1,123 dollars, depending on the city of departure by air to the Soviet Union and on the season. (The cost includes air fare, hotel accommodations--much cheaper for two than for one--three meals a day and guide services.)

2) "Destination Black Sea and Caucasus"--16 days, Leningrad--Sochi--Tbilisi--Yerevan--Moscow, 1,159 to 1,458 dollars.

The American Express Company, another major Intourist partner, offers a 22-day "The Complete USSR" tour through Moscow, Bratsk, Irkutsk, Tashkent, Bokhara, Samarkand, Baku and Leningrad, for 1,059 to 2,085 dollars.

Incidentally, if you do plan to come, for more details get in touch with the Intourist office:

Vitaliy Kryazhev, Intourist Travel Information, 40 East Forty-ninth Street, New York, New York, 10017. Telephone: (212) 371-6953.

Soviet Life, May 1975, p. 59

12. Some questions about visas could be put to Nosenko based on information provided in the book, Your Trip to the USSR (A Tourists Manual). The book is published by Foreign Languages Publication House, Moscow. Although there is no date of publication in this book, the information provided in the book strongly suggests that it was published no later than 1962. The information states that "it should not take more than a week to receive one's visa." The applicant must fill in and sign an application form (sample enclosed) and enclose three photographs of passport size as well as a copy of the Intourist or Intourist contractor firm voucher to the effect that the applicant has paid the full cost of the tour. The tourist need not apply to the Soviet consulate in person, as the tourist firm will take care of the matter.



APPLICATION FORM

For Persons Who Wish to Obtain an Entry Visa
the U.S.S.R. or a Transit Visa Through the U.S.S.R.
(Write clearly in ink or type all answers in full)

QUESTIONS	ANSWERS
1. Surname, name and patronymic (persons who have more than one surname, or who have pen names, must list them in full; married women and widows must give their maiden name and their husband's surname)	
2. Date and place of birth	
3. Nationality	
4. Citizenship. If you were formerly a citizen or subject of another country, indicate former citizenship	
Place of present [illegible] and profession	

p 34

6. Reason for going to the U.S.S.R., duration of [illegible] and itinerary. Note. Persons applying for a transit visa through the U.S.S.R. must have an entry or transit visa of the [illegible] which or through [illegible] to proceed upon leaving the U.S.S.R.	
7. If minors under 16 years of age are accompanying you, indicate the surname, name and patronymic of each child	
8. Were you ever in the U.S.S.R. before? (If so, indicate when, where and purpose of stay)	
9. Surnames, names, patronymics and addresses of close relatives in the U.S.S.R.	
10. Your permanent address	

Date

(day, month, year)

Signature

p. 35

DOCUMENTS

Visas



To enter and leave the U.S.S.R., a foreign tourist must have a valid national passport and Soviet entry and exit visas. It should not take more than a week to receive one's visa.

Citizens of foreign countries are issued Soviet visas through Consulates of the U.S.S.R. in their own country. The applicant must fill in and sign an application form (see sample) and enclose three photographs of passport size, as well as a copy of the Intourist or Intourist contractor firm voucher to the effect that the applicant has paid the full cost of the tour. The tourist need not apply to the Soviet Consulate in person, as the tourist firm will take care of the matter.

Citizens of Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Chinese People's Republic, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and the Czechoslovak Republic have the right, according to a reciprocal agreement, to enter and leave the Soviet Union without applying for Soviet visas, on the basis of their national passports alone.

A person's national passport should not expire [illegible] the date of his departure from the U.S.S.R.

A Soviet tourist visa is valid for entry into the U.S.S.R. and exit during the time specified and is valid [illegible] ting the cities enumerated in the visa. A tourist [illegible] in and leaves the U.S.S.R. only through the border points indicated in his Soviet visa.

Should your plans change unexpectedly, your visa may be extended, the itinerary altered and the border entry and exit points changed without any additional formalities if Intourist is able to provide accommodations and transportation to comply with the change. In all events, you must notify Intourist of a change in plans a few days ahead.

Visitors' visas for visiting relatives in the U.S.S.R. are granted through the usual channels.

Group visas may be issued to tourists on cruises and to large tourist groups travelling together.

Visas are issued, extended, and itineraries and border-points of entry and exit are altered free of charge.

Transit Visas

Soviet transit visas are issued within three days of [illegible] by Soviet Em[illegible] Consulates. No Soviet transit visas are necessary for persons of any nationality flying over the territory of the U.S.S.R., on condition that all reservations (of no longer than 24 hours' stay in any given point of change) have been

made for him along the entire route through the U.S.S.R. and that the passenger has the right to enter the next contiguous country.

Health Certificates

Tourists from Africa, South America and Asia must have an International Vaccination Certificate, and tourists from India and Eastern Pakistan must have a certificate stating that they have been inoculated against cholera. Tourists from other countries do not need to present any health certificates and there will be no medical examination. However U.S.S.R. Public Health officers [illegible] additional proof of health from tourists arriving from countries known to have an epidemic at the time of arrival.

p - 37 -

13. It would be useful to ask Nosenko his comments on the information on "Passports and Other Formalities" taken from the book, A Motorist's Guide to the Soviet Union, by Viktor Louis and his wife Jennifer Louis. The book was published in Moscow in 1967.

Note: Viktor Louis and his wife are "slightly" known to Nosenko.



30 Motorist's Guide

hand-embroidered shirt or *blouse* (15 roubles upwards); toys; gramophone records (12 in. LP--1 rouble); *books* (comparatively inexpensive); traditiona silver- gilt-and-enamel ware (*e.g.* tiny fork for lemon or butterballs—1 rouble child's spoon with animal *handle*—3 roubles); wood, alabaster or potter ornaments.

If you would like to visit *the markets*, you should go as early as possibl in the day. You will be able *to find in the* market good quality fresh fruit which is often lacking in the *hotels*. Also on sale there are honey, fresh eggs and dairy products; there *may be various* items of local handwork as well. Th markets close at 5·00 p.m.

PASSPORTS AND OTHER FORMALITIES

In order to enter and leave the Soviet Union a foreign tourist must have a valid national passport and a Soviet entry visa. Soviet visas are issue free of charge usually within a seven-day period from the time of application to the Soviet Embassy or Consulate in the tourist's own country. The border points through which the tourist enters and leaves the Sovie Union must be those indicated in the Soviet visa.

Foreign tourists' arrivals in the Soviet Union are registered when they firs hand over their passports at the first Intourist service point indicated on the visa

In addition to Soviet visas, it is required that the citizens of most Wester European countries obtain visas for the Communist countries through whicl they will drive on their way to and from the Soviet Union: East Germany Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania or Bulgaria; East German visas are obtainable on entry to that country.

Besides an International Driving Permit, motorists must bring an international automobile registration certificate of the country of departure, stipulated in the 1926 International Automobile Traffic Convention. Tourists' cars can be brought into the Soviet Union and taken out again without payment of duty on condition that the owner gives a written guarantee to take the car out of the country upon departure. This guarantee is to be handed over to the customs authorities at the Soviet border.

It is forbidden to bring the following into the Soviet Union:

(a) arms and ammunition

(b) printed matter, films, photographs, negatives, drawings, etc. "which are hostile to the U.S.S.R. in political or economic respects".

Printed matter, plants (fruit, seeds, etc.) and animals are liable to inspection by customs authorities.

It is forbidden to take out of the Soviet Union:

(a) arms and ammunition

IV. Belorussian KGB and MVD.

1. It would be useful to question Nosenko about his knowledge of the chiefs of the KGB and the MVD in the Belorussian Republic. A list of names follows:

KGB and MVD Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of the Belorussian SSSR.

Chiefs

Lt. General Lavrentiy Fomich Tsanava - NKVD, MGB (State Security) 1941-1953.

Maj. General Mikhail Ivanovich Baskakov - MVD 1952-1954.

Lt. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn - KGB (State Security) 1954-1959.

----------- Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov - MVD 1960-1965.

Lt. General Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov - KGB (State Security) 1959-1973.

Lt. General Yakov Prokopyevich Nikulkin - KGB (State Security) 1973-

Deputies

Maj. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn - MVD 1952-1954

------------ Arkadiy Denisovich Rudak - KGB (State Security) 1959-

------------ Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov - KGB (State Security) 1959-1960.

Maj. General Stepan Alekseyevich Smorodinskiy - KGB (State Security) 1962-

------------ Ivan Leopoldovich Lysakovskiy - KGB (State Security) 1971-

2. What do you know about Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov?

Note: (a) Aksenov was Deputy Chairman of the KGB of Belorussia from 1959 to 1960. It is assumed that when Oswald arrived in Minsk in January 1960, Aksenov was Deputy Chairman of of the KGB and would definitely know about the Oswald case. From 1960 to 1965, Aksenov was MVD Minister of Belorussia. Therefore it would be under his direction that Oswald's passport and the departure of Oswald and Marina from Minsk was arranged. If Nosenko had access to Oswald's file, he must know about Aksenov. From 1965 to 1971, Aksenov was First Secretary of the Vitebsk Obkom of CP Belorussia, and since 1971, Aksenov has been Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Belorussian CP. He has been a member of the CC CPSU since 1976, and he is also a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. On May 9, 1978, Aksenov arrived in Columbia. He headed the Soviet delegation on the invitation of the Columbian Communist Party.

(b) A. N. Aksenov is no doubt identical with a Colonel Nikolay Aksenov with whom, according to Epstein's book, (page 146) Marina Oswald had an interview in 1961. Aksenov is also mentioned in McMillan's book (pages 132-133). Aksenov allegedly said to Marina, "Tell your husband not to worry. I believe your request will be granted." Also see page 125 of the same book.

✓ 3. Did you know or know of Arkadiy Denisovich Rudak?

Note: Rudak was Deputy Chairman of the KGB during 1959 to 1960 and might have taken part in the Oswald case while Oswald lived in Minsk.

✓ 4. Did you know or know of Major General Stepan Alekseyevich Smorodinskiy?

Note: Smorodinskiy was Deputy Chairman of the KGB for Belorussia in 1962 and most likely know about the Oswald case. His name would most likely appear in the Oswald file.

✓ 5. Do you know Lt. General Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov?

Note: Petrov was KGB Chairman for Belorussia from 1959 to 1973. Therefore, it would be his agency, the KGB, which would watch Oswald in Minsk. It is safe to assume that after the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, Petrov, as Chairman of the KGB of Belorussia, would review the Oswald file and send it to Moscow. He would also have been called to Moscow KGB headquarters to take part in the preparation of the spravka (summary) of the Oswald file.

✓ 6. What do you know about Lt. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn?

Note: Perepelitsyn was Chairman of the KGB of the Belorussian Republic from 1954 to 1959. Nosenko should know him or at least about him. Nosenko should be asked if Perepelitsyn took any part in the investigation of Oswald. (Perepelitsyn was Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR from 1959 to 1967. He died in Moscow.)

✓ 7. What part, if any, was played by General Sergey Grigoryevich Bannikov in the Oswald case, especially after the assassination of President Kennedy?

Note: Bannikov was mentioned by Nosenko as one of the Deputy Chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and later on as one of the Deputy Chairmen of the KGB of the USSR. From 1968 to 1978, Bannikov was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Supreme Court.

V. Nosenko - Nikolayev

✓ 1. Can you explain why you went to England and Cuba under the name Nikolayev and to Geneva using your true name, Nosenko? What would have happened if some Englishman or English intelligence officer had met you in Geneva in 1962 or in 1964 and greeted you in the presence of the other delegates with the words, "Oh, Mr. Nikolayev! How are you? I remember you. You visited England with the team of boxers."

VI GRU (Military Intelligence)

1. From where did you learn that the GRU was not informed about Oswald's presence in the USSR? Wouldn't the GRU officer in Intourist, whom you mentioned earlier, have known about Oswald's presence in the USSR? Did you ever hear that Oswald possibly had contact with the Soviet intelligence during his service in Japan?

2. You stated previously that there was no information that Oswald offered to give information on the US Marine Corps. You did not read the file. Then how do you know this to be the case? How do you know that the KGB and GRU made no attempt to debrief Oswald about his service in the US Marine Corps?

3. Previously you mentioned one Colonel Voloshin as an officer of the Defense Ministry of the USSR. Can you provide any additional information on this Voloshin? Could it be possible that he was a KGB officer instead of in the Defense Ministry?

Note: (a) According to Epstein's book, one Pavel T. Voloshin was an administrator at Patrice Lumumba University and was a KGB officer who accompanied a group of Russian dancers to Los Angeles in 1959 at just about the same time that Oswald was making weekend trips there to get his passport and possibly to make other arrangements for his trip to Moscow. A few weeks after Oswald decided to return to the United States, he received a letter from Patrice Lumumba University signed by Voloshin. (page 111)
(b) P. D. knew one KGB officer by the name of Voloshin (first and middle name forgotten) who used to work in SMERSH (military CI) and later in the late 1940's and beginning of the 1950's in S & T Department of the KGB.

VII. Marina.

1. From where did you pick up the information that Marina was a "simple obyvatel" (a politically unaware person) and that she was not anti-Soviet if you did not read the Oswald file?

2. You stated previously that Marina was an obyvatel. Do you have any comments on the following: "We knew each time you had a date. We knew when you applied for your marriage license. We knew the date of your wedding." These were the words of the Komsomol secretary in Minsk when Marina was expelled from the Komsomol.

✓ 3. Do you have any comments on Marina's statement when she said, "Our government (Soviet) knows every move I make." She make this comment shortly after her expulsion from the Komsomol.

✓ 4. Did you know that while in Minsk Marina belonged to a group of youths who gathered together to listen to Voice of America and BBC? Would that be enough for the KGB to have Marina in its card files? Is it possible that Marina was the KGB agent reporting on them?

✓ 5. You stated that if Marina had been recruited by the KGB, you would know about it and it would be in the file. But you did not read the file. How then do you know that she was not recruited?

✓ 6. You said that among Marina's relatives there was an officer of the Minsk Militia, a Lt. Colonel. Do you have any comments on Marina's revelation that her real father was a traitor and that he was shot? If her father was a traitor and he was shot, would his name be in the KGB card file? Would the name of Marina's mother be in the KGB card file as the wife of a traitor? Is it then possible that Marina's name also would be in the KGB card file somewhere?

✓ 7. You stated previously that KGB had no interest in Marina prior to her meeting Oswald and that the KGB investigated her only after Oswald applied for permission to register marriage with Marina. How do you know that? Did you read a special file on Marina? Marina revealed lately that while she was living in Leningrad in 1958 or 1959, she met a diplomat from Afghanistan who lured her to his hotel room and tried to make love to her. Do you think the KGB in Leningrad would know about this diplomat and whom he lured to his hotel? Is it possible that

Marina was already a KGB agent and she was directed to lure the diplomat to the hotel? In either case, the KGB would definitely know about Marina and if she was used by the KGB as a bait for foreigners, might she have already been an experienced KGB agent?

8. You stated previously that you saw Oswald's file only briefly and you read only a summary. Then how would you know that Marina was never used by the KGB? Did you personally make a direct check on whether or not Marina was a KGB informant?

✓ 9. In your previous testimony, you categorically denied that Marina was a KGB-MVD agent or informer. Do you have any comments on Marina's statement to Life Magazine that she was a "Soviet agent"? Is there any possibility that the KGB or MVD in Belorussia or in Leningrad, where Marina had lived previously, had recruitted her as an agent or informer and she continued to work for the KGB or the MVD until her departure to the US? Did you have any information about the possibility that there was another file in the KGB on Marina, a file for an agent or informer of the KGB or MVD? If such a file existed, it must be reflected in the Oswald file, as well as in the summary which you read.

✓ 10. Did you hear or know that while in Leningrad Marina dated one Oleg Tarussin, a student who had ambitions to enter the Soviet diplomatic service and who had some trouble with the authorities over a minor political incident?

✓ 11. Was there any information in Oswald's file to show that after Oswald married Marina, Marina was in the hospital for about five days?

✓ 12. What do you know about Marina's vacation in Kharkov shortly after she married Oswald?

Note: She may have been in Moscow instead of Kharkov.

13. Did you know that while in Minsk Oswald was in the Fourth Clinical Hospital for surgery on his adenoids? (Oswald got special attention from the doctors.)

Note: Marina's Aunt Valya, whose husband was an MVD Colonel, sent eggs to Oswald while he was in the hospital.

14. You previously stated that the reason that there were no difficulties in in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her departure from the Soviet Union was because Oswald was already living and working in the Soviet Union. How would the KGB have reacted to Oswald's marriage if they had known that Oswald wrote a letter to the American Embassy before his marriage about his desire to return to the United States?

15. Did you know that Oswald asked the American Embassy for permission to return to the United States before he married Marina?

VIII. Nosenko and Oswald case file.

✓ 1. Describe in detail your personal involvement with Oswald and with the Oswald case from the day Oswald arrived in the USSR to the day of his departure from the USSR. What positions in the KGB did you personally hold at that time?

✓ 2. Describe in detail your personal involvement with the Oswald case after the assassination of President Kennedy from 23 November 1963 to the day of your defection to the US.

✓ 3. In what activities were you involved in connection with the Oswald case and the assassination of President Kennedy while you were in Geneva at the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964? Name any Soviet diplomats or officers of Soviet intelligence (KGB, GRU) with whom you discussed the Oswald case and the death of the American President in Geneva.

✓ 4. Are you sure that there was no file on Oswald in the KGB before he arrived in the USSR? How do you know this? Did you personally check it?

✓ 5. You previously told American authorities that on the cover of Oswald's file "there definitely was a 'klichka'." But you said you did not remember the klichka. Do you remember whether the klichka was one word or two. As you did not read the file, is it possible that it was an old file, opened a few years previously by the First Chief Directorate or by the GRU?

6. You stated previously that nobody from the KGB had an interest in Oswald, but Oswald admitted that he had been interviewed by officials of the MVD (or KGB) at least twice on his arrival in the USSR and again before his departure. What was said about these interviews in the Oswald file or in the summary (spravka) of Oswald's file? Do you know the names of the people who talked to Oswald? Was it the KGB, MVD, or both?

7. What do you know about the "Intourist guide" Rosa Agafonova who visited Oswald in his hotel room shortly after his arrival in Moscow?

8. Did you personally know Rimma Shirokova, the Intourist guide or interpreter? Was she a KGB officer or KGB agent working for Intourist? Was there a report in the Oswald file that Rimma Shirokova sent two postcards to Oswald in Minsk from some vacation places in the south of the USSR? Did you know that Rimma Shirokova visited Oswald in Minsk? (See Epstein's book, page 124.)

Note: Oswald and Shirokova allegedly talked about the possibility of Oswald studying at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. It also should be noted that Shirokova visited Minsk shortly after Oswald and his wife Marina decided to go to the United States.

9. How did you know that Officer Krupnov wrote a request and opened a case file on Oswald? Did you see when Krupnov was writing it? Did you read the request or hear about it from somebody? If you saw it, who approved and sanctioned the request? If the KGB had no interest in Oswald, then why was a file opened?

10. Previously, on many occasions, you stated that the KGB had no interest in Oswald, that he was not normal, and that he should leave the country. Who among the KGB junior and senior officers made the decision that the KGB had no interest in Oswald and that he should leave the country? Describe in detail how you learned about it, from whom, from what documents, and when.

11. How did you know that there was no microphone in the Hotel Berlin room where Oswald stayed? Did you personally check the room before Oswald arrived?

12. You stated that no KGB officer was ever in contact with Oswald. How could you make such a statement if you did not read the file? You were not responsible for it, and, according to your information, you did not visit Minsk to study the Oswald case.

Note: Oswald's diary clearly shows that most of the students he met were most likely not students at all. They were more likely KGB officers under cover as students.

13. You stated previously that it was Officer Krupnov who wrote a request and opened the case file on Oswald, which was later sent to Minsk. Name other officers who participated in making the decision to open the file, who handled the file, and who sent the file to Minsk. What part did you personally play in Oswald's case while Oswald was in Moscow?

14. You stated previously that the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB was not interest in Oswald because it was concerned only "with internal matters." Isn't it true that the Second Chief Directorate is the internal counterintelligence organization and is responsible for foreigners who enter the Soviet Union for any reason? Isn't it true that the tourist department of the Second Chief Directorate is responsible for foreign tourists such as Oswald? Then why wasn't the Second Chief Directorate interested in Oswald? Do you see any contradictions in your statement?

✓ 15. You stated that there was no attempt made to exploit Oswald for propaganda purposes, such as Radio Moscow broadcasts, TV, lectures, etc. How do you know this? Do you have any comments on the following: "On October 19 (1960), Lee (Oswald) was interviewed in his room at the Hotel Berlin by a correspondent of Radio Moscow, Lev Setyayev, who was ostensibly seeking his impressions as a tourist to use in propaganda broadcasts overseas." Was there an officer in the KGB by the name of Setyayev? Was this interview organized by the KGB?

16. Do you have any information that Oswald might have been met in Leningrad by Intourist and then made all the arrangements to go to Moscow?

17. Who told Intourist that there was no KGB interest in Oswald? What is the name of the officer and his department who did so? While in Moscow, Oswald was interviewed by at least three American correspondents. Is it your opinion that the Second Chief Directorate was not interested to find out why Oswald talked to these newspapermen and who they were? Isn't that part of the KGB's responsibilities?

18. According to your statement, Oswald was not considered normal. Who determined that he was not normal? How many doctors, from what institutions, concluded that Oswald was not normal? The Second Chief Directorate and Intourist officers could not conclude that Oswald was abnormal without medical expertise.

19. If Oswald was abnormal, then why did Soviet authorities, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not inform the American Embassy about it?

Note: In his previous interrogation, Nosenko hesitated in answering these questions.

20. You stated previously that Oswald was in the hospital, the hospital said that Oswald was not normal, and there was no action taken to inform the American Embassy. How do you know all of this without reading the Oswald file?

21. Why do you think that the American Embassy would not have taken Oswald if he had been turned over to them? Do you know that any Soviet government office contacted the American Embassy and informed them about Oswald's presence and the suicide attempt in Moscow?

22. Was the only reason that the Soviet Government did not inform the American Embassy of Oswald's alleged suicide attempt that it was feared that he might try it again?

23. You stated that there was no psychological assessment of Oswald by the KGB nor by the hospital, and that there was no report of that nature. You did not read the file. You read only summaries. Then how could you know that there was no such report? How long was the summary--100 pages?

24. Do you know when and by whom a stateless passport was issued to Oswald? Where was it issued? Are stateless passports usually issued by the MVD on the recommendation and approval of the KGB? What would happen if the MVD issued a stateless passport without KGB knowledge or if the KGB was against it?

25. You stated previously that the KGB considered Oswald to have retained his American citizenship while he was in the Soviet Union. Do you have any comments on the fact that after his arrival in the USSR, and after having made oral requests for Soviet citizenship, he returned to the American Embassy, denounced his US citizenship and threw out his American passport to the American Consul at the Embassy. Do you think the KGB monitored Oswald's conversations with the American Consulate officers or received reports from the American Embassy (from Soviet employees there or Soviet agents there) about Oswald's denunciation of US citizenship? Did the KGB instruct Oswald to denounce his American citizenship at the American Embassy before he would be permitted to apply for Soviet citizenship?

26. You stated that the decision to give Oswald a stipend was made by the Red Cross. Explain in detail how the Red Cross learned that Oswald arrived in the USSR. Who informed the Red Cross that there was an American who needed help? Why was it decided to give help from the Red Cross and not from the Trade Union? It is understandable that Oswald might not have had enough money to start a new life in the USSR, but he was not a poor beggar who needed to be turned to the Red Cross instead of the Trade Union. How did you find out that it was the Red Cross that made the decision? According to available information, the Red Cross does not assign money to anybody without the recommendation of some other Soviet office. Which office was it: the KGB, MVD, the Council of Ministers, Intourist, or the USSR Supreme Soviet? Who

started it first?" Who made the decision on the amount to pay Oswald? Why was it decided to pay him 700 rubles a month instead of 500 or 1000? What was your salary as a KGB officer? Approximately 400 rubles a month, new money? Isn't it true that Oswald received more than you did?

✓ 27. If it was decided by the KGB officers and by Soviet doctors that Oswald was abnormal, then why was he permitted to marry a Soviet citizen?

Note: According to Soviet law, in every union republic, including Belorussia, the "marriage cannot be permitted between persons if one of them is pronounced a mental case or imbecile."

Did you have any information that the Minsk KGB reported to Moscow headquarters Oswald's intention to marry a Soviet citizen, in this case, Marina?

✓ 28. You stated previously that Oswald's file was sent to the Second Directorate of the Belorussian KGB. How do you know that it was sent specifically to the Second Directorate and not to the KGB chairman or his deputy with a special instruction?

✓ 29. What do you mean "to keep an eye on him" (Oswald)? That, according to your words, was the instruction from the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate to the Belorussian Second Directorate of the KGB.

✓ 30. You stated that there was no visible surveillance of Oswald, there was no microphone in his apartment, but you stated his mail was monitered and that there were agents around Oswald in places where he worked and lived. Explain how you learned about it. Do you know tha names of any agents who reported on Oswald? If you did not read the file on Oswald, how could you know about it?

✓ 31. Previously you stated that Oswald was handled no differently than any other American defector. ". . . The only difference was that he was not to be allowed to stay, and he was considered to be abnormal." If this was the only difference, and it is quite a big one, then why was he allowed to stay in the USSR? If Oswald was "not normal" according to the KGB officers, then this should be noted in the Oswald file which was sent to the Belorussian KGB. Therefore, the KGB and MVD in Belorussia knew about it. Then how and why was Oswald permitted to have a shotgun which he kept in his apartment in Minsk?

✓ 32. Do you have any information that while in the USSR, especially during the year 1960-1961, Oswald might have been visiting Cuba?

Note: Nosenko claimed that during October-November 1960, he (Nosenko) went to Cuba with a group of STATE PLANNING COMMISSION'S METALURGISTS headed by Ivan Strigen. He stayed in Cuba for two months.

✓33. Do you have any comments on the statement made by Marina's uncle, the MVD colonel: "I thought that Alik (Oswald) had not only given up his American citizenship but had become a citizen of the USSR."

Note: The question is that if an MVD colonel thought or could be fooled by the KGB that Oswald was a Soviet citizen, it is possible that he really was a citizen or that the KGB spread the rumor that he was.

✓34. What do you know about Oswald's association with the Foreign Language Institute in Minsk?

✓ 35. To your knowledge, what KGB, GRU, and other intelligence schools or training courses were in Belorussia during your work with the KGB?

✓ 36. What do you know about Oswald's application to attend Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow? Why was Oswald denied entrance to the University?

Note: At that time, Colonel Yerzin, senior KGB officer, was a deputy director of Patrice Lumumba University. (P. D.)

✓37. Did you know that Oswald took with him to the American Embassy a letter from his friend Ziger in Minsk? Oswald left that letter at the American Embassy.

✓ 38. What do you know about the fact that Oswald, while in Minsk, received American magazines and other publications? Do you think the KGB knew about it?

✓ 39. Did you know that Oswald was helped to study Russian at the Minsk plant by one of his co-workers and by one of his friends, Erich, and by a girl at the Foreign Language Institute? Do you know the names of those people?

40. What do you know about Oswald's association and friendship with foreign students in the USSR in Minsk and Moscow? Do the names Mary Louise Patterson and Mrs. Roberto Camacho mean anything to you?

41. What do Oswald's files show about his contacts with Cuban students in Minsk?

Note: McMillan's book stated that Oswald began to seek out the Cuban students in Minsk, of whom there were 300 or so, to learn what he could of Castro's revolution. (See page 127.)

42. You stated previously that Oswald was a poor shot and that during his hunting trips he did not kill anything. Was this information in the summary you read? Do you have any comments on the fact that according to the Warren Commission Report and the records of Oswald's service in the Marines that he, Oswald, was a sharp shooter and marksman? Was the "fact" that Oswald was a poor shot mentioned in the summary?

43. You stated previously (27 and 29 July 1964) that you saw the file on Oswald only briefly and that the file was at the Seventh Department for only 35-40 minutes. Then how do you know that nobody in the Soviet Union, including KGB officers, ever sat down with Oswald and got all the information on Oswald? Was everything that you told to US authorities about Oswald picked up from the summary during those 35-40 minutes?

44. Describe in detail how you and other officers of the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate worked together on writing the first Spravka (summary) on Oswald. You also stated that this spravka (the first one) was prepared in Moscow before the Oswald file from Minsk arrived in Moscow. What material did you use in preparing the spravka? Was there another file on Oswald in Moscow or was it a control file (Kontrolnoye delo)?

Note: In important cases the real file is in the place where the subject lives and works. In this case, the Oswald file was in Minsk. Moscow would have an almost identical file on the subject for control purposes and for instructions on how to handle and develop the case. This headquarters file is called the Control File. This file exists on the person who is already an agent or who is under development or training.

45. You stated that when the file on Oswald arrived from Minsk, you, together with other officers looked quickly through the file, then senior officers Fedoseyev and Matveyev of the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate took the file and you never saw it again. Because the file was in your department only 20-30 minutes (in other places Nosenko said 35-40 minutes), the Spravka could not be written in such a short time, and because the file was taken away to the higher authorities of the Second Chief Directorate and to the KGB chairman, you had no chance to see the second Spravka. Then again the question is which summary did you read--the second or the first or both? Describe in detail how long the summary was, what was in it, and how long it took for you to read it. Did you make any notes from the summary in case later on you had to report the "facts" to US intelligence?

46. What do you know about Oswald's visit (from Minsk) to the American Embassy in Moscow on July 8, 1961?

Note: Oswald flew from Minsk to Moscow allegedly without permission from the Soviet authority.

What do you know about Marina's visit to Moscow on July 10, 1961? What part did the KGB play in the arrangements of Marina's visit to the American Embassy in Moscow without checking her papers and without stopping her at the gates. In what hotel in Moscow did Oswald and Marina stay at that time?

✓47. You stated previously that the First Chief Directorate provided no information about Oswald before Oswald went to Mexico. What information did the First Chief Directorate give to the Second Chief Directorate before he went to Mexico? Did you read this information? If you did not personally read it, then how did you learn the contents of the First Chief Directorate information? Who from the First Chief Directorate particularly talked to the officers of the Second Chief Directorate and with whom did they talk?

48. How did you learn what Oswald said at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City? Who told you that Oswald wanted to return to the USSR? Was this written in the summary?

P. 81

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Rodger S. Gabrielson
OLC/C&R

EXTENSION: 1133

NO. REF TO: Con. No. TS191722 thru C

DATE: 19 June 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
Mr. N. Shepanek			
1. ~~[illegible]~~ SA/DO/O Tube: ~~DX6~~-Green			
2. ~~Mr. Jack Sullivan~~ ~~DS~~ ~~Tube: FW~~			
3. ~~Mr. Youn~~g ~~OGC Tube: BH2 Green~~			
4. ~~Mr. Dick [illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~			
5. ~~[illegible]~~dt ~~[illegible] Tube [illegible]~~			
6. ~~Mr. Hubert [illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~			
7. Rodger Gabrielson OLC			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached is a letter from the House Select Committee on Assassinations dated ______________. Please respond as soon as possible.

Shep: Please have CI look at this. It's the T.S. material from Deryabin's safe - requested by Blakey. Thanks,

Rodge

(1 to 7: CI staff says they may be shown to Blakey

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Source SR/CI/K
Doc. No. XAAZ-17241
Doc. Date 20 APR 1964
Copy No. 0 Repro 2
Number of Pages 38
Number of Attachments

REGISTRY

CIA Control No. TS# 191722
Date Document Received 15 JUN 1979
Logged By B

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B. Digg	15 JUN 1979		15 JUN 1979				
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	[illegible] 15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1D15	B. Digg	19 JUN 1979		19 JUN 1979				
[illegible] SA/DO/O LA/C/[illegible]	[illegible]	19 June 79		19 June 79				
DDO/TSCO	B. Digg	20 JUN 1979		20 JUN 1979				
DCI/OLC Breckinridge or Hadilson	[illegible] 20 Jun 79							
DDO/TSCO								

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this fo… are completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for r…

DOWNGRADED	
TO	
By (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE

When finished with these documents return them to DDO/TSCO as we are the control Office for these documents.

TS# 191722
TS# 191722A
TS# 191722B
TS# 191722C

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP I)

(40)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET [redacted] EYES ONLY

LATEST VERSION

1927 to 1934	Lived in Nikol
Fall 1934	Entered "zero"
1935 to 1939	Moved to Lening and then direct then director o cessively on Ul Pr. Maksima Gor (different ones
1938	Father appointe missar of Shipt Commissar. Fam at Ul. Serafim Year school No. Polyanka.
une 941	Completed 6th with parents whe

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Source SR

Doc. No. XAAZ-17241/1

Doc. Date 11 MAY 1964

Copy No. # Repro 2

Number of Pages 28

Number of Attachments

REGISTRY

CIA Control No. 191722A

Date Document Received 15 JUN 1978

Logged By B

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B. Swigg	15 JUN 1978		1[illegible]				
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	[illegible] 15 June							
DDO/TSCO 19/6/78	B. Swigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
Shepanek SA/DO/O	[illegible]	19 June 78		19 June 78				
AC/CI ([illegible])				20 JUN 1978				
DDO/TSCO	B. Swigg	20 JUN 1978						
DCI/OLC Breckinridge	[illegible]							
DDO/TSCO								

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
By (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

T O P S E C R E T

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP-1)

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Source SR/CI/K
Doc. No. XAAZ-17241/2
Doc. Date 19 MAY 1964
Copy No. #Repro 2
Number of Pages 22
Number of Attachments

REGISTRY

CIA Control No. TS# 191722B
Date Document Received 15 JUN 1978
Logged By B

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B Swigg	15 JUN 1978			[illegible]			
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	[illegible] 15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1Q15	B. Swigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
[illegible] SA/DO/C	[illegible]	19 Jun 78		19 Jun 78				
[illegible]								
DDO/TSCO	B. Swigg	20 JUN 1978		2[illegible] JUN 1978				
DCI/OCC Breckinridge or Gabrielson								
DDO/TSCO								

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
BY (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP 1)

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Source C/SR
Doc. No. CSCI-3/781,491
Doc. Date 19 May 1964
Copy No. # Repro 2
Number of Pages 2
Number of Attachments

REGISTRY

CIA Control No. TS# 191722C
Date Document Received 15 JUN 1978
Logged By B

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B. Bigg	15 JUN 1978		15				
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	[illegible]							
DDO/TSCO 1515	B. Swigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
SA/DO/C	McLipawic	19 Jun 78		19 June 78				
ACCI (McCoy)								
DDO/TSCO	B. Swigg	20 JUN 1978		20 JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Breckinridge or Gabrielsen								
DDO/TSCO								

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
By (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

TOP SECRET

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP 1)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

TOP SECRET

DEFECTORS - NOSENKO

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Report on: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, Soviet	2 Apr 64
	Attachments: 1. Memo for Record from David E. Murphy, Subject: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case	2 Apr 64
	2. Memo for Director of Security from Lawrence R. Houston, Subject: Parole Status of Defectors	3 Apr 64
	3. Memo, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO	Jan 75
	Letter for Mr. Richard Helms from J. Walter Yeagley, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	20 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Richard Helms, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Forms I-125 and background data attached)	9 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Louis Wienckowski from Frank E. Bartos, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko	24 July 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Victor R. White, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO	18 Jul 69
	Routing Sheet from Chief, SR Division to DD/OS	13 Feb 64
	Memo for Mr. McGeorge Bundy from Thomas H. Karamessines, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	11 Feb 64
	Memo for US Intelligence Board Members from Marshall S. Carter, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
	Newspaper clipping: Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet	
	Newspaper clipping: U.S. Lets Swiss and Red Envoys talk to Defector	15 Feb 64
	4. Memo for Acting Chief, Support Branch from Jack M. Bauman	12 May 64
	5. Memo for Special Agent in Charge District Field Office from Victor R. White, Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)	10 Jul 64

TAB	TITLE	DATE
	Memo for Headquarters from John D. Noble, Jr., Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of) with Attachment: Emergency Instructions (2)	1 Jul 64
	6. Memo for the Record from John M. Maury, Subject: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case w/att	5 Aug 69
/ 2	Nosenko's Request for Political Asylum	4 Feb 64
2	Secrecy Agreements and Financial Arrangements Between the CIA and Yuriiy Ivanovich Nosenko	21 Apr 69
3	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Office of Security Reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD	31 Dec 74
4	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Nosenko	13 Jan 75
✓	Attachments: 1. Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subject: Yuriiy Ivanovich Nosenko;	9 Jan 75
	1A. Memo for USIB Members from M. Carter, 12 Feb 64, Subject: Yuriiy Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
5	Questions and Answers Concerning the Treatment of Soviet Defector Nosenko	—
5	Memo for the IG, Subject: The Nosenko Case	67
	Attachment: 1. Summary of 1967 Document Which Outlines the Nosenko Case	

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES :

Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case

1. Mr Helms, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.

2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what we at least considered to be two problems on which we would like the advice of the Department of Justice. First, we would seoon feel compelled to begin hostile interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered what the legal position would be in circumstances in which we detained Nosenko against his will for this purpose. Second, we would have to be ready after determining that we could obtain no additional information from Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to Germany and transferring him to Soviet custody in Berlin where this has been done a number of times in the past.

3. There was some discussion of whether deportation to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms explained we would probably face publicity problems in deporting to a third country of the kind we would encounter if he were free in the U. S. Mr. Helms noted there were many items of information which we and the FBI realize are of no significance because of the file holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best place.

4. The question of the basis for detention was again raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "exclusion and parole case" which means he has not been admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is responsible for him while he is in this country. This

parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further. In this event, we would be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest and deportation was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston. Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA Office of Security officials to get the background of their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helms thanked Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall" in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

14-00000

C/SB

SECRET

OGC 64-0903

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states: "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status." This means that the responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word "minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.

3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed departure.

Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

cc: DD/P
C/SR

SECRET

January 1975

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media.

2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet officials/in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in the United States.

SECRET

Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

Department of Justice
Washington 20530

jw

R

October 2[illegible], 1969

Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms: Re: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
(ER 69-5003/1)

Reference is made to your letter dated October 9, 1969, concerning the above case, in which you urge the concurrence of the Attorney General in your proposal to have the above-named alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, as amended.

The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has informed me that on the basis of the records of his Service and the information furnished by you, and in the absence of any other evidence adverse to the alien, he concurs in your proposal that the alien be permitted to enter the United States for permanent residence under the authority of the foregoing statute.

Upon the basis of all the evidence received for consideration and your statement of recommendation and approval which carries with it your determination that the entry of the individual concerned is in the interest of national security and in the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, I concur in your recommendation that the admission for permanent residence of the subject alien be authorized under the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended.

Respectfully,

For the Attorney General

J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

9 OCT 1969 ER 69-5003/1

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrell:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance of subject into the United States for permanent residence since his entry is in the interest of the national security and ~~essential to the furtherance of~~ the national intelligence mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject has provided valuable information to this Agency and he will continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a period of five years and has submitted to a technical interrogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and should any information be developed definitely disproving his bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the Attorney General.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

There are enclosed Forms I-125 and background data, in duplicate, concerning the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/

Richard Helms
Director

Enclosures.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/ H. J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

8 October 1969
Date

Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Signer's copy
1 - DDCI
1 - SR
1 - SB Div.
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP
1 - OGC
2 - CS Files

SECRET

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)

30 October 1927		Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR		
Male	Divorced	Brown	Blue/Gray	5ft. 11 inches
Soviet	Caucasian	--		

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SUBJECT:	Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
AKA:	Yuri NOSSENKO
DPOB:	30 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR
MARITAL STATUS:	1946 - Married and divorced Flavia NOSENKO (Nee: SHISHOV). 1946 - Married Augustina K. NOSENKO (Nee: TELEGIN), 1949 - separated and 1951 - divorced. 23 June 1953 - Married Ludmila Yulianovna NOSENKO (Nee: KOZHEVNIKOVA), January 1964 - separated and 1969 - divorced.
CHILDREN:	Daughters - Oxana NOSENKO, born 21 August 1954, Moscow; Tamara NOSENKO, born 13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USSR)
EDUCATION:	1942-1945 - Attended various USSR Naval Schools. 1945-1950 - Attended Institute of International Relations, Moscow.
EMPLOYMENT:	March 1951-March 1953 - Soviet Naval RU (Naval Intelligence). March 1953-February 1964 - Officer in KGB (The Committee for State Security).
MILITARY:	Lieutenant in USSR Navy while in school and during RU service.
NATIONALITY:	Soviet
PRESENT AND PAST POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS:	1943-1954 - Member Komsomol, USSR 1956 - Candidate Communist Party 1957-1964 - Member Communist Party, USSR

SECRET

SECRET SP-1687

18 JUL 1969

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO

Reference is made to previous correspondence in this case.

~~Subject continues to be of op~~erational interest ~~to this Agency. Therefore, it is~~ requested subject's parole to this Agency be extended for an additional period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of his stay of 16 August 1969.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED
TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

NITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20536

PLEASE ADDRESS REPLY TO

AND REFER TO THIS FILE NO.

July 24, 1969

A13 724 817

Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Louis Wienckowski

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko,
Your SP-1687.

Dear Sir:

As you requested in your letter dated July 18, 1969, the subject ~~has been given a further~~ period of stay to expire on February 16, 1970.

Sincerely,

Frank E. Bartos

Frank E. Bartos
Chief Intelligence Officer
Field Inspection and Security Division

16 Jan. 1970

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

11 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with those contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

TOP
EYES ONLY

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans

CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
2 cc - SR/CI/K-Downey
1 cc - C/CI
1 cc - CSR
1 cc - DD/OS

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account

of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

Defection Preceded Report to Swiss Police, Apparently Ruling Out Negligence

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 — Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place in Washington at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public. The department said that a Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Soviet Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 9.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressure.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities. Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.

1965

file

U.S. Lets Swiss And Red Envoys Talk to Defector

Nosenko Again Voices Desire For Asylum

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Soviet secret police defector Yuri I. Nosenko is in the United States where he was interviewed yesterday by officials of both the Russian and Swiss Embassies.

The State Department said each interview lasted less than an hour and that a Department official was present each time. Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier request for asylum in the United States and it will be granted.

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips, in giving out this information, declined to say where the interviews took place or to give any details. Earlier he had said it was possible that newsmen here will be allowed to talk with Nosenko.

Soviet Kicks up Fuss

These developments came as the Soviet Union kicked up a diplomatic fuss over the disappearance of Nosenko on Feb. 4, from Geneva, where he had been assigned as an "expert" in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. Phillips said he was "on temporary duty from KGB (secret police) headquarters in Moscow."

Up to yesterday Moscow had been directing its public diplomatic wrath at the Swiss, charging them with loose security. The provision for a Swiss diplomat to interview Nosenko was to assure the Swiss that the United States had taken part in no illegal act on their soil.

/The Swiss already had strongly rejected the Soviet charges.

On Wednesday, Phillips re-

See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1

Wash Post
2/15/64

Folio

Swiss, Soviets See Defector

ported yesterday, a Soviet Embassy messenger brought a message to the State Department asking for information "as to the manner in which Mr. Nosenko presented himself to the U.S. authorities and requested an opportunity to interview him." The Department agreed to the interview with American officials present, and said Nosenko also was "agreeable." A reply about the defection also was given to the Soviet Embassy.

Also on Wednesday, in Geneva, Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin gave newsmen an angry statement aimed at the Swiss and charging "provocative activity" by unspecified Western agents. Up to then Tsarapkin had been saying both privately and publicly that the Nosenko defection would not affect the disarmament talks.

Yesterday the Soviets stepped up their protest in two places, Moscow and Geneva.

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called in American Ambassador Foy Kohler and charged the United States with impermissable acts in the case. He stopped short of a kidnaping charge, however. Kohler replied that on behalf of the United States he rejected any implication of American wrongdoing.

Serious Effects Hinted

In Geneva, Soviet officials, including Tsarapkin himself, privately spread to the press hints of serious consequences. Soon there were rumors that Moscow would pull out its delegation, but up to last night no such threat had actually been made, according to word reaching Washington.

In public Tsarapkin said only "I have nothing to say, I am not in the position to tell you anything."

At some so far unspecified date, Nosenko, who had apparently crossed from Switzerland to France, was flown to the United States. It is assumed he is in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency, the normal course for defectors.

Officials here yesterday were knocking down the idea that he was a particularly big fish, that he knew any atomic secrets or that he knew anything about Soviet disarmament strategy. Rather, they said, he was a KGB staff officer, a security man operating, as is the Soviet practice, in a tight compartment. That would mean he would have useful and perhaps important knowledge of part of the KGB but probably not much more.

Believed Genuine

It is assumed here that the 36-year-old Nosenko is a genuine defector though the possibility of his being a double agent has not been overlooked. It also is felt here that the Soviet protest was no stronger than could be expected. The request for an interview, rare but not unprecedented, was granted in hopes of reciprocal treatment should the occasion arise.

Moscow dispatches said there had been no word up to last night of the defection on the Soviet radio or in the press though word of mouth reports had spread through the capital.

It was felt here that Moscow might have stepped up its protest after Tsarapkin had publicly downgraded the case in Geneva. At any rate U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster and Tsarapkin held another business session in Geneva yesterday at which they said the case was not discussed.

It also was noted here that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has been meeting in Moscow all this week. But whether the Nosenko case was discussed was not known.

Wash Post
2/15/64

14-00000

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch YAF

FROM : Chief, Operational Support Division

SUBJECT : AEFOXTROT
#262 622

1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May 1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane, Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs. Bagley, Karpovich ~~([illegible])~~, McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

> Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the Subject:
>
> (1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings," but may have the necessary silverware with which to eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be exercised with regard to controlling the silverware, and it was suggested that at least two of the guards be required to count the silverware in and out; that the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)
>
> (2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is understood that there is quite a bit of equipment available through Logistics channels.)
>
> (3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear; change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.

	DD/ICS
	ADD[illegible]/ICS
	ACST/IOS
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
1	C/[illegible] YAF
2	Bagley
	[illegible]
	[illegible]

SECRET

(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.

(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.

(NOTE--These changes with regard to the bath, haircut, cigarette are not to be considered as something to be done on a regular schedule. We will await specific instructions from SR Division as to when these items are to be accomplished in the future.)

(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the Subject only on Tuesday each week.

(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely the same, and our security procedures, including searches, will continue to be at maximum control.

3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed as to their responsibilities in this matter.

Jack M. Bauman

Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)

ADMINISTRATIVE

Headquarters

10 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR : Special Agent in Charge
District Field Office

SUBJECT : LESNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)
#262 622 C - SD/1

1. Reference is made to the outline of emergency instructions submitted by you on 1 July 1964 for Headquarters approval.

2. The plan as outlined is approved and should be implemented immediately.

Victor R. White

OBIASSEN:dr
JULY 1964
PPLEMENTAL

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/OSD
	DC/OSD
	C/SRD
	C/S:3
✓	C/S3
	C/ID/
	[illegible]
	A&TS

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters

SUBJECT : LEGNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of)
#262 622 C SD/1

1. Attached are instructions and procedures to be followed in the event of emergency situations affecting the SUBJECT's health, safety and custody, as well as the security of the safehouse where SUBJECT is currently being held.

2. This is to formalize instructions which, for the most part, are already in effect and have been briefed to the personnel of the District ~~Field Office who are concerned~~ with this case.

3. Dissemination of copies of these instructions to members of the Special Security Detail will be made upon notification of Headquarters approval.

for JOHN D. NOBLE, Jr.
Special Agent in Charge
2 July 64

Attachment:

Emergency Instructions (2)

[illegible]

[illegible]

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions and procedures are set forth below for the handling of emergency situations such as fire, the escape or attempted escape of SUBJECT, and the sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT. Should such situations arise, it might be necessary to call on the Police, the Fire Department, or outside medical facilities for assistance. It is possible that in such an event representatives of the press or curiosity-seekers in the local community might be attracted to the site, thereby creating security problems with respect to the custody and protection of the SUBJECT from a publicity standpoint.

In view of the above, it is therefore imperative that these instructions be thoroughly understood and memorized by all personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on this case.

FIRE
(Main House)

1. In case of fire in the Main House, the person discovering the fire should apply the nearest fire extinguisher, unless, in his judgment, the fire has reached such proportions where available equipment would be useless. Simultaneously, he should dispatch another member of the Security Detail to alert the Senior Security Agent (SSA) and the other occupants of the house. If no one is available in the immediate vicinity, the person discovering the fire should alert others in the house by shouting "FIRE".

2. Upon being notified of a fire, the SSA shall be responsible for directing the fighting of the fire, protecting classified and sensitive documents and equipment on the premises, calling the local Fire Department if circumstances warrant, and evacuating personnel. Also, at the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

3. In utilizing members of the Security Detail in fighting a fire, it should be borne in mind that two guards must be maintained on the third floor at all times, so long as the SUBJECT remains confined to his quarters. If it should become necessary to remove the SUBJECT from his quarters during an emergency, a minimum of four guards should be present unless circumstances are such as to make this infeasible. In

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

any event, every possible security precaution should be taken during the movement of SUBJECT, including the use of handcuffs or any other restraining devices deemed necessary in order to maintain proper custody and control over the SUBJECT and prevent his escape.

4. If, in the judgment of the SSA, a fire has reached, or is likely to reach proportions that it could not be controlled by firefighting equipment on the premises, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department. In this event, the Security Detail should move with dispatch to remove the SUBJECT from the premises prior to arrival of the Fire Department. The SUBJECT should be placed in an automobile, accompanied by four members of the Security Detail, and driven away from the premises. At appropriate intervals, telephone calls should be made to the safehouse. If no answer is received, the cognizant DEO official should be contacted for instructions as to whether to return to the safehouse or proceed to an alternate site.

FIRE
(Tenant House)

1. In case of fire in the Tenant House, the occupants thereof should be instructed to immediately notify the Main House and to use any available means to combat the fire until assistance arrives, unless the fire is out of control, in which case all efforts should be directed towards the evacuation of the occupants of the premises. It should be clearly understood that in no case should any of the occupants of the Tenant House call the Fire Department. This decision is the sole responsibility of the SSA.

2. Upon notification of a fire in the Tenant House, the person notified should immediately inform the SSA and assist in the dispatching of available personnel and fire extinguishers to combat the fire. If, in the judgment of the SSA, the fire has reached, or is likely to reach, proportions that it could not be controlled by the available firefighting equipment, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department and to take necessary precautionary measures to prevent the observation of the SUBJECT by firemen or other unauthorized persons who might be attracted to the scene.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

3. At the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

ESCAPE OR ATTEMPTED ESCAPE

1. Strict vigilance and security should be maintained on a 24 hour basis in accordance with established procedures in order to discourage and prevent the SUBJECT's escape. If SUBJECT should make an attempt to escape, sufficient force should be used as is necessary under the circumstances in order to subdue the SUBJECT and maintain custody and control over him. However, unnecessary brutality and the indiscriminate use of force will not be condoned.

2. All personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on duty at the site shall be alerted by means of the emergency alarm and/or other appropriate means, and brought into play on any escape attempt. Should the SUBJECT succeed in escaping from the house proper, the SSA shall be responsible for coordinating and directing a hot pursuit of the SUBJECT by all means available.

3. The use of firearms should be scrupulously avoided except in extreme circumstances of self-defense. However, the SSA under circumstances that indicate there are no other means of preventing SUBJECT's total escape, may direct a qualified firearms-trained agent to fire shots over SUBJECT's head followed by verbal warning to halt. In no event, except in self-defense as stated above, will an agent shoot directly at the SUBJECT.

4. At the first available opportunity, the SAC/DFO, or in his absence, one of the ASACs, should be telephonically advised of all the circumstances surrounding an escape attempt. In no case shall the Police be notified unless authorized by the SAC or ASAC.

ILLNESS OR INJURY

1. In case of sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT, Dr. Charles BOHRER, or other physician designated by him in the event

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

of his absence, should be immediately notified and advice obtained as to any emergency action which should be taken pending his arrival. Likewise, the SAC or ASAC/[illegible] should be notified immediately after talking to the doctor in order that he might be apprised of the situation and any instructions or treatment prescribed by the doctor. Regardless of any instructions given by the doctor, no action shall be taken to remove the SUBJECT from the premises or to communicate with any hospital or ambulance service without the prior authorization of the SAC or ASAC.

2. Should it become necessary to remove the SUBJECT to a hospital or other location away from the premises, every possible precaution should be taken to maintain close custody and control over him, and to prevent disclosure of his true identity and status to unauthorized persons.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION

1. Two men on duty on third floor who will keep SUBJECT under constant observation twenty-four hours a day.

2. Four men in attendance whenever SUBJECT leaves cell while confined to third floor.

3. Six men in attendance whenever SUBJECT is taken to interrogation room on second floor, all to remain available in adjoining room for removal signal from visitors.

4. Coveralls taken from SUBJECT at 2200 hours and returned the following morning at 0700 hours daily, leaving SUBJECT in shorts and undershirt overnight.

5. Military appearance and prompt shift schedules maintained at all times when in presence of SUBJECT.

6. Careful room search, including clothes and bunk, to be conducted every time SUBJECT leaves cell.

7. SUBJECT must stand in West corner of cell facing wall whenever anyone but Dr. BOHRER enters cell.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

8. Windows in cell to remain blacked out and doors to other rooms on 3rd floor to be closed and locked when SUBJECT leaves cell, in order to prevent his becoming oriented to surroundings.

9. No unnecessary conversation shall be conducted with SUBJECT or among agents, nor shall any mention of last names be made within SUBJECT's hearing.

10. SUBJECT is not to have access to newspapers and magazines, nor permitted to hear radio or television, nor shall there be any discussion of news events within his hearing. He may be provided selected reading material upon authorization of Headquarters personnel concerned with the case.

11. Recording devices to be promptly activated in order to pick up any comments by SUBJECT or conversation between him and the doctor or other operational personnel.

12. Any unusual or significant comments, movements or activities of SUBJECT to be promptly brought to the attention of the SSA.

13. Telephone numbers of key Security and Operational personnel, as well as photographs and physical description of SUBJECT to be maintained in a secure place for ready reference by the SSA.

14. Should it become necessary to answer questions by the Police or Fire Department regarding the site, personnel at the site, or with specific reference to the SUBJECT, such inquiries should be handled by the SSA with the senior Police or Fire Department official on the scene. The SSA should converse in private with such official, and identify himself by utilizing his DODD credential. He should explain briefly, and only to the extent necessary, that the property is leased and that it is used occasionally for training purposes. All inquiries concerning the SUBJECT should be parried, if possible. However, if necessary, it may be explained that the SUBJECT has a mental disorder which sometimes requires special treatment. He should not be identified under his alias or otherwise. The SSA should tactfully but firmly request that his own identity, plus his DOD affiliation, be held in strict confidence, especially with regard to the press. Inquiries by members of the press or members of the civilian population should be answered by stating that the site is rented by a private group who meet periodically for recreation.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

SPECIAL CONTACTS

1. George PANAGOULIS, Chief of Police, Prince Georges County. (Personally known to SNODDY under GOLIATH)
2. Lieutenant MOON, Commanding Officer, Barracks H, Waldorf, Maryland, Maryland State Police. (Personally known to FERRALL under GOLIATH)
3. Emergency Ambulance - Greenbelt Volunteer Fire Department. (Can be obtained through SNODDY)

Above not to be contacted unless authorized by SAC or ASAC.

OLC 69-0675

5 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Yurly Ivanovich Nosenko Case

1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft memo of 17 June 1969 (copy attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yurly Ivanovich Nosekno case, I have briefed the following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcommittees along the lines proposed on the dates indicated:

Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee -- 23 July 1969

William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee -- 24 July 1969

Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee -- 24 July 1969

Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations Committee -- 29 July 1969

2. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective chairmen when and if they thought it appropriate. None of the staff officers registered particular concern or curiosity about the case and I think it doubtful that all of our chairmen have been informed. Nevertheless, I think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it further at this time.

John M. Maury

JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

Attachment:

Distribution:
Original - OLC Subject File
1 - DDP
1 - Chief, CI Staff
1 - Chief, SB Division
1 - D. Security
1 - OGC
1 - OLC Chrono

SECRET

SECRET EYES ONLY 1-9-12-5/2

DRAFT:JMM - 19 June 1969

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko Case

The following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case. They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees be briefed along the lines indicated.

---

1. This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has received press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.

2. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Staff Officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. He was then brought to the United States where he has since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debriefings by officers of the Agency and the FBI.

SECRET EYES ONLY

3. Nosenko had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years at the time of his defection. Nosenko has provided a large quantity of counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence. For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and foreign liaison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing investigative activity. In addition, Nosenko identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and its techniques and methods.

4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Nosenko, the privileged and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government, was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were made to accommodate Nosenko under highly secure conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases at least, by the additional need to provide Nosenko with continuing personal protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB officer,

he would be targotted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts. With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Nosenko's situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning his bona fides.

5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining alert to the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his stay in the United States Nosenko has cooperated with his interrogators and with the other ~~officers responsible for his safety~~ and welfare, and our current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal, independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance.

6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the fact that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosenko is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences, particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this calculated risk in an attempt to steer him toward a reasonably normal life.

NOSENKO

Question #1 - Conditions under which Nosenko was held while at Clinton? Locked in? Let outside for entertainment? Prisoner? Treatment?

Answer:

During the period of 4 April 1964-13 August 1965, Nosenko was held in strict confinement under the following conditions:

a. Confinement in single room except for periods of interrogation.

b. Constantly under guard and subject to 24 hour visual observation with regular room search.

c. Dress was coveralls and food was of sufficient quantity but limited in variety.

d. No unnecessary conversation was permitted, radio and television were not allowed, newspapers or any information concerning current events were forbidden and reading material was extremely limited.

Question #2 - Conditions at ISOLATION. Same as above.

Answer:

During the period of 13 August 1965 to 25 October 1967, conditons cited above were basically maintained with the following additons or changes:

a. From February 1966 to May 1967, Nosenko was furnished no reading material.

b. After May 1967, Nosenko was periodically given a different volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica to read.

c. From February 1966 to October 1967, Nosenko was not permitted cigarettes.

d. Subject was permitted daily exercise in a small confined area outside the building when weather permitted.

Question #3 - Did McCone or Raborn have any information on this: What?

Answer:

Office of Security records contain only limited information in regard to this question. The SE Division (then SR) was the responsible office for the confinement of Nosenko until late October 1967 when total responsibility was transferred to the Office of Security by the DCI. It is presumed that the DCI was at least generally aware of the confinement of Nosenko and the conditions of confinement, but any definite statement must be based on SE records.

Question #4 - Where is Nosenko working now?

Answer:

Nosenko is currently employed at his personally owned residence in North Carolina. He is engaged in research and analytical work based on his previous knowledge of the KGB and other Soviet matters. He is in the Washington, D. C. area for several days approximately every six weeks for direct interviews by the FBI and Office of Security personnel.

Question #5 - Is he working for CIA?

Answer:

Nosenko has been employed by the Agency on a full-time contractual basis since 1 March 1969. The original contract has been periodically amended to reflect additional remuneration, primarily to compensate for cost of living increases. In late 1972, Nosenko was compensated by mutual agreement for salary not received during the 1 April 1964 to 1 March 1969. In addition, on 12 July 1973 Nosenko signed an acknowledgement and release of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency from any claims prior to that date.

Question #6 - What is his legal status?

Answer:

Nosenko was naturalized as a United States citizen in April 1974.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

SUBJECT : The Nosenko Case

Attached please find a summary of a document written in 1967 to the General Counsel outlining the Nosenko case and explaining to him actions which had been taken with regard to Nosenko. As noted in the first paragraph, in October 1967 Nosenko took up residence in the Washington area and was advised that, should he wish to leave the apartment for any location whatsoever, he was free to so do. In other words, from that date, Nosenko was essentially a totally free man. That he chose not to flee in any way may be indicative of his attitude toward the manner in which he was handled prior to October 1967.

While one can criticize the fact that Nosenko was kept incommunicado for approximately three years, and therefore presumably denied full civil rights, the attached document does indicate, we believe, that the Agency was on the horns of a dilemna in this regard. There were legitimate doubts about Nosenko's bona fides and concern that he was a Soviet plant. There was no country to which he could be deported save the Soviet Union, and Nosenko himself refused to return there. Yet, in the United States, save when isolated from society, he was considered to be a continuing threat to national security.

Recognizing that only legal experts can judge definitively the merits of the case, it seems to the writer that the Agency had no choice but to hold Nosenko incommunicado pending resolution of his bona fides. He was admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely as a parolee to the Agency. As a parolee, Nosenko de facto from the date of his entry to the United States did not enjoy the full civil rights of the normal citizen. He was a ward of the Agency, in a sense, and the Agency was ultimately responsible for his

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018307

SECRET

conduct. There were at the time very legitimate reasons to believe that full and total release of Nosenko would be an abrogation by the Agency of its legal responsibility. To gainsay that decision in retrospect is, we believe, an error. In sum, the act of defection places the defector at the mercy of the laws of the country to which he defects. It is the obligation of the accepting country to see to it that the laws are followed. In the Nosenko case, it seems to us that the Agency acted in a fully responsible manner to ensure that its responsibility for the defector was met. While it was unfortunate that it took so long to resolve the matter, we can find no fault with the fact that the Agency met its responsibility to both the United States and to Nosenko himself.

Attachment: A/S

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency's legal basis for its handling of Nosenko through that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposition of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this memorandum to the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967 in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime. He gradually created a new life for himself in the United States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.

Background

Nosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA representatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place and debriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetings in Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Geneva again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with his CIA handlers he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretly taken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity documents. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt, Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting political asylum from the U.S. Government.

Because serious doubts about Nosenko's bona fides had arisen on the basis of the information he had provided both in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was originally planned to do a detailed bona fides debriefing and assessment in Germany before making any decision about moving Nosenko to the United States. However, unprecedented action by the Soviet Government in respect to the defection of one of its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February, unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the press that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had disappeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected.

Because of mounting pressure from the press, which included much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department would make a brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 February, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and requesting an immediate interview with him and his release. On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Conference TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recommended that Swiss authorities be allowed to interview Nosenko to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of his own free will.

On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director, Nosenko was brought to the United States. He travelled by commercial air, again using alias U.S. Army identification, and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

On 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and Soviet Embassies in Washington advised the State Department that they desired interviews with Nosenko. On 14 February, in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in Ambassador KOHLER and protested "impermissable activities" on the part of the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen took an even harder line to Western correspondents, and accused the U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 September, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to Swiss Embassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. At these interviews, which were also attended by State Department and INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerland of his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition, he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representative to the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship. On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department made a brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued a brief statement to the press noting that the interviews had been held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remain in this country.

From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenko was housed in the Washington area. During this period, regular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko was made available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all times accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, he took a two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case officers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen without changing the conditions in which he was being held. Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in accordance with Agency local responsibility. It was clear that it was only a matter of time before he created a public scandal. More importantly, he was in a position to communicate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.

On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph examination. The results of this examination indicated deception on a number of critical points indicating that he was sent by the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involved his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was decided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko's stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if the Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsibilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement. As a result, he was moved to quarters where his movements could be more easily controlled, and his outing privileges were suspended pending resolution of bona fides.

It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action but accepted Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible that we would have proceeded with a series of operational actions on the basis of his information. The results of some of these actions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Government politically and damaging to U.S. national security. For example, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one that he was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately, involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.

Bona Fides

Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devoted to interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated) and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral investigations. We concluded that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB instructions, and that he came to the United States on a deception mission. The implications of this mission had a grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissable in a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgression of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable means of communication with the KGB.

Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders or that he came to the U.S. on a KGB mission. He has admitted, however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials, both before and after arriving in the United States.

Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies

USIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was discussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an ad hoc basis. Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On 5 February 1964, General Carter reported the defection to an executive session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to USIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that Nosenko's bona fides had not yet been established. It was agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the community.

The President was informed of the full extent of our suspicions about Nosenko's bona fides by the then Director, Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing by Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964.

Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also subsequently informed of the problems about Nosenko's bona fides.

The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other senior officials in the Department of State were informed of our reservations about Nosenko's bona fides and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction that such a move might have on other potential defectors.

The Director of Security, State Department, was informed of the bona fides problem at an early date. We have worked closely with this office since then on the problem of evaluating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects the security interests of the State Department.

Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S. internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was a KGB plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views about Nosenko's bona fides and our progress in interrogating and investigating him from the moment of his defection. The FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's bona fides as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan, were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major aspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review Nosenko's case on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objections to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI formally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the extent that "On considering carefully the results of your interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent provocateur."

The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach (and several members of his staff) were apprised of our reservations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this country.

Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of Nosenko's True Status

From the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential that we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awareness of Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledge of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, and the implications thereof, was restricted to a very few people in the Agency and the intelligence community. Nonetheless, we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intelligence community, even though this carried the inevitable risk of leakage.

Soviet Inspired Inquiries

In 1966 there were several indications that the Soviets were making a serious effort to find out what happened to Nosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatant and unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist, Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine Paris Match with an offer to provide photographs and materials for an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. According to Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to an international juridicial organization in an effort to obtain compensation from Nosenko for damages caused by his abandonment of her and her children. In responding to this approach we quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself, to the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to represent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGB and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing to an interview or in any other way.

Nosenko's Status

To recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on 12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by the Attorney General under the terms of an agreement executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955, which states:

> "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervison and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status."

In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we ensured that he was under our direct observation and control at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United

States. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain amount of movement and of contact with the outside world. After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Although his freedom of movement had been severely restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no complaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several written statements from him in which he stated that our handling of him was justified and even beneficial.

Disposal

From the time that Nosenko was brought to this country we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time, however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what this implied, it was apparent that great practical problems stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a third country.

USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR, and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death, etc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for the adverse effect this might have on other potential defectors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession" by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.

Third Country: Although we believed it likely that Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country, there is certainly no country in the free world on which we could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first informing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplicity on the basis of the political risks involved.

SECRET

[illegible]

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

NOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the U.S., and after a short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and relatively austere conditions for a period of approximately three years. Commencing in 1967, he was given increasing amounts of freedom until he was allowed total freedom in 1969. He subsequently married a U.S. citizen, settled in the Southeastern United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1974. He is presently under contract to the Agency, providing consultative services and information on subjects germane to his background.

NOSENKO was confined when as a result of his debriefing substantive questions were raised concerning his bona fides, and his general behavior raised further concern about his emotional health and general safety. NOSENKO's debriefing and confinement were ended when it was concluded that he was not a threat to national security. The advice of the Justice Department was obtained at the time of his confinement, and the FBI participated in his subsequent debriefing. NOSENKO's initial entry into the U.S. was coordinated with the Department of State, and they were periodically advised of his status during his confinement up to the time of his final settlement.

The strict conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were intended to convey to him the seriousness of his position as a suspected disinformation agent and to make clear to him that his free settlement in the U.S. was precluded as long as this issue was unresolved. It was understood, however, that at any time he could have elected to end his confinement and return to the Soviet Union. OS files do not document that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to NOSENKO, however, it is the recollection of senior staff officers (ADD/O and D/OS) that such was the case, and further that it was a condition routinely applied to other defectors whose bona fides were in doubt.

SECRET

SECRET

13/[illegible]

19 [illegible] 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Nosenko

Attached is a report from the Office of Security concerning the awareness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FBI, and I&NS). We have been advised by ADD/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could elect to leave the U. S., but that he could not be ensured of immediate liberty if he elected to stay; in a sense, we are told, he elected to stay under the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on this latter point, other than as shown in the attachment.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment: a/s

2 O/S, 4c

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~
SECRET

already released

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account .

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET
~~EYES ONLY~~

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 063344
HR 10-23
9 January 1975

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ SECRET

of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, ~~and he therefore is not expected to be~~ able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

[illegible]

31 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Office of Security reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD

1. Forwarded herewith is a 31 December 1974 memorandum from the Acting Director of Security on subject activities. The material represents responses to questions posed by your office. Obviously, the next phase of the investigation will require more detailed reviews of each activity.

2. Questions that occur to us in reading the attached, are:

PARAGON

We should spell out what is meant by the statement that the FBI "deferred further coverage to the Office of Security," how it was expressed and what form it took.

The taping of two conversations does not seem to constitute "electronic surveillance" in the usual sense. It certainly is not trespatory surveillance. A little more detail on the equipment will be wanted.

NOSENKO

We will go to the DDO for any record of DCI knowledge, and report such information as we get.

AELADLE

We will want to verify DDCI's approval of entry.

[illegible]

2 ... CL ... [illegible]

CELOTEX I

We will want more detail on the actual surveillance, including possible higher approval.

This is responsive to the DCI's request for newspaper articles that led to the surveillance.

CELOTEX II

Questions similar to CELOTEX I.

We may want actual copies of newspaper stories for display, in addition to memos, should DCI wish to use it.

MOCKINGBIRD

No recorded (in CIA) formal approval by Attorney General. It may be that Justice will have a copy.

Does this raise a question of surveillance of congressmen if one is contacted by someone under surveillance?

3. Security experts to have reports on Maheu, SIESTA, REDFACE I, surveillance trucks, and Israeli COMINT by COB Thursday.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments a/s

SECRET
EYES ONLY

3 1 DEC 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : PARAGON
NOSENKO
AELADLE
CELOTEX I
CELOTEX II
MOCKINGBIRD

1. Attached is a report concerning Subject topics which was requested by Mr. Scott Breckenridge of your office. As you will note, the report is in a question and answer format with attachments.

2. This Office is still gathering material in regard to the SIESTA Project and REDFACE I. In addition, other files are being culled to provide more details, if they exist, on the above mentioned projects.

Sidney D. Stembridge
/ Sidney D. Stembridge
Acting Director of Security

Atts

Distribution:
Original - Adse
1 - DDA

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010249

EYES ONLY
SECRET

REQUEST

I, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, request the Government of the United States of America to grant me political asylum in the United States of America. This decision has been taken by me as the result of considering this question over the course of several years without any pressure on the part of anyone whosoever. I absolutely do not believe in the truth of the Socialist system. Working in the KGB and knowing more than the ordinary Soviet citizen about the internal situation, the mood of the people and the policies of the Soviet Government, I became convinced that in the USSR there is not and never will be truth and real freedom as long as the country is governed by the Communist Party. Travelling on official trips abroad to the countries of the West, I was able correctly to understand and become aware of the existence of a real and actual free world. The events in Hungary and East Berlin and the split of the Communist movement are for me vivid examples and confirmation of the correctness of my own decision to break forever with the Soviet Union. I want to assure the Government of the United States of America that I will devote all my strength and knowledge to the Government and people of the United States of America.

/s/ Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

4 February 1964

[illegible] To [illegible]

[illegible]

Я, [illegible] [illegible] Иванович, прошу Правительство С.Ш.А. предоставить мне политическое убежище в Соединенных Штатах Америки.

Это решение мною принято в результате [illegible] своих взглядов в течение [illegible] времени, что настоящее решение принято [illegible] по своей воле.

Я обращаюсь к вам в исключительно [illegible] моменте. Работая в КГБ и зная только, что разговоры советских лидеров о разоружении и [illegible], высказывания Хрущева и политика советского правительства о разоружении, что в СССР нет и не будет правды и демократической свободы до тех пор пока руководит страной коммунистическая партия. Находясь в командировке в странах Запада, я имел возможность видеть и сравнить демократические режимы и действительно свободного мира. [illegible] вмешательства в Венгрии и Восточной Германии, разгон [illegible] демократических движений явились для меня примером [illegible] и подтверждают [illegible] правительства [illegible] единственно верное решение [illegible] в Советском Союзе.

Хочу заверить Правительство США и народ, что буду верен и честен Правительству и Народу Соединенных Штатов Америки.

4 февраля [illegible] г.

UNDERTAKING REGARDING OBLIGATIONS AND SECRECY

In consideration of arrangements being made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY for my future employment and welfare, I freely acknowledge that I have no outstanding claims of any nature against the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I further acknowledge that there are no commitments to me on the part of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY which remain unsatisfied arising out of any of my prior associations with the Agency. I fully understand that the current arrangements between myself and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY are intended to completely encompass all obligations of any nature whatsoever made to me by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

I acknowledge my desire to serve the interests of the United States by fulfilling the obligations which I have accepted in the current arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I assert under oath, as indicated by my signature below, that I have completely, totally and permanently severed any and all relationships with any other government, its agencies, organs or functionaries including the Communist Party; that I will not in the future advocate, teach, or become a member of or become affiliated with any organization which advocates or teaches opposition to all organized government; that I will not in the future become a member of or become affiliated with the Communist Party or any other totalitarian party; and that I do not now nor will I in the future advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism.

I understand fully the need for secrecy regarding my past, present and future relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and I agree to keep forever secret these relationships and my arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY including all information which I may obtain by reason of any associations with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject me to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws (18 U.S.C. 793, 794) and other applicable laws and regulations. I understand that this is a solemn and permanent undertaking which I must observe even after termination of any contracts or other arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. In addition, I understand that I may not discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it any information concerning the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, its activities, or intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it.

I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 21 day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1 (L.S.)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 7
Notary Public
My commission expires September 24, 1969

(SEAL)

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not ~~considered an~~ employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required

to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. To assist you in establishing yourself, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will assist you in procuring an automobile and necessary household furnishings, providing funds therefor, up to a maximum of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00). Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. PLACE OF RESIDENCE. In the interests of security, you will be required to live in such State, area, and house or apartment as is specifically approved by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY after mutual discussion and due consideration of all circumstances. All of the expenses of such leased house or apartment will be borne by you and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will not be obligated to pay any such expenses.

6. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

7. HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL CARE. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will provide you with reasonable insurance covering medical care and hospitalization equivalent to that which could be obtained through standard insurance policies; or, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY may provide directly such medical care and hospitalization.

8. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such

secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

9. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

10. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1969 and shall be for a term of one (1) year. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance of the elapse of one (1) year. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations

imposed on you by paragraph 8 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

Contracting Officer

Date:

ACCEPTED:

21 April 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 1

WITNESS:

21 April 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 7

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

Reference is made to your contract with the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, effective 1 March 1969. Effective 1 March 1970 said contract is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

SECRET [illegible]

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($18,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income tax, and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

6. NEGOTIATED BENEFITS.

a. You presently have a private health insurance plan for yourself and your wife paid until late December 1970. Prior to the expiration date of the current policy the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has the option of paying premiums on the current policy until 1 March 1972 or enrolling you in a health insurance program for selected contract individuals of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will pay the premiums on either insurance coverage until 1 March 1972. However, any new contract will include an appropriate clause providing that this organization will bear a portion of the total premium cost of any health insurance and you will bear the remainder.

b. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will endeavor to arrange for you to secure a term life insurance policy with a face value of $15,000.00. This policy contains no additional accidental death benefits. The premiums for the policy will be your personal responsibility. The current premium charge is $12.00 per month.

(1) Subject to the priorities of work you are herein authorized twenty-one (21) work days vacation with pay per contract year to be taken only at times and places approved in advance by the Authorized Government Representative. Vacation time is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Payment for unused vacation time will not be authorized.

(2) If incapacitated for work due to illness, injury and the like, your compensation may be continued for periods not to exceed a total of thirteen (13) working days per contract year. Periods of absence in excess of three (3) consecutive days will require a doctor's certificate. Like vacation time, this benefit is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Cash payment in lieu of this benefit will not be authorized.

7. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

8. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

9. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1970 and shall be for a term of two (2) years. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of

SECRET

this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations imposed on you by paragraph *t* of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

IDEN 6

Contracting Officer

Date:____________________

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1 Date: March 6, 1970

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2 Date: 6 March 1970

SECRET

25 October 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative three Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#AI 25-349	Schroder Trust Company	$15,000.00
#FE 54779	Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.	10,000.00
#A593613	Harris Trust & Savings Bank	10,000.00

This is an advance against a back salary payment covering the period April 1964 to March 1969 which was approved on 18 October 1972. I understand that this advance, $35,000.00, will be deducted from the total back salary payment covering the specified period when the finalization of this payment is made in the near future.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness /s/ IDEN 5

Date: October 25, 1972

16 NOV 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative four Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#155784	Riggs National Bank	$15,000.00
#01-028564	Union Trust Company	15,000.00
#0661511	American Security & Trust	15,000.00
#2-442275	The National Bank of Washington	7,052.00

The above amount, $52,052.00, together with the $35,000.00 advance received on 25 October 1972, constitutes full payment for back salary covering the period April 1964 to March 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness: /s/ IDEN 5

Date: November 16, 1972.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 13 July 1973

FROM : IDEN 2

SUBJECT: IDEN 1

1. On 12 July 1973, the attached Acknowledgement and Release which was prepared by the General Counsel was signed by the Subject in the presence of IDEN 5 and witnessed by the undersigned. There were no problems involved in obtaining the signature of the Subject who had previously voluntarily stated he would sign such a document if he would receive the $15,000.00 which Subject considered was the fulfillment of an Agency promise in 1964 before his defection.

2. Subject understood that the attached did not affect the existing contractual agreement with Subject and that all stipulations in that contract were valid and continuing.

3. Also attached is a copy of the $13,000.00 Cashier's Check given to Subject on 12 July 1973 which completed the agreed sum of $15,000.00, the Subject having previously received $2,000.00 which was a part of the agreed sum.

/s/ IDEN 2

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RELEASE

WHEREAS, IDEN 1, a former citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and an employee of the Committee for State Security (KGB), first cooperated with Officers of the United States Government and then, subsequently, defected to the United States; and,

WHEREAS, IDEN 1 was promised certain sums of money for his cooperation and defection, only part of which have previously been paid to him; and,

WHEREAS, there remains a certain balance of money agreed upon by IDEN 1 and Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, IDEN 1 for himself and for his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, hereby releases and forever discharges the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency and all of its employees and representatives from any claim for money promised to him for, and/or at the time of his defection, and from any and all other claims demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with his cooperation and association with the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency prior to the date of this document, 12 July 1973.

WITNESS THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE AND SEAL:

/s/ IDEN 1 (SEAL)
IDEN 1

WITNESS;
On Behalf of the United States Government

/s/ IDEN 2

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 March 1974, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> "You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($23,750) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY /s/ IDEN 3
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1 May 9, 1974
George Martin Rosnek Date

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2 9 May 1974
Date

APPROVED:

/s/ IDEN 4 17 May 74
Date

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

DEFECTORS

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Memo for Mr. Garrison from S. D. Breckinridge, Subj: Information on Detention of Defector	30 Jan 75
2	Memo for IG from Jerrold B. Brown, Subj: Request for Information (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	18 Jun 75
	MFR from Walter Elder, Subj: Rockefeller Commission Contact (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	23 Jun 75
	Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subj: Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject -- Alleged Abuse of Defector)	27 Jun 75
3	Routing Slip to S. Breckinridge from F. Bucci	22 Jan 75
	Att: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General of the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency for the Entry of Aliens of Interest to the Central Intelligence Agency under Specific Circumstances	10 Feb 55
4	Memo for Inspector General from Jerrold B. Brown, dated 18 June 1975, Subject: Request for Information (re- DCI firing an employee for abusing a defector)	18 June 1975

Defector

Review Staff: 75/880

Mr. Ryan

SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-[illegible]

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security.)

JBB
Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-

EXHIBIT 2

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE ENTRY OF ALIENS OF INTEREST TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDER SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES

The Central Intelligence Agency has frequent need for the covert temporary entry of aliens into the United States for intelligence and operational purposes within its jurisdiction.

To effectuate entry in such cases, the Central Intelligence Agency will submit each such alien's case in writing to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with the request to defer inspection of the subject upon arrival and parole to the Central Intelligence Agency under the authority of Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In order that the intelligence benefits to be derived from such entries not be outweighed by the dangers, if any, to the internal security of the United States by the presence of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency agrees that it will take all necessary steps to establish the bona fides of each prospective entrant prior to submittal to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. It further agrees: (a) That this method of entry will only be utilized where it is strictly in the national interest; (b) That each request will be accompanied by a summary of pertinent background and biographical data with particular emphasis on aspects bearing on internal security and admissibility under the immigration laws, as well as the results of a current check of the FBI file; and (c) That the place, time and manner of arrival will be coordinated with the Service in advance thereof.

Each alien whose entry is authorized by the Commissioner under the foregoing procedure will be paroled for such period of time as may be agreed on by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service, in no instance to exceed one year. Further extensions of parole, similarly limited, may be authorized thereafter on a written statement of need, which include the results of a current security check.

Upon arrival each alien will execute an agreement acknowledging parole status in a form satisfactory to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service.

After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status. Further, in the case of any alien whose physical custody is not to be maintained or is to be terminated, the Central Intelligence Agency will arrange for presentation of each alien for registration pursuant to law at a time and place satisfactory to the Service.

S-E-C-R-E-T

EXHIBIT 2

S-E-C-R-E-T

Upon completion of their intelligence or operational purposes in the United States, or if internal security reasons so require, these aliens will be removed therefrom through the arrangements and at the expense of the Central Intelligence Agency, except in those cases in which other disposition is made of a nature satisfactory to the Service. Also, the Central Intelligence Agency will inform the Service sufficiently in advance of each proposed departure as to permit verification thereof if the Service so elects.

In accordance with past practice, the Service will apprise the FBI of the entry and departure or other disposition of these aliens.

The Service will maintain separate and secure files under this agreement.

S/S
Herbert Brownell, Jr.
Attorney General

S/S
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
(Feb 10 1955)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)

FROM: Charles W. Kane
Director of Security CWK

EXTENSION: 6777

NO.:

DATE: 27 JUN 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDA	30 JUN 1975		[illegible]	
2.				
3. Inspector General Att: Mr. Ainslie	[illegible]		[illegible]	3-5: Attached was prepared in response to an 18 June request from Jerry Brown. Per 23 Jun, MFR by Walt Elder, source of the story is a deposition by Mr. Helms.
4.				
5. Dr. Chamberlain SUS			[illegible]	
6. ~~Mr. Knoche~~ [illegible]	[illegible]			This requires editing before passing to the SSC.
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL
[illegible]

[illegible] JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

ATTENTION : Mr. Neil Ainslie

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Alleged Illegal Activities
(Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse
of Defector)

1. Reference is made to Mr. Ainslie's verbal request for a review of Office of Security files in an effort to provide information pertinent to a case mentioned on page 170 of the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA activities within the United States.

2. The case in question from page 170 of the Commission Report is quoted as follows: "In one other case, a defector was physically abused, although not seriously injured. The Director of Central Intelligence discharged the employee involved."

3. A search of Office of Security file resources has reflected information pertinent to a case in which a defector was physically abused at an overseas location, and the Agency employee was later terminated by the DCI. It is not known whether the following case is identical to the referenced case on page 170 of the Commission Report, but the facts appear to be quite similar.

4. Information developed by this Office of possible interest to the Inspector General, pertains to one John Torpats, an ex-CIA employee, and one Eduard Oun, an Estonian defector.

5. Torpats was born in 1898 in Estonia, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1926. Torpats was employed by CIA in February 1949 and was terminated 30 January 1961. The file information reflected that in July 1956, Torpats was found guilty of mistreatment of an alien by a Special Inquiry Board

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 011018

SECRET

in Frankfurt, West Germany. The alien involved was Eduard Oun, an Estonian who defected from Estonia through Sweden in 1955.

6. The incident in Frankfurt involved mistreatment of Oun during interrogations directed by Torpats. The charges of physical abuse included the striking of Oun with the fist; application of turpentine and ointments to various parts of the body, the scrubbing of Oun's body with a brush, and forcing Oun to stand in the nude as long as eight days during interrogations with only very brief rest periods.

7. Torpats was returned to Headquarters and was brought before an Employment Review Board for consideration of separation from the Agency. The Board's recommendations initially were that Torpats be "transferred to an area outside the Clandestine Services." Torpats appealed the decision, and a later recommendation included reduction in grade from GS-14 to GS-13. Torpats later received unsatisfactory fitness reports and engaged in various "in house" battles with Agency officials concerning his employment.

8. Torpats was later terminated in accordince with the authority granted the DCI under Section 102(C) of the National Security Act of 1947, as ammended, effective 30 January 1961. Later in 1961, Torpats filed suit against the DCI contesting his dismissal, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government's motion for summary judgment against Torpats. Torpats appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals, in 1962, upheld the lower court's ruling that Torpats' termination was legal.

9. The Office of Security file of Eduard Oun contained little information other than interrogation reports dated 1956. It was not clear from file information whether Oun entered the United States after the Frankfurt incident. The most recent document contained in the Oun file was dated 17 September 1956 and noted that Oun had been psychiatrically examined and found qualified for Agency sponsored immigration to the U.S. under Public Law 203.

10. It is noted that Office of Security files contained only fragmentary information in regard to certain areas of the Torpats' case. File review indicated, however, the DDO, OGC and the Inspector General's office will probably have additional information concerning this matter.

Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

SECRET

[illegible]

75-2244 [illegible]

Review Staff: 75/1008
23 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rockefeller Commission Contact

Mason Cargill told me today that the reference in the Commission report to an employee who was fired because he abused a defector came from a deposition by Dick Helms. Helms could not remember an exact name, but from the description which he gave on his deposition, it is clear that the employee who was fired was John Torpats. He was discharged by Allen W. Dulles in 1960.

Torpats, himself a Lithuanian refugee, was working in the Defector Reception Center in Frankfort, Germany. In the course of interrogating another Lithuanian defector, Torpats beat him. After Torpats was fired, he sued the Director (then McCone). He lost the case.

Walt Elder
Walter Elder

cc - DCI
✓cc - IG
cc - OGC

CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET

SECRET

Review Staff: 75/880

SECRET

Mr. Kiya

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-2276

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security)

JBB
Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

Ale C Mardirosian SE/DDO

Dist Staff 3 C/SE

SECRET

IG 75-[illegible]

30 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Garrison

SUBJECT : Information on Detention of Defector

1. The Deputy General Counsel has requested documents bearing on the decision to confine a defector, particularly the considerations at the time such decisions were made and reviewed, as may be reflected in memoranda for the record, staff studies, etc., leading to the initial confinement, the later decisions to continue that confinement, the decision to move to a new facility in Virginia, and eventually to release him.

2. The assumption is that following the initial decision this matter was reviewed formally from time to time, and that those reviews are reflected in some way in the records of the Agency.

/s/ S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

Original - Addressee
1 - SDB Chrono
1 - Judy for QA files

[illegible]

SECRET

Methodology:

1. The portion of the 11 June 1962 tape in question was provided to two employees, both of whom are professional transcribers and native Russian speakers. They were provided with the background of the difficulty, i.e., that previous transcriptions of the tape quoted Nosenko as saying that he had "also been in the States" and that he had used the alias Nikolayev "both in England and 'u vas' i.e., in the United States.

2. Mr. Kozlov and Mr. Berest produced a transcription which contains no statement of Nosenko's saying he had been in the United States. In addition, their rendering of the sentence pertaining to Nosenko's use of the alias Nikolayev reads, with no equivocation, "both in England and 'u nas'", i.e., "in the Soviet Union."

3. Independently, the same portion of tape was given yet another professional transcriber, a native Russian speaker. She was given no background whatsoever on the problem. Her transcript contained no statement of Nosenko's saying he had been in the United States. In addition, her rendering of the sentence pertaining to Nosenko's use of the alias Nikolayev reads unequivocally as "both in England and 'u nas'", i.e., "in the Soviet Union."

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING		
PRIORITY INDEXED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/[illegible]
Former Delegate of Dr. Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango to Help AMBUD-1 because of State Department Request

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

1. An AFOT subsource, Ricardo NUNEZ Garcia, reported on 12 December 1961 that he had that day, by chance, met Manuel E. GIBERGA, a former delegate of Dr. Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango, at the New Orleans Airport. 201-284303

2. NUNEZ stated that GIBERGA said that he was returning that day from a trip to Panama and Guatemala. In Panama he had talked to President CHIARI and had found him to be intimidated, but, to the contrary, when he had talked to President YDIGORAS in Guatemala he had found him extremely anxious to have CASTRO liquidated. YDIGORAS had asked GIBERGA about his visit to CHIARI, and when GIBERGA expressed his opinion, YDIGORAS said it was logical because CHIARI was extremely cowardly.

3. According to NUNEZ, GIBERGA further said that a short time ago he had been called by Mr. Bob Hurwitch, Chief of the Cuban Desk in the State Department, and that Hurwitch had told him not to fool around with SANCHEZ or Julio GARCERAN because the man who had the support of the U.S. was AMBUD-1, and that as he, Hurwitch, had knowledge of the great work done by GIBERGA, he did not want him to continue losing more time.

4. NUNEZ added that GIBERGA said that a few days later he received a phone call from AMBUD-1. GIBERGA told NUNEZ that he will help AMBUD-1, because it was requested, but he would never have done so by his own wish.

5. NUNEZ said that GIBERGA continued his travel on to Washington, where he resides at 1419 - 27th Street, N.W., Washington 7.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3-Headquarters

C S FILE COPY 19-124-25

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]

DATE TYPED
[illegible] Dec 1961

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
[illegible]

(TYPED O/DDP)
ORIG: L. B. KIRKPATRICK
UNIT: I.G. 173
EXT: 8856
DATE: 2 MAY 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
4
5
6

TO: SEE ATTACHED LIST

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: IG

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, EE 4, FE 5, NE 4, AF 4, WE 4, WH 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

MAY 3 01

INITIALS
INITIALS

OUT52128
OUT 52128

TO SEE ATTACHED LIST INFO

CITE DIR ~~37947~~

37947

BOOK MESSAGE

FROM ASCHAM

1. AS RESULT OF DEFEAT OF THE CUBAN OPERATION CONSIDERABLE COMMENT CONCERNING KUBARK NOW BEING MADE IN PRESS AND IN CONGRESS. MANY PROPOSALS ARE BEING AND WILL BE RAISED CONCERNING KUBARK AND OTHER ACTIVITIES IN THIS AREA OF ODYOKE. ACTUALLY MUCH MISINFORMATION GENERALLY REPORTED AND WHILE SOME PROPOSALS ARE FRO RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS, THERE ARE MANY DISTORTIONS OF ACTUAL SITUATION. DETAILS OF CUBAN OPERATION ARE SUFFICIENTLY COVERED IN DEPCIRTEL 1637 AND SUGGEST YOU OBTAIN THIS FOR YOUR INFO. IT IS MY VI THAT KUBARK ACQUITTED ITSELF WELL IN MOST RESPECTS, ALTHOUGH I PLA FULL REVIEW OF OPERATION AFTER REASONABLE PERIOD HAS ELAPSED TO PERMIT ALL ESSENTIAL FACTS TO BE AVAILABLE. IN THE MEANTIME PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR TO TA CLOSE LOOK AT ALL PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS IN AREA OF MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY, GUERRILLA AND ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES WHICH FALL SHORT OF OUTRIGHT WAR. HE WILL GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO LESSONS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

10

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PRIORITY — INITIALS

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

PAGE TWO

C

OUT 52128

TO INFO CITE DIR

DIR 37947

FROM RECENT EVENTS IN CUBA. IN THIS EFFORT HE WILL BE ASSISTED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND MYSELF. HIS REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT BY MAY 15.

2. WHILE IN NO WAY WISHING TO LESSEN THE SERIOUSNESS OF DEFEAT IN CUBA BOTH FOR KUBARK AND PBPRIME, I WISH TO ASSURE EVERYBODY THAT OUR PRIMARY EFFORT SHOULD BE TO LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE, GOOD OR BAD. FURTHER, UNLESS INSTRUCTED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY TO THE CONTRARY, EVERYBODY SHOULD CONTINUE WITH HIS PRESENT ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTS. FOR YOUR INFO, WE HAVE FULLY BRIEFED APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS ON THE CUBAN OPERATION AND IN FACT HAVE MORE THAN EVER BEFORE DURING THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS KEPT THE ARMED SERVICES AND APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES ADVISED ON DAILY BASIS OF VITAL INTELLIGENCE, PERTINENT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND PROBLEMS. WE WILL ~~ENDEAVOR~~ ENDEAVOR TO ADVISE YOU PROMPTLY OF PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WASHINGTON

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE	
DEFERRED	
ROUTINE	
PRIORITY	INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE ✓	INITIALS

PAGE THREE

OUT 52128

TO INFO CITE DIR 31547

THAT AFFECT KUBARK, BUT STRESS THAT YOU RECOGNIZE THAT REPORTS IN PUBLIC MEDIA ~~[illegible]~~ ARE OFTEN MISLEADING.

END OF MESSAGE

DDCI (in draft)
COPS (in draft)

ALLEN W. DULLES
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RICHARD M. BISSELL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

4.

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

	INITIALS
PRIORITY	
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 52128
DIR 37947

TO

INFO

CITE DIR

ALGIERS
BRAZZAVILLE
ADDIS ABABA
ACCRA
CONAKRY
ABIDJAN
NAIROBI
MONROVIA
TRIPOLI
RABAT
LAGOS
LEOPOLDVILLE
MOGADISCIO
KHARTOUM
TUNIS
PRETORIA

VIENNA
FRANKFURT
ATHENS
BERN
NICOSIA
MELBOURNE
RANGOON
PHNOM PENH
HONOLULU
HONG KONG
DJAKARTA
TOKYO
SEOUL
KUALA LUMPUR
WELLINGTON
MANILA

OKINAWA
SAIPAN
SINGAPORE
TAIPEI
BANGKOK
SAIGON
VIENTIANE
[redacted]
KABUL
COLOMBO
NEW DELHI
TEHRAN
BAGHDAD
[redacted]
AMMAN
BEIRUT
KATMANDU

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

14-00000

INC

KARACHI

JIDDA

ANKARA

CAIRO

BRUSSELS

OTTAWA

COPENHAGEN

LONDON

HELSINKI

PARIS

PARIS (LCPIPIT)

REYKJAVIK

ROME

LUXEMBOURG( )

THE HAGUE

OSLO

LISBON

MADRID

STOCKHOLM

BUENOS AIRES

LA PAZ

RIO DE JANEIRO

SANTIAGO

BOGOTA

SAN JOSE

CIUDAD TRUJILLO

QUITO

GUATEMALA CITY

PORT AU PRINCE

TEGUCIGALPA

MEXICO CITY

MANAGUA

PANAMA CITY

ASUNCION

LIMA

SAN SALVADOR

MONTEVIDEO

CARACAS

PANAMA CITY
ASUNCION
LIMA
SAN SALVADOR
MONTEVIDEO
CARACAS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.

2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:

a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.

(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.

(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Operacion Grieta."

c. Underground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian Embassy).

SECRET

(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to me on 6 October.

3. Commando Plan

Then Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners.

With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and materiel provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our meeting at 13:30 on 6 October for transmission.)

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray

Dr. MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.

COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime

Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit.* He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."

* Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.

He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference." "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S."

6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban Soil

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and establish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. "This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognize that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and immediately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in adequate strength to ensure victory.

Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.

Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of ~~this project~~; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't considered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us. "The Punta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries receiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers

I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He declared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRO and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named ALABAU to the

Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescate
30 de Noviembre
MRR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi

He said he had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night

from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says, "Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutes to address the meeting."

10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brasilian who Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after 11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brasil. MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark.

11. Propaganda Commission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is outside the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CARRILLO had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-

nounced FRIC's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and reestablishment of order in the island.

13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferson 2-4680). So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me."

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation - merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings, of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance."

14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile Groups

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I understood that some of those elements were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organizations to be able to discuss the matter effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October, I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

the ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He expressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise to me.

16. Comment

During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals. I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required.

26 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Report on Cuban Operations for Period 1-15 September 61

This is the second summary report of activities in Cuban operations, and covers the period 1-15 September 1961. This report will consist of a breakdown of such operations into the principal categories of activity.

A. FI-CI Activity

1. Reporting to Headquarters. There was a total of twenty-eight reports received during the period, and they consisted of the following: Nine from [illegible] sources, fifteen from debriefings conducted in the Miami area, two via the open mail, and two reports via diplomatic courier. Additionally, eleven CI reports were passed to the FBI, and 1,017 CI name checks were processed for I&NS.

2. Agent Activities and Developments

a. There was a total of eighteen agents within Cuba at the beginning of the reporting period and twenty-four by the period's close.

b. Comment: Of the seven agents dispatched legally during the period, one agent was a returnee. These agents should provide increased coverage of anti-Castro groups, activities at the airport and new entree into the diplomatic community.

c. Four agents were recruited and two agents were terminated during the period.

d. In cooperation with the German desk, we have initiated an operation to debrief Cuban sailors who pass through the area. Clearances have been obtained for two Cubans who will act as coordinators for the operation.

e. AVCKLY-1, a Uruguayan diplomat, has been recruited and has agreed to act as a courier for the intel net in Cuba. The agent is currently on his way to Cuba via boat.

f. AMOT-34, the principal agent/W/T operator, using signal plan OGAKIK, returned to Cuba via legal means on 6 September and was once again in radio communication with us as of 10 September. He is in contact with AMWEEM-1, the principal agent of what remains of our intelligence net in Cuba.

g. Control of the OGAKIK W/T communication link was passed to WAVE from Headquarters effective 14 September.

h. AMPALM-1 was dispatched to Geneva to attempt to recruit Raul CEPERO Bonilla, Minister of the National Bank of Cuba, who is presently attending the sugar conference in Switzerland.

i. Jesus LOPEZ Cuerrara, Cuban airline pilot who is disaffected with the Castro regime, is in contact with the Madrid Station and has agreed to cooperate and remain in place.

j. Arrangements are being made for a technical surveillance of the charge office in the Cuban Embassy, Montevideo.

B. Propaganda Activity

1. Major Efforts

a. Operation Bolivar. Designed to place sixty student/agents of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) exile group in universities throughout the Western Hemisphere. Progress: Three in place and twenty-one are processing.

b. Operation Virgen del Cobre. Designed to exploit the 8 September anniversary of the Cuban patron saint as a day of mourning expressing opposition to Castro's attacks upon the church, religious freedom, and Cuban freedom. Progress: All local and Western Hemisphere assets alerted for the 8 September campaign. Sixty-five thousand pieces of propaganda were distributed for mailing throughout Latin America. The Cruzada Feminina Cubana (CFC) woman's group sent eight cables and 130 letters in the Latin American area. Through the joint efforts of the CFC and Catholics, mass and benediction services were held before 25,000 people in the Miami stadium. It was said to be a huge success.

c. After the recent Castro executions, an amnesty campaign was initiated on behalf of political and military prisoners. Progress: One hundred and eight cables and 220 letters were sent to Latin America by the Cuban affiliate groups.

2. Broadcasts

a. The Avance newspaper sponsored twenty-four thirty minute programs over WMIE, Miami, targeted against northern Havana and Matanzas provinces on general anti-Castro themes. Swan broadcasts ten and one half hours daily over short and medium wave.

b. We support a Cuban exile group producing a weekly thirty minute tape for distribution to a number of Caribbean basin stations, and a weekly fifteen minute tape for distribution through IAAB channels to Central and South American stations. At present some seventy stations participate in this operation.

c. WAVE has assumed contact role with local offices of Swan and radio broadcaster Luis CONTE Aguero through cutout.

d. Beginning 11 September, Luis CONTE Aguero began short wave broadcasts of thirty minutes daily on five frequencies beamed to all Central and South America and Caribbean basin.

SECRET

e. Maritime broadcasts were cancelled for period for vessel maintenance. An electronic engineer has been hired and construction of TV intrusion equipment has begun. This equipment will be used on the maritime broadcast ~~and be~~ targeted against the Havana area.

f. Cuban Freedom Committee funded and directed two hours daily over WGBS, Miami, and six hours daily over WKWF, Key West.

3. Leaflets/Pamphlets. Production and distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere by sources:

a. Cuban exile groups:

1) DRE - 10,000

2) CFC - 15,000

3) FORD - 20,000

b. WAVE printed 4,000 Grandes Mentiras (Big Lies) as first of a series.

4. Periodicals

a. Avance, weekly newspaper: Two editions, 40,500 WH circulation.

b. Information newsletter, weekly: Two editions, 4,940 circulation.

c. DRE Trinchera: One edition, 2,500 WH circulation.

d. AFJ Bulletin: Two editions, 16,000 WH circulation.

e. MRR Bulletin: One edition, 5,000 WH circulation.

f. FORD Bulletin: One edition, 5,000 WH circulation.

g. El Mundo, weekly newspaper: 3,000 per week in Dominican Republic.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

26 Sept 1961

EYES ONLY
SECRET

MEMO FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
SUBJECT: REPORT ON CUBAN OPERATIONS 1-15 Sept 61

h. Bohemia Libre, weekly magazine of over 170,000 WH circulation.

5. Tours and Travel - Cuban Group Representation

a. DRE. Two tours covering Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile.

b. CFC. Two tours covering Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama.

c. Enrique HUERTA. To Rio medical congress.

d. Arrangements are in process to send a small variety troupe to Mexico for propaganda value. The performance will be filmed on 16 mm for subsequent general use throughout Latin America.

e. Arrangements were made with the State Department by WH/4/Security for the facilitation of re-entry into the United States of long-term Cuban assets dispatched on propaganda tours of Central and South America.

6. Other Activities. Headquarters representative met with Rojas Santamarina, and discussed his plan for PHANTOM project, i.e., establishment of phantom cells inside Cuba through medium of propaganda chain letters. Headquarters is studying the idea with a view to possible trial-run on a small scale.

C. Political Action Activity

1. CRC. A meeting was held 9 September with Dr. Miro Cardona at which time he was advised by higher authority that our Government regards the CRC as the control point of contact in its dealing with the Cuban exile and underground activity. A basic administrative budget will be allocated, and it will be in the neighborhood of a million dollars per year. All other allocations of money will be on the basis of specific projects submitted by the Council and approved by the United States. The Cuban Council will continue to broaden its base allowing entry of all substantial exile groups not identified with Batista or with

EYES ONLY
SECRET

Communism. Groups not willing to work with the Council will be dealt with bilaterally (the United States and the group involved), but Dr. Miro will be kept informed of these activities. Such information will be kept in the strictest secrecy by Dr. Miro and his specially appointed assistant. If this arrangement should prove insecure, such contacts will terminate. All problems arising from Council activities will be discussed between the CRC and the Bureau of ARA of State Department. Dr. Miro will maintain his contact with the White House for cases wherein he considers such contact to be urgently necessary.

2. Additional Political Developments. After high level United States consideration and decision, Dr. Miro was informed, at a meeting on 16 September, that the responsibility for the organization and plans for exile Cuban jurists and lawyers would be his. In addition, to his future funding "salaries" of the existing ALASAU organization, $5,000 per month would be provided Dr. Miro or his designee retroactive to 1 August to support Dr. Miro's faction of lawyers to whom he has a long standing commitment. It was emphasized that this transfer of responsibility must be accomplished harmoniously, without adverse press reaction, or support of this work would be withdrawn. Col. Wendell Johnson was hired and will be placed in contact with Dr. Miro prior to 1 October. He will function as the day-to-day contact between Dr. Miro and this Agency and the United States Government. It was made clear to Dr. Miro that his demand for responsibility as exclusive channel to the other professional groups, i.e., students and labor, was rejected. He was told that any proposals he might wish to make in the student and labor fields would be welcomed as promoting harmony and eventual unity of Cuban exile anti-Castro elements.

D. Paramilitary Activity

1. Maritime Activity

a. Eight vessels, four Agency owned and four Cuban owned, are available to support this activity. Of the eight vessels, five were operational and three were undergoing repairs during the period. The principal activity during the period revolved around preparation and support of operation TEABAG, to be implemented 16 September.

b. The LCI, BARBARA J, is now awaiting additional engineering and electrical work at the San Juan Drydock Company. Delay has been caused by the lack of priority and the induction of several Navy ships requiring urgent repairs.

c. Captain TIRADO has spotted a complete crew for the BARBARA J and crew names and biographic data have been submitted to Headquarters for clearance.

d. The Cover and Commercial Staff is engaged in providing for the ships registration, name change, and cover mechanism to allow for future funding and operation.

2. Agent Activities and Developments

a. There was a total of forty-two PM assets involved in activities during the period. Inside Cuba there were two agents, a principal agent and a radio operator. Externally, there were forty agent assets composed of thirty-five PM types and five radio operators.

b. Approval was granted for the passage of RS-6 radio gear complete with signal plan, pads and crystals into Cuba via AMELESS-3 channels which utilize a foreign diplomatic courier.

c. Approval was granted for the conduct of operation SPIKE, an exfiltration operation to be implemented 21 September.

d. On 9 September seven AMHAZE agents were terminated leaving a total of thirty in the group.

e. The internal FA/WT operator ENRIQUE using signal plan BUTLOX reports that his group has been operating a clandestine radio broadcast since 12 September (Radio

EYES ONLY
SECRET

Libertad) on 40 meter band from 1300 to 1315 local time on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays. We are attempting to verify this claim, and an announcement will be made over Voice of America as to the existence of the broadcasts.

E. Training

1. Agents trained by close of period 15 September
    - a. Total number of agents trained: 15
    - b. Total number of agents in training: 26
2. FI-CI
    - a. Agents trained in SW: 7
    - b. Agents trained in tradecraft: 6
3. PA-PROP
    - a. Agents trained in agit/prop: 4
    - b. Agents in training in agit/prop: 9 (Includes two W/T radops.)
    - c. Agents ready for training: 12
4. Paramilitary
    - a. Agents in training: 17
    - b. Type of training: Small boat handling, reception, reconnaissance techniques.

F. Communications - Agent Type

1. Messages. WT: 15 total - 12 received, 3 sent by WAVE.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

C. Support

1. Bases

a. WAVE. Nineteen staff agents were processed at Headquarters and dispatched PCS to WAVE bringing the total of PCS personnel to 23 at the close of the period. The renovation of new offices at WAVE is complete.

b. RIRM. Now has responsibility for relaying all traffic to and from WAVE and crypto relay responsibility for all BASE traffic. The Office of Communications has received their approved T/O for RIRM and have commenced personnel actions on approximately fifty personnel assigned at this installation.

c. The transfer of JMFIG to the Office of Logistics

1) Mr. Glen Laney, WH/4/Logistics, is now at JMFIG for the purpose of adjusting the inventory pending arrangements to be made to transfer all WH material held by JMFIG to Supply Division, Office of Logistics.

2) The Planning Staff, Office of Logistics, has acted as coordinator in matters pertaining to personnel, finance, cover and security, the majority of which have been or will be settled shortly.

3) Present plans contemplate the release of JMFIG to the Office of Logistics on 1 October 1961.

d. All materiel at JMTIDE has been inventoried and prepared for shipment. Although the intended carrier, the ship JOHAN, arrived at JMTIDE on 13 September, loading was delayed due to the presence of foreign shipping in the area. It is anticipated that loading will commence on or about 18 September and will be completed within four days.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

e. JMBARR. A draft of a lease agreement for the JMBARR property has been prepared and forwarded to the owner of the real estate for final approval.

2. Finance

a. Answers have been received from various sources regarding our queries for new Cuban pesos. Two sources are in the process of procuring pesos in the amount of $10,000 U.S. dollars.

b. The funding for JMDUSK is in process. Mr. Hall, WH/4/Finance, is at WAVE to establish a commercial set of records for maintenance by the field office.

c. Total FY 1962 obligations through 13 September for Cuban operations are $4,675,935.00. Of this total, $1,674,775.00 represents payments for the maintenance of the CRC and payments for dependents of the strike force through September.

There is a special intelligence annex to this report, "Counter-revolutionary Activities in Cuba," for the period 1-15 September, issued separately.

J. C. KING
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/4/Plans:W.R.Dinsmore:bh (27 September 1961)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/OPS
1 - A/DDP/A
1 - C/WHD
1 - WH/COPS
1 - C/WH/4
2 - WH/4/Plans

EYES ONLY
SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

February 25, 1963

(1)

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

On February 21, 1963, a confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that he had learned that Carlos Alejos, Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States, had contacted Miguel Ydigoras-Fuentes for the purpose of advising him that Jose Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, an organization opposed to Fidel Castro, Cuban Prime Minister, had apologized for not keeping an appointment he had been granted with Ydigoras-Fuentes. Cardona stated that he had been extremely impressed with what Ydigoras-Fuentes had done for Cuba and told Alejos that those individuals who had said that Ydigoras-Fuentes had to be removed had already been expelled from Cardona's group. Ydigoras-Fuentes commented that the meeting Cardona had missed was a meeting of all important Cuban leaders who went to Guatemala to sign an agreement. Alejos indicated that Cardona wished to see Ydigoras-Fuentes in order to relieve any misunderstanding and Ydigoras-Fuentes agreed to see Cardona anytime he would come to Guatemala. He instructed Alejos to issue Cardona a visa at his request.

The position of Carlos Alejos was verified through the "Diplomatic List" dated November, 1962, published by the United States Department of State.

Miguel Ydigoras-Fuentes is the President of Guatemala.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

NO. 19-124/25-2

DATE : 633 10 OCT 62 WO

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : KINGSTON

ACTION : TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

OCT 11 00212 62

ROUTINE

IN 37423

DIR INFO WAVE CITE KNGS 0208

GYROSE AMBUD

REF A DIR 40852 (CG-A84508)

B KNGS 0202 (IN 32688)

1. COS BELIEVES HIS REF B APPRAISAL JAMAICAN POLITICAL CLIMATE RE ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD DELEGATION HERE CORRECT. JAMAICAN GOVT WANTS NOT BE OVERTLY INVOLVED IN COLD WAR AND OUT OF CONCERN FOR SAFETY LARGE JAMAICAN COMMUNITY CUBA WILL MAKE STRENUOUS EFFORT TO STAY OUT. HOWEVER THEY WILL HELP COVERTLY WHEREVER POSSIBLE. ANY ATTEMPT INVOLVE JAMAICAN GOVT AGAINST ITS WILL AT THIS TIME WOULD RESULT IN NET LOSS OF COOPERATION NOW AND IN FUTURE. STATION REGARDS INCREASING COOPERATION OF RUABBE SERVICE IN CUBAN OBJECTIVES OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE.

2. IF HQS BELIEVES AMBUD REP SHOULD VISIT JAMAICA TO TEST POLITICAL CLIMATE IN GOVT, STATION WOULD CONCUR MOST RELUCTANTLY IN (PTN GBLD., WILL FWD) WITH FRANK (DIAZ) SILVEIRA DURING CARIBBEAN GAMES WHOM GOVT WANTED TO THROW OUT FOR HIS STATEMENTS TO PRESS ABOUT PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD REPRESENTATION HERE. IN ANY EVENT STATION WOULD INSIST NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS PRECEDE JAMAICAN GOVT RULING. SHOULD GOVT REJECT AMBUD FOLLOWING ADVANCE PUBLICITY THIS COULD BE MAJOR VICTORY FOR CUBAN CONSULATE, SHOT IN ARM TO FADING "FRIENDS OF CUBA COMMITTEE"

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ATE

O

OM

ION

FO

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

PAGE 2

IN 37423 KNGS 0208

(COMPRISING LOCAL COMMUNISTS AND RAS TAFARIS), AND GIFT TO BUDDING NEW COMMUNIST FRONT "SOCIALIST PARTY OF JAMAICA".

3. SINCE STATION COULD NOT PLAUSIBLY DENY RESPONSIBILITY FOR AMBUD TO RUABBE AND GOVT OPPOSED TO USE OF JAMAICA FOR COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY PURPOSE AGAINST CUBA, COS BELIEVES IT ADVANTAGEOUS TO KUBARK AND ODYOKE FOR AMBUD STAY OUT OF JAMAICA UNTIL SENTIMENT CHANGES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *SUBJ KNGS CONCURRENCE, SUGGESTED WAVE SEND AMBUD REP TO TEST LOCAL GOVT CLIMATE FOR PROPOSED DELEG AND REPORT RESPONSE AMBUD/1.

RI COPY

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

U. K. Liaison file

See: LOND 5956 (IN 27353), 29 March 1961
LOND 5968 (IN 28181), 31 March 1961

(Extra sensitive cables to be opened by Chief, WH/4/PA only.

13-124-25/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : T. Smith
UNIT : WH/4/PA
EXT : 8715
DATE : 19 April 1961

1749

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : BOOK MESSAGE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PMG, CA/PRG, CA/PROP
EE 4, FE 5, NE 4, AF 4, WE 4, S/C 2, SR 4

ri files as indicated
No filing required
R

APR 20 0320Z 61
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 97713
97713

LISTED
TO ~~ALL~~ STATIONS AND BASES INFO CITE DIR 35831 35831

1. FYI, SENIOR KUDOVE OFFICIALS ONLY. A STRIKE FORCE OF CUBAN REVOLUTIONARIES NUMBERING 1200, INVADED CUBA BY SEA 17 APRIL AT COCHINOS BAY, LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. AFTER THREE INITIAL BEACH HEADS WERE SECURED AGAINST LITTLE OPPOSITION, THE GOC SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING AIR SUPERIORITY USING T-33 JET TRAINERS AND MIG-[illegible]'S. BY 18 APRIL UP TO 12 SOVIET-BUILT TANKS WERE BROUGHT INTO ACTION.

2. THE REBELS LOST ONE BEACH HEAD ON 17 APRIL AND THEIR REMAINING FOOTHOLD ON 19 APRIL. THIS WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THREE FACTORS:

(A) INABILITY TO RESUPPLY WITH PROP A/C IN FACE OF ENEMY JET AIR SUPERIORITY.

(B) INABILITY TO WITHSTAND HEAVY TANK ASSAULT ON A BEACH COMBAT ZONE.

(C) OVERWHELMING ENEMY MAN POWER.

3. THIS STRIKE FORCE WAS THE MAIN REBEL EFFORT DURING THE PERIOD 16-20 APRIL.

4. NO RELIABLE DATA THIS DATE RE REBEL WOUNDED, CAPTURED, OR KILLED. BEACH HEAD WAS COMPLETELY OVERRUN BUT LOCAL TERRAIN SUCH THAT INDIVIDUALS OR SMALL GROUPS MAY HAVE INFILTRATED INLAND.

5. GOC POLICE ACTION, INCLUDING ARREST OF THOUSANDS, EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED CIVILIAN ACTION IN SUPPORT INVASION.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

RE Index:
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 97713

TO INFO CITE DIR 35831

-2-

6. FULL DETAILS NOT AVAILABLE. PSYCH GUIDANCE WILL FOLLOW.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

for C/WH/4 R D [illegible]

WH/C/CA obersT in draft

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RICHARD M. BISSELL
DDP
RELEASING OFFICER

J. C. King
J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

4

FORM 1389 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

FILE NO.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature: -3-

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 97713
OUT 97713

TO INFO CITE DIR 35831
35831

ABIJ ACCR ADDI ALGI AMMA ANCH ANKA ASUN
ATHE BAGH [redacted] BANG BEIR BELG BRLN BERN
BOGO BOMB BONN BRAZ BRUS CAIR CALC CAPT
CARA TRUJ COLO CNRY LISB COPE DKAR DAMA
DARE DJAK FRAN GUAT HAGU HELS HONG HULA
ISTA JIDD KABU KAMP KAHI KTMN KHAR KUAL
KUWA LAGS LAPA LEOP LIMA LOND [redacted] LUXE
MADR MANA MANI MELB MEXI MOGA MNRV MONT
MUNI NOBI NEWD OTTA PACY PARI PENH PRIN
PRET QUIT RABA RNGO REYK RIOD ROME SAIG
SLBY SANJ JUAN SAGO SALV SEOU SING STOC
TAMI THAR TEGU TEHE TOKY TPLI TNIS VIEN
VETN WELL YAOU

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1389 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

19-124-25/4

DATE: 374
16 DEC 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PANAMA CITY

ACTION: BELL 10

INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature: ______

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 16 2212Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 39471

DIR INFO WAVE CITE PACY 7273

JMZIP/KUCAGE

1. REQUEST POA FOR VICENTE HERRERO DIAZ, CUBAN NATIONAL BORN LA HABANA 22 SEPTEMBER 1915. FATHER CRESCENCIO HERRERO HERNANDEZ, SPANISH BORN NOW DECEASED. MOTHER EUGENIA DIAZ DIAZ SPANISH BORN NOW LIVING CUBA. IN CUBA WORKED IN RADIO AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION, PUBLICITY RESEARCH FIELDS. FRIEND OF DR. CONTE AGUERO AND MEMBER HIS FRENTE ANTICOMUNISTA.

2. IN PANAMA HAS WORKED AT MARKET AND AUDIEN
RESEARCH, PRODUCED NOW DEFUNCT MONTHLY MAGAZINE HUMANIDAD. IS ONE OF FIFTEEN MEMBERS OF LOCAL CONSEJO REVOLUCIONARIO CHAPTER WITH TITLE COORDINADOR AUXILIAR. PRODUCES AND BROADCASTS LOCAL CONSEJO DAILY HALF HOUR RADIO PROGRAM ON RADIO MIRAMAR.

3. LOCAL TRACES IN PROCESS. WAVE SEND ANY DEROG TRACES PACY AND DIR.

4. DESIRE USE SUBJ FOR LOCAL PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, MONITORING AND SUPPORT LOCAL JMRAKE ACTIVITIES.

RI COPY

END OF MESSAGE

FORM 1389a

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

"DO" RECORD MATERIAL

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES, RM GE-58, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4598.

DUE DATE

[illegible] Dec 76
[illegible] Sep 76
[illegible] 77

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

3. ~~I/EIB GA-10 R. [illegible]~~		10 MAY 1976	~~[illegible]~~
4. ~~IP/EIS GA-10 D. Isaac~~			~~[illegible]~~
5. IP/EIS GA-10 D. Isaac 305.331			
6. C. [illegible]		16 Feb 77	[illegible]
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14. RETURN TO			
15. IP/ARD Rm ~~GE-58~~ GA50			

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

Job# 72-258/25
SMRC# 407654

FILE NO.:
DOCUMENT:
FOLDER: 3
PAGE:
BOX: 2

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

407165

RETURN TO RECORDS CENT
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 72-258 — BOX 2

DEP. - FINAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO IP/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-68 2593

(7-13)

U R G E N T

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC [illegible]

S P E C I A L

CIA FBI INS SY	FROM:	DATE
FULL NAME (married woman include maiden name) RODRIGUEZ (Garcia), Caridad	ALIASES, NICKNAMES Mrs. Garcia-Rubio	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH Sept. 6, 1907 Cuba Santiago de las Vegas, Havana
HOME ADDRESS 9630 S.W. 9th Terrace Miami, Fl. 33174	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP Cuban
MARITAL STATUS widow	SPOUSE'S NAME (Deceased) Rafael Garcia Rubio	
OCCUPATION retired	NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER former: Catholic Welfare Bureau, Miami and Salon Tropical, Miami	

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

Alien Reg. No. A-12 413 112

Admitted to US as immigrant 9/23/64 at Miami (first entered as a parolee at Miami on 11/28/60.

Requesting permission to travel to Cuba to visit son recently released from prison

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE Visa Office/CD	TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM Cuban Departure Control
DATE Feb. 12, 1975	
NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER Newmaster/Southern	

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

4 MAR 1975

FORM DS-937
9-65

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-27670

FILE NO - 201-298852, 19-124-25/6

DATE - 29 MAY 1967

INDEXING - NO

MICROFILM - NO

TO - C/WH

INFO - NONE

FROM - COS, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - TYPIC/AMBUD/DEPENDENCY PAYMENT

ACTION - SEE BELOW

REF - UFGA-27536, 11 MAY 1967

REQUEST REPLY REF

BURTON J. CELENZA

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

3 - C/WH

[illegible]

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Dependent Payment for Case #103, Jorge FUNDORA Fernandez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: Reply to paragraph three
References: A. UFGW-6351, 19 January 1967
B. UFGA-26878, 1 February 1967
C. HNMW-1985, 27 April 1967

1. A letter dated 7 May 1967 has been received from Silvia HEREDIA, 180 S.E. 13th Terrace, Miami, Florida, via the AMTIKI-1 facility. Mrs. HEREDIA is the widow of Jorge FUNDORA Fernandez (Hero & Martyr, no 201 number) who is the Subject of Case #103 for which a monthly AMBUD payment of $175.00 is made to the widow. In her letter, which is attached, Mrs. HEREDIA requests the AMTIKI facility to also send the payment formerly received from AMBIDDY-1 which she claims was terminated in April 1967.

2. This case was one of three cases for which AMBIDDY requested in January 1967 that WOFACT assume the monthly payments being made by his organization. The request by AMBIDDY was the Subject of Reference A which requested data from JMWAVE concerning the cases. The JMWAVE reply, forwarded under Reference B, included a recommendation that no increase in payment be made. Reference C informed the addressee that, under the circumstances, it was not possible for Headquarters to take any action to provide support to the individuals concerned.

3. In view of the background described above, we propose, with Headquarters approval, to have AMTIKI-1 reply to Mrs. HEREDIA stating that no funds are available in addition to the $175.00 monthly payment which is being made.

4. We are also enclosing copies of the following documentation which has been provided by Mrs. HEREDIA:

Attachments:
A. 1 Letter referred to in para 1 above
B. 3 Documents " " " " 4 "

atts filed Subject's soft file

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/atts. A and B h/w

19-124-25/6

CS COPY

DATE TYPED 22 May 67	DATE DISPATCHED MAY 29 1967
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27636	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

2aa.

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27636

a. Certificate of marriage 14 November 1958.

b. Birth certificate for the son, Eduardo Luis FUNDORA Heredia.
DOB: 4 December 1958

c. Birth certificate for the daughter, Raquel Maria FUNDORA Heredia.
DOB: 16 March 1960

Burton J Celenza
Burton J. CELENZA

14-00000

ATTACH
A
to UFGA-27636, 22May67

Miami, May 7, 1967

Sirs:

By means of these lines I wish to tell you of my present situation with the hope that you can help me.

My name is Silvia HEREDIA, widow of Jorge FUNDORA, and I have been receiving from you a pension of $175.00 monthly. Since this sum was insufficient to cover the needs of my two children, Eduardo who is 8 years old and Raquel who is 7 years old, and the psychiatric treatment for myself, AMBIDDY-1 , in the name of the , sent me $125.00 monthly. In the month of August 1966, that amount (from the) was reduced to $100.00 for economic reasons and in the month of ~~Apl~~ April 1967 I was notified that this amount would be suspended entirely and that I should not count on this subsidy in the future.

My situation cannot be sustained because due to my health I am not able to work at the moment and I am turning to you with the request that the sum suspended by the ___ which was sent to me by AMBIDDY-1 be assigned to me by you.

Respectfully,

Silvia Heredia Vda. de Fundora

180 SE 14 Terrace
Miami, Fla.

att. 1 UFGA-27636

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

Miami, Mayo 7, 1967.

Señores:

Por medio de estas lineas deseo expresarles mi actual situación con la esperanza de que puedan ayudarme.

La que suscribe es Silvia Heredia, viuda de Jorge Fundora y que viene recibiendo de ustedes una pensión de $175.00 mensuales. Como esa cantidad era insuficiente para atender mis dos hijos, Eduardo de 8 años y Raquel de 7 años, así como el tratamiento siquiatrico a que estoy sometida, el [redacted] a nombre del [redacted], me enviaba $125.00 mensuales. En el mes de Agosto de 1966 dicha cantidad quedó reducida a $100.00 por reajustes económicos, y el mes de Abril de 1967 se me comunicó que tenía que suspender definitivamente esa cantidad por no contar más con la subvención con que contaba.

AMBIDDY-1

Como mi situación se hace insostenible ya que por mi salud no puedo trabajar por el momento acudo a ustedes con el ruego de que se me asigne la cantidad suspendida por el [redacted], que me hacía llegar el [redacted]. AMBIDDY-1

De ustedes muy respetuosamente,

Silvia Heredia Vda. de Fundora

180 S.E. 14 Terrace
Miami, Fla.

Mrs. Silvia Heredia,
1[illegible] S.E. 14 Terr. Apt.2
Miami, Florida, 33131.

MIAMI, FLA.
MAY 4
1967

CERTIFIED
No. 381174
MAIL

NOTIFIED
MAY 5 [illegible]

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-27536
FILE NO - 201-298852, 19-124-25/6
DATE - 11 MAY 1967
INDEXING - NO
MICROFILM - NO
TO - CHIEF, WH
INFO - NONE
FROM - COS, JMWAVE
SUBJECT - TYPIC/AMBUD/DEPENDENCY PAYMENT
ACTION - REPLY CONCERNING PARA THREE
REF - UFGA-27303

1. BACKGROUND DATA CONCERNING JORGE KIM YUM CASE AND JMWAVE RECOMMENDATION TERMINATE DEPENDENCY PAYMENTS FOR PARENTS FORWARDED UNDER REFERENCE.

2. LETTER FROM TRUSTEE, DATED 27 APRIL 1967, REQUESTS INFORMATION CONCERNING PAYMENTS THIS CASE WHICH HAVE BEEN WITHHELD BY JMWAVE SINCE JANUARY 1967 IN VIEW BACKGROUND DESCRIBED PARAGRAPH TWO REFERENCE.

3. WE PROPOSE REPLY TO TRUSTEE STATING THAT FOR HIS AND THE PARENTS INFORMATION THE MONTHLY PAYMENTS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED. WE PROPOSE FURTHER TO ADVISE THE TRUSTEE THAT SHOULD THE PARENTS COME TO THE UNITED STATES THE CASE WILL BE REVIEWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES IN EFFECT AT THAT TIME.

BURTON J. CELENZA

DISTRIBUTION
C/WH VIA TELEPOUCH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

13-201-298852

SECRET

10 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Status Report - Transfer of AMBUD Survivor Benefit Payments to BEC

1. Mr. Ben DeFelice, Chief, Benefits and Services Division, was phoned on 8 May for a reading on the status of the AMBUD case, i.e., researching the possibility of transferring Survivor Benefit payments (which total close to $500,000.00 per year) to the Bureau of Employee Compensation.

2. Mr. DeFelice assured WH/COG that whatever could be done was being done and a decision on the feasibility of the turnover was being made by the Director, BEC. Sample Survivor cases had been submitted to BEC for review along with the proposed text of a letter which would be addressed to the BEC by the DCI once the course to be followed was agreed upon by both parties. The draft letter had been prepared by Mr. Lawrence Houston.

3. Mr. DeFelice will advise WH/COG as soon as he has word.

Earl J. Williamson
Acting Chief, WH/COG

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
~~TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational~~
Indexing of AMBUD Dependency Payment Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith for Headquarters information and indexing purposes is a listing of the authorized payees for AMBUD monthly dependent payments effective with the March 1967 payment. Also included for indexing is a listing (pages 28-30) of the Principal Parties for whom 201 numbers are not available at JMWAVE.

Burton J Gerber
for Mark F. EFFIELD

Distribution:
3-WH/COG

NOT S[illegible] FOR [illegible]

19-124-25/6

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
5 May 1967

DATE DISPATCHED
MAY 10 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27514

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. if number needed.

1
SURNAME: ACOSTA Alba, GIVEN NAME: Julio MIDDLE NAME: 201- ~~[illegible]~~
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: 11 February 1915 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: Cuban OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE: 130 E. 16th St. Hialeah, Fla.
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 1~~:

Father of ACOSTA Ruiz, Julio (201-286546).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.
¶ Dependency case payment ¶

2
SURNAME: ACEVEDO Aleman, GIVEN NAME: Oscar MIDDLE NAME: L. 201-282276
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: 13 March 1930 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Santo Domingo, L.V.
CITIZENSHIP: Cuban OCCUPATION: Capt., U.S. Army RESIDENCE: 1601 NW 28th Ave. Miami Fla.
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No.~~ 2:
~~Trustee for payments on behalf of [illegible] Eleo~~
~~(201-[illegible])~~

m/ 201

3
SURNAME: LINAN GIVEN NAME: Olga MIDDLE NAME: 201-
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE: 712 W. 175th St. Apt. D New York, N.Y.
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No.~~ 3:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of BLANCO Cruz, Benito (201-~~
~~283914)~~

m/ 201

4
SURNAME: NAVARRO GIVEN NAME: Mercedes MIDDLE NAME: 201-
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 10 August 1918 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: Cuban OCCUPATION: Housewife RESIDENCE: 523 SW 7th Ave. Apt. 1 Miami, Fla.
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [redacted]4:

Mother of BLANCO Navarro, Manuel (201-268913).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

m/ 201

5
SURNAME: PORTELA GIVEN NAME: Maria MIDDLE NAME: L. 201-
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 10 February 1935 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No~~ 5:

Widow of CRESPO Graso, Jose (201-282317).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: SANCHEZ Dopazo, GIVEN NAME: Juan MIDDLE NAME: Jose 201-
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: 24 June 1922 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE: 1760 SW 1st. St. Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMMUG Dependency Payment Case No. 8~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of FERNANDEZ Mon, Daniel (301-[illegible])~~

2
SURNAME: CAPOTE GIVEN NAME: Nora MIDDLE NAME: 201-
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 26 June 1935 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMMUG Dependency Payment Case No. 7~~:

Widow of GARCIA Fernandez, Crispin (201-286855)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3
SURNAME: FOWLER GIVEN NAME: Victoria MIDDLE NAME: 201-
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 10 March 1906 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Case No. [illegible]~~:

Mother of GARCIA-MENOCAL Fowler, Raul (201-286031)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME: GARCIA Turino, GIVEN NAME: Rolando MIDDLE NAME: 201-
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: 20 January 1927 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Palma Soriano
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMMUG Dependency Payment Case No. 9~~:

~~Trustee for monthly payment on behalf of GARCIA Turino, Marcos (201-287474)~~

5
SURNAME: GONZALEZ GIVEN NAME: Ernesto MIDDLE NAME: 201-
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: 23 December 1907 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMMUG Dependency Payment Case No. 10~~:

Father of GONZALEZ Ramirez, Eduardo (201-287476)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: X BETANCOURT Garcia,
GIVEN NAME: Gloria
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 21 August 1942
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Case No. 11~~:

Widow of GONZALEZ Ramirez, Eduardo (201-287476)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME: X ARCA Campos,
GIVEN NAME: Manuel
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH: 8 August 1898
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Manzanillo
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 12~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of [illegible], Juan~~
~~([illegible])~~

201-191257

3
SURNAME: ESTRADA,
GIVEN NAME: Delia
MIDDLE NAME:
201- 291257
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 31 October 1935
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 13~~:

Widow of MARTINEZ Venegas, Emilio (201-281268).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME: X DIAZ,
GIVEN NAME: Vivian
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 28 August 1941
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Payment Case No. 14~~:

Widow of PIEDRA Negueruela, Osvaldo (201-280991).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5
SURNAME: X ARANGO Cortina,
GIVEN NAME: Ofelia
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 22 June 1929
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 15~~:

Widow of PUIG Mivar, Manuel (201-287193).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	4

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

201-304030

1
SURNAME: IGLESIAS Pineiro, GIVEN NAME: Sarah MIDDLE NAME: 201- 304030
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 22 February 1913 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Cardenas
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE: 2339 SW 17th Ave., Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 16~~:

Widow of QUINTANA Perera, Benjamin (201-287799).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME: ALVAREZ, ~~RAMOS Alvarez, Santos~~ GIVEN NAME: Justo MIDDLE NAME: 201-
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: 24 January 1931 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Limonar, Matanzas
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 17~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of RAMOS Alvarez, Santos (201-[illegible])~~

3
SURNAME: CASTELLANOS, GIVEN NAME: Victoria MIDDLE NAME: 201-
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 10 March 1913 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Jaguey Grande
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): Married name is: Mrs. Arturo MACIAS
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 15~~:

Mother of ROJAS Castellanos, Jorge (201-282288).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME: ABELEDO, GIVEN NAME: Antonio MIDDLE NAME: 201-
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: 20 May 1918 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of SERRANO Camejo, Felix (201-[illegible])~~.

5
SURNAME: PALMA, GIVEN NAME: Vilma MIDDLE NAME: 201-
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE: 2101 NW 26th St., Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Remarried widow of VIANELLO Alakan, Raul (201-098817).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	5

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
QUINTANA,	Petrona		

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	19 January 1917	Cuba	Pinar del Rio

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 21~~:

Mother of VILLARCHAO Quintana, Jesus (201-282038).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
LORENZO Boitel,	Maria	L.	

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	18 August 1903		

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 22~~:

Mother of PEREZ Lorenzo, Lorenzo R. (201-286860)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
GONZALEZ,	Elena		

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	14 May 1898	Cuba	Havana

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 24~~:

Mother of CABALLERO Gonzalez, Julio (201-285169).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
VILA,	Nidia	Rosa	

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	6 July 1937	Cuba	Las Villas

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
		58 Willoughby St. Newark, New Jersey

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 04~~:

Widow of VILA Acebal, Victor M. (201-301742).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case.~~

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SANTOS,	Lucy		

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	27 September 1933	U.S.A.	Philadelphia, Pa.

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
U. S. A.		

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 29 and 06~~:

Ex-wife of PEREZ Rangel, Gaston (201-285269).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	6

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201, if number needed.

1

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
√ PELEA Jimenez,	Rafael		291264

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M	24 October 1925	Cuba	Las Villas, Baez

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency payment [illegible]~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of GALINDO Sanchez, Francisco~~
~~(201-284179)~~

2

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
√ PARDO,	Mirna		No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	6 May 1937	Cuba	Havana

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 28~~:

Widow of MILIAN Velasco, Jose S. (201-290836)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
√ ALEMAN Diaz,	Laureana	Concepcion	No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	4 April 1903	Cuba	Santa Isabel, L.V.

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 29~~:

Mother of ALEMAN Aleman, Eufracio (201-290479)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
√ LEZCANO,	Rosa		No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	19 December 1929	Cuba	Havana

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 30~~:

Widow of AMARO Abreu, Pedro L. (201-290826).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
√ CAMACHO,	Irelda		No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	28 December 1933	Cuba	Guinia de Miranda

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 31~~:

Wife of CARRAZANA Trimino, Jose R. (201-291244).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-65 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	7

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. if number needed.

1

SURNAME AMARO de la Cruz,	GIVEN NAME Emiliano	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 8 August 1899	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Guira de Melina
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;

Father of AMARO Diaz, Antonio (201-294701).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME CORDOVES Camejo,	GIVEN NAME Maria	MIDDLE NAME Esther	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 15 September 1909	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Mantua, Pinar del Rio
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;

Mother of CATA Cordoves, Jose (201-291906).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME HERRERA Silverio,	GIVEN NAME Irma	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 16 November 1939	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;

Ex-wife of CATA Cordoves, Jose (201-291906).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME POU Mazon,	GIVEN NAME Herminia	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 25 April XXXX 1906	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Santa Cruz del Norte
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;

Mother of DIAZ Pou, Antonio (201-278750) ~~not available~~).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME PINO,	GIVEN NAME Maria del Carmen	MIDDLE NAME	201-737479
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 20 February 1934	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Santiago de Cuba
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;

Widow of CANIZARES Gamboa, Armando (201-291341).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 8

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. If number needed.

1

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
FIGUEROA,	Natividad		No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	19 October 1926		

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
		156 Throop Ave. Brooklyn, N. Y.

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~;

Widow of AMORIN Sotelo, Roberto (201-291905).
~~[illegible]~~.

2

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
LOPEZ Moreno,	Paula	Matilde	No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	26 January 1923		

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Payment [illegible]~~;

Widow of JULIEN Padron, Carlos (201-276847).
~~[illegible]~~.

3

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
FERNANDEZ Rubio,	Isis		No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	11 May 1936	Cuba	Baracoa, Oriente

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Payment [illegible]~~;

~~[illegible] JULIEN Padron, Carlos (201-276847)~~

4

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
ANGULO,	Maria	Teresa	No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	26 October 1898		

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Case No.~~ 40;

Mother of GARCIA-MONTES Angulo, Jose (201-292402).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
GARCIA-MONTES,	Maria	C.	No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	10 December 1925	Cuba	Managua

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~;

Widow of GARCIA-MONTES Angulo, Jose (201-292402).
~~[illegible]~~.

FORM 53d 10-65	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	9

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME: ALNLLE,	GIVEN NAME: Carmelina	MIDDLE NAME:	201- NO 201
SEX: F	DATE OF BIRTH: 23 September 1889	COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:	OCCUPATION:	RESIDENCE:	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] 42~~:

Grandmother of MORLJON Hernandez, Ramon (201-289511).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME: GARCIA,	GIVEN NAME: Julia	MIDDLE NAME:	201- NO 201
SEX: F	DATE OF BIRTH: 1 October 1901	COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Puerto Padre, Oriente
CITIZENSHIP:	OCCUPATION:	RESIDENCE:	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): Remarriage name is: AKA Mrs. Antonio OSTUNE			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Payment Case No. 44~~:

Mother of ARIZA Garcia, Carlos (201-292725)
~~[illegible]~~.

3

SURNAME: DELGADO,	GIVEN NAME: Rosa	MIDDLE NAME: Maria	201- NO 201
SEX: F	DATE OF BIRTH:	COUNTRY OF BIRTH:	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:	OCCUPATION:	RESIDENCE:	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): Remarriage name is: AKA Rosa M. Freyre			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] 14~~:

Remarried widow of CERVANTES Lago, Alfredo (201-292730).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME: RODON Alvarez,	GIVEN NAME: Felipe	MIDDLE NAME: General	201- NO 201
SEX: M	DATE OF BIRTH: 14 September 1912	COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Santiago De Cuba
CITIZENSHIP:	OCCUPATION:	RESIDENCE:	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] 45~~:

Father of RODON Caminero, Oscar (201-293106).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME: LEESON Cosio,	GIVEN NAME: Marea	MIDDLE NAME:	201- NO 201
SEX: M	DATE OF BIRTH: 18 November 1905	COUNTRY OF BIRTH:	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:	OCCUPATION:	RESIDENCE: Avenida Munoz Morin 57 Altos, Humacao, Puerto Rico.	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] 46~~:

Mother of HERNANDEZ Cosio, Ernesto (201-292741).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 10

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME BECERRA de Soler,	GIVEN NAME Esther	MIDDLE NAME	201- / 6211
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 18 June 1921	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Trinidad, L.V.
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 47~~:

Widow of SOLER Estrada, Ambrosio (201-294426).
~~Received a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME KING,	GIVEN NAME William	MIDDLE NAME K.	201- 742345
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 1 March 1919	COUNTRY OF BIRTH U.S.A. (Texas)	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Arlington
CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 3036 NW 4th Terrace Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 48~~:

~~Trustee for Payments on behalf of VILA Piqueras (201-[illegible]~~)

3

SURNAME FERNANDEZ,	GIVEN NAME Cecile	MIDDLE NAME	201- 110201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 12 November 1919	COUNTRY OF BIRTH U.S.A.	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH New York
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Ex-wife of MACIA del Monte, Jose L. (201-294229).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME ALCANTARA,	GIVEN NAME Josefina	MIDDLE NAME	201- 110211
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 25 September 1938	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 146 Dayton St. Newark, New Jersey
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 50~~:

Widow of VIDAL Mazola, Reinaldo (201-294433).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME ALONSO,	GIVEN NAME Maria	MIDDLE NAME	201- 110211
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 51~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of RAMOS Alonso, Antonio~~
(~~201 not available~~)

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 11

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME: PAULA,
GIVEN NAME: Arrelia
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 22 September 1927
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 10207½ 5th Ave. Inglewood, California
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 52~~:

Ex-wife of CRUZ de la Torre, Clemente (201-294523).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME: VIQUEIRA,
GIVEN NAME: Jose
MIDDLE NAME: B.
201- No 201
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 1614½ S. Oak St. Los Angeles, Calif.
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 53~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of NAPOLES Viqueira, Narciso J~~.
~~(201-[illegible])~~

3

SURNAME: MIRO,
GIVEN NAME: Grecia
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
Re-married name is: (Mrs) Norman R. Karmon
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 54~~:

Ex-wife of CUERVO Fernandez, Gustavo (201-294558).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME: AGRAMONTE,
GIVEN NAME: Matilde
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 10 August 1929
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Santiago de Cuba
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 55~~:

Widow of RIONDA del Monte, Manuel (201-291932).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME: RODRIGUEZ,
GIVEN NAME: Paulina
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 22 March 1924
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 56~~:

Widow of GARCIA-VILLATA Espinosa, Jorge (201-301458).
Receives a monthly payment for this case.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	12

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME CASTRO de Jones,	GIVEN NAME Rosa	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 9 October 1912	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Cardenas
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependent Payment Case No. 67~~:

Mother of JONES Castro, Jorge (201-293451).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME SANCHEZ,	GIVEN NAME Gladys	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 17 June 1921	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Moron, Camaguey
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependent Payment Case No. 68~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of SANCHEZ Grandal, Anselmo (201-[illegible])~~

SURNAME BEQUER Alvarado,	GIVEN NAME Isabel	MIDDLE NAME Maria	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 29 August 1922	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Cienfuegos, L.V.
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependent Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow of LEON Leon, Vicente (201-286541).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

SURNAME SOUBLETTE,	GIVEN NAME Rosa	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 14 September 1913	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependent Payment Case No. 60~~:

Mother of SILVA Soublette, Rene J. (201-290432).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

SURNAME LOPEZ,	GIVEN NAME Carmen	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 29 November 1918	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Camaguey
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 835 W. 71st Place Hialeah, Florida

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependent Payment Case No. 61~~:

Widow of CARMENATE Cebrian, Marcelo B. (201-297567).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME BORREGO,	GIVEN NAME Gladys	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 3 September 1931	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow of GUERRA Gutierrez, Omar (201-272267).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME MARTINEZ,	GIVEN NAME Elsa	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 30 June 1934	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Manacas, L. V.
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 1220 SW 5th St. Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 59~~:

Widow of GALVEZ Lopez, Mario R. (201-297112).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME ROJAS,	GIVEN NAME Blanco	MIDDLE NAME N.	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 26 February 1920	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Pinar del Rio
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 64~~:

Widow of CAMEJO Lopez, Ovidio (201-297129).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME XIX XXNXKKX VILARELLO Tabares, Jose	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME D.	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

5

SURNAME TABARES,	GIVEN NAME Carmen	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 7 October 1902	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Guanabacoa
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 66~~:

Mother of VILARELLO Tabares, Jose D. (201-301690).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 14

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: ORTEGA Arias,
GIVEN NAME: Carmen
MIDDLE NAME:
201- NO 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 19 November 1934
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUD Dependency Payment Case No. 67~~:

Widow of VILARELLO Tabares, Jose D. (201-301690).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME: MIR Duran,
GIVEN NAME: Elba
MIDDLE NAME: Rosa
201- NO 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 15 November 1913
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Mir, Oriente
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUD Dependency Payment Case No. 68~~:

Mother of ROJAS Mir, Pedro (201-298252).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3
SURNAME: FEIJOO,
GIVEN NAME: Juan
MIDDLE NAME:
201- NO 301
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH: 13 August 1911
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: San Juan de los Yeros
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUD Dependency Payment Case No. 69~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of FEIJOO Fabregat, Jose V.~~
~~(201-[illegible])~~.

4
SURNAME: ESCOBEDO,
GIVEN NAME: Gladys
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

5
SURNAME: ESCOBEDO Martinez,
GIVEN NAME: Gladys
MIDDLE NAME:
201- NO 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 6 January 1915
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUD Dependency Payment Case No. 70~~:

Mother of CASAS Escobedo, Eduardo de las (201-294621).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME FERNANDEZ,	GIVEN NAME Amada	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 6 February 1930	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Holguin
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 245 SW 20th Ave. Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

AMBUD ~~Dependency Payment Case No. 71~~:

~~Receives payments on behalf of [illegible]~~ l.
(~~[illegible]~~)

2

SURNAME VALLE Suero,	GIVEN NAME Alejandro del	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 29 October 1907	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 72~~:

Father of XXXXXX del VALLE Marti, Alejandro (201-282291).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME MARTI,	GIVEN NAME Maria	MIDDLE NAME Luisa XXXXXX	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 18 March 1913	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 73~~:

Mother of del VALLE Marti, Alejandro (201-282291).
~~Received a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME FINALES Hernández,	GIVEN NAME Pastora	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 26 July 1896	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 74~~:

Mother of ORIA Finales, Luis (201-283201).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME ROQUE,	GIVEN NAME Margarita	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 28 January 1912	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 3880 W. 4th Ave. Hialeah, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 75~~:

Mother of NORDA XXXXXX Roque, Pedro (201-298859).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 16

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S E C R E T	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. if number needed.

1

SURNAME X HERNANDEZ Alvarez,	GIVEN NAME Gilberto	MIDDLE NAME	201- Nc 201
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 14 June 1914	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] payment [illegible]~~:

Father of HERNANDEZ Ramirez, Gilberto (201-298850).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~

2

SURNAME X PAYRET,	GIVEN NAME Juan	MIDDLE NAME	201- Nc 201
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Trustee ~~for payments on behalf of [illegible] Decall, Carlos (201-300046)~~.

3

SURNAME X RODRIGUEZ,	GIVEN NAME Aida	MIDDLE NAME	201- Nc 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 19 November 1920	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Cienfuegos
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 2953 SW 38th Court Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Widow of GEAS Decall, Carlos (201-300046).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME X MUNOZ de Ginorio,	GIVEN NAME Aida	MIDDLE NAME	201- Nc 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 30 ~~JNNE~~ 1940	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Artemisa
CITIZENSHIP July	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Widow of GINORIO Mulgado, Ramon (201-297361).
~~[illegible]~~.

5

SURNAME X JUUL,	GIVEN NAME Sara	MIDDLE NAME	201- Nc 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

~~[illegible] on behalf of [illegible] (201-297361)~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 17

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME X MILIAN,	GIVEN NAME Rosa	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 28 August 1912	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 39-11 Lincoln Park Apartment 804 Newark, New Jersey
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUB dependency payment case No. [illegible]~~:

Mother of DIAZ Milian, Osvaldo (201-298810).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME X CLE Marques,	GIVEN NAME Maria	MIDDLE NAME Paz	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 7 April 1929	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 2121 SW 24th Terrace Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUB dependency payment case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow of CUELLAR Alonso, Pedro S. (201-297556).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME X OTEIZA,	GIVEN NAME Margarita	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1933	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUB dependency payment case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow of GONZALRZ Recio, Alberto (201-300035).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME X RECIO y Recio,	GIVEN NAME Esther	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 11 February 1902	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Camaguey
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUB dependency payment case No. 65~~:

Mother of GONZALEZ Recio, Alberto (201-300035).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME X OROPESA,	GIVEN NAME Nelly	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 16 February 1930	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Cardenas
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN) aka Juliana Garcia Oropesa Bosque			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUB dependency payment case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow (remarried) of OROPESA Delgado, Mario (201-300071).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-65 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 18

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: DIB Ase,
GIVEN NAME: Elsa
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 7 May 1938
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Jaruco
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 2003 Galiano, Apt. 2
[illegible]
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 47~~;
Widow of SOLIS Shelton, Carlos (201-300082).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME: CASANOVA,
GIVEN NAME: Oscar
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH: 26 September 1905
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;
Father of CASANOVA Gomez, Fernando (201-300545).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3
SURNAME: CANTERO,
GIVEN NAME: Herminia
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 10 June 1915
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;
Widow of GUIM Gutierrez, Guillermo E. (201-Not available)
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

No 201 ✓

4
SURNAME: ORTIZ de Veral,
GIVEN NAME: Modesta
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 15 June 1906
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Holguin
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 61~~;
Mother of VERA Ortiz, Ruben (201-284492).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5
SURNAME: KOCH Baeza,
GIVEN NAME: Herman
MIDDLE NAME:
201- 741323
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH: 11 March 1906
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 87-21 87th St,
Apt. [illegible]
Woodhaven, New York
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]2~~;
Father of KOCH Gene, Herman (201-283096).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 19

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME X ROVIROSA Ojeda,	GIVEN NAME Graciela	MIDDLE NAME	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 22 October 1919	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Camaguey
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 8670 SW 27th Terrace Miami, Florida

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] No. 44~~:

Mother of FERNANDEZ Rovirosa, Jose A. (201-283357).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME X ACOSTA Lizano,	GIVEN NAME Modesta	MIDDLE NAME	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 15 June 1933	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] No. 45~~:

Widow of RODRIGUEZ, Nemesio (~~Hero and Martyr Case, No. 201~~).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME X CARRERA Gonzalez,	GIVEN NAME Rosa	MIDDLE NAME Maria	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 24 November 1906	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Widow of SORI Marin, Humberto (201-248158).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME X CARBALLO Miranda,	GIVEN NAME Hilda	MIDDLE NAME Rosa	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 7 September 1933	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Pinar del Rio
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Widow of DELGADO, Miguel de los Santos (201- 283995).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME X DELGADO Caraballoso,	GIVEN NAME Clara	MIDDLE NAME	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 4 March 1941	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Iguara, Las Villas
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Widow of RAMIREZ, Porfirio (~~Hero and Martyr case, no. 201~~).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 20

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S E C R E T	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME DIAZ Gonzalez,	GIVEN NAME Rene	MIDDLE NAME L.	201- 720322
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 4 July 1929	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Los Pinos
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 3145 SW 2nd St. Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWORD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of [illegible] and [illegible] Luis, ([illegible] martyr case, no 201 number)~~

2

SURNAME EIREA Sanchez,	GIVEN NAME Maria de las Mercedes	MIDDLE NAME	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 6 February 1903	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWORD Dependency Payment Case No. 100~~:

Mother of ROJAS Eirea, Anastasio (201-282302).
~~Received a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME PALMER Palmer,	GIVEN NAME Francisca	MIDDLE NAME	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 25 April 1937	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWORD Dependency Payment Case No. 101~~:

Widow of ROJAS Eirea, Anastasio (201-282302).
~~Received a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME FERNANDEZ Vilarino,	GIVEN NAME Lilia	MIDDLE NAME	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 26 September 1933	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWORD Dependency Payment Case No. 102~~:

Widow of TAMARGO Gutierrez, Rolando (201-284309).
~~Received a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME HEREDIA Gonzalez,	GIVEN NAME Silvia	MIDDLE NAME	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 11 January 1935	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Aguada de Pajaseros
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWORD Dependency Payment Case No. 103~~:

Widow of FUNDORA, Jorge ~~([illegible])~~.
~~Received a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 21

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME LLON Carrandiz,	GIVEN NAME Lucia	MIDDLE NAME	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 3 December 1896	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 104~~:

Mother of LLON Leon, Vicente (201-286341).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME MAS Machado,	GIVEN NAME Flora	MIDDLE NAME	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 9 April 1917	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 105~~:

Mother of BAEZ, Juventino ~~([illegible])~~.
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME PEREZ Marron,	GIVEN NAME Rita	MIDDLE NAME	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 25 December 1932	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 106~~:

Widow of LE SANTE, William ~~([illegible])~~.
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME POSADA Dominguez,	GIVEN NAME Amparo	MIDDLE NAME	201- NO 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 30 October 1925	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 107~~:

Widow of PRIETO Ruiz, Plinio (201-279298).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME RUIZ Delgado,	GIVEN NAME Maria	MIDDLE NAME Caridad	201- 297156
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 9 July 1900	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Mother of PRIETO Ruiz, Plinio (201-279298).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53J	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 22

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME RODRIGUEZ Exposito,	GIVEN NAME Juana	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 29 July 1909	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Personal Case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow of ESCOTO, Armando (201-283865).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME SUAREZ Homdedeu,	GIVEN NAME Isabel	MIDDLE NAME Maria	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 20 April 1902	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Mother of YERBA, Jose Antonio ~~(Hero & Martyr case, No. [illegible]~~).
~~Receives a monthly Dependent payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME SUAREZ Tous,	GIVEN NAME Teresa	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 22 November 1940	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow of CARRERAS, Jesus ~~(Hero & Martyr case, No. [illegible]~~).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME REYES Martinez,	GIVEN NAME Manuel	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 23 February 1909	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Guanajay
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 526 15th St, Apt. 8 Miami Beach, Florida

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Father of REYES Garcia, Manuel (201-281272).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME GONZALEZ,	GIVEN NAME Concepcion	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 30 September 1923	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 43 NW 7th Ave. Miami, Florida

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of [illegible], [illegible].~~
~~(201-[illegible]~~)

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 23

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: X NUNEZ de Conte,
GIVEN NAME: Teofila
MIDDLE NAME: Hilda
201- [illegible]
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 12 December 1928
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 124~~:

Wife of CONTE Hernandez, Ramon B. (201-285171).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME: FF COUZE Fernandez,
GIVEN NAME: Maria
MIDDLE NAME: D.
201- 287222
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 29 March 1916
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 126~~:

Wife of OJEDA Camaraza, Eduardo (201-282123).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3
SURNAME: X MILIAN,
GIVEN NAME: Angelina
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 25 December 1918
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Batabano
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 128~~:

Wife of MILIAN Perez, Rogelio (201-291258).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME: X SOA Cobo,
GIVEN NAME: Herminia
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX:
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 127~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of CAMPO Gutierrez, Rafael~~
~~([illegible])~~

5
SURNAME: X PERDOMO Lopez,
GIVEN NAME: Esther
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 26 September 1928
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Moron, Camaguey
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 130~~:

Wife of SIERRA Montesino, Fidel ~~([illegible])~~
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-69 53d OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

☒ CONTINUED

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. if number needed.

1
SURNAME: HERNANDEZ O'Fallon, GIVEN NAME: Zoe MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 2 November 1925 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Santiago de Cuba
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Wife of HERNANDEZ, Giordano ~~([illegible])~~.
~~[illegible] dependent payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME: MARDONES Vivanco, GIVEN NAME: Marina MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 12 May 1914 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Wife of BLANCO Muniz, Jose Lauro ~~([illegible])~~.
~~[illegible] dependent payment for this case~~.

3
SURNAME: MACIAS de Borras, GIVEN NAME: Ondina MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 28 May 1921 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE: 3249 NW 3rd St. Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 131~~:

Widow of BORRAS Gutierrez, Jose (201-301745).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME: FRANCO, GIVEN NAME: Ana MIDDLE NAME: Rosa 201- [illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 26 June 1928 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Oriente
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE: 3363 Andrita St. Los Angeles, Calif.
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 132~~:

Wife of FRANCO Mira, Jose (201-300027).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5
SURNAME: GARCIA, GIVEN NAME: Miguel MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: 31 October 1919 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Cardenas
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

~~[illegible] for payment on behalf of GARCIA [illegible], Manuel de Jesus~~
~~([illegible])~~

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	XX CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 25

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201, if number needed.

1

SURNAME VALDES,	GIVEN NAME Rosa	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 6 May 1934	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Wife of SANTIAGO Villa, Armando (201-297837).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME GARRIDO,	GIVEN NAME Manuel	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 437 SW 7th St. Apt 2 Miami, Florida

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 135~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of [illegible], Pedro H.~~.
~~(201-345157)~~

3

SURNAME VASALLO,	GIVEN NAME Esther	MIDDLE NAME Rita	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 18 September 1930	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment No. [illegible]~~:

Wife of MONTERO Duque, Ricardo (201-293321).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME RODRIGUEZ,	GIVEN NAME Caridad	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 6 September 1907	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 137~~:

Mother of GARCIA-RUBIO Rodriguez, Rafael E. (201-281930).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME DIAZ Rivero,	GIVEN NAME Tulio	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 14 August 1907	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Pinar del Rio
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION Attorney		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
Doctor

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 136~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of [illegible] Diaz, [illegible]~~.
~~(201-[illegible]750)~~

FORM 10-68 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ XX CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 26

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME: FERNANDEZ Maseda, Consuelo
201- [illegible]
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 22 June 1930
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): AKA (Mrs) Consuelo FERNANDEZ de Villaverde
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Wife of VILLAVERDE Lamadriz, Jorge S. (201-Not available).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME: RAMOS Pineyro, Reinaldo
201- [illegible]
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH: 1 November 1940
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of [illegible]~~.
(~~201-2757[illegible]~~)

3
SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME: FERNANDEZ Blanco, Orlando
201- [illegible]
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH: 28 June 1936
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 14[illegible]~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of GUTIERREZ Izaguirre, Jorge~~
~~(201-278754)~~

4
SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME: SANTOVENIA, Raul
201- [illegible]
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH: 1 November 1907
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Cardenas
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 5307 Park Abe, B4 West New York, N. J.
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMSUD Dependency Payment Case No. 143~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of KIM Yum, Jorge (201-80[illegible]52)~~.

5
SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME: ESPINOSA, Hilda
201- [illegible]
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Manzanillo
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMSUD Dependency Payment Case No. 144~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of VEGA Perez, [illegible] J~~.
~~(201-28[illegible]22)~~

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	XX☐ CONTINUED	27

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME RAMOS Alonso,	GIVEN NAME Antonio	MIDDLE NAME L.	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the deceased Principal of AMHIM Dependent Payment Case No. 51 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to Maria ALONSO, trustee for the widow, [illegible] FERNANDEZ~~.

2

SURNAME GEIM Gutierrez,	GIVEN NAME Guillermo	MIDDLE NAME E.	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

aka GEIN

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the deceased Principal of AMHIM Dependent Payment Case No. 60 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, Herminia CASTRO~~.

3

SURNAME RODRIGUEZ Navarrete,	GIVEN NAME Nemesio	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

RODRIGUEZ Acosta, Namesio; aka Juan Carlos

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the deceased Principal of AMHIM Dependent Payment Case No. 95 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, Modesta ACOSTA Llano~~.

4

SURNAME RAMIREZ Ruiz,	GIVEN NAME Porfirio	MIDDLE NAME Remberto	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the deceased Principal of AMHIM Dependent Payment Case No. 90 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, Clara DELGADO Caraballoso~~.

5

SURNAME CASTELLES,	GIVEN NAME Julio	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

aka CASTELLES Amigo, Julio

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the deceased Principal of AMHIM Dependent Payment Case No. 99 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to DIAZ Gonzalez, Rene, trustee for the widow, Magdalena Rodriguez~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1 ✓

SURNAME: MENDEZ Perez,
GIVEN NAME: Luis O.
MIDDLE NAME:
201- [illegible]
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~Subject is the deceased Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 99 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to DIAZ Gonzalez, Rene, trustee for the widow, Estela~~ Mona.

2 ✓

SURNAME: FUNDORA Fernandez,
GIVEN NAME: Jorge
MIDDLE NAME:
201- [illegible]
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~Subject is the deceased Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 104 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, Silvia [illegible] Gonzalez~~.

3 ✓

SURNAME: BAEZ,
GIVEN NAME: Juventino, Jr.
MIDDLE NAME:
201- [illegible]
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): (son of BAEZ Rodriguez, ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ Juventino)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~Subject is the deceased principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 105 for which a monthly payment is made to the mother, Flora MAS Machado~~.

4 ✓

SURNAME: LE SANTE,
GIVEN NAME: William
MIDDLE NAME:
201- [illegible]
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): LE SANTE Nacer, William
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~Subject is the deceased Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 106 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, [illegible] PEREZ [illegible]~~.

✓ 5

SURNAME: YEBRA Suarez,
GIVEN NAME: Julio
MIDDLE NAME: Antonio
201- [illegible]
SEX:
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~Subject is the deceased Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 110 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the mother, Isabel [illegible] SUAREZ [illegible]~~.

FORM 10-68 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	29

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. if number needed.

1

SURNAME ✓ X CARRERAS Zayas,	GIVEN NAME Jesus	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN) (Major) (Comandante)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the deceased Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 111 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, [illegible]~~.

2

SURNAME ✓ X SIERRA Montesino,	GIVEN NAME Fidel	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Imprisoned~~

~~Subject is the [illegible] Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 134 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the wife~~,

3

SURNAME ✓ X HERNANDEZ Fraile,	GIVEN NAME Giordano	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the imprisoned (in Cuba) Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 130 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the wife, Zoe [illegible]~~.

4

SURNAME ✓ X BLANCO Muniz,	GIVEN NAME Jose	MIDDLE NAME Lauro	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the imprisoned (in Cuba) Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. [illegible] for which a monthly dependent is made to the wife, Marina [illegible]~~.

5

SURNAME ✓ X VILLAVERDE Lamadriz,	GIVEN NAME Jorge	MIDDLE NAME S.	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the imprisoned (in Cuba) Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 130 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the wife, Consuelo [illegible] Maseda~~,

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 30

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

TO	Chief of Station, Managua
INFO.	Chief of Station, JMWAVE
FROM	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
SUBJECT	TYPIC/AMBIDDY/AMBUD Support for Dependents of Operational Personnel

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

MICROFILMED
MAY 12 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REFERENCE: HNMA 3798, dated 28 March 1967

1. When Wallace A. GROWERY met with AMBIDDY/1 on 13 January 1967 to formally terminate the AMWORLD operation, AMBIDDY/1 discussed in detail reference dependents who had been receiving financial assistance from AMWORLD funds and requested that GROWERY explore the possibility of WOFACT financial assistance following termination of their AMWORLD monthly support payments. An investigation was conducted by both JMWAVE and Headquarters to determine if the agents named by AMBIDDY/1 had been employed by WOFACT in order to determine what, if any, obligation might exist to provide financial assistance to the dependents. The results of the combined Headquarters investigation, keyed to reference dependents, are summarized below for Station Managua information.

(IDEN A) Subject was a WOFACT agent under contract. His MOC provided payment of his $400 monthly salary to his dependent parents for two years following possible death while engaged on a WOFACT mission. After Subject's execution in 1962 the parents received his regular monthly salary until 28 June 1963. At that time Headquarters decided to liquidate the remaining balance of $6400 and paid this amount in a lump sum to the parents. Headquarters considers that all legal and moral obligations have been discharged and is not inclined to assume any further financial obligations to the parents. AMBIDDY/1 is apparently unaware that the parents have received approximately $10,000 from WOFACT.

CONT/

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
B-201-267437	HNMW 1985	27 APR 1967
B-201-281397	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6 201-267437 201-281397

24 April 1967

Distribution:
  1 - RID
  1 - WH/REG/C
  1 - WH/COG/MO
  1 - Originator

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/CICS	N. Gratz	lic	7447

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DC/WH/COG		Mr. Williamson
C/WH/COG/MO		Mr. Ortman

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG		Thomas

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HNMW 1985

(IDEN B) Although IDEN C, the husband of IDEN B, was never directly employed by WOFACT, IDEN B receives $175 per month as a dependent HEROES/MARTYRS widow under the AMBUD program and has been paid a total of $10,850 from March 1962 to date through the JMWAVE/AMBUD cover mechanism. Presumably AMBIDDY/1 is unaware that this dependent has been receiving regular AMBUD assistance in addition to the $125 per month received from AMWORLD funds.

(IDEN D) AMBIDDY/1 provided GROWERY with the complete name and details of the activities of IDEN D's husband prior to his arrest and subsequent 6-30 year prison sentence. With this information traces were run on Subject with negative results. Since neither JMWAVE nor Headquarters records produced any evidence Subject had ever been a WOFACT employee, no obligation exists to provide financial assistance to IDEN B.

2. Although reference indicates the discussion between James D. ZABOTH and Ernest A. LUSBY took place after AMBIDDY/1's conversation with GROWERY in January, it is not clear when, or by whom, the subject was originally brought to ZABOTH's attention. If AMBIDDY/1 was the source of ZABOTH's information it is noteworthy that he apparently neglected to mention his prior detailed discussion with GROWERY.

3. Under the circumstances, it is not possible for Headquarters to take any action to provide support to these individuals.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - COS, Managua
1 - COS, JMWAVE

19-124-25/6

FORM 5-64 53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational Documentation for Hero and Martyr Dependency Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-6440, 8 March 1967

1. A review of Station and AMTIKI files confirms a total lack of legal documentation for the Hero and Martyr cases as anticipated by Headquarters in Reference. A report prepared by AMTIKI-1, which is forwarded herewith, describes the content of his files for these cases and includes a copy, where available, of the authorization upon which payment is based.

2. Although the review of Station records for legal documents was unproductive, the following background data was noted as of possible interest to Headquarters in the processing of these problem cases:

a. Children included as dependents:

Case #95:	one child (in U.S.A.)	Total	monthly	payment	$25.00
" #97:	two children	"	"	"	"	250.00
" #98:	one child	"	"	"	"	100.00
" #101:	one child	"	"	"	"	100.00
" #102:	one child	"	"	"	"	175.00
" #103:	two children	"	"	"	"	175.00
" #106:	two children	"	"	"	"	175.00
" #107:	two children	"	"	"	"	175.00
" #109:	one child	"	"	"	"	175.00
" #111:	one child	"	"	"	"	100.00
" #128:	one child	"	"	"	"	100.00
" #129:	one child	"	"	"	"	150.00
" #130:	one child	"	"	"	"	165.00

b. Cases Involving Trustees:

The only instance of a trustee is Case #99 for which AMOT-186 (201-726322) receives a monthly payment of $66.00 for the widows of Luis MENDEZ and Julio CASIELLES, both of whom are in Cuba. The turstee is not a full-time AMOT and has his own business interests locally. JMWAVE records

CS COPY

Attachment:
AMTIKI Report
Distribution:
3-WH/COG w/att. h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
21 April '67

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 26 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27425

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

19-124-25/6

indicate that this situation developed from a prior event in Cuba and that several of the Hero and Martyr cases are connected by the personalities involved. UFGA-8317, 1 April 1963, describes four of the several individuals who were involved with AMLEMON-1 in a sabotage attempt against the Cuban Electric Company on 30 November 1960. The four, all former employees of the Electric Company, were captured while attempting to escape from Cuba in a small boat following the sabotage:

William LE SANTE
Luis MENDEZ
Julio CASIELLES Amigo
Armando RODRIGUEZ Vizcaino

LE SANTE is the Subject of Case #106 (Hero and Martyr) who was executed as a result of his participation in the sabotage attempt. MENDEZ and CASIELLES, the Subjects of Case #99, were also executed on the same charges. RODRIGUEZ was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment which is being served in the Isle of Pinos Prison.

The Trustee describes himself, in the HEW Survey form, as a former employee of the Cuban Electric Company and a friend of the Subjects of Case #99. He is mentioned in a 26 September 1962 AMOT report (AA-812; UFG-01672, 12 Oct. '62) as residing in Miami where he received letters, containing information, from source Martha RAMOS Castro in Havana. Traces show RAMOS to be the wife of Armando RODRIGUEZ and the sister-in-law of the widow of Julio CASIELLES. The trustee stated in the HEW Survey form that one year previously he forwarded the accumulated funds and started sending $33.00 each month to RAMOS in Chicago, per instructions by the CASIELLES widow, and that in May 1965 he stopped sending the $33.00 payment for the MENDEZ widow to Cuba and started holding it for her. He claimed to have $165.00 on hand at time of the Survey. It is noted that JMWAVE records contain no mention of payment on behalf of Armando RODRIGUEZ. The payments on behalf of LE SANTE, MENDEZ, and CASIELLES appear to be based upon letters from the COMANDO ELECTRICO DE LIBERACION which are included with the AMTIKI attachment.

In view of the Case #99 widows being in Cuba, and the failure of the trustee to provide the exact date-of-birth for the widows in his 9 December 1966 reply to AMTIKI (UFGA-26626, 15 December 1966), it is not believed that he would have the needed documents. We are, however, through AMTIKI-1 requesting the trustee to provide an explanation of his handling of the payments for both widows, and, via his means of communication with them, to obtain the required documentation.

c. Legality of marriages:

None of the widows/wives who provided information for the HEW Survey described their status as anything but wife or widow. The PHS form for the Subject of Case #97 provides date of marriage as 19 March 1954.

d. Operational Relationship with Subject:

Case #95: No record of use by WOFACT. Traces reflect membership MDM and/or MRR in Cuba. Tried on 19 April 1961 for crime against the Powers of the State and possession explosives and inflammable materials. (UFGA-4162, page 464, 29 May 1962)

Case #96: 201-248158. POA granted 17 March 1961. No record of actual use by WOFACT. UR (or MRR) leader tried and convicted with Subject Case #95 above. Executed 20 April 1961.

Case #97: 201-283995. (AMTRIGON-8) POA granted 13 February 1962 for use as seaman on WOFACT vessel. On 11 August 1962 presumed dead and dependent payment of $250.00 month via Hero Martyr fund approved by COS. (Note: Subject on own volition infiltrated Cuba with a team which was being landed by Subject's vessel).

Case #98: No record of use by WOFACT. Appears to have been a member of MRR who was executed in 1961.

Case #99: No record of use by WOFACT. See Paragraph 3.b. above.

Case #100/101: POA granted 16 August 1960, apparently to Havana Station. Nothing further to indicate use of Subject.

Case #102: POA granted 23 September 1960, for PM Cadre. Executed 7 March 1961. No further information available.

Case #103: No record of use by WOFACT. MRR leader executed October 1961. One of three cases for which ARTIME requested WOFACT assume monthly payments (UFGA-26878, Para 3. 1 February 1967).

Case #104: 201-286541. Brigade member killed in action. Although widow receives "Brigade" payment (Case #59), Case #104 provides payment for mother as a Hero and Martyr case.

Case #105: There is no record of an operational use or interest in the Subject of this case. According to JMWAVE records, his death in Cuba resulted from assistance provided to his father, a former Cuban Airlines Pilot. See letter #12 in AMTIKI attachment.

Case #106: No record of use by WOFACT. See paragraph 3.b. above.

Case #107/108: 201-279298. POA requested May 1960. No record in JMWAVE files of actual use by WOFACT.

Case #109: 201-283865. (AMPANIC-13) POA granted 16 September 1960. WOFACT asset captured during airdrop and executed on 20 April 1961.

Case #110: No record of use by WOFACT. Member of RESCATE who executed 18 January 1961 per WAVE 3074. (Document not available at JMWAVE.)

Case #111: No record of use by WOFACT. Subject was an associate of William Morgan. Executed same day as Morgan, 11 March 1961.

Case #128: No record of use by WOFACT. In HEW survey form widow stated that in 1959 Subject was sentenced to nine years imprisonment which was being served in Isle of Pines Prison.

Case #129: No record of use by WOFACT. Arrested 30 June 1960 with Subject of Case #107/108. Serving 30 years sentence in Isle of Pines Prison. Wife of Subject is listed as LNREAD Source SD 15622 per master list dated 18 April 1966.

Case #130: No record of use by WOFACT. An executive member of Organization AUTENTICA 1960-1963.

3. For Headquarters information, steps are being taken through the AMTIKI facility to obtain the required documentation wherever possible.

Mark F. EFFIELD

March 20, 1967

SUBJECT: Review of Certain Hero and Martyr Case Files

The "Heroes and Martyrs" cases were not considered under the same regulations as the dependents of the invaders of the Bay of Pigs. The persons supposed to receive payment were designated, in some cases by "the Department" and in other cases by the C.R.C. through its executives. There are cases in which a written memorandum was given to us but there are others in which no memorandum was given. We were instructed to pay no more than $175.00 monthly to each, and as it can be seen, many cases are receiving lower amounts and never the amount of dependents was taking in consideration. There is only one case receiving a higher amount, Mrs. Hilda R. Carballo (widow of Jesus Delgado), who receives $250.00 because we were specially instructed to pay this amount.

In regards to documents, the files are very poor, and they mostly have only letters informing changes of address.

1) MODESTA ACOSTA (Case #95) $ 25.00
Widow of Nemesio Rodriguez
No documents - only letters

2) ROSA M. CABRERA (Case #96) $ 175.00
Widow of Sori Marin
Memorandum from Dr. Miro instructing to pay her $175.00. No other document but letters.

3) HILDA R. CARBALLO (Case No. 97) $ 250.00
Widow of Jesus Delgado
No documents - only letters

4) CLARA DELGADO (Case #98 $ 100.00
Widow of Porfirio Ramirez
No documents - only letters

5) RENE L. DIAZ (Case #99 $ 66.00
Only case of Trustee. Receiving payment for Luis O. Mendez and Julio Casielle's relatives. There is a letter to Dr. Miro from "Comando Electrico de Liberacion" asking for the assistance to the widows and letter designating Rene L. Diaz as trustee.
No other document but letters.

6) MARIA DE LAS MERCEDES EIREA (Case #100/101 $ 50.00
Mother of Anastasio Rojas
Memorandum from Dr. Miro instructing to pay her $50.00 monthly. No other document but letters.

Att 1 UFGA-27425

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

7)	LILIA FERNANDEZ (Case # 102) Widow of Rolando Tamargo No document.	$ 175.00
8)	SILVIA HEREDIA (Case #103) Widow of Jorge Fundora No document but letters.	$ 175.00
9)	ZOE HERNANDEZ (Case #129) Wife of Giordano Hernandez No document but letters.	$ 150.00
10)	LUCIA LEON (Case #104) Mother of Vicente Leon (dead) Memorandum from Luis Botifoll ("Rescate") No other document but letters	$ 150.00
11)	MARINA MARDONES (Case #130) Wife of Lauro Blanco Memorandum from Dr. Varona ("Rescate) No other document but letters.	$ 165.00
12)	FLORA MAS (Case #105) Mother of Juventino Baez Memorandum from Jose Sosa ("Rescate") No other document but letters.	$ 175.00
13)	FRANCISCA PALMER (Case #101) Widow of Anastasio Rojas No document but letters	$ 100.00
14)	ESTHER PERDOMO (Case #128) Wife of Fidel Sierra No document but letters	$ 100.00
15)	RITA PEREZ (Case #106) Letter to Dr. Miro from Jesus Fernandez asking for the assistance. No other document but letters.	$ 175.00
16)	AMPARO POSADA (Case #107) Widow of Plinio Prieto No documents but letters	$ 175.00
17)	JUANA RODRIGUEZ (Case #109) Widow of Armando Escoto No document but letters.	$ 175.00
18)	MARIA C. RUIZ (Case #108) Mother of Plinio Prieto Memorandum from Jose Sosa No other document but letters.	$ 150.00
19)	ISABEL M. SUAREZ (Case #110) Mother of Julio A. Yebras No Memorandum - Only letters.	$ 175.00

20) TERESA SUAREZ (Case #111) $ 100.00
Widow of Jesus Carreras
No memorandum - Only letters

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
[illegible]	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Adjustment of Dependent Payments Third Quarter FY 1967

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGW-6328, 29 December 1966
B. UFGA-26697, 17 January 1967

1. Adjustments during the third quarter FY 1967 of AMBUD monthly dependency payments are reported herewith in accordance with the Headquarters request received under Reference A, paragraph 3:

Case #28: MILIAN Velasco, Jose (201-290836)
Payee: PARDO, Mirna (widow)

Effective with the February 1967 payment, the amount of the monthly payment was reduced from $325.00 to $300.00 because of the death of the mother, Isabel VELASCO.

2. The report covering the adjustments which were effective with the January 1967 payment, forwarded under Reference B, included certain cases for which the monthly payment was being temporarily withheld pending reply from the payee. For Headquarters information, payment has been reinstated (on a retroactive basis) for the following of those cases:

Case #63: GALVEZ Lopez, Mario (201-297112)
Payee: MARTINEZ, Elsa (widow)

Case #71: TAMAYO Compans, Ramon (201-297954)
Payee: FERNANDEZ, Amada (trustee)

Case #75: NORDA Roque, Pedro (201-298859)
Payee: ROQUE, Margarita (mother)

3. The following information concerning Case No. #141 is included herewith to ensure that the data is available to Headquarters:

Case #141: MESTRE Marcoleta, Ernesto (201-not available)

Payment for this case was terminated effective with the December 1966 payment. Action resulted from Subject's release from prison and returned to his family in Miami.

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 20 April '67
DATE DISPATCHED APR 26 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27424

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27424

4. Notification of the following changes in Payees is also forwarded for the amendment of Headquarters records:

Case #29 ALEMAN Aleman, Eufracio (201-290479)

Payment transferred from the trustee to the mother Laureana C. ALEMAN Diaz, who resides at 2450 N.W. 31st Street, Miami, Florida.

Case #46: HERNANDEZ Cosio, Ernesto (201-292741)

Payment transferred from the trustee to the parents who now reside at Avenida Munoz Morin 57 altos, Humacao, Puerto Rico.

Case #51: RAMOS Alonso, Antonio (201-not available)

Payment is made to Maria ALONSO, sister of the widow, in accordance with written instructions from the widow.

Burton J Celauza
for Mark F. EFFIELD

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Managua X

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

TYPIC/AMBIDDY/AMBUD

Support for Dependents of Operational Personnel

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCE: HNMA 3793, dated 28 March 1967

1. When Wallace A. GROWERY met with AMBIDDY/1 on 13 January 1967 to formally terminate the AMWORLD operation, AMBIDDY/1 discussed in detail reference dependents who had been receiving financial assistance from AMWORLD funds and requested that GROWERY explore the possibility of WOFACT financial assistance following termination of their AMWORLD monthly support payments. An investigation was conducted by both JMWAVE and Headquarters to determine if the agents named by AMBIDDY/1 had been employed by WOFACT in order to determine what, if any, obligation might exist to provide financial assistance to the dependents. The results of the combined Headquarters investigation, keyed to reference dependents, are summarized below for Station Managua information.

(IDEN A) Subject was a WOFACT agent under contract. His MOC provided payment of his $400 monthly salary to his dependent parents for two years following possible death while engaged on a WOFACT mission. After Subject's execution in 1962 the parents received his regular monthly salary until 23 June 1963. At that time Headquarters decided to liquidate the remaining balance of $6400 and paid this amount in a lump sum to the parents. Headquarters considers that all legal and moral obligations have been discharged and is not inclined to assume any further financial obligations to the parents. AMBIDDY/1 is apparently unaware that the parents have received approximately $10,000 from WOFACT.

CONT/

HNMW 1985

19-124-25/6
201-267437
201-281397

S E C R E T

24 April 1967 WH/COG/CICS N. Gratze ljc 7447

Distribution:
  1 - RID
  1 - WH/REG/C
  1 - WH/COG/MO
  1 - Originator

DC/WH/COG Mr. Williamson

C/WH/COG/MO Mr. Ortman

C/WH/COG Thomas J. Flores

(IDEN B) Although IDEN C, the husband of IDEN B, was never directly employed by WOFACT, IDEN B receives $175 per month as a dependent HEROES/MARTYRS widow under the AMBUD program and has been paid a total of $10,850 from March 1962 to date through the JMWAVE/AMBUD cover mechanism. Presumably AMBIDDY/1 is unaware that this dependent has been receiving regular AMBUD assistance in addition to the $125 per month received from AMWORLD funds.

(IDEN D) AMBIDDY/1 provided GROWERY with the complete name and details of the activities of IDEN D's husband prior to his arrest and subsequent 6-30 year prison sentence. With this information traces were run on Subject with negative results. Since neither JMWAVE nor Headquarters records produced any evidence Subject had ever been a WOFACT employee, no obligation exists to provide financial assistance to IDEN B.

2. Although reference indicates the discussion between James D. ZABOTH and Ernest A. LUSBY took place after AMBIDDY/1's conversation with GROWERY in January, it is not clear when, or by whom, the subject was originally brought to ZABOTH's attention. If AMBIDDY/1 was the source of ZABOTH's information it is noteworthy that he apparently neglected to mention his prior detailed discussion with GROWERY.

3. Under the circumstances, it is not possible for Headquarters to take any action to provide support to these individuals.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - COS, Managua
1 - COS, JMWAVE

14-00000

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Concerning Dependent Payment for Jorge KIM Yum (Case #143)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGA-26771, 17 January 1967
ACTION REQUIRED: As stated in paragraph three

1. Biographic data concerning the parents of Subject (201-298852) has been received from the trustee, Raul SANTOVENIA, and is forwarded herewith as Attachment A.

2. A review has been made of JMWAVE, AMTIKI, and AMOT files concerning continued justification for the payment of $225.00 per month to the trustee on behalf of the parents in Cuba. Significant points resulting from the review are as follows:

a. Subject was executed for a prior crime in Cuba and not because of participation at the Bay of Pigs. (Murder of a Cuban soldier during escape from Cuba in March 1960). See "Bohemia" clipping forwarded herewith as Attachment B.

b. The father of Subject, Pedro KIM, is probably identical to one Pedro KIM who is alleged by AMTIKI-1 to be an active communist in Cuba. A Pedro KIM is also described as an active communist in the following reports: DCE-15460, 16 August 1962; DCE-15946, 26 October 1962.

c. Although it appears that the trustee has efficiently handled the funds forwarded to him ($12,602.00 in bank account as of December 1965), there is no evidence that any form of assistance has been provided to the dependents in Cuba.

3. In view of the background of this case, as described in paragraph 3 above, it is recommended that all payments for this case be terminated.

MICROFILMED
APR 12 1967
DOC MICRO. SER.

Burton J. Celaya
for
Mark F. EFFIELD

19-124-25/6

Attachments:
1 - Letter
1 - Clipping

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/1 copy [illegible] Att. "A" & "B"

201-298852

DATE TYPED 31 Mar 67	DATE DISPATCHED APR 6 1967
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27303	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6 201-298852	

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

2 att.

DR. MANUEL F. ARTIME

Subject's [illegible] 28 [illegible] 30 [illegible] 196[illegible] [illegible]
28 June 1963.

Estimado Jim,

Adjunto te envio el Memorandum sobre los tres casos de que te hable hoy personalmente.

MANUEL GUILLOT: Este señor es el padre de Manuel Guillot Castellanos, fundador del Movimiento, que trabajo para el MRR y para la "Compania" durante los años de 1960, 61 y 62, hasta el 30 de Agosto de 1962, en que fue fusilado por la tirania roja en Cuba.

Fue torturado y murio sin decir el nombre de los contactos del Underground Cubano que el conocia. Fue infiltrado en Cuba por la "Compania" varias veces [illegible] su ultimo viaje en que fue fusilado.

Don Manuel Guillot padre tiene 65 años de edad, su esposa, Virginia CASTELLANOS Viuda de Guillot, [illegible] paralitica y solo se mueve con aparatos ortopedicos. Este pobre viejo no puede [illegible] y su mujer es invalida. Nosotros le estabamos pasando 150.00 mensuales [illegible] forma en que este hombre pueda hacer otro trabajo que el que hace de oficinista. La esposa ha sido sometida a tres operaciones quirurgicas y el medico dice que necesita una mas.

SILVIA HEREDIA: es la viuda de Jorge Fundora, el que descubrio el punto de entrada de la mayor parte de armas y "Teams de Infiltracion" que fueron a Cuba antes y despues de Bahia de Cochinos. Esta pobre mujer esta sola en el mundo con dos hijos. Ella esta recibiendo tratamiento Psiquiatrico. El MRR le pasa 125 dolares mensuales. Ella no puede abandonar su casa con los dos hijos para ir a trabajar. Su esposo fue fusilado el 12 de Octubre de [illegible] y murio sin decir el punto por donde entraban las armas y los hombres de la "Compania" en Cuba.

ROSA BARASA: es la esposa de Francisco Echevarria [illegible] hace [illegible] años a 30 años de Presidio por los esbirros rojos. Esta mujer [illegible] puede [illegible] en su casa para mantenerse ella y los dos niños que tiene. No le es suficiente y el MRR le pasa $75.00 dolares mensuales. Este hombre (su esposo) trabajo intensamente con la gente de Fundora transportando las armas que la "Compania" metia en Cuba.

En todos estos casos, que son desesperados, el MRR ha [illegible] hasta los tratamientos medicos.

DR. MANUEL F. ARTIME

(.)

Para la mayor tranquilidad de los hombres que [illegible] la "Compañía", sería conveniente que esta gente no pasaran hambre y miserias que han sido sus parientes muertos o presos hombres que han servido lealmente a la COMPAÑIA y han dado ejemplo de valor y de abnegación, bien distinto de los "héroes" de hoy que van a la Televisión cubana cuando son capturados para hablar mal de la causa anti-comunista, de los EEUU y de la "COMPAÑIA".

Es lo único que me preocupa de la nueva situación creada a partir de Enero de 1967.

Atte. vuestro amigo de siempre:

Manuel F. Artime Buesa

1)

Silvia Herrera - Now under psychiatric treatment.
Born: 11 Jan 1934
Res: 180 SE 14 Terrace
Miami Fla.

Children Eduardo Age 8
Raquel " 6

2) Manuel Guillot - wife Virginia Castellanos
Born 22 Dec 1905 - Born 24 Jan 1892
Res: 3488 N.W. 3rd St. ~~24~~
Miami Fla.

3) Rosa Robasa
Born 3 Dec 1925
Res 1152½ SW 10th St Apt 1
Miami Fla

Children:
Francisco - Age 18
Alfonso " 12
Manuel " 6
Jose Antonio " 4

N. Gratz

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13

SECRET

ORIG: N.GRATZ/yb
UNIT: WH/COG
EXT: 6753
DATE: 13 MARCH 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 38 PER ______ # ______

ONF: WH/COG 8

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR OLC, OGC, C/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 13 21 29Z CITE DIRECTOR 82869

JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: A. JMWAVE 5984 (IN 19287)

2. UFGA 27117

AFTER REVIEWING TEXT REF A LETTER HQS RECOMMENDS AMTIKI ANSWER LETTER ALONG LINES PROPOSED PARA 5 REF B, WITH SUGGESTION WIDOW MAY BE ELIGIBLE HEW ASSISTANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/MO

OLC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-1
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 19

Harry Heatz

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CA MO RR OS RI SS ESEC SPB

Dissem By 48

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/OPS, C/OA, FI, FI/SPG, CI

S E C R E T 102343Z CITE JMWAVE 5934

ACTION

DIRECTOR

1 MAR 67 19287

TYPIC AMBUD

REFERENCES: A. UFGA 27117

B. DIRECTOR 82133

N6

CE2

1. PARA ONE REF A ASSUMPTION CORRECT PER SERVICE MSG SENT 3 MARCH.

2. TEXT OF LETTER REQUESTED BY REF B AS FOLLOWS:

"DEAR MR AVANT: YOU WILL PLEASE ALLOW ME TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION THE CASE OF ALFREDO AND JUANA CERVANTES, OF 1071 N.W. 26TH TERRACE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, THE PARENTS OF ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO, WHO DIED DURING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. I DO NOT HAVE ALL THE FACTS IN REGARD TO CASE BUT AM WRITING YOU IN THE HOPE THAT YOU CAN FURNISH ME WITH THEM AND POSSIBLY BE OF HELP TO MR. AND MRS. CERVANTES.

"APPARENTLY THE WIDOW OF ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO, ROSA MARIA FREYRE, RECEIVED SOME TYPE OF PENSION AS A RESULT OF HER HUSBAND'S DEATH UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SHE REMARRIED IN AUGUST 1965. THE CERVANTES, DUE TO THEIR FINANCIAL SITUATION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 5984 SECRET

AND POOR HEALTH (MR. CERVANTES IS ILL WITH A CHRONIC HEART CONDITION AND IS UNABLE TO WORK AND MRS. CERVANTES IS UNABLE TO LEAVE HIM ALONE IN ORDER TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT, SINCE THE DAUGHTER-IN-LAW NO LONGER LIVES WITH THEM.) THEY ARE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY MIGHT BE ENTITLED TO SOME BENEFITS NOW AS DEPENDENT PARENTS OF THE DECEASED SON IN VIEW OF THE WIDOW'S REMARRIAGE. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT TYPE OF PENSION THE WIDOW WAS RECEIVING BUT UNDERSTAND THE PENSION CHECKS SHE DID RECEIVE WERE SIGNED BY YOU.

"I WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING FROM YOU IN REGARD TO THIS MATTER AND WOULD THANK YOU FOR EVERY CONSIDERATION YOU MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE TO THIS DESERVING FAMILY. SIGNATURE: CLAUDE PEPPER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS."

3. RE PARA TWO REFERENCE, WISH MAKE CLEAR THAT ONLY MOTHER OF DECEASED BRIGADE MEMBER INVOLVED THIS REQUEST. DECEASED WIDOW (NOW REMARRIED) AND HER FAMILY HAVE NOT AT ANY TIME RAISED ~~REASED~~ ANY OBJECTION OR MADE ANY REMARKS CONCERNING SETTLEMENT WIDOW AND CHILDS CASE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

ORIG: NANCYE GRATZ:mjr
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: R-9008
DATE: 10 MARCH 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
CA
MO
RR

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 7 PER #

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. RS 201-292730 19-124-25/8 C

INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN OLG PPB DDP ADDP C/DCS C/OA FI FI/SPG

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

10 14 41 Z

NG

CITE DIRECTOR 82133

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: UGFA 27117

1. ASSUME MOTHER OF DECEASED BRIGADE MEMBER RECEIVING ASSISTANCE FROM SON IGNACIO (CERVANTES) LAGO, NOT FOR SON AS STATED PARA 4 REF SINCE ONLY DAUGHTER BORN 25 AUG 60 TO DECEASED BRIGADE MEMBER AND ROSA MARIA FREYRE PRESENTLY RECEIVING AMBUD ASSISTANCE.

2. LETTER LISTED AS ATTACHMENT NOT RECEIVED WITH DISPATCH. IN VIEW PROMINENCE FAMILIES CONCERNED REQUEST CABLED TEXT LETTER FOR HQS GUIDANCE PRIOR ANY REPLY TO REP. PEPPER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/MO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-25/
X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-292730
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
WH/COG/CICS
DISSEM BY 48

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/OPS, C/OA, FI, FI/SPG, OLC, PPB,

AN
FS
ABSTRACT

S E C R E T 102343Z CITE JMWAVE 5984
WAVE

11 MAR 67 IN 19287

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD

REFERENCES: A. UFGA 27117

B. DIRECTOR 82133

1. PARA ONE REF A ASSUMPTION CORRECT PER SERVICE MSG SENT 3 MARCH.

2. TEXT OF LETTER REQUESTED BY REF B AS FOLLOWS:

"DEAR MR AVANT: YOU WILL PLEASE ALLOW ME TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION THE CASE OF ALFREDO AND JUANA CERVANTES, OF 1071 N.W. 26TH TERRACE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, THE PARENTS OF ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO, WHO DIED DURING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. I DO NOT HAVE ALL THE FACTS IN REGARD TO CASE BUT AM WRITING YOU IN THE HOPE THAT YOU CAN FURNISH ME WITH THEM AND POSSIBLY BE OF HELP TO MR. AND MRS. CERVANTES.

"APPARENTLY THE WIDOW OF ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO, ROSA MARIA FREYRE, RECEIVED SOME TYPE OF PENSION AS A RESULT OF HER HUSBAND'S DEATH UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SHE REMARRIED IN AUGUST 1965. THE CERVANTES, DUE TO THEIR FINANCIAL SITUATION

MICROFILMED
MAR 20 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

201-292730

19-124-25/6
11 March 1967

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 5954 S E C R E T

AND POOR HEALTH (MR. CERVANTES IS ILL WITH A CHRONIC HEART CONDITION AND IS UNABLE TO WORK AND MRS. CERVANTES IS UNABLE TO LEAVE HIM ALONE IN ORDER TO SE~~EK EMP~~LOYMENT, SINCE THE DAUGHTER-IN-LAW NO LONGER LIVES WITH THEM.) THEY ARE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY MIGHT BE ENTITLED TO SOME BENEFITS NOW AS DEPENDENT PARENTS OF THE DECEASED SON IN VIEW OF THE WIDOW'S REMARRIAGE. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT TYPE OF PENSION THE WIDOW WAS RECEIVING BUT UNDERSTAND THE PENSION CHECKS SHE DID RECEIVE WERE SIGNED BY YOU.

MAR 14 2 27 PM '67

"I WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING FROM YOU IN REGARD TO THIS MATTER AND WOULD THANK YOU FOR EVERY CONSIDERATION YOU MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE TO THIS DESERVING FAMILY. SIGNATURE: CLAUDE PEPPER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS."

3. RE PARA TWO REFERENCE. WISH MAKE CLEAR THAT ONLY MOTHER OF DECEASED BRIGADE MEMBER INVOLVED THIS REQUEST. DECEASED WIDOW (NOW REMARRIED) AND HER FAMILY HAVE NOT AT ANY TIME ~~REASED~~ RAISED ANY OBJECTION OR MADE ANY REMARKS CONCERNING SETTLEMENT WIDOW AND CHILDS CASE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

TELEPOUCH

DISP NO- UFGW - 6440

FILE NO- 19-124-25/6

DATE - 8 MARCH 1967

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJ - OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION ON AMBUD
DEPENDENCY CASES

ACTION - SEE PARAGRAPH 2

REFS - UFGA - 26995 DATED 15 FEBRUARY 1967

1. A REVIEW OF THE SAMPLE HEROES/MARTYRS FILES NO. 100-130 FORWARDED IN REFERENCE INDICATES A SERIOUS LACK OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS SUCH AS MARRIAGE AND BIRTH CERTIFICATES, POWERS OF ATTORNEY, ETC., WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH LEGALITY OF DEPENDENTS' SUPPORT CLAIMS.

2. IN VIEW OF THE GOOD POSSIBILITY HEADQUARTERS WILL BE ABLE TO TRANSFER ALL, OR A LARGE PART, OF THESE SURVIROR BENEFIT PAYMENTS TO BEC, IT IS REQUESTED THAT AMTIKI REVIEW ALL CASE FILES PERTAINING TO THE MEMBERS OF THE HEROES/MARTYRS GROUP WHOSE DEPENDENTS ARE PRESENTLY RECEIVING MONTHLY SUPPORT PAYMENTS. IN THE EVENT THE FILES DO NOT CONTAIN THE REQUIRED TYPE OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS, AMTIKI SHOULD REQUEST COPIES OF ALL SUCH AVAILABLE DOCUMENTS FROM THE DEPENDENTS. SINCE DOCUMENTS CONCERNING MARRIAGE, BIRTHS AND BAPTISMS ARE CUSTOMARILY CHERISHED AND RETAINED BY FAMILIES, THERE APPEARS TO BE AN EXCELLENT CHANCE THAT THEY CAN BE OBTAINED. IT IS PROBABLE THAT A SIMILAR EXERCISE MAY HAVE TO BE PURSUED AT A LATER DATE TO OBTAIN

KH/Reg

CS COPY

[redacted]

19-124-25/6

DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO BRIGADE DEPENDENTS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE AMTIKI RECORDS PERTAINING TO THESE INDIVIDUALS APPEAR TO BE MORE COMPLETE, THE NEED TO COMPILE THE NECESSARY LEGAL DATA ON HEROES/MARTYRS DEPENDENTS IS CONSIDERED MORE URGENT AT THIS TIME.

3. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT AMTIKI NOT BE ADVISED OF THE BACKGROUND LEADING TO THIS REQUEST OR BE GIVEN ANY INDICATION THAT A TURNOVER TO ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS CONTEMPLATED.

4. PLEASE EXPEDITE AND ADVISE THE RESULTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

DISTRIBUTION
3-COS, JMWAVE

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Concerning Dependent Payment for Pedro REYES Bello (Case #135)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References:
A. UFGA-26692, 10 January 1967
B. UFGA-26771, 17 January 1967
C. UFGA-26912, 6 February 1967

1. The Headquarters request for biographic data concerning Ana M. BELLO, mother and dependent of Subject, is completed with the forwarding of the attached letter which provides the complete date of birth: 4 March 1886.

2. For Headquarters information, JMWAVE will resume forwarding of the monthly payment to the trustee, Mr. Manuel GARRIDO (instead of to the dependent as reported in Reference C), in accordance with the request stated in attachment.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment:
1 Letter

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/1 att. u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
21 Feb 67

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible] -7 [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27040

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
201-285157

SECRET

6 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Benefits and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT: Samples of 2506 Brigade Working Files

1. Following the 10 February meeting in your office with the Director of BEC, Station Miami was requested to send a representative group of files concerning deceased, missing and imprisoned Cuban Brigade members and their dependents who are presently receiving monthly support payments.

2. Attached is one of the eight files received from Miami for your review. Since all the documents are in Spanish, a resume of those documents considered to be most important for establishing the legal relationship between the deceased and his dependents has been attached for your convenience.

3. An identical resume will be made of the documents in the remaining seven files in order that they may also be reviewed whenever it is convenient for you to schedule a meeting. We may logically assume that a certain number of the remaining files will be lacking some of the vital documents included in the attached file. If these documents are required to meet BEC criteria on an individual basis, they could be obtained in practically all cases from those dependents who reside in the United States.

4. The attached file is a rather impressive example of the type of documented proof we can submit for BEC scrutiny; perhaps we can avoid having to run the gauntlet on an individual basis.

Nancye Gratz
WH/COG

Attachment

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[illegible] attorney [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible] support [illegible]

[illegible] authorized [illegible] of the [illegible]

[illegible] that [illegible] enclosed [illegible] two

[illegible]

[illegible]

Certificate of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] Letter dated [illegible] [illegible] concerning [illegible] the [illegible] the CIA to receive [illegible] residing in

[illegible] Letter dated [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ratification of [illegible] trust.

[illegible] Letter from the [illegible] New York [illegible] the [illegible] by the [illegible] trustee, [illegible] [illegible] to

[illegible] Letter from the [illegible] [illegible] was [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] authority of the [illegible] trustee [illegible]

[illegible] Letter dated [illegible] [illegible] monthly [illegible] to the [illegible], [illegible] recite the [illegible] January 1967 [illegible] terminate [illegible] [illegible] per month. [illegible] to receive [illegible] reproductions of [illegible] left hand side of the file [illegible]. The items on check [illegible], and names of the [illegible] payments were made.

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-27116
FILE NO - 19-124-25/6 , 201-281397
DATE - 3 MARCH 1967
INDEXING - NO
MICROFILM - NO
TO - CHIEF, WH
INFO - NONE
FROM - COS, JMWAVE
SUBJECT - TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
AMBUD DEPENDENCY PAYMENTS
ACTION - NONE
REF - UFGA-6398, 16 FEBRUARY 1967

MICROFILMED
MAR 7 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE, A DISCREET INVESTIGATION BY THE AMOTS TO DETERMINE THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE MOTHER OF MANUEL /GUILLOT/ CASTELLANOS /201-281397/ HAS BEEN COMPLETED. THE RESULTS OF A FURTHER, AND INDEPENDENT, CHECK AT THE CITED HOSPITAL BY AMBUD-3 ARE ALSO DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

2. THE SOURCE OF THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS THE WIFE OF AMOT ASSET LITAMIL/14 -

MRS. VIRGINIA /CASTELLANOS/ DE GUILLOT, THE MOTHER OF MANUEL /GUILLOT/ CASTELLANOS, HAS SUFFERED FROM PARALYSIS SINCE PRIOR TO HER DEPARTURE FROM CUBA. SUBSEQUENT TO HER ARRIVAL IN THE U.S.A., THERE HAS BEEN SURGERY ON HER LEFT BREAST, BECAUSE OF A CANCER CONDITION, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN AN ACUTELY SWOLLEN LEFT ARM THAT IS NOW ALMOST PARALYSED. IN APPROXIMATELY FEBRUARY 1965, SHE EXPERIENCED A FALL WHICH RESULTED IN A FRACTURE OF THE FEMUR. ANOTHER FALL IN JANUARY 1967 DISTURBED THE PINS INSERTED IN THE FIRST OPERATION, AND ON 19 OR 20 JANUARY 1967 SHE UNDERWENT FURTHER SURGERY IN THE PAN-AMERICAN HOSPITAL FOR REPAIR OF ~~[illegible] WITH HER HUSBAND, [illegible] /GUILLOT~~/THE DAMAGE. ~~[illegible]~~

MRS. GUILLOT RESIDES WITH HER HUSBAND, MANUEL /GUILLOT/

SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-27116 PAGE 1

B. 201 - 281397

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MONTES, AT 3488 N.W. 3RD STREET, MIAMI. TELEPHONE NO. 444-1373. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, WHO IS HELPING TO LOOK AFTER MRS. GUILLOT, THERE ARE RUMORS THAT ANY FUNDS RECEIVED BY THE COUPLE ARE 'DISSIPATED' BY THE HUSBAND UNLESS PROVIDED TO THE WIFE, WHICH SOURCE DOES WITH WHATEVER ASSISTANCE SHE IS ABLE TO ARRANGE. IT WAS FURTHER REPORTED THAT 'SEVERAL HUNDREDS OF DOLLARS' RECEIVED BY THE HUSBAND SEVERAL MONTHS AGO HAVE BEEN SPENT AND THAT THEY DO NOT EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE A MONTHLY PAYMENT FROM MANUEL /ARTIME/. THEY ARE PRESENTLY ATTEMPTING TO MOVE TO A LESS EXPENSIVE HOUSE WHERE THE RENT WOULD BE LOWER THAN THE $85.00 A MONTH NOW BEING PAID. THE AMOT REPORT CONCLUDED WITH A SOURCE COMMENT THAT THE PRESENT PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL SITUATION OF MRS. GUILLOT IS 'QUITE CALAMITOUS.'

3. A CHECK BY AMBUD/3 WITH DR. CANO AT THE PAN-AMERICAN HOSPITAL RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CASE-

ALTHOUGH NO SPECIFIC RECORDS WERE AVAILABLE CONCERNING THE BREAST OPERATION, WHICH WAS A TOTAL RESECTION, DR. CANO CONFIRMED THE ORIGINAL BONE OPERATION AS SURGERY FOR A DOUBLE FRACTURE OF THE HIP. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THE RECENT SURGERY FOR RETIREMENT OF THE PINS WHICH HAD BEEN PLACED DURING THE FIRST OPERATION, AND DESCRIBED THE PATIENT'S CONDITION AS 'DELICATE' BUT NOT CRITICAL. REGARDING FINANCES, DR. CANO SAID THAT A PAN-AMERICAN HOSPITAL BILL FOR $599.70 FOR THE LAST ADMITIANCE REMAINS UNPAID.

MARK F. EFFIELD

DISTRIBUTION

C/WH/COG VIA TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Operational/AMBUD/TYPIC
AMBUD Dependency Payments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Para 2

REFERENCES: A. UFGW-6351 (19 January 1967)

B. UFGA-26978 (31 January 1967)

1. Headquarters is in general agreement with JMWAVE recommendations concerning payments to Subjects of references. However, it is requested that a discreet investigation be conducted to determine the physical condition of the mother of Manuel GUILLOT Castellanos. Possibly the AMOTs could be used for this purpose.

2. Results of the investigation would be appreciated as soon as possible.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - COS/JMWAVE

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW-6398	DATE
15 February 1967	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-281397

3P

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-27117

FILE NO - 19-124-25/6, 201-292730

DATE - 3 MARCH 1967

INDEXING - NO

MICROFILM - NO

TO - CHIEF, WH

INFO - NONE

FROM - COS, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - TYPIC/AMBUD/DEPENDENT PAYMENT ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO

ACTION - SEE PARA 5

REFS - NONE

MICROFILMED
MAR 8 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. A LETTER FROM U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CLAUDE PEPPER, DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1967 AND ADDRESSED TO THE AMTIKI FACILITY, IS CONCERNED WITH THE PARENTS OF ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO /201-292730/, WHO IS THE PRINCIPAL OF DEPENDENT PAYMENT CASE NO. 44.

2. THE LETTER EXPRESSES CONCERN FOR THE WELFARE OF THE PARENTS, ALFREDO CERVANTES AND JUANO LAGO DE CERVANTES, WHO RESIDE AT 1071 NW 26TH TERRACE, MIAMI, AND REQUESTS THAT FACTS REGARDING THE CASE BE FORWARDED TO REP. PEPPER WHO WISHES TO BE OF SOME ASSISTANCE TO THEM. A SUMMARY OF THE BACKGROUND OF THE CASE, WHICH AGREES IN GENERAL WITH JMWAVE RECORDS, IS INCLUDED IN THE LETTER AS A BASIS FOR THE PARENTS REQUEST THAT THEY RECEIVE BENEFITS AS DEPENDENTS OF THE DECEASED, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE PREVIOUS TERMINATION OF PAYMENT FOR THE REMARRIED WIDOW.

3. THE FOLLOWING DATA FROM AMTIKI AND STATION FILES IS FORWARDED AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR USE BY HEADQUARTERS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ACTION TO BE TAKEN CONCERNING THIS MATTER -

A. IN A DECLARATION SIGNED ON 26 JANUARY 1961, THE SUBJECT DESIGNATED ONLY HIS WIFE AND CHILD AS DEPENDENTS.

B. BECAUSE OF HER REMARRIAGE ON 21 AUGUST 1965, PAYMENT TO

GROUP 1
[illegible]

CS COPY

THE WIDOW WAS REDUCED, EFFECTIVE WITH THE NOVEMBER 1965 PAYMENT, TO PROVIDE FOR THE CHILD ONLY.

C. A LETTER FROM JUANO LAGO DE CERVANTES /MOTHER OF SUBJECT/, DATED 26 OCTOBER 1966 AND ADDRESSED TO THE AMTIKI FACILITY, STATED THAT THE FATHER WAS UNABLE TO WORK BECAUSE OF A BAD HEART AND EXPRESSED A REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF HER SON'S ''PENSION'' SINCE THE WIDOW NO LONGER RECEIVED IT BECAUSE OF HER CHANGE OF STATUS.

D. ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ROUTINE PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING THIS TYPE OF REQUEST, MRS. CERVANTES WAS INFORMED BY AMTIKI-1, IN A LETTER DATED 31 OCTOBER 1966, THAT ACCORDING TO THE ESTABLISHED RULES THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE IN THIS CASE.

E. THERE ARE NO IDENTIFIABLE JMWAVE TRACES ON THE MOTHER AND FATHER OF SUBJECT.

4. AN AMOT INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS -

THE FATHER OF SUBJECT, ALFREDO CERVANTES, DIED ON 26 JANUARY 1967 FROM WHAT THE WIDOW DESCRIBES AS A BROKEN HEART BECAUSE HE FELT USELESS.

MR. CERVANTES WAS PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED AS ''SUPERINTENDENT'' OF THE SACRED HEART COLLEGE, LOCATED NEAR COCONUT GROVE, MIAMI, BUT WAS DISMISSED BECAUSE HIS WORK WAS CONSIDERED UNSATISFACTORY. THE WIDOW IS NOW RESIDING WITH HER FATHER AT 2390 CORAL WAY, APT. NO. 1, MIAMI. SHE IS RECEIVING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR A [redacted] SON, IGNACIO CERVANTES LAGO, WHILE SEEKING EMPLOYMENT.

MRS. CERVANTES IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE A FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, BUT NOT FOR PRESIDENT KENNEDY WHOM SHE FEELS WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF HER SON. SHE IS DESCRIBED AS A DECENT, EDUCATED, AND WELL-MANNERED PERSON WHO HAS APPARENTLY

ADJUSTED TO THE WAY OF LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES.

5. IN REPLYING TO REP. PEPPER, WE PROPOSE HE BE INFORMED THAT, WITH REGRET, WE ARE UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE REMAINING PARENT IN THIS CASE. IT WOULD BE EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE HELD STRONGLY TO AND ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED BY THE PRINCIPAL PARTY WHICH, IN THIS CASE, DO PROVIDE FOR THE CONTINUED SUPPORT WHICH IS BEING FURNISHED FOR THE CHILD. FURTHER, THAT ALTHOUGH THIS POSSIBLY COULD BE A NEEDY CASE, WE MUST CONTINUE TO BE GOVERNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES UNDER WHICH THE MANY OTHER SIMILAR REQUESTS ARE CONSIDERED AND, THUS, DO NOT FEEL THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE AN EXCEPTION IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE.

MARK F. EFFIELD

ATTACHMENT 1 - LETTER

DISTRIBUTION

C/WH VIA TELEPOUCH W/ATT HEREWITH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

TO	Chief of Station, JMWAVE
INFO	
FROM	Chief, WH Division

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMBUD
C Possible Release of Certain AMBUD Prisoners

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For Your Information

A. UFGA 26880, 31 January 1967
B. UFGA 26912, 3 February 1967

1. Both Headquarters and AMTIKI files reflect Subject of para 2(k), reference B (prisoner #37 on reference A list) is indeed a prisoner, not deceased.

2. It is suggested that AMTIKI be requested to review the file for any indication Subject of para 2(a), reference B (prisoner #32 on reference A list) may actually be a prisoner, not deceased as reported.

3. Subject of para 3, reference B (prisoner #36 on reference A list) is a prisoner. Although he is officially listed as a GARCIA LINES crewman, he may also have been one of the Brigade personalities who served as an auxiliary crewman on one of the GARCIA LINES ships lost in the invasion. The dependents of these deceased and imprisoned crewmen are paid by the GARCIA LINES through a special WOFACT funding mechanism. This also applies to the AMBUD-3 case, Faustino MARTINEZ, who receives $300 per month as a permanent disability case. CELENZA will no doubt recall that during MARGANY's recent TDY to JMWAVE to review the AMBUD dependency cases, MARGANY advised that all GARCIA LINES dependents would be included in the proposed recommendations for future financing of AMBUD dependency payments. Both Subject of para 3, reference B, and Faustino MARTINEZ were included in the recently completed actuarial study to determine the total amount of money required to finance future dependency payments under a proposed trust fund mechanism.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

DISTRIBUTION:
3-COS, JMWAVE

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW 6403	DATE 27 FEB 1967
GROUP 1	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6

Hqs Distribution
1-RID
1-WH/COG/ESEC
1-C/WH/COG

WH/RgC

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG	Nancye Gratz	new	6753

21 February 1967

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG/MO		EWisniewski
FEB 23 8 38 AM '67		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/COG	23/2	Earl J. Williamson

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

18

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE FDO

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Biographic Data Concerning Case No. 75

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICRO
Feb
DOC. MICRO.

Reference: UFGA-26771, 17 January 1967

1. With reference to Headquarters request for biographic data concerning Case No. 75, the complete date of birth for Margarita ROQUE, mother of Pedro NORDA Roque, is 28 January 1912.

2. For Headquarters information, the monthly dependent payment of $175.00 was sent to Margarita ROQUE rather than the former trustee, Mr. Antonio Da CRUZ, effective with the January 1967 payment instead of the February 1967 payment, as stated in paragraph 2.a. of Reference.

for Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

19-124-25/6

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO: B-201-298859

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE TYPED: 14 Feb. 1967

DATE DISPATCHED: FEB 16 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-26972

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-124-25/6
201-298859

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Dependent Payment Case No. 123

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
FEB 17 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

References: A. UFGW-6353, 26 January 1967
B. UFGA-26692, 10 January 1967
C. DIRECTOR-60211, 15 December 1966

1. In accordance with the paragraph 2, Reference A request for clarification of Case No. 123, a review has been made of JMWAVE records and the following pertinent date is forwarded for Headquarters information:

a. There is no record of Subject's mother being designated as a dependent and it is believed that the AMTIKI-1 request for biographic data concerning her (paragraph 2(a), Reference B) was an error resulting from the large number of similar investigations being handled at that time.

b. The monthly payment to the Trustee conforms with the Reference C authorization by Headquarters for termination of the $50.00 per month child dependent payment and for the continued payment of $175.00 per month for the widow as the remaining sole dependent.

2. In conclusion, the Headquarters records for this Case would appear to be correct and our error in correspondence is regretted.

for Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:
✓3-WH/COG

19-124-25/6

CS COPY

DATE TYPED 9 Feb. 1967	DATE DISPATCHED FEB 14 1967
CROSS REFERENCE TO B-201-293105	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA- 26956
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6 201-293105

P. O. Box 8045
S. W. Station
Washington 24, D. C.
February 9, 1967

Garcia Line Corporation
115 East 23 Street
New York, New York 10010

Attention: Mr. Alfredo Garcia, President

Dear Mr. Garcia:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letters dated December 30, 1966 and January 27, 1967 which contained information concerning the six beneficiaries currently receiving compensation. We are grateful for this information.

With regard to Mr. Alfonso Alberti Garcia, our records show that he completed his rehabilitation training in June 1965 which qualified him as a radio/television repairman. In other words, he has a marketable skill which can provide him with employment.

We would appreciate it if you would terminate the monthly payment of $275.00 to Mr. Alberti as of March 1, 1967. Please advise Mr. Alberti that since his rehabilitation training and a lengthy period of grace to find employment he will no longer receive any payments. If he should need any social or financial assistance, you might suggest that he apply to a local, state or national welfare agency.

Please keep us advised of any further developments in this case.

Very truly yours,

David B. Challerton

Coordinated with:
OGC-Mr. Richard Landsdale 8 Feb.
WH/COG/CICS-Nancy Gratz 8 Feb.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Possible Release of Certain AMBUD Prisoners

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

References: A. UFGA-26880, 2 February 1967
B. UFGA-25261 (Attachment No. 1), 3 June 66

1. For Headquarters information concerning the AMBUD Dependent Payment Program, a listing of prisoners forwarded by Reference A includes 11 of the 19 AMBUD cases contained in Attachment No. 1 to Reference B plus one individual believed to be a GARCIA LINES case. In view of the steps being taken by Headquarters concerning the proposal to transfer administration of the dependents payment Program to WUMUTUAL we are forwarding the results of a review of JMWAVE records pertaining to the individuals included on the Reference A list.

2. The following data is keyed to the case numbers in Attachment No. 1 to Reference B:

a. Case #120: 201-293759. The listing of Subject in attachment No. 1 to Reference B as deceased resulted in the September 1966 termination of payment to the trustee account for which AMTIKI-1 is responsible. We do not plan to make any changes in this account at this time.

b. Case #124: 201-285171. Monthly payment of $225.00 to wife.

c. Case #126: 201-291258. Monthly payment of $250.00 to wife.

d. Case #132: 201-300027. Monthly payment of $225.00 to wife (adjusted from $250.00 effective with January 1967 payment per UFGW-6306.)

e. Case #134: 201-297837. Monthly payment of $300.00 to wife.

f. Case #135: 201-285157. Payment of $175.00 per month is being changed from the trustee to the mother who now resides in California.

g. Case #136: 201-293321. Monthly payment of $225.00 to wife.

CS COPY

Continued........

Amended by UFGW-6403
31 Jul 1967

Distribution:
✓3 - WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
3 Feb 67	FEB - 6 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26912

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

h. Case #137: 201-281930. Monthly payment of $175.00 to mother.

i. Case #139: 201-(unknown). Monthly payment of $225.00 to wife.

j. Case #140: 201-279742. Monthly payment of $225.00 to trustee for parents in Cuba.

k. Case #144: 201-294422. Monthly payment of $225.00 to trustee for dependents. For clarification of Headquarters records Subject was listed as deceased in Attachment No. 1 to Reference B.

3. Although the Subject of 201-294744 is described in JMWAVE traces as a Brigade personality and for whom Provisional Operational Approval was requested in JMWAVE-4068, 7 March 1961, he is also included on a listing of Garcia Lines cases. Further, there is no record at JMWAVE of any payments being made on behalf of Subject which may result from his being carried on the Garcia Lines rolls.

Burton J Celenza
for Philip G. ELMARD

SECRET

2 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interim Report on Turnover of Survivor Benefit Payments to BEC

PARTICIPANTS: Ben DeFelice, Chief/Personnel Benefits and Services, Office of Personnel
James Ueberhorst, Office of General Counsel
Nancye Gratz, WH/COG
Walter T. Cini, WH/COG/EXO

1. Reviewed a large number of possibilities on the pros and cons of going to BEC on 2 February 1967.

2. DeFelice feels we have conceived a sufficient number of alternatives to contact BEC directly and discuss.

3. A meeting is to be set up next week, possibly 6 February, to discuss with Mr. Tinsley, Director of Bureau of Employees Compensation, who cleared, friendly and very helpful, with regard to BEC accepting one of the following solutions:

a. Takeover of all or most of the funding of the regular payments, after he has had a chance to review the files. The Agency would continue to distribute the payments through cover (there is a precedent in the HEW arrangement). This would not create a BEC problem according to DeFelice.

b. BEC takes over the majority under present arrangement and the Agency continues to handle those cases which do not qualify under BEC regulations.

c. The BEC pays a lump sum to the Agency fund which would continue the payments at the present rate and under the present system until all cases are terminated.

4. One of the most serious problems facing us at present is the five-year statute of limitations. One way to get around this claim would be for the Agency to issue a statement to the effect that, after the elapse of five years, it is prepared to make a statement of presumptive or conclusive finding of death.

SECRET

Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

The Agency has the authority to make such a statement. The BEC could accept the statement as sufficient grounds but would probably require a half-yearly statement prolonging its validity.

5. Anticipated problems:

a. BEC will require proof of relationship between the deceased or missing and the beneficiary which may not be available or procurable in all cases.

b. The BEC has a base salary rate of $240 minimum which is a higher rate than many of the present payments.

c. If the BEC allocation on the other hand were lower, we could "construct" a salary to up the payment over $240.

d. Whatever the rate of GARCIA LINES payments, they are based on legal maritime compensation rates.

e. The survivor beneficiary in a student status may present a special problem.

Walter T. Cini
WH/COG/EXO

14-00000

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division (ATTN: Mark K. HOLMES)

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational Transmittal of AMBUD Case Histories

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Per telecon between Frederick J. INGHURST and Mark K. HOLMES 2 February 1967 we are forwarding herewith the original HEW reports on AMBUD cases 4, 7, 10, 16, 27, 38, 39, 49, 54, 65, 92, and 144.

Frederick J. Inghurst
Philip G. ELMARD

Case # 277765
sent to IJ for 201 file

Missing Cases Sent to [illegible] Police
for review

Attachment:
Case Histories.

Distribution:
③ - WH/COG, w/att h/w (ATTN: HOLMES)

19-124-25/6

Remove from Project [illegible]
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-258/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
2 Feb 67	FEB - 2 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26908

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

See UFGA-26908 · 2 Jul 67
transmitting original HEW
Reports on # 4, 7, 10, 16, 27, 38,
39, 49, 54, 65, 92 and 144
#27 & #65 sent to 201 files
Other cases sent to [illegible] for review - ([illegible] to [illegible])

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROCESSING	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
AMBUD Dependent Payments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Below

References: A. DIRECTOR 68288, 20 January 1967

B. UFGW 6351, 19 January 1967

1. In accordance with Chief of Station, JMWAVE and Stefan R. LABANOW's telephone conversation on 25 January 1967, we do not plan to take the action requested in the References prior to Headquarters reconsideration of the cases, based on information obtained from a further review of our records.

2. Manuel GUILLOT Castellanos (201-281397). With reference to paragraph 2.A. of Reference B., it is recommended that Headquarters consider the following points in favor of the JMWAVE proposal that no further obligation exists to the dependents of Subject and that payments should not be resumed.

a. Financial: The 1 March 1961 MOC established a monthly salary of $200.00 per month, payable to GUILLOT's parents during the time he was in Cuba. The 31 October 1961 amendment to the MOC provided for a salary of $400.00 per month, payable to GUILLOT's parents during the time he was in Cuba. Further, the MOC provided for 2 years payment of salary to the parents from the date of death if due to operational activities. (Executed 30 August 1962). The 18 April 1962 amendment to the MOC provided for a bonus of up to $750.00 per year if approved by the COS, JMWAVE. In accordance with the MOC, the parents received $3,200.00 in monthly payments prior to 28 June 1963 when with Headquarters approval (UFGS-2992, 19 April 1963) the amount of $6,400.00 was accepted by them as the final settlement. This settlement represented monthly payment projected to 30 August 1964. There is no record of payments to dependents other than the parents. It is believed that the financial settlement is in accordance with current JMWAVE policy for the handling of agent death benefits. (JMWAVE Instruction 20-50). JMWAVE records contain nothing subsequent to the final settlement with the parents on 28 June 1963.

continued.....

Distribution
3-WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
31 Jan 67

DATE DISPATCHED
FEB - 1 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26878

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

b. Operational: Subject was first contacted by a JMWAVE case officer in Miami during July 1960. The last of several missions to Cuba, dating back to 9 December 1960, was the infiltration by JMWAVE on approximately 1 May 1962. Subject was arrested on 29 May 1962 and executed on 30 August 1962.

c. Other: Subject was a friend of Manuel ARTIME prior to early 1959 when Subject joined ARTIME to form the Rural Commands. Subject resumed contact with ARTIME following Subject's arrival in Miami in 1960. Re the ARTIME claim in Reference B that the mother of Subject is in bad health, there is nothing in the file regarding the mother's health, but mention is made of an aunt, Mrs. Eloisa CASTELLANO Rosales, who was in bad health due to liver trouble. According to JMWAVE traces Mrs. CASTELLANO entered the U.S.A. on 3 July 1963 (A13319405). In summary, it is noted that Subject was considered as a valuable asset during the period of his service. However, it is believed that the dependents have been well-paid according to JMWAVE policy, and there is no record of their dissatisfaction with the final settlement. It is further noted that a close and long-time association existed between Subject and Manuel ARTIME, source of the current request for financial assistance to the dependents.

3. Jorge FUNDORA (Hero and Martyr). Reference is made to paragraph 2.B. of Reference B which is concerned with the possible increase of payment to the widow, Silvia HEREDIA. There is nothing in JMWAVE records to indicate that Subject ever worked for WOFACT. However, the original AMBUD arrangement for designation of dependents eligible for benefit payments resulted in the addition of certain non-WOFACT cases to the payment rolls. Further, a review of the original HEW questionnaire shows that Mrs. HEREDIA declared her total income to be the $175.00 a month AMBUD payment. No mention was made of additional income from the MRR. Unless Headquarters has information not available to JMWAVE, we strongly recommend no increase in payments be made.

4. Francisco ECHEVERRIA Texier is the Subject of paragraph 2.C., Reference B. There is nothing in JMWAVE records to indicate that Subject was ever employed by WOFACT. Unless Headquarters has additional information regarding this case it is recommended that payments not be initiated to the wife.

Philip G. ELMARD

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	C1	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: Nancyo Gratz:now
UNIT: WH/COG
EXT: 6753
DATE: 20 Jan 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 21 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, ci/ops

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 20 20 08 Z CITE DIRECTOR 68288

#6

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF UFGW 6351

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL BIO DATA AND ADDRESSES SUBJECTS OF INVESTIGATIONS REQUESTED REF.

A. MANUEL (GUILLOT) MONTES, BORN 22 DECEMBER 1905.
VIRGINIA (CASTELLANOS) DE GUILLOT, BORN 24 JANUARY 1892.
3488 NW 3RD STREET, MIAMI.

B. ROSA RABASA, BORN 3 DECEMBER 25
CHILDREN ARE FRANCISCA, AGE 18; ALFONSO, AGE 12;
MANUEL, AGE 6; JOSE ANTONIO, AGE 4.
1152 1/2 SW 10TH STREET, APT 1, MIAMI.

C. SILVA HEREDIA, BORN 11 JANUARY 35.
CHILDREN ARE EDUARDO, AGE 8; RAQUEL, AGE 6.
180 SE 14TH TERRACE, MIAMI.

2. PLEASE HAVE INVESTIGATOR OBTAIN BIRTHDATES OF RABASA AND HEREDIA CHILDREN.

END OF MESSAGE

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Operational/AMHUD
Return of Letters for AMTIKI File

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See para. 2, below.

REFERENCES:
A. UFGA-26692, 10 Jan 67
B. UFGA-26584, 8 Dec 66
C. UFGA-25261, 3 Jun 66
D. DIR-60211, 15 Dec 66

1. Returned, under separate cover, are recent replies to AMTIKI letters forwarded in Reference A. Please return these letters to AMTIKI for retention.

2. The 30 November letter sent to Trustee of Case No. 123 requested information concerning the mother of deceased (paragraph 2(a), Reference A). According to Case No. 123 study forwarded in Reference C, only the widow and an unidentified child were listed as dependents. The Trustee denied the existence of any child in her original letter to AMTIKI, and Reference D authorized the Station to terminate payment for this child. Deceased's 201 file contains bio data which identifies the mother as reported, but does not reflect she was designated as a dependent. Apparently, information is available at the Station which indicates the mother is the rightful second dependent. Clarification of this case is requested in order that Headquarters data may coincide with that recorded at JMWAVE.

3. Headquarters wishes to express appreciation for the extremely valuable biographic data forwarded to date which was essential for the now completed WUMUTUAL actuary study. The results of this study will be incorporated in recommendations for future financing of this operation which will be submitted to Higher Authority for approval in the immediate future.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

Attachment:
Letters for AMTIKI USC

Dist: 2 - JMWAVE w/Att.

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
3 COPY	UFGW-6353	26 JAN 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	19-124-25/6

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS DIST:
1 - WH/COG
1 - WH/COG/ESEC

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
C/WH/COG	N. Gratz	yb (24 Jan 67)	7451

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG/MO	25	

ABSTRACT
INDEX
WH/Reg C

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG		Thomas J. Flores

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)
MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station - JMWAVE FJ2

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Transmittal of Biographic Data

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
References: A. UFGA-25261, 3 June 1966
B. UFGA-26584, 8 December 1966
C. UFGA-26697, 17 January 1967

1. AMTIKI-1 has obtained biographic data on Case No. 71 which is forwarded under separate cover. The case number is keyed to Reference A, attachment No. 1:

Case No. 71: Requirement completed.

2. AMTIKI-1 has received an interim reply concerning Case No. 63 which is also forwarded for Headquarters information:

Case No. 63: The attached letter did not provide the date of birth for which AMTIKI-1 is again writing by registered mail. In regard to the first sentence of the attached letter which states that the January 1967 payment had not been received, this case is one of the six cases described in Reference C for which payment was withheld, effective with the January 1967 payment, pending reply to the AMTIKI-1 request for data.

Burton J. Celinza
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments:
2 - Letters

Distribution:
✓3 - WH/COG w/1 copy (2) Atts. u/s/c

Remove from Project Scelly
CS Classification: 14-124-25/6
72-358/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
18 Jan 67	JAN 2 (67

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26802

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
~~19-124-25/2~~
19-124-25/6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 act

Miami Enero 7/61

La presente es para informarle que este mes el cheque no me ha llegado, [illegible] estamos ya a 9.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] la dirección de Rafaela Lopez, madre de mi esposa [illegible]

La dirección es la siguiente

Ave 23 # 5807

La Ceiba

Marianao

Habana

Con gracias anticipadas por la atención que le preste a la presente, queda respetuosamente de Ud.

Elia Martinez

E-6

Remove from Project
CS Classifications:
JOB #
Box:______ Fold:______

CS COPY

19-124-25/6
6

S/C SEC-1 UFGA-[illegible]

ELSA MARTINEZ
1156 SW 5 ST
MIAMI FLA

MIAMI, FLA.
AM
9 JAN
1967

TS MUST
EIR ADD
URING JA

PO Box 701
MIAMI FLA 33144

Miami

17 January 1967

Translation

This is to inform you that I have not received the check even though it is the 7th.

A few days ago I received a letter from you in which you asked me for the address of Rafaela Lopez, the mother of my deceased husband. The address is as follows:

Ave. 53 #5807
La Ceiba
Marianao, Havana

Thanking you in advance for your attention to this letter, I remain respectfully yours

/s/ Elsa Martinez

December 29, 1966.
Mr. Paul G. Avant.
P.O. Box 701.
Miami. Fla. 33134.

Mr: Avant:

Please forgive delay in answering but, I had to wait until I received the information from Cuba.

Name:- Isabel Maria Compan Santiesteban
Birthdate - November 19, 1903.
Holguin. Oriente. Cuba.
Address: José Antonio Cardet #132.

Please be advised change my address as of November 1st is:
245 S.W 20 Ave apt #7.
Miami Fla: 33135.

Thanks:
Amada Fernandez

E-26

#1632

Amada Fernandez
245 S.W. 20 ave. Apt 7.
Miami. Fla
33135.

MIAMI, FLA. 5
JUL 12
PM

SPECIAL DELIVERY
WASHINGTON
UNITED STATES

Mr.
Paul G. Avant.
P.O. Box 701.
Miami Florida.
33144.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
/ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE ATTN FRED J. INGHURST

INFO.

FROM
CHIEF, WHD

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/AMBUD
○ REQUEST FOR PRIORITY INVESTIGATIONS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED - SEE BELOW

REFERENCE - UFGA-25261, 3 JUNE 1966

1. DURING THE 13 JANUARY 1967 MEETING OF WALLACE A. GROWERY AND MANUEL ARTIME CONCERNING TERMINATION OF WOFACT FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE MRR, ARTIME SUBMITTED THE NAMES OF THREE DEPENDENT FAMILIES WHO HAVE BEEN RECEIVING MRR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND REQUESTED THAT WE ARRANGE TO PROVIDE CONTINUING ASSISTANCE TO THESE INDIVIDUALS, PARTICULARLY THE SUBJECTS OF CASE A.

2. IT IS REQUESTED THAT JMWAVE INVESTIGATE THE FOLLOWING CASES REGARDING THEIR FINANCIAL SITUATION AND PRESENT STATE OF HEALTH AND SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE MINIMUM MONTHLY PAYMENTS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF SUBSISTENCE AND COVER THE COST OF NECESSARY MEDICAL TREATMENT.

A. MANUEL GUILLOT MONTES AND HIS WIFE, VIRGINIA CASTELLANOS ROSALES DE GUILLOT, PARENTS OF MANUEL GUILLOT CASTELLANOS /201-281397/, MRR MILITARY COORDINATOR WHO WAS EXECUTED 30 AUGUST 1962. ACCORDING TO ARTIME, THE MOTHER IS A PARALYTIC WHO HAS UNDERGONE 3 OPERATIONS AND REQUIRES ANOTHER. APPARENTLY THE FATHER RECEIVES SOME SMALL INCOME FROM A MINOR CLERICAL JOB AND THE MRR HAS BEEN CONTRIBUTING $300 PER MONTH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THE DECEASED SON'S MOC, THE PARENTS CONTINUED TO RECEIVE HIS $400 PER MONTH WOFACT SLARY UNTIL 28 JUNE 1963 WHEN THE BALANCE OF THE AGREED $9600 DEATH BENEFIT WAS LIQUIDATED THROUGH A LUMP SUM ''LIFE INSURANCE'' PAYMENT COVERING THE REMAINING $6400 DUE THE BENEFICIARIES.

DISTRIBUTION BY TAPE
3 - COS, JMWAVE

/CONTINUED/

19-124-25

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-6351

DATE
19 JANUARY 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH COG	Nanc Gratz	ear 19 Janua 1967	7451

COORDINATING

Distribution:
1 - WH/COG/ESE
1 - WH/COG

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
/WH/COG	19 Jan	

AN
WH/ES
ABSTRACT Y

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH COG	19 Jan	

(40)

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

PRESUMABLY, THE PROCEEDS OF THIS DEATH BENEFIT PAYMENT HAS BEEN EXHAUSTED BY THE MOTHER'S MEDICAL EXPENSES. HEADQUARTERS DOES NOT FEEL THAT THE DEATH BENEFIT PAYMENT SHOULD NECESSARILY PRECLUDE FURTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO DEPENDENTS OF A FORMER VALUABLE AGENT IF IT CAN BE PROVEN THEY WILL BE DESTITUTE AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE MONTHLY MRR PAYMENTS. THE INVESTIGATOR SHOULD DETERMINE THE PRESENT FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THESE PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE INCOME OF THE FATHER AND ANY CASH ASSETS, THEIR PRESENT SCALE OF LIVING, THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF BOTH INDIVIDUALS, AND THE MINIMUM AMOUNT REQUIRED FOR LIVING EXPENSES AND PERMANENT MEDICAL CARE ARTIME CLAIMS THE MOTHER REQUIRES. THIS INVESTIGATION IS EXTREMELY URGENT IN ORDER THAT A RECOMMENDATION FOR PAYMENT OF FUNDS, OVER AND ABOVE THE THE DEATH BENEFIT, MAY BE SUBMITTED FOR SPECIAL APPROVAL.

B. SILVIA HEREDIA, WIDOW OF JORGE FUNDORA, WHO PARTICIPATED IN INFILTRATION OPERATIONS BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS AND WAS EXECUTED 12 OCTOBER 1961. SUBJECT IS PRESENTLY RECEIVING $175 PER MONTH UNDER THE AMBUD PROGRAM AS A HEROES/MARTYRS WIDOW /SEE CASE NO. 103/. ACCORDING TO ARTIME, SUBJECT IS UNDER PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT, WHICH IS ALSO REFLECTED IN REFERENCE CASE STUDY, AND HAS BEEN RECEIVING $125 PER MONTH FROM THE MRR TO HELP SUPPORT HERSELF AND HER 2 SMALL CHILDREN. REASSESSMENT OF THE CASE IS REQUESTED TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE OF HARDSHIP THAT WILL BE IMPOSED FOLLOWING THE TERMINATION OF THE MRR ALLOWANCE AND AN ESTIMATE MADE OF THE MONTHLY ALLOWANCE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE EXISTENCE AND MEET MEDICAL COSTS. SUBJECT'S ORIGINAL HEW QUESTIONAIRRE SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR ANY EVIDENCE SHE DECLARED ANY OUTSIDE INCOME FROM THE MRR OR ANY OTHER SOURCE.

C. *ROSA RABASA, WIFE OF *FRANCISCO ECHEVERRIA TEXIER, WHO ACCORDING TO ARTIME WAS ENGAGED IN TRANSPORTING ''COMPANIA''ARMS UNTIL HIS CAPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT 6-30 YEAR PRISON SENTENCE. THE WIDOW, WHO IS DEAF, HAS BEEN RECEIVING $75 PER MONTH AND PAYMENT OF HER MEDICAL BILLS BY THE MRR TO HELP SUPPORT HERSELF AND HER 2 CHILDREN. SHE AUGMENTS HER SMALL INCOME BY SEWING IN HER HOME. SUBJECT'S HUSBAND IS THE INDIVIDUAL ON WHOM MARGANY REQUESTED TELEPHONE TRACES FROM INGHURST 16 JANUARY.

3. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE SAME INVESTIGATIVE FACILITIES EMPLOYED IN THE REFERENCE AMBUD INVESTIGATIONS BE UTILIZED IN THESE CASES. FOR PLAUSIBLE COVER PURPOSES THE INVESTIGATOR SHOULD STATE THAT THEY UNDERSTAND FROM DR. ARTIME THAT HIS ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN GIVING THEM MONTHLY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. THAT IT IS NOW PROPOSED THAT THE FIRM OF MCKIRCHER AND AVANT MAY BE RETAINED TO MAKE FUTURE PAYMENTS AND CERTAIN INFORMATION IS NEEDED FOR THEIR RECORDS. IN ADDITION TO OBTAINING THE OTHER INFORMATION REQUIRED THE INVESTIGATOR SHOULD ASK THE AMOUNT OF THE PRESENT MONTHLY PAYMENT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO VERIFY THE VERACITY OF THE AMOUNTS ARTIME CLAIMS THEY HAVE BEEN RECEIVING. IN THE CASE OF SILVIA HEREDIA, WHO KNOWS SHE IS RECEIVING MONEY FROM MCKIRCHER AND AVANT, SUGGEST THE INVESTIGATOR TELL HER THEY HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF HER ADDITIONAL MRR INCOME AND HAVE TO BRING HER PRIOR QUESTIONAIRRE UP TO DATE. ALSO, QUESTION HOW SHE WILL BE AFFECTED IF THE MRR PAYMENTS ARE TERMINATED.

4. SINCE MRR FUNDING WAS TERMINATED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1966, AND ARTIME STATED THESE SPECIAL CASES WOULD BE LEFT IN A DESPERATE SITUATION, A CABLED REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS IS URGENTLY REQUESTED BY STEFAN R. LABANOW BY COB 25 JANUARY. THE ADDRESSES OF GUILLOT AND RABASA ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT HEADQUARTERS BUT ONE, MANUEL J. GUILLOT, WHO MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH CASE A, IS LISTED IN THE MIAMI TELEPHONE DIRECTORY AS RESIDING AT 1315 NE MIAMI COURT.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW-6351 PAGE 3

5. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ALL CORRESPONDENCE PERTAINING TO PRESENT AND FUTURE AMBUD PAYMENTS IN THE PROPER FILE JMWAVE IS REQUESTED TO USE FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6 ON FUTURE CORRESPONDENCE.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

19-124-25 16

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Termination of Dependency Payment

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGW-6306, 8 December 1966

1. In accordance with guidance provided in the Reference concerning Case #94 (201-283357), the monthly payment to the first dependent (mother) Graciela ROVIROSA for the dependents of 201-283357 was adjusted by terminating the $50.00 monthly payment for the second dependent (father) in Cuba and continuing payment of $175.00 monthly to the first dependent. A letter of explanation prepared by the case officer was enclosed in the 31 December 1966 mailing by AMTIKI/1 of the January 1967 payment.

2. On 10 January 1967 a reply dated 2 January 1967 was received from Mrs. ROVIROSA in which resumption of the payment for the second dependent is requested. Ill health of the father and his need for assistance are cited as justification. A copy of the letter is forwarded under separate cover for Headquarters information.

3. In accordance with the recommendation contained in paragraph one of Reference, Stanley JERSAWIT has provided the following background information on the dependents in this case which results from personal direct knowledge of the family:

> The mother, Mrs. Graciela ROVIROSA, comes from one of the wealthiest, if not the most wealthy, family in Camaguey Province. She left Cuba in 1959 or 1960 in anticipation of what has happened, taking all her personal wealth with her. At the same time, her share of the family fortune was forwarded to her in the U.S. as long as this policy continued, perhaps until 1962.
>
> Her husband, Jose A. RODRIGUEZ, did not leave with her because of a mistress in Cuba. Mrs. ROVIROSA contemplated divorce at that time but no divorce ever came about. Although the father stated numerous times that he intended to leave Cuba, and his name is on the "airlift" listing, he now states that he is not going to leave Cuba because he must stay to

DATE TYPED
12 Jan. 67

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 13 1967

Attachment:
Letter

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26761

Distribution:
3-WH/C w/1 copy att
u/s/c

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-283357
19-124-25/6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

supervise property that has not been confiscated by the state. This is considered by members of the family in the U.S. to be only an excuse for remaining in Cuba.

The father is thought to have a sizeable bank account in the U.S. which was accrued prior to and during the early days of the Castro regime. Although the mother has access to the funds, she is trying to avoid use of the funds for personal reasons.

Mrs. ROVIROSA is believed to be employed by HEW as an IBM key-punch operator in the Refugee Center (JMWAVE has verified the employment as key-punch operator, GS-3, Salary $4,269.00 per annum. Employed since 14 December 1966 on a temporary basis.)

JERSAWIT has heard nothing concerning the father's alleged ill health. To the contrary, a sister of Mrs. ROVIROSA describes the husband as being very active in Cuba and believes he may possibly have obtained a divorce from Mrs. ROVIROSA.

4. In view of the background information concerning the dependents in this case, JMWAVE does not plan to reply to the letter from Mrs. ROVIROSA.

Philip G. ELMARD

Original with copy of letter
filed in 201-283357

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE FJ2

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
Transmittal of Biographic Data

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGA-25261, 3 June 1966
B. UFGA-26584, 6 December 1966

1. AMTIKI-1 has obtained biographic data on Case No. 17 which is forwarded under separate cover. The case number is keyed to Reference A, attachment No. 1:

a. Case No. 17: Requirement completed.

2. AMTIKI-1 has received interim replies concerning Case Nos. 75, 135 and 143 which are also forwarded for Headquarters information:

a. Case No. 75: The attached letter did not provide the complete date of birth. However, the provision by the trustee of the address for the mother will enable AMTIKI-1 to obtain the data from her. Further, JMWAVE plans to forward monthly payment directly to the dependent, instead of the trustee, effective with the February 1967 payment.

b. Case No. 135: The attached letter did not provide the date of birth. It is planned to handle this case in the same manner as Case No. 75 (described above) by obtaining the data from the mother and subsequently forwarding payment directly to her, instead of the trustee, effective with the February 1967 payment.

c. Case No. 143: The attached letter states that the data requested will be forwarded when received from Cuba.

Burton J Celenza
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments
4 Letters

Distribution
~~3-WH/COG~~ w/1 copy (4) Atts. u/s/c

Remove from Project [illegible]
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # [illegible]
Box: [illegible] Fold: 3

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
13 Jan 67

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 17 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26771

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
~~19-124-25/2~~ 6
19-124-25/6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

TRANSLATION

Miami
December 26, 1966

Name - Francisca Alvarez

Birth - May 11, 1915

Residence - Calle 14 entre 23-26
Nueva Gerona, Isla de Pino
Cuba

Name - Juan Maria Ramos

Birth - July 7, 1907

Residence - Calle 14 entre 23-26
Nueva Gerona, Isla de Pino
Cuba

/s/ Justo Alvarez

Remove from ~~Project~~ July
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-258/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

CASE NO: 17

S/C 20-1 UFGA-26771 CS COPY

19-124-25/6

Mexico Dec. 26/66.

Nombre- Francisco Alonso.
Nacimiento- Mayo 11 de 1914
Vecina - Calle 14 entre 23-26
Nueva Gerona Isla de Pinos.
Cuba

Nombre= Juana Maria Ramos.
Nacimiento= Julio 7 de 1907
Vecino- Calle 14 entre 23-26.
Nueva Gerona Isla de Pinos.
Cuba.

Atentamente.

Justo Alonso

C-7

14-00000

Justo [illegible]
2409 SW. 27 st
Miami Fla

5c U.S. POSTAGE

Mr Paul G. [illegible]
POB 701
Miami Fla
33144

MIAMI, FLA.
PM
19

ALWAYS USE
YOUR ZIP CODE

Miami 29-66

Mr Paul G. Avent
P.O. Box 701
Miami, Fla, 33166

B-2

Gentlemens;

As you requesting on your letter of Nov. 22 I inform you the following:

The mother of Pedro Raul Mesa Reyes named Margarita is 54 years old, she arrive to Miami with her daughter and son on July 4th she be at the Jackson Hospital for 3 month an leave her two son. One of the sons still on Cuba because the Castro's militians take him to a Concentration Camp. He is 28 years old and at the

CASE NO: 75

present time in making arrangements to come from Spain or other possible way.

The address of the mother in Miami is 3880 W. 4th Ave. Hialeah, Fla.

Any other information if needed I be glad to serve you at you request.

Very Truly yours

Antonio Da Cruz

Antonio Da'Cruz
3812 S.W. 1st, St.
Miami Fla 33134

Mr. Paul G. Avent
P.O.Box 701
MIAMI, FLA. 33144

TRANSLATION

Miami
January 2, 1967

Mr. Paul Avant
Miami

Dear Sir,

I received your letter dated 28 December. I recently received a letter from Humberto Reyos' mother's daughter but she did not mention her mother's age (even though I had asked) I'm sure she just forgot about it. However, I am sending her address as you requested, the address is:

"Cruz Ortiz"
3667 3/4 So. Grand Ave.
Los Angeles, California 90007

Attentively,

/s/ Manuel Garrido
437 SW 7 St.
Miami, Fla. 33130

CASE NO: 135

[redacted] Enero 2 - 67

Sr. Paul FUNT
Ciudad

A-1

Estimado señor:

Recibí su carta de fecha 28 de diciembre.

Le diré que acabo de recibir carta de la hija de la señora madre de Humberto Reyes en la cual no me menciona la edad de su madre (a pesar de habérselo pedido); seguro a sido olvido de ella, no obstante le envío la dirección de ella en California, como usted me lo pide en la carta suya la direccion es

"Cruz Ortiz"
3667 3/4 So. Grand ave.
Los Angeles. California. 90007.

14-00000

y muchas gracias.

de Ud. atte.

I-A

Manuel

437 SW 7 St

Miami Fla. 33136

[illegible]
437 Sw 7 LC
Miami Fla 33130
ZIP CODE

MIAMI, FLA.
PM
JAN
1967

NA[illegible] CHILDREN'S DENTAL HEALTH WEEK

UNITED STATES WASHINGTON 5

VIA AIR MAIL
CORREO AEREO
PAR AVION

Mr. Paul G Avant
P.O. Box 701
Miami Fla. 33144

Dec 30/066

Mr Paul G Grant.
PO Box 794.
Miami Fla. 33144

Dear Mr Grant.

I have written to Cuba asking for the dates of birth etc. of Jorge Kin Jun parents, when I got them I will send them over to you.

Sincerely Yours
Raul [illegible]

5307 Park Ave. B4
West N York, N.J. 07093

E-34

CASE NO: 143

Raul Santovenia
5307 Park Ave
West N. York, N.J.

WEST NEW YORK N.J.
JAN 1
1987
07093

SUPPORT
ASSOCIATION

Mr Paul G. Hunt.
P.O. Box 701
Miami Fla-33184

To WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMBUD
Adjustment of Dependency Payments

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. UFGW-6306, 8 December 1966
B. DIRECTOR-60211, 15 December 1966
C. UFGW-6328, 29 December 1966

1. The adjustment of AMBUD dependency payments was completed with the January 1967 payment in accordance with guidance provided in References A and B. The adjustment by Station of payments for additional cases as described in paragraphs 4 and 5 further reduced the monthly payments and resulted in a net saving of $3,025.00 per month.

2. Adjustment of payment in accordance with Reference A was as follows (case numbers are keyed to UFGA-25261, Attachment #1):

Case #3: (201-283944)	
Monthly payment reduced by:	$ 75.00
Case #4: (201-268913)	
Monthly payment reduced by:	25.00
Case #6: (201-283500)	
Monthly payment reduced by:	50.00
Case #16: (201-287799)	
Monthly payment reduced by:	75.00
Case #20: (201-098817)	
Monthly payment reduced by:	150.00

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

13-124-25 6

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
12 Jan 67

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 17 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26697

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
13-124-25/~~2~~ 6

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-26697

Case #31: (201-291244)

No action taken per Reference B.

Case #50: (201-294433)

Monthly payment reduced by: $ 75.00

Case #52: (201-294523)

Monthly payment reduced by: 75.00

Case #53: (201-294749)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #59: (201-286541)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #61: (201-297567)

Monthly payment reduced by: 25.00

Case #63: (201-297112)

Monthly payment terminated per UFGW-6306: 25.00

Monthly payment withheld due return by Post Office of AMTIKI/1 registered letter to Elsa MARTINEZ requesting biographic data: 250.00

Case #65: (201-297393)

Monthly payment terminated: 325.00

Case #75: (201-298859)

Monthly payment terminated per UFGW-6306: 50.00

Monthly payment withheld pending reply to request for biographic data: 175.00

Case #78: (201-300046)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #81: (201-298910)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #83: (201-297556)

Monthly payment reduced by: 75.00

Case #87: (201-300082)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #89: (201-297752)

Monthly payment terminated on basis of First dependent's statement to survey case worker that she was fiancee and engaged to be married following return of 201-297752.

Total amount terminated: 275.00

Case #92: (201-283096)

Monthly payment reduced by: $ 50.00

Case #94: (201-283357)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #122: (201-281272)

No change in amount of monthly payments. Father and step-mother receiving $25.00 each. The remaining $225.00 being deposited in trust account at the Coconut Grove Bank for which AMTIKI/1 is trustee.

Case #131: (201-301745)

Monthly payment reduced by: 25.00

Case #142: (201-278754)

There has been no reply to the registered letter mailed to trustee Orlando FERNANDEZ by AMTIKI/1 on 19 December 1966.

Monthly payment withhold pending reply: 225.00

3. Adjustment of payment in accordance with Reference B was made as follows:

Case #1: (201-286848)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #31: (201-291244)

No action necessary because Reference A action had not been taken prior to receiving Reference B.

Case #53: (201-294749)

Monthly payments to parents adjusted to $175.00 and $50.00 per action described in paragraph 2 above.

Case #59: (201-286541)

Monthly payment for Fifth dependent terminated per action described in paragraph 2 above.

Case #123: (201-293105)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #132: (201-300027)

Monthly payment reduced by: 25.00

4. Station took action in terminating the payment for Case #82 (201-300091) effective with the January 1967 payment, upon receipt of trustee letter stating that dependent died on 26 September 1966.

Amount of payment terminated: 175.00

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-26697

5. Station took further adjustment action by withholding payment, effective with the January 1967 payment and involving five cases, for failure to reply to AMTIKI/1 letters requesting data desired by Headquarters. Payment for these cases would be resumed pending receipt of the information. Three of the cases, Nos. 63, 75 and 142, are included in paragraph 2 above. The other cases are as follows:

Case #71: (201-297954)

Amount of monthly payment withhold: $175.00

Case #143: (201-298852)

Amount of monthly payment withheld: 225.00

6. In accordance with guidance provided in Reference C, AMTIKI/1 has been instructed to automatically terminate payments to dependents reaching 21 years of age. AMTIKI/1 will also employ his "radar" in attempting to keep informed of marriages by dependents.

7. A quarterly Station report will be prepared on all future payment terminations per Reference C.

Burton J Celauza
for Philip G. ELMARD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE FJL

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
Transmittal of Biographic Data

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGA-25261, 3 June 1966
B. UFGA-26584, 8 December 1966

1. AMTIKI-1 has obtained biographic data on Case Nos. 6, 27 and 82 which are forwarded under separate cover. The case numbers are keyed to Reference A, Attachment No. 1:

a. Case No. 6: Requirement completed.

b. Case No. 27: Requirement completed.

c. Case No. 82: Requirement completed. For Headquarters information, JMWAVE took action on the basis of information provided in the letter pertaining to case No. 82 and terminated the monthly dependent payment effective with the January 1967 payment.

2. AMTIKI-1 has received interim replies concerning Case Nos. 123 and 135 which are also forwarded for Headquarters information.

a. Case No. 123: The attached letter which is the second reply received on this case states that the data requested will be forwarded when received from Cuba. The first reply was forwarded to Headquarters under Reference B.

b. Case No. 135: The attached letter did not provide the requested data and AMTIKI-1 wrote again on 28 December 1966 stressing urgent need for the information.

Attachments returned to AMTIKI for retention

Burton J Celenza
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments
5 Letters

Distribution
3 - WH/Cuba w/1 cy atts. u/s/c (att.)

Remove from ~~Project~~ Study
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB: 72-258/125
Box: 3 Fold: 3

19-124-25/6

~~19-124-25/2~~

LOTT.

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-26692	JAN 10 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/2

5 January 1967

Mr. Flores,

This morning I received an answer from Mr. Alfredo Garcia, President of the GARCIA LINE, giving the bio data requested on dependents of the crew we are still paying. This completes the bio data required for the actuary study.

When I called Mr. Evan's office to give his secretary the above information concerning the GARCIA people, she told me the computing of the money involved was started yesterday and we may get our total figure within a week. I have the draft memo written by Mr. Millian and the new first page which I revised. As soon as we receive that big, fat figure from WUMUTUAL the final memo can be typed and we will be in business.

Nancye G.

Nancye Gratz:
Deo et Tibi Gratias!

14-00000

N.G.

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Operational/TYPIC/AMBUD
Return of Documents and List of Birthdates for AMTIKI Files

Paragraph 3

[illegible]

References: A. UFGA-26524 dated 8 December 1966
B. UFGA-26626 dated 15 December 1966

1. Forwarded under separate cover attachment A are the replies received in references from AMTIKI. It is requested that these letters be returned to AMTIKI for retention in individual Subject files.

2. It is recommended that AMTIKI assume responsibility for reviewing the status of minor dependents in order to automatically terminate payments to those individuals who become 21 years of age. This should be done on a regular 30 day basis since many of these dependents will become ineligible for payment during 1967. A list of birthdates compiled by ELLEN P. MARGANY is forwarded under separate cover attachment B to assist AMTIKI in monitoring this operation. Some procedure should also be established by AMTIKI for periodically attempting to establish proof of marriages contracted by dependents.

3. A quarterly Station report is requested on all future payment terminations in order that Headquarter's records may be maintained on a current basis.

Ellen P. Margany

Distribution:
3 - COS/JMWAVE

Attachments (USC):
A - Letters for Return to AMTIKI
B - List of Birthdates for AMTIKI

UFGW-6328

SECRET 19-124-25/5

WH/COG/CICS Nancye Gratz mjr 2463

27 December 1966
Distribution:
1 - WH/COG/ESEC
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - RID

WH/COG/MO

_ December 1966

TO : Mr. Flores

FROM: Nancye Grats

1. In order to submit accurate figures for the approved actuary study we must immediately establish some definite criteria for survivor payments in the event the principal dependent is terminated for cause.

2. I find it difficult to accept the inheritance formula that JMWAVE says has been SOP, i. e. when the first dependent is terminated the second dependent inherits the first dependent's share and so on down the line. In the first place, the Station hasn't been consistent in following this procedure and the fact it was originally established by AMBUD is no reason for us to continue it. Regardless of the background for this unrealistic procedure it seems that the whole matter is now at a point where policy governing future payments should be determined at the Headquarters level and the actuary study can't be started until we supply firm figures that are not subject to a variety of changes over the years. Furthermore, the Station views and clarification of the background leading to the present procedure, which was requested over a week ago, has not been forthcoming.

3. I think we can live with the following formula as it isn't too inconsistent with BEC survivorship provisions. I discussed the following with Mr. Millian who agreed the provisions seemed to be thoroughly practical and realistic if you concur.

OK

(a) In those cases where the parents are the sole beneficiaries, in the event one dies the survivor will be paid the larger of the two payments now received, which would be $175 instead of the $225 now received by both of them.

OK

(b) When a widow dies or remarries, her payment will be divided equally among the surviving minor children in lieu of the graduated payments they are now receiving. This may cost us a little more than just lopping off the widow's share and continuing the amounts presently paid to the children but we will minimize possible repercussions from the widow if she is still alive and remarried. It is also much more equitable to the children themselves to share and share alike in the event the mother dies. An additional provision should be that as each child reaches 21 or marries, his payment will be terminated, except in those cases where a child is physically or mentally incapacitated for life. In such cases the child will be paid for life.

In answer to any possible static over these provisions we can always fall back on the original cover story concerning availability of AMBUD funds.

4. May I have your opinion on the above proposal so that I can provide Mr. Evans with the statistics necessary to start the actuary study without further delay?

Nancye Gratz

14-00000

C/WH/Cuba

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
Transmittal of Biographic Data

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References A. DIRECTOR 59411
B. UFGA 26584, 8 December 1966 19-124-25/6

1. The additional biographic data on certain dependents and trustees requested by Headquarters in Reference A will be forwarded under separate cover as it is received from AMTIKI-1.

2. The first 26 replies to the 22-23 November 1966 mailings by AMTIKI-1 were forwarded to Headquarters under Reference B by courier on 8 December 1966. Five additional replies received subsequent to the initial pouching are forwarded under separate cover.

3. Follow-up letters are being sent by AMTIKI-1 via registered mail to the ten individuals from whom no reply has yet been received.

Bertram J Celenza
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments U/S/C (dual)
5 letters

Distribution
3-WH/Cuba w/ 1 cy Atts.

attachment returned to JMWAVE for AMTIKI files - UFGW-6328 - 27 Dec 66

Remove from ~~Project~~ [illegible]
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-258/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

1 a.a.

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
15 Dec 66

DATE DISPATCHED
DEC 15 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 26626

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/2
19-124-25/6

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[illegible] ☐ YES ☐ NO
[illegible]ASSIFY TO FILE NO.
REF TO FILE NO.
[illegible]ILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
[illegible]STROY ☐ SIG.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CICS	5	CI/Ukag
2		6	HQ
3	SS	7	CA
4		8	

FROM
DISSEM BY 22

ACTION
WH/C 6 G 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CI/IA, MPS/B6-2

SECRET 132340Z CITE JMWAVE 4587 (INGHUARST ACTING) NG

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD

14D 58902

REFERENCE UFGW 5306

1. CONCUR ALL RECOMMENDATIONS REF AND PLAN TO IMPLEMENT WITH 31 DEC MAILING OF JAN PAYMENTS BY AMTIKI WHO WILL ENCLOSE EXPLANATION FOR ACTION BEING TAKEN.

2. CONCEPT OF ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED PARA THREE REF CORRECT. HOWEVER, STATION PROPOSES FOLLOWING PAY SCALE FOR PAYMENT FOLLOWING AN ADJUSTMENT OF DEPENDENCY STATUS: NEW FIRST DEPENDENT, REGARDLESS OF RELATIONSHIP TO SUBJECT, $100.00 MONTH; SECOND DEPENDENT $50.00; THIRD OR MORE $25.00 EACH. REQUEST HQS DECISION THIS PAY SCALE PRIOR 31 DEC MAINLING NOTICES AND CHECKS.

3. THE FEW PREVIOUS CASES AS NOTED PARA 3 REF WERE HANDLED ON AD HOC BASIS WHEN BROUGHT TO JMWAVE ATTENTION. NO FIRM POLICY WAS ESTABLISHED. FURTHER, JMWAVE NOT AWARE ANY COMMITMENTS TO DEPENDENTS BY WOFACT.

4. RE CASE 59 REF, REQUEST APPROVAL TERMINATE $25.00 PAYMENT FIFTH DEPENDENT IN VIEW PAYMENT OF 150.00 TO SAME

SECRET

14 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the WUMUTUAL Investment Committee Meeting Held on 7 December 1966

REFERENCE: Agenda for the Subject Meeting

Minutes of meeting were ratified 6 Jan 1967

1. The Subject meeting was held in the DD/S Conference Room at 10:30 a.m. on 7 December 1966. All members of the Committee were present. Also attending were the Chief, DO Division, the Committee Advisor, the WUMUTUAL Secretariat (Evans and Fielder), and Messrs. Kenneth Million and Earl Williamson and Mrs. Nancy Gratz representing WH Division. The WH representatives were present in conjunction with Item 3 of the Agenda.

2. Mr. Houston chaired the meeting, and the first item of business discussed was Item 3 of the Agenda, i.e., WH Division's proposal of WUMUTUAL annuities for dependents of the Cuban Brigade. Mr. Million gave a summary presentation on the Brigade matter. He stated that the payments to the dependents of the Cuban Brigade have been made since 1961 under Presidential order, which order in effect stated that the payments were to be made until rescinded by the President. Since that time, the Agency has spent approximately $17,000,000 on the overall program, of which $12,000,000 represents direct stipends to the beneficiaries. WH Division's FY 1967 budget for this matter is $397,000, and currently 316 individuals are receiving payments, most of whom are dependents of the Brigade with the balance being dependents of the Heros and Martyrs Group and certain Garcia Line crewmen. The individuals are presently paid through a cover firm with no official Government attribution. It is WH Division's position that since this program must be continued until terminated by the President, it is a long range, overall Agency obligation which should not be budgeted for nor administered by WH Division. The Division would like to transfer total responsibility for the program to Project WUMUTUAL by a single premium purchase of annuities. If the single premium method is too costly, they would still like to have the responsibility transferred either by an installment purchase or by the funding method. Mr. Evans advised the Committee that he felt the matter should be brought to the attention of the Committee before WUMUTUAL secured actuarial calculations, since the fees for these calculations will be fairly expensive. After considerable discussion, the Committee concluded that while the

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

chances are remote of securing sufficient funds from the Bureau of the Budget to establish an annuity program, the program should be costed on several alternative bases, including a single premium charge, installment basis and delayed implementation of the program. When the cost study is completed, alternative proposals may be submitted for consideration within the Agency and to the Bureau of the Budget, if deemed appropriate. As soon as WH Division provides WUMUTUAL with the additional information required, WUMUTUAL will request the study from its actuarial consultants.

3. After this matter was considered by the Committee, the WH representatives left the meeting. The Chairman then proceeded to handle the other Agenda items. The Minutes of the 15 November 1966 meeting, the last meeting preceding this one, were ratified.

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET

ORIG : NANCYE GRATZ
UNIT : WH/COG
EXT :
DATE : 13 Dec 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

X): XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1	C/	5	
2		6	
3	WH/COG	7	
4	HO	8	

DISSEM BY M PER #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY DO 4 DO/H 3 ADDP DCI ADDP

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

13 22 17 Z CITE DIRECTOR 59411

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF UFGW 6303

1. ACTUARY STUDY FOR PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD TRUST FUND APPROVED BY WOFACT WUMUTUAL COMMITTEE. IN ORDER PROCEDE E WITH STATISTICAL STUDY URGENTLY REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIO DATA REQUESTED BY AMTIKI.

2. SINCE ACTION REQUESTED PARA THREE REF NOT RECEIVED, TIME FACTOR NECESSITATED FORMULATION NEW HQS POLICY GOVERNING FUTURE DEPENDENCY PAYMENTS. DETAILS WILL BE POUCHED.

S E C R E T

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER NANCYE GRATZ WH/COG
COORDINATING OFFICER NONE
RELEASING OFFICER MR T. FLORES FOR MR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE XX

Chief, Western Hemisphere

OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD

Recommendations for Termination of Certain Dependency Payments

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 3

REFERENCE : UFGA-25261, dated 3 June 1966

1. It is recommended that JMWAVE arrange to notify specific AMBUD dependents that certain payments will be terminated as of 1 January 1967. The cases, and the reasons for such terminations, are listed below by case number corresponding to Reference Attachment #1.

Case # 3

Terminate payments to 2nd and 3rd dependents, daughters of Benito BLANCO Cruz. Both daughters are over 21 years of age.

Case # 4

Terminate 2nd and 3rd dependents, married brothers of Manuel BLANCO Navarro and substitute the father, Manuel BLANCO Canisal, as 2nd dependent.

Case # 6

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent of Daniel FERNANDEZ Mon and pay only $175 to mother, Lucia MON Fuertes.

Case # 16

Terminate payments to 2nd and 3rd dependents, parents of Benjamin QUINTANA Perera, who are apparently not receiving any financial assistance and may actually be deceased. Although there is some question regarding the legal status of 1st dependent, deceased claimed her as his wife and payment should continue until further notice.

8 DEC 1966

continued.......

UFGW-6306

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

19-124-25/2

30 Nov 66 WH/COG Nancye Gratz mak 2578

Distribution:
1 - WH/COG/ESEC
1 - WH/COG/MO
① - C/WH/COG

C/WH/COG Thomas J. Flores

WH/COG/MO Robert Ortman

C/WHD William V. Broe

Case # 20

Terminate payment to 1st dependent, widow of Raul VIANELLO Alakan, as sister gave sufficient evidence of widow's remarriage to justify termination. Also terminate 5th dependent, who apparently is mother of the widow and her sister, not the mother of the deceased, and is not entitled to support money. Children will continue to receive support. Widow receives more money than is customary for a widow since her husband was a pilot. In certain cases of this type, payments were established by AMBUD, not by WOFACT.

Case # 31

Terminate payment to 5th dependent, father of Jose CARRAZANA Trimino, unless proof can be established that father is alive and receiving support money. AMTIKI has been requested to query 1st dependent on status of father.

Case # 50

Terminate payments to 2nd and 3rd dependents, parents of Reinaldo VIDAL Mazola, if widow is unable to provide proof that parents are receiving support. AMTIKI has also been requested to investigate this case.

Case # 52

Terminate payment to 1st dependent, widow of Clemente CRUZ de la Torre, who advised of remarriage in 1964. Children will continue to receive support.

Case # 53

Terminate payments to 1st and 2nd dependents, widow and child of Marcelo NAPOLES Viquiera. 4th dependent advised that widow and child moved to Houston on 19 November 1959. Widow, whose name is Sue Elizabeth Lessmann and probably a US citizen, apparently was separated from husband before his death. There is no indication that Trustee has sent any money to widow.

Case # 59

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent, eldest daughter of Vicente LEON Leon, who was born 26 October 1945 and is now over 21 years of age.

Case # 61

Terminate payment to 4th dependent, youngest daughter of Marcelo CARMENATE Cebrian, who is now married and not entitled to support.

Case # 63

Terminate payment to 4th dependent, father of Mario GALVEZ Lopez, who apparently receives no support money.

continued.........

Case # 65

Terminate payments to Trustee since widow, legal child and parents of Antonio FADRON Cardenas, not receiving entire amount to which they are entitled if Trustee is sending $100 to two mistresses. If, and when, widow does come to the USA, case can be reviewed for possible renewal of direct payments to widow and arrangements made to pay support to illegitimate daughter. Present legitimate dependents will be projected for the actuary study so that funds will be available if required at a future date.

Case # 75

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent, father of Pedro NORDA Roque. Mother of deceased is now in the USA and records indicate she is separated from the father who remained in Cuba.

Case # 78

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent, daughter of Carlos GUAS Decall, who is not only married but is over 21 years of age.

Case # 81

Terminate payment to deceased 2nd dependent, father of Osvaldo DIAZ Milian.

Case # 83

Terminate payments to 2nd and 3rd dependents, children of Pedro CUELLAR Alonso, who reside in Cuba. According to widow, she has little, if any, contact with her stepsons and does not contribute to their support on a regular basis.

Case # 87

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent who is the mother of widow of Carlos SOLIS Shelton, not mother of deceased. On the questionnaire, the widow claimed her mother as dependent. According to AMTIKI, deceased's mother is Rosa SHELTON who has resided in the USA for some time and apparently has never received any money.

Case # 89

Terminate payments to 2nd and 3rd dependents, parents of Roberto PEREZ Cruzata, and 4th dependent, child of first dependent and her former husband Harry FRITZ. Probably all dependents should be terminated but there are conflicting statements concerning the legal status of the "widow". Deceased claimed her as his wife in 1961. AMTIKI's file on this case contains a letter from a Miami lawyer requesting information on the "widow" and advised he had been retained by Harry FRITZ to protect his interest and that of their daughter, Cathleen FRITZ, in view of the supposed marriage of his ex-wife and Roberto

continued...

PEREZ Cruzata. If the lawyer who represents FRITZ could be discreetly queried, the true status of the relationship between the "widow" and PEREZ might be established and lead to a termination of her payment. If JMWAVE concurs, recommend AMTIKI be instructed to pursue this investigation.

Case # 92

Terminate payment to deceased 2nd dependent, mother of Herman KOCH.

Case # 94

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent, father of Jose FERNANDEZ Rovirosa, who apparently receives no support from mother of deceased. Stanley JERSAWIT can supply some background on dependents in this case who are both from wealthy families.

Case # 122

Amount and method of payments to dependents in this case was directed by Headquarters and handled by Humphrey O. TIMANUS. According to the questionnaire filled out by 1st dependent, father of Manuel REYES Garcia, father is not following instructions to provide for the wife and child in Cuba, as well as provide certain comforts for his imprisoned son. It is recommended that this case be reviewed with TIMANUS and AMTIKI resume trusteeship of funds for the widow and child and prisoner. The father and stepmother should then be paid $25 apiece, as 3rd and 4th dependents. The remaining $225 per month would then be deposited in the existing trust account at the Coconut Grove Bank.

Case # 131

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent, son of Jose BORRAS Gutierrez. Son, Alfredo BORRAS Macias was born 19 April 1943 and is over 21 years of age.

2. Although the money saved by the above terminations is small in comparison to the total amount expended each month, it is a beginning which hopefully will lead to more terminations in the near future. All trusteeships are presently being reviewed and JMWAVE will be advised as rapidly as possible concerning trusteeships to be terminated completely or adjusted. Two trusteeships that require special study concern cases # 142 and # 144 as follows:

Case # 142

Jorge GUTIERREZ Izaguirre designated his parents as dependents. It is recommended that the Trustee be requested to submit the names of the uncle and aunt who have possession of the bank book and obtain the exact amount of money on deposit. The uncle may be Alfredo HORNEDO, a former prominent Cuban businessman now in the US, for whom GUTIERREZ formerly worked in Cuba. GUTIERREZ also has a

continued.....

brother who is an American citizen residing in New York. This brother, an engineer who may be engaged in space research, recently queried NASA concerning the possibility of obtaining assistance to effect the release of his brother from prison.

Case # 144

Andres VEGA Perez originally designated his wife and child as dependents and named another sister as Trustee. Information obtained from AMTIKI and various records available, indicate that VEGA learned that his wife was a GOC follower and directed that the present Trustee, another sister, assume control of the money. This could account for the discrepancy between the amount of money now held in trust and the total amount of money paid from 1961-1965 since the new trusteeship was not created until much of the money had been spent. In order to protect the interests of the prisoner, some procedure will probably be devised by which a long-range projection can be made for actuary purposes and the trusteeship terminated. Recommendations for handling this case will be submitted to JMWAVE in the near future.

3. In order to arrive at the exact amount of money to be saved by the immediate and future termination of payments to certain dependents, a definite criteria must be established concerning adjustments for secondary dependents when the first dependent has been terminated. In discussions between Ellen F. MARGANY, during her recent TDY to JMWAVE, and Humphrey O. TIMAHUS, it was MARGANY's understanding that the procedure is to raise the second dependent to the status of first dependent when the original first dependent is terminated for cause. For example, the first child would receive the amount originally paid to the mother, instead of the customary $50 paid to a second dependent, and the third dependent would then become the second dependent and receive $50 instead of the original $25. This procedure was not followed in case # 44 where the second dependent payment remained at $50 after the remarriage of the mother, Case # 25 where child, now sole dependent, does not receive full 1st dependent payment, nor in the contentious CUERVO-RUBIO case (# 84) where an attempt to hold the second dependent to $50 precipitated considerable unpleasantness. However, in case # 86, the procedure of raising the payment level of the second and third dependents after the remarriage of the mother, was followed. Logically, the termination of payments to dependents in any of the top categories would automatically lead to an adjustment in status and payment to not only children, but in some cases parents as well, depending on their position of inheritance. A clarification of Station's past procedure, any known committments to dependents, and present views as to firm criteria to be followed in such cases is urgently requested. Not only is such a fixed criteria necessary to determine the amount of savings involved in the recommended immediate termination, and to provide accurate long-range figures for the actuary study, but also for the purpose of avoiding any possible repercussions such as occurred in the CUERVO-RUBIO case. Request Station cable reply.

continued...

4. A conference with the WUMUTUAL Committee will be held in the near future in order to obtain guidance concerning the proposal for disbursing future AMBUD payments. JMWAVE will be kept advised of the progress of this activity.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
3 - COS/JMWAVE

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, WH Division - ATTN: Ellen F. MARGANY		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE PGE		MICROFILM
SUBJECT AMBUD - Dependent Payments		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		

Forwarded under separate cover are 26 replies received from dependents by AMTIKI/1 concerning age and birth dates of individuals presently on the rolls under the AMBUD program.

Fifteen individuals have not as yet replied to the questionnaire sent to them through AMTIKI/1. When they are received they will be forwarded as soon as possible.

Remove from Project Suby
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-258/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments: u/s/c
26 Letters

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 13 Dec 66

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WH Div., w/att

S/C att returned to JMWAVE for
retention AMTIKI files
UFGW-6328 - 27 Dec 66

19-124-25/6
~~19-124-25/5~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-26584	DATE ~~DEC 8 1966~~ 8 Dec 66
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

NCLASSIFIED ☐ ERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CO ENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) AMBUD - FINANCES

FROM:

1 Dec 1966

EXTENSION

NO. 18113

DATE 28 Nov 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/COG				Seventeen million dollars, repeat, $17,000,000.00
2.				
3.				
4. WH/COG/CI				
5. (Gratz)				
6.				
7.				
8.				RYBAT
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT/SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH ATTN: STEFAN R. LABANOW

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AMBUD/Operational
Transmittal of AMBUD Financial Summary

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is one xerox copy of a compilation of those expenses during the period 1960 thru 30 June 1966 handled thru the JMWAVE Station which may be considered to fall under the AMBUD rubric. The compilation was made by AMTIKI-1 and his staff. The original copy has been retained at the Station. It is interesting to note that the disbursements during the report period are in excess of $17,300,000.

Philip G. Elmard
Philip G. Elmard

Attachment - As Stated

Distribution:

3 - C/WH W/Att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
28 Nov. 66	NOV 30 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-18113

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT/SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational
Quarterly Progress Report Concerning the AMBUD Program

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are two copies of the Quarterly Progress report for the First Quarter of FY 67 concerning the AMBUD program.

2. As explained in the attached report, in the absence of any Headquarters approval to carry out the cost reduction plan proposed by the Station in FY 66 AMBUD expenditures are running at the rate of approximately $34,000 per month. If this rate is continued throughout FY 67, then the total cost for the year will be approximately $408,000, as compared with the $230,000 projected by the Station for the fiscal year. The Station has been kept well informed by Headquarters concerning its struggles to place the AMBUD program on a reasonable and economic basis. Until a decision is taken at the Headquarters level, the Station will continue to administer the AMBUD program under the present ground rules.

Philip G. Elmard
Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment: h/w
AMBUD Progress Report

Return to G. Nancy

Distribution:
2 - WH/C, w/att.

19-124-25/6
~~19-124-25/6~~

Remove from Project: Sully
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-258/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
27 OCT 66	27 OCT 66

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26296

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 Att

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief of Station
THRU : D/OPS
FROM : SP-4/Burton J. CELENZA
SUBJECT: TYPIC/Operational
AMBUD Progress Report
1 July - 30 September 1966

Date: 19 October 66

WSP-1650

Distribution
~~4-COS~~
1-D/OPS
1-C/SP
1-SP-4 Chrono
1-19-124-25
1-REG

A. Operational Highlights

1. The AMBUD program for the handling and disposition of residual Brigade matters pertaining to dependent benefits and medical attention continued during the reporting period. All major developments were reported to Headquarters as described in the following paragraphs.

2. The results of a survey of all persons receiving AMBUD benefits, and the JMWAVE recommendations for handling the ultimate termination of these benefits, were forwarded by UFGA-25261, 3 June 1966.

3. The conclusion of the vocational rehabilitation program covering 63 Brigade members on 30 June 1966 was reported by UFGA-25901, 14 September 1966.

4. The current status of the remaining six medical cases which included a request for Headquarters guidance on the disposition of these cases was prepared in September and forwarded by UFGA-26075.

B. Administration

5. In accordance with guidance received from Headquarters (DIRECTOR 10331, 7 June 1966), payment of benefits were to continue unchanged until further notice. During the reporting period JMWAVE received no guidance or instruction to change this basic decision by Headquarters.

6. Expenses incurred during the reporting period are tabulated as follows:

Remove from Project [illegible]
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-957/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

[illegible]

SECRET

Att #1 To UFGA 26296

[illegible] COPY

19-124-25/6

~~19-124-25/6~~

	July (1966)	August (1966)	Sept. (1966)	Total
Dependents Payments	$26,937.50	$26,937.50	$26,937.50	$80,812.50
Heroes & Martyrs	2,906.00	2,906.00	2,906.00	8,718.00
Payroll(payments office)	1,523.38	1,523.38	1,548.48	4,595.24
Medical Sector(60 wounded)	none	none	none	none
*Medical Sector(1113 POW)	1,139.09	3,203.21	791.60	5,133.90
Brigade Office	800.00	800.00	800.00	2,400.00
General Expenses	337.80	505.89	414.01	1,257.70
Vocational Rehabilitation	none	none	none	none
TOTAL	$33,643.77	$35,875.98	$33,397.59	$102,917.34

*(Expenses for medical treatment and the payment of AMBUD-3 salary, expenses, and office space.)

C. Problems

7. The amount of $250,000.00 originally authorized for the medical phase of the AMBUD program has been almost depleted since expenditures have reached a level of approximately $220,000.00, with bills outstanding of $3,250.00. Headquarters was informed in UFGA-26075 that cases remaining which require medical treatment may necessitate the expenditure of sums in excess of the original authorization.

D. Plans for Next Quarter

8. It is expected that payment of dependent benefits and medical expenses for Brigade members will continue unchanged during the coming quarter. One possible exception would be the termination of any remaining medical cases upon release by medical authorities for return to self-supporting status.

CI:H/C

CWH

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

September 13, 1966

MEMO FOR BILL BROE

Bill -

I should have sent you copies of these * two memoranda before this.

I think that they would be of some interest to you and your staff.

WGB

WGBowdler

Attachments

CONFIDENTIAL

* Other memo unrelated to Brigade members and payment to dependents. (2nd memo concerns interview with Andrew St. George and a film CBS is making re gun-running between the US & the D.R. for use against Haiti.

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

September 9, 1966
5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Manuel Artime - leader of the Bay of Pigs expedition

Artime came to see me at his own initiative. The meeting had been arranged through Congressman Dante Fascell's office. I have known Artime for several years, but had not seen him for about two years.

Artime stated that the purpose of his visit was to express some personal views about the Cuban situation. He said he fully appreciated the fact that the Cuban exile looks at his homeland in a manner quite different from the United States Government with its world-wide responsibilities. Nevertheless, he thought it important that hit-and-run raids be resumed against Cuba to (1) keep up the hopes of the opposition inside the island and (2) force Fidel to maintain a high state of alert which materially subtracts from his economic efforts. Artime noted that assets to make these raids are available but are not being used. He did not specifically ask for support to resume his activities.

I told him that while his arguments had certain merit, there were also other considerations which should be kept in mind, i.e., that hit-and-run raids provide a pretext for Castro to turn the screws of repression harder on the Cuban people and to place the blame for his own failure on external attacks. Artime acknowledged the validity of these arguments and did not pursue the matter further.

Artime said that he had reached the point where he had to think of finding a job to support his wife and three children. He indicated a preference for a job that would permit him to travel throughout Latin America so that he could maintain his contacts in other countries, and asked that I let him know if I learned of any opportunities. I said I would.

The rest of our conversation ranged over a series of points -- Cubela, Rabel, Gutierrez Menoyo, Huber Matos, the status of political prisoners, Castro's security measures, mutual friends in Miami -- but he had nothing significant to say.

Toward the end of our conversation, he returned to the subjectsof raids to volunteer his services in a leadership or subordinate capacity if the United

States Government decided to resume this type of activity. I told him I fully understood his deep desire to see his country freed and what great efforts he had made toward this objective, and thanked him for the offer. He also asked that I do what I could to prevent suspension of remittances to families of those who had fought against Castro. I told him I knew nothing about this but would look into it.

In departing he expressed deep appreciation for my having given him so much time (1 hour) and for having the chance to converse with one who understood Cuba's problems and his preoccupations. This was a rather subdued and reflective Artime -- quite a contrast with the fiery and combative Artime of two years ago.

WGB
William G. Bowdler

cc - Mr. Rostow
Mr. Bill Moyers
Mr. Robert Sayre
Mr. Peter Jessup
Mr. Robert Stevenson

15 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Payments to Dependents of Brigade 2506

REFERENCE: Memorandum for General Counsel, OGC 66-1663 Dated 22 July 1966 with Attachment

1. On 11 August 1966, I met with Nancye Gratz and Ken Millian (WH/C) to explore further the proposal that payments to dependents of Brigade members be reduced.

field or other
investigation

not true

2. I was told that WH is presently expending some $255,000 per year for 144 cases of KIA's and MIA's, which figure includes the 16 still in prison on criminal charges that predate their membership in the Brigade. not true It was emphasized, however, that the proposed cut back would not include the 16. I also learned that the impulse for reopening this matter was a Wave dispatch (UFGA--25261, 3 June 1966). Among other things, this proposed that effective 30 June a new payment schedule be established, and that payments to trustees be discontinued entirely.

3. I told Gratz and Millian that while the reference sought our opinion regarding the proposed action, the matter of payments to dependents was political rather than legal. In this connection, I referred to such memoranda as Bissell's of 8 May 1961 and Helms' of 31 December 1962, which indicate that the White House had determined that these payments would be made. In response to the representation that the search of WH/C files failed to reflect any policy guidance subsequent to that set out in the DDP's memorandum of 31 December, I suggested that the Wave proposal be discussed with Mr. Sam Halpern, who had previously served as Executive Officer, TFW.

4. During the afternoon of 11 August, Millian and I met with Halpern. He stated that the White House was aware that payments to

this word not used—
policy was not used in the context of decision
[illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ payments to be made by CIA
even the president [illegible] [illegible] payments

to be upheld by CIA until further notice dependents were being continued. He also took issue with allegation regarding the lack of policy guidance, saying that it was set out in the YOBITE messages to Wave, copies of which could be found in WH/C files. It was his view that the White House would not want to risk the charge of bad faith, even if the Government might ultimately realize a saving of some quarter of a million dollars a year. He took the position that if WH/C wished to raise the matter for the DCI's present consideration, it should first familiarize itself with YOBITE traffic. Halpern agreed with me that this subject was not one for consideration by the 303 Committee. We concluded with a suggestion that Chief, WH/C might wish to discuss that matter with Chief, WH/D before proceeding further.

Memo did not refer to HQS guidance to JMWAVE

ROBERT J. BLADERGROEN
Assistant General Counsel

OGC:RJB:kab
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Subject ✓ CUBAN RETURNEES PAYMENTS
RJB FILES
1 - Signer
1 - Chrono

Memo of conversation is not accurate

14-00000

SECRET

WH/C 66-324

22 JUL 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT: Payments to Dependents of Brigade 2506 Members

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a memorandum containing recommendations for phasing out payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 members. WH/Cuba plans to propose phasing out and terminating these payments but, before doing so, a review of the legal factors by the office of the General Counsel is desired. It is requested that an estimate be given of possible residual U.S. Government liability in these cases, and advice as to whether they can be handled on the basis of one-time termination payments.

2. In addition to the above, WH/Cuba would appreciate any advice or suggestions on methods or procedures which might be used in effecting the terminations.

3. A reply from your office would be appreciated on or before 10 August 1966.

/s/

Thomas J. Flores
Chief, WH/Cuba

1 Attachment
DDP/WH/Cuba/EXO/WTCini:new
21 August 1966
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - C/WH/C

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

22 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/Cuba

SUBJECT : Recommendations Concerning Payments to Dependents of Brigade Members

1. A review of the existing files fails to reveal any evidence of a clear-cut policy concerning the duration of payments to dependents of Brigade members killed, captured or missing in action despite the many recommendations made at various times to resolve this problem. This lack of policy is implicit in a memorandum from Mr. Helms to the DDCI dated 23 May 1962 in which he referred to a Presidential oral directive that payments to dependents were to be continued until termination by Presidential order. A later memorandum from Mr. Helms to the DDCI, dated 31 December 1962, contained recommendations for terminating these monthly payments with a lump sum death payment to be made to dependents of those killed or missing in action. Both memoranda are attached for your review. A memorandum from Mr. Sterling Cottrell to the Attorney General, dated 1 February 1963, concerning various agreements reached between Brigade leaders, AMBUD and the Agency, also included three possible alternatives for resolving the problem of dependency payments as follows:

A. Follow regulations established by the Bureau of Employment Compensation, i.e. $1,000 lump sum payment for loss of life.

B. Follow U.S. Army practice, i.e. monthly payments of $122 or more (depending on rank and length of service) for as long as the widow survives and does not re-marry. This, Mr. Cottrell pointed out, would be a costly program to administer and would cost roughly $300,000 a year for an indefinite period. (This has proven to be true).

C. A lump sum arbitrary payment of $3,000 which would be a year's dependency at the highest rate (250 per month).

2. Obviously, the above recommendations as well as others proposed at various times in an effort to terminate this costly exercise were never acted on and due to the time lag are probably no longer practical. Tentative approaches to the problem were also made by exploring the possibility of working out some mechanism by which HEW could take over disbursements at a reduced rate and periodic rulings and guidance were requested from the General Counsel concerning the legal and security factors inherent in the proposals.

3. When the original cover mechanism was established for disbursing these payments, the dependents were apparently advised that such payments would continue as long as funds were available. In view of the indefinite time stipulation together with the long-standing demise of the AMBUD organization and its relationship to this program, dependents could reasonably be expected to philosophically accept the fact that these funds have finally been exhausted. In the light of similar past experiences, some carping and protests from dissidents can be anticipated with the usual security hazards whenever the decision is made to terminate this project. These possibilities can hardly justify the indefinite continuation of this enormous expenditure of funds which to date amounts to approximately $2,000,000.00. Any question that may arise as to who has really been footing this bill is unlikely to cause any shock to the public at large after being deluged with reams of Cuban postmortems.

4. The review and recommendations forwarded by JMWAVE are comprehensive and appear to be more than generous in the approach toward a two-stage cut-off of payments. I do believe the recommendations to immediately cease any further payments to trustees should be submitted to the General Counsel for a ruling on the legal technicalities involved in such a step. This may also apply to any attempt to remove existing funds from trustees who are considered to be unreliable or even dishonest in the administration of funds under this control. These trustees were specifically designated by Brigade members and the written authorization to support such trusteeships are in the custody of AMTIKI. It would seem that no one but the

principal himself or his heirs has the legal right to revoke a trusteeship even in the mishandling of funds. Based on a review of pertinent documents and a discussion with Mrs. Evie Vidal, who is probably more knowledgeable of the facts and nuances of this problem than anyone else, I have listed below some recommendations for your consideration:

A. In line with recent JMWAVE recommendations, payments to all principal dependents (wives who have not remarried) be reduced by 30 July, or as soon as feasible, to a flat $100 per month and all minor dependents reduced to $25 per month with notification that all payments will cease 6 months from date of initial reduction. All secondary dependents, such as dependent parents who receive separate checks of not more than $50 per month, should be continued at the present rate until the final termination date for all dependents.

B. Such adjustments as recommended above should be uniform and across the board with no attempt to evaluate each case on an individual basis determined by such factors as outside income, need, etc. This would not only tend to create an undesirable security hazard but would complicate the phasing out of an already complicated situation. Furthermore, individuals who have made an effort to raise their standard of living by augmentation of their income would be justified in feeling they were penalized for having more ambition than some of the lazy pensioner types. Once we attempt to play the role of Solomon as to who is the most worthy or the most needy, we lose sight of the fact that all dependents are equal as widows whose husbands died for the same cause and we could expect no end of recriminations. Neither should there be any distinction as is recommended in some instances by JMWAVE that payments should cease because dependents happen to reside in Cuba. They are as entitled to the same benefits as those fortunate enough to reside in this country. The exception to this may be justified in those isolated cases where it is evident that nothing has been heard from such dependents and they have never received any benefits from the money paid for their support. In these instances payments to trustees should probably be terminated immediately if such action is legal.

C. In the case of the known prisoners, two courses of action could be pursued. Either cut the present dependency payments in line with that proposed for dependents of deceased with the understanding such payments will continue until the status of each man is resolved (either by release or death while in prison) or leave the present amount being paid unchanged with indefinite continuation. Considering the few involved (16 according to the JMWAVE study), the last proposal would probably be better from a psychological point of view and remove any possibility of charges against us of endangering the lives of the prisoners. Furthermore, the memorandum from Mr. Cottrell to the Attorney General referred to in paragraph 1 included as part of the general agreement reached with Brigade leaders assurance that payments to dependents of Brigade members remaining in prison would be continued. One case that falls in this category is extremely interesting. It concerns case #13 who is imprisoned under an alias and in order to insure his safety there seems to be a tacit agreement to treat him as dead. It may be quite a feat to avoid a charge of discrimination against his wife if her payments are terminated "as a widow" in order to preserve the "deceased" cover to preserve his safety.

D. Prior to submitting recommendations to the 303 Committee for phasing out dependency payments, a ruling on all the legal and possible security aspects of any proposal should probably be obtained from the General Counsel.

5. I have not explored in depth the background of the benefits presently being paid to the dependents of Heroes/Martyrs, the majority of which do not appear to have been Brigade members and do not come under the same criteria established for Brigade members. In the event you are contemplating terminating this type of payments, such action could no doubt be defended as not being applicable to the conditions governing dependents of Brigade members. It has been my understanding that your proposal to submit a memorandum to the 303 Committee in the immediate future concerns only recommendations for resolving the Brigade dependency payments. If I am incorrect and such memorandum is to also cover the continued payments to Heroes/Martyrs dependents, please advise me as to what you wish done.

Nancye Gratz
Nancye Gratz
WH/C/CA/EW

APPROVED:

____
Chief, WH/Cuba

22 June 1966
____
Date

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ORIG: T.J.FLORES/yb
UNIT: C/WH/C
EXT: 3481
DATE: 7 JUNE 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1	C/WH/C	5	PP
2		6	C
3	MO	7	
4	CA	8	

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE MP/BG-2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 7 1759 Z CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 10331

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: UFGA 25261

APPRECIATE STATION DESIRE TAKE STEPS REDUCE AMBUD EXPENDITURES PROMPTLY. HOWEVER BECAUSE OF CONSIDERATIONS ARISING OUT OF ORIGIN OF PAYMENTS, DO NOT DESIRE INITIATE ANY CHANGES PENDING REVIEW ATTACHMENTS REF AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT COMPONENTS. WILL ADVISE PROPOSED ACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/MO E J Chiocca

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 7-7

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

TO: CHIEF, WH DIVISION

INFO.

FROM: CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD
REVIEW OF AMBUD PAYMENTS

ACTION REQUIRED : REFERENCES
REF - UFGW-5346 201-315161 12 July 1965

1. AFTER LARGE EFFORT AND CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES STATION HAS COMPLETED SURVEY OF ALL PERSONS WHO RECEIVE AMBUD BENEFITS. JMWAVE ARRANGED WITH LOCAL HEW OFFICE FOR SOCIAL WORKERS TO ACCOMPLISH SURVEY, WORKING ON THEIR OWN TIME WEEKENDS AND NIGHTS JMWAVE ARRANGED PAY WORKERS VIA HEW. OSTENSIBLE SPONSOR OF SURVEY WAS IDEN A, OFFICE OPERATED BY AMTIKI 1. SPECIAL FORM DEVISED BY STATION WAS USED FOR SURVEY. FORM, PLUS COMMENTS OF SOCIAL WORKER RE CASE, WAS FORWARDED TO STATION. IN CASE OF BENEFITS TO RECIPIENTS LIVING OUTSIDE OF MIAMI AREA FORM WAS MAILED BY IDEN A OFFICE.

2. FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER AS ATTACHMENT 1 ARE RESULTS OF SURVEY. EACH CASE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED CASE NUMBER AND SEPARATE ANALYSIS OF EACH CASE HAS BEEN PREPARED. CASE ANALYSIS PROVIDES FOLL DATA -

A. NAME OF DECEASED OR IMPRISONED PERSON.

B. NAME OF TRUSTEE, IF ONE WAS DESIGNATED.

C. NAME OF DEPENDENT/S/.

D. INFORMATION RE TRUSTEE OR DEPENDENT/S/ AS APPLICABLE.

DATA WAS COMPILED FROM AMTIKI 1 RECORDS AND SURVEY FORMS.

E. MONTHLY ALLOTMENT PAID TO RECIPIENT/S/.

F. TOTAL AMOUNT PAID THRU 31 DEC 65.

G. JMWAVE RECOMMENDATIONS RE FUTURE HANDLING.

19-124-25/6
~~19-124-25/6~~

ATTACHMENTS - USC VIA POUCH
1. CHART AND 144 CASE RESUME /IN TRIPLICATE/
2. CHART /3 CYS/ [illegible]
3. IDENTITY (USC)

DISTRIBUTION - BY TAPE
3 - WH/C W/ATTS, USC
~~2 - C/WHD W/O ATTS~~

CS COPY

[illegible] separated [illegible]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

/CONTINUED/

CROSS REFERENCE TO Remove from ~~Project~~ CS Classification: [illegible] JOB # 72-258/25 Box: 2 Fold: 3	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-25261 19-124-25/6	DATE 3 JUNE 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-~~124-25/2-3~~

3. AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS FACTORS INVOLVED STATION DECIDED IT PREFERABLE FOR STATION TO MAKE FINAL JUDGMENT AND THAT IT NOT NECESSARY TO SEEK ASSESSMENT FROM SOCIAL WORKER, ESPECIALLY SINCE DATA ON FORMS IN MOST CASE /IN SOME INSTANCES RECIPIENT REFUSED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS/ IS SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE EQUITABLE JUDGMENT TO BE MADE. TOO SOCIAL WORKERS WERE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF CUBAN AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS.

4. ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED INDICATED ADVISABILITY OF ESTABLISHING CRITERIA GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO ALL CATEGORIES OF BENEFICIARIES, THEN MAKING EXCEPTIONS ONLY IN CASES WHERE GENUINE HUMANITARIAN OR HARDSHIP FACTORS EXIST. SURVEY REVEALED, AS ANTICIPATED, THAT NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS HAVE MADE STRONG EFFORT TO PREPARE SELVES FOR DATE WHEN BENEFIT PAYMENTS WOULD CEASE, WHILE OTHERS HAVE EXPENDED FUNDS ON LUXURIES, HAVE MADE LITTLE OR NO ATTEMPT TO BECOME ECONOMICALLY SELF SUFFICIENT, AND APPEAR TO CONSIDER SELVES AS INDEFINITE PENSIONERS OF ODYOKE /DESPITE IDEN A COVER IT CLEAR MOST RECIPIENTS CONSIDER THEY RECEIVING BENEFIT FROM ODYOKE/.

5. JMWAVE RECOMMENDS FOLLOWING ACTION.

A. THAT BENEFIT PAYMENTS BE CONTINUED AT THE PRESENT RATE UNTIL 30 JUNE 1966.

B. THAT EFFECTIVE 1 JULY 1966 A NEW SCHEDULE OF BENEFIT PAYMENTS BE ESTABLISHED. JMWAVE RECOMMENDS THAT THIS SCHEDULE COMPRISE /1/ $100 PER MONTH FOR THE FIRST DEPENDENT, /2/ $25 PER MONTH FOR EACH ADDITIONAL DEPENDENT.

C. THAT EFFECTIVE 1 JULY 1966 ALL PAYMENTS TO TRUSTEES BE HALTED.

D. THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE DATA CONTAINED IN THE CURRENT SURVEY ACTION BE INITIATED /BY AMTIKI 1 PRIMARILY THRU LETTER CONTACT/ TO ATTEMPT TO RETRIEVE THE FUNDS ALLEGEDLY HELD IN CERTAIN TRUSTEE ACCOUNTS OR BY CERTAIN TRUSTEES. IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THE TRUSTEE HAS DEMONSTRATED HONESTY AND CORRECT DEALING IN THE MAINTENANCE OF A TRUSTEE ACCOUNT WITH A REPUTABLE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION THE CURRENT ACCOUNT WOULD BE LEFT IN PRESENT DEPOSITORY. HOWEVER, PER PARA 5 C ABOVE NO ADDITONAL FUNDS WOULD BE PAID TO TRUSTEE FOR DEPOSIT.

E. THAT A TERMINAL DATE FOR THE PAYMENT OF ALL BENEFITS BE FIXED. JMWAVE RECOMMENDS THAT THIS DATE BE EITHER /1/ 30 DECEMBER 1966, OR /2/ 30 JUNE 1967.

6. IF ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE APPROVED, STATION PLANS FOLLOWING ENABLING ACTION. ITEMS KEYED TO PARA 5 ABOVE.

A,B - STATION, THRU REGISTERED LETTER FROM IDEN A, WOULD NOTIFY EACH RECIPIENT OF NEW PAYMENT SCALE PRIOR TO 30 JUNE 1966.

C,D - STATION, THRU REGISTERED LETTER FROM IDEN A, WOULD NOTIFY EACH TRUSTEE THAT PAYMENTS TO TRUSTEES END 30 JUNE 1966. IN CASE OF THOSE TRUSTEES CONSIDERED ''UNRELIABLE'' LETTER WOULD ALSO REQUEST RETURN OF FUNDS TO IDEN A TO HOLD FOR BENEFICIARY.

E. IF TERMINATION DATE SET AT 30 DECEMBER 1966, ALL RECIPIENTS WOULD BE NOTIFIEBY REGISTERED LETTER PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST 1966. IF DATE SET AT 30 JUNE 1967, ALL RECIPIENTS WOULD BE NOTIFIED BY LETTER PRIOR TO 30 DECEMBER 1966.

7. IT CLEAR THAT EXECUTION OF ACTIONS IN PARAS 5 AND 6 ABOVE WILL ELICIT SOME COMPLAINTS, ESPECIALLY FROM THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE TAKEN NO ACTION TO RENDER SELVES SELF-SUFFICIENT AND FROM THOSE TRUSTEES WHO HAVE MISAPPROPRIATED FUNDS WHICH THEY SUPPOSED TO HOLD IN CUSTODY. HOWEVER BELIEVE THAT SOLUTIONS PROPOSED ARE EMINENTLY FAIR AND COULD BE EASILY JUSTIFIED TO ANY UNBIASED PARTY WITHIN

OR OUTSIDE OF ODYOKE. AMBUD PROGRAM HAS EXPENDED MILLIONS OF DOLLARS, AND BENEFITS PROVIDED TO BENEFICIARIES IN MANY CASES HAVE FAR EXCEEDED THOSE PROVIDED BY ODYOKE TO ITS OWN EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE BEEN KILLED OR SUFFERED INJURIES IN LINE OF DUTY.

8. SINCE STATION NOT AWARE OF ALL INTERAGENCY BACKGROUND RE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PAYMENT OF BENEFITS IN CASE OF CAPTURED OR MISSING PERSONNEL, STATION CAN NOT SUGGEST EXACT METHOD OF HANDLING FUTURE EARMARKING OF FUNDS, IF ANY, FOR THESE PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, STATION TENDS ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURE SIMILARSYO THAT EMPLOYED FOR CERTAIN CAPTURED AGENTS, I.E., ESTABLISHMENT OF ''CAPTIVITY PAY'' SCALE AND POST-RETURN NEGOTIATION RE AMOUNT TO BE PAID.

9. STATION REQUESTS SOONEST CONSIDERATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS CITED PARA 5 AND 6 ABOVE, NOTABLY A THRU D - DECISION RE E /TERMINATION DATE/ CAN BE MADE LATER. APPEARS THAT DECISION RE ACTIONS A AND B MAY HAVE TO BE REFERRED TO HIGHER AUTHORITY AND THAT IMPLEMENTATION DATE MAY HAVE TO BE POSTPONED. HOWEVER, WOULD APPEAR THAT KUBARK CAN TAKE ACTIONS C AND D AT OWN DISCRETION. THUS REQUEST HQS APPROVAL SOONEST RE ACTIONS C AND D. ADVISE.

10. FYI AT PRESENT AMTIKI 1 IS TRUSTEE FOR SOME CASES AND HAS BEEN MAKING MONTHLY DEPOSITS TO THESE ACCOUNTS. STATION RECOMMENDS THAT FUNDS IN THESE ACCOUNTS BE ALLOWED REMAIN ON DEPOSIT /HOWEVER NO FURTHER DEPOSITS WOULD BE MADE, PER SUGGESTED ACTION D ABOVE/. HOWEVER STATION PLANS WITHDRAW AMTIKI 1'S CUSTODIAL POWERS WITH RESPECT TO THESE ACCOUNTS, TRANSFERRING THEM TO CHIEF OF FINANCE BRANCH, AND AS ALTERNATE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF FINANCE BRANCH.

11. FYI VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR WOUNDED MEMBERS OF BRIGADE CONTINUES. BASIC TERMINATION DATE NOW SET FOR 30 JUNE 1966. PLAN CONTINUE BENEFITS IN FEW DIFFICULT MEDICAL CASES. CAN NOT ESTIMATE TERMINATION DATE FOR THESE CASES.

12. FORWARDED AS ATTACHMENT 2 IS CONSOLIDATED DATA CONCERNING ACTUAL COSTS OF AMBUD IN FY 66 AND PROPOSED EXPENDITURES IN FY 67.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER S/C ATTACHMENT NO. 3 TO UFGA-25261

IDENTITY A -- MC KERCHER AND AVANT

Remove from Project
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-258/25
Fold: 3
Box: 2

CS COPY

FORM 6-64 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED 1 - 25/16	PAGE NO.

VOL ~~III~~ - CRC ADMIN BUDGET FINANCE

AUG - DEC 1968

FOLDER - 4

RETIRED FILE
DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 77-558 BOX 2

407,54

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO IP/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 25

36 S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: NGratz:fll
UNIT: WH/COG/SA
EXT: R-1325
DATE: 19 August 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 33 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-25/6 ✓

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR R/AN, WH 8, OGC 2, DO 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

SECRET

19 20 00Z AUG 68

CITE DIRECTOR 257112

TO JMWAVE INFO: JMCOBRA

TYPIC AMBUD

1. PER DISCUSSION WITH MARTHA B. DRANGELIS HQS RECOMMENDS MANUEL (REYES) GARCIA (CASE NO. 122) AND ANGEL (PASTRANA) SANTOS (CASE NO. 118) TRUST ACCOUNTS ALSO BE TERMINATED.

2. REQUEST BALANCES ON DEPOSIT BE T/A'D HQS FOR TRANSFER TO MHMUTUAL ACCOUNT.

END OF MESSAGE

01

AH
AB ✓
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DEC~~ ~~NPD~~
~~FI~~
wh/clsa

OGC/MHMUTUAL D. Fielder (telecon)
WH/B&F
WH/COG/SA

19-124-25/6
19 aug 1968

for William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CS COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 6
2 7
3 8
4 9
5 10

ORIG: N. GRATZ:jgh
UNIT: WH/COG/SA
EXT: 4163
DATE: 30 JULY 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER #

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-25/6 ✓

INFO: FILE , VR . WH 8, CI/OA RI/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 31 16 43z JUL 68 CITE DIRECTOR 20867

TO JMWAVE INFO JMCOBRA

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: UFGT-22352*

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~DX~~
[illegible] ~~ISD~~
~~IP~~
WH/C/SA

CONCUR PAYMENT PLAN PROPOSED PARA 3 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG Comment: *Dependent mother dead Brigader advised AMTIKI of arrival U.S. and requested money held in trust. Monthly amount has also been paid to account of dependent father whom mother advises has been dead since February 1962. JMWAVE proposes pay mother $13,125 (75 months at $175 per month) and turn over remaining $780.57 in account ($50 per month deposited for father plus 6 years accrued interest) to JMWAVE Finance Officer.

CS COPY

19-124-25/6
31 July 1968

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/SA
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY No.

R

E T TELEPOUCH
DISP NO - UFGT 22352
DATE - 29 JULY 1968
TO - CHIEF, WH DIVISION
FROM - ACTING CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE
SUBJ - ARRIVAL IN U.S. OF BRIGADE DEPENDENT FROM CUBA AND SETTLEMENT OF TRUSTEE ACCOUNT.
ACTION REQUIRED - REQUEST CABLE CONCURRENCE OF JMWAVE'S PLAN IN PARA 3.

1. MRS. CLARA MOLINA CABRERA ARRIVED IN THE UNITED STATES FROM CUBAN AND CONTACTED AMTIKI-1 BY LETTER DATED 2 JUNE 1968. MRS. MOLINA IS THE MOTHER OF MARIANO SANTOS MOLINA, KILLED DURING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. THE HISTORY OF THIS CASE IS AS FOLLOWS.

A. MARIANO DESIGNATED HIS MOTHER AND FATHER, BOTH IN CUBA AS HIS DEPENDENTS. MARIANO ALSO DESIGNATED CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS AS HIS TRUSTEE TO HANDLE ALL MONIES FOR HIS DEPENDENTS.

B. AMTIKI-1'S RECORDS SHOW THAT CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS WAS PAID AT THE RATE OF $225.00 PER MONTH FROM APRIL 1961 TO APRIL 1962. ACCORDING TO THE RECORD, ALL PAYMENTS TO CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS CEASED AT THAT TIME BECAUSE "CARLOS FERNANDEZ DID NOT ACCOUNT IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER FOR THE MONEY RECEIVED." AMTIKI-1 OPENED A SAVINGS ACCOUNT IN THE COCONUT GROVE BANK IN MAY 1962 IN THE NAME OF MARIANO SANTOS AND/OR JUAN SANTOS (THE FATHER) WITH HIMSELF AS TRUSTEEM DEPOSITS OF $225.00 PER MONTH WERE MADE TO THIS ACCOUNT FROM MAY 1962 UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1966 WHEN ALL DEPOSITS TO TRUSTEE ACCOUNTS WERE ORDERED STOPPED BY JMWAVE. TOTAL PAYMENT TO THIS ACCOUNT WAS $11,925.00 AND WITH THE EARNED INTEREST OF $1,920.57 THE ACCOUNT BALLANCE AS OF JULY 23, 1968 WAS $13,905.57.

S

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C. THE FIRST INFORMATION RECEIVED THAT MARIANO'S MOTHER MIGHT ARRIVE IN THE UNITED STATES WAS A COPY OF A LETTER DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1967 AND SENT TO MARIANO'S BROTHER RENE SATOS FROM J.A. MORALES, THE PRESIDENT OF THE 2506 ASSAULT BRIGADE ASSOCIATION. RENE SANTOS LIVES IN HACKENSACK, N.J. THIS LETTER ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF A LETTER FROM RENE REQUESTING THAT ALL CHECKS FOR HIS MOTHER, CLARA MOLINA, NOW BEING SENT TO CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS BE SUSPENDED AND THAT HIS MOTHER WOULD "WITHIN SEVERAL MONTHS" BE ARRIVING IN THE UNITED STATES. MORALES' LETTER ADVISED RENE TO WRITE TO THE AMTIKI-1 ADDRESS, WHICH HE PROVIDED AND MAKE THE SAME REQUEST. HE FURTHER ADVISED RENE THAT HE SHOULD PROVIDE THE AMTIKI-1 ADDRESS ADDITIONAL BIO DATA ON MARIANO AND HIS MOTHER AND FATHER.

D. AMTIKI-1 RECEIVED A LETTER DATED 19 SEPYEMBER 1967 FROM RENE SANTOS STATING WHO HE WAS AND THAT HIS MOTHER CLARA MOLINA WOULD "WITHIN SEVERAL MONTHS". BE ARRIVING IN THE UNITED STATES VIA SPAIN. ENCLOSED WITH THE LETTER WAS A COPY OF MORALES LETTER (C ABOVE), MARIANO'S BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND PICTURE.

E. AMTIKI-1 REPLIED AT JMWAVE'S REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGING RECIEPT OF RENE'S LETTER AND ENCLOSURES AND ADVISED RENE THAT PAYMENTS TO THE TRUSTEE, CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS, HAD BEEN TERMINATED (NO DATE GIVEN) AND THAT MRS. CLARA MOLINA CABRERA SHOULD NOTIFY HIS OFFICE BY MAIL UPON HER ARRIVAL IN THE U.S.

F. AMTIKI-1 RECEIVED A LETTER FROM MRS. CLARA MOLINA CABRERA DATED 2 JUNE 1968 STATING THAT SHE WAS NOW IN THE U.S. AND DESIRES TO DISCUSS MARIANOS' CASE.

G. AMTIKI-1 REPLIED ASKING MRS. CLARA MOLINA TO FORWARD ANY DOCUMENTS THAT SHE MIGHT HAVE TO IDENTIFY HER AS THE MOTHER OF MARIANO SANTOS MOLINA. MRS. MOLINA REPLIED IN A LETTER DATED 4 JULY 1968 ENCLOSING HER BIRTH CERTIFICATE,

R

PHOTOGRAPH AND PASSPORT NUMBER. MRS. MOLINA ALSO INFORMED AMTIKI-1 THAT HER HUSBAND AND THE FATHER OF MARIANO SANTOS MOLINA HAD DIED 25 FEBRUARY 1962.

2. AMTIKI-1 ON 23 JULY 1968 COMPLETED A BREAKDOWN OF THE ACCOUNT SHOWING THE AMOUNT IN THE BANK WHICH IS SHOWN IN PARAGRAPH 1 B ABOVE, THE AMOUNT PAID TO THE ORIGINAL TRUSTEE WHICH IS $2,925.00 AND THE AMOUNT DUE MRS. CLARA MOLINA. SINCE MRS. MOLINA'S HUSBAND DIED PRIOR TO AMTIKI-1 TAKING OVER AS TRUSTEE, THE PAYMENTS DURING AMTIKI-1'S TRUSTEESHIP SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT THE RATE OF $175.00 PER MONTH INSTEAD OF THE $225.00. MAY 1962 THROUGH JULY 1968 (75 MONTHS) AT $175.00 PER MONTH AMOUNTS TO $13,125.00 AND AS NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 1 B ABOVE THE ACCOUNT CONTAINS $13,905.57.

3. JMWAVE PLANS TO HAVE AMTIKI-1 WITHDRAW THIS ACCOUNT AND PURCHASE A CASHIER'S CHECK FOR MRS. MOLINA FOR THE TOTAL AMOUNT DUE ($13,125.00) AND PASS THE BALANCE OF $780.57 TO THE JMWAVE FINANCE OFFICER. FOLLOWING THIS AND BEGINNING WITH THE AUGUST 1968 PAYMENT AMIKI-1 WILL FORWARD A CHECK FOR $175.00 EACH MONTH TO MRS. CLARA MOLINA IN THE SAME MANNER AS OTHER BRIGADE DEPENDENTS. JMWAVE PLANS TO HAVE AMTIKI-1 PROVIDE MRS. MOLINA WITH THE NAME OF THE ORIGINAL TRUSTEE AND THE AMOUNT PAID TO HIM WITH REGRETS THAT HE CANNOT ASSIST HER IN THIS MATTER. WE ALSO PALN TO HAVE AMTIK-1 EXPLAIN THE METHOD OF COMPUTING THE $13,125.00 TOTAL ($175.00 PER MONTH FOR 75 MONTHS). WE DO NOT PLAN TO RAISE THE POINT OF EARNED INTEREST. WE BELIEVE THAT WOFIRM WOULD HAVE COMPLETELY FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATION TO MRS. MOLINA BY THE ABOVE PAYMENT PLUS HER MONTHLY PAYMENTS TO FOLLOW. PLEASE CONCUR IN THIS PARAGRAPH BY CABLE.

FREDERICK J. INGHURST

S

C

R E T TELEPOUCH UFGT -22352 PAGE FOUR
DISTRIBUTION
VIA TELEPOUCH
1 - CHIEF/WHD
1 - WH/COG
S E C R E T TELEPOUCH UFGT-22352 PAGE FOUR
BT

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

ORIG: N. GRATZ:igh
UNIT: WH/COG/SA
EXT: 4163/1325
DATE: 12 JULY 68

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2 EV
4 PP
5
6
AMBUD
NANCY
CG

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG-8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH-8, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, OGC-2 RI/AN, MPS/BSG-2, CCS-2, CSPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 15227

12 16 16z JUL 68

TO JMWAVE INFO JMCOBRA

TYPIC AMBUD MHMUTUAL

REF: JMWAVE 3051 (IN 47521)*

PROPOSED GERRITY TRIP TEMPORARILY DELAYED. WILL ADVISE FIRM DATE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG Comment: *Re proposed trip Mr. Marvin Evans to JMWAVE to review AMTIKI records of AMBUD dependency cases.

OGC Mr. Morrisey (telecon)

Paul E Oberst
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Paul E Oberst
DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY Z PER ______ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

WH/COG 8

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, RI/AN, OGC, MPS/BG 3, CCS 2, CSPS, OP 2

SECRET 101502Z JUL 68 CITE JMWAVE 3051 10 JUL 68 IN 47521

Z

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD MHMUTUAL

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 14684

SUGGEST ANGUS L. GERRITY TRAVEL AT HIS CONVENIENCE ANY TIME WEEK OF 15 JULY. PLEASE ADVISE ARRIVAL TIME AND IF GERRITY WISHES TO BE MET.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ORIG: N. GRATZ
UNIT: WH/COG/SA
EXT: 4163/1325
DATE: 9 JULY 68

OPS | OS
DV | TC
PP | SS
RR |
SA | COG REG

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 32 PER

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, RI/AN, OGC 2, MPS/BG 2, CCS 2, CS PS,

SECRET

09 18 55z JUL 68

CITE DIRECTOR NANCYE

14684

TO JMWAVE INFO JMCOBRA

TYPIC AMBUD MHMUTUAL

REQUEST ADVISE PRIORITY MOST CONVENIENT DATE FOR ANGUS L. GERRITY TRAVEL JMWAVE FOR CONFERENCE WITH FREDERICK L. INGHURST RE REVIEW AMTIKI FILES. IN VIEW INGHURST IMMINENT DEPARTURE FROM STATION GERRITY SUGGESTS CONFERENCE BE ARRANGED ASAP.

Robt. Moore

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/SA Mr. Ortman (draft)

OGC---Mr. Morrissey (telecon)

Paul E. Oberst
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Paul E. Oberst
for DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	✓	10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-134-25/6

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/COG/CP BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG N Conetz

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR. WH8, C/OA, MPS/BG2

WAVE

S E C R E T 242102Z JUN 68 CITE JMWAVE 2912 24 Jun 68 IN 37195

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD AMTIKI

AN ✓ E	PI	
PB	DEST	wh/ops
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX -	

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 10200

LAST AMTIKI MONTHLY ACCOUNTING FORWARD VIA T/M 178709 JMPIGEON FLIGHT 6/25/68.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

19-124-25/6
24 June 1968

ORIG: NGrats:fil
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R-1325
DATE: 21 June 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

S-E-C-R-E-T 34

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 41 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR , WH8, ~~[illegible]~~/OG2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

21 20 16z Jun 68

CITE DIRECTOR 10200

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD AMTIKI

COPY LAST AMTIKI MONTHLY ACCOUNTING URGENTLY REQUIRED FOR PROJECT OUTLINE. PLEASE FORWARD IN NEXT JMPIGEON POUCH.

END OF MESSAGE

for Paul E Oberst
William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

for WH/COG/OPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Paul E Oberst
for David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO- UFGW-7076

FILE NO- 19-124-25/6

DATE - 27 MAY 1968

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJ - CTYPIC/AMBUD/MHMUTUAL AMBUD DEPENDENCY PAYMENTS

ACTION - SEE BELOW

REFS - DIR-00211

1. MHMUTUAL HAS AGREED TO TAKE OVER ADMINISTRATION OF THE AMBUD BENEFITS CASES. HOWEVER, PENDING DECISIONS RELATIVE TO THE NUMBER OF CASES THAT SUBSEQUENTLY WILL BE TURNED OVER TO BEC, HEADQUARTERS FEELS THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE PRESENT METHOD OF PAYMENTS /VIA AMTIKI/.

2. IN VIEW OF THE PROBABILITY THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH BEC WILL NOT BE CONCLUDED BEFORE 1 JULY 1968, THE JMWAVE FINANCE OFFICER SHOULD CONTINUE TO FUND THE AMBUD PAYMENTS THROUGH AMTIKI DURING THIS INTERIM PERIOD. FY-1969 FUNDS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR AS LONG AS REQUIRED.

3. THIS MATTER HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH AND CONCURRED IN BY COS, JMCOBRA. PLEASE PASS A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE TO JMCOBRA.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

CS COPY

DISTRIBUTION /BY TAPE/

3- COS, JMWAVE

Originated by: Nancye Gratz
Coordinated by: OGC/MHMUTUAL (Mr. Block) (telecon)
Released by: C/WH/COG Paul Oberst

Distribution:
1. C/WH/COG
2. WH/COG/OPS
3. Originator
4. WH/COG/ESEC

SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGW-7076 PAGE 1

MB

KB	[redacted]	WHC/OPS
[redacted]	[redacted]	
	[redacted]	

19-124-25/6

14-00000

11744

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 3 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY — WH/COG/OPS

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 19-124-25/6

X-REF TO FILE NO ~~[illegible]~~

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO [illegible] BRANCH ☒ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY: 15 PER ______

ACTION
WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

FILE VR, WH 8, OGC 2, MPS/BG 2, DDP, ADDP, CSDO, DO 4, WAVE

S E C R E T 201425Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2440

20 MAY 68 IN 14464

DIRECTOR

AMBUD MHMUTUAL

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 00211

AN 6	FI 2	
PS	DEST	WH/COG PP
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

FORWARDED VIA T/M 070343 JMPIGEON FLIGHT 21 MAY IS LIST OF AMBUD DEPENDENCY CASES, INCLUDING AMOUNTS PAID, MAILING ADDRESSES, AND NAMES OF TRUSTEES, REQUESTED IN REF.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

19-124-25/6
20 March 1968

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE 783

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD
Transmittal of Documentation - Dependency Case #3

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-7040, 29 April 1968

As requested in reference, attached are the birth certificates and the marriage certificate relating to AMBUD Dependency Case #3, Bonito BLANCO Cruz (201-283944).

Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachments:
As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/atts

MAY 15 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-21898

DATE
10 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

ORIG: NANCYE GRATZ:jaf
UNIT: WH/COG/EXO
EXT: 7447
DATE: 15 MAY 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

OPS	7 OS
EW	8 TC
DP	10 SS
WH/EXO	WH/CO
RR	
SA	COG REG

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, OEC 2, MPS/BG 2, DDP, ADDP, CCS 2, CSPS, DO 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 15 23 41 Z CITE DIRECTOR 00211

TO JMWAVE

AMBUD MHMUTUAL

1. HQS PROPOSES TURNOVER ADMINISTRATION AMBUD CASES TO MHMUTUAL IN NEAR FUTURE. IN ORDER ESTABLISH PAYMENT MECHANISM JMWAVE IS REQUESTED HAVE AMTIKI PREPARE LIST DEPENDENTS PRESENTLY PAID, AMOUNTS PAID, AND CURRENT MAILING ADDRESSES FOR CHECKS. NAMES OF TRUSTEES SHOULD ALSO BE INDICATED WHERE APPLICABLE. THIS INFO URGENTLY REQUIRED.

2. ABOVE INFO FOR JMWAVE ONLY. WHEN PROCEDURES PROPOSED MHMUTUAL HANDLING COMPLETED JMWAVE WILL BE ADVISED. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BRIEFING AMTIKI ON CHANGE WILL ALSO BE MADE.

END OF MESSAGE

AM KB ~~24~~		WHC/CPS
~~FS~~	~~SEDP~~	
ABSTRACT ☒		

mp

OGC/MR. GREANEY (BY TELECON)

Thomas Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Paul E Oberst
for DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

15 May 68
19-124-25/4

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
AMTRIGON-8 (201-283995), AMBUD Case #97

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-7040, 29 April 1968

1. AMTRIGON-8 was a member of the VILLARO crew. During May 1962 he clandestinely and without authorization boarded an infiltration craft moments before its departure on an operational mission. His absence was not discovered until the team had infiltrated and moved into its first position.

2. On 8 or 9 June 1962 the infiltration team, including AMTRIGON-8, became engaged in a firefight with a militia patrol. AMTRIGON-2, the team leader, reported that AMTRIGON-8 had been wounded and that he assumed AMTRIGON-8 was killed or perhaps captured. However, no further word has been heard from AMTRIGON-8 and he is presumed to be dead.

3. Taking into consideration that the disposition of this case could have an affect on the morale of the other crew members and their attitude toward WOFIRM, it was decided to advise the widow of AMTRIGON-8 that he died a hero's death while fighting for the liberation of his country and to continue monthly payments to the widow and children for an indefinite period. Inclusion of Subject's name on AMBUD Hero & Martyr rolls was deemed to be the most suitable and expeditious manner in which to handle such payments.

4. The response to paragraph 2 of reference will be the subject of a separate dispatch.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-283995

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-30051

DATE
10 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
201-283995

Nevey [illegible]

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 2 2 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ~~[illegible]~~ 19-124-25/6 ✓

X-REF. TO FILE NO ______ [illegible]

DISSEM BY 5 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/CCE/[illegible] BRANCH ☒ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE. VR. WH 8 C/1A MPS/BG2

WAVE

S E C R E T 101341Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2351

10 MAY 68 IN 08155

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: DIRECTOR 97425

PLEASE SEE UFGT-21810 DATED 28 APRIL 68.

S E C R E T

BT

AH 4 E	[illegible]	
~~PS~~	[illegible]	
ABSTRACT	X	[illegible] ~~INDEX~~

SECRET

19-124-25/6
10 May 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

ORIG: NANCYE GRATZ:pld
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R9008
DATE: 7 MAY 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	7	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 1 PER #
CONF: WH/COG 4 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO 0 BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
INFO: FILE, VR WH 8, C/OA

OS
C
CS
PP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET My 7 17 48 Z

COG REG

CITE DIRECTOR 97426

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: UFGW 7040*

Nancye

PLEASE REPLY REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENTS: JMWAVE requested to provide additional information on two AMBUD dependency cases in order complete BEC documentation.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/WH/COG/OPS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD
AMBUD Trust Accounts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

Reference: UFGW-7020, 11 April 1968

1. ANTIKI-1 has advised that he does not envisage any problems in closing out the trust accounts. However, since the bank holding the deposits is relatively small, it was agreed to accomplish the closing out of accounts over a period of several months. To this end, the accounts pertaining to cases #116 (Justo MONTES DE OCA Ceballos) and #114 (Francisco FERNANDEZ Cabrera) have already been closed out and the funds will be transferred to Headquarters in the near future.

2. Being forwarded under separate cover is the background information on the ten trust accounts as requested in reference.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachment:
As stated para 2, u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-21810

[illegible]

DATE
MAY - 2 1968
28 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphore Division

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational/AMBUD
Request for Additional Information on Two AMBUD Dependency Cases

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: See Paragraph 1

1. It is requested that Raymond K. PANUSES recheck the file of Miguel Los Santos DELGADO Martinez (Case No. 97) in an effort to determine the cause and actual date of his death. Headquarters file does not reflect this information nor the reason why his dependents are paid under the AMBUD program. In those few cases of former active assets whose dependents are paid by AMTIKI, the exact date and circumstance of death is necessary for documentation.

2. It is also requested that AMTIKI be queried regarding certain vital documents which should be in the file of Benito BLANCO Cruz (Case No. 3). A copy of a letter from the widow, dated 11 January 1962, indicated that her marriage certificate and the birth certificates of her children were enclosed with the letter. It is possible, but unlikely, these documents were overlooked when the file was recently reviewed. In any event, the work check sheet used by the documentation team indicates these documents were missing from the file.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
3-COS,JMWAVE

29 APR [illegible]

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-7040	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	19-124-25/6

22 April 1968

Distribution:
1-RID
1-WH/REG/C
1-WH/COG/OPS
1-Originator

KB

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	EXT
WH/COG/OPS	Nancye Gratz:jaf	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/OPS		Arthur T. Kamm

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG	4/24/68	David A. Phillips

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE F.J.

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Adjustment of Dependency Payments - Third Quarter FY 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The following financial adjustments to AMBUD dependency cases were made during the period covered by this report:

Case #90: Guillermo GUIM Gutierrez (no 201 nr.)
Payee: Herminia CANTERO (widow)

Effective 1 March 1968 the monthly payment for this case was reduced to $225.00 inasmuch as the son, Guillermo GUIM Cantero, reached 21 years of age.

Case #42: Ramon MOREJON Hernandez (201-289511)
Payee: Carmelina AENELLE (grandmother)

The payee's daughter returned the January 1968 payment to AMTIKI-1 with a note advising that the payee passed away in December 1967. Since the payee was the sole dependent designated by the Subject, no further payments will be made in connection with this case.

2. Subsistence payments made to Rafael ORTEGA Hernandez (201-299101), AMBUD medical case, were terminated with the January 1968 payment. ORTEGA was advised that this would not affect medical treatment expenses and that medical expenses will continue to be paid as in the past until further notice.

3. Per Headquarters instructions, the monthly payment to the Brigade office was reduced from $800.00 to $500.00 effective with the payment for March 1968 and following the April 1968 payment, all financial support will cease.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-29935	DATE APR 23 1968 18 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief of Station, JMWAVE
INFO	
FROM	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
SUBJECT	TYPIC/AMBUD AMBUD Trustee Accounts
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

Reference: UFGT-21580, dated 25 March 1968

1. Headquarters recommends that all reference accounts, with the possible exception of the PASTRANA account (Case #118), be closed immediately and the proceeds transferred to Headquarters.

2. It is suggested that AMTIKI be queried concerning any possible embarrassment he might suffer in his personal relationship with the bank if he summarily closes all the accounts, since there is no wish to place him in an untenable position. Headquarters is aware that those so-called trust accounts are actually savings accounts and were so designated on the 1967 bank statements filed in the AMTIKI files. Under the circumstances, it is highly possible that an IRS inquiry may be initiated after the accounts are withdrawn and AMTIKI should be assured of Headquarters intercession in his behalf if he is questioned by IRS. However, in the event of such an inquiry, Headquarters must be prepared to submit a full accounting of those cases including dates and amounts of deposits and withdrawals and WOFIRM authorization for transactions which JMWAVE should be able to provide. It is recommended that AMTIKI immediately prepare a full background history relating to the opening of each account, all financial transactions since the accounts were opened, and references to JMWAVE authorization for any deposits and withdrawals. These accountings should be forwarded for Headquarters files as soon as they are completed. When AMTIKI is authorized to close the accounts, a memorandum covering the authorization should be prepared by JMWAVE and a copy forwarded to Headquarters.

3. In the event above recommendations tend to create any insurmountable problems JMWAVE is requested to advise the nature of the problems and submit alternate recommendations.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
3-COS, JMWAVE

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-7020	11 APR 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	19-124-25/6

9 April 1968

Distribution:
1-RID
1-WH/REG/C
1-WH/COG/OPS
1-Originator
1-WH/B&F
1-OCG

AN KB ~~RI~~
~~DS~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/OPS	Nancye Gratz:jaf		

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/B&F		Mr. Want (Coord in draft)
OCG		Mr. Bladergroen (Coord by phone)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG	4/9/68	for David A. Phillips

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
AMBUD Dependency Case #64, Ovidio CAMEJO Lopez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

1. The monthly payment made to the dependents of Ovidio CAMEJO Lopez was reduced by $25.00 effective 1 April 1968 inasmuch as Station and AMTIKI-1 files indicated that Subject's son, Miguel Angel CAMEJO Rojas, had reached 21 years of age on 11 March 1968.

2. Upon being informed of the payment reduction, Subject's widow, Blanca ROJAS, advised AMTIKI-1 by letter that the correct birth date of her son is 11 March 1948 and not 11 March 1947.. Subsequently, the widow provided a photostatic copy of her son's INS-issued residence card (copy attached) which records his birth date as 11 March 1948.

3. Accordingly, AMTIKI-1 has been instructed to reinstate the $25.00 sum retroactive to 1 April 1968.

Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachment:
3 copies of residence card, h/w

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/att. h/w

1, [illegible] filed 201-file
1 copy photostat retained [illegible] BEC documentation

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-29867

DATE
9 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-297129
19-124-25/6

RECEIPT 5 April 1968

RECEIVED FROM NANCYE GRATZ, WH/COG, THREE CHECKS FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR FOLLOWING BEC EMPLOYEES.

PAYEE	AMOUNT
Mrs. Jeanne BROCKIE	$121.50
Mr. James Frank HEFTON	169.80
Mr. Wilfred HARREN	166.25

Ben DeFelice
DD/Pers/SP

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION		1 · 6 2 · 7 3 · 8 4 · 9 5 · 10
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		
BY: ______ AT: ______ Z	INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 19-124-25/6 X-REF TO FILE NO ______		
DISSEM BY 15 PER ______	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/CC6 BRANCH ☒ DESTROY ☐ SIG.		
ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY	INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, ~~CI~~, CI/OPS, CI/OA		

C424

S E C R E T 031840Z APR 68 CITE CARACAS 9294 (LYNER ACTING)

3 APR 68 IN 64285

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD CIMOTIF-1

REF DIRECTOR 38286

AN	FI	
RS	DEST	Cimelops
ABSTRACT ✓		INDEX

CIMOTIF CO ABSENT IN WOLADY ON EMERGENCY LEAVE. PREFER AWAIT HIS RETURN TO RAISE FACT THAT CIMOTIF-1 AND WIDOW HAVE SAME MATRONYMIC RATHER THAN QUERY THROUGH INTERIM CO. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

19-124-25/6
3 April 1968

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AMBUD Trustee Accounts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. UFGA-29508
B. UFGA-29614
C. JMWAVE-1613
D. DIR 83308

1. AMTIKI-1 has contacted the bank regarding the Social Security numbers requested and has been advised that, although the bank is not obligated to insist upon Social Security or other identifying numbers for these accounts, it does feel that AMTIKI-1 may ultimately be subjected to an inquiry from the Internal Revenue Service. Their reasoning is based primarily upon the fact that the accounts, while trust accounts for our purposes, are not true trust accounts in that no trust agreements are of record at the bank. (Trust agreements could not be signed, of course, since the individuals were not and are not available to sign.)

2. In order to protect AMTIKI-1 from any possible IRS investigation and, rather than pursue the matter further with the bank, for which we have no cleared contact, it is suggested that these accounts be closed out over a two or three month period and re-established at Headquarters through the appropriate DTEARN channels. If the accounts remain here, it will be necessary to prepare new signature cards for each account removing Humphrey O. TIMANUS as a signatory and adding a JMCOBRA asset as an "inside" trustee for control purposes, or to remove AMTIKI-1 entirely and establish the JMCOBRA asset as the sole trustee.

3. Please advise.

Leonard R. Stallans
Leonard R. STALLANS

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WH Division

[illegible]

DATE TYPED
25 Mar, 68

DATE DISPATCHED
MA[illegible] 196

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-21580

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 35/21 PER

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

ASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES (21)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 19-124-25

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET TO WH/COG BRANCH ☒ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE. VR. WH 8, CI, CI/OA

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CARA 4

S E C R E T 272210Z MAR 68 CITE CARACAS 9227

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 27 MAR 68 IN 70296

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: HVCA-15247

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

PLS ADVISE STATUS OF REF CASE. STATION QUERY BASED ON FACT CIMOTIF-1 NOT WILLING ACCEPT MARCH SALARY SINCE HE PREFERS IT GO TO SUBJECT OF REF. SHOULD HQS FORESEE INVESTIGATION OF REF CASE WILLTAKE LONG TIME, STATION WOULD APPRECIAE HQS COMMENTS RE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUGGESTION POSED BY CIMOTIF-1 IN PARA 3 REF.

S E C R E T

BT

19-124-25/6
27 March 1968

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

ORIG: Paul E. Oberst:jls
UNIT: WH/COG/EXO
EXT: 7451
DATE: 15 March 1968

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

OPS	OS
EW	TC
PP	COG/EXO
RR	
SA	CO REG

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WHP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 15 2 37 Z CITE DIRECTOR 33308

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD LCDATA

REF: JMWAVE 1613 (IN 67990)*

DTEARN ADVISES THAT TRUSTEE SHOULD GO TO BANK AND CERTIFY THAT INDIVIDUALS ARE FOREIGN NATIONALS WHICH SHOULD SOLVE PROBLEM. ADVISE IF FURTHER ASSISTANCE NEEDED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Asked Hqs advice re handling of AMBUD trust accounts.

OGC (Mr. Bladergroen by phone)
C/WH/B&F

William V. Broe
Chief, WHD

for Paul E. Oberst
David A. Phillips
Chief, WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHERS THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER ______

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-25/6

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/COG BRANCH ☒ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, OGC 2, OF 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 112056Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1613 11 Mar 68 IN 67990

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD LCDATA

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	[illegible]
ABSTRACT		INDEX

REFS: UFGW 6934
UFGA 29508
UFGA 29614

1. STATION WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY. STATION SUGGESTS AS POSSIBLE REMEDY THESE ACCOUNTS BE CLOSED AND TRANSFERRED TO ZRMETAL BANK.

2. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS THIS SUBJECT.

SECRET

BT

19-124-25/6
11 March 1968

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-283964

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

L.N/CIC

[redacted] 2Y

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET /2

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/C/A 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI/OA, CI/OPS

AN	FI	
FS	PEST	
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

S E C R E T 082143Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1596 WAVE

6 MAR 68 IN 66944

1P

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD AMOTIN AMACTION

REF: UFGW 6947

IN REPLY REF PARA 2 AMOTIN-1 ADVISES THAT FILES CONTAIN COPIES BASIC LIMITED PHS RECRUITING DATA ON BRIGADE MEMBERS. THEY DO NOT INCLUDE BIRTH OR MARRIAGE CERTIFICATES. IN SOME CASES NUMBER DEPENDENTS INDICATED AND IN OTHER CASES NAMES OF DEPENDENTS,

MOST LACKING BIRTHDATES.

S E C R E T

SECRET

MICROFILMED
APR 25 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

19.201.283964

19.124.26/6
8 march 1968

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 11 TOTAL COPIES 24
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY: ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY: AT:
DISSEM BY 15 PER
ACTION WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY
INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-25/6
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/COG BRANCH ☑ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
INFO.
FILE. VR. WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

WAVE

SECRET 021602Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1586

8 Mar 68 IN 66649

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR 20924

WILL MEET AND ACCOMMODATE.

SECRET

BT

AN	YI	WH/C/OPS
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT ✓		INDEX

SECRET

19-124-25/6
8 march 1968

N. Gratz

ORIG: NANCYE GRATZ:jaf
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7447
DATE: 7 MAR 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	OPS	6	OS
2		7	TC
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. SA COG REG

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR WH 8, CA 2, CS/S

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 80942

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 80640*

B. UFGT 21376**

1. REF A TEAM ETA 1408 HRS 10 MARCH. NATL FLT 115. APPRECIATE THEIR BEING MET AND ACCOMMODATED IF POSSIBLE.

2. MARGANY WILL HANDCARRY LASER FUNDS REQUESTED REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

COG COMMENTS: *Advising 2 staffers and 3 BEC employees arriving 10 March to document AMBUD dependency cases.

**Requested $40,000 attribution for LASER funding.

AC/WH/COG/OPS

WH/COG/SA

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD
Transmittal of Forms

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference:

Attached herewith are special forms to be used by reference AMBUD documentation team.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

Attachment: h/w
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE W/Att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER S UFGW-10366	DATE 7 MAR 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

Distribution:
1 - WH/SS
1 - WH/SA
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - WH/COG/ESEC
1 - RI/DP

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	Nancye Gratz	ak	3/6/68	Red 9008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/COG/OPS	3/6/68	
~~C/WH/SA~~		
C/WH/SUPPORT	6 Mar 68	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
for C/WH/COG	3/6/68	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG 1-66 (40)

DISPATCH

Nancy Gratz

ORIG: NANCY GRATZ:nk
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS/EXO
EXT: 7447 R. 9008
DATE: 6 MARCH 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3	EW	8	
4		9	
5	DP	10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 26 PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

RR
SA
COG/EXO
COG REG

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR, WH 8, OPS, CCS 3, CSPS, COGS 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 7 0 20 Z CITE DIRECTOR 80630

TO ~~PRIORITY~~ JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

1. THREE MEMBERS IDEN A GROUP, ELLEN F. MARGANY AND IDEN B PLAN ARRIVE JMWAVE SUNDAY, 10 MARCH, TO DOCUMENT AMBUD DEPENDENCY CASES.

2. CAN JMWAVE PROVIDE ACCOMODATIONS SUITABLE FOR BOTH LIVING QUARTERS AND WORK AREA FOR TEAM? ADEQUATE CLERICAL AND TRANSLATOR SUPPORT ALSO REQUIRED.

3. WILL ADVISE ETA.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/COG/OPS
~~C/WH/COG/SA~~

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/DBS (Mr. DeFelice - Telecon)

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

2	CIS	7	OS
3		8	
4	EW	9	TC
5	PP	10	

RR
SA
COG/EXO
COG/REG

ORIG: NANCY GRATZ:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/EXO
EXT: 7447 R. 9008
DATE: 6 MARCH 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ZC PER ____ #____
CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, ~~DDP~~, CCS 3, CSPS

LOGS 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 7 00 20 Z CITE DIRECTOR 80640

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: DIRECTOR 80639

IDEN A: BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION

IDEN B: JOHN P. LITTLEJOHN, PERSONNEL BENEFITS AND SERVICES STAFFER.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/COG/OPS William J. Murray Jr.

C/WH/COG/SA ____

C/DBS Mr. DeFelice - Telecoord

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET TELEPOUCH

28

DISP NO- UFGW-6947
FILE NO- 19-125-24/6
DATE - 4 MARCH 1968
INDEX - NONE
FILE - NONE
TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE
INFO - NONE
FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
SUBJ - TYPIC/AMBUD/AMOTIN/AMACTION.
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON AMACTION/1 BRIGADE FILES
ACTION - SEE BELOW
REFS - UFGA-29430 DATED 2 FEBRUARY 1968

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 29 1972
MICROFILMED

1. THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH BEC TO TAKE OVER FUNDING OF THE AMBUD DEPENDENCY CASES APPEAR TO BE REACHING A FAVORABLE DECISION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. IN THE EVENT BEC AGREES TO HANDLE THESE PAYMENTS, EACH DEPENDENCY CASE MUST BE DOCUMENTED BY BEC TO DETERMINE IF THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED QUALIFY FOR COMPENSATION UNDER BEC CRITERIA. THE MAJORITY OF THE REQUIRED DATA IS AVAILABLE IN AMTIKI'S FILES BUT THERE MAY BE ADDITIONAL MATERIAL IN THE BRIGADE FILES MAINTAINED BY AMACTION/1.

2. ACCORDING TO PARAGRAPH 4 /B/ OF REFERENCE, THE AMACTION FILES ARE THOSE ORIGINALLY PREPARED BY AMOTIN/1 WHICH WERE TURNED OVER TO AMACTION BY AMTIKI. IT SHOULD BE DETERMINED IF SUBJECT FILES CONTAIN ANY VITAL DOCUMENTS SUCH AS MARRIAGE CERTIFICATES, BIRTH CERTIFICATES, ETC., AND PERSONALITY DATA ON AMBUD DEPENDENTS, WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL IN DOCUMENTING THESE CASES. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE AMACTION FILES ARE MERELY DUPLICATES OF THOSE HELD BY AMTIKI. HEADQUARTERS CONSIDERS IT PREFERABLE AT THIS TIME TO EXPLORE THE CONTENTS OF THESE FILES THROUGH AMOTIN/1,

AB	PD	
	BEST	
ABSTRACT X		~~INDEX~~

Remove from ~~Project~~ Subj
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 12-258/25
Box: 2 Fold: 4

19-124-25/6
~~19-125-24/6~~

D-19-125-24/6

RATHER THAN AMACTION/1. IF JMWAVE CONSIDERS THIS FEASIBLE IT IS REQUESTED THAT AMOTIN/1 BE QUERIED CONCERNING THE TYPE OF MATERIAL IN THE FILES WITHOUT REVEALING THE REASON FOR OUR INTERESTS.

3. PLEASE ADVISE THE SUBSTANCE OF INFORMATION THAT MAY BE OBTAINED FROM AMOTIN/1 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ELLEN F. MARGARY

DISTRIBUTION

3 - COS, JMWAVE /BY TAPE/

Originated by: **Nancy Gratz,**
WH/COG/OPS X7447

Coordinated by: **AC/WH/COG/OPS**

Hqs. Distribution:

1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - WH/COG/ESEC
1 - C/WH/COG
1- RI/Files

Released by: **C/WH/COG**

19-124-25/6

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 24 PER

INDEX ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 19-124-25/6

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET TO WH/CG BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH/CG-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, MPS/BG-2, FI

ABSTRACT ✗ INDEX ✗

S E C R E T 012217Z MAR 68 CITE CARACAS 9043

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

CIMOTIF TYPIC

1 MAR 68 IN 62970

1. ~~IN~~ RECENT 15 TO 20 FEB PERSONAL TRIP TO JMWAVE AREA, CIMOTIF-1 MET TERESA SUAREZ WHO OLD FRIEND AND WIDOW OF IDEN A. ACCORDING SUAREZ IDEN A EXECUTED IN PBRUMEN AROUND AUG 61 WHILE ON OP FOR WOFIRM. AS A RESULT SHE AND SEVEN-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER NOW RECEIVING 100-DOLLAR-MONTHLY PENSION FROM IDEN B WHICH SHE STATES NOT ACCORDING TO TERMS OF AGREEMENT WORKED OUT BY IDEN A AND WOFIRM REPRESENTATIVE IN EARLY 1960. SUAREZ STATES AMOUNT SHOULD BE 300 DOLLARS MONTHLY.

2. ALTHOUGH CIMOTIF-1 DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER IDEN A EVER WORKED FOR WOFIRM OR WHAT TERMS OF AGREEMENT WERE IF IDEN A DID, HE STILL GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT SUBSISTENCE OF SUAREZ AND DAUGHTER ON 100-DOLLAR-MONTHLY PENSION. CIMOTIF-1 FEELS RESPONSIBILITY TO THEM BECAUSE HE STATES HE RECOMMENDED IDEN A TO WOFIRM OFFICER IN EARLY 1960.

3. CIMOTIF-1 IN PROCESS OF WRITING DETAILED REPORT ON WHAT HE REMEMBERS ABOUT CASE. HE DOES REMEMBER IDEN A JOINED FORCES WITH IDEN C IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH OP. STATION WILL

MICROFILMED
1968
MICRO. SER.

19-124-25/6
1 March 1968

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: APR 16 AT 2 13 PM '68

DISSEM BY: RECEIVED RID/EDI

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19 11 27 AM '68

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO

BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9043 SECRET

POUCH WHEN RECEIVED. MEANWHILE WOULD APPRECIATE HQS AND JMWAVE CHECK INTO CASE. STATION WOULD LIKE ALLEVIATE CIMOTIF-1 CONCERN THIS CASE ASAP SINCE HE ONE OF STATION KEY ASSETS.

4. JMWAVE; CIMOTIF-1 WAS FORMERLY AMGIRAFFE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F

TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

2d [illegible]

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, MPS/BG-2

IN 62078

SECRET 012219Z MAR 68 CITE CARACAS 9044

CACA

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

CIMOTIF TYPIC

REF: CARACAS 9243 (IN 62070)

IDEN A: (MAJOR) JESUS CARRERAS

IDEN B: HEROES Y MARTIRES FUND

IDEN C: COMANDANTE MORGAN.

SECRET

[illegible] executed in Cuba [illegible] August 1961. ([illegible] CACA 9043)

ABSTRACT X INDEX ✓

M IP

SECRET

MICROFILMED
APR 23 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

[illegible]
1 March 1968

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-29614

FILE NO - 19-124-25/6

DATE - 29 FEBRUARY 1968

INDEX - NONE

FILM - ,9,3

59 - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
AMBUD DEPENDENTS TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS

REFS - A. UFGW-6934
B. UFGA-29508

1. THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE KEYED T PARA 1, REF A -

A. COCONUT GROVE BANK, 2701 S. BAYSHORE DRIVE, MIAMI, FLA. WITH UNCLEARED BANK OFFICIALS.

B. /1/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. PABLO HUGO ROJAS AND/OR ESPERANZA ALONSO /ACCOUNT NUMBER 20237/

/2/ JUAN PAUL I.T.F. MERCEDES RODRIGUEZ /ACCOUNT NUMBER 22304/

/3/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. FRANCISCO I. FERNANDEZ AND/OR VIRGILIA CABRERA /ACCOUNT NUMBER 20192/

/4/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. ANASTASO GONZALEZ AND/OR RAMONA LEON /ACCOUNT NUMBER 22307/

/5/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. JUSTO MONTES DE OCA AND/OR SIXTA CEBALLOS /ACCOUNT NUMBER 20194/

/6/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. CATALINA PUIG /ACCOUNT NUMBER 22306/

/7/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. ANGEL PASTRANA AND/OR MARIA CERNUDA /ACCOUNT NUMBER 20518/

/8/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. AIDA MORALES /ACCOUNT NUMBER 22305/

N

SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29614 PAGE ONE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

/9/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. OLGA SANCHEZ /ACCOUNT NUMBER 22864/

/10/ NO REQUEST RECEIVED FOR ACCOUNT NUMBER 21020 - JUAN PAULA I.T.F. MARIANO SANTOS AND/OR JUAN SANTOS.

C. TRUSTEE ACCOUNTS

D. JUAN PAULA

E. REQUESTS WERE MADE IN FORM LETTERS - NO REASON GIVEN FOR BANK HAVING DELAYED REQUEST.

2. HEADQUARTERS ASSUMPTION THAT JUAN PAULA TOOK OVER TRUSTEESHIP FROM ORIGINAL TRUSTEES IS CORRECT. NO PAYMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO ANY OF THE TRUSTEE ACCOUNTS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1965. CUSTODIANS OF ACCOUNTS ARE HUMPHREY O. TIMANUS /P/, JUAN PAULA, AND MARIO GIRBAU. STALLANS WAS NOT ADDED NOR JUAN PAULA AND MARIO GIRBAU DROPPED PENDING FOLLOWUP OF DIRECTOR 10331. JMWAVE STILL OF OPINION THAT TRUSTEES SHOULD BE STATION OFFICERS AND WOULD LIKE PERMISSION TO PROCEED PER ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION.

GILBERT T. SELECKI

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

3 - C/WH

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: SECRET

ORIG: K. C? [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible] SXG
EXT: 67?3? [illegible]
DATE: 2? FEB [illegible]

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

SECRET

action cable filed
Daniel FERNANDEZ Mon 201-

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MADRID INFO: JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: MADRID 4059 (IN 56793) *

1. NEGOTIATIONS IN PROCESS FOR TURNING OVER MAJORITY AMBUD DEPENDENCY PAYMENTS TO ANOTHER LNHARP AGENCY IN NEAR FUTURE. SINCE CONTEMPLATED TURNOVER WOULD NECESSITATE CHANGE IN PAYMENT PROCEDURE FOR SUCH DEPENDENCY CASES, HQS PREFERS NOT TO DISTURB PRESENT TRUSTEESHIP IN REF CASE.

2. REQUEST STATION MADRID DELAY ANSWER TO RAMIRO (MON) FUERTES, IF POSSIBLE, UNTIL FURTHER ADVICE FROM HQS.

3. PARA 1 INFO FOR STATION ONLY.

END OF MESSAGE

COG Comment: * Request from Ramiro MON Fuertes, provincial Mayor of Asturias, through US Embassy to Madrid Station, that AMBUD dependency payment to mother of deceased Brigade member, be paid direct to mother now living in Madrid. Payment is presently paid through a trustee residing in Miami.

C/WH/COG
OGC telecon (Mr. Vaberhorst)
LUR/CUFI (Mr. Sorrels)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/LUR/SR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

OPS OS REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SA COG/REG

FROM

ACTION

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO

FILE

23 FEB 63 58783

ACTION

S E C R E T 231137Z FEB 63 CITE MADRID 4259

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

1. RAMIRO MON FUERTES, MAYOR OF TINEO AND PROVINCIAL DEPUTY OF ASTURIAS, WAS PUT IN CONTACT WITH STATION BY LNPURE REGARDING SURVIVORS PAYMENTS FOR A RELATIVE WHO KILLED IN BAY OF PIGS INVASIONS. PERSON KILLED WAS DANIEL FERNANDEZ MON AND PAYMENTS REPORTEDLY MADE TO RAFAEL SANCHEZ WHO FRIEND BUT NOT RELATIVE. MON DESIRES PAYMENTS BE TRANSFERRED TO MOTHER OF FERNANDEZ WHO LUCIA MON FUERTES AND RESIDES MARQUES DE LEMA 13, 4 F, MADRID 3, ESPANA.

2. PLS ADVISE WHAT REPLY SHOULD BE GIVEN RAMIRO MON.

SECRET

S E C R E T

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO- UFGW-6934

FILE NO- 19-124-25/6

DATE - 23 FEBRUARY 1968

INDEX - NONE

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJ - TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
AMBUD DEPENDENTS TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS

REFS UFGA-29508 DATED 14 FEBRUARY 68

UFGA-25261 DATED 3 JUNE 66

ACTION - SEE BELOW

1. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING REFERENCE A INQUIRY, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS REQUESTED.

A. NAME OF BANK REQUESTING SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS.

B. NAMES UNDER WHICH ACCOUNTS ARE HELD.

C. TYPE OF ACCOUNTS, I.E. TRUST ACCOUNTS, SAVINGS ACCOUNTS, ETC.

D. WHO DID BANK CONTACT FOR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS?

E. SINCE THESE ACCOUNTS WERE ESTABLISHED IN 60-61 WAS ANY REASON GIVEN FOR BANK HAVING DELAYED ITS REQUEST UNTIL NOW?

2. SINCE REFERENCE A INDICATES ALL OF THE ACCOUNTS ARE IN THE SAME BANK, HEADQUARTERS ASSUMES THESE ARE PROBABLY THE TRUST FUNDS AMTIKI TOOK OVER FROM THE ORIGINAL TRUSTEES AND ADMINISTERED FOR SEVERAL YEARS. ACCORDING TO REFERENCE B JMWAVE PROPOSED THAT NO

AN KB
PG
ABSTRACT X
att/RECC

19-124-25/6

FURTHER DEPOSITS BE MADE TO THESE ACCOUNTS AND CUSTODY BE TRANSFERRED TO THE STATION FINANCE OFFICER.

3. HEADQUARTERS WILL ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM AS SOON AS THE ABOVE REQUESTED INFORMATION IS RECEIVED.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

DISTRIBUTION
BY TAPE 3-COS, JMWAVE

ORIGINATOR:
Nancye Gratz
WH/COG/OPS Nancye Gratz

COORDINATION:
William Murray J.
AC/WH/COG/OPS William Murray
WH/COG/SA Robert Ortman
OCC (Mr. Bladergroen in draft)

RELEASING:
C/WH/COG David A. Phillips

DISTRIBUTION:
1-RID
1-WH/REG/C
1-OGC (Mr. Bladergroen)
1-WH/COG/OPS
1-Originator

14-00000

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-29508

FILE NO - 19-124-25/6

DATE - 14 FEBRUARY 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT O - AMBUD DEPENDENTS TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS

1. UNCLEARED BANK WHICH HOLDS DEPOSITS OF THE NINE AMBUD TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS HAS REQUESTED SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS TO ENABLE TAX REPORTING.

2. HEADQUARTERS ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED IN RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM.

GILBERT T. SELECKI

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

3 - C/WH/COG

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

19-124-25/6

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational Ricardo MONTERO Duque (201-293321), Case 136

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

1. Attached is a letter dated 25 January 1968 and addressed to the AMTIKI/1 facility from Esther F. MONTERO, 47-04 Broadway, Union the wife of imprisoned Brigade City, New Jersey. Mrs. MONTERO is the recipient of a $275 monthly member Ricardo MONTERO Duque and is AMBUD dependency payment.

2. In this letter and in a similar letter sent to Senator Robert F. KENNEDY (copy provided by her attached), Mrs. MONTERO, as President of the Mothers, Wives and Sons of the 9 Bay of Pigs Prisoners Association, refers to the possible exchange of the remains of Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA and Communists imprisoned in Bolivia in return for prisoners in Cuban jails. She requests that the necessary steps be taken to insure that the names of the nine Brigade members still imprisoned in Cuba are included in the list of persons to be exchanged.

Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachment:
Two letters cited above, u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG, w/att (u/s/c)

FEB 14 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-29491	9 February 68
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-293321 19-124-25/5

2P

MICROFILMED
FEB 20 1968
DOC MICRO. SER.

Esther R. Montero
47-07 Broadway
Union City, N.J. 07087

January 25th, 1968

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN.

In the name of the Mothers, wives and sons Pig's Bay Nine Prisioners Association, I beg you to make you biggest effort to get in touch with the Commission or Department in care, to confectionate the list of names in the possible trading between Presidente Barrientos of Bolivia and Fidel Castro of Cuba in order they include the names of the 9 Prisioners Pig's Bay Invasion left in Cuba on the 1962 Trading because at that opportunity Castro did not want to trade them. As you know on this trading are involved prisioners belonging to the CIA Department and others that the Pentagon can include in the Trading's List.

I know always the CIA Department, the Pentagon and the Government of the United States of America have their names in mind, of course they want to bring these nine Prisioners to freedom, in this opportunity there is a very good chance, because Castro agreed with President Barrientos to change all Communist Prisioners and the Body of Ernesto (Che) Guevara for the Prisioners he has in Cuba that will be stated on the Trading's List.

We are sure you will do your best in order to include the nine Pig's Bay Prisioners left on Cuba on the 1962 in the Trading's List. Please let me know something about it. Also we are enclosed copy of the letter we are sending to Senator Robert F. Kennedy asking the same thing.

Thank you very much in advance for your attention in this matter, I remain,

Very truly yours,

Esther R. Montero

Esther R. Montero
(Vasallo)

cc: Senator Robert F. Kennedy
File

CS COPY

S/C aa1 UFGA-29491

201-293321

Esther R. Montero
47-04 Broadway
Union City, N.J. 07087

January 25th, 1968

U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy
110 E. 45th Street
New York, Ny.

Senator:

As President of the Mothers, Wives and Sons of the 9 Prisioners Pig's Bay Association, beg to you and pray to God, it could be possible for you to do something in this particular case. I don't want to make a long letter, because I know how bussy you are, but this is a very good opportunity to bring home my husband RICARDO MONTERO DUQUE, and the others 8 prisioners left on Cuba on the 1962 trading. At that time when all others prisioners belonging to Pig's Bay Invasion came in trading, Castro did not want to include them in the list.

The last time I tried to be in touch with you, was on the 1964 at your Office, in this opportunity you were out the City, but your Secretary Mr. Nolan was very nice with us, and he told us he was sure you were going to do everything possible to bring them home, it was impossible and they stay at CUBA.

Now, you know there is a possible trading of prisioners between Presidente Barrientos of Bolivia and Fidel Castro of Cuba, in it are involved prisioners belonging to the CIA Department and others that the Pentagon can include in the Trading's List. We are sure you will not hesitate to do anything to bring them home, but it is our obligation and duty to try for their freedom.

The possible trading between Presidente Barrientos and Castro is because Castro wants all Communist Prisioners and the Body of Ernesto (Che) Guevara now in Bolivia; that's why he agree to accept all names that the CIA Department, Pentagon and Presidente Barrientos put in the Trading's List.

At the same time I'm writting a letter to the CIA Department from which you will find an attached copy. Please let me know anything about this and of course if this letter got your hands.

Thank you very much in advance for your attention in this matter, I remain,

Very truly yours,

Esther R. Montero

cc: File

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for Hero & Martyr Case #99 (Luis MENDEZ Perez)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Forwarded herewith is a reproduction of the marriage certificate of Luis Horlirio MENDEZ y Perez and Estela MENA y Mendez.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

ATTACHMENT:
As stated above, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - WH/COG w/att

1 ATT

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

JAN 15 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-29280	DATE 10 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DE MATRIMONIO

SOLICITUD No. 148648.-

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE: E S T E.-

SECCION Matrimonios.-	TOMO 97.-	FOLIO 473.-	INSCRIPCION No. 471.-

DATOS DEL CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS: Luis Porfirio Mendez y Perez.-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO Caimito del Guayabal.-	EDAD 22 años.-	ESTADO CIVIL soltero.-

PROFESION U OFICIO empleado.-	DOMICILIO Factoria ciento veintitres.-
NOMBRE DEL PADRE Jose.-	NOMBRE DE LA MADRE Olaya.-

DATOS DE LA CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS: Estela Mena y Mendez.-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO San Jose de las Lajas.-	EDAD 19 años.-	ESTADO CIVIL soltera.-

PROFESION U OFICIO su casa.-	DOMICILIO Gloria doscientos sesentiseis.-
NOMBRE DEL PADRE Eligio.-	NOMBRE DE LA MADRE Evangelina.-

LUGAR, FECHA Y FUNCIONARIO AUTORIZANTE

LUGAR DE CELEBRACION DEL MATRIMONIO La Habana.-	DIA 2.-	MES Septiembre.-	AÑO 1949.-

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS DEL FUNCIONARIO Ricardo E. Viurrun y Ovies.-	CARGO Notario.-

NOTAS MARGINALES

No constan.-

SALVEDADES

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL de la Habana.-

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION DE MATRIMONIO A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

Habana, tres DE Octubre DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete.-

ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CONFECCIONADO	CONFRONTADO
B	

ATT 6 UFGA 29280

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

OLGA VALERA CAMPOS y/o ARSENIO MENDEZ SIERRA

Responsable del Registro de Legalizaciones de las firmas que autorizan las certificaciones expedidas por el Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana

CERTIFICO: Que es auténtica al parecer la firma del Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana que consta de este documento, por la semejanza que guarda — con las que acostumbra a usar en sus actos oficiales.

Habana, tres Octubre 1967 -

14-00000

N/F

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

WH/COG/CICS(NC)

FROM 32

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, EUR 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 292256Z CITE JMWAVE 0124 WAVE

30 Nov 67 IN 02080

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: JMWAVE-0265 (IN 94781) 286400

AN	PI
PS	~~[illegible]~~
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~

BRIGADE WIDOW QUERIED AMTIKI-1 VIA TELEGRAM RE REQUEST FOR FUNDS. PLS ADVISE STATUS OF TRANSFER.

S E C R E T

SECRET

JUAN ARGEO PAULA-BAEZ

201-294245
30 Nov 1967

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Dependency Case #143, Jorge KIM Yun (201-298852)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Being forwarded herewith is a copy of a Special Power of Attorney which grants Roberto M. TRETO, 41-25 Kissen Boulevard, Flushing, New York, complete authorization and power of attorney to act as the representative of Anastacia YUN Cho and Pedro KIM and rescinds the authority previously granted Raul SANTOVENIA Lopez. The change was requested by SANTOVENIA who indicated to Subject's parents his desire to withdraw as trustee.

2. Also attached is a notarized statement signed by both the old and new trustee in which SANTOVENIA acknowledges receipt of $15,750.00 from March 1961 to December 1966 (at which time payments were suspended). The statement also notes the transfer of $13,039.00 by SANTOVENIA to TRETO to be held in trust for KIM's parents. SANTOVENIA listed the following accounting for the $2,711.00 not transferred to TRETO:

Money sent to parents in Cuba	$ 515.00
Medicines sent to parents in Cuba	$ 155.00
Payment to the Committee Pro-Liberty of Playa de Giron Prisoners	$ 75.00
Expenses incurred by trustee	$1,966.00
TOTAL	$2,711.00

Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachments:
As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
3- WH/COG

NOV 29 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-29036	27 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19124-25/6 201-298852

NUMBER TWELVE

SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

---In San Diego del Valle, on June 5th, 1967.--------------------

---BEFORE ME: Doctor Aurelio R. Armiñana Triminño, Lawyer and ----Notary Public of the Association of Las Villas province, District of Santa Clara, with residence here,-----------------------------

---THERE APPEAR: Mrs. Anastacia Yun Cho, and Mr. Pedro Kim, married to each other, cuban citizens, of legal age, housewife and-- employee respectively, she born in Mendez Capote, Cardenas, and - he in Mexico, and both residents at Carretera de Varadero, kilometro dos, house marked with number 12, Cardenas, Cuba, accidentally in this place.---

---I attest of knowing the appearers, and of being sure of their birthplaces and other personal data, according to their statements.

---They appear by themselves, making use of their corresponding - rights, and they assure to be in the full enjoyment of their civil rights, and to have, as I---not knowing anything contradictory--- think they have, the necessary legal capacity for this act, and - they jointly state:--

---FIRST: That as legitimate parents of Jorge Kim Yun, born in -- Cardenas, cuban citizen, of legal age, unmarried, deceased, former resident of the United States of America, they, being his only -- and universal heirs, grant, give, and confer the most ample, whole, and complete authorization and power of attorney, as far as it is necessary, and according to law, in behalf of Mr. Roberto M. Treto, cuban citizen, of legal age, married, employee, born in Santa Clara, province of Las Villas, Cuba, and resident of 41-25 Kissena Blv, Apt. 4 B, Flushing, N.Y., U.S.A., in order that, representing his person, rights, and actions, he uses it and exercise it with the- following:---

FACULTIES:

---FIRST: To administer and direct readily all the wealth, rights, and actions that the appearers have and are entitled to as sole - heirs or beneficiaries of the deceased Jorge Kim Yun, as well as all the wealth that belonged to him or that he may have collected in the United States, whether it be cash or bank deposits, governmental or private, movable property and personal property, and in general everything belonging to the inheritance of the before --- mentioned deceased person, without restrictions; to withdraw cash from the bank account (or bank accounts) that theprincipal had to his name or to the appearers", as beneficiaries or as heirs, in - the manner disposed by the laws in force in said country; to receive the checks, pensions, compensations, or other amount due to any other reason, that may be issued, or that the principal has - the right to collect, being the appearers also able to do so as - heirs, beneficiaries or transferred party, whether the above mentioned assets originate from the American State, or from banking trusts or private agencies of any kind; to sign and subscribe the corresponding and necessary documents to those ends; to send the appearers the aforesaid amounts, deducing from said quantities -- the expenses in which the proxy may incur; to assume the custody- of all the wealth belonging to the principal and his heirs.------

---SECOND: In order that said proxy receive from Mr. Raul Santovenia López the furniture, chattels, documents, and cash that the latter deliver him, with the faculty to sign and subscribe the -- public or private documents that Mr. Santovenia may ask of him as security.--

---THIRD: That they revoke, annul, and invalid Power No. 2 dated January 6, 1964 granted before Notary Public of Martí, Matanzas-province, Cuba, Doctor Antonio Solenoa Santa Marina, in behalf of Mr. Raul Santovenia López.----------------------------------

---FOURTH: That they likely wish to say by meansof this document how grateful they are to Mr. Santovenia Lopez for having managed their affairs with complete honesty. Finally, the appearers state that it is their will that their proxy use this authorization without limitations, and for everything that they, themselves, could - personally do.--

---Thus they state and grant before me, previous the reading of -- this instrument by me, the Notary Public, since they resigned to - the right they had to do soby themselves. They ratify its contents and sign before me. I attest.--------------------------------

(Signed): Anastacia Yun. Pedro Kim. Dr. A.R. Armiñana.

IT AGREES TO ITS ORIGINAL, that under number 12 is filed at the General Registry of Public Instruments of this Office under my charge, and which I have consulted. And to deliver to the appearers upon -- their request, I issue this first copy in two sheets of paper, on - the date of its grant, after having affixed the corresponding revenue stamps, and having left a note of its issuance on the margin of its original. I ATTEST.--

----

The undersigned, Lawyers and Notaries Public of the Association of Las Villas, District of Santa Clara, with residence here, ATTEST: that the preceding signature belongs to our colleague Dr. Aurelio - R. Armiñana Triminño. At Santa Clara on June 5, 1967. (There appear the seals and signatures of the legalizing notaries).-

---

REPUBLIC OF CUBA
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

I, María del C. Dos-Chapelles y Fesser, Keeper of the Registry of - Legalization of Signatures, CERTIFY: that the preceding signatures of notaries with residence in Santa Clara, Doctors Consuelo Barrero and Armando Lopez, seem to be authentic. At Havana, Cuba, on June 16, 1967.- (Signed).-

- - - -

I, the undersigned, José A. Parlá, a legal translator, do hereby - certify: that the foregoing is a true and correct English translation of the hereto annexed document in Spanish. At Havana, Cuba, on June - 19, 1967.-

José A. Parlá
Legal Translator

--- [illegible] AND SUBSTITUTION OF ADMINISTRATOR.---

--- This agreement made between Mr. Raul Santovenia Lopez, a Cuban citizen, of legal age, married, an employee, residing at 5907 Park Avenue, West New York, New Jersey, of the one part; and Mr. Roberto M. Troto, a Cuban Citizen, of legal age, married an employee, residing at 41-[illegible] Kissena Boulevard, Flushing, New York, of the other part, witnesseth:-------------------------

FIRST: That the said Mr. Santovenia was designated Administrator or Trustee of Mr. Jorge Kim Yun's belongings, a Cuban Citizen of legal age, single, who died in Cuba as a Member of The Cuban Brigade number 2506; and this designation was made by the Parents of the deceased, Mrs. Anastasia Yun Cho and Mr. Pedro Kim, both Cuban Citizens, residing in Cardenas, Cuba, and is granted in the Special Power of Attorney signed on January 6, 1964, before The Notary Public, Dr. Miguel Antonio Bolanos Santamarina.-

SECOND: That Mr. Jorge Kim Yun's belongings was a Pension granted to him as a Member of such a Brigade in the amount of $225.00, monthly, during the Period March 1961 to December - 1966, which represents the total amount of $15,750.00.-

THIRD: That of the total amount of $15,750.00, Mr. Santovenia has deducted the following payments and expenses:- (a) The amount of $515.00 sent to Mr. King's Parents. (b) The amount of $159.00 purchased in Medicine and sent to Mr. Kim's Parents. (c) The amount of $75.00 paid to the Committee Pro Liberty of Playa de Giron Prisoners. (d) the amount of $1,966.00 which - represents all the expenses as Administrator during the entire Period.-

FOURTH: Consequently, the net amount kept by Mr. Santovenia after deducting the payments and expenses mentioned in - Parragraph number third, is $13,035.00.-

FIFTH: The other part, Mr. Roberto M. Troto, states:- That he has been appointed Administrator of Mr. Jorge Kim Yun belongings, by Mr. Pedro Kim and Anastasia Yun Cho, Father and mother of the deceased, and this designation is granted in the written Power of Attorney signed on June 5, 1967, before the Notary Public of San Diego Del Valle, Cuba, Dr. Roberto M. Arufnuna Trinino; and therefore, since today he is the substitute of Mr. Santovenia as Administrator.-

SIXTH: That today he receives from Mr. Santovenia a certified check issued by the First National Bank of Jersey City, in the amount of $13,035.00, relieving Mr. Santovenia of further responsibilities.-

Given and subscribed in the City of West New York, New Jersey, this thirteenth day of September, nineteen hundred and sixty seven.---

R. Santovenia
Raul Santovenia Lopez

Roberto M. Troto

Witness: Hilda Barroso
Nilo A. Barroso

SWORN TO BEFORE ME
THIS 13 DAY OF September 1967
NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERSEY
My Commission Expires Oct. 10, 1968

---- RECIBO DE CANTIDAD Y RENUNCIA DE ADMINISTRACION ----

---- Consta por el presente documento, como de una parte: el Senor RAUL SANTOVENIA LOPEZ, natural y Ciudadano de Cuba, mayor de edad, casado, empleado, residente en el numero 5307 de la Avenida Park, en West New York, Estado de New Jersey, Estados Unidos de Norte America; y de otra parte: el Senor ROBERTO M. PRATO, natural y Ciudadano de Cuba, mayor de edad, casado, empleado, y vecino del numero 41-25 del Boulevard Kissena, en Flushing, Ciudad y Estado de New York, Estados Unidos de Norte America, convienen lo siguiente:------------------------------

__PRIMERO__: El Senor Santovenia fue designado Administrador de los Bienes quedados al fallecimiento del Senor JORGE KIM YUN, que era natural de Cardenas, Cuba, Ciudadano Cubano, mayor de edad, soltero, y vecino que fuera de los Estados Unidos de Norte America, y cuyo deceso ocurriera en Cuba, como Miembro de la Brigada Cubana numero 2506, Movilizado numero 1,736; cuya Administracion le fue conferida por los padres legitimos del fallecido, Senora Anastasia Yun Cho, y Senor Pedro Kim, Ciudadanos Cubanos, y vecinos de la Ciudad de Cardenas, Cuba, mediante la Escritura de Poder numero Dos, de fecha Seis de Enero de mil novecientos sesenta y cuatro, otorgada ante el Notario de Marti, Provincia de Matanzas, Cuba, Doctor Miguel Antonio Polanco Santamarina.-

__SEGUNDO__: que el unico bien quedado al fallecimiento del Senor Kim Yun esta representado por la Pension a que se hizo acreedor el Senor Kim Yun, como Miembro de dicha Brigada 2506, ascendente a la suma de $225.00 mensuales, por el Periodo de Marzo de 1961 a Diciembre de 1966, cuya suma total asciende a la cantidad de $15,750.00.-

__TERCERO__: que de la suma total de $15,750.00, el Administrador Senor Santovenia ha hecho las siguientes erogaciones:- (a) La cantidad de $515.00 representada por distintos Giros Postales enviados a Cuba a los padres del Senor Jorge Kim.- (b) La cantidad de $155.00 representada por Medicinas enviadas a Cuba.- (c) La cantidad de $75.00 enviada al Comite Libertad Prisioneros de Giron.- (d) La suma de $1,966.00 representada por gastos de administracion durante todo el periodo del mismo.-

__CUARTO__: en consecuencia, la cantidad liquida que conserva el Senor Santovenia en su poder, una vez deducidas las partidas mencionadas en la Clausula anterior, asciende a la suma de $13,039.00 (TRECE MIL TREINTA Y NUEVE DOLLARES).-

__QUINTO__: El Senor Roberto M. Prato, por su parte, dice:- Que por Escritura Publica numero Doce, otorgada ante el Notario de San Diego del Valle, Cuba, Doctor Roberto M. Ardinana Tricino, por los padres del fallecido Jorge Kim Yun, Senores Pedro Kim y Anastasia Yun Cho, el dia Cinco de Junio de mil novecientos sesenta y siete, fue designado Administrador de los Bienes, en sustitucion del Senor Raul Santovenia Lopez, con todas las amplias facultades contenidas en dicho Poder.-

__SEXTO__: Que en este acto, recibe de manos del Senor Raul Santovenia Lopez, y para sus Poderdantes, la cantidad de TRECE MIL TREINTA Y NUEVE PESOS, representada por un Check Certificado del First National Bank of Jersey City, cesando por tanto la Administracion del Senor Santovenia y relevandolo de futuras responsabilidades.-

(Al Dorso)

Y para constancia, extendemos el presente documento por cuadruplicado, y firmamos en la Ciudad de West New York, Estado de New Jersey, hoy día trece de Septiembre de mil novecientos sesenta y siete.--

Raúl [illegible] López

Roberto [illegible] Prieto

Dr Freddy Alvarez

Testigo: Nilo A. Barroso

Nilo A. Barroso Navarro

SWORN TO BEFORE ME

THIS 13th DAY OF Septiembre 1967

NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERSEY
My Commission Expires Oct. 10, 1968

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for Hero & Martyr Case #109

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Forwarded herewith are reproductions of the following documents pertaining to AMBUD Hero & Martyr Case #109, Armando ESCOTO Aloy (201-283865):

a. Marriage certificate - 8 July 1933. Armando Eladio ESCOTO Aloy and Juana Maria Josefa RODRIGUEZ Exposito.

b. Certification of birth - Armando Miguel ESCOTO Rodriguez (no birth date given). Parents - Armando Eladio ESCOTO Aloy and Juana Maria RODRIGUEZ Exposito.

Raymond K. PANUSES

ATTACHMENT:
As stated above, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - WH/COG w/att

NOV 22 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-28994	DATE 17 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6 201-283865

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DEL ESTADO CIVIL

SOLICITUD No. 03534.-Legalizada.-

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE Arroyo Naranjo.-

SECCION DE:	TOMO:	FOLIO:	INSCRIPCION:
Nacimientos	112	277-	274-

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: ARMANDO MIGUEL ESCOTO RODRIGUEZ.-

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE: Armando Eladio Escoto Aloy

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE: Juana María Rodríguez Expósito.-

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL la Habana

CERTIFICA: QUE AL MARGEN DE LA INSCRIPCION DE NACIMIENTO REFERIDA

no consta nota alguna de matrimonio.-

AUTORIZADO EL USO DE MAQUINA TIMBRADORA POR DECRETO DEL MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA No. 2 DE ENERO 6 DE 1963.-

veinte y dos DE setiembre DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete

CONFECCIONADO POR:	CONFRONTADO POR:	CERTIFICADO POR:
mc		

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

OLGA VALERA CAMPOS y/o ARSENIO MENDEZ SIERRA

Responsable del Registro de Legalizaciones de las firmas que autorizan las certificaciones expedidas por el Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana.

CERTIFICO: Que es auténtica al parecer la firma del Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana que consta de este documento, por la semejanza que guarda con las que acostumbra a usar en sus actos oficiales.

La Habana, 22 de Septiembre 1967

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DE MATRIMONIO

SOLICITUD No. 141001

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE: ARROYO NARANJO

SECCION	TOMO	FOLIO	INSCRIPCION No.
MATRIMONIOS	12	476	241

DATOS DEL CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS: Armando Eladio Escoto y Aloy

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: La Habana

EDAD: 21 años

ESTADO CIVIL: soltero

PROFESION U OFICIO: comerciante

DOMICILIO: Juan Delgado noventa y uno

NOMBRE DEL PADRE: Antonio

NOMBRE DE LA MADRE: Josefa

DATOS DE LA CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS: Juana María Josefa Rodríguez y Expósito

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: La Habana

EDAD: 23 años

ESTADO CIVIL: soltera

PROFESION U OFICIO: no consta

DOMICILIO: D'Strampes setenta y cuatro, Víbora

NOMBRE DEL PADRE: Nemesio

NOMBRE DE LA MADRE: Loreto Sindulfo

LUGAR, FECHA Y FUNCIONARIO AUTORIZANTE

LUGAR DE CELEBRACION DEL MATRIMONIO	DIA	MES	AÑO
Arroyo Naranjo	8	Julio	1933

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS DEL FUNCIONARIO: Dr. Juan Manuel Valdés y Gonzáles

CARGO: Juez Municipal

NOTAS MARGINALES

No constan

SALVEDADES

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL 1
Término Municipal de La Habana

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION DE MATRIMONIO A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA

La Habana, a veintidos DE Septiembre DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete.

ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CONFECCIONADO: Curbelo

CONFRONTADO:

ECAC-319-88-381609

14-00000

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

Olga Dalira Campos
Responsable del Registro de Legalizaciones de las firmas que autorizan las certificaciones expedidas por el Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana

CERTIFICO: Que es auténtica al parecer la firma del Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana, que consta de este documento, por la semejanza que guarda con las que acostumbra a usar en sus actos oficiales.

Set. 22 de 1987.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for Hero & Martyr Case #109

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Forwarded herewith are reproductions of the following documents pertaining to AMBUD Hero & Martyr Case #109, Armando ESCOTO Aloy (201-283865):

a. Marriage certificate - 8 July 1933. Armando Eladio ESCOTO Aloy and Juana Maria Josefa RODRIGUEZ Exposito.

b. Certification of birth - Armando Miguel ESCOTO Rodriguez (no birth date given). Parents - Armando Eladio ESCOTO Aloy and Juana Maria RODRIGUEZ Exposito.

Raymond K. PANUSES

ATTACHMENT:
As stated above, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - WH/COG w/att

NOV 22 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28994

DATE
17 November 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
201-283865

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DEL ESTADO CIVIL

SOLICITUD No. 03574.-Legalizada.-

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE Arroyo Naranjo.-

SECCION DE:	TOMO:	FOLIO:	INSCRIPCION:
Nacimientos	112	277-	274-

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: ARMANDO MIGUEL ESCOTO RODRIGUEZ.-

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE:	NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE:
Armando Eladio Escoto Aloy	Juana María Rodríguez Expósito.-

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL la Habana

CERTIFICA: QUE AL MARGEN DE LA INSCRIPCION DE NACIMIENTO REFERIDA

no consta nota alguna de matrimonio.-

veinte y dos DE setiembre DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete---

AUTORIZADO EL USO DE MAQUINA TIMBRADORA POR DECRETO DEL MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA No. 2 DE ENERO 8 DE 1963.

CONFECCIONADO POR:	CONFRONTADO POR:	CERTIFICADO POR:
mc		

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

OLGA VALERA CAMPOS y/o ARSENIO MENDEZ SIERRA

....

Responsable del Registro de Legalizaciones de las firmas que autorizan las certificaciones expedidas por el Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana.

CERTIFICO: Que es auténtica al parecer la firma del Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana que consta de este documento, por la semejanza que guarda con las que acostumbra a usar en sus actos oficiales.

La Habana, 22 de Septiembre......7

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DE MATRIMONIO

SOLICITUD No. 141001

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE: ARROYO NARANJO

SECCION	TOMO	FOLIO	INSCRIPCION No
MATRIMONIOS	12	476	241

DATOS DEL CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS: Armando Eladio Escoto y Aloy

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO	EDAD	ESTADO CIVIL
La Habana	21 años	soltero

PROFESION U OFICIO: comerciante

DOMICILIO: Juan Delgado noventa y uno

NOMBRE DEL PADRE: Antonio

NOMBRE DE LA MADRE: Josefa

DATOS DE LA CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS: Juana María Josefa Rodríguez y Expósito

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO	EDAD	ESTADO CIVIL
La Habana	23 años	soltera

PROFESION U OFICIO: no consta

DOMICILIO: D'Strampes setenta y cuatro, Víbora

NOMBRE DEL PADRE: Nemesio

NOMBRE DE LA MADRE: Loreto Sindulfo

LUGAR, FECHA Y FUNCIONARIO AUTORIZANTE

LUGAR DE CELEBRACION DEL MATRIMONIO	DIA	MES	AÑO
Arroyo Naranjo	8	Julio	1933

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS DEL FUNCIONARIO: Dr. Juan Manuel Valdés y González

CARGO: Juez Municipal

NOTAS MARGINALES

No constan

SALVEDADES

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL 1
Término Municipal de La Habana

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION DE MATRIMONIO A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA

La Habana, a veintidos DE Septiembre DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete.

ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CONFECCIONADO: Curbelo

CONFRONTADO:

14-00000

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

Olga Valera Campos

Responsable del Registro de Legalizaciones de las firmas que autorizan las certificaciones expedidas por el Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana

[illegible]

CERTIFICO: Que es auténtica al parecer la firma del Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana, que consta de este documento, por la semejanza que guarda con las que acostumbra a usar en sus actos oficiales. [illegible]

Set. 22 de 1987.

6 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Ben DeFelice, C/BSD

SUBJECT : Files Concerning Payments to Bay of Pigs Dependents

1. Attached are duplicate files for your retention and review by Mr. Tinsley. One set of files contains a list of all deceased and imprisoned participants in the Bay of Pigs operation. The other set of files covers a deceased member of BRIGADE 2506 and contains the type of requested documentary material requested by Mr. Tinsley.

2. The master file of policy papers which I understand is for your retention will be delivered to you before the end of this week.

3. Please advise me if there is anything else you require.

Nancye Gratz
WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE F.I.

SUBJECT 0
TYPIC/AMBUD Operational Documentation for AMBUD Dependency Payment Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

Forwarded herewith are reproductions of documents pertaining to the following Hero & Martyr cases:

Case #104: LEON Leon, Vicente (201-286541)

a. Birth certificate: Vicente LEON Leon. DPOB: 25 April 1917, Palmira, Las Villas, Cuba.

b. Marriage certificate: 13 August 1909 Francisco de LEON Castaneda and Lucia de LEON Carrandi.

Case #105: BAEZ Mas, Juventino (201# not available)

a. Birth certificate: Juventino Jose de Jesus Evangelista BAEZ Mas. DPOB: 27 December 1940, Santa Clara, Las Villas, Cuba.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachments:
As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/atts.

CS COPY

OCT 27 1967

1 au

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28801

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE
24 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
19 -124-25/6

14-00000

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL
DE
PALMIRA. LAS VILLAS - - - - - -

CERTIFICACION DE NACIMIENTO

SOLICITUD No.

SECCION DE	TOMO	FOLIO	NUMERO	FECHA DEL ASIENTO: DIA	MES	AÑO
Nacimiento	- 34 -	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	Octubre	1917

HORA: A LAS CUATRO DE LA MAÑANA

DIA: VEINTICINCO

MES: ABRIL

AÑO: DEL MIL NOVECIENTOS DIECISIETE - - - - -

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: VICENTE, LEON Y [illegible] - - - - -

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: PALMIRA - - - - - - - -

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE: Francisco León y [illegible]-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DEL PADRE: [illegible]------

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE: Lucía León y [illegible]------

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DE LA MADRE: Lajas------

ABUELOS PATERNOS: Dionisio------ / Carmen------

ABUELOS MATERNOS: Rafael------ / Petronila---

INSCRIPCION PRACTICADA EN VIRTUD DE: LA COMPARECENCIA DEL PADRE DEL INSCRIPTO - - - - -

NOTAS MARGINALES: No tiene----------

Ley 1213.1967.-

DOCTORA LUCIANA MARIA YOSTE Y FERNANDEZ, ENCARGADO DE ESTE REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL.

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

Palmira a veintiséis de [illegible] DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y [illegible]

ESPACIO PARA FIJAR LOS SELLOS O PONER LA NOTA DE EXENCION.

CONFECCIONADO POR

CONFRONTADO POR

CS COPY

AU-1 UFGA-28801

19-124-2076

14-00000

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL
DE
SAN FERNANDO DE CAMARONES, - L.V.-

CERTIFICACION DE MATRIMONIO

SOLICITUD No.

SECCIÓN DE MATRIMONIOS	TOMO 2 Moderno	FOLIO 532	INSCRIPCION No. 83-

DATOS DEL CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS: FRANCISCO DE LEON Y CASTANEDA

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO este término	EDAD 42	ESTADO CIVIL viudo

PROFESION U OFICIO campo	DOMICILIO este término
NOMBRE DEL PADRE Dionisio	NOMBRE DE LA MADRE Gregoria del Carmen

DATOS DE LA CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS: LUCIA DE LEON Y CARRANDI

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO Cruces	EDAD 16	ESTADO CIVIL soltera

PROFESION U OFICIO su casa	DOMICILIO no consta
NOMBRE DEL PADRE Rafael	NOMBRE DE LA MADRE Petronila

LUGAR, FECHA Y FUNCIONARIO AUTORIZANTE

LUGAR DE CELEBRACION DEL MATRIMONIO no consta	DIA 13	MES Agosto	AÑO 1909

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS DEL FUNCIONARIO AUTORIZANTE DEL ACTO José Barra y Barreiro	CARGO Cura Párroco de este pueblo

NOTAS MARGINALES

NO CONSTAN

SALVEDADES

DOCTORA LUCIANA MARTA YUSTE Y FERNANDEZ, ENCARGADO DE ESTE REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL.

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION DE MATRIMONIO A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

San Fernando de Camarones, A primero - - - - - -
DE Junio - - - - DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete.-

ESPACIO PARA FIJAR LOS SELLOS O PONER LA NOTA DE EXENCION.

CONFECCIONADO POR LGMore	CONFRONTADO POR

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DE NACIMIENTO

SOLICITUD No. 19825

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE: SANTA CLARA

FECHA DEL ASIENTO — DIA: 11 — MES: Enero — AÑO: 1941

SECCION DE: Nacimientos — TOMO: 176 — FOLIO: 246 — INSCRIPCION: 245

FECHA DE NACIMIENTO (EN LETRAS)

HORA: una de la noche — DIA: veinte y siete

MES: Diciembre — AÑO: mil novecientos cuarenta

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: Juventino José de Jesús Evangelista Báez y Mas

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: Esta Ciudad.

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE: Juventino José Severino Báez y Rodríguez

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DEL PADRE: Santa Clara

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE: Flora Aida Laudelina Clara Demetria Mas y Machado.

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DE LA MADRE: Santa Clara

ABUELOS PATERNOS: José Rufino de la Caridad — Isidora [illegible]

ABUELOS MATERNOS: Miguel — Laudelina

INSCRIPCION PRACTICADA EN VIRTUD DE: comparecencia de José Rufino de la Caridad Báez y Díaz abuelo paterno del inscripto.

NOTAS MARGINALES: no tiene

AUTORIZADO EL USO DE MAQUINA TIMBRADORA POR DECRETO DEL MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA No. 9 DE 3 DE ENERO DE 1961.

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE SANTA CLARA

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

SANTA CLARA 2

DE Agosto DE MIL NOVECIENTOS

SESENTA Y siete

Mecanógrafo: Miguel [illegible]

ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CONFECCIONADO	CONFRONTADO
FM	

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Adjustment of Dependent Payments - First Quarter FY 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-6328, 29 December 1966

1. No adjustments of AMBUD dependency payments were made during the reporting period.

2. The following change in payees is being reported for Headquarters records:

Case #2: Elio ALEMAN Armenteros (201-285623)

In accordance with written instructions from the mother, Romualda ARMENTEROS Martinez, the trusteeship for this case has been transferred from Oscar Luis ACEVEDO to Elsa ALEMAN Armenteros, her daughter. Effective with the September payment, AMTIKI-1 was instructed to forward the monthly dependency payment for this case to the following address:

Elsa ALEMAN Armenteros
c/o William CASTRILLO
1033 City National Bank Building
25 West Flagler Street
Miami, Florida 33130

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CS COPY

OCT 25 1967

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-28791

DATE: 20 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 19-124-25/6

ORIG: NANCYE GRATZ:mjr
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 7447/9008
DATE: 13 OCTOBER 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER ____ #

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, OGC 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

OCT 13 16 31 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 43092

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: UFGA-28632*

N6

CONCUR PROPOSED REF LETTER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG COMMENT: *JMWAVE forwarded draft of proposed letter to a New York law firm which was retained by the mistress of one of the deceased Brigade 2506 group after we terminated her dependency payments. Mr. Bladergroen/OGC, drafted subject letter while on a recent TDY to JMWAVE.

C/WH/COG/CICS
WH/COG/MO
OGC MR. BLADERGROEN (TELECON)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Query Regarding Termination of Dependency Payments (Case #89)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: See para 3.

1. AMTIKI-1 received a letter dated 19 September 1967 from a lawyer representing Miguelena Teurbe FRITZ requesting information as to why "payments to the specifically named beneficiaries in your policy if you have one, or those who would normally receive the proceeds of a death benefit if you do not have a policy" had been terminated.

2. A review of this case reveals the following:

a. Miguelena Teurbe FRITZ was advised by a letter dated 31 December 1966 that it had been ascertained that she was not entitled to monthly payments as the widow of Roberto PEREZ Cruzata since she had never married PEREZ. The letter also advised that payments heretofore sent to Mrs. FRITZ for her daughter and the parents of PEREZ were likewise being terminated because it had been learned that her daughter, Kathleen FRITZ, is not related to PEREZ in any manner, that the mother had died, and that there is not evidence that the father in Cuba had received any of the funds intended for him.

b. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. FRITZ requested that the matter be reconsidered since she had not been given advance notice of the termination and because the abrupt halt in payments created a severe economic hardship for her.

c. She was then advised by letter that the payment enclosed with the termination notice was for January 1967 and was intended to provide a one-month notice of the payment termination.

Attachments:
1. Letters mentioned in paras 1, 2a,b,c, h/w
2. Draft response, h/w

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/atts.

OCT -6 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28632

DATE
4 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-297752
19-124-25/6

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-28632

She was also informed that in view of the apparent hardship resulting from her misunderstanding of the procedures, a gratuity payment of $275.00 was enclosed and that no further payments will be made.

3. The Station proposes sending a letter to the lawyer advising him that the assistance in question was in the nature of a gratuity and was in no way based on a contract of insurance and that when it was learned that Mrs. FRITZ was not PEREZ' widow it became necessary to discontinue the payments. Attached herewith is a copy of the proposed draft response, which was coordinated with Louis K. STORSELL from OGC while on TDY at JMWAVE. Prompt Headquarters concurrence is requested.

Raymond K. PANUSES

FORM 6-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

Att 1

McALOON, HIRSCHBERG, MALANG & FRIEDMAN
COUNSELORS AT LAW
75 MAIDEN LANE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10038

DIGBY 4-0978

R. McALOON
HIRSCHBERG
J. MALANG
Y D. FRIEDMAN

T. MULCAHY
NCE M. KLEIN
RD SCHAEFF
ANGSI

September 19, 1967

Mr. Paul G. Avant
P.O.B. 701
Miami, Florida, 33144

Re: Miguelina Teurbe Fritz

Dear Mr. Avant,

Please be advised that I have been requested by Mrs. Miguelena Fritz, to write to you, with respect to her insurance benefits by reason of the death of Roberto Perez Cruzata.

I have in my possession copies of your letter to Mrs. Fritz, dated January 31, 1967, and a letter to her from John L. McKercher, of your office, dated December 31, 1966.

I am interested in knowing your reasons for not paying the specifically named beneficiaries in your policy if you have one, or those who would normally receive the proceeds of a death benefit if you do not have a formal policy.

There is no doubt that the decedent must have wished that any proceeds be paid as he directed, and before proceeding in this matter, I would appreciate your advice.

Thank you for your anticipated cooperation,

Very truly yours,

STANLEY D. FRIEDMAN

SDF/bg

RG. MALANG & FRIEDMAN
75 MAIDEN LANE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10038

Mr. Paul G. Avant
P. O. Box 701
Miami, Florida 33144

AIR MAIL

P. O. Box 767
Miami, Florida 33144
January 27, 1967

Mrs. Migdolina Tourbe
555 N. W. 58th Avenue
Miami, Florida

Dear Mrs. Tourbe:

Your letter of January 5, 1967 has been received and a thorough review of the case has been made in accordance with your request.

In regard to your expressed belief that notice was not given in advance of the payment termination date, it should be noted that the practice has been to forward the payment a month in advance. Thus, the check mailed on December 31, 1966 was for the month of January 1967, and the letter enclosed with the payment was intended to provide a one-month notice concerning the termination of payments.

However, in view of the apparent hardship resulting from your misunderstanding of the procedures it has been possible to obtain a gratuity payment of $375.00. This payment is enclosed. No further payments will be made.

Sincerely yours,

John L. McKercher

TRANSLATION

January 5, 1967

Distinguished Sirs:

I was surprised when I read your letter notifying me of the permanent suspension of the pension I received as a result of the wish of Roberto Perez, my fiance before his death.

I am very surprised because I had not been advised prior to the end of the month. I have incurred the normal expenses such as rent, light, telephone, gas, etc., and now find myself in a very difficult situation since this means that I am going to lose my credit.

When you suspend the checks or pensions of Brigade members or their families you always notify them of the suspension with their last payment so that they could make the necessary arrangements for the future.

I now am without money to cover me expenses. The month of January is a hard time to find employment here, not to mention that my parents who are old, my daughter, and my sister recently arrived from Cuba and do not receive economic aide from the Refugee Center.

Awaiting your response. I think that you should reconsider my situation at this time with the understanding and generosity of the "great nation" which the Cubans will never forget.

Attentively,
/s/ Miguelina Teurbe
555 NW 59th Ave.
Miami, Fla.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

organizada y [illegible]

Por [illegible] organización [illegible]

Siempre Unidos!

Atentamente,

Miguel [illegible]

550 [illegible]

Miami, Fla.

P. O. Box 701
Miami, Florida
December 31, 1966

Mrs. Miguelina Teurbe
850 Ocean Drive, Room 101
Miami Beach, Florida

Dear Mrs. Teurbe:

Effective January 1, 1967 the adjustment of certain payments, including those applicable in your case, is being placed in effect.

Concerning the case of Roberto Perez Cruzata, a review of records and the results of an investigation indicate that although Roberto Perez Cruzata may have planned to marry Miguelina Teurbe following his return from Cuba, the marriage did not take place. Therefore, Miguelina Teurbe is not entitled to payments as his widow, and no further payments will be forthcoming.

The following additional payments which have been made to Miguelina Teurbe are also being terminated effective January 1, 1967 for the reasons given:

The mother of Roberto Perez Cruzata is now deceased.

The father of Roberto Perez Cruzata resides in Cuba; no evidence has been presented to show that he has received any of the funds intended for him.

The child, Kathleen Fritz, is the daughter of Mr. Harry Fritz and is not related to Roberto Perez Cruzata; thus, she is not entitled to benefits as a dependent of Roberto Perez Cruzata.

Sincerely yours,

John L. McKercher

Att # 2

P.O. Box 701
Miami, Florida 33144

Dear Mr. Friedman:

This is in regard to your letter of September 19, 1967 requesting to be advised of the reason for the discontinuance of payments heretofore made to Mrs. Miguelina Teurbe Fritz.

Financial assistance had been made available to Mrs. Fritz with the mistaken understanding that she was the surviving widow of Roberto PEREZ Cruzata. That assistance was in the nature of a gratuity and was in no way based on a contract of insurance.

As indicated in my letter of December 31, 1966, a review of this matter showed that Mrs. Fritz had never been married to Roberto PEREZ Cruzata and, therefore, was not his widow. Upon finding that she lacked the requisite status, it became necessary to discontinue financial aid.

While your interest in this matter is understandable, I must advise that no further payments can be made.

Sincerely yours,
John L. McKercher

6 OCT 1967

NOTE FOR : Nancy Gratz

Following up with our meeting with Tom Tinsley: (27 Sept 1967)

1. Please review all of your keypapers and set up a master policy file of all of them. We should also have a comprehensive list of all brigade members and their survivors as of April or May 1962. Send me in a specific case any correspondence you have had from a widow or beneficiary with translations.

2. Upon receipt of this material, I will see if it meets with Mr. Tinsley's requirement.

B. DeFelice
C/BSD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Request from Widow of Angel PASTRANA Santos (Case #118) for Assistance in Leaving Cuba.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See para 3

References: A. UFGW-6607, 13 July 1967
B. UFGA-27805, 14 June 1967

1. As suggested in Reference B, AMTIKI-1 advised the widow that the only legal means for purchasing passage from Cuba to Spain with US dollars was by purchasing the passage at Iberia Airlines' Madrid office. In a letter dated 11 September 1967, the widow acknowledged receipt of the letter from AMTIKI-1 and stated that she had contacted the Iberia office in Havana and had been told that this procedure is no longer allowed. The widow then went to the National Bank of Cuba where she was advised that the only way she could purchase passage would be to receive funds in Canadian currency through the Cuban bank. The bank suggested that the fastest way to effect the transaction would be to have the money sent by telegraphic transfer through a Canadian bank to the National Bank of Cuba.

2. A check with the Iberia Airlines representative in the JMWAVE area confirmed that the procedure suggested by Headquarters' is not permissible. The representative stated that the procedure suggested by the National Bank of Cuba was correct, adding that a Spanish bank and Spanish currency could be utilized instead of Canadian if so desired.

3. Headquarters guidance regarding the adviseability of effecting such a transfer of funds to Cuba through Canada or Spain is requested. Attached are copies of recent correspondence concerning this case.

Attachment:
Correspondence mentioned in para 3, h/w

Raymond K. PANUSES

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG, w/att.

OCT 10 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-28654	DATE 6 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/5 201-294245

PROTECTIVE MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
Florida Branch Office.
MIAMI, FLORIDA

JOHN PAULBATH
Manager

P. O. B. 701
Miami, Fla. 33144

Miami, August 7, 1967

MRS. MARIA CERNUDA
Colina 33
Jesus del Monte
Havana, Cuba

Dear Mrs. Cernuda:

In response to your request for funds to be able to leave Cuba, we wish to advise you that the only legal means by which pasage can be purchased with US dollars is from Iberia Airlines in Madrid for persons desiring to leave Cuba.

Please let us know if you agree, in which case you must send us the names of your daughter, sister, father and yours as they appear in the Passports, and we will send the necessary funds to Madrid for purchase of tickets and Iberia Airlines in turn will notify its Havana Office that the passages have been prepaid and the Havana Office will then notify you that the passages are available.

Please contact us through our new mailing address shown above.

Sincerely yours

JOHN PAULBATH

JPB/kw

TRANSLATION

Havana, 17 August 1967

COCONUT GROVE BANK
MIAMI, FLORIDA

Attention: Mr. Administrator

Sir:

I am writing to you to ask you to do me the favor of informing Mr. John Paulbath that I urgently need him to contact me because I want him to send the passages to me to go (to the U.S.) via Spain.

The reason I have taken the liberty of writing is that in November of last year, I wrote to Mr. Paulbath at PO Box 427, Tamiami Station in that city and after almost six months the letter was returned to me with the notation that the address was not registered. Since that time a friend of mine who lives in Los Angeles has been trying to locate him and to date has had no success.

Mr. Paulbath sent me a notice informing that the monthly stipend due me (as a result of the death of my husband) per dotal policy 1023, was being deposited in that bank, enclosed is that notice. The last news I had from Mr. Paulbath was in February 1966 when he informed me that on that date the account showed a balance of US $12,518.21.

I appeal to your kindness for help, since I have been trying for more than six years since my husband died R.I.P. to leave (Cuba). I almost had all my papers in order to leave when the American Embassy was closed that was two months after my husband had departed (Cuba), later in April of that same year came the Bay of Pigs Invasion and my husband was killed. On 1 June my daughter was born and it was at this time that they began to grant visa waivers but even though I had the visas I could not leave because I had not been able to get a passport for my daughter since to obtain it they demanded my husband's death certificate and his death was not recorded in any court, I went to all the places it could have been recorded. Then I began to visit lawyers and government offices to find out how I could obtain a passport for my daughter. After much fighting, it was delivered to me at the end of November of last year. I immediately wrote to Mr. Paulbath to ask that he send me the money for passages right away and that was the letter that was returned to me.

Since letters from there to here take so long, I request that you tell Mr. Paulbath to send me the money for passages for those indicated below:

Concepcion PASTRANA Cernuda	(US $154.00)
Serafin CERNUDA Garcia	(US $308.00)
Graciela CERNUDA Fernandez	(US $308.00)
Maria CERNUDA Fernandez	(US $308.00)

and also tell him that the money for all should be sent to the following address:

Colina #33, Jesus del Monte, Habana, Cuba.

Tell Mr. Paulbath that if there is anything I can resolve call me at telephone number 99-2187 or send me a night letter since ~~xegxxx~~ regular mail takes up to one and one half months to arrive.

Attentively,

/s/Maria Cernuda
Maria Cernuda

1720 S.W. 97 Place, Miami, Fla 33165
221-6360

La Habana, Agosto 17, 1967.

COCONUT GROVE BANK.
MIAMI, FLORIDA.

Atención al Sr. Administrador/

SEÑOR:

Me dirijo a usted por este medio, para que me haga el favor de informarle al Sr. John Paulbath, que necesito urgentemente que se comunique conmigo, ya que necesito que me envie los pasajes para irme por Vía España.

Si me he tomado la libertad de molestarlo es porque en Noviembre del año pasado escribí al Sr. Paulbath a P. O. Box 427 Tamiami, Station en esa ciudad y al cabo casi de seis meses me devolvieron la carta, diciendo que esa dirección no estaba regitrada, a partir de entonces una amiga que vive en Los Angeles ha estado tratando de localizar hasta la fecha sin éxito ninguno.

El Sr. Paulbath me envió una certificación donde me informaba que el dinero que mensualmente se me estaba asignando (por el fallecimiento de mi esposo) referente a la póliza Dotal 1023, se me estaba depositando en esa entidad, por lo cual le estoy incluyendo copia de dicha certificación. La última noticia que tuve del Sr. Paulbath fué en Febrero de 1966, donde me informó que en esa fecha el saldo de la cuenta arrojaba $12,518.21 U. S. Dólares.

Apelo a su bondad para que me ayude, pues llevó mas de seis año tratando de irme de aquí desde que mi esposo e. p.d. se marchó. ya que primeramente me quedé con casi todos los papeles preparado cuando cerraron la Embajada Americana aquí que fué a los dos meses de haberse ido mi esposo, después en Abril de ese mismo año fué cuando vino la invasión de Playa Girón y donde murió y el 1 de Junio nació mi hija, fué por esa fecha cuando empezaron a dar visa waiver para trasladarse a los Estado Unidos aunque conseguí las visas no pude irme puesto que no logré obtener el pasaporte de la niña ya que para obtenerlo me exigían la defunción de él, y como aquí no consta la defunción de él por juzgado alguno, pues yo fuí a todos los lugares donde pudiera lograrla. Entonces empecé a visitar abogados y entidades del gobierno para ver como podría obtener el pasaporte de mi hija, y al fin de mucho luchar a finales de noviembre del pasado año me lo entregaron, escribiéndole enseguida al Sr. Paulbath para que me enviara enseguida el dinero de los pasaje cuya carta fué la que me devolvieron.

Como las carta de allá para acá se demoran mucho, le ruego le diga al Sr. Paulbath que me gire el dinero de los pasajes, cuyos datos le voy a poner a continuación:

CONCEPCION PASTRANA CERNUDA	($154.00 dólares)
SERAFIN CERNUDA GARCIA	($ 308.00 dólares)
GRACIELA CERNUDA FERNANDEZ	($308.00 dólares)
MARIA CERNUDA FERNANDEZ	($308.00 dólares)

y que todos tienen que venir dirigido a esta dirección:

COLINA #33, JESUS DEL MONTE, HABANA, CUBA.

Dígale al Sr. Paulbath que cualquier cosa que determine me llame al teléfono 99-2187, o me pase una carta nocturna, pues las cartas se demoran en llegar hasta mes y medio.

Espero confiada que me ayude usted a resolver este problema que me tiene apunto de volverme loca, y si es así le estaré agradecida toda la vida, ya que mi única esperanza es poder ver a mi hija libre y féliz.

De usted atentamente,

MARIA CERNUDA

Havana, September 11, 1967

Mr. John Paulbath
Protective Mutual Life Insurance
P.O.B. 701
Miami, Fla. 33144

Dear Mr. Paulbath:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 7 in which you inform me that it is possible for you to place funds to cover the amount of passages at the Iberia Airlines in Madrid, Iberia then notifying their Havana Office that the tickets have been prepaid and are therefore available for issuance, but I am sorry to say that this procedure is no longer allowed.

I found it out by calling personally on Iberia Airlines here, in Havana, after which I went to the Cuban National Bank where I was told that the only way the tickets could be purchased was upon my receiving the funds through the Cuban National Bank in Canadian currency. They also suggested that the fastest way to carry out the transaction was that the money be sent by telegraphic transfer through a Canadian bank to the National Bank of Cuba, the cost of passage for an adult being $370.00 and $185.00 for a minor.

Below are the names of each member of my family, passport number and the amount of money for each fare in Canadian currency.

GRACIELA CERNUDA FERNANDEZ, Passport No. 59492, amount of passage.	$ 370.00
MARIA CERNUDA FERNANDEZ, Passport No. 22972, amount of passage.	370.00
CONCEPCION PASTRANA CERNUDA, Passport No. 67122, amount of passage.	185.00
SERAFIN CERNUDA GARCIA, Passport No. 16609, amount of passage.	370.00
Total:	$1295.00

In case funds are placed as indicated, please cable me as follows; "FUNDS ALREADY SENT", to enable me to inquire at the Bank here as to its receipt.

Thanking you for your immediate attention to this matter, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Maria Cernuda
MARIA CERNUDA



Mrs. Maria Cernuda
Colina 53
Jesus del Monte
Habana, Cuba

SEP 23

Mr. John Paulbath
Protective Mutual Life Insurance
P.O.B. 701
MIAMI, Fla. 33144
U.S.A.

VIA AEREA -- PAR AVION

NOTIFIED
SEP 28 1967

TRANSLATION

21 September 1967

Mr. Juan Paula
1720 SW 97 Place
Miami, Florida 33165

Dear Paula:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of today, I am enclosing a photocopy of the letter Mrs. Maria Cernuda sent us on August 17 of this year.

Sincerely yours,

A.P. Betancourt
Senior Vice President

Septiembre 21, 1967

Sr. Juan Paula
1720 S. W. 97 Place
Miami, Florida 33165

Querido Paula:

De acuerdo con nuestra conversacion telefonica con la presente te envio una fotocopia de la carta que en Agosto 17 ppdo. nos escribio la Sra. Maria Cernuda.

Tuyo afectisimo,

AP Betancourt

A. P. Betancourt
Senior Vice President

APB:cpa

TRANSLATION

21 September 1967

Mrs. Maria Cernuda
Colina No. 33
Jesus del Monte
Habana, Cuba

Dear Mrs. Cernuda:

I received your letter of 17 August today and in accordance with your wishes, I talked with Mr. John Paulbath to explain what you need. In addition, I am sending him a copy of your letter dated 17 August.

Mr. Paulbath promised me that he would immediately look into this matter and when you desire to communicate with him you may write to me if you would like. I hope that your problem will be resolved promptly.

Attentively,

A.P. Betancourt
Senior Vice President

Septiembre 21, 1967

Sra. Maria Cernuda
Colina No. 33
Jesus del Monte
Habana, Cuba

Estimada Sra. Cernuda:

Hoy recibi su carta del dia 17 de Agosto y de acuerdo con sus deseos hable con el Sr. John Paulbath explicandole lo que Ud. necesita. Ademas, le estoy enviando una copia de su citada carta del dia 17 de Agosto.

El Sr. Paulbath me prometio ocuparse enseguida de su asunto y cuando Ud. desee comunicarse con el puede hacerlo escribiendome a mi, si asi lo desea. Espero que pronto pueda resolver su problema, y quedo,

De Ud. muy atentamente,

A. P. Betancourt
Senior Vice President

APB:cpa

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT

~~TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational~~

O Hero & Martyr Documentation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References:
A. UFGW-6440, 9 March 1967
B. UFGA-27673, 13 June 1967

1. Teresa SUAREZ Tous, widow of Jesus CARRERAS (AMBUD Dependency Case #111), has advised that she does not have a copy of her marriage certificate and is reluctant to request it from Cuba because she fears reprisals against anyone attempting to obtain documents pertaining to her late husband who was executed by the Cuban Government in 1961 for having plotted against the CASTRO regime.

2. In lieu of the marriage certificate, the widow has provided a notarized affidavit (copy attached herewith) attesting to her marriage to Jesus CARRERAS on 30 January 1960 in Havana, Cuba. In addition, the daughter's birth certificate which was forwarded under Reference B lists Teresa SUAREZ Tous and Jesus CARRERAS as parents.

Raymond K. Panuses

Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachment:
Affidavit, h/w

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/att h/w

OCT - 5 1967

1 att

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-28609 GROUP 1 Excluded from [illegible]	2 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6

CERTIFICATE

CITY OF MIAMI)
COUNTY OF DADE) SS.
STATE OF FLORIDA)

I, the undersigned TERESA SUAREZ TOUS, Cuban Citizen by birth, of legal age, legal resident of The United States since 11/2/61, with number A12 478 027. Presently residing at 3016 S.W. 24 St., Miami, Florida, being duly sworn depose and say as follow;

That my first and only marriage was performed on the 30th day of January, 1960; at Havana, Cuba, with Jesus Carreras Zayas Cuban Citizen by birth, deceased on March 11, 1961.

That from said marriage I have a daughter called Lourdes Carreras Suarez, born in Havana, Cuba.

That as Witnesses of same hereto are the signatures of Mr. Raul Garcia, living at 2724 S.W. 30 Ave., Miami, Florida, and Mr. Victoriano Alvarez, living at 2011 S.W. 23 Terrace, Miami, Florida.

That I hereby swear under penalty of perjury before a Notary Public of the State of Florida, United States of America, that the above statements are true and correct.

RAUL GARCIA

TERESA SUAREZ TOUS

Victoriano Alvarez

VICTORIANO ALVAREZ

CITY OF MIAMI)
COUNTY OF DADE) SS.
STATE OF FLORIDA)

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, duly authorized to administer oaths and take acknowledgments, personally appeared Mrs. TERESA SUAREZ TOUS, RAUL GARCIA, and VICTORIANO ALVAREZ, who being by me first duly sworn, depose and say that the allegations contained in the above certificate are true.

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE
ME THIS 18 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1967

NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF FLORIDA, AT LARGE.

CS COPY

14-124-2516

aa 1 UFGA-28609

3f

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Adjustments of Dependent Payments - Fourth Quarter FY 1967

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
AUG 17 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

References: A. UFGW-6328, 29 December 1966
B. UFGA-27424, 20 April 1967
C. UFGA-26697, 17 January 1967

1. Adjustments during the fourth quarter FY 1967 of AMBUD monthly dependency payments are reported herewith in accordance with Reference A:

Case #29: ALEMAN Aleman, Eufrasio (201-290479)
Payee: ALEMAN, Laureana C. (mother)

Effective with the May payment, the amount of the monthly payment was reduced from $225.00 to $175.00 because of the death of the father, Angel ALEMAN Perez.

Case #127: CAMPO Gutierrez, Rafael (201-292430)
Payee: CAMPO Ojeda, Pablo (father)

Effective with the June payment, the monthly amount formerly paid to the trustee will be paid to the father who arrived in the United States in February and currently resides at 1115 Medina Street, Opa Locka, Florida. In addition, the monthly payment was reduced from $225.00 to $175.00 effective with the June payment as a result of the death of the mother, Catalina GUTIERREZ.

2. The following concerns the remaining two cases for which payments were temporarily suspended pending replies from the payees as reported in Reference C:

Case #142: GUTIERREZ Izaguirre, Jorge (201-278754)
Payee: FERNANDEZ Blanco, Orlando (trustee)

Upon receipt of a satisfactory reply, payment to the trustee was reinstated (on a retroactive basis) effective with the June payment.

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
9 August 67

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28220

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Case #143: KIM Yun, Jorge (201-298852)
Payee: SANTOVENIA, Raul (trustee)

Monthly payments for this case were temporarily suspended effective with the January 1967 payment pending a reply to a request for biographic data on the parents. Based on the fact that Subject had been executed for a crime committed prior to his participation at the Bay of Pigs and also on the probability that the father, Pedro KIM, is identical with a person with the same name who AMTIKI-1 alleges to be an active Communist in Cuba (Station traces describe one Pedro KIM as an active Communist), the Station recommended that payments be terminated for this case and the recommendation was approved by Headquarters. The trustee has been informed of the suspension of payments and has also been advised that should one or both parents come to the United States, a review of the case will be made in accordance with procedures in effect at that time.

3. The following changes in payees are being reported for Headquarters records:

Case #3: BLANCO Cruz, Benito (201-283944)

In accordance with written instructions from the widow, Verania TORRES Tellez, the trusteeship for this case has been transferred from Olga LINAN to Juana BLANCO, Subject's daughter, who resides at 4061 NW 4th Terrace, Miami, Florida.

Case #74: ORIA Finales, Luis (201-283201)

The monthly payment for the mother, Pastora FINALES Hernandez, which was formerly sent to trustee Eladio GONZALEZ Finales is now sent directly to the mother who arrived in the United States a short time ago and is residing in California with a son.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	MICROFILM

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for AMBUD Dependency Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCES: A. UFGW-6440, dated 8 March 1967

B. UFGA-27706, dated 31 May 1967

C. UFGA-27673, dated 5 June 1967

1. Headquarters appreciates the time and effort expended by JMWAVE in obtaining and forwarding the documentation requested in reference A. A proposal that BEC assume the responsibility for funding these cases has been submitted to that Agency and a decision is expected in the very near future. In the event the decision is favorable, the type of vital documents forwarded in references B and C will be necessary in order to determine the eligibility of dependents, under the criteria established by BEC, to receive compensation.

2. There appears to be some confusion in the translation of certain documents forwarded in references B and C since the recording dates of births and marriage, rather than the actual dates of the events, was given in references. Listed below are the correct dates for JMWAVE records.

REFERENCE B

Case #95: RODRIGUEZ Navarreto, Nemesio (Attachment A)

Correct DOB of son, Carlos Alberto RODRIGUEZ Acosta, is 8 July 1956 as previously reported. 16 July is the date birth was recorded

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig and 2 - COS, JMWAVE

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW-6617	DATE 24 JUL 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6

20 July 1967

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - OC/WH/COG
1 - Originator

ABSTRACT X

ORIGINATING

OFFICE / OFFICER / TYPIST	EXT.
OC/WH/COG/Nancye Gratz:mjr	7447

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG/MO		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/COG	7/ /	Earl J. Williamson

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG 1-66

(40)

DISPATCH

Case #97: DELGADO, Miguel de los Santos (Attachment B)

a. Correct marriage date is 19 March 1954. 28 April 1954 is the date marriage was recorded.

b. Correct DOB of son, Jose Miguel DELGADO Carballo, is 12 August 1954. 16 December 1954 is the date birth was recorded.

c. Correct DOB of daughter, Ana Maria DELGADO Carballo, is 21 March 1956. 15 April 1954 is the date birth was recorded.

Case #102: TAMARGO Gutierrez, Rolando (Attachment C)

c. Correct DOB of daughter, Barbara Alejandra TAMARGO Fernandez is 29 March 1961 as previously reported. 21 July 1961 is the date birth was recorded.

REFERENCE C

Case #109: ESCOTO, Armando (Attachment #4)

c. Correct DOB of daughter, Ileana Maria ESCOTO Rodriguez, is 23 November 1945. 14 January 1946 is the date birth was recorded.

Case #111: CARRERAS, Jesus (Attachment #6)

b. Correct DOB of daughter, Lourdes CARRERAS Suarez, is 27 August 1960. 1 June 1961 (also incorrectly translated as 1 July 1960) is the date birth was recorded.

3. The station is requested to forward all available documentation as rapidly as it is received by AMTIKI.

Ellen F. MARGANY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
XX	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for AMBUD Dependency Payment Case #130

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-6440, 9 March 1967

No 201

1. Forwarded herewith are reproductions of a letter from Marina MARDONES Vivanco, widow of Jose Lauro BLANCO Muniz, and the following documents pertaining to Hero and Martyr Case No. 130, Jose Lauro BLANCO Muniz (no 201 file):

a. Certification of Birth: Laura Marina BLANCO Mardones, daughter of Jose Lauro BLANCO Muniz and Marina MARDONES Vivanco. DPOB: 3 July 1956, Havana, Cuba.

b. Certification of Birth: Jose Lauro BLANCO y Muniz. DPOB: 18 August 1909, Palmillas, Matanzas, Cuba.

2. Marina MARDONES Vivanco has advised that, thus far, she has been unable to secure a copy of her marriage certificate but indicated she will continue to pursue this matter.

Raymond K Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachments:
1. Letter referred to in Paragraph 1 (3 copies)
2. Laura Marina BLANCO Mardones birth certificate referred to in Paragraph 1a. (3 copies)
3. Jose Lauro BLANCO Muniz birth certificate referred to in Paragraph 1b. (3 copies)

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - WH/COG, w/atts h/w

CC of dispatch w/atts
Filed Jose Lauro BLANCO Soft file
19-124-25/6

1 ATT

CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
22 June 67	JUN 26 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27858

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124/25/6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

att #1:

June 10, 1967

Your re.: Allotment HM

Dear Mr.

As per your request, I tried to obtain copy of my marriage certificate from Cuba. Despite my efforts I have been unable to secure one.

However, copies of my husband's and my daughter's birth certificates, issued some time ago, were forwarded to me.

Marginal note on my husband's certificate shows entry of our marriage and our daughter's also mentions the fact of said marriage.

I am enclosing photocopies of both documents. Should you require the originals, I will be happy to forward them to you as long as they are returned to me since these are the only copies in my possession.

I will continue to try to secure copy of my marriage certificate which I will forward to you, should I obtain it.

Trusting these documents will be of help to you, I am,

Very truly yours

Marina Mardones Vivanco
(Mrs. Lauro Blanco)
3205 SW 7 Street
Apt. 2
Miami, Florida 33135

enc. phcs. of documents

CS COPY

ATT 1 to UFGA 27858

19-124-25/6

att # 5

MOD. CM-4

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL
DE
MATANZAS

CERTIFICACION DE NACIMIENTO

SOLICITUD No. 175494

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL	SECCION DE	TOMO	FOLIO	INSCRIPCION	FECHA DEL ASIENTO: DIA	MES	AÑO
	nacimientos	2 Palmillas	98	105	25	Septiembre	1909

FECHA DEL NACIMIENTO (En Letras)

HORA: Tres de la mañana

DIA: dieciocho

MES: Agosto

AÑO: mil novecientos nueve

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: JOSE LAURO BLANCO Y MUÑIZ

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: Palmillas

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE: José Blanco del Moraval

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DEL PADRE: Palmillas

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE: Avelina Muñiz y Guerra

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DE LA MADRE: Colón

ABUELOS PATERNOS: Benito Blanco Y Herrera
Mercedes del Moral y Martínez

ABUELOS MATERNOS: Rafael Muñiz y Fredres
Andrea Guerra y Suárez.

INSCRIPCION PRACTICADA EN VIRTUD DE comparecencia delpadre del inscripto

NOTAS MARGINALES

Contrajo matrimonio con Marina Mardones y Vivanco el día once de Junio de mil novecientos sesenta ante el Juzgado Municipal de Santiago de las Vegas.-

0243155477

0250155477

ESPACIO PARA FIJAR LOS SELLOS O PONER LA NOTA DE EXENCION.

MARIA FIGUERAS GALLARDO, ENCARGADO DE ESTE REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL.

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

Matanzas, A diez

DE Abril DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete

Maria Figueras

Archivera de la Audiencia

CONFECCIONADO POR: A.L.P.

CONFRONTADO POR: M.F.G.

att. # 2

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DE NACIMIENTO

SOLICITUD No. 146280.-

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE: ARROYO NARANJO.-

FECHA DEL ASIENTO: DIA 30. MES Junio.- AÑO 1960.-

SECCION DE: Nacimientos.- TOMO 155.- FOLIO 563.- INSCRIPCION 1051.-

FECHA DEL NACIMIENTO (EN LETRAS)

HORA: once de la mañana.- Hembra.- DIA: tres.-

MES: Julio.- AÑO: mil novecientos cincuentiseis.-

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: Laura Marina Blanco y Mardones.-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: La Habana.-

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE: Jose Lauro Blanco Muñiz.-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DEL PADRE: Matanzas.-

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE: Marina Mardones y Vivanco.-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DE LA MADRE: Habana.-

ABUELOS PATERNOS: Jose y Avelina.-

ABUELOS MATERNOS: Domingo y Juana.-

INSCRIPCION PRACTICADA EN VIRTUD DE: Ley 797 de 20 de Mayo de 1960 y declaración de la madre de la inscripta.-

NOTAS MARGINALES

No constan.-

AUTORIZADO EL USO DE MAQUINA TIMBRADORA POR DECRETO DEL MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA No. 2 DE 4 DE ENERO
IMPUESTO DEL TIMBRE NACIONAL 2.00
25 MAY 67

CONFECCIONADO: B
CONFRONTADO:

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE la Habana.-

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

Habana, veinticinco

DE Mayo DE MIL NOVECIENTOS

SESENTA Y Siete.-

ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

276.10.01 - 553181

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT

Operational/TYPIC/AMBUD/AMBIDDY
Dependency payment for Case #103

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCES:
A. UFGA-27636, dated 22 May 1967
B. UFGW-6351, dated 19 January 1967
C. UFGA-25261, dated 3 June 1966

1. Headquarters concurs in JMWAVE's proposed action refusing payment of additional funds to Subject of reference. Apparently Subject had not advised AMBIDDY of the regular support payments paid by AMTIKI at the time reference B requested data concerning the case. Neither is there any indication on the HEW form forwarded in reference C that additional income was being received by Subject from AMBIDDY. It would, therefore, appear that AMBIDDY may have indicated there was some connection between the source of AMTIKI and AMBIDDY funds and suggested Subject approach AMTIKI for the terminated AMBIDDY income.

2. In any event, subject letter did provide copies of the type of vital documents JMWAVE is attempting to obtain in order to document Heroes and Martyrs for possible future payments by BEC.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - COS, JMWAVE

19-124-25/6

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-6561	16 JUN 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - OC/WH/COG
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - Originator

13 June 1967

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
OC/WH/COG/	NANCYE GRATZ	mjr	7447

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG/MO		[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/COG		Earl J. Williamson

ANCS	FI	
PS		
ABSTRACT	X	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Documentation for AMBUD Dependency Payment Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: UFGA-27717

Forwarded herewith are reproductions of documents pertaining to the following additional Hero and Martyr case:

Case #105: BAEZ, Juventino (201 # not available)

a. Letter from mother, Flora MAS Machado
(attachment #1)

b. Marriage certificate: 6 January 1937
Juventino Jose Severino BAEZ Rodriguez and
Flora Aida Laudelina Clara Demetria MAS Machado
(Attachment #2)

c. Birth certificate: Flora Elaina de la Caridad
BAEZ Mas
DPOB: 1 December 1946, Santa Clara, Cuba
(Attachment #3)

d. Marriage certificate: 16 May 1964
Mario R. de las CUEVAS and Flora E. BAEZ
(attachment #4)

Burton J. Celenza
Burton J. CELENZA

Attachments:
1.- Letter from mother - H/W
2.- Marriage certificate, mother and father - H/W
3.-Birth certificate, Flora BAEZ - H/W
4.- Marriage certificate, Flora BAEZ - H/W

Distribution
3 - C/WH/COG w/atts. #1 thru #4 - H/W

19-124-25/6

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 June 1967	JUN 13 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27771

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 att.

Miami, May 23, 1967

[redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]

As per your letter dated May 3, 1967, requesting my marriage license and copies of birth certificates of my son and daughter, I am enclosing both my marriage certificate and a copy of my daughter Lora (married) birth certificate. I also have a son Oscar (10 years old) of which I do not have one, but immediately after receiving your letter I requested my family in Cuba to send it to me, and as soon as I receive it will mail it to you.

I want to take this opportunity to thank you for the big help you are giving me and of which I will always be grateful. I remain,

Sincerely yours,

Flora Más

Flora Mas
18010 N.W. 13 Ct.
Miami, Florida 33169

P.S. I am also enclosing my daughters marriage license.

CS COPY

Att. 1 UFGA-27771

19-124-25/6

Certificate of Marriage

Church of

[illegible]

[illegible]

This is to Certify

That [illegible]

and [illegible]

were lawfully Married

on the 16 day of [illegible] 19[illegible]

According to the Rite of the Roman Catholic Church

and in conformity with the laws of

the State of [illegible]

Rev. [illegible] officiating,

in the presence of [illegible]

and [illegible] Witnesses,

as appears from the Marriage Register of this Church.

Dated [illegible]

Pastor

[illegible]
GISTRO CIVIL DE LA CIUDAD DE SANTA CLARA.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICO:- Que al Folio 193 del Tomo 75 de la Sección de MATRIMONIOS del Registro Civil a cargo de este Juzgado, obra el Acta que copiada dice:- -

JUVENTINO JOSE SEVERINO DIAZ Y RODRIGUEZ CON FLORA [illegible] MAGDALENA CIRA DEMETRIA MAS Y MACHADO.- 1º.- En la Ciudad de Santa Clara a las tres y cuarto de la tarde del día diez y [illegible] de Enero de mil novecientos treinta y siete, por ante el Doctor Rafael Sed [illegible], Juez Municipal por designación legal y de mí el Secretario Alfredo Testar y Díaz, se procede a inscribir el Matrimonio celebrado el día seis del mes actual ante el Notario de esta Ciudad Doctor Rodolfo Díaz y del Rosso, por JUVENTINO JOSE SEVERINO DIAZ Y RODRIGUEZ, natural y vecino de esta Ciudad, de veintidós años de edad, cubano, Teniente del Ejército, hijo de José Rufino Díaz y Díaz, Procurador Público y de Isidora [illegible] Rodríguez y Martínez, de los quehaceres domésticos y ambos de su domicilio; Y FLORA [illegible] MAGDALENA CIRA DEMETRIA MAS Y MACHADO, natural y vecina de esta Ciudad, cubana, soltera, hija de Miguel Mas Callejo y de Luz [illegible] Machado Cruz, propietario y de su casa, ambos de su domicilio y de diez y nueve años de edad, acompañados de los Testigos Señores Jorge Lubian Morell, Gerardo Machado Cruz, Orlando Villaurreta, y Miguel Angel Avalos [illegible], naturales de [illegible] y Santa Clara, de profesión Propietarios, de estado casado, menos Villaurreta, todos mayores de edad y de este vecindario. Todo lo cual resulta de la copia fehaciente de la Escritura número cuatro del corriente año, fué otorgada ante dicho Notario por los mencionados Contrayentes y remitida a este Juzgado, junto con el oportuno Expediente. Inscripción que se verifica en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el Artículo [illegible] cuarenta del Código Notarial, firmando el Señor Juez, por ante mí que Certifico. Se hace constar que no se consigna la naturalidad de los padres de los Contrayentes por no constar de la expresada Escritura, lo que también Certifico.- Dr. Rafael Sed. A. Testar. Hay un sello.-

ES CONFORME A SU ORIGINAL Y A PETICION DE [illegible] EXPIDO LA PRESENTE EN SANTA CLARA A [illegible] DE MARZO DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y TRES.- -

JUEZ MUNICIPAL

SECRETARIO JUDICIAL.

Cftla. por
R.V.

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DEL
TERMINO MUNICIPAL DE LA HABANA

CERTI[illegible]

SOLICITUD NO.- 102[illegible]70.-

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE Juzgado Municipal del Vedado.-	DIA 27	MES Junio	AÑO 1947
SECCION DE Nacimientos.	TOMO 182	FOLIO 141	NUMERO 1041

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO
FLORA ELOISA DE LA CARIDAD BAEZ Y MAS.- - - - - - - -

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO
Diez y seis y Veinte y tres.- - - - - - - - - -

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE
Juventino José Severino Baez Rodriguez.

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DEL PADRE
Santa Clara.- - - - - -

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE
Flora Aida Eudolina Clara Demetria Más y Machado, - - - - - - - - -

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DE LA MADRE
Santa Clara.- - - - - -

FECHA DEL NACIMIENTO (EN LETRAS)

HORA
Doce meridiano- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

DIA
Primero- - - - - -

MES
Diciembre

AÑO
Mil novecientos cuarenta y seis.- - - - - - - - -

NOTAS MARGINALES
No constan.- -

SALVEDADES
NINGUNA

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL
DEL TERMINO MUNICIPAL DE LA HABANA
CERTIFICA QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS
CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON
LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION A QUE
SE HACE REFERENCIA.

LA HABANA, ocho
DE Abril DE MIL NOVECIENTOS
SESENTA Y tres.-

AUTORIZADO EL USO DE [illegible] POR DECRETO DEL MINISTRO [illegible] NO. 8 DE [illegible] DE 19[illegible]

CONFECCIONADO POR
F. Jiménez.-

CONFRONTADO POR

CERTIFICADO POR

4

ufga 27674
13 Jun 67
19-124-25/6

[illegible] 4 aug 72 [illegible]

[illegible] CARD and approved

[illegible] and approved

[illegible] and approved

[illegible] FERRED.

[illegible] 201-282302

[illegible] indexed document

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for AMBUD Dependency Payment Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGA-27706, 31 May 1967

Forwarded herewith are reproductions of documents pertaining to the following additional Hero and Martyr cases:

ATTACHMENT #1: Letter and one document.

No 201

Case #98: RAMIREZ, Porfirio (201# not available)

in soft file

a. Letter from widow, Clara DELGADO Caraballoso

b. Parolee cards for Subject and widow.

ATTACHMENT #2: Letter and Six documents.

Case #100: ROJAS Eirea, Anastasio (201-282302)

ATT 2 given slash# UFGA 27673/01 filed in 201-282302

a. Letter from mother, Maria de las M. EIREA

b. Marriage certificate: 1922. Manuel Ignacio de la Concepcion ROJAS Molina and Mercedes EIREA Sanchez.

ATT 3 given slash# UFGA 27673/02 filed in 201-279298

c. Birth certificate: Maria de las M. EIREA. DPOB: 16 March 1903, Havana, Cuba.

ATT 4 given slash# UFGA 27673/03 filed in 201-283865

d. Birth certificate: Manuel Ignacio de la Concepcion ROJAS Molina. DPOB: 11 December 1893, Havana, Cuba

e. Death certificate: Anastasio ROJAS Eirea, 10 March 1961.

f. Death sentence: Anastasio ROJAS Eirea. (First trial 9 March 1961 and appeal trial 10 March 1961)

4 ATTS.

19-124-25/6

ATTACHMENTS:
1. Letter and one document, Case #98
2. Letter and six documents, Case #100
3. Letter and two documents, Case #108
4. " " " Case #109
5. " " " Case #110
6. Letter and one document, Case #111
7. Letter and two documents, Case #128

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - WH/COG w/atts. 1 - 7 H/W

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
5 June 67

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 13 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27673

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
201-282302
201-279298
201-283865

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27673

ATTACHMENT #3: Letter and two documents. filed 201 file

Case #108: PRIETO Ruiz, Plinio (201-279298)

a. Letter from mother, Maria C. RUIZ Delgado

b. Marriage certificate: Plinio Luis PRIETO Ruiz and Amparo POSADA

c. Death certificate: Plinio Luis PRIETO Ruiz

ATTACHMENT #4: Letter and two documents.

Case #109: ESCOTO, Armando (201-283865) filed 201 file

a. Letter from widow, Juana RODRIGUEZ Exposito.

b. Birth certificate: Thania Teresita ESCOTO Rodriguez
DPOB: 27 May 1937, Havana, Cuba

c. Birth certificate: Ileana Maria ESCOTO Rodriguez.
DPOB: 14 ~~January 1946, Havana, Cuba~~ 23 Jan 1945

ATTACHMENT #5: Letter and two documents

Case #110: YERBA, Jose Antonio (201# not available)

filed soft file

a. Letter from mother, Isabel Maria SUAREZ Homdedeu.

b. Birth affidavit: Julio Antonio YEBRA.
DPOB: not given

c. Marriage certificate: Delfin Salvador YEBRA Proenza and Isabel Maria SUAREZ Hondedeu.

ATTACHMENT #6: Letter and one document.

Case #111: CARRERAS, Jesus (201# not available)

filed soft file

a. Letter from widow, Teresa SUAREZ Tous.

b. Birth certificate: Lourdes CARRERAS Suarez.
DPOB: ~~1 July 1960, Havana, Cuba~~ 27 Aug 1960

ATTACHMENT #7: Letter and two documents.

Case #128: SIERRA Montesino, Fidel (201 # not available)

filed soft file

a. Letter from wife, Esther PERDOMO Lopez.

b. Birth certificate: Esther PERDOMA Lopez.
DPOB: 26 September 1928, Moron, Camaguey

c. Birth certificate: Esther B. SIERRA Perdomo
DPOB: 31 March 1948, Arroyo Arenas, El Cano, Havana Prov. Cuba.

Burton J. Celenza
Burton J. CELENZA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ATTACHMENT #1
TO: UFGA-27273

TRANSLATION

Chicago, May 8, 1967

[redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]

In your letter of 1 May 1967 you asked me for my marriage certificate and my son's birth certificate, I do not have them because my home was immediately intervened by the so-called Comandante Felix Torres who burned my family passport and wouldn't even let me get my son's clothing. My cousin (?), Porfirio's brother Rodolfo RAMIREZ xxxx clandestinely went to the coasts of Cuba to get me. I am sending you photostatic copies of our parolee cards. I believe they will suffice but at the same time I will write to Porfirio's mother who is still in Cuba since she has not been given permission to leave and come to this country and I will ask her to get copies of the marriage certificate. I will send them to you as soon as I receive them.

Thanks again,
/s/ Clara DELGADO

D

Chicago 5-8/67

Estimado señor.

En su carta fecha May 1st me pide certificado de mi matrimonio y certificado de nacimiento de mi hijo, yo no tengo en mi poder los mismos pues mi casa fue intervenida inmediatamente por el supuesto Comandante Felix Torres el cual quemó mi pasaporte familiar y todos los documentos importante que tenía, no me dejaron sacar ni la ropita de mi hijo, mi cuñado Rodolfo Ramirez hermano de Porfirio fue a buscarme a las costas de Cuba clandestinamente por eso pude salir, yo le mando copias de nuestros Cables, creo sean suficiente; pero a la vez le escribiré a la madre de Porfirio que todavía se encuentra en Cuba pues no le dan la salida para este país, y le pediré que me saque copias en el

14-00000

juzgado de mi matrimonio, le inmediatamente que las pide se las mandase.

Gracias una vez mas



AFTER 5 DAYS RETURN TO

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ZIP CODE 60638

CHICAGO
[illegible]
ILL.

UNITED STATES

5¢

O'HARE

PLANT for a more BEAUTIFUL AMERICA

●●● VIA AIR MAIL

14-00000

Family Name Given Name Initial

RAMIREZ-Delgado, Porfirio de Jesus

Nationality (Citizenship) Passport Number

Cuban PAROLEE

United States Address

2229 SW 12 St., Miami, Florida

Airline & Flight No. or Vessel of Arrival Passenger Boarded At

[illegible] 3323

Foreign Address

Marti #250-A, Santa Clara, Las Villas, Cuba

Birthdate

7-16-50

Birthplace

Santa Clara, Las Villas, Cuba

Visa Issued At

Date Visa Issued

Your admission cannot be authorized as PAROLED

Until Indefinitely

Conditions 212 (d)(5)

A-12-494-222

KEY 9-27-61 PGR

(Port) (Date) (Immig. Officer)

PLEASE PRINT IN BLOCK LETTERS

Family Name Given Name Initial

[illegible]-Ceballos, Clara

Nationality (Citizenship) Passport Number

Cuban

United States Address

2229 S. 12 St., Miami, Florida PAROLEE

[illegible] 3323

Foreign Address

Marti #250-A, Santa Clara, Las Villas, Cuba, [illegible] at

Until Indefinitely

Santa Clara, Las Villas, Cuba 212 (d)(5)

Visa Issued At

A-12-494-223

KEY 9-27-61 PGR

(Port) (Date) (Immig. Officer)

ATTACHMENT #8
TO: UFGA-27682

Miami,Fla,May 15,1967

Dear Sir:

Your letter of May 3 was received by me,but as I do not have on hand,my son JULIO ANTONIO YEBRA SUAREZ'S birth certificate I had to look for and AFFIDAVIT.

Enclosed photostatic copy of my Marriage Certificate,this is one of the few documents I could to receive from Cuba. I have asked many times for Julio's birth certificate but up to the present I have been unable for getting it. Enclosed is the affidavit signed by my close friend Dr.Martha A.Garcia Ochoa,attorney at Law,Member of the Cuban Bar Association,journalist,former Congresswoman and very honorable and very well known person. I have written again to one friend in Cuba,asking for Julio's birth certificate,if I would receive it,I will send it to you immediately.

Thanking you for your interest on my case,I remain,

Very truly yours,

ISABEL M.SUAREZ Vda.de Yebra.

Isabel M Suárez

590 S.W. 10 St.
Miami,Fla,33129.

(Delfin)

7-4407

DOCTOR JOSE MARIA DIAZ DE VILLEGAS Y MARTINEZ, JUEZ MUNICIPAL Y ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO CIVIL DE LA CIUDAD DE HOLGUIN.---------------

CERTIFICO:- Que al folio 383 del Tomo 19 de la Seccion de Matrimonios de este Registro Civil a mi cargo, aparece la inscripción que copiada dice así:--

DELFIN SALVADOR ELEUTERIO YEBRA PROENZA.CON YSABEL MARIA YNES SUAREZ HONDEDEU.Solteros:-26 y 25 años.-No 328.-En la ciudad de Holguin a las nueve de la mañana del día veinte y nueve de Julio de mil novecientos veinte y siete; ante los señores Doctor Francisco Fernández León, Juez Municipal Sustituto y Luis Alvarez Zaldivar, Secretario, comparecen Delfin Salvador Eleuterio Yebra y Proenza, natural de Fray Benito, vecino de esta ciudad, soltero, de veinte y seis años de edad, Abogado; hijo de Diego y de Ascención, naturales de Fray Benito e Ysabel María Ynés Suarez Hondedeu, natural de Gibara, vecina de esta ciudad, soltera, de veinte y cinco años de edad, de oficios domésticos, hija de Adolfo y de Concepción, naturales de Puerto Rico y de Mayarí respectivamente; con objeto de verificar su matrimonio Civil.-El señor Juez despues de ver que el expediente instruído al efecto está ajustado a la Ley, ordenó la lectura de los artículos cincuenta y seis y cincuenta y siete del Código Civil.Leidas por mi el Secretario dichas disposiciones legales, el señor Juez, preguntó a los comparecientes si deseaban celebrar su matrimonio ysi efectivamente lo verificaban en este acto y habiendo contestado afirmativamente los declaró legitimamente casados.-Fueron testigos:Delfín Aguilera Ochoa y Armelio Feria Salazar, mayores de edad y de esta vecindad.-Leida esta acta y conformes la firman todos por ante mi el Secretario de que certifico.-El sello del Juzgado.-Dr.Francisco Fernández.-Dr.Delfín Yebra.-Ysabel M.Suarez.-Dr.Delfin Aguilera.-A.Feria.-Luis Alvarez Zaldivar.------------------------------

Y para entregar a parte interesada, que así lo ha solicitado, se expide la presente en Holguín a veinte y cinco de Julio de mil novecientos cincuenta y ocho.-

Juez Municipal.-

Ante mi

Confrontada por:- Secretario Judicial.-

1958

Visto y legalizado por este Juzgado de Primera Instancia para que pueda surtir efecto en las Oficinas del Registro Civil.

Holguín, ______ de 2 AGO 1956

Vto. Bno.

Juez de Primera Instancia

Secretario

[illegible]

14-00000

ATTACHMENT #6
TO: UFGA-27673

TRANSLATION

Miami 7 May 1967

Mr. ________

The only paper that I have in my possession is my daughter's birth certificate. My marriage certificate is in Cuba. I cannot send anyone to get it because the person who goes to get it would be persecuted because the name of my husband is on it.

Attached is the child's certificate. I would appreciate your letting me know if this is sufficient since trying to obtain mine would be difficult.

Attentively,
/s/ Teresa SUAREZ

Miami 5-7/67

S/r. -

El único papel que yo tengo en mi poder, es el certificado de nacimiento de mi hija. Mi certificado de matrimonio está en Cuba. No puedo mandarlo a buscar puesto que la persona que se presentara a recogerlo sería perseguida por aparecer el nombre de mi esposo en el mismo.

A esta le adjunto el certificado de la niña. Le agradecería me dejara saber si con eso le es suficiente, ya que con el mío existe esa dificultad.

Atentamente.
Tilda [illegible].

0055638

Dr. JOSE ANTONIO PEREZ GORRIN JUEZ MUNICIPAL DEL [illegible] Y ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO CIVIL DEL MISMO. - - - - - - - - - - - -

Certifico;- Que al folio 500 del tomo 262 de la Sección de NACIMIENTOS, de este Registro Civil de mi cargo consta el acta que copiada dice así;- [illegible] Y [illegible].-1299.-En la Habana, provincia de Habana, a primero de Junio de mil novecientos se[illegible] y [illegible] ante el Doctor José Antonio Perez Gorrin, Juez Municipal, y de Humberto Zurraluqui y Canciano, Secretario, se procede a inscribir el nacimiento de una hembra, ocurrido a las cuatro de la madrugada del día veinte y siete de Agosto de mil novecientos sesenta en veinte y tres entre A y B, a quien se le pone por nombre; [illegible].-es hija de Jesus Carreras y Suarez, y de Teresa Suarez y Tous, naturales de Trinidad y Habana, y vecinos de Diez y nueve dos mil ochocientos [illegible] por línea paterna de Tomás y Asunción, naturales de Cuba.-y por la materna de Pablo y María, naturales de Cuba.-Esta inscripción se practica en virtud de declaración de la madre de la inscripta.-Son testigos Nelson Perez, y Mario Grosso y Díaz, mayores de edad, y vecinos de Fomento quinientos sesenta y ocho, y Concordia doscientos cinco.-Leída esta acta se estampa en ella el sello del Juzgado y la firma el señor Juez, los testigos y el declarante, de que certifico;-Dr. J. A. Perez, Teresa Suarez.-N. Perez.-M. Grosso.-H. Zurraluqui.-Hay un sello. -

Y A [illegible] PARTE INTERESADA expido la presente en la Habana, en la Habana, a diez y seis de Junio de mil novecientos sesenta y uno. -

Secretario.

Miami, May 9-/67.

Dear Mister

Here I send you mine birth certificate and it say that I'm married with Fidel [illegible], and I send you mine daughter birth certificate.

I want you to excuse me for not going to your office but in the letter you sent it doesn't say the address only the P.O. box.

If I have to go to your office send me the address, and I'll go, please.

I want to thank you for your kindness.

Sincerely.

(PS) If you need or want the certificate you can keep it, because I have another.

Thanks.

Esther Ledesma
326 NW 10 Ave.
Miami Fla
33128

UNITED STATES WASHINGTON 5¢

UNITED STATES WASHINGTON 5¢

UNITED STATES WASHINGTON 5¢

5 GREAT RIVER ROAD

30456.

JUZGADO MUNICIPAL DE MORON

30455.

DOCTORA DORIS LIMA VIDAL, [illegible] JUEZ MUNICIPAL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO CIVIL DE LA CIUDAD DE MORON CAMAGUEY.------------------------------------

C E R T I F I C O: Que el Folio.-Numero.- CIENTO ONCE, del Tomo.-Original Numero.-CINCUENTA Y UNO, de la Sección de Nacimientos, del Registro Civil de este Juzgado Municipal a mi cargo consta la inscripción que copiada literalmente dice.-Así.-Numero.-QUINIENTOS CUARENTA Y CUATRO :- BLANCA ESTHER JUSTINA PERDOMO LOPEZ:-En la Ciudad de Morón, a las diez de la mañana del día veinte y siete de Septiembre de mil novecientos veinte y ocho ante el Doctor Mario F. Vázquez Martinez, Juez Municipal, Primer Suplente y de Manuel Pringuier Corrales, Secretario, compareció el Señor Bernardo Perdomo Granela, natural de Vueltas, mayor de edad, Guardia Rural y vive Reparto Vista, con objeto de que se inscriba en el Registro Civil, una hembra, y al efecto como padre de la misma manifestó. Que nació en el domicilio del declarante el día veinte y seis del presente a la una de la mañana. Que es hija del declarante y de la Sra. Elda Rosa López, natural de esta Ciudad, de diez y siete años de edad, ocupada en los quehaceres de su casa, y vive donde el declarante. Que es nieta por línea paterna del Señor Eugenio Perdomo y de la Señora Consuelo Granela Espinosa, naturales de Canarias, y de Remedios y materna de Doña Ramona López, natural de esta Ciudad. Y que lleva los nombres de BLANCA ESTHER JUSTINA. Fueron testigos los Señores Ramón Borroto Borroto y Antonio Lleo Fernández, mayores de edad, casados, empleados, y vecinos de esta Ciudad, a quienes les consta todas las circunstancias consignadas por el declarante. Leída y aprobada esta acta, se sella con el de este Juzgado y la firma el Señor Juez, el declarante y los testigos, lo Certifico. Hay un sello. Dr. Mario F. Vazquez, B. Perdomo, R. Borroto Antonio Lleo, M.L. Pringuier.-NOTA :- Se hace constar que la inscripta a que esta acta se refiere contrajo matrimonio en la Habana ante el Notario José R. Cosculluela el día catorce de Junio del año actual, con Fidel Sierra Montesino, según aparece del remitido por el Juez Municipal del Oeste de la Habana, Morón, cuatro de Noviembre de mil novecientos cuarenta y siete. Certifico Hay un sello. Dr. Mario Ruiz.------------------------------------

CONCUERDA CON SU ORIGINAL QUE OBRA AL FOLIO Y TOMO CITADOS y a instancia de parte interesada que así lo solicita, expido la presente en Morón a los veinte y nueve días del mes de Marzo de mil novecientos sesenta.- - - - - -

Entre líneas, exhorto, Vale.-)

Juez Municipal.-

Secretario Judicial.-

MORON

Se le fijó sellos de Jubilación Judicial por valor de setenta y cincos centavos. Decreto-Ley. 1320-1954.-

YWR

Confrontado por

REPUBLICA DE CUBA

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA

DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

DR. JUAN GUALBERTO CABALLERO EDREIRA, Jefe del Negociado de Asuntos Legales, Encargado del Registro de Legalizaciones de firmas de Funcionarios Judiciales, P.A.

CERTIFICO: que es auténtica, al parecer, la firma del Funcionario Judicial que consta en el precedente documento.

Habana, 20 ABR 1960

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
PODER JUDICIAL
JUZGADO MUNICIPAL DE EL CANO
ARROYO ARENAS

30462

PROCURADOR RAMIRO MARTINEZ TORRES, JUEZ MUNICIPAL DE EL CANO EN ARROYO ARENAS Y ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO CIVIL DEL MISMO. . . . .

CERTIFICO: Que al folio 97 del Tomo 23 de la Sección de Nacimientos de éste Registro Civil, consta el Acta 97, que dice: ESTHER SALBINA SIERRA Y PERDOMO.-En Arroyo Arenas, El Cano, provincia de La Habana, a las once de la mañana del día veinte y ocho de Marzo de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve, ante el Dr. José Miguel Roig y Castro, Juez Municipal, Encargado del Registro Civil y de Alberto Urra Menendez Secretario, se procede a inscribir elnacimiento de una hembra, ocurrido a las doce y media de la tarde del día treinta y uno de Marzo del año próximo pasado, en Carlos Marrero uno, El Cano; es hija de Fidel Sierra y Montesino, natural de Alquizar, empleado y de Esther Perdomo y López, natural de Morón, ocupada en su casa y ambos mayores de edad y vecinos de Santa Catalina ciento siete, Marianao; es nieta por línea paterna de Manuel Sierra y Conde, vecino de Santa Catalina ciento siete, Marianao y de Fidela Montesino y Sánchez, difunta y ambos naturales de Alquizar y por la materna de Bernardo Perdomo y Granela, natural de Santa Clara y vecino de Norte sin número, Marianao y de Elda López y Escudel, natural de Morón y vecina de Cocos sin número Cerro, Habana. Se le puso por nombre: ESTHER SALBINA. Esta inscripción se practica en virtud de declaración del padre de la que se inscribe y la presencian como testigos Roberto Valdés y Cárdenas, natural de San Miguel del Padron, mayor de edad, de estado soltero, ocupación empleado y vecino de Agramonte quinientos diez y ocho y Dimas Vázquez y Valcárcel, natural de España, ciudadano cubano, mayor de edad, de estado casado, ocupación empleado y vecino de San Cándido cinco, digo cincuenta y cinco, ambos en Marianao. Leída esta acta, e invitadas las personas que deben suscribirla a que la leyeran por sí mismas si así lo creyeren conveniente, se estampó el sello del Juzgado y la firma el señor Juez, los testigos y el declarante, de que certifico.-sobre raya" declaración del padre de la que se inscribe" Vale.-Frdo Dr José Miguel Roig.-Fidel Sierra Montesino.-R Valdés-Frdo Ilegible.-Alberto Urra Menéndez. Hay un sello del Juzgado - - - - - - - -

Y a instancia de parte, se extiende la presente en Arroyo Arenas, a primero de Abril de mil novecientos sesenta. -

Ante mí

SECRETARIO
Juzgado Municipal de El Cano

Asiento

Confrontada con ________

REPUBLICA DE CUBA

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA

DIRECCION CENTRAL DE JUSTICIA

DR. JUAN GUALBERTO CABALLERO FERREIRA, Jefe del Negociado de Asuntos Legales, Encargado del Registro de Legalizaciones de firmas de Funcionarios Judiciales, P.A.

CERTIFICO: que es auténtica, al parecer, la firma del Funcionario Judicial que consta en el precedente documento.

Habana, 20 ABR 1960

hfga 27717
12 Jun 67
19-124-25/6

4 aug 72

201-248158

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROC ACTION	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Additional Documentation on AMBUD Dependency Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGW-6440, 9 March 1967
B. UFGA-27425, 26 April 1967

1. Reproductions of the legal-type documents requested by Headquarters under Reference A for the Hero & Martyr cases receiving AMBUD dependency payment are being obtained by the AMTIKI facility as reported in Reference B.

2. We are forwarding as attachments, herewith, reproductions of the documents that have been received for the following cases. Reproductions of documents pertaining to the remaining cases will be forwarded as received:

Attachment A: One document

[illegible] 201

Case #95: ✓ RODRIGUEZ Navarrote, Nemosio (201 # not available) Birth certificate for son, Carlos Alberto RODRIGUEZ Acosta. DPOB: 16 July 1956, Havana, Cuba. (Previously reported as 8 July 1956) — correct

(The widow, Modesta ACOSTA, states that marriage certificate is not available.)

Attachment B: Three documents [illegible] UFGA 27706 [illegible] 201-283995

Case #97: DELGADO, Miguel de los Santos (201-283995)

19 march

a. Marriage certificate: ~~28 April~~ 1954. Miguel de los Santos DELGADO Martinez and Hilda Rosa CARBALLO Miranda.

b. Birth certificate: Jose Miguel DELGADO Carballo. DPOB: ~~16 December 1954~~, Havana, Cuba. (Not previously reported)
12 august 1954

c. Birth certificate: Ana Maria DELGADO Caraballo. DPOB: ~~15 April 1954~~, Havana, Cuba. (Not previously reported.)
21 march 1956

CS COPY

Attachments:
A. Doc. for Case #95 as stated above
B. Docs. for Case #97 " " "
C. " " " #102 " " "
D. " " " #107 " " "
E. " " " #129 " " "

CROSS REFERENCE TO

Distribution:
3-WH/COG w/atts. A thru E H

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
31 May 67	JUN - 6 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 27706

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

19-124-25/

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Attachment C: Letter and two documents. [illegible]

Case #102: TAMARGO Gutierrez, Rolando (201-284309) [illegible]

a. Letter from widow, Lilia FERNANDEZ Vilarino.

b. Death certificate: Rolando TAMARGO Gutierrez. Died: 7 March 1961.

c. Birth certificate: Barbara Alejandra TAMARGO Fernandez. DPOB: 21 March 1961, Havana, Cuba. (previously reported as 29 March 1961) [illegible]

Attachment D: Three documents [illegible] UFGA-27706/03 [illegible]

Case #107: PRIETO Ruiz, Plinio (201-279298)

a. Marriage certificate: 19 December 1947. Plinio Luis PRIETO Ruiz and Amparo POSADA.

b. Birth certificate: Georgina PRIETO Posada. DPOB: 28 April 1950, Puentes Grandes, Havana, Cuba. (Not previously reported.) ck

c. Birth certificate: Fernando Ramon PRIETO Posada. DPOB: 13 January 1953, Puentes Grandes, Havana, Cuba. (Not previously reported.) ok

Attachment E: Letter and two documents.

Case #129: No 201 HERNANDEZ, Giordana (201 # not available)

a. Letter from wife, Zoe HERNANDEZ O'Fallon.

b. Marriage certificate: 6 January 1958. Giordano Jose HERNANDEZ and Zoe M. FARALDO.

c. Birth certificate: Giordano Andres HERNANDEZ Faraldo. DPOB: 4 February 1959, Havana, Cuba.

Burton J. Celenza

Burton J. CELENZA

R.C.

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, JMWAVE X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
Concerning Dependency Payment for Jorge KIM Yum (Case #143)

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCES: A. UFGA-27323, dated 31 March 1967
B. UFGA-27538, dated 11 May 1967
C. UFGA-27670, dated 29 May 1967

1. Headquarters concurs in JMWAVE's proposal to terminate payments to the Trustee for dependents of Subject of references provided there is no question that Subject of the BOHEMIA ARTICLE forwarded in reference A and Subject of references are identical. Presumably AMTIKI-1 has personal knowledge of this case and can explain the discrepancy between the spelling of the name as KING in the press clipping and KIM which according to available records is Subject's actual patronymic.

2. Since the Trustee will be advised that the case will be reviewed in the event the parents come to the United States, it is suggested that copies of any additional information AMTIKI may have on file, and any identifiable traces on the father, be forwarded for inclusion in Subject's 201 file.

Ellen V. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - COS, JMWAVE

UFGW-6550

S E C R E T

19-124-35/8
201-298852

6 June 1967 WH/COG/CICS/NANCYE GRATZ:mjr 7447

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C WH/COG/MO
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - Originator

AC/WH/COG Earl J. Williamson

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
[illegible]	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Investigation of Trust Account for Case #142, GUTIERREZ Izaguirre, Jorge

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-6306, 8 December 1966

1. The information requested by Headquarters in paragraph two of Reference concerning the funds held in trust for Jorge GUTIERREZ Izaguirre (prisoner) has been obtained from the trustee, Mr. Orlando FERNANDEZ and is forwarded herewith.

2. According to Mr. FERNANDEZ, an arrangement with the family of Subject provides that Mr. FERNANDEZ (who now resides in Tampa) receive the monthly payment of $225.00 and forward it to an uncle of Subject, Evelio CORZO (in Miami), who is responsible for the forwarding of assistance to the Subject and his parents in Cuba. Mr. FERNANDEZ further stated that there are actually two bank accounts which he described as follows:

a. Dade Federal Savings and Loan Association, Miami, Florida, account number 04-439677. January 1967 balance: $6,748.36. The account is in the name of Subject's uncle and aunt, Evelio and Lillian CORZO.

b. The Exchange Bank of Temple Terrace, Tampa, Florida, account number 3627. January 1967 balance: $675.00. The account is in the name of the trustee, Mr. Orlando FERNANDEZ.

Mr. FERNANDEZ explained the reason for two bank accounts as follows: During the time that the trustee resided in Miami, the check was deposited by Mr. CORZO in the CORZO account. When the trustee moved to Tampa (date unknown) Mr. CORZO told the trustee that in view of the ample funds on deposit in Miami, the trustee should open a savings account in Tampa for the deposit of future payments.

3. For Headquarters further information, the trustee provided documentation from the family in Cuba, dated 25 February 1967, which designates Evelio CORZO Izaguirre as the representative for Subject. JMWAVE traces on CORZO are as follows:

a. An AMPAID-4 report dated 28 June 1962 describes the following person who is probably identical with the uncle:

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED 31 May 67	DATE DISPATCHED JUN - 5 1967
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27707	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6 201-278754	

CORZO Izaguirre, Evelio (Dr.). Lawyer and fingerprint technician formerly employed at the Electoral Supreme Tribune and the Electoral Census of Havana. Friend and a former student of AMUAID-4, at the University of Havana. Resides at 9290 S.W. 4th Terrace, Miami.

b. An I&NS SX-180 card contains the following data on the uncle:

*CORZO Izaguirre, Ricardo Evelio A 12490487 DPOB: 7 February 1926, Havana, Cuba.

Present address: 9290 S.W. 4th Terrace, Miami, Florida.

Foreign address: Calle 33 #120, Havana, Cuba

Place of Entry: Miami, Florida

Date of Entry: 14 September 1961

Manner: PAA-#422

Nationality: Cuban

Occupation in Cuba: Fingerprint Expert

Foreign Military Service: None

Visa Type: B 1 and 2

Issued: Havana, 20 October 1960.

Marital Status: Married to Lilia TOUS Gonzalez

Burton J. CELENZA

14-00000

11

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESS ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

JUL 3 1967

DOC. MICRO. SER.

INFO.

FROM

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT

OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD

Concerning Dependency Payment for Jorge KIM Yum (Case #143)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCES: A. UFGA-27303, dated 31 March 1967
B. UFGA-27538, dated 11 May 1967
C. UFGA-27670, dated 29 May 1967

1. Headquarters concurs in JMWAVE's proposal to terminate payments to the Trustee for dependents of Subject of references provided there is no question that Subject of the BOHEMIA ARTICLE forwarded in reference A and Subject of references are identical. Presumably AMTIKI-1 has personal knowledge of this case and can explain the discrepancy between the spelling of the name as KING in the press clipping and KIM which according to available records is Subject's actual patronymic.

2. Since the Trustee will be advised that the case will be reviewed in the event the parents come to the United States, it is suggested that copies of any additional information AMTIKI may have on file, and any identifiable traces on the father, be forwarded for inclusion in Subject's 201 file.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - COS, JMWAVE

D-B-201-298852

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGW-6550

DATE

8 JUN 1967

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

19-124-25/6
201-298852

6 June 1967

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - Originator

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/CICS/	NANCYE GRATZ	mjr	7447

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG/MO	7 June 67	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/COG	7/6/67	Earl J. Williamson

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

STATEMENT "II"

Bank Balance; December 31, 1960 $219,383.20

Less: Unpaid checks

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Ricardo Diaz	14	$ 175.00
Oct. 4	Jorge Rodríguez Bezos	68	400.00
Nov. 1	Luis Rivas	425	144.13
Dec. 1	Orlando Aló Clavijo	858	250.00
Dec. 1	Gustavo Cotayo	892	175.00
Dec. 1	Nolis Mesa	961	100.00
Dec. 1	Rolando Zubizarreta	1026	200.00
Dec. 5	José Sosa, Jr.	1069	183.34
Dec. 6	Elvira Piñón	1121	200.00
Dec. 7	Juan Sordo	1149	100.00
Dec. 9	José F. Rodríguez de la Vega	1168	250.00
Dec. 9	Primitivo Lima	1169	250.00
Dec. 9	Manuel B. Ledón	1170	250.00
Dec. 14	Mario Redondo	1216	500.00
Dec. 15	American Insurance Agency	1223	195.10
Dec. 15	Félix Mario Martínez	1235	200.00
Dec. 16	Oscar Madariaga	1269	250.00
Dec. 16	Serapio Montejo	1275	400.00
Dec. 16	Aníbal Jover	1276	103.24
Dec. 16	Gloria Fagés	1277	200.00
Dec. 16	Enrique Alonso de la Torre	1280	250.00
Dec. 16	Francisco Méndez Capote	1281	250.00
Dec. 18	Barnett's	1285	5.66
Dec. 18	Pan-American World Airways	1288	11.58
Dec. 18	Pan-American World Airways	1289	6.00
Dec. 21	José Sosa, Jr.	1307	60.00
Dec. 21	Douglas Corporation	1324	97.85
Dec. 22	Barnett's	1330	95.06
Dec. 22	Manuel Braña	1331	1,000.00
Dec. 22	Eduardo Hernández	1332	5,000.00
Dec. 22	Lem Jones Associates, Inc.	1333	5,256.00
Dec. 23	Miguel Nápoles	1359	50.00
Dec. 23	Josefa Márquez	1362	50.00
Dec. 23	Frank Diaz Silveira	1364	129.80
Dec. 26	Frank Diaz Silveira	1367	71.75

(Continues page No.2)

RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT

STATEMENT "II"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total	
Dec. 27	Francisco Liantaud	1369	$ 34.35	
Dec. 27	Frank Diaz Silveira	1370	357.00	
Dec. 27	Carlos F. Pérez	1371	60.00	
Dec. 27	E. L. Cento	1372	151.58	
Dec. 27	Manuel Rivero Setién	1373	50.00	
Dec. 28	Mail-O-Matic Printing	1379	100.00	
Dec. 28	José González Argüelles	1380	2,000.00	
Dec. 28	Enrique Collazo	1381	250.00	
Dec. 28	Eusebio Capestany	1382	150.00	
Dec. 28	Ivan Portuondo	1383	150.00	
Dec. 28	E. L. Cento	1384	44.10	
Dec. 29	E. L. Cento	1385	101.70	
Dec. 29	E. L. Cento	1386	88.00	
Dec. 30	Western Union	1388	21.48	
Dec. 30	E. L. Cento	1389	87.30	
Dec. 30	E. L. Cento	1390	87.30	
Dec. 30	Florida Light & Power Co.	1391	73.26	
Dec. 30	Elvira Bujones	1392	181.00	
Dec. 30	The Florida National Bank	1393	34.25	
Dec. 30	Juan Paula (Rasco and Paula)	1394	50,000.00	
Dec. 30	Carlos Noval	1395	87.30	
Dec. 30	Carlos B. Fernández	1397	151.47	
Dec. 30	E. L. Cento	1398	44.10	
Dec. 30	Manuel Castillo	1399	356.94	
Dec. 30	José I. Rasco	1400	357.30	
Dec. 31	M. F. Goudie	1401	2,337.00	
Dec. 31	M. F. Goudie	1402	3,499.72	
Dec. 31	M. F. Goudie	1403	2,877.36	
Dec. 31	M. F. Goudie	1404	190.00	
Dec. 31	M. F. Goudie	1405	1,319.99	82,162.01
	Corrected Bank Balance; December 31, 1960			$137,221.19

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

CIVIL SECTION BUDGET

"[illegible] AND ROSA"

December 1 to 31, 1960

STATEMENT "III"

	-Budgeted-	-Spent-	Excess	Defect
Payroll and Refugees:	$46,700.00	$57,466.70	$10,766.70	✓
Travel Expenses:	$10,000.00	$ 7,834.83 ✓		$ 2,165.17 ✓
Rent, Utilities, etc.:	$ 6,000.00			✓
General Expenses		$ 2,946.45 ✓		
Comunications		1,555.24 ✓		
Total	$ 6,000.00	$ 4,501.69 ✓		$ 1,498.31 ✓
Committees:				
Publicity	$48,000.00	$16,796.07		$31,203.93
Agent Exploitation	6,000.00	5,988.07 ✓		11.93
Planning	2,500.00	2,300.00 ✓		200.00 ✓
Finance	-0-	-0-		
Public Relations	10,000.00	13.68 ✓		9,986.32
Organization and Proseltysm	1,000.00	559.94 ✓		440.06
Total	$67,500.00	$25,657.76		$41,842.24 ✓
Delegations:				
Latin American	$14,000.00	$ 4,583.55 ✓		$ 9,416.45 ✓
United States	7.500.00	10,198.00 ✓	$ 2,698.00	
Total	$21,500.00	$14,781.55 ✓	$ 2,698.00	$ 9,416.45 ✓
Miscellaneous	$ 5,000.00	$ 9,909.44 ✓	$ 4,909.44	✓
Budgeted Expenses	($156,700.00)	$120,151.97	$18,374.14	$54,922.17 ✓

(Continues page No.2)

CIVIL SECTION BUDGET

STATEMENT "III"
Page No.2

	-Budgeted-	-Spent-	Excess	Defect
Non-Budgeted:				
Assets		$ 5,773.22	$ 5,773.22	
Monroe Hotel		508.24	508.24	
C.F.R.D.E.C.		2,000.00	2,000.00	
Given to the Executives of the different organizations for the expenses of their jobs		3,000.00	3,000.00	
Total	-o-	$ 11,281.46	$ 11,281.46	-o-
TOTAL BALANCE	$156,700.00	$131,433.43	$ 29,655.60	$ 54,922.17
Spent in excess in Nov.		10,420.81	10,420.81	
Total	$156,700.00	$141,854.24	$ 40,076.41	$ 54,922.17
Non-Spent		14,845.76	14,845.76	
	$156,700.00	$156,700.00	$ 54,922.17	$ 54,922.17

NOTE: In the liquidation of the Budget of the month of November, appear expenses for Assets in the amount of $12,787.58, when in reality it was $11,787.58, so that the difference in excess in the last month of November was $10,420.81 instead of $11,420.81.

ul.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
INCOMES FROM THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-A"

December 5	:	Deposit	BEAN —	$ 158,875.00*
December 15	:	Deposit	BEAN —	90,000.00
December 27	:	Deposit	[illegible] —	103,000.00
December 29	:	Deposit	[illegible] —	100,000.00
			T O T A L :	$451,875.00

+ [illegible] 159.000,00
Bk chgs 125.00
158.875.00

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REINBURSEMENTS CORRESPONDING TO EARLIER MONTHS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-B"

Dec. 6 :	Reinbursment of the remaining of the check 771 (Rafael Miguel) that was extended in the amount of $400.00 for a Caribbean Conference	$ 213.51

N O T E : This reinbursment correspond to an amount that, in excess of what corresponded to the expense for which the check was extended, was returned by Mr. Miguel and deposited in the account "Paula and Sosa". It represents real diminution in the expenses of the month of November, that is compensated when been considered as incomes in this month.

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REIMBURSEMENTS CORRESPONDING TO THE MONTH OF DECEMBER
"PAULA AND CUBA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-C"

Dec. 6 :	Reinbursement of check 1049 in the amount of $70.00 for cables presenting Dr. Llaca, since it was spent only $67.29 (See Annex "I-J")	$ 2.71
Dec. 28 :	Reinburament of checks 1163 and 1164 in the amount of $120.00 each for a trip to Jacksonville, and it was spent only $203.00. (See Annex "I-M")	37.00
Dec. 28 :	Reinbursement of check 1157 in the amount of $107.14 to pay the tickets of the children Raul and Roberto Uriarte, since it was spent only $56.60 (See Annex "I-H")	50.54
Dec. 28 :	Reinbursement of checks 1298, 1299 and 1301 for tickets of various people, of which the taxes were not paid. (See Annex "I-H")	72.78
	Total December reinbursments	$ 163.03

N O T E : These amounts have been deducted from the totals of their respective accounts, as can be seen in the correspondent annexes, to the effects of the exact determination of the expense in each case.

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REINBURSMENT CORRESPONDING TO THE MONROE HOTEL
"PAULA AND JOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-D"

Dec. 28 :	14 Checks in the amount of $4.00 each	$ 56.00 ✓
Dec. 28 :	13 Checks in the amount of $4.00 each	52.00 ✓
Dec. 28 :	19 Checks in the amount of $4.00 each	76.00 ✓
	Total reinbursment Monroe Hotel	$ 184.00 ✓

NOTE : See Annex "I-P".

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT.
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
ASSETS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-E"

Date		Check No.	Total
	DEPOSITS:		
Dec. 7	Revolving fund Monroe Hotel	1145	$ 100.00
Dec. 12	Deposit - Telephone service - P.L. Díaz Lanz - Authorized by Finance Department	1194	150.00
Dec. 15	Increase revolving fund Military Section	1229	5,000.00
	Total of Deposits		$5,250.00
	OFFICE EQUIPMENT:		
Dec. 5	1 Air-conditioner Mr. Sosa's office	1069	$ 183.34
Dec. 22	1 Legal file, 4 drawers (Comptroller Department)	1339	48.93
	Total of Office Equipment		$ 232.27
	OTHERS:		
Dec. 5	1 R.C. Transmitter (Abel de Varona)	1103	$ 19.95
Dec. 5	1 R.C. Receiver (Abel de Varona)	1103	34.95
Dec. 5	1 Servo (Abel de Varona)	1103	8.95
Dec. 5	1 Multi-Testor (Abel de Varona)	1103	16.50
Dec. 5	1 Boat (Abel de Varona)	1103	10.60
Dec. 12	1 "Madjin" Ship spare part	1202	200.00
	Total of Others		$ 290.95
	TOTAL OF ASSETS		$5,773.22

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"PAUTA AND SOSA"
REPORT
PAYROLL
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-F"

61

COMMITTEES:

Planning:

	Check No.	Total
Arturo Alemán Ruiz	856	$ 150.00
Elio R. Alvarez López	860	225.00
Fritz Appel Merodio	862	350.00
Migdolidhia Batard Capote	867	150.00
Guillermo A. Belt Martínez Viademonte	869	250.00
Guillermo Bermello Ruiz	870	350.00
Miguel Angel Busquet Gil del Real	877	150.00
Mario del Cañal Ferrer	880	350.00
Néstor Carbonell Cortina	882	175.00
Syla Cuervo	893	225.00
Raúl Delgado Pereda	895	200.00
Luis Espíndola Palacios	902	200.00
Ramiro Fernández Moris del Valle	908	225.00
Ernesto Freyre Varona	913	300.00
Alberto García Navarro	919	150.00
Laureano Garrote Peluzzo	924	275.00
Ambrosio González del Valle	929	350.00
Francisco Alberto Gutiérrez Bolívar	932	250.00
José Manuel Hernández Puente	937	350.00
Martín León Mena	940	200.00
Armando de León Sotolongo	941	275.00
Francisco López del Rincón Sánchez	944	200.00
Enrique de la Mar y Maza	947	225.00

23

Continues on page No. 2

PAYROLL

ANNEX "1-F"

COMMITTEES: (Cont.)

Planning: (Cont.)

		Check No.	Total
Bernardo Maristany Costales González		951	$ 225.00
Pedro Martínez Fraga		953	400.00
Manuel de Jesús Mencía Gómez		958	350.00
Pedro S. Peñaranda Díaz		977	300.00
Gustavo Ribeaux Figueras		984	275.00
Arsenio Roa		988	200.00
Jorge Salazar Carrillo		1002	275.00
Matías Varas Romero		1014	250.00
Nicasio Vidal Ramírez		1021	150.00
Gerardo de Villiers Betancourt		1022	150.00
Enrique Llaca Orbiz		1029	275.00
Agustín Goytisolo		1042	250.00
Inés Matilde Puig		1057	200.00
Juan Calvo González		1058	200.00
René Cárdenas Abreu		1059	200.00
Humberto Cardounel		1060	175.00
Gustavo Delgado		1066	300.00
Gastón Fernández		1086	200.00
Héctor Febles Barreto		1094	250.00
José R. Villavicencio Orta		1095	250.00
Jorge Guerra Romero	$ 50.00	1208	
	175.00	1264	
	$ 225.00		225.00
Oscar Grau Esteban		1234	225.00
Félix Mario Martínez Moreno		1235	200.00
Rafael Sánchez Losada		1245	225.00
Angel B. Béquer González		1246	250.00

Continues on page No. 3

PAYROLL

ANNEX "I-F"
Page No. 3

		Check No.	T o t a l
COMMITTEES: (Cont.)			
Planning: (Cont.)			
Oscar de Freixas y de la Torre	$175.00	1247	
	50.00	1265	
	$ 225.00		$ 225.00
Cándido García Valdés		1248	200.00
Francisco Martínez Aguilera		1249	175.00
Leoncio Rodríguez Esquivel		1250	225.00
Manuel Navas Aguilera		1251	225.00
Rafael Herrera Télles		1253	225.00
Luis René García Fernández		1254	250.00
Armando Freyre de Varona		1255	250.00
Vitalio Ruiz Gómez		1256	250.00
Rafael Angel Blanco de la Cotera		1258	225.00
Tulio Díaz Rivera		1279	250.00
Enrique Alonso de la Torre		1280	250.00
Francisco Méndez Capote		1281	250.00
13			$14,575.00 ✓
Transportation:			
Arcadio Agrás Guillén		852	$ 200.00
Alonso Fernández Morrell		906	350.00
Manuel García Calero		916	150.00
Mario Redondo Fernández		982	300.00
Armando Vázquez Almagro		1017	200.00
Alberto Martín Martín		1028	150.00
Enrique Llansó Alzugaray		1093	250.00
			$ 1,600.00 ✓

Continues on page No. 4

PAYROLL

ANNEX "I-F"
Page No. 4

COMMITTEES: (Cont.)

Organization and Proselitysm:

		Check No.	Total
Pedro Pablo Bermúdez		871	$ 175.00
Irmina Bouza Enríquez		874	125.00
Luis Bueno Ramsden		875	350.00
Manuel Castillo Cabo [illegible]		886	225.00
Heriberto Corona Méndez		891	200.00
Humberto Figueras González		911	250.00
Rafael Galis Menéndez		914	225.00
Claudio González Morales		928	175.00
René Luis Pelly		945	125.00
Héctor La-Mar		948	175.00
Raúl Medina Mesa		957	200.00
José Millán Velasco		962	225.00
Jesús Miranda Hernández		963	200.00
Segundo Miranda Hernández		964	250.00
Pedro Montiel Zapirain		966	225.00
José Manuel Sánchez Navarro		1003	325.00
Roberto Varona García		1015	225.00
Abel de Varona Loredo		1016	175.00
Adrián Vidal Aznares		1020	225.00
Mario Villalonga Suárez		1044	175.00
Juan Mesa		1083	200.00
Anselmo Rodríguez Rendueles		1236	200.00
Raúl Fernández Corredera		1238	200.00
Gloria Espinosa Díaz		1240	150.00
Jorge Fernández López		1241	150.00
Rolando Fernández Corredera	$150.00	1243	
(Ant.)	85.00	1092	
	$235.00		235.00

Continues on page No. 5

PAYROLL

ANNEX "I-F"

		Check No.	Total
COMMITTEES: (Cont.)			
Organization and Proselitysm:			
Jesús García		1244	$ 200.00
Carlos Cicero MacKinney		1260	225.00
Carlos Arteaga Vilató		1261	175.00
Ignacio Pujol		1278	200.00
José Caragol		1360	250.00
			$ 6,435.00
Public Relations:			
Tomás Durán Quevedo		900	$ 200.00
Antonio González Mora		927	275.00
Silvia Morán Socarraz		969	100.00
Ignacio Freixas Gener	$250.00	1136	
(Ant.)	50.00	1181	
	$300.00		300.00
Max Azicri-Levy		1139	200.00
Miguel A. García		1140	300.00
Fernando Alloza Villagrasa		1150	250.00
Carlos Allen Dosal		1239	225.00
Juan Turro Ichaso		1242	150.00
			$ 2,000.00
Agent Exploitation:			
Ramiro Fernández-Moris Fernández		907	$ 200.00
Anastasic Augusto Martín Elena		954	200.00
Paulino Pérez Blanco		979	125.00
Jorge Roque Castro		995	125.00
			$ 650.00

Continues on page No. 6

PAYROLL

COMMITTEES: (Cont.)

Publicity ("Propaganda"):

		Check No.	Total
Pedro Abascal Berenguer		851	$ 225.00
Mario Barrera Díaz		866	225.00
Humberto Estévez del Pino		903	300.00
Julio C. García Cruz	$135.00	917	
(Ant.)	15.00	1106	
	$150.00		150.00
Margarita Herrera Méndez		938	100.00
Pedro Leyva Ugarriza		943	200.00
Orlando Martínez Miller		956	200.00
Nolis Mesa Vallarino		961	100.00
Raúl Miró Barnet		965	175.00
Fermín Peinado Espino		976	350.00
Rafael Rivas Vázquez		986	225.00
Vicente Agustín Romeo Pérez		994	200.00
Rubén Darío Rumbaut López		1000	350.00
José Salazar Aguilar		1001	300.00
Néstor Suárez Feliú		1006	250.00
Alberto Valera		1013	125.00
Clara Park Pessino		1128	250.00
			$ 3,725.00

Finance:

	Check No.	Total
Arístides Agüero Montoro	853	$ 200.00
José Arriola	863	275.00
Santiago Fernández Pichs	909	175.00
Enrique Ros Pérez	996	400.00
		$ 1,050.00

Continues on Page No. 7

PAYROLL

ANNEX "I-F"
Page No. 7

	Check No.	Total
COMMITTEESS: (Cont.)		
Comunication:		
Ubaldo Arteaga	864	$ 150.00
Angel Castillo Barroso	887	275.00
Gustavo Cuervo Fernández	894	175.00
Hildebrand Díaz Rojas	899	250.00
Celso Pimienta	981	275.00
Fernando Trespalacios	1011	275.00
Francisco A. Zayas González	1024	300.00
Frank Zayas (Confidential)	1025	150.00
Armando Menéndez Rabasa	1096	250.00
Elvira Piñón	1121	200.00
		$ 2,300.00
Total of Committees:		$32,335.00
OTHERS:		
Office of the General Coordinator:		
Carlos Manuel Cibrián Ruisánchez	889	$ 150.00
Jorge Alberto Estrada Casas	904	150.00
Vicente León León	939	350.00
Luis Morales Ortega	967	150.00
Jorge A. Morán Lamadrid	968	300.00
Ricardo Zabala Sánchez	1023	90.00
		$ 1,190.00
Office of the Auxiliar Coordinator:		
Teresa de Jesús Oti Montaner	974	$ 200.00
Pablo Pérez Zamora	980	150.00
		$ 350.00

Continues on page No. 8

PAYROLL

		Check No.	T o t a l
OTHERS: (Cont.)			
Press Department:			
Berta Díaz Fernández		897	$ 125.00
Mario Rodríguez Gómez		991	150.00
Yolanda Rubio García	$125.00	997	
	50.00	1222	
	$175.00		175.00
			$ 450.00
Inmigration:			
Israel Algaze Moya		857	$ 225.00
Acts and Correspondence:			
Rafael Resende Vigoa		983	$ 150.00
Rafael Argilagos		1034	125.00
José López Franco		1035	125.00
			$ 400.00
Economic Section:			
Adel Tomás Sotolongo Ramos		1005	$ 200.00
Military Section:			
Manuel Guillot		931	$ 125.00
Antonio Rómulo Torre Ruiz		1009	125.00
Rolando Zubizarreta Besú		1026	200.00
			$ 450.00
Comptroller Department:			
Manuel Blanco Sanzo		873	$ 250.00
Mario Girbau García		925	250.00

Continues on page No. 9

PAYROLL

ANNEX "I-F"

		Check No.	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)			
Comptroller Department: (Cont.)			
Silvia Martínez Echazábal		955	$ 150.00
Juan Paula Báez		975	350.00
Ana Matilde Rodríguez Rodríguez		993	200.00
			$ 1,200.00
Maintenance of 1700 Biscayne Blvd. Office:			
Hilario Caballero Rodríguez		878	$ 125.00
Ricardo Cabrera Amoedo		879	150.00
Mario Collazo Bernal		890	125.00
René Díaz Escobar		896	125.00
Arturo Escarze Cancio		901	125.00
Oscar García Guerra		918	125.00
Luis Hernández Melis		936	125.00
Pedro Eligio Valdés Claro		1012	125.00
Tomás Vázquez Casanova		1013	200.00
			$ 1,225.00
Díaz Lanz Group:			
Néstor Alvarez Fernández	$250.00	859	
	25.00	1070	
	$275.00		$ 275.00
Pedro Luis Díaz Lanz		893	300.00
Francisco Fiorini	$125.00	912	
	25.00	1072	
	$150.00		150.00

Continues on page No. 10

PAYROLL

		Check No.	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)			
Díaz Lanz Group: (Cont.)			
Abel Hera Corton	$225.00	933	
	25.00	1071	
	$250.00		$ 250.00
Julio Leonard	$225.00	942	
	25.00	1075	
	$250.00		250.00
Francisco Llano Torres	$175.00	946	
	25.00	1078	
	$200.00		200.00
Evangelista Isidro Mursulí	$175.00	970	
	25.00	1077	
	$200.00		200.00
José A. Balboa		1079	250.00
César Leonard		1113	200.00
Marcos Díaz Lanz		1114	225.00
			$ 2,300.00
Miscellaneous:			
Osvaldo Aguirre Noy		855	$ 175.00
Orlando Alo Clavijo		858	250.00
Erundina Besteiro Expósito		872	200.00
Josefina Bujones		876	300.00
Francisco M. Carrillo Masvidal		884	400.00
José Cento		888	200.00
Dr. Carlos B. Fernández		905	200.00

Continues on page No. 11

PAYROLL

	Check No.	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)		
Miscellaneous: (Cont.)		
María García (Manolín García)	915	$ 150.00
Pilar García Rubio	921	150.00
Antonia García Ruiz	922	150.00
Orestes Guerra Cué	930	100.00
Nicolás Hernández	934	100.00
Carlos Hernández Hernández	935	200.00
Marina Mardones Vivanco	949	150.00
Jesús M. Marinas Alvarez	950	125.00
María Antonia Mesa Lecourt	960	250.00
Humberto Núñez	973	90.00
Rita Río García	985	100.00
Manuel Rodríguez Fleitas	990	250.00
Enrique Ruiz Williams	999	175.00
José Suárez Suárez	1007	125.00
Hortensia Tejera	1008	150.00
Silvia Torres	1010	150.00
Cándido Viamontes	1019	225.00
Fernando Marquet Martínez	1027	100.00
Francisco Fernández	1038	125.00
Juan Consuegra Valdés	1045	300.00
Braulio de Gondomar	1053	200.00
Manuel Cobo Sausa	1062	300.00
Abel de Varona Juárez	1064	150.00
Olga Rodríguez	1082	175.00
Armando Sánchez Ferrer	1100	200.00
Guido Colli	1101	200.00
Jaime Burne	1102	200.00
Nora Fernández Gil	1108	250.00
Olga Rueda de Aguirre	1110	150.00

Continues on page No. 12

PAYROLL

			Check No.	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)				
Miscellaneous: (Cont.)				
José Luis Hevia Sánchez			1159	$ 350.00
William Cook Gordon			1160	350.00
Raúl Martínez Núnez			1161	350.00
José Federico Rodríguez de la Vega			1168	250.00
Primitivo Lima			1169	250.00
Manuel B. Ledón			1170	250.00
Ana Julia Fernández Alvarez			1171	200.00
Silvia Rueda			1172	125.00
C.M. Sánchez			1173	250.00
Andrés Suárez		$250.00	1174	
	(Nov.)	250.00	1259	
		$500.00		500.00
Ramiro Ortiz de la Vega			1175	175.00
Urbano Martínez		$250.00	1176	
	(Nov.)	200.00	1259	
		$450.00		450.00
José Revilla			1230	125.00
Jorge Más			1231	100.00
Ramón Bustillos Asencio			1267	250.00
Armando Piedra			1268	250.00
Oscar Madariaga			1269	250.00
Francisco de Juan			1272	150.00
Gloria Pagés			1277	200.00
José Ignacio Zárraga Diez			1312	125.00
Enrique Zayas Bazán			1313	175.00

Continues on page No. 13

	Check No.	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)		
Miscellaneous: (Cont.)		
Chalía Cazalis Goenaga	1314	$ 125.00
		$11,965.00
Total of "Others":		$19,955.00
Total of the Payroll:		$52,290.00

NOTE: The persons included in the group "Miscellaneous" have variable functions, therefore, they cannot be included in a determined group, but all of them work for the F.R.D.

amr.

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MAINTENANCE (HELP TO REFUGEES)
"TABLA AND ROSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-G"

Date		Check No.	Total
	PERMANENT:		
Dec. 1	Otalio Soca Yanes	1004	$ 300.00
Dec. 3	Margarita Acosta	1061	175.00
	Total Permanent		$ 475.00
	OCCASIONAL:		
Dec. 2	R. Peralta	1047	$ 50.00
Dec. 2	A. de la Vega	1048	50.00
Dec. 3	Installation of B. de Gondomar	1052	100.00
Dec. 3	Miguel Alba	1056	30.00
Dec. 5	F. Rodríguez	1068	50.00
Dec. 5	C. Naredo	1073	50.00
Dec. 5	T. Gamba	1076	300.00
Dec. 5	A. González	1099	150.00
Dec. 6	R. Rodríguez	1123	50.00
Dec. 6	Installation of M. Blanco	1124	150.00
Dec. 6	M. Jiménez	1129	50.00
Dec. 7	R. Jaime	1141	50.00
Dec. 7	B. Llerena	1142	50.00
Dec. 7	E. Favlede	1143	50.00
Dec. 7	O. Clive	1146	50.00
Dec. 7	R. Rodríguez	1147	50.00
Dec. 7	L. Martínez	1148	100.00
Dec. 7	J. Sordo	1149	100.00
Dec. 8	A. Estévez	1154	50.00
Dec. 9	E. Méndez	1166	300.00
Dec. 9	J. Moralejo	1177	200.00
Dec. 9	A. Bernal López	1182	50.00
Dec. 9	A. Bernal Bosca	1183	50.00
Dec. 9	R. Morejón	1135	50.00
Dec. 9	F. Rodríguez	1187	50.00
Dec. 9	F. Sánchez	1190	150.00
Dec. 9	E. A. Pérez	1191	40.00
Dec. 9	Installation of H. García and wife	1191	50.00
Dec. 12	O. Mardones	1200	50.00
Dec. 12	Elias Contreras	1201	30.00

(Continues page No.2)

MAINTENANCE (HELP TO REFUGEES)

ANNEX "I-G"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 13	M. García Valdés	1207	$ 50.00
Dec. 13	C. Agüero	1209	50.00
Dec. 13	J. Ares Santos	1210	50.00
Dec. 13	C. O.ª de Varona	1211	50.00
Dec. 15	Three mariners - M.D.C.	1226	150.00
Dec. 15	J. Fundora - M.D.C.	1226	50.00
Dec. 15	A. Fajardo - M.D.C.	1226	50.00
Dec. 15	W. Pimentel - M.D.C.	1226	50.00
Dec. 15	W. Paredes - M.D.C.	1226	41.70
Dec. 15	C. Martínez	1229	250.00
Dec. 15	C. Elcoro	1262	50.00
Dec. 15	Eight persons boat "La Gloria"	1263	150.00
Dec. 15	Eight persons boat "La Gloria"	1282	60.00
Dec. 16	C. Galindo	1283	50.00
Dec. 16	D. Gutiérrez	1284	50.00
Dec. 19	M. Ferrer	1291	10.00
Dec. 19	L. M. Lobeira	1291	30.00
Dec. 20	F. Rodríguez Tamayo	1295	40.00
Dec. 20	R. Soler	1304	50.00
Dec. 20	R. Jaime	1305	40.00
Dec. 21	M. García	1307	60.00
Dec. 21	F. J. Hernández	1325	50.00
Dec. 21	L. R. Bacallao	1326	50.00
Dec. 21	E. Iglesias	1327	50.00
Dec. 21	M. Alonso ✓	1329	100.00
Dec. 22	H. Martínez Maseda	1335	100.00
Dec. 23	P. González	1349	50.00
Dec. 23	A. Lechulan	1354	50.00
Dec. 23	A. de la Vega	1355	40.00
Dec. 23	R. Soler	1356	30.00
Dec. 23	D. Rivero Setién	1357	50.00
Dec. 23	A. Rivero Setién	1358	50.00
Dec. 23	M. Nápoles	1359	50.00
Dec. 23	E. J. Peino	1361	50.00
Dec. 23	J. Márquez	1362	50.00
	Total Occasional		$4,701.70
	TOTAL HELP TO REFUGEES		$ 5,176.70

ml.

[illegible] REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

TRAVEL

"[illegible]"

December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "1-H"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Trip Havana-Miami (Delia Graña)	1031	$ 53.58
Dec. 2	Various trips Havana-Miami (as per receipts)	1041	245.12
Dec. 2	Trip Havana-Miami (A. Guzmán)	1046	53.58
Dec. 3	Travel expenses in excess (Dr.A. Pujol)	1050	134.21
Dec. 3	Trips (Mrs. E.Moya and Mrs. M. Freixas)	1051	80.36
Dec. 5	Trip to New York (Move 1,000 pound material)	1065	321.00
Dec. 5	Trip Havana-Miami (A. Gómez)	1067	53.57
Dec. 5	Trip Havana-Miami (E. Infante and daughter)	1081	85.56
Dec. 5	Trip to Washington and New York (J. Menendez)	1084	300.00
Dec. 5	Trip to Chicago (Varona, Pasco, Botifol)	1098	442.86
Dec. 5	Trip to Tampa (Varona and three more)	1104	110.11
Dec. 5	Trip Havana-Miami (M. Herrera)	1112	53.57
Dec. 8	Trip to Chicago (Dr. Varona)	1155	500.00
Dec. 9	Trip Havana-Miami (Children Raul and Roberto Uriarte)	1157	107.14
Dec. 9	Trip to Puerto Rico (C. Gómez Gil)	1158	425.00
Dec. 9	Trip to Havana (F. Rodríguez)	1162	50.00
Dec. 9	Trip Miami-Washington-New York-Miami (Cámara, Llaca, Pujol)	1167	913.32
Dec. 9	Trips A. Cruz and O. Rodríguez	1178	107.14
Dec. 9	Trip New York-Miami-New York labor leader Harry Bell	1180	121.00
Dec. 9	Trips various persons as per receipts	1191	189.78
Dec. 12	Trip Havana-Miami (G. Massip, E. and F. Cropesa)	1203	160.71
Dec. 12	Expenses in excess - Trip to Europe (J. Carrillo)	1204	192.20
Dec. 14	Trip to Nassau (M. Redondo)	1216	500.00

(Continues page No.2)

TRAVEL

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 14	Trip Havana-Miami (M. Ramos and S. Bujones)	1220	$ 64.80
Dec. 14	Trip Havana-Miami (A. Rodríguez)	1221	43.20
Dec. 15	Trip to Cuba Mrs. Magaly	1259	100.00
Dec. 16	Trip to New York (Aníbal Jover)	1276	103.24
Dec. 18	Deposit trip Havana-Miami (Child F.López)	1290	30.00
Dec. 20	Trip to New York (Duquesne, Artigas, De Juan: Trial "El Gancho")	1294	351.37
Dec. 20	Trip Havana-Miami (Alsina Family)	1298	216.18
Dec. 20	Trip Havana-Miami (Amenabar Family)	1299	108.53
Dec. 20	Trip Havana-Miami (D. Ivonet)	1301	54.77
Dec. 21	Trip to New York (Olga Alzurias)	1322	60.00
Dec. 22	Trip Havana-Miami (Hilda Puig)	1337	54.77
Dec. 23	Trip Havana-Miami (N. Cabezas and H. Bujones)	1348	87.30
Dec. 23	Trip Miami-New York (Piñon Family)	1351	309.00
Dec. 27	Trip Miami-New York-Miami (M.Rivero Setién)	1372	151.58
Dec. 27	Travel expenses M. Rivero Setién	1373	50.00
Dec. 28	Trip Havana-Miami (Bertha Barreto)	1376	44.10
Dec. 28	Trip Havana-Miami (Pedro Rivera)	1377	44.10
Dec. 28	Trip Havana-Miami (Child F. Alonso)	1378	44.10
Dec. 28	Trip Havana-Miami (Caridad Fraga)	1384	44.10
Dec. 29	Trip Miami-New York (G.Gil, H.Pérez and R. Pintado)	1385	161.70
Dec. 29	Trip Texas-Miami (Fernández Carmenaty)	1386	88.00
Dec. 30	Trip Havana-Miami (I. Segura and a member of his family)	1389	87.30
Dec. 30	Trip Havana-Miami (C. Estrada and family)	1390	87.30
Dec. 30	Trip Miami-New York (E. Bujones and S. Hernández)	1392	181.00
Dec. 30	Trip Havana-Miami (Mrs.E. Noval and daughter)	1395	87.30

(Continues page No.3)

TRAVEL

ANNEX "I-H"
Page No.3

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 30	Trip Julio Jane (P/o Dr. Sardiñas)	1398	$ 44.10
			$7,957.65 ✓
Less:			
	Reinbursment remaining of check 1157 (Annex "I-C")	$ 50.54	
	Reinbursment remaining of checks 1298, 1299 and 1301 (Annex "I-C")	72.28	122.82
	TOTAL TRAVEL		$7,834.83 ✓

N O T E : In some of the expenses related in this annex do not exist the receipts in our records, and in this cases, the checks were extended in view of memorandums giving such instructions.

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL EXPENSES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-I"

Date		Check No.	Total
	Office Supplies:		
Dec. 5	Purchase of a rubber stamp	1074	$ 30.00
Dec. 5	Printed matter	1088	15.07
Dec. 5	Printed matter	1105	247.20
Dec. 5	Printed matter	1106	22.86
Dec. 7	Printed matter	1135	71.85
Dec. 9	Printed matter	1191	7.48
Dec. 12	Printed matter	1195	32.17
Dec. 12	Printed matter	1205	34.81
Dec. 18	Printed matter	1285	5.66
Dec. 19	Printed matter	1291	69.18
Dec. 22	Printed matter	1330	95.06
Dec. 22	Printed matter	1338	52.12
Dec. 15	Printed matter	1236	22.45
	Total Office Supplies		$ 705.91
	Rents:		
Dec. 3	Rent 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1054	$ 600.00
Dec. 9	Rent 520 N.W. 23 St. (M.D.C.)	1191	40.00
Dec. 21	Rent Physicians and Lawyers' house (Dec. 21 to Jan. 20)	1324	97.85
	Total Rents		$ 737.85
	Others:		
Dec. 1	Air-conditioner rent (López del Rincón)	1032	$ 75.00
Dec. 1	Electricity - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1033	110.94

(Continues page No.2)

GENERAL EXPENSES

ANNEX "I-I"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 5	General expenses as per receipts	1106	$ 164.56
Dec. 6	Attention and taxis to Dr. Sardiñas' office	1120	56.90
Dec. 6	Two tires for F. Zayas' automobile (to the service of the Front)	1130	44.00
Dec. 7	Reinbursment revolving fund Press Department	1137	49.72
Dec. 9	General expenses as per receipts	1191	49.00
Dec. 12	Physicians and Lawyers' house electricity (November)	1193	5.19
Dec. 14	Water - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1214	3.30
Dec. 14	Tires for J. Moran's automobile	1217	54.00
Dec. 15	Minor general expenses (M.D.C.)	1226	9.97
Dec. 15	Medicine for child A. Calmares (M.D.C.)	1226	25.25
Dec. 15	Gasoline expenses J.M. Sánchez	1232	88.32
Dec. 18	Reinbursment revolving fund Press Department	1287	50.00
Dec. 19	General expenses as per receipts	1291	148.71
Dec. 20	Custody material for 1700 Biscayne Blvd. building	1302	339.80
Dec. 23	Gas - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1353	3.30
Dec. 30	Electricity - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1391	73.26
Dec. 30	Legal expenses (C. B. Fernández)	1397	151.47
	Total Others		$1,502.69
	TOTAL GENERAL EXPENSES		$2,946.45

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
COMMUNICATIONS
"FLORIDA AND CUBA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "1-J"

Date		Check No.	Total
	MAIL:		
Dec. 5	Stamps	1106	$ 63.28
Dec. 12	Stamps	1198	25.00
Dec. 15	Stamps (M.D.C.)	1226	1.60
Dec. 19	Stamps	1291	158.05
	Total		$ 247.93
	TELEPHONE:		
Dec. 1	FR-3-5607 (Congress Bdg.- Oct.and Nov.)	1030	$ 319.12
Dec. 9	FR-3-4881	1165	52.36
Dec. 15	FR-3-1791 Installation and consumption (M.D.C.)	1226	91.40
Dec. 15	Long distance (Dr. Carrillo)	1259	93.61
Dec. 19	Long distance	1291	9.08
Dec. 22	Telephone - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1334	85.60
Dec. 23	Telephone board - 1700 Biscayne Blvd. (Bill)	1350	458.88
	Total		$1,110.05
	TELEGRAPH:		
Dec. 2	Cables presenting Dr. Llaca	1049	$ 70.00
Dec. 12	Cables	1198	50.00
Dec. 19	Telegrams	1291	58.49
Dec. 30	Telegram from Dr. Varona to Fidel Castro	1388	21.48
	Total		$ 199.97
			$1,557.95
Less: Reinbursment excess in check 1049 (Annex "I-C")			2.71
	TOTAL COMMUNICATIONS		$1,555.24

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
PUBLICITY
"PAULA AND COSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-K"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 2	Booklets distribution to the O.E.A.	1039	$ 100.00
Dec. 2	Booklets distribution to the O.E.A.	1040	460.00
Dec. 5	Print 5,000 flysheets Maceo	1085	27.81
Dec. 5	Payment of 5,000 posters on the Publicity account	1087	500.00
Dec. 6	Announcement act of day 7 (D.de las Américas)	1118	40.50
Dec. 6	Rent of chairs and amplifiers act day 7	1119	46.00
Dec. 6	Excess in expenses act Nov. 27	1122	7.10
Dec. 6	*Publicity Triple A - D.de las Américas	1127	195.75
Dec. 7	Film act Nov. 27	1144	15.00
Dec. 10	Freight booklets "Document before the O.E.A."	1192	463.84
Dec. 12	Expenses act Dec. 7 (Teaching Section)	1197	42.19
Dec. 12	Freight booklets and proclamations	1198	300.00
Dec. 14	Part of the bill to print booklets O.E.A	1218	1,283.90
Dec. 14	Advertisement D.de las Américas (Accountant Acs.)	1219	18.00
Dec. 18	Freight publicity	1288	11.58
Dec. 18	Freight publicity	1289	6.00
Dec. 22	Special publicity (P/o J.I. Rasco)	1331	1,000.00
Dec. 22	Film (P/o Executive)	1332	5,000.00
Dec. 22	Publicity decided by the Executive	1333	5,256.00
Dec. 23	5,000 Booklets declaration of "Che" Guevara	1344	92.70
Dec. 23	10,000 Booklets document to the O.E.A.	1345	813.70
Dec. 24	Films, cameras, rents, etc. (Bebo Alonso)	1365	176.00
Dec. 24	Payment "Toronto Star" (Publication of letter to Minister of Commerce of Canada)	1366	840.00

(Continues page No.2)

PUBLICITY

ANNEX "I-K"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 28	Payment print of 3084 booklets C.E.A.	1379	$ 100.00
	TOTAL PUBLICITY		$16,796.07

*Substitutes check No.702 of November, which was lost and cancelled by the Bank, and when it appeared later, was cancelled by us, and is considered as an increase in the Bank balance.

See Annex "I-J" for adj to bank account

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE SECRETARIAT
MILITARY SECTION
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-L"

Date		Check No.	Total
	REIMBURSEMENT REVOLVING FUND:		
Dec. 5	Reimbursement	1169	$ 6,384.22 ① ✓
Dec. 6	"	1134	4,868.51 ① ✓
Dec. 18	"	1226	10,697.83 ① ✓
Dec. 21	"	1316	2,904.52 ① ✓
Dec. 23	"	1346	4,999.19 ① ✓
Dec. 23	"	1347	999.12 ① ✓
Dec. 23	"	1363	2,420.32 ① ✓
Dec. 28	"	1374	2,199.78 ① ✓
Dec. 28	"	1375	2,043.00 ① ✓
Dec. 31	"	1401	2,337.00 ① ✓
Dec. 31	"	1402	3,499.72 ① ✓
Dec. 31	"	1403	2,877.36 ① ✓
Dec. 31	"	1404	190.00 ① ✓
Dec. 31	"	1405	1,319.99 ① ✓
	Total		$47,740.56
	OTHERS:		
Dec. 3	Rent recruiting office	1055	$ 110.00
Dec. 6	Deposit telephone General Staff Control Office	1125	50.00
Dec. 7	1313 N.W. 8 Ave. house rent and electricity	1152	142.16
Dec. 13	Hotel rent	1212	1,666.67
Dec. 15	Three domino sets for the camp	1228	42.40
Dec. 16	Confidential rent (F. Zayas)	1270	80.00
Dec. 20	Confidential subject (V. León)	1296	122.92

(Continues page No.2)

① Detail schedules in file

MILITARY SECTION

ANNEX "I-L"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total
	OTHERS: (Cont.)		
Dec. 21	Expenses compesation Transport Commitee	1315	$ 1,900.00
Dec. 30	Print checks "Rasco and Paula"	1393	34.25
	Total		$ 4,148.40
	TOTAL MILITARY SECTION		$51,888.96

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
COMMITTEES
"PABLO [illegible] ROSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-M"

Date			Check No.	Total
	PUBLICITY:			$ -0-
		Total		$ -0-
	AGENT EXPLOITATION:			
Dec. 5	Budget		1080	$ 5,916.00
Dec. 6	Excess expenses Nov.		1117	72.07
		Total		$ 5,988.07
	PLANNING:			
Dec. 5	Budget		1107	$ 2,300.00
		Total		$ 2,300.00
	FINANCE:			$ -0-
		Total		$ -0-
	PUBLIC RELATIONS:			
Dec. 15	Office supplies		1225	$ 13.68
		Total		$ 13.68
	ORGANIZATION AND PROSELITYSM:			
Dec. 9	Trip to set up Jacksonville Delegation (T. Diaz)		1163	$ 120.00

(Continues page No.2)

COMMITTEES

ANNEX "I-M"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total
	ORGANIZATION AND PROSELITYSM:(Cont.)		
Dec. 9	Trip to set up Jacksonville Delegation (A. L. Sotolongo)	1164	$ 120.00
Dec. 30	General expenses as per voucher	1399	356.94
	Total		$ 596.94
			$ 8,898.69
Less:	"Reinbursment remaining of checks 1163 and 1164 (Annex "I-C")		37.00
	TOTAL COMMITTEES		$ 8,861.69

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
DELEGATIONS
"PAULA AND ROSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-N"

Date		Check No.	Total
	LATINS:		
	ARGENTINA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	A. de J. Piñera	1037	$ 275.00
	Total Argentina		$ 275.00 ✓
	COLOMBIA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	Angel Aparicio	1037	$ 150.00
Dec. 2	Roberto Ruiz	1037	150.00
Dec. 2	Máximo Sorondo	1037	550.00
	Total Colombia		$ 850.00 ✓
	COSTA RICA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	Orlando Núñez	1037	$ 200.00
Dec. 2	José M. Tarafa	1037	200.00
	Total Costa Rica		$ 400.00 ✓
	HONDURAS:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	Antonio Losada	1037	$ 300.00
Dec. 28	Eusebio Capestany	1382	150.00
Dec. 28	Ivan Portuondo	1383	150.00
	Total Honduras		$ 600.00 ✓

(Continues page No.2)

DELEGATIONS

Date		Check No.	Total
	PERU:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	Armando Cruz	1037	$ 200.00
Dec. 2	Frank Díaz Silveira	1037	350.00
	Others:		
Dec. 23	Expenses of November	1364	129.80
Dec. 26	Expenses of November	1367	71.75
Dec. 27	Expenses of November and December	1370	357.00
	Total Peru		$1,108.55
	PUERTO RICO:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	Manuel Fernández	1037	$ 500.00
	Total Puerto Rico		$ 500.00
	CHILE:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 3	J. Valdés Crespo (E. Miró)	1063	$ 600.00
	Total Chile		$ 600.00
	GUATEMALA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 28	Enrique Collazo	1381	$ 250.00
	Total Guatemala		$ 250.00
	TOTAL LATINS		$4,583.55
	NORTH AMERICANS:		
	CHICAGO:		
	Others:		
Dec. 16	Expenses F. Martínez	1274	$ 400.00

(Continues page No.3)

DELEGATIONS

ANNEX "I-N"

Date		Check No.	Total
	CHICAGO: (Cont.)		
Dec. 16	Expenses S. Montejo	1275	$ 400.00
	Total Chicago		$ 800.00
	NEVADA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 9	Isela García de Solís	1189	$ 200.00
	Total Nevada		$ 200.00
	TAMPA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 1	Gustavo Cotayo	892	$ 175.00
	Others:		
Dec. 5	Expenses organization of Delegation	1089	200.00
Dec. 7	Budget of the Delegation	1151	393.00
	Total Tampa		$ 768.00
	MIAMI:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 1	Thelma Carregado	883	$ 125.00
Dec. 1	Nize Martin	952	160.00
Dec. 1	José Nápoles	971	225.00
Dec. 1	Juan Noriega	972	175.00
Dec. 1	Otto Ruiz	998	300.00
	Total Miami		$ 985.00
	KEY WEST:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 1	José M. Caramés	881	$ 200.00
	Total Key West		$ 200.00

(Continues page No.4)

DELEGATIONS

ANNEX "I-N"
Page No.4

Date		Check No.	Total
	NORTH AMERICANS: (Cont.)		
	WASHINGTON:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 1	Eric Agüero	854	$ 700.00
Dec. 1	Nicolás Rivero	987	250.00
Dec. 2	Manuel Braña	1036	200.00
Dec. 2	Carlos Fiad	1036	500.00
Dec. 15	Ignacio Bustillo	1227	350.00
	Total Washington		$2,000.00
	NEW YORK:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 1	Enrique Abascal	850	$ 155.00
Dec. 1	Sergio Aparicio	861	400.00
Dec. 1	Miguel A. Bahamonde	865	255.00
Dec. 1	Salvador Ferrer	910	250.00
Dec. 1	Orlando Gómez Gil	926	200.00
Dec. 1	Harry Pérez	978	250.00
Dec. 1	Iradio Rodríguez	989	300.00
Dec. 1	Juan Rodríguez Pintado	992	300.00
	Others:		
Dec. 14	Expenses New York Delegation	1213	1,135.00
Dec. 28	Expenses publicity	1380	2,000.00
	Total New York		$5,245.00
	Total of Americans		$10,198.00
	TOTAL OF DELEGATIONS		$14,781.55

(Continues page No.5)

DELEGATIONS

RESUME:

	Payroll	Others	Total
LATINS	$ 4,025.00	$ 558.55	$ 4,583.55
NORTH AMERICANS	5,670.00	4,528.00	10,198.00
TOTAL	$ 9,695.00	$ 5,086.55	$14,781.55

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
C.F.R.D.E.C.
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-C"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 15	Spent during the month	1233	$2,000.00
	Total		$2,000.00

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MONROE HOTEL
"[illegible]"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-F"

Date		Check No.	Total
	PAYROLL:		
Dec. 5	Claudio Sánchez (Dec.)	1090	$ 90.00
Dec. 5	Claudio Sánchez (Nov. 19-30)	1091	33.00
Dec. 9	Francisco Liantaud	1156	150.00
Dec. 1	Agustín Menéndez	959	90.00
	Total		$ 363.00
	OTHERS:		
Dec. 6	Miscellaneous expenses	1116	$ 33.23
Dec. 12	Reinbursment revolving fund	1206	25.71
Dec. 15	Monroe Hotel assurance	1223	195.10
Dec. 19	Reinbursment revolving fund	1292	40.85
Dec. 27	Reinbursment revolving fund	1369	34.35
	Total		$ 329.24
			$ 692.24
Less:	Reinbursments (Annex "I-D")		184.00
	TOTAL MONROE HOTEL		$ 508.24

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
TRANSFERENCES
"PAULA AND ROSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-Q"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. ✓ 5	Transference to "Rasco and Paula"	1111	$50,000.00
Dec. 12	Transference to "Rasco and Paula"	1196	50,000.00
Dec. 30	Transference to "Rasco and Paula"	1327	50,000.00
Dec. 30	Transference to "Rasco and Paula"	1394	50,000.00
	TOTAL TRANSFERENCES		$200,000.00 ✓

NOTE: These transferences have been done to the effects of increasing the account "Rasco and Paula", through which the payroll of the Social Work and the military staff is paid.

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-R"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 21	Monthly pay (M.D.C.)	1311	$ 600.00
Dec. 21	Monthly pay (M.R.R.)	1317	600.00
Dec. 21	Monthly pay (Montecristi)	1317	600.00
Dec. 21	Monthly pay (Rescate)	1319	600.00
Dec. 21	Monthly pay (M.I.D.)	1321	600.00
	TOTAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS		$3,000.00

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MISCELLANEOUS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-S"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 6	Clandestine works (C.F.P.)	1132	$ 60.00
Dec. 9	Personnel payment - confidential	1179	2,100.00
Dec. 9	Confidential traveler to Cuba	1186	30.00
Dec. 9	Material secret works	1188	13.44
Dec. 12	Secret works (Confidential)	1199	60.00
Dec. 14	Special works	1215	600.00
Dec. 16	Hospital bill P.L.D. Lanz (Authorized by Finance Department)	1266	165.00
Dec. 16	Confidential works	1273	65.72
Dec. 19	Excess in expenses movement Rasco family	1293	405.00
Dec. 20	Confidential matter (W.Scott-Moran)	1303	100.00
Dec. 20	Confidential matter (J.Anderson-Moran)	1306	200.00
Dec. 21	Excess in work expenses (Check 1215)	1308	22.14
Dec. 21	Lawyer Association expenses	1320	400.00
Dec. 22	P.L. D. Lanza matter (Authorized by the Finance Department)	1340	410.84
Dec. 22	P.L.D. Lanz matter (Authorized by the Finance Department)	1341	4,000.00
Dec. 22	P.L.D. Lanz matter (Authorized by th Finance Department)	1342	500.00
Dec. 23	Confidential matter (C.F.P.)	1343	60.00
Dec. 26	Sickness and funerals F.Carrillo's uncle	1368	300.00
Dec. 27	Confidential matter (C.F.P.)	1371	60.00
Dec. 30	Expenses check Dr. J.I. Rasco	1400	357.30
	TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS		$9,909.44

mi.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

CHECKS OF NOVEMBER CANCELLED IN DECEMBER

"PAULA AND ROSA"

December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-T"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 1	Ana M. Tomeu	297	$ 250.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Guillermo Sánchez	335	350.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Jorge Rodríguez Bezos	346	300.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Salvador Aldereguía	356	200.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Manuel Commellas	357	125.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Alberto Muller	372	90.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Ceferino Pérez	374	90.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Tulio Díaz	378	90.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Carlos Mencía	394	350.00 ✓
Nov. 2	Gloria Pagés	434	200.00 ✓
Nov. 2	P. V. Aja	441	225.00 ✓
Nov. 2	Luis de la Valette	455	255.00 ✓
Nov. 3	Angel del Cerro	505	300.00 ✓
Nov. 7	Gilberto Gómez Quesada	547	125.00 ✓
Nov. 17	Diario de las Américas	702	195.75 ✓
Nov. 23	Arsenio Roa	765	200.00 ✓
Nov. 23	Cándido Viamontes	775	225.00 ✓
	TOTAL		$3,570.75 ✓

NOTE: The amount of these checks was considered in November as part of the total amount of the accounts to which each one of them correspond. They were not cashed in the bank, because they were cancelled on December, reason for what the total amount of them is considered in this month as an increase in the balance in bank as shown in our books.

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REDISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

STATEMENT "IV"

	BALANCES AS PER BOOKS		ADJUSTMENTS DEBIT	ADJUSTMENTS CREDIT	ADJUSTED BALANCES	
Balance in Bank on Dec. 1, 1960		$ 64,903.72				$ 64,903.72
INCOMES:						
From Finance Department	$451,875.00				$451,875.00	
Reimbursements Earlier Months	213.51				213.51	
Reimbursements Month of December	163.03				163.03	
Reimbursements Monroe Hotel	184.00	452,435.54			184.00	452,435.54
		$517,339.26				$517,339.26
Less: Reimbursements December deducted from expenses		346.53				346.53
		$516,992.73				$516,992.73
EXPENSES:						
Assets	$ 5,773.22				$ 5,773.22	
Payroll	52,290.00			$ 28,885.00(1)	23,405.00	
Maintenance (Help to Refugees)	5,176.70				5,176.70	
Travels	7,834.83				7.834.83	
General Expenses	2,940.45				2,940.45	
Communications	1,555.24				1,555.24	

(Continues page No.2)

REDISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

STATEMENT "IV"
Page No.2

		BALANCES AS PER BOOKS		ADJUSTMENTS DEBIT	ADJUSTMENTS CREDIT	ADJUSTED BALANCES	
Publicity		$ 16,796.07			$ 16,796.07(2)	$ -o-	
Military Section	(Annex "IV-A")	51,882.96		$ 450.00		52,338.96	
Committees	(Annex "IV-B")	8,861.69		(2) 16,796.07) (1) 28,435.00)		54,092.76	
Delegations		14,781.55				14,781.55	
[illegible]		2,000.00				2,000.00	
Monroe Hotel		508.24				508.24	
Transferences		200,000.00				200,000.00	
Revolutionary Movements		3,000.00				3,000.00	
Miscellaneous		9,909.44				9,909.44	
		$383,322.39				$383,322.39	
Bank Charges		19.90	383,342.29			19.90	383,342.29
			$133,650.44				$133,650.44
Plus: November Checks Cancelled in December			3,570.75				3,570.75
Balance in our Books in Dec. 31, 1960			$137,221.19				$137,221.19

ml.

[illegible]

[illegible]

MILITARY SECTION ([illegible])

"[illegible]"

December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "IV-A"

Balance as per books (Annex "I-L")	$51,888.96
Plus: Payroll charged to Military Section (Annex "I-[illegible]")	450.00
Cost of Military Section	$52,338.96

ml.

[illegible]

[illegible]

COMMITTEES ([illegible])

"[illegible]"

December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "IV-B"

PLANNING:

Budget (Annex "I-M")	$ 2,300.00	
Payroll (Annex "I-F")	14,575.00	$16,875.00

ORGANIZATION AND FACILITIES:

Miscellaneous expenses (Annex "I-M")	$ 559.94	
Payroll (Annex "I-F")	6,435.00	6,994.94

PUBLIC RELATIONS:

Office Supplies (Annex "I-M")	$ 13.68	
Payroll (Annex "I-F")	2,000.00	2,013.68

AGENT EXPLOITATION:

Budget (Annex "I-M")	$ 5,916.00	
Excess in November expenses (Annex "I-M")	72.07	
Payroll (Annex "I-F")(Not under control of the Agent Exploitation Office)	650.00	6,638.07

PUBLICITY:

Payroll (Annex "I-F")	$ 3,725.00	
Direct (Annex "I-K")	16,796.07	20,521.07

FINANCE:

Payroll (Annex "I-F")	$ 1,050.00	1,050.00

TOTAL COST OF COMMITTEES		$54,092.76

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

GENERAL COMMENTS

"[illegible]"

December 1 to 31, 1960

In the Statements and Annexes attached, appeared the analysis and sub-analysis of each of the incomes and expenses during the month of December.

The receipts, bills, deposit sheets, checks returned by the bank, and other justificatory certificates of the operations of the month, are in our records. In the cases that the justificatory certificates were not given, there are in our records the memorandums on account of which the checks were made.

In December 31, 1960, there are still Reinbursments to collect in the amount of $350.00 that correspond to the check No.21 of October 4, in the name of Mr. A. Fernández Morell, from the Military Section.

The increase of the Revolving Fund of the Military Section was reinbursed to the Comptroller by the Militar Coordinator, but same were not deposited in the bank, since we have learned in practice the necessity of disposal of cash with urgent need, in more than one time, and to solve these cases we decided to maintain this Fund in our hands, but at the Military Coordinator's disposition.

ml.

14-00000

B-2

[illegible]

[illegible]

"[illegible]"

[illegible]

[illegible] 1 2, 1960

14-00000

B-2

[illegible]

[illegible]

"[illegible]"

[illegible]

[illegible] 1 [illegible] 2, 19[illegible]

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

STATEMENT "II"

Bank Balance; November 30, 1960	$ 74,060.48
Less: Unpaid checks (Remited in Spanish)	9,156.76
Corrected Bank Balance; November 30, 1960	$ 64,903.72

To Dec. OK.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
CIVIL SECTION BUDGET-
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

STATEMENT "III"

	-Budgeted-	-Spent-	Excess	Defect
Payroll and Refugees:	$46,700.00*			
Payroll		$ 48,400.00		
Maintenance		6,781.37		
Total	$46,700.00	$ 55,181.37	$ 8,481.37	
Travel Expenses:	$10,000.00	$ 13,292.90	$ 3,292.90	
Rent, Utilities, etc:	$ 6,000.00			
General Expenses		$ 5,860.80		
Comunications		1,973.79		
Total	$ 6,000.00	$ 7,834.59	$ 1,834.59	
Committees:				
Publicity	$48,000.00	$ 45,695.39		$ 2,304.61
Agent Exploitation	6,000.00	5,916.00		84.00
Planning	2,500.00	2,775.44	$ 275.44	
Finance	-o-	766.00	766.00	
Public Relations	10,000.00	3,500.00		6,500.00
Organization and Proseltysm	1,000.00	515.00		485.00
Total	$67,500.00	$ 59,167.83	$ 1,041.44	$ 9,373.61
Delegations:				
Latin american	$14,000.00	$ 2,670.00		$ 11,330.00
United States	7,500.00	11,198.46	$ 3,698.46	
Total	$21,500.00	$ 13,868.46	$ 3,698.46	$ 11,330.00
G.F.R.D.E.C.	$25,000.00	$ 25,000.00	-o-	-o-
Miscellaneous	$ 5,000.00	$ 4,185.53		$ 814.47
Budgeted Expenses	$181,700.00	$178,530.68	$18,348.76	$21,518.08

14-00000

CIVIL SECTION BUDGET

STATEMENT "III"
Page No. 2

	-Budgeted-	-Spent-	Excess	Defect
Non-Budgeted:				
Assets*	-o-	$ 12,787.58	$ 12,787.58	
Monroe Hotel	-o-	1,802.55	1,802.55	
Total	-o-	$ 14,590.13	$ 14,590.13	
TOTAL BALANCE	$181,700.00	$193,120.81	$ 32,938.89	$ 21,518.08
Diference in excess	11,420.81	-o-	-o-	11,420.81
	$193,120.81	$193,120.81	$ 32,938.89	$ 32,938.89

* Includes the budget of the Comptroller Department ($1,700.00) of which $1,350.00 were used for payroll.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
INCOMES FROM THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-A"

November 1	:	Deposit	MIAMI	US$ 100,000.00
November 7	:	Deposit	BERN	42,987.50 **
November 8	:	Deposit	BERN	86,000.00
November 9	:	Deposit		30,000.00 ***
November 11	:	Deposit	BERN	49,975.00 ***
November 14	:	Deposit		40,000.00 ***
November 22	:	Deposit	MIAMI	US$ 25,000.00
			T O T A L :	$ 373,962.50

amr.

** TYC
[illegible]

73.000
12.50
72987 50

*** TYC

90.000.00
25.00
89,975.00

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
INCOMES FROM TRANSFERENCES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-B"

November 16:	Transference from the account "Paula y Carrillo", Mexico City, to transfer its balance to "Paula and Sosa", and close it.	$ 33.76

amr.

Check with Paula
last acct. Mexico City
shows bal of $2,000.-

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REINBURSEMENTS CORRESPONDING TO EARLIER MONTHS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-C"

Nov. 4	Reinbursement from Mr. José Sosa Jr.	$	400.00
Nov. 4	Reinbursement from Mrs. Cabañas		275.00
Nov. 7	Reinbursement from Dr. J.I.Rasco (Check 129)		584.64
Nov. 14	Reinbursement from Mr. J.Noriega (Check 280)		1.81
Nov. 21	Reinbursement from Mr. José Sosa (Check 260)		12.60
	TOTAL	$	1,274.05

NOTE : These reinbursements correspond to amounts that, in excess of what corresponded to the expense for which the check was extended, were returned by the responsable persons, and deposited in the account "Paula and Sosa". They represent real diminutions in the expenses of earlier months, that are compensated when been considered as incomes in this month.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REINBURSMENTS CORRESPONDING TO THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-D"

Nov. 14	Reinbursment from Mr. Abel de Varona (Part of the check No. 589, for the rent of the phisicyan's house -November- that had been already paid. (See Annex "I-G") tested ck 589	$ 97.85
Nov. 16	Reinbursment from the account "Rasco and Paula" to restitute the "Revolving Fund" that was created through the account - "Paula and Sosa". (See Annex "I-E")	1,000.00
Nov. 21	Reinbursment of check 690 tested for excess in advertising in "Diario de la Marina" (See Annex "I-K")	6.00
Nov. 22	Reinbursment of check 730 tested for excess in the telephone bill (FR-7-2389) (See Annex "I-J")	70.90
Nov. 28	Reinbursment of check 797 tested for excess in a trip (M. Cobo) (See Annex "I-H")	0.30
Nov. 28	Reinbursment of check 749 tested in excess in pamphlet freight (See Annex "I-K")	39.31
	TOTAL	$ 1,214.36

NOTE : These amounts have been deducted from the totals of their respective accounts, as can be seen in the correspondent annexes, to the effects of the exact determination of the expense in each case.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
ASSETS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-E"

Date		Check No.	Total
	DEPOSITS:		
Nov. 3	Deposit - Electricity service - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	491	$ 150.00
Nov. 3	Deposit - Telephone service - 1714 Biscayne Blvd.	516	600.00
Nov. 4	Revolving fund - Social Work - J.Riera	533	1,000.00
Nov. 7	Deposit - Telephone service - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	541	900.00
Nov. 8	Deposit - Telephone service - Comptroller Department	570	50.00
Nov. 9	Deposit - Water service - 1714 Biscayne	580	20.00
Nov. 1	Guaranty for laborers visas (R.Piñera)	409	200.00
Nov. 9	Revolving fund - Comptroller Department	582	500.00
Nov. 11	Deposit - Telephone service - 228 NE. 31 St.	607	100.00
Nov. 21	Deposit - Electricity service - 228 NE. 31 St.	730	20.00
Nov. 21	Deposit - Gas service - 1700 Biscayne	735	10.00
Nov. 21	Deposit - Water service - 1700 Biscayne	741	10.00
Nov. 28	Petty Cash (Mario Rodríguez)	832	50.00
Nov. 30	Deposit - Telephone service - José Sosa	849	300.00
			$ 3,910.00
	Less: Reinbursment - Revolving Fund- Social Work (Check 533)		1,000.00
	Total of Deposits		$ 2,910.00
	OFFICE EQUIPMENT:		
Nov. 1	1 Underwood No. 7643983	421	$ 110.00
Nov. 1	1 Underwood No. 7737343	421	110.00

Continues page No. 2

ASSETS

ANNEX "I-E"
Page No. 2

Date		Check No.	Total
	OFFICE EQUIPMENT: (Cont.)		
Nov. 3	1 desk	428	$ 25.00
Nov. 3	1 Thermo-Fax	428	359.00
Nov. 8	4 No. 45 lock - 4 drawer legal files	567	185.40
Nov. 8	4 Type stands No. 100	567	28.63
Nov. 8	5 Wall Arm swivel Chairs	567	206.00
Nov. 8	4 Wells No. 1230 Post. Chairs	567	119.48
Nov. 8	10 Baskets	567	10.30
Nov. 8	6 Executive Desks	567	278.10
Nov. 8	2 Secretary Desks	567	108.15
Nov. 9	1 Underwood No. 6170967	567	80.00
Nov. 9	1 Underwood No. 6788936	576	80.00
Nov. 9	1 Portable Corona No. 16-119371	576	40.00
Nov. 12	Payment - Addressograph (Aug., Sept.,Oct)	622	103.35
Nov. 16	1 R.C.Allen No. 2A-2238342	688	119.05
Nov. 16	2 tables	688	19.90
Nov. 21	1 Olivetti No. 82	730 ✓	180.25
Nov. 21	1 Swingline No. 99 Stapler	741	2.95
Nov. 23	1 Arrow Stapler	767	4.25
Nov. 23	1 Bates Stapler	767	7.95
Nov. 23	2 Used desks	774	100.94
Nov. 23	5 used desks and 1 No. 45 lock	774	301.28
Nov. 23	1 used desk and 1 No. 45 lock	774	99.41
Nov. 30	2 W. Up. Chairs	847	52.00
Nov. 30	1 Swivel chair	847	20.00
Nov. 30	1 No. 45 file with lock	847	51.09
Nov. 30	1 Smith Corona portable - S-292673	848	45.00
	Total of Office Equipment		$2,847.48

Continues page No. 3

ASSETS

Date		Check No.	Total
	AUTOMOBILES:		
Nov. 3	1 - Plymouth 1955 - Tag 1-117896	428	$ 355.00
Nov. 1	1 automobile (F.Martínez)	388	300.00
Nov. 19	Excess in the price of one automobile (J.Nápoles)	729	47.30
Nov. 21	1 Lincoln - Tag No. 1W-36446	734	125.00
	Total of automobiles		$ 827.30
	OTHERS:		
Nov. 1	First payment - "Madjin" ship	384	$1,000.00
Nov. 3	1 Westinghouse fan	428	45.32
Nov. 3	1 Grunding recorder	428	67.98
Nov. 3	3 beds	428	30.00
Nov. 3	1 fire extinguisher	428	14.50
Nov. 10	1 refrigerator	589	45.00
Nov. 23	2nd. payment - "Madjin" ship	776	1,000.00
Nov. 23	3rd. payment - "Madjin" ship	777	3,000.00
	Total of "Others"		$ 5,202.80
	TOTAL OF ASSETS		$11,787.58

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
PAYROLL
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-F"

The details of the payroll are remitted in Spanish	$42,400.00

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL EXPENSES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-G"

			Total
Office Supplies	[illegible]		$1,403.68
Rents		$2,346.57	
Less: Physician's house rent (November - Check 589 - Reimbursed)		97.85	2,248.72
Miscellaneous			2,208.40
	military?		$5,860.80

N O T E : Due to the many payments made as "General Expenses" and that no one of them exceeds of $300.00, details are remitted in Spanish.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
TRAVEL
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-H"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 1	Trip to Chicago (Serapio Montejo)	386	$ 218.43
Nov. 1	Trip to Chicago (Florentino Martínez)	387	300.00
Nov. 1	Trip to Europe (Justo Carrillo)	390	1,750.00
Nov. 1	Transference from Miami - C.Alfonso's family	422	170.00
Nov. 1	New York-Miami (Mrs. del Valle)	424	144.13
Nov. 1	New York-Miami (Luis Rivas)	425	144.13
Nov. 2	Havana (Frank Zayas)	428	50.00
Nov. 2	Tampa-Habana (Frank Zayas - Messenger)	428	54.00
Nov. 3	New York - Press Conference (Dr.Varona)	489	853.60
Nov. 3	Expenses in excess - Trip to Peru (Frank Díaz Silveira)	495	90.50
Nov. 3	Expenses in Dr. Tejera transference	498	107.50
Nov. 3	Trip to New York to get a surgery (G.Camueira)	507	70.00
Nov. 4	Trip to New York (A.Collada and F.Alonso)	526	292.00
Nov. 4	Trip to New York (Dr. Varona)	527	201.93
Nov. 7	Trip to Bogotá (M.Sorondo)	553	200.00
Nov. 7	Trip to Honduras (L.García)	554	100.00
Nov. 9	Trip to West Palm Beach (J.Noriega)	581	9.71
Nov. 9	Trip to Kansas City - Press Conference (A.Rivero)	583	131.12
Nov. 10	Havana-Miami (Juan, Silvia & J.Roque - children)	590	108.00
Nov. 11	Trip to Cuba (Dulce Torres)	606	86.00
Nov. 11	Trip to New York (M.Salvat)	606	150.00
Nov. 11	Havana-Miami (Mrs. Otto Ruiz and Children)	607	86.40
Nov. 11	Havana-Miami (A.C.Vila-Miyares-Rodríguez)	608	129.60
Nov. 11	Havana-Miami (Juan Menéndez)	609	107.05
Nov. 3	Transference of laborers - New York-Miami	49 7	710.36

Continues page No. 2

14-00000

TRAVEL

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 11	Miami-Habana (V.Antón's family)	618	$ 216.80
Nov. 12	Expenses in excess - Trip to Washington - Antonio Collada	621	14.27
Nov. 14	Round trip - New York-Miami (S.Estrada)	646	120.00
Nov. 15	Trip (No specified) Isabel Siero	665	150.00
Nov. 16	Trip to Cuba (Ignacio Freixas)	686	43.20
Nov. 17	Many (Frank Zayas)	698	251.30
Nov. 18	Many to Washington (O.E.A.)	704	391.50
Nov. 18	Havana-Miami (Mrs. Pereira and children)	705	86.40
Nov. 18	Habana-Miami (R.Orta)	710	43.20
Nov. 18	Trip to Mexico (M.F.Goudie)	712	320.40
Nov. 18	Havana-Miami (R.Arronte)	722	43.20
Nov. 21	Havana-Miami (Mrs. G.Ribeaux and son)	743	86.40
Nov. 22	Havana-Miami (G.Villiers family)	753	90.00
Nov. 22	Havana-Miami (Tito Hernández family)	754	108.00
Nov. 22	Tax on the tickets for Mr.Hernández family	755	31.14
Nov. 23	Trip to Cainesville - Caribe Conference (R.Miquel)	771	400.00
Nov. 23	Trip to Chicago (Serapio Montejo)	772	305.47
Nov. 23	Trip to Chicago (F.Martínez)	773	513.98
Nov. 23	Havana-Miami (O.Loredo y Dr.Varona)	779	107.16
Nov. 23	Havana-Miami (2 messengers)	780	107.16
Nov. 23	Havana-Miami (Sordo y Martínez)	783	107.16
Nov. 23	Havana-Miami (L.Gómez y R.Fernández)	786	107.16
Nov. 24	Havana-Miami (E.Hernández e hijo)	790	107.16
Nov. 24	Havana-Miami (Felicia Hernández)	792	53.58
Nov. 24	Miami-New York (M.Cobo)	797	125.59
Nov. 24	Travel expenses - Miami-Washington-New York (Dr. Varona and three more)	798	396.96
Nov. 25	Trip to New York (Varona, Artime, Rasco, Carrillo)	808	1,100.00

Continues page No. 3

TRAVEL

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 25	Trip to Boston, Albany and West Palm Beach (Carlos Fiad)	809	$ 372.90
Nov. 26	Trip to New York - Ricardo Sardiña	817	275.00
Nov. 26	Trip to New York - Montiel and Corona	818	251.80
Nov. 26	Excess in tickets for Chicago (Dr. Varona)	820	61.07
Nov. 28	Travel expenses - New York - (H.Corona)	824	105.00
Nov. 28	Travel expenses - New York - (P,Montiel)	824	105.00
Nov. 28	Havana-Miami (A,Muñoz y P.Guerra)	833	86.40
Nov. 28	Travel expenses - Dr.Rasco (Mexico)	833	125.40
Nov. 29	Travel expenses - New York (Huerta and one more)	840	150.00
Nov. 29	Travel expenses (J.Gómez)	841	68.98
			$13,293.20
	Less: Reinbursemnt - M.Cobo - Check 797		0.30
	TOTAL		$13,292.90

N O T E: In some of the expenses related in this annex do not exist the receipts in our records, and in this cases, the checks were extended in view of a Memorandums giving such instruction.

amr.

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MAINTENANCE
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 22, 1960

ANNEX "I-I"

Details recited in Spanish	$ 6,781.37

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
COMMUNICATIONS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-J"

Date		Check No.	Total
	MAIL:		
Nov. 2	Certificated mail	428	$ 12.62
Nov. 3	Stamps	499	20.00
Nov. 3	Special Delivery	499	1.17
Nov. 3	Special Delivery	499	0.42
Nov. 9	Stamps	581	100.00
Nov. 9	Certificate mail	581	2.28
Nov. 10	Stamps	589	11.00
Nov. 21	Stamps	730	34.92
Nov. 21	Stamps	741	69.97
Nov. 28	Stamps	824	55.33
Nov. 28	Stamps	833	32.00
		Total	$ 339.71
	TELEPHONE:		
Nov. 11	FR-5607	607	$ 63.18
Nov. 11	FR-9-4906	612	346.58
Nov. 11	FR-9-4906	613	224.07
Nov. 14	FR-9-4906	613	10.00
Nov. 14	Long distance - Key West (C.B.Fernández)	661	1.33
Nov. 17	Liquidation - FR-3-1717	693	103.48
Nov. 18	FR-4-0884	703	38.60
Nov. 18	Long distance (M.F.Goudie)	712	52.70
Nov. 21	Long distance FR-7-3389	730	70.90
Nov. 23	FR-4-2628	769	249.81
Nov. 23	FR-4-0884	770	104.69
Nov. 24	Long distance (Dr.Varona) JE-2-3391	800	118.80
			$1,384.14
Less: Reinbursemt - Check 730 - FR-73389	Should have been on Schedule "I-5"		70.90
		Total	$1,313.24

COMUNICATIONS

ANNEX "I-J"

Date		Check No.	Total
	TELEGRAPH:		
Nov. 2	Cable	428	$ 2.92
Nov. 4	Telegrams to the Secretaries of State of Latin America	530	176.74
Nov. 9	Cables to Guatemala	581	30.68
Nov. 18	Cable	710	2.56
Nov. 21	Cable	741	87.09
Nov. 21	Cable to Venezuela	763	13.00
Nov. 28	Telegrams	824	7.85
		Total	$ 320.84
	TOTAL OF "COMUNICATIONS"		$1,973.79

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
PUBLICITY
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-K"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 1	Announcement - Laborers Meeting -Oct.30	391	$ 202.50
Nov. 1	Sketch - Virgen de la Caridad del Cobre	414	60.00
Nov. 1	Publication - Triple A Declarations	423	750.00
Nov. 1	Publicity - Democratic Information Center - Mexico	426	1,700.00
Nov. 2	Fotographic work	428	206.00
Nov. 2	Expenses - laborers meeting - Oct. 30	428	50.00
Nov. 9	W.M.E.T.	571	280.00
Nov. 9	Expenses - laborers meeting - Oct. 30	572	103.00
Nov. 9	Newspapermen meeting	581	59.02
Nov. 9	Announcements - W.M.E.T. - Laborers meeting	584	50.00
Nov. 14	Labels "Cuba Sí, Russia No"	658	412.00
Nov. 15	Auditorium rent	661	25.75
Nov. 16	Two pages of publicity in "Diario de La Marina"	690	136.00
Nov. 17	November 26 meeting	695	800.00
Nov. 17	November 26 meeting	696	385.00
Nov. 17	Publicity Triple-A - Diario de las Américas	702	195.75
Nov. 21	Publication - Triple-A declarations "Avance"	736	165.00
Nov. 22	Freight - Booklets - "Cuba Denuncia Traición de Castro"	749	511.80
Nov. 22	Booklet - Document to the O.E.A.	750	800.00
Nov. 23	Newspapermen announcement - D.de las Américas	782	54.00
Nov. 24	Film - F.R.D. offices	802	150.00
Nov. 24	Press conference - Expenses	803	199.50
			$7,295.32

Less:

Excess on check 690 - D. de la Marina	$ 6.00	
Excess on check 749 - Boodlets freight	39.31	45.31
		$7,250.01

PUBLICITY

N O T E: See more publicity expenses on annex "I-N".

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MILITARY SECTION
"[illegible] AND [illegible]"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-L"

Date		Check No.	Total
	REIMBURSEMENT - REVOLVING FUND:		
Nov. 1	Reimbursement	419	$6,937.52 ①
Nov. 5	"	534	353.88 ②
Nov. 5	"	535	1,000.00 ②
Nov. 5	"	536	749.85 ②
Nov. 5	"	537	480.00 ②
Nov. 5	"	538	1,173.00 ②
Nov. 5	"	539	1,537.45 ②
Nov. 8	"	559	6,235.55 ②
Nov. 14	"	624	5,402.21 ②
Nov. 18	"	714	5,961.00 ②
Nov. 22	" #1 Detail (schedule) in file	756	3,964.48 ②
Nov. 28	" #2 Details reviewed and returned	822	4,502.60 ②
	Total		$38,297.54
	MISCELLANEOUS:		
Nov. 9	Automobile expenses - (Cabañas)	581	$ 55.44
Nov. 10	Hotel rent	592	5,000.00 ?
Nov. 10	Hotel rent	593	1,666.67 ✓
Nov. 3	Given to the Transportation Committee	519	2,000.00
Nov. 9	Purchase of equipment for Comunications	577	1,000.00
Nov. 12	Reparation expenses - Ship - (D.V.Tejera)	623	260.00
Nov. 15	Given to Alberto Martín (Transportation)	663	150.00
Nov. 15	Given to Manuel García (Transportation)	664	150.00
Nov. 17	Radio parts (Comunications)	697	650.00
Nov. 18	Naval effects (Comunications)	709	142.37
Nov. 18	Transference - New York-Miami - (A.R.Alonso family)	713	500.00

Continues page No. 2

MILITARY SECTION

ANNEX "J-L"
Page No. 2

Date		Check No.	Total
	MISCELLANEOUS: (Cont.)		
Nov. 19	Equipment reparation - Transportation Committee (FL.Díaz Lanz)	727	$ 600.00
Nov. 21	Expenses estrictly confidential	744	160.00
Nov. 22	Purchase of one radio (F.Zayas)	760	65.00
Nov. 28	Naval Section Payroll	823	1,938.50
Nov. 28	Purchase of a radio-plant (Comunications)	827	600.00
Nov. 28	Confidential	828	60.00
	Total		$14,997.98
	TOTAL "MILITARY SECTION"		$53,295.52

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
DELEGATIONS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-M"

Date		Check No.	Total
	LATINAS:		
	ARGENTINA:		
Nov. 11	Given	615	$ 275,00
	PERU:		
Nov. 11	Given	615	$ 350.00
Nov. 28	"Propaganda"	826	350.00
			$ 700.00
	COLOMBIA:		
Nov. 11	Given	615	$ 300.00
	HONDURAS:		
Nov. 11	Given	615	$ 300.00
Nov. 24	Travelling tickets (L.García)	789	70.00
			$ 370.00
	COSTA RICA:		
Nov. 11	Given	615	$ 400.00
Nov. 14	Given	631	500.00
			$ 900.00
	SAN SALVADOR:		
Nov. 25	Sent to J.L.Fernández	813	$ 125.00
	Total of "latins"		$2,670.00
	NORTH AMERICANS:		
	ATLANTA:		
Nov. 24	Traveling tickets (R.Rodríguez)	793	$ 500.00

Continues page No. 2

DELEGATIONS

ANNEX "I-M"
Page No. 2

Date		Check No.	Total
	NORTH AMERICANS: (Cont.)		
	WASHINGTON:		
Nov. 21	Sent	748	$1,070.00
	NEW ORLEANS:		
Nov. 21	Instalation of the Delegation	746	$ 300.00
	NEVADA:		
Nov. 11	Sent	619	$ 323.46
	TAMPA:		
Nov. 3	Miscellaneous expenses	501	$ 150.00
	NEW YORK:		
Nov. 11	Sent	610	$2,735.00
Nov. 14	J.M.González	644	1,500.00
Nov. 14	J.M.González	657	3,370.00
Nov. 15	F. de Juan	660	150.00
Nov. 16	"Propaganda"	673	650.00
			$ 8,405.00
	Total of "Americans"		$11,198.46
	TOTAL OF DELEGATIONS		$13,868.46

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
COMMITTEES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-N"

Date		Check No.	Total
	PUBLICITY: ("Propaganda")		
Nov. 8	Given to Rasco	561	$ 500.00
Nov. 22	Abel Mestre (Corresponding October)	751	7,945.38
Nov. 22	Abel Mestre (No accounting submited yet)	757	30,000.00
			$38,445.38
	AGENT EXPLOITATION:		
Nov. 2	Budget	469	$ 5,916.00
	PLANNING:		
Nov. 1	Budget	420	$ 2,775.44
	FINANCE:		
Nov. 9	Given to Lineras (Especial)	587	$ 266.00
Nov. 11	Instalation of "Sectores Economicos" Committee	611	500.00
			$ 766.00
	PUBLIC RELATIONS:		
Nov. 18	Given	717	$ 200.00
Nov. 21	Tournee (E.Llaca) by South America (Still traveling)	738	3,000.00
Nov. 21	Transference to New York - J.Alonso	745	300.00
			$ 3,500.00
	ORGANIZATION AND PROSELITYSM:		
Nov. 15	Advance on the budget	666	$ 500.00
Nov. 28	Miscellaneous expenses	833	15.00
			$ 515.00
	TOTAL		$51,917.82

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
SOCIAL WORK
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-O"

Details remited in Spanish	$ 3,400.00

N O T E : Excluding checks No. 465 (Medicines and medical sevices) and No. 659 (Help to Mrs. Orlando Calero) the rest corresponds to the salaries paid, during the month, to the physicians (M.D.) related. On the month of December, they will be transferred to the Military Section.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
G.F.R.D.E.C. (*)
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-P"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 16	Check to the order of José Sosa	684	$25,000.00
	TOTAL F.F.R.D.E.C.		$25,000.00

(*) Expenses of the FRD in Cuba.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MONROE HOTEL
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-Q"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 18	Deposit and rent - Monroe Hotel	716	$1,350.00
Nov. 21	Expenses of the Hotel (A.de Varona)	721	300.00
Nov. 24	Salarie - A.Menéndez (23-30 Nov.)	794	24.00
Nov. 25	Sheets and linen	810	80.00
Nov. 28	Miscellaneous (F.Liantaud)	830	48.55
			$1,802.55

What was income?

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
TRANSFERENCES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-R"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 2	To the account "Rasco and Paula"	427	$84,000.00
Nov. 14	To the account "Rasco and Paula"	635	50,000.00
	TOTAL		$134,000.00

NOTE: These transferences have been done to the effects of increasing the account "Rasco and Paula", through which the payroll of the Social Work and the military staff. is paid.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MISCELLANEOUS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-S"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 1	Confidential expenses (Dr, Carrillo - R.V.)	389	$ 500.00
Nov. 1	Expenses of a messenger to Havana	408	100.00
Nov. 1	Expenses of a messenger to Havana	411	129.60
Nov. 3	Confidentil (Dr. Varona)	512	2,000.00
Nov. 4	Furniture and equipment purchased by Mr. Ros, for the Miami Delegation office, and that were transferred from it by Mr. Leopoldo Morffi. For that reason they are considered as a lost.	523	371.83
Nov. 7	Operation "Savannah"	552	120.00
Nov. 9	Confidential (Traveling tickets)	586	43.20
Nov. 10	Secret Service A.Torres	588	50.00
Nov. 18	Purchase of military texts	707	100.00
Nov. 21	Expense charged by mistake and reinbursed by Mr. Ros	730	70.90
Nov. 21	Transference, from Mexico to Miami, of Dr. Rasco's family	747	700.00
			$4,185.53

See credit on Schedule "I-J"

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
CHECKS OF OCTOBER CANCELLED IN NOVEMBER
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-T"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Manuel Comellas - Payroll	82	$ 125.00
Oct. 6	Luis Farajón - Payroll	92	350.00
Nov. 18	Antonio Losada - To be justified	205	200.00
Nov. 28	Tacuba Printing - Publicity	276	300.00
Nov. 28	Tacuba Printing - Publicity	278	200.00
Nov. 29	Vicente A.Romeo - Publicity	281	105.00
			$1,280.00

N O T E: The amounts of these checks was considered in October, as part of the total amount of the accounts to which each one of them corresponds. They were no cashed in the bank, because they were cancelled on November, reason for what the total amount of them is considered in this month as an increase in the balance in bank shown in our books.

14-00000

"[illegible]" - Noviembre 1960

Reintegro Fondo Fijo Sector Militar Auxilios de los Gastos - Cheque No. 110 - Partidas 1 a la 15, ambas inclusive.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 1

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional support to cuban refugees)

Ernesto Peinó - Raciones	$ 90.00
Gastón Rodríguez - Raciones	90.00
Gastón Rodríguez - Raciones	20.00
Emilio Fernández Trujillo	5.00
Pedro Arnao	5.00
Manuel López Espinosa	30.00
Rigoberto Montero Pérez	5.00
Cecilio González García del P.	5.00
Luis López González (450)	13.25
Víctor M. Haber Haber	5.00
Miguel A. Mazas García	5.00
Marcos Zamora	8.00
José M. Martínez Vilela	5.00
Luis Ramón Pérez	5.00
Héctor Varona	10.00
Humberto I. Chamizo	5.00
Luis Pérez Rodríguez	4.00
Cecilio González	4.00
Pedro Arnao	4.00
Migual Matas - Rigoberto Montero - Haber - Vilela (4)	20.00
José M. Martínez	5.00
Zenando Quicutis (especial)	10.00
Pedro Arnao (manutención y ropa)	10.00
Cecilio González	5.00
Luis Pérez Rodríguez	5.00
Humberto P. Núñez	10.00
Luis Iglesias Mesias	5.00

Pasa a la Hoja No. 2

Hoja No. 2

Emilio Hernández	$ 6.00	
Abelardo Silva P. y ocho hombres	27.00	
José Alvarez García	5.00	
Cecilio González	5.00	
Luis Pérez Rodríguez	5.00	
José Martínez Vilela	5.00	
Marcos Zamora	10.00	
Gastos varios personal llegado	12.00	
Claudio González (varios)	20.00	
Tomás Vázquez	5.00	$ 488.25
Gastos de Transporte (Gas and Oil)		
Taxi grupo de Cuba y pilotos		5.00
Varios (Miscellaneous)		
Café, etc.		6.75
		$ 500.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 2

Gatos en Radiografías y Análisis (X-Rays and Analisys)	$ 266.50

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 -, "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 3

Manutención y Albergue: (Occasional Support to Cuban Refugees)		
Bartolomé Díaz Cruz	$ 77.00	
Wilfredo Díaz	14.00	
José V. Calcotta	14.00	
Cinco Alistados	50.00	
Osvaldo Coello	10.00	$ 165.00
Gastos de Transportes (Gas and Oil)		
Gasolina, aceite y repación de auto	$ 32.15	
Traslado Armando Rodríguez Alonso	153.66	185.81
Alquileres de Alistados (Rent - Recruits)		
Mario Fernándes	$ 75.00	
Fernando Blanco	10.00	
Leocadio León	16.50	101.50
Otras Ayudas (Other occasional supports)		
Arcángel Amador	$ 25.00	
Guillermo Cancio	20.00	
Dr. Alonso	20.00	
José Mederos Robaina	9.94	
Agustín Carballo	4.00	78.94
Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		
Efectos de Escritorio	$ 41.37	
Mir y Santos - Traslado a Key West	10.00	
Otros	36.98	88.35
		$ 619.60

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 4

Viaje y permanencia de un agente del Coordinador Militar en Cuba, cuyo nombre desconocemos y, además, que no expondríamos en ningún caso por medidas de seguridad.

$ 200.00

Trip and expenses of an agent of de Militar Coordinatos, whose name we don't know and that we - wouldn't mention in any case for security reasons.

AMR.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $ 6,937.52 - "Paula and Sosa"

PARTIDA No. 5

Manutención y Albergue: (Occasional Support to cuban refugees):		
Lázaro Albo	$ 10.00	
Fulgencio R. Gil Hernándes	14.00	
Marcos Zamora	12.00	
Octavio Fernándes	10.00	
Pedro Aranao	2.50	
Emilio R. Hernández	12.00	
Cecilio Gonzáles	5.00	
Luis Senén Lópes	5.00	
José Martínez Vilela	4.00	$ 74.50
Gastos de Transporte: (Gas and Oil)		
Gasolina y Aceite		19.35
Servicios Médicos: (Medical Services)		
Blood Analisys (Análisis de sangre)		54.00
Gastos Varios: (Miscellaneous)		
Comidas	$ 4.05	
Lavado de Ropa	6.58	
Varios	20.14	30.77
Otras ayudas ocasionales: (Other occasional supports)		
Sra. de Roberto Rodríguez		20.00
		$ 199.62

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE NO. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 6

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional Support to cuban refugees)

Ismael Valladares	$ 20.00	
Osvaldo Enriquez	20.00	
Víctor M. Haber	20.00	
Cinco hombres por dos días	15.00	
Alimentos	5.00	
Emilio Hernández	5.00	
Zenaido Quicuti	70.00	
Pedro Arando	5.00	
Rigoberto Montero	20.00	
Guillermo Trabaue	20.00	
Pablo Ubide	25.00	
Orlando Urra	25.00	
José M. Angel Pomar	25.00	
Nildo Acevedo	25.00	
Nicolás Viant	15.00	
Armando Guerra	15.00	
José R. Machado	115.00	
Cándido Alfonso	100.00	$ 545.00 ✓

Gastos de Transporte (Gas and Oil)

Gasolina y Aceite		2.25

Activos (Assets)

Un radio Estado Mayor		184.41

Efectos de Escritorio (Stationary)

Sellos de Correos	$ 20.00	
Papel	4.12	24.12

Pasa a la Hoja No. 2

Hoja No. 2

Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		
Servicio de agua	$ 20.75	
Teléfono Estado Mayor	69.10	
Otros gastos	4.37	$ 94.22
		$ 850.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE NO. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 7

Por la remisión a la Sra. Josefa Patterson a la calle 29 letra "C", No. 7016, entre 70 y 72, Buenavista, Marianao, por medio del Sr. Freddie Goudie.	$ 200.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 6

Luis Morse Delgado, gastos de instalación, incluyendo su familia. (Instalation expenses, including his family)	$ 200.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE NO. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 9

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional Support to cuban refugees)

Humberto Núñez (Renta Hotel)	$ 21.52	
Alquiler Motel (por un día de renta)	6.18	
Hotel San Carlos (renta para nueve hombres)	37.08	
Abelardo Silva (comida ocho personas	32.00	
Víctor M. Haber (comida cuatro hombres)	20.00	
Alfredo Hernández	5.00	
Pedro Arnao	6.00	
Marcos Zamora	10.00	
Cecilio González	10.00	
Heberto Lorenzo	20.00	
Abelardo Silva (comida nueve personas)	18.00	
Humberto I. Chamizo	5.00	
J.Torres y otros	129.78	
Francisco Rodríguez	123.60	$ 444.16
Gastos de Transporte (Gas and Oil)		
Gasolina y Aceite		9.98
Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		23.07
		$ 477.21

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $ 6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 10

Manutención y Albergue: (Occasional support to cuban refugees)		
Joaquín Rodríguez	$ 20.00	
José Fellón	20.00	
Marta García Rubio	50.00	
Ramón Rodríguez	20.00	
Héctor Varona	20.00	
Wamer Hablutzel	25.00	
Raúl Vázquez	20.00	
Ernesto Peinó	20.00	
Nildo Batista	20.00	
Eddy González	20.00	
Reynaldo Lazo	20.00	
Osvaldo Rodríguez	20.00	
Eduardo Herrera	20.00	
Francisco García	20.00	
Renta (Hotel)	16.35	
Renta (Hotel)	17.41	
Renta (Hotel)	16.77	
Renta (Hotel)	4.16	
Renta (Hotel)	12.40	
Manuel Avila	20.00	$ 402.09
Gastos de Transporte (Gas and Oil)		11.23
Varios (Miscellaneous)		
Teléfono	$ 12.02	
Otros	23.10	35.12
		$ 448.44

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE NO. 419
POR $ 6,937.52 - "PAULA ND SOSA"

Partida No. 11

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional support to cuban refugees)

Ramón Rodríguez	$ 20.00	
Amado Cantillo	20.00	
Julián Bunuedo	20.00	
Warnov Hablutzol	20.00	
Eddy González	20.00	
Reynaldo Lazo	20.00	
Alberto Pérez Sordo	20.00	
Nildo Batista	20.00	
Manuel Avila	20.00	
Ramón Rodríguez	20.00	
Héctor Varona	25.00	
Raúl Vázquez	30.00	
Pablo Astudillo	25.00	
Eduardo Herrera	20.00	
Acelo Pedroso	20.00	
Joaquín Rodríguez	20.00	
Gastón Rodríguez	114.80	
Renta Hotel	45.20	$ 500.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 12

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional support to cuban refugees)

Mario A. Enríquez	$ 20.00	
Rolando Moya	68.00	
Osvaldo Coello	27.00	
Fermando Blanco	10.00	
Leocadio León	50.00	
Mario Lamar	50.00	
Rolando Pérez	10.00	
Patricio Artigas	10.00	
Benjamín Granados	17.00	
Ayuda adicional	42.00	
Alquiler	68.45	
Comida	5.00	
Senén Brito	8.00	$ 385.45
Gastos de Transporte (Gas and Oil)		16.60
Gastos Médicos (Medical services)		28.53
Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		9.57
		$ 440.15

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA WD SOSA"

Partida No. 13

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional support to cuban ~~refugees~~)

Mario de Lamar	$ 50.00
José Enrique Alonso	50.00
Ceferino Palmer	44.00
Guillermo Losa Zafrane	51.00
Osvaldo Coello Díaz	27.00
Mario A. Enríquez	51.00
Rolando Moya	51.00
Félix Domínguez	24.00
Antonio Ramos	24.00
Ramón García Avila	22.00
Orlando Bayona	22.00
José A. Darias Rodríguez	20.00
Emilio Izquierdo	14.00
Rogelio de los Santos	14.00
Arcangel Amador	14.00
Augusto Pupo	14.00
Modesto B. García	14.00
Jorge Varela	14.00
Mario Pérez Chile	14.00
Alfredo Mir	14.00
Justo Delgado	14.00
José F. Mederos	14.00
Miguel A. Victorero	14.00
Gilberto Junco	14.00
Arturo Escarce	14.00
Senén Brito	14.00
Julio Tur	14.00
Enrique Moreno	14.00
Leocadio León	14.00
Luis Fuente Roca	14.00
Cándido C. Aguilar	14.00
Fernando Blanco	14.00

Hoja No. 2

Manutención y Albergue (Cont.)
(Occasional support to cuban refugees)

Emiliano Díaz	$ 14.00	
Mariano Santos	14.00	
Mario Collazo	14.00	
Rolando Pérez Pena	14.00	
Patricio Artigas	14.00	$ 786.00

Sueldos (Salaries) :

Esteban Echevarría	$ 55.00	
Eduardo Franqui	55.00	
Guillermo Cancio	50.00	
Jorgë Mackenzie	30.00	
Orlando Arrazola	20.00	
Agustín Carballo	20.00	
Benjamín Granados Alvarez	20.00	250.00
		$1,036.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 14

Por el alquiler de una automóvil al Sr. Guillot, que según comprobante, asciende a $366.94 (por 5 semanas) sin que haya reintegrado $33.06 de sobrante, correspondiendo $250.00 al pago del cheque No. 244 de Octubre 26 y la diferencia a esta erogación. (Automobile rent - Manuel Guillot). $ 150.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 15

Manutención y Albergue (Occasional support to cuban refugees)		
Máximo Ruiloba	$ 125.00	
A. Crispín Hernández	25.00	
Ricardo P. Gómez	5.00	
Lázaro Albo	12.50	
Comida	194.01	
Conrado Santana	64.92	$ 426.43
Transporte (Gas and Oil)		14.20
Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		
Sellos de Correos	$ 100.00	
Material de Oficina	82.12	182.12
Habilitación de evacuados (Uniforms for the recruits)		143.10
Varios (Miscellaneous)		46.32
Activos (Assets)		
Dos ventiladores (Ejército)	$ 15.00	
Una cama	22.60	37.60
		$ 849.77

amr.

"[illegible]" - Octubre 1960

Reintegros Fondo Fijo Sector Militar - Análisis de los Gastos. Chéques Nros. 239 al 244, ambos inclusive.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE NO. 239
POR $499.51 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Manutención y Albergue: (Occasional support to cuban refugees)		
Hugo Román Acevedo - Exp. 411	$ 18.21	
Rodolfo Díaz - Exp. 256	30.00	
Elpidio Felizola - Exp. 392	5.00	
José L. Vivanco - Exp. 89	10.00	
Juan F. Torres - s/n - New York	10.00	
Humberto Chamizo - Exp. 272	12.00	
Florencio F. Valdés - Exp. 376	5.00	
Roberto Rodríguez González - Exp. 77 - N.Y.	20.00	
Mario Riverón (Gasolina y cantidades a varios compañeros)	10.00	
Luis L. López - Exp. 450	5.00	
Ernesto Fernández y 2 compañeros	12.00	
Rogelio Rodríguez (3 hombres)	20.00	
Bernardo J.Bosch y 4 compañeros - N.Y.	20.00	
Pedro Arnao - Exp. 51 - New York	10.00	$ 187.21
Habilitación de Evacuados (Uniforms for the recruits)		191.63
Gastos de Transportes (Gas and Oil)		13.00
Efectos de Escritorio (Office supplies)		7.21
Varios (Miscellaneous)		100.46
		$ 499.51

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 240
POR $479.10 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Manutención y Albergue: (Occasional support to cuban refugees)		
Mario Enríquez	$ 10.00	
Guillermo Losa Zafrané	10.00	
Cándido Aguilar Paz	12.00	
Wilfredo Díaz (50%)	6.00	
Julio Tur Tur	6.00	
Arturo Escarce Cancio - Extra	20.00	
Augusto Pupo	5.00	
Guillermo Losa Zafrané	41.00	$ 110.00 ✓
Gastos de Transporte (gas and Oil)		22.30
Alquileres de Alistados (Rents)		
Ceferino Palmer Prado (Oct.)	$ 65.00	
José F. Mederos (Oct.)	55.00	120.00 ✓
Haberes mensuales (Salaries)		
Esteban Echevarría - Adicional por depend.	$ 36.76	
Eduardo Franqui - Adicional por depend.	36.76	73.52 ✓
Ayudas varias (Other occasional supports)		
Guillermo Cancio - Hospital - Servicio médico - Medicinas	$ 52.00	
Félix Domínguez - Recibo luz	3.72	
Osvaldo E. Coello - Remitir esposa	20.00	75.72 ✓
Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		77.56
		$ 479.10 ✓

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 241
POR $ 850.00 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Manutención y Albergue: (Occasional Support to cuban refugees)		
Cigarros para evacuados	$ 22.41	
Rolando Rodríguez - 414 - Raciones-Movilización	15.00	
Lázaro Alba - Raciones - Encargado movimiento de personal	10.00	
Rafael G. Labrada - Raciones	10.00	
Eliseo Pérez - René Gómez - J.Torres - 4 días - Room	24.00	
Fuentes - Cuéllar - 1 día - Rooms 7 y 6	12.00	
Morales - 14 días - Room 3	84.00	
Rodríguez - 6 días - Room 6	36.00	
Sra. Rodríguez - 6 días - Room 7	36.00	
Impuestos por los cinco renglones anteriores	5.76	
Hotel Ponce de León - s/nombre	130.00	
Motel Valencia - s/nombre	91.00	
José R. Machado	20.00	
Mario Pérez Chile	20.00	$ 516.17
Habilitación de evacuados (Uniforms for the recruits):		36.85
Gastos de Transportes (Gas and Oil):		21.90
Efectos de Escritorio (Office supplies)		67.76
Activos varios (Assets)		122.27
Sueldos (Salaries)		
Ricardo Pérez Gómez - Sereno - Semana		20.00
Varios (Miscellaneous)		65.05
		$ 850.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 242
POR $709.00 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional support to cuban refugees)

Ceferino V. Palmer Prado	$ 44.00	
Guillermo Losa Zafrana	51.00	
Félix Domínguez y Sra.	24.00	
Antonio Ramos y Sra.	24.00	
Ramón García Avila	22.00	
Emilio Izquierdo	12.00	
Rogerio de los Santos	12.00	
Arcángel Amador	12.00	
José A. Darias	20.00	
Orlando Bayona	22.00	
Augusto Pupo	12.00	
Modesto B. García	12.00	
Jorge Varela	12.00	
Mario Pérez Chile	12.00	
Luis Hernández	12.00	
Justo Delgado	12.00	
José F. Mederos Robaina	12.00	
Miguel A. Victorero	12.00	
Gilberto Junco	12.00	
Arturo Escarce Cancio	12.00	
Senén Brito Alfonso	12.00	
Julio Tur	12.00	
Enrique Moreno	12.00	
José M. Fagil Moreira	12.00	
Luis Fuente Roca	12.00	
Cándido C. Aguilar	12.00	
Ricardo Zabala Sánchez	12.00	
Andrés I. Rodríguez	12.00	$ 459.00

Pasa a la Hoja No. 2

Hoja No. 2

Sueldos (Salaries):

Esteban Echevarría	$ 55.00	
Eduardo Franqui	55.00	
Guillermo Cancio	50.00	
Jorge Mackenzie	30.00	
Orlando Arrazola	20.00	
Agustín Carballo	20.00	
Benjamín Granados	20.00	$ 250.00
		$ 709.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 243
FOR $ 600.00 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Gastos de asistencia médica y operación en el hospital de un oficial necesitado del Estado Mayor. (Medical assistence and surgery)	$ 600.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 244
POR $250.00 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Pagando el arrendamiento del auto del Sr. Manuel Guillot, sin que aparesca el recibo de la casa arrendadora. (Automobile rent). $ 250.00

amr.

English
B-1

Paula de Sosa
Oct 1 - 31 . 1960

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

STATEMENT "II"

Bank Balance; Oct. 31, 1960	$	82,559.66
Less: Unpaid checks (remited in Spanish)		11,386.82 ✓
Corrected Bank Balance; Oct. 31, 1960	$	71,172.84 ^

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
INCOMES FROM THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-A"

Oct. 15	Deposit	$ 50,000.00 MIAMI
Oct. 17	Deposit	56,000.00 MIAMI
Oct. 26	Deposit	45,000.00 MIAMI
Oct. 26	Deposit	64,000.00 MIAMI
	Total of incomes from the finance dept.	$215,000.00 ✓

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
INCOMES FROM TRANSFERENCES FROM THE ACCOUNT "RASCO AND PAULA"
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-B"

Oct. 10	Deposit - Check No. 237	$ 12,086.33
Oct. 14	Deposit - Check No. 238	3,000.00
		$ 15,086.33 ✓

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
OTHER INCOMES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-C"

Oct. 17:	Reinbursment - Francisco Carrillo: Amount given in excess for the payment of the payroll	$ 300.00
Oct. 19:	Reinbursment - Juan Paula: Amount not used on check No. 55, account 19314 "Banco del Comercio, S.A." Mexico D.F., for his expenses in a trip to Mexico.	78.89
Oct. 19:	Reinbursment - Ana Tomeu: Her salary of September	250.00
Oct. 21:	Enrique Llaca: Amount not used on check 228, Sept. 8, "Rasco and Paula", for a trip to Colombia.	11.50
Oct. 26:	Roberto Fernández: Amount in excess on check No. 91, August 8, ("Rasco and Paula") for the Students Section.	61.92
Oct. 27:	Paula and Sosa: A deposit that must have been done in the account "Rasco and Paula", on check No. 255, and that by mistake, was redeposited in this account.	50,000.00
		$ 50,702.31

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

ASSETS

"PAULA AND SOSA"

October 1 to 31,1960

ANNEX "I-D"

Date		Check No.	Total
	DEPOSITS IN GUARANTY:		
Oct. 12	Electricity Service - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	144	$ 110.00
Oct. 18	Electricity Service - 970 SW 2 St.	195	10.00
Oct. 12	Electricity Service - Raúl Amieva	135	20.00
Oct. 12	Laundry - 970 SW 2 St.	135	15.00
Oct. 27	Telephone Service - Jorge A.Morán	256	50.00
			$ 205.00
	OFFICE EQUIPMENT:		
Oct. 7	One mimeograph - Planification	117	$ 367.00
Oct. 18	One steel table - Two chairs - 1419 Congress Blding.	190	50.00
Oct. 20	One "Underwood" typewriter - No. 6718540 (Radio station)	235	75.00
Oct. 20	One "Underwood" typewriter - No. 6062299 (Radio station)	236	80.00
Oct. 20	One "Underwood" typewriter - No. 6960833 (Mrs. Park)	236	117.50
Oct. 20	One"Underwood" typewriter - No. 6315650 (Radio station)	236	80.00
Oct. 20	One "Underwood" typewriter - No. 7212532 (Silvia Morán)	236	117.50
Oct. 26	Five typewriters tables - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	246	49.75
Oct. 26	One electric typwriter - Planification Committee	247	485.85
Oct. 28	One "Underwood" typewriter - No. 7237268-15 (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	269	117.50

Date		Check No.	Total
	OFFICE EQUIPMENT: (Cont.)		
Oct. 28	One "Underwood" typewriter No. 7705727 (1700 Biscayne Blvd)	270	$ 120.00
Oct. 28	One "Underwood" typewriter No. 7737343 (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	270	120.00
Oct. 28	One file (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	272	62.50
Oct. 28	One file (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	272	49.50
Oct. 28	One file (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	272	58.00
Oct. 28	Four paper baskets (1700 Biscayne)	272	7.92
Oct. 28	Four plastic paper baskets (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	272	5.96
Oct. 28	One file	272	57.50
			$ 2,021.48
	AUTOMOBILES:		
Oct. 18	One automobile - Segundo Miranda	190	$ 95.00
Oct. 18	One automobile - Chevrolet - Plate No. 30-27179	196	80.00
Oct. 26	One automobile - José Nápoles - Organization and Proselitysm	248	300.00
Oct. 27	One automobile - Plate No. 1-20439 (J.García)	256	300.00
Oct. 27	One automobile - Luis M.Varona	257	300.00
			$ 1,075.00
	OTHER ASSETS:		
Oct. 4	One boat - 28'3'' lenght - two motors - Fo. 2982 ("Piscis")	2	$ 3,000.00 ✓
Oct. 18	Revolving Fund - Comptroller	188	500.00
Oct. 18	Revolving Fund - Militar	200	5,000.00
Oct. 26	Revolving Fund - Militar	245	5,000.00
Oct. 27	One "Blank punkt" radio (258-2St)	256	69.54
Oct. 27	Two radios - Frank Zayas	256	500.00
Oct. 28	Fifty chairs (portables)	272	212.50
Oct. 27	One radio for comunications	256	500.00
			$ 14,782.04

Total sumes next page

TOTAL OF ASSETS: $ 18,083.52

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
PAYROLL
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-E"

	Total
DELEGATIONS:	
Colombia	$ 275.00
Mexico	950.00
Argentina	300,00
Peru	420.00
Washington	800.00
Miami	615.00
New York	2,050.00
Key West	200.00
	$ 5,610.00
COMMITTEES:	
Finance	$ 950.00
Publicity	2,975.00
Planification	4,125.00
Transportation	200.00
Agent Exploitation	450.00
Organization and Proselitysm	2,905.00
Comunications	1,150.00
Public Relations	475.00
	$ 13,230.00
OTHERS:	
Coordinador General	$ 460.00
Coordinador Auxiliar	200.00
Mainteinance - Central Office	795.00

Continue next page

	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)	
Military Section	$ 125.00
Economic Section	200.00
Acts and Correspondence	150.00
Inmigration	150.00
Press	260.00
Especial functions	1,550.00
Comptroller Department	850.00
F. E. U.	100.00
Students Directory	1,195.00
F. O. R. D. C.	4,125.00
Non-determined functions	9,665.00
	$ 19,825.00
TOTAL OF PAYROLL	$ 38,665.00

NOTE: The names, amounts and number of checks, is remited in Spanish.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
TRAVEL
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-F"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	New York (9 persons FORDC)	85	$ 485.10
Oct. 4	New York-Miami (one persons confident.)	86	90.00
Oct. 14	J.A.Hernández (FORDC)	168	3.00
Oct. 18	Perú - Frank Díaz Silveira	181	370.00
Oct. 18	Key West-Cuba (Mrs. Trespalacios)	189	40.00
Oct. 18	New York (Delfín Iñiguez)	195	50.00
Oct. 18	Havana-Miami (Mario Massip)	195	48.00
Oct. 18	New York (Pedro Núñez)	196	60.00
Oct. 18	New York (Juan Rodríguez Pintado)	196	40.00
Oct. 18	Miami-Havana (H. Mederos)	196	50.00
Oct. 12	Tampa (Varona-Redondo)	136	78.22
Oct. 26	Airplane trip (Héctor Cruz)	251	25.00
Oct. 26	Travel expenses (Héctor Cruz)	251	25.00
Oct. 27	Emilio Díaz - from New York	256	45.00
Oct. 27	Havana-Miami (Mrs. Figueras and children)	257	125.00
Oct. 27	Havana-Miami (Mrs. Tomás Vázquez and son)	259	64.80
Oct. 29	New York - Manuel Cobo	283	117.00
Oct. 29	Travel expenses (H.Figueras' family)	234	125.00
Oct. 29	Havana-Miami (Mrs. Sordo and son)	286	105.26
Oct. 29	Washington (Juan Sordo)	287	56.33
Oct. 29	Central America (José M. Tarafa Jr.)	288	636.40
			$ 2,639.11

amr

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MAINTENANCE
"PAULA AN BOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-G"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Expenses 4 days - 9 persons (Workers Section)	85	$ 225.00
Oct. 4	Support to Mrs. R. Cisneros (Mr. Cisneros is actually in jail)	87	250.00
Oct. 8	Cash given to persons as per receipt (M.R.R.)	121	3,317.27
Oct. 8	Meals and other expenses - Many houses (M.R.R.)	121	1,113.42
Oct. 11	Maintenance many persons as per receipt (M.R.R.)	128	200.00
Oct. 14	Maintenance many persons as per receipt (M.R.R.)	168	342.30
Oct. 18	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	183	180.00
Oct. 18	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	189	92.45
Oct. 18	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	190	40.00
Oct. 18	Given to Mrs. Yolanda Rubio	195	75.00
Oct. 18	Given to Mr. H. Núñez	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Per diem - Clnel. Vicente León	196	10.00
Oct. 18	Paid to Mr. and Mrs. F.Díaz - Mexico	196	80.00
Oct. 18	Paid to Mr. and Mrs. F.Díaz - México (October 1 to 10)	196	80.00
Oct. 18	Paid to Mr. and Mrs. F.Díaz - México	196	50.00
Oct. 18	Oscar Pelayo - Paid	196	31.91
Oct. 18	Zenaida Palermo - Paid	196	225.00
Oct. 18	Osvaldo Coello - Paid	196	5.00
Oct. 18	Manuel M. Marcos - Paid	196	50.00
Oct. 18	Given to Mrs. Luisa Palma and children	208	200.00
Oct. 18	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	186	30.60
Oct. 12	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	135	120.24

Continue next page

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 12	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	136	$ 280.00
Oct. 26	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	251	482.00
Oct. 27	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	256	210.33
Oct. 27	Maintenance may persons as per receipt	257	20.00
Oct. 27	Maintenance of colaborating families in Cuba	261	247.10
Oct. 27	Maintenance of J.V.Crespo's family in Miami	263	150.00
Oct. 29	Hotel expenses José M. Tarafa Jr.	288	90.00
			$ 8,297.62

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
RENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-H"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 14	Apartments 4 and 10 - 520NW 23 Ct.	168	$ 30.90
Oct. 14	Morell's house(Triple-A)	168	30.00
Oct. 14	Apartment 10 - 520 NW 23 Ct.	168	15.45
Oct. 18	Armando Díaz' house	195	150.00
Oct. 12	Raúl Amieva's house	135	65.00
Oct. 12	M. Mulet's house	135	50.00
Oct. 26	Congress Building - apt. 1105 (Sept. and Oct.)	250	310.00
Oct. 26	520 NW 23 Ct. - House	251	66.35
Oct. 26	1100 SW 3 Ave. - House	251	33.50
Oct. 27	470 NW 51 Ave.	257	80.00
Oct. 27	Yolanda Rubio's house	257	125.00
Oct. 28	1700 Biscayne Boulevard	271	300.00
			$1,256.20

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL EXPENSES--
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-I"

	Total
OFFICE SUPPLIES:	$ 453.55
MISCELLANEOUS:	3,624.73
	$ 4,078.28

NOTE: Due to the many payments made as "General Expenses", but as no one exceeds of $350.00 the details are remited in Spanish.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
COMUNICATIONS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-J"

Date		Check No.	Total
	MAIL:		
Oct. 6	Stamps	106	$ 17.56
Oct. 18	P.O. Box	195	10.50
Oct. 18	P.O. Box	196	7.50
Oct. 26	Stamps and P.O.Box	251	7.57
Oct. 27	Stamps	256	11.97
			$ 55.10
	TELEPHONE:		
Oct. 8	Telephone - Fort Lauderdale	121	$ 6.42
Oct. 14	Long distance - FR-7-3389	168	60.06
Oct. 18	Telephone - FR-3-1717	189	115.48
Oct. 12	Telephone - H.R.D.	136	9.30
Oct. 27	Telephone - FR-7-1103	256	81.95
Oct. 27	Telphone - NE-4-4416	256	14.41
Oct. 27	Telephone - FR-3-3083	256	63.80
			$ 351.42
	TELEGRAPH:		
Oct. 14	Cables to the presidents of latin american countries	164	$ 490.54
Oct. 18	Cables	195	23.53
Oct. 18	"	195	35.20
Oct. 26	"	251	32.60
			$ 581.87
			$ 988.39

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
PUBLICITY
"PAULA AND SOSA"

ANNEX "I-K"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 12	Campaing to collect funds	142	$ 200.00
Oct. 14	Expenses in advertising distribution	168	1.73
Oct. 18	Newspapermen Meeting	180	50.00
Oct. 18	New plates for "Lucha" newspaper	190	24.00
Oct. 18	International Press Services	196	250.00
Oct. 18	1500 books for advertising	206	450.00
Oct. 26	Publicity - Workers and Studentes (Sep)	256	17.61
Oct. 26	Payment to Voice Inc.	256	150.00
Oct. 26	Stationary for publicity	250	8.00
Oct. 26	Publicity expenses - J.Valdés Crespo	263	250.00
Oct. 27	Oct. 30 Meeting (To be discount to the Publicity Committee)	265	732.00
Oct. 27	Oct. 30 Meeting (To be discount to the Publicity Committee)	266	200.00
Oct. 27	Oct. 30 Meeting (To be discount to the Publicity Committee)	267	225.00
Oct. 28	Booklets Printing	276	300.00
Oct. 28	Printing of Otero Borlaff's essays	277	150.00
Oct. 28	Leaflets Printing	278	200.00
Oct. 29	Flags - Oct. 30 Meeting (FCRDC)	280	44.00
Oct. 29	Fabrics - Oct. 30 Meeting (FCRDC)	281	105.00
			$ 3,357.34

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
EXPENSES OF THE MILITARY SECTION
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-L"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 26	Reinbursment Revolving Fund - Military Section	239	$ 499.51 ① ✓
Oct. 26	"	240	479.10 ① ✓
Oct. 26	"	241	850.00 ① ✓
Oct. 26	"	242	709.00 ① ✓
Oct. 26	"	243	600.00 ① ✓
Oct. 26	"	244	250.00 ① ✓
	TOTAL OF EXPENSES OF THE MILITARY SECTION		$ 3,387.61

NOTE: All the receipts were checked and returned to the Military Office.-

amr.

① Detail schedule in office

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
TRANSFERENCES
"FAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-M"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 27	Transference to the account "Rasco and Paula", to pay the month of November to the military dependants, that by a mistake was deposited again in the account "Faula and Sosa".- See annex "I-C".	225	$ 50,000.00

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MISCELLANEOUS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-N"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 14	Special mission in Washington (Carlos Piad)	165	$ 500.00
Oct. 6	Coffee	106	1.12
Oct. 14	Confidential mission (Manuel Rodríguez)	176	2,500.00
Oct. 18	Installation in Miami (Ing. F.Martínez)	179	400.00
Oct. 18	M.R.R. - Registration	184	272.42
Oct. 18	M.R.R. Expenses (As receipt signed by Mr. Jose Arriola. There are not bills or receipts to justify this amount, but it was ordered to be paid by M. Sosa)	184	1,689.14
Oct. 18	Excess in expenses on check No. 232 ("Rasco and Paula").	187	491.58
Oct. 18	F.R.D. - Registration expenses	190	276.00
Oct. 18	Advance to the Public Relation Delegation	193	40.00
Oct. 18	Expenses of a secret Messenger (F.Zayas)	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Confidential expenses (M.Massip)	195	50.00
Oct. 18	Expenses of a secret messenger (F.Zayas)	195	300.00
Oct. 26	Final settlement to Dr. Justo Carrillo for expenses in a trip to México.(The amounts given in advance to Dr. Carrillo, were made through other account. In the papers presented by Dr. Carrillo is clearly expressed the manner in which he was given the amounts and how it was spent.)	246	268.79
Oct. 27	Paid to J.Prado for a ship storage	256	101.00
Oct. 27	Various expenses as per receipt (Bills were not presented)	256	609.16
Oct. 27	Installation of Mr. Arturo Artalejo	257	750.00
Oct. 27	Paid to Mr. Pimienta for broadcastings and other confidential works	257	150.00

Continue next pages

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 27	Ocassional expenses - Vicente León	257	$ 200.00
Oct. 28	Organization of the "Frente Obrero" in Mexico	268	100.00
Oct. 29	Confidential expensee (Dr. Varona instructions)	282	125.00
			$ 8,924.21

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
ADVANCES RECEIVABLES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-O"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	A. Fernández Morell - Military Sec.	21	$ 350.00
Oct. 17	Serapio Montejo - Military Section	178	300.00
			$ 650.00

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
CHECKS TO BE JUSTIFIED
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-P"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Abel de Varona - Executive Committee House	1	$5,000.00 ✓
Oct. 7	Joaquín Sanjenís - Agent Exploitation	109	5,916.00
Oct. 7	Olga Cobo - Colombia Delegation	112	1,000.00 ✓
Oct. 8	Abel Mestre - Publicity Committee	122	700.00 ✓
Oct. 11	Ricardo Sardiña - Trip to N.Y.	125	238.49 ✓
Oct. 11	José I. Rasco - Trip to Central America	129	2,485.30
Oct. 14	Tulio Díaz - Students Directory	169	250.00 ✓
Oct. 17	Bartolomé Bestard - Transportation Comm.	177	6,000.00 ✓
Oct. 18	Abel Mestre - Publicity Committee	194	20,000.00 ✓
Oct. 18	Raúl Soulary - Publicity Committee	197	1,000.00 ✓
Oct. 18	Antonio Collada - Trip to New York	204	584.58 ✓
Oct. 18	Antonio Losada - Honduras Delegation	205	200.00 ✓
Oct. 18	José Arriola - M.R.R.	217	1,823.50
Oct. 18	Ricardo Sardiña - Trip to SouthAmerica	223	4,000.00 ✓
Oct. 19	Antonio Collada - Trip to N.Y. and Wash.	227	100.00 ✓
Oct. 19	Orestes Martínez - Travelling expenses of the family from Cuba	228	424.50 ✓
Oct. 19	Frank Zayas - Trip to N.Y. - Dr.Varona	229	330.00 ✓
Oct. 19	Pascasio Lineras - Workers Meeting	231	350.00
Oct. 19	Manuel Braña Jr. - Trip to Washinton	233	75.00 ✓
Oct. 12	J.Tejera - Ship expenses - August, September and part of Octuber	135	1,000.00 ✓
Oct. 26	Abel de Varona - Publicity - Students Directory	238	68.00 ✓
Oct. 27	Abel Mestre - Publicity Committee	253	16,000.00
Oct. 27	Luis García - Purchase of a radio station in Guatemala	254	618.15 ✓
Oct. 28	Jesús Valdés Crespo - Travel expenses and instalation in Chile	275.	900.00 ✓
Oct. 28	Máximo Sorondo - Publicity	279	225.00 ✓
			$69,288.52

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
RESUME OF THE INCOME AND EXPENSES OPERATIONS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

In the financial statements and annex the analysis and sub-analysis of each one of the income and liabilities during the month of October are shown.

Receipts, invoices, deposit slips and other papers are kept in our files.

As shown on Annex "I-D", a Revolving Fund has been created for the Military Section, amounting to the sume of $10,000.00, divided into two parts of $5,000.00 each, the amount of $3,387.81, was reinbursed to this Revolving Fund, as per Annex "I-D".

The amount of $50,000.00 which appears as "Transferences" in Annex "I-M" corresponds to the transfered amount from the account of "Paula and Sosa" to "Rasco and Paula" account.

From this amount, we have paid in advance the November payment of the military dependants.

In relation to "Checks to Justify", amounting to $69,288.52, as per - Annex "I-P", these could be classified in two groups; one formed by - those corresponding to amounts advanced according to budget to the - different Committees and Delegations and the other, formed by certain expenses to be made, but specifically determined, with receipts dully signed. The later could have been distributed to those accounts within the cassification, thus eliminating them from the title "to justify", but have been kept as so, to be sure of the making of this expense for the purpose to which the checks were drown for, or its actual classification, if these expense were made for other purposes than those originally aimed to. This is due to the fact that some checks were drawn for a specific purpose; they could also have been applied to acquire some - other asset, thus appearing at the end of the month a false balance, since it would appear as an expense, what it actually is an asset.

Section designated as "Transferences" $50,000.00 is compensated with an income for the same amount, when making a transference of funds to the "Rasco and Paula" account to pay through it the payroll of the Military Dependants, but through a mistake it was deposited again in the same account.

14-00000

Spanish

B-1

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
INFORME
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

Miami, Octubre 1 de 1960

Señores Ejecutivos
Frente Revolucionario Democrático

Señores:

Adjunto les estamos remitiendo el INFORME correspondiente a las operaciones del mes de Octubre de 1960, a través de la cuenta "Paula and Sosa", el cual contiene lo siguiente:

Estado "I" :	Estado de Ingresos y Egresos
Estado "II":	Conciliación Bancaria
Anexo "I-A":	Ingresos del Departamento de Finanzas
Anexo "I-B":	Ingresos por Transferencias
Anexo "I-C":	Otros Ingresos
Anexo "I-D":	Activos
Anexo "I-E":	Nómina
Anexo "I-F":	Viajes
Anexo "I-G":	Manutención
Anexo "I-H":	Alquileres
Anexo "I-I":	Gastos Generales
Anexo "I-J":	Comunicación
Anexo "I-K":	Propaganda
Anexo "I-L":	Gastos Sector Militar
Anexo "I-M":	Transferencias
Anexo "I-N":	Varios
Anexo "I-O":	Reintegros a Cobrar
Anexo "I-P":	Cheques a Justificar
	Resumen de las operaciones de Ingresos y Egresos

De Ustedes atentamente,

DEPARTAMENTO DE CONTROL

Juan Paula

CP. Juan Paula Báez

CP. Mario Girbau

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
ESTADO DE INGRESOS Y EGRESOS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ESTADO "I"

INGRESOS:

Anexo "I-A":	Del Departamento de Finanzas		$ 215,000.00
Anexo "I-B":	Transferencias de la Cuenta "Rasco and Paula"		15,086.33
Anexo "I-C":	Otros Ingresos		50,702.31
	TOTAL DE INGRESOS		$ 280,788.64

EGRESOS:

Anexo "I-D":	Activos	$ 18,083.52	
Anexo "I-E":	Nómina	38,665.00	
Anexo "I-F":	Viajes	2,639.11	
Anexo "I-G":	Manutención	8,297.62	
Anexo "I-H":	Alquileres	1,256.20	
Anexo "I-I":	Gastos Generales	4,078.28	
Anexo "I-J":	Comunicación	988.39	
Anexo "I-K":	Propaganda	3,357.34	
Anexo "I-L":	Gastos Sector Militar	3,387.61	
Anexo "I-M":	Transferencias	50,000.00	
Anexo "I-N":	Varios	6,924.21	
Anexo "I-O":	Reintegros a cobrar	650.00	
Anexo "I-P":	Checks a Justificar	69,283.52	209,615.80
Total de Efectivo Disponible en Banco en 10-31-60			$ 71,172.84

NOTA: Existen además los siguientes Fondos Fijos:

Departamento de Control	$ 500.00
Sector Militar	10,000.00
Total Fondos Fijos	$10,500.00

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
CONCILIACION BANCARIA
En Octubre 31 de 1960

ESTADO "II"

Saldo según Estado del Banco (10-31-1960) $ 62,559.66

Menos: Checks girados y no cobrados:

Fecha		Check No.		Importe
Oct.	4	14	Ricardo Díaz	$ 175.00
"	4	27	Orestes Guerra	100.00
"	4	31	Enrique Huertas	500.00
"	4	40	Felipe Rodríguez	250.00
"	4	68	Jorge Rodríguez Pezos	400.00
"	4	82	Manuel Comellas	125.00
"	6	92	Luis Parajón	350.00
"	11	127	José I. Rasco	34.86
"	12	145	Alberto Muller	90.00
"	13	159	Eric Agüero	300.00
"	18	192	Nise Martín	80.00
"	18	205	Antonio Losada	200.00
"	18	206	Editorial Marymar	450.00
"	26	246	Dade Typewriter Co.	55.75
"	26	247	IBM Electric Type-writer Co. Division	485.85
"	27	254	Lasco International Inc.	618.15
"	27	260	José Sosa Jr.	12.60
"	27	261	Jorge Peña	247.10
"	27	262	Nora Fernándes	350.00
"	27	263	Jesús Valdés Crespo	600.00
"	27	265	Colonial Press of Miami, Inc.	732.00
"	27	268	Abel de Varona	100.00
"	28	269	Dade Typewriter Co.	154.58
"	28	270	Charles E. Proud	240.00
"	28	271	Abel de Varona	300.00

Continúa

ESTADO "II"

Hoja No. 2

Fecha	Check No.		Importe	
Oct. 28	272	Desk Center	$ 453.88	
" 28	274	Abel de Varona	125.00	
" 28	275	Jesús Valdés Crespo	900.00	
" 28	276	Tacuba Printing	300.00	
" 28	277	Tacuba Printing	150.00	
" 28	278	Tacuba Printing	200.00	
" 28	279	Máximo Sorondo	500.00	
" 29	280	The Flag Center	44.00	
" 29	281	Vicente Romeo	105.00	
" 29	282	Frank Zayas	125.00	
" 29	283	Manuel Cobo	117.00	
" 29	284	Humberto Figueras	375.00	
" 29	285	Nicolás Hernández	40.00	
" 29	286	José Peña	105.26	
" 29	287	Juan Sordo	126.33	
" 29	288	José M. Tarafa Jr.	726.40	
" 29	289	Armando de León S.	43.06	$ 11,386.82
Saldo en nuestros libros conciliado en 10-30-60				$ 71,172.84

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
INGRESOS DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-A"

Octubre 15:	Depósito	$ 50,000.00
Octubre 17:	Depósito	56,000.00
Octubre 26:	Depósito	45,000.00
Octubre 26:	Depósito	64,000.00
TOTAL DE INGRESOS DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS		$ 215,000.00

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

"PAULA AND SOSA"

ANEXO "I-B"

INGRESOS POR TRANSFERENCIAS DE LA CUENTA "RASCO AND PAULA"

Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

Octubre 10 - Depósito Check No. 237	$	12,026.33
Octubre 14 - Depósito Check No. 238		3,000.00
TOTAL DE INGRESOS POR TRANSFERENCIAS	$	15,026.33

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
OTROS INGRESOS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-C"

Octubre 17:	Reintegro Francisco Carrillo: Sobrantes de la Nómina	$ 300.00
Octubre 19:	Reintegro Juan Paula: Sobrante check No. 55 de la cuenta No. 19314 del "Banco de Comercio, S.A.", de México D.F., para sus gastos de viaje a México	78.89
Octubre 19:	Reintegro Ana Tomeu: Su asignación del mes de Septiembre	250.00
Octubre 21:	Enrique Llaca: Sobrante check No. 228 de Sept. 8 ("Rasco and Paula") por $3,800.00 para viaje a Colombia	11.50
Octubre 26:	Roberto Fernández: Sobrante check No. 91 de Agosto 8 ("Rasco and Paula") por $915.00 para la Sección Estudiantil	61.92
Octubre 27:	Paula and Sosa: Depósito que debió haberse hecho en la cuenta "Rasco and Paula", correspondiente al check No. 255 y que por error se depositó en la misma cuenta de "Paula and Sosa"	50,000.00
	TOTAL DE OTROS INGRESOS	$ 50,702.31

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
ACTIVOS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-D"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	DEPOSITOS:		
Oct. 12	Fondo Electricidad Biscayne Blvd. y Calle 17	144	$ 110.00
Oct. 18	Fondo Electricidad 970 SW apt.1-2St.	195	10.00
Oct. 12	Fondo Electricidad casa R. Amieva	135	20.00
Oct. 12	Fondo Lavandería - 970 SW 2 St.	135	15.00
Oct. 27	Fondo Teléfono - Jorge A. Morán	256	50.00
			$ 205.00
	EQUIPO DE OFICINA:		
Oct. 7	Un Mimeógrafo - Comisión Planific.	117	$ 367.00
Oct. 18	Una mesa de metal - 2 sillas - 1419 Congress Building	190	50.00
Oct. 20	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 6718540 (Planta Radio)	235	75.00
Oct. 20	Una Máquina de escribir Underwood No. 6062299 (Planta Radio)	236	80.00
Oct. 20	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 6960833 (Sra. Park)	236	117.50
Oct. 20	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 6315650 (Planta Radio)	236	80.00
Oct. 20	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 7212532 (Silvia Morán)	236	117.50
Oct. 26	Cinco mesas de máquina de escribir Biscayne Blvd. y 17	246	49.75
Oct. 26	Una máquina de escribir eléctrica (Comisión de Planificación)	247	485.85

Continúa en la hoja No. 2

ACTIVOS

ANEXO "I-D"
Hoja No. 2

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	EQUIPO DE OFICINA: (Continuación)		
Oct. 28	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 7237268-15 (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	269	$ 117.50
Oct. 28	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 7705727 (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	270	120.00
Oct. 28	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 7737343 (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	270	120.00
Oct. 28	Un archivo legal - 4 gavetas (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	272	62.50
Oct. 28	Un archivo legal - 4 gavetas (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	272	49.50
Oct. 28	Un archivo legal - 2 gavetas - con ruedas (Biscayne Blvd y 17)	272	58.00
Oct. 28	Cuatro cestos para papeles (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	272	7.92
Oct. 28	Cuatro cestos plásticos (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	272	5.96
Oct. 28	Un archivo legal - 2 gavetas y caja de seguridad	272	57.50
			$ 2,021.48
	EQUIPO RODANTE:		
Oct. 18	Un auto (Segundo Miranda)	190	$ 95.00
Oct. 18	Un auto Chevrolet - chapa No. 30-27179	196	30.00
Oct. 26	Un auto (José Nápoles: Comisión de Organización y Proselitismo)	248	300.00
Oct. 27	Un auto chapa No. 1-20439 (J. García)	256	300.00
Oct. 27	Un auto Chevrolet (Luis M. de Varona)	257	300.00
			$ 1,075.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 3

ACTIVOS

ANEXO "I-B"
HOJA No. 3

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	OTROS:		
Oct. 4	Un barco de 22'3'' de eslora - 2 motores - No. 2982 ("Piscis")	2	$3,000.00
Oct. 18	Fondo Fijo - Control	188	500.00
Oct. 18	Fondo Fijo - Militar	200	5,000.00
Oct. 26	Fondo Fijo - Militar	245	5,000.00
Oct. 27	Un radio "Blank punkt" (258 2 St)	256	69.54
Oct. 27	Dos radios (Frank Zayas)	256	500.00
Oct. 28	Cincuenta sillas de tijera (?)	272	212.50
Oct. 27	Un radio para comunicaciones	256	500.00
			$ 14,782.04
	TOTAL ACTIVOS		$ 18, 083.52

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
NOMINA
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-E"

		Check No.	Total
DELEGACIONES:			
Colombia:			
Máximo Sorondo Quintana (Pagada en Octubre la asignación correspondiente a Noviembre)		279	$ 275.00
Washington:			
Eric Agüero Montoro		114	$ 500.00
Ignacio Bustillo García		159	300.00
			$ 800.00
Miami:			
Juan G. Noriega País (Sept. y Oct.)	$ 20.00	195	
	100.00	196	
	75.00	226	
	100.00	136	
	$ 295.00		$ 295.00
Elise Martín Sierra (Sept. y Oct.)	$ 160.00	167	
	80.00	192	
	80.00	193	
	$ 320.00		320.00
			$ 615.00
New York:			
Orlando Gómez Gil		130	$ 200.00
Harry Pérez		100	250.00
Manuel Castillo		97	300.00
Enrique Abascal		93	300.00
Sergio Aparicio		95	400.00
Iradio Rodríguez		96	300.00
Juan Rodríguez Pintado		56	300.00
			$2,050.00

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 2

		Check No.	Total
DELEGACIONES: (Continuacíon)			
Key West:			
José M. Caramés Monteagudo		48	$ 200.00
México:			
Roberto de Varona Loredo		101	$ 300.00
José Caragol		105	300.00
Jorge Rodríguez Fleites		115	150.00
Amaro E. Alvarez Tormes		116	200.00
			$ 950.00
Argentina:			
Angel de J. Piñera		113	$ 300.00
Perú:			
Frank Díaz Silveira (Sept. y Oct.)	$ 100.00	136	
	20.00	195	
	300.00	181	
	$ 420.00		$ 420.00
TOTAL DELEGACIONES:			$5,610.00
COMISIONES:			
Finanzas:			
Arístides Agüero Montoro		35	$ 200.00
José Arriola		76	275.00
Enrique Ros Pérez		6	475.00
			$ 950.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 3

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 3

COMISIONES: (Continuación)

	Check No.	Total
Propaganda:		
Orlando Martínez Miller	8	$ 200.00
Vicente A. Romeo Pérez	136	50.00
Humberto Estévez del Pino	57	300.00
Mario Barrera Díaz	55	300.00
Pedro Abascal Berenguer	22	300.00
Angel del Cerro Muñoz	34	300.00
Rafael Rivas Vázquez	77	225.00
José Salazar Aguilar	33	300.00
Rubén Darío Rumbaut	4	500.00
Enrique Huertas	31	500.00
		$2,975.00
Planificación:		
Néstor Carbonelle Cortina	54	$ 175.00
Enrique Llaca Orbiz	51	275.00
Bernardo Maristany Costales-González	138	250.00
Elio R. Alvarez López	111	400.00
Syla Cuervo	198	225.00
Armando de León Sotolongo	53	275.00
Guillermo A. Belt Martínez Viademonte	163	250.00
Pedro Martínez Fraga	52	400.00
Alberto García Navarro	10	150.00
Luis Espíndola Palacios	123	200.00
Pedro S. Peñaranda Díaz	162	300.00
Manuel de J. Mencía Gómez	60	400.00
Ambrosio González del Valle	70	475.00
Jorge Salazar Carrillo	39	350.00
		$ 4,125.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 4

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 4

	Check No.	Total
COMISIONES: (Continuación)		
Transporte:		
Armando Vázquez Almagro	16	$ 200.00
Información e Inteligencia:		
Ramiro Fernández-Moria Fernández	230	$ 200.00
Jorge Roque Castro	220	125.00
Paulino Pérez Blanco	210	125.00
		$ 450.00
Organización y Proselitismo:		
Jesús Miranda Hernández	133	$ 150.00
Heriberto Corona Menéndez	104	175.00
Abel de Varona Loredo	47	175.00
Adrián Vidal Aznares	18	225.00
Pedro Montiel Zapirain	137	250.00
Rafael Galis Menéndez	17	225.00
José Millán Velasco	13	225.00
Enrique Villarreal Concepción	7	350.00
Luis Bueno Ramsden	72	450.00
Roberto Varona García	101	400.00
Claudio González Morales	43	90.00
Pedro Pablo Bermúdez P.	134	190.00
		$ 2,905.00
Comunicaciones:		
Francisco A. Zayas González	44	$ 300.00
Fernando Trespalacios	24	275.00
Gustavo Cuervo Fernández	11	175.00
Ubaldo Arteaga	78	150.00
Hildebrand Díaz Rojas	74	250.00
		$ 1,150.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 5

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 5

		Check No.	Total
COMISIONES: (Continuación)			
Relaciones Públicas:			
Tomás Durán Quevedo		9	$ 200.00
Antonio González Mora		75	275.00
			$ 475.00
TOTAL COMISIONES:			$ 13,230.00
OTROS:			
Coordinador General:			
Jorge A. Morán Lamadrid		196	$ 300.00
Luis Morales Ortega	$ 150.00	102	
	10.00	195	
	$ 160.00		160.00
			$ 460.00
Coordinador Auxiliar:			
Teresa de Jesús Oti Montaner		107	$ 200.00
Mantenimiento Oficina Central:			
Tomás Vázquez Casanova	$ 50.00	196	
	60.00	212	
	90.00	42	
	$ 200.00		$ 200.00
René Díaz Escobar	$ 32.00	195	
	48.00	215	
	10.00	216	
	$ 90.00		90.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 6

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 6

		Check No.	Total
OTROS: (Continuacion)			
Mantonimiento Oficina Central: (Cont.)			
Luis Hernández Melis	$ 20.00	195	
	60.00	214	
	10.00	216	
	$ 90.00		$ 90.00
Hilario Caballero	$ 32.00	195	
	48.00	213	
	10.00	216	
	$ 90.00		90.00
Ana Villarreal		25	200.00
Ricardo Cabrera		45	125.00
			$ 795.00
Sector Militar:			
Manuel Guillot		84	$ 125.00
Sector Económico:			
Adel Tomás Sotolongo Ramos		12	$ 200.00
Secretaría de Actas y Correspondencia:			
Rfael Resende Vigoa		15	$ 150.00
Inmigración:			
Ierael Algaze Maya		196	$ 150.00
Prensa:			
Yolanda Rubio García		195	$ 125.00
Mario Rodríguez Gómez	$ 10.00	195	
	125.00	201	
	$ 135.00		135.00
			$ 260.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 7

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 7

		Check No.	Total
OTROS: (Continuación)			
Funciones Especiales:			
José Manuel Sánchez Navarro		32	$ 325.00
Francisco M. Carrillo Masvidal		94	400.00
María Antonia Mesa Lecourt		19	250.00
Jesús M. Marinas Alvarez		46	175.00
Manuel Rodríguez Fleitas		196	300.00
Osvaldo Aguirre Noy		29	100.00
			$1,550.00
Departamento de Control:			
Juan Paula Báez		90	$ 400.00
Mario Girbau García		88	250.00
Ana Matilde Rodríguez Rodríguez		89	200.00
			$ 850.00
Federación Estudiantil Universitaria:			
Orestes Guerra Cué		27	$ 100.00
Directorio Estudiantil:			
Jorge Más Casanova		26	$ 100.00
María Teresa Valdés Hurtado		151	90.00
Adi Pino Pérez		152	90.00
Oscar Cerallo Mayo	$ 50.00	195	
	90.00	173	
	$ 140.00		140.00
Alejandro Portes	$ 90.00	171	
	125.00	33	
	$ 215.00		215.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 8

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 8

OTROS: (Continuación)

Directorio Estudiantil: (Cont.)

		Check No.	Total
Tulio Díaz S.		172	$ 90.00
Manuel Salvat Roque		153	90.00
Abel de Varona Juárez		80	200.00
Zoila Díaz Carvajal		170	90.00
Ernesto Fernández Travieso		146	90.00
			$1,195.00

Frente Obrero Revolucionario Democrático:

		Check No.	Total
Felipe Alonso Ortega		56	$ 175.00
Raúl Suárez Quiñones		155	125.00
Fernando Puig (Sept. y Oct.)		91	450.00
Mario Massip Macique		110	250.00
Elsa Liantaud Martínez		221	125.00
José Antonio Hernández		126	125.00
Armando González Hernández		157	125.00
Raúl J. Amieva Betancourt		120	225.00
José J. Revilla Sánchez		220	125.00
Eric Garcés Hernández	$ 125.00	195	
	100.00	196	
	125.00	124	
	$ 350.00		350.00
Manuel Alonso Ortega		160	125.00
José Morell Hernández		132	175.00
Enrique Oviedo		219	125.00
Rafael Delgado Pérez		222	125.00
Alberto M. Gómez Quesada		158	125.00
Rafael Otero Borlaff		234	150.00
Mario Fontela Alfonso		156	125.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 9

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 9

OTROS: (Continuación)

Frente Obrero Revolucionario Democrático: (Cont.)

		Check No.	Total
Pascasio Linera López (Sept. y Oct.)	$500.00	108	
(Giro a N.Y.)	100.00	196	
	$600.00		$ 600.00
Antonio Collada Camblor		203	250.00
Rolando Piñera Pardo		218	125.00
José M. Parapar		274	125.00
			$4,125.00

Funciones No Determinadas:

		Check No.	Total
Salvador Aldereguía		81	$ 200.00
Miguel A. Bahamonde		139	225.00
Manuel Comellas		82	125.00
Carlos Fernández		103	200.00
Julio Gutiérrez		174	40.00
Cristóbal Moré (Sept. y Oct.)	$ 80.00	191	
	80.00	193	
	160.00	166	
	$320.00		320.00
Alberto Muller ✓		145	90.00
Ceferino Pérez		147	90.00
Miguel Reigadas		98	200.00
Jorge Rodríguez Bezos		63	400.00
Guillermo Sánchez		5	500.00
Ricardo Díaz		14	175.00
Segundo Miranda		23	250.00
Benjamín Varela		28	200.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 10

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 10

OTROS: (Continuación)

Funciones No Determinadas: (Cont.)

	Check No.	Total
Roberto Fernández	30	$ 90.00
Augusto Martín	36	200.00
Felipe Rodrígues	40	250.00
Mario Riverón	41	225.00
Crosmán Figueras	216	10.00
Angel López Borges	59	400.00
Manuel Hernández	71	500.00
María J. Riera	69	300.00
Dulce Torres	79	150.00
Luis Parajón	92	350.00
Fernando Melo	99	250.00
Alberto Gutiérrez	140	275.00
Jorge Alonso Pujol ✓	196	300.00
Ramón González Quevedo (Sept. y Oct.)	196	400.00
Raúl Braña ✓	196	100.00
Aurea Faggio	196	100.00
Enrique Ruiz Williams	199	175.00
Clara Park Pessino	207	200.00
Manolín García	209	150.00
José Nápoles	237	225.00
Jesús Valdés Crespo (Pagado en Noviembre - asignación de Octubre)	263	200.00
Leopoldo Morffi	61	250.00
Mario Jordán	62	250.00
Pedro Leyva	63	300.00
Orlando García	64	300.00
Armando Pérez Torron	65	250.00
Juan Vidal	66	200.00
Jorge Vidal	67	250.00
		$9,665.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 11

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 11

		Check No.	Total
TOTAL OTROS:			$ 19,825.00
TOTAL NOMINA DE OCTUBRE:			$ 38,665.00

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA ANE SOSA"
RESUMEN DE LA CUENTA
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

		Total
DELEGACIONES:		
Colombia	$ 275.00	
Washington	800.00	
Miami	615.00	
New York	2,050.00	
Key West	200.00	
México	950.00 MO	
Argentina	300.00	
Perú	420.00	$5,610.00
COMISIONES:		
Finanzas	$ 950.00	
Propaganda	2,975.00	
Planificación	4,125.00	
Transporte	200.00	
Información e Inteligencia	450.00	
Organización y Proselitismo	2,905.00	
Comunicaciones	1,150.00	
Relaciones Públicas	475.00	13,230.00
OTROS:		
Coordinador General	$ 460.00	
Coordinador Auxiliar	200.00	
Mantenimiento Oficina Central	795.00	
Sector Militar	125.00	
Sector Económico	200.00	
Secretaría de Actas y Correspondencia	150.00	
Inmigración	150.00	

Continúa en la Hoja No. 2

RESUMEN DE LA NOMINA

Hoja No. 2

		Total
OTROS: (Continuación)		
Prensa	$ 260.00	
Funciones Especiales	1,550.00	
Departamento de Control	850.00	
Federación Estudiantil Universitaria	100.00	
Directorio Estudiantil	1,195.00	
Frente Obrero Revolucionario Democrático	4,125.00	
Funciones No Determinadas	9,665.00	$19,825.00
TOTAL NOMINA		$38,665.00

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
VIAJES
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-F"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	VARIOS:		
Oct. 4	Pasaje N.Y. - Miami (9 miembros Comisión Obrera)	85	$ 485.10
Oct. 4	Pasaje N.Y. - Miami (una persona-Confidencial)	86	90.00
Oct. 14	Viaje J.A.Hernández -(Dirigente Obrero)	168	3.00
Oct. 18	Viaje al Perú (Frank Díaz Silveira)	181	370.00
Oct. 18	Viaje Cayo Hueso y Cuba (Sra. Trespalacios)	189	40.00
Oct. 18	Viaje a N.Y. (Delfín Iñiguez)	195	50.00
Oct. 18	Viaje Habana-Miami (Mario Massip)	195	48.00
Oct. 18	Pasaje N.Y. (Pedro Núñez)	196	60.00
Oct. 18	Pasaje N.Y. (Juan Rodríguez Pintado)	196	40.00
Oct. 18	Pasaje Miami-Habana (H. Mederos)	196	50.00
Oct. 12	Viaje a Tampa (Varona y Redondo)	136	78.22
Oct. 26	Viaje avión - Héctor Cruz	251	25.00
Oct. 26	Gastos de viaje - Héctor Cruz	251	25.00
Oct. 27	Viaje Emilio Díaz desde New York	256	45.00
Oct. 27	Viaje Habana-Miami (esposa e hijos de Humberto Figueras)	257	125.00
Oct. 27	Viaje Habana-Miami (esposa e hijos de Tomás Vázquez)	259	64.80
Oct. 29	Viaje a New York (Manuel Cobo)	283	117.00
Oct. 29	Gastos de viaje familia (H. Figueras)	284	125.00
Oct. 29	Gastos de viaje Sra. Sordo e hijo (Cuba-Miami)	286	105.26
Oct. 29	Viaje a Washington (Juan Sordo)	287	56.33
Oct. 29	Gastos de viaje a Centro-América (José M. Tarafa Jr.)	288	636.40
	TOTAL DE VIAJES		$ 2,639.11

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
MANUTENCION
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-G"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Gastos 4 días - 9 personas (Comisión Obrera)	85	$ 225.00
Oct. 4	Ayuda a esposa de R. Cisneros (Actualmente preso)	87	250.00
Oct. 8	Efectivo entregado a personas según recibos (M.R.R.)	121	3,317.27
Oct. 8	Comidas y otros gastos de varias casas (M.R.R.)	121	1,113.42
Oct. 11	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes (M.D.R.)	128	200.00
Oct. 14	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes (M.D.R.)	168	342.30
Oct. 18	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	183	180.00
Oct. 18	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	189	92.45
Oct. 18	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	190	40.00
Oct. 18	Entregado a la Sra. Yolanda Rubio	195	75.00
Oct. 18	Entregado al Sr. H. Núñez	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Dietas Crnel. Vicente León	196	10.00
Oct. 18	Pago F. Díaz y Sra. - Asilados México	196	80.00
Oct. 18	Pago F. Díaz y Sra. - Asilados México (1 al 10 de Octubre)	196	80.00
Oct. 18	Pago F. Díaz y Sra. - Asilados México	196	50.00
Oct. 18	Oscar Pelayo - Pago	196	31.91
Oct. 18	Zenaida Palermo - Pago	196	225.00
Oct. 18	Osvaldo Coello - Pago	196	5.00
Oct. 18	Manuel M. Marcos - Pago	196	50.00
Oct. 18	Entregado a la Sra. Luisa Palma y sus hijos	208	200.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 2

MANUTENCION

ANEXO "I-G"
Hoja No. 2

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 18	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	186	$ 30.60
Oct. 12	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	135	120.24
Oct. 12	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	136	280.00
Oct. 26	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	251	482.00
Oct. 27	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	256	210.33
Oct. 27	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	257	20.00
Oct. 27	Manutención familias colaboradoras en Cuba	261	247.10
Oct. 27	Manutención familia J.V.Crespo en Miami	263	150.00
Oct. 29	Gastos hotel José M. Tarafa Jr.	288	90.00
	TOTAL MANUTENCION		$ 8,297.62

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
ALQUILERES
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-H"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 14	Alquiler aptos. 4 y 10 - 520NW 23 Court	168	$ 30.90
Oct. 14	Alquiler casa Morell (Triple-A)	168	30.00
Oct. 14	Alquiler apto. 10 - 520 NW 23 Ct.	168	15.45
Oct. 18	Alquiler casa Armando Díaz	195	150.00
Oct. 12	Alquiler casa Raúl Amieva	135	65.00
Oct. 12	Alquiler casa M. Mulet	135	50.00
Oct. 26	Alquiler Oficina Congress Building No. 1105 (Sept. y Oct.)	250	310.00
Oct. 26	Alquiler casa 520 NW 23 Ct.	251	66.35
Oct. 26	Alquiler casa 1100 SW 3rd. Ave	251	33.50
Oct. 27	Alquiler casa 470 NW 51 Ave.	257	80.00
Oct. 27	Alquiler casa Yolanda Rubio	257	125.00
Oct. 28	Alquiler casa Biscayne Blvd. y 17	271	300.00
	TOTAL ALQUILERES		$ 1,256.20

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"FAULA AND COCA"
GASTOS GENERALES-
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-I"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	EFECTOS DE ESCRITORIO:		
Oct. 6	Varios	106	$ 74.28
Oct. 12	"	141	97.34
Oct. 14	"	168	11.63
Oct. 18	"	185	36.05
Oct. 18	"	195	11.49
Oct. 18	"	196	40.23
Oct. 18	"	236	33.79
Oct. 26	"	246	6.00
Oct. 26	"	251	24.84
Oct. 27	"	256	80.82
Oct. 28	"	269	37.08
			$ 453.55
	OTROS:		
Oct. 7	Papel Periódico "Lucha"	119	$ 227.55
Oct. 8	Lavado de ropa, flete de libros, gastos de autos	121	266.94
Oct. 11	Reintegro a Rasco por exceso en check No. 109	127	34.86
Oct. 12	Gastos gasolina J.M.Sánchez	154	61.00
Oct. 13	Trabajos Taqui-Mecanógrafo	161	150.00
Oct. 14	Varios Gastos Menores	168	23.24
Oct. 18	Edward Lustgarten - Traducciones	182	28.24
Oct. 18	Varios gastos - Delegación Miami	186	20.00
Oct. 18	Copias fotostáticas y otros	190	9.29

Continúa en la Hoja No. 2

GASTOS GENERALES

ANEXO "I-F"
Hoja No. 2

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	OTROS: (Continuación)		
Oct. 18	Servicios especiales - Vicente León	195	$ 50.00
Oct. 18	Gastos de un mensajero	195	135.00
Oct. 18	Electricidad - 270 SW 2nd. St.	195	1.23
Oct. 18	Arreglos servicios oficina	195	5.90
Oct. 18	Reintegro - Ricardo Cabrera	195	64.50
Oct. 18	Conectar bebedero	195	2.01
Oct. 18	Iguala - Dr. Carlos B. Fernández	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Geberto Molina - Asignación	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Adquisición - Tomacorrientes	195	0.66
Oct. 18	Reparación Aire Acondicionado	195	36.50
Oct. 18	Pago por estudios para grabaciones	195	150.00
Oct. 18	Atención de un barco en Miami	196	140.00
Oct. 18	Servicios de Vicente Romero	196	150.00
Oct. 18	Entregado al Dr. Algaze	196	25.00
Oct. 18	Fotografías	196	51.60
Oct. 18	Gastos Junta del Frente	196	200.35
Oct. 18	Compra de periódicos	196	15.00
Oct. 18	Colección de mapas para la Marina	196	70.00
Oct. 18	Traslado barco Cayo Hueso-Miami	196	40.00
Oct. 18	Traslado hijo de Collada desde Cuba	196	45.00
Oct. 18	Gastos autos y parqueos en gestiones del Frente	196	20.00
Oct. 12	Una goma de auto - Frank Zayas	135	20.00
Oct. 12	Multa R. Díaz - Auto del Frente	135	25.00
Oct. 12	Gasolina - Auto Estudiantes	135	6.86
Oct. 12	Dos gomas y tres cámaras - Auto Frank Zayas	135	51.28
Oct. 12	Lavado de ropa - Casa Abogados	135	3.30
Oct. 12	Diligencias asuntos secretos	135	35.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 3

GASTOS GENERALES

ANEXO "I-I"
Hoja No. 3

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	OTROS: (Continuación)		
Oct. 12	Gastos Ejecutivo - Motel	136	$ 47.45
Oct. 12	Gastos Hotel - Sra. Jorge Vega	136	26.35
Oct. 26	Reparación máquina de escribir	251	36.50
Oct. 26	Duplicado llaves	251	2.79
Oct. 26	Gastos Comisión de Organización	251	20.00
Oct. 26	Gastos de visas - J. Miranda	251	10.00
Oct. 26	Gastos autos - J.I.Rasco	251	46.00
Oct. 26	Gastos Deleg. Organ. Miami	251	10.00
Oct. 27	Gastos tripulantes barco "Mari"	256	70.61
Oct. 27	Gastos de gasolina	256	20.39
Oct. 27	Compra de gomas para autos	256	26.45
Oct. 27	Compra de pestillos y tornillos	256	1.76
Oct. 27	Lavado de ropa	256	3.30
Oct. 27	Efectos de ferretería	256	29.33
Oct. 27	Arreglos eléctricos	256	38.00
Oct. 27	Varios gastos menores	256	4.83
Oct. 27	Iguala Carlos B. Fernández (Oct. 22 Nov. 22)	258	100.00
Oct. 27	Dos visas (Tulio Díaz y A. de Varona)	260	12.60
Oct. 27	Instalación de Miami - Nora Fernández	262	350.00
Oct. 29	Instalación en Miami - H. Figueras	284	250.00
Oct. 29	Instalación en Miami - N. Hernández	285	40.00
Oct. 29	Instalación en Miami - J. Sordo	287	70.00
Oct. 29	Gastos gasolina - Com. Planificación	289	43.06
			$ 3,624.73
	TOTAL GASTOS GENERALES		$ 4,078.28

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
COMUNICACION
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-J"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	CORREO:		
Oct. 6	Sellos	106	$ 17.56
Oct. 18	Apartado de Correos	195	10.50
Oct. 18	Apartado de Correos	196	7.50
Oct. 26	Sellos y Apartado de Correos	251	7.57
Oct. 27	Sellos	256	11.97
			$ 55.10
	TELEFONO:		
Oct. 8	Teléfono - Fort Lauderdale	121	$ 6.42
Oct. 14	Larga distancia - Telf. Fr-7-3389	168	60.06
Oct. 18	Teléfono Fr-3-1717	189	115.48
Oct. 12	Teléfono F.R.D.	136	9.30
Oct. 27	Teléfono Fr-7-1103	256	81.95
Oct. 27	Teléfono He-4-4416	256	14.41
Oct. 27	Teléfono Fr-3-3083	256	63.80
			$ 351.42
	TELEGRAFO:		
Oct. 14	Cables a Presidentes de América Latina	164	$ 490.54
Oct. 18	Cables Varios	195	23.53
Oct. 18	Cables Varios	195	35.20
Oct. 26	Cables Varios	251	32.60
			$ 581.87
	TOTAL COMUNICACION		$ 988.39

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA ALD SOSA"
PROPAGANDA
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-K"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 12	Campaña para recolectar fondos	142	$ 200.00
Oct. 14	Envío de propaganda	168	1.73
Oct. 18	Acto de los Periodistas	180	50.00
Oct. 18	Nuevas placas Periódico "Lucha"	190	24.00
Oct. 18	Servicios Prensa Internacional	196	250.00
Oct. 18	1500 libros de propaganda	206	450.00
Oct. 26	Propaganda obreros y estudiantes (Sep.)	256	17.61
Oct. 26	Pago a la Voice Inc.	256	150.00
Oct. 26	Cartulinas para propaganda	250	8.00
Oct. 27	Gastos propaganda - J.Valdés Crespo	263	250.00
Oct. 27	Acto Oct. 30 (A descontar del Presupuesto de la Com. de Propaganda)	265	732.00
Oct. 27	Acto Oct. 30 (A descontar del Presupuesto de la Com. de Propaganda)	266	200.00
Oct. 27	Acto Oct. 30 (A descontar del Presupuesto de la Com. de Propaganda)	267	225.00
Oct. 28	Impresión Folletos	276	300.00
Oct. 28	Impresión trabajos de Otero Borlaff	277	150.00
Oct. 28	Impresión Volantes	278	200.00
Oct. 29	Banderas Acto Domingo 30 (FORDC)	280	44.00
Oct. 29	Telas Acto Domingo 30 (FORDC)	281	105.00
	TOTAL PROPAGANDA		$ 3,357.34

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
GASTOS SECTOR MILITAR
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-L"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 26	Reintegro Fondo Fijo - Sector Militar	239	$ 499.51
Oct. 26	"	240	479.10
Oct. 26	"	241	850.00
Oct. 26	"	242	709.00
Oct. 26	"	243	600.00
Oct. 26	"	244	250.00
	TOTAL DE GASTOS SECTOR MILITAR		$ 3,387.61

NOTA: Todos los comprobantes fueron revisados y devueltos a la Oficina Militar.

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
TRANSFERENCIAS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-M"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 27	Transferencia a la cuenta "Rasco and Paula" para pagar a los familiares de los militares la asignación del mes de Noviembre y que por error se volvió a depositar en la cuanta de "Paula and Sosa".- Véase Anexo "I-C".	255	$50,000.00

amr.

14-00000

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
VARIOS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-N"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 14	Misión especial en Washington (Carlos Piad)	165	$ 500.00
Oct. 6	Gastos de café	106	1.12
Oct. 14	Misión Confidencial (Manuel Rodríguez)	176	2,500.00
Oct. 18	Instalación en Miami (Ing. F. Martínez)	179	400.00
Oct. 18	Legalización M.R.R.	184	272.42
Oct. 18	Gastos del M.R.R. (Según recibo firmado por el Sr. José Arriola, pero sin comprobantes justificativos, ordenado su pago por el Sr. José Sosa Jr.)	184	1,689.14
Oct. 18	Exceso gastos Sr. Joaquín Sanjenís, sobre el check No. 232 de "Rasco and Paula", debidamente justificados	187	491.58
Oct. 18	Gastos inscripción F.R.D.	190	276.00
Oct. 18	Anticipo Presupuesto Delegación de Relaciones Públicas	193	40.00
Oct. 18	Gastos emisario secreto (F. Zayas)	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Gastos confidenciales (M.Massip)	195	50.00
Oct. 18	Gastos mensajero secreto (F.Zayas)	195	300.00
Oct. 26	Liquidación gastos ocasionados viaje a México Dr. Justo Carrillo (Las cantidades anticipadas al Dr. Carrillo no fueron hechas a través de esta cuenta. En la documentación presentada por el Dr. Carrillo está claramente expuesta la forma en que recibió las cantidades y cómo se verificaron los egresos)	246	268.79
Oct. 27	Pago a J.Prado por storage de un barco	256	101.00
Oct. 27	Gastos varios según recibo (No se presentaron los comprobantes)	256	609.16

Continúa en la Hoja No. 2

VARIOS

ANEXO "I-H"
Hoja No. 2

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 27	Instalación Sr. Arturo Artalejo	257	$ 750.00
Oct. 27	Pago a Pimienta por trasmisiones y trabajos secretos	257	150.00
Oct. 27	Gastos imprevistos - Vicente León	257	200.00
Oct. 28	Organización Frente Obrero en México	268	100.00
Oct. 29	Gastos Confidenciales (Instrucciones Dr. Varona)	282	125.00
	TOTAL VARIOS		$ 8,924.21

-amr.

14-00000

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND ROSA"
REINTEGROS A COBRAR
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-O"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	A. Fernández Morell - Sector Militar	21	$ 350.00
Oct. 17	Serapio Montojo - Sector Militar	178	300.00
	TOTAL REINTEGROS A COBRAR		$ 650.00

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAUL [illegible] SOSA"
CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-P"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Abel de Varona - Casa Ejecutivo	1	$ 5,000.00
Oct. 7	Joaquín Sanjenís - Com. Información e Inteligencia	109	5,916.00
Oct. 7	Olga Cabo - Delegación de Colombia	112	1,000.00
Oct. 8	Abel Mestre - Com. de Propaganda	122	700.00
Oct. 11	Ricardo Sardiña - Viaje a New York	125	238.49
Oct. 11	José I. Rasco - Viaje América Central	129	2,485.30
Oct. 14	Tulio Díaz - Directorio Estudiantil Rev.	169	250.00
Oct. 17	Bartolomé Bostard - Com. Transporte	177	6,000.00
Oct. 18	Abel Mestre - Com. de Propaganda	194	20,000.00
Oct. 18	Raúl Soulary - Com. de Propaganda	197	1,000.00
Oct. 18	Antonio Collada - Viaje a New York	204	584.58
Oct. 18	Antonio Losada - Delegación Honduras	205	200.00
Oct. 18	José Arriola - M.R.R.	217	1,823.50
Oct. 18	Ricardo Sardiña - Viaje a Suramérica	223	4,000.00
Oct. 19	Antonio Collada - Viaje N.Y. y Wash.	227	100.00
Oct. 19	Orestes Martínez - Traslado familiares desde Cuba	228	424.50
Oct. 19	Viaje Varona a New York - Frank Zayas	229	330.00
Oct. 19	Pascasio Lineras - Acto Sección Obrera	231	350.00
Oct. 19	Manuel Braña Jr. - Viaje a Washington	233	75.00
Oct. 12	J.Tejera - Gastos barco - Agosto, Septiembre y parte de Octubre	135	1,000.00
Oct. 26	Abel de Varona - Propaganda Directorio Estudiantil	238	68.00
Oct. 27	Abel Mestre - Comisión Propaganda	253	10,000.00
Oct. 27	Luis García - Adquisición Planta Radio Guatemala	254	518.15

Continúa en la hoja No. 2

CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR

ANEXO "I-P"
Hoja No. 2

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 28	Jesús Valdés Crespo - Traslado e instalación en Chile	275	$ 900.00
Oct. 28	Máximo Sorondo - Propaganda a justificar	279	225.00
	TOTAL CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR		$69,288.52

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
DISTRIBUCION POR CONCEPTO DE "CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

Fecha	Detalle	Check Nro.-	Total	-Varios-	Comisiones	Delegaciones	-Viajes-	Directorio Estudiantil	Propaganda
Oct. 4	Abel de Varona-Casa Ejecutivo	1	$5,000.00	$5,000.00					
Oct. 7	Joaquín Sanjenís-Com. Información e Inteligencia	109	5,916.00		$ 5,916.00				
Oct. 7	Olga Cabo-Delegación Colombia	112	1,000.00			$ 1,000.00			
Oct. 8	Abel Mestre-Com. Propaganda	122	700.00		700.00				
Oct. 11	Ricardo Sardiña-Viaje a N.Y.	125	238.49				$ 238.49		
Oct. 11	J.I.Rasco-Viaje América Central	129	2,485.30				2,485.30		
Oct. 14	Tulio Díaz-Direc. Estudiantil	169	250.00					$ 250.00	
Oct. 17	Bartolomé Bestard-Com.Transporte	177	6,000.00		6,000.00				
Oct. 18	Abel Mestre-Com. Propaganda	194	20,000.00		20,000.00				
Oct. 18	Raúl Soulary-Com. Propaganda	197	1,000.00		1,000.00				
Oct. 18	Antonio Collada-Viaje a N.Y.	204	584.58				584.58		
Oct. 18	Antonio Losada-Del. Honduras	205	200.00			200.00			
Oct. 18	José Arriola - M.R.R.	217	1,823.50	1,823.50					
Oct. 18	Ricardo Sardiña-Viaje Suramérica	223	4,000.00				4,000.00		
Oct. 19	A.Collada-Viaje N.Y. y Washington	227	100.00				100.00		
Oct. 19	C.Martínez-Traslado familiares de Cuba	228	424.50	424.50					
Oct. 19	Frank Zayas-Viaje Varona N.Y.	229	330.00				330.00		
Oct. 19	Pascasio Linera-Acto Obrero Oct. 30	231	350.00						$ 350.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 2

DISTRIBUCION POR CONCEPTO DE "CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR"

Hoja No. 2

Fecha	Detalle	Check Nro.-	Total	-Varios-	Comisiones	Delegaciones	-Viajes-	Directorio Estudiantil	Propaganda
ct. 1[illegible]	Manuel Trama-Viaje Washington	233	$ 75.00				$ 75.00		
ct. 1[illegible]	J.Tejera-Gastos barco-Agosto, Septiembre y Octubre	135	1,000.00	$1,000.00					
ct. 2[illegible]	Abel de Varona Jr.-Propaganda	238	68.00						$ 68.00
ct. 2[illegible]	Abel Mestre-Com. Propaganda	253	16,000.00		$16,000.00				
ct. 27	Luis García-Compra Planta de Radio - Guatemala	254	618.15	618.15					
ct. 28	Jesús Valdés Crespo-Del. Chile	275	900.00			$ 900.00			
ct. 28	M.Sorondo-Propaganda	279	225.00						225.00
			$69,288.52	$8,866.15	$49,616.00	$ 2,100.00	$7,813.37	$ 250.00	$ 643.00

OTROS EGRESOS A JUSTIFICAR:

Fecha	Detalle	Check Nro.-	Total	-Varios-	Comisiones	Delegaciones	-Viajes-	Directorio Estudiantil	Propaganda
ct. 27	De Propaganda: J.Valdés Crespo	263	$ 250.00						$ 250.00
	De "Viajes":								
ct. 4	Pasaje N.Y.-Miami (9 obreros)	85	485.10				$ 485.10		
ct. 18	Viaje al Perú (F.Díaz Silveira)	181	370.00				370.00		
ct. 18	Viaje Cavo Hueso y Cuba (Sra. Trespalacios)	189	40.00				40.00		
ct. 18	Viaje a N.Y. (Delfín Iñiguez)	195	50.00				50.00		

Continúa en la Hoja No. 3

DISTRIBUCION POR CONCEPTO DE "CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR"

Hoja No. 3

Fecha	Detalle	Check Nro.-	Total	-Varios-	Comisiones	Delegaciones	-Viajes-	Directorio Estudiantil	Propaganda
Oct. 18	Viaje Habana-Miami (M.Massip)	195	$ 48.00				$ 48.00		
Oct. 18	Viaje N.Y. (Pedro Núñez)	196	60.00				60.00		
Oct. 18	Viaje N.Y. (J.Rodríguez Pintado)	196	40.00				40.00		
Oct. 18	Viaje Miami-Habana (H.Mederos)	196	50.00				50.00		
Oct. 12	Viaje Tampa (Varona-Redondo)	136	78.22				78.22		
Oct. 26	Viaje Avión (H. Cruz)	251	25.00				25.00		
Oct. 26	Gastos de viaje (H. Cruz)	251	25.00				25.00		
Oct. 27	Viaje de N.Y. (Emilio Díaz)	256	45.00				45.00		
Oct. 27	Viaje Habana-Miami (Esposa e hijos Dr. Figueras)	257	125.00				125.00		
Oct. 27	Viaje Habana-Miami (Esposa e hijo Tomás Vázquez)	259	64.30				64.80		
Oct. 29	Viaje a N.Y. (Manuel Cobo)	233	117.00				117.00		
Oct. 29	Gastos de viaje (Familia H. Figueras)	284	125.00				125.00		
Oct. 29	Gastos de viaje Habana-Miami (Sra. Sordo e hijo)	286	105.26				105.26		
Oct. 29	Viaje a Washington (J.Sordo)	287	56.33				56.33		
Oct. 29	Viaje a Centroamérica (J.M. Tarafa Jr.)	288	636.40				636.40		
			$2,796.11	-.-	-.-	-.-	$2,546.11	-.-	$ 250.00
	TOTAL A JUSTIFICAR		$72,084.63	$8,866.15	$49,616.00	$ 2,100.00	$10,359.48	$ 250.00	$ 893.00

AMr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
SUB-ANALISIS DE COMISIONES
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

Fecha		Check Nro.-	Total	Comisión de Información e Inteligencia	Comisión de Propaganda-	Comisión de Transportes
Oct. 7	Joaquín Sanjenís	109	$ 5,916.00	$ 5,916.00	$	$
Oct. 8	Abel Mestre	122	700.00		700.00	
Oct. 17	Bartolomé Bestard	177	6,000.00			6,000.00
Oct. 18	Abel Mestre	194	20,000.00		20,000.00	
Oct. 18	Raúl Soulary	197	1,000.00		1,000.00	
Oct. 27	Abel Mestre	253	16,000.00		16,000.00	
			$ 49,616.00	$ 5,916.00	$ 37,700.00	$ 6,000.00

NOTA: Se han gastado además, por concepto de "Propaganda", en exceso - de lo entregado a la Comisión de Propaganda $893.00	$ 893.00
Lo que eleva lo gastado por concepto de Propaganda a	$ 38,593.00

cmp.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
RESUMEN DE LAS OPERACIONES DE INGRESOS Y EGRESOS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

En los Estados y Anexos que se adjuntan aparecen los análisis y sub-análisis de cada una de las partidas de ingresos y egresos habidas durante el mes de Octubre de 1960.

Los recibos, facturas, hojas de depósitos y demás comprobantes justificativos de las operaciones del mes, obran en nuestro poder.

Como podrá observarse en el Anexo "I-D" se ha creado un -Fondo Fijo- para el Sector Militar, ascendente a $10,000.00 (en dos partidas de $5,000.00), habiéndose procedido a reintegrar a dicho Fondo Fijo, durante el mes de Octubre, la cantidad de $3,387.61, según puede verse en el Anexo "I-L".

La partida de $50,000.00 que aparece como "TRANSFERENCIAS" en el Anexo "I-M", corresponde a la cantidad transferida de la cuenta "PAULA AND SOSA" a la cuenta "RASCO AND PAULA", a través de la cual se ha pagado la asignación adelantada del mes de Noviembre de los familiares de los hombres que se encuentran en el Campo.

En relación con los "CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR", que importan $69,288.52, según Anexo "I-P", los mismos pudieran clasificarse en dos grupos: uno formado por aquellos que corresponden a cantidades adelantadas de acuerdo con presupuestos a las distintas Comisiones o Delegaciones, y otro que lo integran algunas partidas consignadas a un tipo de gasto a realizar, pero específicamente determinado, con sus correspondientes recibos debidamente firmados. Estos últimos pudieron haberse distribuído a las cuentas que responden dentro de la clasificación, con lo que hubieran sido eliminados del concepto "A JUSTIFICAR", pero se han mantenido como tales, a los efectos de tener la seguridad de la realización del gasto para el concepto que fueron extendidos los checks, o su verdadera clasificación si esas cantidades fueron utilizadas en erogaciones distintas a aquellas para que fueron originalmente consignadas. Esto es debido a que algunos checks extendidos para un concepto determinado, pudieran, inclusive, aplicarse a la adquisición de algún activo, con lo cual aparecería en la fecha de cierre del mes, un balance que no sería fiel a la verdad, pues aparecería como un gasto, lo que en realidad es un activo.

La partida denominada "TRANSFERENCIAS" ($50,000.00) está compensada con un ingreso por la misma cantidad, y se originó al querer hacerse una transferencia de fondos a la cuenta "RASCO AND PAULA", para pagar a través de ella la nómina de asistencia social, pero por error se hizo el depósito del check No. 255 por $50,000.00 en la misma cuenta de "PAULA AND SOSA".

amr.

[illegible]

[illegible]

"[illegible] AND [illegible]"

RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT

December 1 to 31, 1960

Bank Balance as per Statement $ 24,119.48

Less: Drawn checks not paid by the Bank:

Check No.	
416	$ 275.00
592	100.00
1018	175.00
1092	175.00
1161	225.00
1230	175.00
1247	275.00
1282	250.00
1297	100.00
1316	225.00
1317	225.00
1356	175.00
1359	100.00
1427	225.00
1433	225.00
1434	275.00
1437	225.00
1447	225.00
1469	175.00
1472	275.00
1479	225.00
1483	175.00
1491	175.00
1492	225.00
1508	175.00
1509	175.00

(Continues page No.2)

RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT

Check No.	
1511	$ 175.00
1514	300.00
1531	54.00
1533	300.00
1534	300.00
1537	175.00
1538	175.00
1539	50.00
1543	175.00
1546	300.00
1547	250.00
1548	225.00
1549	250.00
1551	300.00
1552	175.00
1554	175.00
1568	175.00
1569	225.00
1570	225.00
1575	175.00
1576	175.00
1577	175.00
1580	50.00
1582	100.00
1583	225.00
1587	225.00
1588	250.00
1589	250.00
1590	677.10
1591	50.00
1594	175.00
1595	175.00
1596	175.00

(Continues page No.3)

RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT

Check No.		
1597	$ 175.00	
1598	225.00	
1599	225.00	
1600	275.00	
1601	275.00	
1602	175.00	
1603	175.00	
1605	50.00	
1606	50.00	
1607	175.00	
1608	175.00	
1609	175.00	
1610	275.00	14,556.10
	T O T A L :	$69,563.38

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"RASCO AND PAULA"
STATEMENT OF EXPENSES
FROM CHECK No.1000 TO No.1610 (BOTH INCLUDED)
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "A"

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Renato Díaz Blanco	(Navy)	1000	$ 300.00
Dec.	1	René Cancio González	(Navy)	1001	220.00
Dec.	1	Nicolás Vian Ruiz	(Gen. Staff)	1002	250.00
Dec.	1	Conrado Santana Lima	(Gen. Staff)	1003	200.00
Dec.	1	Jesús Cua González ✓	(Gen. Staff)	1004	300.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED		1005	-o-
Dec.	1	Mario Riverón Hernández ✓	(Gen. Staff)	1006	250.00
Dec.	1	Laureano Pino Cruz	(Gen. Staff)	1007	200.00
Dec.	1	Leovigildo Martín Elena	(Gen. Staff)	1008	200.00
Dec.	1	Eduardo Martín Elena	(Gen. Staff)	1009	400.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED		1010	-o-
Dec.	1	Inocente R. García Fonseca	(Gen. Staff)	1011	200.00
Dec.	1	Antonia Flores	(Gen. Staff)	1012	250.00
Dec.	1	Oscar T. Díaz Martín	(Gen. Staff)	1013	400.00
Dec.	1	Benjamín Camino Garmendía	(Gen. Staff)	1014	400.00
Dec.	1	Tomás Cabana Batista	(Gen. Staff)	1015	400.00
Dec.	1	Ana Rosa Cifontes	(Soc. Work)	1016	175.00
Dec.	1	Lourdes Fenton	(Soc. Work)	1017	250.00
Dec.	1	Margot Acosta	(Soc. Work)	1018	175.00
Dec.	1	Cupertina Rodríguez	(Soc. Work)	1019	200.00
Dec.	1	Estrella Villapol	(Soc. Work)	1020	250.00

(Continues page No.2)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.2

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Jaime Varela Canosa		(Navy)	1021	$ 300.00
Dec. 1	Alberto Sosa Chabau		(Navy)	1022	200.00
Dec. 1	José Escarce Cancio		(Navy)	1023	217.00
Dec. 1	Nora Acebo	Pedro Acebo		1024	250.00
Dec. 1	Alicia Acevedo	Oscar Acevedo		1025	175.00
Dec. 1	Raquel Moya	Hildo R. Acevedo		1026	225.00
Dec. 1	Nora Menéndez	Julio Acosta Ruiz		1027	225.00
Dec. 1	Minerva Morales	Alexis F. Aguado		1028	175.00
Dec. 1	Rita Riverón	Alberto Alberty		1029	400.00
Dec. 1	Carmen Herrera	Armando Alberty		1030	275.00
Dec. 1	Margarita Fernández	Raul A. Munguia		1031	300.00
Dec. 1	Miguel R. Vivancos	Elio Alemán		1032	250.00
Dec. 1	Ana Márquez	Antonio Alfonso		1033	225.00
Dec. 1	María Elvira Ramírez	Oscar Alfonso C.		1034	225.00
Dec. 1	Concepción Almeida	José Almeida C.		1035	175.00
Dec. 1	Eunice Alonso	Fernando Alonso		1036	175.00
Dec. 1	Carmen Serrano	Miguel Alvarez		1037	250.00
Dec. 1	Bertila León	Orlando Alvarez B.		1038	275.00
Dec. 1	Nelsy Matos	Mario Alvarez C.		1039	225.00
Dec. 1	Rafael Alvarez	Rafael Alvarez Fdez.		1040	175.00
Dec. 1	Edgardo Buttari	Nilo Alvarez M.		1041	250.00
Dec. 1	Marta Fernández	José M. Angel Pomar		1042	225.00

(Continues page No.3)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.3

D a t e				Check No.	T o t a l
Dec.	1	Aleida Gossa	Jesús Arias García ✓	1043	$ 175.00
Dec.	1	Martha R. Arrazola	Orlando Arrazola R. ✓	1044	50.00
Dec.	1	Sonia Martínez	Segundo Martínez G.	1045	250.00
Dec.	1	Rubi Avila	Pedro Avila López ✓	1046	225.00
Dec.	1	Lala Luesa	Valentín L. Bacallao ✓	1047	175.00
Dec.	1	María Teresa Gutiérrez	Eduardo Barea G.	1048	225.00
Dec.	1	Virginia Valdés	Eduardo Barreiro V. ✓	1049	175.00
Dec.	1	María Palacios	Rodolfo Bartelemy D.	1050	225.00
Dec.	1	Nilo Batista	Mildo Batista H. ✓	1051	175.00
Dec.	1	Mercedes Navarro	Manuel Blanco M. ✓	1052	275.00
Dec.	1	Mirta Rodríguez	Bernardo J. Bosh R. ✓	1053	225.00
Dec.	1	Marlene Burruezon	Daniel Burruezon A.	1054	175.00
Dec.	1	Lilian Herrera	Alfredo Caballero G.	1055	300.00
Dec.	1	Georgina Diaz	Pedro L. Cabrera A.	1056	225.00
Dec.	1	Raquel Hernández	Miguel Cano H.	1057	175.00
Dec.	1	Georgina Díaz	Francisco Cañizares	1058	225.00
Dec.	1	Antonio Carmona	Antonio O. Carmona	1059	225.00
Dec.	1	C A N C E L L E D		1060	-o-
Dec.	1	Carmen Suárez	Miguel Carro Suárez	1061	175.00
Dec.	1	Alicia García	Manuel Casañas S.	1062	225.00
Dec.	1	Natalia López	Modesto Castañer L. ✓	1063	225.00
Dec.	1	Esther Hernández	Pablo E. Castellón H.	1064	175.00
Dec.	1	Irene Zuloaga	Sergio Castellón S. ✓	1065	325.00
Dec.	1	Celia Travieso	Fulgencio O. Castro	1066	175.00
Dec.	1	Olga Carreño	Alfonso Cereceda C.	1067	275.00

(Continues page No.4)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.4

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Olga Carreño	Castor Cereceda C.	1068	$ 225.00
Dec.	1	Lola Deltine	Ricardo Cervera C.	1069	225.00
Dec.	1	Adelaida Jiménez	Ricardo Céspedes J.	1070	225.00
Dec.	1	Virginia Trimino	Lázaro Cires Pou	1071	175.00
Dec.	1	[illegible] . Clark	José B. Clark Sánchez	1072	225.00
Dec.	1	Aurora Mulet	Tomás Collazo Mulet	1073	225.00
Dec.	1	Iliana Fueyo	Arturo F. Comas M.	1074	175.00
Dec.	1	Hilda Núñez	Ramón Conte Hernández	1075	225.00
Dec.	1	Hilda Laca	Toribio Luis Cosme	1076	325.00
Dec.	1	Rey Guevara	Matías Faria Riesgo	1077	225.00
Dec.	1	María Leonor Portela	José A. Crespo G.	1078	275.00
Dec.	1	Julia Hernández	Francisco Cruz de la T.	1079	250.00
Dec.	1	Virginia González	Antonio Curbelo H.	1080	225.00
Dec.	1	María Ramírez	Humberto I. Chamizo	1081	175.00
Dec.	1	Flora García	Alipio M. Chávez G.	1082	225.00
Dec.	1	Silvia Castro	Manuel F. Chávez P.	1083	250.00
Dec.	1	Aurora Gómez	Odilio Chávez P.	1084	225.00
Dec.	1	María Inés Pérez	René Chávez P.	1085	225.00
Dec.	1	Norma Cowley	Dagoberto Darias S.	1086	250.00
Dec.	1	Berta Rodríguez	Juan M. Delgado Ch.	1087	225.00
Dec.	1	Eulalia García	Jesús Delgado G.	1088	175.00
Dec.	1	Aglene Reyes	Pedro del Pino C.	1089	225.00
Dec.	1	Armando de Avila Cancio	Armando H. Díaz Avila	1090	175.00
Dec.	1	Olimpia Tobías	Santiago A. Díaz M.	1091	250.00

(Continues page No.5)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.5

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Félix Urra	Félix D. Urra Pagés	1092	$ 175.00
Dec.	1	Victoria Carreño	José Dorta García	1093	$ 250.00
Dec.	1	Liliam Samson	Esteban Echevarría D.	1094	275.00
Dec.	1	Rosario Montero	Pedro Echegoyen de la G.	1095	275.00
Dec.	1	Lilia Fernández	Víctor Espinosa H.	1096	225.00
Dec.	1	Magaly Urruela	Marcial Facio C.	1097	300.00
Dec.	1	Gloria García	José M. Fajardo M.	1098	225.00
Dec.	1	María Santos	Jesús Couce Linares	1099	175.00
Dec.	1	Mercedes Fuentes	Elpidio M. Felizola M.	1100	250.00
Dec.	1	Hilda Valdés	Segisberto Fernández A.	1101	225.00
Dec.	1	María del Carmen Pérez	Luis Fernández Ardois	1102	300.00
Dec.	1	Edelmira Mendoza	Francisco Fernández B.	1103	325.00
Dec.	1	Zoila Colina	Ladislao Fernández M.	1104	175.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED		1105	-o-
Dec.	1	María Díaz	Antonio Fernández R.	1106	275.00
Dec.	1	Graciela Rovirosa	José A. Fernández R.	1107	225.00
Dec.	1	Lucía Ferra	Nabi Ferra Matá	1108	175.00
Dec.	1	Andrés A. Prado	Ramón J. Ferrer	1109	275.00
Dec..	1	CANCELLED		1110	-o-
Dec.	1	Rosa María Rico López	Rolando Fuentes R.	1111	275.00
Dec.	1	Clara Zayas	Tristán García A.	1112	175.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED		1113	-o-
Dec.	1	Olga Cabrera	René García Fernández	1114	275.00
Dec.	1	Isabel Ucatorres	Benigno García L.	1115	225.00

(Continues page No.6)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.6

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Inocente F. García Fonseca	Reinaldo A. García M.	1116	$ 225.00
Dec.	1	José Ariel Ramos	Rafael García Pujol	1117	175.00
Dec.	1	Otilia Castellana	Sergio García Puyada	1118	225.00
Dec.	1	Soledad Zayas	Francisco García Z.	1119	225.00
Dec.	1	Mirta Fort	Francisco Ginebra-G.	1120	225.00
Dec.	1	Mirta Fort	Mario Ginebra-Grocro	1121	225.00
Dec.	1	Jorge Giraud	Jorge Giraud Leyva	1122	225.00
Dec.	1	Matilde Bujones	René Gómez Figuerola	1123	250.00
Dec.	1	Paulina Alcalde	Fausto Gómez Gómez	1124	225.00
Dec.	1	Gloria Betancourt	Eduardo González R.	1125	175.00
Dec.	1	C A N C E L L E D		1126	-o-
Dec.	1	Herminia Carmona	Manuel González L.	1127	175.00
Dec.	1	Delia Fernández	Tomás González Matos	1128	225.00
Dec.	1	Dolores Bourle	José D. González M.	1129	150.00
Dec.	1	Celina Romero	Juan González R.	1130	225.00
Dec.	1	Uria Díaz	Manuel A. Granados B.	1131	175.00
Dec.	1	Mireya Valdés	Luis Grillo Díaz	1132	250.00
Dec.	1	Eloisa González	Luis A. Guerra G.	1133	175.00
Dec.	1	Inocente F. García Fonseca	Armando Guerra I.	1134	225.00
Dec.	1	Rogelia Rubaut	Carlos M. Hernández	1135	225.00
Dec.	1	Ernestina Núñez	Marcos D. Hernández	1136	175.00
Dec.	1	Amado Valdés	Jesús Hernández G.	1137	175.00
Dec.	1	Gloria Rodríguez	José M. Hernández H.	1138	175.00
Dec.	1	Gerónimo Hernández	Héctor Hernández R.	1139	225.00

(Continues page No.7)

14-00000

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.7

Date			Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Jorge Escobar	Gonzalo Herrera C.	1140	$ 175.00
Dec. 1	Dynalma Salasquide	Mario Jiménez Rojo	1141	275.00
Dec. 1	Dulce Torres	Wilfredo Leyva E.	1142	275.00
Dec. 1	Nancy Torres	Reynaldo Lazo M.	1143	175.00
Dec. 1	Berta Junquera	Víctor Junquera V.	1144	225.00
Dec. 1	Carmen Domínguez	Angel López Domínguez	1145	175.00
Dec. 1	Nereida Grandal	Silvino López Pérez	1146	175.00
Dec. 1	Mercedes López	Armando López-Estrada	1147	175.00
Dec. 1	Marta Varela	Fernando F. López V.	1148	275.00
Dec. 1	Ernestina Guevara	Eberto R. Lorenzo M.	1149	225.00
Dec. 1	Catalina Chávez	Martín Lorica Chávez	1150	175.00
Dec. 1	Regina López	César Luaces Sotelo	1151	250.00
Dec. 1	Alfredo Llarena	Alfredo Llarena C.	1152	225.00
Dec. 1	Zaida García Horta	Ernesto Lluesma F.	1153	225.00
Dec. 1	Lutgarda Fajardo	Manuel Navarro M.	1154	225.00
Dec. 1	María del Carmen Gutiérrez	Roberto Macia V.	1155	275.00
Dec. 1	José J. Cancio Martínez	Rafael M. Madrigal	1156	275.00
Dec. 1	Julia Ledea	Orestes G. Ruiz L.	1157	225.00
Dec. 1	Elena Morales	Hugo Martínez F.	1158	225.00
Dec. 1	Fe Mazón	Everardo Martínez ..	1159	175.00
Dec. 1	Delia Estrada	Emilio Martínez V.	1160	175.00
Dec. 1	Concepción Hernández	Delfín Martínez V.	1161	225.00
Dec. 1	Paula Mateo	Alfredo Mateo Sierra	1162	175.00
Dec. 1	Elsa Aguilera	Roberto Medell E.	1163	250.00

(Continues page No.8)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Carmen Cummings	Ezequiel Mederos B.	1164	$ 250.00
Dec.	1	Olga Gómez Pena	José A. Molet	1165	175.00
Dec.	1	Concepción Pérez	Nicolás Molina del Rio	1166	225.00
Dec.	1	Gladys Ugalde	José A. Morales Cruz	1167	225.00
Dec.	1	Alma de la Barrera Rubio	Luis C. Morse de la B.	1168	225.00
Dec.	1	Sonia Izzo	Lesslie Nóbregas N.	1169	275.00
Dec.	1	Ma. Dolores Souce	Eduardo A. Ojeda C.	1170	175.00
Dec.	1	Margot Hernández	Rolando Otero N.	1171	175.00
Dec.	1	Marta Suárez	Francisco Peláez V.	1172	175.00
Dec.	1	Enrique Tomeu	Héctor Pereza Sosa	1173	300.00
Dec.	1	Luis Larrauri	Edilio D. Pereira P.	1174	275.00
Dec.	1	Zaida González	Eliseo Pérez Céspedes	1175	250.00
Dec.	1	Alma Pérez	Juan E. Pérez Franco	1176	250.00
Dec.	1	Estrella M. López	Manuel de J. Pérez M.	1177	250.00
Dec.	1	Nieves Rodríguez	Antonio Abel Pérez M.	1178	225.00
Dec.	1	Fabiola Polo	José R. Pérez Menéndez	1179	250.00
Dec.	1	Dulce Ma. Padrón	Francisco Pérez Padrón	1180	225.00
Dec.	1	Ola María Martín Mesa	José Pérez San Román	1181	375.00
Dec.	1	Lidia González	Roberto Pérez San Román	1182	275.00
Dec.	1	Vivian Díaz	Osvaldo Piedra	1183	175.00
Dec.	1	María Teresa Marinas	Néstor Pino Marinas	1184	225.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED		1185	-0-
Dec.	1	Ofelia Altar	Eleuterio Pita Otano	1186	275.00
Dec.	1	Anolan Polanco	Faustino Polanco Sosa	1187	325.00

(Continues page No.9)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.9

Date			Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	CANCELLED		1188	$ -o-
Dec. 1	Olga Facundo	Jorge A. Prellezo del B.	1189	375.00
Dec. 1	María Morales	José Prieto Rodríguez	1190	275.00
Dec. 1	Juan Pajon	Francisco Puente García	1191	175.00
Dec. 1	Humberto Cortina	Manuel Puig Miyar	1192	300.00
Dec. 1	Manuel Pérez	Juan M. Quintana de la T.	1193	250.00
Dec. 1	Olga Perdomo	Zenaido L. Quicutis G.	1194	225.00
Dec. 1	Sara Iglesias	Hermilio P. Quintana P.	1195	175.00
Dec. 1	Ana María Quintana	Francisco Quintana U.	1196	275.00
Dec. 1	José Manuel Raffo	José A. Raffo Barrera	1197	250.00
Dec. 1	Hilda Valdés	José Ramírez Sosa	1198	225.00
Dec. 1	CANCELLED		1199	-o-
Dec. 1	Rosa J. Ramos Justiniano	Reinaldo Ramos S.	1200	175.00
Dec. 1	Carmen García Vieta	Jorge L. Recara y G.	1201	175.00
Dec. 1	Nancy Salas Pérez	José Regalado Santana	1202	325.00
Dec. 1	Emerita Martínez	Arcadio R. Reyes M.	1203	275.00
Dec. 1	Rita García	Orlando Rodríguez A.	1204	225.00
Dec. 1	María Luz Rodríguez	Jacome Rodríguez G.	1205	175.00
Dec. 1	Luz Marina Herrera	Roberto Rodríguez G.	1206	225.00
Dec. 1	Manuel Rodríguez San Pedro	José Rodríguez San Pedro	1207	275.00
Dec. 1	Nicolás Kennedy	Roberto Rodríguez Crs	1208	175.00
Dec. 1	Clara L. Morales	David R. Rodríguez S.	1209	225.00
Dec. 1	Victoria Castellanos	Jorge Rojas Castellanos	1210	175.00
Dec. 1	Noemí Puchol	Ignacio Rojas González	1211	175.00

(Continues page No.10)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.10

Date			Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Ela Maria Suárez	José Rosa González	1212	$ 350.00
Dec. 1	Albertina Lujardo	Antonio Ruiz Alvarez	1213	225.00
Dec. 1	C A N C E L L E D		1214	-o-
Dec. 1	Maria Julia Suárez	Ramiro Sánchez M.	1215	175.00
Dec. 1	Narcisa Quintana	Jesús B. Santana V.	1216	250.00
Dec. 1	Paula Lazo	Juan R. Santana L.	1217	250.00
Dec. 1	Celia Acuna	Vicente C. Secades L.	1218	175.00
Dec. 1	Orlando Reyes	Leonardo Seda González	1219	250.00
Dec. 1	Antonio Acebedo	Félix T. Serrano S.	1220	225.00
Dec. 1	Cristina Pizarro	Raul Solís Sariol	1221	225.00
Dec. 1	Arturo Sonville	Jorge A. Sonville L.	1222	225.00
Dec. 1	Josefina Granda	Edgar Sopo Granda	1223	175.00
Dec. 1	Sara Rios	Hugo Sueiro Rios	1224	225.00
Dec. 1	Raul Ramos Alonso	Guillermo Tabraue N.	1225	275.00
Dec. 1	Pedro Tejera	José [illegible] Tejera S.	1226	225.00
Dec. 1	Hilda Alvarez	Mario Tellechea M.	1227	300.00
Dec. 1	Elia V. Menéndez	Martín Torres F.	1228	225.00
Dec. 1	Isabel L. Guerra	Marcos A. Torres G.	1229	175.00
Dec. 1	Alberta Torres	Juan F. Torres Mena	1230	175.00
Dec. 1	Dolores García Padrón	José E. Trincheria D.	1231	225.00
Dec. 1	Mireya Mosquera	Orlando Urra Q.	1232	225.00
Dec. 1	Isabel Usatorres	Rafael Usatorres S.	1233	175.00
Dec. 1	Silvia O'Sullivan	Fausto Valdés C.	1234	300.00
Dec. 1	Maria L. Hernández	Florencio F. Valdés M.	1235	225.00

(Continues page No.11)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"

Date			Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Celeste Iradia Rodríguez	Ismael Valladares A.	1236	$ 175.00
Dec. 1	Norma V. Larchao	Joaquín Varela V.	1237	225.00
Dec. 1	Ana Roja Yanez	Agustín L. Vega E.	1238	175.00
Dec. 1	Alicia Hernández	Oscar Vega Vega	1239	250.00
Dec. 1	Vilma Palma	Raul Vianello Alakan	1240	325.00
Dec. 1	Ismael Valdés	Ernesto Venero V.	1241	175.00
Dec. 1	Sara E. Llorente	Héctor Villamar R.	1242	275.00
Dec. 1	Yolanda Díaz	José Villamar R.	1243	225.00
Dec. 1	Petrona Quintana	Jesús Villarchao Q.	1244	175.00
Dec. 1	Consuelo Fernández Maseda	Jorge Villaverde	1245	225.00
Dec. 1	Ana María Suárez	Raul Villaverde L.	1246	225.00
Dec. 1	Elia Roques	Gustavo Villoldo S.	1247	275.00
Dec. 1	Marta Vives	Manuel Vives Acosta	1248	225.00
Dec. 1	Sonia Navarrina	Pedro O. Zamora G.	1249	250.00
Dec. 1	Georgina San Pedro	Mario Zúniga	1250	300.00
Dec. 1	CANCELLED		1251	-o-
Dec. 1	Violeta Acosta	Pablo A. Ubide Díaz	1252	225.00
Dec. 1	Nora Capote	Lucio García	1253	225.00
Dec. 1	Argentina Palma	Nis Juárez Fernández	1254	325.00
Dec. 1	Elsa Roldán	Sergio Ares Fernández	1255	225.00
Dec. 1	Bernarda Hernández	Armando Báez Hernández	1256	175.00
Dec. 1	Sara Buesa	José Bacallao Fonte	1257	225.00
Dec. 1	Arturo Lorenzo	Lorenzo Pérez Lorenzo	1258	175.00
Dec. 1	Arturo Alemán	Fernando Huergo Ruiz	1259	225.00

(Continues page No.12)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.12

Date					Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Amalia Cubria	Gastón Pérez		1260	$ 50.00
Dec.	1	Humberto Cortina Corrales	Humberto Cortina L.		1261	250.00
Dec.	1	Miss Jeanette Gorra	Luis Regalado		1262	100.00
Dec.	1	Miss Elena Munoz	Armando Ruiz A.		1263	175.00
Dec.	1	Manuel López Espinosa	Ernesto Abreu A.		1264	175.00
Dec.	1	Cecilia Abreu	Juan F. Abreu Horta		1265	175.00
Dec.	1	Francisco Villaverde	Rafael Villaverde L.		1266	225.00
Dec.	1	Lucindra Rodríguez	Luis E. Martínez C.		1267	225.00
Dec.	1	Maria Julia Lleo	Pedro Montero ...		1268	275.00
Dec.	1	Manuel Alonso		(Soc.Work)	1269	300.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED			1270	-o-
Dec.	1	Cristina Gallardo		(Soc.Work)	1271	225.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED			1272	-o-
Dec.	1	Esther Lauzardo		(Soc.Work)	1273	250.00
Dec.	1	René de La Mar		(Soc.Work)	1274	325.00
Dec.	1	David Matos		(Soc.Work)	1275	225.00
Dec.	1	César Mena		(Soc.Work)	1276	300.00
Dec.	1	Antonio Munoz		(Soc.Work)	1277	275.00
Dec.	1	Sergio Rodríguez		(Soc.Work)	1278	275.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED			1279	-o-
Dec.	1	Rogelio Vázquez		(Soc.Work)	1280	300.00
Dec.	1	Julio Torres		(Soc.Work)	1281	250.00
Dec.	1	Felipe Rodríguez		(Gen.Staff)	1282	250.00
Dec.	1	Manuel González Alvarez		(Gen.Staff)	1283	250.00

(Continues page No.13)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.13

Date					Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	María Josefa [illegible] Reira		(Soc.Work)		1284	$ 300.00
Dec. 1	José Pardo García		(Gen.Staff)		1285	225.00
Dec. 1	Armando Rodríguez Alonso		(Navy)		1286	275.00
Dec. 1	Eduardo Franqui [illegible]		(Navy)		1287	275.00
Dec. 1	Enrique García Batista		(Navy)		1288	275.00
Dec. 1	Esteban Echevarría		(Navy)		1289	275.00
Dec. 1	Luis Morse Delgado		(Navy)		1290	100.00
Dec. 1	Benjamín Granados Alvarez		(Navy)		1291	112.50
Dec. 1	Julio C. Alfaro Ochoa		(Navy)		1292	216.00
Dec. 1	Agustín Carballo		(Navy)		1293	112.50
Dec. 1	Orlando Arrazola		(Navy)		1294	112.50
Dec. 1	Emilio Izquierdo		(Navy)		1295	175.00
Dec. 1	Gloria Betancourt	Osvaldo Enríquez H.			1296	275.00
Dec. 1	Ivan Ricardo Bolívar	Rodolfo de J. Bolívar			1297	100.00
Dec. 1	Dulce Torres	Tomás Afont Rodríguez			1298	225.00
Dec. 1	Carlos [illegible] Yanez		(Soc.Work)		1299	300.00
Dec. 1	Mario Martínez		(Soc.Work)		1300	175.00
Dec. 1	Victoria Fowler	Raul García Menocal F.		December	1301	175.00
Dec. 1	Elia Menéndez	Inocencio T. More I.		December	1302	175.00
Dec. 1	CANCELLED				1303	-o-
Dec. 1	Juan José Delgado	Román Delgado Bello		December	1304	225.00
Dec. 1	Marta Varela	Fernando Félix López V.		Dif. Dec.	1305	50.00
Dec. 1	Marcos Zamora Moreu		(Gen,Staff)	December	1306	90.00
Dec. 1	Jesús Gómez Garrido		(Gen.Staff)	December	1307	90.00

(Continues page No.14)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.14

Date					Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Bárbara Hernández	Rafael Hernández H.		December	1308	$ 225.00
Dec. 1	Raul [illegible] Medina	Pedro Rios Valdés		December	1309	225.00
Dec. 1	Elsa Alcala	Roberto C. de los Heros		December	1310	175.00
Dec. 1	José Díaz	Alberto M. Díaz F.		December	1311	225.00
Dec. 1	Nidia Rosa Vila	Víctor M. Vila Acebal		December	1312	175.00
Dec. 1	Lidia Elena García	Carlos M. García R.		December	1313	225.00
Dec. 1	María Antonia González	José A. Zardon S.		December	1314	250.00
Dec. 1	Angela [illegible] González	Juan J. González L.		December	1315	175.00
Dec. 1	Rafael Sánchez	Daniel Fernández M.		December	1316	225.00
Dec. 5	Rafael Sánchez	Daniel Fernández M.		November	1317	225.00
Dec. 5	Conrado Santana Lima		(Gen.Staff)	Dif. Dec.	1318	50.00
Dec. 5	Laureano Pino Cruz		(Gen.Staff)	Dif. Dec.	1319	50.00
Dec. 5	María Julia Suárez	Ramiro Sánchez M.		Dif. Dec.	1320	50.00
Dec. 5	María Puyada	Elmo L. García Puyada		December	1321	175.00
Dec. 5	Hugo Vega	Miguel Chardiet A.		December	1322	275.00
Dec. 5	Nélida González (Substitutes check 1000 that was cancelled)	Dilio Carrazana León		December	1323	350.00
Dec. 5	Josefina Granda	Edgar Sopo Granda		Dif. Dec.	1324	50.00
Dec. 5	Julio Tarafa	Julio Tarafa B.		September	1325	225.00
Dec. 5	Julio Tarafa	Julio Tarafa B.		October	1326	225.00
Dec. 5	Julio Tarafa	Julio Tarafa B.		November	1327	225.00
Dec. 5	CANCELLED				1328	-0-
Dec. 5	Julio Tarafa	Julio Tarafa B.		December	1329	225.00

(Continues page No.15)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.15

[illegible]						Check No.	T o t a l
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] María Quintana	Francisco Quintana U.	October		1330	$ 275.00
Dec.	6	María C. Fojaco	Eduardo Ferrer G.	December		1331	300.00
Dec.	7	Emilia Acosta	Isidro J. Montesinos A.	December		1332	175.00
Dec.	7	The Florida National Bank and Trust Co.(Christmas Gift)	Celso A. Pérez Rodríguez			1333	100.00
Dec.	7	Elena González	Julio Caballero G.	December		1334	175.00
Dec.	7	Justo Alvarez	Santos Ramos A.	December		1335	225.00
Dec.	7	Francisco Pérez	José M. Battle	December		1336	250.00
Dec.	7	Gloria Cancio	Manuel Cancio R.	December		1337	225.00
Dec.	7	C A N C E L L E D				1338	-o-
Dec.	7	José Ramón Delgado	Pablo Astudillo O.	November		1339	250.00
Dec.	7	María Josefa Riera (Reinbursment Revolving Fund)(Annex "A-1")				1340	732.50
Dec.	7	C A N C E L L E D				1341	-o-
Dec.	7	José Ramón Delgado	Pablo Astudillo O.	December		1342	250.00
Dec.	8	María C. Alonso		December	(Gen.Staff)	1343	175.00
Dec.	8	C A N C E L L E D				1344	-o-
Dec.	8	Manuel Blanco (Reinbursment Revolving Fund)(Comptroller)(Annex "A-2")				1345	100.00
Dec.	8	Justo Alvarez	Santos Ramos A.	November		1346	225.00
Dec.	8	Rafael García Rubio	Manuel García-Rubio R.	November		1347	225.00
Dec.	8	Rafael García Rubio	Manuel García-Rubio R.	December		1348	225.00
Dec.	8	Ernesto García Rubio	Hugo Gómez Oyarzábal	November		1349	175.00
Dec.	8	Ernesto García Rubio	Hugo Gómez Oyarzábal	December		1350	175.00
Dec.	8	C A N C E L L E D				1351	-o-
Dec.	8	C A N C E L L E D				1352	-o-

(Continues page No.16)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

[illegible]				Check No.	Total
[illegible]	Félix Urra	Félix D. Urra Pagés	December	1353	175.00
[illegible]	Pilar Lanzano	Luis A. Bermúdez L.	December	1354	175.00
[illegible]	Manuel Blanco (Reimbursment	Revolving Fund)(Comptroller)(Annex "A-3)		1355	125.30
[illegible]	Zoila Molina	Ladislao G. Fernández M.		1356	175.00
[illegible]	Cristino Vera	Tomás Cruz	November	1357	225.00
[illegible]	Cristino Vera	Tomás Cruz	December	1358	225.00
[illegible]	Sara Martínez	Nildo Batista H.	Dif. Nov.and Dec.	1359	100.00
[illegible]	Juan Pajón	Wilfredo Fernández G.	September	1360	175.00
[illegible]	Juan Pajón	Wilfredo Fernández G.	October	1361	175.00
[illegible]	Juan Pajón	Wilfredo Fernández G.	November	1362	175.00
[illegible]	Juan Pajón	Wilfredo Fernández G.	December	1363	175.00
[illegible]	Agueda Granda	Raul L. Granda Hernández	December	1364	175.00
[illegible]	Elva Matilda González	José A. Carreño G.	December	1365	175.00
[illegible]	Rosa Bueno	Adolfo Martín L.	December	1366	225.00
[illegible]	Fernando Chávez	Jesús Carballeira M.	December	1367	250.00
[illegible]	Miguel Guerra	Luis M. Guerra S.	December	1368	175.00
[illegible]	Concepción Vasallo	Juvenal Montero D.	December	1369	275.00
[illegible]	Roberto García Serra	Roberto García Serra S.	December	1370	225.00
[illegible]	CANCELLED			1371	-o-
[illegible]	María A. Coscuella	Enrique J. Ruiz W.	December	1372	225.00
[illegible]	Pedro Valdés Díaz	René A. Hernández F.	December	1373	250.00
[illegible]	Esther [illegible]	Freddy Izquierdo R.	December	1374	175.00
[illegible]	Salvador Pérez	Roberto Torres F.	December	1375	225.00
[illegible]	CANCELLED			1376	-o-

(Continues page No.17)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.17

Date				Check No.	Total
[illegible]	Pedro Valdés Díaz	Jorge L. Quesada J.	December	1377	$ 225.00
[illegible]	Pedro Valdés Díaz	Angel R. Mujica H.	December	1378	275.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Sorondo	Rodolfo C. Sorondo Q.	December	1379	250.00
[illegible]	Raul A. Medina	Ineido A. Cabrera C.	December	1380	225.00
[illegible]	Raul A. Medina	Angel M. Barrios V.	December	1381	225.00
[illegible]	CANCELLED			1382	-o-
[illegible]	Raul A. Medina	José R. Barrios V.	December	1383	250.00
[illegible]	Jesús Fernández	Guillermo Portuondo	December	1384	250.00
[illegible]	Yolanda Portuondo	Cándido Sierra Rey	December	1385	225.00
[illegible]	CANCELLED			1386	-o-
[illegible]	Antonia Penedo	Juan A. Formoso P.	December	1387	250.00
[illegible]	Francisco Blanco	Héctor Varona F.	December	1388	175.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Carrero	Benito R. González C.	December	1389	225.00
[illegible]	José Acosta Santos	Manuel Avila Ruiz	December	1390	300.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Rodríguez	Orlando Bayona T.	December	1391	225.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Villavicencio	Rogerio de los Santos	December	1392	175.00
[illegible]	[illegible] María Ortiz	Mario A. Enríquez T.	December	1393	225.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Rolando Moya G.	December	1394	250.00
[illegible]	María Elena García	Modesto C. García M.	December	1395	175.00
[illegible]	Estrella Enríquez	Félix Domínguez C.	December	1396	200.00
[illegible]	Estrella Enríquez	Arcangel Amador	December	1397	225.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Álvarez	José A. Darías Rodríguez	December	1398	250.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Juan M. Velasco J.	December	1399	250.00
[illegible]	Irene Rodríguez	Guillermo Cancio G.	December	1400	225.00

(Continues page No.18)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.18

[illegible]				Check No.	Total
[illegible]	[illegible]	Jorge Mackenzie M.	December	1401	$ 275.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Orestes Escandell F.	December	1402	225.00
	[illegible] Escandell	José Escandell F.	December	1403	275.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Ramos	José F. Mederos R.	December	1404	250.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Mario Tomás Pérez Chile	December	1405	175.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Senen Brito Alfonso	December	1406	250.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Osvaldo Coello Díaz	December	1407	250.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Fonseca	Sergio L. Díaz Brull	December	1408	150.00
[illegible]	José Tur Tur	Julio Tur Tur	December	1409	275.00
[illegible]	José Tur Tur	Patricio Artigas E.	December	1410	100.00
[illegible]	María [illegible] Cotta	José V. Cal Cotta	December	1411	175.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Izquierdo	Emilio M. Izquierdo H.	December	1412	75.00
[illegible]	Genaro Pérez González	Angel L. Bolaños L.	December	1413	105.00
[illegible]	Genaro Pérez González	Esteban M. Beruvides B.	December	1414	130.00
[illegible]	Gladys del Valle	Jorge Ramos Alcaniz	December	1415	125.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Casanova	René Cancio González	December	1416	30.00
[illegible]	[illegible] R. Arrazola	Orlando Arrazola R.	December	1417	87.50
[illegible]	Aida Rodríguez	Leocadio León Blanco	Dif. Dec.	1418	158.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Avila Cancio	Miguel A. Avila C.	December	1419	250.00
[illegible]	Juan Pajón	Alberto Poveda A.	December	1420	225.00
[illegible]	Encarnación Ramos	Ricardo Martínez de la C.	December	1421	175.00
[illegible]	Virginia González	Luis de J. Sierra L.	December	1422	250.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Manuel Revuelta S.E.	October	1423	275.00

(Continues page No.19)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.19

[illegible]				Check No.	T o t a l
[illegible]	L. Rothman	Manuel Revuelta S.E.	December	1424	$ 275.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Santiago A. Díaz M.	Dif. Dec.	1425	50.00
[illegible]	Carmela López	Eddy Iruela Garrido	Sep.,Oct.,Nov.,Dec.	1426	900.00
[illegible]	Elsa Roldán	Sergio Ares Fernández	September	1427	225.00
[illegible]	Eloísa Sobrino	Gastón Pérez Rangel	December	1428	175.00
[illegible]	Lili Montoto	Lorenzo C. López Valdés	December	1429	250.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Manuel E. Menéndez F.	December	1430	225.00
[illegible]	[illegible] López	Carlos Hernández Vega	Nov. and Dec.	1431	450.00
[illegible]	Juan [illegible]	Miguel A. Reyes G.	December	1432	175.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Oscar B. Corallo M.	December	1433	225.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Marcos Mesa Robel	December	1434	275.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Gómez Garrido	Sixto F. Espino Alonso	December	1435	225.00
[illegible]	CANCELLED			1436	-o-
[illegible]	Elsa Roldán	Sergio Ares Fernández	November	1437	225.00
[illegible]	L. Rothman	Manuel Revuelta S.E.	November	1438	275.00
[illegible]	Francisco Pérez	José M. Battle	November	1439	250.00
[illegible]	Emilia Acosta	Isidro J. Montesinos A.	November	1440	175.00
[illegible]	Martha [illegible] (First wife)	Juvenal Montero B.	December	1441	50.00
[illegible]	José [illegible]	(Relatives in Cuba)	December	1442	14,100.00
[illegible]	Carlos Hernández	(In advance)	January	1443	55.00
[illegible]	Arturo Lorenzo	Lorenzo Pérez L.	October	1444	175.00
[illegible]	Pilar Gómez	Antonio Gómez Candales	November	1445	225.00
[illegible]	Pilar Gómez	Antonio Gómez Candales	December	1446	225.00
[illegible]	Lorenzo Travieso	Alcides Cabrera P.	December	1447	225.00

(Continues page No.20)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.20

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec. 15	Dolores Fernández	Máximo L. Cruz G.	December	1448	$ 225.00
Dec. 15	Esther Rodríguez	José L. Vivanco Pardo	December	1449	225.00
Dec. 15	Lorenzo Martín	Luis del Valle del Junco	December	1450	225.00
Dec. 15	Eusebio Carvajal	Adolfo Díaz Cabrera	December	1451	175.00
Dec. 15	Lourdes Fernández	Ernesto V. Fernández Dalmau	December	1452	225.00
Dec. 15	José Acosta Santos	Rodolfo Hernández Herrera	December	1453	225.00
Dec. 15	Angélica Medina	Luis E. López González	December	1454	175.00
Dec. 15	Mirella Urra	Miguel A. Lazas G.	December	1455	250.00
Dec. 15	Luis Peña	Arnaldo A. Oliva G.	December	1456	225.00
Dec. 15	Lucía Pera	Félix Pérez Tamayo	December	1457	225.00
Dec. 15	Esperanza Cobas	Bartolomé Pineda G.	December	1458	175.00
Dec. 15	Pablo Martínez	Pablo Hugo Rojas Ramos	December	1459	250.00
Dec. 15	Ramón L. Ravelo	Mario Ravelo López	December	1460	225.00
Dec. 15	CANCELLED			1461	-o-
Dec. 15	Inocente R. García	Fernando O. Torres M.	December	1462	250.00
Dec. 15	Inés Segura Bustamante	Carlos de Varona S.B.	December	1463	175.00
Dec. 15	Luz María Herrera	Rogelio Rodríguez González	December	1464	175.00
Dec. 15	Octavio Estévez	Conrado Caballero A.	November	1465	175.00
Dec. 15	Octavio Estévez	Conrado Caballero A.	December	1466	175.00
Dec. 15	Roberto González	Rigoberto Cancino H.	December	1467	175.00
Dec. 15	Moisés Egozi	José Egozi Bejar	December	1468	225.00
Dec. 15	Fernando Cabana	D. Armando Morejón F.	December	1469	175.00
Dec. 15	Georgina Díaz	Francisco Salicio S.	December	1470	175.00
Dec. 15	Georgina Díaz	Francisco Salicio S.	November	1471	175.00

(Continues page No.21)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.21

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec. 15	Jorge Tomeu	Oliverio Tomeu V.	December	1472	$ 275.00
Dec. 15	Antonio Guzmán	Carlos A. de Varona A.	December	1473	275.00
Dec. 16	Lucía Ferra	Nabi Ferra Mata	Dif. Dec.	1474	50.00
Dec. 16	Rafael García Rubio	Manuel García-Rubio R.	Dif. Dec.	1475	50.00
Dec. 16	Angel Rodríguez	Angel Rodríguez L.	September	1476	250.00
Dec. 16	Angel Rodríguez	Angel Rodríguez L.	December	1477	250.00
Dec. 17	Eduardo Franqui	(3 desks and 1 card file)		1478	161.00
Dec. 17	Lucía Pérez Oquendo	Alvin Ross Díaz	December	1479	225.00
Dec. 17	Dulce C. Roch	Rolando Hernández Valdés	December	1480	175.00
Dec. 17	Antonio Arteaga	Ramón Arteaga Díaz	December	1481	175.00
Dec. 17	[illegible] Macías	Alfredo J. Borras M.	December	1482	175.00
Dec. 17	Arturo Fajardo	Luis Pino Herrera	December	1483	175.00
Dec. 17	CANCELLED			1484	-o-
Dec. 17	Ana Lozano	Rodowaldo Fuentes L.	December	1485	275.00
Dec. 17	Elsa Molina	Carlos E. Ochoa Núñez	December	1486	250.00
Dec. 17	Adelaida Soler	Julio A. de J. Cortés V.	December	1487	250.00
Dec. 17	Elsa Molina	Adalberto A. Delgado G.	December	1488	175.00
Dec. 17	Jesús Gómez Garrido	Alberto Miranda V.	December	1489	250.00
Dec. 17	Elsa Molina	Antonio F. Fernández Peydro	December	1490	225.00
Dec. 17	[illegible] López	Jorge R. Herrera L.	December	1491	175.00
Dec. 17	Lourdes Bonnin	Antonio E. Iglesias P.	December	1492	225.00
Dec. 17	Raul Arango Dalmau	Lucas R. Franco Dalmau	December	1493	175.00
Dec. 17	Caridad Cruz	Amado Fernández Cruz	December	1494	175.00
Dec. 17	CANCELLED				-o-

(Continues page No.22)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.22

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec. 17	Alberto Fontova	León Fontova R.	December	1496	$ 225.00
Dec. 17	[illegible] González Posada	Ernesto F. Garriga C.	December	1497	225.00
Dec. 17	Pedro [illegible] García	Alfredo Barrera A.	December	1498	300.00
Dec. 17	Margarita Díaz	Armando Díaz Fernández	December	1499	250.00
Dec. 17	[illegible] Páez	Angel Páez Platas	December	1500	275.00
Dec. 17	Hipólito [illegible]	Juan N. Prado V.	December	1501	225.00
Dec. 17	Héctor Torres	Mario E. Torres F.	December	1502	175.00
Dec. 17	CANCELLED			1503	-o-
Dec. 17	CANCELLED			1504	-o-
Dec. 17	Cástulo J. Expósito	Carlos A. Sarmiento H.	December	1505	225.00
Dec. 17	Pedro Molina	Carlos F. Navarrete	December	1506	175.00
Dec. 17	María Teresa Gómez	Luis Bianchi Gómez	December	1507	175.00
Dec. 17	Dora Quevedo	Mario M. Martínez Q.	December	1508	175.00
Dec. 17	Alfredo Hernández	Carlos M. Hernández B.	December	1509	175.00
Dec. 17	María Riera	José M. Macías Riera	December	1510	225.00
Dec. 17	Antonia Arteaga	Armando C. Basulto G.	December	1511	175.00
Dec. 17	Esther Lima	Julio Bueno Rivera	December	1512	175.00
Dec. 17	Luis Lima	Manuel B. Pozo del Val	December	1513	275.00
Dec. 17	[illegible] Tavernero	Jorge A. Vega Casas	December	1514	300.00
Dec. 17	William King	Orestes Mirabal H.	December	1515	250.00
Dec. 17	William King	Miguel A. López B.	December	1516	250.00
Dec. 17	Estela Amaran	Antonio Vidal Vera P.	December	1517	250.00
Dec. 17	Mercedes Navarro	Luis G. Rodríguez M.	December	1518	225.00
Dec. 17	Juan Pajón	Humberto Creme G.	December	1519	300.00

(Continues page No.23)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.23

Date				Check No.	T o t a l.
Dec. 17	Antonia Florez	Napoleón Vilaboa de Ll.	December	1520	$ 225.00
Dec. 17	Narciso López	Milton López-Hidalgo B.	December	1521	175.00
Dec. 17	Juan Díaz Sosa	Ernesto Esteban L.	December	1522	225.00
Dec. 17	Ela [illegible] Pérez	Miguel A. Orozco Crespo	December	1523	225.00
Dec. 17	Antonio Carmona	Antonio G. Carmona C.	Dif. Dec.	1524	50.00
Dec. 17	The Florida National Bank	Manuel Comellas A.	December	1525	175.00
Dec. 17	Concepción Pérez	Nicolás Molina del Rio	September	1526	225.00
Dec. 17	Concepción Pérez	Nicolás Molina del Rio	October	1527	225.00
Dec. 19	Ana Trinidad Cruz	Guillermo Lastre E.	December	1528	250.00
Dec. 19	Antonia Florez	Napoleón Vilaboa de Ll.	November	1529	225.00
Dec. 19	Nova Capote	(Travel ticket)		1530	25.00
Dec. 19	Lidia Elena García	(Travel ticket N.J. to Miami)		1531	54.00
Dec. 19	Juan Pagón	Miguel A. Reyes García	Dif. Dec.	1532	50.00
Dec. 19	Raquel Moya	Abelardo Silva Perdomo	November	1533	300.00
Dec. 19	Raquel Moya	Abelardo Silva Perdomo	December	1534	300.00
Dec. 21	Pedro Delgado	Alberto Pérez Sorpo	November	1535	175.00
Dec. 21	Pedro Delgado	Alberto Pérez Sorpo	December	1536	175.00
Dec. 21	Nancy Torres	Raul Vázquez Martín	November	1537	175.00
Dec. 21	Nancy Torres	Raul Vázquez Martín	December	1538	175.00
Dec. 21	Alicia Luquiere	Pedro González Fernández	Dif. Dec.	1539	50.00
Dec. 21	Rosa María Doy	Máximo E. Sanabria Doy	December	1540	175.00
Dec. 21	Julio C. Navarro	Jorge Navarro Rodríguez	December	1541	225.00
Dec. 22	Olga Gutiérrez	Raul E. Taboada R.	December	1542	175.00
Dec. 22	Daniela López	William R. Schuss	November	1543	175.00

(Continues page No.24)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"

Date				Check No.	T o t a l
Dec. 22	Grace Mc Bride	William R. Schoss	December	1544	$ 175.00
Dec. 22	Julieta Sancio	Jorge García Rubio S.	December	1545	175.00
Dec. 22	Olga Alvarez	Carlos López Lezcano	December	1546	300.00
Dec. 23	Bárbara Espino	Jesús Espino Magraner	December	1547	250.00
Dec. 23	Bartola I. Fernández	Abel T. Sotolongo R.	December	1548	225.00
Dec. 23	Isabel G. Mateo	Claudio F. González M.	December	1549	250.00
Dec. 23	Marta Díaz	Félix J. Hildebram Díaz R.	December	1550	250.00
Dec. 23	Lila Artaud	Gerardo A. de Villiers	December	1551	300.00
Dec. 23	Laureano Garrote	José F. Casal Fernández	December	1552	175.00
Dec. 23	[illegible] Lorenzo	Fernando Puig Fernández de C.	December	1553	250.00
Dec. 23	Juan R. Pujol	Domingo R. Carmenate	December	1554	175.00
Dec. 23	Jesús Gómez Garrido	Luis Miranda Hernández	December	1555	300.00
Dec. 23	Jesús Gómez Garrido	Segundo Vega García	December	1556	175.00
Dec. 23	Jesús Gómez Garrido	José M. Rodríguez P.	December	1557	250.00
Dec. 23	Pan American Bank of Miami	Francisco I. Fernández S.	December	1558	175.00
Dec. 23	C A N C E L L E D			1559	-o-
Dec. 23	Clara Ramírez	Fernando Pedro Sala P.	December	1560	225.00
Dec. 23	Manuel Garrido	Carlos M.F. Garrido G.	December	1561	225.00
Dec. 23	Cristina Kindelán	Raul Arango Kindelán	December	1562	175.00
Dec. 23	Manuel Garrido	Sergio Avila Marino	December	1563	250.00
Dec. 23	Carmen Fernández	Julio Monzón Santos	December	1564	250.00
Dec. 23	Teresa Sánchez	Rafael Sánchez Beltrán	December	1565	175.00
Dec. 23	Teresa Sánchez	Luis Sánchez Reyes	December	1566	250.00
Dec. 23	Patricio Martínez	Amado Ramón A. Gayol T.	December	1567	175.00

(Continues page No.25)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.25

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec. 23	Nuria Alvarez Cueto	Francisco M. Condom G.	December	1568	$ 175.00
Dec. 23	Nuria Alvarez Cueto	José E. del Campo P	December	1569	225.00
Dec. 23	Nita María Monne	Ramón G. Gómez del R.	December	1570	225.00
Dec. 23	Jesús Gómez Garrido	Pablo de Armas Olivera	December	1571	175.00
Dec. 23	Dolores Fernández	Armando Gutiérrez C.	December	1572	225.00
Dec. 23	María A. Sánchez	Julio C. González Rebull S.	December	1573	225.00
Dec. 23	CANCELLED			1574	-o-
Dec. 23	Dora Rubiano	Anastasio J. Suárez	December	1575	175.00
Dec. 23	Mercedes González	Antonio M. González B.	December	1576	175.00
Dec. 23	Rafaela Ichaso	Rogelio A. Fernández I.	December	1577	175.00
Dec. 23	René López Lima	Humberto R. López C.	December	1578	225.00
Dec. 23	Manuel Fernández	Mirto Collazo Valdés	December	1579	225.00
Dec. 23	Lugarzo Fajardo	Manuel Navarro M.	Dif. Dec.	1580	50.00
Dec. 26	José L. García	Roberto Pichardo V.	December	1581	225.00
Dec. 26	Alicia L. Atencio	Oscar Acevedo	Dif. Dec.	1582	100.00
Dec. 26	Nancy Torres	Demetrio Pérez R.	December	1583	225.00
Dec. 26	Antonia Pino	Fernando Sardiñas C.	November	1584	175.00
Dec. 26	Antonia Pino	Fernando Sardiñas C.	December	1585	175.00
Dec. 26	Aida Rodríguez	Leocadio León Blanco	Dif. Dec.	1586	69.00
Dec. 26	Juan José Delgado	Román Delgado B.	October	1587	225.00
Dec. 26	Faustina Espinosa	Gerardo Silva P.	November	1588	250.00
Dec. 26	Faustina Espinosa	Gerardo Silva P.	December	1589	250.00
Dec. 27	María Josefa Riera	(Reinbursment Revolving Fund)(Annex "A-4")		1590	677.10
Dec. 26	Olga Carreño	Alfonso Cereceda G.	Dif. October	1591	50.00

(Continues page No.26)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec. 27	Carlos Fernández	(In advance)	January	1592	$ 75.00
Dec. 27	Roberto Fernández	Guillermo Fernández V.	December	1593	225.00
Dec. 27	Marta Gómez Chávez	Ibrahim Rodríguez C.	November	1594	175.00
Dec. 27	Marta Gómez Chávez	Ibrahim Rodríguez C.	December	1595	175.00
Dec. 27	Cristino Vera	Pedro R. Vera C.	November	1596	175.00
Dec. 27	Cristino Vera	Pedro R. Vera C.	December	1597	175.00
Dec. 28	Nancy Díaz	Norberto L. González	November	1598	225.00
Dec. 28	Nancy Díaz	Norberto L. González	December	1599	225.00
Dec. 28	Roberto Correa	Antonio Salgado C.	October	1600	275.00
Dec. 28	Roberto Correa	Antonio Salgado C.	December	1601	275.00
Dec. 28	Elia L. Camargo	Luis R. Pérez Rodríguez	November	1602	175.00
Dec. 28	Elia L. Camargo	Luis R. Pérez Rodríguez	December	1603	175.00
Dec. 28	Marta Ugarte	Lázaro R. Ugarte B.	December	1604	175.00
Dec. 28	Emma Erlinda Cruz	Guillermo Lastre E.	October Dif.	1605	50.00
Dec. 28	Emma Erlinda Cruz	Guillermo Lastre E.	November Dif.	1606	50.00
Dec. 28	Esther Hernández	Pablo E. Castellón H.	October	1607	175.00
Dec. 29	Nancy Díaz	Ramón Fuente Camejo	December	1608	175.00
Dec. 29	Norma Vilarchao	José M. Alfonso	December	1609	175.00
Dec. 29	Nancy Díaz	Daniel González C.	December	1610	275.00
			TOTAL CHECKS DRAWN		$139,224.96
			TOTAL CHECKS ISSUED IN DECEMBER AND PENDING TO BE COLLECTED		$ 14,181.10

N O T E:
All the checks dated Dec. 1 belongs to the month of December.

ml.

[illegible]

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

"[illegible] AND [illegible]"

ANALYSIS OF THE REVOLVING FUND

OF THE SOCIAL WORK SECTION

[illegible] NO. 1340

DECEMBER 1960

ANNEX "A-1"

Medical Assistance:		
Mrs. Regina Luaces (Physician)	3.00	
Mrs. Prellezo (Physician)	10.00	
Mrs. Etchegoyen (Physician)	8.00	
Mrs. Prellezo (Hospital)	7.75	
Mrs. Tellechea (Medicine)	8.00	
Mrs. Prellezo (Hospital)	4.00	
Mrs. Alcida Sessa (Hospital)	70.00	
Mrs. Chamizo (Hospital)	20.00	
Mrs. Caridad García de Chamizo (Hospital)	25.00	
Laboratory (Dr. Rasco) Anita Trespalacios	8.00	
Son of Mercedes Blanco (Physician)	5.00	
Mercedes Blanco (Oculist)	11.00	
Mrs. Olga Gómez Mena de Molé (Physician)	85.00	
Martin Molena Family (Dentist)	50.00	
Medicine for recruits family	188.37	
Mrs. Raul Vianello	50.00	$ 553.12
Transportation Expenses:		
Gasoline		57.77
Office Supplies:		29.63
Miscellaneous:		92.04
Total		$ 732.56

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
CREATION OF A REVOLVING FUND
CHECK NO. 1345
DECEMBER 1960

ANNEX "A-2"

The "Revolving Fund" of the Comptroller Office in the Military Section is created by this check, under the custody of Mr. Manuel Blanco, and it will continue being by this amount.	$ 100.00

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible] AND [illegible]"
REIMBURSEMENT REVOLVING FUND
COMPTROLLER OFFICE MILITARY SECTION
CHECK No. 1555
DECEMBER 1960

ANNEX "A-3"

Office Supplies:		$ 30.22
Assets:		
Typewriter desk (used)	$ 44.00	
Legal File 4 drawers, metal	47.50	91.50
Miscellaneous:		3.58
Total		$ 125.30

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"RASCO AND PAULA"
REIMBURSEMENT REVOLVING FUND
SOCIAL WORK SECTION
CHECK NO. 1590
DECEMBER 1960

ANNEX "A-4"

Medical Assistance:	
Medicine and Mercy Hospital	$ 509.49
Transportation Expenses:	
Gasoline	23.92
Advance payment given by the revolving fund of Social Work:	
Dr. Matos	50.00
Office Supplies:	9.23
Miscellaneous:	84.46
Total	$ 677.10

ml.

A-1

1-31 July 1960

Miami

RASCO - PAULA

TRANSLATION

1-31 July

Miami

RASCO-PAULA

Democratic Revolutionary Front
Miami, Florida

Distinguished Cubans:

Attached herewith I am remitting the report corresponding to the past month of July of the current year containing the following:

I. SUMMARY STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE OPERATIONS
II. ATTACHMENTS CORRESPONDING TO EXPENDITURES
III. BANK CONCILIATION
IV. GENERAL

Attentively,

(signed)
Juan Paula Baez
Public Accountant

Frente Revolucionario Democratico
Miami- Florida.-

Distinguidos Cubanos :

Adjunto les estoy remitiendo el Informe correspondiente al pasado mes de Julio del presente año, y el mismo está integrado por lo siguiente:

- I - ESTADO RESUMEN DE LAS OPERACIONES DE INGRESOS Y EGRESOS.
- II - ANEXOS CORRESPONDIENTES A LOS EGRESOS
- III - CONCILIACION BANCARIA
- IV - GENERAL

De ustedes atentamente,

Juan Paula

Juan Paula Baez
Contador Público

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE OPERATIONS

Proceeding from the conciliated balance of 30 June 1960 of $2,868.95, we added to it a loan received from Dr. Justo Carrillo Hernandez in the amount of $1,500.00, receipts from the Department of Finances in the amount of $8,000.00 and a spontaneous contribution from an anti-communist admirer from South America in the amount of $30.00. We arrived at a total of $12,398.95 of cash on hand for the month of July 1960.

If from the total of cash on hand for the month of July 1960 we subtract the expenditures which are:

Traveling expenses (see Attachment 1)	$6,002.46
Propaganda (see Attachment 2)	1,172.38
Personnel (see Attachment 3)	1,136.00
Sustenance and rents (see Attachment 4)	559.50
Communications (see Attachment 5)	960.75
Students' Section (see Attachment 6)	220.00
Office supplies (see Attachment 7)	219.49
Miscellaneous (see Attachment 8)	1,577.38

we have a total of cash on hand at the Florida National Bank and Trust Company on 31 July 1960 of $550.99. There exists on this date a $100.00 Fixed Fund which increases the cash on hand by this amount.

TRAVELING EXPENSES

In Attachment 1 you may observe to whom the various checks were issued as well as the amount of each expenditure. Although entry #1 is charged to Dr. Luis Aguilar Leon, according to verbal information, only $200.00 corresponds to this gentleman and the remaining $400.00 corresponds to

RESUMEN DE LAS OPERACIONES DE INGRESOS Y EGRESOS

Partiendo del saldo conciliado en 30 de Junio de 1960, de $2,868.95, le sumamos un prestamo recibido del Dr. Justo Carrillo Hernandez -- por $1,500.00; un ingreso efectuado por el Departamento de Finanzas por $8,000.00 y la aportación espontanea de un admirador anti-comunista de Sur America de $30.00, logramos una ascendencia de efectivo disponible para el mes de Julio de 1960 de $12,398.95.

Si al total del efectivo disponible del mes de Julio de 1960, le restamos los egresos, que son:

Gastos de Viajes, (ver anexo-1)	$ 6,002.46
Propaganda, (ver anexo-2)	1,172.38
Personal, (ver anexo-3)	1,136.00
Manutención y alquileres (ver anexo-4)	559.50
Comunicaciones (ver anexo-5)	960.75
Sección Estudiantil (ver anexo-6)	220.00
Efectos de Oficinas (ver anexo-7)	219.49
Miscelaneas (ver anexo-8)	1,577.38

nos queda un efectivo disponible en The Flòrida National Bank and Trust Company, en 31 de Julio de 1960, de $550.99. Existe en ésta fecha un Fondo Fijo de $100.00, que aumenta en ésta cantidad el - efectivo disponible.

GASTOS DE VIAJES

En el anexo-1 podrán observar a quines fuerón extendidos los distintos cheques, así como la cuantía ascendente de cada egreso.

Aunque la partida # 1 aparece cargada al Dr. Luis Aguilar León, según informe verbal, solamente correspondió a dicho señor $200.00 y los $400.00 restantes al Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango.

La partida #8 , a nombre del Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona por --

Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango.

Entry #3 in the name of Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona in the amount of $931.49, according to a "statement" in our possession does not consist totally of "Traveling Expenses", however due to the fact that the Department of Finances claimed the vouchers for the month of July, the analysis of this entry was not possible in spite of having carried out the corresponding measures for obtaining a copy of the statement submitted by Dr. Varona.

Entry #12 in the name of Dr. Manuel Artime for $100.00 is not the result of a check made out in his name but was an amount delivered by Dr. Justo Carrillo in Mexico City according to a "statement for reimbursement" in the amount of $834.20 submitted to the Front during the month of July.

Entry #14 in the amount of $211.05 in the name of Dr. Justo Carrillo corresponds to the reimbursement made to him in the amount of $834.20. The difference between $834.20 and $211.05 corresponds to other types of expenses which are given in detail below.

The remaining entries are self-explanatory in Attachment-1.

The "Traveling Expenses" for the past month of June are excluded.

PROPAGANDA

In Attachment-2 all expenses under this account are given in detail.

Entry #105 in the amount of $500.00 corresponds to the payment for advertisements made in Mexico by Dr. Justo Carrillo, according to a statement for reimbursement in the amount of $834.20 submitted by him.

PERSONNEL

In Attachment-3 the personnel are listed with their monthly, weekly or incidental salaries with charges to the office of the Front in the Congress Building.

$931.49, según "estado" que estuvo en nuestro poder, no es totalmente de "Gastos de Viajes", pero debido a que el Departamento de Finanzas reclamó los comprobantes del mes de Julio, no fué posible el análisis de dicha partida, no obstante haber realizado las gestiones correspondientes para obtener una copia del estado presentado por el Dr. Varona.

La partida # 12 a nombre del Dr. Manuel Artime por $100.00, no es producto de un cheque girado a su nombre, sino que fué una cantidad entregada por el Dr. Justo Carrillo en la ciudad de México, según el "estado de reintegro " por $834.20, presentado en el mes de Julio al Frente.

La partida # 14 por $211.05, a nombre del Dr. Justo Carrillo, corresponde al reintegro que se le hizo de $834.20. La diferencia entre los $834.20 y $211.05, correspondo a otros tipos de gastos, que más adelante se detallan.

Las otras partidas se explican por si sola en el anexo-1.

Estan excluidos los "Gastos de Viajes" del mes de Junio próximo pasado.

PROPAGANDA

En el anexo-2 están detallados todos los gastos realizados bajo ésta cuenta.

La partida # 105 por $500.00, corresponde al pago por anuncios efectuado en México por el Dr. Justo Carrillo, según estado de reintegro por $834.20 por él presentado.

SUSTENANCE AND RENTS

In Attachment-4 the various entries under this title are explained.

Entry #400 of 2 July 1960, check #22, was for the payment of rent for the office of the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT at #1001 Congress Building, Miami.

Entry #402 of 27 July, check #64, in the name of Abel Varona was used to give food, from 27 July to 2 August 1960, both dates inclusive, to the following persons: Miguel Penton, Hugo Zamora, Martin Torres, Giraldo Serafin Penton, Orlando Garcia, Claudio Orozco, Benigno Perez, Humberto Cordero, and Felix Sosa.

As you may note the expenses under this title will necessarily increase, therefore an ample estimate destined to cover future needs is advisable.

Check #67 of 27 July 1960 in the name of the labor leader Pascasio Linera was made void.

COMMUNICATIONS

The expenses of this title are listed in Attachment-5. The principal entries are 500 and 501 in the amounts of $400.00 and $300.00 for postage stamps. If we were to render account of the magnitude which propaganda of the Front must have sent by mail, these costs are ridiculous.

The costs of long distance calls charged to Dr. Justo Carrillo for $23.15 appear in the "statement for reimbursement" for $834.20 which he submitted for the month of July.

The long distance calls (?) of Dr. Jose I. Rasco were paid by the Fixed Fund which exists in the Front's office.

PERSONAL

En el anexo-3 se expone detalladamente el personal con asignación mensual, semanal ó eventual, con cargos a la oficina del Frente en el Congress Building.

MANUTENCION Y ALQUILERES

En el anexo-4 se explica las distintas partidas consumidas bajo - ésta epígrafe .

La partida #400 de Julio 2-960, check # 22 fué para el pago del alquiler de la oficina del FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO, en el Congress Building #1001, Miami.

La partida # 401 de 10 de Julio, check #42 a nombre de Rafael Candia, se utilizó para el alquiler de una casa ó apartamento en el N.W , Avenida 23, que alberga exilados y se le facilita la manutención.

La partida # 402 de Julio 27, check # 64 a nombre de Abel Varona, se utilizó para darle comida, desde el 27 de Julio al 2 de Agosto de 1960, ambos inclusives, a las siguientes personas: Miguel Pentón, Hugo Zamora, Martín Torres, Giraldo Serafín Pentón, Orlando García, Claudio Orozco, Benigno Perez, Humberto Cordero y Felix Sosa.

Como ustedes observarán los gastos de éste epígrafe, necesariamente irá aumentando, por lo que es aconsejable un amplio estimado destinado a cubrir sus necesidades futuras.

El check # 67 de 27 de Julio de 1960 a nombre del lider obrero Pascasio Linera fué anulado.

STUDENTS' SECTION

In Attachment-6 are explained the amounts delivered to the Students' representatives in exile which collaborate with the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT.

OFFICE SUPPLIES

In Attachment-7 are listed all expenses made for office supplies.

MISCELLANEOUS

In Attachment-8 the expenditures which do not come under the other titles are explained.

The Fixed Fund of the Front's office was increased to the amount of $100.00 by means of check #29 of 12 July 1960. This Fixed Fund is under the custody of Ana Villarreal.

Dr. Justo Carrillo was repaid the loan he made during the month of July in the amount of $1,500.00 with check #49 of 29 July 1960.

There are entries paid from the Fixed Fund for taxi fares and personal courtesies which because of their amounts do not merit special attention.

COMUNICACIONES

Los gastos de éste titulo están relacionados en el anexo-5. Las partidas principales son la 500 y 501, por $400.00 y $300.00 en sellos de correo. Si nos damos cuenta de la magnitud que debe tener la propaganda enviada por correo del Frente, éstos gastos resultan irrisorios.

Los gastos de llamadas a distancias cargados al Dr. Justo Carrillo por $23.15 aparecen en el "estado de reintegro" por $834.20 del mes de Julio por él presentado.

Las distancias del Dr. José I. Rasco fuerón reintegrados por el Fondo Fijo existente en la oficina del Frente.

SECCION ESTUDIANTIL

En el anexo-6 se exponen las cantidades entregadas a la representación estudiantil del exilio, que coolaboran con el FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO.

EFECTOS DE OFICINAS

En el anexo-7 se relacionan todos los gastps efectuados en materiales para las oficinas.

MISCELANEOS

En el Anexo-8 se exponen todos los egresos realizados que no caben en los otros epígrafes.

Con el Check # 29 de Julio 12, 1960 se aumentó el Fondo Fijo de la oficina del FRENTE, a la cantidad de $100.00. Este Fondo Fijo está bajo la custodia de Ana Villarreal.

Con el Check # 49 de Julio 26 de 1960 se le pagó al Dr. Justo Carrillo el préstamo que hiciera dentro de este mes de Julio, por la cantidad de $1,500.00.

Existen partidas pagadas por el Fondo Fijo, de Alquiler de Taxis y Atención Personal, que por su cuantía no merecen especial atención.

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Summary of Receipts and Expenditures

Month of July 1960

RECEIPTS:

Balance 30 June 1960
Loan Received from Dr. Justo Carrillo
Receipts from the Department of Finances, July 1960
Contribution from a Collaborator
Total Cash on Hand

EXPENDITURES:

Traveling Expenses (Attachment 1)

Propaganda (Attachment 2)

Personnel (Attachment 3)

Sustenance and Rents (Attachment 4)

Communications (Postage stamps, telegraph, telephone, etc. (Attachment 5)

Students' Section (Attachment 6)

Office Supplies (Attachment 7)

Miscellaneous (Attachment 8)

Total Expenditures

Total Cash Available in Bank

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Traveling Expenses

ATTACHMENT 1

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Luis Aguilar Leon	
			A. Sanchez Arango	
			A. Sanchez Arango	
			A. Sanchez Arango	
			Jose I. Rasco	
			Jose I. Rasco	
			Manuel A. Varona	
			Manuel A. Varona	
			Manuel A. Varona	
			Manuel Artime	
			Manuel Artime	
			Received Dr. Carrillo	
			Justo Carrillo	
			Justo Carrillo	
			Elio Alvarez	
			Return F. Vidal	
			Passage Miami-Mexico and Mexico-Acapulco	
			Expenses of Envoy (?) (Shipment ?) to Mexico	
			Expenses J. Paula Trip (to) New York	
	Total Travel Expenses			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Gastos de Viajes

ANEXO 1

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle		Importe
1	Jul 2	24	Luis Aguilar León		$ 600.00
2	Jul 8	26	A. Sanchez Arango	$ 150.00	
3	Jul 19	40	A. Sanchez Arango	250.00	
4	Jul 26	53	A. Sanchez Arango	750.00	1,150.00
5	Jul 19	37	José I. Rasco	$ 250.00	
6	Jul 26	52	José I. Rasco	750.00	1,000.00
7	Jul 19	38	Manuel A. Varona	$ 250.00	
8	Jul 26	47	Manuel A. Varona	931.49	
9	Jul 27	62	Manuel A. Varona	150.00	1,331.49
10	Jul 19	39	Manuel Artime	$ 250.00	
11	Jul 27	61	Manuel Artime	150.00	
12	-	-	Recibido Dr. Carrillo	100.00	500.00
13	Jul 19	41	Justo Carrillo	$ 250.00	
14	Jul 26	48	Justo Carrillo	211.05	461.05
15	Jul 26	54	Elio Alvarez		250.00
16	Jul 26	57	Regreso F. Vidal		300.00
17	Jul 26	58	Pasaje Miami-Mexico y Mexico-Acapulco		168.64
18	Jul 26	59	Gastos del Enviado a Mexico		60.00
19	Jul 26	63	Gastos J. Paula Viaje New York		181.28
			Total Gastos de Viajes		$ 6,002.46

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Propaganda ATTACHMENT 2

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Enrique Villarreal	
			Sergio Aparicio	
			F. R. D. Manifesto	
			F. R. D. Manifesto	
			Dr. Justo Carrillo	
			Paid by Dr. Carrillo in Mexico	
			Book "Who is Who in America" for use of Propaganda	
			Sent to Dr. J. Gonzales, Director of a Mexican newspaper	
	Total Propaganda			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Propaganda

ANEXO 2

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
100	Jul 14	32	Enrique Villarreal	$ 134.10
101	Jul 14	33	Sergio Aparicio	217.44
102	Jul 15	35	Manifiesto F. R. D.	80.00
103	Jul 22	45	Manifiesto F. R. D.	142.00
104	Jul 26	56	Dr. Justo Carrillo	50.00
105	Jul 26	48	Pagado por el Dr. Carrillo en Mexico	500.00
106	Jul 6	23	Libro "Who is Who in America" para uso de Propaganda	16.72
107	Jul 15	34	Girado al Dr. J. Gonzalez, Director de un Periódico de Mexico	32.12
	Total Propaganda			$ 1,172.38

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Personnel

ATTACHMENT 3

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Ana Villarreal	
			Enrique Villarreal	
			Fernando Trespalacio - incidental weekly salary	
			Fernando Trespalacio	
			Juan Rodriguez Pintado	
			Wife of F. Vidal Santiago	
			Pascasio Linera	
			Silvia Torres - Translations	
Total Personnel				

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Personal

ANEXO 3

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
200	Jul 14	30	Ana Villarreal	$ 100.00
201	Jul 14	31	Enrique Villarreal	300.00
202	Jul 19	36	Fernando Trespalacio - Asiganción eventual semanal	50.00
203	Jul 26	50	Fernando Trespalacio	50.00
204	Jul 27	63	Juan Rodríguez Pintado	250.00
205	Jul 27	65	Sra. de F. Vidal Santiago	200.00
206	Jul 31	70	Pascasio Linera	146.00
207	Jul 26	51	Silvia Torres - Traducciones	40.00
	Total Personal			$ 1,136.00

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Sustenance and Rents

ATTACHMENT 4

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Rent Congress Building Suite number 1001	
			Rafael Candia	
			Abel Varona - support of nine persons	
	Total Sustenance and Rent			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Manutención y Alquileres ANEXO 4

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
400	Jul 22	22	Alquiler Congress Building Departamento No. 1001	$ 165.00
401	Jul 19	43	Rafael Candia	300.00
402	Jul 27	64	Abel Varona - Manutención de nueve personas	94.50
			Total Manutención y Alquileres	$ 559.50

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Communications

ATTACHMENT 5

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			A. Villarreal - Postage Stamps	
			A. Villarreal - Postage Stamps	
			Franking (?) Costs (Fixed Fund)	
			Telephone (FR 3-1717)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Long Distance Calls Dr. Rasco in Mexico (Fixed Fund)	
			Telegram (Fixed Fund)	
			Special Franking (?) (Fixed Fund)	
			Cables and Telegrams (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Certified Correspondence (Fixed Fund)	
			Long Distance Calls Dr. Carrillo in Mexico	
	Total Communications			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Comunicaciones ANEXO 5

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
500	Jul 19	44	A. Villarreal - Sellos Correos	$ 400.00
501	Jul 26	55	A. Villarreal - Sellos Correos	300.00
502	-	-	Gastos Franquicia (Fdo. Fijo)	14.09
503	Jul 12	27	Teléfono (FR-3-1717)	93.24
504	Jul 12	28	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	10.00
505	Jul 12	28	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	2.26
506	Jul 12	28	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	1.28
507	Jul 12	28	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	10.00
508	Jul 15	34	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	30.00
509	Jul 15	34	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	7.74
510	Jul 15	34	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	1.51
511	Jul 19	42	Distancias Dr. Rasco en Mexico (Fdo. Fijo)	24.92
512	Jul 19	42	Un telegrama (Fdo. Fijo)	2.20
513	Jul 19	42	Franquicia Especial (F. Fijo)	0.30
514	Jul 19	42	Cables y Telegramas (F. Fijo)	2.74
516	Jul 27	66	Sellos de Correos (F. Fijo)	13.66
517	Jul 27	66	Correspondencia Certificada (Fdo. Fijo)	23.66
518	Jul 26	48	Distancias Dr. Carrillo en Mexico	23.15
			Total Comunicaciones	$ 960.75

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

ATTACHMENT 6

Students Section

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Roberto Fernandez	
			Roberto Fernandez	
Total Students Section				

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Sección Estudiantil

ANEXO 6

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
600	Jul 28	68	Roberto Fernández	$ 120.00
601	Jul 28	69	Roberto Fernández	100.00
	Total Sección Estudiantil			$ 220.00

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Desk Supplies

ATTACHMENT 7

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Office Supplies	
			Office Supplies	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Index Tablet (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
	Total Desk Supplies			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Efectos de Escritorio **ANEXO 7**

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
700	Jul 8	25	Efectos de Oficina	$ 11.91
701	Jul 25	46	Efectos de Oficina	102.00
702	Jul 6	23	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	5.71
703	Jul 12	28	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	3.18
704	Jul 12	28	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fkjo)	14.00
705	Jul 12	28	Libreta Indice (F. Fijo)	0.59
706	Jul 15	34	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	3.87
707	Jul 15	34	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	1.55
708	Jul 15	34	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	20.00
709	Jul 19	42	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	40.00
710	Jul 19	42	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	0.67
711	Jul 19	42	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	8.24
712	Jul 19	42	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	3.80
713	Jul 19	42	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	3.97
	Total Efectos de Escritorio			$ 219.49

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Miscellaneous

ATTACHMENT 8

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Increase Fixed Fund to $100.00	
			Payment Dr. Carrillo's Loan	
			Bank Charge	
			Personal Courtesy (?)	
			Taxi Fare	
			Taxi Fare	
			Personal Courtesy (?)	
			Expenses for Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
Miscellaneous Total				

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Miscelâneos

ANEXO 8

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
900	Jul 12	29	Aumento Fondo Fijo a $100.00	$ 50.00
901	Jul 26	49	Pago Préstamo Dr. Carrillo	1,500.00
902	Jul 27	-	Cargo Bancario	2.70
903	Jul 27	66	Atención Personal	3.00
904	Jul 27	66	Alquiler Taxi	4.00
905	Jul 27	66	Alquiler Taxi	6.50
906	Jul 27	66	Atención Personal	1.22
907	Jul 12	28	Gastos en Periódicos (F.Fijo)	1.50
908	Jul 12	28	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	2.00
909	Jul 12	28	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	2.30
910	Jul 12	28	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	0.40
911	Jul 15	34	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	1.11
912	Jul 19	42	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	1.00
913	Jul 19	42	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	0.70
914	Jul 19	42	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	0.35
915	Jul 27	66	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	0.60
	Total Misceláneos			$ 1,577.38

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Bank Conciliation

On 31 July 1960

Balance According to Bank Statement

Less: Checks Drawn but not Collected

Check	Date	In Name Of
		Manuel A. Varona
		A. Sanches Arango
		Sent to F. Vidal Santiago
		Manuel Artime
		Manuel A. Varona
		Juan Rodriguez Pintado
		Wife of F. Vidal Santiago
		Roberto Fernandez
		Pascasio Linera

Balance on our books Conciliated 31 Jul 60

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Conciliación Bancaria

En 31 de Julio de 1960

Saldo Según Estado del Banco $ 3,548.48

__Menos:__ Cheques Girados y no Cobrados:

Check	Fecha	A Nombre De		
47	Jul 26	Manuel A. Varona	$ 931.49	
53	Jul 26	A. Sanchez Arango	750.00	
57	Jul 26	Envío F. Vidal Santiago	300.00	
61	Jul 27	Manuel Artime	150.00	
62	Jul 27	Manuel A. Varona	150.00	
63	Jul 27	Juan Rodríguez Pintado	250.00	
65	Jul 27	Sra. de F. Vidal Santiago	200.00	
68	Jul 28	Roberto Fernández	120.00	
70	Jul 31	Pascasio Linera	146.00	2,997.49
		Saldo en n/l Conciliado Jul 31/60		$ 550.99

GENERAL

In compliance with what has been established, of submitting to you a report at the close of each month, I am attaching herewith a STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES corresponding to the month of July 1960.

In spite of the fact that all expenditures were made by check in the name of the respective persons, there was an oversight in not requiring detailed receipts or vouchers of payment for funds drawn from the persons concerned.

On the trip to New York, suggested by you, a series of control measures were imposed upon me which I am also sending separately in order for you to deliberate the same. In addition to those written measures there are other verbal suggestions which are of importance.

Once you have read the control measures you will understand that the management of the funds of the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT is lacking from what is required, for which reason a true relationship between the Executive (Committee) and the Comptroller would be convenient in order to provide you with better efficiency.

I understand that it is troublesome, in accordance with the rank of the members of the Executive Committee, to render accounts of the cash received, but in accepting the conditions suggested by the Department of Finances, I find myself forced to inform you that it is the obligation of all those receiving funds to render accounts unless exceptions are made or established for the Executive Committee.

I understand that the reason why the measures required by the Department of Finances in the management of the funds of the FRONT were not established has been due to the fact that the suggested controls were not known at the close of the month of July.

GENERAL

Cumpliendo con lo establecido, de rendirles un informe al cierre de cada mes, les estoy adjuntando un ESTADO DE INGRESOS Y GASTOS correspondiente al mes de Julio de 1960.

No obstante haberse efectuado todos los egresos por cheques a nombre de las respectivas personas, se incurrió en el descuido de no pedir recibos detallados o comprobantes de pagos, por quien corresponda, del efectivo girado.

En el viaje a New York, por ustedes indicado, fuí impuesto de una serie de medidas de control, las cuales tambien remito aparte, para que deliberen sobre las mismas, existiendo además de las escritas, otras indicaciones verbales de importancia.

Una vez leídas las medidas de control, comprenderán que el manejo de los fondos del FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO, dista algo de lo requerido, razón por la cual sería conveniente una verdadera inter-relación entre el Ejecutivo y la persona del Comptroller, para que pueda ésta brindarles eficiencia.

Comprendo que es enojoso, de acuerdo con la jerarquía de los integrantes del Comité Ejecutivo, el estar rindiendo cuenta del efectivo recibido, pero de aceptar las condiciones sugeridas por el Departamento de Finanzas, me veo compelido a informarles que es obligación de todos los que reciban efectivo, rendir cuenta, salvo que logren o establezcan excepciones para el Ejecutivo.

Comprendo que la razón de no haberse establecido las medidas requeridas por el Departamento de Finanzas en el mane-

I would appreciate it, with the same frankness with which I have written these lines, if you would inform me if there is the slightest disagreement among any of the members of the Executive (Committee) and the person who is to fill the post of Comptroller so that in this manner I will not present an obstacle and can decline in favor of another person. If this is to the contrary it is a pleasure for me to be at the disposal of that worthy organization.

jo de los fondos del FRENTE, se debió a no conocer el control sugerido, llegado al final del mes de Julio.

Les agradecería, con la misma franqueza que expongo estas líneas, que me manifiesten si existe la mas ligera discrepancia entre alguno de los integrantes del Ejecutivo y el que va a ocupar el cargo de Comptroller, para de esta forma no obstaculizar y declinar en favor de otra persona. De lo contrario, de muy buen agrado estoy a la disposición de ese digno organismo.

A-2

F R D
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS
M I A M I

INFORME AGOSTO 1960

TRANSLATION

F R D

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

MIAMI

REPORT AUGUST 1960

Miami, 6 September 1960

Executives
Democratic Revolutionary Front

Dear Sirs:

Attached herewith we are submitting the REPORT corresponding to the month of August of the current year which contains the following:

Statement "I": Statement of Receipts and Expenditures
- Bank Conciliation

Attachment "I-A": Assets
Attachment "I-B": Propaganda
Attachment "I-C": Administrative and General Expenses
Attachment "I-D": Payroll
Attachment "I-E": Trips
Attachment "I-F": Sustenance and Rents
Attachment "I-G": Communications
Attachment "I-H": Students' Section
Attachment "I-I": Commissions and Delegations
Attachment "I-J": Miscellaneous
Attachment "I-K": Checks to be Justified
- Summary of Receipts and Expenditures Operations

Attentively,

(signed)
CP* Enrique Ros

(signed)
CP* Mario Girbau

(signed) Juan Paula

---

*Public Accountant

Miami, Septiembre 6, 1960

Senores Ejecutivos
Frente Revolucionario Democratico

Senores:

Adjunto les estamos remitiendo el INFORME correspondiente al mes de Agosto del corriente ano, el cual contiene lo siguiente:

Estado "I":	Estado de Ingresos y Gastos
-	Conciliacion Bancaria
Anexo "I-A":	Activos
Anexo "I-B":	Propaganda
Anexo "I-C":	Gastos de Administracion y Generales
Anexo "I-D":	Nomina
Anexo "I-E":	Viajes
Anexo "I-F":	Manutencion y Alquileres
Anexo "I-G":	Comunicacion
Anexo "I-H":	Seccion Estudiantil
Anexo "I-I":	Comisiones y Delegaciones
Anexo "I-J":	Varios
Anexo "I-K":	Checks a Justificar
-	Resumen de las Operaciones de Ingresos y Egresos

De Ustedes Atentamente

CP. Enrique Ros   CP. Mario Girbau

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

STATEMENT "I"

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES

RECEIPTS:

Balance in Bank (1-8-1960)

Deposits:

11 August
11 August
12 August

Total Receipts

EXPENDITURES:

Attachment	"I-A":	Assets
"	"I-B":	Propaganda
"	"I-C":	Administrative and General Expenses
"	"I-D":	Payroll
"	"I-E":	Trips
"	"I-F":	Sustenance and Rents
"	"I-G":	Communications
"	"I-H":	Students' Section
"	"I-I":	Commissions and Delegations
"	"I-J":	Miscellaneous
"	"I-K":	Checks to be Justified

Plus Bank Charges:

Debit Memos
Service Charges

Total Cash Available in Bank on 31-8-1960

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

BANK CONCILIATION

On 31 August 1960

Balance According to Bank Statement

Less: Checks Drawn but not Collected:

Date	Check No.	
4-8-60	74	Letter Service
11-8-60	125	Burrelle's Press Clipping

Balance on Our Books Conciliated on 31-8-1960

NOTE: Check No. 74 of Letter Service in the amount of $24.00 does not appear as paid by the bank and we are in doubt as to whether is was cancelled since the receipt or the invoice which covered it is not in our possession, in which case the cash available in the bank would be increased to $113.54 (One hundred thirteen pesos* and fifty-nine cents) on 31 August. There is in addition a Fixed Fund amounting to $100.00 (one hundred pesos*).

---

*As in text.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

CONCILIACION BANCARIA

En Agosto 31, 1960

Saldo Segun Estado del Banco				$ 138.54
Menos: Checks Girados y no Cobrados:				
Fecha	Check No.			
8-4-60	74	Letter Service	$ 24.00	
8-11-60	125	Burrelle'S Press Clipping	25.00	49.00
Saldo en Nuestros Libros Conciliado en 8-31-60				$ 89.54

N O T A: El check No. 74 de Letter Service por $24.00 no aparece pagado por el Banco y tenemos la duda de si fue anulado o no. Es posible que haya sido anulado ya que no obra en nuestro poder el recibo o la factura que lo ampare, en cuyo caso, el efectivo disponible en Banco ascenderia a $113.54 (Ciento trece pesos y cincuenta y cuatro centavos) en Agosto 31. Existe ademas un Fondo Fijo ascendente a $100.00 (Cien pesos).

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-A"

ASSETS

	Date	Check No.	Total
DEPOSITS:			
Electricity Office 914 NW 12 St.			
Telephone Office 914 NW 12 St.			
Gas Office 914 NW 12 St.			
Electricity 1313 NW 8 Ave.			
Water 1125 SW 19 Ave.			
Rent (of) Suite 419 Congress Building			
OFFICE EQUIPMENT:			
1 Perforator (Comptroller)			
1 Underwood typewriter Military Office			
1 Underwood typewriter Labor Commission			
ROLLING STOCK:			
1 auto Women's Section			
1 auto - Roberto Varona			
Total Assets			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-A"

ACTIVOS

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
DEPOSITOS:			
Electricidad Oficina 914 NW 12 st.	8-8	80	$ 20.00
Telefono Oficina 914 NW 12 st.	8-8	80	35.00
Gas Oficina 914 NW 12 st.	8-8	80	10.00
Electricidad 1313 NW 8 Ave.	8-8	83	15.00
Agua 1128 SW 19 Ave.	8-11	114	7.50
Alquiler Depto. 419 Congress Building	8-11	121	55.00
			$ 142.50
EQUIPO DE OFICINA:			
Una Perforadora (Comptroller)	8-2	73	$ 4.07
Una Maquina Underwood Oficina Militar	8-8	82	92.19
Una Maquina Underwood Comision Obrera	8-8	83	46.35
			$ 142.61
EQUIPO RODANTE:			
Un Auto Seccion Femenina	8-11	114	$ 350.00
Un Auto - Roberto Varona	8-12	126	505.00
			$ 855.00
Total Activos			$ 1,140.11

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-B"

PROPAGANDA

	Date	Check No.	Total
RADIO:			
Program Station MWET (sic) WMET (?)			
MISCELLANEOUS:			
Catholic Directory			
Reynold's-Offset			
Photostatic Copies - Lucha			
Spanish Newspapers			
Miscellaneous Newspapers			
Photos R. Dario's Letters			
Propaganda Shipment From Key West			
Printing (of) Propaganda			
Printing (of) Propaganda			
Reynold's Propaganda			
Sending News About Cuba in Newspapers of America			
Propaganda Expenses Rivas Vazquez			
Printing Expenses Lucha			
Total Propaganda			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-B"

PROPAGANDA

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
RADIAL:			
Programa Emisora WMET	8-18	130	$ 280.00
VARIAS:			
Directorio Catolico	8-4	75	10.20
Reynold's - Offset	8-4	77	12.00
Copias Fotostaticas - "Lucha"	8-4	79	13.60
Periodicos Latinos	8-4	79	1.15
Periodicos Varios	8-8	108	1.00
Fotos Cartas R. Dorio	8-8	108	20.80
Envio Propaganda desde Key West	8-11	112	15.00
Impresion Propaganda	8-11	114	50.00
Impresion Propaganda	8-11	114	20.00
Reynold's Propaganda	8-11	122	143.00
Envio Noticias sobre Cuba en Periodicos de America	8-11	125	25.00
Gastos Propaganda Rivas Vasquez	8-12	126	50.00
Gastos Impresion "Lucha"	8-18	128	33.00
			$ 394.75
Total Propaganda			$ 674.75

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-C"

ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL EXPENSES

	Date	Check No.	Total
DESK SUPPLIES:			
Miscellaneous Supplies			
" "			
" "			
" "			
" "			
" "			
" "			
" "			
" "			
MISCELLANEOUS:			
Installation of Locks			
Insecticides, Brooms, etc.			
Develop Recruits' Identification Photos			
Rolls Photographic (Film) and Development			
Transport of Persons in Autos			
Cleaning Supplies, Gasoline, etc.			
Rolls (of Film) and Development Photos			
Gasoline, etc.			
Work (possibly Repairs) Office			
Work (possibly Repairs) Office			
Expenses Shipping Baggage			
Gasoline, Transportation, etc.			
Expenses Settling in Miami (E. Huertas)			
Printing (Pedro Leyva)			
Repairs Ford Auto			
Repairs Auto W.P. Beach - Miami			
Expenses Settling (in Miami) A. J. Pinera			
Auto Expenses, Gasolina, etc.			
Recruitment Expenses			
Auto Expenses (M. Guillot)			
Installation Delegation Office Miami			
Gasoline, Parking, Fines, etc.			
Paint, Gasoline, etc.			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "1-C"

GASTOS DE ADMINISTRACION Y GENERALES

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
EFECTOS DE ESCRITORIO:			
Efectos Varios	8-2	72	$ 95.02
" "	8-4	79	5.22
" "	8-8	80	41.78
" "	8-8	82	62.80
" "	8-8	83	47.44
" "	8-8	90	22.97
" "	8-8	94	322.92
" "	8-11	108	3.64
" "	8-31	135	9.22
			$ 611.01
VARIOS:			
Instalacion Cerraduras	8-4	76	$ 42.91
Insecticidas, Escobas, etc.	8-8	80	11.46
Revelado Fotos Carnets Reclutas	8-8	80	56.40
Rollos Fotográficos y Revelados	8-8	81	15.93
Traslado Personas en Autos	8-8	81	11.58
Efectos Limpieza, Gasolina, etc.	8-8	82	9.07
Rollos y Revelado Fotos	8-8	83	21.64
Gasolina, etc.	8-8	83	4.00
Trabajos Oficina	8-8	84	25.00
Trabajos Oficina	8-8	85	40.00
Gastos Envio Maletas	8-11	107	19.20
Gasolina, Transporte, etc.	8-11	108	5.00
Gastos Instalacion Miami (E. Huertas)	8-11	111	500.00
Impresos (Pedro Leyva)	8-11	111	350.00
Reparacion Auto Ford	8-11	114	62.50
Gastos Auto W. P. Beach - Miami	8-11	114	80.00
Gastos Instalacion A. J. Pinera	8-11	123	100.00
Gastos Autos, Gasolina, etc.	8-12	126	323.00
Gastos Reclutamiento	8-12	126	20.00
Gastos Auto (M. Guillet)	8-12	127	23.75
Instalacion Oficina Delegacion Miami	8-12	130	250.00
Gasolina, Parqueos, Multas, etc.	8-11	124	40.85
Pintura, Gasolina, etc.	8-31	135	54.35

-A la Hoja 2-

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-C"
Continuation

	Date	Check No.	Total
Passports and Passage (Trespalacios Children)			
Gasoline			
Letter Service			
Total Administrative and General Expenses			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-C"
Continuacion

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Pasaportes y Pasajes (Hijos Trespalacios)	8-31	136	$ 100.00
Gasolina	8-2	73	7.00
Letter Service (ck. cancelled See Sept opening balance	8-4	74	24.00
			$ 2,197.64
Total Gastos de Administracion y Generales			$ 2,808.65

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "Y-D"

PAYROLL

	Date	Check No.	Total
Elena Alonso			
Ana Villarreal			
Enrique Villarreal			
Total Payroll			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-D"

NOMINA

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Elena Alonso	8-8	95	$ 100.00
Ana Villarreal	8-8	96	100.00
Enrique Villarreal	8-8	97	300.00
Total Nomina			$ 500.00

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-E"

TRIPS

	Date	Check No.	Total
MANUEL ARTIME:			
Trip to New York			
MANUEL A. VARONA:			
Trip to New York and Washington			
MISCELLANEOUS:			
Various Passages Relating to Navy			
Expenses Delegation Trip Miami - Mexico			
Trip to Cuba by Emissary			
Rumbaut Trip to Buenos Aires			
Three Trips to Key West Boat of J. Prado			
J. A. Pujol - Trip New York and Washington			
I. Rodriguez - Trip Miami-New York-Miami			
E. Llaca - Trip Miami-New York-Miami			
Advance (to) Rumbaut - Trip to Washington			
H. Medrano - Trip to New York			
A. J. Pinera - Trip to Argentina			
L. Fernandez - Trip New York			
J. Rodriguez - Traveling Expenses			
E. Aguero and G. Mora - Trip to New York			
Trip to Costa Rica by 4 Persons			
Trip to Lima - 5 newspapermen			
Total Trips			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-E"

VIAJES

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
MANUEL ARTIME:			
Viaje a New York	8-11	114	$ 100.00
MANUEL A. VARONA:			
Viaje a New York y Washington	8-11	112	$ 149.31
VARIOS:			
Varios Pasajes Relacionados con la Marina	8-8	82	$ 160.00
Gastos Delegacion Viaje Miami - Mexico	8-8	82	125.00
Viaje a Cuba de un Emisario	8-8	83	55.00
Viaje Rumbaut a Buenos Aires	8-8	89	750.00
Tres Viajes a Key West Barco de J. Prado	8-8	93	382.00
J. A. Pujol - Viaje New York y Washington	8-11	112	149.31
I. Rodriguez - Viaje Miami-New York-Miami	8-11	112	125.85
E. Llaca - Viaje Miami-New York-Miami	8-11	112	125.85
Anticipo Rumbaut - Viaje a Washington	8-11	117	21.75
H. Medrano - Viaje a New York	8-11	119	133.49
A. J. Pinera - Viaje Argentina	8-11	123	784.40
L. Fernandez - Viaje New York	8-12	126	130.00
J. Rodriguez - Gastos Viaje	8-12	126	70.00
E. Aguero y G. Mora - Viaje a New York	8-12	129	444.00
Viaje a Costa Rica de 4 Personas	8-12	131	1,380.00
Viaje a Lima - Cinco Periodistas	8-12	132	2,203.00
			$ 7,039.65
Total Viajes			$ 7,288.96

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-F"

SUSTENANCE AND RENTS

	Date	Check No.	Total
RENTS:			
Office 1001 Congress Building			
Various Rents			
Various Rents			
Various Rents			
L. Morffi House			
House 1128 SW 19 Ave.			
House 245 Alcazar, C. Gables			
Various Rents and Food			
Various Rents			
Office Congress Building			
Various Rents			
Various Rents			
Various Rents			
ALLOWANCES AND OTHER EXPENSES:			
Expenses F.R.D. House			
Electricity 914 NW 12 St.			
Allowances Various Persons			
Various Allowances and Expenses			
Allowances Various Persons			
Equipment for Military Office			
Various Allowances			
Various Expenses			
Allowances Captain Ferrer			
Allowances E. Ros			
Allowances S. Miranda			
Allowances E. Trespalacios			
Allowances R. Rumbaut			
Allowances J. Mas			
Allowances O. Guerra			
Allowances H. Corona			
Allowances A. J. Pinera			
Various Expenses			
Food Various Persons			

14-00000

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-F"
Continuation

SUSTENANCE AND RENTS

	Date	Check No.	Total
Allowances and Various Expenses			
Various Expenses			
Allowances Various Persons			
Food and Other Expenses			
Food			
H. Medrano (Allowances)			
A. J. Pinera (Allowances)			
Sustenance Pinera First Month Argentina			
Various Expenses			
Various Allowances and Expenses			
Various Allowances and Expenses			
Allowances Various Recruits			
Expenses Birth Martha del Valle			
Food			
Various Allowances			
Various Allowances			
Various Allowances			
Various Allowances			
Total Sustenance and Rents			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-F"
Continuacion

MANUTENCION Y ALQUILERES

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Dietas y Gastos Varios	8-11	112	$ 533.70
Gastos Varios	8-11	114	123.69
Asignacion Varias Personas	8-11	115	490.00
Comida y Otros Gastos	8-11	116	235.19
Comida	8-11	118	54.55
H. Medrano (Dietas)	8-11	119	100.00
A. J. Pinera (Dietas)	8-11	123	100.00
Mantenimiento Pinera Primer Mes Argentina	8-11	123	300.00
Gastos Varios	8-11	124	526.95
Dietas y Gastos Varios	8-12	126	1,076.06
Dietas y Gastos Varios	8-12	127	247.96
Dietas Varios Reclutas	8-12	133	50.00
Gastos Parto Martha del Valle	8-8	88	200.00
Comidas	8-4	79	2.00
Dietas Varias	8-31	130	40.00
Dietas Varias	8-31	135	176.45
Dietas Varias	8-31	136	85.00
Dietas Varias	8-31	111	700.00
			$ 9,297.45
Total Manutencion y Alquileres			$ 12,252.31

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES
1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-G"

COMMUNICATIONS

	Date	Check No.	Total
POSTAL:			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Post Office Box			
Stamps			
Stamps			
TELEPHONE:			
Long Distance to Atlanta			
Telephone Bill			
TELEGRAPH:			
Cables			
Cables			
Communications Total			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-G"

COMUNICACION

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
CORREOS:			
Sellos	8-2	73	$ 8.94
Sellos	8-4	79	8.05
Sellos	8-8	80	3.00
Sellos	8-8	81	22.31
Sellos	8-8	82	6.91
Sellos	8-8	108	15.35
Sellos	8-11	112	22.13
Apartado	8-11	124	9.00
Sellos	8-12	128	500.00
Sellos	8-31	135	13.63
			$ 609.32
TELEFONOS:			
Larga Distancia a Atlanta	8-8	80	$ 2.40
Cuenta Telefono	8-11	124	86.19
			$ 88.59
TELEGRAFOS:			
Cables	8-8	107	$ 7.93
Cables	8-8	108	9.39
			$ 17.32
Total Comunicacion			$ 715.23

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-H"

STUDENTS' SECTION

	Date	Check No.	Total
Expenses for Opening Office			
Total Students' Section			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-H"

SECCION ESTUDIANTIL

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Gastos de Apertura de la Oficina	8-8	91	$ 915.00
Total Seccion Estudiantil			$ 915.00

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES
1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-I"

COMMISSIONS AND DELEGATIONS

	Date	**Check No.**	**Total**
Mexico Delegation			
Labor Commission			
Legal Commission			
Total Commissions and Delegations			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-I"

COMISIONES Y DELEGACIONES

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Delegacion de Mexico	8-8	82	$ 201.20
Comision Obrera	8-8	83	100.00
Comision Juridica	8-8	88	600.00
Total Comisiones y Delegaciones			$ 901.20

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES
1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-J"

MISCELLANEOUS.

	Date	Check No.	Total
Expenses Coordination of M.R.R. in Exile			
S. Aldereguia Transfer in Curazao			
Coordination Section Expenses (Luis Bueno)			
Extension Visas (Lopez-Cubenas-Hernandez)			
Various Expenses Not Classified			
Total Miscellaneous (Expenses)			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-J"

VARIOS

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Gastos Coordinacion del M. R. R. en el Exilio	8-11	114	$ 500.00
Transferencia S. Aldereguia en Curazao	8-11	114	206.30
Gastos Seccion Coordinacion (Luis Bueno)	8-11	114	200.00
Prorroga Visas (Lopez - Cubenas - Hernandez)	8-11	118	30.00
Varios Gastos sin Clasificar	8-11	124	396.19
Total Varios			$ 1,332.49

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-K"

CHECKS TO BE JUSTIFIED

	Date	Check No.	Total
Francisco Carrillo			
R. Otero Borlaff			
Jose I. Rasco			
Manuel Artime			
Juan Paula			
Aureliano Sanchez Arango			
Total Checks to be Justified			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-K"

CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Francisco Carrillo	8-8	92	$ 1,000.00
R. Otero Borlaff	8-8	98	2,800.00
Jose I. Rasco	8-11	109	3,970.00
Manuel Artime	8-11	110	3,060.00
Juan Paula	8-11	120	400.00
Aureliano Sanchez Arango	8-15	134	1,500.00
Total Checks a Justificar			$ 12,730.00

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

SUMMARY OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OPERATIONS

In Statement "I", which is attached, appears an analysis of the receipts and expenditures for the period 1 to 31 August 1960, in which proceeding from the bank balance on 1 August, plus the deposits made to the "RASCO AND PAULA" account in the Florida National Bank and Trust Company, less the expenditures for the period ($41,261.45), we arrive at cash available in the bank on 31 August 1960 amounting to $89.54.

ASSETS (ATTACHMENT "I-A")

The assets acquired during the period 1 to 31 August are listed in Attachment "I-A" and are classified in three groups: Deposits ($142.50), which corresponds to funds resulting from (deposits for) electricity, telephone, gas, and renting of some of the houses used by the Front; Office Equipment ($142.61); and Rolling Stock ($1,140.11) which includes the acquisition of two automobiles, one at the service of the Women's Section and the other at the service of Mr. Roberto Varona.

PROPAGANDA (ATTACHMENT "I-B")

Expenditures resulting from propaganda for this period have been classified as Radio ($280.00) corresponding to the program broadcast over station MWET (sic) (Possibly: WMET) and Miscellaneous ($394.75) in which all minor propaganda expenses have been grouped.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL EXPENSES (ATTACHMENT "I-C")

The total for Administrative and General Expenses for the month ($2,808.65) includes the office supplies used and other expenses which have been classified under the title of miscellaneous expenses and which include several entries discussed below:

Expenses (for) Settling in Miami (E. Huertas) ($500.00) and Printing (Pedro Leyva) ($350.00): These two entries are part of the total of check # 111 issued in the name of Dr. Justo Carrillo for $1,550.00.

Installation Miami Delegation Office ($250.00): Expenses incurred in the installation of the Delegation's Office in Suite No. 1105 of the Congress Building.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

RESUMEN DE LAS OPERACIONES DE INGRESOS Y EGRESOS

En el Estado "I" que se acompaña se muestra un analisis de los ingresos y egresos tenidos durante el periodo de Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960, en el que partiendo del Saldo en Banco en Agosto 1, mas los depositos hechos en la cuenta "RASCO AND PAULA" de "The Florida National Bank and Trust Company", menos los egresos incurridos durante este periodo ($41,261.45), obtenemos el efectivo disponible en Banco en Agosto 31 de 1960, y que asciende a $89.54.

ACTIVOS (ANEXO "I-A")

Los activos adquiridos durante este periodo de Agosto 1 al 31, aparecen relacionados en el Anexo "I-A" y clasificados en tres grupos: Depositos ($ = 142.50), que corresponde a los fondos por concepto de electricidad, telefono, gas y alquiler de algunas de las casas al servicio del Frente; Equipo de Oficina ($142.61) y Equipo Rodante ($1,140.31), que incluye la adquisicion de dos autos, uno al servicio de la Seccion Femenina y otro al servicio del Sr. Roberto Varona.

PROPAGANDA (ANEXO "I-B")

Los egresos por concepto de propaganda incurridos en el periodo se han clasificado en Radial ($280.00), que corresponde al programa que se radia a traves de la Emisora M W E T y Varios ($394.75) en el que se han agrupado todos aquellos gastos menores por concepto de propaganda.

GASTOS DE ADMINISTRACION Y GENERALES (ANEXO "I-C")

El total de gastos de Administracion y Generales incurridos en el mes ($2,808.65) incluye los efectos de escritorio consumidos y otros gastos que se han clasificado bajo la denominacion de Varios y que incluye algunas partidas que se comentan a continuacion:

Gastos Instalacion Miami (E. Huertas) ($500.00) e Impresos (Pedro Leyva) ($350.00): Estas dos partidas forman parte del total del check No. 111 que se extendio a nombre del Dr. Justo Carrillo por $1,550.00.

Instalacion Oficina Delegacion Miami ($250.00): Gastos incurridos en la instalacion de la Oficina de la Delegacion en el Departamento No. 1105 del Congress Building.

-Continua-

Continuation

PAYROLL (ATTACHMENT "I-D")

The payroll for the month of August only includes Enrique Villarreal, Ana Villarreal and Elena Alonso.

TRIPS (ATTACHMENT "I-E")

Trips have been grouped, with those made by the executives of the Front being considered independently, and in a general manner, under the title of miscellaneous (traveling expenses), such as they appear in Attachment "I-E", all other traveling expenses. Traveling expenses corresponding to checks 89,123, 129, 131 and 132 have no other justification except the duly signed receipts, but not the vouchers justifying the manner in which the expenses were incurred in each case.

SUSTENANCE AND RENTS (ATTACHMENT "I-F")

These expenses are classified in two groups in Attachment "I-F": Rents ($2,954.86) and Allowances and Other Expenses ($9,297.45). Many of the rents do not have the corresponding receipt but they do have a receipt signed by the person who it is supposed received the money to pay these rents as can be seen in the files of receipts, invoices, etc.

The vouchers for allowances, food (meals), etc., are not presented as clearly as they should have been with regard to clarity and the organization of the same; however, instructions have been issued for the purpose of obtaining a better presentation of the same. Check # 82 includes two entries of $300.00 each, the receipts of which are in the names of Messrs. Roberto Varona and Rolando Rojas as well as another entry of $125.00 in the name of the latter. The receipts are not signed and these gentlemen are out of the country.

COMMUNICATIONS (ATTACHMENT "I-G")

Of the $715.23 total for the communications expenditures, there is an entry of $500.00 corresponding to check # 128 which represents the shipment of 5,000 copies of the newspaper Lucha to Cuba.

STUDENTS' SECTION (ATTACHMENT "I-H")

This total of $915.00 corresponds to check # 91 given in the name of Jorge Mas, with its receipt duly signed, and the list of the expenses incurred and to cover them was presented and signed by the persons in charge of that section, although they did not submit the receipts, invoices, etc. It is supposed that these are in their possession since they must have their own accounting for the purposes of the corresponding control.

-Continuacion-

NOMINA (ANEXO "I-D")

La nomina del mes de Agosto solamente incluye a los senores Enrique Villarreal, Ana Villarreal y Elena Alonso.

VIAJES (ANEXO "I-E")

Los viajes se han agrupado, considerando independientemente aquellos incurridos por los Ejecutivos del Frente, y en forma global, bajo el concepto de Varios, todos los otros gastos de Viajes, tal como aparecen en el Anexo "I-E". Los gastos de viajes correspondientes a los Checks Nos. 89, 123, 129, 131 y 132 no tienen mas justificacion que los recibos debidamente firmados, pero sin los comprobantes que justifiquen la forma en que se incurrieron los gastos en cada caso.

MANUTENCION Y ALQUILERES (ANEXO "I-F")

Estos gastos aparecen clasificados en el Anexo "I-F" en dos grupos: Alquileres ($2,954.86) y Dietas y Otros Gastos ($9,297.45). Muchos de los alquileres cargados no tienen el recibo correspondiente, pero si un recibo firmado por la persona que se supone recibio el dinero para hacer los pagos de esos alquileres, segun puede verse en los files de recibos, facturas, etc.

Los comprobantes de dietas, comidas, etc. no estan lo debidamente bien presentados, en cuanto a la claridad y organizacion de los mismos, pero ya se han dado las instrucciones a los efectos de conseguir una mejor presentacion de los mismos. El Check No. 82 incluye dos partidas de $300.00 cada una, cuyos recibos, a nombre de los senores Roberto Varona y Rolando Rojas, asi como otra de $125.00 a nombre de este ultimo no estan firmados, y esos senores se encuentran fuera del pais.

COMUNICACION (ANEXO "I-G")

Del total de $715.23 que importa el desembolso por concepto de Comunicacion, hay una partida de $500.00 que corresponde al Check No. 128 que representa el franqueo a Cuba de 5,000 ejemplares del Periodico "Lucha".

SECCION ESTUDIANTIL (ANEXO "I-H")

Este total de $915.00 corresponde al Check No. 91 que se extendio a nombre de Jorge Mas, con su recibo debidamente firmado, y fue presentada la relacion de los gastos incurridos hasta cubrir esa cantidad, firmadas por los responsables de esa Seccion, aunque no presentaron los recibos, facturas, etc., suponiendo que obren en su poder, ya que ellos deben llevar su contabilidad a los efectos del correspondiente control.

-Continua-

Continuation.

COMMISSIONS OR DELEGATIONS (ATTACHMENT "I-I")

During the month three checks were issued for the following:

a. Part of check # 82 in the name of Manuel A. Varona for $1,917.68 of which $200.00, plus the money order fee of $1.20, was sent to the Mexico Delegation.

b. Part of check # 83 in the name of Manuel A. Varona for $928.43 of which $100.00 was delivered to Mr. R. Otero Borlaff for the Labor Commission.

c. The total of check # 88 for $600.00 in the name of Mr. Jose M. Hernandez for the expenses of the Labor Commission, I mean to say, the Legal Commission.

MISCELLANEOUS (ATTACHMENT "I-J")

All entries concerning those expenses which, because of their nature, cannot easily be classified specifically within the previous classifications have been grouped under this title. Their total amount is $1,332.49 and this total is analyzed in Attachment "I-J".

CHECKS TO BE JUSTIFIED (ATTACHMENT "I-K")

Under this title are grouped all those checks issued during the month for which the expenses incurred for each of them had not been justified on 31 August. The receipts are signed and as soon as the justifications of the same are received, these expenses will be classified and submitted immediately.

GENERAL

In compliance with the instructions received, we have attempted to render a report on the operations for the month of August which will agree as much as possible with the needs required and which will include the greatest amount of information possible for the purpose of having a quick and precise understanding of the month's operations.

Together with this report we are sending, as we have been requested to do, all vouchers in correlative order following the numbering of the checks issued. Due to certain confusion regarding the submission of receipts, invoices, etc., which has already been overcome since precise instructions have been issued, we have had some difficulties in the perfect classification of expenditures.

-Continuacion-

COMISIONES O DELEGACIONES (ANEXO "I-I")

Se extendieron durante el mes tres Checks que corresponden a lo siguiente:

a) Parte del Check No. 82 a nombre de Manuel A. Varona, por $1,917.68, del que se enviaron a la Delegacion de Mexico $200.00 mas los gastos del giro que ascendieron a $1.20.

b) Parte del Check No. 83 a nombre de Manuel A. Varona, por $928.43 del que se tomaron $100.00 que fueron entregados al Sr. R. Otero Berlaff para la Comision Obrera.

c) Total del Check No. 88 por $600.00 a nombre del Sr. Jose M. Hernandez para atender gastos de la Comision Obrera, digo, Juridica.

VARIOS (ANEXO "I-J")

Bajo este concepto se han agrupado aquellas partidas de gastos que por su naturaleza no ha sido facil clasificarlas especificamente dentro de las clasificaciones anteriores. Su importe total asciende a $1,332.49, y en el Anexo "I-J" aparece analizado este total.

CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR (ANEXO "I-K")

Bajo esta denominacion se han clasificado aquell-os checks extendidos durante el mes, y que aun en Agosto 31 no se habian justificado los gastos incurridos con cargo a cada uno de ellos. Los recibos estan firmados, y tan pronto se reciban los justificantes de los mismos, dichos gastos seran clasificados y elevados inmediatamente.

GENERAL

Hemos tratado, cumpliendo las instrucciones recibidas, de rendir un informe de las operaciones del mes de Agosto, que se ajuste lo mas posible a las necesidades requeridas, y que abarque la mayor cantidad posible de informacion a los efectos de tener un enfoque rapido y preciso de las operaciones del mes.

Tal como se nos ha pedido, estamos enviando, conjuntamente con este informe todos los comprobantes, por orden correlativo, siguiendo la numeracion de los Checks extendidos. Debido a cierta desorganizacion en cuanto a la presentacion de los recibos, facturas, etc., que ya se esta superando, pues se han dado instrucciones precisas, hemos tenido dificultades para la perfecta clasificacion de los egresos.

De la revision de los mencionados comprobantes podran observarse ciertas anormalidades, mas bien en la forma que en el fondo. Por ejemplo, el Check No. 124 no ha sido justificado con los recibos, facturas, etc. correspondientes, si no con una relacion de gastos que aparece firmada por el Sr. Manuel Artime. El Check No. 126 tiene los comprobantes justificativos, pero en algunos casos no aparecen firmados por las personas que recibieron las cantidades consignadas y si por el Sr. Jose Arriola. Tambien se dieron instrucciones para evitar esto en el futuro.

-Continua-

Continuation

In reviewing the above-mentioned vouchers one can observe certain irregularities more in form than in funds. For example, check # 124 has not been justified with the corresponding receipts, invoices, etc., but with a list of expenses signed by Mr. Manuel Artime. Check # 126 does have the justifying receipts, but in some cases they are not signed by the persons who received the amounts consigned but were signed by Mr. Jose Arriola. Instructions were also issued to prevent this in the future.

Included in the receipts files are the bank deposit slips which correspond to all amounts deposited during the month of August to the "RASCO AND PAULA" account in the Florida National Bank and Trust Company.

-Continuacion-

Se incluyen en los Files de Comprobantes, los Slips de Depositos del Banco que responden a todas las cantidades depositadas durante el mes de Agosto en la cuenta "RASCO AND PAULA" del "The Florida National Bank and Trust Company".

-0-

14-00000

A-3

1-30 September 1960

[illegible]

GASCO - PAULA

TRANSLATION

Miami, 6 October 1960

Executives
Democratic Revolutionary Front

Dear Sirs:

Attached herewith we are submitting the REPORT corresponding to the month of September of the current year which contains the following:

Statement "I":	Statement of Receipts and Expenditures
-	Bank Conciliation
Attachment "I-A":	Assets
Attachment "I-B":	Propaganda
Attachment "I-C":	Administrative and General Expenses
Attachment "I-D":	Payroll
Attachment "I-E":	Trips
Attachment "I-F":	Sustenance and Rents
Attachment "I-G":	Communications
Attachment "I-H":	Students' Section
Attachment "I-I":	Commissions or Delegations
Attachment "I-J":	Checks to be Justified
-	Summary of Receipts and Expenditures Operations
Statement "II":	Liquidation of Checks to be Justified

Attentively,

(signed) (signed)
CP.* Juan Paula CP.* Mario Girbau

---

*Public accountant

Miami, Octubre 6 de 1960

Señores Ejecutivos
Frente Revolucionario Democrático

Señores:

Adjunto les estamos remitiendo el INFORME correspondiente al mes de Septiembre del corriente año, el cual contiene lo siguiente:

Estado "I": Estado de Ingresos y Egresos
- Conciliacion Bancaria
Anexo "I-A": Activos
Anexo "I-B": Propaganda
Anexo "I-C": Gastos de Administración y Generales
Anexo "I-D": Nomina.
Anexo "I-E": Viajes
Anexo "I-F": Manutención y Alquileres
Anexo "I-G": Comunicacion
Anexo "I-H": Seccion Estudiantil
Anexo "I-I": Comisiones o Delegaciones
Anexo "I-J": Checks a Justificar
- Resumen de las Operaciones de Ingresos y Egresos
Estado "II": Liquidación de checks a justificar

De Ustedes atentamente,

CP. Juan Paula CP. Mario Girbau

MG:amr.

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 30 September 1960

STATEMENT "I"

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES

RECEIPTS:

Balance in Bank (9-1-1960)

Deposits:

6 September
6 September
8 September
14 September
16 September

Total Receipts

EXPENDITURES:

Attachment "I-A":	Assets
Attachment "I-B":	Propaganda
Attachment "I-C":	Administrative and General Expenses
Attachment "I-D":	Payroll
Attachment "I-E":	Trips
Attachment "I-F":	Sustenance and Rents
Attachment "I-G":	Communications
Attachment "I-H":	Students' Section
Attachment "I-I":	Commissions or Delegations
Attachment "I-J":	Checks to be Justified

Plus: Bank Charges:

Debit Memos

Total Cash Available in Bank on 9-30-1960

(1) In Statement "I" in the August report a total of cash available in bank was shown as $89.54 because according to a clarification given in the bank conciliation, check # 74 in the amount of $24.00, which was made void, had been considered as pending and increased the Cash Available in Bank to $113.54 which is correct.

ad for H.F.S.

ORIG : H.F.SWENSON:sm
UNIT : TFW/SA
EXT : 7287
DATE : 14 JANUARY 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO : SAN JOSE (INFO) JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH 7, S/C

09 z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO SJOS INFO WAVE CITE DIR 10303

for AMBUD file

GYROSE

REF: A. SJOS 5487 NOT SENT WAVE (IN 48782)
B. SJOS 5486 NOT SENT WAVE (IN 48778)

1. PBRUMEN EXILES MIAMI DRAFTED TWO POLICE PROPOSALS NEITHER OF WHICH REALISTIC AND NEITHER DISCUSSED OFFICIALLY WITH KUBARK. ORGANIZATION OF STANDBY PBRUMEN SECURITY FORCES IMPORTANT BUT NOT URGENT UNTIL MATTER DISCUSSED OFFICIALLY AND FEASIBLE PLANS MADE. THEREFORE DO NOT WISH ENCOURAGE FURTHER PLANS WHICH MAY COMPLICATE ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT AND BURN ASSETS.

2. DESPITE ABOVE HQS INTERESTED ASSESSING POTENTIAL ANY ASSET IN PBRUMEN FOR INFO COLLECTION. REQUEST SJOS ADVISE DETAILS IDEN REF B ACCESS TO PEOPLE OR DATA OF OPS OR INTEL VALUE, HIS SECURITY, COMMO AND TENTATIVE CONTACT PLAN.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WH/3/COSTA RICA

C/WH/3

J.C.KING
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

14-6

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

E.A.MARELIUS
C/TFW/FI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : H.P.SWENSON:sm
UNIT : TFW/SA
EXT : 7287
DATE : 14 JANUARY 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : TFW 10
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH 7, S/C

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 10804

REF: DIR 10803

IDEN REF B MANUEL PEREZ BORROTO EX-BATISTA POLICE CAPTAIN NOW CIENFUEGOS.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WH/3/COSTA RICA
for C/WH/3

J.C.KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

14-6

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

E.A.MARELIUS
C/TFW/FI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS FOR EXPENSES OUT OF THE $81,500.00 Budget

INFORM

JULY 1 TO 31, 1962.

ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS FOR EXPENSES OUT OF THE $81,500.00 budget for the month of JULY,1962

Annex	"I"	:	Delegations (Special)	$ 5,400.00
Annex	"II"	:	Propaganda	20,000.00
Annex	"III"	:	Clandestineness	25,000.00
Annex	"IV"	:	Judicatura Cubana Democrática	5,000.00
			Total Deposits:	$ 55,400.00

nn.

DELEGATIONS (Special)

July 31, 1962.

Annex "I"

Balance on July 1, 1962.	$ 4,104.11
Deposit (For July)	5,400.00
	9,504.11
July Expenses (See Annex "I-A")	5,368.23
Balance on July 31, 1962.	$ 4,135.88

NOTE: The July 26, deposit will be considered in August Report.

nn.

DELEGATIONS (Budget) SPECIAL

Annex "I-A"

DATE		CHECK NO.	IMPORT	TOTAL
July 3	Delegation of Brazil -expenses in June-	10698	$ 150.00	
" 6	Delegation of Mexico -expenses in June- (to justify)	10712	150.00	
" 6	Delegation of Costa Rica -expenses in June- (to justify)	10713	175.00	
" 6	Delegation of Panama -expenses in June-	10714	174.98	
" 10	Dr. Luis Botifoll -Fare Miami-New York-Miami-	10731	124.30	
" 10	Delegation of Mexico -expenses in June- (To justify July)	10738	800.00	
" 10	Delegation of Honduras -expenses in July to justify-	10740	175.00	
" 10	Delegation of Perú -expenses in July to justify-	10741	250.00	
" 10	Delegation of Brazil -expenses in July to justify-	10742	150.00	
" 10	Delegation of Guatemala -expenses in July to justify-	10743	175.00	
" 10	Delegation of Bolivia -expenses in July to justify-	10744	125.00	
" 10	Delegation of Colombia -expenses in July to justify-	10745	300.00	
" 10	Delegation of Santo Domingo -expenses in July to justify-	10746	100.00	
" 10	Delegation of Ecuador -expenses in July to justify-	10747	150.00	
" 10	Dr. Maximo Sorondo -Fare Miami-Sto. Domingo-Miami-	10753	121.95	
" 14	Dr. Manuel Braña -travel expenses to Caracas- (to justify)	10769	200.00	
" 14	Frank Díaz Silveira -travel expenses to Jamaica- (to justify)	10771	100.00	
" 14	José Valle Sotolongo -travel expenses to Chile-(to justify)	10772	100.00	
" 14	José Julio Fernández -travel expenses to Panamá- (to justify)	10773	100.00	
" 17	Francisco J. Ruíz Benítez -Fare Costa Rica-Miami-Costa Rica- (to justify)	10786	151.00	
" 18	Juan Morenza -expenses in a travel México-Miami-	10788	85.00	
" 19	Miguel de León -Fare Miami-Managua-Miami-	10791	168.00	
" 19	Pedro Aponte -Fare Miami-Bogotá-Miami-	10791	180.00	
" 21	José Julio Fernández -Fare Miami-Panamá-Miami-	10801	171.00	

(Continue on page No.2)

DELEGATIONS (SPECIAL)

Annex "I-A"
Page No.2

DATE		CHECK NO.	IMPORT	TOTAL
July 21	José Alonso Argüelles -Fare Miami-Tegucigalpa-Miami-	10801	$ 166.00	
" 24	Carlos Cibrian -postage stamps to deliver packets- (to justify)	10809	60.00	
" 25	Telephone: FR-4-0884 -Dr. Botifoll's services-	10819	188.72	
" 25	Dr. José I. Rasco -Fare to South América- (Uruguay, etc.)	10835	548.00	
" 30	Dr. Néstor Carbonell -Fare Miami-Washington-New York-Miami- Check No.10288 credited in difference.	10842	27.28	$ 5,368.23
	TOTAL:-			$ 5,368.23

nn.

PROPAGANDA

July 31, 1962

Annex "II"

Balance on July 1, 1962.	$ 3,827.39
Deposit (For July)	20,000.00
	$ 23,827.39
July Expenses (See Annex "II-A")	20,537.13
Balance on July 31, 1962.	$ 3,290.26

NOTE: The July 26, deposit will be considered in August Report.

nn.

PROPAGANDA

Annex "II-A"

DATE		CHECK NO.		TOTAL
July 1	Budget Expenses	10630	$ 14,530.70	$ 14,530.70
	UNDERGROUND LEAVE			
July 23	Stamps for "Cuba en pie de Guerra"	10802	650.00	
" 23	To buy a used car	10803	300.00	
" 23	Impression of 50,000 suplement and underground leave	10804	1,622.25	
" 23	Material for "Cuba en pie de Guerra"	10805	160.00	
" 24	Material, stamps, etc.,	10810	192.88	
" 27	Material, stamps, etc.	10831	800.00	
" 30	Printed material	10844	90.43	3,815.56
	TRAVELS:			
July 2	Angel Cofiño -Fare Miami-New York-Berlin-New York-Miami-	10679	$ 704.62	
" 2	Pascasio Lineras -Fare Miami-New York-Berlin-New York-Miami-	10679	704.62	
" 10	Dr. José Morell Romero -Fare to Central America-	10732	171.00	
" 10	Dr. Gustavo Ribeaux -Fare to Central America-	10732	171.00	
" 10	Dr. José Morell Romero -travel expenses to Central America-	10733	380.00	
" 10	Dr. Gustavo Ribeaux -travel expenses to Central America-	10734	380.00	2,511.24
	RADIO:			
July 6	Roberto Espin -radio program weekly-	10718	$ 50.00	
" 12	Roberto Espin -radio program weekly-	10763	50.00	
" 12	Roberto Espin -radio program weekly-	10764	50.00	
" 12	Roberto Espin -radio program weekly-	10765	50.00	
" 16	W.R.U.L. Program (July 9 to August 8)	10780	1,099.75	1,299.75
				$ 22,157.25
July 31	LESS: Reimbursment			1,620.12
	Total:-			$ 20,537.13

NOTE: The $14,530.70 Budget Expenses correspond:

Review:	$13,175.90
Gral. Exp:	544.80
Delg. Exp:	310.00
	$14,530.70

CLANDESTINENESS

July 31, 1962

Annex "III"

Balance on July 1, 1962.	$ 33,500.00
Deposit (For July)	25,000.00
	$ 58,500.00
July Expenses (See Annex "III-A")	19,000.00
Balance on July 31, 1962.	$ 39,500.00

NOTE: The July 26, deposit will be considered in August Report.
This balance of $39,500.00 is due to the fact that amounts are not given to the - Organizations until they have justified the amounts previously handled to them.

nn.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
CLANDESTINENESS
JULY 1 TO 31, 1962.

Annex "I-T"

DATE			CHECK NO.	TOTAL
July	3	José Fernández Badué -M.D.C.- (July,1962)	10707	$ 4,000.00
"	10	Orlando Rodríguez -30 de Noviembre- (May,1962)	10757	4,000.00
"	12	Ricardo Lorie (July, 1962)	10766	1,000.00
"	14	Raúl Méndez Pérez -Rescate- (June, 1962)	10774	4,000.00
"	18	Pascasio Lineras (April, 1962)	10790	1,000.00
"	21	Orlando Rodríguez -30 de Noviembre- (June,62)	10812	4,000.00
"	21	Gerardo Quesada -A.R.D.- (July, 1962)	10813	1,000.00
			TOTAL:-	$ 19,000.00

nn.

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA

July 31, 1962.

Annex "IV"

Balance on July 1, 1962.	$ -0-
Deposit (For July)	5,000.00
	$ 5,000.00
July Expenses (See Annex "IV-A")	5,000.00
Balance on July 31, 1962.	$ -0-

NOTE: The July 26 deposit will be considered in August Report.

nn.

14-00000

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA
REPORT
July, 1962.

Annex "IV-A"

Document "A"	Receipt of the amount given by Consejo Revolucionario Cubano to "Judicatura - Cubana Democrática". (Check No.10612)	$ 5,000.00

DISBURSEMENTS:

Document	1 :	Alberto Bages Rojas	$ 147.05	
"	2 :	Jorge Boza Masvidal	147.05	
"	3 :	Francisco Calderin Tostte	147.05	
"	4 :	Antonio M. Campos Cárdenas	147.05	
"	5 :	René Cárdenas Abreu	147.05	
"	6 :	Adolfo G. Cuevas Rodríguez	147.05	
"	7 :	Gustavo Delgado Bacallao	147.05	
"	8 :	Raúl Delgado Poroda	147.05	
"	9 :	Tomás Diego Robbio	147.05	
"	10 :	Agustín Elizondo Sorize	147.05	
"	11 :	Ramiro Fernández Noris	147.05	
"	12 :	Juan A. García Hernández	147.05	
"	13 :	Manuel Hernández Hernández	147.05	
"	14 :	Dolores Herrera Herrera	147.05	
"	15 :	Néstor Hoed de Beche	147.05	
"	16 :	Eduardo Le Riverend Brusone	147.05	
"	17 :	Miguel F. Márquez de la Cerra	147.05	
"	18 :	Clara L. Martí Nodal	147.05	
"	19 :	José Moroll Romero	147.05	
"	20 :	Manuel E. Navas Aguilar	147.05	
"	21 :	Tomas G. Oria Ramos	147.05	
"	22 :	Roberto Ravelo Fiol	147.05	
"	23 :	Zenaida Reyes Reyes	147.05	
"	24 :	Gustavo Ribeaux Figueras	147.05	
"	25 :	Leoncio Rodríguez Esquivel	147.05	
"	26 :	José M. Rodríguez Fernández	147.05	
"	27 :	Angel Segura Bustamante	147.05	
"	28 :	Olga Valdés Acosta	147.05	
"	29 :	Alberto de Córdoba Quesada	147.05	
"	30 :	Elio Nardo Báez	147.05	4,411.50

OTHERS:

Salary to the typist	$ 100.00
Typewriter rent	11.33
Suscription to the Miami Herald	2.17
Suscription to the Miami News	1.95
Transport expenses and others	31.20
Transport expenses and others	26.68
Office Supplies	71.15
Expenses pamphlet	71.33
Stamps	18.30
Office rent	150.00
Telephone	19.03

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA

Annex "IV-A"
Page No.2

OTHERS: (Cont.)

Electricity	$ 31.93	
Collection of the Revolutionary Law	10.00	
Repair to the air conditioned	45.00	$ 274.26
Total:-		$ 5,001.57

NOTE: Amount in excess: $1.57. It was paid by Judicatura Cubana to complete the payments above mentioned.-

nn.

EXPENSES OUT OF THE

$81,500.00 Budget

January, 1962.

I, Juan Paula Báez, Comptroller, hereby certify that the Statement and Annexes enclosed in this Report for the month of January, 1962, that shows Incomes for $59,784.50; Expenses for $43,491.26, and Balance in Bank on January 1st, 1962, $6,412.73 and January 31,1962, $22,705.97, (Propaganda $17,305.97 and Delegation Especial $5,400.00), are to my knowledge - correct.

Juan Paula

Juan Paula Báez.
Comptroller.

Miami, February 22, 1962.

nnc.

ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS FOR EXPENSES OUT OF THE $81,500.00 Budget; for the Month of January, 1962.-

Annex "I"	Propaganda	$ 20,000.00
Annex "II"	Judicatura Cubana Democrática.	5,000.00
Annex "III"	Clandestinaje (Underground)	25,000.00
Annex "IV"	Operación Grieta	4,384.50
Annex "V"	Delegations (Special)	5,400.00
	Total:	$ 59,784.50

PROPAGANDA

Annex "I"

Balance on January 1, 1962.	$ 6,412.73
Deposit (January 5, 1962)	20,000.00
	$ 26,412.73
January Expenses (See Annex "I-A")	9,106.76
Balance on January 31, 1962.	$ 17,305.97

PROPAGANDA

Annex "I-A"

		Revista Cubana Democrática	Check No.		Total
Enero	3	Hugo del Cañal (Colaboración)	7672	$ 25.00	
"	3	Alfonso Luaces (Colaboración)	7673	30.00	
"	18	Entrega final primer número de la Revista.	7787	700.00	
"	18	Servicio gráfico	7788	200.00	
"	26	Envío a Latinoamerica de la Revista	7818	1,131.25	
"	26	Marcos Córdoba (colaboración)	7819	50.00	
" "	26	José Alfredo López (colaboración)	7820	25.00	
"	26	Guillermo Zamalea (colaboración)	7821	25.00	
"	26	Mario García Serra (colaboración)	7822	25.00	
"	26	Vicente Rodríguez (colaboración)	7823	50.00	
"	26	José Pintado(colaboración)	7824	50.00	
"	26	Alberto Arredondo (colaboración)	7825	100.00	
"	26	Alberto Gandero (colaboración)	7826	25.00	
"	26	Julio Salabarría (colaboración)	7827	25.00	
"	26	Lucas Morán (colaboración)	7828	50.00	
"	26	Hugo del Cañal (colaboración)	7830	25.00	
"	26	Servicio Gráfico (colaboración)	7831	200.00	
"	26	ler. pago impresión de la revista.	7832	700.00	
"	26	Transporte revista de la imprenta al lugar. de distribución	7834	50.00	
"	26	Envío a Latinoamérica de la Revista.	7835	364.80	
"	30	Gonzalo Jorrín (colaboración)	7839	50.00	

PROPAGANDA

Annex "I-A"
Page 2.

		Check No.		Total
Enero 31	Sellos envío a latinoamérica la Revista.	7841	$ 680.00	
" 31	Fco. Pérez (colaboración)	7844	50.00	
" 31	Sorgio Piñero (colaboración)	7845	50.00	$ 4,681.05
	GENERALES			
Enero 10	Alquiler	7733	$ 90.00	
" 10	Electricidad	7736	18.22	
" 10	Agua	7737	3.15	
" 10	Teléfono	7738	34.34	
" 12	Varios	7752	50.00	
" 12	Apartado Postal	7753	6.00	
" 29	Alquiler de Febrero	7836	90.00	291.71
	OTROS			
Enero 15	Envío a Latinoamérica del Libro del Dr. Silió	7758	$ 150.00	
" 26	Sellos para enviar a Cuba hoja propaganda.	7833	200.00	
" 31	Hora Radial	7843	400.00	2,550.00
	VIAJES			
Enero 11	Dietas viaje P.del Este -Antonio Collada-	7749	$ 180.00	
" 11	Dietas viaje P.del Este -César Lancís-	7750	180.00	
" 11	Dietas viaje P.del Este -Carlos Rodríguez-	7751	160.00	
" 15	Dietas 14 días viaje P. del Este, Néstor Carbonell	7773	210.00	
" 15	Pasaje a P. del Este. -César Lancís-	7780	568.00	
" 16	Pasaje a P. del Este. -A. Collada-	7785	568.00	
" 19	Pasaje a Montevideo -C. Rodríguez.	7808	548.00	2,584.00
	Total:			$10,106.76

PROPAGANDA

Annex "I-A"
Page 3.

		Total Anterior:	$ 10,106.76
Ene,31,	**Menos:**	Reintegro hecho por el Dr. Conte Agüero por cantidad no gastada, en pago envío hojas para Cuba, check #7833.	1,000.00
		T O T A L:	$ 9,106.76

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA

Annex "II"

Deposit (January 5, 1962)	$	5,000.00
January Expenses (See Annex "II-A")		5,000.00
Balance on January 31, 1962.	$	---o---

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA

INFORME

Febrero, 1962.

Recibido del Consejo Revolucionario para la Judicatura Cubana Democrática, la cantidad de:	$ 5,000.00

DESEMBOLSOS:

Documento	1 :	Alberto G. Bages Rojas	$ 147.05	
"	2 :	Jorge Boza Masvidal	147.05	
"	3 :	Francisco Calderín Teste	147.05	
"	4 :	Antonio M. Campos Cárdenas	147.05	
"	5 :	René Cárdenas Abreus	147.05	
"	6 :	Adolfo G. Cuevas Rdguez.	147.05	
"	7 :	Gustavo Delgado Bacallao	147.05	
"	8 :	Raúl Delgado Pereda	147.05	
"	9 :	Tomás G. Diogo Robbio	147.05	
"	10 :	Agustín Elizondo Serize	147.05	
"	11 :	Luis Espíndola Palacios	147.05	
"	12 :	Ramiro Fernández Moris	147.05	
"	13 :	Juan A. García Hernández	147.05	
"	14 :	Jorge Guerra Romero	147.05	
"	15 :	Manuel Hernández Hernández	147.05	
"	16 :	Dolores Herrera Herrera	147.05	
"	17 :	Néstor Hoed De Beche	147.05	
"	18 :	Eduardo Le Riverand	147.05	
"	19 :	Miguel F. Márquez	147.05	
"	20 :	Clara L. Martí Nodal	147.05	
"	21 :	José Morell Romero	147.05	
"	22 :	Elio Nardo Báez	147.05	
"	23 :	Manuel E. Navas Aguilar	147.05	
"	24 :	Tomás G. Oria Ramos	147.05	
"	25 :	Inés M. Puig Sánchez	147.05	
"	26 :	Roberto M. Ravelo Fiol	147.05	
"	27 :	Zenaida Reyes Reyes	147.05	
"	28 :	Gustavo de Ribeaux Figueras	147.05	
"	29 :	Fernando A. Roa Uriarte	147.05	
"	30 :	Leoncio Rodríguez Esquivel	147.05	
"	31 :	José M. Rodríguez	147.05	
"	32 :	Angel Segura Bustamante	147.05	
"	33 :	Olga Valdés Acosta	147.05	
"	34 :	Alberto de Córdova Quesada	147.05	$4,999.70

Superávit de Febrero:	$ 0.30

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA
276 N. E. 25th STREET
MIAMI, FLORIDA

TEL.
37-4-5256

Comite Ejecutivo
Presidente:
Dr. J. Morell Romero
Vice Presidentes:
Dr. G. Ribeaux Figueras
Dr. F. A. Roa Uriarte
Secretaria:
Dra. C. L. Marti Nodal
Vice Secretario:
Dr. R. Delgado Pereda
Tesorero:
Dr. G. Delgado Bacallao
Vice Tesorero:
Dr. R. Fernandez Morin

Asociados

Pdte. del Tribunal Supremo
E. Menendez Menendez
Magistrados del Tribunal Supremo
J. Morell Romero
M. F. Manrara de la Cerra
A. F. Silio Gutierrez
E. Le Riverend Brusone
Presidente de Audiencia
M. Hernandez Hernandez
Presidente de Sala de Audiencia
F. A. Roa Uriarte
Magistrados de Audiencia
A. M. Campos Cardenas
L. Espinosa Palacios
R. Ravelo Vidal
Jueces:
A. Baeza Rojas
J. Boza Masvidal
F. Calderin Toste
H. Cardenas Abreu
A. G. Cuevas Rodriguez
G. Delgado Bacallao
R. Delgado Pereda
T. Diego Rubio
A. Elizondo Ibarra
R. Fernandez Moris
J. A. Garcia Hernandez
D. Herrera Herrera
N. Hurd De Beche Perdomo
C. L. Marti Nodal
I. M. Puig Sanchez
M. Navas Aguilar
T. G. Orsa Ramos
Z. Reyes Reyes
G. Ribeaux Figueras
L. Rodriguez Esquivel
J. M. Rodriguez Fernandez
O. Valdes Acosta
Fiscales:
A. Segura Bustamante
M. A. Falcon Morejon
J. Guerra Romero
E. Nardo Baez

Febrero 19 de 1962.

Sres. Paula y Sosa,
Miami. Fla.
(Por conducto del Dr. José Alvarez Díaz)

Estimados amigos:

Con fecha primero del corriente mes nos fué entregada la cantidad de $5.000.00 dollares (cinco--mil dollares), y de acuerdo con lo solicitado por ustedes, me es muy grato justificar el empleo de dicha suma con los recibos correspondientes que por duplicado se acompañan.

Cantidad recibida	$ 5.000.00
34 entregas a $147.05.....................	$ 4.999.70
Diferencia......$	0.30

Les ruego el acuse de recibo.

Quedo de Uds. muy atentamente,

Dr. Gustavo Delgado Bacallao
Tesorero.

ADJUNTOS: 34 recibos por duplica-do.

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05   Miami, Febrero 5 de 1962.

ORIGINAL

Albert Bages

Alberto C. Bages Rojas

①

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Leoncio Rodriguez Esquivel

30

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

José M. Rodríguez Fernández

31

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Rafael Segura Bustamante.

32

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos- importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Olga Valdés Acosta

33

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática" la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente mes.

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

DUPLICADO

Alberto de Cordova Quesada

34

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Jorge Boza Masvidal

(2)

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Francisco Calderin Tosta

3

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.---

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 8 1962

ORIGINAL

Antonio L.Campos Cárdenas

④

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente mes.

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

René Cárdenas Abreus

5

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Adolfo G.Cuevas Rodriguez

⑥

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Gustavo D[illegible] Bacallao

⑦

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Raúl Delgado Pereda

8

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollars cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Tomas C.Diego Robbio

⑨

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Agustín Elizondo Sorize

(10)

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática" la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares 5 centavos. importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente mes.

SON $147.05 Miami, 5 de Febrero de 1962.

~~DUPLICADO~~
ORIGINAL

Luis Espíndola Palacios

HAGO CONSTAR: Que con fecha 8 de Febrero de 1962 se remitió al Dr. Luis Espíndola Paladios, la cantidad relacionada.

Gustavo Delgado Bacallao,
Tesorero

11

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Ramiro Fernandez [illegible]

12

14-00000

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dolleres cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05

FEB 5 1962

Miami, 2-5-62

ORIGINAL

Juan A. Garcia Fernandez

13

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete collares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Jorge [illegible]rra Negro

14

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Manuel [illegible]rnández [illegible]rnández

15

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Dolores Herrera Herrera

16

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Nestor Hoed De Beche y Perdomo

⑰

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos. importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Eduardo Le Riverend Brusone

18

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente mes.

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962.

ORIGINAL

Miguel F. Márquez de la Cerra

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Clara L. Marti Nodal

20

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

José ~~Rosell [illegible]~~

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Elio Pardo

Elio Pardo Paez

22

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Manuel S.Navas Aguilar

23

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Tomás G. Cria Ramos

24

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Ines M. Ruiz Sánchez

25

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Roberto [illegible]. Navelo Fiol

26

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos. importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Dra. Zenaida Reyes.

Zenaida [illegible] Reyes

27

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Gustavo de Ribeaux Figueras

28

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares 5 centavos----- importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05   Miami, Febrero 9 de 1962.

ORIGINAL

Fernando A. Roa Uriarte

29

HAGO CONSTAR que con fecha Febrero 8 de 1962, se remitió al Dr. Fernando Arsenio Roa Uriarte, la cantidad relacionada.-

Gustavo Delgado Bacallao
Tesorero.

UNDERGROUND

Annex "III"

Deposit (January 5, 1962)	$ 25,000.00
January Expenses (See Annex III-A)	25,000.00
Balance on January 31, 1962	$ ---o---

CLANDESTINAJE.

" Annex III-A"

Enero 1, 1962:

	Check No.	Total
Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano	7763	$ 4,000.00
Movimiento Recuperación Revolucionaria	7764	4,000.00
Movimiento Rescate Democrático	7765	4,000.00
Movimiento 30 de Noviembre	7766	4,000.00
Movimiento 20 de Mayo	7767	2,500.00
Agrupación Montecristi	7768	2,500.00
Higinio Díaz	7769	1,000.00
Ricardo Lorié	7770	1,000.00
Pascasio Lineras	7771	1,000.00
Movimiento Triple-A-Independiente	7783	1,000.00
Total:		$ 25,000.00

"OPERACION GRIETA"

Annex "IV"

Deposit (January 19, 1962)	$ 4,384.50
January Expenses (See Annex "IV-A"_	4,384.50
Balance on January 31, 1962.	$ ---o---

OPERACION GRIETA:

Annex "IV-A"

			Check No.	Total
Enero	9,	Gastos iniciales de visas, etc,-José Morell Romero.	7722	$ 100.00
"	9	Gastos iniciales de visas, etc,-Luis Figueroa	7724	100.00
"	9	Gastos iniciales de visas, etc,-Eduardo Le Riverand	7726	100.00
"	11	Pasajes gira, América Latina y P. del Este, por - los Dres. Morell Romero, Figueroa y Le Riverand.	7741	1,719.00
"	11	Pasaje extra de Córdoba a Rosario y Stgo. Chile-Valparaíso,-Dr. Morell Romero	7742	38.50
"	11	Pasaje extra de Córdoba a Rosario y Stgo.Chile-Valparaíso, Dr. Figueroa	7743	38.50
"	11	Pasaje extra de Córdoba a Rosario y Stgo.Chile-Valparaíso, Dr. Le Riverand.	7744	38.50
"	11	Dietas por 50 días de -- viaje, Dr. Morell Romero	7745	750.00
"	11	Dietas por 50 días de -- viaje, Dr. Figueroa	7746	750.00
"	11	Dietas por 50 días de -- viaje, Dr. Le Riverand.	7747	750.00
		Total:		$ 4,384.50

DELEGATIONS (Special)

Annex "V"

Deposit (January 25, 1962)	$ 5,400.00
January Expenses (No Annex)	--o--
Balance on January 31, 1962.	$ 5,400.00

"[illegible]"

REPORT

DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

I, Juan Paula Báez, Comptroller, hereby certify that the Statement and Annexes enclosed in this "PAULA AND SOSA" Report for the month of December, 1961, that shows Incomes of $396,668.74, balance in our books on December 1, 1961, $34,597.97, - Expenses for $115,256.01, and Transferences for $275,000.00 are to my knowledge correct.- - - -

Juan Paula

Juan Paula Báez
Comptroller.

Miami, February 5, 1962.

ml.

[illegible] COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
[illegible] AND [illegible]
[illegible] 31, 1961

STATEMENT "I"

Balance in our books on December 1, 1961			$ 30,597.97
DEPOSITS:			
Annex "I-A": From Finance Department		$ 396,463.74	
Annex "I-B": Refund check Esther Perdomo		100.00	
Annex "I-C": Reimbursement Cuban Democratic Judicature		105.00	396,668.74
			$ 427,266.71
LESS: Reimbursed to Finance Department			105.00
TOTAL OF INCOMES:-			$ 427,161.71
EXPENSES:			
Annex "I-D": Payroll		$ 27,205.00	
Annex "I-E": Travels		2,493.53	
Annex "I-F": General Expenses		10,135.99	
Annex "I-G": Delegations		15,195.04	
Annex "I-H": Military Committee		4,250.00	
Annex "I-I": Monroe Hotel		779.41	
Annex "I-J": Heroes and Martyrs		2,540.00	
Annex "I-K": Executives		4,550.00	
Annex "I-L": Social Work		5,104.67	
Annex "I-M": Medical Section		1,886.45	
Annex "I-N": Council President's Office		3,000.00	
Annex "I-O": Vice [illegible] Office		2,061.91	
Annex "I-P": Organizations		2,500.00	
	(1)	$ 81,705.00	
Annex "I-Q": Transferences		$ 275,000.00	
Annex "I-R": Underground		$ 25,000.00	
Annex "I-S": Trip of Dr. Conte Agüero to South America		$ 4,500.00	
Annex "I-T": J.C.D. (Continental lockout expenses)		$ 258.74	
Annex "I-U": Propaganda		$ 3,587.27	$ 390,151.01
BALANCE IN OUR BOOKS ON DECEMBER 31, 1961		(2)	$ 37,010.70

(continue page No.2)

STATEMENT OF INCOMES AND EXPENSES

NOTE (1): *This amount represents the spent with charge to the Budget of $81,500.00. There is an excess of $205.00 that correspond to $100.00 reimbursed by the Bank because of a check to the order of Esther Perdomo which was ordered the stop payment and the Bank paid it unduly, and $105.00 spent in excess but which will be deducted from the Budget of January 1962.*

NOTE (2): *This total amount includes $6,412.73 that correspond to the non spent by the Propaganda Committee in the month of December from the total deposited of $10,000.00 for same.*

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
CONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

STATEMENT "II"

Balance as per Bank Statement on December 31, 1961 $ 53,249.85

LESS: Unpaid checks:

DATE		NAME	CHECK NO.	TOTAL
August	5	Jesús Marinas	5438	$ 350.00
Nov.	1	Pedro León Muño	6628	150.00
"	29	Luis del Valle	6935	50.00
Dec.	1	Manuel González	7009	200.00
"	1	Leslie Nóbregas	7041	202.50
"	1	Pedro León Muño	7129	150.00
"	1	Jesús Marinas	7177	100.00
"	1	Frank Díaz Silveira	7192	400.00
"	1	Frank Díaz Silveira	7193	100.00
"	1	Aída Rosette	7194	250.00
"	8	Frank Díaz Silveira	7234	304.00
"	11	José M. Sánchez	7263	66.10
"	14	Aurelio Fernández Díaz	7286	242.13
"	14	César Baró	7291	2,000.00
"	15	M. A. de Varona	7307	500.00
"	15	Pascasio Lineras	7315	1,500.00
"	19	Hyman Merlin, M.D.	7324	295.00
"	20	Julio César Soto	7332	175.00
"	20	Manuel Vieitez Brey	7335	175.00
"	21	César Baró	7341	2,000.00
"	21	Francisco Carrillo	7346	1,000.00
"	21	Pascasio Lineras	7349	1,500.00
"	21	Antonio Silió	7350	66.00
"	26	Jeanette V. Holmes	7362	60.00
"	26	Pan American Business Mach.	7365	61.71
"	26	Emilio Rubido	7366	50.00
"	26	Wendell Rollason	7367	75.00
"	27	Department of Waters & Sewers	7371	7.50
"	27	Kirsten Air & SS Agency	7372	97.41
"	28	Antonio G. Solar	7374	925.00
"	28	Silvio Fontanilla	7375	200.00
"	28	El Popular	7376	175.00
"	28	W. M. I. E.	7377	200.00
"	28	Kirsten Air & SS Agency	7378	57.31
"	30	José Alfredo López	7379	25.00
"	30	Mario García Serra	7380	25.00
"	30	Vicente Rodríguez	7381	50.00
"	30	José Pintado	7382	50.00
"	30	Alberto Arredondo	7383	100.00
"	30	Marcos Córdova	7384	50.00

(Continue page No.2)

RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT

STATEMENT "II"
PAGE NO. 2

DATE		NAME	CHECK NO.	TOTAL	
Dec.	30	Julio Salcitarria	7385	$ 25.00	
"	30	Guillermo Canales	7386	25.00	
"	30	Alina López	7386-A	25.00	
"	30	Jesús Valdés Crespo	7386-B	25.00	
"	30	Lucas Morán	7386-C	50.00	
"	30	Jesús Alonso	7386-D	303.50	
"	30	Luis Conte	7386-E	500.00	
"	30	Luis Conte	7386-F	58.77	
"	30	José I. Rasco	7386-G	600.00	
"	30	Popular	7386-H	175.00	
"	30	Claudio Sánchez	7386-I	124.46	
"	30	Nelio Lugo	7386-J	150.00	
"	30	Natalia Navarro	7386-K	127.76	
"	30	Wilfredo Leiva	7386-L	65.00	16,239.15
		BALANCE IN OUR BOOKS ON DECEMBER 31, 1961			$ 37,010.70

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
DEPOSITS FROM FINANCE DEPARTMENT
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-A"

DATE	TOTAL
December 5, 1961	$ 200,000.00
December 6, 1961	156,500.00
December 14, 1961 (Underground)	25,000.00
December 20, 1961 (Cuban Democratic Judicature)	363.74
December 21, 1961 (Trip of Conte Agüero)	4,600.00
December 28, 1961 (Propaganda)	10,000.00
TOTAL:-	$ 396,463.74

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
REFUND CHECK ESTHER PERDOMO
[illegible] 1 TO [illegible], 1961

[illegible] "I-D"

	TOTAL
Banking credit because of unduly payment of check in the name of Esther Perdomo which was ordered stop payment.	$ 100.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"LAURA AND [illegible]"
REIMBURSEMENT CUBAN DEMOCRATIC JUDICATURE
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-C"

	TOTAL
Amount non spent of the total of $363.74 given to them and reimbursed	$ 105.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
PAYROLL
[illegible] 1 TO 31,1961

ANNEX "I-D"

	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
DR. MIRO'S OFFICE:			
Ernesto Aragón	6952	$ 400.00	
Ramiro Boza	6953	250.00	
Nicanor Díaz	6954	250.00	
María Antonia Ferrer	6956	200.00	
Ascensión Pérez	6957	300.00	
Andrés Quintían Noas	6958	225.00	
Elda Ramos	6959	225.00	
Mercedes Sánchez	6960	225.00	
Antonio Silió	6961	350.00	
Marcelo Fernández	7281	200.00	$ 2,625.00
COMPTROLLER OFFICE:			
Guillermo Bermello	7006	$ 300.00	
Zoila Doménigo	7007	100.00	
Mario Cirbau	7008	250.00	
Manuel González Fernández	7009	200.00	
Julio Moralejo	7010	250.00	
Teresa Oti	7011	200.00	
Juan Paula Báez	7012	350.00	
Humberto Rodríguez Rodríguez	7013	150.00	
Guillermo Tabraue	7014	150.00	
Natalia Navarro	7051	225.00	2,175.00
OFFICE EMPLOYEES:			
Israel Algaze	6962	$ 180.00	
Manuel Alonso	6964	157.50	
Juan Fco. Avila Ruiz	6965	112.50	
Mario Barreras	6966	180.00	
Ricardo Cabrera	6967	135.00	
Angel Castillo	6968	225.00	
Carlos Cibrián	6969	135.00	
Ana Ma. Cueto	6970	135.00	
Yolanda Cura	6971	135.00	
Jorge A. Estrada	6972	157.50	
Roberto Fernández Fichs	6973	112.50	
Oscar de Freixas	6974	202.50	
Ernesto Freyre	6975	247.50	

(Continue page No.2)

PAYROLL

ANNEX "I-D"
PAGE NO. 2

OFFICE EMPLOYEES (Cont.):	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
Tomás Gamba	7223	$ 300.00	
Camilo García	6977	157.50	
Julio C. García	6978	157.50	
Gema Ginoris	6979	135.00	
Pedro González	6980	90.00	
Margarita Herrera	6981	90.00)	
" "	7232	30.00)	
Delfín Iñiguez	6982	112.50	
Armando de León	6983	225.00	
Francisco Maso	6984	112.50	
Angela Parez	6985	157.50	
Sotero F. Pérez	6986	112.50	
Adolfo Rivero	6987	112.50	
Mario Rodríguez	6988	130.00	
Yolanda Rubio	6989	157.50	
Luis Ruisánchez	6990	225.00	
Claudio Sánchez	6991	135.00	
Carlos Solís	6992	200.00	
José P. Suárez	6993	112.50	
Néstor Suárez	6994	202.50	
Carlos Alvarez	6995	112.50	
Juventino Báez	6996	247.50	
Humberto Figueras	6997	247.50	
Pedro Leyva	6998	157.50	
Pedro Martínez	6999	300.00	
Vitalio Ruiz	7000	202.50	
Clara Park	7001	202.50	
Otalio Sosa Llanes	7002	300.00	
Carlos Forment	7003	247.50	
Matilde Peláez	7004	225.00	
Miguel Adolfo García	7005	247.50	
Gladys Martínez	7222	150.00	7,710.00
RESCATE:			
Fernando Alloza	7019	$ 225.00	
Migdolidia Batard	7020	135.00	
Josefina Bujones	7021	247.50	
Andrés Campillo	7022	202.50	
Mario del Cañal	7023	225.00	
Ramiro Fernández	7024	180.00	
Ignacio Fraixas	7025	180.00	
José Nápoles	7026	202.50	
Celso Pimienta	7027	225.00	
Pedro Rivera	7028	135.00	
Manuel Rivero Setién	7029	135.00	
Humberto Rodríguez Saborit	7030	202.50	
Vicente A. Romero	7031	157.50	
Abel de Varona Loredo	7032	247.50	
Francisco A. Zayas	7033	247.50	2,947.50

(Continue page No.3)

PAYROLL

[illegible]
PAGE No. 3

	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO:			
Osvaldo Aguirre	7052	$ 157.50	
Rafael Aguirre	7053	225.00	
Jorge del Alamo	7054	225.00	
Fritz Appel	7055	270.00	
Hilda Barrios	7056	135.00	
Rafael Bergolla	7057	225.00	
Reinaldo Brugge	7058	225.00	
Thelma Carregado	7059	150.00	
Fermín Fleitas	7060	270.00	
César Madrid	7061	135.00	
Jorge Mas	7062	180.00	
Fermín Peinado	7063	270.00	
Danilo Puig	7064	225.00	
Juan M. Rodríguez	7065	135.00	
Arquímedes Texidor	7066	180.00	3,007.50
MONTECRISTI:			
Miguel Abril	7034	$ 135.00	
Arístides Agüero	7035	135.00	
Ana J. Fernández	7036	157.50	
Tomás González	7037	90.00	
Primitivo Lima	7038	157.50	
Moisés López	7039	90.00	
Agustina Martell	7040	90.00	
Leslie Nóbregas	7041	202.50	
Pedro Peñaranda	7042	180.00	
José J. Rodríguez	7043	225.00	
Jorge Salazar	7044	180.00	
José Salazar	7046	202.50	
José M. Sánchez	7047	247.50	
Migdalia Sardiñas	7048	90.00	
Andrés Suárez	7049	180.00	
José I. Zárraga	7050	100.00	2,462.50
30 DE NOVIEMBRE:			
Edelmiro Alfaro	7075	$ 157.50	
Antonio Baños	7076	225.00	
Eduardo Fernández	7077	157.50	
Napoleón González	7078	157.50	
Juan Mosquera	7079	157.50	
Samuel Pérez	7080	157.50	
Anastasio Quintero	7081	157.50	
Alfredo Rodríguez	7082	157.50	
Felipe Sánchez	7083	157.50	1,485.00

(Continue page No.4)

PAYROLL

ANNEX "[illegible]"
PAGE No.4

	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
MOVIMIENTO RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA:			
José J. Caragol	7067	$ 202.50	
Pilar García Rubio	7068	135.00	
Ambrosio González del Valle	7069	240.00	
Manuel Guillot	7070	125.00	
Ernesto Peynó	7071	250.00	
Rafael Rivas	7072	180.00	
Luis Socarrás	7073	180.00	
José R. Villavicencio	7074	202.50	1,515.00
ING. CARLOS HEVIA'S OFFICE:			
Manuel Arán	7016	$ 175.00	
René Mendiola	7017	175.00	
María C. Alonso	7018	200.00	550.00
ACCION REVOLUCIONARIA DEMOCRATICA:			
Salvador Ferrer	7084	$ 202.50	
Ramón Iglesias	7085	225.00	
Gerardo Quesada	7086	225.00	652.50
20 DE MAYO:			
Ofelia Oms	7087	$ 150.00	
Santiago Cuba	7221	150.00	
Héctor Martínez	7220	150.00	450.00
SERGIO CARBO'S OFFICE:			
José Arriola	7015	$ 200.00	200.00
DR. MACEO'S OFFICE:			
Manuel Fernández	7088	$ 150.00	150.00
PROPAGANDA OFFICE:			
Angel del Cerro	7356	$ 350.00	
Clara R. Alvarez	7357	100.00	
Bernardo Barrié	7358	100.00	
Addie Escudero	7359	75.00	
Roberto Pérez Abreu	7360	75.00	
Juan José Martínez	7361	75.00	775.00

(Continue page No.5)

PAYROLL

ANNEX "[illegible]"
PAGE NO. 5

	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
DR. LUIS CONTE AGUERO'S CENTER:			
Guillermo Alcina	7322	$ 150.00	
María del Carmen Dellundé	7321	150.00	
José Pintada	7320	200.00	500.00
	TOTAL:-		$ 27,205.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
[illegible]
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-E"

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 8	Fares Habana-Miami - Alberto Pérez Sordo family	7237	$ 100.00
" 14	1 Fare Miami-New York-Baltimore-Washington-Miami - Dr. Varona 1 Fare Miami-New York-Miami - Ramón Ruisánchez 1 Fare Miami-New York-Miami - Dr. Hertas	7288	449.87
" 14	2 Fares Habana-Miami - Zoraila Cervantes and Ma. Guadalupe del Busto - Wife and daughter of Octavio del Busto	7289	37.50
" 15	Fares Mexico-Miami - Wife and two sons of Wilfredo Leyva	7302	250.00
" 15	Fares Miami-Guatemala-Panamá-Bogotá-Caracas-Miami - Dr. Varona	7306	329.40
" 15	Travel expenses - Dr. Varona	7307	500.00
" 18	Fares Miami-New York-Miami - Lineras and Maceip	7317	215.60
" 19	Fare Halifax, Nova Scotia-Miami - Dinorah Rodríguez	7319	104.00
" 21	Fare New Jersey-Miami - Mother of Frank Díaz Silveira	7340	42.00
" 22	Fare Miami-New Orleans-Miami - Luis Ruisánchez	7351	99.44
" 22	Fare Miami-San José-Miami - José Julio Fernández	7352	161.00
" 22	Fare Miami-Washington - Néstor Carbonell	7354	57.31
" 26	Fare Habana-Miami - Daughter and son-in-law of Emilio Rubido	7366	50.00
" 27	Fare Iaso-Miami - José Acosta Fernández	7372	97.41
	TOTAL:-		$ 2,493.53

ml.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

D[illegible] 1 TO 3[illegible], 1961

ANNEX "I-F"

DATE		CHECK NO.		TOTAL
	OFFICE RENTS:			
Dec. 1	1700 Biscayne Blvd.	7164	$ 600.00	
" 1	Confidential rent	7166	80.00	
" 1	Comptroller Office (Room 25)	7167	60.00	
" 26	Comptroller Office (Room 24)	7362	60.00	$ 800.00
	TELEPHONES:			
Dec. 8	Calls against executions - J. Pandora	7238	$ 193.52	
" 11	Balance telephone CE-8-1985 (Comptroller Office - Kendall)	7274	17.27	
" 11	HI-4-3471 Comptroller Off. (Civil)	7275	27.89	
" 11	448-5653 Comptroller Off. (Military)	7276	51.17	
" 11	448-5622 Comptroller Off. (Military)	7277	83.60	
" 11	FR-1-7363 (Biscayne)	7284	26.29	
" 15	Long distance call - Dr. E. Aragón	7310	141.96	
" 26	FR-4-0884 (Biscayne)	7363	224.42	
" 26	FR-4-2630-38-39 (Biscayne Telephone Board)	7364	382.29	1,148.41
	OFFICE SUPPLIES:			
Dec. 11	Addressograph plates (Comptroller Office - Military)	7273	$ 23.33	
" 18	Miscellaneous supplies	7318	108.72	132.05
	EQUIPMENT RENT:			
Dec. 11	Typewriters, stands, etc.	7270	$ 272.44	
" 11	Ice box - Comptroller Office (Civil)	7271	20.60	
" 14	Three typewriters	7290	83.43	
" 26	Typewriters	7365	58.71	435.18
	OTHERS:			
Dec. 1	Watch Comptroller Office (Civil)	7120	$ 75.00	
" 1	Legal expenses agreement	7121	200.00	
" 1	Favorable actions - Norman Díaz	7122	300.00	
" 7	Gasoline	7230	36.29	
" 8	Repair of ship Ricardo Forté	7249	300.00	
" 11	Reimbursement revolving fund (Biscayne)	7254	495.94	
" 11	Reimbursement revolving fund (Dr. Miró's office)	7258	589.45	
" 11	Reimbursement revolving fund (Dr. Miró's office - balance last month)	7259	195.[illegible]	
" 11	Gasoline - R. Cabrera	7261	3[illegible]	

(Continue page No. 2)

GENERAL EXPENSES

EXHIBIT "[illegible]"
PAGE NO. [illegible]

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
	OTHERS (Cont.)		
Dec. 11	Expenses in Immigration - Israel Algaze	7262	$ 75.00
" 11	Expenses and gasoline - J.M. Sánchez	7263	66.10
" 11	Legal expenses	7265	3.86
" 11	Balance expenses Democratic Training School	7266	44.40
" 11	Compensation for damages in the house 914 N.W. 12 St. (Recruiting Office)	7267	391.00
" 11	Laundry - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	7268	13.40
" 11	Electricity - 5260 S.W. 3 St. (Comptroller Off.-Military)	7269	22.87
" 11	Cleanness of 17 typewriters	7272	34.00
" 11	Help only one time - Enrique Rodríguez	7279	62.50
" 13	Expenses asylum in Argentine Embassy - Olverio Tomeu	7282	135.00
" 14	Reimburement revolving fund - Comptroller Office	7285	307.19
" 14	Expenses of booklet Accounting Association	7286	242.13
" 14	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Silvio Llovio	7299	150.00
" 15	Help ordered by Dr. Miró - Marcos A. Irigoyen	7303	225.00
" 15	Expenses in nonfulfilment contract Mr. Stringer (José Arriola matter)	7304	400.00
" 18	Help only one time - René Román Miyayo	7312	125.00
" 20	Agreement for interior audit	7326	125.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Leovigildo Salom	7327	225.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Tomás Salom	7328	200.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Pedro Vera Ortiz	7329	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Efraín Bermúdez	7330	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Segundo Vega García	7331	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Julio César Soto Camacho	7332	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - René Ravelo	7333	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Luis M. Iglesias	7334	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Manuel Vicites Rey	7335	175.00

(Continued on page No. [illegible])

GENERAL EXPENSES

ANNEX "[illegible]"
SHEET NO. 3

DATE		CHECK NO.		TOTAL
	OTHERS (Cont.)			
Dec. 21	Program in W.M.E.T. - 30 de Noviembre	7338	50.00	
" 21	Gasoline - R. Cabrera	7339	29.54	
" 21	Mail to South America of the book "Tres Aspectos y Un Mensaje de la Revolución Cubana"	7350	66.00	
" 22	Help for one time - Isabel Pérez	7355	100.00	
" 26	Cleanness of typewriter	7365	3.00	
" 26	Reimbursment revolving fund -1700 Biscayne Blvd. Office	7368	485.64	
" 27	Reimbursment revolving fund - Comptroller Office	7369	130.85	
" 27	Water - 914 N.W. 12 St. (Recruiting Office)	7371	7.50	
" 30	Expenses in Embassy - Nelio Lugo	7386J	150.00	
" 30	Reimbursment revolving fund	7386K	127.76	
" 30	Wilfredo Leyva	7386L	65.00	
	Reimbursment to Finance Department by restitution from Cuban Judicature-Check 7336	7373	105.00	7,620.35
		TOTAL:-		$ 10,135.99

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"LATIN AMERICA"
DELEGATIONS
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-G"

DATE		CHECK NO.	PAYROLL	OTHERS	TOTAL
	LATIN:				
	ARGENTINA				
Dec. 1	Manuel Braña	7169	$ 400.00		
" 1	Vitalio de la Torre	7170	200.00		
" 1	Leonardo Bravo	7171	100.00		
			$ 700.00		$ 700.00
	COLOMBIA				
Dec. 1	Eldy Leal	7187	$ 300.00		
" 1	Budget	7188		$ 150.00	
" 1	Máximo Sorondo	7189	300.00		
" 1	Roberto Ruiz	7190	150.00		
" 1	Roberto Halfón	7191	150.00		
			$ 900.00	$ 150.00	1,050.00
	COSTA RICA				
Dec. 1	Francisco J. Ruiz Benítez	7200	$ 300.00		
" 1	José Julio Fernández	7201	300.00		
" 1	Budget	7202		$ 200.00	
" 1	Fare Miami-Costa Rica Francisco J. Ruiz	7236		95.00	
			$ 600.00	$ 295.00	895.00
	HONDURAS				
Dec. 1	José Alonso Argüelles	7203	$ 200.00		
			$ 200.00		200.00
	PERU				
Dec. 1	Raul de Juan	7178	$ 400.00		
" 1	Armando Cruz Cobo	7179	200.00		
" 1	Budget	7180		$ 300.00	
			$ 600.00	$ 300.00	900.00
	CHILE				
Dec. 1	Max Azicri Levy	7181	$ 400.00		
" 1	Budget	7182		$ 350.00	
" 1	Eulalio González	7183	40.00		
			$ 440.00	$ 350.00	790.00
	BOLIVIA				
Dec. 1	Jesus Marinas	7175	$ 350.00		
" 1	Miguel Nápoles	7176	250.00		
" 1	Budget	7177		$ 100.00	
			$ 600.00	$ 100.00	700.00
	URUGUAY				
Dec. 1	Frank Díaz Silveira	7192	$ 400.00		

(Continue page [illegible])

DELEGATIONS

EXHIBIT "I-G"
PAGE No. 2

DATE		CHECK NO.	PAYROLL	OTHER	TOTAL
	URUGUAY (Cont.)				
Dec. 1	Budget	7193		$ 100.00	
" 1	Hilda Rosette	7194	250.00		
" 8	Fare Uruguay-Miami-Uruguay - F. Díaz Silveira	7234		304.00	
			$ 650.00	$ 404.00	1,054.00
	ECUADOR				
Dec. 1	Horacio Ledón	7184	$ 300.00		
" 1	Budget	7185		$ 100.00	
" 1	Evelio Cervantes	7186	100.00		
			$ 400.00	$ 100.00	500.00
	GUATEMALA				
Dec. 1	Orlando Núñez Pérez	7204	$ 300.00		
" 1	Budget	7205		$ 200.00	
" 1	José Luis Valdés Martí	7206	200.00		
			$ 500.00	$ 200.00	700.00
	SALVADOR				
Dec. 1	José M. Tarafa	7207	$ 300.00		
" 1	Fare Miami-Salvador-Miami - Fermín Pérez	7235		$ 187.60	
			$ 300.00	$ 187.60	487.60
	PANAMA				
Dec. 1	Heriberto Corona	7198	$ 350.00		
" 1	Budget	7199		$ 88.99	
			$ 350.00	$ 88.99	438.99
	BRAZIL				
Dec. 1	Angel Aparicio	7172	$ 400.00		
" 1	Francisco Domínguez	7173	200.00		
" 1	Héctor Garmendia	7174	300.00		
			$ 900.00		900.00
	VENEZUELA				
Dec. 1	Francisco Cayrol	7195	$ 450.00		
" 1	Manuel Quesada	7196	300.00		
" 1	José Valle	7197	200.00		
			$ 950.00		950.00
	DELEGATIONS CONTROL				
Dec. 1	Orlando Gómez Gil	7208	$ 200.00		
" 1	José I. Rasco	7209	350.00		
" 7	Travel expenses	7227		$ 50.00	
" 7	Fare Miami-Venezuela-Miami - José Valle	7228		260.00	

(Continua page No.3)

DELEGATIONS

ANNEX "I-G"
[illegible] NO. 1

DATE			CHECK NO.	PAYROLL	OTHERS	TOTAL
		DELEGATIONS [illegible] (Cont.)				
Dec.	7	Fare Miami-Venezuela-Miami - Angel Cofiño	7229		$ 260.00	
"	8	Excess in expenses trip to Central America	7233		155.40	
"	15	Expenses trip Costa Rica and Guatemala - José J. Fernández	7308		200.00	
"	15	Travel expenses to New Orleans - L. Ruizsánchez	7309		80.00	
"	18	Photos and photostat - copies	7313		60.00	
"	18	Round trip to Boston - Sr. Karreño	7314		109.74	
				$ 550.00	$ 1,0[illegible].14	1,625.14
		TOTAL LATINS:-				$ 11,890.73
		AMERICAN:				
		New York				
Dec.	1	Sergio Aparicio	7210	$ 300.00		
"	1	Efrén Hernández	7211	225.00		
"	1	César Rodríguez Lago	7212	200.00		
"	1	Raul Torres	7213	275.00		
"	1	Budget	7214		$ 600.00	
				$ 1,000.00	$ 600.00	$ 1,600.00
		WASHINGTON				
Dec.	1	Carlos Piad	7215	$ 600.00		
"	1	Nicolás Rivero	7216	250.00		
"	1	Ernesto Rojas	7217	200.00		
"	1	Néstor T. Carbonell	7218	400.00		
"	1	Budget	7219		$ 200.00	
"	1	Fare Miami-Washington-Miami - N. Carbonell	7378		57.31	
				$ 1,450.00	$ 257.31	1,707.31
		TOTAL AMERICANS:-				$ 3,307.31
		TOTAL DELEGATIONS:-				$ 15,198.04

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
MILITARY COMMITTEE
DECEMBER 1-TO 31,1961

ANNEX "J-1"

DATE			CHECK NO.		TOTAL
		COMMITTEE PAYROLL			
Dec.	1	Ernesto Despaigne	7101	$ 250.00	
"	1	José E. Monteagudo	7102	250.00	
"	1	José Fernández Martín	7104	200.00	
"	1	Rolando Zubizarreta	7105	200.00	
"	1	Carlos Pérez Vivero	7106	200.00	
"	1	Amador Inguanzo	7107	200.00	
"	1	Humberto Olivero	7108	200.00	
"	1	Armando Guerra	7109	200.00	
"	1	Cándido Molinet	7110	200.00	
"	1	Jorge Sotús	7112	250.00	
"	1	Gastón F. Bernal Fernández	7256	200.00	
"	1	José F.C. Viamontes Jardines	7257	200.00	$ 2,550.00
		RECRUITING OFFICE PAYROLL			
Dec.	1	Juan Consuegra	7113	$ 300.00	
"	1	Laureano Pino	7114	250.00	
"	1	Juan Antonio Hernández	7115	200.00	
"	1	Guillermo Lezcano	7116	200.00	
"	1	Orlando Pino Cruz	7117	200.00	
"	1	Ramón Paz Reyna	7118	200.00	1,350.00
		EXPENSES			
Dec.	1	Budget	7119	$ 350.00	350.00
			TOTAL:-		$ 4,250.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
[illegible]
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-1"

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 1	Rent	7165	$ 450.00
" 8	Reimbursement revolving fund	7231	110.98
" 12	Reimbursement revolving fund	7280	93.97
" 30	Reimbursement revolving fund	73861	124.46
		TOTAL:-	$ 779.41

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
HEROES AND MARTYRS
DECEMBER 1 TO 21,1961

ANNEX "I-I"

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 1	Rosa Ma. Cabrera - Sorí Marín Widow	7123	$ 175.00
" 1	Clara Delgado - Porfirio Ramírez Widow	7124	100.00
" 1	Zenaida Espinosa - José A. Herrera Wife	7125	175.00
" 1	Adalberto Fernández - Adalberto Fernández Father	7126	100.00
" 1	Zoe Hernández - Giordano Hernández Wife	7127	150.00
" 1	Lilliam Leira - Ernesto Mestre Wife	7128	100.00
" 1	Lucía León - Vicente León Mother	7129	150.00
" 1	Marina Mardones - Lauro Blanco Wife	7130	165.00
" 1	Flora Mas Machado - Juventino Báez Mother	7131	175.00
" 1	Martha Miyares - Ulises Silva Wife	7132	150.00
" 1	Esther Perdomo - Fidel Sierra Wife	7133	100.00
" 1	Amparo Posada - Plinio Prieto Widow	7134	175.00
" 1	Juana Rodríguez - Armando Escoto Wife	7135	175.00
" 1	Ma. Caridad Ruiz - Plinio Prieto Mother	7136	150.00
" 1	Isabel Ma. Suárez - Yebra Widow	7137	175.00
" 1	Teresa Suárez - Jesús Carreras Widow	7138	100.00
" 1	Grace Mira - Tamargo daughter	7139	100.00
" 1	Eslance R. Tamargo family	7140	75.00
" 1	Amparo Vidal - Sergio Martín Mother	7142	50.00
		TOTAL:-	$ 2,540.00

ml.

[illegible]

[illegible]

"[illegible]"

[illegible]

[illegible] 1 [illegible], 1961

[illegible]

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 1	Manuel A. de Varona	7143	$ 350.00
" 1	Antonio Maceo	7144	350.00
" 1	Sergio Carbó	7145	350.00
" 1	Raul Méndez Pirez	7146	350.00
" 1	Francisco Carrillo	7147	350.00
" 1	José Fernández Badué	7148	350.00
" 1	César Baró	7149	350.00
" 1	Osvaldo Soto	7150	350.00
" 1	Carlos Rodríguez	7151	350.00
" 1	Manuel Cobo	7152	350.00
" 1	Higinio Díaz	7153	350.00
" 1	Ricardo Lorié	7154	350.00
" 1	Enrique Huertas	7155	350.00
		TOTAL:-	$ 4,550.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
[illegible]
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-L"

DATE		CHECK NO.		TOTAL
	PAYROLL:			
Dec. 1	Dulce Torres	7094	$ 200.00	
" 1	Estrella Villapol	7095	200.00	
" 1	Clara Ramírez	7096	200.00	
" 1	Alberto Santos	7097	200.00	
" 1	Antonio Garrastazu	7098	220.00	
" 1	Cristila Gallardo	7099	180.00	
" 1	Mario Martínez	7100	150.00	$ 1,350.00
	EXPENSES:			
Dec. 1	Reimburement revolving fund	7168	$ 986.25	
" 7	Reimburement revolving fund	7226	767.65	
" 15	Reimburement revolving fund	7300	500.77	
" 20	Toys for prisoners children	7325	1,500.00	3,754.67
		TOTAL:-		$ 5,104.67

ml.

[illegible] COUNCIL
[illegible] DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
[illegible] SECTION
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "[illegible]"

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 8	Anesthesia operation Adelquis Soto	7252	$ 65.00
" 8	Hospital expenses Adelquis Soto	7253	1,031.45
" 19	Medical assistance Norberto González	7323	495.00
" 19	Medical assistance Adelquis Soto	7324	295.00
	TOTAL:-		$ 1,886.45

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCIAL STATEMENT
"[illegible]"
[illegible] OFFICE
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-N"

	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
REIMBURSEMENT REVOLVING FUND:	7251		
Auto rent		$ 106.05	
Trip to Tampa		90.00	
Trip to Washington - Dr. Miró		395.97	
Other expenses, trip to Washington Refugees		86.67	
Trip to Washington Dr. Miró - Inter-American Conference of Peace		307.42	
Cables		44.17	
Office supplies		187.37	
Miscellaneous		347.89	
Rent of office equipment		355.35	
Money Order for Mr. Quintero		25.00	
Contribution for show "Noche Cubana"		60.00	
Félix Angel Yergo		200.00	
Money Orders, Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Pio Verde		50.00	
María Teresa Campa		200.00	
Juan Rodríguez Pintado		200.00	
Father Francisco Villaverde		200.00	
José Fernández Carmenaty		40.00	
Cap. Ernesto Despaigne - Deposit and rent 1045 S.W. 27 Ave. office		400.00	
Pedro Abascal		200.00	
Bulletin "Intervención Comunista en Cuba"		150.00	
Dr. Gonzalo Alvarado		150.00	
Bulletin "Cuba"		50.00	$ 3,845.89
LESS: Amounto to reimburse in January 1962			845.89
TOTAL:-			$ 3,000.00

nl.

14-00000

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
[illegible] OFFICE
[illegible] 1 TO [illegible]/61

ANNEX "I-C"

	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
PAYROLL:			
Wendell Rollason	7089	$ 600.00	
Antonio Fariñas	7090	300.00	
Irmina Bouza	7091	125.00	
Berta Díaz	7092	125.00	
Flor Angela Gómez	7093	150.00	$ 1,300.00
OTHERS:			
Fare to Washington - Mr. Rollason	7225	$ 164.60	
373-0953 Office telephone	7278	72.89	
Miscellaneous expenses	7283	449.42	
Three days expenses in Washington - Mr. Rollason	7367	75.00	761.91
TOTAL:-			$ 2,061.91

ml.

14-00000

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
ORGANIZATIONS
DECEMBER [illegible] 31, 19[illegible]

ANNEX "I-F"

	CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Movimiento Recuperación Revolucionaria	7239	$ 250.00
Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano	7240	250.00
Movimiento Rescate Democrático Revolucionario	7241	250.00
Movimiento Agrupación Montecristi	7242	250.00
Movimiento 30 de Noviembre	7243	250.00
Movimiento Triple A Independiente	7244	250.00
Movimiento 20 de Mayo	7245	250.00
Higinio Díaz	7246	250.00
Ricardo Lorié	7247	250.00
Luis Conte Agüero	7248	250.00
	TOTAL:-	$ 2,500.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
[illegible]
DEC[illegible] 1 TO 31, 196[illegible]

ANNEX "I-F"

DATE			CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec.	14	Movimiento Recuperación Revolucionaria	7291	$ 2,000.00
"	14	Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano	7292	2,000.00
"	14	Movimiento 30 de Noviembre	7293	2,000.00
"	14	Movimiento Rescate Revolucionario Democrático	7294	2,000.00
"	14	Movimiento 20 de Mayo	7295	1,000.00
"	14	Movimiento Agrupación Montecristi	7296	1,000.00
"	14	Higinio Díaz	7297	500.00
"	14	Ricardo Lorié	7298	500.00
"	18	Pascasio Lineras	7315	1,500.00
"	21	Movimiento Recuperación Revolucionaria	7341	2,000.00
"	21	Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano	7342	2,000.00
"	21	Movimiento 30 de Noviembre	7343	2,000.00
"	21	Movimiento Rescate Revolucionario Democrático	7344	2,000.00
"	21	Movimiento 20 de Mayo	7345	1,000.00
"	21	Movimiento Agrupación Montecristi	7346	1,000.00
"	21	Higinio Díaz	7347	500.00
"	21	Ricardo Lorié	7348	500.00
"	21	Pascasio Lineras	7349	1,500.00
		TOTAL:-		$ 25,000.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
[illegible]
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-Q"

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 6	Garcia and Paula	7224	$ 274,500.00
" 8	Garcia and Paula	7250	500.00
	TOTAL:-		$ 275,000.00

ml.

"GARCIA AND PAULA"

TRUST ACCOUNT

"GARCIA AND PAULA"

TRUST ACCOUNT

Paid to recruit's dependents (See Annex 1).	$ 44,225.00
Transferred to Saving Accounts. (See Annex 2).	52,800.00
Reimbursed to Garcia and Paula. (See Annex 3).	30,150.00
Total deposited in Trust Account:	$ 127,175.00

Total deposited in Trust Account:		$ 127,175.00
LESS:		
Paid to recruit's dependents (See Annex 1).	$ 44,225.00	
Transferred to Saving Account (See Annex 2).	52,800.00	97,025.00
Reimbursed to Garcia and Paula (See Annex 3).		$ 30,150.00

PAID TO RECRUIT'S DEPENDENTS

"Annex 1"

ALVAREZ PEYDRO, Luis	$ 700.00
ALVAREZ VILTRES, Jorge	350.00
ANDREU SANTOS, José	2,625.00
BURRUEZO AROCHA, Daniel	175.00
CARMONA CABRERA, Antonio G.	550.00
CASTELLON SERPA, Sergio	325.00
COMELLAS ANGLADA, Manuel	700.00
CREME CANTERO, Humberto	600.00
CUELLAR SOSA, Virginio	525.00
EGOZI BEHAR, José	900.00
ESPINO ALONSO, Sixto F.	450.00
FERNANDEZ PEYDRO, Antonio F.	675.00
FRANCO DUARTE, Pedro	1,225.00
FRANCO DUARTE, Severiano A.	1,050.00
GARCIA-MENOCAL BRITO, Fausto	2,100.00
GOICOCHEA SANCHEZ, Fermín	350.00
GONZALEZ PEREZ, Enrique	1,000.00
COVANTES REYES, Leopoldo	700.00
LOPEZ CASTILLO, José	1,750.00
LOPEZ PEREZ, Miguel E.	3,150.00
LORIGA CHAVEZ, Martín	1,625.00
MADRIGAL MENDIGUTIA, Rafael M.	275.00
MAQUEIRA PEREZ, José	1,000.00
MIRANDA HERNANDEZ, Luis	600.00
MIRANDA VALLADARES, Alberto	500.00
MORALES DIAZ, Santiago	1,575.00
OJEDA CAMARAZA, Eduardo A.	525.00
OROZCO CRESPO, Claudio	1,400.00
PEREZ LUGONES, Aurelio	450.00
PEREZ MARTIN, Antonio Abel	250.00
PEREZ VIVANCOS, Benigno	1,800.00
RECAREY GARCIA-VIETA, Jorge I.	175.00
REGALADO SANTANA, José	325.00
REY DELGADO, Walter	1,500.00
RODRIGUEZ MENDIGUTIA, Félix F.	1,575.00
RODIRGUEZ MIRABAL, José A.	675.00
RODRIGUEZ PELAEZ, José M.	250.00
ROJAS RAMOS,Pablo H.	1,750.00
ROMAN ACEVEDO, Hugo	225.00
SANCHEZ ABASCAL, Mario M.	900.00
SOLIS JURADO, Humberto	2,450.00
VARONA ARJONA, Carlos A.	825.00
VEGA GARCIA, Segundo	350.00
VERA ORTIZ, Pedro R.	700.00
VERA ORTIZ, Rubén	2,625.00
Total:-	$ 44,225.00

TRANSFERRED TO SAVING ACCOUNTS

"Annex 2"

ABREU ARAGON, Ernesto	$ 175.00
ABREU PAZO, Sergio	1,350.00
ALONSO ANTUNA, Félix	1,050.00
BOLIVAR FUENTES, Rodolfo de J.	175.00
BRAVO RODRIGUEZ, Carlos I.	700.00
CABALLERO RODRIGUEZ, Hilario	1,800.00
CABEZAS PENARROYA, Rolando J.	1,000.00
CASTRO CUELLO, Fulgencio O.	225.00
CRUZ BAUTISTA, Tomas	1,125.00
DELGADO FERNANDEZ, Mario	525.00
DELGADO NARANJO, Eugenio M.	250.00
DELGADO SUAREZ, Pánfilo I.	525.00
DIAZ CABRERA, Adolfo	350.00
DIAZ HERNANDEZ, Rodolfo	250.00
DOMINGUEZ CADALSO, Atilano	1,575.00
ESPINO AZCUE, Jorge	700.00
FERNANDEZ DALMAU, Ernesto F.	225.00
FERNANDEZ PERDOMO, Juan de J.	675.00
GARATE NOA, Miguel A.	675.00
GIL HERNANDEZ, Fulgencio R.	2,450.00
GOMEZ OYARZABAL, Hugo	700.00
GONZALES CASTRO, José	2,625.00
GONZALEZ FUENTES, José	350.00
GONZALEZ LABRADA, Rafael	1,625.00
GONZALEZ MOREJON, José	525.00
GONZALEZ PEREZ, Enrique	1,475.00
HERNANDEZ BREZ, Armando	2,975.00
LAVANDEIRA TORRIJO, Eulogio R.	900.00
LOPEZ DE LA CRUZ, Juan R.	875.00
MAQUEIRA PEREZ, José	3,400.00
MENENDEZ RODILL, Arturo L.	1,525.00
MOLE ROSALES, José A.	525.00
MONTOTO GONZALEZ, Hilario	350.00
NAVARRETE FERNANDEZ, Natividad	275.00
NAVARRO VEGA, Víctor	700.00
PENTON ALFONSO, Miguel	2,975.00
PEREZ PADRON, Francisco	225.00
QUINTANA BARBON, Ramón L.	525.00
REYES BELLO, Pedro H.	350.00
REYES GARCIA, Manuel	3,150.00
RIVERO QUESADA, Gerardo	2,800.00
RODRIGUEZ ALVAREZ, Orlando	225.00
RODRIGUEZ FERNANDEZ, Alfredo E.	700.00
RODRIGUEZ GONZALEZ, Jacome	175.00
SAMARA LORENZO, Hugo R.	525.00
SANCHEZ MERZEAU, Raúl	900.00
SOSA VALDES, Paulino	700.00
TEJERA GUTIERREZ, José M.	225.00
TORRE PITA, Raúl de la	700.00
TORRES GUERRA, Marcos G.	175.00
TORRES JIMENEZ, Rafael	175.00
TORRES MENA, Fernando O.	500.00
TORRES MENA, Juan F.	175.00
VARONA LEBLANC, Rigoberto	2,975.00
Total:	$ 52,800.00

REIMBURSED TO "GARCIA AND PAULA"

"Annex 3"

ABREU ORTA, Juan F.	$ 175.00
AGUADO MORALES, Alexis F.	175.00
ALVAREZ-FERNANDEZ CARRILLO, Rafael	875.00
ARIAS GARCIA, Jesús	525.00
ARNAO GARCIA, Pedro	175.00
BACALLAO FONTE, Valentin	525.00
BAEZ HERNANDEZ, Armando	525.00
BARRETO VALDES, Eduardo	350.00
BLANCO CRUZ, Benito	250.00
BLANCO NAVARRO, Manuel	1,100.00
BOLIVAR FUENTES, Rodolfo de J.	175.00
BUTTARI CRESPO, Juan J.	350.00
BUTTARI PUIG, Edgardo	350.00
CARMONA CABRERA, Antonio G.	275.00
CASANAS SANCHEZ, Manuel	675.00
CASTANER LOPEZ, Modesto	450.00
CASTILLO RIVERO, Reinaldo L.	350.00
COMAS MENENDEZ, Arturo F.	675.00
CONTE HERNANDEZ, Ramón	225.00
CREME CANTERO, Humberto	2,100.00
CHAVEZ GUERRA, Alipio M.	225.00
DARIAS SORIANO, Dagoberto	250.00
DELGADO GARCIA, Jesús	175.00
FACCIO CRUCET, Marcial	600.00
FAJARDO MONTANO, José M.	450.00
FERNANDEZ MARTINEZ, Ladislao	450.00
FERRER MENA, Ramón J.	1,100.00
GARCIA-MENOCAL BRITO, Fausto	350.00
GONZALEZ CASTRO, José	525.00
GONZALEZ LABRADA, Rafael	600.00
GOUDIE MONTEVERDE, Manuel F.	2,800.00
GUERRA GONZALEZ, Luis A.	450.00
JIMENEZ MARTINEZ, Víctor J.	675.00
LOPEZ PEREZ, Silvino	525.00
LLUESMA PARETS, Ernesto	225.00
MARTINEZ CASTRO, Luis E.	675.00
MONTERO PEREZ, Rigoberto	225.00
MORALES CRUZ, José	275.00
MORALES DIAZ, Santiago	350.00
MORSE DE LA BARRERA, Luis C.	450.00
OTERO HERNANDEZ, Rolando	350.00
PERAZA SOSA, Héctor	600.00
PEREIRA PEREZ, Edilio	275.00
PEREZ HEIDRICH, Carlos M.	700.00
PEREZ MARQUEZ, Manuel de J.	500.00
PINO MARINAS, Néstor	225.00
PITA OTANO, Eleuterio	825.00
QUINTANA DE LA TORRE, Juan M.	900.00
RAMOS SANTIAGO, Reinaldo	350.00
RECAREY GARCIA-VIETA, Jorge I.	175.00
REGALADO SANTANA, José	325.00
RODRIGUEZ ALVAREZ, Mario T.	1,000.00
RODRIGUEZ-SANTANA ESTEVEZ, Carlos	350.00

(Continue on page No. 2)

Pago No. 2

RODRIGUEZ GONZALEZ, Roberto	$ 225.00
SERRANO CAMEJO, Félix T.	450.00
SOPO GRANDA, Edgar	225.00
TEJERA GUTIERREZ, José M.	225.00
VARONA ARJONA, Carlos A.	275.00
ZAMORA GARCIA, Pedro O.	500.00
Total:-	$ 30,150.00

SECRET

11 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief of Operations

SUBJECT : PM Case Officers in Contact with Segments of the CRC

a. MIRO CARDONA, President of the CRC - periodic contact with Mr. Glenn J. Fransworth.

b. CARLOS HEVIA, Naval Advisor - Gordon Campbell and Lloyd Lindland.

c. HIGINIO DIAZ (Nino), Military Advisor - Eugene Norwinski.

d. HUMBERTO NUNEZ, Military Coordinator of Frente Anti-Communista Cristiano - Thomas M. Hewitt.

e. JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE and CUCHO FLEITES, MDC - Thomas Hewitt.

f. CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, 30th Nov Group - Gordon C. Jung. Dick Sampson

g. CESAR BARO, MRR - Thomas G. Clines.

h. RAUL MENDEZ PIREZ and LUIS SANCHEZ, Rescate - Thomas Hewitt.

i. ERNESTO D'ESPAIGNE, Military Sector - Eugene Norwinski.

j. OSVALDO SOTO, 20 May - Thomas M. Hewitt.

Glenn J Farnsworth
GLENN J. FARNSWORTH
Chief, PM

SECRET

10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.

2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:

a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.

(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.

(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Operacion Grieta."

c. Underground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian Embassy).

(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to me on 6 October.

3. Commando Plan

Then Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners.

With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and materiel provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our meeting at 15:30 on 6 October for transmission.)

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray

Dr. MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.)

COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime

Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit.* He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."

*Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.

He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference." "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S."

6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban Soil

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and establish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. "This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognise that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and immediately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in adequate strength to ensure victory.

Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.

Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't considered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us." "The Punta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries receiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers

I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He declared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRO and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named ALABAU to the

Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescate
30 de Noviembre
MRR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi

He said he had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night

from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says, "Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutes to address the meeting."

10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian who Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after 11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brasil. MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark.

11. Propaganda Commission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is outside the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CARRILLO had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-

nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and reestablishment of order in the island.

13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferson 3-4680). So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me."

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation - merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance."

14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile Groups

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I understood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organizations to be able to discuss the matter effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October, I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

the ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He expressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise to me.

16. Comment

During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals. I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required.

SECRET

20 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Miro in New York City on October 16, 1961

The meeting with Dr. Miro on October 16 was postponed from 10:00 until such time as his audience terminated with Cardinal Spellman. He arrived at my room at about 10:50. He declared that the Cardinal had wept when he learned the details of the suffering of the Cubans at the hands of Castro; declared that the Archbishop of Miami wasn't doing enough for the Cuban refugees; that the U.S. wasn't doing enough for them; that Castro must be overthrown. Miro told the Cardinal that in all Latin America there were going to be organized acts of sympathy for the Cuban sufferers. The Cardinal said he would say a Mass for them on October 17. He invited Miro to see him at any time.

Miro answered my query as to the Lacerda affairs by stating that it was very successful; 2,800 people were inside the auditorium and another 1,000 people outside; that Lacerda had received much applause.

The Inter-American Press Association affairs also had given an opportunity to present the Cuban tragedy. He said that he (Miro) had told how Fidel had shot 31 people in September alone, and other details; had described how Communism was gaining ground day by day; that in Cuba they have installed a powerful radio station broadcasting to Latin America; that ten countries have broken with Cuba, but Argentina has not; that everybody is confused.

He informed me that as for the documents relating to the Cuban plots in Argentina, the Argentine military men came to talk to Varona, and he gave them some documents that have no importance. The officers told Varona textually "We have no confidence in the Argentine Foreign Office," nevertheless, when they arrived there, they turned over the documents to the Foreign Office. But these documents had no importance; they were merely to demonstrate that there had been an extradition of documents, and that they were originals. The important documents are held by Varona in Miami.

Miro said they also visualized another act involving Lacerda in Miami, but that his "administrative" budget really does not provide for propaganda activities (such as the Current SIP and Lacerda affairs). I countered that it was considered that his budget was sufficient for him to conduct some propaganda activities; obviously nothing on a major scale — but some things.

SECRET

Miro declared that internal propaganda and clandestine action in Cuba could not be delayed any longer. I agreed on the necessity, and that it was believed that measures are necessary to forment in Cuba the opposition to Castro. "The people are against him!" declared Miro. "But increase it," I answered. Miro then stated "If this action doesn't stem from the Consejo (CRC) — not as an independent agency, but in close contact with you (the Agency), — what we forment is a complete disorder in Cuba, and afterwards no government can succeed; secondly, if we do not have a central plan, and carry it out well in a more or less limited period of time, there will merely be more shooting of people (prisoners) by Fidel."

"And this is my insistence. Now I am afraid to go to Miami. What am I to tell the people there? What do I do? Converse? Meanwhile the Agency keeps on infiltrating people into Cuba but disconnected from the Council. I was told in my conversation with the President to amplify the membership in the Consejo. I have endeavored to do that. In the Council there are other great organizations - delegates from each of the organizations - that ask me for arms, dynamite, things, and I am here powerless. Therefore I must work with you people in order to see how we may hand over arms and a plan of action so they may see that this is not merely an endless series of sabotage actions." I replied, "Well, I believe that a well-worked-out plan that shows good chances of success will be favorably considered."

"How about arms for the Escambrey?" asked Miro. I replied that it was my understanding that arms for the Escambrey could only be landed on the North Coast; how then would they get to the Escambrey? Miro said that the boat which had made many trips (working for YOU), would have to establish communication and find out when they would pick up the arms; what cannot be done is abandon Osvaldo Ramirez in this situation of anguish because he is the only real regional focus of resistance that there is there, and he has been really left in a desperate situation for three months.

I interposed that there seemed some question about the paper from Ramirez asking for arms, whether it was the real thing. "Perfectly identified" replied Miro. "He assured that it is perfectly identified and requests have come to me through different channels asking for these arms. I am still waiting now for a month and a half. All you have to do is tell us the means of delivery, the people to contact and then deliver to our Cubans the arms, dynatite, fuses. I am still waiting, and criticism (of Cubans against inaction) increases daily."

"All the delegations of revolutionary groups in the Council ask me for arms and means for fighting. But I cannot provide them anything. Meanwhile the Agency is infiltrating people into Cuba without counting on the Consejo for anything. This puts it into an absurd position - merely a "council painted on the Wall." I have said, "Look for someone else if I am not considered able to do the job but we must work. I have confidence in the Agency, but I cannot work in this fashion."

"I've asked for money for the clandestine groups. What have they said about that?" Miro asked. I replied that there is a problem of the means of delivery, that the Italian Embassy at present appears undesirable. The Ambassador isn't there. Well, we look for another means; the Argentine - anything - those people need money" he countered. I have to carry out concrete things," he declared. "I'm now like a person in a swimming pool without water." "For three and a half months I've struggled to maintain a revolutionary spirit. My military people are waiting till I arrived and tell them, "this must be done, that must be done. Nothing yet! And without any plan, I don't go anywhere; nowhere!

"The other time I went with my eyes closed, through faith. We had a failure and the failure fell upon me.—I cannot proceed under such circumstances in no way. I've asked for $50,000 to send in to the underground. The Russians are spending $400,000 in propaganda and have less than the U.S. We shall not compromise the U.S. Tell me the way to send it in. The Council is to aid them, not merely to conduct meetings."

"On that request they haven't replied anything?" he asked. I answered that on this item, I had made known Miro's desire, but that so far nothing had been resolved.

"I'm not complaining," he stated, "but for three months I have been asking for a contact with the authority to resolve. Why? Because I'm getting nowhere. When I return now I shall be asked, "How about it?" and must answer, 'You will have to wait because I have nothing.' And meanwhile the Agency keeps on infiltrating people into Cuba independent of the Consejo. Let us go back. Without being in agreement, I cannot serve you. I have no interest in presiding over a Council that is of no use."

I pointed out that the Council must continue to exist, with him as its president, as the coordinating body of the resistance movement, but that there are certain difficulties in putting the student or labor activities under the direction of the Council; that these groups are now functioning efficiently and that I trusted that he could see the problems of completely changing their control, direction, and coordination. I added that I believed that he should know something of what they are doing and that I believed that should be kept informed.

"I know absolutely nothing," he replied. "What comes to me is from these same individuals. I am not in agreement with that, I'm becoming ridiculous. Under these circumstances I cannot continue. I have planted the problem of the underground, the problem of the collateral organizations (that he would like to have in Council by being their source of support and coordination), of the magistrates, and now you have seen what ALABAU has done (proclaiming GARCERAN as president of exile government), who is working with you people, and you have seen the reaction of the State Department. Now yesterday ALABAU is publishing political denunciations against the Council. I have discussed the matter of the magistrates with the C.I.A., I don't remember the name of the person. A month has passed and the other magistrates (those with ALABAU) haven't been stopped (in their activities) and they haven't had elections as I requested to select another leader."

"The students are continuing their activities. I believe that I have something in my head as a basis for the determination of what should be discussed in the Council with me; and in agreement with you; but these existing circumstances, without any connection, make it so that I cannot continue the clandestine aid. To the first problem, I presented your reply, "We shall see." To the second problem, the collateral organizations — which continues the same as before; the third problem I presented, on arms to send in, nothing. The fourth problem, the propaganda operation "Grieta" that I showed you, nothing." I replied that on the latter I had discussed the matter, that it was, I believed, a suggestion given to him in the Department of State.

"If we don't make propaganda and send arms into Cuba now, it's useless," he declared. "And I cannot remain in silence." I replied that I believed quite a bit of propaganda was being conducted. "Yes, but independent of the Council. I CANNOT BE A PUPPET!" "They (the Agency) keep on dealing with the MRP, with the Unidad Revolucionario, and they haven't entered into the Council simply because they are in direct contact with the Agency. Thus it appears that none of the problems that I took up with you some twenty days ago have been resolved, and I'll have to take another solution. I want to know the truth if I'm not acceptable. I'll leave and without any scandle whatsoever. I have swallowed all the criticism, in my own house, in silence, as though I were responsible for everything. I cannot continue to do this and be doing nothing. I cannot be a puppet! I have no arms to give."

He reiterated that nothing had been resolved on any of his requests and proposals, and that he couldn't continue thus. That he could quit, go to Puerto Rico as a professor. He added he would want to work with us. He then referred to the acts of Lacerda in New York, which had cost four thousand dollars, plus passage, a ridiculous sum spend from the Administrative Budget. "We have paid the passage, his living costs here." he said.

"Now I go to Miami where I have to face the organizations grouped into the Council. "Arms for everywhere?" "I haven't any. All the organizations free-wheeling there which don't want to join together because they are working directly with your people." I said this was unfortunate and asked whether there could not be some form of realizing contacts with them without necessarily channelizing their support and direction through the Council, such as by forming a committee along the lines I had suggested in Miami.

Miro then referred to the agreement reached in the White House meeting with Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Woodward, with gentlemen of the C.I.A., and with Mr. Hurwitz. First, "That the only thing that is recognized is the Consejo (CRC); Dr. Miro is the person of our confidence and will have an administrative budget which he will control and will report later the expenses of coordination, and that any other expenses, propaganda or clandestine activity, will be paid by the Agency; for the problems of the organizations in the Council there will be a contact to assist in working out their solutions; that is to say, that their problems of boats and arms." Another point was that in case there are organizations that do not choose to join the Council, Dr. Miro will be perfectly informed in advance of the matters at hand and will give his

authorization. That is to say, it establishes a unifying control over the

(CRC). I have seven, to work with you, with me, with the people who are going to carry out the activities, with the people that I designate. Nothing of that is being done. Then what they want is to work alone."

"I will not continue. I will not continue from the time I return to Miami. I have gone on for five months, struggling. I cannot accept this situation. I have tried to pull together those groups as asked in the White House. I haven't succeeded in grouping any more, because - I want to speak clearly in order to remain good friends always - because you have prevented it. The students haven't joined, not because of no political reason, but merely because you support them directly. Presumably the idea is that in this way the security of this nation is better safeguarded. A Consejo was desired to serve as the coordinating group and to provide a means by which the United States would not appear to be intervening in Cuba. If there is to be a Consejo, it must have all the dignity of a Council."

"When I try to form a Council, grouping all elements together, they don't join because they are talking directly with your people - and there is an office for that purpose in Miami - which deals with all the men who want to work, who want to do things. This is all indecendent of the Council. And some work for a destruction of the Council. I cannot tolerate this. I have a son who is a prisoner; either I know the plans, and I knew the maneuver and the problems that they are going to carry out, or I, when I arrive in Miami, will say, "No," and send word to Washington. Let them do without me. There will be someone who will submit to these things, but not I."

"And of the four items that ~~Mr. Kennedy~~ promised me to resolve, there have not been resolved any, and I find myself in the dark. And I am very sorry. I am not going to compromise the security of this Nation, but neither am I going to compromise the situation of these boys. When they disappeared, lost their lives, etc., I was confronted with "And you are the president of the Council." I cannot remaine in this way.."

"I haven't been able to group together anything. I was promised that the magistrates would all incorporate together (into the Council), but that rascal ALABAU is working against the Council and I have reason to believe that he is doing it with Agency support, otherwise how would he pay for his political denunciations." I responded, that I believed this could not be true. He shouted, "I have expressed my position to you, and I want you to get an answer when you can. If these problems that I have set forth do not have an immediate solution, I am not to know and to dispose of relative actions to be taken, then how, in view of my situation, must I do."

He asked about the plan for clandestine sabotage action by commando raid, that he had given us, and what had come of it. I replied that he must realize that the study of such a plan necessarily was slow and must be considered by many. He said he was convinced that there was no intention of accepting such plans, and that while now we discuss such plans, we lose out. "I cannot accept this situation, nor would you."

He then said that he could go ahead and dissolve the Council, and let each organization go ahead and do as it pleased; that he couldn't preside over a meaningless council; that this was not a threat, but he would step out. I reassured him that he was highly esteemed in Washington and it was necessary that he continue as head of the Council. He replied, "But they disregard me."

He reiterated that he had planted four problems, none of which had been resolved; reiterated that he had planted the propaganda problem a long time ago, but that propaganda continues independent of the Council and people are sent out like those to the Congress of students in Sao Paulo, where they repeat things like parrots which don't go with Latin American audiences.

"I have asked for arms; either give us massive aid, one, two, three million - whatever is necessary, because this is to destroy Communism, and we'll make our plans. And we'll furnish the dead, for we can do no more. We must work in agreement, because now each time that I speak, it's "we shall see, we are going to study," - and nothing happens. No, no, I shall not preside over another Council existing under these circumstances. I have often spent 24 hours without sleeping, trying to pull together the groups, and meantime, problems arise on all sides. Why? Because so long as other groups get support, they won't enter the Council. The MRP is in contact with you and getting arms; now the Unidad Revolucionario. I remain the ridiculous one. Already I've suffered a lot and have a son who is a prisoner. And I've talked a lot during these days, and I keep on being a puppet, but worse than a puppet, because a puppet is moved, but I'm not even moved."

"Therefore, I say to you that the groups that want to work with us, you, the chief of that group, and I, we ought to resolve all these questions; for example, with the chief of the military group, because he has pulled together the professional army and the rebel army (elements) and the army of liberation, such as Varela, Sotus, Nino and the boys, who have come from the Brigade." He declared that SOTUS is a fighter, is willing to return to Cuba, and that he had great confidence in SOTUS.

I assured him that the legalization of SOTUS' residence would be arranged, and that Mr. Hurwitz informed me that he believed something could be done for the other three returnees whose names Dr. Miro had given me.

Dr. Miro reiterated that he must speak clearly, that he could not continue thus as a travelling president without having anything to give to his people — nothing to the underground through Council action; nor could he be ignorant of plans which he opposed where Cubans go out to die, and then having their relatives come to him as responsible. He declared, "I don't want to live on a budget, preside over an administrative office, receive people, tell them lies, saying, "We shall see." The men who are here (in Council) representing organizations must know something of what they are going to do and if they ask for 40 rifles, I must be able to say, "Here they are" - not to give arms directly into their hands - but through a contact for this. Otherwise you people make your plans, and I'll retire from everything. And be assured that never, never will I say a single word against the Agency or the United States, never; nor explain reasons which shouldn't be explained.

"If I cannot have the responsibility that I should have, I shall not lend myself to what may result in a tragedy. None of the problems I have planted have been resolved; not that of the magistrates nor that of the Escambray, nor the money to the underground, has been resolved, not the plan of propaganda that I gave you. I cannot continue to sit in an office, while you continue operating, as you wish, with my silent consent. You may choose someone else like Mr. Godoy, who is asking for arms. Choose and see whether his name will save Cuba. You are going to create another Fidel, who is nothing.

I reminded him that I had my talks with him only ten days before, not twenty, and that I could talk to no one in Washington until a week ago and had to have many conversations with many people, and that his proposals could not be resolved in such a short time. He returned to the agreement that "plans of action be discussed jointly; that if there were objections, that the objections be discussed. He said there had been no objections so far to discuss; nor objections to propaganda plans. He was to have contact with a representative of C.I.A. to meet with representatives of organizations that want to collaborate, and with Dr. Miro — nothing developed on that! He declared that he should have knowledge of the activities of those that don't want to collaborate; and said each day there will be more, because they want to gain the power for themselves, to act on their own account. He said he knows there is a "Jim" and a "Robert" and others that are doing things.

I assured him he must realize that there were many problems involved in his proposals and that time was essential to work them out. I reminded him of his conversation with Mr. Goodwin and the latters' statement to the effect that there could be no thought in the foreseeable future of a military operation against or invasion of Cuba. Miro countered by referring to his conversation with the President on 18 July and his (Miro's) complaint of inactivity. He said the President proposed the recruiting of Cubans in different units of the Army for training so as to utilize them at the opportune time, and that the officers would be invited to our military schools. Miro said he had gathered some of the military together and informed them of this offer, and the next week he was called to discuss the recruiting, which he approved. Then General Hershey went to see him at his house, telling him that Cubans wouldn't be sent to Berlin or any such place but kept in the U.S. available for use later. Miro said, "If there is to be no invasion, then let's utilize the underground, which needs arms and money."

He again repeated, "There must be massive propaganda; secondly arms; we shall furnish the dead, but I need to know "How are we going to die." He commented that he was going to ask that his photograph not be put on the cover of a certain magazine because he didn't know whether he was going to continue; that in the present circumstances he didn't see how he could continue. Again I urged that he must do so, and that I felt certain that we could resolve some of his proposals, probably not to the extent that he desired, but at least in part, but that time was necessary to accomplish this.

He repeated that the Council needs to have some action taken in Cuba, but the Agency keeps on undertaking actions without any connection with the Council. Further, that he must have the means for conductiong propaganda, such as outlined in the "Operation Grieta." He asked so when could I give him some answers. I replied that during the current week I expected to have meetings in which these matters would be discussed - the Department of State, with Mr. Goodwin, with representatives of the Agency, and that I hoped that something would be resolved, but that he must realize that many people are involved in such matters and solutions are not reached quickly. He reiterated that he had to keep telling his organizations "wait a little longer" and that this was becoming embarrassing.

Then he brought up his proposal of having him and the Council go to Cuba, saying "perhaps it would be advantageous that I die in Cuba; that the Council ask recognition from Cuban soil and the military aid of the United States -- all to take place within 48 hours. He added, "I have told you of the reaction of Cardinal Snellman, "We have done very badly in the Cuban affair."

I reminded him that despite the urgency that we all recognized in the Cuban situation and its threat to the United States and all the Americas, there are many other world problems - Laos, Berlin, etc., - which also occupy the attention of our government people.

Then I said I wished to take advantage of our meeting to ask him for information relative to his current budget; first, did he believe that there were any people receiving a salary from the Council who might also be getting financial aid from H.E.W. He said, "No, I would never permit that." Then he declared that he had two ways of operating when he absorbed the personnel of the various organizations into the CRC: either to cut off their salaries suddenly, or to put them to work for their pay; that the "nomina" (payroll) grew a little bit because he had to take in certain people, and that he considered his absorbing them was according to the policy of C.I.A. Then he declared that the maximum benefit received by refugees from H.E.W. was $100 per family per month, and that no where here could a family live on a hundred a month. Hence, he did not feel that he could cut off the people on the staffs of the CRC organizations, and send them to the H.E.W. Therefore, they were assigned to the different

"The money for the underground is much and contact is doubtful, an excuse. The problem of Cuba costs a lot of money! The people of the Escambray - it's difficult to deliver arms to them? But we are going to run that risk. The arms are going to be lost? Well, risks must be taken." Miro again referred to the groups that didn't want to collaborate with the Council but would collaborate directly with the Agency stating that he had opposed it and still opposed it; that he received a very affectionate letter asking him to try work out all the problems between us and accept a solution, and that a representative would be designated to work with him; that I had appeared and he had spent two very pleasant days with me; that I was very understanding; that twenty days had passed of great anxiety. ("Not twenty but ten," I interposed.) He said he figured that probably he might have arms and help for the underground and know about plans of action and had felt strengthened. "But" he said, "now I feel knocked down. None of the plans or propaganda proposals have been accepted, none. The firing wall in Cuba continues functioning, 31 dead in 30 days. My resignation has been written long ago, and I am ready to submit it as soon as I return to Miami."

I declared that he must not do that, that he must have patience., that it takes time to resolve these things; He replied that he has been waiting since April and mentioned all the suffering he had gone through, attacks by everyone, mothers of prisoners and dead, the American Press, Fortune, Time, Life, New York Times, etc., all against him along with ALABAU Trelles, and others; and that he had supported all of this in silence. He had been asked it it were true that there was no air support and had not answered. "The other time I kept my lips closed with absolute faith, the next time I shall have my eyes open and have many questions. I don't understand how you people can deal with some of these unknown Cubans.

He said, "I've given many proofs of loyalty to you. What they attribute to me the other day in Miami that "there would be an invasion in a few days", that is not true. I have a tape recording of what I said which was "very soon (without mentioning any date) in Cuba there would be unveiled the great Pascuas (resurrection) of the Fatherland. And the press has misinterpreted Pascuas as the Pascuas de Navidad (Christmas).

"Thus the press comes out with statements attributed to Dr. Miro that the invasion will take place by Christmas, completely a lie and nothing like what I said." I conceded to Dr. Miro that he had suffered a tremendous number of attacks in silence and that the press had over a period of time come out with critical remarks. I asked him if he planned to pass through Washington before returning to Miami and he said he didn't have money for such expenses; that his wife was terribly worried about their son, but that he would have to remain in New York until Wednesday to attend the luncheon for all the editors of the Latin American press, who want to converse with him, to help with propaganda but without costing the U.S. a cent.

commissions within the CRC: finance, propaganda, clandestine, military, organization, etc. The ones who are no good or don't want to work, he said, he would cut off, but that he couldn't just fire someone suddenly. He then said salaries were small @ $200, $225 per month as an average except for particular individuals, such as his assistant Aragon, a very capable person, and the chiefs of the various organizations who work "full time" and receive $400 each; further that he planned to give each organization approximately $700 per month for their operating expenses, some less, some a little more - (MRR, Rescate, 30 de Nov, 20 de Mayo, AAA Independientes, Montecristi).

When I questioned whether the Montecristi organization was still in the CRC, he said it was, that only Justo Carillo had dropped out of the CRC but the group remained in and had a new head. He added that he had just had a request from Carillo to provide him (Carillo) with a thousand dollars; that Carillo had photographic copies of some checks that he had paid to Waldo Frank for propaganda activities against Cuba and that Carillowas asking reimbursement but Miro said he didn't consider he had to give it to Carillo.

Returning to the budget, Miro Said, "There are the various employees; there is the item of trips; there are the military people grouped under the military commission - I cannot let them suffer misery. There are no students on the payroll because they are being supported by you (the Agency). And right there a difference is established between those in the Council and those who receive money from the Agency directly, which is more than that received by my people. See how you (the Agency) without intending to, and for reasons of insecurity, are going to destroy the Council." He then stated that he had placed Alvarez Dias, who had been Minister of Finance, in charge of finance matters because he (Miro) could not be everywhere, and to make certain that no expenses were paid on which they were not in agreement, and which Paula would carry out.

I querried whether Paula would continue as accountant, and Miro said, "certainly, as accountant." He said that everyone has been coming to him (Miro) with all kinds of pleas for money and therefore it was necessary to have Alvarez Diaz in there so that he and Paula might resolve the finance matters. Miro added words of praise for Paula, "It's like I want to have for each section of the Council, like I wanted Conte Aguero to handle propaganda, but since he is receiving money from you (the Agency) he doesn't want to. I have to have someone to take this load off of me; first as in Naval affairs, someone to lock for boats, arms, etc."

I asked about Mestre for propaganda and Miro replied that Mestre is no good, never was of value; that he had been put in charge of the propaganda commission previously and given $48,000 monthly, but had done nothing. Then he launched into a criticism of the Swan propaganda; that it was a shame, handled by Batistianos: Fernandes VARELA, a Catholic; Suares Hernandes, a senator in the epoch of Batista. He named another (sounded like Chau Miller) a bad person and a Batistero. Miro said he had asked that Swan be stopped but, since they work directly, these people are defended. He added wryly that he wished they (the Agency) would defend him (Miro) that way.

He said they (the Agency) had posed the problem five months ago in Miami relative to Joaquin, Sagerio, a Cuban who was working with the Council and has worked magnificently, but then he accepted work with the C.I.A. and continues doing this (and does whatever he pleases) — intelligence, arms, recruiting, etc. — and will have nothing to do with the Council.

Again Miro declared that he had the highest regard for Paulo and couldn't desponse with him; had even proposed his name to be the Magistrate of the Tribunal of Accounts in the future government of Cuba. I added my understanding that Paulo had done an excellent job, particularly mentioning his handling of paying dependents, a meticulous and arduous task. Miro exclaimed that he had never considered replacing Paula but merely needed Alvarez Diaz to handle details with Paula. He said everyone in Miami knows it is Paula who has the money to make payments by check, and that he thought it would be better for the people to get payments in cash and sign a receipt; that sometimes someone might rob Paula and then people will ask "from where does this money come," since the Cubans have no money."

Then Dr. Miro said he would like to clarify any doubtful questions. I asked whether he had received any other communication from the Escambray group. He replied that he had not, but that the one had come through the Montecristi group and they continued to ask him for this arms aid. I asked whether any changes or additions had been made in the Council at the October 10th meeting. He replied that the MRP had not answered his invitation because they were working with the Agency, and that the new group, the Union Revolucionario, had replied that they did not, because they have a delegate in Washington who is seeking direct contact with U.S. Government Agencies.

Miro then declared that in order to call a Council meeting, he had to have a press conference or a press release (about calling a CRC meeting) but Prio, ALABAU, and everybody were against all this, and were doubtful whether to come or not to come. "I talked with Conte Aguero and with Arrellano many hours. Arreliano is a fuehrer; if things aren't done as he wants, he won't go along. Moreover, he has a strong anti-American sentiment. I talked to them, but they said, "No." "There were two problems: their lack of confidence in the Government, and my contradictory view that we want to be with them (with U.S.). I would like to have had to call a Council meeting almost by force. Therefore I decided to have no meeting and no press conference, and to come here (to New York City). There was no session //

"The Bastistianos are very well organized and also the Prio followers, waiting for me to do something, and I cannot do anything. I'm like St. Lawrence, roasted on one side and fried on the other."

I asked whether the Council was looked upon too much as a political entity rather than a unifying medium. Miro replied, "Those people (Prio, Alabau, etc.) want to obstruct the ones who are fighting Castro through the medium of the Council. They are divided into two groups: (1) Politicians; Prio, Alonso Pujol; those that want to be the directors; (2) The groups that want to act within Cuba who don't want to join CRC but rather to deal directly with you people in order to have the power tomorrow in Cuba; people only of action, but not of common sense and who cannot mean much to the future of Cuba; they would cause another era like that of Fidel, who is nothing but a student. That is extremely dangerous. You give these people the means and if one of them overthrows Fidel he is the one who assumes power. He may be a good man of action but only 24 or 25 years old and not one who can orient Cuba in the way of democracy. After reaching 40, people think differently. Fighters are capable of carrying out the action you give them to do, but not to govern.//

Dr. Miro continued to dwell on his concern as to the future if these young fighters are given a free hand to do as they please; that care must be taken as to who is supported, that those people are the ones who don't want to work with us; that the MRP hopes that it will be the one who will lead tomorrow in Cuba; that caos of the future will be something to which you the U.S. has contributed by supporting such elements.

Dr. Miro commented in further detail his views and again hammered on the manner of using funds to avoid being like the ostrich. "Everyone knows where the money is coming from and we have to be careful of the form. Everyone does not know of you, but of where the help is coming from"

"We are the politicos of the war against Castro," affirmed Dr. Miro. Let a military man function as chief of staff as long as the military action against Castro continues, but then the civil action must be carried out by non-military men."

He added that during the softening-up action against Castro, we must take good care of the manner in which the action is taken to avoid exposing the U.S. support; and that he considered that the collateral, independent groups were not safeguarding it; so we are losing time now as you (U.S. Agencies) deal with each of those groups. And we must not lose, we must win.

I told Dr. Miro that I was anxious to work out some manner of linking these groups with Dr. Miro and the Council, without having to channel direction and funds through Dr. Miro, since these groups are now functioning well under existing arrangements.

Dr. Miro said he would be pleased to meet with them outside of the Council, and they may continue to function as collateral organizations independently; but that they realize that they have one direction. Dr. Miro added that like the independent magistrates with their attitude — they are injuring the Council.

Dr. Miro commented that he wanted the magistrates to have an election and select their leader according to the results of a vote. He reiterated that all the collateral organizations must operate within the orbit of the Council; and that he would be glad to discuss with them their opinions just as he as a professor had done with students—often times resulting in excellent ideas and viewpoints.

Then I mentioned that I had read in one of our magazines a laudatory item describing his demonstrated capabilities as a mediator between political groups and individuals.

Dr. Miro again returned to his belief that funds of all organizations should funnel through the Council because every Cuban has a sense of smell that inclines him to go where he knows the money is dispensed; that this is sad but true; and that those who are still outside and hope to get direct support, if they knew that the money was here (in his hands), would come running without urging. He then said that he had seven hundred dollars, more or less, for each organization's operating expenses. He concluded by saying that he didn't wish to operate without us (Agency) or without any of the Agency people, but merely desired to pull together the diverse groups and other activities.

He then referred to his conversations with Mr. Berle and General Taylor, and his view expressed to them that in the April affair he felt that the Agency had functioned more or less effectively — sometimes their people had been "rough", or "tough", but that he had no complaint; that the lack of air cover no doubt caused defeat. When he had been querried by reporters and other on specific questions designed to pry secrets out of him, he had replied, "I didn't see them," or similiar evasions, and thus had endeavored to be loyal to us.

He said his son had been certain that his father would be with the expeditionary force, and, in route to the Bay of Pigs from Guatemala the son had searched for him on the boats, and was disillussioned because his father wasn't there.

Again he emphasised his view that the students sent to Latin American countries on propaganda missions should be indoctrinated by people in the Council to prepare them for the cross examining that they would undergo, and thereby prepare them against traps and foolish statements; and to insure that no Batista supporters were sent out. He emphasized that one of the first questions asked of these propaganda emissaries would be "With what money do you come here?" "What Yankee organization is behind you." He added, "The people have to be well prepared to answer; just as I had to undergo a succession of penetrating questions when I first went into exile in Argentina and could answer them without hesitation because of a clean record."

Again he came back to his argument that the collatoral organizations should function through the Council - not "forgotting the Agency, but not being forgotten by the Agency." I told Dr. Miro that I hoped during the course of the week to have a series of conversations in the course of which certain decisions and solutions would be reached that would enable me to sit down with him the following week and work out some details on propaganda and other matters.

Dr. Miro then asked, "How best can the security of this nation be insured - the Agency dealing directly with these people or working with them through Miro?" And he emphasized that he was concerned both with the security of Cuba and of the United States, and that these people (Cubans with whom the Agency is dealing directly) at any moment when they felt they were losing out or were not sufficiently paid - would ask for more, and, being Cubans, might be very indiscrete; but that if they had to deal with Miro they would be obligated to go to him with their complaints. He said that just as a bee seeking sweets will go to any source, but if there is only one source it will go to that one; and that thus all groups must look to the Council.

Again Dr. Miro returned to his thesis that sooner or later there must be war to overthrow Castro, and that Cubans and Americans must realise this; that as a preliminary the Cubans must carry out sabotage, etc., but just as blockades didn't overthrow Franco or Mussolini, neither would they cause the fall of Castro; further that if sabotage was conducted without being a part of an overall plan of missions, the people inside Cuba would come to react adversely to the sabotage and align themselves with Castro.

He then expressed his view that time is being sadly wasted in trying to bring the Latin American countries into agreement with the U.S. against Castro, because, unfortunately, many are ruled by dictators and they fear concerted action against themselves, but if the U.S. attacks and destroys Castro they will applaud. Again he repeated that the Punta del Este agreement might well cause many countries to say, "Thank you Fidel, and not, thank you Mr. Kennedy."

Dr. Miro emphasized that he wanted to collaborate with us fully. Then the conversation turned to the dissolution of the FRD by Varona, and Dr. Miro declared that this step was difficult for Varona, to take because he had been its cheef and in a high position and had thus submitted to the Council. He declared his esteem for Varona, a very brusque man but very honest. He said Varona had declared with respect to the Argentine documents that, "They are in Miami. I don't feel like sending them to Argentina because they don't belong to Argentina. They belong to the thief; that is Castro. Argentina has diplomatic relations with Cuba and if it feels like it, will send the documents to Cuba." Varona declared in the SIP that the Argentin military men had deceived him because, having stated that they didn't trust the Argentine Foreign Office, they nevertheless took to Argentina the three documents that were given to them and upon arrival turned them over to the Foreign Office. Miro added that Varona stated this clearly in the SIP meeting where two Argentine delegates were present. They said, "Without mentioning names, Doctor, do you declare this before the SIP?" "Yes, I declare it," he replied, "and they shut up.

Miro added that Varona had declared last night, "Let them give us arms to finish off with Castro, but give them to us! Whoever has them, give them to us! Dr. Miro then declared, "We are willing to disembark, but here we are just playing hide and seek."

Dr. Miro then referred to his view that Diario de las Americas should receive a small subsidy; that sometimes it published articles unfavorable to the U.S. but that usually, and if subsidized, would eliminate adverse items.

Then I returned to the subject of the budget and concern that some on the Council payroll might also be on H.E.W. payroll. He replied that for October he would have them swear that they were receiving no other money and remarked that many are on the payroll. He enumerated the different sections - delegations in Latin American countries, each person (two or three at most in each country) received only enough to live on; without operating funds. He said each chief of organization in the Council received $400, "which is very little."

He added that during the past month with funds left over, he had sent to Mexico $3,000 because some 240 people had arrived there in need and hungry. He said C.I.A. aided with $5,000 and he had sent $3,000 because they were Cubans. Further, that he had provided each organization with $700 for its expenses of mailing, offices, car, etc., but that this wasn't a fixed sum. He added that whatever was left over he wanted to send to Cuba to those who are fighting there.

He declared , "As for me they can reduce the budget to the minimum provided that they send funds to Cuba; but my problems must be resolved. This payroll was promised to me when I was made president of the Council, and I didn't create it."

I querried about the expenses of his recruitment section, and he said he had told Paula to eliminate that item since recruiting is now done elsewhere, but the military personnel in recruiting should be grouped in the military so that some form of intelligence agency could be maintained to provide information.

He affirmed that his military staff really consisted of three officers (Varela, Desmaigre, Monteagudo) but that they had expenses of office, transportation, and secretarial help. As for his Social Welfare section, he said this had been established by C.I.A. and was necessary for dispensing medicines, etc., for Cuban refugees here.

He declared that he hadn't touched any of the expenses (inherited from FRD) except operating expenses, in order to give him a margin of funds to meet unforeseen urgent expenses.

He said, "I told Paula to eliminate all that could be eliminated; naturally he would have to consult with you." (Agency)

Relative to the Naval section he said he planned to eliminate their expense allowance but not the section itself, because he deems it essential for matters such as sending arms to Cuba, since they cannot be sent by air; and that an office is necessary for them but their expenses must be cut off slowly.

As for the Medical Section which had been created before, he said only two "mutilados" (casualties) remained and that the section was to be eliminated. He reiterated that these sections had been created by us (Agency) and that they could only be eliminated gradually.

He affirmed that there was left for his use only some eleven or twelve thousand dollars for matters such as attendance at the SIP and Lacerda affairs, and such minor propaganda affairs, but that he felt he should have restored to him the funds for propaganda (that had been going through Mestre).

I assured him that it was certainly intended that the Propaganda Commission now function under him as the Propaganda section of the Council and that if Mestre was not considered to be its chief, that he should designate someone else. He declared that Mestre was in New York, had talked to Varona yesterday, and asked Varona what he should do, to which Varona replied, "Resign."

Miro then said he would like to put Conte Aguero in as head of propaganda but that Conte would not agree unless he told him to. Miro mentioned that the staff which Mestre had was very good but that Mestre was no good because he wanted to spend the whole day at a swimming pool. He mentioned Angel del Cerro, Fermin Peinado, Ruben Dario Rurbaud. He said Angel del Cerro would be a good chief of propaganda, but that for this he would also like a good adviser such as Conte, who really is no good except to talk, but would like to be president. Miro said

Humberto Medrano, a reporter, also would be good to direct propaganda efforts. He added that Mestre, chief of propaganda for the FRD, which no longer exists, is the one who continues receiving the propaganda funds from Paula. He declared that he (Miro) didn't control these funds; that he didn't have anything except a bureaucracy.

I told him that I considered this problem of propaganda section and its operators should be corrected right away. He added that he felt that Radio Swan should be put under the propaganda section of the Council; further, that the propaganda section had to quit sending printed matter to the Latin American countries and instead send a format to each country so that they could be printed there with the terms used in each country; in Argentina, in Argentine style; in Brazil, in Portuguese; in Panama, in the manner of speaking in Panama; that such propaganda must be paid for. He affirmed that Humberto Medrano was a great reporter and hard worker and could handle this well; that Fermin Peinado was a fine worker who now is having a struggle to live, but works well at propaganda matters.

Again ~~I~~ he said that the propaganda funds should pass through his control, and that I ~~would~~ take this up upon my return to Washington. Again he declared that he felt plans must be made for him and the Council to return to Cuba. I said this was a matter for the future.

We terminated our meeting with my statement that it would probably not be till the following week when I would return to Miami, after getting matters resolved in Washington. He said that he would probably be returning to Miami on Wednesday after the Press luncheon.

I added that if it seemed desirable for him to come to Washington en route to Miami, I would call him; that otherwise I would look forward to seeing him in Miami. I said I felt we had covered a lot of ground, and thanked him for giving me so much of his time to our meeting.

Again he reiterated that he desired responsibility for all groups and that if he wasn't considered to be the right one, that he was ready and willing to resign. Upon this, we finished and I excorted him to the elevator of the hotel.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
JMZIP/Operational - Contact with Dr. MIRO Cardona

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

For your information, transmitted herewith is a report of contact with subject written by Theodore F. PASSAVOY, and a memo of WH/4 comments.

(END OF DISPATCH)

Copy in AMBUD File

Attachment - 1

DATE TYPED 19 Oct 61	DATE DISPATCHED 20 OCT 1961
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW-606	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.

2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:

a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.

(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.

(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Operacion Grieta."

c. Underground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian Embassy).

(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to me on 6 October.

3. Commando Plan

Then Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners.

With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and material provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our meeting at 15:30 on 6 October for transmission.)

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray

Dr.MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.

COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime

Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit.* He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."

* Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.

He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference." "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S."

6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban Soil

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and establish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. "This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognize that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and immediately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in adequate strength to ensure victory.

Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government ~~through propaganda~~, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.

Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't considered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us." "The unta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries receiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers

I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He declared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRO and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named LABAU to the

Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescate
30 de Noviembre
MRR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi

He said he had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night

from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says, "Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Socieded Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutes to address the meeting."

10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian who Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after 11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brazil. MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark.

11. Propaganda Commission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is outside the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CARRILLO had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-

nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and reestablishment of order in the island.

13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferson 2-4680). So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me."

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation - merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance."

14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile Groups

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I understood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organizations to be able to discuss the matter effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October, I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

the ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He expressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise to me.

16. Comment

During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals. I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
FROM Rome

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 15 TOTAL COPIES
24 SECRET
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	RC	✓	DDP
2		✓	MO
✓	FI	✓	CI
✓	RR	✓	CA

ACTION C/WE-3 ☒ RID COPY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C-5, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/EE-3, C/RI/SD, C/CA-2

S E C R E T 111755Z

11 MAR 65 IN 73315

DIR LISB INFO WAVE NILA (POUCH) CITE ROME 9301

DESENSITIZED [illegible]Y AY/TYPIC/DELORRY

1. DELORRY (D) ARRIVED ITALY 9 MARCH, ROME 10 MARCH. RETURNING FROM HOME 15 MARCH TO SUBMIT DETAILED REPORT.

2. ETA CUBA ABOUT 1 APRIL. AT SUGGESTION FIDEL (F) GIVING DINNER PARTY FOR HIM SOON THEREAFTER.

3. D SAYS ANNIE DE QUENDOZ (Q) (NO STA TRACES) WIFE (BUT GETTING DIVORCE) OF SWISS CHANCELLOR IN HAVANA, WAS MISTRESS OF BOTH "CHE" GUEVARA AND F, CONTINUES RELATIONS WITH F. DIP COMMUNITY GIVING HER COLD SHOULDER BUT D HAS TAKEN PAINS BE FRIENDLY, FOR WHICH BOTH SHE AND F GRATEFUL. D SAYS CAN GAIN DIRECT ACCESS F THROUGH Q IN ANY EMERGENCY. Q DAUGHTER HIGH-RANKING PORTUGUESE POLICE OFFICIAL. MOTHER IS NITA S. PAIS, RUA MOZAMBIQUE, 52-1-DTO LISBON. Q GAVE D LETTER TO MOTHER. HAVE OPENED, PHOTOED, WILL POUCH. RQST TRACES Q.

4. GERMAN (AMADO-BLANCO) Y FERNANDEZ (201-784008) GAVE D MIN OF FOREIGN TRADE ENVELOPE CONTAINING TWO LETTERS FOR LUIS AMADO-BLANCO (201-276972). ALSO PHOTOED, WILL POUCH.

SECRET

AMLASH-1

9

SECRET IN 17315 Pg2

5. D ON GOOD TERMS WITH ROGELIO (MONTENEGRO) GUASP (M). PREPARING REPORT. M WAS SCHEDULED LEAVE HAVANA ONE HOUR AFTER D FOR PRAGUE TO MEET MANUEL ("MANOLITO") (PEREZ) HERNANDEZ BEFORE COMING ROME. ACCORDING HAVANA RUMOR M TO KEEP EYE ON RICARDO (SUBIRANA) Y LOBO (201-333831), WILL BECOME DE FACTO CHIEF OF CUBEMB TO QUIRINALE. D SUSPECTS M HAS CUIS TIES. ENERGETIC COMMY.

6. D ALSO ON GOOD TERMS WITH SAVERIO TUTINO (201-353093) WHO GAVE HIM FOUR LETTERS WHICH COULD NOT SAFELY OPEN. POUCHING NAMES ADDRESSEES. TUTINO TOLD D AMLASH/1 AND AMTRUNK/10 CERTAINLY GUILTY. BUT F LETTER SUGGESTING CLEMENCY CAUSED RUMORS OF PRIOR DEAL. ALSO MANY RUMORS STUDENTS CHALKED "VIVA A/1" AND "VIVA A/10" ON WALLS BUT D DID NOT SEE. FOR TWO DAYS AFTER ARRESTS GOC PUT CONTROLS ON MANY KEY FIGURES.

7. BECAUSE PROTESTANT CLERICS IN CUBA SUBJECT TO MIL DUTY, HAVE PROTESTED RE DRAFT-EXEMPT STATUS CATHOLIC PRIESTS, WHOM GOC MAY START DRAFTING. CESARE ZACCHI (201-753588) WORRIED GOC-VATICAN RELATIONS MAY SUFFER.

8. CUBAMB IN BELGIUM, GUSTAVO (ARCOS) Y BERGNES PRESENTLY IN SOME DISFAVOR. IS ALLEGED TO HAVE MADE ANTI-REGIME REMARKS.

9. INDEX Q AND M.

SECRET

End of message

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

12-62

ORIG : [illegible]/cab
UNIT : [illegible]/SA/[illegible]/[illegible]APROP
EXT : 1496
DATE : 4 FEB. 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-728707
201-142291
201-252234

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

5 FEB 65 23 19z

TO : PARIS JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/SA 8

INFO: VR, FILE, DDP, WE 6, CI, CI/OPS, ~~CI/IC, FI, FI/D~~, [illegible], SOD 6

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

~~MOB~~	INT	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
INFO EOB	RPTS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	BF	~~HH~~
		SEC	NS

CITE DIR 83150

TO PARI WAVE

TYPIC AMLASH AMTRUNK

REFS: A. UFGA 19569, 22 JAN 1965 (NOT SENT PARI)

B. PARI 8986 (IN 71959)* *REF RYBAT

1. FOR WAVE: PLS SEE PARA 15 OF REF A. MRS. A-9 FEARS THAT AMTRUNK-9 WAS CAUGHT CARDENAS MATANZAS AREA 7 JAN MAY BE ALLAYED IF SHE SHOWN ARTICLE MIAMI HERALD 9 JAN WHICH STATED FOUR PERSONS CAUGHT WHILE ATTEMPTING LAND 7 JAN AND SEVEN OTHERS WERE BEING SOUGHT DUE ATTEMPT LAND. AS A-9 DEPARTED ON 21 DEC WITH ONLY TWO PERSONS SEEMS UNLIKELY DID NOT ARRIVE BEFORE 7 JAN OR THAT HE IN GROUP REFERRED TO.

2. ALSO, CASTRO, CITED IN CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 29 JAN, SAID ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO LANDED FIRST WEEK JAN AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY SPOTTED AND REPORTED TO AUTHORITIES BY CUBAN FARMERS. THUS SEEMS LIKELY GROUP OF FOUR CAUGHT 7 JAN, AND SEVEN OTHERS SOUGHT, COULD BE PART OF WHAT CASTRO CALLED THE 20-30 MAN GROUP INFILTRATING ON GUTIERREZ' ORDERS.

3. FOR WAVE: IF MRS. A-9 KNOWS NAMES OF A-9'S TWO CREWMEN, WISH ADVISE SEARCH SI TRAFFIC SINCE VARIOUS NAMES/PERSONS CAUGHT DURING LANDING PERIOD AND SHORTLY AFTER CITED THEREIN.

AMLASH-1 file

RELEASING OFFICER

5-32

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible]

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

DEFERRED [illegible]
ROUTINE

2ND PAGE

TO INFO CITE DIR 83150

83159

4. VIEW ABOVE, SUGGEST WAVE MAY WISH ATTEMPT PERSUADE MRS. A-9 NOT TRY LOCATE A-9 VIA MRS. GPIDEAL OR MEXI PRESIDENT UNTIL AMLASH-1 AFTER RETURN CUBA ON 10 FEB HAS HAD TIME LOCATE A-9 VIA AMTRUNK-10, AS CITED REF B. IF CASTRO'S SERVICES STILL UNAWARE A-9 'S POSSIBLE PRESENCE CUBA, MRS. A-9'S ATTEMPTS LOCATE HIM MAY ALERT THEM.

5. FOR PARI: SINCE A-9 MAY HAVE BEEN CAUGHT, PLS ASK AMLASH-1 TELL AMTRUNK-10 NOT TRY LOCATE A-9 VIA ANY OF FOLLOWING WHOM A-10 MAY KNOW: FISHERMAN CANDIDO DIAZ IN CARDENAS AREA; PEDRO BARBI (OR BALBI) FEBLES, OWNER OF BATE MARINO RESTAURANT IN CARDENAS: MARIO GIL GONZALEZ, DGI OFFICER HAVANA; JOSE VAZQUEZ NEREY AND THREE UNNAMED OTHERS (TWO OF WHOM ACSI AGENTS) ALL HIDING IN HOME OF GLORIA CABRERA IN HAVANA; ALSO, GLORIA CABREAR HERSELF, AS MRS. A-9 DOES NOT TRUST HER SINCE GLORIA WITH REGIME UNTIL RECENTLY. MRS. A-9 LISTED ALL ABOVE AS A-9'S PROBABLE CONTACTS ON TRIP.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SA/EOB/MHAPRON
WH/SA/EOB Bastittas
WH/SA/MOB (Mr. Cini in Draft)
WE/3

Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFIC 'S PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

AMLASH/1

WW

MESSAGE FORM 6

S E C R E T/RYBAT

ORIG: W. WAINWRIGHT/dl
UNIT: WH/SA/EOB
EXT: 6153
DATE: 2/FEB/1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	7FEB65 +9
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SIG CEN

TO: PARIS ROME

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO: DDP, VR, FILE

MOB I&T SS SB
ICS PERS AR
EOB [illegible] LOG CA
CI [illegible] [illegible] ~~WH~~
CITE DIR SEC ~~NS~~

TO IMMEDIATE PARI INFO ROME (PRIORITY)

DIR 87801

DESENSITIZED TYPIC YOBITE AMLASH MHAPRON

REF: PARI 8964 (IN 71838)

For Patrick

1. ACCORDING ROME 2136 (IN 40005) SUBJ REF IS BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO (DELLUNDE) Y PUYANS, DPOB 12 DEC 08 SANTIAGO CUBA. CREDIT MANAGER ROME HILTON WITH WHOM ROME STATION IN INFREQUENT CONTACT UNDER ODACID COVER. ASSESSED AS WILLING AID KUBARK BUT EXPERIENCE TO DATE (MAR 64) INDICATED DOUBT THERE MUCH POTENTIAL PBRUMEN OPS VALUE.

2. ABOVE INFO CABLED IN RESPONSE FROB 7180 (IN 38061) WHICH REQUESTED TRACES VENTURA F. DELLUNDE, CUBAN NATIONAL WHO ASSOCIATED HILTON HOTEL ROME. SUBJ ABOUT 45 YEARS, FORMER VP CUBAN RAILROADS, ALLEGEDLY WELL CONNECTED CUBAN EXILES EUROPE. FAMILY FORTUNE SEIZED BY CASTRO GOVT, SUBJ FATHER DIED OF HEART ATTACK SHORTLY AFTER. MARRIED, ONE CHILD, FAMILY IN ROME WITH SUBJ.

3. OIRA-39287 DESCRIBES 16 JAN 65 ROME MEETING WITH SUBJ, BUNCE, GROWERY, DURING WHICH SUBJ PROVIDED OPS LEADS AND INFO. LEFT KUBARKERS WITH EXCELLENT FIRST IMPRESSION.

4. NO OTHER HQS TRACES SUBJ REF.

WW

5. DEFER TO ROME ANSWER [illegible] REMAINING QUESTIONS PARAS 1,2 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER 2-7

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T/RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONT.......
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET/RYBAT

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 81501

WH/SA/EOB
WE/3
WE/4
WE/5
EE/G

THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET/RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

24 SECRET

RR ☐ COPY ☒

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Jmwave

ACTION DC/WH/SA-3

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, (Suspense-2), RI/AN Dummy CS/RF

S E C R E T 142313Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7141

15 Jan 65 IN 60147

DESENSITIZED TYPIC YOBITE SMAPRON AMWORLD

1. 30 NOV 64 AMDENIM-16 ACQUIRED FOLLOWING INFO FROM ARMANDO (MARTINEZ) Y VIRELLES:

A. MRR VERY ACTIVE AT PRESENT AND SUPPORTED BY AND COOPERATING WITH KUBARK. OVERTHROW OF CASTRO WOULD TAKE PLACE ANY TIME AFTER JAN 65. MANY IMPORTANT PEOPLE WITHIN GOC ARE ENGAGED THIS CONSPIRACY. CUBANS BEING INFILTRATED WITH HELP CASTRO'S OWN PEOPLE. LATTER ARE WAITING FOR RIGHT TIME START INTERNAL REVOLT.

B. MARTINEZ TOLD BY MRR CONTACTS NOT BE SURPRISED IF VERY IMPORTANT PERSON IN CASTRO GOVT LEADS CUBAN UPRISING. NAME OF (FNU) ALMEJEIRAS WAS QUOTED AS EXAMPLE. (STA COMMENT: ALMEJEIRAS PROBABLY EPIGENIO (ALMEJEIRAS Y DELGADO, 201-250391).

C. MARTINEZ MEMBER MRR AND COORDINATOR FROM BANES AREA. HE THROUGHLY DEBRIEFED ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF BANES AREA BY OTHER MRR PERSONNEL.

2. MARTINEZ STATED HIS INFORMATION SOURCE IS TUTO (ALOMA). (STA COMMENT: ALOMA IS ERENESTO (ALOMA) SABAS, 201-297785, MRR MEMBER FROM ORIENTE. INDEX.

SECRET

A-MLASH-1

14

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : W. WAINWRIGHT/dl
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 27/JAN/1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

27 SECRET/~~RYBAT~~

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

27 JAN 65 20z

TO : JMWAVE PARIS
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: DC/WH/SA 5
INFO DDP, ADDP, C/WE 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR, FILE

TO WAVE INFO PARI CITE DIR 80565

DESENSITIZED

TYPIC AMLASH MHAPRON AMGABE

REF: WAVE 7531 (IN 67600) *

CONCUR ACTION PARA 3 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

* PORTELA STATES JEWELER WHO CONTACTED HIM MIAMI HOTEL EARLY FALL 64 BEHALF AMLASH-1 AND AMWHIP-1.

WH/SA/EOB
WH/SA/MOB
WE/3 R. Pierre (telecon)
WE/5/C D. Wright (telecon)

J Flores for
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

201-252234

J Flores for
JOHN L. HART
DC/WH/(SA)
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

27-1

SECRET/~~RYBAT~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

Amlash/1
Commo

T/N: Rolando CUBELA Secades

POSITION: Medical Doctor, Cmdte. Cuban Army
The Cardiovascular Department of Cmdte. Fajardo
Hospital, Havana.

LOCATION: Havana, Cuba

COMMO: S/W system, agent sending - #15136 carbon
agent receiving - #56638 pills

ACC Address: agent sending

Uses true first name or any other first name to AMWHIP/2 (whom he has known for number of years) w/ ~~c/o~~

Business Address (Rome)
Cavaliere Hilton
Jewelry Shop
Monte Mario
Rome, Italy

or Business Address (Geneva)
12 Rue Crespin
Geneva, Switzerland
(Note: AMWHIP/2's business address is same as home: expects get office in Geneva this year.)

Upon receipt of any letter from agent in true first name or from unknown Cuban in Havana, AMWHIP/2 will forward same immediately to AMWHIP/1's business address in New York City.

ACC. Addresses, agent receiving:

Srta Ernestina Acosta
Edif. #526, Apt. 6
Esquina Calles 25 y H.
Habana, Cuba

("Ene" subject's former secretary #8 is top floor Apt. tel 303865)

Return address on letters to Acosta:
Sr Jose Calderon
Palace Hotel
Madrid, Espana

(Emergency):
Virginia Secades
Calle 38 #122
Esquirna Avenida Zoologico
Alturas de Vedado
Havana.

(Subject's mother)

SECRET

Letters to the Acosta signed "Pepe" will contain S/W; letters to the Acosta address signed "Luis" will be written on S/W carbon and indicate resupply of S/W material.

W NOTE: Subject can receive or send S/W messages ~~amt~~ using the AMTRUNK/10 S/W System.

NOTE: Emergency commo: if contact cannot be made through above systems, AMWHIP/1 in NYC can probably arrange a means of contacting subject.

C/O: Wainwright (Formerly)
SANCHEZ

TOTAL COPIES 13 RUN BY ☐ COPY ☒ ...

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

34 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION AC/WHSA 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/DC

S E C R E T 182222Z

19 JAN 65 IN 62258

DIR CITE WAVE 7247

Dir 78971 21 JAN 65

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC AMTRUNK

REFS A. WAVE 6745 (IN 53500

B. WAVE 6877 (IN 55776

C. DIR 75796

D. WAVE 6895 (IN 56238

1. SINCE FORWARDING REF D WAVE PRESSED INVESTIGATION SPONSORSHIP AMTRUNK-9 TRIP. FROM STATEMENTS MADE BY WIFE AMTRUNK-9 TO AMICE-14 AND IDEN A, STATEMENTS FROM A-9 DIRECTLY TO IDEN A AND WRITTEN NOTE FROM AMFAUNA-3 TO A-9, THERE SUBSTANTIAL CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INDICATE ACSI INVOLVEMENT. ON OTHER HAND, ON 15 JAN COS RCVD CATEGORICAL DENIAL BY IDEN B, ACTING CO ACSI WAVE AREA, THAT ACSI OFFICIALLY PARTICIPATING IN ANY WAY AMTRUNK-9 INFIL. IDEN B DID NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY INSUBORDINATION OR MISREPRESENTATION ON PART AMFAUNA-3 AND/OR AGENT HANDLER "TORRES." "JORGE" (SEE PARA 2 REF B) HAS SINCE IDENTIFIED HIMSELF TO MRS. A-9 AS "TORRES" WHICH SAME PSEUDO UNDER WHICH ACSI IDENTIFIED AGENT HANDLER IN CHARGE PRELIM DEBRIEFING A-9 RE FORMER ACSI SOURCE JOSE VASQUEZ NEREY.

WAVE 7248 19 JAN 65

②

SECRET

2. AFTER "TORRES" UNANNOUNCED VISIT HOME A-9 13 JAN, WIFE A-9 NOTED LICENSE PLATE NUMBER OF "TORRES'" AUTOMOBILE. PREFIX "630". THIS LICENSE IDENTIFIED AS PLATE BLOCKED AT STATE CAPITAL LEVEL FOR COVERT USE ODYOKE.

3. DESPITE PROBING AND DIRECT ACCUSATION BY MRS. A-9, NEITHER AMFAUNA-3 NOR "TORRES" ADMITTED TO HER FUNDS FOR A-9 TRIP CAME FROM "PENTAGON" WHICH AMFAUNA-3 TOLD MRS. A-9 "TORRES" REPRESENTS. IN RECENT VISITS, A-3 AND "TORRES" ATTEMPTED CONVINCE MRS. A-9 THEY NOT INVOLVED A-9 TRIP. MRS. A-9 FIRMLY BELIEVES A-3 PAYMASTER FOR FUNDS PROVIDED BY "TORRES" THROUGH PARENT ORGANIZATION.

4. AMFAUNA-3 CLAIMS RAISED MONEY FROM FRIENDS BUT MRS. A-9 MAINTAINS SHE OVERHEARD CONVERSATION BETWEEN A-9 AND "TORRES" IN WHICH "TORRES" TOLD A-9 HE COULD NOT SUPPORT HIM DIRECTLY BUT COULD PROVIDE FUNDS WHICH A-9 COULD USE TO PREPARE TRIP. AMTRUNK-9 TOLD IDEN A AMFAUNA-3 PROVIDED FUNDS FOR HIS TRIP WHICH STATEMENT ALSO SUPPORTED BY MRS. A-9. MRS. A-9 HAS NOTE SHE CLAIMS WRITTEN BY AMFAUNA-3 TO A-9 WHERE A-3 MENTIONS SUM $500 FOR A-9 USE BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR TRIP. THE NOTE (WAVE HAS COPY) INDICATED ADDITIONAL $200 FORTHCOMING.

5. 7 JAN WIFE A-9 VISITED BY AMFAUNA-3 AND "TORRES". GIVING FALSE SOURCE, MRS. A-9 STATED SHE HEARD AMTRUNK-15 ARRESTED AND SHE WORRIED BECAUSE A-9 PLANNED CONTACT HIM. AMFAUNA-3 BROKE INTO CONVERSATION TO SAY "WE" PLANNED ENTIRE OP AND IT NOT TRUE A-9 PLANNED CONTACT A-15. "TORRES" MADE NO COMMENT AT A-3'S USE PRONOUN "WE".

6. 13 JAN VISIT IN WHICH "TORRES" CAME ALONE (SEE PARA 2),

MRS. A-9 MADE TWO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO HIM. SHE ASKED THAT SHOULD WORD BE RCVD FROM A-9 THAT HE HIDING OUT, "TORRES' ORGANIZATION" SEND BOAT RESCUE HIM. OTHER REQUEST WAS IF DEFINITE CONFIRMATION A-9 CAPTURED, "TORRES' ORGANIZATION" NEGOTIATE HIS RELEASE THRU DIP CHANNELS. "TORRES" TOLD MRS. A-9 HE WOULD CONSULT HIS ORGANIZATION RE ABOVE.

7. FUNDS EXPENDED A-9 TRIP ESTIMATED CONSERVATELY APPROX $1450 INCLUDING $700 MENTIONED PARA 4 ABOVE; $200 EACH TO TWO FISHERMEN WHICH MRS. A-9 CLAIMS HER HUSBAND PAID; 50 GAL FUEL TANK AMTRUNK-5 BOAT ESTIMATED $100; $41.00 REPAIR OUTBOARD MOTOR (A-9 HAD SHOWN THIS RECEIPT TO IDEN A); AND $100 GIVEN MRS. A-9 BY A-3. ACCORDING MRS. A-9 BULK OF $700 SPEND FOR FUEL, FOOD FOR ONE WEK AND OP ITEMS PURCHASED LOCAL ARMY/NAVY STORE. A-3 SUPPLIED ONE M-1 RIFLE AND ONE M-1 CARBINE BUT MRS. A-9 BELIEVES A-9 BOUGHT AMMO.

8. EARLIER ASSUMPTION BY MRS. A-9 OF KUBARK SPONSORSHIP APPARENTLY PLAYED BY AMICE-14 REPEATED DENIALS OP KUBARK-BACKED. NEITHER A-3 NOR "TORRES" CLAIMED KUBARK CONNECTION BUT MRS. A-9 ORIGINALLY ASSUMED IT FROM A-9 PREVIOUS KUBARK AFFILIATION. ALSO VARIANCE BETWEEN STORY A-9 TOLD IDEN A AND MRS. A-9 STATEMENT RE TRIP SPONSORSHIP. A-9 TOLD IDEN A FUNDS PROVIDED BY A-3 THRU KUBARK WHILE MRS. A-9 MAINTAINS A-9 TOLD HER BOTH A-3 AND "TORRES" WORKED FOR "PENTAGON".

9. BOTH WAVE AND ACSI PRESSING INVESTIGATION. WAVE SUPPLYING PERTINENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND ACSI SUPPLYING PHOTO OF AGENT HANDLER "TORRES".

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
DEPUTY CHIEF, WH/SA

INFO

FROM
CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMTRUNK/MHAPRON OPERATIONAL
TRANSMITTAL OF COPY OF MEMO REGARDING AMTRUNK-9 INFIL WHICH PASSED TO ACSI 19 JANUARY 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

A. WAVE-7247
B. WAVE-7248

1. TRANSMITTED UNDER SEPARATE COVER VIA FLEXOWRITER IS A COPY OF THE WAVE MEMO TO ACSI AS PRESENTED TO ACSI ON 19 JANUARY 1965.

2. THE ''CAS SOURCE'' MENTIONED THROUGHOUT THE MEMORANDUM IS AMICE-14. THE ''SUB-SOURCE'' IN PARAGRAPHS 11 THROUGH 14 AND THE ''SUB-SOURCE'' IN PARAGRAPH 24 ARE THE SAME PERSON, IDEN A OF REFS.

3. LATER DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE PASSING OF THIS MEMORANDUM ARE THAT BOTH THE WIFE OF AMTRUNK-9 AND AMICE-14 HAVE IDENTIFIED ''JORGE'' AND ''TORRES'' AS THE SAME PERSON FROM A PHOTOGRAPH PROVIDED BY ACSI AND, PER PARAGRAPH 27, THAT THE WIFE OF AMTRUNK-9 /WHO NOW BELIEVES HER HUSBAND TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER/ IS EXERTING PRESSURE UPON ACSI FOR ODYOKE TO NEGOTIATE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS FOR HER HUSBAND'S RELEASE. REPORTEDLY, THE WIFE OF AMTRUNK-9 HAS ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED PERMISSION FROM ''TORRES'' TO WRITE A LETTER TO THE WIFE OF GPIDEAL PLEADING HER HUSBAND'S CASE.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

ATTACHMENT - USC
WAVE MEMO TO ACSI DATED 19 JAN 65

AMLASH-1 file

DISTRIBUTION
BY TAPE
3 - DC/WH/SA W/ATT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-19569	DATE 22 JANUARY 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-728707

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER ATT TO UFGA-19569 PG 1

MEMORANDUM FOR - ACSI, MIAMI

SUBJECT - INFILTRATION INTO CUBA BY
MODESTO ORLANDO OROZCO BASULTO

1. AT ABOUT 1800 HOURS, 29 DECEMBER 1964, MRS. JOSEFINA LOPEZ ANGULO DE OROZCO, WIFE OF MODESTO ORLANDO OROZCO BASULTO AKA ''BEBO'', TELEPHONED A CAS SOURCE WHO HAS BEEN FRIENDLY WITH OROZCO FOR SEVERAL YEARS. MRS. OROZCO ASKED THE CAS SOURCE TO VISIT HER AT HER HOME THAT EVENING.

2. THE CAS SOURCE ARRIVED LATER THAT EVENING. MRS. OROZCO ASKED THE CAS SOURCE IF HE KNEW THAT HER HUSBAND HAD LEFT FOR CUBA. CAS SOURCE REPLIED THAT HE HAD HEARD RUMORS TO THAT EFFECT. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT HER HUSBAND BECAUSE SHE HAD NOT HEARD A WORD FROM OR ABOUT HIM SINCE HE LEFT WITH 2 OTHERS 8 DAYS PREVIOUSLY, ON 21 DECEMBER 1964. OROZCO HAD PLANNED TO RETURN IN A WEEK. MRS. OROZCO ASKED CAS SOURCE TO TRY TO FIND OUT SOMETHING ABOUT OROZCO THROUGH ''HIS FRIENDS IN CUBA''. CAS SOURCE SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY SINCE HER HUSBAND HAD BEEN A GOOD FRIEND OF HIS BUT THAT HE WOULD NEED SOME DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED TRIP TO HELP HIM IN HIS INVESTIGATIONS.

3. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT HER HUSBAND HAD GONE INTO CUBA TO RESCUE JOSE VASQUEZ NEREY AND 3 OTHERS WHO WERE HIDING IN THE HOME OF AWOMAN NAMED GLORIA CABRERA WHO LIVED AT NO.72 27TH STREET BETWEEN ''N'' AND ''O'', APT. 3, VEDADO, HAVANA. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT THE ADDRESS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO OROZCO BY HORTENSIA ORIZONDO MENESES /ACSI SOURCE NO. 180/. MRS. OROZCO ADDED THAT BOTH SHE AND HER HUSBAND HAD KNOWN GLORIA CABRERA IN THE SIERRA MAESTRAS AND THAT SHE /MRS. OROZCO/ DID NOT TRUST HER BECAUSE ''SHE HAD BEEN COMPLETELY WITH THE REGIME UNTIL ONLY A FEW MONTHS AGO''.

4. MRS. OROZCO TOLD CAS SOURCE THAT HER HUSBAND HAD BEEN VISITED ABOUT FIVE TIMES BETWEEN MID-NOVEMBER AND MID-DECEMBER 1964 BY A PUERTO RICAN WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS ''JORGE''. IT WAS ''JORGE'', ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO, WHO TOLD HER HUSBAND OF THE PLIGHT OF JOSE VASQUEZ NEREY. DURING THE SECOND OR THIRD MEETING, ''JORGE'' MENTIONED THE NAME OF ''HORTENSIA'', LATER IDENTIFIED AS HORTENSIA ORIZONDO MENESES, AND, AGAIN ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO, ORIZONDO WAS FROM THAT TIME OROZCO'S CONTACT IN THE VASQUEZ AFFAIR. ALTHOUGH ''JORGE'' DID NOT AT ANY TIME REPRESENT HIMSELF AS CIA, MRS. OROZCO ASSUMED THAT HE WAS SENT BY CIA. THIS ASSUMPTION SHE PASSED ON TO CAS SOURCE. ''JORGE'' NEVER IDENTIFIED THE ORGANIZATION WHICH HE REPRESENTED BUT HE DID TELL MRS. OROZCO THAT HE WAS NOT FROM CIA. ''JORGE'' DID, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO REPRESENT HIMSELF AS HAVING OFFICIAL BACKING FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. ''JORGE'' WAS DESCRIBED AS 5' 6'' TO 8'', MEDIUM BUILD, DARK BROWN SLICKED-BACK HAIR WITH NO PART, DARK BROWN EYES, OLIVE COMPLEXION, ABOUT 33 YEARS OLD, AND SPEAKING NEAR-PERFECT SPANISH.

5. THE CAS SOURCE REMARKED THAT A TRIP OF THIS NATURE REQUIRED A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF MONEY AND SUPPLIES. WHO HAD HELPED OROZCO TO GET THE BOAT, TO EQUIP IT AND FUEL IT AND TO PROVIDE THE OTHER NECESSITIES? MRS. OROZCO REPLIED THAT THE FINDING, EQUIPPING AND READYING OF THE BOAT HAD BEEN HER HUSBAND'S RESPONSIBILITY BUT THAT ORIZONDO HAD PROVIDED THE FUNDS. /AS WILL BE SEEN BELOW, THIS ALLEGATION THAT ORIZONDO WAS THE PAYMASTER FOR OROZCO'S TRIP IS SUPPORTED BY A SIMILAR STATEMENT BY ANOTHER CAS SUB-SOURCE TO WHOM OROZCO TALKED QUITE FREELY ABOUT A WEEK BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE/.

FORM 5-60 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

6. CAS SOURCE ASKED MRS. OROZCO INTO WHICH AREA DID HER HUSBAND INTEND TO INFILTRATE CUBA. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO GO INTO NORTHEASTERN MATANZAS PROVINCE TO THE MARTI AREA WHERE HE HAD SEVERAL CONTACTS WHO HAD HELPED HIM IN THE PAST. CAS SOURCE PRESSED FOR OTHER DETAILS OF THE ACTUAL SITE OF INFILTRATION BUT MRS. OROZCO PROTESTED IGNORANCE OF FURTHER DETAILS. SHE SAID THAT HER HUSBAND HAD WITH HIM AN ''EXPERT'' NAMED ''MATEO'' WHO KNEW THE AREA COMPLETELY. /''MATEO'' WAS LATER IDENTIFIED AS ALBERTO GONZALEZ ORTIZ. CAS FILES INDICATE THAT GONZALEZ HAS MADE A NUMBER OF CLANDESTINE TRIPS TO CUBA WHILE CONTRACTING TO BRING OUT RELATIVES OF EXILES FOR MONEY. HIS REPUTATION IS UNSAVORY BASED UPON THE GENERALLY-ACCEPTED FACT THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO BRING FAMILIES OUT AND HAS FREQUENTLY FAILED TO MAKE GOOD HIS PROMISES. IT IS ALSO A COMMONLY-ACCEPTED FACT AMONG THE EXILE FISHERMEN THAT GONZALEZ WILL NEVER UNDERTAKE SUCH A TRIP UNLESS HE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY PAID OR IS COMPLETELY CERTAIN THAT THE MONEY WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE UPON HIS RETURN/.

7. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW THE NAME OF HER HUSBAND'S INTENDED PRIMARY CONTACT IN THE MARTI AREA. SHE MENTIONED ONE ''CANDIDO'' DIAZ, A FISHERMAN, AND ONE PEDRO BARBI, THE OWNER OF THE BATE MARINO RESTAURANT IN CARDENAS. OROZCO HAD TOLD HIS WIFE THAT HE INTENDED TO SEE THESE PERSONS TO HELP HIM WITH TRANSPORTATION TO HAVANA AND TO PROVIDE HIM WITH FUNDS /MRS. OROZCO CONTENDS--AND IT IS A SORE POINT WITH HER--THAT OROZCO LEFT WITH ONLY A FEW COUNTERFEIT PESOS/. ONCE IN HAVANA, OROZCO PLANNED TO GO FIRST TO THE HOME OF MARIO GIL GONZALEZ /HIS PATRONYMIC HAS ALSO BEEN SPELLED ''HILL''/. FROM THERE, OROZCO PLANNED TO GO DIRECTLY TO THE ADDRESS OF THE CABRERA WOMAN WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM ORIZONDO, PICK UP VASQUEZ AND GROUP AND LEAVE.

8. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT HER HUSBAND TOLD HER THAT HE WOULD SEND A TELEGRAM TO HER AS SOON AS HE REACHED HAVANA SAFELY. SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, HE WOULD SEND ANOTHER CABLE IN PRE-ARRANGED CODE TO INDICATE THAT HE WAS ON HIS WAY OUT. MRS. OROZCO WAS THEN TO CALL ORIZONDO WHO WAS TO ARRANGE AN AIR SEARCH FOR THE BOAT. /AS LATER TOLD BY MRS. OROZCO, INCLUSION OF THE WORD ''BIEN'' /GOOD/ IN A CABLE INDICATED THAT OROZCO WAS SAFE IN HAVANA. INCLUSION OF THE WORD ''SALIO'' /LEFT OR DEPARTED/ WOULD INDICATE THAT HE WAS ON HIS WAY OUT.

9. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT ORIZONDO HAD CALLED HAVANA ON 30 DECEMBER 1964, PRESUMABLY TO THE CABRERA WOMAN'S HOME. VASQUEZ HIMSELF HAD ANSWERED THE PHONE AND STATED THAT THERE WAS NO NEWS FROM OROZCO OR FROM ANYONE ELSE. VASQUEZ AND THE GROUP WERE STILL WAITING FOR CONTACT.

10. CAS SOURCE ASKED MRS. OROZCO HOW MUCH MONEY OROZCO HAD LEFT BEHIND FOR HER SUPPORT. SHE REPLIED THAT HER HUSBAND HAD LEFT $50.00 BUT THAT HE HAD TOLD HER TO RE-CONTACT ORIZONDO IF SHE SHOULD NEED MORE.

11. A CAS SUB-SOURCE REPORTED THAT OROZCO HAD COME TO HIS HOME ON 12 DECEMBER AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE PLANNED TO GO TO CUBA TO RESCUE VASQUEZ. OROZCO SHOWED SUB-SOURCE A RECEIPT FOR $41.00 FOR REPAIR TO AN OUTBOARD MOTOR. OROZCO SAID THAT THE BOAT WAS NOT FAST BUT QUITE SEAWORTHY. OROZCO SAID THAT ORIZONDO HAD PAID THE BILL FOR THE MOTOR REPAIRS AND HAD PROVIDED THE OTHER NECESSARY FUNDS. OROZCO NAMED ORIZONDO AS A PERSON WHOM HE /OROZCO/ HAD BROUGHT OUT OF CUBA AND WHO HAD WORKED IN CUBA UNDER ONE DAVID CABEZAS. AS REPORTED BY SUB-SOURCE, OROZCO TOLD HIM THAT ORIZONDO HAD TOLD HIM OF VASQUEZ' DANGER AND ASKED FOR HIS HELP IN RESCUING HIM. OROZCO TOLD SUB-SOURCE THAT HE HAD REPLIED THAT HE WOULD DO ANYTHING TO HELP HIS FRIEND VASQUEZ BUT THAT HE WANTED TO KNOW WHO THE PEOPLE WERE BEHIND HER /ORIZONDO/. ORIZONDO HAD REPLIED THAT SHE WAS GOING TO PUT HIM IN TOUCH WITH A PERSON WHO SPOKE FLUENT SPANISH BUT WAS NOT CUBAN. THIS WAS ''JORGE'' AND FROM WHAT SUB-SOURCE IS ABLE TO RECONSTRUCT OROZCO MET ''JORGE'' IN A BAR ON FLAGLER STREET ON THURSDAY MORNING, 10 DECEMBER 1964. /HERE THE ACCOUNT OF THIS SUB-SOURCE IS SOMEWHAT AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT

MRS. OROZCO TOLD CAS SOURCE/.

12. OROZCO TOLD SUB-SOURCE THAT ORIZONDO HAD SET UP THE MEETING FOR WESNESDAY MORNING, 9 DECEMBER, WITH THE TWO PERSONS WHO WOULD ACCOMPANY HIM ON THE TRIP. OROZCO MET THEM ON FLAGLER STREET AT A SPECIFIC CORNER WHICH OROZCO DID NOT MENTION TO SUB-SOURCE.

13. OROZCO SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR A RECEIVED $400.00 FOR EACH MEMBER OF THE CREW /IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER OROZCO ACTUALLY RECEIVED THIS SUM OF MONEY FOR HIMSELF AS WELL/ PLUS A PROMISE TO TAKE CARE OF ALL OF THEIR FAMILIES IF THEY DID NOT RETURN.

14. OROZCO CALLED SUB-SOURCE BY TELEPHONE LATE ON THE EVENING OF 14 DECEMBER TO TELL HIM THAT HE WAS ''ON HIS WAY TO THE KEYS''. OROZCO TOLD SUB-SOURCE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MONEY AND THE ASSURANCES TO TAKE CARE OF THE FAMILIES HAD BEEN AGREED UPON.

15. AT A SECOND MEETING BETWEEN MRS. OROZCO AND CAS SOURCE ON 8 JANUARY, MRS. OROZCO TOLD CAS SOURCE THAT SHE HAD COME INTO THE POSSESSION OF SOME INFORMATION FROM AN UNNAMED FISHERMAN WHO HAD RECENTLY COME OUT OF CUBA. THIS INFORMATION INDICATED THAT SEVERAL ARRESTS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE SAME AREA IN WHICH HER HUSBAND INTENDED TO INFILTRATE. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE HAD ALSO HEARD A RADIO BROADCAST THE DAY BEFORE, 7 JANUARY, STATING THAT 4 INFILTRATORS HAD BEEN PICKED UP IN THE CARDENAS/MATANZAS AREA OF MATANZAS PROVINCE. MRS. OROZCO HAD CALLED ORIZONDO AND INSISTED UPON SEEING ''JORGE'' TO GIVE THIS INFORMATION TO HIM PERSONALLY.

16. ''JORGE'' AND ORIZONDO ARRIVED AT HER HOME ABOUT 2000 HOURS, 7 JANUARY. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE TOLD ''JORGE'' THE INFORMATION ABOUT ARRESTS IN THE AREA AND MENTIONED A PERSON NAMED ''PEDRO''. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT ''JORGE'' HAD PRICKED UP HIS EARS AT THE MENTION OF THE NAME ''PEDRO''. ''JORGE'' ASKED MRS. OROZCO THE LAST NAME OF ''PEDRO''. MRS. OROZCO REPLIED THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW. ''JORGE'' ASKED WHAT BUSINESS THIS ''PEDRO'' WAS IN. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE THOUGHT THAT ''PEDRO'' OWNED A RESTAURANT IN CARDENAS, MATANZAS PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO, ''JORGE'' THEN IDENTIFIED ''PEDRO'' AS PEDRO BARBI /OR BALBI/ FEBLES AND SAID THAT BARBI DID NOT ''WORK WITH THE AMERICANS'' OR WITH ANY ORGANIZATION BUT THAT HE HAD HELPED MANY PEOPLE. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT THIS PIECE OF NEWS WORRIED HER GREATLY BECAUSE HER HUSBAND HAD TOLD HER HE INTENDED TO CONTACT THIS PERSON. ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO, ORIZONDO THEN BROKE INTO THE CONVERSATION TO DECLARE THAT ''WE'' / PRESUMABLY MEANING SHE AND ''JORGE''/ HAD DONE ALL THE PLANNING FOR OROZCO'S TRIP AND THAT OROZCO WAS NOT SUPPOSED TO CONTACT BARBI ACCORDING TO THIS PLAN. MRS. OROZCO REPORTED THAT ''JORGE'' DID NOT COMMENT ABOUT ORIZONDO'S USE OF THE TERM ''WE''.

17. THE LICENSE NUMBER OF THE AUTOMOBILE IN WHICH ''JORGE'' AND ORIZONDO ARRIVED WAS NOTED AS A NEW YORK PLATE, BU-5523. THE CAR WAS DESCRIBED AS A LARGE FIAT. THIS LICENSE NUMBER WAS TRACED AND IT WAS REPORTED BY THE NEW YORK MOTOR VEHICLE AUTHORITIES THAT IT WAS REGISTERED TO ONE LEWIS BURNS, 75 EAST PARADE AVENUE, BUFFALO, NEW YORK. THE ONLY OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM THE MOTOR VEHICLE RECORDS INDICATED THAT BURNS WAS BORN 11-10-98, THAT HE WAS RETIRED AND THAT THE AUTOMOBILE REGISTERED UNDER THIS NUMBER HAD BEEN A 1950 BUICK. MRS. OROZCO SAID SHE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS THE SAME CAR ''JORGE'' HAD USED ON PREVIOUS VISITS.

18. MRS. OROZCO SHOWED CAS SOURCE A NOTE WHICH MRS. OROZCO IDENTIFIED AS HAVING BEEN WRITTEN BY ORIZONDO TO HER HUSBAND /SEE ATTACHMENT A/. THE NOTE WHICH WAS NOT DATED STATED THAT THE ACCOMPANYING $500.00 WAS FOR OROZCO TO USE TO BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR HIS TRIP. ANOTHER $200.00 WAS FORTHCOMING BUT SHE ADVISED

OROZCO NOT TO TELL THIS TO ''LOS MUCHACHOS'', PRESUMABLY OROZCO'S CREW MEMBERS. THE NOTE MENTIONED A PERSON ANMED ''ALDO'' AND ALSO ''JORGE''. MRS. OROZCO SAID SHE DID NOT THINK ORIZONDO REALIZED THAT SHE /MRS. OROZCO/ WAS STILL IN POSSESSION OF THIS NOTE.

19. MRS. OROZCO REPORTED THAT ORIZONDO HAD RETURNED TO HER HOUSE THE MORNING AFTER HER VISIT WITH ''JORGE''. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT ORIZONDO HAD BEEN VERY WATCHFUL AND THAT IT SEEMED TO MRS. OROZCO THAT THE PURPOSE OF ORIZONDO'S TRIP WAS TO ATTEMPT TO WHITEWASH ''JORGE'' OF ANY CONNECTION WITH OROZCO'S TRIP. /THIS INFORMATION WAS VOLUNTEERED FREELY TO CAS SOURCE AS AN OBSERVATION OF MRS. OROZCO/. ORIZONDO TOLD MRS. OROZCO THAT ''JORGE'' HAD ONLY COME ALONG WITH HER THE PREVIOUS EVENING BECAUSE HE WAS INTERESTED IN WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO OROZCO AND THAT HE ''JORGE'' HAD HAD NOTHING WHATEVER TO DO WITH OROZCO'S TRIP. MRS. OROZCO REMINDED ORIZONDO THAT IT HAD BEEN ''JORGE'' WHO HAD ORIGINALLY COME TO SEE OROZCO TO TELL HIM ABOUT VASQUEZ'S PLIGHT AND THAT ''JORGE'' HAD VISITED OROZCO SEVERAL TIMES THEREAFTER. HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE THAT ''JORGE'' HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH OROZCO'S TRIP, ASKED MRS. OROZCO. ORIZONDO PROTESTED THAT ''JORGE'' WAS ONLY INVOLVED IN TRYING TO GET INFORMATION ABOUT VASQUEZ.

20. MRS. OROZCO REMARKED SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW IF ORIZONDO CONSIDERED HER A COMPLETE FOOL BUT SHE /MRS. OROZCO/ KNEW THAT SUCH A TRIP REQUIRED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY, AT LEAST $1000.00, AND THAT SHE WAS CERTAIN THAT ORIZONDO DID NOT HAVE THAT KIND OF MONEY OF HER OWN. ORIZONDO REPORTEDLY REPLIED THAT SHE HAD RAISED THE MONEY FROM FRIENDS. MRS. OROZCO PERSISTED AND STATED THAT SHE WAS COMPLETELY SURE IN HER OWN MIND THAT IT HAD BEEN ''THIS GENTLEMAN JORGE'' WHO HAD SUPPLIED THE MONEY. ORIZONDO DID NOT ANSWER. /SEE PARA 26 BELOW IN WHICH MRS. OROZCO CLAIMED TO HAVE OVERHEARD A CONVERSATION BETWEEN ''JORGE'' AND OROZCO IN WHICH ''JORGE'' STATED HE COULD NOT SUPPORT OROZCO'S TRIP DIRECTLY BUT COULD SUPPLY FUNDS/.

21. MRS. OROZCO TOLD ORIZONDO THAT SHE WAS STILL UNCERTAIN OF ''JORGE'S'' CREDENTIALS. MRS. OROZCO TOLD ORIZONDO THAT HER HUSBAND HAD HAD GREAT TRUST IN ORIZONDO AND SHE /MRS. OROZCO/ REALIZED THAT ANYTHING ORIZONDO WAS INVOLVED IN WAS TO HER HUSBAND'S BEST ADVANTAGE BUT AT THE SAME TIME SHE COULD NOT BRING HERSELF TO FEEL THE SAME CONFIDENCE IN ''JORGE'' AS SHE FELT IN ORIZONDO. ORIZONDO TOLD MRS. OROZCO THAT ''JORGE'' WAS NOT CUBAN BUT PUERTO RICAN, AN AMERICAN CITIZEN WHO WORKED FOR THE ''PENTAGON''. ORIZONDO SAID THAT SHE HERSELF WAS NOT ACTIVELY WORKING FOR THE ''PENTAGON'' ANY LONGER BUT THAT THERE ARE TIMES WHEN HER FORMER EMPLOYERS NEED HELP AT WHICH TIMES THEY CALL UPON HER /ORIZONDO/. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT HER HUSBAND HAD TOLD HER THAT BOTH ORIZONDO AND ''JORGE'' WORKED FOR THE ''PENTAGON''.

22. ORIZONDO TOLD MRS. OROZCO THAT SHE WOULD PROVIDE TO MRS. OROZCO ANY MONEY THAT SHE NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE FAMILY. ON 4 OR 5 JANUARY, ORIZONDO HAD GIVEN MRS. OROZCO $100.00 TO PAY HER RENT /FOR WHICH SUM MRS. OROZCO DID NOT SIGN A RECEIPT/. ORIZONDO ALSO TOLD MRS. OROZCO THAT ''JORGE'' WOULD BE OUT OF TOWN FOR AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD.

23. OROZONDO PAID MRS. OROZCO ANOTHER VISIT ON 11 JANUARY. ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO, ORIZONDO NOW CLAIMED THAT NEITHER SHE NOR ''JORGE'' HAD HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH OROZCO'S TRIP, THAT IN FACT THEY HAD BOTH TRIED TO TALK HIM OUT OF MAKING THE TRIP.

24. ANOTHER SUB-SOURCE PAID A SOCIAL VISIT TO MRS. OROZCO ON THE EVENING OF 11 JANUARY. MRS. OROZCO SHOWED THIS SUB-SOURCE THE SAME NOTE WHICH INDICATED THAT ORIZONDO HAD GIVEN OROZCO $500.00 FOR THE INITIAL PREPARATIONS FOR HIS TRIP. MRS. OROZCO TOLD THIS

14-00000

SUB-SOURCE THAT BOTH ORIZONDO AND ''JORGE'' WORK FOR THE PENTAGON AND ALSO MENTIONED ORIZONDO'S VISITS ON 8 AND 11 JANUARY IN WHICH ORIZONDO ATTEMPTED TO DISCLAIM ANY PART FOR HERSELF OR ''JORGE'' IN OROZCO'S TRIP. MRS. OROZCO TOLD THIS SUB-SOURCE THAT SHE WAS GOING TO PUT PRESSURE UPON THESE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PENTAGON /ORIZONDO AND ''JORGE''/ TO EITHER GET HER HUSBAND OUT OF CUBA OR FAILING THAT TO BUY HIM OUT.

25. ''JORGE'' PAID AN UNANNOUNCED VISIT TO MRS. OROZCO ON 13 JANUARY. DURING THIS VISIT, HE CONFIDED TO MRS. OROZCO THAT HIS NAME WAS NOT ''JORGE'' BUT ''TORRES''. ''TORRES'' SAID THAT HIS ORGANIZATION HAD NOT BEEN INTERESTED IN VASQUEZ BUT IN TWO AGENTS /HE USED THE TERM ''AGENTES''/ WHO WERE IN HIDING IN THE SAME HOUSE WITH VASQUEZ. AT WHICH POINT MRS. OROZCO ASKED ''TORRES'' HOW HE HAPPENED TO KNOW ABOUT THIS IF HIS CLAIM WERE TRUE THAT HE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HER HUSBAND'S TRIP. ''TORRES'' MADE NO REPLY, ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO.

26. MRS. OROZCO THEN COMMENTED THAT SHE KNEW FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO RAISE EVEN A FEW HUNDRED DOLLARS IN THE EXILE COMMUNITY. SHE SAID THAT SHE KNEW ORIZONDO DID NOT HAVE THE $1000.00 OR MORE WHICH HAD BEEN SPENT FOR HER HUSBAND'S TRIP. THIS LED HER TO THE CONCLUSION, MRS. OROZCO SAID, THAT ''TORRES'' AND HIS ORGANIZATION HAD SUPPLIED THE FUNDS. AGAIN THERE WAS NO REPLY FROM ''TORRES''. /ON 11 JANUARY 1964, MRS. OROZCO TOLD SAME CAS SOURCE MENTIONED IN INITIAL PARAGRAPHS THAT SHE HAD OVERHEARD A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HER HUSBAND AND ''TORRES'' A WEEK OR TWO BEFORE OROZCO'S DEPARTURE IN WHICH ''TORRES'' TOLD OROZCO THAT HE COULD NOT SUPPORT HIS TRIP ''DIRECTLY'' BUT COULD PROVIDE MONEY WHICH OROZCO COULD USE TO MAKE HIS OWN PREPARATIONS/.

27. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE HAD HAD TWO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO BRING UP TO ''TORRES''. ONE, THAT IF WORD WERE RECEIVED FROM HER HUSBAND THAT HE WAS STILL HIDING OUT, ''TORRES' '' ORGANIZATION SEND A BOAT IN TO HELP HIM EXFILTRATE. THE OTHER WAS THAT IF IT BECAME CONFIRMED THAT HER HUSBAND WAS A PRISONER, ''TORRES' '' ORGANIZATION NEGOTIATE FOR HIS RELEASE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. AS PART OF THIS LAST PROPOSAL, MRS. OROZCO SUGGESTED THAT SHE BE PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT MONEY TO TRAVEL TO MEXICO TO TAKE UP HER HUSBAND'S CASE PERSONALLY WITH THE PRESIDENT OF MEXICO. ''TORRES'' SAID THAT HE HAD TO TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH HIS ORGANIZATION. ''TORRES'' RE-EMPHASIZED THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HER HUSBAND'S TRIP. HE WAS STILL ATTEMPTING TO USE ALL THE RESOURCES AT HIS COMMAND TO FIND OUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO OROZCO AND WHILE HE WAS VERY SORRY ABOUT HER HUSBAND'S MISFORTUNE, HE STATED THAT IT HAD BEEN OROZCO'S OWN DECISION TO GO ON THIS TRIP.

28. UPON LEAVING, MRS. OROZCO TOOK NOTE OF THE LICENSE NUMBER ON ''TORRES' '' BLACK VOLKSWAGEN. SHE ASSUMED BUT COULD NOT BE CERTAIN THAT IT WAS A FLORIDA LICENSE PLATE, NO.68D1304 OR 68D 1344. ACCORDING TO A CAS' INVESTIGATION, THE PREFIX ''68D'' REPRESENTS A PLATE BLOCKED AT THE TALLAHASSEE LEVEL FOR THE COVERT USE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

29. ORIZONDO VISITED MRS. OROZCO LATER THAT SAME EVENING OF 13 JANUARY. SHE SEEMED SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT ''JORGE'' HAD VISITED MRS. OROZCO EARLIER THAT DAY. ORIZONDO ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE MRS. OROZCO THAT THE ''JORGE'' MENTIONED IN A NOTE SHE HAD LEFT FOR OROZCO WAS ONE JORGE MAYO /OR MALLO/ CARDOSO, A FRIEND OF OROZCO'S IN THE REBEL-ARMY-IN-EXILE ORGANIZATION ''EJERCITO LIBERTADOR'' TO WHICH ANOTHER CLOSE FRIEND OF OROZCO'S, JOSE LOPEZ LEGON AKA ''PEPE EL TORO'' BELONGS. MRS. OROZCO REMARKED TO ORIZONDO THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW HOW STUPID ORIZONDO CONSIDERED HER TO BE BUT THAT SHE WAS COMPLETELY CERTAIN THAT THE ''JORGE'' MENTIONED IN THE NOTE WAS THE SAME ''JORGE'' WHO HAD VISITED HER AND HER HUSBAND. MRS. OROZCO ALSO TOLD ORIZONDO THAT ''JORGE'' HAD TOLD HER THAT HIS NAME WAS ''TORRES''. ORIZONDO CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS HIS NAME.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER ATT TO UFGA-19569 PG 6

30. IN ATTEMPTING TO RE-CONSTRUCT HOW MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT TO PREPARE THE BOAT AND EQUIPMENT FOR OROZCO'S TRIP, IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT OROZCO WAS EXAGGERATING WHEN HE SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED $400.00 FOR EACH MEMBER OF THE CREW. MRS. OROZCO HAS STATED THAT OROZCO HAD GIVEN THEM EACH $200.00 AND SHE THOUGHT BUT WAS NOT COMPLETELY CERTAIN THAT HE HAD LATER GIVEN EACH OF THEM AN ADDITIONAL UNSPECIFIED SUM. STARTING WITH THE FIGURE OF $700.00 WHICH IS MENTIONED IN THE ATTACHED NOTE FROM ORIZONDO, IT APPEARS SAFE TO SAY THAT MOST IF NOT ALL OF THAT SUM WOULD HAVE BEEN PAID OUT FOR FUEL /AT LEAST 50 GALLONS SINCE IT HAD BEEN A 50-GALLON TANK WHICH HAD EXPLODED AND HAD TO BE REPLACED/, FOOD FOR ONE WEEK, THE ITEMS /KNIVES, PONCHOS, CANTEENS, FATIGUE UNIFORMS, AMMUNITION, ETC./ WHICH MRS. OROZCO CLAIMS OROZCO BOUGHT IN AN ARMY/NAVY STORE PLUS OTHER MISCELLANEOUS BOAT ITEMS. ADD TO THIS $700.00, THE $200.00 APIECE FOR THE TWO FISHERMEN /WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN MORE/, THE $41.00 FOR THE REPAIR OF THE BOAT ENGINE, THE ESTIMATED $100.00 TO REPLACE THE 50 GALLON FUEL TANK, THE $100.00 GIVEN TO MRS. OROZCO BY ORIZONDO, AND THE TOTAL /A CONSERVATIVE ONE AT THAT/ AMOUNTS TO APPROXIMATELY $1341.00. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHORTLY BEFORE HER HUSBAND'S DEPARTURE, ONLY $125.00 REMAINED OF THE INITIAL SUM. THE GROUP LEFT FOR THE MARATHON AREA A DAY BEFORE THEIR ACTUAL DEPARTURE AND HAD TO RETURN TO MIAMI BECAUSE THEY HAD FORGOTTEN THE KEYS TO THE BOAT. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT THE $50.00 SHE RECEIVED FROM HER HUSBAND WAS TAKEN FROM THE REMAINING $125.00 AND SHE ASSUMES THAT THE BALANCE OF $75.00 WAS SPENT FOR MOTEL ROOMS IN THE KEYS AND FOR OTHER LAST-MINUTE PURCHASES. THE ONLY ITEMS FURNISHED TO OROZCO, ACCORDING TO HIS WIFE, WERE AN M-1 RIFLE AND AN M-1 CARBINE WHICH ORIZONDO HAD GIVEN HIM /MRS. OROZCO THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD HAD TO BUY THE AMMUNITION FOR THESE WEAPONS/, AND A PISTOL OF UNIDENTIFIED MAKE BY LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA OF THE MDC /CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT/ WHO ALSO GAVE OROZCO A MEANS OF ENTREE TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN CUBA IF HE SHOULD RUN INTO UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES. OROZCO ALSO BOUGHT OR RECEIVED FROM SOME UNNAMED SOURCE AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF COUNTERFEIT PESOS.

31. AS ATTACHMENT B TO THIS MEMORANDUM, A COPY OF ANOTHER NOTE FROM ORIZONDO TO OROZCO RECOMMENDING AN INDIVIDUAL WHO COULD PROVIDE A BOAT FOR HIS INFILTRATION IS APPENDED FOR YOUR REFERENCE. THIS INDIVIDUAL IS BELIEVED TO BE ACSI SOURCE NO. 693.

32. CAS WOULD APPRECIATE ACSI COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE PARAGRAPHS, PARTICULARLY AS THESE CONTAIN CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ''JORGE'' AND ORIZONDO. SINCE IT IS NOW APPARENT THAT ''JORGE'' AND ''TORRES'' ARE ONE AND THE SAME, IT IS BELIEVED THAT FURTHER INVESTIGATION INTO THE IDENTITY OF THIS INDIVIDUAL IS UNNECESSARY.

BEBO -

I AM LEAVING YOU $500 SO THAT YOU CAN GO TO SEE ALDO EARLY AND BEGIN THE PREPARATIONS. TONIGHT I WILL HAVE $200 MORE AND I WILL TRY TO OBTAIN THE REST. FIND OUT IF THEY OBTAINED SOME MONEY, I DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THIS BUT IT WOULD BE CONVENIENT ANYWAY. JORGE WAS HERE TONIGHT. YOU CAN COME TOMORROW NIGHT TO ARRANGE ALL THE DETAILS.

TAKE CARE OF THE TANK AS YOU THINK IS BEST. SINCE YOU ALREADY PAID FOR IT, YOU CAN PICK IT UP AND TELL THE BOYS THAT DUE TO THE BAD WEATHER IT IS BEST TO WAIT. IN ORDER TO AVOID HAVING THE ''RUMOR'' SPREAD DOWN FLAGLER STREET, I DON'T THINK IT IS CONVENIENT TO SAY ANYTHING ON THIS OTHER MATTER TO THE BOYS UNTIL LATER ON. THINK ABOUT IT AND SEE WHAT IS BEST ON THIS MATTER.

BEBO -

I CAME TO SEE YOU BECAUSE I HAD TO SPEAK TO YOU. I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH PROGRESS YOU HAD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT I WANTED TO TELL YOU THAT I HEARD OF A MAN, HUMBERTO VERGARA, CALLED VERGARITA. HE WAS RECOMMENDED TO ME AS A VERY SERIOUS PERSON, AND IT IS SAID THAT HE HAS A BOAT READY TO SAIL. MAYBE YOU KNOW HIM. AS I CANNOT SEE YOU OR DO ANYTHING DURING THE DAY, I MADE THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS TO SAVE TIME. I TOLD HIM TO GO TO THE FLAGLER BRIDGE, TOWARDS DOWNTOWN AND TO STOP ON THE LEFT SIDE /NATURALLY GOING TOWARDS DOWNTOWN/ AT 1200 NOON. YOU CAN THEN APPROACH HIM AND ASK HIM IF HE IS VERGARITA, AND YOU IDENTIFY YOURSELF AS MARQUIES. HE IS A YOUNG MAN, HAS ONE TOOTH MISSING. IF YOU THINK HE IS GOOD, SPEAK TO HIM, FIND OUT WHAT HE HAS AND HOW MUCH HE ASKS FOR THE TRIP.

IN ANY EVENT, WHEN YOU GET HOME AND YOU READ THIS NOTE, CALL ME AND LET ME KNOW IF YOU ARE GOING TO SEE HIM. ALSO LET ME KNOW WHETHER YOU HAVE ARRANGED SOMETHING ELSE.

[illegible]

AMTRUNK	5	GONZALEZ Ort[illegible], Alberto
	9	OROZCO Basulto, Modesto
	10	Ramon Tomas Guin Diaz
	11	PEDRAZA, Carlos
	13	Humberto Antoliano ARMADA Guerra
	15	Pedro BARBI
	18	Candido DIAZ
	20	Enrique HERRERA Aro
AMICE	14	Pascasio Lineras Lopez
AMFAUNA	1	David CABEZA Coupau
	3	Hortensia ORIZONDO Meneses

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 22

☐ DESTROY RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE
XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING	MOP		
1	TC	5	CI
2		6	CA
3	FI	7	PA
4	RR	8	D

MARVIN FRANCIS:ack
WH/C/PI/TC ☐ INDEX
R. 1271 ☐ NO INDEX
29 MARCH 1966 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

SECRET

ROME BONN INFO: PARIS, GERMANY, FRANKFURT, BERN, GENEVA

DIRECTOR

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY C/CI C/FI C/CA

C/WE 3 C/FE, C/RI/SI

ROME BONN INFO PARI GMNY FRAN BERN GNVA CITE DIR

TYPIC DESENSITIZED MHAPRON AMWHIP AMWEST

92482

Grace

REFS: A. ROME 9425 (IN 80558) (NOT SENT BONN)
B. FRAN 2758 (IN 83177) (NOT SENT BONN)
C. ROME 9478 (IN 85022) (NOT SENT BONN)

1. SUBJECT REF A PARA 3 TRACE REQUEST IS AMWEST/1 WHO APPROACHED BY KUBARK APR 65 FOR RECRUITMENT. A/1 AGREED COOPERATE BUT FOLLOWING AUG 65 TRIP PARIS REVERSED HIS DECISION AND REFUSED RECRUITMENT. BONN C/O MANGANELLO (M) HOWEVER HAS MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH AMWEST/1'S WIFE, AMWEST/2 WHO HAS CONTINUED BE COOPERATIVE. M HAS BEEN REQUESTED OBTAIN CURRENT ASSESSMENT AMWEST/1 FROM AMWEST/2, AND IF ASSESSMENT FAVORABLE TO PROCEED WITH RECRUITMENT OR DEFECTION OF AMWEST/1 ALONG PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES.

2. FOR ROME, FRAN, GNVA: DURING BRIEF 23 MAR PHONE CONTACT WITH AMWEST/2, M CONFIRMED THAT AMWEST/1 IS UPSET DUE RECENT ARRESTS AND PURGES. AMWEST/2 STATED THAT AMWEST/1 TO MEET ANTONIO CARRILLO IN GENEVA SOON FOR TALKS. AMWEST/1 CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT SINCE HE NOT PARTICULAR FAVORITE OF CARRILLO AND WAS FRIEND OF AMLASH/1.

3. FOR BONN, ATTN MANGANELLO: AMWHIP-2 (IDEN BONN ONLY)

AMLASH-1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 31-5

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

PAGE TWO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF :
INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO
INFO
CITE DIR 92482

IS ROME ASSET. HIS WIFE OF CURRENT OPS INTEREST DUE HER PROPOSED SUMMER TRIP TO VISIT SICK MOTHER IN PBRUMEN, WHERE SHE MAY POSSIBLY CONTACT HIGH LEVEL PBRUMEN MILITARY FRIEND ON OUR BEHALF. BRIEFLY REFS SURFACE POSSIBILITY OF DANGER TO AMWHIP/2'S WIFE DURING TRIP DUE PROBABILITY PBRUMEN AUTHORITIES AND ANTONIO CARRILLO KNOWLEDGEABLE OF AMWHIP/2'S PAST BUSINESS ASSOCIATION WITH AMLASH/1. DURING 22 AND 23 MAR PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMWHIPS AND CARRILLO, LATTER GUARANTEED AMWHIP/2'S WIFE'S SAFETY WHILE PBRUMEN. HOWEVER CARRILLO'S CURIOUS REFERRAL OF AMWHIPS TO AMWEST/1 AS CONTACT DURING HIS (CARRILLO'S) ABSENCE HAS RAISED THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE PROVOCATION ATTEMPT. THIS PARTICULARILY VALID SINCE ALL PARTIES CONTAMINATED BY PAST AMLASH/1 ASSOCIATION, AND DUE AMWEST/2'S STATEMENTS RE CURRENT AMWEST/1-CARRILLO RELATIONSHIP.

4. VIEW ABOVE SITUATION, SUGGEST NO CONTACT BETWEEN AMWESTS AND AMWHIPS. REQUEST REPORT DETAILS AMWEST/1-CARRILLO MEETING AS SOON AS THEY CAN BE OBTAINED FROM AMWEST/2. MEETING OUTCOME SHOULD ESTABLISH AMWEST/1'S FUTURE STATUS AND ALSO RESOLVE PROVOCATION QUESTION.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IG :
IIT :
.T :
TE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

PAGE THREE

OM: DIRECTOR

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

INFO CITE DIR 92482

WH/C/RR/MHAPRON S. W. Roberts

C/WH/C/FI E. J. Williamson

WH/C/CICS

C/WE

XX EE/G George J. Kunz

WE/3

WE/4 John J. Shea

EE/SA/S

C/EE/OFS

for

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

☐ DE ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG : MARVIN FRANCIS:ack
UNIT : WH/C/FI/TC ☐ INDEX
EXT : R. 1271 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 29 MARCH 1966 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING	MOP		
1	TC	5	CI
2		6	CA
3	FI	7	PA
4	RR	8	

TO : BONN

31 MAR 66 21 09 z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/4 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, C/CI, C/FI-2 C/FI/D-4 C/EE-3

DESENSITIZED

TO BONN INFO CITE DIR 92483

TYPIC KAPOK MHAPRON AMWEST AMWHIP

REF: DIR 92482

IDEN REF: JUAN VENTURA VALNER, CUBAN EXILE WHO OWNS JEWELRY SHOP AND RESIDES GENEVA. MAKES INFREQUENT BUSINESS TRIPS TO ROME.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/RR/MHAPRON G. W. Roberts
WH/C/CICS
C/WH/C/FI
EE/G George J. Kunz

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/EE/OPS
RELEASING OFFICER

31-6

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

ORIG : MARVIN FRANCIS:ack
UNIT : WH/C/FI/TC
EXT : R. 1271
DATE : 23 MARCH 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300173

6 S E C R E T

☐ STROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING MO			
1	TC	5	RR-
2		6	CI
3	FI	7	CA
4	IO	8	D

TO : OTTAWA INFO: JMWAVE, GERMANY, FROB, FRANKFURT, BONN 19 302

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, WE 8, EE 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

TO OTTA INFO WAVE ~~GERY~~ ~~FROB~~ FRAN ~~BONN~~ CITE DIR 90518

TYPIC CASUGAR

REF: OTTA 3182 (IN 80650)

1. APPRECIATE OFFER. VIEW CASUGAR/1 HIGH LEVEL ACCESS PBRUMEN TARGET PERSONALITIES, HQS ANXIOUS OBTAIN HIS VIEWS RE CURRENT PBRUMEN POLITICAL SHAKEUP. REQUEST OTTA INTERCEDE WITH SMABOVES AND, IF FEASIBLE, ATTEMPT ARRANGE JOINT SMABOVE/KUBARK DEBRIEFING C/1 IN CANADA. HQS PREPARED SEND TYPIC OFFICER. PLEASE PROVIDE DATES C/1 PROPOSED VISIT.

2. IF HELPFUL, OTTA MAY INFORM SMABOVES THAT C/1 NOT RECRUITED ASSET BUT WILLING PARTICIPANT SEVERAL KUBARK DEBRIEFINGS DURING PAST TWO YEARS.

END OF MESSAGE

fC/WH/C/FI
WH/C/MO
WH/C/CA
WH/C/RR
WH/C/FI/IO
DC/EE/G George J. Kenny
WE/BC/C
WH/C/CICS

AMLASH-1

C/WE/BC
for

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 24-1 SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

104-10234-10141

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ORIG : SChaconas:dap
RSwider
UNIT : WH/C/CA/PP
WH C/FI/TC
EXT : R1938, R1271
DATE : 18 March 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

S E C R E T

LMO
PP FI
CA PA

TO : SEE BELOW

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO [redacted] BOOK CABLE INFO CITE DIR

89022

BUEN
[redacted]
GUAT
SALV
RABA
COLO
LOND
GMNY

KAHI
COBA
SAOP
PRIN
PIBO
CASB
[redacted]
ROME
BONN

LAPA
GORG
TEGU
POSN
DARE
NEWD
OSLO
BRLN

RIOD
SAGO
KNGS
MONT
TOKY
BRUS
OTTA

SEPS
[redacted]
BOGO
MEXI
CARA
HONG
COPE
PARI

BANG
BRIL
SJOS
MANA
WAVE
~~DORK~~
HAGU
STOC
[illegible]
MANI

CURI
SDOM
PACY
[redacted]
BEIR
HELS
BERN

LGRE
QUIT
ASUN
ALGI
BOMB
LISB
GNVA

RECI
GAYA
LIMA
[redacted]
CAIR
MADR
VIEN

TYPIC MHSPAWN MHAPRON

1. REUTERS DISPATCH DATELINED HAVANA 16 MARCH REPORTED WIDESPREAD PURGE UNDERWAY OF MILITARY OFFICERS, HIGH OFFICIALS CUBAN GOVT AND LEADERS COMMUNIST PARTY. FIDEL CASTRO ALSO REVEALED THAT SEVERAL CUBAN LABOR UNION LEADERS ARE UNDER ARREST ON EMBEZZLEMENT CHARGES. IN ADDITION REUTERS SOURCES STATED THAT SEVERAL HIGHLY PLACED OFFICIALS WOULD SOON FALL IN THE CLEANUP AND THAT "FULL INVESTIGATION OF OFFICIALS' MORAL AND POLITICAL PRACTICES ALREADY UNDERWAY IN GOVT MINISTRIES". THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN TRADE WILL BE MOST AFFECTED BY THE PURGE. ON 15 MARCH, THE FOREIGN TRADE MINISTRY IN A SPECIAL MEETING "APPROVED THE PURGE" AND ADOPTED A COMPLETE CHECK ON MEMBERS WORKING ABROAD. NEW RESTRICTIONS ALREADY IMPOSED FORBID THE BRINGING INTO CUBA RATIONED OR HARD-TO-GET DURABLE GOODS.

(6)

AMLASH-1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

S E C R E T

UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 87022

2. QUOTING AN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE, REUTERS REPORTED THAT MAJOR EFIGENIO AMEIJEIRAS, DEPUTY MINISTER OF THE ARMED FORCES AND MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, HAS BEEN DISMISSED FROM HIS OFFICES AND IS TO STAND TRIAL BEFORE A COURT MARTIAL. THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO ANNOUNCED "THE ARREST OF SEVERAL DOZEN OTHER OFFICIALS" ON CHARGES OF INDULGING "LA DOLCE VITA". AN ELABORATION OF THIS CHARGE WAS MADE BY CASTRO IN HIS 13 MARCH SPEECH WHEREIN HE ATTACKED MEMBERS OF CUBAN MISSIONS ABROAD WHO SPENT SEVERAL MONTHS IN "VAPORS OF PARTIES AND GOOD BRANDY AND IN COMPANY OF PRETTY YOUNG GIRLS." CASTRO ADDED THAT THOSE GUILTY OF "PLAYBOY BEHAVIOR" WOULD BE DRAFTED INTO THE ARMY OR SENT TO WORK ON THE FARM.

3. BACKGROUND: THE PURGE HAS BEEN PRECEDED BY THE TRIAL XXXXXXXXXX ON 7 MARCH BY A REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL OF SEVEN CUBANS FOR COMPLICITY IN A PLOT TO OVERTHROW FIDEL CASTRO. THE ACCUSED ALLEGEDLY HAD THE SUPPORT OF SOME CUBAN EXILE LEADERS NOW RESIDING IN THE U.S. TWO OF THE SEVEN, ROLANDO CUBELA AND RAMON GUIN, HELD THE RANK OF MAJOR, HIGHEST RANK IN THE ARMED SERVICES. THE STATE PROSECUTOR REQUESTED DEATH FOR CUBELA AND THREE OTHERS.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING

UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF : INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR 87022

4. MAJOR CUBELA WAS A POPULAR AND PROMINENT UNIVERSITY STUDENT LEADER, AN ARDENT REVOLUTIONARY AND ONE OF THE EARLY COHORTS OF CASTRO DURING THE BATISTA REGIME. CUBELA WAS ALSO A CLOSE FRIEND OF CASTRO AND UNTIL THE ARREST RANKED HIGH AMONG THE LEADERS OF THE REGIME. HIS ARREST AND ABJECT CONFESSION AT THE PUBLIC TRIAL CONDUCTED IN STALINIST FASHION TRIGGERED OFF A SERIES OF STUDENT REACTIONS. THE TRIAL IN EFFECT BACKFIRED AGAINST THE REGIME.

5. UPI REPORTS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICES, INCLUDING ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES WHO DEPARTED RECENTLY FROM CUBA, TESTIFIED TO THE FACT THAT ANTI-GOVT STUDENT AGITATIONS OCCURRED. WALL SCRIBBLINGS ON UNIVERSITY BUILDINGS THREATENED CASTRO, ONE READING: "ONE HEAD PAYS FOR ANOTHER," ANOTHER READ "OUT WITH FIDEL."

6. BECAUSE OF THE STRONG OPPOSITION TO THE TRIAL, CASTRO REQUESTED THE STATE PROSECUTOR NOT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH SENTENCES. IN ORDER PLACATE ADVERSE PUBLIC OPINION THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE GIVEN WIDE COVERAGE ON BOTH RADIO AND TELEVISION CIRCUITS. AS A RESULT, CUBELA AND OTHERS GRANTED CLEMENCY AND SENTENCED TO LENGTHY PRISON TERMS.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IG :
IT :
T :
ATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE FOUR

INFO CITE DIR 97022

7. THE CUBELA TRIAL WAS USED AS A PEG, I.E., GUILT BY ASSOCIATION IN THE DISMISSAL AND CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST MAJOR AMEIJEIRAS WHOSE LOYALTY TO THE REVOLUTION IS "UNDISPUTED" BY CASTRO. HOWEVER, AMEIJEIRAS WAS STRIPPED OF HIS MILITARY RANK AND CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF BEING A PLAYBOY, LIVING THE GAY LIFE.

8. AMEIJEIRAS WAS ONE OF CASTRO'S FIRST REVOLUTIONARY FOLLOWERS. HE HAD BEEN WITH CASTRO SINCE 1956, WAS ONE OF THE SURVIVORS OF THE GRANMA EXPEDITION, FOUGHT IN THE SIERRA MAESTRA IN 1957-58 AND HAD HELD HIGH OFFICE SINCE 1959. IN OCT 1965 HE WAS NAMED TO THE HUNDRED MAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY.

9. RUMORS ARE CIRCULATING THAT BLAS ROCA CALDERIO, MEMBER OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CP AND CHAIRMAN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES COMMITTEE, WILL SHORTLY BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL. SIMILARLY, THE CHARGES OF MALPRACTICES AGAINST THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IMPUGNS THE LOYALTY OF FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA GARCIA HIMSELF. ANOTHER MINISTER UNDER SUSPICION, I.E., GUILT BY ASSOCIATION, IS FAURE CHOMON, MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION. THE ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP OF THE 100-MAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE CREATED IN LATE 1965, MAY NOT BE SPARED AS THE PURGE GATHERS MOMENTUM.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF : INFO: VR . FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE FIVE

TO INFO CITE DIR 79022

10. THE UNDERLYING CAUSE FOR THE "SHOWTRIAL" OF CUBELA, THE ARREST OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE OUTLANDISH CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE CP AND MINISTERIAL OFFICIALS ARISES FROM THE IRREVERSIBLE FAILURES OF THE GOVT IN THE HANDLING OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. THE SCARCITY OF BASIC FOOD PRODUCTS HAS WORSENED. RICE, ROOT CROPS, MILK, MEAT CONTINUE TO BE RATIONED SEVERELY, AND THE AVAILABILITY TO THE CONSUMER IS NOW BELOW THE 1957-59 LEVEL, DESPITE SEVEN YEARS OF "COMMUNIST PLANNING". THERE ARE SERIOUS SHORTAGES OF MEDICINE, TEXTILES AND HOUSING. THE LATTER HAS DETERIORATED IN URBAN AREAS TO A LEVEL FAR BELOW PRE-WAR STANDARDS. SIMILARLY, CASTRO REPORTED THAT THE SUGAR CROP THIS YEAR WILL FALL FAR BELOW THE SIX MILLION TONS HARVESTED IN 1965. SINCE SUGAR ACCOUNTS FOR SOME 80% OF TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE EARNINGS, 1966 INCOME FROM SUGAR SALES, FACED WITH DEPRESSED WORLD MARKET PRICES, WILL NOT IN ANY WAY MEET THE COST OF BASIC IMPORTS, ESSENTIAL FOR SUSTAINING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. CASTRO HAS SOUGHT TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE ON THE ECONOMY BY PERMITTING THE EXODUS OF SOME 400 REFUGEES PER MONTH WHO ARE STREAMING INTO THE U.S. OTHER FAILURES INCLUDE THE FUNCTION OF THE GOC

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE SIX

TO INFO CITE DIR 89022

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE WHICH HAS ALMOST COME TO A HALT. IN THE INTEREST OF ECONOMY SOME 60,000 EMPLOYEES ARE BEING DISMISSED FROM THEIR JOBS. IMPORTANT BUREAUS ARE DENUDED OF COMPETENT STAFFS. ALSO, THE POLICY OF REPLACING EXPERIENCED FUNCTIONARIES WITH UNQUALIFIED CP STALWARTS HAS ALSO BEEN EXTENDED INTO THE ARMED SERVICES. COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN COMMAND POSTS AND THEIR WORD TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THOSE WHO ARE TECHNICALLY COMPETENT BUT NOT PARTY MEMBERS.

11. PSYCH EXPLOITATION IN MEDIA:

A. EMPHASIZE POINT THAT SHOW TRIAL AND PURGES DEMONSTRATE THAT IN THE PATTERN OF ALL DICTATORS, CASTRO GRASPING AT STRAWS, HOPING DIVERT PUBLIC ATTENTION FROM MOUNTING INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES;

B. COMPARE CASTRO TO NKRUMAH, SUKARNO AND OTHERS AS LEADERS WHO HAVE BANKRUPTED THEIR NATIONAL ECONOMIES AND SOLD OUT THEIR NATION TO COMMUNISM;

C. PORTRAY CASTRO IN STATE OF PANIC, HIS RECENT RANTINGS AND RAVINGS ARE REMINISCENT OF OTHER DEFUNCT DICTATORS;

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE SEVEN

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 89022

D. RAISE QUESTION WHO CAN NOW CONSIDER HIMSELF SAFE WHEN CASTRO IS TURNING AGAINST HIS MOST LOYAL FRIENDS. SIMILARLY, CASTRO HAS LASHED OUT AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA AND YUGOSLAVIA, HIS FORMER ALLIES;

E. SHOW THAT UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS WHO IN EARLY 1965 WERE "PURGED" ON TRUMPED UP CHARGES OF HOMOSEXUALITY ARE BECOMING ASSERTIVE. SIMILARLY, MILITARY OFFICERS, FALSELY ACCUSED, WILL CERTAINLY RESPOND. THE STUDENTS WITH THE MILITARY ARE THE TWO POWER GROUPS THAT CAN REVERSE THE TRENDS AS EXEMPLIFIED TODAY IN INDONESIA;

F. LASTLY, AVOID ALL REFERENCES TO ALLEGATIONS OF GOC THAT KUBARK INVOLVED IN CUBELA PLOT.

12. ABOVE BACKGROUND AND INFO MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON.

13. FOR KUTUBE EXPLOITATION:

A. STATIONS WITH CUBAN INSTALLATIONS AND/OR TRADE MISSIONS ARE REQUESTED MAKE MAXIMUM EFFORT ESTABLISH DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTACTS WITH SELECTED CUBAN FORNMIN AND TRADE PERSONNEL THEIR AREAS. PURPOSE TO EMPHASIZE TO THEM THAT THEIR DOLCE VITA AND COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO HAVANA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE EIGHT

INFO CITE DIR 89022

AND THAT TIME HAS COME TO ENSURE THEIR FUTURE THROUGH COOPERATION WITH ODYOKE. CONTACTS SHOULD BE GEARED TO RECRUITMENT IN PLACE AND COOPERATION RATHER THAN DEFECTION. SHORT OF THIS, HOWEVER, SPECIFIC DEFECTION REQUESTS SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE RECEPTIVE EAR.

B. STATIONS REQUESTED CABLE SPECIFIC LEADS IN ORDER ENABLE HQS GEAR RQMS, LIMITS OF COMMITMENT. RECENT DIP/ TRADE DEFECTORS SHOULD BE QUERIED FOR LEADS IN THIS CONTEXT.

END OF MESSAGE

A/DCEHD/C

C/FE

C/WE

C/EE

C/AF

C/NE

C/CA

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DDP

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PA	4	FI
2	CA	5	RE
3	DO	6	RI

FROM Rome

ACTION DC/WH/C5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME

INFO FILE, VR, C/WE 3, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2

15 MAR 6? 70282

SECRET 161515Z

DIR INFO WAVE MILA (BY POUCH) CITE ROME 9357

KA[illegible]YPIC DELORRY

DESENSITIZED

1. 15 MARCH DELORRY (D) REPORTED THAT WHILE HE IN CUBA MANUEL (PINEIRO) LOZADA (201-238687) PHONED D'S SECRETARY HILDA QUINTANA IN RESPONSE ROUTINE D INVITE, SAID WANTED SEE D. MEET FELL THROUGH BECAUSE OF AMLASH/1 ET AL.

2. LATER D TOLD BY SAVERIO TUTINO (201-353093) PINEIRO (P) WANTS GO ITALY, WANTS MAKE TRIP WITH D.

3. D PLANS LEAVE FOR CUBA BETWEEN 28 MARCH -- 2 APRIL. RQST HQS GUIDANCE IN CASE P RPTS RQST.

4. INDEX D, P.

SECRET

CFN: 9357 15 MARCH DELORRY D CUBA MANUEL PINEIRO LOZADA 201-238687 D'S HILDA QUINTANA D D AMLASH/1 ET AL D SAVERIO TUTINO 201-353093 PINEIRO P ITALY D D CUBA 28 2 RQST HQS P RPTS RQST D P

BT

SECRET

⑥

AmLash-1

AMLASH/1 - Paris Station Aspect

Paris Station involvement with the AMLASH case began in 1962, after AMLASH/1 came to Paris after attending the Helsinki Youth Festival that year. In Helsinki, AMLASH/1 was contacted by UNRUMBLE/2 (an asset of the Paris Station who attended the Festival for purposes of disruption) and by other KUBARK assets. It is not clear from our files just when AMLASH/1 was "recruited" but it appears that he was recruited during or shortly after the Festival.

In Paris he was in contact with Peter J. KYMINGHAM (probably in alias although I know that AMLASH/1 was at KYMINGHAM's home upon occasion). In 1962 AMLASH/1 was given training in explosives by [illegible] (I believe) upon request of the Paris Station. He appears to have returned to PBRUMEN in late 1962. It is not known if other Paris Station personnel were in contact with AMLASH/1 during that period.

AMLASH/1 next arrived in Paris on 14 September 1963, coming from the International Games held in Puerto Alegre, Brasil, where he was in contact with TYPIC officers. At this point AMSPORT/1 (now QUSPORT) was in contact with AMLASH/1 in Paris and AMWHIP/1 was another comms channel (the one being used primarily by Hqs.). The Headquarters TYPIC officer, ONTRICH (P), arrived in Paris on 3 October 1963 and picked up the contact with AMLASH/1 which was being maintained by AMSPORT/1 and KYMINGHAM. The meetings with AMLASH/1 took place in KYMINGHAM's home as best I remember. These discussions concerned AMLASH/1's plans to assassinate AMTHUG and overthrow his regime.

ONTRICH returned to Paris In late October, after discussions at Headquarters on the case. ONTRICH and DAINOLD, who ~~was~~ were tdy in Paris at the time, met with AMLASH/1 in late October or early November. DAINOLD's participation was due to AMLASH/1 strong desire to talk with some high-level ODYOKE official concerning his plans and to obtain ODYOKE blessing if possible. I am not aware of exactly what happened at these meetings but I received the impression from KYMINGHAM that such blessing was given. AMLASH/1 returned to PBRUMEN on 27 November 1963. It was during this visit to Paris

AMLASH-1

that STOCKWOOD met AMLASH/1 and AMWHIP/1, presumably in alias but I do not know the details. It was also apparent by the time AMLASH/1 left that he knew UNSNAFU/5 was working for KUBARK and we know that UNSNAFU/9 was aware to some extent of AMLASH/1's plans (UNSNAFU/9 had [illegible] been recruited by KUBARK at that time). It was agreed that AMLASH/1 would used the address of UNSNAFU/13's parents for s/w letters to KUBARK (UNSNAFU/13 is wife of UNSNAFU/9).

AMLASH/1 next arrived in Paris in late November or early December 1964. AMWHIP/1 STOCKWOOD and ONTRICH (tdy from Headquarters) met with him in Paris (this time in a safe house of the Station. AMLASH/1 left for PBRUMEN from Madrid on 20 February 1965. During this stay in Paris AMLASH/1 met the following KUBARK staffers and agents:

STOCKWOOD, CLOADEN, RODAMER
AMWHIP/1, UNSNAFU/9, UNSNAFU/5, UNSNAFU/13

You will recall that in December 1964 UNSNAFU/5 had a nervous breakdown and AMLASH/1 played an important part in convincing UNSNAFU/5 that he should agree to hospitalization. It was in this connection that CLOADEN and RODAMER met AMLASH/1. CLOADEN subsequently met with AMLASH/1 two or three times to received reports for STOCKWOOD. These meetings were street meetings or in the home of UNSNAFU/5. During this stay, AMLASH/1 traveled to Madrid at least once to meet with AMBIDDY/1 and AMBANG/1. I am not aware of results of these meetings except that AMLASH/1 was seeking the physical instruments to carry out his plan to eliminate AMTHUG.

There was no additional contact with AMLASH/1 in Paris subsequent to February 1965 but the Station (CLOADEN and MIRLEES) did have subsequent contact with UNSNAFU/5, UNSNAFU/9, AMLASH/2 and AMLASH/3. You will recall that it was AMLASH/3 who made the "joking" pitch to MIRLEES on 6 May 1965. AMLASH/2 and AMLASH/3 were both aware of AMLASH/1 plans.

14-00000

Paris Station personnel known to AMLASH/1

Peter J. KYMINGHAM	- not known what alias used. Some meetings were held in KYMINGHAM's home in 1962/63. It is not known if other staff personnel (other than ONTRICH) were met then by AMLASH/1.
Paul K. STOCKWOOD	- alias not known for sure but believe he used "Roberto". AMWHIP/1 knew STOCKWOOD as embassy officer and called him there.
Peter M. GLOADEN	- Known as "Dick". True name not used unless told to AMLASH/1 by UNSNAFU/5 or UNSNAFU/9.
Milton P. RODAMOR	- met AMLASH/1 only once, when transporting UNSNAFU/5 to hospital. Known to all A. "Dr. ......" (cant remember aka used).
Dr. Lipsich	- cleared Dr. at American Hospital, Paris. AMLASH/1 met him briefly when admitting UNSNAFU/5 to hospital.
Wallace A. GROWERY (from MADR)	- met in 1962 during explosives training in Paris. Details not known.

Agents (involved to some degree)

UNSNAFU/5
UNSNAFU/9
UNSNAFU/13
AMLASH/2
AMLASH/3
AMWHIP/1

Peter M. GLOADEN
7 March 1966

FORM 1503

Copying (Ra

file AMBUD-1

Pub.

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 08 JUNE 62

FILE: 08/0845Z

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
R ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	FAS	072128Z	IN-06069

TO WAVE

INFO DIR MANA GUAT SALV TEGU SANJ

CITE PACY 8025 ✓

(MASSEY ACTING)

REF: WAVE 4407

1. AMTEASE-1 ARRANGING FOLL FOR AMBUD-1 VISIT PACY:

A. RECEPTION TOCUMEN INTL AIRPORT;

B. BREAKFAST WITH NARCISCO CARAY, RECTOR UNIV OF PANAMA; ARLOS AROSEMENA, PANAMA DELEGATE OAS-PRESIDENT PACY LAW ASSOCIATION; AND LUIS ALFARO, PRESIDENT SAN FERNANDO MEDICAL CLINIC;

C. SUPPER WITH HYHULA-1 (IDEN) AND DULCIDO GONZALEZ, LEADING ANTI-COMMIE INDUSTRIALIST;

D. TIMES FOR INTERVIEW WITH HYJULA-1, PRESIDENT CHIARI, FORMIN GALILEO SOLIS, AND OTHERCABINET MINS;

E. TOUR UNIV OF PANAMA AND HQS DEMOCRATIC LABOR UNIONS;

2. STATION ~~XXXXXX~~ FINANCING PORTION OP FOR LOCAL PROP VALUE. WILL AIRMAIL CLIPPINGS, FOTOS MANA SALV GUAT SANJ TEGU FOR POSS REPLAY, ALTHOUGH ITEMS MAY NOT BE TIMLY ALL CASES.

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION
INFO
COS
DC/OS
EX
CI
FI
SEC
AIR
TR
RI

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

FORM 2-61 1303a

(44)

Caponey

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 08 JUNE 62

FILE: 08/0835Z

			INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	DEFERRED	PRIORITY			
RR	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS FAS	072136Z	IN-06066

TO WAVE

INFO DIR MANA SALV GUAT TEGU SANJ

CITE PACY 8026 ✓ NUMBER

(MASSEY ACTING)

REF PACY 8025

IDEN A: MARCO ROBLES, MINISTER GOVERNMENT AND JUSTICE.

END OF MESSAGE

CTION

INFO

COS
COPS
DC/OS
SO
FI
CI
PI
[illegible]
TS
[illegible]
AIR
[illegible]
TR
COMMO
RI

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

fw

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 11 OCT 62

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
RRRRROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS RF	101008Z	1155S

TO DIR
INFO WAVE
CITE KNGS 0208 ✓ NUMBER

GYROSE AMBUD

REF A. DIR 40582

B. KNGS 0202

1. COS BELIEVES HIS REF B APPRAISAL JAMAICAN POLITICAL CLIMATE RE ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD DELEGATION HERE CORRECT. JAMAICAN GOVT WANTS NOT BE OVERTLY INVOLVED IN COLD WAR AND OUT OF CONCERN FOR ### SAFETY LARGE JAMAICAN COMMUN#ITY CUBA WILL MAKE STRENUOUS EFFORT TO STAY OUT. HOWEVER THEY WILL HELP COVERTLY WHEREEVER POSSIBLE. ANY ATTEMPT INVOLVE JAMAICAN GOVT AGAINST ITS WILL AT THIS ### TIME WOULD RESULT IN NET LOSS OF COOPERATION NOW AND IN FUTURE, STATION REGARDS INCREASING COOPERATION OF RUABBE SERCIVE IN CUBAN OBJECTIVES OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE.

2. IF HQS BELIEVES AMBUD REP SHOULD VISIT JAMAICA TO TEST POLITICAL ~~EKXXM~~ CLIMATE IN GOVT, STATION WOULD CONCUR MOST RELUCTANTLY IN (PTN GBLD WILL FWD) WITH FRANK (DIAZ) SILVEIRA DURING CARIBBEAN GAMES WHOM GOVT WANTED TO THROW OUT FOR HIS STATMENTS TO PRESS ABOUT PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD REPRESENTATION HERE. IN ~~X~~ ANY EVENT STATION WOULD INSIST NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS PRECEDE JAMAICAN GOVT RULING. SHOULD GOVT REJECT AMBUD FOLLOWING ADVANCE PUBLICITY THIS COULD BE MAJOR ~~EX~~ VICTORY FOR CUBAN CONSULATE, SHOT IN ARM TO FACING "FRIENDS OF CUBA

fw

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE:

FILE:

	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		IN 11558

TO

INFO

CITE KIGS 0208
NUMBER

--- PAGE 2---

COMMITTEE" (COMPRISING LOCAL COMMUNISTS AND RAS TAFARIS), AND GIFT TO BUDDING NEW COMMUNIST FRONT "SOCIALIST PARTY OF JAMAICA".

3. SINCE STATION COULD NOT PLAUSIBLY DENY RESPONSIBILITY FOR AMBUD TO RUABBE AND GOVT OPPOSED TO USE OF JAMAICA FOR COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY PURPOSE AGAINST CUBA, COS BELIEVES IT ADVANTAGEOUS TO KUBARK AND ODYOKE FOR AMBUD STAY OUT OF JAMAICA UNTIL SENTIMENT CHANGES.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

FORM 1302a 2-62

DISTR: COS COPS DC/OS

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 03 OCT 62

FILE: 030339Z

PRECEDENCE			INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	DEFERRED	PRIORITY			
RR	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	K	021514Z	11128

TO DIR WAVE

INFO

CITE KNGS 0202 NUMBER

GYROSE AMBUD

REF A. WAVE 9150

B. KNGS 0167

1. COS DOES NOT QUESTION POSSIBILITY COVERAGE CUBAN PROBLEM FROM JAMAICA MIGHT BE EXTENDED BUT BELIEVES DELEGATION SUCH AS AMBUD WHOSE PRESENCE OVERT WOULD PROVE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. STATEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER BUSTAMANTE 4 SEPTEMBER THAT GOVT WOULD NOT ALLOW JAMAICA BE USED FOR COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY PURPOSE AGAINST CUBA MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. REASON FOR THIS STATEMENT IS CONTINUING AND FREQUENTLY REITERATED CONCERN OF JAMAICAN GOVT FOR SAFETY OF 25,000 JAMAICANS RESIDENT IN CUBA.

2. STATION FEELS CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS MADE IN GAINING COVERT SUPPORT THROUGH RUABBE FOR CI EFFORT AGAINST CUBANS WHICH WAS EXTENDED TO SOME ACTUAL ASSISTANCE FOR ANTI-CUBAN ACTION DURING CARIBBEAN GAMES. WISH POINT OUT HOWEVER THIS CONTINGENT UPON MAINTENANCE COVERT NATURE OF ACTIVITY. IN FACE DECLARED GOVT POSITION COS BELIEVES ANY EXPANSION JAMAICA OF ACTIVITIES AGAINST CUBA MUST BE COVERT. FURTHER SINCE VERY DIM VIEW TAKEN OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF DR FRANK DIAZ SILVEIRA BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES WHEN HE INDICATED 14 AUGUST HE WOULD SEEK PERMISSION OPERATE ON ISLAND AS AGENT OF COUNCIL, COS DEFINITELY OF OPINION AMBUD

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

14-00000

FORM 1302a
2.62

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 03 OCT 62

FILE: 030339Z

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG		INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS			11128

TO

INFO

CITE KNGS 0202
NUMBER

PAGE TWO

TYPE DELEGATION IN JAMAICA WOULD BE HARMFUL TO KUBARK AND ODYOKE INTERESTS (SEE KNGS 0123).

3. COS PREPARED CONSIDER ASSIGNMENT STAFF OR CONTRACT AGENT TO JAMAICA UNDER XXXXXXX NON-OFFICIAL COVER TO HANDLE CUBAN AND RELATED HAITIAN AND DOMINICAN PROBLEMS. HOWEVER WOULD PREFER STAFFER UNDER OFFICIAL COVER TO SHARE KUTUBE/KUWOLF GENERAL STATION OPS. EMPHASIS HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE BE ON CUBAN COVERAGE. WOULD NEED ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TRAINED IN COMMO AND ADMIN.

4. IN VIEW PRODUCTIVE LIAISON AND DEVELOPING UNILATERAL ACTIVITIES STATION COULD INCREASE REPORTING NOW IF SECRETARY ADDED TO ABSORB ADMIN CHORES.

5. REQUEST HQS CONSIDER ASSIGNMENTS PROPOSED BY COS.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

②

10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.

2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:

a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.

(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.

(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the "Operacion Grieta."

c. Underground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian Embassy).

(2) [redacted] action as outlined in plan presented [redacted] October.

3. Commando [redacted]

Then Dr. [redacted] me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by [redacted] collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VA[redacted], an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIG[redacted] (fnu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated that they were [redacted] group and had been prisoners.

With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and materiel provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our meeting at 15:30 on 6 October for transmission.)

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray

Dr. MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.

COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime

Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit.* He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."

---

*Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.

He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference." "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S."

6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban Soil

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and establish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. "This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognize that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and immediately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in adequate strength to ensure victory.

Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.

Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't considered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us." "The Punta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries receiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers

I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He declared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRO and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named ALABAU to the

Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescate
30 de Noviembre
MRR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi

He said he had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night

from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says, "Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Socieded Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutes to address the meeting."

10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian who Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after 11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brazil. MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark.

11. Propaganda Commission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is outside the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CASTRILLO had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-

nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and reestablishment of order in the island.

13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferson 2-4680). So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me."

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation - merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance."

14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile Groups

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I understood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organizations to be able to discuss the matter effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October, I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

the ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He expressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise to me.

16. Comment

During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals. I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required.

PDOB: Havana 6 April 1925
teacher

ODENVY name trace requested by PW 8 Feb 61.
(WAVE 3457)

Results: no record

ROSETE, Hada MONT-5469
10 JAN 62

FRD Rep MONT, doing excellent job in Media field. Has established good contacts with editors major newspapers who providing her space at reduced rates and has secured half hour weekly radio time from Radio Sarandi at cost.

ROSETE Rosete, Hada

19-124-25/6
AMBUD Finance
(Misc.)/Att to
Rpt 10 Dec 62

Subject is a member of the Revolutionary Council and is on a Finance Department-Delegations list. for period 1-30 November 62. Subj is representative from Uruguay. No further info.

ROSETE Rosete, Hada Education

FRD, Miami

Bn: 4/6/25, Havana

Divorced

Salary

Rosete, Hada Mireya 615 201-292025

6 April 1925 Havana, Cuba C-59606

Traces - 7 Feb. 61
" 7 " "

eq. by PROP on 7 Feb. 61
ranted DEADLINE: ~~7 March~~ 61 21 FEB, Date

P. O. A. granted
24 FEB 1961

201 FILE RETURNED
TO RID/FILES
POA CANCELLED

FIELD ADVISED by PROP

ROSETE ROSETE, HADA

19-124-25/5A
AMBUD-Delegates
Annex "I-G"
1-31 Mar 63

Subject is Delegate ~~from~~ IN: Uruguay
According to Luis BOTIFOLL (head of CRC delegations), subject's political affiliation is none.

ROSETTE, Hadda

Local FRD Type, who in opinion Segundo and Station providing excellent support to Station KEGAGE PW program.

MONT 5448 6 Jan 62

SECRET

AMBIDDY-1

15 June 1964

SYNOPSIS

Per his request, 2nd Lt. Oliverio Antonio TOMEU Vasallo was recontacted on 8 June 64 at his place of residence. He provided additional details on Carlos and Ana Gloria de VARONA, and identified Osiel GONZALEZ and one "COCO" as possible leads to Jose LLANUSA Gobel.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

15 June 1964

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Recontact of Oliverio A. TOMEU Vasallo. (201-283206)

1. At 1730 hours, 8 June 64, the undersigned was advised at his residence that a Mr. TOMEU (Subject) had called the security number given him (351-8161) and left the message that he would like to talk again with Paul Stroud (the undersigned) anytime after 1800 hours, 8 June.

2. Upon arriving at TOMEU's apartment (Apt. 303, 1028 Wahler Place SE, High Point Apartment House, Washington, D. C.), 1830 hours, 8 June, TOMEU indicated to his two daughters he would like to have some privacy and they and his wife, Caridad, left the apartment.

3. TOMEU apologized for not having recalled the name "de VARONA" as that of Ana Gloria de VARONA. He reiterated that, while in hiding to escape capture by the Cuban Government subsequent to his infiltration, he knew only the first names of the persons with whom he came in contact, but then added he knew Ana Gloria de VARONA, in whose house he was hiding, because she was the sister of Carlos de VARONA, one of his infiltration team members. (This Carlos de VARONA may be identical with one Carlos Manuel de VARONA Segura, 201-289985; or one Carlos Arturo VARONA Arjona, 201-283209.)

4. On several occasions, according to TOMEU, he was seated at the table in Ana's house with several other people. One of these individuals, known to TOMEU only as "COCO," was described as the secretary to Jose LLANUZA Gobel. There was not, however, any discussions in which TOMEU recalls LLANUZA or his political sympathies having been discussed. According to TOMEU's recollection it was "COCO" who was associated with LLANUZA, and he was not aware of any relationship between Ana and LLANUZA. Although TOMEU had no information as to what finally happened to Carlos de VARONA, his infiltration team mate, he suggested that if Carlos or Ana were available they may be able to identify "COCO" and provide data on his accessability for contact.

5. One Oziel GONZALEZ, former Chief of the Havana Fire Department, was identified by TOMEU as another possible lead

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

who would know LLANUZA. TOMEU affirmed Osiel was previously with MENOYO Gutierrez in the Second Front of Escambray. Osiel was under asylum in the Brazilian Embassy (sic, Argentine Embassy?), when TOMEU gained political asylum. When Osiel finally received his safe conduct from the Embassy, he went to Puerto Rico and, TOMEU postulates that Osiel is now again with MENOYO in either the United States or Puerto Rico.

6. Two snap shots (to be returned) were provided by TOMEU of himself and six other individuals who were in asylum at the same time. He identified these, in the photograph in which Monsignor Eduardo BOZA Masvidal is seated, as, from left to right: Manuel VILLAMANAN, Oliverio TOMEU, Nils DIAZ (believed to be in US), Publio RUIZ (US), Jorge Del VALLE (Mex?), and Osiel GONZALEZ (US or Puerto Rico?).

7. Upon completing the debriefing, Stroud and TOMEU "exchanged small talk" for a while until TOMEU finally stated that he still wished there was something more he could do to help free Cuba, and asked "What do you think I should do?" Stroud replied that no person could really make that type of decision for another individual, and countered by asking TOMEU what alternatives he had in mind, other than remaining in the US Army as a career military officer.

8. TOMEU replied that, of course, he was once an agriculturalist, but that there were few job opportunities in which he could apply his past experience. His sister had also asked him if he felt he and his family would want to live with her in Spain or Mexico, but he didn't think too much of this idea. He then stated that he had been asked by Manuel ARTIME to take a job as an instructor. Without indicating any association of even awareness of ARTIME's activities, or of ARTIME's contact with TOMEU (as indicated in TOMEU's 201), TOMEU was asked what he thought of ARTIME's proposition. TOMEU stated that he would no longer follow any man as an individual or as a leader, because a man's ideals, outlook, and objectives change with time. For example, the people of Cuba followed Fidel because of the ideals he advocated. When Fidel took over, his accomplishments gradually became quite different from the ideals he had espoused. TOMEU continued by saying he would "no longer follow a man. One could only trust his ideals or an organization which followed those ideals, since a good organization would be less likely of being controlled by a single man." When asked for an example of the type of organization he had in mind, TOMEU replied he was most favorably inclined towards the ideals and goals of the JURE. (The JURE or JRC is an organization created by Manolo RAY Rivero around a nucleus of former 26 July Movement leaders. See memo and attachment dated 23 July 1963 from John Hugh Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, ARA, Department of State in TOMEU's 201-283206.)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9. It should, perhaps, be noted here that in an informal exchange with Mrs. Donald WEBSTER, TOMEU's supervisor at the Defense Language Institute, Anacostia Naval Annex, 4 June 64, Mrs. WEBSTER volunteered the information that "all of the other 'Brigade students here' have told me they think very highly of TOMEU, and that he is a very brave man, because he and his family were very wealthy in Cuba and he gave it all up to go into exile and fight the Castro Regime."

WH/SA/SO/HS
C. PAUL PLUMB, JR.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

J1-25

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

TO:	☒	CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
	☐	Security Support Division/Office of Security

DATE: 10 Jan 61

FROM: Margaret Ross
WH/4
2702 Qtrs E
8564

SUBJECT: (True name) Santiago ALVAREZ Fernandez

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

PROJECT: JMATE

CI/OA FILE NO.

RI 201 FILE NO.

SO FILE NO.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Cuba

FULL DETAILS OF USE:

PM Trainees

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☐	YES	☒	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION

None

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
		☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: J1-25

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD		
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☒	WILL BE FORWARDED	☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)

RI TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☒	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☒	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
for Joseph Piccolo	8564	for Jacob D. Esterline

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(13)

Y 68221.
Inactive

[illegible] May [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [illegible]

[illegible] 110273

1. On [illegible] April [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] Section, [illegible], [illegible] to the [illegible] that [illegible] Charles had [illegible] Haiti [illegible] and had [illegible] in New York. A [illegible] of Charles, named [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], had [illegible] Charles as a man of [illegible] to the [illegible] in view of the [illegible] in Haiti. Charles was [illegible] of the [illegible], Port au Prince, Haiti, who is in [illegible]. Mrs. [illegible] that she had [illegible] Col. [illegible] in [illegible] to [illegible] in order to obtain more background information and an assessment on Charles.

2. On 1 May (C) Mrs. [illegible] advised that Charles was staying at the Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, and that he had telephoned her since her name had been supplied to him by Dryer. Charles considered her to be his point of contact in Washington. According to Mrs. [illegible], Charles had appointments to see Vice President Johnson, Senator Keating, and Congressman [illegible] (Florida). However, Charles was willing to talk to representatives of Mrs. [illegible]'s office. Mrs. [illegible] stated that the Haitian desk man in [illegible] was ready to go to New York to talk to Charles and [illegible] to accompany him. Charles speaks very little English and a [illegible] in French was therefore required for the interview. Mrs. [illegible] stated that she might be able to obtain a French linguist from First Army, Governor's Island, but he would not be an intelligence officer. It was decided that [illegible], New York Office, who has a knowledge of the French language would accompany the [illegible] representative [illegible]. It was also arranged that [illegible] would meet the [illegible] representative (Captain [illegible]) at the Park Sheraton Hotel where Charles was staying.

3. On 2 May (C) Mrs. [illegible] reported that Col. [illegible] had interviewed Mr. Dryer in [illegible]. Dryer had appointed Charles as Director of his bank in Haiti. Charles, according to Dryer, formerly had no political ambitions but in view of the current political situation in Haiti, Charles now thinks that he may some day be president. Dryer described Charles as well-connected, politically and financially, on both sides of the fence in Haiti. He is also a [illegible] friend of [illegible] Duvalier. Dryer had given Charles letters of introduction to Senator Keating and to other [illegible] in Washington. Charles wanted to see President Kennedy and indeed had gone to the White House to arrange [illegible] an appointment. He was [illegible] by the President's [illegible] secretary and invited to dinner that evening with the appointment

[illegible] 110273

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

secretary. Through a misunderstanding, however, Charles did not attend the dinner [illegible].

[illegible]

4. Charles [illegible], [illegible] with a [illegible] geologist [illegible] Charles [illegible] to arrange a meeting for Charles with Vice President Johnson.

5. On 3 May 63 Jim Daley telephoned to advise that he had had a three-hour session the previous day with Charles and that he had obtained both [illegible] and views by Charles on what the United States should do in the current Haitian situation. [illegible] advised that he was transmitting the information to Washington. Upon receipt, copies of the telegram were transmitted to ACSI (Mrs. Matlack), WH Division, and the Latin American Branch.

6. On 6 May 63 Hugo Struts, Support Branch, advised that WH Division wished to speak to Charles and Daley was asked to arrange an appointment. Mrs. Matlack telephoned at approximately 1715 to advise that she had just received a telephone call from Mrs. de Mohrenschildt asking assistance in obtaining hotel reservations in Washington. Upon being told that we had no special means of obtaining reservations, Mrs. Matlack stated that she would check with the State Department Protocol Office to determine which hotels would admit negro guests. Mrs. Matlack finally made reservations at the Alban Towers. A check with Jim Daley revealed that he had arranged for Charles to meet the WH representative in the lobby of the Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 12:00 noon on 7 May. Attempts to reach Mrs. Matlack that afternoon were unsuccessful. At 0930, 7 May, a call was made to Mrs. Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in Washington on that day and that arrangements had been made for a meeting with an Agency representative for 1200 noon. Mrs. Matlack reported that both Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and Charles had called her that previous evening to confirm a 12:30 luncheon appointment with her. Mrs. Matlack was concerned that CIA and Army should not be working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from ACSI to meet Charles at lunch and felt that it would not be politic for her to withdraw from her commitment since Army considered her the point of contact with Charles. Hugo Struts informed WH Division of the conflict and passed on the suggestion that the WH Division representative might meet Charles and Mrs. Matlack at noon and that Mrs. Matlack offered to withdraw shortly thereafter. The WH representative declined the offer and suggested that a meeting later in the afternoon be arranged. Mrs. Matlack believed that due to conflicting instructions, she had been placed in the middle in the situation from which she could not graciously withdraw and requested that someone accompany her.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

7. I met Mrs. Matlack in the lobby of the Hotel Willard shortly before noon, and a few minutes later, Mr. Charles arrived, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt. We lunched in the restaurant of the hotel. Mr. de Mohrenschildt [illegible] that he had been born in [illegible], Russia, [illegible] had been taken to [illegible] as a small child. [illegible] in Poland prior to World War II and [illegible] in the [illegible] Army. He also mentioned that he had [illegible] to Yugoslavia in 1957 and while in Yugoslavia had met Charles who was visiting Yugoslavia at the time. He had written to Charles and was invited to visit Haiti, which invitation he had accepted. His home is in Dallas, Texas. He has a Ph.D. in geology and has had some [illegible] experience. Mrs. de Mohrenschildt was born in Peking, China. Her father was Russian and her mother French, and she [illegible] has been a fashion designer. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he has known Charles for sometime and that he is a partner with him in a sisal business in Haiti.

8. Both Charles and de Mohrenschildt were anxious to arrange meetings with government officials in Washington. I mentioned to Charles that a meeting had been arranged for him at 2:15 and that a Mr. Green would meet him in the lobby. At 1:50 Mrs. Matlack, Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and I departed and Charles remained in the lobby waiting for contact.

9. In the course of the luncheon conversation, Charles had mentioned to Mrs. Matlack that he desired to see a Mr. [illegible], AID, to discuss US aid to Haiti. Later that afternoon Mrs. Matlack called to state that she had called the State Department to pass along Charles' request. Mr. [illegible] (State) had called her back to pass on the Haitian Desk man's extreme displeasure that anyone in the United States Government should be in official contact with Charles. The desk man considered Charles to be close to the Duvalier Government, to have been involved in several shady financial dealings, and in general, to be an undesirable character. Mrs. Matlack asked whether the Agency had any interest in Charles which would dictate further contact with Charles.

10. [illegible] checked with WH Division and determined that as a result of the meeting with Charles, the WH/[illegible] Haitian Desk had no further plans to contact him. I told Mrs. Matlack that our interests seemed to have been satisfied and that I believed we should disengage ourselves as gracefully as possible.

[illegible]

11. [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] Coordinator, called on 7 May to inquire concerning our involvement in the Charles case. He stated that [illegible] had called him earlier that day to inform him that [illegible] had no direct interest in Charles and that it was acting as an intermediary at the request of General [illegible] who had passed the lead to General [illegible]. [illegible] was concerned that due to the manner in which [illegible] to the [illegible], Charles might think that [illegible] had interfered or had obstructed [illegible] contact with Charles. I explained to [illegible] what had happened and he later called back to state that [illegible] was completely satisfied in the way the matter had been handled.

12. On 8 May Mrs. [illegible] telephoned to advise that the Operational Branch of [illegible] was discussing the Charles case with [illegible] to determine future course of action. She was still somewhat concerned over our own position in the case since Charles considered her to be the focal point in Washington. I reiterated to her that the matter was one for [illegible], the State Department or the operational elements to handle and that we preferred to disengage ourselves. Mrs. [illegible] mentioned that a dispatch had been received to the effect that a cousin of Charles was [illegible] mentioned as a successor to [illegible] should the latter be overthrown. She was of the opinion that the US government should continue to "play ball" with Charles as a future asset in [illegible] affairs.

A. P. [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig - C/[illegible]
1 - New York Office
1 - Support ([illegible])
1 - [illegible] Branch
2 - Index (Central)
1 - Dep/[illegible] chrono

[illegible]:jc:[illegible]

6 Vol I

19-124-25/5-4

WRUL "El Mundo y Usted"

Invoice #	Covering	Amount	Cashier's Check
1232	June 64	$2,632.50	— pd.
1256	July 64	$2,733.75	pd #367218 for $7,998.75
1297	Aug 64	$2632.50	
1324	Sept. 64	$2632.50	
1344	Oct 64	$2,733.75	— pd # 369794
1382	1-15 Nov	?	— ? OK
1389	16-30 Nov	$607.50	pd # 376168 for $1,923.75
1399	Dec. 64	$1,316.25	
1419	Jan 65	$1,316.25	— pd# 382709
1450	Feb 65	$1,215.00	—
1382 + 1450	Nov (adjust.) + Feb 65	$3138.75	— #389049
1475	Mar 65	$1,417.50	— # 393103
1500	Apr 65	$1,316.25	— #
1521	May 65	$1,316.25	— # 399858
1567	June 65	$1,316.25	# 400704
1666	July 65	$1,316.25	# 408357
[illegible]	Aug 65	$1,316.25	# 412002 (mailed dir.)
[illegible]	Sept 65	$1,316.25	#

Radio Americas "El Medico y Usted"

Invoice #	Covering	Amount	Cashier's Check
64-6-2	June 64	$ 1509.00	pd.
64-7-2	July 64	$ 1450.50	pd.
64-8-2	Aug 64	$ 1460.50	pd. #367456
64-9-2	Sept 64	$ 1450.00	pd for $ 2,910.50
—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—
64-12-2	Nov/Dec 64	$ 1064.50	pd#
65-1-2	Dec/Jan 65	$ 1060.50	pd# 350892
65-2-2	Jan/Feb 65	$1060.50	pd# 389048
—	Feb/Mar 65	—	—
65-4-2	Mar/Apr	$ 1,053.00	pd# 393105
65-5-2	Apr/May	$1,063.50	pd# 399854
65-6-2	May/June	$1,012.50	# 405702
65-7-2	June/July	$1,012.50	#
65-8-2	July/Aug ([illegible])	$ 276.50	#

Sergio Mauri

Perteneció a la Juventud Socialista
empezó a trabajar en el Fondo Especial de Obras Publicas alrededor del comienzo del Gobierno Autentico.
Al llegar el actual gobierno al poder el fué dejado cesante en dicho lugar, por haber estado de acuerdo con la dictadura de Batista, y haber colaborado con los distintos Directores que hubo en dicho lugar.
Desconociendo por supuesto lo que el hubo de realizar despues.-
El Sr. Guillermo Perez Fraga, que vive en el 820 N.W. 13 Ct. Apto. y que puede ser localizado por el telefono 373 8122, puede dar mas informes que yo.
Tambien el tiene una intima amiga en esta ciudad que vive en el 630 N.E. 22 Tc. y tiene el telefono 379 8546, esta sabe de el mucho mas pues sabe que estuvo en China comunista y el Canada.
Tambien tiene una hermena aquí, y que se puede localizar at traves de la persona anteriormente señalada.

Charla con el profesor Agustín P. Pons

Posible un intercambio de médicos de Cuba y España

Por JORGE COO
De la Redacción de EL MUNDO

¡Lo mejor que he visto en Cuba son sus médicos!, así se expresó el doctor Agustín Pedro Pons, eminente médico español, durante la conferencia de prensa que ofreció en el salón de actos del Colegio Médico Nacional. El doctor Pons es ampliamente conocido en los grandes centros asistenciales de Europa, en donde en materia de Clínica Médica es llamado con justicia El Maestro. Ha sido además, presidente del Instituto Médico Farmacéutico y presidente de la Academia de Ciencias Medicas, siendo en la actualidad su presidente de honor.

Actualmente se encuentra de visita en nuestro país, acompañado por su auxiliar el doctor Pedro Botet invitados por el Consejo Científico del Ministerio de Salud Pública y el Colegio Médico Nacional.

A una pregunta sobre su impresión de nuestro sistema

(Termina en la Pág. 2, Col. 2)

sejo
de
en
ma-
Bri-
ol"
de
los
v

Logra...

(Continuación de la 1a. Página)

Precedieron a la dirigente revolucionaria en el uso de la palabra, el jefe de la Misión del Frente Nacional de Liberación de Vietnam del Sur, Vo Dong Giang, y el secretario general del Comité de Base de la UJC del MININD, Tomás Alvarez.

Comenzó Vo Dong Giang refiriéndose a que se está celebrando en Vietnam del Sur los festejos del Año Nuevo Lunar "El calendario lunar de 1964 terminó muy mal para los yanquis, y el de 1965 empezó peor", dijo.

Explicó después que durante estos festejos se aprovecha para hacer un balance de las actividades realizadas en 1964 y trazar los planes a desarrollar en 1965. Afirmó que ya los imperialistas y sus lacayos no son los que deciden la situación en Vietnam del Sur, sino el pueblo y el Frente Nacional de Liberación.

En relación con la cooperación material que está realizando Cuba en favor del pueblo sudvietnamita, Vo Dong Giang expresó que esa ayuda no solamente sirve a los damnificados de los tifones, sino de estímulo para acelerar la lucha de liberación.

Al terminar de hablar el Jefe de la Misión, una joven comunista le entregó un cuadro de Julio Antonio Mella en nombre de todos los trabajadores del MININD.

Asistieron al acto el embajador de la República Democrática de Vietnam, señor Nguyen Thanh Ha, y el viceministro de Desarrollo Técnico, Ingeniero Tirso W. Sáenz. (Reporte: Raimundo Rodríguez).

Cuidarán...

(Continuación de la 1a. Página)

escolares recibirán instrucciones sobre suelos, tipos de césped, plantas ornamentales, arbolado, así como nociones de paisajes aplicado a la jardinería.

Posible...

(Continuación de la 1a. Página)

hospitalario, el trabajo de los médicos y la organización asistencial en general, el doctor Pons respondió: "Me es muy fácil contestar a esa pregunta: la organización hospitalaria en Cuba responde plenamente a los postulados democráticos del régimen. Todo el mundo tiene cabida en los hospitales, sin distinción de clase. Además, los centros asistenciales están bien equipados, yo diría que casi con riqueza, si no fuera porque esto parece un término burgués".



Dr. Agustín Pedro Pons

"Capítulo aparte merecen los servidores de estos centros. No quiero que parezca lisonja, pero tengo la impresión de que son médicos de una gran cultura, con una gran sed de aprender. Son médicos que están al corriente de las mejores técnicas modernas, y sobre todo existe en ellos el entusiasmo. No cabe duda que todo esto converge en un mejor servicio. He de decirles que en ningún lado he visto apatía, sino un coro de gente en el que todos vibraban. Y tengan entendido que un cuerpo de médicos que así sienta su profesión, será dentro de poco uno de los mejores del mundo. Todo esto lo puedo

[illegible]

Los equipos de trabajo se dividirán en interiores y exteriores. Los interiores estarán formados por alumnos de cuarto grado y tendrán la responsabilidad del arreglo y mantenimiento de las áreas verdes correspondientes al plantel. Los equipos exteriores los formarán alumnos de los [illegible] los quinto y sexto y tendrán como tarea fundamental la de ir al rescate de las áreas verdes en la zona en que se encuentre ubicada la escuela.

Rx
Por la salud

TRASMISION DE ENFERMEDADES INFECCIOSAS

La trasmisión de una bacteria que causa enfermedades desde una persona enferma a una persona sana, se efectúa de diversos modos.

El agua transporta gran cantidad de bacterias. Por eso hay que hervir el agua. La candela mata los microbios.

La leche puede transportar también bacterias patógenas. Hierva también la leche.

Los alimentos también pueden transportar bacterias patógenas. Proteja los alimentos.

En ocasiones intervienen los insectos. Por ejemplo, una mosca es capaz de cargar hasta diez millones de microbios. Y al posarse en el cuerpo del niño, o en el tete, o en los juguetes, los infecta. El mosquito Aedes Aegypti puede trasmitir la fiebre amarilla. Otros animales como el perro y el gato pueden trasmitir la rabia.

AGUA Y JABON

[illegible] mejor que he visto de Cuba, son sus médicos".

A las preguntas sobre un posible intercambio médico entre Cuba y España, el doctor Pons contestó que esto estaba lleno de promesas y que, precisamente, su viaje trataba de abrir un camino a este intercambio científico. Señaló que para esto Cuba y España tienen una gran facilidad, y es que ambos países hablan una lengua común. Comunista?

Siguiendo el curso de la entrevista, el científico español nos dijo: "No he tenido tiempo de ver nada sobre medicina rural, pero estoy enterado de que se han hecho muchos hospitales rurales y "comarcales" y que se le está prestando una gran atención a la asistencia médica en el campo".

Sobre un posible retorno a Cuba, el Dr. Pons respondió: "Pienso volver en un plazo muy breve. Sobre esto he hablado con el Viceministro y el Ministro del MINSAP y creo que hemos llegado a un acuerdo".

A las preguntas sobre su libro "Clínica Médica", que es usado como libro de texto en nuestra Universidad, dice: "De mi libro no puedo hablar porque es como el elogio de un padre al hijo, pero les diré que no es obra mía solamente, sino que conmigo colaboran más de 45 médicos. Hay muchos libros que tratan sobre lo mismo, sobre todo, libros americanos; pero éstos están escritos muy espontáneamente, con cierta superficialidad; nosotros, por el contrario, nos reunimos semanalmente para hacerle mejoras, y creo que ha esto debe su éxito".

Respecto al Hospital Siquiátrico, el Dr. Pons dice: "Esto culmina la obra médica que se ha hecho en Cuba. Ya no puede ser mejor. Se puede igualar, pero no superar. Es un mundo aparte, es quizás la obra más afortunada de la Revolución con respecto a medicina" (!)

Los reporteros quisieron saber la opinión del doctor Pedro Boret, auxiliar del doctor Pons, acerca de la medicina en Cuba, a lo que el aludido contestó: "Poco se puede agregar a lo dicho por el Dr. Pons, pero hay algo que sí quisiera decir: En este viaje he aprendido a ser humilde, puesto que yo, médico joven, como muchos otros pude decir: bueno, voy a Cuba, doy unas conferencias y ya. Pero después de visitar varios hospitales, después de ver un lugar como el Departamento de Química Endocrinológica del Hospital "Fajardo", uno debe hacer un acto de contrición y reconocer que a Cuba, también venimos a aprender". Qué?

Pedro [illegible] "El [illegible]"
[illegible] of AMBUD-3
Terminated 30 Sept 1965

[illegible]

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

Worldwide Communications Center

W M

Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y.
PL 2-3122

RECEIVED JUL 23 1965

July 22, 1965

Dade County Medical Society
Miami
Florida

Gentlemen:

Enclosed are four (4) copies of a new Broadcast Agreement reflecting your changed programs effective last May.

Please sign all four copies and return to this office for countersignature.

We shall then return two (2) completely signed copies for your files.

Very truly yours,

Richard W. Grefe

Richard W. Grefe
Vice President

RWG/fs
Enc. 4

AUDIO-VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS WORLDWIDE

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

BROADCAST AGREEMENT

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE, 4 WEST 58TH ST., NEW YORK 19, N. Y.
A DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION

Date: July 22, 1965

Contract No.: 765-11

AGREEMENT between Dade County Medical SOCIETY called "Agency" for broadcasting over International Radio Station WRUL programs, announcements and/or participations, as scheduled below on behalf of

Dade County Medical Society, Miami, Florida
(name and address)

called "Advertiser" to advertise Educational Medical Program and Radio New York Worldwide, a division of International Educational Broadcasting Corporation called "Station", subject to the standard conditions on the back hereof and any special conditions set forth below or attached hereto.

Target Area Caribbean Language Spanish Approximate Time of Broadcast 8:01 PM (E.S.T.)

Length of Broadcast 15 Minutes Days Mon.Wed.Fri. Times per Week 3

Starting Date May 17, 1965 Ending Date till forbid Total Broadcasts

Program material arrangements (check appropriate boxes):

☒ Live or ☒ Recorded

☒ Furnished by agency or ☐ By Station

Additional Instructions:

This contract may be cancelled by either party upon four (4) weeks written notice.

Rates

	NUMBER OF BROADCASTS	STATION CHARGE	TALENT	LINE SERVICE	RE-BROADCAST	OTHER CHARGES	TOTAL PRICE
Per Week	3	101.25					303.75
Per Contract							

[illegible]

ACCEPTED:

Date ______________ By ______________
Agency or Advertiser

Date ______________ By ______________
Radio New York Worldwide
Division of International Educational Broadcasting Corporation

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE CONTRACT FOR BROADCASTING

1. PAYMENT AND BILLING.

(a) Time Payments under this contract are to be received by STATION at the address specified on STATION's bills on or before the 15th of each month following that in which broadcasting is done. Payment is to be made in United States funds, net, payable at a New York City bank, unless specifically provided to the contrary on the face hereof.

(b) Materiality. In all cases date of payment is material. If STATION fails to receive timely payment, or if ADVERTISER's or AGENCY's credit is, in STATION's reasonable opinion, impaired, STATION in its own discretion, may either cancel this contract under sub-paragraph 3(a) or change the terms of payment for further broadcasts under this contract.

(c) Billing. STATION will bill AGENCY at intervals following broadcasting.

2. TERMINATION.

(a) Broadcasts Other Than Participations and Spot Announcements. If this contract calls for broadcasts of time periods other than participations and spot announcements, the entire contract may be terminated by either party effective at the end of any 13 week cycle of broadcasting hereunder upon giving the other party not less than 28 days' prior written notice.

(b) Participations and Spot Announcements. If this contract calls for broadcasts of participations and spot announcements the entire contract or parts thereof may be terminated by either party at any time by giving the other party not less than 14 days' prior written notice.

(c) Claims. If STATION is notified of any claim caused by arising out of, or resulting from any broadcast hereunder, whether in connection with program material furnished by AGENCY or STATION, or otherwise, and said claim is deemed substantial in STATION's reasonable opinion, STATION may, by giving written notice to AGENCY, terminate this contract as to any or all further broadcasts.

(d) Effect of Termination. If AGENCY terminates this contract under sub-paragraph 2(a) or (b), AGENCY will pay STATION at earned rate for broadcasts contracted for to and including the date of termination. If STATION terminates this contract under paragraph 2, as to any or all broadcasts scheduled hereunder, such termination shall be without penalty of short rate, that is AGENCY shall have the benefit of the same discounts that it would have earned if STATION had not so terminated and this contract had continued through the last broadcast scheduled. If STATION terminates this contract under sub-paragraph 2(b) or (c) as to less than all of the broadcasts scheduled hereunder AGENCY may, upon giving STATION written notice within seven days after STATION's notice, terminate this contract in its entirety simultaneously with the effective date of STATION's notice, in which event such termination shall also be without penalty of short rate.

3. EFFECT OF BREACH.

(a) By Agency. STATION reserves the right to cancel this contract at any time upon default in the timely payment of bills, failure to furnish continuity acceptable to STATION, or other material breach of the terms hereof. Upon such cancellation all charges accrued hereunder and not paid shall become immediately due and payable, and AGENCY shall also pay, as liquidated damages, a net sum equal to that which AGENCY would have been obligated to pay had it on the effective date of STATION's cancellation, given notice of termination pursuant to sub-paragraph 2(a) or (b), less any net sum which STATION actually receives for the sale of the same airtime.

(b) By Station. In the event of a material breach by STATION in performing this contract, AGENCY reserves the right to cancel this contract. Upon such cancellation STATION shall pay, as liquidated damages, a sum equal to the actual non-cancellable out-of-pocket costs necessarily incurred by AGENCY through cancellation of this contract. STATION's liability, however shall not exceed the net time costs involved for the unexpired and non-cancellable portion of this contract, that is, STATION shall not be liable for any sum greater than the sum of the net time charges involved had the STATION, on the effective date of AGENCY's cancellation, given notice of termination pursuant to sub-paragraph 2(a) or (b). Failure to broadcast covered by paragraph 4 or 5 shall not be deemed a breach of this contract.

(c) Limitation of Liability. In the event of cancellation under this paragraph 3, neither party shall be liable to the other otherwise than as specified in this paragraph and in paragraph 8.

4. FAILURE TO BROADCAST.

If as the result of public emergency or necessity, government order, force majeure, restriction imposed by law, Act of God, labor dispute, mechanical breakdown, or any cause, similar or dissimilar, beyond STATION's reasonable control, STATION fails to broadcast all or part of any program, participation or announcement contracted to be broadcast hereunder, STATION shall not be liable except to adjust its time charges as hereinafter stated: (a) if no part of a scheduled broadcast is performed, a later broadcast of the omitted program, participation or announcement shall be made at a reasonably satisfactory substitute day and time, and if no reasonably satisfactory substitute day and time are available, the time charges for the omitted broadcast shall be waived. (b) if part of a scheduled broadcast, but not all thereof, is omitted, STATION shall allow a pro rata reduction in the time charges; or if a commercial portion of a broadcast is omitted, a credit in the same proportion to the time charges which the omitted commercial portion bears to the total commercial portion of the broadcast, whichever is greater.

In any such case of total or partial failure, AGENCY shall have the benefit of the same discounts which it would have earned if the affected broadcast had been performed in full.

5. PRE-EMPTIONS FOR PROGRAMS OF PUBLIC INTEREST OR SIGNIFICANCE.

(a) Conditions of Substitution. STATION shall have the right to cancel any broadcast or portion thereof covered by this contract in order to broadcast any program or event which, in its absolute discretion it deems to be of public interest or significance. In any such case STATION will notify AGENCY in advance if reasonably possible, but where such notice cannot reasonably be given, STATION will notify AGENCY within a reasonable time after such scheduled broadcast that AGENCY's broadcast has been pre-empted.

(b) Adjustment. If AGENCY and STATION cannot agree upon a satisfactory substitute day and time the broadcast time so pre-empted shall be deemed cancelled without affecting the rates, discounts, or rights provided under this contract, except that AGENCY shall not have to pay STATION any charges for the cancelled broadcast.

6. RATE PROTECTION.

Station reserves the right at any time or times to change the rates discounts and charges hereunder to conform to any rate card issued after the date of this contract. AGENCY shall have the benefit of any decrease in the aggregate sums payable hereunder beginning as of the effective date of such rate card but no increase in said aggregate sums shall be applicable until twelve months from the effective date of such rate card. The protection against rate increases is applicable only to broadcast schedules contracted for prior to the effective date of such rate card and in effect or starting within thirty days after the effective date of such rate card provided that any interruption or lapse of schedule not attributable to STATION shall automatically terminate such protection.

7. PROGRAM MATERIAL.

(a) Agency Responsibility. Unless otherwise noted on the face of this contract, all program material including talent and commercial announcements, shall be furnished by AGENCY, and all expenses connected with the delivery thereof to the STATION and return therefrom, if so directed, shall be paid by AGENCY. AGENCY shall deliver complete music cue sheets for all musical compositions designated by AGENCY for broadcast and all other program material not less than 96 hours (exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) in advance of broadcast.

(b) Approval of Material. STATION may, in its discretion, reject any musical compositions, and may reject recordings, the technical quality of which does not comply with STATION's standards. All live program material to be broadcast hereunder shall be adequately rehearsed, and all live and recorded material to be broadcast hereunder shall conform to the STATION's program and operating policies, STATION's labor contracts, and the public interest, including specifically, but not limited to the Federal Communications Commission regulations requiring that international broadcast service shall reflect the culture of this country and shall promote international good will, understanding and cooperation. Program material and performers furnished by AGENCY are subject to STATION's approval and STATION may exercise a continuing right to reject or cause AGENCY to edit such material or replace performers to the extent STATION deems necessary to conform to the standards specified in this sub-paragraph.

(c) Right to Edit or Substitute. Should STATION fail to receive satisfactory program material when required hereunder STATION may notify AGENCY, and unless STATION receives satisfactory program material within 24 hours after such notice is given, STATION shall have the right to edit any program material received and broadcast the same as edited, or to produce a substitute broadcast, and STATION will be paid for such edited or substitute broadcast its regular charges for the broadcast, plus a reasonable charge for the editing or production of a substitute broadcast.

8. INDEMNIFICATION.

(a) By Agency. AGENCY will hold and save STATION harmless against any and all liability and expense, including attorneys' fees, resulting from the broadcast of programs or program material prepared, produced or furnished by AGENCY, including musical compositions, excepting such liability as may result from the broadcast on AGENCY-produced broadcasts of material furnished by STATION.

(b) By Station. STATION will hold and save AGENCY harmless against all such liability and expense, including attorneys' fees, on STATION-produced broadcasts, excepting only such liability as may result from the broadcast of commercial and other material furnished by AGENCY. In addition, STATION will hold and save AGENCY harmless with respect to material furnished by STATION for AGENCY-produced broadcasts.

9. INCREASED COSTS.

If at any time or times under any collective bargaining agreement(s) by which STATION is bound or to which STATION adheres, or under any law, foreign or domestic, the costs of any service, material or personnel furnished by STATION hereunder is increased as the result of the establishment of or change in minimum compensation payable to personnel, or taxes, assessments, benefits or contributions payable by STATION, AGENCY shall pay STATION the amount of each such increase in costs as of the effective date thereof.

10. GENERAL.

(a) Broadcast Times. STATION will perform the broadcasts covered by this contract on the days and at the approximate hourly times provided on the face of this contract. STATION reserves the right at any time or times to change the days and/or hours of broadcast, in the event of changes by the Federal Communications Commission in allocation of hours and/or frequencies. In such event mutually acceptable alternate days and/or hours shall be substituted; if, however the substitute times offered by STATION to AGENCY are unacceptable to AGENCY, AGENCY shall have the right to cancel upon giving STATION written notice thereof, and such termination shall be without penalty of short rate. Times mentioned shall be those in effect at STATION on the respective days of broadcasting. STATION may deduct from any period of five (5) minutes or longer not more than thirty-five (35) seconds for Station break purposes.

(b) Handling of Property and Mail. STATION shall exercise normal precautions, but shall assume no liability for loss of or damage to program material or other property furnished by AGENCY in connection with broadcasts hereunder. STATION will not accept or process mail, correspondence or telephone calls in connection with broadcasts except after its prior approval, and if so approved, at the sole risk of AGENCY and subject to reimbursement by AGENCY for all expense incurred.

(c) Relationship of Advertiser and Agency. If this contract is with a recognized advertising agency an agency commission of 15% will be allowed, if and as provided on the face of this contract. AGENCY is making and shall perform this contract as agent for a disclosed principal, i.e., the sponsor named on the face of this contract but if ADVERTISER defaults in the performance of any obligation to STATION hereunder AGENCY by executing this contract waives notice of such default and agrees to be liable, jointly and severally with ADVERTISER, for any and all claims debts demands or obligations owing to STATION hereunder. If this contract is made directly with a sponsor, references to AGENCY shall apply to ADVERTISER, except that no agency commission will be allowed.

(d) Assignment and Waiver. AGENCY shall not without the written consent of STATION assign this contract or any of AGENCY's rights hereunder. STATION may not be required to broadcast hereunder for the benefit of any sponsor other than ADVERTISER named on the face of this contract, or to broadcast hereunder for the advertisement of any institution, service or product other than that named on the face of this contract. Notwithstanding the foregoing ADVERTISER shall have the right at any time or times to designate any advertising agency to act for ADVERTISER hereunder in place of AGENCY. Failure of STATION or AGENCY to enforce any of the provisions of this contract shall not be construed as a general relinquishment or waiver as to that or any other provision.

(e) Legal Obligations. STATION's obligations hereunder are subject to the terms and conditions of licenses held by it and to applicable international, federal, state and local laws and regulations.

(f) Entire Agreement. This contract contains the entire agreement between the parties relating to the subject matter herein contained shall be construed according to the law of the State of New York, where STATION's office is located, and cannot be changed or terminated orally.

(g) Notices. Notices given by prepaid telegram or by registered or certified mail shall be deemed given when dispatched. Notices given by ordinary mail shall be deemed given when received. All notices hereunder shall be in writing and if given by other than personal delivery shall be addressed to the party at the address specified on the face of this contract or to such other address as may be specified hereunder in writing

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Alice B.Caponong	DATE 3 Sept 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $1,316.25	COST ACCOUNT NO YOPOLL-11	X	ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE 15 Sept 65		REIMBURSEMENT—OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.	SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

DISBURSEMENTS

			COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
3 Sept	65 PT NO.	AMRUD-3 radio program on WRUL for Sept 65		
		AUTH: COS Check mailed to WRUL 19 Oct 65		
			TOTAL	$1,316.25

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT Invoice attached.

Request Cashier's Check made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS	SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 3 Sept 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Bruce P.Veddar
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 3 Sept 65	SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER 1726	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3-16-49)

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI,
FLORIDA

DATE SEPTEMBER 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1675

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON THE SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON.,-WED., & FRIDAY) SEPTEMBER 1, THROUGH 30, 1965. TOTAL 13 BROADCASTS AT $101.25.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED SEP 3 1965

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Alice B.Caponong	DATE 30 Aug 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT—OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$270.50	YOPOLL/11	X	15 Sept 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
30 Aug 65		AMBUD-1 radio program for Aug 65 on		
		Radio Americas		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$270.50

RECEIPTS ALL ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoice attached. Cashier's Check requested--made payable to Radio Americas,Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 30 Aug 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Bruce P.Vedder
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 30 Aug 65	SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION NO	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER
1531		

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 10-63

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3-16-49)

No. 1 Sept 19 65

Received from

Two hundred seventy and 50/100 ----------/100 Dollars

Radio program "El Medico y Usted" for Sept 65
Cashier's Check #

$ 270.50

Robert WILKENSON

C O P Y

INVOICE 65-8-2

August 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 8/65	"no charge"*
Studio Rental and Tapes - 7/65	134.00
Production and Talent Fees - 7/65	136.50
Amount Due:	[illegible]

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

Note: There is no charge for Radio Air Time because of an overcharge on our part during the first half of 1965.

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Alice B.Caponong	DATE 5 Aug 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT — OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,991.25	YOPOLL-11 XXXXXX	X	25 Aug 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
5 Aug 65		AMBABAL-1 radio program on AMTHIGH, Aug		$ 675.00
		AMBUD-3 radio program on AMTHIGH, Aug		1,316.25
		AUTH: COS	TOTAL	$1,991.25

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoices attached. Request two CASHIER'S CHECKS, EACH MADE PAYABLE TO: Radio New York Worldwide.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 5 August 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Philip G.Elmard
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 5 August 65	SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 10-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3 (C-49))

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE AUGUST 2, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1637

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON THE SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON., WED., & FRIDAY). AUGUST1 1, THROUGH 31, 1965. TOTAL 13 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Alice B. Caponong	DATE 21 July 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 1,949.65	X	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 5 August 65	☐	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Alice B. Caponong

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
21 July 65		AMBUD-3 program XX Radio Americas July 65		$1,012.50
		AMBASAL-1 program Radio Americas July 65		937.15
		ATTN: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,949.65

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS *(Give reasons)*

Invoice for AMBUD-3 program attached; AMBASAL-1 invoice will be forwarded when obtained. REQUEST TWO CASHIER'S CHECKS FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL AMOUNT ABOVE MADE PAYABLE TO: Radio Americas, Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 21 July 65	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Philip G. Elmard
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 21 July 65	SIGNATURE Alice B. Caponong

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE					
YODARK-4								

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER 544	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 5-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

14-00000

No ____________ 27 July 1965

Received from ____________

One thousand twelve and 50/100 ---------- Dollars
Cashier's Check #408698 for "El Medico y Usted" on
Radio Americas for July 65

$ 1,012.50

Robert WILKENSON

C O P Y

INVOICE 65-7-2

July 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: [illegible]

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 7/65	[illegible].00
Studio Rental and Tapes - 6/65	[illegible].00
Production and Talent Fees - 6/65	[illegible]
Amount Due:	[illegible]

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Alice B. Caponong	DATE 12 July 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 1,316.25	X	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 30 July 65	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Alice B. Caponong

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
12 July 65		AMBUD-3 "El Medico y Usted" program on WRUL for July 65		
		[illegible]	TOTAL	$1,316.25

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoice attached.
Request Cashier's Check made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 12 July 65	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Philip G.Elmard
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 12 July 65	SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
YODARK-4								

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-3-14-48)

13 July 19 65

Received from

One thousand three hundred sixteen and 25/100 Dollars

Cashier's Check #408357 for "El Medico y Usted" for ~~xxxx~~July 65 on WRUL.

$ 1,316.25

Robert WILKERSON

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

DATE JULY 1, 1965

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

INVOICE NO. 1606

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON THE SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON., WED., & FRI.) JULY 1, THROUGH JULY 31, 1965. TOTAL 13 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED JUL 1 1965

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 28 June 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 150.00		ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 15 July 65		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE AS OF THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
28 June 65		Telephone service for [illegible] for "El Medico y Usted" May & June 65		
AUTH: COS			TOTAL	$150.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoice attached.
Request cashier's check made payable to: Continental ~~International~~ [illegible]a,
Production Division

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN AND WILL NOT BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 28 June 65	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER John P. Dimmer, Jr.
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 28 June 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BL/CHK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE
[illegible]-1				

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER #11	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 61 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

12 July 65

One hundred fifty and 00/100 ------------

Continental Communications Inc. bill for "El Medico y Usted" for May and June 65 Cashier's Check #406974

$150.00

Robert WILKENSON

Continental
INTERNATIONAL DIVISION
3020 N W 7th ST
MIAMI, FLORIDA
PHONE 371-8008

Mayo 31, 1965

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASSOC.
Miami, Fla.

Telephone line between our studios and WRUL,
for transmission of "Medico y usted" programs
during May and June/65. . . . . $ 150.00

(ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS)

CONTINENTAL INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

Orlando Alvarez

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 7 June 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 2,328.75	X	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 5 July 65	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
7 June 65		[illegible] radio programs for June 65		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$2,328.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (GIVE REASONS)

Invoices attached. Request two Cashier's Checks as follows:
Radio Americas,Inc. in amount of $1,012.50
Radio New York Worldwide in amount of $1,316.25

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 7 June 65	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER John P.Dimmer Jr.
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE		DATE 7 June 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE
YODARK-4				

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION					
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE						
YODARK-4									

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

No. 11 June 1965

Received from

One thousand twelve and 50/100 ---------- Dollars

"El Medico y Usted" on Radio Americas for June 65
Cashier's Check #400702

$ 1,012.50

Robert Wilkenson

14-00000

C O P Y

INVOICE 65-6-2

June 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n, Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 6/65	$750.00
Studio Rental and Tapes - 6/65	126.00
Production and Talent fees - 6/65	136.50
Amount Due:	$1,012.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

No. 1. June 1965

Received from

One thousand three hundred sixteen and 25/100 Dollars

"El Medico y Usted" on WRUL for June 65
Cashier's Check #400704

$ 1,316.25

Robert Wilkenson

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE JUNE 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1567

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON THE SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON., WED., & FRI.) JUNE 1, THROUGH JUNE 30, 1965. TOTAL 13 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

No.

18 May 1965

Received from

One thousand three hundred sixteen and 25/100 Dollars

Cashier's Checks #399858 for WRUL "El Medico y Usted" program for May 65.

$ 1,316.25

Robert WILKENSON

No.

19 May 1965

Received from

One thousand sixty-three and 50/100 -------- Dollars

Cashier's Check #399854 for Radio Americas "El Medico y Usted" program for May 65

$ 1,063.50

Robert WILKENSON

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 12 May 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 2,379.75	X	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 5 June 65		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
12 May 65		MACRO radio program "El Medico y Usted for May 65 on: WRUL and Radio Americas. AUTH: COS		$
			TOTAL	$2,379.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoices for both attached. Please provide Cashier's Checks made payable to
Radio New York Worldwide-- $1,316.25
Radio Americas ----------- $1,063.50

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 12 May 65	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 12 May 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE
YODARK-4				

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
6-60

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE MAY 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1321

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON THE SPANISH SERVICE
A (1) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON. WED. & FRI.)
MAY 1, THROUGH MAY 31, 1965. TOTAL 13 BROADCASTS AT $101.25EA. $1,316.25

C O P Y

INVOICE 65-5-2

May 1, 1965

[illegible] C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1590 N.W. [illegible] Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: [illegible] Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 5/65	[illegible]
Studio rental and tapes - 4/65	1[illegible]
Production and Talent fees - 4/65	125.00
Programs for [illegible], New York Times, Studio time and Postage - 4/65	61.50
Amount Due:	$1,[illegible]2.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, Inc.

No. XX 27 April 1965

Received from

One thousand sixty-four Dollars

and fifty cents. For"El Medico y Usted" of Dec 64-invoice
#64-12-2 Radio Americas.

$1,064.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

WRUL

Worldwide Communications Center

Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y.
PL 2-3322

April 30, 1965

Dade County Medical Society
Miami, Florida

Gentlemen:

As stated in our letter to you of February 27, 1965, regarding frequency changes, the next change would go into effect on Saturday, May 1, 1965. Therefore, the following frequencies will be in use by Radio New York-WRUL, beginning with your 7:15 PM EST Monday, May 3 broadcast of the El Medico y Usted program.

These new frequencies were chosen to provide the best possible reception conditions in the areas your program is beamed and will remain in effect until September 5, 1965.

Frequencies	Principal Areas Beamed
*9.695 Mcs.	Mexico-Cuba Caribbean area
11.790 Mcs.	Cuba-Caribbean - Central America
*15.310	North East South America
17.730 Mcs.	Northern South America and Caribbean
17.840	South America (Argentina-Chile)

*Frequencies presently in use which will continue during new schedule.

I am also enclosing the advance invoice number 1521 for the month of May, 1965.

Sincerely yours,

Ben A. Patch
Traffic Manager

BAP:pnp
Enclosure

AUDIO-VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS WORLDWIDE

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 13 Apr 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO.	ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE	REIMBURSEMENT — OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,064.50	YODARK-4(T/A HQS)	15 May 65	

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
13 Apr 65		"El Medico y Usted" radio program on Radio Americas for December 64.		
		Invoice # 64-12-2		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,064.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Originial invoice attached.

Cashier's Check requested; make payable to: Radio Americas Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 13 April 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 13 Apr 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO.	OBLIGATION NO	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER
7790		

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

C O P Y

INVOICE 64-12-2

December 1, 1964

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n., Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 12/64	$750.00
Studio rental and tapes - 11/64	98.00
Production and Talent Fees - 11/64	136.50
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, Studio Time and Postage - 11/64	80.00
Amount Due:	$1,064.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

13 April 1965

I think we owe following "El Medico y Usted" bills on Radio Americas:

Invoice No.	Amount
64-10-2 (not rec'd)	? $1,541.00
64-11-2 (not rec'd)	?
64-12-2 (rec'd)	$1,061.50 ✓
65-3-2 (not rec'd)	?

As of 12 April Radio Americas gave us bill for Invoice #64-12-2 for which Cashier's Check requested 13 April 65. No invoices have been submitted by Radio Americas for the three other possibly outstanding bills mentioned above. FLUTEO checked all four with Wilkenson by phone with no other results.

ES Vidal

No. 9 April 1965

Received from

Two thousand seven hundred thirty-three and 75/100

Cashier's Check for Invoice Nos. 1475 and 1500 for
"El Medico y Usted" on WRUL for Mar and Apr 65.

$ 2,733.75

Robert WILKENSON

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER

From: Evalena S.Vidal

DATE: 5 Apr 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$ 2,733.75	YODARK-4	X	13 May 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING. I AGREE THAT I WILL FIRST ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE: Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	[illegible]	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
5 Apr 65		MACEO medical radio program "El Medico y Usted" fee on WRUL for: March Invoice #1475— $1,417.50 April Invoice #1500— $1,316.25 AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$2,733.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (List & explain)

Original copies invoices attached.

Request Cashier's Check for total made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide-WRUL

#373103

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE:

		DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
APPROVED		5 Apr 65	Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	5 Apr 65	Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICE ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	STOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION NO	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE March 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1475

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE.

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON-WED-FRI) MARCH 1 THROUGH MARCH 31, 1965	
TOTAL: 14 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH	$1,417.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE APRIL 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1500

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON-WED-FRI), APRIL 1, THROUGH APRIL 30, 1965, TOTAL OF 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25	$1,316.25

No. 9 April 1965

Received from

One thousand eighty-three and 00/100 ------- Dollars

Cashier's Check #393105 for Invoice #65-4-2 for "El Medico y Usted" on Radio Americas, April 65.

$1,083.00

Robert WILKENSON

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 6 Apr 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT — OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,083.00	YODARK-4 (T/A to HQS)	X	15 May 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
6 Apr 65	65	MACHO radio program "El Medico y Usted" for April 65 on Radio Americas, Invoice # 65-4-2		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,083.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoice attached. Request Cashier's Check made payable to Radio Americas Inc. # 393105

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 6 Apr 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 6 Apr 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION NO	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 10-63

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

C O P Y

INVOICE 65-4-2

April 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.   **Program:** EL MEDICO Y USTED
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 4/65	$750.00
Studio rental and Tapes - 3/65	126.00
Production and Talent fees - 3/65	137.00
Programs for [illegible], New York Tapes, Studio Time and Postage - 3/65	60.00
Amount Due:	$1,073.00

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

W
M

Worldwide Communications Center
Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y.
PL 2-3322

February 26, 1965

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Miami
Florida

RECEIVED MAR 1 1965

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is invoice No. 1475 for March, payable in advance.

A review of our records indicates the following unpaid invoices:

No. 1419 (month of January)	$1,316.25
No. 1450 (month of February)	1,315.00
No. 1389 (November 16-30)	607.50

Pd by Cashier's check #359049 on 3 Mar 65

Also enclosed is a copy of our letter of January 27, 1965, which explains the $607.50 charge for November.

Effective Monday, March 8 through May, 2, 1965, RADIO NEW YORK will be operating on the following frequencies during your "El Medico Y Usted" program:

1. 6.155 mcs. (Mexican Beam)
2. 9.695 mcs. (Caribbean and N.W. South America) on 2 transmitters
3. 11.835 mcs. (N. E. S. A.)
4. 15.310 mcs. (Central S.A.)

We know these new frequencies will provide good reception for your Spanish language audience.

Very truly yours,

Richard W. Grefe

Richard W. Grefe
Vice President

RWG:arf

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

Worldwide Communications Center

Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y.
PL 7-3322

March 8, 1965

Dade County Medical Society
Miami, Florida

RECEIVED MAR 11 1965

Gentlemen:

We have received cashier's check No. 389049 for $3,138.75, which pays up your account through February.

We appreciate your attention to this matter.

Sincerely

Richard J. Grefe
Vice President

RWG
ts

According to our records the following invoices have been paid by the following Cashier's Checks:

Invoice No.	Period	Amount	Cashier's Check No.
1344	Oct 64	$2,733.75	369764
1382 (not rec'd)	Nov 64	$1,923.75	NOT PAID PREVIOUSLY
1389 (addit'l)	16-30 Nov 64	$ 607.50	376168 in amount of $1,923.75
and	+	+	
1399	Dec 64	$1,316.25	
1419	Jan 65	$1,316.25	382709
1450	Feb 65	$1,215.00	NOT PAID PREVIOUSLY

Therefore, enclosed is a Cashier's Check No. 389049 to cover the amount owed WRUL, according to our records, for Invoice No.1382 and Invoice No. 1450 in the total amount of $3,138.75. This should liquidate our indebtedness through February 1965 with the next payment being due for the month of March 1965.

(NOTE: the total amount of this check -$3,138.75- is identical to the amount we reportedly owe according to your figures although the time periods covered are different. Under the latter your records indicate that the outstanding bills are Invoices No.1389 for $607.50; No.1419 for Jan of $1,316.25 and No. 1450 for Feb of $1,215.00 which total $3,138.75.)

No. 3 March 1965

Received from

Three thousand one hundred thirty-eight and 75/100 Dollars
(Cashier's Check # 383049). Adjustment of Nov 64 bill
(Invoice #1382) and Feb 65 bill (Invoice #1450) of
"El Medico y Usted" program on WRUL.

$3,138.75

R.

Robert WILKINSON

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalona S.Vidal	DATE 26 Feb 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$3,138.75	YODARK/4	X	31 March 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Evalona S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO.	AMOUNT
26 Feb 65		AMBUD-3 radio program on WRUL. Adjustment of November 1964 bill plus costs of February 65 program.		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$3,138.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Copies of Invoices attached (Nos.1382 and 1450.)
Request Cashier's Check made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide-WRUL.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE. THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 26 Feb 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 26 Feb 65	SIGNATURE Evalona S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION					
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE						

REMARKS

Nov 64
Invoice No.1382 (not previously received)-$1,923.75
Invoice No.1450 (Feb 65) - $1,215.00

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10 63

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

WORLDWIDE · WRUL
WEST 39TH STREET NEW YORK 18 N.Y.

Mailed 11/13

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE NOVEMBER 10, 1964

INVOICE NO 1382

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK FROM NOVEMBER 1 to NOVEMBER 14, 1964. THREE (3) TIMES PER WEEK FROM NOVEMBER 16 to NOVEMBER 30, 1964.

NOVEMBER 1 to 14, 1964	TOTAL	12
NOVEMBER 16 to 30, 1964	TOTAL	7
		19

TOTAL OF 19 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH .... $ 1,923.75

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO ~~DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY~~
~~Miami, Florida~~

DATE Feb 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1450

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY (MON-WED-FRI) FEBRUARY 1 THROUGH FEBRUARY 28, 1965. TOTAL: 12 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,215.00

Mr. Robert Wilkinson
RADIO AMERICAS
101 Madeira
Coral Gables, Florida 33134

RADIO NEW YORK WORLD WIDE WRUL

4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK [illegible]

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY

Miami, Florida

DATE Feb 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1450

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY (MON-WED-FRI) FEBRUARY 1 THROUGH FEBRUARY 28, 1965.

TOTAL: 12 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH. $1,215.00

Mr. Robert Wilkinson

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 389049

3/3/65

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ******************** $2,133.75

FIRST NAT'L BANK [illegible]

CASHIER'S CHECK

0631 0058 000 501 0

3 5

SECOND REQUEST

BERNARD L. KAPPALMAN
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
500 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 36, N. Y
LONGACRE 5-1148

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Radio Americas
101 Madeira
Coral Gables, Florida

GENTLEMEN: In connection with our audit of the records of

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL

their account with you shows a balance of $ 1,923.75 as of December 31, 1964

Kindly compare this balance with your records and if correct please so state, but if not correct, state the amount due according to your records and please explain on the reverse side. If any portion of the amount is represented by notes given as additional security for the account, kindly show each note separately.

This request for confirmation is merely for the purpose of verifying your account. Please furnish the information as promptly as possible. An addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Yours very truly,

BERNARD L. KAPPALMAN, C. P. A.

The balance of $ mentioned above is correct.

The balance of $ by our statement on the mentioned above is NOT

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 389049

MIAMI, FLORIDA 3/3/65

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ********************$3,198.75

FIRST NAT[illegible]
BANK [illegible]

CASHIER'S CHECK

L. Reilly
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑆0631⑈0058⑆ ⑈000⑈501⑈0⑈

SECOND REQUEST

BERNARD L. KAPPALMAN
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
500 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 36, N. Y.
LONGACRE 8-1148

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Radio Americas
101 Madeira
Coral Gables, Florida

GENTLEMEN: In connection with our audit of the records of

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL

their account with you shows a balance of $ 1,923.75 as of December 31,1964

Kindly compare this balance with your records and if correct please so state but if not correct, state the amount due according to your records and please explain on the reverse side. If any portion of the amount is represented by notes given as additional security for the account kindly show each note separately.

This request for confirmation is merely for the purpose of verifying your account. Please furnish the information as promptly as possible. An addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Yours very truly,

BERNARD L. KAPPALMAN, C. P. A.

The balance of $ ________ mentioned above is correct.

The balance of $ ________ mentioned above is NOT in agreement with our records as shown by our statement on the reverse side.

(Signed) ________________________

Date ____________ 19__ By ________________________

See
Voucher #

C O P Y

MEMORANDUM

February 3, 1965

RE: PAYMENTS OF WRUL INVOICES BY DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASS'N. - 1964-65

As per attached copies, it is clear that Invoice No. 1344 covering October was paid by Check No. 369794, Invoice No. 1382 covering November was paid by Check No. 376168. At a later date Invoice No. 1389 covering programs stated as not billed but to be included with November payment was received; this in the amount of $607.50 remains outstanding. Invoice No. 1399 covering December was paid by Check No. 382709 and Invoice No. 1419 covering the month of January 1965, in the amount of $1,316.25, also remains outstanding.

Thus, there is a total due to WRUL of $1,923.75.

RU

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

[illegible] West 58th Street New York 19 N Y
[illegible]

January 27, 1965

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Miami, Florida

Gentlemen:

We have received your check for $1,923.75 in payment of Invoice #138[illegible] covering a reduced billing for three broadcasts per week from November 16 to November 30.

However, since we carried, at your request, 6 broadcasts per week for this period, we sent a supplemental Invoice #1389 for $607.50 to cover these additional broadcasts.

Since we have also received payment for your December Invoice #1399, we wonder if you have misplaced Invoice #1389 covering the additional broadcasts for November.

Enclosed is a copy of Invoice #1389 along with your February Invoice.

Very truly yours,

Richard W. Grefe

Richard W. Grefe
Vice President

RWG:arf

RECEIVED FEB 1 1965

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 50TH STREET, NEW YORK 19 N Y

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE January 2, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1419

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI) JANUARY 1 THROUGH JANUARY 31, 1965	
TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED JAN 4 1965

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

DATE DECEMBER 1, 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

INVOICE NO. 1399

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE
A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI)
DECEMBER 1, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1964.

TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH. $1,316.25

RECEIVED DEC 3 1964

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 382709

1/12/65

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ********************* $1,316.25

FIRST NAT BANK $1316 DOL 25 CTS

CASHIER'S CHECK

B. Reilly
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑆0631⑈0058⑆ ⑈000⑈501⑈0⑈

14-00000

RADIO I W YORK WORLDWII - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

Sent 11/25/64

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE NOVEMBER 20, 1964

INVOICE NO 1389

TERMS CASH

REMAINING PROGRAMS NOT BILLED FOR ON INVOICE # 1382 FOR MONTH OF NOVEMBER. TOTAL OF (6) SIX, THREE EACH DURING THE WEEKS OF NOVEMBER 16, and 23, 1964, AT $101.25 EACH.	$607.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

Worldwide Communications Center

Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y.
PL 2-3322

January 27, 1965

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Miami, Florida

Gentlemen:

We have received your check for $1,923.75 in payment of Invoice #1382 covering a reduced billing for three broadcasts per week from November 16 to November 30.

However, since we carried, at your request, 6 broadcasts per week for this period, we sent a supplemental Invoice #1389 for $607.50 to cover these additional broadcasts.

Since we have also received payment for your December Invoice #1399, we wonder if you have misplaced Invoice #1389 covering the additional broadcasts for November.

Enclosed is a copy of Invoice #1389 along with your February Invoice.

Very truly yours,

Richard W. Grefe

Richard W. Grefe
Vice President

RWG:arf

RECEIVED FEB 1 1965

COPY

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL

4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE NOVEMBER 20, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1309

TERMS CASH

REMAINING PROGRAMS NOT BILLED FOR ON INVOICE # 1332 FOR MONTH OF NOVEMBER. TOTAL OF (6) SIX, THREE EACH DURING THE WEEKS OF NOVEMBER 16, and 23, 1964, AT $101.25 EACH.	$607.50

MEMORANDUM

February 3, 1965

RE: PAYMENTS OF WRUL INVOICES BY DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASS'N. - 1964-65

As per attached copies, it is clear that Invoice No. 1344 covering October was paid by Check No. 369794, Invoice No. 1382 covering November was paid by Check No. 376168. At a later date Invoice No. 1389 covering programs stated as not billed but to be included with November payment was received; this in the amount of $607.50 remains outstanding. Invoice No. 1399 covering December was paid by Check No. 382709 and Invoice No. 1419 covering the month of January 1965, in the amount of $1,316.25, also remains outstanding.

Thus, there is a total due to WRUL of $1,923.75.

FU

See Voucher #

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET NEW YORK 19 N.

RECEIVED OCT 1 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE OCTOBER 1, 1964

INVOICE NO 1344

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MON thru SAT) FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1964.

OCTOBER 1, thru OCTOBER 31, 1964

TOTAL OF 27 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH	$2,733.75

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK NO. 369794
OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA 10/9/64

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ********************** $2,733.75

$2733 AND 75 CTS

CASHIER'S CHECK

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑆0631⑈0058⑆ ⑈000⑈501⑈0⑈

Mailed 10/16/64

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE · WRUL
[illegible] WEST [illegible] STREET NEW YORK 10 N.Y.

Mailed 11/13

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE NOVEMBER 10, 1964

INVOICE NO 1382

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK FROM NOVEMBER 1 to NOVEMBER 14, 1964. THREE (3) TIMES PER WEEK FROM NOVEMBER 16 to NOVEMBER 30, 1964.

NOVEMBER 1 to 14, 1964	TOTAL	12
NOVEMBER 16 to 30, 1964	TOTAL	7
		19

TOTAL OF 19 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH .... $ 1,923.75

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 376168

12/14/64

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ******************** $1,923.75

FIRST NAT BANK $1923 AND 75 CTS

CASHIER'S CHECK

F. Kelly

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

Mailed 12/21

⑆0631⑉0058⑆ ⑈000⑉501⑉0⑈

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

Sent 11/25/64

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE NOVEMBER 20, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1389

TERMS CASH

REMAINING PROGRAMS NOT BILLED FOR ON INVOICE # 1382 FOR MONTH OF NOVEMBER. TOTAL OF (6) SIX, THREE EACH DURING THE WEEKS OF NOVEMBER 16, and 23, 1964, AT $101.25 EACH.	$607.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19 N Y

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE DECEMBER 1, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1399

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE
A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI)
DECEMBER 1, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1964.

TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH. $1,316.25

RECEIVED DEC 3 1964

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 382709

1/12/65

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ******************** $1,316.25

FIRST NAT'L BANK $1316 ...25CTS

CASHIER'S CHECK

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑆0631⑉0058⑆ ⑈000⑉501⑉0⑈

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58th STREET NEW YORK 19 N Y

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE January 2, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1419

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI) JANUARY 1 THROUGH JANUARY 31, 1965

TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH. $1,316.25

RECEIVED JAN 4 1965

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

[illegible] Street New York 19, N.Y.
[illegible]

January 27, 1965

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Miami, Florida

Gentlemen:

We have received your check for $1,923.75 in payment of Invoice #1382 covering a reduced billing for three broadcasts per week from November 16 to November 30.

However, since we carried, at your request, 6 broadcasts per week for this period, we sent a supplemental Invoice #1389 for $607.50 to cover these additional broadcasts.

Since we have also received payment for your December Invoice #1399, we wonder if you have misplaced Invoice #1389 covering the additional broadcasts for November.

Enclosed is a copy of Invoice #1389 along with your February Invoice.

Very truly yours,

Richard W. Grefe

Richard W. Grefe
Vice President

RWG:arf

RECEIVED FEB 1 1965

"El Mediano Unido"

WRUL

Invoice #	Covering	Amount	Cashier's Check #
1344	1-31 Oct	$2,733.75	369794
* ?	1-15 Nov	?	?
1389	16-30 Nov	$ 667.50	376168 in amount $1,923.75
1399	1-31 Dec.	$1,316.25	
1419	1-31 Jan	$1,316.25	382709

Norma says: pls check your books to see whether or not she owes Americas for same program.

SECRET (When Filled In)

ISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER

From: Evalena S.Vidal

DATE 26 Feb 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT — OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,060.50	YODARK/4	X	31 March 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO.	AMOUNT
26 Feb 65		AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas for 2/65 and, Invoice # 65-2-2		
		AUTH: COS	TOTAL	$1,060.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Request Cashier's Check made payable to Radio Americas, Inc.
Copy invoice attached.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 26 Feb 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 26 Feb 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICE ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE	

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10 63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3-16-49)

No. 3 March 1965

Received from

One thousand sixty and 50/100 ------------ Dollars
Cashier's Check #389048
"El Medico y Usted"program on Radio Americas for
Feb 65; Invoice #65-2-2

$ 1,060.50

Robert WILKENSON

C - O - P - Y

INVOICE 65-2-2

February 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

PROGRAM: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 2/65	$750.00
Studio rental and tapes - 1/65	114.00
Production and Talent fees - 1/65	136.50
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, Studio Time and Postage - 1/65	60.00
Amount Due:	$1,060.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS INC.

[illegible]

[illegible] 1965

[illegible] C. [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] County Medical [illegible], Inc.
[illegible] Avenue
Miami, Florida 331[illegible]

[illegible] Y UNID[illegible]

Dear Sir:

The following charges [illegible] studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

[illegible] - 2/65	[illegible].00
Studio rental and [illegible] - 1/65	11[illegible].00
Production and [illegible] - 1/65	1[illegible].50
Program for [illegible], Studio [illegible] - 1/65	[illegible].00
[illegible]	1,0[illegible].50

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 389048

MIAMI, FLORIDA 3/3/65 63-58/631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO AMERICAS, INC.*************************$1,060.50

FIRST NAT'L BANK $1,060 AND 50 CTS

CASHIER'S CHECK

B. Lilly
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑆0631⑈0058⑆ ⑈000⑈501⑈0⑈

14-00000

M E M O R A N D U M

March [illegible], 1965

TO: [illegible] BRACKETT

FROM: ROBERT WILKINSON

RE: DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASS'N. UNPAID INVOICES

Mr. [illegible] from [illegible] called me today at [illegible] P.M. [illegible] that apart from Invoice No. 1475 of March 1st for [illegible], the following invoices are still unpaid:

Invoice No. [illegible] of November 30, [illegible] for $607.50
Invoice No. [illegible] of January 2, 1965 for $1,316.25
Invoice No. [illegible] of February 1, 1965 for $1,215.00

Mr. [illegible] said that he would appreciate very much if some effort were made for paying these outstanding invoices.

ROBERT WILKINSON

Done
4 March 65

[illegible]

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalona S.Vidal	DATE 12 Jan 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT – OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,060.50	YODARK/4-YOYARD HQS	X	15 Feb 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalona S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
12 Jan	65	AMBUD-3 medical program on Radio Americas.		
		For month of January 1965, payable in		
		advance.		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,060.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoice attached.
Request Cashier's Check made payable to Radio Americas Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 12 Jan 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 12 Jan565	SIGNATURE Evalona S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					
YODARK/4-YOYARD HQS								

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10 63

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

No. ______ 19 January 1965

Received from

Carried to Finance for Out 20 Jan 65

Cashier's Check #380892 in amount of Dollars
one thousand sixty and 60/100 -----------
For "El Medico y Usted" program on Radio Americas
for January 65

$1,060.50 R. W

Robert WILKENSON

C O P Y

INVOICE 65-1-2

January 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1559 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 1/65	$750.00
Studio rental and tapes - 12/64	114.00
Production and Talent Fees - 12/64	136.50
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, Studio Time and Postage - 12/64	60.00
Amount Due:	$1,060.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS INC.

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER

From: Evalena S.Vidal

DATE: 11 Jan 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT—OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,316.25	YODARK/4	X	15 Feb 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE: Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
11 Jan 65		AMBUD-3 radio program on WRUL--for month of January 65-paybale in advance		
		AUTHE: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,216.25

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoice attached. Request X Cashier's Check made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide-WRUL.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL BE REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

		DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
APPROVED		11 Jan 65	Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	11 Jan 65	SIGNATURE: Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION			
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE				
YODARK/4							

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER
5156		

FORM 10-63 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3-16-49)

No. 14 January 65

[illegible]

Received from

One thousand three hundred sixteen and 25/100 Dollars
in form of Cashier's Check #382709 for "El
Medico y Usted" pogram on WRUL for January 65.

$ 1,316.25

Robert WILKENSON

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET. NEW YORK 19. N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE January 2, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1419

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI) JANUARY 1 THROUGH JANUARY 31, 1965	
TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED JAN 4 1965

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AMBUD-3

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD	
FROM *(and including)*	TO *(and including)*
18 Dec 64	29 Dec 64

NO.	ITEM — DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)* ~~[illegible]~~			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 18 Dec 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$2,295.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	2,295.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	2,295.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$2,295.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 29 December 64		SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal
APPROVED	DATE: 29 December 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:	DATE: — SIGNATURE:

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
YODARK/1								

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO. 4693	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 9-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(11)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	OBJ. CL.	COST ACCT. NO.	CURRENCIES		
		AMSHADY-1 Dec salary			$425.00		
		AMBASAL-1 personnel(7)			1700.00		
		AMBUD-3 script writer			45.00		
		AMBASAL-1 difference in salary- Rainforth Foundation			125.00		
				Total-	2295.00		

RECEIPTS AND/OR CERTIFICATES IN LIEU OF RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

SECRET

Recibi, del Dr. A. Maceo la cantidad de $45.00,-
Miami, Florida, Diciembre 1, 1964.-

Dr. Vicente Lago Pereda

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AMBUD-3

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

		PERIOD	
		FROM (and including)	TO (and including)
		9 Nov 64	20 Nov 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION	CURRENCY		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD (total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD			
	DATE: 9 Nov 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$45.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	45.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED (itemize on reverse side)	45.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS (attach schedule if necessary):			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$45.00		

Copy to finance [illegible]

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE		SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT
APPROVED	DATE: 20 Nov 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Evalena S. Vidal
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF: — DATE: 20 Nov 64	SIGNATURE: Theodore G. Shackley

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
YODARK/4								

REMARKS
AMBUD-3. Spot payment to Vicente LAGO Pereda for radio script writing during October 64.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER
3784		

FORM 9-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1)

RECIBI, del Dr. A. Maceo, la cantidad de $45.00:- - - - - - - - -

Miami, Florida, Noviembre 1, 1964.-

Dr. Vicente Lago Poreda

14-00000

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER

From: Evalena S.Vidal

DATE: 9 Nov 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$45.00	YODARK/4	X			

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE: Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
9 Nov 64		Spot payment to Vicente LAGO Poreda who assists AMBUD-3 in script writing. For October 64. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$45.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reason)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

		DATE	SIGNATURE
APPROVED		9 Nov 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	9 Nov 64	SIGNATURE: Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION NO	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
YODARK/4				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 10-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

No. 13 Nov 64 19

Received from

Forty-five and 00/100 Dollars

October 64 payment to Vicente LAGO Pereda

$ 45.00

Dr. A. Maceo
Antonio MACEO Mackle

RECEIPTS AND/OR CERTIFICATES IN LIEU OF RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD

FROM (and including): 7 Oct 64

TO (and including): 9 Nov 64

ITEM NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 7 Oct 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$2,733.75		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	2,733.75		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	2,733.75		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$2,733.75		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 9 Nov 64

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalona S. Vidal

APPROVED — DATE: 9 Nov 64 — SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley

RECEIPT — I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF: — DATE — SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICES ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
YODARK/4				

REMARKS: AMBUD-3 radio program on WRUL for October 64. Receipt attached.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO. — DATE — AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

14-00000

No.

~~15~~ 16 October 19 64

Received from

Two thousand seven hundred thirty-three and 75/100 Dollars

(Cashier's Check # 369794)

For "El Medico y Usted" program on WRUL for Oct 64

$ 2,733.75

Robert Wilkenson

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 7~~6~~ Oct 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $2,733.75	COST ACCOUNT NO	X	ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT—OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO.	AMOUNT
7 Oct 64		AMBUD-3 radio program on WRUL for Oct 64.		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$2,733.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS *(Give reasons)*

Invoice attached.

Cashier's Check requested: make payable to Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.	SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 7 Oct 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 7 Oct 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE					

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

RECEIVED OCT 1 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE OCTOBER 1, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1344

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MON thru SAT) FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1964.

OCTOBER 1, thru OCTOBER 31, 1964	
TOTAL OF 27 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH	$2,733.75

D-R-A-F-T

Mr.Ralph Brent
Radio New York Worldwide-WRUL,
4 West 58th Street,
New York 19,N.Y.

Dear Mr.Brent,

Under the terms of our agreement with you, we hereby wish to advise you that beginning 1 December 1964 we desire to reduce the number of the "Medico y Usted" broadcasts from six per week to three per week. If possible we would like to retain the Monday, Wednesday and Friday time slots. If this is not possible, our second preference would be for a Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday schedule.

Thank you very much for your cooperation in this matter and we look forward to continued collaboration with you in these matters of mutual interest.

Sincerely yours,

(DCMA)

D-R-A-F-T

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 8 Dec 64

REQUEST FOR ADVANCE OF FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT -- OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,923.75	YODARK/4	X	15 Feb 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF AN ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
8 Dec 64		Partial radio bill for Nov plus advance billing for all of Dec 64 for AMCUD-3 program on WRUL.		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,923.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS [illegible]

Two invoices attached.
Request Cashier's Check made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide-WRUL for total amount

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS CLAIMED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE; THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ITS ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

		DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
APPROVED		8 Dec 64	Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 8 Dec 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					
YODARK/64								

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10 63

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3-1C-49)

17 December 19 64

Received from

Cashier's Check No.376168 in the amount of Dollars

One thousand nine hundred twenty-three and 75/100 ----

for WRUL "El Medico y Usted" program for Dec 64
plus partial billing for Nov 64.

$ 1,923.75

Robert WILKENSON

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE NOVEMBER 20, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1389

TERMS CASH

REMAINING PROGRAMS NOT BILLED FOR ON INVOICE # 1382 FOR MONTH OF NOVEMBER. TOTAL OF (6) SIX, THREE EACH DURING THE WEEKS OF NOVEMBER 16, and 23, 1964, AT $101.25 EACH.	$607.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE DECEMBER 1, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1399

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI) DECEMBER 1, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1964.	
TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED DEC 3 1964

Radio Americas Inc.

101 MADEIRA AVENUE
CORAL GABLES
FLORIDA 33134

PHONE: 444-8287
(CODE 305)

INVOICE 64-12-2

December 1, 1964

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 12/64	$750.00
Studio rental and tapes - 11/64	98.00
Production and Talent Fees - 11/64	136.50
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, Studio Time and Postage-11/64	80.00
Amount Due:	$1,064.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS INC.

SECRET

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 24 Nov 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO.		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE	REIMBURSEMENT—OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$2,370.00	YODARK/1 YODARK/4	X	15 Dec 64	

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
24 Nov 64		$425.00 - ANSHADY-1 Nov salary	YODARK/1	
		$350.00 - R.GROSO spot payment & rent	YODARK/1	
		$1350.00 - AMBASAL-1 personnel (6)	YODARK/1	
		200.00 - AMBASAL-1 [illegible]	YODARK/1	
		$ 45.00 - [illegible]	YODARK/4	
			TOTAL	$2,370.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

		DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
APPROVED		2[illegible] November 196[illegible]	Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	2[illegible] November 1964	Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE	
YODARK/1				
YODARK/4				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 10-63

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD FROM (and including)	TO (and including)
13 November 64	1 December 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD — DATE: 13 Nov 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$1,000.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	1,000.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	1,000.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$ 1,000.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE	1 December 64	SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal
APPROVED	DATE: 1 December 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:	DATE / SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	INCREASE, DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
YODARK/1			

REMARKS One time payment to AMBUD-1 for hospital bills, etc. Money order receipts attached as well as Postal Dept. receipt of delivery.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

CUSTOMER RECEIPT - MONEY ORDER

7-002577

DADE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA

196- NOV 20

AMOUNT DADE FED S&L ASSN $500 00 CTS

Dr. Jose Miro Cardona

Maria Evans

TO THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK
OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DUPLICATE
NON-NEGOTIABLE

CUSTOMER RECEIPT - MONEY ORDER

7-002576

DADE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA

196- NOV 20

AMOUNT DADE FED S&L ASSN $500 00 CTS

Dr. Jose Miro Cardona

Maria Evans

TO THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK
OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DUPLICATE
NON-NEGOTIABLE

REGISTERED NO. 687101

Value $ NV Spec. del'y fee $ 30
Fee $ 60 Ret. receipt fee $ 10
Surcharge $ Restr. del'y fee $
Postage $ 8 ☐ Airmail

MIAMI, FLA.
NOV 20 1964
KENDALL BR.

Postmaster, By

From Miss Grace Holmes
P.O. Box 1767 Coral Gables
To Srta. Asencion C Perez
Darlington Apt 402
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico

POD Form 3806—Oct. 1960 048—16—70493—6

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300

POSTMARK OF DELIVERING OFFICE

NOV 23

INSTRUCTIONS: Fill in items below and complete instructions on other side, if applicable. Moisten gummed ends, attach and hold firmly to back of article. Print on front of article RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED.

RETURN TO

POD Form 3811 Sep 1963

REGISTERED NO.
687401

CERT'D NO.

INSURED NO.

NAME OF SENDER
Miss Grace Holmes

STREET AND NO. OR P. O. BOX
PO Box 1767

CITY, STATE, AND ZIP CODE
Coral Gables, Fla.

c56-16-71548-6-F

INSTRUCTIONS TO DELIVERING EMPLOYEE

☐ Deliver ONLY to addressee
☐ Show address where delivered

(Additional charges required for these services)

RECEIPT

Received the numbered article described on other side.

SIGNATURE OR NAME OF ADDRESSEE (must always be filled in)
[illegible] C. [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF ADDRESSEE'S AGENT, IF ANY
[illegible] #56

DATE DELIVERED
11/23/65

SHOW WHERE DELIVERED (only if requested)

c56-16-71548-5-F GPO

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 13 Nov 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT – OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,000.00	YODARK/1		20 Nov 64		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
13 Nov 64		One-time payment to AMBUD-1 for hospital bills, etc as per DIR-63436.		
		AUTH: COS	TOTAL	$1,000.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (state reasons)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS VOUCHER AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 13 Nov 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 13 Nov 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	SEC OF FIC	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					
YODARK/1								

REMARKS Request cash please. Money order will be sent to AMBUD-1, [illegible] for which will constitute accounting for this amount.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 10-63 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET 121638Z

WAVE CITE DIR 63426

TYPIC AMBUD

REF WAVE 4556

APPROVE REF PAYMENT.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

PW

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

FORM 11-57 1304 (44)

ORIG.: WH/C/FOHONG:mop

EXT.: 268

DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE: 10 NOV 64

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	NUMBER

218

TO DIR

INFO.

CITE WAVE [illegible]

TYPIC AMBUD

REFS: A. DIR 51679
B. WAVE 4-05

1. RECEIVED SPECIAL DELIVERY LETTER 9 NOV FROM AMBUD-1 SECRETARY STATING AMBUD-1 SUFFERED INFARCT OF MYOCARDIUM AND HOSPITALIZED. NOW DOING WELL BUT NEEDS REST. SECRETARY ADDED AMBUD-1 CONCERNED NOW THAT HOSPITAL AND DOCTOR BILLS SINCE HAS NO HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE AND KNOWS WILL HAVE LONG PERIOD RECUPERATION. AMBUD-1 SON WITH WIFE AND FIVE CHILDREN HAVE ARRIVED AND STAYING AMBUD-1 HOME. SON HAS NO EMPLOYMENT.

2. ABOVE OBVIOUSLY FISHING EXPEDITION FOR KUBARK FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN RESPONSE REFS. UNLESS HQS HAS OTHER FORMULA WISH APPLY, WAVE WILL SEND MONEY ORDER ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS AS APPROPRIATE GESTURE KUBARK INTEREST AND SYMPATHY WHILE AVOIDING PERMANENT ENTANGLEMENT. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

1018

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

OUTGOING

FORM 1304 (9)

ORIG.: PW/CAPOCHEG/CBP
EXT.: 266
DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 4 NOV 64
FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS DTG.	NUMBER
ROUTINE	FPD OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

TO 01
PRITY DIR

INFO.

CITE WAVE 4335
NUMBER

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: DIR - 61679

CAPOCHEG PHONED AMBUD-1 HOME PUERTO RICO 1200 HOURS 4 NOV AND TALKED WITH DAUGHTER-IN-LAW WHO SAID TODAY'S ELECTROCARDIOGRAM SHOWED IMPROVEMENT AMBUD-1 CONDITION. IF ANY ASSISTANCE NEEDED AMBUD-1 SECRETARY WILL ADVISE USING ESTABLISHED ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4/15

RSEC______

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

C.E. CARSON

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

PRIORITY

Nov 4 1 56 PM '64

SECRET 041753Z

PRIORITY WAVE CITE DIR 61679

TYPIC AMBUD

ACCORDING AP REPORT 3 NOV AMBUD-1 HOSPITALIZED IN SAN JUAN WITH HEART ATTACK. REQUEST WAVE DETERMINE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ASSET IF ANY KUBARK ASSISTANCE REQUIRED. ADVISE.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

PW

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD	
FROM *(and including)*	TO *(and including)*
30 Sept 64	2 Oct 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 30 Sept 64 SOURCE: JMWAVE	$45.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	45.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	45.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$ 45.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 2 October 64

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Zvalona S.Vidal

APPROVED — DATE: 2 October 64

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G.Shackley

RECEIPT — I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:

DATE:

SIGNATURE:

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS: Sept 64 xxlxx spot payment to Vicente LAGO Pereda who assists AMBUD-3 in script writing. Receipt attached.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 9-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

No. ______ 1 October 19 64

Received from ______

Forty-five and 00/100 ---------------- $\frac{}{100}$ Dollars

Payment to Vicente LAGO Pereda for September 1964

$ 45.00

A. A. Maceo

Antonio MACEO y Mackle

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 30 Sept 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $45.00	COST ACCOUNT NO	X	ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE 15 October 64		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
30 Sept 64		Spot payment for Sept 64 to Vicente LAGO Pereda who assists AMBUD-3 in script-writing. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$45.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (List reasons)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 30 Sept 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 30 Sept 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE	

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 10-63 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(1-3-16-49)

Recibi, del Dr. Antonio Maceo la cantidad de $45.00.-

Setiembre 30, 1964.-

Dr. Vicente Lago Pereda

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD

FROM (and including)	TO (and including)
4 Sept 64	1 Oct 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION		CURRENCY	
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 4 Sept 64 SOURCE: 1 Oct 64	$ 7,998.75		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	7,998.75		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	7,998.75		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$ 7,998.75		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 1 October 64
SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal

APPROVED
DATE: 1 October 64
SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley

RECEIPT
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:
DATE
SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION			

REMARKS
AMTUD-3 radio program on WRUL for July, Aug and Sept 1964.
Receipt attached.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 3-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1)

No. 25 Sept 19 64

Received from

Seven thousand nine hundred ninety-eight and 75/100 Dollars

(Cashier's Check #367218). For "El Medico y Usted" progr
on WRUL for months July, August and September 1964.

$ 7,998.75

Robert Wilkenson

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 4 Sept 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 7,998.75	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 30 September 1964	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
4 Sept 64		AMBUD-3 radio program on WKUL for July,Aug and Sept 64. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$7,993.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to: Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 4 Sept 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 4 Sept 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE	

REMARKS July bill: $2,733.75 Bills (invoices) attached.
Aug bill: 2,632.50
Sept bill: 2,632.50

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)
GPO 868-022

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

DATE JULY 1, 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

INVOICE NO. 1256

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL IN SPANISH A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MONDAY-SATURDAY) FOR THE MONTH OF JULY 1964.

JULY 1, THROUGH JULY 31, 1964

27 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH $2,733.75

RECEIVED JUL - 1 1964

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI,
FLORIDA

DATE AUGUST 1, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1297

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL IN SPANISH (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MONDAY THROUGH SATURDAY) FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST, 1964 AUGUST 1 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1964	
(26) BROADCASTS AT $101.25 each	$ 2,632.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

DATE	SEPTEMBER 1, 1964
INVOICE NO.	1324
TERMS	CASH IN ADVANCE

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL IN SPANISH (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX TIMES PER WEEK, (Monday thru Saturday) FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1964.

SEPTEMBER 1 THRU SEPTEMBER 30, 1964

(26) BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH	$2,632.50

PAYMENT NOT YET RECEIVED FOR:

INVOICE NUMBER 1256 - JULY 1, 1964 $2,733.75
INVOICE NUMBER 1297 - AUGUST 1, 1964 $2,632.50

RECEIVED SEPT. 3/64

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY

RECEIVED AUG 3 1964

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT

INVOICE NUMBER	BROADCASTS	AMOUNT	INV. MAILED	PAY'T REC'D
1154	FEB 10-29	$1822.50	02/01/64	02/13/64
1169	MARCH 1-31	$2632.50	03/01/64	03/16/64
1186	APRIL 1-30	$2632.50	04/01/64	04/27/64
1197	MAY 1-30	$2632.50	05/01/64	06/08/64
1232	JUNE 1-30	$2632.50	06/01/64	07/30/64
1256	JULY 1-31	$2733.75	07/01/64	----
1297	AUG 1-31	$2632.50	08/01/64	----

AS OF JULY 31, 1964

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD	
FROM (and including)	TO (and including)
11 Sept 64	1 Oct 64

NO.	ITEM — DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 11 Sept 64 SOURCE: JMWAVE	$ 2,910.50		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	2,910.50		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	2,910.50		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$ 2,910.50		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 1 October 64

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalona S. Vidal

APPROVED — DATE: 1 October 64

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley

RECEIPT — I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:

DATE:

SIGNATURE:

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICES ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
TOTALS				

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE					

REMARKS

Aug and Sept 64 expenses involved AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas. Reciept attached.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.

DATE

AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 3-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1)

No. 25 Sept 1964

Received from

Two thousand nine hundred ten and 50/100 ----- Dollars

(Cashier's Check # 367460). For "El Medico y Usted" program on Radio Americas for the months August and September 1964.

$2,910.30

Robert Wilkenson

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 11 Sept 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 2,910.50	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 30 Sept 64	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
11 Sept 64		Aug and Sept 64 expenses involved AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$2,910.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to: Radio Americas, Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 11 Sept 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 11 Sept 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE	

REMARKS Expenses for August 64: $1,460.50
Expenses for Sept 64: $1,450/00

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 81 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(1-3-15-43)

INVOICE 64-8-2

August 4, 1964

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1553 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses for the month of August 1964:

Radio Station Time 26 programs @ $30.00	$780.00
Studio Rental and Tapes	312.00
Production and Talent Fees	283.50
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, Studio time and Postage	85.00

Amount Due: 1,460.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD
FROM (and including): 31 Aug 64
TO (and including): 8 Sept 64
CURRENCY

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION			
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD (total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD			
	DATE: 31 Aug 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$45.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	45.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED (itemize on reverse side)	45.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS (attach schedule if necessary):			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	45.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 8 Sept 64
SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalona S.Vidal

APPROVED: 8 Sept 64
SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G.Shackley

RECEIPT: I CERTIFY RECEIPT OF IMPREST/ADVANCE/PLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF
DATE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION

REMARKS: To AMBUD-3 for ~~Sept~~ August 1964 salary of Dr.Vicente LAGO Pereda who assists AMBUD-3 in writing radio scripts.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.
DATE
AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 11-61 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1)

No. 1 Sept 19 64

Received from

Forty-five and 00/100 Dollars

August 1964 salary for Vicente LAGO Pareda

$ 45.00

ANTONIO MACEO

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 31 Aug 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 45.00		ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 15 Sept 64	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
31 Aug 64		To (Dr.)Vicente LAGO Pereda, who assists AMBUD-3 in writing radio program scripts. AWSH: COG		
			TOTAL	$45.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS: (Give reasons)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 31 Aug 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 31 Aug 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS Dr.LAGO receives $100 assistance from the Refugee Program. The $45 requested is a little less than he can legally make in addition to this aid--according to his budgetted index.

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-3-15-49)
GPO 866-922

RECIBI del Dr. Antonio Maceo la cantidad de $45.00, (CUARENTA Y CINCO, dollares).-

Miami, Florida, Setiembre 1, 1964.

Dr. Vicente Lago Pereda

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD	FROM (and including) 7 Aug 64	TO (and including) 17 Aug 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION			CURRENCIES	
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD (total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)				
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD				
	DATE	SOURCE			
	7 Aug 64	JMWAVE	$450.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR		450.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED (itemize on reverse side)		450.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD				
	A. FUNDS ON HAND				
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS (attach schedule if necessary):				
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR		$450.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE [illegible] WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 17 August 1964
SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal

APPROVED
DATE: 17 August 1964
SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley

RECEIPT
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:
DATE:
SIGNATURE:

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
TOTALS				

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE	

REMARKS
Funeral expenses for Jorge VEGA of Brigade via AMSUMACK-2 to funeral home. Receipts attached.
AUTH: CO3

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 9-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(1)

No. August 7 64

Received from

Four hundred and fifty and no/100-------------- Dollars

$ 450.00------

MON FUNERAL HOME

LA PRIMERA FUNERARIA LATINA DE MIAMI

H. MARVIN PITTMAN
FUNERAL DIRECTOR

FR 9-1697
1873 W Flagler St.
Miami, Florida

Miami, August 7-19

Sr. Gustavo Vega
3276 S.W. 22 Terrace
Miami

Por concepto de los funerales de su hermano Jorge Vega.

$450.^{00}

A. Garcia

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 7 Aug 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 450.00		ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 31 August 64		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
7 Aug 64		Funeral expenses for Horge VEGA, via AMSUMACK-2, to AMBUD-3 to widow. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$450.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 7 Aug 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 7 Aug 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION					
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE						

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

GPO 866-822

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD	FROM (and including) 01 July 64	TO (and including) 28 July 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 9 July 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE			
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	$1,430.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	1,430.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	1,430.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 28 July 64

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal

APPROVED — DATE: 28 July 64

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley

RECEIPT — I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF — DATE — SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE		OBJECT CLASSIFICATION			

REMARKS

Cashier's Check, AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas for July 64.
~~Exxxxxxxxxxxxxxxoriginal~~ Via C/C... [illegible]

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO. — DATE — AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 3-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1)

No. .... July 27 19 64

Received from [redacted]

One thousand four hundred fifty and 00/100 ---Dollars

July 64 expenses for radio program on Radio Americas

(Cashier's Check)

$ 1,450.00

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,

FROM: Evalena S. Vidal

DATE: 9 July 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED: $1,450.00

ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE: 31 August 1964

REIMBURSEMENT OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE: Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
9 July 64		July 64 expenses involved AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,450.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to : Radio Americas, Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED — DATE: 9 July 64 — ALLOTMENT NUMBER — ALLOTMENT TITLE — SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley

RECEIPT — I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE. — DATE: 9 July 64 — SIGNATURE: Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE	

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER — DATE — AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Radio Americas, Inc.

301 MADEIRA AVENUE
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA 33134
444-8281

[illegible] LANGFORD BUILDING
[illegible] S. E. FIRST STREET
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33132
[illegible]

INVOICE 64-7-2

July 1, 1964

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses for the month of July 1964:

Radio Station Time 26 programs @ $30.00	$780.00
Studio Rental and Tapes	312.00
Production and Talent Fees	273.00
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, Studio time and Postage	85.00
Amount Due:	$1,450.00

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK NO. 381637
OF MIAMI

MIAMI, FLORIDA 7/15/64 63-58/631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO AMERICAS, INC.*****************************$1,450.00

FIRST NAT'L BANK $1 450 AND 00 CTS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

			PERIOD	
			FROM (and including)	TO (and including)
			8 July 64	28 July 64
ITEM		CURRENCY		
NO	DESCRIPTION			
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD (total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 8 July 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$1,500.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	1,500.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED (itemize on reverse side)	1,500.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS (attach schedule if necessary):			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	1,500.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE	28 July 64	SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal
APPROVED	DATE: 28 July 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:	DATE / SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
TOTALS				

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS AMBUD-3 radio expenses for June 64 on Radio Americas.
AUTH: COS

Via C/Cover & Liaison

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 9-55 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 9 July 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 1,509.00	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 31 August 1964	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal	

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
9 July 64		June 64 expenses involved AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,509.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to: Radio Americas, Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.	SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 9 July 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 9 July 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY

COST

REMARKS

VOUCHER N

July 27 19 64

Received from

One thousand five hundred nine and 00/100 --- Dollars

June 64 expenses for radio program on Radio& Americas

(Cashier's Check)

$ 1,509.00

FORM 6-60 41

GPO 866 922

Radio Americas, Inc.

101 Madeira Avenue
Coral Gables, Fla.
[illegible]
FRANKLIN 1-6000
(CODE 305)

INVOICE 64-6-2

June 1, 1964

Dewitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami 36, Florida

Program: El Medico y Usted

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses for the month of June 1964:

Radio Station Time 26 programs @ $30.00	$ 780.00
Studio Rental and Tapes	336.00
Production and Talent Fees	273.00
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, studio time and postage	120.00
Amount Due:	$1,509.68

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK NO. 361638
OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA 7/15/64 63-58/631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO AMERICAS, INC.***************************$1,509.00

FIRST NAT'L BANK $1509 AND 00 CTS

101 Madeira Avenue
Coral Gables, Fla.
[redacted]

INVOICE 64-6-2

June 1, 1964

Dewitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami 36, Florida

Program: El Medico y Usted

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses for the month of June 1964:

Radio Station Time 26 programs @ $30.00	$ 80.00
Studio Rental and Tapes	336.00
Production and Talent Fees	273.00
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, studio time and postage	120.00
Amount Due:	$1,509.00

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD	FROM (and including) 9 July 64	TO (and including) 28 July 64	

ITEM		CURRENCIES	
NO.	DESCRIPTION		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*		
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 9 July 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$2,632.50	
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	2,632.50	
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	2,632.50	
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD		
	A. FUNDS ON HAND		
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:		
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$2,632.50	

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE	28 July 64	SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT	Evalena S. Vidal
APPROVED	DATE 28 July 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER	Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:	DATE	SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICERS ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION

TOTALS

July [illegible] 64

Two thousand six hundred thirty two and 50/100

June 64 expenses of radio program on WRUL

(Cashier's Check)

2,632.50

DISTRIBUTION

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE

REMARKS [illegible]-2 radio expenses for June 64 on WRUL.
AUTH: COS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,

FROM: Evalena S. Vidal

DATE: 9 July 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$ 2,632.50	31 August 1964	

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE COLLECTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE: Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
9 July 64		June 64 expenses involved AMBUD-3 radio program on WRUL. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$2,632.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to: Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 9 July 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 9 July 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE					

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 5-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GPO 888-922

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

DATE JUNE 1, 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

INVOICE NO. 1232

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL IN SPANISH (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MONDAY THROUGH SATURDAY) FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE, 1964	
JUNE 1 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1964 (26) BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH	$2,632.50

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK NO. 361639
OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA 7/15/64 63-58/631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ************************$2,632.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 55TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

DATE JUNE 1, 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

INVOICE NO. 1232

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL IN SPANISH (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MONDAY THROUGH SATURDAY) FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE, 1964	
JUNE 1 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1964 (26) BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH	$2,632.50

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,
FROM: Bruce MacMaster
DATE: 27 May 64

REQUEST FOR ADVANCE FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED: $ 2,632.50 XXX
ADVANCE TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE: 27 June 1964
REIMBURSEMENT OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF A ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE: Bruce MacMaster

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
27 ~~XXX~~ May 1964		WRUL Station Program: Dade County Medical Society (Radio Americas) 1-31 May 1964; Auth: COS		
			TOTAL	2,632.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)
Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to: Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 27 May 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 27 May 64	SIGNATURE Bruce MacMaster

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

RATE | DOLLAR VALUE

POSTED BY

FICATION

OR CREDIT

ICER

No. ______ June 1 ~~May 29~~, 1964 19__

Received from ______

Two thousand six hundred thirty two - - 50/100 Dollars
WRUL Station Program (Dade County Medical Society)
Radio Americas - 1-31 May 1964

$ 2,632.50

No. ______ [illegible] 29, 1964 19__

Received from ______

Two thousand six hundred thirty two - - 50/100 Dollars
WRUL Station Program (Dade County Medical Society)
Radio Americas - 1-31 May 1964

$ 2,632.50

(1-3-16-49)
GPO 866-022

Medical Radio Program

Vol II

19-124-25/5-4

Programa radial "El Medico y Usted"
Agosto, 1965

Lunes	2	# 378	Conducta a seguir en el paciente con afeccion Bronco-pulmonar cronica
Miercoles	4	# 379	Hemorragias pulmonares
Viernes	6	# 380	Consideraciones sobre un reciente Seminario Interamericano
Lunes	9	# 381	Ileitis regional
Miercoles	11	# 382	Urticaria
Viernes	13	# 383	Antrax
Lunes	16	# 384	Tularemia
Miercoles	18	# 385	Comentarios sobre Ulcera varicosa
Viernes	20	# 386	Comentarios s/ una reciente informacion de la F.A.O.
Lunes	23	# 387	Se aplica actualmente la vacuna contra el Sarampion
Miercoles	25	# 388	Consideraciones sobre la Psoriasis
Viernes	27	# 389	Sobre algunos temas de interes medico
Lunes	30	# 390	Hernia diafragmatica

Programa radial "El Medico y Ud"
Julio, 1965

Viernes	2	# 365	Influenza o Flu
Lunes	5	# 366	Consideraciones sobre afecciones vasculares perifericas
Miercoles	7	# 367	Algunos comentarios sobre el infarto Miocardico
Viernes	9	# 368	Trastornos de la Laringe
Lunes	12	# 369	Ileitis regional
Miercoles	14	# 370	Algunas consideraciones sobre calculos del Riñon
Viernes	16	# 371	Contestando correspondencia
Lunes	19	# 372	Comentarios sobre Angina de pecho
Miercoles	21	# 373	La Silicosis, enfermedad del trabajo
Viernes	23	# 374	Nuevos aportes en el tratamiento de los quemados
Lunes	26	# 375	Mejores perspectivas para los ancianos
Miercoles	28	# 376	Enfermedades de la Nariz
Viernes	30	# 377	Accidentes a que estan expuestos los escolares en los meses de vacaciones

Programa radial "El Medico y Usted"
Junio, 1965

Miercoles	2	#	352	Calculos en la Vesicula Biliar
Viernes	4	#	353	La clase medica victima del terror comunista
Lunes	7	#	354	Factores en la Tuberculosis
Miercoles	9	#	355	El dolor en medicina
Viernes	11	#	356	Algunos aspectos de la Disfagia en medicina
Lunes	14	#	357	Comentarios sobre el uso indiscriminado de los barbituricos
Miercoles	16	#	358	Factores en la Neumonia y en la Bronconeumonia
Viernes	18	#	359	Sobre un reciente trabajo periodistico en relación a la medicina rural en Cuba
Lunes	21	#	360	Consejo para disminuir el riesgo de Cancer en la boca
Miercoles	23	#	361	Dificultades del niño en edad escolar
Viernes	25	#	362	Consideraciones sobre algunos trastornos de la personalidad
Lunes	28	#	363	Extreñimiento y Colon irritable
Miercoles	30	#	364	Apetito y Hambre

Programa radial "El Medico y Usted"
Mayo, 1965

3	Lunes	#	339	Importancia de la tos como sintoma de serias afecciones respiratorias
5	Miercoles	#	340	Esclerodermia y Dermatomiositis
7	Viernes	#	341	Algunos comentarios sobre la Obra de Finlay
10	Lunes	#	342	Cortedad de la respiracion
12	Miercoles	#	343	Algunas consideraciones sobre Pleuresia
14	Viernes	#	344	Peligro del uso abusivo de los Antibioticos
17	Lunes	#	345	Enfermedad del Suero y accidentes del mismo
19	Miercoles	#	346	Fechas memorables
21	Viernes	#	347	Hipervitaminosis por exceso de ingestion de Vitaminas
24	Lunes	#	348	Cefalalgia, Cefalea o dolor de cabeza
26	Miercoles	#	349	La Fiebre en Medicina
28	Viernes	#	350	Aprovechemos la ventaja de la Vacuna contra la Poliomelitis, como forma de erradicar ésta.
31	Lunes	#	351	Afacciones de la garganta en el niño

Programa Radial "El Medico y Usted"
Abril, 1965

2	Viernes	# 327	Diarreas en el niño
5	Lunes	# 328	Endocarditis Sub-aguda ó Endocarditis lenta
7	Miercoles	# 329	Algunas consideraciones sobre la Polucion del aire
9	Viernes	# 330	Algunos comentarios sobre las anemias
12	Lunes	# 331	Algunas consideraciones sobre la obesidad
14	Miercoles	# 332	Cuadros abdominales agudos en el niño
19	Lunes	# 333	Los factores del enfisema
21	Miercoles	# 334	El fumar cigarrillos y su relacion con la salud
23	Viernes	# 335	Contestando correspondencia
26	Lunes	# 336	Enfermedades venereas
28	Miercoles	# 337	Consideraciones clinicas de la sifilis
30	Viernes	# 338	Consideraciones sobre algunas enfermedades Venereas.

Programa Radial "El Medico y Usted"
Marzo, 1965

1	Lunes	#	313	Sarampion
3	Miercoles	#	314	Tuberculosis del Tracto femenino
5	Viernes	#	315	Sobre los riesgos del rápido crecimiento de las ciudades
8	Lunes	#	316	Mononucleosis infecciosa
10	Miercoles	#	317	Agranulocitosis
12	Viernes	#	318	Sin agua no puede haber vida
15	Lunes	#	319	Util campaña para dar a conocer la Bronquitis Cronica
17	Miercoles	#	320	Algunas consideraciones sobre el Asma
19	Viernes	#	321	Artritis Reumatoidea
22	Lunes	#	322	Algunos comentarios sobre Tuberculosis
24	Miercoles	#	323	Colelitiasis
26	Viernes	#	324	Ulcera Peptica
29	Lunes	#	325	Glomerulo-Nefritis aguda y Sindrome Nefrotico en el niño
31	Miercoles	#	326	Afecciones del Tiroide en el niño

Programa Radial "El Medico y Usted"
Febrero 1965

1	Lunes	# 301	Fiebre Escarlatina
3	Miercoles	# 302	Algunas consideraciones sobre Diabetes
5	Viernes	# 303	Sobre la necesidad de ir a un control de las medicinas que se expenden al publico
8	Lunes	# 304	Hepatitis Virales
10	Miercoles	# 305	Policitemia
12	Viernes	# 306	Actividades de la Organizacion Mundial de la Salud para el año 1965
15	Lunes	# 307	Fiebre Reumatica o Carditis Reumatica
17	Miercoles	# 308	La Conjuntivitis en el niño recien nacido
19	Viernes	# 309	Sobre un reciente informe del aumento de los casos de Viruela y Colera en el mundo
22	Lunes	# 310	Contestando correspondencia
24	Miercoles	# 311	24 de Febrero
26	Viernes	# 312	Muertes por accidente en carretera

Programa Radial "El Medico y Ud"
Enero 1965

1	Viernes	# 288	Feliz Año Nuevo
4	Lunes	# 289	Algunas afecciones abdominales en el niño entre ellas la Apendicitis Aguda
6	Miercoles	# 290	Puede ser conducido con mas lentitud el proceso de envejecer
8	Viernes	# 291	Primer Aniversario de "El Medico y Ud."
11	Lunes	# 292	Algunas consideracion sobre Oligofrenia, Fenilpéruviva y Mongolismo
13	Miercoles	# 293	" " " "
15	Viernes	# 294	La Salud Publica en Cuba segun un tecnico comunista
18	Lunes	# 295	Consideraciones sobre la Tos-Ferina
20	Miercoles	# 296	Paroditis, tambien conocida por Papera
22	Viernes	# 297	Aun la Viruela no está vencida en el Mundo
25	Lunes	# 298	Pielo-Nefritis aguda y cronica
27	Miercoles	# 299	Avances de la Psiquiatria en Paises Europeos
29	Viernes	# 300	Las principales causas de muerte en el Mundo

Programa Radial "El Medico y Ud."
Diciembre, 1964

2	Miercoles	#	275	Recordando "El dia del Medico"
4	Viernes	#	276	Intoxicacion por Salicilato y por Arsenico
7	Lunes	#	277	7 de Diciembre
9	Miercoles	#	278	Reciente Congreso Sanitario sobre Asia y Africa
11	Viernes	#	279	Sobre un reciente Plan Piloto en la lucha contra el Cancer del Pulmon
14	Lunes	#	280	Contestando alguna correspondencia
16	Miercoles	#	281	" " "
18	Viernes	#	282	Sobre la prevencion del Cancer
21	Lunes	#	283	Vacunacion en el niño I
23	Miercoles	#	284	" " II
25	Viernes	#	285	" " III
28	Lunes	#	286	Algunas consideracion sobre Difteria
30	Miercoles	#	287	La Antibioterapia contribuye a disminuir las enfermedades por Rickettesias

SECRET

MEMORANDUM 11 October 1965

TO: Chief, Cover WPW-1018

FROM: Chief, PW

Distribution
1-C/Cover
1-SP/4
1-C/PW
1-Reg

SUBJECT: Request to Advise Sponsor of Discontinuation of Radio Program

This is to formalize a verbal request made earlier this month to Chief, Cover Branch. It would be appreciated if the Dade County Medical Association could be appriced of the fact that the radio program it overtly sponsored entitled "El Medico y Usted" has been terminated as of 30 September 1965. The program was carried on by Dr. Antonio MACEO y Mackle and was heard three times a week over WRUL and Radio Americas. The program was terminated because it was considered of marginal value in the propaganda field.

File: MACEO
B/c

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

In to R O L (okay)
Maceo

SECRET

Letter to Jose K. VICIEDO ~~[illegible]~~ y [illegible] —
from ex-Comrade — to
Manolo F. [illegible]
[illegible]

RETIRAN DE LA VIA PUBLICA LOS VENDEDORES CLANDESTINOS

La JUCEI Municipal de La Habana está retirando y retirará de la vía pública a todos los vendedores ambulantes en carretillas, tableros o puestos fijos y en las demás formas de ejercer el comercio o la industria que actúan en forma clandestina, es decir sin la correspondiente licencia del Departamento de Ingresos de dicha JUCEI Municipal.

¿Casualidades de la vida o señal de los nuevos tiempos? . . . El central "Jaime López", cumplió cien años el viernes de la Semana de Girón . . . ¡Y es la primera vez que muele el viernes de esa semana!

En la calle Tamarindo número 28, altos, existía un salidero de agua. Acudió la ENMIU y con toda rapidez resolvió el problema. Sin embargo, como resultado de la reparación quedó afectado el techo de la casa de Tamarindo 28, bajos, residencia de Mercedes Borrás, quien reclamó el arreglo correspondiente. La respuesta de la ENMIU es que Mercedes, debe pagarle a la ENMIU por reparar los daños que la ENMIU le causó en su casa.

Entonces cuando veas el salidero de tu vecino arreglar, pon tu dinero en remojo . . .

Si usted es escéptico, no lo crea, pero nosotros vimos a Evelio García, un joven comunista de la regional Jovellanos ¡alzar veinte camiones de caña —10,000 arrobas—, en treinta y nueve minutos! Al final, Evelio, auxiliado voluntariamente por Antonio Bringas, Manolo Sánchez y Rubén Llorente, alzaron 64.532 arrobas que, hasta el cierre de esta edición, es el récord nacional.

Siempre hemos dicho que esas estaciones americanas que se ponen aquí a oír a escondidas los gusanos también los va a embarcar; luego no digan que el radio los embarcó.

Badí Castro.

HOJA NO. 1. (PARA J.L.V.P.)

LA QUE SUSCRIBE ESTAS HOJAS NO ES UNA AGENTE PAGADA DEL IMPERIALISMO, NO ES MIEMBRO DE LA CIA NI ES UNA ESPIA EXTRANJERA.NO ES NI SIQUIERA UNA BURGUESA NI UNA EXLATIFUNDISTA QUE SANGRA POR LA HERIDA.ES SIMPLEMENTE UNA OBRERA.UNA OBRERA CUBANA QUE POR MOTIVOS OBVIOS OCULTA SU NOMBRE TRAS UN SEUDONIMO.NO TIENE NADA QUE TEMER PORQUE NO ESTA INVOLUCRADA EN NINGUN GRUPO CONTRA REVOLUCIONARIO PERO COMO LA VERDAD TANTO HIERE Y DUELE A LOS MENTIROSOS,NO DUDA QUE LOS MISERABLES QUE GOBIERNAN A SU PAIS,AL SABER DE QUE MANO PROVIENEN ESTAS HOJAS,TRATEN DE CORTARLA CON LA MISMA DESTREZA SINIESTRA CONQUE CERCENAN HASTA LA MAS LEVE SEÑAL DE DIGNIDAD HUMANA.Y BASTA DE PREAMBULOS.MUCHO HAY QUE DECIR Y ESCRIBIR EN FORMA DE COMBATE,A LA PEQUEÑA MEDIDA DE NUESTRO ESFUERZO PERSONAL, PARA PERDER EL TIEMPO EN PROLOGOS INUTILES QUE QUIZAS POR UN DESCUIDO PONGAN ALGUN INDICIO DELATOR EN LOS PERROS DE PRESA SI POR DESDICHA LLEGARA UNA DE ESTAS HOJAS A EXTRAVIARSE.EN FIN DE CUENTAS NO IMPORTA QUIEN ESCRIBE ESTAS PAGINAS.BASTE CON SABER QUE SON DE UNA CUBANA QUE AMA LA VERDAD Y QUE ESTA RESPLANDECE SIEMPRE POR SOBRE TODAS LAS NEGRURAS.

PRIMERO DE MAYO EN CUBA COMUNISTA.(1965)

MUCHOS SE PREGUNTAN COMO ES POSIBLE SI LA INMENSA MAYORIA DEL PUEBLO CUBANO REPUDIA EL SISTEMA TOTALITARIO Y ABUSEVO QUE POR LA FUERZA DE LAS ARMAS SE HA IMPLANTADO EN SU PAIS,PUEDA EL GOBIERNO REUNIR A TANTOS MILES DE CUBANOS EN LA PLAZA JOSE MARTI.SENCILLICIMA LA EXPLICACION. LO ABSURDO SERIA ADMITIR QUE TODOS ESOS MILES DE CUBANOS APOYAN AL GOBIERNO.VEREMOS DE QUE FORMA SE COMPONE EL DESFILE.HACIENDO UN CALCULO CONSERVADOR,EL 80 % DE LOS COMERCIOS CAPITALINOS SON ESTATALES Y MAS DE UN 90 % DE LAS INDUSTRIAS. NO PUEDE AFIRMARSE QUE LOS OBREROS DE LAS FABRICAS FUERON OBLIGADOS A DESFILAR.LAS FABRICAS SIEMPRE TIENEN UNA VENTAJA SOBRE LOS COMERCIOS DONDE SE EXPENDEN LOS ARTICULOS DE CONSUMO. SIN EMBARGO,TAMBIEN EN LAS FABRICAS TIENEN LA MINORIA DE COMUNISTAS QUE PERMANECE AL FRENTE ALGUNA ORGANIZACION PARA EL PRIMERO DE MAYO.CON EL PRETEXTO DE QUE EL DESFILE SE HACE EN FORMA DE BLOQUES Y ES NECESARIO ENSAYAR CON VARIOS DIAS DE ANTICIPACION,UN DIRIGENTE SINDICAL SE ACERCA A CADA OBRERO UNO POR UNO,Y LE PREGUNTA SI VA AL DESFILE.COMO QUE SIEMPRE LA MAYORIA ES APATICA,Y QUIEN DICE APATICA DICE CONTRARIA AL SISTEMA,SON POCOS LOS QUE CONSIGUEN PARA EL DESFILE.ESOS POCOS QUE CONQUISTAN NO ES TAMPOCO PORQUE SEAN COMUNISTAS.HAY OBREROS QUE NO PERTENECEN AL COMITE DE DEFENSA,NI A LA MILICIA,EN FIN QUE NO ESTAN INTEGRADOS A NINGUN CUERPO DE LA REVOLUCION Y POR TANTO SE DESTACAN COMO GUSANOS.COMO NO PIERDEN NADA CON DESFILAR,PIENSAN QUE CONVIENE ESTAR A BIEN CON LOS COMUNISTAS DE SU SENTRO DE TRABAJO Y UNOS POR MIEDO Y POR ADULACION OTROS SIEMPRE LOGRAN ALGUN GRUPO.SUMENSE ESOS POCOS DE CADA FABRICA Y YA TENEMOS UNOS CUANTOS.LOS DEPENDIENTES DEL COMERCIO ES DIFERENTE.A ESOS LOS OBLIGARON DESDE UNAS SEMANAS ANTES A TRABAJAR CON UN SOMBRERO DE GUANO Y UN PAÑUELO ROJO AL CUELLO.ENTONCES PARA DEVOLVER ESAS PRENDAS LES DIERON UN PAPELITO EL CUAL TENIAN QUE LLEVAR EL DIA PRIMERO....AL DESFILE Y ALLI ENTREGARLO.SIEMPRE HAY EL CORAJUDO QUE SE OPONE Y SIEMPRE HAY TAMBIEN QUIEN VA PRESO POR OPONERSE.PERO LA GRAN MAYORIA VA POR EL TEMOR QUE SE DESATA EN TODAS SUS FORMAS EN EL PAIS.YA TENEMOS OTRO GRUPO MAS NUMEROSO QUE EL PRIMERO.EL SERVIDIO MILITAR OBLIGATORIO ABARCA UNA CANTIDAD INMENSA DE JOVENES,CASI NIÑOS,OBLIGADOS NO A ESTUDIAR UNA CARRERA MILITAR SINO A TRABAJARLE AL ESTADO POR SIETE PESOS AL MES.FORMAN TAMBIEN UN ENORME GRUPO DE CUBANOS DE LOS CUALES DOS O TRES DE CADA CIEN SEAN O SIENTAL ALGUNA INCLINACION POR EL COMUNISMO.EL RESTO ESTA OBLIGADO A APLAUDIR LO QUE DESPRECIA Y A GRITAR CONSIGNAS QUE NO SIENTE.TERRIBLE TORTURA LA DE BESAR LA MANO QUE NOS OPRIME Y ACARICIAR EL PUÑAL QUE NOS DESGARRA. LOS BECADOS SON QUIZAS LA ORGANIZACION MAYOR CONQUE CUENTA EL GOBIERNO PARA LLENAR LA PLAZA.A PRIMERA VISTA PUDIERA ALGUIEN DECIR QUE UN GOBIERNO CON TANTOS JOVENES BECADOS SE PREOCUPA POR LA EDUCACION DEL PUEBLO Y

DA OPORTUNIDADES A LOS POBRES PARA QUE ESTUDIEN..UNA HOJA PROXIMA ESTARA DEDICADA A ESE TEMA.BASTE AHORA SOLO PARA DECIR QUE TRANSPORTADOS EN CAMIONES NO SOLO DE LA PROVINCIA HABANERA SINO TAMBIEN DEL INTERIOR DE LA ISLA FORMEN QUIZAS POR SI SOLOS UN GRUPO CAPAZ DE LLENAR LA PLAZA.¿CUANTOS DE ELLOS SON COMUNISTAS? SE SABE QUE MORALMENTE,LOS DESPRESTIGIOS MAYORES Y LAS MAYORES INDECENCIAS SON LAS QUE OCURREN EN LAS BECAS.SIN GENERALIZAR PUES SIEMPRE HAY HONROSAS EXCEPCIONES,EL DICHO POPULAR ES EL DE QUE LAS BECAS SON INCUBADORAS DE PROSTITUTAS Y CUEVAS DE DEGENERADOS.NO ES EXTRAÑO QUE JUVENTUDES TAN CORROMPIDAS COMO ESAS APOYEN QUIZAS EN UNA CANTIDAD CONSIDERABLE A UN GOBIERNO CORRUPTO.PERO NO.TAMPOCO EN LOS BECADOS MAYORIA LOS COMUNISTAS. LOS COMITES POR SU PARTE TIENEN TAMBIEN SU "ARRASTRE" PARA LLEVAR CIUDADANOS A ESTAS CONCENTRACIONES GUBERNAMENTALES.Y SE REPITE EL CASO DE LA COBARDIA,JUSTIFICABLE EN UN PUEBLO AVASALLADO,DEL QUE NO QUIERE SEÑALARSE ANTE EL COMITE COMO QUE NUNCA COOPERA EN NADA...Y VA AL DESFILE. COMO LA MAYORIA DEL CAMPO ES TAMBIEN NEGOCIO ESTATAL Y COMO UN PORCENTAJE TAMBIEN DE VEHICULOS DEL 100 X 100 SON DEL ESTADO,SE PONEN UNOS Y OTROS DE ACUERDO POR ORIENTACION DEL PARTIDO PARA TRANSPORTAR HACIA LA CAPITAL A UN NUMERO EXTRAORDINARIO DE OBREROS DEL AGRO.MUCHOS VAN OBLIGADOS;OTROS VAN POR VISITAR LA HABANA Y DIVERTIRSE EN EL VIAJE.PERO MUY POCOS VAN PORQUE APOYEN A LA REVOLUCION SOCIALISTA.SE SABE QUE EL MAYOR ENEMIGO QUE TIENEN LOS COMUNISTAS EN CUBA RADICA EN EL CAMPO.ES DONDE EL DESNIVEL SOCIAL SE HACE MAS PATENTE Y DONDE HAY MAS ABUSO DEL PODER Y MAS SALARIOS DE HAMBRE. DE AHI LA POCA PRODUCCION AGRARIA.SUMENSE TODA ESA CANTIDAD Y YA SE TENDRA UNOS CIENTOS DE MILES DE CUBANOS EN LA PLAZA.LOS ORGANISMOS MILITARES EN SI,EN UN PUEBLO PISOTEADO POR LA BOTA,SUMAN TAMBIEN UNA ENORME CANTIDAD QUE VA AL DESFILE,OBLIGADO AUNQUE DESDE LUEGO,MUCHISIMOS DE ESTOS VAN CON EL MEJOR DESEO.UNOS PORQUE YA ESTAN SOBRE EL BURRO Y SABEN DE LA NECESIDAD QUE TIENEN DE DARLE PALOS MAS CUANDO PRESIENTEN QUE EL BURRO PUEDE CAERSE EN CUALQUIER MOMENTO Y DAR CON ELLOS EN EL SUELO. APARTE DE TODO LO DICHO ANTERIORMENTE HAY QUE CONSIDERAR TAMBIEN QUE CUANDO EL GOBIERNO DA UN ESPECTACULO DE ESE TIPO LA CIUDAD SE PARALIZA.VENDEDORES AMBULANTES Y QUIOSCOS PREPARADOS TAMBIEN AL EFECTO LOS CUALES SON DESDE LUEGO DEL ESTADO,SE CONCENTRAN ALLI.NO HAY UN REFRESCO EN TODA LA HABANA NI UN VASO DE AGUA.HAY QUE IR A LA PLAZA.LA RADIO Y LA TELEVISION SE CONECTAN EN CADENA PARA LLEVAR AL AIRE EL DESFILE.SE CIERRAN LOS CINES,CABARETS,ESPECTACULOS PUBLICOS INCLUYENDO LOS PARQUES INFANTILES.¿A DONDE IR?...AL DESFILE Y CONTEMOS TAMBIEN UNA LARGA CARAVANA ANONIMA QUE CON UNA SECRETA ESPERANZA ACUDE A LA PLAZA PENSANDO QUIZAS QUE EL DICTADOR RECTIFICARA SU POSTURA AL COMPRENDER QUE HA EMPEÑADO A LA REPUBLICA CONVIRTIENDOLA EN UNA LIMOSNERA INTERNACIONAL,PORQUE EL SISTEMA SE LE HA IDO DESINTEGRANDO EN LAS MANOS COMO SE ESCAPA UN PUÑADO DE AGUA.BUENAS GENTES SENCILLAS Y HUMILDES DEL PUEBLO QUE TODAVIA TIENEN UN POCO DE FE EN QUE EL TRAIDOR CAMBIE SU POSTURA DEVOLVIENDO LA TRANQUILIDAD PERDIDA A LA PATRIA.

ESE ES EL PRIMERO DE MAYO COMUNISTA.MENTIRA COMO TODO LO QUE SE MUEVE EN EL PAIS.PARADOJICAMENTE CELEBRAN A BOMBO Y PLATILLO EL DIA DEL OBRERO Y JAMAS EN CUBA FUE EL OBRERO MAS EXPLOTADO NI TUVO MENOS DERECHO A LA VIDA. JAMAS SE LE HABIA EXIGIDO TANTO POR TAN POCO.PERO ESE ES EL COMUNISMO. CUANDO LUCHA POR EL PODER,SE DISFRAZA DE IZQUIERDISTA.CUANDO CONQUISTA EL PODER,SE QUITA EL DISFRAZ Y LO DESTRUYE TODO.NI OTRAN TODOS LOS DERECHOS.NO RESPETAN LA MAS PEQUEÑA EXPRESION DEL PENSAMIENTO.O SE ES COMUNISTA Y SE ALABA AL REGIMEN O NO SE HABLA POR TEMOR A QUE LE TAPEN LA BOCA A UNO PARA SIEMPRE.ELLOS,ELLOS,SIEMPRE SOLO ELLOS.LOS DEMAS SON BURGUESES,O CONFUNDIDOS,O ENEMIGOS DEL PUEBLO. ¡MISERABLES!

MARIA PEREZ.

HOJA NO. 3 (PARA J.L.V.F.)

Los pueblos de América Latina tienen conciencia de sus necesidades y aspiran a desarroyar su propia economía,a desarroyar su propia riqueza. La América Latina,los latino americanos y los norteamericanos tenemos los mismos sentimientos.La América nuestra tiene un destino propio,la América nuestra tiene un rol propio,la América nuestra con sus características geográficas,con sus características espirituales,con sus características nacionales,con la idiosincracia de nuestros pueblos,solo puede seguir un camino enteramente propio. (abril 24 de 1959) Nueva York.

Respetamos todos nuestros compromisos internacionales.No denunciaremos el pacto de defensa hemisférica,aunque no tenemos lugar donde guarecernos en caso de una guerra.(abril 18,1959) Washington.S.N.Editores Periódicos.

Yo no soy comunista ni tampoco el Movimiento,pero no tenemos que decir que somos anticomunistas para agradar al extranjero ya que solo tenemos compromisos con el pueblo de Cuba y solo tenemos que responder ante él.

La fortaleza de nuestra posición equidistante de Estados Unidos y Rusia está en la proyección revolucionaria del Gobierno,el cumplimiento de su programa revolucionario y el mantenimiento de las más estrechas relaciones con los demás paises democráticos que constituyen el bloque.(enero 13.Hab.)

Yo realmente no temo caer en la órbita del comunismo internacional.¿Que estamos haciendo nosotros para defender la revolución?¿Hemos ido a buscar apoyo en el comunismo?No,hemos ido a buscar apoyo en la opinión pública de los pueblos de América,que es donde tenemos que buscar nuestra fuerza y no acudir a otras fuerzas porque eso sería una cosa absurda.(enero 22.Hab

Miedo al auge del comunismo,¿por qué?Lo que ha sobrevenido en el pais no tiene posiblemente nada que ver con esos temores.Lo que ha habido en el pais es la recuperación de las libertades públicas,la recuperación de los derechos ciudadanos,de prensa,de reunión,de escribir,de pensar y hablar...

Los que hablan de democracia deben empezar por saber en que consiste el respeto a todas la ideas,a todas las creencias,en que consiste la libertad y el derecho de los demás.Si perseguimos un periódico y lo clausuramos,ah! cuando se empiece por clausurar un periódico no se podrá sentir seguro ningún diario,cuando se empiece a perseguir a un hombre por sus ideas políticas no se podrá sentir seguro nadie,cuando se empiece a hacer restricciones no se podrá sentir seguro ningún derecho.(abril 2,1959.C.M.Q.)

Respecto al comunismo,solo puedo decirles una cosa:no soy comunista ni los comunistas tienen fuerza para ser factor determinante en mi pais.(abril 18,1959.Washington,Sociedad Norteamericana de Editores de Periódicos.)

Alguna gente toma la bandera anti-comista para encubrirse y vivir de ello. No se puede combatir al comunismo en tanto se apoya a dictadores.(abril 23,Conferencia de Prensa,Nueva York)

Ahora lo que no es reaccionario es comunista.Los que buscan esas confusiones son los enemigos del pueblo.Cada pueblo tiene derecho a su propia ideología.La Revolución Cubana es tan cubana como nuestra música.(mayo 5,conferencia de prensa.Río de Janeiro,Brasil)

Yo no se si la calumnia contra nuestra Revolución de que es comunista o de que esta infiltrada de comunismo se debe unicamente al propósito de que nosotros no persigamos a los comunistas y no fusilemos a los comunistas.

Yo no se de que forma se podrán definir las ideas sobre una revolución para que no se intrigue,para que no se calumnie mas de lo que se está calumniando y para que cesen de una vez los ataques infames contra nuestra Revolución....¿Puede acusarse a nuestra Revolución de comunista?¿Pueden confundirse los ideales de nuestra Revolución?...¿ES QUE ACASO PUDIERA ALGUIEN AFIRMAR QUE LE HEMOS MENTIDO ALGUNA VEZ AL PUEBLO? ¿POR QUE CUANDO DECIMOS QUE NUESTRA REVOLUCION NO ES COMUNISTA,POR QUE CUANDO PROBAMOS QUE NUESTROS IDEALES SE APARTAN DE LA DOCTRINA COMUNISTA....POR QUE ENTONCES ESE EMPEÑO DE ACUSAR A NUESTRA REVOLUCION DE LO QUE NO ES?(mayo 8.Hab.)

Cuando se suprime un derecho se termina por suprimir todos los derechos, desoyendo la democracia.Las ideas se defienden con razones.No con las armas. Soy un amante de la democracia.(enero 7,Declaración de Prensa.Habana)

...Y aunque sea en una esquina,y donde lo oigan 20 personas si no lo pueden oir 100,ese hombre pueda expresar su pensamiento.Y si quiere sacar en mimeógrafo una tesis política,que la imprima y la reparta en la Universidad, sin que se lo lleven a la estación de policía..La teoría político filosófica es aquella (ideal)que le da al hombre todas las libertades y además le proporciona las satisfacciones de orden material.Esa es nuestra doctrina revolucionaria.Todo lo demás,¿quiere que le diga lo que es?Pretextos.(abril 2,Ante la Prensa.C.N.C.)

DESEAMOS ESTABLECER EN CUBA UNA VERDADERA DEMOCRACIA,SIN TRAZO ALGUNO DE FASCISMO,PERONISMO O COMUNISMO.ESTAMOS EN CONTRA DE TODA CLASE DE TOTALITARISMO.(Conferencia de Prensa.N.Y.abril 23)

...porque los pueblos de América no quieren ni libertad sin pan,ni pan sin libertad(Buenos Aires. mayo 2)Conferencia Econom.Interamericana.

No queremos tener conflictos con el capital sea cubano o no.Al contrario, lo que queremos es protegerlo,dirigirlo hacia industrias productivas y no que se invierta en casas ni solares.Para industrializar el pais,para desarroyo,necesitamos la ayuda de los capitalistas cubanos,que conocen el asunto,que son los técnicos de inversiones.(abril 26.Montreal,Canadá.Prensa)

YO HE VENIDO AQUI PARA CONTESTAR A LA PRENSA LIBRE,PORQUE LO PRIMERO QUE HACEN LOS DICTADORES ES ACABAR CON LA PRENSA LIBRE,PORQUE NO HAY DICTADURA QUE SOPORTE UNA PRENSA LIBRE,QUE ES LA PRIMERA ENEMIGA DE LOS DICTADORES.¡ESE ES EL PRIMER ERROR QUE COMETEN LAS DICTADURAS!abril 18,Was.)

Se han mencionado maniobras sospechosas de ejército político.QUIERO ADVERTIR AL PUEBLO,A LAS MADRES,PARA RESOLVER TODOS LOS PROBLEMAS SIN DERRAMAR UNA SOLA GOTA DE SANGRE MAS.POR CULPA NUESTRA NO HABRA UNA SOLA GOTA DE SANGRE DERRAMADA EN CUBA.(enero 8,Columbia.Habana)

Cuando hagamos elecciones dentro de un par de años,tendremos menos votos que ahora.¿A quien le conviene posponer la elecciones?(abril 16,Canadá)

ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC.

No.Lo es crito anteriormente no es la reproducción del discurso de algún millonario,de un latifundista,de un politiquero,de un periodista vendido a los Estados Unidos para hacerle mala propaganda al comunismo internacional.Son trozos tomados de los discursos pronunciados por Fidel.Por aquel Fidel que bajó de la montaña acompañado de una aureola de libertad. Por aquel Fidel que fue la esperanza de un pueblo avasallado por el oprobio de una de las dictadura mas sanguinarias que asoló a América.Es la síntesis del joven gobernante,es el idealismo vivo de quin luchó una vez porque su pueblo conquistara la libertad y el decoro perdidos por la ambición y el abuso del poder.¡Bella fraseología de un moderno Tartufo del siglo 20! ¡Canto de sirenas que el pueblo,-Ulises sin precauuión-,creyó y siguió al pie de la letra para despertar demasiado tarde ante una de las traiciones mas grandes que registra la historia del mundo! Repetir hoy en Cuba sus propias palabras,equivale a la muerte.Pensar hoy como pensó Fidel en los primeros dos años de su gobierno,es ser enemigo del pueblo,es tener alma burguesa,es traicionar a los trabajadores,es el delito mas grande que puede cometerse hoy en Cuba.¡Cuántos no guardan prisión y cuántos no yacen bajo tierra por haber cometido el error de seguir siendo fidelista!Por eso para su pueblo,ya no es Fidel:Ahora es Castro.El señor Castro.El dictador Castro.El miserable Castro!

María Pérez.

HOJA NO. 4

EL PERIODICO PALANTE Y PALANTE,SI NO CAMBIA SU FORMA DE ESCRIBIR SERA RETIRADO DE LA CIRCULACION EN CUALQUIER MOMENTO.¿Y POR QUE-SE PREGUNTARA EL QUE NO ESTE AL TANTO DE LAS COSAS-POR QUE QUITARAN ESE PERIODICO QUE TAMBIEN ES COMUNISTA PERO SOLO DEL GENERO SATIRICO? PARECE QUE A PESAR DE SER COMUNISTAS TODOS SUS INTEGRANTES,DE OTRA FORMA NO PODRIAN ESCRIBIR EN EL NI EN NINGUN OTRO PERIODICO,EL HECHO DE TENER QUE LLEVAR SEMANALMENTE CHISTES A LA CIUDADANIA LES HA OBLIGADO A HACER CHISTES A VECES A FORMA DE CRITICA A ALGUNAS COSAS DE LA REVOLUCION.PERO AL COMUNISMO NO SE LE PUEDE ATACAR NI DE LA MEJOR BUENA FE AUNQUE SEA CON EL CHISTE MAS SANO DE ALGUN COMUNISTA QUE VE COSAS MALAS Y CREE QUE CRITICANDOLAS PUEDE ARREGLARLAS,SIN DARSE CUENTA QUE LO MALO VIENE APAREJADO CON EL SISTEMA.CONJUNTAMENTE CON ESTA HOJA VAN UNOS RECORTES DE PERIODICO DE PALANTE Y PALANTE.VEASE EL DE LA CALLE TAMARINDO.UNA EMPRESA ESTATAL AL RESOLVER EL PROBLEMA DEL VECINO LE OCASIONA OTRO PROBLEMA AL DE AL LADO.Y ESE DE AL LADO TIENE QUE PAGARLE AL GOBIERNO PORQUE EL GOBIERNO LE ARREGLE LO QUE EL PROPIO GOBIERNO ROMPIO.Y EN ESE RECORTE NO SE AÑADE QUE LA EMMIU COBRA POR ADELANTADO Y DE CONTADO A PRECIOS ELEVADISIMOS Y QUE DESPUES DE COBRAR DEMORA MESES ENTEROS EN VENIR A HACER LA REPARACION.PERO ,¿QUE HACER? ¿A QUIEN ACUDIR EN UN PAIS DONDE HAY UN SOLO PATRON Y ES POR AÑADIDURA EL MAS EXPLOTADOR DE LOS PATRONES? HAY TAMBIEN EL CHISTE QUE NO ES CHISTE.ES DECIR,LA NOTICIA SERIA QUE POR PUBLICARLA ELLOS COMO SERIA YA QUE SALE TAMBIEN PUBLICADA EN LOS DEMAS DIARIOS COMO UN EJEMPLO DE LA "NUEVA CUBA",RESULTA SER LA MAS CHISTOSA DE TODAS.COMO POR EJEMPLO EL CASO DE ESE JOVEN COMUNISTA((TENIA QUE SER) QUE ALZO CON SUS MANOS NADA MENOS QUE DIEZ MIL ARROBAS DE CAÑA EN 39 MINUTOS.ES DECIR,LLENO VEINTE CAMIONES A ESCASAMENTE DOS MINUTOS POR CAMION.Y DAN EL NOMBRE Y EL LUGAR DEL JOVEN QUE REALIZO TAL HAZAÑA.ESAS MENTIRAS DESCARADAS ES LA QUE DISGUSTA A LOS PROPIOS COMUNISTAS QUE SON MAS COMEDIDOS EN SU CREENCIA POLITICA PERO SON TAMBIEN LAS MENTIRAS QUE LES SIRVE DE ALICIENTE AL PUEBLO SUFRIDO PARA REIR ALGO TAMBIEN DE VEZ EN CUANDO. Y EL CASO DEL CENTRAL AZUCARERO QUE ESTE AÑO TRABAJO EL VIERNES SANTO POR PRIMER VEZ EN SU HISTORIA Y CUMPLIA ESE VIERNES 100 AÑOS DE CONSTRUIDO.ELLOS DICEN LA SEMANA DE LA VICTORIA DE GIRON PORQUE ESTE AÑO NO HUBO EN CUBA SEMANA SANTA.CASTIGARON A LOS QUE POR SU FE RELIGIOSA NO FUERON A TRABAJAR Y SACARON EN MUCHISIMOS PUEBLOS DE CAMPO,EN AQUELLOS DONDE LA FE RELIGIOSA SE HACE MAS PATENTE,CONGAS CALLEJERAS A CANTAR Y EMBORRACHARSE POR LAS CALLES EN UNA ABSURDA PROVOCACION QUE LO UNICO QUE HACE ES ACRECENTAR MAS EL ODIO EN EN UN PUEBLO QUE POR TRADICION ES NETAMENTE CATOLICO.ASI ES COMO LOSCOMUNISTAS GARANTIZAN LA LIBERTAD,EL RESPETO A LAS CREENCIAS AJENAS,Y EL DERECHO DE LOS DEMAS A PENSAR CON SU CABEZA. SI.EN CUBA HAY UNA REPRESION VIOLENTISIMA CONTRA TODO LO QUE NO SEA COMUNISMO.HAY QUE PENSAR COMO UN COMUNISTA O NO PENSAR.POR SUERTE LOS GASES INTESTINALES SON INCOLOROS. DE TENER COLOR TENIAN QUE SER NECESARIAMENTE ROJOS....O PADECER DE DOLOR DE ESTOMAGO. PERO NO OBSTANTE LA REPRESION,NO OBSTANTE QUE NO PERMITAN LA MAS LEVE CORRIENTE EN EL PAIS NO COMUNISTA,PARA UN BUEN OBSERVADOR SIEMPRE SE VE ALGO QUE ELLOS PRETENDEN OCULTAR Y QUE NO PUEDEN.POR EJEMPLO,EL CASO DEL JOVEN QUE VENDE REVISTAS VIEJAS EN UN LUGAR DE LA HABANA Y TIENE UN LETRERO QUE DICE:HAY BOHEMIAS DEL 46,47 HASTA EL 58.¿POR QUE NO HAY BOHEMIAS DE EPOCAS POSTERIORES AL TRIUNFO DE LA REVOLUCION? ES PELIGROSO VENDERLAS PORQUE SON SUBVERSIVAS.¿Y POR QUE SON SUBVERSIVAS? QUIENES ERAN LOS QUE ATACABAN AL COMUNISMO?QUIENES ERAN LOS AGENTES DEL IMPERIALISMO QUE APROVECHABAN EL CAMBIO DE PODERES PARA ATACAR AL COMUNISMO EN CUBA EN AQUELLA EPOCA? UNO DE LOS PRINCIPALES ANTICOMUNISTAS ERA EL SEÑOR FIDEL CASTRO.Y ESAS BOHEMIAS ESTAN LLENAS DE DISCURSOS INDISCUTIBLEMENTE BELLOS QUE FUERON LA TRAMPA EN LA QUE CAYO EL PUEBLO.

MARIA PEREZ.

HOJA NO. 5

LA NOTICIA SALIO EN TODOS LOS PERIODICOS HABANEROS. PARECIA UNA INOCENTE NOTICIA DE ORGANIZACION. "RETIRAN DE LA VIA PUBLICA LOS VENDEDORES CLANDESTINOS." MAS ABAJO EXPLICARA QUE LA JUCEI(JUNTA CENTRAL DE COORDINACION EJECUCION E INSPECCION)RETIRARA DE LA VIA PUBLICA A LOS VENDEDORES AMBULANTES Y AUN A LOS QUE TENIAN PUESTOS FIJOS SIN LA CORRESPONDIENTE LICENCIA. HASTA AHI CORRECTO.LOS DEBERES CIUDADANOS CONLLEVAN TAMBIEN LA NECESIDAD DE PAGAR LOS IMPUESTOS CORRESPONDIENTES POR TODO EL DINERO QUE SE PERCIBE.OCURRE EN TODOS LOS PUEBLOS DEL MUNDO.AH! PERO FALTABA ALGO.¿POR QUE ESOS VENDEDORES AMBULANTES NO PAGAN LOS IMPUESTOS? ¿HAY ALGUIEN TAN LOCO PARA TRABAJAR POR CUENTA PROPIA SIN LEGALIZAR SU OFICIO U OCUPACION EN UN PAIS DONDE LA POLICIA SIN MANDAMIENTO JUDICIAL INVADE CUALQUIER CASA Y DECOMIZA TODO LO QUE QUIERE COMO PAGO A UN SUPUESTO DELITO? ENTRE LOS VENDEDORES AMBULANTES Y DE PUESTO FIJO A LOS QUE SE REFIERE EL PERIODICO,ESTAN INCLUIDOS TODOS LOS DESEMPLEADOS QUE AL NO TENER TRABAJO SE BUSCAN LA VIDA COMO VULGARMENTE SE DICE EN TODO LO QUE PUEDAN.YA DE POR SI ESA ES UNA TAREA ARDUA Y PESADA YA QUE NO HAY NADA QUE VENDER EN UN PAIS DONDE LAS GRANDES TIENDAS SE ESTAN QUEDANDO CON SUS VIDRIERAS VACIAS. EN ELLOS ESTAN INCLUIDOS LOS GRANIZADEROS,VENDEDORES DE DULCES DE FABRICACION CASERA,LO CUAL ES YA UNA HEROICIDAD POR LA FALTA DE AZUCAR,LOS VENDEDORES DE REVISTAS COMUNISTAS QUE OBTIENEN PORQUE ELLOS MISMOS SE LAS DAN, LOS VENDEDORES DE LIBROS VIEJOS?Y GRACIAS QUE AUN NO LOS HAN EXTERMINADO AUN YA QUE ES LO UNICO QUE PUEDE LEERSE HOY EN DIA EN CUBA?ETC. Y AHORA PREGUNTARA EL LECTOR,¿BUENO,Y POR QUE NO SE LEGALIZAN? SENCILLAMENTE PORQUE ESA MISMA JUCEI MUNICIPAL QUE LOS MANDA A RETIRAR DE LA VIA PUBLICA SE NIEGA A LEGALIZARLOS.ES DECIR,ES DELITO NO PAGAR IMPUESTOS A LA NACION PERO LA NACION NO ACEPTA QUE SE LE PAGUEN LOS IMPUESTOS.ESOS INFELICES ESTAN CONDENADOS A LA MISERIA PORQUE TAMPOCO SE LE OFRECE UN TRABAJO. ¿DE QUE FORMA PODRIA OFRECERLES EL GOBIERNO UN TRABAJO,CUANDO HAY UN SINNUMERO DE FABRICAS PARALIZADAS POR FALTA DE MATERIAS PRIMAS? EN MUCHOS CASOS TIENEN QUE SUBSIDIAR A LOS OBREROS POR NO TENER DONDE COLOCARLOS. EL DESEMPLEO AUMENTA Y COMO CONTRADICCION A ESE DESEMPLEO SE LE CIERRA LA PEQUEÑA FUENTE INGRESOS QUE PUEDA TENER ALGUN PADRE DE FAMILIA AL TRABAJAR POR CUENTA PROPIA PARA MANTENER A SU FAMILIA.Y LA DESESPERACION QUE ESAS INJUSTAS MEDIDAS OCASIONAN.NO HAY UN TRIBUNAL,(TODOS SON COMUNISTAS)QUE LO AMPARE Y LO DEFIENDA.LOS ABOGADOS HONRADOS QUE NO QUISIERON AMPARAR ESOS DESMANES DE UN GOBIERNO TOTALITARIO HACE YA MUCHO QUE SE MARCHARON DEL PAIS.NO TIENE ESE POBRE HOMBRE DE LA CALLE A QUIEN ACUDIR. SOLO SABE QUE POR TRATAR DE LLEVARLE UN PEDAZO DE PAN A SUS HIJOS ES PERSEGUIDO Y ACORRALADO. ¿Y POR QUE LA JUCEI NO LOS LEGALIZA? COMO LA ESCASEZ DE TODAS LAS COSAS ES SUMAMENTE GRANDE,CADA VEZ QUE SE LEGALICE A UN VENDEDOR AMBULANTE,AL TENER SU PATENTE FISCAL PUEDE DIRIGIRSE A LOS COMERCIOS ESTATALES EN BUSCA DE MATERIAS PRIMAS PARA SU OCUPACION.Y LA MISERIA QUE TIENEN ESAS TIENDAS ES TAN GRANDE QUE YA POCO PUEDEN RESOLVER. NADA.POR EJEMPLO.UN GRANIZADERO QUE TRABAJA POR LA LIBRE,PAGA EL AZUCAR A SOBRE PRECIO PARA VENDER GRANIZADOS.SIEMPRE GANA ALGO A PESAR DE ESO. PERO AL LEGALIZARLO LA JUCEI TENDRIA QUE GARANTIZARLE UNA CUOTA DE AZUCAR CADA CIERTO TIEMPO PARA QUE EJERZA SU TRABAJO.¿Y DE DONDE LA SACA SI EN ESTA ISLITA MARAVILLOSA LOS COMUNISTAS HAN ACABADO HASTA CON EL AZUCAR, LA CUAL ERA EL ARTICULO MAS ABUNDANTE QUE EXISTIA EN EL PAIS? Y CON LOS DEMAS VENDEDORES PASA IGUAL.NO LE PODEMOS GARANTIZAR NADA Y POR TANTO NO TRABAJEN.MUERANSE DE HAMBRE,QUE YA NOSOTROS NOS ESTAMOS MURIENDO DE RABIA AL VER QUE TODO ES BASURA.ESE ES EL PENSAMIENTO QUE NO DICEN PERO QUE LOS COMUNISTAS MAS INTELIGENTES TIENEN QUE EXPRESAR EN SU FUERO INTERNO.NO HAY DUDAS.SI ESPAÑA QUIERE CARECER DE CHORIZOS Y VINO;SUIZA DE RELOJES;HOLANDA DE QUESO;VENEZUELA DE PETROLEO Y MEJICO DE PLATA,NO TIENEN QUE HACER MAS QUE UNA COSA:VUELVANSE COMUNISTAS!

MARIA PEREZ.

Hoja No.6

Una mujer cubana,Martha Gonzales,ha publicado un libro en Cuba que ha tenido un notable éxito de librería.Su título:Bajo Palabra.Relata en él como se desarroya la vida en Miami.Ella era una exilada que retornó a su patria al encontrarse inconforme con su exilio.Estas hojas que también las escribe una mujer cubana,que también se encuentra inconforme pero de vivir en su patria la cual se ha convertido en una cárcel y que por tanto no tiene la suerte de Marhta de poder escoger,quizás sirvan un día para ripostar ese famoso libro.No han sido escritas estas hojas con el afán de publicación y eso se nota al ver el descuido o la necesidad de pasar inadvertido del amigo gusano que me hace el favor de pasármelas a máquina,ya que ese trabajo se hace en una oficina estatal y en horas de trabajo.Es un riesgo necesario de correr.Pero aunque no han sido escritas con ese afán,repito, quien sabe si alguna imprenta no dudaría en publicarlas al ser unas hojas que llegan desde Cuba,escritas por una cubana que ama la verdad y aunque a veces se exalta por el odio trata en todo momento de ser lo mas objetiva posible.

Conferencia televisada.

Aunque el título dice "conferencia",fue mas bien una charla como advirtio la actriz Consuelito Vidal,ya que ella y dos hombres mas,charlaron durante un rato con Martha Gonzáles el 25 de mayo de 1965 por la televisión de Cuba.Fuí a casa de una amiga esa noche a ver el programa y trataré de escribir las conclusiones sacadas. La primera conclusión es que no fue preparada por el partido o núcleo del partido comunista de C.M.Q.Dicha comparecencia.Ellos cuidan mucho la propaganda y se vio soltura en la Sra. Martha al hablar.Se vio muy bien que venía de un pais donde la libertad de expresión aún para los extranjeros es un derecho que nadie puede coartar, y en cosas que dijo,se notó la contradicción con lo que afirma la propaganda comunista hoy en Cuba.Alguien ha de pagar ese error y Martha empezará poco a poco a darse cuenta de lo que es el comunismo. Dijo Martha que en Miami habían construído un reparto multifamiliar muy económico llamado"Pastorita".Se ve la ironía de darle ese nombre,ya que al empezar el gobierno revolucionario en Cuba,tomó Pastora Núñez la responsabilidad de las viviendas por medio del sorteo semanal de la lotería nacional.Al convertirse la revolución,por obra y gracia del dictador Castro en comunista,aquello pasó a ser un"sueño de una noche de verano" y hoy los cubanos sufren la escasez mas grande de vivienda con la cual se han enfrentado a través de toda su historia y el mismo Castro ha dicho que por lo menos 25 años se necesitan para resolver ese problema.Aparte de que él no consideró el aumento de la población dentro de un cuarto de siglo. Habla Martha de que le molestaba la igualdad conque se trataba a todos los exilados. No es acaso la igualdad lo que mas predican los comunistas,aunque no la ejerzan en la práctica?¿Donde hay igualdad entonces?-Dice que los cubanos en Miami insultan a los norteamericanos,discuten con ellos de política en las esquinas y que le tenían un formidable odio a Kennedy cuando este vivía llegando incluso muchos a emborracharse cuando lo asesinaron y brindar por su muerte.¿Quien se atreve hoy en Cuba a manifestar siquiera una sonrisa porque al dictador le duela una muela? Donde radica entonces la libertad? Habla de la delincuencia en Miami,bolita, charada,robo,inmoralidad,etc.pero también alude a los castigo policiales, por tanto,no ocurren estas cosas con el beneplácito del gobierno de norteamérica.En Cuba sin embargo,lo que no se puede es ser contrarrevolucionario. Son muy benignoscon la delincuencia y el asesinato,cuando no es por motivos políticos,apenas se le castiga.Hay quien no ha cumplido ni un año de cárcel por matar a otro por manifestarse como comunista y hacerle el juego al gobierno. Agrega Martha que da lástima ver a los niños separados de sus padres cuando estos por temor a la bola de la ley de la Patria Potestad,los enviaron a los Estados Unidos.Claro,cuando aquello,los padres y madres cubanos ignoraban que los comunistas no necesitaban mandar a los niños a Rúsia o China ya que iban a cambiar toda la educación en las escuelas,las cuales iban a convertirse en centros de [illegible] tanto comunista. Explica ella el plan llevado a cabo en Florida City, [illegible] la [illegible] luego salarios a los matrimonios que tengan en [illegible] ni [illegible] cubanos, para que estos no pierdan el calor del hogar y dice además que ella jamás haría un trabajo de esa naturaleza. Desde luego, se necesita tener un gran sentido humano y un gran amor y comprensión por esos niños para realizar tal tarea. Añade Martha que la juventud vive errante y carece de ideales por estar desarraigada de su patria y precisamente, lo que más vuelve patriota al hombre es la nostalgia de su suelo natal. Martí fue desterrado a los 16 años y fue esa ausencia lo que más hizo y formó el carácter de Martí como cubano. Habla también de que las cosas se adquieren a plazos. Sí, Cuba también era así antes. Podía el pobre por ese sistema tener refrigerador, televisor, muebles, etc. Ahora, cuestan todas esas cosas hasta 5 veces por encima de su valor, hay que pagarlas de contado siendo además de muy baja calidad. Sin contar que de tres años a esta parte, el que tiene un artículo eléctrico anotado en la libreta no puede coger otro. El que adquirió hace tres años una olla de presión, no puede adquirir ahora un radio o un ventilador, o una batidora o un toca-discos etc. Pero es el caso que aunque pudiera adquirir cualquiera de estas cosas, tampoco las hay en el mercado. O sea, el que plancha no se echa fresco ni oye radio ni cocina en olla de presión etc. Alega Martha que en Miami está autorizado el bofetón y el coscorrón en las escuelas como castigo a los niños. En Cuba no son tan benignos. Simplemente, el estudiante que no hace trabajo voluntario, o sea, que no le trabaja gratis al gobierno cierto tiempo, está obligado a repetir un cursillo en la época del verano aunque haya aprobado todas sus asignaturas. Agrega la escritora de Bajo Palabra, que Fidel es cosa importante entre los exilados ya que éstos van a veces hasta Cayo Hueso para verlo por televisión ya que no les basta con oirlo. Y yo me pregunto: Es que los imperialistas permiten eso? Porque los comunistas hablan de libertad en Cuba y hay que oir La Voz de los Estados Unidos a escondidas ya que eso es un grave delito. Y la mayoría del pueblo la oye a escondidas a pesar de que Raúl dijera en una ocasión: "Siempre hemos dicho que esas [illegible] americanas que se ponen aquí a oir a escondidas los gusanos también los va a embarcar; luego no digan que el radio los embarcó." También dice Martha que los exilados se orientan por lo que dice Fidel y que a veces hace algo y ellos afirman que eso lo había dicho Fidel en el 59. Claro, aquí Martha comete un lamentable error. En el 59, Fidel era nacionalista y anticomunista. Véase la hoja no.3. Dice que la mayoría de los cubanos se fueron con la idea de regresar a su patria, la cual añoran y no se acaban de acostumbrar a aquella vida. Eso, dicho en buena lógica, sitúa a los exilados cubanos como patriotas que huyeron de Cuba por culpa de la dictadura comunista, pero que siguen siendo cubanos y no han mixtificado su criterio como tales. Habla del trabajo el cual es esporádico, mal pagado y sin garantías. En la Cuba actual, esta 5ta. zafra del pueblo como los comunistas le llaman, la han hecho prácticamente los gusanos. Han cerrado fábricas y los han obligado a cortar caña y ellos han tenido que ir para no perder su empleo en un país donde no hay otro medio de vida que la que el gobierno totalitario ofrece. Dice de casos de médicos que limpian pisos pero agrega que para ejercer en los E.U. necesitan pasar por lo menos tres años, dando cursillos de inglés y de medicina internados, lo cual supone que le den también los alimentos, y que además les pagan hasta 200 dólares mensuales. Veo muy natural y JUSTA esa medida. Las condiciones climatológicas son diferentes y la medicina no es igual. Si para revalidar el título en el extranjero le dan esas oportunidades al médico cubano, es digno de agradecer le al gobierno de los E.U. tal actitud. En Cuba el que estudia medicina se recibe de médico ganando mucho menos y está obligado a ejercer un largo tiempo en las lejanas montañas, hambreado y maltratado y después de esa etapa, no puede poner consultorio propio y tiene que trabajar donde el estado esclavista le ordene. Pero hay un caso curioso. Dijo Martha: "Mi estancia en Canadá y después EVENTUALMENTE EN CUBA" ¿Ya piensa en marcharse? Creo que si es una mujer honrada, su mejor libro va a ser el que publique hablando de la vida en Cuba. Cuando le preguntaron su impresión, no dio a entender nada definitivo. Pronto se dará cuenta que ha cambiado, como vulgarmente se dice, la vaca por la chiva.

María Pérez.

1965

13c

[illegible]

VIA AEREA AIR-MAIL

Cuba
correos
24 de abril
día del
sello
1965
13c

[illegible]

VIA AEREA AIR-MAIL

Cuba
correos
24 de abril
día del
sello
1965
13c

[illegible]

VIA AEREA AIR-MAIL

ANA
1965

Cuba
correos
24 de abril
día del
sello
1965
13c

[illegible]

Bernan
Sen: Ferro

Relatives of Dr. ..

can Spain assist with visas?

Carlos Miguel Toledo Pereira
Habana, Cuba, Agosto 27, 1927

Concepción María de la Caridad Casanova del Castillo
Habana, Cuba, Setiembre 21. 1929

Jacqueline Azucena Toledo Casanova
Habana, Cuba, Febrero 9, 1964

Concepción Dolores del Castillo Llanes
Güira de Melena, Enero 10, 1900

Francisco Julio Lozano García
Las Villas, Mayo 22, 1931

Todos viven en: Conde Pareles # 2?
Madrid 13, Spain.

Ramon Guzman Montes (85 yrs

Puerto Cortés

Honduras

Gave idea on how fight C.P.

(9-15-65, 300)

Pongamos Fin al Comunismo en Cuba.

La Organización de Estados Americanos está obligada por la Doctrina Monroe y por Pactos Interamericanos a poner fin prontamente al Comunismo en Cuba, bloqueando totalmente la isla, sin vacilación ni temor, con la certidumbre de que Rusia ni China se atreverán a romper el bloqueo; y si lo intentaran, y eso originara la guerra nuclear, (no la Tercera Guerra Mundial internacional, que no la habrá) para nosotros sería mucho mejor, porque en corto tiempo aquellas dos naciones serían aniquiladas, y no habría más tirantez internacional, porque nuestros ejércitos no saldrían de Rusia hasta que nos hubiéremos reembolsado todo lo que nos debe, más los gastos y daños de guerra, inclusive indemnización por nuestros muertos en ella, y heridos; y restauraríamos a Chiang Kai-Shek en la China continental.- Así deben hablar, con altivez y valentía, los grandes voceros de las naciones libres, si quieren que haya paz, libertad y justicia, que sólo pueden mantenerse por el imperio de la fuerza, que es el único medio para someter a los perversos, con los cuales no hay que tener compasión.- Así también se afirmarán los vacilantes que, lógicamente, quieren lo seguro.

Sólo a las Embajadas acreditadas en La Habana se permitirá importar lo que necesitan para su subsistencia, previo registro en los E. U., y sacar a sus connacionales por la misma vía, para registrarlos minuciosamente.-

Rusia no se atrevería a romper el bloqueo, por lo cual quedaría muy mal parada en el concierto internacional, en tanto que las naciones libres elevarían mucho sus valores.- Entonces podríamos aplastar en pocas horas al Vietnam del Norte por un ataque nuclear aterrador, si no se rindiere incondicionalmente dentro de diez horas contadas desde la intimación.- Así lo requieren las vidas de nuestros conciudadanos y los intereses de nuestros países que se están disipando insensatamente en una guerra de guerrillas como quiere el Comunismo agresor.

Debe garantizarse la vida de Fidel Castro y de sus compinches, quienes, antes que transcurran cuatro meses desde el bloqueo, se asilarán en las Embajadas, excepto la de Rusia y la de China, porque en ellas podrían ser asesinados para q que no revelen sus maquinaciones diabólicas, repletas de hipocresía y de maldad, contra el mundo libre encabezado por Estados Unidos.- Ya seguro en una Embajada, Fidel Castro depositaría el Poder en un grupo de Embajadores, (ninguno comunista) para que prontamente lo traspase a una Comisión nombrada por la OEA, (ningún miembro cubano) la cual organizaría una Policía Panamericana, excepto cubanos, y pondría en libertad a los reos políticos que prometan no ejercer venganzas ni causar disturbios, so pena de ser confinados en campos de concentración. Con igual promesa regresarán los cubanos que quieran. La Comisión nombraría inmediatamente un Presidente provisional de la República que organizaría su Gabinete y convocaría a elección de Diputados a la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente tan pronto como haya decretado la Ley de Elecciones y preparado los proyectos de Constitución Política de la República y de otras leyes que la Constituyente ha de decretar, sin perjuicio del derecho de iniciativa propia de cada Diputado.- También organizará la Administración Pública, excepto los servicios militares y de Policía que continuarán a cargo de la Comisión de la OEA, hasta que tome posesión de su cargo el Presidente Constitucional de la República.

Por la Declaración de Lima, 1938, los Estados signatarios pactaron su solidaridad en el caso de cualquier intervención extranjera; en la Declaración de La Habana, 1940, se proclamó que cualquier acción por parte de un estado no americano en contra de la integridad e inviolabilidad del territorio, la soberanía o la independencia política de un estado americano, sería considerado como un acto de agresión contra los Estados signatarios; en la Conferencia de Río Janeiro, 1947, se acordó un tratado de defensa y ayuda mutua entre los países americanos; y, la Carta de Bogotá,1948, condenó, por su carácter intervencionista, la actividad política del Comunismo Internacional, y demás doctrinas totalitarias, por considerarlas incompatibles con el concepto de las libertades americanas.

Ninguna de esas obligaciones ha cumplido la OEA porque está acobardada por las amenazas y difamaciones de Rusia y de Fidel Castro, quien, a gritos, ha llamado lacayos del Imperialismo Yankee a los Presidentes latinoamericanos, y Ministerio de Colonias del mismo Imperialismo, a la OEA, escarneciéndolos respectivamente.

Hay intervención extranjera en Cuba, que de hecho es una colonia de Rusia que, como metrópoli del Comunismo Mundial, ha amenazado a cualquier país que ataque a Cuba; NADA se ha hecho en su defensa contra el dominio soviético, ni siquiera se ha dado la menor ayuda, fuera de vanas palabras, a los cubanos libres para redimir a su Patria; la soberanía de Cuba, que reside esencialmente en el pueblo libre, dejó de existir totalmente, pues allá no hay más voluntad que la del Amo y Señor Fidel Castro, siervo dócil del Kremlin.- Es risible, si no fuese hipocresía, que algún Estado Americano, desleal a la Magna Organización, invoque, respecto a las sanciones contra Cuba, el principio de no intervención por su respeto a la autodeterminación de los pueblos, la cual está, no en el traidor Fidel Castro,(él no es el pueblo de Cuba) sino en los cubanos libres que han logrado escapar del infernal Comunismo imperante en Cuba, y en los que, en la isla, unos gimen en prisiones, y otros están amenazados a presidio o muerte por sus anhelos de libertad.- Por tanto, cualquier Estado que no quiera cumplir sus obligaciones contraídas en virtud de la Carta Magna de la OEA, debe ser expulsado de su seno y privado de las relaciones diplomáticas, comerciales, turísticas y culturales con los Estados leales.- Tal resolución es necesaria para mantener la dignidad y disciplina de tan alta Corporación política; pues toda asociación restringe, necesariamente, uno o más derechos de cada uno de sus miembros, en cambio de otros mayores y más provechosos.- Y todos los americanos, desde Alaska hasta Patagonia, nos sentiríamos grandemente orgullosos de nuestra OEA, por preferir un posible sacrificio humano al de nuestra dignidad, que debe estar por encima de toda vileza, y que el Comunismo Internacional ha escarnecido y continúa escarneciendo ignominiosamente con sus difamaciones y amenazas a lo Ginés de Pasamonte.

El Comunismo en Cuba, que tan brutalmente ha herido y continúa quebrantando a los ciudadanos de mayor cultura y de más altos ideales, no es un problema que incumbe únicamente a los dignos hijos de la Perla Antillana; no es un caso que atañe solamente a los corajudos adalides del continente colombino; el embrollo turbulento de Cuba -y el de Vietnam- es el conflicto entre el Comunismo agresor y el Capitalismo constructor, conflicto que interesa a todos los hombres con anhelos de libertad y justicia, más aún a los que están subyugados por los oligarcas del Comunismo, y que deliran por su liberación que, para lograrla, a veces encaran la muerte en un doloroso viacrucis.- Esos pocos hombres,

-los jerarcas del Comunismo- archimaestros del engaño, audaces y despiadados, tienen sometidos por el terror y el engaño a todos los que, dentro de sus dominios, no se solidarizan con ellos en el mantenimiento de su despotismo atroz; y tienen minadas todas las naciones libres con sus quinta-columnas y maleantes intensamente infiltrados en todas las esferas gubernativas, radio y prensa, que desvían el croterio del pueblo, le infunden miedo, y lo indisponen contra su Gobierno, los cuales debeis denunciar públicamente como agentes comunistas. Toda su saña la descargan contra Estados Unidos, que es Cabeza del Capitalismo. el país que arrulló en su cuna al gran Jorge Washington, y tantos paladines de la libertad y de la justicia, que ahora se avergonzarían de sus modernos compatriotas por su pusilaminidad ante el espantajo moscovita, pues sufren acobardados tanta humillación y ultraje de Rusia que ha escarnecido vilipendiosamente la sacrosanta Doctrina Monroe, que otrora fuera orgullo del pueblo americano y sólido bastión de América Latina contra la codicia y agresión del Viejo Mundo.- Ahora yace, esa Doctrina, como trapo de inmundicia pisoteada y escarnecida por el Comunismo conculcador.- ¡Qué vergüenza para los altivos constructores de la gran Nación del Mundo! Despertad dignos hijos de América y exigid a gritos a la Organización de Estados Americanos el inmediato bloqueo total de Cuba, y que se advierta claramente a Rusia que no le tememos, y que será abatido cualquier avión y hundido cualquier submarino o barco que intente violar el bloqueo; y que, si quiere la guerra nuclear, le dan la ventaja de empezarla ya, pero que la represalia será sin misericordia, hasta subyugarla totalmente.- Eso debeis hacer también por la prensa y radio de toda la Nación, con la certidumbre de vencer; y pronto habrá paz, libertad y justicia en todo el mundo, porque Rusia quedaría sin la menor influencia internacional, inofensiva, porque ya no infundiría miedo, con todo el poderío bélico de las naciones libres sobre su cabeza.- Y, ¡gloria al Dios Omnipotente!

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

Worldwide Communications Center

Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y.
PL 2-1322

November 24, 1964

Dr. DeWitt C. Daughtry
Dade County Medical Association
2 Coral Way
Miami, Florida

Dear Dr. Daughtry:

This letter will serve to confirm the change in schedule of the "El Medico y Usted" program carried over WRUL. Effective Monday, November 30, we will begin carrying your programs on Monday, Wednesday and Friday. This change is reflected in the revised contract which is enclosed. Please sign all four copies and return to this office for countersignature.

Insofar as billings are concerned, this change will be reflected in your December bill. Our invoice to you for November broadcasts reflected the change prematurely, but you will find enclosed an additional invoice (No. 1389) covering the additional programs carried during the last two weeks of November. This invoice is for $607.50.

Thank you for your continued interest in our station, and we look forward to serving your interests.

Yours very truly,

R. W. Grefe

R.W. Grefe
Vice President

RWG/rdb

Encl.

14-00000

BROADCAST AGREEMENT

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE, 4 WEST 58TH ST., NEW YORK 19, N. Y.
A DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION

(REVISED)
AGREEMENT BETWEEN DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY (EL MEDICO Y USTED)
AND RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

TARGET AREA LATIN AMERICA LANGUAGE SPANISH TIME OF BROADCAST 7:15PM E.S.T.

LENGTH OF BROADCAST ½ hour DAYS M-~~F~~ W.F TIMES PER WEEK 3

STARTING DATE Mon Nov 30 64 ENDING DATE ~~F~~. AUG. 6'65 TOTAL BROADCASTS 108

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:

CONTRACT DATED JULY 8, 1964, REVISED TO SHOW THREE BROADCASTS PER WEEK. SAME PRICE CONTINUES, WITH INVOICES TO BE SUBMITTED MONTHLY IN ADVANCE AND ARE PAYABLE IN ADVANCE BY THE SPONSOR.

THIS CONTRACT MAY BE CANCELLED BY EITHER THE CLIENT OR THE STATION UPON (1) ONE MONTH'S WRITTEN NOTICE IN ADVANCE.

RATES

	NUMBER OF BROADCASTS	STATION CHARGE	TALENT	LINE SERVICE	RE BROADCAST	OTHER CHARGES	TOTAL PRICE
Per Week	3	$101.25 per bctg.					$303.75
Per Contract	36	$3,645.00 per contract					$3,645.00

Less Agency Commission: 15% of Station Charge

DATE ______ BY ______
RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

DATE ______ BY ______
SPONSOR OR AGENCY

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
2 Coral Way
Miami, Florida 33131
Telephone FRanklin 1-2601

November 16, 1964

Mr. Ralph Brent
Radio New York Worldwide - WRUL,
4 West 58th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Mr. Brent:

COPY

Under the terms of our agreement with you, we hereby wish to advise you that beginning 1 December 1964 we desire to reduce the number of the "Medico y Usted" broadcasts from six per week to three per week. If possible, we would like to retain the Monday, Wednesday and Friday time slots. If this is not possible, our second preference would be for a Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday schedule.

Thank you very much for your cooperation in this matter. We look forward to continued collaboration with you in these matters of mutual interest.

Sincerely yours,

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M. D.
President

DCD/lp'

cc: Ray E. Millard,
Vice President & General Manager
Caribbean Management & Service Corp., Inc.,
Suite 619 - Dupont Plaza Center
300 Biscayne Boulevard Way
Miami, Florida

LAGO, VICENTE /DR/

019-006-050/03
UFGA-12894
17 DEC 63
P13

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC DOCTOR
Δ CUBA

DEVOTES HIMSELF EXCLUSIVELY TO HIS PROFESSION. CONTACT OF 201-332675.

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 821 481

LAGO PEREDA, VICENTE

019-500
UFG -01669
12 OCT 62
P1

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA

RE INFO ON MILITIA SOV ENCAMPMENTS, DOI SEP 62.

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 509 743

LAGO PERECA, VICANTE /DR./

019-009-009
UFGA-01727 EOI
15 JUN 61
P1

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

MEMBER OF CUBAN AUTHENTIC REVOLUTIONARY PARTY ON EXILE. /EX-REPRESENTANTE/.

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 369 821

LAGO Pereda, Vicente

Mbr. of directive council of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) in Cuba. No further info.

19-5-3/4-2
11 Dec 62

LAGO Pereda, Vicente (Dr)

Active leader of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) in Cuba. No further info.

19-5-3/4-2
11 Dec 62

AMBUD-3 script writer
receives $45 per mo,
plus some from Refugee Center.

LAGO Pereda, Dr. Vicente

19-6-63/3
AMCOG-3 Ops
15 Apr 63, Rpt

Friend of AMCOG-3 and source report. Ex-Congressman. Medical doctor. Former local chief of Health for City of Habana. Autentico Party.

LAGO Pereda, Vicente (Dr.)

19-5-3/4-84 Vol IV
AMOT 84 Rpt
5 Feb 62

General Practioner, and ex congressman (House of Representatives) from 50-54, and ex Local Chief of Health for City of Havana from 44-50, Prominent member of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano Autentico. Now in Cuba

---

LAGO Pereda, Vicente

19-5-3/4-0
AA-757
21 Sep 62

LAGO PEREDA, VICENTE /DR/

SEX M DOB C 08
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC MEDICAL

201-335851
WAVE-07392
13 NOV 63
P1

Δ CUBA, HAVANA, VIBORA, ESTRADA PALMANRO 57
GENERAL PRACTIONER. EX-CONGRESSMAN. EX-LOCAL CHIEF OF HEALTH CITY OF HAVANA 44-50. MEMBER PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANO AUTENTICO AND CURRENTLY OUT POLITICS AND NO CONNECTION W/ CUBAN HEALTH MINISTRY. ANTI-CASTRO AND PRO-US. TEL NO 4-1042.

#OSM

1 799 296

LAGO Pereda, Vicente (Dr.)

19-5-3/4-2 Vol VII
UFG-976, 9 May 62

In House of Representatives 1950/54, Health Chief for City of Habana 1944/50, leading AUTENTICO member.

LAGO-Pereda, Dr. Vicente

19-6-63/3-2
AMCOG-3 OPS VOL II
August 63 Report

Source of information of AMCOG-3.

FORM
11 57

(44)

ORIG.:
EXT.: PW/CAPONOHG:sep
DISTR.: 268

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 14 OCT 64
FILE:

PRECEDENCE		INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
DEFERRED	PRIORITY			✓
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO DIR
INFO.
CITE WAVE [illegible] NUMBER

TYPIC AMTHIGH

REFS: A. UFGA 12009
B. WAVE 1308

1. AS RESULT REVIEW RADIO OPS [illegible] INTEND REDUCE AMBUD-3 PROGRAM BOTH AMTHIGH AND JMHOPE TO THREE TIMES WEEK BEGINNING ONE DECEMBER. PREFER AMTHIGH SCHEDULE ALTERNATE DAYS PERHAPS MON, WED AND FRI. FOR COVER PURPOSES WILL HAVE SPONSORING ASSOCIATION (IDEN A) SEND LETTER AMCOUP-1 STATING ABOVE PER CONTRACT.

2. ALSO WISH CANCEL AMTHIGH BLACK BROADCAST AMSHADY-1 PROGRAM AS OF ONE NOVEMBER. AMSHADY-1 NOW HAS ESTABLISHED REPUTATION AND RECEIVING GOOD COVERAGE IDEN B AND JMHOPE. PRESENT UTILITY AMTHIGH BROADCAST LIMITED DUE [illegible] BLACK TRANSMISSION, AND NO INDICATION AMTHIGH BROADCAST HEARD PRESUME PROBABLY PARTIALLY DUE FACT CANNOT PUBLICIZE IT.

3. REQUEST HQS ADVISE AMCOUP-1 CANCELLATION AMSHADY-1 BROADCAST AND ALERT TO FORTHCOMING CHANGE AMBUD-3 PROGRAM.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

COORDINATING OFFICERS
[illegible] C/Cover Br.

RELEASING OFFICER
SECRET
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

OUTGOING

FORM 11-57 1304 (44)

ORIG.: PW/CAPORONG:sop
EXT.: 266
DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 14 OCT 64

FILE [illegible] '64

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		✓

RRR

TO DIR INFO. CITE WAVE [illegible]7 NUMBER

TYPIC AMTHIGH CS

REF: WAVE ____

IDENTITIES:

A. DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION.

B. STATION WAVE.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

1.174

C/Cover Br. _

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION
OUTGOING

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN
RELEASING OFFICER

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

	PROCESSING ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

FROM: ADC/WH/SA

SUBJECT: DYVOUR PBRUMEN
Trace Reply

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 16844

There are no identifiable Headquarters traces on the Subject of reference.

re Mario SUAREZ
Nelson

KENT L. POLLOCK

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - JMWAVE
2 - COS, Buenos Aires

AUG 7 - 1964

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-4131	5 AUG [illegible]
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-284635

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/PDRUMEN
Mario Cesar *SUAREZ Nelson

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: UFGA-16844

BIGBEN reported that Mario Cesar *SUAREZ Nelson was a candidate for provincial deputy on the Conservative Party ticket in the 23 February elections, but was defeated. No information was available, from BIGBEN files, regarding Subject's political ideology.

Frederick C. NIND

Distribution:
  2 - JMWAVE
  2 - DC/WH/SA
  2 - Files

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
downgrading and
declassification

PW

BEUhligh: ghf

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA-13,960

DATE
28 August 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
EH 4-9-14

Pro Chrono

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	ACCOM
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/PBRUMEN
Request for Traces on Mario Cesar *SUAREZ Nelson

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

AR: See Para 3

1. Iden, who handles a JMWAVE sponsored radio program replied to Fidel Castro's charges of germ warfare against the United States. His replies were based on the scientific impossibility of germ warfare being carried on as described by the Castro regime plus speculation that this might have been an effort on Castro's part to cover up plans he might have for exterminating part of the Cuban population by means of germ or gas warfare.

2. Shortly after these broadcasts, Iden received a letter from Buenos Aires dated 11 June from Mario Cesar SUAREZ Nelson referring to these broadcasts. SUAREZ said he had not heard anything about the Castro charges and requested that Iden send him the text of the charges, plus the complete text of Iden's reply to same. SUAREZ said he had not had time to hear the entire broadcast. SUAREZ gave his address as : Alsina 770, Tandil, Provincia de Buenos Aires.

3. JMWAVE has no traces on SUAREZ. We would appreciate any information Station Buenos Aires might have on this individual. The rather demanding tone employed by SUAREZ in the letter and his request for complete details lead us to believe that he might be more than an individual with a casual interest in the Cuban problem. We have instructed Iden not to answer the letter in question until further notice.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

Attachment: u/c
Iden List

Distribution:
3 - COS, Buenos Aires w/att
2 - DC/WH/SA w/att

1 RI Chrono
1 201-

DATE TYPED 17 July 64	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-16844	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
PW	ALICE B. CAPONONG	PGS	266

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/PW		BRUCE P. VEDDER
ESEC		DUDLEY R. WILLINGS

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
		ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT UFGA 16844

IDENTITY: DR. Antonio MACEO y MACKLE.

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - COS, BUEN, u/sc
2 - DC/WH/SA, u/sc

[illegible] 1324 (44)

ORIG: [illegible]

EXT:

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 23 JUNE 64

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.		NUMBER
✓ ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS			✓

TO [illegible] INFO. [illegible] CITE WAVE [illegible]
NUMBER

[illegible] PBRUMEN

[illegible]

1. STATION SPONSORED MEDICAL RADIO PROGRAM 10 JUNE OVER [illegible] STATION PUBLICIZED CASTRO CHARGES AGAINST UNITED STATES RE GERM WARFARE.

2. [illegible], MC OF PROGRAM, RECEIVED LETTER DATED 11 JUNE REFERRING BROADCAST FROM MARIO CESAR SUAREZ [illegible], ALSINA 779, TANDIL, PROVINCIA DE BUENOS AIRES. SUAREZ STATED HAD NOT HEARD OF GERM WARFARE CHARGE, DID NOT HAVE TIME HEAR ENTIRE MEDICAL BROADCAST (PROGRAM LASTS 30 MINUTES) AND WANTED ADDITIONAL INFO ON CHARGE AND COMPLETE TEXT REPLY TO SAME.

3. WAVE NOT INTEND HAVE [illegible] REPLY LETTER. HOWEVER, DUE NATURE [illegible] FEEL AS ADVISABLE REQ TRACES SUAREZ. NO RECORD WAVE.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

[illegible] RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

(44)

ORIG.: [illegible]

EXT.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 1? JUNE 64

DISTR.:

CLASSIFICATION

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO DIR INFO. 023 CITE WAVE ______ NUMBER

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF WAVE ____

IDEN: DR. ANTONIO MACEO Y MACKLE

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

Programa Radial "El Medico y Usted"
Diciembre, 1964

Lunes	2	#	250	Varices, Flebotrombosis y Tromboflebitis
Martes	3	#	251	Linfangitis y Linfodema
Miercoles	4	#	252	" "
Jueves	5	#	253	Prematuridad
Viernes	6	#	254	"
Sabado	7	#	255	"
Lunes	9	#	256	Retardo mental
Martes	10	#	257	" "
Miercoles	11	#	258	Desarrollo y Desenvolvimiento del niño
Jueves	12	#	259	" " "
Viernes	13	#	260	" " "
Sabado	14	#	261	" " "
Lunes	16	#	262	" " "
Martes	17	#	263	" " "
Miercoles	18	#	264	" " "
Jueves	19	#	265	Contestando cartas
Viernes	20	#	266	" "
Sabado	21	#	267	" "
Lunes	23	#	268	Sobre algunos problemas psicologicos en los niños
Martes	24	#	269	" " " " "
Miercoles	25	#	270	" " " " "
Jueves	26	#	271	" " " " "
Viernes	27	#	272	Intoxicacion por el Plomo
Sabado	28	#	273	" "
Lunes	30	#	274	Intoxicacion por el Plomo y por Salicilato

Programa Radial "EL MEDICO Y USTED"
Octubre, 1964

1	Jueves	# 223	Neuralgias y Neuritis
2	Viernes	# 224	" "
3	Sabado	# 225	Sindrome Hombro-Mano. Hernia de Disco
5	Lunes	# 226	Neuralgia del Trigemino
6	Martes	# 227	" "
7	Miercoles	# 228	" "
8	Jueves	# 229	Enfisema Pulmonar
9	Viernes	# 230	" "
10	Sabado	# 231	" "
12	Lunes	# 232	Consideraciones sobre Alergia
13	Martes	# 233	" " "
14	Miercoles	# 234	Bronquitis Asmatica
15	Jueves	# 235	" "
16	Viernes	# 236	" "
17	Sabado	# 237	" "
19	Lunes	# 238	Bronquiectasia
20	Martes	# 239	"
21	Miercoles	# 240	"
22	Jueves	# 241	Alcoholismo
23	Viernes	# 242	"
24	Sabado	# 243	"
26	Lunes	# 244	"
27	Martes	# 245	"
28	Miercoles	# 246	"
29	Jueves	# 247	Cartas
30	Viernes	# 248	Cartas
31	Sabado	# 249	Varices, Flebotrombosis y Tromboflebitis

Cartas recibidas para el Programa
"EL MEDICO Y USTED"

Septiembre	2, 1964	Honduras
"	2, 1964	Cuba
"	8, 1964	El Sauce, Nicaragua
"	22, 1964	El Sauce, Nicaragua
"	28, 1964	Coban, Guatemala
"	29, 1964	Camaguey, Cuba
"	29, 1964	Cruces, Las Villas

Programa Radial "El Medico y USTED"
Mes de Septiembre

1	Martes	Dr. Maceo	# 197	Carencias Nutricionales y Vitaminicas.	I
2	Miercoles	"	# 198	" " "	II
3	Jueves	"	# 199	" " "	III
4	Viernes	"	# 200	Ataques Convulsivos	I
5	Sabado	"	# 201	" "	II
7	Lunes	"	# 202	" "	III
8	Martes	"	# 203	Apendicitis	I
9	Miercoles	"	# 204	"	II
10	Jueves	"	# 205	Enfermedades de la Glandula Tiroide	I
11	Viernes	"	# 206	" " "	II
12	Sabado	"	# 207	" " "	III
14	Lunes	"	# 208	" " "	IV
15	Martes	"	# 209	" " "	V
16	Miercoles	"	# 210	Enfermedades del Tiroide. TIROIDITIS	I
17	Jueves	"	# 211	" " "	II
18	Viernes	"	# 212	Enfermedades de la Tiroide	I
19	Sabado	"	# 213	" "	II
21	Lunes	"	# 214	" "	III
22	Martes	"	# 215	Cuidados y atenciones que debe tener la Mujer Embarazada.	I
23	Miercoles	"	# 216	" " " " "	II
24	Jueves	"	# 217	" " " " "	III
25	Viernes	"	# 218	" " " " "	IV
26	Sabado	"	# 219	" " " " "	V
28	Lunes	"	# 220	" " " " "	VI
29	Martes	"	# 221	Toxemia Gravidica	I
30	Miercoles	"	# 222	" "	II

Cartas recibidas para el Programa "EL MEDICO Y USTED"

Agosto	2, 1964	Corozal, Puerto Rico
Agosto	11, 1964	Maiquetia, Venezuela
Agosto	12, 1964	Corozal, Puerto Rico
Agosto	13, 1964	Salcedo, Republica Dominicana
Agosto	14, 1964	San Andres Isla
Agosto	25, 1964	Habana, Cuba
Agosto	26, 1964	Rio Ceballo, Republica Argentina
Agosto	31, 1964	Ciego de Avila, Camaguey, Cuba.

Programacion del mes Agosto "EL MEDICO Y USTED"

Agosto	1	Sabado	Dr. Maceo	# 171	Meningitis	II	
"	3	Lunes	"	# 172	Meningitis	III	
"	4	Martes	"	# 173	Meningitis	IV	
"	5	Miercoles	"	# 174	Meningitis Aseptica		
"	6	Jueves	"	# 175	Miastenia Grave		
"	7	Viernes	"	# 176	" "	II	
"	8	Sabado	"	# 177	" "	III	
"	10	Lunes	"	# 178	Hematuria	I	
"	11	Martes	"	# 179	"	II	
"	12	Miercoles	"	# 180	Purpura	I	
"	13	Jueves	"	# 181	Purpura	II	
"	14	Viernes	"	# 182	Hemofilia	I	
"	15	Sabado	"	# 183	"	II	
"	17	Lunes	"	# 184	"	III	
"	18	Martes	"	# 185	Eclampsia		
"	19	Miercoles	"	# 186	Hemiplegia	I	
"	20	Jueves	"	# 187	"	II	
"	21	Viernes	"	# 188	"	III	
"	22	Sabado	"	# 189	"	IV	
"	24	Lunes	"	# 190	"	V	
"	25	Martes	"	# 191	"	VI	
"	26	Miercoles	"	# 192	Estomatitis		
"	27	Jueves	"	# 193	Ulcera Peptica		(carta)
"	28	Viernes	"	# 194	Infarto		(carta)
"	29	Sabado	"	# 195	Diabetes		(carat)
"	31	Lunes	"	# 196	Prostata		(carta)

Julio	1	Miercoles	Dr.	Maceo	# 144	Tetanos II
"	2	Jueves	Dr.	"	# 145	Tetanos III
"	3	Viernes	Dr.	"	# 146	Neumonitis Alveolar I
"	4	Sabado	Dr	"	# 147	" " II
"	6	Lunes	Dr.	"	# 148	" " III
"	7	Martes	Dr.	"	# 149	Cartas. Esclerosis multiple I
"	8	Miercoles	Dr.	"	# 150	" " " II
"	9	Jueves	Dr.	"	# 151	Fiebre amarilla
"	10	Viernes	Dr.	"	# 152	Nefroptosis
"	11	Sabado	Dr.	"	# 153	Vacunacion I
"	13	Lunes	Dr.	"	# 154	" II
"	14	Martes	Dr	"	# 155	" III
"	15	Miercoles	Dr.	"	# 156	" IV
"	16	Jueves	Dr.	"	# 157	" V
"	17	Viernes	Dr	"	# 158	Paralisis facial I
"	18	Sabado	Dr.	"	# 159	" " II
"	20	Lunes	Dr.	"	# 160	Vomitos I
"	21	Martes	Dr.	"	# 161	" II
"	22	Miercoles	Dr.	"	# 162	" III
"	23	Jueves	Dr.	"	# 163	" IV
"	24	Viernes	Dr.	"	# 164	" V
"	25	Sabado	Dr.	"	# 165	Cefalea I
"	27	Lunes	Dr.	"	# 166	" II
"	28	Martes	Dr.	"	# 167	" III
"	29	Miercoles	Dr.	"	# 168	" IV
"	30	Jueves	Dr.	"	# 169	Ciatica
"	31	Viernes	Dr.	"	# 170	Menegitis. Anatomia I

Junio	1	Lunes	Dr. De la Vega	# 120	Queratitis bulosa	
"	2	Martes	Dr. Maceo	# 121	No trasmitido. Cartas	
"	3	Miercoles	Dr. Maceo	# 122	Bronquitis	R
"	4	Jueves	Dr Benach	# 123	Enfermedades Seno	
"	5	Viernes	Dr. "	# 124	" "	
"	6	Sabado	Dr. "	# 125	" "	
"	8	Lunes	Dr. "	# 126	" "	
"	9	Martes	Dr. "	# 127	" "	
"	10	Miercoles	Dr. Maceo	# 128	Guerra bacteriologica	
"	11	Jueves	Dr. "	# 129	" "	
"	12	Viernes	Dr. Benach	NO LLEGO EL AVION A LA EMISORA. REPITIERON TAPES VIEJOS.		
"	13	Sabado	Dr. Benach			
"	15	Lunes	Dr. Maceo	# 130	Cancer	
"	16	Martes	Dr. "	# 131	"	
"	17	Miercoles	Dr. "	# 132	"	
"	18	Jueves	Dr. "	# 133	"	
"	19	Viernes	Dr. Maceo	# 134	Sarampion I	
"	20	Sabado	Dr. "	# 135	" II	
"	22	Lunes	Dr. "	# 136	Varicela	
"	23	Martes	Dr. "	# 137	Poliomelitis I	
"	24	Miercoles	Dr. "	# 138	Poliomelitis II	
"	25	Jueves	Dr. "	# 139	Paperas	
"	26	Viernes	Dr. "	# 140	Tos ferina I	R
"	27	Sabado	Dr. "	# 141	Tos ferina II y Difteria	R
"	29	Lunes	Dr. "	# 142	Difteria II	R
"	30	Martes	Dr. "	# 143	Difteria III Tetanos I	R

Mayo	1	Viernes	Dr. Cesar Lugones	# 94	Odontologia	
"	2	Sabado	Dr. " "	# 95	Odontologia	
"	4	Lunes	Dr. Maceo	# 96	Gastroenteritis	
"	5	Martes	"	# 97	Paludismo I	R
"	6	Miercoles	"	# 98	Paludismo II	R
"	7	Jueves	Dr.Alonso Portuondo	# 99	Osteoartritis	
"	8	Viernes	Dr. " "	# 100	"	
"	9	Sabado	Dr. " "	# 101	"	
"	11	Lunes	Dr. Peñalver	# 102	Medicina ocupacional	
"	12	Martes	Dr. Peñalver	# 103	Manganismo	
"	13	Miercoles	Dr. Peñalver	# 104	Saturnismo	
"	14	Jueves	Dr. Maceo	# 105	Cartas	
"	15	Viernes	Dr. "	# 106	Cartas, sifilis,artritis	
"	16	Sabado	Dr. "	# 107	" , "	II
"	18	Lunes	Dr. "	# 108	Mononucleoosis, Carta	
"	19	Martes	Dr. "	# 109	Hepatitis viral, Carta	
"	20	Miercoles	Dr. "	# 110	Palabras sobre la fecha	
"	21	Jueves	Dr. Gonzalez Mayo	# 111	Tuberculosis en Ganado V.	
"	22	Viernes	Dr. Gonzalez Mayo	# 112	Tuberculosis en Ganado V.	
"	23	Sabado	Dr. " "	# 113	Enfermedades aviarias	
"	25	Lunes	Dr. " "	# 114	Aftosa	
"	26	Martes	Dr. " "	# 115	"	
"	27	Miercoles	Dr. " "	# 116	"	
"	28	Jueves	Dr. De la Vega	# 117	Chalazion	
"	29	Viernes	Dr. De la Vega	# 118	Retinitis pigmentaria	
"	30	Sabado	Dr. De la Vega	# 119	Desprendimiento retinal	

Abril	1	Miercoles	Dr. Maces	# 68	Trastornos de la voz
"	2	Jueves	Dr. Arias Almariño	# 69	Desarrollo emocional niño
"	3	Viernes	" "	# 70	" " "
"	4	Sabado	" "	# 71	" " "
"	6	Lunes	Dr. " "	# 72	" " "
"	7	Martes	Dr. Alonso Fortzonde	# 73	La gota
"	8	Miercoles	Dr. " "	# 74	" "
"	9	Jueves	Dr. Cesar Lugones	# 75	Denticion
"	10	Viernes	Dr. Maceo	# 76	Mononucleosis infecciosa
"	11	Sabado	"	# 77	Amebiasis
"	13	Lunes	Dr. Benach	# 78	Ginecologia
"	14	Martes	"	# 79	"
"	15	Miercoles	"	# 80	"
"	16	Jueves	"	# 81	"
"	17	Viernes	"	# 82	"
"	18	Sabado	Dr. Maceo	# 83	Cartas
"	20	Lunes	Dr. Maceo	# 84	Cartas
"	21	Martes	Dr. Maceo	# 85	Tuberculosis I
"	22	Miercoles	Dr. Maceo	# 86	Tuberculosis II
"	23	Jueves	Dr. Maceo	# 87	Tuberculosis III
"	24	Viernes	Dr. Maceo	# 88	Tuberculosis IV
"	25	Sabado	Dr. De la Vega	# 89	Estrabismo
"	27	Lunes	Dr. De la Vega	# 90	Glaucoma
"	28	Martes	Dr. De la Vega	# 91	Catarata
"	29	Miercoles	Dr. De la Vega	# 92	Desprendimiento retinal
"	30	Jueves	Dr. Cesar Lugones	# 93	Odontologia

rzo	2	Lunes	Dr. Maceo	#	45	Neuritis I	
"	3	Martes	"	#	46	Neuritis II	
"	4	Miercoles	"	#	47	Atrofia muscular progresiva	
"	5	Jueves	"	#	48	Tetanos	R
"	6	Viernes	"	#	49	Desnutricion	R
"	7	Sabado		#	50	Fiebre reumatica	
"	9	Lunes	"	#	51	Fiebre reumatica	R
"	10	Martes		#	52		
"	11	Miercoles		#	53		
"	12	Jueves	"	#	54	Acromia	R
"	13	Viernes	"	#	55	Radiologia I	
"	14	Sabado	"	#	56	Radiologia II	
"	16	Lunes	"	#	57	Avitaminosis	R
"	17	Martes	"	#	58	Varices	
"	18	Miercoles	"	#	59	Angina de pecho	R
"	19	Jueves	Dr.Alonso	#	60	Artritis reumatoidea	
"	20	Viernes	Dr. Alonso	#	61	" "	
"	21	Sabado	Dr.Alonso	#	62	" "	
"	23	Lunes	Dr.Gzlez	#	63	Anticonceptivos	
"	24	Martes	Dr. Maceo	#	64	Pneumotorax	
"	25	Miercoles	"	#	65	Obesidad	R
"	26	Jueves				SEMANASANTA.	
"	27	Viernes					
"	28	Sabado					
"	30	Lunes	Dr. Mena	#	66	Enfermedades bucales	
"	31	Martes	Dr.Haces	#	67	Trastornos de la voz	

Febrero	1	Sabado	Dr. Maceo	# 20	Desnutricion	
"	3	Lunes	"	# 21	Obesidad	
"	4	Martes	"	# 22	Ulcera hepatica	
"	5	Miercoles	"	# 23	Obstruccion intestinal	
"	6	Jueves	"	# 24	Litiasis renal	
"	7	Viernes	"	# 25	Pancreatitis	
"	8	Sabado	"	# 26	Tosferina	R
"	10	Lunes	"	# 27	Asma	R
"	11	Martes	"	# 28	Schock	
"	12	Miercoles	"	# 29	Parasitismo	R
"	13	Jueves	"	# 30	Hipertension arterial	
"	14	Viernes	"	# 31	Influenza	
"	15	Sabado	"	# 32	Acromia	
"	17	Lunes	"	# 33	Osteomielitis	
"	18	Martes	"	# 34	Erisipela	
"	19	Miercoles	"	# 35	Brucelosis	
"	20	Jueves	"	# 36	Anemia	
"	21	Viernes	"	# 37	Leucemia	
"	22	Sabado	"	# 38	Ictericia	
"	24	Lunes	"	# 39	Dermatitis alergica	
"	25	Martes	"	# 40	Fiebre amarilla	
"	26	Miercoles	"	# 41	Constipacion	
"	27	Jueves	"	# 42	Alcoholismo	R
"	28	Viernes	"	# 43	Bronquitis	
"	29	Sabado	"	# 44	Eczemas	

Enero	10	Viernes -	Dr. Maceo	#	1	Inaguracion
"	11	Sabedo	"	#	2	Gastroenteritis
"	13	Lunes	"	#	3	Asma
"	14	Martes	"	#	4	Sarampion, Varicela, Culebrilla
"	15	Miercoles	"	#	5	Poliomelitis
"	16	Jueves	"	#	6	Angina de Pecho
"	17	Viernes	"	#	7	Parasitismo
"	18	Sabado	"	#	8	Tetanos
"	20	Lunes	"	#	9	Avitaminosis
"	21	Martes	"	#	10	Neumonia
"	22	Miercoles	"	#	11	Difteria
"	23	Jueves	"	#	12	Artritis
"	24	Viernes	"	#	13	Paperas
"	25	Sabado	"	#	14	Calculos hepaticos
"	27	Lunes	"	#	15	Paludismo
"	28	Martes	"	#	16	Rabia
"	29	Miercoles	"	#	17	Lepra
"	30	Jueves	"	#	18	Alcoholismo
"	31	Viernes	"	#	19	Cirrosis hepatica

Cartas recibidas para el programa "EL MEDICO Y USTED"

Enero	20, 1964	Habana, Cuba
Enero	29, 1964	Tampa, Florida
Enero	31, 1964	Sancti Spiritus, L.V.
Febrero	8, 1964	Comayaguela, Honduras
Febrero	9, 1964	Agramonte, Matanzas
Febrero	27, 1964	Choluteca, Honduras
Febrero	29, 1964	Santiago de Cuba, Oriente
Marzo	1, 1964	Choluteca, Honduras
Marzo	9, 1964	Colorado de Abangares, Costa Rica
Marzo	11, 1964	Cartagena, Colombia
Marzo	16, 1964	Pinar del Rio, Cuba
Marzo	21, 1964	Barranquilla, Colombia
Marzo	23, 1964	Liverpool, Inglaterra
Marzo	24, 1964	Mexico,
Marzo	29, 1964	Costilla, Colombia
Abril	1, 1964	Guanajay, Pinar del Rio
Abril	2, 1964	Santa Barbara, Honduras
Abril	7, 1964	ORANGESTAD, ARUBA
Abril	11, 1964	Sahagun, Cordova, Colombia
Abril	19, 1964	Santa Barbara, Honduras
Abril	29, 1964	Santiago de Cuba, Oriente
Abril	29, 1964	Tampa, Florida
Abril	28, 1964	Habana, Cuba
Mayo	1, 1964	Habaha, Cuba
Mayo	1, 1964	Pereira Caldas, Colombia
Mayo	3, 1964	Puerto Cortes, Honduras
Mayo	4, 1964	Savannah, Georgia
Mayo	5, 1964	Tumbador, Guatemala
Mayo	8, 1964	Masaya, Nicaragua
Mayo	15, 1964	Habana, Cuba
Mayo	18, 1964	Tampa, Florida
Mayo	27, 1964	Maiquotia, VENEZUELA
Junio	11, 1964	Rincom, Puerto Rico
Junio	9, 1964	Santa Ana, San Salvador
Junio	11, 1964	El Callao, Venezuela
Junio	18, 1964	Puerto Cortez, Honduras
Junio	28, 1964	Guatemala
Junio	23, 1964	Costilla Magdalena, Colombia
Junio	22, 1964	Valledupar Magdalena Colombia
Junio	25, 1964	Oaxaca, Mexico
Junio 25	, 1964	Colombia
Junio	28, 1964	Tegucigalpa, Honduras
Junio	29, 1964	San Salvador
Julio	7, 1964	Honduras

14-00000

FORM 11-57 1304 (44)

ORIG.: PW/FLUTEO/pgs

EXT.: 271

DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 31 JAN 64

FILE: [illegible]

Doctor's Program ✓

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	CITE NUMBER
RRR ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

TO DIR INFO. CITE WAVE 1340 NUMBER

TYPIC

1. AMCOUP-1 INFORMED WIBALDA 29 JAN HE READY BROADCAST DOCTOR MACEO'S PROGRAM MONDAYS THROUGH SATURDAYS AT 1915 BEGINNING 10 FEB.

2. WIBALDA INSTRUCTED AMCOUP-1 TO BILL SPONSOR, DADE MED ASSOCIATION, THROUGH YOYARD. AMCOUP-1 CHARGING $101.50 PER PROGRAM.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

31-16

ESEC [illegible]
FINA[illegible]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WALTER D. NEWBY
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MESSAGE FORM 24

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

03 03
ORIG (H. WEBSTER) (D. WRIGHT)/pk
UNIT WH/C WE/5
EXT 6393
DATE 15 MARCH 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO (MADRID) 15-2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 INFO DDP, WE 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, VR, FILE

TO (MADR) 15-2 INFO CITE DIR 92731

PBRUMEN

REF DIR 91921*

FYI ACCORDING TO LETTER JUST RECEIVED IN NEW YORK BY AMWHIP/1 FROM AMLASH/2,
02
(QUHOPS/1 DUE RETURN HAVANA 6 APRIL TO HAVE "GOOD POSITION" IN OFFICE OF (VICE FORN MIN ARNOLD RODRIGUEZ CAMPS.)

08

END OF MESSAGE 03

(Wainright)

24
*Hqs agrees to (unilateral recruitment in place)

extra copy
for files?

03
C/WH/C/FI (Sherwood) (phone)

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WE/INT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
C/WE/5

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

9/PV

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ORIG: JOHN SEARS:ch
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 5061/1255
DATE: 9 May 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 22 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WHB INFO FILE, VR. DDP, EUR6, DDC, CI, CI/OPS, EIZ

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 0922 24z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 00801

15-2

TO PRIORITY MADRID, MEXICO CITY, WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMCHALK

REF: DIRECTOR 00402

1. AT HQS REQUEST WODISH CONTACTED "BROTHER-IN-LAW" MENTIONED PARA 1 REF 9 MAY. TURNS OUT THIS INDIVIDUAL, DR. MARTIN PELLA, FORMERLY A REGULAR WODISH (SOURCE)(24), IS NOT GUIN'S BROTHER-IN-LAW. PELLA TOLD WODISH FOLLOWING: HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW, FELIX SUAREC (AS RECEIVED FROM WODISH), DEFECTED MEXICO ABOUT ONE MONTH AGO. HE IS THE ONE HOLED UP IN A MEXICO CITY HOTEL, THOUGH THIS TIME PELLA DID NOT MENTION THE PANUCO. PELLA SAYS SUAREC TOLD HIM BY PHONE THAT COMANDANTE RAMON GUIN HAD HELPED HIM GET OUT OF CUBA, WHERE SUAREC HAD BEEN WITH "MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY ON PROJECT DOING COMPUTER COMPILATION OF MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL FIGURES WHICH BEING PROGRAMMED INTO SOME SYSTEM DEALING WITH TRADE AGREEMENTS. SUAREC HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN WITH "PETROLEUM INSTITUTE." SUAREC ALLEGEDLY TOLD PELLA THAT HE THINKS GUIN ALSO WANTS TO LEAVE COUNTRY "BUT DOESN'T HAVE THE MEANS".

AN	
AB	✓
~~IN~~	
SS	
BX	
DES	NFD
FI	

CS COPY

201-142241

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9 May 69
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

2/pl

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE: JUN 19 1 03 PM '69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

______ PER RECEIVED RID/EDI ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 00801

PAGE TWO

2. RECHECK REF PARA 2 VISA REQUEST SHOWS RAMON TOMAS GUIN DIAZ'S ADDRESS AS "IN CUBA", WITH HIS WIFE, MARGARITA MARIA EMILIA (ARENAL) VEGA, IN SPAIN. HOWEVER, STILL APPEARS REFERENCE TO TRAVEL OF RAMON GUIN ARENAL (WHICH REPORTED AS "INTENDED") PER PARA 5 REF MAY PERTAIN TO SUBJ, THOUGH COULD ALSO BE HIS SON. AS OF MARCH 66 SUBJ WAS REPORTED TO HAVE TWO CHILDREN (SEX UNKNOWN) BY HIS WIFE DAISY (LNU). HOWEVER NOTE DAISY IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF FLOWER "MARGARITA", SO WAS POSSIBLY NICKNAME OF MARGARITA ARENAL. HQS HAS NO TRACES MARGARITA OR DAISY ARENAL OR ON ARENAL'S FATHER VICENTE WHO PER VISA REQUEST RESIDES LOS ANGELES.

3. HMMA 36756 REPORTED ONE FELIX SUAREZ MORE TRAVELLED CUBA-MEXICO 5 MARCH 69 ON CUBAN PP 130637. PELLA'S REPORT INDICATES SUAREZ MAY BE OF DEBRIEFING INTEREST. PELLA ALSO SAID SUAREZ HAS SON IN DENVER, AND SENATOR DOMINICK OF COLORADO ATTEMPTING ARRANGE SUAREZ'S ENTRY INTO U.S. BELIEVE SUAREZ IS IDEN WITH FELIX (SUAREZ) MORE, CITED IN UFGA 26404, 25 NOV 66. THIS DISPATCH FORWARDED DEBRIEFING REPORT OF FORMER MININD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

________ PER ________ # ________ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 00801

PAGE THREE

IBM PROGRAMMER WHO SAID SUAREZ MORE, DOB CIRCA 1916, HAD SON IN U.S. AND WAS PROGRAMMER AT "DIRECCION DE SISTEMAS Y ORGANIZACION" OF MININD.

4. VIEW ALL ABOVE, BELIEVE MEXICO CITY CAN FORGET ABOUT GUIN DIAZ. WOULD APPRECIATE 15-2 MADRID STATION, EITHER THROUGH 02 QUKETCH OR STATION OFFICER USING 32 EMBASSY COVER, ATTEMPT ARRANGE ROUTINE INTERVIEW WITH ARENAL PEGGED TO VISA REQUEST. GUIN'S TRIAL WAS WIDELY PUBLICIZED. OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IS ASCERTAIN GUIN'S CURRENT STATUS AND INTENTIONS, AND ACCOUNT FOR WHY MAN SENTENCED 25 YEARS NOW APPARENTLY OUT OF JAIL AND APPARENTLY CONTEMPLATING BEING ABLE EXIT CUBA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG
WH/1
E/IB/S
WH/SAO L. De Santo
OLC MR. APPLE (IN DRAFT)

63

IN
PS
BX
DEC NFD
FI

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

4/A

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. X-REF TO FILE NO. FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES 26 SECRET PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	AMTRUNK-10 REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 1 TC / RE 2 / MO / FI / CI / TRR / CA
FROM Rome 15-9		
ACTION C/WE-3 ☒ RID COPY	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	UNIT / TIME / BY / PA / 05 / DDP
INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C-5, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/EE-3, C/RI/SD, C/CA-2		

S E C R E T 111755Z 20-9 11 MAR 65 IN 73315

15-15 DIR (LISB) INFO WAVE 15-22 (MILA) (POUCH) CITE (ROME) 9301

KAPOK/KEYWAY/TYPIC (DELORRY)

1. 02 (DELORRY (D) ARRIVED ITALY 9 MARCH, ROME 13 MARCH. RETURNING FROM HOME 15 MARCH TO SUBMIT DETAILED REPORT.

2. ETA CUBA ABOUT 09 (1 APRIL) AT SUGGESTION FIDEL (F) GIVING 08 (DINNER PARTY) FOR HIM SOON THEREAFTER.

3. D SAYS ANNIE DE QUENDOZ (Q) (NO STA TRACES) WIFE (BUT GETTING DIVORCED) OF SWISS CHANCELLOR IN HAVANA, WAS MISTRESS OF BOTH "CHE" GUEVARA AND F, CONTINUES RELATIONS WITH F. DIP COMMUNITY GIVING HER COLD SHOULDER BUT D HAS TAKEN PAINS BE FRIENDLY, FOR WHICH BOTH SHE AND F GRATEFUL. D SAYS CAN (GAIN DIRECT ACCESS F 24 THROUGH Q) IN ANY EMERGENCY. Q DAUGHTER HIGH-RANKING PORTUGUESE POLICE OFFICIAL. MOTHER IS NITA S. PAIS, RUA MOZAMBIQUE, 52-1-DTO LISBON. Q GAVE D LETTER TO MOTHER. HAVE OPENED, PHOTOED, WILL POUCH. RQST TRACES Q.

4. GERMAN (AMADO-BLANCO) Y FERNANDEZ (201-[illegible]54208) GAVE D MIN OF FOREIGN TRADE ENVELOPE CONTAINING TWO LETTERS FOR LUIS AMADO-BLANCO (201-276972). ALSO PHOTOED, WILL POUCH.

SECRET

9/pv

SECRET

5. D ON GOOD TERMS WITH ROGELIO (MONTENEGRO) GUASP (M). PREPARING REPORT. M WAS SCHEDULED LEAVE HAVANA ONE HOUR AFTER D FOR PRAGUE TO MEET MANUEL ("MANOLITO") (PEREZ) HERNANDEZ BEFORE COMING ROME. ACCORDING HAVANA RUMOR M TO KEEP EYE ON RICARDO (SUBIRANA) Y LOBO (201-333831), WILL BECOME DE FACTO CHIEF OF CUBEMB TO QUIRINALE. D SUSPECTS M HAS CUIS TIES. ENERGETIC COMMY.

6. D ALSO ON GOOD TERMS WITH SAVERIO TUTINO (201-353093) WHO GAVE HIM FOUR LETTERS WHICH COULD NOT SAFELY OPEN. POUCHING NAMES ADDRESSEES. TUTINO TOLD D AMLASH/1 AND AMTRUNK/10 CERTAINLY GUILTY. BUT F LETTER SUGGESTING CLEMENCY CAUSED RUMORS OF PRIOR DEAL. ALSO MANY RUMORS STUDENTS CHALKED "VIVA A/1" AND "VIVA A/10" ON WALLS BUT D DID NOT SEE. FOR TWO DAYS AFTER ARRESTS GOC PUT CONTROLS ON MANY KEY FIGURES.

7. BECAUSE PROTESTANT CLERICS IN CUBA SUBJECT TO MIL DUTY, HAVE PROTESTED RE DRAFT-EXEMPT STATUS CATHOLIC PRIESTS, WHOM GOC MAY START DRAFTING. CESARE ZACCHI (201-755668) WORRIED GOC-VATICAN RELATIONS MAY SUFFER.

8. CUBAMB IN BELGIUM, GUSTAVO (ARCOS) Y BERGNES PRESENTLY IN SOME DISFAVOR. IS ALLEGED TO HAVE MADE ANTI-REGIME REMARKS.

9. INDEX C AND M.

SECRET

SECRET **SECRET** IN 73375 P3

CFN

9301 (D)OZ LORRY D ITALY 9 ROME 10 15 ETA CUBA 1 FIDEL F D ANNIE DE MENDOZ Q NO STA SWISS HAVANA CHE GUEVARA F F DIP D F D F Q Q PORTUGUESE NITA S PAIS RUA MOZAMBIQUE 52-1-OTO LISBON Q D REST Q GERMAN AMADO BLANCO Y FERNANDEZ 201-754223 D MIN LUIS AMADO BLANCO 201-275972 D ROGELIO MONTENEGRO GUASP M M HAVANA D PRAGUE MANUEL MANOLITO PEREZ HERNANDEZ ROME HAVANA M RICARDO SUBIRANA Y LOBO 201-333831 DE FACTO CUBEMB QUIRINALE D N COMMY D SAVERIO TUTINO 201-353093 NOT SAFELY TUTINO D AMLASH/1 AMTRUNK/10 F VIA A/1 VIVA A/13 D NOT SEE GOC CUBA MIL GOC CESARE ZACCHI 201-753588 GOC VATICAN CUBAMB BELGIUM GUSTAVO ARCOS Y BERGNES ANTI REGIME Q ..

x Pls Comply with [illegible] Reduction [illegible]

NNN **SECRET**

YPN

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4 [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational
C MOC Amendment for Subject of 201-307337

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Please Record Amendment

References : A. UFGA-11381, 27 September 1963
(MOC Amendment)

B. UFGA-15436, 23 April 1964
(MOC Amendment)

C. WAVE-8141, 19 June 1964

1. Transmitted herewith are three (3) copies of an amended MOC for Subject. This amendment has been written to provide Subject a raise in salary from $350.00 net per month to $400.00 net.

2. Per Reference C, the New York funding mechanism was discontinued with the issuance to Subject of check for period 1-15 June 1964. Subject will be paid henceforth at JMWAVE beginning with period 16-30 June 1964.

Attachments:
MOC (3 cys) - H/W
IDEN Sheet - ~~USC~~ H/W
(3 cys)

Sc A att'd in RID/AN

Distribution:
3 - Addressee w/ MOC - H/W
IDEN Sheet - USC

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

201-307337

3 Encls

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET CS COPY

DATE TYPED
22 June 1964

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 25 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-16604

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-307337

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

TO : Chief, Special Affairs Staff

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Engagement of IDEN A 201-307337

1. Term and Project Charge. The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under TYPIC and is to be charged against PM cost center. The effective date of the oral contract is 16 June 1964 and it shall continue until terminated by either party upon fifteen days actual notice.

2. Security Approval. The appropriate security approval to utilize Subject as requested has been obtained. OA Granted 6 February 1963 via DIR-18422, 6 February 1963.

3. Citizenship. The Subject is a Cuban citizen and was born on 14 February 1937 at Matanzas, Cuba and resides at IDEN B.

4. Compensation. Commencing on the effective date of this agreement, Subject will be paid compensation at the rate of $ 448.14 per month. Such payments to be made following completion of satisfactory service.

5. Taxes. Subject will/XXXXXXXXX be obligated to pay U.S. income tax. Taxes will/XXXXXXXXX be deducted from the above stated paid compensation. Subject is/XXXXXXX eligible for Social Security. # IDEN C. Subject is married and has a total of three dependents other than himself. Subject's dependents are/XXXXXXXX residing in the U.S., U.S. possessions, Canada, Mexico, the Canal Zone, or the Republic of Panama.

6. Quarters and/or Subsistence. The Subject will/XXXXXXXX be furnished quarters and/or subsistence. when operationally necessary.

7. Operational Expenses. When properly authorized, Subject will be reimbursed for:

a. Operational travel including mileage claims for official use of his personal automobile.

b. Operational hotel expenses, meals, telephone calls, etc.

8. Other Commitments. Bonus. With prior approval of the Chief of Station a bonus may be authorized for outstanding performance in the line of duty. The amount of the bonus will be commensurate with the risks taken and the results which were achieved; amount not to exceed $100.00 per any single bonus payment. In the event of Subject's death in the line of duty, an amount not to exceed $5,000.00 will be paid to Subject's estate.

9. Contingent Obligations. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

03

SIGNED:

Field Contracting Officer

03

REVIEWED:

Contract Approving Officer

SECRET

2/RV

[illegible]

CS COPY

201-307337

S E C R E T

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
TO UFGA-16604

IDEN A - Miguel DIAZ Isalgue

IDEN B - 2328 N.E. 6th Avenue
Miami - Florida 30

IDEN C - Social Security (#265-72-0741)

S E C R E T

SCA
Encl #2 UFGA 16604

CS COPY

201-307337

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

AMICE-14

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
MOC Amendment for Subject of 201-307337

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: Please Record Amendment

Reference : UFGA-11381, 27 September 1963
(Transmittal of MOC for Subject)

1. Transmitted herewith are three (3) copies of an amended MOC for Subject. This amendment has been written to delete the requirement for a covert income tax return from Subject's MOC and to place Subject on the JMWAVE payroll whereby taxes will be deducted from Subject's salary.

2. It is requested that the current payment arrangements be kept in effect; to wit, that Subject continue to be paid the net amount of $350.00 monthly (in semi-monthly increments of $175.00) through the New York funding mechanism, TA'd to JMWAVE.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
MOCs (3 cys) - H/W
IDEN Sheet - USC
(3 cys)

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/atts.
MOCs - H/W
IDEN Sheet - USC

45 Copy

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
15 Apr 64

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible] 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-15436

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-307337

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
TO: UFGA-15436

IDEN A	-	Miguel DIAZ Isalgue ✓
IDEN B	-	2328 N.E. 6th Avenue Miami - Florida
IDEN C	-	Social Security #265-72-0741 30

SECRET

SCA to UFGA 15436

CS COPY

201-[illegible]

1/PW

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

15 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMLASH-1 in Paris,
31 January to 3 February 1965

1. AMLASH-1 returned from Rome to Paris on 31 Jan 1965 and was met for a very brief meeting the same night by ONTRICH in order to arrange a meeting for the following day. The following subjects were discussed at the two meetings on 1 and 2 February 1965:

a. The primary reason for again meeting AMLASH-1 before his planned return to Cuba was to brief him on the security implications involved in the infiltration and possible capture of Modesto Orlando Orozco Basulto AKA Bebo Orozco, who infiltrated into Cuba on 21 Dec 1964. Orozco, according to his wife, went to Cuba to rescue Jose Vasquez Merey and three others who were hiding in the home of a woman named Gloria Cabrera, who lived at No. 72 27th Street, between N & O, Apartment 3, Vedado, Havana. Orozco's capture, if he has been captured, presents an indirect threat to the security of AMLASH-1 and a more direct threat to the security of AMTRUNK-10 since Orozco in Jan 1964 exfiltrated through the rat line established by AMICE-14 (Miguelito). Upon his return to Cuba, AMLASH-1 will check the above with AMTRUNK-10; and, if Orozco is under the control of the security service, will decide and communicate with Miami whether AMLASH-1 and AMTRUNK-10 believe it necessary to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-10. AMLASH-1 was briefed to send a letter to UNSNAFU-9 to indicate whether Orozco has been arrested or whether he is still in hiding. If the letter to UNSNAFU-9 mentions a good and pleasant return trip, this will mean that Orozco is not under the control of the security service. If the letter talks about a long, tiring trip, this will indicate that Orozco has been arrested. AMLASH-1 was also requested to send a report on the above and any complications which have developed or may develop from Orozco's infiltration.

b. AMLASH-1 suggested that his nom de guerre "Charles," which we have been using for the past three years, be changed to "Gerardo."

c. AMLASH-1 was given a resupply of S/W developer pills and carbon. He planned to take the S/W material back with him to Havana. 02 AMLASH-1 again reviewed with 02 UNSNAFU-9 and reminded UNSNAFU-9 to turn over to his Paris case officer all letters regardless of how received from AMLASH-1 to either UNSNAFU-9 or letters that may be addressed to his parents-in-law. 02 AMLASH-1 also agreed to send S/W out in letters addressed to Juan Ventura (AMWHIP-1's business partner) in Geneva or Rome. AMWHIP-1 was briefed to inform Ventura that any letters he received from AMLASH-1 should be immediately air mailed to AMWHIP-1 in New York. Since AMLASH-1 will probably find it necessary some time not to sign the letters to Ventura in his true name, AMWHIP-1 was also briefed to inform Ventura to forward to New York any letter received from Cuba addressed to him and signed by a person unknown to him. S/W letters to AMLASH-1 should continue to be addressed to Ernestina Acosta, Edf. No. 526, Apt. 8, Esquina Calles 25 y H. In an emergency a letter can also be sent to AMLASH-1's mother. 15-4 04, 08

d. AMLASH-1 was again debriefed on the cache that had been put down for him in Matanzas. He repeated what he had previously reported and attempted to answer most of the questions in the WAVE cable. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters, info WAVE, on 2 Feb. AMLASH-1 was requested to send a message either through his channel or through AMTRUNK-10's S/W channel reporting how much of the radio equipment and other material had been recovered from the cache.

e. AMLASH-1 was asked if he knew of any individual in Cuba whom he could recruit and who could be inserted into the Cuban Intelligence Service with the idea of attempting to get the DGI to assign this man to Caracas, Venezuela. AMLASH-1 could think of only one possibility, an individual known as Gustavo Gonzalez. 06 AMLASH-1 has full confidence 06 in Gustavo and Gustavo has previously been approached on several occasions by Pinero to work for him. Upon his 06 return to Cuba AMLASH-1 will check to find out if Gustavo can still get himself recruited by Pinero and then be sent on a mission abroad, hopefully to Caracas. (AMWHIP-1, who also knows Gustavo 06 will provide the background information upon his return to New York.) his [illegible] info.

f. AMLASH-1 reported on the upcoming FEU elections on 10 February 1965. AMLASH-1 stated that Crombet, the president of the Communist Youth, will become the new

11/12 PV

president and that his man, Lazaro Mora, would be one of the vice-presidents. (A cable on this subject was sent to Headquarters from Paris.)

15-4 06

g. AMLASH-1 was requested to check with Pizzolo regarding the precautions being taken to prevent sabotage of the locomotives being shipped from France to Cuba; specifically, how carefully do they check the placement of the seals, are they special seals or regular lead seals, are there going to be any additional checks once the locomotives reach Cuba, will they drain the oil and lubricants from the factory to the port, and do they run the locomotives under their own power or are they towed. AMLASH-1 agreed to attempt to develop answers to the above requirements and pass the information to his contact in 15-4 the Paris Station. AMLASH-1 also agreed to attempt to find out and pass to the Paris Station through UNSNAFU-9 the names of the Cuban techs training at La Rochelle.

15-4 02

h. In a general discussion regarding the persons with whom AMLASH-1 had been in contact either personally or through letters, AMLASH-1 mentioned Alfredo Portela. AMLASH-1 stated he had received a letter from Portela and had in turn written to Portela. He considers Portela a friend which was the only reason for writing to him.

i. AMLASH-1 was debriefed on Cuban Intelligence Service personnel. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters.

15-4 15-4

j. A cable was sent from Paris to Headquarters suggesting WAVE send a S/W letter to AMTRUNK-10 stating: "Este tranquilo. Carlos regresa pronto."

k. AMLASH-1 was asked for information on the following persons:

(1) Samuel Gonzalez Rodriguez-Planes. AMLASH-1 reports he is a member of the Ameijeiras group and is a good and brave man.

(2) Antonio Lusson y Batile, Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Occidental Army. AMLASH-1 reports Lusson is an independent and rare type individual who keeps to himself and doesn't involve himself in political matters. AMLASH-1 has heard nothing bad about Lusson.

7/R

(3) Cmdte. Raul Diaz Arguelles, Chief of Artillery of the Occidental Army.

(4) Elpidio Baez Bigo. According to AMLASH-1, Baez is a trusted Fidelman.

(5) Luis Manuel Cantillo Toirac. Assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and one of the security people. He was formerly assigned to Brazil, is young and has for several years been with Pinero and the Cuban IS.

(6) Enrique Oltuski Osacki. Oltuski is a close friend of Faustino Perez and his stock with the regime rises or falls as does that of Faustino.

(7) Sergio Tollon. Code clerk in the Embassy in Paris. Tollon is staying in Paris at the request of Ambassador Carrillo.

l. Gastro enteritis, water pollution and unsanitary conditions. AMLASH-1 states there are no real problems, although the scarcity and lack of a balanced diet do cause some problems. The purification of water has been a problem which probably has been the cause of some of the sickness in the country.

interest!

m. AMLASH-1 did not believe that Aragones had invited him to fly back to Havana with him in order to get him back because of any serious security matter. AMLASH-1 did state that Aragones was concerned that AMLASH-1 may not return to Cuba. Since Aragones cleared AMLASH-1 for his trip abroad, he is in a way responsible that AMLASH-1 does not defect and returns to Cuba. AMLASH-1 feels Aragones does not want any problems with Fidel in case AMLASH-1 decides to stay out.

n. AMLASH-1 was unable to provide any information on the political developments in Cuba in mid-November and December since he had been out of the country since early November. AMLASH-1 was asked to check on the problems between the opposing factions in the Cuban leadership and explained the issues, the background and personalities involved.

o. Soviet advise or influence in political and economic matters creates resentment among the middle and higher level Cuban officials. Basically, the Soviets are not respected.

p. Rank of Cuban officials under Fidel in terms of their influence in making national policy. Raul is still the heir apparent to Fidel. Next to Raul is Che Guevara. After that, no other official, according to AMLASH-1, has any great influence in the making of Cuban national policy. President Dorticos' relationship with Fidel is good since he is a hard and serious worker, has good administrative ability and is able to work within the general outline laid down by Fidel. Raul Castro has some political influence and control in Oriente where he has placed his men in positions of influence, but only Fidel personally has any political influence in the rest of Cuba. Even within the military Fidel selects and appoints high army officers. Che Guevara is still strong in the economic field and has not suffered a decline in his influence and authority because of his earlier policy of industrialization. Guevara restricts himself to the economic field and plays a very small role in the political field. He is serious and very hard worker, one of the few, according to AMLASH-1, who has worked seven days a week without leave since the revolution. Emilio Aragones holds an important position as the organizational secretary of the PURS. He is the official who was always at the office of the National Directorate of the Party and has contact with all the officials in the regime. He plays an important coordinating role. Faure Chomon has been accused of organizing former 13th of March Revolutionary Directorate people, but, according to AMLASH-1, this probably based on the fact that Chomon always gives jobs in the ministry he heads to DR people. Because of this Chomon today controls to a large degree the Ministry of Transportation. Of all the ministries, the DR's stronghold is in the Ministry of Transportation. Other DR people who continue to hold important positions in the regime are Alberto Mora, Ambassador Carrillo and Jose Naranjo.

q. AMLASH-1 and AMWHIP-1 were unable to develop any specifics, but from their conversations with Ambassador Carrillo got the impression that Carrillo would prefer and welcome a transfer from the Embassy in Paris to the Embassy in Madrid.

r. According to Emilio Aragones, Anibal Escalante is being considered for a job outside Cuba. The job will probably be in the commercial/economic field, but a decision had not been made as of November 1964 as to location.

06

s. AMLASH-1 again reported that he feels Orlando Blanco, Consul of the Cuban Embassy in Bern 10 is approachable since he is unhappy with the Cuban regime. AMLASH-1 also feels that Enrique Rodriguez Loeches, 06 Cuban Ambassador in Rabat, 10 is approachable if approached and developed by the right person. Marina Garcia Gonzalez, 06 assigned to the commercial section of the Cuban Embassy in Rabat, 10 AMLASH-1 feels is also approachable and feels money can be used as an inducement. Ambassador Carrillo, AMLASH-1 feels, if the proper person developed him, could probably be compromised with Fidel. He is a character and could easily be entangled according to AMLASH-1 in a compromising situation. Ambassador Carrillo is a close friend of Lucy Echevarria.

2. AMLASH-1 was also asked information on a long list of other requirements on Cuba. On many he was unable to provide information and cables were sent to Headquarters on the requirements on which he did provide information.

Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/AMWORLD

cc: WH/SA/EOB
WH/SA/MOB

File:
AMLASH-1 201
Internal Op

6/7N

SECRET

12 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Federico PALMIERI Guillermo
C-165019

1. A memorandum has been received in OS from WH Division reflecting that Subject, who had been terminated as a CIA agent in 1964, is known to be writing a book, to be entitled "My Seven Years with CIA".

2. PALMIERI is in exile from Guatemala and is presently employed by Moore Commercial Company in San Salvador, Salvador. According to information received from [redacted] #36980 ([redacted]), Subject has stated that a publisher in Mexico City is interested in publishing the book.

3. WH also furnished a copy of a memorandum from the Philadelphia office of Domestic Contact Service, reflecting that Subject had advised a DCS contact that he had worked as a CIA agent for Roger RUSS. (RUSS could not be identified in OS files.)

4. A copy of this memorandum is being placed in the OS files of those individuals who are known by Subject to be affiliated with the Agency. Original memorandum from WH will be found in Subject's file.

E. Mendoza

EM:kd

cc: [redacted] - 36980
[redacted] - 48852
[redacted] - 53160
[redacted] - C 98507
[redacted] - C 98853
Viola June Cobb - C 216264
[redacted] - C 214409
[redacted] - 37621
[redacted] - 60003
[redacted] - O&C 59320

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. NAME (*Last, First, Middle*) HICKS, CALVIN W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 NOV 1924	GRADE GS-13
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (*or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment*) DDP/WH/CS/CS Dev Comp	5. PRESENT POSITION OPS OFFICER	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 6815
7. PROPOSED STATION 16-16 LA PAZ, BOLIVIA	8. PROPOSED POSITION (*title, number, grade*) OPS OFFICER - 0977 - GS-13	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION STATE 32	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE SEPT 66	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 7

12. NAME OF DEPENDENT TO ACCOMPANY	13. RELATIONSHIP	14. DATE OF BIRTH		15. REPORT OF MED. HIST. (SF 89) ATT.	
		MONTH	YEAR	YES	NO
CATHERINE L.	WIFE	MAY	1925		X
THERESA L.	DAU	JAN	1953		X
MICHAEL C.	SON	JULY	1954		X
MARY C.	DAU	DEC	1955		X
LISA ANNE	DAU	OCT	1957		X
DANIEL C.	SON	FEB	1959		X
PATRICIA E.	DAU	MAR	1960		X

16. COMMENTS

FORM 89 ATTACHED IN DUPLICATE. PLEASE SCHEDULE MEDICAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

17. DATE OF REQUEST 10 MAY 1966	18. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL 03 Kenneth L. Wambold	19. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING GH 56 Hqs	20. EXTENSION 6315

21. EVALUATION AND SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICIAL

Date: 2 JUN 1966

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request

Chief, Personnel Security Division

3/N

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 6-65 259a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

TO : Deputy Chief, SSD 22 June 1954

FROM : Chief, Special Referral Branch

SUBJECT: HIDALGO, Balmes, Jr.
#65077

GIST

The Subject is a covert employee of this Agency now in the United States for four weeks training and being considered for use by Staff C/ICB in a highly sensitive assignment. Immigration authorities may submit questions through this Agency which will be answered by the Subject, but requests to have the Subject testify in open court hearings must be refused.

DETAILS

1. Reference is made to the letter received by the Alien Affairs Staff from the Immigration and Naturalization Service and reference to your request of 15 June 1954 to ascertain the details of the Subject's status with this Agency and prepare a reply to I&NS.

2. On 17 June 1954 Special Agent Chester R. HOATSON of this office interviewed Mr. Robert DAHLGREN, Acting Chief, WH/FI, Room 1128 "J" Building, and Mr. 93 (John BONNETT) Chief, WH/Panama, Room 2204 Quarters "J", x4456, regarding the Immigration request. The following information was obtained during this interview.

a. The Subject is still a covert employee of this Agency, is now in the United States (New York City) on home leave, and is scheduled to report to Washington, D.C., to commence four weeks of covert training on 6 July 1954.

b. The Subject is presently under consideration by Staff C/ICB for an assignment with a highly sensitive project under the supervision of Staff C/ICB. Under this proposed assignment any publicity or notoriety that the Subject would receive from testifying publicly on questions of Communist associations of which he may have knowledge would ultimately preclude his future use with the Staff C project and would probably jeopardize his future as a covert employee of this Agency.

c. If the Staff C assignment does not materialize, the Subject will return to (Balboa, 16-46 Panama Canal Zone) on approximately 15 August 1954 as a case officer, and this position would also be jeopardized by undue publicity.

2/IN

3. Mr. DAHLGREN and Mr. 03 (BOTTET) indicated that from a WH standpoint only there would be no objection to a controlled interview with the Subject if the interview could be afforded the Subject while he is still in New York City. This, however, would have to be coordinated with Staff C/ICB for possible objections that they might raise in view of their proposed use of the Subject. Mr. 03 (BOTTET) requested that he be informed of any action taken in this matter and any public testimony or open court testimony would have to depend on the seriousness of the case being prepared by the Immigration authorities.

4. Any contact with the Subject during his period of covert training from 6 July to approximately 15 August 1954 would have to also be coordinated with Mr. (Peter HOEHL) Covert Training Officer, OTR, whose office is located in Building 03 T-31.

5. In [illegible] June 1954 Special Agent HOATSON contacted Mr. (Paul 03 BURKE) Staff C/ICB, 1613 "I" Building, x668, to discuss the Subject's future position and also the request received from I&NS. The following factors were obtained from Mr. (BURKE):

a. The Subject's use in the proposed 03 Staff C project is still in the planning stage, but the assignment that the Subject is being considered for is a highly sensitive one and any further publicity which the Subject may receive would ultimately disqualify him for consideration on this project.

b. Any approval for I&NS contact of the Subject would have to be determined after carefully considering the importance of the I&NS case for which the Subject's testimony may be required. Mr. 03 (BURKE) indicated that the Subject could still be considered as an employee of WH Division regardless of whether or not the proposed Staff C/ICB assignment materializes and any action in the request received from I&NS should be closely coordinated with both Staff C and WH.

6. Mr. PENNINGTON, Alien Affairs Staff, SO, contacted William A. HOGAN, Special Assistant to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization on 18 June 1954 requesting further information regarding their memorandum of 9 June 1954 on the Subject. Mr. HOGAN explained that I&NS has a list of possible informants which contains the Subject's name. The people on this list are being contacted for use on a continuing basis when specific cases arise which might fall in their particular area of knowledge. At the present time, I&NS has no specific case for which they want to contact the Subject, but they just want to know if he would be available in the future for use as an informant regarding various Communist activities of which the Subject has personal knowledge.

6/RJ

7. After his conversation with Mr. HOGAN, Mr. PENNINGTON indicated that a refusal of the I&NS request would not be considered out of order, but recommended cooperating to the extent that I&NS could submit specific questions to this Agency which could be presented to the Subject and the answer forwarded to I&NS. The refusal of their original request should be based on the sensitivity of the Subject's position which could be jeopardized by any undue publicity and also on the fact that the Subject moves frequently and it would be difficult to locate him until an important contact was [illegible].

8. Mr. James SPROUSE, Alien Affairs Staff/SO, stated on 18 June 1954 that Mr. HOGAN, Special Assistant to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, had indicated in a conversation with Mr. SPROUSE on 8 June 1954 that I&NS had been able to locate the Subject's location and affiliation with this Agency through the Subject's father who told the inspector that the Subject was employed by this Agency in Balboa, Panama, Canal Zone, 16-46 which appears to be a security flap on the part of the Subject's father.

9. Mr. John BONNET, 03 Chief, WH/Panama, was recontacted on 18 June 1954 and informed of the nature of the I&NS request and also informed of the apparent security flap on the part of the Subject's father. 03 On the basis of this further information, it was suggested to Mr. BONNET that the I&NS authorities be requested to submit any questions through this Agency which would, in turn, be presented to the Subject and his answers be returned to I&NS. Mr. BONNET agreed 03 to the proposal of having the I&NS people contact the Subject through this Agency and also indicated that the reported security breach on the part of the Subject's father would be taken into consideration and an attempt would be made to determine the extent of the Subject's relatives or acquaintances know of the Subject's employment by this Agency. Mr. Paul BURKE, 03 Staff C/ICB, also agreed to the proposed procedure and requested that any and all action taken be coordinated with WH and Staff C.

ACTION

It is recommended that the attached memorandum to I&NS and to the Chief, WH Division, with a carbon copy to Staff C/ICB, be forwarded and that no further action be taken pending a report from Mr. 03 BONNET regarding the seriousness of the security flap from an operational standpoint.

Charles W. Kane

Attachments
1 - Letter to I&NS
1 - Letter to WH with cc to Staff C/ICB

HOATSON/mlc
6/21/54

6/N

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Deputy Chief, Special Security Division DATE: 21 October 1953

FROM : Chief, Special Referral Branch

SUBJECT: HIDALGO, Jr., Balmes Nieves
#65077

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 16 October 1953, in which it was requested that appropriate inquiries be made to ascertain the answers to the following questions.

a. Can BALMES be made available for testimony before the Subversive Activities Control Board in the United States.

b. If the answer to question "a" is in the negative, can the FBI interview BALMES wherever he may be outside the United States.

c. Or can questions to be answered by BALMES be submitted to CIA for transmittal to BALMES and the answers given by BALMES be sent back to the FBI, via CIA.

03

2. On 21 October 1953 Mr. William B. CALDWELL, Chief, WH/FI was interviewed in his office. Mr. CALDWELL advised that the Subject was presently a Contract Employee whose services are being utilized in Panama under the Travel Control Project. He stated that Subject has been overseas for approximately one and a half years and that his contract period will probably expire within six months. He advised that in answer to question "a", Subject can be made available for testimony before the Subversive Activities Control Board in the United States if necessary. He stated that Subject's position was not such that he was indispensable to the Project and that if it was absolutely necessary, he could be recalled to the United States within twenty-four hours. In reference to question "b", Mr.03 CALDWELL advised that there was no reason why the Subject could not be interviewed by the FBI at his place of duty. In reference to question "c", Mr.03 CALDWELL reported that this was the most desirable alternative and that he would prefer the questions to be answered by Subject be submitted to CIA for transmittal to Subject and that the answers would be returned to the FBI, via this Agency.

03

3. On 21 October 1953 Miss Helen POINDEXTER of Staff C reviewed her records and determined that Subject's true name is identical to the captioned Subject and not as shown in your memorandum of 16 October 1953.

SSD Chief
2 Dep. Chief
A. to Chief
Chief CSS
CSS Desk
Desk

10/2

SECRET
Security Information

6/PJ

4. In view of the above, no further investigation is contemplated by this office unless advised to the contrary.

Charles W. Kane

McGRATH/mla
10/21/53

03 I informed Mr [illegible] today of the position of Mr Caldwell. I told Mr [illegible] that subject could be [illegible] if necessary, but that we would [illegible] to the [illegible] at his present station [illegible] interviewed [illegible] Mr [illegible] 2, 4, 7 & 9 [illegible] determined [illegible] subject's presence [illegible] subject's that, in the event subject's presence be necessary, the question of payment of subject's travel expenses would have to be settled.

[illegible]
10/22/53

- 2 -

SECRET
Security Information

VPJ

SECRET

HIDALGO, LUZ MARIA 06 OVERT #198780

HIDALGO, BALMES N., JR. - OVERT AND COVERT #65007 - FATHER

HIDALGO IS A CURRENT EMPLOYEE, GS-11, ASSIGNED TO WH DIV. HE WAS ADVISED TO ENTER A HOSPITAL IN EARLY MARCH 1962. HIS CURRENT MEDICAL STATUS IS NOT SHOWN.

HIDALGO ASSISTED THE FBI AS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY FROM AUGUST 1946 UNTIL MAY 1949 WHEN HE APPEARED AS A GOVERNMENT WITNESS AT THE TRIAL OF THE ELEVEN TOP CP LEADERS.

BEFORE HIS CONVERSION TO 24 STAFF EMPLOYEE STATUS, HIDALGO WAS 24 A CONTRACT EMPLOYEE. HE WAS GRANTED AN OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE FOR USE AS AN AGENT IN LATIN AMERICA IN DEC. 1951. HE WAS GRANTED A COVERT SECURITY CLEARANCE IN 1952 FOR USE AS A CONTRACT AGENT. 24 FILES ATTACHED. 24

HIDALGO, ANNIE LOUISE - COVERT #147818 - MOTHER 06 08

SUBJECT'S MOTHER WAS GRANTED A COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR USE IN A CONTRACT-CLERICAL CAPACITY. FILE ATTACHED. 24

5/3/62 DHWOLDORF:MB

7/PN

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE FILES

FROM : (George Weademan) 03

SUBJECT : MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATICA CRISTIANO
#353 012

1. Subject Organization is of interest to CA/1 because it forwarded the attached letter (prepared by Laureano BATESTI falla---212 635) to Bela Kiraly of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Inc.---a 24 (CA sponsored activity) James Condon, CA1/ asked for any available Office of Security data concerning Subject Organization or the writer of the letter. If there was nothing unfavorable available concerning either of them, CA was going to permit (Kiraly) to meet with the representative of Subject Organization in order to determine whether (Kiraly) could be of help to Subject group. 06

2. A review of Office of Security records revealed that Subject Organization is an Anti-Castro group and that the writer of the letter was of interest to the Agency under an Operational Approval in 1960.

03

(George Weademan)

cc: 212 635

5|r/

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

21 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. F. I. G. Coleman
C/OPS/LSN

SUBJECT : FBI Investigation of Allegations
Regarding CIA Activities

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 30 July 1974 and captioned as above, requesting that the names of certain individuals and organizations be searched in Office of Security records and the results of such checks which may be passed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. The records of this Office contained no prior information identifiable with Security Defense System; Intelligence Services, Ltd.; or Advance Security Corporation. Our records reflect no prior information identifiable with Howard Gibson of Powder Springs, Georgia.

3. Mitchell Livingston Werbell III, born 8 March 1918 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, served in the Office of Strategic Services briefly from July to December 1945 during World War II, and has repeatedly come to the attention of CIA through the intervening years through his activities, primarily in connection with the Far East and Caribbean areas. He has a reputation as a "wheeler dealer, con-man, arms peddler, and soldier of fortune."

4. The foregoing information may be passed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

5. The following information from Office of Security records was recently passed to Mr. Frank Schwartz, Federal Bureau of Investigation Liaison representative:

"John Patrick Muldoon - Subject was born 25 August 1937 at Washington, D. C. He entered on duty with the Agency on 7 January 1958 as a GS-03 Courier. During his Agency career he became an Operations Officer primarily in the Far East area. His overseas assignments included Malaysia, Bangkok, and areas of Indonesia. He went on a

13-13 13-5 13-20

-2- 663217

3|RJ

Leave Without Pay status on 19 November 1971, pending disability retirement. His retirement became effective on 19 November 1972, as a GS-12. At the time of retirement he resided at 4305 Kentbury Drive, Bethesda, Maryland. The latest notation in his file indicated he may be employed as the Washington representative of the firm, Security Consultants International."

6. Office of Security records reflect that an individual, probably identical to Steve Van Cleave of Atlanta, Georgia, had falsely claimed to the State Department in January 1974 that he worked for CIA in Latin America under cover of Coca Cola Company. He also apparently indicated that he is known to FBI representatives in Buenos Aires. This information is contained in Agency cables DIR-507298, 30 January 1974, and DIR-490860, 12 December 1973.

Charles S. Phalen
Chief
Security Support Division

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	CL/SR	6	
2	CI/OPS/FE	7	
3	WRJ	8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

RYBAT

DISSEM BY #7 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/FE 4 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/CI/SD C/CI C/FE/VNR 4

860 C/FE/CO 4/85 C/SOD 3 C/FI 2

S E C R E T 261218Z MAY 69 CITE BANGKOK 3055 26 MAY 69 IN 66602

13-7 13-28 13-1

SAIGON INFO: DIRECTOR, VIENTIANE, SINGAPORE, MANILA, RANGOON, 13-9

13-14 13-3

HONG KONG, TAIPEI, DJAKARTA, TOKYO, SEOUL, KUALA LUMPUR

13-6 13-20 13-16 13-13

REF: DIRECTOR 88114 (SENT BANGKOK ONLY)

13-5

1. WE HAVE BEEN PLAGUED FOR SOME WEEKS NOW BY MR. MITCHELL L. WERBELL III, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF R AND D OF SIONICS, ATLANTA, GEORGIA. WERBELL DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS A COUNTERINSURGENCY EXPERT, HAS A VARIETY OF WEAPONS TO DISPLAY, CLAIMS TO BE A RETIRED COLONEL, AND LAST WEEK INTRODUCED HIMSELF AT A LOCAL NIGHTCLUB AS CHIEF OF WOFIRM IN THAILAND.

2. WERBELL HAS A HISTORY OF SHOWING UP IN TROUBLE SPOTS WHERE HE CAN MAKE A FAST BUCK. HE IMPLIES THAT HE IS U.S. GOVT CONNECTED AND PRESENTS A DEMONSTRATION OF A VARIETY OF EXOTIC WEAPONS THAT NEVER FAILS TO IMPRESS. REF DESCRIBES HIM AS AN UNSCRUPULOUS OPPORTUNIST WITH A REPUTATION FOR LIVING BEYOND HIS MEANS.

To C/SK

light

and OS record

SF 27686

Bb

from e/1SIC

Bb

SECRET

12/PJ

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

18-5

PAGE 2 BANGKOK 3055 S E C R E T

3. WERBELL IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, BORN 1919, — 8 March 1918 Phila. SERVED IN OSS, HAS SHAVEN HEAD AND HANDLEBAR MUSTACHE. REF ADVISES THAT FULL DETAILS OF HIS BACKGROUND SHOULD NOT BE PASSED TO LIAISON 24 SINCE HE IS U.S. CITIZEN. HOWEVER, STATES THAT LIAISON 24 CAN BE INFORMED, SHOULD HE APPEAR IN YOUR AREA, THAT HE HAS AN UNSAVORY REPUTATION, HAS NO U.S. GOVT CONNECTIONS, AND ANY DEALINGS WITH HIM SHOULD BE APPROACHED WITH EXTREME CAUTION.

4. FOR SAIGON: WE UNDERSTAND THAT WERBELL RECENTLY VISITED SAIGON AND DID HIS THING WITH GEN. ABRAMS, WHO WAS SUITABLY IMPRESSED, AND WERBELL IS NOW SETTING UP A SNIPER TRAINING PROGRAM.

5. FILE: 201-259910

SECRET

SECRET

3/PJ

SL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD DATE: 18 DEC 1967

SUBJECT: SWENSON, Harold F. **
#73086

Subject's file has been reviewed in connection with his being presented with a Retirement Medallion ~~(Silver - Bronze)~~ having retired after fifteen (15) or more years of CIA service.

** Certificate Only.

Subject overseas - re-check 1 yr for release of medallion/certificate. O/Pers so advised 12/15/67.

Laurence G. Parr
Laurence G. Parr
Chief
Employee Activity Branch

After discussion with [illegible] Release to Subject (5/8/68)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED				DATE 13 December 1967
	XX	YES		NO	LETTER NO.

TO : Chief, Central Cover Staff	FROM: Laurence G. Parr
ATTN: James W. Franklin	Chief, Employee Activity Branch, 3 E 54

Please check your records for any cover considerations in connection with the presentation of a retirement medallion to Mr. Harold F. Swenson.

Laurence G. Parr
SIGNATURE

REPLY	DATE

As long as Mr. Swenson remains overseas, there are cover considerations involved.
(R C Blake)
03

03
(James K. D. Becker)
SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 5-61 1831

SECRET

2|N

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/WH/SEC
GH-56

EXTENSION: 6300

NO. 109301

DATE: 5 May 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, PSD 3E-48	12 May 66			For inclusion in Subject's security file.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. Pauline, Control Desk	RECORDED CONTROL DESK			⑤ Record resignation.
6.				
7. FILE-1				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief, KUVEST

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/ADMIN/PERSONNEL James B. Wilcott Jr.
Debriefing of [redacted] - Resignation in field

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Wilcott
1. [redacted] arrived PCS at JMWAVE on 26 April 1965 and submitted his resignation at JMWAVE from KUBARK to be effective cob 15 April 1966. While at JMWAVE Subject was under the cover of JMOCEAN.

2. [redacted] resigned in order to seek employment in private industry. A resume of his KUBARK employment is as follows:

a. Mar 57 (EOD) to May 60 - in Hqs - overt employee

b. May 60 to July 64 - Tokyo, Japan under ODIBEX cover 13-3

c. Aug 64 - leave

d. Sept 64 to Apr 65 - in Hqs - ODIBEX cover

e. 26 Apr 65 to 15 Apr 66 - JMOCEAN

3. Subject was instructed in the event he ever seeks employment with ODYOKE he should contact the Station for guidance as to what he will show as his former ODYOKE employment.

4. Under separate cover there is being forwarded to Headquarters a copy of the resume that [redacted] is submitting in seeking employment with private industry. This resume was written by [redacted] and it was concurred in by Chief/Finance and Chief/Cover of JMWAVE.

Attachment: 1 (Resume)
Under Separate Cover

Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:
3 - WH w/att u/s/c
2 - KUVEST w/att u/s/c

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
20 Apr 66

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 26 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-~~15989~~ 16012

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT

SUBSEQUENT TO GRADUATION FROM CENTRAL CITY BUSINESS INSTITUTE

32

March 1957 to May 1960 U.S. Army Element, (Composite Operations Group
Room 1B945,) The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
Salary: $6,000.

Review vouchers and determine cost center and object class.

Maintain special payrolls and related accounts and resolve problems relating to leave, retirement, taxes, etc. and correlate payroll function with other departments.

Assist in the installation of and supervision of posting machine operation to maintain allotment ledger. Maintain Miscellaneous Obligation Record and supervise posting clerks. Monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annual Summary of Allotment Accounts preparation and other related statements. Maintain Expenditure Distribution Ledger and balance with IBM run.

Police certain Appropriation, Fund and Limitation Accounts.

Assist in the preparation of budgets, summaries and reports.

32

May 1960 to July 1964 U.S. Army Element, (Composite Operations Group)
assigned to (Composite Analysis Group,) 32
10 (Tokyo, Japan)
Salary: $6,500.

Maintain and pay special payroll and prepare reports, surveys and summaries.

Control and responsibility for funds in the high six figures. Monthly disbursements in the high six figures to revolving funds, Supervision and audit of revolving funds and accounting vouchers, Monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annual statements, summaries and reports of revolving funds.

Control and responsibility for transfers of funds and foreign currency and maintenance of conversion accounts.

11

Supervise and perform financial negotiations with (Japanese) businessmen.

(Continued)

5|rJ

September 1964 to April 1965

U.S. Army Element, (Composite Operations Group Room 1B945) 32
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
Salary: $6,890

Perform audit of several special payrolls. Assist in the pilot study and installation of a new payroll system.

Assist various branches in problems relating to the conversion to computer bookkeeping.

Assist in the balancing of the General Ledger accounts in connection with the year-end closing of the books.

May 1965 to Present

The (Melmar Corporation) 24
Miami, Florida
Payroll Officer
Salary: $8,000.

Reorganize the payroll office and assume responsibility for the schedule and accuracy of payrolls. Instruct, direct and assist clerks in compiling, computing and preparation of payrolls. Prepare checks for distribution. Investigate and settle disputes regarding alleged errors in pay checks. Audit payroll summaries, bank balances and labor distribution records, etc. Prepare quarterly and annual tax report forms, wage reports and surveys. Correlate payroll function with other departments.

S-E-C-R-E-T

18 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Clearance Branch/Office of Security

FROM : Chief, Contract Personnel Division/Office of Personn

SUBJECT : Full Clearance Requests on WH/C/JMWAVE Staff Agents Converting to Staff Employee Status

It is requested that full clearances be granted the following staff employees converting from staff agent status and remaining with WH/C/JMWAVE.

Name (T)	Security #	Date of Birth
Arnett, Charles L. 03	60831	09/13/14
Carr, Donald W. 03	194478	09/29/42
Chapple, Earl W. 03	101535	10/25/19
Engman, Gladys E. 03	70805	05/29/25
Leahy, John J., Jr. 03	72733	06/04/23
Wages, Dan S. 03	62797	07/08/24
Walls, Helene C. 03	103691	06/14/29
Watkins, William A., Jr. 03	189185	06/29/29
Weimer, Edwin Q. 03	139714	09/18/30
Wilcott, James B., Jr.	109301	09/27/31
Wisniowski, Anthony S.	48802	06/08/08
Wisniowski, Bess A.	49871	12/26/08
Wynn, Marea R. 03	32719	07/09/09
Yothers, Charles D. 03	130499	08/07/29

Joseph B. Ragan
JOSEPH B. RAGAN

Clearance Memo to SA Branch/CPD
Attn: Jo Ann Varney
5 E 69

S-E-C-R-E-T

I. ENTRY INTO DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

A. BACKGROUND

Five men were arrested by the Washington Metropolitan Police at 2:10 a.m. on 17 June 1972, after having been discovered breaking into the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate in Washington, D.C. The five men had cameras and rather sophisticated bugging equipment. Although the suspects initially used aliases during the police interrogation, they were identified as Messrs. James Walter McCord, Jr.; Bernard L. Barker; Frank Anthony Sturgis; Eugenio Rolando Martinez Careaga; and Virgilio Ramon Gonzales-Rosabel. The Watergate incident has continued to receive extensive publicity, and there is suspicion that a sixth person was directly involved in the illegal entry.

B. PRIMARY FIGURES

1. James Walter McCord, Jr.

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., a former Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, served as a Staff Employee of the Agency from 22 August 1951 until his retirement on 31 August 1970. At the time of his retirement, he was a GS-15, Security Officer. He has since set up his private investigative organization known as McCord Associates, and in early 1972, he was named Security Coordinator for the National Committee for the Re-election of President Nixon.

2. Bernard L. Barker

Mr. Bernard L. Barker, a former Captain in the U.S. Air Force, was born in Cuba of American-born parents, and he began cooperating with the Agency in 1959. He was hired on a contract basis in April 1960, and was used primarily to report on Cuban exile activities. Mr. Barker was terminated by the Agency on 31 July 1966, to accept employment in private industry.

3. Frank Anthony Sturgis

Mr. Frank Anthony Sturgis, who has used numerous aliases, formerly served in the U. S. Marine Corps and the U. S. Army in the 1940's. As of 1959, Mr. Sturgis was a Captain in the Cuban Army, but later became disillusioned with Castro, became a soldier of fortune, and in 1961 headed an organization called the International Anticommunist Brigade, which he claimed had 5,000 members. Mr. Sturgis was never recruited by the Agency, but has been associated with Mr. Eugenio Rolando Martinez Careaga, an Agency contact since the 1960's.

4. Eugenio Rolando Martinez Careaga

Mr. Eugenio Rolando Martinez Careaga, an American citizen of Cuban birth, was recruited by the Agency in 1961. The project to which he was assigned was terminated in 1969, and he has since been on a part-time retainer to report on the Cuban exile community, receiving $100.00 a month. Prior to 1969, he received $8,100.00 per year for his full-time operational activity. It is to be noted that Mr. Martinez is a real estate partner of Mr. Bernard L. Barker.

5. Virgilio Ramon Gonzales-Rosabel

Mr. Virgilio Ramon Gonzales-Rosabel, who has used various aliases, is not on record in WH Division/DDP, or any other component of the Agency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been advised that the Central Intelligence Agency has no record of Mr. Gonzales-Rosabel.

C. THE WHITE HOUSE

Everette Howard Hunt, Jr.

Mr. Everette Howard Hunt, Jr., a former War Correspondent and free lance writer, was previously affiliated with the Office of Strategic Services, and he was employed as an Agency Staff

Employee from 8 November 1949 until his retirement on 30 April 1970, when he commenced private employment with Robert R. Mullen and Company, a firm which has been utilized by the Agency for cover purposes. A news article of July 1971 indicated that Mr. Hunt joined the White House Staff as a Consultant to President Nixon preparatory to the President's visit to the Peoples Republic of China. Much of the recent publicity in the case has focused on Mr. Hunt, who was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 17 June 1972. He admitted that he had written a check to Mr. McCord but invoked his Constitutional rights on all other questions.

On the White House issue, previous reference was made to the employment of Mr. James W. McCord by the Committee for the Re-election of President Nixon.

D. CURRENT AGENCY STAFF EMPLOYEES

1. James Corbin Fitchett

James Corbin Fitchett entered on duty with the Agency in early 1952, and is currently a GS-13, Security Officer. His wife, Kathryn Fitchett, is also an Office of Security employee. Scheduled to retire from the Agency on 30 June 1972, Mr. Fitchett made it known to Mr. McCord in May 1972, that he would be available to work with the Committee for the Re-election of President Nixon, and he was offered a position as a paid Security Officer. Mr. McCord initially wanted to utilize him as of 15 June 1972, but Mr. Fitchett requested a polygraph interview to substantiate his claim that he was not involved in the Watergate incident. Polygraph testing on 20 June 1972, was completely favorable.

2. Ralph Orlando True

Ralph Orlando True entered on duty with the Agency on 1 December 1950, and is currently a GS-15, Security Officer. Scheduled to retire from the Agency on

14-00000

SECRET

EYES ONLY

30 June 1972, Mr. True planned on assuming a position with McCord Associates or an affiliate security unit. It has been established that Mr. True was in Mr. McCord's office at the Committee for the Re-election of President Nixon on 16 June 1972, the day before the Watergate incident. Mr. True denies any direct involvement in the case.

03

3. (Donald Read Heath, Jr.)

03

(Donald Read Heath, Jr.) entered on duty with the Agency in mid-1952, and is currently a GS-14, Operations Officer assigned to WH Division/DDP. He has been acquainted with Mr. Everette Howard Hunt, Jr., through the years, and he developed an acquaintance with Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., at Montgomery Community College in the fall of 1971, when Mr. McCord was teaching an industrial security course at the educational institution. Mr. 03 (Heath's) association with Mr. McCord developed through his interest in a young Chilean protege, Juan Rigoberto RUIZ Villegas, who formerly worked 24 as an (Agency operational asset in Santiago, Chile.) It is to be noted that Mr. (Heath) 03 arranged for Juan RUIZ Villegas to acquire an office position at McCord Associates while the young Chilean continued to live in Mr. (Heath's) 03 home, drive Mr. (Heath's) 03 vehicle, and attend school.

4. Harry Thayer Mahoney

Harry Thayer Mahoney entered on duty with the Agency on 30 March 1951, and is currently a GS-14, Operations Officer assigned to WH Division/DDP. Scheduled to retire from the Agency on 30 June 1972, Mr. Mahoney, a former polygraph examiner in the Office of Security, is acquainted with Messrs. Ralph O. True and Everette Howard Hunt, Jr. The Office of Personnel Outplacement Assistance Branch referred Mr. Mahoney to Mr. McCord and he was interviewed for a position at his offices for the Committee for the Re-election of President Nixon, or or about 10 May 1972. Mr. Mahoney was offered a position with McCord Associates.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

7 [illegible]

McCord Associates has an approved job resume, but Mr. Mahoney has made no decision on taking the McCord offer.

E. FORMER AGENCY STAFF EMPLOYEES

1. Therese Mae Shea

Mrs. Therese Mae Shea served as a GS-07, Staff Employee of the Agency from 15 June 1948 until her resignation from maternity leave on 20 April 1956. Her husband, William Francis Shea, was also with the Agency until February 1971. Mrs. Shea has been working as a secretary to Mr. James W. McCord at McCord Associates in Rockville, Maryland, and she quite naturally has extensive knowledge of Agency contacts with the private investigative firm. She knows Mr. Donald Read Heath, Jr., and is aware of his ties with Juan Rigoberto RUIZ Villegas. 03

2. Dr. Edward Mansfield Gunn

Dr. Edward M. Gunn served with the Agency from 13 June 1955 until 31 May 1971, and he was a GS-17, Deputy Director of Medical Services, at the time of his retirement. Dr. Gunn was interviewed by an Office of Security representative on 19 June 1972, and discussed in some detail his involvement with the Institute for Protection and Safety Studies, Incorporated, which is affiliated with McCord Associates and occupies space in the same offices. Dr. Gunn last had direct personal contact with Mr. McCord on 21 April 1972, and he denies having any knowledge of the Watergate incident.

3. Dr. Jacob Victor Golder

Dr. Jacob V. Golder, a former OSS employee, served with the Agency from 3 January 1955 until 16 April 1971, and he was a GS-15, Chief of Psychological Services Staff/Office of Medical Services, at the time of

1172

his retirement. He is still being utilized by the Agency on a contract basis at the SECRET level. Dr. Golder has not yet been interviewed (as of 23 June 1972) but indications are that his ties to Mr. McCord are similar to those of Dr. Gunn mainly through his participation as a Consultant-Instructor at the Institute for Protection and Safety Studies, Incorporated.

4. William Francis Shea

William F. Shea served with the Agency from July 1951 until February 1971, and was a GS-14, Intelligence Officer with the Office of Strategic Research, DDI at the time of his resignation. He had (unsatisfactory fitness reports); resigned in lieu of termination; and may not be too favorably disposed towards the Agency. As previously indicated, his wife, Therese Mae Shea, works as a secretary at McCord Associates. /The Office of Personnel referred Mr. Shea to McCord Associates in 1971, and Dr. Edward M. Gunn indicated that Mr. Shea is affiliated with the Institute for Protection and Safety Studies, Inc.

5. Walter Edward Brayden

Walter Edward Brayden served with the Agency from 2 February 1948 until 31 October 1969, and was a GS-13, Intelligence Officer, assigned to Operational Services/Central Cover Staff/DDP, at the time of his retirement. Mr. Brayden was interviewed by an Office of Security representative on 20 June 1972, when he indicated that he has been employed by McCord Associates in minor security duties during the last few months. In April 1972, he served as a guard for Mrs. Martha Mitchell on a trip to Chicago, and he expected to work on a security survey of the Hotel Fontainbleau in Miami in late June 1972.

EYES ONLY

6. George Theodore Stanton

George Theodore Stanton served with the Agency from 4 August 1947 to 8 January 1972, and was a GS-14, Operations Officer, assigned to the Counter Intelligence Staff/DDP, at the time of his retirement. Dr. Edward M. Gunn indicated that Mr. Stanton has been serving as a Consultant to the Institute for Protection of Safety Studies, Incorporated.

7. Louis Edgar Sherrard

Louis Edgar Sherrard served with the Agency from 2 July 1952 until 31 January 1969, when he resigned. At the time of his resignation, he was a GS-13, Security Officer assigned to the Security Research Staff. Mr. Sherrard's employment background centers on industrial and physical security, and he resigned from the Agency with the stated intention of taking a position with Bestline Products, Incorporated, of San Jose, California. There have been recent "rumors" that Mr. Sherrard is in some way affiliated with McCord Associates, but there are no specifics on this.

8. Ross Ward Lambert

Ross Ward Lambert, a former OSS employee, served with the Agency from 11 January 1965 to 9 August 1971, and was a GS-13, Contract Employee assigned to the Special Operations Division/DDP, at the time of his resignation. Mr. Lambert served extensively in Far East Division overseas posts, and there was a previous security interest in the case because of his daughter's involvement in activities of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The Office of Personnel referred Mr. Lambert to McCord Associates but he took a job elsewhere.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

9. James Louis Baker

James Louis Baker served with the Agency from 2 July 1952 until 24 June 1972, when his contract was allowed to expire. Mr. Baker, a GS-12, Operations Officer assigned to Special Operations Division/DDP, was in Saigon, South Vietnam, from April 1968 until 24 July 1971, when he was returned to Headquarters because of serious marital 99 and related medical problems involving his wife. Divorce proceedings continued through early 1972, and his case has been monitored by the Office of Personnel. Subject was referred to McCord Associates by the Office of Personnel, but he acquired a position with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to be effective as of 26 June 1972. His application may possibly be on file at McCord Associates.

F. OTHER CIA CONNECTIONS

1. Robert Foster Bennett

Robert Foster Bennett, son of U. S. Senator Wallace Bennett of Utah, is Director and Executive Vice-President of Robert R. Mullen and Company, which has been utilized by the Agency for commercial cover purposes. Mr. Bennett has been interviewed by members of the news media because of intense interest in Mr. Everette Howard Hunt, Jr., a former Agency Staff Employee working for the same firm. A Covert Security Approval was issued on 19 March 1971 for Mr. Bennett's use in providing cover for an Agency overseas asset. The Executive Director-Comptroller and the Director of Central Intelligence were advised at the time of the approval.

2. Juan Rigoberto RUIZ Villegas

Juan Rigoberto RUIZ Villegas was hired by Mr. 03 Donald R. Heath, Jr. as a Covert Asset in 11 16-23 Santiago, Chile and continued to be used in Chile from June 1969 to June 1971. RUIZ came to the United States in August 1971, became something of 03 a Heath protege, and resided in Mr. Heath's 03 home from 19 August 1971 to 21 April 1972. RUIZ attended Montgomery Community College, became acquainted with Mr. James W. McCord at that educational institution, and later acquired temporary (and illegal) employment at McCord 03 Associates as a sort of caretaker. Mr. Heath also assisted Mr. McCord in arranging for the payment of RUIZ, a Chilean National, and Mr. Heath at one point got RUIZ a part-time job with Mr. Glenn 03 I. Sedam, Head of the District of Columbia Committee to Re-elect Richard Nixon.

G. COVER ORGANIZATIONS

1. Robert R. Mullen and Company

Robert R. Mullen and Company has been utilized by the Central Cover Staff since 1963, and since that time a total of eight people of the Mullen Company have been cleared or made witting of Agency ties. Mr. Mullen has provided sensitive cover support overseas for Agency employees and he was instrumental in the formation of the Cuban Freedom Committee. Mr. Edward Naeher, Mullen's Bookkeeper and Accountant, is a retired CIA Finance Officer. As of 1 May 1970, Mr. Everette Howard Hunt, Jr., who had just retired from the Agency, became a legitimate employee of Mr. Mullen. He is aware of at least two present cover placements under Robert R. Mullen and Company. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was informed of this Agency connection by memorandum dated 21 June 1972.

7/N

SECRET

EYES ONLY

2. Interprogres

Interprogres is a new subsidiary of the Mullen Company formed in 1971, as a result of contacts developed at the Zagreb Trade Fair in Yugoslavia. It is a pilot operation aimed at expanding East-West commercial relationships. At least two 24 (Agency overseas assets) have tangential tasks of promoting the acceptance of this company as a Mullen subsidiary. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised of the Agency connection by memorandum dated 21 June 1972, which covered Robert R. Mullen and Company.

3. General Foods Corporation

General Foods Corporation, headquartered in the White Plains, New York area, is a client of Robert R. Mullen and Company. The General Foods 24 Corporation is providing cover support to (two Agency assets overseas.) Over the years, because of personnel changes, sixteen officials have been cleared on certain aspects of our interests, but they have not been informed of our use of Robert R. Mullen and Company. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was informed of our (Agency ties) 24 to the General Foods Corporation by memorandum dated 21 June 1972.

H. RELATED AGENCY CHECKS

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and/or the news media have mentioned the following individuals or organizations in the course of the investigation of the Watergate incident. Agency records are either negative or contain no information directly pertinent to the Watergate incident:

1. Association of National Advertisers

Association of National Advertisers was mentioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as having offices with Robert R. Mullen and Company. The Bureau was advised "no record".

EYES ONLY

SECRET

3/12/

2. "CIF"

"CIF", without further details, was mentioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as having offices with Robert R. Mullen and Company. The Bureau was advised "no record" on the basis of available information.

3. Ameritas, Incorporated

Ameritas, Incorporated is said to be a Florida real estate firm and several individuals listed employment with this organization when registering at the Watergate. The Bureau was advised "no record".

4. George Leonard

George Leonard, 1601 Washington Avenue, Kansas City, Kansas, registered at the Watergate. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised "not identifiable".

5. Edward Warner

Edward Warner, 143 West 73rd Street, New York City, New York, registered at the Watergate. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised "not identifiable". The Federal Bureau of Investigation later listed the person as Edward L. Warren, of the same address, and we advised "no record". The press has speculated that "E. Warren" may be an alias of Mr. James W. McCord.

6. Paul Jose Piedra

Paul Jose Piedra registered at the Watergate. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised "no record".

7. Joe Granada

Joe Granada registered at the Watergate. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised "no record".

8. Michael Douglas Caddy

Michael Douglas Caddy (aka: Douglas Caddy) is a lawyer with an office at 1250 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. He is mentioned in the press as an attorney who was called into the case by the wife of Mr. Bernard L. Barker, one of the primary figures in the Watergate incident.

On 21 June 1972, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised that Caddy has never been employed by or associated with the Agency in any capacity.

9. McCord Associates

No Agency file reference located on McCord Associates.

10. Institute for Protection and Safety Studies, Inc.

Institute for Protection and Safety Studies, Inc. is affiliated indirectly with McCord Associates and has offices at the same Rockville, Maryland address.

11. Joseph A. Rafferty, Jr.

Joseph A. Rafferty, Jr., a trial lawyer who was called into the case by Mr. Barker's attorney, Douglas Caddy. No record.

12. Miguel A. Suarez

Miguel A. Suarez is mentioned in the press as a Cuban exile and lawyer and one of the "links to the Republican Party". He was listed by the press as a self-styled "Nixonian" who represented Florida's Cuban community in dealing with former GOP Governor Claude R. Kirk, Jr. He is listed as having an office with Mr. Barker at 955 First Street, Southwest, Miami, Florida, and is said to be a business partner of Mr. Barker. Allegedly the Federal Bureau of Investigation planned on interviewing him. He was of Agency interest between 1960 and 1965 in connection with propaganda activities aimed toward Cuba.

SECRET

EYES ONLY

13. Marie-Elene Barker Moffett

Marie-Elene Barker Moffett is mentioned in the press as the daughter of Mr. Bernard L. Barker. Thought was given to releasing Mr. Barker to her custody. No record.

14. Alberto Carricarte

Alberto Carricarte is mentioned in the press as the law partner of Miguel A. Suarez and Secretary of Ameritas, Incorporated. No record.

15. All State Investment Fund, S.A.

All State Investment Fund, S.A., is mentioned in the press as the parent company of Ameritas, Incorporated. It reportedly was established in Panama by Miguel A. Suarez to engage in real estate investment activities in the Caribbean area. No record

I. BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARIES

Complete biographic summaries have been prepared on those current Staff Employees, former Staff Employees, and Contract Personnel who were in any way connected with the Watergate incident, McCord Associates, the Institute for Protection and Safety Studies, Inc., or cover organizations.

J. ADDENDUM

Mr. Ralph Orlando True was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 23 June 1972, and he furnished a statement covering his association with Mr. James W. McCord and possible future employment by McCord Associates. The Bureau was following up on Mr. True's Agency telephone extension.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

6 July 1972

I 6 34, Tab 4

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : Information Provided the Federal Bureau of Investigation Regarding the Watergate Incident

1. As a result of our conversation of 5 July, I would like to summarize the information which has been provided to you by the Agency in memorandum form (attention Mr. Arnold Parham) since the first series of memoranda on the subject beginning 20 June.

2. On 20 June separate memorandums were sent to you concerning Messrs. Frank Anthony Sturgis, Eugenio Rolando Martinez Careaga, Bernard L. Barker and Virgilio Gonzales. The papers detailed available information on the subjects. We said that Mr. Frank Anthony Sturgis had never been recruited by the Agency, that he was a soldier of fortune but that he had been associated with an Agency contact, Mr. Eugenio Rolando Martinez Careaga, since the early sixties. Their relationship was built on a mutual interest in Cuban exile activities. Mr. Martinez was recruited in January 1961 and has performed a variety of tasks for the Agency on Cuban matters up until June of this year. He has been on a $100.00 a month retainer since 1969. Mr. Martinez is a business associate of Mr. Bernard Barker in a real estate firm in Miami. Mr. Barker was a regular contact of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Cuba when turned over to the Agency in mid-1959. He was used as a source of information in Cuba until evacuated in early 1960. He was hired by the Agency in 1960 for work among exile groups and was terminated by the Agency on 31 July 1966. No Agency contact has been maintained with him since that date. A thorough investigation of our files at Headquarters and by our Station in Miami has failed to turn up any information regarding Mr. Gonzales' connection with any Agency personnel or Agency-sponsored activities.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)

1 4

3. In two memoranda on 21 June we informed you of our relationship with the Robert R. Mullen Company and the General Foods Corporation. The utilization of the Robert R. Mullen Company dates back to June 1963. Mr. Mullen has provided certain sensitive cover support overseas for Agency employees. In addition, Mr. Mullen was involved in the formation of the Cuban Freedom Committee -- an activity terminated several years ago. As of 1 May 1970 Mr. Everette Howard Hunt, who had just retired from the Agency, became a legitimate employee of Mr. Mullen. In July 1971 Mr. Hunt informed the Agency he had been assigned to the White House Staff but continued to devote part of his time to the Mullen Company. The General Foods Corporation is a client of the Mullen Company. (General Foods is providing certain cover 24 support to two Agency assets overseas.) Over the years sixteen officials of General Foods have been cleared on certain aspects of our interests. They have not been informed of our use of the Robert R. Mullen Company. Also on 21 June, in response to a verbal request of 20 June, we informed you that a check of our records disclosed no record of Agency involvement with the Association of National Advertisers or the words "CIF".

[illegible]

4. In a separate memorandum on 21 June we advised you that a review of the duties and assignments of Mr. James McCord provided no indication that he was involved in Cuban matters and that he was not assigned to the Bay of Pigs operation. We stated, however, that he might have developed personal acquaintances which are not recorded in official personnel and security records. We have no information regarding Mr. McCord's activities with Cuban exiles since his retirement. We indicated in the same memorandum that as an Agency employee, Mr. Hunt was involved in operational activities relating to Latin American countries and was known to have had some ties to Mr. Barker. In a separate memorandum of 27 June regarding Mr. Hunt, we informed you about the issuance of the alias, Edward V. Hamilton, to Mr. Hunt on 30 September 1960. This alias was subsequently used by Mr. Hunt for several drivers licenses. We provided additional information on this subject in a memorandum of 5 July and also reported that there is no information in our files to the effect that Mr. Hunt was issued a Social Security Card or Insurance Policy bearing the name Edward J. or Edward Joseph Hamilton.

[illegible]

GPN

5. Further, a memorandum was sent to you on 27 June regarding peripheral Agency contact with an ex-employee of Mr. James McCord, one Mr. Juan Rigoberto Ruiz Villegas. Mr. Ruiz was used by this Agency as a translator during the period June 1969 to June 1971. He has had no affiliation with the Agency since that time other than a personal relationship with a current Agency employee. One additional memorandum was provided you on 5 July regarding a Mr. Ross Ward Lambert who worked for the Agency as a Contract Employee from January 1965 until his retirement on 9 August 1971. Our Office of Personnel referred Mr. Lambert to McCord Associates for employment upon retirement. He submitted a formal application but decided to accept employment elsewhere.

6. In addition to the above cited memoranda and several lesser items of information provided telephonically to Mr. Arnold L. Parham of your Alexandria office, the Director of Central Intelligence informed you orally on 27 June regarding information available to us on Mr. Manuel Ogarrio Daguerre, a Mexican national who has offices located in the same building as the Banco Internacional of Mexico City. In short, Mr. Manuel Ogarrio Daguerre has not had any operational contacts with this Agency. On 28 June the Director of Central Intelligence also informed you orally regarding our information concerning Mr. Kenneth Harry Dahlberg. The last recorded contact of the Agency with Mr. Dahlberg was in May 1961.

7. Our Office of Security is in frequent contact with members of your staff in connection with the investigations you are conducting. The above information is for your use only and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau.

Vernon A. Walters
Lieutenant General U.S.A.
Acting Director

Question 8

HOW MUCH MONEY IS IN THE BUDGET FOR PAYMENT TO CONTRACT EMPLOYEES? SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAD RELATIONSHIP TO THE CIA AND WHO WERE INVOLVED IN THE WATERGATE BURGLARY WERE SAID TO BE CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. IS THIS THE CASE? TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE SAME CONTROLS PLACED ON YOUR CONTRACT EMPLOYEES AS ARE PLACED ON REGULAR STAFF EMPLOYEES?

Proposed Reply

24

The CIA budget for 1975 includes $279.5 million for the salaries and benefits of 14,000 staff employees (end-of-year ceiling) and $32.6 million for the same expenses for 2,348 contract employees.

24 24

With respect to the relationship to the CIA of the seven individuals involved in the Watergate burglary, one of them at the time of the break-in was a part-time contract employee (Martinez), one was a former full-time contract employee (Barker), two were retired staff employees (Hunt and McCord). The remaining individuals (Liddy, Sturgis and Gonzalez) were never connected with CIA in any capacity. (See attached sheet for details on these seven individuals). [These facts have been set forth previously in the testimony of ____________ before ____________ and we believe members of the Appropriations Committee are fully aware of all significant developments in this area.]

Not all contract employees have the same type of contract. Some are subject to all the controls that are placed on regular staff employees. Others, however, are employed for a specific purpose, generally limited in time, for the use of their talents and/or disciplines in meeting a particular need of the Agency, and these are not all subject to all the controls which apply to full-time staff employees. Both Barker and Martinez were in this latter category of contract employees. The obligations of such contract employees are as stated in their contracts.

4/pd / 6

Question 28

MR. DIRECTOR, WHEN YOU WERE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE LAST YEAR WE ASKED YOU TO OUTLINE FOR US THE PARTICIPATION IN THE WATERGATE BURGLARY AND THE SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT TO COVER UP WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT IN THAT BURGLARY AND YOU DID SO VERY WELL. HAS ANYTHING BEEN UNCOVERED IN THE YEAR SINCE YOU WERE HERE IN THIS AREA. HAS ANY FURTHER PARTICIPATION BY CIA PERSONNEL BEEN REVEALED.

Proposed Reply

A brief answer to this question is that there have been major developments regarding allegations of CIA participation in the Watergate burglary and the subsequent attempt to cover up White House involvement. However, as the definition of Watergate has been expanded to include other matters we have continued our rigorous attempts within the Agency to learn everything possible about any Agency personnel associations and correspondence on these developments. In line with this the following actions have been or are being taken.

a. Senator Baker's continuing requests for record searchs and files are being pursued.

b. Testimony of Agency personnel before the Senate Select Committee has been completed.

c. Requests for Agency documents and files for the Office of the Special Prosecutor are continuing to be supplied.

d. Requests for Agency documents and files for the Special Counsel of the Impeachment Committee are being honored.

Our search has not revealed the participation of any CIA personnel not previously identified.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Building Security Branch

FROM : Joseph K. Moore & Joe C. Liggett 03

SUBJECT : Tour of Duty Report 0900 - 1700 Hours

1. 0900 - Entered on duty. Reviewed the current OSDO instructions and the previous Tour of Duty Reports.

2. 0900 - Agency Operator transferred to the OSDO a call from Nick Horrack, Newsweek Magazine wishing contact with the DCI/SA. Contacted Mr. Thuermer's residence and was advised to have Horrack call Thuermer at home. JCL

3. 0900 - Gordon Woll 03 CCS, requested and received home telephone number of 03 Hugh Ennis SB. CES

4. 0904 - Dr. Cameron, MED/DO, requested and received the home telephone number of Marvin N. Flaherty, 03 COM. JCL

5. 0908 - Dr. Cameron, MED/DO, advised he can be reached via Pageboy #134, until further notice. JCL

6. 0930 - Mr. Carter, GSA Engineer, advised that one of the bay doors at the South Loading Dock is malfunctioning. Efforts to contact Mr. Harrington, Building Manager, and/or an elevator mechanic met with negative results. OSDO directed Mr. Carter to close the door by any means and to secure it. JKM JCL

7. 1010 - REFERENCE ITEM #6 ABOVE- Mr Carter advised that the bay door had been closed mannually and secured. Request Monday day shift advise GSA Building Manager. JKM

8. 1038 - 03 Mike Lander, Safety/DO, advised he may be reached via Unit #68 or his home phone the remainder of the weekend. JCL

9. 1045 - Mr. James Bennett, 06 spouse of Donna Bennett, 03 OSR, called through the Agency Operator and requested assistance in contacting his wife, who is working overtime in the building. SDO contacted Mrs. Bennett 03 who advised she would call her husband. JKM

10. 1050 - 03 Bert Griffen, FE, requested and received the home telephone number for Jim Londergan, 03 OS. JKM

CONFIDENTIAL

E2IMPDET-CL-BY-017504

Administrative - Internal Use Only

34647

SECRET

11 May 1960
File K-4849

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE

ATTENTION : Mr. (Thomas A. Olsen) 03

SUBJECT : VITALE, Guy, nmi
Establishment of Official Cover Backstop

REFERENCE : Request for Domestic Cover 2 May 1960

1. In compliance with above reference, official cover backstopping which utilizes the U. S. Army Element, Joint Operations Group has been established for the above-named individual. All information concerning this cover arrangement is available in the Official Cover and Liaison Section, CCD.

2. It is requested that OCL/CCD be notified when this cover arrangement is no longer required. Any changes in the Subject's Headquarters status should be coordinated with this office for the determination of need for continued documentation and cover.

3. Subject has been issued Unit ID Card No. 1205 for domestic use only. In accordance with arrangements made with Offices of Security and Personnel, the above documentation will be picked up by a CPB representative for any individual making a PCS move from Headquarters or an overseas TDY trip. In the case of the PCS traveler, CPB will return this documentation to OCL/CCD for disposition. For the TDY traveler, this documentation will be retained by CPB and returned to the TDY traveler upon completion of the trip. In the event of a resignation from the Agency, OCL/CCD will obtain the documentation from the employee at the time of the employee's debriefing conference.

/S/ PAUL P. STEWART

JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCD

cc: Personnel Security Division,
Office of Security

13402

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HKH-A-5353
TO Chief, KURIOT INFO Chief, WHD		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. UNKNOWN
FROM Chief of Station, Habana		DATE 31 July 59
SUBJECT Operational Transmittal of Blank Documentation		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED None.		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S) DIR-36520 (KYBAT)

1. Transmitted herewith as attachment No. 1 for KURIOT are the following blank documents which were not used or required for the Station Habana E/E Operation referred to in referenced cable. The KURIOT Document Specialist requested that the documents be returned to Headquarters.

10, 31

a. 10 City of Newark, New Jersey Birth Certificate.
b. New York Driver's License (instruction sheet).
c. 31 National Geographic Travel Film Series blank Identity Card.
d. "The Flamingo Hotel" Identity Card.
e. A blank Social Security card.

31

2. The following is also transmitted herewith as attachment No. 2:

31

a. Cachet of the Department of Labor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with ink pad.

b. Assorted cellophane sheets used for lamination.

Stanley R. Zaska

Attachments:
2 ~~envelopes.~~

Distribution:
3 - KURIOT w/atts.
1 - C/WHD w/o atts.
2 - Files

29 July 59
SRZ/cbd

HKH-A-5353

D[illegible]SITIZED

5/1N

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/~~KYBAT~~	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1

[illegible]

[illegible]

Headquarters traces

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA-24799

1. Headquarters traces on the Subjects of reference and the Hudson Institute follow:

A. Alberto LLERAS Camargo (201-102576) was born in Bogota, 3 July 1906. He left school at the age of seventeen to become a journalist. He traveled to Argentina and lived in Buenos Aires for three years (1926-29) writing for various Argentine periodicals. His political career began upon his return to Colombia in 1929, when he was appointed secretary of the Liberal Party (1930-33) and received tremendous impetus under the aegis of Alfonso LOPEZ, Liberal Party leader and former President of Colombia (1934-38 and 1942-45). Subsequently, LLERAS served in the National House of Representatives (1931-34). When Alfonso LOPEZ was inaugurated President in 1934, he took LLERAS into his government as Secretary General of the Presidency (1934-35), and later made him Minister of Government from 1943 to 1945. The latter year he was made Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as First Vice President of Colombia. His public service culminated then in his accession to the Presidency on the resignation of President LOPEZ in 1945. After discharging the duties of Chief Executive for a year (1945-46), LLERAS was elected Secretary General of the Pan American Union in 1947, a post which he held until 1954. He then resigned and returned to Colombia to accept the position of Rector (President) of the University of The Andes (1955-56). Devoting himself once again to politics, LLERAS began writing a column in the Liberal Daily _El Espectador_. In his columns he strongly criticized the Rojas regime (1953-57) and called for the return of constitutional government in Colombia. In March 1956, he was elected President of the Liberal Party and shortly thereafter (June 1956) travelled to Spain and had conversations with Laureano GOMEZ, a leader of the Conservative Party and former President of Colombia (1950-53). These two political leaders signed a manifesto condemning the Rojas regime and

(CONTINUED)

[illegible] UFGW-6130

201-102576 SECRET 201-308736

1 - WH/C/RR/OS
1 - WH/C/MSDC
1 - 201-308736

WH/C/RR/OS W. Ullery rat 22 Aug 66 2621

WH/C/RR

WH/C/MO R. Ortman (phone)

WH/C/CA/PP A. Gonzales (draft)

C/WH/C Thomas J. Flores

[illegible] for the establishment of a coalition government in Colombia through bi-partisan efforts. From November 1956 to February 1957 LLERAS served as a United Nations Observer to investigate the Hungarian situation.

LLERAS is described as a champion of the Pan American cause and as being very friendly to the United States and a firm believer in the Western type democracy.

Although he did not complete his education and has no formal degree, he has long been addressed as "doctor" as a matter of courtesy. He does, however, have honorary degrees from several Colombian universities as well as from the University of California. He speaks English and French, is married to the former Berta PUGA (daughter of a late President of Chile) and has four children.

On 24 February 1958 an Operational Approval was granted for the utilization of LLERAS in supporting a special operation. However, before the operation was implemented, LLERAS was elected President of Colombia. There has been no operational interest in him since.

B. There are no Headquarters or LNERGO traces on the Rodman Institute per se, however, LNERGO files contain derogatory information on several members of the institute which LNERGO will furnish WOFACT if we specify which of the members are of interest. If JMWAVE wishes this done, please advise on which of the members information is requested.

C. There are no identifiable traces on the other subjects of paragraph 5 of reference.

2. Headquarters defers to JMWAVE regarding AMBASK/1's future association with the institute.

HOWARD R. COLLEARY

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COS, JMWAVE

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2	Anne - pls note Paul's		
3	Comments. When we		
4	[redacted] get Paul's firm		
5	date for travel to Puerto Rico		
6	will you follow this up with Ed. S.		

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

Paul - due to
go to P.R. 1st week
of Feb. - Stanulis
notify him to send
& ask
the [illegible] of introduction.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

23 December 1966

Tom:

I'm not overly enthusiastic about the possibilities of getting much from SKEWEF-1; however, I would like to meet him and chat about his friends and business associates in the W/L Islands. He possibly might be used as an entree to reporting or support assets.

It would be my openion that we would not have to bring his clearance up to date to chat with him.

Paul

I've not made any notes from the files; therefore, if Ed agrees to helping us, details should be forwarded to me prior to my departure for San Juan.

201 SKEWER 1 ✓

Record on SA cards

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DOCO/SA

ATTENTION : Gale W. Allen

[redacted]

SUBJECT : FERRE, Luis Albert
#215 627

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 5 January 1965 which requested a Covert Security Approval be granted Subject for briefing on KUBARK objectives in WUBRINY D and propose long term commercial collaboration of mutual advantage, Project WUBRINY.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a Covert Security Approval is granted for the use of the Subject as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of Covert Security Approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Covert Security Approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-3. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

for R. D. Sparkman

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

30 Dec 1974
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on Ferre (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened __________ OI Code A2.

☒ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3. – Perhaps still some DCD interest – file not clear.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed J. Manger (name) Desk Officer (title) LA/DRH (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed KAM (initials) 6 JAN (date) 1975

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-205712

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

[redacted] 201 SKEWER 1 ✓

Record on
SA cards

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DOCO/SA

[illegible]

ATTENTION : Gale W. Allen

SUBJECT : FERRE, Luis Albert
#215 627

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 5 January 1965 which requested a Covert Security Approval be granted Subject for briefing on KUBARK objectives in WUBRINY D and propose long term commercial collaboration of mutual advantage, Project WUBRINY.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a Covert Security Approval is granted for the use of the Subject as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of Covert Security Approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Covert Security Approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-3. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

for R. D. [illegible]

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Skewer/1 201

26 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Antilles Material Company Limited (AMCO) - Meeting with SKEWER/1 on the Relationship of the Puerto Rican Cement Company to AMCO

1. As agreed in his 11 January 1965 meeting with SKEWER/1, Mr. Edward Stanulis telephoned SKEWER/1 on the morning of 18 January to arrange a meeting with SKEWER/1 at his convenience later in the day. SKEWER/1 suggested a meeting at 1500 hours that afternoon in his office at the Puerto Rican Iron Works in Ponce. He indicated to Mr. Stanulis that the Puerto Rican Cement Company looks with favor on AMCO and is doing business with it through its Manager, Mr. Alvin T. Philpotts, Jr.

2. Prior to the meeting, Messrs. Allen, Carter, and Stanulis reviewed the approach to be made to SKEWER/1 in the light of his favorable view of AMCO. It was agreed that no mention would be made of the fact that AMCO is in poor financial condition or that Mr. Philpotts is inadequate as a manager. Stress would be laid upon assessment of the long-term commercial viability of AMCO because KUBARK is ostensibly interested in placing an officer in a managerial position in AMCO, or some other similar firm, in order to monitor Castro's activities in the Caribbean area.

3. Messrs. Allen, Carter, and Stanulis arrived precisely at 1500 hours at SKEWER's office on the second floor of the Puerto Rican Iron Works. His male secretary asked us to take seats in the corridor outside his office. Within a few minutes his secretary reappeared and asked us to wait in the Conference Room. Some ten minutes later SKEWER/1 appeared and invited us into his private office. He was extremely cordial and gracious. Mr. Stanulis introduced Mr. Allen as a colleague who is assessing AMCO's commercial viability. He introduced Mr. Carter as a lawyer consultant who is obtaining background information in the event KUBARK should decide to proceed with placement of an officer in AMCO.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

4. Mr. Allen informed SKEWER/1 that KUBARK is assessing the factors bearing on the long-term commercial viability of AMCO. He explained that such an assessment is necessary because KUBARK does not want to place an officer in a company which is not commercially viable for the long term. One of the factors bearing on the commercial viability of AMCO is the relationship of the Puerto Rican Cement Company with AMCO and the terms of any agreements. We would also like his views on commodities other than cement which can be shipped from Puerto Rico to the outer islands and what commodities can be shipped on return voyages. Another factor of interest is competition in the shipping field.

5. SKEWER/1 indicated that he needed some clarification of KUBARK objectives. Mr. Stanulis reviewed KUBARK's ostensible interest in having an experienced commercial man in a commercially viable shipping company for the purpose of checking on Castro activities in the Caribbean area. SKEWER/1 assumed that Mr. Philpotts was the man in whom we are interested. Mr. Allen dispelled this assumption explaining that KUBARK has a candidate whom we would like to place in a managerial position in AMCO if it is determined that AMCO is commercially viable. KUBARK would seek to effect this placement through a friend on the Board who, like SKEWER/1, has helped KUBARK in the past and would undoubtedly help again. SKEWER/1 said, "Oh, yes, through the top man in the company." He then asked if Mr. Philpotts would know of KUBARK interest. Mr. Allen replied no, emphasizing that our interest should be closely held.

6. SKEWER/1 said that he had not realized that we wanted so much detail and asked if we desired to talk with the man in his company most familiar with AMCO. Mr. Stanulis declined, emphasizing that we wanted to keep our interest in this matter confined solely to SKEWER/1. SKEWER/1 immediately agreed to make the necessary telephone calls to obtain answers to our questions. As the basis for his inquiry, he would ask about the amount of credit extended by the Puerto Rican Cement Company to AMCO. SKEWER/1 then made a series of telephone calls to one of his subordinates named Tomas and also made one call to his son. The following information was obtained in the above telephone calls:

a. AMCO has 2 or 3 ships under charter and ships primarily cement to Martinque, Guadaloupe, Barbados, and Antigua.

b. The Puerto Rican Cement Company has a verbal agreement with Mr. Philpotts granting him exclusive distribution of cement in Guadaloupe, Barbados, and Antigua.

c. AMCO currently owes the Puerto Rican Cement Company $40,000 and is slow in payment.

d. The normal procedure for payment is for the consignee to pay Mr. Philpotts by a note which the Puerto Rican Cement Company discounts.

e. The Puerto Rican Cement Company is currently examining how much credit it can extend to AMCO. In this connection the company is examining whether credit extended to AMCO can be insured under the Foreign Credit Insurance Association. (FCIA insures 80% of export credit.) If so, the risk to the Puerto Rican Cement Company would be reduced and further credit could be extended.

f. The Puerto Rican Cement Company has sold 133,000 bags of cement to AMCO.

7. SKEWER/1 said that Mr. Philpotts is aggressive and that he is pushing Puerto Rican cement. Mr. Carter asked SKEWER/1 if his firm were worried about the amount of credit extended to AMCO. SKEWER/1 replied that AMCO is trying to help the Puerto Rican Cement Company and Puerto Rican Cement is in turn trying to help AMCO. SKEWER/1 imparted the impression that he has absolute confidence in his subordinates. In calling Tomas, SKEWER/1 said to us that he had gone over the head of his son. SKEWER/1 was not aware that AMCO Puerto Rico is a subsidiary of AMCO Panama. When apprised of this fact, he said that this arrangement is probably for tax purposes. SKEWER/1 left the impression that he considers AMCO as a Puerto Rican company and one worthy of support. He recalled that he had previously given a job to a Trujillo opponent, Fred Imbert, whom no one else would hire. Mr. Imbert now has his own shipping company and SKEWER/1 suggested that we assess his operation. He recalled that Mr. Trujillo had telephoned him about harboring a criminal. SKEWER/1 told Trujillo to mind his own business as would SKEWER/1. Mr. Stanulis indicated that KUBARK would not want to consider Fred Imbert's operation, given his family's involvement in the Dominican Republic. Throughout the conversation, the picture emerged of a man who trusts his subordinates and who would help an individual or firm, particularly Puerto Rican, which is also trying to help his firm.

8. Mr. Allen said that we would assess the situation carefully, and in the event it should be determined to proceed, we would advise him. Mr. Allen informed him that two New York firms have invested in AMCO, namely, W. S. Kies and Company, and Train, Cabot and Associates. Our friend is Mr. Train, who, as he surmised, is the top man in his firm. Mr. Allen revealed this information to SKEWER/1 in the event that it should be deemed desirable for Mr. Train to negotiate with the Puerto Rican Cement Company. Conversely, in the event of AMCO's failure, it was felt that SKEWER/1 should know that KUBARK is not connected with any other participants. SKEWER/1 offered full cooperation. He had arranged his schedule to give us as much time as necessary. In our presence he received a telephone call in which he apologized for cancelling an appointment in order to accommodate us. It is considered that, as in his past relations with KUBARK, SKEWER/1 can be trusted and will help KUBARK in any way he can.

GALE W. ALLEN
DOCO/SA

Distribution:
Orig. - Ops file
1 - WUBRINY D file
1 - SKEWER/1 201
1 - chrono

SECRET

13 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT: Project WUBRINY--Antilles Materials Company, Ltd., Discussion by Mr. Edward Stanulis with SKEWER/1.

1. I made initial telephonic contact with SKEWER/1 at approximately 1100 hours on 10 January 1965 and made arrangements for a meeting in my hotel room for the following day between the hours of 1600 and 1700 to be followed by another on Tuesday at a time and place that would be convenient for SKEWER/1. Later in the day SKEWER/1 informed me that he would be unable to meet with us on Tuesday as he was leaving by air on the evening of 11 January for a series of appointments in the States.

2. The meeting with SKEWER/1 was held in my hotel room at 1645 hours on 11 January. I told SKEWER/1 that as he knew, one of KUBARK's prime information targets in Latin America concerned the activities of Castro's Cuba and that in this connection some of our people had been thinking for some time that it would be most useful in pursuing this requirement to have entree into shipping interests that were active in Caribbean waters. SKEWER/1 said he thought this idea excellent. I further stated that these people had heard that SKEWER/1's firm was discussing the possibility of entering into an exclusive Caribbean distributorship contract with Alvin T. Philpotts, Jr., who is associated with the Antilles Materials Company, Ltd. S. A. of Panama and Puerto Rico, and asked him if he had any knowledge of the individual or the negotiations. SKEWER/1 replied that he did not know of either, but that his son would be familiar with both.

3. I asked SKEWER/1 if he would be willing to investigate the situation discreetly without mentioning any interest on KUBARK's part and at the same time consider the commercial feasibility of the venture for AMCO. He agreed.

4. In elaborating on the basic concept, I told SKEWER/1 that if the proper maritime firm were located (that is, one that may be floundering now but has commercial viability potential), we would be interested in placing with the company an individual who possesses the necessary commercial background qualifications and also has the capability of accomplishing certain KUBARK requirements. SKEWER/1 reiterated his conviction that the concept is an excellent one and said he would do all in his power to

SECRET

help KUBARK achieve this objective.

5. I told him that I would appreciate his cooperation in meeting with two of my friends who are more fully versed in these matters. He agreed and set the meeting for Monday, 19 January 1965. SKEWER/1 gave me his unlisted private telephone number and suggested that I contact him Monday morning, 19 January 1965, to set time and place for the meeting. The number is 842-2120.

E. A. STANULIS

Distribution:
Orig. --C/DO/SA
ADCDO/CO
Gale W. Allen
1--WUBRINY/OPS
1--WUBRINY/D
✓ 1--SKEWER/1 201 file
1--SA Chrono

SECRET

Skewer: 201

1 February 1965

Case Officer Comment:

The meeting with SKEWER/1 confirmed Mr. Philpotts' report that his relations with the Puerto Rican Cement Company are good. It also revealed the terms of the relationship between the Puerto Rican Cement Company and AMCO which Mr. Philpotts had not reported in detail to WUBRINY/2. It is obvious that Mr. Philpotts has sold himself to certain officials in the Puerto Rican Cement Company who have the confidence of the Company's top management. The extent to which Mr. Philpotts may have conned other businessmen into extending credit and the amount of such credit is a key factor for investigation by WUBRINY/1 and /2, and Mr. Malia on their forthcoming trip. It is feared that Mr. Philpotts has incurred so many debts that the firing of Mr. Philpotts and reorganization of AMCO would be prohibitively expensive.

GALE W. ALLEN
DOCO/SA

SECRET

SECRET

1 February 1965

Case Officer Comment:

The meeting with SKEWER/1 confirmed Mr. Philpotts' report that his relations with the Puerto Rican Cement Company are good. It also revealed the terms of the relationship between the Puerto Rican Cement Company and AMCO which Mr. Philpotts had not reported in detail to WUBRINY/2. It is obvious that Mr. Philpotts has sold himself to certain officials in the Puerto Rican Cement Company who have the confidence of the Company's top management. The extent to which Mr. Philpotts may have conned other businessmen into extending credit and the amount of such credit is a key factor for investigation by WUBRINY/1 and /2, and Mr. Malia on their forthcoming trip. It is feared that Mr. Philpotts has incurred so many debts that the firing of Mr. Philpotts and reorganization of AMCO would be prohibitively expensive.

Gale W. Allen
GALE W. ALLEN
DOCO/SA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]

14 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Antilles Materials Company, Ltd.

1. Mr. Ed Stanulis telephoned Mr. Allen at home from San Juan, Puerto Rico, on 11 January 1965. He met with SKEWER/1 as scheduled at 3 P.M. SKEWER/1 was not familiar with any negotiations between the Puerto Rican Cement Company and AMCO but agreed to look quietly into the matter. He made a telephone call to PR Cement's Sales Manager before he left for New York. SKEWER/1 said that he had such a heavy schedule on this trip, requiring his presence in New York, Chicago, and Connecticut, that he could not squeeze in a meeting with KUBARK representatives. He would, however, be glad to meet with KUBARK representatives in Puerto Rico on 18 January 1965. This delay would also enable him to investigate thoroughly the status of negotiations with AMCO.

2. Mr. Stanulis said that he had followed the previously agreed approach to SKEWER/1. He emphasized that KUBARK is interested in AMCO only to the extent that a feasible commercial arrangement can be worked out, so that placement of an officer in AMCO to work against Cuba would make sense. He indicated that AMCO is not doing too well financially and that the question is whether it can be resurrected on a sound commercial basis. Mr. Stanulis informed SKEWER/1 that KUBARK is not interested in taking an equity position in AMCO.

3. Mr. Stanulis affirmed unequivocally to Mr. Allen his previous assessment of SKEWER/1, namely that SKEWER/1 will do anything to help KUBARK, particularly against Cuba. Mr. Stanulis will write a report upon arrival in Washington on or about 13 January 1965.

GALE W. ALLEN

Distribution:
- Orig. - Ops file
- 1 - Subj. file
- 1 - SKEWER/1 201
- 1 - chrono

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DOCO/SA 14 JAN 1965

ATTENTION : Gale W. Allen

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : FERRE, Antonio Luis
#450 945

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 7 January 1964 which requested a Provisional Covert Security Approval to permit Subject, President, Puerto Rican Cement Company, to be made witting of Agency interest in WUBRINY/D in the event his father, a cleared Agency contact, desires to discuss with Subject this interest.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a Provisional Covert Security Approval is granted for the use of the Subject as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above. This confirms a verbal PCSA granted 5 January 1965.

3. Subjects of Provisional Covert Security Approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Provisional Covert Security Approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-3. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be sumbitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event action is not taken within 90 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

R. G. Sparlini
for Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from Automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

Subject

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 7 January 1964

TO:
☐ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: DOCO/SA

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Antonio Luis Ferre

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES

PROJECT: WUBRINY

CI/OA FILE NO.

RI 201 FILE NO.

SO FILE NO. 450945

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

United States-Puerto Rico

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Desire PCSA in the event his father, a cleared KUBARK contact, 201-205712, SO file number 215627, desires to discuss with him KUBARK interest in WUBRINY/D. Subject is President, Puerto Rican Cement Company, born 1934, Ponce, Puerto Rico, U.S. citizen. Will seek additional biographic information.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRO AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRO I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRO II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRO II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☒	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST OF [illegible] CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Gale W. Allen, DOCO/SA	11-61961	Norman G. Swift, C/DOCO/SA

FORM 8-60 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

Skewer/1

13 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Antilles Materials Company, Ltd.

1. Messrs. Allen and Carter met on 8 January 1965 with Mr. Edward Stanulis, former COS San Juan, to discuss an approach to SKEWER/1 for information on subject company. It was agreed that Mr. Stanulis would go to Puerto Rico on 9 January and contact SKEWER/1 on the 10th. Hopefully SKEWER/1 could obtain information on negotiations between Puerto Rican Cement Company and AMCO in time for a meeting with Messrs Stanulis, Allen, and Carter on 12 January. Messrs. Allen and Carter would plan to arrive in San Juan at 10:50 P.M. on 11 January.

2. Mr. Stanulis would apprise SKEWER/1 of KUBARK's interest in placing a KUBARK officer in a small shipping and trading company operating in the Caribbean area in order to monitor Cuban activities. SKEWER/1 would be cautioned to keep this knowledge confidential. In this connection, Mr. Stanulis said that SKEWER/1 had proved to be absolutely reliable from the security point of view. Mr. Stanulis would advise SKEWER/1 that KUBARK is looking at AMCO which is negotiating with the Puerto Rican Cement Company to be its cement distributor in the Caribbean area. SKEWER/1 would be asked to confirm any negotiations and the terms involved. His answers would be given in the subsequent meeting with Messrs. Stanulis, Allen, and Carter. Further discussion with SKEWER/1 would be conditioned on his answers. In any case KUBARK representatives would ascertain his views on the validity of AMCO's commercial concept and on any possibility for commercial collaboration between PR Cement and AMCO.

3. Mr. Stanulis on 10 January 1965 telephoned Mr. Allen at home to report that he has a meeting scheduled with SKEWER/1 at 3 P.M. on 11 January. SKEWER/1 is leaving the night of 11 January for New York where he will remain through part of 15 January. Mr. Stanulis will try to get a flight out of Puerto Rico for New York, so that a meeting may be arranged for Messrs. Stanulis, Allen, and Carter with SKEWER/1 in New York. Mr. Stanulis will call Mr. Allen after his meeting with SKEWER/1. Mr. Stanulis is staying at the Hotel Da Vinci, Room 81.

SECRET

14-00000

SKEWER/1 will be staying in New York at the Hotel Savoy Plaza. Mr. Allen immediately telephoned Mr. Carter, 941-2802, and advised him of the change in plans.

Gale W. Allen
Gale W. Allen
DOCO/SA

DOCO/SA:GWA:jev (13 Jan. 1965)

Distribution:
✓ 0 - Subject
1 - WUBRINY Ops
1 - SA Chrono
✓ 1 - SKEWER/1

Subject

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 5 January 1965

TO:

☐	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
☒	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: DOCO/SA

SUBJECT: (True name) Luis Albert Ferre

PROJECT: WUBRINY

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO. C-82943

RI 201 FILE NO. 201-205712

SO FILE 215[illegible]

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL 8 Dec. 1964	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☒	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

United States - Puerto Rico

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

The Puerto Rican Cement Company is interested in having WUBRINY D as its overt distributor in the Caribbean area. Desire to brief Subject on KUBARK objectives in WUBRINY D and propose long term commercial collaboration of mutual advantage. One of the KUBARK officers doing the briefing will be the new manager of WUBRINY D and continuing contact with Subject. Previously investigated

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 100951

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Gale W. Allen, DOCO/SA	11-61951	Norman G. Swift, C/DOCO/SA

FORM 8-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

5 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luis Albert Ferro (201-205712)

1. WH/2/Dominican Republic holds Subject's file which has been loaned to DO/SA. Mr. Allen on 5 January 1965 telephoned the DR Desk Officer, Mr. David McGrath, and explained that DO/SA would like to make Subject witting of KUBARK interest in WUBRINY D. Mr. McGrath said that the Desk is not now using Subject and that it has no objection to DO/SA briefing Subject. He asked that a memorandum covering the contact be prepared for inclusion in the Subject's file.

2. Mr. Allen on 5 January 1965 informed DO/Security that DO/SA desires to make Subject witting of KUBARK interest in WUBRINY D. A PCSA had previously been granted on 8 December 1964 with the understanding that a CSA can be quickly obtained because of the existing O/A on him. DO/Security said that necessary action for a CSA would be undertaken at once and that he foresees no problem.

Gale W. Allen
Gale W. Allen

GWA:jev

Distribution:
✓0 - Subject file
1 - WUBRINY Ops
1 - WUBRINY D
1 - SA Chrono

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

9 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luis Albert FERRE

DO/Security informed Mr. Allen on 8 December 1964 that a PCSA has been granted on Subject. Subject's Office of Security file number is 215627. DO/Security further advised that if Subject has to be made witting of Agency interest in WUBRINY D, then a CSA can be quickly obtained because an OA was previously issued on Subject.

Gale W. Allen
Gale W. Allen

GWA/gc

Distribution:
1 - Subj file
1 - WUB ops
1 - SA chrono

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLAS ICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DO/SA, Mr. Gale ALLEN		
2	Rm 522-F, 1750 Pa Ave.		
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	X	INFORMATION		SIGNATURE
X	per your phone request				

Remarks:

Mr. ALLEN: Subject has two sons per Security's record:

Antonio Luis F..... born 1934, Ponce
Rosario J. F...... born 1938, Ponce

Pls let me know if I should conduct traces.

Thank you—

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Anna PANOR, DO/HS 5 E 46 HQS Bldg.	7 Dec.64

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61 (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

SECRET

26 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: A/DC/CA

ATTENTION : Mr. Howard Hunt

SUBJECT : Trace reply - Luis FERRE

REFERENCE : A/DC/CA Memorandum dated 7 August 1964

1. Traces have been completed on .

Luis Alberto FERRE Aguayo, 201-205712
AKA: Luis A. FERRER; Luis Albert FERRE
DPOB: 17 February 1904, Ponce, Puerto Rico
CIT : U.S.A., formerly, Puerto Rico
OCC : Senator and Industrialist
RES : Reina Mora Street, No. 2, Ponce, Puerto Rico

Subject, a wealthy member of the Puerto Rican Legislature, heads the Republican (Statehood) Party, and is a stockholder in El Tiempo, Inc., located at 76 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. The Chief, DO Division desires background information on Subject.

2. RID Files, the Office of Security, CI/OA, and WH/2/DR had a record of Subject. The 201 file is held by WH/2/DR on permanent charge. CI/OA maintains a file on Subject which was reviewed and the results are forwarded herewith, in a separate envelope, as Attachment No. 1. Included in Attachment 1 is operational and investigative information from the Office of Security and the 201 file. Attachment No. 2 is a biographic data sheet forwarded by the Office of Security.

3. The following biographic information is from the 201 file:

Physical Description: 5 ft., 7½ inches tall; weight - 155; slender build; light complexion with brown hair and eyes; oval-shaped face with a scar on the left cheek bone.

Education: Public schools, Ponce, Puerto Rico; the Morristown School, Morristown, New Jersey; Massachusetts Institute of Technology, B.S. and M.S. Degrees.

Languages: English, Spanish, and French.

Family Background: Married to Lorencita (nee Ramirez de Arellano) FERRE, born 9 July 1905, San German, Puerto Rico and she is a U. S. citizen. There are two children who also are

U. S. citizens. Subject has four brothers and one sister (see Attachment 2). He is Vice President of the Ferre Industries, which comprise the following group:

Ponce Cement Corporation, Ponce, P. R.
Puerto Rico Iron Works, Ponce, P. R.
Puerto Rico Glass Corporation, San Juan, P. R.
Puerto Rico Clay Corporation, San Juan, P. R.
Fabrica Nacional Vidrio, Maiquetia, Venezuela
Cementos Nacionales, Santiago de Cuba (present status unknown)
Ponce Products, Incorporated, Miami, Florida

Subject is the Director of the Bank of Ponce. Capital holdings of Ferre Industries had been estimated at over $1,000,000.00 in 1960 and Subject's personal earnings at approximately $50,000.00 per year. Subject has written articles on: "Industrial Democracy," "American Citizenship," "Cement Plants," and "Sugar Mills." He is a member of the Lions Club and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

Anna Panor
DO/HS

Attachments:
1. Envelope
2. Bio Data Sheet (Not att'd/DO/HS Chrono copy is a thermofax and will not reproduce, sorry)

Distribution:
Orig. w/atts. - A/DO/CA
1, " " - C/DO/H
1, " " - DO/HS Chrono.

Attachment to DO/HS Memorandum
dated 26 August 1964

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment No. 1 to
DO/HS Memorandum dated
26 August 1964

Operational and Cl[illegible] Information

1. Subject was mentioned in two KAPOK Dispatches by the Chief of Station, San Juan, Puerto Rico, as a possible candidate through whom leads to persons in the Dominican Republic could be developed and targeted against the intelligence service and the ruling circles there. In HPSA-1223 and HPSA-941, both dated 11 September 1956, Subject is mentioned as a good person for the beginning of covert operations in the Dominican Republic because he was well known and considered discreet by those who knew him. Becuase of his businesses in the U.S. and the Caribbean area, Subject had many persons working for him over a period of years who owed him some allegiance. Subject's companies did much business in the Dominican Republic. SKEDADDLE, the Station's contact, was instructed to approach him indirectly through a cut-out who was Angel FONSECA Jiminez, a personal friend of SKEDADDLE, a member of the Puerto Rican legislature, a senior member of the Republican (Statehood) Party, and very close to Subject.

2. Information in Subject's PRQ II revealed that he was assigned the cryptonym SKEWER/1. The case officer was introduced to Subject by one Francisco A. LOPEZ Dominguez, the U.S. Collector of Customs-in-Charge in Puerto Rico on a strictly social basis in March 1960 (this was to be Subject's cover, and there was no monetary remuneration). Since Subject was considered a loyal U.S. citizen, he was made witting of KUBARK's interest in persons in the Dominican Republic who might lead to the target. He accepted to assist KUBARK in this endeavor enthusiatically. Although it was known that Subject once served as an honorary Vice Consul for Sweden, a common practice for prominent businessmen in Latin America, he was not known to have any connections with a foreign intelligence service. His value to KUBARK lay in his personal knowledge of persons and facts in the Dominican Republic, particularly individuals who travelled there for legal reasons, as well as his social and political status. The case officer described Subject as "intelligent," "well educated," and "a political leader whose real strength is in his being an enlightened capitalist." Because he was (and is) so prominent, and could not withstand too much weakening of his position, he should not be used "directly" in any operation (in the opinion of the case officer who wrote the PRQ evaluation).

SECRET

Attachment No. 1 to
DO/HS Memorandum dated
26 August 1964

5. According to information in C-82943 (CI/OA File), WH/3/DRAE requested a POA on 4 May 1960 for permission to allow the use of Subject to "provide useful information on, or through witting or unwitting employees, courier access to the Dominican Republic." Results of Green List No. 100951 dated 4 May 1960 were "no pertinent identifiable information" on 17 May 1960, and a field trace reply of that date was "no derogatory traces." The POA was granted 31 May 1960 and the OA on 11 September 1960. These clearances were cancelled on 21 and 24 March 1961, respectively, in notices to CI/OA by WH/3/DRAE. Reasons for these cancellations were not given. On 28 August 1961, WH/4/Cuba requested a reinstatement of the OA, for use as an informant. The request was granted by CI/OA on 11 September 1961.

6. An investigation report by the Office of Security in 1960 was not unfavorable. It did make reference to information in an FBI report dated 19 May 1960, in Washington, D.C., which also appeared in the Subject's 201 file. This report contained the following information:

a) In 1951, as leader of the Statehood Party, Subject attacked compulsory military service for Puerto Rico, calling it taxation without representation. In 1952, however, he was one of the Statehood Party leaders who made public statements of their pride in their U.S. citizenship, their desire to live permanently under the U.S. flag, and their recommendation that pardon and clemency be granted in meritorius cases of persons accused in connection with the Nationalist Revolt in 1950.

b) In 1952, Subject reportedly offered a job to Elizer Curet Cuevas, a Communist Party member in Puerto Rico (source not specified).

c) The FBI received information (source not specified) in 1952 and 1953 that Subject received mail from one Juan Antonio Corretjer, a former member of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party.

SECRET

Attachment No. 1 to
DO/HS Memorandum dated
26 August 1964

d) At the request of the Justice Department, the FBI conducted an *inquiry, under the Anti-trust Laws of the U.S., into the cement industry in San Juan, Puerto Rico during December 1958. As industrialist and financier, Subject reportedly controlled the cement industry in Puerto Rico. The Anti-trust Division Files of the Department of Justice contain the results of the inquiry.

5. The Chief of Station, San Juan, Puerto Rico, according to HPSA-1969 dated 4 January 1964, met with Subject in Ponce on 28 December 1963. At this time, Subject told the Chief of Station that he was considering the construction of two sizable plants (cement and glass) in the Dominican Republic "as a means of augmenting official assistance through private enterprise." Subject felt that it was "imperative for all free nations of the Hemisphere to do all in their power to help the Dominican Republic become a true Democracy and deny it to the Communists. In this vital task, private capital must also participate actively." This is the conviction that prompted Subject to consider building the plants.

*According to a memorandum to CI/OA dated 27 May 1960, from WH/3/DRAH, the inquiry had no effect on its proposed operational use.

6. One document in the 201, UFGA-12398 dated 7 November 1963, reveals that Subject was a member of a group of Latin Americans who notionally subsidized AMSCROLL (probably an asset of WH/SA). JUAN 0404 (IN 33997), 7 December 1961, one of a number of cables in Subject's 201 file, indicates that Subject took intense interest in Cuban affairs and was more than willing to obtain information on Cuban elements.

7. According to a document in Subject's 201, the Central Cover Staff had a record, Page 2129 dated 11 May 1960 in their File #5-3 in connection with WH/3/DRAH's POA/OA, but had no active or direct interest in Subject.

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FEB 63

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:
RID/AN

7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Chrono detached

Any intel value?

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/6		14 JAN	1964	
2.				
3. C/WH/6/PE				
4. CRL				
5. BI				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST ABSTRACT INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-205712

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
4 Jan 64

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HPSA 01969

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS

SECRET

(40)

# DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, WHD		MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief of Station, Santo Domingo		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, San Juan		MICROFILM
SUBJECT Meeting with SKEWER-1		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: Information

1. COS met with SKEWER-1 in Ponce, P. R. on 26 December 1963.

2. During general conversation, SKEWER-1 said he was considering the construction of two sizeable plants (cement and glass) in the Dominican Republic as a means of augmenting official assistance through private enterprise and asked COS's opinion of the venture. COS responded that this was personal decision for SKEWER-1 to make.

3. SKEWER-1 said he felt that it was imperative for all free nations of the Hemisphere to do all in their power to help the Dominican Republic become a true democracy and to deny it to the Communists. In this vital task, he added, private capital must also participate actively. This personal conviction, he said, is what has prompted him to consider building the cement and glass plants.

3. SKEWER-1 said that he believed the present GODR was democratically-oriented and would do a good job in the interval between the Junta reign and elections for a successor government. He also praised the selection of Donald REID Cabral to succeed DE LOS SANTOS.

Melvin K. Lamiaux
Melvin K. LAMIAUX

Distribution:
② - Chief, WHD
1 - COS, Santo Domingo

201-205712

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HPSA-1969	DATE 4 January 1964
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER

201-305712

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : JACQUES PRINDIVILLE:spjm
UNIT : WH/4/DRAH
EXT : 2065
DATE : 19 SEPTEMBER 1961 1716

TO : SAN JUAN
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : BELL 10
INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

19 SEP 61 22 46z

~~SIG CEN~~
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT98467

TO JUAN INFO CITE DIR 12786

REF: DIR 12785 (OUT98466)*

IDEN XX LUIS ALBERT FERRE.

END OF MESSAGE

*Cable Secretariat please supply ref.

R. W. Herbert for
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

J. L. Douglas
R. K. DAVIS, C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

201-305712

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ORIG : JACQUES PRINDIVILLE:pj
UNIT : WH/4/DR&H
EXT : 2065
DATE : 19 SEPTEMBER 1961 1715

TO : SAN JUAN
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: BELL 10
INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

19 SEP 61 22 45z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT98466

TO JUAN INFO CITE DIR 12785

OA GRANTED IDEN. ASSIGNED CRYPTO SKIMER-1.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO JMZIP CABLES.

R. W. Herbert
J. C. KING, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

R. K. DAVIS, C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

201-205 [illegible]

No. C-82943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4 - A. Amori

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of Luis Albert FERRE

______________________, for the purpose specified in your request

dated 12 Aug 1961.

OA granted for use of Subject as set forth in PRQ Part II.

SEP 12 12 15 PM '61

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI 10-5 and FR 10-215.

James [illegible], Jr.

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 11 Sept 1961

PM '61

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

dea

SECRET

FORM NO. 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JUN 58 (8)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

Attention: Mr. Drew Kohler

FROM : WH/4/FI-CI

SUBJECT : C-82493

1. Attached for your retention is a complted copy of the PRQ Part II on Subject case. It is requested that a full Operational Approval be processed on the Subject.

2. Subject has not yet been assigned a cryptonym. Your office will be advised immediately of any further action on this matter.

Joseph S. Piccolo
WH/4/FI/Haiti-PR

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, San Juan

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: SKEWER-1 - Clarification of Operational Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: As appropriate, per paragraphs two and three.

REF: HPSA-1955 (RYBAT) (27 September 1963)

1. A full Operational Approval was issued on 11 September 1961 for use of SKEWER-1 as set forth in the PRQ Part II submitted to Headquarters with JU-232 (18 July 1961). Notification of issuance of the OA was given the Station in DIR 12785 and DIR 12786.

2. If the Station judges that the above-cited PRQ Part II no longer obtains as to Subject's actual current operational status and use (Headquarters' file on Subject shows that it does not; e.g., his funding of a Station JMWAVE operation), an up-to-date PRQ Part II should be submitted in order to amend the OA issued in September 1961.

3. The Station should be guided by the provisions of CSI-F-50-17 with respect to keeping Headquarters informed of current operational contact with and use of Subject.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - COS, San Juan

201-205712

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	CS COPY HPSW-1407	[illegible] NOV 1963 31 October 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-205712

1 - CS (201-205712)
1 - RID/Chrono

ROUTING | INITIALS
RID/AN
RID/MIS
WH/6/PR
DESTROY

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
1-63

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/6/DR-PR	C. R. LANUALES	ja	4524

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/6/DR-PR		W. TRENTA

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	1 Nov 63	J. C. KING

(40)

DISPATCH

578

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

~~Rouse~~ - 201-

DATE : 2 AUG 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JUAN

ACTION: BELL 10

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/EAG, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, IOD 4, WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 3 0106Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 47500

PRITY DIR INFO TRUJ CITE JUAN 0240

DYVOUR 4

TDCS-3/482,637
carded

MEETING 1 AUG WITH LUIS FERRE PRODUCED FOLL:

A. FERRE HAD CONVERSATION 25 JULY WITH FRANK CHAVEZ AFL-CIO LEADER IN PUERTO RICO. CHAVEZ PROPOSED FERRE GO DOM REP ACT AS CATALYST BETWEEN CONFLICTING FORCES AND USHER IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT ARGUED THAT MAN FERRE'S STATURE COULD SERVE IN PLACE OAS COMMISSION. FERRE FAVORABLY INCLINED IN PRINCIPLE. FERRE IN CONTACT CARLOS CHARDON, WELL KNOWN PUERTO RICAN AGRONOMIST WHO NOW IN DOMREP AT INVITATION BALAGUER CONNECTION AGRARIAN REFORMS. CHARDON FAVORS IDEA FERRE MEDIATION. (COMMENT: FERRE REQUESTED NOTHING; YAUGER VOLUNTERRED NOTHING. FOR HQS INFO YAUGER EXPECTS TALK NEXT WITH FERRE 8 AUG).

B. CHAVEZ HAD JUST RETURNED FROM SEEING ARTURO ESPIALLAT IN CANADA. AS LONG TIME FRIEND ESPIALLAT, CHAVEZ CLAIMS CREDIT FOR GETTING RAMFIS TRUJILLO RELEASE ESPAILLAT. CHAVEZ ALSO FRIENDLY WITH RAMFIS WHO, ACCORDING CHAVEZ FAVORS DEMOCRATIZATION DOMREP BUT WANTS LEAVE COUNTRY, LIQUIDATING FAMILY ASSETS AT TEN CENTS ON THE DOLLAR. ASSETS IN DOMREP ESTIMATED AT 800 MILLION DOLLARS. FERRE COMMENTED THAT IN LONG RUN IT WOULD BE CHEAPER FOR DOMINICANS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

RID THEMSELVES TRUJILLOS BY PAYING, SAY, FIVE CENTS ON DOLLAR RATHER THAN SUFFER CONSEQUENCES CIVIL WAR. CHAVEZ SAYS HECTOR TRUJILLO ALSO WANTS OUT BUT PETAN WANTS CONTINUE DYNASTY. CHAVEZ SAYS RAMFIS HAS SOLID BACKING AIR FORCE WHICH IS REAL STRENGTH ARMED FORCES.

carded

C. FERRE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY OSVALDO T GRIMALDI AND JOSE ANTONIO SALCEDO AS LEADERS IN PUERTO RICO OF PRD WHO ASKED MONEY FOR MEDICINES CLOTHING ETC. FERRE STALLED BUT IS INCLINED GIVE SOMETHING TO KEEP ON GOOD SIDE ANY ANTI COMMUNIST GROUP.

END OF MESSAGE

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO. JU-232

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is __not__ to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM: SKEWER/1

2. PSEUDONYM:

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case Officer first met Subject through the aid of Francisco A. LOPEZ Dominguez who, as U.S. Colector of Customs in charge, is witting of CO's true status. LOPEZ arranged a lunch for three at the Zipperlie Restaurant. There were two purposes: to meet Subject as part of SKIPPER's general requirement to know outstanding figures, and to pave the way for contact in accordance with the POA that already had been requested. The initial meeting was in March 1960; the POA was received on 24 June 1960 in JW-45.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO __ANY__ RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Yes - to any senior officer (Subject is 57 years old)

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

None

FORM NO. 1 NOV 58 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-95B WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4-80)

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is a genuine loyal American citizen. His citizenship, his schooling (Morristown School, Morristown, New Jersey; Massachusetts Institute of Technology), his position as head of the large industrial complex which operates both in Puerto Rico and in the continental United States, and his outstanding political status combine to motivate him to support the United States.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

No control other than the suasion of patriotism.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Social cover. Case Officer's cover makes acquaintanceship entirely plausible.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

His business and social positions.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Witting.

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

No known such connection.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

F. A. LOPEZ Dominguez (see Section II) to the extent only of having effected the introduction.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Such collaboration is in the realm of theoretical possibility. Only known connection with a foreign government is that he has served asan honorary vice consul for Sweden, a common practice of Latin American business men.

SECRET

SECTION VI — **OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT**

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

No previous use known.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

From his business and social positions. That is, his normal business and social contacts supply him with his information.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject is witting.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's value lies in his personal knowledge of persons and facts in the target country, and his access to persons having legal reasons to travel to that country. Also, through him access can be had to local persons who may be in a position to be useful - wittingly or unwittingly.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

See Para 4 immediately above.

SECTION VII — **PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY**

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII — **AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT**

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E., TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

So far as is known, the Case Officer is the only Agency person known to Subject. The relationship is social - on a witting basis. No remuneration is involved.

SECRET

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Although Subject is an intelligent, well-educated person, he should not be used directly in operations. His value is as described in Section VI4. Furthermore, his political position prohibits involvement in operations.

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

NA

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

NA

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

--

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

As an outstanding public figure, knowledge about Subject is general and all "Who's Who" write-ups contain long articles about him.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED. POA	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

In addition to Section II 1, although a leader in politics, Subject's real strength is in his being an enlightened capitalist. One Who's Who description says "pioneer in the job of humanizing industry". Is a Catholic lay leader. Has held various public service positions, e.g., Lions Club, Chamber of Commerce, Council of the Boy Scouts; honorary secretary of MIT; philanthropist; etc.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

None known

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

With Case Officer, Subject has been most sparing in use of liquor; as a political public figure any personal weaknesses would have been well aired.

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Plays the piano well.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject's English is excellent but he probably would be noted as having been raised other than in the continental United States. Information is lacking as to his foreign language abilities, and such information has not been sought in view of the non-operational nature of his connection with the Agency.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Except for such factual data as place of schooling, Subject is such a prominent public figure that general information about him is public knowledge.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (Also see para. 43b, supra)

NA

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE? WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

If contact with Subject were to be made other than through the Case Officer, the newly-contacting Officer should exhibit documentary evidence of his Agency connection and a reasonable explanation of why the introduction is not made by the Case Officer.

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

See Section IX 1.

DATE 18 July 1961	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SKEWER-1

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: *1. Write clearly.*
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* Luis	*(Middle)* Albert	*(Last)* FERRE	*(Nee)*

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

5. DATE OF BIRTH
17 February 1904

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
Ponce, Puerto Rico

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

Very well-known in community; of high moral character.

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)*

None

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

9a. SEX X M ☐ F	9b. AGE 56	9c. APPARENT AGE 50	9d. HEIGHT FT. 5 IN.	9e. WEIGHT 155	9f. COMPLEXION Light	9g. FACE *(Shape)* Oval
9h. COLOR OF HAIR Brown	9i. COLOR OF EYES Brown	9j. TEETH Good	9k. BUILD Slender	9l. POSTURE Erect		

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES
Scar on left cheek bone

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING; ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 7-60 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (4-60)

14-00000

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP [illegible]	2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1.)* [illegible]

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*
[illegible]

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 3.)*
[illegible]

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

Europe, Venezuela, Cuba. Business and travel.

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION Ferre Industries	2. TITLE Vice-President	3. SALARY *(Per annum)* Over $25,000

4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Roman Catholic

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Lions Club
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Member of Republican (Statehood) Party

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Ponce Public Schools				
Morristown School, New Jersey				
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, Mass.				B.S., M.S.

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	
English	X		X		X		X	
French	X				X		X	

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Articles on: Industrial Democracy
American Citizenship
Cement Plants
Sugar Mills

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Piano playing; fencing.

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
Unknown					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

1	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
2	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
3	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
4	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
5	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX **MARITAL STATUS**

1. CHECK ONE:	☐ SINGLE	☐ MARRIED	☐ WIDOWED	☐ SEPARATED	☐ DIVORCED	☐ ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE (*First*) Lorencita (*Middle*) (*Nee*) Ramirez de Arellano (*Last*) FERRE

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
6. DATE OF BIRTH 9 July 1905	7. PLACE OF BIRTH San German, Puerto Rico
8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Puerto Rican	9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS U. S.

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Last residence, if deceased*) Reina Mora St., No. 2, Ponce, Puerto Rico

SECTION X **CHILDREN**

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Antonio Luis FERRE	X		1934	Ponce, Puerto Rico	
Rosario J. FERRE			1938	Ponce, Puerto Rico	

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (*Identify child and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XI **FATHER**

1. FULL NAME Antonio FERRE	2. YEAR OF BIRTH [illegible]	3. PLACE OF BIRTH Cuba	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS U. S.	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE La Alhambra, Ponce, P.R.	

SECTION XII **MOTHER**

1. FULL NAME Mary AGUAYO	2. YEAR OF BIRTH [illegible]	3. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible], Puerto Rico	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE Deceased	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Jose A. FERRE	X		1902	Ponce, Puerto Rico	
Rosario FERRE	X		1905	Ponce, Puerto Rico	
Carlos F. FERRE	X		1907	Ponce, Puerto Rico	
Herman FERRE	X		1909	Ponce, Puerto Rico	
Isolina FERRE		X	1914	Ponce, Puerto Rico	

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

None

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

N.A.

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE

SIGNATURE

file

SECRET

8 August 1961

SUBJECT: Luis Albert FERRE

1. Luis Albert FERRE, prominent Puerto Rican businessman, financier, and industrialist, was born in Ponce, Puerto Rico on 17 February 1904. The Subject was educated in the Ponce Public schools, the Morristown School in New Jersey, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he received his B.S. and M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering.

2. FERRE has traveled widely, primarily through Europe and the Caribbean, under United States Passport #3452P, issued in 1953, San Juan, Puerto Rico. Subject speaks Spanish, English, and French; he is a member of the Roman Catholic Church, the Republican (Statehood) Party, Lions Club, and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

3. FERRE is presently Vice-President of Ferre Industries and has held (or in some instances still holds) the following positions:

Vice-President	Ponce, Cement Corp., Ponce, P.R.
Vice-President	Puerto Rico Iron Works, Ponce, P.R.
President	Puerto Rico Glass Corp., San Juan, P.R.
Vice-President	Puerto Rico Clay Corp., San Juan, P. R.
President	Fabrica Nacional Vidrio, Maiguetia, Venezuela
Director	Cementos Nacionales, Santiago de Cuba
Chairman	Ponce Products, Inc, Miami, Florida
Director	Maule Industries, Miami, Florida
Director	Banco de Ponce, P.R.

The Subject's capital holdings are estimated to be over $1,000,000; his earnings are estimated at $50,000 per year.

4. Sr. FERRE is widely known throughout the Caribbean and is reportedly a man of high moral character and above average intelligence.

Sent to STATE
on 8 Aug 61

as possible candidate for
OAS-sponsored team to
go DR for long period

SECRET

SECRET

JU-232

18 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, WH DIVISION

SUBJECT: General - Operational

Specific - Submitting PRQ Part II on Subject JW-45

REFERENCE: JW-84

In compliance with Reference, the requested information is herewith submitted.

Warren S. Yauger

Warren S. Yauger

Enclosure:
PRQ Part II

SECRET

SECRET

Memo No.: [illegible] 84

Date 5 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR : **Warren S. YAUGER**

FROM : **Chief, WHD**

SUBJECT : General -

Specific - **Subject of References**

ACTION REQUIRED:

Reference : **A. DIR 01693 (OUT 71937)**

B. JW-45

1. The operational use of the subject of the references was requested by ODIBEX on 1 June 1961. In view of KUBARK's previous contact with the subject and probable future operational interest in the subject, STONESET has requested KUBARK's maintainance of the subject's clearance.

2. To complete the subject's clearance for full operational approval, you are requested to provide as promptly as possible the requisite PRQ Part II information. Enclosed herewith are two copies of the appropriate form.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment
As Stated

SECRET

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

FI/DC/ISR 1613 L Marie Ferrari

NO.

DATE 1 June 1961

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/3/Puerto Rico -Rm 1-004 Barton Hall Attn: Nelson Smith				Attached for your subject's 201 file.
2.				
3.				
4. Farmer				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. Sec.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

Dispatch to Skipper stating [illegible] has taken out. [illegible] sub. for our use [illegible] need any II.

~~File Skipper~~

File Ferre 201.

201-205712

FORM 1 DEC 54 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Marie Ferrari
ISR 1613 L
x 8077

TRACE REQUEST

ISR MATERIAL
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

PLS CALL REQUESTOR WHEN CHECK IS COMPLETED

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISRM NO. 3395
DATE 24 May 61
201 NO. 305712

NAME
Luis Alberto Ferre Aguayon NN SD-78645 — Department of the Army

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS
None indicated

DATE OF BIRTH
17 Feb 1904

PLACE OF BIRTH
Ponce, Puerto Rico

CITIZENSHIP

PRESENT ADDRESS

OCCUPATION
Mechanical Engineer

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT

TRAVEL

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA
MIT graduate - 1924 - Mechanical Engineer
Master Degree, MIT, 1925

WH/3 has operational interest
Nelson Smith x2056
1-004 Barton Hall
Ferre listed

Called Army
O/I - 1 June 61

1 June 1961

1. Subject is being utilized by a member of the Interagency Source Register and has been duly registered as such.

2. Above confirms telecon of 1 June 1961 between Miss Ferrari and Mrs Utz of your office.

ISRM-3395

5/25/61

Ferre, Luis
C/R. a.t.l. not listed
(KA)

"PRIORITY"

SECRET

SC/148

201-205712

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: N. H. SMITH
UNIT: WH/3/DR&H
EXT: 3054
DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1960

655

TO: SAN JUAN
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO: FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	DR & H	4	[illegible]
2		5	
3			

SEP 20 22 20'60
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED		
XX	ROUTINE		
	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT 71937

TO JUAN INFO CITE DIR 01693

REF: JW-52*

REQUEST REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Comment: *Contact Luis FERRE as soon as possible for information on the Dominican Republic.

for Ned P. Holman
RUDOLPH E. GOMEZ, AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Ned P. Holman
NED P. HOLMAN, AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

Memo No.: JW- 52

Date : 13 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR : Warren S. YAUGER

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : General - Operational

Specific - Subject of JW-45

ACTION REQUIRED:

Reference :

You are requested to contact Subject as soon as possible and on a continuing basis for information on the internal political situation in the Dominican Republic.

Oliver G. Galbond

OLIVER G. GALBOND

SECRET

SECRET

DR 205712
201

[illegible] : 45

Date : 10 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR : Warren S. YAUGER

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : General - Operational

Specific - Luis Albert FERRE (C-82943)

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2.

Reference :

1. You are advised that Subject was granted provisional operational approval on 31 May 1960 for the purpose of assessing him as a possible source of information on the Dominican Republic, and for determining the feasibility of his providing courier access to that country.

2. To complete Subject's clearance for full operational approval, you are asked to provide as promptly as possible the requisite PRQ Part II information.

Oliver G. Galbond
OLIVER G. GALBOND

SECRET

201-205712
7116

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/DR&H
Attn: Nelson Smith

NUMBER	C-82943
SUBJECT	Luis Albert FERRE
REFERENCE:	Your Memorandum, Dated 4 May 1960

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Thomas Carroll Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	31 May 1960 ada

FORM 7-60 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (8)

SECRET

27 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Luis Albert FERRE
J-82943

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum, same Subject, dated
25 May 1960

1. In reply to Para 1 of Reference, this Division does not believe the information therein precludes consideration of Subject for possible operational use.

2. As for Para 2 of Reference, Reference crossed with advice from this Division that field traces had not revealed derogatory information regarding Subject.

3. Regarding Para 3 of Reference, this Division is not interested in the investigation of possible infraction of the anti-trust laws by Subject. Consequently, it is requested that CI/OA notify the Office of Security to this effect.

W. H. Smith
WH/3/DR&H

SECRET

SECRET

201

25 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/DR&H

ATTENTION: Nelson H. Smith

SUBJECT: Luis Albert FERGE
C-82943

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a FBI memorandum received this date from the Office of Security. Please advise CI/OA as to whether or not the information contained therein would tend to affect Subject's operational use.

2. Review of Subject's file indicates that field trace results have not yet been received from your Division. Please forward at your earliest convenience for further POA processing.

3. The Office of Security, unless notified to the contrary by CI/OA, will continue its investigation, following the FBI lead provided in the last paragraph of the attached memorandum.

John B. Brewer
for
THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
Chief, CI/OA

Attachment:
FBI Rpt dtd 19 May 1960

SECRET

file

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

DATE: 17 May 1960 ada

TO: WH/3/DR&H Nelson Smith

C NO. 82943
Luis Albert FERRE

FROM: Chief, CI/OA Thomas Carroll Jr.

201

In order that further consideration can be given to your request for approval in this case, it is requested that you furnish this office the information checked below:

☐	PRQ I	☐	OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
☐	PRQ II	☐	ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☒	FIELD TRACES	☐	OTHER (See remarks)
☐	RI TRACES		

REMARKS

No derog field traces (per W. Galbraith)
CI/OA so advised 25 May 60.

SECRET

TO: Nelson H. Smith

FROM: FI/D

The reply on your Green List Request

Number	Name
100951	FERRE, Luis Albert

was completed and forwarded to CI/OA

13 MAY 1960

SECRET

9 MAY 1960

THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED: SECRET

1. SUBJECT (NAME, IN ROMAN LETTERS AND IN NORMAL ORDER)
Lois Albert FERRE C-32943

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. BIRTH DATE
17 February 1904

4. BIRTH PLACE
Ponce, Puerto Rico

5. CITIZENSHIP
U. S.

6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Vice-President of Ferre Industries
San Juan, Ponce, and Caroline, Puerto
Rico, offices in Miami and New York

7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Mechanical engineer (degree from
Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

RESPONSE TO GREEN LIST REQUEST Nº 100951

DATE OF REQUEST 4 May 1960

REQUEST FROM

NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER Nelson H. Smith
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/3/DR&H
ROOM, BUILDING 1005 Barton Hall
EXTENSION 2056

14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED? ☒ YES ☐ NO

15. TYPE OF REQUEST
☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ COVER

16. INTEREST IN SUBJECT
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

17. INFORMATION REQUIRED
Derogatory

8. MILITARY SERVICE

SERVICE ARM, COUNTRY	SPECIALTY	LOCATION	DATES
Unknown			

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
		13 3 [illegible]

10. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5' 7½	155	Brown	Brown	W	Scar left cheek

11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Lorencita Ramirez de Arellano

12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND ASSOCIATES

13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC) ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED
Republican (Statehood) Party, religion Roman Catholic

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI-10-7

FORM 11-58 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

12 May 1960
DATE

TO: Nelson H. Smith

FROM: FI/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS no pertinent INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF A CONTINUING SEARCH WAS REQUESTED IN SECTION 14, INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

Noted
17 May 60

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TO Chief, WH Division	ATTENTION Nelson H. Smith WH/3/DR&H	ROOM 1021	BLDG. Barton Hall
SUBJECT FERRE, Luis Albert	CI/OA NUMBER C- 82943	CCD FILE NO. 5-3, p. 2129	CCD CASE OFFICER F.L.Coolidge

Central Cover Division concurs in your proposal to use the above individual for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon Central Cover Division to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise Central Cover Division/Non-Official Cover promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject is in CCD/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCD/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

COPY TO CI/OA	DATE 11 May 1960	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, CCD/NC John G. Southard

FORM 12-59 1678

CCD CONCURRENCE

(8) SECRET

13370

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
FERRE, Luis Albert

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.				
3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE	
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.		9. EVALUATION	
10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE		

5. ANALYST ns

6. DATE PROCESSED 10 Mar 60

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 83943.

WH/3

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-205712

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 4 May 1960

TO:
☒ CI/Operational App-oval and Support Division
☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: Nelson H. Smith
WH/3/DR&H

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis Albert FERRE

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-205712

SO FILE NO.:

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Dominican Republic

FULL DETAILS OF USE:

Subject has connections in the Dominican Republic, and it is anticipated that he may provide useful information on, or through witting or unwitting employees, courier access to the Dominican Republic.

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION:

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☒	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO.

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Nelson H. Smith	2056	Ned P. Holman, AC/WH/3

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HPSA-1519

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: OCT 18 1957

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Chief of Station, San Juan CMTS

SUBJECT: GENERAL—Operational

SPECIFIC—PRQ Part I - Mr. Luis Albert Ferre

Attached is PRQ Part I on subject. PRQ Part II will follow at a later date.

William S Fadane
WILLIAM S. FADANE

Attachment:
PRQ Pt I (4 cys)
PRQ Pt II, Under Separate Cover
17 October 1957

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters, w/att

FORM NO. JAN 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

201-205712

HPS/PRQ/143

SONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Instruction:
1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable"
3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. Full Name Luis (First) Albert (Middle) Ferre (Last)

2. Name in native script

3. Name at birth (if different from 1.)

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.)

5. a. Date of birth 17 Feb 1904 b. Place of birth Ponce, Puerto Rico

6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate American - White

7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.)

8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) Owner
Reina Mora St. #2, Ponce, Puerto Rico

9. Permanent address (if different from 8.)

10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.)
Vice-President, Ferre Industries - Over $25,000.

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate granted.)

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship)

FORM NO. 51-96A
MAY 1950

201-305-712

13. Father - full name occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

Antonio Ferre; La Alhambra, Ponce, P. R.; born in Cuba, 9 June 1877; came to Puerto Rico 1894; American.

14. Mother - same information as 13.

Mary Aguayo; born in Ponce, P. R., 1879; deceased.

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

née

Lorencita Ramires de Arellano; born 9 July 1905, San German, P. R.; American.

Lorencita FERRE

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Antonio Luis Ferre; b. February 1934, Ponce, P. R.; American.
Rosario J. Ferre; b. 28 September 1938, Ponce, P. R.; American.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Jose A. Ferre; b. 1902, Ponce, P. R.; American.
Rosario Ferre; b. 1905, Ponce, P. R.; American.
Carlos F. Ferre; b. 1907, Ponce, P. R.; American.
Herman Ferre; b. 1909, Ponce, P. R.; American.
Yeolina Ferre; b. 1914, Ponce, P. R.; American.

201-205712

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

None.

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

U. S. Passport #3452P; issued 1953, San Juan, P. R.

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

Roman Catholic.

21. Present and past political affiliations

Republican (Statehood) Party.

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited

Europe, Venezuela, Cuba. Business and travel.

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

Ponce Public Schools.
Morristown School, New Jersey.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; B.S. & M.S., Mechanical Engineer.

24. Languages and dialects (indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language Spanish Speak X Read X Understand X
Language English Speak X Read X Understand X
Language French Speak X Read X Understand X

201-205712

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

Lions Clubs.
American Society Mechanical Engineers.

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Piano playing; fencing.

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property

Capital over $1,000,000.
Earnings over $50,000. yearly.

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

Vice-Pres. - Ponce Cement Corp., Ponce, P. R.
Vice-Pres. - Puerto Rico Iron Works, Ponce, P. R.
Pres. - Puerto Rico Glass Corp., San Juan, P. R.
Vice-Pres. - Puerto Rico Clay Corp., San Juan, P. R.
Pres. - Fabrica Nacional Vidrio, Maiguetia, Venezuela
Dir. - Cementos Nacionales, Santiago de Cuba
Chairman - Ponce Products Inc., Miami, Fla.
Dir. - Maule Industries, Miami, Fla.
Dir. - Banco de Ponce, Ponce, P. R.

201-205712

29. (Continued)

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

Articles on: Industrial Democracy
American Citizenship
Cement Plants
Sugar Mills

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

Three brothers.
(Mr) Manuel A. Mayoral, Ponce, P. R.

32. List five character references.
(Col.) Francisco Parra Toro, Ponce, P. R.
(Col.) Walter E. Bligh, 41 E. 42d St., New York, N. Y.
(Judge) Cecil Snyder, San Juan, P. R.
(Judge) Jorge L. Cordova Dias, San Juan, P. R.

201-305712

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

None.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age 53

Apparent age 50

Height 5' 7½"

Eyes Brown

Face - shape Oval

Complexion White

Sex Male

Posture Straight

Weight 155

Teeth Good

Hair Brown

Scars On left cheek bone

Build Slender

General appearance

Prominent features

Other identifying features

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

201-205712

Subject's own hand

NPS/PRQ/149

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Instruction: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable"
3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. Full Name Luis (First) Albert (Middle) Ferré (Last)
2. Name in native script Luis A. Ferré
3. Name at birth (if different from 1.)
4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.)
5. a. Date of birth Feb. 17/1904. b. Place of birth Ponce, Puerto Rico
6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate American - White
7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.) —
8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) Owner.
Reina Mora St. #2, Ponce, P.R.
9. Permanent address (if different from 8.)
10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.)
Vice-Pres. Ferré Industries — Over $25,000
11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate granted.)
12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship)

FORM NO. 51-95A
MAY 1950

/PRQ/

13. Father - full name occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

ANTONIO TERRE' -
La Alhambra - Ponce, Puerto Rico -
Born in Cuba 1877 - June 9.
Came to P.R. 1894. - American.

14. Mother - same information as 13.

Mary Aguayo.
Born in Ponce, Puerto Rico. 1879.
Deceased.

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

~~[illegible]~~ FERRE nee

Lorencita Ramirez de Arellano.
Born July 9, 1905, San German, Puerto Rico.
American

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Antonio Luis Ferre' ~~Born~~ Feb. 1934.
American (Ponce, Puerto Rico.
Rosario J. Ferre'. ~~Born~~ Sept 28, 1938.
American. (Ponce, Puerto Rico

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

José A. Ferre' - Born 1902 - Ponce, P.R., American
Rosario Ferre' - Born 1905 - " " "
Carlos F. Ferre' - " 1907 - " " "
Herman Ferre' - Born 1909 " " "
Ysolina Ferre' - " 1914 " " "

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

None.

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

U.S. Passport # 31528 - Issued 1953. San Juan, Puerto Rico.

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

Roman Catholic -

21. Present and past political affiliations

Republican (Statehood) Party.

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited

Europe, Venezuela, Cuba.
Business & Travel.

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

Ponce Public Schools.
Morristown School - New Jersey.
Mass. Inst. of Technology - B.S. & M.S. - Mechanical Engineer

24. Languages and dialects (indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language Spanish Speak ✓ Read ✓ Understand ✓
Language English Speak ✓ Read ✓ Understand ✓
Language French Speak ✓ Read ✓ Understand ✓

25. **Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war**

26. **Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)**

Lions Clubs.
American Society Mechanical Engineers.

27. **Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)**

Piano playing - Fencing -

28. **Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property**

Capital over $1,000,000.00.
Earnings over $50,000 yearly.

29. **Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.**

Vice-Pres. Ponce Cement Corp., Ponce P.R.
" " P.R. Iron Works, " "
Pres. - P.R. Glass Corp. - San Juan P.R.
V. P. - P.R. Clay " - " "

/PRQ/

29. (Continued)

Pres. - Fabrica Nacional Vidrio - Maiquetia - Venezuela
Dir. - Cementos Nacionales - Santiago de Cuba, Cuba
Chairman - Ponce Products Inc. Miami, Fla
Dir. - Maule Industries " " "
Dir. - Banco de Ponce, Ponce, P.R.

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

Articles on Industrial Democracy
American Citizenship.
Cement Plants.
Sugar Mills.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

My three Brothers
(Mr) Manuel A. Mayoral, Ponce, Puerto Rico.

32. List five character references.

(Col.) Francisco Parra Toro, Ponce, Puerto Rico.
(Col.) Walter E. Bligh, 41 E. 42d St., New York City.
(Judge) Cecil Snyder, San Juan, Puerto Rico.
(Judge) Jorge L. Cordova Diaz, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

DOC 205712

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

None.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age 53.

Apparent age 50

Height 5'-7 1/4".

Eyes Brown.

Face - shape Oval.

Complexion White.

Sex Masc.

Posture Straight

Weight 155

Teeth Good.

Hair Brown.

Scars On left cheek bone

Build Slender.

General appearance

Prominent features

Other identifying features

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

14-00000

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

8P.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE 15 April 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, San Juan

[redacted]

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Dominican Republic Progress Report

Reference: A. HPS-A-497, 13 June 1955; B. HPS-A-941, 11 Sept 1956

Action Required: See para. 3

PRECIS

The Station herein outlines what it believes to be the targets for covert operations in the Dominican Republic. Included is a list of assets which the Station has for commencing operations, as well as operational leads, the potentialities of which the Station is investigating. Action taken or contemplated in regards to each of these assets or leads, is also set forth. Periodic progress reports will be forwarded to Headquarters on development of this program.

1. Pursuant to instructions given to REDDRUBER at Headquarters, the Station has begun to activate the persons listed in Reference B., where they are still available, and to discreetly ascertain from local contacts further operational leads. There follows a report on the progress made by the Station since REINDEPPER's return.

2. The Station's plan of action to begin third country KUTUBE operations in the Dominican Republic -- targeted primarily against the Dominican Intelligence Service and the Dominican Ruling Circles -- is as follows:-

A. Through SKEDADDLE (Operational Approval granted in HPS-A-[illegible]) to develop persons in Puerto Rico who have access to individuals in the Dominican Republic and can enter that area on a regular basis.

(1) SKEDADDLE has been contacted and advised of the activation of operations against the Dominican Republic. It must be pointed out that SKEDADDLE's attitude has cooled somewhat toward taking an active part in operations. He feels frustrated because of the long period in which he has attempted to maintain contact with assets and, at the same time, not being able to cultivate them. He informed that some contacts have lost interest and others no longer

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

16 Apr 57

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

KAPOK

21-6-4

have access to the target. He was advised of the importance of these operations and it is believed that he will work out in time.

(a) A review of all of the persons mentioned in Reference B. was made with SKEDADDLE, and it was decided to proceed first with the person mentioned in para. 4.g.(5), Reference B., Luis A. FERRE. Because FERRE is very well known all over this area and is considered most discreet by all who know him, SKEDADDLE has been instructed to approach him indirectly through a cut-out. The cut-out will be SKEDADDLE's personal friend and close confidant for many years, Angel FONSECA Jiminez. FONSECA is a senior member of the political party headed by FERRE and a member of the local legislature. He is very close to FERRE. Naturally, no indication of Station interest will be divulged at this time. FERRE is considered to be a good starting point because he is the owner of many businesses in the Caribbean Area and in PBPRIME and has had many persons working for him over a period of years who owe him allegiance. This includes persons in the Dominican Republic.

(2) Another suggestion by SKEDADDLE which was accepted was that he sound out two National Guard Lieutenant Colonels under his command who have access to persons traveling to and from the Dominican Republic from Puerto Rico. In private life, these men are United States Customs inspectors, who handle entry from the Dominican Republic. They are Lt. Colonel Alberto A. PICO, of Ponce, Puerto Rico, and Lt. Colonel O. MATTEI, of San Juan, Puerto Rico. Both of these men are loyal and have clearances from ODIBEX. || Check

(a) SKEDADDLE will interview these men for operational leads.

(3) Interrogation of SKEDADDLE revealed that his relationship with Hilario TIRADO, mentioned in para. 4.g.(2), Reference B., has deteriorated.

(a) It is believed advisable at this time to sound out TIRADO through his former colleagues, which will be done in the near future.

(4) At the next meeting with SKEDADDLE, which will take place in the next few days, he will be requested to covertly contact certain Dominican exiles (see page 3., Reference B.), resident in Puerto Rico, to ascertain the true assets they have within the Dominican Republic. It is felt that SKEDADDLE's morale must be improved prior to assigning this additional work load.

(5) Also at the next meeting, SKEDADDLE will be requested to contact Francisco PARRA-TORRO in Ponce, Puerto Rico, whose potential is described in Reference B.

B. Through local contacts develop a cadre of PBPRIME continentals located in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic that would have spotting and casual intelligence potential. (Please note it is not the intention of Station to jeopardize the position of any PBPRIME citizen or company actually located within the Dominican Republic) In this regard, the following is of importance:

SECRET KAPOK

DESENSITIZED

14-00000

Mr. Holcomb [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]

DESENSITIZED

VIA AIR

DISPATCH NO. HPSA-941

Jck

CLASSIFICATION

DATE

TO Chief, WHD

FROM Chief of Station, San Juan

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Dominican Republic Situation Report

REF: HPSA-497, 13 Jun 55

1. For Headquarters information, the following is a resumé of current material that is maintained in order to keep reference up-to-date and applicable should the occasion arise. Part I of reference remains the same, however, certain personnel changes outdate the operational section, Part II of reference. Under Part II, A, the Mission, Objectives and Tasks as stated in reference would be correct were the Station actually conducting operations in the Dominican Republic. However, as the Station is holding any activities in this direction in abeyance per previous correspondence on the subject, it is felt that we should restate our tasks to more accurately reflect the Station's present activity; namely, being prepared for the actual implementation of operations when the occasion arises. Further, that Headquarters may be cognizant of the Station's current activities in fulfilling these tasks, there is included a more current listing of the covert assets maintained for the future implementation of operations.

[illegible]

2. Under the present situation, the Station's tasks in maintaining itself in readiness for the possible initiation of operations in the future are:

a. Developing and maintaining background information on persons who are active in anti-Dominican activities in Puerto Rico who, should the occasion arise, would be potential agent material. Should anything happen to the present regime in the Dominican Republic some of these persons would undoubtedly return there and become active in politics.

b. Developing and maintaining current background information and information on the activities of persons who have contact with prominent members of the present Government in the Dominican Republic and who have qualifications indicating that they are potential agent material and might be called upon to act in our behalf should the need arise.

INDEX

CLASSIFICATION

11 Sept 56
22-6-4

FORM NO. 51-28A

3. The Station feels that in directing its efforts in both the above directions, it will have at least a good starting point when operations in the Dominican Republic begin. Naturally, per previous correspondence, all of these operations would be worked from out side the Dominican Republic utilizing third country methods. The Station does not believe that any of the prospective assets, other than SKEDADDLE, should become aware of our interest in them under the present circumstances. It is felt that were we to carry operational development of these assets any further at this time that we would run the risk of having them go cold and possibly sour as we could not actually put them to work under present conditions. We feel that this is the best method of keeping our assets on ice.

4. A current listing of assets available as of the present date is as follows:

a. SKEDADDLE -- Situation is the same as that noted in reference. He is still considered a very good choice as a future P/A for these operations. He continues to maintain contact with Dominicans located in Puerto Rico and to keep himself aware of their activities. Most of the persons listed below are contacted through SKEDADDLE.

b. Tobias ECHOLS -- Subject is still available through his place of employment. Subject has become less active in reserve activities to date. Contact with him is maintained through SKEDADDLE.

c. SKEET is a commercial outfit and the writer maintains occasional contact with it.

d. WANTA-4 remains in his present position, however, he is considered better situated to assist the Station in money conversions, etc., and is no longer considered necessary to this objective.

e. Leslie HIGHLEY is a contact of Station personnel. He is in the advertising business and has previously handled the account for the publicity of the Dominican Republic Fair in Puerto Rico. He is now planning to open an office in the Dominican Republic. Presently, he is planning a campaign to interest Puerto Rican tourists in travel to the Dominican Republic. His contacts are strictly business, and he has let the Dominican Republic Government know that he will not involve himself in any of their political machinations. They are apparently satisfied with this arrangement. Subject has indicated a willingness to report anything of interest that comes to his attention in his dealings with and in the Dominican Republic. The Station believes that his greatest potential is that of a spotter of potential agent material in the Dominican Republic. He is carried as current with that in mind.

f. The active anti-Trujillo organization here is made up of Dominican Exiles for the most part. Contact with that organization is maintained through SKEDADDLE. The possibility of potential agent material among their leaders is considered to be good. Among this group are the following:

(1) (Dr) Angel MORALES, leader of the Dominican exiles in Puerto Rico. MORALES has no visible means of support, possibly lives on private income.

(2) Carmen Natalia MARTINEZ, secretary to MORALES, active Dominican exile.

(3) Dr. Leovigildo CUELLO, M.D., occasionally practices in Puerto Rico; is second man in the organisation of Dominican exiles in Puerto Rico.

(4) Oscar MICHELENA, Dominican exile, active, operates a photo shop in Santurce, Puerto Rico.

(5) Frank GOILLINI, leader of the pickets who regularly demonstrate in front of the Dominican Republic Consulate in San Juan. Subject has a brother who is a printer in San Juan but he is not visibly employed. Subject is apparently a fanatic and recently reported to the local police that the killer of Dr. GALINDEZ in New York was in San Juan after him. He claimed that the killer was a person known as "El Cojo". Local investigation did not substantiate his claim which probably was done as a publicity attempt in the anti-Trujillo campaign locally.

(6) Amado and Rafael HERNANDEZ, Dominican exiles, San Juan insurance brokers. Subjects, at one time, occupied an office in the same building with the Dominican Consulate but have moved recently to the Condado Section of Santurce. They recently told SKEDADDLE that activity of the anti-Trujillo group here has been "quiet of late".

(7) Luis ORTIZ Arseno, active Dominican exile in San Juan.

c. Persons with official contacts in the Dominican Republic.

(1) (Captain) Enrique JANER, Professor of Military Science ROTC, NPII at the University of Puerto Rico, is a naturalised PBPRIME citizen and is known to Station through G-2 here. Subject has two or three brothers who served in World War II with PBPRIME. His family is originally from the Dominican Republic but they apparently fled some years ago and took up permanent residence in Puerto Rico. The family has relatives there and subject still knows people in the Dominican Republic. Recently JANER recommended one Rafael MONTAZ, a lawyer in the Dominican Republic, who is the NPII director of the Historical Museum in downtown Ciudad Trujillo, and on the strength of this recommendation, MONTAZ was contacted by a local ODIBEX officer. As a result of this contact, the ODIBEX officer suggested both JANER and MONTAZ to the Station as possible operational prospects.

(2) Hilario TIRADO, Puerto Rican, formerly a Warrant Officer with the CIC and now operating a photo shop owned by his brother-in-law on Avenida Ponce de Leon, Stop 18-20, Santurce, Puerto Rico, visits the Dominican Republic frequently to go hunting with a prominent Dominican who is his close personal friend. Both TIRADO and this Dominican are ardent cock fight fans and the Dominican often brings his cocks to fight in Puerto Rican rings. TIRADO is recommended by SKEDADDLE as completely trustworthy and could be approached should the need arise.

(3) Francisco PARRA-TORO, former G-2 Colonel, retired and now an attorney-at-law with offices in the Banco de Ponce Building, Ponce, Puerto Rico, knows many persons traveling to the Dominican Republic. He is a close friend of SKEDADDLE and was introduced at one time to the former Chief of Station.

(4) Captain CANEPA, on active duty with the Selective Service System in Puerto Rico, is a naturalized PBPRIME citizen. His father was a former cattle farmer in the Dominican Republic, however, it is rumored that Trujillo wanted his father's property and forced the family to move out of the Dominican Republic. The family fled and settled here. CANEPA should know persons on both sides of the political fence in the Dominican Republic. SKEDADDLE knows CANEPA superficially but knew his sister well when he worked for G-2 here. CANEPA is described as good, serious and probably could provide operational leads in Puerto Rico.

(5) Luis A. FERRE, Puerto Rican industrialist, is head of Empresas FERRE in Puerto Rico and is also a member of the local legislature. Subject is also head of the Puerto Rican Statehood Party (affiliate of the Republican Party) and is that party's candidate for the Governorship in the forthcoming elections. He is known to SKEDADDLE and could provide operational leads as his company does much business in the Dominican Republic.

UPIL

(6) Continuing contact is also maintained by Station personnel with senior members of large PBPRIME firms with offices both here and in the Dominican Republic which include, for example, Esso Standard Oil Company and the Texaco Company. These contacts are exploitable and could be very valuable should the need arise.

b. Other persons of less reputable character but of possible use should a particular situation arise are:

(1) Luis Manuel BORDAS of Hermanos BORDAS, Inc., Puerto Rico, is a large coffee dealer in Puerto Rico with central offices in Pueblo Viejo, Urb. Monterrey, P.R. Subject was born in the Dominican Republic and is a naturalized PBPRIME citizen. He was drafted in World War II; received a commission through OCS during his stay in the service and was described as being a loyal and good officer. Upon discharge from the service he joined the anti-Trujillo forces in Puerto Rico. In 1949 or 1950, BORDAS purchased

14-00000

many canteens, ammunition belts, etc., at a surplus sale at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, which he had shipped to a Dominican Exile group in Cuba who were then being trained. At this time he also engaged in recruiting Puerto Rican veterans, promising them high salaries and rewards if they would go to Cuba and join the anti-Trujillo forces in training there. The recruits were sent to Cuba via Miami, however, one of the recruits returned to Miami from Cuba and exposed the whole operation to the Miami Herald which was instrumental in blowing the preparations being made and exposing BORDAS. It is said that the government had enough on him to prosecute for acting in behalf of a foreign group, however, little action was taken against him. His commission was revoked, however, because of these activities. At present, reports are that BORDAS is "taking it easy" because his firm is now doing business in the Dominican Republic. He is known to SKEDADDLE and if we desired, possible advantage could be taken of his anti-Trujillo sentiments in view of his past activities.

(2) FRUTPIAZA, owner and operator of the "2 Dice Club" in San Juan, is a big gambler and unsavory. Subject is rumored to be a Trujillo agent in Puerto Rico and is reported as the type who would probably play both sides of the Trujillo argument. He has some contact with pro-Trujillo Dominicans and possibly also with anti-Trujillo Dominicans. He is not considered trustworthy nor is he recommended by SKEDADDLE, however, he is listed here as a possible should ever a person of his "talents" be desired.

5. It is requested that the names listed in Paragraph 4 above be checked by the desk at a Headquarters level for indication of points that might not be known to the Station.

William S. Fadane
WILLIAM S. FADANE

11 September 1956

Distribution
3-Headquarters

11 Sep 56
32-6 ✓

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 24/10/57	ACTION [✓ OPEN] AMEND CLOSE
FROM RI/AN	ROOM NO.	TELEPHONE

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☑ NONSENSITIVE

201 NO. 1. 205712

SOURCE DOCUMENT HRSA-01519

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): FERRE, LUIS ALBERT

SEX 3. M ☐ F ☐

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2. (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
YES ☐ NO ☐	17-02-04	PR	PONCE.	1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION: Vice-Pres. Ferre Industries

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.
PR	WH/3AN		

COMMENTS:

PUNCHED

201- 205712

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
YES [✓ NO]	YES [✓ NO]	M. Turner

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 86

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(44)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FEB. 60

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

FROM:

RID

Adws

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/SR/CI/P	21 MAR 196			
2.				
3. IP/DMS -		5 Jan 77		MSJ
4. DW - (n-		5 Jan 77		
5. C/CA/I				
6. CI-5				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

RYBAT

1 cy det for CI/SIG

C/CI/SIG has advised that British officers handled these reports 06 on (Wynne – Ellen) locally

4 March 1962

RYBAT

RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO RID FOR MICROFILMING BEFORE IT IS FILED. IF THIS DOCUMENT IS TO BE RESTRICTED, CHECK HERE ☐ RESTRICTED TO ________

Unit Designation

RID/MI 1085 L

RID/FI

201-044788

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

VPJ

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET/RYBAT

CELA-35954

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-294855

TO	Chief, WE
INFO	
FROM	Chief of Station, London
DATE	14 March 1962
SUBJECT	Operational/REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AELADLE (Michael WYNNE-ELLIS) 06
ACTION REQUIRED	See below
REFERENCES	OELW-19307, 23 January 1962

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

01

SMOTH appreciated the KGB document forwarded with Reference and have submitted the following comments and questions:

1. "We have a number of questions about this document on which we should be grateful for your comments, and as background to some of these we think it will be useful for you to have an account of WYNNE-ELLIS' dealings with AELADLE: 06

a. "They date from June 1961 when he was considering a visit to the U.S.S.R. He mentioned this to the Soviet Ambassador, whom he met at the Queen's Birthday Celebration in Helsinki, (he did not realise at first that it was the Ambassador to whom he was talking). The Ambassador suggested that he should get in touch with Ivan Efimovich SERGEEV, an identified R.I.S. officer.

06

b. "Between 5th and 15th July 1961 WYNNE-ELLIS went to the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy to see about the visa. Apparently he did not see SERGEEV but met AELADLE who showed a good deal of curiosity about him and asked whether he had ever been to the U.S.S.R. before, whether he had applied in London for a visa, what he was doing in Helsinki etc. The possibility of AELADLE taking English lessons from WYNNE-ELLIS was mentioned and AELADLE said he would get in touch with WYNNE-ELLIS about this. He asked for a short biography of WYNNE-ELLIS. 06

c. "He brought the visa application forms and his biography to AELADLE two days later and although AELADLE was apparently very busy he asked WYNNE-ELLIS for clarification of various details. AELADLE did not take English lessons from WYNNE-ELLIS. 06

d. 06 "At the end of September, or beginning of October 1961, WYNNE-ELLIS received a letter from AELADLE asking for the address of his pen friend in Russia, Stanislav GALKIN, who had been concerned in WYNNE-ELLIS' 06 recruitment by the R.I.S. 06 WYNNE-ELLIS telephoned AELADLE to say that he did not have the new address. AELADLE told him that if he wanted it, he could have a visa 'tomorrow' to visit Stalingrad (now Volgograd) and in the course of conversation said 'sometimes it is better to visit places but not old friends'. We wondered at the time, and ever more after AELADLE's defection, whether this remark had any special significance.

06

e. "On 16th November AELADLE invited WYNNE-ELLIS to attend a Soviet concert. AELADLE told him that he had been granted a tourist visa but that if he wished to visit his pen friend he would require a letter of invitation from him. AELADLE asked about his British friends in Helsinki and said that he would phone WYNNE-ELLIS next week to make a further appointment. He did not do this. 06

H/N

CLASSIFICATION PAGE NO

06

f. "A further development which may be of interest is that in early January 1962 WYNNE-ELLIS received a further letter from his Russian pen friend giving him a fairly pressing invitation to visit him. 06 WYNNE-ELLIS, who was not aware of AELADLE's defection, wrote to AELADLE telling him that he had now received the invitation, and inviting him to coffee at his house!

2. "We thought that the arrival of this letter (it was dated 25.12.61) so shortly after AELADLE's defection, 06 and after a long gap in the correspondence between WYNNE-ELLIS and his pen friend, might indicate that the R.I.S. suspected that WYNNE-ELLIS had had a hand in AELADLE's defection. 06 WYNNE-ELLIS was never aware that AELADLE was an R.I.S. officer.

3. 06 "As you know from an earlier conversation about this case WYNNE-ELLIS is a most unsatisfactory character to deal with, and we believe that the R.I.S. have found him equally unsatisfactory! We have no reason to suppose that 24 (he has double-crossed us since he was turned) but we would not exclude this as a possibility - or at least would not exclude the possibility that he might have considered this. 06

4. "Our questions on the WYNNE-ELLIS document supplied by AELADLE are as follows:

a. "What is the manuscript word at the top of the first page, and what is its significance?

b. "The two typed words, one immediately below the manuscript word on page 1 and the other to the left, are not legible on our copy.

c. "Is there any significance in the date 11th November being in inverted commas, thus "11"?

d. "We are puzzled by what at first sight appeared to be a date, 22.XII.1961, in the heading immediately above the text on page 1. In fact the Roman numerals 'XII' are the cyrillic letter XП, but we do not understand their meaning. Can AELADLE explain this?

e. "What is the name in which the document is signed, and does AELADLE know the true identity of this person?

f. 06 "We are a little surprised at the cyrillic transliteration of WYNNE-ELLIS's name. We should have expected the KGB to have a system which would enable them to get back to the correct English spelling. Admittedly WYNNE-ELLIS's name is an awkward one to deal with. 06

g. "We should have expected that AELADLE would have sent a trace request to his Headquarters shortly after the first meeting with WYNNE-ELLIS in July 1961. Yet the reply was apparently sent only on 11th November. Can AELADLE comment on this? 06

5. "We do not wish to suggest by these comments that we suspect that this document might be a forgery, but we would be grateful for your confirmation that you do not consider this a possibility.

6. "You will no doubt in due course be questioning 06 AELADLE in detail on his knowledge of the WYNNE-ELLIS case. We do not at this stage wish to suggest detailed questions except to remark that we do not know the real names of any of the R.I.S. officers who dealt with him - including the man whom, it is stated in the AELADLE document, he met in the U.K. There is some mystery about this because WYNNE-ELLIS 06 denies having met any R.I.S. officer in the U.K., he did however have contact with various Russians here (including an R.I.S. officer) and we suspect that the R.I.S. officer never identified himself as such to WYNNE-ELLIS." 06

James L. Griffiths
James L. GRIFFITHS

Distribution:

3 - Chief, SR ✓
2 - Chief, WE

3|PJ

SECRET

20 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Highlights of Tape-Recorded Conversation in Miami Between
Mr. William D. Pawley and an Unidentified Cuban during
Period 17-18 October

1. On 20 October the undersigned and Owen Faust of WH/3 listened to the play-back of a tape, brought to Washington from Miami and given to Colonel King by Mr. Pawley on 19 October, which was a recording of Mr. Pawley's conversations with two Cubans during the period 17-18 October. The first conversation was with an unidentified Cuban, believed to be a member of a group of wealthy anti-CASTRO Cubans, members of which have talked to Mr. Pawley recently about their plans for sabotage of the coming sugar harvest as reported in UPWA-32 dated 2 October. The second Cuban was AMPACA-1, a Cuban journalist of operational interest to Station Habana, and a separate memorandum is submitted on that conversation.

2. The unidentified Cuban, who had somewhat of an accent and spoke indistinctly, was difficult to understand. He mentioned a meeting "with some of our people who came up from Cuba" to discuss plans. He said his group had been contacted by a representative of General Jose Eleuterio PEDRAZA, leader of Cuban revolutionary groups in the Dominican Republic, who wanted to know what action their group had taken and was told that they had a plan "to start sabotage". The Cuban said the PEDRAZA representative said their group (the PEDRAZA group) had four provinces organised in Cuba, mentioning Camaguey and Santa Clara, and that they had two provinces yet to be organized -- Habana and Matanzas.

3. The Cuban said his group needed two things -- moral backing and money; he pointed out that Cubans in Cuba are afraid to start an underground movement, and there was no way to raise funds, etc. Mr. Pawley gave him no encouragement on the money angle, saying that even if there were Americans willing to run the risk of becoming involved in Cuban revolutionary activities by furnishing money for such a movement, which he doubted, he felt that at the present time it would be like "putting money down a rat-hole" for the following reasons: (1) there is no unity among the anti-CASTRO groups, and there are at least 10 that he knows of who are working absolutely independently of one another; and (2) CASTRO is in control of the country and has the support of a large number of Cubans, especially the under-privileged. Mr. Pawley said he felt the Cuban economic situation was worsening fast and that if it gets bad enough, a large number of Cubans will turn on CASTRO; but until that time comes it would be dangerous to try to organise a revolutionary movement.

SECRET

201-77378

4. Mr. Pawley asked the Cuban if his group felt they had moral support of the U. S. and the Cuban replied that they wanted U. S. moral support but whether they had it or not, they felt they were obliged to carry through with their plans. Mr. Pawley said he didn't know what to tell him -- would have to think about it and see if anything could be done. He said, "having been connected with the U. S. Government, I can't get involved in revolutionary movements". Also said he would hate to see the Dominican Government get involved, which might be difficult to avoid with so many Cuban exiles there, but commented that he understood "the Dominican Government hasn't given them a dime".

Martha Tharpe
WH/III/CARIB

MICROFILMED
JUL 1983
DOC. MICRO. SER.

VIA: A I R (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HDCA-1382

1P

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 12 June 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Ciudad Trujillo

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— PAWLEY Business Interests in the Dominican Republic

ACTION REQUIRED: For info only.

1. In addition to minerals exploitation in which Mr. William D. PAWLEY has substantial investments, negotiations are being concluded for the purchase by PAWLEY of the Hotel Hamaca in Boca Chica, a resort town near the almost-completed new international airport, about 30 km east of Ciudad Trujillo.

2. Another activity which is kept very much under wraps is the concession granted PAWLEY for procurement and world-wide sale of all new issues of Dominican postage stamps. This activity is managed by Edward F. PAWLEY, brother of William, whose office is in the Dominican post office building.

D. Pawley

3. The source (considered sensitive) of the information in paragraph 2. is Mrs. Nora BRITZIUS, a U. S. citizen employed by PAWLEY Wm. D in the stamp business. The source volunteered the information on a very confidential basis to Helene I. DAHLERUP at a social gathering.

D. Republic

Edward F. Stoneset
EDWARD F. STONESET

10 June 1958

Distribution:
3 - Hqs.

CS COPY

INDEX

FORM NO. 51-28A

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

12 June 58

201-77378

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

SECRET

22 JAN 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on COBB (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened __________ OI Code A2.

☒ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Barry Gilton (name) Ops Officer (title) LA/M/F (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ________ (initials) 3 FEB (date) 197__

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-278841

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

SECRET
When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET

CASE OFFICER CHECK LIST

PROJECT

CRYPT/PSEUDO: LICOOKY/1 (Joyce H. PINEINCH) 201- 278841 (7 Vol.)
AREA/BASE : WH/New York C/O: aka

I. TRACES*

Base: Req'd by Base: DO Base/N.Y.-3219, 1 Aug 67
(For local traces)
Other: Req'd by
(Specify)
Hqs: [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Reply to Base:

II. CLEARANCES

POS : Req'd DO Base/N.Y.-3219 Granted
PRQ I fw'd to CI/OA 3 Aug 67

PCSA : Green List # 182786- [illegible]
Req'd Granted

OA : Req'd Granted
Complete PRQs I & II fw'd

CSA : Req'd Granted

CNC : Req'd Granted

OTHER : Req'd Granted
(Specify)

SGSWIRL :

III. SPECIAL APPROVALS/CONCURRENCES

60-11 : Req'd Granted
A/WOMACE : Req'd Granted
LNERGO :: Req'd Granted
Field Office Coordination
OTHER : DCS: #039, 3 Aug 67
(Specify)

IV. CONTRACTS

Type: Eff. Date & Term
Secrecy Agmnt; Termination Date

V. ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS:

Describe briefly)

ACCOMMODATION TELEPHONE:
Describe briefly

VI DOMESTIC ASSETS INVENTORY

Fw'd Hqs. Rec'd

VII. TERMINATION OF INTEREST

Date: Hqs. Notified
Reasons for Termination:

Clearance Cancelled:
Secrecy Agreement:
Quit Claim:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
COBB, Viola June	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☐ 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

☐ 13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# R34[illegible].

201-278841

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-278841
~~201-278841~~

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

SECRET

11 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : WH/Personnel, Attention: ~~Mr.~~ Renehan

SUBJECT : Joyce C. PINEINCH (201-278841)

1. Subject has been terminated effective 1 July 1966 by the Mexico City Station. She was paid her salary through 30 June and was given her income tax refund for the period 1 January 1965 through 30 June 1966. A copy of the termination Secrecy Oath, signed in true name, is on file in Subject's official 201 file.

2. It is requested that the CPD and Office of Finance files be altered to reflect the termination of Subject.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

201-278841

13 October

rcd & fwd
WH/B&F
c/WH/SS
c/CPD
OF/CAAS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

SECRET

Miss Joyce H. Pineirch

Dear **Miss Pineirch**

Reference is made to your current **MOC** ~~contract~~ with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective **21 April 1966**, said **MOC** ~~contract~~ is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"**10**. Taxes. As an independent contractor, monies paid you under paragraph **four (4)** above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal Income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms and conditions of said **MOC** ~~contract~~ remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

8 Jun

cy WH/B&F
WH/1.

14-00000

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 25 September 1962

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT: Engagement of [illegible]-1 as Independent Contractor.

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project ________ and is chargeable to Headquarters. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 [illegible] 1962 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for Subject's use has been obtained. Type OA Date 29 August 1962.

3. CITIZENSHIP: The Subject ( ) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid 250.00 dollars per mo. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is $ --- dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's salary. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc. include: ________

5. TAXES : Subject (X) is ( ) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner [illegible] %, deducted. or $45.00

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) SUBJECT ( ) will (X) will not be [illegible] quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increased cost of living and quarters expenses: ________

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject ( ) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimbursed: As approved by Case Officer and Chief of Station

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation None

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

Signed ________
Case Officer

Reviewed ________
Contract Approving Officer

Approved Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

Distribution: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs
1 File P-____
1 Admin Office

201-278841

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICERS:

1. Prepare Orig & 4 copies for distribution as above. Extra copies as needed.

2. PRIOR HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL IS REQUIRED before any commitments can be made regarding the following special benefits: Death; Disability; Missing in Action; Resettlement; and Citizenship or Emergency Assistance.

3. The dispatch sending copies to Hqs should provide, among other things, the following: (a) Statement regarding primary functions of the individual and the cover under which he will operate; (b) Pay instructions if to be paid by Headquarters; and (c) If cover income is to be offset, the amount of such income and date of first payment by the cover organization.

SECRET

April 18, June Cobb called the New York DODS office about what to do about her CIA salary on her income tax return.

After discussions with CF/CAAS and George Powell of the Tax Committee, I phoned DODS to telll Cobb the following:

> Since she was supposedly a student in Mexico, and she had paid tax on her CIA salary, she was not to list her salary anywhere on her 1966 tax return. However, she should send us a copy of her overt 1966 tax return.

charlotte Bustos-Videla

[illegible] 1301

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RID CONTROL NO. (Filled in by RID)

DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST

FROM: (Requester's name) OR AFFIX REQUESTER GUMMED LABEL.
Renihan BR 4169

DATE OF REQUEST: 18-7-67

BRANCH: WH/PER
ROOM NO.: 3D5309
PHONE NO.: 4460

TO:	DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1 RID/FILES			EJC
2 REQUESTER			
3 RID/FILES			
4			
5			

SUBJECT: Penernch
Peniunch, Joyce H.

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from RID/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

☒ Temporary ☐ Permanent

4. Indicate source of reference:

☐ Document reference from RID/Index.
☐ Document reference from source other RID/Index.

VERIFIED

R

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE
201-278841	CS COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY	

FORM 11-64 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38)

21 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Joyce H. PINEINCH (p) - Tax Assessment

1. A covert Federal income tax percentage of two and eight-tenths (02.8) per cent of PINEINCH's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee. This percentage assessment is effective 1 December 1964, the beginning date of tax year 1965.

2. The retroactive application of this assessment to tax year 1965 will result in a dollar assessment of $84.00 (02.8% of $3,000.00). After applying the 1965 covert tax withholding of $540.00, a refund of $455.00 will be due PINEINCH for 1965. This eliminates the requirement for a covert tax return for 1965.

3. An acknowledged letter of instruction will be forwarded at a later date.

(s) JOHN F. PATTON

JOHN F. PATTON
Secretary
Covert Tax Committee

Finance (2)
CPD
WH
OF/CTB
CTC #361

201-278841

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

- retire files & comm'l POA. Make copy to send to CI/OPP/DO but give to me as I want to make a comment.

CI/

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DO/RI		24 APR 1968	24 APR 1968	
2. C/PO/LIB-2		24 APR 1968		OB
3. 2.m.				
4. Lee				JOL
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-277341

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
22 apr 68

DOCUMENT NUMBER
JNDA 03761

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Domestic Operations

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Base, New York K

SUBJECT
0 ISOLOG/LICOOKY -- Termination of Contact with LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action required: retire file, again.
References: A. UNDA 3502, 22 January 1968
B. UNDA 3650, 13 March 1968

1. During a meeting with LICOOKY/1 on 5 April 1968 agreement was reached that the WOFIRM relationship with her would be terminated. A memorandum of contact (NYM-2689) concerning the meeting is attached herewith, and indicates the reasons for this termination. No administrative action is required of either the Base or Headquarters in this instance, as LICOOKY/1 was not being paid by us here, and was formally terminated once before (1966). Her file can be retired, again, and this time presumably will be the last time.

2. Termination was very amicable, and LICOOKY/1 holds no ill-will for WOFIRM: she just does not wish to have any relationship with WOFIRM anymore.

3. The writer fully expects to hear from LICOOKY/1 from time to time by phone (in fact, she called later the same day of the meeting to wish the writer a pleasant Easter, as she had forgotten to do so during the meeting), but does not plan any further personal contact.

HOWARD G. FIGALAN

Attachment: NYM-2689 h/w

Distribution: 2 C/DO w/att.

APR 22 1968

1 H/w att

CS COPY

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UNDA ~~3739~~ 3761

DATE
17 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-278841

SECRET

MEMORANDUM 5 April 1968

TO: LICOOKY/1 File NYM-2689

FROM: Howard G. PIGALAN

SUBJECT: Meeting with LICOOKY/1, 5 April 1968

Distribution:
1-Unit A Chrono
2-Unit B Chrono
1-LICOOKY/1
1-WBM/Info (paras 3, 4 & 5)

1. A meeting with LICOOKY/1 was held at 1100 hours, Friday, 5 April 1968. We breakfasted, and then held the meeting at the BARTHOLOMEW site. As is detailed below, we reached a mutual agreement that the relationship was not worth pursuing; this was thoroughly amicable, and recontact methods are available on both sides.

2. Substantive matters first. LICOOKY/1 said that John GERASSI had been in town on 23 March for the day. He was invited to lunch at the CMUN that day, Sunday. Apparently, GERASSI, is back in the good graces of the Cuban regime. He told LICOOKY/1 that he would be spending this Summer in Arizona.

3. LICOOKY/1 has been commissioned by M. S. ARNONI, editor of The Minority of One, to write a piece on the recent intellectual/political developments in Czechoslovakia.

4. LICOOKY/1 thought up, and is arranging, a Czech film festival to begin 15 April. It is to be sponsored by the St. Clemens Film Association, St. Clemens Church, 423 West 46th Street (this church houses the American Place Theatre -- Robert LOWELL's group). LICOOKY/1 got this idea from the recent Czech travails -- which she hails as evidence of the power of Czech intellocracy -- and from the commission referred to in paragraph 3 above. She contacted the Czech UN Mission which put her in touch with PAVLIC, the Czech Cultural Attache in the Washington Embassy. PAVLIC was all for the idea, and will be here for the opening of the festival. Milos FORMAN (director of the film "Loves of a Blonde") is currently here at the Hotel Chelsea (a "dump on 23rd on the West Side" -- LICOOKY/1's characterization), and will participate in the festival. KADAR (director of the "Shop on Main Street") has been invited to participate. LICOOKY/1 is going to ask PAVLIC whether it would be OK for her to ask DRV[illegible] who teaches film at Columbia and who is a Czech in exile, to participate. LICOOKY/1 is very enthusiastic about this venture.

not true

5. COMMENT: Milos FORMAN is mentioned in the article about Czechoslovakia in the 5 April 1968 issue of Time Magazine.

HTW att 1.70 UNDA 3761 SECRET RS COPY 201-278841

6. I knew something was bothering LICOOKY/1 and made her drag it out into the open. She started by remarking that WOFIRM and its computer apparently checked the welfare of its old agents every so often, and that this was the nature of our relationship. I explained that this was not the case, that I had found out she was in Manhattan and suggested to Washington that LICOOKY/1 might be of some value to us. This surprised her, and she apologized. She then took off on how when she was in Cuba she had dealt with Fidel and Che and Celia, and when she was involved with Guatemala she was dealing with AREVALO. She said that she didn't want to sound snobbish, but that she was accustomed to dealing with top politicos and intellectuals; she referred to a statement that I had made previously that perhaps she could get Tana de GAMEZ to invite her along to one of Tana's lunches with Cuban Permanent Representative Ricardo ALARCON Quesada. She said that she didn't want WOFIRM to think that she would seek out and cultivate lower level people, that she wasn't built that way. LICOOKY/1 said that even though Tana was a friend and that she liked her, Tana was not her equal, and that Tana wasn't "on her pedestal". That ALARCON was certainly not in LICOOKY/1's intellectual category. LICOOKY/1 said that she considered herself as very flexible, but not that much. LICOOKY/1 is a "special person" and that WOFIRM bureaucracy -- with the exceptions of "Bill" (her Mexico case officer, a friend of the writer), C/WH/1 (with whom LICOOKY/1 is particularly taken), and the writer (LICOOKY/1 repeatedly assured me that she had a very sincere esteem for me) -- probably didn't understand or acknowledge this. LICOOKY/1 said her feelings for certain WOFIRMers were one thing, but her dislike of WOFIRM itself was something else. WOFIRM is a massive card index that shows Miguel Angel ASTURIAS as an old "Nicaraguan war-horse" -- ASTURIAS of course is Guatemalan. LICOOKY/1 couldn't stop liking Communists regardless of WOFIRM desires.

and

7. LICOOKY/1 went on and on in this/similar veins, very impassioned, but very straightforward and without personal rancor for the writer. Summing up, the stated reasons as to why she does not wish to continue regular collaboration with WOFIRM are as follows:

A. fear of compromise -- LICOOKY/1 said that were her relationship with us to become known, it would ruin her standing in and associations with the intellectual community;

B. distaste for WOFIRM -- LICOOKY/1 really believes that WOFIRM is a large card file with all the cards having errors on them;

C. intellectual honesty -- LICOOKY/1 does not think that her intellectual honesty gains from her WOFIRM relationship;

D. lack of understanding -- WOFIRM, except for the three officers cited above, does not really understand the real LICOOKY/1.

8. Obviously, the unsaid reasons are the ones that really brought about this "confrontation", in the writer's opinion. These are as follows:

A. emotional instability -- LICOOKY/1, as has been known for years by the writer, is not the most stable of individuals;

B. money -- LICOOKY/1 receives no money from us anymore (since her termination in Mexico), and the writer suspects that LICOOKY/1 could have more easily rationalized working for the "Giant Indices in Washington" were she on salary;

C. sex -- in this case, lack of same (LICOOKY/1 comes always to emotional involvement with her male associates, and her Case Officers cannot fulfill this need, thus giving rise to problems; in the past, LICOOKY/1 could easily obtain her physical/emotional fulfillment in Cuba and Mexico without relying on the Case Officer, but now she is getting older and quite shop-worn and cannot compete for attention from men in the environment of a place such as Manhattan);

D. discipline -- again, in this case, lack of same; LICOOKY/1 tell us what she does, we don't tell her what she should do.

9. LICOOKY/1 exhibited some anguish over this whole affair. She has been upset for the past month, over this as well as over the confused outlook for her in general. It was made very clear at one point what aid and comfort could have been extended to LICOOKY/1 to alleviate her anguish, and the writer beat a hasty retreat to the kitchenette for a tactical drink of water.

10. Not elaborated above were the writer's answers to LICOOKY/1's opinions, but these were effective in countering her logic, if not her attitudes. LICOOKY/1 had to agree that WOFIRM did have grounds for its assessment of her performance - not awfully good.

11. At any rate, the entire proceedings were very amicable, and, as mentioned above, LICOOKY/1 stressed that her basic opposition to WOFIRM was not on personal grounds, as she had enjoyed her dealings with her "three favorite contacts". She offered to call the writer anytime she had something tangible to pass on, and that he should do the same. It's just that she would be more comfortable as an ex-agent than as a current one. The writer fully expects to hear from her from time to time.

12. It actually was quite an interesting session.

201-278841

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA

FROM: (Division) (Case officer) (Extension) DO/I/B-2 Lee Peterson 4008

SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used): LICOOKY/1

NAME SHOWN IS: ☐ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☒ CRYPT

CI/OA NO.:

201 NO.: 201-278841

PROJECT:

DATE OF BIRTH: 24 August 1927,

PLACE OF BIRTH: Ponca, Oklahoma

AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD: ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

Subject requested that her relationship with CIA be terminated.

DATE 29 April 1968

SIGNATURE Lee Ann Peterson

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

TO: Chief of Base, New York

INFO.

FROM: Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: [illegible]

For your information [illegible] does have a 201-file (201-828165). However, [illegible] in the file to identify her half-sister or her nephew [illegible], who claimed to have been recruited by [illegible].

J.T.L.

Jessica T. LABATT

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COB, New York

21 MAR 1968

201-828165

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-278841	[illegible]	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-828165

1 - DO/RI
1 - RID/AN

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
DO/I/B-2:I.Peterson/mb	20 Mar 68	4008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DO/I/B-2	[illegible]	[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DO/I/B-2		W L O'Brien Walter L. O'Brien

DO/RI

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, DO		MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	XX	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Acting Chief of Base, New York		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
ISOLOG/LICOOKY - Tana de GAMEZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: Per para 1 & 7

1. During a meeting with LICOOKY/1 on 7 March 1968, the agent passed on the following information which may be of interest to the appropriate Headquarters components. L/1 apologized for the lack of details, but the agent was not in a position to pump for further information beyond that which was volunteered.

2. On 7 March Tana de GAMEZ, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Spanish origin, said that she had been telephoned the night before by the son of her half-sister Mercedes (last name unknown to L/1), her nephew Roy. The latter is a college student somewhere in Connecticut (possibly the University of Connecticut), and his home is somewhere in Westchester County. Roy said that he was calling his Aunt Tana because he knew that she had worked for OSS during WWII; Tana rejoined that she had never had anything to do with OSS, that she had worked for the Office of War Information (OWI). At any rate, Roy said that he wanted to tell his Aunt Tana that he had been "recruited" by the CIA, and that he was only going to work for the CIA so as to evade the draft. Upon being questioned on this, Roy maintained that he had been "recruited" by the CIA on campus.

3. The nephew's statements rather rattled Tana de GAMEZ, to the point where she had to take her heart medicine for palpitations (she has a heart history). Among other things, Tana was upset by the thought of a family member being affiliated with the CIA, even though the nephew is disliked by her as an individual.

4. Tana de GAMEZ was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Havana Cultural Congress in January 1968. She is a well-known figure in the intellectual leftist set in New York, and is outspokenly pro-Castro. She is a member of the editorial board of Grove Press; is a published author herself; and is a close friend and associate of John GERASSI, formerly of Ramparts Magazine.

CS COPY FILED IN 201-829165

5. Tana de GAMEZ is the subject of a voluminous file at the LNERGO office here. LNERGO information, which agrees with Base information obtained from L/1, indicates that de GAMEZ is vocal but

/CONTINUED/ file in 201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA-3650 GROUP 1	11 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-27 88 41

harmless. She considers herself a loyal American, but does not find this to be incompatible with being a vigorous "New Left" type. She recently became the Latin American editor of Manhattan FM radio station WBAI, an interesting melange of bourgeois/avant-garde programming slanted toward the left, according to L/1.

6. Tana de GAMEZ is in frequent contact with Ambassador Ricardo ALARCON Quesada, Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations; she also is in contact with Jose Raul VIERA Linares, DGI officer within the CMUN.

7. Tana de GAMEZ probably is the subject of a 201 file at Headquarters; if so, this dispatch should be cross-referenced to that file. If not, the Base suggests that de GAMEZ be indexed.

8. Re paragraph 2 above, L/1 agreed that what the nephew probably meant was that he had been interviewed on campus, and that this to him meant that he had been accepted for employment.

Howard G. FIGALAN

DISTRIBUTION:
2-DO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Base, New York

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Domestic Operations Division

SUBJECT
0 LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UNDA-3502 dated 22 January 1968

A copy of Subject's PRQ I is being forwarded under separate cover as per request. There was no PRQ Part II in Subject's file.

J.T.L.
Jessica T. LABATT

Attachment: U/S/C
As stated.

Distribution:
2 - New York

CS COPY

01 FEB 1968

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UNDW-2149	DATE
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-278841

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
DO/I/B2	Lee Peterson	sm (29 Jan. 68)	4008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DO/I/B2	30/1/68	John Markham

Internal Distribution:
1 - DO/I
1 - RI/AN,201-278841
HB

AN PP
D
ABSTRACT X
INDEX

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DO/I/B2		W L O'Brien Walter L. O'Brien

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-64
(40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, DO

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
0 ISOLOG -- LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: Forward PRQ Parts I and II, per paragraph 3 below

REF: UNDW - 2013, 29 November 1967

1. Reference advised that a POA had been issued to LICOOKY/1 for Base contact to determine her access to targets of interest.

2. The undersigned met with LICOOKY/1 on 20 December 1967 and 4 January 1968 and it appears that she can and will be of operational service to us. Headquarters will be kept abreast of future operational developments as they unfold.

3. For purpose of our background knowledge here, we would appreciate receiving copies of LICOOKY/1's PRQ Part I and her most recent PRQ Part II. No other material from her voluminous 201 file is really needed here, as the undersigned is conversant with her case from Headquarters' days.

4. A new PRQ Part II will be compiled on her in the near future.

Howard G. FIGALAN

DISTRIBUTION:
2-DDO

CS COPY

JAN 22 1968

201- 278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	UNDA - 3502	19 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-278341

14-00000

DISPATCH

	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Base, New York		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, Domestic Operations Division			MICROFILM

SUBJECT ISOLOG/LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UNDA-3303, 25 October 1967

1. A POA is issued for contact with Subject to explore her access to targets and information of operational interest in the Latin American and possibly Cuban context. In issuing the POA, WOMUSE made the following comments:

a. In dealing with this Subject it should be recalled that her past association with WOFIRM has been widely blown through broad publicity.

b. It is recommended that Subject be handled by a strong, mature case officer who can and will avoid emotional involvement with the Subject.

c. The case officer should be fully briefed on Subject's background and her emotional and sexual problems. Worthy of particular note is her involvement with John Rettie, BBC correspondent in Mexico and an MI - 6 agent whom the Soviets tried to compromise while he was serving a tour in Moscow.

2. Please forward PRQ Part II.

J.T.L.
Jessica T. LABATT

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COB, New York

CS COPY

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UNDW-2013	DATE 29 NOV 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-278841

1 - DO/I
1 - RID/AN

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT.
DO/I/B-2:LPeterson/mb (27 Nov 1967)	4008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DO/I/B-2	27/11/67	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DO/I/B-2		Walter L. O'Brien

AN C/I 28
25
DO/I/B2

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DO/I/WH - L. A. Peterson	NUMBER 201 - 278841
	SUBJECT LICOOKY/1
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 3 August 1967 cy

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

A POA is issued for contact with Subject to explore her access to targets and information of operational interest in the Latin American and possibly Cuban context.

In dealing with this Subject it should be recalled that her past association with CIA has been widely blown through broad publicity.

It is recommended that Subject be handled by a strong, mature case officer who can and will avoid emotional involvement with the Subject.

The case officer should be fully briefed on Subject's background and her emotional and sexual problems. Worthy of particular note is her involvement with John Rettie, BBC correspondent in Mexico and an MI - 6 agent whom the Soviets tried to compromise while he was serving a tour in Moscow.

Please forward PRQ Part II.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	13 November 1967

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Domestic Operations Division

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
ISOLOG--LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated

REFERENCES:
A) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219
B) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264
C) DIRECTOR 30635

1. Please advise the status of processing for the reinstatement of the clearance on LICOOKY/1, whom the Base is interested in contacting for the purpose of assessing her access to targets and information of Latin American ops interest.

2. FYI: we understood from C/WH/1 during his visit here some two months ago that LICOOKY/1 in his opinion still had mileage for our purposes here.

Howard C. PIGALAN

Distribution:
2-C/DO
2-C/WH

201-278841

OCT 25 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UKDA-3303

DATE
24 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

SECRET

8 November 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

FROM : DO/I

SUBJECT : LICOOKY 1 (201-278841)

REFERENCE : Form 889 dated 27 October 1967

1. The following summaries indicate no derogatory information on Subject.

2. New York report dated 12/29/59 captioned "June COBB - Registration Act-Cuba" furnished CIA 1/8/60. This report stated that June Cobb translated pamphlets as part of her job for Fidel Castro with the idea of familiarizing the American people with Castro's writing. June Cobb believes Castro is doing a tremendous job in reconstructing the economy of Cuba. However, she stated that in her opinion it is unthinkable that Communism would ever be embraced by Castro or the people of Cuba. There seems to be no particular significance to this report as this information was previously known by the Agency.

3. Letter to Director, FBI, from CIA dated 11/7/60 captioned "June COBB - Internal Security - Cuba". Bernie Brennan asked June Cobb to deliver some information to Juan Orta who stated that Brennan was not needed anymore. Cobb thought Brennan might have been attempting to obtain a position with the Cuban Tourist Commission. The Agency has no further interest in Brennan. Therefore, there is no significance attached to the report.

4. Washington report dated 4/26/62 captioned "Lyle Stuart - IS - Cuba; SM-C; RA-Cuba", furnished to CIA 5/4/62 was merely interview with Stuart. There is no significance attached to this report.

SECRET

5. Letter from CIA to Director, FBI, dated 8/19/64 captioned "Lyle Stuart" (CSI 316/00789-64). June Cobb interviewed re Lyle Stuart. Lyle Stuart attempted to get close to Fidel Castro for the purpose of exploiting the journalistic advantages of an interview. Therefore, there is no significance attached to this report considering that it was merely an interview.

Lee Ann Peterson

201-[illegible]
SEX F DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC TRANSLATOR
BIO DATA ON PERSONNEL EMPLOYED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

UFG -[illegible]
23 APR
P5

COBB, JUNE

SEX F DOB ?

CIT USA
OCC ?

053-009-008
DBA -15934
11 JUL 62
P2

SINCE SEP, 59, SHE HAS BEEN EMPLOYED IN OFFICE OF FIDEL CASTRO, PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA. MISS COBB WAS IN NEW YORK CITY FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT INTENDED TO RETURN TO CUBA ON DEC 3, 1959.

COBB, Viola June

U.S. citizen

DAR-5060
10 Feb 62

Translator of "The Shark & the Sardines" - pro-Castro - expelled from Guatemala for political activities (Nov 61) employee, Exec Office of Prime Minister (June 61)

(List of Persons connected with Intel, Subversive & Sabotage Activities in behalf of Cuban Govt as [illegible] in working files of CI Branch, Security Div ACSI on 10 Feb 62)

[illegible] Calif., USA. Former add: [illegible] New York City [illegible] New York City. A great admirer of CASTRO. (additional info in the [illegible] of the same date)

8 Jan [illegible]

[illegible] "The Shark & the Sardines" [illegible] by [illegible] police [illegible]

9 Nov 61

[illegible] 1 Dec 61 [illegible]

COBB, June
Viola

[illegible] CUBA

COBB, was reported as secy to Fidel CASTRO, described by [illegible] Marita LORENZ, self-admitted former girl friend of CASTRO, as one of the most fanatical members of the 26 July Club in NYC. COBB, according to LORENZ, took great pleasure in making fervent speeches praising everything CASTRO did and criticizing US State Dept policy on Cuba.

[illegible]

[illegible] attache at Cuban Consulate in New York City, suggested that [illegible] (no other identification) [illegible] with subject [illegible]

[illegible]

Cards from Cuban Desk
16/8/67

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 27 October 1967 cy
TO: DO/I/WH - F. Toth	C NO. 201 - 273341
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: COBB, Viola June

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRO I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRO II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
XX	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
XX	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

What is the status of this case? Please see our 889 of 27 September 1967. If DO is no longer interested, please advise so CI/OA can close its file on the Subject.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Domestic Operations Division

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Base, New York /K

SUBJECT
0 ISOLOG--LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated

REFERENCES: A) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219
B) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264
C) DIRECTOR 30635

1. Please advise the status of processing for the reinstatement of the clearance on LICOOKY/1, whom the Base is interested in contacting for the purpose of assessing her access to targets and information of Latin American ops interest.

2. FYI: we understood from C/WH/1 during his visit here some two months ago that LICOOKY/1 in his opinion still had mileage for our purposes here.

Howard G. FIGLAN

Distribution:
2-C/DO
2-C/WH

CS COPY

201-278841

OCT 25 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UNDA-3303

DATE
24 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE 27 September 1967 jab

TO:
DO/I/WH - Frank Toth

C NO. 201 - 278341

FROM: CEIEF, CI/CA /s/ Edward L. Brown

SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
XX	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
XX	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In addition to the requested traces, an evaluation and statement of the significance as to the proposed use of Subject, is needed on the following FBI references:

(1) New York report dated 12/29/59, captioned "June COBB - Registration Act-Cuba", furnished CIA 1/8/60.

(2) Letter to Director, FBI, from CIA dated 11/7/60 captioned "June COBB - Internal Security - Cuba".

(3) Washington report dated 4/26/62 captioned "Lyle Stuart - IS-Cuba; SM-C; RA-Cuba", furnished to CIA 5/4/62.

(4) Letter from CIA to Director, FBI, dated 8/19/64 captioned "Lyle Stuart". (CSI 316/00789-64).

CI/OA has no information indicating that these references have previously been reviewed; it appears that all others have.

CI/OA is otherwise prepared to take action on your request for a POA/OA on Subject.

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

TO: DO/I/WH - Lee Peterson ~~Doris LaBaron~~/Frank Toth	C NO. 201 - 278841
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

DATE: 5 September 1967 jab

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

CI/OA has received, through the Office of Security, a new and rather lengthy list of references to the Subject from the FBI. It appears that some of these references have previously been available to us and some have not. The CI/OA file on Subject also contains a long list of previous references to the Subject.

It is requested that someone from DO/I/WH discuss this case with an officer of CI/OA so that the course of required action can be determined.

This discussed in NYC between Kaufman & Boone. Latter told Dummer or Pavy that an occasional contact would be ok but not to pick her up on a regular contact basis. Could do an occasional job but no [illegible]

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1	WH	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

RIG: L. PETERSON
NIT: DO/I
XT: 6762
ATE: 24 AUG 67

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
T 24 PER ____ # ____
ONF: DO-4 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-278841

INFO: FILE , VR . CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, WH-8,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

25 13 57 Z

30635

TO DO BASE/NEW YORK

ISOLOG

REF: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264

WOMUSE AWAITING LNERGO CHECKS ON LICOOKY/1 AND ALSO CAREFULLY REVIEWING CASE ~~XXXXXXX~~ DUE TO FACT SUBJECT TERMINATED BY DYVOUR AS RESULT MAY 1966 PRESS EXPOSURE IN MEXICO CITY RE CONNECTION WOFACT.

END OF MESSAGE

EUGENE F. O'MEARA
C/DO/OP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

for FRANK A. TOTH
DO/I

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-278841
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. L. Pelligrin

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
2

ACTION
D 64

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/ICG, SECUR 4

S E C R E T 221933Z CITE DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264 (KLUTAS ACTING) 22 AUG 67 IN 36824
NYDO

DIRECTOR

ISOLOG

REF: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219 (IN 23383)

PLEASE ADVISE STATUS OF PROCESSING FOR REINSTATEMENT OF LICOOKY ONE CLEARANCE.

S E C R E T

BT

AN 7	~~PI~~	
~~PS~~	~~DEST~~	DO/I
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

SECRET

22 Aug 67
201-278841

SECRET

DATE 21 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : John Howard

SUBJECT : LICOOKY/1

REFERENCE : Form 889 dated 18 August 1967

Field ___ RID XXX Division X traces have been completed on Subject with the results indicated below:

REFERENCE(S)	COMMENTS
RID	NDI
Division	
WH/Mexico	NDI
WH/Cuba	NDI
WH/Ecuador	NR
WH/Guatemala	NR
WH/Colombia	NR
Green List #182786	No new information which would change the status of LICOOKY/1's case.

Lee Ann Peterson
DO I/WH

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) June Viola Cobb

FROM: John Howard

EXTENSION:

NO. 278841

DATE 18 Aug 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Frank A. Toth			lap
2. DO/1/WH			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

To 1:

In accordance with the requirements of CSI No. 10-7, Para. 4 C, dated 23 June 1961, please review the attachments or dossier on Subject at FI/D and advise CI/OA in writing as to the significance of the information and your opinion as to its effect on the use of Subject in the operational capacity requested.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 182786

DATE 3 Aug 67

TO CHIEF, FI/D

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
e1/04
201-278841
C O B B, Viola June

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.
Aka June COBB
Aka Clarinda E. SHARP

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
24 Aug 27; Ponca, Oklahoma

4. CITIZENSHIP
USA

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Residing in New York since Jul 65.

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME Lee Ann Peterson
OFFICE DESIGNATOR DO/I/WH
ROOM, BUILDING 1H 19
EXTENSION 6762

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Has been active in Fair Play for Cuba Committee		

Aug 17 [illegible] 67

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION	(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
Any information except basic biographic and/or occupational data since previous Green List, No 125246, dated 5 Sep 62.

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

TO: **Lee Ann Peterson**

16 Aug 67
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

* Except

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO PXXXXXXX INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

* PREvious green list requests from WH/3/M, 5 Sept 62, op., GL#125246 and from WH/4, 9 June 60, op., GL#101924 & GL#101066

--- NOTE:

1. State, To Havana, Dsp. A-348, 24 June 60, CONFIDENTIAL
2. State, Guatemala, Dsp. #257, 14 Nov 61, UNCLASSIFIED.
3. Associated Press, 9 Nov 61, UNCLASSIFIED (gist).
4. Washington Post, Parade, 12 Aug 62, p. 12, UNCLASSIFIE

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 18 August 1967 jab
TO: DO/I/WH - Lee Ann Peterson	C NO. 201 - 278841
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'S DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'S COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
XX	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
XX	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

sent results 21/8/67

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 4 August 1967 jab
TO: DO/I/WH - Lee Ann Peterson	C NO. 201 - 278841
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW. OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

XX	PRQ I CURRENT (OLD IN FILE)	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
XX	PRQ II CURRENT AFTER ASSESSMENT (old in file)	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

sent PRQ I 10 AUG 1967

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PROJ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. *Write clearly.*
2. *Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"*
3. *Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed*

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* Viola *(Middle)* June *(Last)* Cobb *(Nee)*

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

Clarinda E. Sharp - for Guatemalan friends to write her and for correspondence with Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

5. DATE OF BIRTH August 24, 1927

6. PLACE OF BIRTH Ponca City, Oklahoma

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

Very seldom drinks liquor. Does not gamble. Does not use drugs. Has had numerous affairs.

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)*

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE *(Shape)*
☐ M ☒ F	40		FT. 5 IN. 6	128	fair	oval
h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE		
blonde	blue	regular	tall	erect		

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Scar over left clavicle.

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS IF OBTAINABLE

SECTION II	**CITIZENSHIP**
10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP US	11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (*If different than Item 10.*) NA

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant*)
New York City, New York

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*If different than Item 12.*)

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Countries, dates and purposes*)
Mexico - 1947 - 48 original purpose to study. 1949 - Ecuador ith fiance. 1951 - Colombia with fiance. 1952 - Colombia with fiance. 19 - Colombia. 1954 - Mexico. 1955 - Cuba. 1956 - Colombia, Cuba with fianc . 1959 - Cuba o work with Cuban govt. 1961 - Mexico and Guatemala. 1961-65 Mexico

SECTION III	**OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA**	
16. PRESENT OCCUPATION	17. TITLE	18. SALARY (*Per annum*)

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (*Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property*)

SECTION IV **ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS**

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V **EDUCATIONAL DATA**

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE RECEIVED
McKinley Grade School		1933	1939	Diploma
Ponca City Junior High		1939	1942	Diploma
Ponca City Senior High Ponca City, Oklahoma		1942	1944	Diploma
University of Oklahoma	Liberal Arts	1944	1946	None

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE (*List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.*)	READ YES	READ NO	WRITE YES	WRITE NO	SPEAK YES	SPEAK NO	UNDERSTAND YES	UNDERSTAND NO
Spanish (fluent)	X		X		X		X	
French (limited)	X		X		X		X	

SECTION VI	**SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS**

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Only literary output in book form bearing her name is English translation of "The Shark and the Sardines" by J. J. Arevalo, published by Lyle Stuart 1961.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Has experience at radio announcing, programming, and radio control operating. (WMAD and WBBZ in Oklahoma.)

SECTION VII	**MILITARY SERVICE**

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

Adjutant of the Civil Air Patrol squadron of Norman Oklahoma. Her commission was Second Class Lieutenant. During wartime the CAP was auxiliary of the Armed Air Forces.

SECTION VIII	**EMPLOYMENT HISTORY**

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1961 - 1966	b. EMPLOYER WOFACT			c. ADDRESS Mexico
	d. TYPE OF WORK Contract Agent	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Terminated July 1966 and returned to New York	
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1959 - 1960	b. EMPLOYER Prime Minister, Cuban Govt.			c. ADDRESS Havana, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK In charge of Eng. publications	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $500	per month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Return to U.S.	
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1957 - 1958	b. EMPLOYER MD Medical Newsmagazine			c. ADDRESS 30 East 60th, New York City
	d. TYPE OF WORK Asst. to Managing Editor	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS 85	PER week	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Intended to go to Europe	
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 195 - 53	b. EMPLOYER Dr. I. Shaper			c. ADDRESS Mount Sinai Hosp, NYC Cook County Hospital, Chicago, Ill.
	d. TYPE OF WORK Secretarial & Edit	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING To join her fiance's sister	
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1947 - 48	b. EMPLOYER Southeastern Oil de Mexico SA de CV			c. ADDRESS Paseo de la Reforma #1 Mexico, D. F.
	d. TYPE OF WORK Public relations	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 100	PER month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING To return to U.S.	

1946 - Ponca City News - Ponca City, Oklahoma - Staff writer - Left to go to Mexico

SECTION IX — **MARITAL STATUS**

31. CHECK ONE: ☒ SINGLE	☐ MARRIED	☐ WIDOWED	☐ SEPARATED	☐ DIVORCED	☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (*First*) (*Middle*) (*Nee*) (*Last*)
NA

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE NA	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
36. DATE OF BIRTH	37. PLACE OF BIRTH
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Last residence, if deceased*)

SECTION X — **CHILDREN**

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
NA					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (*Identify child and give his, or her, present address*)

NA

SECTION XI — **FATHER**

41. FULL NAME Jasper E. Cobb	42. YEAR OF BIRTH circa 1897	43. PLACE OF BIRTH Missouri	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH US
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS NA	46. OCCUPATION Retired Engineer	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE 710 N. Sunset, Ponca City, Okla.	

SECTION XII — **MOTHER**

48. FULL NAME Jessie Lois Sharp	49. YEAR OF BIRTH circa 1895	50. PLACE OF BIRTH Illinois	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH US
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS NA	53. OCCUPATION housewife	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE deceased	

SECTION XIII — BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Jasper E. Cobb	X		circa 1923	Ponca City, Oklahoma	US
Arthur Tom Cobb	X		circa 1925	Ponca City, Oklahoma	US

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

NA

SECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENT AND POSITION HELD

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

Jasper E. Cobb - Father

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

Janet Post

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS

DATE: 9 August 1967

SIGNATURE:

SECRET

Att. No. 17 to UFGA 19939

128

201

SUBJECT: COBB, June

1. BIOGRAPHIC DATA

a. DPOB: c. 1930, Somewhere in US. USA citizen.

b. OCCUPATION: Helping a fnu PELLICER, write a book on Anti-Communism.

c. ADDRESS: Somewhere in Mexico City, DF.

2. BACKGROUND

a. Around June or July of 1959, AMDOFF/1 was ordered by Celia SANCHEZ to pay the Habana hospital bill of an American named June COBB. The bill, which A/1 recalls, was over $2,000.00 plus Habana Hilton Hotel expenses, were paid out of the PM's office account. A/1 believes that Miss COBB became acquainted with Fidel and Sanchez on their US trip of April-May 1959, but ignores the details. Sanchez instructed A/1 to employ Miss COBB in the press section of the PM's office: She was responsible with seeing all American and English speaking newsmen who desired to interview Castro or requested permits to visit the interior of the island. She also helped to translate Fidel's important speeches into English. It is A/1's understanding that she had no other duties or responsibilities. She never dealt with Castro directly, but through Maria WITOSKA, who was Sanchez's laison with the PM's office. A/1 states that their relationship was limited to her official function. She appeared to have a newspaper background, but A/1 ignores the details.

b. About late 1959 Miss COBB, together with Jose PUENTE Blanco, then FEU (Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria) president of the University of Habana, in conjunction with the INIT (Instituto Nacional de Industrias Turisticas), took over a finca (formerly owned by Batista) near Ceiba del Agua, Habana, and set up a boarding house to be used by American students visiting Cuba as guests of the government. A/1 ignores the details of this operation.

c. By mid 1960 A/1 learned that Miss COBB had left for New York City. She never returned. A/1 claims he does not know why she made this decision.

d. When A/1 arrived in Mexico in late October 1964, he came to know an American writer, Daniel JAMES (address: Vicente Gomez #145, Mexico City, DF. tel 40-19-71). James told A/1 that Miss COBB had recently been deported from Guatemala and was living in Mexico City. Later, A/1 met Miss COBB accidently at the Mexican Ministerio de Gobernacion offices. She was very friendly and said she was helping a fnu PELLICAR (believed by A/1 to be a Guatemalan) to write a book describing his defection from Communism. She wanted A/1 to help Pellicer with reference material on the Marcos RODRIGUEZ trial. She gave A/1 her address, but for various reasons he said he tore up the slip

SECRET COPY

23 Jul 65

17 UFGA 19939

201-152634

A/1 claims he did not want to be associated with her while his political position is still under investigation and further, he did not want his wife to find any feminine references on his person when she arrived. He has not seen Miss COBB again.

e. (It should be pointed out that A/1 did not include her name on the original roster of the personnel of the PM's office. He remembered her participation when directed a special series of questions (requested by Dave in Mexico City in late Nov 64) on the activities of US news and public relations media.

3. JMWAVE traces:

a. COBB, June: Soviet officials informed the Cubans that Subject who acted as an interpreter for Fidel Castro was an FBI agent (201-287019, HVCA-08569; 01 Sept 61)

b. COBB, June: Since sept, 59, she has been employed in the office of Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of Cuba. Miss Cobb was in New York City for Medical treatment intended to return to Cuba on December 3, 1959 (053-009-008; DBA 15994; 11 Jul 62; P2)

c. COBB, June: Expected leave Hava on afternoon 3 June 60 by National airlines for NY. Requesting FBI not impede her activities (OUT 81006 to FBI; 31 May 60)

d. COBB, June: DPOB Jun 1927, Ponca, Calif., USA. Former Add" 1192 Park Ave, New York City; 220 E. 52nd St., New York City. A great admirer of CASTRO (Additional info to the DBF of the same date (DBF 40107; 8 Jan 60)

e. COBB, June: Subj; who translated AREVALO's "The Fable of the Shark and Sardines" was deported on 9 Nov 61 by Guatemalan police, according to news broadcasts (Also see DBF 95411, 1 Dec 61, File 100-9-14) (HAVA, FBIS; 9 Nov 61)

201-152634

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO

FEB 1965

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [illegible]	26	Feb	65	Yp
2. WH/C/MO		FEB 1965		
3. WH/C/CA/PP				
4. WH/C/F/TC				
5.				
6. WH/C/RR				
7. RR/RE			1/2	
8. WH/C/RR/OS [illegible]				
9. [illegible]	3			
10. RI/AN				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Copy detached

Prefer in RR/OS/mis. [illegible] and/or RI indexing [illegible]

Return for indexing [illegible]

Each attachment should be filed under its own 201 number, leaving in the 201-152634 file only the cover sheet and any attachments without 201.

AN | FI

BY

REQ. X X

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-152634

REQUEST | ABSTRACT | INDEX

DOCUMENT DATE | DOCUMENT NUMBER

DATE MICROFILMED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PROC. ACTION	ACTION
XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO: COS, Mexico; Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC
Debriefing of AMDOFF/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None - FYI

References: UFGA -18898

1. Forwarded herewith are biographic data sheets based on information provided by AMDOFF/1 during his debriefing by AMBLINK/1 and Edwin M. [illegible] in Mexico City.

2. Data on additional personalities of interest to ODYOKE and KUBARK known to AMDOFF/1 will be forwarded as they become available in the future.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

UFGA 19839/01 filed 201-[illegible]
/02 201-190218
/03 201-273018
/04 201-351235
/05 201-74638
UFGA 19839/06 201-[illegible]
/07 201-354266
/08 201-332257
/09 201-[illegible]
UFGA 19839/10 201-334535
/11 201-344157
/12 201-163413
/13 201-357915
/14 201-344732
UFGA 19839/15 filed 201-777603
/16 201-755064

Attachments:
1 - 71 (a/s) (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - DC, WH/SA w/att
1 - COS, Mexico w/att
1 - Chief, WH w/att
[illegible]

201-152634

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 18 Feb 65

DATE DISPATCHED: FEB 23 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-19939

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-152634

55-

SECRET

8 August 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

FROM : Lee Ann Peterson, DO/I/WH

SUBJECT : Viola June Cobb

There does not appear to be anything new or derogatory in DCS files on Subject. DCS has no interest in Subject.

Lee Ann Peterson

Lee Ann Peterson:DO/I:sm: (8 Aug. 67)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DO/I/WH
1 - DO/I/Chrono

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Viola June COBB, CDS Case 48248, and B 67-166

FROM:
Lee Ann Peterson
DO/I/WH
1H 19

EXTENSION: 6762

NO.:

DATE: 3 August 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DO/DCSL Attn: Jon Sucher 910 Key Bldg.	4 AUG 1967	4 AUG 1967	COT
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6. DO/I/WH (Mr Toth) Attn: Lee Peterson 1H 19 Hqs.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

4 Aug '67

1-6: As per our telecon, there does not appear to be anything new or derogatory in DCS files on this gal. The opinion here is that she is nothing but trouble, as I mentioned. Let me know if anything else is needed here —

COT

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED XX YES ☐ NO	DATE 3 August 1967 LETTER NO. 0039

TO : DO/DCSL

ATTN: Jon Sucher

FROM: Lee Ann Peterson
DO/I/WH
1H 19

Re: COBB, Viola June (aka June COBB)

1. Subject is of interest to DO Base/New York as a source of information on Latin American and Cuban activities. According to our records, Subject has been in contact with the New York office of DCS.

2. Attached for your information is pertinent correspondence on Subject. We would appreciate knowing Subject's current residence and employment, in addition to any derogatory information DCS may have in their files, since her arrival in the U. S. (July 1966). A POA is in process for our proposed use and we would appreciate an expedite on this request.

for Lee Ann Peterson
SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 8-61 1831

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 3 August 1967

TO:
- XX CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM:
Lee Ann Peterson
DO/I/WH
1H 19

SUBJECT: *(True name)* C O B B, Viola June

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES
Aka June COBB Clarinda E. SHARP (A)
LICOOKY/1
Joyce H. PINFINCH (P)

CI/OA FILE NO. C83492

RI 201 FILE NO. 278841

SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
USA

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

POA is requested to contact Subject and explore her access to targets and information of operational interest in the Latin American and possibly Cuban context.
Coordination with DCS will be effected.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. No US Govt interest

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? XX YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	XX	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 182786

6. RI TRACES (current)

	NO RECORD	XX	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES (current)

	NO RECORD	XX	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES (current)

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
X	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)* No foreign travel since previous OA		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: Lee Ann Peterson

EXTENSION: 6762

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: FRANK A. TOTH, DO/I/WH

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

PRQ PART I (EQUIVALENT)

NAME:	C O B B, Viola June Aka June COBB; Clarinda E. SHARP
DPOB:	24 August 1927; Ponca, Oklahoma
CITIZENSHIP:	USA
OID:	Subject returned to New York from Mexico City in July 1966 to look for a job. She recently came to our attention through the FBI/New York field office when the latter contacted our New York Base to inquire of her present residence. Subject is presently in contact with the DCS/New York field office, from whom we shall attempt to ascertain her present residence and employment.

SECRET

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE: 3 Aug 1967

FROM: Name: Lee Ann Peterson

OFFICE: DO/I/WH

ROOM: 1H 19

PHONE: 6885

TUBE ADDRESS:

1. TYPE ACTION: ☐ OPEN ☒ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

2. FILE RESTRICTED: ☐ YES ☒ NO

3. PERMANENT CHARGE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): COBB, Viola June

5. 201 NO.: 278841

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
A	COBB,	June	
A	SHARP,	Clarinda	E.

7. SEX: F x

8. DATE OF BIRTH: 24 Aug 27

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH:

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: OKLA, Ponca

11. CITIZENSHIP:

12. OCCUPATION (clear text):

OCC. CODE:

13. SWL:

14. OI CODE:

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER: NYDO-3219

DATE: 1 Aug 67

16. RESIDENCE: USA, N.Y.

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards):

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION: USA/N.Y. CODE: 432

19. ACTION DESK: DO/I/WH CODE: 778

20. SECONDARY DESK: CODE:

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES: UMD

22. CRYPTONYM:

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER: Lee Ann Peterson

201 NO.: 278841

FORM 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-65

SECRET

(38-51)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-278841
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 2 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 3C

ACTION
☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, WH8, C/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI.

1 Aug 67 IN 23383

S E C R E T 012214Z CITE DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219
NYDO

AB C4/	~~PI~~	
~~PS~~	~~DEST~~ /	DO/I
ABSTRACT ✗	~~INDEX~~	

DIRECTOR
ISOLOG

REF: DIRECTOR 15147

BASE DESIROUS OF CONTACTING LICOOKY/1, SUBJ REF, TO EXPLORE HER ACCESS TO TARGETS AND INFO OF OPS INTEREST. BELIEVE SHE COULD BE OF VALUE IN LATIN AMERICAN, AND HOPEFULLY CUBAN, CONTEXT. WOULD APPRECIATE REINSTATEMENT OF APPROPRIATE CLEARANCE. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

1 aug 67
201-278841

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

C. TRETTIN:jaf
WH/COG/CICS
5106
XXXXXXXXX 26 JUNE 67

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY:

1		6	
2	MO	7	
3	RR	8	
4		9	
5		10	

FI
RS

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 30 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

WH/COG8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR WH8, DO4, CI/OPS, CI/CA,

SECRET
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

28 18 39 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 15147

278847

TO DO BASE/NEW YORK

TYPIC

REFERENCE: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3108

JUNE COBB IS FORMER WOFACT AGENT RESIDING NEW YORK CITY. HQS HAD GIVEN NAME AND CLEARANCE TO CONTACT COBB IN CONJUNCTION WITH INVESTIGATION LNERGO CONDUCTING. MATTER HANDLED THROUGH WODISH OFFICE. SUGGEST TO LNERGO THEY CONTACT NEW YORK WODISH OFFICE FOR CURRENT ADDRESS OF JUNE COBB WHO HAS BEEN ALREADY ALERTED TO LNERGO DESIRE CONTACT HER.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS
DO/WH

E. O'Meara
C/DO/OP
EUGENE F. O'MEARA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-278841

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-278841

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CA

MO

RS

FROM.

ACTION 22 WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE VR WH 8 DO 4 CI, CI/OPS, FI

NYDO

S E C R E T 232159Z CITE DDO BASE/NEW YORK 3108

23 Jun 67 IN 97218

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

NEWYORK LNERGO WISHES INTERVIEW JUNE COBB, NEW YORK RESIDENT, DESCRIBED AS FORMER CASTRO PARAMOUR WITH WHOM THEY IN CONTACT APPROX SIX YEARS AGO. LNERGO STATES INFORMED BY WOFACT HEADQUARTERS THAT WOFACT HAD INTERVIEWED MORE RECENTLY, BUT NO MEANS OF CONTACT SPECIFIED. PLS ADVISE IF CURRENT ADDRESS AVAILABLE.

Pls handle as desired

S E C R E T

BT

AN FI

ABSTRACT X

201-278841
23 June 1967

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) ORTIZ, John

FROM: WH/COG/CICS/E. Ayers:jaf	EXTENSION 6835	NO 2389 DATE 19 May 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DC/WH/COG/CIS		7/3/67		
2. WH/1/MEXICO				R per
3. CI/IPS/WH CI/LIAISON 2C-35	26 MAY 1967			
4.				Hand deliver pl.
5. RI/AN				
6. RID/MIS			85	26 MAY 1967
7. RID/PS				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-278841

AN	FI
PS	~~DEST~~
ABSTRACT X	[illegible]

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

14

26 MAY 1967

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director For Plans

SUBJECT: John ORTIZ
INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA

MICROFILMED
JUN 15 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Reference is made to your informal request dated April 26, 1967, file: (LA) 105-165206, subject as above and to this Office's CSCI 316/01366-66 dated 25 March 1966.

2. This is to advise you that this Office no longer has contact with the source who originally furnished the information concerning Estelle SOKOLOWSKA de MADRIGAL in March 1966. Source is currently residing in the United States, New York City, and we have no objection to your contacting the source and debriefing her concerning any questions you may have concerning this case. Source has been alerted to the fact that you might contact her regarding this matter. Source is Viola June COBB, usually referred to as June COBB, who is mentioned in your informal memorandum to this office dated June 1, 1964, Subject: Lyle Stuart.

3. We would appreciate being apprised of any new information concerning the SOKOLOWSKA case that is surfaced as a result of your debriefing COBB.

CSCI-316/02389-67

19 May 1967

DDP/WH/COG/CICS/E. Ayers:jaf

File: 201-278841
201-794302

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RID
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/1/Mexico
1 - DCS (Mr. Musulin via telephone)
1 - Originator

JUN 13 1 09 PM '67
CS COPY

B-201-794302

SECRET

201-278841

15 Apr 1967

April 18, June Cobb called the New York DODS office about what to do about her CIA salary on her income tax return.

After discussions with OF/CAAS and George Powell of the Tax Committee, I phoned Mr. Muselin x2268 DODS to telll Cobb the following:

> Since she was supposedly a student in Mexico, ~~xkx~~ and she had paid tax on her CIA salary, she was not to list her salary anywhere on her 1966 tax return. However, she should send us a copy of her overt 1966 tax return.

charlotte Bustos-Videla

14-00000

SECRET

Jane

11 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : WH/Personnel, Attention: Mr. Renehan

SUBJECT : Joyce C. PINEINCH (201-278841)

1. Subject has been terminated effective 1 July 1966 by the Mexico City Station. She was paid her salary through 30 June and was given her income tax refund for the period 1 January 1965 through 30 June 1966. A copy of the termination secrecy oath, signed in true name, is on file in Subject's official 201 file.

2. It is requested that the CPD and Office of Finance files be altered to reflect the termination of Subject.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Contract Personnel
cc - WH/Personnel
cc - WH/1 Chrono
cc - PINEINCH file (201-278841)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

201-278841

SECRET

22 AUG 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Domestic Operations/WH

: Director, Domestic Contacts Service

SUBJECT : Miss Viola June Cobb, born 24 August 1927, Ponca, Oklahoma

Background:

1. On 22 or 23 September 1965 Miss June Cobb contacted the New York Domestic Contacts Office through Igor Gordevitch of the Vision Magazine, trying to establish contact in New York with CIA to pass along some information. WH/1 chose not to establish contact with Miss Cobb at that time, even though she was cleared CIA agent in contact with the Mexico City Station.

Recent Developments:

2. Miss Cobb was terminated effective 1 July 1966 and was paid her salary through 30 June and given money for one-way air fare to New York City. She was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement and signed a Termination Secrecy Oath. Although she was terminated for lack of access and production, there was also considerable newspaper publicity in May 1966 in the Mexico City newspapers wherein Subject was attacked because of her connection with an anti-Communist meeting, the Latin American Conference to Study the Situation of the Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union. In this publicity Subject was labeled as being closely connected with U. S. Government Police, and also as an agent of the FBI and INTERPOL. She was also accused of working for a newspaperman Daniel James who was described as being responsible to CIA.

3. Miss Cobb planned to return to New York in July where she was to look for a job. Subject had been told previously by the Mexico City Station that the telephone number of the New York CIA office is listed in the directory and she could call that office if contact were necessary while she was in the United States, but that she should only establish contact for an important or urgent matter. Since Miss Cobb tends to

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-278841

SECRET

liberally apply importance to a wide variety of events and subjects, and since she is likely to be short of money shortly after arriving, WH Division believes there is a possibility she may try to establish contact.

Suggested Action:

4. WH Division suggests that you may wish to forward a copy of this memorandum to your New York office. If Miss Cobb does establish contact, we would appreciate your office interviewing her to accept whatever information she might wish to contribute, but that no financial commitments be made on our behalf. WH Division plans to have no direct contact unless the information provided would appear to merit a special interview.

(Signed) Jacob D. [illegible]

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
0 & 1 - DO/WH
cc - D/DCS
cc - LICOOKY-1 201-
cc - WH/1/Memo Chrono

SECRET

June

SECRET

12 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Domestic Operations/WH

: Director, Domestic Contacts Service

SUBJECT : Miss Viola June Cobb, born 24 August 1927, Ponca, Oklahoma

Background:

1. On 22 or 23 September 1965 Miss June Cobb contacted the New York Domestic Contacts Office through Igor Gordevitch of the Vision Magazine, trying to establish contact in New York with CIA to pass along some information. WH/1 chose not to establish contact with Miss Cobb at that time, even though she was a cleared WOFACT agent in contact with the Mexico City Station.

Recent Developments:

2. Miss Cobb was terminated effective 1 July 1966 and was paid her salary through 30 June and given money for one-way air fare to New York City. She was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement and signed a Termination Secrecy Oath. Although she was terminated for lack of access and production, there was also considerable newspaper publicity in May 1966 in the Mexico City newspapers wherein Subject was attacked because of her connection with an anti-Communist meeting, the Latin American Conference to Study the Situation of the Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union. In this publicity Subject was labeled as being closely connected with U. S. Government Police, and also as an agent of the FBI and INTERPOL. She was also accused of working for a newspaperman Danial James who was described as being responsible to WOFACT.

3. Miss Cobb planned to return to New York in July where she was to look for a job. Subject had been told previously by the Mexico City Station that the telephone number of the New York WOFACT office is listed in the directory and she could call that office if contact were necessary while she was in the United States, but that she should only establish contact for an important or urgent matter. Since Miss Cobb tends to liberally apply importance to a wide variety of events and subjects, and since she is likely to be short of money shortly after arriving, WH Division believes there is a possibility she may try to establish contact.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-278841

Suggested Action:

4. WH Division suggests that you may wish to forward a copy of this memorandum to your New York office. If Miss Cobb does establish contact, we would appreciate your office interviewing her to accept whatever information she might wish to contribute, but that no financial commitments be made on our behalf. WH Division plans to have no direct contact unless the information provided would appear to merit a special interview.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

Distribution:
- 0 & 1 - Domestic Operations/WH
- 1 - Director, Domestic Contacts Service
- ① - LICOOKY-201-
- 1 - WH/1/Memo Chrono

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA	FROM: (Division) WHD (Case officer) C. Bustos (Extension) 3654	
SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used) LICOOKY-1		NAME SHOWN IS ☐ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☒ CRYPT
CI/OA NO.	201 NO. 201-278841	PROJECT LICOOKY
DATE OF BIRTH 24/8/27	PLACE OF BIRTH Ponca, Okla, USA	AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED will not be forwarded

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

LICOOKY-1 was terminated effective 1 July 1966. The last meeting with her was on 23 June, she was paid salary through June, and she was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement.

In view of subject's personality, and the broad publicity in mid-1966 (see 201 file) of accusations that Subject was connected with U.S. intelligence in Mexico, any use of Subject should be made only after careful consideration.

See copy of HMMA 29461, Mexico City Station termination report, attached.

DATE [illegible]

SIGNATURE [illegible]

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT LICOOKY Project
Termination of LICOOKY-1

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. Attached herewith is the LILINK report on the termination of LICOOKY-1. This report was received from LILINK on 24 June 1966.

2. Forwarded under separate cover are two copies of the Secrecy and Termination agreement signed by LICOOKY-1, in true name, on 23 June 1966.

3. At the time of termination, LICOOKY-1 was given (1) salary for [illegible], (2) [illegible] from Mexico City to New York, and (3) Federal Tax refund amounting to 9,005.00 MN. The household items in her possession at the time of termination, which belonged to the Station, were sold to her for US $300.00.

4. It should be noted that although LICOOKY-1 claims she intends to remain in the United States, she retained her apartment, which was turned over to a rental agency for subrenting. The Station believes that she intends to return within the next several months or so should it develop that she cannot find suitable work in the New York area. Should she do so on her own it may be that the Station would want to make occasional use of her, and for that purpose a post office box to which she can write to initiate contact was given her prior to departure.

(CONTINUED)

Attachment:
A. U/W LILINK Report
B. U.S.C. 2 cys Secrecy Agreement

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WH w/atts

14 July 66

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-278841	HMMA-29461	14 July 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	~~50-6-120~~/1

201-278841

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-29461

5. Headquarters will be advised should the Station have additional contact with her.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, June Cobb, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of our country. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of our government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims I may have against the Organization or our government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of the Organization concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

SECRET

201-278841

5. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to our government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of our government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and our government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 23 day of June 1966.

(SEAL)
Signature

Witnessed by me this 23 day of June 1966,

at Mexico City, Mexico.

Arthur F. Ladenburg
SIGNATURE

ATT TO HMMA-29461

Draft of Dispatch

1. LICOOKY-1 has been terminated effective 1 July 1966. The last meeting with her was held on 23 June. She was paid her salary through 30 June, her income tax refund for the period 1 January 1965 - 30 June 1966 and given money for one-way air fare to New York City. She was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement. A Termination Secrecy Oath, signed in true name, was obtained.

2. L-1 plans to return to New York on or about 1 July. She said she will look for a job there, and is confident she will have no difficulty obtaining one. She does not yet know where she will be living.

3. L-1 is subletting the apartment she occupies here. She has purchased the KUBARK-owned household effects which had been loaned to her for that apartment. For this reason, in addition to the fact that she has acquired many close friends and interests here as a result of five years residence, the Station expects that she will return to Mexico, although she insists she has no plans to do so.

24 July 66

201-278841

4. She was given a post office box address to use to contact the Station in the event that she does return to Mexico and feels it necessary to do so. But no committment was made to her regarding any future contact or payment for information.

5. She was previously told that the telephone number of the New York KUBARK office is listed in the directory and she could call that office if contact were necessary while she was in the United States. She asked if that would still be the case and was told that it was but only to attempt such contact for an important or urgent matter. But since she tends to liberally apply importance to a wide variety of events and subjects, and since she is likely to be short of money shortly after arriving, it would not be surprising if she did try to establish such contact.

SECRET

21 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Request for Termination of Project LICOOKY

The LICOOKY Project was last approved for the period 1 January 1965 through 31 December 1965 for $5,140--$2,530 for FY 1965 and $2,610 for FY 1966. It is requested that the LICOOKY Project be terminated effective 1 January 1966, based on the following information geared to the outline in CSI-F NO. 230-60.

(1) Project Name: LICOOKY

(2) Original Project Objectives: Identify and report on plans, activities and associates of Central American Communists resident in or visiting Mexico City.

(3) Reason for Termination: LICOOKY-1 lost her access to the hard core group of CA communists partly because of her close association with LINLUCK who publicly renounced his break with the Guatemalan CP in 1962. The loss of access was also partly due to L-1's own apparent indiscretion vis-a-vis some of her close friends in Mexico City. This can be attributed both to her own growing distaste for the grubby and blindly unreasoning members of this group with whom she was asked to consort, and her reaction in her social group which took the form increasingly of anti-Communist remarks, and to the concomitant (or possibly resultant) rumors of increasing currency that she was in the pay of PBSWING. Attempts were made to take advantage of her connections with literary circles in Mexico, but her inability to budget her time sufficiently to satisfy station requirements led to the decision to terminate her. A contributing cause was also her inability to regularize her status in Mexico so she could accept a paying position which would give her reason to remain there, with the resultant strain of the thin legend that her father was providing her support.

SECRET

[illegible]

(4) Effectiveness of Project: Project supplied a certain amount of miscellaneous detail on the Central American Communist group in its early stages. Detail and continuity have always been lacking. During the post-project period of association, after termination notice was already given, she began to be more attentive to Station requirements and supplied several rather detailed profiles of controversial persons in the intellectual world who could be of operational interest to the Station.

(5) Date of Termination: 1 January 1966

(6) Status of commitments:

a. LICOOKY-1: This Contract Agent is being carried under LIRANCH (OOA) from 1 January through June 1966 to prepare special reports against non-LICOOKY Project objectives. Termination costs will be borne by Project LIRANCH.

b. LICOOKY-2: LICOOKY-2 was terminated on 31 December 1965 for lack of continuous production. He was very understanding when told of the termination and recognized that his limited and occasional access made a regular salary illogical. Contact is maintained with him via a letter box through which he can indicate his need for case officer contact. He is then paid small sums for travel information supplied.

(7) Disposition of funds, material and personnel: There are no funds or material to be disposed of. LICOOKY-1 is being terminated effective 30 June 1966. At this time she will be supplied with air fare from Mexico City to New York and paid the income tax refund due her. Station owns some of the furnishings in her apartment and she has expressed a wish to purchase some of these. The normal three-bid process will be complied with in this case, through her advertising the sale and then offering slightly higher prices for the items. She plans to retain the apartment in Mexico and sublet it furnished so she will have a pied-a-terre whenever she returns there. Her specific plans for leaving the city are not known. The Station has no objections to her remaining in Mexico and

is quite willing to maintain contact with her on an occasional basis. She would be reimbursed out of LIRANCH on a piecework basis.

(8) Request for funds: No extra funds are required.

(9) Progress made toward attainment of project objectives: See paragraph 4 above.

(10) Review of Project: No review is contemplated of Project LICOOKY.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:
RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO

TO. ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REG				
2.				
3. C/WH/1/Fisher	27 JUN 1966			
4.				
5. Kaufman				WYK
6.				
7. Chacones				SC
8.				
9. Bustos				B
10. WH/FI/Buran				K
11.				
12.				
13. RI/AN				mof
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COMMENTS

Copy Detached JUN 27 1966

Hold for Bustos

FYI

Please reclassify into 201-278841

WH/1
ABSTRACT X

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT X	FILE TITLE	
	INDEX	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)	~~50-6-179/3~~ 201-278841
DATE MICROFILMED		DOCUMENT DATE: 16 June, 1966	DOCUMENT NUMBER: HMMA 29207

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LICOOKY-1/ Forwarding of Clippings and Comments Concerning Conference on Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None; FYI.

1. As Headquarters is already aware, a Latin American Conference to Study the Situation of the Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union (Conferencia Latinoamericana de Estudios sobre la Situación de la Minoría Judía en la URSS) was held in Mexico City during the period 13 - 15 May 1966. Judging by numerous articles in the press, Política, La Voz de México, Sucesos Para Todos (see attachments under separate cover) and excerpts from conversations between numerous persons on LIENVOY and LIFEAT, the Soviet Embassy, the Mexican Communist Party (PCM - Partido Comunista Mexicano) and other groups and individual Communists were determined, if possible, to prevent the Conference from being held and, failing that, to discredit it completely and pin the ODYOKE/ ODACID label on it. Despite their efforts and the voluminous adverse propaganda, both before and after the Conference, the Conference was held and was probably mildly successful.

2. Política, 1 May 1966, carried an article attacking the proposed Conference and ridiculing some of the Mexican participants (Attachment A). It contains, among other things, a partial reprint of the text of an interview or statement by Nicolas S. Leonov, Press Attaché of the Soviet Embassy in which he states that Mexico should not be drawn into the cold war propaganda battle, and he maintains that Jews in the Soviet Union are not mistreated or discriminated against. In addition to the attacks and counterattacks in the press, efforts were made (based on LIFEAT on Enrique SEMO Calev, Gerard PIERRE-CHARLES, and LIENVOY) to prevent Carlos Pellicer, a darling of the Mexican left but not a formal PCM member, from taking part; Pellicer is an official of the Mexican Committee for the Defense of the Jews in the USSR (Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética). Política, 15 May 1966

DOC [illegible] BY [illegible] 2 JUN [illegible]

CONTINUED

Attachments:
As stated above, UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WH Division, w/atts usc

CS COPY

201-278541
50-6-129/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-29207	16 June 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-129/3

(Attachment B) continued the attack on the Conference and its participants, claiming in effect that it is a clear anti-Soviet move backed by ODACID. As of 18 May, according to the article, numerous signatures had been collected on a "progressive manifesto" protesting the Conference. The list includes many well known Mexican Communists and pro-Communists. Attached also (Attachment C) is a copy of the "progressive manifesto", which was published in El Día on 19 May 1966, and a copy of a manifesto (Attachment D) published in El Heraldo, 22 April 1966, by the Mexican Committee for the Defense of the Jews in the USSR, in which a number of demands are made on the Soviet Government with respect to the Jews and their rights.

3. La Voz de Mexico, 15 May 1966 (Attachment E) carried an article bitterly attacking the Conference, which it charges is being organized and held by groups and persons in the service of ODACID. It specifically names LICOOKY-1, although the latter's name is incorrectly spelled, as one of those responsible for the Conference and says she is "well connected" with ODYOKE police. Sucesos, 21 May 1966, carried an article (Attachment F) attacking the Conference and its organizers and charging that there are sinister forces behind the Conference. This article carries a picture of LICOOKY-1.

4. Sucesos, 4 June 1966, included an inserted sheet (not found in all copies of this edition) entitled "An Agent of the FBI and INTERPOL in the Association of Mexican Writers," which deals almost exclusively with LICOOKY-1, her expulsion from Cuba, work in Mexico, and contacts and activities in Mexico. It charges that in Mexico she is working for Daniel James, who is responsible to KUBARK (Attachment G).

5. LICOOKY-1's name appeared in a notice (Attachment H) appearing in El Excelsior, 28 May 1966 by Vicente Echeverría del Prado, treasurer of the Mexican Association of Writers (AEM - Asociación de Escritores de México, A.C.), which simply stated that LICOOKY-1 is not authorized to accept dues or handle other business of the AEM within the province of the treasurer's duties and obligations. However, in view of the adverse publicity previously, the announcement had the effect or implied that the AEMAC or members of that group believed the charges that LICOOKY-1 had a part in organizing the Conference and/or is an agent of KUBARK. The notice, as it appears, also implies that LICOOKY-1 was mishandling AEMAC funds. Echeverría offered to publish the clarification on the sheet on which the AEMAC announcement appears; however, LICOOKY-1 asked him not to do so and said she would take up the notice and any clarification with the AEMAC Justice and Honor Commission.

6. On 9 June 1966 while conversing with SEMO (Attachment I), Leonov said that LICOOKY-1 had called him to say that she had had nothing to do with the Conference, and does not want the Soviets to catalogue her as an enemy. Leonov commented that LICOOKY-1 had left him her phone number and had asked him to help her (presumably refute the charges that she was involved with the Conference). The LILINK case officer who currently handles LICOOKY-1 said on the morning of 14 June 1966 that LICOOKY-1 told him she had called the Soviet Press Attaché to deny that she had had anything to do with the Conference "because it is what she would normally do." She did not, however, mention beforehand that she intended to call the Soviet Embassy. (Tape of conversation is forwarded as Attachment J.)

7. The Station believes that most or all articles attacking the Conference, and particularly those attacking LICOOKY-1, were Soviet inspired, and it is further believed that SEMO wrote most if not all articles attacking the Conference which appeared in La Voz, Política and Sucesos. The Soviets, who are probably aware of previous Cuban charges that LICOOKY-1 is an ODYOKE agent, probably felt that as an American closely associated with the AEMAC LICOOKY-1 would be vulnerable to such an attack.

8. As a result of the Sucesos article of 4 June 1966 an official from the Ministry of Government did visit LICOOKY-1 to check on her documentation. The official said that he did not believe the charges made in the Sucesos article, but since her tourist visa had expired he advised her to immediately leave the country in order to renew it, and he provided her with a letter to show to Mexican border authorities permitting her exit. She is currently in PBPRIME but is expected to return to Mexico in a few days.

9. As Headquarters is aware, LICOOKY-1 will be terminated effective 30 June 1966; the decision to terminate her was made some time ago, prior to the occurrence of the Conference and the resulting adverse propaganda. While she may be of some occasional use should she return to and remain in Mexico, it is believed that the recent adverse propaganda has impaired her future usefulness in Mexico, although many Mexicans undoubtedly do not believe the charges and others offered to "come to her defense."

10. A dispatch will be prepared and forwarded when the termination has been completed, and any new developments with respect to her alleged participation in the above Conference will be included in that dispatch.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Att J to

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO. HMMA 29207

DATE 16 June 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

BULKY

Tape Recording of Conversation

CALL RID/FILES, EXT. 6867
FOR ATTACHMENTS.
RECORDS CENTER JOB NO. 67-1003
BOX NO. 8

201-278841

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Contract Amendments

ACTION REQ: Advise Subjects

Attached for your retention are contract amendments relating to income taxes for the following personnel:

Cecil B. ARLISS
Rita H. BLAZEK
Howard R. BENJAYA
Helen P. FILESHA
Joyce H. PINELOCH
Leo C. REDLICH
Philip K. TESSAROLO
David M. WILSTED
Carol K. ZUNSMEISTER

Howard D. MYNARD

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

Wilcox

HMMS - 4770

S E C R E T

WH/Pers/W.S. Renehan: gms 8 June 1966 4660

Distribution:

Miss Joyce H. Pineinch

Dear **Miss Pineinch**

Reference is made to your current **MOC** with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective **21 April 1966**, said **MOC** is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"**10**. Taxes. As an independent contractor, monies paid you under paragraph **four (4)** above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms and conditions of said ~~contract~~ moc remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ________________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONGRESOS

¿Les Darán Permiso?

En 1961 un Comité Hindú pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética solicitó al gobierno de la India permiso para realizar un congreso al que asistirían intelectuales de varios países asiáticos. El permiso fue negado porque el primer ministro Nehru entendió que esa reunión afectaría las buenas relaciones de indo-soviéticas.

Trámites similares se hicieron al año siguiente en Ceilán y correspondió a la señora Sirimavo Bandaranaike, jefa del gobierno cuya política nacionalista fue saludada por las fuerzas progresistas de todo el mundo, negar el permiso, pues vio que se trataba de una más o menos sutil intromisión en la política exterior de su país.

Instituido el gobierno *gorila* en el Brasil, un Comité Latinoamericano pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética no tuvo problemas para llevar a cabo en 1965 un congreso; éste se celebró poco después de uno similar que se reunió en mayo del año pasado en Washington y sobre el que un conocido poeta judío-norteamericano de ideas derechistas, Jacob Glatstein, hizo este comentario: "Todos gritaban en inglés que hacía falta la lengua judía... en Rusia". Esta expresión fue comentada por Aarón Vergelis, poeta y director de la revista en yidish *Sovietish Heimland* que se publica en la URSS con esta frase:

Politica, 1 May 1966

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

Martín Luis Guzmán, Carlos Pellicer, Luis Gómez Z. y Jawaharlal Nehru

"…¿qué se pretende con toda esta propaganda contrarrestar la discriminación racial que sí se practica en otros países?…"

"Nadie grita en ruso que hace falta la lengua judía… en los EU".

A otro mitin antisoviético celebrado el tres de junio pasado en Nueva York, dos prominentes sabios judíos de la URSS, el economista Evsei Liberman, profesor de la Universidad de Jarkov, y el físico Lev Landau, Premio Nobel, enviaron un mensaje que decía: "Los ciudadanos de la URSS de nacionalidad judía expresamos nuestra profunda indignación por el hecho de que algunos círculos de Occidente hagan cundir incesantemente toda clase de infundios sobre la situación de los judíos en la Unión Soviética. Los judíos soviéticos consideramos como una provocación el mitin del tres de junio en el *Madison Square Garden* donde sin nosotros, sin representantes nuestros, se pretende discutir una cuestión que, para colmo, ni siquiera existe".

Al congreso de Río de Janeiro concurrieron por México dos personajes de prestigio: Martín Luis Guzmán y Carlos Pellicer. Poco después quedó constituido el Comité Mexicano pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética, presidido ejecutivamente por un judío-mexicano de ideas ultraderechistas, Jacobo Mondlak, y honorariamente por el poeta Carlos Pellicer. Como secretario actúa el exlocutor de Radio Universidad, actor aficionado y empleado de la sucursal mexicana de una empresa financiera israelí Sergio Guzik. Para colaborar con ellos llegó a México a principios de este año Dov Yosefi, funcionario del ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Israel, experto de darle un barniz "liberal" y hasta "progresista" a ciertos eslabones de esta cadena echada a tejer por el Departamento de Estado de los EU.

Dov Yosefi trajo consigo abundante "literatura", entre la que se contaba el artículo *Los judíos en la URSS*, publicado por la revista *Marcha* de Montevideo el 16 de octubre de 1965, y del que es autor Julio Adin, miembro del Partido Obrero Unificado de Israel. Julio Adin estuvo en México a mediados de abril y declaró a POLÍTICA: "Yo escribí ese artículo a pedido del Dr. Carlos Quijano, director de *Marcha*, revista cuya orientación progresista todos conocemos. Al remitírselo desde Jerusalén le expresaba en una carta adjunta que me disgustaría sobremanera que fuese utilizado para cualquier actividad, disimulada o no, de tipo antisoviético. Estoy enterado de los congresos que se han venido celebrando en muchos países para «defender» los derechos de los judíos en la URSS, y no tengo dudas sobre su carácter antisoviético propiciado por el Departamento de Estado de los EU".

Firmas mexicanas. La consecuencia para México de la reunión de Río de Janeiro fue un *Llamado de conciencia*, a cuyo pie se puso la respetable firma de Carlos Pellicer. El hábil trabajo de Dov Yosefi y Sergio Guzik logró que a la de Pellicer se sumaran 50 firmas, algunas tan honorables como las de León Felipe, Héctor Cruz, Rosario Castellanos, Alí Chumacero, Dagoberto Guillaumin, Héctor Mendoza, José Emilio Pacheco y últimamente otras como la de José Revueltas, Luis Gómez Z. o Carlos Monsiváis.

Para dar a conocer ese *Llamado de conciencia* fue ofrecida una conferencia de prensa el 2[illegible] de abril en el edificio central de la comunidad israelita de México. En las invitaciones se decía que la iba a presidir Carlos Pellicer, pero su lugar fue ocupado por una personalidad mucho menos importante, como lo es el Lic. Benjamín Laureano Luna, del Frente [illegible] Humanos. Empleando el [illegible] que consiste en [illegible] tan las [illegible] nes civiles en Vietnam, Laureano Luna repetía una y otra vez [illegible] la URSS y los países socialistas, para afirmar luego mentiras tales [illegible] URSS se editan millones [illegible] de libros de franco y [illegible] sentido antisemita, que son vendidos a menor precio que las obras científicas o literarias; y que si bien la Constitución soviética condena el antisemitismo, actualmente el gobierno no sólo lo tolera sino que propicia su expansión.

Jacobo Mondlak, después de afirmar de modo irresponsable que todos los sectores de la comunidad judía de México lo habían elegido presidente del mencionado comité, sufrió un ataque de confusión geográfica y afirmó que en la URSS se producen frecuentes profanaciones de cementerios judíos. La verdad es que el único país donde se ha sabido que se produzcan tan abominables salvajismos es en la República Federal Alemana, donde florece el neonazismo y, en consecuencia, el antisemitismo; pero sobre esto ni una palabra dijeron los apurados "defensores": Mondlak, Laureano Luna y Guzik.

El 22 de abril, en todos los periódicos matutinos, incluido *El Nacional*, apareció el *Llamado de conciencia* con las 50 firmas. Esto sorprendió de manera desagradable a los sectores progresistas de México, no repuestos todavía de las intempestivas cuan amenazantes visitas de Johnson y Goldwater. La primera reacción de esos sectores fue el envío de cartas que diversas instituciones y personas hicieron llegar al poeta Carlos Pellicer, lamentando que hubiera aceptado presidir un comité inspirado y movido

ATT A to HMMA-29307

201-278841

por el Departamento de Estado yanqui.

Comentario soviético. En entrevista con *El Día*, Nicolás S. Leonov, agregado de prensa de la embajada de la URSS en nuestro país, afirmó: "México no es campo propicio para hacer propaganda de guerra fría. El prestigio internacional de que goza y el respeto que le tiene el mundo entero no permiten que florezcan en este país brotes de la guerra fría. En la actualidad no hay ni datos, ni situaciones ni acontecimientos que justifiquen el deseo de algunas personas y elementos de reavivar el cadáver del llamado problema judío en Rusia. A juzgar por los argumentos, la aplastante mayoría de los firmantes usó para sus conclusiones no los datos personales, no los resultados de una investigación objetiva, sino [illegible] tomado de segunda mano, superficial, erróneo y muchas veces tergiversado por pura mala voluntad".

En referencia al pedido de control de las publicaciones antisemitas que hacía el llamamiento, Leonov comentó: "Es curioso que pidan esto a la URSS y no a otros países en donde prolifera esta clase de literatura. Es falso afirmar que las publicaciones antisemitas aparecen en forma regular en la URSS; al contrario, la Unión Soviética es uno de los pocos países en donde la revelación de prejuicios raciales se castiga por la ley y se condena por la opinión pública. Es una pena —concluyó— que tantos intelectuales en tan poco espacio hayan cometido tantos errores. ¿No se pretende con toda esta propaganda contrarrestar la discriminación racial, que sí se practica en otros países?"

El congreso. Muy en silencio se ha venido preparando un congreso que habrá de celebrarse en la ciudad de México del 13 al 15 de mayo, al que concurrirán intelectuales de los países centroamericanos para "defender" los derechos de los judíos soviéticos [illegible] la cadena, [illegible] Mundial, durante la [illegible], se reunirá después otro [illegible] en Santiago de Chile, al [illegible] intelectuales de Argentina, [illegible] y otros países del "cono sur". Como decía un lector de *Siempre!* en la sección de *Cartas* del Nº 671, los resultados de esta campaña antisoviética "no pueden ser otros que los de favorecer la propaganda imperialista y, a la postre, el antisemitismo". Consideraba además que "muchos de quienes aparecen suscribiendo ese llamado parecen no darse cuenta de que son empujados como resonancia y apoyo para la celebración de un congreso [illegible] antisoviético con sede en México; es decir, en un país que tiene buenas relaciones con la URSS y que sufre en carne propia las falacias del anticomunismo manejado desde Washington".

TRABAJO

Primero de Mayo

La celebración del Primero de Mayo, no ha dejado nunca de ser representativa de las aspiraciones de la clase trabajadora y de sus condiciones de vida y de lucha, por un lado, y de la actitud de la clase capitalista y su dominio frente a aquella, por el otro.

Así, por deformado y desvirtuado que esté el sentido esté el sentido auténtico de la conmemoración, a través de toda la historia de los 1os de Mayo en el país se ha visto una CROM callista, haciéndole el juego al régimen con el propósito de instituir el día de lucha del proletariado universal en una "fiesta del trabajo" organizada por el gobierno. Bajo el cardenismo, en pleno ascenso revolucionario, las manifestaciones obreras volvieron a ser en este día una presencia combativa de la clase trabajadora. Durante Alemán, al tiempo que se llegaba a asesinar trabajadores en el desfile, la sumisión de los *charros* del movimiento obrero llegaba a su máxima expresión cuando Fidel Velázquez lo calificaba de "primer obrero de la República".

En este 1966, lo que una vez fue en México lucha a favor de mejores condiciones de vida ha devenido en una "fiesta de unidad nacional a la que son invitados los empresarios", lo que da una panorámica general de la situación de la lucha de clases en el país.

Organizado con el [illegible] controlar las aspiraciones crecientes a la unidad por parte de los trabajadores (el Congreso Nacional del Trabajo), el Primero de Mayo, días antes de su celebración se hizo público el criterio que el gobierno y los líderes reaccionarios deseaban imbuir a esa fecha. Circulares y declaraciones de Fidel Velázquez y Antonio Bernal coincidieron con los conceptos que más tarde externaría el presidente Gustavo Díaz Ordaz.

El deseo del régimen de dar apariencia de unidad al intento de fusión burocrática que ha sido el Congreso del Trabajo, así como su empeño en presentarse como impulsor de la unidad obrera se evidencia en su discurso de este Primero de Mayo: "Hoy empieza a ser una promisoria realidad la unificación de los trabajadores no en una sola central propiamente dicha, sino en ideales, en principios, en metas y en ayuda recíproca para poder alcanzarlos".

14-00000

Vol. VII, Nº 146

POLÍTICA

15 DE MAYO DE 1966

Quince días de México y del Mundo

PANORAMA NACIONAL

CONGRESOS

Antisovietismo en México

Del 13 al 15 de mayo se celebró en el Hotel del Prado de la ciudad de México la silenciosamente organizada Conferencia Latinoamericana de Estudios sobre la Situación de la Minoría Judía en la URSS. Convocada por el Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética y con asistencia de algunos delegados extranjeros, especialmente centroamericanos, esta reunión fue el remate de una campaña internacional antisoviética, iniciada desde hace por lo menos cinco años por el Departamento de Estado norteamericano y el sionismo organizado.

A pesar de los densos [illegible] de humanitarismo y eclecticismo con que se ha pretendido cubrirla, esta conferencia fue denunciada en su fase preparatoria por publicaciones como POLÍTICA y *La Voz de México*, órgano del Partido Comunista Mexicano. Nicolás S. Leonov, embajador de la Unión Soviética en nuestro país, la condenó como parte de la "guerra fría".

Analizando, aun en forma somera, la extracción de los diferentes delegados extranjeros, es fácil inducir sus nexos con el imperialismo norteamericano y la intervención de éste en la conferencia. Los delegados son en su mayoría o han sido funcionarios de gobiernos gorilas de Centro y Sudamérica; entre ellos se cuentan Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, exministro de Cultura de El Salvador; Ricardo J. Bermúdez, exministro de Educación de Panamá; Gerardo Molina, exrector de la Universidad de Colombia; Lic. Gardillo Barios, exministro de Economía y Trabajo de Guatemala; y Dr. René de Sola, exministro de Justicia y de Relaciones Exteriores de Venezuela.

A esta campaña, nada democrática y de calidad intelectual harto dudosa, fueron arrastrados algunos intelectuales mexicanos honestos. Una larga serie de artimañas fueron usadas para ella, desde el ocultamiento de la bien [illegible] organización y del puntual pago de los servicios necesarios para la celebración de la conferencia, hasta el uso demagógico y falaz de pronunciamientos hechos, en bien diversas circunstancias, por personalidades y organizaciones de reconocida solvencia progresista.

Además se escamoteó el nombre del escritor Martín Luis Guzmán, que no aparece entre los firmantes del nefasto "Llamado de Conciencia". Sin embargo, el literato había sido designado con anterioridad para presidir la conferencia; así lo prueban tanto el mensaje dirigido a su nombre por el filósofo inglés Bertrand Russell el 26 de abril, como el discurso de inauguración de la conferencia, que debía dirigir Martín Luis Guzmán y que fue impreso y repartido por la oficina de prensa aun antes de que comenzara la reunión.

La conferencia. En la sesión de apertura se escenificó una farsa en la que se intentó despojar a la conferencia "pro judía" de toda implicación política, ubicándola dentro de una esfera exclusivamente "humana". Al mismo tiempo, se pretendió dar a las delegaciones extranjeras —algunas de las cuales sólo constaban de una sola persona— una representatividad "democrática" en las dos comisiones que se formaron: la de estudio y la de resoluciones.



UNA SESIÓN DE LA CONFERENCIA "PRO JUDÍA"

...sus nexos con el imperialismo norteamericano y la intervención de éste...

La realización de la primera tarea se encargó de iniciarla, por medio de una carta a la conferencia, el que ha figurado como presidente del Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética, Carlos Pellicer. Después de disculpar su ausencia de la reunión, pues acompañaba al presidente Díaz Ordaz, en una gira de trabajo, Pellicer enarboló el nombre de Bertrand Russell para "demostrar" que "...no, detrás de nosotros no hay ninguna fuerza que nos mueva a actuar como lo estamos haciendo". Y finalizó su carta con estas palabras: "Nunca como hoy se habla tan universalmente de Derechos Humanos. El gobierno soviético los proclama todos los días. ¿Qué ocurre entonces con los dirigentes de tan grande nación? ...Estaré lejos de ustedes en persona. Pero mi corazón está aquí y mi voluntad entera para seguir luchando por la justicia y la libertad donde quiera que la necesidad tan honrosamente nos obligue".

A continuación, el presidente de la conferencia, Martín Luis Guzmán, y el que actuó como maestro de ceremonias, Benjamín Laureano Luna, hicieron sendos discursos en los que, cada uno a su manera, trató de justificar los objetivos de la conferencia.

Martín Luis Guzmán afirmó: "Pese a la revisión de aquellos factores negativos de la vida soviética y a los frecuentes cambios que en ellos se introdujeron, el gobierno de la URSS no ha restituido a los judíos sus indiscutibles derechos al goce de su cultura ancestral, a la conservación de sus instituciones, a la continuidad de su tradición milenaria". Despues de algunas vaguedades añadidas a la primera, el escritor finalizó con ésta: "Así, enterados de las persecuciones que hoy sufre un gran grupo del pueblo judío, cuyo milenario legado cultural forma parte de la civilización de Occidente, hemos considerado deber ineludible el acudir aquí para que esta conferencia manifieste su decisión de protestar, como lo haría

ATT B-73 HMMA 29207

201-278841

en cualquier otro caso de discriminaciones raciales, culturales o religiosas, contra el régimen que pesa sobre la minoría israelita de la URSS".

Benjamín Laureano Luna, presidente del Frente Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, cubrió su anticomunismo con reiteradas y demagógicas protestas en contra de las agresiones norteamericanas a Santo Domingo y Vietnam. Luego lanzó las más graves calumnias contra la Unión Soviética, y poco le faltó para poner en el mismo nivel del genocidio hitleriano al régimen de la primera nación donde se han sentado las bases para realizar el comunismo.

La jornada del 14 de mayo se cerró con un banquete al que asistieron, además de los delegados extranjeros, numerosos miembros de nuestra versátil y desaprensiva intelectualidad. Allí habló Jacobo Mondlak, gerente ejecutivo de la conferencia. De este seudoescritor, *La Voz de México* (en su edición 1829) denunció su filiación de extrema derecha y lo presentó como "dirigente del JEIRUT (partido israelita de ultraderecha y fascista), bien conocido en la comunidad judía de México por su ideología chovinista y reaccionaria".

Mondlak sólo dirigió ditirambos a la "gloriosa y hospitalaria patria mexicana" y a sus "monumentos toltecas de piedra". Después de barajar demagógicamente citas de Morelos, Hidalgo, Bolívar y Sandino pretendió curarse en salud: "No es preciso ser agente del Departamento de Estado para denunciar brotes antisemitas en la Unión Soviética, como tampoco es preciso ser agente comunista al criticar algunas facetas de la política norteamericana".

A los informes sobre la filiación política de Mondlak se añade que su insistencia en colocarse al lado de quienes luchan por la libertad y contra la esclavitud es determinada por la posición de clase que ocupa dentro de la sociedad mexicana. Es miembro del grupo Mondlak, que posee tal y en el interior del país. La familia Mondlak acaba de invertir $20 millones en maquinaria textil, mediante operaciones realizadas con una empresa imperialista germanooccidental de rancio abolengo nazi.


DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS


VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO

"...han sido, son y seguirán siendo enemigos irreconciliables del socialismo..."

"Demandas". La conferencia se clausuró el domingo 15 de mayo, luego de adoptarse el acuerdo de pedir a la Unión Soviética que:

- Devuelva a la minoría judía la posibilidad de llevar una vida cultural integral.
- Extirpe de raíz toda manifestación antisemita.
- Dé a los judíos la posibilidad de profesar su religión, al igual que los creyentes de otras religiones.
- Otorgue a los judíos el derecho a la autodeterminación y el derecho a unirse a sus hermanos cuando así lo deseen.

Estos puntos fueron propuestos por el escritor costarricense Samuel Gevinsky quien, no pudiendo ocultar los intereses a los que sirve, dedicó su exposición a calumniar en todas las formas posibles a la Unión Soviética. Y acabó por hacer una ardiente defensa del sionismo internacional, movimiento al que la URSS, durante la asamblea general de las Naciones Unidas en 1965, propuso que se le condenara junto al nazismo, al neonazismo y a todas las otras formas de colonialismo y de odio hacia razas y nacionalidades.

Respuesta. De inmediato, grupo de personas progresistas redactó un manifiesto donde respondió a los organizadores del movimiento antisoviético y de la conferencia que:

"En relación al «Llamado de Conciencia» del Comité en Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la URSS y la Conferencia organizada por el mismo comité, que se celebró los días 14 y 15 de mayo, declaramos:

- "La posición activa contra el antisemitismo y otras formas de discriminación racial en cualquier parte del mundo, es y debe ser tarea diaria de toda persona progresista y democrática.
- "El «Llamado de Conciencia» publicado en la prensa, no sirve a estos altos valores humanitarios. Es, pues, de lamentarse que algunas personalidades bien intencionadas y de reconocida militancia democrática y antiimperialista hayan sido confundidas, prestando sus firmas a un

ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ


BERTRAND RUSSELL

"...¿cómo pueden explicar los apurados «defensores» su negativa a dialogar?..."

documento que contiene afirmaciones falaces en contra de la URSS.

o "El racismo y las teorías antisemitas han sido, son y seguirán siendo enemigos irreconciliables del [illegible] y de su construcción en el país de los soviets. La defensa de la existencia del Estado soviético, unión voluntaria y fraternal de numerosos pueblos, está íntimamente ligada a la lucha consecuente contra estas aberraciones chovinistas.

o "La campaña mundial —que ahora se expresa en México— contra el llamado «antisemitismo soviético» no sirve a la verdad, ya que falsea deliberadamente la situación real de los judíos en la URSS. Tampoco aporta algo a la fraternidad entre los pueblos, porque tiende a desviar la atención de estos de los verdaderos promotores del racismo y el antisemitismo, como los neonazis y los belicistas que una vez más, levantan cabeza en Alemania occidental y en los Estados Unidos.

o "Los judíos en la URSS gozan en la actualidad de los mismos derechos y tienen las mismas obligaciones que los demás ciudadanos soviéticos en los campos económico, social, político y religioso. Toda afirmación en sentido contrario, es burda calumnia o consideración subjetiva sin posibilidad de comprobación.

o "En cuanto al desarrollo libre de su cultura específica en lengua nacional, yiddish, los judíos soviéticos, sus artistas y escritores siguen creando obras que continúan la herencia de la cultura progresista judía del pasado, aun cuando podrían señalarse ciertas deficiencias originadas en la compleja situación de la minoría judía en la URSS, que no vive concentrada en un territorio común y que conoce además un acelerado proceso de asimilación.

o "Los hoy gratuitos defensores de la cultura judía en la URSS siempre han combatido y difamado esa cultura, porque como la cultura de los demás pueblos soviéticos, su forma es nacional y su contenido socialista. ¿Cómo pueden explicar los apurados «defensores» su negativa a dialogar, en el pasado y el presente, con los representantes más sobresalientes de esa cultura?

o "Los verdaderos organizadores de la conferencia mencionada tratan en realidad de imponer, desde afuera y con posiciones antisoviéticas, una anacrónica solución nacionalista estrecha y de ghetto, a la minoría judía de la URSS, que ligada íntimamente a la epopeya histórica de la construcción del socialismo, no comulga con las ideas de movimientos políticos judíos del mundo capitalista.

o "Las relaciones amistosas entre el pueblo de México y la URSS no deben ser perturbadas por la acción de fuerzas que no sirvan a los verdaderos intereses de México, ni tampoco a los intereses vitales [illegible] judías en el mundo en su lucha por la plena igualdad y fraternidad con los demás pueblos".



CARLOS PELLICER



MARTÍN LUIS GUZMÁN

...junto al nazismo, al neonazismo y a todas las otras formas de colonialismo...

Hasta el 18 de mayo habían firmado ese manifiesto progresista, que constituye un reto al brote de antisovietismo que ha surgido en México, las siguientes personas:

Vicente Lombardo Toledano, diputado; David Alfaro Siqueiros, pintor; Alberto Bremauntz, rector de la Universidad de Morelia; Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, director de POLÍTICA; Eli de Gortari, catedrático; Rius, caricaturista; Raquel Tibol, crítica de arte; Ermilo Abreu Gómez, escritor; Enrique Semo, economista; Margarita Paz Paredes, poetisa; Fernando Carmona, economista; Mercedes Quevedo, Pintora; Manuel Meza Andraca, agrónomo; Juan de la Cabada, escritor; Lic. Xavier Campos Ponce, Presidente de la Asociación Mexicana de Periodistas; Lic. José G. Saavedra; José Luis Parra, periodista; Marco Arturo Montero, escritor; Antonio Caram, periodista; Lic. Adán Nieto, dirigente sindical; Rosendo Gomez Lorenzo, periodista; Adriana Siqueiros; Carlos Estrada Lang, presidente de la AMPEC; Gerardo Dávila, periodista; José Chávez Morado, pintor; Lic. Luis Córdova; Germán Liszt Arzubide, escritor; Profra. Hermelinda Ogazón; José Luis Ceceña, economista; Gabriel Figueroa, cineasta; Luis Suárez, periodista; Luis Rivera Terrazas, astrónomo; Elvira Vargas, periodista; Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo; Roger Bartra, antropólogo; Daniel Casez, lingüista; Sergio Véjar, director de cine; Javier Guerrero, pintor; Gerardo Dávila, periodista; Lic. Juan Manuel Gómez Gutiérrez; Francisco Mora, pintor; Lic. Arturo Rivera M.; Ramón Ramírez, economista; Jorge Godoy, director de teatro; Edmundo Jardón, periodista; Enrique Bordes, fotógrafo; Norberto Martínez, pintor; Froylán Manjarrez, periodista, y Óscar S. Frías, pintor.



JOSÉ LUIS CECEÑA

"...una anacrónica solución..."

[illegible]

En relación al "Llamado de conciencia" del Comité en defensa de los derechos de los judíos en la URSS y la conferencia organizada por el mismo Comité, que se efectuó los días 14 y 15 de mayo, declaramos:

1. La oposición activa contra el antisemitismo y otras formas de discriminación racial, en cualquier parte del mundo es y debe ser tarea diaria de toda persona progresista y democrática.

2. El "Llamado de conciencia" publicado en la prensa no sirve a estos altos valores humanitarios. Es, pues, de lamentarse que algunas personalidades bien intencionadas y de reconocida militancia democrática y antiimperialista hayan sido confundidas y hayan suscrito un documento que contiene afirmaciones falaces en contra de [illegible]

3. El racismo y las teorías antisemitas [illegible], son, y seguirán siendo enemigos irreconciliables del socialismo y de su construcción en el país de los soviets. La defensa de la existencia del Estado soviético, unión voluntaria y fraternal de numerosos pueblos, está íntimamente ligada a la lucha consecuente contra estas aberraciones chovinistas.

4. La campaña mundial —que ahora se expresa en México— contra el llamado "antisemitismo soviético" no corresponde a la verdad, ya que falsea deliberadamente la situación real de los judíos en la URSS. Tampoco aporta algo a la [illegible] entre los pueblos, porque [illegible] a desviar la atención [illegible] de los verdaderos promotores del racismo y del antisemitismo, como los neonazis y los belicistas que una vez más, levantan cabeza en Alemania Occidental y en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica.

5. Los judíos en la URSS gozan en la actualidad de los mismos derechos y tienen las mismas obligaciones que los demás ciudadanos soviéticos en los campos económico, social, político y religioso. Toda afirmación en sentido contrario es [illegible] consideración subjetiva sin posibilidad de comprobación.

6. En cuanto al desarrollo libre de su cultura específica en la lengua nacional "idish", los judíos soviéticos tienen artistas y escritores que han creado obras que continúan la gran herencia de la cultura progresista judía del pasado, aun cuando por [illegible] ciertas deficiencias [illegible] en la compleja situación de la minoría judía en la URSS, que no vive concentrada en un territorio común y que conoce, además, un acelerado proceso de asimilación.

7. Los promotores de la campaña mundial "en defensa de la cultura judía en la URSS", han [illegible] y deformado esa cultura, porque, como la cultura de los demás pueblos soviéticos, su [illegible] nido es socialista. ¿Cómo pueden explicar los aparatos "defensores" su negativa a [illegible] en el pasado y en el presente, con los representantes más sobresalientes de esa cultura?

8. Los verdaderos organizadores de la conferencia mencionada tratan, en realidad, de imponer desde afuera y con posiciones antisoviéticas, una anacrónica solución, nacionalista, estrecha y de ghetto, a la minoría judía de la URSS, que, ligada íntimamente a la epopeya histórica de la construcción del socialismo, no coincide con las ideas de movimientos políticos judíos del mundo capitalista.

9. Las relaciones amistosas entre el pueblo de México y la URSS no deben ser perturbadas por la acción de fuerzas que no sirven a los verdaderos intereses de México ni tampoco a los intereses vitales de las masas judías en el mundo, en su lucha por la plena igualdad y fraternidad con los demás pueblos.

México, D. F., 16 de mayo de 1965.

David Alfaro Siqueiros, pintor
Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, ingeniero
Jorge L. Tamayo, ingeniero
José Chávez Morado, pintor
Francisco Mora, pintor
Mario Gill, escritor
Olga Costa, pintora
Xavier Guerrero, pintor
Oscar Frías, pintor
Froylán Manjarrez, periodista
[illegible]
[illegible], pintor
[illegible] Orozco Avila, profesora
[illegible] Quevedo, pintora
[illegible], artista
Enrique Bordes Mangel, fotógrafo
Luis Suárez, periodista
[illegible], periodista
[illegible], periodista
Rina Lazo, pintora
[illegible] Méndez, pro[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Marato, pintora

Vicente Lombardo Toledano, abogado
Antonio Castro Leal, escritor
[illegible] Cecena, economista
Luis Rivera Terrazas, ingeniero
[illegible], caricaturista
Raquel Tibol, crítica de arte
[illegible] de la Cabada, escritor
[illegible]
Ramón Ramírez, economista
[illegible] Godoy, Dir. de teatro
Rosendo Gómez Lorenzo, periodista
Ricardo López Toraya, [illegible]
[illegible] Arturo Montero, escritor
[illegible] A. Montero, [illegible]
[illegible] Parra, periodista
Laura Bolaños, periodista
Carlos Estrada Lang, periodista
[illegible] Nieto Castillo, abogado
[illegible] Rivera N., abogado
[illegible] Jardón, periodista
[illegible] Campos Ponce, economista
Alberto Híjar, crítico de arte
[illegible] Campos Alatorre, profesora
Luis Carrión, periodista
Natividad de Cruz Chávez, profesora

Alberto [illegible], abogado
[illegible] Gómez, profesor
[illegible] de [illegible], escritor
Luis Cardoza y Aragón, escritor
Fernando [illegible], economista
Gabriel [illegible], abogado
J. Manuel [illegible] Gutiérrez, [illegible]
[illegible], escritor
[illegible], agrónomo
[illegible] P. [illegible] Barreda, profesora
[illegible], antropólogo
[illegible], abogado
[illegible] Carrión, profesora
José G. [illegible], abogado
Enrique [illegible], escenógrafo
[illegible]
[illegible] cine
José Carlos [illegible], [illegible] de cine
Antonio [illegible], periodista
Juan [illegible] C., profesor
Ignacio [illegible] Rodas, profesor
Alfonso [illegible], abogado
[illegible], profesora
[illegible], artista
[illegible] Rivera, profesor

ATTC HMMA-29207

201-27884

UN LLAMADO DE CONCIENCIA DEL COMITE MEXICANO PRO DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DE LOS JUDIOS EN LA UNION SOVIETICA

Al termino de un examen, libre de todo espiritu partidario, hemos comprobado ciertos hechos que nos llevan a abrigar el temor de que aún existe una brecha entre la situación de igualdad que la Constitucion de la URSS confiere a los judios, y su situacion real, en el plano religioso, cultural, económico y humano. Estamos convencidos que dicha situacion se halla en contradiccion con los fines que persigue la sociedad sovietica, y su evolucion desde 1956. Estamos asimismo convencidos que la misma constituye un obstaculo para aminorar la tension internacional. Es por esta razon que estamos igualmente persuadidos que el Gobierno de la Union Sovietica se mostrara sensible al llamamiento que hoy le dirigimos:

SOLICITAMOS DEL GOBIERNO DE LA URSS

1.—Que confiera a los judios soviéticos el derecho de desarrollar libremente su cultura especifica, con medios identicos a aquellos de que disponen las demás culturas nacionales: textos, periodicos, bibliotecas, teatros, enseñanza, etc.

2.—Que permita a los judios soviéticos practicar su religion y disponer libremente de los textos, contar con oficiantes y con los objetos necesarios a la observancia del culto;

3.—Que autorice a los judios sovieticos para que a semejanza de las demas religiones, puedan organizarse en comunidades religiosas en todo el territorio, y a establecer intercambios culturales y de culto, con sus correligionarios;

4.—Que, a fin de evitar en el futuro toda publicacion antisemita del tipo de: "El Judaismo al Descubierto" y "El Judaismo y el Sionismo Contemporaneo", asi como ciertos folletines y caricaturas que aparecen en forma regular en la prensa sovietica, se ejerza un severo control sobre dicho tipo de propaganda racial. Dicho control seria sumamente viable toda vez que existen en la URSS los organismos adecuados para llevarlo a cabo;

5.—Que una legislacion especial sancione los delitos de indole racista, velando especialmente porque dichas tendencias antisemitas no lleguen a poner en peligro ante la justicia, la igualdad de los derechos de los ciudadanos sovieticos, considerando que los recientes procesos por delitos economicos y las condenas a muerte que les siguieron, dan lugar al temor de que dicha igualdad no es enteramente aplicada en el caso de los judios;

6.—Que considere con benevolencia el caso de los judios que deseen reunirse con sus parientes y conyuges que viven en Israel y en otros paises, despues de haber sido separados por diversas circunstancias.

Tenemos la plena conviccion que la atención que otorgue el Gobierno de la URSS a estas peticiones, habra de satisfacer la aspiracion de justicia de los pueblos y su adhesion a la Declaracion Universal de los Derechos del Hombre. La misma contribuira, además, debido a la renovacion y fortalecimiento de las simpatias y lazos amistosos que dicha actitud aportaria a la URSS, al relajamiento de la tension internacional, meta que todos anhelamos.

CARLOS PELLICER
Presidente del Comite

Licenciado Sergio Alvarez Castro; Max Aub, escritor; Abelardo Avila, grabador; Arnold Belkin, pintor; licenciado Carlos Carrero de la Barreda; Rosario Castellanos, escritora; doctor Teodoro Cesserman; Ali Chumacero, escritor; Hector Cruz, pintor; licenciado Sergio Dominguez Vargas, catedratico; Roberto Dumont, actor; Leon Felipe, poeta; Juan Garcia Ponce, escritor; doctor Luis Garrido; Argelio Gasca, escritor; senador Luis Gómez Z.; profesor Julio González Tejada, catedratico; Miguel Guardia, escritor; Dagoberto Guillaumin, director teatral; Juan Jose Gurrola, director teatral; Joaquin Gutierrez Heras, compositor; Sergio Guzik economista; Arturo Guzman, escritor; Regino Hernández Llergo, periodista; Jorge Ibargüengoitia, escritor; Francisco Icaza, pintor; Benjamin Laureano Luna, Frente Mexicano Pro-Derechos Humanos; Vicente Leñero, escritor; Juan Lopez Moctezuma, director teatral; Jacobo Margolis, pintor, licenciado Carlos Medina; Juan Vicente Melo, escritor; Hector Mendoza, escritor y director teatral; licenciado Ruben Moheno, diputado; Jacobo Mondlak, escritor; Carlos Monsiváis, escritor; Magda Montoya, coreografa; doctor Manuel Moreno Barrera; doctor Marcos Moshinsky; Jose Emilio Pacheco, escritor; licenciado Carlos Pellicer; arquitecto Salvador Pinoncelly; Hero Rodriguez Toro, periodista; Fanny Rabel, pintora; Malkah Rabell, escritora y periodista; profesora Maria del Carmen Ramirez A.; Jose Revueltas, escritor; licenciado Salvador Rodriguez, diputado; licenciado Antonio Ruiz Acosta, catedratico; doctor Andres Serra Rojas, senador; Gutierre Tibon, periodista; licenciado Juan Tovar; Jacobo Zabludowsky, periodista.

EL Heraldo [illegible] de 1966

ATTD to HMMA-29007

201-278541

La Voz de México, 15 May 1966 # 1830

Repudio a la farsa antisoviética

La organiza el Dpto. de Estado, denuncia la AMP

La Asociación Mexicana de Periodistas salió al paso a la campaña antisoviética iniciada hace dos semanas por un grupo al servicio del imperialismo norteamericano que se ostenta como "defensor de los judíos". En un documento firmado por el Lic. Xavier Campos Ponce, Antonio Caram y Gerardo Dávila, presidente, secretario y vocal, respectivamente de la AMP, denuncian el carácter de la campaña difamatoria, presentan un hecho que sirve para corroborar que los hilos de toda [illegible] del imperialismo y demuestran con una serie de datos que en la Unión Soviética no existe discriminación contra los judíos.

Este documento fue emitido días antes del anunciado "Congreso Latinoamericano" que grupos subvencionados por el Departamento de Estado planeaban iniciar en México el sábado 14.

En la declaración de referencia se señala el principio que la persona encargada de recolectar firmas para el llamamiento que apareció en todos los diarios de esta ciudad el 21 de abril en "defensa de los derechos de los judíos en la Unión Soviética", es nada menos que la ciudadana norteamericana June Jacob, persona muy ligada con las policías norteamericanas que actúan en nuestro país y quien inmediatamente después de regresar de un largo viaje por Estados Unidos, Europa y el Medio Oriente, se dedicó a conseguir firmas de intelectuales y personalidades progresistas, para el documento antisoviético, que sirve de base para la convocatoria de un congreso supuestamente dirigido a "defender a los judíos

(Pasa a la pág. 4)

Repudio .

(Viene de la pág. 1)

residentes en la URSS". Los firmantes del manifiesto fueron sorprendidos hábilmente y muchos de ellos mantienen una actitud de desconfianza hacia los promotores de la campaña.

Respecto de una de las "peticiones" que se hace en el llamamiento antisoviético para "que se conceda a los judios soviéticos el derecho a desarrollar libremente su cultura específica con medios idénticos a aquellos de que disponen las demás culturas nacionales: textos, periódicos, bibliotecas, teatros, enseñanzas, etc.", la AMP dice: "...los dos millones y tercio de judios que forman parte del pueblo soviético viven exactamente igual que el resto de las 109 nacionalidades y de los 11 grupos afines a nacionalidades extranjeras. En cuanto a su cultura específica, tomo todas las del mundo tiende a fusionarse y a unificarse... los judios en todas partes asisten a las mismas escuelas donde van los rusos, ucranianos, uzbecos, etc. Reciben, como todos los demás, educación gratuita en todos los niveles". Otros datos que demuestran que la discriminación de judios en la URSS es sólo una invención de los agentes a sueldo del gran capital yanqui, son los siguientes:

En la biblioteca Lenin de Moscú hay 70.000 libros en yidish y 50.000 volúmenes en ese mismo idioma, en la Schedrin de Leningrado. Los judios en la URSS disponen de publicaciones en su idioma, así por ejemplo la revista mensual "Yidish Hemland" tira 25.000 ejemplares. Se publican ediciones de autores judios tanto soviéticos como extranjeros que alcanzan tiradas de millones de ejemplares como es el caso de Sholem-Aleijem. Los hebreos disponen también de sus propios teatros.

"Además de ello —se dice en el documento—, disponen de una tierra particular, exclusiva, a la que muchos llaman patria propia y que existe desde mayo de 1934, mucho antes de que los héroes judios de la postguerra arrancaran Israel al poder inglés... calculamos en medio millón los judios que habitan en esa región autónoma llamada Birobidjan, la cual forma parte de la URSS y abarca una superficie de 32 mil kilómetros cuadrados", a continuación viene luego una lista detallada de la cantidad de escuelas, institutos, centros médicos, etc. que existen en dicha república autónoma.

"Mucho más podríamos citar —dice finalmente la declaración de la AMP— en contestación a los errores cometidos por ese grupo de personas firmantes del "llamado", pero lo amplio del tema nos obliga a detenernos aquí, por ahora..."

ATTE to HMMA 29207 201-278841

SUCESOS DE ULTIMA HORA

LOS JUDIOS EN LA URSS

EL CAPITULO "MEXICANO" DE UNA INTRIGA INTERNACIONAL

LUBLIN es una ciudad polaca en la que Hitler pensó concentrar a los judíos en un hacinado ghetto de tantos millones de discriminados como habitantes tiene hoy Tokio. En el histórico avance para acabar con la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas, Hitler consideró que en vez de concentrar a los judíos se creaba menos problemas si los mataba de una buena vez. En los crematorios y fosas de los campos de concentración erigidos por los nazis en su marcha hacia el oriente quedaron las cenizas y los cadáveres de seis millones de judíos. La lucha contra el nacifascismo costó a la URSS 20 millones de vidas humanas.

En la ciudad de Lublín Nació Jacob Glatstein. Joven aún emigró a los Estados Unidos y se convirtió, con el correr de los años, en una de las más brillantes figuras de la poesía y de la crítica literaria en lengua ídish. Tiene ahora 70 años y milita en las filas del partido Poalé Sión (Trabajadores de Sión), que agrupa a los sionistas de tendencia socialdemócrata de derecha. Los poalesionistas editan en Nueva York el semanario Indisher Kempfer (Luchador judío). En septiembre de 1965, y en este periódico, publicó Jacob Glatstein un comentario bibliográfico sobre Horizontes, una antología con la producción más reciente de los poetas judíos de la Unión Soviética que escriben en lengua ídish, de la que se acababan de editar en Moscú 5,000 ejemplares, número que el comentarista señaló como bastante considerable para una antología de poesía nueva en cualquier parte del mundo. Glatstein celebraba haber descubierto en Horizontes a por lo menos una docena de poetas de primer orden a quienes, decía, "elogio sin titubeos porque son maestros del verbo y notables artífices de lo emotivo y lo temático... El ídish en manos de los magistrales poetas de la Unión Soviética es una creación madura que se sustenta más en un sabor popular que en la gran poesía del pasado. Ahí se ha conservado una savia popular que ha ampliado verdaderamente sus horizontes". Ya para terminar su comentario Jacob Glatstein afirmaba: "La antología Horizontes viene a demostrar que la palabra poética ídish vive en la Unión Soviética".

La comunidad judía de habla ídish en México es una de las más jóvenes de la América Latina; tiene [illegible] 60 años de existencia y unos 30 mil miembros [illegible] se concentran principalmente en la capital y [illegible] ciudades de Monterrey y Guadalajara. Organizada al estilo tradicional, cuenta con un centro deportivo, varias sinagogas y nueve colegios e institutos de enseñanza, en cinco de los cuales se enseña a los jóvenes la lengua ídish. En estos 60 años, hubo en México tres poetas que crearon en ídish obra digna de consideración: Itzjok Berliner, Moishe Glikowski y Jacobo Glantz. Los dos primeros han muerto y el sobreviviente, Jacobo Glantz, decidió en 1963 a los 61 años de edad, cambiar el ídish por el español, porque su poesía en aquel idioma, a pesar de los colegios e institutos que lo enseñan, no cuenta con lectores en México.

Ahora bien, Jacob Glantz, poeta ídish de México, que nació en Ucrania 15 años antes del estallido de la Revolución de Octubre, y que antes de su emigración a este país, en 1925, había sido profesor de literatura en Odesa, no firmó el "Llamado de conciencia" que el 22 de abril publicó en todos los periódicos de la capital el denominado Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética, que preside Carlos Pellicer, eminente poeta mexicano que no sólo no lee el ídish sino que no sabe nada de poesía o de literatura en esa lengua.

Ese llamado, que Pellicer firmó aunque seguramente no redactó, porque los términos que lo com-

La numerosa concurrencia, presidida por don Martín Luis Guzmán.

21 de Mayo de 1966

ATT F to HMMA - 29207

201-278841

ponen son casi idénticos a los de llamados similares que han venido circulando en el último lustro en muchos países, solicitaba antes que nada al gobierno de la URSS "que confiara a los judíos soviéticos el derecho a desarrollar libremente su cultura específica, con medios idénticos a aquellos de que disponen las demás culturas nacionales: textos, periódicos, bibliotecas, teatros, enseñanza, etc.".

Pellicer es poeta —¡quién lo duda!—, y las savias de su sensibilidad y de su forma poética son la realidad mexicana, las tradiciones nacionales y esa lengua que él depura y elabora porque la habla su pueblo y hay textos, periódicos, bibliotecas, teatros y escuelas por medio de los cuales la lengua y su correspondiente cultura se desarrollan libremente. Pellicer, que es poeta, ¿puede creer que existan poetas con "luminosa potencia creadora", que las savias populares amplíen sus horizontes, que un idioma sea elaborado con "tanto conocimiento y virtuosismo, con tan original y extraordinaria plasticidad" allí donde la cultura en ese idioma no tiene el derecho a desarrollarse libremente? ¿Lo creen así poetas de la talla de Rosario Castellanos, de José Emilio Pacheco, de Miguel Guardia, de León Felipe, o escritores que conocen los auténticos secretos del difícil y vivo oficio de las letras, como Max Aub, Alí Chumacero, Juan García Ponce, Jorge Ibargüengoitia, Vicente Leñero, Carlos Monsiváis, José Revueltas y Gutierre Tibón, que junto con Pellicer firmaron ese "Llamado de conciencia", que de tal sólo tiene el título, pues el nombre que le correspondería, después de someterlo a un riguroso análisis objetivo, sería el muy inonesquiano de "Llamado de un grupo de mal informados que firmaron porque dicen que les dijeron lo que no les consta porque no saben nada al respecto y la culpa de todo la tiene Bertrand Russel?"



Carlos Pellicer, el poeta; Martín Luis Guzmán, el escritor; Jacobo Mondlak, el organizador.

Donde no aparece la firma de don Martín Luis. El ya anciano (79 años) autor de El águila y la serpiente y La sombra del caudillo, el escritor Martín Luis Guzmán, gusta del infantil juego de las escondidillas. En 1965 fue él quien convenció a Carlos Pellicer para que juntos asistieran a la Conferencia Latinoamericana Sobre la Situación de los Judíos en la URSS que se celebró en Río de Janeiro los días 14 y 15 de septiembre de ese año. Pero he aquí que entre las 53 firmas que suscribieron el "Llamado de conciencia", que apareció en cuartos de plana, al día siguiente, en todos los diarios, en inserción pagada por la norteamericana June Cob, no aparece el nombre de don Martín. ¿Se había retirado arrepentido? Al contrario, prefirió en ese momento no salir a la liza porque estaba atareadísimo desde hacía mes y medio firmando, como cabeza del Comité Mexicano Pro Derechos de los Judíos de la Unión Soviética, las cartas en las que se invitaba a intelectuales mexicanos y latinoamericanos a concurrir a la conferencia que se efectuaría "en la ciudad de México durante los días 13 a 15 de mayo próximo y que se ocupará, como objetivo único, en examinar detenidamente el problema a que la minoría israelita hace frente en la Unión Soviética".

Según esas cartas, el comité organizador de la conferencia lo integraban, junto con don Lui Martín, el Dr. Luis Garrido y los licenciados André Serra Rojas y Carlos Pellicer. Mas he aquí que ninguna de estas personas se presentó en la conferencia de prensa que el Comité Mexicano Pro Derechos de los Judíos de la Unión Soviética dio en el edificio central de la comunidad israelita de México (Acapulco 70), el 21 de abril. Ahí apareció como presidente uno de los pocos judíos (19 en total) que habían firmado el llamado, un tal Jacobo Mondlak que es comerciante pero se dice escritor por los artículos que publica en un periódico que sale algunas veces al año, Tribuna Sionista, órgano del más ultraderechista de los grupos sionistas que existen en México.

El asistente de Mondlak en la conferencia de prensa era otro de los pocos firmantes judíos del documento, Sergio Guzik, actor aficionado que suele presentarse en los espectáculos de Juan José Gurrola y que tiene con Walter Rubinstein y F. Mondragón una oficina —Consultores Técnicos de Negocios— donde se conciertan operaciones financieras con empresas israelíes, privadas o estatales. Esa oficina, en el Paseo de la Reforma No. 122, 6o. piso fue la que se ocupó en distribuir libros, folletos y reproducciones fotostáticas y mimeografiadas de documentos sobre la situación de los judíos en la URSS, antes, durante y después de la conferencia de prensa, y de preparar el material que utilizarían los intelectuales que se reunieron en el hotel Del Prado los días 14 y 15 de mayo.

Que el interés de don Martín Luis era muy grande lo prueba el hecho de que fue él quien llevó la voz cantante en la entrevista que el comité tuvo en los primeros días de abril con el secretario de Gobernación, Lic. Luis Echeverría, para solicitarle el permiso de rigor para que la conferencia pudiera celebrarse. Y fue él también quien ocupó desde el primer momento la presidencia de la reunión Del Prado

El santo Bertrand Russell. El gran pacifista Bertrand Russell, tan admirado en el mundo entero por sus protestas contra todo brote belicista, ha sido el consagrado ajonjolí de este mole antisoviético; a él se le atribuye un mensaje cuya autenticidad plena convendría averiguar, pues ni el estilo ni los conceptos corresponden a los de otros documentos que sobre este mismo asunto firmó Russell. Extraño resulta que el comité haya descuidado la presentación de una copia fotostática con la firma del sabio inglés. En lugar de eso se distribuyó una dizque traducción en papel con membrete de la Conferencia Latinoamericana de Estudios Sobre la Situación de la Minoría Judía en la URSS, y pie de página que dice: "organizada por el Comité Pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética". El "mensaje" de Lord Russell está redactado en un estilo burdo, digno de la pequeñez espiritual del señor Mondlak.

Con todo y su orientación humanitaria burguesa, los mensajes de Russell que se conocen estaban

21 de Mayo de 1966

expresados con dignidad y con un respeto esencial por los grandes logros de los países socialistas. Hace apenas un año, Russell comenzaba así su mensaje a una conferencia similar celebrada en abril de 1965 en Estocolmo: "Es de gran importancia que la situación de los judíos en la Unión Soviética no sea utilizada como arma en la guerra fría. Hay muchos en Occidente que buscan cualquier oportunidad para continuar e intensificar la división del mundo entre el Este y el Oeste...

La autoridad democrática de Bertrand Russell está avalada por su decidida posición antimperialista, y para muestra basta un párrafo de su mensaje a la Conferencia Tricontinental efectuada en enero de 1966 en La Habana, Cuba. "Por toda la América Latina —dice—, regímenes corrompidos y tiránicos asesinan al pueblo y lo mantienen en un estado de inanición y enfermedad debido al apoyo militar y económico de la camarilla gobernante norteamericana para los tiranos locales. Tan pronto como el pueblo se alza contra la opresión, el poderío militar norteamericano entra directamente en acción. ¿Por qué, entonces, los pueblos del mundo han de confiar su destino a aquellos que colaboran con los regímenes títeres o tratan de encubrir a los notorios verdugos? Los frutos de tal política pueden verse dondequiera que ha sido aplicada: en Iraq o Indonesia, en Guatemala o en Brasil".

¿Cuántos de los conspicuos representantes de gorilas que don Martín Luis logró reunir en el Prado los días 14 y se atreverían a firmar junto con Russell este mensaje? ¿Y qué experto en política puede creer en la autenticidad plena de ese mensaje que fue mostrado como de Russell, enviado a un bananero ramillete de "intelectuales" procedentes de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Panamá, Nicaragua, Colombia, Guatemala y Venezuela, que jamás han hecho declaración alguna en contra de sus gobiernos serviles, traidores a sus pueblos, ni han puesto el grito en el cielo porque los neonazis revanchistas de la República Federal Alemana le den al Estado de Israel un crédito de 100 millones de marcos para "promover una colaboración continua entre ambos países", a pesar de las cenizas todavía calientes de los seis millones de judíos que fueron víctimas ayer de los generosos acreedores de hoy, ni se han reunido a conferenciar para ver qué se puede hacer contra el agresivo antisemitismo de los grupos ultras de Argentina, Uruguay, Brasil y otros países de la América Latina?

Faltó otra firma. En la fotostática que se distribuyó del mensaje del ausente Carlos Pellicer a los reunidos en el Prado, cualquier James Bond hubiera podido notar que, siendo copia fotostática, no traía la firma autografiada del poeta, y que no habiendo asistido Pellicer por encontrase en Tabasco, como lo notificaron varios periódicos, la carta dirigida a los delegados estaba fechada en México, D. F.

"Detrás de nosotros —afirmaba en su mensaje Pellicer— no hay ninguna fuerza que nos mueva a actuar como lo estamos haciendo. Sería terrible saber que Bertrand Rusell el gran filósofo inglés, protesta, como lo ha hecho por el asunto que nos reúne, impulsado por algún gobierno. El insigne escritor inglés es uno de los espíritus más altos y limpios de todos los tiempos y nos honra pensar como él en esta cuestión judía".

¿No ha pensado Pellicer, que tan sabiamente maneja el hermetismo de los símbolos de la estatuaria antigua, que muchas veces el más honrado credo antirracista y antidiscriminatorio puede por ingenuidad, coincidir con las determinaciones de los Barry Goldwater y otros campeones del racismo y la discriminación? ¿Cómo puede Pellicer poner en primer plano el problema de los judíos de la URSS, los únicos que hoy en día producen una viva, una renovada cultura en ídish en todo el mundo, a pesar de las grandes concentraciones de judíos en los Estados Unidos y en Argentina, olvidando que es en Alemania Occidental donde sí se profanan con alarmante frecuencia los viejos cementerios judíos y las tantas veces vilipendiadas sinagogas?

El día en que se revele la trama invisible de este asunto, ante el cual los judíos de la URSS han tenido que reaccionar diciendo un "No me ayudes compadre", se verá que todo se origina en la guerra fría y en la necesidad de hacer olvidar la guerra en Vietnam y la discriminación contra los negros.



La dinámica Juno Cob.

Un Agente de la FBI y de la INTERPOL en la Asociación de Escritores de México

El sábado 28 de mayo, en la página [illegible] del diario Excélsior el tesorero de la Asociación de Escritores de México, Lic. Vicente Echeverría del P[illegible], publicó un pequeño aviso advirtiendo a los [illegible] que no se dejaran sorprender por la señorita June Cobb, quien por su cuenta y riesgo se había tomado la libertad de cobrar y recibir cuotas de inscripción o mensuales en nombre de la AEM.

El 30 de mayo, Lunes de Excélsior comentaba un "sorprendente ciclo de conferencias imaginado por Wilberto Cantón, June Cobb y Piazza" y que se efectuaría en el Instituto Cultural Israelí, A. C.

¿Quién es June Cobb? Es una ciudadana norteamericana que ha pasado por México muchas veces en la última década y ha fijado aquí su residencia, después de haber sido expulsada de la República de Cuba, acusada de ser agente provocador de la FBI. Antes de eso, y como agente de la Interpol, había colaborado de manera determinante para descubrir una poderosa red de traficantes de drogas en Lima, Perú.

Su centro de actividades en México es justamente la Asociación de Escritores, donde ha logrado arraigar como ayudante de confianza del secretario Miguel Guardia y del presidente de la AEM, el poeta Carlos Pellicer, presidente que de hecho ha delegado sus funciones en esta señorita "servicial" y turbulenta, que ha tenido el cuidado de lograr un antecedente que la ligara a los escritores de la América Latina: tradujo al inglés el famoso libro del Dr. Juan José Arévalo, El tiburón y las sardinas, y después el libelo anticomunista del renegado guatemalteco Carlos Manuel Pellicer.

En la secretaría de Gobernación June Cobb figura como corresponsal extranjera, lo que le daría derecho a pertenecer al Club de Corresponsales Extranjeros que tiene su sede en el hotel Hilton, y no a una asociación nacional como la de escritores, que tiene su sede en esa especie de multifamiliar de grupos de periodistas e intelectuales que es el Club de Periodistas de México.

June Cobb conoce muy bien los círculos culturales mexicanos, pues ha buscado amistad con pintores, escritores, actores, músicos y demás especialistas en la creación artística. ¿Qué misión vino a cumplir en nuestro país? Se sabe que trabaja a las órdenes del periodista Daniel James, responsable en la Agencia Central de Inteligencia de una oficina cuya función consiste en penetrar en los círculos intelectuales, tanto de los Estados Unidos como de otros países, usando como fachada supuestos encargos de investigaciones para universidades estadunidenses.

Si en el Perú la señorita Cobb pudo decirle a la Interpol "misión cumplida", según van las cosas, en México el reporte ante su jefe Daniel James y la Agencia Central de Inteligencia no será tan escueto ni tan brillante. En el cálculo de probabilidades que en torno a este extraño personaje hicieron los organismos de penetración y provocación de los Estados Unidos no tuvieron en cuenta que para moverse entre intelectuales no sólo hay que ser singularmente inteligente, como lo es la señorita Cobb, sino que, además y también, hay que ser intelectual, trabajar como intelectual, dormir y pensar como intelectual. Y resulta que la señorita Cobb trabaja, piensa, actúa y hasta duerme como agente secreto, aunque indiscreto.

No deja de llamar la atención el que por segunda vez aparezca [illegible] junto con el Instituto Cultural Mexicano-Israelí, ahora en el ciclo de conferencias. "¿Qué pasa con el teatro en México?", que "imaginaron" ella y Luis Guillermo Piazza y coordinó Wilberto Cantón, secretario de actividades teatrales de la Asociación de Escritores de México. Antes fue la Conferencia Latinoamericana sobre la Situación de los Judíos en la URSS, en cuya preparación mostróse muy activa la directora cultural del Instituto, Susana Gamboa, quien trató de que algunos grandes periódicos dedicaran sus suplementos culturales al tema de la "discriminación" de los judíos en la Unión Soviética, maniobra provocadora de la cual SUCESOS ha informado ampliamente.

Aunque la cultura siempre adorna y es agradable, da qué pensar el hecho de que a partir del ingreso de Sara Susana Lubowitz (verdadero nombre de Susana Gamboa) el Instituto Cultural Mexicano-Israelí haya incrementado una serie de actividades que exceden la función específica de tales institutos, que es el intercambio cultural de México con [illegible] país amigo. El Instituto Cultural Mexicano-Israelí opera como una Dirección de Difusión Cultural o como un Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes, y no se percibe en sus programas (como ocurre con el Instituto Mexicano-Norteamericano, o con el Anglo-Mexicano, o el Francés para la América Latina, o el de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso) el interés o la intención de divulgar en México los valores tradicionales y las conquistas actuales de la muy antigua y a la vez muy joven cultura israelí.

La bohemia un tanto cuanto camp que ha cundido en cierto sector de la intelectualidad mexicana ha sido buen caldo de cultivo para el planecito Camelot que seguramente trae en cartera la "servicial" June Cobb. Quizá no esté muy lejano el momento en que figuras tan respetadas como Francisco Monterde, Salvador Novo, Héctor Azar, Celestino Gorostiza, Luis Reyes de la Maza, Carlos Solórzano y otros se pregunten alarmados qué intereses culturales pueden compartir con un brillante y dinámico agente femenino de la Interpol, la FBI y la ACI.

Al centro, el escritor alemán Günter Grass; a la derecha, la señorita June Cobb y el escritor Monteforte Toledo.



ATT 4: HMMA-29207

201-278841

ASOCIACION DE ESCRITORES DE MEXICO, A. C.

El aviso publicado en los principales diarios de esta Capital el día 25 de mayo del año en curso, y suscrito por la Tesorería de la A.E.M.A.C., parece inculpar, por un mero error de redacción, de manejos indebidos de fondos, a la Srita June Cobb, Secretaria Adjunta de la Asociación y, por lo mismo, nos complace aclarar que sólo se trataba de hacer una delimitación de funciones entre la Secretaría General de la Asociación y la Tesorería de la misma.

México, D.F., a 25 de mayo de 1966.

El Tesorero General.

V. Echeverría

Arq. Vicente Echeverría del Prado.



AVISO

ASOCIACION DE ESCRITORES DE MEXICO, A. C.

[illegible] del conocimiento de [illegible] de la Asociación de Escritores de México, A. C. que la señorita June [illegible] autorizada para cobrar y recibir cuotas de [illegible] mensuales [illegible] que son exclusivas [illegible] a [illegible] asociados que hayan en[illegible] a la mencionada señorita [illegible] comunicarse con el [illegible] Sola No. 26. Ciudad. México, D. F. Mayo de [illegible]

El Tesorero de la Asociación Vicente Echeverría del Prado.

ATTH 40 HMMS 29207

201-278841

After 1250, 9 June

7.7 In. Leonov asks maid, who answers, for Enrique (Semo).
ES takes phone. ES has been looking for Leonov. Yes, L. got the message but at noontime, when ES is at home, Leonov has been very busy. (They talk to each other in familiar form.)

The University of Puebla has decided to invite a series of Ambs. to talk about the economic achievements of their countries. At the Economy School. France, USSR, U.S., Czech and other countries are invited. ES has the letter of invitation for Soviet Amb. What does Leonov think about this? Could this arrange this? They can try. Leonov understands that the Amb. is going ~~onx~~ vacations to Moscow at the end of this month, in 2 or 3 weeks. He is only waiting for the Councillor who is in Moscow (now) and Amb. will leave right after his return. Amb. will return in August. Perhaps there is someone else who could represent the Amb. The Councillor could go or some other "high-class" attache. Or First Secretary. ES says perhaps Leonov. No, he is too ignorant (joking). No. Leonov would be very good since he could talk Spanish. No, any person who would go, would speak Spanish. Yes, this is a lecture. It would be a person who speaks Spanish. ES thinks this would be a positive (act), a good opportunity. Leonov agrees. ES leaves Mexico today for 2 days. Perhaps they could see about this on Monday. ES could ~~xxx~~ send Leonov the letter meanwhile and then on Monday they can get together. Yes, they can set the time and place and will really meet. Leonov has no engagement on Monday so they could see each other at any time ES wants. ES asks if it wouldn't be good to talk to Amb. or someone on Monday. Leonov will take this up. ES will send Leonov the letter and perhaps he could arrange an interview for Monday. Leonov thinks it is not worthwhile for ES to talk to him. Leonov will talk to him (Amb.) and he (Amb) will tell Leonov frankly how things are and Leonov will give ES the message. Then, they can have lunch together on Monday. Fine. ES wil go by for Leonov at 1400 on Monday.

ES asks how Leonov liked all the things and articles on the Jewish matter. They (Soviets) have sent everything there (to USSR). L. liked all of it. ES says that Leonov know that ....fell immediately and there is absolutely nothing on this. Leonov comments that - Besides, the people who participated lost prestige. Yes, they suffer...ES laughs. No, Leonov ~~can tell~~ him about the name of some people who call Leonov at times and they ....ES says - The people who signed the document. No, Leonov says, including persons like June Cobb. She called Leonov. ES has no idea of the repentance. JC gave Leonov her phone, asking him to help her - so doors are not closed to her. ES is surprised. She - did not want them to catalog her among their enemies (of Soviets), that she had nothing to do...This is a matter of fear. Leonov will tell ES all about it on Monday.

Label on Semo
Enrique
Reel 84-ES-248
9 June 1966

JUN 13 1966 Leonov

ATT I to HMMA 29207

201-278841

Traitor or Idealist?

William Morgan, deprived of U.S. citizenship in 1959 and executed in Cuba for treason in 1961, was described in secret Senate testimony as a loyal American "with ideals" who fought with Fidel Castro to overthrow the Batista dictatorship and expected Castro "to blow the whistle" when he "finally realized that the Communists were taking over."

Viola June Cobb, who worked in Havana in 1959 and 1960 and knew Morgan well, appeared before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1962. Her testimony was released yesterday at her request for unexplained reasons.

Post 23 May 66

Trial Is Delayed

Washington Post 23 May 66

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

201-278841

14-00000

7/NII/1

Excelsior 21 March 69

Fiesta de María José Chopitea



CONCEPCION de López Belloso, Maria Jose Chopitea, Maria Asúnsulo de Colín y June Cobb

Con motivo de su día onomástico, la escritora María José Chopitea ofreció la noche del sábado en su departamento de la calle Río Po, una alegre reunión.

Acudió un numeroso grupo de escritores, pintores, poetas, periodistas, quienes felicitaron a la anfitriona y disfrutaron de una velada muy alegre.

Los cocteles y bocadillos circularon al gusto de los presentes quienes cantaron y declamaron, en un derroche de inspiración.

"La Llorona" fue interpretada por un rato largo casi interminable, porque los versos se sucedían unos a otros en diferentes bocas.

Estanislao Rodríguez Ibarra, intérprete del salterio, deleitó a los concurrentes entre los que estaban, licenciado Benigno R. Jiménez y señora, Cecilia viuda de Espinosa Altamirano, Horacio Espinosa Altamirano, Helia D'Acosta, Marina Krauss, Juan García Jiménez, Eduardo Sierralta, Cristina Torres, Ivonne Garrido, Nicte Ha, María Asúnsolo de Colín, licenciado Mario Colín, Filiberto Aguilar, María del Carmen Aguilar, Manuel Vela Ladrón de Guevara, Juan Fanhausser y señora, Cecilia Cárdenas, Fernando Gaytán, Angel Cañas y señora, Anzelina Ibarra, Mara del Carmen Fuentes, y muchas más.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

201

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LICOOKY Progress Report: 1 October 1965 - 30 April 1966

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-27358, 7 October 1965

1. Station regrets the delay in keeping Headquarters informed of the progress of our association with LICOOKY-1. When the proposed amendment to the LIREAM Project involving LICOOKY was turned down, we informed her on her return to Mexico that we could no longer justify the continued association at the present rate since we were simply not getting enough out of it, but that if she could regularize her status here and obtain working papers, we would be more than happy to conclude a new arrangement with her. She felt there was little chance of this, and we then told her we would conclude our arrangement with her sometime in the summer. As indicated in paragraph 2 of the attachment, the date has now been established as 30 June, at which time all outstanding financial arrangements with her will be terminated and she will be given her air fare to New York.

2. Unfortunately, LICOOKY-1 seems to be incapable of realizing which side her bread is buttered on, at least here in Mexico. She cannot parcel her time out to her various interests, and therefore finds all her time taken up by her unpaid AEMAC duties. The profiles we have been harping on have not materialized except for the one submitted under HMMA-28831. We still hope for one on Francisco VILLAGRAN Kramer and such of the Mexican literary figures as amount in her judgment to "non-pigmies." We are not sanguine. We are still after a copy of Oseguedo's paper on university reform.

Attachment:
Progress Report (in triplicate), h/w

CONTINUED

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att

LICOOKY-1 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28944	17 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-129/3

3. The advance made her at Headquarters is being held over her as an inducement to give us the balance of her time before departure and finish in a blaze of activity. If she does this, we will write off the advance here. If she does not, $195 of the advance will be counted as her February salary, $48 as travel expenses from New York to Washington and the remainder will be written off.

4. Rather than go through the formality of a project amendment as per HMMW-14517, Station would prefer merely to consider the project as terminated as of 31 December 1966 and pick up subsequent costs in LIRANCH. A formal project termination will be submitted in the near future.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

LICOOKY Project Progress Report
1 October 1965 - 30 April 1966

1. Production

   a. LICOOKY-1 has continued to devote the bulk of her time to the Mexican Writers' Association (AEM). She continues to handle most of its administrative work. She also organizes and does most of the work on the majority of the projects or activities which the AEM sponsors.

   b. L-1 continued to report on efforts to establish the Latin American Writers' Community (CLE), including the results of the Organizing Congress in Arica, Chile. She reported on the steps taken by Mario Monteforte Toledo in beginning preparations for an early 1967 Congress in Mexico and on the AEM's probable role in helping organize that Congress.

   c. L-1 supplied information on reactions among the Central American community in Mexico to the Guatemalan election campaign and results.

   d. She maintained contact with and reported on individuals of interest to the Station, including Monteforte Toledo, Carlos Pellicer Cámara, Manuel Germán Parra, Francisco Villagran Kramer, and Raúl Osegueda Pelala.

e. LICOOKY-2 continued to report travel of Communists or leftists from Central America to Eastern Europe. During this period he reported on eight such travelers.

2. Operations

a. L-1 has been notified that she will be terminated effective 30 June. She has been given the following requirements to be fulfilled before that date.

Provide profiles on the personality and politics of significant Mexican and Central American intellectuals with whom she is acquainted.

Obtain information on the newly-formed Latin American Writers' Community, its probable political development, and progress toward the holding of its scheduled meeting in Mexico City in January 1967.

Obtain a copy of the analysis written by Raúl Osegueda Pelala of the problems of authonomous universities.

Special tasks such as reporting on the activity of Stasia Madrigal and on the UNAM student strike.

b. In order to accomplish the above tasks in the short time remaining, L-1 will be forced to curtail her activities at the AEM. There are enough jobs that need doing at AEM to occupy her full-time and therefore the immediate partial withdrawal from AEM work is a prerequisite to the accomplishment of these assignments.

c. Because L-1 has played such a key role in all AEM activities, and therefore in determining the direction and scope of these activities, her sudden withdrawal could result in important changes within AEM. Any major change in direction by AEM would probably become predictable once the identity of the person or persons who will move in to fill the vacancy left by L-1 become known. By having L-1 step aside now, rather than waiting until she is ready to leave Mexico, she may then be able to provide Station with an accurate account of any change resulting from her withdrawal.

d. L-2 has not been met regularly since 25 January. On that date he was given a mailing address which he uses to request a meeting only if he has information to report. L-2 is paid on a piece-rate basis for information supplied and does not receive a regular salary.

3. **Security**

   No change.

4. **Personnel**

   Handling of LICOOKY-1 was taken over by Gary H. Reymander, from Howard T. Etsinger, on 12 January 1966.

5. **Plans**

   a. See paragraph 2a above.

   b. It is possible that L-2 will, in the very near future, lose access to the travel information which he has been reporting, because he is being given new responsibilities in the office where he works. L-2 is intelligent, conscientious, and well-motivated. If he does lose his present access, the Station will consider him for other assignments in which he could be useful.

MORE IMPORTANT - HANDLING UNNEEDED COPIES WASTES OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE - TIME

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Recruitment by Cuban Intelligence of IDEN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached under separate cover for your information are two Headquarters memoranda concerning IDEN, a PBPRIME citizen, who was reported by LICOOKY-1 (an asset of Mexico City Station) to have been recruited by a Cuban intelligence officer assigned to HTBASTE.

FRANCES A. BUSALACCLI

19 April 1966

Attachment:
As Stated u/s/c/

Distribution:
3 - COS/JMWAVE u/s/c att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-5981	05 MAY 1966
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-794302

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
1 - RID wo/att.
1 - WH/C/ESEC wo/att.
1 - WH/1/M wo/att.
2 - WH/C/CICS wo/att.
1 - WH/C/MO wo/att.

OFFICE	ORIGINATOR	TYPIST		EXT
WH/C/CICS	E. Ayers	nlk		455

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/C/CICS		
C/WH/C/MO		
WH/1/M		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
A/DCWHD/C		John T. Flynn

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raul OSEGUEDA Pelaia

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached, at long last, is LICOOKY-1's profile on Subject. While it is not as penetrating as it might be, it is better than we had expected. It is unfortunate that "Janet" is not available to query about the material allegedly turned in following L-1's return from Venezuela, since she is so insistent that she gave Janet quite a bundle of information.

2. This is the first of a series of profiles we hope L-1 can get around to preparing before she leaves Mexico.

3. L-1 has been instructed to do her best to obtain Subject's manuscript on university reform, which is now in the hands of someone at the UNAM press. This could be a highly popular subject in the train of the current trouble at the UNAM.

4. ~~No indexing is requested~~ here since nothing of substance is said about anyone except subject.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Profile on OSEGUEDA, h/w

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WHD, w/att
1 - COS, Guatemala City, w/att

CS COPY

Licooky 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28831	3 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~50-6-144/3~~ 201-58003

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem By 24 Per WH/C#2

ACTION DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH2, C/CI

S E C R E T 170103Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7347

17 May 66 IN 18[illegible]5

DESENSITIZED

DIRECTOR

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REFERENCE MEXICO CITY 7076 (IN [illegible])

1. STASHA ARRIVED MEXICO 17 APRIL BY EASTERN FROM NEW YORK. STATION NOT YET ABLE CONFIRM FROM AIRLISTS. DEPARTED FOR CUBA 24 APRIL.

2. S RETICENT ABOUT HER MIAMI SOJOURN. MENTIONED JERRY HEMING AND HIS FRIEND "HOWIE" WHO HELPED HER GET AROUND IN EXILE GROUP. IN WHAT LICOOKY INTERPRETED AS SLIP, S IDENTIFIED HER CUIS CASE OFFICER NEW YORK AS GUTIERREZ. SAID HAD GIVEN HIM SEVERAL ROLLS TAPE COVERING MIAMI VISIT.

3. FUTURE CONTACT TO BE VIA TRAVELERS BETWEEN HABANA AND MEXICO WHO WILL MAIL LETTERS IN COUNTRY OF DESTINATION. S WANTS AMERICAN MAGAZINES SENT HER VIA PRENSA LATINA. PRECISE EMPLOYMENT CUBA NOT CERTAIN. ALLEGEDLY CAN HAVE OLD JOB WITH PRENSA LATINA, BUT LICOOKY SUGGESTED SHE TRY CASA DE LAS AMERICAS.

4. LICOOKY FEELS S DRAWN BACK TO CUBA MORE BY PRACTICAL THAN IDEOLOGICAL OR EMOTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, SINCE GOVT WOULD SUPPLY HOUSING AND HUSBAND WOULD HAVE TO HELP SUPPORT CHILDREN.

SECRET

FORM 4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 9

2/21 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH 2

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C 3, C/CI

DISSEM PER WH/C #2

S E C R E T 222348Z

23 APR 65 02733

DIR CITE MEXI 7076

KAP[illegible] DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REF DIR 93349

1. ACCORDING LICOOKY ON RETURN FROM MIAMI, STASHA WAS ALMOST DETERMINED TO BREAK OFF GAME WITH CUIS AND STAY IN U.S. BUT WAS SO OVERCOME BY SQUALOR IN WHICH FORCED TO LIVE IN BRONX QUARTERS THAT IMPETUOUSLY DECIDED CHUCK IT AND RETURN CUBA, BUT STILL NOT CONVINCED WISDOM THIS DECISION.

2. AS OF 22 APRIL, STASHA APPARENTLY HAD NOT HAD WIT TO GO CUBANA OFFICES ABOUT TICKETS PER TELECON WITH HUSBAND. MERELY WENT AIRPORT AND CHECKED BAGGAGE THROUGH 21 APRIL. NOT CLEAR HOW SHE DID THIS WITHOUT TICKET, BUT AS OF 1000 THIS DATE STILL DID NOT HAVE TICKETS. DOUBTFUL THEREFORE THAT WILL MAKE 22 APRIL PLANE. HOPES MAKE 25 APRIL FLIGHT.

3. S ARRIVED HERE 17 APRIL BY AIR. LINE NOT YET KNOWN.

4. NOT CERTAIN WHAT HQS HAS IN MIND RE "UNWITTING ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION." HOWEVER LICOOKY CERTAIN S WILL WANT COMMUNICATE AND NO PROBLEM ABOUT SUGGESTING NEUTRAL ADDRESS SINCE L HAS NO WISH GET S IN TROUBLE WITH CUBANS. WILL

LICOOKY

Stewart

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
Dissem By 24 Per WH/C#2

ACTION
DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH2, C/CI

S E C R E T 170103Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7347 17 May 66 IN 18.75

DESENSITIZED

DIRECTOR

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REFERENCE MEXICO CITY 7075 (IN 13733)

1. STASHA ARRIVED MEXICO 17 APRIL BY EASTERN FROM NEW YORK. STATION NOT YET ABLE CONFIRM FROM AIRLISTS. DEPARTED FOR CUBA 24 APRIL.

2. S RETICENT ABOUT HER MIAMI SOJOURN. MENTIONED JERRY HEMING AND HIS FRIEND "HOWIE" WHO HELPED HER GET AROUND IN EXILE GROUP. IN WHAT LICOOKY INTERPRETED AS SLIP, S IDENTIFIED HER CUIS CASE OFFICER NEW YORK AS GUTIERREZ. SAID HAD GIVEN HIM SEVERAL ROLLS TAPE COVERING MIAMI VISIT.

3. FUTURE CONTACT TO BE VIA TRAVELERS BETWEEN HABANA AND MEXICO WHO WILL MAIL LETTERS IN COUNTRY OF DESTINATION. S WANTS AMERICAN MAGAZINES SENT HER VIA PRENSA LATINA. PRECISE EMPLOYMENT CUBA NOT CERTAIN. ALLEGEDLY CAN HAVE OLD JOB WITH PRENSA LATINA, BUT LICOOKY SUGGESTED SHE TRY CASA DE LAS AMERICAS.

4. LICOOKY FEELS S DRAWN BACK TO CUBA MORE BY PRACTICAL THAN IDEOLOGICAL OR EMOTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, SINCE GOVT WOULD SUPPLY HOUSING AND HUSBAND WOULD HAVE TO HELP SUPPORT CHILDREN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7347 SECRET

ALTHOUGH HER CONVERSATION SHOWED DESIRE TO FIND FIDELISTAS AND COMMUNISTS ON RIGHT TRACK, SHE NOT APPARENTLY FULLY COMMITTED TO INFALLIBILITY OF FIDELISMO. JUST BEFORE LEAVING MEXI, SHE AND LICOOKY PREPARED LETTER REQUESTING GOM GRANTHER TRANSIT VISA FOR RETURN TO U.S. WITHIN "APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS." LICOOKY WHO WILL FILE THIS LETTER WITH GOBERNACION SAYS IT IS JUST IN CASE MEASURE, SHOULD CUBAN SOJOURN NOT WORK OUT.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

NNNN

FORM 4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 9

2/21 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
C/WH 2

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, DC/WH/C 3, C/CI

DISSEM PER WH/C #2

S E C R E T 222348Z

23 APR 65 02733

DESENSITIZED

DIR CITE MEXI 7076

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REF DIR 93349

1. ACCORDING LICOOKY ON RETURN FROM MIAMI, STASHA WAS ALMOST DETERMINED TO BREAK OFF GAME WITH CUIS AND STAY IN U.S. BUT WAS SO OVERCOME BY SQUALOR IN WHICH FORCED TO LIVE IN BRONX QUARTERS THAT IMPETUOUSLY DECIDED CHUCK IT AND RETURN CUBA, BUT STILL NOT CONVINCED WISDOM THIS DECISION.

2. AS OF 22 APRIL, STASHA APPARENTLY HAD NOT HAD WIT TO GO CUBANA OFFICES ABOUT TICKETS PER TELECON WITH HUSBAND. MERELY WENT AIRPORT AND CHECKED BAGGAGE THROUGH 21 APRIL. NOT CLEAR HOW SHE DID THIS WITHOUT TICKET, BUT AS OF 1000 THIS DATE STILL DID NOT HAVE TICKETS. DOUBTFUL THEREFORE THAT WILL MAKE 22 APRIL PLANE. HOPES MAKE 25 APRIL FLIGHT.

3. S ARRIVED HERE 17 APRIL BY AIR. LINE NOT YET KNOWN.

4. NOT CERTAIN WHAT HQS HAS IN MIND RE "UNWITTING ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION." HOWEVER LICOOKY CERTAIN S WILL WANT COMMUNICATE AND NO PROBLEM ABOUT SUGGESTING NEUTRAL ADDRESS SINCE L HAS NO WISH GET S IN TROUBLE WITH CUBANS. WILL

LICOOKY

Stewart

SECRET

OBTAIN L ASSESSMENT FOLLOWING S DEPARTURE.

SECRET

CFN 7076 98349 MIAMI STASHA CUIS U.S. BRONX CUBA NOT CONVINCED 22 STASHA NOT HAD WIT 21 NOT CLEAR 1000 NOT HAVE 22 25 S 17 NOT YET NOT CERTAIN HQS S NO PROBLEM L NO WISH S CUBANS L S

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 4

SECRET

ORIG : [illegible]/[illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]/[illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : 11 APR 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-794302
~~201-276041~~

☐ [illegible] ☐ [illegible] TO BRANCH ☐ [illegible]

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4			

TO : MEXICO

PRIORITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 2 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY [illegible]

TO PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR

98349

KAPOK DIVOUR PBRUMEN AMMOD LICOOKY

REF A. MEXI 7049 (IN 00938)
B. MEXI 6703 (IN 91562)

1. NO FURTHER INTELL RQS BUT WOULD LIKE KNOW WHEN AND HOW STASHA ARRIVED MEXI. FYI ONLY ODENVY WAS ADVISED OF STASHAS TRAVEL PLANS PER REF B; HOWEVER WE HAVE NOT BEEN ADVISED OF ANY COVERAGE MADE OR ACTION TAKEN BY ODENVY AS A RESULT. HQS ADVISING ODENVY STASHAS PRESENCE MEXI AND THAT WE HAVE COVERAGE.

2. INFO PARA 2 REF, I. E., NERVOUSNESS AT LACK TRAVEL FUNDS, UNCERTAINTY OF FUTURE, DISTRUST VALIDITY HER OWN DECISIONS AND DEPENDENCE LICOOKY MIGHT SUGGEST POSSIBILITY LICOOKY REASSESS AND HANDLE CONTACT WITH STASHA WITH POSSIBLE FUTURE PITCH IN MIND FOR EVENTUAL USE IN PLACE CUBA. IF PROGNOSIS FAVORABLE, MIGHT THINK IN TERMS LICOOKY PUSH EFFORT MAINTAIN MAIL CONTACT STASHA ORDER ARRANGE FUTURE CONTACT OUTSIDE CUBA FOR FINAL ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE PITCH. MIGHT THUS BE ABLE OBTAIN COPIES ANY LETTERS FROM STASHA AND MONITOR HER FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH FATHER OF HER CHILD AND HER REACTION TO LIVING AND WORKING IN CUBA. IF REASSESSMENT UNFAVORABLE, WOULD LIKE SEE UNWITTING ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED FOR CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION. NOT THINKING IN TERMS CRASH PITCH PRIOR REPORTED

CONTINUED.../

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

PAGE TWO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 98349

DEPARTURE [illegible] THIS AND HER PROBABLE INABILITY DISSEMBLE IN CUBA ON [illegible] ANY SUCH PITCH.

END OF MESSAGE

Estelle

WH Comment: Refs reported presence of Ana "Stasha" Scholowska in Mexico, contact with her through LICOOKY, and "Stasha's plans travel Cuba via Mexico.

WH/C/CICS
WH/C/FI/Hazlett (in draft)
WH/C/CA/PA/C. Anderson (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 9

2/4 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2			
3			
4			

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
DC/WH/C 3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH/C TIME 0240Z BY 8

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH 2, C/CI

DISSEM PER WH/C #2

S E C R E T 210135Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7049

21 Apr 66 [illegible]C0988

NO NIGHT ACTION

TYPIC LICOOKY AMROD

REF DIR 92045

1. STASHA (S) NOW IN TOWN STAYING BOARDING HOUSE. LICOOKY SPENDING CONSIDERABLE TIME WITH HER AND HOPES GET ANSWERS REF QUESTIONS BY END 20 APRIL SESSION.

2. S DID GREAT DEAL WRITING DURING MIAMI TRIP MOSTLY ON COMMUNAL FORMATIONS OF MIAMI EXILES WHICH GAVE TO NY CUIS CASE OFFICER. ARRIVED MEXI WITH NO TRAVEL FUNDS AND AFTER NEAR HYSTERIA FOUND HUSBAND HAD SENT TICKETS TO CUBANA OFFICE HERE. PLANS TAKE 22 APRIL CUBANA FLIGHT THOUGH DOES NOT KNOW HOW LONG WILL REMAIN CUBA. DEFINITELY HOPES GO TO POLAND TO IMPROVE POLISH AND WHILE THERE MAKE UP MIND WHETHER WANTS CONTINUE CUBAN ASSOCIATION. WHOLE ATTITUDE HERE IS ONE OF DISTRUST VALIDITY HER OWN DECISIONS AND CONSTANTLY ASKS L FOR ADVICE. L HAS SO FAR AVOIDED GIVING ANY.

3. REYMANDER SEES LICOOKY AT 1000 LOCAL TIME 21 APRIL AND CAN RELAY ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS HQS WISHES PUT. SECRET

Licooky-1
201

4. PARA 2 ABOVE NEGATES LINLUCK REPORT PARA 2 MEXI 6783.

SECRET

CFN 7049 92845 STASHA S 28 S MIAMI MIAMI NY CUIS NO TRAVEL CUBANA 22 CUBANA NOT KNOW CUBA POLAND POLISH CUBAN L L REYMANDER 1323 21 HAS 2 LINLUCK 2 6783

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 27

26 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/IC 2, C/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OA

ACTION

S E C R E T 362030Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6783

LICOOKY

REF: DIR 90202 *

* ODENVY MAY WISH INTER-VIEW LICOOKY ON HER NEXT TRIP TO STATES.

6 Apr 66 S1562

1. LICOOKY-1 REPORTS RECEIVED CALL FROM STASHA ON 4 APRIL. STASHA HAD BEEN BACK IN NEW YORK FOR ABOUT WEEK AWAITING CUBAN VISA. WILL BE COMING THROUGH MEXI AS SOON AS VISA RECEIVED.

2. CONFLICTING REPORT FROM LINLUCK SAME DAY SAYS LICOOKY CALLED HIM TO SAY HAD JUST FINISHED TELECON WITH STASHA WHO SAID WOULD BE ARRIVING MEXI 7 APRIL AND LEAVING FOR CUBA 11 APR. SINCE CANNOT CALL DISCREPANCY TO ATTENTION EITHER SOURCE, STATION CANNOT RESOLVE CONFLICT UNTIL AFTER DATES MENTIONED.

S E C R E T

CFN 6783 90202 LICOOKY-1 4 STASHA LINLUCK LICOOKY 7 CUBA 11CANNOT CANNOT

BT

SECRET

WH/C/ Castro
passed info orally to FBI,
Sam Papich - FBI said no
dissemination LICOOKY-1

B

14-00000

P. L. Johnson

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 7

☐ DEST ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : PATRICIA L. JOHNSON:car
UNIT : WH/C/CA/PA ☐ INDEX
EXT : 4198/1502 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 29 MAR 66 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-794302 201-278841

3 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[illegible] 1cc - Licooky cc Sokolowska

TO : MEXICO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: DC/WH/C 3 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY 30 MAR 66 18 23z
C/EI/SD, C/WH 2, C/CI

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 92045

TYPIC LICOOKY AMROD

LICOOKY

DISSEM PER WH/C #2

REF: DIR 90202*

1. HAVE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RQMTS FOR SOKOLOWSKA WHEN SHE GOES CUBA IF LICOOKY-1 THINKS SHE CAN LOGICALLY ASK THEM:

A. ANYTHING SHE CAN FIND OUT ABOUT CURRENT ARRESTS, PARTICULARLY IN MILITARY SPHERE.

B. ANY SIGNS PSP TYPES RETURNING TO POWER IN WAKE OF CURRENT PURGES.

D. IS DR. JOSE BUSTAMANTE, OLD COMMUNIST, STILL TREATING FIDEL CASTRO?

E. ANY INDICATION HILDA GADEA RETURNING CUBA?

2. REQUEST THAT LICOOKY-1 TRY PERSUADE SOKOLOWSKA TO CORRESPOND WITH HER FROM CUBA, POSSIBLY VIA CUTOUT SUCH AS SOKOLOWSKA MOTHER, TOUCHING ON ABOVE MATTERS, IF IT CAN BE DONE DISCREETLY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C Comment: *Sokolowska, old friend of LICOOKY-1, recruited by CUIS and returning to Cuba to join husband.

C/WH/C/CA/PA
C/WH/C/CA
C/WH/C/RR
A/D C/WH/C
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

30-3

~~JOHN T. FLYNN~~
~~C/DEVHD/C~~
WW/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
0 LICOOKY reports on Raul OSEGUEDA and Juan Jose AREVALO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MEXI-6574

Attached herewith are reports prepared by LICOOKY-1 on OSEGUEDA and AREVALO in January 1961 shortly after her return from Venezuela. No trace could be found of any additional reports though both reports indicated she planned to provide more information later.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Attachment:
2 rpts.

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w

21 March 1961

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-14432

DATE
24 MAR 1961

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-278841

RI

Chrono

C/WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	C. Bustos	m	4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	22 March	J. C. King

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

2/

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : C. BUSTOS-VIDELA
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 22 March 1966

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-278841

2/ SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

23 ... 28 31 Z

TO : MEXI

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY c/cps c/ci 2 c/ci4 FI, FI/INT 2

WHC 8

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 90202

LICOOKY

REF MEXI 6574 (IN 77407)*

1. HQS HAS LOCATED WHAT APPEARS BE AREVALO AND OSEGUEDA REPORTS PREPARED BY LICOOKY-1 (L-1) IN 1961. POUCHING COPIES HMMW-14432. FYI "JANET" RESIGNED EARLY 1963.

2. ODENVY REPORTS SOKOLOWSKA UNDER SURVEILLANCE MIAMI NOW, AND ACCORDING CURRENT INFO PROBABLY WILL RETURN NEW YORK FOR MEETING WITH HER CASE OFFICER PRIOR TRAVELING MEXI AND ONWARD HABANA. ODENVY WILL KEEP KUBARK ADVISED OF HER TRAVEL PLANS. POSSIBILITY ODACID WILL LIFT HER PASSPORT.

3. IF SOKOLOWSKA SEES L-1 IN MEXI, ONLY REQUIREMENT IS FOR L-1 TO ELICIT ANY INFO SHE CAN RE SOKOLOWSKA'S ACTIVITY MIAMI, PARTICULARLY RE FULFILLMENT OF HER CASE OFFICER'S INSTRUCTIONS, AND HER PLANS FOR HABANA. IN CASE SOKOLOWSKA EXITS CUBA VIA MEXI, L-1 SHOULD ELICIT WHAT SHE CAN AND OBTAIN TRAVEL PLANS.

wyf 4. ODENVY MAY WISH~~ES~~ INTERVIEW LICOOKY ON HER NEXT TRIP TO STATES. AT TIME OF NEXT TRIP PLEASE ARRANGE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS WE CAN PASS TO ODENVY.

END OF MESSAGE

Licooky-1 (201)

WH Comment: *Request Headquarters look again for LICOOKY reports on AREVALO and OSEGUEDA. Request requirements for LICOOKY against SOKOLOWSKA.

WH/C/Mr. Castero (in draft)

John A. Castero

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

7/WH/1

LICOOKY

Excelsior 21 March 69

Fiesta de María José Chopitea



CONCEPCION de López Belloso, María José Chopitea, María Asúnsulo de Colín y June Cobb

Con motivo de su día onomástico, la escritora María José Chopitea ofreció la noche del sábado en su departamento de la calle Río Po, una alegre reunión.

Acudio un numeroso grupo de escritores, pintores, poetas, periodistas, quienes felicitaron a la anfitriona y disfrutaron de una velada muy alegre.

Los cocteles y bocadillos circularon al gusto de los presentes quienes cantaron y declamaron, en un derroche de inspiración.

"La Llorona" fue interpretada por un rato largo casi interminable, porque los versos se sucedían unos a otros en diferentes bocas.

Estanislao Rodríguez Ibarra, intérprete del salterio, deleitó a los concurrentes entre los que estaban, licenciado Benigno B. Jiménez y señora Cecilia viuda de Espinosa Altamirano, Horacio Espinosa Altamirano, Helia D'Acosta, Marina Krauss, Juan García Jiménez, Eduardo Sierralta, Cristina Torres, Ivonne Garrido, Nicte Ha, María Asúnsolo de Colín, licenciado Mario Colín, Filiberto Aguilar, María del Carmen Aguilar, Manuel Vélez Ladión de Guevara, Juan Fanhausser y señora, Cecilia Cárdenas, Fernando Gaytán, Angel Cañas y señora, Angelina Ibarra, Mara del Carmen Fuentes, y muchas mas.

LICOOKY

201

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

21

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR C/OPS C/I/C2 C/IBA FI

S E C R E T 171941Z

17 MAR 63 IN 77407

DIR CITE MEXI 6574

LICOOKY

REFS A DIR 77211

B MEXI 6419 (IN 66243)

1. LICOOKY STILL INSISTS ON COMPLETION HER FIRST TRIP VENEZUELA (SEE PARA 4 HMMW-9800, JUNE 61) ABOUT FEB 61 AFTER WHICH SHE RETURNED DIRECTLY TO ZRMETAL, SHE MET "JANET" AND UNKNOWN CASE OFFICER(APPARENTLY PBRUMEN SPECIALIST) IN NO LONGER REMEMBERED HOTEL AND DELIVERED TO JANET EXTENSIVE PROFILES OSEGUEDA AND AREVALO. STATION PARTICULARLY INTERESTED RECOVERING OSEGUEDA WRITEUP TO BE USED AS BASIS UPDATED REPORT. NOTE THESE OCCURRENCES PRIOR STATION CONNECTION LICOOKY. OUR FILES BEGIN JUNE 61. APPRECIATE HQS EFFORT LOCATE AND QUERY "JANET."

SECRET

[illegible]
early '63

Licooky-1

2. LICOOKY REPORTS ON 15 MARCH TRIED RETURN PHONE CALL WHICH ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA MADRIGAL MADE HER IN NEW YORK 10 MAR. LEFT HER PHONE NUMBER WITH S HOTEL SWITCHBOARD. SAYS S WILL SURELY CALL HER AND PROBABLY STAY WITH HER WHEN COMES THROUGH MEXI. ADVISE WHAT ACTION MEXI TO TAKE.

SECRET

CFN 6574 A DIR 88211 B MEXI 6419 VENEZUELA 4 HMMW-9800 JUNE 61 FEB 61 JANET NO LONGER HOTEL OSEGUEDA AREVALO OSEGUEDA JUNE 61 HQS JANET 15 MARCH ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA MADRIGAL NEW YORK 10 MAR S HOTEL S

BT

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Meetings with LICOOKY-1 in New York During February/March 1966

ACTION REQUIRED : FYI

REFERENCES : DIR 85413, 5 March 1966

1. Attached are four (4) copies of internal Headquarters memoranda resulting from meetings with LICOOKY-1 in New York during February and March 1966, and as reported in Reference.

2. Three of the memoranda deal with the alleged planned travel of Estelle SOKOLOWSKA and one deals with the Rose and George SIMINOW case.

Thomas W. LUND

Attachments:
4 memos, h/w
8 Feb 66
1 Mar 66
4 Mar 66
9 Mar 66
} sent -

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City w/4 memos attached.

10 March 1966

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-14407	DATE 14 MAR 66
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-278841

1 - RI
1 - chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/	Mr. Kaufman	jz	4523

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
CWH/1		W. J. Kaufman

INDEX
ABSTRACT X
F/WH/1

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/WH/1	EXTENSION 4250	NO	DATE 8 February 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/1			wyk	
2.				
3. CI/OPS/~~Johnson~~ Hughs 2 B 44			Fult	Per oral telecom. wyk
4.				
5.				Orally, for source protection, to FBI 11 Feb with request for State P.P. status checked by Bureau, covering no.
6. C/WH/1 (Jack Kaufman)				
7.				
8.				3-6: Jack: Info. in your attached memo was passed orally to the Bureau. The Bureau responded that there had been previous corres. between us on Sokolowska. As a matter of fact, Sam Papich queried John Castoro of WH/Cuba/CI for any additional info. on her (this was on 17 Jan. Suggest you discuss previous Bureau interest with John Castoro. Also, your gal had previously reported info. ~~[illegible]~~ to the Bureau [illegible] while she was in the U.S. [illegible]
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. your gal in the U.S. Pls. contact John Castoro re the				
15. attached memo, because John has an outstanding reply to make to the Bureau				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

9 Feb 66

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI Staff

SUBJECT : Alleged Planned Travel to Cuba of Estel Sakolowska

1. On 7 February LICOOKY-1 told the writer that Estel Sakolowska, a long-time acquaintance, had told her that she is planning a trip to Cuba. Sakolowska is now married to Mario Madrigal, a Costa Rican medical doctor who is now in Cuba. Sakolowska told LICOOKY-1 that she is now in the process of obtaining a (U.S.) passport for her child so that they can travel together to Cuba. This is her child's first passport. Her explanation for requesting the passport is for making a trip to Costa Rica. Sakolowska claims that the passport application is now in the State Department "Security Section".

2. Sakolowska also told LICOOKY-1 that the "Prensa Latina Bureau Chief" had proposed to her an apparent intelligence mission to accomplish enroute to Cuba. She believes this mission is to take place in Miami. LICOOKY-1 reported that on 7 February Sakolowska had a luncheon engagement with "someone" at the United Nations and speculates it may be to pick up a package to take to someone in Cuba. LICOOKY-1 further speculates that this may only be a gift to someone in Cuba.

3. LICOOKY stated that she had no additional information. It should be noted, however, that this item was given in a last minute rush just prior to her departure from the writer. LICOOKY-1 expects to be in New York until the end of February.

4. LICOOKY-1 states that Sakolowska has been a long-time "left winger". LICOOKY-1 reported earlier on Sakolowska and her connections with revolutionaries in Central America and Havana in dispatch HMMA 27924 dated 21 September 1965 pages 4 and 6. This office is planning no further action on this matter and in line with the writer's telephone conversation with Frank Hughes of the CI Staff today, we understand your office will be coordinating the Subject with the FBI and State Department.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

1 March 1966

cc to Mr ?

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI Staff att Mr Hughes

INFO : WH/C Attention: Mr. Castoro

SUBJECT : Alleged Planned Travel to Cuba of
Estelle Sokolowska

REFERENCE : Memo, Same Subject, Dated 8 February 1936

1. On 22 February LICOOKY-1 told me that the referenced Prensa Latina correspondent, according to Sokolowska, had just advised her she would receive $500 operational expenses for the alleged intelligence assignment in the Miami area and $450 for travel presumably to Cuba. This information was passed orally to your office 23 February.

2. On 28 February LICOOKY-1 told me that while visiting with Sokolowska in New York on 23 February two FBI agents called at the Sokolowska apartment and interviewed Sokolowska about her intended travel to Cuba. According to L-1 the agents warned Sokolowska that she would be in serious trouble if she attempted such trip. The interview went on about three hours during which time L-1 remained in Sokolowska's apartment, sometimes in the living room and sometimes in the kitchen where the interview reportedly was taking place. L-1 stated that as a result of the warning by the FBI agents Sokolowska later told L-1 she would not make the trip.

3. Presumably the FBI, if the above story is accurate, had reason for this reported action even though from the limited information available, from L-1, there would seem a possibility of other more profitable courses of action.

4. L-1 states that Sokolowska had heard that her husband, now in Cuba, was living in Sokolowska's house and with a nurse to whom he was (engaged). It was partially for this reason Sokolowska wished to visit Cuba at this time.

5. This office is taking no further action on this matter unless so requested and suggests that addressees coordinate any planned ~~advice~~ action on this matter ~~to~~ with the Bureau.

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

WH/1/Kaufman:mep Dist: 0 & 1 - CI
2 - WH/C/Castoro
2 - WH/1
1 - WH/FI w/8 Feb Memo

Cooky-201

4 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Hughes

SUBJECT : Rose and George SIMINOW Plans for Vietnam Conscientious Objector Demonstration

1. Confirming telephone conversation with your office March 1st the following information was obtained from LICOOKY-1 in Washington on February 28th:

Rose SIMINOW, 382 Central Park West, New York City, long-time communist and contact of LICOOKY-1, told L-1 at several meetings during February that she was making plans for a demonstration against the U.S. role in Vietnam. Rose's son, George, discharged about September 65 from the military after active duty in Panama, expected to be recalled for active duty in Vietnam as a member of a military reserve unit. It is planned that if recalled George will refuse induction as a conscientious objector and mass demonstrations will be promoted in New York. Rose has had discussions with a "constitutionalist lawyer", one Boudion, to handle the expected court trial. Boudien's secretary, Teresa, is a friend of Rose. Rose plans to pay the initial attorney fees after which she will launch a national drive to raise funds. According to Rose, Boudine is "swamped" with similar cases. Rose is employed by Wolf Popper Jones Ross and Wolf. She has been a secretary for ten to fifteen years.

2. This office is taking no further action on this report unless so requested. Please advise if this matter is turned over to the FBI or any other action taken.

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

SECRET

14-00000

LICOOKY-1 201

SECRET

9 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/Staff

ATTENTION: Mr. Frank Hughes

INFORMATION: WH/C, Mr. John Castoro
CWH/FI

SUBJECT: Alleged Planned Travel to Cuba of Estelle SOKOLOWSKA

SOURCE: LICOOKY-1

REFERENCE: Memoranda, same subject, dated 8 February and 1 March 1966.

1. Further to references, the writer again saw LICOOKY-1 in New York on 8 March. In that this new information clarifies and elaborates on Subject's alleged espionage intentions, it is believed best to recapitulate the whole story obtained during the course of the past month.

2. SOKOLOWSKA's husband, a Costa Rican medical doctor, by the name of Mario MADRIGAL, is now in Cuba with a profitable job and living in a house assigned to him with a Cuban nurse with whom he is "engaged." Subject is desirous of returning to Cuba in that she admires CASTRO and what she believes he is doing for Cuba, and wishes to assist in the "cause." She gained this impression during her stay in Cuba in the early 60's, at which time she personally met CASTRO and was befriended by him. Her desire to return is also influenced by the need to care for her two children and she plans to move in with her husband from whom she expects support. She no longer has any love for her husband, In New York Subject stays with her mother, a not too well informed Polish peasant immigrant.

3. An as yet unidentified Cuban UN representative in NY visited Cuba during the 1965 XMas holidays. While there he had one meeting with Subject's husband and upon returning to NY delivered a letter from the husband to Subject. From this first meeting, Subject was gradually drafted by the Cuban UN representative (hereafter referred to as CUIS rep) for intelligence purposes.

4. This culminated in Subject's departure from New York on the Atlantic Seaboard "Champion" train on 7 March for Miami. On 5 or 6 March, before her departure, the CUIS rep gave Subject a written list of questions to be used for cultivating and gaining the confidence of Cuban exiles in the Miami area to learn more about their organizational design and plans for work against Cuba.

SECRET

Subject's cover for this assignment is to gather material for a book she plans to write on the Cuban Revolution. The questions themselves are not intelligence requirements and reputedly are along the lines of "what was your role in the invasion attempt? Why did your particular sortie fail? etc." Pertinent here, however, is that the CUIS rep told Subject that he is very interested in the "Municipalidades" organizational development by the Cuban exiles. He said this was the smartest thing the exiles have done. Source stated that she understands the exile community has regrouped into cell organizations so that exiles from the same community from their homes in Cuba now form the individual cells. In this fashion they can better protect themselves from penetration and will be a better informed and cohesive group. Subject was given $550. for the Miami trip expenses. Source saw the money. Subject plans to spend two or three weeks on this mission and then return to NY to report to the CUIS rep.

5. Subject is taking her two children with her to Miami and is taking along a "babysitter." Subject had wanted to take a Puerto Rican girl acquaintance of hers who works with [illegible] in NY, but as [illegible] girl could not obtain a leave of absence from her job, the PR girl's brother is serving as babysitter. He is described as being in his early twenties and is a supporter of CASTRO. Subject's immediate problem is to obtain entre to the Cuban exiles and a cheap way to live in the Miami area. To accomplish this she has re-established contact with a former acquaintance and ally, one Jerry HEMING. HEMING is described as being an American member of the William Morgan group in the invasion attempt. Subject met HEMING in the Frente Sandino in Nicaragua. She re-established this contact by finding an old Miami telephone number for HEMING and spoke to a person at this number who identified himself as "Little Joe." Little Joe said that HEMING moved but that he could put her in touch with him.

6. Subject told source she was delighted at having received a passport for herself and her children and permission from the State Department to travel to Cuba with them. Permission was granted on compassionate grounds. She was so excited at this development she immediately telephoned the CUIS rep despite an earlier admonition to never again call him at his office. He said his business is strictly compartmented from other members of the Cuban UN group. Subject stated that with her passport she now will be able to travel to Europe after returning to Cuba. Source understands that European travel will be for Cuban intelligence purposes but has no details. Source speculates that because Subject is fluent in Polish and French, with some knowledge of German, coupled with her American citizenship and Polish background, she will be able to gain entre into European Bloc circles to glean what she can of their true feelings and intent to the CASTRO government. Upon completion of her Miami mission and her return to NY, Subject then plans to depart to Cuba via Mexico. She plans only about two days in Mexico. She will be provided travel funds by the CUIS rep.

7. Source explained that Subject promised to advise source where she will be staying in the Miami area. Source has been requested to remain in NY until the morning of 10 March in the hope that this information will be forthcoming. Source was also requested to consider the feasibility of visiting the Miami area to determine Subject's whereabouts. Source stated that an excuse for this visit could be to visit Dr. SHAPPER and his wife in Miami in that they are leaving NY 9 March for a long-planned 10 day holiday there. Both Subject and Source are close friends of SHAPPER so this arrangement would be plausible. In this regard, Source stated that to save all concerned from embarrassment, she advised SHAPPER not to question Subject too closely as to Subject's plans upon Subject's departure from NY in that SHAPPER was under the impression that Subject was travelling directly to Cuba. Source implied to SHAPPER that Subject has to "earn her way" to Cuba. SHAPPER was described as being in no way connection with Subject's assignment nor to be in sympathy with such business. The SHAPPERS plan to stay in the Nichols Hotel, Miami Beach, Collins Avenue.

8. Of interest, was Source's description of Subject being naive as to the happenings in Cuba. Source said that when discussing some aspects of the true situation there, Che GUEVARRA's name came up. When Source suggested that Che may have been done in, Subject responded that this certainly was not the case. Subject stated that about 3 March one of Che's "close aides" arrived in NY. Source understands this aide came to NY for contact with the Cuban UN group. Subject learned this from the CUIS rep.

9. The CUIS rep is described as being 5'3" to 5'4" tall, slight build, small ~~stature~~ features, tiny moustache, a "latin type" but not dark. He looks like Harold MARTINEZ, the father of Subject's first baby. Source now states that the CUIS rep is probably not a Prensa Latina rep as Subject stated this assignment is furthering his diplomatic career. The CUIS rep had meetings with Subject at least three times at Subject's home.

10. Depending upon developments by the morning of 10 March, Source may be asked to transit Washington for another meeting while enroute to Mexico. It is understood that Your Office will undertake the necessary coordination with other components and other Agencies and that this Office will take no further action pending your advice and request.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

SECRET

14 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/C, Mr. Castoro

SUBJECT: Estelle SOKOLOWSKA

REFERENCE: Memo dated 9 March 1966

Confirming my telephone conversation with you 11 March 1966, LICOOKY-1 at that time stated that Subject could be reached in Miami at telephone number 374-9336. L-1 learned this from Subject, who telephoned L-1's hotel room in New York with a number where she could be reached.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

cc: CI Staff

SECRET

14-00000

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

X. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13

ORG : W.J. Kaufman
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 11 March 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

26 SECRET

ROUTING			
1	I	5	
2		6	
3		7	55
4		8	

12.... 17 232

TO : Mexico City

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY cilop, cilicz

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 87397

Zenance Porter
vyc

LICOOKY-1 DEPARTED 11 MAR PLANS STOPOVER TULSA. ARRIVING MEXI ~~SIXOE~~ 13 OR 14 MAR. L-I ADVANCED TOTAL $295.

END OF MESSAGE

Jacob D. Esterline
DC/WHD

W J Kaufman
W.J. Kaufman
C.WH/1

WJK

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	C
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

5 Mar 66 01 09z

ORIG : W.J.Kaufman
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 4 Mar 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

S-G GEN 7

CONF: WH 8

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY, CI/OA, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 85413

REF: MEXI 6341 (IN 59865)

1. LUND MET WITH LICOOKY-1 FEBRUARY 7 IN NEW YORK (NY) AND FEBRUARY 28TH WHEN SHE VISITED WASHINGTON TO REVIEW THE 1962 SENATE HEARING RECORDS FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE TO USE IN HER LEGAL PROBLEMS. L-1 PLANS TO RETURN TO MEXI NO SOONER THAN MARCH 7 DEPENDING ON PROGRESS WITH HER LAWYER. L-1 WON ROYALTY CASE WHICH SHOULD PRODUCE ABOUT $700 NOW; OTHER SUIT STILL UNRESOLVED.

2. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO DEBRIEF L-1 IN DEPTH IN THAT ALMOST EVERY ITEM SHE RAISED WAS REPEAT MATERIAL ON HER OLD CRONIES AND CONTACTS. POINTED OR REVEALING QUESTIONING ON ANY ACTIVE TARGET, I.E. LEVENSON COMPLEX, WAS AVOIDED.

3. FURTHER TO DIR 81088 L-1 STATED LEVENSON MET BERDECIO IN MEXI PRIOR TO EITHER SPRING OR SUMMER 63. IDEN OF GIRL IN CALIFORNIA UNKNOWN. LEVENSON LIVED WITH BERCEDIOS ON ARRIVAL 63. L-1 CLASSIFIES REVUELTOS, BERDECIOS, LEVENSON AS NON-COMMIE, SLIGHTLY LEFT, ALMOST APOLITICAL.

Licooky-1 201

CONTINUED.....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO :

PAGE TWO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 85113

4. LEVENSON'S MAID INTRODUCED TO REVUELTOS BY THE FILIOS AT PARTY IN FILIOS' HOME. FILIOS' SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (OTHER CHANNELS) INVOLVED COMMERCIAL ITEMS SUCH AS TRANSISTOR RADIO ETC. FOR MONETARY GAIN ONLY AND NOT INVOLVED WITH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. L-1 RECALLS MEXICAN MILITARY PILOTS SOMEHOW INVOLVED BUT HAS NOT DETAILS.

5. IN DISCUSSING LITERARY WORLD ONLY FLEETING REFERENCE
LIREAM EDITOR
MADE TO LIREAM, / AND TICHBORN WITH NO HINT OF KUBARK INVOLVEMENT DESPITE ETSINGER'S ADVICE THAT L-1 SAID LIREAM BLOWN. TO THE CONTRARY, L-1 CLAIMS LIREAM CONCEPT WAS HER IDEA
EDITOR
AND HAD SPOKEN TO / ABOUT IT SOME TIME AGO ONLY TO DISCOVER
EDITOR
SUBSEQUENTLY ON RETURN FROM TRIP OUTSIDE MEXI / HAD TAKEN THE IDEA AND WITH TICHBORN PRODUCED LIREAM. L-1 CLASSIFIES MEXICAN LITERARY GROUP WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS AS LOW CALIBER (PYGMIES) AND HARDLY WORTH BOTHERING ABOUT.

6. L-1 CLAIMS IGNORANCE ON CURRENT EVENTS GUAT AS SHE COMPLETELY OUT OF TOUCH SINCE LEAVING MEXI.

CONTINUED....

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

PAGE THREE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 85413

7. L-1 ASKED SEVERAL TIMES FOR LATEST DEVELOPMENT ARICA, CHILE CONFERENCE (MEXI 6177) STATING SHE HAD HEARD OR READ NOTHING CONCERNING IT SINCE LEAVING MEXICO NOR DID ANY OF HER NY CONTACTS HAVE ANY INFORMATION. SHE DID SAY HOWEVER MARIO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO HAD ALWAYS SINCE DEPARTURE, PLANNED RETURN MEXI 1 MARCH (DESPITE MEXI 6385 AND HMMA 28303 ADVISING THIS WAS A CHANGE IN PLANS). REASON BEING THAT MONTEFORTE COULD OBTAIN ONE YEAR ONLY LEAVE OF ABSENCE FROM UNIVERSITY WHEREAS SOCIOLOGY STUDY SPONSORED BY UN REQUIRED TWO YEARS.

8. CONCERNING RAUL OSEGUEDA L-1 REPEATED HER CAPABILITY OF INFLUENCE AND COLLABORATION ON IDEAS WITH HIM AS WITH FRANCISCO VILLAGRAN KRAMER AND MANUEL GERMAN PARRA (PREVIOUSLY REPORTED HMMA 27924). IN ADDITION THOUGH AND OF INTEREST WAS ADVICE THAT OSEGUEDA HAD PREPARED A PAPER ON UNIVERSTTY REFORM FOR A SOCIOLOGICAL CONFERENCE AT VERACRUZ IN NOVEMBER 65. IN THIS CONTEXT SHE POINTED OUT THAT OSEGUEDA HAD BEEN A MILITANT CHAMPION FOR AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITIES IN HIS EARLY YEARS BUT NOW REALIZING THAT SUCH AUTONOMY HAS BEEN THE ROOT EVIL OF UNIVERSITY MALADY IS CURRENTLY PROMOTING NEEDED CORRECTION AND CONTROL. FOR SOME REA

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PAGE FOUR

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 85113

PAPER NOT PRESENTED AT CONFERENCE BUT OSEGUEDA LATER MAY HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH MANUEL CALVILLO AND MAURICO MAGDALEÑO OF MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. L-1 CLAIMS SHE CAN OBTAIN THIS PAPER. STATION MAY WISH FOLLOW UP FOR POSSIBLE USE LICOAX AND OVERALL UNIVERSITY REFORM PROGRAM. MONTEFORTE AND VILLAGRAN KRAMER ALSO TOOK PART VERACRUZ CONFERENCE, PRESENTING PROBLEMS OF THE LEFT AND PROBLEMS OF THE RIGHT RESPECTIVELY.

9. MUCH TIME SPENT ON L-1 LEADS UPON LATEST ESCAPADE ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA (MEXI 5054) IN THAT S REPORTEDLY GIVEN ASSIGNMENT BY PRENSA LATINA CORRESPONDENT NY TO VISIT MIAMI AND CUBA. THIS COORDINATED WITH ODENVY AND REACHED CRESCENDO WITH ODENVY REPS INTERVIEWING S IN HER NY APARTMENT (WHEN L-1 BY HAPPENSTANCE WAS VISITING HER AND PRIOR ODENVY KNOWLEDGE FULL STORY ON ALLEGED PRENSA LATINA INVOLVEMENT). L-1 MAY BE ASKED TO DELAY RETURN MEXICO TO MONITOR S PLANS. STATION WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

10. L-1 ALSO SAW ROSE SIMINOW (MEXI 5075) WHO CLAIMED TO BE PLANNING DEMONSTRATIONS IN NY BY UTILIZING HER SON GEORGE AS A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TO MILITARY DUTY IN VIETNAM. GEORGE WAS DISCHARGED ABOUT SEPTEMBER 65 AFTER MILITARY DUTY IN PANAMA AND

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

PAGE FIVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF : INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 85413

ANTICIPATES RECALL AS MEMBER OF RESERVE UNIT. THEY PLAN UTILIZE SERVICES OF CONSTITUTIONALIST LAWYER BOUDIEN. PLAN INCLUDES NATIONAL FUND DRIVE. ITEM PASSED ODENVY. MEMOS THIS AND PRECEDING PARA BEING POUCHED.

11. L-1 ~~ADVISED~~ SAID STATION HAD REQUESTED SHE MAKE PROFILES OF SELECTED PERSONALITIES (MEXI 6419) BUT THAT SHE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO COMPLETE. SHE INTENDS DOING THIS IMMEDIATELY ON RETURN. L-1 CONTACTS WITH GUAT EXILES BEING REVIEWED WITH GUAT DESK. WILL ADVISE IF WE DECIDE RECONTACT L-1 HERE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

12. WHILE DISCUSSING WITH L-1 "INTELLECTUAL GROUP" MEXI, (AS TO WHAT MAKES THEM TICK ETC) HER RECOMMENDATION FOR PRACTICAL METHOD TO EXERT INFLUENCE SOLICITED. SHE SUGGESTED THE USUAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS ETC. AT SECOND MEET SHE SOMEWHAT DESPONDENT IN BEING UNABLE PRODUCE REALISTIC BROAD GUAGE PROGRAM. IN THIS CONTEXT SHE WAS TOLD WE NOT SATISFIED OUR OVERALL PRESENT APPROACH AND BELIEVE ALL OF US SPINNING OUR WHEELS NEEDLESSLY. ADVISED WE NOW WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO REGROUP AND TOLD HER SHE SHOULD NOT COUNT ON CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM US. WHEN ASKED HER PLANS IF TERMINATED SHE STATED SHE PROBABLY WOULD STAY MEXI FOR ANOTHER YEAR

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PAGE SIX

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR [illegible]

BEFORE RETURNING NY. SUPPORT WOULD COME FROM FATHER. IN NY SHE HAS MANY "PROJECTS" WHICH NEED TO BE DONE. NO SPECIFICS. SUGGEST STATION CONSIDER KEEPING HER ON PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS COUPLE OF MONTHS TO PRODUCE PROFILES AND ANY DEBRIEFING IN DEPTH REQUIRED AND THEN TERMINATE. UPON RETURN TO NY SHE MIGHT BE PICKED UP FOR CONTACT BY KULAMP OR ODENVY. HAVE INITIATED DISCUSSIONS WITH KULAMP AND THEY INTERESTED CONTACT ARRANGEMENT WITH PIECERATE PAYMENT. LUND FOUND L-1 PROBABLY WELL-INTENTIONED BUT TRAGIC GADFLY HANDY TO HAVE AROUND FOR TIDBITS DESPITE BEING THOROUGHLY BLOWN BUT NOT WORTH A PROJECT. WILL ADVISE ANY REQUESTS FOR L-1 SERVICES DURING GUAT POST-ELECTION ACTIVITIES.

13. RECOMMEND STATION EXTEND PRESENT PROJECT FOR TIME DESIRED AND INCLUDE TERMINATION ARRANGEMENT. PLEASE NOTE LUND DID NOT TERMINATE BUT ONLY INDICATED THIS AS LIKELY FORTHCOMING. TERMINATION IF SO DECIDED IS NATURALLY STATION PREROGATIVE. WELCOME STATION COMMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

CI/Ops/Hughes (draft)

Jacob D. Esterline
DC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 11

24 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	1	5	
2		6	
3		7	2
4		8	

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/OA, CI/IC-2

SECRET 021858Z

ACTION

2[illegible] 65243

DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 6419

LICOOKY

1. JUST BEFORE HER DEPARTURE FOR PBPRIME LICOOKY TOLD EASBY AND REYMANDER SHE HAD PREPARED LONG PROFILES OF JUAN JOSE AREVALO AND RAUL OSEGUEDA FOLLOWING HER FALL 1961 TRIP TO VENEZUELA. SEARCH OF STATION FILES SHOWS NO EVIDENCE THESE PROFILES ALTHOUGH THERE SOME REPORTING ON TRIP ITSELF.

2. DID ADDRESSEES RECEIVE PROFILES? SUGGEST HQS QUERY

Licooky-201

B.

IN 66243 Pg 2

CLYDE D. SHRYOCK FOR HIS RECOLLECTION. **SECRET**

3. GIVEN RECENT REPORTING ON PLANS FOR TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY IN GUAT FOLLOWING ELECTIONS AND OSEGUEDA PARTICIPATION, KUBARK SHOULD HAVE MOST DEFINITIVE INFO AVAILABLE ON IMPORTANT GUATS IN EXILE.

4. HQS NOTE PREVIOUS CABLES HAVE DESCRIBED LICOOKY ACCESS TO OSEGUEDA AND VILLAGRAN KRAMER WHICH APPARENTLY STILL PERSISTS DESPITE GOSSIP RE HER KUBARK AFFILIATION. DID HQS DEBRIEF HER IN ANY DETAIL THESE CONTACTS?

SECRET

CFN 6419 EASBY REYMANDER JUAN JOSE AREVALO RAUL OSEGUEDA FALL 1961 VENEZUELA NO EVIDENCE HQS CLYDE D. SHRYOCK GUAT OSEGUEDA HQS OSEGUEDA VILLAGRAN KRAMER RE HQS

BT

SECRET

MAR-66

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

PAGE FOUR

Changed not sent

Hold in file for 2 mos. until June '66 then destroy

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAPER NOT PRESENTED AT CONFERENCE BUT OSEGUEDA LATER MAY HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH MANUEL CALVILLO AND MAURICO MAGDALENO OF MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. L-1 CLAIMS SHE CAN OBTAIN THIS PAPER. STATION MAY WISH FOLLOW UP FOR POSSIBLE USE LICOAX AND OVERALL UNIVERSITY REFORM PROGRAM. MONTEFORTE AND VILLAGRAN KRAMER ALSO TOOK PART VERACRUZ CONFERENCE, PRESENTING PROBLEMS OF THE LEFT AND PROBLEMS OF THE RIGHT RESPECTIVELY.

9. MUCH TIME SPENT ON L-1 LEADS UPON LATEST ESCAPADE ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA (MEXI 5054) IN THAT S REPORTEDLY GIVEN ASSIGNMENT BY PRENSA LATINA CORRESPONDENT NY TO VISIT MIAMI AND CUBA. THIS COORDINATED WITH ODENVY AND REACHED CRESCENDO WITH ODENVY REPS INTERVIEWING S IN HER NY APARTMENT (WHEN L-1 BY HAPPENSTANCE WAS VISITING). ~~AS STATE ON 3 MARCH GAVE PERMISSION FOR S TRAVEL CUBA ON COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS DESPITE ODENVY OBJECTIONS, L-1 MAY BE ASKED TO DELAY RETURN MEXI TO MONITOR~~ S PLANS.

10. L-1 ALSO SAW ROSE SIMINOW (MEXI 5075) WHO CLAIMED TO BE PLANNING DEMONSTRATIONS IN NY BY UTILIZING HER SON GEORGE AS A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TO MILITARY DUTY IN VIETNAM. GEORGE WAS DISCHARGED ABOUT SEPTEMBER 65 AFTER MILITARY DUTY IN PANAMA AND

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MEMORANDUM RECEIPT

____
DATE

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

I hereby acknowledge receipt of the following:

$ 100—

28 Feb 66

Please return ________ **signed copy(ies) of this receipt**

To ______________________________

SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT

DATE RECEIVED

FORM NO. 752 REPLACES FORM 36-66
1 AUG 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(33)

DODS

23 Feb 66

Jack,

I briefed Gaines for 30 minutes on LICOOKY giving him the full background on her bio, education, CIA relationship---from recruitment through current use in Mexico. My suggestion was that she be told to go to NY and find a job which would give her a means of livelihood as well as cover for any future CIA income. After 6 months (or some other specific period of time) it would be arranged that either we contact her or she contact us to determine what her personal situation was and whether she would then be in a position to target against selected persons of interest to CIA in the NY area. She could then be paid on a spot basis for herCIA work. Mr. Gaines wanted to think about it but thought that this would be the best approach. He will talk to you before Friday.

His only question was whether we had any indication whether she was under development by the opposition---Soviet, Cuban, etc. I told him that as far as I knew there was no such indication. If I am wrong (per your and Bill Johnson's recent activity) you better correct this.

Charlotte

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, [illegible]
Director of Finance
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
[illegible] - Tax Administration

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. During the stay of the Tax Committee representative seventeen individuals were briefed and sixteen were assessed. Attached is a copy of the briefing schedule prepared by the Station.

2. [illegible] was requested to obtain a signed blank return from HELEBRANT when he saw him on a recent TDY and to obtain as much information as possible on his tax problem. [illegible] was going to hand carry the signed return and the information to Headquarters.

3. [illegible] was advised of the I.R.S. interpretation of the Code as it affected his claim for a standard deduction. He stated that he would appreciate I.R.S. making a ruling on his particular circumstances. Under separate cover the request is being forwarded.

4. [illegible]'s assessment was prepared and an estimate of his 1965 tax liability was computed. Based on this estimate he requested that the personal check forwarded under separate cover be applied to the tax withholding account thereby satisfying his estimated 1965 tax liability.

5. [illegible], and Douglas J. [illegible] are in the Headquarters area and should be contacted directly. [illegible] was not returning to the Station until after the Committee representative left.

6. The forms for Jeremy K. [illegible], Douglas J. [illegible], [illegible], John R. [illegible] will be completed upon [illegible]'s return to Headquarters.

7. Edward G. [illegible] was not available for a briefing.

Attachment:
As Stated Above, h/w & usc

Distribution:
1 - Chief, [illegible], w/att
1 - Director of Finance, w/o att
1 - Chief, WHD, w/o att

Processed [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-6309

DATE
21 February 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Carl [illegible]
[illegible]	
[illegible]	

[illegible] forms were forwarded earlier.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 1535 BY G

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH 2, C/OA, C/OPS, FI, FI/INT, CS/DO

S E C R E T 211925Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 6341

LICOOKY

21 FEB 66 IN 59865

REF DIR 81716 *

1. IF DESPITE LIREAM AMENDMENT AND MEXI 6043 (IN 46043) HQS STILL INTENDS TERMINATE LICOOKY BELIEVE IT ONLY JUST GIVE HER CHANCE LOOK AROUND WHILE SHE STILL AVAILABLE THERE. IF THIS DONE REQUEST MEXI BE GIVEN FULL REPORTING ON CONVERSATIONS AND DEBRIEFINGS TO COINCIDE NEARLY AS POSSIBLE HER ARRIVAL HERE. REQUEST SHE BE GIVEN FULL SECURITY REBRIEFING RE HER TERMINATION.

2. MEXI 6177 (IN 49273) AND VARIOUS CABLES OTHER CHANNELS MADE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR TOPICS HQS MIGHT WISH TAKE UP WITH HER. PLS CONFIRM WHICH DONE AND WHAT REMNANTS LEFT FOR MEXI CLEAN UP.

S E C R E T

CFN 6341 81716 LIREAM 6043 HQS RE 6177 HQS PLS

BT

* GIVE INDICATION OF POSSIBLE TERMINATION.

SECRET

NNNN

LICOOKY-201

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

24 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, SR-8

ACTION 18 FEB 66 IN 58426

Kaufman
Johnson [illegible]
[illegible]

S E C R E T 181810Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6319

KUDESK

REF DIR 81088 *

PARA TWO REF, SUGGEST HQS CONSIDER PRETEXT CALL JEWISH MEMORIAL HOSPITAL FOR DATE LEVENSON VACATION MEXICO.

S E C R E T

* KUBARK QUERY PASSPORT OFFICE SHOWS LEVENSON RENEWED PASSPORT 14 JAN 66 FOR VACATION MEXI

CFN

6319 81088 HQS JEWISH LEVENSON

BT

SECRET

NNNN

B

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : C.Bustos-videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 18 Feb 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

30 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO CITY

PRIORITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY c/a

PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 81716

LICOOKY

AT LICOOKY REQUEST HQS PLANNING ADVANCE HER $200 FOR RETURN TRAVEL MEXI. SHE DOES NOT PLAN RETURN TILL END FEBRUARY. WOULD STATION LIKE HQS TO GIVE HER INDICATION OF PROBABLE TERMINATION? ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Licooky-201

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG : W. R. Johnson
UNIT : CI/OPS
EXT : 6918
DATE : 16 Feb 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☑ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-786276

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

17 FEB 66 17 39z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: C/OPS

INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY WH 8, CI, SR 8

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 81088

KUDESK

REF: HMMW-14325*

1. LICOOKY TOLD LUND LEVENSON CONTACT OF ROBERTO BERDECIO BEFORE 1963 VISIT TO MEXI. HAD BEFRIENDED GIRL FREIND OF BERDECIO IN CALIFORNIA.

2. KUBARK QUERY PASSPORT OFFICE SHOWS LEVENSON RENEWED PASSPORT 14 JANUARY 66 FOR VACATION MEXICO. PASSPORT ORIGINALLY ISSUED FOR DEPARTURE ONE OCTOBER 62 FOR TRAVEL AND POSTGRAD STUDY EUROPE INCLUDING SPAIN USSR.

END OF MESSAGE

*ODENVY INVESTIGATION AND TRACES ROBERT CHARLES LEVENSON 201-786276.

LICOOKY-1

Thomas Polgar

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

James R. Hunt
DC/CI

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 49

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Mexico City

ACTION CA/O-4 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA-2, WH-8 WE-8, , CA/Prop, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CI/OA, DO-4, DO/H-3, AF-7, FI, FI/INT-2

S E C R E T 052018Z

5 FEB 65 IN 462[illegible]

SAGO INFO DIR PALP CITE MEXI 6177

QKCPERA DTLEAFAGE

REF HMM-[illegible] (NOT TO PALP OR SAGO)

HMMA-26069 (NOT TO SAGO)

1. SUBJECT IS FORMATION OF COMUNIDAD LATINOAMERICANA DE ESCRITORES (CLE) WHICH WAS DISCUSSED DURING JANUARY 65 MEET OF COMUNAUTE EUROPEENE D'ESCRIVAINS (COMES) IN GENOA. CARLOS PELLICER (P) PROMINENT MEXICAN POET AND COMMY-LINER, ONE OF MEXI DELEGATES THAT MEETING, AGREED PUSH FOR ORGANIZING MEETING IN MEXICO DURING 1965 TO FORM SISTER ORGANIZATION TO BE CALLED CLE. THIS MEETING HAS NEVER BEEN CALLED. HOWEVER EARLY 65 MEXI STATION AGENT LICOOKY-1 WAS ACTIVE COOPERATOR IN ORGANIZING ASOCIACION DE ESCRITORES MEXICANSOS A. C. (AEMAC) WHICH SERVICE ORG FOR WRITERS TO GET BETTER ROYALTIES, PUBLICITY, DISTRIBUTION, AND OTHER BENEFITS. THIS ORG WHOSE CONSTITUTION SPECIFICALLY FORBIDS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATION ELECTED CARLOS PELLICER PRESIDENT. P HAS BEEN TRYING NUMEROUS DEVICES TO BRING CLE ORGANIZING MEETING UNDER AEMAC AUSPICES [illegible] BUT SO FAR FRUSTRATED BY MEMBERSHIP.

SECRET

SECRET IN 49273 Pg 2

2. LUIS VILLORO, EDITOR OF REVISTA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE MEXICO, ALSO ONE OF ORGANIZING COMMITTEE IN GENOA AND ATTENDING CONGRESO DE LA COMUNIDAD CULTURAL DE LATINO AMERICA IN ARICA, CHILE. EXPECTS MEET NUMBER OF GENOA ATTENDEES WHO HE THINKS WILL WANT PROGRESS REPORT ON PLANS FOR CLE ORGANIZING MEETING. VILLORO PLANS RATHER VAGUE. REALIZES GENOA MEETING ATTENDED MAINLY BY LEFTISTS AND THAT IF CLE WERE LAUNCHED UNDER SAME AUSPICES IT WOULD BE HEAVILY WEIGHTED ON LEFT. SAME TIME REALIZES THAT ONLY WRITERS ORGANIZATION MEXICO WITH ENOUGH COHESION TO GET MEETING GOING WOULD BE AEMAC WHICH COVERS WHOLE POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND WHICH SO FAR HAS SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED TAKING POLITICAL STANDS.

3. ALTHOUGH NOT CLEAR EXTENT TO WHICH PLANS FOR FORMATION CLE MAY COME UP DURING ARICA MEETING, NUMBER OF THOSE IN ATTENDANCE LIKELY BE SAME AS ATTENDED GENOA MEETING AND MAY TRY STEAMROLLER COMMITTIMENT FORM MEXI DELEGATION TO HOST ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING. MEXICAN INVITEES TO ARICA BESIDES VILLORO ARE HECTOR AZAR, HEAD OF THEATER DEPT OF NATINAL FINE ARTS INSTITUTE; PADRE ANGEL MARIA GARIBAY, LEFTIST AND WINNER NATIONAL LITERARY AWARD; HECTOR MENDOZA, UNIDENTIFIED; JUAN RULFO WHO NOT GOING; AND MARIO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO, GUATEMALAN RESIDENT MEXI WHO MARXIST WRITER FOR LEFTIST MAG SIEMPRE.

SECRET

SECRET IN 49273 Pg 3

VILLCRO AND MONTEFORTE KNOWN TO CLAIM OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AEMAC. QKOPERA HAD APPARENTLY BEEN CONCERNED RE FORMATION OF A POLITICALLY ACTIVE CLE.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES KEEP MEXI POSTED ON ANY DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED BY ASSETS ATTENDING ARICA CONFERENCE PERTINENT ABOVE SUBJECT. BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE PURPOSE MONTEFORTE ATTENDANCE ARICA NOT AS PER LINLUCK, PARA 2 HMMA-28166 ("PREPARATION COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR LA INTELLECTUALS"). LINLUCK NOT AS WELL PLUGGED IN THIS GROUP AS LICOOKY.

5. DIR: MOST OF ABOVE FROM LICOOKY11. YOU MAY WISH QUERY HER IN DEPTH THIS SUBJECT WHILE SHE AVAILABLE.

SECRET

CFN

6177 HMM_10024 NOT TO HMMA-26069 NOT TO COMUNIDAD LATINOAMERICANA DE ESCRITORES CLE JANUARY 65 COMUNAUTE EUROPEENE D'ESCRIVAINS COMES GENOA CARLOS PELLICER (P) MEXICO 1965 CLE 65 ASOCIACION DE ESCRITORES MEXICANOS A.C. AEMAC P CLE AEMAC LUIS VILLORO REVISTA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE MEXICO CONGRESO DE LA COMUNIDAD CULTURAL DE LATINO AMERICA ARICA CHILE CLE NOT CLEAR HECTOR AZAR PADRE ANGEL MARIA GARIBAY HECTTR MENDOZA JUAN RULFO NOT GOING MARIO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO GUATEMALAN MAG SIEMPRE RE ARICA NOT AS LINLUCK PARA 2 HMMA-28166

SECRET

Li Cooky-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALL WH BRANCH CHIEFS
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DESK

SUBJECT : Contract Agents

According to latest records, attached is a list of Contract Agents assigned to countries in your Branch. To assist in updating and consolidating personnel records on WH Contract Agents, your Branch is requested to furnish by 28 January 1966 the following information for ONLY U. S. citizen Contract Agents who are employed full time.

Name	Viola June COBB	
Date of Birth	24 Aug 1927	
Place of Birth	Ponca, Oklahoma	
Salary per Annum	$3000	
Date of Arrival to Assignment	MAY 1961	Officially recruited in Habana June 60
Date of Scheduled Departure (if applicable)		
Type Contract	Formal written	

Donald C. Marelius
WH/EXO

Attachment

Suspense: 28 January 66

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

26 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO TIME 1830 BY P

INFO
RF FILE CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4; DO/H3, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, OGC 2, CS/DO

S E C R E T 262150Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 6043

LICOOKY

REF DIR 74752 *

AC

* MISS JONE COBB RETURNING NEW YORK TO FIGHT LIBEL SUIT CONCERNING AREVALO BOOK.

26 JAN 66 IN 42076

1. SUBJ RETURNED 22 JAN BY PLANE TO NEW YORK TO CONSULT LAWYERS BROWN CROSS AND HAMILTON RE 600,000 DOLLAR LIBEL SUIT BEING BROUGHT AGAINST HER BY LYLE STUART, PUBLISHER OF ENGLISH VERSION OF BOOK FOR HER CHARGES THAT HE ALTERED ORIGINAL TEXT. VISIT REVOLVES AROUND LAWYERS DESIRE OBTAIN RELEASE HER SENATE TESTIMONY OF MARCH 30, 1962 FOR USE IN DEFENSE. SHE UNWILLING RELEASE BECAUSE OF DELICACY SOME OF REVELATIONS ABOUT LINLUCK, AREVALO AND OTHERS. STUART LAWYERS ARE SCHEIMAN, ALBERT AND MACLEAN. FEELS CONFIDENT THROUGH PERSONAL VISIT TO LAWYER CAN PREVENT CASE COMING TO TRIAL.

2. SHE ALSO REPRESENTING ~~[illegible]~~ SELF IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CASE 8 FEB AGAINST STUART FOR HIS FAILURE PAY FULL ROYALTIES DUE HER ON ENGLISH EDITION BOOK.

3. EASBY HAD LONG SESSION 20 JAN ATTEMPTING PERSUADE HER

HANDLE BY PHONE. SHE ALREADY TRIED THIS AND FOUND IT UNSATISFACTORY. SHE TOLD IN VIEW STILL PENDING APPROVAL HER KUBARK FUTURE, WE COULD NOT POSSIBLY RECOMMEND PAYMENT HER EXPENSES AND URGED HER RETURN SOONEST TO BEGIN VIGOROUS WORK ON NEW PROJECT DIRECTION. SHE EXPECTS RETURN 9 OR 10 FEB.

4. NO KNOWLEDGE WHERE STAYING NEW YORK AND TOLD HER ATTEMPT

NO ROUTINE CONTACT. IN EMERGENCY TO CONTACT OVERT OFFICE NEW YORK. IF HOS SEEKS CONTACT CAN DOUBTLESS MAKE THROUGH LAWYERS.

5. RE CONTINUATION LICOOKY KUBARK ASSOCIATION URGE SOME KIND DECISION NEAR FUTURE. SHE ANTICIPATES NO PROBLEM GETTING WORK NEW YORK IF WE TERMINATE, BUT DOES NOT WISH BE KEPT HANGING. SHE IS PROBABLY SINGLE MAIN SPARKPLUG AEMAC PROGRAM AND OBVIOUSLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT WORK AND PROSPECTS. BEFORE ANY TERMINATION PROCEDINGS STATION SUGGESTS HQS MAKE CAREFUL DETERMINATION THAT IT DOES NOT WANT WINDOW INTO AND ACTION CAPABILITY IN INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY AND WILL NOT WANT IT TWO OR THREE YEARS HENCE. LICOOKY HAS WIDEST AND MOST INTIMATE RANGE CONTACTS ANY STATION ASSET THIS FIELD WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TICHBORN. STATION AT FAULT IN NOT EARLIER RECOGNIZING AND REPORTING HER UTILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICAN LEFTIST FIELD EXHAUSTED AND FUTURE LAY IN INTELLECTUAL WORLD. STILL RETAINS INTIMATE CONTACT HOWEVER WITH FRANCISCO VILLAGRAN KRAMER AND RAUL OSEGUEDA.

SECRET

CFN 6043 74752 22 JAN NEW YORK BROWN CROSS HAMILTON RE 600,000 DOLLAR LYLE STUART ENGLISH 30 1962 LINLUCK AREVALO STUART SCHEIMAN ALBERT MACLEAN 8 FEBSTUART EASBY 20 KUBARK NOT POSSIBLY

IN 42076 PAGE 3

9 10 FEB NO KNOWLEDGE NEW YORK NO ROUTINE NEW YORK HQS RE LICOOKY KUBARK NO PROBLEM NOT WISH AEMAC HQS NOT WANT NOT WANT LICOOKY TICHBORN NOT EARLIER CENTRAL AMERICAN FRANCISCO VILLAGRAN KRAMER RAUL OSEGUEDA

BT

SECRET

14-00000

NO. ______

NO. ______

______

RET. TO BRANCH ☐

SIG. ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES/24

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, VR, CS/DO, CI/OA, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 262252Z

ACTION

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 6047

LICOOKY

REF MEXI 6043 (IN 42076)

26 JAN 65 IN 42101

JUST LEARNED FROM REYMANDER LICOOKY STAYING HOTEL SUTTON PLAZA, 116 EAST 58 ST. ALTERNATIVE MEANS CONTACT IS THROUGH HER DOCTOR, I. SNAPPER, BARBIZON PLAZA, PHONE CI-7-7[illegible].

S E C R E T

CFN 6047 &/043 REYMANDER LICOOKY HOTEL SUTTON PLKA, 116 EAST 58ST I SNAPPER BARBIZON PLAZA CI-7-7[illegible]

BT

NEED DECISION ON CONTINUATION KUBARK ASISTANCE TO LICOOKY.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
~~XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : C.Bustos-Videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 24 Jan 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201- 278841

84 SECRET

TO : MEXICO CITY

24 JAN 66 20 16z

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY CA2, CA/PROP, DO4, DO/H3 CI/OA,

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 74752

ETSINGER REPORTED MISS JUNE COBB RETURNING TO NEW YORK TO FACE LIBEL SUIT CONCERNING AREVALO BOOK. ETSINGER VAGUE ON NAME OF PERSON BRINGING SUIT. /~~EXXT~~ REQUEST STATION PROVIDE DETAILS INCLUDING ETA, MODE OF TRAVEL AND MEANS CONTACT IN NEW YORK.

END OF MESSAGE

LICOOKY-1

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

1C

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LICOOKY /1/
201-278841
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

050-126-036/01
HMMA-27923
20 DEC 65

R 6512300052

FILE IN 201-278841

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(19-00)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Office of Finance

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
1964 Income Tax Forms - Joyce H. PINEINCH

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REFERENCE: MEXI 5550, 8 December 1965

Attached herewith are two copies of PINEINCH's 1964 Covert Income Tax Return.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated (h/w)

Distribution:
2 - Finance, w/atts
1 - WHD, w/o atts

cooky-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-6025

DATE
9 December 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

21 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, OF 2, CCS 3

S E C R E T 081945Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5550

8 Dec 65 IN 10658

REF: DIR 62414

1. 1964 COVERT TAX RETURNS FOR BENADUM, LIMOTOR 19 (BARBARA C. HUFIG), PINEINCH, SANDAMANIE BEING SENT BY HMMT 6218 IN 10 DEC POUCH. NOT POUCHED EARLIER AS OVERLOOKED IN STATION ACTION FILES.

2. RETURN FOR CAZAZZUS SENT HMMT 5399 APR 23 (JOINT WITH DOUGLAS J. FEINGLASS). RETURN FOR LIFUED 30, NOW RITA N. BLAZIK, SENT HMMT 5928, 28 OCT 65.

3. LIHUFF 1 SUBMITTED RETURN THROUGH OVERT CHANNELS; SIGNED COPY BEING POUCHED HQS.

4. WILL REPORT ON TICHBORN SEPARATELY.

S E C R E T / [illegible] covert 1964 [illegible] tax returns received [illegible]

CFN 5550 62414 1964 BENADUM LIMOTOR 19 BARBARA C HUFIG PINEINCH SANDAMANIE HMMT 6218 10 NOT POUCHED CAZAZZUS HMMT 5399 APR 23 DOUGLAS J FEINGLASS LIFUED 30 RITA N BLAZIK HMMT 5928 28 65 LIHUFF 1 HQS

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

ORIG : J. Fisher
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 29 Nov 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2	P	6	
3		7	
4		8	

2Dec65 22 06z

TO : Mexico City

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG GEN~~

CONF: WH8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY OF2, CCS3

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 62414

PLS ADVISE WHEN HDQS CAN EXPECT 1964 COVERT TAX RETURNS REQUESTED HMMS-4366.* IF NOT RECEIVED SOON, KUBARK MAY BE FORCED REVEAL TRUE NAMES TO IRS WHO WILL THEN TAKE DIRECT ACTION.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested 8 delinquent 1964 Covert Income Tax returns.

WH/B&F

Licooky
~~[illegible]~~

Thomas Polgar
William V. Broe
C/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

HIR

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Overdue 1964 Covert Income Tax Returns

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMS 4287, 19 August 1965

The following 1964 Covert Income Tax Returns are still overdue. Please contact the agents and see that they are forwarded to Headquarters as soon as possible. See referenced dispatch for information on the penalities imposed for late returns.

Jeremy K. BENADUM
Sandra S. CAZAZZUS
LIFEUD-30
[illegible]
LIMOTOR-19
Joyce H. PINEINCH ✓ 200KX
John R. SANDMAGIE
Edward C. TICHBORN

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
0 & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS 4360

DATE
21 OCT 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

RI
Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/Bustos-Videla:mes		(15 Oct 65)	4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	RELEASING OFFICER'S NAME
C/WHD		William V. Broe

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-2788..
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

23/30 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CI/ICZ, WH/C8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/ICZ, DO4, DO/H3,

19 OCT 65 IN 75330

SECRET 182320Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5075

LICOOKY

REF MEXI 5054 (IN 74054)

1. RECEIPT OF LICOOKY-1 WRITTEN REPORT REQUIRES SOME CORRECTIONS IN REF:

A. IGOR INTRODUCED HER TO "HARRY" (BUT NOT BY FULL NAME, WHICH SHE NEVER KNEW), DESCRIBING HIM AS ABSOLUTELY TRUSTWORTHY. IN LATE 1960, HARRY RECONTACTED HER THRU JORGE LOSADA WHOM SHE HAD KNOWN SINCE 1952 AND THIS TIME HARRY RECRUITED HER. COVER WAS RESEARCH FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS.

B. L-1 DID NOT TELL IGOR SHE RECRUITED AND WORKING FOR KUBARK IN MEXI. SHE SURMISES HE EITHER KNEW OLBSOQ*
ŒDUYMC YSMXQHXOM,3((645 & MMEN AND THAT SHE THEREFORE STILL WORKING IN MEXI

C. REAL REASON FOR ATTEMPTED KUBARK CONTACT WAS TO PASS ON INFO RE CARLOS ENRIQUE POLANCO, GUAT EXILE, ONETIME MEXI RESIDENT AND CURRENTLY IN PBRUMEN ON MEDICAL SCHOLARSHIP. L-1 LEARNED

19 oct 65
201-278841

11-75330 PAGE 3 of 3

POLANCO NOT PREVIOUSLY STASHA PRENSA LATINA HILDA GADEA CHE GUEVARA MID NEW YORK DAILY WORKER L-1 STASHA ROSE SIMINOW AMERICAN STASHA SIMINOW MARXISM L-1 STASHA 4

BT

5

NNN

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 48

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DO4, DO/H 3, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, WH/C8

S E C R E T 162125Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5754

16 Oct 65 IN 74054

IN 74054

LICOOKY

REF: DIR 45335

1. STATION PROBABLY AT FAULT FOR NOT FORWARDING LICOOKY-1 (W94044) NY ADDRESS IN MEXI 4628. HOWEVER FEEL IN GENERAL WHEN PBPRIME NATIONAL AGENT ASKS FOR CONTACT MUST BE FOR WHAT HE FEELS GOOD REASON.

2. L-1 RELATES THAT WHILE VISITING HOME OF FRIEND IN NY SHE PICKED UP PHONE AND CALLER WAS ESTELLE "STASHA" SOKOLOWSKA (MADRIGAL) WHOM SHE HAD KNOWN IN PBRUMEN AND IN MEXI DURING 61, WHERE SHE HAD COME TO HAVE BABY OF HAROLD MARTINEZ, NICARAGUAN LEADER OF FRENTE SANDINO IN CUBA. ATTENDING PHYSICIAN WAS MARIO MADRIGAL, YOUNG COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST DOCTOR WHO SUBSEQUENTLY MARRIED SOKOLOWSKA AND TOOK HER TO PBRUMEN SOME TIME 19[illegible] 62. SOKOLOWSKA HAD LEFT MADRIGAL AND ARRIVED NEW YORK VIA MONTREAL 12 OR 13 SEPT. TOLD L-1 THAT "IF NOTHING ELSE WORKED OUT" PLANNED JOIN JO ANNE SALAS, AMERICAN, NOW TEACHING ENGLISH IN CHINA. SOKOLOWSKA MOTHER IS ANNA SOKOLOWSKA, 963 179TH ST, BRONX, NY. ESTELLE WAS STAYING WITH HER.

SOKOLOV Secy for Dr. Snapper [illegible] [illegible] noted N.Y.

SECRET

SECRET IN 74054 PAGE 2.

3. IT WAS ABOVE INFO L-1 TRYING GET INTO KUBARK HANDS AND USED SUBJECT PARA 1 REF SINCE HE MADE FIRST INTRODUCTION TO HERMSDORF IN PBRUMEN WHO, ACCORDING L-1 RECRUITED HER SPECIFICALLY FOR KUBARK. STATION FILES ON L-1 DO NOT GO BACK THAT FAR SO HAVE ONLY HER WORD. L-1 DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER ESTELLE STILL NY OR WHETHER OTHER PLANS MATERIALIZED.

4. IF HQS DECIDES PURSUE LEAD, TRUST WILL BE DONE SO AS NOT IMPLICATE L-1.

SECRET

CFN 5054 45335 LICOOKY-1 NY 4623 L-1 NY ESTELLE "STASHA" SOKOLOWSKA MADRIGAL 61 HAROLD MARTINEZ NICARAGUAN SANDINO MARIO MADRIGAL 1962 12 13 L-1 NOTHING ELSE JO ANNE SALAS 963 179TH ST NY L-1 1 HERMSDORF L-1 L-1 NOT GO L-1 NOT KNOW NY HQS NOT IMPLICATE L-1

BT

SECRET * Licooky-1 Requested Kubark contact in NEW YORK.

SECRET

TO: Certain Chiefs of Stations and Bases

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Contract Amendment Concerning Social Security Taxes for Certain Contract Agents Cecil B. ARLISS, Rita N. BLAZEK, Barbara ~~C. HUTTO,~~ LIFEUD/19, LIHUFF/1, Joyce H. PINEINCH, John R. SANDAVANIE, Philip K. ~~TESSAROLO~~, Edward G. TICHBORN, Carol K. ZINSMEISTER

☒

PRIORITY

Action Required: As Noted

1. Electronic data processing methods of the Internal Revenue Service have made it necessary to effect a procedure by which Social Security self-employment taxes and credits may be securely transferred for those Contract Agents (Independent Contractors) who do not have an attributable cover source for income earned under their contracts. Such individuals will be taxed under the Social Security [illegible] and provisions applicable to Contract Employees. Deductions at the employee rate will begin 1 December 1964 (beginning of the 1965 tax year) on contract compensation.

2. The attached amendment is for your retention and includes the Contract Agents who should participate in the new procedure. Acceptance by the individual is presumed since his Social Security tax is at a lesser rate for the same credits.

a. It is suggested the individual under written contract be asked to sign the amendment.

CONTINUED...

18 OCT 1965

Attachment:
As Stated

DATE TYPED: 4 October 65

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: Book Dispatch 5178

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: Retain

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Distribution:
2 - WH/PERS
1 - WH/1
1 - WH/2
1 - WH/3
1 - WH/4
1 - WH/5
1 - WH/7
1 - WH/C

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/Pers/W.S. Renehan:		gms	6576

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/PERS		
C/WH/1		
C/WH/2	[illegible]	
C/WH/3	[illegible]	
C/WH/4	5 X 65	
C/WH/5		
C/WH/7	[illegible]	
ADC/WH/C	[illegible]	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WHD	10/5/65	William V. Broe

[illegible]

[illegible] contract employee [illegible] "pay as you go" basis [illegible] this year.

[illegible] Security [illegible] 1965, [illegible] on or before 15 [illegible] 1965.

[illegible] A. [illegible]

S E C R E T

SECRET

~~XXMr.~~ Miss Joyce H. Pineisch

Dear ~~XXX~~ Miss Pineisch:

Reference is made to your current ~~contract~~ Memorandum of Oral Commitment with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Arrangements have been recently completed allowing certain independent contractors of this organization to obtain social security credits by covering such individuals under the social security tax provisions applicable to employees. These arrangements also include a provision for retroactive applicability to the beginning of the 1965 tax year. This can be done only for reasons of security since the procedure results in reducing the social security tax from the self-employed rate to the employee rate. For example, in January of 1965 the tax rates were 5.4% and 3-5/8% respectively.

As a consequence thereof, said contract is amended by deleting all reference to social security and by adding the following paragraph:

"Effective 1 December 1964, social security taxes will be covertly deducted by this organization from your compensation in the same manner and to the same extent as would be done if you were a Government employee. Security reasons make this procedure necessary. Its implementation does not imply in any manner the actual creation of an employee-employer relationship. Your legal status under this agreement continues to be that of an independent contractor.

If you receive or expect to receive full or partial social security credits from overt sources you will so notify this organization and an adjustment will be made or covert deductions discontinued, depending upon the circumstances. Further, if you should subsequently receive overt social security credits, evidence thereof will be submitted to this organization. In such event your covert credits will be erased and your covert deductions returned.

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY SIGNED

Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

☐ DF ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

C/Bustos-Videla
ORIG : WH/1
UNIT : 4506
EXT : 23 Sept 65
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-278841

51/53 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO CITY

24 SEP 65 18 46 z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY DO 4, DO/H3, C/OPS, WH/C8, C/OA, C/IC 2, CA 2, FI

SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 45335

1. HDQS RECEIVED PHONE REPORT FROM NYDO 23 SEPT THAT LICOOKY-1 HAD CONTACTED KUJUMP THROUGH IGOR GORDEVITCH [illegible] OF VISION MAGAZINE. LICOOKY HAD TOLD GORDEVITCH [illegible] SHE HAD BEEN RECRUITED FOR KUBARK BY MR. HERMSDORF IN CUBA, WAS NOW MEXI, AND WANTED A KUBARK CONTACT IN NEW YORK. SHE ONLY PLANNED BE THERE A COUPLE OF DAYS PRIOR RETURNING MEXI AND GAVE NO INDICATION WHY SHE WISHED CONTACT.

2. ALTHOUGH GORDEVITCH [illegible] IS CLEARED KUWOLF CONTACT, PREFER NOT USE HIM AS INTERMEDIARY TO LICOOKY. IN VIEW HER PLAN RETURN MEXI SHORTLY HDQS MAKING NO CONTACT. REQUEST STATION DEBRIEF LICOOKY ON HER ACTIONS, PARTICULARLY WHY SHE REVEALED HER KUBARK RELATIONSHIP.

END OF MESSAGE

5/

LICOOKY-1

DO/WH/Toth

WH/FOA

William V. Broe
Chief, WH D
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______
X-REF TO FILE NO. ______
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 60

/53 SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CI/IC2, CI/OA, DO4, DO/H3, CA2, CA/04, D/MS2

SECRET 020322Z

ACTION

2 SEP 65 IN 44044

DIR CITE MEXI 4628

LICOOKY

1. LICOOKY-1 HAS BEEN IN POOR HEALTH FOR SEVERAL MONTHS EVIDENCED BY RECURRENT HACKING COUGH, BRONCHITIS AND OTHER ILLS. TREATMENT HERE HAS TEMPORARILY ALLEVIATED CONDITION BUT NEVER PERMANENTLY. MOST RECENT RECURRENCE HAS L-1 WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE LUNG CANCER. WANTS VISIT DR. I. SNAPPER, CHIEF BROOKDALE MEDICAL CENTER WHO KNOWS HERE ENTIRE MEDICAL HISTORY. LEAVING END FIRST WEEK SEPT AND RETURNING FIRST WEEK OCTOBER.

2. OWING L-1 STRATEGIC LOCATION IN LITERARY WORLD THROUGH HER ACTIVITY IN AEM STATION PAYING EXPENSES FROM PROJECT FUNDS. (SEE HMMW 13902) MEDICAL EXPENSES COVERED BY BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD SO ESTIMATE ONLY TRAVEL AND TEMPORARY HOTEL STAY BEFORE ENTERS HOSPITAL.

3. IF HQS WISHES INTERVIEW HER NEW YORK SUPPLEMENTING STATION REPORTING ON COMES PLANS FOR ESTABLISHING LA WRITERS COMMUNITY, STATION WILL FORWARD EXACT DATES AND ADDRESS.

SECRET

SECRET

Licooky-201

SECRET IN 44044 Page

CFN 4628 LICOOKY-1 ILLS L-1 DR. I. SNAPPER BROOKDALE OWING L-1 STRATEGIC LITERARY WORLD THROUGH AEM STATION HMMW 13902 BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD HOTEL NEW YORK LA WRITERS

BT

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

C No. 83492

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1/Mexico -- W.J. Kaufman

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of ____________________

LICOOKY/1 ____________, for the purpose specified in your request

dated as follows ____________.

Amended as specifically requested in your memorandum of 17 August 1965.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 30 August 1965 jh

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LICOOKY-1 Participation in Mexican Writers' Association

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Removed from Project LICOOKY
CS Classification: 50-6-129/3
JOB #67-86/77
Box: 27 Fold: 3

Reference: HMMA 26,621, 15 July 1965

1. LICOOKY-1's efforts as described in reference have substantial merit and some potential particularly if the Station can find a way to tie them in with the LIREAM effort in the intellectual field.

2. LICOOKY-1 certainly is to be commended for her effort in getting writers both of the right and left such as Carlos PELLICER Camara to join the AEM. From a KUBARK standpoint the most interesting contact is the one with PELLICER because he has been the reported force behind the COMES/CLE effort in Mexico.

3. Although her assigned tasks as reported in para 7 a, b and d of the LILINK memo do not entail making her witting of other Station assets engaged in MHSPAWN Ops among the intellectuals, an amendment to her OA is required, and one has been requested. If her efforts progress to the point where she might be able to influence leftist writers in their efforts to establish the CLE in Mexico (para 7 c of LILINK memo) Headquarters should be forwarded your ideas on why and how LICOOKY-1 should be used as an active MHSPAWN agent, and another ammendment will be required for this role.

4. ANDRIETTE will discuss this operation with the Station during his TDY.

5. In view if the restricted OA which confines KUBARK's association with LICOOKY-1, it is important that Headquarters remain aware of any unusual activity in her personal life which might affect her security or the granting of amendments to her OA for individual operations. Therefore, we would appreciate your keeping us informed on a more timely basis of any undertakings such as the recruitments for membership in the AEM described in reference.

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-129/3

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

FILE IN 201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW 13902	18 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-129/3 201-278841

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Overdue 1964 Covert Income Tax Returns

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Priority

The following agents in Mexico City are delinquent in the filing of their 1964 Covert Income Tax returns. You are requested to obtain these outstanding returns as soon as possible since delinquent tax returns are subject to 6% statutory interest on the unpaid tax due from 15 April to the date of payment, and in addition are also subject to a penalty of 5% per month, not to exceed 25% of the tax liability.

Jeremy K. BENADUM
Sandra B. CAZAZIUS
LIFEUD/30
LIHUFF/1
LIMOTOR/19
Joyce C. PINEINCH
John R. SANDAMANIE
Philip K. TESSAROLO
Edward G. TICHBORN

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

LICOOKY-1

Pineinch 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMS 4278	19 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	

SECRET

17 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR : CI/OA

SUBJECT : LICOOKY-1 (201-278841)

An amendment is requested to the Operational Approval of LICOOKY-1 to use her 1) to develop and report on members of the Mexican Writers' Association, 2) to assess her influence on these members and leaders, and 3) to continue her work in the AEM and to become a close confident of Pellicer, Rulfo and other influential leaders of the AEM. This is in compliance with the request set forth in HMMA 26,621, 15 July 1965, a copy of which has been made available to your office.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief WH/1

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 201-278841
1 - WH/1 Memo

WH/1/Bustos-V:jah

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LICOOKY Project Progress Report for March 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HMMA-25560, 11 March 1965.
B. HMMW-13437, 15 March 1965.

1. Attached is the LICOOKY Project Progress Report for the month of March 1965. The activity of this Project during the reporting period is covered in detail in an effort to comply with the instructions contained in paragraph 4 of reference-B.

2. Unless otherwise required the next Progress Report will cover the period 1 April through 30 June 1965. By that time the LILINK Unit hopes it will have a secretary to help with its "paper" load.

3. The "Juanita" referred to in paragraph 1c of attachment, is identical with Juana de LARIOS, previously reported in MEXI-2772. The Station is trying to locate her address and phone number in order to be able to provide the Guatemala Station with more information on this group.

4. It is requested that Headquarters index the following names in the context in which they appear here: Jorge *CARRANZA, Maria Teresa *RETES de *REVUELTAS, Arturo *FILIO, Jorge *FILIO, Luis *ARENAL, Guillermo *ROUSSET Banda, Jaime *NAVARRO. Station has no traces on Navarro, the brothers Filio, nor on the pseudonym Carranza.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

ATTACHMENT: Progress Report (Orig & 2), h/w

Distribution:

3 - Chief, WHD w/att. h/w
2 - Files:

Licooky-1
201 file

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-25798	7 April 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-129/3

ATTACHMENT TO: HMMA-25796

LICOOKY Project Progress Report

March, 1965

1. Production

The LICOOKY Project has not produced any information reports during this reporting period. During this period LICOOKY-1 has been reporting on her activities and working as follows:

a. L-1 learned that the Guatemalan PGT have approached Bartolomé Costa-Amic about printing a "news letter" to be distributed in Guatemala. When this occurs she will be able to obtain copies and identify the authors and other pertinent details.

b. Continuing reports on the activities of Miguel Angel Toralla Burgos, Guatemalan guerrilla now in exile in Mexico. L-1 has established that Toralla meets Victor Manuel Gutiérrez once a week at some undisclosed place and time.

c. L-1 is attempting to identify and obtain the address and telephone of one "Juanita". "Juanita" acts as a courier to Guatemala for Gutierrez and also acts as a cut out between Gutierrez and Dr. Raul Oseguida Pelala. It has been established that Gutierrez always uses "Juanita's" phone to make his telephone calls. "Juanita" also takes telephone calls for Guitiérrez.

d. L-1 is attempting to identify one "Jorge Carranza", posing as an attorney in Cuidad Hidalgo. It has been established that "Jorge Carranza" is a psuedonym for a woman who is

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

in contact with Miguel Toralla and apparently a Guatemalan living in Ciudad Hidalgo who is a part of the commo system between the Guatemalan Communist exiles in Mexico and Party Members in Guatemala.

e. L-1 continues reporting target study data on Margarita Paz Paredes and Ljuka Julius.

f. L-1 completed basic target studies on Amelia Castillo Ledon, new Mexican ambassador to Austria, and Alejandro Gomez Maganda, new Mexican ambassador to Panama.

g. L-1 is preparing a target study on Victor Urquidi, an advisor to the Secretary of Treasury.

h. L-1 has been instructed to report as fully as possible on Ernesto Madero, former chargé d' affaires in Moscow and who now has a responsible position in the Foreign Office.

i. L-1 is attempting to identigy 11 Nicaraguan guerrillas now living in Mexico and being assisted by Edelberto Torres Espinosa and to get a line on their activities.

j. L-1 is also attempting to identify a group of Central Americans, Salvadoreans, Nicaraguans and Guatemalans, who are meeting with Luis Manuel Zuñiga.

k. L-1 has been instructed to try and locate one Victor Rico Galan and discover his present activities.

l. L-1 has been the source of information which provided the foundation for an CA operation against the PCM. L-1 has been seeing Maria Teresa *Retes de *Revueltas, wife of

Jose Revueltas, Communist landmark personality in Mexico for the past several years, on a regular basis. Jose Revueltas has become an alcoholic and for the last several weeks has been living with an Indian girl. Mrs. Revueltas blames this situation of her husbands relationship with two brothers Arturo and Jorge Filio and on Jaime Navarro. According to Mrs. Revueltas these three are engaged in smuggling contraband goods into Mexico and are also engaged in ~~smuggling~~ drug activities. Mrs. Revueltas claims that they use their smuggling channels to help the PCM pass items and bodies in and out of the country. Jose Revueltas was the contact man between this group and ~~Alfredo~~ David ALFARO Saqueiros and Luis Arenal who were interested in smuggling Guillermo Rousset Banda accused of murdering Carlos Farias Jimenez, both known Communists, out of the country. There has been speculation that this murder was the result of differences between the Pro-Soviet and Pro-Communist China groups of PCM. Mrs. Revueltas believes that if she could cause the arrest of the Filios and Navarro she could rescue her husband from their influence. At L-1's suggestion, she wrote an anonymous letter denouncing the Filios and Navarro, describing their activities, types of contraband the addresses where the contraband was located. Mrs. Revueltas was told by L-1 she would give it to a friend of hers on the Narcotics Board in Mexico.

The letter was passed to the Station where it will reach the proper Mexican authorities. This may not work, but if the information provided by Mrs. Revueltos is true and the group is arrested, publicity plus additional help from the stations publicity can create a damaging scandal against the PCM.

L-1 has been additionally instructed of the requirements outlined in para 2 of Ref. B.

LICOOKY-2 reported on 15 March that Judith Ferreto called him to send a ticket to San Jose, Costa Rica for Manuel Mora or to the person to whom he assigns it. The ticket was for travel from San Jose to Mexico City. On March 18 Ferreto called saying Mora was in the city and had not used the ticket but had given it to Señora Carmen Lopez de Ferreto who travelled to Mexico on 21 March. Ferreto called again on 26 March making a reservation for Carmen de Ferreto's return to San Jose on 1 April.

L-2 took advantage of this phone call to remark to Ferreto that there had been little travel lately. She told him there was no explanation other than people were just not travelling. She said she expected there would be some movement of students this summer.

2. Operations

I In order to better control and guide L-1's work, two steps have been taken. Discussions with L-1 have been directed toward blocking out and defining the goals she should achieve during the next three months period. For each meeting she prepares an "activities report". In this report she outlines her activities for the preceeding week, the tasks she was working on, the people she was in contact with and the results. She also lists the tasks she will work on during the coming week, the people she will see, etc.

L-1 is handicapped in this work since she has no control over her contacts and has to be extremely discreet in her elicting of the facts. Many times her plans go awry since during a given conversation there is no opening to bring up the subject she wished to discuss.

3. Security

Both LICOOKY-1 and-2 appear to recognize the security implications of their work. Neither are curious about their case officers. They follow their instructions concerning the security of their meetings and commo with their case officers. During the reporting period their has been no evidence of any unusual security problems.

4. Personnel

LICOOKY-1 has regained her good health and her morale is high. Now that she has a permanent base of operations, in that she has her apartment furnished and a telephone, she is resuming her regular contacts that were broken when she was ill and living in a series of different locations.

During the present case officer's contact with L-1, she has not presented the personality described in Para 3 of Ref B. She is an intelligent woman, and in all our meetings she has appeared mature and attentive. She has been prompt and reliable in her meetings. She discusses her problems calmly and accepts instruction and criticism without argument. She has responded well to instructions and has worked hard in trying to improve her reporting. She appears to be well adjusted to her environment which is most extremely trying at times.

In discussions concerning the Communist and leftist movements, she admitted that at one time she was influenced by their ideology, but as she had grown older and had observed more of their activities and personalities, she had lost all respect for them. She said that she had been fooled by Fidel Castro in his early days and had thought he would be good for Cuba, but as events have developed she has seen how mistaken she had been originally. She also commented that in long talks with LINLUCK, he had opened her eyes to the fallacy of the Communist ideology. In all of these conversations she has appeared sincere in her statements. Her liason with LINLUCK appears to be based on deep affection for him and not on promiscuity. The case officer has the impression that if there was not a present Mrs. LINLUCK she would become legally his wife. This is a problem that may have to be faced in the future.

LICOOKY-2 doesn't present any personnel problem. While his niche is a small one and his access is limited, his assignments are carried out conscientiously.

5. Problems

There are no unusual problems presented by this project.

LICOOKY-2 admitted the access to her communist contacts here had been hurt as a result of her known association with LINLUCK at the time he publicly broke with the party. As an example of this, Miguel Toralla told her that Gutierrez had referred to LINLUCK and LICOOKY-1 as "enemies" of the party and that he had been reprimanded for seeing LINLUCK when he first arrived in town. He had been forbidden to see either one of them.

6. Effectiveness

LICOOKY-1's target studies and suggestions on possible recruitment approaches has been helpful. While her reporting for the [illegible] past month has not produced any Information Reports, it has kept the station aware of the activities in her particular area of access. If she is successful in performing her tasks as outlined in the paragraph under "Production" above, such information will be useful to the station. LICOOKY-2's effectiveness is limited to his narrow target, but such travel information that he does provide does serve a useful purpose.

7. Plans

It is planned to continue the present direction and guidance given to LICOOKY-1 in an effort to increase the quantity and quality of her production.

The same attention will be given to LICOCKY-2.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

31

RI ☑ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO
VR. FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, RF/AN

S E C R E T 132022Z

GUAT INFO DIR CITE MEXI 2772 (EASBY ACTING)

REF HGG 3595

HMMA 25336

HMM 9477

HMM 9529

13 MAR 65 IN 22433

1. ALTHOUGH LICOOKY-1 SOURCE OF REFS C AND D, LUNLUCK CONTACT TO MIGUEL ANGEL TORALLA BURGOS HAS BEEN MUCH CLOSER. SINCE REFS TORALLA HAS CONFIDED FOLLOWING TO LINLUCK:

A. RICARDO RAMIREZ DE LEON IS REAL LEADER OF FAR AND PERSONALLY PARTICIPATED IN ASSASSINATION OF ONE COL. OLIVA AND SON. RAMIREZ

SECRET

file LICOOKY-1

Para 1 disseminated as
CS-311/03295-65
by WH/2/G

ALEGEDLY ORDERED MURDER OF COL. MEDINA AND JUST ESCAPED WITH HIS LIFE (SEE REF A). R ALSO ORDERED BURNING AID GARAGE IN WHICH TORALLA PARTICIPATE.

B. GUAT WOMAN NAMED JUANA LARIOS MOVES BACK AND FORTH FREELY BETWEEN MEXICO AND GUAT AS COURIER TO YON SOSA FROM VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ, OF WHOM SHE AND HUSBAND RAFAEL ARE INTIMATE FRIENDS. RAFAEL IS SPANISH REPUBLICAN AND FORMER CHAUFFEUR FOR PRESIDENCY DURING ARBENZ REGIME. EXILED MEXI IN 1954. (LICOOKY-1 HAS IDENTIFIED "JUANITA" LARIOS GUTIERREZ AS CUTOUT BETWEEN VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ AND DR. RAUL OSEGUEDA. L-1 SOURCE IS OSEGUEDA WHO CONFIRMED JUANITA COURIER ROLE AND SAID HER LAST TRIP TO GUAT WAS EARLY FEB.)

2. DURING FIRST THREE DAYS IN MEXI, LINLUCK ASKED LICOOKY PUT TORALLA UP AT HER APT. THEREAFTER TORALLA MOVED IN WITH ABEL CUENCA MARTINEZ.

3. 4 MARCH TORALLA CONFIDED FOLLOWING TO LICOOKY (LINLUCK ABSENT IN FRANCE OWING SERIOUS ACCIDENT TO SON):

A. T HAS HAD THREE MEETINGS WITH VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ WHO GAVE HIM MONEY TO PAY BOARD AT CUENCAS, AND ASSURED HIM PGT CAN GET HIM WORKING PAPERS HERE THRU GOBERNACION.

B. G TOLD T HAD RECEIVED FINE REPORT FROM PGT AND T SO WOULD is an intelligent woman, and in all our meetings she has appeared mature and attentive. She has been prompt and reliable in her meetings. She discusses her problems calmly and accepts instruction and criticism without argument. She has responded well to instructions and has worked hard in trying to improve her reporting. She appears to be well adjusted to her environment which is most extremely trying at times.

In discussions concerning the Communist and leftist movements, she admitted that at one time she was influenced by their ideology, but as she had grown older and had observed more of their activities and personalities, she had lost all respect for them. She said that she had been fooled by Fidel Castro in his early days and had thought he would be good for Cuba, but as events have developed she has seen how mistaken she had been originally. She also commented that in long talks with LINLUCK, he had opened her eyes to the fallacy of the Communist ideology. In all of these conversations she has appeared sincere in her statements. Her liason with LINLUCK appears to be based on deep affection for him and not on promiscuity. The case officer has the impression that if there was not a present Mrs. LINLUCK she would become legally his wife. This is a problem that may have to be faced in the future.

LICOOKY-2 doesn't present any personnel problem. While his niche is a small one and his access is limited, his assignments are carried out conscientiously.

5. Problems

There are no unusual problems presented by this project.

LICOOKY-2 admitted the access to her communist contacts here had been hurt as a result of her known association with LINLUCK. at the time he publicly broke with the party. As an example of this, Miguel Toralla told her that Gutierrez had referred to LINLUCK and LICOOKY-1 as "enemies" of the party and that he had been reprimanded for seeing LINLUCK when he first arrived in town. He had been forbidden to see either one of them.

6. Effectiveness

LICOOKY-1's target studies and suggestions on possible recruitment approaches has been helpful. While her reporting for the past month has not produced any Information Reports, it has kept the station aware of the activities in her particular area of access. If she is successful in performing her tasks as outlined in the paragraph under "Production" above, such information will be useful to the station. LICOOKY-2's effectiveness is limited to his narrow target, but such travel information that he does provide does serve a useful purpose.

7. Plans

It is planned to continue the present direction and guidance given to LICOOKY-1 in an effort to increase the quantity and quality of her production.

The same attention will be given to LICOOKY-2.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	2	5	13
2		6	
3	1	7	
4		8	

FROM
Mexico City

ACTION
WH 8

INFO
VR. FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, RI/AN

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

S E C R E T 132028Z

GUAT INFO DIR CITE MEXI 2772 (EASBY ACTING)

REF HGG 3695

HMMA 25336

HMM 9477

HMM 9529

13 MAR 65 IN 22433

1. ALTHOUGH LICOOKY-1 SOURCE OF REFS C AND D, LUNLUCK CONTACT TO MIGUEL ANGEL TORALLA BURGOS HAS BEEN MUCH CLOSER. SINCE REFS TORALLA HAS CONFIDED FOLLOWING TO LINLUCK:

A. RICARDO RAMIREZ DE LEON IS REAL LEADER OF FAR AND PERSONALLY PARTICIPATED IN ASSASSINATION OF ONE COL. OLIVA AND SON. RAMIREZ

SECRET

file LICOOKY-1

Par. to disseminated as
CS-311/03295-65
by WH/2/G

ALEGEDLY ORDERED MURDER OF COL. MEDINA AND JUST ESCAPED WITH HIS LIFE (SEE REF A). R ALSO ORDERED BURNING AID GARAGE IN WHICH TORALLA PARTICPATE.

B. GUAT WOMAN NAMED JUANA LARIOS MOVES BACK AND FORTH FREELY BETWEEN MEXICO AND GUAT AS COURIER TO YON SOSA FROM VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ, OF WHOM SHE AND HUSBAND RAFAEL ARE INTIMATE FRIENDS. RAFAEL IS SPANISH REPUBLICAN AND FORMER CHAUFFEUR FOR PRESIDENCY DURING ARBENZ REGIME. EXILED MEXI IN 1954. (LICOOKY-1 HAS IDENTIFIED "JUANITA" LARIOS GUTIERREZ AS CUTOUT BETWEEN VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ AND DR. RAUL OSEGUEDA. L-1 SOURCE IS OSEGUEDA WHO CONFIRMED JUANITA COURIER ROLE AND SAID HER LAST TRIP TO GUAT WAS EARLY FEB.)

2. DURING FIRST THREE DAYS IN MEXI, LINLUCK ASKED LICCOKY PUT TORALLA UP AT HER APT. THEREAFTER TORALLA MOVED IN WITH ABEL CUENCA MARTINEZ.

3. 4 MARCH TORALLA CONFIDED FOLLOWING TO LICOOKY (LINLUCK ABSENT IN FRANCE OWING SERIOUS ACCIDENT TO SON):

A. T HAS HAD THREE MEETINGS WITH VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ WHO GAVE HIM MONEY TO PAY BOARD AT CUENCAS, AND ASSURED HIM PGT CAN GET HIM WORKING PAPERS HERE THRU GOBERNACION.

B. G TOLD T HAD RECEIVED FINE REPORT FROM PGT AND T SO WOULD

FORGIVE HIS ERROR IN SEEING AND ACCEPTING HELP FROM (LINLUCK) AND (LICOOKY-1) WHOM HE NOT TO SEE AGAIN. T ASKED LICOOKY NOT TO REVEAL HE STILL SEEING HER. T ALSO REGULARLY SEEING LINLUCK NEPHEW JORGE GODOY.

4. LICOOKY ADDS THAT T APPEARS BE DELIBERATLEY CHANGING APPEARANCE BY CUTTING HAIR AND GROWING MUSTACHE. SPECULATES MAY PLAN RETURN GUAT. REPORTS ALSO THAT ABOUT 26 FEB LINLUCK TOLD ALL GLEANINGS FROM T (PRESUMABLY INCLUDING INFO IN HMM 9582 AND 9576) TO COL. MARCO ANTONIO VARGAS AGUIRRE, GUAT MILATT HERE WHO ALLEGEDLY RETURNED TO GUAT WEEKEND 27 FEB WHERE PLANNED REPORT ALL LINLUCK INFO. NOTE LINLUCK DID NOT TELL STATON THIS. [HIS RETURN WILL (BE INDIRECTION) TRY GET HIS ADMISSION IN ORDER to DETERMINE WHAT COURSE ACTION (WILL PROBABLY BE) should be taken TAKING]. ?

5. BECAUSE OF GUTIERREZ WARNING AGAINST OUR TWO MAIN SOURCES, STATION MAY BE LOSING IMPORTANT ACCESS TO T. ALSO POSSIBLE VARGAS REPORT MAY RESULT IN DEMARCHE TO GOM THRU GUAT AMB HERE TO COOPERATE IN CLOSER CONTROL ARMS MOVEMENTS AND SUBVERSIVE TRAVEL BETWEEN MEXI AND GUAT. ACCORDINGLY MEXI NEITHER TAKING NOR RECOMMENDING ACTION UNTIL AFTER LINLUCK RETURN, BUT WILL CONTINUE REPORT.

6. INDEX RAMIREZ, JUANA AND RAFAEL LARIOS, GODOY AND COL. VARGAS.

SECRET CFN

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LIRING-3
C-798301

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: OFFICE OF SECURITY MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2:33 4 AUG 78	4 Aug 78	ED LOPEZ	Edwin Juan Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

THIS FOLDER IS NOT TO BE RELEASED OUTSIDE OF
CI/STAFF. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH THIS FOLDER
MUST NOTIFY CI/CA 3077 IM[illegible]TELY IF IT IS
TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHE[illegible]UP WITHIN
C/STAFF SO THAT IT MAY [illegible]GED TO THE
PROPER PERSON AND SO [illegible]OLDER CAN
BE READILY LOCATED AT [illegible]S NEEDED.

Polygraph Report
Office of Security

TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				
CCS/NC NOTIFIED				
CCS/NC COMPLETED				

FORM 9-65 126a

SECRET GROUP 1

(5-9)

14-00000

SECRET

DATE SET UP 6 June 1966 jep	APPROVAL WORK RECORD	DATE ORIG. REQ. 27 May 1966
201 # 798301	TRUE NAME JURADO-Delmar, Carlos	SO#
☒ POA ☐ CNC ☐ ORSD ☒ OA ☐ SP. IN	VARIATIONS	
CRYPTONYM LIRING/3	PSEUDONYM	PROJECT LIRING
DATE OF BIRTH 1930	PLACE OF BIRTH Mexico City, Mexico	
CASE OFFICER Jane Zerance	DIVISION WH/1	EXTENSION 3656

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
P.O.A.				Records on RIS Agents Checked in CI/R&A, date: 6 June 1966 Results: NR Jab 9 June 66
OA				4 APR 1967 — Audio op to be run against subject.
ORSD				
CNC				
CASE CANCELLED	✓	WH/1	20 DEC 1968	"HOSTILE"
PRQ I	BIO			
PRQ II				
167696 GREEN LIST	NR	[illegible]	14 June 66	
RI TRACES	~~WILL FWD.~~ No traces JFW 23 June 66 per Div memo of 22 June 66			
OPS & DIV TRACES	NR			
FIELD TRACES	DEROG. ATTACHED			
S.O. INDICES	NR	Jab	9 June 66	
XX FBI INDICES	Neg	JFW	6 July 66	
FBI CORD. REQUESTED				
FBI CORD. COMPLETED				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION	Conf. Post - Neg	JFW	6 July 66	
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				
CCS/NC NOTIFIED				
CCS/NC COMPLETED				

FORM 9-65 126a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5-9)

IND. YES ☐ NO
CLASS TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 42

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 25/3

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD 6, NE 6, DO 4, DO/H 3,

SECRET 262005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7454 EASBY ACTING

DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

26 MAY 65 24650

REF DIRECTOR 27441

1. LIRING-3 INFORMED ROWTON 25 MAY HE OBTAINED ONE- DAY VISA SERVICE 24 MAY. MEETING HELD 1300 HOURS 25 MAY PRIOR ARRIVAL REF. LIRING-3 SHOWED APPARENT DISAPPOINTMENT IN ROWTON NOT BEING ABLE CONFIRM TRIP. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH LIRING-3 26 MAY LUNCH AT WHICH WILL GIVE SUBJ GO SIGN.

26 [illegible]

2. QUICK SERVCE ON VISA APPEARS CONFIRM LIRING-3 BOAST HE CONFIDANT OF RODRIGUEZ. ROWTON HAS IMPRESSED ON LIRING-3 THAT HE ROWTON'S AGENT AND MIDDLE MAN IN THIS TRANSACTION AND MUST NOT REVEAL ROWTON. IF ROWTON REVEALED THEN CUBANS WOULD WANT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH ROWTON CUTTING OUT LIRING-3. LIRING-3 STATES HE UNDERSTANDS THIS CLEARLY. LIRING-3 ASSURES ROWTON HE NEED NOT INFORM CUBANS ANYTHING OF ARRANGEMENT SINCE THEY TRUST HIM.

3. CAN HQS SUPPLY ROWTON WITH GREEK PASSPORT NEW YORK DRIVERS LICENSE AND ANY OTHER LOGICAL POCKET LITTER INDICATING GREEK NATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. MATERIAL WOULD NOT BE USED FOR TRAVEL, BUT AS OP DEVELOPS MY BE HANDY FLASH GREEK

Passport as means identification,

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ORIG: JSTEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 25 May 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☑ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 23/3 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 25 21 25 Z CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 07441

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 7422 (IN 23654)*

B. MEXICO CITY 7234 (IN 10462)**

Hold for 7722

26 MAY 66

CONCUR REF TRIP. EVEN IF TRIP NON-PRODUCTIVE, OP STILL MIGHT DEVELOP INTO LIRING PENETRATION VIA LIRING-4. IN THIS REGARD, STATUS OF LIRING-4 FATHER, WHO PRESUMABLY CHINESE, PER PARA 4 REF B, IN PBRIME OF INTEREST IN VIEW STRINGENT ENTRY REQUIREMENTS AND BELIEVE ROWTON MIGHT PROFITABLY ATTEMPT ELICIT INFO THIS ASPECT CASE DURING L-3 DEVELOPMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * L-3/Rowton meeting re L-3 trip to Cuba.
** Rowton contact and assessment of L-3 and L-4. Requested POA on both.

WH/C/FI/TC

WILLIAM V. BROE
Chief, WH Division
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES 19

33/M SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4	6A	8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION TC/WH/C 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

77212

9 MAY 1965

SECRET 050042Z

DIR ~~INFO~~ WAVE CITE MEXI 7234

5 MAY 66 IN 10462

KAPOK TYPIC

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAS MADE CONTACT WITH CARLOS JURADO, ARTIST HUSBAND OF MIRIAM CHICHAY, CLERK IN CUBAN CONSULATE. ROWTON HAS BECOME QUITE FRIENDLY WITH JURADO, HAS TAKEN HIM AND CHICHAY TO DINNER AND IN TURN JURADO ESCORTED ROWTON ON TOUR OF RIVERA MURALS IN MEXI CITY BUILDINGS.

2. ROWTON USING ALIAS HAS EXPLAINED SELF AS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUSINESS. WHERE FIRST MEETING DEVELOPED FROM ROWTON VISIT TO SALON WHERE JURADO SHOWING HIS PAINTINGS RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW SWUNG AROUND TO PLACE WHERE ROWTON INTERESTED GENERAL WELFARE OF JURADO AND WANTING DO SOMETHING FOR HIM IF JURADO CAN SUPPLY SOME SERVICE FOR WHICH ROWTON COULD LOGICALLY AFFORD PAY HIM. JURADO IS SNAPPING AT THIS BAIT AND APPEARS GENUINELY LIKE ROWTON ASIDE FROM FACT ROWTON APPEARS BE NON-AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH MONEY.

3. IN LAST MEETING, ROWTON QUERIED JURADO ON HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICAN COMMERCE AND JURADO SAID HE HAD NONE. ROWTON ASKED WHAT SORT CONTACTS HE HAD CUBA SINCE THAT SUBJECT OF INTEREST OT ALL AND JURADO FELL OVER SELF COUNTING WHAT HE COULD DO FOR ROWTON ON CUBAN SUBJECT.

SECRET

SECRET

SAID HE KNEW EVERYONE AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXI AND COULD GO TO CUBA FOR ROWTON.

4. ROWTON SLOWED MATTERS DOWN BY SAYING HE HAD GO EUROPE FOR ABOUT THREE WEEKS BUT THAT THEY WOULD TALK MORE ABOUT IT UPON HIS RETURN. IN TURNING COVERSATION TO WIFE, ROWTON LEARNED SHE HAS FATHER IN NEW YORK WHO LEFT CUBA TO GET AWAY FROM REVOLUTION. FATHER AND DAUGHTER ON GOOD TERMS AND HE WRITES HER EVERY WEEK. HIS NAME CHINESE FOR PEACH BLOSSOM AND CHICHAY IS CUBAN ATTEMPT AT TRANSLITERATION. JURADO SPOKE CHINESE NAME BUT ROWTON UNABLE REMEMBER PHONETIC PRONUNCIATION AND COULD NOT ASK FOR SPELLING. CHICHAY MOTHER STILL IN CUBA WITH BROTHERS AND SISTERS.

5. LITAINT-2 HAS BEEN CULTIVATING CHICHAY SEVERAL MONTHS. SAW LETTER HER DESK ONE DAY IN CONSULATE AND ASKED IF BORE NEW CUBAN STAMPS. CHICHAY SAID NO IT FROM HER FATHER IN NEW YORK. SHE UNSALARIED AT CONSULATE AND CURBELO, WHO REPORTED BE FRIEND OF JURADO ACCORDING LIENVOY, HAS DELAYED SENDING HER PHS TO CUBA FOR EMPLOYMENT ON SALARY BASIS. REASON FOR DELAY NOT KNOWN. SHE FREINDLY WITH CURBELO BUT NOT WITH LIRING-1. WHEN THEIR DAUGHTER SICK LITAINT-2 GAVE CHICHAY MONEY TO TAKE CHILD TO DOCTOR. L-2 SAYS JURADO HAS MANY COMMIE FRIENDS MEXI. SPENT TIME IN CUBA AND MAY HAVE SERVED CUBAN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXI 7234 S E C R E T

MILITARY SERVICE OR MILITIA.

6. STA TRACES SHOW JURADO AS MEMBER PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA, MEXICO, IN JULY 61, AND MEMBER PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THIRD LATIN AMERICAN CONGRESS, ARTISTS AND WRITERS, HAVANA, JAN 62. WIFE MIRIAM CHICHAY DE JURADO EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY ABOUT SIX MONTHS.

Controlled by Soviets

7. REQUEST POA JURADO AND CHICHAY FOR CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT. REQUEST COUPLE BE ASSIGNED PSEUDOS IN LIRING SERIES.

8. POUCHING ROWTON CONTACT REPORTS THIS SUBSECT.

SECRET

CFN 7234 WALLACE B. ROWTON CARLOS JURADO MIRIAM CHICHAY CUBAN RIVERA CUBA EUROPE NEW YORK CHINESE PEACH BLOSSOM CHINESE NOT ASK LITAINT-2 NO IT CURBELO LJENVOY NOT KNOWN NOT WITH LIRING-1 -2 L-2 STA PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA MEXICO 61 HAVANA JAN 62 POA LIRING

BT

SECRET

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : W.P.Frederick
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 6 May 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

9 MAY 66 20 26z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 02820

REF: MEXI 7234 (IN 10462)*

1. NO TRACES HQS ON SUBJS REF. PLS CABLE BIO DATA SO THAT POA CAN BE OBTAINED.

2. ~~SUBJS ASSIGNED CRYPTOS LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4.~~

END OF MESSAGE

Card crypts

Hold for 772

10 MAY 1966

NR

*ROWTON made contact with Carlos Jurado and Miriam Chichay de Jurado and wants POA and crypts.

M/R - Check original incoming cable - [illegible] info as to connections w/Cubans?

Polgar
Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
[illegible]
[illegible] Mexico City

SUBJECT: 201 -

TYPE OF REQUEST
☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CNC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY
(Date) [illegible] June [illegible]

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT
Informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (*Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.*)

CS TRACE RESULTS
RI [illegible]
DIVISION [illegible]
FIELD [illegible]

GREEN LIST INITIATED
☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS
☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL PIQ ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

M/R - Bona fides need establishment.

FORM 3-64 693

SECRET

(9)

5

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/1/Zerance 332 Ames

EXTENSION: 3656

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/1 Stewart				Note deray process.
2.				
3.				
4. DCWH/1		6/3		
5.				
6.				
7. CI/OA				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 27 May 1966

TO:	X	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
		CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
		CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Jane Zerance
WH/1
332 Ames Center
x3656

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Carlos JURADO-Delmar

PROJECT: LIRING

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LIRING-3
nR

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-758301 nR

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
X	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE: Contact, assessment and use in an unwitting capacity to furnish information on Cuban economic & military reqmts, on activities in general in the Cuban Emb and Consulate in Mexcity, and to spot persons of possible interest for Cuban ops. Of course, should development results warrant, consideration will be given to seeking operational approval for his use in a witting capacity against the same targets, especially thru his wife, LIRING-4, an employee of Cuban Consulate in Mexico City.
nR

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	X	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 167696

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

X	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	X	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
	3656	

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS
2-63 EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

SUBJECT: *Carlos JURADO-Delmar

DPOB: 1930 in Mexico City

CITIZENSHIP: Mexican

OCCUPATION: Artist

SCHOOLING: Studied anthropology and archeology at the National University in Mexico

RESIDENCE: Resided in Cuba for a considerable length of time.

NR NR

MARITAL STATUS: Miriam CHICHAY de JURADO (Chichay is a Cuban attempt at transliteration of Peach Blossom which is her Chinese name.)

DEROGATORY TRACES
STATION

Subject was a member of the PPS in July 1961

Member of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Latin American Congress, Artists and Writers, Havana in January 1962.

LITAINT-2 reports that JURADO has many Communist friends in Mexico. He spent time in Cuba and may have served in the Cuban military service or militia.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-798301
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑ WH/1
DESTROY ☐ SIG. J. Jarvis

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 67

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

AH WH/1
ABSTRACT INDEX
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

DISSEM BY 38 PER 90-19

ACTION
WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO
FILE, VR, CS/DO, SUSPENSE WH/COG, CDO, WH8, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/D4, FI/INT, 14, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, CI/IS, SOD6, CS/SGO, DO4, DO/H3, CCS3, C9PS, ADDP

S E C R E T 041905Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9810 MEXI

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY

4 JAN 67 71138

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9608 (65952)

1. FOLL ARE HIGHPOINTS LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING BY ROWTON ON 2 JAN ON HIS VISIT TO GUATEMALA AND HIS DISCUSSIONS IN VILLAGE NEAR ZACAPA WITH ALLEDGED REPS OF GUAT GUERRILLA GROUP.

2. LIRING-3 MET AT HUEHUETENANGO BUS STATION BY TWO MEN WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS "OCTAVIO" AND "FALCON" AND LOCAL FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS (FAR) REPS. SINCE LIRING-3 ONLY ABLE OBTAIN 48 HR GUATEMALA VISA FAR REPS ASKED HIM RECROSS INTO MEXICO AND MEET THEM AGAIN NIGHT 28 DECEMBER AT POINT ON MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY NEAR LA MESILLA, GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 DID AS TOLD, WAS LED ACROSS BORDER BLACK AND DRIVEN TO GUATEMALA CITY BY SUCCESSION OF VEHICLES. DURING ALL LEGS OF TRIP SECOND VEHICLE WAS USED WELL AHEAD OF ONE DRIVING LIRING-3 TO GUARD AGAINST ROADBLOCKS.

3. IN GUATEMALA CITY LIRING-3 TAKEN TO HOUSE ON 29TH AVENUE OCCUPIED BY WOMAN INTRODUCED AS VICKY (WILL OBTAIN EXACT ADDRESS). TOLD STAY THERE UNTIL CONTACTED WHICH [illegible]

LIRING-3

201 file

WH/1
201-798301

201-798301
4 JAN 67

OCCURRED 23 DEC WHEN OCTAVIO AND FALCON RETURNED AND ESCORTED HIM BY CAR TO GUALAN ON TRANS OCEANIC HIGHWAY BEYOND ZACAPA. THERE LIRING-3 INTRODUCED TO "PASCUAL" AND "SALVADOR" WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS MEMBERS OF "EDGAR IBARRA" FRONT. THESE TWO REPS STATED FOLLOWING:

68-
45 1

A. TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE AGREEMENTS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

B. FOR ABOVE REASON CUBAN ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN INCONSEQUENTIAL AND THEREFORE GUERRILLAS HAVE RESORTED TO MORE DIRECT METHODS TO OBTAIN ASSISTANCE INCLUDING BANK AND TRAIN ROBBERIES. MOST DIRECT SOURCE OF OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN SOVIETS VIA THEIR EMBASSY MEXICO.

C. GUERRILLA ALSO UNABLE COUNT ON CUBA FOR ASSISTANCE AS CUBA TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH OWN PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTIONARY CONSOLIDATION. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR EVIDENCED SARCASM IN THIS STATEMENT.

D. "EDGAR IBARRA" GUERRILLAS CONTROL FRONT MORE THAN 120 KILOMETERS LONG AND REQUIRE MORE AND MORE SUPPLIES TO EXPAND MEMBERSHIP AND INCREASE THEIR AREA (NOT FURTHER DESCRIBED).

E. IN PAST GUATEMALA GUERRILLAS THEMSELVES ARRANGED

SHIPMENTS ARMS AND SUPPLIES WITHIN MEXICO. CONSEQUENCES DISASTROUS, E. G. LOPEZ CASE. THEY HAVE LEARNED GREAT PRECAUTIONS MUST BE TAKEN MEX-GUAT BORDER AREA WHERE THERE NUMEROUS NORTH AMERICAN AGENTS WORKING ON MEXI SIDE UNDER COVER AS TOURISTS AND MISSIONARIES. SPECIFICALLY THERE IS AMERICAN BASE LOCATED AT YAXOQUINTELA (NOT IDENTIFIED) WITH AIRFIELD AND COMMO CENTER WHICH WELL KNOWN TO THEM AND ATTACKED BY THEM IN PAST. (STATION FEELS THIS MAY REFER TO "ALAS DE SOCORRO MISSION" IN IXTAPA, CHIAPAS.)

4. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR INDICATED INTEREST RECEIVING MANY TYPES SUPPLIES INCLUDING ARMS BUT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED ANTIBIOTICS AND TUBES FOR ZENITH MEDIUM RANGE TRANSMITTER RECEIVER. NO TYPES OR QUANTITIES SPECIFIED EITHER ITEM BUT GUATS SAID WOULD TAKE ANY AMOUNT THESE ITEMS THEY COULD GET.

5. LIRING-3 COMMITTED SELF RECONTACT GUATS IN 20-30 DAYS WHEN HE TOLD THEM WOULD HAVE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION. GUATS ASKED FOR CONCRETE PLAN RE MANNER SHIPPING SUPPLIES. THEY TOLD LIRING-3 THEY COULD HANDLE FROM MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER TO THEIR GUERRILLAS IN GUATEMALA.

6. LIRING-3 SUGGESTED TO ROWTON THAT HOUSE BE RENTED IN [illegible]

SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, MEXICO, 300 KILOMETERS NORTH GUAT BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY AS PERMANENT CONTACT POINT WITH GUERRILLAS. LATTER TOLD LIRING-3 TOWN ACCESSIBLE TO THEM AND THAT THEY COULD PICK UP SUPPLIES THERE, CARRY ACROSS BORDER AND DELIVER TO GUERRILLA GROUP.

7. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 HE DEPARTING MEXICO FOR MONTREAL AND PROBABLY NEW YORK NEXT DAY FOR TWO WEEKS AND WOULD TRY OBTAIN RADIO TUBES AND ANTIBIOTICS IN TIME FOR LIRING-3 NEXT TRIP TO BORDER. LIRING-3 CONTACT PLAN WITH GUATS TO REMAIN SAME AS BEFORE: WHEN READY TRAVEL WILL CONTACT AUGUSTINA HERNANDEZ IN GUATEMALA CITY AND ADVISE HER DATE HIS ARRIVAL IN HUEHUE TENANGO. LIRING-3 WOULD NOT CARRY SUPPLIES TO GUATEMALA BUT WOULD LEAVE THEM IN MEXICO, TRAVEL TO HUEHUETENANGO MEET CONTACTS AND INFORM THEM WHERE LOCATION. GUERRILLAS WOULD THEN MAKE PICK UP AND CARRY SUPPLIES GUATEMALA.

8. STATION COMMENTS AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL PROPOSAL BEING CABLED.

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION BY 7
WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR DDP ADDP SOD 6 CI CI/OPS CI/PS FI FI/INT 2 DO 4 IO/HS 3 CA 2 CS/SEO

S E C R E T [illegible] CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6831

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

31 Dec 66 68782

18

REFERENCE: GUATEMALA CITY 6347 (IN 64291)

1. ON EVENING 28 DECEMBER, COS DISCUSSED WITH MINDEF COL. ARRIAGA THE OBJECTIVE OF THREE WAY COLLABORATION ON PROBLEM OF ARMS SMUGGLING FROM MEXICO. COS GAVE ACCOUNT OF RESULTS OF CONVERSATIONS BY COS AND RODDY WITH COLS. SOSA AND CHINCHILLA AND INFORMED ARRIAGA OF IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINCHILLA. ARRIAGA WELCOMED IDEA OF COLLABORATION AND SAID THAT, AT TIME HIS VISIT TO MEXICO IN SEPTEMBER, MEXICAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS HAD PROMISED TO STRENGTHEN MILITARY COVERAGE ON GUATEMALAN BORDER. HE SAID THAT MEXICANS HAD COMPLIED FULLY WITH PROMISE AND HAVE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF WHOLE MEXICAN FRONTIER WITH GUATEMALA. WHEN ASKED IF HE HAD ANYTHING ADDITIONAL TO ADD PRIOR COS DEPARTURE FOR MEXICO, ARRIAGA SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT KNOWN TO INTERESTED PARTIES THAT GUATEMALAN ARMY, AFTER 1 JANUARY, WILL INCREASE ITS FORCES ON BORDER TO PROVIDE EQUALLY COMPLETE COVERAGE ON THIS SIDE OF FRONTIER.

SECRET

2. ARRIAGA SOMEWHAT VAGUE ON SPECIFIC AREAS COVERED BY MEXICAN ARMY. SUGGEST STATION MEXICO CITY THROUGH APPROPRIATE ASSETS MAY BE ABLE DETERMINE MEXICAN ARMY STRENGTH AND LOCATION OF UNITS ON GUATEMALAN FORNTIERS. STATION GUATEMALA CITY WILL UNDERTAKE PROVIDE SAME INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO GUATEMALAN ARMY FRONTIER STRENGTH.

3. AS RESULT CONVERSATIONS WITH COLS. SOSA AND ARRIAGA, IT APPEARS THAT GUATEMALAN ARMED FORCES ARE MOVING FORWARD ON OWN INITIATIVE AND NEITHER OFFICER HAS AS YET MADE ANY SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR WOFACT ASSISTANCE, ALTHOUGH AS OPERATIONS DEVELOP, WOFACT MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE ASSISTANCE POSSIBLY IN FORM OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS OR TECHNICAL AIDS. FOR THE MOMENT, STATION WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WHICH HAS BEEN REQUESTED FOR TREASURY GUARD.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

LITEMPO PASSPORT CAMERA
FILM #179-180
14-21 NOV 66

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.	50	6	91	/6

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-30821

4. DATE 9 Dec 66

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM LITEMPO

8. DATE OF INFO. 14-21 Nov.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST Green

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Carlos JURADO-Delmar- Mexican arrived Mexico City via Cubana flight 464 from Cuba on 21 November 1966.

Mentioned in manifest following Subject's name was the name, Carlos Alberto JURADO-Malacara- (Any relation?)

LIRING-3

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-798301

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-764704

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑ WH/1

DESTROY ☐ SIG. France

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 29

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION WH/COG-8 (☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, WH-8, CI/OPS, FI, DO-4, DO/H-3

AN | PI | WH/ES
PS | ~~DESK~~
ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~

MEXI

S E C R E T 240009Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9346

24 Nov 45539

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9097 (IN 31445)

LIRING-3 RETURNED MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 21 NOV AND HAD SHORT MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT NIGHT. HIGHLIGHTS OF LONG DEBRIEFING MORNING 22 NOV AND PROPOSED FUTURE DIRECTION L-3 OPERATION BEING CABLED SEPARATELY. ALSO POUCHING TAPE OF MEETING.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

AN 19 | PI
PS | | WH/ES
ABS

WH/1 Records officer - this should have been 201-798301.

201-798301

~~201-764704~~

24 Nov. 1966

14-00000

217.- Entrada a las 1119hs.- MF Dio[illegible] Leon Giraldo -colombiano- por su visa.- Araceli: que llame mañana.--- 230. 6091

252.- Entrada a las 1129hs.- MF para el pasaporte de Othón González.- Araceli: que llame en diez minutos.--- 260.

295.- Entrada a las 1146hs.- MF por Mirabal.- MD que no está.- MF que si Mirabal no dejó recado para Ramírez Pérez, - porque están esperando para la salida a Cuba para el día 14, alumnos de la Escuela Superior de Economía.- MD que llamen mañana para saber.-- Ramirez: que les urge hoy una solución. MD: que entonces dentro de una hora vuelva a llamar.-- 351

368.- Entrada a las 1205hs.- Rojas -de Cubana- por Curbelo, Abreu o Morabal.- MD que ninguno de ellos está, que llame - dentro de dos horas.-- MD es la Sra.de Cepero y le informa a Rojas de la enfermedad de Cepero.--- 398.

433.- Salida al 357900.- 1212hs.- MD la Sra.de Cepero con Almada.--- Almada que le diga a Cepero que llegó un cable para que viaje el 21 de noviembre a la Habana.--- MD pide una reservación para el vuelo del viernes para Gerardo Cantú.- ----- 437.

8 Nov 66 458.- Entrada a las 1245hs.- MF Marcela por Chichay.- MD -

50-6-75/4

HMMA 30549 14 Nov 66

LIRING-3
201-

Tres.- M18.- 8 noviembre 66.

fmr 66

que ella ya no trabaja aquí porque se está preparando para entrar a la Universidad.- Marcela que Chichay le hizo un pedido de libros para enviar a Cuba y que ya se los están cobrando.---- 472.

473.- Entrada.- HF por la visa para Salomón Swan.- Araceli que ya está.--- 486.

510.- Entrada a las 1324hs.- HF por la visa para Luis Sánchez Mondragón -mexicano- Araceli que no ha llegado.-- Sanchez que está solicitada desde septiembre.--- 592.

704.- Entrada a las 1431hs.- HF José Ramírez Perez por Mirabal.- HD que no se encuentra.- Ramírez: que quiere verlo - para las cuatro de la tarde.- HD que le pasará el recado.-- ----- 720.

. . . .

682. Entrada 1208.-Ignacio Sánchez Lo[illegible] pregunta al Vicecónsul si llegó su permiso de regreso a Cuba y Miraval indica que nó.- 730.-

730. Entrada.-HF pregunta por Chichay y MD informa que hoy no trabajó.- 739.-

739. Entrada equivocada.- 761.-

761. Entrada 1254.-Héctor Ramírez de Arellano pregunta si llegó su pasaporte nuevo y MD dice que sí.- 782.-

782. Entrada 1300.-El italiano Rafael Giordano pregunta si llegó su visa y MD pide hablo ~~más~~ tardo.- 814.-

814. Entrada 1346.- Botifol, el que habló en la mañana, pregunta cómo puede hacer para solicitar prórroga para sus padres, porque a su papá lo tienen que operar nuevamente y MD pide pase mañana al Consulado para pasar un cable. HF acepta. 859.

859. Entrada 1359.-Rafael Giordano pregunta si llegó su visa y MD dice que nó.- 880.-

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (3.-L11.- 7 Nov.66).- - - - - - - -

148.- Entrada a las 1102hs.- Sámano, de Cubana pregunta que si el cónsul es Curbelo.- Jorrín que no, que es Mirabal.--- 151.

6094

158.- Entrada a las 1109hs.- HF con Jorrín le dice que con el muchacho que le va a mandar el papel que pidió que si le pueda mandar algo de literatura sobre Cuba porque él es simpatizante de los cubanos.- Jorrín: que sí, que lo que tenga se lo va a mandar.--- 169.

177.- Entrada a las 1115hs.- HF el diputado Alberto Orduña Culebro con Jorrín, le dice, que allá en la tierra de don Fidel hay una persona que necesita unas llantas y que el hermano de él le quiere mandar un juego de llantas -cinco llantas- por los conductos regulares, que si no hay alguna limitación a ese respecto.- Jorrín: que no, que las puede mandar por la Agencia General de Carga que está en Isabel la Católica 249.---- 193.

222.- Entrada a las 1200hs.- HF pregunta por Chichay.- Jorrín que ella ya no viene a trabajar a la embajada y que ella mismo dijo que ya no iba a venir.- HF que se trata de unos libros.--- Que la va a localizar a su domicilio.--- 238. -- HF es Marcela Olguín.---

8 nov 66

247 .- Entrada a las 1210hs.- HF por el embajador Hernández Armas.- Jorrín que no está.- HF es el profesor González Ra-

Mexican
went to Cuba
for [illegible] Institute

HMMA 30549 14 Nov 66

LIRING-3

2

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 25/M

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 3, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 192319Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6841

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR , JMWAVE

20D [illegible] 62778

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY-9608 (IN [illegible]) *

1. STATION EXTREMELY INTERESTED LIRING-3 OPERATION WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL. FOLLOWING RESULT OF STATION TRACES AND INVESTIGATION OF INFO CONTAINED REF:

A. THERE ARE NO STATION TRACES ON AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ. NOT ABLE LOCATE PIEDRO SANTO (OR PIEDRA SANTA) PRINTING OFFICE IN ANY GUATEMALA CITY DIRECTORIES.

B. GUATEMALA CITY PHONE NUMBER 20 057 IS JOINTLY REGISTERED TO ROBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ AND SAMUEL B. (FRANCO) CORDON. NO TRACES EITHER ROBERTO OR SAMUEL, BUT JULIO HUMBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ, WHO POSSIBLY BROTHER OF ROBERTO, REPORTEDLY INVOLVED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN 1962 INCLUDING ARMS BUYING FOR GUERRILLAS.

C. THERE ARE NUMEROUS TRACES ON JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO WHICH INDICATE HE INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1949.

2. ALSO NUMEROUS TRACES ON JACOBO (RODRIGUEZ) PADILLA, WHO

SECRET

Jack

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 6841 S E C R E T **SECRET**

INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST AND COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES SINCE 1940'S. MOST RECENT REPORT WAS NOVEMBER 1964

LIAISON REPORT WHICH LISTED HIM AS MEMBER OF THE PGT.

INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT RODRIGUEZ PARTICIPATED IN SOME

FRONT ACTIVITIES WITH JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO. * RE DEBRIEFING LIRING/3

SECRET

S E C R E T
BT

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

akc

CLASSIFICATION

#146 **SECRET**

ORIG. A. K. Carley:sm
UNIT WH/COG/RR
EXT. 3483
DATE 16 December 1966

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Strover — for LIRING/3 Secr

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH/C 11

TDCS #-314/15974-66

INFORMATION COPIES
CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 2, DO/H 4, EUR 4, WH 13

DATE DISTRIBUTED
16 December 1966

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WHC/RR	3	WHC/WAVE	1	E/IB/R	1		
WHC/FI	2	WHC/CA	1	E/MADR	1		
WHC/CI	1	WHC/CA/EW	1				
WHC/MO	1			WH/R	1		
WHC/SI	1			WH/1	2	WH/PACY (CINCSO)	1

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
MEXICO CITY-9628
(IN-60597)
HMM-10908
LIRING (LIRING-3)
Liaison *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR						

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/1 - Mr. Bounds (in draft)

RELEASING OFFICER
A. M. Harding
C/WH/COG/RR

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

FORM 12-62 1K-2 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(53-30-44-47)

• ROUTINE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -60597

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXXXXX SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

BIC TREASURY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

TDCS -314/15974-66

16 22 02 Z

DIST 16 DECEMBER 1966

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO

DOI 14 DECEMBER 1966

SUBJECT CUBAN PURCHASE OF MEXICAN COFFEE SEED

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (14 DECEMBER 1966) FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WHO IS A NEW UNWITTING REPORTING ASSET. SOURCE IS IN CLOSE CONTACT AND ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH CUBAN OFFICIALS TRAVELING TO MEXICO CITY.

1. ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ HAS SPENT MORE THAN A MONTH IN MEXICO ON A SPECIAL COFFEE SEED BUYING MISSION FOR CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: SUAREZ ARRIVED IN MEXICO 23 OCTOBER 1966 ASSIGNED AS AN ATTACHE IN THE COMMERCIAL SECTION OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY). WHEN SUAREZ FINALLY CONCLUDED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF TEN TONS OF SEED, HE FOUND UPON DELIVERY THAT THE MEXICANS HAD WET THE SEED AND THAT MOISTURE ACCOUNTED FOR ONE TON OF THE WEIGHT OF THE SHIPMENT. THIS DECEPTION REPRESENTED A LOSS OF $10,000.00 (U.S. DOLLARS) TO THE CUBANS.

2. SUAREZ SAID THAT CUBA WAS TRYING TO INCREASE ITS PRODUCTION OF COFFEE TO OFFSET LOSSES SUFFERED IN RECENT HURRICANES AND GENERALLY TO BUILD UP ITS CROP OF COFFEE FOR EXPORT IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL HARD CURRENCY EXCHANGE.

3. DURING THE WEEK OF 18 DECEMBER SUAREZ PLANS TO VISIT COFFEE PLANTATIONS IN CHIAPAS STATE WHERE HE HOPES TO PURCHASE ADDITIONAL SEED.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: AN INDEPENDENT USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE HAS REPORTED THAT SUAREZ HAS BOUGHT APPROXIMATELY 15 TONS OF MEXICAN COFFEE SEED AND IS TRYING TO BUY MORE. THIS SOURCE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE MEXICANS HAD CHEATED THE CUBANS BY WETTING THE SEED TO INCREASE ITS WEIGHT. THE SEED IS BEING FLOWN TO HAVANA BY CUBANA AIRLINES. SUAREZ INSTRUCTED THE CUBANA REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO TO ARRANGE TO HAVE THE SEED WELL AIRED AS SOON AS IT REACHES HAVANA.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, FBI, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM DISSEM BY 66

ACTION WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, SUSPENSE WH/COG, CDC, ADDP, CSDO, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/PS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, IW, CI/OA, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA/O 4, DDP

S E C R E T 162250Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9634

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

16 DEC [illegible] 60637

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 14 DEC 66 HE HAD HEARD IN HAVA
ON RECENT TRIP (HE RETURNED MEXI 5 DEC) THAT FIDEL CASTRO HAD RECENTLY
CAUSED ARREST OF ELEVEN MEMBERS EDITORIAL STAFF OF GRANMA NEWSPAPER.

2. L-3 LABELED THOSE ARRESTED AS MEMBERS OF QUOTE RED GUARD
UNQUOTE WHICH HAD CRITICIZED CASTRO FOR HIS RECENT SPEECH REGARDING
CUBAN MILITIA IRREGULARITIES AND DIFFICULTIES. CRITICISM REFLECTED
IN COLUMNS OF GRANMA AND BROUGHT ABOUT ARREST OF ELEVEN.

3. ROWTON ASKED L-3 FOR IDENS THOSE ARRESTED BUT LATTER COULD
NOT SUPPLY EXCEPT TO SAY ONE WAS HUSBAND OF HIS FRIEND VELKIS CUSA,
NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED. ROWTON HAS ASKED L-3 DISCUSS ARRESTS WITH
ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ORDER OBTAIN MORE DETAILS.

4. L-3 STATED HE HAD DISCUSSED INTERNAL CUBAN AFFAIRS WITH
SUAREZ AND LATTER TOLD HIM FIDEL CASTRO EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES
ACCOMPLISHING OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRATIC CLUMSINESS PARTY
UNDERLINGS AND UNBELIEVABLE INEFFICIENCY CUBAN DIP SERVICE. SUAREZ
TOLD L-3 CASTRO REQUIRED DELEGATE IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE TASKS
HIS CLOSE CONFIDANTS ORDER ASSURE ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

LIRING-3

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 35/M

ACTION C/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR C/WH/COG 5, C/CI,

S E C R E T 141930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9613   15 Dec 65 IN 59794

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 59022 PARA 2*

COMPLETE TEXTS OF ALL PBRUMEN LIENVOY TRAFFIC POUCHED HQS ATTN: URQUHART REGULARLY. IN VIEW OF EXTENSIVE TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE COFFEE AND FERTILIZER SUGGEST THIS TEXT BE READ IN ITS ENTIRETY. BOTH NAMES ARE USED IN TRANSCRIPTIONS.

S E C R E T

3T

SECRET

* SUGGEST COUNTER SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW ROUNTON - LIRING/3 MEETS

LIRING-3
201-798301

6

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM DISSEM AT 3

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, MPS/RG 2, CI/CA

S E C R E T 141725Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9612

ACTION

14 Dec 65 59552

DIRECTOR

PERUMEN LIRAVINE

REF: DIRECTOR 57519

AS REQUESTED REF, LIRING-3 HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN LIRAVINE PROJECT RENEWAL.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

LIRING-3
201-798301

8

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 4/3/53

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	C
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, CI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6

S E C R E T 140320Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9608

14 DEC 66 IN 58952

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY, JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 56844)

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-3 BY WALLACE B. ROWTON PRODUCED ADDITIONAL INFO RE LIRING-3 IMPENDING TRIP GUAT MEET COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS.

2. PHONE NO. AGUSTINE HERNANDEZ IS GUAT CITY 20 057. JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA GAVE LIRING-3 THIS NO. WHICH USED FIRST CONTACT WITH AGUSTINA. AFTER LIRING-3 RETURN FROM MEXI BORDER, JACOBO TOLD LIRING-3 NOT ASK FOR AGUSTINA THAT NUMBER BUT FOR JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO. JACOBO TOLD L-3 AGUSTINA WORKED AT PIEDRO SANTO PRINTING OFFICE, BUT COULD BE REACHED FRANCO NUMBER WHEN NOT AT WORK.

3. NO MEXI STA TRACES AGUSTINA. HMM 4340, 26 JUN 59 REPORTS JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO ATTENDED MEETING PGT 29 MAY 59 AT MANUEL MARIA CONTRERAS NO. 43-J, MEXI CITY. SEVENTY PERSONS ATTEBNDED MEETING. LIESCORT ON 29 JAN 59 REPORTED JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO, PAINTER, WAS NEW APPLICANT FOR PGT MEMBERSHIP.

4. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE WOULD LEAVE 15 DEC 66 ORDER ARRIVE HUEHUETENANGO TIME BE IN PLACE 18 DEC PER INSTRUCTIONS AGUSTINA.

Gilbert or Garn

LIRING-3

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9633 SECRET

CITY OF MEETING GIVEN REF WAS ERROR. SHOULD READ HUEHUETENANGO, GUAT, NOT QUEZALTENANGO. WILL CARRY LETTER FROM JACOBO TO CESAR MONTEZ EXPLAINING LATTER THAT LIRING-3 LIKE BROTHER TO JACOBO AND ASKING MONTEZ PROVIDE ALL ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE.

5. L-3 GAVE ROWTON COPY LETTER HE SENT ARNOLD RODRIGUEZ CAMPS AFTER HE RETURNED FROM LAST FRUSTRATING TRIP CUBA. IN LETTER L-3 EXPLAINED HE REALIZED HE MADE MISTAKE DESCRIBING HIS PLAN AND TOLD ARNOLD TO RELAY TO OSMANI HE HAD NO INTENTION MAKING HIS COMMERCIAL CONTACT WITTING ANY ARMS PASSED THROUGH CHANNEL. ALSO TOLD ARNOLD HE PLANNING TRIP CENTRAL AMERICA SOON TO CONTACT AND ASSESS BUSINESS CONTACTS. ALSO RELAYED WHAT ROWTON LEARNED RE PRICES OF WEED KILLER MEXI AND ASKED FOR SPECIFICATIONS AND QUANTITIES DESIRED. ALSO STATED WAS SOMEWHAT DISTURBED AND RESENTFUL AT WAY REYNALDO CEPEDA AND DSE TREATED HIM.

6. NEXT L-3 ROWTON MEETING 14 DEC 66.

7. HQS PLS INDEX AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ, JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO AND CESAR MONTEZ TO MEXI STA FILE P-12,729. * REF R/BAT.

SECRET

BT

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2/

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

	ROUTING		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

DISSEM BY 25/7 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR F[illegible] ☒ [illegible]D COPY WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 12 20 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR 59022

TO MEXICO CITY

JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: A. MEXI CITY 9508 (IN 53817)
B. JMWAVE 4498 (IN 54946)*

1. NO HQS TRACES ADDITIONAL TO REF B. FURTHER DETAILS UGWA-17, 11 SEPT 59: ON 1 SEPT 59 BENIGNO DIAZ, FORMER SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN AIR FORCE AND THEN SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN MAPPING INSTITUTE (ICCC), ANGEL ROS, ICCC CO-PILOT, AND ISMAEL SUAREZ ARRIVED MIAMI CONNECTION ALTERATION AT-11 AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMMODATE PHOTO EQUIPMENT. SUAREZ REPRESENTED BY DIAZ AND HIMSELF BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON CASTRO GOVERNMENT, AND WAS OBVIOUSLY SENIOR PERSON IN GROUP AND CLEARLY ONE GIVING ORDERS. SUAREZ SAID AT ONE TIME DURING REVOLUTION HE WAS CO-ORDINATOR OF THE SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONTS. SUAREZ INVITED SOURCE QDALUM TO VISIT HIM HAVANA AND GAVE QDALUM KEY TO APARTMENT 65, CORNER CALLE D AND 23RD. SUAREZ TOLD QDALUM THAT SUAREZ CODE NAME WAS "ECHEMENDIA" AND USE THIS NAME WOULD RESOLVE ANY QDALUM PROBLEMS CUBA. TRACES ROS AND DIAZ INDICATE BOTH LEFT CUBA 1960 FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER 12 40

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : J. Stewart/pm
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 59022

PAGE 2

TO

2. GIVEN CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST LIRING-3 AS RESULT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ CASE AND NOTING COINCIDENTAL APPEARANCE ON SCENE OF PERSON OF SUAREZ BACKGROUND, NOT OUT OF QUESTION SUAREZ AMONG OTHER THINGS SENT TO CHECK LIRING-3 "BUSINESSMAN CONTACT", I.E. ROWTON. WHILE NOT WISHING BE OVERLY CAUTIOUS, DOES SEEM ADVISABLE SUGGEST COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW ROWTON-LIRING-3 MEETINGS. ALSO, REQUEST CABLE FULL LIENVOY TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE TWELVE TONS OF "SOMETHING" AND FURTHER INFO ON SUAREZ AS DEVELOPED.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested traces Ismael SUAREZ De La Paz
poss iden Ismael ECHEMENDIA

WH/C/[illegible]/OS
WH/COG/[illegible]
WH/COG/MO EJChiocca
WH/COG/FI
WH/COG/CA

WJ Kaufman
W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Jacob D. Esterline
for AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTIO. .Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

XX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 15 PER ____ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 10 15 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR 58866

TO GUATEMALA CITY INFO

JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

REDWOOD LIRING

MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 55884)

1. REF CONCERNS EFFORTS BY STATION MEXICO CITY TO INJECT LIRING-3 (IDEN) INTO CUBAN SUBVERSION ACTIVITIES MEXICO. LIRING-3 IS UNWITTING ANTI-[illegible] ASSET HANDLED BY SENIOR [illegible] STAFF AGENT, WILLIAM B. ROWTON, UNDER DEEP COVER MEXICO CITY. ROWTON PRETENDS BE GREEK BUSINESSMAN ALIAS NICK HARRIS WHO INTERESTED DEVELOPING LUCRATIVE SEMI-LEGAL BUSINESS DEALS WITH CUBA. LIRING-3 HAS MADE 3 TRIPS TO CUBA THIS CONNECTION. IN OCTOBER 1966 STATION SENT LIRING-3 INTO CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY WITH AS YET-UNDISCLOSED NEWS ARREST CUBAN DIPLOMAT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ. AS RESULT CUBANS INVITED LIRING-3 CUBA DISCUSS SENSITIVE CUBAN ACTIVITIES BUT ON ARRIVAL MERELY GAVE HIM LOW LEVEL REQUIREMENTS.

2. MEXICO CITY 9512 AND DIRECTOR 56903 CONCERN RESULTS ABOVE TRIP AND LIRING-3's SUGGESTION TO ROWTON HE BE ALLOWED GO CHIAPAS,

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 58866

PAGE 2

TO

WHERE LIRING-3 FORMERLY WORKED FOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND HAS GOOD CONTACTS, TO ATTEMPT CONTACT GUATEMALAN FRIENDS ACROSS BORDER AND ARRANGE MEET THEM MEXICO, ALSO TO MEET JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA TO DEVELOP MORE GUATEMALAN CONTACTS, ALL FOR PURPOSE SETTING ~~UP~~ STAGE CREATE) NET-WORK FOR CUBANS.

WC

END OF MESSAGE

Summary Ref: Results LIRING-3 meeting with Jacobo RODRIGUEZ Padilla and set-up of meeting with Guatemalan communist in Guatemala.

WH/2/G TERRELL (TELECOORD)

WH/COG/CICS

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-793301

SECRET

DISSEM BY 15 PER #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 10 15 45 Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 58867

TO GUATEMALA CITY

JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

[illegible] LIRING

DIRECTOR 58866

IDEN: CARLOS JURADO DELMAR, BORN 3 NOV 30 MEXICO CITY, MEXICAN ARTIST RESIDING MEXICO CITY, RESIDENT HAVANA 1963-64. WIFE MIRIAM CHECHAY, EX CUBAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN-CHINESE DESCENT, EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY UNTIL NOV 66. JURADO 5 FEET 6, 130 POUNDS, HAZEL EYES, DARK BROWN HAIR, LIGHT COMPLEXION, APPARENT AGE 35, E SLIGHT BUILD, BOYISH APPEARANCE, HAIRLINE RECEDING ON SIDES OF FOREHEAD.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/2/G TERRELL (TELECORD)

WH/COG/CICS

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

5
4
3
2
1

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM DISSEM BY 33 M

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 092303Z CITE JMWAVE 4534

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

9 DEC 66 IN 56744

TYPIC MHAPRON

REF JMWAVE 4498 ([illegible])

AMOTS PROVIDED FOLL INFO ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ: DURING BATISTA REGIME PARTICIPATED UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES WITH FATHER DIEGO MADRIGAL OF CARIDAD CHURCH. ONE ISMAEL SUAREZ WAS WITNESS FOR PROSECUTION IN DISMISSAL OF OTTO SIRGO FROM CUBAN ARTIS ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY STAGE PERFORMANCE. (REFS: BOHEMIA MAGAZINE EDITIONS OF 18 JAN 59, 7 AUG AND 21 AUG 60.)

HIGH-LEVEL CASTRO COMMUNIS

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem by 24 PerRYBAT

ACTION C/WH/COG-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 392055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9560 S[illegible] 55884

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: A. MEXICO CITY 9512 (IN 53867) #

B. DIRECTOR 56923

1. LIRING-~~2~~3 SAW JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA NIGHT 1 DEC 66
AND ASKED FOR CONTACTS IN GUATEMALA COMMUNIST PART. JACOBO
GAVE HIM NAME AND PHONE NUMBER SENORA HERNANDEZ (FNU), IN
GUATEMALA CITY. AND SAID WOULD CABLE HER THAT LIRING-3 WOULD
CALL. KROWTON WILL OBTAIN PHONE NUMBER.) LIRING -3 PROCEEDED BY
20-057
RAIL TO MEXICAN-GUATEMALAN BORDER 2-3 DEC AND CALLED HERNANDEZ
FROM MEXICAN SIDE. SHE PROMISED PUT HIM IN CONTACT WITH
"IMPORTANT PERSON FROM COMPANY" AND ASKED HIM CALL BACK
EVENING 3 DEC OR NEXT MORNING, "SINCE COMPANY OFFICIAL NOT EASY
LOCATE ON SHORT NOTICE".

2. LIRING-3 PHONED HERNANDEZ MORNING 4 DEC AND WAS INFORMED
MEETING COULD NOT BE ARRANGED PRIOR 18 OR 20 DEC SINCE OFFICIAL
AWAY ON BUSINESS. HERNANDEZ SAID MEETING WOULD BE HELD
QUEZALTENANGO, GUAT., AND INSTRUCTED HIM CHECK IN ANY THREE
HOTELS THAT CITY AND THEY WOULD LOCATE HIM.

SECRET

[illegible]

8

SECRET

3. LIRING-3 RETURNED MEXICO CITY 6 DEC AND RECONTACTED JACOBO REPORTING WHAT TRANSPIRED. JACOBO EXPLAINED DELAY IN MEETING AS NATURAL IN VIEW SECURITY PRECAUTIONS NECESSARY UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS AND SURMISED COMMIE OFFICIAL WOULD HAVE TO TRAVEL TO QUEZALTENANGO FROM MOUNTAINS. JACOBO SAID HE HAD NO IDEA WHO REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE BUT HOPED WOULD BE FROM TURCIO GUERRILLA BAND. JACOBO SAID TURCIO HAD BEEN REPLACED BY CESAR MONTES WHO OLD FRIEND OF JACOBO. JACOBO PROMISED GIVE LIRING-3 LETTER TO MONTES WHICH LIRING-3 COULD PRESENT TO PERSON SENT BY HERNANDEZ. LETTER WOULD ASK THAT LIRING-3 BE TAKEN TO MONTES.

4. LIRING-3 PLANS PROCEED QUEZALTENANGO 15 DEC. PER ROWTON INSTRUCTIONS WILL INFORM COMMIE REP OR MONTES HE HAS DEVELOPED EXCELLENT COMMERCIAL CONTACTS GUATEMALA CITY, HAS DISCUSSED GENERAL PLANS OF AID WITH OSMANI CIENFUEGOS, AND WANTS HELP REVOLUTION BY EXPLOITING UNWITTING COMMERCIAL CONTACTS PASS ARMS, ETC. ROWTON IN POSITION TIE LIRING-3 INTO ARVANITIS METALO-PLASTICS INDUSTRY GUATEMALA FOR COVER PURPOSES THROUGH STYLIANOS PREVOLIS, EMPLOYEE GREEK EMBASSY MEXICO CITY, WHO CLOSE FRIEND ARVANITIS AND COULD GIVE LIRING-3 LETTER INTRODUCTION IF REQUIRED.

SECRET

5. RE QUESTIONS POSED REF B: LIRING-3 DID NOT HEAR WHAT HAPPENED LOPEZ; HERRERA NEVER MATERIALIZED, WILL REQUESTION FOR DETAILS CAMPS AND LOCATIONS. ROWTON ASKED LIRING-3 IF HE THOUGHT ARNOL RODRIGUEZ MIGHT HAVE BEEN BRIEFED BY DSE TO QUESTION HIM RE SOURCE HIS INFORMATION RE LOPEZ. LIRING-3 SAID RODRIGUEZ IN NO WAY INTERROGATED HIM AND ASKED NO QUESTIONS BEYOND WHAT LIRING-3 TOLD HIM. LIRING -3 SAID HE IN HANDS FOUR SECURITY TYPES FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND THESE COULD HAVE INTERROGATED HIM HAD THEY DESIRED BUT APPARENTLY THEY DID NOT. LIRING-3 SAID RODRIGUEZ APPEARED KNOW NOTHING OF LOPEZ CASE.

SECRET *Re DeBriefing Liring/3

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
DISSEM BY 22 PER RYBAT

ACTION
C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 291955Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9565

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

9 DEC 66 IN 56646

REF MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 55884)*

PARA ONE REF LIRING 2 SHOULD BE LIRING 3.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

8

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : J. [illegible]/pem
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☒ INDEX
[redacted]
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301 ✓

SECRET

DISSEM BY 25/7 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA,

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 12 20 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 59022

TO MEXICO CITY
JMWAVE VFG
PBRUMEN LIRING

ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ 2P (86)
POSSIBLE CUBAN GOVT SECURITY AGENT (1966)

AN NLFI	
PS ~~REST~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~ X

REF: A. MEXI CITY 9508 (IN 53817)
B. JMWAVE 4498 (IN 54946)*

1. NO HQS TRACES ADDITIONAL TO REF B. FURTHER DETAILS UFGA-17, 11 SEPT 59: ON 1 SEPT 59 BENIGNO DIAZ, FORMER SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN AIR FORCE AND THEN SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN MAPPING INSTITUTE (ICCC), ANGEL ROS, ICCC CO-PILOT, AND ISMAEL SUAREZ ARRIVED MIAMI CONNECTION ALTERATION AT-11 AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMMODATE PHOTO EQUIPMENT. SUAREZ REPRESENTED BY DIAZ AND HIMSELF BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON CASTRO GOVERNMENT, AND WAS OBVIOUSLY SENIOR PERSON IN GROUP AND CLEARLY ONE GIVING ORDERS. SUAREZ SAID AT ONE TIME DURING REVOLUTION HE WAS CO-ORDINATOR OF THE SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONTS. SUAREZ INVITED SOURCE QDALUM TO VISIT HIM HAVANA AND GAVE QDALUM KEY TO APARTMENT 65, CORNER CALLS D AND 23RD. SUAREZ TOLD QDALUM THAT SUAREZ CODE NAME WAS "[illegible]ENDIA" AND USE THIS NAME WOULD RESOLVE ANY QDALUM PROBLEMS CUBA. TRACES ROS AND DIAZ INDICATE BOTH LEFT CUBA 1960 FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

(CONTINUED)

LIRING-3
201-798301

MICROFILMED
JAN 06 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RELEASING OFFICER 1240

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER 8 DEC 66

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : J. Stewart/pm
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 59022

PAGE 2

TO

2. GIVEN CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST LIRING-3 AS RESULT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ CASE AND NOTING COINCIDENTAL APPEARANCE ON SCENE OF PERSON OF SUAREZ BACKGROUND, NOT OUT OF QUESTION SUAREZ AMONG OTHER THINGS SENT TO CHECK LIRING-3 "BUSINESSMAN CONTACT", I.E. ROWTON. WHILE NOT WISHING BE OVERLY CAUTIOUS, DOES SEEM ADVISABLE SUGGEST COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW ROWTON-LIRING-3 MEETINGS. ALSO, REQUEST CABLE FULL LIENVOY TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE TWELVE TONS OF "SOMETHING" AND FURTHER INFO ON SUAREZ AS DEVELOPED.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested traces Ismael SUAREZ De La Paz
poss iden Ismael ECHEMENDIA

WH/COG/RR/O3
WH/COG/CICS
WH/COG/MO E.J. Chiocca
WH/COG/FI
WH/COG/CA

Jacob D. Esterline
for AC/WHD

[redacted]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	TC	5	RK
2		6	[illegible]
3	F	7	C
4	OS	8	CA-[illegible]

Dissem by 24

ACTION WH/COG-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT MO TIME BY EW

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI/INT-2

S E C R E T 372228Z CITE JMWAVE 4498

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

7 DEC [illegible] 54946

TYPIC MHAPRON LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9508 (IN 53817)

1. STATION FILES CNTAIN FOLL INFO ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ AKA COMANDANTE ECHEMENDIA: ISMAEL SUAREZ WITH CODE NAME OF ECHEMENDIA REPORTED TO BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON IN CASTRO GOVERNMENT (UMWA-17, 11 SEPT 59). COMMUNIST; SECRETARY OF CONSTRUCTION; RESIDES SAN JOSE DE LAS LAJAS (UFGA-3240, 12 JAN 62). COMANDANTE ISMAEL SUAREZ AKA COMANDANTE ECHEMENDIA REPORTED AS ONE OF MANAGERS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION DEPT IN CUBA (CS-3/479,278, 29 JUNE 61). ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ AKA COMANDANTE ECHEMENDIA WAS FORMER ADMINISTRATOR OF HAVANA BUS TERMINAL; AS OF EARLY 63 HELD POSITION OF CHIEF OF BASIC SERVICE OF TRANSPORTATION MINISTRY (CUBAN REFUGEE, PEDRO LOPEZ CHAVIANO, 4 APR 63). ADMINISTRATOR OF CONSOLIDATED ENTERPRISE FOR TRANSPORT BY OMNIBUS (UFG-2997, 10 JUNE 63).

2. AMOT TRACES PENDING. WILL FORWARD ANY ADDITIONAL AVAILABLE INFO.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

201-798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PRIHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
DISSEM AT 22 PER RYBAT REF

ACTION
C/WH 6

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 071940Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9537

ACTION

7 DEC 63 54834

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9512

CORRECT MATRONYMIC PARA TWO NEXT LAST SENTENCE REF TO PADILLA.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

[redacted]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ORIG: J. Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 6 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-134/1

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 40/53 PER ______ # ______ [redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/COG 8, CI/OA, MPS/BG 2

~~(CLASSIFICATION)~~ ~~(DATE AND TIME FILED)~~ ~~(REFERENCE NUMBER)~~ (ELITE) (PICA)

[redacted] SECRET [redacted] 6 21 54 Z CITE DIRECTOR 57519

TO [redacted]

MEXICO CITY

[redacted] LIRING-3

VIEW [redacted] SUBSTANTIAL LIRING-3 MONTHLY EXPENDITURES (ABOUT $2,200 FOR SEPT-OCT), SUGGEST STATION INCLUDE THIS AGENT UNDER LIRAVINE PROJECT WHICH UP FOR RENEWAL 31 DEC. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	e
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION C/WH-6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH/COG-8, C/CI, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 061850Z CITE MEXICO CITY 5512

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 6 Dec 66 IN 53867

KAPOK PERUMEN LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 56923

1. RE PARA ONE REF, HQS ASSUMPTION CORRECT. LIRING-3 TOOK SON BY FORMER MARRIAGE WITH HIM AND BOTH RETURNED. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON THAT WHEN HE DELAYED BY EMBASSY HE TOLD CEPEDA HE TAKING SON ALONG AS HOSTAGE TO PROVE GOOD INTENTIONS. CEPEDA PROTESTED THIS NOT NECESSARY BUT LIRING-3 TOOK SON ANYWAY.

2. RE PARA FOUR REF, LIRING-3 DEPARTED FOR CHIAPAS 1 OR 2 DEC 66 FOR IDENTIFICATION AND PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT CANDIDATES AS POSSIBLE SMUGGLING CHANNELS. HAD TALK WITH JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILIA PRIOR DEPARTURE BUT ILLNESS ROWTON DID NOT ALLOW HIM GET RESULTS MEETING. LIRING-3/ WILL RETURN ABOUT TEN DEC.

3. RE PARA SEVEN REF, LIRING-4 NOT WORKING BUT STATES INTENTION ENTERING UNAM FOR COURSE ANTHROPOLOGY NEXT SEMESTER. BOTHER QUESTIONS POSED PARA SEVEN WILL BE ANSWERED UPON RETURN L-3 FROM CHIAPAS.

4. POUCHING ADDITIONAL DETAILS ROWTON'S DEBRIEFING L-3.

S E C R E T

BT

Re HQS INTEREST IN INFO CONCERNING LIRING/4 CURRENT STATUS

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	TC	5	MO
2		6	KV
3	H	7	FT
4		8	

FROM By 1

ACTION WH/COG

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME

INFO

FILE VR, WH 8, TI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, CI, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 251720Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9523

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

6 DEC 66 IN 53817

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. RTWTON 21 NOV 66 HE HAD MET IN CUBAN EMBASSY INDIVIDUAL FROM HAVANA WHO TOLD HIM HE TRAVELING UNDER ASSUMED NAME. L-3 REPORTED INDIVIDUAL TOLD HIM HE MEXICO TO BUY COFFEE SEEDS ON DIRECT ORDERS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

2. L-3 STATED HE BELIEVED MAN'S NAME TO BE ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. CHECK OF CUBAN MANIFESS OCT AND NOV 66 SHOWS NO ARRIVAL OF ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA BUT ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ARRIVED 23 OCT 66. RECENT LIENVOY SHOWS SUAREZ INTERESTED IN COFFEE MATTERS.

3. ON 28 NOV SUAREZ PHONED COMMERCIAL OFFICE IN EMB AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WANTED TALK TO HUGO DEL PINO ABOUT A MEETING IN MEXICAN INSTITUTE OF COFFEE AND WHEN TOLD HUGO NOT IN HE ASKED IF ROLANDO (CURBELO) COULD GO WITH HIM TO AN INTERVIEW AT INSTITUTE. HE SAID IT VERY IMPORTAANT TO THEM AND THEY WERE MUCH INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEM. HE ASKED HER TO TELL HUGO HE WAS GOING TO INSTITUTE AND THAT HUGO WAS TO COME TOO. THREE MINUTES LATER MAN CALLED SAME PHONE AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WAS NOW AT INSTITUTE AND THAT HE WAS AWAITING HUGO.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9523 S E C R E T

JUST AFTER THIS CALL HUGO DEL PINO CALLED SAME OFFICE AND SECRETARY TOLD HIM ECHEMENDIA IS AT INSTITUTE AND IS AWAITING HIM. HUGO SAID HE WOULD GO THERE IMMEDIATELY.

4. NO STA TRACES ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ OR ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. L-3 STATED INDIVIDUAL APPEARED WELL DRESSED, INTELLIGENT AND DEVOTED FIDELISTA. LATEST LIENVOY INDICATES HE HAS BOUGHT TWELVE TONS OF SOMETHING BUT ITS IDENTITY NOT MENTIONED.

5. TRACES REQUESTED.

6. HQS PLS INDEX NAMES PARA FOUR.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 7 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED #129

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

UNIT	TIME	BY

ACTION WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

ACTION CHANGE

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/COG 8 R/AN

MEXICO CITY 9508 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 53817 A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : WH/COG (DIVISION)

TO : WH (DIVISION)

BY : MR BELT WH/COG — (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : MR STEWART WH — (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

LIRING-3

201-798301

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM [illegible]

ACTION [illegible]

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE VR, [illegible], TI/AN, CI/OP, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, CI, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 251722Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9528

6 Dec 66 IN 53817

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. RTWTON 21 NOV 66 HE HAD MET IN CUBAN EMBASSY INDIVIDUAL FROM HAVANA WHO TOLD HIM HE TRAVELING UNDER ASSUMED NAME. L-3 REPORTED INDIVIDUAL TOLD HIM HE MEXICO TO BUY COFFEE SEEDS ON DIRECT ORDERS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

2. L-3 STATED HE BELIEVED MAN'S NAME TO BE ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. CHECK OF CUBAN MANIFESS OCT AND NOV 66 SHOWS NO ARRIVAL OF ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA BUT ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ARRIVED 23 OCT 66. RECENT LIENVOY SHOWS SUAREZ INTERESTED IN COFFEE MATTERS.

3. ON 25 NOV SUAREZ PHONED COMMERCIAL OFFICE IN EMB AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WANTED TALK TO HUGO DEL PINO ABOUT A MEETING IN MEXICAN INSTITUTE OF COFFEE AND WHEN TOLD HUGO NOT IN HE ASKED IF ROLANDO (CURBELO) COULD GO WITH HIM TO AN INTERVIEW AT INSTITUTE. HE SAID IT VERY IMPORTAANT TO THEM AND THEY WERE MUCH INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEM. HE ASKED HER TO TELL HUGO HE WAS GOING TO INSTITUTE AND THAT HUGO WAS TO COME TOO. THREE MINUTES LATER MAN CALLED SAME PHONE AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WAS NOW AT INSTITUTE AND THAT HE WAS AWAITING HUGO.

SECRET

Ismael SUAREZ - 201-257780 UMWA-00017 11 Sept 67
represented by DIAZ as highly important person
in FOC.

8

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9538 SECRET

JUST AFTER THIS CALL HUGO DEL PINO CALLED SAME OFFICE AND SECRETARY TOLD HIM ECHEMENDIA IS AT INSTITUTE AND IS AWAITING HIM. HUGO SAID HE WOULD GO THERE IMMEDIATELY.

4. NO STA TRACES ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ OR ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. L-3 STATED INDIVIDUAL APPEARED WELL DRESSED, INTELLIGENT AND DEVOTED FIDELISTA. LATEST LIENVOY INDICATES HE HAS BOUGHT TWELVE TONS OF SOMETHING BUT ITS IDENTITY NOT MENTIONED.

5. TRACES REQUESTED.

6. HQS PLS INDEX NAMES PARA FOUR.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [illegible]-14420

4. Please forward any Station traces on Dr. Armando SOTO Rodriguez or Professor [illegible] for Headquarters files. It is suggested that [illegible]-1 might be able to develop a channel to SOTO should the Station wish to follow up the matter through him.

Andrew F. [illegible]

USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

14-00000

ORIG : Jack Stewart/nao
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 1 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	C
4		8	

DISSEM BY 44 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 6 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

SECRET 2 23 44 Z CITE DIRECTOR 56903

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9371 (IN 46965)*

1. PER STATION REQUEST PARA 12 REF, HQS OFFERS FOLLOWING COMMENTS: SUDDEN SWITCH FROM SERIOUS SENSITIVE PROJECTS ENVISIONED FOR LIRING-3 BY CUBAN EMBASSY (SUCH AS IMPLIED PARA 3 MEXI 8944 FOR EXAMPLE) TO RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL COMMERCIAL PROPOSALS COULD, AS STATION OF COURSE AWARE, BE ONE OF SEVERAL NORMAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS CUBANS MIGHT TAKE THIS CASE. ANOTHER WOULD BE TRANSFER OF LIRING-4 TO LESS SENSITIVE JOB OR DISMISS ALTOGETHER, AS APPARENTLY OCCURRED. ALSO, SEEMS INCREDIBLE CUBAN SECURITY WOULD NOT QUESTION L-3 IN DETAIL ON SOURCE HIS INFO LOPEZ DIAZ CASE. THUS ARNOL RODRIGUEZ, TO WHOM L-3 SPENT THREE HOURS EXPLAINING DETAILS LOPEZ CASE, MIGHT BE DEBRIEFING L-3 BY SPECIAL REQUEST CUBAN SECURITY. LATTER, IF TRUE, WOULD GO FAR EXPLAIN GREAT EASE WITH WHICH L-3 ABLE OBTAIN SEVERAL VISAS GO CUBA THROUGH RODRIGUEZ. IN THIS CONNECTION,

He later confirmed [illegible] the DGI had [illegible] [illegible] known [illegible] — to [illegible]. See April 1967 contact reports.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 56903

TO

PAGE TWO

NOTE IN SCMEXI 873 THAT VISA ALSO GRANTED FOR PERSON WITH SAME NAME AS L-3 EXCEPT DIFFERENT MATRONYMIC (POSSIBLY SON BY FORMER MEXICAN WIFE?). NOTE THAT 6 NOV AIR MANIFEST SHOWS TRAVEL TO CUBA AND GIVES SAME MEXICO ADDRESS FOR BOTH. WOULD BE INTERESTING KNOW IF BOTH RETURNED MEXI 21 NOV AND WHAT EXPLANATION MIGHT BE.

2. GIVEN COMMERCIAL PROPOSALS AND ASSUMING STRONG CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST IN CASE, BELIEVE GOOD POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT LIRING-3 HAS IDENTIFIED HIS "CONTACTS" TO CUBANS AT LEAST IN PART AS GREEK BUSINESSMAN LOOKING FOR SERIOUS AND LUCRATIVE CUBAN TRADE WHO SOMEHOW HAD INFO ON LOPEZ DIAZ CASE. THUS REQUEST FROM RODRIGUEZ/SECURITY TO TEST HIS CONTACT BY SEEING IF HE COULD PRODUCE.

3. WITH REGARD ACTION SUGGESTED PARA 10 REF, HQS CONCURS STATION'S PLAN SEND L-3 BACK INTO CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY BUT WOULD SUGGEST L-3 PLAY DUMB ON WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED CUBA AND USE VISIT ONLY FOR OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE DELIVERING MESSAGE TO RODRIGUEZ VIA AMBASSADOR AND ROA PER PARA 8 REF. MESSAGE WOULD

(CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 52903

TO

PAGE THREE

ASK RODRIGUEZ FOR CLARIFICATION TERMS WEED-KILLER, AMOUNTS DESIRED, ADVISE WHAT CURRENTLY AVAILABLE MEXI, ETC. MESSAGE COULD ALSO EXPRESS L-3'S DISAPPOINTMENT AT MISSION GIVEN HIM SINCE IT NOT SERIOUS REVOLUTIONARY TALK WHICH HE ANTICIPATED, BUT WOULD SHOW HIS GOOD FAITH BY FOLLOWING THROUGH AS CUBANS SUGGESTED. IN KEEPING THESE SENTIMENTS ROWTON AND L-3 CAN GO THROUGH MOTIONS ATTEMPTING FIND INTERESTED PARTIES, ASCERTAINING AVAILABILITY, GETTING TERMS, AND, OF COURSE, OFFERING LEGITIMATE EXCUSES FOR INABILITY CONSUMMATE DEALS LATER ON. TO AVOID STEPPING NOTICEABLY OUT OF BELLIGERENT CHARACTER, L-3 CAN STILL WAX XXBXHEXXX INDIGNANT ABOUT LOPEZ DIAZ XXXXXX STUPIDITY, ETC. BELIEVE THIS COURSE OF ACTION MIGHT PRESERVE VARIOUS EQUITIES INVOLVED.

4. AGAIN TO SHOW L-3'S GOOD FAITH, BELIEVE L-3 SHOULD NOT TRY PRESENT CIENFUEGOS READY-TO-OPERATE SUBVERSION NETWORK, BUT IN INTEREST IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL SMUGGLING CHANNELS SEE NO OBJECTION L-3 CONTACTING JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA OR MAKING TRIP

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 56903

TO

PAGE FOUR

TO CHIAPAS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND PRELIM ASSESSMENT ONLY POSSIBLE CANDIDATES. DO NOT BELIEVE L-3 SHOULD ATTEMPT SIMILAR TASK ACROSS GUAT BORDER VIEW CURRENT SITUATION THERE.

5. HQS HAS NUMEROUS TRACES JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA (201-210804), GUATEMALAN PAINTER, NOT ACTIVE IN COMMUNIST PARTY WHO MARRIED TO LETICIA NAJARRO, RECENTLY EXPELLED FROM GUAT COMMUNIST PARTY BOTH RESIDING MEXICO (DOI 1957).

6. FYI, MACHINE RUNS SHOW FOLLOWING TRAVEL L-3 BETWEEN MEXI AND CUBA:

A. DEC 63 TO CUBA. B. NOV 64 TO CUBA. C. JAN 65 TO MEXI WITH FAMILY. D. MAY 66 TO CUBA. E. JUNE 66 TO MEXI. F. 19 AUG 66 TO CUBA WITH FAMILY. G. 29 AUG 66 TO MEXI. H. 18 SEPT 66 TO MEXI (FAMILY ONLY).

7. HQS INTERESTED IN ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF AND WHEN ACQUIRED:

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

X ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ________

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

TO SECRET INFO CITE DIRECTOR 52903

TO

PAGE FIVE

A. WHERE LIRING-4 WORKING NOW? STILL IN EMBASSY?

B. RESULTS OF L-3 PLANNED CONTACT WITH JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA?

C. DID L-3 EVER HEAR WHAT HAPPENED TO JULIO LOPEZ DIAZ AFTER HIS RETURN CUBA?

D. DID FNU HERRERA (PERSON WHO WAS TO MEET L-3 IN HAVA) EVER MATERIALIZE? DETAILS?

E. ANY WAY GETTING L-3 TO PROVIDE MORE DETAIL AND LOCATE CAMPS HE VISITED ON MAP WITHOUT OVERSTRAINING ROWTON COVER?

F. ALL POSSIBLE DETAILS L-3 3-HOUR CONVERSATION WITH RODRIGUEZ ON LOPEZ DIAZ CASE, ESPECIALLY THOSE INDICATING FORMAL CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST.

END OF MESSAGE

* Gave LIRING-3 report of his visit to Havana and requested comments on proposals to send LIRING-3 back into Cuban Embassy Mexico City and for him to make contacts for possible subversive net.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ——— BRANCH

DISSEM BY ——— PER ——— #

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 56903

TO

PAGE SIX

[redacted]

WH/COG/[redacted]

WH/2/G

Thomas Polgar

William V. Broe
C/WHD

WJKaufman

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFI... IS PROHIBITED.

7 DEC 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR LIRING-3 FILE

SUBJECT: OOA Expenditures for LIRING-3 Ops as of 1 November 1966

REFERENCE: HMMT 7306 9 November 1966

Following are Subject Expenditures:

20 October	$495.86	Medbery/Rowton Ops	LIRING-3 Op
25 October	$ 87.16	Medbery/Rowton Ops Expenses	LIRING Op October
25 October	$500.00	Medbery/Ops Payment	LIRING Travel PBRUMEN
26 October	$120	Medbery/Ops Payment	Safehouse LIRING Op October/November

Liring-3 file

STRAUSE - 8

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

67

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

LIRING/3

ORIG.	Virginia B. Flynn;eb		ROUTING		
UNIT	WH/COG/RR	1		4	
EXT.	3483	2		5	
DATE	30 November 1966	3		6	

TDCS DB-315/03581-66

CONFIRMATION COPIES

WH/COG 13

INFORMATION COPIES

CS/DO, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 2, DO/H 4, EUR 4, CI/OPS, WH 13

DATE DISTRIBUTED

30 November 1966

PRECEDENCE

☒ ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)

MEXI-9398 (IN-47895)
HMM-10866
LIRING (LIRING-3)
Liaison *

DISSEMINATION

WHC/RR	6	WHC/WAVE	1	WH/R	1
WHC/FI	2	WHC/CA	1	WH/1/R	3
WHC/CI	1			WH/MEXI	1
WHC/MO	1	E/IB/R	1		
WHC/SI	1	E/MADR	1		

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

WH/1/R C. Bounds (in draft)

RELEASING OFFICER

L. M. Harding
C/WH/COG/RR

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(WHEN FILLED IN)

COPY NO.

(05-20-66-67)

FORM 12-62 1K-2 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

• ROUTINE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

IN -47895

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXXX SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

FBI INS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE TDCS DB-315/03581-66

S-E-C-R-E-T

DIST 30 NOVEMBER 1966

30 1720 Z

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO

DOI 4 NOVEMBER 1966

SUBJECT NEW REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE STAFF AND GUESTS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (21 NOVEMBER 1966) FIELD NO. HMM-10866

SOURCE MEXICAN PROFESSIONAL MAN WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG CUBAN DIPLOMATS IN MEXICO CITY. HE IS A NEW AND UNTESTED SOURCE.

1. ON 4 NOVEMBER 1966, THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY RECEIVED AN ORDER FROM HAVANA THAT ONLY THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS FAMILY, THE CODE CLERK AND HIS FAMILY, AND ONE OTHER OFFICER, INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY MOST PROBABLY, WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LIVE IN THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. BEFORE THIS ORDER WAS RECEIVED, SEVERAL BACHELOR OFFICERS OR OFFICIALS, WHOSE FAMILIES WERE STILL IN CUBA, HAD BOARDED AND LODGED IN THE EMBASSY. ACCORDING TO THE RECENT ORDER, BOARD WILL BE PROVIDED ONLY TO THOSE OFFICERS WHO ARE NOW ALLOWED TO LIVE IN THE EMBASSY COMPOUND.

2. THE ORDER ALSO SPECIFIED THAT ONLY CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC) MEMBERS WILL BE ALLOWED TO STAY IN THE EMBASSY WHILE IN MEXICO. ALL OTHER VISITORS WILL BE OBLIGED TO SEEK PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS.

3. IN ADDITION, THE ORDER SET UP NEW REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE HIRING OF MEXICANS TO WORK IN THE EMBASSY. MEXICANS MAY BE EMPLOYED ONLY AS SERVANTS. CHAUFFEURS AND SECRETARIES WILL NOW BE SENT FROM CUBA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

[redacted]

ORIG: TJFlores/yb
UNIT: C/WH/COG
EXT: 3481
DATE: 28 NOV 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

#132

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28 PER ___ # ___

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE DO 4 DO/a 3 WH/COG 8

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 30 22 07Z

~~DIRECTOR~~ DIRECTOR

(ELITE) (PICA)

(REFERENCE NUMBER) IN-46964-B

TO CABLE SECRETARIAT

6. PLEASE RELAY MEXICO CITY 9370 (IN 46964 AND 46964-A) to DOST/ NEW YORK ~~DOMESTIC OPERATIONS~~ FOR INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

EUGENE P. O'MEARA
C/DO/op 28-16

RELEASING OFFICER 1630

DO/WH

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

T J Flores for

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 46

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM DISSEM BY 22

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, ADDP, DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, FI/SPG, IW, CS/DO 7, DDI, D/OCI-2, D/ONE, FIR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY.

SECRET 302230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9439

30 Nov 66 IN 49724

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

INTEL TYPIC

1. ON 21 NOVEMBER LIRING-3 REPORTED ONE FUNDORA OR FUNDIDOR (FNU AND MATRONYMIC UNKNOWN), WHO IS OFFICIAL IN HAVANA IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, STATED IN MID-NOVEMBER THAT CUBAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS WERE HANGING BY A THREAD. ACCORDING L-3 THIS PERSON PERFORMS LIAISON WITH ALL FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES. DEFER ANY DISSEM HQS IN VIEW LACK DETAIL AND IDENTITY CUBAN OFFICIAL.

2. AMBASSADOR ONLY INFORMED OF CUBAN'S STATEMENT.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION #115 **SECRET**

ORIG. A. K. Carley;sm
UNIT WH/C/RR
EXT. 3483
DATE 28 November 1966

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH/C 11

TDCS-314/14998-66

INFORMATION COPIES
CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 2, DO/H 4, EUR 4, WH 13

DATE DISTRIBUTED
28 November 1966

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

BASED ON (FF. ..., PROJ.)
MEXICO CITY-9370
(IN-46964)
LIRING (LIRING-3)
Liaison *

DISSEMINATION

		WHC/SI	1	E/IB/R	1	WH/R	1		
WHC/RR	3	WHC/WAVE	1	E/MADR	1	WH/1/R	2		
WHC/FI	2	WHC/CA	1			WH/MEXI	1		
WHC/CI	1	WHC/CA/EW1				WH/PACY (CINCSO)			1
WHC/MO	1								

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR						

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
PR Olson
DC/WH/C/RR

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/1/R - Mr. Bounds (in draft)

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/C/RR

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

COPY NO.

LIRING/3-Prod

FORM 12-62 1K-1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (13-20-44-67)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -46964

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXX USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

REPCINCLANT FBI I&NS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

TDCS-314/14998-66

28 23 53 Z

DIST 28 NOVEMBER 1966

COUNTRY CUBA

DOI 25 NOVEMBER 1966

SUBJECT REPORTED OUSTER OF CUBAN VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER CARRILLO

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (25 NOVEMBER 1966) FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WHO IS A NEW UNWITTING REPORTING ASSET. SOURCE IS IN CLOSE CONTACT AND ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH CUBAN OFFICIALS TRAVELLING TO MEXICO CITY.

1. ANTONIO CARRILLO CARRERAS, WHO WAS APPOINTED CUBAN VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER IN JUNE 1966, WAS OUSTED FROM THIS POSITION BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ ON 24 NOVEMBER 1966.

2. AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER, HE WAS AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE. IN HIS NEW CAPACITY, HE REPLACED TWO VICE-MINISTERS, PELEGRIN TORRAS DE LA LUZ AND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS. CARRILLO HAD BEEN APPOINTED TO THIS POSITION WITH THE SPECIFIC MISSION OR REORGANIZING AND REVITALIZING CUBAN DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATIONS ABROAD. HOWEVER, CASTRO HAD BECOME DISSATISFIED WITH

CARRILLO'S PERFORMANCE AND LACK OF ACTION. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS NOT KNOWN WHO HAS BEEN APPOINTED AS CARRILLO'S REPLACEMENT.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM C SSGM BX22

ACTION C/WH/COG5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH8 C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/SPG, C/CI/PS, C/CS/SGO, C/SID3, C/DO4, C/DO/H3

S E C R E T 261845Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9371

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

26 NOV 63 46965

REF: MEXICO CITY 9346 (IN45539) *

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON HE MET WITH OSMANI CIENFUEGOS ON REF TRIP BUT RESULTS SOMEWHAT LESS THAN HOPED FOR POSSIBLY DUE NAIVE MANNER WHICH LIRING-3 PRESENTED HIS PLANS TO CIENFUEGOS.

2. ACTIONS LIRING STAFF AS LIRING-3 LEFT FOR HAVANA SEEMED INDICATE CUBANS NOT READY FOR LIRING-3 VISIT. LIRING-3 OBTAINED OWN VISA PRIOR DEPARTURE THROUGH FRIEND IN HAVANA, ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS, AND MADE PLANS DEPART 4 NOV. THAT DAY, HOWEVER, EMBASSY TOLD HIM VISA NOT COMPLETE, NEEDED SIGNATURE, AND HE UNABLE DEPART. LIRING-3 INDIGNANTLY TOLD REGINALDO CEPEDA CUBANS DID NOT TRUST HIM SINCE THERE NO REASON FOR DELAY. LIRING-3 TOLD AMBASSADOR HE LEAVING NEXT PLANE, 6 NOV, OR WOULD NOT GO AT ALL. IN PROCESS LIRING-4, ANGRY OVER APPARENT STALLING, WENT STORMING TO AMBASSADOR CLAIMING THERE NO REASON FOR DELAY. STATION BELIEVES THIS PARTLY REASON LIRING-4 NO LONGER WORKING INCONSULATE.

SECRET

where working now?

LIENVOY - Have phone calls? in cipher?

SECRET

NR 100

Called RI under (Trace 3) for files Visa A25 8 nov 66.

Hoover, re MKC 8189 MH 73260 [illegible] [illegible]

3. EMBASSY ALLOWED LIRING-3 DEPART 6 NOV BUT WITHOUT ENTHUSIASM. UPON ARRIVAL HAVANA, LIRING-3 MET AT AIRPORT NOT BY HERRERA AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED BY CEPEDA BUT BY FOUR UNIFORMED SECURITY OFFICERS. THEY CHATTED AMICABLY WITH HIM ON INSIGNIFICANT MATTERS AND TRIED FOUR HOTELS IN ATTEMPT FIND HIM PLACE STAY. EFFORTS UNSUCCESSFUL. FINALLY LIRING-3 SUGGESTED HE STAY WITH HONDURAN FRIEND RENE OCHOA FUNEZ, SECURITY OFFICERS AGREED AND HE SETTLED THERE.

4. NEXT MORNING FOUR OFFICERS RETURNED AND TOOK LIRING-3 TO FINCA IN PINAR DEL RIO. PLACE FILLED WITH AMERICAN ARMS AND MEN AND WOMEN DRESSED IN COMBAT CLOTHES UNDERGOING PARAMILITARY TRAINING. HE SHOWN OTHER SIMILAR FINCAS, ONE TO WHICH HE LIFTED BY HELICOPTER IN CAMAGUAY AND ANOTHER TO WHICH HE HIKED 20 KILOMETERS. HE GIVEN NO EXPLANATION FOR TOUR AND ON 10 OR 11 NOV HE RETURNED TO OCHOA HOME.

5. 14 NOV LIRING-3 CONTACTED ARNOL RODRIGUEZ WHO HAD BEEN ON WEEK LONG TRIP CAMAGUAY. LIRING-3 SAID HE SPENT THREE HOURS TELLING RODRIGUEZ DETAILS LOPEZ CASE AND EXPLAINING HE HAD PLAN FORM HIS MEXICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN CONTACTS INTO NETWORK WHICH WOULD ASSIST PERFORM CLANDESTINE SUBVERSIVE MISSIONS FOR

SECRET

CUBA AS REQUIRED. RODRIGUEZ STATED HE THOUGHT THIS MAGNIFICENT IDEA. RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING-3 HE READY TRAVEL NEXT DAY. ON 15 NOV HE TOOK LIRING-3 IN OWN PLANE TO CAMAGUAY FINCA WHERE CIENGUEGOS SPENDING MOST HIS TIME.

6. AT FINCA LIRING-3 MET CIENFUEGOS WITH RODRIGUEZ AND FOURTH MAN, FAT, SQUAT, WHO LIRING-3 ASSUMED BE CIENFUEGOS SECRETARY. CIENFUEGOS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR LIRING-3 OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND STATED CUBA INTERESTED EXPORTING SUBVERSION TO CENTRAL AMERICAN TO HARASS UNITED STATES. LIRING-3 THEN EXPLAINED HIS PLAN ORGANIZE HIS MEXICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN CONTACTS INTO NETWORK ASSIST THIS ACTIVITY BUT CIENFUEGOS DID NOT TAKE BAIT STATING CUBANS TRUSTED LIRING-3 BUT NOT HIS CONTACTS OF WHOM KNEW NOTHING. CIENFUEGOS SAID SUBVERSION SERIOUS AND COMPLICATED BUSINESS AND THAT ONE UNTRUSTWORTHY MEMBER OF LINK COULD BLOW ENTIRE EFFORT. RODRIGUEZ SUGGESTED LIRING-3 BE GIVEN POSSIBILITY TEST SINCERITY HIS CONTACTS. SAID CUBA WOULD PAY DOLLARS FOR MUCH NEEDED WEED KILLER BUT WOULD RATHER BARTER FOR NICKEL ORE. ASKED LIRING-3 SHOW WHAT HIS CONTACTS COULD DO THIS MATTER. LIRING-3 NOT ASKED IDENTIFY CONTACTS.

why Cubans
[illegible] L-3's
switch goal
for commercial
use — L-3 went
from [illegible] subversion

7. LIRING-3 SOMEWHAT STUNNED BY LET-DOWN DID NOT ASK

SECRET

SPECIFICS RE NICKEL ORE OR WEED KILLER. ROWTON HAS EXPLORED MATTERS SLIGHTLY AND FOUND NICKEL ORE ALREADY BEING OFFERED IN MEXICO BY OTHERS. MEXICAN-MADE WEED KILLER AVAILABLE THOUGH NOT YET SURE IT NOT MADE FROM U.S. PATENTS. STILL EXPLORING ALONG WITH PROBLEMS OF EXPORT.

If so, only Cubans being difficult — do they want US product or nothing

8. END MEETING WITH CIENFUEGOS, RODRIGUEZ GAVE LIRING-3 FOLLOWING COMMO PLAN: WRITE LETTER TO RODRIGUEZ, PUT IT IN ENVELOPE BEARING RODRIGUEZ NAME ON OUTSIDE, PLACE THIS ENVELOPE IN SECOND ADDRESSED TO RAUL ROA GARCIA AND GIVE TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR MEXICO.

i.e. deal directly with [illegible]

9. LIRING-3 TREATMENT CUBA MAY BE RESULT CUBANS TAKING SECOND LOOK AT PROPOSITION USING MEXICAN ASSIST IN GUNRUNNING TO CENTRAL AMERICA, PARTICULARLY SO SOON AFTER LOPEZ CASE. THEIR EFFORTS STALL HIS DEPARTURE MEXICO CITY 4 NOV MAY HAVE BEEN ON ORDERS FROM DISCOURAGE TRIP ALTOGETHER.

Si could be wrong. all but some report said could be arms going Cent. Am. via [illegible] from Mexico.

10. AS FIRST COUNTER MEASURE AND IN KEEPING HIS PERSONALITY PLAN SEND LIRING-3 BACK INTO EMBASSY, AGAINST INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM RODRIGUEZ TO CONFRONT LIRING-2 OR CEPEDA WITH DEMAND TO KNOW WHAT CUBANS PULLING ON HIM. WOULD POINT OUT HE SENT HAVANA ON SERIOUS MISSION OF SENSITIVE POLITICAL NATURE AND GIVEN TOUR OF FARMS AND REQUIREMENT FOR WEED KILLER. WOULD

SECRET

PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 9371 S E C R E T SECRET

EXPRESS DISGUST AT WAY CUBA TREATS DEDICATED FRIEND OF REVOLUTION. PLAN ALSO CONTINUE EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES SUPPLYING REQUIRED WEED KILLER FROM MEXICO. HAVE NO INTENTION INTRODUCING LIRING-3 INTO COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES FOR CUBANS BUT THIS ONE EFFORT WOULD SHOW GOOD FAITH. PLAN ALSO HAVE LIRING-3 WRITE RODRIGUEZ STATING HE DISAPPOINTED MISSION GIVEN SINCE IT NOT SERIOUS REVOLUTIONARY TALK WHICH HE ANTICIPATED.

11. LIRING-3 ALSO SUGGESTS TO ROWTON HE BE ALLOWED TRAVEL CHIPAS WHERE HE FORMERLY WORKED FOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND WHERE HE CLAIMS HAVE GOOD CONTACTS NOT YET IDENTIFIED. ROWTON WILL GET IDENTIFICATION. WOULD ALSO ATTEMPT CONTACT GUATEMALA FRIENDS ACROSS BORDER AND ARRANGE MEETING WITH THEM IN MEXICO. LIRING-3 SAID HE WOULD MEET JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA NIGHT OF 24 NOV TO DEVELOP MORE GUAT CONTACTS. ONCE HE HAS CHECKED CONTACTS COULD PRESENT TO CIENFUEGOS AS NETWORK READY TO OPERATE.

[illegible]

12. WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS.

S E C R E T SPCING FUR CFN.

BT

NEW CONTACT.

* PENDING TAPE OF MEETING

SECRET

Guat 6745 in 48570

Traces requested 1000, 21 Nov

(15 hits) + 201-210804

Guat [illegible]

[illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 240002Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9346 24 Nov 63 45539

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9097 (IN 31445)

LIRING-3 RETURNED MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 21 NOV AND HAD SHORT MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT NIGHT. HIGHLIGHTS OF LONG DEBRIEFING MORNING 22 NOV AND PROPOSED FUTURE DIRECTION L-3 OPERATION BEING CABLED SEPARATELY. ALSO POUCHING TAPE OF MEETING.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

CKH

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WHC/ES	25	NOV	66	
2. WH/C06/CI/S				
3. FA				
4. BC				
5. WH/C06/FI/TC				
6.				
7.				
8.				

C/S/catt

To TSD 29 NOV 66

Only 1 cy of attachment sent to TSD 19 Dec 66 via memo.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Deputy Chief WH/C

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/AMKNOB/LIRING/Letter from LIRING-1 to AMKNOB-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: FYI

Reference: Mexico City 9111

1. A copy of a letter written by LIRING-1 to AMKNOB-1 as set forth in reference is being forwarded under separate cover.

2. As pointed out, LIRING-1 used LIRING-3's old address as a return and when the letter was not delivered to AMKNOB-1 in Madrid it eventually was returned to LIRING-3 in Mexico City.

3. LIRING-3 mentioned the letter to Wallace B. ROWTON and later loaned it to him. Due to the relationship between LIRING-3 and ROWTON it is not possible for ROWTON to retain the letter and he will return the original to LIRING-3.

Frank C. Medbery
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Letter a/s para 1 UNDER SEPARATE COVER att 29 Nov 66
See note above. TO: TSD

Distribution:
(2) - DCWH/C w/att
1 - C/WHD w/o att 1cc to WH/1
5 - FILES

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN 22 NOV 66

RING-3

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-30583

DATE: 17 November 1966

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: LIRING-3 201-

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NIR NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO. Deputy Chief WH/C

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT (LIRING/OPERATIONAL/PRQ Part II on LIRING-3

MICROFILMED
DEC 7 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 30540 of 10 November 1966

1. A PRQ Part II for LIRING-3 is being forwarded under separate cover. It is to be noted that LIRING-3 has not been recruited in the name of WOFACT, but instead is engaged in clandestine activities for Wallace B. ROWTON, who LIRING-3 believes is a Greek businessman with international connections who requires economic, political and personality information in order to conduct his business.

2. The fact that LIRING-3 is not aware of his WOFACT connection, at the present time, outweights the value which would accrue were an attempt made to make him knowledgeable. He performs clandestinely for ROWTON and he is actually attacking priority targets. In this way he works against the target with a clear conscience and his left-wing sentiments are not threatened.

3. The operation is moving, however, toward the eventual full recruitment of LIRING-3, but it is moving slowly in that direction because of the political and social beliefs of Subject. One advantage of this false flag recruitment of this individual, at the present time, is the fact that he is able to enter the target area without fear of capture and exposure as an enemy agent. Under the present plan of operation he believes his work actually is aiding the revolution which he believes in from an idealistic standpoint.

Frank C. [illegible]
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
PRQ II UNDER SEPARATE COVER (3 cys) BY RI/AH
Dated [illegible]

Distribution:
(2) - C/WHD w/att
1 - DCWH/C w/o att
2 - FILES

IA-T

CS COPY

[illegible]-79353

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-30584

DATE
25 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 7 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

-57

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 13b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM
[illegible]

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Elias [illegible] Newton first met Subject on 24 April, [illegible], at the Union de la Plastica Mexicana, Calle [illegible] 7, Mexico City, under alias (Nicolas Harris, Greek businessman), on the pretext that he was interested in arranging for Subject to paint a mural for a night-club in New York City. The approach was cold and subject did not question Newton's bona fides either as a Greek or international businessman visiting Mexico as a tourist. This first meeting led to social contact with Subject and wife.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could easily be turned over to a friend or business associate of Newton who could pose as a (non-American) third country national, preferably a Greek, Frenchman or [illegible]. If officia [illegible] connections could be indicated at this point.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

None.

[illegible]

CS COPY

FORM 7-60 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET.

(4-20)

201-798301

SECRET

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use blank comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is mostly [illegible] for [illegible] social and [illegible] reasons. He has become [illegible] for [illegible] com [illegible] [illegible] o [illegible] l.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

In his relations with the Cubans and to a [illegible] the [illegible] Subject has accepted [illegible] direction from [illegible]. [illegible] he knows almost nothing. He realizes [illegible] his close connection with [illegible] it would be [illegible].

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Social [illegible] professional [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible]

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Social and [illegible] [illegible]

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

[illegible]

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

[illegible]

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

[illegible]

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None [illegible].

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

[illegible] countries. [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION VI	OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

[illegible] reports of [illegible] Subject [illegible] of interest and [illegible] produced [illegible] to officials of [illegible] in [illegible] Mexico City.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from social contacts with Cubans in Mexico City and Havana and through his wife, an employee of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Nothing. Subject appears to assume that Lawson retains the information for his personal use.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is being used in an attempt to penetrate (unwittingly) the DGI and the Tricontinental (LAAAPSO) Organization in Havana and Central Africa.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is also being used to pass controlled information on an unwitting basis to the Cubans in Mexico City and Havana.

SECTION VII	PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII	AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is unwitting of an Agency interest in Subject.

SECRET

SECTION IX.	**QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS**

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is [illegible]

SECTION X	**COMMITMENTS**

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject has been paid on a spot basis to date. It is proposed to pay Subject a regular salary of 3,000 [illegible] per month in addition [illegible].

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None. Subject is interested in travel and [illegible] has exploited this by indicating that he may be able to arrange interesting trips for Subject if business developed [illegible] to justify such trav-

SECTION XI	**CE AND SECURITY**

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

[illegible] of his life to [illegible] artistic [illegible] anti-social. [illegible] in social or [illegible]

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

[illegible] (one of his [illegible]) [illegible]

SECTION XII	**SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS**

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS: GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

[illegible] Subject does not appear to [illegible]

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

[illegible]

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

[illegible] through [illegible] files.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

No problems foreseen at this time. Subject is [illegible] of [illegible] interest or contact, and [illegible] has not made long-term commitments in his personal and business contacts.

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W. WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

[illegible]'s home. [illegible], or [illegible] [illegible] should reply: "No, but I have heard [illegible]".

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

Subject is [illegible] on [illegible] questions. He has [illegible] been pressed, as he himself states, for [illegible] and [illegible] personal decision to [illegible] Newton's guidance in his relations [illegible]. Subject has [illegible] asked Newton for personal details of his (Newton's) life, including his permanent or temporary address. Subject apparently feels that through Newton he will acquire relative [illegible] financial security and be able to travel and eventually improve his [illegible].

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Deputy Chief WH/C

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/LIRING/Review of LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Attached is an operational review of the LIRING-3 operation prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON. Attention is also called to PRQ Parts I and II. Part I was sent as HMMA 30540 and part II is being prepared for pouching.

Frank C. Medbery
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
LIRING-3 Review HEREWITH

Distribution:
(2) - C/WHD w/att
1 - DCWH/C w/att
3 - FILES

LIRETAIL OPS
50-6-137/3

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-30585

DATE
16 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9 November, 1966.

Subject: Review and Assessment of LIRING Operation.

I. Background, Character and Assessment of LIRING/3:

1. Liring/3 (Subject) is a 36-year-old Mexican artist of the Diego Rivera School and an atheistic existentialist oriented toward the philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre, with relatively strong leftist political convictions. He has produced a fair amount of painting and had relatively good success in murals both in Cuba and Mexico, but has not succeeded in selling many of his works, despite numerous expositions, sponsored by the Mexican Government plastic arts organization (Bellas Artes). Because of his family, educational and environmental background, Subject feels that his work has not been appreciated for its intrinsic worth by the Mexican Government and tends to blame his political convictions for this lack of acceptance. Subject, however, has, as he himself asserts, no feelings of bitterness or resentment, although he frequently experiences the "anguish, forelornness and loneliness" of the existentialist, but he has not permitted himself to degenerate into a beatnik either in his personal or artistic life. Subject has confided to Rowton that he has no real friends and that he has withdrawn from society, the dictates of which he cannot accept. He enjoys the prospect of travel, especially abroad, "to develop his art" but also as an escape from the pressures and obligations of the social life he has been forced to lead in Mexico.

2. Shortly after he met Rowton, in April, 1966, Subject confessed that he felt himself at a critical point in his personal and artistic life. He indicated that he felt the paradoxes inherent in his philosophy were overwhelming and depressing him and that he welcomed friendship with Rowton, an experienced foreigner whom he felt he could trust implicitly. At one critical point, Subject quit his rather tedious job with the Ministry of Education (teaching art in a public school) with the comment that "everyone must make personal decisions and take risks, and I have decided to throw my lot in with you (Rowton) for better or worse, and so have quit the job since it was interfering with my availability". This he did without knowing any more about Rowton than his name, which technical surveillance revealed he did not accept as a true name, and with no guarantees of future financial support from Rowton. Rowton, in his conversations with Subject, has been careful not to reveal any data concerning his personal life and background, including his permanent or local address, providing Subject only with the number of a telephone answering service, and using the safehouse rented by Subject as a principal point of contact. Subject has accepted money from Rowton, at first only for previously approved expenses, and subsequently for his personal use, but has accepted Rowton's initiative in this matter, and made no demands on Rowton for remuneration for services rendered. He has been meticulous in accounting for funds and shown no reluctance to sign receipts presented to him by Rowton (with his true-name signature). Subject has confessed (and shown) an almost complete lack of experience in business and intelligence work, but has accepted Rowton's guidance, where required, without hesitation.

Att A to HMMA-30585 CS COPY 201-798301

3. Subject, in his political outlook, is left of center, with a history of revolutionary activity in Cuba from 1961 until his return to Mexico in 1964. Subject has insisted to Rowton that, because of his (existentialist) philosophy, he has never permitted himself to join any organization, including the communist party, although he has given moral and material support to revolutionary movements both in Cuba and now Mexico. Subject has confessed his disillusionment with many of the revolutionary leaders in Cuba and with all of the Mexican leaders, remarking that sooner or later "the real" revolution will come to Mexico to eliminate the corruption and injustice that prevails throughout the country. Subject, however feels that in the meantime he must live under a more practical philosophy of daily life and is willing to make the necessary compromises to assist Rowton in his busines affairs. Subject has shown no reluctance to exploit his friends, and even his wife, to be of specific service to Rowton, and has, on numerous occasions, volunteered to do so with Rowton's approval. This appears to Rowton to be a reflection of the existentialist conviction that his philosophy gives him freedom to choose without dependency, obligation or justification.

4. Rowton is aware that Subject is currently undergoing a decisive climacteric, the future direction of which is not as yet certain. Rowton has succeeded in making Subject compromise a great deal with his past ideals particularly concerning deep involvement with other people and acceptance of financial support for purely business transactions, and for this reason has hesitated to uncover for Subject any of the mystery surrounding his own life and activites. Subject dislikes "northamericans" and considers life in the U.S., with which he is not familiar from experience, as corrupt and decadent. Rowton feels that he can eventually break down Subject's prejudice, if this proves to be necessary and worthwhile, but it would be fatal at this time for Rowton to reveal his [redacted] and [redacted] connections. Subject is, in his own words, completely confident of Rowton's good will toward him and is, at least for the moment, totally dependent upon him for guidance as well as financial support. Any attempt at direct recruitment for [redacted] at this point would, in Rowton's opinion be counterproductive. In his various contacts with the Cubans thus far, particularly his current visit to Havana on what appears to be an IS briefing, Subject can in all respects act naturally, without the feeling that he is concealing anything from his Cuban friends, simply because he is unwitting of Rowton's true affiliations and intentions. If he were witting, he would appear to all concerned to be suffering from a severe psychological crisis, and certainly would not be in a good position to produce useful information or inspire confidence. Subject is under some strain as a result of his current relationship with Rowton in his capacity as an international bourgeois businessman, a fact attested to by his wife to Rowton on 7 November when she expressed concern over Subject's recent moodiness and lack of interest in painting. Subject has also become involved in a love affair with one of his rich art students, a Mexican woman who is known to visit Subject at the safehouse.

WOFACT

5. In summation Rowton feels that Subject is excellent potential agent material, both because of his background and experience as well as his direct access to targets of interest. The problems inherent in his philosophical and psychological make-up will continue to be taken into consideration in developing Subject's full potential. The obvious disadvantages of Subject's unwitting status vis-a-vis [redacted] can be overcome by careful handling of Subject and increased control over him in the future.

WOFACT

B- Development of LIRING/3 by Rowton:

6. Rowton met Subject in April,1966, by cold approach in the art studio where Subject at the time was presenting his latest works under sponsorship of Bellas Artes. Rowton posed as a Greek businessman interested in Subject's style and his immediate objective at the time was to ascertain the address in New York City of Subject's wife's father (a Cuban of Chinese origin who had left Cuba as a refugee). Rowton, feeling that he had to present an above-average prospect to Subject to permit future meetings, alleged that he was anxious to arrange for the painting of a mural to be installed in a New York nightclub owned by a Greek friend of his (Rita Dimitri, owner and performer at the "La Chansonette"). Rowton felt that pin-pointing a "New York nihhgtclub" would have the double advantage of determining Subject's sentiments toward working in New York City and in a bourgeois environment.

7. Subject reacted very favorably to the initial approach and accepted Rowton's invitation to dinner in the company of Subject's wife the next evening. Both Subject and his wife were cautious in revealing any specific data concerning their background and personal history, but neither concealed their mutual approval of Castro's regime and dislike for the corruption in Mexico. As a result of this meeting Rowton realized that any attempt at a direct approach to either Subject or his wife, who was then employed part-time at the Cuban Consulate, would be conterproductive and that a more subtle approach would have to be developed. Rowton decided that a strong personal relationship developed bwith Subject would be productive and could eventually lead to useful production on Subject's part.

8. When, therefore, on 2 May,1966, Subject eXpressed gratification at having met Rowton and indicated that he wished to continue his friendly contacts, regardless of whether Rowton purchased his painting or arrganged for the mural, Rowton ~~xx~~ moved in with an offer to "hire" Subject as his business associate on an unofficial basis, so that Subject could acquire a degree of indepence financially and perhaps do some traveling for Rowton. In order to develop as much clandestinity as possible in his future contacts with Subject, Rowton explained that he was simply a tourist in Mexico and as such not permitted to engage in lucrative business activities. He would therefore have to depend on Subject's discretion in any dealings he might have with him. Subject accepted this as quite normal but pointed out to Roton his limitations xas far as business training and experience went. In reply to Rowton's cuery, he did confess,however, that he had excellent contacts in Havana that could be exploited for business dealings with Cuba. He volunteered to make an exploratory trip to Havana to renew his friendship with the perons concerned. Rowton accepted this offer, not only to test Subject's story but also to seize the occasion to be in a position to provide Subject with money to make the trip and thus compromise him somewhat at the outset.

9. Rowton's next move was to explain to Subject that he had a long-term interest in Cuba and hoped to do a great deal of business in the futre but first felt it was essential that both he and Subject develop the proper contacts inside to ensure success. Subject readily agreed to this and felt relieved that Rowton did not expect him to produce concrete results overnight. When Rowton, therefore suggested that Subject find and rent a safehouse for entertainment and development of prospective contacts, Subject went to work immediately without question. (Althoug Rowton's suggestion was first made on 17 June, Subject did not succeed in finding a suitable place until the end of July.) This project, however, gave Subject something specific and relatively clandestine to do for Rowton without seriously compromising any of his principles. Subject, as it developed later, was intereste in such a hide-away, unknown even to his wife, for his own purposes.

10. Inasmuch as Subject and his wife had long lived an almost ascetic life in a small sparcely furnished apartment with no apparent luxuries and dressed in the simplest and apparently most inexpensive clothing available, and furthermore apparently did not have any conscious desire to improve their living conditions, Rowton realized that financial control over Subject would be difficult to establish unless Subject and his wife could be made to lift their eyes to see a more comfortable and promising life within their reach. He therefore chose some of the best restaurants for lunch dates with Subject (prior to the renting of the safehouse), brought several relatively expensive dolls and toys for their child, arranged through the COS to have a credit account opened for Subject and his wife at Sears Roebuck Stores and was able to present Subject with a credit card that would enable Subject and his wife to make effortless purchases on credit. Rowton also persuaded Subject to open a checking account at the Banco de Londres y Mexico, ostensibly so that he could keep better track of the rent payments on the safehouse. All these bourgeois trappings were calculated to raise Subject and his family fromthe complacent proletariat standard of living into which they had sunk. Subject expressed to Rowton his appreciation for such gestures and confessed that he now realized the importance of these outward signs of respectability and as a result felt more able to step into the world of higher society. His wife also revealed in her comments of appreciation to Rowton that she welcomed the prospect of a better life for herself and her child and hoped to be able to purchase enough furniture to make her home respectable and permit her to invite guests occasionally.

11. The one adverse effect of this effort on Rowton's part has been that Subject began to use the safehouse apartment for amorous trysts with one of his art students, an apparently wealthy Mexican woman, who has now in effect become his mistress (as revealed by technical surveillance from an LP in the same building set up and run very effectively by Medbury). Subject has revealed the name and address of this woman to Rowton in connection with the establishment of a P.O. Box which could be used as a drop for communication between Subject and Rowton while the former was in Cuba; but he has not to date told Rowton of his illicit relationship with the woman. This development can, of course, serve as a potential control over Subject and can be used in any future [redacted] secure examination, but, on the other hand may lead to complications in Subject's personal life and create hostility on the part of his wife, should she discover the philandering of Subject. She might likewise tend to blame Rowton for Subject's conduct. For this reason Rowton has made every effort to maintain good relations with Subject's wife (she has already confided to Rowton her concern over Subject's recent moodiness,as stated above) in the hope that she will turn to Rowton for help in the event she feels her marraige in jeopardy. Consideration is also being given to the possibility of breaking up as discreetly as possible Subject's affair with the Mexican woman in the event that it becomes more serious. Technical surveillance of the trysts will continue to provide useful information in this direction.

12. With regard to the use of Subject unwittingly to elicit operational information from his Cuban friends in Mexico City as well as Havana, Rowton gradually impressed on Subject the need to acquire all possible information both political and economic on Cuban developments as a prelude to engaging in serious and lucrative business with the Castro regime. Subject accepted this line without question and did produce some useful inside information of value. The turning point, however, came in connection with the disappearance of Julian López, the Press Attaché of the Embassy in Mexico City in late September,1966. Subject reported the disappearance to Rowton with some glee, commenting that he and his wife were convinced that López had gone

off on a binge with some friends. Subject then repeated to Rowton his criticism of López' childishness and inexperience and recalled that when he himself had pointed out to López his negligence in handling his Embassy functions(in the Press and Cultural Field) López had shrugged off his admonitions with the comment that there were more important things to do for the revolution. The disregard, bordering on distain, with which López as well as apparently other Cuban officials, had greeted Subject's friendly advice in the past, obviously cut Subject to the quick and fostered in him the resentment of a peasant toward his master. Taking this into consideration and in the hope of stirring up as much trouble for López and the Embassy as possible, the Station permitted Rowton to pass to Subject the highly restricted information that López had actually been arrested by the Mexican police for complicity in the arms smuggling ring that has recently been uncovered in their operations from Mexico into Guatemala. Rowton gave Subject enough details to make the story convincing and asked Subject to attribute the information to "Central American friends" and to stress that it was already inthe hands of the press. In addition Rowton suggested that Subject pass this information personally to López as a hot tip so that López could discreetly disappear before the reporters managed to question him. When Subject did as requested by Rowton, López was apparently so overwhelmed with gratitude for Subject's good intentions that he informed the Ambassador the following morning (just before his sudden departure for Havana). Events then moved swiftly. The Ambassador called in Subject and expressed his personal appreciation for Subject's interest and help in this delicate matter and agreed with Subject that the involvement of Embassy personnel in arms smuggling was placing Cuban-Mexican relations in jeopardy. Overnight this raised Subject's status in the eyes of the Ambassador and his closest advisors (Curbelo and Cepeda) to that of a valued confident rather than simply a friend of the revolution. This obviously pleased Subject and made him all the more anxious to conceal the role of Rowton in the affair so that all the credit would continue to fall to him.

13. As a result Subject was subsequently called in by Curbelo and Cepeda and asked to offer his services to help the Tricontinental in its work in Central America. On Rowton's advice (which Subject sollicited) the offer was accepted on condition that the work to be done would be serious (i.e. worth the personal risks Subject would have to run) and that Subject would be permitted to work without the overt involvement of the local Embassy, These conditions were promptly accepted and Subject was invited to visit Havana again so that he could be briefed on the spot by Osmani Cienfuego and his staff.

14. Subject was thus catapulted into the level of IS activites,with Rowton maneuvered into a position of éminence grise. It remains to be seen following Subject's return from Havana (estimated at 21 November,1966) whether Subject will be entrusted with secret requirements by the Tricontinental, but it appears certain at this point that Rowton will be able to provide full guidance to Subject and to steer the operations he might be engaged in toward targets of interest to WOFACT.

C- Biographical Data Elicited from LIRING/3:

15. Subject was born in Mexico City in 1930 of a middle class family. Subject's grandfather was a well-known textile merchant who served some 12 years as president of the Chamber of Commerce. At least one of Subject's aunts is currently well-to-do and the owner of several apartment houses in Mexico City. Subject has at present little or no contact with his family.

16. At the age of 15 Subject left home to join the Mexican Navy. Subject has commented to Rowton that his childhood was not particularly happy and that his mother and father separated, apparently when he was in his teens. It appears likely that Subject left home as a result of family dissension. Subject states that his desire to travel and see the world wasvery strong at the time he joined the navy.

17. Inasmuch as the legal age for enlistment was 18, Subject had to have his birth certificate altered to show that he had been born in 1927 rather than 1930. As a consequence all of Subject's official documents now show his birth-date as 1927, including his passport.

18. Subject served a three-year hitch in the navy and visited nearly all the ports of Mexico and many of Central America. Subject's speciality appears to have been in the quartermaster branch, since he learned the rudiments of navigation and ship-handling. When he left the naval service, Subject entered the University of Mexico and took courses in Archaeology and Anthropology for the next two years. Subject simultaneously developed a strong interest in painting and sculpture and over the next five or so ~~xx~~ years, studied under such masters as Rivera and Siqueiros.

19. Subject was married in 1950 at the age of twenty years to a young Mexican woman from Leon, GTO..and during the next ten years had at at least four children by her. He divorced his wife in about 1960, just prior to his departure for Cuba, but he had not been on good terms with her for several years prior to the divorce. From about 195[illegible] to 1960 Subject worked in the Mexican Government Social Service among the Indians in the southern states of Mexico. Subject attributes some of the tension that arose between him and his wife to this employment venture. He commented to Rowton that his first wife wanted to live a quiet normal life in Mexico City and was unwilling to share with him the hardships of social work in remote areas of tropical Mexico. During this period Subject gradually developed his own style in painting and began to establish close contacts with Mexican art circles.

20. Subject went to Cuba in about 1960 "to join the revolution",apparently as a result of his increasingly leftist political sympathies. He did a relatively large amount of painting and mural work during his four-year residence in Cuba, while at the same time working in the Ministry of Labor and Education. In about 1961 he married a Cuban woman of Chinese origin from Santiago de Cuba and the following year a (girl) child was born to them in Havana. Subject has told Rowton that he has had very little contact with his first wife since his divorce and pays no alimony. He added that his family, however, has continued to take an interest in his first wife and the children of his first marriage and has helped to support them financially. During his stay in Cuba, Subject developed close friendship with many Cuban revolutionaries, particularly Arnol Rodriquez, whose wife worked with Subject in the Ministry of Education at the time when Arnol Rodriquez was serving as Minister of Labor.

21. Subject returned to Mexico City in 1964 with his new wife and child (whom he had naturalized as a Mexican citizen). By this time Subject had become a professional artist but supplemented the rather modest income he acquired from the sale of his painting by teaching art privately and in Mexican public schools. His monthly income during 1965 and early 1966 did not exceed 3,000 pesos.

Wallace B Rowton

11

MEXI GOVT cc

14 NOV 66

SEE SCMEXI 873 FOR

INFO RE CIRING-3 VISA

issue tourist visa #5120 ~~[illegible]~~ Carlos Jurado Elman Pp 135587

and Carlos Jurado Malecena Pp 9755.

CIRING-3

14-00000

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational LIRING
PRQ Part I - Carlos JURADO Delmar

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Enclosed is PRQ Part I for Carlos JURADO Delmar. PRQ Part II has been prepared and will be forwarded by separate dispatch.

Frank C. [illegible]
for
Robert L. EASBY

MICROFILMED
NOV 17 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Enclosure:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD w/att (4 cys)

GROUP 1
Excluded from [illegible]
[illegible]

1ATT

CS COPY

201-795301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-30540

DATE
10 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS. FILE NUMBER
201-

7P

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PROJ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA."
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-30540

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)*	*(Middle)*	*(Last)*	*(Nee)*
Carlos		Jurado	DELMAR

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: none

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*: none

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

201-798301

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 3 November, 1927 (see #8 below)

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Mexico City, Mexico

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

No known vices. Drinks in moderation for social reasons.

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)*

Date of birth actually 3 November 1930, but birth certificate altered to show 1927 in order to qualify for entrance into Mexican Navy (age 18 in lieu of actual age 15).

MICROFILMED
NOV 17 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE *(Shape)*
M X F	39	[illegible]	FT. 5 IN. [illegible]	130	[illegible]	oval

h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE
Dark ~~Dk~~. brown	Hazel	regular	slim	erect

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: Ears relatively large - slight indentation on tip of nose. Cheek-bones protrude slightly

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE: Neat, clean shaven, generally dresses in plain sports clothes

o. PROMINENT FEATURES: Slight build, boyish appearance, hairline receding on sides of forehead.

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 2-61 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (4-20)

ATT TO HMMA 30540

CS COPY

201-798301

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Mexican

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*
same

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*
[illegible] Mexico

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*
same

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*
1960-1964 Cuba (employed by Ministry of Labor and Education)
1965 - three ten-day visits.

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION
Artist and art teacher

17. TITLE
Art Teacher

18. SALARY *(Per annum)*
[illegible]

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*
Depends almost totally on earnings from sale of paintings and salary (nominal) paid by Bellas Artes(equivalent to government [illegible]

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
none

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Member ~~Socialist Party of Mexico~~ PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTO (PPS)

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE RECEIVED
"La Esmeralda" Mexico DF	Painting&Sculpture	[illegible]	1951	none
School Anthropology, Univ of Mexico	Anthropology .	1946	1951	none

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE *(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)*	READ YES	READ NO	WRITE YES	WRITE NO	SPEAK YES	SPEAK NO	UNDERSTAND YES	UNDERSTAND NO
Spanish	x		x		x		x	

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☒ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

First married in Mexico City 1950, divorced 1960. [illegible] children by this marriage. No alimony paid since Subject's family continued support ex-wife. Oldest child born 1953. No contact with ex-wife.
Married again 1961 in Havana, Cuba, to Miriam Chiclay, Cuban citizen.

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

✓ 33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) Miriam NO 21 (Middle) (Nee) WIFE Chiclay (Last) JURADO

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE [illegible]

35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE Havana, Cuba SEX F

DOB 36. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]

POB 37. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH CIT. Cuban

39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS WIFE OF CARLOS JURADO DELMAR (201-79230)

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE [illegible]

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Miriam [illegible] Chiclay		x	[illegible]	Havana, Cuba	Mexican

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (*Identify child and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME

42. YEAR OF BIRTH

43. PLACE OF BIRTH

44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

46. OCCUPATION

47. PRESENT RESIDENCE

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME [illegible]

49. YEAR OF BIRTH

50. PLACE OF BIRTH

51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

53. OCCUPATION

54. PRESENT RESIDENCE

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES. Murals

1) Escuela de Derecho de Chiapas, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chis. 1957.
2) Pabellón de la Revolución Mexicana, Feria del Libro, Mexico, DF, 1960.
3) Biblioteca del Ministerio de Educación (T.S.E.) La Habana, Cuba, 1963.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Art and sculpture.

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
Mexico	1945	1946	Navy	Seaman	Sea

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

Joined Navy at age 15 by falsifying birth certificate to read born 3 November, 1927 instead of 3 November, 1930.

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) 1954-1960	b. EMPLOYER Mexican Government		c. ADDRESS Instituto Nacional Indigenista
	d. TYPE OF WORK Social	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Personal reasons
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) 1962-1964	b. EMPLOYER Cuban Government		c. ADDRESS Ministry of Education
	d. TYPE OF WORK Teaching art	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Return Mexico
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) 1964-1966	b. EMPLOYER Mexican Government		c. ADDRESS Ministry of Education
	d. TYPE OF WORK Teaching art	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 1,[illegible]	PER pesos per	f. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible] Travel of Cuba
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) 1964-1966	b. EMPLOYER Mexican Government		c. ADDRESS Bellas Artes
	d. TYPE OF WORK Tutor of art	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 1,[illegible]	PER pesos per month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING still employed
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

DATOS BIOGRAFICOS DE CARLOS JURADO.

[illegible]
[illegible] (?)

Hace el 3 de noviembre de 1927 en la ciudad de México. Estudia durante un tiempo en la Escuela de Pintura y Escultura "La Esmeralda", donde es discípulo de María Izquierdo, Rivera, etc. Permanece por seis años en medios rurales del país, trabajando con el Instituto Nacional Indigenista. En 1960 obtiene un premio en el certamen " Nuevos Valores" en el Salón de la Plástica Mexicana del Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes.

Exposiciones colectivas más importantes:

Galería 23 Escalones, México,D.F. 1953. Escuela de Artes Plásticas de Chiapas, Tuxtla Gtz. Chis. 1956. Exposición Internacional de Grabado, Yogoeslavia, 1959. Primer Salón Nacional de Pintura, México, D.F. 1959. " Nuevos Valores " México,D.F. 1960. Galerías Glantz, México,D.F. 1960- Galerías Chapultepec, México,D.F. 1960. Reseña Mundial de Festivales Cinematográficos, Acapulco, Gro. 1962. Nueva Búsqueda de la Joven Pintura Mexicana, San Antonio, Texas, 1962. Retratos, Galerías Glantz, México,D.F. 1964. Pintura Contemporánea de México, Nueva Orleans, 1964. Salón de Pintura 1964, México,D.F. Pintura Mexicana Contemporánea, Galerías de San Carlos, México,D.F. 1964. Primer Salón de Artistas Jóvenes, Museo de Arte Moderno, México,D.F. 1965. Pintura Contemporánea de México, La Habana, Cuba, 1965. Salón de Pintura 1965, México,D.F. " Autorretrato y Obra" Museo de Arte Moderno, México,D.F.1966.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

S E C R E T

ROUTING 79 83 01

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IG: J. SEARS:mamd
IIT: WH/COG/OPS
T: 1255
ATE: 8 MAY 69

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
76 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2

(classification) S E C R E T (date and time filed) 08 20 06z MAY 69 (elite) (reference number) (pica) CITE DIRECTOR 001366

JACK LALLY

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY-0125 (IN 53298)

1. VIEW PBRUMEN APPARENT SUSPICIONS OF LIRING-3, PREFER ROWTON NOT LEVY ANY REQUIREMENTS ON LIRING-4 OR OFFER ANY AID. HOWEVER, SHOULD OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF OR ELICIT DEVELOP AFTER TRIP, WOULD WELCOME SAME.

2. FILE 201-798301, 201-818842.

END OF MESSAGE

9 MAY 1969

DC/WH/COG Paul Eckert

Charles M Bauer
WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 17 June 66	CASE NO. 201- 798301

☐	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE	
☐	SET UP FOR OA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐	ORSD	AREA:	

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE: ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
✓	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓	TICKLE 30 June 66
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ________________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

SIGNATURE ☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE [illegible] Jun

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - [illegible]

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] City

TYPE OF REQUEST		OS INDICES RESULTS BY	FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CSC ☐ SI		(Date) [illegible] June [illegible]	(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT
Informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI [illegible] FD.	DIVISION [illegible]	FIELD [illegible]

GREEN LIST INITIATED		ATTACHMENTS			
☐ YES	☐ NO	☐ PRQ - PART I	☐ PARTIAL BIO	☐ OTHER	

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA
DATE

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results:

JUN 9 8 49 AM '65

FORM 8-64 693 SECRET (9)

Exposiciones Individuales :

Ateneo de Artes y Ciencias de Chiapas, Tuxtla Gtz. 1957. Galerías Glantz, México, D.F. 1960. Galería de Arte, La Habana, Cuba, 1962. Casa de las Américas, la Habana, Cuba, 1963. Galerías Chapultepec, México,D.F. 1964. Salón de la Plástica Mexicana, México,D.F. 1966.

Obra Mural:

Escuela de Derecho de Chiapas, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chis.1957. Pabellón de la Revolución Mexicana, Feria del Libro, México,D.F. 1960. Biblioteca del Ministerio de Educación (I.S.E.) la Habana, Cuba, 1963.

14-00000

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 25/M

ACTION
WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH8, TSD6, FI, EUR8

S E C R E T 072045Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9156 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

7[illegible] 34558

TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF: DIRECTOR 49618 *

INSPECTION REF ENVELOPE DISCLOSES MEXICO CITY POSTMARKS DATED 27 FEB 66. ADDITIONAL POSTMARK MADRID SHOWS IT PLACED IN GENERAL DELIVERY THERE 1 FEB 66. NO INDICATION WHEN TAKEN OUT OF MADRID GENERAL DELIVERY AND RETURNED MEXICO CITY.

S E C R E T

*RYBAT

BT

LIRING-3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 3

ACTION
DC/WH/C 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO
FILE VR, ~~DDP/WH6~~, CI/CI, CI/E12

S E C R E T 251558Z CITE JMWAVE 3970

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

5 Nov 66 IN 33709

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF MEXICO CITY 9111 (IN 39408)

1. REVIEW OF FILES SHOWS THAT IN AMKNOB/1 S/W MESSAGE TWO DATED 24 MAR 66 MEXICO RECEIVED JMWAVE 28 MAR AMKNOB/1 REPORTED RAUL ASKED HIM IF HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM HIM IN MADRID THE FIRST OF FEBRUARY. WHEN AMKNOB/1 ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE, RAUL SAID IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT AND WITH THE RETURN ADDRESS USED HE WAS SURE THE LETTER WOULD BE RETURNED.

2. RE PARA 4 REF "HOUSE OF AMADEO" PROBABLY REFERS TO AMADEO MARTINEZ ZEPEDA, CUIS ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY GIVEN TO AMKNOB/1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

8

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13

[redacted]

ORIG: J. STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 3 NOV. 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 26 PER ______ # ______
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: DC/WH/C5 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: VR , FILE C/WH6

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)
[redacted]

CITE DIRECTOR 31465A
061

TO

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT

PLEASE RELAY MEXICO CITY 9097 (IN 31465) PRIORITY TO JMWAVE FOR INFO FRADYER.

SECRET

WH/C COMMENT: REF CONCERNS COVER STORY FOR LIRING-3 BEING IN POSSESSION OF INFO IN CASE OF JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, CUBAN DIPLOMAT RECENTLY ARRESTED IN MEXICO.

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER J STEWART WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER A WISNOWSKI FOR WH/C/MO
RELEASING OFFICER W CINI FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

BT

Stewart

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES: 25

ORIG: B.CAREW
UNIT: WH/C/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 4 NOVEMBER 1966

☐ RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 30/17 PER RYBAT # CABLES [redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/C5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI2, C/TSD3, C/SB5,

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 04 19 16Z CITE DIRECTOR 49618

TO MEXICO CITY INFO ROUTINE JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF MEXICO CITY 9111 (IN 32408)*

1. REQUEST DETAILS OF EXAMINATION REF ENVELOPE FOR INDICATIONS LOCATIONS REACHED, CANCELLATIONS AND CHANNELS IT WENT TO INCLUDE DATES AND TIMES IF POSSIBLE.

2. CHECK OF AVAILABLE TRAVEL MANIFESTS REVEALS LIRING/1 DID NOT TRAVEL PRAGUE EARLY 1966.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/CICS John A. Easton
WH/1 JACK STEWART (DRAFT)
WH/C/MO
WH/C/FI/FI Stan J. Murray
WH/COG/RR Priscilla Lench

William V. Broe
C/WHD

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER 4-6 COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

13⁰⁰

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/EUR-4, C/SB-5, C/TSD-3, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 031606Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9[illegible]

JMWAVE DIRECTOR

3 N[illegible] 32408

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF HMMW 14744

1. LIRING-3 RELATED FOLL STORY TO WALLACE B. ROWTON ON 31 OCT 1966:

2. WITHIN FEW DAYS PREVIOUS ABOVE MEETING LIRING-3 HAD GONE TO OLD RESIDENCE AT IDEN A TO CHECK WHETHER ANY MAIL HAD ARRIVED THERE SINCE HE DEPARTED. FOUND TWO LETTERS, ONE OF WHICH ADDRESSED AMKNOB, ADDRESS IDEN B. LETTER HAD LIRING-3 NAME AND ADDRESS FOR RETURN AND LETTER NOT FINDING ADDRESSEE HAD BEEN RETURNED TO LIRING-3.

3. LIRING-3 OPENED LETTER WHICH DATED 17 JANUARY 1966 TYPEWRITTEN ON HAMMERMILL BOND AND SIGNED QUOTE RAUL UNQUOTE. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD THOUGHT MUCH OF MYSTERY AND FINALLY REMEMBERED THAT LIRING-1, MANY MONTHS AGO, HAD FOR NO APPARENT REASON ASKED HIM FOR HIS ADDRESS. HE HAD GIVEN LIRING-1 IDEN A ADDRESS. WITH THIS KNOWLEDGE LIRING-3 CONFRONTED LIRING-1 WITH FACT HE HAD RECEIVED LETTER AND HE ASKED LIRING-1 WHAT WAS IDEA USING HIS RETURN. LIRING-1 GAVE NO REASONABLE ANSWER AND ASKED FOR LETTER

SECRET

BACK. LIRING-3 REFUSED SAYING QUOTE YOU SENT IT, IT WAS RETURNED TO ME AND I'M KEEPING IT UNQUOTE.

4. IN LETTER LIRING-1 EXPRESSES HIS HOPE OF MEETING AMKNOB IN PRAGUE WHERE LIRING-1 HAS TO GO ON BUSINESS NEXT MONTH (FEB 66). LIRING-1 THEN ASKS AMKNOB TO WRITE OR BETTER CABLE HIM QUOTE TO THE HOUSE OF AMADEO UNQUOTE SAYING WHETHER HE CAN MAKE MEETING. LIRING-1 STATED HE WOULD BE A GUEST IN HOTEL FLORA, PRAGUE, AND THAT HE WOULD ADVISE AMKNOB OF DATE HIS ARRIVAL THERE.

5. WOACRE REP INSPECTED LETTER AND ENVELOPE. NO EVIDENCE OF SW DISCLOSED. OPEN TEXT WOULD INDICATE LETTER CONTAINED NO SW. POUCHING COPY OF LETTER. DUE RELATIONSHIP ROWTON LIRING-3 IT WOULD NOT BE EASY RETAIN LETTER AND ROWTON WILL RETURN IT TO LIRING-3 WHEN LATTER RETURNS FROM FORTHCOMING TRIP PBRUMEN.

SECRET

BT

19-6-113/3 filed

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO 201-798521

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ WH/1

DESTROY ☐ SIG. Wilcarsen

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem by 2d

ACTION DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/CI, C/WH-6, C/EUR-4, C/SB-5, C/TSD-3, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 031610Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9112

3 Nov 66 IN 32191

JMWAVE DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF MEXICO CITY 9111 (IN 32406)

IDENS:

A. FRESNO202, COLONIA FLORIDA, MEXICO CITY

B. LISTA DE CORREOS PRINCIPAL, CIBELES, MADRID.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

WH/1 INDEX

11P

NNNN

MICROFILMED
NOV 14 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RING-3

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

ORIG: Jack Stewart/nao
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 1 November 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-800004

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 60/53 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE DDP/WH/C 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, ADDP, C/FI/INT 2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

12 23 10 Z CITE DIRECTOR 49106

TO MEXICO CITY INFO CARACAS [redacted]

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REF A. MEXICO CITY 9024 (IN 27279)

B. CARACAS 5157 (IN 28199)

1. APPRECIATE STATION VIEWS RE ATTEMPTING HAVE LITEMPO-12 ESTABLISH HIS SOURCING REF A REPORT THAT SUBJECT VEN COMMIE, CARRYING MESSAGES FROM PEDRO MEDINA SILVA AND AMERICAN DOLLARS FOR FALN, AND ON VENEZUELAN IMMIGRATION BLACKLIST. IN PARTICULAR, DID INFO COME FROM VENEZUELAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES WHO HQS UNDERSTANDS IN CONTACT WITH DFS OR FROM CUBAN EXILES OR BOTH? NOTE THAT MEDINA REPORTEDLY IN VENEZUELA SINCE SEPTEMBER.

2. FYI, SEVERAL REPORTS RECEIVED ON SUBJECT AND HUSBAND WHICH CONFLICT SENSITIVE INFO FROM TWO SOURCES. IF STATION COULD ESTABLISH REASONABLE GROUNDS BELIEVE SUBJECT ACTUALLY CARRYING LARGE SUM AMERICAN DOLLARS (I.E. OVER AND ABOVE TRAVELING EXPENSES), BELIEVE IT IN OUR INTEREST ATTEMPT ENCOURAGE DFS ARREST AND SEARCH. THIS, IF ACCOMPLISHED, WOULD GIVE CHANCE ASSESS VARYING REPORTS

(CONT'D)

LIRING-3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

[redacted]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 49106

PAGE 2

TO

AND IF SHE ACTUALLY SUBVERSIVE AGENT WOULD ACCOMPLISH IMPORTANT DISRUPTION ON OUR PART. NEEDLESS TO SAY WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED SEEING ANY MESSAGES OR MONEY FOUND. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE STATION ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE DAMAGE OUR INTERESTS SUCH ARREST MIGHT HAVE, INCLUDING EFFECT ON ROWTON-LIRING/3 RELATIONSHIP.

[redacted]

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/FI T. Hazlett (in draft)
WH/C/CA/PA C. Anderson (in draft)
WH/3/V ______
[redacted] ______

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY: 2

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, VR, EUR 2, WH 8, FI, FI/INT 2.

S E C R E T 021114Z CITE LONDON 6474

2 Nov 66 IN 30875

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 48602

COOKE HAS BEEN IN NEW YORK FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, RETURNING LONDON 19 NOVEMBER. WILL ATTEMPT GET PROMPT REPLY AT THAT TIME.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

Jane

LIRING-3

Stewart

MEMORANDUM FOR: J Kaufman

T. Polgar would like to talk to you before sending attached. He seems to believe that it~~s~~ is redundant Also said T.Flores was with him and believes same.

J Stewart

not sent.

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 1 AUG 54 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WH/1		✓
2	WH/C/MO		
3	WH/C/FI		
4	~~WH/C/CICS~~		
5	WH/FI		
6	Cable Secretariat		

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WH/1/J. Stewart/332 Ames/3654	3 Nov 66

UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET

FORM NO. 237 2-61 Use previous editions (40)

FORM 11-65 12 OBSOLETE [redacted] PREVIOUS EDITION

1. MESSAGES ARE CONSIDERED ROUTINE UNLESS A HIGHER PRECEDENCE IS INDICATED IN INTERNAL ADDRESS LINE
2. SEND ORIGINAL AND BLUE-GREEN COPY TO CABLE SECRETARIAT. REMOVE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.
3. DO NOT ERASE, X CUT AND CONTINUE TYPING. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES. END TEXT LINES WITHIN THE RIGHT MARGIN GUIDE APPROPRIATE FOR YOUR TYPEWRITER

MESSAGE FORM [redacted]

TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: J. Stewart/mhf
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 3 November 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798303

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

TO

PRIORITY

MEXICO CITY PRIORITY INFO: JMWAVE FOR FRADYER

DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRING

REFS: MEXICO CITY 9097 (IN 31465) ~~[illegible]~~

1. ~~WHILE REALIZE STATION IN BEST~~ POSITION SELECT PROPER COVER STORY HQS RELUCTANT SEE ATTENTION INVITED TO ROWTON ANY MORE THAN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

2. FOR JMWAVE: REQUEST FRADYER COMMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

* Ref concerns cover story being furnished LIRING-3 for ~~the~~ information he had on Cuban diplomat Julian LOPEZ Diaz being arrested by Mexicans for involvement Guatemalan arms smuggling.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

for WH/C/MO

~~WH/C/RI~~
~~WH/C/CICH~~
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~FROM~~ DISSEM BY 30/M

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6/ C/CI, C/FI2,

relayed JMWAVE 3 Nov on [illegible]

S E C R E T 022135Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9097

2 Nov 66 31465

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9011 (IN 27211)

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON EVENING 1 NOV 66 ONLY SIGNIFICENT INFORMATION REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ HAD GIVEN HIM IN WAY OF BRIEFING FOR FORTHCOMING TRIP WAS THAT LIRING-3 WOULD BE MET AT HAVA AIRPORT BY ONE HERRERA (FNU) WHO WOULD PUT HIM IN CONTACT WITH PROPER PEOPLE.

2. FLIGHT ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 2 NOV WAS FIRST POSTPONED TO 3 NOV THEN SET BACK TO 4 NOV. STRIKE OF MEXICANA AIRLINE EMPLOYEES MAY CAUSE FURTHER DELAY SINCE MEXICANA SERVICES CUBANA.

3. LIRING-2 AND CEPEDA MET WITH LIRING-3 26 OCT AS REPORTED REF BUT NO SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION RESULTED. LIRING-3 SAID IT APPEARED HIM MEETING CALLED IMPRESS HIM WITH IMPORTANCE OF CEPEDA AND LIRING-2. CEPEDA DID ALL TALKING. AMBASSADOR DROPPED IN, GREETED LIRING-3 CORDIALLY BUT LEFT. CEPEDA PREFACED MEETING WITH LENGTHY LECTURE ON POSITION CUBA VIS A VIS TRI CONTINENTAL. POINT MADE WAS CUBA INDEPENDENT OF ACTIVITIES THIS ORGANIZATION BUT DIRECTLY INVOLVED SOME ASPECTS DUE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION.

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9297 S E C R E T

4. DURING MEETING CEPEDA ASKED LIRING-3 WHO HE KNEW HAVA. LIRING-3 BRUSHED THIS OFF SAYING HE KNEW MANY PEOPLE AND COULD NOT BEGIN LIST THEM. CEPEDA THEN WENT ON IN APOLOGETIC TONE ASKING LIRING-3 AVOID TOO MUCH CONTACT WITH FRIENDS UNTIL HE HAD CONFERRED WITH THOSE INSIDE. AS RESULT MEETING LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE DEFINITELY CONCLUDED CEPEDA DSE REP MEXICO. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 COMPLY WITH CEPEDA REQUEST AND NOT CONTACT FRIENDS HAVA UNTIL HE HAD DISCREETLY CHECKED SUCH CONTACTS WITH PERSONS DIRECTING HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. AT 26 OCT MEETING CEPEDA SAID HE WOULD HAVE FINAL BRIEFING WITH LIRING-3 BEFORE HE DEPARTED. THIS FINAL SESSION HELD 1 NOV AND RESULTED ONLY IN CEPEDA INFORMING LIRING-3 OF NAME OF FIRST CONTACT CITED PARA ONE ABOVE.

6. ROWTON HAS BRIEFED LIRING-3 ON GENERAL SECURITY PRECAUTION AND WARNED HIM BE ALERT POSSIBLE SURVEILLANCE INSIDE. ALSO IN CASE EXTREME PRESSURE APPLIED TO LEARN SOURCE LIRING-3'S INFO ON JULIAN LOPEZ HE WAS TOLD BY ROWTON TO INFORM THEM HE HAD OBTAINED FROM FRIEND (ROWTON) GIVING FICTICIOUS NAME FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL, WHO HAD OBTAINED FROM UNKNOWN GUATEMALA REPORTER WHO OBTAINED FROM NATZUL AGUIRRE COCK, GUATEMALAN PGT MEMBER. THIS EXTENT INFO GIVEN LIRING-3. ACTUALLY AGUIRRE WAS EXILED IN MEXICO AFTER FALL OR ARBENZ AND WAS

Assumption that NAC can't be checked by Cubans through PGT? Of course friend (ROWTON) could have be deceiving L-3.

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 9297 SECRET

ARRESTED BY MEXICAN AUTHORITIES EARLY OCT 66 FOR BEING ONE OF PRIME INSTIGATORS IN STUDENT RIOTS MORELIA RECENTLY. AGUIRRE DEPORTED TO GUATEMALA BY MEXICANS EARLY OCT 66 ALONG WITH JAIME DIAZ ROZZOTTO, FORMER PGT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER.

SECRET

BT

~~[illegible]~~ Guat border + ~~[illegible]~~
on beat hospital list
Eyes [illegible]
8 ~~[illegible]~~ dead!

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

SE: [redacted]

J.M.
ORIG: J. MOUGHAN:fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 31 OCTOBER 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 30/M PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE EUR8, WH8, FI, FI/INT2,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 1 20 21 52 CITE DIRECTOR 48602

TO LONDON INFO MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 34711

PLS ADVISE WHETHER COOKE HAS DEVELOPED ANY INFO ON REF REQUEST.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA

WH/C/MO E. Chiocca (phone)

WH/1 J. Stewart (Phone)

EUR/Cuba Crawford (phone)

E/BC/UK John G. Roberts

LIRING-3

John G. Roberts
C/EUR/BC
for

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

1-3

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

0845

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CLO	5	FI
2		6	[illegible]
3	RTC	7	CA
4	MO	8	[illegible]

UNIT
TIME
BY 5

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, DO-4, DO/H-3, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 260055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8977

26 OCT 66 IN 25352

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8944 (IN 23843)

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 24 OCT 66 THAT
LIRING-4 PASSED MESSAGE TO HIM MORNING 23 OCT THAT REYNALDO (CEPEDA)
HERNANDEZ, FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY AND IDENTIFIED DGI OFFICER,
WISHED SEE HIM SAME DAY. LIRING-3 MET CEPEDA SAME MORNING IN
EMBASSY RECEPTION ROOM. MEETING LASTED ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

2. CEPEDA MADE IMMEDIATE REFERENCE RECENT CONVERSATION LIRING
3 AND LIRING-2 MENTIONED REF. LIRING-3 FEELING SHOULD PLAY IT CLOSE
TO CHEST REPLIED HE HAD TALKED WITH LIRING-2 AND WAS PLANNING TRIP
HAVANA EARLY NOVEMBER FOR CERTAIN DISCUSSIONS. CEPEDA REPLIED HE WAS
AWARE OF EVERYTHING AND HAD CALLED LIRING-3 TO STATE HE VERY INTERESTED
WHOLE AFFAIR AND WANTED WORK CLOSELY WITH LIRING-3 IN FUTURE. CEPEDA
SAID HE PLANNING GO HAVANA 12 NOV 66 AND SUGGESTED THEY BOTH GO TO-
GETHER ORDER KEEP CLOSE CONTACT DURING DISCUSSIONS.

3. LIRING-3 REPLIED HE WOULD TRY REVISE PLANS TO ARRANGE TRIP
COINCIDE THAT OF CEPEDA.

4. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 THIS CLEVER PLAN OF CEPDA INSINUATE

SECRET

Liring-1 - Abreu

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8977 SECRET SECRET

HIMSELF IN MATTER NOT CONCERNING HIM DIRECTLY. ROWTON EMPHASIZED IT ESSENTIAL LIRING-3 CONSULT HAVANA CONTACTS PRIOR ANY INVOLVEMENT LOCAL PERSONNEL LIKE CEPEDA WHO MIGHT WISH INFILTRATE INTO LIRING-3 AFFAIRS THROUGH CURIOSITY OR AS CUBAN INTEL OR SECURITY DESIRING MONITOR HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD AGAIN SEEN LIRING-2 MORNING 24 OCT AND QUESTIONED HIM RE CONTACTS HE WOULD BE EXPECTED MAKE IN HAVANA DURING TRIP. LIRING-2 REPLIED OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WOULD CERTAINLY BE ONE OF PRINCIPAL CONTACTS.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 CABLE FRIEND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMP FOR VISA. HE EXPECTS RECEIVE IT BY 28 OCT. LIRING-3 WILL THEN PURCHASE TICKET FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULED 31 OCT. HE WILL THEN TELL OR GET WORD CEPEDA HE LEAVING EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. ONLY FACTOR MIGHT ALTER THIS PLAN IS INSTRUCTIONS FROM LIRING-2 DELAY DEPARTURE TO COINCIDE WITH THAT CEPEDA.

SECRET SECRET

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

: JACK STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT :
DATE: 28 OCT 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 48 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: VR , FILE WH/C8, DO4, DDH3, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

28 22 56 Z CITE DIRECTOR 47951

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF A MEXICO CITY 9311 (IN 97211)

B MEXICO CITY 8944 (IN 23093)

HQS FOLLOWING LIRING-3 CASE WITH INTEREST. AGREE STATEMENT PARA 7 REF B THAT CUBANS MAY WANT GET L-3 TO CUBA TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT "SOURCES" FROM WHOM OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ DIAZ. BELIEVE IT MATTER OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT L-3 BE GIVEN BEST POSSIBLE COVER STORY AND URGE STATION GIVE FULL ATTENTION THIS ASPECT OF OP IN VIEW UPCOMING TRIP L-3 TO CUBA PER REF A.

S E C R E T

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER	JACK STEWART WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER	JOHN A. CASTORO WH/C/CICS
RELEASING OFFICER	W. CINI FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CICS	5	H-R
2		6	
3	RL-RE	7	
4	MO	8	

FROM Disseminated by 24

ACTION DC/WHC-5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/CI, C/FI-2

ACTION

S E C R E T 272040Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9011

27 OCT 65 IN 27211

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8977 (IN 35352)

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON EVENING 26 OCT 66 THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY LIRING-2 COME TO EMBASSY AT 1900 HOURS THAT NIGHT FOR MEETING WITH LIRING-2 AND REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.

2. LIRING-3 PRESSED LIRING-2 FOR GENERAL IDEA OF MEETING AGENDA. LIRING-3 REPLIED QUOTE WHEN YOU GO TO HAVANA YOU WILL BE SEEING CERTAIN CENTRAL AMERICANS AND WE WOULD LIKE TO TALK THIS OVER WITH YOU BEFORE YOU GO IN UNQUOTE.

3. LIRING-3 WILL MAKE DETAILED REPORT TO ROWTON EVENING 27 OCT WHICH WILL BE TAPED. ACCORDING PRESENT PLANS LIRING-3 WILL LEAVE FOR HAVANA ON FLIGHT SCHEDULED 1 NOV 66.

S E C R E T

a LiRing/3 Reported He Had Again seen LiRing/2 24 Oct

BT

SECRET

LIRING-3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

Dissem by 24

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

ACTION WH/C-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, DO-4, DO/H-3, C.I., CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 260055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8977

26 OCT 66 IN 25352

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8944 (IN 23093)

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 24 OCT 66 THAT LIRING-4 PASSED MESSAGE TO HIM MORNING 23 OCT THAT REYNALDO (CEPEDA) HERNANDEZ, FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY AND IDENTIFIED DGI OFFICER, WISHED SEE HIM SAME DAY. LIRING-3 MET CEPEDA SAME MORNING IN EMBASSY RECEPTION ROOM. MEETING LASTED ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

2. CEPEDA MADE IMMEDIATE REFERENCE RECENT CONVERSATION LIRING 3 AND LIRING-2 MENTIONED REF. LIRING-3 FEELING SHOULD PLAY IT CLOSE TO CHEST REPLIED HE HAD TALKED WITH LIRING-2 AND WAS PLANNING TRIP HAVANA EARLY NOVEMBER FOR CERTAIN DISCUSSIONS. CEPEDA REPLIED HE WAS AWARE OF EVERYTHING AND HAD CALLED LIRING-3 TO STATE HE VERY INTERESTED WHOLE AFFAIR AND WANTED WORK CLOSELY WITH LIRING-3 IN FUTURE. CEPEDA SAID HE PLANNING GO HAVANA 12 NOV 66 AND SUGGESTED THEY BOTH GO TOGETHER ORDER KEEP CLOSE CONTACT DURING DISCUSSIONS.

3. LIRING-3 REPLIED HE WOULD TRY REVISE PLANS TO ARRANGE TRIP COINCIDE THAT OF CEPEDA.

4. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 THIS CLEVER PLAN OF CEPDA INSINUATE

HIMSELF IN MATTER NOT CONCERNING HIM DIRECTLY. ROWTON EMPHASIZED IT ESSENTIAL LIRING-3 CONSULT HAVANA CONTACTS PRIOR ANY INVOLVEMENT LOCAL PERSONNEL LIKE CEPEDA WHO MIGHT WISH INFILTRATE INTO LIRING-3 AFFAIRS THROUGH CURIOSITY OR AS CUBAN INTEL OR SECURITY DESIRING MONITOR HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD AGAIN SEEN LIRING-2 MORNING 24 OCT AND QUESTIONED HIM RE CONTACTS HE WOULD BE EXPECTED MAKE IN HAVANA DURING TRIP. LIRING-2 REPLIED OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WOULD CERTAINLY BE ONE OF PRINCIPAL CONTACTS.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 CABLE FRIEND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMP FOR VISA. HE EXPECTS RECEIVE IT BY 28 OCT. LIRING-3 WILL THEN PURCHASE TICKET FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULED 31 OCT. HE WILL THEN TELL OR GET WORD CEPEDA HE LEAVING EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. ONLY FACTOR MIGHT ALTER THIS PLAN IS INSTRUCTIONS FROM LIRING-2 DELAY DEPARTURE TO COINCIDE WITH THAT CEPEDA.

SECRET SECRET

BT

NNNN

24 Oct 61

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Handling of LIRING-3 as Hostile Agent

In view of Station Mexico City's statement in paragraph 6 of MEXI 8944 (IN 23093), which presumably comes from LIRING-3's handler Wallace B. ROWTON, to the effect that LIRING-3 "still has strong anti-U.S. feelings", the time probably has come to review the LIRING-3/Ops (closely.) ~~In~~ the same cable the Station set forth several control elements including true name receipts and taps made in ROWTAN's safehouse of LIRING-3's amourous sessions with a young art student. What appears to be lacking in ~~not~~ considering the case as the handling of a double agent, possibly ~~probably~~ hostile, is "homework"--that is to say, that there are certain actions that should be taken in the case as follows:

a. Placing of a phone tap on L-3's telephone, if it can be determined that he has a telephone.

b. Intercept of all mail going to LIRING-3's home address.

c. Physical and photo surveillance of L-3 to determine any patterns of actions or contacts with suspicious persons, to see if L-3's contacts and actions agree with what L-3 tells ROWTON and to allow ROWTON to be prepared to cover himself in his relations with L-3.

d. To discreetly investigate L-3's sources of income, i.e., to see if his income from teaching art classes (and more recently from his wife's salary from Cubana ~~LIRING~~) are sufficient to account for his scale of living, whatever it is.

Secret

There are indications in the file that the "homework" as outlined above has not yet been done. The Station was queried in DIR 39039 DIR 14107 and in DIR- 07441 as to and the above matters. It is noted in MEXICO CITY- 8944 that the Station said that it did not as yet have "independent checks" on this agent, beyond evidence of entry to the Cuban Embassy furnished by LIONION photo surveillance, and in fact had only his word on claimed actions and statements; ~~and~~ (, in previous correspondence,) that LIENVOY and LITAINT-2 confirm that L-4, L-3's wife, is definitely employed as a secretary to LIRING-1 as claimed by L-3. The Station tended to doubt that L-3 is a Cuban plant but said that even if he were, that it was no additional risk (the Station was referring to a proposed trip by L-3 to Cuba) since L-3 would be provided with a suitable uncheckable explanation as to how L-3 obtained info on the LOPEZ case.

e. Check as suggested in DIR 07441 on status of LIRING-4's father, who is presumably a Chinese, reportedly in the United States. This is of interest in view of stringent U.S. entry requirements laid on Chinese.

Sherrod given the "word" on his TDY trip Oct 65

Secret

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 25

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR, [illegible] CI, CI/OPS, [illegible] FI, DDP, [illegible] CA 2, [illegible] FI/INT

22 OCT 63 IN 23093

S E C R E T 220016Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8944

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 39039

1. LIRING-2 CALLED LIRING-3 TO EMBASSY 19 OCT. DURING MEETING L-2:

A. THANKED L-3 FOR HIS COOPERATION DURING LOPEZ AFFAIR AND COMPLIMENTED HIM ON ACCURACY HIS INFO.

B. SAID HAD GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO L-3 SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS AND ADDED QUOTE WE WOULD LIKE YOU ASSIST US FURTHER IN SPECIFIC PROJECTS HERE IN MEXICO UNQUOTE.

2. PER PREVIOUS DIRECTIVES FROM ROWTON L-3 TOLD L-2 WOULD BE GLAD HELP REVOLUTION PROVIDED:

A. PROJECTS ASSIGNED HIM BE OF IMPORTANCE TO REVOLUTION.

B. EMBASSY PERSONNEL NOT BE INVOLVED IN THEM FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION.

3. L-3 REACTION TO L-2 VERY FAVORABLE COMPLIMENTED HIM ON SERIOUS APPROACH SAID HAD ANTICIPATED L-3'S CONDITIONS AND FELT L-3 SHOULD GO HAVANA TO DISCUSS PROJECTS DIRECTLY WITH RESPONSIBLE PERSONS RATHER THAN WORK THROUGH EMBASSY. (L-2 DID NOT THINK IT WISE

SECRET

This necessary for commercial type action —

PRESS FOR DETAILS. L-2 SAID AMBASSADOR IN FULL AGREEMENT AND HOPED L-3 WOULD BE ABLE TRAVEL WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS.

4. ROWTON ENCOURAGED L-3 PROCEED WITH PLANS FOR TRIP AND PROMISED PROVIDE MAXIMUM SUPPORT. L-3 STATED WOULD NOT MENTION ROWTON (AS GREEK FRIEND) TO CUBANS BUT WOULD COUNT COMPLETELY ON LATTER'S ADVICE AND GUIDANCE IN ALL ACTIONS. AGREED WITH ROWTON HE SHOULD NOT APPEAR NEED FUNDS TO MAKE TRIP SINCE WANTED CONTINUE HAVE FREE HAND IN PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS. WOULD EXPECT CUBANS FINANCE HIS ACTIVITIES ONCE BEGINS WORKING FOR THEM. FINANCES NOT MENTIONED IN MEETING WITH L-2.

How account for if he furnish?

5. L-3 FEELS CUBA NEEDS COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WITH WEST. SINCE ROWTON DOES NOT APPEAR AGAINST REVOLUTION AND WANTS DEVELOP TRADE WITH CUBA, L-3 WILLING WORK FOR HIM. AGREES WITH ROWTON THAT TO TRADE WITH CUBA, MUST HAVE GOOD INSIGHT IN WHAT IS GOING ON THERE, POLITICALLY AS WELL AS ECONOMICALLY. AT SAME TIME L-3 BELIEVES CUBANS OPERATING IN MEXICO WITH POOR SECURITY AND FEELS THAT WITH ROWTON'S ASSISTANCE COULD DO BETTER JOB AND SERVE BOTH ROWTON AND REVOLUTION. HIS CONDUCT WITH CUBANS THEREFORE IS NATURAL AND HIS CLANDESTINITY WITH ROWTON JUSTIFIED IN HIS EYES ON GROUNDS IT NECESSARY FOR OWN WELFARE.

SECRET

6. DIRECT WOFACT APPROACH AT THIS TIME WOULD DEFINITELY SHOCK L-3 WHO STILL HAS STRONG ANTI WOLADY FEELINGS AND COMPROMISE OP. DEGREE OF L-3'S ASSOCIATION WITH ROWTON SUFFICIENT COMPROMISE HIM WITH CUBANS AND LEFTISTS SHOULD IT COME TO LIGHT. OTHER CONTROL ELEMENTS ARE TRUE NAME RECEIPTS AND TAPES MADE IN ROWTON'S SAFE HOUSE OF L-3 AMOROUS SESSIONS WITH YOUNG ART STUDENT. IN VIEW OF ABOVE BELIEVE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLOITATION OF L-3 SHOULD CONTINUE ON CURRENT BASIS HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH ROWTON AS NOTHING WOULD BE GAINED BY FORMAL RECRUITMENT AT THIS TIME.

7. STATION AWARE CUBANS MAY WANT GET L-3 TO CUBA TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT "SOURCES" FROM WHOM OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ. INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITIES GIVE L-3 NAME OF STATION CENTRAL AMERICAN LEFTIST ASSET OR EVEN D.F.S. CONTACT (WITHOUT IDENTIFYING THEM AS ASSET OR CONTACT). L-3 WOULD EXPLAIN THAT INFO FROM THESE SOURCES, WHOM HE DOES NOT KNOW, WAS TRANSMITTED TO HIM VIA LOCAL FOREIGN LEFTIST WITH WHOM HE HAS REGULAR CONTACT PLAN BUT WHOSE ADDRESS OR REAL NAME HE DOES NOT KNOW.

8. STATION NOT AWARE YET OF TIMING ON CUBA TRAVEL, BUT TENTATIVELY VIEWS WITH FAVOR PENDING RECEIPT AND STUDY ALL AVAILABLE BACKGROUND DATA ON LIRING-3 FROM ROWTON. AWARE FACT

SECRET

rich
wife of Mexican

STATION HAS NO INDEPENDENT CHECKS THIS AGENT BEYOND EVIDENCE OF ENTRY TO EMBASSY FURNISHEED BY LICNION. HAVE ONLY HIS WORD ON CLAIMED ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS. HOWEVER, SO FAR TEND DOUBT HE CUBAN PLANT, BUT EVEN IF SHOULD BE, STATION INCURRING NO ADDITIONAL RISK BY FALLING IN WITH TRIP, SINCE WILL PROVIDE HIM ONLY WITH SUITABLE UNCHECKABLE EXPLANATION HOW HE OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ.

9. FACT LIRING-4 DEFINITELY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY LIRING-1 CONFIRMED BY L-3, LITAINT-2 AND LIENVOY. STATION NOT SURE, HOWEVER, IF SHE PAID BY HAVANA OR BY EMBASSY OUT OF LOCAL FUNDS.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

14-00000

YES ☐ NO
TO FILE NO.
TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, CA 2, CA/PROP

S E C R E T 212318Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8938

22 OCT 66 IN 23083

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8889 (IN 20149)

1. LIRING-~~2~~-3 REPORTED TO ROWTON 19 OCT 66 HE HAD MADE CONTACT WITH CECILIA CARMEN MARQUEZ DE ROSSIE AFTER LATTER ARRIVED ON CUBANA FLIGHT FROM HAVANA 17 OCT 66.

2. LIRING-3 STATED LIRING-4 HAD MET CECILIA AT PLANE BUT THAT LATTER HAD BEEN SO OPEN IN HER DENUNCIATION OF CASTRO REGIME THAT LIRING-3 TOLD LIRING-4 BREAK CONTACT FOR FEAR JEOPARDIZING HER POSITION. LIRING-4 NOTED CECILIA WAS CONTACTED AT HOTEL BY CUBAN REFUGEES OF "DOUBTFUL LOYALTY" AND THAT CECILIA, AFTER THESE CONTACTS, WAS SEEN TO HAVE LARGE SUM U.S. DOLLARS IN HER POSSESSION. LIRING-4 REPORTED SHE SAW ONE QUANTITY AMOUNTING TO FIVE HUNDRED.

3. IN VIEW LIRING-3 PRESENT STATUS WITH LIRING-2, LIRING-3 CONFIRMED WITH ROWTON THAT HE SHOULD REPORT FACTS OF CECILIA TO LIRING-2. HE BELIEVES THAT TO WITHHOLD SUCH INFORMATION MIGHT WORK TO HIS DISADVANTAGE WERE IT TO BECOME KNOWN TO CUBAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL.

4. CECILIA REPORTED TO LIRING-4 THAT CUBANS HAD BUMPED HER OFF PLANE 9 OCT 66 ON PRETEXT THERE NO ROOM. DID NOT ARREST OR QUESTION

HER AND LATER ALLOWED HER AND CHILDREN LEAVE ON 17 OCT. SHE REMAINED IN HAVANA HOTEL DURING INTERIM.

5. CECILIA PROFESSES HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE HER FORMER HUSBAND. HOWEVER, MEXICO CITY NEWSPAPER EL UNIVERSAL, 11 OCT 66, CARRIES STORY DATELINED RIO DE JANEIRO, 10 OCT 66 IN WHICH RAMON ROSSIE, NAMED IN PAPER AS RAMON RODRIGUEZ, DENOUNCES CASTRO REGIME AND STATES HE GOING MAKE HOME IN RIO. LIRING-3 GAVE EL UNIVERSAL CLIPPING OF STORY TO ROWTON.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-800004

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 1 PER #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 20 16 27 Z CITE DIRECTOR 5108

TO: MEXICO CITY INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, CARACAS, JMWAVE

TYPIC AMPOP

REF: MEXICO CITY 8889 (IN 20149) (BEING SENT RIO DE JANEIRO)

FOR MEXICO CITY: PLEASE ATTEMPT ELICIT FROM LIRING/3 INFORMATION CONCERNING AMPOP/1'S WIFE AND FAMILY WHO ARE SUBJECTS OF REFERENCE. PARTICULARLY INTERESTED WIFE'S FUTURE PLANS; HER TREATMENT WHILE CUBA; AND REACTION AMPOP/1 EMPLOYERS TO HIS DEFECTION AND DESERTION HIS FAMILY.

END OF MESSAGE

LIRING-3

C/WH/C/FI ______

C/WH/C/CI ______

C/WH/C/MO ______

WH/1 ______

WH/3/V ______

WH/5 ______

by
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

19-18

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 38

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION DC/WH-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY Transmitted To AMES BLDG. ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME 2040z BY B

INFO FILE, CSDO, VR, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/SOD-3, C/CA-2, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/CI/PS

S E C R E T 071805Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8757

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA 7 OCT 66 12398

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8692 (IN 07422)

1. STATION PURSUING JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ ARMS SMUGGLING CASE WITH TWO OBJECTIVES:

A. "BURN" LOPEZ IN EYES HIS SERVICE AND EXPOSE CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS CASE. THIS DELICATE UNDERTAKING IN VIEW MEXICAN EFFORTS PLAY DOWN CASE AND AVOID MENTION CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

B. ELEVATE LIRING-3 IN EYES OF CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO AND HOPE HE MIGHT BE DRAWN INTO LOCAL CUBAN SPONSORED CLANDESTINE OPS. THIS ALREADY DISCUSSED BY ROWTON WITH L-3 WHO AGREED COOPERATE PROVIDING CUBANS USE HIM IN PROFESSIONAL MANNER PROVIDING HIM WITH GOOD SECURITY.

2. AS PROBABLE DIRECT RESULT FACING LOPEZ WITH FACTS HIS ARREST, LIRING-3 SAW AMBASSADOR JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS AT LATTER'S REQUEST ON 2 OCT. PER STATION INSTRUCTIONS RELAYED BY ROWTON, L-3 MADE FOLL POINTS:

A. LOPEZ WHO TALKED UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR WAS

SECRET

Jane

RESPONSIBLE FOR ARMS CASE ARRESTS. ONE OF PERSONS WHO OVERHEARD HIM CONTACTED POLICE WHO SURVEILLED LOPEZ PRIOR TO RAID ON GONZALEZ HOME.

B. LOPEZ FOOLISHLY INVOLVED HIMSELF UNDER HIS DIPLOMATIC STATUS IN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES BETTER UNDERTAKEN BY INDIVIDUALS READY SERVE REVOLUTION AND MUCH LESS CONSPICUOUS, SUCH AS LIRING-3.

C. WIFE AND FATHER IN LAW OF LOPEZ COULD BE OBJECT LOCAL HARASSMENT SHOULD STORY LOPEZ INVOLVEMENT BE PRINTED.

D. DETAILS OF LOPEZ ARREST OBTAINED FROM "LEFTIST CENTRAL AMERICAN FRIENDS" WHOM HE SAID HE WOULD NOT IDENTIFY FURTHER FOR OBVIOUS REASONS.

from Paston m also from unknown [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

3. ALTHOUGH APPRECIATIVE, CUBAN AMBASSADOR TRIED GIVE LOW KEY EMPHASIS TO ENTIRE ARMS AFFAIR. IN COURSE 2 OCT MEET THIS ANGERED L-3. LATTER CALLED ON AMBASSADOR NEXT EVENING TO WARN HIM THAT "STORY OF ARMS CASE SOLD IN MEXICO TO FOREIGN NEWSMAN". THIS APPEARED WORRY AMBASSADOR WHO ALSO SHOWED CONCERN WHEN L-3 AGAIN POINTED TO GUILT AND FOOLISHNESS OF LOPEZ AND REITERATED HIS CONCERN FOR LOPEZ' WIFE. AMBASSADOR SAID MRS. LOPEZ DUE LEAVE FOR HAVANA ON NEXT PLANE (7 OR 8 OCT).

4. LATE 4 OCT LIRING-2 ASKED SEE L-3, OSTENSIBLY TO THANK HIM

Cubans think info from Soviets?

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 8757 S E C R E T **SECRET**
FOR HIS INTEREST IN "EMBASSY" AFFAIRS. L-3 REPEATED WHAT HE ALREADY
MENTIONED TO AMBASSADOR. L-2 VISIBLY SHAKEN SAID HE HAD HARD TIME
BELIEVING LOPEZ LOOSE TALK RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERYTHING. L-3 STRESSED
IT INFANTILE FOR CUBANS TO BE USING DIPLOMATS FOR CLANDESTINE OPS
AS SUCH EFFORTS EASY SPOT AND COULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE MEXICAN/
CUBAN RELATIONS. L-3 ADDED IT PROBABLY VERY COSTLY TO KEEP CUBAN IN-
VOLVEMENT IN ARMS AFFAIR QUIET. L-2 SAID CUBANS DID NOT HAVE TO PAY
BUT L-3 REPLIED HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT AS KNEW MEXICANS ONLY TOO WELL.
L-2 CURRENTLY SITTING IN OFFICE OF COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY. HIS MEETING
WITH L-3 LEFT LATTER UNDER DEFINITE IMPRESSION L-2 ASSESSING HIM FOR
POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT.

5. ARMS STORY INCLUDING LOPEZ INVOLVEMENT APPEARED IN GUATE-
MALAN "ELIMPARCIAL" 3 OCT. AT STATION DIRECTION, LITAMIL-2 PASS-
ING AS IRATE ANTI-COMMIE MEXICAN PHONED GUATEMALAN EMBASSY 5 OCT TO CALL
ATTENTION OF EMBASSY TO "IMPARCIAL" ARTICLE WHICH APPARENTLY WOULD
NOT BE RECEIVED AT EMBASSY FOR NEXT FEW DAYS. ALSO EVENING 5 OCT
STATION OFFICER MENTIONED "IMPARCIAL" PIECE TO FORNOFF CONTACT (WHO
HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN OF IT). HE SEEMED DISTRUBED AND MADE
PHONE CALL TO UNKNOWN PARTY. ENGLISH LANGUAGE PAPER MENTIONED

SECRET

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS CASE 6 OCT WITHOUT GIVING LOPEZ IDENTITY, SIMPLY MENTIONING THAT CUBAN OFFICIAL INVOLVED "DISAPPEARED". LICOMET-1 WAS APPROACHED BY UPI STRINGER LATE 5 OCT AND ASKED VERIFY LOPEZ ARREST. AFTER CHECKING WITH STATION L-1 WILL CONFIRM LOPEZ ARRESTED WITHOUT FURTHER DETAILS. STATION HAS ARRANGED HAVE LICOMET-28 DISCREETLY PHOTOGRAPH DEPARTURE MRS. LOPEZ AT AIRPORT UNDER COVER HIS FUNCTIONS. HOPE TO BE ABLE USE PHOTOS FOR FURTHER ARTICLE IN FOREIGN PRESS. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 37

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 26

ACTION
WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/PS

S E C R E T 021630Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8659

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

2 OCT 66 IN 07879

REF: MEXICO CITY 8632 (IN 07422)*

1. LIRING/3 HAS RECEIVED REQUEST FROM JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS FOR MEETING AND MEETING SCHEDULED NIGHT OF 2 OCTOBER 1966 IN CUBAN EMBASSY. NO DOUBT BUT THAT HERNANDEZ REQUEST FOR MEETING RESULT OF LIRING/3 CONFRONTATION OF JULIAN LOPEZ MENTIONED REF.

2. LIRING/3 PREPARED GIVE HERNANDEZ SAME STORY HE GAVE LOPEZ BUT WITH TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH WILL BE EMPHASIZED:

A. ACCORDING TO LIRING/3 FRIENDS, WHICH HE INSTRUCTED NOT TO IDENTIFY, ARRESTS CAME AS RESULT LOPEZ BABBLINGS AT DRINKING PARTY TO EFFECT CUBANS SUPPORTING REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA AND HE AT HEAD OF EFFORT IN MEXICO. AS RESULT THIS DISCLOSURE MEXICAN POLICE HEARD OF GANG AND BEGAN FOLLOWING LOPEZ AT LEAST TWO WEEKS BEFORE ARRESTS MADE.

B. LOPEZ FOOL FOR TAKING ACTIVE PART IN REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORT AND SHOULD HAVE PROTECTED HIMSELF AND CUBANS BY USING SUCH PEOPLE AS LIRING/3 AND OTHER MEXICANS OR CENTRAL AMERICANS. HOPE BY THIS MEANS ELEVATE VALUE OF LIRING/3 TO CUBAN EMBASSY AND ITS ILLEGAL/CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

[illegible] MEXICO CITY [illegible] S E C R E T SECRET

3. ALSO PLANNING HAVE LITAMIL/3 RETURN TO HERNANDEZ OCTOBER WITH STORY FACTS OF LOPEZ ARREST ABOUT TO BREAK IN PRESS AND [illegible] MAY ENDANGER IRMA TRAPOTE DE LOPEZ AND HER FATHER VICTOR TRAPOTE. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT SCHEDULED BREAK STORY IN MEXICO 4 OCTOBER [illegible] ISSUE. WARNING TO HERNANDEZ COULD BE STAGED SO LATE THERE NO [illegible] GETTING IRMA AND VICTOR ON CUBANA FLIGHT WHICH SCHEDULED OCTOBER.

S E C R E T

* JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ RELEASED BY MEXICAN POLICE [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

RID COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

c/c2/576

MEXICO CITY 9592

[illegible] GUATEMALA CITY

10[illegible]07422

REFERENCES: A. MEXICO CITY [illegible] (IN [illegible]424)

B. MEXICO CITY 9643 (IN 4643)

1. JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ RELEASED BY MEXICAN POLICE AFTERNOON [illegible] CONSIDERING FACT NO EVIDENCE TO [illegible] RECRUITABLE IT DECIDED AT LEAST [illegible] CONCERN [illegible] MAY [illegible] LEAD INTO [illegible] [illegible]ICAL.

2. [illegible] BE PLAYING THIS ACTIVITY LOW. [illegible] APPEARED IN MEXICO CITY PRESS AS [illegible] IDENTIFICATION [illegible] LOPEZ DIAZ [illegible]

3. [illegible] WALLACE B. ROWTON CONTACTED [illegible] LIRING/3 ACKNOWLEDGED LOPEZ DIAZ [illegible] 29 SEP [illegible] MORNING OF 29 SEP AND WAS NOT AVAILABLE [illegible] EMBASSY [illegible] LIRING/3 HE HAD LEARNED LOPEZ DIAZ HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH ARMS SMUGGLING [illegible] AND HAD BEEN HELD FROM 25 SEP TO 28 SEP.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5592 S E C R E T

[illegible] LOPEZ WAS CARRYING $6000 IN TWENTY DOLLAR BILLS WHEN ARRESTED IN HOUSE OF GONZALEZ. LIRING/3 WAS AMAZED AT [illegible]. ROWTON THEN TOLD LIRING/3 INFO WAS IN HANDS AT LEAST ONE NEWSPAPERMAN AND MIGHT BREAK IN PRESS ANY TIME. ROWTON SAID HE HAD LEARNED THIS FROM OFFICIAL OF MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND [illegible] ALREADY HAD STORY. ROWTON ALLEGED HE HAD PERSUADED MEXICAN OFFICIAL TO CONVINCE NEWSPAPERMAN NOT [illegible] STORY FOR NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. ROWTON SUGGESTED LIRING/3 GO LOPEZ HOME AND TIP HIM OFF SO HE WOULD NOT BE UNEXPECTEDLY CONFRONTED BY PRESS [illegible] IN CASE STORY BROKE. LIRING/3 INSTRUCTED GIVE LOPEZ ALL FACTS ROWTON HAD DISCOVERED.

5. MORNING 30 SEPTEMBER ROWTON CONTACTED LIRING/3 [illegible] TO FIND OUT RESULTS OF PLOY. LIRING/3 [illegible] NIGHT BEFORE FOUND LOPEZ THERE WITH WIFE AND FATHER-IN-LAW VICTOR TRAPOTE. LIRING/3 TOLD LOPEZ HE HAD LEARNED LOPEZ HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND DETAINED [illegible] AFTER HE HAD TURNED UP IN CONTACT WITH ARMS [illegible] AND THAT HE WAS CARRYING $6000 IN SMALL BILLS. LIRING/3 STATED HE HAD NO WAY KNOWING TRUE FACTS BUT WAS

SECRET

14-00000

PAGE [illegible] MEXICO CITY [illegible] S E C R E T

SECRET

[illegible] THAT IF TRUE LOPEZ COULD GO INTO [illegible]. ACCORDING LIRING/3 LOPEZ TURNED WHITE UPON HEARING [illegible] REALLY ADMITTED STORY COMPLETELY TRUE.

4. LIRING/3 TOLD NEWTON HE HAD INFORMED LOPEZ AFFAIR [illegible] AND HE HAD LEARNED IT FROM SOME CENTRAL [illegible]. [illegible] COMMENTED THAT THESE FRIENDS MUST HAVE LEARNED IT FROM POLICE AND ADDED IN ANY CASE HE LEAVING [illegible]. LIRING/3 REPLIED PLANE NOT DUE UNTIL [illegible] HOW COULD LOPEZ LEAVE NEXT DAY. LOPEZ [illegible] HAD BEEN ARRANGED BUT HE NOT CERTAIN WHETHER [illegible] OR SIMPLY SCHEDULED 1 OCT FLIGHT ADVANCED [illegible]. LIRING/3 CHIDED LOPEZ BECOMING INVOLVED IN AFFAIR [illegible] LOPEZ SHOULD HAVE USED SOMEONE LIKE LIRING/3 [illegible]. THIS GOT LITTLE REACTION FROM LOPEZ WHO MERELY COMMENTED IT ALREADY [illegible] NOW.

5. LIRING/3 TOLD NEWTON HE SAW NO SIGNS OF PHYSICAL [illegible] LOPEZ.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

B.CAREW:mot
NIT: WH/C/CICS
XT: 2578
ATE: 28 SEPT 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 8 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

ROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , WH 8, C/OA, C/OPS, C/IC 2

FI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 29 1313Z CITE DIRECTOR 39039

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A) MEXICO CITY 8651 (IN 04697)*

B) MEXICO CITY 7711 (IN 43725)**

FROM HQS READING OF THIS OP, APPEARS THAT ROWTON/LIRING-3 RELATIONSHIP MAY BE NEARING POINT OF POSITIVE RECRUITMENT. REQUEST CURRENT STATION READING OF OPERATION AND UPDATED ASSESSMENT LIRING-3 AND -4 INCLUDING POSSIBLE PLANS FOR RECRUITMENT OF EACH. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE PLACE TECHNICAL OR OTHER SURVEILLANCE AS MENTIONED REF B? HAS LITAMIL -7 BEEN ABLE VERIFY LIRING/4 ~~[illegible]~~ EMPLOYMENT LIRING?

END OF MESSAGE

* REFS ATTACHED.
**

C/WH/C/CICS ____
C/WH/C/FI T. Hazlett (draft)
WH/C/FI/TC J. Lucey (draft)
C/WH/C/CA/PA C. Anderson (draft)
C/WH/1 J. Fisher (draft)
WH/C/MO R. Ottman (draft)

LIRING 3

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

28-23
10

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM

DISSEM BY 32

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	TC	5	RR
2		6	CI
3	FI	7	CA
4	MO	8	PA

ACTION WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY D

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC2

S E C R E T 272215Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8651

27 Sep 66 04697

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 26 SEPT THAT LIRING-4 NOW OFFICIALLY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY TO LIRING-1. ACCORDING TO LIRING-3 LIRING-1 AND LIRING-2 WILL GO HOME PCS IN DECEMBER.

2. NEW CONSUL WHO WILL REPLACE LIRING-1 IS EMPLOYEE WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY TWO YEARS AGO. LIRING-3 COULD NOT REMEMBER HIS NAME BUT WILL QUERY LIRING-4 AND OBTAIN.

3. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD BEEN ASKED ABOUT CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AT EMBASSY BY ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ON LAST TRIP TO HAVNA. LIRING-3 SAID HE REPLIED THERE WAS NONE. WHEN HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY LIRING-3 CARRIED LETTER TO JULIAN LOPEZ, CULTURAL ATTACHE, AND AFTER LOPEZ READ IT HE APPEARED COOL TOWARD LIRING-3. MORE RECENTLY LOPEZ APPEARED WARM UP AGAIN WITH LIRING-3 AND NOW HAD ASKED LIRING-3 DIRECT CUBAN ART ACTIVITIES MEXICO, PARTICULARLY PLASTIC ARTS. LIRING-3 ACCEPTED. LIRING-3 TAGS LOPEZ AS CUIS TYPE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

Joe 7
4/6

15 Sept 66 WASH POST

Western Trade With Cuba Down

MIAMI, Sept. 14 (AP)—An exile organization reported today that Western world trade with Communist Cuba declined sharply last month compared with the same month in 1965.

Revolutionary Unity (UR), which claims it keeps track of ship dockings in Cuba, said only 14 ships from non-Communist countries called at Cuban ports last month. This was a drop of 65.8 per cent compared with August, 1965, the group said.

Of the vessels reported docking in Cuba last month, eight belonged to Britain, three to Greece, and one each to Lebanon, France and Italy, the report said.

Interesting, in view LIRING-3 report that Cuba needed 24 bottoms.

J

John
LIRING-3

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

[redacted]

ORIG: J. MOUGHAN;fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, WH 8, CI/OA, FI, [illegible]

~~(CLASSIFICATION)~~ ~~(DATE AND TIME FILED)~~ ~~(REFERENCE NUMBER)~~

SECRET 15 12 53Z CITE DIRECTOR 35223

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8487 (IN 91995)

B. DIRECTOR 34711

1. APPRECIATE STATION POSITION BUT IT HQS OPINION THAT ANY BOOST IN PRESTIGE LIRING 3 MIGHT GAIN IS OVERSHADOWED BY WOLADY POLICY AGAINST CHARTERING SHIPS. HQS ATTEMPTING CONFIRM NEED FOR SHIPS THROUGH OTHER SOURCES AND DOES NOT WISH INVOLVE STAM.

2. PLS KEEP HQS INFORMED PARA 1 REF A DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA H. Mustakos
C/WH/C/MO E. J. Clinica
WH/1 Stewart (draft)

E. C. Williamson
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

E. C. Williamson
THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-8

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 40

SECRET

ORIG: MOUGHAN:fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1966R

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX

FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 47 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE EUR 8 WH 8

FI FI/INT 2 SB 8

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 13 20 29Z CITE DIRECTOR 34711

TO LONDON INFO MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8487 (IN 91995) NOT SENT LONDON

1. MEXICO CITY SOURCE REPORTED INFORMATION ON CUBAN NEED FOR 24 SHIPS OF APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TONS. SHIPS POSSIBLY TO BE USED TO TRANSPORT 1967 SUGAR CROP WHICH REPORTEDLY TO REACH LARGE PROPORTIONS. FOREGOING MAY INDICATE RUSSIAN SHIPPING AID CUBA BEING CUT.

2. PLS QUERY STANLEY A. COOKE (P) TO SEE WHETHER HE CAN DISCREETLY CONFIRM CUBAN NEED FOR SHIPS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA
WH/C/MO Ortman (draft)
WH/1 Stewart (draft)
E/BC/UK
EUR/Cuba Raty (phone)

4
LIRING-3

C/EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

13-9
1040

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

[illegible]

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT	CLASSIFICATION #032 **SECRET**

		ROUTING			
ORIG.	R. Whitney Tucker;sm	1		4	
UNIT	WH/C/RR/RE	2		5	
EXT.	3483	3		6	
DATE	10 September 1966				

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH/C 11

TDCS DB-315/02533-66

INFORMATION COPIES
CS/DO, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 2, DO/H 4, EUR 6, WH 12

DATE DISTRIBUTED
10 September 1966

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
MEXI-8487 (IN-91995)
MEXI-8458 (IN-89335)
LIRING-3
Liaison *

DISSEMINATION

WHC/RE	3	WHC/SI	1	E/IB/R	1	WH/1/R	2
WHC/RR	1	WHC/WAVE#	1	E/BC/C	2	WH/MEXI	1
WHC/FI	2	WHC/CA	1	E/MADR	1		
WHC/CI	1						
WHC/MO	1			WH/PACY(CINCSO)			1

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

LIRING-3 PROD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER	COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (WHEN FILLED IN)	RELEASING OFFICER C/WH/C/RR
	COPY NO.

FORM 12-62 1K-2 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

[illegible] (13-20-44-45)

LIRING-3 Production

ROUTINE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -91995
-89335

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXXXX SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

REPCINCLANT FBI BIC COAST GUARD

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

TDCS DB-315/02533-66

DIST 10 SEPTEMBER 1966

10 15 22 Z

COUNTRY CUBA

DOI AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT CUBAN INTEREST IN CHARTERING MERCHANT VESSELS

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY

FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WHO IS A NEW, UNWITTING REPORTING ASSET. SOURCE HAS CULTURAL AND FAMILY TIES IN CUBA. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION DURING CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO.

1. ACCORDING TO WORD RECEIVED IN MEXICO FROM AN OFFICIAL OF THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE, CUBA'S MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT AT THE MOMENT IS THE CHARTERING OF 24 SHIPS, VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS "OF MEDIUM TONNAGE" AND "OF APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TONS", FOR USE IN 1967. THIS PROJECT IS BEING HELD AS SECRET INFORMATION, AND MANY CUBAN OFFICIALS DO NOT KNOW OF IT, EVEN IF THEY ARE CONCERNED WITH TRADE AND SHIPPING MATTERS. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SHIPS ARE POSSIBLY TO BE USED TO TRANSPORT THE 1967 SUGAR CROP, WHICH ALLEGEDLY WILL REACH LARGE PROPORTIONS.) (FIELD COMMENT: PERHAPS A REDUCTION IS EXPECTED IN SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN THE MATTER OF SHIPPING.)

2. AURELIO ALONSO GONZALEZ, OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE, IS GOING TO CANADA ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER TO SEEK THE BEST AND CHEAPEST CHANNEL FOR RENTING SHIPS. HIS TRIP IS NOT BEING PUBLICIZED BECAUSE PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT CHARTERING IS MORE DIFFICULT AND EXPENSIVE FOR CUBA ONCE HER REQUIREMENTS BECOME KNOWN TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS.

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

Cua 2.-430.- 19 octubre 66.

S-)./ 460.- Salida al 703009.- 1442hs. Orlando Suárez con MF -- Electa le pregunta que que estaba haciendo.- Electa que esta dibujando.- Suárez: que buena ocupación.--- Electa: que donde esta.- Suárez: que en la embajada.- Electa: que si se cansó ayer.- Suárez: que no que tuvo que hacer un montón de cosas por la mañana.- Electa: que si vió a Leopoldo.- Suárez que sí.- Electa: que qué le dijo.- Suárez: que bueno, que ésí que el interés de hacer la exposición, pero que con poco entusiasmo.--- Electa: que mamá le dice que seguramente el que sí no tiene toda la coolección completa de su obra, que el sí tiene una colección completa que puede ser suficiente - para hacer la exposición personal.- Suárez: que el dice que tiene muy pocas, que para hacer una exposición de unos cien o ciento cincuenta grabados que nada mas tendría la tercera parte y que el resto tendrían que ser fotografías y que a él -Suarez- no le gusta esa idea.--- Electa: que se podría conseguir -pero que eso sería averiguarlo con calma- que -- Bellas Artes prestara algunas cosas.--- Suarez: que puede ser una cosa combinada con la OPIC.--- Electa: que otra cosa, que el taller está preparando una exposición de toda su historia y piensa poner un número pequeño de cada uno de sus miembros pero va a ser grande en conjunto, que eso es lo que están preparando.--- Suárez que a él le interesa ir por el taller.--- Electa: que entonces dice mamá que que le parecería que llevaran a traves tuyo esta exposición después de presentarse en Bellas Artes, que fuera a Cuba así - completaecito la va a montar Bellas Artes, que no sabe que dificultades haya con esta gente de Bellas Artes, pero su mamá parece entusiasmada con esa idea, que entonces su morá fijará un día para que vaya con ella al taller, que le diga cuando y que el día en que se vayan a reunir que ella le avisa para que tu estés al tanto de eso.--- Suarez que se pondran de acuerdo estos días y que cuando puedan ir allá que irán.--- Electa: que que va a hacer ahora.- Suárez que va a ver si puede ver a Carlos Jurado que vive cerca de la embajada, que comió con Siqueiros ahora en su casa.- Electa que que dice.- Suárez: que está enfrascado con su trabajo que quiere terminar para el 20 de noviembre el mural de Chapultepec; que esta noche hay una conferencia que le interesa ir, que es al Curso que se llama Teorico Problema Arte Sociedad, que va a hablar el maestro José Luis Balcarcel que

Arenal

22 Oct 66 HMMA 30397

#5985

el lugar va a ser en el Salón 14 de la Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Políticas de la Ciudad Universitaria a las 19 horas, que si le interesa ir.--- Electa: que hay un compromiso con los hijos.--- quedan en comunicarse para hacer cita para verse.--- 553.

558.- Salida al Hotel Insurgentes.- HD Rafael con Heriberto le dice que va a pasar con ellos.-- Heriberto de acuerdo. - - - - 577.

. . . .

Rico le diga llame al 146777 y pregunte por Juán Gonzáles.--
Rico queda de dar el recado al Dr.Roberto Pereda.- 220.-

220. Salida al 492141.-1530.-Jorrin pide a HF le diga a Juán que le tiene un paquete y HF acepta.- 224.-

224. Salida al 310106.-HD pregunta por Enrique,Olga y Sergio, y HF informa que no están.- 233.-

233. Salidas al 259100.-1601.- Curbelo se comunica a la Embajada Americana,pide la ext.343 y pregunta a la señorita .... qué noticias le tiene de la visa del [illegible]..... y HF dice que estará lista a las 5. Curbelo:que irá a esa hora.- 246. --

246. Salidas sin contestación y ocupado.- 434.-

434. Entrada.-Rolando pregunta a Jorrin si alguién lo llamó- y éste dice que nó,pero Carlos Jurado le dejó un recado. - Rolando Rodríguez pregunta cuál Carlos Jurado y Jorrin dice- efectivamente estaba equivocado.- 447.-

448. Salidas ocupado y sin contestación.- 693.-

693. Salida al 153273.-1700.- Jorrin se queja de que le llevaron el pedido pero sin los 6 atomizadores que pidió y HF - pide marque el 158720 y hable con la señorita Durán.- 706.-- Jorrin acepta y al enterarse de que por la mañana no habló-- con la señorita Durán, repite lo anterior a la señorita Barrera y ésta queda de enviárselos mañana.- 756.-

756. Aparato muerto y salidas ocupado y sin contestación.852.

(3.-L31.- 10 Oct.66).-

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES (26)

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM DISSEM by 23/

ACTION WH/C8

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, C3, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, [illegible]

S E C R E T 131756Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8624

13 OCT [illegible] 19737

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8608 *

1. WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN OF RAMON ROSSIE LISTED ON CUBANA MANIFEST OF OCT 66 TO MEXICO CITY, HOWEVER MANIFEST SHOWED THEY DID NOT TRAVEL. SOURCE LIFIRE.

2. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 11 OCT 66 HE HAD HEARD CECILIA MARQUEZ FERNANDEZ DE ROSSIE AND TWO CHILDREN ARRESTED AS THEY BOARDING CUBANA FOR MEXICO CITY 9 OCT. SOURCE OF LIRING-3 INFO NOT DISCLOSED BUT PROBABLY CAME FROM OTHER PASSENGERS WHO MADE FLIGHT.

3. LIRING-3 ALSO TOLD ROWTON HE HAD HEARD ROSSIE NOW IN BRAZIL WHERE HE MADE DEROGATORY STATEMENTS AGAINST CUBAN REGIME. LIRING-3 SUSPECTED THIS MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSE FOR WIFE'S ARREST AT AIRPORT.

SECRET

SECRET * NOT PROCESSED BY C/S AS OF 13 OCT 66 2030 HRS.

SECRET

BT

LIRING-3

5839

[illegible]4. Entrada sin contestación.- 1[illegible].-

127. Salida al 144237.-1045.- Chichay pregunta a Olga hasta qué hora [illegible] puede llevar cosas para enviar a Cuba y Olga dice que hasta las 12.- 182.-

1050 h.

182. Entrada.-La señora Susana Mitrani Moreno de Benzuza pregunta si llegó la certificación de su acta de nacimiento y Chichay dice que nó; pregunta su teléfono y Susana dice que es trabajo en el 122584.- 246.-

246. Entrada 1052.-HF explica que su hijo que está en Cuba [illegible] le mandó su acta de matrimonio y quisiera saber dónde pudo legalizar al embajador y Abreu dice que en Relaciones Exteriores y pregunte por el Embajador Dammes.- 259.-

259. Aparato descolgado, aparato muerto y entrada equivocada. 349.-

349. Salida al 713689.-1156.- Abreu con Marcela para platicarle que ayer fué a Oaxtepec, pero prefiere el Varadero; que hoy ó en la semana irá a verla. Marcela acepta y luego habla con Chichaya a quien queda de ir a ver mañana a la embajada ó a su casa y Chichay acepta y aclara que vive a media cuadra de la embajada.- 414.-

NMMA 30173
4 oct 66

Nacida Tuschi

414. Entrada 1[illegible] .- La señora ....de Tuschi pregunta si llegó su pasaporte que solicitó hace un año y Chichay dice que nó; pregunta su teléfono y HF dice que es el 403646.-462.-

462. Entrada.-La señora Rosa María .... pregunta si llegó la prórroga de su pasaporte y Chichay indica que nó.- 499.-
(2.-L11.-26 Sep.66).-

5827

Embajada Cubana.- 11-28-47.
29 septiembre 63.- 111-M18.
09[illegible]0-14[illegible]

01-49.- Entradas sin contestación.

45.- Entra a las 1000hs.- García de Cubana con HD le dice que está un señor que trae una carta firmada por Curbelo para unos pasajes, pero que el número de orden que dan no está correcto.- HD que para quienes son los pasajes.- García: [illegible] HUDEL.-, que dice que para que hagan uso de un pasaje de la orden de [illegible] con el número 1369-03558 y que ese número no existe.- HD que va a investigar con Curbelo en la embajada y que luego le llama.--- 63.-

64.- Salida al 141326.- 1007hs.- Mery de parte de [illegible] por el teléfono de CAPOTE.- Jorrín que es el 35-39-64.--- 72.

86.- Salida al 141326.- HD con Jorrín le dice que si está Curbelo.- Jorrín que no está.- HD que le diga que en Cubana no pueden expedir los pasajes para Pérez González y Cepeda Hernández porque está equivocado el número de la orden de pasajes.- Jorrín que él va a llamar a Cubana.--- 110.

111.- Salida al 213689.- 1055hs.- Miriam con Marcela Olguín hablan de asuntos personales.- Quedan en juntarse a platicar previa cita.- Marcela le proporciona su dirección: Xola 1053-1 [illegible] con [illegible].--- Miriam a su vez le proporciona su dirección: Calzada de Tacubaya 172-5-B.-- 171.

203.- Entrada.- HF la Sra. Mitrani con Miriam le habla sobre la [illegible] de un documento que se mandó a la Habana.- Miriam que no ha llegado, que llame el lunes.-- 257

2[illegible]3.- Entrada a las 1140hs.- HF con Mery le dice que ella

[illegible] 11-12-3[illegible].
21 [illegible] 1130-1[illegible].
1[illegible]

66.- Salida al 111075.-1530hs.- Jorrín con Mª Villarroel le dice que celebra su impaciencia que ya lo comprenderá.- Villarroel: que su coche ya lo mandaron traer pero que no lo [illegible] ahora, que el [illegible] que será mañana.- Jorrín: [illegible] que le gustaría que le [illegible] a [illegible] Alcántara de El Universal porque ellos [illegible] alguna foto [illegible], aunque ya se hizo la entrega simbólica, pero que sería [illegible] por portando el vehículo. Jorrín: que es mejor que él se comunique con el cuando ten[illegible] eso.- Villarroel: que entonces el lo avisa [illegible].- 67.

70.- Salida al 494407.- 1602hs.- Chichay con Aurea le dice que [illegible] en la Ciudadela va a tener una exposición de [illegible] de dos caricaturistas cubanos para que vayan, que es a las [illegible] de la noche.- Aurea: que Jorge anda por Aguascalientes porque se fué de jurado para el concurso de teatro y que regresa hasta el sábado.- Chichay: que la exposición es solamente mañana en la Escuela de Artesanía, que le diga a las demás personas que vayan.--- 92.

93-195.- Salidas sin contestación, ocupado y equivocado.

215.- Entrada a las 1616hs.- Mª Alberto Domingo por Nuez.- Chichay: que no está.--- Domingo: que mas tarde habla.- 26

263.- Salida al 197010.- 1540hs.- Chichay por Sonia Quiñones.- MP que no ha llegado.- Chichay: que le diga que pasó a [illegible] por un [illegible] en casa de Carlos Jurado.--- 273.

274-275.- Salidas sin contestación y ocupado.

5924

[illegible] y Rogelio Farias, pide a Chichay que cuando lleguen -- lo llamen al 485925. Chichay acepta.- 115.-

115. Salida.- Curbelo al enterarse de que no está Acevedo,-- pide que cuando llegue le digan lo llame y MF acepta.- 122.-

123. Salida sin contestación.- 135.-

135. Entrada.-MF pregunta por Curbelo y Chichay pide le hable al 143237.- 144.-

144. Salidas ocupado.- 155.-

155. Salida.- Chichay pregunta a qué número se le puede hablar a Juán Carrasco y MF dice que le hable a su mamá al -- 217404 y pregunte por la señora Rosa....-170.-

170. Salidas sin contestación.-184.-

184. Salida al 217404.-1058.- Chichay, la esposa de Carlos - Jurado, pide a MF le diga a su amigo Juán Carrasco que le -- trajo una caja de tabacos de La Habana y quisiera invitarlo- para hoy a las 8 de la noche a la exposición de unas caricaturas de unos cubanos en la Ciudadela, Balderas 125, Escuela- de Artesanía. MF queda de dar el recado.- 210.-

210. Salidas ocupado.- 219.-

219. Salida al 480339.-1102.- Chichay pregunta el teléfono-- de la oficina de Carmen Fabregat y al enterarse de que MF no lo sabe, pide le diga que Carlos Jurado la invita a la exposición de caricaturas que tendrá lugar en Balderas 125 hoy-- a las 8 de la noche. MF: muy bien.- 237.-

(2.-L31.-22 Sep.66).-

14-00000

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 11-28-47.
21 septiembre 66.- M18-L11.
0950-1227hs.-

10.- Entrada a las 0950hs.- MF de la embajada Checoeslovaca con Chichay le pregunta que si puede mandar al consulado a la japonesa para su pasaporte.- Chichay que sí.--- 28.

36.- Entrada a las 1045hs.- MF Armando Martínez con Curbelo le pregunta que si puede pasar a verlo para tratarle un caso de asedio por la policía.- Curbelo que sí.- Mtz. que dentro de hora y media pasará con él.---- 68.

69.- Entrada a las 1047hs.- MF Velete -venezolana- con Abreu hablan sobre el asunto de la visa para su hijita.--- que no la necesita.--- 79.

80.- Entrada a las 1122hs.- MF Fernando Rodríguez por su visa.- Chichay: que no ha llegado.--- 101.

102.- Entrada a las 1129hs.- MF por Curbelo.- Chichay dice que Curbelo ya no trabaja en el consulado, que llame a la embajada al 141326.--- 107.

109.- Entrada a las 1129hs.- MF por el permiso de entrada para Adolfina Carnot.--- Abreu le dice que un momento, pero no hay información.--- 161.-

183.- Entrada.- Adolfina Carnet por su pemiso de entrada. Mery: que no ha llegado nada.--- 198.

226.- Salida al 147010.- 1223hs.- Chichay con MF que se le diga a su amiga que pase a recoger una carta a la casa de Carlos Jurado, de parte de Oscar.--- 234.

235.- Salida al 347770.- (Laboratorios Química Mexicana) 1223hs._ Chichay con MF Andres Aguirre le dice que ya tie

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 9 TOTAL COPIES 36

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[illegible] EN CY 25/M

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR C/WH6, C/DO4, C/DO/H3, C/NE3, C/TSD3, ADDP, C/EI2 C/FI/D 4 C/FI/INT2

S E C R E T 222125Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8608 (EASBY ACTING) 22 SEP 66 01702

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

6808

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8458 (IN 89337)

B. DIRECTOR 33487 *

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 19 SEP 66 THAT ON PASSING THROUGH HAVANA FROM SANTIAGO ON WAY HOME TO MEXICO CITY LIRING-4 HAD VISITED AURELIO ALONZO MUTUAL FRIEND IN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE.

2. ALSONZO TOLD LIRING-4 THAT THEIR FRIEND RAMON ROSSIE HAD ABSCONDED WITH $300,000 OF MINCEX FUNDS WHICH HAD BEEN ENTRUSTED TO HIM TO MAKE PURCHASES SYRIA. THIS HAD LED DSE, WHICH AT FIRST BELIEVED ROSSIE DEFECTED FOR POLITICAL REASONS, TO BELIEVE THAT HIS MOTIVES FOR FLIGHT WERE PURELY PERSONAL AND FOR FINANCIAL GAIN. LIRING-4 ALSO CONTACTED ROSSIE'S VENEZUELAN WIFE IN HAVANA. LATTER TOLD LIRING-4 SHE HAD BEEN OFFERED GOOD JOB BY CUBAN GOVT BUT HAD TURNED IT DOWN BECAUSE SHE DESIRED RETURN VENEZUELA WITH TWO CHILDREN.

3. ACCORDING LIRING-4 FROM ALONSO THIS REFUSAL OF WIFE CAUSED DSE REASSESS CASE AND IT NOW INCLINED BELIEVE ROSSIE SECRETLY IN TOUCH WITH WIFE AND WILL PROBABLY RETURN TO HER ONCE SHE OUT OF CUBA. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON IF WIFE COMES THROUGH MEXICO SHE WILL MOST PROBABLY CONTACT LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8625 SECRET

BECAUSE OF PAST FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN COUPLES.

4. RECOGNIZE THIS DOES NOT JIBE WITH REF B REPORT BUT WILL WATCH FOR WIFE AND IF CONTACT CAN BE MADE HAVE APARTMENT WHICH LIRING-3 CAN OFFER HER IN MEXICO CITY TO ASSIST HER DURING STAY.

5. ALONZO ALSO TOLD LIRING-4 HE WOULD TRAVEL TO MEXICO CITY 30 SEP OR 1 OCT ON TRIP MENTIONED REF A. ALSO HOPE HOUSE HIM IN APARTMENT WHICH STATION NOW PREPARING WIRE FOR SOUND.

SECRET

*RE ROSSIE, CUBAN DEFECTOR

BT

SECRET

14-00000

5704

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 11-26-47.
19 septiembre 65.- M18-111.
0924-1300hs.

25.- Salida al 259100 (Embajada Americana) 0924hs.- Curbelo con HF la Srita. De Laval le pregunta que si tiene una visa para MIGUEL FERRER y EDUARDO CISNEROS y DORA RIVERO -- [illegible].-- De Laval que el de Dora ya está pero que el de Ferrer no,-que quizas llegue en el transcurso del día la autorización.--- 53.

74.- Salida al 48564F.- 0953hs.- Miriam con HF le dice que tiene una carta para el Sr. Leopoldo Zorrilla Montiel que le trajo de la Habana, que pasen a recogerla.- HF de acuerdo.- ---- 90.

92.- Salida al 118220.- 0955hs.- Miriam con HF Graciela le dice que le trajo una carta de la Habana. Graciela que ella pasará a recogerla.--- 107.

115.- Entrada a las 1025hs.- HF aleman con Miriam le dice que le llama de Siemens de México, S.A., que uno de los señores de nuestra casa matriz en Alemania quiere volar a Cuba y están preguntando si ustedes aquí le pueden dar una visa y que cuanto tiempo tarda eso.- Miriam: que que es lo que va a hacer a Cuba.- HF que el va a estar en contacto con las empresas con las cuales estamos haciendo negocio, que no le dicen precisamente cuales, pero que deben ser la QUIMIMPEX, LA ALIMPEX... etc., Miriam: que llame al departamento comercial al 250914.----- 128.

215.- Entrada.- HF con Miriam Chichay.- Miriam le llama de amor.-- HF que le llama porque a la 1.15pm que ya habló con ACE que ya se consiguió la primera de las cosas que se va a hacer; que la va a llevar a la persona que va a encargarse de eso a [illegible] que es donde van a estar ellos a la 1.15pm que entonces llegará como al cuarto para las dos.- Miriam: que está bien.- HF que a donde lo va a esperar.- Miriam: que en la embajada porque es el primer día que está trabajando y que está sola.- HF que mejor se vaya a la casa.--- 227.

223.- Entrada a las 1159hs.- HF por la respuesta del cable 130 para renovación de pasaporte.-- Mery: que ya llegó.- 236

237.- Entrada a las 1207hs.- HF por la contestación del cable 132.- Mery: que ya llegó.--- 244.

253.- Entrada a las 1227hs.- HF Sánchez Leal por Curbelo.- Mery que no está.- Sánchez que llamará mas tarde.--- 259.

260.- Entrada a las 1230hs.- HF Amado por Abreu.- Mery: que no está.-- Amado: que le diga que les hace falta la cosa del fiador que lo tenga preparado para esta tarde.--- 264.

287.- Entrada a las 1244hs.- HF por el permiso de entrada para Adolfina Carmot.- Mery que no ha llegado.- HF que de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba aseguran que ya lo mandaron.- ---- 323.

332.- Entrada.- HF por la visa para Fernando Rodríguez.- Miriam que no ha llegado nada.--- 339.

347.- Entrada a las 1300hs.- HF por la certificación para la Srita. Teresa Lovaina Morales, que es certificación de segundo año de secundaria básica.- Miriam que no ha llegado. ---- 373.

374.- 460.- Entradas y salidas sin contestación.- Teléfono desconectado.-

---

. . . .

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 55

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
Dissem BY 24

ACTION
WH/C-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH-8, DO-4, DO/H-3, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, SB-8, SOD-6, CI/IC-2, EUR-8

S E C R E T 031353Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8437

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

0 SEP 66 [illegible] 91995

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8453 (IN 89338) *

B. DIRECTOR 32951 **

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED INFORMATION ON CUBAN NEED FOR 24 SHIPS OF APPROXIMATELY 13,000 TONS AS COMING FROM AURELIO ALONSO GONZALEZ, OFFICIAL OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE. LIRING-3 MADE STATEMENT SHIP POSSIBLY TO BE USED TRANSPORT 1967 SUGAR CROP WHICH HE SAID WOULD REACH LARGE PROPORTIONS. NOT KNOW IF THIS STATEMENT BY ALONSO BUT HE EXPECTED THROUGH MEXICO CITY SHORTLY AND LIRING-3 WILL BE ABLE CONTACT AND POSSIBLY CAN REQUERY REASON FOR NEED. STATION COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS RUSSIAN SHIPPING AID BEING CUT.

2. REALIZE THAT TO GIVE ASSISTANCE CHARTERING SHIPS COUNTER WOLADY POLICY, HOWEVER, IN VIEW BOOST SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD MEAN IN LIRING-3 PRESTIGE WITH PBRUMEN REQUEST HQS COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS. WALLACE B. ROWTON KNOWS GREEK SHIPPING OFFICIAL NEW YORK FORMERLY CLEARED WHO HE BELIEVES COULD ASSIST. THIS INDIVIDUAL, CAPT. GEORGE STAM OR STAMATOPOLIS, WELL ACQUAINTED INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CIRCLES AND MIGHT BE IN POSITION MEET ALONSO IN CANADA AND UNDER GUISE

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8437 S E C R E T SECRET

ATTEMPTING ASSIST OBTAIN CHARTERS COULD POSSIBLY LEARN MORE DETAILS CUBAN SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS.

3. IN FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-3 BY ROWTON ON MATTERS CONTAINED REF A, LIRING-3 STATED ARMANDO HART IS LEADING FIGURE IN CIVILIAN FACTION ALONG WITH PRESIDENT DORTICOS AND RAUL ROA GARCIA.

S E C R E T

BT *Ref: RYBAT

** Requested Source Statement Possibility Exists Cut in Soviet Assistance.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Deputy Chief WH/C and Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIRING-1 and LIRING-2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 6 September 1966 Station Officer Lawrence F. BARKER attended a meeting of the Consular Association, a loosely knit, rather [illegible] association used in the past primarily as a stepping stone to status by honorary consular officers. With the election of LIRING-2 as president of the group in late 1965, representatives of countries not friendly with PBRUMEN have generally boycotted the meetings. In the belief that the incumbents were willing to present their resignations so that another slate of officers might be elected, BARKER was selected to attend for LNPURE. As it turned out, the meeting drew only nine persons and no business of any consequence was transacted. [illegible] previously met. The purpose of this dispatch is to record certain conclusions drawn about LIRING-1 and LIRING-2. The latter "presided" over the meeting.

2. LIRING-1 impressed BARKER as being intelligent, articulate, self confident, affable and attentive. It was clear that, while LIRING-1 holds no office in the association, he intended to speak for himself and LIRING-2. He explained in a straightforward manner that he felt that the sad state of the association was due to politics; namely, that a representative of a "socialist country" (LIRING-2) had been elected president in a sparsely-attended meeting. He felt that because of this most of the other consular officers were avoiding meetings and that no amount of nice diplomatic talk could gloss over this fact. (This impressed BARKER as a good estimate of the situation). LIRING-1 then said that he felt it would be best for LIRING-2 to step down so that the association could once again draw people to its meetings. He further promised that the PBRUMEN representatives would stick with the association as ordinary members and give their full support to the next slate of officers.

3. Dressed in a rather lumpy and shabby suit that appeared to have been made from old army blankets dyed dark blue, LIRING-1 made up for his appearance and slight stature by flashing a warm smile and being pleasant throughout the meeting which consisted of a sojourn at the bar followed by dinner. BARKER

CONTINUED . . . .

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
1 - DC/WH/C
1 - COS/JMWAVE
3 - FILES

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-29999

DATE
7 September 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-[illegible]

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-2[illegible]

attempted, apparently with success to exorcise all [illegible] slang and accent from his own speech, and LIRING-1 never inquired whether BARKER had ever been to [illegible] or had any connection with matters [illegible]. He seemed genuinely interested in a BARKER spiel on Mayan archaeology and anthropology and by the end of the meal was slapping BARKER on the back. While young and perhaps somewhat immature, LIRING-1 appears to be a tough character — quick witted and thoroughly convinced that he stands for what is right. The overall impression is somewhat at variance with what had been expected from [illegible]-1 and, to some extent, [illegible]-1 reports. LIRING-1 is no "kid" and while he may have plenty to learn in the intelligence trade he appears to be quite capable of learning it given sufficient time. From the opposition viewpoint he should be an effective agent developer.

4. For the record, it should be noted that he has a ruddy complexion and bright blue-green eyes.

5. LIRING-2, on the other hand, appears to be a rather wishy-washy sort [illegible] projects an impression of weakness. Although superior to LIRING-1 in the association and within LIRING itself, he took a back seat to LIRING-1 in the discussions. He seems to be essentially introverted. He is pleasant but one gets the impression that this is a matter of diplomatic correctness.

6. The above observations are all based on a one-time, two-hour encounter and may well be inaccurate. They are set forth, however, in an effort to assist in arriving at a correct assessment of key opposition personnel, primarily LIRING-1. He has the makings of a good operator and merits respect as well as study with a view to his eventual recruitment.

for Willard C. CURTIS

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 39

ORIG: H. WEILER
UNIT: WH/C/RR
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 8 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , WH 8, SB 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6

~~(CLASSIFICATION)~~ ~~(DATE AND TIME FILED)~~ (ELITE) ~~(REFERENCE NUMBER)~~ (PICA)

6 15 18 Z CITE DIRECTOR 32961

TO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8458

HQS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED INFO PARA 5 REF. REQUEST SOURCE STATEMENT POSSIBILITY EXISTS CUT IN SOVIET ASSISTANCE. IS THIS STATION OR LIRING/3 COMMENT, OR WAS IT STATEMENT BY LIRING/3 CONTACT IN CUBA? IF LATTER, WHO WAS SOURCE?

SECRET

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER H WEILER WH/C/RR
COORDINATING OFFFICER H WEILER WH/C/RR
R ORTMAN WH/C/MO
?????? WH/1
T HAZLETT WH/C/FI
RELEASING OFFICER W CINI FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

LIRING-3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS: ael
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 6 SEPT 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-800004

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: bolowka ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE · cl/oh6, cl/ci, cl/fi2, cl/oc3, cl/sas

SECRET

141Z CITE DIRECTOR 33487

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8658 (IN 88835)

ROSSIE OF REFERENCE, PARAGRAPH 7 WHILE VISITING BEIRUT EARLY JULY 1966 WAS RECRUITED BY WOFACT AND TRAINED BECOME ON ISLAND ASSET. ROSSIE WAS DEPART SYRIA FOR PRAGUE 14 JULY ENROUTE CUBA BUT INSTEAD STAYED SYRIA WITH NEW SYRIAN WIFE. EARLY JULY CUBAN REPRESENTATIVE BEIRUT BEGAN TRYING LOCATE ROSSIE. WE UNAWARE HIS WHEREABOUTS FROM 14 JULY UNTIL 13 AUGUST WHEN HE WALKED INTO WOFACT COVER OFFICE BARCELONA, SPAIN. HE SUBSEQUENTLY SENT MADRID WHERE STATION HAD LITTLE LUCK DEBRIEFING HIM DUE HIS AGITATION AND NERVOUSNESS. 26 AUGUST HE SIGNED QUIT CLAIM. HE AND NEW WIFE HOPE RESETTLE VENEZUELA WHERE HE NATURALIZED CITIZEN. ROSSIE DID NOT DEFECT WITH ANY CUBAN FUNDS. HE BROKE WHEN ARRIVED BARCELONA AND RELIABLE SENSITIVE SOURCE INDICATED CUBANS WHEN INITIALLY BEGAN LOOKING FOR HIM WERE WORRIED BECAUSE HAD LIMITED FUNDS.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER 8-5 COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

0843

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 33487

TO

PAGE TWO

DC/WH/C/CICS

C/WH/C/FI

for C/WH/C/MO

WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 40

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CCC—	5	PP
2		6	EJ
3	CA	7	MC
4	PA	8	FI

FROM Disse/BY 24

ACTION DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CSDO TIME 2120Z

INFO FILE, CSDO, VR, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/SOD-3, DDP, ADDP, C/CA-2, C/CA/O-2, C/SB-3, C/EUR-3

SECRET 031932Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8463

3 SEP 65 IN 68336

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE

BC

KAPOK PERUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8458 (IN [illegible])

1. LIRING/3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT IN HAVANA AIRPORT 29 AUGUST AS HE ABOUT EMBARK ON CUBANA TO MEXICO CITY HE MET LINO SALAZAR FORMER EMPLOYEE CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO. SALAZAR TOLD LIRING/3 HE AT AIRPORT TO ESCORT VIRGINIA A. GOMEZ CUEVAS DE LIZALDE TO PLANE AND SEE HER SAFELY ON WAY BACK TO MEXICO CITY.

2. VIRGINIA IS SISTER OF GUMERSINDO GOMEZ CUEVAS ARRESTED IN RICO GALAN ROUNDUP. GOMEZ ACCORDING TO POLICE STATEMENT WAS REPORTEDLY IN CHARGE DRAWING UP PLANS ON ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL CENTERS IN MEXICO (IN MEXICO CITY 8241). (IN 76854)

3. LIRING/3 TALKED WITH VIRGINIA ON FLIGHT. SHE APPEARED VERY DEPRESSED OVER ARREST OF HER BROTHER AND FRIENDS IN MEXICO. SHE SAID SHE HAD BEEN UNABLE DO ANY SIGHTSEEING IN HAVANA. LIRING/3 IMPLIED FROM FACT SHE ESCORTED TO AIRPORT SHE MUST HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH CUBAN OFFICIALS HAVANA. ON RETURN FLIGHT SHE ACKNOWLEDGED HAVEING NO MONEY AND LIRING/3 PRESSED 150 MN ON HER AS FRIENDLY LOAN. LIRING/3 ALSO CONCLUDED FROM HER SAD APPEARANCE CUBAN OFFICIALS HAD GIVEN HER NO

SECRET

HOPE FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THERE.

4. CUBANA MANIFESTS SHOW VIRGINIA FLEW MEXICO CITY TO HAVANA 15 JULY 1966. HER MEXICO CITY ADDRESS GIVEN ON RETURN FLIGHT MANIFEST 29 AUG. AS ALMENCENES 98 A WPRN COLONIA TLALTELOLCO, MEXICO CITY.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

FORM 4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 39

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CI/S	5	FP
2		6	Eu
3	CA	7	IO
4	PA	8	[illegible]

FROM Dissem By 2d.

ACTION DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT OS TIME

HQ FI PT

INFO FILE VR, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/CA-2, C/EUR-3, C/SOD-3, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/SB-3, C/CA/O-2, DDP, ADDP

BC/BT

S E C R E T 031858Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8458

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

3 SEP 66 IN 89335

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8310 (IN 79989)

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON AND LIRING/3 HELD BRIEF MEETINGS 2 SEPT 66 FOLLOWING LIRING/3 RETURN FROM HAVANA 29 AUG. BELOW ARE SOME OF HIGHLIGHTS LIRING/3 TEN DAY TRIP.

2. ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS HOLDS KEY POSITION IN MINISTRY OF SUGAR ALTHOUGH HE NOT ACTUALLY MINISTER. HE EXPECTS TRAVEL TO SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, PROBABLY POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IN NEAR FUTURE ORDER ARRANGE FUTURE PURCHASES SUGAR.

3. ON OWN INITIATIVE, RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING/3 THAT LIRING/4 SHOULD BE EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY. APPARENTLY FACT SHE ALREADY WORKING THERE NOT KNOWN HAVANA. RODRIGUEZ SAID LIRING/4 SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DIPLOMATIC STATUS SINCE THIS WOULD JEOPARDIZE HER STATUS AS WIFE LIRING/3. RATHER SHE WILL WORK OSTENSIBLY AS VOLUNTEER. LIRING/3 HAS NEVER ADMITTED TO ROWTON THAT LIRING/4 WORKING IN EMBASSY.

4. RODRIGUEZ PUT LIRING/3 IN CONTACT WITH IMPORTANT OFFICIAL OF MINISTERIO DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR (MINCEX) WHOSE FIRST NAME IS AURELIO (LELO) BUT WHOSE LAST NAME LIRING/3 CANNOT RECALL. LIRING/3 STATES HE HAS KNOWN

SECRET

AURELIO SOME TIME BUT NEVER HAD BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH HIM. AURELIO APPEARED APPOINT LIRING/3 HIS SPECIAL REP MEXICO AND SAID HE WOULD SEND LIRING/3 INSTRUCTIONS THROUGH COMMERCIAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY, SERGIO MARTINEZ BARROSO, REGARDING URGENT COMMERCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF HAVANA.

5. AURELIO CONFIDED TO LIRING/3 THAT CUBA'S MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT OF MOMENT WAS CHARTER OF 24 MEDIUM TONNAGE SHIPS FOR USE IN 1967. AURELIO ADDED THIS CLASSIFIED SECRET AND THAT SERGIO MARTINEZ KNEW NOTHING OF THIS AND THAT LIRING/3 SHOULD NOT MENTION IT. AURELIO STATED HE WILL TRANSIT MEXICO CITY ABOUT 15 SEPTEMBER ENROUTE CANADA AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY LEADS LIRING/3 COULD GIVE AT THAT TIME RE BEST AND CHEAPEST CHANNEL RENTING SHIPS. AURELIO COMMENTED CUBA COULD NOT PUBLICIZE THIS NEED SINCE PAST EXPERIENCE INDICATED CHARTERING MORE DIFFICULT AND EXPENSIVE FOR CUBA ONCE REQUIREMENT KNOWN TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. POSSIBILITY EXISTS RUSSIANS MAY HAVE CUT DOWN THEIR ASSISTANCE TRANSPORT CUBAN SUGAR FORCING CUBANS CHARTER BOTTOMS FOR THIS PURPOSE.

6. LIRING/3 TOLD ROWTON HE MET AMOIL-1 ON PLANE GOING INTO CUBA 18 AUG AND APPARENTLY TWO BECAME FRIENDLY. AMOIL-1 ARRANGED BY PHONE PASSAGE ON CUBANA FOR LIRING/4 TO SANTIAGO WHEN PASSAGE NOT EASY OBTAIN, EVEN OFFERED FLY HER THERE IN HIS PLANE IF NECESSARY. LIRING/3 ASKED

AMOIL/1 IF THERE WEREN'T SOMETHING HE NEEDED FROM MEXICO CITY OR IF HE COULD NOT SEND HIM GIFT. AMOIL/1 APPARENTLY HAD NO PARTICULAR WANTS BUT ASKED LIRING/3 USE CHANNEL THROUGH JORRIN AT CUBAN EMBASSY RATHER THAN POUCH IF LIRING/3 WANTED SEND SOMETHING TO AMOIL/1.

7. AURELIO OF MINCEX TOLD LIRING/3 THEIR MUTUAL FRUEND RAMON ROSIE WHO HAD BEEN SENT SYRIA BY MINCEX HAD DONE EXCELLENT JOB BUT HAD FINALLY DEFECTED AND MARRIED LOCAL SYRIAN TELEPHONE OPERATOR. ROSIE HAS WIFE AND CHILD HAVANA. AURELIO IMPLIED ROSIE HAD DEFECTED WITH CONSIDERABLE MOUNT OF CUBAN FUNDS. LIRING/3 COMMENTED TO ROWTON THAT ROSIE COULD BE USEFUL ROWTON'S BUSINESS INTERESTS BECAUSE OF HIS MANY CONTACTS MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE. LIRING/3 BELIEVES HE KNOWS ROSIE WELL ENOUGH RECRUIT HIM FOR ROWTON.

8. AS TO POLITICAL MANEUVERS LIRING/3 REPORTED ARNOL RODRIGUEZ TOLD HIM MOST POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN CUBA AT PRESENT ARE RAUL CASTRO AND RAMIRO VALDEZ WHO CARRY WEIGHT OF MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES DESPITE FACT NEITHER HAS POPULAR SUPPORT. THEIR OPPOSING FACTION HEADED BY DORTICOS AND RAUL ROA CARCIA WHO APPEAR HOLD RELATIVELY GOOD POPULAR SUPPORT. FIDEL CASTRO IS IN MIDDLE ATTEMPTING CONCILIATE TWO FACTIONS BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE.

9. ACCORDING ARNOL RODRIGUEZ LIRING/2 NO LONGER CONSUL MEXICO CITY But

SECRET

Discrepancy with SI.

SECRET

IS TO REMAIN MEXICO LONG ENOUGH CLEAN UP ADMINISTRATIVE MESS HE CREATED DURING HIS TOUR. MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS TOLD LIRING/3 IN HAVANA HE WOULD NOT BE COMING BACK TO MEXICO CITY. DID NOT KNOW WHERE HE WOULD BE REASSIGNED OR WHO WOULD REPLACE HIM MEXICO.

10. REGARDING CURRENCY RESERVES, ARNOL RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING/3 CUBA HAS SUFFICIENT RESERVES MEET CURRENT COMMITMENTS. CUBA HAS RECENTLY SIGNED 52 MILLION DOLLAR CONTRACT WITH FRANCE TO BUILD INDUSTRY CUBA.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

NNNN

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief of Station, Guatemala City; San Salvador

Acting Chief, WH Division

DYVOUR/[illegible]

Report of Cuban Guerrilla Training Near Netzahualcoyotl Dam

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

Action Required: See Paragraph 3

References:
A. SAN SALVADOR-6332, 26 August 1966
B. HMMW-14[illegible], 27 June 1966
C. HMMW-14480, 5 April 1966

1. Headquarters was interested to learn of JUSLING-1's report of Mauricio de la SELVA's claim in Reference A that..."they have a center in Tehuantepec for the training of guerrillas for Central America..." in the light of Subject Report involving the same general area and the identification of Mauricio de la SELVA Venegas by AMMUG-1 in 1964 as the Salvadoran Communist Party link with the Cuban Intelligence Service in Mexico City.

2. For the information of Stations Guatemala City and San Salvador, Reference B reported information from a Mexican ex-military physician of unknown reliability that the Cuban Consulate in Merida had established a group of Cubans in Raudales, Malpaso, where the Netzahualcoyotl Dam is being finished, who are training Mexicans in guerrilla tactics; and Reference C reported background information on Malpaso published in the Mexican pro-Castro magazine *Siempre* under the byline of one Carlos NAVARRETE. It was noted that a person by the name of Carlos NAVARRETE had been reported by LICOOKY-1 in 1963 as a Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico. It is now noted that the *Siempre* staff appears recently to have been taking more than usual amount of interest in the Chiapas area (which includes Tehuantepec). In addition to the NAVARRETE article on Malpaso, the 31 August 1966 issue carried no less than eleven articles and a four-page color picture spread on the area by Jose Natividad ROSALES, Horacio [illegible], Pedro ALVARADO Lang, Pablo MONTANES, Antonio [illegible], Nabor [illegible], Renato LEDUC, Jose CIRON, and Rodolfo [illegible]. One of the articles by ROSALES even noted that on the road from Tapachula, the entire *Siempre* team almost perished in a near-automobile accident. The same issue carried part two of an article on guerrilla activities of the

Continued.../

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City
1 - COS, Guatemala City
1 - COS, San Salvador

Possible interest in LIRING-3 Cont

HMMW-14822

1 September 1966

SECRET

50-120-13

RI
Chrono
WH/C/FI
WH/2

WH/1 Jack Stewart ; mr 3654

WH/C/FI

WH/2

AC/WH/1 Fisher

53

DISPATCH

[illegible] Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) by Antonio CARAM. Antonio CARAM may be identical with Antonio CARAM [illegible], a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in Mexico City who was born in [illegible], Chiapas. CARAM was reported to be a high official of the Frente Electoral del Pueblo (FEP) in 1963 and is believed to be identical with the Antonio CARAM who was reliably reported in May 1964 to be in contact with Oldrich [illegible] of the Czech Embassy in Mexico City. While of course none of the foregoing may have any direct connection with reports of guerrilla training in this area or with the arrest of Victor RICO Galan, the noted [illegible] writer and pro-Castro activist, on 18 August 1966 for subversive activities, the information may be of background interest.

3. When [illegible]-1 is debriefed, it might be of interest to attempt to ascertain if he has any further light to throw on the Tehuantepec area with respect to guerrilla training activities and to ask him to keep an ear out for such information.

Andrew F. [illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3	CA	7	
4	PA	8	FI

~~FROM~~
DISSEM BY 33/3
ACTION
WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/O 4

S E C R E T 192255Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8310 IN 79989
20 AUG 66

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON MET LIRING-3 18 AUG IN LAST MEET PRIOR L-3 DEPARTURE FOR CUBA 19 AUG. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD TALKED WITH ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON ON 18 AUG FROM WHOM HE LEARNED FOLLOWING:

A. ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS HAS BEEN MADE MINISTER OF SUGAR IN NEWLY ORGANIZED OR REORGANIZED SUGAR MINISTRY. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE WOULD CONTACT RODRIGUEZ CAMPS FIRST UPON ARRIVAL CUBA TO CHECK HIS PRESENT POSITION AND LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

B. SENDING OF OLD DC-4 AIRPLANE TO MEXICO 16 AUG WAS OSTENSIBLY SPECIAL SERVICE FOR JOSEPHINE BAKER AND 16 CHILDREN TO TRANSPORT THEM TO MEXICO. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO CURBELO THIS PLANE ALSO GAVE CUBANS EXCUSE FOR NOT EVACUATING MEXICANS IMPLICATED IN RICO GALAN CASE WHO WERE PRESSING CUBAN EMBASSY FOR SANCTARY IN CUBA TO AVOID ARREST.

2. L-3 BELIEVES RICO GALAN CASE POINTS UP CONFLICT IN CUBAN EMBASSY BETWEEN SECURITY/INTEL AND FOREIGN MINISTRY GROUPS. ON 15 AUG L-3 TOLD ROWTON THAT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, PRESS AND CULTURAL ATTACHE WARNED L-3 NOT TAKE 16 AUG PLANE BECAUSE THERE GOING BE SEVERAL

SECRET

Jane

MEXICANS GOING TO CUBA TO ESCAPE ARREST IN RICO GALAN CASE. AS IT TURNED OUT ONLY FIVE PERSONS FLEW IN DC-4 BACK TO CUBA 16 AUG AND NO MEXICANS AMONG THEM. L-3 STATED CURBELO ON 18 AUG INDICATED CUBANS VERY FEARFUL FOR CUBAN/MEXICAN RELATIONS DUE RICO GALAN CASE AND DID NOT WANT BE ACCUSED BY MEXICANS OF GRANTING ASYLUM TO GUILTY PARTIES. IT VERY UNUSUAL FOR CUBANA ON MEXICO TO HAVANA RUN CARRY ONLY FIVE PASSENGERS.

4. L-3 STATED HE SAW FERNANDO RICO GALAN BROTHER OF VICTOR, IN CUBANA OFFICE 12 AUG ATTEMPTING ARRANGE FLIGHT TO HAVANA. FLIGHT DID NOT COME MEXICO CITY THAT DAY AND FERNANDO ARRESTED IN ROUNDUP. L-3 ALSO SAW ON 12 AUG ONE NOEL BARRA ZENIL ATTEMPTING ARRANGE PASSAGE. BARRA DESCRIBED BY L-3 AS RABID COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY WHO CLOSE TO RICO GALAN AND UNTIL RECENTLY A LONG RESIDENT IN HAVANA.

5. L-3 BELIEVES LOPEZ PROBABLY SECURITY OR INTEL REP IN EMBASSY SINCE HE VERY CLOSE RICO GALAN AND APPEARED FEEL MEXICANS CONNECTED WITH CASE WHO NOT YET ARRESTED SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN PASSAGE TO CUBA. ALSO RECENTLY L-3 ASKED LOPEZ WHY HE DID NOT DO MORE IN CULTURAL PRESS WORK FOR CUBA. LOPEZ REPLIED THAT NOT IMPORTANT BUT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS ASSISTING REVOLUTIONARY FORCES MEXICO. L-3 COMMENTED ATTITUDE OF CURBELO APPEARED REFLECT FOREIGN MINISTRY POLICY NOT TO

14-00000

SECRET

DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT UPSET CUBAN MEXICAN RELATIONS.

SECRET

SECRE

14-00000

Dolores, a agregada del Departamento de Visas, con Abreu, --- quien explica que hace aproximadamente 5 días la señorita -- Lourdes González solicitó a su familia la visa, que sus padres están graves y como Lourdes es religiosa quisiera saber si - puede hacer algo por ella, ya que si no se va el viernes, ya no podrá viajar, pero la opinión del Consulado es que viaje- lo más pronto posible. Dolores que está en trámite, pero lo volverá a decir al compañero.- 870.-

870. Salida al 09.- MD pide el costo de la llamada anterior- y MF queda de llamarlo.- 880.- Lourdes González vuelve a- llamar y pide que el importe de la llamada se la pasen al -- 732962 y pregunta por la madre Angela. MF dice que fueron 9 minutos e importaron $ 112.50. Lourdes dá las gracias.962.

962. Entrada 1221.- El Lic. Mejía, de la Secretaría de la -- Presidencia, y Abreu quedan de verse mañana a las 3 de la -- tarde en la Fonda Santa Anita que está en Humboldt.- 999.-

999. Entrada 1225.- Marcela Olguín después de comunicarlo a- Miriam que se va hoy ó mañana, se entera que Chichay se va - el viernes a Cuba con su esposo y su hija, pero regresarán - como dentro de 10 días para luego regresar por más tiempo. - Marcela le desea buen viaje e indica que cuando tenga tiempo irá a verla porque ya no aguanta a su esposo y quiere que lo- deporten. Miriam indica que mañana ó el sábado llega -- Carbelo y le sugiere que le hable todos los días. Marce-- la acepta.- 1074.-

HMMA-29793
18 Aug 66
LIENVOY

Jane
LIRING-3

- -

- - (5.-LIL.- 15 agosto 66).-

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 31

ORIG: H. WEILER;gb
UNIT: WH/C/RR
EXT: 3561
DATE: 10 AUGUST 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 3 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , FI, FI/INT 2, IW, WH 8

RUR 8, CI/OPS

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

11 06 21 52Z CITE DIRECTOR 27103

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8189 (IN 73260)

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RQMS FOR LIRING-3:

A. CUBAN REQUIREMENTS FOR FREE WORLD PURCHASES. MOST URGENT ITEMS. AMOUNT FOREIGN EXCHANGE AVAILABLE FROM THIS YEAR'S SUGAR CROP FOR SUCH PURCHASES. CREDIT PLANS TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PURCHASES POSSIBLE.

B. CUBAN PLANS INCREASE OTHER EXPORTS AUGMENT FOREIGN EXCHANGE AS HEDGE AGAINST CONTINUED POOR CROPS.

C. CUBAN PLANS INCREASE TRADE MEXICO, OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. CUBAN PLANS IMPROVE RELATIONS THIS AREA.

D. PRESENT POSITION, STATUS ARNOL RODRIGUEZ.

2. ONLY ADDL TRACE OCHOA: EGK 40533, 23 MARCH 1966 (CATIDE) REPORTS RENE OCHOA (NATIONALITY NOT GIVEN) AND AGUSTIN P. ROMAN ATTENDANCE FIRST CONGRESS OF PUBLISHERS OF SOCIALIST PEDAGOGICS, PRAGUE, 15-30 NOV 1965.

END OF MESSAGE

LIRING-3

WH/C/FI
WH/1 J. Stewart (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

11-11

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

1A SS

4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM

DISSEM BY 33/M

ACTION

WH/~~C~~ 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH 8, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T Ø92240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8189

DIRECTOR

9 Aug 66 IN 73260

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8129 (IN 68738)

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON AT 8 AUG MEETING HE PREPARED REVISIT CUBA TO FURTHER DEVELOP CONTACTS FOR ROWTON BUSINES ACTIVITIES. HE PLANS REQUEST VISA 9 AUG DIRECTLY FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ WHO STILL IN FOREIGN MINISTRY THO NO LONGER VICE MINISTER. L-3 EXPECTS SPEEDY SERVICE ON VISA REQUEST ALLOWING HIM TAKE 13 AUG FLIGHT TO PBRUMEN.

2. L-3 VERY ANXIOUS TAKE WIFE AND CHILD WITH HIM THIS FLIGHT AND HER VISA APPROVALGN REQUESTED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, EXPECTED ARRIVE IN TIME ACCOMPANY HIM. WIFE AND CHILD WILL FLY ON TO SANTIAGO FOR VISIT WITH HER MOTHER. WILL GIVE L-3 $1,200 U.S., HALF IN MEXICAN PESOS, FINANCE TRIP. L-3 TO STAY HAVANA 13-26 AUG GO SANTIAGO 27 AUG RETURN MEXI 29 AUG.

Fme

File LIRING-3

3. ROWTON CONFIDENT L-3 RELATIONSHIP PROGRESSED TO POINT HE CAN LEVY SPECIFIC POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND EVEN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS ON L-3 WHO WILL DO BEST TO SATISFY. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE REALIZES NECESSITY KEEPING ROWTON INFORMED IN DETAIL ON CUBAN SITUATION SINCE

SECRET

Weiler drafted Roms/cable. & [illegible] traces. I coordinated. J

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 8189 SECRET SECRET

BUSINESS SO CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH AFFAIRS OF COUNTRY. ROWTON HAS ASKED HIM SOUND OUT ALL CONTACTS FOR ANY INDICATION CASTRO NEUTRALIZED OR DOWNGRADED AND IF SO WHO NOW IN POWER. ALSO HAS ASKED TO REPORT ANY INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCE. REQUEST OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

4. ROWTON ALSO HAS ASKED L-3 SPOT AND POSSIBLY RECRUIT HAVA RESIDENT TO WORK WITH ROWTON AND L-3 IN BUSINESS VENTURES. INDIVIDUAL WOULD HAVE TO HAVE CAPABILITY FOR TRAVEL MEXICO FREQUENTLY CONSULT WITH ROWTON. L-3 FROM CURRENT KNOWLEDGE FRIENDS INSIDE PROPOSED RENE OCHOA FUNEZ, 30-YEAR-OLD HONDURAN MARRIED TO CUBAN. OCHOA IS DIRECTOR DE LA EDITORA NACIONAL DE EDUCACION DE CUBA WITH EXCELLEN ACCESS TO HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. HE INTENDS SOUND OUT OCHOA FOR COLLABORATION AND WILL LOOK AT OTHER CENTRAL AMERICANS AS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES. FOR POSSIBLE INFORMATION ON OCHOA HQS IS REFERRED TO HSSA 04248 30 APRIL 1964.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

- Frias OCHOA.

[illegible] 0515 10 Aug

EGIC-40533 Petite 23 Mar 66
Subj: Agustin P. ROMAN attended 1st
Congress of Publishers of Socialist Pedagogic
held Prague 15-20 Nov 65

~~[illegible]~~ files from PCH HSSA-64148
Jan 64
63-4-124.2 p15

in Cuba 1962
expelled from PCN

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS:ack
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 3 AUGUST 1966

FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C-8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , WH-8, CI/OA

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 03 18 16Z CITE DIRECTOR 25094

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8126 (IN 68738)

CARLOS OF REFERENCE IS LIRING/3. PLEASE USE CRYPT IN FUTURE TRAFFIC.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/C/FI

C/WH/C/CI

C/WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

3-16

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

13

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	LICS —	5	RO
2		6	[illegible]
3	FI-C	7	e
4	CR-FA	8	2

UNIT TIME BY

FROM Dissem BY 24

ACTION WH/C-8

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 021815Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8115

2 Aug 66 IN 68647

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. IN MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON ON 1 AUGUST 1966, CARLOS JURADO DELMAR STATED MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS HAD SHOWN HIM LENGTHY CABLE FROM HAVANA WHICH ARRIVED MEXICO CITY AFTER DEPARTURE OF ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON ON 25 JULY WHICH SUMMARIZED LIST OF DEFICIENCIES AND INEFFICIENCIES OF CURBELO DURING HIS ASSIGNMENT MEXICO CITY.

2. CABLE SIGNED BY RAUL ROA GARCIA. CABLE CITED UNANSWERED MESSAGES REQUESTING SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND LIST OF ACTIONS NOT TAKEN. LOZANO TOLD JURADO IT UNLIKELY CURBELO WOULD RETURN TO MEXICO CITY.

S E C R E T

BT

?? I note that Curbelo back in spite of this remonstrance — Obviously not build up. Thus L-3 possibly legit.

201-798301

LIRING-3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

FROM
DISSEM BY 30/4

ACTION
WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO
FILE, VR, ~~WH8~~, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 0222272 CITE MEXICO CITY 8126 2 AUG 63 IN 08738

DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING

File

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 1 AUG HE HAD CONTACTED MANOLO GONZALEZ IN VERACRUZ 30 AND 31 JULY. GONZALEZ IS MEXICAN FUNCTIONARY AND LOCAL EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN CONSULATE IN VERACRUZ. HAS RESIDED VERACRUZ PAST 35 YEARS AND HAS WORKED FOR CONSULATE MOST THIS PERIOD.

2. JURADO HAD BEEN SENT VERACRUZ BY ROWTON TO DEVELOP GONZALEZ FOR USE IN ROWTON - JURADO BUSINESS DEALS AND ULTIMATELY FOR INTEL PURPOSES. GONZALEZ AGREED WORK WITH JURADO ON CONDITION HIS COOPERATION REMAIN QUOTE BETWEEN US UNQUOTE SINCE HE SAID IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO HIM IF HAVA LEARNED HE DOING BUSINESS ON SIDE.

3. GONZALEZ TOLD JURADO HE GOING HAVA SOON ON HIS OWN SINCE HE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CITY SINCE REVOLUTION. PLANS FLY CUBANA FROM MEXI CITY 5 AUG AND WILL ARRIVE MEXI CITY DAY BEFORE. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO OFFER HIM FREE OVERNIGHT STAY IN NEW APARTMENT RENTED BY JURADO AND FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON. NO EVIDENCE GONZALEZ HAS YET ASKED FOR VISA.

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8126 S E C R E T

4. VIEW GONZALEZ GENERAL ACCEPTANCE JURADO PITCH, ROWTON WILL PASS 100 DOLLARS U.S. TO GONZALEZ THROUGH JURADO HELP HIM MEET EXPENSES. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO PASS GONZALEZ REQUIREMENTS PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. JURADO TOLD BY ROWTON NOT SURFACE ROWTON TO GONZALEZ. JURADO ALSO PLANNING MAKE SECOND EXPEDITION HAVA FOR ROWTON SOON AND EXPECTS SEE GONZALEZ THERE WILL TAKE WIFE WITH HIM BUT DELAY BEING ENCOUNTERED OBTAINING VISA FOR HER.

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

14-00000

☐ ☐

☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 41

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dissem By 22

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐

UNIT

TIME 1253

BY C

INFO FILE, VR, CSDO, DCI, DDP, CS/RE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI OPS, CI, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, IW, OSA 3, FE 8, SAVA 2, FI/SPG, WH 8, DO 4, DO/H 3,

FOR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY: DCI, DDCI

23 JUL 66 IN 62489

S E C R E T 231655Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8026

DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7994 (IN 60657)

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON AFTERNOON OF 22 JULY 1966, HE HAD DISCUSSED MATTER OF AIRMEN PRISONERS IN NORTH VIET NAM WITH MIGUEL LOZANO EARLIER THAT DAY. JURADO SAID LOZANO REMARKED THAT IN HIS OPINION AIRMEN WOULD NOT BE EXECUTED AND REFERERED TO RECENT REPLY OF NORTH VIET NAM PRESIDENT TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS THAT PRISONERS WERE BEING TREATED HUMANELY. LOZANO ADDED NO SUCH THING AS EXECUTION OF PRISONERS WAS FORESEEN.

2. BELIEVE THIS BEST KNOWLEDGE CUBANS AT EMBASSY HERE HAVE OF SITUATION AND CAN ONLY CONCLUDE ORIGINAL STATEMENT BY ABELARDO CURBELO WAS UTTERED TO SPARK AN OTHERWISE ORDINARY CONVERSATION AND PERHAPS ATTEMPT GET RISE OUT OF RAMIRO ABREU AND JURADO.

S E C R E T

CS Comment: *Advised that ROWTON (1) would meet Jurado and attempt to assess Cuban knowledge of NVN intentions regarding the airmen prisoners.

BT

SECRET

ROWTON ??

[illegible]

201-798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 83

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 47

ACTION
WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT. CS/DO TIME 0515Z BY J

INFO
FILE, VR, CS/DO, CS/RF, DCI, DDP, ADDP, WH 8, FE 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT, FI/SPG, FI/D 4, IW, SAVA 2, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI, DO 4, DD/H 3,

S E C R E T 210345Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7994 CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY DDI 20, D/DCI 2

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

IN 60657

NO NIGHT ACTION

TYPIC LIRING

REF A DIRECTOR 21425 **

B MEXICO CITY 7971 (IN 59538)*

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON[1] IN MEETING 20 JULY WITH CARLOS JURADO DETERMINED STATEMENT REPORTED REF B RE EXECUTION OF PRISONERS MADE BY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON IN PRESENCE OF RAMIRO ABREU QUINTANA AND JURADO. STATEMENT WAS MADE POSITIVELY BY CURBELO IN CONTEXT OF BRIEF DISCUSSION RE GRAVITY OF SITUATION IN VIET NAM.

2. THOUGH FACT CURBELO MADE STATEMENT RATHER THAN ABREU WHO RECENTLY RETURNED MEXICO CITY FROM HAVANA, TENDS DETRACT FROM IMPACT OF STATEMENT, ROWTON[1] HAS INSTRUCTED JURADO CONTINUE CHECK OUT STATEMENT IN EMBASSY TO DETERMINE QUESTIONS RAISED IN PARAS 2 A AND B REF A. JURADO TOLD ROWTON[1] HE WOULD TALK WITH MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS, EMBASSY COUNSELOR, WHO, ACCORDING TO JURADO, IS MUCH MORE RELIABLE SOURCE AND MORE AWARE OF SITUATION IN HAVANA THAN EITHER CURBELO OR ABREU.

SECRET

LIRING-3

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 7994 SECRET

3. NEXT ROWTON[1] JURADO MEETING WILL BE AFTERNOON 23 JULY.

WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

SECRET

BT CS COMMENT: *Jurado told ROWTON (1) that the situation in Vietnam is grave because the North Vietnamese are going to execute the U.S. Airmen recently captured.

**Hqs feels it essential for ROWTON (1) to develop fullest possible info needed to assess Cuban knowledge of VN intentions and seek answers to a number of posed questions.

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 2015Z BY m

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, CS/DO, FE 8, SAVA 2, FI, FI/INT 2, C/OPS, C/CA, ADDP

S E C R E T 221939Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7933

20 JUL [illegible] 00505

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 21425 *

B. MEXICO CITY 7971 (IN 59838)

* SEEKING TO CLARIFY STATEMENT MADE BY LIRING-1 RE EXECUTION OF AMERICAN ~~[illegible]~~ AIRMEN

1. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH JURADO SCHEDULED FOR 2000 HOURS 20 JULY. ROWTON BELIEVES IT BEST NOT ATTEMPT SET EARLIER MEETING LEST IT RAISE QUESTIONS JURADO'S MIND RE ROWTON'S INTEREST IN REPORT. THUS FAR ALL REPORTING BY JURADO TO ROWTON HAS BEEN UNDER GUISE OF BASIC POLITICAL INFORMATION WHICH ESSENTIAL TO PLANS FOR FUTURE BUSINESS DEALS OF ROWTON.

2. AT 2000 HOUR MEETING ROWTON WILL BE ABLE ESTABLISH PARAGRAPH 2 A AND B REF A AND THIS WILL BE REPORTED SOONEST.

3. ANSWERS TO PARA 2C AND D WILL REQUIRE JURADO REINTERROGATION OF LIRING-1. ROWTON WILL REQUEST JURADO DO THIS AT MEETING BUT IT PROBABLY WILL BE 21 JULY BEFORE JURADO CAN SEE LIRING-1.

4. IT APPARENT FROM CONTEXT OF REPORT CITED REF B THAT LIRING-1 HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IT POSSIBLE REPORT REGARDING AIRMEN WAS EXPRESSION MADE TO LIRING-1 BY RODRIGUEZ.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

LIRING-3

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: V. GRIFFIN
UNIT: WH/C/RR
EXT:
DATE: 20 July 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH8, FE8 SAVA 2, FI, FI/INT 2, IW

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 21425

TO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 7971

1. REF OBVIOUSLY PROVOKING MUCH INTEREST HQS, PARTICULARLY DUE JURADO CLAIMED ACCESS, PLUS DEFINITENESS STATEMENT RE NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTION EXECUTE U.S. AIRMEN AND ATTRIBUTION TO OFFICIAL CUBAN SOURCE.

2. IT THEREFORE ESSENTIAL ROWTON PURSUE ACTION ANTICIPATED PARA 4 REF AND METICULOUSLY DEVELOP FULLEST POSSIBLE INFO NEEDED TO ASSESS CUBAN KNOWLEDGE VN INTENTIONS. SPECIFICALLY REQUEST ROWTON SEEK ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. CAN STATEMENT BE ATTRIBUTED TO LIRING/1 WITH CERTAINTY?

B. ANY FURTHER INFO AS TO UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN WHAT CONTEXT WAS STATEMENT MADE?

LIRING-3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

C. DID STATEMENT REFLECT OFFICIAL CUBAN ESTIMATE OR WAS IT PERSONAL SPECULATION BY LIRING/1 OR HIS MERE ECHOING OF VN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, PRESS PLAY, OR CUBAN WISHFUL THINKING?

D. IF STATEMENT REPRESENTS OFFICIAL POSITION, FROM WHAT GOC OR OTHER FUNCTIONARY DID LIRING/1 OBTAIN IT? WHAT IS POSITION AND ACCESS OF THIS FUNCTIONARY TO SUCH HARD INFORMATION RE VN INTENTIONS, E.G., VN REP CUBA.

SECRET

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER GRIFFIN/VIDAL WH/C/RR/CICS
COORDINATING OFFICER J. FISHER WH/1
RELEASING OFFICER E. WILLIAMSON FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

4
3
2
1

3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 72

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

[redacted]

DISSEM BY 48

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO TIME 0435Z BY J

INFO FILE, VR, DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF, CS/DO, WH8, FE8, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2, FI/D4, FI/SPG, IW, DO4, DO/H3, CIA [illegible] USE ONLY DD120, DOC 2

S E C R E T 200352Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7971

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

20 JUL 66 59838

TYPIC LIRING

1. WALLACE E. [1] ROWTON IN MEETING 19 JULY WITH CARLOS JURADO OBTAINED FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY CAME FROM LIRING-1 [2] WHO RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY FROM HAVANA 15 JULY.

2. SITUATION IN VIETNAM GRAVE BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOING TO EXECUTE U.S. AIRMEN RECENTLY CAPTURED.

3. ROWTON [1] ELICITED THIS STATEMENT FROM JURADO AFTER JURADO TOLD HIM LIRING-1 [2] HAD BROUGHT JURADO MESSAGE FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS WHO RECENTLY WAS REPLACED AS VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS. MESSAGE TO JURADO FROM RODRIGUEZ VIA LIRING-1 [2] WAS TO EFFECT HE REPLACED AND AWAITING REASSIGNMENT BUT EFFECT OF REPLACEMENT NOT SERIOUS. JURADO TOLD ROWTON [1] LIRING-1 [2] HAD SAID THERE MUCH REORGANIZATION GOING ON IN CUBA NOW BUT IT NOT SERIOUS; HOWEVER, LIRING-1 [2] SAID SITUATION IN VIETNAM WAS SERIOUS BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE GOING SHOOT AMERICAN AIRMEN AND AS A CONSEQUENCE THIS WOULD ESCALATE WAR THERE.

4. ROWTON [1] HAS SCHEDULED MEET WITH JURADO EVENING 20 JULY. WILL ATTEMPT LEARN MORE DETAILS AND ESTABLISH [illegible] FOR

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 7971 S E C R E T
2
[illegible]-1 KNOWLEDGE THAT MATTER.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28 PER WH/C #2

ACTION

DC/WH/C 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBES

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH 2, C/CI

S E C R E T 142332Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7920

15 JUL 65 IN 56860

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY

REF DIRECTOR 19940

1. NO MORE HEARD OF PLANS SEND ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS TO MEXICO CITY INSPECT CONSULATE. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR HAS BEEN ASKED SEVERAL TIMES BY WALLACE B. ROWTON IF HE HAS HEARD ANY MORE OF RODRIGUEZ' TRAVEL PLANS BUT HE ADMITS BEING PUZZLED WHY RODRIGUEZ HAS NOT APPEARED.

2. RENTAL OF APARTMENT WHICH STATION HOPES HOUSE RODRIGUEZ WHILE HE HERE EXPECTED BE COMPLETED THIS WEEK. JUARDO HAS RECEIVED AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE FROM LANDLADY AND HAS MONEY AND FIADOR AVAILABLE. OCCUPANTS SUPPOSED BE OUT OF APARTMENT 15 JULY. WILL ADVISE.

3. CHECKING NUMBER TEST LETTERS NOW IN BOX. WILL SERVICE AS REQUESTED.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

ORIG: C.W.ANDERSON/pap ☐ FILE RID
UNIT: WH/C/CA/PA
EXT: 2975.
DATE: 14 JULY 1966

SECRET

ROUTING

1	PA	CC
2		C
3	CA	
4	PE	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible] ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE 0/1u#2 c/c1

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBERS)

14 18 09 Z CITE DIRECTOR 19940

TO MEXICO CITY

KAPOK TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 7868 (IN 54246)

B. MEXICO CITY 7549 (IN 32832)

MEXI 7920
15 July 66

1. REF A SUGGESTS RETURN OF ABREU MAY PRODUCE MOVEMENT IN AMROD OP.

2. PLS CONTINUE TWO TEST LETTERS PER WEEK TO MIGUEL SCHULTZ AND SERVICE ALL BOXES 5-8 AUGUST IN USUAL MANNER.

3. ABOUT HOW MANY TEST LETTERS ARE NOW STACKED UP AT SCHULTZ?

4. MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR CONTINUING REPORTS ON LIFEAT/LIENVOY REFERENCES TO LICLOVE-2. THIS IS OUR PRIMARY WINDOW INTO OVERALL AMROD OP STATUS AND EFFECTIVENESS AND INFO CONTAINED IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO HANDLING OTHER ASPECTS THIS OP AND RELATED OPS.

5. ANY INDICATION REF B INSPECTION OF LIRING IS STILL SCHEDULED?

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA/PA ______
C/WH/C/CA ______
WH/1 J. Lewis

③

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

10-10
1810

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ROUTING 79 83 01

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IG: SEARS:mamd
JIT: WH/COG/OPS
T: 1255
ATE: 8 MAY 69

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
76 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. MI/AN, C/OPS, C/CA, FI 2

(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) 08 20 06z May 69
(elite) (reference number) (pica)
CITE DIRECTOR 00136

Jack Lally

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY-0125 (IN 52298)

1. VIEW PBRUMEN APPARENT SUSPICIONS OF LIRING-3, PREFER ROWTON NOT LEVY ANY REQUIREMENTS ON LIRING-4 OR OFFER ANY AID. HOWEVER, SHOULD OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF OR ELICIT DEVELOP AFTER TRIP, WOULD WELCOME SAME.

2. FILE 201-798301, 201-818842.

END OF MESSAGE

9 MAY 1969

DC/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY #

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

79 83 01

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED | TOTAL COPIES 15 | SECRET (When Filled In) | GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION | REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 22 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WHB ☐ RID COPY

INFO. FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/ICG, FI2, FI/D4

358

S E C R E T 080031Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 8125 8 MAY 1969

8 MAY 69 IN 53298

DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING-4

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 9832 (IN 34397)

B. MEXICO CITY 4543, 16 FEB 68

Two "no approach" cases.

M

818842

1. FATHER LIRING-[illegible] DIED 21 APRIL. LIRING-4 FEELING VERY BAD ABOUT FACT SHE DID NOT SEE FATHER BEFORE DEATH HAS NOW APPLIED FOR VISA TO VISIT HER MOTHER IN CUBA. IF VISA GRANTED PLANS STAY ONLY ONE OR TWO WEEKS.

798301

2. ROWTON HAS KEPT AWAY FROM LIRING-4 SINCE LIRING-3 RELEASED FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA AND LIRING-3 HAS TOLD HER HE OUT OF CLANDESTINE BUSINESS. IF HQS SO DESIRES HOWEVER ROWTON COULD TRY RENEW CONTACT WITH HER TO SEE IF SHE WILLING ASSESS SOME HER "FRIENDS" LISTED IN PARA 1A THROUGH 1F OF REF B OR AT LEAST COLLECT UP TO DATE BIO INFO ON THEM. (STATION HAS SUBJECT PARA 1C REF B PARTICULARLY IN MIND.) THIS IN RETURN FOR FINANCIAL HELP IN MAKING TRIP. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

SECRET

798301

CABLE SEC DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 13 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION 131 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. Riles, ciloes, cilo A

S E C R E T 121716Z JUL 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9242

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 12 JUL 68 IN 48231

REF A. SCWASHINGTON 94613

B. DIRECTOR 15576

STATION APPRECIATES MEXICO CITY STATION OPERATIONAL PROBLEM WITH LIRING/4. HOWEVER, SICE ACTION SUGGESTED REF A MIGHT RESULT IN LIRING/3 CASE BEING WORKED OUT WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL INTERVENTION, BELIEVE REASONABLE THIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PASS PRIOR LIRING/4 TAKING ANY ACTION.

S E C R E T

BT

15 JUL 1968

SECRET

798301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 26 PER ____ # ____

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☒ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

INFO: xref 50-9-11 201-818642 FILE, VR. RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

11 22 06 z JUL 68

CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9236 (IN 47690)**

12 JUL 1968

1. HQS FILES INDICATE ARTURO SERRANO IN 1966 WAS DIRECTOR PCM PUBLISHING HOUSE FONDO DE CULTURA IN MEXICO CITY, BUT THERE NO DETAILS RE HIS CONTACTS WITH THIRD COUNTRY EXILES OR OFFICIALS. WE THEREFORE UNABLE COMMENT ON VALIDITY HIS CLAIM TO ASSIST LIRING/3. 798301

2. CONCUR GUATEMALA CITY COMMENT REF B. FEEL LIRING/4 818642 SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS SERRANO FOR MORE DETAILS HIS CHANNEL TO AND IDENTITY OF GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED. BELIEVE LIRING/4 AND STATION WILL THEN BE IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS VALIDITY SERRANO CLAIM. SUGGEST LIRING/4 ALSO CHECK SERRANO STORY WITH LEFTIST CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO ATTEMPT VERIFY IT AND EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDS IF FEASIBLE. STATION

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY PAGE - 2

SHOULD NOT ADVANCE LIRING/4 ANY FUNDS UNLESS LIRING/4 ABLE SECURELY EXPLAIN THEIR SOURCE.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX SERRANO

WH COMMENTS: *LIRING/4 approached by PCM member Arturo SERRANO who claimed he has contact with Guatemalan exile who could arrange bribe through relatives in Guatemala to assist LIRING/3 who imprisoned that country.
**Guatemala City requested more information prior to commenting on feasibility of bribe offer by SERRANO.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

WH/2/G:

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

- 798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________

DISSEM BY 53 PER ________

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RO COPY

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

17

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 250185Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5685

27 MAY 1968

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

25 MAY 68 IN 18245

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5598 (IN 12717)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9002 (IN 13509)

1. HECTOR RODOLFO (SANDOVAL) ALEGRIA IS GUAT REBEL WHO TOGETHER WITH FRANCISCO (LARA) ENGINEERED LIRING-3 798301 AND FRANCISCO LARA TRIP TO GUATEMALA WHERE NOW INCARCERATED. SANDOVAL SAW LIRING-4 818842 SEVERAL TIMES AFTER LIRING-3 ARREST AT ONE POINT SAYING HE MIGHT HAVE TO HOLD UP BANK TO COME TO LIRING-4 ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS, SANDOVAL ARRESTED 5 MAY SHORTLY AFTER HIS WIFE RETURNED FROM TRIP TO GUATEMALA. SANDOVAL WIFE NOW STAYING AT HOUSE OWNED BY MARCUE TOGETHER WITH FAMILY FRANCISCO LARA.

2. IN ATTEMPT COUNTER EVENTUALITY MEXICAN POLICE (ON BASIS INFO PROVIDED BY SANDOVAL) MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR LIRING-4 FOR INTERROGATION, STATION HAS ASKED LIRING-4 GIVE UP BOTH APARTMENTS SHE AND LIRING-3 HAVE BEEN RENTING. LIRING-4 NOW LIVING WITH GIRLFRIEND. BEFORE MOVING SHE RECEIVED VISIT OF MAN WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS LAWYER OF MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LAWYER SAID HE APPOINTED DEFEND LIRING-3. LIRING-4 HAS RECEIVED FIVE SHORT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSE
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED M

SECR
(When Filled in)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS CO HIBITED

RO NG AND/OR INITIALS

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5683 SECRET

MESSAGES FROM LIRING-3 SMUGGLED FROM JAIL. ONE IN OPEN CODE SUGGESTED S/W BE PASSED TO HIM. STATION NATURALLY WILL DO NO SUCH THING.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 32 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 33/1 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION
WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO.
FILE. VR. WH/COG 8, CA5, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

SECRET 162103Z MAY 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8996 16 May 68 IN 12603

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5540 (IN 08570)

798301

LIAISON REPORTS THAT PERSAVAL AND LIRING/3 BEING HELD PAVON PRISON FARM PENDING SENTENCING BY FOURTH JUZGADO DE PRIMERA CNSTANCIA. ONLY CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. LIAISON SPECULATES THEY WILL RECEIVE LIGHT SENTENCE IF ANY.

SECRET

BT

File

17 MAY 1968

SECRET

14-00000

- 798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ______

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE. VR. WH/COG8 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 CI/OA FI FI/INT2 DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 102325Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5542

10 MAY 68 IN 08570

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 5375 (IN 98384)

818842

1. MANUELH (MARCUE) PARDINAS INFORMED LIRING-4 8 MAY THAT HIS SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW HAD SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING GUAT VISA AND TRAVELED GUATEMALA CITY IN AN EFFORT TO SEE CARLOS MINUEL (PERSAVAL) MARCUE IN JAIL. MARCUE SAID SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW WHO RETURNING WEEK 12 MAY LEARNED P~~X~~ERSAVAL AND LIRING-3 SENTENCED TO MINIMUM TERM OF SIX MONTHS.

2. LIRING-4 CURRENTLY EXPLORING POSSIBILITY TRAVEL GUATEMALA TO TALK TO LIRING-3. 798301 STATION IN FAVOR SUCH TRAVEL IF SHE CAN GET VISA AS LIRING-3 CAN BE EXPECTED URGE LIRING-4 GO CUBA DURING HIS TERM OF IMPRISONMENT.

3. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION CONFIRM LIRING-3 SENTENCE AND PROVIDE DETAILS.

S E C R E T

BT

13 MAY 1968

SECRET

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY IL PER ______

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE. VR. CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 151615Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5205 15 APR 68 IN 91298

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

B. MEXICO CITY 5141 (IN 86263)

NR

16 APR 1968

1. UPON RETURN FROM SHORT VACATION, WALLACE B. ROWTON WAS GIVEN SEALED LETTER FROM LIRING-3 BY LIRING-4. LETTER INDICATED

798301 [illegible]

A. LIRING-3 DEPARTURE FOR GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS DELAYED WHEN FRANCISCO LARA ACCIDENTALLY SHOT SELF IN ANKLE WHILE CLEANING GUN. LARA ANXIOUS NEWS OF ACCIDENT NOT REACH EARS OF FAR AS FAR MEMBERS FORBIDDEN CARRY WEAPONS IN MEXICO.

B. LIRING-3 DEPARTED 10 APRIL WITH LARA AND OTHER GUAT WHO MEMBER YON SOSA FACTION. LIRING-3 STATED IN LETTER THIS GUAT INSISTENT HE TALK DIRECTLY WITH YON SOSA.

C. LIRING-3 AND LARA WILL PROBABLY VISIT SAN SALVADOR IN ADDITION GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS.

2. PER LIRING-4 OTHER GUAT WHO INTRODUCED TO LIRING-3 BY LARA AND IS PROBABLY RODOLFO SANDOVAL CALLED AT HER APARTMENT 9 APRIL LOOKING FOR LIRING-3 WHO OUT. SANDOVAL STATED HE HAD TO TALK TO LIRING-3 IN PRIVATE AS DID NOT WANT LARA LISTEN TO CONVERSATION. SANDOVAL IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER SOSA FACTION. EXPLAINED THAT

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOTAL COPIES

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5205 SECRET

ALTHOUGH SOSA GROUP AND FAR NOW GENERALLY WORKING TOGETHER THERE WERE STILL MANY THINGS "KEPT ON A COMPARTMENTED BASIS." ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 DID NOT REFER TO SANDOVAL IN HIS LETTER TO ROWTON, HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD "LONG TALK" BEFORE LEAVING.

3. LIRING-3 WILL KEEP ROWTON ABREAST OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS VIA ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ROUTING 79 83 01

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

IG: J. SEARS:mamd
IIT: WH/COG/OPS
T: 1255
ATE: 8 MAY 69

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
76 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISP: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. CI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 08 20 06z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 001376

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY-0125 (IN 53298)

JACK KALLY

1. VIEW PBRUMEN APPARENT SUSPICIONS OF LIRING-3, PREFER ROWTON NOT LEVY ANY REQUIREMENTS ON LIRING-4 OR OFFER ANY AID. HOWEVER, SHOULD OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF OR ELICIT DEVELOP AFTER TRIP, WOULD WELCOME SAME.

2. FILE 201-798301, 201-818842.

END OF MESSAGE

9 MAY 1969

DC/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

6
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

79 83 01

CABLE SECRETARIAT ... ATION
☐ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

TO MESSAGE TOTAL ...

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 22 PER ___ # ___

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI2, FI/D4

358

S E C R E T 080031Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0125 8 MAY 1969

DIRECTOR 8 MAY 69 IN 53298

TYPIC LIRING-4

Two "no approval" case.

M

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 9830 (IN 384397)

B. MEXICO CITY 4543, 16 FEB 68

818442

1. FATHER LIRING-4 DIED 21 APRIL. LIRING-4 FEELING VERY BAD ABOUT FACT SHE DID NOT SEE FATHER BEFORE DEATH HAS NOW APPLIED FOR VISA TO VISIT HER MOTHER IN CUBA. IF VISA GRANTED PLANS STAY ONLY ONE OR TWO WEEKS.

798301

2. ROWTON HAS KEPT AWAY FROM LIRING-4 SINCE LIRING-3 RELEASED FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA AND LIRING-3 HAS TOLD HER HE OUT OF CLANDESTINE BUSINESS. IF HQS SO DESIRES HOWEVER ROWTON COULD TRY RENEW CONTACT WITH HER TO SEE IF SHE WILLING ASSESS SOME HER "FRIENDS" LISTED IN PARA 1A THROUGH 1F OF REF B OR AT LEAST COLLECT UP TO DATE BIO INFO ON THEM. (STATION HAS SUBJECT PARA 1C REF B PARTICULARLY IN MIND.) THIS IN RETURN FOR FINANCIAL HELP IN MAKING TRIP. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

SECRET

798301

CABLE SEC DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 13

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER #

ACTION
131 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
INFO:
FILE, VR, CI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 121715Z JUL 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9242

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 12 JUL 68 IN 49331

REF A. SCWASHINGTON 94613

B. DIRECTOR 15576

STATION APPRECIATES MEXICO CITY STATION OPERATIONAL PROBLEM WITH LIRING/4. HOWEVER, SICE ACTION SUGGESTED REF A MIGHT RESULT IN LIRING/3 CASE BEING WORKED OUT WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL INTERVENTION, BELIEVE REASONABLE THIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PASS PRIOR LIRING/4 TAKING ANY ACTION.

S E C R E T

BT

15 JUL 1968

SECRET

798301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

SECRET 3V

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 26 PER #

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☒ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

INFO: xref 50-9-11 201-818842
FILE , VR . CI/AN, CI/PS, C/OA
CI, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

11 22 06z Jul 68

CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9236 (IN 47690)**

File

12 JUL 1968

1. HQS FILES INDICATE ARTURO SERRANO IN 1966 WAS DIRECTOR PCM PUBLISHING HOUSE FONDO DE CULTURA IN MEXICO CITY, BUT THERE NO DETAILS RE HIS CONTACTS WITH THIRD COUNTRY EXILES OR OFFICIALS. WE THEREFORE UNABLE COMMENT ON VALIDITY HIS CLAIM TO ASSIST LIRING/3. 798301

2. CONCUR GUATEMALA CITY COMMENT REF B. FEEL LIRING/4 818842 SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS SERRANO FOR MORE DETAILS HIS CHANNEL TO AND IDENTITY OF GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED. BELIEVE LIRING/4 AND STATION WILL THEN BE IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS VALIDITY SERRANO CLAIM. SUGGEST LIRING/4 ALSO CHECK SERRANO STORY WITH LEFTIST CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO ATTEMPT VERIFY ~~SS~~ IT AND EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDS IF FEASIBLE. STATION

5
4
3
2
1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG : J. Stewart/pen
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 25/7 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR . FILE ☑ RID COPY WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/CA,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 12 20 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR 59022

TO MEXICO CITY

JMWAVS

PBRUMEN LIRING

OVER

REF: A. MEXI CITY 9508 (IN 53817)
B. JMWAVE 4498 (IN 54946)*

1. NO HQS TRACES ADDITIONAL TO REF B. FURTHER DETAILS UMMA-17, 11 SEPT 59: ON 1 SEPT 59 [illegible] DIAZ, FORMER SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN AIR FORCE AND THEN SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN MAPPING INSTITUTE (ICCC), ANGEL ROS, ICCC CO-PILOT, AND ISRAEL SUAREZ ARRIVED MIAMI CONNECTION ALTERATION AT-11 AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMMODATE PHOTO EQUIPMENT. SUAREZ REPRESENTED BY DIAZ AND HIMSELF BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON CASTRO GOVERNMENT, AND WAS OBVIOUSLY SENIOR PERSON IN GROUP AND CLEARLY ONE GIVING ORDERS. SUAREZ SAID AT ONE TIME DURING REVOLUTION HE WAS CO-ORDINATOR OF THE SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONTS. SUAREZ INVITED SOURCE QDALUM TO VISIT HIM HAVANA AND GAVE QDALUM KEY TO APARTMENT 65, CORNER CALLE D AND 23RD. SUAREZ TOLD QDALUM THAT SUAREZ CODE NAME WAS "[illegible]" AND USE THIS NAME WOULD RESOLVE ANY QDALUM PROBLEMS CUBA. TRACES ROS AND DIAZ INDICATE BOTH LEFT CUBA 1960 FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER 12 40

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG : J. Stewart/pm
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 59022

PAGE 2

798301

TO

2. GIVEN CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST LIRING-3 AS RESULT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ CASE AND NOTING COINCIDENTAL APPEARANCE ON SCENE OF PERSON OF SUAREZ BACKGROUND, NOT OUT OF QUESTION SUAREZ AMONG OTHER THINGS SENT TO CHECK LIRING-3 "BUSINESSMAN CONTACT", I.E. BOWTON. WHILE NOT WISHING BE OVERLY CAUTIOUS, DOES SEEM ADVISABLE SUGGEST COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW BOWTON-LIRING-3 MEETINGS. ALSO, REQUEST CABLE FULL LIENVOY TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE TWELVE TONS OF "SOMETHING" AND FURTHER INFO ON SUAREZ AS DEVELOPED.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested traces Ismael SUAREZ De La Paz
poss iden Ismael ECHEMENDIA

WH/COG/RR/OS
WH/COG/CICS
WH/COG/MO E. Chiocca
WH/COG/FI
WH/COG/CA

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

By 7

ACTION WH/[illegible]

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH 8, [illegible], CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, [illegible], [illegible], F[illegible] 2

S E C R E T 061722Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9523

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE File 77830 Lily

6 Dec 66 IN 53817

TYPIC LIRING [illegible] 9 DEC 1966

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. RIWTON 21 NOV 66 HE HAD MET IN CUBAN EMBASSY INDIVIDUAL FROM HAVANA WHO TOLD HIM HE TRAVELING UNDER ASSUMED NAME. L-3 REPORTED INDIVIDUAL TOLD HIM HE MEXICO TO BUY COFFEE SEEDS ON DIRECT ORDERS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

2. L-3 STATED HE BELIEVED MAN'S NAME TO BE ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. CHECK OF CUBAN MANIFESS OCT AND NOV 66 SHOWS NO ARRIVAL OF ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA BUT ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ARRIVED 23 OCT 66. RECENT LIENVOY SHOWS SUAREZ INTERESTED IN COFFEE MATTERS.

3. ON 28 NOV SUAREZ PHONED COMMERCIAL OFFICE IN EMB AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WANTED TALK TO HUGO DEL PINO ABOUT A MEETING IN MEXICAN INSTITUTE OF COFFEE AND WHEN TOLD HUGO NOT IN HE ASKED IF ROLANDO (CURBELO) COULD GO WITH HIM TO AN INTERVIEW AT INSTITUTE. HE SAID IT VERY IMPORTAANT TO THEM AND THEY WERE MUCH INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEM. HE ASKED HER TO TELL HUGO HE WAS GOING TO INSTITUTE AND THAT HUGO WAS TO COME TOO. THREE MINUTES LATER MAN CALLED SAME PHONE AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WAS NOW AT INSTITUTE AND THAT HE WAS AWAITING HUGO.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9508 SECRET

JUST AFTER THIS CALL HUGO DEL PINO CALLED SAME OFFICE AND SECRETARY TOLD HIM ECHEMENDIA IS AT INSTITUTE AND IS AWAITING HIM. HUGO SAID HE WOULD GO THERE IMMEDIATELY.

4. NO STA TRACES ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ OR ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. L-3 STATED INDIVIDUAL APPEARED WELL DRESSED, INTELLIGENT AND DEVOTED FIDELISTA. LATEST LIENVOY INDICATES HE HAS BOUGHT TWELVE TONS OF SOMETHING BUT ITS IDENTITY NOT MENTIONED.

5. TRACES REQUESTED.

6. HQS PLS INDEX NAMES PARA FOUR.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 40/53

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, DI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, SOD6

14 [illegible] 1966

S E C R E T 140020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9638 File

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY, JMWAVE

14 DEC 66 IN 58952

IN 58952

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 55841)

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-3 BY WALLACE B. ROWTON PRODUCED ADDITIONAL INFO RE LIRING-3 IMPENDING TRIP GUAT MEET COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS.

2. PHONE NO. AGUSTINE HERNANDEZ IS GUAT CITY 20 057. JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA GAVE LIRING-3 THIS NO. WHICH USED FIRST CONTACT WITH AGUSTINA. AFTER LIRING-3 RETURN FROM MEXI BORDER, JACOBO TOLD LIRING-3 NOT ASK FOR AGUSTINA THAT NUMBER BUT FOR JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO. JACOBO TOLD L-3 AGUSTINA WORKED AT PIEDRO SANTO PRINTING OFFICE, BUT COULD BE REACHED FRANCO NUMBER WHEN NOT AT WORK.

3. NO MEXI STA TRACES AGUSTINA. HMM 4343, 26 JUN 59 REPORTS JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO ATTENDED MEETING PGT 29 MAY 59 AT MANUEL MARIA CONTRERAS NO. 43-J, MEXI CITY. SEVENTY PERSONS ATTENDED MEETING. LIESCORT ON 29 JAN 59 REPORTED JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO, PAINTER, WAS NEW APPLICANT FOR PGT MEMBERSHIP.

4. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE WOULD LEAVE 15 DEC 66 ORDER ARRIVE HUEHUETENANGO TIME BE IN PLACE 18 DEC PER INSTRUCTIONS AGUSTINA.

83

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9608 S E C R E T

CITY OF MEETING GIVEN REF WAS ERROR. SHOULD READ HUEHUETENANGO, GUAT, NOT QUEZALTENANGO. WILL CARRY LETTER FROM JACOBO TO CESAR MONTEZ EXPLAINING LATTER THAT LIRING-3 LIKE BROTHER TO JACOBO AND ASKING MONTEZ PROVIDE ALL ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE.

5. L-3 GAVE ROWTON COPY LETTER HE SENT ARNOLD RODRIGUEZ CAMPS AFTER HE RETURNED FROM LAST FRUSTRATING TRIP CUBA. IN LETTER L-3 EXPLAINED HE REALIZED HE MADE MISTAKE DESCRIBING HIS PLAN AND TOLD ARNOLD TO RELAY TO OSMANI HE HAD NO INTENTION MAKING HIS COMMERCIAL CONTACT WITTING ANY ARMS PASSED THROUGH CHANNEL. ALSO TOLD ARNOLD HE PLANNING TRIP CENTRAL AMERICA SOON TO CONTACT AND ACCESS BUSINESS CONTACTS. ALSO RELAYED WHAT ROWTON LEARNED RE PRICES OF WEED KILLER MEXI AND ASKED FOR SPECIFICATIONS AND QUANTITIES DESIRED. ALSO STATED WAS SOMEWHAT DISTURBED AND RESENTFUL AT WAY REYNALDO CEPEDA AND DSE TREATED HIM.

6. NEXT L-3 ROWTON MEETING 14 DEC 66.

7. HQS PLS INDEX AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ, JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO AND CESAR MONTEZ TO MEXI STA FILE P-12,729. * REF R/BAT.

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

ORIG: J. Stewart
UNIT: WE/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 6 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-134/1

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 45/53 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/COG 8, CI/OA

mrs/BG2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

6 21 54 Z CITE DIRECTOR 57519

TO [redacted]

File
7 DEC 1966

MEXICO CITY

[illegible] LIRAVINE LIRING-3

VIEW [illegible] SUBSTANTIAL LIRING-3 (798301) MONTHLY EXPENDITURES (ABOUT $2,200 FOR SEPT-OCT), SUGGEST STATION INCLUDE THIS AGENT UNDER LIRAVINE PROJECT WHICH UP FOR RENEWAL 31 DEC. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 46

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM DISSEM BY 22

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, ADDP, DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, FI/SPG, IW, CS/DO 7, DDI, D/OCI-2, D/ONE, FOR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY.

S E C R E T 302230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9439 File Jack

30 Nov 66 IN 49724

8 DEC 1966

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

INTEL TYPIC

1. ON 21 NOVEMBER LIRING-3 REPORTED ONE FUNDORA OR FUNDIDOR (FNU AND MATRONYMIC UNKNOWN), WHO IS OFFICIAL IN HAVANA IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, STATED IN MID-NOVEMBER THAT CUBAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS WERE HANGING BY A THREAD. ACCORDING L-3 THIS PERSON PERFORMS LIAISON WITH ALL FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES. DEFER ANY DISSEM HQS IN VIEW LACK DETAIL AND IDENTITY CUBAN OFFICIAL.

201-798301

2. AMBASSADOR ONLY INFORMED OF CUBAN'S STATEMENT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

EX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 2✓

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION WH/C-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, DO-4, DO/H-3, C.I., CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CA/OP,

S E C R E T 260055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8977

26 OCT 66 IN 25352

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

26 OCT 1966

REF: ~~MEXICO~~ CITY 8944 (IN 23093)

798301

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 24 OCT 66 THAT NR LIRING-4 PASSED MESSAGE TO HIM MORNING 23 OCT THAT REYNALDO (CEPEDA) HERNANDEZ, FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY AND IDENTIFIED DGI OFFICER, WISHED SEE HIM SAME DAY. LIRING-3 MET CEPEDA SAME MORNING IN EMBASSY RECEPTION ROOM. MEETING LASTED ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

2. CEPEDA MADE IMMEDIATE REFERENCE RECENT CONVERSATION LIRING 3 AND NR LIRING-2 MENTIONED REF. LIRING-3 FEELING SHOULD PLAY IT CLOSE TO CHEST REPLIED HE HAD TALKED WITH LIRING-2 AND WAS PLANNING TRIP HAVANA EARLY NOVEMBER FOR CERTAIN DISCUSSIONS. CEPEDA REPLIED HE WAS AWARE OF EVERYTHING AND HAD CALLED LIRING-3 TO STATE HE VERY INTERESTED WHOLE AFFAIR AND WANTED WORK CLOSELY WITH LIRING-3 IN FUTURE. CEPEDA SAID HE PLANNING GO HAVANA 12 NOV 66 AND SUGGESTED THEY BOTH GO TOGETHER ORDER KEEP CLOSE CONTACT DURING DISCUSSIONS.

3. LIRING-3 REPLIED HE WOULD TRY REVISE PLANS TO ARRANGE TRIP COINCIDE THAT OF CEPEDA.

4. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 THIS CLEVER PLAN OF CEPDA INSINUATE

SECRET

SECRET

HIMSELF IN MATTER NOT CONCERNING HIM DIRECTLY. ROWTON EMPHASIZED IT ESSENTIAL LIRING-3 CONSULT HAVANA CONTACTS PRIOR ANY INVOLVEMENT LOCAL PERSONNEL LIKE CEPEDA WHO MIGHT WISH INFILTRATE INTO LIRING-3 AFFAIRS THROUGH CURIOSITY OR AS CUBAN INTEL OR SECURITY DESIRING MONITOR HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD AGAIN SEEN LIRING-2 MORNING 24 OCT AND QUESTIONED HIM RE CONTACTS HE WOULD BE EXPECTED MAKE IN HAVANA DURING TRIP. LIRING-2 REPLIED OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WOULD CERTAINLY BE ONE OF PRINCIPAL CONTACTS.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 CABLE FRIEND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMP FOR VISA. HE EXPECTS RECEIVE IT BY 28 OCT. LIRING-3 WILL THEN PURCHASE TICKET FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULED 31 OCT. HE WILL THEN TELL OR GET WORD CEPEDA HE LEAVING EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. ONLY FACTOR MIGHT ALTER THIS PLAN IS INSTRUCTIONS FROM LIRING-2 DELAY DEPARTURE TO COINCIDE WITH THAT CEPEDA.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA 2, CA/PEG, FI/INT

22 OCT 66 IN 23093

S E C R E T 220016Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8944

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 39039

25 OCT 1966

798301

1. LIRING-2 CALLED LIRING-3 TO EMBASSY 19 OCT. DURING MEETING L-2:

A. THANKED L-3 FOR HIS COOPERATION DURING LOPEZ AFFAIR AND COMPLIMENTED HIM ON ACCURACY HIS INFO.

B. SAID HAD GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO L-3 SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS AND ADDED QUOTE WE WOULD LIKE YOU ASSIST US FURTHER IN SPECIFIC PROJECTS HERE IN MEXICO UNQUOTE.

2. PER PREVIOUS DIRECTIVES FROM ROWTON L-3 TOLD L-2 WOULD BE GLAD HELP REVOLUTION PROVIDED:

A. PROJECTS ASSIGNED HIM BE OF IMPORTANCE TO REVOLUTION

B. EMBASSY PERSONNEL NOT BE INVOLVED IN THEM FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION.

3. L-3 REACTION TO L-2 VERY FAVORABLE COMPLIMENTED HIM ON SERIOUS APPROACH SAID HAD ANTICIPATED L-3'S CONDITIONS AND FELT L-3 SHOULD GO HAVANA TO DISCUSS PROJECTS DIRECTLY WITH RESPONSIBLE PERSONS RATHER THAN WORK THROUGH EMBASSY. L-2 DID NOT THINK IT WISE

SECRET

14-00000

3h

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA 2, CA/PEG, FI/INT

22 OCT 66 IN 23093

S E C R E T 220016Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8944

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

25 OCT 1966

REF DIRECTOR 39039

798301

1. LIRING-2 CALLED LIRING-3 TO EMBASSY 19 OCT. DURING MEETING L-2:

A. THANKED L-3 FOR HIS COOPERATION DURING LOPEZ AFFAIR AND COMPLIMENTED HIM ON ACCURACY HIS INFO.

B. SAID HAD GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO L-3 SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS AND ADDED QUOTE WE WOULD LIKE YOU ASSIST US FURTHER IN SPECIFIC PROJECTS HERE IN MEXICO UNQUOTE.

2. PER PREVIOUS DIRECTIVES FROM ROWTON L-3 TOLD L-2 WOULD BE GLAD HELP REVOLUTION PROVIDED:

A. PROJECTS ASSIGNED HIM BE OF IMPORTANCE TO REVOLUTION

B. EMBASSY PERSONNEL NOT BE INVOLVED IN THEM FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION.

3. L-3 REACTION TO L-2 VERY FAVORABLE COMPLIMENTED HIM ON SERIOUS APPROACH SAID HAD ANTICIPATED L-3'S CONDITIONS AND FELT L-3 SHOULD GO HAVANA TO DISCUSS PROJECTS DIRECTLY WITH RESPONSIBLE PERSONS RATHER THAN WORK THROUGH EMBASSY. L-2 DID NOT THINK IT WISE

SECRET

PRESS FOR DETAILS. L-2 SAID AMBASSADOR IN FULL AGREEMENT AND HOPED L-3 WOULD BE ABLE TRAVEL WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS.

4. ROWTON ENCOURAGED L-3 PROCEED WITH PLANS FOR TRIP AND PROMISED PROVIDE MAXIMUM SUPPORT. L-3 STATED WOULD NOT MENTION ROWTON (AS GREEK FRIEND) TO CUBANS BUT WOULD COUNT COMPLETELY ON LATTER'S ADVICE AND GUIDANCE IN ALL ACTIONS. AGREED WITH ROWTON HE SHOULD NOT APPEAR NEED FUNDS TO MAKE TRIP SINCE WANTED CONTINUE HAVE FREE HAND IN PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS. WOULD EXPECT CUBANS FINANCE HIS ACTIVITIES ONCE BEGINS WORKING FOR THEM. FINANCES NOT MENTIONED IN MEETING WITH L-2.

5. L-3 FEELS CUBA NEEDS COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WITH WEST. SINCE ROWTON DOES NOT APPEAR AGAINST REVOLUTION AND WANTS DEVELOP TRADE WITH CUBA, L-3 WILLING WORK FOR HIM. AGREES WITH ROWTON THAT TO TRADE WITH CUBA, MUST HAVE GOOD INSIGHT IN WHAT IS GOING ON THERE, POLITICALLY AS WELL AS ECONOMICALLY. AT SAME TIME L-3 BELIEVES CUBANS OPERATING IN MEXICO WITH POOR SECURITY AND FEELS THAT WITH ROWTON'S ASSISTANCE COULD DO BETTER JOB AND SERVE BOTH ROWTON AND REVOLUTION. HIS CONDUCT WITH CUBANS THEREFORE IS NATURAL AND HIS CLANDESTINITY WITH ROWTON JUSTIFIED IN HIS EYES ON GROUNDS IT NECESSARY FOR OWN WELFARE.

SECRET

6. DIRECT WOFACT APPROACH AT THIS TIME WOULD DEFINITELY SHOCK L-3 WHO STILL HAS STRONG ANTI WOLADY FEELINGS AND COMPROMISE OP. DEGREE OF L-3'S ASSOCIATION WITH ROWTON SUFFICIENT COMPROMISE HIM WITH CUBANS AND LEFTISTS SHOULD IT COME TO LIGHT. OTHER CONTROL ELEMENTS ARE TRUE NAME RECEIPTS AND TAPES MADE IN ROWTON'S SAFE HOUSE OF L-3 AMOROUS SESSIONS WITH YOUNG ART STUDENT. IN VIEW OF ABOVE BELIEVE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLOITATION OF L-3 SHOULD CONTINUE ON CURRENT BASIS HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH ROWTON AS NOTHING WOULD BE GAINED BY FORMAL RECRUITMENT AT THIS TIME. [illegible] already accomplished -

7. STATION AWARE CUBANS MAY WANT GET L-3 TO CUBA TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT "SOURCES" FROM WHOM OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ. INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITIES GIVE L-3 NAME OF STATION CENTRAL AMERICAN LEFTIST ASSET OR EVEN D.F.S. CONTACT (WITHOUT IDENTIFYING THEM AS ASSET OR CONTACT). L-3 WOULD EXPLAIN THAT INFO FROM THESE SOURCES, WHOM HE DOES NOT KNOW, WAS TRANSMITTED TO HIM VIA LOCAL FOREIGN LEFTIST WITH WHOM HE HAS REGULAR CONTACT PLAN BUT WHOSE ADDRESS OR REAL NAME HE DOES NOT KNOW.

8. STATION NOT AWARE YET OF TIMING ON CUBA TRAVEL, BUT TENTATIVELY VIEWS WITH FAVOR PENDING RECEIPT AND STUDY ALL AVAILABLE BACKGROUND DATA ON LIRING-3 FROM ROWTON. AWARE FACT

PAGE FOUR MEXICO CITY 3944 S E C R E T SECRET

STATION HAS NO INDEPENDENT CHECKS THIS AGENT BEYOND EVIDENCE OF ENTRY TO EMBASSY FURNISHEED BY LIONION. HAVE ONLY HIS WORD ON CLAIMED ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS. HOWEVER, SO FAR TEND DOUBT HE CUBAN PLANT, BUT EVEN IF SHOULD BE, STATION INCURRING NO ADDITIONAL RISK BY FALLING IN WITH TRIP, SINCE WILL PROVIDE HIM ONLY WITH SUITABLE UNCHECKABLE EXPLANATION HOW HE OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ.

9. FACT NR LIRING-4 DEFINITELY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY NR LIRING-1 CONFIRMED BY L-3, C-83565 LITAINT-2 AND LIENVOY. STATION NOT SURE, HOWEVER, IF SHE PAID BY HAVANA OR BY EMBASSY OUT OF LOCAL FUNDS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

S E C R E T 212318Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8938

22 OCT 66 IN 23083

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8889 (IN 20145)

1. LIRING-2 REPORTED TO ROWTON 19 OCT 66 HE HAD MADE CONTACT WITH CECILIA CARMEN MARQUEZ DE ROSSIE AFTER LATTER ARRIVED ON CUBANA FLIGHT FROM HAVANA 17 OCT 66.

2. LIRING-3 STATED LIRING-4 HAD MET CECILIA AT PLANE BUT THAT LATTER HAD BEEN SO OPEN IN HER DENUCIATION OF CASTRO REGIME THAT LIRING-3 TOLD LIRING-4 BREAK CONTACT FOR FEAR JEOPARDIZING HER POSITION. LIRING-4 NOTED CECILIA WAS CONTACTED AT HOTEL BY CUBAN REFUGEES OF "DOUBTFUL LOYALTY" AND THAT CECILIA, AFTER THESE CONTACTS, WAS SEEN TO HAVE LARGE SUM U.S. DOLLARS IN HER POSSESSION. LIRING-4 REPORTED SHE SAW ONE QUANTITY AMOUNTING TO FIVE HUNDRED.

3. IN VIEW LIRING-3 PRESENT STATUS WITH LIRING-2, LIRING-3 CONFIRMED WITH ROWTON THAT HE SHOULD REPORT FACTS OF CECILIA TO LIRING-2. HE BELIEVES THAT TO WITHHOLD SUCH INFORMATION MIGHT WORK TO HIS DISADVANTAGE WERE IT TO BECOME KNOWN TO CUBAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL.

4. CECILIA REPORTED TO LIRING-4 THAT CUBANS HAD BUMPED HER OFF PLANE 9 OCT 66 ON PRETEXT THERE NO ROOM. DID NOT ARREST OR QUESTION

798301

LK

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 8938 S E C R E T SECRET

HER AND LATER ALLOWED HER AND CHILDREN LEAVE ON 17 OCT. SHE REMAINED IN HAVANA HOTEL DURING INTERIM.

5. CECILIA PROFESSES HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE HER FORMER HUSBAND, HOWEVER, MEXICO CITY NEWSPAPER EL UNIVERSAL, 11 OCT 66, CARRIES STORY DATELINED RIO DE JANEIRO, 10 OCT 66 IN WHICH RAMON ROSSIE, NAMED IN PAPER AS RAMON RODRIGUEZ, DENOUNCES CASTRO REGIME AND STATES HE GOING MAKE HOME IN RIO. LIRING-3 GAVE EL UNIVERSAL CLIPPING OF STORY TO ROWION.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 37

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

~~FROM~~
DISSEM BY 26

ACTION
WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/PS

S E C R E T 021630Z CITE MEXICO CITY 6699

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

JACK 4 OCT 1966

File

20CT 66 IN 07879

REF: MEXICO CITY 6692 (IN 07422)*

798301

1. LIRING/3 HAS RECEIVED REQUEST FROM JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS FOR MEETING AND MEETING SCHEDULED NIGHT OF 2 OCTOBER 1966 IN CUBAN EMBASSY. NO DOUBT BUT THAT HERNANDEZ REQUEST FOR MEETING RESULT OF LIRING/3 CONFRONTATION OF JULIAN LOPEZ -Luis MENTIONED REF.

2. LIRING/3 PREPARED GIVE HERNANDEZ SAME STORY HE GAVE LOPEZ BUT WITH TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH WILL BE EMPHASIZED:

A. ACCORDING TO LIRING/3 FRIENDS, WHICH HE INSTRUCTED NOT TO IDENTIFY, ARRESTS CAME AS RESULT LOPEZ BABBLINGS AT DRINKING PARTY TO EFFECT CUBANS SUPPORTING REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA AND HE AT HEAD OF EFFORT IN MEXICO. AS RESULT THIS DISCLOSURE MEXICAN POLICE HEARD OF BRAG AND BEGAN FOLLOWING LOPEZ AT LEAST TWO WEEKS BEFORE ARRESTS MADE.

B. LOPEZ FOOL FOR TAKING ACTIVE PART IN REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORT AND SHOULD HAVE PROTECTED HIMSELF AND CUBANS BY USING SUCH PEOPLE AS LIRING/3 AND OTHER MEXICANS OR CENTRAL AMERICANS. HOPE BY THIS MEANS ELEVATE VALUE OF LIRING/3 TO CUBAN EMBASSY AND ITS ILLEGAL/CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

3. ALSO PLANNING HAVE LIRING/3 RETURN TO HERNANDEZ 3 OCTOBER WITH STORY FACTS OF LOPEZ ARREST ABOUT TO BREAK IN PRESS AND THIS MAY ENDANGER IRINA TRAPOTE DE LOPEZ AND HER FATHER VICTOR TRAPOTE. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT SCHEDULED BREAK STORY IN MEXICO 4 OCTOBER 1966 ISSUE. WARNING TO HERNANDEZ COULD BE STAGED SO LATE THERE NO CHANCE GETTING IRINA AND VICTOR ON CUBANA FLIGHT WHICH SCHEDULED 3 OCTOBER.

SECRET

BT ≠ JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ RELEASED BY MEXICAN POLICE 28SEPT,

SECRET

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-800004
[illegible]

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 4 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE [illegible]

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 20 18 27 Z CITE DIRECTOR 45103

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, CARACAS, JMWAVE

TYPIC AMPOP

REF: MEXICO CITY 8889 (IN 20149) (BEING SENT RIO DE JANEIRO)

FOR MEXICO CITY: PLEASE ATTEMPT ELICIT FROM LIRING/3 798301 INFORMATION CONCERNING AMPOP/1'S WIFE AND FAMILY WHO ARE SUBJECTS OF REFERENCE. PARTICULARLY INTERESTED WIFE'S FUTURE PLANS; HER TREATMENT WHILE CUBA; AND REACTION AMPOP/1 EMPLOYERS TO HIS DEFECTION AND DESERTION HIS FAMILY.

END OF MESSAGE

24 OCT 1966

C/WH/C/FI
C/WH/C/CI
C/WH/C/MO
WH/1
WH/3/V
WH/5

COORDINATING OFFICERS

by J. [illegible]
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

19-18

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Earl J. Williamson
THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

27

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, C/OA, FI, FI/INT2

S E C R E T 181930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8859

CARACAS INFO JMWAVE, DIRECTOR

PERUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 2824 (IN 16737) 19830 18 OCT 66 20149

LIFIRES REPORTED ARRIVAL MEXICO FROM HAVANA ON 17 OCT OF ISABLE (ROSSIE) MARQUEZ, VEN PPT M38861, CARMEN (MARQUEZ) DE (ROSSIE), VEN PPT M38860 AND MIGUEL (ROSSIE) MARQUEZ VEN PPT M38862. LOCAL ADDRESS GIVEN WAS HOME OF LIRING-3.

S E C R E T

BT

19 OCT 1966

File

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

CICS

[illegible] 66

☐ RID COPY

FI

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 39039

13 13 Z

MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A) MEXICO CITY [illegible] (IN [illegible])

B) MEXICO CITY 7711 (IN 43725)

79830

WITH HQS READING OF THIS OP, APPEARS THAT [illegible]/LIRING-[illegible] RELATIONSHIP MAY BE NEARING POINT OF POSITIVE RECRUITMENT [redacted] REQUEST CURRENT STATION READING OF OPERATION AND UPDATED ASSESSMENT LIRINGAS AND -4 INCLUDING POSSIBLE PLANS FOR RECRUITMENT OF EACH. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE [illegible] TECHNICAL OR OTHER SURVEILLANCE AT [illegible]? HAS LIRAMIL-7 BEEN ABLE VERIFY HIS EMPLOYMENT LIRING?

Guess they haven't read process traffic

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CICS

C/WH/C/FI T. Hazlett (draft)

WH/C/FI/[illegible] [illegible] (draft)

C/WH/C/CI [illegible] [illegible] (draft)

[illegible]

[illegible]

Mr Sally:

No Record of LIRING/1, /2 + /4
as of this A.M.

Bert
28 Sep 66

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

~~FROM~~ DISSEM BY 33

ACTION WH/C8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, WH/C8, CI/OPS, CI/IC2

S E C R E T 272216Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8551

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

File

27 Sep 66 04697

28 SEP 1966

TYPIC LIRING

78301

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 26 SEPT THAT LIRING-4 NOW OFFICIALLY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY TO LIRING-1. (Cuban Ambassador (or Consul)) ACCORDING TO LIRING-3 LIRING-1 AND LIRING-2 WILL GO HOME PCS IN DECEMBER.

2. NEW CONSUL WHO WILL REPLACE LIRING-1 IS EMPLOYEE WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY TWO YEARS AGO. LIRING-3 COULD NOT REMEMBER HIS NAME BUT WILL QUERY LIRING-4 AND OBTAIN.

3. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD BEEN ASKED ABOUT CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AT EMBASSY BY ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ON LAST TRIP TO HAVNA. LIRING-3 SAID HE REPLIED THERE WAS NONE. WHEN HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY LIRING-3 CARRIED LETTER TO JULIAN LOPEZ, CULTURAL ATTACHE, AND AFTER LOPEZ READ IT HE APPEARED COOL TOWARD LIRING-3. MORE RECENTLY LOPEZ APPEARED WARM UP AGAIN WITH LIRING-3 AND NOW HAD ASKED LIRING-3 DIRECT CUBAN ART ACTIVITIES MEXICO, PARTICULARLY PLASTIC ARTS. LIRING-3 ACCEPTED. LIRING-3 TAGS LOPEZ AS CUIS TYPE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

4-11

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

[redacted]

ORIG: J. MOUGHAN;fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

[redacted]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible] ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE [illegible]

[redacted] ~~(CLASSIFICATION)~~ [redacted] ~~(DATE AND TIME FILED)~~ [redacted] ~~(REFERENCE NUMBER)~~ (ELITE) (PICA)

SECRET

15 12 53Z CITE DIRECTOR 35223

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING 798301 15 SEP 1966

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8487 (IN 91995)

B. DIRECTOR 34711

File
JL

1. APPRECIATE STATION POSITION BUT IT HQS OPINION THAT ANY BOOST IN PRESTIGE LIRING 3 MIGHT GAIN IS OVERSHADOWED BY WOLADY POLICY AGAINST CHARTERING SHIPS. HQS ATTEMPTING CONFIRM NEED FOR SHIPS THROUGH OTHER SOURCES AND DOES NOT WISH INVOLVE STAM.

2. PLS KEEP HQS INFORMED PARA 1 REF A DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA
C/WH/C/MO for
WH/1 Stewart (draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-8

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE [illegible]

C NO. [illegible]

TO: [illegible]

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA.
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In order to qualify Subject for a [illegible]. it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of Subject's bona fides.

Note has been made of [illegible] 7234, [illegible] 7441 and [illegible] 7454.

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 12 SEP 1966

CASE NO. 201- 798301

☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA	

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES	☐ FILE
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓ TICKLE 14 Nov.
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES	✓ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ✓ FINAL
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐ OTHER

☐ POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

Tickle

Pls repeat my memo of 23 June 66.

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

14-00000

4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM

DISSEM BY 33/ M

ACTION WH/C 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 092240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8189 10 AUG 1966 [illegible], FYI

DIRECTOR 201-798301 9 AUG 66 IN 73260

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8126 (IN 78738)

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON AT 8 AUG MEETING HE PREPARED REVISIT CUBA TO FURTHER DEVELOP CONTACTS FOR ROWTON BUSINES ACTIVITIES. HE PLANS REQUEST VISA 9 AUG DIRECTLY FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ WHO STILL IN FOREIGN MINISTRY THO NO LONGER VICE MINISTER. L-3 EXPECTS SPEEDY SERVICE ON VISA REQUEST ALLOWING HIM TAKE 13 AUG FLIGHT TO PBRUMEN. ?

2. L-3 VERY ANXIOUS TAKE WIFE (LIRING-4) AND CHILD WITH HIM THIS FLIGHT AND HER VISA APPROVALGN REQUESTED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, EXPECTED ARRIVE IN TIME ACCOMPANY HIM. WIFE AND CHILD WILL FLY ON TO SANTIAGO FOR VISIT WITH HER MOTHER. WILL GIVE L-3 $1,000 U.S., HALF IN MEXICAN PESOS, FINANCE TRIP. L-3 TO STAY HAVANA 13-26 AUG GO SANTIAGO 27 AUG RETURN MEXI 29 AUG. — He has already used [illegible] to re-[illegible] GCH- ZAPEZ? [illegible] give [illegible] — see MEXI 8126 2 Aug '66.

3. ROWTON CONFIDENT L-3 RELATIONSHIP PROGRESSED TO POINT HE CAN LEVY SPECIFIC POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND EVEN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS ON L-3 WHO WILL DO BEST TO SATISFY. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE REALIZES NECESSITY KEEPING ROWTON INFORMED IN DETAIL ON CUBAN SITUATION SINCE

SECRET

BUSINESS SO CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH AFFAIRS OF COUNTRY. ROWTON HAS ASKED HIM SOUND OUT ALL CONTACTS FOR ANY INDICATION CASTRO NEUTRALIZED OR DOWNGRADED AND IF SO WHO NOW IN POWER. ALSO HAS ASKED TO REPORT ANY INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCE. REQUEST OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

4. ROWTON ALSO HAS ASKED L-3 SPOT AND POSSIBLY RECRUIT HAVA RESIDENT TO WORK WITH ROWTON AND L-3 IN BUSINESS VENTURES. INDIVIDUAL WOULD HAVE TO HAVE CAPABILITY FOR TRAVEL MEXICO FREQUENTLY CONSULT WITH ROWTON. L-3 FROM CURRENT KNOWLEDGE FRIENDS INSIDE PROPOSED RENE OCHOA FUNEZ, 30-YEAR-OLD HONDURAN MARRIED TO CUBAN. OCHOA IS DIRECTOR DE LA EDITORA NACIONAL DE EDUCACION DE CUBA WITH EXCELLEN ACCESS TO HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. HE INTENDS SOUND OUT OCHOA FOR COLLABORATION AND WILL LOOK AT OTHER CENTRAL AMERICANS AS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES. FOR POSSIBLE INFORMATION ON OCHOA HQS IS REFERRED TO HSSA 04848 30 APRIL 1964.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

7

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 6

ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS:ack ☐ FILE RID
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC ☐ INDEX
EXT: 2625 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE: 3 AUGUST 1966 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 21 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH-8, FI/SPG

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 03 18 16Z CITE DIRECTOR 25094

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8126 (IN 88738)

CARLOS OF REFERENCE IS LIRING/3. PLEASE USE CRYPT IN FUTURE TRAFFIC.

END OF MESSAGE

File

AC/WH/C/FI

C/WH/C/CI

C/WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

3-16

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

13

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
DISSEM BY 30/4

ACTION
WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WHB, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

1966

S E C R E T 022227Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8126 AUG 1966 [illegible] 63738

DIRECTOR 798301

8 AUG 1966

TYPIC LIRING

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 1 AUG HE HAD CONTACTED MANOLO GONZALEZ IN VERACRUZ 30 AND 31 JULY. GONZALEZ IS MEXICAN FUNCTIONARY AND LOCAL EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN CONSULATE IN VERACRUZ. HAS RESIDED VERACRUZ PAST 35 YEARS AND HAS WORKED FOR CONSULATE MOST THIS PERIOD.

Use as a direct [illegible] agent - requires qualifying for POA/OA.

2. JURADO HAD BEEN SENT VERACRUZ BY ROWTON TO DEVELOP GONZALEZ FOR USE IN ROWTON - JURADO BUSINESS DEALS AND ULTIMATELY FOR INTEL PURPOSES. GONZALEZ AGREED WORK WITH JURADO ON CONDITION HIS COOPERATION REMAIN QUOTE BETWEEN US UNQUOTE SINCE HE SAID IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO HIM IF HAVA LEARNED HE DOING BUSINESS ON SIDE.

3. GONZALEZ TOLD JURADO HE GOING HAVA SOON ON HIS OWN SINCE HE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CITY SINCE REVOLUTION. PLANS FLY CUBANA FROM MEXI CITY 5 AUG AND WILL ARRIVE MEXI CITY DAY BEFORE. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO OFFER HIM FREE OVERNIGHT STAY IN NEW APARTMENT RENTED BY JURADO AND FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON. NO EVIDENCE GONZALEZ HAS YET ASKED FOR VISA.

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8126 SECRET

4. VIEW GONZALEZ GENERAL ACCEPTANCE JURADO PITCH, ROWTON WILL PASS 100 DOLLARS U.S. TO GONZALEZ THROUGH JURADO HELP HIM MEET EXPENSES. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO PASS GONZALEZ REQUIREMENTS PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. JURADO TOLD BY ROWTON NOT SURFACE ROWTON TO GONZALEZ. JURADO ALSO PLANNING MAKE SECOND EXPEDITION HAVA FOR ROWTON SOON AND EXPECTS SEE GONZALEZ THERE WILL TAKE WIFE WITH HIM BUT DELAY BEING ENCOUNTERED OBTAINING VISA FOR HER.

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE 6 June 1966 jep

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 -798301

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
LIRING
WH/1 ~~XXXX~~ Mexico City

TYPE OF REQUEST
☒ POA ☒ OA ☐ CHC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date) 15 June 1966

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

JUN 7 1 38 PM '66

USE OF SUBJECT
Informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS
RI: WILL FWD.
DIVISION: NR
FIELD: Derog. in Bio

GREEN LIST INITIATED
☒ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS
☐ PRQ - PART I ☒ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

POA

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE 6/ /66
1 JUL 1966

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results: NR SO #798301

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☒	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

JUL 5 2 25 PM '66

☐ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached ____________

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, _______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS
file
[illegible]
6 July 66

DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY, IOS

FORM 3-64 693

SECRET

(9) 1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

TO: [illegible]	DATE [illegible]
	C NO. [illegible]
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA ~~/s/ Edward P. Brown~~	SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In order to qualify Subject for a POA, it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of Subject's bona fides.

Note has been made of MEXI 7354, DIR 07441 and MEXI 7454.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

DATE: [illegible] 1966 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C#
SO#
201#

FI traces - No Traces

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY):

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

FORM 8-65 2413

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(40)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 23 JUN 1966

CASE NO. 201- 798301

☐ SET UP FOR POA
☐ EXPEDITE INDICES
DATE
☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES
DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA
☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY
☐ COVERT NAME CHECK
☐ ORSD
AREA:

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL
☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL
☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION
☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I
☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (*No notice to Division*)
☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ REFLUTTER REPORT
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (*Reason checked below.* or see remarks*)
☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ REQUEST FI TRACES
✓ FILE CH
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES
✓ TICKLE 23 July
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES
☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
☐ ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED __________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

To: WH/1

In order to qualify subject for a POA, it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of subject's bona fides.

Note has been made of MEXI 7234, DIR 07441, and MEXI-7954.

See MEXI 8126 of 2 Aug '66.
ROWTON using subj. as directed agent to recruit & use GONZALEZ.

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/1/[illegible]

EXTENSION: 3656

NO.

DATE: 22 June 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DCWH/1		6/22		
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. CI/OA				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

22 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. Lally

SUBJECT: LIRING-3
201-798301

JUN 23 9 24 AM '66

There were no RI traces on Subject. A Provisional Operational Approval is requested.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

cc to SO
fi 9705 23 June 66

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE
TO:	C NO.
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT:

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	PI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY_____ PER_____ #_____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO_____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY PAGE - 2

SHOULD NOT ADVANCE LIRING/4 ANY FUNDS UNLESS LIRING/4 ABLE SECURELY EXPLAIN THEIR SOURCE.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX - SERRANO

WH COMMENTS: *LIRING/4 approached by PCM member Arturo SERRANO who claimed he has contact with Guatemalan exile who could arrange bribe through relatives in Guatemala to assist LIRING/3 who imprisoned that country.
**Guatemala City requested more information prior to commenting on feasibility of bribe offer by SERRANO.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/2/G:

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

798301

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 53 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 250105Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5683

27 MAY 1968

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

25 MAY 68 IN 18245

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5590 (IN 12717)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9002 (IN 13509)

1. HECTOR RODOLFO (SANDOVAL) ALEGRIA IS GUAT REBEL WHO TOGETHER WITH FRANCISCO (LARA) ENGINEERED LIRING-3 AND FRANCISCO LARA TRIP TO GUATEMALA WHERE NOW INCARCERATED. SANDOVAL SAW LIRING-4 SEVERAL TIMES AFTER LIRING-3 ARREST AT ONE POINT SAYING HE MIGHT HAVE TO HOLD UP BANK TO COME TO LIRING-4 ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS, SANDOVAL ARRESTED 5 MAY SHORTLY AFTER HIS WIFE RETURNED FROM TRIP TO GUATEMALA. SANDOVAL WIFE NOW STAYING AT HOUSE OWNED BY MARCUE TOGETHER WITH FAMILY FRANCISCO LARA.

798301

818842

2. IN ATTEMPT COUNTER EVENTUALITY MEXICAN POLICE (ON BASIS INFO PROVIDED BY SANDOVAL) MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR LIRING-4 FOR INTERROGATION, STATION HAS ASKED LIRING-4 GIVE UP BOTH APARTMENTS SHE AND LIRING-3 HAVE BEEN RENTING. LIRING-4 NOW LIVING WITH GIRLFRIEND. BEFORE MOVING SHE RECEIVED VISIT OF MAN WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS LAWYER OF MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LAWYER SAID HE APPOINTED DEFEND LIRING-3. LIRING-4 HAS RECEIVED FIVE SHORT

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSE

CLASSIFIED M

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECR

(When Fille

REPRODUCTION OF THIS CO ITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE. VR.

RO NG AND/OR INITIALS Y

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5683 SECRET

MESSAGES FROM LIRING-3 SMUGGLED FROM JAIL. ONE IN OPEN CODE SUGGESTED S/W BE PASSED TO HIM. STATION NATURALLY WILL DO NO SUCH THING.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33/1 PER ______

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR. WH/COG 8, CA6, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 162103Z MAY 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8996 /16 May 68 IN /12603

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5548 (IN 08570)

LIAISON REPORTS THAT PERSAVAL AND LIRING/3 BEING HELD PAVON PRISON FARM PENDING SENTENCING BY FOURTH JUZGADO DE PRIMERA CNSTANCIA. ONLY CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. LIAISON SPECULATES THEY WILL RECEIVE LIGHT SENTENCE IF ANY.

798301

S E C R E T

BT

file

17 MAY 1968

SECRET

14-00000

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TOTAL COPIES 21

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 30 PER

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE. VR. WH/COG8 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 CI/OA FI FI/INT2 DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 102325Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5542

10 May 68 IN 08570

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PERUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 5375 (IN 98384)

215942

1. MANUEL H (MARCUE) PARDINAS INFORMED LIRING-4 5 MAY THAT HIS SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW HAD SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING GUAT VISA AND TRAVELED GUATEMALA CITY IN AN EFFORT TO SEE CARLOS MINUEL (PERSAVAL) MARCUE IN JAIL. MARCUE SAID SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW WHO RETURNING WEEK 12 MAY LEARNED PXRSAVAL AND LIRING-3SENTENCED TO MINIMUM TERM OF SIX MONTHS.

2. LIRING-4 CURRENTLY EXPLORING POSSIBILITY TRAVEL GUATEMALA TO TALK TO LIRING-3. STATION IN FAVOR SUCH TRAVEL IF SHE CAN GET VISA AS LIRING-3 CAN BE EXPECTED URGE LIRING-4GO CUBA DURING HIS TERM OF IMPRISONMENT.

798301

3. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION CONFIRM LIRING-3 SENTENCE AND PROVIDE DETAILS.

S E C R E T

BT

5 MAY 1968

SECRET

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 12 PER #

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP:

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 151615Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5205 15 Apr 68 IN 91298

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

B. MEXICO CITY 5141 (IN 86263)

WR 16 APR 1968

1. UPON RETURN FROM SHORT VACATION, WALLACE B. ROWTON WAS GIVEN SEALED LETTER FROM LIRING-3 BY LIRING-4. LETTER INDICATED

A. LIRING-3 DEPARTURE FOR GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS DELAYED WHEN FRANCISCO LARA ACCIDENTALLY SHOT SELF IN ANKLE WHILE CLEANING GUN. LARA ANXIOUS NEWS OF ACCIDENT NOT REACH EARS OF FAR AS FAR MEMBERS FORBIDDEN CARRY WEAPONS IN MEXICO.

B. LIRING-3 DEPARTED 10 APRIL WITH LARA AND OTHER GUAT WHO MEMBER YON SOSA FACTION. LIRING-3 STATED IN LETTER THIS GUAT INSISTENT HE TALK DIRECTLY WITH YON SOSA.

C. LIRING-3 AND LARA WILL PROBABLY VISIT SAN SALVADOR IN ADDITION GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS.

2. PER LIRING-4 OTHER GUAT WHO INTRODUCED TO LIRING-3 BY LARA AND IS PROBABLY RODOLFO SANDOVAL CALLED AT HER APARTMENT 9 APRIL LOOKING FOR LIRING-3 WHO OUT. SANDOVAL STATED HE HAD TO TALK TO LIRING-3 IN PRIVATE AS DID NOT WANT LARA LISTEN TO CONVERSATION. SANDOVAL IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER SOSA FACTION. EXPLAINED THAT

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY: PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5205 SECRET

ALTHOUGH SOSA GROUP AND FAR NOW GENERALLY WORKING TOGETHER THERE WERE STILL MANY THINGS "KEPT ON A COMPARTMENTED BASIS." ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 DID NOT REFER TO SANDOVAL IN HIS LETTER TO ROWTON, HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD "LONG TALK" BEFORE LEAVING.

3. LIRING-3 WILL KEEP ROWTON ABREAST OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS VIA ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY_____ AT_____ Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER _____

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO._____

X-REF TO FILE NO._____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO. FILE VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI

ORIG AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 062030Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5141 5 APR 68 IN 86253

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

8 APR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

1. ON 5 APRIL 68 STATION RECEIVED PHOTOGRAPHIC COPIES OF GUATEMALAN PASSPORT WHICH LIRING-3 798301 SAID FRANCISCO LARA WOULD USE TO ENTER HONDURAS FROM GUATEMALA. COPIES INDICATE THERE WAS DISCREPENCY IN NAME ORIGINALLY REPORTED IN REF AND NAME ON PASSPORT. CORRECT NAME IS JOSE MARIA OLIVA CARRANZA, ORDINARY GUATEMALAN PASSPORT NUMBER 134825 SERIES D REGISTRY NUMBER 22743 ISSUED 27 MAY 1963 IN GUATEMALA CITY. OLIVA BORN SAN FELIPE, RETALHULEU ON 9 FEB 1935.

2. OTHER DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED INCLUDE MILITARY INSCRIPTION IN GUATEMALAN ARMY, CARD NUMBER 49859, BIRTH CERTIFICATE NUMBER 2825671, CEDULA DE VECINDAD 287165 AND ELECTIRON CARD 127817.

3. THESE DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED BY LIRING-3 WHEN THEY PASSED TO HIM BY FRANCISCO LARA TO USE IN MAKING FALSE MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION. POUCHING COPIES OF DOCUMENTS TO ADDRESSEES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: 26 PER #

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 1C

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR, CI/OA, CI, CI/OPS, FI

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

4 Apr 68 IN 85161

15 APR 68

S E C R E T 041920Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5111

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: GUATEMALA CITY-8822 (NOT SENT TEGUCIGALPA) (IN 80309)

798301

1. AFTERNOON 3 APRIL 68, LIRING-3 REPORTED HE PLANS DEPART FOR GUATEMALA CITY VIA LAND IN COMPANY GUATEMALAN CITIZEN FRANCISCO LARA CIRCA 4 APRIL 68. ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 HAS VALID MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION AND LARA HAS FALSE MEXICAN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION DOCUMENTATION, THEY WILL ATTEMPT ENTER GUATEMALA ILLEGALLY.

2. IN GUATEMALA CITY, LARA PLANS INTRODUCE LIRING-3 TO WOMAN WHO LOGISTICAL OFFICER FOR FAR IN GUATEMALA CITY. TRIP WILL THEN BE ARRANGED FOR LIRING-3 TO VISIT FAR SIERRA DE LAS MINAS HEADQUARTERS TO DISCUSS FUTURE SUPPORT OF FAR FROM MEXICO CITY.

3. AFTER APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS IN GUATEMALA, LARA AND LIRING-3 WILL TRAVEL TEGUCIGALPA TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES OF SETTING UP PRINTING PRESS UNDER LIRING-3'S TRUE NAME.

4. LARA'S FALSE MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION IS IDENTITY CARD FROM SECRETARIA DE EDUCACION PUBLICA UNDER NAME JACINTO RANGEL CERVANTES. FOR IDENTITY CARD PHOTOGRAPH, LARA WORE GLASSES, HAIR DYED GREY AND NO MUSTACHE. LARA TOLD LIRING-3 THAT FOR TRAVEL TO TEGUCIGALPA FROM GUATEMALA CITY, HE WILL USE GUATEMALAN PASSPORT UNDER NAME

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY_______ AT:_______ Z

DISSEM BY_______ PER _______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO._______

X-REF TO FILE NO._______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5111 SECRET

MIGUEL ANGEL OLIVA CASTANEDA. LIRING-3 WILL PROBABLY USE VALID MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION. POUCHING COPIES OF LARA AND LIRING-3 DOCUMENTATION.

5. FOR TEGUCIGALPA: LIRING-3 (IDEN) IS STATION PENETRATION OF GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA GROUP IN MEXICO CITY. FRANCISCO LARA IS FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS, GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARY WHO HAS RESIDED IN MEXICO FOR PAST YEAR AND WHO CLAIMS TO BE FAR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO.

6. ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 HAS TELEPHONE NUMBER AND POST OFFICE BOX IN MEXICO CITY FOR STATION CONTACT, DO NOT BELIEVE STATION WILL BE ABLE SUPPLY ADDRESSEES WITH INFO ON HIS TRIP TO GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS UNTIL HE IS THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED AFTER HIS RETURN TO MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 24 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CE/OA, FI

SECRET 041910Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5112 4 Apr 68 IN 85227

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR TEGUCIGALPA

REF MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

IDEN: CARLOS JURADO DELMAR

MEXICAN CITIZEN

PROFESSION: ARTIST (PAINTER)

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO
ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY: D AT: 0430 Z
DISSEM BY: 48 PER ____ #
ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 56

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____
X-REF TO FILE NO. ____
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

		6	
2			
3			798301
4		9	
5		10	

INFO: FILE VR. CS/DO, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, WH/COG 8,

S E C R E T 282327Z MAR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8822 29 MAR 1968

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5000 (IN 80219)

29 MAR 68 IN 80309

1. RE PARA 4 REF: DUE 28 MARCH CHANGES WITHIN GUATEMALAN ARMY, INCLUDING REMOVAL OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAFAEL (ARRIAGA) BOSQUE, STATUS OF "OPERATION AZTECA" UNCERTAIN. CONSEQUENTLY STATION CANNOT GUARANTEE ANY TYPE PROTECTION FOR LIRING-3 (798301) IN CASE HE CAPTURED. ALSO NOTE THAT MEXICAN BORDER AREA BEING HEAVILY PATROLLED.

2. ESMOOSE-1 (818094) REPORTED THAT ON EARLY MORNING 28 MARCH ESMARVEL-1 (804875) ALERTED SPECIAL COMMANDO UNIT OF GUAT ARMY (SCUGA) TO BE PREPARED FOR IMPORTANT OPERATION. HE SAID INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED THAT GROUP OF THIRTY CASTRO CUBANS PLANNED ENTER GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO AND THEIR ARRIVAL TIED IN WITH WAVE OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE WHICH REPORTEDLY TO TAKE PLACE 31 MARCH. ESMARVEL-1 DID NOT INDICATE SOURCE OF ABOVE INFO. HE SAID THAT REINFORCED SCUGA TEAMS WOULD BE SENT TO THE DEPARTMENTS OF SAN MARCOS AND HUEHUETENANGO ON MEXICAN BORDER, WITH A BACK-UP TEAM IN DEPARTMENT OF QUEZALTENANGO. SCUGA UNIT WAS IN PROCESS OF PREPARING VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT WHEN WORD RECEIVED OF REMOVAL OF ARRIAGA. ESMOOSE-1 SAID AS RESULT OPERATION CANCELLED. POSSIBLE HOWEVER THAT SAME

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE. VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 8522 SECRET

INFO HAS BEEN PASSED TO MILITARY UNITS AT BORDER WHICH MIGHT MAKE LIRING-3'S CROSSING INTO GUATEMALAN EVEN MORE DANGEROUS.

3. FOR HQS: PARA 2 INFO HAS NOT BEEN DISSEMED DUE LACK OF CONFIRMATION AND SCARCITY OF DETAILS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ✓ | TOTAL COPIES 31 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY 798301

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE. VR. CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI/ICZ, CI/PS,

TSD 6, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, ADDP, DDP

S E C R E T 282120Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5000

28 MAR 68 IN 80219

PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

29 MAR 1968

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4828 (IN 70689)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 8551 (IN 41008)

C. MEXICO CITY 4486 (IN 50312)

798301

1. ON 27 MARCH 68 LIRING-3 REPORTED THAT GUAT FAR MEMBER WHO PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS MIGUEL ANGEL OLIVA CASTANEDA IS ACTUALLY FRANCISCO LARA, PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS, AKA CARLOS LARA (REFS B AND C). LARA INADVERTENTLY GAVE HIS TRUE NAME WHILE DISCUSSING WITH LIRING-3 THE PLANNED TRIP TO GUATEMALA.

2. AT PRESENT, LIRING-3 MAKING FALSE DOCUMENTS FOR PERSONS HE TO LEAD INTO GUATEMALA. THEY PLAN TRAVEL SOMETIME BEFORE 31 MARCH. LIRING-3 TO ENTER GUATEMALA WITH GROUP IN ORDER MEET UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN WHO IS FAR LOGISTICAL OFFICER. GROUP BELIEVES
NR
LIRING-2 SHOULD TALK TO HER TO DETERMINE WHAT SUPPLIES HE CAN MAKE AVAILABLE TO FAR (COULD UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN BE DIAN ADELA JIMENEZ OR BRENY HOSEL CUENCA?)

3. LIRING -3 IS NOW ATTEMPTING DETERMINE TRUE NAMES OF OTHER PERSONS HE TO TAKE TO BORDER AND EXACT DEPARTURE DATE. STATION

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE. VR.

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5000 SECRET

WAS ABLE TAKE PHOTO OF PERSON LIRING-3 IN CONTACT AND LIRING-3 IMMEDIATELY IDENTIFIED THIS PERSON AS FRANCISCO LARA. STATION HAS ALSO TAKEN PHOTOS OF ADDRESS WHERE GUATS BELIEVED BE STAYING AND FILM BEING DEVELOPED. WILL PRIORITY POUCH PHOTOS AND LIRING-3 REPORTS.

4. LIRING-3 WILLING ENTER GUATEMALA WITH FAR MEMBERS BUT WOULD LIKE KNOW IF OPERATION AZTECA STILL IN FORCE. IF NOT, COULD STATION GUATEMALA ARRANGE ANY TYPE OF PROTECTION FOR HIM IN CASE HE IS CAPTURED BY MILITARY OR POLICE?

SECRET

BT

SECRET

24 798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER ______

ACTION WHB ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, DDP, ADDP, CI/OA, 7 file

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 141940Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4828

15 MAR 1968

GUATEMALA CITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

14 MAR 68 IN 70689

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4790 (IN 68111)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 8733 (IN 68957)

1. FOLLOWING CABLED IN ANSWER QUESTIONS RAISED PARA 3 REF B:

A. FAR KNOWS LIRING-3 HAS CAPABILITY OBTAIN FALSE DOCUMENTATION. LIRING-3 FOR EXAMPLE OBTAINED FALSE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND MILITARY REGISTRATION CARD FOR JACOBO PADILLA.

798301

B. LEFTIST CONTACTS LIRING-3 INCLUDING GUATS KNOW HE FAMILIAR WITH GUAT BORDER AREA IN CHIAPAS. LIRING-3 WORKED FOR NUMBER OF YEARS IN CHIAPAS FOR MEXICAN EQUIVALENT INDIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU. IT ALSO WELL KNOWN TO FAR THAT LIRING -3 HAS BUSINESS LOCATED IN BORDER AREA IN ST CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS SINCE THIS BUSINESS WAS TO BE USED AS COVER FOR ARMS SUPPLY TO GUAT REBELS.

C. AS GUAT CITY STATION WILL REMEMBER LIRING-3 WAS TAKEN BY FAR TO HIDEOUT IN GUAT WHERE HELD TALKS WITH FAR MEMBERS. LIRING-3 EVEN SUPPLIED FAR SOME MEDICINE AND COGNAC FOR WHICH INCIDENTALLY HE NEVER PAID.

D. IN LIRING-3 OPINION, FACT FAR REPS IN CUBA RECENTLY EXPRESSED THANKS FOR HIS DENUNCIATION MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL IN

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE, VR.

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4828 SECRET

SUMMER 67 AND SENT WARNING THAT FAR "PENETRATED BY WOFIRM AGENT" * (SEE MEXICO CITY 4314) IN 40487 CONSTITUTES INDICATION HE STILL IN GOOD GRACES OF AT LEAST SOME OF FAR RANK AND FILE.

E. REQUEST LIRING-3 HELP FAR REPS OVER GUAT BORDER CAME FROM CARLOS (PERSAVAL) MARCUE, NEPHEW OF MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINES, VIA CARMEN (LOZADA) DE RAMIREZ, PERSAVAL SISTER IN LAW * ANF4$13,5 ~~8543)848, 3 3.~~ MISTRESS LIRING-3. AS FAR AS STATION KNOWS PERSAVAL, MARC~~SN~~UE OR LOZADA HAVE NO DIRECT CONNECTION WITH ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO AND OTHER GUAT LEFTISTS WITH WHOM LIRING -3 PREVIOUSLY IN CONTACT.

2. LIFEAT ON LIRING-3 CONFIRMED PERSAVAL SCHEDULED PHONE LIRING-3 14 MARCH TO SET UP 15 MARCH MEETING WITH TWO MALE AND ONE FEMALE GUAT REBELS LIRING-3 AGREED GUIDE OVER GUAT BORDER. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, STATION KNOWS GUATS MAY PHONE LIRING-3 AND ASK FOR IMMEDIATE MEETING. TO FACE SUCH POSSIBILITY LIEMBRACES STARTED SURVEILLANCE LIRING-3 MORNING 14 MARCH, WILL TRY OBSERVE MEETING WITH GUATS, TAKE PHOTOS OF THEM AND DETERMINE THEIR ACTUAL RESIDENCE THROUGH TAILING EXERCISING UTMOST CAUTION.

3. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

SECRET * SERVICED

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 29

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

#184

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 41 PER ______

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE VR WH/COG8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI/INT2, DDP, ADDP, CI/EA

SERVICE

MEXICO CITY [illegible]
STA & NR

1[illegible] MARCH 196[illegible]
DATE

[illegible]
IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"PERAVAL SISTER IN LAW AND RECENT MISTRESS LIRING-3"

SECRET

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:
FILE. VR. CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

TING MOUCR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 122147ZIAR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8733

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 12 MAR 68 IN 68951

REF MEXICO CITY 4790 (IN 68111)

1. ALTHOUGH SPECULATION ONLY, POSSIBLE THAT YOUNG WBZQAN * WHO TO RETURN GUATEMALA COULD BE CLEMENCIA (PAIZ) CARCAMO (AKA "LUISA"), SISTER OF MIRNA (PAIZ) CARCAMO WHO RECENTLY RELEASED FROM JAIL IN MEXICO. ACCORDING TO FEMALE INFORMANT OF GUAT ARMY, CLEMENCIA IS WIFE OF JULIO CESAR (MACIAS) MAYORA (AKA "CESAR MONTES"). ALSO REPORTED THAT CLEMENCIA WAS TO TRAVEL TO MEXICO IN MID-DECEMBER 1967 TO ARRANGE FOR SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO FAR, AND WAS POSSIBLY TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY DINGRDELA (JIMENEZ) MUNOZ AND HILDA (SOSA) ALDANA. THERE HAS BEEN NO CONFIRMATION THAT ANY OF THE ABOVE WOMEN TRAVELLED, BUT PRESENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

2. STATION DOES NOT HAVE BIO DATA OR PHOTOGRAPHS CLEMENCIA, AND ESLAIR TEAM HAS NOT BEEN ABLE LOCATE ENTRY FOR HER IN FILES OF CIVIL REGISTRY. ATTEMPTING OBTAIN FROM ESMICAS, AND WILL SEND TO MEXICO CITY IF SUCCESSFUL.

798301

3. WOULD APPRECIATE MEXICO CITY COMMENTS ON WHY LIRING/3 APPROACHED TO OBTAIN FALSE DOCUMENTS FOR RETURNEES AND WHY HE MIGHT BE SELECTED

13 MAR 1968

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR

PAGE TWO GUATEMALA CITY 8733 SECRET

TO SERVE AS GUIDE. ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE THAT MEMBERS OF PGT SUPPORT NET IN MEXICO--SUCH AS ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO, MAY BE UNWILLING ASSIST FAR MEMBERS IN VIEW RUPTURE PGT/FAR RELATIONS, WOULD SEEM THAT FAR WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ENTRUST DELICATE MISSION OF THIS NATURE TO LIRING/3 WHO RELATIVELY UNKNOWN QUANTITY.

SECRET * SERVICED

BT

SECRET

FORM 3020 9-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 28
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 48 PER ______

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 12 MAR 1968

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 74-126

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. CI/OPS, CI/IC2, (CI/OA), SOD6, CA5, FI, FI/INT2

S E C R E T 120055Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4790   12 MAR 68 68111

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

798301

1. ON 5 MARCH 68, LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD DINNER WITH CARLOS PERSAVAL MARCUE, NEPHEW OF MANUEL MARCUE PARDINAS, DIRECTOR OF THE NOW DEFUNCT MAGAZINE "POLITICA", COMMUNIST BI-MONTHLY PUBLICATION. PERSAVAL ASKED LIRING-3 IF HE COULD OBTAIN A FALSE PASSPORT FOR WIFE OF IMPORTANT GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA LEADER IN MEXICO WHO MUST TRAVEL GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO OBTAIN DOCUMENTS.

2. ON 8 MARCH, PERSAVAL SAID TWO IMPORTANT GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES HAD TO TRAVEL TO GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO BY MID MARCH AND ASKED IF LIRING-3 STILL WILLING TO HELP. LIRING-3 ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE BUT SAID THERE WAS LIMITED CHANCE OBTAINING FALSE DOCUMENTATION. HE COULD, HOWEVER, BRIEF THESE REVOLUTIONARIES ON GUAT/MEXI BORDER IN ORDER MAKE ILLEGAL CROSSING EASIER. IF THEY DESIRED, HE COULD PERSONALLY GUIDE THEM ACROSS BORDER.

3. ON 9 MARCH, PERSAVAL CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS WITH LIRING-3 ON GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES WHO HAD TO TRAVEL GUATEMALA URGENTLY. HE SAID ONE OF THEM HAS LEGAL DOCUMENTATION BUT OTHER DOES NOT. HE

FORM 3020A 9-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4798 SECRET

THEREFORE DECIDED BOTH SHOULD ENTER GUATEMALA ILLEGALLY. THEY CANNOT ENTER THRU TAPACHULA, HOWEVER, SINCE THEY WELL KNOWN THERE. LIRING-3 SUGGESTED SAN CRISTOBOL AREA WHICH NOT SUBJECT TO MEXICAN OR GUATEMALAN SURVEILLANCE. THE PERSON WITHOUT DOCUMENTS IS WOMAN 20 YEARS OLD. PERSAVAL NOT WILLING GIVE LIRING-3 NAMES OF REVOLUTIONARIES BUT PROMISED ARRANGE FOR CONTACT BETWEEN THEM EVENING 15 MARCH.

4. STATION HAS NO INFO ON IDENTITIES OF MAN AND WOMAN WHO MUST RETURN GUATEMALA MID MARCH. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible] lk
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2	79830	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY zf PER ______ # ______
CONF. WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, TSD-6, CI/OA, FI, OPSER

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

Jan 19 23 40Z

CITE DIRECTOR 68269

TO MEXICO CITY

INFO: JMWAVE

PERUMEN TECHS

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 67083*

POUCHING AGENT S/W SENDING SYSTEM #36 AND AGENT RECEIVING SYSTEM #92 TOGETHER WITH NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRAINING IN HMMW-16083.

END OF MESSAGE

22 JAN 1968

79839

COORD: TSD/SW Little (by phone)
C/WH/COG/CICS MD Rothwell

WH COMMENT: *Hqs. selecting appropriate S/W system for use with LIRING-3.

818842

LIRING-3's [illegible] we have a CRC [illegible] Card [illegible] [illegible] location

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W.J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES (21)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 3

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE. VR, WH/C 8, CA, CA/OPS/CA/PEG, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2

SECRET 162326Z 16 FEB 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 4526 16FEB63 IN 52083

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

PERUMEN

REF A MEXICO CITY 4371 (IN 45349)

B DIRECTOR 79922

C JMWAVE 1115 (IN 42146)

1. VIA LIRING-3 ROWTON MET XOCHITL VIVO DE LA TORRIENTE, DAUGHTER OF LOLA DE LA TORRIENTE MENTIONED IN REFS. XOCHITL, BORN MEXICO CA 1932 IS MEXICAN CITIZEN. SHE LIVED CUBA 1958 TO 1963 WHERE SHE ACTIVE AS BALLERINA IN MODERN DANCE GROUP OF CUBA WHICH TRAVELED MANY PLACES IN EUROPE INCLUDING MOSCOW. SHE LEFT CUBA 1963 FOR U.S. WHERE WORKED IN NEW YORK AS SHOW GIRL AND SECRETARY FOR SEVERAL YEARS. SHE SINGLE BUT NOW LIVING WITH AMERICAN AND WORKS AS THEATRICAL ARTIST.

16 FEB 1963

2. XOCHITL THOROUGHLY ANTI-COMMUNIST, IS DISSATISFIED WITH HER SITUATION AND ANXIOUS DROP AMERICAN BOYFRIEND. WOULD LIKE GET IN SOME SORT OF BUSINESS GIVING HER FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE. SHE IN REGULAR MAIL CONTACT WITH MOTHER IN CUBA AND FEELS MOTHER WHO VERY MUCH WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE CUBA COMPLETELY ANTI-REGIME.

3. AFTER SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH XOCHITL, ROWTON OBTAINED HER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4526 SECRET

AGREEMENT VISIT CUBA TO DETERMINE IF MOTHER WILLING COOPERATE IN SUPPLYING INFORMATION ON GVT ACTIVITIES AND PERSONALITIES SHE IN CONTACT WITH. ROWTON HAS PASSED SELF AS BUSINESSMAN INTERESTED IN CUBA FOR EVENTUAL FINANCIAL PROFIT. WILL CONTINUE REPORT DETAILS THIS OPERATION. REQUEST ADDRESSEES FILE CHECK XOCHITL AND HQS START PROCESS POA. PRQ PART ONE BEING POUCHED.

SECRET

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
25

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 5, CA/PEOP, TSD 6, SECURY, CI/IC 2, OPSER, MPS/BG 2,

S E C R E T 262013Z JAN 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4271

26 JAN 68 IN 38363

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING-4

29 JAN 1968

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 4123 (IN 29420)

B. DIRECTOR 67233

201-

COVER

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-4 PRODUCED FOLLOWING:

A. SHE LONG TIME FRIEND CLARIBEL (GUILFRIDO), NIECE PRESIDENT DORTICOS WHO WORKED AT CUBAN PRESIDENCY IN 1964 WHEN LIRING-4 LAST SAW HER. GUILFRIDO WHO BORN IN LIRING-4 HOME TOWN IN ORIENTE ABOUT 1938 IS ANTI-CASTRO. LIRING-4 FELT GUILFRIDO COULD PROBABLY HELP HER OBTAIN USEFUL JOB IF STILL IN CUBA AND MIGHT EVEN AGREE COOPERATE AGAINST REGIME. GUILFRIDO RECENTLY GOT MARRIED AND MOVED BUT LIRING-4 FELT COULD FIND HER.

B. LIRING-4 KNOWS LOLO DE LA (TORRIENTE), ELDERLY CUBAN NEWSPAPER WOMAN WHO DISAFFECTED WITH CURRENT REGIME. LIRING-3 WHO ALSO KNOWS WOMAN TOLD ROWTON THAT IN EARLY 1967 MEXICAN LEFTIST PAINTER RAUL (ANGUIANO) CONFIED TO HIM HE RECEIVED LETTER FROM DE LA TORRIENTE WHO CLOSE FRIEND ASKING HIM HELP HER OBTAIN MEXICAN VISA IN ORDER LEAVE CUBA SINCE SITUATION THERE "INTOLERABLE." ANGUIANO CONFESSED TO LIRING-3 HE IN QUANDARY

SECRET

14-00000

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4271 S E C R E T SECRET

AS DID NOT WANT BETRAY REVOLUTION OR DAMAGE HIS REPUTATION. AS FAR LIRING-3 KNOWS, ANGUIANO DECIDED AGAINST APPEAL FOR HELP TO [illegible] LITEMPO-8 WHO CLOSE FRIEND AND DE LE TORRIENTE APPARENTLY DROPPED MATTER. LIRING-3 ADDED DE LA TORRIENTE IS WELL KNOWN BIOGRAPHER OF DIEGO RIVERA AND CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND LUIS (WANGUEMER), DIRECTOR OF "MUNDO." LIRING -3 FELT RELATINSHIP WITH WANGUEMER MAY HAVE PROTECTED DE LA TORRIENTE FROM REPRISALS FOR ANTI-REGIME ATTITUDE. ROSENDO (GOMEZ) LORENZO OF MEXICAN "SUCESOS" IS ACCORDING TO LIRING-3 WANGUERMER'S BROTHER AND UNCLE ANDREA (GOMEZ) WITH WHOM LIRING-4 MAY STAY IN HAVANA. THIS SHOULD ENABLE HER RENEW CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH DE LA TORRIENTE.

C. LIRING-4 KNOWS CAPT JOSE LUIS (CARBALLO), CURRENT HEAD OF CUBAN INSTITUTO CAROGRAFIA Y GEODESIA WHOM SHE FIRST MET AT LIRING IN AUG 67 ~~WHEN~~ ed HE ATTENDED GEODETIC CONFERENCE MEXICO CITY. CARBALLO WAS MOST HELPFUL ~~1-43-119 2 ,95 13)317L~~ SECURING SPACE ON HAVANA SANTIAGO FLIGHT FOR LIRING-4 DURING THE LATTER'S LAST VISIT TO CUBA.

D. SHE ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH MARGOT (MACHADO), HEAD OF THE DEPARTAMENTO JURIDICO OF MINREX WHEN SHE AND LIRING-3 LIVED IN CUBA.

E. SHE GOOD FRIEND RAQUEL (PEREZ) WHO SERVED TOUR AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO WITH HUSBAND. PEREZ WHEN LAST HEARD FROM

SECRE

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

24

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2	/	6	
3	/	7	
4	/	8	

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/CoG-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT-2, MPS/BG-2, TSD-6

S E C R E T 270045Z JAN 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4277

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

PERUMEN LIRING-4

27 Jan 68 IN 38440

29 JAN 1968

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4123 (IN 29420)

B. DIRECTOR 67663

C. MEXICO CITY 4271 (IN 38363)

OVER

201-818842

1. IN FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH LIRING-4 ROWTON REACHED FOLLOWING TENTATIVE AGREEMENT

A. ROWTON WILL PROVIDE 600 DOLLARS FOR THREE MONTHS FOR MAINTENANCE LIRING-4 AND HER DWAUGHTER (CHILD NOW GOING WITH HXER) IN CUBA PLUS 150 DOLLARS TO COVER TRAVEL EXPENSES.

B. LIRING-4 WILL INFORM ROWTON VIA S/W OF DEFECTABLE TARGETS AND OF PROGRESS MADE IN OBTAINING POSITION ON INTEREST IN MINREX, INTERIOR MINISTRY OR PRESIDENCY.

C. IF ROWTON INSTRUCTS HER REMAIN HAVANA BEYOND THREE MONTH PERIOD (MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF TIME SHE ALLOWED STAY OUT OF MEXICO WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HER IMMIGRANT STATUS IN THAT COUNTRY), ROWTON WILL ARRANGE REINSTATEMENT FULL TIME ALREADY ACCUMULATED IN MEXICO AND WILL DEPOSIT TO NEW YORK ACCOUNT IN LIRING-4 NAME "REASONABLE" MONTHLY COMPENSATION COMMENSURATE WITH POSITION SHE OBTAINED AND

SECRET

22 JAN 1963

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4277 S E C R E T SECRET

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED. ROWTON MENTIONED FIGURE BETWEEN 300 AND 500 DOLLARS A MONTH BUT MADE NO RPT NO COMMITMENT.

2. ROWTON CAN DRAW UP LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING TO BE SIGNED BY LIRING-4 IF HQS DESIRES. LIRING-4 STATED FRANKKLY SHE HOPED BE ABLE PROVIDE ROWTON SUFFICIENT RECRUITMENT LEADS AND BIO INFORMATION TO BE ABLE LEAVE CUBA AFTER THREE MONTHS ALTHOUGH SE REITERATED SHE WOULD STAY LONGER IF SHE SUCCEEDED IN GAINING POSITION PROVIDING UNUSUALLY GOOD ACCESS TO INFORMATION DESIRED BY ROWTON.

3. AS LONG AS SHE DOES NOT ACTUALLY DIVORCE LIRING-3, LIRING-4 IS ELIGIBLE FOR MEXICAN VISA TO ALLOW HER LEAVE CUBA AND REJOIN HUSBAND EVEN IF SHE REMAINS CUBA MORE THAN THREE MONTHS. DO NOT BELIEVE CUBANS WOULD PREVENT HER FROM RETURNING MEXICO TO HUSBAND. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, BELIEVE LIRING-4 COULD GAIN REINSTATEMENT AS IMMIGRANT WITH APPROPRIATE BRIBE. LITAMIL-7 FOR EXAMPLE REGAINED IMMIGRANT STATUS WITHOUT ANY TIME PENALTY BY PAYING THOUSAND PESOS BRIBE. PLS ADVISE WHEN STATION MAY EXPECT S/W FOR LIRING-4 SO THAT FINAL PLANS CAN BE MADE FOR HER DEPARTURE. ANTICIPATE LIRING-4 WILL OBTAIN CUBAN TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

S E CD E T SECRET

WAS WORKING IN MINREX.

F. LIRING-4 RECALLS HAVING MET AND DEVELOPED FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH A NEGRO CUBAN IMMIGRATION OFFICIAL WHO QUESTIONED HER ROUTINELY WHEN ~~SE~~ SHE LAST LANDED AT HAVANA AIRPORT. NAME OF OFFICIAL IS VINCENTE (LEYVA), DIRECCION PROV. DE INMIGRACION, VEDADO.

2. STATION FILES CHECKS ON ABOVE NAMES GAVE FOLLOWING RESULTS:

A. CLARIBEL (GUILFRIDO), CAPT JOSE LUIS (CARBALLO), AND VINCENTE (LEYVA), ~~32-95~~ NEGATIVE.

B. LYA DE LA (TORRIENTE) BRAU WAS LISTED IN 1960 AS DIRECTOR OF CULTURE AND PUBLIC RELATIONS, CUBAN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, AND TRAVELED CHILE IN 1959 AND MEXICO 1960 AS DELEGATE TO LEFTIST WOMEN CONGRESSES. SHE REPORTED IN EARLY 1960 BE CLOSE FRIEND VILMA (ESPIN) DE (CASTRO), WIFE RAUL (CASTRO).

C. MARGOT (MACHADO) PADRON AND RAQUEL (PEREZ) BOTH SPENT TOUR OF DUTY WITH CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO, MACHADO AS OFFICER AND PEREZ AS SECRETARY TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR. PEREZ WAS REPORTED HAVE PREVIOUSLY WORKED FOR CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL (ROA) AS HIS SECRETARY. HER HUSBAND MIGUEL ANGEL (LOZANO) VILLALOBOS WAS REPORTED TO HAVE OCCUPIED FAIRLY HIGH POSITIONS IN MINISTRY OF

PAGE FOUR MEXICO CITY 4271 SECRET SECRET

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

D. ONLY REFERENCE TO (WANGUEMER) IS INTERCEPTED LETTER DATED MARCH 63 FROM LUIS G (WANGUEMERT) IN CUBA MENTIONING SUGAR HARVEST.

E. NUMBER OF REFERENCES LIST RAUL (ANGUIANO) AS SUCCESSFUL MEXICAN LEFTIST PAINTER WHO TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY AND MAINTAINS CONTACTS WITH EMBASSIES COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN MEXICO CITY.

3. REQUEST ADDEE TRACES.

SECRET SECRET

798301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ORIG: Will Korbe~~sas~~
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 10 January 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 25 PER ____ # ____
CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR WH/COG 8, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

JAN 10 22 40Z

CITE DIRECTOR 65492

11 JAN 1968

TO MEXICO CITY
INFO: JMWAVE
PBRUMEN
REF: MEXICO CITY [illegible] (IN [illegible])*

LIRING-3
201-798301

1. HQS CAN ARRANGE TO OPEN SAVINGS BANK ACCOUNT FOR SUBJECT REF USING POST OFFICE BOX AS RETURN ADDRESS. ACCOUNT WILL BE WITH FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK.

2. TO OPEN ACCOUNT IN TRUE NAME IT NECESSARY THAT SUBJECT SIGN BANK SIGNATURE CARDS WHICH HQS POUCHING. SUGGEST ROWTON HAVE SUBJECT SIGN CARDS NEXT TIME HE VISITS MEXICO.

3. WILL CONSIDER FUTURE REQUESTS FOR OPENING OF SWISS ACCOUNTS ON AN INDIVIDUAL CASE BASIS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Since opening a bank account in Switzerland appears so difficult, request advise possibility of opening account in U.S.

C/WH/COG/FI

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

Monetary Div. Mr. Farr (by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

V. Daly

ORIG: V. Daly
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6955
DATE: 5 JAN. 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO [redacted] BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-818842

CONF: WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR .WH/COG-8, TSD-6, CI/OA, FI, CI, CI/DPS, FI/D-4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

Jan 5 23 55 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 64492

18 JAN 1968

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

PBURMEN TECHS 201-798301 LIRING-3

file

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 3994 (IN 22968)*

[redacted]

type

1. BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE AT THIS JUNCTURE LET LIRING-4 RETURN PBRUMEN AND ATTEMPT ESTABLISH HERSELF BEFORE MAKING COMMITMENTS FOR CLANDESTINE COMMO, SALARY AND SGSWIRL. WHILE INTERESTED IN POSSIBILITIES LIRING-4 GAINING ACCESS IN ANY ONE OF POSITIONS MENTIONED REF, COMMITMENTS SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY DEGREE OF ACCESS, COMMO ARRANGEMENTS AND HER WILLINGNESS TO PERFORM. CONSIDERING FACT SHE NOT PARTY MBR AND THREE YEAR ABSENCE FROM PBRUMEN, IT APPEARS ~~UNLIKELY SHE WILL~~ PREMATURE TO ASSUME SHE WILL GET ~~LAND~~ JOB WITH SUFFIENTLY INTERESTING ACCESS. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY WE NEGATIVE ON OPS UTILIZATION IF SUCH WARRANTED BY DEVELOPMENTS.

The husband
We have a case on [illegible] in the L-3 file for this [illegible]

17 JAN 1968

2. IF LIRING-4 DOES OBTAIN INTERESTING POSITION CAN STATION MAKE ARRANGEMENTS NOW FOR HER TO TRAVEL MEXI AFTER

(CONTINUED..)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 64492

TO

PAGE TWO

SEVERAL MONTHS, OSTENSIBLY VISIT HUSBAND OR TO CLOSE OUT HER BUSINESS AFFAIRS AT WHICH TIME COULD ARRANGE TRAINING, SECURE COMMO AND LEVY REQUIREMENTS BASED ON ACCESS? ALSO CAN STATION NOW ESTABLISH CORRESPONDENCE LINK TO ROWTON THRU HUSBAND?

3. REQUESTING POA. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Coord: C/WH/ECOG/CI

WH COMMENT: *Requested Hqs advise re possible recruitment, SGSWIRL, Commo and salary for LIRING-4, who returning Cuba to obtain job.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W.J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

3 JAN 1968

ECT

LIRING-4

FILE NUMBER

798301

Discd the PCA/CA request with Will Kolbe, WH/1, today. He sees the inconsistency of requesting a PCA/CA on L-4 (for which she cannot qualify) and will resubmit request for a CNC.

We agreed that TCACTON has been running her as an agent (without any approval) since May, 1966.

Kolbe sees TCACTON losing interest in L-3 (her husband, who doesn't have a PCA/CA either) because of poly results, etc.

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

FORM 7-62 1954

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 45

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 26/21

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, TSD 6, CI/OA, FI, FE 8, FI/D 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 040105Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3994

4 JAN [illegible] 22968

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

Why did she leave employ of Cuban Consulate?

4 JAN [illegible]

TYPIC TECHS

798301

1. AS RESULT DIFFICULTIES WITH LIRING-3 AGGRAVATED BY HIS AFFAIR WITH CARMEN LOZADA, LIRING-4 DECIDED TO SEPARATE FROM LIRING/3 AT LEAST TEMPORARILY AND GO CUBA FOR THREE MONTHS. THIS IS MAXIMUM LENGTH OF TIME LIRING-4 CAN STAY OUT MEXICO WITHOUT LOSING IMMIGRANT STATUS AND POSSIBILITY BECOMING MEXICAN IN TWO MORE YEARS AFTER FIVE YEARS RESIDENCE.

WR

2. IN COURSE SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS, ROWTON, WITHOUT INFLUENCING HER DECISION GO CUBA, POINTED OUT LIRING-4 COULD HELP HIM COLLECT VALUABLE DATA ON CURRENT POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CUBA. THIS WOULD DEPEND ENTIRELY ON HER WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY GAIN ACCESS TO IMPORTANT TARGETS. LIRING-4 ASSURED ROWTON SHE DEEPLY APPRECIATED HIS INTEREST AND HELP IN PAST AND VOLUNTEERED DO WHATEVER SHE COULD UNDER ROWTON DIRECTION TO ACCOMPLISH TASKS ASSIGNED BY HIM. LIRING-4 DID NOT QUERY ROWTON AS TO HIS ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OR POLITICAL AFFILIATION HIS "FRIENDS" AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN HER ABILITY MAKE CONTACTS AND DEVELOP FRIENDSHIPS IN HAVANA. HER ONLY RESERVATION WAS PROCUREMENT OF SPECIFIC INFO REQUIRED BY ROWTON AS THIS WOULD DEPEND ON GAINING ACCESS TO RIGHT PERSONS AND MAKING SKILLFUL ELICITATIONS.

3. LIRING-4 PLANS LEAVE MEXICO LATE JAN, SPEND ONE WEEK

SECRET

SANTIAGO VISITING FAMILY THEN RETURN HAVANA TO TRY FIND WORK INTERIOR MINISTRY, ICAP OR FOREIGN MINISTRY. SHE AWARE GOOD JOBS IN THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE USUALLY RESERVED FOR COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS BUT BELIEVES SHE MAY HAVE CHANCE LAND JOB GIVING HER ACCESS TO INTERESTING INFO THROUGH SUCH FRIENDS AS LIRIH-1, JOSE ANTONIO (PORTUONDO) VALDOR AND OTHERS. LIRING-4 COULD PROBABLY LIVE IN HAVANA AS GUEST ANDREA GOMEZ, MEXICAN MURALIST WHO RESIDES NEAR MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND IS CLOSE FRIEND MASOLA OF ICAP. GOMEZ IS DAUGHTER ROSENDO (GOMEZ) LORENZO OF MEXICAN MAGAZINE SUCESOS AND NIECE (GOMEZ) WANGUEMER, DIRECTOR OF EL MUNDO IN HAVANA. ANDREA GOMEZ, NOW ON VACATION MEXICO, WILL SEE LIRING-4 PRIOR HER RETURN HAVANA.

4. LIRING-4 PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH LIRING MERMBERS GREATLY IMPROVED SINCE RUMORS SHABBY TREATMENT SHE RECEIVED FROM LIRING-3 AND HER PROBABLE BREAK WITH HIM REACHED LIRING. BOTH LIRING-2 AND LIRING-13 ASSURED HER 29 DEC THEY PREPARED DO WHATEVER THEY CAN FOR HER. SHE ALSO HAD FRIENDLY CHAT WITH CHIEF LIRING. LIRING-4

HAS EQUIVALENT TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE, SPEAKS SOME ENGLISH AND SOME CANTONESE AND PREVIOUSLY WORKED AT LIRING. AT STATION REQUEST ROWTON SOUNDED HER OUT ON POSSIBILITY SHE MIGHT LAND JOB WITH CUBAN EMBASSY ABROAD AND ASKED HER ABOUT HER WILLINGNESS GO COMMUNIST CHINA. LIRING-4 SAID SHE WILLING DO ANYTHING FOR ROWTON INCLUDING LEARN MANDARIN AS POSSIBLE WAY LAND CHINA ASSIGNMENT. SHE AGREEABLE STAY CUBA BEYOND THREE MONTHS PERIOD MENTIONED ABOVE IF OBTAINS JOB JUDGED OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE BY ROWTON. LIRING-4 CAN RETURN MEXICO AS LONG AS SHE STAYS MARRIED TO LIRING-3 WHO MEXICAN CITIZEN. THROUGH BRIBERY THERE GOOD POSSIBILITY SHE MAY BE REINTEGRATED AS IMMIGRANT AFTER MORE THAN THREE MONTHS ABROAD WITHOUT LOSING HER THREE YEARS MEXICO RESIDENCE. LIRING-3 HAS NO PLANS DIVORCE LIRING 4 EVEN IF LATTER REMAINS SEPARATED FROM HIM FOR LONG PERIOD. LIRING-4, WHO STILL IN LOVE WITH LIRING-3, DOES NOT WANT DIVORCE EITHER.

5. LIRING-4 AT ROWTON REQUEST PROVIDED BASIC PRQ DATA ESSENCE OF WHICH CABLING SEPARATELY. ALTHOUGH SHE WILL REMAIN UNRECRUITED FORMALLY, ANTICIPATE LIRING-4 WILL READILY ACCEPT SGSWIRL. THUS REQUEST:

A. STEPS BE TAKEN ISSUE LIRING-4 POA FOR USE AS ON ISLAND ASSET.

SECRET

What are the Field Trace results?

PAGE FOUR MEXICO CITY 3994 SECRET SECRET

B. SPANISH SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR BE SCHEDULED VISIT MEXICO CITY TO TEST LIRING-4 BEFORE 31 JAN.

C. TWO WAY S/W SYSTEM BE ISSUED LIRING-4 AFTER PASSING SGSWIRL. HQS MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER OWVL IN ADDITION TO TWO WAY S/W. TRAINING COULD BE DONE BY ROWTON OR SPANISH SPEAKING TECHNICIANS. COMMO SYSTEM MUST BE GIVEN HER BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR CUBA AS WILL NOT RETURN AFTER THREE MONTHS IF ABLE LAND WORTHWHILE JOB.

D. HQS INDICATE WHAT IT WILLING PAY LIRING-4 FOR WORTHWHILE JOB IN CUBA OR IN CUBAN OFFICIAL INSTALLATION ABROAD. LIRING-4 INTENDS LIVE STRICTLY ON CUBAN SALARY WHILE WORKING FOR CUBANS. WOFIRM SALARY TO BE DEPOSITED IN ESCROW.

6. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 26/21

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OA

S E C R E T 040105Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3995

4 Jun 63 IN 22967

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REF MEXICO CITY 3994 (IN 22968)

1. FOLLOWING IS BIO DATA MIRIAM (CHICHAY) DUARDO DE JURADO:

A. BORN 17 DEC 1940 CENTRAL JOBABO, ORIENTE PROVINCE. OTHER NELIDA DUARDO, CUBAN, LIVES CALLE AGUILERA 554, SANTIAGO DE CUBA. FATHER PORFIRIO CHICHAY, CU~~, 31 118,33 94868, 3.864-535~~BAN OF CHINESE ORIGIN EMIGRATED U.S. 1959 AND RESIDES 1506 NORTHERN BLVD MANHASSET L.I. NEW YORK.

B. THREE BROTHERS, JOAQUIN 29, PORFIRIO 25, ROGELIO 20. ONE SISTER LILIAN 18.

C. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL: TWO YEARS ORIENTE UNIVERSITY, SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES, NO DEGREE.

D. MARRIED TO CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR IN HAVANA 1962 (MEXICAN CITIZEN). DAUGHTER ZINZUNI (JURADO) CHICHAY BORN 1963 HAVANA, MEXICAN CITIZEN.

E. CUBAN CITIZEN BUT HAS FM-2 IMMIGRANT STUATUS IN MEXICO AS SPOUSE MEXICAN NATIONAL. HAS THREE YEARS OF MEXICO RESIDENCE.

2. POUCHING MORE COMPLETE INFO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

798301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

J. STEWART/lm
WH/1
6954
17 AUGUST 67

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

22 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

WH8 ☐ RID COPY INFO: FILE VR WH/COG 8, C/CI/S, C/CA/B, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 28757

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE 17 17 Z

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 2479 (IN 32323)

1_ AUG 1967

Brown

REGRET HAVE BEEN UNABLE COME UP WITH SUITABLE INTERIM HANDLER FOR LIRING-3. SUGGEST ROWTON SET UP PLAN FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT BY "TRUSTED BUSINESS ASSOCIATE WHO MAY BE COMING THROUGH AREA." WILL DISCUSS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES WITH ROWTON DURING LATTER'S TDY HQS BEGINNING 21 AUGUST.

798301

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: ROWTON going on home leave 18 August. Station feels it most desirable keep direct contact with LIRING-3 during ROWTON's absence.

Jacob D. Esterline

WH/COG W. CINI (IN DRAFT)

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

J. H. V. FISHER
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 2 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐

ADV. COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION

WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2, OF Z, SECUR 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

15 AUG 67

S E C R E T 151515Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2479

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

15 AUG 67 IN 32323

PBRUMEN

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON DEPARTING ON HOME LEAVE 18 AUGUST.

2. AFTER THROUGH REVIEW LIRING-3 OPERATION FEEL IT MOST DESIRABLE KEEP DIRECT CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 (WHO LIABLE GO CUBA AND POSSIBLY GUATEMALA IN NEAR FUTURE) DURING ROWTON'S ABSENCE. UNTIL SGSWIRL CAN BE GIVEN LIRING-3 BY SPANISH SPEAKING OPERATOR AS REQUESTED BY STATION, FEEL IT WISE NOT PUSH LIRING-3 TO WITTING LNHARP RECRUITMENT. THEREFORE BELIEVE LIRING-3 SHOULD BE HANDLED BY SPANISH SPEAKER ABLE PASS NOTIONALLY AS EUROPEAN BUSINESS FRIEND OF ROWTON (I.E. WITHOUT GRINGO ACCENT). ALTHOUGH KNOWLEDGE EUROPEAN LANGUAGE NATURALLY DESIRABLE IT NOT ESSENTIAL AS PER ROWTON LIRING-3 WILL NOT QUESTION BACKGROUND HIS FRIEND OR MEET HIM IN PRESENCE OF OTHER FOREIGNER SINCE MEETINGS HELD IN SAFEHOUSE. TO AVOID SECURITY COMPLICATIONS AT THIS JUNCTURE BELIEVE LIRING-3 WOULD BEST BE HANDLED FOR THREE - FOUR WEEK PERIOD BY TDYER FROM WAVE OR HQS WITH ABOVE REQUIREMENTS. STATION WILL CONTINUE TO ASSUME COMPLETE DIRECTION THIS OPERATION.

201-798301

3. ALTERNATIVE TO HANDLING BY TDYER WOULD BE TO PLACE

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY PER #

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐

ADV. COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

INFO:

FILE.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2479 SECRET

LIRING-3 "ON ICE" FOR PERIOD ROWTON'S ABSENCE SENDING HIM OUT OF MEXICO CITY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND THUS CUTTING HIM OFF TEMPORARILY FROM FURTHER CONTACTS WITH CUBANS, GUATEMALAN REBELS AND LOCAL MEXICAN LEFTIST FRIENDS. THERE NO GUARANTEE HOWEVER LIRING-3 WOULD STAY OUT OF MEXICO AND FURTHER OPERATIONAL INVOLVEMENT FOR FULL PERIOD ROWTON'S ABSENCE.

4. PLS ADVISE PRIORITY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

798301

Brown

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, 8006, C/OPS, C/OA, FI

4 AUG 1967

S E C R E T 040003Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2372 4 Aug 67 IN 25197

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PHOTO LEONARDO (CASTILLO) HOHNSON, CHIEF SAN MARCO GUERRILLA AREA, GUATEMALA, SHOWN LIRING-3 (798301) WHO DID NOT RECOGNIZE. LIRING-3 STATED HOWEVER THAT MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL TOLD HIM 31 JULY THAT CASTILLO HAD BEEN KILLED. OROZCO ALSO IMPLIED DAVID (CASASOLA) MEJIA ALSO DEAD.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

798301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2C

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: Jack Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 1 August 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 55/21 PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/10A, SECUR 4

(classification) 19 09 7 CCS 3 (date and time filed) 24298 (pica)

PRIORITY

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

PERUMEN LIRING-3

REFERENCE: A. MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 22584)

B. DIRECTOR 99380

C. MEXICO CITY 2105 (IN 11646)

REGRET SPANISH-SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR READIED 1 JUNE PER REFERENCE B NOW NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL SEPTEMBER. CAN FURNISH ENGLISH-SPEAKING OPERATOR FROM HEADQUARTERS 4? IF ACCEPTABLE. ~~COULD ALSO HANDLE REFERENCE C CANDIDATES IF DESIRED.~~ PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST. ASSUME YOU UNDER NO ILLUSION ABOUT HIDING GOVERNMENT INTEREST ONCE SGSWIRL USED.

END OF MESSAGE

798301

WH/Comments: A. Requested SGSWIRL operator for LIRING-3 4 Aug. B. Spanish-speaking SGSWIRL operator available for LIRING-3 1 June. C. Station queries if can examine new Station contract employee and three field agents.

2 AUG 1967

WH/COG MAHONEY (TELECOORD)
OS/JRD BEONAR (TELECOORD)

5
4
3
2
1

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/WH/1
W.J. Kaufman
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

798301

1

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR. DI. CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI

17

SECRET 152015Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2139

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

15 Jul 67 IN 12289

REF MEXICO CITY [illegible]15 (P06822)

12289

1. ON 14 JULY 67, DOSCHER SHOWED LIREBEL-2 (244191) COMPOSITES OF "GARCIA" MADE BY THE LIEMBRACES, LIRING-3 (748221) AND LIRING-4 (NP). LIREBEL-2 SAID THE PERSON WAS DEFINITELY NOT DAVID CARASOLA MEJIA (STATION FELT IT WAS INITIALLY) BUT THAT THE COMPOSITE HAD A STRONG RESEMBLANCE TO LUIS CASTILLO RALDA. LIREBEL-2 GAVE DOSCHER CASTILLO'S ADDRESS BUT ASKED THAT CASTILLO NOT BE FOLLOWED BECAUSE HE IS VERY SECURITY CONSCIOUS. HE WOULD SPOT THE SURVEILLANCE AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY SUSPECT LIREBEL-2 OF HAVING PASSED THE ADDRESS TO SOMEONE.

2. IN VIEW OF THIS, STATION HAS DECIDED USE PHOTO TRUCK TO OBTAIN RECENT PHOTOS OF CASTILLO AND THEN DETERMINE IF HE IS "GARCIA" BY SHOWING PHOTOS TO LIEMBRACES AND LIRING-3 AND 4.

3. ADDRESSEES WILL BE ADVISED OF THE RESULTS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

201-798301

mmp

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

ORIG: M. PALMER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 14 JULY 1957

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

COPY: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA,

SECRET WH/COG 8 ADP, ADDP F1, FI/INT 2

17 16 33 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 20276

TO MEXICO CITY INFO CARACAS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY-2111 (IN 11245)*

B. CARACAS-7262 (IN [illegible])**

C. MEXICO CITY-1954 (IN 01455)***

1. REQUEST MEXICO CURRENT APPRAISAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIRING-3 (798301) AND WOULD BE BENEFACTORS OF VENEZUELAN SUBVERSION AS SOON AFTER ROWTON RETURN MEXICO AS POSSIBLE.

2. CONCUR THAT [redacted] (VALDEZ-MORENO) OPERATION APPEARS HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE. CAN LIRING-3 DISSUADE VALDEZ FROM THIS UNDERTAKING BY POINTING OUT EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA MONITORING OF SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS? 2 JUNE ARREST OF ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF MOVEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), AMERICO MARTIN, AND 19 JUNE ARRESTS OF FELIPE NERI CARRILLO ALONG WITH SEVENTEEN OTHER DOUGLAS BRAVO ORIENTED TERRORISTS MIGHT SERVE AS CASES IN POINT.

3. SUGGEST THAT LIRING-3 MIGHT BE ABLE TO PERSUADE VALDEZ AND MORENO THAT INVOLVEMENT WITH VENEZUELAN SUBVERSION AT PRESENT TIME SIMPLY NOT PRUDENT AND WASTFUL OF RESOURCES WHICH COULD BE BETTER EMPLOYED ELSEWHERE.

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: MM PALMER
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ # ________

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

SECRET
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PAGE 2

CITE DIRECTOR 20276

TO 4. IF LIRING-3 UNABLE DAMPEN VALDEZ ARDOR BUT RETAINS ABILITY MONITOR ACTIVITIES, SEE NO HARM IN LIRING-3'S CONTINUED CONTACT, PROVIDED MONITORING CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT CONTRIBUTING IN ANY WAY TO SUCCESS THEIR EFFORTS.

5. FOR CARACAS: REQUEST TRACES ORTEGA AND COMMENTS ON PARA 1, MEXICO 2075.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: *ROWTON (LIRING-3 Case Officer) will return to Mexico without stopping in Caracas to discuss LIRING-3 operation.

**Caracas requested that LIRING-3 not become operationally engaged - principally because assistance most likely being directed to BRAVO guerrilla forces and the MIR and that the tangible advantage to be derived by the extremists would outweigh the value of any intelligence produced.

***LIRING-3 has established contact with VALDEZ and MORENO, young Mexican leftists who wish to go to Caracas and set up some sort of commercial venture in order to provide assistance to Venezuelan subversives. LIRING-3 aggreed to help them as partner in Venezuelan venture.

WH/1/Mexico

Thomas Polgar
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

201-798301

E

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

21

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 38

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, DDP, ADDP, CCS 3, CSPS, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CA 2, CI/PS, CS/SGO, SOD 3, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 111930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2075

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

IN 09498

PBRUMEN

REF A MEXICO CITY 1954 (IN 01455)

B CARACAS 7262 (IN 02328)

1. ACCORDING TO SERGIO VALDEZ, LATTER'S CONTACT WITH VENEZUELAN REBELS IN CARACAS IS RAMIRO ORTEGA WHOM HE ORIGINALLY MET IN MEXICO. ORTEGA INSTRUCTED VALDEZ WHEN LATTER COMES CARACAS TO INSERT AD IN LOCAL NEWSPAPER SAYING: QUOTE LA PERSONA INTERESADA EN ARTESANIA MEXICANA FAVOR COMUNICARSE CON SERGIO VALDEZ UNQUOTE FOLLOWED BY ADDRESS. EITHER ORTEGA OR OTHER MEMBER VENEZUELAN RESISTANCE WILL MAKE CONTACT. VALDEZ ALSO IN CONTACT WITH VENEZUELANS IN MEXICO.

12 JUL 1967

2. STATION BELIEVES VALDEZ AND RAUL MORENO DETERMINED HELP VENEZUELAN RESISTANCE WITH OR WITHOUT ADVICE OF LIRING-3. (798301) SINCE IT APPEARS DESIRABLE MONITOR THEIR ACTIVITIES, LIRING-3 FORMED LOOSE COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATION WITH THEM IN MEXICO CITY BY NAME "COLORLUZ". THIS WILL ALSO HELP LIRING-3 IN FUTURE DEALINGS WITH HIS REVOLUTIONARY FRIENDS IN CUBA WHEN NEXT VISITS HAVANA (WHICH HE BEING URGED DO SOON) AS COULD POINT TO PERSONAL

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 2875 S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

CHANNELS TO BOTH GUATEMALAN AND VENEZUELAN REBEL ELEMENTS.

3. WALLACE B. ROWTON (IDEN) WHO DIRECTS LIRING-3 OP CURRENTLY ON TDY SOUTH AMERICA AND IS SCHEDULED FLY BACK MEXICO 18 OR 19 JULY VIA CARACAS. RATHER THAN EXPLAIN LIRING-3 OP, AT THIS POINT, WHICH INVOLVED UNDERTAKING, SUGGEST ROWTON STOP CARACAS ONE DAY AND DISCUSS OP DIRECTLY WITH STATION. WILL NOTIFY ROWTON IF STATION AGREEABLE. ROWTON UNDER DEEP COVER MEXICO CITY SO THAT EVENTUAL CARACAS MEETING SHOULD BE SET UP ACCORDINGLY.

4. MEXICO STATION TRACES RAMIRO ORTEGA NEGATIVE. REQUEST ADDEE TRACES.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 38

SECRET

[illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted] 21

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, DDP, ADDP, CCS 3, CSPS, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CA 2, CI/PS, CS/SGO, SOD 3, FI, FI/INT 2

SECRET 111930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2076

11 Jun 67 IN 09490

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REFERENCE MEXICO CITY 2075 (IN 09498)

IDEN IS MR. ROBERT DRISCOLL.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 24

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, CI/OA, FI/INT-2, SOD-6

S E C R E T 301930Z CITE CARACAS 7262 6 JUL 1957 30 Jun 67 IN 02328

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 1954 (IN 01455)

201- file 798301

1. NO STATION TRACES.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE THAT STATION EXERCISE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS COVER BUSINESS, PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT LIRING-3 NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE. HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MEXI MONITORING DEVELOPMENTS, BUT DO NOT DESIRE BECOME ENGAGED OPERATIONALLY.

3. PCV OBTAINING SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM ABROAD PRESENT TIME AND STATION ABLE MONITOR THIS THROUGH EXISTING ASSETS. WHILE A CUBAN SPONSORED FUNDING MECHANISM WOULD PROBABLY SUPPORT THE DOUGLAS BRAVO DISSIDENT PCV GROUP AND THE MIR, BELIEVE THAT TANGIBLE ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED BY THE EXTREMISTS WOULD OUTWEIGH THE VALUE OF ANY INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED.

4. HAS LIRING-3 BEEN SUFFICIENTLY TESTED IN OPERATIONS VIS A VIS GUAT GUERRILLAS TO ESTABLISH HIS BONA FIDES? IS HE STILL UNWITTING AND IF SO WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF OUR CONTROL OVER HIM?

Good questions

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

201-798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 41/50

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG8, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, SOD6

S E C R E T 300015Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1954 30 JUN 67 IN 01455

CARACAS INFO JMWAVE DIRECTOR

PERUMEN

6 JUL 1967

201-798301

1. MEXICO CITY STATION ASSET LIRING-3 RECENTLY HAD SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH YOUNG MEXICAN LEFTISTS SERGIO GABRIEL (VALDEZ) AND RAUL (MORENO) WONCHEE WHO INTERESTED HELP LEFTIST ELEMENTS VENEZUELA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE COMMUNIST PARTY FRAMEWORK. VALDEZ WHO WOULD TAKE CARE COMMERCIAL VENTURE USED AS COVER FOR THIS ACTIVITY CURRENTLY IN CONTACT WITH MARYEDITH GARCIA MENDEZ AVENIDA LOS GERANIOS RES. MAFARA 4, LA FLORIDA, CARACAS. GARCIA WHO DIVORCED OR OBTANING DIVORCE IS WEALTHY WOMAN WHO TRAVELS EXTENSIVELY AND TOOK APT COURSE MEXICO WITH VALDEZ. SHE WILLING FINANCE DECORATIVE GLASS FACTORY RUN BY VALDEZ AND IS UNWITTING OF LATTER'S PLAN TO USE SUCH FACILITY AS COVER FOR SUPPORT OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. MORENO WHO CLAIMS HAVE LEFTIST CONTACTS VENEZUELA WOULD HANDLE CLANDESTINE WORK. TWO MEN WENT TO CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXICO, FOR HELP BUT WERE GIVEN RUN AROUND AND FINALLY TOLD CONTACT LIRING-3 AS THEIR PROJECT "TOO SENSITIVE FOR CUBANS TO SUPPORT AT THIS TIME".

2. LIRING-3 WHO CURRENTLY IN TOUCH WITH PEPS GUAT GUERRILLA

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TO MEXICO CITY 1954 S E C R E T

MEXICO AND ATTEMPTING BUILD COMMERCIAL COVER FOR ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT THESE GUERRILLAS AGREED HELP MORENO AND VALDEZ AS PARTNER IN THEIR VENEZUELA VENTURE. WILL PROVIDE IDENTITY MORENO'S SUBVERSIVE CONTACTS VENEZUELA AND HELP DESIRED BY THEM AS SOON INFO AVAILABLE. WOULD APPRECIATE ADDEES TRACES MARYEDITH GARCIA. STATION TRACES NEGATIVE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-288,301

14-00000

998301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG: Art Porn
UNIT: WH/2/G
EXT: 6026
DATE: 30 June 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR . WH/COG 8, C/OPS, C/, C/OA, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

1 16 50 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 16464

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: GUATEMALA CITY, JMWAVE

REF: MEXICO CITY 1930 (IN 00593)

1. NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE TRACES ON CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR.

2. MARCO VINICIO GONZALEZ PROBABLY MARCO ISIDRO VINICIO GONZALEZ Y GONZALEZ (201-817006) WHO PRESIDENT GUATEMALA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ASSOCIATION (AEU) AND KNOWN REBEL ARMED FORCES (FAR) MEMBER.

3. IF FURTHER L-3 CONTACT CONFIRMS SALAZAR FAR CONNECTION, AND SALAZAR CONTINUES RECEIVING COLD TREATMENT FROM CUBANS, BECOMES NATURAL RECRUITMENT CANDIDATE. THEREFORE HQS INTERESTED ANY FURTHER INFO WHICH CAN BE DEVELOPED, INCLUDING CONFIRMATION BY OTHER STATION SOURCES IF CAN BE SECURELY OBTAINED.

6 JUL 1967

LIRING-3

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: LIRING-4 reported Carlos Enrique Salazar visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico and requested to go to Cuba. Salazar destitute and without necessary documentation. Cuban Embassy personnel appear in no hurry to help him travel to Cuba.

198301

C/WH/2
WH/COG/FI
WH/FI

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 38

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

FILE VR, WH/COG 8, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, [illegible], FI, FI/INT 2, [illegible], CA 2, CS/CO.

S E C R E T 282320Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1930

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE 29 Jun 67 IN 00593

PBRUMEN

1. NR LIRING-4 WHO NOW WORKING LIRING TALKED TO CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR AT LIRING 22 JUNE. LATTER SAID:

A. HE FLED GUAT CA 7 JUNE AS CONNECTED WITH REBEL MOVEMENT AND POLICE LOOKING FOR HIM.

B. HE STAYING WITH ANGEL CAMPIARAN SANCHEZ WHO OWNS BATTERY SHOP CALLE DE AMORES 806, LETRACX, MEXICO CITY. ANGEL CAMPIRAN IS FATHER ENICE CAMPIRAN YOUNG MEXICAN STUDENT REPORTEDLY ASSASSINATED WITH HUSBAND BY POLICE IN GUAT CITY.

6 JUL 1967

C. COULD GIVE MARCO VINICIO GONZALEZ, PRESIDENT "SOCIEDAD ALUMNOS UNIVERSITARIOS DE GUATEMALA" AS REF IN GUAT.

D. REBEL MOVEMENT IN GUAT CRUMBLING AS RESULT INTENSIFIED ARMY AND POLICE COUNTER INSURGENCY ACTIVITIES.

2. LIRING STAFF APPARENTLY IN NO HURRY HELP GUAT REBEL WHO DESTITUTE WITHOUT PAPERS AND ANXIOUS GO PBRUMEN. WILL TRY HAVE LIRING-3 798301 CONTACT HIM (GUAT STUDIED PAINTING IN GUADALAJARA) AND DEBRIEF RE REBEL CONTACTS IN GUAT.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **SECRET** IN 09493 PAGE 2/2

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 1930 S E C R E T

3. NO STATION TRACES SALAZER OF GONZALEZ. STATION HAS SEVERAL REFS TO EUNICE CAMPIRAN AS ACTIVE TROTSKYITE IN MEXI 1954 WHO KILLED WITH HUSBAND DAVID AGUILAR MORA GUATEMALA SUMMER 1966.

S E C R E T

BT

268301

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

3c

ACTION WH/COG8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/O4.

S E C R E T 212240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1852

22 [illegible] 967

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC PERUMEN

REFS A MEXICO CITY 1945*

21 Jun 67 IN 95240

B DIRECTOR 127320

798301

1. SUBJS REF B RETURNED CUBA 19 JUNE. LIRING-3 TO WHOM THEY HANDCARRIED LETTERS FROM HAVANA FRIENDS, HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH THEM. INFO OBTAINED DURING THESE MEETINGS CABLED MEXICO CITY 1319, (IN 93428) 1842 AND 1943.** (IN 94380)

2. DURING PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH LIRING-3 SHORTLY BEFORE RETURNING CUBA, DR. JOSE AGUILERA MACEIRAS TOLD L-3 HE SENIOR VICE MINISTER AND NO. TWO IN CUBAN MINISTRY EDUCATION. UNLIKE DR. MAX FIGUEROA ARAUJO, EDUCATION VICE MINISTER IN CHARGE HIGHER (UNIVERSITY) EDUCATION, HE MEMBER COMMUNIST PARTY AND, AS SUCH CLAIMED COULD DO "FEW THINGS" FOR L-3 IF AND WHEN LATTER COMES CUBA. AGUILERA ADDED FIGUEROA TYPICAL OLD STYLE TEACHER AND STILL BOURGEOIS AT HEART WHO HAD CHANCE APPLY FOR COMMIE MEMBERSHIP BUT DID NOT TAKE IT.

3. HAVE ASKED LIRING-3 FOR ANY BIO ON VICE MINISTERS AND HIS PERSONAL ASSESSEMENT OF BOTH. IT ALREADY APPARENT HE NOT OVERLY IMPRESSED WITH PERSONALITY OF FIGUEROA WHOM HE FEELS IS OPPORTUNIST.

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 1851 S E C R E T SECRET

BOTH MEN HAD LIRING-4 BUY LONG LIST OF ITEMS FOR WHICH, IN THE END, THEY HAD INSUFFICIENT FUNDS. AGUILERA APOLOGIZED AND OFFERED REIMBURSE LIRING-3 IN CUBAN PESOS WHENEVER HE COMES HAVANA.

SECRET

BT

*POSSIBLE REF SHOULD BE 1745** 1743
(IN 87949) (IN 87938)

14-00000

22 798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

RECAP 30

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, C/OA, FI.

S E C R E T 171520Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1805 17 JUN 67 IN 92302

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

PBRUMEN

1. LIRING-4 RECEIVED PHONE CALL 14 JUNE FROM CERTAIN "DELVA" ASKING FOR LIRING-9. WHEN TOLD LIRING-9 NOT AT LIRING, "DELVA" LEFT MESSAGE HAVE L-9 CONTACT HER ROOM 909 MARIA ISABEL HOTEL. THIS INFORMATION CONFIRMED BY LIENVOY SAME DAY.

2. DISCREET CHECK MARIA ISABEL IDENTIFIED OCCUPANT ROOM 909 AS SANDRA LINDA CONTRERAS, US CITIZEN GIVING HOME ~~TWON~~ Town AS NEW YORK, NO OTHER DETAILS. CONTRERAS CHECKED OUT HOTEL EARLY AFTERNOON 14 JUNE. STATION CHECKING AIR MANIFESTS THAT DATE TO NEW YORK. WOULD APPRECIATE TRACES INCLUDING LNERGO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

798301

File in LIRING-3

19 JUN 1967

30 79830 11

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
25/M

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR WH/COG 8, CI/OA, DDP, ADDP, TSD 6, FI,

S E C R E T 302230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0399

30 MAR 67 33549

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LISAMPAN LIRING-3

C-105308

NR

1. REQUEST HQS REINSTATE POAS LICASE-1 AND LICASE-2. EXPLORING POSSIBILITY RECONTACT FOR USE AS BASEHOUSE KEEPERS/ TRANSCRIBERS FOR LP SERVING TECH INSTALLATION AGAINST LIRING-3. LIPLUGS IN TURN WILL BE USED MAN THIRD LISAMPAN LP WHEN SUITABLE ONE LOCATED.

79830/

2. REQUEST PRIORITY HANDLING THIS CLEARANCE.

S E C R E T

BT

31 MAR 1967

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 25/3

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD 6, NE 6, DO 4, DO/H 3,

S E C R E T 260005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7454 EASBY ACTING

DIRECTOR

Hold for LIRING/4

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 07441

[illegible] RING/3 [illegible] 24660

1. LIRING-3 INFORMED ROWTON 25 MAY HE OBTAINED ONE-DAY VISA SERVICE 24 MAY. MEETING HELD 1300 HOURS 25 MAY PRIOR ARRIVAL REF. LIRING-3 SHOWED APPARENT DISAPPOINTMENT IN ROWTON NOT BEING ABLE CONFIRM TRIP. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH LIRING-3 26 MAY LUNCH AT WHICH WILL GIVE SUBJ GO SIGN.

26 MAY 1966

2. QUICK SERVCE ON VISA APPEARS CONFIRM LIRING-3 BOAST 201-798301 HE CONFIDANT OF RODRIGUEZ. ROWTON HAS IMPRESSED ON LIRING-3 THAT HE ROWTON'S AGENT AND MIDDLE MAN IN THIS TRANSACTION AND MUST NOT REVEAL ROWTON. IF ROWTON REVEALED THEN CUBANS WOULD WANT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH ROWTON CUTTING OUT LIRING-3. LIRING-3 STATES HE UNDERSTANDS THIS CLEARLY. LIRING-3 ASSURES ROWTON HE NEED NOT INFORM CUBANS ANYTHING OF ARRANGEMENT SINCE THEY TRUST HIM.

17 APR 1967

3. CAN HQS SUPPLY ROWTON WITH GREEK PASSPORT NEW YORK DRIVERS LICENSE AND ANY OTHER LOGICAL POCKET LITTER INDICATING GREEK NATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. MATERIAL WOULD NOT BE USED FOR TRAVEL, BUT AS OP DEVELOPS MY BE HANDY FLASH GREEK

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 7454 SECRET

PASSPORT AS MEANS IDENTIFICATION.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

8

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ORIG: JSTEWART
UNIT: WH/1,
EXT: 3654
DATE: 25 May 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28/3 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/C 3, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 25 21 26 Z CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 07441

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRING

Note, we have these? unable to locate [illegible] 7724

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 7422 (IN 23654)*

B. MEXICO CITY 7234 (IN 10462)** see attached

26 MAY 1966

CONCUR REF TRIP. EVEN IF TRIP NON-PRODUCTIVE, OP STILL MIGHT DEVELOP INTO LIRING PENETRATION VIA LIRING-4. IN THIS REGARD, STATUS OF LIRING-4 FATHER, WHO PRESUMABLY CHINESE, PER PARA 4 REF B, IN PBRIME OF INTEREST IN VIEW STRINGENT ENTRY REQUIREMENTS AND BELIEVE ROWTON MIGHT PROFITABLY ATTEMPT ELICIT INFO THIS ASPECT CASE DURING L-3 DEVELOPMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * L-3/Rowton meeting re L-3 trip to Cuba.
** Rowton contact and assessment of L-3 and L-4. Requested POA on both.

WH/C/FI/TC

Thomas Polgar
WILLIAM V. BROE
Chief, WH Division

W. J. Kaufman
W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ABS: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 17

33/M SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1 | 5
2 | 6
3 | 7
4 | 8

OA

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

7720

9 MAY 1966

S E C R E T 250242Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7234

5 MAY 66 IN 10462

KAPOK TYPIC

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAS MADE CONTACT WITH CARLOS JURADO, ARTIST HUSBAND OF MARIAN CHICHAY CLERK IN CUBAN CONSULATE. ROWTON HAS BECOME QUITE FRIENDLY WITH JURADO, HAS TAKEN HIM AND CHICHAY TO DINNER AND IN TURN JURADO ESCORTED ROWTON ON TOUR OF RIVERA MURALS IN MEXI CITY BUILDINGS.

2. ROWTON USING ALIAS HAS EXPLAINED SELF AS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUSINESS. WHERE FIRST MEETING DEVELOPED FROM ROWTON VISIT TO SALON WHERE JURADO SHOWING HIS PAINTINGS RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW SWUNG AROUND TO PLACE WHERE ROWTON INTERESTED GENERAL WELFARE OF JURADO AND WANTING DO SOMETHING FOR HIM IF JURADO CAN SUPPLY SOME SERVICE FOR WHICH ROWTON COULD LOGICALLY AFFORD PAY HIM. JURADO IS SNAPPING AT THIS BAIT AND APPEARS GENUINELY LIKE ROWTON ASIDE FROM FACT ROWTON APPEARS BE NON-AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH MONEY.

3. IN LAST MEETING, ROWTON QUERIED JURADO ON HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICAN COMMERCE AND JURADO SAID HE HAD NONE. ROWTON ASKED WHAT SORT CONTACTS HE HAD CUBA SINCE THAT SUBJECT OF INTEREST OT ALL AND JURADO FELL OVER SELF COUNTING WHAT HE COULD DO FOR ROWTON ON CUBAN SUBJECT.

SECRET

SAID HE KNEW EVERYONE AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXI AND COULD GO TO CUBA FOR ROWTON.

4. ROWTON SLOWED MATTERS DOWN BY SAYING HE HAD GO EUROPE FOR ABOUT THREE WEEKS BUT THAT THEY WOULD TALK MORE ABOUT IT UPON HIS RETURN. IN TURNING COVERSATION TO WIFE, ROWTON LEARNED SHE HAS FATHER IN NEW YORK WHO LEFT CUBA TO GET AWAY FROM REVOLUTION. FATHER AND DAUGHTER ON GOOD TERMS AND HE WRITES HER EVERY WEEK. HIS NAME CHINESE FOR PEACH BLOSSOM AND CHICHAY IS CUBAN ATTEMPT AT TRANSLITERATION. JURADO SPOKE CHINESE NAME BUT ROWTON UNABLE REMEMBER PHONETIC PRONUNCIATION AND COULD NOT ASK FOR SPELLING. CHICHAY MOTHER STILL IN CUBA WITH BROTHERS AND SISTERS.

5. LITAINT-2 HAS BEEN CULTIVATING CHICHAY SEVERAL MONTHS. SAW LETTER HER DESK ONE DAY IN CONSULATE AND ASKED IF BORE NEW CUBAN STAMPS. CHICHAY SAID NO IT FROM HER FATHER IN NEW YORK. SHE UNSALARIED AT CONSULATE AND CURBELO, WHO REPORTED BE FRIEND OF JURADO ACCORDING LIENVOY, HAS DELAYED SENDING HER PHS TO CUBA FOR EMPLOYMENT ON SALARY BASIS. REASON FOR DELAY NOT KNOWN. SHE FREINDLY WITH CURBELO BUT NOT WITH LIRING-1. WHEN THEIR DAUGHTER SICK LITAINT-2 GAVE CHICHAY MONEY TO TAKE CHILD TO DOCTOR. L-2 SAYS JURADO HAS MANY COMMIE FRIENDS MEXI. SPENT TIME IN CUBA AND MAY HAVE SERVED CUBAN

MILITARY SERVICE OR MILITIA.

6. STA TRACES SHOW JURADO AS MEMBER PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA, MEXICO, IN JULY 61, AND MEMBER PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THIRD LATIN AMERICAN CONGRESS, ARTISTS AND WRITERS, HAVANA, JAN 62. WIFE MIRIAM CHICHAY DE JURADO EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY ABOUT SIX MONTHS.

Soviet front
conf [illegible]
[illegible] Buenos,
WH/1

7. REQUEST POA JURADO AND CHICHAY FOR CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT. REQUEST COUPLE BE ASSIGNED PSEUDOS IN LIRING SERIES.

8. POUCHING ROWTON CONTACT REPORTS THIS SUBJECT.

SECRET

CFN 7234 WALLACE B. ROWTON CARLOS JURADO MIRIAM CHICHAY CUBAN RIVERA CUBA EUROPE NEW YORK CHINESE PEACH BLOSSOM CHINESE NOT ASK LITAINT-2 NO IT CURBELO LIENVOY NOT KNOWN NOT WITH LIRING-1 -2 L-2 STA PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA MEXICO 61 HAVANA JAN 62 POA LIRING

BT

SECRET

NNNN

☐ [illegible]ROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

ORIG : W.F. Frederick
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 6 May 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

9 MAY 66 20 26 z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY C/CA WH/C8

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

02820

REF: MEXI 7234 (IN 10462)*

1. NO TRACES HQS ON SUBJS REF. PLS CABLE BIO DATA SO THAT POA CAN BE OBTAINED.

2. SUBJS ASSIGNED CRYPTOS LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4.

END OF MESSAGE

Card crypts

Hold for 772

10 MAY 66

NR 21 May

NR

*ROWTON made contact with Carlos Jurado and Miriam Chichay de Jurado and wants POA and crypts.

M/R - Check original incoming cable - derog info as to connections w/Cubans?

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

998301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

J.
X. Z[illegible]ce/sas
WH/1
4167/9424
12 May 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
3 PER ___ # ___
WH 3
☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-815836

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/CA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 22 12 Z CITE DIRECTOR 01284

MEXICO CITY

REF MEXICO CITY 1361 (IN 62544)*

1. SUBJECT REF 201-815836 IS LIROSIN ONE.

2. TO FACILITATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION XE AND CRYPT RECOGNITION, LIRING CRYPT WILL BE RESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LIRING PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH LIRING CRYPTS ALREADY ASSIGNED WILL BE RETAINED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT *Requested Crypt be assigned Leon CRUZ-Garcia who targetted against LIRING-3.

998201

cabled + recorded
a a g
15 may 67

~~Cardex~~
File

15 MAY 1967

WH/COG/FISHER AMES (TELECORD)

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM 22

ACTION WH/2 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, WH/COG 3, SECUR 4, TSD

S E C R E T 200047Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1162 20 APR 67 IN 49085

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: DIRECTOR 92565

20 APR 1967

1. LICAGE-1S FAMILY INCREASED SINCE LAST CONTACTED AND IS NOW TOO LARGE FOR LIRING-3 L/P. SAME CONDITION APPLIES LIPLUGS. REQUEST CLEARANCE LEON (CRUZ) GARCIA DPOB 11 APRIL 40, PACHUCA HIDALGO, MEXICO, FOR USE L/P/KEEPER L-3 OP. SUBJ KNOWN TO ~~PEUVION~~ STATION PAST 2 YEARS AS RESPONSIBLE HARD WORKING PRO U.S. TYPE. IN VIEW URGENCY THIS OP PLUS FACT SGSWIRL OPERATOR NOW MEXICO. REQUEST PRIORITY PROCESSING.

2. PLS ADVISE.

Fantastic, but...

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

20 APR 1967

File

11 MAY 1967

John,
I believe that we have a case now.
Dis. file JK

Hold for #772.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

22

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG-4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/RA, TSD-6, FI, DDP, ADDP, CI/OA

S E C R E T 122250Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1086 12 APR 67 IN 43875

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 0399 (IN 33549)

B. HMMA 31721

13 APR 1967

STATION NOW IN RECEIPT RECEIVER NEEDED MONITOR REF B INSTALLATION IN HOME LIRING-3 AND LP READY AND WAITING. REQUEST PRIORITY HANDLING CLEARANCES REF A BASEHOUSE KEEPER CANDIDATES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-814895

201-350966

14-00000

201-778301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: J. Stewart/sas
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 11 April 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ____ PER ____ # ____
CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR MBS/BE 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 23 33 Z. Brown CITE DIRECTOR 92161

TO MEXICO CITY

PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

REF HMMW-15396*

PROJECT LIRAVINE APPROVED 7 APRIL FOR DOLLARS 36,150 INCLUDING FUNDS FOR C-16351 UMPHLET AND 778301 LIRING-3 POUCHING OPS. COPY 13 APRIL. SINCE LIRANCH SERIOUSLY OVEROBLIGATED BECAUSE OF LISAMPAN, UMPHLET AND LIRING-3 CHARGES, PLEASE REOBLIGATE TO LIRAVINE WHERE APPROPRIATE AND XX DO SAME WITH LISAMPAN WHEN WRITTEN AND APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref advised that Hqs include LIRING-3 and UMPHLET under LIRAVINE Project renewal request.

13 APR 1967

WH/13+F David W...

WH/COG

William V. Broe
C/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

YES ☐ NO
TO FILE NO.
TO FILE NO.
RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 38

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

S E C R E T 082253Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3336

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

9 FEB 1967

PBRUMEN LIRING

[illegible] 96558

REF: DIRECTOR 73089

1. RE QUESTIONS ASKED REF, WALLACE B. ROWTON SAW LIRING-3 OFF ON PLANE WHICH TRAVELED NON-STOP GUAT CITY FROM MEXI CITY. L-3 SAID HE STAYED AT FLORIDA HOTEL AS PLANNED AND RECEIVED PHONE CALLS THERE FROM FAR REPS. L-3 SAID HE MET SEVERAL TIMES AND HAD LUNCH WITH NICOLAS BATSAKIS, DIRECTOR OF METALOPLASTICA, AND BROUGHT BACK SAMPLES OF PLAETIC FLOWERS MADE AT FACTORY AND WHICH SEEN BY ROWTON.

795301

2. ROWTON PLANNING QUERY L-3 FOR MORE DETAILS TRIP AND DESCRIPTIONS INDIVIDUALS HE MET. NEXT ROWTON L-3 MEETING NIGHT OF 8 FEB 67. FAR REP MEXI CITY HAS NOT YET CONTACTED L-3 TO PICK UP MEDICINE, RADIO TUBES AND COGNAC.

3. HQS PLS INDEX NICOLAS BATSAKIS AND METALOPLASTICA TO MEXI STA FILE P-12729.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

File reviewed 8 March 67 by A. Ladenburg WH/1

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG : Jack Stewart/nao ☐ FILE RID
UNIT : WH/1 ☐ INDEX
EXT : 6954 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 7 February 1967 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______ #

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY wh/cog-8, ci/ops, ci/ia

SECRET

7 16 41 Z CITE DIRECTOR 73089

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY 8 FEB 1967

PBRUMEN LIRING

File

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 0240 (IN 93416)*

B. MEXICO CITY 0130 (IN 88362)**

PLEASE ADVISE WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN AND COULD BE TAKEN TO CONFIRM LIRING-3'S TRAVEL AND STORY OF ACTIVITIES WHILE IN GUATEMALA CITY. DID HE STAY AT HOTEL FLORIDA AS PLANNED REF B? COULD ROWTON SAFELY ELICIT DESCRIPTIONS OF YOUNG FAR REPRESENTATIVE CONTACT AT MUSEUM AND FEMALE CONTACT AT RESTAURANT? ALSO APPRECIATE DETAILS METALOPLASTICA VISIT AND ANY OTHER INFO TO ASSIST HQS FOLLOW THIS HIGHLY ~~[illegible]~~ complex CASE.

798301

END OF MESSAGE

*Furnished details LIRING-3 trip to Guatemala City 26-29 January.
**Reported LIRING-3's departure and plans to go Guatemala City.

WH/COG Earl N Williamson

WH/2/G

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WH

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM: [illegible]

ACTION: [illegible] ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO: FILE, VR, [illegible] CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA

31 JAN 67 80356

S E C R E T 312102Z CITE JMWAVE 5378 (INGHURST ACTING)

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, RIO DE JANEIRO

TYPIC AMPOP

REF: CARACAS 5376 (IN 77369)*

* CAR HQS [illegible] ON AMPOP-1 WIFE POL ORIENTATION

1. JMWAVE FILES DO NOT REFLECT ANY INFO RE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF AMPOP-1 WIFE.

2. DI SERVENO, WHO DEBRIEFED AND TRAINED AMPOP-1 IN BEIRUT, REMEMBERS FAMILY WAS TOUCHY SUBJECT WITH AGENT WHO DESERTED VENEZUELAN WIFE AND CHILDREN IN CUBA TO "MARRY" SYRAIAN GIRL IN FICTITIOUS CEREMONY. BECAUSE OF THIS AND LACK OF TIME, POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF WIFE WAS NOT DISCUSSED WITH AMPOP-1 AND ONLY ROUTINE PRQ PART ONE INFO WAS OBTAINED.

3. HOWEVER, WISH POINT OUT FOLLOWING FACTS. ACCORDING TO [redacted] REPORTS, WIFE AND CHILDREN WERE DETAINED AS THEY BOARDED CUBANA FLIGHT FOR MEXICO CITY 9 OCT 66 AND WIFE DENOUNCED CASTRO REGIME OPENLY AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL MEXICO 17 OCT 66. ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY WIFE IS NOT PROREGIME, POSSIBILITY EXISTS SHE MAY HAVE AGREED SERVE CUBAN I.S. IN EXCHANGE FOR PERMISSION LEAVE CUBA WITH CHILDREN AND GET EVEN WITH AMPOP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

☐ YES ☐ NO
TO FILE NO.
FO FILE NO.
RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 49

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 56

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2, SB8, SOD6, CI/PS CS/SGO, CA2, CA/O4, DOT

S E C R E T 190340Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9984 19 JAN 67 81261

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9339 (IN 72194)

1. AT MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON 16 JAN 67, LIRING-3 798301 REPORTED THAT CUBAN A13 ON 11 JAN CALLED LIRING-3 ASIDE DURING RECEPTION AT EMB AND STATED HE HAD RECEIVED CABLE FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ASKING LIRING-3 RETURN CUBA FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS.

2. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE BELIEVES THIS IS ANSWER HIS FIRST LETTER TO RODRIGUEZ FOLLOWING LAST TRIP TO CUBA MID DECEMBER AT WHICH RODRIGUEZ INTRODUCED HIM TO OSMANI CIENFUEGOS AND AT WHICH THEY DISCUSSED LIRING-3 PROPOSAL ASSIST TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE IN GUAT.

3. LIRING-3 AND STA BELIEVE IT BEST L-3 NOT JUMP MINUTE CUBANS CALL SO HE TELEPHONED RODRIGUEZ NIGHT 17 JAN INFORMED HIM HE WOULD GO CUBA BUT NOT UNTIL AFTER HAD MADE ANOTHER TRIP SOUTH WHICH MUST DO IN NEXT FEW DAYS. LIRING-3 PLANS GO GUAT ABOUT 27 JAN AFTER RECEIVING SUPPLIES ROWTON ORDERED WHILE AT HQS WHICH DUE ARRIVE MEXICO 25 JAN. POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT RODRIGUEZ WILL ASK LIRING-3 COME CUBA PRIOR TRIP TO GUAT BUT LIRING-3 INTENDS BEG OFF IF POSSIBLE. RESULTS PHONE TALK WILL BE OBTAINED AT ROWTON LIRING-3 MEETING NIGHT 18 JAN.

SECRET

4. DURING PAST WEEK LIRING-3 CONTACTED ARCHAEOLOGIST FRIEND CARLOS NAVARETTE CACERES, GUAT COMMIE WORKING FOR MEXI GOVT, WHO REVEALED TO LIRING-3 IN GREAT CONFIDENCE HE INFORMED BY MUTUAL FRIENDS OF LIRING-3'S RECENT TRIP TO GUAT. NAVARETTE FURTHER STATED HE HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO PLACE HIMSELF AT DISPOSAL OF LIRING-3 TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE. NAVARETTE SAID HE AND JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA WERE MEMBERS OF FAR NETWORK IN MEXI. HE CAUTIONED LIRING 3 AGAINST CONTACT WITH MEXI COMMUNIST PARTY BECAUSE CERTAIN HIGH LEVEL POLICY MATTERS HAD NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED BETWEEN PCM AND FAR.

5. NAVARETTE FURTHER TOLD LIRING-3 MASSIVE SOVIET AID PAREN IN EXCESS OF TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARES END PAREN WAS AVAILABLE TO FAR QUOTE DIRECTLY UNQUOTE BUT WITH CERTAIN STRINGS ATTACHED WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT PLACE FAR UNDER COMPLETE SOVIET CONTROL. FAR, IN DESPARATE ATTEMPT RETAIN INDEPENDENCE, IS RAISING FUNDS ON OWN BY SUCH MEANS AS BANK AND TRAIN ROBBERIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 RENT HOUSE IN SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, LEAVE SHIPMENT THERE ON WAY TO GUAT, CONTACT FAR REPS INSIDE GUAT AS ON LAST TRIP, AND EXPLAIN SHIPMENT IS AT HOUSE AND CAN BE PICKED UP WHEN THEY WISH. WILL EXPECT THEM PICK UP SHIPMENT IN SAN CRISTOBAL AND CARRY ACROSS BORDER.

* Requested op be discussed with Rostow;

SECRET

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 49

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

4

798301

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
Dissem by 24

ACTION
WH-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, SOD-6, CS/SG0, CI, CI/OPS, CI/PS, FI, CI/IC-2, FI/INT-2, CA-2, CA/O-4, MPS/PSC-3, CI/OA, WH/COG-8, FI/SPG/MPS/BG-2

SECRET 062152Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9849

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

6 JAN 67 IN 73020

ATTENTION DAINOLD

REFS: (A) GUATEMALA CITY 6831 (IN 61532)
(B) GUATEMALA CITY 6847 (IN 64231)
(C) GUATEMALA CITY 6881 (IN 68762)
(D) GUATEMALA CITY 6888 (IN 69317)
(E) GUATEMALA CITY 6892 (IN 70202) #
(F) HGGA 8352

OVER

1. USING REFS ABOVE AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GUATEMALA CITY COS AND MEXICO CITY STATION OFFICERS ON OPERATIONS WHICH CAN BE INITIATED BY WOFACT TO AID MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENTS COUNTER GUERRILLA ARMS SMUGGLING FROM MEXICO INTO GUATEMALA. FOLLOWING POINTS EVOLVED:

A. MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENTS APPARENTLY BELIEVE MOST SMUGGLING OCCURS IN SOUTHEASTERN PORTION STATE OF CHIAPAS ON MEXICAN SIDE AND SOUTHWESTERN PORTION GUATEMALA WHERE GOOD ACCESS ROADS EXIST. MOST SMUGGLING DONE VIA TRUCKS, BUSES AND OTHER VEHICLES. BOTH GOVERNMENTS COOPERATING CLOSELY AND HAVE BEEFED UP OR HAVE PLANS TO BEEF UP MILITARY UNITS ...

SECRET

THIS BORDER AREA TO DETECT ARMS TRAFFIC. GUATEMALAN SECOND VICE MINISTER DEFENSE, COLONEL FRANCISCO SOSA AVILA, HAS INITIATED UNILATERAL OPERATION TO PENETRATE GUATEMALAN CUSTOMS HOUSES IN KEY AREAS TO DETERMINE WHO AIDING SMUGGLERS.

B. TREMENDOUS SURGE OF GOODWILL WHICH NOW EXISTS BETWEEN MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENTS WILL CERTAINLY AID IN KEEPING JOINT OPERATION OF WIPING OUT SMUGGLERS ON TRACK. TEND BELIEVE MAJOR WOFACT EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGEMENT AND AID TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH ADVICE, TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, TRANSPORTATION, MONEY AND HARD INFO ON SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES WHEN AVAILABLE. AS CITED IN REFS, GUATEMALA CITY STATION HAS ALREADY INITIATED SUCH MATERIAL SUPPORT TO GUATEMALAN TREASURY GUARD TO BUILD UP ITS COLLECTION CAPABILITIES.

C. REGARDING COLONEL SOSA'S UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF THE CUSTOMS HOUSES ALONG THE BORDER. MEXICO CITY STATION CAN DISCUSS SIMILAR POSSIBILITY WITH 745332 LITEMPO-8 TO SEND PERSONNEL TO PENETRATE MEXICAN CUSTOMS HOUSES. THIS MIGHT REQUIRE FINANCIAL AID FROM MEXICO CITY STATION TO PAY SLARIES OF ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEE/AGENTS.

2. UNILATERALLY, STATIONS PLAN:

A. EXPLOITATION OF WHATEVER POTENTIAL 798301 LIRING-3 AND C-16251 NORRIS K. UMPHLET MAY HAVE IN PENETRATING GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT AND ARMS TRAFFIC RING. THESE PLANS DISCUSSED IN SEPARATE CABLES

9 JAN 1967

B. LIRENO-1, FORMER MEXICAN IMMIGRATION OFFICER, WILL BE QUERIED ON HIS ABILITY RECONTACT FORMER COLLEAGUES ALONG BORDER AREA WHO HAVE ACCESS INFO ON ARMS SMUGGLING FOR POSSIBLE UNILATERAL RECRUITMENT. THIS DIFFICULT OPERATION, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF COMMO PROBLEMS CREATED BY DISTANCE FROM MEXICO CITY. ALSO, ANYONE WHO NOT FROM BORDER AREA EASILY SPOTTED BY LOCALS AND WOULD CREATE SUSPICION.

C. ON 5 OR 6 JAN 67, MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES PLAN MEET TO DISCUSS SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES AND WHAT THESE GOVERNMENTS CAN DO TO JOINTLY SMASH ARMS TRAFFIC. COS GUATEMALA WILL FIND OUT WHO ATTENDED MEETING AND WHAT WAS AGREED UPON TO GIVE MEXICO CITY STATION CLEARER IDEA OF FOLLOW UP POSSIBILITIES.

D. IN VIEW FACT LIREBEL-1 TRIP TO CUBA HAS NOT PANNED OUT TO DATE AND FACT HE COULD BE OF IMMEDIATE USE TO GUATEMALA CITY STATION IN WORKING WITH GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT ON GUERRILLAS AND ARMS TRAFFIC, PLAN CANCEL CUBA TRAVEL AND HAVE HIM RE-ENTER SECRET

JAN 1967

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 9849 S E C R E T

9 JAN 1967

File

GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SEPARATE DISPATCH TO FOLLOW.

2. DESPITE LINLUCK ASSESSMENT CAPUANO WHICH SHOWED OBVIOUS PREJUDICE, STATION INTENDS REVAMP PLANS FOR CAPUANO RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT. CABLE TO FOLLOW.

3. ONE OF MAIN POINTS IN ENTIRE CASE IS HOW SERIOUS IS SMUGGLING THREAT. THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF ARMS IN GUATEMALA FROM VARIOUS HISTORICAL INCIDENTS (1954 FALL OF ARBENZ REGIME; 13 NOV 1960 UPRISING WHEN LARGE AMOUNTS OF ARMS TAKEN FROM GUATEMALAN MILITARY; 1961 WHEN ARMS LEFT IN GUATEMALA TRAINING SITES AFTER BAY OF PIGS; AND CONTINUOUS INFILTRATION OF ARMS ON SMALL SCALE OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS). WOFACT GOALS OF JOINT OPERATION ARE TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF ARMS SMUGGLING INTO GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO AND ASSIST GUATEMALAN AND MEXICAN AUTHORITIES IN EFFORT REDUCE ARMS TRAFFIC AND GUERRILLA THREAT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

4. CANNOT ESITMATE COST OR DURATION OF OPERATION YET, BUT EXPECT SOME FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE MAY BE REQUIRED TO HELP BOTH GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISH INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS IN BORDER AREA. THIS, OF COURSE, IS IN ADDITION TO TECHNICAL AND OTHER

SECRET

PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 9849 S E C R E T

EQUIPMENT. Re Leads On Current Arms Smuggling Activities.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 63

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 27 PER 90-14

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, SUSPENSE, WH/COG, CDO, WH8, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/D4, FI/INT, IW, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, C/ICA, CI/IS, SOD6, CS/SGO

S E C R E T 041905Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9310 DO4, DC/H3, CCS3, CSPS, ADDP

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY 5 JAN 1967

TYPIC LIRING 4 JAN 67 IN 71138

REF MEXICO CITY 9608 (

798301

1. FOLL ARE HIGHPOINTS LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING BY ROWTON ON 2 JAN ON HIS VISIT TO GUATEMALA AND HIS DISCUSSIONS IN VILLAGE NEAR ZACAPA WITH ALLEDGED REPS OF GUAT GUERRILLA GROUP.

2. LIRING-3 MET AT HUEHUETENANGO BUS STATION BY TWO MEN WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS "OCTAVIO" AND "FALCON" AND LOCAL FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS (FAR) REPS. SINCE LIRING-3 ONLY ABLE OBTAIN 48 HR GUATEMALA VISA FAR REPS ASKED HIM RECROSS INTO MEXICO AND MEET THEM AGAIN NIGHT 22 DECEMBER AT POINT ON MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY NEAR LA MESILLA, GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 DID AS TOLD, WAS LED ACROSS BORDER BLACK AND DRIVEN TO GUATEMALA CITY BY SUCCESSION OF VEHICLES. DURING ALL LEGS OF TRIP SECOND VEHICLE WAS USED WELL AHEAD OF ONE DRIVING LIRING-3 TO GUARD AGAINST ROADBLOCKS.

3. IN GUATEMALA CITY LIRING-3 TAKEN TO HOUSE ON 29TH AVENUE OCCUPIED BY WOMAN INTRODUCED AS VICKY (WILL OBTAIN EXACT ADDRESS). TOLD STAY THERE UNTIL CONTACTED WHICH SECRET

OCCURRED 23 DEC WHEN OCTAVIO AND FALCON RETURNED AND ESCORTED HIM BY CAR TO GUALAN ON TRANS OCEANIC HIGHWAY BEYOND ZACAPA THERE LIRING-3 INTRODUCED TO "PASCUAL" AND "SALVADOR" WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS MEMBERS OF "EDGAR IBARRA" FRONT. THESE TWO REPS STATED FOLLOWING:

A. TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE AGREEMENTS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

B. FOR ABOVE REASON CUBAN ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN INCONSEQUENTIAL AND THEREFORE GUERRILLAS HAVE RESORTED TO MORE DIRECT METHODS TO OBTAIN ASSISTANCE INCLUDING BANK AND TRAIN ROBBERIES. MOST DIRECT SOURCE OF OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN SOVIETS VIA THEIR EMBASSY MEXICO.

C. GUERRILLA ALSO UNABLE COUNT ON CUBA FOR ASSISTANCE AS CUBA TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH OWN PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTIONARY CONSOLIDATION. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR EVIDENCED SARCASM IN THIS STATEMENT.

D. "EDGAR IBARRA" GUERRILLAS CONTROL FRONT MORE THAN 100 KILOMETERS LONG AND REQUIRE MORE AND MORE SUPPLIES TO EXPAND MEMBERSHIP AND INCREASE THEIR AREA (NOT FURTHER DESCRIBED).

E. IN PAST GUATEMALA GUERRILLAS THEMSELVES ARRANGED

SECRET

SHIPMENTS ARMS AND SUPPLIES WITHIN MEXICO. CONSEQUENCES DISASTROUS, E.G. LOPEZ CASE. THEY HAVE LEARNED GREAT PRECAUTIONS MUST BE TAKEN MEX-GUAT BORDER AREA WHERE THERE NUMEROUS NORTH AMERICAN AGENTS WORKING ON MEXI SIDE UNDER COVER AS TOURISTS AND MISSIONARIES. SPECIFICALLY THERE IS AMERICAN BASE LOCATED AT YAXOQUINTELA (NOT IDENTIFIED) WITH AIRFIELD AND COMMO CENTER WHICH WELL KNOWN TO THEM AND ATTACKED BY THEM IN PAST. (STATION FEELS THIS MAY REFER TO "ALAS DE SOCORRO MISSION" IN IXTAPA, CHIAPAS.)

4. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR INDICATED INTEREST RECEIVING MANY TYPES SUPPLIES INCLUDING ARMS BUT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED ANTIBIOTICS AND TUBES FOR ZENITH MEDIUM RANGE TRANSMITTER RECEIVER. NO TYPES OR QUANTITIES SPECIFIED EITHER ITEM BUT GUATS SAID WOULD TAKE ANY AMOUNT THESE ITEMS THEY COULD GET.

5. LIRING-3 COMMITTED SELF RECONTACT GUATS IN 20-30 DAYS WHEN HE TOLD THEM WOULD HAVE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION. GUATS ASKED FOR CONCRETE PLAN RE MANNER SHIPPING SUPPLIES. THEY TOLD LIRING-3 THEY COULD HANDLE FROM MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER TO THEIR GUERRILLAS IN GUATEMALA.

6. LIRING-3 SUGGESTED TO ROWTON THAT HOUSE BE RENTED IN

SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, MEXICO, 300 KILOMETERS NORTH GUAT BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY AS PERMANENT CONTACT POINT WITH GUERRILLAS. LATTER TOLD LIRING-3 TOWN ACCESSIBLE TO THEM AND THAT THEY COULD PICK UP SUPPLIES THERE, CARRY ACROSS BORDER AND DELIVER TO GUERRILLA GROUP.

7. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 HE DEPARTING MEXICO FOR MONTREAL AND PROBABLY NEW YORK NEXT DAY FOR TWO WEEKS AND WOULD TRY OBTAIN RADIO TUBES AND ANTIBIOTICS IN TIME FOR LIRING-3 NEXT TRIP TO BORDER. LIRING-3 CONTACT PLAN WITH GUATS TO REMAIN SAME AS BEFORE: WHEN READY TRAVEL WILL CONTACT AUGUSTINA HERNANDEZ IN GUATEMALA CITY AND ADVISE HER DATE HIS ARRIVAL IN HUEHUE TENANGO. LIRING-3 WOULD NOT CARRY SUPPLIES TO GUATEMALA BUT WOULD LEAVE THEM IN MEXICO, TRAVEL TO HUEHUETENANGO MEET CONTACTS AND INFORM THEM WHERE LOCATION. GUERRILLAS WOULD THEN MAKE PICK UP AND CARRY SUPPLIES GUATEMALA.

8. STATION COMMENTS AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL PROPOSAL BEING CABLED.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

~~FROM~~ DISSEM BY 25/M

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2,

S E C R E T 192319Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6844 File 20 DEC 1966

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING 79830 20 DEC 66 62778

REF: MEXICO CITY-9638 (IN [illegible]) *

1. STATION EXTREMELY INTERESTED LIRING-3 OPERATION WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL. FOLLOWING RESULT OF STATION TRACES AND INVESTIGATION OF INFO CONTAINED REF:

A. THERE ARE NO STATION TRACES ON AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ. NOT ABLE LOCATE PIEDRO SANTO (OR PIEDRA SANTA) PRINTING OFFICE IN ANY GUATEMALA CITY DIRECTORIES.

B. GUATEMALA CITY PHONE NUMBER 22 057 IS JOINTLY REGISTERED TO ROBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ AND SAMUEL B. (FRANIO) CORDON. NO TRACES EITHER ROBERTO OR SAMUEL, BUT JULIO HUMBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ, WHO POSSIBLY BROTHER OF ROBERTO, REPORTEDLY INVOLVED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN 1962 INCLUDING ARMS BUYING FOR GUERRILLAS.

C. THERE ARE NUMEROUS TRACES ON JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO WHICH INDICATE HE INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1949.

2. ALSO NUMEROUS TRACES ON JACOBO (RODRIGUEZ) PADILLA, WHO

SECRET

INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST AND COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES SINCE 1940'S. MOST RECENT REPORT WAS NOVEMBER 1964 LIAISON REPORT WHICH LISTED HIM AS MEMBER OF THE PGT. INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT RODRIGUEZ PARTICIPATED IN SOME FRONT ACTIVITIES WITH JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO.

* RE DEBRIEFING LIRING/3

SECRET

S E C R E T
BT

14-00000

c.o. Lilly

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 54

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM DISSEM BY 66

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, SUSPENSE WH/COG, CDC ADDP, CSDO, WH 8, CA 2 CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, IW, C/OA, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA/O 4, DDP

S E C R E T 16205CZ CITE MEXICO CITY 9534

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

79534

16 DEC 1966

16 Dec 66 IN 60637

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B ROWTON 14 DEC 66 HE HAD HEARD IN HAVA
ON RECENT TRIP (HE RETURNED MEXI 5 DEC) THAT FIDEL CASTRO HAD RECENTLY
CAUSED ARREST OF ELEVEN MEMBERS EDITORIAL STAFF OF GRANMA NEWSPAPER.

2. L-3 LABELED THOSE ARRESTED AS MEMBERS OF QUOTE RED GUARD
UNQUOTE WHICH HAD CRITICIZED CASTRO FOR HIS RECENT SPEECH REGARDING
CUBAN MILITIA IRREGULARITIES AND DIFFICULTIES. CRITICISM REFLECTED
IN COLUMNS OF GRANMA AND BROUGHT ABOUT ARREST OF ELEVEN.

3. ROWTON ASKED L-3 FOR IDENS THOSE ARRESTED BUT LATTER COULD
NOT SUPPLY EXCEPT TO SAY ONE WAS HUSBAND OF HIS FRIEND VELKIS CUSA,
NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED. ROWTON HAS ASKED L-3 DISCUSS ARRESTS WITH
ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ORDER OBTAIN MORE DETAILS.

4. L-3 STATED HE HAD DISCUSSED INTERNAL CUBAN AFFAIRS WITH
SUAREZ AND LATTER TOLD HIM FIDEL CASTRO EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES
ACCOMPLISHING OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRATIC CLUMSINESS PARTY
UNDERLINGS AND UNBELIEVABLE INEFFICIENCY CUBAN DIP SERVICE. SUAREZ
TOLD L-3 CASTRO REQUIRED DELEGATE IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE TASKS
HIS CLOSE CONFIDANTS ORDER ASSURE ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28
ACTION WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, CCS 3

S E C R E T 091757Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6913 9 JAN 1967 9 JAN 67 IN 74091

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY-9839 (IN 72194) (IN 73330) File

B. GUATEMALA CITY-6906 (H GG-4397)

C. MEXICO CITY-9810 (IN 71138)

798301

1. STATION GUATEMALA MOST OPTIMISTIC DEVELOPMENTS LIRING-3 OPERATION WHICH APPEARS HAVE EXCELLENT POTENTIAL. OPERATIONAL TAKE SHOULD PROVE EXTREMELY USEFUL. STATION AGREES WITH MEXICO CITY THAT LONG RANGE OBJECTIVES THIS OPERATION PRECLUDE PASSAGE TO LIAISON AT THIS STAGE DEVELOPMENT.

2. AS REF B REPORTED THAT TWO MEMBERS OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) NOW IN HABANA SEEKING CUBAN AID, BELIEVE LETTER SUGGESTED PARA 1 OF REF A WOULD BE TIMELY AND ALMOST CERTAIN BOOST LIRING-3'S IMAGE WITH THE FAR.

C-16251

3. BELIEVE PARALLEL OPERATION USING NORIS K. UMPHLET (PARA 3 REF A) ALSO OFFERS EXCELLENT POSSIBILITIES. AS MOST KEY COMMUNISTS IN GUATEMALA NOW UNDERGROUND, INITIAL CONTACTS MIGHT PROVE PROBLEM. UMPHLET MIGHT ARRANGE CONTACTS THROUGH GUATEMALAN EXILES IN MEXICO, OR COULD BEGIN WITH SO CALLED COMMUNIST "INTELLECTUALS", SUCH AS ROLANDO COLLADO ARDON OR ALFONSO BAUER PAIZ, WHO STILL IN THE OPEN.

PAGE 2 GUATMALA CITY 6913 S E C R E T

GUATEMALA WILL BE HAPPY PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT.

4. RE PARA 4 REF C: STATION WOULD BE INTERESTED IN RECEIVING ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON THE "ZENITH MEDIUM RANGE TRANSMITTER RECEIVER". ALSO NOTE WOULD APPEAR DIFFICULT PURCHASE CORRECT TUBES IF NO ADDITIONAL DATA AVAILABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD	DATE [illegible] 1967
SUBJECT	FILE NUMBER X07668 - 798301

Rec'd for my coordination an outgoing cable to MEXI, saying that PREVCHS had been granted a Limited Contact-Assessment POA on 19 Jan '67. The next sentence said that WH/1 was asking for amendment of this contact & assessment POA so that PREVCHS could provide cover for LIRING-3 (201-798301). [redacted] Jack Stewart, at the outset of our conversation when I mentioned L-3, said "I hope you never got mixed up in the LIRING-3 case. What a mess".

I informed Stewart I had been deeply "mixed up" in the L-3 case since 3 June '66 when Stewart himself requested a POA on L-3. I told him of the three notices over a six month period I had sent to WH/1 asking for resolution of the derog info and my invitation to discuss. CI/OA never heard a word from WH/1 in answer to its notices. Thus on 20 Dec. '66, CI/OA closed the LIRING-3 file for failure to comply. Stewart said Station was handling L-3 as a hostile, but appeared dumbfounded that the use of such a person as a directed agent requires that that person qualify & gain a POA.

Re the requested amendment on PREVCHS, the latter has only a limited POA because of items cited in POA granting; moreover, L-3 has never had the proper approval and was technically disapproved by the action of 30 Dec. 1966.

Stewart removed sentence telling MEXI that they WH/1 were asking for such an amendment, and I coordinated on simple notification of POA action of 19 Jan '67.

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE
CI/OA/WH	

FORM 7-62 1954

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

14-00000

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE ____________

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible]/1

ATTENTION : [illegible]

201- [illegible]
C- ____________

The file on [illegible] is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Case closed for failure to comply.

M/R - See M/R dtd. 20 Jan. 1967 in 201-809668.
jk

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/CA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

FORM 3-65 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(9)

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 14 DEC 1966	CASE NO. 201- 798301

☐	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐	SET UP FOR OA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK		AREA	

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
✓	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(~~Reason checked below.*~~ or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE att.
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

☐ POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

To: WH/1

Case closed for failure to comply.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

20 DEC 1966

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(23)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
DISSEM 04 3

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH/CCG 8, MPS/RG 2, ~~CI/OA~~

S E C R E T 141725Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9612

14 Dec 66 IN 59552

DIRECTOR

PERUMEN LIRAVINE

Sally

REF: DIRECTOR 57519

498301

AS REQUESTED REF, LIRING-3 HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN LIRAVINE PROJECT RENEWAL.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

File

and now, about resolution of bona fides ----

NNNN

15 DEC 1966

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: J. Stewart/pem
UNIT: WH/2
EXT: 3054
DATE: 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-[illegible]8301

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY 15 PER ___ # ___

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/COG 4, CI, CI/OPS,

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 1545Z 12 DEC 1966 CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 58866

TO [illegible] CITY INFO

[illegible] MEXICO CITY

[illegible]

MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 5[illegible])

File

11 JAN 1967

,78301

~~Pls bring me this file~~

~~Also w/file~~

1. [illegible] CONCURS [illegible] STATION MEXICO CITY TO [illegible] [illegible]-5 ([illegible]) INTO CUBAN SUBVERSION ACTIVITIES MEXICO. [illegible]-3 IS [illegible] ANTI-[illegible] AGENT HANDLED BY SENIOR CONTRACT STAFF AGENT, WILLIAM D. ROWTON, UNDER DEEP COVER MEXICO CITY. ROWTON PRETENDS BE [illegible] ALONG WITH [illegible] AND [illegible]-[illegible] [illegible]-[illegible] BUSINESS DEALS WITH CUBA. [illegible]-3 HAS MADE 3 TRIPS TO CUBA THIS CONNECTION. IN OCTOBER 1966 STATION SENT [illegible]-3 INTO CUBA [illegible] MEXICO CITY WHEN HE [illegible]-UNDISCLOSED [illegible] ARREST CUBAN DIPLOMAT [illegible]. AS RESULT CUBANS INVITED [illegible]-3 CUBA DISCUSS SENSITIVE CUBAN ACTIVITIES BUT ON ARRIVAL [illegible] GAVE [illegible].

2. MEXICO CITY 95[illegible] AND DIRECTOR 5[illegible]03 CONCERN RESULTS ABOVE TRIP AND [illegible]-3's SUGGESTION TO ROWTON HE BE ASSIGNED TO CHIAPAS,

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : WE/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 58866

PAGE 2

TO

WHERE LIRING-3 FORMERLY WORKED FOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND HAS GOOD CONTACTS, TO ATTEMPT CONTACT GUATEMALAN FRIENDS ACROSS BORDER AND ARRANGE MEET THEM MEXICO, ALSO TO MEET JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA TO DEVELOP MORE GUATEMALAN CONTACTS, ALL FOR PURPOSE SETTING ~~UP~~ STAGE CREATE NET-WORK FOR CUBANS. WC

END OF MESSAGE

Summary Ref: Results LIRING-3 meeting with Jacobo RODRIGUEZ Padilla and set-up of meeting with Guatemalan communist in Guatemala.

WH/2/G TERRELL (TELECOORD)
WH/COG/CICS

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-796301

DISSEM BY 15 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR . FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CA

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 10 1545 Z

CITE DIRECTOR

(REFERENCE NUMBER) 58867

TO GUATEMALA CITY

JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

[illegible]

DIRECTOR 58866

IDEN: CARLOS JURADO DELMAR, BORN 3 NOV 30 MEXICO CITY, MEXICAN ARTIST RESIDING MEXICO CITY, RESIDENT HAVANA 1963-64. WIFE MIRIAM CHECHAY, IS CUBAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN-CHINESE DESCENT, EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY UNTIL NOV 66. JURADO 5 FEET 6, 130 POUNDS, HAZEL EYES, DARK BROWN HAIR, LIGHT COMPLEXION, APPARENT AGE 35, E SLIGHT BUILD, BOYISH APPEARANCE, HAIRLINE RECEDING ON SIDES OF FOREHEAD.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/2/G TERRELL (TELECOORD) 8

WH/COG/CICS ____

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

5
4
3
2
1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

JURADO DELMAR, CARLOS
201-796301
SEX M COB ?

201-020481
MEXI-07920
15 JUL 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE NO MORE HEARD OF PLANS SEND ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS TO MEXICO CITY INSPECT CONSULATE. SUBJ ADMITS BEING PUZZLED WHY RODRIGUEZ HAS NOT APPEARED.

R 6608050621

Ring 3

FILE IN 201-798301

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 23 June 1966 crm
TO: WH/1 - J. Zerance Stewart —	C NO. 201 - 798301
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LIRING/3

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In order to qualify Subject for a POA, it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of Subject's bona fides.

Note has been made of MEXI 7234, DIR 07441 and MEXI 7454.

4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 43

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	C	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dsg. AY24 Pg 90-19

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME 1845Z BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/SDO, DDP, SUSPENSE - C/WH, CDO, ADDP, WH/C-8, CA-2, CA/PEG, CA/Prop, CA/CO-4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/D-4, FI/INT, IW

ACTION

S E C R E T 091642Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7855

9 JUL 66 53438

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REF: MEXICO CITY 7828 (51413) *

1. AT MEETING 1800 HRS 8 JULY 66 BETWEEN WALLACE B. ROWTON AND CARLOS JURADO DELMAR, LATTER STATED HE HAD SAT IN ON QUOTE BULL SESSION UNQUOTE THAT MORNING BETWEEN REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ AND MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS AT WHICH SUBJECT WAS FIDEL CASTRO.

2. BOTH LOZANO AND CEPEDA DECLARED CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY THROUGH ITS CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD FORMALLY UPBRAIDED FIDEL FOR HIS EXCESSES FOLLOWING GUANTANAMO INCIDENT. PARTICULARLY DISTASTEFUL TO PARTY WAS FIDEL RAGING ON RADIO IN WHICH HE CALLED U.S. HIJO DE PERRO. SHORTLY AFTER SPEECH HIJO DE PERRO SIGNS APPEARED IN HAVANA. AFTER SPEECH PARTY ALSO CONCERNED FIDEL'S ACTIONS DURING FORTHCOMING 26 JULY CELEBRATION AND THIS ANOTHER REASON PARTY BELIEVED FIDEL SHOULD TAKE REST ORDER CALM HIMSELF AND ASSURE ORDERLY DIGNIFIED CELEBRATION.

3. THROUGHOUT BULL SESSION DISCUSSION IMPLICATIONS WERE

Suspense handled by M Bencheg 11 Jul
[illegible]

LIRING 3
201-798301

FIDEL'S MENTAL CONDITION SUCH HE UNACCOUNTABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE IN HIS ACTIONS.

4. MUST POINT OUT ATMOSPHERE OF BULL SESSION ONE IN WHICH ALL THREE PARTICIPANTS CONFIDENT THEY SPEAKING WITH FRIENDS WHO WOULD NOT RELAY STATEMENTS MADE.

SECRET Re Rpt That Castro Drop From Scene
BT Due Operation For Hernia

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 15 TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	RE	5	FI
2		6	TC
3	RI	7	CI
4	MD	8	CS

FROM Disem BY 2 W/ps-90-19

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME 1 1/2 DMI

INFO FILE, CSDO, VR, DDP, C/WH-Suspense, Addl, CA-2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O-3 — WH/C-8, SB-2, D/MS-2, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/D-4, FI/INT, IW, EUR-2, DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 062230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7328 6 JUL 66 IN 51413

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7711 (IN 43725) *

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 4 JULY 1966 HE HAD DISCUSSED CASTRO DISAPPEARANCE WITH MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS, COUNSELOR OF CUBAN EMBASSY, AND LATTER REPORTED CASTRO DROP FROM SCENE DUE OPERATION FOR DOUBLE HERNIA. LOZANO TOLD JURANDO HE LEARNED THIS FROM BRITISH CITIZEN WHO CAME OUT OF CUBA IN LAST FEW DAYS AFTER SPENDING THREE YEARS THERE ASSISTING AGRICULTURE PROGRAM. LOZANO REPORTED BRITISHER VERY CLOSE TO FIDEL.

2. JURADO ALSO TOLD ROWTON CASTRO HAD OVER EXERTED HIMSELF DURING RECENT GUATANAMO INCIDENT WHICH INDUCED HERNIA. JURADO ALSO OPINED CASTRO HAD SOMEHOW INCURRED SOVIET DISPLEASURE. ROWTON DID NOT QUESTION HIM ON WHERE HE GOT THIS IDEA BUT IT MAY ALSO HAVE COME FROM LOZANO.

S E C R E T *REF: RYBAT

BT

SECRET

Jam

LIRING-3

(5)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT DYVOUR/PBRUMEN/Dr. Armando SOTO Rodriguez-Report of Cuban Guerilla Training near Netzahualcoyotl Dam

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See para 3 & 4 of Reference

Reference : HMMW-14480, 5 April 1966

Hqs. notes that in Siempre of 22 June 1966 there appears an article on page IX of the supplemental section entitled "A Punto de Revelarse El Misterio de la Cultura Olmeca. Los Trabajos de Arqueologia en Malpaso by one Carlos NAVARRETE. The article may be of interest to the Station in connection with subject report. A person with the same name as the author of the Siempre article was reported by LICOOKY-1 in 1963 to be a Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico.

Andrew F. MERTON

Attachment:
HMMW-14480

Possible interest on
an LIRING.3

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City w/o att
1 - COS, Guatemala City w/att

7 July 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-14635

DATE
27 June 1966

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-120-13

RI
Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/J.Stewart/mvh		3654

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/CICS		
WH/C/FI		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1		R. J. Kaufman

53

DISPATCH

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

~~FROM~~ DISSEM BY 56/60

ACTION C/WH6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C5, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/DO4, C/DO/H3

S E C R E T 231953Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7711

23 J[illegible] 43725

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

ACTION

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 14107

1. STATION PLANNING PLACE LIRING-3 UNDER SURVEILLANCE AS SOON AS TEAM FREE. TIME SPENT BY ROWTON ON L-3 THUS FAR AT MINIMUM AND IT NOT BELIEVED IT WILL INVOLVE MAJOR EFFORT. AT SAME TIME, L-3 HAS ALMOST EMPLOYEE-LIKE ACCESS TO CONSULATE, KNOWS ALL STAFFERS THERE INCLUDING AMBASSADOR AND WITH WIFE ON SCENE BELIEVE HE AT LEAST PARTIAL PENETRATION OF LIRING ESTABLISHMENT.

2. ROWTON BELIEVES ACTUAL RECRUITMENT OF L-3 WILL EVOLVE IN RELATIVELY SHORT TIME, AND HE ALREADY MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION. ~~WITH~~ ~~RELATIVELY SHORT TIME, AND HE ALREADY MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION.~~ WITH REPLACEMENT OF ARNOL RODRIGUEZ, CLOSE FRIEND OF L-3, ROWTON HAS GOOD OPENING PULL L-3 UP SHORT BY STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF HAVING GOOD INFORMATION ON GOINGS-ON INSIDE SO THAT HE AND L-3 WILL KNOW QUOTE BUSINESS ATMOSPHERE UNQUOTE IN WHICH THEY OPERATING. SHORTLY ROWTON WILL FACE L-3 WITH BIG JUMP IN WHICH L-3 MUST DECIDE WHETHER HE WORKING FOR CUBANS OR FOR ROWTON. AS RELATIONS DEVELOP ROWTON WILL MENTION AMERICANS WITH WHOM HE DOES BUSINESS AND POSSIBILITY THAT AT TIMES BUSINESS MAY BE TO DETRIMENT OF CUBANS. ALSO PLAN SOON GIVE L-3 REQUIREMENTS OF DETAILED REPORTING ON PERSONNEL IN LIRING

201-778301

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 711 SECRET

INSTALLATION IN ORDER COMPROMISE L-3.

3. ALREADY HAVE COMPROMISING RECEIPTS SIGNED BY L-3 IN TRUE NAME AND BY GRADUALLY APPLYING PRESSURE EXPECT HIM WAKE UP ONE DAY TO FACT HE HAS BEEN IN CLANDESTINE BUSINESS WITH ROWTON FOR SOME TIME. HE HAS NOT YET ASKED FIRST QUESTIONS RE ROWTON'S BONA FIDES AND ROWTON PLAYING BIG BUSINESS ACT SO CLOSELY TO INTEL COLLECTION L-3 MAY TAKE RECRUITMENT TO WITTING BASIS IN STRIDE.

4. L-3 ALREADY DISCUSSING NEXT TRIP IN FOR ROWTON BUT COMMENTED 26 JULY NOT GOOD TIME BECAUSE OF FIESTA ATMOSPHERE. SUGGESTED TO ROWTON HE GO IN AFTER CELEBRATION WHEN MINISTRIES BACK TO NORMAL.

5. REMOVAL OF ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS FROM POSITION AS VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS SOMEWHAT DISCONCERTING HOWEVER DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL AFFECT TDY VISIT OF ARNOL BROTHER ALDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ON INSPECTION TRIP TO CONSULATE HERE. IF ALDO COMES L-3 WILL BE IN GOOD POSITION CONTACT HIM AND EFFORTS BEING MADE THROUGH L-3 TO PROVIDE ALDO WITH QUOTE PREPARED UNQUOTE APARTMENT IN WHICH TO LIVE DURING STAY HERE.

SECRET

BT

*the importance of penetrating clandestine Activities of— CUIS.

NNNN

SECRET

22 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. Lally

SUBJECT: LIRING-3
201-798301

There were no RI traces on Subject. A Provisional Operational Approval is requested.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ORIG: J. [illegible]/
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: 3654
DATE: 20 JUNE 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY 48 PER #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, DC/WH/C 5, C/SOD 3, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 21 20 36Z CITE DIRECTOR 14107

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 7613 (IN 37364)*

1. VIEW IMPORTANCE PENETRATING CLANDESTINE Activities of [illegible] CUBANS IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE, HQS WELCOMES ANY LEADS INTO TRICON ARMS SUPPLY TO LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES. DIFFICULT TO COMMENT AT THIS TIME ON HOW FAR TO GO ON LEADS AS THEY UNCOVERED, AS DECISIONS WILL [illegible] HAVE TO BE MADE ON CASE BY CASE BASIS. WOULD NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED TIME-CONSUMING ARMS SMUGGLING OP UNLESS LIRING-3 RECRUITED AND CONTROLLED AND INFO FROM HIM PROVES RELIABLE. VIEW L-3 BACKGROUND AND PERFORMANCE AS NOTED TO DATE, CONSIDER IT NOT OUT OF REALM POSSIBILITY HE CLOSER TO CUBANS THAN APPARENT. MIGHT BE WORTH WHILE PUT COMPLETE SURVEILLANCE/COVERAGE ON HIM FOR 10-DAY PERIOD TO SEE IF PATTERN DEVELOPS OR INTERCEPTS OF INTEREST OBTAINED. WOULD WELCOME STATION COMMENT ON AMOUNT TIME ROWTON THINKS REQUIRED THIS OP SINCE DO NOT DESIRE THIS OP BE TO EXCLUSION OF TARGETING HIM AGAINST ON-ISLAND

CONTINUED.../

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET PAGE 2

CITE DIRECTOR 14107

TO

REPORTING SOURCES OR LOCAL LIRING PENETRATIONS. ALSO REQUEST COMMENT ON POSSIBILITY RECRUITING L-3 ON WITTING BASIS.

2. RE POSSIBLE SALVADORAN CONTACTS MEXI, HQS FILES REFLECT THAT AMMUG-1 WAS TO HAVE MET WITH FOLL SALVADORANS DURING VISIT MEXI MAR 64: A. JORGE ARIAS GOMEZ. B. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA. C. ALEJANDRO MONTANA GOMEZ. D. RAUL CASTELLANOS. NOTE ARIAS IDENTIFIED AS SERGIO PEREZ, HEAD SALVADORAN DELEGATION TRICON CONFERENCE JAN 66. ALSO NOTE THAT MAURICIO DE LA SELVA VENEGAS REPORTED 64 BY AMMUG-1 AS SALV CP LINK IN MEXI WITH CUBS THERE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref furnishes possible lead to Central American group authorized by TRICON committee to purchase arms and supply to LA revolutionaries.

WH/C/CICS [illegible] (DRAFT)
WH/C/FI [illegible] (DRAFT)

Thomas Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 17 June 1966 crm

TO: WH/1 - J. Zerance

C NO. 201 - 798301

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: LIRING/3

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
XX	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

No Ri traces

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

~~FROM~~
DISSEM BY 25/M

ACTION C/WH-6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR DC/WH/C 5, C/SOD 3, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT

S E PMR E T 141800Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7613 14 Jun 66 37364

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK DYVOUR LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7558 (IN 33490)*

ACTION

1. AT LUNCH 13 JUN 66, CARLOS JURADO DELMAR TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT FOR THEIR BUSINESS PURPOSES HE PLANNING CULTIVATE CONTACTS HE HAS IN MEXICO WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN GROUP AUTHORIZED BY TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE PURCHASE ARMS AND SUPPLY TO LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES.

How know?

2. IN RESPONSE ROWTON QUERIES JURADO SAID HE ALMOST CERTAIN ONE OF GROUP IS SALVADORAN HE MET IN HAVANA DURING REVOLUTION. JURADO SAID THIS PERSON VISITS MEXICO MORE OR LESS REGULARLY AND HE AND JURADO HAVE MUTUAL FRIENDS HERE. JURADO INDICATED HE HOPED MAKE CONTACT WITH THIS GROUP WITHIN NEXT 60 DAYS. BECAUSE OF PRESENT JURADO - ROWTON RELATIONSHIP ROWTON DID NOT ASK FOR NAME OF SALVADORAN AT THIS MEETING BUT IS CERTAIN CAN OBTAIN IT SHORTLY.

Can we help?

3. IN PASSING, JURADO MENTIONED ANTONIO DEL CONDE PONTONES (201-728065) WHO HELPED SUPPLY FIDEL WITH GRANMA AND ARMS. COMMENTED DEL CONDE PROBABLY NOT BEING USED BY TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE BECAUSE

SECR

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7613 S E C R E T

HIS WIFE HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY CUBANS WHILE IN ACT SMUGGLING LARGE QUANTITY OF DOLLARS OUT OF CUBA.

4. CONSIDER IT HIGHLY POSSIBLE JURADO WILL TURN UP LEAD TO ARMS-BUYING GROUP LEADING TO THEIR IDENTIFICATION AND OPERATIONG METHODS, HOWEVER, WOULD APPRECIATE HQS COMMENTS THIS ASPECT AND GUIDANCE ON HOW FAR CAN PLAY THIS GAME. ARMS SMUGGLING SO TENUOUS AND INVOLVED THAT ROWTON OPERATIONG THROUGH JURADO SHOULD BE ABLE DEVELOP LOGICAL SOUNDING, EVEN TO JURADO, SUPPLY STORY WHICH COULD BE MADE TO FALL THROUGH ANY TIME KUBARK DESIRED PULL PLUG.

5. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET *RE FURTHER DEBRIEFING CARLOS JURADO

BT

[illegible]

8 June 1966

EXCERPT FROM HMMA 29157

Para 32: "ROWTON is off and running on his development of LIRINGs 3 and 4. He is doing this under false flag as a Greek businessman. Again, the ubiquitous LITAINT-2 is in a position to monitor this operation as he is close to both LIRINGS and has no connection with ROWTON. On 27 May LIRING-3, who is well connected in PBRUMEN, flew to PBRUMEN on a trip to scout out business opportunities for ROWTON. LIRING-4 continues to work at LIRING."

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

dissem by 23

ACTION c/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C5, c/CI, c/SB5, c/FI, c/FI/D4, c/FI/INT, c/CA2

S E C R E T 081720Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7558

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

8 JUN 65 IN 33490

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7549 (IN 32832)

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING OF CARLOS JURADO DELMAR BY WALLACE ROWTON PRODUCED THE FOLLOWING REGARDING JURADO TRIP CUBA 27 MAY 5 JUNE 66:

2. MILITIA FORCE WHICH CAPTURED LANDING PARTY IN LAUNCH RECENTLY WAS LEAD BY CUBAN MINISTER OF EDUCATION. JURADO STATED CUBA LITERALLY BRISTLING WITH VERY LATEST WEAPONS INCLUDING MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS. IN RESPONSE TO ROWTON QUERY JURADO STATED HE ASSUMED SOVIETS CONTROLLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT THAT CUBANS NOW WELL TRAINED TO USE THEM IF NECESSARY.

3. JURADO STATED EVERY CUBAN HE TALKED TO WAS SINCERELY CONVINCED INVASION IMMINENT AND THAT ONLY ALERTNESS OF MILITIA HAD PREVENTED A SUCCESSFUL LANDING. JURADO ENTERED MOVIE ONE DAY DURING WEEK SAW ONLY THREE SPECTATORS AND LEFT IN EMBARRASSMENT. SUBJ SAID IT OPINION IN CUBA THAT ABORTIVE INVASION HAD SOME DIRECT CONNECTION WITH ELECTIONS IN SANTO DOMINGO. HE ADDED HE WAS TOLD STATE OF WAR MOBILIZATION IN CUBA WOULD LAST ABOUT MONTH.

SECRET

To repts - Brown

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7558 S E C R E T SECRET

4. DUE NATURE ROWTON CONTROL OVER JURADO AND PARTICULAR MANEUVER BY WHICH ROWTON INDUCED SUBJ MAKE TRIP IT NOT POSSIBLE ESTABLISH GOOD SOURCING FOR ABOVE STATEMENT. JURADO SAW ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, THREE TIMES AND ONE OF THESE IN RODRIGUEZ' HOME WHERE PAIR SAT UP TALKING UNTIL 0330.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ZURATO-Delmar, Carl   201-798301

6 June 1966   [illegible] Jane Zarenne x3556

THERE IS A RESTR[illegible]DA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT
OF THIS 201

FORM 11-63 44a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS   **ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)**

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/C[illegible] THE SUBJECT
OF THIS 201

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 79 83 01

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.   SECRET   (7-48)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 15 TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 25/M

ACTION
C/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR C/CI, C/FI 2, DC/WH/C 5,

S E C R E T 072305Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7549

7 Jun 66 IN 32832

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 7537 (IN 32041)*

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR REPORTED FOLLOWING TO WALLACE B ROWTOONN 6 JUNE 66 WHICH CARLOS HAD OBTAINED 27 MAY - 3 JUNE IN HAVANA FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS:

2. A. ALDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS,, BROTHER OF ARNOL, WILL SOON COME TO MEXICO CITY TO INVESTIGATE AFFAIRS AT CUBAN EMBASSY. ALDO RODRIGUEZ IS WATCHLIST 65 NO. 534. FORMERLY WAS CUBAN DIP ASSIGNED MONTEVIDEO. NOW WORKING FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVANA.

B. CUBAN MOBILIZATION HAS COST GOVT 25 MILLION PESOS UP TO LAST WEEK.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

* RE RETURN OF CARLOS JURADO DELMAR

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 40/57

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION C/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/CS, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 070145Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7537

7 JUN 66 IN 32041

ACTION

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PERUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7454 (IN 24660)

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR RETURNED MEXICO CITY 3 JUN FROM TRIP TO HAVANA SPONSORED BY WALLACE B. ROWTON. DID LITTLE PROMOTE ROWTON BUSINESS DEALS EXCEPT RECEMENT RELATIONS WITH ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS WHO ASKED JURADO SEND HIM SOME SPARK PLUGS FOR CAR.

2. JURADO SAID ATMOSPHERE EXTREMELY TENSE IN HAVANA BUT PEOPLE DO NOT BELIEVE SOLDIERS PENETRATED GUANTANAMO, WHERE SHOT AND THEN MANAGED TO GET OUT. PEOPLE GENERALLY BELIEVE THIS CUBAN PROVOCATION TO COVER SORRY EXONOMIC PLIGHT OF COUNTRY AND BOLSTER SAGGING MORALE.

3. SUBJ REPORTS CUBA CALLING ON OTHER COUNTRIES FOR VOLUNTEERS AUGMENT ARMED FORCES AND MIRIAM CHICHAY TOLD ROWTON CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO JOAQUIN ARMAS HAD ATTENDED MEETING OF OFFICIALS IN HAVANA AT WHICH CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS WAS DISCUSSED.

4. FURTHER DEBRIEFING BY ROWTON IN PROGRESS. JURADO STILL ASKING NO PRYING QUESTIONS OF ROWTON AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED IF JURADO HAD BLOWN ROWTON TO CUBANS. CHICHAY TOLD LITAINT-2 LAST WEEK JURADO IN HAVANA, NO OTHER DETAILS. LITAINT-2 TOLD STATION C/O HE THOUGHT JURADO ON CULTURAL MISSION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Probably dismissed Barbara Brown. WH/Cu/RR

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

SECRET

ORIG: Robert O. Bussey:hl
UNIT: C/TSD/OA
EXT: 2603
DATE: 31 May 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1 5
2 6
3 7
4 8

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TSD-6 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: VR , FILE , WH-8, WH/C-8, FI, NE-6, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 31 20 30Z CITE DIRECTOR 00639

TO MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING TECHS

LIRING 3

RE: MEXICO CITY 7454 (IN ~~XX~~ 24660)

1. KURIOT CAN SUPPLY REQUESTED DOCUMENTS BUT SINCE HAVE LIMITED SUPPLY BLANK ORIGINAL GREEK PASSPORTS, PROPOSE FOLLOWING: ISSUE AS MAIN IDENTITY DOCUMENT REPRODUCED GREEK INTERNATIONAL DRIVER'S LICENSE FROM ATHENS. SUPPORT THIS WITH NEW YORK DRIVER'S LICENSE, POSSIBLY MEXICAN TOURIST CARD AND GREEK POCKET LITTER. ADVISE.

2. FOR PASSPORT OR LICENSE NEED FOLLOWING: FULL NAME, INCLUDING MATRONYMIC, PARENTS' FIRST NAMES, PROFESSION, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, DISTINGUISHING MARKS, COLOR EYES AND HAIR, FULL FACE AND THREE QUARTER PROFILE WITH RIGHT EAR PHOTO NEGATIVES AND SIX SPECIMEN SIGNATURES, HEIGHT, WEIGHT, MARITAL STATUS.

MEXI 286.3B

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	
2	
3	7
4	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 03639

TO

3. KURIOT CAN ARBITRARILY SELECT DATA WHICH CANNOT BE FURNISHED.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD Comment: Requested information whether TSD can supply Greek passport, New York driver's license and pocket litter for flash identification in Mexico.

Telecoordination: WH/1 - Jack Stewart (x3655)
NE/Greece - Pete Dodge (x6808)
WH/1 - Joseph H. Fisher (x2861)

RICHARD A. KRUEGER
ADC/TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

ROBERT O. BUSSEY
C/TSD/OA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK Nº 167696

DATE 27 May 66

TO ~~CHIEF,~~ FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME Jane F. Zerance

OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/1

ROOM BUILDING 332 Ames Center

EXTENSION 3656

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)

☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED

☐ ADDITIONAL DATA

☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)

☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY

☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)

Carlos JURADO-Delmar 201-788301C/66

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

1930 in Mexico City

4. CITIZENSHIP

Mexican

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Artist

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

Studied anthropology and archeology at the National University

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Resided Cuba a considerable length of time		

JUN 2 31 PM '66

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

Miriam Chichay de JURADO (Chichay is Cuban attempt at transliteration of Peach Blossom which is her Chinese maiden name)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

JUN 3 21 PM '66

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

MORE BIO DATA AND PERTINENT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

14 June 1956
DATE

TO: Jane F. Zeranze

FROM: 64 FI/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO ~~PERTINENT~~ INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 27 May 1966

TO:
- ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Jane Zerance
WH/1
332 Ames Center
x3656

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Carlos JURADO-Delmar

PROJECT: LIRING

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LIRING-3

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-798301

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE: Contact, assessment and use in an unwitting capacity~~y~~ to furnish information on Cuban economic & military targets, on activities in general in the Cuban Emb and Consulate in MexCity, and to spot persons of possible interest for Cuban ops. Of course, should development results warrant, consideration will be given to seeking operational approval for his use in a witting capacity against the same targets, especially thru his wife, LIRING-4, an employee of Cuban Consulate in Mexico City.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☒	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 167696

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☒	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☒	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☒	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER Jane F. Zerance	EXTENSION 3656	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 1-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Carlos JURADO-Delmar

DPOB: 1930 in Mexico City

CITIZENSHIP: Mexican

OCCUPATION: Artist

SCHOOLING: Studied anthropology and archeology at the National University in Mexico

RESIDENCE: Resided in Cuba for a considerable length of time.

MARITAL STATUS: Miriam CHICHAY de JURADO (Chichay is a Cuban attempt at transliteration of Peach Blossom which is her Chinese name.)

DEROGATORY TRACES

STATION

Subject was a member of the PPS in July 1961

Member of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Latin American Congress, Artists and Writers, Havana in January 1962.

LITAINT-2 reports that JURADO has many Communist friends in Mexico. He spent time in Cuba and may have served in the Cuban military service or militia.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-798301
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. Gfrance

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM Dissem BY 24

ACTION C/WH-6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C-5, C/CI, C/FI-2

MEXI
S E C R E T 270105Z CITE MEXICONCITY 7457 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7454 (IN 24660)

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	WH/1
ABSTRACT		INDEX

26 MAY 66 IN 25489

1. LIRING-3 PURCHANSED CUBANA TICKET FOR CUBA 26 MAY, WITH MONEY PROVIDED BY ROWTON. WILL DEPART 27 MAY. SIGNED TRUE NAME RECEIPT FOR FUNDS. PLANS STAY WEEK. HAS CONTACTED FRIENDS AMONG CUBAN ARTISTS WITH WHOM WILL LIVE WHILE ON ISLAND.

2. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE MET ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS IN 1960 WHILE LIRING-3 EMPLOYED WITH CUBAN MINISTRY EDUCATION. ACTUALLY WIFE RODRIGUEZ WORKED UNDER LIRING-3 AND FRIENDLY ASSOCIATION BEGAN THROUGH WIFE. RODRIGUEZ THEN WORKING FOR MINISTRY LABOR.

3. QUICK ACTION ON LIRING-3 VISA BROUGHT QUERIES FROM CUBAN CONSUL MEXICO CITY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON AS TO WHOM LIRING-3 KNEW IN CUBA. CURBELO SAID EVEN FOR CUBANS IT TAKES WEEK. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE ANSWERED ONLY THAT HE HAD FRIENDS CUBA. ROWTON GAVE LIRING-3 MONEY WITH WHICH HE BUYING GIFTS MEXICO FOR RODRIGUEZ AND FAMILY.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

note RI cm Jane

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 13

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 25/3

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD 6, NE 6, DO 4, DO/H 3,

ACTION

26 May 66 IN 24660

24660

S E C R E T 260005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7454 EASBY ACTING

DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 27441

[illegible]

1. LIRING-3 INFORMED ROWTON 25 MAY HE OBTAINED ONE-DAY VISA SERVICE 24 MAY. MEETING HELD 1300 HOURS 25 MAY PRIOR ARRIVAL REF. LIRING-3 SHOWED APPARENT DISAPPOINTMENT IN ROWTON NOT BEING ABLE CONFIRM TRIP. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH LIRING-3 26 MAY LUNCH AT WHICH WILL GIVE SUBJ GO SIGN.

2. QUICK SERVCE ON VISA APPEARS CONFIRM LIRING-3 BOAST HE CONFIDANT OF RODRIGUEZ. ROWTON HAS IMPRESSED ON LIRING-3 THAT HE ROWTON'S AGENT AND MIDDLE MAN IN THIS TRANSACTION AND MUST NOT REVEAL ROWTON. IF ROWTON REVEALED THEN CUBANS WOULD WANT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH ROWTON CUTTING OUT LIRING-3. LIRING-3 STATES HE UNDERSTANDS THIS CLEARLY. LIRING-3 ASSURES ROWTON HE NEED NOT INFORM CUBANS ANYTHING OF ARRANGEMENT SINCE THEY TRUST HIM.

3. CAN HQS SUPPLY ROWTON WITH GREEK PASSPORT NEW YORK DRIVERS LICENSE AND ANY OTHER LOGICAL POCKET LITTER INDICATING GREEK NATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. MATERIAL WOULD NOT BE USED FOR TRAVEL, BUT AS OP DEVELOPS MY BE HANDY FLASH GREEK

SECRET

[illegible] - 6P08

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 7454 SECRET

PASSPORT AS MEANS IDENTIFICATION.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

1

8

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: JSTEWART
UNIT: WH/1,
EXT: 3654
DATE: 25 May 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28/3 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA C/ICZ, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 25 21 26Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 07441

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 7422 (IN 23654)*

B. MEXICO CITY 7234 (IN 10462)**

CONCUR REF TRIP. EVEN IF TRIP NON-PRODUCTIVE, OP STILL MIGHT DEVELOP INTO LIRING PENETRATION VIA LIRING-4. IN THIS REGARD, STATUS OF LIRING-4 FATHER, WHO PRESUMABLY CHINESE, PER PARA 4 REF B, IN PBRIME OF INTEREST IN VIEW STRINGENT ENTRY REQUIREMENTS AND BELIEVE ROWTON MIGHT PROFITABLY ATTEMPT ELICIT INFO THIS ASPECT CASE DURING L-3 DEVELOPMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * L-3/Rowton meeting re L-3 trip to Cuba.
** Rowton contact and assessment of L-3 and L-4. Requested POA on both.

WH/C/FI/TC

Thomas Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
Chief, WH Division

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM DISSEM by 23/3

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2,

S E C R E T 242240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7433 24 [illegible] 23008

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO 7422 (IN 36521)

FULL NAME SUBJ REF IS CARLOS JURADO DELMAR.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

Liring-3

LIRING-3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION DC/WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY
WH	1840Z	C

INFO

FILE VR, C/WH/C 6, C/CI, C/FI-2, CS/DO, CS/D0

S E C R E T 241655Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7422

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

24 [illegible] 23654

REF: MEXICO 7234 (IN [illegible])

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAD LUNCHEON MEETING LIRING-3 22 MAY WITH RESULT THAT LIRING-3 ENTHUSIASTICALLY URGING ROWTON LET HIM MAKE TRIP CUBA LEARN WHAT ITEMS CUBANS WANT BUY FROM WESTERN FIRMS.

2. LIRING-3 BELIEVES HE DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL GREEK BUSINESSMAN WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS WHO WANTS ECONOMIC RESEARCH DONE ON CUBA FOR UNNAMED CLIENTS WISHING SELL TO CUBA. LIRING-3 SAID HE HAD MANY HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS INSIDE CUBA DEVELOPED BEFORE CASTRO TAKE-OVER.

3. BEST LIRING-3 FRIEND IS (FNU) RODRIGUEZ WHO HIGH IN MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHO MIGHT BE ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. WILL CHECK TO BE CERTAIN. LIRING-3 ALSO CLAIMS PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH RAUL ROA KURI AND EVEN FIDEL CASTRO.

4. LIRING-3 KNOWS ROWTON ONLY AS NICOLAS HARRIS. HAS ASKED NO QUESTIONS TO BETTER ESTABLISH ROWTON BONA FIDES. APPARENTLY ACCEPTS HIM WITHOUT QUESTION. DUE LIRING-3 CLOSE

SECRET

SECRET

CONTACTS WITH HIGH OFFICIALS ROWTON TOLD HIM FIRST THING HE SHOULD DO IS FIND OUT WHAT THESE OFFICIALS PERSONALLY NEED ON OUTSIDE. LIRING-3 ACKNOWLEDGED THIS PROBABLY SMART MOVE AS HE HAD BECOME SOMEWHAT DISILLUSIONED SEEING HIGH OFFICIALS BUYING ALL TYPES WESTERN CONVENIENCES AND PRODUCTS FOR SELVES.

5. LIRING-3 HAS BEEN OFFICIALY INVITED TO 26 JULY CELEBRATION. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 HE APPEARED BE GOOD CANDIDATE FOR ROWTON NEEDS SINCE HE PLACED PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE AND CONFIDENCE IN THESE MATTERS ABOVE PRACTICAL OR THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE OF ECONOMICS. SUBJ COMMENTED CUBANS HAD LEARNED THEY COULD NOT BUY ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES DIRECTLY AND OPENLY ON WORLD MARKET HENCE WOULD WELCOME LIRING-3 ROLE AS INTERMEDIARY WHOM THEY COULD TRUST. ROWTON HINTED HE HAD CONTACTS IN MUNITIONS TRADE IN ITALY AND GREECE AND WOULD BE INTERESTED CUBAN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. LIRING-3 SAID HE COULD HANDLE THIS ALSO THROUGH RODRIGUEZ WITH THE CUBAN GENERAL STAFF.

6. AT END OF LUNCH LIRING-3 ASSURED ROWTON HE COULD VISIT CUBA FOR 10 DAYS OSTENSIBLY TO SEE WIFE'S FAMILY. HE ALSO ASSURED ROWTON HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO EXPLAIN TO ANYONE HIS RELATIONS WITH ROWTON. NEXT MEETING SET FOR 25 MAY.

SECRET

SECRET

7. ROWTON OBTAINED INFORMATION SUBJECT BORN MEXI CITY 1930, STUDIED ANTHROPOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGY AT NATIONAL UNIVERSITY AND LIVED CUBA CONSIDERABLE LENGTH OF TIME. MARRIED WIFE THERE SIX YEARS AGO.

8. REQUEST AUTHORITY PERMIT ROWTON SEND LIRING-3 CUBA ON EXPLORATORY TRIP WHICH WILL ALLOW LIRING-3 RECONTACT OLD FRIENDS LEARN WHAT ITEMS ARE CRITICAL AND WILL BE FIRST STEP INVOLVING LIRING-3 IN CLANDESTINE OPERATION ~~WITH ROWTON~~. IF, DESPITE HIS ASSURANCES THAT HE WILL NOT REVEAL NICK HARRIS TO CUBANS, HE IS INDUCED GIVE NAME HIS CONTACT IN MEXICO CITY NOTHING IS LOST AS IT THUS FAR ALL IN NAME OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. IF TRIP MADE NOW IT COINCIDES WITH LIRING-3 SPRING VACATION FROM HIS ART TEACHING CLASSES.

9. RECOGNIZE THIS QUICK JUMP INTO OPERATION WITHOUT FULL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJ BUT BELIEVE IT GOOD OPPORTUNITY TIE LIRING-3 TO ROWTON IN WAY WILL LATER REVEAL ITSELF TO BE COMPROMISING. DO NOT BELIEVE LIRING-3 NEEDS BE FULLY CLEARED WITTING AND RECRUITED FOR THIS OPERATION.

10. REQUEST PRIORITY REPLY.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

EXERPT FROM HMMA-28909, 12 May 1966

Para 29: "ROWTON; posing asd Greek, made rapid progress in developing the husband of a girl now working at the PERUVIAN Cfonsulate by expressing interest in the young man's professional work. The Subjects are LIRING-3 and LIRING-4."

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO	DCWH/C	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City	MICROFILM
SUBJECT	PBRUMEN/OPERATIONAL/Carlos JURADO and Miriam CHICHAY	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : MEXI 7234

1. As indicated in Reference, attached are the contact reports of Wallace B. ROWTON resulting from his recent meetings with Subject individuals.

2. Similar contact reports will continue to be forwarded to Headquarters as this operation develops.

Frank C. Medbery

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact report a/s h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att
1 - DCWH/C w/o att
4 - FILES

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

1cc w/o att to WH/C/ES

CS COPY

201-798301

~~50-120-13~~

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28875	11 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER FFN # 12,328

GROUP 1
[illegible]

2 May, 1966

Subject: Wallace B Rowton Contact with Carlos Jurado.

1. At about 1830 on 2 May, 1966, Rowton dropped into the Salon de La Plastica Mexicana in the hope of running into Subject so that he could renew contact more or less casually.

2. Fortunately as soon as he stepped into the door he found Subject engaged in conversation with the receptionist and another person (probably a Mexican employe of the Salon). When Subject spotted Rowton he broke off his conversation and moved away to greet Rowton cordially. He said that he had himself just arrived at the Salon and was very happy to run into Rowton again. After a few briff remarks, he invited Rowton to coffee in a nearby cafe. Rowton accepted and they both left the Salon without further delay.

3. Rowton remained with Subject in conversation over coffee for about 45 minutes. Subject expressed gratification in having met Rowton and several times reassured Rowton that he enjoyed conversing with him regardless of whether he made an sale of his painting or not. Rowton reverted to the theme that he had a genuine interest in Subject's future and hoped in some way to provide Subject with the means of becoming relatively independent so that he could travel and carry on his art work freely. Rowton added that he had given much thought to the idea of using Subject to help him in his economic research, since this would justify Rowton's putting Subject on his expense account. He then questioned Subject on his possible connections in Mexico, but Subject confessed that he had only limited contacts that probably would not be useful to Rowton. Rowton then moved into the target question. He stated that most of his clients in England, France and Greece were interested in Cuban requirements and perhaps Subject was in a unique position to prepare a report on what the Cuban economy required at the moment. Subject responded without hestitation that he could do something on Cuba without too much difficulty. He explained that he knew official Cubans in Mexico City, including those in the Commercial Mission, and could travel into Cuba if necessary.

4. Rowton then stressed that he really did not need too many statistics on the Cuban economy nor contact with the Cubans but wanted somehow to justify helping Subject financially. He explained that he could easily assemble some data himself, but wanted Subject to do something concrete so that he would remain in the picture and Rowton could consider him in

201-798301

Att #1 to HMMA-28875

RS COPY

a sort of stringer in reporting on economic developments. Subject replied that he understood and did not see that such a task would be too difficult.

5. Rowton then asked Subject how he was coming in locating a new aprtment/studio. Subject replied that he had found a desirable place near Chapultepec, and hoped to be able to move soon. Rowton then commented that he might have to leave for Paris in the next few days and would be away for about two weeks on business. He stated that he might be able to help Subject with the rent on his studio provided it had a phone. Rowton explained that he was at present paying 350 pesos monthly for secretarial service and could just as well pay Subject something for taking telephone messages. Subject replied that he would be glad to be of service to Rowton without compensation ("mi casa es suya")in such a matter.

6. Rowton then turned the conversation to Subject's wife and family. Subject revealed that his wife's maiden name (apellido) was the Chinese translation of "Flor de Durazno". He pronounced it in Chinese for Rowton but Rowton made no attempt to transliterate it and at this point cannot recall the phonetic pronunciation. Subject added that Chi-chay is a Cuban corruption of the Chinese given name. In reply to Rowton's direct query, Subject stated that his wife's ~~father~~ mother is in Cuba but her father is in New York. He added that her father did not agree with the revolution and left but the rest of the family remained. He also stated that her mother has not remarried and lives with her brothers and sisters. Subject added that his wife felt no bitterness toward her father and in fact the father writes regularly - once a week from New York. Rowton did not press for an address at the time, feeling that it would be more discreet to wait for an opening at a subsequent meeting(when he could allege that he was planning to stop over in New York).

7. Rowton took the occasion of his alleged impending departure to ask for Subject's home address so that he could write from Europe. Subject stated that since he might move it would be better for Rowton to write to him care of the Salon rather than to his present address.

8. On leaving Subject Rowton promised to pass by the Salon again before he left so that he could say goodbye to Subject.

Wallace B Rowton

2 May, 1966

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Contact with Carlos Jurado.

1. When Rowton arrived at the entrance to the Bellas Artes Building at 1100 on 30 April, as planned, he found Subject waiting on the steps. Subject greeted Rowton cordially and suggested that they take a taxi since the Ministry of Education building was a little too far to walk to. He then hailed a taxi and instructed the driver to take them to the Secretaria de Education Publica on Calle Argentina.

2. On arrival he escorted Rowton through the court-yard of the building and explained the murals of Diego Rivera. He commented that he felt the murals were superior to those at the Prado Hotel and Cuernavaca since they had more "social meaning". He stressed the hardship under which Rivera had worked, which included some physical danger from certain elements opposed to his socialist ideas. Rowton picked up this theme in relationship to Subject's own situation in an attempt to elicit as much information as possible concerning Subject's financialstatus and position vis-a-vis the Mexican government.

3. In the course of conversation Subject stated that he had received relatively little understanding and sympathy from the government officials as a whole but did receive some support from the Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes. He explained that he was able to earn enough money from teaching assignments to be relatively independent, and not depend on sales of his picutres to make a living. In reply to Rowton's comment to the effect that perhaps his wife could find some employment to help Subject, the latter replied that his wife could not work because of her status. He quickly added that he probably would not find it difficult to procure working papers for her, but he preferred not to do so at least at the present time.

4. After completing his tour of the Secretariat of Education Building, Subject invited Rowton to view the murals of the Supreme Court Building on Piño Suarez, which he described as superior even to those of Diego Rivera, especially because of their open defiance of official opinion. On the way Rowton continued to put discreet questions concerning Subject's personal life. Subject replied by revealing that

he lived with his wife and three-year-old child in a very small apartment near San Angel and shared a studio with another artist. He added that he was paying 650 pesos monthly rent which he considered very high for what he was getting. He also complained that the artist with whom he was sharing the studio was a dilettante who was more interested in the atmosphere of the Latin Quarter than in art for its own sake. He said he found it difficult to paint with guitars playing and cocktail glasses clinking in the background. Subject then stated that he was looking for a more suitable arrangement, perhaps in a condominio and preferably in the Tacubaya area.

5. In connection with his own future hopes, Subject stated that he wanted very much to travel to gain as much experience as possible so that his style could be crystalized. He commented that he could move easily to Cuba since his wife's family lived there and he could get along with the Cuban authorities, but he felt Mexico was better for him at the moment. He expressed preference for Sweden, North Africa and Greece. In reply to Rowton's queries, he stated that he did not feel that his daughter would present a problem, since he could leave her in the care of his or his wife's relatives. He added that she was currently attending a Jardin de Niños in the mornings and doing very well despite her tender age.

6. Subject commented also that he likedtravel so much that he had joined the Mexican Navy to see the world. He added that he had been able to visit almost all the ports of the east and west coasts of North and Central America but had not succeeded in seeing Europe as he had hoped. Since Rowton was posing as a Greek, Subject expressed great interest in visiting Athens and the Middle East, and at one point asked Rowton how much money he would need to live in Athens for a month as a tourist. Subject also stated that both he and his wife were anxious to learn English and French so that they could absorb as much local culture as possible in their travels.

7. After inviting Rowton to coffee at a nearby restaurant, Subject stated that he had to meet his wife and some friend's for lunch and left Rowton at about 1335 in front of the Cathedral. He promised to telephone Rowton again so that they could get together before Rowton left the country.

Wallace B Rowton

27 April, 1966

Subject: Wallace B Rowton Contact with Mr. and Mrs.
Carlos Jurado. (from LITAMIL-1)

1. Following a Station lead to the effect that Mrs. Chichay Jurado, who is employed by the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, is the daughter of a Cuban residing in New York City, Rowton visited the Salon de la Plastica Mexicana, Calle Havre 7, where Carlos Jurado's paintings were on exhibit. After several unsuccessful attempts to meet Jurado by chance at the salon, Rowton left his alias and telephone answering service number with the receptionist on 14 April, 1966, and asked that Jurado contact him for a meeting. On 18 April Rowton again visited the salon (having received no message through the answering service) and fortunately met Jurado who had dropped in to pick up messages from the receptionist.

2. Rowton explained that he was interested in Jurado's style, particularly for a mural that might go well in a New York night club owned by a friend of his. Jurado was, of course, immediately interested and commented that he was most anxious to visit New York to see the Museums. In answer to Rowton's query, he stated that he did not have any relatives in New York and had never been outside Mexico. Rowton invited Jurado and his wife to dinner the following evening so that they could discuss the proposed mural. (Rowton planned, if pressed, to use the "La Chansonette" night-club restaurant owned by his ~~frien~~ Greek friend Rita Dimitri as the prospective client).

3. On 19 April at 1930 Rowton met Jurado at the Salon as planned. Fortunately Jurado had brought his wife Chichay along as Rowton had suggested. Rowton invited them to dinner at the Restaurante &

"El 77" at Calle Londres 77. Neither had eaten there previously and appeared delighted at the opportunity to enjoy a good dinner.

4. In the course of conversation, Jurado stated that his wife Chichay was born in Cuba and that they had a three-year old daughter. Niether he nor Chichay made any referance to her employment at the Consulate and Rowton did not feel it wise to press too hard on that subject. Rowton again asked whether Jurado had any relatives in New York in the event it might be advisable for him to travel there in connection with the mural, but neither he nor his wife responded in the affirmative.

5. Later in the evening, Jurado and his wife strolled along ~~Ntuz~~ Calle Niza and Reforma to the Hotel Hilton with Rowton. This gave Rowton an opportunity to sound them out on politics with specific reference to Cuba. Rowton pretended to be of Greek-Irish parentage and more or less neutral in his own political views with respect to Cuba. Chichay Jurado stated that she felt Cuba was doing well and that the relovution was the only answer to the corruption that had existed previously. Carlos Jurado agreed, commenting that the "Northamerican" position with regard to Cuba was unfortunately erroneous and short-sighted. Rowton placed much of the blame on the former Batista regime but lamented the fact that in the meantime the Cuban people ware suffering from the mistakes of the politicians.

6. While walking along Reforma, Carlos Jurado commented that his wife's father was Chinese but did not indicate where he was then residing. Chichay Jurado stated that she had learned some Cantonese as a child, but did not consider herself proficient in Chinese.

7. Before leaving him for the evening, Carlos Jurado invited Rowton to visit some of the better murals in Mexico City on Saturday, 23 April, and promisedd to telephone Rowton to set the time and

place of the meeting. He informed Rowton that he himself could be contacted on 48 22 66, a telephone that was located near his studio in the Colonia Florida. He asked Rowton to obtain as soon as possible the measurements of the proposed mural and x photographs of of the owner so that he could make a sample painting.

Wallace B Rowton

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
X...XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

9 MAY 66 20 26 z

W.F. Frederick

ORIG : W.F.Frederick
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 6 May 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY , C/CA , WH/C8

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 02820

REF: MEXI 7234 (IN 10462)*

1. NO TRACES HQS ON SUBJS REF. PLS CABLE BIO DATA SO THAT POA CAN BE OBTAINED.

2. SUBJS ASSIGNED CRYPTOS LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4.

END OF MESSAGE

LIRING-3 LIRING-4

*ROWTON made contact with Carlos Jurado and Miriam Chichay de Jurado and wants POA and crypts.

201 req'd
25 May 66

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 17

33/M SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 050040Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7234 5 MAY 66 IN 10462

KAPOK TYPIC

*

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAS MADE CONTACT WITH CARLOS JURADO, ARTIST HUSBAND OF MIRIAM CHICHAY CLERK IN CUBAN CONSULATE. ROWTON HAS BECOME QUITE FRIENDLY WITH JURADO, HAS TAKEN HIM AND CHICHAY TO DINNER AND IN TURN JURADO ESCORTED ROWTON ON TOUR OF RIVERA MURALS IN MEXI CITY BUILDINGS.

2. ROWTON USING ALIAS HAS EXPLAINED SELF AS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUSINESS. WHERE FIRST MEETING DEVELOPED FROM ROWTON VISIT TO SALON WHERE JURADO SHOWING HIS PAINTINGS RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW SWUNG AROUND TO PLACE WHERE ROWTON INTERESTED GENERAL WELFARE OF JURADO AND WANTING DO SOMETHING FOR HIM IF JURADO CAN SUPPLY SOME SERVICE FOR WHICH ROWTON COULD LOGICALLY AFFORD PAY HIM. JURADO IS SNAPPING AT THIS BAIT AND APPEARS GENUINELY LIKE ROWTON ASIDE FROM FACT ROWTON APPEARS BE NON-AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH MONEY.

3. IN LAST MEETING, ROWTON QUERIED JURADO ON HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICAN COMMERCE AND JURADO SAID HE HAD NONE. ROWTON ASKED WHAT SORT CONTACTS HE HAD CUBA SINCE THAT SUBJECT OF INTEREST OT ALL AND JURADO FELL OVER SELF COUNTING WHAT HE COULD DO FOR ROWTON ON CUBAN SUBJECT.

SECRET

*Lead given to ROWTON by Station.
Believe original lead from LITAINT-2. S

C[illegible] — DO NOT [illegible]

S

Stewart

SAID HE KNEW EVERYONE AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXI AND COULD GO TO CUBA FOR
ROWTON.

4. ROWTON SLOWED MATTERS DOWN BY SAYING HE HAD GO EUROPE
FOR ABOUT THREE WEEKS BUT THAT THEY WOULD TALK MORE ABOUT IT UPON
HIS RETURN. IN TURNING COVERSATION TO WIFE, ROWTON LEARNED SHE HAS
FATHER IN NEW YORK WHO LEFT CUBA TO GET AWAY FROM REVOLUTION. FATHER
AND DAUGHTER ON GOOD TERMS AND HE WRITES HER EVERY WEEK. HIS NAME
CHINESE FOR PEACH BLOSSOM AND CHICHAY IS CUBAN ATTEMPT AT TRANSLIT-
ERATION. JURADO SPOKE CHINESE NAME BUT ROWTON UNABLE REMEMBER
PHONETIC PRONUNCIATION AND COULD NOT ASK FOR SPELLING. CHICHAY
MOTHER STILL IN CUBA WITH BROTHERS AND SISTERS.

5. LITAINT-2 HAS BEEN CULTIVATING CHICHAY SEVERAL MONTHS. SAW
LETTER HER DESK ONE DAY IN CONSULATE AND ASKED IF BORE NEW CUBAN
STAMPS. CHICHAY SAID NO IT FROM HER FATHER IN NEW YORK. SHE UN-
SALARIED AT CONSULATE AND CURBELO, WHO REPORTED BE FRIEND OF JURADO
ACCORDING LIENVOY, HAS DELAYED SENDING HER PHS TO CUBA FOR EMPLOYMENT
ON SALARY BASIS. REASON FOR DELAY NOT KNOWN. SHE FREINDLY WITH
CURBELO BUT NOT WITH LIRING-1. WHEN THEIR DAUGHTER SICK LITAINT-2
GAVE CHICHAY MONEY TO TAKE CHILD TO DOCTOR. L-2 SAYS JURADO HAS MANY
COMMIE FRIENDS MEXI. SPENT TIME IN CUBA AND MAY HAVE SERVED CUBAN

SECRET

MILITARY SERVICE OR MILITIA.

6. STA TRACES SHOW JURADO AS MEMBER PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA, MEXICO, IN JULY 61, AND MEMBER PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THIRD LATIN AMERICAN CONGRESS, ARTISTS AND WRITERS, HAVANA, JAN 62. WIFE MIRIAM CHICHAY DE JURADO EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY ABOUT SIX MONTHS.

7. REQUEST POA JURADO AND CHICHAY FOR CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT. REQUEST COUPLE BE ASSIGNED PSEUDOS IN LIRING SERIES.

8. POUCHING ROWTON CONTACT REPORTS THIS SUBSECT.

SECRET

CFN 7234 WALLACE B. ROWTON CARLOS JURADO MIRIAM CHICHAY CUBAN RIVERA CUBA EUROPE NEW YORK CHINESE PEACH BLOSSOM CHINESE NOT ASK LITAINT-2 NO IT CURBELO LIENVOY NOT KNOWN NOT WITH LIRING-1 -2 L-2 STA PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA MEXICO 61 HAVANA JAN 62 POA LIRING

BT

Need Hq assessment

Cmd [illegible] [illegible]

Traces Peach Blossom — Chinese name of Miriam Chichay.

Ray [illegible]

HSI 1153 [illegible] family name

Hua [illegible]

HSCI 6892 very complex.

female given name

TAO-HWA 2711-5363

TAO HUA

Hwa-tao

NNNN

[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.
Chief of Station, JMWAVE
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief of Station, San Salvador

SUBJECT
J[illegible]CAS
Identification of Jorge ARIAS Gomez as Salvadoran Delegate to Tri-Continental Conference

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. [illegible] forwarded to [illegible] a copy of the 15 February 1966 edition of Politica, a Mexican publication that contained photos of and speeches delivered by the Chiefs of the various delegations to the Tri-Continental Conference held in Havana in January.

2. "Sergio [illegible]", described therein as the Chief of the Salvadoran delegation, was identified from his photo by the [illegible] and [illegible]-2 as Jorge ARIAS Gomez, a member of the Central Committee of the [illegible]. According to [illegible]-2, ARIAS is probably the #4 man in the [illegible] hierarchy - behind Raul CASTELLANOS Figueroa, Jorge Shafick [illegible], and Salvador Cayetano CARPIO. It is rather strange that the [illegible] sent [illegible] on this [illegible], [illegible] [illegible]-2 and [illegible]-2 reported that, while in Cuba in 1961-62, ARIAS had an affair with a girl that resulted in her pregnancy, and the Cubans sent a strong complaint to the [illegible] concerning his conduct. So?

3. A LIVACATE main intercept ([illegible]-[illegible]91) indicated that ARIAS was expected in Moscow in January. He apparently has not yet returned to El Salvador, and thus he may also be representing the [illegible] at the 23rd CPSU Congress. Any available photos of Salvadorans at that affair would be appreciated.

4. R.I. please index:

Jorge ARIAS Gomez (aka Sergio [illegible])
CIT: El Salvador

In photo of chiefs of various delegations to Tri-Continent Conference in Havana in January 1966 (Politica, 15 Feb 66), "Sergio [illegible]", head of Salvadoran delegation, was identified as Jorge ARIAS Gomez.

Floyd R. [illegible]

LIRING-3

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
1 - COS, JMWAVE
1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HSSA-5557

DATE
1 April 66

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-111046
[illegible] 63-[illegible]-117.3

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE [illegible]

FROM: Name [illegible]	OFFICE [illegible]	ROOM [illegible]	PHONE [illegible]	TUBE ADDRESS —

1. TYPE ACTION	☒ OPEN ☐ AMENT ☐ CLOSE	2. FILE RESTRICTED	☐ YES ☐ NO
3. PERMANENT CHARGE	☒ YES ☐ NO		

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible] D1

5. 201 NO. [illegible] E2

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
H2			
H2			
H2			
H2			
H2			
H2			

7. SEX F1 M F	8. DATE OF BIRTH F2	9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH G1	10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible] G1
11. CITIZENSHIP [illegible] H1	12. OCCUPATION (clear text) [illegible] J1	OCC. CODE J2	13. SWL K1 / 14. OI CODE M1
15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER K1	DATE K1	16. RESIDENCE [illegible]	

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

[illegible] N1

[illegible] P1

R1

S1

T1

U1

V1

W1

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE Q1	19. ACTION DESK CODE R1	20. SECONDARY DESK CODE R1

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES [illegible] B1 & C1

22. CRYPTONYM LIRING-3

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER [illegible]

201 NO. [illegible]

FORM 9-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38-51)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: [illegible]/Dr. Armando SOTO Rodriguez - Report of Cuban Guerrilla Training near Netzahualcoyotl Dam

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraphs 3 and 4

1. Attached is a copy of an undated employment letter to [illegible] from Dr. Armando SOTO Rodriguez, self-described as an ex-military physician. The letter bears the return address [illegible] 611, Villahermosa, Tabasco, Mexico and a Villahermosa postmark dated 21 (?) February 1966. In the letter, which was written in fairly good English, SOTO said among other things that the Cuban Consulate in Merida has established a group of Cubans in Raudales, Malpaso, where the Netzahualcoyotl Dam is being finished, who are training Mexicans in guerrilla tactics.

2. Headquarters has no traces identifiable with Armando SOTO Rodriguez or [illegible] also mentioned in the letter. The National Geographic map of Mexico and Central America dated 1953, 1:3.5 million, shows the town of Netzahualcoyotl at [illegible], on the [illegible] River about fifty miles from the Guatemalan border.

3. [illegible] on Cuban guerrilla activity at Netzahualcoyotl. Since a sensitive source ([illegible]) did report occasional interest by the Cuban Consulate in the Tabasco area, and since the area pinpointed by source does lend itself to cross-border activities, it would be appreciated if Mexico City Station would endeavor to check out this report. [illegible]-1 especially might be able to furnish some information in this connection. A former Merida Base staffer now stationed at Headquarters recalls that Ventura "El Tigre" [illegible], a wealthy Mexican cattleman, has extensive holdings centering around Emilio Zapata, about 25 miles from Netzahualcoyotl, and might be knowledgeable of activities in the area. Access to [illegible] would probably be gained through [illegible]-1 and Raimundo [illegible] who services [illegible]-1's and [illegible]'s airplanes in Merida. [illegible] has previously extended invitations to visit his ranch at [illegible] and might do so again if suitably approached. It is recalled that Lawrence F. BARKER has traveled or planned travel near the general area. Perhaps BARKER could set up a trip to this area. Another possibility for background and channels might be through [illegible] who has recently been heard to say that he is visiting the Isthmus of Tehuantepec regularly. (This was overheard from an intercepted ham radio conversation). Three maps of the area are attached as of possible assistance.

Continued...

Attachment:
A. Letter u.s.c.
B. 3 maps u.s.c.

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

Possible interest in [illegible]·3 case.

DATE TYPED: 5 April 1966

DATE DISPATCHED: 11 Apr [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-14459

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

RI
Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	J. Stewart	mf	5506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/FI		
WH/2/S		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		W. J. Kaufman

DISPATCH

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES 21

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

SEEN BY 27 PER

SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT OT TIME 2140 Z BY B

FILE, VR, CS/DO, OT, C/OA, OPS FS, WH/C 8

S E C R E T 072054Z CITE JMWAVE 1869 7 JUL 66 IN 52218

PRIORITY 01 (ISOLATION) INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, EGLIN

PBRUMEN KUROAR CHAPPIE RAMROD

REF A WAVE 0818 (IN 47001)

B WAVE 0746 NOT SENT EGLIN (IN 14906)

1. REQUEST TRAINING FOR SIX MAN LEADER GROUP SCHEDULED ARRIVE 01 (ISOLATION) 11 JULY AS FOLLOWS: 01 (ISOTROPIC) SAME GIVEN AMANCHORS LESS EMPHAIS UDT. 01 (ISOLATION) STRESS LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND ROTATE LEADERSHIP ASSIGNMENTS IN FIELD EXERCISES ENCOMPASSING TRADECRAFT, CACHING, OBSERVATION AND REPORTING. ALL TRAINEES COMPLETED JMWAVE TRAINING AND HAVE OA'S AND RECENT LCFLUTTERS.

2. TRAINEES: 728526

AMLILAC/29 TA IGNACIO (TRAINED AT 01 (ISO/ISOT) JULY 63)

AMLILAC/33 TA MANUEL (TRAINED AT 01 (ISO) FEB 64) 741331

AMSKIRT/1 TA PABLO (TRAINED AT 01 (ISO) JAN 65) 755409

AMHINT/56 TA FRANK (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 332676

AMTRUNK/21 TA LUIS (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 3.6···43

AMLUNT/2 TA FILIPE (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 334551

AMPOLISH/1 TA SIMON (01 (ISO/ISOT) AUG 65) INTERPRETER C/O TO 285159

SECRET

BE ASSIGNED.

01

3. REQUEST AIRLIFT LEADER TEAM TO ISO NIGHT 11 JULY AND RETURN AMANCHOR GROUP ISO WAVE NIGHT 12 JULY.

SECRET 01

BT

2/IN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

313 ERB
DATE : 17 MAY 61

TO : BELL
FROM : RIO DE JANERIO
ACTION : BELL 15
INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, WH, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

MAY 18 1340Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 2065

BELL WAVE MEXI INFO SAOP (BY POUCH) CITE RIOD 5366

JMZIP

1. ACCORDING LOCAL PRESS CUBAN VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS CARLOS OLIVARES NOW IN MEXI, PLANS COME BRAZIL ABOUT 20 MAY TO "PROCLAIM TRUTH ABOUT CUBAN REVOLUTION".

2. REQUEST SOONEST RESUME DEROG INFO OLIVARES TO BE PASSED HIGH LEVEL LIAISON.

3. REQUEST MEXI ADVISE RE TRAVEL.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

2 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMBANG-1

1. I met with AMBANG-1 on 27 July 1963 in Miami. The following is a resume of the business transacted at that meeting.

a. Request for High Explosives

AMBANG-1 stated that in view of my outline of strategic targets inside Cuba during our last meeting which took place in Washington on 21 June 1963, he had decided to attempt a sabotage operation against the Havana power plant. He informed me that he has a man employed in the power plant in Havana who is capable of launching this operation. In this connection AMBANG-1 asked if we could make available twenty pounds of high explosives as well as six to eight thermite grenades. AMBANG-1 asked if it were possible to have the twenty pounds broken into smaller lots. In our further discussion of this subject, it became apparent that A-1 would be willing to receive the materiel either in San Juan or inside Cuba, but that he definitely preferred the latter if this were possible. Like in most other instances during our conversation, I advised AMBANG-1 that I would need to discuss this matter with my superiors but that I could tentatively assure him of our ability and willingness to furnish the high explosives in San Juan and possibly inside Cuba. At this point I asked AMBANG-1 if he could foresee the need for materiel of this type inside Cuba. I told him that I asked this question because if his group were prepared now or in the near future for meaningful sabotage action inside Cuba it was conceivable that we could begin the caching of needed materiel inside Cuba. AMBANG-1 assured me that they were in a position to sabotage the electrical plant in Havana. (I did not ask, neither did he specify which plant.) He did not promise immediate action, adding that he wanted to assure himself of the details of the planned operation and the safety-odds of the man involved. A-1 then indicated that he would certainly be in a position to accomplish this mission and others in the future and would be most grateful for any materiel we could put in place. I left the matter with him with the understanding that if it were possible we would proceed with caching the high explosives in the general area of Havana. He assured me of their capability to service and retrieve the cache.

b. Request for Contact in Guantanamo

AMBANG-1 asked me if it would be possible for us to arrange some means for Rogelio Cisneros to visit Guatanamo and talk to his brother who is an employee of the Naval Base and another agent of theirs likewise employed there. The reason A-1 gave for the request was that they wished to inform Ramon Cisneros Diaz of the JURE plans to begin the implementation of their plan of resistance and overthrow of the Castro Regime. I advised A-1 that whereas I would look into this matter as I could tentatively tell him that the chances of accomplishing this were remote.

c. AMBANG-1 Political Plans

AMBANG-1 informed me that he was planning at this time to be in New York on or about 10 August and that following this trip he intended to go to Santo Domingo and Caracas. In Santo Domingo he hoped to set up a small base for operations such as a small house on a farm near the shore which could be used for boat travel to Cuba. Once he had made such arrangements he intended to talk to President Juan Bosch telling him of the plan and asking his acquiescence if not support. AMBANG-1 intends to tell Bosch that he will not embarrass him and will go about his business in a secure and professional manner adding that if he should embarrass Bosch, the latter could disclaim him and A-1 would desist from any further activity there.

So far as AMBANG-1's trip to Caracas is concerned, that will be principally devoted to orienting the JURE representation in that city. In addition, AMBANG-1 will attempt to see and talk to Venezuelan Government officials including President Betancourt.

Some time after this trip AMBANG-1 intends to visit Central America principally Costa Rica and if he can procure a visa, Mexico. The purpose of all his travel is the raising of funds, the general tightening of his organization and discussions necessary to coordinate their efforts.

d. Isolation of Cuba.

AMBANG-1 made it exceedingly clear that the lifeline to his assets inside Cuba had been severely restricted when PAA flights were suspended. Nothing could suit AMBANG-1 more than to have these flights resumed. AMBANG-1's obviously great interest in the resumption of these flights was the most eloquent statement yet of his belief that he has a network, or that he can revive a network within Cuba. At least at this stage of JURE operations, AMBANG-1 does not appear to consider the infiltration of manpower as necessary.

AMBANG-1 stated that the use of flights from Spain and Mexico to Cuba was difficult and costly whereas the Miami-Havana run had been most useful in maintaining contact within Cuba. It was AMBANG-1's opinion that the resumption of PAA flights would be an operational boom to JURE and that whereas he could see Castro making some political capital out of the flights, he believed that some appropriate statement such as "there is no political significance but only a humanitarian and compassionate reason for the reestablishment of this link," would be sufficient to negate any political advantage by Castro.

e. AMBANG-1 Phasing Out of his Employment

AMBANG-1 gave me to believe that he is closing shop and giving up his position with the Corporacion de Renovacion Urbana y Viviendas where he is employed as an engineer in charge of building pre-cast concrete houses. AMBANG-1 stated that during the past week Governor Munoz Marin gave final authority for the erection of a plant to produce these houses in Puerto Rica. AMBANG-1 is torn with the thought of leaving this project which he believes will be most successful, and which would assure his livelihood, but he knows that he must devote himself to the fight against Castro. It is obvious to me that AMBANG-1 will within the next two months phase out of this employment to devote full time to the liberation of Cuba.

f. A JURE Radio Link

AMBANG-1 asked me if I would be able to assist him in the establishment of a San Juan-Caracas-Miami radio link. He explained that the JURE has spent a great deal of money on telephonic communications between these points and were most anxious to set up a means of radio communication in order to economize. I guess that AMBANG-1 could tell from my reaction that I was not too sympathetic to his request for he withdrew it almost as soon as he had made it. He went on to say that this was a problem which they could overcome and I presume that he will seek to establish such radio communications without our assistance.

g. Aerial Maps of Cuba

AMBANG-1 informed me that the JURE membership had brought out of Cuba an entire series of maps showing key roads, bridges, industrial plants, et al, which they had copied by the Aero Service Corporation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. AMBANG-1 stated that they had received most of these photos from the Aero Service Corporation but that the 101 were still missing. He gave me the numbers of those missing and asked if we could procure them. I have since informed AMBANG-1 that it would perhaps be best it he could, or his organization, do this instead but that we would pay the travel of one of his men, should this prove necessary. Attached, hereto, is a copy of the missing photos in question.

h. JURE Organization and Strength

AMBANG-1 informed me that the membership of the JURE in San Juan was now at about 500 members and that each of these individuals makes a weekly contributionto the organization.

In addition there are large JURE organizations in Caracas, Venezuela and Dallas, Texas. There are according to AMBANG-1 a total of thirty delegations in Latin America, the U. S. A. and Europe. He cited as an example the delegation in San Francisco which had recently purchased a typewriter through the collection of green stamps. He added that Rogelio Cisneros had travelled to San Francisco some time ago to communicate with that group and to tighten its organizational activities.

i. AMBANG-1 Asks About ARTIME and the Activities in Central America

AMBANG-1 raised the question of Manuel ARTIME's activities in Central America and particularly in Nicaragua. He stated that any association with Somoza would not help in creating the mistique and political coloration necessary to inspire revolution and resistance from the non-Communists elements in Cuba. Whereas, I had expected AMBANG-1 to go into a long harangue as to the positive damage that ARTIME's actions with Somoza could cause, he left the matter at about this point. I agreed that the Somozas did not have a liberal political reputation throughout Latin America, but added that whatever Cubans could do from that or any vantage point against Communism in Cuba would in my estimation be helpful, -- while I am sure AMBANG-1 did not agree with me, he did not say so. In respect to ARTIME and Miro Cardona, whose name entered into the conversation later, AMBANG-1 took a fairly objective view. He stated that Miro had arrived in San Juan and that he wished him the best as he figured he had suffered enough. Insofar as ARTIME was concerned I gathered that AMBANG-1 might feel that the association with Somoza would not do ARTIME any good in a post-Castro Cuba. As AMBANG-1 is convinced that a government after Castro must be of a progressive liberal stripe, ARTIME was not doing himself any good by identifying himself with the Somozas.

j. A List of Cuban Diplomats

As AMBANG-1 had asked for a list of Cuban Diplomats abroad while we were in Paris, I advised him that such a list had been prepared and we would make it available to him. In this connection he asked if we could include the addresses of each of the Cuban installations. Speaking of diplomats, AMBANG-1 wanted to know if Ambassador Gustavo Arcos had returned from Prague. I informed him that I did not know. AMBANG-1 was most interested to learn that Franqui's wife and children had actually come out of Cuba, and indicated that he would intensify his efforts to maintain contact with Cuban Diplomat Cabrera Infante in Brussels as a means toward the eventual recruitment of Franqui.

k. AMBANG-1 Relation with Jorge Volsky

In conjunction with questions regarding propaganda sent to Cuba, and the JURE's general plans in this field, I asked A-1 about his relation with Jorge Volsky. A-1 stated that he considered Volsky to be an extremely able, serious newspaperman. He added that whereas he saw Volsky frequently on his trips to Miami, the latter did not work for him. A-1 stated that Volsky's work was a full-time job which left him little time to do anything else.

A-1 stated that JURE propaganda was produced by a twelve - man board.

A-1 added that the JURE expected to shortly introduce a statement on its position into Cuba.

l. AMBANG-1 Asks about Two Man Underwater Craft

A-1 asked if I knew anything about a two man type craft which travels through the water. I presume A-1 was talking about the "sea-sled." I advised him that I knew little about this type craft, but in my opinion its usefulness for the type activity he had in mind was limited. AMBANG-1 would use this craft for the final phase of an infiltration effort. A-1 stated that this craft was being used at the hotel beaches in San Juan as a type of sporting activity. I will advise him that he could pursue this matter himself as all knowledge on this subject is publicly available.

m. AMBANG-1 Trained in Simple Scorch System

A WAVE technician, Culver Ladd, under the name of Mr. Lane trained A-1 to use a simple scorch system of S/W. A-1 was given some eighty pills with which he will be able to make the "ink" used in this system of S/W. A-1 was pleased with the system, especially its simplicity. He will use the system to communicate with his chief delegate in Paris and undoubtedly other persons in Cuba as well as in the other JURE delegations.

n. AMBANG-1 is Writing an Article for Cuadernos

At the request of German Arcienegas, the famed Colombian intellectual, A-1 is preparing an article which is to be published in Cuadernos. The article will deal with the problems facing Latin America and how they can be resolved. A-1 will be in select company as Arcienegas has asked a number of prominent Latin American intellectuals for their views.

o. Communication Between AMBANG-1 and Case Officer

AMBANG-1 gave me the following addresses at which he can be reached:

Corporacion de Renovacion
Urbana y Viviendas
PARADA 31
Ponce de Leon,
Hato Rey
Puerto Rico Telephone No. 723-1671

(NOTE: This is not AMBANG's office or home, but that of a friend who is always able to reach A-1.)

Also:

Mr. Jaime Mitrani
1260 W. 61 Place
Hialeah, Florida

AMBANG-1 was given the following means of contacting me:

Mr. Alfred Fernandez
P. O. Box 1104, Main Post Office
Washington, D. C. Telephone No. 737-8294

AMBANG-1 will use the name "Tony" as a signature in mail to me.

2. General Observations

I beleive AMBANG-1 is planning to return to Cuba. He indicated that he would give the matter serious thought to even go in, disguised, as a legal traveller if that road were generally open, i. e., if rather large numbers of travellers were going in via PAA flights. This line seemed a bit out of character for A-1, for it seems unrealistic and somewhat remindful of Macaulay's references to the state of mind that exiles develop. I also detected what we consider to be a somewhat unrealistic appraisal of the Cuban situation in A-1's estimate that Castro has considerably less than 40% of the Cuban people with him. A-1 may be losing more than a little touch with Cuban reality.

A-1 remains convinced that he is on the right track in working for the eventual overthrow of Castro. He is convinced, however, that two to three years is all the time left for actually destroying the Castro regime, believing that there will be a favorable turn in the Cuban economic situation by late 1965. A-1 is likewise convinced that Castro cannot add to the improvement of Cuba, to the contrary that so long as the principal decisions are made by Castro, the general trend will be confusion arising from a failure to concentrate on specific problems until they are corrected.

AMBANG-1 is likewise convinced that the JURE is building a political group and general outlook which will have an impact on Cuba for many years to come. He is especially concerned with the need to carefully consider each position of his group in order to create the lasting impression that JURE knows where it is going and that its leadership is composed of men who know how to "run" a country without the false starts, confusion and chaos identified with the Castro regime.

AMBANG-1 is likewise greatly concerned with the necessity of not creating an impression inside Cuba that the JURE will return to mete out "justice." It is essential, A-1 states, to convince the general populace that the overthrow of Castro will not result in a bloodbath, rather that the sole aim is to save the revolution that has been betrayed. He is anxious that the people inside Cuba see the JURE as a responsible, intelligent and dispassionate group which is capable of bringing to Cuba all that the revolution promised.

Alfonso Rodriguez
SAS/SO

Distribution:
1 - C/SAS
1 - SAS/Bolten; Hecksher; Amori
1 - Chrono
1 - RAY File

[illegible]
[illegible]
6937
[illegible]. 63

MEXICO CITY

MEXI

RYBAT TYPIC

86264

REF: DIR 86283

IDEN A: FERNANDO PALENZUELA VAQUET
SON OF MATEO AND JOSEFA
DPOB 9 NOV 1903 ARTEMISA, PINAR DEL
RIO, CUBA, 5'7" BROWN EYES, GRAY
HAIR, PASSPORT No. 45809, RESIDENT OF
AVENIDA 35 No. 9809, MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN B: MARIA FRANCISCA CRESPO FALCON
DAUGHTER OF ARTURO AND JOSEFINA
DPOB 28 NOV 1914 GUIRA DE MELENA, HABANA, CUBA
5'0" BROWN EYES/HAIR PASSPORT No. 28149,
RESIDENT OF AVENIDA 35 No. 9809
MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN C: HOWARD ANDERSON

SAS/SEC MKH
WH/3/MEXI ✓
C/WH/3 ✓

J. C. King
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

[illegible] ANDERSON [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

201-2048[illegible]

3 Dec 63 22

X

86520

RYBAT TYPIC AMROD

[illegible] HAVE SCANTLING WRITE LETTER EMBODYING FOLLOWING IDEAS:

EXCELENCIA:

AS YOU MAY KNOW FOR SEVERAL MONTHS I HAVE BEEN ENGAGING IN PURCHASING VARIOUS COMMERCIAL ITEMS FOR MR. SIMOBAS AND MR. VEGA OF YOUR EMBASSY. FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS THESE PURCHASES WENT VERY WELL AND I BELIEVE BOTH YOUR GOVERNMENT AND I WERE SATISFIED WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS AND DELIVERIES.

SINCE THE DEPARTURE OF MR. SIMOBAS AND MR. VEGA, HOWEVER, I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CARRY ON MY BUSINESS WITH THEM IN A NORMAL MANNER. I HAVE GONE TO MUCH TROUBLE TO GATHER ARTICLES THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN AND TO DELIVER THEM AS INSTRUCTED; YET, NOW THREE WEEKS AFTER MAKING MY LAST DELIVERY I HAVE STILL NOT BEEN PAID.

I OBJECT TO [illegible] DELAYS IN MAKING PAYMENT TO ME AND REQUEST THAT MR. SIMOBAS OR HIS APODERADO IN THIS CITY BE INFORMED THAT I BADLY NEED THE MONEY AND CANNOT MAKE FURTHER DELIVERIES UNTIL I HAVE RECEIVED THE [illegible]

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

INDEX
NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

[illegible]

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

INFO

CITE DIR [illegible]

"I ALSO REQUEST THAT THIS LETTER BE ANSWERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND I HOPE NEITHER YOUR GOVERNMENT NOR I WILL BE CAUGHT UNPREPARED IN THE EVENT THE AMERICAN NATIONS ALL BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA. I HAVE NOW AT MY WAREHOUSE A NUMBER OF ITEMS MR. SINOBAS AND MR. VEGA ORDERED AND WILL DELIVER THEM AS SOON AS THE CHECK ARRIVES AND OUR ACCOUNTS LIQUIDATED.

S S S

MARCO TULIO RODRIGUEZ"

2. PLEASE DATE AND SEND 7 DECEMBER VIA REGISTERED MAIL TO SR. JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS, FRANCISCO MARQUEZ 160, COLONIA CONDESA, DF, USING OROPEZA PO BOX AS RETURN ADDRESS, IF OROPEZA BOX SERVICING 6 DECEMBER UNPRODUCTIVE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/MOB
WH/3/MEXI

J. C. KING
C/WHD

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

104-10290-10055 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: SAS/[illegible]/PA/PROP
EXT: 6055
DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 63 18 32z

TO: MEXICO CITY BOGOTA LIMA JMWAVE GUATEMALA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: [illegible], CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, WH 7, VR

~~SIG CEN~~

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI BOGO LIMA GUAT INFO WAVE CITE DIR

86694

REF: DIR 86693

IDEN: GRACE HOLMES, P.O.BOX 1767, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SAS/[illegible]

WH/2

WH/3/[illegible]

[illegible]

A. A. [illegible]
C/SAS/[illegible]

[illegible]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: FE 8

INFO: DDP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH 7, SAS 8, RR

[illegible] 23 32

TO [illegible] INFO [illegible] CITE DIR 86803

SUGAR [illegible]

REF DIR 86802

1. [illegible] A MR. [illegible] WATANABE.

2. [illegible] B MR. [illegible] K. SUZUKI, TRANS PACIFIC COMMERCE CONSULTANTS, SUITE 315, 450 SUTTER STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. TELEPHONE DOUGLAS 2-6594.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3

SECRET

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : SR/CI/K
EXT : 6991
DATE : 10 DECEMBER 63

TO : SEE BELOW

FROM : DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

INFO : ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, AF 5, FE 4, WE 4, NE 4, EE 6, VR, WH 7

89383

AF

ALGI
ORAN
[illegible]
YAOU
ADDI
ACCR
CNKY
ABID
NOBI
MNRV
TPLI
WHEL
GAZI
TNAR
[illegible]
CASA
[illegible]
LAGS
BRAZ
LEOP
ELIZ
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
CAPT
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

EE

VIEN
SBUR
MECA
FRAN
BRLN
BONN
DORF
FROB
HAMB
HEID
MUNI
STUT
ATHE
KAVA
[illegible]
[illegible]
GNVA
ZURI

FE

MELB
CNBR
[illegible]
PENH
[illegible]
TAHI
[illegible]
DJAK
SURA
TOKY
SEOU
KHAN
[illegible]
KUAL
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
SAIG
[illegible]

NE

KASU
COLO
NEWD
BOMB
CALC
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
CAIR
ALEX
[illegible]
TAIZ
[illegible]

WE

BRUS
OTTA
COPE
LOND
HELS
PARI
[redacted]
[illegible]
[redacted]
LISB
[illegible]
OSLO
[redacted]
[illegible]
COBA
LAPA
RIOD
ELEN
BELO
BRIL
CURI
LOBE
RECI
SALV
SAOP

WH

GORG
SAGO
BOGA
SJOS
[illegible]
QUIT
GAYA
GUAT
[illegible]
TEGU
KING
MEXI
MRID
MNTY
MANA
PACY
[illegible]
LIMA
SJAN
SALV
PIED
PRIN
MONT
CARA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: SHAMPOVICH:mg
UNIT: [illegible]/E
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] DECEMBER 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO: BOOK CABLE (SEE BELOW)
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO ALL COS, &COB INFO CITE DIR

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

1. 20 DECEMBER IS FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF SOVIET STATE SECURITY ORGANIZATION. THIS "CHEKIST BIRTHDAY" IS TRADITIONALLY CELEBRATED BY KGB RESIDENCIES AROUND THE WORLD BY DISCREET GATHERING IN EMBASSY OR OTHER OFFICIAL INSTALLATION, OR IN HOME OF REZIDENT OR OTHER REZIDENTURA MEMBER.

2. ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS SOME STATIONS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE NEW IDENTIFICATIONS OR TO CONFIRM PREVIOUS TENTATIVE IDENTIFICATIONS ON BASIS OF ATTENDANCE THIS PARTY. SUGGEST ADDRESSEES MOUNT UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE AND/OR ALERT LIAISON SERVICES TO THIS DATE AS APPROPRIATE.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

X

PAGE TWO

TO

I certify that this cable must go to all stations and bases.

C/SR

C/SR/CI
SR/O/AF
SR/O/EE D.W. Schroeder
SR/O/FE
SR/O/WE
SR/O/WH
SR/O/NE

C/AF
C/EE
for C/FE
C/WE
C/WH
C/NE

C/SR/CI

C/SR

(C/SR

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]

OTTA CUBA [illegible] HAGU BONN MEXI CARA

89669

REFS: A. CARA 8845 (IN 77469) (NOT SENT MEXI, HAGU, BRUS)*

B. HAGU 9136 (IN [illegible]) (NOT SENT MEXI, CARA)**

1. 40 H.P. OUTBOARD MOTOR MODEL R.D.S. SERIAL NUMBER C-367809 RPT 367[illegible] MANUFACTURED BY JOHNSON MOTORS, PETERBOROUGH, CANADA, FOUND IN ARMS CACHE VENEZUELA COAST, ASCERTAINED FROM MANUFACTURER'S WAUKEGAN, ILLINOIS, INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS TO HAVE BEEN ORDERED 25 SEPT 1963 BY MONTREAL MOTOR BOAT, 785 ST. [illegible], MONTREAL, DEALER OF LONG STANDING. MOTOR ONE OF FOUR 40 H.P. UNITS, OTHERS SERIAL NUMBERS C-367808, C-367830 C-367833, SHIPPED FOR THIS DEALER TOGETHER WITH ONE 40 H.P. UNIT WITH ELECTRIC CLUTCH, SERIAL C-387450, AND ONE 28 H.P. MOTOR, SERIAL C-389561.

2. IN VIEW IMPORTANCE ESTABLISH BEFORE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES THAT CUBA SOURCE THIS CACHE REQUEST OTTA THROUGH LIAISON ASCERTAIN IDENTITY PURCHASER FROM MONTREAL DEALER WITH ANY AVAILABLE BACKGROUND BIO INFO. ALSO ATTEMPT TRACE MOTORS MOVEMENTS FROM HANDS PURCHASER IN EFFORT ESTABLISH DELIVERY CHANNEL CUBA.

3. FOR HAGU, BRUS: RE 12 OUTBOARDS IN REF B, WAUKEGAN HEADQUARTERS ADVISES THREE MODELS RDS 25D SHIPPED BY AMSTERDAM FACTORY 25 OCTOBER 1963 TO ALMACO [illegible] JOHNSON BRUSSELS DISTRIBUTOR. OTHER PLACED WITH DISTRIBUTOR 24 OCT BY MR. [illegible]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

J. J. [illegible] (WH)
WH/[illegible]
6657
17 FEB 1963

S E C R E T

PAGE TWO

INFO

8966

HOTEL PLAZA, BRUSSELS, WITH TERMS CASH AND DELIVERY F.O.B. DISTRIBUTOR'S PLACE OF BUSINESS. BENOIT HAD MOTORS TRUCKED TO BRUSSELS AIRPORT AND SHIPPED SCHIPHOL AIRPORT, AMSTERDAM, WHERE TRAIL LOST. BANK RECORDS SHOW PURCHASE FUNDS TRANSFERRED FROM CANADIAN BANK ACCOUNT OF [illegible] [illegible] CO. LTD., QUEBEC. BENOIT HOME ADDRESS GIVEN AS 3019 [illegible] [illegible], ST. FOY, QUEBEC.

4. [illegible] CARACAS CHECK WHICH CURRENTLY REPORTEDLY ORIGINATED ALSO BY CANADIAN [illegible] [illegible] GOV.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * Identified by Manufacturer's name plate outboard motor (found) arms cache.

** Identified [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] background [illegible].

S E C R E T

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : 17 DEC 63

SECRET

TO : SEE BELOW

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO : DDP, DODS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, SAS 8, VR

17 DEC 63 23 07z

PRIORITY

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY BOOK CABLE INFO CITE DIR 89778
CARA MANA WAVE DODS
MEXI LIMA PACY GUAT
MONT BOGO QUIT GAYA
RIOD SAOP SAGO LAPA
SANJ SDOM BUEN

REF: DIR 88860 *

FYI. ACTION INTENDED PARA 2 REF WAS UNATTRIBUTABLE SURFACING VIA MEDIA. DO NOT DESIRE AT THIS TIME ADDEES MAKE DIRECT OR INDIRECT OVERTURES TO LOCAL OFFICIALS OR GOVTS IN THIS CONNECTION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADDEES TO CONSIDER SURFACING ANY EVIDENCE CASTRO FINANCING TERRORIST AND PRO CUBAN ACTS, ETC.

J. C. KING
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

William [illegible]
WH/PO/B
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] Dec 1963

S E C R E T

BOOK MESSAGE AS [illegible]

PRIORITY MUNI
ROUTINE

DELH HAMB OSLO BEIR TEHE TUNI MANI BERN HEID PARI CAIR ACCA [illegible] [illegible]
FROB LUDR ATHE JIDD LEOP REGO MEXI GEVA ANKA KARI PRET SING QUIT
[illegible] LISB ROME ADDA ALGI HELS OKIE FRAN LAND VIEN DHAH KHAR [illegible] [illegible]
HAGU NAIRO BAGH BRUD TRIP ZUAL RICD KINGS SJAN ADDI

PIRAND

WORLD BRIEF

(NOFORN IN SLANTS. REMAINING INFO RELEASABLE TO LIAISON.)

1. BERLIN: THE COMMUNISTS VIEW AS "OFFICIAL" THE TALKS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BERLIN NEGOTIATORS WHICH ACHIEVED THE AGREEMENT ON CHRISTMAS PASSES AND CONSIDER THEM A BOOST TO MOSCOW'S "FREE CITY" PROPOSAL FOR WEST BERLIN. WILLY BRANDT, ON THE OTHER HAND, REGARDS THEM AS ONLY "TECHNICAL" AND AS NO SETBACK TO HIS STATURE IN WEST GERMAN POLITICS.

2. YUGOSLAVIA: //TITO IS APPARENTLY NO LONGER DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ADMINISTRATION OF YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS. HE HAS EXHIBITED LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF A NUMBER OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AND HAS BEEN DIVESTING HIMSELF OF RESPONSIBILITIES. TWO RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT HIS FACULTIES HAVE DIMMED.//

3. NORTH VIETNAM: HEAVY PROPAGANDA EMPHASIS ON THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

SECRET

SECRET

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

20 DEC 63 00 47Z

SIG CEN

90407

(PAGE TWO)

SUGGESTS A GROWING CONFIDENCE IN HANOI THAT INSURGENTS CAN SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE THEIR POSITION DESPITE US BACKING OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. (CONF)

4 CUBA: COASTAL DEFENSE CRUISE MISSILES NOW REPORTEDLY ARE PART OF THE CUBAN ARTILLERY FORCES, [redacted] CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOVIET-DOMINATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IS ALSO INCREASING A SOVIET SO-1-CLASS SUBCHASER HAS ARRIVED IN CUBAN WATERS AND TWO OTHERS ARE PROBABLY EN ROUTE.

5. USSR: KHRUSHCHEV'S LONG-RANGE PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IS TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY RETRENCHMENT IN OTHER PARTS OF THE ECONOMY DURING THE NEXT TWO YEARS. HOUSING CONSUMER SERVICES, AND SOME HEAVY INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION ARE TO BE AFFECTED, AND IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE A SLOWING IN THE RATE AT WHICH MILITARY EXPENDITURES HAVE INCREASED SINCE 1960

6 ITALY: DOUBTS ABOUT THE MORO GOVERNMENT'S VIABILITY HAVE SUBSIDED SOMEWHAT AS A RESULT OF STRONG VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IT RECEIVED ON 17 DEC. NENNI'S AUTHORITY HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED BY HIS REFUSAL TO MAKE ANY DEAL WITH LEFTWING [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

(PAGE THREE) 9045

SUPPORT ON THE CONFIDENCE VOTE MORO'S POSITION IS FIRMER BECAUSE OF THIS AND BECAUSE OF THE VATICAN'S PRESSURE ON CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT RIGHTWINGERS NOT TO BREAK PARTY UNITY. (CONF)

7. CUBA: THE CASTRO REGIME SEEMS INTENT ON CULTIVATING AFRIC COUNTRIES AS WAY OF LESSENING ITS ISOLATION FROM THE FREE WORLD. AN EMBASSY IN TANGANYIKA INDICATES THIS. IN ADDITION, CUBA HAS, DURING THE PAST MONTH, EXPANDED CONTACTS WITH NINE COUNTRIES SOUTH OF THE SAHARA. THERE IS ALSO REASON TO SUSPECT AFRICANS GOING TO CUBA ON SCHOLARSHIPS ARE GETTING TRAINING IN GUERRILLA WARFARE TECHNIQUES.

8. UK://BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE DOUGLAS-HOME GOVERNMENT INCREASINGLY FOCUSED ON KEEPING THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE OPEN AND IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY. BOTH SIR ALEC AND FOREIGN SECRETARY BUTLER ESPECIALLY DETERMINED TO KEEP EXPLORING AREAS POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WITH MOSCOW -- A POLICY WHICH PAID OFF HANDSOMELY FOR CONSERVATIVES IN ELECTIONS OF 1955 AND 1959. MAIN OBJECTIVE - BUTLER'S RECENT VISIT, BONN WAS TO SOUND OUT GERMAN REACTION TO SUCH BRITISH INITIATIVES.//

9. BRITISH GUIANA. JAGAN AND HIS LIEUTENANTS HAVE BEEN ATTACKING

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

INFO (PAGE FOUR) 90407

THE UK AND US IN INCREASINGLY VITRIOLIC TERMS. HIS PARTY IS PARALYZED BY INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND IS UNDECIDED WHETHER TO CONTEST THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS SET FOR NEXT YEAR OR TRY TO BLOCK THEM BY RESORTING TO VIOLENCE. OPPOSITION PARTIES, MEANWHILE HAVE DONE LITTLE TO COOPERATE AGAINST JAGAN BEYOND REACHING A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT NOT TO ATTACK EACH OTHER PUBLICLY.

10. FRANCE: PARIS IS TRYING TO PROMOTE TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA BY ENCOURAGING PRIVATE FIRMS TO DEVELOP NEW MARKETS THERE THERE ARE BUILT IN LIMITATIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT FRENCH-CHINESE TRADE CAN GROW, COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS ARE FEW, AND CREDIT PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO LIMIT PURCHASES BY CHINESE WHO SEEM PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN OBTAINING FRENCH TECHNICAL SKILLS. PARIS INTEREST IN CHINESE TRADE AND EXPANDED CULTURAL CONTACTS WITH PEIPING HAVE STIMULATED SPECULATION THAT SOME SORT OF DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION IS IN THE OFFING. THIS IS STOUTLY DENIED AT ALL LEVELS OF FRENCH GOVERNMENT

11. FINLAND: FOR THE SECOND TIME IN FOUR MONTHS FINLAND IS GOING THROUGH A CABINET CRISIS BROUGHT ON BY DISAGREEMENT WITHIN THE RULING COALITION OVER DOMESTIC LEGISLATION. A NON-POLITICAL GOVERNMENT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

S E C R E T

9640

(PAGE FIVE)

OF CIVIL SERVANTS, HEADED BY ECONOMIST REINO LEHTO, HAS BEEN APPOINTED TO SERVE UNTIL THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY IS RESOLVED. THE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS SEEM LIMITED TO AGRARIAN MINORITY GOVERNMENT, RECONSTITUTION OF AGRARIAN-DOMINATED COALITION OR AS A LAST RESORT, GENERAL ELECTIONS. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, PRESIDENT KEKKONEN'S DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. MOSCOW CAME OUT AGAIN DURING HIS TRIP TO THE USSR.

(CONTINUE)

12. SOUTH KOREA: PRESIDENT PAK CHONG-HUI'S DOMINATION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY INAUGURATED ON 17 DEC UNDER SOUTH KOREA'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME MAY TRANSFER POLITICAL INFIGHTING TO A NEW ARENA. THE CONTROVERSIAL FORMER SECURITY CHIEF KIM CHONG-PIL CONTROLS THE PARTY APPARATUS, AND HIS MANY ENEMIES ARE LIKELY TO TRY TO USE THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES TO TRY TO WREST POWER FROM HIM. PRESIDENT PAK STILL BACKS KIM, HOWEVER, AND THEY AND THEIR COHORTS WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THE GOVERNMENT'S MAJOR DECISIONS. THE CABINET HEADED BY CHOE TU-SON APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CHOSEN WITH A MIND TO BALANCING FACTIONAL AND SECTIONAL INTERESTS AND FOR AN ABILITY TO CARRY OUT, RATHER THAN FORMULATE POLICY. WITH ELECTIONS OVER, THE REGIME IS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 90407

(PAGE SIX)

LIKELY TO SPEED DECISIONS ON MANY OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS. A STAGNANT ECONOMY BESET BY INFLATION IS THE MOST PRESSING ONE. DISCONTENT WITH RISING PRICES EXTENDS INTO THE ARMED FORCES. PAK IS ALSO ANXIOUS TO CONCLUDE THE TEN-YEAR OLD NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. (CONF)

13. TURKEY: THE THREE-WEEK OLD CABINET CRISIS APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING A CLIMAX FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF BOTH MAJOR PARTIES TO BRING MINOR PARTIES INTO COALITION ARRANGEMENTS. ONLY A COALITION BETWEEN THESE TWO, PRIME MINISTER INONU'S REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY AND THE JUSTICE PARTY, OR A "NATIONAL COALITION" OF ALL POLITICAL GROUPS, REMAINS TO BE TRIED. DESPITE THE DEEP DIFFERENCES, AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE TWO MAY PROVE FEASIBLE, FOR THE POLITICIANS FEAR THAT EXTENDING THE CRISIS MUCH LONGER MIGHT PROVOKE MILITARY INTERVENTION. (CONF)

14. CONGO: //THE ADOULA REGIME'S POSITION REMAINS PRECARIOUS. ITS EXTREME LEFTIST OPPONENTS JOINED IN A "COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" (CNL) CONTINUE TO PLOT AGAINST IT FROM THEIR BRAZZAVILLE BASE THOUGH SOMEWHAT CRIPPLED BY LEOPOLDVILLE'S EXPULSION OF THEIR SOVIET

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

(PAGE SEVEN)

EMBASSY CONTACTS. THE EXILES HAVE SENT EMISSARIES ABROAD TO SEEK FUNDS AND ARMS. THEIR PLANS REPORTEDLY INCLUDE ASSASSINATION OF [illegible] LEOPOLDVILLE LEADERS, AN "INVASION" OF THE CONGO, AND INSTIGATION OF A COUP BY THE CONGO ARMY. THE WEAKNESS OF THE LEOPOLDVILLE REGIME, ESPECIALLY THE QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY OF GENERAL MOBUTU'S ARMY, CLEARLY ENHANCES THE CNL PROSPECTS. LAST MONTH MOBUTU AND SURETE CHIEF NENDAKA, THE REGIME'S TWO KEYSTONES, WERE WAYLAYED BY SOLDIERS AND NEARLY KILLED. STUDENT AGITATION MAY BECOME A FACTOR IN VIEW OF THE CLOSE CONNECTIONS TO STUDENT GROUPS OF TWO HIGH OFFICIALS RECENTLY OUSTED -- FOREIGN MINISTER MABIKA-KALANDA AND LONDON CHARGE THOMAS KANZA. IN THE NEWEST DELIBERATIONS TOWARD WRITING A CONSTITUTION PROVINCIAL VOICES DESIRING A LOOSE ARRANGEMENT APPEAR STRONGER THAN SUPPORTERS OF ADOULA'S PUSH FOR A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.//

[illegible] LAOS //RIGHT-WING AND NEUTRALIST MILITARY FORCES, ENCOURAGED BY RECENT SUCCESSES IN CENTRAL AND NORTHERN LAOS, ARE CONSIDERING [illegible] INITIATIVES. THEY ARE PLANNING MOVES AIMED AT CAPTURING [illegible] BESIEGED [illegible] AND FURTHER SOUTH OPERATIONS AGAINST COMMUNIST SUPPLY ROUTES FROM NORTH VIETNAM. COMMUNISTS CONCENTRAT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 90407

(PAGE EIGHT)

HAVE RECAPTURED THE KEY ROAD JUNCTION OF LAK SAC, HOWEVER, AND RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE SHARP COUNTERMOVES ELSEWHERE. THE CONTINUING MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PATHET LAO AND NEUTRALIST FACTIONS HAVE BEEN MARKED BY ACRIMONIOUS EXCHANGES, BUT THE PATHET LAO HAVE EXPRESSED NEW INTEREST IN ARRANGING A MEETING BETWEEN THEIR CHIEF PRINCE SOUPHANNOUVONG AND PREMIER SOUVVANNA PHOUMA TO ARRANGE FOR FULL PATHET LAO PARTICIPATION IN THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. COUP RUMORS, MOSTLY CENTERING ON PLANS BY RIGHT-WING MILITARY ELEMENTS ALLIED WITH THE SANANIKONE CLAN, CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE IN VIENTIANE. //

JAMES W. [illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

LOLA DUBS ASUN BOGO BRIL SAOP
BUEN CARA GUAT LIMA
H/MA MONT PRIN QUIT
RIOD SAGO SJOS SDOM
TEGU MEXI LAPA SALV
PACY GAYA GORG SECI
WAVE KOLA OTTA

IN 30598

RADNOTE

BOOK MESSAGE

1. MIHV NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AKAHET AND AUTHORIZED HANDLE ODYOKE CLASSIFIED CLEAR TEXT. ROUTING INDICATOR RUQSHM ASSIGNED.

2. OTTA NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AKAHET. ROUTING INDICATOR RUEIOW ASSIGNED. ONLY KUBARK TRAFFIC HANDLED BY OTTAWA.

END OF MESSAGE

OC-S - JB

OC-T - [illegible]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

OC-AD
RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

OC-AD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Margaret Ragler
ERAA/AP
5151
16 Dec. 63

SECRET

☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-760633

TOKYO MEXI MANILA HONG KONG

21 DEC 63 21 37z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TOKY ~~XXXXXX~~ MEXI INFO MANI, HONG, ~~MEXICO-CITY~~ CITE DIR 90761

REQUEST TRACES HENRY YAMADA, CIT US, PTOB CALIFORNIA 1923, JAPAN 1946-48 USARMY OCCUPATION FORCES, MEXICO CITY C. 1950-55 FREE LANCE PHOTOGRAPHER, TRAVELED JAPAN, ~~IN~~ MANILA, HONGKONG WITH AGENCE FRANCE PRESS BETWEEN 1956-62.
NO OBJECTION LIAISON CHECKS PROVIDE NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST SHOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/3
WH/Mexico
FE/HongKong
FE/Manila
FE/Japan
C/ERAA/AP
DDP/AA
C/FE
ERAA/COPS

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, DODS/L, DOD3 4, SPOG 2, CI/OPS, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 151758Z

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6536

15 Oct 63 IN 40401

PBRUMEN HTBASTE

1. WHILE IN NEW YORK 7 OCTOBER CONTACTING CUBAN EXILES WITH POSSIBLE LINKS MEXI, LITAMIL-3 HAD CHANCE ENCOUNTER AND CHATTED BRIEFLY WITH ANTONIO DE SOUZA CARBAJAL, MEMBER CUBAN UN DELEGATION. ON OWN INITIATIVE, L-3 SUGGESTED DEFECTION TO WHICH DE SOUZA REPLIED HE MERELY PERFORMING HIS DUTY AND VERY FRIGHTENED. DE SOUZA DID STATE HE WOULD TALK WITH L-3 AGAIN IN FUTURE UNDER SECURE CIRCUMSTANCES. L-3 DESCRIBES DE SOUZA AS "A KEY MAN."

2. REQUEST TRACES, COMMENTS, ADVICE ON ANOTHER TRIP BY L-3 TO N.Y. FOR PURPOSE TALKING DE SOUZA.

S E C R E T

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

S E C R E T 191917Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 6587

TYPAT RRRUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA BENITO RUIZ GUARDILCA. DOB 1[illegible] JAN [illegible], LOS ARABOS, MATANZAS. WIFE OFELIA [illegible] RUIZ, BORN SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR, HAVANA PROVINCE. MANAGER NACIONAL TRAVEL SERVICE, HOTEL NACIONAL, HAVANA. FOUNDER AMERICAN SOCIETY TRAVEL AGENTS (ASTA). ACQUIRED AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP EARLY YOUTH, RELINQUISHED CIRCA 1930. NO LIVING CHILDREN. GRANDDAUGHTER [illegible] LIVES NEAR SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS. GRANDDAUGHTER JENNY LAVIN AND GRANDSON JOHN P. RUIZ LIVE MIAMI. THIRTY-THIRD DEGREE MASON.

2. SUBJECT IS SOLE CUBAN DELEGATE ASTA CONVENTION MEXI [illegible] 21 THRU 28 OCTOBER. ALLOWED TRAVEL DUE PRESTIGE AS FOUNDER ASTA, PRESIDENT CARIBBEAN AREA, AND DEAN ALL HAVA TRAVEL AGENTS. STATES HAS ACCESS TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRAVEL INFO, INCL PRIOR NOTICE MUCH OF LATTER. CLAIMS VALUABLE INFORMATION SOURCE IN NATIONAL POST OFFICE, ESPECIALLY CENSORSHIP SECTION. SAYS HAS ASSISTED ANTI-CASTRO PERSONS BY FORCING VISAS. KNOWLEDGEABLE BLOC TECHS LIVING HOTEL NACIONAL.

SECRET

14-00000

APPROACH TO SUBJECT FACILITATED DUE CASUAL ACQUAINTANCE WITH [illegible] IN [illegible]ANA 1959. SUBJECT AGREES COOPERATE AND COMMUNICATE VIA S/W. PRQ PART I BEING FORWARDED. NO NEXT TRACES.

SECRET

APPROACH TO SUBJECT FACILITATED BY CASUAL ACQUAINTANCE [illegible]

[illegible] 1959. SUBJECT AGREES COOPERATE AND

COMMUNICATE VIA [illegible]. PRQ PART I BEING FORWARDED. NO TRACES.

SECRET

[illegible]

1
2
3

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 222330Z 23 OCT 63 IN 45573

DIR INFO WAVE MNTY CITE MEXI 5620

PERUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA JORGE ANTONIO ABASOLO GARCIA, CUBAN,
DOB 1927, INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER, GRADUATE GEORGIA TECH, ADDRESS
CALLE 96 OXABER 308 TELEPHONE 2-6301, MIRAMAR, HAVANA. SUBJ DIVORCED
FROM MARIE PAZ SOMEILLAN WHO NOW REPORTED LIVING WITH TWO CHILDREN
AGES 5 AND 7 IN MNTY. SUBJ CHIEF OF DIVISION IN MINISTRY INDUSTRIES.
WORKS CLOSELY WITH ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA. CONTROLS WOOD FURNITURE
INDUSTRY, PORTION OF PAPER INDUSTRY INCLUDING PAPER SACKS, TOY
INDUSTRY, ONE OTHER UNSPECIFIED INDUSTRY. HAS HAD SOME CONTACT WITH
SOVIETS IN CONNECTION WITH CEMENT PROCUREMENT. RECENTLY REPORTED
BELIEF SOVS CONSTRUCTING SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA. CAME TO MEXICO
ON SPECIAL PASSPORT 2 AUG 63 TO SEE CHILDREN BUT FORMER WIFE MANAGED
PREVENT CONTACT. RETURNED CUBA 21 AUG.

2. BROTHER OF SUBJ IS GUSTAVO ABASOLO, CUBAN, ABOUT 42, LEFT
CUBA ABOUT
1959 OR 1960 GOING FIRST TO BERMUDA, LATER TO MEXICO.
EMPLOYED CONTINOUSLY 22 YEARS COMPANIA INTERAMERICANA DE SEGUROS.
NOW ASSISTANT MANAGER SALES FOR MEXICO. STRONGLY ANTI-CASTRO,
FRIEND OF AMSEVER-2. CORRESPONDS WITH SUBJ THROUGH NETHERLANDS
H
EMBASSY DIPLOMATIC POUCH. AT STATION REQUEST THROUGM A-2 GUSTAVO

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

14-00000

RECENTLY ASKED SUBJ IF WOULD BE WILLING FURNISH "CERTAIN INFORMATION" FOR A-2 WHOM SUBJ KNOWS AS ANTI-CASTRO. SUBJ GAVE TENTATIVE AGREEMENT BUT ASKED HOW FAR DO YOU WANT ME TO GO?

3. SUBJ PLANNING TO LEAVE CUBA AT END OF YEAR, DISILLUSIONED WITH REGIME. BELIEVE STATION MIGHT BE ABLE PERSUADE HIM STAY IN PLACE.

4. DIVORCED MOTHER OF EX-WIFE HAS RE-MARRIED TO JOAQUIN MIRABAL, COMMUNIST; FORMER "CHIEF OF SECURITY SERVICE" HAVANA, RECENTLY PROMOTED TO MORE IMPORTANT POSITION.

5. ABOVE INFO FROM GUSTAVO ABASOLO, FLESHED OUT BY A-2 WHO MET SUBJ DURING AUGUST SOJOURN MEXI. NO STATION TRACES ANY PERSONS MENTIONED HEREIN EXCEPT FOR CONFIRMATION SUBJ TRAVEL. LIFIRE LISTS SHOW HE CARRIED SPECIAL PASSPORT G3/442, SHOW HIS ADDRESS AS CALLE 34 NUMBER 1712, MARIANAO.

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

[illegible]
Federal Personnel Manual Ch. 293

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

[redacted]

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS [illegible] **BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE**

SECRET

Handle With Care

Fox, Jerome
PO Box 593514 AMF
Miami, FL 33159

Rel. in 75

23 February 1977

Mr. Jerome Fox
P.O. Box 593514 AMF
Miami, Florida 33159

Dear Mr. Fox:

Enclosed is correspondence received in the Agency to be forwarded to you. Pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974, we have made no response. In accordance with our policy, the request is mailed to you for any personal attention you wish to give it.

Sincerely,

/S/

Abraham Schwartz
Chief, Control Division

Dist.
Orig. - Adse.
1 - TRB
1 - OPF/FOX, Jerome
OP/TRB/PCS/GSmith:jjs(23Feb77)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Glenn D. Smith

EXTENSION: 5695

NO.

DATE: 02/22/77

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OC/TRB				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

Mr. Jerome Fox
P. O. Box 593514 AMF
Miami, FL 33159

Dear Mr. Fox

Enclosed is correspondence received in the Agency to be forwarded to you. Pursuant tothe Privacy Act of 1974, we have made no response. In accordance ~~ix~~ with our policy, the request is mailed to you for any personal attention you wish to give it.

Sincerely,

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

21 [illegible] 1975

Mr. Jerome Fox
2004 Wellfleet Court
Falls Church, Virginia 22043

Dear Mr. Fox:

I am happy to send to you, under separate cover, your Agency Retirement Medallion. The Medallion is a tangible form of recognition and appreciation of your service to the Agency. It should serve as a lasting reminder of an honorable career, rewarding associations and the knowledge that you played your part in a vital activity.

Let me, therefore, add my congratulations and wish you the very best for the future.

Sincerely,

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

14-00000

Executive Registry
75-6755

APR 1975

Mr. Jerome Fox
2004 Wellfleet Court
Falls Church, Virginia 22043

Dear Mr. Fox:

As you bring to a close your active career of service to your country, I join your friends and colleagues in wishing you well in your retirement.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I extend to you my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done.

Sincerely,

W. E. C

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - OPF

Originator: Director of Personnel

OP/RAD/ROB/JFalatko:jat/3287 (25 April 1975)

14-00000

DL 41 23 MAY 75

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

REF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017379

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (DISABILITY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM FROM FSL

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 DA 16 YR 75

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 5237 1392 0414

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 231

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION:

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: JCOP

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D40

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: 25451

18. REMARKS:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 MAY 1975

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 017974 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, JEROME ✓

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT - DISABILITY - CIARDS FROM EXTENDED SICK LEAVE

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 | DAY 14 | YEAR 75

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE / FAN AND NSCA: 5237-1392-0000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643, Section 231

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/EA DIVISION DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: DCOF

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DMG ✓

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13/6

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 25,451 ✓

18 REMARKS

LWD: 6 SEPTEMBER 1974

Co-ordinated with Frank Driscoll/ROB
22 May 1975.

CMG/MSB: _______ 5-2-75

ROB ______________________

5/5/75

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert E. O'Brien
MICHAEL PAVYLAK, CEA/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 5/05/75

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CMG/

DATE SIGNED: 6 May 75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 8(?)

20 EMPLOYEE CODE: 90

21 STATION CODE: [redacted] [redacted]

22 STATION CODE: [redacted]

26 DATE OF BIRTH: 10 07 03 ✓

30 SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0,85,00,0,0

IDO DATA

1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SL 5-27-75

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 September 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Fox, Jerome

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Extended Sick Leave
~~Pending~~ Disablity Retirement
NTE: 14 MAY 75

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 06 YEAR 74

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND FOCA: 5237-1392 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/EA Division
Development Complement

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DMG

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: 21,122

18. REMARKS:

LWD: 6 September 1974

HB: EA

Pending Disability Retirement

Reassigned from DDO/EA/JK/K Position 4408

Kathleen R. Ball
MSB/MPC

*OTHER

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert E. O'Brien
Michael Pavlyak CEA/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 09/04/74

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

CMG/~~MPD~~ 12

DATE SIGNED: 6 Sept 74

F
42

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

DATE OF BIRTH: 10 09 28

SL

EOD DATA

OF 9/12/74

SECRET

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT

Mr. Jerome Fox

1955-1962: Economic Analyst - Conducted research and analysis including statistical studies of Sino-Soviet Bloc production of military equipment and related materials. Duties included the collection of economic intelligence information; briefings and debriefings; training of human sources in Latin America and Asia; the preparation of inter-departmental studies and the development of technical devices to aid in the collection of economic intelligence.

1963-1974: Intelligence Operations Officer - Served in various staff, supervisory and liaison capacities on U.S. and Asian area assignments. Was primarily concerned with the collection, evaluation and reporting of high priority intelligence of national interest including economic, political, social and military aspects of nations where assigned. Conducted liaison with foreign government officials, law enforcement officers, senior military officers, influential businessmen and an array of socio-political and religious leaders who had knowledge of interest to the U.S. Government and some of whom were in a position to influence their governments and mold public opinion in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Supervised a staff of as many as 10 Americans and foreign nationals and provided guidance and assistance to colleagues involved in similar activities. At various times was responsible for the staffing, budgeting and management of major programs and projects.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 September 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Fox, Jerome
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 05 YEAR 74
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 5237-1392 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/EA Division Development Complement
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DMG
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 24,122

18. REMARKS

*HB:EA

Reassigned from: DDO/EA/JK/K Position #4408

Pending Disability Retirement

*OTHER

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert E O'Brien
Michael Pavlyak CEA/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 09/10/74

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CMG/MID
DATE SIGNED: 11 Sept 74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45717 ALPHABETIC EA
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA 09 YR 38
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. LEI EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CIA 2-CSRA 3-FICA 4-NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV. PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1-WAIVED 2-REG/OPT 3-INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: OK 9/10/74
46. O P APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 9/13/74

FORM 9-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET CLASSIFIED BY 01-0332

E2 IMPDET

ADMINISTRATIVE

6 SEP 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Jerome Fox

THROUGH : Head of D Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Disability Retirement

1. This is to inform you that the Director of Personnel has approved your request for disability retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System. On the basis of medical evidence, the Director of Personnel has determined that your disability is of a permanent nature; therefore, no further medical review of your case will be required.

2. Your retirement will become effective 14 May 1975, the expiration date of your accrued sick leave. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative details required to effect your retirement.

Ronald Gage
Chief
Retirement Affairs Division

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D Career Service
1 - OMS
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/WFMadigan:jat/3257 (5 September 1974)

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

2 JUL 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Board of Medical Examiners

SUBJECT : Request for Medical Evaluation - Mr. Jerome Fox

1. Subject, a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System, has applied for disability retirement under the provisions of Section 231 of Public Law 88-643, Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees. It is requested that a medical examination be arranged for Subject and that a written report of the Board of Medical Examiners as prescribed in paragraph f.(4) of HR 20-50 be submitted to the Director of Personnel.

2. Attached are copies of the Supervisor's Statement and the Application for Disability Retirement. The Office of Personnel has been advised by the Office of Medical Services that a private physician's statement has been forwarded directly to them.

3. Mr. Fox will remain on duty pending a decision on his application for retirement.

for R. L. Austin, Jr.
Deputy Director of Personnel
for Special Programs

Attachments:
a. Supervisor's Statement
b. Application

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Folder

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

OP/RAD/ROB/WFMadigan:jat/3257 (28 June 1974)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 JANUARY 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 20 YEAR 74
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 4237-1374-0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/EAST ASIA DIVISION [illegible]
JAPAN AND KOREA BRANCH
KOREA SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (13)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4418 ~~4409~~
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $24,122
18. REMARKS:

FROM: EA/PMI #4024

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ERNEST L. HARDT, CEA/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 1/11/74
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CM/17
DATE SIGNED: 7 Jan 74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 4500 ALPHABETIC EA
22. STATION CODE: 7013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. ROSTERS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RES/PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: MCB 1.8.74
46. C.P. APPROVAL: William B
DATE APPROVED: 1.9.74

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 OCTOBER

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 14 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF ☐
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4237-1374-0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/EA DIVISION
P.I., MALAYSIA, INDONESIA BRANCH
PHILIPPINE SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (D-13)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4024
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 6 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 24,132 $ ~~23,828~~ 23,945
18. REMARKS:

FROM: DDO/EA/PMI/MS/#4939/MANILA, P.I.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: William H. Bright
ERNEST L. HARDT, C/EA/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 10/2/73
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 10-4-73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 70
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 4514 ALPHABETIC EA
22. STATION CODE: 7013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOOTERS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG./OPT. 2—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: WEB 10-4-73
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 9 OCT 73

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET CLASSIFIED BY 01-0332

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) FOX, Jerome	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* W-Mary A.	CLAIM NUMBER 74-0194

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 1 July 1973.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 11 Sept 1973	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 11-72 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

(4-21-33)

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENTS	CLAIM NUMBER
FOX, Jerome	Self	74-0096

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 30 June 1973.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
27 August 1973	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 11-72 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) FOX, Jerome	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* SELF	CLAIM NUMBER 72-0959

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 18 February 1972.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 9 May 72	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

/6 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(4-21-31)

14-00000

SECRET

1-2164

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans 20 [illegible]

THROUGH : Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Departure Short of Tour and Home Leave - Mr. Jerome Fox

REFERENCE : CSN 20-89, PERSONNEL, 16 April 1971

1. Paragraph four contains a recommendation for your approval.

2. Mr. Jerome Fox is a GS-13 Operations Officer who has been assigned to the Manila Station since 20 May 1969. His current tour will end on 19 May 1971; his request for a second tour after home leave has been approved.

3. Mr. Fox's wife has acrophobia and does not fly. In view of her condition she has been authorized round-trip travel by sea. The Division has authorized Mr. Fox and children to accompany her on the voyage from Manila to the U. S.

4. Manila Station advises that the Fox Family can be accommodated on a ship scheduled to sail from Manila on 3 May. In order to make the sailing, Mr. Fox would have to depart post before completion of his tour. The Far East Division recommends approval for Mr. Fox to depart Manila short of tour for home leave.

William E. Nelson
Chief, Far East Division

CONCUR:

Director of Personnel

30 April 1971
Date

The request contained in Paragraph four is APPROVED:

Deputy Director for Plans

3 [illegible] 71
Date

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 AUGUST 1970

F
22

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, JEROME ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 21 | YEAR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS:

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1137-1639
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FOREIGN FIELD — Manila Station
FE/PMI - [redacted]
[redacted]
Unilateral Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MANILA, ~~PI~~ Philippine Is

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS. OFFICER (14)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4945
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 18,437.

18. REMARKS:
FROM: SAME/4947

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: James R. Doherty, Jr.
Chief, FE Personnel
DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 4 AUG 1970

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	4544	FE	57557		3	10 09 25		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIACR 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. DIST. PROV. TEMP.; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 08.21.70 JJK
46. O.P. APPROVAL: James B. [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 08.21.70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 AUGUST 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH / DAY / YEAR
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR	6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1137-1639	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD FE/PHI - UNILATERAL BRANCH MANILA STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MANILA, P.I.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS. OFFICER 2-14	12. POSITION NUMBER: 4945
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D	14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 18,437.	

18. REMARKS

FROM: SAME/4947

/s/ James R. Doherty, Jr.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: James R. Doherty, Jr. Chief, FE Personnel	DATE SIGNED: 18 AUG 1970
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY. CODE | 21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 HOURS CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) | 26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OTHER, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) CODE | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 37 LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RES., PROV. TEMP. CODE) | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0—WAIVED, 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 CLEAR CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION | 46 O.P. APPROVAL | DATE APPROVED

FORM 3-62 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

F
22

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 April 1969

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 02 YEAR 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ XX CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9137-1639
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE
FOREIGN FIELD
FE PMI - MANILA STATION
Liaison Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MANILA, PHILIPPINE IS
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS. OFFICER 49(13)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4947
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 15,369.

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/FE PMI/PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, INDONESIA/PHILIPPINE SECTION/4024

Mr. Fox is replacing Mr. James Gillis who is being reassigned.

Home Base: FE

Security [illegible] 4-16-69
5-1-69

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Mary T. Boulger C/FE Personnel
DATE SIGNED: 29 APR 1969
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 29 Apr 69

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 13441 ALPHABETIC FE
22. STATION CODE: 57551
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HEADTRS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 07 YR. 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 04-30-69 JRR
44. O P APPROVAL: Carmen B. Russell
DATE APPROVED: 04-30-69

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

F
8

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 April 1969

F
8

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, Jerome
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 06 YEAR 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9137-1375
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE PMI - PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, INDONESIA
PHILIPPINE SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: [redacted] OPS OFFICER (13)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4024
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): [redacted] GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: [redacted] 13 [redacted] 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: [redacted] $ 15,369
18. REMARKS:
I Wash, D.C.
Vin Div/FE

FROM: Same

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Mary Y. Boulger C/FE Personnel
DATE SIGNED: 4/11/69
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 11 April 69

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 56
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45 146 ALPHABETIC FE
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. ROOTES CODE:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: 10 09 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 04-11-69 CBR
45. OP APPROVAL: Carrie B. Russell
DATE APPROVED: 04-11-69

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 16 OCTOBER 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 20 YEAR 68

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9137 1375

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/PMI - PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, INDONESIA
PHILIPPINE SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE:
CON OFF VICE CONSUL W/C
OPS OFFICER (D-13)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 4024

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP:
05/5
13/3

17. SALARY OR RATE:
$13,330
$15,369

18. REMARKS:
FROM: SAME (GS-13/6 to GS-13/3)

Gaynell Callaf

1 cy to FE/DAF

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Mary T. Boulger C/FE/Pers

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 11 Oct 1968

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 03

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45149 ALPHABETIC FI

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE: 5

24. CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 10 10 1920

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE

42. LEAVE CAT.

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA

44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46. OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

A

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Career Service Board

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion from GS-12 to GS-13 for Mr. Jerome A. Fox

1. FE Division recommends the promotion of Mr. Jerome A. Fox from GS-12 to GS-13.

2. Mr. Fox first joined the Agency in 1955 in the DDI. He rose rapidly from GS-07 to GS-12 which grade he achieved in March 1961. He spent one overseas tour in Tokyo in the Factory Markings Program. In April 1963 he transferred to the DDP. This action and the adjustments it necessitated have undoubtedly held him back from the normal career advancement to be expected for one of his ability.

3. In the DDP Mr. Fox first served in Vietnam Operations in Headquarters and then from 1964-1966 in Saigon. There he performed effectively in both liaison and unilateral operations with elements of the Vietnamese police. He personally recruited several agents and established a successful mail intercept unit. He was first recommended for promotion to GS-13 during his Vietnam tour.

4. In November 1966 Mr. Fox joined FE/PMI, first on the Indonesian and currently on the Philippine Desk. He has served as the Indonesia Desk and Branch referent for Communist Party Operations, where he proved himself to be an excellent analyst. He has also served as a desk officer handling a variety of projects. He has performed his duties in a consistently strong manner, and has shown sound operational judgment. Mr. Fox writes well, and gets along extremely well with his co-workers and contacts. He is now scheduled for a field assignment in Manila in 1969. In view of his strong Headquarters desk performance and his previous recommendation from Vietnam, Mr. Fox was recommended for promotion again in February 1968.

5. Mr. Fox is an experienced and competent Headquarters and field operations officer. He has repeatedly demonstrated his ability to perform at the GS 13 level. In consideration of his fine record of productivity I recommend that he be promoted to GS-13.

William E. Nelson

William E. Nelson
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 May 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 017974

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): ~~XXX~~ FOX, JEROME

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 19 YEAR 68

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V XX | CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8137-1375

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/PMI - Philippines, Mayaysia, Indonesia
Philippine Section

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Consular Off/Vice Consul w/c
OPS OFFICER (P)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 4025

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FUR
GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 5/5
12/5

17 SALARY OR RATE: 12,604
$12,989

18 REMARKS:

FROM: DEVELOPMENT COMP.
SLOT WAS VACANT

X Wash, DC

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: MARY T. BUTLER CFE/Pers

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 10 May 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

IDD DATA

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

[illegible]

30 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Career Management Committee

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion from GS-12 to GS-13 of Mr. Jerome Fox

1. This office wishes to reiterate its previous endorsement of the Saigon Station's recommendation for the promotion of Mr. Fox from GS-12 to GS-13.

2. Mr. Fox was initially assigned to the Indonesian Desk as an Operations Officer responsible for Headquarters support of the Djakarta Station's Communist Party Operations Program. This was a demanding task requiring sound operational judgment, experience, and the capacity to absorb large quantities of operational data and information. Despite no prior background in Indonesia, Mr. Fox quickly got on top of the material and projects and made a valuable contribution. He also had other duties concerned with support for other Station unilateral activity.

3. Mr. Fox was subsequently assigned to the Philippines Desk in preparation for an assignment to the Philippines as chief of a separate field unit in Cebu. His work on the Philippines Desk in support of Manila Station operations was also marked by a high degree of professionalism and competence.

4. Mr. Fox is a capable and experienced Operations Officer. He has proven in Vietnam a unique ability to develop valuable operational assets(he was the case officer charged with sensitive contacts with the Vietcong), and his work in this Branch has been excellent. In view of this good record of productivity, and as a stimulus for future development, I strongly recommend that Mr. Fox be promoted to GS-13.

John P. Kennedy
Acting Chief, FE/PMI

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 November 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, Jerome
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Suspension (For three working days)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 01 YEAR 68 BOB
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO C | C TO V | C TO C
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8137-1375
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE Development Complement
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Vice Consul / Ops Officer
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 5 5 / 12 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12,874 / $ 12,203

18. REMARKS: Form 1150 Remarks:

Suspended for three (3) working days for infraction of Agency physical security regulations [redacted]. To return to duty BOB [redacted]. 4 April 1968 Employee is warned that further violations will be viewed with extreme seriousness.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Mary P. Boulger, FE/Pers
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul W. ...
DATE SIGNED: 25 Mar 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

EOD DATA

DATE APPROVED: 27 MAR 1968

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 NOVEMBER 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 01797~~8~~ 4

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, JEROME ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION - DEPARTMENT OF STATE

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 21 YEAR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO C ☐ C TO V ☒ C TO C

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8137 1375

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: CONSULAR OFFICER VICE CONSUL w/c OPS. OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		5 5	12,074
GS	0136.01	12 5	$ 12,443

18. REMARKS:

All SICK AND All HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED
DAU DOB: 22 NOV 59
SON DOB: 17 FEB 61

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: DANISH COVER OFFICER x5083

DATE SIGNED:

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SS | 18 | [illegible] FE | 75C13 | 1

FCC DATA

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 October 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER 017974	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) FOX, Jerome

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment and Transfer to Confidential Funds	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 11 ~~10~~ DAY 19 YEAR 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 8137-1392	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

46

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FE/Development Complement	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 5	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 12,443

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/FE/PMI/Indonesia Section/3977
Subject is being assigned to the Dev Comp NTE: 31 May 1968 for cover integration and training for overseas assignment.

*

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Mary T. Boulger, CFE/Pers	DATE SIGNED OCT 1967	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 3 Oct 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 30	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10 3	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 75997	ALPHABETIC FE	22. STATION CODE 25073	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. OCCUPAT. CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. [illegible] 32	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA	STATE CODE				
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED							

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 May 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, Jerome

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 21 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7237-1385
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/PMI - Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia
Indonesia Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer D-12
12. POSITION NUMBER: 3877
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 12,443

18. REMARKS:

FROM: DDP/FE/PMI/Philippine Section/Unilateral FI and CA Unit/4025

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Mary T. Boulger, CFE/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 5/15/67
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 7/18/67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45742 ALPHABETIC FE
22. STATION CODE: 25742
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 05-16:67K
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 05-18-67

FORM 4-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 October 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, Jerome
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Vouchered Funds
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 20 | YEAR 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7237-1385
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/PMI - Philippine, Malaysia, Indonesia
Philippine Section
UNILATERAL - FE AND CA UNIT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer D-12
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4025
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 12,443
18. REMARKS

FROM: FE/VNC/Saigon Station/Internal Ops Br/IOB Capital Ops Section/4608
Subject is occupying a vacant slot.

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 10/26/66
11/3/66

1 cy Security
1 cy FE/B&F

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: for Mary T. Boulger, C/FE/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 10/31/66
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 1 Nov 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45144 | ALPHABETIC FE
22. STATION CODE: 25613
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 | DA. 09 | YR. 25
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSR, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. | CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11 03-66N
46. O.P. APPROVAL: HMilton
DATE APPROVED: 11-03-66

FORM 3-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

F23

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 Sept 66

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 017974 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, JEROME

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 | DAY 25 | YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7137-1487

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAIGON, SOUTH VIET [illegible]

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS:

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY CODE | 21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 HOURS CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. | 26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR. | 27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 DATE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR. | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC, 2-FICA, 3-NONE; CODE: 2 | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE, MO. DA. YR. | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR. | 37 LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR. | 38 CAREER CATEGORY: CODE | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVED, 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS) | 42 LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 08-16-66

46 C.P. APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 2 SEP 1966

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 November 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 17974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137-1487
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE
FE/VNC - SAIGON STATION
~~[illegible]~~ INTERNAL OPS BRANCH
10B CAPITAL OPS SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAIGON, ~~VIETNAM~~ South Viet Nam
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER ~~([illegible])~~
12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~4402~~ 4608
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 11,315

18. REMARKS

Subject to Medical Approval.

FROM: DDP/FE
FE/DEV COMP [illegible], 27F

SECURITY [illegible] 11/5/64
[illegible] 12/1/64

ONE COPY TO SECURITY
ONE COPY TO CF PAYROLL

RECEIVED [illegible]
CSPD

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CALL X5459

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Robert L. Staten, CPS/Pers	DATE SIGNED 11/9/64	19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER A. Bunkley	DATE SIGNED 11-10-64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

20. ACTION CODE	21. EMPLOY. CODE	22. OFFICE CODES NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	23. STATION CODE	24. INTEGEE CODE	25. HQTRS. CODE	26. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	28. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
51	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]025		3	10 07 28		

29. [illegible] EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	30. SPECIAL REFERENCE	31. RETIREMENT DATA	CODE	32. SEPARATION DATA CODE	33. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	34. SECURITY REQ. NO.	35. SEX

36. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	37. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	39. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	40. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	HEALTH INS. CODE	41. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

42. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	43. LEAVE CAT. CODE	44. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	45. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED CODE NO. TAX EXEMPT STATE CODE

46. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION [illegible] 11/9/64 ②	47. CP APPROVAL A. Bunkley	DATE APPROVED 11-10-64

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 September 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, Jerome,
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION--Dept of State
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 9 DAY 18 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137-1392
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE CS/CS
Development Complement

27
F

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Foreign Service Reserve Off
Ops Off
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 5 2
12 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $10,290
$11,315
18. REMARKS:

All sick and All hours annual leave to be transferred to the Dept of State

MARITAL STATUS: Married
Dau - DOB: 22 Nov 59

Training

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: B Eggleston
B. Eggleston, Cover Officer, X5013
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 55
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 13
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45997 ALPHABETIC FE
22. STATION CODE: 75012
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. VOUCHER CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAREER PROV./TEMP.; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED, 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES, 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES, 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 09/21/64
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
8-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 September 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER	017974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	FOX, JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 9 DAY 13 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	5137-1392
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE CS/CS ~~FE~~/DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	12 @ 4
17. SALARY OR RATE	~~$10,960.~~ 11,315

27
4

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/FE
FE/VNC - VIETNAM, CAMBODIA
NORTH VIETNAM SECTION

Lay 17 F

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 9/9/64 Ug 9/11/64

SUBJECT (TO BE INTEGRATED) TO STATE DEPT PRIOR 21 SEPTEMBER 1964, TO ATTEND AID VIETNAM PROVINCIAL OFFICERS TRAINING PROGRAM FOR NINE MONTHS

ONE COPY TO SECURITY
ONE COPY TO VOUCHERED PAYROLL

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CALL X5459

Recorded by CSPD
SZL

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	Robert L. Staten, CFS/FERS
DATE SIGNED	9/11/64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	A. Busby
DATE SIGNED	9-11-64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
20	13	45922	FE	15213		1	10 09 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PTS. 2—10 PTS.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	FE 9/11/64
46. OP APPROVAL	A. Busby
DATE APPROVED	9-11-64

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation

TO: COLONEL FRED [illegible]
Commander, Det #4 (PACATIC)
1125th USAF Field Activities
(ATIC) APO 94

1. The successful outcome of the Aerospace Technical Intelligence Course conducted at Nichols Air Base, Pasay City, has been due to the indefatigable efforts exerted by the training team of your unit from 12 to 23 June 1961.

2. During that brief period your team displayed professional competence and mastery of the subject. They successfully imparted to the students vital data on the procedural aspects of gathering aerospace technical intelligence. Their extensive use of training films further enhanced the student's learning process and the practical training they gave in intelligence photography will go a long way in helping PAF personnel assimilate important technical aspects. They are, indeed, a credit to your organization.

3. It is, therefore, with great pleasure that I commend the following members of your team for the valuable services they rendered to the Philippine Air Force;

LT COL ROBERT O [illegible] 3004A
MAJOR ROBERT A TOLHURST [illegible]
MAJOR JOSEPH R [illegible] 16710A
CAPT RAYMOND L HAYES AO-2232914
MR. [illegible]
T/Sgt CHARLES F MILLER AF-18376590

4. It is requested that a copy of this commendation form part of each individual's military personnel record.

[illegible] A VICTORIA
Colonel PAF
Commanding Officer

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 MARCH 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT And change of Service Designation

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 1 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3237-1250-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/VCL - VIETNAM - CAMBODIA - LAOS
VIETNAM OPERATIONS SECTION
FI/CI OPERATIONS UNIT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 2608

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: ~~DI~~ D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 ~~2~~

17. SALARY OR RATE: $9790

18. REMARKS:
FROM: DDI/ORR
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FACTORY MARKINGS STAFF
ANALYSIS BRANCH/1564

ONE COPY TO SECURITY

Recorded by CSPD 3/21/63 DM

ty 1127

CONCUR: 15 Apr. 63
DDI/ORR
Date

CONCUR: Jerome Fox 15 Apr 63
Mr. Jerome Fox
Date

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CALL PAT X5459

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: LEE AUSTIN, CHIEF, FE/PERSONNEL

DATE SIGNED: 2 Mar 63

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul A. Wilson

DATE SIGNED: 18 Apr 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

20. ACTION CODE	21. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.
37	10	56160	FE	10013		1	10 09 29

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 4/25/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Paul A. Wilson

DATE APPROVED

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

8 Mar 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CSPO/Branch C

SUBJECT : Mr. Jerome Fox, Request for Reassignment from DDI/OCR to FE/VCL

1. The FE Division requests that arrangements be made with the DDI/OCR for the reassignment of Mr. Jerome Fox, GS-12, to the VCL Branch to work on the recently approved North Vietnam program. The Vietnam Desk of VCL has a requirement for an officer to devote full time to the collection, collation and evaluation of material available on North Vietnam. This material, once assembled, will be used as a basis for both paramilitary and psychological warfare operations to be mounted against North Vietnam. It is felt that Mr. Fox is particularly qualified for this assignment with his excellent background as a research officer and the experience gained on his Far East assignment in 1959-62. The knowledge he gained at that time of covert operations in relation to his DDI responsibilities will be helpful to him in the work envisioned for him in FE/VCL. Mr. Fox has traveled in Southeast Asia and also dealt with North Vietnam as an operational target during his military service 1952-54.

2. It is our understanding that Mr. Fox is available for reassignment. He has been interviewed by Division officers who feel his assignment would satisfy an important requirement on this priority program. It is requested that his assignment to FE/VCL, without a change in Service Designation, be arranged with DDI for approximately one year. At the end of that time, based on a review of Mr. Fox's capabilities and interest in relation to a permanent DDP assignment, the possibilities of a change of service designation would be explored.

Robert J. Myers
Acting Chief, Far East Division

Approved by C/PMC,
R.S. Sheay, Sect/PMC
15 MAR 1963

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 November 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): FOX, Jerome ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Vouchered Funds
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH [illegible] DAY [illegible] YEAR [illegible]
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF XX CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3257-1019-6000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/ORR
Office of the Assistant Director
Factory Markings Staff
Analysis Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: I.O. (Factory Markings)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1564
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IR
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1390.08 ~~0132.06~~
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 9,790
18. REMARKS

Attached are:
Form W-4, Employee's Withholding Exemption Certificate
Form D-4-A, Certificate of Non-Residence in the District of Columbia
Form Va.-4, Virginia Employee's Withholding Exemption Certificate
Copies to:
Payroll
Security

CR [illegible] 12/18/62

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES Q. MAY, Chief, SE/FM/RR
DATE SIGNED: 23 Nov. 62
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: OTTO E. GUTHE, AD/RR
DATE SIGNED: 17 DEC 196

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION: 16 ~~37~~
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 22100 ALPHABETIC ORR
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. VETERANS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 28
26. DATE OF GRADE:
27. DATE OF LEI:
28. NTE EXPIRES:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE
36. SERV. COMP. DATE
37. LONG. COMP. DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
42. MILITARY SERV. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46. C.P. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 18 Dec 62

FORM 2-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) [illegible]	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER 62-303

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on [illegible].

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 2 JUL 1962	SIGNATURE OF [illegible] REPRESENTATIVE B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-64 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 March 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER 517974	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) FOX, Jerome

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Promotion	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 3 DAY 14 YEAR 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 1137-7000-6135	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS Office of DDI (Tokyo) Strategic Intelligence Staff	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE IO-Factory Mark	12. POSITION NUMBER ~~1~~-96	12a. PCR CONTROL NO.	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION IR
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1390.~~06~~ .08	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 1	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 8955

18. REMARKS

FROM: Same as above

Approved by DDI - per attached memo

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL ROBERT D. CASHMAN, CFE PERSONNEL	19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

20. ACTION CODE	21. EMPLOYEE CODE	22. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	23. STATION CODE	24. [illegible]	25. [illegible] CODE	26. DATE OF BIRTH		27. DATE OF GRADE	28. DATE OF LEI
22	10	73 539	0121	39587		3	10 9 28		[illegible]	[illegible]

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

3/27

46. O/P APPROVAL

DV Mulcahy MD 3/29

FORM 1152

SECRET

23 FEB 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH: Chief, FE, DD/P

THROUGH: Assistant to the DD/I (Administration)

SUBJECT: FOX, Jerome -- Promotion

1. It is requested that Mr. Jerome Fox be promoted from GS-11 to GS-12. Mr. Fox is currently assigned to Tokyo on the DD/I Foreign Field Annex. He entered the zone of consideration for promotion in October of 1958.

2. Mr. Fox was assigned to Tokyo in July of 1959 to serve as the Factory Markings Officer. He has displayed expertise and professional competence in the markings field, functioning in an outstanding manner as the authoritative focal point for the program in the North Asian area. This request for promotion was initiated by the Chief, SIS, Tokyo, and favorably endorsed by the COS, Tokyo. The Chief of the Factory Markings Staff, ORR, who recently returned from a visit to the Tokyo Station, personally observed Mr. Fox's effective working relationships with U.S. officials and foreign liaison in Tokyo, Taipei, and Hong Kong. Mr. Fox has demonstrated high devotion to duty and displayed a high degree of initiative and self-reliance.

3. Upon completion of Mr. Fox's overseas assignment, he will return to the ORR Departmental Staffing Complement in a position commensurate with the grade to which promotion is recommended.

SUBJECT: FOX, Jerome -- Promotion

4. It is requested that FE/DD/P initiate the appropriate request for personnel action and that processing of this promotion action be accomplished as soon as possible. It is also requested that a copy of the 1150 be forwarded to this Office.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ORR:

PAUL H. HILDEBRAND
Chief, Administrative Staff

CONCURRENCES:

Assistant to the DD/I (Administration) — 3/1/61 Date

Chief, FE Division — 3/10/61 Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

Date Prepared (Mo, Da, Yr)				V to V / UV to V	V to UV / UV to UV
1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) FOX, JEROME	3. Date of Birth (Mo Da Yr) 10 09 25	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pts.-1, 10 Pts.-2) Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD (Mo Da Yr)
7. SCD (Mo Da Yr)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo Da Yr)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1	12. LCD (Mo Da Yr) · 13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD (Yes-1, No-2) Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

3

14. Organizational Designations DDI OPR FACTORY MARKINGS STAFF EQUIPMENT ANALYSIS BRANCH	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Wash., D.C.	Station Code
16. Dept.-Field (Dept's, Field, Frgn) Code 2	17. Position Title Identification Spec.	18. Position No. S23.01	19. Serv. CS · 20. Occup. Series 1390.06
21. Grade & Step 11 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 7,270	23. SD IR · 24. Date Of Grade (Mo Da Yr) 10 20 57	25. PSI Due (Mo Da Yr) 10 16 60 · 26. Appropriation Number 9 5709 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment + Transfer to Confidential Fund	Code 61	28. Eff. Date (Mo Da Yr) 07 26 59	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

3

31. Organizational Designations OFFICE OF DDI (TOKYO) ~~CRR STAFF~~ Strategic Intelligence Staff	Code 1325	32. Location Of Official Station Tokyo, Japan	Station Code 37577
33. Dept.-Field (Dept's, Field, Frgn) Code 3	34. Position Title I.O. Factory Mark	35. Position No. S-96	36. Serv. · 37. Occup. Series
38. Grade & Step 11 - 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 7270	40. SD · 41. Date Of Grade (Mo Da Yr) 10 20 57	42. PSI Due (Mo Da Yr) 10 16 60 · 43. Appropriation Number 9-5?-401 ~~[illegible]~~

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) William ... [illegible]	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) Robert D. Cannon, C/E/Personnel
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Jeanelle Little, X2957	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	C	7-1-59	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	7/1/59

Remarks: [illegible]

2 copies Security
Please transfer from (vouchered to unvouchered) funds on 26 July 1959.
Subject to replace Walter Little, who is returning to 27 Sept. 1959.

FORM 1152 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) Fox Jerome	3. Date Of Birth Mo Oct Da 9 Yr 28	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDI/Office of Research & Reports Factory Markings Staff Equipment Analysis Branch	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - X Unfld. Fran. Code	17. Position Title Identification Specialist	18. Position No. 923.01	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1370.06

21. Grade & Step 9-2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 5575.	23. SD IR	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 8-5709-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Promotion	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr ASAP	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDI/Office of Research & Reports Factory Markings Staff Equipment Analysis Branch	Code	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - X Unfld. Fran. Code	34. Position Title Identification Specialist	35. Position No. 923.01	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 1370.06

38. Grade & Step 11-1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6390.	40. SD IR	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo 7 Da 12 Yr 57	43. Appropriation Number 8-5709-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
JAMES Q. MAY, Chief, St/FM/RR

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
WILLIAM C. CASEY x2465

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
PAUL H. HILDEBRAND
Chief, Administrative Staff, ORR

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

Form 1152e

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

21 JUN 1956

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. XXXXXX One given name, initial(s), and surname): JEROME FOX

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct 1928

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 12 June 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

A. PROPOSED: ASAP

B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Identification Specialist F-925.09 (99(67))	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Identification Specialist F-924.08 (99(64))
GS-1390.06-07 $4660 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE AND SALARY	GS-1390.06-09 $5440.00 per annum
DDI/Office of Research and Reports Office of Chief, Coordination Techniques and Methods Division Analysis and Reports Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Research and Reports Office of Chief, Coordination Techniques and Methods Division Analysis and Reports Branch
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Complies with CIA Regulation 20-530

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): JAMES Q. MAY, Chief, D/T

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): WILLIAM C. COOLEY x 2485

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature: PAUL H. HILDEBRAND

Title: Chief, Administrative Staff, ORR

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE | 5 PT. | OTHER | 10 PT. | DISAB. | OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I.A. | REAL

3D/IR

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION

FROM: 7-8704-20

TO: 7-8704-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO):

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE DUE 17 Jun 56

TO SALARY $ 4660

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		22 JUN 1956	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		6-25-56	
E			

F. APPROVED BY

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ENTRANCE ON DUTY NOTICE

1. DATE: 22 June 1955

2. TO: Mr. Cooley

3. OFFICE (Division, Branch, Etc.): DDI/ORR

4. THE PERSON NAMED BELOW MEETS THE STANDARDS FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THIS AGENCY SUBJECT TO THE TYPE OF CLEARANCE INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9. THE SIGNED CLEARANCE FROM I&S FOR ENTRANCE ON DUTY HAS BEEN MADE A PART OF THE PERSONNEL FILE OF THIS INDIVIDUAL. HE/SHE IS REPORTING FOR DUTY THIS DATE.

5. NAME (Last) Fox (First) Jerome (Middle)

6. JOB TITLE AND GRADE: Ident. Spec. GS-7

7. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ACTION: 15 June 1955

8. ☒ E.O.D.
☐ REASSIGNMENT
OTHER:

9. TYPE CLEARANCE: Provisional

10. REMARKS: (Include Medical or Other Limitations)

Subject to EOD, testing, 24 June 1955.

H.O. Reynolds
PERSONNEL OFFICE

DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL AND COPY (WHITE) TO ITEM NO. 3. COPY (PINK) TO PERSONNEL FOLDER.

FORM NO. 37-110 PREVIOUS EDITIONS [illegible] TO BE USED
NOV 1952

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED 16 FEB 1955

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. ~~XXXXX~~ —One given name, initial(s), and surname): JEROME FOX

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct 1928

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 2 Feb 55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Excepted Appointment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
		8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Identification Specialist F-925.~~33~~.99
		9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1390.06-07 $4205.00 per annum
		10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Research and Reports Office of Chief, Coordination Techniques and Methods Division Analysis and Reports Branch
		11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Attachments:
~~1 Interview Sheet~~
/ 3 cys. PHS
2 cys. PHS (Appendix I)
3 pictures
2 cys. Report of Medical History
/ 2 cys. of Letter of Commendation

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Paul H. Hildebrand
PAUL H. HILDEBRAND, Admin. Officer, ORR

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): WILLIAM C. COOLEY x 2425

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: L. S. Hitchcock
L. S. HITCHCOCK
Title: Executive, ORR

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: SD/IP

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM
TO 5-5709-20

18.

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 52 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES | INITIAL OR SIGNATURE | DATE | REMARKS

F. APPROVED BY:

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: JUN 9 1955

TO : Placement and Utilization Division, Personnel Office

FROM : Assistant Director, ORR

SUBJECT: JEROME FOX

The case of Jerome Fox, [illegible] a (provisionally) cleared applicant has been thoroughly reviewed and this Office does guarantee that the position to which he is to be assigned does fall within the personnel ceiling of ORR. Therefore, it is requested that the above-named individual be brought on duty as soon as possible.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ORR:

Paul [illegible] Hildebrand
Chief, Administrative Staff, ORR

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Placement and Utilization Division, O/P DATE: 21 April 1955
ATTEN : Miss McKenney

FROM : Personnel Officer, ORR

SUBJECT: FOX, Jerome - Request for Provisional Clearance

1. It is requested that a Provisional Clearance be granted for Mr. Jerome Fox to allow his entrance on duty at the earliest opportunity.

2. This Office is prepared to assign Mr. Fox to an unclassified project in the Library of Congress for the Techniques and Methods Division. It is the opinion of the Techniques and Methods Division that the material produced by this project will be advantageous to the Division.

William C. Cooley
WILLIAM C. COOLEY

St/A/RR
WCCooley:lp

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
2 - St/A/RR
2 - AD/RR

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 6 Sept 1974

FILE NO.: 6215

SS NUMBER: 102-22-9185

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 017974

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) EA

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: RETIREMENT

SUBJECT: FOX, Jerome

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify):

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2)

SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2)

EAA, CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

SUBMIT FORM 2088 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY:

Subject will be acknowledged as CIA for entire period of employment and is not to reveal specific places or locations of cover assignments.

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS

X EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD

X SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

NA EAA, CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

X RETURN ALL DESIGNATED DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.

X SUBMIT FORM 2088 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - [illegible]
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - [illegible]
COPY 4 - [illegible]
COPY 5 - [illegible]

SECRET

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

SECRET

IFICATION F ES' BLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

Date: 28 Sep 1973
FILE NO. 6415

TO: (Check)
x CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
x CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) ZA ~~XXXX~~

SS NUMBER: 102-22-9186
EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 017974
ID CARD NUMBER: HC-102 #25389

ATTN: Chief Support Staff
REF: Form 1322 dated 21 Sep 73

OFFICIAL COVER: x ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: FOX, JEROME
UNIT: Technical Services Group (Prov)

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

x ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE AUGUST 1959
☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)

x SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 3 (HHB 20-7)

x SUBMIT FORM 3254 Army W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

x SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HB 240-2e)

x SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HB 240-2e)

x EAA, CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II xx

x SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR AGZ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ________ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ (HHB 20-7)

EAA, CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

JUN 55-AUG 59-HQS/OVERT
AUG 59-NOV 62-JAPAN/DAC/DAFC
NOV 62-DEC 64-HQS/DAC
DEC 64-AUG 66-VIETNAM/DAC
AUG 66-NOV 67-HQS/DAFC
21 NOV 67-APR 69-HQS/STATE INT
MAY 69-SEP 73-~~HE~~ PHILIPPINES/DAFC
24 SEP 73-HQS/DAFC

DISTRIBUTION:
[illegible]
[illegible] OPERATING COMPONENT
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

JB/ae

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

51 [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 26 August 1966

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) FE

ESTABLISHED FOR: FOX, Jerome (NMI)

ATTN: FE/Security

FILE NO. 6415

REF: Form 1322 dated 24 August 1966

ID CARD NO. 8575

OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: USAF Technical Services Group (Prov)

EMPLOYEE NO.

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ Block Record
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ____ days, effective ____________.

b. Continuing, effective as of August 1959.

☒ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category.
(HHB 20-7)

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover.
(R 240-250)

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility.
(R 240-250)

THIS [illegible] REMAIN

☐ Remarks:

☒ Cover History
Jun 1955-Aug 1959 Hdqs/Overt
Aug 1959-Oct 1961 Japan/DAC
Oct 1961-Nov 1962 Japan/DAFC
Nov 1962-Dec 1964 Hdqs/DAFC
Dec 1964-present Vietnam/DAC

RCB/ncz

Franklin

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-[illegible], Copy 4-[illegible], Copy 5-PSD/OS, Copy 6-[illegible], Copy 7-File

FORM 1551 [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE
8 November 1962

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT - ORR

ESTABLISHED FOR
FOX, Jerome

ATTN:
Administrative Staff

FILE NO.
K-2303

REF:
Verbal request for cover

ID CARD NO.

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
Technical Services Group, Provisional

☒ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPNEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________.

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

THIS [illegible] [illegible] REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

☐ COPY TO CPD/DP

Franklin

CGS/DD [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: 1 ORIG/OS, 1 [illegible] OS, 1 [illegible] COPY

FORM 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDIT [illegible]

SECRET

(13-40-43)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	45 997	V	GS 13 6	$25,451

SECRET

1 July 1959

File: K - 2303

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : **Jerome FOX**

1. Cover arrangements [redacted] have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 15 June 59, it is requested that your records be properly blocked [redacted] to deny [redacted] Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of 1 July 1959 by Mr. E. C. Davies, Room 1608, "L" Building, Extension 2420.

Joseph M. Adams
for HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS

SECRET

FORM 1580a

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

FOX JEROME 017974 42371374

DLM: 28 MAY 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

REF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017374
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (DISABILITY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM FROM ESL
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 DA 14 YR 75
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. FAN AND NSCA: 5237 1532 [illegible]
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 231
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/EA DIVISION DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: DCOF
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 25651
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 65
20. Employ Code: 4
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hqtrs Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA [illegible] YR 23
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1. CSC 2. CIA 3. FICA 4. NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0. NONE 1. 5 PT 2. 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR SEEV EXCP TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSUR: CODE 0. WAIVED 1. REG HEALTH
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0. NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1. NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2. BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3. BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1. YES 2. NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. 1. YES 2. NO

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET


FOX, Jerome

BBG: 25 SEPT 74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXTENDED SICK LEAVE - DISABILITY RETIREMENT NTE: 14 MAY 1975
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 09 DA 06 YR 74
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. FAN AND NSCA: 5237 1392 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/EA DIVISION DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DMG
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 24122
18. REMARKS:

LWD: 06 SEPTEMBER 1974
OTHER

HOME BASE: EA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 31
20. Employ Code: 40
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45997 ALPHABETIC EA
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Health Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA 09 YR 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO 05 DA 14 YR 75
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: SL
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1. CSC 2. CIA 3. FICA 4. NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0. NONE 1. 5 PT 2. 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. PROV. INDEF. CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1. WAIVED 2. YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0. NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1. NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2. BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3. BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1. YES 2. NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1. YES 2. NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JK 9/24/74

FORM 1150 9-72 (mfg 8-73) Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

DHS: 16 SEPT 74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): [illegible] 15 74
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 5237 1302 3011
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/EA DIVISION DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DNC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 2[illegible]122
18. REMARKS: OTHER

HOME BASE: EA

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY CODE: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 46097 ALPHABETIC EA
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. [illegible] CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 11 [illegible] 2[illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE:
27. DATE OF LEI:
28. NTE EXPIRES:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. [illegible] Computation Date
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE
36. SERV COMP DATE
37. LONG COMP DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 Use Previous

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

22 JAN 74

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 017974	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 01 DA 20 YR 74	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NBCA		8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
4237 1374	0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/EA DIVISION CHINA OPERATIONS JAPAN AND KOREA BRANCH KOREA SECTION	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	1408	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	13 6	24122

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING		22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	45080	EA	75013		1	10 09 28		

28.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[illegible]

SECRET

F. 1108

1. SERIAL NO	2. NAME				3. ORGANIZATION		4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS	
017974	FOX JEROME				45 443		CF		
6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	5	23,433 ~~[illegible]~~	10/17/71	GS 13	6	24,122 $~~[illegible]~~	10/14/73		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE -- Oct 1973

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP 0

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

1108

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	45 140	V	GS 13 5	$23,433

KHN: 15 OCT 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 017974	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 10 14 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NOGA 4237 1374 0000
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/EA DIVISION P.I., MALAYSIA, INDONESIA BRANCH PHILIPPINE SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 4024	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 24122

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 16	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING 45140 EA	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. [illegible] CODE	24. [illegible] Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH 10 03 28	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI

28. [illegible] EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. [illegible] DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. [illegible] COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. [illegible]	[illegible] HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. [illegible] CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA		44. STATE TAX DATA			

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

IO [illegible]

ews 10 16 73

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	45 440	CF	GS 13 5	$22,328

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 04/30/73

1. SERIAL NUMBER 017414	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 04 DA 29 YR 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 5137 1035 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	A	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/FE DIVISION DDO/FE/PP/FE/PMI-HS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MANILA, PHILIPPINE IS

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 4535	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1152 8-73 (EO) 6-73 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	45 440	CF	GS 13 5	$21,237

F 22

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
017974	FOX JEROME	45 440	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	4	$19,537	10/19/69	GS 13	5	$20,129	10/17/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

7/6/7?

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK'S INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	45 440	CF	GS 13 4	$19,537

SEPT 1970

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 | 21 | 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1137-1639-4000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FOREIGN FIELD
FE/PHIL-MANILA STATION
UNILATERAL BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MANILA, PHILIPPINE IS
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1915
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 18437
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employee Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Military Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	45440	FE	57367		3	10 03 28		

28. [illegible] 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 30. RETIREMENT DATA 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 32. [illegible]

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO. 34. [illegible]

35. VET. PREFERENCE 36. SERV. COMP. DATE 37. LONG. COMP. DATE 38. CAREER CATEGORY 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
2 2 [illegible]

SECRET FVD

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	45 440	CF	GS 13 4	$18,437

F22

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
017974	FOX JEROME	45 440	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 13	3	$16,865	10/20/68	GS 13	4	$17,393	10/19/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 6 OCT 69

☒ PAID EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

2
776

CLERKS INITIALS

FORM 560E

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	027974	45 440	CF	GS 13 3	$16,866

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FVD: 2 MAY 69

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCI

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 05 02 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS				
	☐	V TO V	☐	V TO CF
	☐	CF TO V	☒	CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 9137 1039 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FOREIGN FIELD
FE/PMI-MANILA STATION
LIAISON BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MANILA, PHILIPPINE IS
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4947
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 15369
18. REMARKS:

HOME BASE: FE

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Major Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	45440	FE	57557		3	10 09 28		

EOD DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

SECRET

SF

JLB: 14 APR 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	017974
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE	COB 04 06 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	9137 1375 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE FE/PMI - PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, INDONESIA PHILIPPINE SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	4024
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE	15369

18. REMARKS

WASH., D.C.

HOME BASE: FE

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24.	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
56	10	45140	FE	75013		1	10 06 23		

EOD DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 3-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET PLW

14-00000

SDF: 7 NOV 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 017974	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 10 20 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF X	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9137 1375 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FE/FMI-PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, INDONESIA PHILIPPINE SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE CON OFF VICE CONSUL W/C OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 4024	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 05 5 13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE 13330 15369		

18. REMARKS
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC) 45140 FE	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE S	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 10 09 28	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) 10 20 63	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR) 10 20 63
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1. CSC 2. CIA 3. FICA 9. NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE, 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES, HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE)					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-9-63

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

JLB

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

F8

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
017974	FOX JEROME	45 140	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 12	5	13798	09/11/66	GS 12	6	14204	09/08/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

5
000

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

COMPENSATION

SEP 3 1968

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	45 140	CF	GS 12 5	$12,989	$13,798

JLB: 17N MAY 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 05 19 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 8137 1375 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/PMI-PHILIPPINES, MAYASIA, INDONESIA
PHILIPPINE SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: CON OFF VICE CONSUL W/C
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4025
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 5
12 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12604
12989
18. REMARKS: WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45140 ALPHABETIC FE
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE: S
24. Hours Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 10 09 28
26. DATE OF GRADE:
27. DATE OF LEI:
28. FITE EXPIRES:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction / Cancellation Data:
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE:
36. SERV. COMP. DATE:
37. LONG. COMP. DATE:
38. CAREER CATEGORY:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE:
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA:
44. STATE TAX DATA:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
5/20/68

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FLW

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	45 997	CF	GS 12 5	$12,443	$12,989

EVD: 1 APR 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 017974	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION SUSPENSION FOR THREE WORKING DAYS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 04 01 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 5137 1375 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE VICE CONSUL OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 05 5 12 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 12604 12989

18. REMARKS

SUSPENDED FOR THREE WORKING DAYS FOR INFRACTION OF AGENCY PHYSICAL SECURITY REGULATIONS. TO RETURN TO DUTY BOB 4 APRIL 1968. EMPLOYEE IS WARNED THAT FURTHER VIOLATIONS WILL BE VIEWED WITH EXTREME SERIOUSNESS.
OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Health Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 10 09 28	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE; MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
4-1-68

FORM 1150 Use Previous
3-66 Mfg. 10-67 Edition

SECRET SF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SE. 27 NOV 67

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION-DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 11 DA. 21 YR. 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 8137 1375 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: CONSULAR OFFICER VICE CONSUL OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		05 5	12074
GS	0136.01	12 5	12443

18. REMARKS OTHER

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $12443 AND FSR SALARY OF $12074 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.

ALL SICK AND ALL HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPT. OF STATE.

MARITAL STATUS- MARRIED

DAU DOB- 22 NOV 59 SON DOB- 17 FEB 61

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
55	13	45997	FE	75013	S	1	10 08 2		

28. NTE EXPIRES
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE
37. LONG COMP. DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

RS

11-29-67

PLW

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] NOV 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 11 [illegible] 1967
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 5137 1392 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE
FE DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1197
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12143
18. REMARKS: TRAINING

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 26
20. Employ Code: 13
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45997 ALPHABETIC FE
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. [illegible] Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 10 [illegible] [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSR 2 - FICA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPT STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible] 11/6/67

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET FVD

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJT: 25 MAY 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
017974	FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	05 21 67	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	7237 1385 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/FE FE/PMI - PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, INDONESIA INDONESIA SECTION	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	3877	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12 5	12443

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
37	10	45140	FE	75013		1	10 09 28		

28. INTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIV, 3 - FICA, 9 - NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAT. CODE) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVED, 1 - REG; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 DAYS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 DAYS) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-5-67

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET BJT

(When Filled In)

14-00000

MRT: 17 NOV 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 11 DA. 20 YR. 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7237 1385 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/PMI - PHILIPPINE, MALAYSIA, INDONESIA
PHILIPPINE SECTION
UNILATERAL - FI AND CA UNIT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4025
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12443
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45140 ALPHABETIC FE
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 11-62 1150 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

RZF: 26 SEPT 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017374

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 09 DA. 25 YR. 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ ; V TO CF ☐ ; CF TO V ☐ ; CF TO CF ☒

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7137 1487 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS: EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. [illegible] Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. MTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE / HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9-27-66/hm

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

123

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
017974	FOX JEROME	45 500 CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PM Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	[illegible]	ADJ.
GS 12	4	~~$11,723~~ 12064	09/13/64	GS 12	5	~~$12,091~~ 12443	09/11/66			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ X / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Wm DATE 8/24/66

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560E Mfg 3-65

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	45 500 CF	GS 12 4	$11,723	$12,064

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	45 500	CF	GS 12 4	$11,315	$11,723

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445		.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500									

4-00000

DLB: 30 SEPT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: (CANCELLATION) INTEGRATION-DEPT. OF STATE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 09 DA. 18 YR. 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137 1392 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP FE CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: FOREIGN SER RES OFF OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 2 12 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 10290 11315
18. REMARKS: ADMIN ERROR

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 01
20. [illegible] CODE: 13
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45927 ALPHABETIC FE
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE: 1
24. [illegible] CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 28
26. DATE OF GRADE
27. DATE OF LEI
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: 55 MO. 09 DA. 18 YR. 64
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/[illegible]/64 2K

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLS: 23 SEPT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
017974	FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
INTEGRATION - DEPT. OF STATE	09 13 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5137 1392 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP FE CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
FOREIGN SER RES OFF OPS OFF	9997	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	05 2 12 4	10290 11315

18. REMARKS

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $11315 AND FSR SALARY OF $10290 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.

ALL SICK AND ALL HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPT. OF STATE.

MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED. DAU - DOB: 22 NOVEMBER 1959

TRAINING

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Photo Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
55	13	45397	FE	75013	1	1	10 03 23		

28. DTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

NOTED

9 July 64

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

14-00000

JGD: 11 SEPT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 017974	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 09 13 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V	X	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5137 1392 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 11315

18. REMARKS
TRAINING.
SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.
TO BE INTEGRATED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employee Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
20	13	45997	FE	75013		1	10 09 28		

28. DTE EXPIRES — 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30. RETIREMENT DATA — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — EOD DATA — 33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

35. VET. PREFERENCE — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE — 37. LONG. COMP. DATE — 38. CAREER CATEGORY — 39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA — 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: FE

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

13 SEP 1964

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PAYROLL BRANCH

SEP 1[illegible] 10 38 AM '64

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
017974	FOX JEROME	27 XF 45 160 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EP. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PM	LM	ADJ
GS 12	3	10,960 ~~$[illegible]~~	09/15/63	GS 12	4	11,315 ~~$[illegible]~~	09/13/64			

8. Remarks and Authorization

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS [illegible] AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE E. D. ECHOLS DATE [illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 9-61 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-61)

14-00000

DEC 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 017974	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 12 02 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5137 1487 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP FE FE/VNC - SAIGON STATION INTERNAL OPS BRANCH IOB CAPITAL OPS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 4608	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 11315

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	45300	FE	72205		3	10 09 29		

EOD DATA

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 09/01/64

1. SERIAL NUMBER 017974	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 08 31 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO U	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5237 1352 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		U TO V		U TO U		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE DIVISION FE VNC NORTH VIETNAM SEC	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 4429	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GC	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9/1/64 mc

Form 1152 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	45 160	V	GS 12 3	$10,105	$10,640

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
017974	FOX JEROME	56 160 V 7	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	2	$ 9,790	09/16/62	GS 12	3	$10,105	09/15/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE E. D. ECHOLS DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560

14-00000

RZR: 29 APR 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 017974	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FOX JEROME

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 29 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V CF TO V		V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3237 1250 1000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FE/VCL - VIETNAM - CAMBODIA - LAOS VIETNAM OPERATIONS SECTION FI/CI OPERATIONS UNIT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 2003	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) CS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 9790

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Health Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	56160	FE	75013		1	10 02 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 30. RETIREMENT DATA 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO. 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE 36. SERV. COMP. DATE 37. LONG COMP. DATE 38. CAREER CATEGORY 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA 42. LEAVE CAT CODE 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05/06/63 JK

1150 Use Previous Edition

23 APR 1963

SECRET

ABM: 20 DEC 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 017974	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) FOX JEROME			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 12 23 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3257 1019 6000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI ORR OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FACTORY MARKINGS STAFF ANALYSIS BRANCH		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE I O FACTORY MARK		12. POSITION NUMBER 1564	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION IR	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1390.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 9790	
18. REMARKS				

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	88100	ORR	75013		1	10 09 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
20 DEC 1962

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition B3K

SECRET

20 DEC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1955, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	017974	70530	CF	12 2	$ 9215	12 2	$ 9790

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
017974	FOX JEROME	70 530 CF 3	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	1	$ 8,955	03/19/61	GS 12	2	$ 9,215	09/16/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

4

792

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD MB 7/...

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form [illegible] 560

PSC: 17 MARCH 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): FOX JEROME
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 03 DA. 19 YR. 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1137 7000 6135
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: OFFICE OF DDI (TOKYO) STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE STAFF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN
11. POSITION TITLE: IO FACTORY MARK
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0096
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IR
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1390.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 8955
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	70530	001	37587		3	10 09 28	03 19 61	03 19 61

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC; 2 - FICA; 3 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT.; 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES; 2 - NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 1 - WAIVED; 2 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
03-28-61

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
517974	FOX JEROME	DDI 3	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR.				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 11	2	$ 7,820	04	19	59	GS 11	3	$ 8,090	10	16	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

WR

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-58 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
IR	FOX JEROME	517974	18 25	GS-11 2	$ 7,270	$ 7,820

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 THIS NOTIFICATION EFFECTS A CHANGE IN OCCUPATIONAL SERIES RESULTING FROM APPLICATION OF STAFFING COMPLEMENT CHANGE AUTHORIZATION NUMBER 22 DATED 1 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	OLD OCC SERIES	NEW OCC SERIES
IR	FOX JEROME	517974	18 25	1390.06	1390.08

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JEC: 7 JULY 59

1. Serial No. 517974	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) FOX JEROME	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 10 Da. 09 Yr. 28	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 06 Da. 15 Yr. 55
7. SCD Mo. 04 Da. 16 Yr. 54	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo. 06 Da. 15 Yr. 55
13. [illegible] Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDI ORR FACTORY MARKINGS STAFF EQUIPMENT ANALYSIS BRANCH	Code 1323	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 2	17. Position Title IDENTIFICATION SPEC	18. Position No. 923.01	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 1390.06	21. Grade & Step 11 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 7270	23. SD LR
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 10 Da. 20 Yr. 57	25. PSI Due Mo. 04 Da. 19 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 8 5709 20	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	Code 06	28. Eff. Date Mo. 07 Da. 26 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations OFFICE OF DCI (TOKYO) STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE STAFF	Code 1825	32. Location Of Official Station TOKYO, JAPAN	Station Code 37597
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 5	34. Position Title IO FACTORY MARK	35. Position No. 0035	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 1390.06	38. Grade & Step 11 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 7270	40. SD LR
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 10 Da. 20 Yr. 57	42. PSI Due Mo. 10 Da. 1[illegible] Yr. 60	43. Appropriation Number 9 3709 75 901	

44. Remarks

SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

POSTED
CP
23 JUL

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
117974	FOX JEROME	DDI/ORR 3	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 11	1	$ 7,030	10	20	57	GS 11	2	$ 7,270	04	19	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP None
10. INITIALS OF CLERK ЭU
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS
CP

14. AUTHENTICATION

MAR 13 1 50 PM '59
PAYROLL BRANCH

C. M. STEWART

ЭU

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 THIS NOTIFICATION EFFECTS RESLOTTING RESULTING FROM R-20-250

SER #	NAME	SD	OLD SLOT	NEW SLOT	DATE
117974	FOX JEROME	IR	0923.01	923	03/11/59

S E C R E T

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1959 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
FOX JEROME	117974	GS-11-1	$ 6,390	$ 7,030

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

S E C R E T

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 117 [illegible]	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) FOX, J[illegible]	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 1[illegible] Da. Yr. [illegible]	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. Da. 1[illegible] Yr. [illegible]
7. SCD Mo. [illegible] Da. 1[illegible] Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. 1[illegible] Yr.	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDI OCR [illegible]ACTORY MARKINGS STAFF COMPONENT ANALYSIS BRANCH	Code	15. Location Of Official Station WAS[illegible]., D.C.	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field Dept.-2 USfld-4 Frgn.-6 Code 2	17. Position Title IDENTIFICATION SPEC.	18. Position No. 2[illegible]1[illegible]	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1350.0[illegible]

21. Grade & Step [illegible] 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ [illegible]575	23. SD [illegible]	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]	26. Appropriation Number [illegible]

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code [illegible]	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible] 12 [illegible]7	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 1	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDI OCR [illegible]ACTORY MARKINGS STAFF [illegible] ANALYSIS [illegible]	Code [illegible]	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., [illegible]	Station Code [illegible]

33. Dept.-Field Dept.-2 USfld-4 Frgn.-6 Code	34. Position Title IDENTIFICATION SPEC.	35. Position No. 2[illegible]	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 1[illegible]

38. Grade & Step [illegible] 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ [illegible]	40. SD [illegible]	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]	43. Appropriation Number [illegible]

44. Remarks

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 67

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO. 117974	2. NAME FOX JEROME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN. DDI/ORR 3	4. FUNDS V-20	5. ALLOTMENT

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
9	1	$ 5,440	07	01	56	9	2	$ 5,575	06	30	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR JAMES Q. MAY	DATE 23 May 57	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR James Q. May

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO. 117974	2. NAME FOX JEROME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN. DDI/ORR	4. FUNDS V-20	5. ALLOTMENT

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
9	1	$ 5,440	07	01	56	9	2	$ 5,575	06	30	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE: ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a
1 MAR 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Jerome Fox

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct. 1923

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 18 April 1957

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP

B. APPROVED: 2 JUN 1957

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Identification Specialist F-924.03	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Identification Specialist F-923.31
GS-1390.06-09 $5440.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1390.06-09 $5440.00 per annum
DDI/Office of Research and Reports Chief, Coordination Area Division of Techniques and Methods Analysis and Reports Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Research and Reports Factory Markings Staff Equipment Analysis Branch
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Reassignment submitted to conform to T/O reorganization

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): JAMES Q. MAY, Chief, St/FM/RR

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): WILLIAM E. COOLEY x2185

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature: PAUL H. HILDEBRAND

Title: Chief, Administrative Staff, ORR

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.

SD/IR

15. SCX

16. APPROPRIATION

FROM 7-5709-20

TO 7-5709-20

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED

STATE:

E. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED

22 MAY 1957

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. ORG. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS

F. APPROVED BY

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

© U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954 O-320030

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Period ended

3. Block No.
6-5709-20

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
FOX, JEROME

6. Grade and salary
GS-7 $4525

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
ORR 21

12. Prepared by
fjp 25APR56

13. Audited by

☐ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. ~~Performance rating is satisfactory or better~~
JUNE56	15JUNE55	$4525	$4660	SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen. U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 107

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP—— PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY P.C. 27 May 1955
SR-9297-A cm

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. JAMES FOX
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct. 1928
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 15 June 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 15 June 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Ident. Specialist F 925.99
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1390.06-7 $4205.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Research and Reports Office of Chief, Coordination Techniques and Methods Division Analysis and Reports Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	DISAB	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.		
				DOC	SD-IP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: 5-5702-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 15 June 1955
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: New York

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year and a medical examination.
R3-69

EOD 06/15/55
CSSCD 06/15/55
LCD 06/15/55

POSTED
27 JUN 1955

(SIGNED) Director of Personnel

8. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (5 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. JEROME FOX 117974
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct 1928
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 26 June 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION 30
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 July 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
F-585.99	8. POSITION TITLE	Identification Specialist F-934.99
GS-1390.06-7 $4660.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1390.06-9 $5440.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 131630	DDI/Office of Research and Reports Office of Chief, Coordination Techniques and Methods Division Analysis and Reports Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS a	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE ☐ WWII ☐ OTHER ☐ 5 PT ☒ 10 POINT ☐ ☐

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ REES ☐ L.A. ☐ REAL ☐ SD-IR

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 7-5779-20 TO: Same 750-13

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT: Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

EOD 06/15/55

POSTED

~~Director of Personnel~~

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 017974
2. NAME (last, first, middle): Fox, Jerome
3. DATE OF BIRTH: 7 Oct 27
4. SEX: M
5. GRADE: GS-13
6. SD: D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDO/LA/JK/K
9. CURRENT STATION: Hqs
10. CODE (if any): HQS ☐ OF ☐

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT of supervisor ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): Feb - Jul 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See Section C	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

[illegible] RATING LETTER

45 CLASSIFICATION [illegible] 12(13)

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

It is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt an evaluation of Mr. Fox's performance as an operations officer based on the relatively short period (5 months) he has been assigned to the Korean Desk. Throughout this time he has been faced by a series of medical and personal problems which have understandably preoccupied him. His medical problem, which causes him almost constant pain, has led him to apply for disability retirement; a decision on his application is pending. He has also had to undergo a series of family problems which required a great deal of time and attention. Under the circumstances no specific duties and letter grades are being listed in Section B above.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 15 July 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, EA/JK/K	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Kenneth C. Cathey Kenneth C. Cathey

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 15 July 1974	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [illegible] Fox

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully agree with the supervisor's narrative comments. It would be grossly misleading to attempt to provide letter ratings or a performance evaluation under the unique conditions which obtained throughout this period.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/EA/JK	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston L. Oliver

4. BY EMPLOYEE

[illegible]	DATE [illegible] 1974	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

28 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meritorious Unit Citation

On 20 August 1974 the Director of Central Intelligence approved award of the Meritorious Unit Citation to the Manila Station in recognition of the outstanding performance of the following employees during the period June 1971 to December 1973:

Smith, Vernon
Finneran, Robert
Summers, Georgette
Cohen, Meyer
Watson, Anita
Rider, Benjamin F.
Gordon, James M.
Miller, Richard H.
Doyle, Mary Patricia
O'Reilly, John
Walier, Marie E.
Cotton, Mary Anne
Ferguson, Alan C.
Steed, Herbert L.
Boucher, Charles
Vasko, Philip F.
Hayes, Richard
Stephens, James L.
Jameise, Jill
Anton, Eleanor A.
Lawhorne, H. Wesley
O'Reilly, Judith S.
Donohue, Thomas A.
Vaccaro, Joseph R.

Flagg, Warren
Sullivan, Daniel J.
White, Robert H.
Johnson, Richard W.
Markle, Cheryl L.
Thomas, Ann
Robinson, Owen E.
Chu, Kirby K. P.
Larson, Judy A.
Reiniger, Noel W.
Blooding, Shaleta C.
Byerly, Paul M.
Carnivale, Frank
Edinger, John B.
Rejonis, Dahlia A.
Fox, Jerome
Kaul, Robert J.
Rejonis, Walter G.
von Berg, Helmut L.
Keberline, Lloyd J.
Sherno, Frank
Reynolds, Malcolm
Soderquist, Ray
Jackson, Arthur

Johnson, Wesley
Kalaris, George T.
Mears, Alyce A.
Champlin, Wendy C.
Behee, Jean A.
Fitchett, Mildred L.
Harris, Bobby
Chao, James
Thompson, Colin R.
Wright, William H.
Brookner, Janine M.
Hauschild, Raymond G.
Amiano, Suzanne K.
Shields, Charles A.
Ticulka, Vincent R.
Newhouse, Lawrence L.
O'Connell, Mary M.
Kaul, Marlene
Schroeder, Roderick
Gesswein, F. Clark
Chao, Karen
Edinger, Sharon
Shima, Terry

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT

NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 0 17974	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Fox, Jerome (nmi)	3. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 28	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-13	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/PMI	9. CURRENT STATION Manila

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		CAREER-PROVISIONAL		RESERVE
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

X	ANNUAL		21-MONTH		30-MONTH	X	REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-) 30 Nov 72-31 July 73	13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 September 1973

SECTION B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serves as Station referent for MHABYSS matters.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spot, develop, assess and recruit penetration agents in the Philippine liaison services.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Spot, develop, assess and recruit agents to obtain intelligence on production and international trafficking of narcotics.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Handle on-going cases: tighten operational security, increase production, strengthen agent motivation.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Serves as official Station liaison contact on PBRAMPART affairs.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepare reports, correspondence and other management/administrative requirements.	RATING LETTER P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 45N

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

As the Station narcotics referent, Subject has continued to concentrate his efforts on developing our drug field collection capability. The penchant for detailed analysis that earlier made him an authority on Communist Party affairs has served him well in the past year in building the Station canon of knowledge on narcotics matters. He has successfully recruited the head of a private organization concerned with addict rehabilitation and drug abuse prevention. Because of his proximity to the drug world, this agent serves as a rich source of background data and as a spotter. In the latter role he has produced two individuals whom Subject has recruited as intelligence sources. One, the estranged wife of a narcotics wholesaler who, at one time was engaged in international trafficking. The other is a chemist formerly employed unwittingly, on a part time basis, by a suspected drug syndicate. The latter source is, at this writing, once again on the fringe of involvement with a group that apparently wants to use her as a courier on a one-shot basis and later utilize her professional skills in their laboratory.

Subject is the Station representative on Mission narcotics affairs and the focal point for the Mission Narcotics Intelligence Sub-Committee. He provides the day-to-day liaison with the regional DEA office. Liaison with the Philippine enforcement services, while largely the realm of DEA, provided Subject an opportunity to recruit unilaterally one of the country's leading experts in narcotics enforcement after he was chosen

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 21 August 1973	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ Jerome Fox

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 21 August 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Thomas A. Donohue

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject has completed his second tour of duty at this Station. Looking back over his record of accomplishments, one will find a number of good achievements, but when they are all added up and measured against four years at the Station the sum falls short of what I believe he was capable of producing and should have produced. The promise that he showed during the early part of his tour never really materialized. He can and does work hard at his assignment, but he is unable to apportion his time; he can analyze an operational situation well, but cannot express the analysis lucidly in writing without a great deal of effort and re-writing. In fairness to the Subject it should be noted that during a part of this

DATE 5 September 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ George T. Kalaris

Section C. Narrative Comments (Continued)

for a multi-national advisory role abroad. A turnover was made to a TDY BKHERALD officer from the country concerned prior to the expert's departure from the Philippines.

Because of the profusion of various U.S. intelligence groups in-country, PBRAMPART and related business is a very lively and time consuming activity. He has coordinated and monitored the activity, maintaining the while good and forthcoming working relationships with his counterparts.

A Muslim source, whom he recruited, has been sent on regular trips into his home province now an embattled area in the insurgency and has become a regular producer on Muslim attitudes and plans. He enjoys access as well to Muslims resident in the Manila area and to travellers from the southern Philippines.

Subject is an intelligent, experienced officer with a wide knowledge of the entire Philippine scene, its participants and their pecking order. He is a quick and ready source of the details of the history of recent years and he has extensive knowledge of where many of the more important bodies are buried. He maintains a wide variety of disparate contacts that enable him to maintain a detached perspective. It may be, however, that a degree of staleness is affecting his performance and four years has been too long a tour. A recurring problem, an attempt to do too much at one time, continues to mar his performance; over time, this has been the subject of discussions with him. Because of his inability to establish correct priorities for himself, he often expends his extensive energies on incidentals at the expense of the important. This is an unfortunate failing for under the pressure of inexorable deadlines, clarity and detail suffer in his operational correspondence and, in general, he hides his considerable light under a bushel of his own making.

calendar year he was plagued with both health and personal problems that diverted him from the work at hand.

Subject has spent almost seven consecutive years on Philippine affairs, at Hqs and in the field. In Subject's case I believe this has worked to his disadvantage. He is "burned out" on the Philippines.

The rating officer has been fair and objective in his assessment of Subject's performance for the period covered by this fitness report. Subject's performance came to my attention daily.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 017974

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Fox, Jerome
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct 28
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-13
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/PMI
8. CURRENT STATION: Manila, P.I.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify)				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify)		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 30 November 1971-30 November 1972

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serve as the Station referent for MHABYSS matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Serve as the Station referent for Communist matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Spot, develop, assess and recruit penetration agents in the Philippine liaison services.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Spot, develop, assess and recruit agents to obtain intelligence from the decision-making levels of the Communist parties (particularly the Maoists) and their main front organizations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Handle on-going cases: tighten operational security, increase production, strengthen agent motivations, handle ad hoc operational cases.	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepare reports, correspondence and other management/administrative requirements.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

Reviewed by DDP/SPD/EEB

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

JAC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In keeping with our growing national concern for worldwide narcotics production and traffic, the Station reallocated personnel, resources and priorities in order to learn the nature of the Philippine role in this illicit activity. Subject was assigned, halfway through this reporting period, as Station referent with as his primary responsibility the coordination of all of our efforts in the narcotics field. One other officer has been assigned full time to assist him.

Subject began, starting literally from scratch, by surveying the entire mission and the military bases to learn what on-going activity already existed and what areas of the problem the various civilian and military agencies considered to be of prime concern. He established an intelligence sub-committee of the mission narcotics group and set the guidelines for inter-agency intelligence coordination and established a common source registry. A great amount of missionary work has been necessary on his part, even among the professionals in the drug field, differentiating enforcement considerations from those of pure intelligence. He has established good working relationships with the concerned mission elements, concentrating primarily, of course, on liaison and support arrangements with the LNAGON representatives; the latter, during this period, moved their regional office to Manila expanding greatly

(Continued)

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 24 November 1972

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ Jerome Fox

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 24 November 1972

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Deputy Chief of Station

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Thomas A. Donohue

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

There is no question in my mind that Subject has ability. What he lacks is the capacity to organize himself and his work. The result is that his performance is very uneven. This deficiency has been brought to Subject's attention on several occasions in the past 30 months. He recognizes it, but has been unable, in my opinion, to overcome it finally. This limits his usefulness at a small or medium sized Station where perforce an officer must be able to handle competently a number of disparate matters simultaneously. His written work continues to fall short of the level one should be able to expect from an officer of his grade and experience. It is

(continued)

DATE: 24 November 1972

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief of Station

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ George T. Kalaris

SECRET

SECTION C - Narrative Comments (continued)

their need for our support.

Subject, at the same time, surveyed the host government intelligence and enforcement agencies to learn how they had structured their responsibilities in combating the narcotics trade. By seeking out current and former liaison contacts, the picture that he received of the estimated size of the problem and the Philippine control effort gave us some idea of the parameters of what it was we were dealing with. Through a formerly dormant liaison contact, one of the country's experts on narcotics, he has developed both a window on what is being done officially and a means of access capable of affecting the Philippine policy on the subject. During a recent regional ASEAN meeting on narcotics held in Manila, Subject was able to insure that our objectives for the conference were met through this influential asset.

Subject has made a fine beginning in getting our narcotics effort underway. He has done the basic research, begun building the necessary data base and has culled from other activities three or four Station assets whose natural access is being utilized to develop leads into the murky Philippine underworld. His flair for organizing disparate data is being put to excellent use.

In the earlier period covered in this fitness report, Subject was plagued by a nasty, debilitating fever that eluded diagnosis for some time. A period of hospitalization followed by the necessary recuperative period kept him out of action for a lengthy period. Close on its heels, this was compounded by a freak bone break in his hand that required surgery and once again kept him off the active list.

Subject is a good agent handler; he is both FI and CI minded and he has the ability to ask the right questions to extract the maximum information from his sources. He has a great deal of energy and he liberally expends it in his work. This strength, curiously, is also a weakness since he has the tendency to ride off in all directions at once. In this flurry of activity, by attempting to do everything at the same time, his writing tends to become a shorthand of sorts and clarity inevitably suffers. He is aware of these problems and has consciously made the effort -- particulary since he has become the narcotics referent -- to give proper order to his priorities.

As has been mentioned previously, his knowledge of the Communist Party activities and personnel is impressive and until he relinquished his role as the Communist Party referent, he was a helpful focal point for other Station officers with party assets. In the months ahead his concentrated efforts against the narcotics target should bear fruit.

SECRET

SECTION D - Comments of Reviewing Official (continued)

because of these shortcomings that I would rate him in the overall sense as Proficient. We get the results we want from him, but we have to push fairly hard. Comments made in earlier Fitness Reports regarding Subject's expertise in local Communist Party matters continue to apply. He is indeed a walking encyclopedia on local party matters and shows considerable acuity in his analyses of the party. Subject's work comes to my attention on the average of five to six times a week.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 017974

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Fox, Jerome
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct. 1928
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-13
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops. Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE PMI
8. CURRENT STATION: Manila, P.I.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- XX CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- XX ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1972
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 August 1971 - 31 December 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serve as the Station referent for communist matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spot, develop, assess and recruit penetration agents in the Philippine Liaison Services.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Spot, develop, assess and recruit agents to obtain intelligence from the decision-making level of the communist parties (particularly the Maoists) and their main front organizations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Handle on-going cases, tighten operational security, increase production, strengthen agent motivations; handle ad hoc operational cases.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepare reports, correspondence, and other management/administrative requirements.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepare media placement articles and themes.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

DEC 6 10 19 AM '71

This report covers a period of four months. There was no change in the substance of Subject's duties - merely a re-ordering of the priorities. Specific duty number four was elevated to the second priority. While we cannot cite any specific accomplishments yet in the performance of this second priority, we can say, in all honesty, that Subject is making a determined effort to achieve results. He is allocating his time in accordance with priorities and meeting deadlines. Comments I made in earlier fitness reports on his qualities as an agent handler, recruiter and "guru" of the Philippine Communist movement continue to apply.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 29 November 1971	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Jerome Fox

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 29 November 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR COS, Manila	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ George Kalaris

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur with comments made by the supervisor. Mr. Fox is an overall proficient case officer with some very strong talents, particularly in the Communist and CI field. He lacks supervisory experience and his talents in this regard are uncertain. Nonetheless, he does render a creditable service to the organization and is a responsible and dedicated employee. In order to determine if he has the potential for further advancement, he should be given some supervisory responsibilities to evaluate his talents in this area.

DATE 02 DEC 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL CFE/PMI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ralph J. Katrosh

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
017974

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox, Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct. 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/PMI	8. CURRENT STATION Manila		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1971 - 30 July 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serve as the Station Referent for Communist Matters.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spot, develop, assess, and recruit agents to obtain intelligence from the decision-making level of the communist parties (particularly the Maoists) and their main front organizations.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Handle on-going cases: tighten operational security, increase production, strengthen agent motivations; handle ad hoc operational cases.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Spot, develop, assess, and recruit penetration agents in the Philippine liaison services.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepare reports, correspondence, and other management/administrative requirements.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepare media-placement articles and themes.	RATING LETTER P

20 AUG 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Aug 20 11 29 AM '71
MAIL ROOM

The Fitness Report of the previous period continues generally to apply during this rating period of seven months. Subject was on home leave for about one month during this period.

Subject continued to handle until his home leave in May 1971 two agent penetrations in the decision making level of the Moscow oriented communist movement. They have since been turned over to another officer for handling. Also, Subject continued to handle the Muslim agent recruited during the previous period but the Agent's performance has been marginal. In July 1971, Subject recruited a former Philippine intelligence officer who was connected with the two agent penetrations cited above. The primary purpose of this recruitment was to increase the Station's control and equity over the two agents and, as a by-product, to obtain intelligence on the communist movements. During July four developmental cases, all intelligence producers (including documentary), were turned over to Subject for continued development towards recruitment. One has unique access in the student movement, mainly in the Greater Manila area but also in the main provincial cities; another is an experienced officer of a civilian law enforcement agency who collaborated unilaterally with the Station; the other two are senior intelligence officers who have unofficially passed intelligence information. Subject continued to handle his duty as (Continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 31 July 1971
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ Jerome Fox

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 31 July 1971
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Deputy Chief of Station
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Terry T. Shima

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I would characterize Subject as a competent, hard working case officer who can both handle cases and recruit new assets and who is capable of an even better performance than that reflected in this fitness report, if he could only organize himself. He knows his subject, communism in the Philippines, better perhaps than the majority of the Filipino communists. This is a mixed blessing, however, because he is so easily distracted pursuing obscure historical points, not really relevant to the conduct of operations, that occasionally he finds himself behind schedule in meeting levied requirements. I have taken him out of communist operations as such except in his capacity as the "referent" (continued)

DATE: 6 August 1971
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief of Station
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ George T. Kalaris

SECRET

NARRATIVE (Continued)

Referent for Communist Matters in an excellent fashion. He has a thorough knowledge of the communist situation in the Philippines and can provide briefings on any aspect of it. Subject has made meaningful comments on the communist penetration operations of other officers advising them on vulnerabilities and suggesting approaches for greater exploitation of these assets. His briefings are well prepared and he delivers them fully and persuasively. During this rating period, Subject was the most aggressive and effective of the three "Referents", who are senior operations officers responsible for the main operational targets of the Station.

Subject has continued to be an effective agent handler. He motivates them and applies discipline without destroying initiative. He has directed them to collect difficult intelligence information, which has been of high value in planning and assessing future operations. Headquarters grades to Subject's intelligence disseminations from the two communist penetration agents above attest to Subject's competence in extracting and preparing intelligence disseminations.

While Subject has performed well as a Referent and agent handler, he has not done as well in the priority area of acquiring fresh assets in the unilateral and liaison penetration fields. This requirement has been spelled out in his Letter of Instructions (LOI), discussed by COS in the weekly operations staff meetings and daily Referent meetings, and in separate consultations with COS and DCOS. It is not that Subject dislikes contacting new people or contacting Filipinos; to the contrary, Subject has a warm, natural, and sincere approach in meeting Filipinos. Initial contacts are made with potential assets but there is a lack of planned and systematic follow through that all developmental cases require. Subject keeps himself busy throughout the day and his workday at the office normally begins at 0730 hours. He is no slouch when it comes to work and he appears to gravitate to it. His attitude and efforts in a recent highly sensitive Station operation were commendable. Subject is at his best in ad hoc duties: he sizes up a problem quickly, discusses his operational plan with COS/DCOS, and proceeds at once to implement it. Intelligence product derived from such operations are well written and meaningful; operational reports are thoughtful and thorough. His total work load described above is no heavier than any other officer at this Station. The Station of the '70's is lean on personnel and heavy on responsibilities. Since there appears to be no relaxation of the latter and the trend is further personnel reduction, not increase of personnel, operations officers will have to trim excess corners.

NARRATIVE (Continued)

In my opinion, Subject's basic weakness, which was pointed out in the previous Fitness Report, continues to be his inability to budget his time to handle the priorities as established by COS/DCOS as well as by himself. Subject spends considerable time on a given matter of the moment and has great power of concentration on a single problem. These are attributes many wish they possess, but at the same time they impede the efficiency of an operations officer with numerous high priority duties. Unless he can budget his time by discriminating against the low priority or non-priority matters and focus on maintaining a balanced portfolio of contact and staff responsibilities, I believe his further development into the well-rounded senior officer would be impaired. Subject has made a determined effort to correct the above weakness including the submission of paper work by the deadline. By the end of the rating period, there has been favorable progress. I am confident he can overcome completely this area of weakness by exercising the same discipline he uses in executing duties #1 and #3.

Above all, Subject tries to excell and he works extremely hard. I believe that Subject has the potential capability to progress to more responsible positions in the operations and management fields: he has sound operational judgment, he is cooperative and responsive, he works well with and has the confidence of people he deals with, and he has a good feel for the Station's total aims and capabilities.

Subject was given an overall Strong in view of his vigorous and successful prosecution of the two important duties, his determined effort to overcome the weakness cited above, and his potential capability for continued growth in the management and operational fields.

Subject has responsibility for the Station's communist penetration project. He has budgeted his funds realistically and has spent it on operations which have brought good results.

REVIEWING COMMENTS (continued)

for the subject, assigned him other responsibilities and given him strict deadlines in the hope that he will get organized. He is an above average officer who could do a lot better. His work comes to my attention on a daily basis. The rating officer is known to me to be a fair and objective rater. In this case, however, I disagree with the overall rating of Strong, because potential of this officer notwithstanding, he has not performed overall at that level. Both the Subject and the rating officer are aware of my views and both have read the foregoing comments. I believe the overall grade should be PROFICIENT.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
017974

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox, Jerome (nmi)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct. 1925	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE PMI		8. CURRENT STATION Manila	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
28 February 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 May 1970 to 31 December 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station communist movement (CM) officer responsible for functional coordination of overall program, including program guidance, analysis and research, and maintenance of central subject files pertinent to program targets (1 May - 10 August 1970).	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Serve as the Station Referent for Communist Matters (August - 30 December 1970).	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Spot, develop, assess, and recruit agents to obtain intelligence from the decision-making level of the communist parties (particularly the Maoists) and their main front organizations.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Handle on-going cases: tighten operational security, increase production, strengthen agent motivation, and handle ad hoc operational cases.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Spot, develop, assess, and recruit penetration agents in the Philippine liaison services.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepare reports, correspondence, and other management/administrative requirements.	RATING LETTER P

9 MAR 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Beginning in early July 1970 a new Station operational policy was enunciated. It emphasized the thorough operational and security assessment of on-going cases and the acquisition of new agents in various priority fields. In early August the Station was reorganized and Subject was appointed as the Referent for Communist Matters (Duty 2), the highest priority area in our Operating Directive. This responsibility, plus other equally important priority of acquiring high grade agents in the communist movement and the Philippine Security Services, was incorporated in Subject's revised Letter of Instructions (LOI) later in the year.

Subject has demonstrated a keen grasp of the details of the communist movements. He has developed a thorough knowledge of the leaders, their inter relationships, personal background, strengths and weaknesses. At the same time he has kept current on the many front organizations. As Referent for Communist Matters, Subject has at his disposal the utilization of all Case Officers under official and non official cover to prosecute, as noted above, the Station's number one priority. While he has no command responsibility, he has been granted considerable latitude in the coordinative, creative, reporting, and project management role. Subject has used his knowledge effectively by providing staff advice to Case Officers, spotting new leads, approaches, and

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
12 February 1971	/s/ Jerome Fox

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 February 1971	DCOS, Manila	/s/ Terry Shima

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The rating officer has done well in describing this officer's strengths and weaknesses. He is an effective team member, a perceptive student of the communist movement and a thorough agent handler. He knows the craft and practices it carefully. He is an officer on whom I can depend to handle well assignments involving people without need for close supervision. He now is in a position that will allow him to demonstrate leadership abilities and I believe he will acquit himself well. Compared to other officers of the same grade known to me, I would place Subject well above the average. He has the potential for further growth given the opportunity.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 February 1971	COS, Manila	/s/ George T. Kalaris

SECRET

NARRATIVE (con'td)

opportunities; suggesting new targets; sharpening the focus of going cases; assisting in the pruning of marginal assets; briefing visiting officials and Our Government's officials assigned to the Philippines; writing assessments and target analysis; and reviewing Station's total efforts against the communist movements.

To achieve a tighter control and monitor of the Station efforts against the communist movements, Subject submitted a comprehensive project proposal to Headquarters. Responses of Case Officers to Subject's assistance have been favorable and productive. He has a friendly and easy way that exudes confidence and he has been generous with his time to those who solicit it to discuss matters related to his responsibilities.

Subject has handled his on-going cases very professionally. Two agents, who operate as a team, were acquired from a friendly service earlier in the year and they represent our deepest penetration in the pro Moscow communist movement in the Philippines. Between them we are provided with key information as to the Movement's policy, plans, and organization. During this period Subject has formally recruited a Muslim who was spotted and developed by a previous Case Officer. The asset was subjected to a technical examination and has since been a reporting source on matters pertaining to the Muslim minority problem in the Philippines. He is a potential asset to use against our Soviet Bloc operations. Subject has handled a liaison official who has agreed to share his cases with the Station. In addition to receiving positive intelligence on communist matters, Subject has been attempting to make this official a truly suborned liaison asset to provide counterintelligence information as well. Subject has conducted a thorough assessment of a second liaison collaborator and subjected him to two technical interviews which resulted in his termination. He had provided sensitive documentary intelligence; however, the factors suggesting termination were overriding. Subject has handled the Manila end of a complicated communist penetration case with results that have impressed Headquarters and a third Station. Subject served as the first Case Officer of an asset turned over to the Station by liaison. Subject conducted a thorough assessment of this asset's capability and subsequently trained, motivated, and handled him effectively before turning

NARRATIVE (CON'TD)

him over to another Case Officer. He has shown thorough knowledge of his cases, exercised tradecraft, and sound operational practices and judgment in his contact procedures; displayed inventiveness in extracting maximum information and at the same time motivating the assets; and has shown that he has full command of the assets. Subject is well prepared for his meetings and is a thorough debriefer.

While Subject is an excellent agent handler he has not done as well in the higher priority agent acquisition field. Perhaps he has not yet achieved his stride to contact communist targets either directly or through the recruitment of principal agents. With his excellent knowledge of the communist targets, it would appear that he should theoretically be the most aggressive in the agent acquisition field. I still have hope that there will be an operational breakthrough in this vital sector by this potentially capable officer. Of somewhat lower priority than the above, Subject, like all other declared officers, has also been tasked with the job of penetrating the security services for positive and counterintelligence information. He has acquired several liaison contacts from his predecessor and while one of them is being met regularly there has been no appreciable increase as yet in the number of developmentals in this area.

Subject is a "team player" who has demonstrated high dedication and integrity; his intelligence disseminations and operational correspondence shows that he has a firm grasp of the Station's mission; he is sensitive to information that must be brought to the attention of COS/DCOS and communicates such information promptly. Subject responds to requests for advice and discussions from various quarters in an enthusiastic fashion and gives his time freely and constructively. While the latter is one of Subject's greatest strengths, it is at the same time a main contributory factor to his weakness, I believe. Subject is not as rapid as he should be in meeting deadlines and he had to be prodded to get his operational correspondence and also administrative requirements, such as accountings, to the concerned offices. It should be stated, however, that when these papers are submitted they are well done and clearly thought out. I believe this weakness, which could be corrected easily with firmer personal discipline, is a main inhibiting factor to his assumption of a position that requires minimal supervision. Subject and COS/DCOS have daily consultations

NARRATIVE (CON'TD)

and Subject has been encouraged to budget his time so that his main priorities can be accomplished in a balanced keel. Consultations have been in a constructive vein and Subject has responded favorably. Subject has the willing attitude, sustained interest, aggressiveness, and professional competence to potentially excel further to assume more senior operational and management responsibilities. Subject has no cover responsibilities.

Subject budgets his funds realistically and spends them wisely and with good impact. At the same time he is economy minded in the use of Government equipment.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
017974

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox, Jerome (nmi)	2. DATE OF BIRTH Oct. 1928	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF. DIV. OR BR. OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/PMI		8. CURRENT STATION Manila	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
28 February 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1970 - 30 April 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station communist movement (CM) officer responsible for functional coordination of overall program, including program guidance, analysis and research, and maintenance of central subject files pertinent to program targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer for joint liaison operations and the conduct of relationships with local services, including intelligence exchange, operational, support and administrative matters consonant with maintaining Station's liaison equities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Unilateral case officer for selected agents/operations targeted against CM and CM-related objectives and for the development of new unilateral assets under the CM program, including liaison-derivative operations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 The collation and preparation of raw intelligence data from liaison sources primarily, but including Station-wide unilateral sources as feasible, into draft field information reports.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Managerial and supervisory conduct in performance of duties and cost consciousness in the use of own time, other personnel, equipment, funds and on-the-job initiative.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

17 JUN 1970

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUN 16 3 10 PH '70

No substantive change from previous Fitness Report. The comments therein remain essentially valid. Subject will be acting capacity covering in the main the current supervisor's functional responsibilities for an interim period of over two months. Through a deliberately imposed trial period in preparation for this change, Subject has moved in strongly and with good judgment. The variation in Rating Letter grades reflects the longer period of assessment. Subject has improved demonstrably in approaches and initiative under Specific Duty No. 3; under Specific Duty No. 6 the current Supervisor has noted a tendency to be less than prompt in finalizing support actions so vital to liaison as such and our own support elements; finally, the present Supervisor finds room for improvement in the conduct of intra-Station relationships, but this is admittedly a highly subjective view. There remains no question about overall professionalism and capabilities.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 8 May 1970
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ Jerome Fox

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 12 months
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 8 May 1970
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Ops Officer
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Harry G. Petersen

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing comments made in the previous fitness report continue to apply for this brief rating period. For the same reasons stated therein, I would rate Subject in Duty #1 as Proficient and the overall grade of Proficient. Duty #1 is Subject's principal function assigned in his Letter of Instruction (LOI). During the past two weeks and for a two week period in mid April when Subject managed the Communist Operations Branch and his cases all by himself, I have observed a distinct increase in his effectiveness. He has worked long and hard, has shown initiative and imagination, has kept DCOS/COS currently briefed, and has shown good judgment in the decisions he

DATE: 22 May 1970
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: DCOS
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Terry T. Shima

SECRET

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

made and recommendations referred to DCOS/COS. Subject has been encouraged to continue to exploit these strengths, as well as to expedite the preparation of written reports as noted by the Rating Officer. I have no doubt that Subject can and will exploit his potential to the maximum capacity during the next rating period in order to increase his rating, his comparative standing among the Station's other GS-13 officers, and to fulfill more thoroughly the priorities in his LOI.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
017974

GENERAL

SECTION A

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox, Jerome (nmi)	2. DATE OF BIRTH Oct. 1928	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/PMI		8. CURRENT STATION Manila	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- X ANNUAL
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
[illegible] February 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
20 May 1969 - 31 December 1969

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SECTION B

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station MPWATCH officer responsible for functional coordination of overall program, including program guidance, analysis and research, and maintenance of central subject files pertinent to program targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer for joint liaison operations and the conduct of relationships with local services, including intelligence exchange, operational, support and administrative matters consonant with maintaining Station's liaison equities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Unilateral case officer for selected agents/operations targeted against MPWATCH and MPWATCH-related objectives and for the development of new unilateral assets under the MPWATCH program, including liaison-derivative operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 The collation and preparation of raw intelligence data from liaison sources primarily, but including Station-wide unilateral sources as feasible, into draft field information reports.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 The preparation and organization of finished field intelligence reports, operational cables, teletapes, dispatches and related correspondence on MPWATCH and other liaison/operational matters.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Managerial and supervisory conduct in performance of duties and cost consciousness in the use of own time, other personnel, equipment, funds and on-the-job initiative.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

SECRET

FORM 9-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject arrived at Station in May 1969 well prepared and took over from his predecessor in an organized and professional manner; there were no hitches, either in terms of personality conflicts or operational lag. He has since continued to demonstrate care in preparation and approach to what is a demanding and highly varied assignment; he "uses" his past experience with originality and selective aggressiveness, and more important, with a keen sense of adaptability to his operational environment. Subject is definitely not a clock-watcher and gives of his own time freely and at his own initiative. Subject's initiative in developing new assets/operations is limited only by the broad scope of duties already assigned.

Section B Specific Duties are directly related to Subject's Letter of Instruction dated 26 May 1969. In discharging his responsibilities as MPWATCH referent, which includes advice and guidance to other Mission intelligence components in addition to Station officers, Subject is limited only by the extent to which he is called on; he himself is thoroughly grounded and available for the discharge of this function. He has handled one existing and very sensitive coopted liaison asset in excellent fashion and is developing a second such asset into a unilateral role; based on qualifications and experience, he can do more in this area and in the unilateral field generally, even given an already restrictive time schedule. In a rapidly changing operational atmosphere,

/continued ----/

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
26 February 1970	/s/ Jerome Fox

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 February 1970	Ops Officer	/s/ Harry G. Peterson

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur generally with ratings and narrative comments. Subject is a dedicated, responsive and methodical officer whose previous duty Station was Headquarters Philippine Desk. In a relatively brief period of time Subject has obtained a good knowledge of the MPWATCH situation and operational information. Probably because of the presence of knowledgeable senior ops officers at the Station, Subject has been somewhat reserved in executing his assigned responsibility as MPWATCH functional officer. I believe Subject could have been more vigorous in this primary area of responsibility. This may change when these officers are rotated this spring and summer. This matter has been discussed with Subject by COS/DCOS and encouraged him to assume a more aggressive and substantive

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 February 1970	DCOS	/s/ Terry T. Shima

SECRET

SECTION C - /continued --/

not necessarily conducive to easier relationships with local counterparts, Subject handles himself with professionalism, tact and understanding, well designed to absorb increasing sensitivities and still get the job done. Operational and performance consultations are held constantly -- daily on specifics and at least weekly on detailed performance and operational objectives. These sessions are frank and Subject is as much contributor as receiver, but he is distinctly receptive to realistic supervision and guidance for operational continuity. Subject is markedly security conscious, maintains his cover status as appropriate and is perhaps overly cost conscious. His work in analysis and research in the complex MPWATCH field, bringing together and collating viably positive intelligence (which otherwise be lost) in draft form is exemplary; his finished written work requires and is getting continuing attention. In fairness to Subject on latter point, he does very well in this area when adequate time is available to "finish" the product; on balance we prefer him active and mobile and can live with this marginal fault while evident efforts to improve continue. Overall, Subject is a well-rounded operations officer, a credit to the Agency and capable of larger responsibilities.

Reviewing Comments (continued)

role in suggesting operational ideas, levying tailored intelligence requirements, etc. to the various ops officers. Accordingly, for this rating period, I would rate Subject in Duty #1 at Proficient with an over-all rating of Proficient. Subject has the potential to increase his capability in the operations and ops management spheres. Subject and his rating officer work effectively as a team; consultations between them have produced some positive results.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
017974

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox, Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1928	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/PMI/P	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1969 - 10 May 1969

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Acting Chief of the Philippine Desk	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Headquarters case officer for a variety of Manila Station CA and FI operations	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Contact of liaison and unilateral assets in the U.S.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation and coordination of correspondence, studies, etc., in connection with Desk activities	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-68 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the reporting period Mr. Fox has assumed greater responsibility as an Acting Desk Chief. As such he is responsible for the support of the operations of a large and active Station and for the direction of some eight employees either serving on this Desk or in process for the field. On balance he has done extremely well. His ability to express himself well verbally or in writing has stood him in good stead. His operational judgment is extremely good. He gets along well with his subordinates, delegates to them, and has obtained good production from them. He is highly cost conscious.

MAIL ROOM

He has made progress in speeding up the preparation of his written material. After serving with him for some two years the undersigned is convinced that Mr. Fox has considerable potential for further advancement as a manager and operations officer.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 April 1969	Jerome Fox

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28/4/69	ADC/FE/PMI	Laurent M. St. Georges Laurent M. St. Georges

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Fox leaves shortly for an assignment in Manila. He will be missed here since he assumed increasingly heavy responsibilities during his tenure on the Branch and performed in a responsible manner which clearly warrants the strong fitness report given him.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
29 APR 1969	AC/FE/PMI	Robert F. Thompson

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 017974

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox, Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1928	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/PMI/P		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1969	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1968 - 31 December 196

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 DC10 [illegible] Hqs desk officer for a variety of Manila Station CA & FI operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Contact of liaison and potential unilateral assets in connection with operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Preparation and coordination of correspondence, studies, etc. in connection with Desk Activities.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 [illegible] CK	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-68 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JAN 13 8 36 AM '69

Mr. Fox is a bright, energetic and capable officer. At the same time, he is professionally sound in his judgement. He is thorough in reviewing and evaluating his programs and has a superior knowledge of his subject matter. He is cost conscious.

During the past year he has handled a very large work load. While his general performance has been exemplary, there have been, at times inordinate delays in completing a proportion of his written work, accounting, etc. Mr. Fox has been cautioned in this occasionally erratic performance, and it is expected that he will show marked improvement.

This officer is scheduled for assignment to the Philippines in mid-1969. His operational work in Hqs in handling visiting unilateral and liaison assets, as well as local developmentals argue well for a fine performance in the field. He is an extremely personable individual, who while intense does very well in social situations. He is a self starter, who needs little guidance. These factors should stand him in good stead.

In spite of occasional delays noted above, Mr. Fox was a very strong asset for the Philippine Desk during the past year. He remains a most capable officer with considerable potential career development.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT		
DATE 30 Dec. 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Jerome Fox	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR CFE/PMI/P	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Laurent St. Georges
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I believe the foregoing evaluation sums up the situation very well. Mr. Fox is an aggressive, capable, and experienced officer.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
2 January 1969	DC/FE/PMI	Robert F. Thompson

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

NAME OF TRAINEE: Fox, Jerome — **COURSE:** CI Operations

DOB 1 1928 — **HOURS:** 80

OFFICE: FE SD:D — **DATES:** 25 Nov - 6 Dec '68

OBJECTIVE AND METHOD OF INSTRUCTION

Objectives

To provide the Clandestine Services Officer who will be responsible for counterintelligence operational planning and implementation with current counterintelligence operational concepts, techniques, and tactics; to describe the current field organization, functions, techniques, and tactics of selected intelligence and security services; to increase his proficiency in the planning, management, and implementation of counterintelligence operations; and to acquaint him with Headquarters organization and support for operations against selected counterintelligence targets.

Method of Instruction

The course is presented by means of lecture, case study, and discussion.

ADJECTIVAL RATINGS OF ACHIEVEMENT	Adjectival Rating
1. Demonstration of understanding of course concepts and materials.	Excellent
2. Participation in class discussions.	Excellent
3. Imaginative and practical application of operational principles to case studies and problems.	Good
4. Industriousness.	Excellent

COMMENT: Mr. Fox was a very active student in discussions to which he contributed many helpful ideas. His presentation of the Wennerstroem Case was both objective and critical in terms of the available information on the case.

OVERALL adjectival rating of achievement: Excellent

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

2 JAN [illegible]
Date

George G. Kisevalter
Chief Instructor

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 017974

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FOX, JEROME	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1928	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/PMI/P	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- XX CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- XX ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
7 April 1967 - 31 December 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counselling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment, or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Headquarters Desk Officer for several Manila Station operational activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Study and Familiarization of the situation in the Philippines in preparation to an assignment in that country.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Contacts various operating units and staffs in the furtherance of operational assignments.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares operational correspondence to the field in connection with his assigned responsibilities.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-63 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Dec 29 3 52 PM '67
MAIL ROOM

Mr. Fox is a thoroughly competent case officer who has been a major asset to the Philippine Desk. He has worked extremely hard with a minimum of supervision. He has not limited himself to his assigned duties, but has interested himself in other aspects of the Desk. In this regard he contributed considerably to the complete reorganization of the desk files.

In carrying out his duties he has been extremely thorough. His analysis of his cases has been excellent. While he writes clearly and meaningfully he still tends to be slow in handling correspondence. He will have to pay extra attention to this in his coming assignment as a Chief of a one-man base.

Mr. Fox is personable intelligent, and mature officer. He is a self starter who should do extremely well in his upcoming assignment.

Mr. Fox has had no supervisory responsibilities during the period under review. He is commendably cost-conscious.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 19 December 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE J. [illegible] Fox

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 19/12/67	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR CFE/PMI/P	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Laurent St. Georges

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL I concur with the Rating Officer's evaluations and comments. Prior to his assignment to the Philippines Desk Mr. Fox served under me on the Indonesia Desk. While there he mastered with commendable speed a variety of complex operational matters and related subjects of interest. He could always be counted on to know his cases and come up with the facts. He is a sound professional who can be trusted to do a job with a minimum of supervision.

In view of his excellent performance since his assignment to this Branch, Mr. Fox has been recommended for promotion to GS-13. He is also being programmed for an assignment as Chief of a facility in Cebu where his independence and self-reliance should stand him in good stead.

DATE 22 December 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DCFE/PMI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John P. Kennedy John P. Kennedy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 017774

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1928	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/PMI/I	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL XXX REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January - 7 April 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Serves as Headquarters Desk case officer for certain Djakarta Station operational activities as assigned to him.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Serves as primary referent on the Indonesian Desk for operations involving communist and other left-wing matters	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Performs operational research functions on Indonesian communist and left-wing activities	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares operational correspondence to the field in connection with his assigned responsibilities	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

13 JUN 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The comments noted in Mr. Fox's previous Fitness Report to the effect that a little more experience with the Indonesian Desk (to which he was assigned in mid-October 1963) should make him a strong member have been more than amply justified during this period. With minimum supervision or direction, Mr. Fox undertook the task of absorbing and systemitizing the complexities of Djakarta Station operations against communists and other left-wing elements. The result has been increased comprehension on the part of Headquarters regarding these efforts.

Mr. Fox also contributed materially in the way of preliminary operational research, support, recommendations and follow-through on two operational ploys conducted by Headquarters: one, an attempted recruitment of a communist functionary in a third country; and the other the turnover of a former Djakarta Station asset now in the U.S. to another agency. Mr. Fox was further involved in studies to determine the feasibility of capitalizing on other agency assets for entrees to the communist movement not only in Indonesia but also the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. His performance in these functions was characterized by thoroughness and imagination.

Mr. Fox is an extremely capable, intelligent officer with whom it is a genuine pleasure to serve, both professionally and personally. He is intellectually

(Continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 May 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Three	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 May 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Acting Chief, FE/PMI/I	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William T. Makino

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I would have rated Mr. Fox about the same. He at times suffers from an inability to articulate his thoughts clearly. There is no question of his professional grasp of his field, however. His feel for CP penetration operations is unusually sharp and he is capable of playing a significant ops role in a field assignment.

DATE 29 May 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, FE/PMI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Clyde R. McAvoy

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT - JEROME FOX 25 May 1967

SECTION C, NARRATIVE COMMENTS (Continued)

curious, has a probing mind and has the knack of quickly and accurately assessing a given situation. A diligent worker, he retains a good sense of humor and gets along well with his colleagues. He is inclined to become a bit impatient with the bureaucratic procedures at Headquarters, but has the maturity to subdue such feelings in the interests of expediency.

As for weak points, Mr. Fox has tended to be somewhat lax about answering correspondence, particularly when he felt them to be of marginal value. This has been pointed out to him, however, and he is effectively overcoming this defect.

During this period, Mr. Fox had no supervisory duties as such, although he assisted on an ad hoc basis in the supervision of a career trainee temporarily assigned to the Indonesian Desk. His performance here was promising and it is contemplated to assign him some supervisory responsibilities in the future.

Mr. Fox exhibits good cost consciousness.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 017974

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox, Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/PMI	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) October - December 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See Section C	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 [illegible] 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JAN 13 3 22 PM '67

Subject has been assigned to the Indonesia Desk since mid-October 1966, consequently evaluation of performance of specific duties at this point would not be based upon representative evidence.

During the very brief interval Subject has been with the desk, he has shown several consistent qualities that deserve noting. Assigned the Communist Party operations sector, he applied himself to background reading, files research and organizing his materials, with commendable energy. He has accepted a variety of spot assignments requiring timely response, shown considerable initiative in locating the necessary facts, and met the required deadlines without undue assistance or observation. He shows every evidence of absorption in his assigned field. A little more experience with the country, Headquarters procedures and local conventions should make him a strong member of the desk.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 December 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Jerome Fox

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Oct - Dec 1966	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 Dec 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR CFE/PMI/I	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donald M. Richardson

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

DATE 20 December 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, FE/PMI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Clyde R. McAvoy

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Soviet Bloc Operations Course No. 4
80 hours, full time 18 - 29 March 1968

Student : FOX, Jerome **Office** : DDP/FE

Year of Birth: 1928 **Service Designation:** D

Grade : GS-12 **No. of Students** : 32

EOD Date : 1955

COURSE OBJECTIVES

To orient the student on the special nature of the Clandestine Services' Soviet Bloc target and to train him in the application of clandestine methods for collecting information on, assessing, and preparing recruitment operations against Soviet Bloc personalities.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No evaluation is made of individual performance in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

4/4/68
Russell A. Langelle Date
Instructor, OTR

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

CHINA FAMILIARIZATION NO. 34
(40 hours, full-time)

26 February - 1 March 1968

Name : Fox, Jerome

No. of Students : 17

Office : FE

SD : D

Year of Birth : 1928

Grade : GS-12

EOD Date : June 1955

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The course is designed for Agency personnel requiring a sound basic understanding of contemporary China and some acquaintance with the fundamentals of the Chinese language. The aim is familiarization, no specialization. The course focuses on mainland China. The language familiarization phase includes pronunciation of Chinese words, an introduction to the most widely accepted system of dictionary recording of Chinese characters and the telegraphic code. The area phase includes: cultural and historical development, geography and resources, economic development and problems, the political system, social change and control in contemporary China and foreign relations.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

The above named student actively participated in the China Familiarization Course No. 34. In this session no evaluation was attempted for the area phase. The student's performance in the language familiarization phase was Satisfactory.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor

5 March 1968
Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

China Operations Course No. 1-68
40 hours, full time 4 - 8 March 1968

Student	: Fox, Jerome	**Office**	: FE
Year of Birth	: 1928	**Service Designation**	: D
Grade	: GS-12	**No. of Students**	: 25
EOD Date	: June 1955		

COURSE OBJECTIVE

To prepare Clandestine Services officers to conduct operations against Communist China from the point of view of Human Source Collection; to present material directed toward the updating of officers in the operational realities inside and outside China today; and specifically to train officers in providing political, political-military, advanced weapons and other coverage of the priority China target which cannot be obtained by technical means.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No record is made of individual performance in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

1 5 MAR 1968

Henry C. Berringer   Date
Chief Instructor

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Chiefs of Station Seminar No. 2-68
80 hours, full time 5 - 16 February 1968

Participant : Jerome Fox **Office** :FE/PMI

Year of Birth: 1928 **Service Designation:** D

Grade : GS-12 **No. of Students** : 18

EOD Date : 1955

COURSE OBJECTIVES, CONTENT AND METHODS

The COS Seminar is aimed to prepare prospective Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Station and Chiefs of Base for field assignments. Emphasis was upon the difficulties confronting Chiefs of small or medium-sized installations, since they must handle a peculiarly wide range of problems. Included were case studies serving to remind outgoing chiefs of various operational approaches and techniques, but more time was devoted to policy, coordination, management, reporting, and administrative responsibilities of the Chief of Station, both within CIA and in the government at large, at home and abroad.

The bulk of the course is given in lectures and question periods conducted by officials responsible for the missions, functions, programs, and services discussed. A few key items of suggested reading are included, and bibliographies of suggested reading tailored to the individual's assignment are offered for those who want them.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No further assessment of individual capacity or performance is made in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

20 FEB 1968

Henry C. Barringer Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Information Reporting, Reports and Requirements Course No.2 - 68
120 hours, full time - 26 February 1968

Student	**:**	FOX, Jerome	**Office**	**:**	FE/PMI
Year of Birth	**:**	1928	**Service Designation**	**:**	D
Grade	**:**	GS-12	**No. of Students**	**:**	5
EOD Date	**:**	1955			

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The over-all objectives of the course are: to show the requirements function as it develops; to describe information evaluation, appraisal, and dissemination; to present fundamental principles of collection and communication of information; to demonstrate how, through Headquarters guidance, reporters can be directed and developed; and to prepare intelligence officers in the field to put information into finished report form. Supervised practice to develop skills is given in the production of finished reports; in reporting on area guidance patterns; in tailoring requirements into specific assignments; and in observing, collecting, organizing, and communicating information.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student achievement is judged from each student's observed performance during laboratory practice in the areas of instruction indicated. An asterisk (*) indicated this student's ratings. The ratings are weak, adequate, proficient, strong, and outstanding.

A. Qualitative and Quantitative Production of Reports:

Weak	Adequate	Proficient	Strong	Outstanding
			*	

COMMENT: The quality of Mr. Fox's work was uniformly excellent in every respect. He worked to full capacity.

B. Requirements Performance:

Weak	Adequate	Proficient	Strong	Outstanding
			*	

COMMENT:

His paper on this subject demonstrated that he has a very sound understanding of the Requirements and guidance systems.

S-E-C-R-E-T

C. **Editorial Performance:**

Weak **Adequate** **Proficient** [✓ **Strong**] **Outstanding**

COMMENT:

His work demonstrated that he has acquired a very sound understanding of the principles of good editorial organization in intelligence reporting.

D. **Reporting Performance:**

Weak **Adequate** [✓ **Proficient**] **Strong** **Outstanding**

COMMENT:

His outside reporting assignment was efficiently executed. It was well organized. Unfortunately, it lacked sufficient reporting detail to warrant a higher rating.

INSTRUCTOR'S OVER-ALL COMMENT:

Mr. Fox was a very fine student. He worked extremely well and his many penetrating questions added very considerably to the tone of the class. His work was of excellent quality and it showed that he has acquired a sound understanding of the various aspects of the reporting function discussed.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

Herbert G. King
Herbert G. King
Chief Instructor

1 FEB 1968
Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 017974

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox, Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNC	8. CURRENT STATION Vietnam		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January - 9 July 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 The initiation, development and management of a sensitive FI/CI operation. 5 CIO DC 70	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 The spotting, assessment, development, recruitment and management of unilateral FI agents.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Functions as a liaison officer with officials of the Vietnamese National Police. WE 51	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 The preparation of dispatches, cables, intelligence information reports, memoranda and other necessary papers required by the above duties.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

20 JUL 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 28 3 23 PM '66
MAIL ROOM

1. This employee has been under the supervision of the rating officer for a period of four months. During that time he has displayed the professional qualities of a competent and knowledgeable operations officer.

2. During his tour at this Station, Subject was responsible for the initiation and development of a highly sensitive and productive FI/CI operation. His management of this project in its early stages, which has included its evolution into a unilateral activity, has been performed in a highly commendable manner, and the Project has now reached the point where its future potential appears to be substantial. Subject has demonstrated his capability in the area of unilateral agent recruitment and management through the recruitment of three unilateral agents during his present tour. He has carried out a variety of liaison duties with various elements of the National Police efficiently and capably.

3. Subject has shown the capacity properly to place his own activities within the perspective of the Station's mission. In this respect he has devoted considerable effort to acquiring a solid background of area familiarization and knowledge which has enabled him to function in a highly effective fashion.

4. This employee has shown a high degree of cost consciousness in his approach to his duties. Employee has not had supervisory responsibilities.

5. Subject has sometimes shown a lack of sufficient emphasis in properly recording the progress of his operational activities through the normal reporting procedures. Subject is now aware of this, and it is believed that this will not be a problem in the future.

6. This employee is a well-motivated, highly capable officer with excellent career potential. This supervisor would be pleased to serve with him again.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 8 July 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Jerome Fox (s)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 8 July 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Michael F. Stern (s)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above.

DATE 8 July 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of LB	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John L. Stent (s)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 017974

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox, Jerone	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/09/25	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/[illegible]/ATC		8. CURRENT STATION Saigon	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: Feb 66

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 29 December 1964 to 31 Dec 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Officer in charge of liaison with the Municipal Police DES	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Officer in charge of liaison with postal authorities	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Officer in liaison with operational components of Headquarters, Special Branch	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Handles all the correspondence, files and associated memoranda connected with the tasks cited above.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

15 FEB 1966

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MAIL ROOM
FEB 15 10 43 AM '66

During the reporting period this officer was given different assignments due to a reorganization within the branch. During the past two months he has been solely responsible for liaison with the postal authorities and has developed this into a very worthwhile activity. In addition to this effort he has been personally responsible for development and recruitment of two senior officials of both short and long range interest. He has handled an area of extreme sensitivity which called for unremitting attention to detail. He accomplished this assignment in an outstanding manner. This officer is rated on the overall as proficient.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 Feb 66	/s/ Jerome Fox .

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 Feb 66	Ops Officer	/s/ James Braafladt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the above.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 Feb 66	Ops Officer	/s/ John Stent

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAINING REPORT - LANGUAGE

COURSE TITLE: French Inter. - RSW - Ph I

INSTRUCTOR: Mr. T. Burke

PROGRAM: Daytime - Part-time

NO. OF STUDENTS: 1

NO. OF HOURS: 60

DATE OF COURSE: 05/04/64 - 07/10/64

STUDENT

NAME	YOD	EOD DATE	OFFICE	GS	SD
Fox, Jerome	28	06/55	FS	12	D

(See reverse side for definitions of proficiency levels)

LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY AT ENTRY INTO TRAINING ☒ INSTRUCTORS ESTIMATE ☐ OFFICIAL TEST

BEFORE	NO PROFICIENCY	SLIGHT	ELEMENTARY	INTERMEDIATE	HIGH
READING			X		
WRITING			X		
PRONUNCIATION			X		
SPEAKING		X			
UNDERSTANDING		X			

LANGUAGE TRAINING OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

The general aims of language training are attainment of proficiency in speaking, understanding, reading and writing. The specific objectives are (1) ability to produce and distinguish the sounds of the language; (2) ability to use a stock of basic sentences and expressions; (3) ability to recombine the elements of basic sentences and expressions and to apply them to new situations; (4) ability to comprehend the language spoken at normal speed in various situations; (5) ability to write and read the language commensurate with ability to speak.

Methods used in all courses stress oral drills and free conversation based at first on memorized material and, at a later stage, on varied reading materials. Written and oral tests are given at intervals. Listening to and recording on tapes in the Language Lab is essential for class preparation.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	EXCELLENT
ACHIEVEMENT		X	
ATTITUDE		X	
ATTENDANCE		X	

LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY AT COMPLETION OF TRAINING ☒ INSTRUCTORS ESTIMATE ☐ OFFICIAL TEST

AFTER	NO PROFICIENCY	SLIGHT	ELEMENTARY	INTERMEDIATE	HIGH
READING				X	
WRITING			X		
PRONUNCIATION			X		
SPEAKING			X		
UNDERSTANDING			X		

Foreign Language Aptitude Test: 6

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

W. Ray Rackley
W. RAY RACKLEY
SIGNATURE, HEAD OF DEPARTMENT, LS/TR/OTR

25 Mar 64
DATE

FORM 4-64 2222

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(45)

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

Covert Action Operations Course No. 63, 30 March to 17 April 1964
60 hours part time

Student : Fox, Jerome

Office : FE

Year of Birth: 1928

Service Designation: D

Grade : GS-12

No. of Students : 13

EOD Date : June 1955

STUDENT OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The Covert Action Operations Course is an advanced seminar for senior and middle grade CS officers who will direct and conduct covert action operations in the field. It provides a conference setting in which experienced officers may discuss the full range of operational problems — from policy and strategy to tactics and techniques — with senior Agency officers, both those recently returned from field posts and those assigned to Headquarters for guidance and support of CA field operations.

The CAO course covers the origin and scope of CIA's covert action mission, CA activity of Bloc services and party organs, tactical approaches to the direction of CA operations, political action, economic action, propaganda, paramilitary operations, special operations, the national counterinsurgency program, covert action in the labor and youth field, counterintelligence problems in covert action, joint CI-CA programs, and current area case studies.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. Adjectival ratings are not given in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Dawson Smith
Chief Instructor

22 April 1964
Date

Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
017974

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) FOX	(First) Jerome	(Middle) J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1928	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNC/VN		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
January 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
April 1963 - 31 January 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assembles available information on North Vietnam, and its diplomatic establishments abroad.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Acts as ZRGRAIL officer for Vietnam Desk.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Aids in giving operational support to denied areas ops program run by Saigon Station.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares periodic reports on progress of denied area ops program.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

17 MAR 1964

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

During the period covered by this report, Mr. Fox has [illegible] first time been assigned as an operations officer in the DD/P, having transferred from the DD/I in April 1963. Mr. Fox has made this transition very well, and has adjusted himself to the operating tempo and atmosphere of a busy desk. He is now a competent and flexible case officer, making a valuable contribution to his desk and branch. For the past month, he has served very capably as acting chief of the North Vietnam element of the desk, during the absence of another officer.

Mr. Fox was quick to recognize the difference between his present assignment and those previous to it. This difference has required some changes on his part, in terms of emphasis and flexibility. Mr. Fox has graciously accepted guidance given him during this period, and has developed into an efficient DD/P officer.

Mr. Fox's assignment involves partial supervision of two junior officers. He directs these officers effectively, and in a natural manner, giving promise of considerable supervisory capability which future assignments can develop.*

Following some additional time on the desk, during which time it is expected that Mr. Fox will assume more responsibility for the North Vietnam program, it is planned to send him to the field, as his performance on the desk would indicate that he is fully capable of an operational field assignment.

*Mr. Fox's supervisory duties have not been directly related to fiscal matters. However, he has revealed a normal degree of cost consciousness in those budgetary matters with which he has come in contact.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 18 February 1964
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: E. Jerome Fox

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 10
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:
DATE: 18 February 1964
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, FE/VNC/Vietnam
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Donald P. Gregg

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur in supervisor's comments. I have observed this officer since early May 1963 and I believe he has developed steadily in the operations field, a field new to him. After another six to nine months on the desk, he should be ready for his first ops assignment abroad, hopefully in Saigon working on the North Vietnam program. He is showing the earmarks of a well-rounded, thoughtful case officer and we should not delay too long in getting him to the field in a real operational situation.

DATE: 9 March 1964
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, FE/VNC
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Philip B. K. Potter

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
Reg 017774

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FOX, Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD IR
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Factory Mark (JN)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE		8. CURRENT STATION TOKYO	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 Jan 62 - 23 September 1962

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Monitors and coordinates with ODYOKE and allied armed services the Factory Markings Collection Program (FMCP) in North Asian area covering specifically Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Determines, initiates and directly participates in the exploitation of FMCP targets in conjunction with KUDOVE and ODYOKE armed services.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides detailed training and guidance for ODYOKE personnel and for foreign allied personnel (e.g. Japanese, South Korean, Chinese Nationalists) in the identification, photographic and collection techniques applicable to the FMCP.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintains continuing & close official and personal working liaison with & support for commanders & officers of the various ODYOKE military intel collection units in Japan, & with Tokyo KUDOVE elements, particularly the Japanese Liaison Staff.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Responsible for preparation of collection intel & admin rpts & dispatches to KULYNX Factory Markings Center, on all matters pertaining to the FMCP in this area of jurisdiction.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Assisted the Branch Chief in the handling of KULYNX requirements.	RATING LETTER P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER
P+

24 APR 1963

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject during his tour of duty at this station demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the Factory Markings program and was sincere and competent in performing his duties. The establishment of the joint center (Comet) was a creditable achievement which should make an important contribution to the program in the years to come. He was cooperative and willing to undertake additional duties when requested. He has done an outstanding job in the training of both ODYOKE and and foreign personnel.

The reporting officer feels that Subject has a tendency to procrastinate and that on a few occasions he did not follow through on his commitments as aggressively as he might have. This, however, was the only weakness noticed in an otherwise competent performance.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1\.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 4/23/63

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: ~~Jerome Fox~~ /s/ Jerome Fox

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 15 MONTHS

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: HAS ALREADY DEPARTED TO NEW POST
FR shown to employee 4/23/63

DATE: 19 Oct 1962

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR:

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Elmer F. Hintz

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Concur.

DATE: 22 Oct 1962

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: D COS Tokyo

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 017974

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FOX Jerome J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1928	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNC/VN	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- ☐ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- XX ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: January 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): April - 31 January 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counselling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assembles available information on North Vietnam, and its diplomatic establishments abroad.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Acts as ZRGRAIL officer for Vietnam Desk.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Aids in giving operational support to denied areas ops program run by Saigon Station.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares periodic reports on progress of denied area ops program.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-53 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

During the period covered by this report, Mr. Fox has for the first time been assigned as an operations officer in the DD/P, having transferred from the DD/I in April 1963. Mr. Fox has made this transition very well, and has adjusted himself to the operating tempo and atmosphere of a busy desk. He is now a competent and flexible case officer, making a valuable contribution to his desk and branch. For the past month, he has served very capably as acting chief of the North Vietnam element of the desk, during the absence of another officer.

Mr. Fox was quick to recognize the difference between his present assignment and those previous to it. This difference has required some changes on his part, in terms of emphasis and flexibility. Mr. Fox has graciously accepted guidance given him during this period, and has developed into an efficient DD/P officer.

Mr. Fox's assignment involves partial supervision of two junior officers. He directs these officers effectively, and in a natural manner, giving promise of considerable supervisory capability which future assignments can develop.*

Following some additional time on the desk, during which time it is expected that Mr. Fox will assume more responsibility for the North Vietnam program, it is planned to send him to the field, as his performance on the desk would indicate that he is fully capable of an operational field assignment.

*Mr. Fox's supervisory duties have not been directly related to fiscal matters. However, he has revealed a normal degree of cost consciousness in those budgetary matters with which he has come in contact.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 18 February 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 18 February 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, FE/VNC/Vietnam	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donald P. Gregg

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur in supervisor's comments. I have observed this officer since early May 1963 and I believe he has developed steadily in the operations field, a field new to him. After another six to nine months on the desk, he should be ready for his first ops assignment abroad, hopefully in Saigon working on the North Vietnam program. He is showing the earmarks of a well-rounded, thoughtful case officer and we should not delay too long in getting him to the field in a real operational situation.

DATE 9 March 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, FE/VNC	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Philip B. K. Potter

SECRET

14-00000

HF-27

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Fox (First) Jerome (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12 CSB
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION IR	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Factory Mark		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Tokyo, Japan

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS					
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 15 Apr 61-31 Dec 61

SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Monitors and coordinates with ODYOKE and allied armed services the Factory Markings Collection Program (FMCP) in North Asian area covering specifically Japan, S. Korea & Taiwan	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintains continuing & close official & personal working liaison with & support for commanders & officers of the various ODYOKE military intel collection units in Japan, with Tokyo (con't)	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Determines, initiates & directly participates in the exploitation of FMCP targets in conjunction with KUDOVE and ODYOKE armed services.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Responsible for preparation of collection intel & admin rpts dispatched to KUBARK Factory Markings Center, on all matters pertaining to the FMCP in this area of jurisdiction.	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides detailed training and guidance for ODYOKE personnel & for foreign allied personnel (e.g. Japanese, S. Korean & Chinese Nationalists), in the identification, exploitation and (con't)	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Represents the interest of KUBARK generally in liaison with other ODYOKE intelligence components-both collection & analysis-in Japan.	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(d)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE ... 1 02 PM '62 MAIL ROOM

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This officer continues to perform his duties in a highly [illegible] manner, showing diligence and initiative. He has successfully coordinated the activities of the ODYOKE intelligence community in the Factory Markings field, and has succeeded in keeping this an active and rewarding program. He has been cooperative at all times, and has willingly assumed additional duties, particularly in assisting the Branch Chief in handling KUL[illegible] problems and requirements. He has established good working relationships with the ODYOKE agencies in the field, and has twice during this period received letters of appreciation from other agencies for the high calibre of training which he has conducted. No specific weaknesses have been noted, and no special training is recommended at this time.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 31 December 61	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Jerome Fox (Signed)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 7	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 31 December 61	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Elmer F. Hintz (Signed)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 31 Dec. 61	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert P. Wheeler (Signed)

SECRET

Continuation of Section B:

Specific Duty No. 3

collection techniques applicable to the FMCP.

Specific Duty No. 4

KUDOVE elements, particularly the Japanese Liaison Staff.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FOX, Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 October 1920	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION IR	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Factory Mark	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From Sept 59 To Apr 61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Monitors and coordinates with ODYOKE and allied armed services the Factory Marking Collection Program (FMCP) in North Asian area covering specifically Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintains continuing and close official & personal working liaison with & support for commanders & officers of the various ODYOKE military intel collection units in Japan, & with Tokyo (cont)	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Determines, initiates and directly participates in the exploitation of FMCP targets in conjunction with KUDOVE and ODYOKE armed services.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Responsible for preparation of collection intel & admin rpts & dispatches to KULYHX Factory Markings Center on all matters pertaining to the FMCP in this area of jurisdiction.	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides detailed training and guidance for ODYOKE personnel and for foreign allied personnel (e.g. Japanese, South Korean & Chinese Nationalist) in the identification, photographic and (cont)	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Represents the interest of KULYHX generally in liaison with other ODYOKE intelligence components-both collection and analysis-in Japan.	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINED IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 3-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (8)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

The undersigned's assessment of subject officer continues essentially the same as stated in the previous fitness report.

During the 18 months this officer has performed his duties at Tokyo Station he has carried on and, with marked success, built upon the program organized by his predecessor. Subject officer by diligent effort and by demonstrating outstanding competence and expertise in the Factory Markings field has successfully established himself as the focal poin for the Factory Markings Collection Program (FMCP) within both the Station and the ODYOKE intelligence community. He has established and maintained excellent working relations with all ODYOKE intelligence components having an interest and/or capability in the FMCP. His status insures the maximum coordinated effort in this field with resultant benefits to the entire intelligence community. The thoroughness and effectiveness with which I believe the FMCP is being carried out in the North Asian area is strong testimonial for the caliber of subject officer's performance.

Subject officer has demonstrated high devotion to duty and complete willingness to undertake any task, no matter how difficult or inconvenient, which would contribute to the FMCP. In addition, he has voluntarily undertaken to look after the broader interests of KUBARK with both KUDOVE and ODYOKE military intelligence components in this area. In the performance of his duties subject officer has also displayed a high degree of initiative and self-reliance, as well as mature judgment in assessing the goals of his program and devising and implementing all measures necessary to achieve them.

With regard to subject officer's current assignment and performance I have no weaknesses to note. From the point of view of his career development I do recommend further trainin (continued)

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 14 April 1961
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Jerome Fox (Signed)

This report has been prepared in accordance with F.E. Division standards which [illegible] in rating the individual [illegible] an average [illegible] performance.

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 18
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.
☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 14 April 1961
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, SIB
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Frank J. Denny

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I am not, of course, as familiar with Subject's work as is the rater, but I cannot help but question what I consider the extremely high ratings given here. True, we have no person performing comparable duties in the station, but we have few, if any, officers here who consistently perform at this high level. In my dealings with Subject, I have been struck by his high motivation and devotion to duty. On the other hand, I have not been favorably impressed by his failure to handle promptly his (cont'd)

DATE: 14 Apr 1961
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

Continuation of Section B:

Specific Duty No. 3

collection techniques applicable to the FMCP.

Specific Duty No. 4

KUDOVE elements, particularly the Japanese Liaison Staff

Continuation of Section E:

and experience in the broader, analytical aspects of the KUCHAP area, including language and area studies.

Continuation of Section F-3:

normal administrative responsibilities.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A	**GENERAL**		
1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FOX Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 October 1928	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION IR	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 4 Sept 59 To 30 Sept 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Monitors and coordinates with ODYOKE and allied armed services the Factory Markings Collection Program (FMCP) in North Asian area covering specifically Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintains continuing and close official & personal working liaison with & support for commanders & officers of the various ODYOKE military intel collection units in Japan, [illegible]	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Determines, initiates and directly participates in the exploitation of FMCP targets in conjunction with KUDOVE and ODYOKE armed services.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 particularly the Japan Liaison Staff.//Responsible for preparation of collection intel & admin rpts & dispatches to KULYNX Factory Markings Center on all matters pertaining to the FMCP in	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides detailed training and guidance for ODYOKE personnel and for foreign allied personnel (e.g. Japanese, South Korean & Chinese Nationalist) in the identification, photographic and collection techniques applicable to the FMCP.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 his area of jurisdiction. Represents the interests of KUBARK generally in liaison with other ODYOKE intelligence components-both collection and analysis-in Japan.	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

Continuation of Section E:

In recognition of subject officer's outstanding performance to date and in view of the considerable responsibilities incident to the post of Factory Markings representative in this area, I recommend that subject officer be promoted to the grade of GS-12 as soon as possible.

SECRET 24 AUG 1959
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	117974

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox, Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1928	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION IR	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Factory Markings)		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT ORR-FM/EA

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐ NOT ELIGIBLE ☒ MEMBER ☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING ☐ DECLINED ☐ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 Oct 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 15 Mar 58 - To 30 Sep 1959

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Prepares written reports on results of analysis.	RATING NO. 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Directs and participates in field exploitation.	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Derives significant intelligence from factory markings data.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Organizes raw data into analytic file.	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises junior analyst.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 3

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY				X			
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Fox is a steady, conscientious worker, and has consistently displayed initiative and thoroughness in his research assignments. His main weakness is in organizing and presenting the results of his work. This weakness is also apparent in his oral presentation of argumentation. Mr. Fox frequently "talks around a point" instead of "hitting the point". This weakness has influenced the rating given under Section D - "thinks clearly", and limits his effectiveness as a supervisor. It is hoped that Mr. Fox will overcome this weakness in his forthcoming assignment overseas.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 19 4 56 PM '59
MAIL ROOM

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
42	Departed on PCS overseas.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 August 1959	Chief, FM/EA	John H. DuBois

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 August 1959	Chief, St/FM	James Q. May

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT OF TRAINING

Operations Familiarization Course No. 17

I. IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

Name:	FOX, Jerome	Sex:	Male
Date of Birth:	9 October 1926	Grade or Rank:	GS-11
EOD Date:	15 June 1953	Office:	ORR
Dates of Course:	6 Apr - 15 May 59	No. of Students:	25

Projected Assignment or Present Position: (from Request for Internal Training) Factory Markings Officer in Tokyo.

II. DESCRIPTION OF COURSE

The Operations Familiarization Course is a six-week course designed primarily for Clandestine Services non-case officer personnel and for non-Clandestine Services officers whose responsibilities in support of operations require adequate familiarization with case officer functions and with the programs and operations of the Clandestine Services.

III. REPORT OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

To satisfactorily complete the Operations Familiarization Course the student must demonstrate in a series of seminars and in a limited number of written assignments that he has acquired an adequate understanding of the fundamentals of clandestine operations. Testing mechanisms are minimal and do not permit an extensive evaluation of individual performance.

Mr. Fox satisfactorily completed Operations Familiarization Course No. 17.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

(SIGNED) KENNETH E. [illegible]

Chief Instructor, OFC

Chief, Field Training

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

SPANISH BASIC READING, SPEAKING, WRITING II (PART-TIME)

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME **FOX, Jerome**		SEX **Male**	DATES OF COURSE **5 Jan - 13 March 1959**	NO. OF STUDENTS **3**
DATE OF BIRTH **9 Oct 1928**	EOD DATE **15 June 1955**		GRADE OR RANK **GS-11**	OFFICE **ORR**
PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION **Analytic position in ST/FM**				

SECTION II: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

This course lasts 10 weeks. The classes are held 2 hours per day, 5 days a week. Students are required to do a minimum of 10 hours per week of drill in the Language Laboratory outside of class hours. The instructor is able to meet at any time by appointment with each student individually. Students are given at least two major tests and a number of ten-minute tests during the progress of the course.

SECTION III: OBJECTIVES

The general aim of this course is to provide a thorough grounding for the student who has previously had either a reading course in the language or an insufficient introduction to the language. It serves as a basis for further advancement either by independent learning in the area or by further study.

The specific objectives are:

A. Ability to produce and distinguish all the sounds of the language.
B. Ability to use adequately a stock of correct Spanish sentences and expressions.
C. Ability to analyze sentences and expressions into their components.
D. Ability to comprehend normal-speed spoken Spanish in a wide variety of non-technical situations.
E. Ability to read and write informal Spanish using a limited number of vocabulary and structural items.

SECTION IV: EVALUATION RATINGS

The following is an explanation of the five terms of evaluation employed below:

1. The student failed to satisfy minimum requirements, and his grasp of the material is too inadequate to be functional.
2. The student satisfied only the minimum requirements of the objectives. His grasp is barely functional.

3. The student met the objectives in a creditable manner, revealing a good grasp of essentials.
4. The student showed a high degree of competence in meeting the objectives.
5. The student demonstrated exceptional ability or proficiency in meeting the objectives. His accomplishment was one attained by a very small number of students.

SECTION V: ACHIEVEMENT RATINGS

The number in each cell represents the number of students receiving that rating in terms of the above objectives. The asterisk (*) represents the rating this student achieved.

Course Objectives	Rating 1	Rating 2	Rating 3	Rating 4	Rating 5
Objective A			2 *	1	
Objective B			2 *	1	
Objective C			2 *	1	
Objective D			2 *	1	
Objective E			2 *	1	

This class as a whole is rated as:

Above average ______ Average X Slower than average ______

SECTION VI: COMMENTS

Mr. Fox performed fairly unevenly in this course. As a rule his preparations were more thorough during the first five weeks of the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

PIERRE E. NYS /s/
Signature of Instructor

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME **FOX, Jerome**	SEX **Male**	DATES OF COURSE **13 Oct 58-19 Dec 58**	NO. OF STUDENTS **6**
DATE OF BIRTH **9 October 1928**	EOD DATE **15 June 1955**	GRADE **GS-11**	OFFICE **ORR**
PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION **Analyst**			

SECTION II: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

This course lasts 10 weeks. The classes are [illegible] hours per day, 5 days a week. Students are required to do a minimum of 10 hours per week of drill in the Language Laboratory outside of class hours. The instructor is able to meet at any time by appointment with each student individually. Students are given at least two major tests and a number of ten-minute tests during the progress of the course.

SECTION III: OBJECTIVES

The general aim of this course is to provide a thorough grounding for the student who has previously had either a regular course in the language or an insufficient introduction to the language. It serves as a basis for further advancement either by independent learning in the area or by further study.

The specific objectives are:

Objective A. Ability to produce and distinguish all the sounds of the language.

Objective B. Ability to use adequately a stock of correct Spanish sentences and expressions.

Objective C. Ability to analyze sentences and expressions into their components.

Objective D. Ability to [illegible] spoken Spanish in a wide variety of [illegible] situations.

Objective E. Ability to [illegible] limited number of vocabulary and structural items.

SECTION IV: EVALUATION [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

The following is an explanation of the five terms of evaluation employed below.

Rating 1. The student failed to satisfy minimum requirements, and his grasp of the material is too inadequate to be functional.

Rating 2. The student satisfied only the minimum requirements of the objectives. His grasp is barely functional.

Rating 3. The student met the objectives in a creditable manner, revealing a good grasp of essentials.

Rating 4. The student showed a high degree of competence in meeting the objectives.

Rating 5. The student demonstrated exceptional ability or proficiency in meeting the objectives. His accomplishment was one attained by a very small number of students.

SECTION V: ACHIEVEMENT RATINGS

The number in each cell represents the number of students receiving that Rating in terms of the above objectives. The asterisk (*) represents the Rating this student achieved.

Course Objectives	Rating 1.	Rating 2.	Rating 3.	Rating 4.	Rating 5.
Objective A.		1	2	2*	1
Objective B.			3*	3	
Objective C.			4*	2	
Objective D.			3*	3	
Objective E.			3	3*	

This class as a whole is rated as:

Above average ______ Average X ______ Lower than average ______

SECTION VI: COMMENTS

Since reading skills are stressed during the latter part of the 30-week course series, the rating for Objective E is based on a limited amount of information.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

/s/ PIERRE E. EYB
Signature of Chief Instructor

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section A below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FOX JEROME	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 28	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION IR

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OPR/St/FM/EA

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Identification Specialist

7. GRADE: 11

8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 29 March 58

9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 15 March 57 - 15 March 58

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Individual on TDY Overseas

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB-PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 8 April 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR JOHN H. DUBOIS John H. Du Bois	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Branch Chief/EA

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		10 APR 1958
Reviewed by PCD		4/14/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 8 Apr 58	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL JAMES C. MAY James	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, SR/[illegible]/RR

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF ... MAIL ROOM
APR 9 4 30 PM '58

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. *Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:*

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Organizes raw data into analytic file	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Directs field exploitation	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Derives significant intelligence from date	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervises junior analysts	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares reports on conclusions	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Fox is a steady, conscientious, cooperative worker. He is very thorough in his approach to research assignments and has displayed initiative in these assignments. He does not require close supervision. His main weakness is in organizing and presenting the results of his research.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management, and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FOX JEROME	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 26	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION IR
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT CRR/St/FM/EA	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Identification Specialist		
7. GRADE 11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 29 March 58	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 15 March 57 - 15 March 58	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

A. THIS DATE 8 April 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR JOHN H. DuBOIS John H. DuBois	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Branch Chief/EA

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT, AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 8 Apr 58	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL JAMES C. [illegible]	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, St/FM/RR

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES.
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES.
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING.
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL.
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES.

DATE
Reviewed by PCD ____________

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION.
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION.
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION.
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION.

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP USING THE BASIC JOB (Truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A [illegible] WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHOLE PLANT, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

30

APR 9 4 31 PM '58

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

His knowledge of basic social science analytic processes and maturity of judgment give him potential of a reasonably broad scope. Weakness in organizing and presenting his findings will be a limiting factor in the immediate future.

MAIL ROOM

SECTION D. **FUTURE PLANS**

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Writing courses and additional on-the-job training, to include overseas TDY on operational assignments.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION E. **DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL**

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS, HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	[illegible]	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS		30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

TSS/PB TRAINING DIVISION EVALUATION

DARKROOM 9

BASIC PHOTOGRAPHY No. 1

NAME Jerome FOX DIV CSR BR. EA DATES TRAINED: from 29 June to 17 July '59

This course is primarily designed to develop the following skills: Use of 35 mm cameras with accessories, document copy, processing and printing.

	None	Unsat	Fair	Good	Excellent	Superior
I. Manipulation of camera.						
a. Leica				X		
b. Retina II C	X					
c. Recordak				X		
II. Processing and printing.						
a. Film loading				X		
b. Film processing				X		
c. Enlarging				X		
d. Reflex and contact printing					X	
III. Use of accessory equipment.						
a. Exposure meter				X		
b. Filters	X					
c. Telephoto and wide angle lenses				X		
IV. Document copy and small objects.						
a. Available light	X					
b. Accessory illumination				X		
c. BOOWU, portra lens, focus slide				X		
V. Ground photography.						
a. Coverage						
b. Report	X					
VI. Casing.						
a. Coverage						
b. Report						
VII. Surveillance.						
a. Coverage						
b. Report						
VIII. Special problems.						
a. Coverage						
b. Report						
General quality of prints				X		
Choice of subject matter				X		
Quality of darkroom work (Cleanliness, etc.)				X		
Attitude toward subject matter				X		
Cooperation					X	

REMARKS:

Mr. Fox met the course objectives and completed all of the course assignments for the two weeks he attended with average results.

Encountering some difficulty at the outset, Mr. Fox soon overcame many of his [illegible] to be checked out in not only course equipment, but other equipment as well. He also offered to complete additional assignments on his own time.

It is suggested he continue his practice and association with photography in order to maintain and improve present proficiency.

APPROVED ______________________
C/TSS/TD

[illegible]
Instructor

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FOX Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct. 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION IR

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: ORR/Techniques & Methods/Analysis & Reports

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Identification Specialist

7. GRADE: GS-9

8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 29 March 1957

9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 15 March 1956 - 15 March 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

XX	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
XX	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 28 March 57	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR John H. DuBois John H. DuBois	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Acting Branch Chief

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos.		22 APR 1957
Reviewed by		

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 28 March 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, D/T/RR

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

B. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Organizes raw data into analytic file.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Devises codes for mechanical processing of raw data.	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Derives significant intelligence from data.	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Participates in field exploitation	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Drafts reports on conclusions.	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Fox is an energetic, competent worker. He has demonstrated the ability to handle research problems and to present his findings in writing. Mr. Fox organizes his work so that he requires a minimum of supervision. He has worked as an excellent team member and his suggestions have been constructive.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) FOX Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct. 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION IR
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT ORR/Techniques & Methods/Analysis & Reports	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ident. Specialist		
7. GRADE GS-9	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 29 March 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 15 March 1956 - 15 March 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
28 March 57	John H DuBois John H DuBois	Acting Branch Chief

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
28 March 57	[illegible]	Chief [illegible]

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

DATE
22 1957
Reviewed

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A SMALL GROUP, FOR WHOSE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors).
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT ALL BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
18

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 5 4 09 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

A fine junior officer who will certainly continue his progress upward in factory markings analytic competence and responsibility. [illegible] to have the personal flexibility and breadth to develop into a competent senior intelligence officer of reasonably broad scope.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Mr. Fox's development program will continue to be in increasing his capabilities in factory markings analysis and exploitation. A training course in supervision will be considered.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	X	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	X	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	—	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

21

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Fox Jorome
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct 1928
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD/IR
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: ORR, Techniques & Methods Div., Analysis & Reports Br.
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Identification Specialist
7. GRADE: GS-7
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 6 April 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 15 June 1955 - 15 March 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☒ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 9 April 1956
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: H. HARRISON [illegible] H Harrison Hemenway
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: CHIEF, T/AR

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

No difference of opinion. Concur in evaluation of Mr. Fox as one of the better young men I've seen.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	FP.	20 APR 1956
Reviewed by PUD	21	5-26

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 9 April 56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: JAMES Q. MAY
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: CHIEF, D/T

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

1. Employment should be continued beyond the probationary period.
2. Mr. Fox's performance on the job was substantially superior to indications from the BCC evaluation.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OTC RECEIVED
APR 19 12 02 PM '56

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Organize raw data into analytic file	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Participate in field exploitation	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Derive significant intelligence from data	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Draft reports on conclusions	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Fox has been an energetic and steady worker, quick to grasp instructions, and able to proceed without close supervision. He has made specific contributions toward simpler and more precise analytic methods, and has consistently worked as an excellent team member.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Fox Jerome	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD/IR
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT ORR, Techniques and Methods Div., Analysis & Reports Br.	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Identification Specialist		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 6 April 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 15 June 1955 - 15 March 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☒ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 9 April 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR H. HARRISON HEMENWAY H Hemenway	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE CHIEF, T/AR

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 9 Apr 56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL JAMES C. MAY James C. May	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL CHIEF, D/T

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

SIX

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

A fine junior officer who will certainly progress rapidly upward in factory markings analytic competence and responsibility. He apparently has the personal flexibility and breadth to develop into a competent intelligence officer of reasonably broad scope.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 19 12 03 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

For the immediate future, Mr. Fox' development program should be in terms of increasing his capabilities in specific terms of factory markings exploitation and analysis.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS, HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITY	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	X	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONTINUALLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS REGARD FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOTTED TIME LIMITS	[illegible]	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

INTELLIGENCE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS NO. 8

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME **FOX, Jerome**	SEX **M**	DATES OF COURSE **26 Sept. - 21 Oct.**	NO. OF STUDENTS **14**
DATE OF BIRTH **9 October 1928**	EOD DATE **15 June 1955**	GRADE OR RANK **GS-7**	OFFICE **ORR**

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION

Identification Specialist

SECTION II: OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE

1. To introduce students to the skills and methods involved in the processing of intelligence materials;
2. To provide practice in the oral and written presentation of intelligence for a variety of purposes.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

Intelligence Principles and Methods is a four weeks (160 hours) extension of Basic Orientation Course for personnel who are or will be engaged in the production of intelligence. Emphasis is on "learning by doing", through the medium of a series of integrated written exercises which require processing of actual intelligence documents. Exercise is also gained in the oral presentation of intelligence through a series of briefings before the class. Each student is assigned a special research problem for which approximately 40 hours are allotted in the course schedule. The results are presented to fellow-students and instructors in an oral briefing at the close of the course. The student also prepares an annotated bibliography, and writes a critical review of one of his chief sources.

SECTION IV: HOW THE STUDENTS ARE EVALUATED

Written exercises are graded independently by at least two members of the instructional staff on the basis of how well the student has fulfilled the requirements of selectivity, organization, accuracy to original, brevity and clarity of style. Grades for each type of written exercise are entered in Section V. Oral briefings are evaluated by both instructors and fellow students through the use of written critique sheets and oral observations following each presentation. A composite grade is given for the oral briefings. In the evaluation of the research problem the grade entered reflects intelligence focus, exploitation of sources, and general effectiveness of written and oral presentation. The grades are defined as follows:

SUPERIOR: The student demonstrated outstanding ability or proficiency in meeting this course goal or objective; he [illegible] thorough knowledge of the material presented [illegible] area.

Section IV. How the Students are Evaluated (Contd.)

EXCELLENT: The student showed unusual competence, skill or ability in meeting this objective or goal; he demonstrated a thorough grasp of the presented material, or, if skills are involved, he demonstrated that he can perform in an extremely effective manner in this area.

SATISFACTORY: The student met this objective in a competent and adequate manner; he demonstrated a good understanding and grasp of the information presented, or, if skills are involved, he demonstrated sufficient competence to operate effectively in this area.

POOR: Although the student may have met some of the standards set for minimum achievement of this course goal or objective, he demonstrated serious gaps in knowledge or sufficient lack of skill to be of doubtful competence.

FAILURE: The student was unable to grasp the concepts of information presented, or demonstrated that he had not acquired the necessary information and skills to operate at even minimum capacity in this area.

SECTION V: REPORT OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

Figures show grade distribution. The asterisk indicates grade this student received.

SUBJECT	FAIL	POOR	SAT	EXC	SUP
1. Exercise - Interview Reporting	0	0	6*	7	1
2. Exercise - Brief Daily Intell. Item	0	0	7	6*	1
3. Exercise - Periodical Intell. Item	0	0	5*	9	0
4. Critical Book Review	0	0	4	7*	3
5. Research Problem	0	0	6*	7	1
6. Skill in Oral Briefing	0	0	6*	8	0

SECTION VI: INSTRUCTORS OVER-ALL EVALUATION

In terms of all factors observed during the course and taking into account this student's experience in the Agency, grade, and general area of work, an "X" in one of the boxes shows the judgment of the instructional staff of his performance.

Fail ☐ Poor ☐☐☐ Minus ☐☐☐☐☒ Satisfactory ☐☐☐☐☐ Plus Excellent ☐☐☐ Superior ☐

COMMENTS:

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor

THIS PAGE OF THE REPORT IS NOT TO BE SHOWN TO THE STUDENT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES

SECTION VII: INSTRUCTORS' COMMENTS

Observations of the instructional staff, especially on habits, characteristics, strengths, weaknesses or anything that may have influenced the student's performance in the course are reported here.

Mr. Fox's performance in the course was no more than average, but he applied himself to the work and was interested in getting something out of the instruction. Mr. Fox took "Economic Relations between Afghanistan and the USSR" as the topic for his research project and did considerable work on the subject, in spite of a dearth of material. His critical review was workmanlike and showed that he had put a definite effort into preparing it.

Mr. Fox improved throughout the course in his oral briefing, although at no time were they well organised or concise. When his faults were pointed out to him, he made a genuine attempt to remedy them. Mr. Fox also has the capability of self-criticism; he frequently recognized his mistakes himself and was interested in discussing them with his adviser. Although his performance was frequently disappointing, I believe that he obtained considerable benefit from the course as he was genuinely anxious to learn and improve.

This evaluation, shown by an "X" in one of the boxes, takes into account this training record, the student's age, grade, Agency experience, and projected assignment. It is included for the purpose of giving supervisors an estimate of the implications of the training evaluation report for the student's assignment and career potential.

Fail Poor Minus Satisfactory Plus Excellent Superior

☐ ☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐ ☐

Training Officer's Comments:

Training Officer

SECRET

Jerome FOX

READING ANALYSIS PROGRAM 8

OBJECTIVES OF PROGRAM

1. To determine employees' proficiency level in scanning, extensive and intensive reading tasks.
2. To determine employees' degree of reading versatility. Versatility is defined as the ability to apply the several reading skills appropriately to various reading situations.
3. To ascertain the probable gain which would accrue from further training in reading skills.
4. To inform each employee concerning his relative reading proficiency in scanning, extensive and intensive reading and his versatility.

TEST DESCRIPTION

READING COMPREHENSION TEST: Measures speed and accuracy of basic comprehension skills. Complete and objective understanding, analysis, and interpretation are required in this test.

EXTENSIVE READING TESTS: Measure the degree of proficiency in informational, or general reading.

INTENSIVE READING TESTS: Measure reading proficiency in acquiring basic knowledge of new subjects.

SCANNING TESTS: Measure proficiency in the organization and location of specific information, main idea, and questions.

ANALYSIS OF READING PERFORMANCE

	Poor	Fair	Sat.	Exc.	Sup.
1. Basic Comprehension Skills			X		
2. Extensive Techniques			X		
3. Intensive Techniques		X			
4. Scanning Techniques:					
Specific Information					
Main Idea			X		
Questions			X		
Organization				X	
			X		
5. Versatility			X		

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Mr. Fox scans for specifics quickly and accurately; he scans for main ideas satisfactorily, but could improve his use of that technique with practice. Poorer comprehension in intensive reading could be caused by lack of concentration or failure to organize information while reading. Extensive reading could be improved by adjusting rate to read selectively for pertinent information. The Reading Improvement Course would be of benefit in developing use of more diversified skills.

MJH

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

Frances Cook
Chief Instructor

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION -- BASIC ORIENTATION

COURSE NO. 21

SECTION I IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME OF STUDENT FOX, Jerome	SEX X MALE ☐ FEMALE	DATES OF COURSE 6 - 23 September 1955	NO. OF STUDENTS 120
DATE OF BIRTH 9 October 1928	EOD DATE June '55	GRADE OR RANK GS-7	OFFICE RR

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION
Identification Specialist

SECTION II CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

Material in this course is presented primarily by lecture and exhibit; several seminars and discussions are also held. The rating on Introduction to Intelligence is determined by the results of one multiple choice test, based on lecture material; the rating on Communism and the USSR is determined by one multiple choice test covering the lecture and readings.

SECTION III OBJECTIVES

A. The Basic Orientation Course is designed to provide the student with information in the following areas:

1. Introduction to Intelligence

   a. Organization for national security, with emphasis on the intelligence community and the organization and mission of CIA as it fits into the whole national security effort.
   b. The principles and methods of intelligence, emphasizing the substantive components of CIA, considering the types of information, and the collecting, processing, and disseminating functions.
   c. An introduction to clandestine activity, with emphasis on the functions of the clandestine services.

2. Communism and the USSR

   This deals with Marxist theory, the history of Socialism and Communism, Communist activities outside the USSR, history and geography of Russia, political structure of the USSR, Soviet foreign policy, and potentialities and vulnerabilities of the USSR.

B. Throughout the three weeks of the course discussions and conferences deal with the American Thesis.

SECTION IV STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT RATINGS

The numbers placed in the columns below show how many students received each rating. An asterisk (*) shows the rating this student received.

SUBJECT	HOURS	RATING				
		FAIL	POOR	SATISFACTORY	EXCELLENT	SUPERIOR
INTRODUCTION TO INTELLIGENCE	64	4	9	30	45 *	32
COMMUNISM AND THE USSR	56	2	14	40*	37	29

SECTION V COMMENTS

INDICATE ANY STRONG AND WEAK POINTS OF THE STUDENT, OR ANYTHING THAT MAY HAVE INFLUENCED HIS PERFORMANCE IN THE COURSE

CONTINUE COMMENTS ON REVERSE SIDE ☐ OVER

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

SIGNATURE OF CHIEF INSTRUCTOR
Edward J. O'Gara

FORM NO. 450 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 AUG 55

SECRET

(45)

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING	FILE
TO: Retirement Operations Branch Office of Personnel	DATE
RETIREE [illegible] Fox	CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Cover & Commercial Staff, the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT		CIVIL SERVICE	x	CIARDS	DATE NOT DETERMINED				
COVER		OVERT ROUTINE		COVERT *(OFFICIAL COVER)* LOCK-UP		COVERT *(NOC)* SPECIAL	RETENTION OF AWARDS	x	YES		NO
CORRESPONDENCE	x	OVERT		COVERT		THRU CCS			

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE	x	U.S. GOV'T. CHECK				OTHER *(Payment instructions follow)*
TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE	x	CIA		CSC		OTHER *(MEMO FOLLOWS)*
REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION		YES		NO		INTERNAL TRANSFER

INSURANCE

FEGLI	x	OVERT		COVERT		MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD: GEHA

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE	X	YES		CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE	x	YES		NO		OVERT		COVERT

REMARKS

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH
COVER & COMMERCIAL STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

________________ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FORM 12-73 3429 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-0-13) 7 - OFF. PERS. FILE ROOM

Standard Form No. 54
January 1969
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 890-1
54-106

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INSURED:

NAME (Last) Fox (First) Jerome (Middle) (NMI)

DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year) October 9, 19[illegible]

PLACE AN "X" IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW TO SHOW WHETHER YOU ARE:

☐ AN EMPLOYEE ☐ RETIRED OR AN APPLICANT FOR RETIREMENT ☐ RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION BENEFITS OR AN APPLICANT FOR SUCH BENEFITS

IF YOU ARE RETIRED OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION GIVE YOUR "CSA," "CSL," "A," or "X" NUMBER

(CSA, CSL, A, or X number)

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH PRESENTLY EMPLOYED (If retired, former department or agency):

(Department or agency) (Bureau) (Division) (Location—City, State, and ZIP Code)

I, the individual identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any amount of LIFE INSURANCE and ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE due and payable at my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, with respect to any amount payable, unless or until canceled by me in writing, or until such time as it is automatically canceled (see regulation "f" on reverse side of duplicate copy).

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES (SEE EXAMPLES OF DESIGNATIONS):

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address (including ZIP Code) of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
[illegible] Fox	5019 [illegible] St. Annandale, Va. 22003	Daughter	50%
[illegible] Fox	5019 [illegible] St. Annandale, Va. 22003	Son	50%

For each type of insurance (regular and optional): (1) I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. (2) I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change this Designation of Beneficiary at any time without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

(Date of execution—month, day, year)

Jerome Fox
(Signature of insured)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE *(A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary):*

(Signature of witness) (Number and street) [illegible] McLean, VA 22101 (City, State, and ZIP Code)

(Signature of witness) 1613 No. [illegible] (Number and street) Arlington, VA (City, State, and ZIP Code)

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS (including ZIP Code) OF INSURED

Jerome Fox
[illegible] St.
Annandale, Va. 22003

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING AGENCY

JUL 9 10 00 AM '74
PERSONAL AFFAIRS

(Indicate date and by whom received).

SEE REVERSE SIDE OF DUPLICATE COPY FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON WHERE TO FILE THESE FORMS.
DO NOT FILE WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE.

IMPORTANT.—The filing of this form will completely cancel any Designation of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program you may have previously filed. Be sure to name in this form all persons you wish to designate as beneficiaries of any insurance payable under that program at your death.

EXAMPLES OF DESIGNATIONS

1. How To Designate One Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary (Including ZIP Code)	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Mary E. Brown*	214 Central Avenue Muncie, Ind. 47303	Niece	All

2. How To Designate More Than One Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary (Including ZIP Code)	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary**
Alice M. Long	503 Canal Street Red Bank, N.J. 07701	Aunt	25%
Joseph P. Brady	360 Williams Street Red Bank, N.J. 07701	Nephew	25%
Catherine L. Rowe	792 Broadway Whiting, Ind. 46394	Mother	50%

3. How To Designate a Contingent Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary (Including ZIP Code)	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
John M. Parrish, if living	810 West 180th Street New York, N.Y. 10033	Father	All
Otherwise to: Susan A. Parrish	810 West 180th Street New York, N.Y. 10033	Sister	All

4. How To Designate Different Beneficiaries for Regular and Optional Insurance***

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary (Including ZIP Code)	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
John D. Jones	124 Elm Street Dayton, Ohio 45420	Son	All Regular Insurance
Jane M. Smith	421 Spring Avenue Portland, Maine 04101	Niece	All Optional Insurance

5. How To Cancel a Designation of Beneficiary and Effect Payment Under Order of Precedence (see back of duplicate)

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary (Including ZIP Code)	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Cancel prior designations			

---

*Do not write name as M. E. Brown or as Mrs. John H. Brown. If you want to designate your estate as beneficiary, enter "My estate" in the beneficiary column.

**Be sure that the shares to be paid to the [illegible] beneficiaries add up to 100 percent.

***If a beneficiary for regular or optional [illegible] predeceases designator, and there is no surviving [illegible] or contingent beneficiary for that type of insurance, payment for that type of insurance [illegible] made in order of precedence (see back of duplicate).

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): FOX, Jerome 017974

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): October 9, 1928

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER*: 102 22 9186

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY:

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): Jerome Fox

DATE: February 19, 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 21 10 32 AM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original.

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1964
(For use only until April 16, 1968)
176-101

SECRET

S E C R E T

13 December 1973

Letter of Commendation

TO: Jerome Fox

1. I hereby commend you for your performance in a sensitive Station operation which was completed on 3 and 4 December 1973. Your role ensuring the security of the operation was of the utmost importance. To your credit you remained alert and carried out your duties professionally, despite the initial frustrations and the long hours involved. In doing so you have contributed to the successful accomplishment of a priority objective of our organization.

2. A copy of this letter will be placed in your official personnel file.

James W. NOTTACKER
Chief of Station

S E C R E T

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

AN ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE EXECUTED BY EACH EMPLOYEE AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AND WHEN A CHANGE OCCURS IN THE INFORMATION SHOWN BELOW. ITEMS OF CHANGE MAY BE REPORTED IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCKS WITHOUT COMPLETING THE REMAINDER OF THE FORM EXCEPT THE EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AND DATE. WHEN EXECUTING ITEM 4 ALSO COMPLY WITH HHB 20-7, PERSONNEL EMERGENCY AND LOCATOR RECORDS. THIS FORM WILL BE COMPLETED ONLY BY HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL AND NOT SENT TO THE FIELD. FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

GENERAL

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Fox	Jerome		102-22-9186

1. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: New York, N.Y
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 2 Sept 1956
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:

2. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)	TELEPHONE NO.
Mary Ann Fox	5019 Cockney Ct. Annandale, Va 22003	978-6327

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Laura Louise Fox	Same	F	22 Nov 59
Peter Jerome Fox	Same	M	17 Feb 61

NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.
Deceased		

NAME OF MOTHER, INCLUDING MAIDEN NAME (or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.
Deceased		

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY: Brother (Staff Employee)

3. OTHER RELATIVES WHO ARE DEPENDENT UPON ME FOR AT LEAST 51% OF THEIR SUPPORT AND MEET OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN TRAVEL REGULATIONS (HR 22-15). SPECIFY NAMES AND RELATIONSHIPS.

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

4. PERSON RESIDING IN U.S. TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr. [✓ Mrs.] Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Trainor, Ann
RELATIONSHIP: Friend
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: 8815 Trafalgar Ct. Springfield, Va
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 461-7237
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: Housewife
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) USAF	YES ☐ NO ☒	
IS THE INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) Yes	YES ☒ NO ☐	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) Yes	YES ☒ NO ☐	

The persons named in item 2 or 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

FORM 3-73 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS, AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED:

Northern Virginia Bank Acct # 4 9298

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

Northern Virginia Bank, Ravensworth Branch

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

7. RESIDENCE DATA - TO BE COMPLETED ONLY BY EMPLOYEES ENTERING ON DUTY
(No Approval Required)

RESIDENCE WHEN EMPLOYED (Full Address)	PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE AS DEFINED IN HR 22-3 (Full Address)

8. CHANGE IN PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE (See HR 22-3)
(To Be Completed by Employee Desiring Such Change While Assigned to Headquarters)

FULL ADDRESS	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OR DESIGNEE	DATE
	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL (when applicable per HR 22-3)	DATE

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Wash DC	4 Oct 73	

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME (use pseudo only if so): Jerome Fox
DATE (from item 5-D): 14 Mar 73
NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true): George Kalaris
DATE (from item 5-D): 14 Mar 73

DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 14 March 1973
DISPATCH NUMBER: FPMT-15218
DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 10/9/28
2. SERVICE DESIGN: D
3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE: Ops Ofcr, GS-13
4. STATION OR BASE: Manila
5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER: MIHALLUX

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD: (2nd tour) 29 June 71
6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE: 1 July 1973
6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ: 1 August 1973
6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE: 1 September 1973

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Wife; Dau - 13; Son - 12

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

Wife cannot travel by air for medical reasons. Separate travel has been utilized in past assignments with principal and dependents going by air and wife following by ship.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Referent on MHABYSS matters 1 July 1972 to present.
Referent on MPWATCH matters prior to 1 July 1972.
Recruit and handle unilateral agents.
Backup liaison officer with official services.
Station PERAMPART officer.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

None

FORM 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
8-63 EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

Supervise field unilateral and liaison MHABYSS program.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☒ EXTEND TOUR 12 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO 1 July 1974 (DATE).

3 BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY; INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE FE 2ND CHOICE WH 3RD CHOICE EUR

[illegible] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Bangkok 2ND CHOICE Seoul 3RD CHOICE Singapore

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

I believe that Subject could make a contribution as a case officer at a station with an active MHABYSS program. He knows the subject well and can get along with LNAGON personnel. His other strength lies in Communist Party operations either as a handler of recruited assets or as an analyst of doctrine. In light of the foregoing, Bangkok Station might well be an appropriate assignment. Should that not be practical, recommend that Subject be reassigned to HQs. in a component where his strengths can be utilized. If assigned at HQs, he should be given the (CONT'D)

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Mr. Fox will be assigned to EA/PMI upon completion of his tour and home leave. He has been so advised.

DATE 21 Jul 73 TITLE C/EA/PERSONNEL SIGNATURE William H [illegible]
Ernest L. Hardt

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ____________ DATED: ____________

CABLE NO. ____________ DATED: ____________

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ____________ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ____________

SECRET

FRQ - Jeromo Fox - 14 March 1973

Operations Review *course* and training in writing.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
017974	Fox	JERome	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY, FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY	COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38 39		CODE 40-42
05	22	69					1		MANILA	575

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY	AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38 39		CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☒	OTHER (Specify) PER Division		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ OCD
☐ C & L DIVISION, CTGS.
☒ C & T DIVISION

☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE 6/4/71

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE PUNCHED BY

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6 017974	7-24 Fox	Jerome	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			05	22	71		1			PHILIPPINES	575

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

TRAVEL VOUCHER	DISPATCH
✓ CABLE	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
OTHER (Specify)	
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. Manila 16911	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 4 May 1971

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	✓ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
OCO		
C & L DIVISION, CTBS.	DATE 5/21/71	SIGNATURE
✓ C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if 34) Jeromo Fox	DATE (from item 5.1) 5 Oct 1970	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) George T. Kalaris	DATE (from item 5.2) 5 Oct 1970
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 16 October 1970	DISPATCH NUMBER: FPMT 13290	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE: 11 DEC 1970	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 10/9/28	2. SERVICE DESIGN D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Operations Officer GS-13	4. STATION OR BASE Manila	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER LNLEVY
6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 22 May 1969	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 26 May 1971	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 27 July 1971	

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

A. Recruit and handle unilateral agents.
B. Conduct liaison with local security and intelligence services as required.
C. Provide advice and support for Station's CP penetration program.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS:

None

FORM 3-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

NA

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☒ EXTEND TOUR 12 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO 20 May 1972 (DATE)

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

[illegible] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Bangkok 2ND CHOICE Kuala Lumpur 3RD CHOICE Seoul

[illegible] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION after home leave.

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

I favor strongly the return of Subject to this Station for a second tour of duty following home leave. He is handling one of the most complex fields of activity at this Station, one which is of a very high priority - the radical left in all its manifestations. Continuity and experience are essentials to any significant progress against this target. Returning Subject for a second tour of duty would give us both at a time when the radical left will be expanding and moving ahead towards its goals.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

The Division approves subject's request for home leave and return to Manila.

DATE 10 Dec 70 TITLE CFE SIGNATURE James R. Doherty

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. FPMS 5948 DATED: 10 Dec 70

CABLE NO: ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: 14 Dec [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD COMMENTS - continued

Subject has performed well in his assigned field thus far and I would expect to reap substantial benefits from his performance during his second tour based on the experience and knowledge he will have gained by the end of his first tour.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) Fox (First) Jerome (Middle)
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 102-22-9186

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY: 28 Willow St. Brooklyn, N.Y.
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad): 5019 Cockney Ct. Annandale, Va.
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: Annandale, Va.
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: New York, N.Y

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: New York, N.Y.
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 2 Sep 1956
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED:
DATE SPOUSE DIED:
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S):

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Mary Ann Fox	5019 Cockney Ct. Annandale, Va 22003	461-7920	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**DATE OF BIRTH**
Laura Louise Fox	"	F	22 Nov 1959
Peter Jerome Fox	"	M	17 Feb 1961
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
[redacted]	Deceased		
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
Deceased			

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. None

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., [redacted] (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Poole, Peter D.
RELATIONSHIP: Bro-In-Law
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code): RFD #2 Bloomsburg, Pa
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: (717)
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: Americana Mobile Homes Corp, Berwick Pa
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION: 759-0341

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) Dept. of State
☐ YES ☒ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) Nathaniel Cohen 333 Central Park West, New York, N.Y.
☐ YES ☒ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)
☒ YES ☐ NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 3-67 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Mary Ann and Jerome Fox Northern Virginia Bank
Check-A-Lot Division Acct# 004 929 8
Springfield, Va.

Mary Ann and Jerome Fox First National Bank of Arizona
Scottsdale, Ariz. Acct# 635 6462

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

Northern Virginia Bank
Ravensworth Branch. Lot Box No. 171

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

Catherine Hylander 11765 Gainsboro Rd. [redacted] Rockville, Md.

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE 28 April 1969	SIGNATURE Jerome Fox

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

IMPORTANT

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the field have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checked out for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 28 October 1964.

Signature

15 April 1969
Date

FOX, JEROME

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

55A/DDS 67-2031

SECRET

CD/P 7-4476

16 OCT 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Messrs. Jerome Fox and Harry G. Peterson - Fourth Security Violation

REFERENCE : HR 10-16

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for approval in paragraph 4.

2. Two officers of this Division have incurred their fourth security violation. Reference requires that I impose at least two weeks' leave without pay in each case unless your approval is obtained for a lessor penalty. I propose such a lessor penalty and request your concurrence.

3. The officers concerned, Messrs. Jerome Fox and Harry G. Peterson, are both dedicated Agency employees who have never, to the best of my knowledge, evidenced contempt for our security procedures nor displayed such gross negligence as to require strong remedial action. In neither case were any of the violations such as to indicate a compromise of information was probable; all were either open-safe or "exposed-classified-material" violations such as one-time typewriter ribbons, and none involved loss of documents, indiscreet talk or other more serious matters. Further, the majority of the violations occurred on occasions when the individuals concerned worked past the normal close of business and, while this is no excuse for carelessness, frequent overtime work does increase the possibility of a violation since the usual after-hours duty check is not operative. It seems to me, therefore, that the two weeks' leave without pay required by reference would be an excessively harsh penalty and not conducive to the enhancement of Agency security in general. I, therefore, propose the imposition of two days' leave without pay and a written reprimand for each officer. Copies of the proposed reprimand are attached.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

4. It is recommended that the subjects be each issued a written reprimand and directed to take two days' leave without pay as the result of incurring their fourth security violation.

signed/Joseph W. Smith

William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Division

Attachment
Proposed reprimands

* **The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is APPROVED:**

/S/ Cord Meyer, Jr.
A/Deputy Director for Plans

16 NOV 1967
Date

* The recommendation contained in para. 4 is approved; except that 3 days LWOP will be charged instead of the 2 days proposed.

SECRET

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of JEROME FOX

Effective 21 November 1967

The purpose of this memorandum is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are integrated and to set forth certain rights and obligations which are incident to your status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS-12 $12,443. per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of 21 November 1967. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected at FSR-5 and salary of $12,074. per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of 2 years from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and (except as provided in paragraph three (3) above) allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they are less than or equal to the salary and allowance payments due on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due, the difference will be credited to your payroll account with this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due, the overage will be remitted to this organization at designated intervals, presently ____________. Computations hereunder will be made on the basis of the aggregate gross due and received provided, however, that in computing remittances for overage Federal and, if applicable, District of Columbia income taxes withheld by your cover facility against the overage may be deducted. To assure timely accuracy in your payroll account with this organization you are expected to immediately report cover facility payroll changes.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integration into your cover facility, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and at your personal expense you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half per cent) on the basis of your cover salary or your salary from this organization, whichever is the greater.

b. If you receive taxable income from both your cover facility and this organization, necessary adjustments for Federal, and if applicable, District of Columbia income tax purposes will be made in conformance with instructions received from this organization.

c. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with the rules and regulations of this organization.

d. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with your cover facility of any status with your cover based on your services performed with that organization at the request of this organization.

e. All annual and sick leave which is accrued to your credit at the time of integration will be transferred to your cover facility. While integrated you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon completion of your integration your accrued annual and sick leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization including any income taxes withheld by your cover facility.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Personnel Office
EVELYN N. FLAGG

ACCEPTED:

JEROME FOX

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

C 5/5/5 80

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Jerome Fox	DATE (from line S-1) 7 Feb 66	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) James Braafladt	DATE (from line S-2) 3 Mar 66
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 11 Mar 66	DISPATCH NUMBER: FVST 11617	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 9 Oct 28	2. SERVICE DESIGN D XX	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE GS-12 Ops Officer	4. STATION OR BASE Saigon	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER
6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 29 Dec 1964	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 9 July 1966	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 15 August 1966	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 10 September 1966	

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

3 - 35,6,5

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

No unaccompanied assignment

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Liaison Police operations - penetration communist organizations

Unilateral operations - penetration local security services

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

CI course

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

Unilateral operations

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE)

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HQDTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

☒ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Bangkok 2ND CHOICE Kuala Lampur 3RD CHOICE Manila

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING: This man has completed a tour separated from his family and has performed competently both in liaison and in unilateral operations in which he has done an outstanding job. Believe he would profit by the CI course and another field tour in Southeast Asia at a post where he can be with his family.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

FE Division has no suitable assignment for subject. Request his next assignment be determined by the CS Career Service and that he be advised accordingly.

DATE 03/24/66 TITLE C/FE/Pers SIGNATURE H.T. Boulger

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:
Assigned to [illegible]

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ______ DATED: ______
CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

[illegible] F. [illegible]

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ DATE: [illegible]
(SIGNATURE)

SECRET

41

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Career Management Committee

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion of Mr. Jerome Fox from GS-12 to GS-13

1. The Vietnam Station has recommended the promotion of Mr. Jerome Fox from GS-12 to GS-13. He has been in his present grade for almost five years. He is already performing at the level normally expected of a GS-13. Mr. Fox was ranked fifth among all GS-12's currently at Vietnam Station. The Station recommendation as contained in Saigon 4925 (T2709) is quoted in the following paragraphs.

2. This employee has performed at a highly commendable level during his tour at this Station. During the first year he was assigned to a variety of jobs, all of which he approached with vigor and capability. These included liaison responsibilities with both the Special Branch of the National Police and the Saigon Municipal Police. He has also engaged in unilateral agent activities; he has developed, recruited and managed two unilateral agents, and plans to attempt the recruitment of a third prior to his departure. During the last period of his duty, Subject has concentrated on the development and progress of a sensitive FI/CI activity concerned with a mail intercept. He initiated this project, and has since managed it in such a manner that it has evolved into a unilateral project with considerable potential. During the course of his tour, the case officer was also charged with the implementation of an activity designed to bring about the release of an American prisoner held by the VC. While this did not come to fruition, Subject approached this difficult task with a reasonable degree of initiative and energy.

3. Subject displays the qualities of a highly capable, well-rounded officer. He has approached his own tasks with a mature and efficient manner, and has always demonstrated an excellent understanding of the role and mission of MACV and the Station in this area. He appears to be highly motivated, and I consider him an officer with a great deal of long-range potential.

[illegible] 3 Oct 66

Thomas A. Duncan
Chief, Vietnam-Cambodia Branch

(11 Aug 66)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2 8 MAR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE Division, DD/P

SUBJECT : Security Violation - Open Safe
FOX, Jerome
(FOURTH VIOLATION)

1. An investigation by this Office has determined that Mr. Fox, assigned to your Division, was responsible for an Open Safe security violation which occurred on 9 March 1967.

2. The records of this Office indicate that Mr. Fox has been previously charged with an Open Safe security violation which occurred on 28 May 1964, an Exposed Classified Material security violation which occurred on 11 January 1966, and an Exposed Classified Material security violation which occurred on 13 May 1966. In view of the fact that there have not been two consecutive years without a violation since 28 May 1964, this is to be considered Mr. Fox's fourth security violation for administrative action as specified in Section (e) of CIA Headquarters Regulation 10-1.

3. It would be appreciated if you would advise this Office by memorandum of the administrative action taken in this case.

S. J. KANE
Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

Att
Violation Report

cc: Deputy Director for Plans
Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY VIOLATION REPORT

DETAILS OF VIOLATION:

On 9 March 1967, at 7:29 p.m., USSP Poag reported finding Safe No. D-1460 improperly secured in Room 5C-35, Headquarters Building. Security Duty Officer Craig responded and determined that:

1. both drawers were found closed but unlocked;
2. the safe was opened by merely depressing the hand latch;
3. the safe contained material classified through SECRET;
4. the char force had not been in the area prior to this discovery.

SDO Craig changed the combination and secured the safe at 8:30 p.m.

INVESTIGATIVE FACTS:

Mr. Jerome Fox, the custodian of the safe, accepted full responsibility for this occurrence when interviewed in his office on 10 March. Mr. Fox stated that he obviously failed to secure the safe due to the fact that he had no reason to believe anyone else would have opened it subsequent to his departure at 6:00 p.m. (NOTE: The safe was left improperly secured for approximately 90 minutes.) It should be noted that Mr. Fox had signed for the security check of his area.

CONCLUSION:

In view of the above circumstances, Mr. Fox is charged with an Open Safe security violation.

SECURITY HISTORY:

Mr. Fox has been employed by the Agency since June 1955. A review of his record indicates that he has been previously charged with an Open Safe security violation which occurred on 23 May 1964, an Exposed Classified Material security violation which occurred on 11 January 1966, and an Exposed Classified Material security violation which occurred on 12 May 1966.

WILLIAM S. WILKINSON
Chief, Survey Branch

JOHN M. SANDELS
Investigator

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

MERIT COMMENDATION

FOR Mr. JEROME FOX, American counterpart to the Police Special Branch of the Directorate General of National Police, who is awarded the Third Class Honorary Police Medal by Decree No. 1744-ND/HP/VP of 24 September 1966.

Mr. JEROME FOX is an outstanding counterpart and a sincere friend of the National Police Branch.

During his period os service in Vietnam, Mr. JEROME FOX devoted all his ability, experience, and good will to helping the Police Special Branch, especially in the task of setting up a people's intelligence net.

The dedication and enthusiasm of Mr. JEROME FOX helped the National Police Branch to achieve excellent results in safeguarding security and maintaining law and order in Saigon, the Capital.

Mr. JEROME FOX's spirit of mutual aid merits praise and remembrance.

Saigon, 24 September 1966

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee

/Signed and Sealed/

Air Vice Marshal NGUYEN CAO KY

Việt Nam Cộng Hòa

BẢNG TUYÊN-DƯƠNG CÔNG-TRẠNG

về Ông Jerome Fox, Phối-trí-viên Hoa-Kỳ cạnh Khối Cảnh-Sát Đặc-Biệt Tổng Nha Cảnh-Sát Quốc-Gia được ân thưởng Bộ tam đẳng Cảnh-sát danh-dự Bội-tinh do
do Nghị-định số 1744-NĐ/HP/VP ngày 24 tháng 9 năm 1966.

Ông Jerome Fox là một Phối-trí-viên ưu-tú và là Người bạn chân-thành của ngành Cảnh-Sát Quốc-gia.

Trong thời gian phục-vụ tại Việt-Nam, Ông Jerome Fox đã đem hết khả năng, kinh-nghiệm và thiện-chí giúp đỡ Khối Cảnh-sát Đặc-biệt, nhất là trong công tác đặt lưới tình báo nhân dân.

Sự tận tâm và lòng nhiệt thành của Ông Jerome Fox đã giúp cho ngành Cảnh-sát Quốc-gia thâu đạt được nhiều kết-quả tốt đẹp trong công cuộc bảo vệ an-ninh và duy-trì trật-tự tại Đô-thành Saigon.

Tinh-thần tương-trợ của Ông Jerome Fox đáng được khen ngợi và ghi nhớ.

Saigon, ngày 24 tháng 9 năm 1966
CHỦ-TỊCH ỦY-BAN HÀNH-PHÁP TRUNG-ƯƠNG,

CHỦ-TỊCH

Thiếu-Tướng NGUYỄN CAO KỲ

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Reference the order of 19 June 1965 which was supplemented by Decree No. 6-QLVNCH/QD of 6 June 1966 of the Armed Forces Council of the Republic of Vietnam;

Reference Decree No. 3-QLVNCH/QD of 14 June 1965 which was supplemented by Decree No. 7-QLVNCH/QD of 6 June 1966 of the Armed Forces Council of the Republic of Vietnam which established and fixed the composition of the National Leadership Council;

Reference Decree No.001-a/CT/LDQG/SL of 19June 1965 and all succeeding documents which established and set the composition of the Central Executive Committee;

Reference Decree No. 060-CT/LDQG/SL of 6 September 1965 which created two types of medals, the Police Service Medal and the Honorary Police Medal;

Reference Decree No. 001-CT/LDQG/ND of 21 January 1966 which fixed the methods of awarding the medals mentioned above,

DECREE

Article One. Now the Third Class Honorary Police Medal is awarded to Mr. JEROME FOX, American Counterpart to the Police Special Branch of the Directorate General of National Police.

Article Two. The Commissioner General for Security and the Administrative Assistant in the Office of the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee will assume the responsibility for implementing the Decree.

Saigon, 24 September 1966

/Signed and Sealed/

Air Vice Marshal NGUYEN CAO KY

VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA

Phủ Chủ-Tịch
Ủy-Ban Hành-Pháp Trung-Ương

Số 1744-NĐ/HP/VP.

Chủ-Tịch
Ủy-Ban Hành-Pháp Trung-Ương

Chiếu Ước-Pháp ngày 19 tháng Sáu năm 1965 bổ-túc bởi quyết-định số 6-QLVNCH/QĐ ngày 6 tháng Sáu năm 1966 của Đại Hội-Đồng Quân-Lực Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa ;

Chiếu Quyết-định số 3-QLVNCH/QĐ ngày 14 tháng Sáu năm 1965 bổ-túc bởi quyết-định số 7-QLVNCH/QĐ ngày 6 tháng Sáu năm 1966 của Đại Hội-đồng Quân-lực Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa thành-lập và ấn-định thành-phần Ủy-Ban Lãnh-Đạo Quốc-Gia ;

Chiếu Sắc-lệnh số 001-a/CT/LĐQG/SL ngày 19 tháng Sáu năm 1965 và các văn-kiện kế-tiếp thành-lập và ấn-định thành-phần Ủy-Ban Hành-Pháp Trung-Ương ;

Chiếu Sắc-lệnh số 080-CT/LĐQG/SL ngày 6 tháng Chín năm 1965 thiết-lập hai loại huy-chương "Cảnh-Sát Chiến-Công Bội-Tinh" và "Cảnh-Sát Danh-Dự Bội-Tinh" ;

Chiếu Nghị-định số 001-CT/LĐQG/NĐ ngày 21 tháng Giêng năm 1966 ấn-định thể-thức cấp thưởng các huy-chương kể trên,

NGHỊ-ĐỊNH :

Điều thứ nhất.- Nay ân-thưởng Đệ-tam đẳng Cảnh-Sát Danh-Dự Bội-Tinh cho Ông JEROME FOX, Phối-trí-viên Hoa-Kỳ cạnh Khối Cảnh-Sát Đặc-biệt Tổng Nha Cảnh-Sát Quốc-Gia.

Điều thứ 2.- Tổng-Ủy-Viên An-Ninh và Phụ-Tá Hành-Chánh tại Phủ Chủ-Tịch Ủy-Ban Hành-Pháp Trung-Ương, chiếu nhiệm-vụ, lãnh thi-hành Nghị-định này.

Saigon, ngày 24 tháng 9 năm 1966

CHỦ-TỊCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
017974	FOX,	JEROME		45

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1				07	11	66	VIET NAM	722

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☒ DISPATCH
☐ CABLE
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐ OTHER (Specify)

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: FVST- 12830

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 7-14-66

REMARKS

PREPARED BY RJH
☐ OSA
☐ C & L DIVISION
☒ C & P DIVISION

☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE 7-21-66

ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE RICHARD L HARTMAN

FORM 4-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4.10)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	7-24			25-26
17974	Fox,	JEROME		45

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	12	29	60				VIET NAM	772

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☑	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
EVST 8803	31 Dec 60

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ D & L DIVISION		DATE 13 Jun 62	SIGNATURE
☑ C B T DIVISION			

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print) FIRST MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	7-24	25-26
17974	Fox Jerome	45

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1				09	23	62	JAPAN	375

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE	*	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. Form - 764	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 2 Sept - 23 Sept 62

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE 16 OCT 1962	SIGNATURE Doris Harris
^	FINANCE DIVISION		

FORM 9-56 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — ~~FOR~~ HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY — DO NOT COMPLETE — DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(true)* FOX, JEROME	DATE *(from item 9-1)* Jan 1962	NAME OF SUPERVISOR *(true)* HINTZ, ELMER F.	DATE *(from item 9-2)* Jan 1962
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:		COLBERT, EDWARD M.	DATE 12 Feb 1962

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 9 October 1928	2. GRADE GS-12	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Factory Markings Field Station Control Off.
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION *(if known)* NA	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Tokyo Station	
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR NA		7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE September 1962

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

a) Supervise, coordinate and monitor with KUDOVE, ODYOKE and allied military services, the Factory Markings (CHUCKWAGON) Collection and Exploitation Program in North Asia specifically covering Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. b) Determine new CHUCKWAGON targets and initiate specific collection projects with appropriate KUDOVE, ODYOKE and allied military units. c) Prepare and provide detailed training and guidance for KUDOVE assets, ODYOKE and allied military personnel, on CHUCKWAGON collection techniques and CHUCKWAGON targets. d) Personally participate in the exploitation of CHUCKWAGON targets when appropriate. e) Conduct official liaison relationships with ODYOKE intelligence units pertaining KUCHAP interests, as directed by the Chief, SIS, Tokyo

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT: Continue as Factory Markings Field Control Officer.

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

SAME

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*:

Language Training

FORM NO. 202
1 SEP 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

FILE PERSONNEL
JUL 16 11 30 PM '62
MAIL ROOM

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION:

1ST CHOICE: Singapore

2ND CHOICE: London

3RD CHOICE:

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

30 days

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Three: 32, 30 months, 18 months

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

In view of this officer's field experience and his competent performance as Factory Markings coordinator in the Japan area, his continued assignment to a field station would soon to be in the best interests of KUBARK.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

FE Division concurs.

"The staffing plans of St/FM call for the assignment of Mr. Fox to analytical duties on his return to Headquarters in the fall of 1962."

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR LEWIS R. FIRTH	SIGNATURE: Lewis R. Firth
TITLE: Personnel Officer, CRR	DATE: 20 March 1962

17. REMARKS (additional comment)

Mr. Fox was notified of his planned reassignment in Memorandum No. 363, dated 14 March 1962.

21 MAR

David E. Yager
DAVID E. YAGER
Acting Secretary, CRR Career Service Board

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print) 7-24	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
17974	FOX	JEROME		18

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	09	04	59				JAPAN	375

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE	X	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 10 AUG. - 5 SEP. 59

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
X	FINANCE DIVISION HLF	21 APR. 60	

FORM 5-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

Office of Training
TRAINING REPORT

Instructor Training Course No. 60 — **6** students
40 hours, 30 Oct. - 3 Nov. 1961

Student: **Fox, Jerome** Year of Birth: **1928**

EOD Date: **June 1955** Grade: **11** Office: **Orr/3t/FM**

COURSE OBJECTIVES, CONTENT, AND METHODS

The Objectives of this course are:

1. To develop an acquaintance with the learning processes.
2. To apply the principles of learning and instruction in practical teaching experiences.

This course included planning and practical teaching work in: principles of learning and teaching; effective oral communication; demonstration techniques; training aids; elements of effective class discussions; principles of lesson planning; all based upon the implementation of the principles of learning. Due to the shortness of the course, familiarization only was attempted with the above aspects of teaching.

During this course, each student presented to the class a sample speech, demonstration, a class discussion, and lesson plan, all related to his own subject matter area. These presentations were critiqued and rated by his classmates and the instructor. Over half of the students' course time was spent in practical exercises.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This student has satisfactorily accomplished the course objectives and met the course standards in presenting his exercises. Mr. Fox has a pleasant manner of speaking, and with each presentation to the class his effectiveness increased. He was able to use visual aids effectively to good advantage, and he made worthwhile suggestions for improving the presentations of others. He evidenced a sound grasp of the principles of lesson plan format.

Despite his noticeable progress during the course, Mr. Fox needs to show more interest in his students and regularly maintain good eye contact with his entire class. By giving continual attention and practice to vocal variety, overt manifestations of enthusiasm, and the establishment of closer rapport with the students, Mr. Fox should be able to increase considerably his competence as an instructor.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: David E. Weaver 9 NOV 1961

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (*true*) Jerome Fox	DATE (*from item 9-B*) 21 March 1961	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (*true*) Frank Denny	DATE (*from item 9-B*) 21 March 1961
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:		Edward M. Colbert	DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 9 October 1928	2. GRADE GS-11	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Identification Specialist
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (*if known*) NA	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Tokyo Station	
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR NA		7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE October 1961

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (*see special note on Transmittal Form*):

a) Supervise, coordinate and monitor with KUDOVE, OKYOKE and allied military services, the Factory Markings (CHUCKWAGON) Collection and Exploitation Program in North Asia specifically covering Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. b) Determine new CHUCKWAGON targets and initiate specific collection projects with appropriate KUDOVE, ODYOKE and allied military units. c) Prepare and provide detailed training and guidance for KUDOVE assets, ODYOKE and allied military personnel, on CHUCKWAGON collection techniques and CHUCKWAGON targets. d) Personally participate in the exploitation of CHUCKWAGON targets when appropriate. e) Conduct official liaison relationships with ODYOKE intelligence units pertaining to KUCHAP interests, as directed by the Chief, SIS, Tokyo.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT: Continue as Factory Markings Field Control Officer

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

SAME

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (*refer to catalog of courses, if available*):

Language Training

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

c. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

☐ 1 RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

☐ 3 BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

☐ 2 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

OCT 23 10 08 AM '61

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION:

1ST CHOICE: London

2ND CHOICE: Singapore

~~MAN-ROOM~~

3RD CHOICE:

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

30 Days

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Three, 31, 23 months, 8 months

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 8-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING: This officer's job performance has been outstanding. His accumulated experience over the past 18 months has given him a thorough grasp of his function and has enabled him to establish himself in the ODYOKE and Japan intelligence community as the focal point for Factory Markings intelligence activities in this area. Since this officer is now reaching the point of maximum capability to carry out his mission, I believe it to be in the best interests of KUBARK to extend his tour to cover a period of three years.

This recommendation is, of course, subject to and contingent upon Headquarters decision on the proposal contained in FJTA-6969 that the FRCO slot at Tokyo Station be withdrawn from the Japan area.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 8-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

FE Division recommends subject be reassigned by the IA Career Board.

Headquarters recommends extension of tour for another year.

LEWIS R. FIRTH
Personnel Officer, ORR

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR: Edward M. Colbert

SIGNATURE:

TITLE: Chief, FE/[illegible] Personnel

DATE:

17. REMARKS (additional comment)

SECRET

SECRET

18 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Outstanding Advance Balance, Jerome Fox

1. This memorandum is to be made a part of subject's personnel file, by direction of Acting Chief, Tokyo Station.

2. As stated in Paragraph 4 of the Tokyo Station Audit Report for the period 1 September 1960 through 28 February 1961, subject has an outstanding balance of $167.62 in his travel advance account. The advance has been open since 8 December 1960, despite repeated efforts on the part of Finance to close the account.

3. The balance referred to above is computed as follows:

8 December 1960 - Travel advance	$500.00
22 March 1961 - Accounting for travel for period 10-18 December 1960	332.38
Balance Outstanding	$167.62

4. Finance Memorandum 61-19 dated 17 April 1961 again requested that the balance be refunded and the account closed. An addendum to this memorandum, signed by Acting Deputy for Operations, informed KRACKE that he was to refund the balance no later than COB 17 April 1961.

5. Fox's written reply to the memo stated that he would refund the balance no later than 28 April 1961, upon receipt of a bank deposit slip from PBPRIME.

6. After further discussion between POLLOCK, Fox, HOLCER, and the undersigned, TOKY 6451 and FJTT-7132 were sent to Headquarters requesting an immediate transfer of $167.62 from subject's Credit Union account to Finance Division for T/A to Tokyo Station.

7. Subject has been informed that no further advances of official funds will be made to him, except for housing expenses and the exact cost of tickets necessary for official travel.

HENRY R. ZINNGRABE
Finance Officer

Distribution
✓1 - PERS
2 - FIN
1 - A/DOPS

SECRET

SECRET

TSS/PB/TRAINING DIVISION EVALUATION

DARKROOM 9

BASIC PHOTOGRAPHY No. 1

NAME Jerome FOX DIV. CRI BR. CA DATES TRAINED: from 23 June to 17 July '71

This course is primarily designed to develop the following skills: Use of 35 mm cameras with accessories, document copy, processing and printing.

	None	Unsat	Fair	Good	Excellent	Superior
I. Manipulation of camera.						
a. Leica				X		
b. Retina II C	X					
c. Recordak				X		
II. Processing and printing.						
a. Film loading				X		
b. Film processing				X		
c. Enlarging				X		
d. Reflex and contact printing					X	
III. Use of accessory equipment.						
a. Exposure meter				X		
b. Filters	X					
c. Telephoto and wide angle lenses				X		
IV. Document copy and small objects.						
a. Available light	X					
b. Accessory illumination				X		
c. BOOWU, portra lens, focus slide				X		
V. Ground photography.						
a. Coverage						
b. Report	X					
VI. Casing.						
a. Coverage						
b. Report						
VII. Surveillance.						
a. Coverage						
b. Report						
VIII. Special problems.						
a. Coverage						
b. Report						
General quality of prints				X		
Choice of subject matter				X		
Quality of darkroom work (Cleanliness, etc.)				X		
Attitude toward subject matter				X		
Cooperation					X	

REMARKS:

Mr. Fox met the course objectives and completed all of the course assignments for the two weeks he attended with average results.

Encountering some difficulty at the outset, Mr. Fox soon overcame many of his problems in the two week time. He demonstrated an eagerness to learn, by asking to be checked out in not only course equipment, but other equipment as well. He also offered to complete additional assignments on his own time.

It is suggested he continue his practice and association with photography in order to maintain and improve present proficiency.

APPROVED ____________
C/TSS/TD

[illegible]
Instructor

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Fox Jerome

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER:

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE:

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: Paul, Genevive

2. RELATIONSHIP: Aunt

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 4933 South Salina St. Syracuse, N.Y.

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: 333 E. Washington St. Syracuse, N.Y. City of Syracuse

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: HO 9 3173

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER:

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION:

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First): MARY (Middle): ANN (Maiden): POOLE (Last): FOX

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 2 Sept. 1956

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): New York, N.Y.

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 127 E. 29 St. New York, N.Y.

7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH:

9. CAUSE OF DEATH:

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased):

11. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 June 1930

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Jackson, Tenn.

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY:

14. PLACE OF ENTRY:

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country):

16. DATE ACQUIRED:

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country):

18. OCCUPATION: Housewife

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers):

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country):

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM 444b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
10-57

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
National Bank of Washington	Wash. D.C.
Old Dominion	Arlington, Va.

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS
☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐ MASTER'S DEGREE
☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEMESTER HRS COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

Standard Form No. 54
September 1954
U. S. Civil Service Commission
F. P. M. Chapter Z1

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT OF 1954

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INSURED:

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
FOX	JEROME		October 9, 1928

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED (*If retired, so state and give "CSA" or "CSI" number*):

(Department or agency) (Bureau) (Division)

I, the employee or annuitant identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any amount of GROUP LIFE INSURANCE and GROUP ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE due and payable at my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, with respect to any amount payable, unless or until canceled by me in writing, or until such time as I become insured in a department or agency other than the above, or until such time as I become insured as a retired employee, in which event this Designation of Beneficiary shall terminate.

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES:

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Cancel prior designations			

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change any Designation of Beneficiary at any time without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

August 30, 1956
(Date of execution—month, day, year)

Jerome Fox
(Signature of Insured)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE (*A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary*):

[illegible] (Signature of witness) 3636 30th St. N.W. (Number and street) Washington 16 D.C. (City, zone number, and State)

[illegible] (Signature of witness) 2722 S. [illegible] St. (Number and street) Arlington, Va. (City, zone number, and State)

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS OF INSURED

Jerome Fox
4520 MacArthur Blvd., N.W.
Washington 7, D.C.

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING AGENCY

'56 AUG 31 AM 11 27

(Indicate date and time when received)

IF INSURED AS AN EMPLOYEE, DELIVER BOTH COPIES TO THE PROPER OFFICE OF YOUR AGENCY. DUPLICATE WILL BE NOTED AND RETURNED.
IF INSURED AS AN ANNUITANT, SEND BOTH COPIES TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON 25, D.C. DUPLICATE WILL BE NOTED AND RETURNED.

IMPORTANT.—The filing of this form will completely cancel any Designation of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act you may have previously filed. Be sure to name in this form all persons you wish to designate as beneficiaries of any group life and accidental death insurance payable under that act at your death.

EXAMPLES OF DESIGNATIONS

How To Designate One Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Mary E. Brown*	214 Central Avenue, Muncie, Ind.	Niece	All

How To Designate More Than One Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Alice M. Long	509 Canal Street, Red Bank, N. J.	Aunt	** One-fourth
Joseph P. Brady	360 Williams Street, Red Bank, N. J.	Nephew	One-fourth
Catherine L. Rowe	792 Broadway, Whiting, Ind.	Mother	One-half

How To Designate a Contingent Beneficiary

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
John M. Parrish, if living	810 West 180th Street, New York, N. Y.	Father	All
Otherwise to: Susan A. Parrish	810 West 180th Street, New York, N. Y.	Sister	All

How To Cancel a Designation of Beneficiary so That Amount Due Will Be Payable as Provided in the Law

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Cancel prior designations			

---

*Do not write names as M. E. Brown or as Mrs. John H. Brown

**Be sure that the shares to be paid to the several beneficiaries add up to 100 percent.

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Chief, Fiscal Division 1405 Alcott Hall

FROM : Chief, Records and Services Division

SUBJECT: SF-2808

Attached is SF-2808 (Designation of Beneficiary) for:

Fox, Jerome

Rec'd Millie Kuster

Date 21 JUN 1955

Please sign second copy and return to:

Chief, Transactions and Records Branch
Room 187
Curie Hall

Joseph S. Reff
JOSEPH S. REFF

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST [illegible])
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) .... (Bureau or Division) .... WASHINGTON, D.C. (Place of employment)

I, Jerome Fox ...., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

15 June 1955
(Date of entrance on duty)

Jerome Fox
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 15th day of June A. D. 1955,

at Washington, (City) D.C. (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

[illegible]

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State)
4520 Mac Arthur Blvd. WASH., D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: OCT 9, 1928
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country): BROOKLYN, N.Y.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: JULIAN FOX
(B) RELATIONSHIP: Brother
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 340 E. 53rd St. New York N.Y.
(D) TELEPHONE NO.: EL-5-7829

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED [illegible] OR LESS OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF [illegible] OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that the appointment [illegible] is in accordance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked [illegible] of office, position, suitability [illegible] with [illegible] of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose eligibility was established. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was [illegible] in the examination room. His [illegible] appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned as to his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. [illegible] Form 61 constitutes [illegible] proof of [illegible] citizenship status [illegible]. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until evidence has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under [illegible] permanent appointment in the competitive service no other member [illegible] competitive service. [illegible] preference [illegible] not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision [illegible] temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

Standard Form No. 54
September 1954
U. S. Civil Service Commission
F. P. M. Chapter Z1

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT OF 1954

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INSURED:

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
FOX	JEROME		OCTOBER 9, 1928

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED (If retired, so state and give "CSA" or "CSI" number):

CIA
(Department or agency) (Bureau) (Division)

I, the employee or annuitant identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any amount of GROUP LIFE INSURANCE and GROUP ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE due and payable at my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, with respect to any amount payable, unless or until canceled by me in writing, or until such time as I become insured in a department or agency other than the above, or until such time as I become insured as a retired employee, in which event this Designation of Beneficiary shall terminate.

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES:

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
JULIAN FOX	340 E. 53rd St. New York, N.Y.	Brother	ALL

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change any Designation of Beneficiary at any time without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

JUNE 15, 1955
(Date of execution—month, day, year)

Jerome Fox
(Signature of Insured)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE (A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary):

[illegible] (Signature of witness) [illegible] (Number and street) [illegible] (City, zone number, and State)

Margery J. Donnelly (Signature of witness) 4287 6th St. S.E. (Number and street) Wash. 20 D.C. (City, zone number, and State)

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS OF INSURED

JEROME FOX
4520 MacArthur Blvd, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING AGENCY

Rec'd Off. of Personnel
6/15/55
Margery J. Donnelly
(Indicate date and by whom received)

IF INSURED AS AN EMPLOYEE, DELIVER BOTH COPIES TO THE PROPER OFFICE OF YOUR AGENCY—DUPLICATE WILL BE NOTED AND RETURNED.
IF INSURED AS AN ANNUITANT, SEND BOTH COPIES TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.—DUPLICATE WILL BE NOTED AND RETURNED.

IMPORTANT.—The filing of this form will completely cancel any Designation of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act you may have previously filed. Be sure to name in this form all persons you wish to designate as beneficiaries of any group life and accidental death insurance payable under that act at your death.

EXAMPLES OF DESIGNATIONS

HOW TO DESIGNATE ONE BENEFICIARY

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Mary E. Brown*	214 Central Avenue, Muncie, Ind.	Niece	All

HOW TO DESIGNATE MORE THAN ONE BENEFICIARY

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Alice M. Long	509 Canal Street, Red Bank, N. J.	Aunt	** One-fourth
Joseph P. Brady	360 Williams Street, Red Bank, N. J.	Nephew	One-fourth
Catherine L. Rowe	792 Broadway, Whiting, Ind.	Mother	One-half

HOW TO DESIGNATE A CONTINGENT BENEFICIARY

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
John M. Farrish, if living	810 West 180th Street, New York, N. Y.	Father	All
Otherwise to: Susan A. Farrish	810 West 180th Street, New York, N. Y.	Sister	All

HOW TO CANCEL A DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY SO THAT AMOUNT DUE WILL BE PAYABLE AS PROVIDED IN THE LAW

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Cancel prior designations			

---

*Do not write name as M. E. Brown or as Mrs. John H. Brown.

**Be sure that the shares to be paid to the several beneficiaries add up to 100 percent.

16—73610-1

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1957
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND P1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): Fox, Jerome

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct. 1928

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
CIA	55	6	15				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	DISCHARGE (Hon. or dishon.?)
U.S. ARMY	1952	NOV	17	1954	NOV	16	HON.
				2	11	17	

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE, IF KNOWN (LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer. Mar)	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	TOTAL YEARS	TOTAL MONTHS	TOTAL DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

15 June 1955
(DATE)

5 Jerome Fox
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 15th day of June (MONTH) 1955 at Washington, D.C. (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
2	00	00
1	1	29

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 1 1 29

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

PART III.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)			

verified 4/11/57

ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)	55	~~6~~ 5	~~15~~ 45
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)	1	1	29
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*Leave purposes*)	54	4	16

PART IV.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES

(To be completed only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes)

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 12*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 14*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			

ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)			
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*RIF purposes*) (*Enter as the "service computation date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF-7*)			

REMARKS:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) FOX, JEROME (NMI)	2. DATE OF BIRTH OCT 1938	3. GRADE GS-13
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/FE/PMI	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Officer -PMI/P	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENS. 6109
7. PROPOSED STATION Manila, PI.	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) OPS Officer-4947-GS-13	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION DAFC	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 10 May 1969	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 3

12. COMMENTS

Request evaluation of current medical for proposed PCS assignment

Paul M.

13. DATE OF REQUEST 24 Jan 1969	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Dale R. Skovgaard FE/PERS/PMI	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 5 E 22	16. EXTENSION 6109

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

27 MAR 196[illegible]

QUALIFIED [illegible]

Chairman, Overseas C[illegible] Review Panel

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Fox, Jerome (NMI)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 October 192[illegible]	3. GRADE GS-12
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/FE/PMI	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Officer	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION [illegible]
7. PROPOSED STATION Cebu, Philippines	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Ops Officer/[illegible]/GS-13	

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION State Integree	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 1 June 1968	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 3

12. COMMENTS

Request that Subject's State Integration physical be re-evaluated for the above PCS assignment.

13. DATE OF REQUEST 28 December 1967	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Virginia Curry	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 5 E 22	16. EXTENSION 6109

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

[illegible]

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

[illegible]

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-64 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

fl

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office EX 3-6115
Ext. 8532
Home EL 3-3179

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) Miss Mr. Mrs. JEROME (First) (Middle) FOX (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 4526 MacArthur Blvd [illegible] D.C. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS N.A. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME JERRY WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? N.A.

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES?

HOW LONG? IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

(Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH OCT 9, 1918 PLACE OF BIRTH B'KLYN, N.Y. (City) N.Y. (State) KINGS (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE? NA

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. NA ISSUED (Date) BY (Court)

AT (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? NO (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? TO ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS:

[illegible]

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? N.A

PORT OF ENTRY? .... ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ....

LAST U. S. VISA .... (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE .... SEX .... HEIGHT .... WEIGHT ....

EYES .... HAIR .... COMPLEXION .... SCARS ....

BUILD .... OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ....

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE .... MARRIED ✓ DIVORCED .... WIDOWED ....

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ....

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE MARY (First) ANN (Middle) POOLE (Maiden) FOX (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE NEW YORK, N.Y. SEPT 2, 1956

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 119 E 29 St (St. and Number) New York (City) NY (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH June 11, 1936 PLACE OF BIRTH JACKSON (City) TENN (State) MADISON (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION CLERK LAST EMPLOYER FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS 3rd Ave & E 69th St (St. and Number) New York (City) N.Y. (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM N/A (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? .... ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ....

LAST U. S. VISA .... (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE .... SEX .... HEIGHT .... WEIGHT ....

EYES .... HAIR .... COMPLEXION .... SCARS ....

BUILD .... OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ....

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE .... MARRIED ✓ DIVORCED .... WIDOWED ....

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ....

....

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE MARY (First) ANN (Middle) [illegible] (Maiden) FOX (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE New York, N.Y. SEPT 2, 1956

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 117 E 29 St. New York, N.Y. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH June 11, 19[illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] (City) [illegible] (State) [illegible] (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION CLERK LAST EMPLOYER Federal Bureau of Investigation

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS 3rd Ave & E 69th St New York C. N.Y. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

4-00000

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ......

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ......

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ......

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED .... DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH .... PLACE OF BIRTH .... (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ....

CITIZENSHIP .... WHEN ACQUIRED? .... WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION .... LAST EMPLOYER ....

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM .... (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED .... DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH .... PLACE OF BIRTH ....

CITIZENSHIP .... WHEN ACQUIRED? .... WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ....

OCCUPATION .... LAST EMPLOYER ....

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM .... TO .... BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....

PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

2. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....

PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

3. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....

PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

4. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....

PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

5. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....

PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME MARTIN VAN BUREN POOLE, SR. (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 22 B WESTWOOD GARDENS JACKSON TENN MADISON (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH NOV 25, [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH JACKSON, TENN

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A

....

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION [illegible] LAST EMPLOYER GULF, MOBILE & OHIO R.R.

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME LOUISE (First) PAUL (Middle) PICLE (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE MAY 1955 CAUSE Leukemia

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 22 B WESTWOOD GARDENS (St. and Number) JACKSON, (City) TENN. (State) MADISON (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH FEB. 14, 1902 PLACE OF BIRTH LOCKPORT, N.Y.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION N/A LAST EMPLOYER

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME N/A. RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME N/A. RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

2. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME ______________________ RELATIONSHIP ______________

ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) ______ (City) ______ (State) ______ (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON D. C. (City and State) DATE AUG 30, 1956

______ (Witness) ______ (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.



PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "N.A." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? [illegible]

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephones:
Office: [illegible]
Home: [illegible]

A. FULL NAME Mr. [illegible]

PRESENT ADDRESS [illegible] Brooklyn N.Y. [illegible]

PERMANENT ADDRESS [illegible] Brooklyn N.Y. U.S.A.

B. NICKNAME [illegible] WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? [illegible]

IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU USED THESE NAMES? [illegible]

HOW LONG? [illegible] IF A LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS [illegible]

C. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. [illegible]

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. [illegible]

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? [illegible]

[illegible]

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE [illegible] SEX [illegible] HEIGHT [illegible] INCHES WEIGHT [illegible] LBS.

EYES [illegible] HAIR [illegible] COMPLEXION [illegible] SCARS [illegible]

BUILD [illegible] OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES [illegible]

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE [illegible] MARRIED [illegible] DIVORCED [illegible] WIDOWED [illegible]

STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ANY SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS [illegible]

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.) [illegible]

NAME OF SPOUSE [illegible]

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE [illegible]

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE [illegible]

LIVING OR DECEASED [illegible] DATE OF DECEASE [illegible]

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS [illegible]

DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

IF FOREIGN BORN, U.S. CITIZEN? DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] WHEN ACQUIRED [illegible]

OCCUPATION [illegible] EMPLOYER [illegible]

EMPLOYER'S ADDRESS [illegible]

MILITARY SERVICE [illegible] DATES OF SERVICE [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

Sec. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents) [illegible]

1. NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible] AGE [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible] AGE [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible] AGE [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

Sec. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME [illegible]

(First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE [illegible] CAUSE [illegible]

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS [illegible]

(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] WHEN ACQUIRED [illegible]

OCCUPATION [illegible] EMPLOYER [illegible]

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS [illegible]

MILITARY SERVICE FROM [illegible]

COUNTRY [illegible]

[illegible]

Sec. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother [illegible])

FULL NAME [illegible]

LIVING OR DECEASED [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW [illegible]

FULL NAME ______ (First) ______ (Middle) ______ (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST ADDRESS ______ (No. and Street) ______ (City) ______ (State or Country)

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED ______ WHERE ______ (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible] AGE [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

2. NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible] AGE [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

3. NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION [illegible]

[illegible]

NAME [illegible]

[illegible]

NAME [illegible]

[illegible]

Sec. II. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYST

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? [illegible]
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY
FREQUENTLY ______ CONSTANTLY ______

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED IN WASHINGTON, D.C. X
ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES X OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS

Sec. III. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]
DATES ATTENDED [illegible] GRADUATE? [illegible]
HIGH SCHOOL [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]
DATES ATTENDED [illegible] GRADUATE? [illegible]
COLLEGE [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]
MAJOR AND MINOR [illegible] DATE COMPLETED
DATES ATTENDED [illegible] DEGREE [illegible]
COLLEGE [illegible] ADDRESS
MAJOR AND MINOR [illegible] DATE COMPLETED
DATES ATTENDED DEGREE
OTHER UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE TRAINING [illegible]

OTHER GRADUATE COLLEGE TRAINING [illegible]

Sec. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

U.S. [illegible] (Country) Army (Service) [illegible] (Date of Entry) 1944

[illegible] (Last Rank) [illegible] (Serial Number) [illegible] (Date of Discharge)

REMARKS: [illegible]

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 297 ADDRESS [illegible] Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON: [illegible]

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS: NA

Refer to Appendix [illegible]

Sec. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government regardless of dates.)

From [illegible] To [illegible] CLASSIFICATION GRADE IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE [illegible]

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY [illegible]

Address [illegible]

KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible] NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB [illegible]

YOUR DUTIES [illegible]

REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]

From [illegible] To [illegible] CLASSIFICATION GRADE IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE [illegible]

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY [illegible]

[illegible]



Sec. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NA

Sec. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY AS [illegible] FAIR, OR (FLUENT)

LANGUAGE French SPEAK [illegible] READ [illegible] WRITE [illegible]

LANGUAGE Russian SPEAK [illegible] READ [illegible] WRITE [illegible]

LANGUAGE SPEAK READ WRITE

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU. INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

[illegible]

C. HAVE YOU ANY SPECIAL [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] HAVE YOU [illegible] OR [illegible]

[illegible] LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (TO) [illegible] LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (TO) [illegible]

GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:
(1) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

[illegible]

HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN. NO

[illegible]

18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U.S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Joseph [illegible]	BUS. ADD.	133 W. 19 St.	New York	N.Y.
	RES. ADD.	101 Ocean Pkwy	Brooklyn	N.Y.
2. [illegible] A. [illegible]	BUS. ADD.	8517 Bay Pkwy	Brooklyn	N.Y.
	RES. ADD.	715 E. 17th St.	Brooklyn	N.Y.
3. George [illegible]	BUS. ADD.	[illegible]	Washington	D.C.
	RES. ADD.	1310 [illegible] Av. N.W.	Washington	D.C.
4. [illegible]	BUS. ADD.	Pentagon	Washington	D.C.
	RES. ADD.	[illegible] N. 9 St.	Arlington	Va.
5. [illegible]	BUS. ADD.	Bard College	Annandale-on-Hudson	N.Y.
	RES. ADD.	Bard College	Annandale-on-Hudson	N.Y.

19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. [illegible]	BUS. ADD.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	RES. ADD.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
2. [illegible]	BUS. ADD.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	RES. ADD.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
3. [illegible]	BUS. ADD.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	RES. ADD.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
4. [illegible]	BUS. ADD.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	RES. ADD.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
5. [illegible]	BUS. ADD.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	RES. ADD.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

GIVE PARTICULARS [illegible]

b. GIVE THREE CREDIT [illegible]

1. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

2. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

3. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

Sec. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM [illegible] TO Present [illegible]

FROM July [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM May [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

Sec. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

Sec. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

a. LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, [illegible] OTHER GROUP, ORGANIZATION OR ANY [illegible] OF ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCHES [illegible] WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED [illegible]

NAME OF [illegible]

DATE OF MEMBERSHIP [illegible]

NAME OF [illegible]

DATE OF MEMBERSHIP [illegible]

(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

SEC. [illegible] MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? NO

IF YES, EXPLAIN:

B. DO YOU OR HAVE YOU [illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER [illegible] NO

TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

[illegible]

SEC. [illegible] PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible]

ADDRESS [illegible]

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN A SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. ANSWER: No

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

APPENDIX

Sec. 5 – Father
Emigrated to U.S.A. with family about 1905. Resided in [illegible] from 1905 to 1960.

Sec. 6 – Stepmother
Name: Eva Landy Fox – Living
Address: 2144-79th St., Brooklyn, N.Y., U.S.A.
Born: Oct. 8, 1902 – Place: New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.
Occupation: Housewife.
Other Information: Married father on Oct. 10, 1947.

Sec. 10 – Relatives Living Abroad:
1. Reuben Dennis – Uncle – 56 –
Canadian – 125 Kilbarry Rd., Toronto, Ontario, Canada
2. Helene Dennis – Aunt – 45 –
Canadian – 125 Kilbarry Rd., Toronto, Ontario, Canada
3. David Dennis – Cousin – 20
Canadian – 125 Kilbarry Rd., Toronto, Ontario, Canada
4. Sheila Dennis – Cousin – 18
Canadian – 125 Kilbarry Rd., Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Sec. 15 – Employment
From July 1947 to Aug. 1948
Employer: [illegible] Specialty Products Corp.
Address: [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Duties: [illegible]
Reason for Leaving: Return to School

From [illegible] 1948
Employer: [illegible]
Address: [illegible] Fulton St., Brooklyn, New York, U.S.A.
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Reason for Leaving: Return to School (College [illegible])

[illegible] 1947
Employer: [illegible]
Address: [illegible] U.S.A.
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Reason for Leaving: Return to School (College [illegible])

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]-PCI

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation [illegible] November 19[illegible]

TO: Sergeant Jerome [illegible], ER [illegible]
[illegible] Intelligence Detachment
Fort Myer, Virginia

1. On the occasion of your departure from the Office of Assistant Chief of [illegible], I wish to commend you upon your outstanding performance of duty as a member of the [illegible] and the [illegible] Intelligence Detachment, during the period [illegible] November [illegible]

2. [illegible] have contributed to the production [illegible] Training Division, but [illegible] operating division [illegible] assignment has required you to perform duties both as an intelligence analyst and an aerial [illegible] Conscientious [illegible] been of great assistance [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 2 August 1955

Your Reference: SR-9299-A ORR

Case Number: 102815

TO: Chief, Records & Services Division
Personnel Office

FROM: Chief/Security Division
Personnel

SUBJECT: FOX, Jerome

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of EOD procedures.

Ernal P. Geiss
Ernal P. Geiss
ny

Branch advised
8/4/55
MJS

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

101

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 27 May 1955

TO: Chief, Processing & Records Division
Personnel Office
FROM: Chief,/Security Division
Personnel

SUBJECT: FOX, Jerome - #102815 Request No. SR-9299-A - ORR

1. Reference is made to your request for security clearance of the subject person who is being considered for employment in the following position:

Ident. Spec. GS-7, DDI/ORR-Office of the Chief, Washington, D. C.

2. This is to advise you of the following security action:

a. ☒ Provisional security clearance is granted to permit subject's employment on a temporary basis in the following area or in the following capacity:

This clearance is granted upon the condition that subject: 1. not have access to classified material; 2. not have access to secure areas; 3. not be issued a badge or credential; 4. not represent himself as a CIA employee; and 5. not be assigned to any unclassified duties other than indicated above.

b. ☐ Name-checks have been completed on this person. Arrangements should now be made by your office for an interview in this Division. Upon completion of this interview further consideration will be given to the requested Limited clearance for access to information classified no higher than Secret. If subject has not entered on duty under a previously granted provisional clearance the interview should be arranged after entrance on duty.

c. ☐ Subject is security approved for temporary appointment to a position requiring access to information classified no higher than Secret.

Officials of the employing office should be advised of this security limitation and should be instructed to supply future supervisors with advice as to the limitation so as to insure continued compliance.

Security action to effect full approval is continuing and your office will receive advice of full clearance upon completion of this action. Upon receipt of full security clearance, the present limitation will be rescinded and supervisors should be advised accordingly.

3.

Ernal P. Geiss

CONFIDENTIAL

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS
SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Smith, Joseph B.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 28 May 1954 – 18 May 1978

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SMITH, JOSE, P TERMINATED

SECRET

78-1140

DD/A [illegible]

78-3082

18 MAY 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Mr. Joseph Burkholder Smith

1. (U) Action Requested: None; this memorandum is in response to your request of 15 May 1978 to provide you with a very brief rundown on Mr. Joseph Burkholder Smith.

2. (C) Mr. Smith was born in 1921, holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in History and has studied at the Ph.D. level in this field. He served as a Corporal in the U.S. Army (1943-46) and from 1946-51 he was an Assistant Professor of History at Dickinson College. He entered on duty with the Agency in September 1951 as a GS-09 and reached the GS-14 level before his retirement in June 1973. At the time of his retirement, he was assigned to the DDO/Western Hemisphere Division. He received the Career Intelligence Medal. Overseas assignments included Singapore 1954-56; Manila 1958-60; Buenos Aires 1962-66; and his last assignment, Mexico City 1969-73.

3. (S) Apparently after retirement, he wrote a book, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, which he did not submit for security review or for DCI approval. This book was already printed in advance uncorrected proofs when the Agency first learned of its publication. It contained classified information; however, the Office of General Counsel advised us that it was the final decision of this Agency and the Department of Justice that we would not pursue civil action against Mr. Smith. In this sort of action you must prove damages. The Operations Directorate was reluctant for security and sensitivity reasons to point up those areas wherein we had been damaged.

4. (U) In the event you wish to read further on this subject, we have attached papers furnished us by Mr. John Greaney of the Office of General Counsel.

F. W. M. Janney

Attachment

78-1610

78-1468

15 MAY 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Joseph Burkholder Smith

Could you give me a very brief rundown on who Joseph Burkholder Smith is, the one who just had an article in The Washington Post on Sunday. He apparently retired in 1973.

for STANSFIELD TURNER

14-00000

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE D-4

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 May 1978

How CIA Agents Suffer From Secrecy

CONTINUED

d

By Joseph Burkholder Smith

TWENTY-FIFTH college reunions are great occasions for letting the world know how well you've done, and mine was no exception. All my old classmates, it seemed, had become assistant secretaries of state or vice presidents of General Motors or had acquired some equally impressive title. So it was a little embarrassing when they'd ask me what I was up to.

Not that I hadn't done well myself — I was at the time fairly high up in the Central Intelligence Agency. But I wasn't allowed to say that, so when they asked, I had to mumble something vague about being a civilian employee at Patrick Air Force base, an excuse that, I could tell, conjured up images of genteel failure (too much drinking, perhaps) in the people who heard it.

Not being able to impress my old classmates was a small wound, but it symbolizes an important problem for CIA agents. We live in a society where lots of people plan their lives so as to accumulate the greatest possible number of credentials of the sort that will wow their peers at reunions and similar moments. These credentials give many Americans a sense of identity and of security. CIA people are by no means immune to the desire to impress people with credentials, but their jobs are directly at odds with that urge. In that way and several others, we in the CIA have been deprived of the normal ego supports of the American life of our time, and how we dealt with (and didn't deal with) their absence from our lives has had something to do with how our agency has (and hasn't) done its job.

It wasn't just our status among our peers that suffered as a result of our work. Normal family life was a victim too. The CIA's Clandestine Services division has for years had the highest divorce rate of any organization in the government. Part of the reason is that recruits of my generation of clandestine operators were instructed never to tell their wives what they were really doing. "Just say it's a question of national security," they told us when we had to take one of our frequent absences from home.

Of course, many men also discovered quickly what an improvement that line was over the old "working late at the office" routine and took advantage of it. Still, most of the marital problems came not from philandering but from the unspectacular, bitter toll that living under cover takes on people. Officers with good marriages might tell their wives in general terms what kind of work keeps them out at night, but they have to insist that the wives give no hint. The first thing a CIA wife learns is never to ask another woman what her husband does, for fear she will be asked the same question.

CIA wives also have to join their husbands in keeping their children in the dark. When schools have programs in which the kids' fathers tell their classes about their fascinating work, she has to help invent reasons why her child can't volunteer his father's participation. When the son wants to visit his father's office, the way his friends do, she must try to ease his terrible feeling of rejection when his father tells him no. This kind of travail makes many women wonder if it's worth the effort.

Talking to Yourselves

IF A CIA AGENT is stationed in Washington, he has to get used to being asked at every party, by every stranger he meets, "What do you do?" Personal qualities like kindness, good temper, or intelligence — even good looks and money — mean nothing in the nation's capital compared with where one stands in the pecking order. A CIA couple who maintain their cover are quickly "selected out" of any party they go to and end up in a corner talking to themselves.

CIA wives, particularly, feel this instant social failure deeply and resent it. Until the women's movement, most women were raised to channel their ambitions toward the areas of party-giving and cooking. When married to a CIA agent, they felt they were denied these things because of their husbands' work, and their marriages got into trouble.

When CIA families go abroad they find their lives even more disrupted by status anxieties. The American official community, centered at the embassy, spends more time and effort than the Soviet KGB trying to discover who are the CIA families. If a CIA officer is assigned to the embassy under the guise of being in the Foreign Service, the U.S. Information Service, or the Agency for International Development, the real employes of those organizations ferret the CIA agents out and then take pains to treat them as second-class citizens. The government employees who are "legitimate" embassy personnel don't speak to them at all. If they arrive at the embassy under deep cover, with no false identity, then not even the other CIA personnel speak to them.

The game of uncovering the CIA people is made simple for the "legitimate" embassy personnel by a number of means: The State Department won't let CIA agents call themselves, as a cover, Foreign Service Officers; they have to say they're "Foreign Service Reserve" or "Foreign Service Staff" officers. Real FSSs, as they're called, are fairly low-level and real FSRs are never in political jobs, so the CIA's people — listed as FSS or FSR "political officers" — are obvious to one and all.

In the same status-preserving spirit, the State Department used to publish an annual Biographic Register, a who's who of the Foreign Service that included information on degrees, jobs, and murky pasts; it wasn't until 1975 and the murders of several CIA agents that State made the Biographical Register a classified document.

Envy, Jealousy, and Distrust

THERE ARE several ways to deal with the problem of credentials. One is to rise above the woes of status anxiety. Another is to learn to laugh them off, even if they are painful. Unfortunately, however, a more common way of handling the trade-off between your cover and your status is to give up some of the first to get more of the second. In foreign capitals CIA agents often have been so anxious for the natives and the diplomatic community to consider them

CONTINUED

important that they've made their secret jobs obvious — which has not only brought them envy, jealousy, and distrust, but has made it very hard for them to do their job of intelligence-gathering properly.

"Do you know that CIA people are paid double salaries to serve abroad?" the new political officer in Singapore said to me when I showed him and his family around the Singapore Swimming Club on the Sunday after he arrived. "They get paid twice as much as you or I do. They get paid for their cover jobs and then paid again for their hanky-panky work. That's why they live better than we do."

I felt flattered that I was holding my cover well enough to be told his secret, and I only wished what he was saying were true.

But it was an impression that was understandable, if erroneous. CIA officers did serve in covers that were lower in rank than their real jobs, and, both on the job and off, they didn't live lives consistent with the rank they were pretending to have. For reasons of their jobs, agents cultivate contacts in the local government and other diplomatic missions in circles far higher than people of their cover rank ever have a chance to meet. And they insist on renting the kind of houses to which their CIA rank entitles them, as well as demanding and receiving a lot of special perquisites.

My new friend was wrong about the double salaries, but all the CIA officers he had seen abroad would certainly have given him the impression that he had about that rate of compensation.

In particular, most CIA station chiefs are not content to live in quarters much less grand than the ambassador's official residence. In many countries, this makes sense — the CIA has liaison responsibilities that are officially recognized by the ambassador and the State Department. But this is not appreciated by the lower-level employees of the embassy, if it's told to them at all. Resentment of the chief of station's life style bubbles up.

In the past, many chiefs of state made no attempt to hide their preference for dealing with the CIA station chief rather than the ambassador — sometimes because they owed a great debt to the CIA, which may have stolen the election for them or financed the coup that put them in power. In any case, CIA station chiefs have always felt they could not entertain these men in hovels. It would be detrimental to the prestige and interests of the United States, they argue, if they did not have the rank and accoutrements of the foreigners with whom they deal. One station chief I knew in the 1960s got two grade promotions by this gambit. It has served many a CIA official well in regard to his housing.

Frank Snepp, in his book "Decent Interval," gives a vivid account of the perquisites agency personnel enjoyed in Vietnam. They had their own hotel, club, swimming pool, and cars. In the 1960s in Asia it was customary for CIA officers to have chauffeurs, too, on the rationale that you needed somebody around to guard CIA cars against looting. Since the cars were government property, the gas and oil and maintenance costs, as well as the chauffeur, were paid for out of the station's housekeeping funds. People who were listed as lowly attaches were often seen driving around in big, unmarked, chauffeured cars, which drove the Foreign Service Officers into frenzies of envy.

"We'll Entertain Ourselves"

EVEN WORSE, perhaps, than using perquisites to fend off the pangs of status anxiety is CIA people's tendency to huddle together. If the rest of the world thought we were nondescript Army officers and the like, well, we knew who was and wasn't who and could play the game with each other. The other embassy personnel won't invite us to their parties? We're too low on the diplomatic list to get invited to the important functions given by other embassies and by officials of the local government? We'll entertain ourselves. Conscientious CIA officers try hard to curb this practice, which after all is a breach of nearly every tenet of good security, but they fail more often than they succeed.

In the days when our national purpose was more clearly defined, when we would, in the words of John F. Kennedy, pay any price and bear any burden in defense of the free world, it didn't matter so much if the cover of CIA personnel was a little thin. In some countries, the prestige of the agency was even higher than it was at home, enormously higher than it has been at home for the last three years. In the Philippines in the late 1960s, the CIA was so well regarded that members of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps used to try to recruit Filipinos by passing themselves off as CIA agents. Today, the open life style of a station chief can lead to his death, as it did for Richard Welch in Athens.

Welch was killed by the gun of an anti-American assassin, but the gun was put into the assassin's hand by all the defenses against the dilemmas of covert life that I've described. Welch lived in a house inherited from past station chiefs, everyone in the embassy knew his true position, and his biography appeared in the Biographic Register, which could be found in any library.

After Welch died the register was mercifully classified, but that doesn't mean an end to the problem. CIA personnel will always feel a strain from having to pretend to be much less successful than they really are — even if they love their work and believe in it deeply, they'll still feel pangs. That's human nature, and while we ought to curb the obviousness of CIA agents' identities, to some extent we've just got to deal with it.

On way to do that is to treat CIA agents sympathetically. These are obviously people who have sacrificed something to work for the agency, and who depend to an inordinate extent on having stable relationships with their co-workers, since they can't have stable relationships with anyone else. The main thing in an agent's life — practically the only thing, for many — is how he's treated at Langley, where he stands there.

CONTINUED

CIA Director Adm. Stansfield Turner.

So when Adm. Stansfield Turner quickly fired 820 Clandestine Services officers last year, my initial approval (some of those fired, I thought, must have been the people who made me decide to leave the CIA in 1973) gave way to misgivings. It's true that the greatest physical hazard many spooks have ever faced is the danger of choking on the pit of the olive in their martinis. But the greatest hazard we all face in life is not physical danger, it's having something eat away at our soul. No one has to be a clandestine operator, of course, but once he is, he is deprived of the normal means of sustaining his self-image that prevails in our society.

I don't mean Turner should have kept on incompetents. But I'm sure that after those 820 firings everybody else at Langley felt bitter and frightened. These are not, after all, people who have anything else to fall back on, and they need a lot of support from their organization. Turner has to use these people, and if he wants to use them effectively he ought to find a way of letting some go while making the rest feel secure.

The author, whose article is reprinted from The Washington Monthly, is a former high CIA official.

4-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 June 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SMITH, JOSEPH BU~~RKHOLDER~~ COB

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR, RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIARDS AND CANCELLATION OF N.S.C.A.

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 30 YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

G
51

7. FAN AND NSCA: 3135 0990 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643 Section 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/WH DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1 6
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (11)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0340

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 8

17. SALARY OR RATE: $28478

18. REMARKS:
LAST WORKING DAY 29 JUNE 1973.

1 - Security
1 - Finance

George [illegible]
DDO/PERS

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: H.L. BERTHOLD, C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 8 JUN 73

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 6/13/73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. MODIFIER CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 06 DA 16 YR 21
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: [illegible]
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 08 JUN 1973 noted 6-21-73
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Thomas B[illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 6/21/73

FORM 8-73 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET CLASSIFIED BY 01-6232

E2-2 IMPDET

Executive Registry
73-5753

4 September 1973

Mr. Joseph B. Smith
1213 North 2nd Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105

Dear Mr. Smith:

As you bring to a close your active career of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find your retirement filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
O - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/WFM/lks

Originator: ______________
Director of Personnel

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING

FILE [illegible]

DATE [illegible] May 1971

TO: Retirement Operations Branch
Office of Personnel

RETIREE Joseph [illegible] Smith

CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Central Cover Staff, the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT		CIVIL SERVICE	X	CIARDS	DATE Jan. 1972			
COVER		OVERT ROUTINE	X	COVERT (OFFICIAL COVER) LOCK-UP		COVERT (NOC) SPECIAL	**RETENTION OF AWARDS**		YES	X	NO
CORRESPONDENCE		OVERT		COVERT		THRU CCS		

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE	X	U.S. GOV'T. CHECK				OTHER (Payment instructions follow)
TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE		CIA	X	CSC		OTHER (MEMO FOLLOWS)
REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION	X	YES		NO		INTERNAL TRANSFER

INSURANCE

FEGLI		OVERT	X	COVERT		MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD: Non - Living Overseas

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE	X	YES		CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE	X	YES		NO		OVERT	X	COVERT

REMARKS

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

______________________ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FORM 4-71 3429 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

7 - OFF. PERS. FILE ROOM

14-00000

SECRET

SUMMARY OF ~~AGENCY~~ EMPLOYMENT

JOSEPH B. SMITH

September 1951 to January 1954	- **Began employment with the Department of the Army as a Civil Service employee in grade GS-11, assigned to the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. as a research analyst of economics and political affairs concerning Korea. Because of my wartime experience and some post war graduate work on Korea, I was contacted by the Army for this position during the Korean War.**
January 1954 to August 1956	- In 1954 I applied for employment with the United States Information Service as an Information Officer with the Grade of Foreign Service Staff S. I served on the U.S.I.S. Mission in the Far East area. My duties included design execution and supervision of the U.S.I.S. media operations in the Far East. Also I was special liaison representative with the British Information Officer for the British High Commissioner for that area.

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT, JOSEPH B. SMITH (Cont'd)

August 1956 to May 1969 - In 1956 I applied for employment with the Department of the Air Force. Assigned with the U.S.A.F. Services and Support Group, Provisional at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. as a Foreign Affairs Officer as a GS-14. I served two overseas tours with the Air Force in the Far East and the Western Hemisphere. My duties included liaison with personnel of the services of the respective areas in pursuit of U.S.A.F. objectives.

May 1969 to August 1973 - In May 1969 I made application to the Department of State as a Political Officer/Foreign Service Reserve Officer 4 and consequently was assigned to the Western Hemisphere for two tours. My duties included liaison in political affairs with several Latin American Countries and Political studies of South American affairs.

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT, JOSEPH B. SMITH (Cont'd)

CONCUR:

CCS ____________________ DATE ____________________

Fred E Hubbard
CI Staff

April 25, 1973
DATE

APPROVED:

L E Dunn
Office of Security

4/27/73.
DATE

ADMINISTRATIVE -- INTERNAL USE ONLY

OPF

16 April 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Career Intelligence Medal for Mr. Joseph B. Smith

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Career Intelligence Medal has been approved in recognition of Mr. Smith's contributions to this Agency. You are requested to inform him of the award and of the security provisions governing it as set forth in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security.

2. When Mr. Smith returns to Washington, please notify the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 3645, room 412, Magazine Building, so that presentation arrangements may be made.

/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Att

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers -- OPF W/forms 382 & 600
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

ADMINISTRATIVE -- INTERNAL USE ONLY

DD/M&S 73-1320

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

ENTRY 73-1050

DATE OFF
27 March 1973

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

[illegible] OR ID NO. 007894	NAME (Last-First-Middle) SMITH, Joseph B.	BIRTH YEAR 1921	SEX M	TYPE EMPLOYEE Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/WH	SD D	SCHEDULE GS	GRADE 14	STATION

BE AWARDED
Career Intelligence Medal

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD **September 1951 - Present**

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. Joseph B. Smith is hereby awarded the Career Intelligence Medal in recognition of exceptional achievement throughout his Agency career. During more than 21 years of service, Mr. Smith, a dedicated intelligence officer, served in a variety of important positions at Headquarters and abroad--consistently demonstrating skill, imagination and enthusiasm. Mr. Smith is a recognized authority in his field. His overall performance and the high quality of his work have contributed significantly to the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency, reflecting credit on him and the Federal service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by ADD/O on 3 March 1973)

APPROVED
/s/ Vernon A. Walters
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
13 APR 1973
DATE

SIGNATURE
/s/Harry B. Fisher
TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
Harry B. Fisher
SIGNATURE
Signed Original
TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
R. L. Austin, Jr.

FORM 6-60 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPF

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD
(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A — PERSONAL DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.: 007894
2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle): Smith, Joseph B.
3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
4. GRADE: GS-14
5. SD: D
6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH
7. OFFICE EXT. (If Inq):
8. STATION: ☐ HEADQUARTERS ☒ FIELD (Specify location) Mexico City
9. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code):
10. HOME PHONE:
11. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED: U.S. Birth
12. RECOMMENDED AWARD: Career Intelligence Medal
13. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT: 15 August 1973
14. POSTHUMOUS: ☐ YES ☒ NO
15. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: Jeanne H. Smith
16. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
17. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code):
18. HOME PHONE:

SECTION B — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF HAZARD

19. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

20. FULL NAME	21. ORGN. TITLE	22. GRADE	23. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

24. FULL NAME	25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

26. LOCATION:
27. INCLUSIVE DATES:
28. TIME OF DAY:
29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED:
30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED:
31. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO
32. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION C — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT, SERVICE, OR PERFORMANCE

33. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☐ YES ☐ NO
34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: Recommendation covers entire career.
35. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location): Various.
36. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSIGNED POSITION: Chief CA, Mexico City Station.
37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED:
38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☒ NO
39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL WHO ASSISTED OR CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE

40. FULL NAME	41. ORGN. TITLE	42. GRADE	43. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE PERFORMANCE

44. FULL NAME	45. TYPE OF AWARD

FORM 9-63 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 007034

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CRF

SECTION D	NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. I[illegible]te results of the act. Enclose unclassified citation.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. (Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.) What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation. Enclose unclassified citation.

Mr. Joseph B. Smith has made an outstanding contribution to CIA operations for the past 21 years. He has consistently received strong/outstanding efficiency reports in a wide variety of assignments, including two in the Far East (Singapore/Malaya and Manila) and two in Latin America (Buenos Aires and Mexico City). At Headquarters he served as Chief of the Malaya/Australia Branch in FE Division, on the CA Staff, in WH Division on the Venezuelan Desk and the Division CA Staff, and in OTR on a rotational tour.

Mr. Smith is a recognized authority on Covert Action. While with OTR he was commended for his efforts in completely revamping the CA curriculum. In close coordination with the CA Staff he organized two totally new CA seminars, both of which evoked a very positive response. He also received praise for organizing and conducting a training course for military officers destined for Saigon where they were to conduct psychological warfare operations. In Argentina he worked in liaison with local services on Covert Action operations. This work with liaison was rated as outstanding. He developed a long-time agent in one of the services to a point where the product was considerably improved. Political contacts at all levels developed by Mr. Smith in Mexico City have been instrumental in developing disseminable intelligence. In all his assignments his rating officers have consistently praised his imagination, flexibility, enthusiasm, perception and professionalism.

Mr. Smith's career has been one of exceptional achievement and he has made an outstanding contribution to the Agency's Covert Action program and to Agency training. His record of commendations and sustained superior performance of duty of value to the Agency throughout his career make it fitting that he be awarded the Career Intelligence Medal upon retirement.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES (List individually) IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR PERFORMANCE, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESS OR INDIVIDUALS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY	48. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION	49. DATE
Theodore G. Shackley	Theodore Shackley Chief, WH Division	17/2/73

SECTION E	RECOMMENDATION FORWARDED THROUGH OFFICIALS CONCERNED FOR THEIR INFORMATION	
50. HEAD OF D CAREER SERVICE (Career service of nominee)	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item 52	DATE
51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item 52	DATE
52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	TITLE AND SIGNATURE A Deputy Director for Plans	DATE 3 Mar

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 MAY 1969

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SMITH, JOSEPH B.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INTEGRATION - DEPARTMENT OF STATE

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 | DAY 21 | YEAR 69

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9135 0990

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

G
51

11. POSITION TITLE:
POL. OFF., ATTACHE
OPS. OFF[icer] (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0340

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP:
04 7
14 6

17. SALARY OR RATE:
17,289
$ 19,771

18. REMARKS:

All SICK AND All HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED

DAU DOB: 19/12/52
SON DOB: 20/09/60

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
X-5013
J. CARSON, COVER OFFICER

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
55	10	51630	WH	45075	S	3	06 16 21		

28. EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIASR 3 - FICA 4 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.; CODE

39. FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: CS 69 JWK

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 05 22 69

FORM 1152 3-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 APRIL 69

6
51

1. SERIAL NUMBER	007894
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	SMITH, JOSEPH B.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH ~~04~~ 6 DAY ~~20~~ 18 YEAR 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	9135 0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH ~~[illegible]~~ Foreign Field ~~[illegible]~~ Branch 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO Station
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER (14)
12. POSITION NUMBER	0340
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	14 6
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 19771

HOME BASE WH

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/CA STAFF/POS. #0645

VICE ALBERT F. REYNOLDS

1 - Finance
(1)- Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	Henry L. Berthold C/WH/Personnel
DATE SIGNED	4-24-69
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	
DATE SIGNED	4-24

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	30
20. EMPLOY. CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	57620
21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	WH
22. STATION CODE	45025
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. POSITION CODE	3
25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	06 16 21
26. DATE OF GRADE	
27. DATE OF LEI	
28. NTE EXPIRES	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC 2-OTHER 3-FICA 5-NONE)	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT.)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE	
38. CAREER CATEGORY	
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPT.; STATE CODE)	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	04-28-69 [illegible]
46. C.P. APPROVAL	James B. Russell
DATE APPROVED	04-28-69

6
32

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

TR-1138 [illegible]

17 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Clandestine Services Career Service Board (Panel A)

SUBJECT : Joseph B. Smith - Recommendation for Promotion from GS-14 to GS-15

1. Mr. Smith joined the Headquarters Training Branch of the OTR Operations School in October 1966 specifically to assume responsibility for Covert Action training. He spent the first few months in a thorough study and review of all CA courses previously given in OTR. This was a long and complicated job, compounded in part by the public compromise of a wide range of Agency CA activities. In closest coordination with the CA Staff, Mr. Smith devised a totally new and different CA curriculum, consisting of two short seminars for middle and senior grade officers -- one called a Covert Action Operations Seminar and one a Politics Workshop. These seminars, emphasizing the integrated nature of CS operations, have evoked a very positive response, confirming the soundness of Mr. Smith's creative efforts in revamping CA training in this fashion.

2. As a corollary to the main duties cited above, Mr. Smith has also successfully run, in conjunction with FE Division, a Psychological Warfare Operations Course for military officers being assigned to MACV/SOG in Saigon. Finally, in the CA field, Mr. Smith has provided tutorials, as requested by various area Divisions, to a number of Staff and Contract Agents and to foreign liaison representatives in such fields as black radio, youth and student operations, veterans organizations, and methods of countering Communist propaganda.

3. In February 1968 Mr. Smith was asked to assume responsibility as Tradecraft Advisor and Coordinator for the Operations Support Course, a critical block of instruction for (primarily young

SECRET

and inexperienced) CS clericals headed for overseas assignments where they may be called upon to assist case officers in operational support tasks. Although, strictly speaking, this teaching and coordination task was outside Mr. Smith's normal purview and main area of expertise, he accepted this additional responsibility with exemplary willingness, and then proceeded to discharge it smoothly, energetically, and effectively. In addition to managing an extensive live problem, the Tradecraft Advisor must ensure that presentations by a number of instructors result in a balanced and coherent coverage of all operational subjects in the course. This entails the coordination of efforts of several senior and experienced instructors, all under the nominal aegis of the course's Chief Instructor, and, thus, demands a great deal of finesse and tact. Mr. Smith has not only fulfilled this difficult role in a highly efficient manner but has also drawn on his own long field experience for pertinent and meaningful contributions to the course.

4. During Mr. Smith's tour with OTR, he was requested to participate as a member of a Survey Team in a review of the effectiveness of the Propaganda Group of the CA Staff. In a 30 June 1967 memorandum of appreciation to the Director of Training, Chief, CA Staff commented as follows on Mr. Smith's work:

> "Throughout Mr. Smith participated in a most effective professional manner bringing to bear his extensive background in the Clandestine Services. His direct and objective approach to the problems considered in the course of the survey made his contribution to the over-all Team effort invaluable. The Team report, which I am still in the process of discussing within the Staff, will be of considerable value not only to this Staff in our future planning but also, I feel, to the future posture of the covert propaganda mission of the Clandestine Services; thus, I heartily commend Mr. Smith for his effective participation with the Survey Team in this effort."

5. In his last two fitness reports Mr. Smith has received a "Strong" rating and the Chief of the Operations School as reviewing official has added his opinion that Mr. Smith has done his job with distinction and with credit to himself and his career service, citing the assignment to ~~OTR~~ as a first-rate example of quality in rotational tours. While Mr. Smith passed on his expertise through the training process, he also enhanced his own versatility through involvement in the various training activities cited above.

6. In recognition of the foregoing, it is felt that Mr. Smith is qualified to carry out the duties of the GS-15 grade for which he is recommended. Mr. Smith has been in grade 5 1/2 years.

CM Broutsas
C.M. Broutsas
Chief, Headquarters Training/OTR

CONCUR:

Charles B. Wheeler
Chief, Operations School/OTR

Smith has worked under my supervision on two occasions, once in the Philippines and most recently in the Office of Training. Both jobs were in the CA field where Smith is, I believe, one of the Agency's most experienced officers. My own view is that Smith made an outstanding contribution to Agency training, particularly in CA, during his recent tour with OTR.

John Richardson
John Richardson
Director of Training

21 JUN 1968

SECRET

[illegible]-1565

AUG [illegible] 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT: Statement of Appreciation - Mr. Joseph B. Smith.

1. We wish to take this means and opportunity to express formally and for the record the appreciation of the Covert Action Staff for the work of Mr. Joseph B. Smith as Chief Instructor for Covert Action of the Headquarters Operations School in the Office of Training during the past two years.

2. As you know, Mr. Smith worked closely with the Covert Action Staff in totally revamping the Headquarters covert action training program. It was through his efforts that the new intensive Covert Action Operations Seminar was introduced as a technique of instruction to replace the outdated Covert Action Operations (Familiarization) Course. He carried his basic concept one good step further in introducing the Political Action Workshop as an advanced forum for studying and applying covert action operational and planning techniques. Mr. Smith's work has also laid the groundwork for more specialized follow-up in covert action training.

3. The enthusiastic reception and endorsement of these two courses, the quality attendance by Division officers, and the participation by senior Division officers as speakers, attest to the need for new courses and the success of these endeavors.

4. Those of us who had the opportunity to work closely with "Little Joe" learned to appreciate his vitality, flexibility and personal commitment to the success of these training innovations. The contribution they have already made, and will continue to make, to the Agency's training program are testimony to the role that he played in devising and implementing them.

CA-68-904

SECRET

5. I suggest that you forward this letter to Chief, WH so that it may be made a part of Mr. Smith's permanent personnel record.

Fred W. Valtin

FRED W. VALTIN
Acting Chief
Covert Action Staff

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 June 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SMITH, JOSEPH B. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH ~~08~~ 7 DAY ~~30~~ 14 YEAR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235-0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH CA STAFF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (N)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0645
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~[illegible]~~ 19771 ✓
18. REMARKS

FROM: DDS/OTR/Operations School/1314, VICE JOHN W. ISAMINGER

Security Approval Checked by Pers. SD/OS 6/26/68
LC 7/15/68

OTR/PERS J.R. DeHERTX (phone)

1 - Finance
1 - Security

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: [illegible] 68
19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: July 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37
20 EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC: 51BO ALPHABETIC: WH
22 STATION CODE: 75013
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HOURS CODE:
25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.: [illegible]
26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.:
27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.:
28 WAGE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.:
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34 SEX:
35 VET. PREFERENCE
36 SERV. COMP. DATE
37 LONG COMP. DATE
38 CAREER CATEGORY
39 FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA
44 STATE TAX DATA
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] OTR
46 C.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 7/15/68

FORM 3-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

COPY

15-0387-68

SECRET

30 MA [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph B. Smith

VIA : Director of Training

SUBJECT : Next Assignment

1. We wish to advise you that the Clandestine Services Career Service approves your next assignment to WH Division upon completion of your current tour with the Office of Training.

2. The Clandestine Services appreciates your excellent performance in your current assignment and wishes you continuing success.

Vernet L. Gresham
DDP/OP

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

16 AUG 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Training
Room 810
1000 Glebe Road

SUBJECT : Training of Military Officers in Covert Psychological Warfare Techniques

1. In response to my request of 2 May 1967 your Office did an extremely fine job in organizing and conducting the training course for the military officers who will be going to Saigon to work with Agency personnel in psychological warfare. Special note should be taken of the efforts of Mr. Joseph Smith, of your Office, who organized the course and provided not only the impetus for the program but also the catalysis for a very enthusiastic response from the students.

2. The group of trainees have been requested to provide a critique of the course after they have settled into their jobs in Saigon in order to determine how well the course material fitted their assignments. We will forward copies of these critiques as they become available.

3. Again let me express my appreciation for your very effective support.

Douglas S. Blaufarb
Chief, Vietnam Operations

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XIIF

DATE PREPARED: 22 September 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SMITH, Joseph B.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Excepted Appointment (Career)

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 09 YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7175-3009

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OTR
Operations School
Headquarters Training Branch
Operations Faculty

D
S

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Instr Operations (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1314

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1712.32

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $17,198

18. REMARKS:

C-69-59

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: James H. Richardson
John Richardson, Director of Trng.

DATE SIGNED: 23 Sept 66

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Russell G. Gee

DATE SIGNED: 14 Oct 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 17600 ALPHABETIC OTR

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOOTRS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. [illegible] DA. [illegible] YR. [illegible]

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 12 DA. 23 YR. 63

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. [illegible] DA. [illegible] YR. 66

28. DIE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE CODE 2

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.: 00000

34. SEX: [illegible]

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 1 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT

36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. [illegible] DA. [illegible] YR. [illegible]

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. 07 DA. 17 YR. 57

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV, TEMP CODE [illegible]

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1 0-WAIVED 1-YES HEALTH INS. CODE —

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: —

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 1
0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE: 6

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE 0 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 00

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE —

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-17-66 HS

46. O.P. APPROVAL: 14 Oct 66

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XIS

DATE PREPARED: 23 SEPTEMBER 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Smith, Joseph [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 08 YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF XX

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7135-0633

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 4
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0084

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 17198

18. REMARKS

FROM: SAME

CAPPARRIS WILL RESIGN EFFECTIVE CLOSE OF BUSINESS 8 OCTOBER 1966.

1 - Security
1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: O'Neill
Robert D. Cashman
C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 26 Sept 66

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Collins

DATE SIGNED: 17 Oct 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. VOUCHER CODE: B

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 6 / 11 / 21

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. ... EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1 B 0051

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-17-66 H

46. C.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 17 - 66

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

C 53

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XXB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 February 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Smith Joseph [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 DAY 13 YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135-0633

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
UNASSIGNED

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): CS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 16,712

18. REMARKS:
EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED | 18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 32
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51623 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 04041
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOOTHS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 DA. 16 YR. 21
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 12 DA. 23 YR. 62
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 12 DA. 19 YR. 65
28. STE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 0301461J
46. O.P. APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 25 FEB 1966
DATE APPROVED: 28 Feb 66

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XXB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 APRIL 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 7294 / 035455

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Smith, Joseph B.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 | DAY 12 | YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135-5050-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 2
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA STATION
EE UNIT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0651

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13695 ✓

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/2/BUENOS AIRES/BAF-848

Recorded by
CSPD

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 4/25/63

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: D. M. Collins
DATE SIGNED: 29 Apr 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64650 | ALPHABETIC WH

22. STATION CODE: 64041

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. VOUCHER CODE: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 04 DA. 18 YR. 21

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 05/06/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION
4-62 AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

141

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 DECEMBER 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: ~~036155~~ ✓ 0078944

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Smith, Joseph B.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 23 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135-5050-1000 jg

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 2
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0848

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~12,845~~ ~~[illegible]~~ $13,195

18. REMARKS:

FROM: SAME

Approved by
CSPD
Aue

19a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: P. C. Bowers
P. C. BOWERS C/WH/PERSONNEL

DATE SIGNED: 18 Dec. 62

19b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: L. M. Collins

DATE SIGNED: 18 Dec '62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22

20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64656 ALPHABETIC WH

22. STATION CODE: 04041

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. POSITION CODE: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 DA. 16 YR. 21

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 12 DA. 23 YR. 62

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 12 DA. 23 YR. 62

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 80

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 2 = FICA, 3 = NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAREER/PROVISIONAL; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPS.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Kearney 12/20/62

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. Logan

DATE APPROVED: 19 Dec 62

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XXB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 April 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 036455

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Smith, Joseph B [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT Cave

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 27 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2135-5050-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 2
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA STATION

6

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

11. POSITION TITLE: OP~~ERATIONS~~ OFFICER (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: *RAF-848

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (12)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 ~~555~~

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~[illegible]~~ 11,675

18. REMARKS: C-09/54

*Personal rank assignment in accordance with HR 20-21b.(2) for a maximum period of two years. The only qualified person available for assignment to a position which must be filled immediately.

Approved for Chairman, PMC
Charles W. Clarke
25 Apr '62

RECORDED CSPD

19a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: P. C. BOWERS C/WH/Personnel
DATE SIGNED

19b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64659 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 00011
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. ... CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: 06 16 21
26. DATE OF GRADE: 12 29 55
27. 10/01/61
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 80
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 2 = FICA 3 = NONE; CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 028991
34. SEX: M 1
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 1 (0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: 10 03 48
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: 09 12 51
38. ... CREDITED: 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE 0
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1 (0 = WAIVED 1 = YES); HEALTH INS. CODE —
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 1 (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 6
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE 0; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 2 —
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO —; CODE —; NO. TAX EXEMP. —; STATE CODE —
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: GD 1 MAY 1962
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. Hoggard Jr
DATE APPROVED: 26 Apr 62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

4-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 April 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SMITH, Joseph B.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 | DAY 26 | YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235-1000-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 1
VENEZUELA SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 505

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (14)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~11575~~ 11,675

18. REMARKS:

CS

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Kelly /P. C. BOWERS/ C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED:

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 25 Apr 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE:

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. POSITION CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 | DA. 16 | YR. 21

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28. MIL. EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE; CODE: 1,00093

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT: 1 = YES, 2 = NO

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: ED 31 May

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Herman T. Hogan

DATE APPROVED: 26 Apr 62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ____________ (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE:	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Joseph B. Smith

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS: (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular	Summer	WAE
Part Time	Detail Out	Consultant
Temporary	Detail In	Military
Temporary - Part Time		

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE:
Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
Office, Major Staff, etc.
Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
Branch
Section
Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 August 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SMITH, Joseph B.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 15 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235-1000-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 1
VENEZUELA SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~[illegible]~~-505

12a. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (14)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $11415

18. REMARKS:

(From: DDP/WH/1/Venezuela Sec/459/D.C.)

Staffing complement change.

Recorded by
OCPD
9/12 [illegible]

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: for P. C. BOWERS WH/Personnel Officer

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Walter [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

20. ACTION CODE: 37 | 21. EMPLOY. CODE: 10 | 22. OFFICE CODE NO.: NUMERIC 14300 ALPHABETIC [illegible] | 25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 DA. 16 YR. 21

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 09/1?/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Walter [illegible]

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 July 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SMITH, JOSEPH B.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 27 YEAR 6

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS	☒	V TO V	☐	V TO CF
	☐	CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235 1000 1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 1
VENEZUELA SECTION

2

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~[illegible]~~-459

12a. PCN CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (13)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 4 ✓

17. SALARY OR RATE: $11415 ✓

18. REMARKS

(FROM: DDP/CA Staff/Prop.Grp./356/D.C.) Tray 3

1 copy to Security.

Release date [illegible] WH [illegible] 5 Sept [illegible]

Recorded by CSPD
V3

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 7/[illegible]/61
[illegible]/61

CONCURRENCE: for CHARLES J. FRANCIS
CA/Support Group

19a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: PC Bowers

19b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Walter N. Potter

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. [illegible] CODE	24. [illegible] CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	64300	WH	75013		1	06 16 21		

28. [illegible] EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC; 3 - FICA; 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. [illegible] NO.
34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT.; 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. [illegible]: 1 - YES; 2 - NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED; 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. [illegible] CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kinney 08/23/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Walter N. Potter

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITI[illegible] AND FORM 1152A.
8-60

SECRET

(4)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

12 Sept. 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.				
107894	SMITH JOSEPH B	06	16	21	1	M 1	09	17	51				
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code	
10	03	48	1	50 USCA 403 J					09	17	51	2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP COVERT ACTION STAFF PROPAGANDA GROUP MEDIA BRANCH	4230	WASH., D.C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
1	OPS OFFICER	0399	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
13 4	$ ~~10610~~ 11415	D	10	09	55	10	01	61	0221 1000 1000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Reassignment	37	10 02 60	Regular	10	

3

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP CA Staff Propaganda Group Guidance Branch	[illegible]	Wash., D. C.	[illegible]

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	Ops Officer	356	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
13 4	$ 11415	D –	10	09	55	10	01	61	1221-1000-1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Charles J. Francis, Chief, Support Group

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Betty R. Weyland x 3625

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): J. FOSTER COLLINS, Chief, CA Staff

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		[illegible]	Placement		
B. Pos. Control		9-27-60			
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

Action to correct slotting.

LCD 11-3-60

CSPD

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

14-00000

V to V	V to UV	**SECRET** (When Filled In)	C O P Y REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED Mo. Da. Yr.
UV to V	UV to UV			

1. Serial No. 107894	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) SMITH, Joseph B.	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 06 Da. 16 Yr. 21	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex M A	6. CSLCD Mo. 09 Da. 17 Yr. 51	
7. SCD Mo. 10 Da. 03 Yr. 48	8. CSC Retire. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo. 09 Da. 17 Yr. 51	13. Fed. Serv. Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FE Branch 3 Philippines Station PP Section	Code 5161	15. Location Of Official Station Manila R. P.	Station Code 57557

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - USHd. - Frgn. - Code 5	17. Position Title Ops Off	18. Position No. 0710	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01

21. Grade & Step 13 4	22. Salary Or Rate $ 10610	23. SD DP	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 10 Da. 09 Yr. 55	25. PSI Due Mo. 10 Da. 05 Yr. 58	26. Appropriation Number 8 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment & Transfer to Vouchered Funds	Code 02	28. Eff. Date Mo. 05 Da. 29 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP Covert Action Staff Propaganda Group Media Branch	Code 4230	32. Location Of Official Station Wash., D. C.	Station Code 75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - USHd. - Frgn. - Code 2	34. Position Title Ops Officer	35. Position No. 0399	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01

38. Grade & Step 13 4	39. Salary Or Rate $ 10610	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 10 Da. 09 Yr. 55	42. PSI Due Mo. 10 Da. 01 Yr. 61	43. Appropriation Number 0221 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Charles J. Francis, Chief, Support Group	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) J. FOSTER COLLINS, Chief, CA Staff	Date Approved
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Betty R. Weyland x 3625		

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved B.		

Remarks

Two copies to Security

CONCUR: ____________________

☐ Continued Reverse Side

FORM NO. 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Smith, Joseph B.	Wife - Jean	59-44D

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 16 September 1955

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF OCD REPRESENTATIVE
28 [illegible] 1958	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

3 February 1958

1. Serial No. [illegible]
2. Name (Last-First-Middle) [illegible] JOSEF [illegible]
3. Date Of Birth Mo. [illegible] Da. [illegible] Yr. [illegible]
4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1
5. Sex [illegible]
6. CS EOD Mo. [illegible] Da. [illegible] Yr. [illegible]
7. SCD Mo. [illegible] Da. [illegible] Yr. [illegible]
8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code [illegible]
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority [illegible]
10. Apmt. Affidavits Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code /
12. LCD Mo. [illegible] Da. [illegible] Yr. [illegible]
13. Code [illegible]

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations
[illegible] FE
BR 5
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
Code 121
15. Location Of Official Station [illegible]
Station Code [illegible]
16. Dept. - Field: Dept. - USfld. - Frgn. - Code [illegible]
17. Position Title AREA OPS OF [illegible]
18. Position No. [illegible]
19. Serv. [illegible]
20. Occup. Series [illegible]
21. Grade & Step [illegible]
22. Salary Or Rate $ [illegible]
23. SD [illegible]
24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]
25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]
26. Appropriation Number [illegible]

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment (V to UV)
Code 35
28. Eff. Date Mo. 02 Da. 07 Yr. 58
29. Type Of Employee Regular
OK [illegible] FE
Code 01
30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations
DDP/FE
Branch 3 - Philippines Station
PP Section
Code 5161
32. Location Of Official Station Manila, R. P.
Station Code 57557
33. Dept. - Field: Dept. - USfld. - Foreign Code
34. Position Title Ops Off (PP)
35. Position No. 710
36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.31
38. Grade & Step
39. Salary Or Rate $
40. SD
41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 10 10 [illegible]
42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. 10 16 58
43. Appropriation Number 8-3780-55-006

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Ronald [illegible]
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Jimmie Dewberry, Ext 2957
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) Chief, [illegible] FE
[illegible]

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	[illegible]	[illegible]
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	[illegible]	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert [illegible]	[illegible]

Remarks 2 copies to Security.

W4 [illegible]

[illegible]

8 Feb [illegible]

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/P PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: SMITH, JOSEPH B.   AGE: 16 JUN 1921   DATE: 3 FEB 1958

STATION MANILA, R.P.
AND DUTIES: OPS OFF (PP)   DD/P UNIT: FE
REASSIGNMENT
PRIMARY CAREER
DESIGNATION: DP

PRESENT GRADE: GS-13
PROPOSED GRADE: GS-13
PRESENT T/O SLOT
NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-3369 GS-14
CIA TRAINING: ORIENT, BASIC & ADVANCED PSYCH. WARFARE SEMINAR, F&S BRIEFING, BOC, CPO, OC,
PROPOSED T/O SLOT
NUMBER AND GRADE: BFF-710 GS-14

EDUCATION: 1943 HARVARD, AB IN HISTORY; 1943-44 YALE, 36 SEM HRS IN FE POLITICS; 1947-48 JOHNS HOPKINS, 6 SEM HRS GOVT; 1950 U OF PENN, MA IN HISTORY
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY: JAPANESE-LIMITED; GERMAN-LIMITED

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):

1943-46	JAPANESE LANGUAGE SPECIALIST, US ARMY
1946-51	ASST PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, DICKINSON COLLEGE

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:

17 SEP 51	EOD, IO, GS-9, OPC/FE, PLANS BRANCH, WASHINGTON, D.C.
30 MAR 52	PROMOTION, OPS OFF, GS-11, OPC/FE, PLANS & OPS BR, WASH., D.C.
26 APR 53	PROMOTED TO GS-12
20 DEC 53	REASSIGNED AS IO, GS-12, DDP/FE, MALAYA STATION
1 APR 54	ARRIVED SINGAPORE, PCS
9 OCT 55	PROMOTION, OPS OFF (PP), GS-13, DDP/FE, SINGAPORE
13 JUL 56	RETURNED TO HEADQUARTERS, PCS
2 DEC 56	REASSIGNED AS AREA OPS OFF (CH), MALAYA & AUSTRALIA SEC, WASH.
1 APR 57	REASSIGNED AS ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF, FE/5
17 NOV 57	REASSIGNMENT, AREA OPS OFF (D CH), GS-13, DDP/FE, WASH., D.C.

RECOMMENDED BY: CONCURRENCES:

AP Frizell
ARTHUR P. FRIZZELL, CFE/3

- -

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

24 Sept. 1957

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 Pt-1 10Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo	Da	Yr
	SMITH, Joseph B.	06	16	24		1	M			

7. SCD Mo	Da	Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Aff. Mo	Da	Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	12. LCD Mo	Da	Yr	13. Code
										1				

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE Branch 5 Malaya and Australia Section Office of the Chief		Washington, D.C.	

16. Dept.- Field Dept. Unif. Fran.	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
		Area Ops Off (Ch)	303	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step		22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	25. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	26. Appropriation Number
13	2	$9205.00	DP							8-3700-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo	Da	Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Reassignment					Regular		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE Branch 5 Office of the Chief	5121	Washington, D.C.	75013

33. Dept.- Field Dept. Unif. Fran.	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
		Area Ops Off (D Br Ch)	322 10	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step		39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	42. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	43. Appropriation Number
13	2	$ 9205.00	DP	10	16	55	10	10	58	8-3700-20

13

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Ronald Gage, Chief, FE Personnel

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Jimmie Dewberry x 2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):

Service Rec'd
5 NOV 1957

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	R. Bear, Jr.	
B. Pos. Control	JS	11/12/57	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Shoup	6 NOV

Remarks

FORM 1152a
3-57

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/P PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: SMITH, JOSEPH B. AGE: 16 JUNE 1921 DATE: 26 SEP 57

STATION AND DUTIES: WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA OPS OFF (D BR CH)
DD/P UNIT: FE REASSIGNMENT
PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: DP

PRESENT GRADE: GS-13
PROPOSED GRADE: GS-13
PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-303 GS-13/14
CIA TRAINING: ORIENT, BASIC & ADVANCED PSYCH. WARFARE SEMINAR, F&S BRIEFING, BOC, CFO, OC,
PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-3369 GS-14

EDUCATION: AB IN HISTORY, 1943, HARVARD; 36 SEM HRS IN FE POLITICS, 1943-44, YALE; 6 SEM HRS GOV, 1947-48, JOHN HOPKINS; MA, HISTORY, U OF PENN 1950
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY: JAPANESE - LIMITED;

ASSESSED:	DATE:	TYPE OF POSITION:	RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
1943-46, JAPANESE LANGUAGE SPECIALIST, US ARMY
1946-51, ASST PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, DICKINSON COLLEGE

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
17 SEP 51, EOD, IO, GS-9, OPC/FE, PLANS BRANCH, WASHINGTON, D. C.
30 MAR 52, PROMOTION, OPS OFF, GS-11, OPC/FE, PLANS & OPS BR., WASHINGTON
26 APR 53, PROMOTION TO GS-12
20 DEC 53, REASSIGNED AS IO, GS-12, DDP/FE, MALAYA STATION
1 APR 54, ARRIVED SINGAPORE, PCS
9 OCT 55, PROMOTION, OPS OFF (PP), GS-13, DDP/FE, SINGAPORE
13 JUL 56, RETURNED TO HEADQUARTERS, PCS
DEC 56, REASSIGNED AS AREA OPS OFF (CH), MALAYA & AUSTRALIA, SEC. WASH.
APR 57, REASSIGNED AS ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF, FE-5

RECOMMENDED BY: CONCURRENCES:

Joseph W. Smith
JOSEPH W. SMITH, CFE/5

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

SECRET

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice Expires 3 October 1957

CSN NO. 1-138

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
NOTICE NO. 1-138

ORGANIZATION
3 September 1957

PERSONNEL ANNOUNCEMENT

FE DIVISION

Announcement is made of the appointment, effective 3 September 1957, of Mr. Joseph W. Smith as Chief, FE/5, vice Mr. Joseph B. Smith, Acting Chief. Mr. Joseph B. Smith has resumed his position of Deputy Chief, FE/5.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Released by:
Richard Helms
Chief of Operations

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice Expires 9 September 1957

CSN NO. 1-131

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
NOTICE NO. 1-131

ORGANIZATION
7 August 1957

PERSONNEL ANNOUNCEMENT

FE DIVISION

Announcement is made of the designation, effective 5 August 1957, of Mr. Joseph B. Smith as Acting Chief, FE/5, vice Mr. Robert H. Linn, reassigned.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Released by:
Richard Helms
Chief of Operations

S-E-C-R-E-T

FE/PT

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice expires 15 May 1957

AMENDMENT TO
FE NOTICE NO. 1-46

ORGANIZATION
20 March 1957

FAR EAST DIVISION NOTICE

SUBJECT: Personnel Assignment

The designation of Mr. Joseph B. Smith as Acting Deputy Chief, FE/5 is effective 1 April 1957.

Alfred C Ulmer Jr.
ALFRED C. ULMER, JR.
Chief, Far East Division

Distribution:
FE Staffs and Branches
SSA/DDS
RI

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice expires 15 May 1957

FE NOTICE NO. 1-46

ORGANIZATION
20 March 1957

FAR EAST DIVISION NOTICE

SUBJECT: Personnel Assignment

Effective 15 April 1957, Mr. Joseph B. Smith is designated Acting Deputy Chief, FE/5, vice Mr. John E. MacCannell, reassigned.

Alfred C Ulmer Jr
ALFRED C. ULMER, JR.
Chief, Far East Division

Distribution:
FE Staffs and Branches
SSA/DDS
RI

S-E-C-R-E-T

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Joseph B. Smith	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Jun 1921	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 14 Nov. 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 2 Dec 56	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY —

FROM—		TO—
Ops Officer (PP) BFF-923	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer (Ch) BF-303 /13
GS-0136.31-13 $8990.00 P/A	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8990.00 P/A
DDP/FE Branch 5 Malaya	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 5 Malaya & Australia Section Office of the Chief
Singapore Station Singapore	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C. 13/14 D
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

14

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Unvouchered to Vouchered

Transfer of Funds

W4 attached

"2 copies to Security?"

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
Henry P. Gilbert, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Dorothy Tweedie x4697

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

Approved by
NOV 20 1956
McCallie

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WW II	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:DP

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM 7-3745-55-042
TO 7-3700-20

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		30 NOV 1956
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		11/26/56
E.		
F. APPROVED BY		

REMARKS

26 Nov 56

SECRET

DD/P PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: Joseph B. SMITH   AGE: 35   DATE: 14 Sept 56

STATION: Washington, D.C.
AND DUTIES: Area Ops. Off. (Ch.)   DD/P UNIT: FE

PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: SD:DP

PRESENT GRADE: GS-13
PROPOSED GRADE: GS-13

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE BFF-923 GS-13

CIA TRAINING: Orient. 2-5 Oct 51; Basic Psych. Warfare Seminar - May 52; Advanced Basic Psych Warfare Seminar- November 52.

PROPOSED T/O SLOT: BF-303
NUMBER AND GRADE: GS-13/14

EDUCATION: 1940-43 - A.B. Harvard University - History, Govt., Economics
1943-44 - Yale, Far East Japanese, Certificate
January 1950 - U. of Pennsylvania, History - M.A.

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY: Japanese, German

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
1943-1946 - U.S. Army, Cpl., MIS Japanese Language Specialist
1946-1951 - Asst. Professor of History, Dickenson College, Pennsylvania

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
17 Sept 1951 - Excepted appointment, GS-9, OPC/FE/Plans Br., Washington, D.C.
30 Mar 52 - Promotion and reassig., Ops. Off., GS-11, OPC/FE/Plans & Ops Br., Psych Warfare Unit, Wash. D.C.
26 Apr 1953 - Promotion, Ops. Officer GS-12, DDP/FE/Political & Psych Warfare Sec. Wash. D.C.
20 Dec. 1953 - Reass., Intelligence Officer, GS-12, FE/Malaya Station Singapore Malaya - Arrived O/S 1 April 1954)
28 Feb. 1954 - Reass., Ops. Officer PP - GS-12, FE/Branch 5, Singapore, Malaya, - (9 October 1955 - Promotion to GS-13) to Present. Returned to Hqs. July 1956.

RECOMMEND BY: CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

Approved NOV 20 1956
Career Service

Subject Prom., GS-13, 9 October 1955
Rank In Grade - 61st of 95

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Joseph B. Smith
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 15 June 1921
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 30 Aug. 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Conversion from FSS Status
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: C.O.B. 25 Aug. 1956
B. APPROVED:
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer(PP) BFF-923 Info. Officer		Ops Officer (PP) BFF-923
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.31-13 $8990.00 P/A FSS-5 $8015.00 P/A		GS-0136.31-13 $8990.00 P/A
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 5, Malaya Singapore Station		DDP/FE Branch 5, Malaya Singapore Station
11. HEADQUARTERS	Singapore		Singapore
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

19
56

DF

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): [illegible] Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Dorothy Tweedie x4697

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	ANS	I.A.	REAL.

SD:DP

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION
FROM 7-3745-55-042 CP
TO Same
17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (SSS-SS): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: PA

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Concurred in by
31 AUG 1956
DM Collins
DDP Career Service

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	WLA	[illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		31 Aug 56
E.		

REMARKS

F. APPROVED BY Robert A Fricklin by [illegible] 31 Aug '56

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Joseph B. Smith	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 5 Aug. 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Promotion B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED:	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Ops Officer (PP) BFF-923-12	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer (PP) BFF-923-13
GS-0136.31-12 ~~$7240.00~~ 7785 P/A	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.31-13 $8990.00 P/A
DDP/FE Branch 5 ~~Malaya~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 5 Malaya
~~Singapore Station~~ Singapore, Malaya	11. HEADQUARTERS	Singapore Station Singapore, Malaya
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL SD:DP

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Pers. Data Sheet, Recommendation, Job Description and Fitness Report attached.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Henry P. Gilbert, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Dorothy Tweedie x3780

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:DP

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 6-3745-55-042 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Approved SEP 13 1955
Dwight M. Collins
PD/Career Service

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCR	
E.		

REMARKS:
APPROVED BY THE CAREER [illegible] COMMITTEE
16 Aug 1955

F. APPROVED BY
per 20 Sept 55

SECRET

SECRET

DD/P

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: Joseph B. SMITH AGE: 34 DATE: 9 September 1955

STATION AND DUTIES: Singapore, Malaya Ops Officer

DD/P UNIT: FE

PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: PP

PRESENT GRADE: GS-12

PROPOSED GRADE: GS-13

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BFF-923 GS-12/13

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BFF-923 GS-12/13

CIA TRAINING: Orientation 2-5 Oct 51
Basic Psychological Warfare Seminar - May 52
Advanced " " " " - Nov 52

EDUCATION: 1940 - 1943, A.B. Harvard U, History, Government, Economics
1943 - 1944, Yale, Far East Japanese, Certificate
January 1950, A.M., U of Pennsylvania, History

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY: Japanese, German

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):

1943 - 1946, U.S. Army, Cpl, MIS Japanese language specialist
1946 - 1951, Ass't Professor of History, Eickenson College, Pennsylvania

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:

17 Sep 51 - Excepted appointment, GS-9, OPC/FE/Plans Branch, Washington, D.C.
30 Mar 52 - Prom & Reass., Ops Officer, GS-11, OPC/FE/Plans & Operations Branch Psychological Warfare Unit, Washington, D.C.
26 Apr 53 - Prom, Ops Officer, GS-12, DDP/FE/Political and Psychological Warfare Section, Washington, D.C.
20 Dec 53 - Reass., Intelligence Officer, GS-12, FE/Malaya Station Singapore, Malaya (arrived 1 April 1954)
28 Feb 54 - Reass., Ops Officer (PP), GS-12, FE/Branch 5, Singapore, Malaya

RECOMMENDED BY:
V. O. Goodell
Chief, FE/5

CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

Subject promoted Gs-12,
26 April 1953

SEP 22 11 01 AM '55

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE/Personnel

FROM : Chief, FE/5

SUBJECT : Promotion of Joseph B. Smith

1. Mr. Joseph Smith holds the position of senior KUCAGE officer in the Singapore/Malaya Mission. In this capacity Mr. Smith has conducted liasion with Smyopia on KUCAGE matters pertaining to his area and has assisted with KUCAGE liason for all of Southeast Asia.

2. The position that Mr. Smith occupies calls for a considerable degree of initiative, diplomacy and resourcefulness. Mr. Smith has demonstrated that he possesses these qualities having desplayed sound judgement in dealing with a service where many policy problems have to be met and solved. In addition, as will be noted from the attached recommendation from the field, the Chief of Station has delegated to Mr. Smith most of the responsibility for the conduct of the KUCAGE program at the station. An integral part of this program has been the development of very useful independent KUBARK/KUCAGE operations by Mr. Smith.

3. Attached is a job description for Mr. Smith which illustrates in more detail the special requirements necessary for the position which he has so ably filled since April 1st of 1954.

4. Mr. Smith is recommended for promotion to GS-13.

V O Goodell
V. O. Goodell
Chief, FE/5

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET
Security Information

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Joseph B. SMITH
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 June 1921
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 17 Aug 53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 20 Dec 53
B. APPROVED:
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Operations Officer (FN) BF-93	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer ~~[illegible]~~/II S-5-12
GS-132-12 $7040.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-12 132 $7040.00 p/a/
DDP/FE Political & Psychological Warfare Political & Psychological Warfare Sect.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE ~~[illegible]~~ - ~~[illegible]~~a Malaya Station
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Singapore, Malaya
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Slot #5 (GS-13 slot)

Transfer TO Unvouchered Funds FROM Vouchered Funds

C# 1074

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Clarence E. Witt
Clarence E. Witt, FE Personnel Officer
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Alma Weiss, extension 3497
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Willard
Title: PP/CS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD: PP ✓

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-3700-20
TO: 4-3745-55-042
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

E date O.K.' per FE' Personnel
Betty 8/14/53

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	CT.	
E.		

REMARKS: ✓

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET
Security Information

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET
Security Information

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Joseph B. SMITH
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 June 1921
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 17 Aug 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Operations Officer (PW) 3F-93	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer (~~[illegible]~~ S-5-12
GS-132-12 $7040.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-12 $7040.00 p/a
DDP/FE Political & Psychological Warfare Political & Psychological Warfare Sect.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE ~~Area Br. 5 - Indonesia/Malaya~~ Malaya Station
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Singapore, Malaya
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Slot #5 (GS-13 slot)

Transfer TO Unvouchered Funds FROM Vouchered Funds

C#1074

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Clarence E. Witt, FE Personnel Officer
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Alma Weiss, extension 3497
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	S.P.T.	10 POINT	
				DISAD.	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD: PP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM 4-3700-20
TO 4-3745-55-042
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

WPGibbons

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CTRL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

PP Career Service Officer   1 Sept 1953

Chief, FE

Transfer of Joseph B. Smith

1. Request for transfer of subject from the FE Division PP Staff T/O to the T/O of FE Branch 5 in order that he may be assigned as Senior PP Officer in Singapore was made 17 August 1953. The Branch was notified that no action would be taken until indication was given regarding Subject's fulfillment of training requirements.

2. Subject has satisfied Phase I by virtue of his 2 years' experience. He will undertake to complete his training beginning 5 October 1953 on which date he has been enrolled in the Phase II Course.

GEORGE E. AURELL

FE-5/JSmith:grc

Distribution:
2 - PP Career Serv. Officer
2 - FE/5

Note: Request for reassignment approval was received by PP/CSO on 24 August 1953. FE Division was notified of training requirements on 25 August 1953. This memorandum was received on 3 September and forwarded to FDC on 4 September 1953.

EDWIN A. WILLARD
PP/CS

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED FUNDS

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Joseph B. SMITH	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 27 Mar 53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Promotion B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Operations Officer (PW) BF-93-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Operations Officer (PW) BF-93
GS-132-11 $5940.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-12 $7040.00 p/a
DDP/FE Political & Psychological Warfare Staff Political & Psychological Warfare Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE same same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Position description is attached.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Kathryn J. Rex, Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Mary Lee Mitchell [illegible] - 2314

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Kathryn J. Rex
Title: Personnel Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 3700-20
TO: same

11X2100

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		4/10/5	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY James H. Powell 13 Apr 53

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME: SMITH, Joseph Burkholder

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 Mar.

NATURE OF ACTION: Reassignment +
Promotion

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)
LAST WORKING DAY:
EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer	Ops ~~Intelligence~~ Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9 $5060.00 p/a	GS-11 $5940.00 p/a
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH AND SECTION	Plans Branch ~~Slot 521~~	Plans and Operations Br. Psychological Warfare Unit
OFFICIAL STATION	~~Washington D. C.~~	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS: (Slot 521) JK

132

~~#~~ 1389

RECOMMENDED:

18 February 1952
(DATE)

George A. Lasley
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, FIELD, DEPUTY OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT
DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED
CLEARANCE REQUESTED: DATE / TYPE
CLEARANCE APPROVED: DATE / TYPE
DATE / SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION
BUREAU NO. 7781 6446
C. B. C. NO.
DATE APPROVED 3-13-52 3-4-52
NEW / VICE / L. A. ✓ / REAL
DATE 3/13/52
SIGNATURE Gilbert
EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS
APPROPRIATION: 2123700
ALLOTMENT: 5017
C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch. A —
DATE 3-25-52 SIGNATURE

PERSONNEL RELATIONS
DATE / SIGNATURE

APPROVALS
☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE
DATE / SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE MAR 1 1952
SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
D. Mulesley

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNL. ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME: SMITH, Joseph [illegible]

NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 Sept '51

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-9, $4600 p/a
OFFICE	S.C. 29 Aug. 51	OPC
DIVISION		FE
BRANCH AND SECTION		Plans Branch
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS: C#1314 132

S-9~~4~~ 71302

8003

RECOMMENDED:

12 June 1951
(DATE)

for RICHARD G. STILWELL, Chief FE Division
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF, OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: 6/21/51

CLEARANCE REQUESTED: DATE / TYPE

CLEARANCE APPROVED: DATE / TYPE

DATE / SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU No.: 2914

C. S. C. No.: 3051

DATE APPROVED: 6/2/49

NEW / VICE / C.A. ✓ / REAL

DATE: 6/26/51

SIGNATURE: [illegible]

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2125900

ALLOTMENT: 2.017

C. S. C. AUTHORITY:

DATE SIGNATURE: 7-19-51

SIGNATURE:

PERSONNEL OPERATIONS

DATE: / SIGNATURE:

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE / SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE: JUN 22 1951

SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF: [illegible]

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62433-1

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

28 May 1951 1950

Name of Candidate Joseph B. Smith

Position Considered for I.O. Office FE-3 Interviewer D.R. Smith

Personal Appearance	Dignified......		Natural.....	X	Awkward....	
	Well-groomed..	X	Clean.......	X	Slovenly...	
	Wide-Awake.....	X	Stolid......		Apathetic..	
	Impressive....		Ordinary....		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive....		Responsive..	X	Taciturn....	
	Imperturbable..		Steady......	X	Excitable...	
	Cheerful......		Tranquil....		Dejected....	
	Straight-forward	X	Reserved....		Evasive.....	
	Modest.........	X	Complacent..		Conceited...	
	Dominant.......		Confident...	X	Submissive..	

Is education adequate? Yes (X) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes(X) No( )

Area Knowledge Extensive studies of Japan-Korea Area but no travel in area

Previous intelligence or related experience MIS Language School

GS-7 GS-7

Salary level requested $ 5000 p/a Lowest salary acceptable $ 5000 p/a

General Recommendations:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Describe: Too passive for [illegible] operations, does not wish to go overseas for some time
2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification:

[illegible] GS-9

Specific Recommendation for employment:

Position: Branch Division

Location:

Salary level:

Recommendation as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration:

[illegible]

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse.)

D. R. Smith
Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

May 28 195[illegible]

Name of Candidate Smith, Jos. B.

Position Considered for ________ Office __________ Interviewer [illegible]

Personal Appearance	Dignified......		Natural.....	✓	Awkward....	
	Well-groomed..		Clean.......	✓	Slovenly...	
	Wide-Awake....	✓	Stolid......		Apathetic..	
	Impressive....		Ordinary....		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive....		Responsive..		Taciturn....	
	Imperturbable..		Steady......		Excitable...	
	Cheerful......		Tranquil....		Defeated....	
	Straight-forward		Reserved....		Evasive.....	
	Modest........		Complacent..		Conceited...	
	Dominant......		Confident...		Submissive..	

Is education adequate? Yes (✓) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes (✓) No ( )

Area Knowledge Study Far East

Previous intelligence or related experience Japanese Lang. School

Salary/level requested $GS-9 Lowest salary acceptable $5000.00

General Recommendation:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Describe: ________
2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: [illegible] – potential [illegible] – [illegible]

Specific Recommendation for employment:

Position: ________ Branch ________ Division ________

Location: ________

Salary level: ________

Recommendation as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: ________ Over>

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

[illegible]
Signature of Interviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

Vol - [illegible] [illegible] Dor...

O/F - [illegible] [illegible] the time [illegible] [illegible] relations
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] site family [illegible]

Available [illegible] Sept 51.

MILITARY STATUS QUESTIONNAIRE

THIS DATE

NAME (PRINT) (Last) (Middle) (First): Smith, Burkholder, Joseph

BIRTH DATE (Day) (Month) (Year): 16 June 1921

SEX: MALE ☒ FEMALE ☐

RACE: white

CODE

MARITAL STATUS: (1) SINGLE ☐ (2) MARRIED ☒ (3) WIDOWED ☐ (4) DIVORCED ☐ (5) SEPARATED ☐

NO. OF DEPENDENTS (INCLUDE WIFE): 2

AGENCY ASSIGNMENT

OFFICE

DIVISION

CODE

POSITION OR TITLE

GRADE

CODE

PRESENT DRAFT STATUS

(A) HAVE YOU REGISTERED FOR DRAFT? (1) YES ☐ (2) NO ☒

(B) IF YES, CHECK YOUR PRESENT DRAFT CLASSIFICATION BELOW:

- ☐ 1A AVAILABLE FOR MILITARY SERVICE. AGES 18-26
- ☐ 1AO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR, BUT AVAILABLE FOR NON-COMBATANT DUTY.
- ☐ 1C MEMBER OF ANY ACTIVE BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE. MUST BE ON FULL DUTY.
- ☐ 1D MEMBER OF ANY RESERVE COMPONENT OF MILITARY SERVICE. CANNOT BE CALLED BY DRAFT BOARDS. CALLED ONLY BY MILITARY SERVICE CONCERNED.
- ☐ 2A DEFERRED ON ACCOUNT OF OCCUPATION.
- ☐ 2C DEFERRED FOR AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATION.
- ☐ 3A MAN HAS DEPENDENTS.
- ☐ 4A REGISTRANT WHO HAS COMPLETED SUFFICIENT SERVICE IN WORLD WAR II TO BE CLASSIFIED AS A VETERAN (NINETY DAYS SERVICE DURING FIGHTING WAR OR ONE YEAR AFTER V-J DAY). SOLE SURVIVING SON IN FAMILY. IF A FAMILY HAD TWO SONS IN A WAR AND ONE WAS KILLED, THE SOLE SURVIVING SON COME IN THIS CATEGORY.
- ☐ 4B OFFICIAL DEFERRED BY LAW.
- ☐ 4C ALIEN.
- ☐ 4D MINISTER OF RELIGION OR DIVINITY STUDENT.
- ☐ 4E CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR - OPPOSED TO BOTH COMBATANT AND NON-COMBATANT SERVICE.
- ☐ 4F PHYSICALLY OR OTHERWISE UNFIT FOR SERVICE.
- ☐ 5A MAN WHO HAS ATTAINED TWENTY-SIXTH BIRTHDAY. NOT LIABLE TO INDUCTION UNDER PRESENT ACT.

LOCAL DRAFT BOARD

NAME

NO.

ADDRESS (Street and No.)

[The remainder of this form will be filled out only by personnel who have performed duty in any of the U.S. Armed Services, Merchant Marine or any foreign military organization.]

SERVICE RECORD

1. CHECK ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH YOU HAVE SERVED:

(1) ARMY ☒ (4) AIR FORCE ☐ (7) NATIONAL GUARD ☐
(2) NAVY ☐ (5) COAST GUARD ☐ (8) FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION ☐
(3) MARINE CORPS ☐ (6) MERCHANT MARINE ☐

2. LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN THE U.S. ARMED SERVICES (INCLUDING TRAINING TOURS)

	YEARS	MONTHS
(1) WORLD WAR I AND ALL PRIOR DUTY		
(2) BETWEEN WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II		
(3) WORLD WAR II	2	11
(4) SINCE WORLD WAR II		
ACTIVE DUTY TO DATE (TOTAL)	2	11

3. FURNISH THE FOLLOWING DATA AS TO YOUR COMMISSIONED OR ENLISTMENT STATUS UPON SEPARATION:

(1) COMMISSIONED ☐ OR (2) ENLISTED ☒

NAME OF SERVICE	RANK, GRADE OR RATING	ARM, BRANCH OR CORPS	LAST SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NO.
Army	T/5 grade	HTS	11 081 139

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

FORM 60.
AUG 1950 37-82

(over)

4. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION:

(1) ☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
(2) ☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
(3) ☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
(4) ☐ RETIREMENT FOR OTHER PHYSICAL DISABILITY
(5) ☒ SEPARATED (POINTS, CATEGORY, ETC.) length of service category
(6) ☐ RELEASE ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL HEALTH, SAFETY OR INTEREST
(7) ☐ RELEASE BECAUSE OF UNDUE HARDSHIPS

5. IF YOUR PRESENT STATUS DIFFERS IN ANY RESPECT FROM THAT STATED IN 3 ABOVE, INDICATE CHANGE ONLY AND DATE OF CHANGES

		DATE	CODES
COMMISSIONED			
SERVICE			
ARM, BRANCH OR CORPS			
RANK, GRADE OR RATING			
SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NO.			

6. ARE YOU NOW IN THE NATIONAL GUARD? (1) YES ☐ (2) NO ☒

(A) IF YES, WHAT UNIT?

(B) DID YOU ENTER FEDERAL ARMED FORCES THROUGH NATIONAL GUARD? (1) YES ☐ (2) NO ☒

7. DO YOU HAVE RESERVE STATUS? (1) YES-INACTIVE ☐ (2) YES-ACTIVE ☐ (3) NO ☒

(A) ARE YOU ASSIGNED TO AN AGENCY UNIT? (1) YES ☐ (2) NO ☒

(B) IF NO, WHAT IS YOUR ASSIGNMENT? none

(C) IS YOUR ASSIGNMENT AN ORGANIZED UNIT? (1) YES ☐ (2) NO ☒

8. DO YOU HAVE A MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? (1) YES ☐ (2) NO ☒

(A) IF YES, STATE NAME OF UNIT ORGANIZATION

REMARKS:

[illegible] B. Smith
SIGNATURE

14-00000

SECRET

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET
[illegible]

[illegible]

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 20 June 1972

FILE NO.: 14732

TO: (Check)
- x CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- x CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

SS NUMBER: 714-18-4732

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 037804

ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: Chief Support Staff

REF: Form 2554 Retirement

SUBJECT: SMITH, Joseph B.

OFFICIAL COVER: x ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☒ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE from [illegible]

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER *(Specify)*

x SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*

x SUBMIT FORM 3254 [illegible] W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*

x SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR 240-2e)*

SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR 240-2e)*

x EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR [illegible] HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS

EFFECTIVE DATE:

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______________ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*

SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHD 20-7)*

EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______________ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

FILE

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

SUBJECT WILL BE DENIED FOR ENTIRE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT EXCEPT FOR US GOVERNMENT APPLICATIONS.

COVER HISTORY:
Sept 51 - Jan 54 - Hqs - Overt
20 Jan 54 - Aug 56 - Singapore - [illegible]
Aug 56 - Feb 58 - Hqs - ODFC
Feb 58 - Mar 60 - Manila - ODFC
Apr 60 - May 62 - Hqs - ODFC
[illegible]
Sept [illegible] - May [illegible] - Hqs - ODFC
May [illegible] - Jun 72 - Mexico City - State - Int

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD OR CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SRBCD
COPY 4 - OL/TFD
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

James [illegible]

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
1-73

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP	DATE 22 September 1966
TO: (Check) ☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH	ESTABLISHED FOR SMITH, Joseph B.
ATTN: Mr. Hannah	FILE NO. K-1480
REF: Form 1322 dated 20 September 1966	ID CARD NO. B-5261
OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED Services and Support Group (Provisional)	EMPLOYEE NO.

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ **Block Records:**
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ________________

b. Continuing, effective as of 23 September 1954

☒ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category.
(HHB 20-7)

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover.
(R 240-250)

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility.
(R 240-250)

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

☐ Remarks:

☒ Cover History

Sep 51	Sep 54	Hqs/Overt
Sep 54	Aug 56	Singapore USIS integrated
Aug 56	Feb 58	Hqs/DAFC
Feb 58	Mar 60	DAFC/Manila
Mar 60	May 62	Hqs/DAFC
May 62	Sep 66	Buneos Aires/NOC
Sep 66		Hqs/DAFC

JB/jaw

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-OL/TELSVC, Copy 5-FSD/OS
Copy 6-OCS/OPS Copy 7-File

155

4-00000

C/S

File No. K-1480
21 July 1960

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : Joseph B. Smith

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/or have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 26 April 1960, it is requested that your records be properly blocked [illegible] to deny ~~acknowledge~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of Edward FitzGerald, CCL/CCO.

HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

FORM 1-59 1580a

57

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA

1. NAME (CAPS) Last – First – Middle (Mr. – Miss – Mrs.)
SMITH JOSEPH B

2. SOCIAL SECURITY ACCT. NO.
714-18-4732

3. (FOR AGENCY USE)

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
RETIREMENT 063073

5. A. SUBJECT TO 5 USC 6304(B) (45 day leave ceiling) ☐ YES ☐ NO

B. LAST DATE SUBJECT TO 5 USC 6304(B)

C. ANNUAL LEAVE BALANCE AS OF THAT DATE (hours)

6. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
☐ Less than 15 years (show) ______ years ______ months ______ days ☐ 15 years or more

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

	MO.	DAY	YEAR	HOURS ANNUAL	HOURS SICK
7. Carryover balance from prior leave year ending	01	06	73	360	2019
8. Current leave year accrual through pay period ending (If 90 day qualifying period not completed, explain in remarks)				096	04
9. Total				456	2067
10. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)				0	0
11. Total leave taken, current year through date of separation				[illegible]	0
12. Balance				445	2067
13. Total hours paid in lump sum (include 0 hours for holidays)				0	

14. Salary rate(s) per hour:
$13.69

15. Lump sum leave dates (If part-time tour, explain in remarks)		MO	DAY	YEAR	HOUR NO
	From	00	00	00	0
	Thru	00	00	00	0

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

(Except while in receipt of pay from B.E.C.)

	MO	DAY	YEAR	HOURS
16. During leave year in which separated				0
17. During step-increase waiting period which began on	12	10	72	0

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE (DAYS)

18. Basic service period of 24 months of continuous service abroad:	MO	DAY	YEAR
DATE STARTED	11	11	11
DATE COMPLETED			

	MO	DAY	YEAR
19. Current 12 months accrual period began on			

Hours absence without pay since that date: ______

	MO	DAY	YEAR
20. Current balance (in accruals) as of			

No. days: 44

21. Twelve months accrual rate as of date of separation No. days: 15

22. Dates leave used, prior 24 months: FROM MO	FROM DAY	FROM YEAR	TO MO	TO DAY	TO YEAR

MILITARY LEAVE

23. During current calendar year	FROM MO	FROM DAY	FROM YEAR	TO MO	TO DAY	TO YEAR
A. Regular – active duty or training						
B. Special – civil disturbance						

24. REMARKS (Include home leave information, if applicable)

SCD: 10/03/48

25. CERTIFIED CORRECT BY (Signature)
Joseph C. [illegible]

26. TITLE – AGENCY – ADDRESS – TELEPHONE NO.
FOR CHIEF PAYROLL

27. DATE
1/19/73

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPP. 296-31 B-2

Standard Form 1150
MARCH 1971
1150-108

LML: 03 JUL 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): SMITH JOSEPH B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR, RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 06 DA. 30 YR. 73 ~~COD~~

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V ☒ / CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3135 0990 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: P L 88-643 SECT 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/WH DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1-MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0340

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 8

18. REMARKS



SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERS

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. Employ Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. Hdqtrs. Code

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 06 DA. 16 YR. 21

28. FITR EXPIRES: MO / DA. / YR

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC / 2-CIA / 3-FICA / 4-NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0BJ0000

32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE / MO / DA / YR.

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE / 1-5 PT. / 2-10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO / DA / YR

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO / DA. / YR

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR / RESV. / PROV / TEMP. CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVED / 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE / 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE / 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) / 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[illegible] 7 3 73

FORM 3-66 1150 Mfg. 11.71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET BBG

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
SMITH JOSEPH B	007894	51 620	CF	GS 14 8	$28,478

G
51

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
007894	SMITH JOSEPH B	51 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 14	7	$26,354	12/14/69	GS 14	8	$27,084	12/10/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 12-19-72

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS H.E. FISHER

AUDITED BY 1/35

1/55

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

351

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 10/14/72

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007894	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) SMITH JOSEPH B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHANGE IN N.S.C.A.	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 02 DA. 2 YR. 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	3135 0950 0002	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0340	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
WEB 10-26-72

Form 1150a Use Previous
2-66 MFG. 2-72 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
SMITH JOSEPH B	007894	51 620	CF	GS 14 7	$26,352

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
SMITH JOSEPH B	007894	51 620	CF	GS 14 7	$24,979

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
SMITH JOSEPH B	007894	51 620	CF	GS 14 7	$23,573

G51

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
007894	SMITH JOSEPH B	51 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 14	6	$21,621	12/17/67	GS 14	7	$22,239	12/13/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 9 Oct 1969

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

559

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY:

FORM 7-60 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
SMITH JOSEPH B	007894	51 620	CF	GS 14 6	$21,621

14-00000

MAY 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007894	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) SMITH JOSFEH B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION INTEGRATION-DEPARTMENT OF STATE	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 21 69	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	9135 0930 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE POL OFF ATTACHE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0340	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 04 7 14 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 17289 13771

18. REMARKS

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $13771 AND FSR SALARY OF $17289 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWIT...
ALL SICK AND ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPT. OF STATE.
MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED
DAU DOB: 19 DECEMBER 1952
SON DOB: 20 SEPTEMBER 1960

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
55	10	51620	WH	45075	S	3	06 18 21		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CH 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR / RES / PROV / TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05-22-69 JK

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

PLW

(When Filled In)

16 MAY 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

SERIAL NUMBER 007894	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) SMITH JOSEPH B

NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 05 18 69	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

FUNDS	☐	V TO V	☒	V TO CF
	☐	CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 9135 0990 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0340	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 19771

18. REMARKS

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. Integrate Class	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
20	10	51620	WH	45075		3	06 16 21		

IOD DATA

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

PLW

POSTED
05-16-69 JO2

14-00000

FVD: 16 JUL 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): SMITH, JOSEPH B
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 07 14 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 9235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
CA STAFF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0645
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 19771
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51150 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. [illegible] Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 06 16 21
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. [illegible] EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; [illegible]; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: OTR

POSTED
7/17/68

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SMITH JOSEPH B	007894	51 150	V	GS 14 6	$18,481	$19,771

D-5

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
007894	SMITH JOSEPH B	17 600	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	S	ADJ.
GS 14	5	$17,198	12/19/65	GS 14	6	18481 ~~$17,731~~	12/17/67		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE C M Broutsas

DATE 13 Oct 1967

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

CHECKED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SMITH JOSEPH B	007894	17 600	V	GS 14 5	$17,198	$17,953

MRT: 17 OCT 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): SMITH JOSEPH B
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT CAREER
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 10 | 09 | 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7275 3000 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OTR
OPERATIONS SCHOOL
HEADQUARTERS TRAINING BRANCH
OPERATIONS FACULTY
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INSTR OPERATIONS
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1314
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1712.32
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 17198
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGRATE CODE	24. Approp. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
13	10	17600	OTR	75013		1	05 18 21	12 23 62	12 19 65

28. MIL EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		2			EOD DATA	00000	M

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
1	10 03 48	09 17 51	C	1		

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA
1	B	C		

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1152 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

MRT: 17 OCT 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Smith, Joseph [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. DA. YR. 10 08 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☒

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7135 0633 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 4
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0024

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: 17133

18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. Employ. Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. Health Code

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR 06 18 21

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 600091

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE, HEALTH INS CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

1152 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Smith, Joseph [redacted]	007894	51 720	CF	GS 14 5	$16,712	$17,198

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/31/66

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007894	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Smith, Joseph [redacted]				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 05 DA. 23 YR. 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT		
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6135 0633 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION BR 4 BUENOS AIRES ARGENT ST		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA			
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0084	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D		
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14	17. SALARY OR RATE		
18. REMARKS					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150c
1-63

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

N.M: 11 MAR 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007394

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Smith, Joseph [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. DA. YR. 03 13 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6135 0633 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
UNASSIGNED

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: 16712

18. REMARKS: EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
23	10	51620	WH	04041		3	06 18 21	12 23 62	12 19 65

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 9 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32. MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
		2						

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
03 20 66 N

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

1. Serial No.	2. Name			3. Cost Center Number				4. LWOP Hours		
007894	Smith Frank [redacted]			51 720 CF						
5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PR Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	[illegible]	ADJ
GS 14	4	$16,204 ~~$15,640~~	12/22/63	GS 14	5	$16,712 [illegible]	12/19/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

[illegible]

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Joseph B. Ragan DATE [illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg. 3-65

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 9 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Smith Frank [redacted]	007894	51 720	CF	GS 14 4	$15,640	$16,204

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF ~~1949,~~ AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956; SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Smith, Joseph	007894	51 650	CF	GS 14 4	$14,120	$14,965

[illegible]

WH -

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
007894	[redacted] [illegible]	51 650 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 14	3	$13,695	12/23/62	GS 14	4	$14,120	12/22/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 15 Dec 63

C/WH/Z

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 360 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EOD: 10 MAY 63

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Smith, Joseph [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 05 DA. 12 YR. 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

V TO V		V TO CF
CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135 5050 1000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 2
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA STATION
EC UNIT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0651

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: 13695

18. REMARKS:

POSTED ON
GIO CT-4
4 MAY 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64650 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 04784
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 DA. 16 YR. 21
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. LWE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05/13/63

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

9 MAY 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

LLG: 21 DEC. 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: OC 7844 ~~000455~~

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Smith, Joseph B
[redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 12 DA. 23 YR. 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135 5050 1000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 2
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0848

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: 13695

18. REMARKS:

[illegible]
1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	61650	WH	04041		3	06 16 21	12 23 62	12 23 62

28. MTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSL 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.		33. SECURITY REG. NO.	34. SEX
	80						EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. PROV. RESV. TEMP.	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

POSTED
01/14/63

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

27 DEC 1962

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1964, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS: EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR_ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR_ST	NEW SALARY
Smith, Joseph [redacted]	007894 [redacted]	64650	CF	13 5	$11575	13 5	$12610

gw

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ABM: 1 JUNE 62

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: CC7894 ~~036455~~
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Smith, Joseph [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (CAREER)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 05 DA. 27 YR. 52
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2135 5050 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 2
BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0848
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 11675
18. REMARKS:

POSTED ON
Del 5 June 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64650 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 04041
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 DA. 16 YR. 21
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 55
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 10 DA. 01 YR. 61
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 30
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE): CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 07894
34. SEX: M1
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT): CODE 1
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO 10 DA. 03 YR 48
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO 09 DA 17 YR. 51
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO): CODE C
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES): CODE 1 HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)): CODE 1
42. LEAVE CAT CODE: 6
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE 0 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
26/07/62 WK

Form 5-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

EOD 1 June 62

ABM: 1 JUNE 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): SMITH JOSEPH B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 05 26 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235 1000 1000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 1
VENEZUELA SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0505

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: 11675

18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. Employ. Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC):

22. STATION CODE:

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. Hqtrs. Code:

25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 06 16 21

26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):

27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE:

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1BD0091

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.):

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.):

36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):

37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):

38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO):

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE):

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)):

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS):

44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE):

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06/04/62 TJK

Form 8-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

[illegible] 1 June 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AES: 15 SEPT 61

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): SMITH JOSEPH B
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 09 | 15 | 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH BRANCH 1
VENEZUELA SEC
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0505
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 11415
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Requil. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)
37	10	64300	WH	75013		1	06 16 21	

27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.):
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) CODE:
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) CODE: HEALTH INS. CODE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)):
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS):
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE):

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
09/19/61 2K

Form 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions
6-60

SECRET

14-00000

ARE:25 AUG 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007894
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): SMITH JOSEPH B
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 08 25 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V; CF TO V; V TO CF; CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH I
VENEZUELA SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0459
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 11415
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64300 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 06 16 21
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED, CODE 1 - YES 2 - NO; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

IDXED

08/29/61 JK

Form 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

S 7/25/61

14-00000

3/
2/
2

REC'D PAYROLL BRANCH
SEP 25 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name			3. Cost Center Number			4. LWOP Hours	
07894	SMITH JOSEPH B			WH RA ~~[illegible]~~ V				
9. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE			7. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI / LSI / ADJ.
GS 13	4	$11,415	04/03/6	13	5	$11,675	10/01/61	

8. Remarks and Authentication

/✓/ NO EXCESS LWOP

/✓/ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

BLT: 30 SEPT 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007894	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) SMITH JOSEPH B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 02 60	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 1221 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP CA STAFF PROPAGANDA GROUP GUIDANCE BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0356	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 11415

18. REMARKS

[illegible]
10-20-60 WP

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Health Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	44300	CA	75013		1	06 16 21		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT-LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 8-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	SMITH JOSEPH B	107894	42 30	GS-13 4	$10,610	$11,415

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 25 JULY 1960

1. Serial No. 107894	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) SMITH JOSEPH B	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 06 Da. 16 Yr. 21	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-9 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 09 Da. 17 Yr. 51	
7. SCD Mo. 10 Da. 03 Yr. 48	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo. 09 Da. 17 Yr. 51	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FE BRANCH 3 PHILIPPINES STATION PP SECTION	Code 5161	15. Location Of Official Station MANILA, R.P.	Station Code 57557

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USHd-4 Fron-6 Code 5	17. Position Title OPS OFFICER	18. Position No. 0710	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01

21. Grade & Step 13 4	22. Salary Or Rate $ 10610	23. SD 0	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 10 Da. 09 Yr. 55	25. PSI Due Mo. 10 Da. 05 Yr. 58	26. Appropriation Number 8 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT & TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	Code 02	28. Eff. Date Mo. 05 Da. 29 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP COVERT ACTION STAFF PROPAGANDA GROUP MEDIA BRANCH	Code 4230	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USHd-4 Fron-6 Code 2	34. Position Title OPS OFFICER	35. Position No. 0399	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01

38. Grade & Step 13 4	39. Salary Or Rate $ 10610	40. SD 0	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 10 Da. 09 Yr. 55	42. PSI Due Mo. 10 Da. 01 Yr. 61	43. Appropriation Number 0221 1000 1000

44. Remarks

[illegible]

2-26 Co [illegible]

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 67

SECRET

(4)

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 13	2	$10,130	04	07	57	GS 13	3	$10,370	10	05	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
507894	SMITH JOSEPH B	DDP/FE 25 -3d	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 13	2	$10,130	04	07	57	GS 13	3	$10,370	10	05	58

REMARKS

FPMT-722

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Frank T. Driscoll FE/P/FSH	10 OCT	Frank T. Driscoll

FORM NO. 560
1 OCT

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
507894	SMITH JOSEPH B	DDP/FE 2	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 13	3	$10,370	10	05	58	GS 13	4	$10,610	04	03	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

JCF 4/8/60

C. M. STEWART

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 560

SECRET

OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SMITH JOSEPH B	507894	GS-13-2	$ 9,205	$10,130

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DMG 7 FEB 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
507894	SMITH JOSEPH B	06 16 21		1	M 1	09 17 51

7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Civil Serv. Credit, LCD Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
10 03 48		1	50 USCA 403 J			1	09 17 51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BR 5 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5121	WASH. D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	AREA OPS OF D BR CH	3369	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
13 2	$ 9205	DP	10 09 55	10 05 58	8 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO UNVOUCHERED FUNDS	05	02 09 58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BRANCH 3 PHILIPPINES STATION PP SECTION	5161	MANILA P. P.	57557

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	OPS OFF PP	0710	GS	0136.31

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
13 2	$ 9205	DP	10 09 55	10 05 58	8 3780 55 006

44. Remarks

SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

POSTED
CM

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 47
2/14/58

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DMG.

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
107894	SMITH JOSEPH B	06	16	21		1	M	1	09	17	51	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
10	03	48		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	17	51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BR 5 MALAYA & AUSTRALIA SEC OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		WASH. D. C.	

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	AREA OPS OFF CH	303	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
13 2	$ 9205	DP							8 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	11	17	57	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BR 5 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5121	WASH. D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	AREA OPS OF D BR CH	3369	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
13 2	$ 9205	DP	10	07	56	10	05	58	8 3700 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
11/29/57

C. M.

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

5

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTM
107894	SMITH JOSEPH B	DDP/FE 14	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
13	1	$ 8,990	10	09	55	13	2	$ 9,205	04	~~06~~ 07	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
R H Linn	13 Mar 57	CFE/

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 50

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (R PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1v1

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Joseph B. Smith 107894	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Jun 1921	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 5 Dec 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment 01	6. EFFECTIVE DATE EOD 2 Dec 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Ops Officer (PP) BFF-923	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer (CH) BF-303-13
GS-0136.31-13 $8990.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8990.00 per annum
DDP/FE Branch 5 Malaya Singapore Station	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 512131	DDP/FE Branch 5 Malaya & Australia Section Office of the Chief
Singapore	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DP

15. SEX: M

1

16. APPROPRIATION
W
FROM: 7-3745-55-042
TO: 7-3700-20 750-13

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 09/27/51

"Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

POSTED
1956
GP

CONFIDENTIAL

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950-872647

20 12/06/56

..o (7 PART)
..RIL 1951
..ULGATED BY
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
..TER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

MJW

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. JOSEPH B. SMITH	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Jun 1921	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 6 Sept 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Conversion from FSS Status 60	6. EFFECTIVE DATE BOB 26 Aug 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Ops. Officer (PP) BFF-923 (Info. Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Ops. Officer (PP) BFF-923
GS-0136.31-13 $8990.00 per annum (FSS-5 $8015.00 per annum)	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.31-13 $8990.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 516900	DDP/FE Branch 5 Malaya Singapore Station
	11. HEADQUARTERS 5	Singapore
☒ XX FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ XX FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DP

16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
W	FROM: 3745-55-042 TO: same 430-51	Yes		☑ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

REMARKS:

3 EOD

POSTED
10 SEP 1956

..CE PERFORMANCE RATING:

..ector of Personnel

..SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

..ET

Ey 9/7/52

RM 50 (7 PART)
IL 1951
TED BY
ICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

rws

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. JOSEPH B. SMITH	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 4 October 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) PROMOTION	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 9 Oct. 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Ops Officer (PP) BFF-923-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Ops Officer (PP) BFF-923
GS-0136.31-12 $7785.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.31-13 $8990.00 per annum
Branch 5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 5 Malaya Singapore Station
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Singapore, Malaya
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DP

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 6-3745-55-042 TO: Same	Yes		☑ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS:

POSTED
Af 10/10/55

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. ~~EMPLOYEE~~ COPY

recd 10/4/55

...and organizational designations

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 067374

1. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
SMITH, Joseph Burkholder

2. Pay roll

3. Block No. UU

4. Slip No.

6. Grade and salary GS-12 $7040

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

TO FINANCE DIVISION

12 OCT

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 13 MAR. 1955
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: 7785

11. Appropriation(s) ~~PE-39~~

12. Prepared by
8 Sep 54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date: 24 Oct 54

15. Date last equivalent increase: 26 Apr 53

16. Old salary rate: $7040

17. New salary rate: $7240

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

RCH

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

[illegible] FORM 52
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

Unvouchered

2/25/54

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Joseph B. Smith	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 17 Feb 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: FEB 28 1954 B. APPROVED: FEB 28 1954	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Officer/~~S-5~~	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer (PP) BFF-923
GS-12 $7040. p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.31--12 $7040. p/a
DDP/FE ~~[illegible]~~ Malaya Station	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same ~~Same~~ Branch 5
Singapore	11. HEADQUARTERS	~~Same~~ Singapore, Malaya
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Christine Collins	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: R. C. Clinkscale Title: FE Personnel Officer
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT.	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD:PP DP

15. SEX M	16. RACE [illegible]	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3745-55-042 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Copies to Sec. 2/20

POSTED
25 Feb 54

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	Jm	23 Feb 54	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

2-24-54

10—67329-0

7d 1 mx
8/4/54
Jam

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Joseph B. Smith	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 14 July 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
Integration - USIA

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
* 23 Jul 1954
B. APPROVED:
~~23 Feb. 1954~~
23 Jul 54

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
~~Ops Officer (PP) BFP 923~~ INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FS-5	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Information Officer BFP 923
~~GS-0136.21-12~~ $7040.00 P/A GS-132-12	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	FSS-5 $7095.00 P/A
DDP/FE Malaya Station	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Malaya Station
Singapore, ~~Malaya~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Singapore, Malaya
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

No differential is to be paid since Subject's CIA salary is $7040 and FSS is $7095.

Sick and annual leave are to be held in escrow until Subject reverts to GS status.

*EOD USIA 23 Feb. 1954

B. REQUESTED BY: (Name and title)
H. C. Clinkscale, FE Personnel Office

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Gertrude Smith X-2314

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY: Approved JUL 23 1954
Signature: D. M. Collins
Title: PP/Career Service

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD : PP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-3745-55-042
TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Penn

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED
6 AUG 1954

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		3 Aug 54
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		7/30/54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
Joseph B. Ragsin by D. C. Dawson 7/29/54

19—67832-1

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL, 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC.

SECRET
Security Information

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

con. 13 Nov. 53 mem

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Joseph B. Smith
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 June 21
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 14 Dec. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: B. O. B. 20 Dec 53
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Operations Officer (PW) BF-93	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer ~~XX~~ 8-5-12
GS-132-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-12 $7040.00 per annum
DDP/FE Political & Psychological Warfare Political & Psycholcgical Warfare Sect	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Malaya Station
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Singapore, Malaya
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER	
			X			claimed

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD-FP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3700-20
TO: 4-3745-55-042
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

SECRET
Security Information

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Personnel Director

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

PAM 12-15-53

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1953 — 349

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Joseph B. Smith	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 21	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 16 Apr. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 26 Apr. 53	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY ScheduleA-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Operations Officer (PW) BF-93-11	8. POSITION TITLE	Same BF-93
GS-132-11 $5940.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-12 $7040.00 per annum
DDP/PP Political and Psychological Warfare Political and Psychological Warfare Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION ~~11X2100~~ 3700-20 FROM: TO:	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE Penna.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Chief, Personnel Division

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

(1) Staff or Division FE (2) Date T/O Approved 17 November 1952 (3) Effective date of Action 7 December 1952

(4) NAME	(5) ORG. INF. & POS. TITLE	(6) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(7) SLOT NOS.	(8) ACTION	(9) ORG. INF. & POS. TITLE	(10) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(11) SLOT NOS.
OPC/FE FE-2 China Sec Ing, Horatius	Intell Off.	GS-13	581		Pol & Psy FE Stf O/C Ops Off-Pls	GS-132-13	BF-98
OPC/FE P&O Br Ferguson, Edna	Secy-Steno	GS-6	501		Secy-Steno	GS-318-6	BF-90
OPC/FE P&O Br Ops.Sec Sherman, Katherine D.-P/W Unit	Ops Off	GS-14	1173		Pol & Psy W/F Section Ops Officer	GS-132-14	BF-91
OPC/FE P&O Br Pls Sec Ishii, John -P/W Unit	Ops Off	GS-12	523		Ops Off P/W	GS-132-12	BF-92
OPC/FE P&O Br Ops Sec Smith, Joseph - P/W Unit	Intell Off	GS-11	521		Ops Off P.W.	GS-132-11	BF-93
OPC/FE P&O Br Int Sec Christensen, Julianne	Intell Off	GS-7	525		Ops Off-R.A.	GS-132-7	BF-94

(12) APPROVED BY: ______________ Staff or Division Chief

(13) APPROVED BY: ______________ Class. & Wage Div.

(14) APPROVED BY: ______________ Personnel Div.

SECRET
Security Information

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 50 (6 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1950
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R-1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(ml)

1. NAME (MR. — MISS — MRS. — ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Joseph B. Smith
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 June 1921
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: #1389
4. DATE: 24 Mar. 52'

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment & Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 Mar. 52'
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer
GS-9-132 $5060.00 per. annum.	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-11-132 $5940.00 per. annum.
OPC FE Plans Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC FE Plans & Operations Branch Psychological Warfare Unit
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT. WIFE	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		X	

Bu. #9801
3/13/52'

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2123900 TO: 2017
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES OR NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Penna.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(921)

Chief, Personnel Division

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING.

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

3-25-52

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-858070

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

P.C. 8/29/51

(ml)

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R 1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Joseph B. Smith
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 June 1921
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: # 8003
4. DATE: 17 Sept. 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Excepted Appointment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 Sept. 1951
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(b)

	FROM	TO
8. POSITION TITLE		Intelligence Officer, GS-9
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY		GS-9-132 $4600.00 per. annum.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		OPC FE Plans Branch
11. HEADQUARTERS		Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE | 5-PT. | OTHER | 5-PT. | 10-POINT: DISAB. | OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | L.A. | REAL — Bu.#2974 CSO#3051 6/2/49

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2123900 TO: 2017
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 17 Sept. 1951
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Penna.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(71302)

ANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
VE 24 OCT. 1951
Y ADJUSTED TO $ 5760

This appointment is subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.

"Subject to a satisfactory medical examination."

SF61 Affidavit Executed.

COS - 09/26/51
CSEOC - 09/17/51
RCC - 09/17/51

DV Mulcahy

D. V. MULCAHY

Personnel Division

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007894

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Smith, Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Jun 21	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
X CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)			X ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 December 1972	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January - 31 October 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a section that is responsible for CA, Political, and Exile activities. This includes supervision over two officers, 1 NOC, one IA and one secretary.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises operations for the collection of intelligence on selected targets in the Mexican government and political arena.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops new contacts and operations to improve the output of Station third country targeted propaganda.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops new contacts for producing intelligence on significant targets inthe Mexican political and intellectual community.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER 1 Feb 1973

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

FEB 1 3 14 PM '73

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject is a mature seasoned officer who has an excellent grasp and understanding of local politics and its ever changing profile. Most of his career Subject has specialized in the CA activity and this experience has proven very useful to the Station. During this reporting period he was given added responsibility in supervision and a change of pace with operational duties in the subversive, leftist and exile field. He accepted the new challenge and performed well. Just recently the Station has completed major reorganizational changes which resulted in Subject once more concentrating his attention on CA and Mexican government matters. He has done exceptionally well at developing contacts in Government circles and we are taking advantage of his ability to do this to develop long lasting and meaningful relationships. (This beyond official liaison contacts.)

Subject is responsive to guidance and direction and is one of our more imaginative officers. Most recently he has indicated a desire to retire, after completion of his present tour in August 1973. Subject has performed well at this Station for over three years and his departure will be most felt in the area of his specialization.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
8 Jan 1973	/s/ [redacted] Joseph B. Smith

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
8 Jan 1973	Operations Officer	/s/ John W. Beckwith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the above. The loss to the Station is greater than usual for Subject is retiring and thus his considerable talents will probably be unavailable to the Agency, unless some special arrangements are made in the future, depending on what he ends up doing.

I am personally sorry to see this friend leave the Agency and I know further that it will be hard to replace his abilities in various operational fields, including that of good contacts in the community here. He has served the Agency well here and in many other posts and his leaving is a loss to us.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
8 Jan 1973	Chief of Station	/s/ John R. Horton

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 007894

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Smith, Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 21	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
XX	CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY	☐	INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	XX	ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):	☐	SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.		12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) April 1971 - 31 December 1971	

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises the CA section of the station which includes one station case officer, one senior outside career agent and parttime services of one senior contract agent.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises operations for the collection of intelligence on selected targets in the Mexican government and political arena.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops new contacts and operations to improve the output of station third country targeted propaganda.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops new contacts for producing intelligence on significant targets in the Mexican intellectual community.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 28 FEB 1972	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

4-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

FEB 25 1 42 PM '72

Subject is now well into his second tour at this station and has not lost any of his momentum. He charges into his work daily as if it were all a new challenge and new experience. His past fitness reports from this station have all reflected his professional approach to the job and he continues to merit these plaudits. He is conscientious, dedicated and a team worker. He takes direction well and takes great pride in meeting deadlines. One of our more imaginative officers who is effective.

Yet, with all of this, he has not progressed in the organization as he should have. It has been recommended that he be considered for promotion and/or a chance in a command job. The station is presently considering some reorganization which will give Subject an opportunity to manage and direct activity which will be diversified and a change from the specialized jobs he has held in the past. This will be another excellent test for him and we are optimistic in that he will handle this new assignment with the same degree of expertise that we have learned to expect from him.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 9 Feb 1972	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Joseph B. Smith

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 9 Feb 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ George A. Fill

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with all of the above. Concerning his performance here and his delay in getting a promotion, I made a special point of bringing these matters to the attention of Deputy Chief, WOMACE, while I was in Washington in October of 1971. Our pending reorganization would find him with considerably increased responsibility, which is a good indicator of how we feel about him.

DATE 9 Feb 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ John R. Horton

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007894

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) SMITH, JOSEPH B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 21	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Branch 1	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
April 1970 - 31 March 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises the CA section of the station which includes one station case officer, one senior outside career agent and parttime services of one senior contract agent.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises operations for the collection of intelligence on selected targets in the Mexican government and political arena.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops new contacts and operations to improve the output of station third country targeted propaganda.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops new contacts for producing intelligence on significant targets in the Mexican intellectual community.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Uses his language capability in the conduct of above-mentioned operational activity, especially 3 and 4.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 10 APR 1971	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Recorded [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AM 15 1 30 PM '71

Subject, a senior officer in all respects, has been at this station for the past 20 months as the responsible CA and Political officer. His past fitness report covered very thoroughly and accurately his ability to meet, develop and recruit assets that are important to station's objective. He enjoys his work and the challenge of being on the spot. He is a thoroughly experienced officer in his field and although forced to specialize for years, we must start thinking of more responsible and more diversified employment for this fine officer.

He is conscientious, dedicated and a team worker. He takes direction well and takes great pride in completing his obligations on schedule. One of the more imaginative officers of the station who is aggressive and effective. He handles his financial responsibilities well and has a good appreciation for the expenditure of official funds.

I was particularly impressed with Subject during his recent activity re the MAR disclosures. Subject cannot be credited for the disclosures but he can be given full credit for exploiting these events. He quickly put to use all of his assets. He personally prepared material for passage to the press. He supplied information for coverage in other papers in the hemisphere. He coordinated and furnished guidance to other Latin American stations on this subject. In all, he worked

-continued

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT.

DATE 26 March 1971	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Joseph B. Smith

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 26 March 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ George A. Fill

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with all of the above. Subject does a marvelous job in the propaganda field, getting a great deal of product out of a greatly-reduced (in number and cost) propaganda apparatus. He has a good sense of politics, and we have a few operations which are devoted to finding out what the COM won't tell us and what the political section probably can't get at. He has a good way with people and has made some interesting acquaintances which, in themselves, greatly increase the sensitivity of the station.

Our lack of a political mission here, aside from the limited one

-continued

DATE 26 March 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ John R. Horton

SECRET

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS** **-continued**

long hours, devoted his full efforts and produced remarkably when we needed him. He can always be expected to perform in this manner.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL **-continued**

alluded to above, means that Subject is not able fully to use and to demonstrate his great operational talent and flair in this field. What we have here to do is done well under his able management.

For one reason or another, I think largely because of his having been in more or less specialized jobs, although senior ones, rather than having been in a command position, ✓ Subject has lost ground in promotions, having been in grade since December, 1962. I should like to see him promoted in this position or, if this is difficult, to see him given a chance in a command job which might qualify him for promotion.

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007894

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Smith Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 21	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Off.	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Br. 1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT				
X	CAREER		RESERVE	TEMPORARY	XX	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)					ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):					SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 05/70

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) June 1969 - April 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counselling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of CA Section, supervising one Station Case Officer, two outside Case Officers and one secretary.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Directing CA assets so that they not only accomplish assigned CA missions, but contribute to Station's efforts against Soviet targets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Development of new contacts and assets to contribute to priority Station objectives.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with the LNPURE political section and with QKFLOWAGE	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

12 JUN 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject has his goals clearly in mind and has proceeded about his business with full confidence and perseverance. He is conscientious, dedicated and a team worker. Subject has gained the confidence of his supervisors and his subordinates have accepted him as one of the group.

He has recently experienced some unusual operation problems where he was required to handle the termination of some very delicate assets. He organized, planned and handled the terminations personally in a very professional and successful manner. He was commended for this work by both Headquarters and Station management.

He has developed political contacts at all levels and has been very instrumental in developing disseminable information in this manner. He has quickly moved to replace assets which were terminated and by his efforts will fill in the void in a minimum amount of time.

Subject enjoys meeting people and conducting operations. In the future, he will be forced to spend more time in managing his section due to administrative changes now taking place in the Station.

He takes directions well and can be depended upon to fulfill all his obligations on schedule. He has an excellent command of the Spanish language and he is definitely cost conscious in the projects which he handles.

Of special note is that Subject was one of the first officers to quickly retool his section when given a new requirement to fulfill. He responded immediately and in so doing once more indicated his desire

-continued

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 05/15/70
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /S/ Joseph B. Smith

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:
DATE: 05/15/70
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR:
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /S/ George A. Fill

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur fully with above and would add that Subject is one of the Station's most aggressive and effective development/contact officers. In what has been an almost complete reorganization of the Station and the termination or redirection of most of its assets, Subject has probably moved faster and more effectively than any other section. Perhaps even more notable, his development of new assets and potential assets has more than kept pace with the termination of those who have outlived their usefulness. While he is very thorough and effective in all of his undertakings, a tendency to go off on tangents has a slight effect on his overall efficiency. This is probably due in large

-continued

DATE: 05/15/70
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief of Station
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /S/ James B. Noland

SECRET

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS** **Continued**

to operate in a manner which best suited Station's objectives.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL **Continued**

part to his considerable mental agility and imaginativeness, and as such could hardly be called a weakness.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007894

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) SMITH, Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Jun 21	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/CA Staff		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
July 1968 to 31 March 1969

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Help to establish and monitor the political action and propaganda priorities and plans of the Division, including commenting on policy papers and plans originating outside the Division.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Prepare propaganda guidance to accomplish priority area-wide objectives.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Advise and consult with the Branches and Desks concerning the management of political and propaganda activities.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Direct the activities of a contract specialist in conducting political research, including polling, useful in the achievement of Division objectives.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 4 MAR. 196	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Smith lives covert action -- his imaginative and disciplined mind comes forth with many operational concepts and ideas ranging from simple, quite routine matters to complicated and carefully shaded activities. It is to be expected that within this enthusiastic outpouring, practical details of implementation are sometimes buried. In these instances, Mr. Smith quickly trims his sails and comes forth with the needed realistic approach. In short, he is a fine operations officer, more competent and at ease in real as against planning or policy situations.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 24 February 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 24 February 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/CA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Gerard Droller

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Smith is an excellent CA officer. I concur in this report.

DATE 26 February 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL WH/Executive Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donald C. Marelius

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) SMITH,	(First) Joseph	(Middle) B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Instr Ops

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDS/OTR/OS/HTB

8. CURRENT STATION: Hdqs. [illegible]

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1967 to 29 March 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief Instructor for the Covert Action Operations Seminar and the CA Politics Workshop DR 20	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Course Coordinator for the Vietnam Psychwar Course given to the military in conjunction with FE Division	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Tradecraft Advisor and Coordinator for the Operations Support Course	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 DG 50 - DM 60	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 DG 70	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

20 MAY 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

As indicated in the last Fitness Report, Mr. Smith assumed responsibility for Covert Action training presented by this Branch in the wake of compromise of a wide range of Agency CA activities. Quite apart from all the operational consequences of these public disclosures, there were also, of course, concomitant ramifications in the training field. Following careful study and examination of the new situation, Mr. Smith devised, in closest coordination with the CA Staff, a radically new and different Covert Action curriculum. The existing comprehensive courses on youth and labor operations were discontinued for obvious reasons. In place of these and the part-time Covert Action Operations Course, Mr. Smith developed a new, full-time, three-day Covert Action Operations Seminar for middle and senior grade officers. This intensive seminar, stressing the integrated nature of CS operations, was designed as a basic core around which skills-oriented seminars or workshops could be built to deal with such topics as propaganda operations, election operations, use of agents of influence, etc. To date, in line with this concept, a Politics Workshop has been created to provide training in the assessment, recruitment, and handling of assets among key interest groups, including political parties.

The resonance which these new courses has evoked confirms the soundness of Mr. Smith's creative efforts in completely revamping Covert Action training in the (cont.)

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10 May 68	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
6		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 May 1968	Chief, Headquarters Training, Operations School/OTR	C M Broutsas C. M. BROUTSAS

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur. Mr. Smith has done his job with distinction and with credit to himself and his career service. His assignment to OTR is a first-rate example of quality in rotational tours. At the same time he has given a good deal to the training mission, I think it also fair to say he has gained professionally from the rather wide exposure to disciplines other than CA which he has handled extremely well.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 May 1968	Chief, Operations School/OTR	Charles B. Wheeler CHARLES B. WHEELER

SECRET

SECTION C - NARRATIVE COMMENTS, Joseph B. Smith (cont.)

Agency. In design and content the new courses reflect thoughtfulness, imagination, and realism--a combination of traits only too seldom encountered.

As a corollary to the main duties cited above, Mr. Smith has also successfully run, in conjunction with FE Division, a Psychological Warfare Operations Course for military officers being assigned to MACV/SOG in Saigon. Finally, in the CA field, Mr. Smith has provided tutorials, as requested by various area Divisions, to a number of Staff and Contract Agents and to foreign liaison representatives in such fields as black radio, youth and student operations, veterans organizations, and methods of countering Communist propaganda.

In February 1968 Mr. Smith was asked to assume responsibility as Tradecraft Advisor and Coordinator for the Operations Support Course, a critical block of instruction for (primarily young and inexperienced) CS clericals headed for overseas assignments where they may be called upon to assist case officers in operational support tasks. Although, strictly speaking, this teaching and coordination task was outside Mr. Smith's normal purview and main area of expertise, he accepted this additional responsibility with exemplary willingness, and then proceeded to discharge it smoothly, energetically, and effectively. In addition to managing an extensive live problem, the Tradecraft Advisor must ensure that presentations by a number of instructors result in a balanced and coherent coverage of all operational subjects in the course. This entails the coordination of efforts of several senior and experienced instructors, all under the nominal aegis of the course's Chief Instructor, and, thus, demands a great deal of finesse and tact. Mr. Smith has not only fulfilled this difficult role in a highly efficient manner but has also drawn on his own long Field experience for pertinent and meaningful contributions to the course.

Mr. Smith occasionally handles Branch-wide administrative tasks and in my absence functions as Acting Chief, Headquarters Training Branch, to my complete satisfaction. At such times he has exercised supervisory responsibilities well. He is cost conscious and makes effective use of personnel, space, equipment, and funds.

In summary, Mr. Smith is a mature and responsible officer, keeps things nicely in perspective, and has a good sense of priorities. In tackling problems he strives to make molehills out of mountains, which is a refreshing change; in short, a dedicated and intelligent officer and, withal, unfailingly cordial and cooperative.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007894

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) SMITH, Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Instr Operations	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDS/OTR/OS/HT		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters WAC	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
28 April 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief Instructor for Covert Action subjects presented in Headquarters Training DA 22	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 8-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

APR 21 9 27 AM '67

Since his assignment to Headquarters Training Branch of the Operations School, Mr. Smith has been principally engaged in a thorough study and review of all courses in Covert Action previously given in OTR. This has been a long and complicated job, the difficulty of which has been compounded by the necessity, at least in part through public events, to plan and project a total revision of instruction in the CA field. As a result, Mr. Smith has not yet had the opportunity to teach. This will come shortly, however, when a new course begins on 8 May. The "Strong" rating given him here is based on the excellent work and thoroughly professional approach he has taken in all of the preparatory work he has undertaken. He has been eminently successful in establishing useful new relationships and in maintaining his old contacts in the Clandestine Services for the purpose of laying a solid groundwork for high quality training. In addition to his responsibilities in OTR he has been regularly consulted by the CA Staff in a survey of one of its activities. This is fine testimony for the regard in which he is held outside the confines of his present job. The prognosis for a very effective performance in all of his teaching assignments is excellent. He has no supervisory responsibilities and is average in cost consciousness.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10 April 67	Joseph B. Smith

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
6		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
7 April 1967	Chief, Headquarters Training	CHARLES B. WHEELER

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As noted above, Mr. Smith, for several valid reasons, has not done much teaching in his first six months in the Operations School, but judging from the way he handles himself in preparing his courses, he will be a very effective teacher once he begins, which will be very soon.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 April 1967	Chief, Operations School/TR	Benj. H. Cushing BENJAMIN H. CUSHING

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

SECTION A GENERAL

SMITH, JOSEPH B

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Jun 21	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/4		8. CURRENT STATION Buenos Aires	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April - 28 August 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operational and administrative management of all Station media activities.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conduct liaison with local services on Covert Action operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Spotting, developing, handling and exploiting unilateral assets.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of operational, contact and dissemination reports.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Preparation of operational programs, projects and briefing papers in the media field.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 30 DEC 1966	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

DEC 30

Subject has been under the direct guidance and supervision of this rating officer for a period of 14 months. This report is being submitted because of the transfer of the employee. For the last 6 weeks of the period covered by this report Subject was under the direct supervision of the COS because of the absence from the Station of this rating officer. Any differences of opinion with respect to the caliber of Subject's performance during the last six weeks will be reflected in the reviewing officer's comments.

During this period, as in the preceding period, Subject carried out all of his assigned duties and responsibilities in a highly professional and thoroughly competent manner. He continued to show a good deal of initiative and imagination in dealing with the liaison services on day to day matters. He demonstrated a keen sense of the internal political situation and he made maximum use of his contacts to elicit a large amount of disseminable information. Subject took over one new operational project during this period and he was able, because of his deep knowledge and understanding of the operational techniques employed in the CA field, to improve on the quality of the agent's product. Subject is an able and fully qualified officer who acquired a good deal of expertise about local operating conditions and then proceeded to apply his specialized knowledge and past experience to the Station's advantage. He has a great capacity for creative

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	[redacted] /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
14	Subject had departed Station	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 September 66	Deputy Chief of Station	Michael Tanos /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I would have rated Subject employee about the same. During the period under review, I had the opportunity to follow this employee's activities closely and can attest to his professional and imaginative handling of key assets. He corrected an earlier occupational fault found in many CA officers of a lack of cost consciousness, by cutting back on costs without adverse results to the operations concerned. During the one year under my observation, this employee performed highly satisfactorily. [redacted]

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 September 66	Chief of Station	Nicholas Natsios /s/

SECRET

[redacted]

SECTION C (CONTINUED)

thinking; he is perceptive and resourceful. He requires a minimum of guidance and direction. Subject showed some definite improvement with respect to cost consciousness and it is noteworthy that it did not adversely affect his enthusiasm. His operational and positive reports continue to be clear, concise and well written.

Summed up, Subject is a highly regarded professional officer who made a most worthwhile contribution to the Station's overall mission.

S-E-C-R-E-T
(when filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training

27 DEC 1966

This is to advise you that SMITH, Joseph Burkholder training request # R-18762 attended the following external training program:

COURSE: NATIONAL INTERDEPARTMENTAL SEMINAR

INSTITUTION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE: 21 NOVEMBER - 16 DECEMBER 1966

GRADE: Successful Completion

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Attachments:

- ___ Grade Report
- XXX Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
- ___ Certificate of Completion
- ___ Roster of Participants
- ___ Training Report by Institution
- ___ Training Report by Student
- ___ None
- ___ Other: __________

GROUP I
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(when filled in)

Department of State • Department of Defense •
Agency for International Development • U.S. Information Agency

NATIONAL INTERDEPARTMENTAL SEMINAR

This is to certify that

Joseph Burkholder Smith

has successfully completed the seminar on

PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNAL DEFENSE

at the Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C.

December 16, 1966

A TRUE COPY OF
SIGNED ORIGINAL

Seminar Coordinator

Geo. V. Allen

Director of FSI

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007894

SECTION A GENERAL

Smith, Joseph B

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Jun 21	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/4		8. CURRENT STATION Buenos Aires	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

WKR

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
13 July 1965 - 31 Mar 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operational and administrative management of all Station media activities. DG 80	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conduct liaison with local services on Covert Action operations. DC 51 DG 50	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervise one deep cover agent who operates in the student field. DC 63 DA 1	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Spotting, developing, handling and exploiting unilateral assets. DC 14	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Preparation of operational, contact and dissemination reports.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Preparation of operational programs, projects and briefing papers in the media field.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. TC [illegible]	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has been under the direct guidance and supervision of this rating officer for the nine-month period covered by this report.

Subject is well grounded in the knowledge and application of Covert Action tradecraft techniques and he has amply demonstrated an ability for creative thinking. He is both imaginative and resourceful and he uses his extensive knowledge of the internal political scene and his fluency in Spanish to the best operational advantage. He has initiative and he is persistent in carrying things through to a conclusion. He has an excellent facility for written communication. His operational and positive reports are clear, concise and well presented. He requires a minimum of guidance and direction. He responds very well to supervision and he accepts comments, suggestions and criticism in the constructive light in which they are presented. As a supervisor he has been able to obtain satisfactory results.

Subject's only weakness is that he tends to be less cost conscious than is desirable and unless his activities are circumscribed he is apt to allow his fertile mind and enthusiasm to get out of hand.

Summed up, Subject is a highly professional and experienced officer who has all of the necessary operational and intellectual abilities to meet the requirements of the job.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	**BY EMPLOYEE**	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 26 April 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (?) [redacted] /s/	
2.	**BY SUPERVISOR**	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Nine	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 26 April 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Michael Tanes /s/
3.	**BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I would have rated Subject officer approximately the same. In the past eight months that I have observed him in action, he has demonstrated an ability to get things done in a professional manner. He is, without doubt, the most professional and effective senior case officer at this Station. It was a pleasure to work with this officer and he will be sorely missed after his departure in August.

DATE 27 April 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station.	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Nicholas A. Natsios /s/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007394

SECTION A — GENERAL

Smith, Joseph B.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted])	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 21	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/4		8. CURRENT STATION Buenos Aires	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
- X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 August 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1965 - 12 July 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains contact with Chief and other key officers of the Psychological Action Department of the principal Argentine intelligence service and is case officer for an important and large CA project run in conjunction with the local service.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer for three unilateral CA projects in the following fields: one propaganda (films), one student/youth, and one political action. These projects have significant FI overtones.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Case officer of a new project essentially FI in nature.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervisor for one American Staff Agent in the CA field who is case officer of one formal project and is engaged in important developmental work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Assists the Station CA officer in over-all and tactical planning.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

2 AUG 1965

FORM 4-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This report is submitted due to the reassignment of the supervisor. Subject's performance remains as before. The Rating Letter of Specific Duty No. 1 was lowered from "O" to "S" for the simple reason that the goal in large measure has been achieved, i.e., a substantial reduction in costs but with a concurrent improvement in the net product—a not inconsiderable achievement in that this is a joint undertaking with the local service. Specific Duty No. 2 lists three unilateral CA projects rather than four as described in the last report. This is due to the termination (on Subject's recommendation) of one of these projects.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 12 July 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] /s/	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 15	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 12 July 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Frederick Larkin /s/
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This officer's performance in the last three months has continued at a high level and I have nothing to add to the reviewing comments made in his last report.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 July 65	Chief of Station	J. Foster Collins /s/

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

SECTION A Smith, Joseph B. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [redacted] [redacted]
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 June 21
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-14
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops. Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/4
8. CURRENT STATION: Buenos Aires

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1965
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains contact with the Chief and other key officers of the Psychological Action Department of the principal Argentine intelligence service and is case officer for an important and large CA project run in conjunction with the local service.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer for four unilateral CA projects in the following fields: one propaganda (films), two student/youth, and one political action. These projects have significant FI over-tones.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Case officer of a new project essentially FI in nature.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervisor for one American Staff Agent in the CA field who is case officer of one formal project and is engaged in important developmental work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Assists the Station CA officer in over-all and tactical planning.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Serves as coordinator of the Station's activities in the student/youth field.	P

D663

POSTED ON

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

24 JUN 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

There is little change over the previous report. Subject remains eager and aggressive and his enthusiasm for his assignment has not been dulled by the everyday frustrations and difficulties of doing business and living in Argentina. Subject's political action project was reactivated during this period with the return to Buenos Aires of the principal agent. This activity shows promise of making an important contribution to understanding the political tides at work in Argentina. Subject has developed a long-time agent in the liaison service (and recruited his wife) to a point where the "take" has been considerably improved. Subject's project management remains good and his reporting is both timely and in depth.

Subject supervises an American Staff Agent under deep cover in which effort Subject exhibits a high degree of competence. This officer continues to show an admirable cost consciousness which can be demonstrated in his management of a large and important CA liaison project; the costs to the Agency of this project have been reduced about 65% since subject assumed direction while at the same time improving the end result. Subject's Spanish continues to improve and he has no difficulty in understanding and in speaking with Argentines who have no English.

Subject has obviously established effective rapport with his agents and his Argentine colleagues and friends. This is in part due to a genuine interest on Subject's part in these people, their country's problems, and their culture. Subject remains responsive to guidance

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 24 May 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 24 May 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Frederick Larkin, Jr. /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

From fairly close observation of his work I agree generally with ratings and comments of supervisor. The rating of "outstanding" on his work with liaison was justified in his last report because of the exceptional job he had done in developing this relationship. While he has continued to maintain it at a high level, there is some question in my mind whether a rating of "outstanding" is still justified. He is definitely a strong and active officer, handling a heavy load of liaison and independent operations. A well-rounded judgement of this officer should, however, include the statement that he sometimes rushes ahead a bit too precipitously and enthusiastically, and is inclined to gloss over operational details which can be important. He is effective

DATE 24 May 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE J. Foster Collins /s/

SECRET

SECTION C (Continued)

and direction but is quick to disagree if such be the case. However, he can be counted upon to implement fully a decision once one has been reached.

SECTION D.3. (Continued)

in his written work, more so than in his oral presentations which tend to be somewhat rambling. He is a cheerful and outgoing person who has learned Spanish exceptionally rapidly and well. He has developed a good understanding of, and rapport with, his contacts both liaison and independent.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007894

SECTION A GENERAL

Smith, Joseph B.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [redacted]
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 June 1921
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-14
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP WHD 2
8. CURRENT STATION: Buenos Aires

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1964
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1963-31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains contact with the Chief and other key officers of the Psychological Action Department of the principal Argentine intelligence service and is case officer for an important and large CA project run in conjunction with the local service.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer for four unilateral CA projects in the following fields: propaganda (films), economic action and reporting, student/youth, and political action. Three of these have significant FI overtones.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervisor for one American Staff Agent in the CA field who is case officer of one formal project and is engaged in important developmental work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assists the Station CA officer in over-all and tactical planning.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Serves as coordinator of the Station's activities in the student/youth field.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON
05 45

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

25 JUN 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject remains the eager, aggressive, and intelligent individual described in his last Fitness Report. During the year under review, Subject was assigned case-officership of two agents taken over from an officer who departed PCS. One of these agents is in an area new to Subject--economic action and economic reporting. In total, Subject is case officer of four active projects plus one that is temporarily inactive as the agent is absent from Argentina. Also, Subject is the supervisor of one American Staff Agent under deep cover. Subject handles these varied assignments with a high degree of competence and indicates a versatility of high degree. Subject's project management is good and his formal reporting to both his supervisor and Headquarters is kept current and done in depth.

This officer has consistently shown a cost consciousness during the period he has been at this Station (24 months). In addition he has an ability to relate cost to production which has resulted in almost halving funds spent for his CA liaison project while at the same time improving the product--and with the cooperation of the local service.

Subject's language competence (Spanish) is sufficiently fluent to permit him to engage in extended professional conversations with agents and others who have no English.

--continued--

SECTION D

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
22 May 1964	/S/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
20		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
22 May 1964	Operations Officer	/S/ Frederick Larkin

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I generally concur with the Supervisor's ratings on Subject and on his general comments. In direct dealings with this officer I find him an aggressive and well-rounded officer who carries a full load of projects and liaison activity. He is making a significant contribution to the Station's mission.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
22 May 1964	Chief of Station	/S/ J. Foster Collins

SECRET

Continuation of Section C, Fitness Report, attachment to HABT-2892, 22 May 1964

Subject's rapport with his agents and other contacts appears to be excellent, which is doubtless an important element in his continuing success with his projects. Subject is responsive to guidance and direction and when after full discussion a course of action is agreed upon, he can be counted upon to take action within the agreed limits.

GA

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007894

SECTION A GENERAL

Smith, Joseph B.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH 2		8. CURRENT STATION Buenos Aires	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
5 June 1962 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains contact with the Chief and other key officers of the Psychological Action Department of the principal Argentine intelligence service.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer for an important and large CA project run in conjunction with the local service.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Case officer for two unilateral CA projects, one in the propaganda field and the other political action with important FI overtones.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer for two American staff agents in the CA field. This involves four formal projects and important developmental work.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Assists the Station CA officer in over-all and tactical planning.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

13 June 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

11 JUN 1963

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section II to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUN 10 10 14 AM '63

Subject is an aggressive, eager, and intelligent person who knows what he wants to do with and where to take his projects. In the case of the project run with the local service, Subject inherited an expensive project over which little control had been exercised in either effective utilization of funds or the actual operations. After analyzing the project to determine the state of assets, capabilities, etc., Subject ingratiated himself in a highly commendatory way with the Argentines concerned to the end that Subject's ideas and positive cooperation are now sought on a daily basis. This has resulted in greatly improved project management and, better, more demonstrable results for the money spent.

Also, during this period Subject developed and recruited one new agent, a leading political scientist with access to important political leaders. In addition Subject inherited a project in the motion picture field which he has developed into an effective mechanism which now promises to reach into the newspaper field.

In addition to the above three projects, Subject is case officer for two staff agents who between them handle four projects. Subject has had these responsibilities for less than three months and during this period he has handled these assignments proficiently.

Subject's language competence (Spanish) is proficient; he is able to converse meaningfully in Spanish with persons of intelligence interest who have no English.

(continued on separate sheet)

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 24 May 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Eight	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 24 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Frederick Larkin Jr.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I am in general agreement with the supervisor's assessment of this individual, whom I have seen fairly frequently. He is extremely active and aggressive and has moved ahead rapidly into new activities in both the liaison and unilateral field. He has only recently taken over the direction and supervision of two other case officers so it is too early to know what his abilities in this area are, but it is in this direction that he should work for broadening his career potential.

DATE 24 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ James F. Collins

SECRET

Continuation of Section C, Fitness Report, attachment to HABT-2308, 24 May 1963

Subject has no important weaknesses. His aggressiveness and eagerness have at times led to hasty action that might have resulted in professionally embarrassing results. On the other hand, these very qualities resulted in a recent and important recruitment. Subject is responsive to guidance and direction. He reports fully and within time limits. Subject's rapport with those with whom he is in professional contact appears excellent.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Smith Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-13	
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐ NOT ELIGIBLE	☐ MEMBER	☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING	☐ DECLINED	☐ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL	☒ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
1 Jan 62-30 Apr 62

SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Provide Hqs support to field installations by reviewing projects and forwarding them for approval, obtaining name traces, clearances, etc.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Meet, brief, debrief non-US Government figures of intelligence and/or operational interest.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Have primary responsibility for operational and intelligence correspondence with the field via cable and pouch.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervise area desk personnel (ops officers, reports officers, JOTs, secretaries)	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepare oral briefings, memoranda, studies, Special Group Papers, other correspondence for DCI and other senior officials of CIA and other USG agencies.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee.

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-61 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Smith was head of the Venezuela Desk at the beginning of the reporting period. He left this position shortly thereafter in preparation for an overseas assignment, with another Branch of WHD. During his duty with WH/1, Mr. Smith was a strong asset. With his previous operational experience and his innate good sense, he supervised the Venezuela Desk in a most effective fashion. This was particularly evident during the Presidential visit to Venezuela and Colombia in December 1961. The effective management of the Headquarters aspects of the visit called for a well-coordinated, efficient and intensive effort by all concerned. Mr. Smith and the personnel under his supervision measured up quite well in this situation.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: Four months

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: Subject departed on overseas assignment.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 8 June 1962

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: AC/WH/1

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: R. Reynolds

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

Smith, Joseph B. 15 June 1921 Male 13

D Operations Officor DDP/WH/1

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS						9. TYPE OF REPORT [illegible]			
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED	☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED	☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD	SPECIAL (Specify)
28 February 1962	From 19 Jul 61 - To 31 Dec 61	

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Reviews, assesses, and supervises all current operations in his area and provides guidance and support to the field.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Drafts dispatches, memoranda and cables. Edits and occasionally drafts project actions, assures their proper coordination and processes them for approval.	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Recommends courses of action to the field and policy to his superiors.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reviews and monitors field monetary obligations and expenditures.	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Keeps abreast of the political and economic situation in his country and briefs superiors as requested.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises reports officer's and secretary's work and exercises general responsibility for all operational and administrative duties of his unit.	RATING NO. 6

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 6-59 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This employee was new to WH and served only about three months under the supervision of the undersigned. He brought wide experience and background in CA work to the Branch due to his past experience in other components of KUBARK. He was applying himself industriously to the task of learning about the WH area and specifically Venezuela, for which country he was the desk officer responsible for FI as well as CA work. His performance was excellent and can be expected to improve with more familiarization with the area.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 4 April 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 26 March 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/1	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Edwin M. Terrell

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
XX	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS; I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

During the period from the rating officer's departure in Oct 1961 until Mr. Smith was reassigned to another Branch in Feb 1962 in preparation for an overseas assignment, he demonstrated high competence in all of his duties, thereby confirming the rating officer's expectations in the last sentence of Section E. On the basis of this fine performance, I would upgrade the rating in Section C from 4 to 5,

DATE 4 April 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AC/WH/1	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE R. Reynolds

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

Spanish Basic Reading, Speaking, Writing I
-100- hours, part time, 16 January 1961 - 24 March 1961 -6- students

Student : **Joseph B. Smith**
Year of Birth: **1921**
EOD Date: **September 1951**
Grade: **GS-13**
Office : **CA Staff**

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

This is the first phase in a three-phase basic sequence of 30 weeks, each phase lasting 10 weeks.

The general aim of the course is to enable the student to use the spoken language with moderate facility and accuracy in a large number of everyday situations while providing a basis for further learning of the language either by actual use in the area or by further formal study. The three major objectives of this phase of the course are to develop an ability: (1) to adequately distinguish and pronounce the sounds of the language; (2) to use appropriately a small quantity of Spanish sentences and expressions; (3) to comprehend normal-speed spoken Spanish in a limited number of everyday, non-technical situations.

Classes are held 2 hours per day, 5 days a week, requiring a minimum of 10 hours of preparation per week. To receive the maximum benefit from this course each student should plan to devote at least two-thirds of the class preparation time doing drill in the language laboratory.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student progress is evaluated primarily on oral recitation in the form of drills and free conversation based on memorized material. In addition, several tests are given during the course. This student's rating is indicated by the asterisk.

Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Excellent	Incomplete
		3 *	3

It is regrettable that Mr. Smith will not be able to continue in the course at this time but increased office duties do not permit it. Mr. Smith had made a very profitable start in Spanish in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: /s/ L. C. [illegible]
Chief Instructor

23 May 1961
Date

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

FOREIGN LANGUAGE APTITUDE AND EXPERIENCE REPORT

DATE OF TESTING

NAME

OFFICE

☐ MALE
☐ FEMALE

The category checked below is an interpretation of the scores made by the person named above on a battery of foreign language aptitude tests. The relationships between test performance and subsequent training performance of trainees in Agency language training courses are indicated by the graphs next to the aptitude categories. The graphs to the left are for women and the graphs to the right are for men. From these graphs you can read for each aptitude category the probability that a person in that category will perform in an Agency foreign language training course at an average or better-than-average level. For example, 22 percent of the women who obtain an aptitude rating of "8" can be expected to be average or better in course performance, while 5 percent of the men with ratings of "8" can be expected to be average or better in course performance. A man needs an aptitude rating of "6" to have about the same expectation of success in language training as a woman with a rating of "8." At the other end of the scale, 80 percent of either men or women who obtain aptitude ratings of "2" can be expected to do average or better-than-average work in training. The differences in relationship are due to differences between men and women in both training performance and test scores. On the average women are somewhat higher on both.

% OF WOMEN WHOSE LANGUAGE TRAINING PERFORMANCE IS EXPECTED TO BE AVERAGE OR BETTER THAN AVERAGE (100 80 60 40 20 0)	APTITUDE CATEGORY		% OF MEN WHOSE LANGUAGE TRAINING PERFORMANCE IS EXPECTED TO BE AVERAGE OR BETTER THAN AVERAGE (0 20 40 60 80 100)
88%	1.	☐	91%
80%	2.	☐	80%
72%	3.	☐	68%
63%	4.	☐	52%
53%	5.	☐	37%
43%	6.	☐	23%
33%	7.	☐	13%
22%	8.	☐	5%

Since many things other than aptitudes enter into the determination of training course performance, in any class of students there will usually be some whose performance will be better than would be expected from their test scores, just as there will likely be some whose performance is poorer than expected. STRENGTH OF MOTIVATION, PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH A FOREIGN LANGUAGE, and other factors should be considered in selecting people for language training and in interpreting language training results. For example, the number of languages previously studied or learned and the amount of academic and nonacademic language-learning experience are factors not measured by the tests but are indicative of probable success in learning a foreign language. Whether such experience was in the same language as the one to be studied or in a different one is, of course, an additional relevant factor.

NUMBER OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES STUDIED OR LEARNED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL :

MONTHS OF ACADEMIC TRAINING			NONACADEMIC EXPERIENCE (1 year or more)	
HIGH SCHOOL	COLLEGE	OTHER	READING OR WRITING	SPEAKING
12				

DATE

SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, A S F STAFF

NOTE: This report may be shown to the individual concerned.

FORM 7-63 1674

CONFIDENTIAL

(41)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

30 JAN 1961

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 7894

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) SMITH	(First) Joseph	(Middle) B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX M
4. GRADE GS-13	5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CA/PROP/Guid Br.	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify)		

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 25 May 60 - To 31 Dec. 60

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conceive, write and coordinate propaganda guidance on matters relating to area of geographic and substantive competence. (WH).	5/6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Originate, develop and coordinate continuing strategic propaganda campaigns of world-wide significance. (Nationalism-Neutralism)	3
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Analyze such public and official papers & communications as may be required to maintain knowledge in areas of assigned responsibility & to assure stimulation & coord of propaganda operations.	5/6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervise the establishment & maintenance of basic files including those deriving from NSC & OCB policy papers & those necessary for the conduct of campaigns.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Participate in review of and contributes substantively to Agency planning-cycle documents.	5/6 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5/6

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):					X		

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-55 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

141

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 27 2 21 PM '61

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Smith has demonstrated both competence and versatility since his assignment to CA/PROP. With no prior experience in the area, he was assigned to WH affairs and has quickly developed both a surprising knowledge of the problems of that volatile group of countries and an excellent rapport with members of the Division (which, on several occasions has indicated a strong interest in securing his services when his release from the staff can be arranged). Assignments are completed with dispatch and in good order.

The rating of 3 with regard to the proposed campaign on Neutralism-Nationalism reflects only that we have not yet got underway in this admittedly difficult and controversial field. The sum of research which Mr. Smith has done in this field leads him to the present conclusion (in which undersigned concurs) that unlike most of our other campaigns this will have to be conducted on a selected country basis and differently tailored for each.

During the absence of the rating official Mr. Smith has acted as Branch Chief.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 23 January 1961

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS

☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 23 January 1961

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: CA/PROP/C/Guidance Branch

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: W.H. CARPENTER

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE:

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: CA/C/PROP

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: HENRY C. SUTTON

Henry C. Sutton

SECRET

4 apr 60 63-115
13-27

22

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A 63-115 B 27 GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) SMITH, Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION [illegible]	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE [illegible]		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/[illegible]/MANILA

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT [illegible]

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 Nov 59 To 30 Mar 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operations officer, political action	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assisting in political action planning	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Collection and processing of intelligence	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Origination of correspondence	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4/5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is an exceptionally able political action officer. His capacity for grasping a rapidly developing political situation quickly and for making on-the-spot decisions is quite unique, and he would be a powerful addition to any station with a challenging political program. He is not always able to separate the significant from the insignificant and therefore tends to over-report. He is also inclined to operate more as a singleton than as an integrated member of an operations team. He has been quite successful in exploiting PP contacts for FI by-product. Additional training does not appear necessary at this time.

In preparing this report, careful consideration was given to the guidance in FS Field Dispatch No. 20-40 which recognizes the principle of rating the individual against the group, and establishes an "average" rating as being an entirely satisfactory performance. The supervisor, however, considers this fitness report to be in keeping with that guidance. [illegible]

This report has been prepared in accordance with [illegible] Division standards which recognize [illegible] the individual against the group. Thus an [illegible] reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ Joseph B. Smith

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS

☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify)

DATE: 30 March 1960

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Donald M. Richardson

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE: 30 March 1960

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ John H. Richardson

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) SMITH, Joseph B.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DP	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS Officer, PP		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Manila	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To Sept 1958-31 Oct 1959	SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As case officer has directed and managed two well established PP projects.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assists in the production of Station PP themes as required.	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Served as a principal case officer for a special election project.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Acts as Deputy Chief, PP	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects and produces intelligence according to Station requirements.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO. 4

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4/5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject has a well developed background applied to PP operations in the Far East. He has continually demonstrated initiative and imagination in obtaining the maximum production from his projects, and has developed new assets of definite value to the Station. He is a capable handler of agents, and has particular potential in the political action field. He has proven especially effective in a special election project in which he handled and developed numerous high level contacts. No particular weaknesses were observed. Subject is well qualified for senior operational assignments in either PP or FI, and is recommended for promotion. Since subject is planning to return for a second tour, no additional training is recommended at this time.

In preparing this report, careful consideration was given to the guidance in FE Field Dispatch No. 20-40 which recognizes the principle of rating the individual against the group, and establishes an "average" rating as being an entirely satisfactory performance. The supervisor, however, considers this fitness report to be in keeping with that guidance in that subject has clearly demonstrated a high degree of operational capability as indicated herein.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 5 November 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Joseph B. Smith

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 21 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 5 November 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/PP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William T. Tarrant

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 9 November 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John H. Richardson

SECRET

SECRET

9 November 1959

COMMENT OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

HALSEY, ROCHON and I have carefully reviewed this Fitness Report in order to comply with division policy of avoiding overrating. We are satisfied that TOOHILL, who has been given a high rating with respect to specific performance characteristics, fully merits such rating. During the fourteen years I have been with the Agency, I have had the opportunity to observe personally a good number of political action operation officers. Additionally, I have worked closely with TOOHILL during the current 1959 Philippine election. I have no hesitation in stating that I regard him as an unusually qualified officer for political action in the field. I believe also that he should be promoted as soon as practicable from GS-13 to GS-14.

S P Shorden
STEPHEN P. SHORDEN

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) SMITH Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DP
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Manila	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer--~~Deputy Chief~~,(PP)		
7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 15 March-15 September 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☒ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE 5 Nov 58	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William T. Tarrant	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, PP

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		17 DEC 1958
[illegible]		DEC 18 1958

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 5 Nov 58	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL George E. Aurell	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: Subject has proven himself to be an effective and productive case officer.

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
2 25 FH '58
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As case officer directs and manages two well-established PP ops	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Acts as Deputy Chief PP	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Collects and produces intelligence according to Station requirements	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assists in the production of Station PP themes as required	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has a well developed background applied to PBCCTOATE operations in the Far East. He has demonstrated he is a careful and productive case officer and a capable handler of agents. No particular weaknesses were observed.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Well qualified for most operational assignments both PBCCTCATE and DYGHOSTLY.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

9

2 DEC RECD

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): SMITH Joseph B.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 June 1921
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: ~~PP~~ DP
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Manila
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer-~~Deputy Chief~~,(PP)
7. GRADE: GS-13
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 15 March-15 September 1950
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☒ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 5 Nov 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: William T. Tarrant
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, PP

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 5 Nov 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: George E. Aurell
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: COS

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess at the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE EXPERTS OF THE SPECIFIC JOB
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

6 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Qualified as senior case officer in both PBOCTAES and DYCHOS[illegible] activities.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 16 2 25 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Continue with present duties for time being.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject and family well adapted to overseas duties

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOTTED TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

34 6 JUN RECD

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) SMITH Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DP
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Manila	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer--~~Deputy Chief~~, (PP)		

7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP Special	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 15 March-15 May 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	X	SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion action
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
☐	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 19 May 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William T. Tarrant	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, PP

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
14 JUL 1958
Posted Doc. Control CA
Reviewed by PSD JOB 7/24/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 19 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL George E. Aurell	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: Subject has proven himself to be an effective and productive case officer.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 28 2 03 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As case officer directs and manages two well-established PP ops	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Act as Deputy Chief PP	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Collect and produce intelligence according to Station requirements	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assist in the production of Station PP themes as required	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has a well developed background applied to PBCCTOATE operations in the Far East. He has demonstrated he is a careful and productive case officer and a capable handler of agents. No particular weaknesses were observed.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your *team*. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Well qualified for most operational assignments both PBOCTOATE and DTGHOSTLY.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JUN

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) SMITH Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DP
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer-~~Deputy Chief~~, (PP)		
7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP Special	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 15 March - 15 May 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion action

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 19 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William T. Tarrant	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, PP

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 19 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL George E. Aurell	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3.		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Potential (4)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 26 2 03 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Two months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Qualified as senior case officer in both PROTOATE and UMGHOSTLY activities.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Continue with present duties for time being.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject and family well adapted to overseas duties.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
3	6. SHOWS [illegible] TO [illegible] ASSIGNMENTS	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS [illegible] FOR FACTS	4	18. IS [illegible]	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN SPECIFIED TIME LIMITS	4	30. [illegible] AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) SMITH (First) Joseph (Middle) B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD:DP
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP FE 5	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer, ADBr. Ch.		
7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 2 December 1956 - 2 August 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
☐	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 2 August 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR R. H. Linn	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, FE/5

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	OM	23 AUG 1957
Reviewed by PDD		

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 9 AUG 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Alfred C. Ulmer Jr. Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

5

INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC DUTIES performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF SEC
AUG 20 10 23 AM '57

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervision, as Deputy Chief of Branch	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Operational and administrative planning	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Prepares cables and dispatches	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Coordination of branch activities	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Oral briefings	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is capable, conscientious, and energetic. He gets along well with associates and is a good supervisor. His scholarly knowledge of political science and history, coupled with an ability to express himself well is a distinct asset. Has a slight tendency to lecture his listeners, and is sometimes carried away by the momentum of his own initiative and aggressive approach to problems but of course these characteristics can easily be qualities rather than faults when recognised and guided.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) SMITH Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD:DP
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP FE 5	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer, ADBr.Ch.		
7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 2 December 1956 - 2 August 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 2 August 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR R. H. Linn	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, FE/5

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 9 AUG 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr. Alfred C. Ulmer Jr	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL CFE

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

BY: DATE
21 AUG

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds), WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

8 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has many qualities which as he acquires experience and maturity, will make him increasingly valuable as a supervisor, operator, or higher level case officer.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
10 26 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Management training might be useful.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Has well-balanced attitude toward his work and his associates. His short stature and quiet personality make him acceptable to many orientals who might be repelled by the average american.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN REASONABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

14-00000

[illegible]

TRAINING EVALUATION

COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS COURSE No. 16

NAME	SEX	DATES OF COURSE	NO. OF STUDENTS
SMITH, Joseph B.	**Male**	**25 Nov - 13 Dec 1957**	**15**

DATE OF BIRTH	EOD DATE	GRADE OR RANK	OFFICE
16 June 1921	**17 Sept 1951**	**GS-13**	**DDP FE**

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION

Deputy Chief of FE/5.

I. Course Objectives: to familiarize the student with the various types of CE operations and with methods and procedures peculiar to CE in the field and at Headquarters, to outline CE objectives, and to increase proficiency in the recognition and exploitation of leads.

II. Course Characteristics: The Counterespionage Operations Course is of three weeks duration. The curriculum material is presented by means of lectures, seminars, and directed reading. It is divided into sections as follows:

A. Introduction (definition of terms, the CE Staff, operational security and risk assessment, sources of CE leads, CE reporting and records, documentation)

B. Interrogation

C. Foreign Intelligence Services (with emphasis on currently hostile services)

D. Penetration and Defection

E. Double Agent Operations

During the course each student is required to present orally a CE case and to submit a written version of the case. Evaluations are based on problems, written exercises requiring analyses of assigned case studies, the case analysis presented by the student, and on objective tests.

III. Evaluations: (This student's performance indicated by asterisk.)

A. Two double agent problems and one walk-in problem requiring case analysis. This analysis involves thorough study of the case:

1. To determine areas of missing, inadequate, or questionable information.
2. To pick out information which can be checked through other sources.
3. To recognize all possible leads.
4. To assess the risk involved.
5. To propose appropriate action (operational decisions).

	Fail	Poor	Satis	Exc	Sup	Incomplete
Ratings in this class		6	8 *			1
Total of ratings in 15 classes	1	15	199	18		4

B. Four written exercises requiring analysis of assigned CE case studies.

	Fail	Poor	Satis	Exc	Sup	Incomplete
Ratings in this class		4	9 *	1		1
Total of ratings in 14 classes			193	24		1

C. Case Analysis (Student Presentation.)

	Fail	Poor	Satis	Exc	Sup	Incomplete
Ratings in this class			8	6 *		1
Total of ratings in 15 classes			179	49		1

D. Objective tests based on all sections of the course.

	Fail	Poor	Satis	Exc	Sup	Incomplete
Ratings in this class		2	7	5 *		1
Total of ratings in 15 classes	5	54	132	43	1	1

Mr. Smith was reserved, but his contributions were quite pertinent and advanced the progress of the class discussions. In his written work he showed a sound knowledge and a feel for the handling of agents, but in other aspects of the cases and problems his efforts were more casual. His student presentation demonstrated a cautious approach and a comprehensive analysis of a possible double agent.

[illegible]

[illegible] The student demonstrated outstanding ability or proficiency in meeting this course goal or objective; he indicated an unusually thorough knowledge of the material presented, or, if skills were involved, he demonstrated that he was one of the most effective individuals in this area.

EXCELLENT. The student showed unusual competence, skill, or ability in meeting this objective or goal; he demonstrated a thorough grasp of the material presented, or, if skills were involved, he demonstrated that he could perform in an extremely effective manner in this area

SATISFACTORY. The student met this objective in a competent and adequate manner; he demonstrated a good understanding and a grasp of the information presented, or if skills were involved, he demonstrated sufficient competence to operate effectively in this area.

FAIR. Although the student may have met some of the standards set for minimal achievement of this course goal or objective, he demonstrated serious gaps in knowledge or sufficient lack of skill to be of doubtful competence.

FAILURE. The student was unable to grasp the concepts or information presented, or demonstrated that he had not acquired the necessary knowledge and skills to operate at even minimum capacity in this area.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Harry D. H. Carroll

[illegible]

SECRET

REPORT OF SW and F & S TRAINING

Date: 27 Oct 1955

1. Pseudo: Joseph B. Smith [redacted] Grade:

2. Office: Division: Branch:

3. Project Assignment: Malaya Station

4. Dates Trained: 10 Oct 1955

Location: Singapore

5. Training Received:

Basic SW: Briefing in use of low level systems for dead-drop use only.

F & S: No restoration.

Other:

6. Evaluation: Smith [redacted] was able to spend only about three hours in the briefing session. During this time, he was able to use all three systems assigned for station use and, since he will be able to get help from Samuel A. [illegible] (q.v.) if necessary, he should have no difficulty with them. Further training would be required if mail channels or higher level systems were to be used.

7. Instructor: Ulysses A. [illegible]

Chief, KURIOT Laboratory

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-9)	
107894	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)		
	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
SMITH, Joseph S,	June	18	[illegible]

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)			5.
	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
German 283	May	2	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
[✓ 4.] I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
[✓ 4.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
[✓ 4.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-43)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 6 2 34 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 2 May 1957	SIGNATURE
(46) C	(47) E

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
107894	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
SMITH, Joseph B.	June	16	1921

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
Japanese 379	May	2	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 2 May 1957	SIGNATURE
(46) 0—	(47) 8—

CONFIDENTIAL

15 February 1956

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE [illegible]: [illegible]

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: [illegible]

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME: SMTTH Joseph B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 June 1921	3. SEX: M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DP
5. OFFICE [illegible]: FE/ Singapore	6. [illegible]: Dops Officer (PP)		
7. GRADE: GS-13	8. [illegible]	9. [illegible]: ~~Year prior to his departure on~~ May 1955 to 24 May 1956.	
10. [illegible] (Check one)		X	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. [illegible] [X] [illegible] NOT [illegible] SHOWN [illegible]

Rated after his departure.

☒ [illegible]

☐ [illegible]

☒ [illegible]

24 July 1956 — Robert A. Barmick — Chief of Station

[illegible]

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Ctrl	WhA	13 SEP 1956
Reviewed by		

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

Aug. 1956 — R. H. Linn — Chief, FE/5

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

[illegible]

DIRECTIONS: [illegible]

5 [illegible]

COMMENTS:

15 February 1956 **CONFIDENTIAL**

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty [illegible]
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - Incompetent in the performance of this duty
2 - Barely adequate in the performance of this duty
3 - Performs this duty acceptably
4 - Performs this duty in a competent manner
5 - Performs this duty in such a fine manner that it is a distinct asset on his job
6 - Performs this duty in an outstanding manner found in very few individuals holding similar jobs
7 - Excels anyone I know in the performance of this duty

SPECIFIC DUTY NO.	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO.	RATING NUMBER
Planning, developing unilateral local operations	5	Writes intelligence reports and estimates	5
Case officer for unilateral operations	5	Handling of Station KUCAGE correspondence	5
Liaison with SMOOTHER, especially SMOTH on KUCAGE	5	Liaison with and work for QKFLOWAGE and ODACID	5

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Smith is an intelligence, sincere, imaginative, hard-working, loyal KUBARK officer who is a definite credit to the organization. He has carried out all his assignments in a most professional manner and has served as a most useful and respected member of the team. His judgment and opinions are respected by his colleagues both in KUBARK and ODACID.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual: productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents [illegible] and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER 6

1 - Definitely unsuitable [illegible]
2 - Of doubtful suitability [illegible]
3 - [illegible]
4 - [illegible]
5 - [illegible]
6 - [illegible]
7 - [illegible]

[illegible] ☑ [illegible]

MAIL ROOM

SEP 12 11 17 AM '56

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

Figure 1 (back)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION E GENERAL

SMITH Joseph B.

16 June 1921

M

DP

Singapore

Ops Officer (PP)

GS-13

~~Year prior to his departure on~~ May 1955 to 24 May 1956.

X

SECTION F CERTIFICATION

24 July 1956

Robert A. Barnack

Chief of Station

Aug. 1956

R. H. Linn

Chief, FE/5

SECTION G ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

6

DATE

Posted [illegible] WEA 13 SEP 1956

Reviewed by [illegible]

✓

2

2

3

2

3

2

CONFIDENTIAL

15 February 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

3. INDICATE THE [illegible] NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

26 months

4. Smith [illegible]

is ready, willing and able to shoulder additional responsibilities inherent in a more responsible position in the organization. He has the intelligence, know-how, enthusiasm and drive that the organization desires in its officers.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Smith

is scheduled for assignment in KUCAGE, Headquarters, which he is fully qualified to handle. It is hoped he will, during his Headquarters tour, be able to tr' the Basic Management training course. After his headquarters tour, ' should receive a field assignment to make full use of his abilities.

2. OTHER FACTORS (INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES) TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Smith

is happily married to an intelligent young lady, and they have two attractive daughters. His wife is willing to go anywhere her husband desires on assignment for KUBARK.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

0 - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS, HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. [illegible]	5	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. [illegible]
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. [illegible]	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. [illegible]	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
3	6. [illegible]	4	16. [illegible]	4	26. [illegible]
4	7. [illegible]	4	17. [illegible]	4	27. [illegible]
3	8. [illegible]	3	18. [illegible]	3	28. [illegible]
4	9. [illegible]	4	19. [illegible]	4	29. [illegible]
4	10. [illegible]	3	20. [illegible]	4	30. [illegible]

Figure 2 (back)

[illegible] 72

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: PP 1 October 1956

NAME: Joseph B. SMITH

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION: ☐ PROMOTION ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ ROTATION ☐ TRAVEL ☐ OTHER (Explain)

FROM: Ops Off PP, GS-13, Singapore

TO: Ops Off PP, GS-13, Hqs.

EOD: 17 Sept 51

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN
PW	BASIC ORIENT. ALSO BIC, BITC, SOC, BIP, PH I			AIR OPS. 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. M & T ALSO OC, PH II	5/10-6/11/53		MAR. OPS 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. OPS. ALSO AIC, AITC, ADC, CAI, PH III			CLAND. FLD. ACT. 1 2 3 4 5 6	
	RESISTANCE OPS ALSO PM, I-II-III RAFT			SURVIVAL 1 2 3 4 5 6	
R	CLAND. SERV. REV			BASIC PHOTO	
	WORLD COMMUNISM	see CPO		DOCUMENTATION	
A	ANTI-COMM. OPS.			LOCKS	
	ADMIN PROCEDURES			SECRET WRITING	
	OPS. SUPPORT			FLAPS & SEALS	
	TRADECRAFT PHASE			SMALL ARMS FAM.	
	ADMIN PHASE			OTHER TRAINING	
	REPORTS			CPO	7-18/12/53
	ORDER OF BATTLE			CIA Q.	2-5/10/51
	COUNTERESPIONAGE				
	ADV. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE				
	OPS. SECURITY				
	WAR PLANS				
X	CLAND. POL. WARF.				
	STAYBEHIND OPS.				
	TECH. DEV. ORIENT.				
	INSTR. TECH.				
	EVASION-ESCAPE				
	SAB. OPS.				
	INVEST. TECH. ALSO CI TECH.				
	ADMIN REFRESHER				
	RDG. IMPROVE.				
	BASIC SUPV.				
A	BASIC MGMT.			PRE-TEST	
	BALLOON OPS.			ASSESSMENT	

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.
2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

TRAINING OFFICER COMMENTS:

☐ A. THIS DOES (NOT) MEET TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.
☐ NO FURTHER TRAINING RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN "S". THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY BASIC QUALIFYING STANDARDS.

☒ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE
☒ QUALIFYING [R] REFRESHER A-Addt'l.
TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT.
A-2 ☒ xxxxxx When Available
☐ UPON RETURN TO HQ.

☒ D. WAIVER AND CC. SHOULD BE REQUESTED FOR THOSE COURSES MARKED WITH A "W".*

☐ E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING WERE MADE ________ (DATE). THESE RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MET.

*Subject to Waiver test.

DIVISION TRAINING OFFICER
Donald H. Sage
DONALD H. SAGE

STAFF TRAINING OFFICER
Walter B. Griggs for
Rene J. Guiraud, PP/SD/TRO

TO: Personnel Officer,

FROM: Career Management Officer

The above projected personnel action has been ☑ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE: 20 November 1956

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER: [illegible]

FORM NO. 467 REPLACES FORM 38-77
1 JAN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(2-4-45)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY Joseph B. Smith	1. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION ~~KUGOWN~~ SP:DP
4. GRADE GS-12	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) SINGAPORE		
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 31 March 1954 - 1 May 1955		

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Senior Kugago Officer, Singapore	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 31 March 1954

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

1. Conduct of liaison with SMOTH FE Headquarters on KUGAOE matters relating to FE.
2. Conduct of covert KUGOWN projects, Televox, Temperament, and Tenacious.
3. Initiation through Project Temperament of covert themes targeted at other SEA countries.
4. Development of additional covert operational activity and agents.
5. Development of one specific joint operation with SMOTH targeted at SEA.
6. Coordination of DTPILLAR-SMOTH local liaison.
7. Development of plans for other joint operations with SMOTH targeted at various FE countries.
8. Contact with QKHAYSEED-PBGRUMBLE.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (Type) Robert J. Jantzen	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (Type) Robert J. Jantzen
3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.	
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. Aug. 1955	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES V. O. Goodall V. O. Goodall

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 858
1 JUN 54

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

SAMPLES

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES: NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.										X				
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.									X					
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.									X					
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.									X					
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.											X			
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.									X					
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.									X					
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.									X					
11. CALM.										X				
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.									X					
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14. GETS THINGS DONE.											X			
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.											X			
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.										X				
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.											X			
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.										X				
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.										X				
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.											X			

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".									X					
29. TOUGH MINDED.									X					
30. OBSERVANT.											X			
31. CAPABLE.											X			
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.										X				
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.										X				
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.										X				
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.								X						
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.									X					
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										X				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.									X					
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.										X				
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.								X						
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.										X				
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.											X			
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.									X					

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject has demonstrated to a high degree the resourcefulness, initiative, diplomatic skill and imagination his job requires.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

He really has none but his talkativeness, which is really enthusiasm, [illegible] has led many people to believe he talks too much on a plane far from practical. Subject is getting his talkativeness in hand.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

no.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None. Experience in the field is what is needed.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):

none.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☑ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ...WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) SMITH	(First) Joseph	(Middle) B.	2. GRADE GS 11	3. POSITION TITLE Ops Off

4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION FE	BRANCH PP	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From To

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☐ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

1. Exercise staff supervision over and assist Branch PP officers in the conduct of operations.
2. Advise my chief on the problems and developments in the conduct of Branch PP operations.
3. Conduct liaison with elements of DD/P Senior Staffs.
4. Plan and coordinate division-wide and division participation in world-wide PP operations.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Basic Psychological Warfare Seminar		4 months	May 1952
Advanced Psychological Warfare Seminar		6 months	Nov 1952

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Psychological and political warfare operations.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

11 Sept 1953
DATE

Joseph B Smith
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

a. Has done a superior job in selling himself and his ideas to his seniors as well as subordinates both within and outside the FE Division.

b. Should be recognised for his creative thinking and outside studies on his own time in support of this assignment.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

See Para. 11 (b) and realistic application of covert techniques.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Should concentrate on more concise oral presentations.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Capable of added responsibilities and with proper guidance and experience has almost unlimited capabilities.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No.

6. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Due for complete training prior to field assignment in January 1954.

7. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE. NA

8. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

21 Dec 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

9. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

28 Dec 53
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

0. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

ORD

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) Smith (First) Joseph (Middle) Burkholder

2. GRADE GS-12

3. POSITION TITLE Ops Officer (PW) CO-PP

4. OFFICE DDP

STAFF OR DIVISION FE

BRANCH FE/PP ~~Political~~

☒ DEPT'L.
☐ FIELD

IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 2-17-53 To 9-17-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

See period 2-17-52 to 2-17-53 report - No Change

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

DATE

SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) SMITH	(First) Joseph	(Middle) B.	2. GRADE GS 11	3. POSITION TITLE Ops Off C D-[illegible]
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION FE	BRANCH PP	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT
From To

6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial ☐ Annual ☐ Special
☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

1. Exercise staff supervision over and assist Branch PP officers in the conduct of operations.
2. Advise my chief on the problems and developments in the conduct of Branch PP operations.
3. Conduct liaison with elements of DD/P Senior Staffs.
4. Plan and coordinate division-wide and division participation in world-wide PP operations.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Basic Psychological Warfare Seminar		4 months	May 1952
Advanced Psychological Warfare Seminar		6 months	Nov 1952

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?
Psychological and political warfare operations.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

DATE SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 13 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

a. Has done a superior job in selling himself and his ideas to his seniors as well as subordinates both within and outside the FE Division.

b. Should be recognized for his creative thinking and outside studies on his own time in support of this assignment.

FORM NO.
MAY 1952 37-151

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST ACCEPTABLE, GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

See Para. 11 (b) and realistic application of covert techniques.

OFFICE [illegible] P & RD
FILES SECTION

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Should concentrate on more concise oral presentations.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Capable of added responsibilities and with proper guidance and experience has almost unlimited capabilities.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Due for complete training prior to field assignment in January 1954.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE. NA

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

OPERATIONS

IMPORTANT: The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. He may show it to other members of his staff or to the student concerned if such action is considered necessary and advisable.

This report summarizes the test results. Observations and opinions of the various instructors for the course listed only. More complete data are available in the files of the office of Training (Covert), and may be examined after contacting the Training and Evaluation Officer. Any questions as regards the evaluation of this student should be referred to the Chief, Training and Evaluation, TR(C).

NAME OF STUDENT (LAST): SMITH, (FIRST): Joseph (MIDDLE): B.
AGE: 32
GRADE (GS OR RANK): GS-12
DATE OF REPORT: 13 November 1953
DIVISION: FP/FE
PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT: Senior PP Officer
COURSE NO.: 4

PERFORMANCE RECORD

THE FOLLOWING GRADES SHOW THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE STUDENT IN THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE COURSE. TWO GRADES ARE ASSIGNED IN EACH AREA. ONE FOR COMPREHENSION AND ONE FOR IMPLEMENTATION. A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF EACH OF THESE TERMS, AS WELL AS OF THE ADJECTIVAL RATINGS EMPLOYED, IS GIVEN ON THE BACK OF THIS EVALUATION FORM.

MAJOR ELEMENTS	ADJECTIVAL RATINGS									
	FAILURE		POOR		SATISFACTORY		EXCELLENT		SUPERIOR	
	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.
1. Organization of Clandestine Operations							X	X		
2. Cover								X	X	
3. Communications								X	X	
4. Target Analysis								X	X	
5. Criteria For Agent Selection								X	X	
6. Agent Recruitment								X	X	
7. Agent Handling									X	X
8. Agent Direction									X	X
9. Assessment and Reassessment								X	X	
10. Special Operational Problems									X	X

TRAIT RECORD

THE FOLLOWING INDICATES THE VARIOUS TRAITS AS OBSERVED BY THE INSTRUCTORS DURING THE TRAINING PERIOD. THE OBSERVATIONS INCLUDE THE STUDENT'S PARTICIPATION AND CONDUCT IN TRAINING AS WELL AS HIS REACTIONS TO VARIOUS PROBLEMS AND SITUATIONS.

A. Constructive Imagination (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Devoid of constructive imagination or inventiveness in approach to problems.	Showed only a very limited degree of constructive imagination.	Showed sufficient constructive imagination to meet most school situations adequately.	Demonstrated the possession of creative ability to a greater than average degree	Outstandingly creative, inventive, or original.

B. Astuteness (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	[✓ 5]
Appeared gullible and naive.	Exhibited below average skepticism and discernment.	Displayed adequate judgment and perspicacity.	Displayed above average perspicacity and skepticism.	Displayed exceptional shrewdness and perspicacity.

C. Industry (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	[✓ 5]
Did not show sufficient application of time and effort.	Applied only the minimum amount of time and effort necessary.	Showed adequate compliance as regards time and effort necessary.	Volunteered greater time and effort than is normally expected in this course.	Was unusually industrious, giving generously of time and effort.

D. Initiative (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	[✓ 5]
Consistently failed to act without being specifically instructed to do so.	Generally exhibited a low level of enterprise but occasionally acted on his own.	Normally took steps to implement ideas without external prompting.	Usually displayed enthusiasm and aggressiveness in carrying out projects.	Displayed unusual energy, enthusiasm, and aggressiveness.

1	2	3	4	5

E. Ability to Write (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Seemed unable to express thoughts clearly in written	Was weak in expressing thoughts clearly in written	Written work showed no significant weakness.	Displayed ability to express thoughts [illegible] in written form.	Was outstanding in ability to express ideas in clear, correct, coherent manner.

F. Facility of oral expression (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Unable to express self clearly. Presented ideas in groping and incoherent fashion.	Lacked fluency or ease in his speech, but meaning usually clear.	Displayed reasonable facility in oral expression.	Spoke confidently, conveying ideas clearly and readily.	Outstanding in fluency and clarity of oral expression.

G. Ability to Get Along With Associates. (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	[✓ 5]
Frequently alienated his associates.	Failed to win social acceptance but did not actively antagonize others.	Reasonably effective in his social relations.	Displayed definite ability to achieve harmonious relationships with his associates.	Unusually effective in his ability to win acceptance from others.

H. Ability to Influence His Associates (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	[✓ 5]
Withdrew from group activities to a [illegible] and actions of others.	Normally, [illegible]	Was fairly successful in selling a point or himself.	Was excellent at [illegible] by his own personality and thinking.	Was outstanding in respect and attention through his personality and thinking.

I. Tact (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	[✓ 5]
Markedly blunt and indiscreet.	Frequently said or did something which induced an unfavorable reaction.	Reasonably discreet and tactful.	Had good discernment for the appropriate thing to say or do.	Constantly demonstrated keen perception for fitting speech or conduct.

J. Adaptation to Training (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	[✓ 5]
Displayed no interest or enthusiasm for training and failed to adapt himself to the demands made upon him.	Accepted training program reluctantly and had difficulty adapting himself to the training requirements.	Displayed average interest in and acceptance of training.	Exhibited an excellent acceptance of training and readily adapted to demands made upon him.	Outstanding in his acceptance of training and display of enthusiasm and interest.

COMMENTS

Subject was outstanding in his performance and especially so in his ability to adjust to training. He met and exceeded all course requirements. His superior thinking ability allows him to cover most of the ground on all pertinent points rapidly and it is only through deliberate self-control that he slows down sufficiently to make an easily understandable oral presentation.

His imaginative analytical ability make him a natural for directing clandestine activity. His professorial background would make him very worthwhile for consideration by the Office of Training upon completion of his contemplated tour of duty in the field.

SIGNATURE OF CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED	REVIEWED
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY FOR STAFF TRAINING	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, TRAINING AND EVALUATION

51-66

SECRET

(OVER)

SECRET

14-00000

SUBJECT: Training Evaluation
Communist Party Operations Course, Advanced Training Division

Student's Name **SMITH, Joseph B.** Course No. **19**

Division and Branch **FE-5/PP** Grade **GS-12** Age **32**

The Communist Party Operations Course is a specialized two-weeks' course designed to provide adequate background and understanding of the World Communist Movement, and to increase the effectiveness of staff personnel charged with the planning and conduct of operations against these movements. The emphasis is on essentials, the generally valid aspects of Party policy, tactics, administration, organization, and action.

A combination of lectures, seminars, and written assignments is utilized, and the evaluation is based on the observation of the instructional staff. The supervisor is cautioned that this evaluation should be considered subjective in nature and applies only to the two weeks' period of the course. In those cases where no comment is given for one phase or activity, it does not imply that the student is deficient but only that the instructors do not feel that they have sufficient basis upon which to place a meaningful evaluation.

1. Student Performance in the Classroom:
Mature comprehension of the World Communist Movement and the varied aspects of its theory and practice. A developed feeling for current relationships between "national" Communist Parties' practices and the World Communist Movement; including its organization, strategy, tactics, and operations.

Superior comprehension -- in his area of assignment he was especially effective in his grasp of CP operations and tactics.

2. Willingness to Share Own Experiences or Thinking

Freely expressed ideas when appropriate to the subject.

3. Ease of assimilation in the group - pleasant, cooperative relationship:

Pleasant but reserved.

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

4. Cooperation with the staff in presenting pertinent suggestions as to future material for the course with the purpose of the improvement of same:

Appreciative of the course; suggested valuable background material for incorporation in certain subjects.

5. Efficient use of study periods and after hours to read materials contained in student folders, including materials assigned for home study with the resulting reflection in class participation:

Used all available time and materials for study during and after class.

6. Class attendance and compliance with training and security regulations:

Punctual and security conscious.

Instructors' over-all comment where appropriate.

Erich J. Vesely
Chief Instructor, C[illegible]

Date 22 December 1953

S-E-C-R-E-T

1 December 1952

1. Name: Joseph Smith 2. Grade: GS-11

3. Position:

4. Period his service for rater:

5. Exact nature of his assignment:

Time in Grade: 9 months

Education:

Previous Experience:

	Unsatisfactory	Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Excellent	Superior	Outstanding
His efficiency in carrying out this assignment								✓
Degree to which he extended himself in fulfilling his assigned duties								✓
His ability to get along with his associates							✓	
His ability to get along with indigenous personnel								N.A.
The conduct of his social and personal life insofar as it affected the performance of his duties							✓	
His ability to carry out his duties in the face of discouragement and frustration								
His political motivation and attitude toward [illegible] the agency [illegible]								✓
His attitude toward career employment by the agency							✓	
Emotional stability under field conditions								N.A.
Degree to which he shows initiative							✓	
Ability to work without supervision								✓

6. Other Comments: N.A.

Signature Immediate Supervisor

I agree with the evaluation of the supervisor except for the following:

Chief of Station

14-00000

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) SMITH Joseph Burkholder 007894	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) Jan. 16 - 1921 ~~16/6/41~~	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 714 18 4732
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

DATE 2/14/68

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

SECRET See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1954
(For use only until April 14, 1958)
176-101

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 9 July 1970, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

Joseph B. Smith 12 July 71

Signature Date

Joseph B. Smith

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Joseph B. Smith	DATE (from item S-1) 21 Oct, 1970	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) John R. Horton	DATE (from item S-2) 21 Oct, 1970
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 29 Oct, 1970	DISPATCH NUMBER: HMMT -10581	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	2. SERVICE DESIGN D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE C/CA, Mexico City 14	4. STATION OR BASE Mexico City	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER LNGOLD

6A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 21 June 1969	6B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE	6C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ	6D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Three: wife 47, daughter 19, son 11

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENTS:

LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Supervise one case officer, one career agent and one secretary in planning and conducting Station CA activities and intelligence collection activities on Mexican government

Support and conduct operations against other priority Station targets

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

None

FORM 5-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I prefer to continue in my present assignment.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 *(for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice)* IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

[2] EXTEND TOUR 18 months MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO Jan 1973 (DATE)

[4] BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE,
1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE DO 3RD CHOICE OTR

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE EUR 3RD CHOICE FE

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Subject's wish to return here for another tour fits our ideas of what would be good for him and the Station. His function in the Station will continue and he performs it very well. Even should there be a readjustment in the amount of case officer time put into his field, there will still be enough--probably more than enough--for him to do. He does it very well. This recommendation would be modified if Subject were given an opportunity for a post which might give him a better chance for promotion, which he would like and which he deserves.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Per HMMS 7052, Mr. Smith has been approved for home leave and return to Mexico City for a second tour of duty.

DATE 23 Nov 70 TITLE C/WH/Personnel SIGNATURE Henry L. Barthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. DATED:
CABLE NO. DATED:

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: (SIGNATURE) DATE:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE
PUNCHED
BY [illegible]

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
007894	Smith	Joseph	B.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 . PCS (Basic) 3 . CORRECTION 5 . CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
06	27	69					1			Mexico	450

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 . TDY (Basic) 4 . CORRECTION 6 . CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
✓	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. IN 37612

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 23 June 1969

REMARKS

PREPARED BY				
☐	OCS	✓	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	F D & DIVISION, CTSO	DATE 7/24/69		SIGNATURE
✓	C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
8-67

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET

4R

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of **Joseph B. Smith**

Effective **21 May 1969**

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth existing policies of concern to you while integrated and to reiterate certain rights and obligations which derive from your true status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of **GS-14 $19,771.00** per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of **21 May 1969**. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected as a **FSR-4/7** at a salary of **$17,209.00** per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of **two (2) years** from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable

regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they do not exceed the salary and allowance payment due you on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due you, the difference will be paid to you by this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due you, the excess amounts will be remitted to this organization at intervals to be designated by the Office of Finance. Computations hereunder will be based on the aggregate gross amounts due and received. That portion of retirement contributions withheld by your cover facility which exceeds the retirement contributions applicable to your organization salary will be deducted from the gross amount of the overpayment. Upon integration, the payroll office of this organization will establish the date on which you would normally receive a regular step increase from your cover facility. Failure to report a grade promotion received from a cover facility does cause errors in processing regular step increases. Regular step increases, incorrectly processed in such manner, should be reported immediately to this organization. To eliminate this problem, any grade promotion received from a cover facility will be reported immediately by you to this organization's payroll office through channels showing both the old and the new rate and the effective date. All salary difference payments and adjustments will be reflected on earnings statements.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integrating into your cover facility you will continue to be covered by the particular retirement system in which you are a participant as an employee of this organization. Salary received from your cover facility and any salary differences payable by this organization will be subject to appropriate retirement contributions.

b. Appropriate Federal income tax withholdings shall be made from taxable income received from both your cover facility and this organization. Additionally, while serving in the United States, withholdings shall also be made for District of Columbia or State income tax, when applicable. You may claim reimbursement for excess income taxes paid on overt tax returns by reason of taxable income from your cover facility exceeding the taxable income due you as an employee of this organization.

c. All annual and sick leave which is accrued to your credit at the time of integration will be transferred to your cover facility. While integrated you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon termination of your integration, your unused annual leave, sick leave, and home leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization and your leave record will be reconstructed as of the beginning of the leave year in which you return to this organization, as explained in the Handbook on Leave for Special Situations. Serving in an integrated capacity does not permit the carryover from one leave year to another of an annual leave balance which exceeds the ceilings authorized by regulations of this organization and the Federal leave law. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, upon your "resignation" you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization, including any income taxes withheld by your cover facility in order to receive credit for such annual leave.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

IMPORTANT

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the field have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checked out for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 23 October 1964.

Joseph B. Smith
Signature
JOSEPH B. SMITH

12 Mar. 1969
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 1 - Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
007894	SMITH	Joseph	B.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
04	27	69	05	10	69		2			WH(Mex Cty)	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER WH-538-69		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 4/27/69 @ 1725 - 5/10/69 @ 2130

REMARKS

No leave

PREPARED BY				
	[illegible]	X	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
X	[illegible] DIVISION, [illegible]		DATE 5/13/69	SIGNATURE DSV
	C & [illegible] DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

14-00000

SECRET

11 MAY 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Smith, Joseph
[redacted]
Change of Home Leave Address

REFERENCE: HABT-3734, 29 April 1966

It is requested that the home leave address of [redacted] be changed from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania to Cambridge, Massachusetts. [redacted] last remaining relative in Harrisburg died in November 1965, and he has no other connections there. On the other hand his wife has relatives in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and his daughter is attending Wellesley College in Wellesley, Massachusetts and he plans to visit this area on home leave.

Edward F. O'Malley
Robert D. Cashman
C/WH/Personnel

Concur:

Director of Personnel 12 May 66
(Date)

Attachment:
Reference

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
Change of Home Leave Address of [redacted] (SA)

Smith, Joseph

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: As noted below

It is requested that the home leave address of John W. [redacted] be changed from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania to Cambridge, Massachusetts. [redacted]' last remaining relative in Harrisburg died in November 1965, and he has no other connections there. On the other hand his wife has relatives in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and his daughter is attending Wellesley College in Wellesley, Massachusetts and he plans to visit this area on home leave.

CLIFFORD N. NOYES

Distribution:
O & 2 - Chief, WHD

John W. CATA [illegible]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HAPT-3734

DATE
20 April 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

TM-837055

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true)	DATE (from item 5.1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 5.2)
[redacted]	27 Dec. 65	Michael Tanes	28 Dec. 1965

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW: 28 March 66

DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 16/6/21	2. GRADE 14	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE Operations Officer	7A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR 29/8/64
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known) D	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Buenos Aires		7B. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD [illegible]
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7C. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS 29/10/66

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

a. Case officer for a large-scale liaison activity in the CA field.

b. Station functional officer for media activity.

c. Station functional officer for university and university student field.

d. Supervises staff agent concerned with university target.

e. Case officer for two unilateral media operations.

f. Case officer for a political action research project.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

I list the choices in Question 9C because of the limited opportunity for achievement in operations and because I believe I have abilities that can be used to better [illegible] of the Agency in other fields. I have five years college teaching experience, which should be of use to OIR; I have maintained high level political and business contacts which experience should be useful to DDP; my educational background and operational area experience should help qualify me for DDI.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

SECRET

8. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE OTR 2ND. CHOICE DDP 3RD. CHOICE [illegible]

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:

1ST. CHOICE ______ 2ND. CHOICE ______ 3RD. CHOICE ______

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 30

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

wife and two children; ages: 42, 13, 6

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Desire to be in the United States for the senior year and graduation from college of my older daughter.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

The Station concurs in Subject's request for his next assignment. Based on the capabilities that he has demonstrated during his present tour of duty, we have every reason to believe that he will perform in a professional and highly competent manner in either one of the three areas that he has selected. If Subject is considered for another field assignment, it is strongly recommended that he be afforded official cover status.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

The WH Division Personnel meeting of 24 February 1966 concurred with the Subject's request for assignment to OTR.

Edward F. O[illegible]

Robert D. Cashman
C/WH/Personnel

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER DATE	SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. ______ CABLE NO. ______
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME	20. SIGNATURE
21. TITLE	22. DATE

23. COMMENTS WH + OSRS jointly will [illegible] [illegible] authorize [illegible] return for assignment to OTR. McGrae will discuss with [illegible] while at E.D.

SECRET

SECRET

05073c
[illegible]

[illegible] 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT: Appreciation: Joseph Smith

1. With your approval Mr. Joseph Smith, of OTR participated as a member of the Survey Team which during January - March 1967 reviewed the effectiveness of the Propaganda Group of the CA Staff. This involved 30 full Team meetings, interviews with 57 CS officers, various specific inquiries, and numerous drafting sessions.

2. Throughout, Mr. Smith participated in a most effective professional manner bringing to bear his extensive background in the Clandestine Services. His direct and objective approach to the problems considered in the course of the survey made his contribution to the overall Team effort invaluable. The Team report, which I am still in process of discussing within the Staff will be of considerable value not only to this Staff in our future planning but also, I feel, to the future posture of the covert propaganda mission of the Clandestine Services; thus I heartily commend Mr. Smith for his effective participation with the Survey Team in this effort.

3. I would appreciate your conveying my thanks to Mr. Smith.

Cord Meyer, Jr.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Chief
Covert Action Staff

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Smith, Oscar

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY — DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (~~True~~) Pseudo [redacted]	DATE (from item 5-1) 20 Sep 63	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Frederick Larkin	DATE (from item 5-2) 20 Sep 63
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:		William S. Renehan	DATE 25 Sep 63

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 16 June 1921	2. GRADE GS-14	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE Operations Officer, GS-12	7A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR 5 June 1962
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known) D		5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Buenos Aires	7B. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD 5 June 1964
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7C. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS None

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

a. Case officer for large-scale KUWOLF liaison project with local services.
b. Supervisor of two staff agents conducting KUWOLF activities.
c. Case officer for two unilateral KUWOLF projects.
d. Station functional officer for projects in student field.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

If not reassigned to present post, I would prefer to work in the political action field as a unilateral case officer with staff agent status. I believe my past experience and performance qualifies me for this type of assignment and I know that I find this type of work stimulating and challenging. Most preferred would be an assignment combining KUTUBE and KUWOLF responsibilities.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

None, if reassigned to present post.

FORM 3-59 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:
1ST. CHOICE Domestic Ops 2ND. CHOICE Division Desk 3RD. CHOICE Division Staff

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:
1ST. CHOICE Mexico City 2ND. CHOICE Guatemala 3RD. CHOICE Lima

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?
INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 30

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

3: aged 40, 11, and 3 years

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Eldest daughter attending college in the United States.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Supervisor and Chief of Station concur with the employee's expressed desires. While assigned to this Station this employee has made an important contribution to the Station's KUWOLF program which doubtless will continue to be the case should he be reassigned to this Station.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Recommend return to Station for second tour of duty.

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER DATE	SIGNATURE Robert D. Cashman

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. [illegible] CABLE NO.
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME	20. SIGNATURE
21. TITLE	22. DATE 27 [illegible] 195[illegible]

23. COMMENTS
[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
[redacted]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Smith, Joseph

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on [illegible]. appendicitis

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
[illegible]	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

Supplement to Staff Agent Personnel Action

For [redacted] . Effective 27 MAY 1962

Smith, Joseph

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted] ,

In view of your contemplated cover assignment, you have been designated a Staff Agent. The purpose of this Supplement is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are so designated and to set forth certain rights and obligations incident to your status as an appointed employee.

1. Payroll Administration. As indicated in your Staff Agent Personnel Action, your present salary and grade are $ 11,675.00 and GS- 13 5 , respectively, and you are entitled to receive the salary, allowances and other benefits applicable thereto, however, certain procedural variations will be followed to preserve the security of your cover position.

(a) The gross emoluments that you receive from your cover activities will be retained by you as an offset against the gross emoluments due you from this organization. If, except as provided in paragraph 4 below, your cover emoluments ever exceed those due you as a Staff Agent, the overage is to be remitted to this organization on a monthly basis, unless a different period is specified.

(b) Your Federal income taxes will be withheld and reported in conformance with HR 20-33 or any subsequent regulations or procedures promulgated by this organization. For your information, this organization shall withhold from the gross payments due you Federal income taxes in an amount which, when added to the income taxes withheld by your cover facility, will equal the tax withholdings normally made from your gross taxable compensation with this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make tax remittances in conformance with HR 20-661-1. Also, that issuance together with R 30-720 covers the procedures to be followed in order to receive reimbursement for foreign income taxes imposed upon you.

(c) This organization will deduct from the gross payments due you an amount equivalent to six and one half per cent (6 1/2%) of your gross salary for contribution to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. This amount will be deducted from the differential due you by this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make direct remittances to this organization in satisfaction of the required contributions.

(d) If permanent quarters are not furnished, your quarters allowance will be granted at the maximum rate established for your post of assignment, family status and grade. No accounting for this allowance will be required.

[illegible] position requires that you make contribution to the Social Security Fund, such contributions will be at your expense. However, involuntary contributions for cover facility programs, such as insurance and retirement, may be considered items of expense to this organization, and in such category money you receive as a result of your participation in such [illegible] this organization. Whether [illegible] in a particular [illegible] to conformity will be determined by this organization.

2. Non-[illegible] Cover Premium Pay. You are hereby [illegible]

3. Equalization Allowance. You are hereby authorized an equalization allowance in accordance with applicable organization regulations.

4. Travel Expenses. You will be entitled to travel, transportation and storage in conformance with the regulations of this organization. HR 20-52 provides that travel expenses of integrated personnel will be allowed in accordance with the regulations of their cover organizations or HR 22, whichever allows the greater amount.

5. Travel Penalties. You herein agree that your assignment abroad will be for a minimum of **two years** from the date of your arrival at your permanent post of duty, unless such assignment shall be sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience. Your violation of such agreement may result in regulatory travel penalties. HR 22-6 provides that if the agreement is violated during the first year of duty abroad, expenditures for travel and transportation to the post, including per diem while at headquarters and storage of effects, shall be reimbursed by the employee. If the agreement is violated after the first year of duty, but before the completion of the minimum tour agreed to above, return travel at Government expense shall not be allowed.

Smith, Joseph

AGREED: [redacted]

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep for [illegible] this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

By
Personnel Officer

JUC

5K

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST / FIRST / MIDDLE)	OFFICE/COMPONENT
~~36155~~ ~~119296~~ 80T894	(Print) 1-24 Smith, Joseph [redacted] R	25-26 64

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COL. TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING 1. NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1. PCS (*Basic*) 3. CORRECTION 5. CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	01	06	05	62				ARGINTINA	040

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2. TDY (*Basic*) 4. CORRECTION 6. CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☒	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: HABT-1787

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 8 June 1962

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION ☒ FINANCE DIVISION	DATE 6/20/62	SIGNATURE

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

14-00000

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

Lew Rapali

INSTRUCTIONS: Use R 20-1000 and HR 10-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 6556

DATE:

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Smith, Frank
[redacted] JLV

2A. PROJECT:

2B. PERMANENT STATION: NA Buenos Aires JLV

3. ALLOTMENT NO.:

3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☒ UV

4. SLOT NO.: BAP-848

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES:
Raphael E. NYHAOSN
Arthur H. TOOHILL

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Staff Employee - 9 September 1951 to date

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Staff Employee

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: ☒ OBTAINED ☐ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☐ YES NA ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Staff Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U. S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 40

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 16 June 1921

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, U.S.

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Arlington, Virginia

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Joanne Hoffman - Wife - 38
Ruthuen - Daughter - 16
Julie E. - Daughter - 9
Andrew C.- Son - 1½

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: No

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: Army

24. RANK OR GRADE: Corporal

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: 11,650

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL:

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): NA

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER	CIA
YES	☐	☒
NO	☐	☐

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: 3,500

32. POST:

33. OTHER: Equalization $915 and 10% Staff Agent Premium pay JLV

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any):

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES: ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☐ YES ☒ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☒ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
See 18 above.

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION:

43. ENTERTAINMENT:

44. OTHER:

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

FORM 3-59 204 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET

CASE OFFICER

TELEPHONE EXTENSION

DIVISION

DATE

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

All benefits and allowances of a staff employee.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS ☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) ☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ___ MONTHS ___ 2 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: June 1962

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): NA

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: NA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other): PP

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Liaison with host government service.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

See personnel file.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☒ COLLEGE DEGREE ☒ POST GRADUATE ☒ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK FLUENT	SPEAK AVERAGE	SPEAK POOR	WRITE FLUENT	WRITE AVERAGE	WRITE POOR	READ FLUENT	READ AVERAGE	READ POOR
Spanish		X			X			X	
Japanese			X			X			X
German			X			X			X
Malay			X			X			X

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Graduate study, History & Politics (2 courses). CA Staff WH Liaison (15 mos). Chief, Venezuela Desk (6 mos.)

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

See personnel file.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ CONT.

APPROVAL

DATE

TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICIAL

Gerard Droller C/[illegible]

DATE

TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT OFFICER

Paul F. Arneson C/[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT	THIS DATE

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
SMITH JOSEPH BURKHOLDER

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
4813 N. 7th ST
Arlington 3, Va

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
Same as 2

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
[illegible]

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
[illegible]

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
Smith [illegible]

2. RELATIONSHIP
[illegible]

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
Same as 2 above

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country) - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
NA

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
None at present

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
NA

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
NA

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
NO OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
NA

SPOUSE. If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First) [illegible] (Middle) [illegible] (Maiden) [illegible] (Last) Smith

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
[illegible]

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)
[illegible] USA

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)
[illegible] PA

7. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)
Same as 2 above

11. DATE OF BIRTH
[illegible]

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
[illegible] PA USA

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY
NA

14. PLACE OF ENTRY
NA

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
[illegible]

16. DATE ACQUIRED
NA

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
NA

18. OCCUPATION
[illegible]

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
NA

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM 444b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-57

SECRET

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
March 1945 — Feb 1946

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
Army and Air Force

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
U.S.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
None

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☑ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☑ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.
NA

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
NA

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Shirlington Trust Co.	[illegible] VA
First National Bank of Arlington	Arlington VA

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

N.A.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
US

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE:
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION. (First papers, etc.)
NA

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☒	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Harvard, Cambridge, Mass	Hist & Govt	EC	1940	1942	AB	1942	?
Pennsylvania, Phila Pa	Hist	Int. relations	1947	1950	MA	1950	?
Johns Hopkins, Baltimore Md	Hist		1946	1947	—	—	?

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	
Mil. Int. Language school	Japanese	1944	1945	?
Yale University	Japanese	1943	1944	?

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECTION VIII GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Japan	studied language	—			X	
China	area study	—			X	
Korea	" "	—			X	

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HQOTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING
Indonesia	politics & govt.	1953 ([illegible])		X	
Singapore-Malaya	" "	1957-1958		X	
Philippines	" "	1958-1960		X	

SECTION IX TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM						
		☐	GREGG	☐	SPEEDWRITING	☐	STENOTYPE	☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

SECTION X SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Tennis - good

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

[illegible] [illegible] Teaching [illegible]

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

N/A

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

N/A

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)	6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

NA

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NA

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

5 years teaching Dickinson College; community public speaking

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

AMERICAN ASSN. OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, SEVERAL UNDERGRADUATE [illegible]

SECTION XI. ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) APRIL 1957 - SEPT 1958	2. GRADE 13	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/Br. 5
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 29	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Branch Chief	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES As usual for the position		

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) 9/1958 - Mar 1960	2. GRADE 13	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/Manila Station
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 1	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Senior PP officer concentrating on pol. action activities		

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)	2. GRADE	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

(Use additional pages if required)

SECTION XII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 2

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Ruthven Smith	Daughter	1946		X	U S	Same as above
Julie Smith	"	1952		X	U S	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED 27 April '60

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

14-00000

63-115
13-27

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6): 07898
2. ID NO.: 5018
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE: Smith, Joseph B.
4. OFFICE OR DIVISION: WH
5. LANGUAGE: Spanish
6. LANG. CODE (25-27): 725
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51: May 18, 1962
8. ANNIVERSARY DATE: May 10, 1962
9. GRADE: 11
10. DATE OF BIRTH: June 26, 1921

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST
XX APPLY FOR AWARD
ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
R	I	I	I	I

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)
XX A
M
NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
A	G-H	R	D

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $87.50 (40-45)
SIGNATURE
DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.
CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

MRD COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

23 79 49 MAR 1 62

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE — LAST *(Print)*	FIRST 6-23	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5				24-28
007894	SMITH	Joseph	B.	~~WH~~ 64

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		39-41
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		39-41
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		
	2	c/ Jan	6	62	c/ Jan	13	62	WH	811

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 6-13 Jan 62

REMARKS

5/4/62. abm

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED:
☐	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
☒	FINANCE DIVISION	5 March 62	

FORM 6-58 1451a

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET

3 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE/PIA

SUBJECT : Appreciation for Briefing of Japanese Government Officials

1. FE/JAO would like to take this opportunity to express its appreciation for the briefing conducted by Mr. Joseph Smith on 14 September for the benefit of Messrs. M. YAMAMOTO and M. SHIGAKI, of the Japanese Cabinet Research Chamber.

2. Before beginning the return portion of their trip to Japan, the two officials requested that their expressions of gratitude be conveyed to Mr. Smith for his presentation on subjects of mutual interest.

3. Briefings such as these contribute materially to our relationships with these officials and their organizations and result in considerable benefit to the overall U.S. Intelligence effort in Japan. Your continued indulgence and cooperation are requested.

Philip F. Fendig
Chief, FE/JAO

SECRET

DD/P 2-0050

CONFIDENTIAL

8 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Joseph D. Smith

SUBJECT : Commendation for Services Performed in Connection with President John F. Kennedy's Visit to Venezuela and Colombia

1. It gives me a great deal of personal pleasure to commend you on the high degree of competence and devotion to duty you displayed in connection with President John F. Kennedy's visit to Colombia and Venezuela. The professionalism you demonstrated in planning for and during the President's visit contributed to the outstanding success of his trip.

2. A copy of this memorandum is being made a matter of record in your personnel file.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
07894	SMITH	JOSEPH	B	51

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
1. PCS (Basic) 3. CORRECTION 5. CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1				03	29	60	PHILIPPINES	575

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
2. TDY (Basic) 4. CORRECTION 6. CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☒	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
FPMT 2250	30 MAR 60

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
☒	FINANCE DIVISION	4/6/60	

FORM 5-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

Secret

COMMENDATION

1. This is to commend Joseph B. Smith for his operational activities in connection with MIECU which culminated in the accomplishment of Phase One on April 24, 1959.

2. Smith is a capable, imaginative, and versatile professional operative who has had broad PBOCTOATE experience. He has handled MIDSHIP-4 in a most effective and professional manner, and rapidly developed MIREDEEM-1 at a time that proved strategic for the creation of Phase One of MIECU. He has conscientiously attempted to fulfill the objectives of MIECU.

3. It is requested that this commendation be made a part of his personnel record.

William E. [illegible]

William E. [illegible]

Signed by: George E. Aurell

7 May 1959

Secret

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

Office of Personnel
Margaret G. Dasse

Joseph B. Smith
Joseph B. Smith (Employee)

Date: 4 Feb 58

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) SMITH, Joseph B.	DATE OF BIRTH unk	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER 56-255

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on January 1955.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 22 Aug. 1957	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE George S. Cary Jr.

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

(4-21-35)

14-00000

SECRET FE/5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

3 APR 19[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph B. Smith

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 17 September 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted: Joseph B. Smith

Date: 13 July 1956

Career Service Staff
Office of Personnel
20 JUL 1956

SECRET

FORM NO. 511, 1 APR 55

(4)

[illegible] 420

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

27 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/FE/PC

SUBJECT: Covert Psychological Warfare Conferences Attended by Mr. Joseph Smith

1. Between 18 January and 26 May 1952 your consultant held a group of sixteen Secret conferences on specialized techniques in covert psychological warfare with particular reference to the Far Eastern area. These conferences amounted to a series of reorientation and developmental meetings in which persons actually on the job at CIA in OPC capacities could review their own doctrine, talents, and opportunities for serving the Government and the Agency in this field.

2. The topics covered included: a survey of the goals sought through covert activities of the U.S. Government; the basic bibliography on covert operations; the action response of target groups; media vehicles and the cultural terrain; specific covert psychological warfare techniques; the intelligence need for CPW; the operational vocabulary of Marxism; psychiatry and CPW; propaganda analysis; content analysis; press techniques of the Chinese Communists; covert economic warfare and CPW; personality problems in covert operations; basic doctrine on passive resistance; and a review meeting.

3. In difficulty and in seriousness of approach, this series of conferences corresponded to an advanced graduate course in an American university. It was a mixture of the seminar and lecture techniques.

4. Mr. Joseph Smith immediately made himself one of the outstanding participants of the group. He brought the capacity of a reflective and richly educated mind to this new field and demonstrated a real talent for seeing the opportunities presented by novel and unconventional methods of attack upon Communism. Not only did Mr. Smith learn a great deal himself; he contributed substantially to the intellectual participation of the other members of the conferences in the common tasks.

Paul M. A. Linebarger

PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER
Consultant to FE/PC

FE/PC:PMAL:rww

Distribution:
D/FE/PC, Original
FE Personnel
CIA Personnel
Mr. Smith
FE/Linebarger

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

Smith Joseph Burkholder
Name: Last, First Middle

TO: All C. I. A. Personnel

FROM: Personnel Director

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 21 Aug '58

1. The Agency is currently revising the system for machine coding employee qualifications, thereby permitting more complete and accurate data on all personnel. The new system will aid in implementing Agency policies on promotion from within by facilitating the selection of personnel with desired education and experience for vacancies which may occur. It is also expected that the new system will provide readily accessible statistics for planning and management purposes.

2. The attached questionnaire is designed to cover adequately those factors in which the Agency is interested. Although the information is, in a large measure, already reflected in previous forms submitted by you, it is felt that your time within the organization may enable you to emphasize those qualifications pertinent to its needs. The questionnaire also serves to bring your education and qualifications record up to date.

3. Your cooperation is requested in completing the questionnaire as thoroughly and accurately as possible and returning it to your Administrative Officer within the time allotted.

George E. Meloon
George E. Meloon
Personnel Director

SECRET
Security Information

FORM NO. 37-152
MAY 1952

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry) 7894	2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) Smith Joseph Burkholder	3. Office Opc (FE)
4. Date of Birth 16 June 1921	5. Sex: X male (1) __ female (2)	Martial Status M Nr. Dependents 2
6. CIA Entry Date: 17 Sept 1951		
7. Citizenship: X U.S. __ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) X Birth (2) __ Marriage (3) __ Naturalization (4) __ Other(specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ______	

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
4. Two years college, or less
5. Over two years, no degree
6. Bachelor degree
7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
[✓ 8. Masters degree]
9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd From	Dates att'd To	Yrs Compl Day	Yrs Compl Night	Degree Recd Title	Degree Recd Date	Sem Hrs
Harvard University Cambridge, Mass.	History	Govt.	1940	43	3		AB	1943	120
Yale University New Haven, Conn.	FE politics	Japan.	1943	1944	1				36
Johns Hopkins Baltimore Md.	Govt.		1947	1948	1				6
University of Penna. Philadelphia, Pa.	History	Pol. Sci	1948	1951	3		MA	1950	34

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates From	To	Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization
U. of Michigan Ann Arbor, Mich.	1944	1945	9	Japanese
Ft. Snelling Minneapolis, Minn.	1945	1945	84	Japanese, Intelligence

4. Military or Intelligence Training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, command & staff, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates From	To	Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization
This entry				
Should have been				
made here, I suppose				

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. CIA Experience: State the specific nature of duties performed with CIA and CIG, starting with your present position. Take position titles from your official personnel papers, if you have personal copies. Please do not request your Official Personnel Folder. Include geographic area and subject matter dealt with, if applicable. Position Title is your classification title such as . Geographer, Intelligence Officer, etc. Duty Title indicates your organization position such as - Section Chief, Branch Chief, Administrative Assistant, etc., and is to be filled in only if different to the Position Title. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From 1951 To 1952 Tot. mos. 10 Grade 11 Salary 5940 Office Opc (FE) Position Title: Operations Officer Duty Title: Psy War and Pol warfare Advisor For SEA	Description of Duties: assist in planning of SEA objectives and country plans assist desk officers in writing projects in Political and psychological warfare. Coordinate FE matters with ADPC's staff and with other agencies and depts. assist in writing PSB plans. Duty Station, if overseas:
From To Tot. mos. Grade Salary Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From To Tot. mos. Grade Salary Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From To Tot. mos. Grade Salary Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.)

From 1946 To 1951 Tot. mo's 63 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) ______ Salary 3600 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 150 students (av.) Employer Dickinson College Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) College	Exact Title of your position Asst. Prof. of History Description of Duties: Teach 14 hrs history weekly, including Far Eastern, American, European (middle ages) (general survey) Duty Station if overseas:
From 1943 To 1946 Tot. mo's 35 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) T/5 Salary 90 per mo. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) U.S. Army (MIS)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Japanese language specialist. Duty Station if overseas:
From ______ To ______ Tot. mo's ______ Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) ______ Salary ______ Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From ______ To ______ Tot. mo's ______ Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) ______ Salary ______ Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From ______ To ______ Tot. mo's ______ Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) ______ Salary ______ Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01___ U.S. Secret Service
02___ Civil Police
03___ Military Police
04___ U.S. Border Patrol
05___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06___ FBI
07___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22___ Office of War Information
[✓ 23]___ Army G-2
20___ Office of Strategic Services
24___ Air Force A-2
25___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26___ Counter Intelligence Corps
27___ Immigration & Naturalization
28___ Strategic Services Unit
29___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30___ Central Intelligence Group
31___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32___ Coordinator of Information
33___ Office of Facts & Figures
34___ Board of Economic Warfare
35___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study (Inc. CIA training)
Japanese				X						X

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein. I have sufficient spoken Japanese for category #2 (above) but my knowledge of written Japanese needs considerable review.

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ___

SECRET
·· Information

SEC.
2.

Fr
Cl
Se
N
S
E
K
(I
u
I
(
S
I

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
Japan				X
China				X
mainland SEA				X

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specalized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION) N/A

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc. None

2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications. Writing

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership. American History Assn.
American Assn of University Professors

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

"The Koreans and their Living Space", Korean Review, Sept. 1949

"A Frontier Experiment with Higher Education", Penna. History, Jan. 1949

Understanding Our State Government, Masland and Sons, Carlisle, Pa 1949

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented
None	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No

SEC. X. CIA TESTS

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken in CIA:

Type of Test	Date Taken
None	

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

None

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

[✓ (1)] 2 year Tour X [✓ (2)] 4 year Tour X (3) Not interested ____

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment in CIA do you think you are best qualified?

Work on psychological and political warfare matters related to the Far East, at headquarters or in the field, in a planning and/or supervisory capacity.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status

Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? Yes [✓ No.]

If yes, indicate your present draft classification __________

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status

Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status Yes [✓ No.]

If yes, complete the following.

1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service __________ Grade __________ Location __________

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated __________

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any __________

Location of Service Records, if known __________

SEC. XV. CIA TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken while in the CIA.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours
None		

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

From 15 JAN 1952 to 15 MAY 1952, I attended a seminar in psychological warfare given by an FE Division consultant & professor at SAIS.

DATE 24 June 1952

SIGNATURE Joseph B. Smith

SECRET
Security Information

14-00000

Clearance of category
X-V

CONFIDENTIAL

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

Smith, Joseph Burkholder

OFFICE CIC	DIVISION FE
BRANCH [illegible]	SECTION IV

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Central Intelligence Agency	Washington, D.C.	17	9	1951	31	12	51	15	3	—
							Total Civilian Service	15	3	

SCD: ~~[illegible]~~ 10-3-48
Verified 8-20-57
fz

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
U.S. Army	11	3	1943	24	2	1946	14	11	2
						Total Military Service	14	11	2

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

[illegible] 1951
DATE

Joseph B. Smith
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ARMY SERVICE)

[illegible] 12/21/51

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
29	2	3

Cat 6

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA (Department or agency) .... (Bureau or division) .... Washington, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, Joseph Burkholder Smith, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

17/9/51 (Date of entrance on duty)

Joseph B. Smith (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 17 day of September, A. D. 1951,

at Washington, (City) D. C. (State)

(Signature of officer)

[SEAL]

(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State)
3073 So Woodrow St. Arlington, Va.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 16/6/21
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country): Harrisburg, Pa.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: Jeanne H. Smith
(B) RELATIONSHIP: wife
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 3073 So Woodrow St. Arlington, VA.
(D) TELEPHONE NO.:

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION - (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		✓
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		✓
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		✓
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		✓

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS
ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that the appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for [illegible] and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and other pertinent papers. [illegible]

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. [illegible] In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been obtained from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible to probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. [illegible] Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY CIB

1. NAME (LAST) SMITH, (FIRST) JOSEPH (MIDDLE) B.

2. DATE 25 July 1956

3. TO POSITION Foreign Service Staff Off.

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH FE

5. GRADE GS-13

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☒ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Subject is qualified for Departmental Duties (8/3/56).
May be re-evaluated on request.

Max N. Hartman
MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION (☐ OVERT ☒ COVERT) (☒ ISR ☐ CPB)

1. NAME (LAST) SMITH (FIRST) Joseph (MIDDLE) B.

2. DATE 2 Dec. 53

3. TO POSITION Intell. Off.

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH Singapore, Malaya
DDP/FE, Malaya Station

5. GRADE GS-12

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☒ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR Transfer of funds.
☐ EOD
☒ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Transfer of funds from Vouchered to Unvouchered.

Return to Miss Meadows, Wing 1-J, Curie Hall

S. had exam 3-30-53 and found qualified for Full duty/General
12-9-53.

MEDICAL OFFICE

FORM NO. 37-115
MAY 1950

TO: Medical Division

FROM: Transactions & Records

SUBJECT: Joseph B. Smith

Request that above named subject be given a physical examination.

POSITION: Intelligence Officer

GRADE: GS-9

BRANCH: OPC

SERVICE: Departmental

NATURE OF APPOINTMENT: Exc.

OK.

Peggy Decey

9/17/51

FORM NO. 37-115
MAY 1950

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME Smith, Joseph B.	NATURE OF ACTION EOD
TITLE OF POSITION I.O.	GRADE GS-9
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Department	

Subject was found physically ☒ fit ☐ unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

17 Sept 19[illegible]
DATE

SIGNATURE O YSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-87
NOV 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT	NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 007894	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Smith, Joseph B.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Jun 21	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-14	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/WH/1	9. CURRENT STATION Mexico City

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		CAREER PROVISIONAL		RESERVE
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

	ANNUAL		21-MONTH		30-MONTH		REASSIGNMENT	X	SPECIAL Retirement

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-) 1 Nov 72 - 30 June 73

13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for CA and Political activities.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Collects intelligence on selected targets in the Mexican government and political arena.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops new contacts and operations to improve the output of Station third country targeted propaganda.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops new contacts for producing intelligence on significant targets in the Mexican political and intellectual community.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 5-73 45N

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

8 AUG 1973 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject will retire effective 30 June 1973 thus this will be his final agency Fitness Report. Subject's performance at this Station, during the past four years, has always been consistently strong. Subject has primarily concentrated his attention on CA and Mexican government matters. He has done very well at developing contacts in government circles and we have taken advantage of this ability.

Subject is responsive to guidance and direction and has an excellent grasp and understanding of local politics and its ever changing profile. Subject is a mature seasoned officer who will be missed at this Station. His departure for retirement will be most felt in the area of his specialization.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 29 ~~22~~ June 1973	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/Joseph B. Smith

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 48	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 29 ~~22~~ June 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ George A. Fill

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

In writing a comment on his Fitness Report in January 1973, I spoke of what a loss he will be to the Station. Because of overlap problems, he will have retired soon after the new COS arrives and before the new DCOS has come. It is typical of him that he has offered to perform introductions to some of his contacts even after retirement. He will be in Mexico and, while the Station must be careful to protect him in his new status, he probably will think of the Station first when he runs on to things of interest.

DATE 12 ~~22X~~June 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/John Horton

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

UIC

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, ~~Office of~~ Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
007894	SMITH Joseph Burkholder	16 June 1921

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - TO -			
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

SECRET

6 9 SEP

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 12 9 01 AM '68
MAIL ROOM

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Argentina	politics, sociology	Jun.62-Aug66	Buenos Aires Mendoza	X	X		X
Peru		Jun 64			X		

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

No updating necessary for portions not filled in.

DATE 9 April 1968

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
< ● 2	6-DIGITS ●	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS ●

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR ●	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR ●	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< ● 3	●	●	●							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR ●	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR ●	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NON-LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< ● 5	● 007894	● SMI	● C	● BL18	4	3	4	4	4	4	63

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST			
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR	
● BL18	H	3	I	I	H	4	67	● 04	13	67	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AWARDS DATA.

10 JUL 1967

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME	ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
< ● 4	●	3-LETTERS ●	A - ADDITION TO RECORD C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE	CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR
	SMITH, JOSEPH B.										

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
								04/13/67	06/16/21	14	OTR

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN SPANISH (NEW WORLD) BL18 (NAME OF LANGUAGE) AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
H	+	I	I	H

TEST RATINGS
Q = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE
S = SLIGHT H = HIGH
E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 19 JUN 1967

12. SIGNATURE

13. LD NUMBER
L3652

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-40) **SECRET** GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION 1 - OP/QAB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

SECTION I

1. EMP SER NO 037854	2. NAME (last-first-middle) SMITH JOSEPH B	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 06/16/21	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS -14-05
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE INSTR OPERATIONS	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OTR	9. LOCATION (country, city) WASH., D.C.	

AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

SECTION II

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
INDONESIA	TDY ~~PCS~~ 56	53/06/01	53/08/01
~~ASIA AREA~~ SINGAPORE	PCS 56	54/03/01	56/06/01
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	PCS 56	58/03/01	60[illegible]/~~09~~/01 08
ARGENTINA	PCS 56	62/06/01	66/08/01

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 14 JUN 67
INITIALS:

EDUCATION

SECTION III

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	HISTORY, GENERAL	HARVARD UNIV MASS	43
MSTR	HISTORY, GENERAL	PA UNIV	50

FORM 1-67 444j

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

67 JUN ENTD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - - CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
JAPAN	political, cultural		YALE 1943-44			X	
CHINA	political, cultural		YALE 1943-44			X	
THAILAND	political, cultural		1951-53, WASH DC				X
BURMA	political, cultural		1951-53, WASH DC				X
VIETNAM	political, cultural		1951-53 WASH DC				X
INDONESIA	political, industrial, cultural	1953	1956-58 1953-54 WASH DC	X			X
MALAYSIA	political, cultural	1954-56	1956-58 WASH DC	X			X
Philippines	political, cultural	1958-1960		X			X
VENEZUELA	political, cultural	~~[illegible]~~	1960-1961 WASH D.C.				X
ARGENTINA	political, cultural	1962-1966		X			X

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

~~[illegible]~~

See PHS

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

See PHS

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

See PHS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single Married Widowed Separated Divorced Annulled Remarried SPECIFY

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) Middle (Maiden)
No CHANGE

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U. S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Ruthven Smith	daughter	25/2/46 HARRISBURG PA	U.S.	11703 KAREN DR. Potomac, Md
Julie E. Smith	daughter	19/12/52 ALEXANDRIA Va	U.S.	11703 KAREN DR. Potomac, Md.
Andrew C. Smith	son	20/9/60 Alexandria Va.	U.S.	11703 KAREN Dr. Potomac, Md.

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO

DATE
29/4/1157

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Joseph B. Smith

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

27 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION : Staff Agents Branch

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Division

SUBJECT : Smith, Joseph [redacted] (P)
#56169

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 26 April 1962 in which a covert security clearance was requested to permit Subject's use as a Staff Agent, GS-13, by DDP/WH/2/Argentina Station in the capacity of Operations Officer at Buenos Aires, Argentina.

2. This is to advise that a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

4. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-5)

REQUEST DATE (6-11): 26 April 1962

NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) (12-20): [redacted] Smith, Joseph

YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30): 06/16/21

POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

POSITION NUMBER (31-36):

OCCUP. CODE (37-42):

GRADE (43-44): GS-13

LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): Buenos Aires, Argentina

ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH): DDP/WH/2/Argentina Station

ORGN. CODE (45-46):

TYPE OF APPLICANT: REGULAR · CONSULTANT · ✓ CONTRACT · MILITARY

CONVERSION ACTION: SE-SA

IF OTHER, SPECIFY:

TYPE OF APPL. (49):

NAME OF REQUESTER (OR OFFICIAL): Joseph B. Ragan
JOSEPH B. RAGAN, Chief/CPD

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS: HQS · USF · FF · V · UV

HDQTRS & FUND (50):

CLEARANCE REQUIRED: PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP): COVERT SECURITY CLEARANCE · SECRET · FULL

CLEARANCE (51):

ATTACHMENTS: PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT · PHOTOGRAPH(S) · APPENDIX I · APPENDIX II · REQUEST FOR WAIVER · REPORT OF INTERVIEW

RECRUIT. CODE (52-54):

VETERANS STATUS: MALE - VETERAN · MALE - NON-VETERAN · FEMALE - VETERAN · FEMALE - NON-VETERAN

VET PREF. & SEX (55):

REMARKS:

Security #: 56169

Case Officer: Louis Napoli x6556

(under nonofficial cover)

Please forward clearance memo to SA Branch/CPD
Attn: Dot Kreinhoder
5 E 38

Phone verbal concurrence to Jo Ann Varney
x7170

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 1 SEP. 56 377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ Joseph Burkholder Smith (First) (Middle) (Last)

Telephone 265
Office
Ext. none
Home Mt Holly 909-R-12

PRESENT ADDRESS Box 323 B, Route 2, Gardners, Pa. USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS same as above (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME Joe WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? none

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES?

HOW LONG? IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

(Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 6/16/21 PLACE OF BIRTH Harrisburg, Pa., USA (City) (State) (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U.S. (Country) BY BIRTH? yes BY MARRIAGE?

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. ISSUED (Date) BY (Court)

AT (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? no (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? TO ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? no GIVE PARTICULARS:

14-00000

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? .... ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ....

LAST U. S. VISA .... (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 29 SEX male HEIGHT 5' 7'' WEIGHT 155

EYES hazel HAIR brown COMPLEXION ruddy SCARS none

BUILD stocky OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES wear glasses

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE .... MARRIED yes DIVORCED .... WIDOWED ....

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ....

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Jean (First) Marie (Middle) Hoffman (Maiden) Smith (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE Cambridge, Mass., December 19, 1942

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 1928 Green St., Harrisburg, Pa. U.S. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Box 323 B, Route 2, Gardners, Pa. U.S. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 9/9/23 PLACE OF BIRTH Enola, Pa., U.S. (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ....

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? birth WHERE? Enola, Pa. U.S (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION housewife LAST EMPLOYER Earl Moore, Dean University of Michigan Music School, Ann Arbor, Mich.

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM none (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME Ruthven Smith RELATIONSHIP daughter AGE 5

CITIZENSHIP U.S. ADDRESS Box 323B, Route 2, Gardners, Pa. U.S (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME no other children RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Robert Craighead Smith (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 2225N. 3rd St., Harrisburg, Pa., U.S. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 3/28/84 PLACE OF BIRTH Baltimore, Md., U.S. (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? birth WHERE? Baltimore, Md. (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION rate clerk LAST EMPLOYER Shirks Motor Express Cor

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS P.O. Box 239 Enola, Pa. U.S. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM none (Date) TO (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Margaret Elizabeth Burkholder Smith (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 2225 N 3rd St., Harrisburg, Pa. U.S. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 8/3/88 PLACE OF BIRTH Harrisburg, Pa. U.S.

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? birth WHERE? Harrisburg, Pa. (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

OCCUPATION housewife LAST EMPLOYER none

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ________ TO ________ BRANCH OF SERVICE ________

COUNTRY ________ DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN ________

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME Robert Craighead Smith Jr. (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE deceased
   PRESENT ADDRESS no other brothers or sisters (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME ________ (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME ________ (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME ________ (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME ________ (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME John Frederick Hoffman (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED deceased DATE OF DECEASE 6/10/49 CAUSE heart failure

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 1708 Wyndham Road, Camp Hill, Pa. U.S. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 9/27/99 PLACE OF BIRTH Huntington, Pa. U.S.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? birth WHERE? Huntington, Pa. U.S. (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION agent LAST EMPLOYER Prudential Insurance Co

Sec. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Hilda Marie Smith Hoffman
(First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED deceased DATE OF DECEASE 1928 CAUSE hyperthyroid

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 107½ Columbia Road, Enola, Pa. U.S.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 9/18/00 PLACE OF BIRTH Harrisburg, Pa.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? birth WHERE? Harrisburg, Pa. U.S.
(City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION housewife LAST EMPLOYER none

Sec. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES: NA

1. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

Sec. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME William Turner RELATIONSHIP 1st cousin AGE 44

CITIZENSHIP U.S. ADDRESS VA Hospital, Northport, L. I. U.S.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) medical officer, VA (I believe)

2. NAME James W. Engel RELATIONSHIP husband of 1st cousin AGE 56

CITIZENSHIP U.S. ADDRESS 1634 N. Irvine St. Arlington, Va. U.S.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) bacteriologist, Washington D.C.

3. NAME John Smith RELATIONSHIP wife's 3rd cousin AGE 32

CITIZENSHIP U.S. ADDRESS unknown
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) AF, Japan, (I believe)

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR Intelligence Specialist, Far East, Planning, and/or research

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 4600
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY occasionally
FREQUENTLY ______, CONSTANTLY ______

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. x
ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES x, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES ______

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL Cameron ADDRESS Harrisburg, Pa. U.S. (City) (State) (Country)
DATES ATTENDED 1928-1934 GRADUATE? yes

HIGH SCHOOL William Penn ADDRESS Harrisburg, Pa., U.S. (City) (State) (Country)
DATES ATTENDED 1937-1940 GRADUATE? yes

COLLEGE Harvard ADDRESS Cambridge, Mass., U.S. (City) (State) (Country)
MAJOR AND SPECIALTY His. Govt., Ec. American History YEARS COMPLETED graduated
DATES ATTENDED 1940-1943 DEGREE A.B. cum laude

COLLEGE Yale ADDRESS New Haven, Conn, U.S. (City) (State) (Country)
MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Far East Japanese YEARS COMPLETED 1
DATES ATTENDED 1943-1944 DEGREE certificate

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS History, Government, Economics,

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS Japanese, Political Science, History, geography.

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

U.S. (Country) Army (Service) corporal (Rank) Mar.1943-Feb. 1946 (Dates of Service)

Ft. Snelling, Minn. U.S. (Last Station) 11081139 (Serial Number) honorable (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS:

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 3 ADDRESS Harrisburg, Pa.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS College Enlisted Reserve, July 1942-Mar. 1943.

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM August 1, 1946 TO date CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Dickinson College

ADDRESS Carlisle, Pa. U.S. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS college NAME OF SUPERVISOR Herbert Wing, Jr.

TITLE OF JOB Asst. Prof. of History SALARY $ 3600 PER year

YOUR DUTIES teach 12 hours of history weekly

REASONS FOR LEAVING no chance for advancement

FROM May 1946 TO July 1946 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) CAF 1 (I think)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY United States Employment Service

ADDRESS 2nd and Locust Strs. Harrisburg, Pa. U.S. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS employment agency NAME OF SUPERVISOR Jack Brown

TITLE OF JOB Jr. clerk SALARY $ 108 PER month

YOUR DUTIES process veterans' applications for unemployment compensation; hand out checks.

REASONS FOR LEAVING to accept position at Dickinson

FROM Mar.1943 TO Feb.1946 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) corporal

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. Army

ADDRESS principal stations,Yale,U.ofMichigan,Ft.Snelling,Minn
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS soldier NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB principally SALARY $ 90 PER mo.

YOUR DUTIES Japanese language specialist student and trainee translation of Japanese military materials. Last few weeks before discharge I served as a company clerk.

REASONS FOR LEAVING honorable discharge,length of service

FROM Feb.1946 TO May 1946 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY unemployed

ADDRESS 1928 Green St.,Harrisburg,Pa.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB NA SALARY $ NA PER NA

YOUR DUTIES I was looking for employment, negotiating with Dickinson College,Carlisle,Pa., part of this time, also drew unemployment compensation as veteran, and in May1946 accepted position with USES while awaiting

REASONS FOR LEAVING notice of empolyment from Dickinson College.

FROM Feb.1943 TO Mar 1943 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Patriot and Evening News Co.

ADDRESS Market Square,Harrisburg,Pa.U.S.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS newspaper NAME OF SUPERVISOR V.HummelBerghaus

TITLE OF JOB reporter SALARY $ 20 PER week

YOUR DUTIES general reporting

REASONS FOR LEAVING to enter U.S. Army

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

no

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Japanese SPEAK fluent READ fair WRITE slight

LANGUAGE German SPEAK fair READ fair WRITE slight

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

badminton, fair bridge, fair

tennis, fair

gardening, good

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Japanese language specialist, MIS

college professor of history, 5 years experience

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

none

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 40 SHORTHAND 0

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC.

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE no

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) .... LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ....

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

"The Koreans and Their Living Space," Korean Review, Korean American Cultural Assn., Sept. 1949

"A Frontier Experiment in Higher Education", Pennsylvania History Pennsylvania Historical Assn., Jan. 1949

Understanding Our State Government, C.H. Masland and Sons, Carlisle, ~~Fall 1949.~~

Held full tuition scholarships at Harvard, 1940-43, from various funds.

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

no

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

no

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. William Shower, Jr. BUS. ADD. Shower Mfg. Co. Kansas City, Mo.
RES. ADD. 5819 High Drive, Kansas City, Mo.

2. Herbert C. Rupp, Jr. BUS. ADD. 317 N. 2nd St., Harrisburg, Pa.
RES. ADD. 3010 N. Second St. Harrisburg, Pa

3. James G. Gates BUS. ADD. 728 S. Cameron St, Harrisburg, Pa.
RES. ADD. 251 S. Hanover, St. Carlisle, Pa.

4. Capt. Edward F. Keevan BUS. ADD. Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
RES. ADD. 5401 Columbia Pike, Arlington Va.

5. Whitfield J. Bell BUS. ADD. Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa.
RES. ADD. 165 W. High St., Carlisle, Pa.

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. Milton E. Flower, BUS. ADD. Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa.
RES. ADD. 166 W. Pomfret St., Carlisle, Pa.

2. Harry E. Newman, BUS. ADD. Bond Bakers, Harrisburg, Pa.
RES. ADD. 3012 N. 3rd St, Harrisburg, Pa.

3. Mrs. Harry T. Rensel BUS. ADD. Pomeroy's Inc. Harrisburg, Pa.
RES. ADD. 2501 Green St. Harrisburg, Pa.

4. Roy R. Kuebler BUS. ADD. Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa.
RES. ADD. 212 N. Hanover St. Carlisle, Pa.

5. Philip Bridgham BUS. ADD. Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa.
RES. ADD. 422 W. Louther St. Carlisle, Pa.

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. Frank Black BUS. ADD. C. H. Masland, Carlisle, Pa.
RES. ADD. Route 2, Gardners, Pa.

2. Walter Slusser BUS. ADD. Naval Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, Pa.
RES. ADD. R.D.2, Gardners, Pa.

3. Lloyd Brough BUS. ADD. unknown
RES. ADD. R.D.2 Gardners, Pa.

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
Carlisle Deposit Bank and Trust Co., Carlisle, Pa.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? no
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.
1. NAME Carlisle Deposit ADDRESS Carlisle,Pa. (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME Carlisle Trust Co. ADDRESS Carlisle,Pa. (St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME Montgomery Ward Inc. ADDRESS Carlisle,Pa. (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM 1950 TO Present Box 322 B,Route 2,Gardners,Pa. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 1949 TO 1950 50 N. College St.,Carlisle,Pa. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 1947 TO 1949 100 N. College St.,Carlisle,Pa. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 1943 TO 1947 1928 Green St.Harrisburg,Pa. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 1940 TO 1943 Harvard University,Cambridge,Mass. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM TO or 2225 N 3rd St. Harrisburg,Pa. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 1939 TO 1940 2203 Green St. Harrisburg,Pa. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 1936 TO 1939 2220 N. 3rd St. Harrisburg,Pa. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

NA

A. FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. American Association of University Professors (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: local chapter,Dickinson,Carlisle Pa.1949-date

2. American Historical Assocaition,Washington,D.C. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1947 - date

3. Signet Society Harvard University Cambridge,Mass. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1941-1943

4. Harvard Crimson, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1941 1943

5. Crimson Network and Radio Workshop, Harvard University, Cambridge Mass.
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1941-1943

6. Zion Lutheran Church, Harrisburg, Pa.
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1934-to date

7. Carlisle, Inter-cultural Council, Carlisle, Pa.
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1947-1949

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?
no
IF "YES," EXPLAIN:

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? moderately

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:
no

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:
no

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:
Central Intelligency Agency
Army Intelligence
Chief of Military History
Historical Office, Army Chemical Center, Edgewood, Md.
Navy Intelligence
Operations Research Office

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

not to my knowledge

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Jean Hoffman Smith RELATIONSHIP wife

ADDRESS Box 323 B, Route 2, Gardners, Pa. U.S. (Rt. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

no

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Carlisle, Pa. (City and State) DATE May 31, 1951

(Witness) Joseph B. Smith (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16 [illegible]

Addenda

Sec. 11. I wish to state that the material here furnished is approximate only. I have not seen any of these relatives in over 10 years and cannot check the material any further.

Sec. 13.
Colleges: (continued)

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
1944-45, Japanese and Far Eastern society
certificate granted (12 hours graduate credit)

Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
1947-48 Political Science and Political Geography
Far East(especially Korean area-speciality)

University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
1948- to date(part time)
History, especially American social history
M.A., January, 1950.

Sec. 15. July-Aug. 1941
July-Aug. 1942
Harrisburg Park Department
park maintenance, Clarence Beck, supervisor
laborer, $16 per week
summertime general laboring in city parks
summer job while attending college
nb. what appear as periods of unemployment in these years can be accounted for by my attendance at Harvard University Cambridge, Mass.

Sec. 24. 8. Foreign Policy Association, Branch, Harrisburg, Pa.
1950 to date
9. Employee groups--Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ins.
1947(I think) to date.

STANDARD FORM 57- NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

…LICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYM…

INSTRUCTIONS: In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type, write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: Historian
2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement): Intelligence, Social Science Analyst
3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State): Washington, D. C.
4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: April 3, 1950
5. ☒ Mr. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): Joseph Burkholder Smith
6. (a) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 50 North College Street
(b) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Carlisle, Pennsylvania
7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): Pennsylvania
8. (a) OFFICE PHONE: 265 (b) HOME PHONE: 288 R
9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): June 16, 1921
10. ☒ MARRIED ☐ SINGLE
11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE
13. (a) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 7 INCHES (b) WEIGHT: 165 POUNDS
14. (a) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO
(b) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE: Jr. Clerk, July 1946

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON APPOR.
MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED
ENTERED REGISTER
NOTATIONS:
APP. REVIEW:
APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUG. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (a) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 4500 PER YEAR. *You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.*
(b) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED, FOR: ☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS
NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*
(c) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: ☒ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY
(d) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: ☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
(e) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS:

16. EXPERIENCE: It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year): FROM August 1946 TO PRESENT TIME
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Asst. Professor History
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service):
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 2600 PER Yr. PRESENT $ 3400 PER Yr.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Carlisle, Pennsylvania
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Herbert Wing, Jr., Chairman, History Dept.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Dickinson College
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Four Year Liberal Arts College
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 150 Students
REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT: No chance for advancement

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:
14 hours teaching: including: World history, American history,
human geography, historical geography, Far Eastern history.
Have also taught: English history, International Relations history
history of Science, medieval history.
Committee work: president's policy committee
(advice on major policy decisions)
World civilization course committee
Honors candidates committee
(these last two are self-explanatory)

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

14-00000

18. CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: May 1946 TO: July 1946

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Jr. Clerk

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service): Jr. Clerk

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 100 PER mo. FINAL $ 108 PER mo.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): USES Harrisburg Pa. Branch Office

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Jack Brown, Office Manager

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): USES Branch Office, Harrisburg

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Employment Office

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: none

REASON FOR LEAVING: To accept position at Dickinson

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

Processed veterans for unemployment compensation. Distributed checks to veterans.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: Mar. 1943 TO: Feb. 1946

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Cpl.

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service): 749 mos

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $90 PER mo. FINAL $90 PER mo.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Ft. Snelling, Minneapolis Minn.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: C. E. Taylor, Company Commander

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): U. S. Army, Mis. Language School

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Japanese Language and Intelligence

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: Army Squad

REASON FOR LEAVING: Honorable Discharge

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

Studied Japanese and Japan at University of Michigan, then Ft. Snelling. Study included spoken and written Japanese Organization of Japanese Army, Japanese Intelligence, Political and Social Institutions of Japan.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: TO:

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR LEAVING:

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NAME: Joseph Burkholder Smith

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: June 16, 1921
Harrisburg, Pa.

Marital status: Married

Children: one daughter, aged 4

EDUCATION: Entered Harvard University, Sept. 1940, completed requirements for degree, cum laude, in history, government and economics, Feb. 1943, awarded degree while in service, Nov. 1943.
History: 30 hours, including, American, modern European, ancient, medieval,
Honors thesis: Andrew Jackson and the Presidency
Government: 12 hours, including, American federal, comparative, administration, political theory.
Economics: 12 hours, including, principles, banking, international trade.

Further: Yale University, 1943-44, ASTP, Far Eastern Area and Japanese, including, Chinese and Japanese history, Pacific islands, society, Japanese political parties and society and spoken Japanese.

University of Michigan: MIS Language School, including spoken and written Japanese, Japanese political, social and military organization (awarded 12 hours graduate credit) 1944-45.

GRADUATE: Training: Johns Hopkins University, 1947-48, 6 hours, international relations and political geography, including economic geography and seminar study of Korea.

University of Pennsylvania, 1948-50, 34 hours, history and political science.

History: 30 hours, including, American social, diplomatic, development and organization of British Empire, British foreign policy 1919-1939, American colonial, political since 1865, United States and Latin America.
Political Science: 4 hours, government and politics Latin America.

DEGREES: A. B. Harvard, A.M. University of Pennsylvania (doctorate expected in history, University of Pennsylvania 1951).

MILITARY SERVICE: U. S. Army, 1943-1946, Grade: corporal, Unit: MIS, Japanese specialist.

EXPERIENCE: Instructor in history, Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa., 1946-48.
Assistant Professor of history, Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa., 1949 -
Subjects taught: world history, medieval, American, Far East, International relations, human geography, historical geography.

PUBLICATIONS: "A Frontier Experiment in Higher Education", Pennsylvania History, Pa., Historical Association, January 1949. A study in the social problems in the establishment of Dickinson College in Carlisle, Penn. 1783-1803. "The Koreans and Their Living Space", Korean Review, Korean Cultural Association, September, 1949. An attempted analysis of the Korean situation in terms of political and economic geography.

Understanding our State Government, C. F. Masland and Sons, Carlisle, Pa., 1949. A booklet discussing the history, organization and functioning of the government of Pennsylvania published for the Masland employees and for use in the schools of Pennsylvania.

ORGANIZATIONS: American Historical Association, American Association of University Professors.

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFICATION (if in Federal service) GRADE	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU		REASON FOR LEAVING	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES		LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
FROM	TO		

18. EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF: ☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED
William Penn, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED
History, Problems of Democracy, German

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED		DEGREES CONFERRED		SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
		FROM	TO	DAY	NIGHT	TITLE	DATE	
Harvard, Cambridge Mass.	His. Gov.	1940	1943	3		AB	1949	150
Yale, New Haven Conn.	Jap.	1943	1944	1				36
Michigan, AnnArbor Mich.	Jap.	1944	1945	1				12(GRAD)

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
History	30	History	30
Government	12	Political Science	10
Economics	12	Japanese	12

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR IN-SERVICE TRAINING IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

See attached summary

SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED	
	FROM	TO	DAY	NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ger. Fr.			X						
Japanese		X			X			X	

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☐ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20. [illegible] (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES, (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT [illegible] (3) [illegible] (e. g., military service, business, education, vacation)

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS [illegible]

See attached summary

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(1) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(5) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

See attached summary

APPLICANTS: [illegible]

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Herbert Wing Jr.	History Dept. Dickinson College Carlisle Pennsylvania	Dept. Chairman (History)
2. Conyers Read	History Dept. University of Penna., Philadelphia 4, Penna.	Historian
3. Leonidas Dodson	Same as above #2	Historian

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		X
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $5 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39*		

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WARTIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?		
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?		
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE, FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?		

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
March 1943	February 1946
BRANCH OF SERVICE (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.) Army	SERIAL NO. (if none, give grade or rating at time of separation) 11 081 139

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		X
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (Indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
	See attached summary		
	38. Full files exist at: University of Penna., Placement Service Attention: Miss Quick Philadelphia, Pa.		

If more space is required, use sheets the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

(Sign your name in ink) [illegible]

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

Joseph B.Smith
Box 323 B,Route 2
Gardners,Pa.

Items 21 and 23, Form 57

I. Educational Background
A. Undergraduate
1. Student at Harvard College,1940-43
a. Held tuition scholarships granted from various funds
b. Activities included: Crimson(asst. editorial chairman) dramatics, radio(Harvard Radio Workshop)
c. Completed requirements for A.B. degree(cum laude),in 2 and one-half years.
d. Field of concentration -History,Government,Economics
1) 12 hours American history,12 hours European history, 6 hours ancient history.
2) honors thesis
Andrew Jackson and the Tribunician Theory of the Presidency
a) An analysis of the concept of the powers of the president held by Jackson and his lieutenants, including an attemp to trace their origin in the democratic movement of the 1830s
3) Other subjects studied
12 hours government
6 hours economics
6 hours sociology
6 hours geology
3 hours political philosophy

B. Military Training
1. Student atYale University 1943-44
a. 36 hours Japanese and history and politics of the Far East
b. 18 hours Japanese and 18 hours history of China and Japan.
1) Emphasis placed on analysis of society of these countries
a) Research in the political organization of modern Japan and modern China
b) Study of the military organization of Japan and China
c) Some study of personalities

2. Student at University of Michigan,1944-45
a. 12 hours graduate credit for study of Japan and Japanese
b. Hours divided between study of written and spoken Japanese and history of Japan
1) Emphasis placed on history and politics in the study of the language in addition to special study of political organization
a) Example-study of recent Japanese history in Japanese.

3. Ft. Snelling,Minnesota, MIS Japanese Language School
a. Major emphasis on Japanese military organization
e.g. units of Japanese army,navy,weapons,equipment.

C. Graduate Study
1. Johns Hopkins University,1947-48
a. International relations and seminar in political geography.

Joseph B. Smith
Box 323 D, Route 2
Gardners, Pa.

Items 21 and 23, Form 57

C. Graduate Study (continued)

Work Project #1

A. Project Synopsis

1. The strength and vulnerability of Korea as an independent nation.
2. Location - Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
3. I was the sole worker employed.
4. The political geography seminar was concerned in 1847-48 with areas of maximum change. Members of the seminar conducted studies of India, Poland, Newfoundland, Ceylon, Sinkiang, Korea.
   a. Each member made a deep-level study of the area of his choice. I chose Korea.
5. Principal sources used by me were: USAMG Reports, all available background studies, interviews with Koreans stationed at Carlisle, (Carlisle Barracks AMG School) and with Miss Phyllis Johnson, reporter who was in Korea 1945-46.
6. The material covered mostly the years 1945-46-47, and was fairly complete for South Korea. I was unable to get information on North Korea, nor would the Army give me political information other than that officially published.
7. Methods used were historical and political because of my previous training. Statistics were used wherever possible.
8. Length of study-Sept. 1947-Sept. 1948.
9. Findings and conclusions
   a. I made an analysis of Korean physiographic features; including edaphic as well as usual climatic and topographical factors.
      1) I attempted to find the physical potential for the successful maintaining of Korean independent national existence.
      2) Conclusion: such obviously favorable factors as Korean peninsular situation were nullified by other space relations which made Korea vulnerable to Russian and Chinese attack.
      I found also that the soil was not adaptable throughout Korea for the practise of the nation's most thoroughly learned economic technique-rice culture.
   b. Secondly, I made a complete check on the resources of the Korean economy, as far as I could. The limitations imposed by censorship made it impossible for me to correlate North Korean industrial activity with South Korean agricultural activity as completely as I could have otherwise done.
      1) Conclusions: The country would have to be industrialized to overcome the problem of overpopulation.
      The Korean people had not shown in the past any significant evidence of the ability to operate a democratic government.
10. My study was not used by any government agency.
11. My study was published, in part, under the title "The Koreans and their Living Space", in the Korean Review, Korean-American Cultural Association, Sept. 1949.

Joseph B. Smith
Box 323 B Route 2
Gardners, Pa.

Work Project #1
continued

12. Two persons with knowledge of this project: Dr. E.F.Penrose
Johns Hopkins
Baltimore,Md.
Owen Lattimore
Johns Hopkins
Baltimore,Md.

B. Participation

1. I was the person responsible for formulating and carrying out the Korean part of the general project(See A, 4).
2. The determination of the sources used was made by me. I was assisted, in part, by Dr.Penrose and Mr. Lattimore.
3. I gathered the data.
   a. I analyzed the data according to three principal criteria
      Accuracy of information
      Existence of corroborating information
      Use of statistics when available in preference to other data
   b. General procedure followed
      Gather as much information as possible
      Attempt to eliminate waste effort by concentrating objective (the strength or vulnerability of Korea as an independent state
   c. Dr. Penrose.Mr. Lattimore and Dr. Jean Gottmann advised me at various points mostly on methodology
4. Conclusion and report preparation
   a. Conclusions were my own responsibility
   b. Writing and editing were done by me with one exception
      Exception: Mr. Lattimore advised me to re-examine the peninsular situation of Korea and suggested the idea which led to my conclusion on this point(See A, 9,a).
5. This was an independent study and not a government project and I not supervising any assistants.
6. My responsibility in promotion and interpretation was limited to an exposition of them and a defense of my conclusions before members of the faculty and student body of the Page School,Johns Hopkins University.
   a. This was carried on in several sessions
      1) Preliminary report
      2) Final revision session

eph B. Smith
Box 323 B, Route 2
Gardners, Pa.

Items 21 and 23, Form 57

C. Graduate Training (cont.)
  2. University of Pennsylvania 1948-51
    a. At Pennsylvania I have taken courses primarily in American history.
    b. I received a master's degree, Feb. 1950
    c. I have completed course work for my Ph. D. I expect soon to take my doctoral examination.
    d. I have taken several courses in foreign area study.
      Latin American History
      The U.S. and Latin America
      Latin American Parties and Politics
      British Foreign Policy 1919-1939.
    e. In addition to the above, I have taken course work in U.S. foreign policy 1890 to date.

II. Research and Publication
  A. See pp. 2 and 3, Work Project #1
  B. Work Project #2
    1. Sponsored by Dickinson College.
    2. Scope- to investigate the relation of Dickinson College to the frontier community in which it was established in 1783.
    3. I was the sole researcher.
    4. Principal sources were: the large letter collection, Dickinson College Library, Church records at Carlisle and Philadelphia (Presbyterian Historical Society), early Carlisle newspapers, (American Antiquarian Society, Wocester, Massachusetts), contemporary writings, local histories.
    5. This study was made from Oct. 1947 until June 1948.
    6. Methods were historical.
    7. Findings and Conclusions
      a. Dickinson College, founded 1783, had numerous problems incident to the establishment of any such institution, butintensified by the hostility of frontier society; e.g. financial, disciplinary, recruitment.
      b. Frontier society rejects higher education as unnecessary and even hostile to its social goals.
      c. That under-developed areas need so-called practical education first.
    8. The material was used in the publication of the first volume of materials on early America published by the college under title of Bulwark of Liberty, June, 1950.
      Also published in part as "A Frontier Experiment in Higher Education", Pennsylvania History, Pennsylvania Historical Association, January, 1949.
    9. Two persons associaited with this project: Whitfield J. Bell
      Dickinson College
      Carlisle, Pa.
      May Morris
      Dickinson College
      Carlisle, Pa.
    10. I was solely responsible for methods, procedure and writing.
    11. The project was promoted by the college as noted in (1).

eph B. Smith
Box 323 B, Route 2
Gardners, Pa.

Items 21 and 23, Form 57

II. Research and Publication (cont.)

C. Understanding Our State Government, C.H. Masland and Sons, June, 1949.

1. A pamphlet giving a simple account of the Pennsylvania state government.
   a. The divisions of the government and their functions
   b. The citizen and his government.
2. Used in the Masland Company monthly magazine for the benefit of their employees.
3. Distributed to the Pennsylvania schools for use in problems of democracy classes.

III. Teaching Experience

A. I call attention to the subjects I have taught in the past five years (Item 16, (1), Form 57, corrected as noted here to 5)

B. Explanation of techniques and scope of work in my courses in:
International Relations
Far Eastern History
Human and Historical Geography

1. International Relations

a. Scope

The history of the national state system, international law, and history of the idea and attempts at world government.

The strategic evaluation of the major powers
   Analysis of their geographic, economic, and demographic resources
   Evaluation of their military potential
   Study of their diplomatic policies in regard to the above

b. Technique

Use of Sprouts' text Foundations of National Power, which I consider most appropriate for the strategic material stressed

Use of outside readings on international law and world organization

Analysis of current newspapers to give the student practise at gathering information regarding the economies, military potentials and activities of the major powers.

The students must evaluate their newsreports and attempt to correlate them in the form of reports on strategic situations.

2. Far Eastern History

a. Scope

Historical background on the ancient civilization of China and Japan, major emphasis on the Far East since 1500, special attention to the diplomacy of imperialism and the reaction to it throughout Asia, also attention to 20th century Chinese and Japanese internal politics.

Joseph B. Smith
Box 323 B, Route 2
Gardners, Pennsylvania

Items 21 and 25, Form 57
III. Teaching Experience (cont.)
b. technique

Text used is Eckel, Far East since 1500
Supplemental reading is used for the ancient civilizations. Use is made of China Yearbook, Japan Yearbook, and U.S. State Department Documents in order to give the students practise in gathering and correlating data on the modern Far East and U.S. policy there.
Emphasis is placed on reports on the strategic evaluation of th the Chinese and Japanese nations and their adjacent areas, viz. Korea, Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria.
Emphasis is placed on understanding of personalities prominent in Chinese and Japanese affairs.

3. Human and Historical Geography
nb. Historical Geography is a second semester continuation of Human Geography which stresses an historical survey of western civilization (Rome to 1950) from a geographical view.

a. Scope
Analysis of the physical environment, geography of climatic regions, topographical regions, oceans and their coasts, minerals, ground and surface waters, soils, and man's relation to this environment -- human ecology
In the second semester spacial factors are stressed, political geogrpahy analyzed, and then a survey made of the geography ad ancient, medieval and modern Europe, evaluating the history of these periods in terms of the physical, spacial, and human ecological factors studied.

b. Techniques
Texts: White and Renner, Human Geography, Whittlesey, Environmental Foundations of European History.
Emphasis is placed on the gathering of geogrpahical information by the students, map study and interpretation.
Example: the strategic position of the major powers in modern times is studied, attention being paid to the identification of the problems of areal size, form, geomatical position, natural situation and geographical location.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 3 October 1966

YOUR REFERENCE: 42095

CASE NO. : 56169

TO : Director of Personnel

ATTN :

SUBJECT : SMITH, Joseph Burkholder

1. This is to inform you that Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulations 10-3 and 20-5 including access to classified information through TOP SECRET as required in the performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made for entrance on duty within 150 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐ Please advise Chief, Clearance Branch, extension 5620 when Subject enters on duty.

4. This is a Conversion case.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Steven L. Kuhn

Steven L. Kuhn
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 3-63 1173 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-5) 42095
REQUEST DATE (6-11) 21 Sept 1966

NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) (12-28) Smith, Joseph B.			YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30) 1921
POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	POSITION NUMBER (31-36)	OCCUP. CODE (37-42)	GRADE (43-44) GS-14
LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY) Washington, D.C.	ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH) DDS/OTR/Ops School/Hd. Trng Br.		ORGN. CODE (45-48)
TYPE OF APPLICANT ☐ REGULAR ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ CONTRACT ☐ MILITARY	CONVERSION ACTION SA-SB	IF OTHER, SPECIFY	TYPE OF APPL. (49)
NAME OF REQUESTER (OR OFFICIAL) Dow H. Lustochar, Chief/CPD	TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS ☐ NOS ☐ USF ☐ FF ☐ V ☐ UV		HDQTRS. & FUND (50)
CLEARANCE REQUIRED	PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP) Full Clearance	☐ SECRET ☐ FULL	CLEARANCE (51)
ATTACHMENTS	☐ PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ☐ PHOTOGRAPH(S)	☐ APPENDIX I ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER ☐ APPENDIX II ☐ REPORT OF INTERVIEW	RECRUIT. CODE (52-54)
VETERANS STATUS	☐ MALE - VETERAN ☐ MALE - NON-VETERAN	☐ FEMALE - VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - NON-VETERAN	VET PREF. & SEX (55)

Security #: 56169

Clearance memo to SA Branch/CPD
Attn: Jo Ann Varney
5 E 69

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

FORM 3-61 377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (MFG. 5-63)

14-00000

FE-11

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

Blf
in

Date: 29 August 1951

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division

Your Reference: L2143

FROM: Chief, Security Division

Case Number: 56169

SUBJECT: SMITH, Joseph Burkholder

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the EOD procedures.

Br. notified to call in
OK.
31 Aug 1951.
Blf
per Ethel 18 Sept.
1000

C V Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
JUL 1951

104-10291-10002

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

STANDARD FORM 66
October 1960
[illegible] OF U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] Personnel Manual Ch. [illegible]
66-102

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

RETURN TO RECORDS C[illegible]
IMMEDIATELY AFTE[illegible]
JOB 75-132 BOX 24

437115

[redacted]

0 9 MAY 1970
(1)
0 7 JUN

TERMINATED

CODED

14-00000

SECRET
[illegible]

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAP

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 Dec 72

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (CIARDS) VOLUNTARY

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 31 YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 4221-0117 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643 Section 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PLANS STAFF
CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
NONOFFICIAL Cover BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER - CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0049

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (G.S., L.B., etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 ~~10~~ 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000

18. REMARKS:

Supergrade Board

LAST WORKING DAY 28 Dec 73

Coordinated with Paul Seidel/ROB 27 December 1973

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: J.L. Olmstead, C/MSB | DATE SIGNED: 27 Dec 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. HOOTRS. CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA. 04 YR. 15

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIAGH 3—FICA 4— 5—NONE CODE: 0

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: BJ, 00, 0, 0

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: [illegible]

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-27-73 JFR

02 JAN 1974

46. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 27 DEC 1973

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET CLASSIFIED BY: 01-0352

E2-2 IMPDET

(4)

3 APR 1974

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler
6600 Millwood Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Dear Pete:

I am happy to send to you, under separate cover, your Agency Retirement Medallion. The Medallion is a tangible form of recognition and appreciation of your service to the Agency. It should serve as a lasting reminder of an honorable career, rewarding associations and the knowledge that you played your part in a vital activity.

Let me, therefore, add my congratulations and wish you the very best for the future.

Sincerely,

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - OPF

OP/RAD/ROB/MWBenthall:jtb (26 March 1974)

Executive Registry
74-522

26 JAN 1974

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler
6600 Millwood Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Dear Pete:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your many years of service to your country. The success with which you have met this challenge should be a source of lasting pride and satisfaction to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/Pers
~~1 - OPF~~
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: Director of Personnel
23 JAN 1974

OP/RAD/ROB/MDLasnek:jat/3257 (17 January 1974)

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

OPF

T-D

29 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Plans Staff

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Distinguished Intelligence Medal for Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Distinguished Intelligence Medal has been approved for Mr. Robert P. Wheeler and requests that you inform him of the award. Arrangements for presentation may be made with the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 3645, room 412, Magazine Building.

/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF w/forms 382 & 600
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

OFF

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

Executive Registry 74-196

DATE 18 December 1973

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO. 060947	NAME (Last-First-Middle) WHEELER, Robert P.	BIRTHYEAR 1915	SEX M	TYPE EMPLOYEE Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DO/CMG	SD D	SCHEDULE GS	GRADE 17	STATION

BE AWARDED

Intelligence Medal of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD **September 1952 - December 1973**

☐ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☒ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF **Distinguished Intelligence Medal**

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler is hereby awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal in recognition of his outstanding achievement with the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 23 years. Serving in a series of responsible senior positions both in headquarters and abroad, Mr. Wheeler has compiled an enviable record of achievement. Demonstrating deep integrity and total dedication, his performance has been characterised by creativity, and superb leadership. Mr. Wheeler's devotion and professionalism have been evident throughout his career, reflecting the highest credit on him and the Federal service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by DD/O on 10 December 1973)

APPROVED

/s/ Vernon A. Walters

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

9 JAN 1974

DATE

SIGNATURE (Signed) F. W. M. Janney

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
F. W. M. Janney

SIGNATURE
(signed on original)

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
R. L. Au n, Jr.

FORM 9-73 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDIT

(4)

Off

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A — PERSONAL DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.: 060947
2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.
3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Off/Chief
4. GRADE: GS-17
5. SD: D
6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: DDO/CMG/NOC
7. OFFICE EXT. (Hqs): 4103
8. STATION: ☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD (Specify location)
9. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code): 6600 Millwood Rd., Bethesda, Md. 22034
10. HOME PHONE: 229-1973
11. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED: U.S., Birth
12. RECOMMENDED AWARD: Intelligence Medal of Merit
13. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT: 31 December 1973
14. POSTHUMOUS: ☐ YES ☒ NO
15. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: Adelia Wheeler
16. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
17. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code): same as above
18. HOME PHONE: same

SECTION B — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF HAZARD

19. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

20. FULL NAME	21. ORGN. TITLE	22. GRADE	23. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

24. FULL NAME	25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

26. LOCATION:
27. INCLUSIVE DATES:
28. TIME OF DAY:
29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED:
30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED:
31. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO
32. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION C — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT, SERVICE, OR PERFORMANCE

33. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☒ YES ☐ NO
34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: Ops Officer/Chief
35. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location): CMG/NOC
36. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSIGNED POSITION: Chief, Nonofficial Cover Affairs Branch
37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED: Sept 1952-December 1973
38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☒ NO
39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL WHO ASSISTED OR CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE

40. FULL NAME	41. ORGN. TITLE	42. GRADE	43. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE PERFORMANCE

44. FULL NAME	45. TYPE OF AWARD

FORM 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
5-68

SECRET

(4)

OPF

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION D — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act. Enclose unclassified citation.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. (Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.) What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation. Enclose unclassified citation.

Mr. Wheeler entered on duty with the Agency in September 1952 for assignment in Tokyo. During the period from 1952-1956 he served in the capacity of Deputy Chief, FI Ops and Chief, FI Liaison. For several years he served in responsible positions at Headquarters and was promoted to GS-15 in 1957. In 1959 he returned to Tokyo as Deputy for Operations and as DCOS until 1964. He was promoted to GS-16 in August 1964. From 1964-1966 he served at Honolulu Base. In 1965 he was appointed COB, Honolulu. From 1966-68 he served in the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting. In 1968 he was reassigned to the Missions and Programs Staff and in 1971 was appointed Chief, MPS and served there until January 1972 during which period he was promoted to GS-17. In 1972 he was appointed Chief of the then designated Nonofficial Cover Affairs Division (presently Nonofficial Cover Affairs Branch), from which assignment he is retiring.

Mr. Wheeler's outstanding characteristics are his integrity and total dedication. He is a natural leader, bright and original. He has a creative mind, is articulate and rational. He has excellent recall, is a gifted administrator and manager. He is a searching individual who is totally committed and has the high regard of most of the elements comprising the DDO. During his tenure he has received laudatory commendations for his efforts.

Mr. Wheeler has made a valuable contribution to the Agency during his extended career and it is fitting that upon retirement after such a distinguished career, he be awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES (List individually) IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR PERFORMANCE. ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESS OR INDIVIDUALS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY Gordon Mason	48. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION Gordon Mason Chief, CMG	49. DATE 10 DEC 1972

SECTION E — RECOMMENDATION FORWARDED THROUGH OFFICIALS CONCERNED FOR THEIR INFORMATION

50. HEAD OF DDO CAREER SERVICE (Career service of nominee)	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item # 52	DATE
51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item # 52	DATE
52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	TITLE AND SIGNATURE William E Nelson William E. Nelson	DATE 11 Dec 72

SECRET

14-00000

2-13

11-31

13-2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	18 September 1973
1. SERIAL NUMBER	060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	Wheeler, Robert P.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	09 / 3/ / 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	Regular
6. FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	4121-0117/0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDO/Plans Staff Career Management Group Non Official Cover Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE	Ops Officer-Ch (17)
12. POSITION NUMBER	0049
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	17/4
17. SALARY OR RATE	$36,000 ✓

18. REMARKS

Reassigned from DDO/PS/CMG Pending Reassignment

+ [illegible]

+ Super blurb

BCS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	Jasper [illegible] Olmstead C/NSSB
DATE SIGNED	9/7/73
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	
DATE SIGNED	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	37
20. EMPLOY. CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	3132 PS
22. STATION CODE	75013
23. INTEGRATE CODE	
24. [illegible] CODE	1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	10 04 15
26. DATE OF GRADE	
27. DATE OF LEI	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	9-21-73
45. O.P. APPROVAL	
DATE APPROVED	

EOD DATA

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, ROBERT P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 01 YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V 7109 | CF TO V 0109

7. FAN AND NSCA: 4221-~~2975~~ 0117 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PLANS STAFF
~~UNASSIGNED~~ Career Management Group
Pending Reassignment

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $36000

18. REMARKS: FROM: DDP/NOCA DIVISION/DEV COMP/9997

x2
I

bb8

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL — DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED: 10 July 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 30
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 39135 ALPHABETIC PS
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. OCCUPATIONAL CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 14 DA. 04 YR. 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-FICA 4-NONE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | CODE 0-WAIVED 1-REG 2-REG/OPT 3-INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. FEGLI CAT.
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED CODE 1-YES 2-NO | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-10-73 ll.

Rm
rec'd D

46. O/P APPROVAL — DATE APPROVED: 24 Jul 73

(4)

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]

E2 IMPDET

SECRET

31 JAN 1973

Dear Mr. Richmond,

At the direction of the Deputy Director for Plans you served from 6 November to 17 November 1972 as a member of the Clandestine Service Nonofficial Cover Board Sub-Panel convened for the purpose of evaluating GS-12 Staff and Career Agent personnel under nonofficial cover. I know that this work was particularly demanding. Your full-time participation and the diligent application of your professional experience were decisive factors in the successful accomplishment of this aspect of the Nonofficial Cover Board's missions.

I wish to commend you personally for your contribution to our evaluation procedures each phase of which helps to strengthen the Clandestine Service Career Service.

A copy of this letter will be included in your official personnel file.

Robert P. Wheeler

Robert P. Wheeler
Chairman
Nonofficial Cover Board

SECRET

[illegible]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

12 July 1972

Dear Pete,

I want to thank you personally for your fine work as a member of the GS-15 Evaluation Board which convened from 15 May to 16 June 1972. I know that this work has been particularly demanding. Your full-time participation and diligent application of your professional experience have been decisive factors in the successful accomplishment of the Board's missions. I know that your recommendations will provide a reliable base for the Clandestine Service Career Service Board and myself in arriving at a final promotion list.

Your wise and energetic participation in the evaluation process has helped to strengthen the Clandestine Service by objectively identifying those officers whose performance, qualifications and potential mark them as especially fitted for senior positions of leadership.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

Robert P. Wheeler

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

AC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 22 February 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947 ✓
2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): Wheeler, Robert P. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 DAY 09 YEAR 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2231-4148
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/NOCA~~D~~ division
Development Complement
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer - Ch
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000

I
42

18. REMARKS

*0410

From MPS, Position # 0001

Concur: Karen Tillotson (telecoord)
MPS

[illegible] 3/8

DB 3/20

M
36

cc: Payroll
cc: Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Carl T. Taylor
Carl T. Taylor, C/NOCAD/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 23 Feb 72

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
Robert W. Sheay, C/CSPS
DATE SIGNED: 9 MAR 1972

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
32	18	54977	NCCA	75013		1	10 07 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV FLOY/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: DDR
*From MPS
3.9.72

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher

DATE APPROVED: 15 Mar. 72

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

20 MAR 1972

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 November 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 28 | YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2221-2886-0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/Missions & Programs Staff
Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, DC
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer - Ch (18)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: ~~GS~~ 17 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 35,801
18. REMARKS:

cc: Payroll

36
H

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert W. Sheay, C/CSPS
DATE SIGNED: 24 Nov 71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
22	10	52100	MPS	15013		1	10 09 15	11 28 71

27. DATE OF EOD: MO. 11 DA. 28 YR. 71
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OASDI 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-26-71 Wh
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher
DATE APPROVED: 1 Dec 71

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

46

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 March 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Vouchered Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 DAY 21 YEAR 71

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1221-2886

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/Missions and Programs Staff
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer - Ch

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 32,819

18. REMARKS: From MPS Position # 0008

cc: Security
cc: Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Rowland K. Chatham — DATE SIGNED: 5 Mar 1971

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: — DATE SIGNED: 3/8/71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 52100 ALPHABETIC MPS
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOOTRS. CODE:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OASDI 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RES/PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-8-71
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher — DATE APPROVED: 8 March 71

FORM 8-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

4c

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Memorandum

Date: MAR 4 1971

In Reply Refer To:

Your Reference:

Subject: Completion of "The Winter Program for FEI Executives" at the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, Virginia

From: Nancy W. Dalton
Nancy W. Dalton
Registrar, Federal Executive Institute

To: Mr. Hugh Clayton
Registrar, Office of Training
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

This is official notice that ROBERT P. WHEELER has satisfactorily completed the "Winter Program for FEI Executives" at the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia. This session of that educational program was held from February 28 - March 2, 1971. One copy of this memorandum is intended for filing in the employee's official personnel folder and the other copy for routing to the employee's immediate supervisor.

[illegible]
2 1998
23 MAR

Keep Freedom in Your Future With U.S. Savings Bonds

CSC FORM 631
NOVEMBER [illegible]

4c

SECRET

23 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion -
Robert P. Wheeler

1. As one of the final acts in my CIA career I want to bring to your attention and add my strong concurrence and recommendation to two (2) recorded recommendations for the promotion of Robert P. Wheeler to the grade GS-17. I find it hard to imagine a more persuasive recommendation for this action than that forwarded by my predecessor in June 1969 (Attached). I can imagine Mr. Mitchell's feeling when he prepared the second recommendation in February 1970 (Attached). And yet, I find in February 1971 there has still been no action. In the year that has passed this promotion has become even more deserved, for despite the natural disappointment accompanying such a continuing lack of recognition, there has been no diminution of enthusiasm, no lowering of standards, and the CS is clearly better managed because of his continuing efforts. Were these two previous recommendations not so clear cut and descriptive, I would conclude that those in control simply do not know what this officer does and has done. Knowing what he does and how he does it should not continue to be unrewarded and, hence, I add my strongest recommendation for early and favorable action.

2. This officer has performed in a most outstanding manner, as testified in his fitness reports by my predecessor, and certainly during my tenure as Chief, MPS for the past 12 months.

Sidney A. Stein

Sidney A. Stein
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

SECRET

4C

5 JUN 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Clandestine Service Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Promotion of Mr. Robert P. Wheeler to GS-17

1. It is recommended that Mr. Robert P. Wheeler be promoted to GS-17.

2. Mr. Wheeler obtained a B.A. degree in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1942 and a M.A. in International Relations from George Washington University, Washington, D.C., in 1946. He entered the U.S. Navy in 1942 and after a concerted course in Japanese served the Navy until 1946 as an Intelligence Specialist, Japanese Language Officer, and the War Department, still as an Intelligence Specialist in Tokyo, from 1946 to 1952. In September 1952 he joined the Agency for duty in Tokyo; returned to Headquarters in June 1956 where he served until 1959; left for service in Japan from June 1959 to October 1964; served under non-official cover in Honolulu from August 1964 to August 1966; served at Headquarters with the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (OPPB) from August 1966 until January 1968, and with MPS from the latter date to the present.

3. During his career with the Agency he has been a field Operations Officer, Liaison Officer to overseas U.S. agencies and a foreign intelligence service, a supervisor, Deputy Chief of Station (Tokyo), Chief FI for a division (FE), Chief of Base (Honolulu), Program Analyst (OPPB), and Program Analyst and Group Chief (MPS).

4. In his present position as Chief of Programs Group in the Missions and Programs Staff, Mr. Wheeler is responsible for liaison between the CS and the OPPB on the PPB System and non-budgetary matters; installing the PPB System

within the CS; advising and assisting CS components in the preparation of Operating Directives and the program portions of the annual responses to the Program Call; chairing the Program Review Panel; preparing and/or coordinating special studies and surveys on operational programs; coordinating and preparing the annual DDP report to the PFIAB; preparing the annual DDP briefing of the DCI on CS problems and progress; and, as required, advising CS components on the requirements of PPBS that need to be addressed in CS documents requiring DCI or Executive Director-Comptroller action.

5. In his previous assignment Mr. Wheeler was detailed to OPPB to give that office, in the preparation of Agency programs for submission to the Bureau of the Budget, a better understanding of clandestine collection and covert action, to help that office better review and integrate CS programs in Agency programs, and to give him a broad view of the PPB System and Agency management in both of which he had shown considerable interest. His performance in that office was rated "Strong," and it was on that performance and on his genuine enthusiasm and interest in management generally that his services were sought for MPS.

6. In the performance of his duties as Chief, MPS/PRG he made immediate use of his long experience in and knowledge of CS operations, the experience and knowledge gained in OPPB, his formal education in the PPB System, and a strong belief in and desire to put to work within the CS certain concepts of that system for general and specific management improvement. Given the idiosyncrasies of the CS, he recognized early that in order to make the PPB system work effectively knowledge of the "why" and "how" of that system must be possessed at every decision-making level. With limitless energy and enthusiasm he set about "preaching the gospel" from division chief to case officer. Whenever and wherever a formal group is assembled and management is a topic for discussion, the Office of Training can count on him to drop everything and hold forth on the subject, be it the Senior Management and Planning Course (whether for supergrades or below), Station Chief Conferences, the CS Senior Seminar (now in session) and the like. Acting as the DDP/TRO's right arm to encourage attendance at the Senior Management and Planning Course he has crusaded with division and staff chiefs for the attendance of certain of

their key employees. To date upwards of 100 from the CS have attended that course with many more to follow. With some of those same senior officials he has argued the benefits ultimately to accrue to their components from the temporary assignment of a senior key official for a year or two to MPS and/or OPPB and eventual return to the mother component. One such arrangement, with duty in OPPB, has just been completed. His tactful, understanding, friendly, businesslike, professional and competent handling of the chairmanship of the PRP and the reviews of the Operating Directive and country activities conducted by that Panel leaves little to be desired. Regarding the PPB System, he reads everything, pro and con, that comes to his attention, and he has spent a fair sum out of his own pocket to build a library on the subject. He has persuaded potential converts to the system to read those books, magazines, periodicals and pamphlets to the end that most of that library is on constant loan. His insatiable appetite for news on current as well as historical domestic and foreign matters, his excellent sense of humor, and his genuine friendliness are invaluable assets in his present assignment inasmuch as they have given him such a wide range of acquaintances, in and out of the CS, as to open wide the door for discussion on MPS responsibilities that are anything but sexy. He is so highly regarded by his contacts in the divisions and staffs of the CS and in OPPB that his advice and guidance are constantly sought. He gives of his time and energy willingly, regardless of the grade of the individual or the magnitude of the problem. His enthusiasm is catching and he sets an excellent example for subordinates, equals and superiors as well.

7. In view of the above, Mr. Wheeler, a broadgauged, fast moving, competent, dedicated, sincere and friendly individual who has not yet reached his full potential, whose goal is to make the Clandestine Service the best managed directorate in CIA, and who will soon have served five years in grade, is strongly recommended for promotion to GS-17.

(signed) Michael G. Mitchell

Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

9 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Clandestine Service
Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Promotion
of Mr. Robert P. Wheeler to GS-17

1. It is recommended that Mr. Robert P. Wheeler be promoted to the grade GS-17.

2. By memorandum dated 5 June 1969 the undersigned recommended Mr. Wheeler for promotion. In that memorandum was set out the career of Mr. Wheeler from the date he completed college (1942) until June 1969, and was described his wartime (1942-1946), immediate post-war (1946-1952) and Agency (1952-to June 1969) experience, all in the field of intelligence. Since it is the opinion of the undersigned that the Board should have the benefit of all the facts stated in that memorandum and since there is no change in the contents thereof, I hereby incorporate by reference the memorandum of 5 June 1969, make it part hereof and attach it hereto as a significant part of the present memorandum.

3. The time passed since 5 June 1969 has served only to confirm my conviction in Mr. Wheeler's true value to the CS. He has continued the strong leadership of the Program Review Panel and his subordinates. His unbounded energy and incessant championing of the applicable principles of the PPB System have resulted in office chiefs or other most senior officials appearing before the last Program Review Panel apparently interested and better prepared than ever before. His obvious sincerity and friendly and intelligent approach to the job have convinced many of the need for the better management of their affairs. This is no mean accomplishment in a world where the normal human resents

even constructive criticism. Mr. Wheeler is so dedicated to making the CS the best managed component in the Agency that he continues to spend his own earnings on books and periodicals on the subject of management and to encourage interested parties to read them and pass them on to others.

4. The undersigned is aware that for the past six (6) months a private interest has dangled an impressive carrot in front of Mr. Wheeler in an attempt to induce him to retire and represent overseas the interests of that private concern. This fact is not to be considered by the Board as a sword of Damocles. It is simply to bring to the Board's attention that if a promotion at this time should serve to dissuade Mr. Wheeler from accepting the proffered job, the Board would have been instrumental in retaining for the CS in the management field one of the most dedicated, friendly, readily accepted, knowledgeable, industrious and qualified officers in the Agency.

5. In view of paragraph 3 above, the contents of the attachment hereto, and his potential for further growth, Mr. Wheeler is strongly recommended for promotion to Grade GS-17.

(signed) Michael G. Mitchell

Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

Attachment: a/s

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Robert P. Wheeler

THROUGH : Head of Career Service

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. In order to assist employees in planning for their eventual retirement, it is the practice of the Agency to notify each employee at a point in service five years prior to the date of scheduled retirement. I am, therefore, taking this opportunity to advise you that you are scheduled to retire in October 1975.

2. The prospect of retirement from the Agency deserves serious thought and careful planning so that you may make the transition to the next phase of life with purpose and confidence. To assist you in this regard, the Agency will make available to you various resources which are attuned to the needs of prospective retirees. In October 1970, the Agency will conduct a Retirement Information Seminar to which you will be invited. Your spouse, if you are married, may accompany you to this seminar. Following the seminar, you will be invited by the Retirement Counselor for your Directorate to an individual pre-retirement counseling session (or more than one, if you wish); this phase of retirement planning will be tailored solely to your own particular situation and circumstances and will be within the context of the retirement system under which you will retire. The individual counseling sessions are intended to give you a wide range of information on such matters as estimates of your annuity, survivor benefits, life and health insurance, Social Security taxes, relocation and movement of household effects and assistance in obtaining other employment, if appropriate. In addition to the sessions with your Retirement Counselor, you will be invited to avail yourself of selected literature on all aspects of retirement.

3. Some persons who wish to retire voluntarily prior to the scheduled date, or who wish to commence their planning as early as possible, prefer to work with their Retirement Counselor well before the time he would normally contact them. If you believe you would benefit from such an earlier start on your personal planning, you are invited to contact the Retirement Counselor responsible for your Directorate. He is assigned from your Directorate to the Retirement Affairs Division, 212 Magazine Building in Rosslyn, on telephone extension 3328.

4. Experience has amply demonstrated that careful planning facilitates the transition to retirement. I recommend, strongly, that you avail yourself of the services the Agency offers you in planning your own retirement.

R. S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE O

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

13 MAR 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

THROUGH : Administrative Officer, MPS

SUBJECT : Purchase of Service Credit

1. This is to advise you that your application to purchase service credit under the CIA Retirement and Disability System has been processed. The amount of $437.00 will be required to purchase credit for the period 18 June 1946 through 17 June 1947 when no deductions were withheld from your salary. Under the current provisions of the CIA Retirement System, payment of the above amount will increase your annuity by approximately 2 per cent of your high-three average salary at the time of retirement. The amount due includes interest to the present date.

2. It should be explained that under the CIA Retirement and Disability System, all periods of creditable Federal civilian service during which retirement deductions were not taken from salary must be purchased by making a deposit in order for the time to be counted in the computation of the retirement annuity. Under the Civil Service Retirement System, such periods of Federal service are always creditable in the computation of annuity, but if not purchased, the annuity is reduced by 10 per cent of the amount due. For example, if a deposit of $1,000 is required to purchase credit for those periods of service during which no deductions were withheld from salary, and it is not paid, the basic annuity would be reduced by $100 per year. If the deposit of $1,000 is paid, the retiree would have to wait 10 years to recover his own deposit before profiting from the payment.

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

3. The Agency has as an aim legislatively to secure the Civil Service option, i.e., credit for periods of non-deduction service without prior payment therefor, but with reduction of the basic annuity by 10 per cent of the amount due. Therefore, you may wish to consider deferring payment. You should be aware that the interest on the amount due will continue to accumulate at the rate of 3 per cent compounded annually if you decide to defer. For example, if it would take $1,000 to purchase credit today, the amount due one year later would be $1,030.

4. After consideration of the above options, if you wish to purchase credit for the period of non-deduction service noted in paragraph 1, please make your check payable to the Treasurer of the United States and forward it to the Chief, Retirement Operations Branch, 205 Magazine Building. If you prefer, you may make installment payments or arrange for bi-weekly payroll allotments of $25.00 or multiples thereof. A receipt showing a statement of your account will be sent to you acknowledging each payment.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

/s/ Francis G. Monan

Francis G. Monan
Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

Distribution:
- O - Addressee
- 1 - D/Pers
- 1 - OPF
- 1 - ROB Soft File
- 1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/RTConners:jat (6 March 1970)
Retyped: OP/RAD/JMG (13 March 1970)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED 3 June 1968

H

36

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) WHEELER, Robert P.				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment			4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH DAY YEAR 06 12 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	
6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 8121-2887	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
	CF TO V	X CF TO CF			
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/Missions and Programs Staff Programs Group			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE ~~Operations~~ Ops Officer (SG)			12. POSITION NUMBER 0008	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16. GRADE AND STEP 16 5	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 23,778	

18. REMARKS

Security Approval has been granted for this request
Date:

Dist: 1 - CSPS
1 - Security
1 - Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Michael L. Mitchell	DATE SIGNED 3 June 1968	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 52150 ALPHABETIC MPS	22. STATION CODE 7503	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. OCCUPATIONAL CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. APPT EXPIRES MO. DA. YR. XX XX XX	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 4-NONE CODE		31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.		38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. COND. PERM. TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 2-WAIVER 1-YES HEALTH INS. CODE		40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)			42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE		
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION From O/PPB 06-12-68				46. C.P. APPROVAL KB Fisher			DATE APPROVED 10 June 68	

E4

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
3-63

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XII

DATE PREPARED: 4 August 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER	060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	Wheeler, Robert P.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	Excepted Appointment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month / Day / Year)	7 / 31 / 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	Regular
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	7114-0001
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DCI/Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting Planning and Programming Division Program Analysis Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	IO - Program Eval
12. POSITION NUMBER	0005
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0132.70
16. GRADE AND STEP	16 4
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 22085

E
4

18. REMARKS

~~2. FRA as provided by the provisions of HR 20-17 d.(c). for a period of two~~ years.

C-09-55

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL John M. Clarke, Director/PPB	DATE SIGNED 8/5/66	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Head, D Career Service	DATE SIGNED 8/5/66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	13
20. EMPLOY. CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC	02350
21. OFFICE CODING — ALPHABETIC	OPPB
22. STATION CODE	75013
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. POSITION CODE	1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	10 05 15
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	02 10 64
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	02 07 65
28. APPT EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSR, 2-FICA, 3-NONE) CODE	2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	00000
34. SEX	M
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	1
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	02 06 43
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	02 13 62
38. FEGLI CODE	C
39. FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	1
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	—
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS, 3-BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	1
42. CODE	3
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — CODE	0
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	MO
44. STATE TAX DATA	— — —
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	
46. C.P. APPROVAL	Bal Bond
DATE APPROVED	10 Aug 66

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XXB

DATE PREPARED: 1 August 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible], Robert [redacted]			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 07 DAY 30 YEAR 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR		
6. FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7129-0369	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD U.S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION HONOLULU, HAWAII			
11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF BASE GS-14	12. POSITION NUMBER 0261	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D		
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) CS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 4	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 22,085	

18. REMARKS

Subject is reemployable.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Virginia C. Lynch, C/EO Pers. & Training	DATE SIGNED 1 Aug 66	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Collins	DATE SIGNED 5 Aug. 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] CODE ✓	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 1,0D 609,1	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVED 1-REG HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE					
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 8/4/66	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 8-5-66						

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible], Robert, G.
[redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 01 | YEAR 65

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF XXX

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6129-0369

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
U. S. FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
HONOLULU BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF BASE

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.08

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20,245

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

1cc to OP/BSD/BCB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Philip C. [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 12 Jul 65

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
28	10	43620	DOD	75020		2	10	04	15	08	30	64	08	30	64

28. ... EXPIRES MO. DA. YR. | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR. | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR. | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR. | 38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE | 39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE: 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPT. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 8/[illegible]/65

46. O.P. APPROVAL: [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XXB

DATE PREPARED: 29 OCTOBER 1964 ✓

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]. Cohrseen, Robert

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: (CAREER) EXCEPTED APPT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 25 YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF X

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5329-0369

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
US FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
HONOLULU BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20245 ✓

18. REMARKS:

C-09/55

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia [illegible]
VIRGINIA C. [illegible], DD/P/DOD
DATE SIGNED: 29 Oct 64

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: J. M. Collins
DATE SIGNED: 4 Nov. 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 43620 ALPHABETIC DOD
22. STATION CODE: 7602 Om ~~[illegible]~~
23. INTEGREE:
24. [illegible] CODE: 2
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 08 DA. 30 YR. 64
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 08 DA. 30 YR. 64
28. LCD EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO: 09860
34. SEX: M
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 1 (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. 08 DA. 06 YR. 43
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. 09 DA. 28 YR. 52
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE C
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1 (0—WAIVED 1—YES); HEALTH INS. CODE —
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO: —
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 1 (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))
42. LEAVE CAT CODE: 8
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO); CODE 0; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO); CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPT —; STATE CODE —
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11/9/64 [illegible]
46. C.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 5 Nov 64

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF CLEARANCES

TO: DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL
ATTENTION:
☐ Mobilization and Military Personnel Division
☐ Chief, Benefits and Counseling Branch, BSD
☒ Chief, Staff Agent Branch, CPD

SERIAL NO. 060947	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) Wheeler, Robert P.	GRADE GS-16	POSITION TITLE Ops Officer
	OTHER TRUE NAMES USED WHILE IN AGENCY	COST CENTER NUMBER CHARGEABLE 5120-0269	FUNDS ☐ V ☒ CF

REASON FOR CLEARANCE
☒ SEPARATION
☐ EXTENDED LEAVE (Note reason)
☐ OTHER (Specify):

LAST WORKING DAY (Date): 23 October 1964
EFFECTIVE DATE OF SEPARATION: 24 October 1964

☐ FORM 1152, REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION, WAS FORWARDED TO THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL ON 29 Oct. 64

☐ FORM 1152, REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION, IS ATTACHED TO THIS FORM.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE COMPONENTS LISTED BELOW HAVE FURNISHED POSITIVE VERIFICATION BY TELEPHONE OR CERTIFICATIONS TO THE UNDERSIGNED THAT THE SEPARATING EMPLOYEE:

- HAS RETURNED OR ACCOUNTED FOR ANY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY ISSUED TO HIM;
- SETTLED OR SATISFACTORILY ARRANGED FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ANY INDEBTEDNESS TO THE AGENCY;
- RETURNED SPECIAL I.D. CARDS OR CREDENTIALS ISSUED TO HIM;
- RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING SPECIAL CLEARANCES, COVER INFORMATION, AND SECURITY BRIEFINGS;
- SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED OR CLOSED OUT ANY SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED TO HIM.

		DATE CLEARED	CLEARED BY - NAME
✓	OFFICE OF LOGISTICS	10 Nov. 64	Brown
	OFFICE OF SECURITY	19 Nov 64	John Whitty
✓	DOCUMENT CONTROLS (Incl. RID)	10 Nov. 64	Becky
✓	SPECIAL CLEARANCES	10 Nov. 64	[illegible]
	CENTRAL COVER STAFF 4408	18 Nov 64	[illegible] Jr
✓	MEDICAL STAFF	6 Nov. 64	BILL MICHAEL
✓	COMSEC SECURITY	[illegible] Nov. 64	Mr. Michael

TITLE OF OPERATING COMPONENT OFFICIAL	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE	DATE SIGNED
DC Personnel & Training	Virginia L. Lynch Virginia C. [illegible]	16 Nov 64

REMARKS

FORM 7-63 21a

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(4-2)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VKF

DATE PREPARED: 29 OCTOBER 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIEHLER ROBERT F
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 31 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5129-0369
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
US FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
HONOLULU BASE

Dar

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20245
18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch
VIRGINIA C. LYNCH, DC/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 29 Oct '64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 5
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 04 YR. 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. MIE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1 S2 0091
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11/4/64
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Benedetto Affilice
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
8-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 24 64		5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5129 0369 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS				10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER			12. POSITION NUMBER 0281	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 20245	

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 11-63 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 September 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, ROBERT P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 1 YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5129-0369

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

236

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/~~DODx~~ US Field
U.S. STATION
HONOLULU BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, Hawaii

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS. OFFICER 00

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS-~~[illegible]~~

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: ~~15~~ 16 ~~5~~ 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~18,740~~ 20,245

18. REMARKS:

* Phone concurrence R Newman for FE

POSITION TITLE CHANGE

Security Approval Granted by Pers. [illegible] 10/6/64
lly 10/16/64

WT

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch
VIRGINIA C. LYNCH, DO/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 30 Sept 64

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 13 Oct 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 43830 ALPHABETIC WLR

22. STATION CODE: 25020

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOURS CODE: 2

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 04 YR. 15

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR.-RESV. PROV./TEMP. CODE

39. FEDL. HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: FE 2 14 Oct 64

46. O.P. APPROVAL: B J [illegible] for [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 14 Oct 64

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2/5

SECRET

10 MAY 1963

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to GS-16, Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

1. It is recommended that Mr. Robert P. Wheeler be promoted to GS-16. He has been in grade since December 1957.

2. Mr. Wheeler is serving as Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo. To this post he has brought his depth of knowledge of things Japanese, gained over many years of concentration on this subject. He has also brought his operational ability and his personal capability of operating among significant Japanese leaders. He has been of major value through a most difficult period of very substantial reduction of the station's staff and the termination of many of its functions. While Mr. Wheeler may have spent much of his time on things Japanese, he has also served as Chief, FI, for FE Division in which post he demonstrated his ability to operate on non-Japanese matters with force, intelligence and dispatch.

3. For these reasons it is recommended that Mr. Wheeler be promoted to GS-16.

W E Colby
William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

EYES ONLY

SECRET
EYES ONLY

19 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to GS-16 -- Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

1. Mr. Wheeler stands Number Four on the Division's list of recommended promotions to GS-16. Mr. Wheeler is 47 years old and has been in grade since December 1957. Most of Mr. Wheeler's Agency career has been devoted to the Japanese scene although he served one tour most commendably as Chief FI for the FE Division. He is now Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo, and is an operations officer and executive of the highest quality. In addition to bearing a very large share of the administrative burden of a big station, Mr. Wheeler has acquired a collection of Japanese friends and contacts in important governmental and business circles unequaled, I believe, by any other member of the official American community in Tokyo. Although he has exploited these contacts most effectively for Agency and U.S. Governmental purposes, it is the plan of the FE Division to give freer rein to Mr. Wheeler's operations in this field by arranging, carefully and deliberately, unofficial cover for Mr. Wheeler which will permit him to devote a greater share of his time to the exploitation of this most important section of Japanese society. We believe that his very considerable talents as an administrator can be adequately replaced but that his standing among the Japanese and his capability for operational exploitation of his advantages are unique. I believe that Mr. Wheeler can well be considered to be the prototype of the high ranking staff officer who can forego bureaucratic advancement for a purely operational career under deep cover in one area.

2. On the basis of his proven ability and past performance as well as his seniority I believe Mr. Wheeler to be fully qualified for promotion to GS-16.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 August 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 560947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, Robert P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 8 DAY 30 YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137-1566

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JKO - Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief

9
F

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE: Pol Asst 1st Sec
Ops Officer (DCOS)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3003

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS .00

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 7
16-3

17. SALARY OR RATE: 19860
$20,245

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 5 Aug 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HOURS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 04 YR. 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. WIC EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAREER-RESV. PROV.-TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 08/28/64

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry W. [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 28 AUG 1964

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 August 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER 560917	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) WHEELER, Robert P.				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 8 DAY 30 YEAR 64		5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF X CF TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5137-1566	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FE/JKO - Tokyo Station Office of the Chief			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Tokyo, Japan		
11. POSITION TITLE Ops Officer (DCOS)			12. POSITION NUMBER 3003	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16. GRADE AND STEP 16-3	17. SALARY OR RATE $20,245	

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC — ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HOOTERS CODE
25. DATE OF BIRTH — MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE — MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI — MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES — MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA — 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE — CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — TYPE — MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REG. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE — CODE — 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE — MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE — MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY — CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP — CODE
39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE — CODE — 0—WAIVED 1—YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA — CODE — 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO — CODE — NO TAX EXEMP. — STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46. O.P. APPROVAL: /s/ Harry W. [illegible], Jr.
DATE APPROVED: 28 AUG 1964

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
9-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 SEPTEMBER 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR Status *

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 COB 25 YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137-1566

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FOREIGN FIELD
FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

9
F

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER DCOS

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3003

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 18749

18. REMARKS:

SUBJECT CONVERTED FROM FSR COB 25 AUGUST 1964.

* Superseded Action Promotion to GS16 3 $20295 effective 08/30/64.

[illegible] By
[illegible]
[illegible]

1 COPY PAYROLL

FOR FURTHER INFO CALL X5271

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT L. STATEN C/FE/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 9/21/64

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ronald Gage
DATE SIGNED: 9/22/64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
56	10	15370	FE	38591		3	10	04	15						

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV./TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Kearney 09/24/64

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Ronald Gage
DATE APPROVED: 9/22/64

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET

DD/P 1-4627

30 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Second Tour for Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, as D/COS, Tokyo

Panel "A" recommends your approval of request of second tour for Mr. Wheeler.

Al Lipp
Al Lipp
Clandestine Services
Career Service Panel
(Section A)

APPROVED:

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

1 SEP 1961
Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

V to V	V to UV	REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED Mo Da Yr
UV to V	UV to UV		

1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.
3. Date Of Birth: Mo 10 Da 04 Yr 15
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code: 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS - EOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code:
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code:
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. Mil Serv Credit LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code:

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO - Tokyo Station
Deputy for Operations
Office of the Chief

Code:

15. Location Of Official Station: Tokyo, Japan
Station Code:
16. Dept.- Field: Dept.- Usfld. ~~Field~~ Code 5
17. Position Title: Pol Asst 1ST Sec* Ops Officer
18. Position No.: 3936
19. Serv.: FS GS
20. Occup. Series: 0136.01
21. Grade & Step: 03 15 ~~X~~ 2
22. Salary Or Rate: 11660 $ ~~12,770~~ 12070
23. SD: DI
24. Date Of Grade: Mo 12 Da 15 Yr 57
25. PSI Due: Mo 12 Da 11 Yr 60
26. Appropriation Number: 0137 7351 3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: Reassignment
Code: 56
28. Eff. Date: Mo 09 Da 06 Yr 59
29. Type Of Employee: Regular
Code: 01
30. Separation Date:

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO - Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief

Code: 5191

32. Location Of Official Station:
Station Code: 37577
33. Dept.- Field: Dept.- Usfld.- Field Code 5
34. Position Title: Pol Asst 1ST Sec Ops Officer (D COS)
35. Position No.: D-15 3003
36. Serv.:
37. Occup. Series:
38. Grade & Step:
39. Salary Or Rate: $
40. SD:
41. Date Of Grade: Mo 12 Da 15 Yr 57
42. PSI Due: Mo 12 Da 11 Yr 60
43. Appropriation Number:

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): William M. Center, ACFE/JAO
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Mozelle Little, X2957
C. Request Approved By (Signature and Title): for Desmond FitzGerald, CFE
Date Approved:

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		1959 20	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		8	E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks
Subject will replace Mr. William E. Nelson, who is returning to Hqs. PCS in August 1959.

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 4-58 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

DD/P 4: 6610

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans) 17 AUG 1959

SUBJECT: Appointment of Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler as Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo, Japan

1. The appointment of Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler as Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo, Japan, effective on or about 15 August 1959 is recommended. Mr. Wheeler will replace Mr. William E. Nelson who is scheduled to return to Headquarters approximately 2 September 1959 for reassignment.

2. Mr. Wheeler has been an employee of the Agency since 28 September 1952 and is currently assigned as an Intelligence Officer, GS-15. A biographic data sheet, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

for William V. Broe
Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is approved:

Richard M. Bissell 25 AUG 1959
Deputy Director (Plans) (Date)

SECRET

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

NAME	:	Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler
GRADE	:	GS-15
SERVICE DESIGNATION	:	DI
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	:	4 October 1915, Fitzgerald, Georgia
MARITAL STATUS	:	Married; six children
EDUCATION AND CAREER OUTSIDE OF AGENCY	:	1934-1937, Mercer University 1941-1942, University of California 1942-1943, University of Colorado 1944-1946, George Washington University, M.A., International Relations 1941-1942, University of California, Reader in Political Science (part-time) 1942-1946, U.S. Navy, Language Officer, Intelligence Specialist, Lt. 1946-1952, War Dept., GHQ, FEC, Tokyo, Intelligence Specialist
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY	:	Japanese - Fair
CIA EXPERIENCE	:	EOD CIA Sep 1952, Acting Chief, FI, concurrently Chief of Liaison, Tokyo Station Jun 1956, Deputy Chief, FE/1 Mar 1957, Acting Chief, FE/1 Dec 1957, Chief, FE/PO/FI, FE Division
CIA TRAINING	:	Operations Course, Clandestine Methods & Techniques, Staff Indoctrination, Secret Writing, Documentation, Clandestine Services Review, CIA Review, Special Management Course, Reading Techniques

Approved by the
Bureau of the Budget

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

121-250-104

SERVICE
☒ FS ☐ DEPTL

C0255

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 10-4-15

3. FOREIGN SERVICE ACTION NO.: FSA-7

4. DATE: 3-26-59

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology): Limited Appointment

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 5/8/59

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Section 522.1 PL 724 - 79th as amended

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE		Political Officer	
Diplomatic or Consular Title			
9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY		FSR-3	$11,660
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS			
Post		Tokyo	
11. HEADQUARTERS			
12. CS CATEGORY / FS Category	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ Regular ☐ Resident ☐ Non-US	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ Regular ☐ Resident ☐ Non-US	

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5-PT	10 POINTS Disab.	10 POINTS Other
	X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
	X			1-1011-333

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM
TO 91-4013

17. RETIREMENT ACT
☒ CSC ☐ FS
☐ FICA ☐ NONE

18. DATE OF APPOINT. FIRST APPOINTMENT (Accessions Only): 5/8/59

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: D.C.

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department.

Marital Status - Married - Six

Military Reserve Status - None

Appointment limited to 5 years or need of employee's services, whichever is less.

Execute SF-61a.

R. H. TAYLOR

THROUGH APPROPRIATE OFFICER

EMPLOYEE COPY

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref.	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10	04	15	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	1	M 1	09	28	52			
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
08	06	42		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	28	52

13. Yes-1 No-2 Code: 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FI CI STAFF	5113	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field (Dept. - USfld - Frgn -) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	I.O.FI STF CH	3448	GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770 ~~[illegible]~~	01	12	15	57	06	14	59	9 ~~2~~ 3700 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
Reassignment Confidential Funds	05	05	03	59	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE FE/JAO Tokyo Station Office of the Chief Deputy for Ops.	517	Tokyo, Japan	37557

33. Dept. - Field (Dept. - USfld - Frgn -) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
5	Area Ops Off [redacted]	[redacted]		0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
	$								9-3735-55-005

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A) Requested By (Name And Title): Edward R. Korn C/FE/JAO

B) For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Mozelle Little X2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): H. L. Stobe C/FE/Personnel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks: Please transfer from Vouchered to Unvouchered funds on 3 May 1959.
~~[illegible]~~
2 Copies to Security.

Recorded by CSPD

FORM NO. 1152 1 MAR 57

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo Da Yr

V to V / UV to V / V to UV / UV to UV

1. Serial No.

2. Name (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, Robert P.

3. Date of Birth: Mo 10 Da 4 Yr 15

4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code

5. Sex: M

6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr

7. SCD Mo Da Yr

8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code

9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority

10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr

11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code

12. LCD Mo Da Yr

13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT. LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO - Tokyo Station
~~Tokyo Station~~ Deputy for Operations
Office of the Chief

Code

15. Location Of Official Station: Tokyo, Japan

Station Code

16. Dept.-Field: Dept.-1 Field-2 From-8 Code 5

17. Position Title: ~~Deputy for Operations~~ Ops Officer

18. Position No.: 3936

19. Serv.: GS

20. Occup. Series: 0136.01

21. Grade & Step: 15 1

22. Salary Or Rate: $ 12,770

23. SD: DI

24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr

25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr

26. Appropriation Number

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: Integration Department of State

Code: 58

28. Eff. Date: Mo 5 Da 8 Yr 59

29. Type Of Employee: R

Code: 3M

30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

11

31. Organizational Designations

Code

32. Location Of Official Station

Station Code

33. Dept.-Field: Dept.-1 Field-2 From-X Code

34. Position Title: Pol. Assistant, 1st Sec. (when)

35. Position No.

36. Serv.: FSR

37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step: 3

39. Salary Or Rate: $ 11,660

40. SD

41. Date Of Grade: Mo 10 Da 5 Yr 57

42. PSI Due: Mo 6 Da 14 Yr 59

43. Appropriation Number: 9-3734-35-005

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): OPER/CCD/CCL

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): B. Eggleston, x8168

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): B. Eggleston Cover Officer

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		14 MAY 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks: [illegible] sick and [illegible] annual leave to be transferred to Department of State.

FORM 12-57 1152a USE PREVIOUS EDI.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice Expires 1 July 1959

N 20-190-160

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-160

PERSONNEL
14 July 1958

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENTS TO KEY POSITIONS

PANEL OF EXAMINERS OF THE CIA SELECTION BOARD

In accordance with paragraph 5b of Regulation No. 20-105, The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence has appointed the following persons, as members of the Panel of Examiners for the period 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1959.

Name	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Anderson, Kenneth A.	SC	DDS/OC
Beers, Colwell E.	SA	OTF/DDS
Bielefeldt, Talbot	OD	DDI/OO/FDD
Blackett, Gustav	OD	DDI/OO/FDD
Bradley, Herbert C.	SA	DDS/OC
Brooks, William E.	SA	DDP/WE
Burris-Meyer, Harold	D	DDP/CI Staff
Burt, Arthur L.	IR	DDI/ORR
Cashell, John L.	SF	DDS/Compt
Channing, Hayden	IS	DDI/OSI
Crowley, Robert T.	OC	DDI/OO/C
Czajkowski, Anthony J.	OC	DDI/OO/C
Darling, James A.	DN	DDP/NEA
Dean, Warren L.	DI	DDP/WE
Donalley, Gail F.	SC	DDS/OC
Fuller, Robert, III	D	DDP/PPC
Gibson, Frank E., Jr.	SM	DDS/Med
Heney, Carlyle F.	SS	DDS/OS
Hewitt, Robert L.	IN	DDI/ONE
Holbrook, Newton D.	DI	DDP/SR
Heuffner, Donald C.	DI	DDP/FI
Ingersol, Harold B.	IC	DDI/OCI
Johnson, Dwight C.	IB	DDI/OBI
Karamessines, Thomas H.	DI	DDP/FI
Kaufman, Walter J., Jr.	DI	DDP/NEA
King, Henry E., Jr.	DP	DDP/PP

S-E-C-R-E-T

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-160

PERSONNEL
14 July 1958

NAME	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Knott, William M.	SS	DDS/OS
Kolarik, George T.	SL	DDS/OL
Korn, Edward N.	DP	DDP/FE
Kriebel, Norman F., Jr.	OB	DDI/OO/FBID
Leach, Arthur R.	SL	DDS/OL
Lohman, Raymond D.	SC	DDS/OC
Little, Harry W., Jr.	DI	DDP/FI
Lowe, Francis D.	SL	DDS/OL
McPherson, Paul S.	OB	DDI/OO/FBID
Morse, Richard A.	SL	DDS/OL
Needham, William C.	DP	DDP/SE
Osborne, William A.	SS	DDS/OS
Phillips, Marvin W.	DT	DDP/TSS
Radford, William J.	C	DDI/OCR
Ragan, Joseph B.	SP	DDS/OP
Reinhardt, Nicholas W.	SF	DDS/Compt
Remsen, James K.	IR	DDI/ORR
Richardson, J. Roy	IS	DDI/OSI
Roberts, Elliott P.	ST	DDS/OTR
Roman, Howard E.	DI	DDP/EE
Ryan, Edward	DI	DDP/WE
Sawyer, William L.	SC	DDS/OC
Sells, Oscar H.	ST	DDS/OTR
Sharpe, C. F. Stewart	IB	DDI/OBI
Sheay, Robert W.	SP	DDS/OP
Swasey, Edgar, Jr.	DT	DDP/TSS
Tenney, Calvin W.	DI	DDP/CI Staff
Thorn, John H.	C	DDI/OCR
Voigt, Frederick A.	IC	DDI/OCI
von Schrader, Atreus	I	OFF/DDI
Walsh, William B.	SM	DDS/Med
Wheeler, Robert P.	DI	DDP/FE

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

L. K. White
Deputy Director
(Support)

DISTRIBUTION: A, plus each member of the Panel of Examiners

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

19 Nov. 1957

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WHEELER, Robert Prentiss	3. Date Of Birth Mo 10 Da 04 Yr 15	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/FE FI/CI Staff ~~Office of the Chief~~	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code
16. Dept.- Field Dept.- Ustld.- Fran.- Code	17. Position Title I.O. (FI) Stf Ch	18. Position No. 3448	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.51	21. Grade & Step 14 - 5	22. Salary Or Rate $ 11,180.00	23. SD DI
24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 8-3700-20 CH	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Promotion	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr 15 DEC 1957	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 5113	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
33. Dept.- Field Dept.- Ustld.- Fran.- Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.
37. Occup. Series	38. Grade & Step 15	39. Salary Or Rate $ 11,610.00	40. SD
41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr 12 1957	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr 6 14 57	43. Appropriation Number	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Ronald Page Ronald Page, Chief, FE/Personnel	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Jimmie Dewberry x 2957	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		27 Nov 57	D. Placement		27 Nov 57
B. Pos. Control		12/3/57	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		12/3/57

Remarks

FORM 1152a 5-57

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

30 August 1957

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WHEELER, Robert Prentiss	3. Date Of Birth Mo 10 Da 04 Yr 15	4. Vet. Pref. None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2 Code /	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2 Code /	12. LCD Mo Da Yr 13. Mil Serv. Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/FE Branch 1 - Japan Office of the Chief	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code

5

16. Dept.- Field Dept. - X Usfld. Frgn. - Code	17. Position Title Area Ops Off (Dep Br Ch)	18. Position No. ~~E~~-110	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01

21. Grade & Step 14 ~~4~~ 5	22. Salary Or Rate ~~$10,965.00~~ 11,180 p/a	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo 09 Da 22 Yr 57	26. Appropriation Number 8-3700-20 GP

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment	Code 51	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr 1 DEC 1957	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP/FE FI/CI Staff	Code 5113	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C. DI	Station Code [illegible]

1

11-19-57

33. Dept.- Field Dept. - Usfld. - Frgn. - Code	34. Position Title I. O. (FI) (Stf Ch)	35. Position No. 3448 ~~[illegible]~~	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.51

38. Grade & Step 14 5	39. Salary Or Rate ~~$10,965.00~~ 11,180 p/a	40. SD DI	41. Date Of Grade Mo 09 Da 28 Yr 57	42. PSI Due Mo 03 Da 22 Yr 59	43. Appropriation Number 8-3700-20 GP

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
Alfgrave, Elmer, Jr. C/FE

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Ronald Gage, Ext. 3003

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
Approved by CS Career Service Panel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	[illegible]	OCT
B. Pos. Control		11/1/57	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Shoay	OCT

Remarks

Please double slot with Robert L. Brown who is to be reassigned.

APPROVED BY FE CAREER MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

FORM 1152a
3-57

u/o File

SECRET

14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/P PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

: WHEELER, ROBERT P. AGE: 4 OCT 1915 DATE: 30 AUGUST 1957

TON WASHINGTON, D. C. PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: DI
JTIES: I.O.(FI)STF.CH. DD/P UNIT: FE
REASSIGNMENT

ESENT GRADE: GS-14 PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-67-15
OPOSED GRADE: GS-14
TRAINING: OPERATIONAL MGT, CSR, CLAND MET & TECH, DOC, S/W, SIC, TSS BRIEFING
PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-110-14

UCATION: 1934-37, MERCER UNIV; 1940-42, UNIV OF CALIF, BA IN POL SCI; 1942-1943 UNIV OF COL. JAPANESE; 1944-46, GWU, MA IN INTERNATIONAL REL.
ANGUAGE PROFICIENCY: JAPANESE - FAIR

SESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
MAY 38-OCT 38, CHAUFFEUR, AARON GOLDBERG
NOV 38-AUG 40, CLERK-DRIVER, GROCERY STORE
SEP 41-JUN 42, READER, UNIV OF CALIFORNIA
JUN 42-JUN 46, INTL OFF, TRANSLATOR, INTERPRETER, US NAVY, AUSTR. & JAPAN
JUN 46-SEP 52, INTEL CONSULTANT, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
28 SEP 52, EOD, IO, GS-14, OSO/FE, TOKYO, JAPAN
28 FEB 54, REASSIGNED, IO(FI), GS-14, TOKYO, JAPAN
4 SEP 56, RETURNED TO HQS, PCS, & ASSIGNED AS D BR CH, DDP/FE/BR. 1, JAPAN
11 MAR 57, APPOINTED AS ACTING CHIEF, DDP/FE/BR. 1 JAPAN, WASH., D. C.

RECOMMENDED BY: CONCURRENCES:

ALFRED C. ULMER, JR., CFE

- -

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

APPROVED BY FE C.S. [illegible] COMMITTEE
OCT 1 - 20 [illegible] 1957

FORM NO. 965 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
1 MAR 57

SECRET

SECRET

2 1 AUG 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Wheeler, Robert P. -- Recommendation for Promotion from GS-14 to GS-15

1. Mr. Wheeler entered on duty with CIA on 28 September 1952 as a GS-14. He had, previous to that, served in a distinguished manner with the G-2 Section of the Army in Japan in the early days of the occupation. His name was submitted for promotion by the Chief of the Japan Station in November 1955. He entered on duty at Headquarters as Deputy Chief of the Japan Branch in September 1956. In April, 1957 he became Acting Branch Chief and has been serving in this position in a superior manner. He is 41 years of age and has been in grade with the Agency for 4½ years.

2. A review of Mr. Wheeler's Fitness Reports will adequately reflect his strength and weaknesses, with the possible exception of the most recent one dated 7 July 1956, in which, in the undersigned's opinion, the rating officer did not have adequate time to fairly rate Mr. Wheeler. Granting his occasional tendency to allow his emotions to color his work, he is, nevertheless, one of the hardest working and generally capable officers I have been associated with. He has great ability in dealing with people, he is an accurate and meticulous reporter, and he is adjusting rapidly to the requirements of his job in Headquarters and is turning in a most effective performance. In view of the length of time in grade, his age, and above all his performance, I strongly recommend Mr. Wheeler for promotion from GS-14 to GS-15. It is planned in the near future to appoint Mr. Wheeler Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff of the FE division, a most responsible GS-15 position.

Alfred C Ulmer Jr

Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET

5 APR 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chairman, FI Career Service

SUBJECT: Nominations for Replacement of FE Consultants to FI Career Service

The following individuals are nominated to replace those Consultants from the FE Division to the FI Career Service, who will no longer be available for such duty:

Robert P. Wheeler vice William E. Nelson

Robert J. Jantzen vice Evan J. Parker, Jr.

Robert V. [illegible] vice Armand J. Vallieres

Paul B. Breitweiser vice Bernard Reichhardt

signed

ALFRED C. ULMER, JR.
Chief, Far East Division

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice Expires 20 April 1957

CSN NO. 1-104

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
NOTICE NO. 1-104

ORGANIZATION
20 March 1957

PERSONNEL ANNOUNCEMENT

FE DIVISION

Announcement is made of the designation, effective 4 March 1957, of Mr. Paul B. Breitweiser as Acting Chief, FE/7.

Announcement is made of the following designations, effective 11 March 1957:

Mr. Robert J. Jantzen, Chief, FE/4

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, Acting Chief, FE/1

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Released by:
Richard Helms
Chief of Operations

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

FE NOTICE NO. 30-11
CHANGE 2

FISCAL
7 March 1957

FAR EAST DIVISION NOTICE

SUBJECT: FE NOTICE NO. 30-11, "FE Division Approving Officers"

1. Effective 4 March 1957, paragraph 1,k of FE Notice No. 30-11 dated 21 November 1956, should be amended as follows:

Delete Bernard F. Reichhardt, CFE/7 reassigned
Add Paul D. Breitweiser, A/CFE/7

2. Effective 11 March 1957 paragraph 1,f of FE Notice No. 30-11 dated 21 November 1956, should be amended as follows:

Delete William E. Nelson, CFE/1 reassigned
Add Robert F. Wheeler, A, CFE/1

3. Effective 11 March 1957 paragraph 1,i of FE Notice No. 30-11 dated 21 November 1956, should be amended as follows:

Delete Evan J. Parker, CFE/4 reassigned
Add Robert J. Jantzen, CFE/4

Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.
ALFRED C. ULMER, JR.
Chief, Far East Division

Distribution:
FE Staffs and Branches
CSA/EOS
RI

S-E-C-R-E-T

8 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Promotion of Robert P. WHEELER

1. Mr. Wheeler entered on duty with CIA on 28 September 1952 as a GS-14. He had, previous to that, served in a distinguished manner with the G-2 Section of the Army in Japan in the early days of the occupation. His name was submitted for promotion by the Chief of the Japan Station in November 1955. He entered on duty at Headquarters as Deputy Chief of the Japan Branch in September 1956. As of this date he has served in that capacity for a period of five months. He is 41 years of age and has been in grade with the Agency for 4½ years.

2. A review of Mr. Wheeler's Fitness Reports will adequately reflect his strength and weaknesses, with the possible exception of the most recent one dated 7 July 1956, in which, in undersigned's opinion, the rating officer did not have adequate time to fairly rate Mr. Wheeler. Granting his occasional tendency to allow his emotions to color his work, he is, nevertheless, one of the hardest working and generally capable officers I have been associated with. He has great ability in dealing with people, he is an accurate and meticulous reporter, and he is adjusting rapidly to the requirements of his job in Headquarters and is turning in a most effective performance. In view of the length of time in grade, his age, and above all his performance, I strongly recommend Mr. Wheeler for promotion from GS-14 to GS-15.

William E. Nelson
WILLIAM E. NELSON
Chief, FE/1

CONFIDENTIAL

STAN. FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Robert Prentiss WHEELER	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 16 Oct. 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 16 Dec 56	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
I.O. (FI) BFF-2302	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Off - Dep Br. Ch. BF-110
GS-0136.51-14 $10,965. p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,965. p/a
DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Base Operations Staff Liaison Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Office of the Chief
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington D.C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL D

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Subject is transferring from UNVOUCHERED to VOUCHERED funds.
Subject's W-4 and Form D-4 attached.
Subject's Personnel Data Sheet attached.

R. A. ... (acting), FE/...
14 Nov. 56

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Henry F. GILBERT, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Nelda P. Wicklund x-3308

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

Approved by CS Career Service Panel
23 Nov 56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT: DISAB.	10 POINT: OTHER
	x				

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REV.

SD:DI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM 7-3735-55-005
TO 7-3700-20

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		30 NOV 1956
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		23 Nov 56
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
Robert ... FE ... 28 Nov '56

14-00000

SECRET
(When filled in)

DD/P

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: Mr. Robert Prentiss WHEELER AGE: 41 DATE: 16 October 1956

STATION AND DUTIES: Washington D.C.
Area Ops. Officer - Dep. Br. Chief

DD/P UNIT: FE/1

PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: DI

PRESENT GRADE: GS-14

PROPOSED GRADE: GS-14

CIA TRAINING: BOC, OC, SW, SIC
TSS Briefing, CSR

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BFF-2302 GS-0136.51-14

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-110 GS-0136.01-14

EDUCATION: Mercer University 1934 - 2½ yrs; Univ. of California 1940 - 2 yrs.- B.A.
George Washington University 1944 - 2 yrs. - M.A.

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Japanese - Speak - Fair; Read - poor; Write - poor.

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
June 1946 - Sept. 1952 - U.S. Dept. of Army - Tokyo, Japan - Intell Specialist
June 1942 - June 1946 - U.S. Navy - Language Officer, Intel specialist

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
EOD 28 Sept. 1952 to present - Deputy Chief of Mission, Tokyo, Japan - GS-14
Chief, Liaison Division - Japan Station, Tokyo

RECOMMENDED BY: Philip F. Fendig
Philip F. FENDIG, CFE/1

CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

FORM NO. 965 1 APR 55 REPLACES FORM 38-1 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

Job Description: Will be assigned as Deputy Chief, FE/1.

Recommended by Philip F. FENDIG, CFE/1.

MAIL ROOM
NOV 26 11 [illegible] AM '56
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DI Career Service Board

DATE: 19 December 1955

FROM : Chief, FE

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert P. WHEELER

ATTACHMENT: FJBA-7751

1. Mr. Robert P. WHEELER, I.O., FI, GS-14, will complete his overseas tour (as extended) with the Japan Base, Tokyo, in June 1956. Subject will return to the U. S. for Home Leave and requests that he be permitted to return to the Japan Base for a new two year tour of duty upon completion of TDY at Headquarters for orientation and training.

2. Mr. WHEELER is Chief of Liaison for the Japan Base, Tokyo. He will resume this position upon his return to his official station (refer to Form 202 dated 9 November 1955 for subject).

3. Subject's request has the concurrence of the Chief, Japan Base, and this Division.

for

George E. AURELL
Chief, FE

APPROVED:

DI Career Board

14-00000

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

RYBAT

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]- 7751

5 DEC 1955

TO Chief, FE

DATE 30 November 1955

FROM Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo J.K.

INFO: COS/KA

SUBJECT
GENERAL Administrative/Personnel
SPECIFIC [redacted]

Mr. Richard P. Wheeler

1. Attached is a rotation data sheet on [redacted].

2. As you will note [redacted] lists as his first choice return to Japan Base.

3. While it is realized that [redacted] has not had a regular tour at Headquarters, Japan Base concurs in [redacted]'s request, provided it does not hinder his career. This concurrence is based on the fact that Japan Base will be losing by next summer several of its key personnel who have contributed much to the operations of the Base. These include STANARD, WAISTLING, possibly CAPASSO and others.

4. [redacted] has a unique knowledge of the Japanese scene, speaks the language and has a continuity of service that makes his service invaluable.

5. During the next couple of years as this base gradually reduces in size, and while the Japanese are still in a receptive mood it is felt that much can be accomplished through our liaison efforts. It is therefore felt that [redacted]'s experience can be to the maximum benefit to KUBARK by his return here for another tour.

6. In order to assist this Base in its planning, an early answer will be appreciated.

Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo

OK

Attachment:
1. Rotation Data Sheet;

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Chief, FE, w/attach.
1 - COS/KA, w/o attach.

RYBAT

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. FJFA- 7285

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, FE

DATE 28 OCT 1955

FROM Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo R.J.K

INFO: COS/FA
FE Support Base

SUBJECT GENERAL Administration/Personnel
SPECIFIC Recommendation for Promotion of Robert P. Wheeler

REF JAPA-3079

1. In pursuance of recommendation submitted in Ref, it is requested that Robert P. Wheeler be considered for promotion from the grade of GS-14 to GS-15. Subject has been in grade since 27 September 1952. He occupies a GS-15 slot.

2. Subject has been in his present position for approximately one year and has been under my supervision for 22 months.

3. Subject has made an unusual contribution to the work of the base through:

a. His outstanding leadership;
b. His almost unique knowledge of the area;
c. His ability to deal on a close personal basis with individuals on the highest levels; and
d. His quick and often brilliant assessment and solution of many of the important day-to-day problems of the base.

4. These qualities coupled with his strong devotion to duty fully warrant, in my opinion, his promotion to the grade of GS-15.

Harry W. Little Jr.

Robert P. Wheeler Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo

Attachment:
1. Job Description:
18 October 1955
Distribution:
4 - Addressee, w/attach.
1 - COS/FA, w/attach.
1 - FE Support Base, w/attach.

Cancelled
for C FE
Dec 55

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

JOB DESCRIPTION

Robert P. Wheeler

1. The position currently held by incumbent is two-fold: a. Deputy for KUFIRE and b. Chief of Liaison. These two positions will be described separately.

2. Deputy KUFIRE, Japan Base

As the title implies, incumbent is Deputy Chief, Japan Base for KUFIRE activities, a position comparable to the Deputies for Administration and KUCOMN activities. As such, incumbent is the responsible officer for the KUFIRE activities of the Japan Base, responsible to the Chief and Deputy Chief of Base. These responsibilities include the originating, planning and supervision of the execution of all Japan Base KUFIRE activities under the broad supervision of the Chief of Base, guided and directed by KUBARK KUFIRE regulations such as the SOI and the TRD. Incumbent supervises the work of approximately twenty persons ranging in grade from GS-13 to GS-5 and including such persons as the KUFIRE operations officer, the special projects officer, the chiefs of the KUFIRE sections of the Base. It is incumbent's further responsibility, generally on the initiative of the Deputy for Administration, to handle certain personnel matters for KUFIRE personnel, matters such as efficiency reports, promotion actions, disciplinary actions, etc. Incumbent also represents the Base on all KUFIRE matters, being charged, for example, with most KUFIRE relations with higher echelons, such as the Senior Representative, FE, and laterally with KUFIRE elements of adjacent Bases. As one of five Deputies, incumbent assists in setting Base policy, determination of personnel assignments, determination of work assignments, determination of Base operational priorities (again under the guidance and direction of KUBARK Headquarters), and, generally with the Chief of Base but often on his own responsibility, represents the KUFIRE aspects of the Base and of KUBARK so far as Japan is concerned to ODACID, ODIBEX and ODUNIT.

3. Deputy for Liaison, Japan Base (or Chief, Japan Base Liaison)

In this capacity incumbent is charged with basic responsibility for all Japan Base liaison activities, with all Japanese agencies or entities and other ODYOKE Agencies represented in Japan. Here incumbent is responsible to the Chief of Base for the origination, planning, supervision and frequently the actual conduct of all Base liaison, under the broad guidance of HR 52-200. Under incumbent's direct supervision are approximately twenty persons, separate from those mentioned above, who range in grade from GS-14 to GS-5, including all Base personnel in any form of liaison activity though their basic assignment may well be in one of the operating sections of the Mission. Being the Senior Liaison person of the Base, incumbent is frequently called upon to conduct liaison activities with such persons, on the one hand, as the Deputy Prime Minister of the host country, the Chiefs of major Japanese Governmental departments, high ranking officials of various branches of the host country, and, on the other, with such persons as the Senior ODACID representative in the country and various branch or section heads of the local ODACID establishment, senior military officers of all three services and various branch and section chiefs of the local military establishments. One segment of these activities involves LAURICLE matters of high importance. One of the primary direct responsibilities of incumbent is the origination of KUBARK liaison with these agencies and of equal import is the maintenances of good liaison relationships, stepping in where there is potential trouble, where policy decisions have to be made, where new departures in liaison are necessary (such as joint operational activities with other PARO or other ODYOKE agencies).

4. Inherent in both of the current assignments is the planning and review function which are both so necessary to effective and continued operations. This includes the initiation of FPOP's and review of those originated by personnel under the supervision of incumbent; included also is operational review and critical analysis of all KUFIRE operational and Base liaison activities.

5. In addition to the above functions and responsibilities, incumbent is also the case officer for one political KUFIRE operation.

6. Aside from the above general description of incumbent's duties and responsibilities the following seems pertinent: incumbent has been on duty in Japan, with minor interruptions, since September 1945 and in this period, seven years was spent with G-2 of the command (throughout its many changes). One result of this service has been an uninterrupted liaison relationship with many Japanese agencies and more importantly Japanese personalities, while, on the other hand, at the same time there has been a rather unique relationship with the Command and with personnel of the Command (many of the ODYOKE personnel with whom KUBARK is now in liaison are persons with whom incumbent has worked intimately at some period throughout the past ten years, making for a naturalness of relationship that has paid innumerable dividends). In addition incumbent has specialized in things Japanese for some fifteen years, being somewhat more than a neophyte in Japanese history, economics, language, and customs and traditions.

7. I certify that the above described duties are true and correct.

/s/ Robert P. [illegible]

/s/ Harry W. Little, Jr.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FI Career Service Board

DATE: 26 January 1955

FROM : Chief, FE

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert P. WHEELER — Extension of Overseas Tour

ATTACHMENT: FJBA-3333, dated 13 January 1955

1. Subject's request for extension of overseas tour contained in the attachment is forwarded for your approval.

2. Mr. WHEELER entered on duty with the Agency in the field on 28 September 1952. He completed his two-year tour on 28 September 1954 and requests that his tour be extended to 28 September 1956.

3. The above request has the concurrence of the Chief of the Japan Mission and Chief, FE/1.

for George E. AURELL
Chief, FE

APPROVED:

FI Career Service Board

Orig: A. Tallackson
x - 3332

SECRET

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. FJBA-3335

[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

13 JAN 1955

TO : Chief, FE

DATE

FROM : Chief, Japan Mission

INFO: Support Mission

SUBJECT { GENERAL : Administrative - Personnel
SPECIFIC : Robert P. WHEELER Request for Extension of Overseas Duty

Robert P. WHEELER completed his two-year overseas tour on 28 September 1954. Subject requests an extension to 28 September 1956. The Chief of Mission concurs in this request.

Viola N. Partain
Viola N. PARTAIN
Acting Chief, Personnel Section

Distribution:
4 - Headquarters
1 - Support Mission

[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

SECRET [illegible]

11 June 1954

MEMORANDUM

TO : Robert P. Wheeler [redacted]

FROM : Chief of Mission

SUBJECT: Commendation

1. It gives me very great pleasure to forward herewith a personal commendation to you from Robert A. ASCHAM, Chief, KUBARK. This commendation was transmitted to the Japan Mission by Philip J. CROCKETT, the Senior Representative, North Asia, who requested that his personal appreciation be extended to you.

2. Your performance in the case which resulted in ASCHAM's commendation reflects great credit upon KUBARK in general and upon the Japan Mission in particular, as well as indicating conclusively your outstanding professional and executive capabilities in the direction and conduct of intelligence activities.

3. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my congratulations and to extend my personal thanks and appreciation.

Robert J. Kendall
Robert J. KENDALL

SECRET

MAY 1 1954

TO : [redacted] Robert P. Wheeler

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. It is a very real pleasure for me to be able to acknowledge the excellent manner in which you carried out your duties as officer in charge of the direct handling of the POCARGO case. You are to be particularly commended on the manner in which you adjusted to a type of operation with which you had never previously been directly concerned, on the personal rapport which you developed with POCARGO and the good judgment displayed in anticipating and dealing with difficult personality problems, and on your understanding of the broad policy problems implicit in this case.

2. I wish to assure you that your substantial contributions to the success of this operation, as well as the personal inconvenience caused by your precipitate and prolonged departure from your family, are fully appreciated. You are further commended on the demonstrated fact that this personal inconvenience in no way affected either your effectiveness or your contagious enthusiasm which contributed so much to this operation.

3. Copies of this letter are being forwarded for the Chief, Japan Mission and the Senior Representative, North Asia, as well as to your permanent personnel file at headquarters.

Robert A. Ascham

ROBERT A. ASCHAM

SECRET

PERSONNEL TRANSFER AND CLEARANCE SHEET

3 October 1952

TO: Chief, FE

FROM: Chief, JCU

1. Robert Prentiss WHEELER Branch: JCU

2. Detached from: Tokyo, Japan Ordered to: Washington, D. C.

   On Temporary Duty for 90 days and return to Tokyo, Japan

3. Approximate date of departure: 3 October 1952. Travel by air.

4. Monthly salary allotment in the Field: $400. Not yet effective.

   Overall base pay per annum: $9600 Marital status: Married

5. Allowances: 10% Differential. Not yet effective.

6. Per Diem: Not applicable

7. Unaccounted or unpaid advances at time of detachment:

   Travel advance in the amount of $1,460.62 outstanding. Travel from Tokyo, Japan, to Washington, D.C., to be accounted for at headquarters. Travel from Washington, D.C., to Tokyo, Japan, to be accounted for at field station upon return to Japan.

8. Leave used at this station: None

   Accumulated leave to date of detachment: Unknown

Additional Remarks: Subject entered on duty in the field 28 September 1952. Transfer of leave record has not yet been accomplished. Salary and 10% differential have not been paid.

FOR THE CHIEF, JCU:

Walter D. [illegible]

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. ZJJA-505

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

TO : **Chief, FE**

DATE: 30 September 1952

FROM : **Chief, JCU**

SUBJECT: GENERAL- **Administration - Personnel**
SPECIFIC- **WHEELER, Robert Prentiss, Completion of Personnel Forms**

REFERENCE: **ZJJW-108, 17 March 1952**

ATTACHMENTS:
(a) Form W-4
(b) Form 61
(c) Secrecy Agreement (dup)
(d) SF 78 (in lieu of Form 88)
(e) Letter of Appointment (dup)
(f) SF 2806
(g) Form 37-79 (dup)
(h) Form 37-50
(i) Memorandum of Field Allowance dated 28 September 1952 (dup)
(j) True Signature Form (dup)
(k) Personnel Transfer and Clearance Sheet (quad)([illegible])

1. Transmitted herewith are completed personnel forms for subject employee.

2. Standard Form 2808, Designation of Beneficiary, is withheld by this Unit. Designated beneficiary as indicated by Retirement Act order of preference is satisfactory to subject.

3. Reference attachment (j), Acknowledgement of Pseudonym Forms will follow.

4. Attachment (k) is submitted in accordance with Field Regulation 30-3. Subject entered on duty 28 September 1952 and estimated date of departure from Tokyo is 3 October 1952 via Pan American Airways Flight 822 at 1600 for temporary duty in headquarters for a period of 90 days. A travel advance in the amount of $1,460.62 has been given employee. A field allotment of $400 per pay period will be effective beginning pay period 11 October to 8 November 1952. This allotment will accumulate at the field station and will be paid in a lump sum upon subject's return from temporary duty at headquarters. However, the period of duty from 28 September to 12 October 1952 should be paid to subject by the headquarters finance division.

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

[illegible]

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Robert Prentiss Wheeler, understand that by virtue of my duties in the ______________________, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to security standards set by the ______________________. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917, (Espionage Act) as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the ______________________, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Director, ______________________.

4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States.

5. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 23rd day of September 1952.

Robert Prentiss Wheeler (Seal)

Sworn to before me this 23rd day of Sept 1952

at Tokyo, Japan.

Bonnie M. Travelini

1499

VIA: A I R
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. FJTA -

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: AUG. 28. 1953

TO : Chief, FE

FROM : Senior Representative, Tokyo

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative - Personnel

SPECIFIC— [redacted] Commendation of Mr. Robert P. WHEELER

Attachment (1) Dispatch No. FJJA-1279- dtd 17 August 1953 under the above subject

It is with pleasure that I endorse and forward to Headquarters the attached dispatch prepared by the Chief, JCU, commending [redacted] for performance of his duties as Chief of Staff, JCU.

Philip J. Crockett
PHILIP J. CROCKETT

24 August 1953

Distribution

- 3 - HQS - w/3 encls.
- 1 - JCU - w/o "
- 1 - Registry
- 1 - File

SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO.
SEP 1949 51-28A

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

DATE: 2 November 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE		I.O. (CE)
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-13 $8360
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		FDZ
BRANCH		C - Japan Composite Unit CE Section Slot #1
OFFICIAL STATION		Tokyo, Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE

CLASSIFICATION Thomas M. Fisher

PERSONNEL OFFICER H. C. [illegible] 2/11/51

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

C # 1817

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS: Attachments: PHS (in duplicate) w/Appendix I, Ltr. of Availability

Request subject be processed against Japan Composite Unit, CE Section Slot #1 (I.O, CE, GS-13), Personnel No. 51. Subject to be processed at basic salary of GS-13; upon receipt of 201 file from Deptar, necessary salary adjustments to be made at that time.

ICM, Requesting Waiver of OSO Reg. 20-1 attached.

Secrecy agreement to be forwarded from the Field.

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

GPO 16-62206-1

(2)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TRAINING EVALUATION

OPERATIONS

IMPORTANT: The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. He may show it to other members of his staff or to the student concerned if such action is considered necessary and advisable.
This report summarizes the test results. Observations and opinions of the various instructors for the course listed only. More complete data are available in the files of the office of Training (Covert), and may be examined after contacting the Training and Evaluation Officer. Any questions as regards the evaluation of this student should be referred to the Chief, Training and Evaluation, TR(C).

NAME OF STUDENT (LAST) (FIRST) (INITIAL): Wheeler, Robert P.	AGE: 37	GRADE (GS OR RANK): GS-14	DATE OF REPORT: 9 December 1952
DIVISION: FI FE C		PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT: Tokyo, Japan	COURSE NO.: 40

PERFORMANCE RECORD

THE FOLLOWING GRADES SHOW THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE STUDENT IN THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE COURSE. TWO GRADES ARE ASSIGNED IN EACH AREA. ONE FOR COMPREHENSION AND ONE FOR IMPLEMENTATION. A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF EACH OF THESE TERMS, AS WELL AS OF THE ADJECTIVAL RATINGS EMPLOYED, IS GIVEN ON THE BACK OF THIS EVALUATION FORM.

MAJOR ELEMENTS	ADJECTIVAL RATINGS									
	FAILURE		POOR		SATISFACTORY		EXCELLENT		SUPERIOR	
	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.
1. Organization of Clandestine Operations						X	X			
2. Cover						X	X			
3. Communications						X	X			
4. Target Analysis								X	X	
5. Criteria For Agent Selection							X	X		
6. Agent Recruitment							X	X		
7. Agent Handling								X	X	
8. Agent Direction								X	X	
9. Assessment and Reassessment								X	X	
10. Special Operational Problems							X	X		

TRAIT RECORD

THE FOLLOWING INDICATES THE VARIOUS TRAITS AS OBSERVED BY THE INSTRUCTORS DURING THE TRAINING PERIOD. THE OBSERVATIONS INCLUDE THE STUDENT'S PARTICIPATION AND CONDUCT IN TRAINING AS WELL AS HIS REACTIONS TO VARIOUS PROBLEMS AND SITUATIONS.

1	2	3	4	5

A. Constructive Imagination (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Devoid of constructive imagination or inventiveness in approach to problems.	Showed only a very limited degree of constructive imagination.	Showed sufficient constructive imagination to meet most school situations adequately.	Demonstrated the possession of creative ability to a greater than average degree	Outstandingly creative, inventive, or original.

B. Astuteness (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Appeared gullible and naive.	Exhibited below average skepticism and discernment.	Displayed adequate judgment and perspicacity.	Displayed above average perspicacity and skepticism.	Displayed exceptional shrewdness and perspicacity.

C. Industry (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Did not show sufficient application of time and effort.	Applied only the minimum amount of time and effort necessary.	Showed adequate compliance as regards time and effort necessary.	Volunteered greater time and effort than is normally expected in this course.	Was unusually industrious, giving generously of time and effort.

D. Initiative (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Consistently failed to act without being specifically instructed to do so.	Generally exhibited a low level of enterprise but occasionally acted on his own.	Normally took steps to implement ideas without external prompting.	Usually displayed enthusiasm and aggressiveness in carrying out projects.	Displayed unusual energy, enthusiasm, and aggressiveness.

E. Ability to Write (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Showed unable to express thoughts clearly in written form.	Was weak in expressing thoughts clearly in written form.	Written work showed no significant weakness.	Displayed ability to express thoughts thoroughly in written form.	Was outstanding in ability to express ideas in clear, correct, coherent, manner.

F. Facility of oral expression (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	[✓ 5]
Unable to express self clearly. Presented ideas in groping and incoherent fashion.	Lacked fluency or ease in his speech, but meaning usually clear.	Displayed reasonable facility in oral expression.	Spoke confidently, conveying ideas clearly and readily.	Outstanding in fluency and clarity of oral expression.

G. Ability to Get Along With Associates. (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Frequently alienated his associates.	Failed to win social acceptance but did not actively antagonize others.	Reasonably effective in his social relations.	Displayed definite ability to achieve harmonious relationships with his associates.	Unusually effective in his ability to win acceptance from others

H. Ability to Influence His Associates (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	[✓ 5]
Withdrew from group activities to a marked degree, failing to influence the thinking and actions of others.	Normally socially retiring, opinions rarely affected his associates.	Usually participated in group activities, was fairly successful in selling a point or himself.	Was excellent at influencing others by his own personality and thinking.	Was outstanding in ability to command respect and attention through his personality and thinking.

I. Tact (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Markedly blunt and indiscreet.	Frequently said or did something which induced an unfavorable reaction.	Reasonably discreet and tactful.	Had good discernment for the appropriate thing to say or do.	Consistently demonstrated keen perception for fitting speech or conduct.

J. Adaptation to Training (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Displayed no interest or enthusiasm for training and failed to adapt himself to the demands made upon him.	Accepted training program reluctantly and had difficulty adapting himself to the training requirements.	Displayed average interest in and acceptance of training.	Exhibited an excellent acceptance of training and readily adapted to demands made upon him.	Outstanding in his acceptance of training and display of enthusiasm and interest.

COMMENTS

CHB

SIGNATURE OF CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED	REVIEWED
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY FOR STAFF TRAINING Robert B. Shaffer	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, TRAINING AND EVALUATION

FORM NO. 51-86
OCT 1951

SECRET

(OVER)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

Sections 1 through 6 will be completed by employee. Type if possible.

1. NAME (Printed) WHEELER Robert P.

LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	GS-14	$9600.

Date of assignment to present post 28 Sept. 1952
(Was in U.S. on TDY. Returned station 12 January 1953)

2. Description of duties since last efficiency report. (List most recent first. Describe concisely but fully)

Deputy Chief of Station

3. If courses of instruction were completed during period of this report, list title, location of school, length of course and date completed.

Courses while on TDY in U.S.

4. Proficiency in Foreign Language

Proficiency in Foreign Language	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
Japanese			x			x		x	

5. My preference for next duty after termination of current assignment is:

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Same	Same

(List one or more in order of preference)

6. Have there been any changes in personal status since original employment or last report — whichever is latest (Answer yes or no.)
Marital Status No, Number of Dependents +1 *, Emergency addresses No, legal address No. If the answer to any of the above is yes, attach a separate detailed report in duplicate hereto. In the case of marriage, the report will include names, addresses, and citizenship of spouse, Father-in-law, Mother-in-law, Brothers-in-law and Sisters-in-law.

DATE 1 June 1953

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

/s/ Robert P. Wheeler

* Child born 11 Feb. 1953
Charles Slayton [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

Items 5 through 11 to be completed by immediate supervisor

7. Period covered by this report. Date from 27 Sept. 1952 to 1 June 1953
Occasion for report: Annual x, Reassignment of reporting officer ___, Proposed reassignment of employee reported on ___, Covering initial 90 days of employment ___

8. Is this employee qualified to perform all present duties? Yes x No ___
Is employee better qualified for other duties? Yes ___ No x
If so, what duty or duties?

Do you concur in employee's description of duties under Section 2?
Yes x No ___. If NO, explain in Section 11.
Has employee striven for professional improvement? Yes x No ___
Do you recommend employee for promotion? Yes x No ___
If so, to what grade and for what position?
To grade GS-15. However, there is no current vacancy in JCU T/O.

9. For each factor observed check the appropriate box to indicate how the employee compares with all others of the same classification whose professional abilities are known to you personally. Do not limit this comparison to the others now under your supervision. Do not hesitate to mark "Not Observed" on any quality when appropriate.

Rating Factors

	Not Observed	Unsatisfactory	Fair	Good	Very Good	Excellent	Outstanding
A. Ability to work and get along with people						x	
B. Interest and enthusiasm in work						x	
C. Security consciousness						x	
D. Ability to grasp instructions and ideas					x		
E. [illegible]							x
F. [illegible]						x	
G. Ability to obtain results and get things done							x
H. Discretion						x	
I. Initiative							x
J. Ability to handle and direct staff						x	
K. Knowledge of present duties							x
L. Ability to evaluate intelligence information						x	
M. Tact						x	
N. Sagacity (Non-Gullibility)					x		
O. Leadership						x	
P. Physical Stamina					x		
Q. Mental Stamina						x	

10. Indicate your attitude toward having this employee under your command or supervision. Would you: Definitely not want him ___, Prefer not to have him ___, Be satisfied to have him ___, Be pleased to have him ___, Particularly desire him x

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

11. Enter here any desired remarks pertaining to particular qualifications or lack therof which are considered pertinent to the evaluation of this employee. Outstanding assets and/or serious limitations should be stated, also reasons for and recommendations as to reassignment will be given if appropriate to this report.

Subject officer is an outstanding addition to KUBARK as a general service staff officer. He has the aggressive sense of urgency so necessary in any position of responsibility together with the necessary qualities of balance, understanding of human nature and sincerity of purpose. He would be an asset to any branch, division or staff of KUBARK home office, and would be capable of assuming almost any responsible position in an overseas post. If he has any weakness at present, it is a lack of experience in covert operations; this can be overcome before the expiration of his present tour.

(If additional space is needed, attach extra sheet.)

17 August 1953
(Date)

Walt D. Newph
(Signature of Reporting Officer)
Walter D. NEWPHER

(If Reviewing Officer or Chief of Station does not concur with this report, exceptions will be stated in space provided below.)

Walt D. Newph
(Signature of Reviewing Officer)
Walter D. NEWPHER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

BIASED OPINIONS BASED ON PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PREPARATION OF EFFICIENCY REPORTS IS AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF ALL SUPERVISORS OF EMPLOYEES, AND THE ACCURATE AND TRUE EVALUATIONS EXPRESSED THEREIN ARE A DIRECT REFLECTION UPON HIS OWN ABILITY AND QUALIFICATION FOR THE POSITION HE HOLDS.

ANY DESIRED REMARKS OF REVIEWING OFFICER AND/OR CHIEF OF STATION:

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

1.12-31-73

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 26 Dec 73

FILE NO.: 4908

SS NUMBER: 258-12-0844

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 060947

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) NOCAD

ATTN: Administrative Officer

REF: Retirement Debriefing

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert P.

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS
☐	BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______
☐	OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER *(Specify)*
	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ *(HHB 20-7)*
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED *(HHB 20-11)*
	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR 240-2c)*
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR 240-2c)*
	EAA, CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	SUBMIT FORM 2588 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS
X	EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD
X	SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*
NA	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ *(HHB 20-7)*
NA	EAA, CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
X	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
X	SUBMIT FORM 2588 FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD
	DO NOT NOTIFY [illegible]

THIS [illegible] ON TOP OF FILE

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

SUBJECT WILL ACKNOWLEDGE CIA AS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR HIS ENTIRE PERIOD OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT BUT WILL NOT REVEAL SPECIAL PLACES OR LOCATIONS OF ASSIGNMENT.

CSN/kas

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - [illegible]
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SSSCD
COPY 4 - [illegible]
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY 007622

(13-20-43)

FORM 5-73 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABL[illegible]MENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: MARCH 1971

FILE NUMBER: 4908

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 060947

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) MPS

ATTN: MPS/Chief Personnel Branch

REF: FORM 1322 dtd MARCH 1971

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert P.

OFFICIAL COVER: X XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

X DISCONTINUED

UNIT: REMOVE FROM: U.S. ARMY STAFF GROUP

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	X	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
	A. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE ____ B. CONTINUING AS OF		DATE EFFECTIVE COB 28 FEB 1971
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	X	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X	ASCERTAIN THAT CIA W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	X	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2*)		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2*)		
X	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

EDP/pw

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - O/CD
COPY 4 - [illegible]
COPY 5 - OF
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

James F. [illegible]

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-80-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ES   SHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

2 April 1968

TO: (Check)	X CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION	FILE NUMBER 4908
	☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION	EMPLOYEE NUMBER 060947
	X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) O/PPB	ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF	OFFICIAL COVER	X	BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
REF: VERBAL REQUEST		☐	DISCONTINUED
SUBJECT WHEELER, ROBERT P.	UNIT U S ARMY STAFF GROUP		

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (opmemo 20-800-11)	☐	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (opmemo 20-800-11)
	A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF XXX EOD		DATE (as of COB)
X	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)		SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X	ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HR 20-661-1)		RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
X	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
X	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)		
	CONCUR IN ISSUANCE: ☐ AAG HOSPITALIZATION CARD ☐ AACS HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY:

Sep 52 - Jun 56 Japan/DAC
Jul 56 - Jun 59 Washington, D.C./DAC
Jul 59 - Aug 64 Japan/State integree
Aug 64 - Aug 66 Honolulu/NOC
Aug 66 - Apr 68 Washington, D.C./DOD
Apr 68 Washington, D.C./DAC

[illegible] RHF/nch

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - [illegible]
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - [illegible]
COPY 4 - [illegible]
COPY 5 - [illegible]
COPY 6 - [illegible]
COPY 7 - [illegible]

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP	DATE 17 October 1966
TO: (Check) ☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) DCI/OPPB	ESTABLISHED FOR WHEELER, Robert P.
ATTN: Chief Personnel	FILE NO. 4908
REF: Verbal Request	ID CARD NO.
OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED Office, Secretary of Defense (Admin)	EMPLOYEE NO. 060947

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ Block Records: (OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ____ days, effective ____________

b. Continuing, effective EOD.

☒ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category. (HHB 20-7)

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued. (HB 20-661-1)

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover. (R 240-250)

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility. (R 240-250)

THIS RECORD MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

N/A Concurred in issuance

AGE ☐ Hospitalization card.
NACS ☐

COVER HISTORY

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CCS

Copy 1-PAB Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-D/OS, Copy 4-CL/TELSR, Copy 5-OP/DSD'IB, Copy 6 CCS OFF Copy 7-File

931 SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OMS? 2 JAN 74

Dorothy / P.B.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	060947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	12 31 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NBCA	4221 0117 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	PL 88-643 SECT 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDO/PLANS STAFF CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP NONOFFICIAL COVER BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
12. POSITION NUMBER	0040
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	17 5
17. SALARY OR RATE	36000

CH

20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK
IRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF

WHEELER ROBERT P

BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

22. STATION CODE	
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24.	
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	10 04 15
26. DATE OF GRADE	
27. DATE OF LEI	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	0EJ0000
32. Correction/Cancellation Data	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ NO	
34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE	
36. SERV COMP DATE	
37. LONG COMP DATE	
38. CAREER CATEGORY	
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	
44. STATE TAX DATA	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1-3-74
VAR

SECRET

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

H31

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P	37 135	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 17	4	$36,000	11/28/71	GS 17	5	$36,000	11/25/73		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Gordon Macon

DATE 2 Oct. '73

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK'S INITIALS

VERIFIED BY

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous edition

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

14-00000

DMSB 2 JAN 74

DEP

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 12 DA. 31 YR. 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS				
	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FAN AND FSCA: 4221 0117 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION:

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0043

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: 36000

18. REMARKS:
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 USE 11 72
9-72

Use Previous Edition

(4-31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	37 325	V	GS 17 4	$36,000

14-00000

KHN: 12 OCT 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 09 DA 21 YR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4221 0117 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PLANS STAFF
CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
NON OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0049
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 36000

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING		22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Health Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	37325	PS	75013		1	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CS, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR)
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REG. NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAT, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE)
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEM; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 9-72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(1)

RCS: 30 JULY 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 01 YR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X — V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4221 0117 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PLANS STAFF
CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
PENDING REASSIGNMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 36000
18. REMARKS:
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 37135 ALPHABETIC PS
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Military Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA 04 YR 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1 YES 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: NOCAD

POSTED
8-1-73

FORM 1150 9-72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	54 997	V	GS 17 4	$36,000

74-00000

BS: 21 MAR 72

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 03 05 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 2231 4148 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/NOCA DIVISION DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 17 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 36000

18. REMARKS
OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 18	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 54997	ALPHABETIC NOCA	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Vacancy Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)	28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction Cancellation Data	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES / HEALTH INS. CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM MPS

POSTED
3-22-72

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-66 Mfg. 6-73

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	52 100	V	GS 17 4	$36,000

14-00000

EOD: 30 NOV 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 11 DA 28 YR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 2221 2886 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/MISSIONS & PROGRAMS STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 35801
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: Numeric 52100 Alphabetic MPS
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23.
24.: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA 04 YR 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO 11 DA 28 YR 71
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 11 DA 28 YR 71
28. FILE EXPIRES:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction Cancellation Data:
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE:
36. SERV. COMP. DATE:
37. LONG COMP. DATE:
38. CAREER CATEGORY:
39. FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE:
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA:
44. STATE TAX DATA:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7 DEC 1971

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

21

H 36

AUG 15 15 11 '71

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P	32 100	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	6	$32,819	08/24/69	GS 16	7	$33,757	08/22/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 11 June 71

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

WITHIN GRADE PAY SUSPENDED UNTIL 14 NOV 71 PER 2.0. P1015. EFFECTIVE DATE RETAINED FOR DATES OF LAST EQUIVALENT INCREASE.

CLERKS INITIALS BEK

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PDO: 13 MAR 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS.	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 03 21 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1221 2886 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/MISSIONS AND PROGRAMS STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0001	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 32819

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 16	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODINGS NUMERIC 52100	ALPHABETIC MPS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Rights Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1. CSC 2. CIA 3. FICA 4. NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0. NONE 1. 5 PT. 2. 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR / RESV PROV / TEMP	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE / CODE 0. WAIVED 1. YES / HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0. NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1. NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2. BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3. BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1. YES 2. NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1. YES 2. NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
Dh 3.22.71

FORM 1150 (6-70) Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	52 150	CF	GS 16 6	$32,619

36 H

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P	52 150	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	5	~~$25,873~~ 28384	08/27/67	GS 16	6	~~$26,640~~ 29219	08/24/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Michael G. Mitchell

DATE 3 June 1969

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

FORM 7-65 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

DB

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	52 150	CF	GS 16 5	$28,384

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962".

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	52 150	CF	GS 16 5	$23,778	$25,879

JLB: 12 JUN 58

SECRET
(When Filled In)

UCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 | DA 12 | YR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 8121 2887 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/MISSIONS AND PROGRAMS STAFF PROGRAMS GROUP
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0008
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 23778
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 52150 | ALPHABETIC MPS
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Minority Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 | DA 04 | YR 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA | YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO | DA | YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO XX | DA XX | YR XX
29. SPEC. REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CSS 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM O/PPB

POSTED

CL-13(S?)[illegible]

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962,"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	02 350	CF	GS 16 3	$22,755	$23,778

E-4

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. [illegible]	5. LWOP HOURS
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P	02 390	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	4	$22,085	08/29/65	GS 16	5	$22,755	08/27/67		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Gene R. Koontz

DATE 6 June 1967

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

[illegible]

R.S.

FORM 7-58 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

COMPENSATION & TAX DIV

AUG 22 11 11 AM '67

PJH: 15 AUG 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 050947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXCEPTED APPT CAREER		4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 07 31 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO V X / CF TO CF ☐		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7114 0001 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DCI/OFFICE OF PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING DIVISION PROGRAM ANALYSIS BRANCH		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE IO PROGRAM EVAL		12. POSITION NUMBER 0005	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.70	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 22025

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 13	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 02350	ALPHABETIC OPPB	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) 08 30 64
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.) 08 29 65	28. QTR EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA CODE 2	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO. 00000	34. SEX M
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 1	36. SERV. COMP. DATE 08 06 42	37. LONG COMP. DATE 09 28 52	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE C	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 1	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE 0	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA C MO	44. STATE TAX DATA					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
ad 8.17.66

FORM 1152 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

FJH: 15 AUG 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible], Robert [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 07 DA. 30 YR. 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7123 0369 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
US FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
HONOLULU BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF BASE

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.08

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: 22085

18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. Employ. Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. Hdqtrs Code

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 04 YR. 15

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1BD0091

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS.; 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
dd 8.17.66

1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

060947 [redacted] 43 620 CF

[illegible]

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 16	3	$20,245	08/30/64	GS 16	4	$20,900	08/29/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

POSTED

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Harry DATE 15 June 65

L1

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Wheeler, Robert	060947	43 620	CF	GS 16 4	$21,653	$22,085

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] T Wheeler, Robert	060947	43 620	CF	GS 16 4	$20,900	$21,653

14-00000

: 11 AUG 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Wheelen, Robert
[redacted] [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 08 01 65

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☒

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6123 0359 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
U. S. FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
HONOLULU BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF BASE

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.08

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: 20245

18. REMARKS:
EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

POSTED
AT
[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28	10	43520	000	25020		2	10 04 15	8 1301 64	08 30 58

28. MTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 6 - NONE	30. CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	ZOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

8/6/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

JCD: 12 NOV 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible], Robert [redacted]			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT CAREER		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 25 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V X	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5129 0369 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD U. S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION HONOLULU, HAWAII		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0261	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 20245	

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
10 29 1964

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 13	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 43620 ALPHABETIC 000	22. STATION CODE 75020	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 2	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR. 08 30 64	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR. 08 30 64
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE 1	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.		EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO. 00000	34. SEX M1
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 1 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR. 08 06 42	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR. 09 28 32	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. - RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE C	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE		40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 1 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE 3	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE 0	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/13/64

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

JCD: 12 NOV 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 24 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5129 0369 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD U. S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0261	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 20245

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Regis. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 18D0091	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REG. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAP RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JCD 11/13/64

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET JCD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

16 OCT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	10 | 16 | 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5129 0369 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/DOD US FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE	HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0261	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	16 3	20245

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
37	10	43620	DDD	75020		2	10 | 04 | 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32. MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: FE - 2

E.D. ECHOLS

POSTED
19 Oct 1964

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

DLB: 30 SEPT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION (CORRECTION)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 08 DA. 30 YR. 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5137 1568 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP FE FE/JKO-TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER DCOS	12. POSITION NUMBER 3003	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 20245

18. REMARKS
THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 08/30/64 AS FOLLOWS:
TO DELETE INTEGRATED INFORMATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RSRV. TEMP. / CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1 - WAIVED 2 - YES / HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/6/64 MCQ

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

DLB: 16 SEPT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION (CORRECTION)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 08 30 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5137 1566 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP FE FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE POL ASST 1ST SEC OPS OFFICER DCOS	12. POSITION NUMBER 3003	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 03 1 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 14860 20245

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 08/30/64 AS FOLLOWS:
ITEM #1, SERIAL NUMBER, WHICH READ 560947, TO READ 060947.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY RFQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
09/18/64 UK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 16 SEP 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

28 AUG 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 560947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 08 | 30 | 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5137 1566 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP FE FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE POL ASST 1ST SEC OPS OFFICER DCOS	12. POSITION NUMBER 3003	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 03 1 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 14860 20245

18. REMARKS
TOKYO, JAPAN

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	45380	FE	37587	1	3	10 | 04 | 15	08 | 30 | 64	08 | 30 | 64

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV. RESV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
09/15/64 JLS

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

SEP 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

DLD, 20 SEPT 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060347	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. COB 08 25 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137 1566 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS

DDP FE
FOREIGN FIELD
FE/JKO-TOKYO STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER DCOS	12. POSITION NUMBER 3003	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 18740

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
56	10	15380	FE	37581		3	10 04 15		

28. MIE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV / RESV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/01/64 mck

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

060947	WHEELER ROBERT P			45 380	CF					
5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	4	$17,210	06/10/62	GS 15	5	$17,725	06/07/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP 03

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 7/2

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 14 May 64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	45 380	CF	GS 15 4	$16,005	$17,210

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	56380	CF	15 4	$14705	15 4	$16005

060947	WHEELER ROBERT P			55 380	11 CF					
5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	3	$14,380	12/11/60	GS 15	4	$14,705	06/10/62			

8 Remarks and Authentication

3

742

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS E. D. ECHOLS AUDITED BY WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

742

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO. 560947	2. NAME WHEELER ROBERT P	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN. DDP/FE 11	4. FUNDS UV	5. ALLOTMENT

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	2	$14,055	06	14	59	GS 15	3	$14,380	12	11	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

POSTED TO 2808

WK 12/7/60

E. D. ECHOLS

OBLIGATION APPROVED

12/7/61

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	WHEELER ROBERT P	560947	51 71	GS-15 2	$13,070	$14,055

437

EMMETT D. ECHOLS

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

BS 4 SEPT 59

1. Serial No.: 560947
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER ROBERT P
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 10 | Da. 04 | Yr. 15
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M 1
6. CS-EOD: Mo. 09 | Da. 28 | Yr. 52
7. SCD: Mo. 08 | Da. 06 | Yr. 42
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA 403 J
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo. | Da. | Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code
12. LCD: Mo. 09 | Da. 28 | Yr. 52
13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD (Yes-1, No-2): Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP FE
FE/JAO TOKYO STATION
DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
Code: 5171
15. Location Of Official Station: TOKYO, JAPAN
Station Code: 37587
16. Dept. - Field (Dept-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5): Code 5
17. Position Title: POL ASST 1ST SEC* OPS OFFICER
18. Position No.: 3936
19. Serv.: FSR ~~GS~~
20. Occup. Series: 0136.01
21. Grade & Step: 03 15 2
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 11660 13070
23. SD: 01
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. 12 | Da. 15 | Yr. 57
25. PSI Due: Mo. 06 | Da. 14 | Yr. 59
26. Appropriation Number: 9 3735 55 005

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT
Code: 56
28. Eff. Date: Mo. 09 | Da. 06 | Yr. 59
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR
Code: OM ~~CM~~
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDP FE
FE/JAO - TOKYO STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
Code: 5171
32. Location Of Official Station: TOKYO, JAPAN
Station Code: 37587
33. Dept. - Field (Dept-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5): Code 5
34. Position Title: POL ASST 1ST SEC. OPS OFF (D COS)
35. Position No.: 3003
36. Serv.: FSR GS
37. Occup. Series: 0136.01
38. Grade & Step: 03 15 2
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 11660 13070
40. SD: 01
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. 12 | Da. 15 | Yr. 57
42. PSI Due: Mo. 12 | Da. 11 | Yr. 60
43. Appropriation Number: 0137 7351 3000
44. Remarks:

POUCHED

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

0 S

742

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	DDP/FE -11	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	1	$12,770	12	15	57	GS 15	2	13,070	06	14	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

3 [illegible]

742

14. AUTHENTICATION

40 19 5/3/57

M 16

1/30/59

[illegible]

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 55

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

1
ARE: ~~1X~~ MAY 1959

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS. EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
560947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10	04	15	1	M 1	09	28	52			
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. ECD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code
08	06	42	1	50 USCA 403 J				1	09	28	52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations		Code	15. Location Of Official Station			Station Code	
DDP FE FI CI STAFF		5113	WASH., D. C.			75013	
16. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5 Code	17. Position Title		18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series		
2	I.O.FI STF CH		3448	GS	0136.51		
21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Date Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number		
15 1	$ 12770	DI	12 15 57	06 14 59	8 3700 20		

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	05	05 03 59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations		Code	32. Location Of Official Station			Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		5171	TOKYO, JAPAN			37587
33. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5 Code	34. Position Title		35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series	
5	AREA OPS OFF		3936	GS	0136.01	
38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number	
15 1	$ 12770	DI	12 15 57	06 14 59	9 3735 55 005	

44. Remarks
SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARC: 19 MAY 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	
560947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10 04 15	1	M 1	09 28 52	

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1 No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1 No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. (Yes-1 No-2) Code
08 06 42	1	50 USCA 403 J			09 28 52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5171	TOKYO, JAPAN	37587

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 1, Field - 3, Frgn - 5) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	AREA OPS OFF	3936	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. WI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	D1	12 15 57	06 14 59	9 3735 55 005

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
INTEGRATION DEPARTMENT OF STATE	58	05 08 59	REGULAR	CH	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5171	TOKYO, JAPAN	37587

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 1, Field - 3, Frgn - 5) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
5	POL ASST 1ST SEC* OPS OFFICER	3936	FSR* GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. WI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
03 15 1	11660 $ 12770	D1	12 15 57	06 14 59	9 3735 55 005

44. Remarks

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $12770 AND FSR SALARY OF $11660 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.

ALL SICK AND 160 HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

[illegible]

FORM NO. 1150a

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	160947	GS-15-1	$11,610	$12,770

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth			4. Vet. Pref.		5. Sex	6. CS - EOD				
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10	04	15		1	M 1	09	28	52		

7. SCD			8. CSC Retmt.		9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav.			11. FEGLI		12. LCD			13.	
Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes - 1 No - 2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes-1 No-2	Code	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
08	06	42		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	28	52		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FI CI STAFF	5113	WASH. D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USlid - 4 Fron - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	I.O. FI STF CH	3448	GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade			25. PSI Due			26. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
14 5	$ 11180	01	09	28	52	03	22	59	8 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date			29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
PROMOTION	30	12	15	57	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FI CI STAFF	5113	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USlid - 4 Fron - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	I.O.FI STF CH	3448	GS	0136.51

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade			42. PSI Due			43. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
15 1	$ 11610	01	12	15	57	06	14	59	8 3700 20

44. Remarks

POSTED

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

41077

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DMG

1. Serial No. 160947	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WHEELER ROBERT P	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 10 Da. 04 Yr. 15	4. Vet. Pref. 1 (none) 0 / 5 Pt-1 / 10 Pt-2 Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 07 Da. 28 Yr. 52	7. SCD Mo. 08 Da. 06 Yr. 42	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 09 Da. 20 Yr. 52
13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code 2			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FE BRANCH 1 JAPAN OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code	15. Location Of Official Station WASH. D. C.	Station Code
16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6 Code 2	17. Position Title AREA OPS OF DEP BR CH	18. Position No. 0110	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.01	21. Grade & Step 14 5	22. Salary Or Rate $11180	23. SD 01
24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number 8 3700 20	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo. 12 Da. 09 Yr. 57	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP FE FI CI STAFF	Code 5113	32. Location Of Official Station WASH. D. C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6 Code 2	34. Position Title I.O. FI STF CH	35. Position No. 3448	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.51	38. Grade & Step 14 5	39. Salary Or Rate $11180	40. SD 01
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 09 Da. 28 Yr. 52	42. PSI Due Mo. 03 Da. 22 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 8 3700 20	

44. Remarks

POSTED
JP 12/27/57

C M ST

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	DDP/FE 5	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
14	4	$10,965	03	25	56	14	5	$11,180	09	22	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Vernet L. Gresham	14 Aug 57	Vernet L. Gresham

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560 — SECRET — PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	DDP/FE	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
14	4	$10,965	03	25	56	14	5	$11,180	09	22	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	NO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b — SECRET — PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1v1

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler 160947	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 11 Dec 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment 01	6. EFFECTIVE DATE BOB 16 Dec 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
IO (FI) BFP-2302	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Off - Dep Br. Ch. BF-110
GS-0136.51-14 $10,965.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,965.00 per annum
DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Base Operations Staff Liaison Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 518301	DDP/FE Branch I/Japan Office of the Chief
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT WIFE	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DI

1 15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION: H
FROM: 7-3735-55-005
TO: 7-3700-20 750-13

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 09/28/52

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

[illegible] 1956

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-373047

713 12/14/56

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Robert Prentiss WHEELER	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 2 May 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: JUN 3 1956	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	BFF 2302		I.O. (FI) BFF-2302-14
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY			GS-0136.51-14 $10,965.00 p/a
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Japan Mission Deputy for FI Operations Staff Liaison Section		DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Base Operations Staff Liaison Branch
11. HEADQUARTERS			Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL SD: DI

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

T/O Change

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Henry P. GILBERT, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Robert A. Shuls (WAW)
Title: FE/CMS 7 May '56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE					
NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL

SD: DIO

15. SEX

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible]
MAY 1956
WAR

USED IN LIEU OF SF50
NOTI [illegible] OF PERSONNEL
ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	WAR	[illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible] 5/4/56	
E.		

REMARKS.

F. APPROVED BY
per T. B. Bear, Jr 10 May '56

SECRET

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION (When Filled In)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-320030

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Payroll period

3. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
WHEELER, ROBERT P.

5. Class No. UV

6. Slip No.

4. Grade and salary
GS-14 $10,750.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
FE/5

12. Prepared by
afw 1/10

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	
25Mar56	26Sep54	$10,750.00	$10,965.00	All following certified as of date. SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

☑ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised.
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

Wh

14-00000

7 Hmr
1/24/55
Jum

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19— FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*)
entiss
Mr. Robert PS WHEELER

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Oct 1915

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 20 Dec 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
Reassignment

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: JAN 16 1955

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
I.O. (FI) BFF-459	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BFF-2302-14
GS-0136.51-14 ~~$9800.00~~ p/a 10 000.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-14 ~~$9800.00~~ p/a 10 000.00
DDP/FE Japan Composite Unit Military Element Office of the Deputy Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Japan Mission Deputy for FI Operations Staff Liaison Section
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

PURSUANT TO PSI DIRECTIVE
[illegible] 1955
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: 10750

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
H. C. CLINKSCALE, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Avis M. Tallackson – x-3332

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: James P. Humphries (wmh)
Title: FI/CMO 4 Jan 55

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

D.D
SD ~~FI~~

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-3735-55-005
TO: Same

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: W. Va.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE 4 Jan '55

1/24/55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	PCH	1/10/55
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
SECRET
1-14-55

13—67229-3

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 - 667874

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Pay roll #

3. Check No. UV

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

6. Grade and salary
GS-14 $9800

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

FINANCE DIVISION

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
FS-4

12. Prepared by
mo 12 Aug 54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date
26 Sep 54

15. Date last equivalent increase
20 Mar 53

16. Old salary rate
$9800

17. New salary rate
$10,000

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s)

☑ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

(Initials of Clerk)

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] - FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

[illegible] 24 Feb 54

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Robert ~~P~~ G. WHEELER	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 5 Feb 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ~~12~~ 14 Feb 1954 B. APPROVED: FEB 28 1954	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
I.O. (Ops) S-7	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BFF-459
GS-132-14 $9800.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-14 $9800.00 p/a
DDP/FE Japan Composite Unit Military Element Office of the Deputy Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same Same
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Avis M. Tallackson, x-3332

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: H. C. CLINKSCALE
Title: FE Personnel Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL

CD: FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-3735-55-005 TO: SAME	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible]

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	17 Feb 54
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C Taylor	[illegible] Feb 54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
[illegible] C Taylor [illegible]-54

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

6/15/53
FI 98

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) [illegible], Robert Prentice	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 15	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 8 May 53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: JUN 7 1953	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
I.O. S-1 GS-14 $8800	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	I.O. (OPS) Slot #7 GS-136-14 $9800
DDP/FE ~~[illegible]~~ Japan Composite Unit OPC Team Tokyo, Japan	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 11. HEADQUARTERS	DDP/FE ~~[illegible]~~ Japan Composite Unit Military Element Office of the Deputy Chief Tokyo, Japan
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

From: JCU, OPC Team Slot #1 (cls T/O) FE-1

Subject entered on duty in the field 28 Sept 1952

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: MAY 21 1953

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Clarence E. [illegible], Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Avis Tallackson, [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Boris B. Pash
Title: FI/CMO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2755-55-005 TO: Same			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			NO CORRES
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
5/21/53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

1. Agency and organizational designations
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2. Pay roll

3. Block No.
U7

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
WEXLER, Robert Prentiss

6. Grade and salary
GS - 14 $9600

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. Now normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:
Delay due to admin error

11. Appropriation(s)
FY [illegible]

12. Prepared by
Sn 4/7/53

13. Audited by

☑ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date
29 Mar 53

15. Date last equivalent increase
30 [illegible] 51

16. Old salary rate
$9600

17. New salary rate
$9800

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1120a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—41111-2a • U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 973785

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

10/21/52

989

NAME: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

DATE: 15 July 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 23 Sept. 52

	FROM	TO
TITLE		I.O.
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-14 $9600
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		FE
BRANCH		Japan Composite Unit C - OPC Team, Slot #1
OFFICIAL STATION		Tokyo, Japan 3739

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION Thomas M. Fisher	PERSONNEL OFFICER 8/8/52	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO-STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 23 Sept. 52

SECURITY CLEARED ON 28 July 52

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 23 Sept. 52

ENTERED ON DUTY 23 Sept. 52

DOG 07/28/52
OSEOD 07/28/52
LCD 07/28/52

Paul C. Latchford
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

Request subject be processed against Japan Composite Unit, OPC Team Slot #1 (I.O., GS-14), Personnel No. 427. This action supersedes request for appointment dated 2 November 1951.

Resubmitted in accordance with JACO 0106 (IN 15330), dtd 30 Jun 52; WASH 48690 (OUT 88734), dtd 7 Jul 52; JACO 0114 (IN 17577), dtd 9 July 52.

Request that subject's security clearance be held open to permit him to EOD o/a 1 Sept 52.

[illegible] that subject is [illegible] GS.14

Allot. #3739

H.B.

FORM NO. 37-1

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FORM

Name:	Robert P. Wheeler (060947)
Date of Birth:	10/04/15
Sex:	Male
Grade:	GS-17
SD:	D
Official Position Title	Ops Officer - Staff Chief
Current Station:	Headquarters
Type of Report:	Annual
Reporting Period:	1 April 1972 - 8 May 1973

During the past reporting period Mr. Wheeler has served his first full year as Chief of the newly-created Nonofficial Cover Affairs Division. He has worked hard and long to improve and simplify the procedures through which we recruit, train, and deploy our nonofficial cover personnel. He has identified accurately the bureaucratic roadblocks that stand in the way of our efficient use of nonofficial cover and if he has not succeeded in removing these barriers he has made some progress. His enthusiasm for the job and his belief that it can be done have been invaluable during a formative period, and his performance on the whole has been a strong one.

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr.
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

I have noted this report:

Robert P. Wheeler
Robert P. Wheeler

6/20/73
Date

E 2 IMPDET
CLY 008103

5 JUL 1973
119

Fitness Report - Robert P. Wheeler

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Concur - a committed and effective performance -

3 JUL 1973
Date

WEColby
W.E. Colby, Deputy Director for Operations

30 May 1972

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FORM

Name:	Robert P. Wheeler (060947)
Date of birth:	10/04/15
Sex:	Male
Grade:	GS-17
SD:	D
Official position title:	Ops Officer - Staff Chief
Current station:	Headquarters
Type of report:	Annual
Reporting period:	21 March 1971 - 31 March 1972

During the first part of the reporting period, Mr. Wheeler served as Chief, Missions and Programs Staff, and on 17 January 1972 he assumed his new duties as Chief, Non-Official Cover Affairs Division. As Chief, MPS, Mr. Wheeler effectively supervised the important planning and budgetary functions of that office and under his leadership the Clandestine Service has considerably improved its programming presentations to the 7th floor and, due to the effective staff work and Mr. Wheeler's guidance, the area divisions have been largely relieved of the many questionnaires and interventions with which they were once plagued.

Mr. Wheeler took over his new duties as Chief, NOCAD with enthusiasm and his wide field experience and good relationships with the area divisions should in the future bring about a much more secure and imaginative employment of our non-official

6 JUN 72

cover personnel. Unfortunately a heart attack during the past year slowed Mr. Wheeler down for a while but he has made a good recovery and his performance on the whole has been very strong.

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report:

5/30/72
Date

Robert P. Wheeler
Robert P. Wheeler

Comments of reviewing official:

Fully concur.

31 May 72
Date

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

16 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report (Special) - Robert P. Wheeler

1. This memorandum is submitted in lieu of the Fitness Report form to cover the performance of Mr. Wheeler from 1 March 1970 through February 1971. It is submitted as the final report of the Rating Officer who is retiring at the end of February 1971.

2. Mr. Wheeler's outstanding characteristics are his integrity and total dedication to the continuing upgrading of management within the CS at all levels. By background, interest and training; by service in OPPB; by full-time participation in the Federal Executive Institute; and by his abiding determination to instill others with a similar will for perfection within the CS, he has made a valuable contribution to the Missions and Programs Staff (MPS) and to the Clandestine Services.

3. As chief of the Program Review Panel he has chaired the hearings of the various divisions with a great degree of sensitivity and knowledge, and has upgraded the quality and substance of those hearings. He has been especially helpful in those instances where divisions have proposed new approaches, as well as in the development of new and effective management techniques designed to simplify control and to coordinate the activities of headquarters elements and field stations.

4. Mr. Wheeler is a natural leader, bright and original. His is a creative mind, and innovative. He is articulate, rational, and thinks and talks sequentially. He has demonstrated clearly his ability to instill enthusiasm and continuing effort on the part of his subordinate officers who, taking their cue from him, are thoughtful, energetic and hard working. His officers demonstrate very high morale and great enjoyment and satisfaction in their work.

23 FEB 1971

5

SECRET

5. Mr. Wheeler also has the gift of being able to absorb rapidly and commit to paper accurately and quickly, a characteristic and asset of his which has much to commend it.

6. He has been a superb deputy, acting in this capacity in my absence. He has excellent recall, is a gifted administrator, and has introduced a number of procedural changes that have increased MPS effectiveness. He has been effective in dealing with OPPB and in participation in the briefings of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) personnel. He is very cost conscious and has made several suggestions resulting in the saving of hundreds of thousands of dollars. Mr. Wheeler has always enthusiastically accepted assignments to panels designed to upgrade the quality of various trouble areas, the latest being the searching look into the nonofficial cover situation within the CS.

7. Mr. Wheeler is a searching individual who is totally committed to the Plans Directorate and has the high regard of most of the elements comprising the Clandestine Services.

8. As I have previously recommended, I believe Mr. Wheeler would make an outstanding Chief of the Missions and Programs Staff.

Sidney A. Stein
Sidney A. Stein
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

I have noted the above report:

Robert P. Wheeler — 2/16/71
Robert P. Wheeler — Date

Reviewing Official:

Cord Meyer Jr. — 18 Feb 71
Cord Meyer, Jr. — Date
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

9 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report (Special) -
Robert P. Wheeler

060747-GS-16 - M/S - D

1. This memorandum is submitted in lieu of the Fitness Report form to cover the performance of Mr. Wheeler from 1 April 1969 to February 1970. It is submitted as a Special Fitness Report to serve as the final report of the Rating Officer who is retiring at the end of February 1970.

2. As Chief of the Programs Group (PRG) of the Missions and Programs Staff, Mr. Wheeler is responsible for, inter alia, liaison, except on budgetary matters, between the CS and OPPB; installing the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) within the CS; advising and assisting CS components in the preparation of Operating Directives and the program portions of the annual Operating Program response; chairing the Program Review Panel; preparing and/or coordinating special studies and surveys on operational programs; preparing DDP responses to requests of the Executive Director-Comptroller on CS programs, etc.; and, as required, advising CS components on those requirements of the PPBS that need to be addressed in CS documents requiring DCI or Executive Director-Comptroller action.

3. In carrying out the above-stated functions Mr. Wheeler has continued his superb performance in the field of management. His unusual dedication and sensible approach to and great enthusiasm for the tenets of PPBS have contributed immensely to the system's installation in the Clandestine Service. His energy, logical reasoning and sincerity have infected his numerous contacts within the CS and are goals which his officer-subordinates are striving to attain. He is so strong in his determination that good management will prevail in all components of the CS that he

SECRET

has never passed up an opportunity informally to discuss PPBS, to lecture at formal courses and to assist the DDP/TRO in his exhortations for management training. He has been a strong leader as Chairman of the Program Review Panel and supervisor of his subordinates. He has been outstanding in his ability rapidly to gather facts and produce a document in response to program and management queries levied on MPS. His wide CS experience, affability, sincerity, intelligence and dedication to the missions of the Agency, all of which have continued to be in evidence during the reporting period, make Mr. Wheeler, in the opinion of the Rating Officer, one of the CS' most valuable officers.

Michael G. Mitchell

Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

I have noted the above report:

Robert P. Wheeler — 2/10/70

Robert P. Wheeler — Date

Reviewing Official: Concur

Cord Meyer Jr. — 10 Feb 70

Cord Meyer, Jr. — Date
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
060947

SECTION A
GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WHEELER, Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH Oct. 1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/MPS/PRG		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1968 - 31 March 1969

SECTION B
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counselling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
4-65

SECRET

7 APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report (Annual) - Robert P. Wheeler

1. In compliance with HR 20-20, this memorandum is submitted in lieu of Fitness Report Form 45 covering the performance of Mr. Wheeler from January 1968 to 31 March 1969.

2. In late 1967 it was determined that Mr. Wheeler would be reassigned in June 1968 from the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (OPPB) to the Missions and Programs Staff (MPS). Under an arrangement with the Director of PPB, Mr. Wheeler was lent to MPS on 1 January 1968 for the purpose of preparing himself to assume the functions of Chief of the Programs Group (PRG) in MPS. Accordingly, what follows covers the period of the loan, from 1 January to 11 June 1968, and the period as Chief, PRG, from 12 June 1968 to 31 March 1969.

3. From 1 January to 11 June 1968. During the period of loan to MPS, Mr. Wheeler understudied the then Chief of PRG, acquainted himself with all Group files and responsibilities, attended the Advanced Management (Planning) Seminar and performed numerous ad hoc tasks assigned him by C/MPS. He prepared himself for the new assignment and performed the ad hoc tasks assigned with such dispatch, enthusiasm and intelligence as to augur well for the future. No minor task was too menial; every major task was readily accepted as a challenge. In short, his preparation for the new position soon to be assumed left little to be desired on the part of the Rating Officer.

4. From 12 June 1968 to 31 March 1969. As Chief of PRG, Mr. Wheeler is responsible for, inter alia, liaison on non-budgetary matters between the CS and OPPB; installing the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) within the CS; advising and assisting CS components in the preparation of Operating Directives and the program

portions of the annual Operating Program responses; chairing the Program Review Panel; preparing and/or coordinating special studies and surveys on operational programs; and, as required, advising CS components on the requirements of PPBS that need to be addressed in CS documents requiring DCI or Executive Director-Comptroller action.

5. In carrying out the functions enumerated in paragraph 4, above, Mr. Wheeler has displayed drive, initiative, enthusiasm and understanding. He has pushed within the CS on those concepts of PPBS that are considered applicable to an intelligence organization and has argued with OPPB against forcing the CS to apply those concepts which are not considered to be applicable. He has worked diligently, alone and with the assistance of the DDP/TRO, to spread throughout the CS an understanding of the why and how of PPBS. He has prepared himself well for and has exercised sound judgment and tact in the handling of the chairmanship of the Program Review Panel, on the actions of which he has brought to bear his experiences in OPPB. He has given unstintingly of his time to lecturing at Agency management courses when requested. Although he understands the need for flexibility in the CS, he has to be slowed down at times so anxious is he to make the CS the best managed directorate in the Agency. His sincere interest in good management has made him and the two senior officers he supervises cost conscious. This affable, conscientious, dedicated, highly experienced, intelligent employee, who already has given evidence of a strong performance, is a pleasure to collaborate with and a valuable asset to MPS and the CS.

Michael G. Mitchell
Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

I have noted the above report:

Robert P. Wheeler
Robert P. Wheeler

7 April 1969
Date

Reviewing Official Concur

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

8 April 69
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

ADVANCED MANAGEMENT (PLANNING) SEMINAR (50 hours) 3-68

Student	: Robert P. Wheeler	Dates of Course	: 17-22 March 1968
Year of Birth:	1915	Office	: MPS
Grade	: 16	Service Designation	D
ECD Date	: September 1952	No. of Students	: 36

COURSE OBJECTIVE:

Course objective is to increase individual effectiveness on-the-job by developing better understanding of planning as a managerial skill and by providing familiarization with the Agency's overall planning system.

The course seeks to meet this objective by: a) providing an overall and systematic framework for managerial planning; b) identifying and analyzing basic styles of planning; c) covering selected techniques useful in planning; d) providing an orientation on the PPB system in use in the Agency and Federal Government; and by e) permitting feedback to students on their personal planning styles as revealed during course exercises.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor 28 MAR 1960
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

18 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, GS-16, O/PPB,
Employee Serial No. 060947, D Career Service

REFERENCE: HR 20-20c(2)

1. In accordance with reference, this memorandum is submitted in lieu of a Fitness Report (Form 45). This is an annual report but in view of Mr. Wheeler's transfer to the Missions and Programs Staff, DD/P, in January 1968, it covers only the period April 1967 through December 1967.

2. Mr. Wheeler's assignment as Program Analyst involved: (a) reviewing and evaluating Agency activities, principally covert action programs; (b) participating in special in-depth studies of selected Agency activities; (c) preparing the Covert Action Program Memorandum for the Director's approval and submission to the Bureau of the Budget; (d) keeping abreast of Agency plans, programs, and progress toward defined objectives; (e) providing general staff assistance to the Director/PPB in implementing the Agency planning, programming, and budgeting system; and (f) preparing special presentations and correspondence for the Office of the Director.

3. During the year, Mr. Wheeler participated in a survey by the Inspector General of Agency proprietary organizations. He contributed significantly to the study. In addition, he was the Office monitor for at least two studies for the Bureau of the Budget.

4. Mr. Wheeler was the principal analyst assigned to the review of the Agency's Covert Action Program. He reviewed Directorate program plans and proposals, identified issues to be raised with the Director, and prepared a Program Memorandum for the Director's approval which presented Agency Covert Action plans and programs for the next five years.

7 MAY 1968

[illegible]

5. Mr. Wheeler's long operational experience, extensive contacts throughout the Agency, and exceptional writing ability have contributed to the realistic appraisal of programs and plans and to their effective presentation to the Director and to the Bureau of the Budget. Mr. Wheeler is effective in dealing with other elements of the Agency and has contributed useful suggestions for improving operations and analysis. In summary, Mr. Wheeler made a significant contribution while in the Office. In view of the similarity in functions between the two organizations, I would expect this contribution to be carried forward to his new assignment.

6. I rate Mr. Wheeler's over-all performance during the period as Strong.

7. Mr. Wheeler had no supervisory responsibilities.

8. This report was not shown to Mr. Wheeler because of his earlier transfer to another Agency component.

Gene R. Koontz

Gene R. Koontz
Chief, Program Analysis Branch
PPD/O/PPB

I showed this report to Mr. Wheeler. He pointed out that he is still assigned to OPPB; he has not been transferred to MPS/DDP.

Reviewed by:

Roy F Burleigh 22 April 1968
Chief, Planning and Programming Division, O/PPB (date)

SECRET

11 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, GS-16, O/PPB,
Employee Serial No. 060947, D Career Service

REFERENCE: HR 20-20c(2)

1. In accordance with reference, this memorandum is submitted in lieu of a Fitness Report (Form 45). This is an annual report and covers the period 1 August 1966 through 31 March 1967.

2. Mr. Wheeler's assignment as Program Analyst involves: (a) reviewing and evaluating Agency activities or programs, principally in the areas of clandestine collection and covert action; (b) participating in special in-depth studies of selected Agency activities; (c) preparing Program Memoranda for the Director's approval and submission to the Bureau of the Budget; (d) keeping abreast of Agency plans, programs, and progress toward defined objectives; (e) providing general staff assistance to the Director/PPB in implementing the Agency PPB system; and (f) preparing special presentations and correspondence for the Office of the Director.

3. Mr. Wheeler has many years of experience in clandestine operations and administration, both at Headquarters and in the field. This experience has proven to be of great value to this Office in assessing Agency activities. Mr. Wheeler has been quick to see the usefulness of the new planning, programming, and budgeting concept as a tool for assisting management at all levels in the Agency. He has enthusiastically supported the development of a system adapted to Agency needs and has made significant contributions toward this end.

4. Currently, Mr. Wheeler is participating in three studies of Agency activities: an Inspector General survey of Agency proprietary organizations and two studies which were requested by the Bureau of the Budget--Agency use of communications media for political-psychological programs and Agency air capabilities at two selected facilities. In addition, Mr. Wheeler is in the process of preparing a Program Memorandum for the Director's approval which presents Agency Covert Action plans and programs for the next five years.

21 APR 1967

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

5. Mr. Wheeler is effective in dealing with other elements of the Agency; he writes exceptionally well, has many useful ideas, and is most cooperative. His vast first-hand knowledge of operational problems permits realistic appraisal of operating plans and proposals. In summary, Mr. Wheeler has made a definite contribution during his eight months in this Office; and we expect this contribution to continue in importance.

6. I rate Mr. Wheeler's over-all performance during the period as Strong.

7. Mr. Wheeler has no supervisory responsibilities.

Gene R. Koontz

Gene R. Koontz
Chief, Program Analysis Branch
PPD/O/PPB

Shown to employee:

Robert P. Wheeler 4/11/67
Robert P. Wheeler (date)

Reviewed by:

Roy F. Burleigh 11 April 1967
Chief, Planning and Programming Division, O/PPB (date)

Concur: Mr Wheeler has provided strong support to the functions of this office and contributes materially to value judgments of covert activities

Concur: Mr. Wheeler has provided strong support to the functions of this office and contributes materially to value judgments of covert activities.

John M. Clarke
Director/PPB
12 April 1967

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

Name:	[redacted] Whaley Robert P.
Date of Birth:	10/04/15
Sex:	Male
Grade:	GS-16
SD:	D
Official Title:	Chief of Base
Assignment:	DDP/DOD/USS
Current Station:	Honolulu, Hawaii
Appointment:	Career
Reporting Period:	1 April 1966-15 August 1966
Report:	Reassignment Supervisor Reassignment Employee

POSTED ON
[illegible]

During the past four months Subject has been in Honolulu only a few weeks because of a TDY assignment to Headquarters, and has now been reassigned. There are no grounds for rating his performance.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

Date:

Emerson T. LEASKIS

BY SUPERVISOR

Months under my supervision
19 months

Date: 5 AUG 1966

COS/US

Harry A. Rositzke

Harry A. Rositzke

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

23 AUG 1966

Date: 8 August 1966

C/DO

C. Tracy Barnes

C. Tracy Barnes

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training

26 SEP 1966

This is to advise you that ___WHEELER, Robert P.___ training request # ___R-17992___ attended the following external training program:

COURSE: Executive Orientation in Programming, Planning and Budgeting

INSTITUTION: Civil Service Commission

DATE: 18-19 August 1966

GRADE: None

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Attachments:

- ___ Grade Report
- ___ Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
- ___ Certificate of Completion
- ___ Roster of Participants
- ___ Training Report by Institution
- X Training Report by Student
- ___ None
- ___ Other: ______________

GROUP 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF TRAINING AT NON-CIA FACILITY
(Forward Original and One)

TO : Director of Training
ATTN : Registrar/TR
THROUGH: Training Officer

FROM : Robert P. Wheeler
OFFICE: O/PPB
DATE : 24 August 1966

1. FACILITY ATTENDED
USCSC

2. DATES OF TRAINING
18 & 19 August 1966

3. NAME AND DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM
Executive Orientation in PP&B

4. YOUR TRAINING OBJECTIVES
To get a broad introduction to the concepts of PPBS and to learn what some other non-military elements of the Executive Branch are doing with the PPBS.

5. EVALUATION OF PROGRAM (Include: a. Strengths and weaknesses of program. b. Identify any outstanding speakers and their specific topics or area of instructional competence.)

I thought that from a broad, general standpoint the orientation was worthwhile but that far more BOB participation would have enhanced the program greatly. There was too much of "we think this is what BOB means" and too little of BOB saying "this is what we mean". I found the movie presentation of Dr. E. S. Quade's speech terrible because of inept projection, faulty audio equipment, and out-of-place music. Dr. Quade had a message and fortunately the CSC planners must have known their film was inadequate, for we were provided with the written text. Outstanding possibly because he stood out so far in comparison to the others was Mr. Peter Szanton from BOB. Dr. Adams from the University of Maryland was quite good and Mr. Greenhouse of VA was one of the few others who really seemed to know what he was talking about beyond immediate low to medium level parochial application.

6. ATTACHED ARE	TRANSCRIPT OF GRADES	YES	X	NO
	CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION	YES	X	NO

7. I CERTIFY THAT I ATTENDED THE TRAINING PROGRAM DESCRIBED ABOVE.

Robert P. Wheeler
Robert P. Wheeler
SIGNATURE

NOTE: Upon receipt of this report, with attachments as applicable, a certification of completion will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in your official folder.

P

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

066947

Name: [redacted]

Date of Birth: 10/04/15

Sex: Male

Grade: GS-16

SD: D

Official Title: Chief of Base

Assignment: DDP/DOD/USS

Current Station: Honolulu, Hawaii

Appointment: Career

Reporting Period: 1 April 1965 - 31 March 1966

1. During the past year it has clearly emerged that the Honolulu area offers very limited opportunities for CS operational action. The main target of a Honolulu base, as originally conceived by FE Division, was the East-West Center with its large number of Asian students. Although, during the 1964-65 academic year several prospective candidates for the WUENVOY program were assessed and one recruited, political developments in Southeast Asia prevented the arrival of any students at the Center from the priority Southeast Asian countries: Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia.

2. It is against this perspective that Subject's performance during the past year should be evaluated. He approached his job with enthusiasm and vigor but soon found that there were no tangible operational activities he could devote himself or his supporting agents to. He has been frank to state officially and unofficially the absence of any targets to which an operational base could direct itself and has therefore been relatively unoccupied during this period except for an occasional item of local coordination or follow-up on a headquarters task. Subject has had under his direct supervision a long-term Staff Agent at the University of Hawaii and two Staff Agents assigned to the

11 APR 1966

SECRET

e

University as students for the current academic year. He has handled them well and has done his best to maintain their morale in spite of the fact that there were only a few specific targets on whom they could systematically work.

3. Subject is a mature, experienced and energetic officer with both operational and scholarly interests in Far Eastern, especially Japanese, affairs. His talents are obviously being wasted in Honolulu and arrangements have already been made to have him reassigned. The base itself will be phased down in the summer of 1966 with two of the three Staff Agents reassigned, the long-term Staff Agent kept on at the University, and a more junior officer replacing Subject as COB.

4. Subject has displayed an economical approach to the use both of funds and personnel.

5. In view of the limitations, outside his control, on operational activities in Honolulu, Subject's performance has been more than satisfactory and is rated as proficient.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

(not available for signature)

[redacted]

Date:

Mos. under my supervision
15 months

BY SUPERVISOR

Harry Rositzke

Harry A. Rositzke

Date: 30 MAR 1966

COS/US

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

C. Tracy Barnes

Date: 8 A[illegible] 1966

C/DO

C. Tracy Barnes

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

Name: Wheeler, Robert [redacted] 060947

Date of Birth: 10/04/15

Sex: Male

Grade: GS-16

SD: D

Official Title: Ops Officer

Assignment: DDP/DO/USS

Current Station: Honolulu, Hawaii

Appointment: Career

Reporting Period: 27 October 1964 - 31 March 1965

POS[illegible] CH
[illegible]

Wheeler
[redacted] effectively assumed his duties as Chief of Base, DO/Honolulu in early January 1965. During the ensuing three months, he has devoted himself primarily to housing, cover, establishment of liaisons, and the orientation of his two outside people. Although he has begun to work on his operational program (directed at the recruitment of WUENVOY candidates), he has not been at work long enough to provide a basis for any evaluation of his operational performance.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

Not Available for signature [redacted]
Wheeler, Robert

Date:

BY SUPERVISOR

Date: 24 MAR 1965 COS/US Harry A. Rositzke

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

C. Tracy Barnes

Date: 25 Mar '65 C/DO C. Tracy Barnes

[illegible]

2 9 MAR 1965

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: [illegible]
[redacted]
DOB: 4 October 1915
Male
GS-15
Deputy Chief of Station
Tokyo
Annual Report For the Period 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

In preparing this memorandum in lieu of submitting Fitness Report Form 45, I can only set forth my yearly reiteration that Subject is a senior, well-experienced, well-motivated, high caliber KUBARK officer who has been in his present grade, GS-15, since 1957. His high standard of contribution to the Station as its Deputy Chief of Station continues unfailingly. Tokyo Station operations encompass a broad spectrum of internal and external targets emphasizing denied area operations. To keep on top of this activity it needs a man of energy backed up by sound operational knowledge and Subject has carried this job capably and with a will. I would certainly grade him "S" in performance evaluation.

Tokyo Station is widely dispersed and I have urged Subject on several occasions to get out to the various operational elements in an attempt to get closer to and stimulate the working case officers. After one or two starts he has not kept this up on a continuing basis, remaining at his Embassy desk and invariably working through the individual branch chiefs. I am convinced more effort on his part in this field could have resulted in more yield to the Station from his long area and operations experience.

Subject actively participates in the operational review and budget preparation of the Station and has shown a definite cost consciousness.

Subject's long tenure in Japan and experience with things Japanese are well-known and the pro's and con's of the value of an officer remaining in one area for the major portion of his time with KUBARK (possibly to the detriment of his career) have been discussed to a sufficient degree as to rule out further reference in this memorandum. Subject is scheduled to leave the Japan Station and enter an assignment where his operational talents will be of great value.

In any considerations concerning Subject being conducted by any personnel board or by any official of the Agency interested in KUBARK personnel, the significant points are Subject is a deeply motivated, highly capable officer who has been in his current grade too long.

Certification:
By Employee: This memorandum was read by Subject and discussed with him in draft. He left the area on TDY and so cannot sign it.

By Supervisor: 28 April 1964 /s/ William Broe Chief of Station

8 JUN 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: [redacted] (P)

Robert Wheeler

Comments of Reviewing Official:

FE Division is in agreement with this balanced assessment of Subject's performance in Japan. We are also hopeful that he will respond well in a new environment and broaden his operational capabilities.

Signature of Reviewing Official: DCFE

28 MAY 1964
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

READING TECHNIQUES (EXECUTIVE WORKSHOP)

Name WHEELER, Robert P.	Sex M	Dates of Course 24 Jun-19 Jul 57	No. of Students 3
Date of Birth 4 Oct 1915	EOD Date 28 Sept 1952	Grade or Rank GS-14	Office FI/FE
Projected Assignment or Present Position Chief, FE/1			

I. Objectives:

To inform senior personnel of efficient reading techniques, and to lay the groundwork for improved reading understanding, speed, and retention.

II. Specific Characteristics of Training:

This 20 hour course briefly reviews reading techniques for effective intelligence reading. The course sets forth the same principles of effective reading as Course I-7, Reading Techniques, emphasizing flexibility in reading different subjects for different purposes. Lectures, discussion, and practice exercises are used [illegible] reading skills, since these are the skills most often required in supervisory reading.

III. Certification of Completion:

Mr. Wheeler satisfactorily completed Reading Techniques (Executive Workshop) which was conducted each morning from 0730 to 0830.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Frances Cliff
Chief Instructor

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
160917	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle). (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
WHEELER Robert Prentiss	October	4	1915

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
JAPANESE 379	April	24	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING; BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 29 59
MAIL ROOM

Speaking (43)

SECTION D.

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

Understanding (44)

SECTION E.

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

[✓ 3.] BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 3C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 4/24/57	SIGNATURE Robert Prentice Wheeler
(44) C	(47) E

Transmitted VIA [redacted]
FJIT 10,344

SECRET

30 April 1963

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FOR PERIOD:

9 October 1962 - 31 March 1963

[redacted] **Robert P. Wheeler**

A review of the file reflects that [redacted] has been constantly rated as a well-motivated, superior officer always willing to spend the "extra effort" by a variety of supervisors. During the rating period there has been no diminution in the caliber of professionalism or in the time and effort this man has contributed to the work of the Tokyo Station. He is a distinct asset. Over and above his drive and professionalism, [redacted] brings to the Station a full background concerning intelligence activities having been associated with such activities in Japan for the last seventeen years, either with the military or as a member of the Agency. All of this time he has been in Japan except for a period of almost three years in Washington.

[redacted] has a proficiency in the Japanese language and due to his long tenure in Japan has contacts at a variety of levels.

In sum, the Agency has in [redacted] a superior officer with long background and continuity in Japan, who can and is making a highly significant contribution to the Agency's objectives in Japan.

The above has stressed solely [redacted]'s ability to contribute to KUBARK objectives in Japan. However, there is no doubt in the rater's mind that [redacted] could perform in a superior manner no matter to what geographical area he was assigned.

Serial Number 060947, DOB: 4 Oct 1915, GS-15, D Designee, DCOS, Tokyo Station

William V. Broe /S/
COS

Read by

Robert P. Wheeler /S/

Date: 1 May 1963

20 JUN 1963

SECRET

19 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Robert P. Wheeler

1. Chief of Station, Tokyo was requested to forward a memorandum, in lieu of Fitness Report Form 45, on Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo to cover the period April 1961 to October 1962. His comments are as stated below:

> Mr. Wheeler is a superior operations officer of wide scope, experience and imagination. He has over a period of years been highly successful in a variety of supervisory roles both operational and staff. In addition to these attributes he has unique qualifications of an extensive, continuous operational span of time in Japan, Japanese contacts at a variety of levels and proficiency in the Japanese language. Because of these latter aspects of his ability, he is able to contribute extensively to Tokyo Station and CIA operational objectives.

2. I concur with the above.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WHEELER, Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer D-COS		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Tokyo Station

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
1 Apr60 to 31Mar61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 In the absence of COS, acts as Station Chief	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison, as required, with ODACID and ODIBEX	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As Deputy Chief of Station, supervises Station operational effort and intelligence production X) A 12	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Makes recommendations to COS on Station operational program, cover and personnel	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C. EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):	[redacted]						

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 9-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 1 2 52 PH '61
MAIL ROOM

Subject is a superior officer in every important respect. He is intelligent, imaginative, resourceful and has balanced judgment. He understands administrative procedures and knows how to make them work. As a supervisor, he is firm and fair, and achieves the respect of his subordinates. As a subordinate, he is unfailingly loyal and helpful. He has a good overall grasp of the intelligence business and maintains a healthy attitude of common sense with respect to operations. He is especially useful in Japan, because of his great knowledge of and long experience with Japanese affairs, personalities and psychology, yet I consider he would be a superior officer and supervisor in any other context. His personal character is of the best.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE:
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 18
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: Report was prepared at headquarters.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE:
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief of Station
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: John E. Baker

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE: 23 MAY 1961
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C F E
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE:

SECRET

14-00000

21

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Recorded

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WHEELER, Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Off (DCOS)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/Tokyo Station	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 60

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 27 Jun 59 To 31 Mar 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 DA 12 As Deputy for Operations, supervises Station operational effort and intelligence production.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 In the absence of COS, acts as Station Chief.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Makes recommendations to COS on Station operational program, cover and personnel.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison, as required, with ODACID and ODIBEX. DB/1	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This is the first Fitness Report made by Rating Officer on Subject since the latter assumed duties as Deputy for Operations, Tokyo Station. He has worked out extremely well in this role. He is intelligent, energetic, hard-working and faultlessly loyal. He pays attention to detail while remaining mindful of larger considerations. He is effective as a supervisor and commands the willing allegiance of his subordinates. He has excellent judgment in both administrative and operational matters. Because of his extensive background in Japan, his knowledge of things and people Japanese and his fair-to-good command of the language, he is particularly well suited for his present position. However, he would be an asset to any station or element of Headquarters in a high supervisory position.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 27 Apr 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Robert P. Wheeler (Signed)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON:

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 27 Apr 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John E. Baker

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William V. Broe

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

31 JUL

V
JUL 1959 31

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
160947

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wheeler Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (FI) (CH)		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/POS

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30/04/59

11. REPORTING PERIOD From Aug 58 31/03 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Coordinates and furnishes guidance for all FI and CI matters in the FE Division.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts liaison with other components of the DDP, and agencies in general.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Directs and supervises a staff component of nine people.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is a well-seasoned, imaginative operations officer, who is extremely practical in his approach to operational situations. He is especially fine in his dealings with people whether superiors or subordinates. He did an excellent job as a member of the FE Division Staff in improving and expediting the FI and CI activities of the Division. Subject has an excellent background in all things Japanese and is extremely adept at building rapport with his Japanese counterparts.

He has the capacity to handle large volumes of work which many times leads him afield into activities that are not within his purview. His personality however allows him to do this without alienating others.

This report has been prepared in accordance with FE Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an "average" rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 18 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Abroad

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 22 July 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, FE Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William V. Broe WILLIAM V. BROE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 22 July 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Far East Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Desmond FitzGerald

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Wheeler (First) Robert (Middle) P.
2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915
3. SEX M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/FI/Hqs
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief, FE/FI IC (FI)
7. GRADE GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) December 1957 - August 1958
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE 2 SEP 1958
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR WILLIAM V. BROE William V. Broe
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief, FE Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted For Control		15 SEP 1958
Reviewed by F.O.		SEP 1958 17

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the Supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ALFRED C. ULMER, Jr.
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, FE Division

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SEP 15 11 52 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing a similar duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. *Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:*

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Coordinates and furnishes guidance for all FI and CI matters in the FE Div	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts liaison with other components of DDP and the Agency in general	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Wheeler is a sound, well experienced imaginative officer. He is especially adept in dealing with people at all levels so as to earn their respect and cooperation.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wheeler Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/FI/Hqs	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief, FE/FI Tc (FI)		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) Dec 1957 - Aug 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 2 Sept 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William V. Broe William V. Broe	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief, FE Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 2 Sept 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr. A C Ulmer	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, FE Division

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work:

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER:

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

14-00000

OFFICE OF PERSONNE
SEP 15 11 52 AM '5
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

6 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Wheeler has displayed the operational and supervisory attributes that give every indication that he has an excellent potential to advance with this Agency.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject is married and has six children ranging in age from 4 to 15 years.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Wheeler	(First) Robert	(Middle) P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/FI Hdqs.

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief, FE/FI

7. GRADE: GS-15

8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 30 January 1958

9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)*: March 1957 - December 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*
XX	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE *(Specify)*:
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
10 Jan. 58	Vernet L. Gresham	Deputy Chief, Far East Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		2/5/58
Reviewed by P. R.		2/10/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10 Jan. 58	Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.	Chief, Far East Division

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Performance

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 4 9 07 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Acting Chief of Branch	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducting External Liaison	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Has and Uses Area Knowledge	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordinates with other offices	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

During most of the period for which subject is rated he was acting chief of an active and important branch (Japan - Okinawa). He is currently chief of the FI group of the Division's plans and operations staff. Subject is a hard-working, dedicated employe. He has initiative and imagination and is profiting enormously from his present hq. experience. He is a very fine employe.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents...and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

After many years in the field with virtually no hq. duty, subject is now obtaining both command and staff experience. He has adapted himself splendidly and has shown remarkable versatility.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, IT MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wheeler Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/FI Hdqs.	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief, FE/FI		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 20 January 1958	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) March 1957 - December 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
10 Jan. 1958	Vernet L. Gresham Vernet L. Gresham	Deputy Chief, Far East Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10 Jan. 1958	Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr. Alfred C. Ulmer Jr	Chief, Far East Division

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (Typists, clerks, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) [illegible] (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, [illegible] (Executive level)
3		[illegible]
3		[illegible]
3		[illegible]
		OTHER (Specify):

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) [illegible] SECRET Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

14 months

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
9 03 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

After many years in Japan without any hq. duty, subject is now receiving badly needed hq. experience. He has shown great adaptability and versatility in two responsible hqs. positions.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject should remain at hq. at least another year in order that he may further broaden his experience.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject is married and has six children ranging in age from 3 to 14 years.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF HIS OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ACCEPTS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS RESPECT FOR FACTS	4	18. IS DILIGENT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

45

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wheeler, Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/1	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief, FE/1		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP April 30, 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 16November 1956 - 15 March 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐	SPECIAL (Specify)
☐	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS BEEN SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 16 April 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson William E. Nelson	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, FE/1

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		APR 1957
Reviewed by FUD		

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section. ☐ NOTED ON ATTACHED SHEET

A. THIS DATE 16 April 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Vernet L. Gresham Vernet L. Gresham	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, FE

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4/5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: With additional experience on the job, his performance might be such as to warrant a 5 rating.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

APR 18 2 47 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists Branch Chief in Management abd supervision of Branch	RATING NUMBER 4/5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Provides operational and administrative guidance to field station.	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Gen. Supervision of CE, liaison and CP ops. of Branch	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with other Agency elements and outside agencies.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

His greatest strength is a warm and engaging personality, an unabashed friendliness that secures him an immediate willingness to cooperate from the people with whom he deals. He is an extremely hard worker, an accurate and meticulous reporter, has energy and enthusiasm and is generally sound in his judgment. On occasions he demonstrates a lack of depth in his assessment of a situation which leads him to jump too quickly to conclusions based on intuition and emotion. As the facts assert themselves, however, he is ready to revise his opinions. As his knowledge of the Agency and operations continue to grow, however, this tendency should diminish.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4/5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Although he is perfectly capable of conducting his current job with distinction, he would shine in any position involving liaison with the U.S. military in which his long experience in dealing with military men and his personality could be brought to bear.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wheeler, Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/1	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief, FE/1		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP April 30, 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 16 Nov. 1956 - 15 March 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 16 April 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson William E. Nelson	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, FE/1

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 16 April 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Vernet L. Gresham	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, FE

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
2		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 10 2 47 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

6 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

When he is unsure of himself in new problems, he tends to trade on his [illegible] and his emotional feeling for a situation or a person resulting in a vacillation of attitude and an inconsistency that limits his effectiveness. Where [illegible] had past experience he generally makes sound decisions.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

He has a large family (six children) and would like to return to the field after enough Headquarters experience.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4/5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	3	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	3/4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4 -	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3/4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4/5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(When Filled In)

18 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

THROUGH: Staff Training Officer

SUBJECT: Completion of Operational Management Course for FE Personnel

1. Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, FE/FI, has completed a Special Management Course (Operational Management Seminar) held 7-18 January, 1957.

2. The course covered 38 hours of lectures and group discussions, together with a limited amount of reading. The course outlined the responsibilities of management at the Branch Chief level and selected problems of Headquarters management dealing with clandestine activities. The individual named completed all course assignments but received no grade, since no evaluation was made of the student's performance in this special course, or of his ability to perform a particular job assignment.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Robert L. Welk
ROBERT L. WELK
Chief Instructor, Basic Management

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(When Filled In)

18 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Fitness Report on Robert P. WHEELER

1. The attached Fitness Report should be read with the following facts in mind. The Rating Officer arrived in the Japan Station on 21 January 1956. Mr. Wheeler left Japan on or about 19 March 1956 and was in the United States on TDY until 8 May 1956. From 8 May until he left Japan PCS on 7 June 1956, Mr. Wheeler was unassigned in the Japan Station. While the Rating Officer was Chief of Operations, Japan Station, Mr. Wheeler was in his assigned position simultaneously for less than one month and it is my understanding Mr. Wheeler did not report to Mr. Heckscher, but directly to the Chief of Station.

2. I question, therefore, whether Mr. Wheeler was under the Rating Officer's direct supervision for a sufficient period of time to insure that the attached report is a completely equable one. Inasmuch as the Chief of Station reviewed this report and made no comment, I am in no position to take issue with it, but suggest that it be viewed in the context of other Fitness Reports on Mr. Wheeler.

William E. Nelson
WILLIAM E. NELSON
Chief, FE/1

Attachment

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY Robert P. WHEELER	1. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION [redacted] D1
4. GRADE GS-14	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) Japan Station ✓		
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 November 1955 to 7 June 1956		

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION I.O. ([redacted]) (F/)	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION April, 1954

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Chief of Japan Station liaison section.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	JP	11 JAN 1957
Reviewed by PUD	RDM	1-14-57

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Henry D. HECKSHER	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) W. Lloyd GEORGE

3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☒ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 7 Dec 1956	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS. AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES William E. NELSON, CPP/1

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 10 10 49 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left, then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.								X						
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X				
5. UNEMOTIONAL.										X				
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.								X						
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X		
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.									X					
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.									X					
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.						X								
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.											X			
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.											X			
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X						
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.								X						
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.								X						
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.										X				
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.						X								

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.								X						
COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.										X				
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".								X						
29. TOUGH MINDED.							X							
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.										X				
32. CLEAR THINKING.								X						
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.								X						
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.									X					
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.										X				
36. DELIBERATE.								X						
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.											X			
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.						X								
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.								X						
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.									X					
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.									X					
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.										X				
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.									X					
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.							X							
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.							X							

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Intuitive adaptability to characteristics of professional contacts matched by warm human approach, facilitate easy and potentially useful rapport with Japanese officials. Good reporter of events, aided by retentive memory. Broad background of understanding of history and culture of Japan. Prone to work "off the top of his head," but assesses situations quickly. Well qualified liaison officer if properly backed and supervised.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

"Weather vane" in his attitudes, he frequently lacks discernment and consistency in his assessment of personalities and vacillates in the pursuit of objectives; this limits him in the role of supervisor and operations officer. Lacks toughness in presenting unpopular issues to Japanese liaison personnel.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Performance in Japan hamstrung by preoccupation with personal and professional status in the agency, unwarranted in terms of both personal popularity and quality of work.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 13 10 49 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☐ NO ☒ YES. IF

Shrinks from assuming full responsibility. Fits well into a system of checks and balances.

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

In view of prospective return to Japan field assignment, should keep up his knowledge of the Japanese language. Tradecraft training designed to develop a basic facility for developing personal contacts into a control relationship and for turning

F. OTHER COMMENTS (Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):

contacts over effectively to other ops personnel.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☒ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: 1 25 October 1956

NAME: Robert Prentiss WHEELER

FROM: I.O.(FI), GS-14, Tokyo

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION: ☐ PROMOTION ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ ROTATION ☐ TRAVEL ☐ OTHER (Explain)

TO: Area Ops Off, GS-14, Hqs.

EOD: Sept 52

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN
	BASIC ORIENT. ALSO BIC, BITC, SOC, BIP, PH I			AIR OPS. 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. M & T ALSO OC, PH II	27 Oct-26 Nov 52		MAR. OPS 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. OPS. ALSO AIC, AITC, AOC, CAI, PH III			CLAND. FLD. ACT. 1 2 3 4 5 6	
	RESISTANCE OPS ALSO PM, I-II-III WAFT			SURVIVAL 1 2 3 4 5 6	
	CLAND. SERV. REV	22 Sept 1 Oct 56		BASIC PHOTO	
✓	WORLD COMMUNISM			DOCUMENTATION	22 Oct 52
	ANTI-COMM. OPS.			LOCKS	
	ADMIN PROCEDURES			SECRET WRITING	8-9 Dec 52
	OPS. SUPPORT			FLAPS & SEALS	
	TRADECRAFT PHASE			SMALL ARMS FAM.	
	ADMIN PHASE			OTHER TRAINING	
	REPORTS			BIC	1-5 Dec 52
	ORDER OF BATTLE				
	COUNTERESPIONAGE				
✓	ADV. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE				
	OPS. SECURITY				
	WAR PLANS				
	CLAND. POL. WARF.			[illegible]	
	STAYBEHIND OPS.				
	TECH. DEV. ORIENT.				
	INSTR. TECH.				
	EVASION-ESCAPE				
	SAB. OPS.				
	INVEST. TECH. ALSO CI TECH.				
	ADMIN REFRESHER				
	RDG. IMPROVE.				
	BASIC SUPV.				
✓	BASIC MGMT.			PRE-TEST	
	BALLOON OPS.			ASSESSMENT	

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.
2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

TRAINING OFFICER COMMENTS:

☑ A. THIS DOES (NOT) MEET TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.

☐ NO FURTHER TRAINING RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN "E". THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY BASIC QUALIFYING STANDARDS.

☐ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ☐ QUALIFYING ☐ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT:

☐ SOONEST

☐ UPON RETURN TO HQ.

☐ D. WAIVER AND CC. SHOULD BE REQUESTED FOR THOSE COURSES MARKED WITH A "W".

☐ E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING WERE MADE ________ (DATE). THESE RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MET.

DIVISION TRAINING OFFICER

HENRY P. GILBERT

STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,

FROM: Career Management Officer

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE: 14 Nov. 56

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 467 REPLACES FORM 50-77
1 JAN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(2-4-49)

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

CLANDESTINE SERVICES REVIEW NO. 14

NAME Wheeler, Robert P.	SEX Male	DATES OF COURSE 24 September-12 October 1956		NO. OF STUDENTS 42
DATE OF BIRTH 4 October 1915	EOD DATE 28 September 1952		GRADE OR RANK GS-14	OFFICE FE/1
PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION Chief, Japan Desk/FE-1				

I. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this course are to provide familiarization with 1) the Clandestine Services' functional structure, current mission, operational programs, and support facilities; 2) other Agency offices and their capacity to support the Clandestine Services. It is not intended to impart basic operational knowledge, but is designed to make the returning case officer current with recent developments.

II. SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COURSE:

A description of current policy, objectives, organization, programs showing operational emphasis, methods of personnel management, fiscal administration, and existing capabilities for providing operational and intelligence support was presented by means of lectures, tours, and selected reading material. The course involved three weeks.

III. CERTIFICATION OF COURSE COMPLETION:

Mr. Wheeler has attended the entire course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Spencer L. Taggart
[illegible]
Chief Instructor
Clandestine Services Review

S-E-C-R-E-T

3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY WHEELER, Robert P.	1. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION [redacted] DI

4. GRADE GS-14	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) Japan Base
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 October 1955	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 31 October 1954 to 30 October 1955

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION I. O. ([redacted]) (FI)	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION April, May, 1954

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

a. As Acting Chief, FI, has been responsible for supervising all FI activities of the Base, and for coordinating those activities with Chief, PP.
b. With the above duties, has been concurrently Chief of Liaison Section and thus responsible for directing all liaison activities conducted by the Base.
c. Case officer for one important project involving a Japanese agent who is an influential member of the Diet.

BY mck DATE Sept. 56
Posted Pos. Control ____
Reviewed by PUD ____

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Robert H. LINN	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) Harry W. LITTLE, Jr.

3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☒ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 23 March 1956	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES Philip F. FENDIG, ACPE/1 Philip F. Fendig

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 3 1 36 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. Each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
SAMPLES B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.										X				
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.											X			
5. UNEMOTIONAL.						X								
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.											X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.												X		
10. KNOWS [illegible] SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.						X								
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.										X				
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.												X		
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.										X				
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.											X			
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.										X				
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.						X								
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.									X					

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.										X				
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".											X			
29. TOUGH MINDED.								X						
30. OBSERVANT.										X				
31. CAPABLE.												X		
32. CLEAR THINKING.										X				
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.										X				
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.										X				
36. DELIBERATE.								X						
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.											X			
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.											X			
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										X				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.											X			
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.												X		
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.											X			
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.										X				
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.											X			

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject is highly capable in several fields: he writes well and quickly; he speaks clearly and to the point; his sense of humor and breezy charm make him the center of any social group and able to get along with people on any level. He does a prodigious amount of work with great facility and is always willing to work long hours to get a job done. He is ideal as a liaison man for contacts with high level officials.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Has a tendency to do things "off the top of his head". Some what easily upset when difficulties arise or when he has worked himself into a combination of fatigue and depression. Sometimes allows his emotions or his moods to color his reports and his evaluations of others. Has some tendency to "fall in love" with his agent.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

Versatility in dealing on a friendly and extremely effective basis with all kinds of people, particularly those in high level positions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 3 1 58 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

P&P training, and refresher course, if available, in FI ops.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*): Subject has an excellent knowledge of the area, its people, and language and is able to use this knowledge with great resultant benefits to his work.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☒ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY..WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 90 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

DATE
Posted Pos. Control B7 2-15-55
3/8/55

A

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED.

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY: Mr. Robert F. [illegible]
1. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Oct. 1919
2. SEX: M
3. SERVICE DESIGNATION: ~~[illegible]~~ SD-P1
4. GRADE: GS-14
5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current): Japan Mission
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT: 30 Sept. 1954
7. PERIOD: 1 January 1953 to 30 October 1954
14 Nov. 1953 to 30 October 1954 (present supervisor)

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: 10 (FI) 0136.51
Acting Depty for KUFIRE; Chief of Liaison
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: April-May 1954
3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Subject is Acting Deputy for KUFIRE activities within the Mission. As such, he is responsible for organizing, directing, and coordinating the three sections charged with KUFIRE duties in Japan, as well as the Intelligence Staff which is in turn responsible for requirements, central intelligence files, CE carding and filing, and the preparation and dissemination of reports. Subject is also Chief of Liaison and in his capacity directs and coordinates the work of four liaison sections dealing with both U.S. and Japanese official agencies. Subject is also responsible for the development of one potentially important agent asset.

SECTION III (To be completed at Headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True): Mr. Robert H. [illegible]
2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True): Mr. Harry [illegible] Jr.
3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☒ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.: 14 Jan 55
5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES: Mr. William E. [illegible], Chief, [illegible] William E. [illegible]

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

(4)

SECRET

FORM NO. 45a
1 JUL 54

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FEB 9 10 31 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.													X	
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.													X	
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X		
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.														X
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.												X		
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.												X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.										X				
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT [illegible]											X			

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.												X		
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.													X	
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES, A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.									X					
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.														X
32. CLEAR THINKING.										X				
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.													X	
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.													X	
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.												X		
36. DELIBERATE.									X					
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.													X	
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													X	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												X		
41. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT.											X			
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.												X		
43. HAS DRIVE.													X	
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.													X	
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.													X	
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.													X	

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject has the outstanding ability to do a remarkable number of jobs remarkably well. He performs brilliantly and rapidly, if sometimes superficially, and completes a prodigious amount of work, meeting deadlines, and at the same time, unless deeply disturbed, maintaining a humorous and kindly attitude toward his associates that makes him almost always exceptionally pleasant to deal with. He is extremely well suited for almost any phase of intelligence work.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES? Subject tends at times to become elated or depressed to the extent that he sometimes loses his ability to make a carefully balanced judgement. When, as happens very rarely, he runs up against what he believes to be stupidity or serious incompetence, his strongly emotional reaction sometimes hampers a necessary working relationship. He is occasionally a little too easily swayed, like a weather-vane, by the opinions of his superiors. Some of these characteristics are, however, at times actually advantageous in his work, and are far overbalanced by his outstanding strengths.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

High capacity for competant and rapid accomplishment in almost any intelligence field, particularly as based on his long residence and interest in Japan.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 9 10 31 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☐ NO ☒ YES. IF YES, WHY?

Subject has excellent balance in supervising others, but often requires guidance and direction in something in which he personally is closely concerned.

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

T&P course; refresher course in KUFIRE techniques.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

Subject makes an invaluable contribution through his knowledge of Japan, and through the continuity resulting from his willingness to remain for an indefinite period in the area.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities as normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS..REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

IMPORTANT EMPLOYEE INSTRUCTIONS ON PAGE 4	**LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE** FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM	IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON PAGE 2

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read page 4 carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or print in ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) Wheeler Robert P.	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) Oct 4, 1915	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	AGENCY LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED THIS FORM? ☐ YES ☐ NO

If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one.

3 By law, a person, who can be covered, automatically receives regular life insurance, unless he waives all coverage. You have the choice of waiving all coverage, increasing your life insurance coverage through additional optional insurance, or declining the additional optional insurance. So, READ CAREFULLY AND THEN

MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (DO NOT MARK MORE THAN ONE):

Mark here for BOTH OPTIONAL AND REGULAR Insurance. → ☐ A I WANT THE $10,000 OPTIONAL INSURANCE in addition to my regular insurance. I authorize deductions to pay the full cost.

Mark here for REGULAR BUT NO OPTIONAL insurance. → ☒ B I DO NOT WANT THE $10,000 OPTIONAL INSURANCE but I understand I still get my regular insurance. I understand I cannot get optional insurance, unless I: (1) wait at least one year after I sign this form, (2) am under age 50 when I apply, AND (3) give satisfactory medical evidence of insurability.

Mark here for NO INSURANCE AT ALL. → ☐ C I DO NOT WANT ANY LIFE INSURANCE NOW. I understand that I cannot get any regular insurance, unless I: (1) wait at least one year after I sign this form; (2) am under age 50 when I apply, AND (3) give satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand I cannot get the $10,000 optional insurance unless I first have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
Subject failed to elect optional insurance during the open period.

DATE
14 Apr 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

PERSONNEL OFFICE
APR 14 10 2 AM '68
PERSONNEL OFFICE

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
MARCH 1973
FPM Supplement 870-1
176-103

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6 060947	(Print) ~~WKK~~ Wheeler	7-24 Robert	P.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
						1 . PCS (Basic) 3 . CORRECTION 5 . CANCELLATION					

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
05	16	73	06	17	73	2 . TDY (Basic) 4 . CORRECTION 6 . CANCELLATION	2			EUROPE	801

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒ TRAVEL VOUCHER

☐ CABLE

☐ DISPATCH

☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT

☐ OTHER (Specify)

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.
NOCAD-000091-73

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
05/15/73 - 06/17/73

REMARKS

PREPARED BY
☐ OCO
☒ C & L DIVISION, CTRA.
☐ C & T DIVISION

☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT

DATE
July 9 1973

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CERTIFICATION OF ATTENDANCE

NAME OF SCHOOL OR FACILITY: Federal Executive Institute

COURSE : Follow-up Seminar

COURSE DATES : 10 December 1970 (1 day only)

GRADE (IF GIVEN) : None

TRAINING REQUEST NUMBER : 031297

I certify the above to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Robert P. Wheeler 1/5/71

SIGNATURE DATE

NOTE: This form is to be used only when the facility attended does not give official completion information.

TRAINING COMPLETED

Request No. 031297

Date 7/12/71

S-E-C-R-E-T

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Memorandum

Date: July 15, 1970
In Reply Refer To:
Your Reference:

Subject: Completion of "The Residential Program in Executive Education" at the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia

From: FRANK P. SHERWOOD Frank
Director, Federal Executive Institute

To: Mr. Hugh Clayton
Registrar, Office of Training
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

This is official notice that ROBERT P. WHEELER has satisfactorily completed the eight-week session of "The Residential Program in Executive Education" at the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia. This session of that educational program was held from May 10 - July 2, 1970.

A certificate of completion has been issued to the above named person.

One copy of this memorandum is intended for filing in the employee's official personnel folder and the other copy for routing to the employee's immediate supervisor.

TRAINING COMPLETED
Request No. [illegible]
Date [illegible]

Keep Freedom in Your Future With U.S. Savings Bonds

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1964—O—725-462

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

GS-16 D

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
060947	WHEELER, Robert P.	4 Oct. 1915

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-69 444n

SECRET

14-511

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

	NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (X))			
					RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.				APR 9 9 37 AM '63				
2.								

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

	NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
			FROM	TO
1.				
2.				
3.				

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 4 APR 1963

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Robert P. [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO: Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
[redacted] 060947	[redacted] Coheeler	[redacted] Robert	[redacted]	[redacted] 43

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE 27	MONTH 28-29	DAY 30-31	YEAR 32-33	MONTH 34-35	DAY 36-37	YEAR 38-39		40-42
1. PCS (Basic) 3. CORRECTION 5. CANCELLATION	1	08	26	64	06	12	66	Hawaii	750

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE 27	MONTH 28-29	DAY 30-31	YEAR 32-33	MONTH 34-35	DAY 36-37	YEAR 38-39		40-42
2. TDY (Basic) 4. CORRECTION 6. CANCELLATION									

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
XX	CABLE Honolulu 3499	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. IN NR 36523A

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 13 June 1966

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	C & L DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
X	C & F DIVISION	7-1-66	

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-101

Supplement to Staff Agent Personnel Action

For [redacted], Effective 25 October 1964

Robert [illegible] Anderson
Robert [illegible] Anderson

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted], Anderson

In view of your contemplated cover assignment, you have been designated a Staff Agent. The purpose of this Supplement is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are so designated and to set forth certain obligations incident to your status as an appointed employee.

1. Payroll Administration. As indicated in your Staff Agent Personnel Action, your present salary and grade are $20,245.00 per annum and GS-16³, respectively. As an appointed employee of the Government you are entitled to receive and retain only the salary, allowances and other benefits applicable to that status. However, procedural variations will be followed to preserve the security of your position.

(a) The gross emoluments that you receive from your cover activities will be retained by you as an offset against the gross emoluments due you from this organization. If cover emoluments ever exceed those due you from this organization, the overage is to be remitted to this organization on a monthly basis, unless a different period is specified.

(b) Federal income taxes will be withheld, reported and paid in conformance with Agency procedures designed to protect against the unauthorized revelation of your true relationship to the Government. You will be briefed thereon prior to your departure.

(c) This organization will deduct from the gross payments due you an amount equivalent to six and one-half percent (6 1/2%) of your gross salary for contribution to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. This amount will be deducted from the differential due you by this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make direct remittances to this organization in satisfaction of the required contributions.

(d) This organization will not reimburse you for mandatory Social Security deductions if such deductions are required by virtue of your cover employment. However, when for compelling cover, security or operational reasons this organization determines that you must ostensibly participate in a fringe benefit program of a cover facility you will be reimbursed therefor by this organization in an appropriate manner. In such event any benefit received by you, your heirs or any other party as a result of your ostensible participation therein while a Government employee is the property of the Government and will be disposed of at such time and in such a manner as this organization may require.

SECRET

2. Furnished Quarters. If you and your dependents are furnished quarters by the Government while PCS Honolulu, Hawaii, you will be charged a reasonable rental therefor, as established under the Hawaii rental rate schedule of this organization.

3. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this Supplement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

4. Place of Assignment. This Supplement is predicated upon an assignment in Honolulu, Hawaii, under nonofficial cover. Any deviation therefrom will require a new supplement or an amendment thereto.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY

Personnel Officer

[illegible]

14-00000

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: [illegible]
DIVISION: [illegible]
INSTRUCTIONS: (See HR 10-3? and RR 10-1000.1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "N/A" when items are not applicable. Forward original and two copies for preparation of contract.)
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: [illegible] 11-3040
DATE: 2? Oct. 6?

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
[redacted]
[illegible]

2A. PROJECT:
2B. PERMANENT STATION: Honolulu, Hawaii
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 5139-0369
3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☒ UV
4. SLOT NO.: 0261

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: BREDLIN, Adam M.

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☐ YES ☒ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Staff Employee - Sept. 5? to Present - GS-1? to GS-16

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Staff Clearance

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: ☒ OBTAINED ☐ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Staff Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U. S.
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. AGE: 50
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): October 4, 1915
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Washington, D. C.
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Honolulu, Hawaii

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife, 47
Daughters, 15, 13, & 9
Sons, 13 & 11

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE:
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: Navy
24. RANK OR GRADE: Lt.
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $20,235
GS-16 Step 3
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: 15%
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): See below under #40
30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING:

	COVER		CIA
X	YES		YES
X	NO		NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: *
32. POST: N. A.
33. OTHER: N. A.
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any):
* Quarters handled locally by Honolulu Station

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO
37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO
37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☒ YES ☐ NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO
39. PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH.
Same as 18 above

For #29: Cover Pay: W-2 - Proprietary - $10,000.00
1099 - 1st Devised Cover - 4,875.00
1099 - 2nd Devised Cover - 4,362.50

-- There will be a yearly adjustment for any amount due or owed by Subject.

Taxes will be withheld on the $10,000 paid through proprietary No taxes will be held on the two devised covers.

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes
43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes
44. OTHER:

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

FORM 10-63 204 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: [illegible]

DIVISION: [illegible]

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: [illegible]

DATE: [illegible]

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See HR 20-40, HR 20-41, HR 20-7, HR 20-33, and HR 20-820-1, HR 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

Same as Staff Employee

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☒ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS ☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) ☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ___ MONTHS ___ 2 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE:

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 30

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other): FI

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

As Senior operations officer at Honolulu Base, Subject will be responsible for all administration and operational activities of the Base. He will handle recruiting of agents once they have been spotted and assessed.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Subject has been employed by the Agency since 28 September 1952 —

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained): ☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☒ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK: FLUENT	SPEAK: AVERAGE	SPEAK: POOR	WRITE: FLUENT	WRITE: AVERAGE	WRITE: POOR	READ: FLUENT	READ: AVERAGE	READ: POOR
[illegible]		X			X			X	

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Japan

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING.

1941-42 - Univ. of Calif.
1942-46 - U.S. Navy
1946-52 - War Dept. Intel Specialist

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
	Stanley J. Gaines Stanley J. Gaines, [illegible]	2 NOV 1964	Geo. F. Schreyer Geo. F. Schreyer, [illegible]/EX

SECRET

SECRET

This document consists of 1 page,
No 1 of 3 copies, Series A.

Executive Registry
64-5841

DD/P

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

AUG 21 1964

Dear Mr. McCone:

I am pleased to transmit Ambassador Reischauer's telegram to you in which he expresses his high opinion of Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, the acting Station Chief in Tokyo. In particular, the Ambassador cites Mr. Wheeler for his assistance with the recent case of the two Soviet musician defectors.

Sincerely,

George Denney
George C. Denney Jr.
Acting

Attachment:
Telegram 586, copy 2.

Mr. John A. McCone
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Langley, Virginia

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

34-31
Action
INRD
Info
RMR

CONTROL: 13542 SECRET
RECD: AUGUST 17, 1964
6:19 A.M.

FROM: TOKYO

ACTION: SECSTATE 586

DATE: AUGUST 17, 2 P.M.

ROGER CHANNEL 002

PERSONAL FOR MCCONE FROM REISCHAUER

WE WILL BE REPORTING IN ANOTHER FORM OUR ANALYSIS OF THE CASE OF THE TWO SOVIET MUSICIANS. I JUST WANT TO TELL YOU, HOWEVER, THAT WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET THE RESULTS WE DID IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR PETE WHEELER. HE WAS ON THE JOB WITHIN MINUTES AFTER THE MEN WALKED IN, GOT HIS RUSSIAN SPEAKING PEOPLE WORKING QUICKLY, AND HELPED TO HANDLE THE WHOLE AFFAIR WITH EFFICIENCY AND DISPATCH. HIS EXPERIENCE IN JAPAN AND THE CONFIDENCE WHICH THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES SHOWED IN WORKING WITH HIM WERE A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE DEFINITE CHANGE WHICH TOOK PLACE OVER THE WEEKEND IN THE JAPANESE ATTITUDE ON HOW TO HANDLE CASES LIKE THIS.

HIS CONTRIBUTION HAS BEEN MAJOR AND THE RESULTS WILL BE LONG-LIVED. THIS IS ONLY ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE SERVICE WHEELER HAS PERFORMED HERE OVER THE YEARS. WE ARE SORRY TO SEE HIM LEAVE AND WILL MISS HIM VERY MUCH.

GP-1.

REISCHAUER

BA

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

SECRET

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of Robert F. Wheeler

Effective 8 May 1952

The purpose of this memorandum is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are integrated and to set forth certain rights and obligations which are incident to your status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS-15 $12,770 per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of 8 May 1952. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected at FSR-3 and salary of $11,660 per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of 24 Months from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

FORM 10-54 1535

SECRET

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and (except as provided in paragraph three (3) above) allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they are less than or equal to the salary and allowance payments due on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due, the difference will be credited to your payroll account with this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due, the overage will be remitted to this organization at designated intervals, presently (months if applicable). Computations hereunder will be made on the basis of the aggregate gross due and received provided, however, that in computing remittances for overage Federal and, if applicable, District of Columbia income taxes withheld by your cover facility against the overage may be deducted. To assure timely accuracy in your payroll account with this organization you are expected to immediately report cover facility payroll changes.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integration into your cover facility, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and at your personal expense you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half percent) on the basis of your cover salary or your salary from this organization, whichever is the greater.

b. If you receive taxable income from both your cover facility and this organization, necessary adjustments for Federal, and if applicable, District of Columbia income tax purposes will be made in conformance with instructions received from this organization.

c. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with the rules and regulations of this organization.

d. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with your cover facility of any status with your cover based on your services performed with that organization at the request of this organization.

e. A portion of your annual and all of your sick leave which has accrued to your credit at the time of your integration shall be transferred to your cover facility. The remainder of your annual leave will be held by this organization in escrow pending the completion of your integration. If the sum of your accumulated annual leave with your cover facility and this organization exceeds the maximum accumulation entitlement afforded you under the regulations of this organization, the excess will be forfeited. If possible, such forfeiture will be accomplished by reducing the leave credit in your escrow account with this organization. While integrated, you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon completion of your integration, your accrued annual and sick leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization including income taxes withheld by your cover facility.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

____

SECRET

15 OCT 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT: Report of Gifts

REFERENCE: Memo for D/Pers from C/FE dtd 29 Sept 58, Subject: Gifts to Agency Personnel

Referenced memorandum reports the receipt of gifts by several Agency employees from recent visitors. These gifts are determined to be of insignificant intrinsic value and may be retained by the recipients for whatever use they desire.

Gordon M. Stewart

Gordon M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - Ex O-DD/P
1 - Recorder, EAB
1 - D/Sec
1 - D/Pers Subject File
1 - D/Pers Reader Chrono
1 - Subjects' Files
[illegible]
William V. Broe
Robert H. Wheeler
William H. Canter
[illegible] C. Trabulsi

OD/Pers/[illegible] (10 Oct 58)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

4-2108

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA: Director of Security
Attn: Chief, Policy Staff

SUBJECT: Gifts to Agency Personnel

REFERENCE: Field Regulation 20-644

The following Agency personnel received gifts as noted from three Cabinet Research Chamber visitors during their recent visit to Washington:

	Approx. value
Satoshi Nagano	
Box of nori	$2.00
Set of chopsticks (lacquered)	.75
William V. Broe	
1 woodblock print	1.50
Robert P. Wheeler	
Box of nori	2.00
William M. Center	
1 woodblock prints	3.00
Nageeb G. Trabulsi	
Woodblock print	1.50
1 jar Japanese sauce	.50

Signed Robert P. Wheeler
DESMOND FITZGERALD
Chief, Far East Division

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

31 OCT 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT: Gift from Foreign National

REFERENCE: Memo to D/Pers from C/FE dated 22 Oct 57, subject: Gifts to Agency Personnel (DD/P 3-7838)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 22 October 1957 concerning the following gifts received by Agency personnel from FUJII Gaichiro, Director General of the Public Safety Investigation Agency, Japan, during his recent visit to Washington:

Allen W. Dulles, DCI	a 5"x8" charcoal drawing
Desmond Fitzgerald, C/PP	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., C/FE	painted scroll (kakemono)
John H. Henry, Jr., C/SR	picture
Robert P. Wheeler, FE/PI/CI	incense burner
Katherine Sherman, FE/PO/PP	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Edward H. Horn, C/FE-1	painted scroll (kakemono)
Paul E. Breitweiser, C/FE-6	picture
John R. Horton, C/FE-2/PO	picture
George H. Kalaris, C/SR-5	picture
Lothar Metzl, C/CI/ICD	picture
Paul A. Chretien, ORR	picture
Eugene C. Tsuboi, FE-1	pearl tie pin
Chester M. Ito, FE-1	2 silk scarfs, 1 hand-painted tie and painted scroll (kakemono)

2. Under the provisions of Regulation 20-642, dated 10 October 1956, it is my determination that these gifts are of such insignificant intrinsic value that they may be retained and utilized to whatever benefit desired.

Gordon M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
- Orig - Addressee
  - 1 - DD/P
  - 1 - D/Sec w/basic
  - 1 - IAD w/basic
  - 1 - Each individual's file w/basic
  - 1 - OP Files: Foreign Awards and Decorations
  - 1 - D/Personnel Reader Chrono

OD/Pers/ (30 Oct 57)

SECRET

SECRET

2[illegible] 195[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA: Director of Security
ATTN: Chief, Policy Staff

SUBJECT: Gifts to Agency Personnel

REFERENCE: Field Regulation 20-644

1. The following Agency personnel received gifts as noted from FUJII Goichiro, Director General of the Public Safety Investigation Agency, Japan, during his recent visit to Washington:

Allen W. Dulles, DCI	a 5' x 8' charcoal drawing
Desmond Fitzgerald, C/FP	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., CFE	painted scroll (kakemono)
John M. Maury, Jr., C/SR	picture
Robert P. Wheeler, FE/PI/CI	incense burner
Katherine Sherman, FE/PO/PP	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Edward H. Horn, CFE/1	painted scroll (kakemono)
Paul B. Breitweiser, CFE/6	picture
John R. Horton, CFE/2/EO	picture
George H. Bolie, C/SR/5	picture
Lothar Metzl, C/CI/ICD	picture
Paul A. Chretien, CFE	picture
Nageeb G. Trabulsi, FE/1	pearl tie pin
Chester H. Ito, FE/1	2 silk scarfs, 1 hand painted tie and painted scroll (kakemono)

2. Additional gifts of small pictures were left by FUJII to be given to those people whom he did not meet but who worked behind the scenes to make his visit a pleasant one. No listing is believed necessary of these items or their recipients.

ALFRED C. ULMER, Jr.
Chief, Far East Division

Distribution:
2 - Director of Personnel
1 - Director of Security

SECRET

14-00000

SE T

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(true)* Robert P. WHEELER	DATE *(from item 8-1)* 9 Nov 1955	NAME OF SUPERVISOR *(true)* Harry W. LITTLE, Jr.	DATE *(from item 8-2)* 9 Nov 1955
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW.	William E. NELSON, Chief, FE/1		DATE 19 Dec 1955

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 4 October 1915	2. GRADE GS-14	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Chief, Liaison
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION *(if known)* DI	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Japan Base	ETA - 1 Sept 56
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None		7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 1 June 1956

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

Formerly Deputy Chief of Mission; formerly Deputy Chief of Mission, KUTUBE and Chief, Mission Liaison; currently, Chief, Liaison, Japan Base. Current assignment involves responsibility for all Base Liaison activities with all Japanese agencies and Department of Defense agencies represented in Japan. Current assignment also involves case officer responsibilities for two KUTUBE operations and one developmental KUTUBE operation. Japanese contacts, to whom I represent KUBARK, range from the Prime Minister to case officers in various Japanese security and police agencies.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*:

1. Advanced CE course
2. Operational Security course

22 Dec 55

FORM NO. 202
1 SEP 54

[illegible] / DEPUTY [illegible]

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION: See attachment.

1ST CHOICE:

2ND CHOICE:

3RD CHOICE:

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

7 dependents.

Wife - 37
Daughter - 12
Daughter - 7
Daughter and son - 5
Son - 3
Daughter - 1

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 9.1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 9.2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Despite subject's lack of formal Headquarters assignment we feel for overriding operational reasons he should be returned to the field for another tour.

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR: William E Nelson William E. NELSON	SIGNATURE:
TITLE: Chief, FE/1	DATE:

17. REMARKS (additional comment)

SE T

ATTACHMENT TO FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE:

Re Paragraph C - Preference for Next Assignment:

1. I would like to state that while a tour at Headquarters should be my preference I believe that for me to leave my current assignment at this time for even one year would not be in the best interests of either KUBARK or ODYOKE. Therefore, I request home leave, with approximately one month at Headquarters for requested training and refresher work and one month of leave, returning to current assignment for at least an additional two-year tour with the proviso that after the first year the situation be re-examined with the ultimate view of possibly at that point considering a two-year tour at Headquarters.

2. In my years in work on Japan, approximately ten of which have been spent consecutively in Japan, I feel that I have been able to provide a certain degree of intelligence continuity which could be spoiled by a two-year break. Realizing that career-wise I should spend at least one tour at Headquarters in the future, I believe that, despite possible reflections against my career, that two year period should be delayed until (a) KUBARK is better established in Japan and (b) the Japanese governmental and economic situations are on more stable grounds. I believe that I can play a major role in both those situations, not because I have any special talent to offer but simply because I have the continuity which KUBARK as such lacks in Japan.

3. I believe that by experience, training and inclination I can better serve KUBARK in this country in the type of work in which I am now engaged than by any other assignment currently known to me.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Combined Personnel Action in lieu of SF-52.

Change of Service Designation from D to DI.

Effective date: 19 June 1955

	GRADE
Office of DDP	
TOD, Roy S.	15
CI	
BURKE, Paul J.	14
DOUGLASS, John F.	13
MULLIN, Edward [illegible]	13
PENDLEY, Robert L.	13
EE	
HOLTZ, Oscar W.	13
HUGHES, Frank W.	13
FE	
KITCHENS, Henry G.	13
LALLY, John F.	13
WHEELER, Robert [illegible]	14
NEA	
ANDREWS, E. Wyllys	15
BOWLING, Robert, Jr.	13
WE	
FULLER, Benjamin, II	14
SITRA, Alphonse G.	13
VANDERVOORT, Benjamin H.	14
WALSH, Rutherford T.	13

[illegible]

6/15/55

Robert A. Stricklin by John J. Calder 10 June 1955

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONFIDENTIAL

NARRATIVE EVALUATION REPORT

[illegible]

Name: [redacted]S-14 **Period Covered:** 1 June 1953 to 1 June 1954

Occasion for report: Annual X ; reassignment of reporting officer ______; proposed reassignment of employee reported on ______; covering initial 90 days of employment ______.

Employee is to be rated upon following factors:

1. **Knowledge of the job being performed.**
2. **Judgment in arriving at logical and workable solutions.**
3. **Dependability, not only in being on the job, but in accomplishment of assigned tasks within reasonable deadlines.**
4. **Stability under pressure and ability to adjust to changing conditions and circumstances.**
5. **Imagination, initiative, and originality.**
6. **Security consciousness.**
7. **Tact and diplomacy in dealing with others.**

IN FAIRNESS TO EMPLOYEES, COMPLETED NARRATIVE EVALUATIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH EMPLOYEE CONCERNED

1. Employee is well qualified in substantive fields concerning Japan and the long background of FEC intelligence activity in this area. This knowledge serves him exceedingly well in the performance of assigned duties. What knowledge he lacks concerning KUBARK policies or procedures is fast being supplied by practical field experience.

2. His judgment at arriving at logical solutions is good under normal conditions, and he generally comes up with solutions which are workable and realistic.

3. He is completely dependable and is particularly sensitive to deadlines, which he makes almost a fetish of meeting. In every sense of the word, he is a man of action in terms of treating with the recurring problems of the station.

4. Employee is somewhat excitable and emotional and, thus, at times of unusual pressure, he may require a steadying hand. This is not a serious fault and is one concerning which the employee is aware. He adjusts well to changing conditions and situations.

5. His imagination, initiative, and originality have shown time and again in his dealings with Army personalities in FEC with whom he has maintained excellent relations on behalf of this Station.

CONFIDENTIAL RYBAT

6. Security consciousness is excellent.

7. Tact and diplomacy in dealing with others is superior.

NOTE: See attached sheet for additional comments by Reviewing Officer

Date: 17 June 1954

Walt D. Newpher

Signature of Reporting Officer
Walter D. NEWPHER

Robert J. Kendall

Signature of Reviewing Officer
Robert J. KENDALL

(If Reviewing Officer or Chief of Station does not concur with this report, exceptions will be stated in space provided below)

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

1. While the Reviewing Officer concurs generally with statements made in this report, it is felt that the over-all impression does not give Subject as much credit as he deserves. In the opinion of the Reviewing Officer, Subject's faults are somewhat over-emphasized. Subject's qualities as exhibited during past months have proven to be outstanding, particularly in his excellent judgement in arriving at logical and workable solutions and in his stability under operational exigencies in which Subject has performed exceedingly well under heavy pressures of both time and responsibility.

2. Working in an area where, in the past, there has been an unfortunate number of misunderstandings between KUFIRE and KUGOWN components, and where there have been the usual difficult personality conflicts, Subject has exhibited not only superior tact and diplomacy, but has also been able to smooth out many difficulties, and modify aggressively offensive actions. He has supplied a needed cooperative spirit and sense of humor to prevent, in many cases, serious antagonisms and unnecessary vituperation so detrimental to a smooth working organization. Subject's contribution to bringing about a friendly, cooperative relationship within the mission and with outside agencies including U.S. military organizations cannot be praised too highly.

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. PJJA-1279

TO : Chief, FE
Through: Senior Representative, Tokyo
FROM : Chief, JCU ✓

DATE: 17 AUG 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative - Personnel
SPECIFIC- [redacted], Commendation of
Mr. Robert P. WHEELER

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to make a matter of record the excellence of performance of duties demonstrated by [redacted] over the period of his first ten months of assignment to JCU.

2. During that time [redacted] has shown himself to be a valuable addition to KUBARK as a whole and a great asset to this particular station. As JCU Chief of Staff, he has performed innumerable tasks in the operational, intelligence and support fields with effectiveness and dispatch. His aggressiveness, imagination and initiative in spite of recurring frustration have been an inspiration to all members of JCU. His diligence and selflessness have set an example throughout the ranks. From the first day of his arrival in JCU, [redacted] has dedicated his every effort to improving the efficiency and broadening the capability of the station.

3. [redacted] should be especially commended for his unceasing efforts in connection with the provision of new office space for this organization. Working tactfully but aggressively through the Army hierachy here in Tokyo, he was able to accomplish many concessions of direct benefit to JCU which would have been most difficult to obtain through official channels.

4. Special mention should also be made of the excellent progress [redacted] has made in the fostering of truly cooperative and productive relationships with the various intelligence elements of the Far East Command. Capitalizing on a wide range of friends and former associates and combining a large portion of common sense and patience, [redacted] may be credited with the development of highly profitable JCU relations with military organizations in the area.

5. [redacted] has shown no task to be too large or too small to deserve his range of energy and talent. He has been a vital factor in the accomplishments of JCU to date.

Walter D. Newpher
Walter D. NEWPHER

15 August 1953

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
1 - Sr. Rep, Tokyo

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on OCT 14 1951 I have attended
(DATE)
the Agency Indoctrination Course specified by Regulation 25-1.

Robert Prentiss Wheeler
(NAME)

Robert P. Wheeler

FORM NO. 81-121
DEC 1951

(6)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

(Department or agency)	(Bureau or division)	(Place of employment)

I, Robert Prentiss Wheeler, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

22 September 1952
(Date of entrance on duty)

Robert Prentiss Wheeler
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 22nd day of September, A. D. 1952

at Tokyo (City) Japan (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

Administrative Assistant
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*) Great Heights #512 Tokyo, Japan (DRS, Hq. FEC APO 500)

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH 4 October 1915

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*) Fitzgerald, Georgia

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY Adelia Callaway Wheeler

(B) RELATIONSHIP wife

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE DRS, Hq, FEC APO 500.

(D) TELEPHONE NO. 86-5303

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
				(Check one)	
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

Date 23 SEPTEMBER 1952

Name **Robert P. Wheeler**

Dear **Mr. Wheeler**:

1. This is to notify you that your employment has been accepted effective 28 SEPTEMBER 1952.

Position: **I. O. GS-14**

Base Salary: **$9600.00**

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave (only in accordance with existing rules and regulations.)

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with this Agency's regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside the Headquarters Area, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by regulations of this Agency.

3. As a condition of your employment by this Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the Headquarters Area. Each time you are so assigned, unless otherwise specified in advance by this Agency, you will be required to remain at the post to which assigned for a period of 24 months from the date of arrival thereat, unless sooner transferred, reassigned or separated for reasons beyond your control. If you wish to return to the Headquarters Area for personal reasons during that period, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

4. If this employment is for assignment to a post outside the Headquarters Area, it is understood and agreed that, unless earlier separated for reasons beyond your control, you will remain in Government service for 12 months after your arrival at your first post outside the Headquarters Area, and if you violate this agreement, any money expended by the United States on account of your travel and the transportation of your immediate family and household goods will be considered a debt due to the United States.

5. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by this Agency and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of six months from date of employment. In the event either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by this Agency, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

6. Your appointment is for such time as your services my be required and funds are available for the work of this Agency. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by existing rules and regulations.

Walter D. [illegible]
Chief of Station

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by this Agency.

Robert Prentice [illegible]
Employee

23 September 1952
Date

kgt

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) WHEELER (First) Robert (Middle) P.
2. DATE 29 November 1957
3. TO POSITION
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH FE
5. GRADE GS-14

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. State
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☒ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks:

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES [illegible] 1957

MEDICAL OFFICER

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY CPD

1. NAME (Last) WHEELER, (First) ROBERT (Middle) P.
2. DATE 7 Sept. 1956
3. TO POSITION I.O.
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH FE
5. GRADE GS-14

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. State
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☒ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Subject is qualified for Departmental Duties. (9/13/56)
May be re-evaluated upon request.

MEDICAL OFFICER

SECRET

14-00000

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS

NAME: Wheeler, Robert Prentiss #1

DATE: 1/5/53

FOR VOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

NATURE OF ACTION:

TITLE OF POSITION:

GRADE:

☐ DEPT. ☐ FIELD

SUBJECT FOUND ☐ FIT ☐ UNFIT FOR DUTY IN THE ABOVE GRADE AND POSITION.

FOR UNVOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

SUBJECT QUALIFIED FOR:

☐ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☒ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (MILITARY ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS:

NON-ARDUOUS O/S DUTIES.

PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-32
NOV 1951 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 37-32 AND 37-57, WHICH MAY BE USED. (28)

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS

NAME: Wheeler, Robert Prentiss Ret.

DATE: XXXXXX 12/24/52

FOR VOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

NATURE OF ACTION:

TITLE OF POSITION:

GRADE:

☐ DEPT. ☐ FIELD

SUBJECT FOUND ☐ FIT ☐ UNFIT FOR DUTY IN THE ABOVE GRADE AND POSITION.

FOR UNVOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

SUBJECT QUALIFIED FOR:

☐ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (MILITARY ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS:

Returnee examination O.K.

PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-32
NOV 1951 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 37-32 AND 37-57, WHICH MAY BE USED. (28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
060947	Wheeler, Robert P.	Oct 1915	D	GS-17

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

	NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
					RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.								
2.								

APR 10 3 24 PM '72

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨
			RESIDENT AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

	NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
			FROM	TO
1.				
2.				
3.				

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
7 APR [illegible]	Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
060947	Wheeler, Robert P.	4 Oct 1915	D

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - - TO - -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR				
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-68 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81)

72 NOV [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.		MAR 22	9 43 AM '71				
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM. ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE 17 MAR 1971

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444I, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
060947	WHEELER, Robert P.	4 Oct 1915	D

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-83 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

[illegible] (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

APR 24 2 15 PM '70
MAIL ROOM

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT
			☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE
4/23/70

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Robert P. McCabe

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Wheeler, Robt P.

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
<• 2	6-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR •	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
			BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 3	•	3-LETTERS •	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR •	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NON-LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST						
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 5	• 060947	• WHE	• C	• BS96	0	0	7	0	0	3	69

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST			
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR	
• NO++	L	A	N	G	U	A	GE	• 09	02	69	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 127 [illegible] LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME	ENTER UNDER "TYPE" - A - ADDITION TO RECORD C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD
<• 4	•	3-LETTERS •	

TYPE	CODE # 1					CODE # 2				
	BASE	1	2	3	YR	BASE	1	2	3	YR
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLC

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444i, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not. Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
060 947	WHEELER Robert Prentiss	10/9/15

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM--TO--			
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (COUNTRY(IES))	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☑ DELETE WHEELER, Rosella C.	Daughter	[illegible]	USA	
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 3-68 444n — SECRET — (4-31)

09 MAY 1970

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	GOVT. ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 22 9 12 AM '68
MAIL ROOM

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4/18/68	Robert P.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER ROBERT P
3. SEX:
4. DATE OF BIRTH: 10/04/15
5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP: GS -16-04
6. SD: D
7. POSITION TITLE: IC PROGRAM EVAL
8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: OPPB
9. LOCATION (Country, City): WASH., D.C.

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
JAPAN	PCS 56	52/09/01	56/06/01
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	PCS RR	64/08/26	66/06/12
Japan	PCS 59	59/06/15	64/05/26
USA	PCS 56	56/06/15	59/06/18

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 31 MAY 67
INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	POLITICAL SCIENCE (GOVERNMENT), GENERAL	CAL UNIV berkeley	40
MSTR	INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, GENERAL	GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV DC	46

FORM

SECRET

7 JUN ENTD

SECTION IV

GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Japan	Economic, political, cultural						
		194[illegible]-56 59-65		X	X	XXX	X

SECTION V

TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Photography - fair, all phases

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES, SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Include license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX **MARITAL STATUS**

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried, SPECIFY)

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIPS (COUNTRIES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X **DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE**

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Robert Prentiss Wheeler, Jr	Son	2/15/51 Tokyo	USA	Bethesda, Maryland
Melissa C. "	Daughter	2/15/51 Tokyo ~~xx/xx/xx~~	USA	" "
Charles Slayton "	Son	2/11/53 Tokyo	USA	" "
Mary S. "	Daughter	2/16/55 Tokyo	USA	" "

SECTION XI **PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO

DATE: 3/22/67

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

This form was completed by subject in pseudonym. We have deleted ~~as~~ pseudo. However, if it is not acceptable ~~[illegible]~~ as is, we will request another one from the field.

A. Tallackson
x-3332

FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

rmining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II

IT

2. DATE OF BIRTH
4 October 1915

RICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT IS

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
Department of the Army Tokyo, Japan ✓	1948 1948	June 6	18 18	52 1952	Sept 9	27 27	Excepted Appointment ✓
CIA	1952	9	28				SCD: 8-6-42 Verified 4-19-57

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DISCHARGE (Hon. or dishon.?)
U. S. Navy	42	8	6	46	6	15	Inactive status

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar)	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TOTAL YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

[redacted]
(SIGNATURE)
/S/ Robert P. Wheeler

(DATE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ (MONTH) 1952 at ______ (CITY) ______ (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

12. TOTAL SERVICE

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE: SEP

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

GENERAL

SECTION I

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER Robert Prentiss

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 3616 Rittenhouse St. N.W. Washington 15, D.C.

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Same

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: WO 6-6616

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: DISTRICT of Columbia

PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

SECTION II

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: WHEELER Adelia Callaway

2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): Same

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: WO-6-6616

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER:

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION:

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

MARITAL STATUS

SECTION III

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS: No CHANGE. See last PHS for data re 1937 annulment

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First): Adelia (Middle): Belle (Maiden): Callaway (Last): WHEELER

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 19 Aug 1939

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Huntington, West Virginia, U.S.A.

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 1045 Madison Avenue Huntington, West Virginia, U.S.A.

7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH:

9. CAUSE OF DEATH:

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 3616 Rittenhouse St. N.W. Washington 15, D.C.

11. DATE OF BIRTH: 17 Aug 1919

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Huntington, West Virginia, U.S.A.

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.

14. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.A.

16. DATE ACQUIRED: BIRTH

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): Huntington, West Virginia, USA

18. OCCUPATION: Dental Hygienist

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers): U.S. Army 1946-1947

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): N.A.

CODED FOR QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 4 NOV 1959

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR
N.A.

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
N.A.

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
N.A.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
Receptionist, CIA, Tokyo, JAPAN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Mrs. Charles A. Wheeler
2. RELATIONSHIP: Sister-in-law
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: USA
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country): Australia
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: Three times in 10 years
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: ~~June~~ 1956

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES
Re 1 above - alien is wife of my brother, U.S. Airforce Lt.Col. C.A.Wheeler, O-5304A. Knew this person in 1945, 1953 and 1956.

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
Very limited dividends from mutual fund investment.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Riggs National Bank	Conn. Ave, D.C., USA

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
U.S.A

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE:
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☒	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
MERCER University, Macon, Ga	Science A.C.	Pre-	1934	1937			
University of California, Berkeley Calif.	Poli Sci	Internatl Relations	1940	1942	A.B	1942	
University of Colorado, Boulder	JAPANESE (NAV JAP)		1942	1943	Certificate in Japanese		
George Washington Univ, Wash, D.C.	Intern'l Law & Relations		1944	1946	M.A	1946	

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	
University of Colorado (NAV TRAINING JAP)	JAPANESE	June 1942	June 1943	54

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Japan		Sept 45 - Dec 45 June 46 - June 56	X	X	X	X
Australia		Jan - Sept 45		X		X

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

Australia - Navy duty
JAPAN - Navy duty, DEPTAR civilian employ, CIA station

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING

SECTION IX TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.) [illegible], Thermofax, etc

SECTION X SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH Photography - good - all phases Tape recording
Hi-fi - handy at wiring 'em, etc. General radio interests

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)	6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES TO WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED. Univ of Calif degree w/honors, same at Grad. Belonged to a Poli. Sci. Honor Society, name forgotten.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) EoD to ~~Nov-53~~ Mar '54
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION ?
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief, Japan Composite Unit Tokyo
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) MAR '54 June '56
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION ?
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CFI/Japan MISSION/TOKYO
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES FI officer for Japan Mission when it succeeded JCU. Instigator and monitor of Liaison Activities.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) APR '54 June '56
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION ?
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CFI & Chief Liaison, JAPAN MISSION, TOKYO
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Continued FI duties and took more active role in liaison as Senior CIA Liaison Officer for Japan.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) Sept '56 Sept '57
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 28
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Various but mainly CFE/1
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) SEPT '57 —
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 12
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE C/FE/FI
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 6

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Geraldine D. Wheeler	Daughter	1943		✓	USA	3616 Rittenhouse St NW Washington 15, D.C.
Rosella C. "	"	1948		✓	"	"
Robert Pratis " Jr	Son	1951	X		"	"
Melosia C. "	Daughter	1951		✓	"	"
Charles S. "	Son	1953	X		"	"
MARY SLAYTON "	Daughter	1955		✓	"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Addresses since EOD:
1953-1956 TOKYO, JAPAN
1956-present Washington, D.C.

I believe in my 15 yrs gov't service, Navy, Army Civilian and CIA, I have acquired a fair degree of competence as a manager, executive. In all three agencies I held increasingly responsible managerial positions. In my CIA experience, more than five years, I have handled agents, developed training activities, managed a variety of offices, etc., and have worked to point where I [illegible] Division Staff [illegible] which should call into play these experiences.

DATE COMPLETED 10/4/57

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Robert [illegible] Wheeler

SECRET

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes (Yes or No)

Sec. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Date [illegible]

A. FULL NAME Mr. Robert [illegible]

PRESENT ADDRESS [illegible] APO 500 c/o PM San Francisco, Calif

PERMANENT ADDRESS 1045 Madison Ave. [illegible]

B. NICKNAMES None   WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU USED THESE NAMES?

[illegible]



CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME Geraldine [illegible] Wheeler RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS Same as principal
(Street and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME Rosella [illegible] Wheeler RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 12

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS Same as principal
(Street and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME Robert Prentiss Wheeler RELATIONSHIP son AGE 4 mos
Melissa Callaway Wheeler daughter 4 mos

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS Same as principal
(Street and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Charles [illegible]
(First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Deceased DATE OF DEATH [illegible] CAUSE [illegible]

[illegible] ADDRESS [illegible] Avenue [illegible] Georgia U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] Georgia

[illegible]

14-00000

MOTHER [illegible]

FULL NAME [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] Alive [illegible]

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS 1045 Madison Ave., Huntington, West Va., U.S.A.

(No. and Street) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH Huntington, West Va., U.S.A.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY Not applicable

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? See above

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Self

Sec. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP Sister-in-law [illegible] (opp)

[illegible]

Washington, D.C.

ADDRESS

[illegible] San Francisco

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER [illegible]

IF DISCHARGED GIVE SERIAL NO. Not applicable

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS [illegible]

Item 18. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM June 1946 TO Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS-13

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. Department of the Army

ADDRESS G-2, GHQ, FEC, APO 500, c/o PM San Francisco (Tokyo, Japan)

KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible] NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB Intelligence Specialist [illegible]

DUTIES [illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

FOREIGN LANGUAGE [illegible]

LANGUAGE [illegible] SPEAK FAIR READ FAIR WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE [illegible] SPEAK [illegible] READ FAIR WRITE [illegible]

LANGUAGE [illegible] SPEAK [illegible] READ [illegible] WRITE [illegible]

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU. INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

[illegible]

HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

14-00000

[illegible] WHO [illegible]

[illegible] BUS. ADD. [illegible] Washington, D.C.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

[illegible] BUS. ADD. [illegible]
RES. ADD. [illegible] Arlington, Virginia

[illegible] BUS. ADD. [illegible] Washington, D.C.
RES. ADD. [illegible] Arlington, Va.

[illegible] BUS. ADD. [illegible] Washington, D.C.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

[illegible] BUS. ADD. [illegible] Washington, D.C.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES (NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS) [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

University [illegible] Avenue [illegible] Berkeley, California [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Avenue [illegible] Washington, D.C., USA

[illegible]

[illegible]

DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED [illegible] ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME Adelia Calloway Wheeler RELATIONSHIP Wife

Stewart F. Wheeler 015, [illegible] APO 500 c/o PM San Francisco

[illegible] or 1048 Madison Avenue, Huntington 4, West Virginia

[illegible] YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

[illegible]

00000-14

[illegible]

[illegible] annulment of [illegible] Taylor [illegible] 1928 [illegible] Bridgeport, Conn. [illegible] I have never mentioned this [illegible] annulment in the Superior Court of the State of California, San Francisco City and County, 10 May 19[illegible]. [illegible] this marriage was not known to anyone but the principals and the officials who performed the marriage and the annulment. Neither set of parents and few if any friends have ever known of it. Any investigation at this late date would only be the source of needless embarrassment to all concerned. Miss Taylor, as far as I know, has long since married and I have had no contact with her since Feb 19[illegible]. If there are further questions, it would be appreciated if only I am approached. There is nothing to hide or to be ashamed of, but there is a lot of unnecessary embarrassment that can so easily be avoided.

Re Sec. 5 My father was born in Coaticook, Quebec, while his mother was visiting there, so I have always understood. Both of his parents were US Citizens and he was the 10th generation in the US. He had some military service in the Spanish-American War, but I am totally ignorant of any details.

Re Sec 12 College: University of Colorado Address: Boulder, Colo. Dates Attended: June 1942-June 1943 (NAVY JAP LAN) Certificate of Completion. College: George Washington University ADDRESS: Washington, D.C. 1945-46-[illegible] M.A.

Re Sec 14 [illegible] Under heading of duties: My work with the Army in Japan is of necessity classified but my job description of Military Intelligence Special[illegible] will give a good idea of the work in general.

[illegible] Also under the heading of duties: The work in the Navy was even more classified and [illegible] information can be [illegible] Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-6): 42076
REQUEST DATE (8-11): 5 Aug 66
NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) (12-28): Wheeler, Robert P.
YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30): 1915
POSITION TITLE: IO- Program Eval.
POSITION NUMBER (31-36):
OCCUP. CODE (37-42):
GRADE (43-44): GS-16
LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): Washington, D.C.
ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH): DCI/PPB/Planning & Prog. Div/Prog. Anal. Br.
ORGN. CODE (45-48):
TYPE OF APPLICANT: ☐ REGULAR ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ CONTRACT ☐ MILITARY
CONVERSION ACTION: SA-SE
IF OTHER, SPECIFY:
TYPE OF APPL. (49):
NAME OF REQUESTER (OR OFFICIAL): Dov H. Lutscher, Chief/CPD
TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS: ☐ HQS ☐ USF ☐ FF ☐ V ☐ UV
HDQTRS. & FUND (50):
CLEARANCE REQUIRED: PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP): Full Clearance ☐ SECRET ☐ FULL
CLEARANCE (51):
ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ☐ APPENDIX I ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER
☐ PHOTOGRAPH(S) ☐ APPENDIX II ☐ REPORT OF INTERVIEW
RECRUIT. CODE (52-54):
VETERANS STATUS: ☐ MALE - VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - VETERAN
☐ MALE - NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - NON-VETERAN
VET. PREF. & SEX (55):

Security #: 60164

Clearance memo to SA Branch/CPD
Attn: Jo Ann Varney
5 8 69

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

FORM 3-61 377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(MFG. 5-65)

(9)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 30 July 1966

YOUR REFERENCE: 42076

CASE NO. : 60164

TO : Director of Personnel

ATTN : Jo Ann Varney

SUBJECT : WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

1. This is to inform you that Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulations 10-3 and 20-5 including access to classified information through TOP SECRET as required in the performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made for entrance on duty within 150 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐ Please advise Chief, Clearance Branch, extension 5620 when Subject enters on duty.

4. This is a Conversion case.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Steven L Kuhn

Steven L. Kuhn
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 9-66 1173 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1 [illegible]

(1)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

STAFF AGENT CLEARANCE

DATE : 9 November 1964

YOUR REFERENCE: 15100

CASE NO. : 60164

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN. : Staff Agents Branch

SUBJECT : [redacted]. (P)

1. This is to advise that a security clearance is granted for the employment of the Subject as a Staff Agent, GS-16, by DDP/DCD in the capacity of Operations Officer at Honolulu, Hawaii.

2. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of the Subject, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

3. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

4. As a part of entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged by your office.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

FORM 10-62 1989 CONFIDENTIAL (9-40)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-5): 15100
REQUEST DATE (6-11): 5 Nov 1964
(12-26)
NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE): [redacted] (P)
YEAR OF BIRTH (27-30): 10/04/15
POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
POSITION NUMBER (31-36):
OCCUP. CODE (37-42):
GRADE (43-44): GS-16
LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): Honolulu, Hawaii
ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH): DDP/DOD/Honolulu Base
ORGN. CODE (45-48):
TYPE OF APPLICANT: ☐ REGULAR ☐ CONTRACT ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ MILITARY
CONVERSION ACTION: SE9SA
IF OTHER, SPECIFY:
TYPE OF APPL. (49):
TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS: ☐ NCS ☐ USP ☐ PP ☐ V ☐ UV
HDQTRS. & FUND (50):
NAME OF REQUESTER: Joseph B. Ragan, Chief/CPD
CLEARANCE REQUIRED: PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP) COVERT SECURITY CLEARANCE ☐ SECRET ☐ FULL
CLEARANCE (51): /
ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ☐ PHOTOGRAPH(S) ☐ APPENDIX I ☐ APPENDIX II ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER ☐ REPORT OF INTERVIEW
RECRUIT. CODE (52-54):
VETERANS STATUS: ☐ MALE - VETERAN ☐ MALE - NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - NON-VETERAN
VET PREF. & SEX (55):

Security #: 60164

Case Officer: Bill Michael Code 11 x68060

Clearance memo to SA Branch/CPD
Attn: Margo Dalsh
5 E 69

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

FORM 3-61 377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (MFG. 5-61) (9)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 28 May 1959

PROT 9-258

TO : FE

Director of Security

Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Notification of Cryptographic Clearance - Robert P. Wheeler

1. Subject employee has been granted a cryptographic clearance under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Clearance is effective 25 May 1959.

2. Subject has been informed of the granting of clearance, has been briefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Briefing Statement acknowledging responsibility for the protection of cryptographic information.

3. When Subject employee no longer requires the clearance in order to perform his assigned duties, it is requested that the Communications Security Staff (2411 "I" Bldg., Ext. 3021) be notified by FE, that the clearance may be revoked.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
1 - FE
1 - Security Office (Briefing Statement attached)
1 - Personnel Office
1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-59 1597a

(8)

Sec Ch 11 [illegible]

dsm.

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 28 July 1952

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division

Your Reference: L-5937-A

FROM: Acting Chief, Security Division

Case Number: 60164

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the EOD procedures.

Not: Lynn
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~

W.U. EOD in field.

E. P. Geiss
E. P. GEISS

Pouch sent out 17 mar 52
Branch has cabled field on change of action a papers are to be forward back.
186
8/16/52

EOD per cable
9/28/52
[illegible]

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

(5)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Covert Personnel Division

DATE: 8 May 1952

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Branch

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss - 60164

Reference is made to a memorandum dated 1 May 1952 from Lloyd George, Chief, FE, which is as follows.

> "1. Full security clearance was issued 11 March 1952 for Subject's employment in the field as an I.O. (CI) assigned to the Japan Composite Unit.
>
> 2. Our field representative advises that Mr. Wheeler is still on duty with the Security Division of G-2, FEC; however, he will be available for assignment to the Japan Composite Unit on or about 15 June 1952.
>
> 3. It is therefore requested that Subject's security clearance be extended for a period of sixty days."

This is to advise that the security clearance granted 11 March 1952 is extended to 30 June 1952.

W. A. Osborne
W. A. OSBORNE

SECRET

FD2
68
u✓

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

hc

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 11 March 1952

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division
Your Reference: L-5937

FROM: Chief, Security Division
Case Number: 60164

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3.

Called in per Mr. Jones 14 Mar.

Field!

C. V. BROADLEY

Charles P. Michelet

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
JUL 1951

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE 1 OCT 1974 mk

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIROGUE

INCLUSIVE DATES: 24 July 59 - 27 July 1961

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

MAYCRUNK, Ernest G.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.:

TO: Chief, Finance Division

Chief, AF

FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville

DATE: 27 JULY 1961

SUBJECT: Finance/WIROGUE

Transfer of Accountability-Ernest G. Mayerink

RE: "43" - CHECK "X" ONE

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Credit Advance Account

REFERENCES:

LEOP-1573	DIR-49325
LEOP-1558	LEOP-1599
DIR-46429	DIR-00712

1. On 7 July 1961 WIROGUE was advanced the sum of U. S.$100.00 for living expenses in Brazzaville while awaiting onward transportation to PBPRIME. (DIR-46429 requested WIROGUE return to PBPRIME). This is his only outstanding advance with Leopoldville Station. Receipt attached hereto.

2. DIR-49325 authorized Station to withhold money received from sale of personal car against outstanding advances. However, before his departure WIROGUE accounted for 11,980 BCF over what he owed the Station. The sum of 42,100 BCF from the sale of his automobile plus 11,980 BCF converted at 50/$1.00 (LEOP-1599 and DIR-49325) gave WIROGUE a credit of $1,081.60. In January 1961 WIROGUE was ordered to Thysville by the Station and was authorized $0.10 per mile for use of his personal car, therefore, 312.5 miles times $0.10 equals $31.25 leaving WIROGUE a credit of U. S. $1,112.85. (See attachment).

3. WIROGUE was paid his June salary of $500 on 26 June and also his housing for July ($250.00). (Station was notified on 1 July, DIR-46429 that WIROGUE was to return to PBPRIME). However, July rental was used in the final settlement of the lease for the usual damages claimed by local landlords and in lieu of 30 days termination notice. Receipt forwarded under Voucher: 1153.

4. Accountability in the amount of U. S. $100.00 is herewith transferred to Headquarters plus a credit of $1,112.85. As WIROGUE was specifically told he would have to account for the above $100.00 for living/traveling expenses Station did not subtract that amount from his credit.

18 July 1961

Angela B. Dearleste

Attachments: 1. Receipt for $100, h/w
2. Thysville certification by Outhman, h/w
3. Coquilhatville estimate, h/w
4. Breakdown of advances and accountings, h/w

Distribution:
Hqs - 4, w/a a/s

Approved

[illegible]

1 September 19[illegible]

Mr. Ernest G. [illegible]

Dear Mr. May[illegible]:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 31 October 19[illegible].

You are herein formally notified that said contract will be terminated by the Government as of bob 1 September 1961. You are reminded of the contents of paragraph eleven (11) of said contract, which reads as follows:

> "11. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed through instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the undersigned Contracting Officer executing this agreement. It is agreed that any revelation whatsoever of the above information will constitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement."

~~Effective 1 September 1961~~, You are herein authorized a one-time payment in the amount of $2,110.__ ~~[illegible]~~ In full consideration for said payment and effective as of the date of its receipt, you hereby release and forever discharge the United States Government and any agency, department or instrumentality thereof, and all its agents, officers, employees and representatives from any and all claims, demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever throughout the world arising from services performed by you for the United States Government under the contract effective 31 October 1960.

Your signature in the space provided below is acknowledgment of the contents hereof.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY: OK
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

S
Ernest G. May[illegible] Date: 7-9-61

WITNESS:

APPROVED: Fields
[illegible] Officer

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT : Termination of [redacted] Ernest J. Meyerink

1. Approval is herewith requested to relocate, terminate and make a final severance payment of $2000.00 to [redacted]. In return for this [redacted] will be required to sign a Quit Claim and Secrecy agreement.

2. It is presently planned to relocate subject in Europe, with the Office of Security transporting subject via MATS as far as Frankfurt, from whence he will proceed to any Western European country of his choice and at his expense. The $2000.00 payment will constitute his only assets until he can find gainful employment.

3. There are adequate funds available in the project to cover the termination bonus and transportation to Frankfurt via MATS.

4. Approval is also requested to write off and charge to expense the $[illegible] loan given [redacted] of which approximately $3200.00 is still outstanding.

William H. Dunbar
for C/AF/W/2

Approved:

Bronson Tweedy
Bronson Tweedy

Amount requested in paragraph one is approved for payment. Based upon cover and operational circumstances, payment is not subject to Federal Income taxes.

JBR

Special Contracting Officer

Mr. Ernest G. Maycrink

Dear Mr. Maycrink:

Effective 31 October 1960, all contracts, oral or written, by and between you and the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, are hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and service, you will receive from the Government, payable in such an approved manner as you may direct in writing, the following:

   (a) Basic compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $6000 per annum.

   (b) Additional compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum for cost-of-living expenses (including quarters), effective upon your arrival at and applicable only to your contemplated permanent post of assignment overseas. Quarters will not be furnished you nor will you accept quarters provided by a cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement.

O/K

~~2. Taxes. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. You herein authorize this organization to withhold taxes on said income if it determines such requirements so necessitate.~~

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses to and from your permanent post of duty overseas and for authorized operational travel. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence during such travel and, when authorized, while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved and financially limited by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Negotiated Benefits. (a) (1). If, in the performance of activities un this agreement, you incur an injury or illness which is not the result of gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intemperate act, the Governme will provide medical, surgical, hospital, transportation and disability be fits in such amounts and under such conditions as the Government in its s discretion deems proper provided, however, that such benefits shall not exceed a total of $5000 for the same injury or illness.

(2) If you die in the performance of acti hereunder and your death is not the result of your gross negligence, will misconduct or intemperate act, the Government will pay the sum of $500 to your beneficiary(ies) less any amount paid to you under sub-paragrap above if such injury or illness resulted in your death, provided that said beneficiary(ies) is acceptable to the Government at the time such payme to be made. An acceptable beneficiary hereunder is an individual to who payment by the U.S. Government can be made without conflicting with its avowed principles and ideals.

(b) Outstanding performance by you under t agreement and your fulfillment of obligations hereunder in an efficient m ner will result in the Government undertaking your resettlement in an ar mutually agreeable to both parties, to the extent deemed appropriate by United States Government.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services unde this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, whic property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Governmen you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relations either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever docu may be required by this organisation to evidence this relationship.

8. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incide to an employee status.

9. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangemen monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner. is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment b the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

10. Cover. (a) It is anticipated that you will undertake a cover ventu in the course of your performance under this agreement. Such venture be approved by the appropriate Government representative overseeing y activities prior to its initiation. Any and all documents which you may execute in the course of said cover venture are subordinate to this agre ment and any contradiction in terms which in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by t agreement which shall always be dominant.

(b) To provide capital for your approved cover venture t Government will loan you $4000 to be secured by a non-interest bearing p isory note, payable on demand. Said loan will be deposited to an accoun in a foreign bank and a $3000 letter of credit will be issued you against deposit. The additional $1000 will be released from said account, after approval by the Government representative overseeing your activities.

(c) You will submit to the Government quarterly income and expense statements on the cover venture and copies of all tax returns filed in connection therewith. Your cover accounts shall be kept separate and distinct from the bank account into which your personal compensation payments are made.

(d) You herein agree that monies loaned you by the Governm shall be repaid from the profits of the cover venture, in amounts and at periodic intervals to be established by the Government representative ove seeing your activities. After said loan has been completely repaid and all other obligations, such as local taxes, etc., have been made, you may ret any further profit derived from said cover venture. However, it is clearl understood and agreed that your primary obligation under this agreement i the performance of Governmental activities.

11. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed thr instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the undersigned Contracting Officer executing this agreement. It is agreed that any revelation whatsoever of the above information will constitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement.

12. Instructions. During the term of this agreement, and in your official cover capacity you herein agree to act in conformance with instructions, oral or written given you by authorized representatives of this orga zation.

13. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulat in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on this organization.

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 November 1960, and sha continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

(a) By sixty (60) days' actual notice to you from the Government, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extend upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expirati of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination or expiration of this agr ment will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMEN

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Ernest C. Maycrink

WITNESS: ____________________

APPROVED: ____________________

[illegible] 16 Nov 60

8 NOV 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : WIROGUE/1 Contract (Formerly AEASPIC)

1. A review of the WIROGUE/1 file showed that subject was under contract for a period beginning 20 September 1959 through 30 June 1960. Since that date until 20 October 1960, subject was under SR/DOB OOA. On 21 October 1960, the African Division picked up the case and is preparing to dispatch him on 20 November 1960.

2. It is requested that the contract be brought up to date and amended to encompass the following points:

option to renew

A. Effective date: 21 November 1960 through 20 November 1962.

5-9-40 D

B. Compensation: $500 per month, plus $3000 per annum for housing.

C. Medical: to extent it is necessary to maintain good health.

D. Insurance: $5000 payable to beneficiary.

mutually agreed upon

E. Bonus: for outstanding performance, resettlement in another country.

F. Termination: ending of all benefits and monies.

3. This contract will have to be prepared for signing prior to 18 November 1960.

4. For further information, please contact Mr. Daniel R. Niescior, X8284.

Glenn Fields
Glenn D. Fields
Acting Chief, Africa Division

+ A 4,000 operational loan - non interest bearing - to be repaid from profits

Medical OK - per C.O.

Subject is on F.N. - no taxes.

SECRET

SR/DOB/60-2074

20 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Contracting Officer

THROUGH: SR/SS
Attention: ~~Madge Hobbs~~ [illegible]

SUBJECT: Project Termination of Ernest G. Maycrink (p) as independent contractor for SR Division

REFERENCE: SR/DOB/59-1735 dated 17 September 1959
SR/DOB/59-1660 dated 24 July 1959

1. Because of the indefinite postponment of Project AESENTINEL, under which subject individual was engaged, subject has been terminated by this office on 20 October 1960.

2. Subject individual will be picked up on contract on 21 October 1960 by Africa Division. Subject was paid on 20 October 1960 by this office all monies remaining due him as per Engagement of Independent contractor agreement for Project AESENTINEL. Subject has no further remunerative claim against the U. S. Government.

Michael Rae
MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

Approved: J. Keith Reid
J. Keith Reid

Joseph B. Ragan

SECRET

SR/DOB/59/ 1735

17 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

THROUGH : Special Contracting Officer

FROM : Contract Approving Officer, Michael Rae

SUBJECT : Engagement of Ernest G. MAYCRINK (p) as Independent Contractor

REFERENCE : SR/DOB/59/ 1660, dated 24 July 1959 to Finance Division re same subject

1. Project AESENTINEL, under which subject individual has been engaged, was originally approved through the period 31 March 1960. A request for renewal and amendment of the project has been submitted to FI, and it is intended subject individual will be utilized under this project during 1960.

2. The following provisions will apply to subject individual during the interim period, i.e.: 20 September 1959 through 30 June 1960.

3. Term and Project Charge. Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project AESENTINEL. The effective date of the oral contract is 20 April 1959, and has been extended through the period 31 March 1961, subject to termination by the Government upon thirty (30) days actual notice.

4. Security Approval. The initial security clearance obtained for Subject's use, CI/OA No. C-73532, dated 11 March 1959, has been suspended during the interim period. Requests have been made of the Office of Security (SSD and Alien Affairs Staff) for subject's use.

5. Citizenship. Subject is a foreign national.

6. Compensation. Subject will be paid salary in the amount of $400.00 per month, payable in United States currency.

7. Quarters and Subsistence. Basic quarters and subsistence costs will be borne by the Subject. Occasional incidental expenses will be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

8. Operational Expenses. No Operational Expenses are contemplated during the period covered.

9. Other Commitments. The following additional commitments have been made to the Subject:

SECRET

a. Medical Benefits. Subject will receive such dental and medical benefits as may be necessary to maintain his physical status for his eventual use on his assigned mission. Costs to be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

b. Insurance. Insurance coverage for death or disability incurred in line of duty, not to exceed $5,000.00. Costs chargeable against Project AESENTINEL.

c. Resettlement. The initial provisions made for resettlement of Subject still apply.

d. Entertainment. Basic entertainment expenses will be borne by Subject. Occasional entertainment expenses will be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

10. Contingent Obligations. Although no such promise has been made the Subject, resettlement in the United States could possibly become necessary as a form of control, should this be deemed necessary from a security viewpoint.

11. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

12. At such time as Subject re-enters training for his proposed mission, about 1 July 1960, all provisions of his initial engagement will again apply.

APPROVED:

Special Contracting Officer

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

Dist:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Contracting Officer

SECRET

SR/DOB/59/ 1660

24 July 1959

TO: Chief, Finance Division

VIA: Special Contracting Officer

FROM: Contract Approving Officer, Michael Rae

SUBJECT: Engagement of Ernest O. MAYCRINK (P) as Independent Contractor.

1. Term and Project Charge. The subject individual has been engaged under oral contract, for use under Project AESENTINEL. The effective date of the oral contract is 20 April 1959, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one year subject to termination by the Government upon thirty (30) days actual notice.

2. Security Approval. The appropriate security approval for Subject's use has been obtained. Type Operational Approval, No. C-73532, dated 11 March 1959.

3. Citizenship. The Subject is a foreign national.

4. Compensation. Subject will be paid salary in the amount of $500.00 per month, payable in United States currency. Of this amount, he will actually receive $50.00 per month during training and the duration of the mission. All unpaid monies will accrue to his credit in an escrow account, the payment of which will be dependent upon the proper performance of his duties and be payable upon completion of mission for which engaged. Provisions also made for payment of bonus not to exceed $10,000.00.

5. Quarters and Subsistence. The Subject will be furnished quarters and subsistence. Those costs to be borne by SR/DOB Station funds.

6. Operational Expenses.

Operational travel and expenses to be paid as officially authorized.

a. Domestic travel costs will be borne by SR/DOB Station funds. Travel costs to and from the United States, and foreign travel will be charged against Project AESENTINEL.

b. Operational expenses to be borne by Project AESENTINEL. Training expenses to be carried by Station Allotment.

SECRET

7. Other Commitments.

The following additional commitments have been made to the Subject:

a. Medical Benefits. Subject will receive such dental and medical benefits as may be necessary to permit him to properly perform his assigned mission. Costs to be borne by SR/DCB Station Funds.

b. Insurance. Insurance coverage for death or disability incurred in line of duty, not to exceed $5,000.00. Costs chargeable against Project AESENTINEL.

c. Resettlement. Provisions made for resettlement of Subject in a country other than that in which he was recruited. Costs of resettlement will not exceed $1,000.00, and will be chargeable against Project AESENTINEL.

d. Entertainment. All normal entertainment expenses will be borne by SR/DCB Station funds.

8. Contingent Obligations. The following has not be promised the individual, but may have to be met by the Government:

a. Resettlement in the United States, either as an additional bonus for the Subject or as a form of control should this become necessary from a security viewpoint.

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

MICHAEL RAF
Chief, SR/DCB

APPROVED: ____________________
J. KEITH REID

APPROVED: [illegible]
[illegible] Officer

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 66
October 1960
PRESCRIBED BY U S CIVIL SERVICE COMM
Federal Personnel Manual
66-102

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

[redacted]

(N)

69 Feb Entd

WOODS JAMES S
502-16-6560
02/20/28

29 SEP 1969

Coded

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

03 AUG

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 26 July 1978

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT - [✓ VOLUNTARY] CIARDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 04 YEAR 78

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ▶ V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 8026-3430 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Section 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/IMS
INFORMATION MGMT AND PLANNING GROUP
RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH
AREAS UNIT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE (13)

12. POSITION NUMBER: CG45

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: $26,889

18. REMARKS

Last Working Day: 4 August 1978

CONCUR: 07/26/78
CNS/MSB Date

co-ordinated w/Ellen [illegible] ROB
7/31/78

George L. [illegible]
CNS/MSB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry E. Walton
Henry E. Walton
C/PCS/CSS/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 7/26/78

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 7/26/78

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CM13

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. FOOTES CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 20 YR. 28

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIARDS 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: C1,85,0000

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: ex 7/26
03 AUG 1978

46. OP APPROVAL: William [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 8/1/78

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622 (4)

25 July 1978

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT

I entered on duty with the CIA in April 1952 and have been in records management for my whole career, seventeen years of it overseas.

James Woods
James S. Woods

NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS

ICN: 1 25 May 78

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16 MAY 1978

0CF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 May 1978

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT [illegible]

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 09 YEAR 78

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 8026-3430 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/~~NE~~ IMS
INFORMATION MGMT AND PLANNING GROUP
RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH
AREAS UNIT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE (13)

12. POSITION NUMBER: CG45

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: $26,889

18. REMARKS:

FROM: DDO/NE

CONCUR: John Diffley (telecord)
C/NE/Pers

DATE

Karen Wykle
IMS/MSB 05/12/78

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry E. Walton
C/PCS/CSS/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 5/10/78

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]
DDO/CMS/07-12
DATE SIGNED: 5/11/78

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 VOUCHER CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR.
37	10	53740	IMS	75013			02 20 28		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—DRGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA YR
37 LONG. COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV. PROV/TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 30 MAY 19 5-12-78 [illegible]
From NE

46 OP APPROVAL: [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 5/26/78

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C **REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION**	DATE PREPARED 6 Feb 78

1 SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) WOODS, JAMES S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH ~~02~~ 03 DAY 12 YEAR 78	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6 FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 3033 4800 0000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/NE DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, NE DIVISION PLANS STAFF	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OFF (13)	12 POSITION NUMBER CG45	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13 2	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 26589

18. REMARKS

CONCUR:

From '12 5

Henry Walton (telecoord)
ISS

6 Feb 78
Date

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL John F. [illegible], CNE/PERS	DATE SIGNED 6 Feb 78	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 2/8/78

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 22	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 46015	ALPHABETIC NE	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTES CODE 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA. YR 02 20 28	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR 03 12 78	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR 03 12 78
28 MTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CS 2—OPEN 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV. PROV/TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 3-6-78 ARO 08 MAR 1978	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 8 MAR 78

FORM 6-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622

18 August 1978

Mr. James S. Woods
304 Meadow Hall Dr.
Rockville, MD 20851

Dear Mr. Woods:

We are enclosing the employee copy of your retirement action (Form 1150) that you requested 04 August 1978.

Sincerely,

/S/

Abraham Schwartz
Chief, Control Division

Enclosure: 1 Form

Dist.
Orig. - Adse.
1 - TRB
1 - OPF/WOODS, James S.
OP/TRB/SEAllewelt;sea(18AUG78)

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

18 APR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: James S. Woods

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Commendation for Exceptional Performance

1. The Directorate of Operations Records Review Task Force has finished its work in Warrenton. I want you to know that I realize that a large measure of the success of this effort was due to the exceptional performance of the Records Management Officers who worked long and hard during the six-month period, patiently guiding the 435 Directorate personnel who served on the component teams. Many of you performed additional duties, voluntarily and cheerfully, extending beyond the ten-hour work day, which kept the task force functioning smoothly.

2. This fine team effort and your personal contribution to it is in the best tradition of the Directorate of Operations. I commend you for a job well done.

Thank you – John McMahon

John N. McMahon

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

FROM : Kenneth Corbat
Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement -
Mr. James S. Woods

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50h.

Grade: GS-13 Position: Records Management Officer
Career Service : Operations
Office/Division : Information Management Staff
Date Requested for Retirement: 4 August 1978
Age at that Date : 50
Years of Creditable Service : 29
Years of Agency Service : 26
Years of Qualifying Service : 9

3. The applicant's Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommend that the request be approved.

/s/ Kenneth Corbat

The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved.

(Signed) F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

2 AUG 1978
Date

Distribution:
0 - Return to ROB
1 - Applicant
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

2 [illegible] 0026

CONFIDENTIAL

3589

14-00000

OUB - 11/1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 Oct 1977

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Woods, James S. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment AND CANCELLATION of NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 11 | YEAR 77
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular ✓
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE (FAN) AND NSCA: 8033 4801 | 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: ✓
DDO/NE Division
Office of the Chief, NE Division
Plans Staff
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C. ✓
11. POSITION TITLE: Records Admin Off ~~CH~~ (13) ✓
12. POSITION NUMBER: CG45 ✓
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC ✓
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ✓
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01 ✓
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 4 ✓
17. SALARY OR RATE: 24070 ~~$22,489~~ ✓

18. REMARKS:
replacing Peter Serra

#11 PER Sue 10.17.77

*SAL, BLURB

Concur:

#3 PER NANCY 10.17.77

Heidena H. Bennett 10/12/77
AC/PCS/CSS/Personnel Date

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: John [illegible] C/NE/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 10-05-77
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 11/31/77

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 46025 | ALPHABETIC NE
22. STATION CODE: 7503
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HEADQTRS. CODE: 1 ✓
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 | DA. 20 | YR. 28 ✓
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.
28. LEI EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CSRDS 3—FICA 4—NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.
FOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR./RESV. PROV./TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 01 NOV 1977 10.14.77 RSH
46. O P APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 1 Nov 77

*FROM: CCS

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
3-72

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

C-NO

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 August 1976

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010022

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CHANGE OF FAN [illegible]

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 09 YEAR 76

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: T230 0130 0002

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDC/CCS REGISTRY

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH (12)

12 POSITION NUMBER: BL 44

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 21,324

18 REMARKS:

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Donald E. McMahill, Admin Off

DATE SIGNED: 9 Aug 76

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTUS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	39115	CCS	75013		1	02 20 25		

28 LWOP EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OASDI 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO

34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10 AUG 1976 BL 8.9.76

46 O P APPROVAL: B Brai[illegible]

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 8-73 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

D

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622

(4)

C-NO MON ABJ 7/16

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 July 1976

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S. ✓

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment - Change of Home Base
~~CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION~~

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 13 | YEAR 76

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO C | C TO V | C TO C

7 FAN AND OBSCA: 230 0118 | 0008 2

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/CCS ✓ REGISTRY ✓

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH (12)

12 POSITION NUMBER: BL 44 ✓

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01 ✓

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 4 ✓

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 21,324 ✓✓

18 REMARKS: DAC to DCC

DESIGNATION CHANGED FROM DAC TO DCC.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Donald F. McMahill
Donald F. Mc Mahill, CCS/ADM

DATE SIGNED: 13 Jul 76

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

115 SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	37
20 EMPLOY CODE	10
21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	31
21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	CCS
22 STATION CODE	75013
23 INTEGREE CODE	
24 AGENCY CODE	1
25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	02 [illegible] [illegible]
26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	
27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	
28 VET DOMICILE MO. DA. YR.	
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30 RETIREMENT DATA CODE	
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA	
EOD DATA	
33 SECURITY REQ NO	
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	
36 SERV COMP DATE	
37 LONG COMP DATE	
38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE	
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	
42 LEAVE CAT CODE	
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA	
44 STATE TAX DATA	

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 20 JUL 1976 bh 7.19.76

46 OP APPROVAL: W. L. T. H-Fram

DATE APPROVED: 07/19/76

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

14-00000

CR
11-22-74 C Macy

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ØCF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 November 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 24 | YEAR 74

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

8. FUNDS: XX V to V | V to CF | CF to V | CF to CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 5230 0121 | 0002 ✓

6. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CCS
~~[illegible]~~
REGISTRY

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF CH (12)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0061

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 19,693 ✓

18. REMARKS:

CONCUR: MARGARET SCOTT (TELECOORD)
SS/SE/PERS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Donald E. McMahill
Donald E. Mc Mahill C/CCS/ADM

DATE SIGNED: 13 Nov 74

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 15 Nov 74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 39115 | ALPHABETIC CCS

22. STATION CODE: 75613

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. VOUCHER CODE: 1 ✓

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 02 20 28

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR. 11 24 74

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR. 11 24 74

28. VTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OASDI 3—FICA 4—NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. CD.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RES. PROV./TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI—HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 1—WAIVED 2—REG. 3—REG./OPT 4—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPT. CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-15-74 JR 25 NOV 1974

46. O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED:

H
27

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
1-72

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 August 1973

11-27

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT, Transfer to Vouchered Funds, AND DELEGATION OF N.S.C.A.

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 16 YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF ☐

7. FAN AND NSCA: 4230 0121 0002

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CCS
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND REGISTRY SEC

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF CH (12)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0061

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 16,326

18. REMARKS: HOME BASE: ~~[illegible]~~ SS

* CONCUR FOR CIA W-2: [illegible]
CCS/OCB/S

6-24

CONCUR: GEORGE OWENS (TELECOORD)
C/EUR/PERS

CONCUR: WILLIAM H. FLIPPEN (TELECOORD)
DDP/RECORDS MGMT OFFICER

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Erich W. Isenstead, C/CCS
DATE SIGNED: 8/24/73

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
16	10	39100	CCS	75013		1	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
XX XX XX							

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE: (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE (0—WAIVED, 1—REG, 2—REG/OPT., 3—INELIGIBLE) HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-23-73
*FF Sr. EUR

46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 28 Aug 73

FORM 1-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET CLASSIFIED BY 01-0352 E2 IMPDET

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

NOTE TO PCS RETURNEES

Personnel processing in from a PCS foreign field assignment through Central Processing Branch are required to review the Employee Conduct Handbook and the information for PCS returnees. This information is contained in a notebook provided by the CPB receptionist.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 9 July 1970 and the information for returnees dated 1 February 1972.

JAMES S WOODS
NAME
(Please Print)

James S Woods
Signature

11 Sept 73
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

[illegible]

17 APR 1973

Certificate of Exceptional Service (for Vietnam)

Terrones, Aubrey F.
Taylor, Paul F.
Tilberry, Austin S.
Tilton, John S.
Tronnes, Sue Ann

Valetich, Steven T.
Vandaveer, Robert J.

Walker, Richard L.
Walsh, Frances M.
Ward, James R.
Ward, Loretta L.
Warren, Gail
Warren, Ward W.
Watson, William Bruce
Weagraff, Ross M.
Whelan, James W.
Whistler, Leonard
White, Walter W.
Whittinghill, Robert B. (no. 2)
Wickham, Ben, Jr.
Wilcox, Rose Marie
Williams, Bruce P.
Williams, Caryl Joyce
Williams, Edward, Jr.
Wilson, Carolyn J.
Wolfe, Mayme E.
Woods, James S.

Yellin, James H.
Young, Robert C.

VIETNAM (Contract Employees)

Allen, Maxwell J.

Bauso, Philip
Baylard, Robert W.
Bias, Louis
Bivens, Edmond
Bolton, William C., Jr.
Boos, Marvin L.
Bowman, David L.
Brown, Robert D.
Buckley, William F.

Chow, Gary Y. C.
Collins, Francis A.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 January 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 04 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 3136 1267 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
ITALIAN AREA
ROME STATION
SUPPORT BRANCH

A
24

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ROME, ITALY
11. POSITION TITLE:
A.DM
RECORDS ~~ADMIN~~ OF~~FICER~~ (09)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0699
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11.6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $16326
18. REMARKS

HOME BASE: IS: CONCUR Vivian Graham
PRA HR 20-17e (1) (a) PROMOTION
CONCUR: C/E/~~RE~~ ITALY
NTE 1 yr.

Mr. Woods will be assigned to DDP/COS/RMU position 0061 vice Mr. Evan.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLIAM C. COOLEY, C/E/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 1/31/73
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Jay R Mawrer
DATE SIGNED: 2/2/73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROSTERS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
33	10	44750	EUR	36533		3	02 20 28	02 04 73	02 04 73

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. 02 DA. 03 YR. 74
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 81
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: LAB/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 2-2-73 mw
46. OP APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 2/2/73

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

FEB 1973

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

JAMES WOODS

FROM:

EUR/PERS
4B0002 Hqs

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. E/PERS/TEDDY				
2. C/E/PERS				
3. C/E/~~BR~~ I				for concurrence
4. E/PERS/JON		1/31	Jon	
5. C/IS/PERS	1 FEB 1973	2 Feb 73		for concurrence
6.				
7. CSPS/SOB GG10		2/2/73	jay	7. Subject will be assigned as Ch Reg. + RMO DDP/CCS upon his return to Hqs (about Aug 73), vice Evan.
8.				
9. OP/PI 5E03				Mr. Woods will be assigned to CCS/RMO position 0061 vice Mr. Michael Evan.
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 MARCH 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 30 YEAR 71

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

☐	V TO V	☒	V TO CF
☐	CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 1136-1267

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
ITALIAN AREA
ROME STATION
SUPPORT BRANCH

A 24

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ROME ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OF (09) 9

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0699

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,821

18. REMARKS:

X HB: EUR

1 cc: Payroll

From: DDP/EUR
DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

No Language Required
PRA HR 20-17E(1) (B) NTE Two Yrs

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C TAYLOR, C/E/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 3/15/71

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 5/5/71

A 25

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24 HOQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
20	10	44625	SIF	36533		3	02 20 28		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
05 29 73	82								

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV/TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVED 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5-7-71

46. O P APPROVAL: C Blake

DATE APPROVED: 5-10-71

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

P 1

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 02 DECEMBER 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 13 YEAR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF ☐
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1236-1186
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,041

18. REMARKS

2cc: SECURITY & Other
cc: PAYROLL

HB EUR

FROM: DDP/EUR/FOREIGN FIELD
LONDON, ENGLAND SLOT# 0254

NTE: 30 June 1971
Pending Reassignment.

Security Approval Granted by Pers. 12/4/70
Pld 12/10/70

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 3 Dec 70
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

A 25

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOCTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
16	18	44942	EUR	75313		1	02	20	28						

A 1

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 4—NONE) CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV. PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER 1—YES) HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-8-70 MW
46. O P APPROVAL: W Keat
DATE APPROVED: 12/8/70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 JANUARY 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS (CORRECTION)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 10 YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ XX CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 1234-1186
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,821

18. REMARKS

HQ: EUR

cc: Payroll
TO CORRECT EFFECTIVE DATE TO READ 1/10/71 VICE 12/13/70

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLIAM C. COOLEY, AC/E/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 1/21/71
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Gregory W. [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 1/21/71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 58
20. EMPLOY CODE: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 44997 ALPHABETIC EUR
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 20 YR. 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 76 MO. 12 DA. 13 19 70
EOD DATA.
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV./TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1-26-71 MW
46. O P APPROVAL: W. Reat
DATE APPROVED: 1/26/71

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

10

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 FEBRUARY 1971

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CHANGE OF FAN
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 18 YEAR 71
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1236-1186
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 10 7
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,821

18 REMARKS:
FROM 1234-1186
cc: Payroll

KH/B/EUR

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 12 Feb 71
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 17 Feb 71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQDTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	18	44997	EUR	75013		1	02	20	28		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OBGH 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 2-18-71 km
46. OP APPROVAL: W. R. H
DATE APPROVED: 2-18-71

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

8

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
WOODS, JAMES S.	SELF	70-0961

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 6 MAY 1970.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
19 JUNE 1970	/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-69 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET

14 May 1968 approved

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Career Management Committee

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion for Mr. James S. Woods from GS-09 to GS-10

1. FE Vietnam Operations concurs in the field recommendation for the promotion of Mr. James S. Woods from GS-09 to GS-10. Following is the recommendation from the Chief, Operational Services Branch, Vietnam Station.

"Subject has been with the Organization since April 1952 and has served at Vietnam Station as Chief, RI since January 1967. Subject was last promoted in 1958.

"As Chief, RI at Vietnam Station, Subject is responsible for the supervision of eleven personnel engaged in highly diversified activities, all subject to tight scheduling and deadlines. Examples of some of the diversified activities for which Subject is responsible are courier service throughout Vietnam, cable secretariat functions and intelligence reports reproduction and distribution, in addition to the classic registry functions normally performed by a station registry.

"Subject has energetically applied himself to improving procedures within his Section and to the cross-training of employees under his supervision to provide flexibility in his operations. His efforts in these areas bore welcome fruit during the recent disturbances when his Section was placed on twenty-four (24) hour duty for several weeks. During this period, while operating with a reduced staff and an ever-increasing workload, Subject kept all services operationally effective and on a timely basis with the exception of the in-country courier runs which were interrupted for a few days by circumstances beyond his control.

"Subject is a dedicated, conscientious and loyal employee. He is cooperative, exercises initiative in accomplishing the tasks at hand and responds favorably to constructive criticism. Personnel in his section perform their duties in a friendly, courteous and efficient manner. Their attitude, which is an expression of the direction received, has been brought to the attention of the writer on numerous occasions by various Station personnel.

SECRET

"Subject is an acknowledged expert in his chosen field. He constantly seeks out new methods, equipment and knowledge pertaining to his profession and is furthering himself academically through attendance at the local University extension. He has the background and drive to provide potential for assumption of more senior positions in his field. In view of Subject's strong performance, extensive overseas experience in a variety of situations and length of time in his present grade he is strongly recommended for promotion to the GS-10 level."

2. If promoted, Subject will occupy the position of IO General, GS-11, Slot # 4984.

John Caswell

Douglas S. Blaufarb
Chief, Vietnam Operations

SECRET

4 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Station

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion - Mr. James S. Woods

1. It is recommended that Subject be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10. Subject has been with the Organization since April 1952 and has served at Vietnam Station as Chief, RI since January 1967. Subject was last promoted in 1958.

2. As Chief, RI at Vietnam Station, Subject is responsible for the supervision of eleven personnel engaged in a highly diversified activities, all subject to tight scheduling and deadlines. Examples of some of the diversified activities for which Subject is responsible are courier service throughout Vietnam, cable secretariat functions and intelligence reports reproduction and distribution, in addition to the classic registry functions normally performed by a station registry.

3. Subject has energetically applied himself to improving procedures within his Section and to the cross training of employees under his supervision to provide flexibility in his operations. His efforts in these areas bore welcome fruit during the recent disturbances when his Section was placed on twenty-four (24) hour duty for several weeks. During this period, while operating with a reduced staff and an ever increasing workload, Subject kept all services operationally effective and on a timely basis with the exception of the in-country courier runs which were interrupted for a few days by circumstances beyond his control.

4. Subject is a dedicated, conscientious and loyal employee. He is cooperative, exercises initiative in accomplishing the tasks at hand and responds favorably to constructive criticism. Personnel in his Section perform their duties in a friendly, courteous and efficient manner. Their attitude, which is an expression of the direction received, has been brought to the attention of the writer on numerous occasions by various Station personnel.

SECRET

[illegible]

5. Subject is an acknowledged expert in his chosen field. He constantly seeks out new methods, equipment and knowledge pertaining to his profession and is furthering himself academically through attendance at the local University extension. He has the background and drive to provide potential for assumption of more senior positions in his field. In view of Subject's strong performance, extensive overseas experience in a variety of situations and length of time in his present grade he is strongly recommended for promotion to the GS-10 level.

/s/John K. Smith
Chief, OSB

CONCUR /s/Vincent Lockhart
Acting Deputy Chief of Station

APPROVE: /s/Lewis J. Lapham
Chief of Station

PRA SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 Oct 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY YEAR 68

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V ☐ · CF TO CF XX

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9136 1214

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH REGION
LONDON STATION
SUPPORT BRANCH
REGISTRY SECTION

A
7

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: LONDON, ENGLAND

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OF (09)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0254

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 10 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 10,847

18 REMARKS

PRA 20-F1-D(1)(a) (B)
NTE 2 YR.
vice Imogene [illegible]

CONCUR: Mary Boulger FE/Pers
By Phone

259a Attached

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 7 Oct 68

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 28 OCT 1968

F
24

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 MINUTES CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
37	10	44525	EUR	21025		3	02	20	28						

28 STE EXPIRES MO.	DA.	YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 4—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO.	DA.	YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO.	34 SEX
11	04	70	53										

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE · 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV./TEMP · CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE · 0—WAIVED 1—YES · HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE · 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE · 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE · 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) · 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO · CODE · NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO · CODE · NO. TAX EXEMP. · STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: From FE. 10-28-68 amu

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 10-31-68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 July 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 28 | YEAR 68

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 9137 1487

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD
FE/VNO - VIET NAM STATION
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
COLLATION BRANCH
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SECTION
BIOGRAPHIC UNIT

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAIGON, South Vietnam.

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF D 11

12 POSITION NUMBER: 4984

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 10 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 10847

18 REMARKS:

RECORDS ADMIN OFFICER OCCUPYING IO GENERAL POSITION.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: CFE/PERSONNEL, Mary T. Boulger

DATE SIGNED: 23 July 68

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert McWhite

DATE SIGNED: 2 1

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 22

20 EMPLOYEE CODE: 10

21 ORGANIZATION CODING: NUMERIC 85200 | ALPHABETIC FE

22 STATION CODE: 7705

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 POSITION CODE: 3

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 | DA. 20 | YR. 28

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CHGH 3—FICA 4—NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAS RESV PROV TEMP | CODE

39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 25 Jul 68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 NOVEMBER

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7137-1487

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE/FOREIGN FIELD
FE/VNC - VIETNAM STATION

EXECUTIVE OFFICE
REGISTRY SECTION

18

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF ~~GS-11~~ (11)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 4127

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 09/~~4~~ 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~9001~~ 9262

14

18 REMARKS:
FROM: JKO/TOKYO STATION/OFFICE OF THE CHIEF/
CENTRAL REGISTRY AND RECORDS SECTION

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: W. T. BOULGER, CFE/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 2 Dec 66

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 29[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45500 ALPHABETIC FE
22 STATION CODE: 77265
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HODGES CODE: 5
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 02 DA 20 YR 28
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA. YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV./TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1207064

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 11/1/66

'52 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

F-14

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 Nov 66

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOOLG, JAMES S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 | DAY 18 | YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 7137-1566

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 9

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: | DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: | DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY CODE | 21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 HOGTRS CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) | 26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSR, 2-FICA, 3-NONE) CODE 2 | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 37 LONG COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV, TEMP; CODE) | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0-WAIVED, 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-21-66 N

46 O P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 16 NOV 66

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
8-4-7-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(43)

14-00000

5 January 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Career Management Committee

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion
of Mr. James S. Woods
from GS-09 to GS-10

1. It is strongly recommended that Mr. James S. Woods be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10. Mr. Woods entered on duty with the Agency in April 1952 as a GS-03 Records and File Clerk assigned to RID. Since that time Mr. Woods has served as a Records Analyst at Headquarters, in Korea and [illegible] Manila, and since 1961 in the Central Registry Section of the Tokyo Station. Mr. Woods is 37 years old and has been in grade as a GS-09 since 1958. He was previously recommended for promotion to GS-10 in November 1964 and June 1965.

2. In the promotion recommendation for the Tokyo Station, 9 November 1964, the [illegible] commented on Mr. Woods as follows:

> "A. Mr. Woods is now on his second tour as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry. This unit is located at [illegible] Air Station and handles all correspondence for all Station elements. In view of the fact that the Station is located in [illegible] different geographic locations, a great deal of responsibility is given to Mr. Woods in [illegible] action responsibility [illegible] incoming cables is rapidly and properly [illegible], dispatches are [illegible] routed and processed, correspondence from other local military agencies is correctly analyzed and routed, the [illegible] system is functioning effectively, and the [illegible] is rapidly [illegible] out [illegible] dispatch [illegible].
>
> "B. The Registry is presently composed of six employees in addition to Mr. Woods [illegible] Chief of this [illegible]. Mr. Woods does an exemplary job in supervising these employees with the result that [illegible] Registry [illegible] well-[illegible] unit.

Not Approved
3/1/66

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

"C. In addition to his normal duties, Mr. Woods is constantly thinking of ways to increase the efficiency of the Station Registry, and to be of greater assistance to the Station as a whole. Several of his ideas have been adopted by the Station with a resulting increase in effectiveness. His positive approach to all problems and his cheerfulness and willingness to perform any task have benefited both the Station and the Agency.

"D. In view of Mr. Woods' demonstrated ability to provide leadership to the Station Registry unit, his positive approach to the solution of the many problems which daily beset this unit, it is strongly recommended that he be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10 at the earliest opportunity."

5. Mr. Woods has continued to perform in an over-all "strong" manner as indicated in his recent fitness report. He recently planned and effectively implemented the move of the Cable Secretariat from one location to another. In a dispatch, dated 22 November 1965, the present Chief of Station, Tokyo, stated "There is little I can add to my predecessor's recommendation, dated 3 November 1964, for promotion of Mr. Woods. He is performing his duties as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry with efficiency and dispatch. He is a strong supervisor who constantly strives to achieve the maximum [illegible] in the use of his personnel and materials."

6. The Acting Chief [illegible] Tokyo, recommended [illegible] qualification [illegible] Mr. Woods be promoted [illegible] GS-10 [illegible] Mr. Woods be [illegible] GS-10 at the [illegible]

Terry T. Shima
for Richard G. Davis
Chief, FE/[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Woods, James S.	Louise A. - wife	66-502

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 26 October 1965.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
17 DEC 1965	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Woods, James S.	Wife - Louise A.	66-148

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 26 June 1965.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
17 AUG 1965	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 Feb 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 110032

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, James S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Confidential funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 DAY 19 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1137-7351-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief
Central Registry and Records Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE: Intel Analyst - Gen 12-D

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3061

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.36

16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 6765

18. REMARKS:
FROM: FE/Office of the Chief/2461 tray 1
1cc - Security

Form 259 forwarded to Medical Staff
Departure Date: 31 March 1961
FE/CMC Approved

Security [illegible] 2/16/61
mr 3/14/61

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/FE PERSONNEL

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 11
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 5130 ALPHABETIC [illegible]
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HQTRS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 20 YR. 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT: 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVER 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Kearney 03/13/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

52 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A. SECRET (4)

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: James S. Woods

VIA : Chief, FE

1. The problem of effective management of the operational records of the Clandestine Services is one of our most important responsibilities. In this connection, you have been selected by your Division, and authorized by the Clandestine Services Records Committee, to act as Records Officer for your component. Your selection is based on your professional qualifications to carry out an assignment requiring experience, judgment, and a knowledge of the objectives of the Clandestine Services. A copy of this memorandum will be placed in your official personnel folder to record your appointment as Records Officer.

2. You are to act on behalf of your Division or Staff element in authorizing the destruction of material of no value to the Clandestine Services in accordance with criteria established for this purpose. You are empowered to authorize the destruction of documents and index cards recommended for destruction by other members of your Branch, and to desensitize KAPOK and RYBAT material which is no longer sensitive or which has been restricted in error. Your signature will be recognized by RID as that of an officially appointed Records Officer.

3. At the meeting of 16 December 1958 , you were briefed on the details of your duties as Records Officer. It is now considered that you will be able fully to execute your duties as Records Officer and thus make a real contribution to the CS Records Management Program.

Wendell E. Little

WENDELL E. LITTLE
DDP/RMO

cc: Personnel Jacket of Addressee

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
510032	WOODS JAMES S	02	20	28	1	M 1	04	21	52

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code
11	12	48	1	50 USCA 403 J				/	04	21	52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/PSH PHILIPPINES STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	RECDS MGMT ANAL	3382	GS	0306.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	01	11	16	58	11	15	59	9 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
Reassignment / Vouchered funds	01	3 22 59	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE Office of the Chief Secretariat	5112	Washington, D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
5	Records Mgmt Of	2461 58		

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
	$				9 3700 20 001

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Harriet Weiler, CFE/Secretariat

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Mozolle Little X2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) M. L. Shobe, CFE/Personnel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		3-12-59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

please transfer from Unvouchered to Vouchered funds
2 Copies to Security

4/0 File

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

6 October 1958

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
510032	WOODS JAMES S	02	20	28		1	M	1	04	21	52	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13 Mil. Serv. Credit Ltr. Yes-1 No-2	Code
XX	XX	XX		1	50 USCA 403 J						04	21	52		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BRANCH 3 PHILIPPINES STATION ADMIN SEC	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn -	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	RECORDS MGMT ANALYST	3382	GS	0306.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 8 4	$ 5430 ~~4795~~	DI	~~04~~	~~10~~	~~55~~	~~04~~	~~06~~	~~50~~	9 8 3780 55 006

75

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Promotion	30	11	16	58	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE FE/PSH - Philippines Station Support Branch	5161		57557

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn -	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
9 1	$ 5985		11	16	58	11	15	59	9-3780-55-006

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
Arthur F. [illegible] C/FE/PSH

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Mozelle Little 2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
H. L. Shobe, C[illegible] Personnel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		11/13/58	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		11/14/58	E.		
C. Classification	Alex M. [illegible]	7 Oct 58	F. Approved By		11/14/58

Remarks Request for upgrading slot to GS-9 submitted to Wage & Salary Division. (Hold promotion in Career Panel until slot approved.)

Recorded by
CSPD
1958

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET

COPY AIR

HMMA-9355
(50-1-5)

Chief, WH Division
ATTN : Chief, RI
Chief of Station, Mexico City

31 January 1958

Administrative

TDY Service - RI Team

ACTION REQUIRED: Routing copies to Personnel files of employees concerned

1. During the period of February to August 1957, Francis E. BUCY, James S. WOODS, Dorothy SPICKA, Virginia LONG, and Sarah J. BENNETT served the Mexico City Station as a Records Reorganization team. The Chief of Station, Mexico City, wishes to make it a matter of record that the RI employees listed above served efficiently and well and were a fine addition to this station during their service here.

2. Mexico City Station wishes to acknowledge at this time, not only the exemplary service rendered by these employees but also the splendid support that RI Division has given to this station.

3. The RI employees named in paragraph 1 worked hard (spending many hours more than the forty normal work hours each week) and efficiently on Mexico City Station files. In addition, they were congenial, friendly and a pleasure to have in the Station.

WINSTON SCOTT

ACF/cps

29 January 1958

Distribution:
8 - Hqs.
2 - Files

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse. ✓

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb. 1928
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 5 July 1957

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment # transfer to VV funds
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: [illegible]
B. APPROVED: 8 Sept 57

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intel Analyst BV-430.12 4795		~~Intel Analyst~~ BFF-3582 Records Integ Analyst 4795
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.35-7 ~~$4660.00~~ p/a		~~GS-0132.35-7~~ $4660.00 p/a GS-0306.01-7
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section	3161	DDP/FE Branch 3 - Philippines Station Administrative Section
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.		Manila, R.P
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
# Memo dtd 18 June 1957 to Mgm staff via SSA/DD/S requesting that three RI Positions (1 GS-9 and 2 GS-7s - Record Analyst) be established on the Manila T/O. Woods to be slotted against the GS-9 slot.
Please call FE/PT/III x 4009 for effective date.
2 copies to Security.

Raymond B. Wilson
DDP/FI

Concur & Fit. Rep.
FE/PO

B. REQUESTED BY: Ronald Gage
RONALD GAGE, FE/PERSONNEL OFFICER

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Jimmie Dewberry x 2957

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:DI

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 8-2309-23 TO: 8-3780-55-006 [illegible]
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS
DOC 04.10.55
PSI - 04.06.52
[illegible]

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JJ	6
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	D. L. REEDY	
E.		

REMARKS: 10-V, DH to be forwarded to payroll

F. APPROVED BY
Robert [illegible] 7/12/57 ; 16 August 57

10-61137-8

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs – One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1928
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 15 Aug 1956

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
BV-430.02	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intel Analyst BV-430.12
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.35-7 $4660.00 pa
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Slot BV-430.02 was used for slotting purposes only--this action will eliminate double slotting.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): John M. Scott, Chief, RI

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Ruth Robinson, Ext. 2510

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	S.A.	REAL.

SD: DI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 7-2309-23
TO: SAME

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE 16 Aug 56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL	LP	8/17/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		17 Aug 56
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

C. Littel, 17 Aug 56

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED TO VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr – Miss – Mrs – One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1928
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 14 June 1956

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:
7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
11. HEADQUARTERS
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL

FROM—		TO—
IO-CI BFF 583.05 GS-0136.53-7 $4660.00 DDP/FE Branch 1 - Korea Base Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section Yokosuka, Japan	71 88	Intel Analyst BV-430.02 GS-~~0136.53-7~~ -0132.35-7 $4660.00 pa DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section Washington, D.C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer from Unvouchered to Vouchered Funds.
Vice Lenore Johnson, transferring to EE
Copies of this action have been submitted to Payroll and Security offices.

CONCUR:

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): John M. Scott, Chief, RI John M. Scott
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Ruth Robinson, Ext. 2510
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: Exec MO 26 June 56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER, 5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A.	REAL

SD: DI

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION FROM 6-3740-55-096 TO 6-2309-23
17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: DC

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY
FI PASSED

26 June 56

21 June 56

6/29/56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL		6/21/56	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		10 Jul 56	
E.			

E. APPROVED BY

SECRET

10-5

SECRET

Name: WOODS, James S. **Date:** 15 June 1956

CS Designation: DI

Nature of Action: Reassignment

	FROM	TO
Pos. Title:	I. O. (CI)	Intel Analyst
Grade:	GS-7	GS-7
Division:	DDP/FE	DDP/FI
Staff:	Branch 1 - Korea Base	RI
Branch:	Records Integration	Analysis ~~NH~~ & Operations
Section:	Personality Files	Analysis
Hdqrs:	Yokosuka, Japan	Washington

I & R Comment ________ 19 JUN 1956 ________

Date

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. FKLA 5886

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 4 FEB 1955

TO : Chief, FE

FROM : Chief, Korea Mission

INFO: Chief, Support Mission, Okinawa

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative/Personnel
SPECIFIC- Recommendation for Promotion - James S. WOODS

1. It is recommended that James S. WOODS be promoted from GS-5 to GS-7. Subject entered on duty with the Korea Mission 26 July 1954.

2. WOODS presently occupies proposed Slot No. 21 which has been recommended as a GS-9 slot. Subject has been in grade as a GS-5 since 6 June 1953 and has performed the duties of his present assignment since 10 August 1954.

3. Subject has had approximately two years of experience in the maintenance of agent records. This experience has enabled him not only to assume his present responsibilities with a minimum of supervision, but also to initiate a completely new and improved system for the maintenance of the agent records of the Korea Mission. Due partially to the efficiency of the system that he has initiated and partially to the enthusiasm with which he approaches his work, FOSHAG has assumed the work load previously handled by two individuals and at the same time has managed to keep his backlog to a minimum.

4. WOODS is conscientious, hard-working and more than willing to work long hours of overtime without additional compensation in order to maintain his section on a current basis. Subject individual devoted unusually long hours to reestablish himself during the recent move of this Mission to Japan. On the basis of work performance and motivation, subject is recommended as justly deserving of promotion to GS-7.

5. I certify that WOODS is performing the duties outlined in the job description attached hereto.

/s/ JOHN L. HART

1 February 1955

1 ENCL - a/s
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Chief, FE
1 - Chief, SM

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

POSITION DESCRIPTION - James S. WOODS

1. Nature and Purpose of Work:

My position is that of intelligence analyst in the Personality File section of the Records Integration Branch. I am responsible for the maintenance of agent records and personality files.

2. Duties:

a. To maintain all agent records. This takes a good percentage of my time as it includes the following:

(1) Make all KOMI file checks on PRQ's and file check requests, writing up the results and forwarding them to the proper agencies.

(2) Make sure that all PRQ's and file check requests have the correct classification, the proper number of copies for distribution, correct name and telecodes, and are forwarded to the proper case officer or foreign unit.

(3) See that the results of KOMI file checks received from Headquarters and CHIMI are properly carded and forwarded to the case officer concerned.

(4) Keep all agent records up-to-date with regard to cryptonyms, POC's, OC's and other additional information received.

(5) Keep files on all terminated agents and see that the proper records are filled out and forwarded when they are terminated.

b. To maintain the RI card index, assuring that all cards received in RI are properly filed and have the correct names and telecodes.

c. To analyze, card and file all documents forwarded to Personality Files; these includ**State Station**emos, MOR's, Contact Reports, [illegible] Reports, [illegible]'s, various intelligence summaries, etc.

3. Responsibility for the Work of Others:

N/A

4. Scope and Effect of Work:

I am responsible for making all KOMI file checks. I must see that they are made out thoroughly, quickly and accurately. My check may decide the outcome of hiring or refusing to hire a prospective agent or other employee for an operation or project.

5. Supervision and Guidance Received:

I receive no direct supervision or guidance in duties relating to the maintenance of agent records. I receive over-all policy guidance from the Chief of RI and some guidance from branch chiefs and case officers.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 Mental Demands:

a. Initiative: In order to maintain agent records properly, I must always keep alert for new ways to keep them up-to-date and meet any demands that may be made for drawing up new procedures for the maintenance of agent records.

b. Originality: To adopt new ways of maintaining agent records without losing control over the flow of daily material.

c. Judgment: I must decide what action should be taken on all KOMI file checks, regarding what information is to be sent to Headquarters and CHIMI.

7. Personal Work Contacts:

I must maintain close personal contact with all case officers and branch chiefs in order that I may maintain up-to-date agent records.

8. Other:

I must maintain files of all documents routed to Personality Files. Also I must resolve problems the branch chiefs or case officers may have in regard to agent records.

Also, I have recently established a 201 agent record system for the Mission and am responsible for its continual maintenance.

CHECK LIST FOR TRAINING

Woode James S
Name

1. Typing

2. Shorthand

3. English Usage

[✓ 4.] Office Practice
(Electric typewriter, filing, phones, Correspondence Manual, proofreading, office protocol.)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED TO
UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. James S. WOODS
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 28
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 16 Feb 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: [illegible] 25 Apr 54

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
	Intell. Anal. BT-469.08	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	10(FI) BFF 602.02-5
	~~GS-132-5~~, $3410.00 p.a. GS-0132.35-5	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-~~7~~5, $3410.00 p.a.
	DDP/FI Records Integration ~~Staff~~ Div Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ~~Foreign Mission~~ ~~Intelligence~~ Division ~~Positive Intelligence Branch~~
	Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Korea
	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer to Unvouchered Funds from Vouchered Funds.

concur John M. Scott CHIEF, RI

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): H. C. Clinkscale, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Edward F. Mitchell TS-1 X8761

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for FI/DO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT USSAB	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-2309-20
TO: 7-3740-55-096

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Eff date okay
per FE & FI
16 Apr [illegible]

Conc. 26 Mar 54.
16 Apr [illegible]

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	Jm	29 Mar 54	
C. CLASSIFICATION		[illegible]	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C Taylor	23 Mar 54.	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
[illegible] Taylor 30 Mar 54

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19— FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER 31

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.* If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1928
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 1 June 1953

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Promotion
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 7 June 53

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Intel. Anal. BV-469.08-4	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intel. Anal. BV-469.08
GS-~~4-132~~ 132-4 $3175.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-~~5-132~~ 132-5 $3410.00 pa
DDP/FI Records Integration ~~Division~~ STAFF Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Records Integration ~~Division~~ STAFF Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Subject has been in grade since ~~21 April~~ 17 aug 1952.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): JOHN M. SCOTT, Chief, RI John M. Scott
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): 2510
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. Mc
Title: Ac. FI/PO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-FI

15. SEX:
16. RACE:
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

✓

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS.
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	4 June	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY Orville A. Dawson 4 June 1953

16—57130-3

Mr. James S. Woods   25   1 June 1953

Washington, D. C.
Intel. Anal.   FI/RI

GS-4   BV-469.08
GS-5   GS-4

BV-469.08
GS-5

High School Graduate, 2 years of Business College

Treasury Dept., Accounting Clerk, GS-2, May 1950 to Jan. 1952
GS-3, Jan. 1952 to April 1952

OSO/RI, File Section, File Clerk, GS-3, 21 April 1952 to 17 Aug. 1952
GS-4, 17 Aug. 1952 to 16 March 1953
DDP/FI/RI, Consolidation Section, Mail & File Clerk, GS-4, 16 March 1953 to present

Chief, RI

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY [illegible]—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: *Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.*

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1928
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 15 Apr 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Reassignment
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 26 Apr 53

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A

FROM—		TO—
Mail & File Clerk BV-364.08	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intel. Anal. BV-469.08-4
GS-4-305 $3175.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-4-132 $3175.00 pa
DDP/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)
Position BV-364.08 has been deleted from the T/O.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): JOHN M. SCOTT, Chief, RI John M. Scott

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*):

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: C/FI/OO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX:
16. RACE:
17. APPROPRIATION 11X2100
FROM: 2319-20
TO: 2319-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS
N

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	20 April
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Orville D. Dawson 20 Ap 1953

10—[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] — FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): James S. Woods

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1928

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 2 March 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 15 Mar 53

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
File Clerk BV-356	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Mail & File Clerk BV-364.08
GS-4-305 $3175.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-4-305 $3175.00 pa
DD/P/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch File Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DD/P/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

From BV-356 to BV-364.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): JOHN M. SCOTT, Chief, RI John M. Scott

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension):

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY:
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for FI/PO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	S-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: [illegible]
TO: 2309-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY James H. Pr[illegible] - 3/6/53

14-00000

PERSONN__ ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME James S. Woods	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE 17 Aug
NATURE OF ACTION Promotion	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	File Clerk X-39.04	File Clerk X-102.22
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-3-305 $2950.00 per annum	GS-4-305 $3175.00 per annum
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	RI	RI
BRANCH AND SECTION	Processing & Records Branch File Section	Analysis & Operations Branch Service & Correspondence Section
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

From X-39.04 to X-102.22

Subject has been in grade since 21 April 1952.

Approved: John M. Scott

31 July 52 Chief, RI

RECOMMENDED:

4 25 52
(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE	SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

DATE	SIGNATURE
8/13/52	Thomas M. [illegible]

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 1182100

ALLOTMENT: 2309-02

C S C AUTHORITY: Sch. A. 6.116 ee

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
8-14-52	B. Leidy

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE
DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
7 Aug 52	

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—02463-1

File

21. To: RELEASING ORGANIZATION—You are requested to furnish promptly the leave data on

From 11 May 1950 to 19 April 1952
Fiscal Acct. CLERK GS - 3 $2950.00 per annum
SUPERVISOR: Miss Ryan
U.S. Treasury Department
Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.
PLEASE FORWARD FILE AND LEAVE RECORD TO:

WOODS, JAMES S.
(NAME OF EMPLOYEE)

NOTE

If this address is not the correct one to which future inquires should be mailed, be sure to insert the correct address under item 20a.

FOLD HERE FOR MAILING
IN WINDOW ENVELOPE

10—61956-1

22. Return to: EMPLOYING ORGANIZATION

FORWARD OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER TO
R. H. J. HOPKINS,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

To: RELEASING ORGANIZATION—You are requested to furnish promptly the leave data on

FROM 11 May 1950 to April 1952
Fiscal Acct. Clerk GS 3 $2950.00
U.S. Treasury Dept.
15th & Penna. Ave N.W.
Washington D.C.

James S. Woods
(NAME OF EMPLOYEE)

NOTE

If this address is not the correct one to which future inquiries should be mailed, be sure to insert the correct address under item 18a.

10-61956-4 GPO

FOLD HERE FOR MAILING
IN WINDOW ENVELOPE

Return to: EMPLOYING ORGANIZATION

George E. Meloon
2430 E Street N.W.
Washington D.C.

SF 1150 was forwarded by your office in May 1952. Since this copy has been detached from our files it is requested that you forward a copy of same to the address at left.

1/15 P.S.L.

Tou

ENTRANCE ON DUTY NOTICE

1. TO OSO FI	2. DATE 22 April 1952

Notice of Final Processing of Applicant for Entrance on Duty

3. NAME Jeana E. Woods	4. ENTRANCE SALARY $2950.00
5. TITLE F - File Clerk	6. GRADE GS — 3

The applicant named in item 3 above meets all standards for full employment with CIA. Signed clearance for entrance on duty has been received from Inspection and Security and made a part of the personnel file of this individual. Effective this date he/she is assigned to duty with your office.

Full — 26 March 1952
Int. — 23 April at 3:00 P.M.

POSTED
APR 30 1952

Frank C. Jarema WCD
PERSONNEL OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-114
JAN 1952

(4)

Date APR 4 1952

MR. JAMES WOODS
3505 MINN. AVE, SE
CITY

Dear MR WOODS,

Your employment has been approved by this Agency at $2950 per annum, subject to the satisfactory completion of additional processing on the day you enter on duty. It is requested that you report to the Receptionist, East End of Temporary "I" Building located at 17th and Independence Avenue, S. W., at 8:30 a.m. as soon as possible.

Please advise Mrs. Brown, 2430 "E" Street, N. W., by telephone, Executive 6115, Extension 3693 of your exact reporting date.

Sincerely yours,

EJS APR 4 - 1952
FRANK S. JAREMA
Personnel Division

Subject telephoned: 4-5-52 ; spoke with EJS
(date)

Subject will EOD 21 Apr 52 - Now w/Treasury

SUBJECT WILL NOT EOD; Reason: Release obtained

[illegible]
4/8

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

22 March 1952

Mr. James S. Woods
3505 Minnesota Avenue, S. E.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Woods:

In reference to your application for employment, this letter is to assure you that the processing of your papers as a GS-3, $2950 per annum is being continued by this agency. A definite offer of employment cannot be made, however, until such time as all processing has been completed.

The processing is a rather lengthy one; but when further information is available, we shall get in touch with you immediately.

In the meantime, it would be appreciated if you would advise us of any change in your present status, such as change of address, etc.

Your continued interest and patience are appreciated.

Very truly yours,

FRANK C. JANEMA
Personnel Division

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE NO ....

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE: 5 Mar 52

FROM: PDC

TRANSMIT TO:
MR. JAMES WOODS
~~2817 CONNECTICUTT AVE., N. W.~~
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY ☐ URGENT ☐

(ORIGINATING OFFICER) (PHONE EXTENSION)

see new address
on route sheet

(CLASSIFICATION)

TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS, DOUBLE SPACED

TELEGRAM - NIGHT LETTER

EMPLOYMENT APPROVED THIS AGENCY $ 2750 PER ANNUM, SUBJECT SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF ADDITIONAL PROCESSING. DESIRE REPORT SOONEST POSSIBLE RECEPTIONIST, EAST END TEMPORARY "I" BUILDING, 17TH AND INDEPENDENCE AVENUE, SOUTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. AT 8:30 A.M. ADVISE MRS. BROWN 2430 "E" STREET NORTHWEST, BY COLLECT NIGHT LETTER OR COLLECT PHONE, EXECUTIVE 6115, EXTENSION 3698 THE EXACT REPORTING DATE.

Is now a
GS-3 (actual PHS)
won't take a GS-2.

Frank G. Jarema
FRANK G. JAREMA

8 March

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 35-7 [illegible]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

20 February 1952
In reply refer to ED-4

Mr. James Woods
2317 Conn. Avenue N. W.
Washington D. C.

Dear Mr. Woods:

This is to advise that actual processing of your application for employment with this Agency has been initiated. Specific details as to the type of appointment and salary will be contained in subsequent correspondence. Please direct all future correspondence to the undersigned.

If applicable, the attached form should be completed and returned within two weeks. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

[illegible]
Personnel Division

Enclosure
2 [illegible]
1 Append
1 PHS
Please forward three passport size photographs at your earliest convenience.

m 0

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on APR 28 1952 I have attended
(DATE)
the Agency Indoctrination Course specified by Regulation 25-1.

James S Woods
(NAME)

[illegible]

FORM NO. 51-121
DEC 1951

(6)

384

File
WD

FORM NO. 37-115
MAY 1950

TO: Medical Division

FROM: Transactions & Records

SUBJECT: Woods., James S.

Request that above named subject be given a physical examination.

POSITION: , File Clerk

GRADE: GS - 3

BRANCH: CSO .RI

SERVICE: DEPT.

NATURE OF APPOINTMENT: EXC.

OK

[illegible]Y DACEY
[illegible] BLDG.

FORM NO. 37-115
MAY 1950

14-00000

PERSO L ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME James S. WOODS

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE APR 21 1952

NATURE OF ACTION Excepted Appointment

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE		File Clerk I-39.04-1
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-305-3 $2950.00
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		RI
BRANCH AND SECTION		Processing and Records Branch File Section
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

F. C.
26 March 52

REMARKS:

(To P-39.04) gw

Approved: John M. Scott
Chief, RI
15 FEB 1952

#57

In Status 4-28-52

RECOMMENDED:

15 Feb '52
(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF, OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED James H. Powell

CLEARANCE REQUESTED: DATE TYPE

CLEARANCE APPROVED: DATE TYPE

DATE SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO. C. S. C. NO. DATE APPROVED

NEW VICE L. A. REAL.

DATE 27 Feb. SIGNATURE

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION 2123900

ALLOTMENT 3009

C. S. C. AUTHORITY Sch A. 116 (8)

DATE SIGNATURE 21 Apr. 52

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE SIGNATURE

APPROVALS

SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE 4 Mar 52 SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. M-2007A

DATE 1? FEB 52

FULL NAME (Last) WOOLS,	(First) JAMES	(Middle) CAUVIE		YEAR OF BIRTH 1928
POSITION TITLE FILE CLERK			GRADE GS-3	CODE
LOCATION (OFFICE) CO	CODE	DIVISION DT	CODE	BRANCH BLOC.REC	CODE

GEOGRAPHIC DESTINATION (CITY AND STATE OR COUNTRY, AS APPROPRIATE) W., D.C.

TYPE OF EMPLOYEE 1. ☒ REGULAR 2. ☐ CONTACT 3. ☐ CONSULTANT 4. ☐ MILITARY 5. ☐ OTHERS:

FUNDS ☒ VOUCHERED ☐ UNVOUCHERED

TYPE(S) OF SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUESTED

☒ PROVISIONAL FOR: (Show name of pool or group) D ST. POOL

☒ SECRET

☒ FULL

☐ WAIVER

AVAILABILITY DATE (Da-Mo-Yr)	EST. CLEARANCE DATE (Mo-Yr)	RECRUITMENT SOURCE	CODE
			01

SEX AND VETERAN STATUS 1. ☒ M-V 2. ☐ M-NV 3. ☐ F-V 4. ☐ F-NV

REMARKS:

SECURITY INITIATED BY NORTH. SUPERSEDES ACTION OF 1/5/52.
CHANGE OF OFFICE, DIVISION & BRANCH.

Attachments:
PHS
Append, I ______
Photos. ______

FRANK O. JAMES
SIGNATURE

PTC
DIVISION

FORM NO. 37-104
JUN 1951

(8)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Joanna

FROM :

DATE: 8 Feb. 1952

SUBJECT: WOODS, JAMES

In process as GS 2 Clerk. He wants accounting clerk eventually, but there are no openings at present, & we have two other – better qualified – accounting clerks in process in reserve at present.

Possibility for microfilm trainee?

Haugland

14-00000

P.O. 12-26

MP

2817 Conn. Ave. N.W.
January 12, 1952

Dear Sir:

I received your letter dated January 5, stating that I was to inform you of any changes in my present status.

I am now a grade GS 2 with an one year increase. I am now being considered for a grade GS 3 in the Treasury Dept. I assure you, this does not lesson my zeal to get in the C.I.A.

I would like to know if your Agency would transfer or consider me for appointment at a grade GS 3.

Sincerely yours,

James [illegible]

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST NO. 11-2007
DATE 1/5/52

FULL NAME (Last) WOODS (First) JAMES (Middle) GAUVIN
YEAR OF BIRTH 1928
POSITION TITLE Clerk
GRADE GS-2
CODE
LOCATION (OFFICE) Personnel
CODE
DIVISION Personnel (O)
CODE
BRANCH Personnel Pool
CODE
GEOGRAPHIC DESTINATION (CITY AND STATE OR COUNTRY, AS APPROPRIATE) Washington, D. C.

TYPE OF EMPLOYEE 1. ☒ REGULAR 2. ☐ CONTACT 3. ☐ CONSULTANT 4. ☐ MILITARY
5. ☐ OTHER:

FUNDS
☒ VOUCHERED ☐ UNVOUCHERED

TYPE(S) OF SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUESTED
☒ PROVISIONAL POR: (Show name of pool or group) D. Street Pool
☒ SECRET
☒ FULL
☐ WAIVER

AVAILABILITY DATE (Da-Mo-Yr)
EST. CLEARANCE DATE (Mo-Yr)
RECRUITMENT SOURCE
CODE 01

SEX AND VETERAN STATUS 1. ☐ M-V 3. ☐ F-V
2. ☒ M-NV 4. ☐ F-NV

REMARKS:

Morris 1-17-52

Attachments:
PHS
Append, I ____1____
Photos. ____1____

CONFIDENTIAL

JOSEPH D. RAGAN
Chief, Personnel Division
DIVISION

FORM NO. 37-104
JUN 1951

SECURITY INFORMATION

(8)

5 January 1952

Mr. James S. Woods
2017 Conn. Ave. N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Woods:

You are being considered for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency at grade GS 2, salary $2750.00 per annum.

The appointment, if offered, will be temporary indefinite in nature. Processing procedures require about 30 days to complete. Unless you are notified to the contrary during this period, you may assume that you are being actively considered for employment. Upon completion of this processing, we will contact you immediately.

In the meantime, it would be appreciated if you will keep us advised of any changes in your present status, such as change of address, etc.

Please let us know immediately if during the interim you find that you will not be able to accept employment with this organization.

Very truly yours,

Joseph B. Ragan
Chief, Personnel Division

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

SECURITY INFORMATION

REQUEST NO.

DATE: 4 JAN. 1952

FULL NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WOODS, JAMES SAUVIE

YEAR OF BIRTH: 1928

POSITION TITLE: CLERK

GRADE: GS 2

CODE:

LOCATION (OFFICE): Pool

CODE:

DIVISION:

CODE:

BRANCH:

CODE:

GEOGRAPHIC DESTINATION (CITY AND STATE OR COUNTRY, AS APPROPRIATE)

TYPE OF EMPLOYEE 1. ☑ REGULAR 2. ☐ CONTACT 3. ☐ CONSULTANT 4. ☐ MILITARY 5. ☐ OTHER:

FUNDS ☑ VOUCHERED ☐ UNVOUCHERED

TYPE(S) OF SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUESTED

☑ PROVISIONAL FOR: (Show name of pool or group)

☑ SECRET
☑ FULL
☐ WAIVER

AVAILABILITY DATE (Da-Mo-Yr): asap

EST. CLEARANCE DATE (Mo-Yr):

RECRUITMENT SOURCE:

CODE: 01

SEX AND VETERAN STATUS 1. ☑ M-V 3. ☐ F-V 2. ☐ M-NV 4. ☐ F-NV

REMARKS:

89 to Med. Sec
1/5

Attachments:
FHS
Append, I ______
Photos. ______

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

SIGNATURE

DIVISION

FORM NO. 37-104
JUN 1951

(9)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : File

DATE: 3 January 1952

FROM :

SUBJECT: James S. Woods

1. Contacted Treasury Dept. this date and Employee Relations Officer stated that subject had no efficiency ratings since he had not been there long enough before being granted military furlough and after his discharge. However, she stated that Mr. Woods had been a very satisfactory employee and there was nothing derogatory in his file.

L. E. BLAIS

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

THIS DATE 18 Dec. 51

NAME James Sauvie Woods

REFERRED BY

HOME ADDRESS 2817 Conn. Ave., N. W. Wash., D. C.

TELEPHONE AD 8430

BUSINESS ADDRESS Treasury

TELEPHONE EX 6400 x2612

DATE OF BIRTH 2:20:1928

PLACE OF BIRTH Forest River, N. D.

CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED) US

NAME OF SPOUSE none - no expectations

DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED)

SALARY REQUESTED GS-2

NO. OF DEPENDENTS none

INTERVIEWER WM. J. BINGHAM

EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES)

Hadlich's Bus. Sch. Diploma in jr. accounting

MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION, SPECIAL SKILLS, SALARY LEVELS)

Present- Treasury Dept. L/A attached

MILITARY OCCUPATION (RANK, SERIAL NO., DATES OF SERVICE, DUTIES AND AREAS)

Oct 3, 1946 Apr 12, 1948

Oct 19, 1950 Aug 7, 1951

Pfc (Infantry)

FORM NO. 37-117
JAN 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

(4-11)

CONFIDENTIAL

AREA KNOWLEDGE (RESIDENCE OR STUDY)

Japan, Korea (US Army) No 10-9

LANGUAGE FACILITY

None

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS (BE COMPLETE AND JUSTIFY DECISIONS, NOTE ANY UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.)

A CLEAN CUT, BRIGHT EYED, EAGER YOUNGSTER, VERY AMBITIOUS BUT HAS HAD LIMITED EXPERIENCE. HE WOULD LIKE TO GET INTO ACCOUNTING, BUT HE HAS HAD ONLY BASIC ACCOUNTING AND HAS NEVER HAD A JOB IN ACCOUNTING TO TEST HIM. HE IS WILLING TO TAKE A CLERK JOB IF HE WILL GET A ~~CLEARANCE~~ CHANCE AT ACCOUNTING. WILL GO O/S. FEELS HE IS BLOCKED IN HIS JOB IN TREASURY DEPT. SINCE HE WILL COME AS A GS-2, I WOULD TAKE A CHANCE ON ~~HO~~ HIM IF HIS TESTS SHOW ANYTHING ENCOURAGING. HE EXPECTS TO ENTER STRAYERS COLLEGE OF ACCOUNTING (NIGHT) IN FEBRUARY. DOES NOT DESIRE POOL. SUGGEST MISS MC KENNEY LOOK HIM OVER. FORMS ATTACHED. HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR GS-4 CLERK-ACCT. TEST ON 20 DECEMBER.

FORMS GIVEN: ☐ PHS ☐ MEDICAL ☐ RESERVE

WILLIAM J. BINGHAM
SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO: Personnel Division
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 "E" Street, N. W.
Washington, 25, D. C.

DEC 3 1951

SUBJECT: Availability of James S. Woods

1. This is to advise you that no objection is interposed to your consideration of the application for employment of the above-named individual who is presently employed by this office.

2. In the event this employee is accepted by your Agency, it is requested that the individual named below be contacted relative to the effective date of his ~~transfer~~ release.

(Signature)

Acting Personnel Officer
(Title)

Bureau of Accounts
Treasury Department
(Agency)

Contact for further information:

Frances C. Murphy
(Name) Employee Relations Officer

Code 172, Extension 2628
(Telephone)

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET

BIOGRAPH

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 12 May 1975

FILE NO.: 2542

SS NUMBER: 502-16-6806

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 010032

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)		
	X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
	☐	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) CCS

ATTN: CHIEF ADMIN STAFF

REF: VERBAL REQUEST

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED; X DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WOODS, James S.

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED (HHB 20-11)

SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)

SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)

EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER-UNBLOCK RECORDS

X EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD

X SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 2 (HHB 20-7)

X EAA: CATEGORY I X CATEGORY II ☐

X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

X SUBMIT FORM 24[illegible] CSIA [illegible] ABBREVIATION [illegible]

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Apr52-Aug54	HQS/Overt
Aug54-Nov56	Korea and Japan/DAC
Nov56-Aug57	HQS/Overt
Aug57-Feb59	Philippines/DAFC
Feb59-Mar61	HQS/DAFC
Mar61-Jan67	Japan/DAC
Jan67-Oct68	HQS/STATE-NOM
Oct68-Nov70	London/DAC
Nov70-Jun71	HQS/DAC
Jun71-Aug73	Rome-STATE-NOM
Aug73-Present	Overt

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD OR CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SR&CD
COPY 4 - OC-CO/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

EDF:JP

Geo. A. Chr

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF

FORM 1-74 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E2. IMPDET CL BY 0.7622

(13-20-43)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF [illegible] OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check)	☐ CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP	SS NUMBER
	☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP	EMPLOYEE NUMBER
	☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)	ID CARD NUMBER

FILE NO.

ATTN: [illegible]

REF: [illegible]

OFFICIAL COVER ☐ ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT

UNIT

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ____________

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TO [illegible] OTHER (Specify) ______

SUBMIT FORM 642 [illegible] TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)

SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)

EAA, CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

[illegible]

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS

EFFECTIVE DATE: [illegible]

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

SUBMIT FORM 642 [illegible] TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK •

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SH&CD
COPY 4 - OL/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

James [illegible] Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER; CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 8-73 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL. BY 007622

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 10 May 1971

FILE NUMBER: 2542

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 010032

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- ☒ CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) EUR

ATTN: EUR/Chief Support Staff

REF: Form 1413 dated 6 May 1971

OFFICIAL COVER:
- ☒ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
- ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WOODS, James S.

UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF From EOD	DATE
☒ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
☒ ASCERTAIN THAT State W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	☐ RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)	
☐ SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Apr 52 - Aug 54 - Headquarters - Overt
Aug 54 - Nov 56 - Korea/Japan - DAC
Nov 56 - Aug 57 - Headquarters - Overt
Aug 57 - Feb 59 - Philippines - DAFC
Feb 59 - Mar 61 - Headquarters - DAFC
Mar 61 - Jan 67 - Japan - DAC
Jan 67 - Oct 68 - Headquarters - Nom State
Oct 68 - Nov 70 - London - DAC
Nov 70 - June 71 - Headquarters - DAC
June 71 - Rome - Nom State

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSEC
COPY 5 - RF
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

RF:km

James [illegible] Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 12-70 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTA[illegible]SHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 12 November 1970

FILE NUMBER: 2542

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 10032

ID CARD NUMBER: RAG-542

TO: (Check)
- ☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

ATTN: EUR/ Chief Support Staff

REF: Form 1322

SUBJECT: WOODS, James S.

OFFICIAL COVER: ☒ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

UNIT: Records Analysis Group

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPN 20-800-11)	☐ CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPN 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF COB Aug 57	DATE (as of COB)
☒ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
☒ ASCERTAIN THAT Army W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	☐ RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)	
SUBMIT FORM 2688 ☒ FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Apr 52-Aug 54 Hqs Overt
Aug 54-Nov 56 Korea and Japan DAC
Nov 56-Aug 57 Hqs Overt
Aug 57-Feb 59 Philippines DAFC
Feb 59-Mar 61 Hqs DAFC
Mar 61-Sep 66 Japan DAC and DAFC
Sep 66-Jan 67 Hqs State Nom
Jan 67-Oct 69 Vietnam State Nom.
Oct 69-Nov 70 England DAC
Nov 70 Hqs DAC

JHR

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CCS
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
[illegible]

JC

JC/pt

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

6 Mar 59

File: 2542

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : James Sauvie WOODS

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective as 5 Mar 1959, it is requested that your records be properly blocked to deny Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of 6 Mar 59 by Mr. E. C. Davies, Room 1608 "L" Building, Extension 2420.

Paul P. Stewart
for HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS

SECRET REMAIN

OF FILE

FORM 1580a

(4-12-40)

SECRET

DEC 5 1956
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records & Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Security Support Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : **James S. WOODS**

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject who will be visiting a foreign country for a ____________ day TDY trip.

2. Effective this date, it is requested that your records be properly (XXXXXXX) (re-opened) to (XXXX) (acknowledge) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

Edward J. Boston
for JOSEPH N. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

CC: SSD/OS

THIS CARD MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

17-11-54

[illegible]

EMR 080878

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OFF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 08 DA 04 YR 78

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 8026 3430 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SEC 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/IMS
INFORMATION MGMT AND PLANNING GROUP
RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH
AREAS UNIT

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE

12 POSITION NUMBER: CG45

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 2

17 SALARY OR RATE: 26889

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45

20 Employ Code: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 Hours Code

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 02 DA 20 YR 28

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0BJ0000

32 Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES; PROV TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

JLS

tle

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74 Mfg 10/74

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

153078

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 09 78	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 8026 3430 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/IMS INFORMATION MGMT AND PLANNING GROUP RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH AREAS UNIT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE	12. POSITION NUMBER C045	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 26889

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	53740	IMS 75013			1	02 20 28		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	BOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV EPOV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: NE

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

OCF B

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES B
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 03 12 78
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 8033 4800 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/NE DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, NE DIVISION
PLANS STAFF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF
12. POSITION NUMBER: CG45
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WO, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 26889
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 46075 ALPHABETIC NE
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 03 20 28
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR): 03 13 78
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR): 03 13 78
28. LTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

MAR 22 1978

FORM 1150 5-74 Mfg 10-74 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
010032	[illegible] JAMES	[illegible]		

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ.
12	4	24070 ~~$2[illegible]~~	11/23/75	12	5	24799 ~~[illegible]~~	11/20/[illegible]			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 15 Sept 1977

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS [illegible] AUDITED BY

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4 51)

Nov 15 3 [illegible] '77

LJF 110977

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 11 77	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 8033 4801 0000
			8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/NE DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, NE DIVISION PLANS STAFF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OFF	12. POSITION NUMBER CG45	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 24070

18. REMARKS
THIS ACTION REFLECTS NEW LEGISLATIVE PAY INCREASE EFFECTIVE 10/09/77.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 46075 ALPHABETIC NE	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 02 20 28	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction Cancellation Data TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

~~FROM: CCS~~

POSTED
NOV 1977 18

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74 Mfg 10-74

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

A11 L20 100 045

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12010 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 09 OCTOBER 1977

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	0010032	OCS	GS 12 4	$24,070

15848

KKK: 22 JULY 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT - CHANGE OF HOME BASE	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 13 76	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NOCA T230 0118 0002	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CCS REGISTRY	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH	12. POSITION NUMBER BL44	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 21324

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	39115	CCS	75013		1	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Use Previous

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

AEO: 13 AUG 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHANGE OF FAN	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 08 DA 09 YR 76	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA T230 0130 0002	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CCS REGISTRY	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH	12. POSITION NUMBER BL44	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 21324

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 39115	ALPHABETIC CCS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Vet. Pref. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO 02 DA 20 YR 28	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR
								27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. FITE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
							34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE		

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
AUG
1976

Bl

RC

FORM 1150 Use Previous

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PJCS 01/31/76

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 01 23 76	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT		
6. FUNDS ▶	V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA. 6230 0118 0002	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DCO/CCS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.			
11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF CH	12. POSITION NUMBER E144	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DAC		
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12	17. SALARY OR RATE	

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

30

[illegible]

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition
8-72 MFG. 7-74

SECRET

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

(4-37)

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
010032	WOODS JAMES S	39 115	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ
GS 12	3	20678 ~~$19,693~~	11/24/74	GS 12	4	21324 ~~$20,308~~	11/23/75		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE 12 Sept 1975

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1976

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 12 4	$22,485

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11883 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 12 OCTOBER 1975

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 12 3	$20,678

14-00000

[illegible] 74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION				4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 11 24 74	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 5230 0121 0002
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDC/CCS REGISTRY		10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF CH		12 POSITION NUMBER 0031	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DAC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 12 3	17 SALARY OR RATE 19693

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 22	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 39115	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC CCS	22 STATION CODE 75043	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 02 20 28	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) 11 24 74	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR) 11 24 74
28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
DEC 3 1974

FORM 1150 9-72 Mfg 8-73 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

BBG: 19 SEPT 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT, TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS AND DELEGATION OF NSCA	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 10 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 4230 0121 0002	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CCS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND REGISTRY SEC	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF CH	12 POSITION NUMBER 0061	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 11 6	17 SALARY OR RATE 16326

18 REMARKS

W-2 INFO: CIA

HOME BASE: SS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 16	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 33160	ALPHABETIC CCS	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Mdquirs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 02 20 28	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR XX XX XX	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: EUR

POSTED
9-30-73

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-72 Mfg 11 72

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 11 6	$18,061

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

WOODS JAMES S 010032 42300121

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 11 6	$17,116

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	44 750	CF	GS 10 7	$15,331

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM
7 JAN 1973 TO 1 OCT 1972 UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
11777, DATED 12 APR 1974.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LML: 13 FEB 73

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 04 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 3135 1267 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD ITALIAN AREA ROME STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADM OF	12. POSITION NUMBER 0699	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 16326

18. REMARKS

HOME BASE: IS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44750	ALPHABETIC EUR	22. STATION CODE 36533	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Majors Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 02 20 28	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 02 04 73	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 02 04 73

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR 02 03 74	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 81	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 4-NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVED 1-YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7-4-7

FORM 1152 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	44 750	CF	GS 10 7	$14,581

23 MAY 1971.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 30 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V	X	V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1136 1267 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD ITALIAN AREA ROME STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADM OF	12. POSITION NUMBER 0699	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 13821

18. REMARKS

HOME BASE: EUR

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Mission Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
20	10	44525	EUR	36533		3	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30.	RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data		33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
05 23 73	82		CODE			EOD DATA		

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-3-71

SECRET

DMB

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

13

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ARS: 11 MARCH 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHANGE OF FAN	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 18 71	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS ▶ X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1236 1166 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11 POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADM OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 9957	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 10 7	17 SALARY OR RATE 13621

18 REMARKS
OTHER

HOME BASE: EUR

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 Employ Code 18	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44997	ALPHABETIC EUR	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 02 20 28	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	FOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	1 NONE 2 5 PT 3 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RSV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
3-12-71

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

806

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES 3	010032	44 997	V	GS 10 7	$13,821

14-00000

ARS: 27 JAN 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OKF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS-CORRECTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 01 10 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	1234 1186 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADM OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 13821

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 THE EFFECTIVE DATE WHICH READ 12/13/70 TO READ 01/10/71.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	21. OFFICE CODING (ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
58	18	44997	EUR	75013		1.	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXP RES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE)	32. (MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
				16	12 13 70			

35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE)	39. FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FOSTED
1-29-71

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BBG

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ARS: ~~1[illegible] DEC 70~~

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER ~~TO~~ VOUCHERED FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 12 13 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1236 1186 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADM OFF	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 13041

18. REMARKS
OTHER

HOME BASE: EUR

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 16	20. Employ Code 18	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44997	ALPHABETIC EUR	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 02 20 25	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR								

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX						

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR REAS PROV TEMP	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	FEGLI 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.							

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE		

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JJ 12-19-70

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-66 Mfg. 6-70

SECRET BBG

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

1. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
010032	WOODS JAMES S.	44 525	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 10	6	$12,679	07/28/68	GS 10	7	$13,061	07/26/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 6/23/70

2

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

6/17

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-81)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS		GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	44 525	CF	GS 10 6	$12,679

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS		GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	44 525	CF	GS 10 6	$11,942

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

: 4 NOV 68

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 04 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶	☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9136 1214 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD BRITISH COMMONWEALTH REGION LONDON STATION SUPPORT BRANCH REGISTRY SECTION		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION LONDON, ENGLAND		
11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADM OF		12. POSITION NUMBER 0254	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 10847	

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44525 ALPHABETIC EUR	22. STATION CODE 21025	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Major Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 02 20 28	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR 11 03 70	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 83	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CS 2 CA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS. CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM FE

11-7-68

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET SF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

VD: 6 AUG 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 28 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9137 1487 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD FE/VNO VIET NAM STATION INTELLIGENCE DIVISION COLLATION BRANCH CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SECTION BIOGRAPHIC UNIT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM		
11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF	12. POSITION NUMBER 4984	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 10847

18. REMARKS
RECORDS ADMIN OFFICER OCCUPYING IO GENERAL POSITION

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 45500	ALPHABETIC FE	22. STATION CODE 77205	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hiring Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 02 20 28	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 07 28 68
27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 07 28 68	28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE; CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction - Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES; HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8/6/68

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
8-66
Mfg. 10-67

SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(14 51)

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 500	CF	GS 09 7	$ 9,668	$10,154

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 500	CF	GS 09 7	$ 9,202	$ 9,668

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/31/67

1 SERIAL NUMBER 010832	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 05 21 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 7137 1487 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE DIVISION			10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM		
11 POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF			12 POSITION NUMBER 4965	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 09	17. SALARY OR RATE	
18. REMARKS					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9/24/67

Form 7-66 1150B MFG. 9-66 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

14-00000

MRT: 9 DEC 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 12 18 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V ☒ · CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7137 1566 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 203	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Saigon, South Viet Nam ~~TOKYO~~, JAPAN		
11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP 09	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS
EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) / 27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE: 2	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. PROV. / RES. TEMP.) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE		40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE			

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12-14-66

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MRT: 8 DEC 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 12 08 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7137 1487 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD FE/VNC - VIETNAM STATION EXECUTIVE OFFICE REGISTRY SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF	12. POSITION NUMBER 4127	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 09 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 9262

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 45500	ALPHABETIC FE	22. STATION CODE 77205	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) 02 20 28	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE; MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO. / 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. / RESV / PROV. / TEMP; CODE)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12-12-66

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-81

```
"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504
 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
 AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

      EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

                                                            OLD       NEW
 NAME                   SERIAL  ORGN. FUNDS GR-STEP       SALARY    SALARY
WOODS JAMES S           010032  45 380  CF  GS 09 7    $ 9,003   $ 9,262
```

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
010032	WOODS JAMES S	45 380 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-09	6	08749	11/07/65	GS-09	7	09003	03/27/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ Emmett D. Echols Date: 21 March 1966

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
010032	WOODS JAMES S	45 380 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-09	6	08749	11/07/65	GS-09	7	09003	03/27/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ [illegible] D. Echols Date: 21 March 1966

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 3 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 380	CF	GS 09 3	$ 8,200	$ 8,495

EOC

13

10F

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3. Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
010032	WOODS JAMES S	45 380 CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 09	3	8495 $ ~~[illegible]~~	11/10/63	GS 09	6	8749 $ ~~[illegible]~~	11/07/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

4

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 7/12
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY EH

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 11 October 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-31)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES
Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 09/18/64

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 09 DA 18 YR 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5137 1566 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE DIVISION JKO TOKYO CEN REG REC	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE INTEL ANALYST CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 4466	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.39	16. GRADE AND STEP 09	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9/24/64 ROM

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

AES: 16 MARCH 61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT & TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS*

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 03 DA 19 YR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1137 7351 1000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP FE
FE/JAO TOKYO STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
CENTRAL REGISTRY AND RECORDS SEC

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE: INTEL ANALYST GEN

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3061

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.36

16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: 6765

18. REMARKS:
*SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
20	10	56380	FE	37587		3	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR
38. MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPT STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
03/22/61 [illegible]

Form 8-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

[illegible] 3-16-6-

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 380	CF	GS 09 5	$ 7,575	$ 7,990

1. Serial No	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
010032	WOODS JAMES S	56 380 CF //	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 09	4	$ 7,350	11/12/61	GS 09	5	$ 7,575	11/10/63			

8 Remarks and Authentication

742

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY lb 11/7

o o

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE. 11-14-63

SIGNATURE: [redacted] DATE JK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS. EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	56380	CF	09 4	$ 6930	09 4	$ 7350

110032 | WOODS JAMES S

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO	DA	YR
GS 09	2	$ 6,600	11	15	59	GS 09	3	$ 6,765	11	13	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b. **SECRET** **OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER** (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
10032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FE 11 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 09	3	$ 6,765	11/13/60	09	4	$ 6,930	11/12/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D.ECHOLS

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Obsolete Previous **SECRET** (4-61)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	WOODS JAMES S	110032	51 12	GS-09 2	$ 6,135	$ 6,600

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
110032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FE	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR.				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 9	1	$ 5,985	11	16	58	GS 9	2	$ 6,135	11	15	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

NOV 3 10 42 AM '59
REC. PAYROLL BRANCH

C. M. STEWART

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-49 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCH 20 MAR 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
010032	WOODS JAMES S	02	20	28		1	M	1	04	21	52	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit, LCD Yes-1 No-2	Code
11	12	48		1	50 USCA 403 J					1	04	21	52		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/PSH PHILIPPINES STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	RECDS MGMT ANAL	3382	GS	0306.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	DI	11	16	58	11	15	59	9 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data	
REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	01	03	22	59	REGULAR	01		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SECRETARIAT	5112	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	RECDS MGMT OFF	2461	GS	0306.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	DI	11	16	58	11	15	59	9 3700 20 001

44. Remarks

[illegible]
0 APR 1959

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 14 NOV 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
510032	WOODS JAMES S	02	20	28		1	M	1	04	21	52

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12 LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Yes-1 No-2	Code
11	12	48		1	50 USCA 403 J	—					04	21	52		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BRANCH 3 PHILIPPINES STATION ADMIN SEC	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

16. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	RECORDS MGMT ANALYST	3382	GS	0306.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 4	$ 5430	01	04	10	55	04	06	58	8 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	11	16	58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/PSH PHILIPPINES STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

33. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	RECDS MGMT ANAL	3382	GS	0306.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	01	11	16	58	11	15	59	9 3780 55 006

44. Remarks

POSTED
20 NOV 1958 JB

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	510032	GS-07-4	$ 4,930	$ 5,430

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
510032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FE	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 7	3	$ 4,795	04	07	57	GS 7	4	$ 4,930	04	06	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS
[illegible]

14. AUTHENTICATION

CF

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a
1 MAR. 50

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LVL

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 510032	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WOODS JAMES S	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 02 Da. 20 Yr. 28	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1
6. CS-EOD Mo. 04 Da. 21 Yr. 52	7. SCD Mo. XX Da. XX Yr. XX	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo. 04 Da. 21 Yr. 52	13. Mil. Status Yes-1 No-2 Code 2		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations
DDP FI
RECORDS INTEGRATION DIV
ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONS BR
ANALYSIS SEC

Code:

15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D.C.

Station Code:

16. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5 Code 2	17. Position Title INTEL ANALYST	18. Position No. 430.12	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0132.35
21. Grade & Step 07 3	22. Salary Or Rate $ 4795	23. SD D1	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.
26. Appropriation Number S 2309 23				

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO UNVOUCHERED FUNDS	Code 06	28. Eff. Date Mo. 09 Da. 08 Yr. 57	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations
DDP FE
BRANCH 3
PHILIPPINES STATION
ADMIN SEC

Code: 5161

32. Location Of Official Station: MANILA, R.P.

Station Code: 57557

33. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5 Code 5	34. Position Title RECORDS MGMT ANALYST	35. Position No. 3382	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0306.01
38. Grade & Step 07 3	39. Salary Or Rate $ 4795	40. SD D1	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 04 Da. 10 Yr. 55	42. PSI Due Mo. 04 Da. 06 Yr. 58
43. Appropriation Number 8 3780 55 006				

44. Remarks
SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
110032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FI 29	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR
7	2	$ 4,660	04	08	56	7	3	$ 4,795	04	07	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
JOHN M. SCOTT	11 MAR 1957	John M. Scott

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
110032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FI	V-20	2301

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
7	2	$ 4,660	04	08	56	7	3	$ 4,795	04	07	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G.M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, FINANCE DIVISION

ATTENTION : Payroll Section

SUBJECT : Change in Allotment Account Designation - Personal Services of **WOODE, James B.**

1. [illegible] Division requests that cost of personal services of [illegible] employee be changed effective [illegible] as follows:

FROM ALLOTMENT 6-3710-55-098

TO ALLOTMENT 6-2309-23

2. When this change is accomplished, it is requested that [illegible] copy of this request [illegible] to the [illegible] Budget Officer, with [illegible]

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ORG

1. NAME (MR—MISS—MRS—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): MR. JAMES S. WOODS 110032
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1923
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 22 August 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): REASSIGNMENT 56
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 26 Aug 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
BV-430.02	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel Analyst BV-430.12
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.35-7 $4660.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 410825	DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L 2	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE ☐ WWII ☐ OTHER ☐ S-PT. ☒ 10 POINT: ☐ ☐ 1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ I. A. ☐ REAL. ☐ SD-FI

15. SEX: M 1

16. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 7-2309-23 TO: Same 750-13

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

3 ECD 04/21/52

POSTED
8/29/56

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1955-373667

vm 8/28/56

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 21, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1v1

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): Mr. James S. Woods 110032

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1922

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 2 Jul 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment 02

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 15 Jul 1956

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE	IO (CI) ESP-583.05	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel Analyst EV-430.02
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.53-7 $4660.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.33-7 $4660.00 per annum
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 1-Korea Base Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 410825	DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section
11. HEADQUARTERS	Yokosuka, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE | WWII | OTHER | 5-PT X | 10 POINT (DISAB. | OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I. A. | REAL. SD/RI

15. SEX: M W

16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-3740-55-056 TO: 7-6309-25 730-13

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

POSTED
7/19/56

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

3 END 04/21/92

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1954-273047

7/17/56

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. James S. Wooas	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 5 May 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*) Change in Title and Service Number		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 17 JUN 1956	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Ops Off (CE) BFF 583.05~~3~~	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO-CI BFF 583.05~~4~~
GS-0136.52-7 ~~[illegible]~~ 4660.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.53-7 ~~[illegible]~~ 4660
DDP/FE Korea Mission Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 1 - Korea Base Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section
Atsugi, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Yokosuka, Japan
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL SD:DI

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

T/O Change

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) H. P. Gilbert, FE Personnel Officer	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Robert A. Shub (ymk)
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) Iris S. Wilson Ex 8761	Title: FE/CMO 21 May 57

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER 5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL

SD:DI

15. [illegible] M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-3740-55-096 TO: Same	17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: D.C.

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

IO [illegible]
JUN 1956

USED IN LIEU OF SF50
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	D. Liddel	21 May 57	
E.			

E. APPROVED BY

By Gerald C. Liddel, 21 May 56

SECRET

14-00000

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-320030

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Payroll period

3. Block No. UV

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) WOODS, JAMES S.

6. Grade and salary GS-7 $4525.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous accrual													
8. New accrual													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

4/ / 6

11. Appropriation(s) FE/7

12. Prepared by afw 1/10

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 8Apr 56	15. Date last equivalent increase 10Apr55	16. Old salary rate $4525.00	17. New salary rate $4660.00	~~18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.~~ SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In appropriate ages of waiting period

☐ LWOP at end of waiting period

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T

COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION IN LIEU OF SF-52
CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION

Effective Date - 22 April 1956

D to DI

Name	Grade
FE	
ACAMPORA, Tullius	12
GILLIS, Vincent A.	12
WATERS, Harry C., Jr.	11
WOODS, James S.	07
McCOY, Leonard V.	09
EE	
MONTGOMERY, Hugh	12
SR	
TRECIOKAS, Aldona V.	07
KAPUSTA, Peter P.	11

Name	Grade
NEA	
FRIAR, John R.	12
FI	
BECK, Marian F.	07
ROY, Ruth R.	07

D to DS

Name	Grade
WE	
LOEBS, Virginia	05

D to DP

Name	Grade
EE	
McLAUGHLIN, Mary S.	07

by

17 April 1956

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 — FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

FA/ BMR
4/7/58
Dan

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr — Miss — Mrs — One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. James S. WOODS
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 28
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 21 Feb 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Promotion
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: OPS. OFF. (CO) APR 10 1955

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: per memo de alan 3/28/55

FROM—		TO—
IO (FI) BFF 602.02-5	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	~~IO (FI)~~ FF ~~502.02~~-7 583.05
GS-0136.51-05 $3535.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.~~51~~-07 [illegible].00 p/a
DDP/FE Korea Mission ~~Intelligence Division~~ ~~Positive Intelligence Branch~~ UNCONV. WARF. DIV.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same ~~Same~~ RECORDS INTEGRATION BR. ~~Same~~ PERSONALITY FILES SECTION
Atsugi, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	~~Same~~
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Attached herewith are Job Description, Dispatch, and DD/P Personnel Data Sheet.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): H. C. Clinkscale, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): O. A. Fehlow, FE/I, [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	T. A.	REAL.

FI slot SD: D

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM 5-3740-55-096 TO Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: D.C.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE [illegible] 1955 [illegible] TO: 1/525

[illegible] 4/11/55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		3/28/55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			REYNOLDS
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
R A Stricklin

SECRET

BW

F/[illegible]
2/24/55
[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. James S. WOODS	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 28 Jan 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 26 Oct 54 B. APPROVED: 26 Oct 1954	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
IO (FI) BFF 602.02-5	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO (FI) BFF 602.02-5
GS-0136.51-~~0~~5 [redacted].00 p/a 3535.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-~~0~~5 [redacted].00 p/a 3535.
DDP/FE Korean Mission UNCONVENT., WARFARE Division ~~[illegible]~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same Same
Korea	11. HEADQUARTERS	Atsugi, Japan
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Subject arrived PCS Japan 26 Oct 54 per FKLA-5239 of 17 Nov 1954.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
H. C. CLINKSCALE, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
O. A. FEHLOW, FE/1 X3761

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: James P. Humphries (for)
Title: FE/CMO 8 Feb 55

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
	x		x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	T. A.	REAL

SD B

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 6-3740-55-096 TO. Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: D.C.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible] 2/24/55

Sec Concur
[illegible] 18 Feb 55
2/24/55
[illegible]

E date per
J. Martin. FE
2/24/55
[illegible]

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	2/14/55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
E.			

F. APPROVED BY Reginald Peacock [illegible]

SECRET

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - [illegible]

1. Agency and organizational designation	2. Pay roll [illegible] 3. Block No. UV 4. [illegible] No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) WOODS, James E.	6. Grade and salary GS-5 $3410

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks	11. Appropriation(s) 73-9	12. Prepared by jm 4/20/53 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other ADVANCE DIVISION

14. Effective date 6June53	15. Date last equivalent increase 7June53	16. Old salary rate $3410	17. New salary rate $3535	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better. JUN -7 [illegible] 3 12 (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods).
Period(s)

☐ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP [illegible] Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen. U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
TH. FL. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 26 Mar 1954 Jan

AME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) . James S. Woods	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1928	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 16 Apr 1954

is is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

ATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) assignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE E.O.D. 25 Apr 1954	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
sal. Analyst EY 469.08	8. POSITION TITLE	IO (FI) EFF 602.02-5
-0132.35-5 $3410.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-5 $3410.00 per annum
/FI cords Integration Division ocessing and Records Branch nsolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Korean Mission Unconventional Warfare Division
ington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Korea
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

ETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
			DISAB.	OTHER
		XX		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

SD:D
-CD-FI

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-2399-83
TO: 4-3740-55-096

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: D. C.

EMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

J.m. Ben Mc

ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

aty Assistant Director for Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952—

4/16/54

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SOS

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. James S. Woods	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 28	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 27 Feb. 54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 28 Feb. 54	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel. Analyst BY 569.08
GS-132-5	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.35-5 $3410.00 per annum
R I Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI R I Division Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-2309-23 TO: same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel [illegible]

3-4-54

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

mkh

1. NAME (MR. — MISS — MRS. — ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. James S. Woods	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 February 1928	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 5 June 1953

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 7 June 1953	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Sch A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intel. Anal. EV-469.08-4	8. POSITION TITLE	Same EV-469.08
GS-132-4 $3175.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-5 $3410.00 per annum
DDP/FI Records Integration Staff Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same Same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION 11X2100 FROM: 8309-20 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

EXTENSION
2027

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

JOHN W. [illegible]

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

DE

Chief, Personnel Division

6-8-53

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 319794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb. 28
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO:
4. DATE: 24 Apr. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 26 Apr. 53
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: ScheduleA-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Mail and File Clerk BV-304.08	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel. Anal. BV-469.08-A
GS-4-305 $3175.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-4-132 Same
DDP/FI/RI Processing and Records Br. Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION ~~11X2100~~
FROM: 2309-00
TO: 2309-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED ☒ STATE DC

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United [illegible] Service Commission. The action may be corrected or cance[illegible] all requirements.



ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Chief, Personnel Division

[illegible] IDENTIFICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952 210794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. James S. Woods	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 28	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 9 Mar. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 15 Mar. 53	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY ScheduleA-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
File Clerk BV-356	8. POSITION TITLE	Mail and File Clerk BV-364.08
GS-4-305 $3175.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-4
DDP/FI/RI Processing and Records Br. File Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	SAME SAME Consolidation Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 11X2100 TO: 2309-20	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Chief, Personnel Division

JOHN W. [illegible]

22. SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER

KPA 3-9-53

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952-210794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION

Page 9 of 36 pages

Used in lieu of SF-52 and/or SF-50 to document the following types of personnel actions involving no change in grade or salary: (a) Change in title (b) Change of position number (c) Reassignment within Division without series code change (d) Reassignment within Division with series code change. (Note: For action (type d) a SF-50 will be prepared for vouchered positions from information on this form.

(1) Staff or Division RI (2) Date T/O Approved 17 November 1952 (3) Effective Date of Action 7 December 1952

	FROM				TO		
(4) NAME	(5) ORG. IDF. & POS. TITLE	(6) SCHEDULE SERIES-Grade	(7) SLOT NOS.	(8) ACTION	(9) ORG. IDF. & POS. TITLE	(10) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(11) SLOT NOS.
Johnson, Dorothy A.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-32.03	A	File Supervisor	GS-305-4	BV-353.01
Akers, Erma D.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.02	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.
Hallinan, Martha M.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.01
Gawlor, Carol A.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-38.02	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.02
Law, Lois	File Clerk	GS-4	X-38.03	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.03
Pruitt, Earl B.	File Supervisor	GS-5	X-33.	B	File Supvr.	GS-305-5	BV-355.
Service & Correspondence Section							
Woods, James	File Clerk	GS-4	X-102.22	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-[illegible]
File Section							
Lanapace, Marie J.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.03	A	File Supervisor	GS-305-4	BV-357.
Riter, Irene M.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-32.02	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-358.
Lyddane, Mildred K.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-38.04	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-358.01
Ceppa, Loretta M.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.01	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-358.02

(12) APPROVED: ______ (13) APPROVED: ______ (14) APPROVED: ______

Class & Wage Div. Personnel Div.

W(11/18)

S-E-C-R-E-T

STANDARD FORM NO. 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R-1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(ml)

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James S. Woods	20Feb.'28		14Aug.'52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Promotion	17Aug.'52	Schedule A-6.116(h)

FROM		TO
File Clerk X-39.04	8. POSITION TITLE	File Clerk X-102.22
GS-3-305 $2950.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-4-305 $3175.00 per annum
OSO RI Processing and Records Branch File Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO RI Analysis and Operations Branch Service and Correspondence Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: TO: 11X2100	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS

Chief, Personnel Division

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

RDJ 8-15-52

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-600978

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

V.C. 26 March 1952
MCD

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R 1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James S. Woods	20 Feb. 1928	# 57	21 Apr. '52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Excepted Appointment	21 Apr. 1952	Sch. A — 6.116 (B)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	File Clerk GS - 3 139.04
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS - 3 305 $2950.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO RI PROCESSING AND RECORDS BRANCH FILE SECTION
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT. DISAB.	10 POINT. OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
M	W	FROM: 2123500 TO: 3009	Yes	21 Apr. 1952	X STATE: D.C.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(39.04)

This appointment is subject to a satisfactory trial period of one year.

Subject to a satisfactory medical examination.

SF # 61 Affidavit executed.

3445

DOG - 06/07/53
CSEOD - 04/21/52
LCD - 04/21/52

Chf, Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 11080-609875

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) WOODS, James S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 02/20/28	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 12	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CCS/REG	9. CURRENT STATION HQS	10. CODE (Ck. 1) ☒ HQS. ☐ OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO): 01 July 76 - 08 July 77

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 July 1977

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. NO

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of CCS Registry--Supervises employees in setting up and maintaining Staff files and necessary card indices; receiving, distributing and dispatching correspondence to and from the Staff; and processing requests for file traces and other information.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 CCS Records Management Officer--Responsible for overall management of CCS records management program. Monitors developments in DDO records management policies and procedures; maintains liaison with ISS and DDO Records Management Officers; seeks improvement in CCS records organization and discipline.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Works with personnel responsible for developing and launching the CCS computerized records system (CENCO) to ensure proper integration of Registry information.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

FORM 7-73 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2, IMPDET CL BY 061088

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Woods continued to perform in outstanding fashion as Chief of the CCS Registry during an extremely busy period. The figures cited in the last Fitness Report as to the workload of the CCS Registry continued to be representative of the volume and variety of Mr. Woods' responsibilities. He supervised the work of six subordinates with a successful combination of patience and firm professionalism. He continued to be the source of sound, constructive suggestions for coping with the paper "explosion" occasioned by the investigations of CIA and the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts.

Mr. Woods is a highly valuable, reliable, unobtrusively effective records manager. In moving on to new responsibilities in an area division he leaves behind a solid record of achievement and the admiration of those with whom he has served in CCS.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 24	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 August 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Arthur C. Close

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☐ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods James S. Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Close's evaluation of Mr. Woods' performance during the reporting period agrees completely with my observations and conclusions. Mr. Woods is a first-class professional records officer and supervisor who has clearly earned an overall rating of OUTSTANDING.

DATE 17 August 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Central Cover Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☐ HAVE NOT ☐ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 18 Aug 1977	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S. Woods

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) WOODS James S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 02/20/28	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-12	6. SD DAC
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF CH	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CCS/REG	9. CURRENT STATION HQS	10. CODE (Ck. 1) ☒ HQS. ☐ OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO): 1 July 1975-30 June 1976

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 July 1976

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. **NO**

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section--supervises 6 employees in maintenance of Staff files and required card indices; receiving and distributing Staff correspondence; and processing requests for file checks and other information	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Records Management Officer--responsible for the overall CCS records management program	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER [illegible]

FORM 7-75 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2, IMPDET CL BY 061088

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Woods is a quiet, highly effective manager of a major repository of records within the DDO. The workload of his Section is staggering: over 8,000 documents filed each month, over 500 index cards prepared each month; close to 300 Freedom of Information or Privacy Act requests processed each month, etc. Mr. Woods organizes his Section well; he handles a group of six women with skill and understanding and he heads, as a result, a harmoniously working team.

Mr. Woods approaches problems with a positive attitude and brings his considerable experience and imagination to bear with appropriate initiative and follow-through. His response to the exceptionally heavy workload of the Staff over the past year of Congressional investigations and cover exposes was vital to the Staff's and the DDO's requirements for current and historical records. He volunteers ideas designed to improve the Staff's records; he works weekends and after hours to keep ahead of a growing avalanche of paper and requests for information. He is, in sum, a highly competent, knowledgable, yet flexible records manager upon whom the Staff relies heavily.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 27 July 1976	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Arthur C. Close

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☐ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 27 July 76	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have no difficulty in agreeing with the letter ratings and the narrative evaluation in the above report. Mr. Woods established the high level of his professional competence very soon after his assignment in CCS and has maintained this standard without interruption. I again must emphasize his abilities as supervisor in one of the toughest supervisory assignments known to me. With a Registry Chief like Mr. Woods, it is easy to come to the conclusion that running a registry of the complexity and volume as that of CCS is a cinch - at least he makes it appear that way.

DATE 29 July 1976	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Erich W. Isenstead

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☒ HAVE NOT ☐ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 29 July	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods James S. Woods

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Woods, James S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 02/20/28	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-12	6. SD DAC

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin OF-CH	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CCS/REG	9. CURRENT STATION HQS	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS ☐ OF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
1 January 1975 - 30 June 1975

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 July 1975

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section - supervises 7 employees	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Records Management Officer - responsible for the overall CCS records management program, ensuring that it is in conformity with DDO and Agency records management policy and procedures.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

E2 IMPDET CL BY 17 JUL 1975

(4)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUL 8 11 29 AM '75

During the 6 months under review Mr. Woods has continued to fulfill his rosponsibilities in the same excellent manner which has been documented in his last two fitness reports and which led to his promotion to GS-12. Mr. Woods surefootedness as a records officer and manager of people, together with ability to take necessary initiatives where actions are required and his maturity and sound judgement, make him an ideal chief of this very active and complex registry and records management office. I dread to think that eventual rotation will deprive me of the services of this extraordinarily competent and effective officer.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 1 year, 9 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 7 July 1975	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Erich W. Isenstead

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 7 July 1975	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods James S. Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

There is no one in the chain of command who could act as reviewing officer.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE 7 July 1975	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S. Woods

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (last, first, middle) WOODS, JAMES S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 02/20/28	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-12	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF-CH	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CCS/REGISTRY	9. CURRENT STATION HEADQUARTERS	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS. ☐ OP		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT X SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
1 June 1974-31 December 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1974 (Retirement of Supervisor

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section - supervises seven employees	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Records Management Officer - responsible for the overall CCS records management program, ensuring that it is in conformity with DDO and Agency records management policy and procedures.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 CCS Security Officer - Briefs all new and departing CCS employees on Agency and CCS security procedures. Also responsible for duty rosters and related security instructions, and maintains liaison with the Office of Security - through 6 October 1974.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY 008317

20 NOV 1974

(4)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Since his last Fitness Report, in June 1974, Mr. Woods has continued his extremely fine performance as a conscientious, hardworking and thoughtful records manager and registry supervisor. The CCS registry workload remains at about the same level as previously reported, and Mr. Woods regularly works an hour or so of uninterrupted overtime every working day personally reorganizing procedures, cleaning out, consolidating, and retiring files. His enthusiastic determination in reducing the numbers of out-of-date and no longer useful files is most exemplary. Knowing the numbers of primary and supplemental files involved in this exercise, and as a retiring supervisor, I can only wish him "good luck"!

Mr. Woods also continues eager to learn and use new methods and techniques. During this reporting period, in July 1974, he took the Agency course "Introduction to Micrographics Seminar #2."

Finally it gives me pleasure to note here that, effective ~~11~~ 24 November 1974, Mr. Woods will be given a well deserved promotion from GS 11/6 to GS 12/3.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 15 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 20 November 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Carter H. Yates Carter H. Yates

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☒ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 20 Nov 74	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S. Woods James S. Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Both Mr. Yates' letter ratings and narrative comments accurately reflect the quality of Mr. Woods' performance during the reporting period. He is a thoroughgoing professional records officer who uses his extensive experience and his good judgement to take initiatives toward improving the Registry service and the management of records. Hand in hand with his high substantive competence goes his excellent ability as a supervisor. I can say nothing more laudable in this regard than that I have not had to deal with Registry personnel problems during the last year. He knows the job that needs to be done and so do his people. With this kind of leadership, the work gets accomplished with a high state of morale.

DATE 25 November 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Erich W. Isenstead

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE 25 Nov 74	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S. Woods

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (Last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
010032	WOODS, JAMES S.	02/20/28	M	GS-11	D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION	10. CODE (ck one)
RECORDS ADMIN OF - CH	DDO/CCS/REGISTRY	HEADQUARTERS	X HQS ☐ DF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 June 1973 - 31 May 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 June 1974

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. NO

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section - supervises seven employees.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Records Management Officer - responsible for the overall CCS records management program, ensuring that it is in conformity with DDO and Agency records management policy and procedures.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 CCS Security Officer - Briefs all new and departing CCS employees on Agency and CCS security procedures. Also responsible for duty rosters and related security instructions, and maintains liaison with the Office of Security.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 008317

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment, and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

After a short overlap with his predecessor, Mr. Woods assumed his responsibilities as Chief of Registry, CCS, on 3 October 1973 - roughly nine months ago. In this position he is responsible, overall, for CCS registry and records management activities, including the supervision of seven other individuals. As could be expected from even a casual reading of his past fitness reports, Mr. Woods quickly took hold, and has been performing his new responsibilities in an exemplary manner. Despite the volume and variety of files with which he was required to become familiar, early on he systematically began cleaning out, consolidating, and retiring files as appropriate, reorganizing and updating the indexing system for individual and project files, and redistributing employee workloads. He also reorganized the placement of file machinery, desks, and service counter to achieve greater employee comfort and efficiency in the utilization of personnel. Although his task as Staff Security Officer is a secondary function, he also reorganized, simplified and re-wrote the security check and duty officer roster procedures.

Indicative of the work which he supervises are selected Registry statistics for May 1974: 7015 documents filed, 8200 files pulled (and re-filed) for Staff officers' use, 6642 cables processed and distributed, 9900 facility and name searches, 2353 documents logged, 833 index cards made and filed, and 200 new files opened. During his nine months with CCS, Mr. Woods not only has had to learn the CCS "system" himself,

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 mos	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 June 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Carter H. Yates Carter H. Yates

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☒ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 25 June 74	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods James S. Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

In the relatively short period of his assignment to CCS, Mr. Woods has completely lived up to his advance billing as reflected in past fitness reports. Mr. Yates has provided the specifics of Mr. Woods' accomplishments and has left me only to say that Mr. Woods is a first class professional Records Officer and supervisor who fully deserves an overall rating of Strong.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Erich W. Isenstead

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE 1 July 74	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Fitness Report   Woods, James D.   010032

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS (continued)

but has been required, due to a turnover in personnel, to train three new Records Clerks.

Courses taken since the start of his tour with CCS include Operational Records I and III, ADP I, Forms Management Seminar, and Forms Analysis and Design Workshop.

Mr. Woods has proved to be a conscientious, hard-working and thoughtful records manager and supervisor, and CCS is glad to have him aboard. I am sure that the next records inventory will provide statistical evidence of his abilities as a "housecleaner."

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/EUR	8. CURRENT STATION Rome		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 June 72 -31 May 73

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station Records Management and Control Officer - responsible for the mediation, preparation, implementation and control of the Records Management Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Chief of Registry Section - in this capacity he supervises one employee in the processing and pouching of all dispatch and other correspondence; serves as the cable analyst, processing ~~and distributing all cable traffic; and serves as Top Secret~~ Control Officer.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

9 MAY

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer has continued to perform with a high degree of effectiveness and accomplishment. He has concentrated on improving our records holding standards and on purging irrelevant and out dated files. In May 1972 he began a monthly series of progress reports for the Chief of Station outlining the month's accomplishments. Copies of these reports through January 1973 were sent to Hqs in OIRT-18014 and 18015, dated 9 Feb 73. These reports clearly show this officer's focus on records management activities, his ingenuity and agressiveness in launching programs of review of files and his tireless efforts in reducing Station holdings to a practical and useable minimum. His records inventory as of September 1972, reporting a total reduction in excess of 85 feet, speaks for itself. His next report also promises to show dramatic reductions.

This officer shows a sense of professional responsibility and determination in the oft neglected function of records management, deeper and more intense than any other witnessed by the rating officer in his career. He performs his other duties as Chief, Registry with an equally high degree of effectiveness. Subject officer may have been inadvertently hiding his talents under the proverbial bushel basket by having remained in the field for so long. It is the rater's hope that Hqs now has focussed on him and has discovered his potential for greater responsibilities. The records in this Station are tremendously improved for his having had a tour in Rome. We are certainly glad he came.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 30 April 1973	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 May 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Admin Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Thomas McKinley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This officer has been remarkably effective during his tour in Rome. While we are very sorry to lose him, there is no question that his formidable talents should be used on a much broader range of records management and related problems than could be done in this Station. His next assignment in Headquarters appears to give him that additional scope. We are glad that he served in Rome and that during this tour here he received a well-deserved promotion. Rome Station's records have improved considerably as a result of this officer's tour here. I am in full agreement with the above comments and ratings.

DATE 23 May 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ William Acon, Jr.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/I	8. CURRENT STATION Rome		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 July 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 October 1971 - 31 May 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section - In this capacity he supervises one employee in the processing and pouching of all dispatch correspondence and in the performance of other registry duties.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Station Records Officer - Responsible for the Station's Record Management Program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Cable Analyst - Processes and distributes all incoming and outgoing cable traffic.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Top Secret Control Officer.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

21 AUG 1972

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer's performance over the past year has been outstanding. He is a skilled professional records manager, an indefatigable worker and a highly imaginative and efficient supervisor. Since his last Fitness Report he has directed a TDY team of records officers in a concentrated program of records reduction. He devised the program and supervised its execution with most effective results. This officer is a driver and a doer. He constantly strives to improve the Station's records management posture and follows up with procedures designed to maintain the gains achieved by his efforts. It is highly gratifying and stimulating to work with him. He sees the broad dimensions of the task at hand and focuses constantly on improving the system. This quality convinces the rater that he is capable of greater responsibilities in a position of broader scope. I recommend that Headquarters begin to plan for the utilization of this officer on the completion of his tour of duty in Rome. He should be placed in a Headquarters position in which his skills and broad experience can be fully used and in which he can achieve the professional growth of which he is both capable and deserving.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 17 July 1972	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 17 July 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Admin Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Thomas McKinley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the comments of the rating officer and believe the overall outstanding rating is well deserved. Subject is a first-rate Records Management officer - deeply interested in his work, conscientious in the extreme and always looking for an innovative approach that will upgrade the functioning of Registry and better serve Station needs. Without losing sight of the unending pressure to reduce and periodically reorder the Station's holdings, this officer avoids assuming attitudes that are cast in cement. He works with the Branches and individual officers in solving problems rationally. He is unfailingly pleasant and courteous and is well-liked by all. The Station is fortunate to have him.

DATE 25 July 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Joseph A DiStefano

SECRET

14-00000

ON duty

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. '28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Off	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/I	8. CURRENT STATION Rome		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 4 July 1971-30 September 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section - In this capacity he supervises one employee in the processing and pouching of all dispatch correspondence and other registry duties.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Station Records Officer - Responsible for the Station's record program and to give guidance and/or assist the Station officers when called upon to do so.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Cable Analyst - Process and distribute all incoming and outgoing cable traffic, this includes maintenance of the chrono files.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Top Secret Control Officer.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

21 OCT 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

20 A 42

I have worked with this officer just 2½ months, but this has been long enough to satisfy me that he is above average in registry work. He is a very knowledgeable registry technician, but most important, he is aggressive and imaginative in devising new procedures, or revising old ones to improve the quality of registry service to this Station. He is affable in dealing with his peers and confident and persuasive in dealing with the senior management of this Station. Shortly after his arrival he took over the analysing and distribution of the cables, and prepared a Station procedure for this purpose. Immediately following that, he devised a new procedure for handling correspondence and installed it. He had reviewed the multitudinous files at this Station and has plans to trim them back to more reasonable and appropriate dimensions. In every respect, this officer has taken charge of the function he is here to perform, and has devoted a great deal of time, thought and effort to improve it. We are indeed satisfied with his performance.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 October 1971	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
2½ months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 October 1971	Chief, Support	/s/ Thomas McKinley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Since I have just arrived at the Station I have not had an opportunity to observe this officer's performance. However, I respect the rating officer's judgment, which in this case coincides with other favorable comments I have heard about the Subject. I therefore defer to the rating officer's evaluation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 October 1971	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ Joseph A. Distefano

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS James S	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Adm. Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/Italian		8. CURRENT STATION Rome, Italy	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
☐ CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ TEMPORARY	☐ INITIAL		☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			☐ ANNUAL		☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):			☒ SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion		
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.			12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1971 - 30 May 1971		

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Reviewed, retired and rationalized Italian Branch Files and explained same system to Branch personnel	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

3 AUG 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Woods first made a survey of the Augean stable that the Italian Branch files had become over many years of shifts in personnel and changes of direction. He then reviewed, downgraded, and retired approximately 350 Top Secret documents with appropriate Project and Subject files and copies destroyed. At the completion of this there was not one Top Secret document on the Branch. He devised, gained approval from FI/D, and carried out a new procedure for the downgrading of TYLOTE material from Top Secret to Secret so that it could be retired. He retired approximately 60 Project, 25 Subject, and fifty 201 files. He surveyed the Communist Party of Italy files and discovered that there were a total of 93 of which 19 were already closed. He closed 47 of the remainder and left 25 open and arranged for RID/ARD to retire all the material in the open files prior to 1 January 1971. He closed and retired Pian files dating back to the early 1950's. All in all, out of 76 feet of safe space filled with CS material, he retired 36 feet of files leaving a catalogue of where everything is or has been sent. A remarkable record (and done with a minimum of fuss and Branch dislocation)!

What he did in such a short time speaks eloquently of how he went about his duties for which see the accompanying memorandum of recommendation for promotion. Reporting officer has known him over fourteen years and has the unvarying impression of him as a quietly competent, diligent, reliable, self-reliant individual.

/continued/

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Subject now in Rome Station

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION See above	
DATE 27 July 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR ADC/EUR/Italy	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE R. Campbell James

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL I concur in the above evaluation. Subject turned in a most impressive performance during his brief time on the Italian Branch. Largely as a result of his enthusiasm and initiative, the Branch was able to achieve what had never been accomplished before: a complete overhaul, cleaning, purging, and restructuring of its filing system. To his credit, Subject has a keen appreciation for operational requirements and all of this work was done without sacrificing the future utilization of informati acquired in the past; on the contrary, the efficient use of this material has been so enhanced that it will surely be reflected in our future operations. Mr. Woods has a unique contribution to make in Rome or any other place he is assigned. The Station is fortunate to have him....his presence is sorely needed to do the same thing in Rome that he has just accomplishe

DATE 27 July 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief/Italian Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Herschel F. Peak

SECRET

SECRET

You give him a job and need not worry about whether or how it will be done.

The job offered no opportunity to observe his supervisory capabilities. He is cost conscious and security conscious.

Fitness Report James S. Woods (continued)

SECTION D.3. (continued).

in Headquarters. The importance of his contribution and his personal initiative and efforts should be rewarded by a promotion.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Recs Adm Off	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/BCR	8. CURRENT STATION London		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 November 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 June 1970 - 18 November 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for organization and direct management of the Station Registry	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 First-line supervisor for two full-time registry assistants.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Organizes and implements review and purge of Registry and other Station files.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares Station notices and outgoing correspondence on Registry matters.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains and controls case file index and 201 file index.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Top Secret Control Officer	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. _Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable._ If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In the four months he has been under my supervision, Subject has demonstrated that he merits in full measure the high opinion of him held by his previous supervisor. Conscientious, careful, fully knowledgeable of Registry procedures he has gone about his day-to-day tasks in an exceptionally proficient way without the need for constant supervision. He is prompt in his response to requests and has an excellent sense of "get the job done". He is an intelligent and concerned supervisor who has been meticulous in keeping his supervisors briefed on personnel and other problems as they have arisen in the Station Registry. He appears fully capable of assuming larger responsibilities in the records field. The rating officer regrets that Subject's family situation precludes his staying for another tour.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
17 Nov 1970	James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
4 months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
17 November 1970	DCOS	/s/ Cameron J. LaClair

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Although the rating officer is newly arrived in London, he has had numerous opportunities in the past to observe Subject's work and the results he has achieved in reducing London files to manageable proportions. As a result the ratings awarded in this report are endorsed without hesitation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 November 1970	COS	/s/ Rolfe Kingsley

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Off	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/BCR		8. CURRENT STATION London	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)			ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 October 1969 - 30 June 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for organization and direct management of station registry.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 First-line supervisor for two full-time and one part-time registry assistants.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Organizes and implements review and purge of registry and other station files.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares station notices and outgoing correspondence on registry matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains and controls case file index and 201 file index.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Top Secret Control Officer.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

JUL 1970

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

With about nineteen months experience managing the station registry already under his belt, his usefulness here increases. He continues to demonstrate the same quietly effective leadership and talent for sound organization in his own shop as were noted on the last fitness report.

While maintaining a high standard in the more routine day-to-day services and processes a registry is normally expected to supply, he has also been the catalyst for a thorough, carefully phased and continuing review and, where appropriate, purge of registry and other file holdings. Administering this ambitious reduction program requires sound judgment and experience in handling the detail in our existing records. Subject has these qualities and has achieved impressive results. To complete this task, he has asked to extend his tour here for one year until November 1971 and Headquarters has approved this.

He is invariably completely responsive to guidance from the DCOS, his immediate supervisor, and conscientiously seeks to achieve the work goals which are identified during our occasional accomplishment and performance consultations. The spirit of cooperation with which he deals with other station personnel is equally commendable.

No criticism can be made of his security and cover deportment.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 18 June 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 18 June 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David Whipple

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur entirely with this favorable assessment. Subject has been a dedicated and conscientious supervisor of his office. His achievements have been quite measurable and specific, as described in the above report. On the basis of his performance here, Subject should have excellent career prospects for further growth in his chosen field.

DATE 22 June 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Bronson Tweedy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/BCR		8. CURRENT STATION London	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 October 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
18 November 1968-30 September 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for organization and direct management of Station Registry.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 First-line supervisor for at first three, later two, full-time Registry personnel and one part-time Registry assistant.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides informal training and guidance to some Station officers and secretaries on records procedures.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares Station Notices and outgoing correspondence on Registry matters.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains and controls case file index and 201 file index.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Top Secret control officer	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable. He arrived ten months ago at this post with considerable experience in Registry work at Headquarters and at other field stations and with a thorough understanding of how a Station Registry should be organized and run. He immediately put this understanding to good use. While maintaining the overall efficiency of Registry programs already in effect when he took over, he enthusiastically began a carefully-planned and continuing effort to further reduce less than essential Registry paper holdings with results which are already impressive. His suggestions on new procedures designed to conserve space and manpower are usually imaginative and practical.

He himself is a remarkably well-organized, conscientious and cooperative person.

He has had to undertake his improvements while accommodating to the loss of one Registry slot which fell victim to a Foreign Service reductions program. Primarily due to his managerial talents, the Registry has been made to carry on almost as well with three regulars as with the previous four. Although his people are increasingly hard-worked, their morale is high. He himself appears to be a glutton for work but his Registry is obviously a happy shop.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 October 1969	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 October 1969		/s/ David D. Whipple

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur with this very favorable assessment. Subject has a real talent for work in his chosen field and his professional accomplishments here have been impressive. Subject's career should be watched with care and there should be room for considerable advancement in the Records Management end of our business.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
5 November 1969		/s/ Bronson Tweedy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Of	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNO	8. CURRENT STATION Vietnam		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 5 March 1968 - 5 October 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counselling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief Station Registry DC 52	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Management and training of personnel under his supervision	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Scheduling of routine and exceptional work assigned to his unit.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of routine and other reports on the activities of his Section.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Overall Security of Registry operations	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 8 OCT 1968 BK	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This is Subject's final Fitness Report as Chief, Registry at Vietnam Station. He has worked long and hard but can look with pride at the many accomplishments that he has effected during his tenure. He will depart leaving a sound and well-functioning organization. His planning has been effective and his cross-training and development of the personnel under his supervision have been fully productive.

During this period, his unit has experienced heavy increases in workload and assumed new or additional functions with no reduction in the service provided to Station components.

Subject has been responsible for many work saving innovations, procedural changes and a thorough updating and revamping of the highly important registry reference records.

The personnel under his supervision display enthusiasm and dedication in their work. Their pleasant manner is a reflection of Subject's management ability.

Subject performs his managerial and supervisory duties in a highly professional manner. He knows systems, writes lucid and concise procedures and reacts positively to situations. He is a "Doer".

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 21 Sept 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/James S. Woods	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 14	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 21 Sept 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Records Admin Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/John K. Smith
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the ratings and comments of the Rating Officer.

Subject has been most amenable and responsive to positive direction.

DATE 21 Sept 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Vincent M. Lockhart

SECRET

NARRATIVE COMMENTS, Section C. (Continued)

I have enjoyed serving with Subject, wish him success at his next post and look forward to serving with him again.

Subject is cost conscious.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNO	8. CURRENT STATION Vietnam		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER | RESERVE | TEMPORARY

CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

INITIAL | REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

ANNUAL | REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

X SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 16 October '67 - 21 March 68

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief Station Registry	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Management and training of Personnel under his supervision	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Scheduling of routine and exceptional work assigned to his unit	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of routine and other reports on the activities of his Section	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Overall Security of Registry operations	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

20 MAY 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has done an excellent job in organizing the layout and arranging the work flow in the new Station Registry. As a result, his unit has been operating on a fully effective and productive basis, even during the recent emergency when certain workloads increased several hundred per cent. In operation and physical appearance the Station Registry may be considered a model registry.

He is very cooperative and works well with other offices in solving mutual problems or setting up new requirements.

Subject is industrious and dedicated and willingly works long hours to meet the daily demands of his position. He performed in an exemplary manner while working for an extended period under stress during the recent emergency.

Subject is a pleasant, dependable individual who is anxious to do the best job possible in a demanding and vital position at the Station.

He is properly cost conscious in the use of personnel, space and equipment.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8 mos	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject has not reviewed this report inasmuch as it recommends him for promotion.	
DATE 5 March 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Records Admin Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/John K. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 5 March 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Vincent Lockhart

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. '28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Of	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNO	8. CURRENT STATION Vietnam		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 10 May 1967 - 30 Sep. 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Station Registry Section	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Management and training of personnel under his supervision	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Scheduling of routine and exceptional work assigned to his unit.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of routine and other reports on the activities of his Section.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Overall security of Registry operations.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 29 NOV 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject is responsible for the supervision and operation of one of the more diversified and complex field registry operations in the Organization. He is thoroughly knowledgeable and experienced in registry practices. Subject is a dedicated and hard working officer who will apply himself diligently to individual registry activities. Such diligent application occasionally causes him to overlook his overall supervisory role, the supervision and management of eleven personnel and the responsibility for providing a wide variety of services, locally and in-country. In the press of his activities, he does not always employ a high degree of tact in dealing with his subordinates. In this context it should be noted that he is performing proficiently in a position well above his present grade level.

During the past several months, the Section has undergone several changes and assumed additional functions under his guidance.

Subject is cost conscious in the use of supplies and equipment in his Section.

Subject is attending evening courses leading toward his degree to further himself professionally.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
14 Aug 1967	/s/James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
14 Oct 1967	Records Admin Officer	/s/John K. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the ratings and comments of the supervisor. In fairness to the employee, it should be noted that the supervisor is a conscientious and conservative rater.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
14 Oct 1967	Ops Officer	/s/Vincent M. Lockhart

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032 ✓

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS 9	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNO		8. CURRENT STATION VIETNAM	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 14 Jan 67 - 9 May 67

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Registry with supervisory responsibility for 8 employees.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 28 JUN 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-60 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUN 12 10 44 AM '67

Although Subject has been at the Station for only a few months, he quickly established himself as a formidable leader in a very large Registry operation. He is resourceful and constantly strives to improve office procedures in order to increase efficiency and provide better service. He is an old hand in the Registry field, well indoctrinated in proper procedure and knows when and how to adjust to meet changing situations.

Subject effectively supervises 8 employees and displays cost consciousness in the management and operation of his office.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 8 May 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 8 May 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Records Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Richard Richardson

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur with rating and narrative comments. Subject is employing in this position his cumulative experience as a Registry supervisor at previous posts. Subject has contributed to the improvement of Registry procedures and in-country courier system of this large and fast moving station.

DATE 15 May 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Terry T. Shima

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS JAMES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel. Analyst - CH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/Pers/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
☐ CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ TEMPORARY		☐ INITIAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				☐ ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE	
SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):			
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.				12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 30 Sept 65 - 1 Sept 1966			

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises six Registry employees	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises the analysis and distribution of incoming and outgoing cables.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervises the operation of the Station Flexowriters.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

06 SEP

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

OFFICE OF
SEP 1 3 30 PM '66
MAIL ROOM

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

FOSHAG has continued to perform at a "Strong" level. He is a fine supervisor and thereby gets maximum performance from his staff which is too small to handle a work load which has constantly increased over the past year. He is cost conscious in funds material and also strives to stream-line and improve the functioning of the Registry and its related functions.

FOSHAG has twice been recommended for promotion. He definitely deserves it and should be assigned next to a position above his present rating.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 August 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James Woods /S/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 14	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 August 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR OPS. Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Kenneth Miller /S/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur in above rating.

DATE 17 August 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William E. Nelson /S/

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Analyst Ch	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
NOV 30 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July - 30 September 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises six Registry employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyze and distribute all incoming and outgoing Station cables.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervise the operation of the Station Flexowriter.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

15 DEC 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF [illegible]
DEC 15 9 21 AM '65
MAIL ROOM

Woods

During the four months [redacted] has been under my supervision he has demonstrated very real supervisory ability and a talent for getting maximum performance from a small staff which handles an increasingly large volume of work. He has also shown his ability to cut the costs of his operation.

Woods

[redacted] not only runs a most efficient Registry but is also constantly seeking ways to improve and stream-line its operation. He is a man who takes such interest in his job that his ideas and plans for improvement are carefully worked out and sound.

Though I have observed his work for only four months, I believe his over-all performance is "Strong" and close to "Outstanding." He has been recommended for promotion. He deserves it.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27 October 1965	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
4		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 October 1965	Ops Officer	/s/ Kenneth P. Miller

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with his supervisor that Subject is unusually competent in his field and fully deserving of a "Strong" rating. Subject displays unflagging enthusiasm for his job and constantly tries to improve his operation. He has displayed a high degree of imagination and inventiveness in making changes in our over-all CRR set-up. He very definitely deserves promotion.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
2 November 1965	DCOS	/s/ Horace Z. Feldman

SECRET

14-00000

13711

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Analyst Gen	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1964 - 30 June 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises six Registry employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyzes and distributes all incoming and outgoing Station cables	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervises the Station Flexowriter	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

29 JUN 1965

FORM 8-61 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUN 29 9 02 AM '65

As Chief of the Station Registry this employee continues to perform [illegible]ceptionally proficient level with little supervision from his supervisor. His super[illegible]s being reassigned and is scheduled to be replaced by another officer who will necessarily need several months to become knowledgeable of Registry activities. However there is no concern that the flow of paper and the maintenance of accurate records will be affected due to the turnover of supervisors. This employee continues to use his native ingenuity and high standards of achievement to ensure that his office continues to be a well run and efficient unit. He continues to ensure that no government funds are wasted, even to the extent of arranging for the construction of certain modifications to the Registry office by Registry employees at little cost to the Government. This employee has been performing at a level above his present GS-09 grade. As recommended in November 1964, it is reconfirmed that this employee should be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest possible opportunity.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4 June 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 45	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 4 June 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Frederick Handall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject takes his job seriously and performs it in strong fashion. I would say that he displays more energy, interest, and continuing attention than just about anyone else I've seen in registry-type work.

DATE 10 June 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Horace Z. Feldman

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~ Attachment No. _ to FJLI 22242
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Analyst Gen	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO	8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 Nov 64

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1963 - 30 September 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises six Registry employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyzes and distributes all incoming and outgoing Station cables	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervises the Station Flexowriter	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

10 DEC 1964

FORM 4-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This employee continues to be Chief of the Station Registry. During the past year his level of performance can be properly evaluated as exceptionally proficient. He continues to welcome hard work, is not bothered by constantly changing deadlines and is able to fill in for any absent member of his unit, and keep up his own work as well. He is quite conscious of the value of Government personnel and materiel, and does everything in his power to conserve these resources. He continues to come up with new ideas on how to perform his functions in a more efficient and effective manner. This results in benefits to the entire Station. It is regretable that the position this employee fills does not allow for promotion since he has been performing at a level above his present grade for several years.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 Oct 64	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 Oct 64	Ops Officer	/s/ Frederick Randall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully concur with the rater's comments and sentiments. I have known this employee for a number of years during which time he has evidenced real growth in self-sufficiency and also in the handling of his responsibilities as a supervisor.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
29 Oct 64	COS	/s/ William V. Broe

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

ATT TO FJTT-10860

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
10032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Woods,	(First) James	(Middle) S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intel Analyst Gen

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/JKO

8. CURRENT STATION: Tokyo

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 November 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Oct 62-30 Sep 63

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises six Registry employees	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyzes and distributes all incoming and outgoing Station cables.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

30 SEP

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

As Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry, this employee has performed at a level of exceptional proficiency for the past year. He welcomes hard work, is able to fill in for any absent member of his unit and keep up his own work as well. He continues to bring up ideas for the improvement of his unit. These have been particularly welcome during the past year in view of the impending move of the Registry to a new location at Fuchu Air Station. The slight tendency to be arbitrary mentioned in the last fitness report has been eliminated during this reporting period. In view of this employees strong performance over the past year, he is being recommended for promotion to GS-10.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 10 Sept. 63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 10 Sept. 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Ops Support Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Frederick Randall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in this rating and add that this employee has not let the very serious personal problems thrust upon him during this period interfere in any way with his consistently dependable performance. In this key role, in any station of this size, dependability, reliability, and confidence are "musts" and while there are quite naturally small aggravating incidents of mis-routing or mis-direction of documents, I have been struck by the lack of them here, because ratee has the "must" qualities. His performance certainly warrants favorable consideration of the projected promotion action.

DATE 11 September 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert Wheeler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Analyst	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE	8. CURRENT STATION TOKYO		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 Oct 61 - 30 Sept 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt, analysis and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises four Registry employees.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises a courier service which distributes correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. _Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable._

As the Chief of the Tokyo Registry this employee has performed well. He has abundant energy and constantly comes up with ideas for the improvement of the efficiency of his unit. He welcomes hard work and is able to fill in and take over any job in his unit and keep up with his own duties as well. As a supervisor, he has a slight tendency to be arbitrary when convinced he is right. This may be due to the fact that the Registry frequently operates under conditions of pressure due to the recent reorganization, reduction, and relocation of the Station. The Station has been required to get the job done with fewer people and under more difficult working conditions.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 Oct. 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S. Woods /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Frederick Randall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject has done and continues to do well what is expected of him. In amplification of the last sentence of the rater's comments (Section C) Subject has made the adjustment to "fewer people" and "more difficult working conditions" quite well, without trouble and more importantly with no impediment to the CRH service.

DATE 26 Oct 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	CSPD

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT TOKYO STATION

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 15 Apr 61-30 Sep 61	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of local registry, supervising four persons.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
4

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE		X					
WRITES EFFECTIVELY		X					
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM
61

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Ratee has been in charge of station registry since 2[illegible] Ap[illegible]. This has been a period of dramatic change in the station and especially in our paper management. He has responded well to these changes and shows a degree of adaptability that bodes well. His handling of our recent "holdings" inventory, his unceasing efforts to reduce unnecessary holdings, and his knowledge of his business (RI) have made him a valued addition to our shrinking team. In this short rating period there has been little opportunity for me to observe his supervisory abilities, but the lack of any problem on this count coming to my attention means to me that he is doing well. Another six months should tell us more on this score.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
6 Oct 61	Signed

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
6 Oct 61	Ops Officer	Wheeler, Robert P.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
6 Oct 61	Ops Officer	Wheeler, Robert P.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

20 DEC 1960

2 FEB 1961 FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
110032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 February 1928	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Management Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/Secretariat	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 October 1960

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
Sep 59 - 30 Sep 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Liaison with RID, DDP/RMO, DDP/MMU, other Division records officers, etc., re implementation of DDP records management program	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assistance to FE personnel in problems of retention and retirement of records DC 59	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Training and assistance to FE personnel in records management procedures	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Guidance to field records officers	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Planning and development of Division vital materials program	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Implementation of various records purges and records programs	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is an excellent records officer. His interest in the subject and his perseverance in carrying out tasks connected with it have not only produced results in his own work, but have kindled enthusiasm and interest within the Division in developments in Agency records management. He has been able to improve records within the Division with a great deal of success, and at the same time avoided the usual aversion to records responsibility which too much emphasis on records creates in the case officer. His ability to get along well with others is important in his liaison function.

Mr. Woods' work on the vital materials program in the last year has resulted in a much more realistic program for the Division. The creation and ~~retention~~ up-to-date retention of vital materials has for some time been a problem for which little solution could be found. It appears that the present program will result in vital materials which will be current and usable if needed.

Subject is at present assigned to a part-time detail in MMU. This should help to broaden his knowledge of new approaches in the records field. A/EXO/DDP has expressed his complete satisfaction with the very effective work Mr. Woods is doing on this detail.

Mr. Woods' work during the last year was the basis for a commendation of the Division's records program by COP.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 16 DEC 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 20	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

OTHER (Specify):

DATE 16 December 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/FE/ESEC	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harriet L Weller Harriet L. Weller

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL FE/EXO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Orrin R. Magill, Jr.

SECRET

X
SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]10032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods [illegible] J.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 February 1923	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-9
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Mgmt Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/Secretariat

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 October 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 1 Jul 58 - 30 Sep 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Liaison with RID, DDP/RMO, DDP/MMU, other Division records officers, etc, re implementation of records mgt program	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assistance to FE personnel in problems of retention and retirement of records	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Training and assistance for FE personnel in records mgt procedures	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Guidance to field records officers	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Planning and development of Division vital materials program	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Guidance in all records problems	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made [illegible] improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and [illegible] greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is an excellent records officer. He is enthusiastic about his specialty and works hard at it, putting a great deal of energy into his work.

He is quick and understands records thoroughly. Because of this, he is at times inclined to jump ahead of others in records discussions and should attempt to slow down his approach to the subject to meet the level of persons who do not have the same records background.

Subject could fill any position in the records management field, and should advance quickly. He is interested in developing his capabilities and is at present enrolled in the Writing Workshop with this in mind.

This report has been prepared in accordance with FE Division standards which recognize the [illegible] rating the individual against the group. Thus an "average" rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 29 Oct 59
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James S [illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 7
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.
☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 27 October 1959
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/FE/ESEC
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Harriet Weiler

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Subject is a promising young records officer. He has demonstrated a capability for growth and for assuming greater responsibility. He is very much interested in records management and wants to make a career of it. His career development should be designed to afford him opportunities for maximum development both in terms of varied Headquarters experience and in field assignments.

DATE:
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: FE/EXO
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Orrin R. Magill, Jr.
Orrin R. Ma[illegible], Jr.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In) FF-25

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [redacted] Woods (James [redacted] B. XXX
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 38
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [redacted] DT
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/ XX FE/PBH/Manila
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Records Mgmt Anal ~~21 August 1958 - 4 Sept 1958~~
7. GRADE: GS-7
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 21 August 1958 - 4 September 1958
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☒ SPECIAL (Specify) For TDY Period--MELB

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Subject left station

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN SECTION D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 18 Sept 1958
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: [redacted] Collas G. Harris
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief of Station, Melb

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY	DATE
	3 NOV 1958

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: -
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: -
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: -

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: This rating covers the period 21 August - 4 September 1958, while subject was in Melbourne surveying Station files and installing new RI standardized filing system.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 24 2 14 PM '5?
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this [illegible]. Do not include minor or unimportant duties. Place the most important first.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do [illegible] supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing [illegible] at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Installing new RI Filing System	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops new Programs	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Surveying Station Files	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Manages Files	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Oral Briefing	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job

STRENGTHS: Ability to see another's viewpoint and to work out satisfactory compromises between the RI system and operational requirements of the Melbourne Station.

WEAKNESSES: None observed.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents ...and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE. HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY. I WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE. HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET 35 CWA
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ~~XXXXX~~ WOODS James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Manila	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Management Analyst		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 8 December 1957 - September 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☒ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.
Absent from Station. Will be shown upon return.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS SEE ATTACHED REPORTS	X	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify): Will upon return to Station.
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 4 Sept 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Ray F. Drummond	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/Admin

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
h.B.
EAR 10/20/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 4 Sept 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL George E. Aurell	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

5
INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Performance

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 9 37 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises 2 Records Mgm. Analysts	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Processes files in accordance with Specific Records System	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Devises Records Systems to suit Station needs.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Trains Station personnel in Records maintenance.	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Strengths: Works hard and fast. Able to analyze problems and organize work of Records Management Team in methodical sequence.

Weakness: No notable weaknesses.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Manila	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Management Analyst		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 8 December 1957 - September 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 4 Sept. 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Ray F. Drummond	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/Admin

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 4 Sept. 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL George E. Aurell	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

6 months

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 9 17 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None planned nor available while on current overseas tour.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject single and willing serve geographic locations. Believe subject performs best in demanding assignments.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACES	3	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET ⑤ FF-35 20 SEP

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE		
7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 4 April - 30 June 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify) T.D.Y.

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Report prepared after subject departed this station

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND ~~[illegible]~~ other SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 10 July 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Orrin R. Magill, Jr.	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted [illegible]	J.B.	14 OCT
		15/10/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Nicholas A. Natsios	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY, OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 9 30 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only)*.
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analysis of records problems and establishing records procedures	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervising	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Keeping his owns records and reporting on work progress	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject analysed difficult records problems quickly and precisely, discussed his recommendations forcefully and convincingly, and then proceeded to put them into effect with considerable energy. He not only supervised his subordinates effectively so that every minute was productive, but did a good share of the routine work himself, making certain that everything was done precisely as planned.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

29 SEP RECD

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT		6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	
7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 4 April - 30 June 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify) T.D.Y.

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 10 July 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR ~~James~~ Orrin R. Magill, Jr.	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 10 July 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Nicholas A. Natsios	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	0	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
	0	OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 11 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Three

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

From subject's performance here it appears that his potential in the records management field may be limited only by his lack of formal higher education, and I feel that even in this respect he could overcome this deficiency with some training. His forcefulness and boundless energy would unquestionably inspire any subordinates to higher performance. He has an intense interest in records work and an ability to grasp complex problems and make quick decisions.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

3

None

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	X	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

G/S

G/S

SECRET

SECRET
(When Fil

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS James	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FI RI A&O	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE GS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 January 1957 - 15 July 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)		
☐ ANNUAL	☒ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE			

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:
Mr. Woods is on temporary duty in Mexico City, Mexico.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 22 July 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR James L. Brogdon James I. Brogdon	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Coordinator, 201 Control Unit, RI/Analysis Section

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	JB	7/23/57
Reviewed by PUD	D. L. REEDY	10-8-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 22 July 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John Murray Jr John J. Murray, Jr.	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Supervisor, RI/Analysis Section

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

☐ INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: Mr. Woods departed for temporary duty on 9 Feb 1957. His last Fitness Report was completed on 5 Feb 1957, just prior to his departure. Reports from the station indicates the he is doing a commendable job.

AUG 16 3 19 PM '57

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF [illegible] PERSONNEL

AUG 16 3 19 PM '57

MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. *Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:*

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

SECTION C. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER ☐

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS James	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FI RI A&O	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 January 1957 - 15 July 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐	SPECIAL (Specify)
☐	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

☐
RATING NUMBER

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
		A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Potential

(4)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled-In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

AUG 16 3 19 PM '57

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: *This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.*

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW		11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT		21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES		12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY		22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
	3. HAS INITIATIVE		13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES		23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING		14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS		24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS		15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION		25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE		16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT		26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE		17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS		27. IS VERSATILE
	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS		18. IS OBSERVANT		28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
	9. GETS THINGS DONE		19. THINKS CLEARLY		29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES		20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS		30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

19

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD:DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FI RI A&O	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE GS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 21 Jan 57	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 22 January 1956 - 20 January 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

JSW

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 5 Feb 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR James L. Brogdon James L. Brogdon	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Coordinator 201 Control Unit

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT:

Mr. Woods since return from foreign assignment has completed one temporary duty assignment and is preparing for another. He has applied the present headquarters work at the station registry on a standard equating with this evaluation.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		11 FEB 1957
Reviewed by RID	JM	2-11-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 5 Feb 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John J. Murray, Jr.	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Supervisor, RI/AN Section

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 6 3 08 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

B. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analysis - subjective analysis of CE, FI and PP material.	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assignment Management - Organization & scheduling of work.	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analysis - Quantitative	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Has and uses area knowledge.	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

During the short time Mr. Woods has been assigned to this office, he has very quickly grasped the essentials of his assignment; he knows when to seek guidance and is constantly striving to increase his knowledge and understanding of his assignment. He is extremely conscientious, accepts the responsibilities of his job and performs his duties commendably.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WOODS, James S.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1928
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD:DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FI RI A&O
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: GS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst
7. GRADE: GS-7
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 21 Jan 57
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 21 January 1956 - 20 January 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 5 Feb 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: James L. Brogdon James L. Brogdon
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Coordinator 201 Control Unit

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 5 Feb 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: John J. Murray, Jr. John J. Murray Jr
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Supervisor, RI/Analysis Section

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 6 3 08 PM '57

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Three Months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Woods is lacking in formal education, however, he has intelligence, initiative and ability and with continued on-the-job experience is capable of developing into a good supervisor of a section in RI or in operating the Registry Section of a field installation.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Training within the established FI/RI pattern.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS: HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

FE 7

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

Posted Pos. Control BY uhr DATE 28 MAY 195[illegible]

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY James S. Woods	1. DATE OF BIRTH 25 Feb. 1928	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI

4. GRADE GS-7	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) KOBA/Hqs
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT April 1956	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 15 April 1955 - 15 April 1956

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Intelligence Analyst - CE	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 25 September 1954

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Subject is an intelligence analyst in the Personality File Section of the Records Integration Branch. Subject is responsible for the maintenance of agent records and personality files, and is responsible for making all KOBA file checks.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Agnes M. Prime	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) Paul B. Breitweiser

3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 1 May '56	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES William E. Nelson William E. Nelson, CFE/1

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

14-00000

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

May 53

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	CATEGORIES												
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.	X													
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.								X						
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.											X			
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.								X						
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.								X						
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X						
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.								X						
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.								X						
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.								X						
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.								X						
14. GETS THINGS DONE.											X			
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.									X					
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.									X					
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.										X				
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.								X						
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X						
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.									X					
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.								X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.								X						
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.								X						
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT								X						

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.								X						
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.								X						
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".											X			
29. TOUGH MINDED.								X						
30. OBSERVANT.								X						
31. CAPABLE.								X						
32. CLEAR THINKING.								X						
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.										X				
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.								X						
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.	X													
36. DELIBERATE.								X						
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.								X						
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.									X					
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.								X						
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT.								X						
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.								X						
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.								X						
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.								X						
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.								X						
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.								X						
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.											X			
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.								X						

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject is conscientious, hard-working and more than willing to work long hours. Subject has a good background and experience in maintaining agent records. Subject has assumed his present responsibilities with a minimum of supervision.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Subject is weak in his ability to express himself in writing.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PE...
MAY 28 11 16 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Subject's stamina and persistence in accomplishing his tasks in a minimum amount of time outweigh his weakness.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Recommend training in Phase II and III

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE, CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☒ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☒ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

14-00000

DDP - FF T-1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

✓

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

CODED

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff, and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A

Posted to Control Card BY [illegible] K.G.W. 6/22/55

Reviewed by FUD

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY James S. Woods	1. DATE OF BIRTH 25 Feb 1928	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD-D

4. GRADE GS-5	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) Korea Mission Headquarters
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 November 1954 - 14 April 1955

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Intelligence Analyst - CE 0136.52	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 25 September 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Subject is an intelligence analyst in the Personality Files Section of the Records Integration Branch. Subject is responsible for the maintenance of agent records and personality files, and is responsible for making all Korea Mission file checks.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Agnes M. Irime	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) John L. Hart

3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 29 April 55	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES William E. Nelson William E. Nelson

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 SEP 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 16 '55
ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale under each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so wish. Read each of the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES														
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE			
SAMPLES															
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒												
B. PRACTICAL.										☒					
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.			X												
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.					X										
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X							
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X					
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X							
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.								X							
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.								X							
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X							
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.								X							
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.								X							
11. CALM.								X							
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.								X							
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.								X							
14. GETS THINGS DONE.										X					
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.									X						
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.									X						
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X					
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.										X					
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.								X							
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X							
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.									X						
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.								X							
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.								X							
24. EVEN DISPOSITION								X							
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT								X							

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.									X					
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.									X					
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".											X			
29. TOUGH MINDED.									X					
30. OBSERVANT.									X					
31. CAPABLE.									X					
32. CLEAR THINKING.									X					
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.									X					
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.					X									
36. DELIBERATE.									X					
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.									X					
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X			
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.									X					
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.									X					
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.									X					
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.									X					
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.									X					
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.									X					
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.											X			
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.									X					

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject is conscientious, hard-working, and more than willing to work long hours. He has a good background and experience in maintaining agent records. Subject has assumed his present responsibilities with a minimum of supervision.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Subject is weak in his ability to express himself in writing.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Subject's stamina and persistence in accomplishing his tasks in a minimum amount of time outweigh his weaknesses.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 16 8 43 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Recommend training in Phase II and III

F. OTHER COMMENTS *(Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):*

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

C. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

B. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

D. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

BY DATE
Jm 24 June 54

FE 9

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WOODS, James S.

2. GRADE: GS-5

3. POSITION TITLE: Intel. Anal. CD-FI

4. OFFICE: DDP/FI/RI

STAFF OR DIVISION: P & R Branch

BRANCH: Consol Section

☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD

IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 21 Apr. 53 To 20 Apr. 54

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

As senior anaylist on the EE/FI/G/Z area my duties consist of:

(A) Consolidating personality files which entails the following: (1) Make a complete search in Index on all references pertaining to the subject, (2) gathering all references in RI/Files, (3) anaylyzing documents for inclusion in 201, (4) preparing a summary of reference sheet which notes the disposition of all the documents put in the case.

(B) Liaison with the area desk.

(c) Supervising the work of the junior anaylist.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
NONE			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Intelligence work at the desk level.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

Two years experience in RI.

10.

12 April 1954
DATE

James S Woods
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 15 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Woods has performed his duties conscientiously and well. He possesses a great deal of energy, is extremely industrious and has maintained excellent relations in his liaison with the area desk.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over)

(4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Woods has performed his duties most outstandingly by virtue of his formation and maintenance of excellent liaison relations.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Woods has handled his present responsibilities admirably and I am certain he would be capable of handling additional ones as the opportunity occurs.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. Woods could qualify as an Intelligence Analyst in any of the appropriate section of RI.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None at this time

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

13 April 54
DATE

Harry D. Randall
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

18 May 1954
DATE

John K. Smith
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

Subject transferred to FE effective 25 April 1954.

over

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) WOODS (First) James (Middle) S.
2. GRADE GS-4
3. POSITION TITLE File Clerk
4. OFFICE DD/P
STAFF OR DIVISION FI
BRANCH RI
☒ DEPT'L.
☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 4-21-52 To 4-21-53
6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special
☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

Review and analize material for consolidation of 201 Personality Files. This includes making a complete impartial name check in RI/SC index and a complete search for all material pertinent to the subject in the RI/Files. Also maintain liaison with the [illegible]desks.

After reviewing documents, make up Cross References and any Document changes as necessary. Complete a Summary of References Form listing all references reviewed and the action taken on each.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
None			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Accounting.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

Two years of Accounting and law school.

10.
9 April 1953
DATE
James S Woods
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Woods' performance in this section has been very satisfactory. While still in a trainee position, he is learning the procedure of this section very well. He is extremely industrious and shows little inclination to waste time.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Woods has been most outstanding by virtue of his industry.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Woods has had little opportunity to show his ability, in this line, so far.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Due to his position as trainee, other duties cannot be considered, but I feel that he is quite capable of filling any number of jobs in RI.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None at this time.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

20 April 1953
DATE

Harry D. Randall
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

APR [illegible] 1953
DATE

John K. Smith
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

14-00000

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (*please print or type*):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		
WOODS	James	Sauvie	FEB 20 1928	502	16	6806
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)			
010032						

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW. (do NOT *mark more than one*):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print) James S. Woods

DATE 4 MAR 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WORKSHOP

Student: James S. Woods **Dates:** 23-24 February 1978

Employee No: 010032 **Office:** ISS

Service Designation: D

COURSE OBJECTIVES

At the conclusion of this Workshop, students should:

1. Be familiar with the principal parts of the Agency's Personnel Evaluation Program;
2. Understand their roles as supervisors in the Performance Evaluation part of the overall Program;
3. Be better prepared to deal with some of the more troublesome problems encountered in performance evaluation;
4. Know how to prepare more useful Fitness Reports and conduct more effective FR interviews;
5. Understand how the Letter of Instruction relates to the performance evaluation process.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the workshop.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Ralph E. Bell 10 MAR 1978

Instructor Date

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

EOD: 9 Aug 76

Name (Last-First-Middl

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE

Woods, James S.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concern separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensat
NA	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Gro Life Insurance).
NA	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Empl Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
NA	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks). Cotton [illegible] back
✓	6. Only applicable to Retiree - Returnee (resignee from overseas assignment) I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medic check to my health and well-being.
	7. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Arm Forces Duty).
	8. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee

James S Woods

Date Signed

Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code)

304 MEADOW HALL DR.
ROCKVILLE, MD. 20851

Correspondence

☐ Overt ☐ Co

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WORKSHOP

Student: James S. Woods **Dates:** 23-24 February 1978

Employee No: 010032 **Office:** ISS

Service Designation:D

COURSE OBJECTIVES

At the conclusion of this Workshop, students should:

1. Be familiar with the principal parts of the Agency's Personnel Evaluation Program;
2. Understand their roles as supervisors in the Performance Evaluation part of the overall Program;
3. Be better prepared to deal with some of the more troublesome problems encountered in performance evaluation;
4. Know how to prepare more useful Fitness Reports and conduct more effective FR interviews;
5. Understand how the Letter of Instruction relates to the performance evaluation process.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the workshop.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Ralph E. Bell 10 MAR 1978

Instructor Date

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

3 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : ISS/Training Staff

SUBJECT: Document Analysis II for Records Management Officers

1. Jim Woods -OPF has satisfactorily completed the Document Analysis II Course given for Division and Staff Records Management Officers by ISS Training Officer, JoEllen S. McCann. Classes were held daily from 0900 to 1230 hours from 29 November through 10 December 1976.

2. The topics covered in the course were records principles and processing procedures used by Data Management Section analysts for initial input of correspondence into the DDO Records System. The students also covered the official files system and indexing criteria as they currently exist and discussed some of the drawbacks and possible systems changes we might expect in the next few years. Periodic exercises were given to test the students comprehension of topics discussed.

JoEllen McCann
JoEllen McCann

20 JUL 1976

I, the undersigned, authorize the Office of Personnel to give to: CartBlanche whatever information is necessary for me to obtain a credit card.

James S Woods
James S. Woods

ma 7-21-76

CERTIFICATE OF TRAINING

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT

JAMES WOODS

SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED

SUPERVISORY COUNSELING WORKSHOP

ON

26 - 27 AUGUST 1976

INFORMATION SERVICES GROUP

Peggy Hall
CHIEF, ISG TRAINING

TRAINING REPORT

OFFICE OF TRAINING

This certifies that **James S. Woods** has successfully completed the Introduction to Micrographics Seminar #2 which was conducted from 24 July to 25 July 1974.

This seminar provides basic information on microphotography and explores the application of this technology in controlling overburdened and sometimes inefficient paperwork systems. Specific blocks of instruction include: Image Recording Techniques, Microfilm Formats, Viewers and Viewer-Printers, Indexing Methods, Computer Output Microfilm (COM), Micropublishing, and Development and Implementation of Agency Applications. Participants receive a portfolio of various samples of microforms, a Glossary of Micrographic Terms, and a Primer on Information Science.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Edward A. Seroskie
Course Coordinator

Final Grade Report

Grading System:
- A – Superior Scholarship
- B – Good Scholarship
- C – Average Scholarship
- D – Passing Scholarship
- F(a) – Failure Academic
- F(n) – Failure Non-Attendance
- I – Incomplete *
- WX – Withdrawal during first half of term
- WP – Withdrew Passing during second half of term
- WF – Withdrew Failing during second half of term
- X – Emergency excused official withdrawal

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

EUROPEAN DIVISION - UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

Report of WOODS, James S. Student Copy

Term 1, Acad. Yr. 1971/72 at Rome Center

COURSE	Semester Hours	GRADE
ITAL 111	3	B

Signature of Instructor: DeSantis

* If Incomplete is to be assigned, student must have attended three-fourths of class meetings. Indicate below remaining work, e.g. final exam, term paper, reports, etc. ____________

Grade to Date ________ Deadline date for completion, if established ____________

The student is responsible for arranging with the Instructor for completion of these requirements.

UMR 18 [illegible]

Final Grade Report

Grading System:
- A – Superior Scholarship
- B – Good Scholarship
- C – Average Scholarship
- D – Passing Scholarship
- F(a) – Failure Academic
- F(n) – Failure Non-Attendance
- I – Incomplete *
- WX – Withdrawal during first half of term
- WP – Withdrew Passing during second half of term
- WF – Withdrew Failing during second half of term
- X – Emergency excused official withdrawal

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

EUROPEAN DIVISION - UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

Report of WOODS, James S. Student Copy

Term 2, Acad. Yr. 19 71/72 at Rome Center

COURSE	Semester Hours	GRADE
ITAL 112	3	B

Signature of Instructor: DeSantis

* If Incomplete is to be assigned, student must have attended three-fourths of class meetings, indicate below remaining work, e.g. final exam, term paper, reports, etc. ____________

Grade to Date ________ Deadline date for completion, if established ____________

The student is responsible for arranging with the instructor for completion of these requirements.

UMR 18 [illegible]

[illegible]
(When Completed)

TRAINING REPORT

Americans Abroad Orientation - Japan
16 Hours 20-21 March 1961 6 Students

Student: **BYRD, James B.** Year of Birth **1928**

EOD Date: **April 1952** Grade: **GS-9** Office: **FE**

[illegible]

[illegible] on travel in the general area and country of destination. Included are a briefing on "the Americans Abroad problem," its implications for the individual employee or dependent and the Agency, prescriptions for successful personal adjustment to everyday phenomena of working and living in the area of assignment, useful information on the area, and guide lines for understanding its major problems. Advice includes cues for effective interpersonal relations in the particular country or region. Area information includes an analysis of the importance of the region to the United States and descriptions of the people, their institutions, and current living conditions. The course offers lectures, panel discussions, films, slides and exhibits, and selected readings for a recommended program of self-study. Employees and dependents [illegible]

This is a certificate of attendance [illegible]

[illegible] **25 April 1961**

/s/ KENNETH E. [illegible]

[illegible]
(When Completed)

[illegible]

Japan

16 [illegible] Abroad Orientation 20-21 March 1961 6

Name: WOODS, Louise (Dependent, James R.)

Student: Year of Birth

Grade: Office

[illegible]

[illegible] for residence or travel in the general area and country of destination. Included are a briefing on "the Americans Abroad problem," its implications for the individual employee or dependent and the Agency, practical advice for successful personal adjustment to everyday problems of working and living in the area of assignment, useful information on the area, and guide lines for understanding its major problems. Advice includes [illegible] for effective interpersonal relations in the particular country or region. Area information includes an analysis of the importance of the region to the United States and description of the people, their institutions, and current living conditions. The course offers lectures, panel discussions, films, slide commentaries, and selected readings for the [illegible] [illegible]

This is to certify [illegible] of attendance [illegible] [illegible] this course.

26 April 1961

/s/ [illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

WRITING WORKSHOP (INTERMEDIATE) NO. 2

TRAINING EVALUATION

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME WOODS, James S.	SEX M	DATES OF COURSE 26 October - 19 November 1959	NO. OF STUDENTS 17
DATE OF BIRTH 20 February 1928	EOD DATE April 1952	GRADE OR RANK GS-9	OFFICE FE/Administration

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION

Records Officer

SECTION II: OBJECTIVE OF THE COURSE

To stimulate habits of thoughtful, self-critical writing for intelligence production.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

The class is conducted for 10 to 15 students. It meets for nine three-hour morning sessions over a period of four weeks. There are three sessions during the first week and two thereafter for three weeks. The course is run on the "learn by practice" system. A number of writing tests are given in class, and they are evaluated against national and Agency norms. The trainees also prepare written exercises and have an opportunity to rewrite some of them during later sessions. Students may use the form and substance of their own office's written product. Special attention is paid to logical organization, diction, sentence structure and other mechanics of writing. The trainees receive detailed comments on their papers and are encouraged to discuss special writing problems with the staff.

SECTION IV: HOW THE STUDENTS ARE EVALUATED

Staff members observe the student's writing ability, any change demonstrated, and application to the course material. The evaluation represents their agreed comments based on the student's total performance.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECTION V: REPORT OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

Mr. Woods added to the good improvement in mechanics of expression he had achieved in the Basic Writing Workshop. He has now developed the ability to write smooth, compact, and readable sentences. He also learned to organize topics more effectively, and with further writing experience, he can develop the ability to write analytical papers of a professional caliber.

Chief Instructor

WRITING WORKSHOP (BASIC) NO. 8

TRAINING EVALUATION

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME **WOODS, James S.**	SEX **M**	DATES OF COURSE **21 Sept. - 15 Oct. 1959**	NO. OF STUDENTS **13**
DATE OF BIRTH **20 February 1928**	EOD DATE **April 1952**	GRADE OR RANK **GS-9**	OFFICE **FE/Administration**

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION

Records Officer

SECTION II: OBJECTIVE OF THE COURSE

To stimulate habits of thoughtful, self-critical writing for intelligence production.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

The class is conducted for ten to fifteen students. It meets for nine three-hour morning sessions over a period of four weeks. There are three sessions during the first week and two thereafter for three weeks. The course is run on the "learn by practice" system. A number of writing tests are given in class, and they are evaluated against national and Agency norms. The trainees also prepare written exercises and have an opportunity to rewrite some of them during later sessions. Students may use the form and substance of their own office's written product. Special attention is paid to logical organization, diction, sentence structure and other mechanics of writing. The trainees receive detailed comments on their papers and are encouraged to discuss special writing problems with the staff.

SECTION IV: HOW THE STUDENTS ARE EVALUATED

Staff members observe the student's writing ability, any change demonstrated, and application to the course material. The evaluation represents their agreed comments based on the student's total performance.

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECTION V: REPORT OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

Mr. Woods considerably improved the clarity of his writing during the course, by reducing sentence errors and roundabout phrasing. His written papers reflected his gains in knowledge of basic rules of English usage. His achievement in the Writing Workshop (Basic) shows that Mr. Woods can develop good writing skills, and that he and the Agency would benefit if he took the Writing Workshop (Intermediate).

Frances C. Gemmill
Chief Instructor

S-E-C-R-E-T

#1

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT COURSE # 9

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME Woods, James S.	SEX M	DATES OF COURSE 10 - 28 May 1954	NO. OF STUDENTS 1st week-49 2nd & 3rd weeks-44
DATE OF BIRTH 21 February 1928	EOD DATE 21 April 1952	GRADE OR RANK GS-5	OFFICE FE/FI
PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION Registry Analyst			

SECTION II. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this course are to provide the student with (1) an understanding of the inter-relationships between operating functions and administrative support functions; (2) an understanding of some of the basic principles and techniques of Agency operations and the organization and functions of the various clandestine components; (3) a knowledge of procedures, regulations, and problems peculiar to Logistics, Finance, and other areas of administrative support.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

One week of the course is devoted to lectures in the area described in category 1 on reverse of this page. The material in categories 2 and 3 is presented both by lecture and by practical exercises during the remaining two weeks of the course. Categories 4 through 9 are concerned with the application of knowledge of Agency organization, structure, procedures and regulations in practical situations.

SECTION IV: STUDENT [illegible]

The [illegible] show how many students received [illegible] [illegible] this student [illegible] [illegible] students' performance in the course with no allowance made for differences in age, education, experience, etc. These ratings are defined as follows:

EXCELLENT: The student indicated exceptional ability or proficiency in meeting this goal or objective; he demonstrated an unusually thorough knowledge of the material presented.

SATISFACTORY: The student met this objective in a competent and effective manner; he demonstrated a good grasp and understanding of the material presented.

UNSATISFACTORY: The student did not achieve this goal or objective; the student's performance indicated a serious lack of knowledge concerning material presented.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

MAJOR CATEGORIES	UNSAT	SAT	EXCELLENT
1. Orientation in basic principles of clandestine activity.	2	30 ●	12
2. Knowledge of clandestine services command structure and organization.	5 ●	14	25
3. Knowledge of Agency and clandestine services regulations and administrative procedures.	2	28 ●	14
4. (A) Preparation of advance form; travel voucher (DOMESTIC) and entertainment reimbursement (DOMESTIC).	0	17	[illegible] ●
(B) Preparation of travel voucher (FOREIGN) including computation of per diem and currency conversion.	1	15 ●	28
5. Preparation of Station Finance Reports.	3	5	36 ●
6. Preparation of forms used in a detached station for property records; knowledge of responsibility for property at the station.	2	30 ●	[illegible]
7. Preparation of form required for project presentation to the Project Review Committee.	1	30 ●	13
8. Preparation of cable form used at Headquarters writing message from material given, with use of accepted digits, punctuation, and abbreviations.	[illegible]	33 ●	[illegible]
9. Preparation of Headquarters and Field dispatch form and Field pouch manifest.	0	31 ●	13

SECTION V: COMMENTS

Comments, especially on habits and characteristics, with particular reference to strong or weak points of the individual or anything that might have influenced his performance in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Evelyn S. Bugbee
Signature of Chief Instructor

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

SECTION I; IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

Name Woods, James S.	**Sex** M	**Course and Beginning Date** PHASE I - ORIENTATION#9 - 19 April 54

Date of Birth 23 February 1928	**E O D** April '52	**Grade or Rank** GS-5	**Office** FE/FI

Projected Assignment or Present Position
Registry Analyst

This evaluation is based on a course of 120 hours given over a period of 3 weeks in which there were 89 students. The length of the course, number of students, nature of the course, skills and knowledge taught, and the opportunity for observing the individual student determine which sections of this report are used. These facts must also be considered in interpreting the evaluations which, therefore, *should not be used as the sole basis for personnel decisions.* THIS REPORT IS INTENDED PRIMARILY TO FURNISH INFORMATION AS TO HOW WELL THE STUDENT LEARNED THE SUBJECT MATTER OR SKILLS TAUGHT. In addition, observations of interest and importance are reported which can have significance only as they are related to other information. Unless otherwise stated, performance is evaluated in terms of standards set by instructors or in relation to the performance of others who have taken the course. For further information, consult the Training Evaluation Branch, Assessment and Evaluation Staff, Office of Training.

SECTION II: KNOWLEDGE

Subject	Hrs	Rating				
		Fail	Poor	Sat	Exc	Sup
Introduction to Intelligence	80	5	12	26*	34	12
Communism and the U S S R	40	5	17	35*	31	7

The numbers show how many students received each rating. An asterisk (*) shows the rating this student received.

SECTION III: SKILLS

The 'Course Instruction' column contains scores and/or ratings given by the instructional staff for skills which are specifically intended to be outcomes of the course. The 'Observation' column contains ratings by instructors and/or students concerning skills which have been observed for every student in a class but which have not been the subject of intensive instruction or practice.

Skill	Hrs.	Course Instruction		Observation	
		Objective Score	Rating or Evaluation	Av. Rating by ______ Instructors	Av. Rating by ______ Students

SECTION IV: OBSERVATIONS of ATTITUDES or OTHER PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

During the course incidents were observed which suggested that this person:

	Yes	No		Yes	No
Had difficulty in getting along with others.		X	Lacked motivation for an Agency career.		X
Interfered with instructional and classroom activities.		X	Lacked sufficient security-mindedness.		X
			Lacked interest in the course.		X

Explanations of any 'Yes' answers to items above. Frequency of occurrence and number of persons observing these attitudes or characteristics are included.

SECTION V: COMMENTS

Comments, especially on habits or characteristics, with particular reference to strong and weak points of the individual, or anything that may have influenced his performance in the course are reported here.

Chief Instructor

SECTION VI: ADJUSTED OVER-ALL EVALUATION

FOR OPTIONAL USE BY INSTRUCTORS		FOR OPTIONAL USE BY TRAINING OFFICERS	
In terms of all factors observed during the course and taking into account this student's experience in the Agency, grade, and general area of work, an 'X' in one of boxes shows the instructor's judgment of his performance in the course.		This evaluation, shown by an 'X' in one of the boxes, takes into account this training record, the student's age, grade, Agency experience, and projected assignment. It is included for the purpose of giving supervisors an estimate of the implications of the training evaluation report for the student's assignment and career potential.	
He was inadequate in his performance.	☐	☐	This is an inadequate performance.
He was barely adequate in his performance and performed acceptably only in a limited range of assignments.	☐	☐	This is a barely adequate performance and raises questions concerning his suitability for his assignment.
He performed acceptably, but was barely adequate in some respects.	☐	☐	This is an acceptable performance but discloses possible areas of weakness.
He was a typically effective student who performed in a competent, dependable manner.	☐	☒	This is a satisfactory performance revealing a typically competent person.
He performed at a high level of competence.	☐	☐	This performance reveals a high level of competence.
He performed at an extremely high level that only a few students have surpassed.	☐	☐	This is an extremely competent performance that only a few persons of his background and position have surpassed.

Training Officer's Comments

Training Officer

SECRET

15 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Clandestine Service Personnel Staff

SUBJECT: James S. WOODS - Recommendation for Promotion

1. Subject has been in grade GS-10 since June 1968. Based on his outstanding performance as Chief of Registry in the Rome Station since June 30, 1971, he strongly merits promotion to grade GS-11 at this time. When Subject took over the responsibility for Registry a year ago, he found a system glutted with paper and bound up by a policy which discouraged getting rid of it. He found many procedures in force which were out of date, if not obsolete, and proposed streamlined procedures, which were adopted, to replace them. He asked for and was given the responsibility to analyze and distribute the cables, which had previously been a function of the Chief of Station's secretary. He recommended the discontinuance of the abstract system, which proposal had been adopted by most elements of the Station. He recommended a reduction in the retention period for cable and dispatch chronos. With the help of a TDY team here for the first half of CY 1972, he devised and instituted a program of purging the files. This program has resulted in the disposition of most of the departed Soviet files, a severe trimming of the true name files, and the review, reduction and up-dating of the project and operational files. All of this work was accompanied by appropriate name checks, entries on the index cards and selection of pertinent documents for transmittal to Headquarters. In summary, Subject performed a thorough "house-cleaning" of Station records in the full meaning of that phrase. This program is by no means finished. In fact, Subject has plans for continuing efforts along these lines which may exceed his tenure at this Station since he intends to return to Headquarters not later than May 1974. The on-going program includes a review and reorganization of the subject files, the encrypted 201's and the disposition (hopefully) of about 50 feet of microfilm. A corollary to these projects will be a significant reduction in the index cards, which at present lead to the microfilm and to other superfluous material we either have or will destroy.

2. The equally important aspect of records management, namely the introduction of procedures to lessen the likelihood

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 026244
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

if not prevent the reoccurrence of this pile-up of paper is not lost on this officer. He constantly thinks in terms of procedures and controls to accomplish this end.

3. Subject is dedicated, highly motivated, conscientious, and hard working. He reports to work each day an hour before the Station opens in order to distribute the cables by opening of business. He never hesitates to respond positively to any request for help. Indeed, he solicits work which he believes can be done more easily or more simply in his unit. In all respects, Subject is a trained, professional records management officer who is thoughtful as well as enthusiastic about his work.

4. It is strongly recommended that Subject be promoted to grade GS-11.

Roosevelt

Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr.
Chief, European Division

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

AN ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE EXECUTED BY EACH EMPLOYEE AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AND WHEN A CHANGE OCCURS IN THE INFORMATION SHOWN BELOW. ITEMS OF CHANGE MAY BE REPORTED IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCKS WITHOUT COMPLETING THE REMAINDER OF THE FORM EXCEPT THE EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AND DATE. WHEN EXECUTING ITEM 4 ALSO COMPLY WITH HHB 20-7, PERSONNEL EMERGENCY AND LOCATOR RECORDS. THIS FORM WILL BE COMPLETED ONLY BY HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL AND NOT SENT TO THE FIELD. FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

GENERAL

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS, James Sauvie	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 502 16 6806

1. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Washington, D.C.	DATE OF MARRIAGE 6 Aug 60
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE

2. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE LOUISE ANNE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) 432 College Pkwy Rockville	TELEPHONE NO. 424-0163	
NAMES OF CHILDREN LAURA RENEE WOODS	ADDRESS 432 College Pkwy Rockville, MD.	SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 20/2/71
NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian) ROSS A. WOODS - DECEASED	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
NAME OF MOTHER, INCLUDING MAIDEN NAME (or female guardian) SUSAN A. WOODS	ADDRESS FOREST RIVER, N. DAK.	TELEPHONE NO.	

CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH
MAR 15 2 27 PM '71

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

Mother & Sister (husband is [illegible])

3. OTHER RELATIVES WHO ARE DEPENDENT UPON ME FOR AT LEAST 51% OF THEIR SUPPORT AND MEET OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN TRAVEL REGULATIONS (HB 22 1...). SPECIFY NAMES AND RELATIONSHIPS

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

4. PERSON RESIDING IN U.S. TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) FIALA, RICHARD	RELATIONSHIP BROTHER-IN-LAW
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE 521 HAMLINE ST. GRAND FORKS, N. DAK.	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER 701-775-4472
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)	YES	✓
	NO	
IS THE INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) UNION TRUST CO. OF D.C.	YES	
	NO	✓
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	✓
	NO	

The persons named in item 2 or 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

FORM 3-70 61 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

UNION TRUST CO. OF D.C.

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

UNION TRUST CO. OF D.C.

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

In the will

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

7. RESIDENCE DATA - TO BE COMPLETED ONLY BY EMPLOYEES ENTERING ON DUTY
(No Approval Required)

RESIDENCE WHEN EMPLOYED *(Full Address)*	PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE AS DEFINED IN HR 22-3 *(Full Address)*

8. CHANGE IN PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE *(See HR 22-3)*
(To Be Completed by Employee Desiring Such Change While Assigned to Headquarters)

FULL ADDRESS	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OR DESIGNEE	DATE
	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL *(when applicable per HR 22-3)*	DATE
SIGNED AT Hqs.	DATE 9 Mar 71	SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE [illegible]

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
010032	WOODS	JAMES	S

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			11	18	70		1			ENGLAND	210

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☒	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☑ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCO	DATE	SIGNATURE
☐	C & L DIVISION, CTRR.	1/5/71	
☒	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

30 June 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, European Division

FROM : Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT : Promotion Recommendation - James S. Woods

Subject, who has been in grade as a GS-10 just two years, has been Chief of the Registry of the London Station for eighteen months. Subject, fresh from a Saigon assignment, brought with him a broad and varied background of field experience (Far East) and several Headquarters' assignments. He has been in one or another aspect of records management work since he started with us as a very junior clerk in 1952.

Subject's fitness reports, since he has been in London, testify to the high regard in which he is held by the Station and the excellent results he has managed to achieve. When he arrived at the Station, the start had been made on a file reduction program but an enormous amount of organized work remained to be done. Subject set about it with great enthusiasm and a high degree of professional organization. As a result, the Registry inventory today is the leanest and the most efficient the Station has seen for many a long day, if ever before. To a great extent this can be laid at Subject's own door and he personally did much of the work. At the same time, Subject surveyed and reorganized the overall workload of the Registry and was finally able to recommend to the Station management a reduction of one Registry clerk. The smaller staff has certainly required a more intensive work effort on the part of Registry personnel, which has been attained without any loss of morale; in fact, quite the reverse.

Subject, therefore, emerges as a records management officer who has thoroughly learned his business and a hard-driving, sympathetic and successful supervisor. In the opinion of the Station management, Subject is already quite capable of taking over broader and more senior responsibilities in the records management field. In this respect, however, we do not believe he will be wasting his time in London by spending, as he currently plans to do, an additional year here on the completion of his tour in November. The London Registry, reflecting the multi-faceted work of the Station, is sufficiently complex an operation to warrant

Subject's continued attention.

In view of his really excellent performance and high promise, it is strongly recommended that Subject be promoted to GS-11.

/s/ Bronson Tweedy
COS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6 010032	(Print) WOODS	7-24 JAMES	S

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42
11	15	68					1			ENGLAND	210

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

TRAVEL VOUCHER	DISPATCH
CABLE	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
OTHER (*Specify*)	
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 1-15-68

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
AREA		
C & L DIVISION, OTHER	DATE 10 DEC 1968	SIGNATURE
✓ T & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 8-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

IMPORTANT

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility (OMI 20-6- dated October 1961) for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the field have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checked out for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 30 July 1962.

James G Woods — 15 Nov 68

Signature — date

JAMES G. [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
010032	Woods,	James	S.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 30, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			10	03	68		1			Vietnam	710

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☐ DISPATCH
☐ CABLE
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
✓ OTHER (*Specify*) telepouch

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. FVST 31976
DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 10/3/68

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OCD	✓	
	C & L DIVISION, CTOR.	DATE 10/15/68	SIGNATURE K. K. Lee
	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
010032	Woodard	James	S.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
01	14	67					1			Vietnam	772

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☑	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 764

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY				
☐	OCO	☐	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	C & L DIVISION, CTRS.	DATE 5/22/67		SIGNATURE L. Howard
✓	C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-10)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 7 October 1963, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

James S. Woods
Signature
JAMES S. WOODS

28 NOV 66
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

19 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. James S. Woods**

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. I have determined that you meet the criteria outlined in HR 20-50 for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System. Your designation as a participant was made effective 18 December 1966.

2. You are hereby notified of your right to appeal this action to the Director of Central Intelligence as specified in HR 20-50. Such appeal must be received in the Office of the Director not later than 30 calendar days from the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6		7-24		25-26
010032	Woods	James	S	45

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		✓ ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	05	28	66	09	24	66	Japan	375

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☒	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
	5/28 – 9/24/66

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	C & L DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
☒	C & T DIVISION	10/14/66	

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 2 Years from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

Evelyn M. Flagg
Office of Personnel
Evelyn M. Flagg

James S. Woods
(Employee)
James Sauvie Woods

Date: 23 Nov 66

SECRET

23 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Head, Clandestine Services Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - James S. Woods

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. As this award is designed to encourage excellence by recognizing and rewarding the employee, may I ask that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

29 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James S. Woods

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase

1. I was pleased to learn that you have been granted a Quality Step Increase. Such a recognition is proof of the high esteem in which you are held by your supervisors in the Clandestine Services.

2. Please accept my personal best wishes. I am confident that your future performance will be of a continuing high quality.

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

SECRET

61-257

4 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

ATTENTION: DDP/OP

SUBJECT: Request for Quality Step Increase for Mr. James S. Woods, GS-09

1. On the basis of the information presented below, it is recommended that a Quality Step Increase be approved for Mr. James S. Woods.

2. Mr. Woods entered on duty with the Agency in April 1952 as a GS-03 Records and File Clerk assigned to RID. Since that time Mr. Woods has served as a Records Analyst at Headquarters, in Korea and Atsugi, Manila, and since 1961 in the Central Registry Section of the Tokyo Station. Mr. Woods is 37 years old and has been in grade as a GS-09 since 1958.

3. Mr. Woods' exceptional performance is described by the Tokyo Station as follows:

> "A. Mr. Woods is now on his second tour as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry. This unit is located at Fuchu Air Station and handles all correspondence for all Station elements. In view of the fact that the Station is located in five different geographic locations, a great deal of responsibility is given to Mr. Woods to ensure that action responsibility on incoming cables is rapidly and properly assigned, dispatches are correctly routed and processed, correspondence from other local military agencies is correctly analyzed and routed, the twice-a-day courier system is functioning effectively, and the Station flexowriter is rapidly churning out priority dispatch traffic.
>
> "B. The Registry is presently composed of six employees in addition to Mr. Woods, who is Chief of this unit. Mr. Woods does an exemplary job in supervising these employees with the result that the Station Registry is a smooth and well-functioning unit.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

"C. In addition to his normal duties, Mr. Woods is constantly thinking of ways to increase the efficiency of the Station Registry, and to be of greater assistance to the Station as a whole. Several of his ideas have been adopted by the Station with a resulting increase in effectiveness. His positive approach to all problems and his cheerfulness and willingness to perform any task have benefited both the Station and the Agency.

"D. In view of Mr. Woods' demonstrated ability to provide leadership to the Station Registry unit, his positive approach to the solution of the many problems which daily beset this unit, it is strongly recommended that he be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10 at the earliest opportunity."

4. Mr. Woods has continued to perform in an over-all "Strong" manner as indicated in his recent fitness report. He recently planned and effectively implemented the move of the Cable Secretariat from one location to another. In a dispatch, dated 22 November 1965, the present Chief of Station, Tokyo, stated, "There is little I can add to my predecessor's recommendation, dated 9 November 1964, for promotion of Mr. Woods. He is performing his duties as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry with efficiency and dispatch. He is a strong supervisor who constantly strives to achieve the maximum economy in the use of his personnel and materials."

5. Consideration has been given to the granting of an Honor and Merit Award to Mr. Woods, but in this particular case it appears that a Quality Step Increase is more appropriate.

William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Division

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

MAR 11 1966
Secretary, CS Panel Section C

MAR 11 1966
Date

338985

SUBJECT: Request for Quality Step Increase for Mr. James S. Woods, GS-09

CONCUR:

Gerald E. Miller
DDP/OP

15 March 66
Date

APPROVED:

for John J. Caldwell
Director of Personnel

18 Mar '66
Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST / FIRST / MIDDLE)	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print) 7-24	25-26
10032	WOODS, JAMES S.	56

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	04	15	61				JAPAN	375

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE	✓	DUTY STATUS ~~OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE~~ REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT ~~DATE~~/PERIOD
—	30 MAR - 15 APR 1961

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓ FINANCE DIVISION SKP	26 JUNE 1961	

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

14-00000

3364 093614

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER I-5 F.P.M.
6 GAEO-3000

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ball-point pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. 070538

PART A ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): WOODS James S
2. DATE OF BIRTH — MONTH 2 DAY 20 YEAR 22
3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2
4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE): AICD APO 925 San Francisco, Calif. ☐
5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2
6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☒ NO ☐
7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range. UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1 $4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2 $6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3 $10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3, if applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN: Association Benefits Plan - Family
OPTION (HIGH OR LOW): High
ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER: 4 2 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband Louise A.	8 May 37	1			6
		2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☒

PART C FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3.

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐
2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐
3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
   - (a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
   - (b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
   - (c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan: 4 2 5
2. Number of event which permits change. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.) ~~7~~ 8
3. Date of event which permits change. MONTH March DAY 22 YEAR 1964

PART E ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER
(ALTERNATE)
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)
2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 3-1-64
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 3-15-64
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.

1 E

5010

Triplicate—To Employing Office

APRIL 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1, S

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
100321	Woods,	Janes	S.	51

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
[✓ 1 - PCS (Basic)] 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		
	1				03	19	59	Philippines	575

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓	FINANCE DIVISION		

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
9-58 EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

14-00000

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER I-5 F.P.M.
5 GAO 5 00

[illegible] LTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FOR 3372

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959

(Read [illegible] tions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ball [illegible] pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. ~~882697~~

PART A
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL) [illegible] S

2. DATE OF BIRTH (the numbers) MONTH DAY YEAR

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE) [illegible]

5. SEX MALE ☑ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☑ NO ☐

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1
$4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2
$6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3
$10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
[illegible] Plan	Low	4 2 5

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband [illegible]	6 May 1927	1			6
		2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3.

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
(c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan. 4 2 2

2. Number of event which permits change. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.) 7

3. Date of event which permits change. MONTH Mar DAY 31 YEAR 1961

PART E
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE) 27 Mar 61

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F
TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE 3/27/61

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION 4/16/61

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS (FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.)
FE 11632
X-2579

Triplicate—To Employing Office

April 1960

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of Twenty-four months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

Anna C. Phillips
Office of Personnel
Anna C. Phillips

James S Woods
(Employee)
James S. Woods

Date: 21 Feb. 1961

14-00000

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER I-5 F.P.M.
6 GAO 1-00

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959

(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ball point pen.)

3364

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. [illegible]

PART A ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) Woods (FIRST) James (MIDDLE INITIAL) S

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH 2 DAY [illegible] YEAR [illegible]

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) [illegible] (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) [illegible] (STATE) VA ☐

5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☑ NO ☐

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.

UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1
$4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2
$6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3
$10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
[illegible]	[illegible]	4 2 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception: List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband [illegible]	[illegible] 1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box)

(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1

(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2

(c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan. 4 2 1

2. Number of event which permits change (See table on back of brochure for proper number.) 2

3. Date of event which permits change MONTH Aug DAY 6 YEAR 1960

PART E ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

James S. Woods [illegible]
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

J. L. [illegible]
HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE 8/11/60

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION [illegible]

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY REGISTRANTS AND AGENCY.

[illegible]

11632

Triplicate—To Employing Office

APRIL 1960

14-00000

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER I-5 F.P.M.
6 GAO 3000

H' .TH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORᴹ

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ballpoint pen.)

3362

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. ~~033078~~

PART A ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): WOODS JAMES S
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers): MONTH 2 DAY 20 YEAR 28
3. Are you now married? YES ☐ 1 NO ☒ 2
4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE): FORESST RIVER NORTH DAKOTA ☐
5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2
6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by an enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☐ NO ☒
7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range. UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1 $4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2 $6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3 $10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer Item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer Item 2 and Item 3 if applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN: ASSOCIATION BENEFIT PLAN
OPTION (HIGH OR LOW): HIGH
ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER: 4 2 1

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐
2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐
3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
   - (a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
   - (b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
   - (c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B

1. Enrollment code number of present plan.
2. Number of event which permits change. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)
3. Date of event which permits change: MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART

S Woods 14 June 60
(SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
   SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL
2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 6/30/60
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 7/10/60
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.

FE

Triplicate—To Employing Office

APRIL 1960

10564

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

James S Woods
(Employee)
James S. Woods

Lorene E Norbeck
Office of Personnel
Lorene E. Norbeck

Date: 23 aug 57

CONFIDENTIAL

29 November 1956

JAMES S. WOODS

Korea Station wishes to express its appreciation to for his most diligent performance of duty during his recent TDY here, his highly cooperative attitude and above all, his extreme eagerness to get a job done well and expeditiously.

It was largely with his help that Korea Station was able to screen and process the voluminous material which needed to be handled in order to establish a coordinated and integrated record and file maintenance system.

All Korea Station personnel connected with the work of the TDY Team members were impressed and gratified by the eagerness with which they assisted with details and helped with problems that were outside the responsibilities of their assigned task. Their pleasant manner, apt suggestions, their excellent cooperation and untiring efforts to complete more than the initially estimated workload, all created a most favorable impression which reflects much credit not only on the team members themselves but on the Records Integration Branch as well.

Leland H. Carlisle

Leland H. CARLISLE
Chief, KOSTA (Rear)

CONFIDENTIAL

144 Beeik NRLL–
Oisar. Board
11-3

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

1. NAME (Last) Woods (First) James (Middle) S.

2. THIS DATE 6 August 1957 ✓

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME

☑ WAR AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA)
☑ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED (GHI)
☑ MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA - HOSPITALIZATION
☑ UNITED LIFE INSURANCE (UBLIC)
☑ AIR TRIP INSURANCE
☑ DREAD DISEASES *
☑ INCOME REPLACEMENT *
Fed fors

* CASH PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS AT THE TIME EMPLOYEE APPLIES FOR INSURANCE MUST COVER THE PERIOD OF TIME HE WILL BE AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS.

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance)

WDC - Tokyo - WASH - TDY

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INSURANCE PROGRAMS LISTED BELOW.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
Air Trip	✓		2017	———	4.00
FEGLI		✓			

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY

CPD (Signature) Patton

ICD (Signature) Esther Patterson

8. REMARKS

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to TARB for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPD files.

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

FORM NO. 797 REPLACES FORM 37-190
1 SEP 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Date 23 July 1954

Dear James S. Woods

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective 25 April 1954

Position: I.O.

Base Salary: GS-5 $3535.00

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave in accordance with Civil Service Commission rules and regulations, or such other provisions of law or regulations as may be established in lieu thereof.

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with CIA Regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside continental United States, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by CIA Regulations.

3. As a condition of your employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the continental United States. Each time you are so assigned, unless otherwise specified in advance by CIA, you will be required to remain at the post to which assigned for a period of 24 months from the date of arrival thereat, unless sooner transferred, reassigned or separated for reasons beyond your control. If you wish to return to the United States for personal reasons during that period, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

4. If this employment is for assignment to an overseas post, it is understood and agreed that, unless earlier separated for reasons beyond your control, you will remain in Government service for 12 months after your arrival at your first overseas post, and if you violate this agreement, any money expended by the United States on account of your travel and the transportation of your immediate family and household goods will be considered a debt due to the United States.

5. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of ~~six~~ months from date of employment. In the event

either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

6. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of CIA. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by Civil Service rules and regulations.

Ralph L. Lovelace
Official authorized to sign letters of appointment.

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by CIA.

James S Woods
Employee

23 July 54
Date

Form No. 51-104
June 1948

14-00000

2202 [illegible] PE-1 [illegible]

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. NAME (Last) Woods (First) James (Middle) S

2. THIS DATE 10 June 54

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME:

☑ WAR AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA) ☑ MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA

NI ☑ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED ☑ AIR TRIP INSURANCE

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance):

Lvg Wash. 2 July 54 To Minneapolis, Seattle, + Tokyo

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FOLLOWING INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
WAEPA	✓		#2574	P/R -$8.33-8/04/54	$27.55
Air Trip Ins	✓		28354		$4.00

James S Woods
SIGNATURE

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

SIGNATURE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY:

CPB: [illegible] SIGNATURE I&CB: [illegible] SIGNATURE

8. REMARKS:

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to T&2B for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPB files.

FORM NO. 37-190
1 MAR 54

(4)

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

C.I.A. (Department or agency) — (Bureau or division) — Washington, D.C. (Place of employment)

I, James S. Woods, do solemnly ~~swear (or~~ affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

April 21, 1952 (Date of entrance on duty)

James S. Woods (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 21st day of April, A. D. 1952,

at Washington (City) D.C. (State)

[SEAL]

Margaret C. Casey (Signature of officer)

5 USC 16 & 16A (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—68160-3

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*): 3505 Minn. Ave. S.E. Washington 19, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: Feb. 20, 1928
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*): Forest River, N. Dak.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: Mr. Rose a. Hoade Forest River, N. Dak.
(B) RELATIONSHIP: Father
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: Forest River, N. Dak
(D) TELEPHONE NO.: —

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☒ YES ☐ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
Miss Marilyn Hoade	3143 W 18th St. Denver, Col.	1. clerk 2. temporary 3. V.A.	sister		✓
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any; or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—53132-1

✓

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE		OFFICE 050	DIVISION RA
NAME (LAST) WOODS	(FIRST) JAMES	(MIDDLE) SHUYIE	BRANCH Processing & Records
			SECTION File

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
		DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
C.I.A. ~~April 21, 1952~~		21	4	1952				14	8	
Treasury Dept	15th & Penn	~~5~~ 7	11	1951	~~19~~ 23	4	1952	~~19~~	~~5~~	-
Treasury Dept.	15th & Penn	~~19~~ 20	5	1950	~~19~~ 12	9	1950	~~1~~ 10	~~4~~ 3	
							Total Civilian Service	18	9	—

SCD 11/12/48
verified 10/23/57

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
Army	3	10	1946	12	4	1948	10	6	1
Army	~~19~~ 10	~~10~~ 9	1950	7	8	1951	~~20~~ 15	~~10~~ 7	~~2~~
						Total Military Service	~~20~~ 9	~~1~~ 4	~~2~~ 2

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby ~~XXXXXXX~~ swear (or affirm) that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

April 21, 1952
DATE

James S. Woods
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)	V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY		
Margaret C. Macey 50 SC 160016 R SCD 11-8-48	TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE		
	DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
	25	1	3
MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE	as of 21 April 1952		

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry)

2. NAME: (last) WooDs (first) JAMES (middle) SAUVIE

3. Office RI/FI

4. Date of Birth Feb. 20, 1928

5. Sex: ✓ male (1) __ female (2)

Marital Status Single

Nr. Dependents 1

6. Employment Date: April 1952

7. Citizenship: ✓ U.S. __ Other

8. Acquired By: (1) ✓ Birth (2) __ Marriage (3) __ Naturalization (4) __ Other(specify)

Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ______

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
[✓ 4. Two years college, or less]
5. Over two years, no degree
6. Bachelor degree
7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
8. Masters degree
9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	
Aakers Business School - Grand Forks N. Dak.	accounting	Law	Oct Feb	48 50			Junior accounting Diploma		
Strayers College Washington D.C.	accounting	Law	Now attending						

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

4. Military, Intelligence or Investigative training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. State the nature of duties performed with this organization, starting with your present position. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From April 52 To Nov 52 Tot. mos. 7	Description of Duties:
Grade GS-4 Salary 3175 yr	Supervise the changing of the folders from [illegible] to ~~one~~ single documents, autostat documents for RI. Do requests and other general office duties.
Office RI/FI	
Position Title: CLERK	
Duty Title: General Office Work	Duty Station, if overseas:
From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____	Description of Duties:
Grade ____ Salary ____	
Office ____	
Position Title: ____	
Duty Title: ____	Duty Station, if overseas:
From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____	Description of Duties:
Grade ____ Salary ____	
Office ____	
Position Title: ____	
Duty Title: ____	Duty Station, if overseas:
From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____	Description of Duties:
Grade ____ Salary ____	
Office ____	
Position Title: ____	
Duty Title: ____	Duty Station, if overseas:
From ____ To ____ Tot. mos. ____	Description of Duties:
Grade ____ Salary ____	
Office ____	
Position Title: ____	
Duty Title: ____	Duty Station, if overseas:

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Previous Employment: Describe your previous work experience in sufficient detail to permit full recognition of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.

From Jan 52 To April 52 Tot. mo's 4 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) GS-3 Salary 2950 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Treasury Dept. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Div. of Investments	Exact Title of your position Fiscal accounting Clerk. Description of Duties: Working with Mexican Claims Duty Station if overseas:
From May 50 To Jan 52 Tot. mo's 7 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) GS-2 Salary 2750 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Treasury Dept. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Div. of Disbursements	Exact Title of your position Fiscal accounting Clerk Description of Duties: verified checks for correct names, addresses and money. Other 13 months of this period spent in the Army Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01___U.S. Secret Service
02___Civil Police
03___Military Police
04___U.S. Border Patrol
05___U.S. Narcotics Squad
06___FBI
07___Criminal Investigation Div.
21___Office of Naval Intelligence
22___Office of War Information
23___Army G-2
20___Office of Strategic Services
24___Air Force A-2
25___Foreign Economic Admin.
26___Counter Intelligence Corps
27___Immigration & Naturalization
28___Strategic Services Unit
29___Foreign Service, State Dept.
30___Central Intelligence Group
31___Armed Forces Security Agency
32___Coordinator of Information
33___Office of Facts & Figures
34___Board of Economic Warfare
35___Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
LANGUAGE	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein __________

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. __________

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
~~Tokyo, Ja~~				
Tokyo, Japan	Jan 47 - March 48	x (army)		
Korea	Dec 50 - June 51	x (army)		

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specialized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1. 50%	2.	35	1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand	1.	2. ✓	—	1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc.	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership.

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No

SEC. X. TESTS (Within present organization)

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken.

Type of Test	Date Taken

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

None

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour ✓ (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested ___.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment do you think you are best qualified?

One in which I may be able to use my accounting experience, such as some finance work or administrative work.

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status

Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ✓ Yes ___ No.

If yes, indicate your present draft classification 4 A

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status

Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___ Yes ✓ No.

If yes, complete the following.

1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service ARMY Grade P.F.C Serial Number ER17214704

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated ____________

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ____________

Location of Service Records, if known Washington 25, D.C

SEC. XV. TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken in this organization.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

DATE Nov. 13, 1952

SIGNATURE James

WEAR

REPORT OF QUALIFICATIONS

NOTE: THIS REPORT MUST NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (OR APPLICANT): WOODS, James S. Acct Clk.

THIS DATE: 20 December 1951

TEST RECORD

NOTE: PRINTED BLACK LINE REPRESENTS MEAN PERCENTILE RANKINGS OF GS-4'S. COLORED LINE REPRESENTS PERCENTILE RANKINGS FOR THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT.



TYPING			SHORTHAND			
GROSS	NET	ERRORS	1	2	3	TOT. TIME
28	18	10				

EVALUATION OF EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE

TYPE OF POSITION		OUTSTANDING	SUPERIOR	ADEQUATE	WEAK	INADEQUATE
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

QUALIFICATIONS TECHNICIAN

FORM NO. 37-70C
JAN 1950

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 25 August 1976

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Woods, James S.

3. POSITION TITLE: Records Admin Officer

4. GRADE: GS-12

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDO/CCS/RRD

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6352

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (*One block must be checked*)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Donald E. [illegible]

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: [illegible] HQS

EXT.: 6344

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Annual Exam Completed.

DATE: 4 October 1976

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: William T. Golder, OMS/PEO

FORM 9-72 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle): WOODS, James S.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 February 1928

3. GRADE: GS-10

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment): DDP/EUR

5. PRESENT POSITION: Records Admin Officer

6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION: c/o7152

7. PROPOSED STATION: Rome, Italy

8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade): Records Admin Officer 0699 (09)

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION: SS# 502-16-6806 Nominal (Light State)

10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE: 31 May 1971

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: -2-

12. COMMENTS

Please evaluate for proposed assignment.

No language is required for this position

Form 58 attached

13. DATE OF REQUEST: 8 March 1971

14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Floyd G. Lanter
Floyd G. Lanter, E/Pers

15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING: 4B0002 Hq.

16. EXTENSION: 7152

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

7 APR 197

QUALIFIED [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-60 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
100.32	WOODS JAMES SAUVIE	20 FEB 28	

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND			1964-1970			48 SEM HRS
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☒ ADD ☐ DELETE	Daughter	Bethesda, MD.	American	Rockville, MD 432 College Pkwy
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 444n USE PREVIOUS
10-68 EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAR 11 9 21 AM '71
MAIL ROOM

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO	2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS	4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT	6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE X James Saunie Woods

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 030032	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) WOODS JAMES S	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 02/20/28	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS-09-07
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT FE	9. LOCATION (Country, City) SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
JAPAN	PCS 56	54/08/01	56/07/01
JAPAN	TDY 56	56/08/01	56/11/01
MEXICO	TDY 56	57/02/01	57/08/01
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	PCS 56	57/09/01	59/03/19
JAPAN	PCS 45	61/04/24	66/09/24
VIETNAM	PCS 6	67/01/14	68/10/3

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 16 OCT 1968 INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		

FORM
1-67 444j
Mfg 7-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

29 F[illegible] ENTD

(4-51)

SECTION III EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (from - to)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM / QTR HRS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - TO			
1 U. OF MD. TACHIKAWA, JAPAN		ENG I	1966			3
2 U. OF MD. TACHIKAWA, JAPAN		BH 10	1966			3
3 U. OF MD. SAIGON		HIS 127	1967			3
U OF MD SAIGON		ECN 31	1967			3
4 U OF MD SAIGON		Py 1	1967			3

DATE
CS
[illegible] DATA

5 IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				
3.				

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				

SECTION IV NONE **GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL**

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY -- CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

SECTION V NONE **TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS**

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED -- CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card-punch, etc.)

SECTION VI NONE **SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS**

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. Provide license registry number if known.

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECTION VIII

AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): Jan 67 - Oct 68
2. LOCATION (Country, City): Saigon Vietnam
3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH:
4. TITLE OF JOB:
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB:
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): APR 61 - SEPT 66
2. LOCATION (Country, City): TOKYO, JAPAN
3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: FE
4. TITLE OF JOB: CHIEF OF REGISTRY
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS 9
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

SUPERVISED 7 EMPLOYEES IN REGISTRY WORK.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): FEB 59 - MAR 61
2. LOCATION (Country, City): WASH. D.C.
3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: FE
4. TITLE OF JOB: RECORDS ADMIN OFFICER
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-9
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

ASSIST THE FE RMO IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FE RECORDS. INCLUDED CLOSE LIAISON WITH RID. ALSO INVOLVED 4 MONTHS OF HALF-DAY WORK WITH DDP/MACHINE RECORD GROUP IN SETTING UP THE APERTURE CARD SYSTEM.

SECTION VIII	AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)	
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) AUG 57 - FEB 59	2. LOCATION (Country, City) MANILA, P.I.	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH FE
4. TITLE OF JOB CHIEF OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT TEAM		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-7 & GS-9

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

CHIEF OF A TEAM OF THREE INDIVIDUALS STATIONED PCS MANILA BUT TRAVELLED THROUGHOUT THE F.E. (INCLUDING AUSTRALIA) TO SET UP RECORD SYSTEMS, INCLUDING REGISTRY, ACCORDING TO HEADQUARTERS REGULATION. THIS WAS TO ENSURE THAT FIELD SYSTEMS WOULD BE IN LINE WITH HQS PROCEDURES.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) FEB 57 - JULY 57	2. LOCATION (Country, City) MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH WH
4. TITLE OF JOB TEAM MEMBER OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT TEAM		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-7

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

MEMBER OF A TEAM OF 4 SENT TO MEXICO TO ESTABLISH AND STREAMLINE A SYSTEM OF RECORDS. THIS INVOLVED SETTING UP A 201 SYSTEM, BETTER NAME TRACE SYSTEM, CHARGE-OUT SYSTEM FOR FILES AND THE MICROFILMING OF FBI RECORDS. MY MAIN SPECIALTY WAS 201'S.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) AUG 54 - NOV 56	2. LOCATION (Country, City) SEOUL, KOREA + FUCHU & YOKOSUKA, JAPAN	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH FE
4. TITLE OF JOB ADMIN ASSISTANT		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-5 & GS-7

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

NAME TRACES AND OTHER REGULAR REGISTRY DUTIES.

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY: MARRIED

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) WOODS (First) LOUISE (Middle) ANNE (Maiden) FALLON

3. DATE OF BIRTH: 8 MAY 1937

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): BROOKLYN, NEW YORK.

5. OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE.

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER: NA

7. CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S), COUNTRY(IES): —

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: —

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
CHRISTINE MARIE	DAU.	APR 14, 1963 TOKYO, JAPAN	American	DECEASED July 63

SECTION XI NONE PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO

DATE: 9 OCT 68

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James L Woods

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT	THIS DATE

Return to
QAB
1604 Curie

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel [illegible] will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item [illegible] more complete or correct than you have previously reported.

SECTION I GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
WOODS, JAMES SAUVIE

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
2224 F. ST. N.W. WASH. D.C

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
FOREST RIVER, NORTH DAKOTA

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
4791

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
U.S.A.

SECTION II PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
MR. ROSS A WOODS

2. RELATIONSHIP
FATHER

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
FOREST RIVER, NORTH DAKOTA

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
FOREST RIVER, NORTH DAKOTA NA

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
4791

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
NA

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
NA

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
NA

SECTION III MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

12 SEP

WIFE OR HUSBAND. If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)

6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)

CODED

7. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)

10 DEC

11. DATE OF BIRTH

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DATE OF ENTRY

14. PLACE OF ENTRY

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

16. DATE ACQUIRED

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)

18. OCCUPATION

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is unemployed, last two employers)

20. EMPLOYER'S OR OWN [illegible] ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM NO. 444b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

NA

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

NA

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
UNION TRUST CO.	WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

NA

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

NA

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*
U.S.A.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS
NA

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First papers, etc.)*
NA

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☒	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
[illegible] NA							

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
HadLicKs PRIVATE	Accounting	NOV-48	APR-49	9 month
Business school GRAND FORKS, N. DAK.		OCT-49	FEB 50	

4. MILITARY TRAINING *(Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)*

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
NA				

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NA

SECRET

SECTION VIII FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

CANCELLED

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED															HOW ACQUIRED			
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
	R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK																		
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD.

SECTION IX GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE", INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
NA						

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

NA

SECTION X TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.) 30

2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.) NA

3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

NA

SECTION XI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

NA

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

NA

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

NA

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

NA

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue) NA

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue) NA

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

NA

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NA

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

NA

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

NA

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): APR-1952-JUNE-1954
2. GRADE: 4
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: FILE CLERK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

Worked in FILES doing Filing and other Related duties.
Worked in Consolidation with 201's

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): July 54 - June 56
2. GRADE: 5
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FE/6 OVERSEAS
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

HEAD OF PERSONALITY FILE (201 FILES) SECTION FOR BASE, which included ALL AGENT FILES.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): AUG 56 - NOV 56
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI TDY OVERSEAS FOR FE/6
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 5
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

RETIREMENT OF RECORDS TO Hqs FROM BASE.
SET up NEW SYSTEM OF RECORDS FOR BASE

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): DEC 56 - JAN 57
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

Worked in RI/AN 201 SECTION in FILLING out 831's

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): FEB 57 - AUG 57
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI TDY - MEXICO
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

SET up SYSTEM OF RECORDS FOR STATION

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Can't recall addresses but lived in the following places since Apr 1952 -

Conn. Ave. N.W. D.C.
Minnesota Ave. S.E. D.C
Colonial terrace, arlington, VA.
Greenbrier St, arlington, VA.

DATE COMPLETED: 10 Sept 57

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James S Woods

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6) 116632	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Woods, James S	Feb	20	1928

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
000	9	9	57	☒ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 9 Sept 57	SIGNATURE James S Hoode
(46)	(47)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 57 - NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYN.

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: Accountant

2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement):

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State): Washington D.C.

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION:

5. MR. MRS. MISS (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): James Sauvie Woods

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 2817 Conn. Ave. N.W.

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Washington 8, D.C.

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): N. Dak.

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: ex 8400 et 2612

(B) HOME PHONE: AD 8430

9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): Feb. 20, 1928

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Forest River, N. Dak.

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 6 INCHES

(B) WEIGHT: 136 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE: GS-2

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON APPOR.

MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED

ENTERED REGISTER:

NOTATIONS:

APP. REVIEW:

APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 2950 PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 4 TO 6 MONTHS ☒ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year): FROM May, 1950 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Fiscal Accounting clerk

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service): GS-2

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING, $ 2450 PER year; PRESENT, $ 2830 PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Washington D.C.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mrs. Gervias

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Treasury Dept. Penn. Ave.

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Division of Disbursements

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT: Better Position

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:
Working with vouchers and checks; checking them for names, dates, money, etc. Doing other clerkical duties of a general nature.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

18 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Feb, 1950 TO May, 1950

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Clerk & Salesman

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $
FINAL $ 180 PER month

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)
Grand Forks, N. Dak.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Mr. or Mrs. Pat M. Byrne

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
General Tobbacco & Candy Company
Grand Forks, N. Dak.

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)
Wholesaler of Tobacco & Candy

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
None

REASON FOR LEAVING
To work for the Government

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Selling tobacco and candy. Doing office work such as taking inventorys and making out sales tickets.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Oct, 1949 TO Feb, 1950

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
In school

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM April, 1949 TO Oct, 1949

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Farm Laborer

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $
FINAL $ 150 PER month

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)
Inkster, N. Dak.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Mr. Zeck Thomas

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
Zeck Thomas Inkster, N. Dak.

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)
Farming

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
none

REASON FOR LEAVING
To go to school

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Doing general farm duties.

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (*month, year*)
FROM Oct, 1948 TO April, [illegible]

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
In School

CLASSIFICATION [illegible] (*if in Federal service*)

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (*city and State*)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (*firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division*)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (*e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.*)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING **In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)**

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING

18 EDUCATION. (*Circle highest grade completed*):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 ⑫

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF
☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED
Forest River High, Forest River, N. Dak.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED
English, Bookkeeping and Math

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Hadlich's Priviate	Accounting	Oct. 48	April	49		Junior		
Business School	& Tax	Oct. 49	Feb.	50		Accountancy		
Grand Forks, N. Dak.						Diploma		

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
		Accounting	
		Income Tax	

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (*show name and location of school*) OR IN-SERVICE TRAINING IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19 INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR

22 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (*such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.*)?

☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE.

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20 IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (*e. g., military service, business, education, recreation*) Jan. 1947 to March 1948 in Japan. Nov. 1950 to June 1951 in Korea.

23 GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (*do not submit copies unless requested*)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

21 LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 35 SHORTHAND .....

24 REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

	FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.	Robert Hadlich	Box 659, Grand Forks, N. Dak.	Teacher
2.	Calmer Hovland	521 Maple Ave. Grand Forks N. Dak.	Teacher
3.	Merland W Berg	618 Cottonwood St., Grand Forks N. Dak.	Teacher

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25 MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26 ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein		X
30 SINCE YOUR 18TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*		X
31 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case*		X
32 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39*		X
33 HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34 DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35 ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39*		X
36 DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a **PEACETIME VETERAN** who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a **DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN**, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a **WAR-TIME VETERAN** not claiming disability preference, you should **NOT** submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer *prior* to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37 (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D)

DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
Oct. 1946 Oct. 1950	April, 1948 August, 1951
BRANCH OF SERVICE *(Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.)*	SERIAL NO. *(If none, give grade or rating at time of separation)*
Army	ER 17 214 704

	YES	NO
38 (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		X
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		X
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		X

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19.....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39 SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (Indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this form.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80)

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

(Sign your name in full, your given name, initial or initials, and surname). If married woman, Mrs. Mary ... sign your given name as "Mrs. Mary L. ..."

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT 1008

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient space.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? [illegible]

SECTION I PERSONAL BACKGROUND

[illegible]

ADVANCE NAME CHECK

[illegible]

FATHER [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] N/A

DATE OF BIRTH N/A PLACE OF BIRTH N/A

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. GIVE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP N/A WHEN ACQUIRED [illegible] WHERE

OCCUPATION N/A [illegible] ADDRESS N/A

SEC. 18. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES.

N/A

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible] MILITARY SERVICE [illegible]

[illegible]

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON [illegible]

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS [illegible] 1950 [illegible] August [illegible] 1951 [illegible]

[illegible] CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST [illegible] YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL [illegible] OR OTHER GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN OR SUPPORT OF ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED.

[illegible]

[illegible] MISCELLANEOUS

DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

YOU ARE [illegible] TO HAVE THE CONTENTS OF [illegible] HEREIN WAS INVESTIGATED [illegible]

[illegible] AND [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] I attended [illegible] school [illegible] from the first grade to the [illegible] at which time I entered Forest River school. The address of [illegible] school is Inkster, N. Dak. As I've stated I entered Forest River school in 1936.

[illegible] From June 1946 to October 1946 I worked on Zeek Thomas Farm located at Inkster, N. Dak.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Aaker's School of Business

Grand Forks, North Dakota

REPORT OF PROGRESS

NAME WOODS, James S. ADDRESS Forest River, N. Dak. COURSE OF STUDY Accountancy DATE December 14, 1951

SCHOLASTIC ACHIEVEMENT

SUBJECTS COMPLETED:

	E	D	C	B	A
Elementary Accounting					X
Advanced Accounting					X
Income Tax					X
Cost Accounting (Elem.)				X	
Typewriting				X	
Spelling					X
Business Mathematics					X
Business Law					X
Penmanship			X		
Salesmanship				X	
Business English				X	
Office Machines					X

KEY

A Superior
B Above Average
C Average
D Fair
E Slow

COMPLETED SUBJECTS

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

	E	D	C	B	A
INITIATIVE					X
QUALITY OF WORK				X	
QUANTITY OF WORK				X	
ENTHUSIASM					X
PUNCTUALITY					X
COOPERATION					X
ADAPTABILITY				X	

KEY

	E	D	C	B	A
INITIATIVE	Needs Supervision	Routine Worker	Fairly Progressive	Resourceful	Marked Ability
QUALITY OF WORK	Careless	Inaccurate	Passable	Good Quality	Highest Quality
QUANTITY OF WORK	Very Low Output	Low Output	Average Output	High Output	Very High Output
ENTHUSIASM	Indifferent	Occasionally Enthusiastic	Average	Determined	Confident
PUNCTUALITY	Undependable	Improvement Needed	Occasionally Absent or Late	Seldom Late	Always Punctual
COOPERATION	Reluctant	Passive	Usually Agreeable	Co-operative	Co-operative
ADAPTABILITY	Limited	Slow	Average	With Ease	Exceptional

Manager

Please keep this report for future comparison

h.1

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 26 March 1952

TO: Chief, Personnel Division

FROM: Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: WOODS, James Sarvis

Your Reference: H-3007A

Case Number: 61415

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the EOD procedures.

C. V. Broadley

Mr. Clements

1/2: will call back:

Dol Spida called 1/2: ok

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-131
JUL 1951

[illegible] sent to d filing. [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 29 Feb. 1952

TO: Chief, Personnel Division

FROM: Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: WOODS, James Sauvie 61415 Request No. N-3007-A

1. Reference is made to your request for security clearance of the subject person who is being considered for employment in the following position: File Clerk, GS-2, OSO, RI, Proc. & Rec., Washington, D. C.

2. This is to advise you of the following security action:

a. ☐ Provisional security clearance is granted to permit subject's employment on a temporary basis in the following area or in the following capacity:

This clearance is granted upon the condition that subject: 1. not have access to classified material; 2. not have access to secure areas; 3. not be issued a badge or credential; 4. not represent himself as a CIA employee; and 5. not be assigned to any unclassified duties other than indicated above.

b. ☒ Name-checks have been completed on this person. Arrangements should now be made by your office for an interview in this Division. Upon completion of this interview further consideration will be given to the requested Limited clearance for access to information classified no higher than Secret. If subject has not entered on duty under a previously granted provisional clearance the interview should be arranged after entrance on duty.

c. ☐ Subject is security approved for temporary appointment to a position requiring access to information classified no higher than Secret.

Officials of the employing office should be advised of this security limitation and should be instructed to supply future supervisors with advice as to the limitation so as to insure continued compliance.

Security action to effect full approval is continuing and your office will receive advice of full clearance upon completion of this action. Upon receipt of full security clearance, the present limitation will be rescinded and supervisors should be advised accordingly.

3. Cancel per [illegible] 5 Mar.

C V Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-106
JUL 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 25 January 1952

TO: Chief, Personnel Division

FROM: Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: WOODS, James Sauvie #61415 Request No. N-3007

1. Reference is made to your request for security clearance of the subject person who is being considered for employment in the following position:

2. This is to advise you of the following security action:

a. ☒ Provisional security clearance is granted to permit subject's employment on a temporary basis in the following area or in the following capacity: D Street Pool.

This clearance is granted upon the condition that subject: 1. not have access to classified material; 2. not have access to secure areas; 3. not be issued a badge or credential; 4. not represent himself as a CIA employee; and 5. not be assigned to any unclassified duties other than indicated above.

b. ☐ Name-checks have been completed on this person. Arrangements should now be made by your office for an interview in this Division. Upon completion of this interview further consideration will be given to the requested Limited clearance for access to information classified no higher than Secret. If subject has not entered on duty under a previously granted provisional clearance the interview should be arranged after entrance on duty.

c. ☐ Subject is security approved for temporary appointment to a position requiring access to information classified no higher than Secret.

Officials of the employing office should be advised of this security limitation and should be instructed to supply future supervisors with advice as to the limitation so as to insure continued compliance.

Security action to effect full approval is continuing and your office will receive advice of full clearance upon completion of this action. Upon receipt of full security clearance, the present limitation will be rescinded and supervisors should be advised accordingly.

3.

SENT

1952 FEB 13 12

C. V. Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-106
JUL 1951

OAF OF TERMINATED FILE BEING MICROFILMED

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: PERMINDEX CORP.
DCD DOCUMENTS

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: DCD

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

Permindex Corporation

F 776.9

CONT 359

YOUR CITE VA 47261

SAME FROM SUPPORT (GRANT)

CASE 31735 RPT 31765, REOUR VA 46669 RPT 46669

57769

CAN YOU GIVE US ANY IDEA OF WHEN AND IF WE WILL GET A D RPT D AND B RPT B REPORT ON PERMINDEX AND WORLD TRADE CENTER?

A-59621

[illegible] 59621

F 7969

Chief, New York Office

30 November 1959

Chief, Contact Division (Support)

New Case 31785

CASE 82

MES-59621

3-79677

1. Commercial Staff has requested a Dun & Bradstreet report on Permindex Ltd., a Swiss Corporation Registered in Bern, Jan 1956, and its affiliate formed in Rome, Centro Mondiale Commerciale (World Trade Center). We are advised that Dr. Ferenc Nagy, former Prime Minister of Hungary, is president of Permindex. A-79699

2. Attached is outline of information desired on the two organizations. If the D & B report does not contain the financial information desired, would you please try to obtain this information through your bank sources.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Attachment
LJGrant:ga
cc: Index

Copy filed 59621

C

14-00000

P-1-011

REC

JA CITE NYOR 9195

SUPPORT (GRANT) FROM DADE

CASE 31789 (31789 - PERMINDEX

CASE A/

65 MAY 15 11 22 33

1. SEE THESE TWO PAPERS FOR BACKGROUND

A) N.Y. TIMES, 31 AUGUST 1959 (31 AUGUST 1959

B) DAILY AMERICAN, ROME X ROME, 9-15 NOV 1958 (9-15 NOV 1958

use S-79699

2. ONE OF DIRECTORS ENRICO MANDEL-MANTELLO X ENRICO MANDEL-MANTELLO WAS RECENTLY IN US X US, EXPECTS TO BE BACK TO N.Y.C. ABOUT 17 JAN 1963 X 17 JAN 1962. HE IS ONE OF DIRECTORS AND ALSO DESCRIBED AS IN CHARGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS.

3. ADDRESS: DUFOURSTR 11, BASEL X DUFOURSTR 11, BASEL

CAPITAL - 1 APT 1 MILLION FRENCH FRANCS

I-79699

OFFICERS - DR. FERENC NAGY X DR. FERENC NAGY, PRESIDENT

use S-79699

FRITZ SCHURCH X FRITZ SCHURCH, V.P.

use S-79699

DR. ERNST W. INFELD X DR. ERNST W. INFELD, DELEGATE

use S-79699

DR. ERNST FEISST X DR. ERNST FEISST

= 11679

DR. ERNST FOLLENDORF. DR. ERNST FOLLENDORF

(HEAD OFFICE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM BERN BERN TO BASEL IN 1956 X 1956.

4. THEY PLAN TO OPEN A NYC OFFICE IN JAN 1960 JAN 1960.

5. WILL TRY TO OBTAIN MORE DETAIL LATER.
LITTLE ELSE AVAILABLE NOW.

6. SHALL WE SEND ANY REPORT NO. NO. FOR DONALD DONALD CREDITT

SOURCE: ALFRED BARTH A-116
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK

A-79677

SECRET

Chief, DD/S-CM
ATTN: Mr. Charles P. White

23 December 1959

CASE 84

Chief, Contact Division, OO

S-79699 A-59621

Perminidex, Ltd and World Trade Center

REF : Your memorandum dated 23 Nov 1959 - CD/OO Case 31785

1. As you were previously advised, Dun & Bradstreet had no available information on either of the subject concerned. However, a bank source of this office has provided the following preliminary information.

2. For background our source suggested that we refer to the New York Times, 31 August 1959 and the Daily American, Rome, 9-10 November 1958. One of the directors, also described as being in charge of administrative affairs, Enrico Mandel-Mantello, was recently in the US and expects to return to New York City about 17 Jan 1960. S-79699

A-79699

3. The address of Perminidex is Dufourster 11, Basel (office transferred from Bern to Basel in 1956). They plan to open a New York City office in January 1960. Capital: One million French Francs. Officers: Dr. Ferenc Nagy, President; Fritz Schurch, Vice President; Dr. Ernst W. Infeli, Delegate; Dr. Ernst Feisst; Dr. Ernst Follender. S-79699 S-79699 S-79699

4. We will forward additional information as it becomes available. We are also trying to obtain information from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers. A-5199 A-2412

5. If you have any questions please contact Lillian I. Grant, extension 2268.

K. M. ASHCRAFT

LIGrant/fet
cc: Index

Copy filed 59621

SECRET

F-79699

Chief, DD/S - CI 22 January 1960
ATTN: Mr. Charles P. White

Chief, Contact Division, OO

S-79699 A-59612

PERMINDEX, Ltd. and World Trade Center

REF : Your memorandum dated 23 November 1959, CD/OO Case 31785

1. Attached for your retention is a brochure on subject organizations which was received by National Association of Manufacturers about early November 1959. A-2442

2. NAM also suggested that additional information might be obtained from Lloyd McMahon, now Federal Judge of Southern District Court, New York City, who was formerly General Counsel for PERMINDEX, Ltd. If you wish our New York Office to pursue this lead, please let us know. S-67472

3. As we believe Mr. Crowley advised you, the Foreign Department of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce does not maintain records of individual foreign companies. C of C suggested that the World Trade Division, Dept. of Commerce might have some information which we presume you have already checked out.

4. Please advise Lillian I. Grant, CD/OO, Support Branch, extension 2268, of further wishes concerning this subject.

Z. M. ASHCRAFT

Attachment

LIGrant/fet
cc: Index

Not orig.

Copies filed in above jackets

1 C

STANDARD FORM 66
October 1960
FURNISHED BY U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Federal Personnel Manual R-1
66-101

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

448219

RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 70-274 BOX 23

0 7 JUL ENTD

NOEL, JAMES A.

[illegible]

21 MAY

term
8-3-68

70-374
8-23

Mr. James A. Noel
2057 Flying Hills Lane
El Cajon, California 92020

Dear Mr. Noel:

I am very pleased to forward to you your Letter of Commendation from Mr. Helms and your Certificate of Retirement.

Your service medallion has been ordered and, of course, will be sent to you as soon as it is received from the engraver. You should have it in approximately ten weeks.

Sincerely,

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

Enclosures

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - OPF
1 - D/Pers
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

CIA Letterhead

OP/RAD/ROB/EGraff: gln 14 May 1975

[illegible] 5706

Post Office Box 1925
Washington, D.C. 20013

2 [illegible]

Mr. James A. Noel
2057 Flying Hills Lane
El Cajon, California 92020

Dear Mr. Noel:

I am responding to your letter of 27 November addressed to Mr. John F. Blake, former Director of Personnel.

Your request that your Certificate of Retirement and your Letter of Commendation from the Director be released to you was given very careful consideration. I am most sorry to advise that circumstances still prevail which preclude their release.

Sincerely,

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/EGraff:blc (18 December 1973)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CCS/CSB Mr. Biladeau CH-44 Hqs	7 Dec	
2			
3			
4	ROB/Eleanor		
5	205 Magazine		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Dick:

Would you please take another look at this one to see if we might now release letter and certificate.

Eleanor

His cover status has not changed. This is his yearly letter. RB

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
ROB, 205 Magazine, x2847	12/5/73

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions. (40)

2057 Flying Hills Lane
El Cajon, Calif., 92020

November 27, 1973

Mr. John F. Blake
Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C., 20505

Dear Mr. Blake:

I am writing to you personally and directly at the suggestion of my old friend and new neighbor, Don Marelius.

As the records will show I retired in the spring of 1971 after 40 years of Federal service 27 of which were with the Agency and predecessor organizations. At the time of my retirement a small ceremony was held, presided over by Mr. Tom K., and I was shown various items attesting to my length of service, dedication to duty, etc. However, I was not permitted to take these items with me due to certain cover considerations which I admit have never been quite clear to me. I was told informally in the division that perhaps after a year the items would be forwarded to me. It will soon be three years and I have not yet received them.

I am sure I don't need to tell you how much these items mean to me and what they will mean to my sons in later years. Therefore I would appreciate hearing from you as to the status of these items. I am sure there are many other fellows in the same boat.

Anxiou~~l~~sly awaiting your reply, I am

Sincerely,

James A. Noel

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief, FR Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Base, Los Angeles

SUBJECT
ISOLOG/ADMIN - Retirement Letter & Certificate - Cecil J. KLOBUKAR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: For your retention
Ref: USLS-416, dated 8 November 1971

Forwarded under separate cover is the retirement letter and certificate of Cecil J. KLOBUKAR. KLOBUKAR has seen these documents and they are being returned per Reference instructions.

P Hill

Lisle P. HILLQUIT

Attachment:
Letter & Certificate u/s/c

Distribution:
3-C, FR w/att u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
USLT-431

DATE
21 March 1972

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

August 25, 1971

Dear Tom -

I am taking advantage of Gene's coming visit to Washington to send you this little note.

We will be moving to the San Diego area the end of this month and hoped to be settled into our new home there by the time mid-September rolls around.

Tom, you will recall that at the time of my retirement you presented me with a letter from Dick, a certificate of service, and (I understood) a silver medallion. All of these items were then returned to be safely stored away until some future date - not specified. I am sure you can appreciate that these items mean an awful lot to me - and eventually will mean a lot to my two sons. I realize and appreciate the need, because of cover reasons, for discretion with respect to displaying these items to friends, etc. At the same time I realize that as the years pass the chances of these items getting "lost" or falling between the chairs back home is very good. I do not want to lose them and it goes without saying that I would honor any restrictions that might be imposed in the event they are sent to me. The outfit in past years has entrusted me with top secrets, with the management of unvouchered funds, with details of sensitive operations. Surely it can now trust me to use intelligent discretion in the safeguarding of these items I write about. I would appreciate it Tom if you would take this request into careful consideration.

When I saw you last in Washington you promised one day you would be making a trip out to San Diego. I am holding you to that and hope it will be soon.

Lillian joins me in sending you our warmest regards. Don't forget - wherever I am you and the outfit have a sincere friend who is prepared to help out to the best of his ability.

Sincerely,

Jim

James A. Noel

SECRET

14 September 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/ADDP

SUBJECT: Mr. James A. Noel

1. Mr. James Noel was uninterruptedly employed by the Department of State from 1931 to 1968. From 1931 to 1944 Mr. Noel was a bona fide Foreign Service Officer. Since 1944 his Department of State employment was in cover status while he was with OSS, SSU, CIG and CIA. He ostensibly retired from the Department of State in 1968. Until his actual retirement from CIA in 1971, he had cover as a consultant for the Department of Army. Mr. Noel received a 35 year certificate and service pin from the Department of State in lieu of the usual CIA retirement documentation and awards. Mr. Noel retired under cover and continues to be administered in this manner.

2. Under current guidelines, personnel retiring from CIA under cover do not receive any CIA retirement documentation or awards since this would be inconsistent with the retention of cover in retirement status.

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
Chief, Central Cover Staff

SECRET

71 6983

71-[illegible]

2 0 MAR 1971

Mr. James A. Noel
1807 Sebastian Drive
Burlingame, California 94010

Dear Jim:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your more than forty years of service to your country. The success with which you have met this challenge should be a source of lasting pride and satisfaction to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

19 MAR 1971

Distribution:
O - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

Telephone Concurrence
*Concur: 16 March 1971
C/EAB/OS

OP/RAD/ROB/ERanochak:sl (16 March 1971)
* May be shown to Subject but must be retained in Agency files.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE
22 May 1970

TO:
OP/TRB - John McCann

ROOM NO.	BUILDING
5 E 13	Hqs

REMARKS.

Would you be able to get the prior Federal Service file on this fellow. He's now a Career Agent with DOD and making retirement plans.

JAMES A NOEL 055297
SSN 083-36 2788.

5/25/70 Request sent to Fed. R/C. [illegible]
7/14/70 Request sent to State thru CCS. [illegible]
7/13/70 RID searching OSS file for State Dept file. [illegible]
9/8/70 - Per P.S. (ROB) we have been [illegible] from [illegible] for [illegible] [illegible]

FROM: RAD/ROB - E. Graff

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
205	Magazine	3257

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20415

F/R

REQUEST FOR OFFICIAL FILES

TO:

National Personnel Records Center
General Services Administration
111 Winnebago Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63118

DATE 25 MAY 1970 6-5-70
INA:SNT

FILE SSN: 083-36-2388

NAME N-400
NOEL, JAMES A.

DATE OF BIRTH 19 MARCH 1911

Please furnish the following material, needed by the Commission for the purpose shown below. The bottom part of this form is for your use as a transmittal. This material will be returned to you as soon as it has served its purpose. Any material classified under E.O. 10501 should be safeguarded and transmitted in accordance with the requirements of that order.

MATERIAL NEEDED:

- ☒ Official Personnel File
- ☐ Abstract of Federal Employment from Official Personnel File
- ☐ Copies of any interviews held
- ☐ Copies of interrogatories and replies
- ☐ All copies of FBI reports of investigation (if you no longer employ this person, these reports will not be returned — See FPM Chapter 736, Subchapter 5.)
- ☒ U.S. STATE DEPT.
  FOREIGN SERVICE
  ENSENADA, MEXICO & GUADALAJARA, MEXICO
  EMPLOYED: 26 JAN. 1931 - 8 AUG. 1944

PURPOSE:

- ☐ Request for consideration under C.S. Regulation 731.401.
- ☐ Request for consideration under C.S. Regulation 732.401.
- ☐ To answer Congressional or other correspondence
- ☐ For use in considering pending application for examination.
- ☒ Special Request

Chief, Division of Adjudication and Appraisal

Kimbell Johnson, Director
Bureau of Personnel Investigations

TO: Division of Adjudication and Appraisal
Bureau of Personnel Investigations
U. S. Civil Service Commission
Washington, D. C. 20415

The material indicated below is attached as requested.

- ☐ Official Personnel File
- ☐ Abstract of Federal Employment
- ☐ Copies of any interviews held
- ☐ Copies of interrogatories and replies
- ☐ All copies of FBI reports of investigation

REMARKS: The official personnel folder for Mr. Noel is in the custody of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel Records, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

6-18-70

DATE	SIGNATURE	OFFICIAL TITLE
25 MAY 1970		PERSONNEL

IN 502
OCTOBER 1969

SECRET

27 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

SUBJECT : Mr. James A. Noel

REFERENCE : Dispatch - USFT-1584, 19 March 1970

1. Attached is a copy of a dispatch from subject, now a career agent - in which he poses certain questions with respect to his retirement status based on former service with the Department of State. We forwarded the dispatch to Central Cover Staff, for action with the Department of State. We were informed that there is no record of subject's service in Mexico either with the Civil Service or the Department of State, since records have been destroyed.

2. Since subject's retirement plans are directly involved with the service claimed, it would be appreciated if his records could be checked. Perhaps the Records Center could be checked.

(signed) Virginia C. Lynch
Virginia C. Lynch
Chief, DO Personnel & Training

Attachment: As Stated

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

ABSTRACT

TO
Chief, Domestic Operations

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Base, San Francisco

SUBJECT
TUSLOG/LCWIN
Retirement Plans - [redacted] Conrad A. Neil

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: USFS-860, 26 February 1970

1. Reference has been seen and noted by [redacted] and Headquarters' offer to assist him in programming his retirement is greatly appreciated.

2. There is a matter in which Headquarters could be of assistance and which, conceivably, could influence a decision on the part of [redacted] to retire before he reaches his 60th birthday in March 1971. It is this. When [redacted] resigned from LNGOLD on 15 August 1954, to accept employment on 16 August 1954, with WOHIVE, he had to his credit with LNGOLD a considerable amount of annual and sick leave accrued over a period of almost fourteen years. Due to regulations or practices in effect at that time he was not paid for his annual leave but was told that both his annual and sick leave balances would be held in escrow and if he returned to LNGOLD employment in the future the credits would be reinstated. Years later when [redacted] was being integrated into LNGOLD, he inquired concerning the old annual and sick leave credits and was informed by the LNGOLD official handling the integration papers that reinstatement of his leave could not be granted due to the fact that there had been a "break in the continuity of [redacted]'s government

...Continued...

Distribution:

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
USFT-1534

DATE
19 March 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

service" as reflected by the papers submitted by [illegible] to LNGOLD in connection with the integration process. This break in the continuity of service was completely fictitious but was inserted into the employment record of [redacted] by our cover people for some technical reason not clear to [redacted]. [redacted] has been in continual government service from 26 January 1931 to date without a single day's break in service, as his personnel record will disclose. He realizes, of course, that he has long lost his annual leave credit with LNGOLD and the lost annual leave is therefore not a matter of contention at this writing. However, he is most interested in now ascertaining whether the sick leave which he had to his credit when he resigned from LNGOLD in 1944 can be recovered and added to his sick leave balance now being held by KVROCK. Since unused sick leave can now be used in computing longevity for retirement purposes, the recovery of this sick leave could play an important part in [redacted] retirement plans. Consequently, he would greatly appreciate it if the appropriate Headquarters officials would look into this matter at their earliest convenience.

3. [redacted] would also like to raise another matter relating to his service with LNGOLD. [redacted] served from October 1933 to July 1941 at Mazatlan, Mexico, which was then designated by the LNGOLD as an "unhealthful post" for retirement purposes. Each year of duty at an unhealthful post entitled the employee to one and one half years of credit for retirement purposes. [redacted] would appreciate learning whether his service at Mazatlan during the period mentioned would, under present rules, entitle him to extra retirement credit.

4. A ruling by Headquarters on the two points raised is respectfully requested.

William G. BOLAND

Originated by [redacted]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 July 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER 055292	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) NOEL JAMES A ✓	
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 08 DAY 03 YEAR 68	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6 FUNDS: V TO V; V TO CF; CF TO V; XX CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE 9129-0256	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD US FIELD INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP SAN FRANCISCO BASE	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.	
11 POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF BASE	12 POSITION NUMBER 0150	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.08	16 GRADE AND STEP 16 6
17 SALARY OR RATE $ 26,640 ✓		

18 REMARKS

Subject is reemployable.

1815 H. St. N.W.
WASH., D.C.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Virginia C. Lynch Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO Pers. & Training	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 3 aug 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 45	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HQRTRS CODE 2	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. 03 DA. 19 YR. 11	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE 1	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE BL 00	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE 7 1 MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO.	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37 LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 O P APPROVAL HB. Fisher	DATE APPROVED 6 AUG. 68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE 08 August (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON.

Retired

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE—	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE see attached

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code*)

1815 H. St. NW
Washington DC

PERSONAL AFFAIRS BRANCH
AUG 8 11 21 AM '68
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a — The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains *only* to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 — "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular
Part Time
Temporary
Temporary-Part Time
Summer
Detail Out
Detail In
WAE
Consultant
Military

Item 9 — "Organizational Designations" should show *all* levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE: Major Component (*Director, Deputy Director, etc.*)
Office, Major Staff, etc.
Foreign Field or U.S. Field (*if pertinent*)
Division or Staff (*subordinate to first line*)
Branch
Section
Unit

Items 11 and 15 — "Position Title" and "Occupational Series" should be the standard abbreviated title and corresponding occupational series in Handbook of Official Occupational Titles and Codes for the duties actually to be performed by the employee. If different from the title and series of the position occupied as shown on the most current edition of the Position Control Register or Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization, explain under Item 18—Remarks.

Item 18b — Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, *the gaining Career Service should approve* and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING— The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel *through* the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of Finance, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 April 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 055292

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): NOEL, JAMES A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REMOVAL FROM CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM - VOLUNTARY

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 05 YEAR 68

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 8129-0256

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/DOD

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16

17. SALARY OR RATE: $

18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY CODE
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HQQTRS. CODE
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. [redacted]
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: RK 4-25-68
46. OP APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 23 APR 68

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 OCTOBER 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER 055292	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) NOEL JAMES A.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 10 DAY 08 YEAR 67	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF XX	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE 8129-0256	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD U.S. FIELD INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP SAN FRANCISCO BASE	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	
11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF BASE (GS-00)	12 POSITION NUMBER 0150	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 ~~5~~ 6	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 23425

18 REMARKS

T/O Change.

TRA

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO Pers. & Training	DATE SIGNED 12 OCT 1	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Paul [illegible]	DATE SIGNED 16 Oct 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 39	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC [illegible]	ALPHABETIC DOD	22. STATION CODE 12009	23 INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS CODE 2	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 03 19 11	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO. / 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV PROV/TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION Rl. 10/2/67	46 O P APPROVAL B H Bond	DATE APPROVED 18 Oct 67

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

Posted

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

2 7 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : **James A. Noel**

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. As a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System, you will reach mandatory retirement at age 60. The prospect of retirement deserves serious thought and planning because of its impact on each of us and for this reason, we are taking this opportunity to provide you with this advance notice that according to our records you will be required to retire on **March 1971.**

2. Planning ahead can bring about, with each passing year, definite progress toward your retirement goals and the Agency is anxious to assist you in your retirement planning.

3. We would like to make available to you as much information as possible on the general subject of retirement, your annuity estimates, life and health insurance protection in retirement, opportunities for other employment, Social Security benefits, and other additional material which is available. The Agency feels that this type of information and advisory service should be made available and, hopefully, will be used by employees well in advance of the date of retirement.

4. Our Chief, Retirement Branch, on extension 3257, is available to discuss with you any aspect of your retirement planning and we encourage you to contact him.

Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

DD/P 6-3552

DO 66-197

16 AUG 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. James A. Noel as Chief of Base, San Francisco, California

1. The appointment of Mr. James A. Noel as Chief of Base, San Francisco, California effective 6 September 1966 is recommended. Mr. Noel would replace Mr. Gerald J. Steiner.

2. Mr. Noel has been an employee of the Agency since 18 September 1947, and was previously assigned as Chief of Station, Madrid, Spain. A biographic profile, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

C Tracy Barnes

C. Tracy Barnes
Chief, DO Division

1 Attachment
Biographic Profile (Parts 1 & 2)

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Acting, Deputy Director for Plans — 16 Aug. 66
Date

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence — 17 Aug. 66
Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 Nov. 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER 055292	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) NOEL JAMES A
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT CORRECTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 08 DAY 14 YEAR 66
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	6 FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / XX CF TO CF
7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7129-0256	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD U.S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION SAN FRANCISCO BASE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF BASE [redacted]	12. POSITION NUMBER 0150
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 5
17. SALARY OR RATE $ 22,755	

18. REMARKS

~~Subject is being assigned to this position in accordance with HR 20-[illegible] for a 2 year period.~~

Corr. eff date from: 08-10-66 to 08-14-66

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Virginia C. Lynch Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO Pers. & Training	DATE SIGNED 17 Nov 66	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 11/25/66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24 HDQTRS CODE 2	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 03 19 11	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34 SEX	
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37 LONG. COMP DATE MO DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP / CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES / HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE					
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION WE— 11-28-66 US	46 OP APPROVAL B. Bond	DATE APPROVED 29 Nov 66						

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 JULY 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 055292

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): NOEL, JAMES A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 13 YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF XXX

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7136-1347

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
FOREIGN FIELD
MADRID STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MADRID, SPAIN

11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF STATION (16)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0399

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~22,331.~~ 22355

18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: RICHARD F. WESTERMAN

DATE SIGNED: C/E/PERS

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 27 July 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 56

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 50660 ALPHABETIC WE

22. STATION CODE: 67033

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOURS CODE: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 03 DA. 19 YR. 11

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. MEI EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO:

34. SEX:

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO: 3W

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO Apr 51 CODE 1 NO. TAX EXEMP. 50 STATE CODE Cit, 00

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-27-66 WR

46. O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 28 Jul 66

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET Posted

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 July 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 055292
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): NOEL JAMES A.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 8 DAY ~~ASAP~~ YEAR 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7129-0256
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
U.S. FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
SAN FRANCISCO BASE
Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF BASE GS-00 (15)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0150
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~22,035~~ 22765
18. REMARKS:

Replacement for Gerald Steiner - to be reassigned

Subject is ~~being assigned to this position in accordance with HR 20-21c (2) for two years.~~

From: DDP/WE/Madrid Station/Position No. 0399

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 8/3/66
Cl 8/10/66

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO Pers. & Training
DATE SIGNED: 21 July '66
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 8-8-66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 43620 ALPHABETIC PCP
22. STATION CODE: 75017
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOOTRS CODE: 2
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 03 DA. 19 YR. 11
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: From WE 8/8/66
46. O.P. APPROVAL: R. W. Bond
DATE APPROVED: 9 Aug 66

FORM 1152 6-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

23 March 1966

Noel, James Arthur
SS# [illegible]-23[illegible]

19 March 1911

U. S. State Dept.
Foreign Service
American Consulate
Guadalajara, Mexico
26 Jan. [illegible] To Aug. 1944

PERSONNEL

SECRET

29 MAR [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THRU : DDP/OP

SUBJECT : PCS Return Prior to Completion of Tour of Duty - James A. Noel

REFERENCE : CSN-20-59, dated 17 November 1965

1. This memorandum contains in paragraph 2 a recommendation for the approval of the Director of Personnel.

2. Mr. Noel arrived in Madrid as the Chief of Station on 21 September 1961. After home leave, he returned to Madrid on 7 August 1964, for a second tour of duty which would normally be completed on 6 August 1966. We have been advised that upon completion of his current assignment, Mr. Noel will be assigned as Chief of the DODS field office in San Francisco, California. Since the officer now filling that position is required to leave in early September for another assignment, it is very desirable that Mr. Noel arrive in San Francisco about 6 September. Therefore, it is requested that Mr. Noel be permitted to leave Madrid on or about 1 July 1966. This will permit him to take some home leave and arrive at his new post in sufficient time to settle his family, which includes two school age children, and report for his projected assignment on schedule.

Edward Ryan

Edward Ryan
Acting Chief
Western Europe Division

Concur
DDP/OP

A/DIPERS

(over)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SUBJECT: PCS Return Prior to Completion of Tour of Duty - James A. Noel

CONCUR:

See Concurrence on Page 1 — 22 April 1966
DDP/OP — Date

The recommendation in paragraph 2 is APPROVED:

A/Director of Personnel — 26 APR 66
Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

F 57

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 January 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 055292
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): NOEL, JAMES A.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 16 YEAR 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6136-1347
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 81-110 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
FOREIGN FIELD
DDP/WE
MADRID STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MADRID, SPAIN

11. POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE
CHIEF OF STATION

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0399
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		02 4	20,920
GS	0136.05	16 5	$22,331

18. REMARKS:
EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Philip C. B	5 JAN 1966		

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOUSING CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
22	10	50640	WE	67033		3	03	19	11	03	20	60	10	10	65

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		2					

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV./TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE (0—WAIVER, 1—YES) HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. OP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
01-07706 N		5 Jan 6

FORM 5-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET

Chief of Station, Madrid X

Director of Personnel James R Noel

WELVCCACS [redacted] Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

Action: As indicated
REF: OSMS-2378

Reference dispatch informed you that the Director of Personnel had determined that you met the criteria specified in the applicable regulation for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System. On the basis of this determination and your recently executed election to remain in the System, your designation as a participant was made effective 16 January 1966.

/s/ Joseph P. Cardia
21 JAN 1966

/s/ RICHARD B. EGAN

27 JAN 66

OSMS - 2643 21 Jan 66

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 16 August 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 055292 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): NOEL JAMES A.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 20 YEAR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2136-6400-1017
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
MADRID STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

14

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MADRID, SPAIN

11. POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE
CHIEF OF STATION D

12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]-399
12a. PCR CONTROL NO.:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
FSR
GS 00

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP:
03
16 01

17. SALARY OR RATE:
13,600
15,255

18. REMARKS:
DDP/WH/Dev Comp/Havana Cuba

COPY SENT TO SECURITY

Security Approval [illegible] Pers. SD/OS 8/21/61
[illegible] 9/7/61

coordinated with (Phil Bowes phone) 8/21/61

I certify funds available:
Obl'g. Ref. No.: MCR 2-007
Charge Allot. No.: 2136-6400-1012
Auth. Officer: Charles E. [illegible]

and 67
CSPD
[illegible]

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Thomas M. Fisher
THOMAS M. FISHER, WE PERSONNEL OFFICER

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMP. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] CODE	25. DATE OF [illegible] MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF [illegible]	27. DATE OF [illegible]
37	10	62660	WE	67033		3	03 19 11		

28. [illegible] EXP. RES.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY RQD. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE
37. LONG. COMP. DATE
38. [illegible]: 1 = YES 2 = NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. MILITARY CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 08/20/61

46. C.P. APPROVAL: D. C. Knapp for D/Pers 5 Sep 61
[illegible] 21 Aug 61

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIO AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 July 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 255272

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): NOEL, JAMES A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 23 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2135-1990-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
DDP/WH DIVISION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: * HAVANA, CUBA

11. POSITION TITLE: ATTACHE
CHIEF OF STATION

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 3
16 1

17. SALARY OR RATE: 13600
15255

18. REMARKS

(FROM: DDP/WH/Branch 4/PAP-114/Havana, Cuba) [illegible]

1 copy to Security Office.

*Returnee Casual - pending approval of his appointment as Chief of Station, Madrid.

SPD concurrence [illegible] 07/25/61 KK

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: P C Bowers
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23.	24.	25. DATE OF	26. DATE OF	27. DATE OF
37	14	14997	[illegible]	19085		5	07 24 61		

28. NTE/EXPIRES
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE
31.
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE
37. LONG. COMP. DATE
38.: 1 = YES 2 = NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM W-4: 1 = YES 2 = NO; TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 07/25/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL: 24 July 61

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

1-36831

61-5924/1

16 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. James A. Noel, Chief of Station, Madrid, Spain

1. The appointment of Mr. Noel as Chief of Station, Madrid, Spain, effective on or about 15 September 1961, is recommended. Mr. Noel would replace Mr. Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr. who is scheduled to be reassigned to the Covert Action Staff.

2. Mr. Noel has been an employee of the Agency since 18 September 1947, and is presently assigned to WH Division. A biographic data sheet, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

3. In view of the fact that Mr. Noel is not available for interview because he is on home leave the usual interview endorsement is not made a part of this memorandum.

EW Timm
ERIC W. TIMM
Chief
Western Europe Division

1 Attachment
Biographic Information

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Richard M. Bissell Jr. DDCI 26 July 61 — 8 JUL 1961
Deputy Director (Plans) — (Date)

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is approved:

11 AUG 1961
Director of Central Intelligence — (Date)

SECRET

SECRET

16 June 1961

Name: James A. Noel
Grade: GS-16
Service Designation: D

Date and Place of Birth: March 19, 1911
New York, New York

Marital Status: Married
Wife: Lillian B. Noel
Son : James A. Noel, Jr.
Son : Richard A. Noel

Education and Career Outside the Agency:

1926 - 1929	San Diego Senior High School
1931 - 1944	Department of State Ensenada, Mexico; Vice Consul Mazatlan, Mexico; Vice Consul Guadalajara, Mexico; Vice Consul
1944 - 1947	OSS/SSU/CIG Spain and Guatemala; Chief of Station

Languages: Spanish; Good

Military Duty: None

CIA Experience:

Sep 1947	OSO/FBT/Guatemala; COS, GS-12
Mar 1949	Promoted to GS-13
Aug 1949	OSO/FBT/Buenos Aires; COS, GS-13
Aug 1951	Promoted to GS-14
Sep 1952	DDP/WH/Caracas; COS, GS-14
Aug 1954	Promoted to GS-15
Jan 1956	DDP/WH-1/Branch Chief, Headquarters
Jun - Jul 1956	TDY - South America
Jun 1957	DDP/WH-2/Branch Chief, Headquarters
Apr 1958	DDP/WH/Havana; COS, GS-15
Apr 1961	Promoted to GS-16

SECRET

15 June 1961

Name: James A. Noel

CIA Training:

1947	Investigation Techniques
1947	Photography
1947	Communications Training
1949	Familiarization Sound & Surveillance Equipment
1949	Intelligence Orientation
1949	SAIC
1949	AIC
1949	Documentation
1949	Cryptographic Training
1952	Psychological Warfare
1952	Clandestine Political Warfare
1958	Basic Supervision
1958	Clandestine Political Warfare

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

	V to V		V to UV
	UV to V	XX	UV to UV

DATE PREPARED		
Mo	Da	Yr
3	4	60

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo	Da	Yr
	NOEL, James A.	3	19	11	0	M			

7. SCD Mo	Da	Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo	Da	Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo	Da	Yr	13. Mil Serv Credit LCD Yes-1 No-2	Code

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

7

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/WH WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station		Havana, Cuba	

16. Dept.-Field Dept.-Ustld.-Fran.	Code	17. Position Title (Clerk)	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	CHIEF OF STATION	114	(FSS) GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step		22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	25. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	26. Appropriation Number
15 (2-1)	4	$ 13,670 (13,975)	DI	08	01	54	07	24	60	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo	Da	Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
PROMOTION (TEMPORARY) *		03	20	60	REGULAR		

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

33. Dept.-Field Dept.-Ustld.-Fran.	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5				

38. Grade & Step		39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	42. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	43. Appropriation Number
16	1	$ 14,190	DI	03	20	60	[illegible]	[illegible]	61	0135-5450-3000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
Richard Helms
Chief of Operations, DD/P

Date Approved

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	3-10-60	E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	8 MAR 60

Remarks

* Promotion to the grade indicated is temporary and for such duration as the Director will determine. Your permanent grade is the grade from which you are temporarily promoted.

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 4-58 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

Classify According To Content

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) NOEL, James A.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 3 Da 10 Yr 11	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 0	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. Mil Serv Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code					

2A

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

UNVOUCHERED

14. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch II Argentina Section	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field Dept - X Ufld-Fran - Code	17. Position Title (Attache) Area Ops Officer (Br Ch)	18. Position No. ~~SA~~-160	19. Serv. (FSS) GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01

21. Grade & Step ~~[illegible]~~-2 GS-15-3	22. Salary Or Rate 9925 $ 12, 150	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 8-3500-10-200

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 67	28. Eff. Date Mo 4 Da 6 Yr 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

UNVOUCHERED

31. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station	Code 4657	32. Location Of Official Station Havana, Cuba	Station Code 17085

33. Dept.-Field Dept - Ufld-Fran - X Code 5	34. Position Title (Attache) ~~Area Ops Officer (SGS)~~ CHIEF OF STATION	35. Position No. D ~~[illegible]~~-114	36. Serv. (FSS) GS	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step 2 15 / 3	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo 08 Da 10 Yr 54	42. PSI Due Mo 01 Da 25 Yr 59	43. Appropriation Number 8-3545-55-055

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) ROBERT S. WATTLES C/WH/Support	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) JOHN WASHINKO X 8242	

Service [illegible]
27 FEB 1958

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		11 MAR
B. Pos. Control		3/18/58	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Sheehy	[illegible] MAR

Remarks

2 copies to Security. Sec. Conc. [illegible] 3/24 [illegible] 3/26

FORM 5-57 1152a

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] 3-1958

Registry

58-1694/1

12 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Appointment of Mr. James A. NOEL, Chief of Station, Havana, Cuba

1. The appointment of Mr. Noel as Chief of Station, Havana, Cuba, effective on or about 7 September 1958, is recommended. Mr. Noel would replace Mr. William B. Caldwell whose reassignment to another field station is under active consideration.

2. Mr. Noel has been an employee of the Agency since 15 August 1944, and is presently assigned as Chief of Branch II, WH Division, Headquarters, GS-15. A biographic data sheet, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

J C King
J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

1 Attachment
Biographic information

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:
Mr. Noel has been interviewed by the Chief of Operations, and by myself, and we are satisfied that he is qualified for this assignment.

CPC
DDCI 1 [illegible] 1958

Frank G Wisner
Deputy Director (Plans)

5 March 1958
(Date)

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is APPROVED:

Allen W Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence

10 MAR 1958
(Date)

SECRET

NOEL James A. 12 November 57

Branch Chief DDP/WH/II GS-15

000

000

TDY Stand-by Status

Subject is qualified for one (3 weeks) TDY. (11/25/57)
Must be evaluated for each TDY.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice Expires 1 July 1958

N 20-190-139

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-139

PERSONNEL
2 July 1957

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENTS TO KEY POSITIONS

PANEL OF EXAMINERS OF THE CIA SELECTION BOARD

In accordance with paragraph 5b of Regulation No. 20-105, The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, the following persons are appointed, effective 1 July 1957, to serve as members of the Panel of Examiners for the period ending 30 June 1958:

Name	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Albertsen, C. V.	DP	DDP/WE
Brent, Irl Darcy	TS	DDI/OSI
Broe, William V.	DI	DDP/FE
Buscey, Robert O.	DT	DDP/TSS
Cain, Benjamin B.	OD	DDI/OO/FDD
Caldwell, John J.	SP	DDS/OP
Christ, David L.	DT	DDP/TSS
Connor, Sydney	IB	DDI/OBI
Covell, Louis C.	C	DDI/OCR
Czajkowski, Anthony	OC	DDI/OO/C
Darling, James A.	DM	DDP/NEA
Dean, Warren L.	DI	DDP/WE
Desmond, Daniel H.	SC	DDS/OC
Dillon, Thomas P.	SL	DDS/OL
Flynn, Anthony P.	DI	DDP/CI
Ganley, Frederick W.	SF	DDS/Compt
Gause, William M.	SL	DDS/OL
Gibson, Frank E., Jr.	SM	DDS/Med
Giesecke, Fritz H.	DP	DDP/EE
Gimmell, Kermit V.	IB	DDI/OBI
Godfrey, Francis E.	C	DDI/OCR
Hall, Fred H.	SS	DDS/OS
Heimann, Peter K.	DI	DDP/EE
Henderson, Donald G.	IN	DDI/ONE
Heney, Carlyle F.	SS	DDS/OS
Hines, Samuel M.	D	DDP/PPC

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-139

PERSONNEL
2 July 1957

Name	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Ilyin, Boris	DP	DDP/SR
Ingersoll, Harold B.	IC	DDI/OCI
Johnson, Quentin C.	DI	DDP/SR
Karamessines, Thomas H.	DI	DDP/FI
Kaylor, James S.	D	DDP/I&R
Lamberth, Hugh R.	IR	DDI/ORR
Larsen, Boyd N.	SF	DDS/Compt
Lowe, Benton S.	SL	DDS/OL
Little, Harry W., Jr.	DI	DDP/FE
Lyon, N. Harris	SS	DDS/OS
MacDonald, John	SC	DDS/OC
Mathews, Charles W.	IS	DDI/OSI
McPherson, Paul S.	OB	DDI/OO/FBID
Mitchell, Michael O.	DI	DDP/FI
Noel, James A.	DI	DDP/WH
Pearson, Robert W.	SL	DDS/OL
Porter, George A.	SC	DDS/OC
Procaccino, Joseph	DI	DDP/WE
Ranlet, Robert R.	DM	DDP/PP
Reff, Joseph S.	SP	DDS/OP
Schmalbach, Stewart	SC	DDS/OC
Seeley, Jay S.	IR	DDI/ORR
Shallcross, Lawrence B.	ST	DDS/OT
Shattuck, William B.	ST	DDS/OT
Shaw, J. Arnold	SA	Off/DCI
Sherman, Katherine	DP	DDP/FE
Steege, Harold N.	SC	DDS/OC
Tenney, Calvin W.	DI	DDP/CI
Voigt, Frederick A.	IC	DDI/OCI
von Schrader, Atreus	SP	Off/DDI
Wattles, Robert S.	SA	DDP/WH

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

H. GATES LLOYD
Acting Deputy Director
(Support)

DISTRIBUTION: A, plus each member of the Panel of Examiners

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.* If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs – One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. James A. NOEL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Mar 1911	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 17 May 57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
(ATTACHE) (BR CH) Area Ops Officer (~~BC~~) EA-40	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	(ATTACHE) (BR CH) Area Ops Officer (~~BC~~) BA-~~51~~ #60
GS-0136.01-15 $11,880.00 p.a. (FSS-3 $9635.00 p.a.)	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $11,880.00 p.a. (FSS-3 $9635.00 p.a.)
DDP/WH Branch I	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch II ARGENTINE SECTION
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C. 15
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL (D)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Memorandum forwarded to Management on 23 May 1957 requesting that position BA-51 be converted from Headquarters Vouchered to Headquarters Unvouchered.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
ROBERT J. [illegible] C/WH/SUPPORT

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
J. KOPLANOVICH X-8242

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

[illegible]
BB 10 JUNE 57

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
W FROM 7-3500-10-200
TO Same

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	RW	12 JUN 1957
C. CLASSIFICATION	[illegible]	14 June
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	BB	10 JUNE 57
E.		

REMARKS: approved by C/OPS/DDP on [illegible]

F. APPROVED BY
R W Sleay per [illegible] jr 11 June 1957

SECRET

16—68137-8

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. James A. NOEL
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 March 1911
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 14 Dec 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Reassigment
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 29 Jan. 1956
7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM–		TO–
Area Ops Officer (S.C.) BAF-93 (Attache)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer (B. C.) BA-40 (Attache)
GS-0136.01-15 $11610.00 p.a. (FSS-3 $8481.00 p.a.)	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $11610.00 p.a. (FSS-3 $8481.00 p.a.)
DDP/WH	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch I - NWC
Caracas, Venezuela	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL 15 FP	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL 15 (FP)

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

A memorandum has been forwarded to the Management Staff requesting that this position be converted from vouchered to unvouchered.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): P. C. BOWERS X 4457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature: James P. [illegible] (WH)

Title:

Approved by CS Career Service Panel

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
x					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

SD-DI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3588-55-066
TO: ~~6-3500-20~~ 6-3500-10 200
18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Case by [illegible]
20 Dec 55
LR 1/24/56

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		JAN 1956
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	1-9-56	
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [illegible] by Jos. J. Caldwell 19 Jan. '56

16—57320-8

SECRET

26 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: PERSONNEL OFFICER, FI

SUBJECT: NOEL, James A. - Recommendation for Promotion

1. Mr. James A. Noel was born 19 March 1911, in New York City, is married and has two children. He graduated from San Diego Senior High School and entered the United States Foreign Service, where he served as consular officer in Mexico and Spain, from 1931 to 1944. He entered on duty with CIA, at CAF-11, on 15 August 1944. He served in Madrid and Barcelona and was promoted to CAF-12 in 1946. He subsequently served at Guatemala City as Chief of Station, and in March 1947, was promoted to GS-13. He was assigned to Buenos Aires as Chief of Station, and in August of 1951 was promoted to GS-14. Subject is presently Chief of Station at Caracas, Venezuela.

2. Mr. Noel has been rated Excellent to Outstanding as Chief of Station. His last efficiency report in June 1953 reflected a lower rating due to a difficult personnel situation and hospitalization. However, this situation has been resolved, and it is felt that Mr. Noel has earned his promotion to GS-15.

3. Your approval is requested.

J. Caldwell King

J. Caldwell King
Chief, WH

SECRET

SECRET

21 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: CWH

SUBJECT : Reference to James A. Noel by William I. Clark, Assistant Director U.S.I.A. for Latin America.

During the briefing of CIA personnel conducted by William I. Clark, Assistant Director of U.S.I.A. for Latin America, on 14 January 1954, he twice referred to the excellent cooperation between our Chief of Mission at Caracas, James A. Noel and the P.A.O., which he characterized as exemplary and a model for all other stations.

CPP/WH

Distribution:

Original and 1: Addressee

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

12951

NAME		DATE
NATURE OF ACTION [illegible]L, James A.		EFFECTIVE DATE 12 March 1952
XXXXXXXX Reassignment	FROM	Eff 27 April 1952
TITLE	Intell Off Chief of Station, GS-14	Intell Off Chief of Station, GS-14
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-14, $9600.00 per annum	GS-14, $9600.00 per annum
OFFICE	DDO	
DIVISION	[illegible]	WH
BRANCH	PC	Branch I
OFFICIAL STATION	Buenos Aires, Ar[illegible] (#3510)	Caracas, Venezuela (#3529)

QUALIFICATIONS.

[illegible] 4·24·52

CLASSIFICATION

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

PERSONNEL OFFICER

EXECUTIVE

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

DATE MAR 20 1952

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

CONCUR FOR THE CHIEF OF INSPECTION AND [illegible]

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY BRANCH

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

#1.

[illegible] 12 March 1952

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV. 1949

SECRET

GPO 16-53206-1

(2)

14-00000

SECRET

MR+CFD

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME [illegible], James A.		DATE 16 July 19[illegible]
NATURE OF ACTION Promotion		EFFECTIVE 19 August 1951
	FROM	TO (Intelligence officer)
TITLE	Chief of Station, GS-13	Chief of Station, GS-14
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-13, $[illegible] per annum	GS-14, $[illegible] per annum
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	[illegible]	[illegible]
BRANCH	EC	EC
OFFICIAL STATION	Buenos Aires, Argentina	Buenos Aires, Argentina

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS: Slot # 67.

[illegible], [illegible]

POSTED
22 Aug 51

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 83-500339

14-00000

SECRET

FROM: BUENOS AIRES ROUTINE

TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 22 DEC 49

ACTION: FDT (1-2) IN 12169

INFORMATION: ADSO (3-4), SED (5), CFD (6), COMMO (7-8), IID (9)

BUEN 818

TO: WASHF CITE: BUEN

RE: WASH 4980 (OUT 95043)

RECKER DEPARTED FOR URUGUAY 22 DECEMBER. [redacted] IN CHARGE.

James Noel

SECRET

TOR: 1932Z 22 DEC 49

Copy No. 5

C. To be able to plan my travel and leave, it is important that I know the approximate duration of TDY.

D. Would it be possible to postpone the date of my arrival at my new post until 15 June? This would be a great convenience to me, and I would appreciate any consideration which Headquarters may be able to give to this request.

[redacted]

Chief of Station

close relation to the job he is doing. Since this job is directly concerned with national security and the national interest, and has been consistently well done, I believe that Mr. Hoel can be said with sincerity to be an employee of unquestionable loyalty and integrity.

5. The same beliefs of the writer pertain to Mr. Hoel's wife, whom I have met on many occasions and found to share his attitudes and feelings completely. She, too, is strongly interested in the work Mr. Hoel is engaged in and has few, if any, outside interests. Their home life is happy and wholesome and their social activities appear strictly restricted to the business of the day.

6. In this respect, I believe that both Mr. Hoel and his wife are, by training and personality, security-conscious people who are quite happy to devote themselves to the success of the career in intelligence which Mr. Hoel has selected.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

(1)

TO : Miss K. Haller, X-2

DATE: 21 August 1945

FROM : OSS Draft Deferment Committee

SUBJECT:

The local Board has notified us as follows:

James Arthur Noel   Class 2-A   Eff. Aug. 1, 1945 until Indefinitely

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

File

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. William Sherwood

DATE: 17 October 1944

FROM : M. L. Brockdorff

SUBJECT: Mr. James Arthur Noel

①

This office is in receipt of advice from Mr. Noel's Local Board, dated 12 October 1944 that he has been classified II-A until 9 April 1945. The Local Board also stated that their records show that the registrant was never ordered for a pre-induction physical examination by that Board.

M. L. B.

M. L. Brockdorff
Administrative Assistant

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS **BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE**

SECRET

Handle With Care

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ (When Completed) SECRET

CHIEF OF MISSION'S EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

(Mission submits original and one copy directly to appropriate agency; retains one copy.)

I.	OFFICER BEING RATED Chief, CAS Noel, James A	POST Madrid, Spain
	POSITION Chief, Liaison Section	GRADE FSR-2 — AGENCY CAS
	RATING PERIOD 9/4/64 to 10/31/65	DATE OF REPORT December 15, 1965
	SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER Angier Biddle Duke	TITLE Ambassador
	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	TITLE

II. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

☒ Outstanding ☐ Satisfactory ☐ Unsatisfactory

Does this officer properly understand and perform his role and his functions as a member of your staff under existing Presidential directives? ☒ Yes ☐ No (If no, explain in detail below.)

Has he seen this report? ☐ Yes ☒ No

III. NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(Attach additional sheets, if necessary for this section or for reviewing officer's comments.)

Chief, CAS is one of the ablest members of my Country Team. He has a profound knowledge and understanding of the complex Spanish political scene, and scores of valuable contacts. I have a healthy respect for his judgment, and frequently seek his advice and counsel.

He manages his staff effectively and enjoys their respect and confidence. Popular and well liked by his colleagues in the Embassy and the Spanish Government, Chief, CAS is an excellent representative of our Government.

Chief, CAS is prudent and discreet, and I have complete confidence in him. He is a man of few words but when he expresses himself, he does so in a meaningful way.

A gifted analyst with an incredibly deep grasp of the complicated Spanish mentality, Chief, CAS' assessment and opinions are highly valued by me and the members of my Country Team.

Chief, CAS and his associates have been most cooperative at all times, and have provided me with excellent support. I regard their operation superior in every respect which is a compliment to Chief, CAS' skillful leadership and direction.

Chief, CAS' wife is an attractive American lady who is an asset to her husband. She takes an active part in community affairs.

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF ONE PAGE. COPY NUMBER 1 OF TWO COPIES, SERIES A.

FORM 4-65 FS-572

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ (When Completed) SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
NOEL JAMES A	055292	43 500	CF	GS 16 6	$24,477	$26,640

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 22 July 1966

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
☒ ~~CHIEF~~, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) DOD

ESTABLISHED FOR: NOEL, James A.

ATTN: Personnel

FILE NO. 233

REF: Verbal Request

ID CARD NO.

OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: DOS, Evaluation Office (SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF)

EMPLOYEE NO.

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ **Block Records:**
([illegible] 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______________________.

b. Continuing, effective EOD.

☒ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category.
(HHB 20-7)

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued.
(HB 20-682-1)

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover.
(R 240-250)

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility.
(R 240-250)

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

☐ Remarks:

☒ Cover History

1944-1947 OSS/CIG
1947-1949 St Int/Guatemala
1949-1951 St Int/Argentena
1951-1955 St Int/Venezuala
1956-1958 St Int/Hdqs
1959-1961 St Int/ Cuba
1961-1961 St Int/Hdqs
1961-1966 St Int/Madrid Spain

CD/nz

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER CCS

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D'OS, Copy 4-OL/TELSVC, Copy 5-FSD/OS, Copy 6-OCS/OPS, Copy 7-File

FORM 11-65 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(13-20-43)

14-00000

PLWs: 15 AUG 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF:

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 055232
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): NOEL JAMES A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 03 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶

☐	V TO V	☐	V TO CF
☐	CF TO V	☒	CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3129 0256 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
US FIELD
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP
SAN FRANCISCO BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

11. POSITION AREA
12. POSITION NUMBER
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION

1. LAST NAME: Noel FIRST NAME: James INITIAL(S): A.

2. APPOINTMENT DATA: Entered on duty ___ F/T ___ P/T ___
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act: Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ______ Annual Leave Bal

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation): Years ___ Months ___ Days ___
☐ More than 15 years

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION:
Retirement: ~~3/31/71~~ 8-3-68

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	ANNUAL	SICK
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1/9 1971	480	1901
6. Current leave year accrual through 3/20 1971	40	20
7. Total	520	1921
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9. Total leave taken	40	0
10. Balance	480	1921

11. Total hours paid in lump sum: 480 hrs. + 1 Holiday
12. Salary rate(s): $33,757.00
13. Lump sum leave dates: From 4/1/71 to 6/24/71 ______ (Hours)

26. Certified correct: J. F. McMahon (Signature) ______ (Date)
Auth. Cert. Officer (Title) ______ (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______
15. Current balance as of ______ 19__ None
16. 12-month accrual rate ______
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______
18. Monthly accrual date ______
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date ______
20. Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr ______ to ______
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension
23. During leave year in which separated	0	0
24. During step increase waiting period which began on 10/5/69	0	0

25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates) ______

REMARKS
SCD:
1/26/31

* Unused Sick Leave 5 USC Ch. 63

Standard Form 1150
November 1963
1150-0116

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

FUOIEIU
7.15

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

JLB: 14 MAY 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 055292

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): NOEL JAMES A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REMOVAL FROM CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM-VOLUNTARY

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 DA 05 YR 68

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 8129 0256 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/DOD

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ Code
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1. CSC, 2. CIA, 3. FICA, 4. NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction /Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0. NONE, 1. 5 PT., 2. 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0. WAIVED, 1. YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0. NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1. NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2. BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS., 3. BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1. YES, 2. NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1. YES, 2. NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
BJ
5-14-68

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition Mfg 10-67

SECRET

PLW

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-5)

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
NOEL JAMES A	055292	43 500	CF	GS 16 5	$22,755	$23,778

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAH: 25 OCT 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 055292	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) NOEL JAMES A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 08 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 8129 0256 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD U.S. FIELD INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP SAN FRANCISCO BASE	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF BASE	12. POSITION NUMBER 0150	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 23425

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	43500	DOD	75007		2	03 19 11		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
R.S.
10-25-67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-0

(When Filled In)

2316

D-25

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
055292	NOEL JAMES A	43 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	5	$22,755	10/10/65	GS 16	6	$23,425	10/08/67		

9. CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Stanley H Gaines

DATE 11 Aug 67

4
941

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

RS

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 055292	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) NOEL JAMES A		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT - CORRECTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 08 14 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / CF TO CF ☒	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7129 0256 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD US FIELD UNITED STATES STATION SAN FRANCISCO BASE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA		
11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF BASE	12. POSITION NUMBER 0150	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 22755

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 TO CHANGE EFFECTIVE DATE WHICH READ 08/10/66 TO READ 08/14/66.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ. Code
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 03 19 11
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - CIFF, 2 - 15 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. - PROV. / RES. - TEMP.; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-30-66 AS

FORM 5 66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

RZF 2 AUG 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 055292	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) NOEL JAMES A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR COB 08 13 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7136 1347 0000
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE FOREIGN FIELD MADRID STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MADRID, SPAIN

11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0399	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 22755

18. REMARKS
MADRID, SPAIN

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
56	10	50660	WE	67033		3	03 19 11		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	30. CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32. MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO. DA. YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	38. CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	43. CODE	43. NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	44. CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

080366

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

PJH: 10 AUG 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 055292	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) NOEL JAMES A		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 08 DA. 10 YR 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / CF TO V X / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7129 0256 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD U.S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION SAN FRANCISCO BASE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA		
11. POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF BASE	12. POSITION NUMBER 0150	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 22755

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 43620	ALPHABETIC DOD	22. STATION CODE 75007	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 2	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA. YR 03 19 11	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO DA. YR.	28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAP RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH.INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO-TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: WE

dCB 8.11.66

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-5)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
NOEL JAMES A	055292	50 660	CF	GS 16 5	$22,331	$22,755

14-00000

PJH: 17 JAN 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 055292	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) NOEL JAMES A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 01 16 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	6136 1347 0000	SECTION 203 P.L.88-643

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE FOREIGN FIELD MADRID STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MADRID, SPAIN

11. POSITION TITLE ATTACHE CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0399	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP 02 4 16 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 20928 22331

18. REMARKS
EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

MADRID, SPAIN

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28	10	50660	WE	67033	I	3	03 19 11	03 20 60	10 10 65

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
			2				EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
NOEL JAMES A	055292	50 660	CF	GS 16 5	$21,555	$22,331

11

F57

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
055292	NOEL JAMES A	50 660 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 16	4	$20,900	10/13/63	GS 16	5	$21,555	10/10/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

01

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

663

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY [illegible]

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: W [redacted] DR3E 20 Aug 1965

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

57

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 06/16/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 055292

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): NOEL JAMES A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: SERIES CODE ADJUSTMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA 07 YR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 9136 1347 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WE DIVISION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MADRID, SPAIN

11 POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF STATION

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0399

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.05

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18 REMARKS

POSTED
lin 6.21.65

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 1-63 MFG 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51) (When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS: EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
NOEL JAMES A	055292	62660	CF	16 2	$15515	16 2	$16500

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
055292	NOEL JAMES A	62 660 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-16	2	$16,500	09/17/61	S-16	3	$17,000	10/14/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

CCS

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11/6/62

SIGNATURE: Edward W. McG[illegible] DATE: 24 Oct 1962

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition **SECRET** (4-51)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
055292	NOEL JAMES A	62 660 CF 14	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 16	3	$17,000	10/14/62	GS 16	4	$17,500	10/13/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY 663

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

AG

Rb 10/8/63

SIGNATURE: DATE Aug 26, 1963

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

L1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
55292	NOEL JAMES A	DDP/WH 9 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 16	1	$15,255	03/20/60	16	2	$15,515	09/17/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

541

L1

14-00000

AES: 26 JULY 61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OD:

1. SERIAL NUMBER 055292	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) NOEL JAMES A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 07 23 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	2135 1990 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS CS/CS DEV COMP DDP WH DIVISION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION HAVANA CUBA

11. POSITION TITLE ATTACHE CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 03 0 16 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 13600 15255

18. REMARKS
RETRUNEE CASUAL

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR.)
37	14	64997	WH	17085	1	3	03 19 11		

28. NTE EXPIRES (NO. DA. YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, NO. DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FO[illegible]

7/28/61

ECHOLS

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

7/27/61

(4-51)

PSC: 7 SEPT 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 055292
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): NOEL JAMES A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 08 | 20 | 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2136 6400 1017
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
MADRID STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MADRID, SPAIN
11. POSITION TITLE:
ATTACHE
CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0399
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): FSR / GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 03 0 / 16 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 13600 / 15255
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 62660 | ALPHABETIC WE
22. STATION CODE: 67033
23. INTEGREE CODE: 1
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 03 | 19 | 11
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9-11-61 JJV

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-51)

gae 9-7-61

14-00000

AES: 6 APRIL 61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OOF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 055292
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): NOEL JAMES A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION TO PERMANENT SUPERGRADE RANK*
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 04 DA. 06 YR. 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE:
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

DDP WH
BRANCH 4
HAVANA CUBA STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HAVANA CUBA
11. POSITION TITLE:

ATTACHE
CHIEF OF STATION

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0114
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSS		02 0	11740
GS	0136.01	16 1	15255

18. REMARKS:
*THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON 6 APRIL 1961 APPROVED YOUR PERMANENT GRADE AS GS 16.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ Code
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

I.C.
4.27.61 CW

E.D. ECHOLS

Form 8-62 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-51)

gae 4-27-6

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	NOEL JAMES A	555292	46 52	GS-16 1	$14,190	$15,255

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 11 MARCH 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
555292	NOEL JAMES A	03	19	11		0	M	1	09	18	47	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil Serv Credit Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
01	26	31		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	18	47		1

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III HAVANA CUBA STATION	4652	HAVANA CUBA	17085

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	ATTACHE CHIEF OF STATION	0114	FSS GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
02 15 4	$ 10920 13670	01	08	01	54	01	25	59	8 3545 55 055

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION (TEMPORARY)*	30	03	20	60	REGULAR	OM	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III HAVANA CUBA STATION	4652	HAVANA CUBA	17085

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	ATTACHE CHIEF OF STATION	0114	FSS GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
02 16 1	$ 10920 14190	D	03	20	60	09	17	61	0135 5450 3000

44. Remarks

* PROMOTION TO THE GRADE INDICATED IS TEMPORARY AND FOR SUCH DURATION AS THE DIRECTOR WILL DETERMINE. YOUR PERMANENT GRADE IS THE GRADE FROM WHICH YOU ARE TEMPORARILY PROMOTED.

POSTED
4-7-60

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	3	$13,370	07	28	57	GS 15	4	$13,670	01	25	59

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
ROBERT N. DAHLGREN	11 Dec. 1958	Robert N. Dahlgren

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
555292	NOEL JAMES A	DDP/WH	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	3	$13,370	07	28	57	GS 15	4	$13,670	01	25	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

541

CF

JW 7/10

14. AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

FORM
1 MA

RSO

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
NOEL JAMES A	555292	GS-15-3	$12,150	$13,370

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DMG 4 APR 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
555292	NOEL JAMES A	03	19	11		0	M 1	09	18	47	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 / Code
01	26	31		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	18	47	1

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III ARGENTINA SECTION		WASH. D.C.	

16. Dept.-Field Dept.-1 USfld.-3 Frgn.-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	1	ATTACHE AREA OPS OFF BR CH	0460	FSS GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
02 15 3	9925 $12150	01							8 3500 10 200

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
REASSIGNMENT	67	04	06	58	REGULAR	OM	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III HAVANA CUBA STATION	4652	HAVANA CUBA	17085

33. Dept.-Field Dept.-1 USfld.-3 Frgn.-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	ATTACHE CHIEF OF STATION	0114	FSS GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
02 15 3	9925 $12150	01	08	01	54	01	25	59	8 3545 55 055

44. Remarks

POSTED
9 MAY 1958

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

DC 4/11/58

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
555292	NOEL JAMES A	DDP/WH -3	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR
15	2	$11,880	01	29	56	15	3	$12,150	07	28	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
J. C. KING	16 July 57	J C King

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 54

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
555292	NOEL JAMES A	DDP/WH	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR
15	2	$11,880	01	29	56	15	3	$12,150	07	28	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

0700

14. AUTHENTICATION

CF

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a
1 MAR. 54

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

moo

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): MR. JAMES A. NOEL 555292
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Mar 1911
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO:
4. DATE: 28 Jun 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): REASSIGNMENT 56
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 Jun 1957
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
BA-40	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer (Br Ch) BA-460 (Attache)
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $11,880.00 per annum (FSS-3 $9635.00 per annum)
Branch I	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 467552	DDP/WH Branch II Argentina Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS 1	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

	NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT WIFE	10-POINT OTHER
0	X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ I.A. ☐ REAL ☐ SD/DI

1 15. SEX: M W
16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-3500-10-200 750-13 TO: same
17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 09/18/47

POSTED
5 JUL 1957

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

7/11/57

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1954-220030

1. Agency and organizational designation	2. Payroll period	3. Sect. No. [illegible]	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) NOEL, [illegible]	6. Grade and salary GS-15 $11,610		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks	11. Appropriation(s) WH-5	12. Prepared by jab 10 Nov 55 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
29 Jan 56	[illegible]	$11,610	11,800	SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY. (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

rvs

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. JAMES A. HOEL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Mar 1911	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 25 Jan 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 29 Jan 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Off (Sta Ch) BAF-93 (Attache)	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer (B. C.) BA-40 (Attache)
GS-0136.01-15 $11,610.00 per annum (FSS-3 $9120.00 per annum)	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-15 $11,610.00 per annum (FSS-3 $9120.00 per annum)
DDP/WH	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch I - BWC
Caracas, Venezuela	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
x					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-3588-55-066 TO: 6-3500-10-200	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☑ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS:

POSTED
26 JAN

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. ~~EMPLOYEE COPY~~

rua 1/25/56

SECRET

9/23/54

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
MR. JAMES A. NOEL	19 Mar.1911	-	26 May 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: AUG 1 1954

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
	AREA OPS OF (STA CH), BAF-93-14 (Attache, FSS-4)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	AREA OPS OF (STA CH), BAF-93 (Attache, FSS-4)
	GS-0136.01-14, $9800.00 p.a. (FSS-4, $7929.00 p.a.)	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-15, $10,800.00 p.a. (FSS-4, $7929.00 p.a.)
	DDP/WH	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH
	CARACAS, VENEZUELA	11. HEADQUARTERS	CARACAS, VENEZUELA
	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
BAF-93

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE DUE 15 Aug 5

TO SALARY $ 10,000.00/pa

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) King C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) V. C. LYNCH, x-4457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J. Keith Reid
Title: DDP Admin

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD: FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-3583-55-066 TO: same			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

RECEIVED 29 June 54

POSTED

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: JUN 23 1954

F. APPROVED BY Joseph B. Rogan

July 23, 1954.

2/23/54

SECRET

UNVOUCHERED

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B* and *7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Jamed A. NOEL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Mar.1911	3. REQUEST NO. -	4. DATE OF REQUEST 16 Feb.54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 28 Feb.54 B. APPROVED: FEB 28 1954	7. C.S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
OPS OF - CHIEF, BA-121-14 (ATTACHE, FSS-4)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	AREA OPS OF - (STA CH) BAF-93-14 (Attache, FSS-4)
GS-132-14, $9800.00 p.a. (FSS-4, $7929.00 p.a.)	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01- 14, $9800.00 p.a. (FSS-4, $7929.00 p.a.)
DDP/WH I	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH
CARACAS, VENEZUELA	11. HEADQUARTERS	CARACAS, VENEZUELA
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)
BAF-93

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) V. C. Lynch C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) V. C. LYNCH, x-4457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
✓					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD: F1

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3588-55-066 TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A		
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL	ICW	2/19
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C Taylor	
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY C Taylor 19 Feb 54

14-00000

☆ U. RNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952-908490

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Pay roll	3. Block No. UV	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) SOKL, James A.	6. Grade and salary GS - 14 88 $9600		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:	11. Appropriation (s) 3 6 VH	12. Prepared by bn 2/17/53 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date 15 Feb 53	15. Date last equivalent increase 19 Aug 52	16. Old salary rate $9600	17. New salary rate $9800	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better. (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)

Periods:

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ Leave status and duty period

LWOP status and Check of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 6, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY 1

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNVOUCHERED

FD MK 25 Mar 53 mp

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B* and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. – Miss – Mrs. – One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. James A. NOEL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Mar.1911	3. REQUEST NO. -	4. DATE OF REQUEST 7 Mar.53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED: 29 Mar 53	

FROM—		TO—
INTELL.OFF (Chief of Station,) GS-14 (Attache - Economic Ofcr) GS-14, ~~$9600.00~~ p.a. $9800 (FSS-4, $7689)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	OPS OF (CHIEF,) BA-121-14 (Attache - Economic Ofcr) GS-132-14, ~~$9600.00~~ p.a. (FSS-4, $7689) $9800
DDP WH I	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP WH I
Caracas, Venezuela	11. HEADQUARTERS	Caracas, Venezuela
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

BA-121

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: 11 March 53
J. [illegible] DDP.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) V. C. LYNCH, x-1157

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for FI/PD

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
		FROM: 3529 TO: 3529			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED
AK

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY M. L. Shobe 3/23/53

16—57290-2

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. James A. NOEL 555 292
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Mar 1911
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 7 May 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 20 MAY 1956
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer (Br Ch) BA-40		Area Ops Officer (Br Ch) BA-40
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY			GS-0136.01-15 $11800.00 p.a. (FSS-5 $9380.00 p.a.)
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS			DDP/WH Branch I
11. HEADQUARTERS			Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL (D)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary): New T/O

USED IN LIEU OF SF50
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Philip C. Bowers for C/WH
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): J. KOPLANOVICH X4457
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	R. A.	REAL.

SD-CI

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3500-10-200
TO: Same
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS.

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: 14 May 56

POSTED
5-21-56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		5/18
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	16 May 56	
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
Robert H. Tillier per John J. Caldwell 16 May 56 (JFB)

16—77370-4

SECRET

+ MR

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

21 Aug 52

NAME: NOEL, James A.

DATE: 14 August 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: Integration

EFFECTIVE DATE: 15 August 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intell. Off. (Chief)	Attache (Econ. Off.)
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-14, $9600	FSS-4, $7689.
OFFICE		
DIVISION	WH	WH
BRANCH	1	1
OFFICIAL STATION	Caracas, Venezuela	Caracas, Venezuela

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO-STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

Subject integrated into the Department of State with a FSS-4, $7689. Subject is to be paid the difference between CIA salary of $9600. and salary of $7689 to be paid by the Department of State in accordance with his instructions therewith.

Sick and annual leave are to be held in escrow until subject reverts back to GS-status.

POSTED

29 August 52 HP

FORM NO. 37-1

SECRET

16—60123-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

(2)

SECRET

FDX MR
30 apr 52 T.H.

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: NOEL, James A.

DATE: 12 March 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: Reassignment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 27 April 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intell Off Chief of Station, GS-14	Intell Off Chief of Station, GS-14
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-14, $9600.00 per annum	GS-14, $9600.00 per annum
OFFICE	OSO	
DIVISION	FDT	WH
BRANCH	EC	Branch I
OFFICIAL STATION	Buenos Aires, Argentina (#3510)	Caracas, Venezuela (#3529)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS C. M. Fugg 4-24-52	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION 1801 26 Apr 52	PERSONNEL OFFICER H. C. 4/29	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____

ENTERED ON DUTY ____

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:
S-#1.

132

POSTED

W. B. Caldwell 12 March 1952
ACWH

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

GPO 33-500339

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME NOEL, James A.	DATE 16 July 1951
NATURE OF ACTION Promotion	EFFECTIVE DATE 19 August 1951

	FROM	TO (Intelligence Officer)
TITLE	Chief of Station, GS-13	Chief of Station, GS-14
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-13, $7800.00 per annum	GS-14, $8800.00 per annum
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDT	FDT
BRANCH	EC	EC
OFFICIAL STATION	Buenos Aires, Argentina	Buenos Aires, Argentina

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION 8/17/51 F-648	PERSONNEL OFFICER 8/1/51	

S:130

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____

ENTERED ON DUTY ____

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 21 OCT 1951
SALARY ADJUSTED TO $ 9600

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS: Slot # 87.

Chief, FDT

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

9C

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

GPO 83-500339

SECRET

[redacted] SECRET [redacted] Seymour

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: NOEL, James A.

DATE: 19 September 1950

NATURE OF ACTION: Periodic Pay Increase

EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 September 1950

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Staff)	Intelligence Officer (Staff)
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-13 $7600.00	GS-13 $7800.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDT	FDT
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION	Buenos Aires	Buenos Aires

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Wm G. [illegible]	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER Robert P. Waters	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

L.S.I. 7 March 1949.
This is to certify that the conduct and services of the employee during this period were satisfactory in all respects.

DIVISION CHIEF

POSTED
JM 25 Sept

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

GPO OSO 50-284

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: NOEL, James A.

DATE: 10 November 1949

NATURE OF ACTION: Conversion - Classification Act of 1949*

EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 October 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Staff)	Intelligence Officer (Staff)
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-13 $7432.20	GS-13 $7600.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	FBT	FDT
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Buenos Aires	Buenos Aires

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

* Per authority contained in ltr DCI - 28 October 1949

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
AUG 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME James A. Noel				DATE 28 June 1949	
RESIDENCE AT TIME OF EMPLOYMENT					
LOCAL ADDRESS					
CITIZENSHIP U.S.	SEX Male	DATE OF BIRTH 19 March 1911	MARITAL STATUS Married	NO. OF DEPENDENTS	DATE OF APPOINTMENT
NATURE OF ACTION Transfer and Reassignment				EFFECTIVE DATE 24 July 1949	

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Chief	Intelligence Officer (Staff)
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-13, $7432.20	CAF-13, $7432.20
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	FBT	FBT
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Guatemala City	Buenos Aires

APPROVAL

FIELD	HEADQUARTERS
	Wm G. Tharp
CHIEF OF STATION	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
	PERSONNEL OFFICER

COPY IN PAY... DIFFERENTIAL TAXES ...

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 10/10/49

ENTERED ON DUTY

AUTHENTICATED BY

REMARKS
S-2
Subject is replacement for
Vernet L. Gresham who is
leaving that slot.

FORM NO. 37-1 - PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
FEB 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME NOEL, James Arthur	DATE 25 February 1949
RESIDENCE AT TIME OF EMPLOYMENT	
LOCAL ADDRESS	

CITIZENSHIP USA	SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 19 March 1911	MARITAL STATUS Married	NO. OF DEPENDENTS	DATE OF APPOINTMENT

NATURE OF ACTION Promotion	EFFECTIVE DATE 7 March 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Chief of Station	Chief of Station
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-12 $6714.00	CAF-13 $7432.20
OFFICE	OSO - FBT	OSO - FBT
BRANCH		
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Guatemala City	Guatemala City

APPROVAL

FIELD	HEADQUARTERS
CHIEF OF STATION	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
	PERSONNEL OFFICER George E. Milam 2-28-49

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ [✓ NO ☐]

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____

ENTERED ON DUTY ____

AUTHENTICATED BY

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH
INITIALS

REMARKS

Subject has been in grade since 20 October 1946.

3/31/49

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
8 1949

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST
SPECIAL FUNDS

JB

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side.

NAME James Arthur NOEL

DATE 12 October 1948

LEGAL ADDRESS California

MARITAL STATUS Married

LOCAL ADDRESS

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS

TELEPHONE

CITIZENSHIP USA

SEX M

AGE 37

NATURE OF ACTION Periodic Pay Increase

EFFECTIVE DATE 17 October 1948

	FROM	TO
Title	Chief of Station	Chief of Station
Grade and Salary	CAF-12 $6474.60	CAF-12 $6714.00
Office - Branch	OSO - FBT	OSO - FBT
Division		
Section		
Official Station	Guatemala City	Guatemala City
ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)	▨	▨
Quarters		
Cost of Living		
Special Foreign Living		

REMARKS: (May be continued to reverse side)

Subject has received no increase in salary since 6 April 1947.
I certify that the services and conduct of the employee during the period were satisfactory in all respects.

D.5 03 F1.51
(SFOD 09.12.41)
(SI) 09.18.41

POSTED
CSE 11/4/48

Branch Chief

APPROVAL

FIELD

CHIEF OF STATION DATE

SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER DATE

DATE

DATE

DATE

HEADQUARTERS U.S.

H. C. [illegible] PERSONNEL OFFICER 13 Oct 48 DATE

BRANCH CHIEF 15 Oct 48 DATE

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR DATE

E. M. [illegible] CHAIRMAN PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMITTEE DATE

SPECIAL FUNDS OFFICER 10/21/48 DATE

SECRET

FORM NO. 37-1
JUN 1947
PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

HB

(2

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

SECRET

This form is to be initiated in triplicate by the appropriate branch or Office Chief for processing in accordance with personnel procedures. Upon approval, the original and one copy will be retained by the Disbursing Office and one copy returned to the originating office.

NAME **NOEL, JAMES A.** DATE **19 March 1947**

NATURE OF ACTION **Periodic Increase** NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS **One**

EFFECTIVE DATE **6 April 1947** LOCATION OF DEPENDENTS

MARITAL STATUS **Married** CITIZENSHIP **U.S.** SEX **M** AGE **35**

FROM	TO
POSITION **Chief of Station**	POSITION **Chief of Station**
CONTROL NO.	CONTROL NO.
CLASSIFICATION **CAF-12**	CLASSIFICATION **CAF-12** [illegible] 1946 Salary Act [illegible]
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY **$5905.20**	ANNUAL GROSS SALARY **$6144.60** 6471.60
OFFICIAL STATION **Guatemala City, Guatemala**	OFFICIAL STATION **Guatemala, City, Guatemala**
ALLOWANCES:	ALLOWANCES:
QUARTERS	QUARTERS
COST OF LIVING	COST OF LIVING
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING	SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING
TOTAL	TOTAL
OFFICE:	OFFICE:
BRANCH **OSO-FBT**	BRANCH **OSO-FB T**
DIVISION	DIVISION

TO BE PAID BY ______ (Field) OFFICE $

TAX WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES

INSURANCE TO BE WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES
(Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased)

SAVINGS BONDS 12.50

RETIREMENT WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES 37.50

OTHER (Specify in detail)

ALLOTMENTS ______ (Name of Allottee) [illegible].65

Address

TOTAL GROSS SALARY PER PAY PERIOD 478.65

I hereby authorize and direct the Disbursing Office to make above allotments from my compensation.

Form No. 37-1
Sep 1946

(Signature of Employee)

JOB DESCRIPTION:

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS REASONS FOR ACTION DATE OF LAST PROMOTION

Periodic Pay Increase - Last Salary Increase - 1 Sep 1946

APPROVED ____________ (Field) OFFICE

____________ (Chief of Mission) Date ____

____________ (Security Officer) Date ____

____________ (Special Funds Officer) Date ____

APPROVED - U.S. OFFICE

____________ (Administrative Officer) Date ____

____________ (Branch Chief) Date 20/3/47

____________ (Chairman, Pers. Review Com.) Date ____

____________ (Special Funds Officer) Date 24 Mar

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

SECRET

This form is to be initiated in triplicate by the appropriate Branch or Office Chief for processing in accordance with existing personnel procedures. Upon approval, the original and one copy will be retained by the Disbursing Office and one copy returned to the originating office.

NAME NOEL, JAMES A.

DATE 6 March 1947

NATURE OF ACTION Transfer

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS one

EFFECTIVE DATE 10 March 1947

LOCATION OF DEPENDENTS

MARITAL STATUS married

CITIZENSHIP American SEX male AGE 35

FROM		TO	
POSITION	Chief of Station	POSITION	Chief of Station
CONTROL NO.		CONTROL NO.	
CLASSIFICATION	CAF-12	CLASSIFICATION	CAF-12
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	$5905.20	ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	$5905.20
OFFICIAL STATION	Barcelona, Spain	OFFICIAL STATION	Guatemala City, Guatemala
ALLOWANCES:		ALLOWANCES:	
QUARTERS		QUARTERS	
COST OF LIVING		COST OF LIVING	
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING		SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING	
TOTAL		TOTAL	
OFFICE:		OFFICE:	
BRANCH	OSO - FBK	BRANCH	OSO - FBT
DIVISION		DIVISION	

TO BE PAID BY ____________ (Field) OFFICE $ ____________

TAX WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES ____________

INSURANCE TO BE WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES
(Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased) ____________

SAVINGS BONDS ____________

RETIREMENT WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES ____________

OTHER (Specify in detail) ____________

ALLOTMENTS ____________ (Name of Allottee) ____________

Address ____________

TOTAL GROSS SALARY PER PAY PERIOD $ ____________

I hereby authorize and direct the Disbursing Office to make above allotments from my compensation.

Form No. 37-1
Sep 1946

SECRET

____________ (Signature of Employee)

JOB DESCRIPTION:

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS	REASONS FOR ACTION	DATE OF LAST PROMOTION

APPROVED ______________________ OFFICE
(Field)

______________________ Date ________
(Chief of Mission)

______________________ Date ________
(Security Officer)

______________________ Date ________
(Special Funds Officer)

Knox P. Pruden 14 Mar 47

APPROVED — W.S. OFFICE

______________________ Date ________
(Administrative Officer)

Raymond G. Leddy Date 4/3/47
(Branch Chief)

______________________ Date 14 Mar 47
(Chairman Pers. Review Com.)

______________________ Date 18 Mar 47
(Special Funds Officer)

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

This form is to be initiated in triplicate by the appropriate Branch or Office Chief for processing in accordance with existing personnel procedures. Upon approval, the original and one copy will be retained by the Disbursing Office and one copy returned to the originating office.

(2)

NAME NOEL, JAMES A.

DATE OCT 20 1946

NATURE OF ACTION New Appointment

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS one

EFFECTIVE DATE OCT 20 1946

LOCATION OF DEPENDENTS Barcelona, Spain

MARITAL STATUS married

CITIZENSHIP American SEX female AGE 35

FROM		TO	
POSITION		POSITION	Chief of Station, Barcelona
CONTROL NO.		CONTROL NO.	
CLASSIFICATION		CLASSIFICATION	CAF-12
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY		ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	$5905.20
OFFICIAL STATION		OFFICIAL STATION	Barcelona, Spain
ALLOWANCES: QUARTERS		ALLOWANCES: QUARTERS	$ 900.00
COST OF LIVING		COST OF LIVING	840.00
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING		SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING	
TOTAL		TOTAL	$ 1,740.00
OFFICE: BRANCH		OFFICE: BRANCH	FSRO
DIVISION		DIVISION	

TO BE PAID BY Madrid OFFICE $ 121.53
(Field)

TAX WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES

INSURANCE TO BE WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES
(Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased) 12.50

SAVINGS BONDS 37.50

RETIREMENT WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES

OTHER (Specify in detail)

Acct. of J. A. & Lillian B. Noel
ALLOTMENTS First National Bank of San Diego 282.71
(Name of Allottee)

Address 5th & Broadway, San Diego, California

TOTAL GROSS SALARY PER PAY PERIOD $ 454.24

I hereby authorize and direct the Disbursing Office to make above allotments from my compensation.

Form No. 37-1
Sep 1946

James A. Noel
(Signature of Employee)

JOB DESCRIPTION:

Chief of Station at Barcelona. Administration of office. Preparation of all administrative and intelligence reports emanating from Barcelona office. Direction of Barcelona chains. Direction of Bilbao chains with contact maintained by occasional visit to that area. Processing of Bilbao material. Preparation on behalf of the Consulate General, Barcelona, of political reports; of reports on military activity on behalf of the Military Attache, Madrid, and of weekly report on movement of naval vessels on behalf of the Naval Attache, Madrid (through the Consulate General). Cooperation with the Joint British-American Trusteeship (ACC), Madrid, on "safe haven" cases. Liaison with British I.S.

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS	REASONS FOR ACTION	DATE OF LAST PROMOTION

APPROVED Madrid OFFICE
(Field)
William L. [illegible] Date 20.10.46
(Chief of Mission)
Date
(Security Officer)
Date
(Special Funds Officer)
Wm. G. [illegible]

APPROVED U.S. OFFICE
Date 13 Nov
(Administrative Officer)
C.W. Tenney Date 14 Nov
(Branch Chief)
Date
(Chairman, Pers. Review Com.)
Date [illegible] Nov
(Special Funds Officer)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
055292

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Noel, James A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 3-19-11	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Base	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DOD	8. CURRENT STATION San Francisco		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 67 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Base supervising six professional and three clerical subordinates.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Establishment and maintenance of operational support mechanisms.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operational reporting.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with FBI and DCS, et al.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Direction of recruitment and handling of support assets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

28 JUL 1968

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE MAIL ROOM JUL 19 11 08 AM '68

Mr. Noel is much too experienced and practiced a hand for his performance to vary very much from year to year. He has continued to turn in the highly creditable performance in San Francisco that has been standard for him for many years. He has managed his subordinates well and has exercised uniformly good judgment in directing their operational efforts. Of particular value has been his steadiness in the face of administrative adversity disrupting the organization of his Base. Mr. Noel insured that the work of the Base continued uninterrupted and demonstrated his capacity to keep on top of all details and report them to Headquarters as appropriate. It is a credit to Mr. Noel that in the post-Ramparts exposure period there was not a single instance of an academic asset withdrawing from a relationship with the Base.

The performance of his officers atteststhe careful guidance and wise leadership which has enabled them to operate securely and well in sensitive areas. His realtions with the FBI and DCS are excellent. He is appropriately economy minded. In short, he is a decidedly strong supervisor.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 18 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Mr. Noel is in the Field and will be shown a copy of this Fitness Report on his next TDY trip to Headquarters.	
DATE 15 July 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/DO/I	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Stanley H. Gaines

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur in rating officer's judgment.

DATE 17 July 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, DO Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Gordon F. Jorgensen

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 055292

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Noel, James A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 3/19/11	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Base	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DOD		8. CURRENT STATION San Francisco	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Base supervising six professional and three clerical subordinates.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Establishment and maintenance of operational support mechanisms.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operational reporting.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with the FBI and DCS, et al.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Direction of recruitment and handling operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 31 AUG 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

AUG 30 3 50 PM '67

Mr. Noel is an old hand at running Bases or Stations abroad and his performance as Chief of Base, San Francisco, amply attests that. It goes without saying that he understands all aspects of the business, knows how to delegate, organize, direct and report. He has continued to do all these things well. His seniority, experience and maturity served the Agency in particularly good stead during this period when the location of his Base was compromised in the public press, through no fault of Mr. Noel. His subsequent and consequent actions were all taken with sound judgment and appropriate calm and circumspection. He was also most receptive to, and cooperative in, Headquarters suggestions in this matter. He is, of course, cost conscious and an excellent supervisor. His overall performance is that of a high order of senior Agency officers.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
6 months	Subject is in the field; a copy of this report is being retained to show him on his next TDY to Hqs.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 August	C/DO/I	(signed in draft) Stanley H. Gaines

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur fully in overall rating of "Strong".

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 August 1967	Chief, DO Division	Gordon L. Jorgensen

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 055292

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) NOEL, James A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 March 1911	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Iberian	8. CURRENT STATION Madrid		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1965 - 27 September 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 My rating of the performance of this officer remains the same as the description of his performance which is contained in his fitness report for the period ending 31 March 1965.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

23 OCT 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 20 12 01 PM '65
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
	Mr. Noel is currently at his overseas post.	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
27 September 65	Chief, WE Division	William D. O'Ryan William D. O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
19 OCT 1965	ADDP	Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

SECRET

12 May 1965

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

WE
D
Hdqrs. 3

SUBJECT: James A. Noel, Employee Serial No. 055292
Fitness Report for the Period 1 April 1964
to 31 March 1965

1. Subject, who was born 19 March 1911, is a GS-16 and has been assigned to Madrid as Chief of Station since October 1961.

2. As Chief of Station, he is charged with the organization and management of the station and is responsible for the planning, direction, and supervision of all its activities. He also exercises general supervision of the Barcelona base. Assisting him and under his general supervision are 24 staff employees and 15 contract employees.

3. Subject serves as the Ambassador's principal intelligence officer, as chairman of the Embassy Defector Committee, as the Agency representative on the Embassy Country Team, and as the coordinator of U.S. clandestine intelligence operations in Spain. Accredited as the Agency's representative to the Spanish Intelligence (AEM) and Security (DGS) services, he plans, directs, and supervises all aspects of the station's multi-level liaison with these services and personally handles the liaison with the Service chiefs and a number of their senior officers. On the operational side, subject handles BISHAD/1, CITIZEN and QUWIND/1. He recruited QUIP/1 during the rating period, arranged a new cover job for HARRIOTT through QUWIND/1, and participated in the handling of QUMALT and QUHOPS.

4. Subject is an experienced and mature officer, possessing an excellent command of Spanish. Highly motivated, conscientious, and industrious, he readily accepts responsibility and is both thorough and reliable in the execution of his duties. Even tempered and affable, he holds the confidence and friendship of those whom he directs and those to whom he is responsible, and the morale of his station is noticeably high. He is alert to the operational possibilities

14 JUN 1965

SECRET

of any given situation, evidences sound and objective judgment, and works well under pressure. He writes lucidly, speaks articulately, and exhibits a high degree of cost consciousness in the use of government funds and property. His delegation of responsibility to others is meaningful and well delineated.

5. Subject's performance has been strong throughout the rating period. He has given the station purposeful direction and competent management and as an effective supervisor who commands the loyalty and respect of those whom he supervises, he has succeeded in obtaining a maximum effort from the station personnel. He enjoys the confidence of the Ambassador and other principal officers of the Embassy, several of whom have expressed their appreciation of subject's work and commented on the value of the station's contribution to the functioning of the Embassy. The fact that the Ambassador arrived in Madrid with definite prejudices regarding the Agency but was of quite another mind upon his departure is testimony to subject's skill and tact.

6. Subject has conducted the Agency's liaison with the Spanish services most competently, as evidenced by the relationship he established with Captain General Munoz Grandes, his ability to persuade the AEM to undertake sensitive operations in Cuba, and the fact that this liaison did not suffer following the attack on the Spanish ship "Sierra Aranzazu". Marked progress has been achieved in joint CE and CP operations, and subject has developed QUANTUM/30 to the point wherein the latter's collaboration far exceeds the cooperation normally expected in an official liaison relationship.

7. In addition to his considerable executive and liaison duties, subject has carried out the previously cited operational assignments with marked ability. He is a convincing and persuasive agent handler, and his operational reporting is prompt and thorough.

8. The only criticism I would make of subject is that I believe the station should be making a greater effort to develop internal assets who will be able to report on and influence developments in Spain following the departure of Franco.

Edward Ryan

EDWARD RYAN
Deputy Chief
Western Europe Division

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION: "S"

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: CONCUR William D. O'Ryan, C/WE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 055292

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) NOEL, James A	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1911	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station, Madrid	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Iberia	8. CURRENT STATION Madrid		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As Chief of Station, Madrid, plans and directs all FI and CA operations within Spain	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises Madrid Station and Barcelona Base personnel	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains contact with senior officials in the Spanish Intelligence Services	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Represents the Director of CIA with the Ambassador to Spain and other U.S. officials in Spain	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Personally handles several sensitive third country intelligence operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises Cuban operations in Spain	RATING LETTER O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

12 MAY 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 11 10 30 AM '64
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C | **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject is one of the Agency's truly mature, experienced operations officers. He has had unusual operational experience in Central and South America, both in the field and in Headquarters. His activities have spanned both the FI and the CA spectrum. He has and does deal easily and graciously with high ranking officials, both American and foreign. His good sense, poise and dignity never fail to impress. He is a person of principal and high morals. He does not hesitate to express his conviction even though he may have reason to believe such convictions are not popular. He is a strong supervisor who enjoys his subordinate's respect. He is economy minded and made diligent efforts to comply with requests to economize. Mr. Noel has succeeded in creating a cohesive station in Madrid.

SECTION D | **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1.	BY EMPLOYEE
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject is in the field. This report will be shown to him upon his return.	
DATE 20 April 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WE/5	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Fred E. Hubbard

3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 5 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 055292

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) NOEL, James A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1911	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS 16	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Iberian Br.		8. CURRENT STATION Madrid		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 22 April 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1962-31 March 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Direction of all FI and CA operations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Administration of Station and supervision of personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Direct supervision of senior ops officer in charge of Cuban operations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Personally handles a sensitive operation of interest to another CS component.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains contact with senior liaison personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Maintains a working relationship with the Ambassador and other U. S. officials.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

30 APR 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

APR 29 9 54 AM '63

Mr. Noel has ably administered a large Station and has displayed maturity, good judgment and tact in the day-to-day management and direction of Station activities and personnel. This has been achieved despite the physical location of Station staff personnel in a number of separated office sites.

Under the direction of Mr. Noel a far reaching and fruitful major operational program against the high priority Cuban target has been undertaken and Madrid Station today is making a substantial contribution in good operations and good intelligence information to the over-all Agency effort. Another notable accomplishment directly attributable to Mr. Noel, and in part a reflection of his long years of service in Latin America, has been his professional handling personally of theStation operation involving Juan Peron. Interested CS components have stated categorically that Madrid Station coverage of Juan Peron and his activities is essential in satisfying existing intelligence requirements on Peronism.

Despite the Station's heavy diversion into Cuban and Latin American activities and State Department policy restrictions on internal political activities, Mr. Noel has encouraged the development of a long-range program involving activities against the Spanish Communist Party and clandestine contact with the Spanish political opposition.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 4 Feb 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 19	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject employee is in the field. Report will be shown to him upon his return to Headquarters.	
DATE April 25, 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Roland E. Dulio
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL I concur in the above assessment.		
DATE 25 April 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan

SECRET

14-00000

RYBAT
SECRET

Recorded by
CSPD

17 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, WE

SUBJECT : Mr. James A. Noel
Fitness Report Covering the Period 14 August 1961 to
31 March 1962

1. Mr. Noel assumed his duties as Chief of Station, Madrid on 23 September 1961. The Station, as constituted when Mr. Noel arrived, included some 21 staffers plus numerous contract personnel, as well as a two man base in Barcelona. The Madrid Station proper not only includes the Embassy installation but an outside operations section as well. Since Mr. Noel arrived the Station has been launched into a Cuban operations program of considerable scale and on a crash basis. In addition, in this period, one State cover slot was withdrawn, and the experienced Chief of Base, Barcelona had to be brought home due to a family emergency.

2. To date Mr. Noel has given every evidence of a particular ability to cope with the crash program and the acute shortage of personnel with judiciousness and maturity. While it is too early, yet, to pass judgement, there are indications that Mr. Noel has been preoccupied with Cuban problems (an area of special interest to him) to the detriment of lower priority but, nonetheless, necessary Spanish targets (for example, contact with the local opposition and a budding effort against the Spanish Communist Party).

3. As indicated above, Mr. Noel has not been in place as Chief of Station long enough to justify firm reservations concerning his management, nor to permit meaningful criticism. Also, as indicated above, his outstanding noticeable strength to date has been his ability to cope with a heavy operational program, a shortage of personnel, and a sometimes difficult operational climate, with judgement, calmness and patience.

Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS F. THIELE
Chief, WE/5

CONCUR:
[illegible] C/WE

[illegible]

RYBAT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: State Department Promotion of
NOEL, James A.

1. The Department has informed this office that effective April 1, 1962 subject employee was promoted from FSR-3, $13,600 to FSR-2, $14,900

2. Request this notice be placed in the official folder of the employee concerned.

Chief, Central Cover Group

cc: Finance Division
Area Division

CONFIDENTIAL

70-[illegible] B of 33

STANDARD FORM 56
JANUARY 1970
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENT 870—1 S6—109

AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS
Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): NOEL, James A.

2(a). DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year): 19 March 1911

2(b). SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER: 083 | 36 | 2388

3. CHECK THE REASON FOR TERMINATING INSURANCE

- (a) ☐ Separated (includes resignations)
- (b) ☒ Retired ——————→
- (c) ☐ Died as an employee
- (d) ☐ Died as a reemployed annuitant
- (e) ☐ End of 12 months non-pay status
- (f) ☐ Other (specify)

NOTE: If the reason checked is "b, Retired" your group life insurance (but not accidental death and dismemberment benefits) will continue during retirement if you meet the conditions described in "Notice to Retiring Employee" below.

4. CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX CONCERNING SF 54, DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

(a). ☐ — CURRENT SF 54 ATTACHED

(b). ☒ — A CURRENT SF 54 IS NOT ON FILE WITH THIS AGENCY

(c). ☐ — A CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (OR EQUIVALENT)

NOTE: IF EMPLOYEE (A) DIED OR (B) IS RETIRING OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION UNDER CONDITIONS ENTITLING HIM TO RETAIN HIS LIFE INSURANCE, ATTACH CURRENT SF 54, IF ANY, TO ORIGINAL SF 56 AND CHECK BOX 4 (a) ON ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF SF 56. IF NO CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE, CHECK BOX 4 (b). IN ALL OTHER CASES, SHOW WHETHER OR NOT CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE BY CHECKING BOX 4 (b) OR (c). A CURRENT SF 54 IS ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN CANCELED BY EMPLOYEE OR AUTOMATICALLY BY TRANSFER OR PRIOR TERMINATION OF INSURANCE.

5. DATE OF EVENT CHECKED IN ITEM 3 (MONTH, DAY, YEAR): 31 March 1971

6. ANNUAL BASIC PAY RATE (NOT AMOUNT OF INSURANCE) ON DATE IN ITEM 5 CONVERT DAILY, HOURLY, PIECEWORK, ETC. RATE TO ANNUAL RATE. $33,757 PER ANNUM

7. DID EMPLOYEE HAVE OPTIONAL INSURANCE ON DATE IN ITEM 5? NO ☒ YES ☐ IF YES, GIVE RECEIPT DATE OF ELECTION OF OPTIONAL INSURANCE (SF 176 or 176-T)

8. DATE OF NOTICE OF CONVERSION PRIVILEGE (SF 55) TO EMPLOYEE (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)

9. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM, AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS, OFFICIAL RECORDS AND THAT THE EMPLOYEE NAMED WAS COVERED BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 5.

Personal signature of authorized agency official

Typed name of authorized agency official: Francis G. Monan

Title: Insurance Officer, Alternate

Name and address of agency, including zip code:
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Phone number, including area code

Date: 6 APR 1971

SEE OTHER SIDE
FOR
INSTRUCTIONS TO EMPLOYING AGENCY

PART 3—FILE COPY

14-00000

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) NOEL	(first) JAMES	(middle) ARTHUR	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) March 19, 1911	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 083 36 2388
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print) James A. Noel

DATE 16 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

MAR 28 1 22 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1962
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

SECRET

26 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: James A. Noel -
Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

Mr. James A. Noel arrived in Havana in September of 1958, a trifle more than three months before Fidel Castro assumed power on 1 January 1959. With the advent of that new government Cuba became, so far as U.S. economic and political interests are concerned, one of the most important spots in the world, as well as increasingly more difficult to conduct CIA business. As a result, with the constant worsening of Cuban-U.S. relationship, it is doubtful that there is at the present time a more difficult assignment than Havana in this Division. Nevertheless, with an extremely limited staff, Noel has been able to continue, and even extend, his operations to the point where almost every significant phase of Cuban life is covertly covered. When the increase of anti-U.S. feeling is considered, to say nothing of the increase of effectiveness of the Cuban counterintelligence resulting from its direction by Soviet professionals, it is amazing that Noel has been able to produce the great volume of important reports which he has sent. He has conducted some extremely delicate operations in the face of almost certainty of discovery. In all this, however, he has offered leadership of a high quality to his staff and has been a fine example of good morale, which is reflected in the attitude of every member of his staff, all of whom respond readily and without complaint to the demands made of them by their surrounding circumstances. Mr. Noel deserves to be warmly commended for a job well done.

JCKing
J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

REVIEWED BY:
W. Lloyd George for
Chief of Operations, DD/P

SECRET

DC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

25

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) NOEL James A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 March 1911	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/III/Havana, Cuba

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 20 Oct 57 – 31 Mar 59

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
Direction of FI operations	6	Intelligence evaluation and reporting	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
Direction of PP operations	5	Development of working relationship with indigenous leaders and local Americans	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.
Administration of Station and supervisor of personnel	6	Development of working relationship with Ambassador and other US officials	5

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee.

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Noel was assigned to his post at a time when the country was undergoing a revolution which later was successful. He has done an outstanding job in adapting and redirecting the Station's operational program. He has shown initiative, imagination and resourcefulness in developing new operations, both in the FI and PP fields.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Employee is in the field

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON:

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 29 May 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/WH	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE R. E. GOMEZ R Gomez

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur that Mr. Noel's operational performance under difficult conditions has been outstanding. It should also be noted that he has been highly successful at his present post in getting the best out of his staff.

DATE 28 May 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WHD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE J. C. KING J C King

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in Item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): NOEL, James A.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 March 1911
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: (DI)
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/II/DC
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer - Branch Chief
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 9 November 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 21 Oct 56 - 20 Oct 57

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one):

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)	
A ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 14 Oct 57
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Donald C. Marelius
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: ADC/WH

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

Posted Pos. Control KN DATE 29 OCT 1957
Reviewed by FOD 11/5/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 15 Oct 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: J. C. King JC King
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, WH

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 24 2 11 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during [illegible] period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty [illegible] rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing [illegible] duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 **Direction of Branch**	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 **Spotting of operational possibilities**	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 **Supervision of FI Ops**	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 **Use of area knowledge**	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 **Supervision of PP Ops**	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 **Working relationship with other U. S. officials**	RATING NUMBER 5

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

This officer has performed in a superior manner during the past year as branch chief of the West and North Coast of South America branch, subsequently of the East Coast branch. His long experience in the field coupled with a flair for intelligence, sound judgement and an ability to organize and efficiently administer his branch make him a valuable asset to the organization. He has markedly improved in his ability to express himself and in his conduct of PP operations.

SECTION B. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5/6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): NOEL, James A.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 March 19[redacted] //
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: (DI)
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/II/DC
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Ofcr - Branch Chief
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 9 Nov 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 21 Oct 56 - 20 Oct 57
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 14 Oct 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Donald C. Marelius
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: ADC/WH

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 15 Oct 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: J. C. King JCKing
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, WH

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds). WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 24 2 11 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

He will be an excellent Station Chief where there are both major FI and PP responsibilities.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Senior staffs

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

none

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) NOEL James A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 March 1911	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DD/P/WH/Br. I	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer (Branch Chief)		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 4 November 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 11 October 1955 - 20 October 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☑ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

2. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:
- ☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- ☑ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- ☑ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- ☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- ☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

4. THIS DATE 7 DEC 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Franklin P. Holcomb	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief/WH

7. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted [illegible]		FEB 1957
Reviewed [illegible]	JM	2-?-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 4 Feb. '57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL J. C. King JCKing	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief/WH

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 5 2 37 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO.	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO.	RATING NUMBER
1. General Management of Branch	5	4. Spotting operational possibilities	5
2. Supervision FI Ops	6	5. Use of area knowledge	5
3. Supervision PP Ops	4	6. Coordination other Branches	5

D. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Under his supervision the Branch will do a reliable job without higher echelon direction. His administration is efficient. His inability to express himself in clear, and forceful language is a handicap, particularly in connection with briefings.

In addition to his proven competence as an FI officer he is applying with steadily increasing effectiveness his growing knowledge of the conduct of PP operations.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY: He has at the same time excellent judgment and displays sound thinking at all times; these characteristics, along with his administrative ability, are his distinguishing qualifies.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) NOEL James A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 March 1911	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION [illegible]

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Branch I	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer (Branch Chief)

7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 4 November 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 11 October 1955 - 20 October 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐	SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 7 DEC 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Franklin P. Holcomb	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief/WHD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 4 Feb '57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL J. C. King JCKing	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief WHD

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 3
5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	1	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
30 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL He will be an above-average station chief, particularly in basically FI missions; he is, as a result of his current Hqs. assignment, showing an increasing comprehension of PP matters, and may in the near future have earned the opportunity to assume strong PP field responsibilities.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 5 2 37 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
FI Staff; however, not in the near future because of the key position he occupies now in this Division.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS
None of importance.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

Reviewed by PCD 2/29

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I *(To be filled in by Administrative Officer)*

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) NOEL, James A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 March 1911	3. SEX M	4. CAREER DESIGNATION SD-DI
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 15 August 1944	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO DDP	7. DIVISION WH	8. BRANCH I
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION: Caracas, Venezuela		11. GRADE GS-0136.01-15
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 10 October 1955	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 16 July 1954 - 10 October 1955		

SECTION II *(To be filled in by Supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION Branch Chief	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 20 January 1956

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS: *(List in order of frequency)*:

Branch Chief: Under Division Chief, plans and supervises performance of all covert espionage and CE ops, covert political, economic and psychological warfare activities in area of responsibility and the collection of foreign clandestine intelligence in the area. Reviews all projected and current FI and PP operations with desk officers; provides guidance to desk officers on FI and PP ops matters; supervises processing and dissemination of foreign clandestine intelligence information collected in area; makes recommendations to Div. Chief of any change in projects, organization or procedures in order to achieve maximum effectiveness; responsible for general administration and supervision of Branch personnel at Hqs.

This officer was Chief of a major station for part of the period under review.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ *has* ☐ *has not been shown to the individual rated.*

THIS DATE March 20 '56	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER *(Employee's immediate supervisor)* F. P. Holcomb

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT *(Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)*

THIS DATE March 20, 1956	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(Official next higher in line of authority)* J C King

FORM NO. 45 REPLACES FORM 37-16 1 MAY 54
1 OCT 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Read the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.										X				
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X				
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.										X				
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.										X				
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.										X				
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.											X			
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.				X										
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.										X				
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.										X				
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.												X		
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.											X			
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.								X						
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.											X			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.										☒				
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.										☒				
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".									☒					
29. TOUGH MINDED.								☒						
30. OBSERVANT.										☒				
31. CAPABLE.												☒		
32. CLEAR THINKING.												☒		
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												☒		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.										☒				
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.										☒				
36. DELIBERATE.								☒						
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										☒				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										☒				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.										☒				
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										☒				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										☒				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.												☒		
43. HAS DRIVE.										☒				
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											☒			
45. VERSATILE.								☒						
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										☒				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.										☒				
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.										☒				
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												☒		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.										☒				

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Serious approach and dedication to duties. General level of professional competence in FI and CI fields.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

His extent of comprehension of PP activities is a weakness only in the sense that his field duties have not offered sufficient opportunity to develop his presumed capability in this field to the point it would compare favorably with his FI ability.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:
Strength: General reliability.

PERSONNEL
MAR 22 9 34 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?
Advance PP.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):
His attention to duty has been manifested in steady improvement in regard to major objectives and in a commendable increase of station assets.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D.

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☒ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the Agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Noel, James A.	Wife-Lillian	67-0415

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 8 August 1966.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
2 December 1966	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-59)

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(true)* James Noel	DATE *(from item S-1)* 18 Feb. 1963	NAME OF SUPERVISOR *(true)*	DATE *(from item S-2)*
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:			DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Mar 1911	2. GRADE GS-16	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE Chief of Station	7A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR 23 September 1961
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION *(if known)*	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Madrid		7B. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD about 10 June 1964
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7C. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

Chief of Station. Overall responsibility for all KUBARK operations and activities in country of assignment.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

Return to post for second tour following home leave.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*:

None at this time.

FORM 3-59 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:
1ST. CHOICE WE 2ND. CHOICE WH 3RD. CHOICE -

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:
1ST. CHOICE Hague 2ND. CHOICE Copenhagen 3RD. CHOICE Mexico City

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?
INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 45

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

wife; and two sons, ages (at time of contemplated travel - June 1964) 15 and 13.

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

None - except schooling facilities for children.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Recommend approval of extension to June 1964. A recommendation regarding a second tour or other assignment will be forwarded to the Panel at a later date.

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER GEORGE K. MOGANNAM DATE 11 April 1963	SIGNATURE GK Mogannam

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. CABLE NO.
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME	20. SIGNATURE
21. TITLE	22. DATE

23. COMMENTS

DO NOT COMPLETE

SECRET

3 SEP

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Admonition

1. An analysis of the compromise and arrest of Agency personnel in Havana on 14 September 1960, originally made by the Chief, Operational Services, and since confirmed by a review committee, assigns to WH Division responsibility for command failures in control and supervision of a sensitive operation. I find that the following officers, by reason of the official assignments they then held, could or should have exercised such control and supervision:

[redacted]

f. James A. Noel as Chief of Station, Havana

[redacted]

2. This memorandum constitutes an official admonition to the above officers, and will be included in their personnel files.

/S/ J. C. King

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/SA-C/WH/DRMcLean:msm
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - ea Personnel File
1 - DD/P

14-00000

S E C R E T

23 January 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. NOEL

SUBJECT: Commendation for Extraordinary Performance of Duties.

1. It is with great personal satisfaction that I have reviewed the performance of members of this Division and, in particular your own, during the recent crisis in Cuba. I fully concur with your commendation of various members of your staff, and I am having it made a matter of record in the personnel folder of each employee, together with a supporting comment from the Division. In addition, I wish to single out your own outstanding performance. You have justified our highest estimate of your qualifications at the time of your selection as Chief of Station, Havana. Your consistently sound and intelligent evaluation of the situation, courageous and objective proposals for action, extensive coverage of the various groups involved, immediate and comprehensive reporting, dedication to duty, and leadership, are among the major ingredients of your success.

2. Now that the military phase of the crisis is over, although the political one may linger long, I wish to thank you and the following members of your staff for a superior performance which has been a great credit to all concerned:

ELIZABETH A. BARR
MARGARET T. JOYCE
SARAH E. RICHARDS
ARTHUR AVIGNONE
FRANK J. DEVEIRO
BASIL A. BEARDSLEY
PAUL J. BURNS
JACK STEWART
DAVID S. MORALES

JCKing
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

S E C R E T

SECRET
COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs

In reply refer to
SY

31 March 1954

My dear Mr. Dulles:

I should like to express my appreciation to you for the security assistance furnished by your representatives during the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Venezuela. Colonel J. C. King, the Head of your Latin American Division and Mr. James A. Noel, your station Chief in Caracas were a tremendous help to us in carrying out our security arrangements for the Conference and for the protection of the Secretary and Conference Delegates.

Colonel King was most cooperative and assisted us greatly during the initial planning of the security and throughout the Conference. The cooperation and advice of Mr. Noel was an invaluable service. Through Mr. Noel's knowledge and contacts our work was greatly facilitated. He consistently made available his time, equipment and the facilities of his office and maintained a close working relationship with our security representatives in Caracas.

Please accept my thanks for the assistance of Colonel King and Mr. Noel and for a job well done.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) Scott McLeod
Administrator

The Honorable
Allen Dulles
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D. C.

(Original in 201 file of J.C. King)

SECRET

SECRET

21 January 1954

File

MEMORANDUM FOR: CWH

SUBJECT : Reference to James A. Noel by William I. Clark, Assistant Director U.S.I.A. for Latin America.

During the briefing of CIA personnel conducted by William I. Clark, Assistant Director of U.S.I.A. for Latin America, on 14 January 1954, he twice referred to the excellent cooperation between our Chief of Mission at Caracas, James A. Noel and the P.A.O., which he characterized as exemplary and a model for all other stations.

CPP/WH

Distribution:

Original and 1: Addressee

SECRET

UV ✓

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE: OSO
DIVISION: WHD
BRANCH: I
SECTION:

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
		DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
Department of State (FS)	Washington, D.C.	26	Jan	1931	15	Aug	1944	19	6	13
OSS, SSU, CIG, CIA	Washington, D.C.	✓15 16	Aug	1944	31	12	51			
							Total Civilian Service	6	11	20

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
NONE									
						Total Military Service			

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

14 August 1952
DATE

James A. Noel
James A. Noel
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

as of 31 Dec 51

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
6	11	20

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, FBT

DATE: 30 June 1949

(1)

FROM : Commo

SUBJECT: Training

Mr. James A. Noel was given the training course, "Basic Familiarization in Sound and Surveillance Equipment."

This training was given on June 28, 1949 in the Commo Demonstration Room, 1005A "L" Building and was of two hours duration.

J. Kaplan

J. Kaplan

file
m-6

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

MAR 20 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ATTENTION : Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

SUBJECT : NOEL, James Arthur, Request for Appointment in the Foreign Service

REFERENCE : Appendix E-4 to Memorandum of 23 November 1951 Subject, Representation in Foreign Service Missions

ENCLOSURES : a. Application Forms 57 and DSP-34

b. Medical Forms 88 and 89

c. Occupational History Supplement

d. Proposed Biography

1. It is requested that Mr. James Arthur Noel, GS-14, $9600 be appointed in the Foreign Service with the title of Attache, FSS-3, $8481, for duty in the American Embassy at Caracas, Venezuela. Mr. Noel will replace Mr. Robert E. Dahlgren who occupies position number one as listed in above reference.

2. Mr. Noel has been a member of the Foreign Service of the United States since January 1931. He served for 13 years as Vice Consul with the Department of State at various locations in Mexico. Mr. Noel joined this agency's predecessor organization in 1944 and was assigned to Spain as Chief of Station at Bilbao and Barcelona, and as Intelligence Officer at Madrid. He subsequently became an employee of this agency in 1947 and has since served as Chief of Station in Guatemala at Guatemala City, and in Argentina at Buenos Aires.

3. It is requested that subject arrive at his destination on or about 15 May 1952.

/s/ Richard Helms
for
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
Assistant Director

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

JAMES ARTHUR NOEL

OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE: December 1951 to Present, Intelligence Officer Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C.

June 1949 to December 1951, Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, under cover as Attache, American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Argentina

March 1947 to June 1949, Intelligence Officer Central Intelligence Agency under cover as Attache, American Embassy Guatemala City, Guatemala.

August 1944 to March 1947, Intelligence Officer SSU (OSS)

PRINTED BIOGRAPHY

NOEL, James Arthur.—b. New York, N. Y., Mar. 19 1911; San Diego (Calif.) High School grad.; bookkeeper, paint and varnish firm, 1929-30; asst. to traffic mgr., chamber of com., 1930; app. clk. in consulate at Ensenada Jan. 26, 1931; v.c. at Ensenada Sept. 25, 1935; at Mazatlan Oct. 6, 1938; temp. at Manzanillo from Oct. 1939 to May 1940; at Guadalajara July 17, 1941; at Bilbao Aug. 15, 1944; at Madrid Dec. 23, 1945; at Barcelona May 1 1946; app. For. Ser. Staff Officer of class six and assigned to the Dept. Feb. 27, 1947; att. at Guatemala Mar. 2[illegible], 1927; class four May 2, 1949; att. at Buenos Aires June 17, 1949; married.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Ele

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
055292	NOEL James Arthur	19 March 1911

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - TO			
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-66 444n

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

15 AUG 1968

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAY 2 2 38 PM '68
MAIL ROOM

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE [illegible]	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS.
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or As Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE
2 May 1968

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE GRADE STEP
055292	NOEL JAMES A	M.	03/19/11	GS-16-05

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
D	CHIEF OF BASE	DOD	SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
GUATEMALA	PCS CC	47/09/18	49/07/01
ARGENTINA	PCS CC	49/08/01	52/08/01
VENEZUELA	PCS VV	52/09/03	55/12/02
SOUTH AMERICA	TDY CC	56/06/01	56/07/01
SOUTH AMERICA	TDY CC	57/02/01	57/02/01
SOUTH AMERICA	TDY CC	57/11/01	57/12/01
CUBA	PCS VV	58/09/04	61/01/07
SPAIN	PCS	61/09/21	66/07/09

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 29 Jun 67
INITIALS: TPB

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD NO COLLEGE DEGREE		

FORM 1-67 444J
MFG 2-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

6 7 JUL ENTD

(4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED From To	GRADUATE
San Diego Senior High School	San Diego, California	1927-29	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM / QTR HRS (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR				
1	NONE						
2							
3							
4							

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

NONE

DATE: [illegible]
CSC [illegible]
[illegible] ONLY

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1	NONE				
2					
3					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1	NONE				
2					
3					
4					
5					

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1	NONE				
2					
3					
4					
5					

SECRET

SECTION IV — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
MEXICO (West Coast)	Political, economic, topographic,cultural	Jan. [illegible] to Aug. 1944		X			X
SPAIN	Political, economic, topographic,cultural	Sept.1944 to Feb. 1946	-----	X			X
GUATEMALA	Political,economic, topographic, cultural	Apr. 1947 to May 1949	—	X			X
ARGENTINA	Political, economic, cultural	Aug.1949 to Dec. 1951	----	X			X
VENIZUELA	Political; economic, cultural	Aug.1952 to Dec. 1955	---	X			X
CUBA	Political, economic, topographic, cultural	Sept.1958 to Jan. 1961	----	X			X
SPAIN	Political, economic, topographic, cultural	Sept. 1961 to July 1966		X			X

SECTION V — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
60		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

NONE

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Collector contemporary Spanish art

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4 SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving) OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

None

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

NONE

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NONE

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

NONE

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION VII **MILITARY SERVICE**

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify)
NONE

2. BRANCH OR CORPS

3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty)
FROM TO

4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify)

5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation if past service)

6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

NONE

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG NONE
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

NONE

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS.

NONE

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED		
1.	NONE			☐	RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
2.				☐	RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
3.				☐	RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
4.				☐	RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
5.				☐	RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	**MARITAL STATUS**
1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY	NO CHANGE
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)	

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER	
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (COUNTRIES)	9. DATE U. S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X — **DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE**

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
James A. Noel, Jr.	son	Nov.3,48,Guatemala	USA	1807 Sebastian Drive, Burlingame, Cal. 94010
Richard [illegible]. Noel	son	Apr.30,51,Argentina	USA	same

SECTION XI — **PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO
American Foreign Service Association	Wash. D.C. RESIGNED October 1966.		

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
2 May 1967	James Noel

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION FOR LANGUAGE AWARD

PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. 555292

LC NO. 739

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) NOEL JAMES ARTHUR	2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year) MARCH 17, 1911

3. CAREER STATUS YES	4. SD FI	5. COMPONENT WHD/BRANCH II

5. LANGUAGE SPANISH	CODE 720	7. DATE OF TEST (Month, Day, Year) APRIL 7, 1958	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE (Month, Day, Year) April 25, 1957

9. TEST SCORE	READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
WR	H	I			

10. AWARDABLE LEVEL	COMPREHENSIVE			SPECIALIZED-READING			SPECIALIZED-SPEAKING			NOT QUALIFIED AT ANY LEVEL
	ELEM.	INTER.	HIGH	ELEM.	INTER.	HIGH	ELEM.	INTER.	HIGH	

11. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS ELIGIBLE FOR THE AWARD INDICATED, HAVING MET ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SAID AWARD.

DATE

SIGNATURE

12. TYPE OF AWARD				
SP	A-W	S-P	C-P-S	E-I-M
I	M		R	H

AMOUNT OF AWARD $100.00

13. I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

SIGNATURE

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

DATE

14. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION	$	15. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.
16. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION	$	17. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT
18. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD PAID	$	19. CHECK NUMBER ISSUED — DATE

20. FORWARD CHECK TO

FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 5th & BROADWAY, [illegible] FOR DEPOSIT ACCT.

[illegible] C. NOEL

FORM 7-57 1273 SECRET (46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE: SEP

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): NOEL, James Arthur

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):
5528 Uppingham Street
Somerset
Chevy Chase 15, Maryland

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):
3506 Juniper Street
San Diego 4, California

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: OLIVER 4-3809

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: California

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: NOEL, Lillian Bobbett

2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 5528 Uppingham Street, Chevy Chase 15, Maryland

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: ------

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Oliver 4-3809

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: none

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: none

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Alfred E. NOEL (father), 1714 Dale Street, San Diego 2, California

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS: none

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME: (First) Lillian (Middle) Edith (Maiden) Bobbett (Last) NOEL

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 29 Sept. 1934

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): San Diego, California

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 3614 Fairmount Avenue, San Diego, California

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 25 JUL 1958

7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH:

9. CAUSE OF DEATH:

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 5528 Uppingham Street, Chevy Chase 15, Maryland

11. DATE OF BIRTH: 12 January 1911

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Colorado Springs, Colorado

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.

14. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.A.

16. DATE ACQUIRED: birth

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): birth in U.S.

18. OCCUPATION: Housewife

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers): N.A.

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): N.A.

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM 4-57 444b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR
N.A.

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
N.A.

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
N.A.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
Clerk in U.S. Consulate, Ensenada, B.C., Mexico, from 1935-37.

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
NONE
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
None

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Bank of Bethesda (checking account)	Bethesda, Maryland
1st National Bank (checking account)	5th & Bdwy, San Diego, California

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

N.A.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
United States

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE:
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII No changes since EOD EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED:

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE		
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE		
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE		
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE	☐	DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Mexico	Political, economic, terrain, people	Jan. 1931 to Aug. 1944				x

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

Mexico - duty with U.S. Foreign Service, State Department.

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY:

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HDQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING
Spain	Terrain, indigenous psychology, pol. parties	Sept. 1944 thru Feb. 1947		x	
Guatemala	Terrain, pol. personalities, economic sit.	April 1947 thru April 1949		x	
Argentina	Political parties & personalities	August 1949 thru November 1951		x	
Venezuela	Political parties & personalities, industries.	September 1952 to Nov. 1955		x	
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Bolivia	Pol. parties & figures	June-July 56 Feb. 1957	x TDY		

SECTION IX — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
60		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (*Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.*)

SECTION X — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

No changes since last report.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (*Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.*), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (*Year of issue*)	6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (*Year of issue*)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) April 1947 to April 1949	2. GRADE GS-12	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/ WH Division
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 2	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station, Guatemala City, Guatemala	

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Responsibility for the administration and operations of a field station. Opened our Station at Guatemala City. Established and maintained relations with other U.S. officials and agencies. Agent development and handling.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) August 1949 to Nov. 1951	2. GRADE 13-14	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/ WH Division
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 8	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE DCOM & later Chief of Mission, Buenos Aires, Argentina	

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Chief of Station. Supervision of all station activities. Planning and execution of field operations. Maintenance of liaison with Ambassador and other U.S. officials. Agent handling.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) Sept. 1952 to Nov. 1955	2. GRADE 14-15	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/ WH Division
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 10	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station, Caracas, Venezuela	

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Chief of Station. Supervision of all station activities. Liaison with local security services in Venezuela and Netherlands West Indies and Surinam. Liaison with Amb. & other U.S. agencies. Planning & execution of field ops. Agent handling.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) January 1956-June 1957	2. GRADE GS-15	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH Division, Branch I
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 21	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Branch	

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Supervision of activities of six country desks. Providing operational guidance and support to stations and bases in six ~~Southxx~~ American countries. Consulting senior staff & other components; briefing of Ambassadors & other officials.

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) June 3, 1957 to date	2. GRADE GS-15	3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH Divisio, Branch II
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION from 20 to 25	5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Branch	

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
As indicated in 4 above except that four countries are involved. Responsible to Division Chief for efficient handling of op matters relating to area.

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF [illegible] MAIL ROOM

SECTION XII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 2

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepchildren, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING ▷ 1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Lillian B. NOEL	wife	1911		x	U.S.	5528 Uppingham St. Chevy Chase 15, Md.
James A. NOEL, Jr.	son	1948	x		U.S.	same
Richard A. NOEL	son	1951	x		U.S.	same

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Continuation Section VIII, 3.

In addition to the countries listed, I have traveled on TDY assignments to:

British Guiana	-	January 1953
Dutch Guiana	-	Aug.? 1955
Cuba	-	Nov. 1953 and in Nov. 1956
Panama	-	May 1948
Costa Rica	-	May 1948
Venezuela	-	July 1956
Netherlands West Indies	-	various during period Sept. 52-Nov. 55.

I have visited or transited every country of the Western Hemisphere except Paraguay.

DATE COMPLETED: 12 October 1957

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James A. NOEL James A. Noel

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 57 NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

AI ATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYME

INSTRUCTIONS: In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type, write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR

2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State): Foreign Service

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: 10 Mar. 1952

5. MR. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): James Arthur NOEL

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: % 511 Alban Towers, 3700 Massachusetts, N.W.,

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Washington, D.C,

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): California

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: —

(B) HOME PHONE: WOodley 6400 Ext. 511

9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): March 19, 1911

10. ☒ MARRIED ☐ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): New York City, New York

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 6 FEET 0 INCHES (B) WEIGHT: 200 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE: FSS-4 $6,990. May 2, 1949

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPROV. ☐ NON APPROV.	MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED	ENTERED REGISTER
NOTATIONS	APP. REVIEW APPROVED:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $.................. PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY:
☒ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED,
☐ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS

16. EXPERIENCE: It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in each activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM. TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Unemployed

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS. STARTING, $ PER PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: I left the Foreign Service in Dec. 1951 with the intention of entering private business in California in company with my oldest brother and other close relations. A few months trial convinced me that I would not be happy away from foreign service work, in which I have spent my entire adult life, and I therefore am anxious to return to government foreign service as soon as it is possible for me to do so.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16. CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM June 1949 TO Dec. 1951	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Attache	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service) FSS-4	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ FINAL $6,990 PER annum
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Argentina		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Elsworth Bunker, Ambassador	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) State Department, Foreign Service		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Government	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU 2 secretaroes		REASON FOR LEAVING enter private business	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Attache in political section of Embassy. My basic task was political reporting. Duties included daily perusal of several Spanish language newspapers and other periodicals for purpose detecting editerial and political trends. Establishment of reliable outside contacts among business and professional people and groups; drafting of political reports on general and specific topics assigned to me by the Ambassador. Liaison with other Embassy sections and U.S. agencies for coordination of political reporting activities.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Mar. 1947 TO June 1949	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Attache	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service) FSS-6	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ FINAL $5,910 PER annum
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Guatemala City, Guatemala		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Richard C. Patterson, Ambassador	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) State Department, Foreign Service		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Government	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU Two secretaries		REASON FOR LEAVING transfer to Buenos Aires	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Political reporting officer. Drafting of political reports and dispatches on general and specific political topics assigned to me by the Ambassador. Perusal of all local publications; establishment and maintaining of contacts in business, professional, political and diplomatic circles.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Aug. 1944 TO Mar. 1947	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Vice Consul	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service) —	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $4,000. PER annum FINAL $5,100 PER annum
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) SPAIN (Bilbao, Madrid and Barcelona)		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Richard Ford, Consul General	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) State Department, Foreign Service		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Government	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU 2 consular clerks		REASON FOR LEAVING transfer to Guatemala City	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Vice consul engaged in visa and passport work; examination of visa applicants; other activity included political reporting in the ~~xxxx~~ absence of the principal officer and Safe Haven activities while assigned to the Embassy in Madrid.

Jam[illegible]thur NOEL
511, Alban Towers,
3700 Mass. Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Birth: March 19, 1911.

Application for Federal Employment

Date of Employment	Exact Title of Position	Salary
		Starting: $1,800. p.a.
Jan. 1931 to Oct. 1938	Vice Consul	Final 2,000. p.a.

Place of Employment	~~Kindx~~ Name of Immediate Supervisor
Ensenada, Mexico	Wm. A. Smale, Consul

Name and Address of Employer	Reason for Leaving
State Department, Foreign Service	transfer to Mazatlan

Number and kind of employees supervised

Two consular clerks

Description of Work

General consular work including shipping services, visas, passports, welfare and protection, agricultural reporting, drafting of replies to trade inquiries.

K.

Jam ...thur NOEL

[illegible]

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Oct. 1938 TO Aug. 1944

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Vice Consul

CLASSIFICATION (If in Fe[illegible]

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 2,250 PER FINAL $ 3,000 PER annum

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) (MEXICO) Mazatlan and Guadalajara

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Rufus H. Lane, Jr. and Maurice L. Stafford, Consuls

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) State Department, Foreign Service

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, manufacture of locks, etc.) government

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU cons. clerks 2 [illegible] at Mazatlan, 4 at Guadalajara

REASON FOR LEAVING transfer to Bilbao

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

consular officer in charge of all immigration work at these two consulates, as well as shipping, notarial services, passport and citizenship work, welfare and protection activities; also engaged in economic and political reporting at these posts. In charge of both consulates for prolonged periods during absence of principal officer.

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
			NONE

18 EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF
☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED San Diego Senior High School, San Diego, Calif.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED History, Economics, commercial law, Spanish

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
None								

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
None			

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR IN-SERVICE TRAINING IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT
None					

19 INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
Spanish	x			x			x		

20 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?
☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:
FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)
LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20 IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

Mexico, Spain, Guatemala, Argentina, 1933 to 1951 - in Government service.

CAN USE SUCH OFFICE MACHINES [illegible] EIER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

none

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ..... SHORTHAND .....

21 GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

Member Rotary Clubs of Ensenada and Guadalajara, Mex. Jolaseta Tennis Club, Bilbao, Spain; Mayan Golf Club, Guatemala, American Club, Buenos Aires.

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

	FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.	Gordon B. Dunlap	321 Corona Street, San Antonio, Tex.	Motion Picture Distributor
2.	Lee R. Blohm	903 N. Canal, Carlsbad, New Mexico	Retired FSO
3.	H. B. Gregory	1700 Shroyer Road, Dayton, 9, Ohio	Official, Nat. Cash Register

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DEBARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for each debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a **PEACETIME VETERAN** who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a **DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN**, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a **WAR-TIME VETERAN** not claiming disability preference, you should **NOT** submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?		X
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?		—
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?		—

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
—	—
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO. (*if none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).
—	—

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		—
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? N.A. *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?	N.A.	
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?	N.A.	

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19....

Agency: .... Title:

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered *ALL* questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT ....

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married [illegible] own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

FORM DSP-34
1-26-51

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPLICATION FOR FOREIGN SERVICE AND DEPARTMENTAL EMPLOYMENT

(Use with Standard Form 57)

If more space is required, use additional sheets of paper. Write on each sheet your name, address and date of birth. Identify each item, and attach to this application.

BUDG BAU NO. 47-R0??-B
APPROVAL EXPIRES August 31, 1954

1. a. NAME *(Print)*

James Arthur NOEL

b. ADDRESS

511, Alban Towers, 3700 Mass., N.W., Washington, D.C.

2. USE OF APPLICATION - Check one box below to indicate whether you wish this application to be considered for Foreign Service employment only, or for both Foreign Service and Departmental employment. Completion of this form is not required for Department employment only. Standard Form 57 must be filled out in any case.

☒ FOREIGN SERVICE ONLY ☐ FOREIGN SERVICE AND DEPARTMENTAL

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(Place from which you will expect transportation of self and household effects, if any, if appointed to the Foreign Service)*

San Diego, California

4. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED? IF A NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE. *(Section 11 on Form 57).*

Not applicable

5. a. ARE YOU NOW INVOLVED IN ANY LITIGATION OR SEPARATION AGREEMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO
b. DO YOU KNOW OF ANY PROSPECTIVE LITIGATION IN WHICH YOU MAY BE INVOLVED? ☐ YES ☒ NO
(Give details, if answer is yes to a. or b.)

6. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT? *(Exclusive of allowances)* $ PER YEAR

7. WHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE, IF ANY, ON YOUR IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY FOR DUTY IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD?

none

8. a. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE *(If wife, give maiden name)*: Lillian Bobbett NOEL
b. DATE OF BIRTH: January 12, 1911
c. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State or Province, and Country)*: Colorado Springs, Colo.
d. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED?: not applicable
e. IF NATURALIZED, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NO. OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE.: not applicable

9.

NAMES OF DEPENDENTS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH	WILL RESIDE WITH YOU OVERSEAS YES	WILL RESIDE WITH YOU OVERSEAS NO
Lillian Bobbett Noel	wife	Jan. 12, 1911	x	
James A. Noel, Jr.	son	Nov. 3, 1948	x	
Richard A. Noel	son	April 30, 1951	x	

10. a. FATHER'S NAME: Alfred E. NOEL
b. PRESENT ADDRESS: 1714 Dale St, San Diego, Calif.
c. PLACE OF BIRTH: Plainfield, N.J.

11. a. MOTHER'S NAME *(Maiden)*: Ethel Louise LEACOCK
b. PRESENT ADDRESS: deceased
c. PLACE OF BIRTH: New York City, N.Y.

12. IF PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, DID THEY EVER OBTAIN UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP? *(Check below)*

FATHER ☐ YES N.A. ☐ NO
MOTHER ☐ YES N.A. ☐ NO

13. HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR A POSITION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR TAKEN AN EXAMINATION FOR A POSITION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE? ☒ YES ☐ NO

If "Yes" give date, nature of position applied for, and kind of examination taken, if any.

I was employed in the Foreign Service of the State Department from January 26, 1931 to December 1951.

14-00000

FORM [illegible] PAGE

14. RELATIVES NOW RESIDING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS
None		

15. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (Replaces item 19 on Form 57)

Name and indicate the extent of your competence, i.e. Excellent, Good, Fair

A. LANGUAGE	B. READ	C. WRITE	D. SPEAK	E. UNDERSTAND
Spanish	Excellent	Good	Good	Excellent

16. LIST PRESENT OR FORMER FOREIGN CONNECTIONS:
A. BUSINESS
B. EMPLOYMENT
C. MILITARY

U.S. Foreign Service from Jan. 26, 1931 to Dec. 1951.

17. DATES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE FOR LAST 10 YEARS

DATES	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE OR COUNTRY
1941-1944	Ave. del Bosque 389	Guadalajara	Mexico
1944-1946	Various	Bilbao, Madrid, Barcelona	Spain
1947-1949	1° Calle y 2° Avenida	Guatemala City	Guatemala
1949-1951	Ave. Aguirre 52	San Isidro (Buenos Aires)	Argentina
1951(Dec)			California

18. DOES YOUR FINANCIAL POSITION PERMIT DISCHARGE OF ALL DEBTS INCURRED? ☒ YES ☐ NO
IF "NO," STATE INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW:

NAMES OF CREDITORS	AMOUNTS DUE	DATES ON WHICH OBLIGATIONS WERE CONTRACTED
none		

19. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN MEDICALLY DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS IN ITEM 39 OF FORM 57.

20. PRESENT MILITARY STATUS

A. ARE YOU REGISTERED WITH A SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," STATE BELOW THE NUMBER AND ADDRESS OF THE BOARD, AND YOUR CLASSIFICATION:

B. DO YOU HAVE A MILITARY RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," STATE BELOW, THE BRANCH OF SERVICE; YOUR SERIAL NUMBER; YOUR ORGANIZATION UNIT AND HEADQUARTERS.

21. LIST OTHER NAMES, IF ANY, BY WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN KNOWN INCLUDING MARRIED NAMES, IF MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, GIVING DATE DURING WHICH NAMES WERE USED. DO NOT DUPLICATE INFORMATION SUPPLIED IN ITEM 1a ON FORM 57.

none

22. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM?
Subject to C.S. Retirement Act

23. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, IF ANY:
—

24. If you believe the information you have supplied on this application does not fully show your qualifications for Foreign Service Employment, state in Item 39 of Form 57 or on a separate sheet, any additional appropriate data that you wish to have considered.

DATE
March 10, 1952

SIGNATURE

[redacted]

Jam[redacted]thur NOEL
511, Alban Towers,
3700 Mass. Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Birth: March 19, 1911.

Application for Federal Employment

Date of Employment	Exact Title of Position	Salary
Jan. 1931 to Oct. 1938	Vice Consul	Starting: $1,800. p.a. Final 2,000. p.a.

Place of Employment	~~Xxxxx~~ Name of Immediate Supervisor
Ensenada, Mexico	Wm. A. Smale, Consul

Name and Address of Employer	Reason for Leaving
State Department, Foreign Service	transfer to Mazatlan

Number and kind of employees supervised

Two consular clerks

Description of Work

General consular work including shipping services, visas, passports, welfare and protection, agricultural reporting, drafting of replies to trade inquiries.

K.

Jam. ...thur NOEL
[illegible]

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Oct. 1938 TO Aug. 1944

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Vice Consul

CLASSIFICATION (if in Federal service)
—

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ 2,250 PER
FINAL $ 3,000 PER ~~xxxxx~~

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)
(MEXICO) Masatlan and Guadalajara

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Rufus H. Lene, Jr. and Maurice L. Stafford, Consuls

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
State Department, Foreign Service

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, manufacture of locks, etc.)
government

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
2 ~~xxxxx~~ cons. clerks at Masatlan, 4 at Guadalajara

REASON FOR LEAVING
transfer to Bilbao

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

consular officer in charge of all immigration work at these two consulates, as well as shipping, notarial services, passport and citizenship work, welfare and protection activities; also engaged in economic and political reporting at these posts. In charge of both consulates for prolonged periods during absence of principal officer.

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 38) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
			NONE

18. EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF
☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED
San Diego Senior High School, San Diego, Calif.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED
History, Economics, commercial law, Spanish

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
None								

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
None			

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR IN SERVICE TRAINING IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
None

SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
Spanish	X			X			X		

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)
Mexico, Spain, Guatemala, Argentina,
1933 to 1951 in Government service

[illegible] CAN USE SUCH AS OFF[illegible] COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES
none
APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ... SHORTHAND ...

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?
☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:
FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)
LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

Member Rotary Clubs of Ensenada and Guadalajara, Mex. Jolaseta Tennis Club, Bilbao, Spain; Mayan Golf Club, Guatemala, American Club, Buenos Aires.

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Gordon B. Dunlap	321 Corona Street, San Antonio, Tex.	Motion Picture Distributor
2. Lee R. Blohm	903 N. Canal, Carlsbad, New Mexico	Retired FSO
3. H. B. Gregory	1700 Shroyer Road, Dayton, 9, Ohio	Official, Nat. Cash Register

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combinations of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE OR OTHER DISABILITY, WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?		X
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?		-
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?		-

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
-	-
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	**SERIAL NO.** (*if none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).
-	-

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		-
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? N.A. *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?	N.A.	
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?	N.A.	

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19....

Agency: Title:

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT ....

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married, own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1949 O 89297 16—53940-1

FORM DSP-34
3-26-51

DEPARTMENT O ATE

APPLICATION FOR FOREIGN SERVICE AND DEPARTMENTAL EMPLOYMENT

(Use with Standard Form 57)

If more space is required, use additional sheets of paper. Write on each sheet your name, address and date of birth. Identify each item, and attach to this application.

BUDG EAU NO. 47-R071.3
APPRO L EXPIRES August 31, 1954

1. a. NAME *(Print)*
James Arthur NOEL

b. ADDRESS
511, Alban Towers, 3700 Mass.,N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

2. USE OF APPLICATION - Check one box below to indicate whether you wish this application to be considered for Foreign Service employment only, or for both Foreign Service and Departmental employment. Completion of this form is not required for Department employment only. Standard Form 57 must be filled out in any case.

☒ FOREIGN SERVICE ONLY ☐ FOREIGN SERVICE AND DEPARTMENTAL

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(Place from which you will expect transportation of self and household effects, if any, if appointed to the Foreign Service)*

San Diego, California

4. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED? IF A NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE. *(Section 11 on Form 57).*

Not applicable

5. a. ARE YOU NOW INVOLVED IN ANY LITIGATION OR SEPARATION AGREEMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

b. DO YOU KNOW OF ANY PROSPECTIVE LITIGATION IN WHICH YOU MAY BE INVOLVED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(Give details, if answer is yes to a. or b.)

6. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT? *(Exclusive of allowances)* $ PER YEAR

7. WHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE, IF ANY, ON YOUR IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY FOR DUTY IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD?

none

8. a. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE *(If wife, give maiden name)*
Lillian Bobbett NOEL

b. DATE OF BIRTH
January 12, 1911

c. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State or Province, and Country)*
Colorado Springs, Colo.

d. IF BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED?
not applicable

e. IF NATURALIZED, GIVE PLACE, DATE, AND NO. OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE.
not applicable

9.

NAMES OF DEPENDENTS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH	WILL RESIDE WITH YOU OVERSEAS	
			YES	NO
Lillian Bobbett Noel	wife	Jan. 12, 1911	x	
James A. Noel, Jr.	son	Nov. 3, 1948	x	
Richard A. Noel	son	April 30, 1951	x	

10. a. FATHER'S NAME
Alfred E. NOEL

b. PRESENT ADDRESS
1714 Dale St, San Diego, Calif.

c. PLACE OF BIRTH
Plainfield, N.J.

11. a. MOTHER'S NAME *(Maiden)*
Ethel Louise LEACOCK

b. PRESENT ADDRESS
deceased

c. PLACE OF BIRTH
New York City, N.Y.

12. IF PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, DID THEY EVER OBTAIN UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP? *(Check below)*

FATHER ☐ YES N.A. ☐ NO

MOTHER ☐ YES N.A. ☐ NO

13. HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR A POSITION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR TAKEN AN EXAMINATION FOR A POSITION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE? ☒ YES ☐ NO

If "Yes" give date, nature of position applied for, and kind of examination taken, if any.

I was em ployed in the Foreign Service of the State Department from Jan uary 26, 1931 to December 1951.

FORM [illegible] PAGE [illegible]

14. RELATIVES NOW RESIDING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS
None		

15. FOREIGN LANGUAGES *(Replaces item 19 on Form 57)*

Name and indicate the extent of your competence, i.e. Excellent, Good, Fair

A. LANGUAGE	B. READ	C. WRITE	D. SPEAK	E. UNDERSTAND
Spanish	Excellent	Good	Good	Excellent

16. LIST PRESENT OR FORMER FOREIGN CONNECTIONS:

A. BUSINESS
B. EMPLOYMENT
C. MILITARY

U.S. Foreign Service from Jan. 26, 1931 to Dec. 1951.

17. DATES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE FOR LAST 10 YEARS

DATES	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE OR COUNTRY
1941-1944	Ave. del Bosque 369	Guadajalara	Mexico
1944-1946	Various	Bilbao, Madrid, Barcelona	Spain
1947-1949	1° Calle y 2° Avenida	Guatemala City	Guatemala
1949-1951	Ave. Aguirre 52	San Isidro (Buenos Aires)	Argentina
1951(Dec)			California

18. DOES YOUR FINANCIAL POSITION PERMIT DISCHARGE OF ALL DEBTS INCURRED? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF "NO," STATE INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW:

NAMES OF CREDITORS	AMOUNTS DUE	DATES ON WHICH OBLIGATIONS WERE CONTRACTED
none		

19. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN MEDICALLY DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS IN ITEM 39 OF FORM 57.

20. PRESENT MILITARY STATUS

A. ARE YOU REGISTERED WITH A SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," STATE BELOW THE NUMBER AND ADDRESS OF THE BOARD, AND YOUR CLASSIFICATION:

B. DO YOU HAVE A MILITARY RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," STATE BELOW, THE BRANCH OF SERVICE; YOUR SERIAL NUMBER; YOUR ORGANIZATION UNIT AND HEADQUARTERS.

21. LIST OTHER NAMES, IF ANY, BY WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN KNOWN INCLUDING MARRIED NAMES, IF MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, GIVING DATE DURING WHICH NAMES WERE USED. DO NOT DUPLICATE INFORMATION SUPPLIED IN ITEM 16 ON FORM 57.

none

22. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM?
Subject to C.S. Retirement Act

23. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, IF ANY:
——

24. If you believe the information you have supplied on this application does not fully show your qualifications for Foreign Service Employment, state in Item 39 of Form 57 or on a separate sheet, any additional appropriate data that you wish to have considered.

DATE March 10, 1952

SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

4 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Liaison Control, OSO

SUBJECT : Integration of James A. NOEL

1. On 20 March 1952 the Department of State was requested to integrate Mr. James A. NOEL for assignment as Chief of the OSO station at Caracas, Venezuela. It is understood that Mr. Noel's papers are still in process at the Department.

2. This Division has now been informed that the medical staff of CIA will not approve an overseas assignment for Mr. Noel until 1 August 1952. At that time Mr. NOEL will undergo another physical examination and if results are satisfactory he will be certified as fit for overseas duty.

3. In order to avoid cancellation of Mr. NOEL's appointment, it is requested that the Department of State be asked not to call Mr. NOEL to enter on duty until advised by OSO that he is certified for overseas duty and ready to proceed to his Caracas assignment, subject to State's concurrence. It is anticipated that this will occur about 1 August 1952, or shortly thereafter.

for J. C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere

State Dept informed 10 June 52 by [illegible]

SECRET

Date 14 August 1952

Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen.

1. In accordance with the policy of this agency it is understood and agreed by me that I shall be required to serve a minimum tour of two years from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, unless terminated by the Government for its convenience. If the assignment is terminated at my request in less than twenty four months, the following shall prevail:

(a) If I resign in less than twelve months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses involved in the transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the foreign station, and pay all such expenses for return to the United States.

(b) If I resign between the twelfth and twenty-fourth month from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the United States.

2. Part (a) above shall not apply to employees who have served in a departmental position with CIA or who have served an overseas tour of duty with CIA, and in such case part (b) only shall apply, amended to read. "If I desire to terminate or return to the United States prior to the expiration of twenty-four months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the United States".

Witness:

Jeanine M. Browne

SECRET

Standard Form 57—June 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

AP ICATION FOR FEDERAL EMI OYMENT

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R046.

INSTRUCTIONS.—Answer every question below [illegible] ly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. If you are applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. Mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

1. Name of examination, or kind of position applied for: Chief of Station

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement):

3. Place of employment applied for: Barcelona, Spain

4. Name (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): James Arthur NOEL

5. Street and number or R. D. number:

City or post office (including postal zone), and State:

6. Legal or voting residence (State): California

7. Office phone No.: Home phone:

8. Place of birth (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): New York, New York

9. Date of birth (month, day, year): March 19, 1911

10. Age last birthday: 35

11. ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. ☒ Married ☐ Single

13. Height without shoes: 6 feet 0 inches Weight: 185 pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No

If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade: CAF-12, July 1, 1945.

APPLICATION No.

ANNOUNCEMENT

SUBJECT AND No.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Accept. ☐ [illegible]	Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned	Entered register
Notations		App. Review Approved

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife, or Widow	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		X
3 to 6 months?		X
6 to 12 months?		X
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— in Washington, D. C.?	X	
anywhere in the United States?	X	
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations:

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept? $ 5,905.20 per year.

You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify: ☐ Occasionally ☒ Frequently ☐ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers or agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the space provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience).

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for such position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (Month, year): From: August, 1944 To present time

Exact title of your present position: Chief of Station

Salary or earnings: WITH OT
Starting, $4680 per year
Present, $5905 per year

Place of employment (city and State): Barcelona, Spain

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: SSU, FSRO

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.):

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: 2 clerical; 12 outside agents

Name and title of immediate supervisor: William L. Sheal Acting Chief of Mission

Reason for desiring to change employment: Liquidation of SSU

Description of your work: Chief of Station at Barcelona. Direction of intelligence chains, evaluation of material and preparation of intelligence reports. Preparation of political reports on behalf of Consulate General, Barcelona, and military reports on behalf of Military Attache, Madrid.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

18 CONTINUED

Dates of employment (Month, year) From: January, 1931 To: August 1944

Place of employment (city and State): Ensenada, Mazatlan, Manzanillo and Guadalajara, Mexico.

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: State Dept., Foreign Service

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.):

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: Six male and female clerks

Name and title of immediate supervisor: John James Meily, Consul General (now deceased)

Reason for leaving: to accept position with OSS

Exact title of your position: American Vice Consul

Salary or earnings Starting $1800 per year Final $3050 per year

Description of your work: General consular work including passport and visa work, political reporting, economic reporting, performance shipping services, outside investigations of all kinds, accounts, supervision of subordinate personnel; in charge of consulate for prolonged temporary periods during 14 years continuous service with the State Dept. at 4 different Mexican posts.

Dates of employment (Month, year) From: July 1930 To: Jan. 1931

Place of employment (city and State): San Diego, California

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Alfred E. Noel (father) 1714 Dale St., San Diego

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): gasoline service station

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: one

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Alfred E. Noel

Reason for leaving: to accept position in the American Foreign Service

Exact title of your position: Service Station Manager

Salary or earnings Starting $ 1800 per year Final $ 1800 per year

Description of your work: management and operation of gasoline service station

Dates of employment (Month, year) From: Jan. 1930 To: July 1930

Place of employment (city and State): San Diego, California

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: San Diego Chamber of Commerce

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Chamber of Commerce

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: none

Name and title of immediate supervisor: C. F. Reynolds

Reason for leaving: reduction of staff on account of reduced budget

Exact title of your position: Assistant

Salary or earnings Starting $ 1200 per year Final $ 1200 per year

Description of your work: assistant to foreign trade and traffic manager of San Diego Chamber of Commerce. Stenographic work, drafting routine correspondence, maintenance of traffic rates files.

Dates of employment (Month, year) From: March 1929 To: Jan. 1930

Place of employment (city and State): San Diego, California

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: National Paint & Varnishes Co.

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): wholesale and paints and varnishes, retail

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: none

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Matt L. Aitken

Reason for leaving: to accept higher paying position with S.D. Chamber of Commerce.

Exact title of your position: bookkeeper

Salary or earnings Starting $ 900. per year Final $ 900. per year

Description of your work: bookkeeping and office management of branch paint store

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE.—In order to make [illegible] effective placements of war veterans detailed information is needed about the training and experience they have acquired in the Armed Services. Fill in the [illegible] space for each service school you have attended. If you attended no special or technical schools while in the service, write in Item (a) "No attendance at service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all important changes in duty assignment, showing dates of each assignment.

(a) First Special Service School attended:	(b) What were you taught in First Special Service School?
Location:	
Dates attended (months, years): From To	
Rating received at end of this training:	
(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School):	(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?
Dates of duty assignment (months, years): From To	
(a) Second Special Service School attended:	(b) What were you taught in Second Special Service School?
Location:	
Dates attended (months, years): From To	
Rating received at end of this training:	
(c) Duty assignment after this training:	(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?
Dates of duty assignment (months, years): From To	

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION.—Circle highest grade completed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

Mark (X) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of:
☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(a) Give name and location of last high school attended:
San Diego Sr. High School, San Diego, Calif.

(b) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired:
Business course with emphasis on office management.

(c) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended		Years Completed		Degrees Conferred		Semester Hours Credit
		From—	To—	Day	Night	Title	Date	

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours

(e) Other training such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of schools or "in-service training" in a Federal agency):
Special training in intelligence work at OSS. Sixteen years of government foreign service.

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended		Years Completed	
	From—	To—	Day	Night

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	Exc	Good	Fair	Exc	Good	Fair	Exc	Good	Fair
Spanish	X			X			X		

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?
Sixteen years of residence in Spanish speaking countries.

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries indicate (1) names of countries (2) when and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e. g. business, education, recreation).
Mexico, 1931-44; Spain 1944-46; gov't foreign service

20. List the special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key-punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices.

Approximate number of words per minute in typing 60 shorthand ......

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)
☐ Yes ☒ No Give kind of license and State:
First license or certificate (year):
Latest license or certificate (year):

22. Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application such as
(a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(b) your patents or inventions
(c) public speaking and public relations experience
(d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

—

23. REFERENCES.—List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16. [illegible]

FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Gen. Rufus H. Lane	Falls Church, Virginia	retired Marine off.
2. xxxxCaix Jack D. Neal	State Department, Washing.(FAC)	State officer
3. Eric C. Wendelin	State Department, Washington	State officer

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		X
28. Since your 16th birthday, have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail, for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating if retired from military or naval service.		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 38.		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatever? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?	OSS	
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?	X	
(c) Was service performed on an active full-time basis, with full XXXX pay and allowances? civilian	X	

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service	Date of separation or separations
Aug. 14, 1944	Oct. 1945

Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	Serial No. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation.)
OSS	Chief of Station

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY, OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		X
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		X
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		X
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service connected disability?		X

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c) OR (d) IS "YES," AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14, TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19....

Agency: .... Title: ....

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions (indicate item numbers to which answers apply).

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	
36	I do not know if service with OSS		reference to the service is being
	in a civilian capacity abroad is con-		included for whatever it may be worth.
	sidered "military service." However,		
	since an "honorably served" certificat		
	was issued to me, and since the org.		
	was under the Joint Chiefs of Staff		

If more space is required use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80).

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date 3 Oct. 1946.

Signature of applicant ....

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial, or initials, and surname). If female prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name, e. g., "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

GPO 16—16 17703-2

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS COMPLETELY. IF QUESTION DOES NOT APPLY WRITE "NOT APPLICABLE". WRITE "UNKNOWN" ONLY IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER AND CANNOT OBTAIN THE ANSWER FROM PERSONAL RECORDS. USE A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER FOR EXTRA DETAILS ON ANY QUESTION OR QUESTIONS FOR WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ROOM. ATTACH TWO RECENT PASSPORT SIZE PICTURES TO THIS FORM. DATE TAKEN WRITTEN ON THE BACK OF EACH. TYPE, PRINT OR WRITE CAREFULLY; ILLEGIBLE OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL NOT RECEIVE CONSIDERATION

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS? YES ☒ NO ☐

SECTION 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

NAME MR. ☒ MISS ☐ MRS. ☐ FIRST: James MIDDLE: Arthur LAST: NOEL TELEPHONE: 95-37

PRESENT ADDRESS (STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): Chalet Sylvia, 2a Av. y 1a. Calle de Santa Clara, Guatemala City, Guate.

LEGAL RESIDENCE (STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): 4389 McClintock Street, San Diego, 5, California, U.S.A.

NICKNAMES: Jim, Jaime

OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED: none

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ---

HOW LONG? ---

IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (WHERE, WHEN AND BY WHAT AUTHORITY): ---

DATE OF BIRTH: Mar. 19, 1911

PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY: New York City, STATE: New York, COUNTRY: U.S.A.

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: US

ACQUIRED BY: BIRTH ☒ MARRIAGE ☐ NATURALIZATION ☐

NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: NUMBER: --- DATE ISSUED: ---- NAME OF C: -

LOCATION OF COURT: --- CITY: --- STATE: -

PREVIOUS CITIZENSHIP: none DATE HELD: FROM: ---- TO:

OTHER CITIZENSHIPS (GIVE PARTICULARS): none



STEPS TAKEN TO CHANGE PRESENT NATIONALITY (GIVE PARTICULARS): none

LAST U.S. PASSPORT: NUMBER: Diplomatic 261 DATE: 25 Mar. 1947 PLACE OF ISSUE: Washington, D.C.

ALL OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS YOU HAVE HAD (GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES): Spec.Pass. 32694, 4/10/43, Wash; plus 4 other Spec.Passports issued (between Jan. 1931 and October 1943).

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: none

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.: DATE OF ARRIVAL IN THIS COUNTRY: ---- PORT OF ENTRY: ----- PASSPORT OF COUNTRY: ------

LAST U.S. VISA: NUMBER: --- TYPE: ---- DATE: ---- PLACE OF ISSUE: -----

SECTION 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 36	SEX Male	HEIGHT 6' 0"	WEIGHT 185 Lbs.	EYES Dk.Brown	HAIR Dk. Brown

COMPLEXION: Ruddy SCARS: two scars on neck BUILD: heavy

OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: none

FORM NO. 38-1
SEP 1946

SECTION 3. MARITAL STATUS

MARRIED ☒ SINGLE ☐	WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐	SEPARATED ☐	DATE OF SEPARATION OR DIVORCE -----	PLACE ---

REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE ------

NOTE: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

NAME OF WIFE OR HUSBAND	FIRST Lillian	MIDDLE (FOR WIFE, MAIDEN) Bobbett	LAST Noel	DATE OF MARRIAGE 29 September 1934

PLACE OF MARRIAGE: San Diego, California

(HIS OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE — STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY: 3614 Fairmount Ave., San Diego, Calif.

LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐ — DATE OF DECEASE ---- — CAUSE ---------

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY: Chalet Sylvia, 2a. Av. y la. Calle de Sta. Clara, Guatemala City

DATE OF BIRTH: 12 January 1911 — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: Colorado Springs, STATE: Colorado, COUNTRY: U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP: U.S. — DATE ACQUIRED: birth — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY, STATE, COUNTRY: ----

OCCUPATION: housewife — LAST EMPLOYER: San Diego Board of Education

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: Board of Education, CITY: San Diego, STATE: California, COUNTRY: U.S.A.

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE — FROM: none — TO: ---- — BRANCH OF SERVICE --- — COUNTRY ---

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): U.S. Consulate, Ensenada, Baja California, Mexico, from 1934 to 1937.

SECTION 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (INCLUDE PARTIAL DEPENDENTS)

NAME none	RELATIONSHIP ---	AGE
CITIZENSHIP --	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER --- CITY STATE COUNTRY	
NAME ---	RELATIONSHIP ---	AGE
CITIZENSHIP ---	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY ---- STATE COUNTRY	
NAME ----	RELATIONSHIP ----	AGE
CITIZENSHIP ---	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY --- STATE COUNTRY	

SECTION 5. PARENTS

NOTE: FOR STEPFATHER, STEPMOTHER AND/OR GUARDIAN, GIVE THE SAME INFORMATION AS REQUIRED BELOW ON SEPARATE SHEET

NAME OF FATHER	FIRST Alfred	MIDDLE Edwin	LAST Noel	LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE ----- — CAUSE -----

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 1714 Dale Street, CITY: San Diego, 5, STATE: California, COUNTRY: U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH: 2 May 1886 — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: Plainfield, STATE: New Jersey, COUNTRY: U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP: U.S. — DATE ACQUIRED: birth — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY, STATE, COUNTRY: -----

OCCUPATION: Supervisor — LAST EMPLOYER: Curtis Publishing Company

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER, CITY: San Diego, 5, STATE: California, COUNTRY: U.S.A.

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED TO PAGE 3) I understand my father [illegible]s, or is about to be, re-married, but I have no information concerning my prospective stepmother.

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2)

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE — FROM: none — TO: --- — BRANCH OF SERVICE: --- — COUNTRY:

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): none

NAME OF MOTHER — FIRST: Ethel — MAIDEN: Leacock — LAST: Noel — LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☒

DATE OF DECEASE: 21 Feb. 1943 — CAUSE: Bright's disease

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 1714 Dale Street, — CITY: San Diego, 5, — STATE: California, — COUNTRY: U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH: 10 March 1888 — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: New York City, — STATE: New York, — COUNTRY: U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP: U.S. — DATE ACQUIRED: birth — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY: — STATE: ---- — COUNTRY:

OCCUPATION: housewife — LAST EMPLOYER: ------

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: ------- — CITY: — STATE: — COUNTRY:

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): none

SECTION 6. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (INCLUDING HALF-, STEP-, AND ADOPTED BROTHERS AND SISTERS)

NAME — FIRST: Edward — MIDDLE: Charles — LAST: Noel

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 815 South Lake St., — CITY: Los Angeles, 5, — STATE: California. — COUNTRY:

NAME — FIRST: George — MIDDLE: Thomas — LAST: Noel

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: — CITY: Laguna Beach, — STATE: California, — COUNTRY: U.S.A.

NAME — FIRST: William — MIDDLE: Alfred — LAST: Noel

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 1714 Dale Street, — CITY: San Diego, 5, — STATE: California. — COUNTRY: U.S.A.

SECTION 7. PARENTS-IN-LAW

NAME OF FATHER-IN-LAW — FIRST: Albert — MIDDLE: none — LAST: Bobbett — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: ----- — CAUSE: ---------

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 4389 McClintock Street, — CITY: San Diego, — STATE: California, — COUNTRY: U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH: Feb. 2, 1886 — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: Wells, — STATE: Somerset — COUNTRY: England

CITIZENSHIP: U.S. — DATE ACQUIRED: 13/1/23 naturalization — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY: — STATE: Colorado Springs, Colorado — COUNTRY:

OCCUPATION: retired merchant — LAST EMPLOYER: self

NAME OF MOTHER-IN-LAW — FIRST: Thala — MAIDEN: Clausen — LAST: Bobbett — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: ---- — CAUSE: ------

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER: 4389 McClintock Street, San Diego, 5, California, U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH: July 10, 1881 — PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY: Neksö — STATE: Bornholm — COUNTRY: Denmark

CITIZENSHIP: U.S. — DATE ACQUIRED: 22 June 1928 — WHERE ACQUIRED — CITY: San Diego, — STATE: California — COUNTRY:

OCCUPATION: housewife — LAST EMPLOYER: ------

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2)

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE	FROM: none	TO: ---	BRANCH OR SERVICE ---	COUNTRY

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): none

NAME OF MOTHER	FIRST Ethel	MAIDEN Leacock	LAST Noel	LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☒

DATE OF DECEASE 21 Feb, 1943	CAUSE Bright's disease

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER 1714 Dale Street,	CITY San Diego, 5,	STATE California,	COUNTRY U.S.A.
DATE OF BIRTH 10 March 1888	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITY New York City,	STATE New York,	COUNTRY U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP U.S.	DATE ACQUIRED birth	WHERE ACQUIRED	CITY	STATE ----	COUNTRY

OCCUPATION housewife	LAST EMPLOYER ------

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER -------	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): none

SECTION 6. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (INCLUDING HALF-, STEP-, AND ADOPTED BROTHERS AND SISTERS)

NAME	FIRST Edward	MIDDLE Charles	LAST Noel	
PRESENT ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER 815 South Lake St.,	CITY Los Angeles, 5,	STATE California.	COUNTRY
NAME	FIRST George	MIDDLE Thomas	LAST Noel	

ADD - Section 6. (Brothers and Sisters)

Name	First	Middle	Last
	Robert	Joseph	Noel

Present Address	Street	City	State
	1942 4th Street,	Seattle, 99,	Washington.

Name	First	Middle	Last
	Louise	Rhoda	Noel

Present Address	Street	City	State
	1714 Dale Street,	San Diego, 2,	California.

4509 McClintock Street, San Diego, 6, California, U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH July 10, 1881	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITY Neksö	STATE Bornholm	COUNTRY Denmark

CITIZENSHIP U.S.	DATE ACQUIRED 22 June 1923	WHERE ACQUIRED	CITY San Diego,	STATE	COUNTRY California

OCCUPATION houswife	LAST EMPLOYER ------

SECTION 8. RELATIVES

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO LIVE ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A FOREIGN POWER, ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS.

NAME I have no relatives who are not citizens of the United States or who are married to non-citizens.	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP --	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY ---	
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION ---		
NAME ----	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP ---	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY ----	
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION ---		
NAME ----	RELATIONSHIP ---	AGE
CITIZENSHIP ---	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY ---	
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION -----		

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE (UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN)

NAME George Thomas Noel	RELATIONSHIP brother	AGE 38
CITIZENSHIP U.S.	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY Laguana Beach, California	
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) Civil employee of U.S. Navy Department at El Toro Field, Santa Ana, Calif		
NAME ---	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY ---	
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ---		
NAME ---	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY ----	
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ----		

SECTION 9. EDUCATION

SCHOOL S.D. Sr. High School	ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY San Diego, California, U.S.A.		
DATES ATTENDED	FROM 1926	TO Feb. 1929	DEGREE Diploma
SCHOOL --	ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY --		
DATES ATTENDED	FROM --	TO --	DEGREE --
COLLEGE none	ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY		
DATES ATTENDED	FROM	TO	DEGREE
COLLEGE	ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY		
DATES ATTENDED	FROM	TO	DEGREE

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS (CONTINUED TO PAGE 5)

14-00000

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS

CLASSIFICATION II-A	ORDER NUMBER 2856-B	APPROXIMATE INDUCTION DATE ---	BOARD NUMBER 156

ADDRESS OF BOARD	STREET AND NUMBER 2356 30th Street,	CITY San Diego, 2,	STATE California

IF DEFERRED, STATE REASON

SECTION 11. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE - UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN

COUNTRY U.S.A.	SERVICE Foreign Service	SERVICE DATES	FROM: 26 January 1931	TO: date

GRADE Attaché	SERIAL NUMBER ---	TYPE OF DISCHARGE ----

LAST STATION American Embassy, Guatemala City	COMMANDING OFFICER Ambassador Edwin J. Kyle

REMARKS:

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (USE ADDITIONAL SHEET IF NECESSARY).

NOTE: INCLUDE BELOW PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 15 YEARS.

EMPLOYER U.S. State Department (Consular Service)			JOB TITLE Vice Consul	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE American Consulate, Ensenada, Mexico			KIND OF BUSINESS government	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY Gen. consular, including immigration, passports			NAME OF SUPERVISOR Consul Wm. A. Smale	
DATES COVERED	FROM: 26 January 1931	TO: 6 October 1938	SALARY $1,800.00	PER annum
REASONS FOR LEAVING transferred to American Consulate at Mazatlán, Mexico.				
EMPLOYER U.S. State Department (Consular Service)			JOB TITLE Vice Consul	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE American Consulate, Mazatlán, Mexico			KIND OF BUSINESS government	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY shipping, invoice, immigration, political rept.			NAME OF SUPERVISOR Consul Rufus H. Lane, Jr.	
DATES COVERED	FROM: November 1938	TO: August 1941	SALARY $2,250.00	PER annum
REASONS FOR LEAVING transferred to American Consulate, Guadalajara, Mexico				
EMPLOYER U.S. State Department (Consular Service)			JOB TITLE Vice Consul	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE American Consulate, Guadalajara, Mexico			KIND OF BUSINESS government	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY passport, visa, political & economic reporting			NAME OF SUPERVISOR Consul Maurice L. Stafford	
DATES COVERED	FROM: August 1941	TO: August 1944	SALARY $3,160.	PER annum
REASONS FOR LEAVING to accept employment with Office of Strategic Services				
EMPLOYER Office of Strategic Services			JOB TITLE Station Chief	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE American Consulate, Bilbao, Spain			KIND OF BUSINESS government	

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 6)

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY special reporting			NAME OF SUPERVISOR Donn Paul Medalie	
DATES COVERED	FROM: September 1944	TO: December 1945	SALARY $4,680.00	PER annum
REASONS FOR LEAVING temporarily assigned to American Embassy, Madrid, Spain				
EMPLOYER Office of Strategic Services			JOB TITLE -	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE American Embassy, Madrid, Spain			KIND OF BUSINESS Axis Assets, Allied Trusteeship	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY investigating and reporting			NAME OF SUPERVISOR Donn Paul Medalie	
DATES COVERED	FROM: December 1945	TO: May 30, 1946.	SALARY $5,190.00	PER annum
REASONS FOR LEAVING transferred to Barcelona, Spain				
EMPLOYER Strategic Service Unit (War Department)			JOB TITLE Station Chief	
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE American Consulate General, Barcelona, Spain			KIND OF BUSINESS government	
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY specialized reporting			NAME OF SUPERVISOR Donn Paul Medalie	
DATES COVERED	FROM: June 1, 1946	TO: Mar. 1, 1947	SALARY $5,905.00	PER annum
REASONS FOR LEAVING transferred to American Embassy, Guatemala City, Guatemala.				

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW GIVE DETAILS CONCERNING ANY POSITION FROM WHICH YOU MAY HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED OR WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE.

DETAILS: ----

SECTION 13. CHARACTER REFERENCES—FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE
Mr. Frank Forward	Union Title Co., San Diego, California
Mr. Gordon B. Dunlap	5602 Broadway, San Antonio, Texas.
Mr. Wayne M. Brown	1667 Pontiac Street, Denver, 7, Colorado.
Col. Herbert King	731 Macon Street, Brooklyn, New York.
Mr. Wm. Blackstone	Riviera Apts., 1000 2nd St., Coronado, Calif.

SECTION 14. SOCIAL ACQUAINTENCES—FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE
Mr. Paul W. Boltz	4451 Monroe, San Diego, 3, California.
Mr. Art Jacobs	4441 42nd Street, San Diego, California.
Gen. Rufus H. Lane (Ret'd)	Falls Church, Virginia
Eric C. Wendelin	State Department, Washington, D.C.
Jack D. Neal	State Department, Washington, D.C.

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS—THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 7)

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

NAME Mr. Harry [illegible]. Hawley	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE [illegible]-Retired, % State Department, Washington
NAME Mr. Don Morgan	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE 4320 Glenwood Drive, RT. 4, box 10A, Riverside Calif.
NAME Mr. R. G. Leddy	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE Street Address Unknown, Washington, D.C.

SECTION 16. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? YES ☐ NO ☒

IF ANSWER IS "YES" EXPLAIN BELOW:

DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS? Social drinking only.

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE, AND DISPOSITION OF CASE.

No

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? YES ☐ NO ☒

IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

SECTION 17. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES ☒ NO ☐ IF ANSWER IS "NO", STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME.

--

NAMES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

First National Trust & Savings Bank, San Diego, California.

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? YES ☐ NO ☒ IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE PARTICULARS:

SECTION 18. CREDIT REFERENCES-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME First National Bank	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE 5th & Broadway, San Diego, California.
NAME Marston & Company	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE 5th & "C", San Diego, California.
NAME Union Oil Company	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE San Diego, California.

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS

FROM: Jan. 1931	TO: Oct. 1938	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY American Consulate, Ensenada, B.Cfa., Mexico
FROM: Nov. 1938	TO: Aug. 1941	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY American Consulate, Mazatlan, Sin., Mexico
FROM: Aug. 1941	TO: Aug. 1944	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY American Consulate, Guadalajara, Jal., Mexico.

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 8)

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7)

FROM: Sep. 1944	TO: Dec. 1945	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY American Consulate, Bilbao, Vizcaya, Spain
FROM: Dec. 1945	TO: May, 1946	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY American Embassy, Madrid, Spain
FROM: June 1946	TO: March 1947	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY American Consulate General, Barcelona, Spain
FROM: April 1947	TO: date	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY American Embassy, Guatemala City, Guatemala.
FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

SECTION 20. RESIDENCES OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
	see No. 19 above - identical with above.			
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE

SECTION 21. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ALL KINDS TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS. INCLUDE ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR A BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OR TO WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT.

NAME DeMolay Society	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY La Mesa, California (1930)
NAME Rotary Club	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY Ensenada, Mexico (1926)
NAME Rotary Club	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY Guadalajara, Mexico (1941)
NAME Jolaseta Tennis Club	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY Bilbao, Vizcaya, Spain
NAME British-American Club	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY Barcelona, Spain
NAME Mayan Golf Club	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY Guatemala City, Guatemala.
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY
NAME	STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

SECTION 22. LANGUAGES—FOREIGN (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT", "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
Spanish	fluent	fluent	fluent
French	--	slight	--

SECTION 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

INDICATE ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING YOU HAVE; ALSO, SET FORTH ANY QUALIFICATIONS YOU HAVE AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION.

I have had seventeen years of continuous service abroad with the United States government. I have had considerable experience in all phases of government foreign service work, including: political, economic and agricultural reporting; citizenship, passport, visas, shipping and protection work. For varying periods of time I have been in charge of the American Consulates at Ensenada, Mazatlán and Guadalajara, Mexico. My long experience in Latin countries has provided an insight into Latin character, temperament and psychology which cannot be acquired in any other way. Three years of my service abroad has been devoted exclusively to investigative work. I have had special training in photography and reporting.

SECTION 24. SPORTS AND HOBBIES

Golf, tennis, bridge and reading.

SECTION 25. EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE

NAME Alfred E. Noel
RELATIONSHIP father
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER 1714 Dale Street, CITY San Diego, 2, STATE California
COUNTRY
TELEPHONE Franklin 5583

SECTION 26. INFORMATION AND FINAL COMMENTS

NOTE: YOU ARE INFORMED THAT CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION. IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO".

No.

SECTION 27. CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR MY IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT Guatemala City, Guatemala
City State
DATE 1 December 1947

Frances A. Hateman
Witness

Signature of Applicant

APPLICANT-PLEASE DO NOT USE SPACE BELOW	COMMENTS OF INTERVIEWER
	SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY	ORIGINATING OFFICIAL	DATE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1662—8—1947

file

SECRET

30 June 1949

TO : CCD DATE

FROM : CSO

SUBJECT: Security and Cryptographic Approval

The following person has been security approved for the purpose of performing cryptographic duties as of dates indicated.

Name	Security	Cryptographic
NOEL, James A.	**6 January 1944**	**30 June 1949**

John C Bonnet
ng.
JOHN C. BONNET
Security Officer SO

SECRET

35786

OSS Form 2201

② CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY OFFICE

Investigation Report

Date: 6 January 1944

Subject: NOEL, James A.

Number: 12951

To: Mr. E. M. Terrell.

1. Investigation directed by: AOT.

2. Sources of information: S.

3. Summary of information:

An American born citizen, 32 years old, son of American born parents.

Subject is a high school graduate and has had twelve years experience in the Foreign Service of the United States Government.

Confidential informants recommend the subject as to loyalty, ability and personal character.

Rec'd. [illegible] — 1-8-44
Notified Maj. [illegible] by [illegible]
E. J.

(Over)

CONFIDENTIAL

(20639)

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Summary of Information (Cont'd.):

4. **Remarks:**

5. Recommendation:

Security approval recommended, though subject to the receipt of derogatory information at some future date. Interview waived.

Final interview is in this case unnecessary if originating official will provide two (unsigned) passport size photographs and completed fingerprint card of Subject. Par. 6 should be returned with indication of disposition.

Jcw

By A. G. Thomson Date 1/6/44.
Security Officer
A. G. Thomson.

ccc.

14-00000

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

206 ✓

For Noel File ↑

8 January 1944

(2)

MEMORANDUM

TO: Major McDonough

FROM: E M Terrell for W. H. Sherwood

SUBJECT: James A. Noel

Confirming our report by telephone to your office, the Security Office has just notified us that clearance has been granted on Subject.

CONFIDENTIAL

KLOBUKAR, Cecil

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET – SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTRACT PERSONNEL

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

RETURN FILE TO 5E62, HQS

NOTICE: This is an Office of Personnel File and subject to 10 day limitation period. This file has been charged to [illegible]; and is due to be returned to CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, 5E-68 Hqs., x7841, as of 6-1.

RETURN TO RECORDS [illegible]
IMMEDIATELY [illegible]
JOB 72-250

30-2-66

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Retirement: Cecil J. KLOBUKAR (P)

FROM: Chief, CSPS
GG-10, Hqrs

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE 19 February 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Chief, DO/Pers	25 Feb		w
2.			
3.			
4.			
5. Chief, CSPS GG-10, Hqrs Attn: Agent Branch			
6			
7.			
8.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

To 1: To avoid any possible misunderstanding and to facilitate staffing plans, please assure prompt attention to the attached memorandum on the scheduled retirement of Cecil J. Klobukar (P)

1 to 5: Subject has been reminded*** of retirement and will submit formal application at least 90 days in advance of the date scheduled in the attached memorandum.

Vurpora
Personnel Officer

***by dispatch USFS-860 prepared 26 February '70 and field memo addressed to him was attached. Contents of this attachment were contained in body of the dispatch.



JAMES A. NOEL

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

S-E-C-R-E-T

19 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DO

SUBJECT : Retirement of Cecil J. KLOBUKAR (P) under the CSC Retirement System.

1. This memorandum is to remind all concerned that Cecil J. KLOBUKAR (P), GS-16 of your component is scheduled for retirement under the CSC system during the month of March 1971.

2. As you know, the normal retirement date is the last day of the month in which the individual becomes eligible to retire. To insure complete understanding, it is suggested that this matter be again explained to the employee and an appointment be arranged with the Retirement Counseling Branch, Retirement Affairs Division, Office of Personnel, extension 3328, for further discussions or counseling on benefits available upon retirement. Formal application for retirement should be made at least three months prior to the scheduled date.

3. If you should propose to take any steps to retain this employee after his retirement date, your attention is invited to HN 20-324. Any recommendation in that connection will require the concurrence of the Deputy Director for Plans and should be submitted at least 12 months prior and not more than 18 months prior to the scheduled retirement date.

4. If a replacement is required, early notification to CSPS will assist in locating a qualified replacement. (See CSPS Memo No. 15-69, dated 9 July 1969, "Staff Personnel Requisition".)

Robert W. Sheay

Robert W. Sheay
Chief, Clandestine Service
Personnel Staff

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP I-Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

18 July 68

CCS has this memorandum for consideration. Action is being held up pending KLCBUYAR'S TDY in D. C. beginning 29 July 1968. Appropriate modifications will be worked out with CCS at that time.

Montgomery

6 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff

FROM : Chief, Domestic Operations Division

SUBJECT : Request for Non-Official Cover for Cecil J. KLOBUKAR (P)

The following paragraphs are keyed to points raised in Form 10-64, 2311.

A. General Information

1. and 2. This request concerns Staff Employee Cecil J. KLOBUKAR (P) formerly Woodrow C. OLIEN (P), who is converting to Career Agent status. He is presently Chief of Base San Francisco. He will operate in the same area on the outside as a Career Agent. KLOBUKAR has been under Department of State Cover since the Agency was established. From 1931-44 he was a bona fide Foreign Service Officer. From 1944-47 he was with OSS/SSU/CIG. KLOBUKAR is a senior staff officer who has had Chief of Station positions during his entire career as an Agency employee.

3. N.A. KLOBUKAR will serve under unofficial cover domestically.

4. KLOBUKAR has been operating under LNSLED cover in San Francisco.

5. KLOBUKAR can assume his new cover immediately.

6. Since KLOBUKAR's change of status involves a domestic base where he is presently assigned, the only consideration involves establishing him under non-official cover in San Francisco as a contributing Base asset as soon as possible.

Submitted by DO/I

S E C R E T

7. KLOBUKAR will be carried under new project WUBALANCE, presently in process of submittance for approval and for which funds will be made available.

B. Biographic Information

1. Cecil J. KLOBUKAR (P) was born 19 March 1911 in New York City. He is a white, male citizen of the United States. He is married and has two sons. His present address is 1807 Burlingame, California. His previous residence was Madrid, Spain where he served as Chief of Station.

2. N.A.

3. KLOBUKAR is a high school graduate.

4. KLOBUKAR has been a State Department employee from 1931 to 1944. Subsequently OSS and CIA. From 1929 to 1930 he was a bookkeeper and assistant to a traffic manager.

5. Not necessary for cover development.

6. As a senior Foreign Service Officer of many years KLOBUKAR has the social, intellectual and diplomatic qualities that are necessary in any form of business activity. He is a pleasant and interesting personality.

7. N.A.

8. Mexico, Guatemala, Argentina, Ecuador, Cuba, Spain.

9. He speaks fluent spanish.

C. Security Considerations

1. See A. (General Information)

2. N.A.

3. Infrequently and then only when on TDY to Headquarters.

4. As a Chief of Station over many years, in several countries, KLOBUKAR has had official cover and operational contact with many foreign governmental officials.

5. See A. (General Information)

6. None known

7. None known

8. It is anticipated that KLOBUKAR will continue his association with CIA in a Career Agent, non-official cover capacity.

9. N.A.

10. N.A.

11. N.A.

12. N.A.

13. N.A.

D. Operational Information

1. The type of operation is FI and the duration of assignment is indefinite. KLOBUKAR will be involved in spotting, assessing, and handling of selected agents. In appropriate and highly selected cases he will act as a recruiter. No need is anticipated at present that any individual will be made witting of KLOBUKAR's CIA affiliation while he is under unofficial cover.

2. San Francisco area.

3. Possibly other areas for which San Francisco Base is responsible and in the northwestern United States.

4. Ideally, KLOBUKAR's cover should be such as to allow him free and plausible business, and social and professional access to as great a portion of the local foreign element of the business, academic, consular and journalistic community.

5. KLOBUKAR's income cushion will be that of a retired Foreign Service Officer, supplemented by his cover income, approximatly in total $30,000.00 per annum.

ing

6. The number of hours per week that KLOBUKAR will spend at his cover employment will to a certain extent also reflect his operational activity. Since his primary function will be spent in the area of spotting and assessing, his cover activity, if truly suitable, will enable him to accomplish this in conjunction with fulfilling his cover duties.

7. Communication channels desired: It is expected that KLOBUKAR's Base contact will meet him under safe apartment conditions.

8. Attached are cover suggestions prepared by KLOBUKAR. These suggestions clearly indicate the types of cover that could be plausibly and feasibly established for a person of KLOBUKAR's background.

Gordon L. Jorgensen
Chief
Domestic Operations Division

SECRET

18 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Clandestine Services Personnel Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Frank De Wald

SUBJECT : Request to Revert to Civil Service Retirement System - James A. Noel

In accordance with your request there is attached (sterilized) copy of the original dispatch signed by subject in pseudonym, addressed to the Director of Personnel, in which he requests to revert to the Civil Service Retirement System. This is forwarded for appropriate action by C/CSPS.

Virginia C. Lynch
Chief, DO Personnel & Training

Attachment: A/S Above

SECRET

Chief Personnel

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Director of Personnel

INFO.
Chief, Domestic Operations

FROM
Chief of Base, San Francisco

SUBJECT
Request to Revert to Civil Service Retirement System

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: USFS-577 dated 21 April 1967

1. On 26 November 1967, I reached the "break even" point between the Civil Service Retirement System and the Organization's System, having completed 36 years and 11 months of Government Service on that date.

2. Since I plan to work until age 60, at which time I will have 40 years of Government Service, it is my desire to revert to the Civil Service System in order to take advantage of the increased annuity under that System.

3. I would appreciate it therefore if you would take whatever steps may be necessary to transfer my retirement account back to the Civil Service Retirement System.

Signed. [illegible] Keel
to Personnel. Certified
by
Reginald [illegible]
C/DO/Pers.

Distribution:
2 - C/DO
~~2~~ - C/Personnel

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER USFT-1301	DATE 26 Feb 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

(1) Admin'l-info
[illegible]
7/17/68

12 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: James A. Noel

1. Chief, DO and I talked to Jim Noel this morning about the possibility of his converting from staffer to career agent. After considerable discussion, Jim agreed to the conversion. He is obviously doing this reluctantly, but he appreciates the situation within the DDP in which the encumbrance of senior grades by long-time employees is blocking the promotions of junior officers.

2. Jim urged that he be retained as a career agent until he reaches the age of mandatory retirement (about three years). Chief, DO stated that the need in the San Francisco area for handlers of contacts and assets is such that there would be a continuing need for experienced career agents on the outside of the small San Francisco Base. I told Jim that unless he pulled something stupid, he was virtually assured of career agent status until he reached age 60, and perhaps could be employed as a retired annuitant after that time if his performance was productive and if operational requirements remain as they are at present.

3. Jim explained why he could not retire -- the next five years will be difficult for him financially with two teen-age boys to put through college.

4. Chief, DO and Jim will work out the details and timing of his conversion to career agent.

V. L. Gresham
Chief, Operational Services

cc:
DDP
C/DO

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Secret

James A. Noel

Date of birth: 3/19/11 SCD: 1/26/31 ECD: 9/18/47

Estimated retirement annuities:

	CIA 31 March 69	CIA 31March 70	CIA 31 March 71	CSR 31March 71
Basic Annuity	$15725 p.a.	$16398 p.a.	$16902 p/a	$18,491 p.a.
Reduced annuity for survivor benefits	$14424 p.a.	$15028 p.a.	$15482 p.a.	$16912 p.a.
Survivor benefits	$8649 p.a.	$9019 p.a.	$9296 p.a.	$10,170 p.a.

Memo sent to DOD Pers to advise Noel that he would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service Retirement rather than the CIA System in view of the amount of his service.

A policy decision has been made that a participant in the CIA Ret System should not later than 18 months prior to his retirement apply to be removed from the CIA Retirement System and transferred to the CSR System.

In ofder to retire under the CSR System (55-30) he must be under that system for at least one year prior to retirement.

4 March 68

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ RNAL ONLY ☐ CON NTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
James A. Noel — file

FROM:
CSPS/Donald

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE
24 July 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
1. Virginia Lynch				1- Please see that Mr. Noel gets the attached information as asap. Note para c. If Mr Noel decides to go back to the CSR system, would appreciate routing his request through C/CSPS. Frank
2. C/DOD/Pers				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	X	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CSPS, Attn: Mr. Dewald GC-10 Hqs.	21 Jy 67	D
2			
3	R. Sheay		
4			
5			
6	F J Dewald Jr.	21 July 67	D

	ACTION ✓		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE
	F.Y.I.				

Remarks: (1) This is the first and only one of this type that we will get for some time — Please return to me

DOB - 3/19/11
SCD 1/26/31

F.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO	DATE
OP/BSD/RB MWBenthall 205 Magazine X2847	

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	X	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
2-61

18 JUL 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James A. Noel

SUBJECT : Retirement Information

1. There are a few situations in which an employee at the time of retirement may have so many years of service (almost 37) that he would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service Retirement System than under the Organization System. Because of this, the policy decision has been made that a participant in the Organization System who would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service System may, not later than eighteen months prior to his retirement, apply to be removed from our system and transferred to the Civil Service System. Since you will complete 37 years of Federal service in January of next year it is felt that you should be advised of your retirement status under the Organization System and also if returned to the Civil Service System. The following information is being submitted to assist you in determining which course of action you desire to follow:

a. During the period from 15 August 1944 through 19 October 1946 there were no retirement deductions withheld from your salary. In order for this time to be credited in counting total service under the Organization System it would be necessary for you to make a deposit, with interest, to cover this period. The maximum annuity under our system is 70 per cent based on 35 years of creditable service. If you should return to the Civil Service System in order to receive the maximum annuity it would be necessary for you to make a deposit, with interest, to cover that period for which no contributions were made; however, you may receive full credit in counting total service without making a deposit but your annuity will be reduced by one-tenth of the amount due as deposit.

b. As you are aware, you are presently entitled to apply for voluntary retirement under the Organization Retirement and Disability System. The annuity estimate given below as of 31 October 1967 would be applicable if a deposit were made to cover the period for which no deductions were withheld. The annuity estimate given for 31 March 1968 would be applicable without a deposit since you would have completed 35 years of creditable service at that time without this period of service.

31 October 1967		31 March 1968
$14,265.00	Basic Annuity	$14,640.00
$13,109.00	Reduced to Provide for Survivor Benefit	$13,446.00
$ 7,848.00	Survivor Benefit	$ 8,052.00

SE

SECRET

SUBJECT: Retirement Information

e. If you were to return to the Civil Service Retirement System, you would be entitled to retire under the 55-30 optional provision at any time after you have been back in that system for a period of one year. The Civil Service Regulations state that to retire under the Civil Service Retirement System an employee must have been under that system for at least one year during the two years immediately preceding retirement under that System. Therefore if you should desire to return to the Civil Service System you should submit a request to Headquarters sufficiently in advance of your planned retirement in order to allow time for your request to be acted upon and for transfer to be made effective, as well as allowing for the aforementioned one year required by Civil Service Regulations. The following annuity estimate would be applicable in this situation as of 31 December 1968, assuming a deposit is made:

Basic Annuity	$15,755.00
Reduced to Provide for Survivor Benefit	$14,450.00
Survivor Benefit	$ 8,664.00

2. The above information is being forwarded for your consideration and should not be considered as anything more. If you have any questions regarding the above please feel free to forward them to Headquarters.

/s/ B. DeFelice

B. DeFelice
Chief, Benefits and Services Division

2/13/68 – 10:50 AM
Called Virginia Lynch – asking if [illegible] deadline or [illegible]
anything re retention –
She will go out with another dispatch &
then will quote para of this memo. DCD memo
only mentioned 1 year, & did not say anything
that request must be made at least 18 months
prior to retirement date. She will coordinate dispatch
with CCPS – [illegible] Ret Br [illegible]
informed of this

SECRET

DoD

SECRET

21 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. NOEL

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. The attached memorandum dated 29 May 1967 from the Director of Personnel concerns current Agency policy on retirement of personnel at age 60.

2. According to our records, you will achieve age 60 on 3/19/71, having completed 40 years 2 months of service. On this basis you would be scheduled to retire on 31 MARCH 1971.

3. If there are any questions relative to your status, please feel free to call Frank J. Dewald, Jr., of the Clandestine Services Personnel Staff, extension 5476. We also urge you to contact the Retirement Branch, Office of Personnel, extension 3257 as soon as it is convenient for you.

Gerald E. Miller

Gerald E. Miller
DDP/OP

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

EOD
65-16

27 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : **James A. Noel**

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. As a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System, you will reach mandatory retirement at age 60. The prospect of retirement deserves serious thought and planning because of its impact on each of us and for this reason, we are taking this opportunity to provide you with this advance notice that according to our records you will be required to retire on **March 1971.**

2. Planning ahead can bring about, with each passing year, definite progress toward your retirement goals and the Agency is anxious to assist you in your retirement planning.

3. We would like to make available to you as much information as possible on the general subject of retirement, your annuity estimates, life and health insurance protection in retirement, opportunities for other employment, Social Security benefits, and other additional material which is available. The Agency feels that this type of information and advisory service should be made available and, hopefully, will be used by employees well in advance of the date of retirement.

4. Our Chief, Retirement Branch, on extension 3257, is available to discuss with you any aspect of your retirement planning and we encourage you to contact him.

Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

OP-36

SECRET

29 MAR [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THRU : DDP/OP

SUBJECT : PCS Return Prior to Completion of Tour of Duty - James A. Noel

REFERENCE : CSN-20-59, dated 17 November 1965

1. This memorandum contains in paragraph 2 a recommendation for the approval of the Director of Personnel.

2. Mr. Noel arrived in Madrid as the Chief of Station on 21 September 1961. After home leave, he returned to Madrid on 7 August 1964, for a second tour of duty which would normally be completed on 6 August 1966. We have been advised that upon completion of his current assignment, Mr. Noel will be assigned as Chief of the DCDS field office in San Francisco, California. Since the officer now filling that position is required to leave in early September for another assignment, it is very desirable that Mr. Noel arrive in San Francisco about 6 September. Therefore, it is requested that Mr. Noel be permitted to leave Madrid on or about 1 July 1966. This will permit him to take some home leave and arrive at his new post in sufficient time to settle his family, which includes two school age children, and report for his projected assignment on schedule.

Edward Ryan
Acting Chief
Western Europe Division

SECRET

SUBJECT: PCS Return Prior to Completion of Tour of Duty - James A. Noel

CONCUR:

See Concurrence on Page 1
DDP/OP

22 April 1966
Date

The recommendation in paragraph 2 is APPROVED:

/s/ Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

[illegible] APR 1966
Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(true)* James Noel	DATE *(from item 8-1)* 18 Feb. 1963	NAME OF SUPERVISOR *(true)*	DATE *(from item 8-2)*
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:			DATE

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Mar 1911	2. GRADE GS-16	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE Chief of Station	7a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR 23 September 1961
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION *(if known)*		5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Madrid	7b. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD about 10 June 1964
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD ~~BASES DURING~~ CURRENT TOUR None			7c. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

Chief of Station. Overall responsibility for all KUBARK operations and activities in country of assignment.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

Return to post for second tour following home leave.

10. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*:

None at this time.

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE WE 2ND. CHOICE WH 3RD. CHOICE -

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:

1ST. CHOICE Hague 2ND. CHOICE Copenhagen 3RD. CHOICE Mexico City

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 45

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

wife; and two sons, ages (at time of contemplated travel - June 1964) 15 and 13.

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

None - except schooling facilities for children.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Recommend approval of extension to June 1964. A recommendation regarding a second tour or other assignment will be forwarded to the Panel at a later date.

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER GEORGE K. MODANNAM DATE 11 April 1963	SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. ______ CABLE NO. ______
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME	20. SIGNATURE
21. TITLE	22. DATE

23. COMMENTS

SECRET

SECRET

FEB 8 - 1955

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY — DO NOT COMPLETE — DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (*true*) James A. NOEL	DATE (*from item 9-1*) 11 Jan 55	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (*true*) J. C. KING -	DATE (*from item 9-2*) 26 Jan 55
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:		Bourne	DATE 2/7/55

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 11 March 1911	2. GRADE GS-15	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Chief of Mission
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (*if known*) KUFIRE SD-FI	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Caracas	
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None		7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE September 1955

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (*see special note on Transmittal Form*):

Chief of Mission at Caracas. Supervisory jurisdiction over Sub-Station at Maracaibo. Supervision of all KUBARK activities in Venezuela. Liaison with Ambassador, Service Attachés, and Embassy section heads; liaison with friendly intelligence and security services. Projects and plans.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

First preference: Branch Chief in WH Division

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (*refer to catalog of courses, if available*):

CE Course
Communist Party Operations
Operational Security

FORM NO. 202
1 SEP 54

SECRET

(4)

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT *(continued)*

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[2] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION [1] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIE[illegible]

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 8 2 24 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION:

1ST CHOICE: Mexico City
2ND CHOICE: Santiago
3RD CHOICE: London

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?
45 work days
INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 45

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:
Wife, 43; two children, 6 and 4.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

I concur in subject's expressed preference for next assignment and recommend that he be given the training courses listed in 9B.

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR J. C. KING	SIGNATURE: JCKing
TITLE: CHIEF, WH DIVISION	DATE: 26 January 1955

17. REMARKS *(additional comment)*

This officer, who will have been with the Agency for nine years on the completion of his present tour, never has had a Headquarters assignment. His performance in the field has been excellent and his long experience will make him a valuable addition to WH Headquarters staff.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. SUBMIT FOR:
A. CONTRACT EMPLOYEES (TYPE A, B AND CAREER)
B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT OR MOC (US CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS ONLY
2. THIS FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR OPERATIONAL OR FIELD AGENTS
3. COPIES OF THE FORM WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ORIGINATING COMPONENT (NUMBER OF COPIES AT ITS DISCRETION) AND BY CSRS/AGENT BRANCH (1 COPY ONLY)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE) Cecil J. KLOBUCAR (P)			SEX MALE	DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] March 1911
MARITAL STATUS Married	NO. DEPENDENTS 2	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1911 and 1951	NATIONALITY U.S.	LAST MEDICAL EXAM [illegible]. 1967
DATE OF LATEST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL 3 April 1968		JOB TITLE Ops Off		COMPONENT DO

CONTRACT CATEGORY Career Agent	EFFECTIVE DATE 4 Aug. 1968	EXPIRATION DATE NA	SALARY 30,054	GRADE EQUIVALENT GS-16/7	PROJECT OR FAN # WUBALANCE

BENEFITS	YES	NO
SOCIAL SECURITY		NO
FECA DEATH AND DISABILITY	YES	
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE	YES	
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT	YES	
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERICAL CIA ANNUITY		NA
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE	YES	
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		NO
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS		NO
OTHER (EXPLAIN) UBLIC, WAEPA, DREAD DISEASE & ASS'N HEALTH PLAN	YES	

NON-CIA EDUCATION

High School Graduate

DATES	NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT			
FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
1931 - 1936	Dept. of State	Mexico	Vice-Consul	
1936 - 1941	" "	"	" "	
1941 - 1944	" "	"	" "	
1944 - 1947	OSS/SSU/CIG	Spain & Guatemala	COS	

CIA TRAINING

Invest Tech, Photo, Commo Trng, Famil in Sound & Surveil Equip, Intel Orient, OATC, AID, Documentation, Crypto, Psych Warfare, Cland Pol War, Basic Supervision and Cland Pol Warfare. (Training taken during staff status).

1947-6/68 COB, San Francisco Guatemala, BA, Caracas, Hqs, Havana/ Madrid & SF. GS-12 - GS-16

DATES	CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (BEGINNING WITH EOD)					
FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR. CAT.	LOCATION	PROJECT	SALARY	GRADE EQUIV.
4 Aug 1968	Ops Off	Career Agent	San Francisco	WUBALANCE	26,540	16/6
					30,054	16/7
					31,857	

FACTORS AFFECTING SUBJECT (PUBLIC EXPOSURE - PRESS, RADIO, TV), KNOWN OR SUSPECTED IDENTIFICATION TO OTHER THAN CIA STAFF PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE, OR SECURITY SERVICES

If such factors exist, they have not affected his performance in his present assignment. He is far removed geographically from his overseas assignment.

COVER

A. PRESENT COVER IS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NON-OFFICIAL

DIVISION EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY:

Excellent. KLOBUKAR poses as a retired Foreign Service Officer and can testify to his service with the Department since 1931. In addition he is a legitimate member of two private organizations active in the field of international relations which provide him with access to consular officials in San Francisco

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE:

KLOBUKAR has recruited several support agents and has been used successfully by the San Francisco Base on other operational activities. One of these ad hoc activities aided the assessment and final recruitment of two students from Saudi Arabia, the first recruited in the United States under the priority NE Division TWJUNGLE program.

ADAPTABILITY (SUBJECT AND FAMILY) TOWARDS DUAL LIFE

Excellent

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☒ OFFICIAL ☐ NON-OFFICIAL (GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

None

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANSOR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

This is KLOBUKAR's last tour as he reaches the mandatory retirement age in March 1971.

(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) EOD: 26 Jan 1931

055392			
NOEL, James Arthur	M	Mar 1911	18 Sep 1947
Married	3	1911 1942 1951	NA
Jul 1954	Sep 1966	TDY Standby	Domestic PCS
X			
None	None		None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1931-38 Dept of State, Ensenada, Mexico - Vice Consul
1938-41 Dept of State, Mazatlan, Mexico - Vice Consul
1941-44 Dept of State, Guadalajara, Mexico - Vice Consul
1944-47 OSS/SSU/CIG, Spain and Guatemala - Chief of Station

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

High school graduate

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

Spanish - R High; W Interm - Apr 1958 P, U, High; S, Inter; Interp & Trans Apr 1957.

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1947	Invest Tech	1949	BAIC	1958	Basic Supervision
1947	Photo	1949	AIC	1955	Cland Pol Warfare
1947	Commo Trng	1949	Documentation		
1949	Famil in Sound&Surveil Equip	1949	Crypto		
1949	Intel Orient	1952	Psych Warfare		
		1952	Cland Pol War		

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, etc., Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUP. SERIAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN.	LOCATION
Sep 1947	I.O.	0132.00	12		OSO/FBT/COS	Guatemala
Mar 1949	" "	0132.00	13		" " "	"
Aug 1949	I.O. (Stf)	0132.00	13		OSO/FBT/COM	BuenosAires
Dec 1950	" " "	0132.00	13		OSO/FBT/COS	"
Aug 1951	I.O.	0132.00	14		OSO FBT/EC/COS	"
Sep 1952	" "	0132.00	14		WH-I COM	Caracas
Aug 1954	Area Ops Off	0136.01	15	FI	DDP/WH-I/COS	"
Jan 1956	" " "	0136.01	15	DI	DDP/WH/Ch, Br I, NWC	Hq
	Jun - Jul 1956, TDY South America					
Jun 1957	Area Ops Off	0136.01	15	DI	DDP/WH Ch, Br II	"
Sep 1958	" " "	0136.01	15	DI	DDP/WH-III/HavanaCubaSta/COS	Havana
Mar 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	16	D	" " " " " "	"
Sep 1961	Chief of Station	0136.01	16	D	DDP/WE/COS	Madrid
Jun 1965	" "	0136.05	16	D	" " "	"
Aug 1966	Chief of Base	0136.08	16	D	DDP/DOD/USF/USSta	SanFrancisco
Oct 1967	" "	0136.08	16	D	DDP/DOD/USF/Intel Ops Grp	"

20. DATE REVIEWED	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE	
13 Feb 1968	hms/hc		No

FORM 1200 (PART 1) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPL. SERIAL NO. 055292	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
NAME (Last-First-Middle) NOEL, James Arthur	DATE OF BIRTH Mar 1911

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appreciation 1954 from Administrator, Bureau of Inspection, Security & Consular Affairs, Dept of State for security assistance furnished during the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Venezuela.

Commendation 1959 from Chief, WH Division for superior performance during the Cuban crisis.

Admonition 1963 from C/WH for part in command failure in control and supervision of a sensitive operation.

27. DATE REVIEWED 20 Apr 1966	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hms/nc

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1000 (PART 6) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (40)

SECRET RYBAT

12 May 1970

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report for Cecil J. KLOBUKAR for the Period 31 March 1969 to 31 March 1970

Cecil J. KLOBUKAR, a career agent, has been primarily targeted against the local consular community during this reporting period. For this purpose he has maintained membership in two local organizations concerned with foreign affairs. More than that, he has been an active contributor to their programming and has participated in most of their social and cultural functions. This has enabled him to come in contact with a relatively large number of consulate officers. During the past year he has met, on one or more occasions, thirty consular members. He is concentrating, however, on the ten consulates which have representation in the denied and semi-denied areas. Within this area he is further refining the target by attempting to contact the more junior officers who give promise of a longer future career and a greater chance of being posted to an area of operational interest. To date, he has succeeded in establishing such contacts in the Japanese, Finnish and Indian Consulates. In this last case he has successfully passed the target to another Base officer for further development and hopes to accomplish the same with his Japanese and Finnish contacts.

In addition to this primary responsibility, KLOBUKAR also handles a support asset who is targeted against the academic community. He is directing this asset's efforts in the cultivation of two promising leads -- one, Japanese and the other, Vietnamese. Both of these cases are progressing very well due in great part to the direction and guidance which KLOBUKAR gives to the support asset.

KLOBUKAR also played a very important and direct role in the assessment and intermediate cultivation of TWPARROT/1 and TWPARROT/2 who were subsequently successfully recruited. He is now developing a local QKWAFER student who is an interesting, but difficult, recruitment prospect.

KLOBUKAR is cost conscious in the expenditure of operational funds; he does not have supervisory responsibilities.

SECRET RYBAT

As has been indicated above, KLOBUKAR has made excellent progress in gaining access to the consular community and in maintaining personal contact with potential recruitment prospects. He has also done extremely well in his direct participation in the academic area and in the supervision and direction of his support asset; his performance has been Strong.

Signed in pseudo on 45a on 12 May 1970
[redacted] Eugene O'Meara
Chief of Base, San Francisco

Signed in pseudonym on 45 a by employee on 12 May 1970
Employee

I concur with the rating and narrative comments. Subject has done remarkably well in establishing himself within the San Francisco diplomatic community.

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

C/DOI/1 11 June 1970
Signature **Date**

CAREER AGENT SECRET RYBAT (1) jm

att to USFT-1498

27 May 1969

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report for Cecil J. KLOBUKAR
for the Period 26 July 1968 to 31 March 1969

Cecil J. KLOBUKAR was the Chief of this Base until July 1968 at which time he was assigned new duties as a career agent, targeted primarily against the San Francisco consular community. Until that time there was no specific program aimed at the official foreign community. It was KLOBUKAR's responsibility, therefore, to break ground in this new target area. He went about this chore in an orderly and organized manner by refining the community to those which were of priority interest because of their representation in denied and semi-denied areas. He then started looking for a means to get information and gain access to members of this target group. To assist him in this endeavor he recruited two members of the consular community, representing Latin American countries. Since their performance did not live up to expectations, KLOBUKAR took the initiative by joining three local organizations relating to foreign affairs in order to enhance his cover and possibility of direct access as a retired LNGOLD officer. By participating in the gatherings of these organizations, KLOBUKAR is aiming at direct contact with at least a few of the officers from target consulates.

KLOBUKAR has demonstrated excellent initiative in pursuing as many avenues of approach as possible to this rather difficult target. It is not a cohesive community and does not experience the usual mixing and contact that one finds in normal diplomatic circles. It is fragmented and cliquish and for this reason KLOBUKAR has had to show both imagination and perseverance in probing for access to those specific consulates in which the Base has priority interest. He is now demonstrating his determination to get at this target by exploring another possible means of approach of his own device.

In addition to his primary responsibility against the consular target, KLOBUKAR also handles one support asset currently being used against a high priority student target and three general purpose assets who are used from time to time in both the business and academic areas. Here he has done excellent work, particularly in the direction and guidance of the first asset.

KLOBUKAR is cost-conscious in the expenditure of operational funds; he does not presently have any supervisory responsibility.

As has been indicated above, KLOBUKAR has been given a very difficult primary target on which the Base had very little information or prior experience. While it has been a frustrating and sometimes exasperating assignment, KLOBUKAR has shown both initiative and perseverance in attacking it; his performance has been Strong.

Chief of Base, San Francisco

27 May 1969 - Employee signed in pseudo on 45a - Cecil J. KLOBUKAR

27 May 1969 - Supervisor, Chief of Base, signed in pseudo on 45 a - Eugene O'Meara

Reviewing Official's Comments and Signature.

I concur. KLOBUKAR has the maturity, wisdom and integrity necessary for the secure search for concrete recruitments in this difficult and sensitive operational sector.

10 June 1969	DCDO/I	
Date	Title	Stanley H. Gaines

6

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
055292

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Noel,	James	A.	3-19-11	M	GS-16	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Chief of Base	DDP/DOD	San Francisco

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 67 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Base supervising six professional and three clerical subordinates.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Establishment and maintenance of operational support mechanisms.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operational reporting.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with FBI and DCS, et al.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Direction of recruitment and handling of support assets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-68 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Noel is much too experienced and practiced a hand for his performance to vary very much from year to year. He has continued to turn in the highly creditable performance in San Francisco that has been standard for him for many years. He has managed his subordinates well and has exercised uniformly good judgment in directing their operational efforts. Of particular value has been his steadiness in the face of administrative adversity disrupting the organization of his Base. Mr. Noel insured that the work of the Base continued uninterrupted and demonstrated his capacity to keep on top of all details and report them to Headquarters as appropriate. It is a credit to Mr. Noel that in the post-Ramparts exposure period there was not a single instance of an academic asset withdrawing from a relationship with the Base.

The performance of his officers atteststhe careful guidance and wise leadership which has enabled them to operate securely and well in sensitive areas. His realtions with the FBI and DCS are excellent. He is appropriately economy minded. In short, he is a decidedly strong supervisor.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
18 months	Mr. Noel is in the Field and will be shown a copy of this Fitness Report on his next TDY trip to Headquarters.	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 July 1968	C/DO/1	Stanley H. Gaines

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur in rating officer's judgment.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 July 1968	Chief, DO Division	(Signed) Gordon L. Jorgensen Gordon L. Jorgensen

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DC

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 056292

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Noel, James A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 3/19/11	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Base	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DOD	8. CURRENT STATION San Francisco		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Base supervising six professional and three clerical subordinates.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Establishment and maintenance of operational support mechanisms.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operational reporting.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with the FBI and DCS, et al.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Direction of recruitment and handling operations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Noel is an old hand at running Bases or Stations abroad and his performance as Chief of Base, San Francisco, amply attests that. It goes without saying that he understands all aspects of the business, knows how to delegate, organise, direct and report. He has continued to do all these things well. His seniority, experience and maturity served the Agency in particularly good stead during this period when the location of his Base was compromised in the public press, through no fault of Mr. Noel. His subsequent and consequent actions were all taken with sound judgment and appropriate calm and circumspection. He was also most receptive to, and cooperative in, Headquarters suggestions in this matter. He is, of course, cost conscious and an excellent supervisor. His overall performance is that of a high order of senior Agency officers.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject is in the field; a copy of this report is being retained to show him on his next TDY to Hqs.	
DATE 21 August	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/DO/I	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in draft) Stanley H. Gaines

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur fully in overall rating of "Strong".

DATE 28 August 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, DO Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [illegible] Gordon L. Jorgensen

SECRET

SECRET

21 July 1966

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: James A. Noel, Employee Serial No. 055292, DDP/EUR,
Period: 1 April 1965 - 1 July 1966, SD: D, YOB: 1911

1. Subject, who was born 19 March 1911, is a GS-16 and has been assigned to Madrid as Chief of Station since October 1961.

2. Subject is an experienced and mature officer dedicated to the Agency's mission. Conscientious and diligent, he readily accepts responsibility and is both thorough and reliable in the performance of his duties. Morale at his station has been consistently high, and Subject enjoys the respect and confidence of his subordinates. He evidences sound and objective judgment and operates well under pressure. In all aspects of the station's activities, he exhibits a high degree of cost consciousness in the expenditure of Government funds and property.

3. Subject's performance has been Strong throughout the rating period and he has obtained a maximum effort from his subordinates. He has enjoyed the confidence of the Ambassador and the other senior Embassy officials, all of whom have demonstrated considerable dependence upon the station.

Rolfe Kingsley
Rolfe Kingsley
Chief, European Division

Concur
/s/ ADDP (T.K.)
26 July 66

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 055292

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) NOEL, James A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 March 1911	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Iberian	8. CURRENT STATION Madrid		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1965 - 27 September 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 My rating of the performance of this officer remains the same as the description of his performance which is contained in his fitness report for the period ending 31 March 1965.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 28 12 07 PM '65
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Mr. Noel is currently at his overseas post.

DATE 27 September 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WE Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Original Signed William D. O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 19 OCT 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADDP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Thomas H. Karamessines Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

12 May 1965

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: James A. Noel, Employee Serial No. 055292
Fitness Report for the Period 1 April 1964
to 31 March 1965

1. Subject, who was born 19 March 1911, is a GS-16 and has been assigned to Madrid as Chief of Station since October 1961.

2. As Chief of Station, he is charged with the organization and management of the station and is responsible for the planning, direction, and supervision of all its activities. He also exercises general supervision of the Barcelona base. Assisting him and under his general supervision are 24 staff employees and 15 contract employees.

3. Subject serves as the Ambassador's principal intelligence officer, as chairman of the Embassy Defector Committee, as the Agency representative on the Embassy Country Team, and as the coordinator of U.S. clandestine intelligence operations in Spain. Accredited as the Agency's representative to the Spanish Intelligence (AEM) and Security (DGS) services, he plans, directs, and supervises all aspects of the station's multi-level liaison with those services and personally handles the liaison with the Service chiefs and a number of their senior officers. On the operational side, subject handles BISHAD/1, CITIZEN and QUWIND/1. He recruited QUIP/1 during the rating period, arranged a new cover job for HARRIOTT through QUWIND/1, and participated in the handling of QUMALT and QUHOPS.

4. Subject is an experienced and mature officer, possessing an excellent command of Spanish. Highly motivated, conscientious, and industrious, he readily accepts responsibility and is both thorough and reliable in the execution of his duties. Even tempered and affable, he holds the confidence and friendship of those whom he directs and those to whom he is responsible, and the morale of his station is noticeably high. He is alert to the operational possibilities

JUN 3 3 05 PM '65

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

of any given situation, evidences sound and objective judgment, and works well under pressure. He writes lucidly, speaks articulately, and exhibits a high degree of cost consciousness in the use of government funds and property. His delegation of responsibility to others is meaningful and well delineated.

5. Subject's performance has been strong throughout the rating period. He has given the station purposeful direction and competent management and as an effective supervisor who commands the loyalty and respect of those whom he supervises, he has succeeded in obtaining a maximum effort from the station personnel. He enjoys the confidence of the Ambassador and other principal officers, of the Embassy, several of whom have expressed their appreciation of subject's work and commented on the value of the station's contribution to the functioning of the Embassy. The fact that the Ambassador arrived in Madrid with definite prejudices regarding the Agency but was of quite another mind upon his departure is testimony to subject's skill and tact.

6. Subject has conducted the Agency's liaison with the Spanish services most competently, as evidenced by the relationship he established with Captain General Munoz Grandes, his ability to persuade the AEM to undertake sensitive operations in Cuba, and the fact that this liaison did not suffer following the attack on the Spanish ship "Sierra Aranzazu". Marked progress has been achieved in joint CE and CP operations, and subject has developed QUANTUM/30 to the point wherein the latter's collaboration far exceeds the cooperation normally expected in an official liaison relationship.

7. In addition to his considerable executive and liaison duties, subject has carried out the previously cited operational assignments with marked ability. He is a convincing and persuasive agent handler, and his operational reporting is prompt and thorough.

8. The only criticism I would make of subject is that I believe the station should be making a greater effort to develop internal assets who will be able to report on and influence developments in Spain following the departure of Franco.

Original Signed

EDWARD RYAN
Deputy Chief
Western Europe Division

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION: "S"

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: CONCUR William D. O'Ryan, C/WE

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 055292

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) NOEL, James A	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1911	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station, Madrid	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Iberia	8. CURRENT STATION Madrid		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As Chief of Station, Madrid, plans and directs all FI, and CA operations within Spain	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises Madrid Station and Barcelona Base personnel	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains contact with senior officials in the Spanish Intelligence Services	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Represents the Director of CIA with the Ambassador to Spain and other U.S. officials in Spain	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Personally handles several sensitive third country intelligence operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises Cuban operations in Spain	RATING LETTER O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject is one of the Agency's truly mature, experienced operations officers. He has had unusual operational experience in Central and South America, both in the field and in Headquarters. His activities have spanned both the FI and the CA spectrum. He has and does deal easily and graciously with high ranking officials, both American and foreign. His good sense, poise and dignity never fail to impress. He is a person of principal and high morals. He does not hesitate to express his conviction even though he may have reason to believe such convictions are not popular. He is a strong supervisor who enjoys his subordinate's respect. He is economy minded and made diligent efforts to comply with requests to economize. Mr. Noel has succeeded in creating a cohesive station in Madrid.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject is in the field. This report will be shown to him upon his return.	
DATE 20 April 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WE/5	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Fred E. Hubbard

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 5 May 64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE W D Tyne

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 055292

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) NOEL, James A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1911	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS 16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Iberian Br.		8. CURRENT STATION Madrid	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 22 April 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1962-31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Direction of all FI and CA operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Administration of Station and supervision of personnel.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Direct supervision of senior ops officer in charge of Cuban operations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Personally handles a sensitive operation of interest to another CS component.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains contact with senior liaison personnel.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Maintains a working relationship with the Ambassador and other U. S. officials.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to over-all performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Noel has ably administered a large Station and has displayed maturity, good judgment and tact in the day-to-day management and direction of Station activities and personnel. This has been achieved despite the physical location of Station staff personnel in a number of separated office sites.

Under the direction of Mr. Noel a far reaching and fruitful major operational program against the high priority Cuban target has been undertaken and Madrid Station today is making a substantial contribution in good operations and good intelligence information to the over-all Agency effort. Another notable accomplishment directly attributable to Mr. Noel, and in part a reflection of his long years of service in Latin America, has been his professional handling personally of theStation operation involving Juan Peron. Interested CS components have stated categorically that Madrid Station coverage of Juan Peron and his activities is essential in satisfying existing intelligence requirements on Peronism.

Despite the Station's heavy diversion into Cuban and Latin American activities and State Department policy restrictions on internal political activities, Mr. Noel has encouraged the development of a long-range program involving activities against the Spanish Communist Party and clandestine contact with the Spanish political opposition.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 19	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject employee is in the field. Report will be shown to him upon his return to Headquarters.	
DATE 25 APR 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Roland E. Dulin

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in above assessment.

DATE 25 APR 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan

SECRET

SECRET

Recorded by
CSPD

17 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, WE

SUBJECT : Mr. James A. Noel
Fitness Report Covering the ~~Period~~ 14 August 1961 to
31 March 1962

1. Mr. Noel assumed his duties as Chief of Station Madrid on 23 September 1961. The Station, as constituted when Mr. Noel arrived, included some 21 staffers plus numerous contract personnel, as well as a two man base in Barcelona. The Madrid Station proper not only includes the Embassy installation but an outside operations section as well. Since Mr. Noel arrived the Station has been launched into a Cuban operations program of considerable scale and on a crash basis. In addition, in this period, one State cover slot was withdrawn, and the experienced Chief of Base, Barcelona had to be brought home due to a family emergency.

2. To date Mr. Noel has given every evidence of a particular ability to cope with the crash program and the acute shortage of personnel with judiciousness and maturity. While it is too early, yet, to pass judgement, there are indications that Mr. Noel has been preoccupied with Cuban problems (an area of special interest to him) to the detriment of lower priority but, nonetheless, necessary Spanish targets (for example, contact with the local opposition and a budding effort against the Spanish Communist Party).

3. As indicated above, Mr. Noel has not been in place as Chief of Station long enough to justify firm reservations concerning his management, nor to permit meaningful criticism. Also, as indicated above, his outstanding noticeable strength to date has been his ability to cope with a heavy operational program, a shortage of personnel, and a sometimes difficult operational climate, with judgement, calmness and patience.

THOMAS F. THIELE
Chief, WE/5

CONCUR:

William D O'Ryan/AC/WE

SECRET

Contract Service — Cecil J. KLOBUKAR (P)

Date	Action	Compensation	GS Equivalent
	Former Staff Employee		
4 Aug 68	~~Contract Employee~~ Career Agent with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs.	$26,640	GS-16/6
13 Jul 69	LPI	29,219	GS-16/6
5 Oct 69	PSI	30,054	GS-16/7
28 Dec 69	LPI	31,857	GS-16/7
10 Jan 71	LPI	33,757	"
31 Mar 71	Contract terminated (Subject retired)	33,757	"

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 001295[illegible]	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KLCBLKAP CECIL J	PREPARED: 04/16/71
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONTRACT TERMINATION (08H0000)	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 03 31 71	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)
6 FUNDS V TO V | V TO CF CF TO V | X CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 1129-3507	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIV WUBALANCE	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES [illegible]	16 GRADE AND STEP 16 7
17 SALARY OR RATE DOG: 032060 $ 33757 LEI: 100569		

18 REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

BIRTH DATE: [illegible] SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 03
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 091847 FED SERVICE COMP: 012631
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC/FICA HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 6 S/L INC: 4

- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

EFF DATE: C80-68 EXPIRATION DATE: 080371 DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 080468
REFERRING OFFICER: DOD PERSONNEL REFR ORG: DOD PHONE: 3376

- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -

TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: NHN OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: N FEST/EQUAL: N
HOME LEAVE: C DIFFERENTIAL: N OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: N
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : N ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION: N
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION: N

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 11508 Use Previous Edition
7-66 MFG 11-69

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4 51)

SECRET

7 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: OF/C&TD/CAS

VIA : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Cecil J. KLOBUKAR
Retirement

Cecil J. KLOBUKAR, Career Agent, retired effective 31 March 1971 under the Civil Service Retirement System. This memorandum authorizes the payment by the Office of Finance of any money due him.

Paul S. Latchford
Chief, DO Personnel

CONCUR:

14 APR 1971

/s/ Don H. Luetscher

Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CPD
1 - Subject's File
1 - DO/Pers Chrono
DO/Pers/RASanford:dag (7 Apr 71) 3193

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN DUPLICATE

DATE: 22 March 1971

PERSONAL DATA

NAME (*Last, First, Middle - true or pseudonym*) KLOBUKAR, Cecil J.	OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DO Division
LOCAL ADDRESS 1807 Sebastian Drive Burlingame, California 94010	PERMANENT ADDRESS San Diego, California
PERMANENT STATION OR BASE San Francisco Base	POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE dOps Officer

CONTRACT DATA

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
8/4/68		Indefinite	3/31/71

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

Subject is retiring effective 31 March 1971.

INTERNAL STAFF OR DIVISION CLEARANCES (*Add or delete as applicable*)

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE	Mr. Randall		
LOGISTICS			
PERSONNEL	Mr. Latchford		
Registry	Mrs. Moats		

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER	CLEARED BY (*Signature*) Carroll L. Hauver, C/DO/SG	DATE

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES

(*OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE*)

OFFICE	SCHEDULE			INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL
	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	
CENTRAL COVER STAFF				CLEARED BY (*Signature*) DATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY PSD				CLEARED BY (*Signature*) DATE
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CPD				CLEARED BY (*Signature*) DATE

REMARKS (*Please initial*)

APPROVED:
/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

STAFF OR DIVISION AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	SIGNATURE OF STAFF OR DIVISION RESPONSIBLE OFFICER	DATE
DO Division	Paul S. Latchford, C/DO/Personnel	

FORM 3-67 1689 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

8 MAR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: CSPS/Agent Panel

VIA : Central Cover Staff

VIA : Office of Security

VIA : CI Staff

SUBJECT : Summary of Employment
Mr. James A. Noel

Attached hereto is Mr. Noel's Summary of Employment for approval and permanent record.

Carroll L. Hauver

Carroll L. Hauver
Chief, DO Support Group

Attachment:
As Stated

CONCURRENCE:

________________ (CSPS Agent Panel)
[illegible] (Central Cover Staff) [illegible]
[illegible] (Office of Security)
[illegible] (CI Staff)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT

James A. Noel

From 1931 to 1944 I served as a Foreign Service Officer in various posts in Mexico. In 1944 I joined OSS/SSU/CIG and from that date until 1947, I worked in Europe and Latin America. In 1947 I again joined the Department of State, and served in many posts in Latin America until 1966 when I returned to the United States for a two (2) year detail with the Department of Army. In 1968 I retired from the Department of State and since then I have been living in the San Francisco area doing occasional work on a consultant basis for the Department of Defense.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 10 February 1971

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Hoel, James A. (T) Career Agent

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-16

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH:

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION: San Francisco

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☒ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Ruth A. Sanford

Ruth A. Sanford DO/Personnel

ROOM NO & BUILDING: 201 Key

EXT.: 3193

10. COMMENTS

Subject will retire effective 31 March 1971. He will come to Headquarters and be available for a medical examination on 22 March. Please schedule the medical during that week. DO is requesting approval for him to enter the Hq building.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified Executive Annual

P.E.

DATE: 31 March 1971

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Peter Zrowka, OMS/pro

FORM 2.69 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(26)

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
	KLOBUKAR, Cecil J. (Career Agent)	DDP/DO	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS-16	6	$29219	10/08/67	GS-16	7	$30054	10/05/69	x	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Eugene F. O'Meara
rc

DATE 28 Oct 69

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

Disp # 11SFT
1535
13 Oct '69

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4 51)

22 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: OP/PAB

SUBJECT : Cecil J. KLOBUKAR (P) - Career Agent

Attached is a copy of USFT-1477 dated 4 April 1969 in which subject requests cancellation of his optional FEGLI plan to be effective 3 May 1969.

/S

Virginia C. Lynch
Chief, DO Personnel and Training

Attachment: USFT-1477 and authorization

CC - OP/C&TD/SA/S
: CPD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED ✓
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Domestic Operations

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Base, San Francisco

SUBJECT
ISOLOG/ADMIN
Cecil J. KLOBUKAR -Life Insurance Coverage

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: USFT-1303 dated 29 February 1968

mc

Forwarded under separate cover is a memorandum from Cecil J. KLOBUKAR requesting cancellation as of 3 May 1969 of the $10,000 optional life insurance coverage under FEGLI which he elected to take in 1968 per the reference. Please forward the memorandum to the Insurance Branch for appropriate action.

William G. BOLAND

sac

Originated by Susan A. CONSUEGRA

Attachment:
Memorandum a/s/a, 2 copies USC

Distribution:
2 - Chief, DO w/attachment

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	USFT-1477	4 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

4 April 1969

MEMORANDUM

TO :

FROM : James A. Noel

SUBJECT : $10,000 Optional Insurance

This memorandum is authorization to cancel the $10,000 additional optional life insurance coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program which I elected to take in February 1968. I request that this cancellation be effective as of 3 May 1969.

James A. Noel

5 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: OF/PAB

SUBJECT : Cecil J. KLOBUKAR (P)
Career Agent - Employee No. 463100

Subject converted from Staff Employee to Career Agent status effective 4 August 1968. Attached is his FEGLI application signed in pseudonym.

Virginia C. Lynch
Chief, DO Personnel and Training

Attachment: A/S

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

• IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
KLOBUKAR	CECIL	XX J.	3/19/11	
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

Cecil J. Klobukar

DATE

18 July 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

AUG 8 11 15 AM '68
GOVT PERS DIV

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

DUPLICATE COPY—For Agency Use

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1963
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

S E C R E T

6 Aug 68

MEMO FOR: The File

SUBJECT : Cecil J. KLOBUKAR (P), Service
Computation Date

1. On his SF-144 dated 31 July 68 subject claimed following creditable service:

Service	From	To
Dept of State	26 Jan 31	15 Aug 44
OSS/SSU/CIG	16 Aug 44	17 Sep 47
CIA Staff Employee	18 Sep 47	3 Aug 68
CIA Career Agent	4 Aug 68	date

2. Subject has had continuous service from 26 Jan 1931. Accordingly, this date was set as subject's SCD. Review of subject Staff Employee file this date found that the Staff Employee file also cited subject's SCD as being 26 Jan 1931.

Paul Wilson

5/31/71

S E C R E T

SECRET

31 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/OP

This is to advise you that Cecil J. Klobukar has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 4 August 1968. The contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/DO.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Mr. Cecil J. Klobukar

Dear Mr. Klobukar:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. Your status is that of a Government employee under contract and, as such, your rights and benefits are governed by the provisions of this agreement. It is specifically understood that you are not entitled to rights and benefits pertaining to appointed staff status, except as provided herein.

2. Cover. In the performance of your services hereunder, you will act under cover suitable to conceal your true relationship with the Government. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction of terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

3. Compensation. For your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at a basic salary of $26,640 per annum, the equivalent of a GS-16/6. In addition you will be entitled to legislative pay adjustments and within grade promotions in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees.

4. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangement, monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner. It is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment by the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

5. Taxes. As a Career Agent, monies paid you under paragraph three (3) above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference.

SECRET

6. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by this organization. This may include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel and while on temporary duty away from your post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations, or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

7. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government or your cover facility. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

8. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

9. Benefits. By virtue of your employment relationship with the Government hereunder, you are herein authorized:

(a) Coverage under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs or legal representatives under this Act will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) Continued participation in the Civil Service Retirement System in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. From the basic compensation paid you hereunder there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6-1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Social Security deductions required by virtue of your cover activities will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

(c) Continuation of your present coverage under the Federal Employees' Health Benefits Act. This organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(d) Continued coverage under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act unless you have previously executed a written waiver of said coverage. This organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(e) Sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives. All accrued but unused leave credited to your former account as an appointed employee of this organization will be transferred to the leave account established for you under this agreement.

10. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. You will render signed reports to this organization, every six (6) months, indicating all cover emoluments received during the reporting period. Negative reports covering the same period will be submitted if no cover emoluments are received. Failure to submit timely reports may result in suspension of any contractual payments due you hereunder. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions.

11. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

12. Secrecy. (a) You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all classified information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws of the United States and other applicable laws and regulations.

(b) In the event you marry or remarry during the term of this contract, you agree to advise this organization at least one hundred twenty (120) days in advance of such contemplated marriage, or otherwise as soon as known, and to furnish such personal history data on your prospective spouse as may be required by this organization. You understand and agree that should this organization determine that your marriage would limit or otherwise impair your usefulness to the Government, this contract may be terminated.

13. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

14. Reassignments. During your period of service under this agreement, it may be necessary for this organization to terminate an assignment for reasons beyond your control. In such event, you will be given every consideration for other assignments appropriate to Career Agents.

15. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government. Specifically, you herein acknowledge that this organization makes no commitment, either express or implied, that appointed employment status will be offered you at the conclusion of or during your period of contractual service.

16. Term. This contract is effective as of 4 Aug 68, and shall continue thereafter until your retirement from the organization upon reaching age sixty (60) unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon ninety (90) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Cecil J. Klobukar

WITNESS: ____________

APPROVED: ____________

[illegible] EV/[illegible] 30 July 68

SECRET

19 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CSPS

ATTENTION: Chief, Agent Branch

SUBJECT: Conversion to Career Agent Status
James A. Noel - GS-16

1. Transmitted herewith are the following documents in connection with subject's conversion to Career Agent status:

Contract Check List (3)
Nonofficial Cover Request (1)
Biographic Profile (9)
Latest Fitness Report (9)

2. The Request for Nonofficial Cover form has been sent to Chief, Central Cover Staff for consideration. Action is being held up pending subject's TDY at headquarters, on or about 29 July 1968. Appropriate modifications will be worked out with CCS at that time.

3. Subject will convert at his current salary, GS-16/6 and will be assigned to the San Francisco area, under Project WUBALANCE, engaged in spotting, assessing, recruiting and handling agents. The effective date of his contract will be determined following discussions with Mr. Noel during his TDY.

W. T. Montgomery

W. T. MONTGOMERY
Chief, DO Support Group

Attachments:
as stated above

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and two copies for preparation of contract

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 11- [illegible]

DATE: 19 March 1[illegible]

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Cecil J. KLOBUKAR

2A. PROJECT
WUBALANCE

2B. PERMANENT STATION
San Francisco, Calif.

3. ALLOTMENT NO.

3A. FUNDS ☐ V ☒ VV

4. SLOT NO.
----

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES
Woodrow C. OLIEN

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
$24,477.00 (GS-16 step 6)
Staff from Sept. 1947 to present XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date)
Conv. app. 3 Apr 6[illegible]

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE ☒ OBTAINED ☐ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.)
CAREER AGENT

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP
USA

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE
57

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
3/10/11

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country).

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country)
1307 Sebastian Drive, Burlingame, Calif.

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife
Son DOD 3 Nov 48
Son " 30 Apr 1951

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☐ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — XXXX NONE — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE

21. VETERAN

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE

24. RANK OR GRADE

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☐ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY
$26,640*
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
$XXXXXXXX (GS-16 step 6)

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

COVER		CIA	
☐	YES	☐	YES
☐	NO	☐	NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS

32. POST

33. OTHER

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☒ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☐ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

*Salary includes IPI - 14 July 1968

Compensation approved [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS a/o ☒ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION
yes

43. ENTERTAINMENT
yes

44. OTHER
as authorized

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS a/o ☒ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

FORM 204 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET

Larene E. Morrison DO

TELEPHONE EXTENSION 11-5 042

DATE 19 March 1963

SECTION VIII OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See R 20-613, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)*

ALL CAREER AGENT BENEFITS

SECTION IX COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)* ☐ PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE *(Check)* ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS ☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)* ☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI TERM

51. DURATION ☐ DAYS ☐ MONTHS ☐ YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE

53. RENEWABLE ☐ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)* 90 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(CI, FI, PP, other)* FI

SECTION XIII DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Spotting, assessing, recruitment and handling of agents in San Francisco.

SECTION XIV QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Staff

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐ GRADE SCHOOL XX HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE *(No degree)* ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish					Inter.			High	

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

SECTION XV EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

1931-38 State Dept., Mexico - Vice-Consul (Ensenada)
1938-41 " " " - " " (Mazathen)
1941-44 " " " - " " (Guadalajara)
1944-47 OSS/SSU/CIG, Spain and Guatemala - Chief of Station

SECTION XVI ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
	Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO/Pers & Trng		W. T. Montgomery W. T. MONTGOMERY, C/DO/SG

SECRET

104-10291-10014
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

October 19[illegible]
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Federal Personnel Manual R-1
90-101

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 72-60 BOX 26

315392

67 [illegible] ENTD

ONEAL, BIRCH D. TERMINATED 68553 D

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) O'NEAL, BIRCH D.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

/	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
NA	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employers' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
NA	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
NA	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks).
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee Birch D. O'Neal	Date Signed February 26, 1970
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) 5704 Ridgefield Rd. Washington DC 200[illegible]	Correspondence ☑ Overt ☐ Covert

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 February 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058553 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'NEAL BIRCH D. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT & DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 | DAY 28 | YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0227-0170

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sect. 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/CI Staff
Special Investigation Group

I
SD

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0022

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 30,054 ✓

18. REMARKS:

Last working day will be 27 February 1970.

Recommended for Agency Reserve Program.

[illegible] CS/S 2/24/70

1152 telecoord w/ [illegible], SOB, 2/25/70
cc: Finance and Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: CI STAFF — DATE SIGNED: 2-19-70

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED: 2/23

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE:

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOOTRS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 06 | DA. 01 | YR. 13

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: C,CJ,C0,0,0.

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO:

34. SEX:

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. CAREER CAT CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 2-26-70 DB

46. OP APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher

DATE APPROVED: 26 Feb. 70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 16 February 1970

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 058553

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'NEAL, BIRCH D.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 | DAY 22 | YEAR 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE: 0227 0170

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/CI STAFF

I/50

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: | DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: | DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE:

20 EMPLOY CODE:

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 NOOTRS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 06 | DA 01 | YR 13

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA | YR

27. DATE OF LEI: MO | DA. | YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA | YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE 2

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO | DA. | YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO | DA. | YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 2-20-70 PB

46 OP APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher

DATE APPROVED: 17 Feb '70

FORM 0-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

OP-I 1-66

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

8 SEP

Mr. Birch D. O'Neal
5704 Ridgefield Road
Washington, D. C.   20016

Dear Mr. O'Neal:

It is the practice of the Organization to follow up with former employees six months after their retirement. We hope by such inquiry to obtain information on what our retirees are doing and where they are located, invite suggestions for improving the retirement program and to learn if the Organization might be of some assistance on any post-retirement matters.

We should like very much to hear from you on the above points and on any other topics you think would be useful to us.

For your convenience in replying, we have enclosed a sheet somewhat akin to a form on which we have listed those standard items of information we'd like to have on every retiree. The remainder of the sheet, including the reverse side, is for your comments and suggestions. We shall be most appreciative of your fullest response to this inquiry.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Carroll A. Duchay
Personnel Officer

Enclosures:
Questionnaire
Return Envelope

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - OPF
1 - RAD Subject's File

OP/RAD/EFAB/MLShobe:mlp (1 Sept. 1970)

12 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI Support

SUBJECT: Resume of Employment - Birch D. O'Neal

1. Attached is a proposed resume of my employment covering the entire service to the U. S. Government.

2. I would propose to use this should the need arise. However, I would not like to be restricted to the statements therein. In 1968 I applied for admission to the Bar in the District of Columbia and prepared a detailed response to certain questions in the application. The information provided at that time went on record and should the occasion arise, I would like to be in a position to make the same statements. I do not think that such a situation will occur, but if it does, I would propose to support the attached resume with the more detailed information attached hereto and which appeared in that application.

Birch D. O'Neal
Birch D. O'Neal

Attachments:
As stated.

RESUME

U. S. GOVERNMENT SERVICE

BIRCH D. O'NEAL

From January 10, 1938 on entering U. S. government service as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to February 28, 1970 (with exception of a few months in the fall and winter of 1946-47) was employed by various Departments and Agencies of the U. S. Government, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, U. S. Department of State, and Central Intelligence Agency. In this period of more than 32 years steadily advanced in salary with commensurate responsibilities from $3200 per annum to more than $30,000 per annum while holding various titles including Special Agent, Legal Attache, Civil Attache, and Foreign Affairs Officer. More than 12 years of this service was performed while stationed abroad or in travel status in many foreign countries of Latin America, Europe and Africa.

While the entire service involved utilization of legal training and conduct of investigations affecting the national security interests of the United States, that from September

1942 to February 1970 (voluntary retirement) also involved direct supervision of investigative and clerical assistants (on occasions more than 50 employees and expenditure of extensive funds). The service also involved extensive liaison with foreign government and other U. S. government officials. Liaison on occasions, both domestic and foreign, related to matters of the highest sensitivity and importance and accordingly was conducted at highest levels (Cabinet and sub-Cabinet).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

February 1947 - March 1947. In February 1947 I entered on duty with what was known as the Central Intelligence Group, 2430 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., a government body created by Executive Order which was a predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency. I was a legal liaison officer with this group.

March 1947 - December 1949. During this period I was detailed to the U. S. Department of State, 20th Street and Virginia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C., where I was assigned to the U. S. Embassy, Caracas, Venezuela, as Attache. In that capacity I prepared reports and advised and counselled the U.S. Ambassador on matters of a legal and political nature. In this work I employed legal knowledge, background and experience as related to the laws of the United States and the Republic of Venezuela.

January 1950 to December 1951 - Central Intelligence Agency, 2430 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. In this period I was assigned to duties involving liaison on legal matters with other departments of the U. S. Government including the Department of Defense, Department of Justice (Immigration and Naturalization Service and Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the Department of State. Criteria for the position included knowledge, application and interpretation of U. S. and foreign laws. The establishment of the position was at the instance of the General Counsel of the Agency and my selection to the position was with his concurrence. The assignment required close working coordination and collaboration with the General Counsel of the Agency and other governmental legal counsel. I discontinued this particular work to enable me to again undertake further assignment with the Department of State as a member of the Foreign Service Staff Corps.

December 1951 - April 1954 - U. S. Department of State, Foreign Service Staff, Washington, D. C. During this period I served as Attache, Political Officer, American Embassy, Guatemala City, Guatemala. In that capacity I gathered information concerning the legal system, laws, and enforcement thereof and counselled and advised the U. S. Ambassador on matters of a legal and political nature. In this work I employed legal knowledge and experience as related to the laws of the United States and the Republic of Guatemala. I resigned from this position in Guatemala to return to the U. S. for personal and family reasons.

April 1954 - to Present - Central Intelligence Agency, 2430 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. I have been employed with this Agency since April 1954 as a Foreign Affairs Officer. In that capacity I have had regular, almost daily contact and liaison with the Department of Justice and Department of State representatives on matters of a legal and political nature. My duties involve the application of knowledge and experience in the legal field, both foreign and domestic.

[illegible] 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Birch D. O'Neal

THROUGH : Head of D Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Request for Voluntary Retirement

1. I am pleased to inform you that your request for voluntary retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System has been approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Your retirement will become effective 28 February 1970. Your annuity will commence as of 1 March 1970 and is payable 1 April 1970. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative processing required to effect your retirement.

3. You will receive a lump-sum payment for your accrued annual leave up to 30 days or for whatever amount of leave credit you carried over from the last calendar year if that amount is more than 30 days.

/s/

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
- 0 - Addressee
- 1 - D/Pers
- 1 - OP Files
- 1 - ROB Soft File
- 1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat/3257 (26 February 1970)

Excluded [illegible]

14-00000

EVD. 28 FEB 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DEF

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 059553

2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): ONEAL BIRCH D

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT & DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO DA YR 02 28 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 0227 0170 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: P.L. 88-643 SECT 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: [illegible]

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: [illegible]

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0022

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: 30054

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY U.S.A.

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-51)

14-00000

70-1274

8 70/1553

Mr. Birch D. O'Neal
5704 Ridgefield Road
Washington, D. C. 20016

Dear Birch:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your more than thirty-one years of service to your country. The success with which you have met this challenge should be a source of lasting pride and satisfaction to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Good luck and best wishes!

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Originator: __________ [illegible]
Director of Personnel

SIGNED

Concur: ______________
C/EAB/OS

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat/3257 (6 March 1970)

SECRET

Executive Registry
70 911

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement
Birch D. O'Neal

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. Birch D. O'Neal, GS-16, Operations Officer, Counter Intelligence Staff, Clandestine Service, has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j, to be effective 28 February 1970.

3. Mr. O'Neal has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for voluntary retirement under the System. He is 56 years old with over 31 years of Federal service. This service includes over 22 years with the Agency of which 5 years were in qualifying service. The Head of the Clandestine Service Career Service has recommended that his application for voluntary retirement be approved. I endorse this recommendation.

4. It is recommended that you approve the voluntary retirement of Mr. Birch D. O'Neal under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

/s/ Richard Helms

Director of Central Intelligence

2[illegible] FEB 1970

Date

SECRET

1 October 1968

Mr. C R. Locke
Director
National Conference of Bar Examiners
155 East 60th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637

Dear Mr. Locke:

With reference to your letter of 26 September 1968 concerning Mr. Birch Dilworth O'Neal, I have known Mr. O'Neal since the late 1940s. In 1947 we were establishing formal liaison with the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and, because a thorough knowledge of the complex immigration laws was essential, I proposed that this position must go to a lawyer. Mr. O'Neal was selected and performed very well in that job, which required constant liaison with this office on the legal aspects.

In Mr. O'Neal's assignments since that time, I have had occasion to work with him from time to time on a variety of problems. I have found he has had a good grasp of the legal aspects of these matters. From this long association my conclusion is that Mr. O'Neal's moral character is good, he has sound background in the field of law, and is generally fit for the practice of law.

Sincerely,

s/

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

OGC:LRH:job
OGC chrono
OGC subject BAR ADMISSIONS

National Conference of Bar Examiners

AMERICAN BAR CENTER
1155 EAST 60TH STREET
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60637
C. RICHARD LOCKE, DIRECTOR

CHAIRMAN
PAUL E. [illegible] DAYTONA BEACH, FLA.
SECRETARY
MERRILL P. [illegible] BANGOR, ME.
BOARD OF MANAGERS
THE OFFICERS AND
ROBERT E. [illegible] EX-OFFICIO
JEFFERSON CITY, MO
CHAIRMAN-ELECT
FRED G. FRANCIS PRESTONSBURG, KY.
VICE CHAIRMAN
R. LOWELL [illegible] LIVERMORE, CALIF.
RICHARD C. [illegible] DENVER, COLO.
ARTHUR [illegible] NEW YORK, N. Y.
YOSHIO [illegible] HONOLULU, HAWAII
MARK WILMER PHOENIX, ARIZ.
WILLIAM J. [illegible] ST. PAUL, MINN.
ROY WILKINSON, JR. BELLEFONTE, PA

September 25, 1968

Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Our Conference has, as one of its purposes, the work of investigating the moral character and fitness for the practice of law of those attorneys of one state who seek admission to the bar of another. In this connection, we have been asked to report on BIRCH DILWORTH O'NEAL, 55, a member of the bar of Georgia who is applying for admission to the bar of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Mr. O'Neal states he has had the following employment with the Central Intelligence Agency:

February 1947 to March 1947	Central Intelligence Group	Legal Liaison Officer
January 1950 to December 1951	Legal employment with the CIA	
April 1954 to date	Foreign Affairs Officer	

We wish to verify this information with you and to obtain as well any information concerning his qualifications you may wish to present to the admitting authority.

Can you also verify for us the following government employment as given by Mr. O'Neal:

March 1947 to December 1949	Department of State	U. S. Embassy Caracas, Venezuela
December 1951 to April 1954	Department of State	U. S. Embassy Guatemala City, Guatemala

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,
C. R. Locke
C. R. Locke, Director

CRL:ee

All information solicited and received for character reports is confidential and restricted to official [illegible] by the proper admitting authority.

National Conference of Bar Examiners

AMERICAN BAR CENTER
1155 EAST 60TH STREET
CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS
C. RICHARD LOCKE, DIRECTOR

October 16, 1968

Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

As our report must be filed with the admitting authority very soon, we would greatly appreciate a reply to our inquiry

Dated: September 25, 1968
Concerning: BIRCH DILWORTH O'NEAL
Applicant for admission
to the bar of U. S. Dist. Court for D.C.

For your convenience we enclose a copy of our previous letter.

Very truly yours,

C. Richard Locke

C. Richard Locke, Director

Already answered

All information solicited and recei[illegible] for character reports is confidential and restricted [illegible]cial use by the proper admitting authority.

National Conference of Bar Examiners

AMERICAN BAR CENTER
1155 EAST 60TH STREET
CHICAGO ILLINOIS 60637
C. RICHARD LOCKE DIRECTOR

[illegible]
[illegible] DAYTONA BEACH FLA
SECRETARY
[illegible] BRADFORD BANGOR, ME
BOARD OF MANAGERS
THE OFFICERS AND
[illegible] EX OFFICIO
JEFFERSON CITY MO
CHAIRMAN ELECT
[illegible] PETERSBURG [illegible]
VICE CHAIRMAN
[illegible] LIVERMORE CALIF
[illegible] DENVER COLO
[illegible] NEW YORK N Y
[illegible] HONOLULU, HAWAII
[illegible] PHOENIX ARIZ
WILLIAM J LLOYD ST PAUL MINN
ROY WILKINSON JR BELLEFONTE PA

September 25, 1968

Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Our Conference has, as one of its purposes, the work of investigating the moral character and fitness for the practice of law of those attorneys of one state who seek admission to the bar of another. In this connection, we have been asked to report on BIRCH WILWORTH O'NEAL, SR., a member of the bar of Georgia who is applying for admission to the bar of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Mr. O'Neal states he has had the following employment with the Central Intelligence Agency:

February 1947 to March 1947	Central Intelligence Group	Legal Liaison Officer
January 1950 to December 1951	Legal employment with the CIA	
April 1954 to date	Foreign Affairs Officer	

We wish to verify this information with you and to obtain as well any information concerning his qualifications you may wish to present to the admitting authority.

Can you also verify for us the following government employment as given by Mr. O'Neal:

March 1947 to December 1949	Department of State	U. S. Embassy Caracas, Venezuela
December 1951 to April 1954	Department of State	U. S. Embassy Guatemala City, Guatemala

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

C. R. Locke, Director

CRL:eo

Dupl

29 OCT 1968

Mr. C. Richard Locke, Director
National Conference of Bar Examiners
American Bar Center
1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637

Dear Mr. Locke:

This is in reference to your letter requesting information concerning Mr. Birch Dilworth O'Neal's employment and qualifications.

Mr. O'Neal has been employed by this Agency since 11 February 1947. On two occasions, March 1947 to December 1949 and December 1951 to April 1954, he was detailed to the Department of State.

During the more than 20 years this employee has been with the Central Intelligence Agency, his performance has been consistently high. Mr. O'Neal is one of our senior officials and is highly regarded.

If I can be of further service to you, please do not hesitate to get in touch with me.

Sincerely,

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
- 0 - Addressee
- 1 - Subject File
- 1 - D/Pers Chrono
- 1 - EEAB

OP/EEAB/Post:dag
OD/Pers/RDKenne :mtw (28 Oct 68) - Rewritten

SECRET

11 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

SUBJECT: Application for Admission to the Bar of the District of Columbia - Birch D. O'Neal.

1. You recall I spoke to you about my application for admission to the Bar in the District of Columbia. The application has been filed. You have been listed as one of three persons connected with the U. S. Government in the Washington, D. C., area with whom I am personally acquainted and who are familiar with my work in the Department of Justice and other Branches of the U. S. Government. The others are Mr. S. J. Papich of the F.B.I. and Mr. Thomas C. Mann, former Foreign Service Officer with whom I worked, Ambassador, and later President of the Automobile Manufacturer's Association.

2. My application is being considered primarily on the basis of education qualifications as provided in the rules prior to admission to the Bar and reciprocity between the states of Georgia and the District of Columbia on matters of admission. They may not contact you but for your information in case they do, attached are copies of Attachments B, D, E and F of the application for admission which I filed in the District recently. You will note that in the last paragraph of Attachment B that services performed since April 1954 is carried in the capacity of a Foreign Affairs Officer. This had been agreed upon with Central Cover and primarily at their instance and I did not think it would jeopardize my case if, in fact, I could otherwise qualify under the experience provisions of the District rules. In any event, the information herein may be helpful to you in the event you are called upon to respond to an inquiry.

3. I am sending copies of this and the attachments to the Office of Security and Office of Personnel and I should hope that any response from these various elements of the

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Agency at least would be coordinated with the other respective offices to avoid any confusion and difficulties for me in the course of the investigation which will be made to determine my qualifications for admission to the Bar in the District of Columbia.

BIRCH D. O'NEAL
CI/SIG

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - Director of Security
① - Director of Personnel

Attachments:
As stated.

ATTACHMENT B

The following information is provided in response to Item 5, Page 3 of Applicant's Questionnaire and Affidavit:

July 1937 - January 1938, Decatur County Courthouse, Bainbridge, Georgia - associated with father, M. E. O'Neal, Sr. I engaged in the general practice of law and served as assistant to my father in the preparation of civil cases. He was the Solicitor (Prosecuting Attorney) for the City Court of Bainbridge which had general jurisdiction throughout Decatur County. I represented defendants in criminal cases in the City Court of Bainbridge during a period in which my father was ill. My oldest brother, Maston Emmett O'Neal, Jr., presently Congressman from the Second District of Georgia, was Solicitor Pro-Tem of that Court. I represented defendants in criminal cases in the Superior Court of Decatur County (Albany Judicial Circuit) which was and is a Court of unlimited, general, jurisdiction. Practice was both civil and criminal and included contracts, torts, real and personal property law, title searches, etc. I left this practice for the purpose of entering on duty with the U. S. Department of Justice on January 10, 1938 when I became a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Requirements for admission to that service included having a law degree and admission to the bar.

January 1938 - 30 May 19[illegible] - U. S. Department of Justice, 10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. During this period I was engaged in gathering evidence, preparing investigative reports and prosecutive summaries, assisting U. S. Attorneys in preparation of cases for trial, and otherwise serving the U. S. Department of Justice in its many and varied peacetime and wartime responsibilities. This involved daily application of legal knowledge and experience for which I had been educated and trained and as required for the government position which I held. I served in field offices at Omaha, Nebraska, Memphis, Tennessee, Charlotte, North Carolina, New York, N. Y., and Albany, New York, as Assistant Special Agent in Charge, and in the Department in Washington, D. C. as an Administrative Assistant to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. In addition I was designated and served as Legal Attache, American Embassy, Bogota, Colombia, from September 1942 to June 1945. In that capacity I was the highest ranking

ATTACHMENT B (Continued)

ranking representative of the U. S. Department of Justice at that post. My duties consisted of gathering information of interest in and required in the enforcement of laws of the United States and the Republic of Colombia, handling matters requiring liaison between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the United States Department of Justice and counselling the United States Ambassador and the [illegible] Secretary of State for American Republic affairs concerning legal matters of concern to Colombia and the United States. From June 1945 to December 1946 I served in Mexico in the same capacity and with the same duties under the U. S. Ambassador, American Embassy, Mexico, D. F. At that post I was also the highest ranking U. S. Department of Justice representative.

June 1946 - February 1947. In this period I briefly engaged in general practice of law. Primarily I was engaged in writing contracts, bills of sale, deeds, wills and the like. This work was in association with and as a matter of assistance to my father, Weston Emmett O'Neal, Sr. whose offices were in the Decatur County Court House, Bainbridge, Georgia. I left this work to reenter U. S. government service at Washington, D. C. where my legal education and experience in liaison with foreign governments and between various departments and independent agencies would be employed o the benefit of our government.

February 1947 - March 1947. In February 1947 I entered on uty with what was known as the Central Intelligence Group, 430 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., a government body reated by Executive Order which was a predecessor to the entral Intelligence Agency. I was a legal liaison officer ith this group.

March 1947 - December 1949. During this period I was etailed to the U. S. Department of State, 20th Street and irginia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C., where I was assigned the U. S. Embassy, Caracas, Venezuela, as Attache. In that apacity I prepared reports and advised and counselled the U.S. mbassador on matters of a legal and political nature. In his work I employed legal knowledge, background and experience related to the laws of the United States and the Republic Venezuela.

ATTACHMENT F (Continued)

January 1950 to December 1951 - Central Intelligence Agency, 2430 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. In this period I was assigned to duties involving liaison on legal matters with other departments of the U. S. Government including the Department of Defense, Department of Justice (Immigration and Naturalization Service and Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the Department of State. Criteria for the position included knowledge, application and interpretation of U. S. and foreign laws. The establishment of the position was at the instance of the General Counsel of the Agency and my selection to the position was with his concurrence. The assignment required close working coordination and collaboration with the General Counsel of the Agency and other governmental legal counsel. I discontinued this particular work to enable me to again undertake further assignment with the Department of State as a member of the Foreign Service Staff Corps.

December 1951 - April 1954 - U. S. Department of State, Foreign Service Staff, Washington, D. C. During this period I served as Attache, Political Officer, American Embassy, Guatemala City, Guatemala. In that capacity I gathered information concerning the legal system, laws, and enforcement thereof and counselled and advised the U. S. Ambassador on matters of a legal and political nature. In this work I employed legal knowledge and experience as related to the laws of the United States and the Republic of Guatemala. I resigned from this position in Guatemala to return to the U. S. for personal and family reasons.

April 1954 - to Present - Central Intelligence Agency, 2430 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. I have been employed with this Agency since April 1954 as a Foreign Affairs Officer. In that capacity I have had regular, almost daily contact and liaison with the Department of Justice and Department of State representatives on matters of a legal and political nature. My duties involve the application of knowledge and experience in the legal field, both foreign and domestic.

ATTACHMENT D

The following information is provided in response to Item 7, Page [illegible] of Applicant's Questionnaire and Affidavit:

I am and have been since early 1967 self employed on a part time basis as an Investment Counselor with an office at my residence, 5201 Ridgefield Road, Washington, D. C. 20016 (Montgomery County, Maryland). I am one of two trustees of a charitable trust with offices in my residence but my service to date to the trust is without compensation.

ATTACHMENT I

[illegible] information is provided in response to Item [illegible], Page [illegible] of Applicant's Questionnaire and Affidavit.

In the [illegible] month of 1957 I directed an application to the Board of Bar Examiners of Georgia, Atlanta, Georgia, [illegible] Slaton, [illegible] I was [illegible] to [illegible] in the [illegible] Court [illegible] Georgia, [illegible] and [illegible] Georgia, [illegible] to the [illegible] State of Georgia.

The record [illegible] certified by the Board of Bar Examiners of Georgia [illegible] in that [illegible] then [illegible] Albany [illegible] on July [illegible] the Clerk of the Superior Court of Decatur County, Georgia, [illegible] Judicial Circuit, Bainbridge, [illegible] that the [illegible] determined on [illegible] Law Examiner [illegible] administered the attorney oath on that day, July [illegible], in the Court Room of the Superior Court of Decatur [illegible], Georgia, by Judge Gardner. The record [illegible] appear in Minute Book [illegible], Page [illegible] in the office of the Superior Court Clerk, Decatur County, Bainbridge, Georgia. Attached is a copy of the certification [illegible] to the above [illegible] made by the Clerk of the Superior Court, Decatur County, State of Georgia, Mr. [illegible] Plowden on January 15, 1962.

[illegible]

The following information is provided in response to Item 11, Page [illegible] of [illegible] Questionnaire and [illegible]

As a member of the State Bar of Georgia, and having taken the oath as an attorney in the Superior Court, Decatur County, Georgia, Albany Judicial Circuit, I am entitled to practice law in all Superior and Courts of Limited Jurisdiction in the State of Georgia. I am qualified to the practice of law before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Georgia [illegible] Court but [illegible] before [illegible] the courts. [illegible] Superior [illegible] the State of Georgia in which [illegible] and unlimited jurisdiction in that State took place on Feb. 27, 1957, in the Superior Court of Decatur County, Albany Judicial Circuit, Bainbridge, Georgia.

SECRET

2[illegible] NOV 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Birch D. O'Neal,
CI Staff

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. I have your memorandum of 27 October 1966 which refers to my memorandum advising you that in the initial screening of personnel eligible to become participants in the CIA Retirement System you have been determined to be ineligible because of an apparent deficiency in "qualifying duty". It is important that you realize that such a deficiency is only significant in the initial review of Agency personnel who have 15 or more years of Agency service since the law permits such persons to acquire at their option a vested interest in the CIA Retirement System. At the same time, the law requires a minimum of 60 months qualifying duty before one can possibly qualify for retirement benefits under the CIA Retirement System. It serves no purpose, therefore, to place a person permanently in the System if there is a possibility that he may never qualify for benefits therein.

2. In paragraph 2 of your memorandum you indicate concern that failure to contest the initial findings in your case may prejudice the possibility of a favorable decision with regard to your eligibility to participate in the CIA Retirement System at some future date. It is assumed that you were referring to the possibility that you may have some additional service that could perhaps be considered as qualifying duty under the System. As noted in paragraph 2 of my memorandum of 28 September 1966, our initial determination of ineligibility does not preclude reconsideration of your eligibility at some future date.

3. As you know, Regulation 20-50 provides for an appeal to the Director of any adverse determination under that regulation. However, the regulation also provides an opportunity for an employee to present his case to the CIA Retirement Board prior to the making of an adverse determination. Because of the large number of employees covered in the initial screening of on-duty employees to identify those eligible for participation in the System, this procedure was not applied when, as in your case, the employee's Career Service reported that he did not meet the requirements of Regulation 20-50 for nomination as a participant. Accordingly, the procedure of notifying employees of their non-eligibility for participation in the System based upon the initial finding of an employee's Career Service has been followed in all such cases. This is contrary to the implication in paragraph 2 of your memorandum that other employees in circumstances similar to yours were not so informed and I would be pleased to look more deeply into that aspect of your memorandum, if you wish.

SECRET

[illegible]

4. In the event that you have performed service which you believe to be qualifying duty under the CIA Retirement System, you are most certainly entitled to present the details of such service to the Clandestine Services Career Service Board for review and formal submission to the CIA Retirement Board. A copy of this memorandum will be forwarded to the Executive Secretary of that Board.

/s/ Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF
1 - D/Pers
1 - Exec.Sec. CIA Retirement Board
1 - C/BSD

OP/BSD/PCBowers:bhd (21 November 1966)

SECRET

27 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. Reference is made to your memorandum directed to me, dated 28 September 1966, entitled as above, in which it is stated that I may request that my case be formally considered by the CIA Retirement Board and that such request must be made within 30 days of the date of the notification. Other pressing responsibilities have not permitted me to prepare for formal consideration a challenge to the decision of non-eligibility. My request, through the support officer of the Staff to which I am assigned, for a reading on retirement benefits which I might receive should I retire on 31 December 1966 or five years from that date, would not constitute a formal request of a decision as to my eligibility for retirement under the CIA Retirement System. The figures provided me in that connection were simply to serve as a guideline for my own considerations as to possible future retirement.

2. This memorandum is directed to you and to those to whom copies are designated to preclude the expiration of this day, 27 October 1966, without protesting the notification that I must provide certain notification within 30 days of 28 September 1966. I am informed that other officers of CIA who have not qualified for retirement have not in fact been given such notifications and my inquiry concerning possible benefits should not require therefore a formal decision that I am not eligible on any specific basis.

SECRET

3. I have questions with regard to certain aspects of the law and in respect to my eligibility, and this notification to you at this time is designed to preclude a loss of any right I might have under the law to challenge the decision of non-eligibility as given by you on 28 September 1966.

4. I would appreciate a formal reply acknowledging this communication with a statement as to whether in fact the legal question of eligibility is now before the CIA Retirement Board or any other authority of the Agency, or is not. This request is intended not only for the Director of Personnel to whom it is primarily addressed and from whom such notification of non-eligibility was received, but also is intended for others receiving copies of this memorandum.

Birch D. O'Neal

Birch D. O'Neal

cc: CIA Retirement Board (Attn. Mr. F. DeWald)
CIA Retirement Staff
Mr. Gerald E. Miller, DDP/OP
C/CI Staff
C/CI/Personnel-Support

SECRET
(When Filled In)

28 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Birch D. O'Neal

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification [illegible]eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the System, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the System may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you have 15 years or more of Agency service, but have not as yet performed 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees."

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 205, Magazine Building (extension 2847). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the CIA Retirement Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 26 November 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 53553

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'NEAL, Birch D.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 1 DAY 2 YEAR 1966

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 0170 6227-~~0000~~

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
CI STAFF
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OF-CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0022

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 ~~4~~ 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $~~21,555~~ 22,331

18. REMARKS:

CC: Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 29 [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE

20. EMPLOY CODE

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. HQQTRS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 06 DA. 01 YR 13

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA. YR

27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE / CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV, TEMP / CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1—YES / HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46. OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 29 DEC

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14.

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

May 16, 1957

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. ____________

Office of Personnel
2430 E Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Personnel Officer

Gentlemen:

In accordance with your request received in this Bureau on May 10, 1957, there is transmitted herewith the Official Personnel Folder of Mr. Birch D. O'Neal.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosure

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) BIRCH D. O'NEAL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1933	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 31 Oct. 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) PROMOTION B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP B. APPROVED: 6 NOV 1955	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
IO-CI-CH BU 22	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO-CI-CH BU-22
GS-0136.53-14 $10,965. pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.53-15 $11,610. p.a.
DDP/CI Staff Office of the Chief Special Investigation Unit	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/CI Staff Office of the Chief Special Investigation Unit
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Approved by Clandestine Services Career Service Board on 26 Oct. 1955
John J. Caldwell
CS/CMO

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
S. Herman Horton, Deputy Chief, CI Staff

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Howard P. Clifford, X-8537

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.	
				SD:DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 6-2705-27 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Ga.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL OR POS. CONTROL	JRB	2 Nov 55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	TSB	2 Nov.	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
Apv. by Jo. J. Caldwell 3 Nov '55

16—07830-2

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950 — FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Birch D. O'NEAL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 30 Mar 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 10 Apr 55 B. APPROVED: Bob 8 May 1955	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops Of (Sta CH), BAF-102-14	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO-CI-CH BU 22-14
GS-0136.01-14 $10,000.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.53-14 $10,000.00
DDP/WH	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/CI Staff Office of the Chief Special Investigation Unit
Guatemala City, Guatemala	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

36

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Please transfer all leave and pay records from unvouchered to vouchered.

Verbal concurrence for WH by Phil Bowers 1 April 55

J. J. Herman Horton

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
S. Herman Horton, Dep. Chief, CI Staff

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Howard P. Clifford, 2351

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: ✓ Howard P. Clifford
Title: Admin. Off. ~~Dep. Chief~~, CI Staff

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE						14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION			
NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER	NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.
x									

SD:DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3560-55-058 TO: 5-2705-27	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Ga.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Conc by Beers 4/14/55 pvm

E date OK per Mr. Clifford 4/29/55 vam

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CLIL. OR POS CONTROL	BH	4/26/55
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	L	4-8-55
E.		

REMARKS:
APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: APR 5 1955

F. APPROVED BY
Robert G. Strickland by John J. Caldwell 12 April 1955

10—67320-2

SECRET

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP in the CAREER STAFF of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

To the Director of Central Intelligence

Sir:

I submit herewith my application for membership in the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency as defined below:

> "The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency is a group of carefully selected and trained individuals who accept an obligation to devote themselves to the needs of the Agency, and who intend to make a career with the Agency."

In accordance with this definition, I desire to devote myself to the faithful performance of duty in the Central Intelligence Agency, and I accept the obligations and conditions of that service which are determined to be essential to the furtherance of its mission.

I am aware of the many restrictions necessarily placed upon me by virtue of the security requirements inherent in my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency. I am also aware that as a member of the Career Staff, it will be my obligation to serve anywhere and at any time and for any kind of duty as determined by the needs of the Agency, and I have been assured that in order to carry out this policy, full consideration will be given to my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances. By virtue of this application for membership and upon my acceptance in the Career Staff, I am assured that, with continuing satisfactory work performance and conduct on my part, just and equitable attention will be accorded my personal progress during my tenure in the Career Staff. I am also assured that, on my satisfactory completion of any assignments, I will be offered reassignments which are compatible insofar as possible with my abilities and career interests, and that I shall be entitled to the benefits now available or to be made available in the future to members of the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Birch D. O'Neal
(Signature)

18 October 1954
(Date)

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CAREER STAFF OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY APPROVED, TO TAKE EFFECT 1 JUL 1954

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
THE CIA SELECTION BOARD

[illegible] Bolton

SECRET

25 June 52

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant, Intelligence
Department of State

SUBJECT : O'NEAL, Birch Dilworth
Transmission of Affidavit for Leave Purposes
~~Forms~~

REFERENCE : Memorandum for Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.
from this office, subject, O'NEAL, Birch
Dilworth, Request for Appointment in the
Foreign Service dated 1 October 1951

Attached hereto is original of affidavit for leave purposes form, marked #1, which was completed by subject at his post, American Embassy, Guatemala City, Guatemala, and forwarded to this office for transmission to the Department of State. This action has been taken in the interest of security, so that subject's connection with this Agency will not appear in the Embassy's administrative files. There is also attached, for informational purposes only, the original of the copy which has been filed with the Embassy, marked #2, which does not show any CIA employment.

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
Assistant Director

Attachments: a. Affidavit for Leave Purposes form #1

b. Affidavit for Leave Purposes form #2

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

7 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Liaison Control
Attention: Col. Gaynor

SUBJECT: Transmission of Affidavit forms -
Birch D. O'NEAL

It is requested that the attached memorandum be sent to the Department of State, without delay, in order to prevent the Department from communicating with the Embassy at Guatemala City, regarding the leave status of this employee and thereby jeopardizing his security. There has already been some delay while your office determined whether or not this procedure was in accordance with Integration policy.

J. Caldwell King

J. Caldwell King
Chief, WH

Attachment: Memorandum for Department of State
Orig & 5 copies

SECRET
Security Information

OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

File

December 4,1951

Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C.

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter RI-35 of the Federal Personnel Manual, it is requested that the official personnel file and leave record of Birch Dilworth O'Neal, Legal Liaison Officer who e.o.d. December 3,1951 with this agency, date of birth June 1,1913, employed by your agency from December, 1949 to 1951 at Washington, D.C. be forwarded to the following address at the earliest practicable date:

Department of State,
Division of Foreign Service Personnel Records,
Room600-A, SA-12,
Washington 25. D. C.

Very truly yours,

Howard Mace

Chief, Field Operations Branch
Division of Foreign Service Personnel

PER:FP: nn

SL-534
51

'A'

Form FS-349 Nov. 27, 1951

File
in JC

2A

O'Neal, Birch D. June 1, 1913 PL 724 79th

FSS

Indefinite Appointment EO 10180 12/3/51 12/3/51

Political Officer

Attache

Guatemala City

FSS-3 $8481

2A 5011

GT-20

Indef

x

x x

x

Male Married - 2 Georgia

Items: a, b, c, d, i(61a)

Standard Forms 85 and 87 executed 12/3/51

Dependents: Birch Dilworth O'Neal, Jr., son, dob 7/16/47
Melinda Pauly O'Neal, daughter 6/12/50
Frances Paul O'Neal - wife

Authorize travel for appointee from Washington, D. C. to Guatemala City.
Family direct from Washington, D. C. to Guatemala City.

Shipment of effects from Washington, D. C. and Bainbridge, Georgia to Guatemala City.

No reserve status.

1 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ATTENTION : Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

SUBJECT : O'NEAL, Birch Dilworth, Request for Appointment in the Foreign Service

ENCLOSURE : a. Application Forms DSP-34

b. Medical Forms 88 and 89

c. Occupational History Supplement

1. It is requested that Mr. Birch Dilworth O'Neal be appointed in the Foreign Service with the title of First Secretary, FSR-3, $8,330.00, for duty in the American Embassy at Guatemala City, Guatemala. Mr. O'Neal will receive from CIA a basic salary of $8,800.00 per annum.

2. Mr. O'Neal, who is 38 years of age, received his A.B. and LL.B. Degrees from the University of Georgia. He has had approximately thirteen years experience as an attorney, investigator, and intelligence officer in Government service. From September 1942 to August 1943 he was Legal Attache in Bogota, where he was responsible for all FBI activities in Colombia. From August 1943 to December 1944 he was Civil Attache in Mexico City, Mexico, where he was responsible for all FBI activities in Mexico, having under his supervision more than fifty special agents of the FBI. From March 1947 to December 1949 he served as Attache in Caracas, Venezuela, where he was OSO station chief, having as his responsibility all CIA activities in Venezuela. Since December 1949 Mr. O'Neal has served in a very responsible position at CIA headquarters in Washington, in which position he has represented the Director of Central Intelligence in liaison with all other Government agencies in connection with all matters relating to aliens of interest to CIA. It is believed that Mr. O'Neal possesses the professional qualifications for the duties planned for him and, in addition, has the cultural qualifications required of an American representative serving abroad.

SECRET

Memorandum for: The Secretary of State - 2

3. A commissioned title as First Secretary is requested for Mr. O'Neal in order that he may be enabled to carry out his duties in a secure and efficient manner. The use of a commissioned title in this instance, which has been discussed at length with appropriate offices of ARA, is believed necessary in order to make possible the appearance of a complete break between Mr. O'Neal and the previous OSO station chief, and in order to provide him with adequate cover which will integrate him completely into the Embassy in a country whose present Government is noticeably hostile and vigilant with regard to American intelligence activities. It is proposed that Mr. O'Neal will serve in the Political Section of the Embassy. He will replace Mr. Collins D. Almon, who returned to the United States in March 1951.

4. The proposed biography for Mr. O'Neal will be forwarded at a later date.

5. It is requested that subject arrive at his destination on or about 15 November 1951.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

/s/ Harry W. Little, Jr.
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
Acting Assistant Director

WH/WMW/cap
Distribution: Orig & One to Addressee
cc: OS/PDC
LCO
WH Front Office Files
WH Admin Office

SECRET

14-00000

Morris 10-24-51 Payroll desk

PERSON. . ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO. 7912 10/3/51

NAME: O'NEAL, Birch D.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 21 Sept 1951 COB

NATURE OF ACTION: Resignation *

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE: Birch D. O'Neal

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Chief, Alien Affairs) ~~Officer,~~ GS-14	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-14, $8,800.00 per annum (130)	
OFFICE		
DIVISION	~~I & S~~ Inspection + Security Staff	
BRANCH AND SECTION	Alien Affairs Branch	
OFFICIAL STATION	Security Control Staff Washington, D. C.	
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

* To accept other employment

Please transfer leave to unvouchered funds.

for ACNR

RECOMMENDED:

6 August 1951
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE

SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION MM

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
5625		6-9-50

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
	✓		

DATE

SIGNATURE

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2123900

ALLOTMENT: 7101

C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6. 116(a)

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
10-26-51	M. Meier

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE
10.14 51	for E. Donald Tinklepaugh

APPROVALS ☒ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
9/5/51	S. C. Hinkle

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—02400-1

10-23-51 Joseph B. Rogers
WO

C
O
P
Y

SMITH, LEACH & ANDERSON
Lawyers
Security Bank Building
Raleigh, North Carolina

Willis Smith
Oscar Leach
John H. Anderson, Jr.
J. K. Dorsett, Jr.
Willis Smith, Jr.

September 26, 1951

Mr. Birch D. O'Neal
4703 Crescent Street, N. W.
Washington 16, D. C.

Dear Mr. O'Neal:

Several days ago I had a call from your agency advising me that an existing vacancy must be filled by November 1, and that a definite commitment was necessary by October 1. Actually I had intended to be in Washington during the early part of September for a further talk with you, but two court trials have prevented this.

If convenient to you, I would like to see you in Washington this coming Monday morning, October 1. If that day happens to be inconvenient, please telegraph or telephone me collect. I will assume this time to be agreeable unless I hear to the contrary.

I certainly appreciate the necessity for a positive commitment on my part, and will be prepared to give a definite answer when I am in Washington. Since our talk last June, quite a few personal complications have arisen, which I have been attempting to resolve.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. K. Dorsett, Jr.

JKDjr/h

Mr. Dorsett conferred with the writer and Col. Sheffield Edwards on 1 October. He was still in a position of not being able to state that he would enter on duty on 1 November 1951. He mentioned various personal reasons and the necessity of conferring with his father-in-law Senator Willis Smith. He later called me at my home at 9:00 PM 1 October 1951 and stated he could not enter on duty 1 November 1951, but he continued to be interested in the job and would probably be in contact with Col. Edwards in the spring of 1952 to determine if there continued to be a vacancy in which he could be placed.

/s/ Birch D. O'Neal
Alien Affairs Officer
I&SO
2 October 1951

SECRET

10 September 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OVERSEAS SECTION, PDC

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment, Birch D. O'NEAL

It is requested that the Overseas Section, Personnel Division Covert, take the necessary steps to obtain a Foreign Service appointment for the following employee:

a. Name: Birch D. O'NEAL

b. Station of Assignment: Guatemala City, Guatemala

c. Foreign Service title requested: First Secretary

d. Employee is a replacement for Collins D. [illegible], who held the title of Attache at Guatemala City, Guatemala.

e. Availability date for departure: 15 October 1951

The Guatemala City station has been without a Chief for six months. The appointment being requested is desired to strengthen the cover of our representative.

A. L. Gresham

Attachments: [illegible] (2)

SECRET

X.

DRAFT

PROPOSED BIOGRAPHY

O'NEAL, Birch Dilworth.—b. Bainbridge, Ga., June 1, 1913; U. of Ga., A.B. 1935; U. of Ga., Law Sch., LL.B. 1937; atty. pvt. prac., 1937-38; atty., Dept. of Justice, 1938-42; to the Dept. of State, att., Mexico City, D. F. and Bogota, Colombia, 1942-45; atty., self 1946-47; to the Dept. of State, att., Caracas, 1947-49; Legal officer, Dept. of Defense 1949-51; married.

14-00000

SECRET

ad-1087

6 August 1951

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, Administrative Staff

SUBJECT: Reclassification of Chief of Station Slot in Guatemala City

1. It is requested that the chief of station's slot in Guatemala City, Guatemala be reclassified ~~from GS-13 to GS-14.~~

2. The Western Hemisphere Division has been advised by the Department of State that Guatemala is to receive priority attention from this Division.

3. Accordingly, WHD desires to have its station in Guatemala City headed by a high-caliber individual in order that our program for that country be implemented as soon as possible.

4. Mr. Birch D. O'Neal, GS-14, will be processed as Chief of Station for Guatemala City. It would be of great assistance to this Division if the reclassification of the slot could be effected as soon as possible.

[illegible] JR.
[illegible]

Approved - Austin J. Thomson
asst Chief Class + Wage
4 Sept 51

Orig in
Class & Wage
Div.

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Director/Special Operations **DATE:** 13 February 1951

FROM : Security Officer

SUBJECT: O'NEAL, Birch D.

Reference to your memorandum concerning return to duty of Subject sometime prior to 1 December 1951, this office will endeavor to comply with your proposals. I might say that Mr. O'Neal has done a superior job as Alien Affairs Officer for the Agency. There has been some thought given to transferring the Alien Affairs Branch from I&S to the immediate office of Mr. Dulles, and it is impossible to give a positive guarantee of his availability, which in that case would be dependent upon Mr. Dulles' decision.

I feel, however, that OSO could at least tentatively plan along the line of your proposal. The cooperation of the ADSO and Chief, FDT, in making Mr. O'Neal available has been sincerely appreciated.

Sheffield Edwards

SHEFFIELD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC

SECRET

PERSONNEL CTION REQUEST

EGISTER NUMBER

NAME O'NEAL, Birch D.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE ASAP 9-17-50
NATURE OF ACTION Promotion	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:
FROM	TO
TITLE ~~Intelligence Officer~~ (Chief, Alien Affairs) gp-13	~~Intelligence Officer~~ (Chief, Alien Affairs) GS-14
GRADE AND SALARY GS-13 --$7800.00 p.a. (130)	GS-14 -- $8800.00 p.a.
OFFICE Inspection & Security Staff	Inspection & Security Staff
DIVISION Security Control Staff	Security Control Staff
BRANCH AND SECTION Alien Affairs Branch	Alien Affairs Branch
OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐ 130

REMARKS:

The requirements of Administrative Instruction 20-1 dated 9 December 1949 have been met.

[illegible] 8/31/69

RECOMMENDED:

25 August 1950
DATE

CHIEF, INSPECTION & SECURITY STAFF
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED 9-5-50

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
5625		6-9-50

NEW
VICE ✓
I.A.
REAL

DATE 8-30-50
SIGNATURE

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2115900
ALLOTMENT: 161-101
CSC AUTHORITY: Sch A-6.116(b)

DATE SIGNATURE 9-18-50
SIGNATURE

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE
SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE 15 Sept 50
SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE L. T. Shannon

DATE 1 Sept. 50
SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF Robert G. Strickland

FORM NO. 37-3
NOV 1949

14-00000

Sec. 4-30-50

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

ROSTER NUMBER 11 11

NAME O'NEAL, Birch D.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE ~~17 April 1950~~ 6/11/50

NATURE OF ACTION ~~New Appointment~~ Transfer & Reassignment

WHEN LEAVING [illegible] HERE

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

JCP

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer (Chief)	INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (Chief, Alien Affairs) GS-13
GRADE AND SALARY	GS 13 7800 00 per annum	GS-13 $ 7800.00 p.a.
OFFICE	050	Inspection and Security Staff
BRANCH	FBT	Alien Affairs
DIVISION AND SECTION	East Coast Branch	Security Control Staff
OFFICIAL STATION	Wash. DC	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☑ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐ 130

REMARKS:

Reviewed [illegible] 6/13/50

RECOMMENDED:

12 April 1950
DATE

Sheffield Edwards
Col. Sheffield Edwards, Chief, I & S Staff
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED R R Hoga 6-9-50

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
5626		6/9/50

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
	X		

DATE 6/9/50 SIGNATURE WR Manning Per WDS

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2105900

ALLOTMENT: 160-101

CSC AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116 (b)

DATE SIGNATURE 6/19/50 SIGNATURE Pitts

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE
SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE 6.20 SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE W. J. Kelly Lindsay 6-20

DATE 6.9.50 SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1949

19 April 1950

TO : Violet Pitts, Personnel Div, North Building

FROM : H. E. Eissner, Employees Div, "L" Building

SUBJECT : Transmittal of 37-3 and Personnel Folder

Transmitted herewith is the personnel folder of Mr. Birch D. O'Neal.

Attached is a 37-3 from I&S placing Mr. O'Neal in one of their slots, the T/O of which Employees Division does not carry.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

ENTRANCE ON DUTY RECORD

DATE: 21 March 1950

TO: OSO, FDT

BUILDING: L

ROOM:

FROM: PERSONNEL OFFICER

EOD DATE: 20 March 1950

NAME OF EMPLOYEE: O'Neal, Birch D.

POSITION TITLE: Intell. Officer

GRADE: GS-13

SALARY: $7800.00

PAYROLL: Vouchered

DUTY STATION: Washington, D. C.

DATE SECURITY CLEARED: Concurrence 10 March 1950

DATE OATH OF OFFICE ADMINISTERED: 20 March 1950

DATE PERMANENT IDENTIFICATION REQUESTED: N. A.

DATE FINGERPRINTED: N. A.

DATE BRIEFED BY SECURITY: N. A.

DATE OF PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: N. A.

DATE 24 MONTH AGREEMENT SIGNED: N. A.

EMPLOYEE'S EMERGENCY ADDRESS:
Mrs. Birch D. O'Neal
4703 Crescent N. W.
Washington, D. C. OL. 0821

EMPLOYEE'S LOCAL ADDRESS: Same as above

REMARKS:

Subject transferred from Unvouchered to Vouchered Funds.

POSTED
21 Mar 52

SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER R. T. Hopkins by

FORM NO. 37-75
DEC 1949

RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

file

PERSONAL STATUS REPORT

FULL NAME: MR. ☑ MRS. ☐ MISS ☐

FIRST: BIRCH MIDDLE: DILWORTH LAST: O'NEAL

DATE: 21 March 1950

HOME ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: 4703 CRESCENT ST. N.W. CITY: WASH. STATE: D.C. COUNTRY: USA

HOME TELEPHONE: OL-0821

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

DIVISION: OSO BRANCH: FDT OFFICE: EAST COAST

MARITAL STATUS

NAME OF SPOUSE: FIRST: FRANCES MIDDLE (OR MAIDEN): PAULY LAST: O'NEAL

ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: 4703 CRESCENT ST. N.W. CITY: WASHINGTON STATE: D.C. COUNTRY: USA

DATE OF BIRTH: APRIL 30 1920 PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY: GLENPOOL STATE: OKLA. COUNTRY: USA. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A

NAME OF FATHER-IN-LAW

FIRST: FRANK MIDDLE: ROBERT LAST: PAULY LIVING ☑ DECEASED ☐

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: 220 EAST 27TH PLACE CITY: TULSA STATE: OKLA COUNTRY: USA

DATE OF BIRTH: 2/4/92 PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY: EDMOND STATE: OKLA COUNTRY: USA CITIZENSHIP: USA.

NAME OF MOTHER-IN-LAW

FIRST: GRACE MAIDEN: MERCHANT LAST: PAULY LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☐

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: 220 EAST 27TH PLACE CITY: TULSA STATE: OKLA. COUNTRY: USA.

DATE OF BIRTH: 8/4/91 PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY: LAFAYETTE STATE: IND. COUNTRY: USA CITIZENSHIP: USA.

EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE

NAME: FIRST: MRS. BIRCH MIDDLE: D. LAST: O'NEAL TELEPHONE: OL-0821

ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: 4703 CRESCENT ST. N.W. CITY: WASH. STATE: D.C. COUNTRY: USA

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR:

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Birch D. O'Neal

FORM NO. 38-17
APR 1947

(607)

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NUMBER 709

NAME O'NEAL, Birch D.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE 20 March 1950

NATURE OF ACTION Excepted Appointment

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE # 2072

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer (Chief) GS-13
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-13 $7600.00 per annum
OFFICE		OSO
BRANCH		FDT
DIVISION AND SECTION		East Coast Branch
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS: 130

S-1 Please transfer leave from UV funds.

Security concurrence requested 7 March 1950

Previously employed with the Executive Department of the Government as GS-13, $7800.00 per annum.

RECOMMENDED:

6 March 1950
DATE

SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED 13 March 50

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE

SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
485	441	10/13/47

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		✓	

DATE 9 Mar. 50 SIGNATURE Austin J. Thomas per

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2105901

ALLOTMENT: 350-106

CSC Authority: Sch A 6.11(d)

DATE SIGNATURE 3-16-50 SIGNATURE L. A. Quin.

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE

SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE 14 Mar

SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1949

14-00000

file [illegible]

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTROL
885

UNCLASSIFIED • NO STENCIL • NO DISTRIBUTION

March 9, 1950

AMEMBASSY,

CARACAS.

A-66

The assignment of Attaché Birch D. O'Neal, CV-1003, to your Mission has been cancelled.

PER:FP:[illegible]:eb
3-7-50

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

file
gs

21

MAR 1 1950

(6.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ATTENTION: Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Subject : Cancellation of Foreign Service
Title of Attaché at Caracas for
Mr. Birch D. O'Neal

1. This is to advise you that Mr. Birch D. O'Neal, CIA representative who has been serving at Caracas, Venezuela with the Foreign Service title of Attaché, has returned to the United States. It is requested, therefore, that his Foreign Service title be cancelled.

ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director

Attachment: Diplomatic Passports No. 210
and No. 211

POSTED
2 Mar 50

SECRET

VIA: Air
Air or Sea

DISPATCH NO. TVC-A-778

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

DATE 29 November 1949

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

FROM : Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: General Administrative
Specific ~~Vincent B. Ogden~~ Birch D. O'Neal

1. With reference to the above employee, you are advised that his present travel plans on permanent change of station to Washington, D.C., are as follows:

13	December	1949	Depart Caracas, Venezuela, via Alcoa Steamship Line
19	"	"	Arrive Mobile, Alabama, at 7 a.m.
19	"	"	Depart Mobile via air at 10:30 a.m.
19	"	"	Arrive Tulsa, Oklahoma

In Tulsa he can be contacted by letter or telegram directed to him at 220 East 27th Place. He expects to obtain an automobile in Tulsa and proceed to his home address via car on or about 10 January 1950. He can be reached through his home address until approximately 17 February, at which time he expects to depart by car for Washington, D.C., and report for duty 20 February 1950.

2. This proposed schedule of travel is in line with approved sixty days' calendar leave plus travel time.

VBO:JIH

Vincent B. Ogden
Vincent B. Ogden

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

905 d
(See Note 13, Par. a of Consular Regulations)

PERSONNEL REPORT ON REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER DEPARTMENTS ABROAD

C
O
P
Y

Name of officer ..... Birch D. O'Neal

Title ..... Attaché

Post ..... American Embassy, Caracas

Mr. O'Neal has done extremely satisfactory work since he has been here and I wish to reiterate the satisfaction shown respecting him in Mexico City by stating that I am very happy that he is not to be transferred but is to remain another year in Caracas.

He has been exceptionally helpful to the Embassy, and his level head and good sense have been of extreme usefulness.

Both he and his wife are extremely well liked by their colleagues in the Embassy and by the Venezuelan and American Communities.

C
O
P
Y

16—43477-1

(Over)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

26 January 1949

MEMORANDUM

TO : Deputy Budget Officer

FROM : Deputy Personnel Officer

SUBJECT: Foreign Post Differential

1. In accordance with Part 325, Sub-Chapter B, Chapter III, Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations,

Birch D. O'Neal

is eligible to receive foreign post differential pay as prescribed by regulations.

George E. Meloon
Deputy Personnel Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CARACAS ROUTINE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS 13 MAY 49
COPS 1 OUT 81388
ADSO 2-3, FBT 4-5, PERS 6

WASH 3578

TO: CARA CITE: WASHF

RE: CARA 546 (IN 31421) AND CARA 547 (IN 31483)

EYES ALONE - VINCENT B. OGDEN

1. GAGE NOT CONSIDERED SUITABLE TO ACT AS STATION CHIEF FOR PROLONGED PERIOD.

2. TIME WILL NOT PERMIT OGDEN TAKING HOME LEAVE IN ADDITION TO NECESSARY 30 DAYS TDY HERE PRIOR TO GAGE'S DEPARTURE.

3. FOR THESE REASONS DESIRE OGDEN POSTPONE HOMELEAVE UNTIL AFTER CRIMMINS HAS BECOME WELL INDOCTRINATED.

Birch D. O'Neal

W.G. THARP RSW JSR DDEB WM. M. WHEELER

0119Z 14 MAY 49

SECRET

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
FC - LEN

May 17, 1948

SECRET

To: Donald H. Galloway, Esquire,
Assistant Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.

From: Jack D. Neal,
Chief, Division of
Foreign Activity Correlation.

Reference is made to your memorandum dated May 7, 1948 regarding Mr. Birch D. O'Neal.

The Embassy at Caracas has been notified by telegram May 14, 1948 that Mr. O'Neal's travel from Caracas to Habana and return for conference approximately May 19, 1948 is authorized by travel order No. 8-9649, May 4, 1948, chargeable allotment Z-137295.

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

6

MAY 7 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ATTENTION: Mr. Jack D. Neal

Subject : Clearance for Travel for Mr. Birch D. O'Neal

1. This memorandum is to confirm the telephone conversation between Mr. Neal's office and Mr. Green's office on 4 May 1948 at which time verbal clearance was obtained for Mr. Birch D. O'Neal, presently serving as Attaché of the American Embassy at Caracas, Venezuela, to proceed to Habana, Cuba for conference purposes.

2. Mr. O'Neal will arrive in Habana on or about 19 May 1948 and will return to his post at Caracas upon completion of the conference in Habana.

ALAN R. McCRACKEN
Acting Assistant Director

RECEIVED
1948 MAY 11 AM 11 26
O.S.O.

SECRET

5513

23 January, 1948

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief Personnel Division, OSO
via Executive Secretary for Information of
Assistant Director, Special Operations

FROM : Acting Chief, FBT

SUBJECT: Recognition of Service - Birch D. O'Neal

1. In compliance with S.O. Circular No. 46, Recognition of Service, the following information is submitted for your observation and for inclusion in the personnel file of Mr. Birch D. O'Neal.

2. A State Department dispatch, dated 11 December, 1947, from Walter J. Donnelly, American Ambassador, Caracas, Venezuela to the Secretary of State, read as follows:

"I have the honor to forward herewith three photostatic copies of a memorandum prepared by a controlled American source entitled "The Communist Movement in Venezuela."

"I consider this memorandum an excellent piece of work which is particularly useful in that it brings together in a brief scope the essential facts regarding the development of Communism in this country and gives the names of the principal Communist leaders. Attention is invited especially to page 7 of the memorandum which gives the campaign platform that the Communist Party is using in the election scheduled to be held December 14, 1947."

3. Mr. Birch D. O'Neal, chief of FBT's station in Caracas, prepared the memorandum mentioned in Ambassador Donnelly's dispatch.

1/27/48

Splendid.
Place in O'Neal's
file

14050

John A. Cleveland

John A. Cleveland
Acting Chief, FBT

SECRET

10 March 1947

NOTE TO FILES:

The following officials are approved for the Group II classification for overseas quarters, under provisions of Bureau of the Budget Circular A-8, and CIG Administrative Order No. 31.

William B. Caldwell	CAF-12	Chief of Station, Santiago, Chile
Hobart Spalding	CAF-2	Chief of Station, Lima, Peru
Justin O'Donnell	CAF-12	Chief of Station, La Paz, Bolivia
Albert R. Haney	CAF-12	Chief of Station, Quito, Ecuador
✓ Birch D. O'Neal	CAF-12	Chief of Station, Caracas, Venezuela

WED

SECRET

5 March 1947

ADDENDUM TO TRANSFER LETTER DATED 28 FEBRUARY 1947

TO: Birch D. O'Neal

1. Authorization is granted for the crating and shipping of your personal car at the expense of this organization in accordance with an agreement dated 25 February 1947. The weight of such automobile will not be deductable from the total weight allowed for personal and household effects.

(Signed) Donald H. Galloway
(Approving Officer)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

3 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

SUBJECT: CIG Administrative Order No. 31

1. CIG Administrative Order No. 31, dated October 31, 1946, makes provision for Group II classification for civilian employees who are Chiefs of Missions or principal officers directly subordinate to Washington, D.C. The Order specifies that these officials will fall in grades CAF-13 or P-6 or above, unless otherwise approved by the Director.

2. I recommend the Group II classification for Wm. B. Caldwell, Hobart Spalding, Justin O'Donnell, Albert R. Haney, and Birch D. O'Neal, who will be Chiefs of their respective Stations and directly subordinate to Washington, but whose grades are below the CAF-13 or P-6 level.

3. It is believed in each case that the fulfillment of the obligations at the Station concerned justifies the Group II classification. Therefore, there is attached a proposed letter of authorization for the Director's signature. The Director's approval of this proposed letter will permit the Special Funds Section to pay the Group II classification to the individuals concerned.

4. It is recommended that the payment under the Group II classification be made effective as of the dates the individuals concerned assume the responsibility at the overseas post.

DONALD H. GALLOWAY
Assistant Director
Special Operations

cc: Registry - Admin. Bldg.
Mr. Duggan
Mr. Farrell
Special Funds
Central Registry -2

SECRET

2

SECRET

5

20 February 1947

TRANSFER LETTER AUTHORIZING PERMANENT CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION

To: **Birch D. O'Neal**

1. Pursuant to authority vested in me, the transfer of your official station from Washington, D.C. to Caracas, Venezuela is hereby ordered and approved.

2. This change of official station is to be effected as soon as practicable and is to be effective upon arrival at your new post. The transfer is not for your convenience or benefit, or at your request, but in the best interests of the Government. The reimbursement of travel expenses is authorized. Per diem in lieu of subsistence is authorized, and shall be in accordance with the provisions of Administrative Order No. 42. Living and quarters allowances at the rates authorized by Budget Circular A-8 shall be paid, effective upon arrival.

3. In accordance with the provisions of EO 9805, and subject to the availability of funds, the shipment at Government expense of your household goods and personal effects, including packing, crating, unpacking, uncrating, drayage, and temporary storage not to exceed 60 days, within the prescribed weight allowance, is authorized.

4. Subject to the availability of funds, the movement of your immediate family at Government expense is authorized in accordance with regulations prescribed in EO 9805.

(Signed) Donald H. Galloway
(Approving Officer)

SECRET

22 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FREDERICK B. LYON
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CONTROLS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Request for Foreign Service Title as Attaché at Caracas for Mr. Birch D. O'Neal

Enclosure: Personal History Statement of Birch D. O'Neal

1. It is requested that the Department of State grant to Mr. Birch D. O'Neal the Foreign Service title of Attaché of Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela.

2. Mr. O'Neal received his A.B. and LL.B. Degrees from the University of Georgia. He was a Special Agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation for nine years, with service in Latin America, and he practiced law one year. It is believed that he possesses the professional qualifications for the duties planned for him and, in addition, has the representative qualifications expected of an American official serving abroad.

3. Mr. O'Neal will receive from CIG a basic salary of $5,905.00 per annum.

4. It is requested that a diplomatic passport be issued to Mr. O'Neal, in view of the fact that he will be the chief CIG representative in Caracas.

5. There is transmitted herewith a biographical sketch on Mr. O'Neal which sets forth in detail pertinent information on him and on his special qualifications for the duties it is intended that he perform at Caracas.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

DONALD H. GALLOWAY
Assistant Director

Passport recd. at FC State
on 14 March 1947.

Notified FC —

Ce

SECRET

2

28 FEB 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief, Special Funds Section

FROM : Director, CIG

THRU : ADSO

SUBJECT : Group II Classification under Bureau of Budget Circular A-8

1. The following officials of the Office of Special Operations are approved for the Group II classification for overseas quarters, under provisions of Bureau of the Budget Circular A-8, and CIG Administrative Order No. 31.

William B. Caldwell	CAF-12	Chief of Station, Santiago, Chile
Hobart Spalding	CAF-12	Chief of Station, Lima, Peru
Justin O'Donnell	CAF-12	Chief of Station, La Paz, Bolivia
Albert R. Haney	CAF-12	Chief of Station, Quito, Ecuador
Birch D. O'Neal	CAF-12	Chief of Station, Caracas, Venezuela

2. This authorization will remain valid only so long as the above named individuals remain in their respective posts and directly subordinate to Washington, D. C.

3. This authorization will be effective as of the date that the individual concerned assumes his duties at the overseas post.

CC: Registry - Admin. Bldg.
Mr. Duggan
Mr. Terrell
Special Funds
Central Registry - 2

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, CIG

Signed by Gen. V. 28 Feb. 1947

SECRET

2

14-00000

SECRET

26 February 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO: Control, Special Operations

FROM: R. G. Leddy
Acting Chief, FBT

VIA: Chief, Special Operations

SUBJECT: Request for Designation of Birch D. O'Neal.

1. Will you kindly request the State Department to designate Birch D. O'Neal as Attache, American Embassy, Caracas, Venezuela.

2. The Caracas office has not previously been in operation under CIG and will be opened upon the arrival of Mr. O'Neal. Intelligence work is, at the present time, being carried on in the Caracas Embassy by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whose representative in that city carries the title of Legal Attache.

3. The FBI has approximately seven of its personnel stationed at this post.

4. Mr. O'Neal served from January 1938 to May 1946 as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In 1942 he spent six months in Ecuador, 1942-1943 he spent nine months in Colombia, and in 1943-1944 he spent sixteen months in Mexico. He was Civil Attache in the American Embassy, Mexico City.

5. Mr. O'Neal is now located in Washington where he is completing arrangements for the opening of the Caracas station.

6. No designation has previously been refused him. Subject will perform the duties previously carried out by the Legal Attache and will be the ranking representative of CIG, reporting directly to Washington.

7. Subject's duties will be comparable to the present FBI representative, who is assigned as Legal Attache to the Embassy.

8. This designation does not involve a replacement or an increase in personnel but concerns the opening of a new CIG office.

9. In order to enable subject to operate securely, it is believed essential that he be given diplomatic status and be issued a diplomatic passport in the capacity of Attache.

Info for Miss Bailey:
$5900.00, P1A-12

SECRET

SECRET

10. Subject has previously enjoyed diplomatic status as detailed under [illegible] in the capacity of Civil Attache, American Embassy, in Mexico City, Colombia and Ecuador. As will be noted, he has been in intelligence work for the past nine months, a large portion of which was performed outside the United States.

11. Mr. O'Neal will be accompanied to his station by his wife, Gladys F. O'Neal, an American-born citizen whose parents are also American citizens.

ATT: Personal History Statement
cc: [illegible]C
[illegible]J/er

SECRET

1511

20 February 1950

MEMORANDUM

TO: Employees Division

FROM: Chief, Foreign Division T

SUBJECT: Birch D. O'NEAL

It is requested that Mr. Birch D. O'Neal be transferred from Unvouchered Funds to Vouchered Funds, to occupy Slot No. 19, Chief, East Coast Branch, on the FDF Washington T/O.

W M Wheeler Jr
W. M. WHEELER, JR.

37-3 Resig
D.O. GS-13
GS-13 $7800.00
030
FDT

Wash DC (Field)
Please trans leave to V Funds.

37-B Appmt
D.O. GS-13
(Chief)
East Coast Branch

Wash DC
Deptl
S-1 Please trans leave from UV Funds.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 February, 1947

7

FOR MEMORANDUM

Mr. Birch D. O'Neal entered on duty 11 February, 1947, with OSO, FBT. His foreign assignment will be Chief of Station, Caracas, Venezuela, at grade CAF-12 at a salary of $6905.20, and he will be carried on the Special Funds payroll.

The oath of office was completed on 11 February, 1947, and photographs, fingerprints, and other credentials required were requested this date. Request for physical examination and inoculations also made this date.

Agreement to remain at his station for the prescribed length of time (24 months) was also completed by Mr. O'Neal this date. In this connection, Mr. O'Neal posed a question with regard to releases granted to foreign service personnel when they wish to transfer to other government organizations while in the field. Captain Hillsman called Mr. Warner in General Counsel to obtain an opinion from him in this matter. Captain Hillsman was given the following information:

> If a CIG employee wishes to transfer to another government agency while on duty at a foreign station, and prior to the end of his first year abroad, the employee, if released by CIG, will not be required to reimburse CIG for the cost of his own transportation, that of his family, nor the transportation of his personal effects to his original duty post. Return transportation to the States or to a new post with another government agency will be the responsibility of the individual, not CIG.

Assessment approval was given 10 February, 1947: security cleared 20 January, 1947.

Emergency address given by Mr. O'Neal:

Mrs. M.E. O'Neal, 211 Evans Street, Bainbridge, Ga.
Tel: 312-J

Temporary local residence: Plaza Hotel, Washington, D. C.

Mary K. Haller

cc: FBT

CONFIDENTIAL

SECERT

SECRET
([illegible])

BIOGRAPHIC

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTA' 'IMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIA. COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 24 February 1970

FILE NUMBER: 236

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 058553

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)

☒	CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
☐	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
☒	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) CI

ATTN: Chief Support Staff

REF: Retirement Debriefing

OFFICIAL COVER:

☐	BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
☒	DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: O'NEAL, Birch D.

UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS *(OPM 20-800-11)*	☒	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS *(OPM 20-800-11)*
	A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF COB		DATE XXXXXXX) From EOD
☐	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY *(HHB 20-7)*	NA	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*
☒	ASCERTAIN THAT CIA W-2 BEING ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*	NA	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
☐	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR-240-2e)*		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
☐	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR-240-2e)*		
☐	SUBMIT FORM 2688 ☒ FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

1947 - MAR 47 HQS/OVERT
MAR 47 - DEC 49 CARACAS/STATE NOM
DEC 49 - DEC 51 HQS/OVERT
DEC 51 - APR 54 GUATEMALA/STATE INT
APR 54 - PRESENT HQS/OVERT

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - RCD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - CCS - CHRONO
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

CD/sl

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 8-68 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET

4 December 1956
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records & Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Security Support Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : **Birch D. O'NEAL**

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject who will be visiting a foreign country for a ________ day TDY trip.

2. Effective this date, it is requested that your records be properly (XXXXXX) (re-opened) to (XXXX) (acknowledge) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

Edward J. Boston
for JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

CC: SSD/OS

THIS [illegible] MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

JB
12-11-54

SECRET

DEC 5 1956
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records & Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Security Support Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : **John Floyd PARKER**

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject who will be visiting a foreign country for a ______ day TDY trip.

2. Effective this date, it is requested that your records be properly XXXXX) (re-opened) to (XXX) (acknowledge) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

Edward J. Boston
for JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

CC: SSD/OS

THIS CARD MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

JB 12-11-56

SECRET

12 October 1956
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records & Services Division,
Office of Personnel

THROUGH: Security Support Division,
Office of Security

SUBJECT: O'NEAL, Birch D.

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject who will be visiting a foreign country for a 30 day TDY trip.

2. Effective 24 October 1956, it is requested that your records be properly (blocked) (~~[illegible]~~) to (deny) (~~[illegible]~~) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

Edward J. Boston
for JOHN H. STOWELL
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

CC: SSD/OS

SECRET

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

Please file
10·24·56

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE
CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 9 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT [illegible] December [illegible]

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
O'Neal, Birch D.	[illegible]	31 [illegible] V	GS-[illegible] Y	[illegible]

---

1. LAST NAME ONEAL FIRST NAME BIRCH INITIAL(S) D

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty F T X P T
Subject to Sec 203(d), 1951 Leave Act Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec 203(d) on ______ Annual Leave Bal ______

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)

Years	Months	Days
31	5	10

☐ More than 15 years

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
RETIREMENT(VOL) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT & DISABILITY SYSTEM 2/28/70

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	ANNUAL	SICK
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1-10 19 70	240	1076
6 Current leave yr accrual through 2-21 19 70	24	12
7 Total	264	1088
8 Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	-	-
9 Total leave taken	0	0
10 Balance	264	~~1088~~ * -0-

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 240 HOURS
12. Salary rate(s) 30,054.00
13. Lum leave dates 830 3-2-70 to 4-10-70 1700 (Hours)

26 Certified correct by
(Signature) 3/13/70 (Date)
FOR CHIEF PAYROLL (Title) 351-2585 (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14 Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______
15 Current balance as of ______ 19 ___ ______
16 12 month accrual rate ______
17 Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______
18 Monthly accrual date ______
19 Calendar days credit for next accrual date ______
20 Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21 Dates during current calendar yr ______ to ______
22 Dates during preceding calendar yr ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23 During leave year in which separated	-	-
24 During step increase waiting period which began on 12-28-69	-	-
25 During 12 month HL accrual period (dates) ______		

REMARKS

SCD: 9-18-38

* sick [illegible] forwarded credits

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

FF

1 SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) ONEAL BIR D

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT & DISABILITY SYSTEM	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 0 | | 7	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 27 017	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY -643 SEC 233
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/CI STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12 POSITION NUMBER 0021	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 16 7	17 SALARY OR RATE 30054

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 15	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22 STA CO	DATE OF BIRTH 13	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE		**EOD DATA**	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP MO DA		HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CODE			44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIG



POSTED
2-27-70

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BBG

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): ONLAL SIR[illegible] D

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 12 DA 22 YR 7[illegible]

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS

✓	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: [illegible]227 [illegible]17[illegible] [illegible]

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL [illegible]-643 SECT 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: [illegible] CI STAFF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16

17 SALARY OR RATE:

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE

20 Employ Code

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 Military Code

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 5 NONE; CODE: 2

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVER, 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES, 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES, 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

R. S. WATTLES

POSTED
2-24-70
DB

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-66 Mfg 10-67

SECRET

(4-51)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FVD

(When Filled In)

I-50

1. SERIAL NO.	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
058553	ONEAL BIRCH D	31 250	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 16	6	$29,219	12/31/67	GS 16	7	$30,054	12/28/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 10/10/69

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS mob

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

DB

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
ONEAL BIRCH D	058553	31 250	V	GS 16 6	$29,219

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
ONEAL BIRCH D	058553	31 250	V	GS 15 5	$24,477	$26,640

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
ONEAL BIRCH D	058553	31 250	V	GS 16 5	$22,755	$23,778

I 50

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
058553	ONEAL BIRCH D	31 250	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	5	$23,778	01/02/66	GS 16	6	$24,477	12/31/67		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE [illegible]
DATE [illegible]

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS nm
AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions
PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION
(4-51)

JBR P

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
ONEAL BIRCH D	058553	31 250	V	GS 16 5	$22,331	$22,755

RZI : 10 JAN 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058553

2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): ONEAL BIRCH D

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION - CORRECTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 01 02 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6227 0170 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/CI STAFF
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0022

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: 22331

18. REMARKS
THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE 01/02/66 AS FOLLOWS:
ITEM #7 WHICH READ 6227 0000 0000 TO READ 6227 0170 0000.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

ACTION CODE

20. Employ Code

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. Hdqtrs Code

25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 06 01 13

26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA YR)

27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR)

TE EXPIRES (DA YR)

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO

34. SEX

PREFERENCE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)

37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVER, 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA:
0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

F.D.ECHOLS

dub 1-11-66

50 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

RZF: 29 DEC 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058553
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): ONEAL BIRCH D
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 01 DA 02 YR 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6227 0000 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/CI STAFF
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0022
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 22331
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	31250	C1	75013		1	06 01 13	01 02 66	01 02 66

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC; 2 - FICA; 3 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO.
34 SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT; 2 - 10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR; RES; PROV; TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER; 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1 7 66

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-01)
(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED [illegible] OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
ONEAL BIRCH D	058553	31 250	V	GS 15 6	$19,310	$20,005

I 5 2

OCT 27 3 30 PM '65

1 Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
058553	ONEAL BIRCH D	31 250 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	6	$19,310	10/27/63	GS 15	7	$19,880 20,005	10/24/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS RL AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [redacted] DATE [illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9 61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND OCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
ONEAL BIRCH D	058553	31 250 V	GS 15 6	$16,965	$18,240

337-1001

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
058553	ONEAL BIRCH D	32 250 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	Adj.
GS 15	5	$16,485	10/29/61	GS 15	6	$16,965	10/27/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

14-00000

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND
DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS,
EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
ONEAL BIRCH D	058553	32250	V	15 5	$15030	15 5	$16485

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
58553	ONEAL BIRCH D	DDP/CI / V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	4	$14,705	05/01/60	15	5	$15,030	10/29/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-31)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	ONEAL BIRCH D	158553	54 18	GS-15 4	$13,670	$14,705

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
158553	ONEAL BIRCH D	DDP/CI	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 15	3	$13,370	11	02	58	GS 15	4	$13,670	05	01	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP None

10. INITIALS OF CLERK JM

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-58 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b.

SECRET

OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
158553	ONEAL BIRCH D	DDP/CI	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA	YR				MO	DA	YR
GS 15	2	$13,070	05	05	57	GS 15	3	$13,370	11	02	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY. fg

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
S. H. Horton	13 Oct 58	

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR 56 560

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
158553	ONEAL BIRCH D	DDP/CI	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR				MO.	DA	YR.
GS 15	2	$13,070	05	05	57	GS 15	3	$13,370	11	02	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12 PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

OCT 27 3 05 PM '58
REC. PAYROLL BRANCH

C. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560b

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85-462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
ONEAL BIRCH D	158553	GS-15-2	$11,880	$13,070

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1 EMP. SERIAL NO.	2 NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4 FUNDS	5 ALLOTMENT
158553	ONEAL BIRCH D	DDP/CI	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA	YR
15	1	$11,610	11	06	55	15	2	$11,880	05	05	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1 EMP. SERIAL NO.	2 NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4 FUNDS	5 ALLOTMENT
158553	ONEAL BIRCH D	DDP/CI	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA	YR
15	1	$11,610	11	06	55	15	2	$11,880	05	05	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9 NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10 INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12 PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

...ARD FORM 50 (9 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

dab

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–DR.–GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Birch D. O'Neal 156553	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 4 Nov 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 6 Nov 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
IO-CI-CH BU-22	8. POSITION TITLE	IO-CI-CH BU-22
GS-0136.53-14 $10,965.00 Per Annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.53-15 $11,610.00 Per Annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/CI Staff Office of the Chief Special Investigation Unit
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 6-2705-27 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Jas 9 Nov 55

...ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

...rector of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

11/9/55

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954—O15736

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Birch D. O'Neal	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 17 May 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment(Correction)*	6. EFFECTIVE DATE B.O.B. 3 May 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops. Of (Sta Ch) BAF 102-14	8. POSITION TITLE	IO-CI-CH BU 22-14
GS-0136.01-14 $10,200.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.53-14 $10,200.00 per annum
DDP/WH	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/CI Staff Office of the Chief Special Investigation Unit
Guatemala City, Guatemala	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-3560-55-053 TO: 5-2725-27	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Ca

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

*This action corrects Item #9, on notification dated 6 May 1955, to show the correct salary, previously shown as $10,000.00 per annum.

PURSUANT [illegible]
EFFECTIVE [illegible] 1955
SALARY [illegible] TO: [illegible]

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

CODED FOR QUALIFICATIONS
DATE [illegible]

FO[illegible]
[illegible] 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

~~ector of Personnel~~

AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-O-313758

5-18-55

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 FAN.
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 91, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Birch D. O'NEAL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 8210 6 May 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment.	6. EFFECTIVE DATE D.O.D. ~~8 May 1955~~	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY ~~50 USCA 403~~

FROM		TO
Area Ops. Of (Sta Ch) DAF 102-14	8. POSITION TITLE	IO-CI-CH BU 22-14
GS-0136.01-14 $10,000.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.53-14 $10,000.00 per annum
DDP/WH	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/CI Staff Office of the Chief Special Investigation Unit
Guatemala City, Guatemala	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-3560-55-058 TO: 5-2705-27	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Ca

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

PROCESSED
TAS
5/17/55

CONFIDENTIAL

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-313798

Pd 5.13.55

14-00000

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954 520090

1. Agency and organizational designation	2. Payroll period	3. Book No. UV	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) O'NEAL, BIRCH D.	6. Grade and salary GS 14 $10000.00		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET $
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks	11. Appropriation(s) WH 4	12. Prepared by ppb/8Feb55 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
27MAR55	27SEPT53	$10000.00	$10200.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

AK Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

7-D77x
4/23/54
Exm

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (~~Mr. - Miss - Mrs. -~~ One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. O'NEAL, BIRCH D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. REQUEST NO. -	4. DATE OF REQUEST 7 Apr.54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) CONVERSION FROM FSS STATUS B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: cob 8 Apr.54* B. APPROVED: Bob 9 Apr.54	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
AREA OPS OF (STA CH), BAF-102-14 (Attache (Political Ofcr), FSS-3)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	AREA OPS OF (STA CH), BAF-102-14
GS-0136.01-14, $10,600.00 p.a. (FSS-3, $8961.00 p.a.)	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-14, $10,000.00 p.a.
DDP/WH	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP /WH
GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA	11. HEADQUARTERS	GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

BAF-102

*Date of resignation from State

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
V. C. LYNCH, x-4457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature R. W. Burrows
Title DDP admin 4/13/54

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	S-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A	REAL.	
				CD: FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3560-55-058 TO same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Georgia

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED
APR
RW

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: APR 13 1954

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL	RW	4/21	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		22 April 54	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
22 April 54

23. RESIGNATION

OFFICE OF P[illegible]
MAR 13 10 20 AM '54
MAIL ROOM

I RESIGN FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON: [illegible]

DATE ____________

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE ____________ ____________
(SIGNATURE)

24. SEPARATION DATA

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS:

[illegible]

(STREET) (CITY) (ZONE) (STATE)

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

[illegible]

QUALIFICATIONS

EDUCATION [illegible]

(If pertinent)
AGE RANGE ____________ SEX ____________

Essential: [illegible]

Desired:

ESSENTIAL QUALIFICATIONS (Experience, Skills, Languages, Area Knowledge, etc.)

[illegible]

DESIRED QUALIFICATIONS (Experience, Skills, Languages, Area Knowledge, etc.)

[illegible]

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950 — FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER 31

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

2/23/54

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Birch D. O'NEAL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. REQUEST NO. -	4. DATE OF REQUEST 16 Feb.54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 28 Feb.54 B. APPROVED: FEB 28 1954	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	

FROM—		TO—
OPS OF - (CHIEF,) BA-131 (Attache, FSS-3)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	AREA OPS OF - (STA CH) BAF-102-14 (Attache, FSS-3)
GS-132-14, $10,000.00 p.a. (FSS-3, $8961.00 p.a.)	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-14, $10,000.00 p.a. (FSS-3, $8961.00 p.a.)
DDP/WH III	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH
GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA	11. HEADQUARTERS	GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)
BAF-102

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) V. C. Lynch C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) V. C. LYNCH, x-4457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD: FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM. 4-3560-55-058 TO. same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	RW	2/19
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C Taylor	19 Feb 54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
C Taylor 19 Feb 54

14-00000

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 997374

1. ... and organizational designations

2. Pay roll

3. Block No. UV

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) O'NEAL, Birch D.

6. Grade and salary GS-14 $9800.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s) WH-6

12. Prepared by JX 8-25

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
27 Sept53	30 Mar52	$9800.00	$10000.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ First day of non-pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☐ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP ________ Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Birch D. O'NEAL	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Jun.1913	3. REQUEST NO. -	4. DATE OF REQUEST 7 Mar.53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassigament

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: APR 12 1953

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Chief of Station (Intel.Ofcr),GS-14 (Attache - Political Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	OPS OF (CHIEF) BA-131 (Attache - Political Officer)
GS-14, p.a. $9800 (FSS-3, $8431)	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-14, p.a. $9800 (FSS-3, $8431)
DDP WH MID	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP WH III
Guatemala City, Guatemala	11. HEADQUARTERS	Guatemala City, Guatemala
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
BA-131

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
J. Kirk Reid DATE: 11 March 1953

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
V. C. LYNCH, x-457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for FI/PO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX
16. RACE
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 3520
TO: 3520
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED
JM 9 Apr

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
M. L. Shobe 4/3/53

and organizational designations NTELLIGENCE AGENCY	2. Pay ro iod	3. Block No. UY	4. Slip No.
mployee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) O'NEAL, Birch	6. Grade and salary GS - 14 $9600		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX____	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks: Note year of PSI	11. Appropriation(s) WH	12. Prepared by bn 3/23/53 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 30 Mar 52	15. Date last equivalent increase 17 [illegible] 50	16. Old salary rate $9600	17. New salary rate $9800	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better. (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP ____

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period

Initials of Clerk

NDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
rescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—61111-2e * U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 975783

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: O'NEAL, Birch D.
DATE: 29 November 1951
NATURE OF ACTION: Integration
EFFECTIVE DATE: 3 December 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer	Attache Political Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-14, ~~$[illegible]~~ $9600.00	FSS-3, $8481.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDT	FDT
BRANCH	MID	MID
OFFICIAL STATION	Guatemala City, Guatemala	Guatemala City, Guatemala

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE

CLASSIFICATION

PERSONNEL OFFICER

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

POSTED

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Subject integrated into the Department of State as Fss-3, $8481.00 Subject isto be paid the difference between CIA salary of $9600.00 and XXX salary of $8481.00 to be paid by the Department of State and allowances in accordance therewith.

Subject is due a lump sum payment for annual leave to be paid up to 2 December 1951.

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANC.

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: O'NEAL, Birch D.

DATE: 6 August 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 September 1951

	FROM	TO (Intelligence Officer)
TITLE		Chief of Station, GS-14*
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-14, $8,800.00 per annum
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		FDT
BRANCH		LTD
OFFICIAL STATION		Guatemala City, Guatemala

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION F-647 Austin J. Thomas	PERSONNEL OFFICER 9/5/51	

5:130

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 2 October 1951

SECURITY CLEARED ON 16 August 1951 concurrence

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 2 October 1951

ENTERED ON DUTY 30 September 1951

Robert M. White
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS: Please transfer leave from vouchered to unvouchered funds.

* Request for reclassification of grade from GS-13 to GS-14 submitted to Classification Section, PDC on 6 August 1951.

W. L. Graham
for ACWRI

DOG - 09/17/50
CSCOD - 09/17/47
LCD 09/18/47

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 24 OCT. 1951
SALARY ADJUSTED TO $ 9600.00

GN

FORM NO 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16-63268-1

(2)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Imp

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Birch D. O'Neal	6/1/13		10/26/51

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Resignation*	9/29/51 cob	Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer GS-14 (Chief, Alien Affairs)	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-130-14 $8800.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
Inspection & Security Staff Alien Affairs Branch Security Control Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL	
	VV			Bu.#5625 6/9/50

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 2123900 TO: 7101	Yes		☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE Georgia

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

*To accept other employment.

EOD: 9/28/51
LSL: 449 hours, 10/1/51 thru 1 hour
12/20/51 and 2 holidays 11/12/51,
11/22/51.

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING.

JOSEPH B. KAGAN
Chief, Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Hyp 1/1/52

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-888575

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (5 PARTS)
[illegible]
[illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

gk

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Birch D. O'Neal

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 6/1/13

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO:

4. DATE: 9/15/50

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 9/17/50

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116 (b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer GS-13 (Chief, Alien Affairs)	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-14 (Chief, Alien Affairs)
GS-130-13 $7600.00 per annum Bu.#5626	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-130-14 $8800.00 per annum
Inspection and Security Staff Alien Affairs Branch Security Control Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Inspection and Security Staff Alien Affairs Branch Security Control Staff
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A	REAL	
	VV			Bu.#5625 6/9/50

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 2115900
TO: 161-101

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Georgia

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATINGS:

Robert A. Stricklin

ROBERT A. STRICKLIN
Acting Chief, Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950-873048

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CS

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Birch . O'Neal
2. DATE OF BIRTH: /1/1913
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 6/9/1950

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Transfer & Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 6/11/1950
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.11 (b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer (Chief) GS-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-13 (Chief, Alien Affairs)
GS-130-13 $7000.00 per annum Bu.#1185	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-130-13 $7000.00 per annum
OSO FBT East Coast Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Inspection and Security Staff Alien Affairs Security Control Staff
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
	VV			Nu.35625 6/9/50

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2105900 / 150-101 TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Georgia

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

vp
6/21/50

A. P. FLYNN
Assistant Chief, Personnel Division
22 SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950 - 078648

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (4 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1939
PROMULGATED BY
[illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

F. C. 3/10/50
(mof) 130

1. NAME (MR. – MISS – MRS. – ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Birch D. O'Neal

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 June 1913

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO: #2072

4. DATE: 20 March 1950

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Excepted Appointment

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 20 Mar. 1950

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer ~~(Chief)~~ GS-13
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-13, $7300.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO FDT East Coast Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	P. A.	REAL
		X	

Bu. #1485
CSC #1441
10/10/47

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: TO: 2105900 950-196

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES – NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 20 Mar. 1950

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Georgia

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

Subject has satisfactorily completed trial period.

Previously employed with the Executive Department of the Government as a GS-13, $7300.00 per annum.

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

R. L. J. Hopkins

R. D. J. HOPKINS
Chief, Employees Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

MJ 3-22-50

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1949 [illegible]

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: O'NEAL, Birch D.

DATE: 6 March 1950

NATURE OF ACTION: Resignation

EFFECTIVE DATE: Cob 19 March 1960

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intell. Officer GS-13	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-13 $7800.00	
OFFICE	OSO	
DIVISION	FDT	
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C. (Field)	

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER 14 Mar	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON __________

SECURITY CLEARED ON __________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED __________

ENTERED ON DUTY __________

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Please transfer leave to V funds.

Harry H. Hend[illegible]
Authorized [illegible]

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME O'NEAL, Birch D.		DATE 23 February 1950
NATURE OF ACTION Transfer		EFFECTIVE DATE 20 February 1950
	FROM	TO
TITLE	Chief of Station Intelligence Officer GS-13	Intelligence Officer GS-13
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-13, $7800.00	GS-13, $7800.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	FDT	FDT
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION	Caracas	Washington, D. C. (Field)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE [illegible] CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS [illegible] cmw
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER 27 Feb	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____________

ENTERED ON DUTY ____________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: O'NEAL, Birch D.

DATE: 14 November 1949

NATURE OF ACTION: Conversion-Class. Act of 1949*

EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 October 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Chief of Station	Chief of Station
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-13 $7671.60	GS-13 $7600.00
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
BRANCH	FDT	FDT
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Caracas	Caracas

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE COPY IN PAYROLL FILES CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

*Per authority contained in Letter - DCI - 10/23/49.

FORM NO. 37-1
AUG 1949 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME Birch D. O'NEAL	DATE 30 March 1949
RESIDENCE AT TIME OF EMPLOYMENT	
LOCAL ADDRESS	

CITIZENSHIP	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	MARITAL STATUS	NO. OF DEPENDENTS	DATE OF APPOINTMENT
U.S.	M	1 June 1912	Married		

NATURE OF ACTION: Periodic Pay Increase

EFFECTIVE DATE: 6 March 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Chief of Station	Chief of Station
GRADE AND SALARY	CAF-13 $7432.20	CAF-13 [illegible]1.60
OFFICE	OSO-FBT	OSO-FBT
BRANCH		
DIVISION		
OFFICIAL STATION	Caracas	Caracas

APPROVAL

FIELD	HEADQUARTERS
COPY IN PAYROLL FILES CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH INITIALS	
CHIEF OF STATION	FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
	PERSONNEL OFFICER

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ [✓ NO ☐]

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____

ENTERED ON DUTY ____

POSTED
R.E. 4/20/49

AUTHENTICATED BY

REMARKS Subject has had no increase in salary since 24 August 1947. I certify that the service and conduct of the employee during the period have been satisfactory in all respects.

[illegible] CHIEF

Branch Chief

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
FEB 1947

SECRET

2 July 1947

TO : FBT

FROM : OSO, Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Personnel Action Data

The following personnel actions have been approved:

Name	Nature of Action	From	To	Effective
Fisk, Leonard R.	*PCS	Ciudad, Trujillo	Guayaquil	29 June 1947
Harrington, Alma	PCS	Havana	Guatemala City	29 June 1947
Moore, Hannah	PCS	Havana	Lima	29 June 1947
Marelius, Donald C.	PCS	Havana	San Salvador	29 June 1947
Power, Mary J.	PCS	Quito, Ecuador	Ciudad	29 June 1947
O'Neal, Birch D.	Promotion	CAF-12, $5905.20	CAF-13, $7102.20	24 Aug. 1947
Almon, Collins D.	Promotion	CAF-11, $5152.80	CAF-12, $5905.20	24 Aug. 1947
Herbert, Raford	Promotion	CAF-12, $6104.60	CAF-13, $7102.20	24 Aug. 1947
Caldwell, William B.	Promotion	CAF-12, $6104.60	CAF-13. $7102.20	24 Aug. 1947
O'Donnell, Justin E.	Promotion	CAF-12, $5905.20	CAF-13, $7102.20	21 Sept. 1947
Martin, Charles B.	Promotion	CAF-5, $2644.80	CAF-6, $3021.00	29 June 1947

The proposed promotion of Howard A. Marelius from Operations Officer, CAF-9, $4149.60 to Operations Officer, CAF-11, $4902.00 was returned with the recommendation that it be resubmitted about 15 August 1947. This action has not been cancelled and is being held in the employees official personnel folder and will be returned to the Personnel Review Committee on or about the suggested date.

* Permanent Change of Station.

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

This form is to be initiated in triplicate by the appropriate Branch or Office Chief for processing in accordance with existing personnel procedures. Upon approval, the original and one copy will be retained by the Disbursing Office and one copy returned to the originating office.

NAME **O'Neal, Birch D.**
DATE **20 June 1947**

NATURE OF ACTION **Promotion**
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS

EFFECTIVE DATE 24 AUG ~~29 June~~ **1947**
LOCATION OF DEPENDENTS

MARITAL STATUS **Married**
CITIZENSHIP **US** SEX **M** AGE **34**

FROM		TO	
POSITION	**Chief of Station**	POSITION	**Chief of Station**
CONTROL NO.		CONTROL NO.	
CLASSIFICATION	**CAF-12**	CLASSIFICATION	**CAF-13**
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	**$5905.20**	ANNUAL GROSS SALARY	**$7102.20**
OFFICIAL STATION	**Caracas**	OFFICIAL STATION	**Caracas**
ALLOWANCES: QUARTERS		ALLOWANCES: QUARTERS	
COST OF LIVING		COST OF LIVING	
SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING		SPECIAL FOREIGN LIVING	
TOTAL		TOTAL	
OFFICE: BRANCH	**OSO/FBT**	OFFICE: BRANCH	**OSO/FBT**
DIVISION		DIVISION	

TO BE PAID BY ______________ (Field) OFFICE $ ______

TAX WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES ______

INSURANCE TO BE WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES (Amount subject to change if premium is increased or decreased) ______

SAVINGS BONDS ______

RETIREMENT WITHHELD IN UNITED STATES ______

OTHER (Specify in detail) ______

ALLOTMENTS ______________ (Name of Allottee) ______

Address ______________

TOTAL GROSS SALARY PER PAY PERIOD $ ______

I hereby authorize and direct the Disbursing Office to make above allotments from my compensation.

Form No. 37-1
Sep 1946

____
(Signature of Employee)

JOB DESCRIPTION:

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS　　REASONS FOR ACTION　　DATE OF LAST PROMOTION

Slot #1, Employee EOD with organization 11 Feb. 1947 and has been at present station since 17 March 1947.

APPROVED ______________ OFFICE
(Field)

______________ Date ______
(Chief of Mission)

______________ Date ______
(Security Officer)

______________ Date ______
(Special Funds Officer)

Knox P. Pruden 30 June 47

APPROVED — U.S. OFFICE

E. M-Terrell Date 6-23-47
(~~[illegible]~~
Ch., Personnel Division

Glen A. Clevenger Jr Date 6/24/47
(Branch Chief) for

Date 6/30/47
(Chairman, Pers. Review Com.)

E. W. Echols Date 7 July 47
(Special Funds Officer)

SECRET

(2)

ENGAGEMENT SHEET

1. To be filled out in duplicate by the Unit Administrative Officer for all prospective employees to be paid from Special Funds.
2. To be accompanied by detailed job description, complete biographical sketch, and a formal notice of security clearance, and Personnel Action Request if engagement is overseas.
3. To be approved or accepted by the officers in the order listed below.
4. Original to be retained by S.F.; copy to be returned to initiating Administrative Officer.

9 January 1947

1. NAME: Birch D. O'NEAL
2. LEGAL RESIDENCE: Georgia -- 702 [illegible] Street, Bainbridge, Georgia
3. ADDRESS OF LOCAL LIVING QUARTERS: Plaza Hotel TEL.
4. ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE: 1 February 1947 MRD
5. ANNUAL SALARY: ~~[illegible]~~ $5905.20 CLASSIFICATION: CAF-12
6. PERMANENT STATION: Latin America -- Caracas, Venezuela
7. POSITION: Chief of Station, FBT CONTROL NO. FBT
8. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED, STATE BUREAU, BRANCH, OR DEPARTMENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FROM WHICH TRANSFERRED:
9. GENERAL REMARKS: Security investigation requested 9 January 1947.

Cleared 22 Jan 47 attached

[illegible] 1 Feb 47

Personnel Folder Requested 7/8/57
from FBI
Initials DM

APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE
(In accordance with existing personnel engagement procedures)

A. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER DATE 9 Jan 47
B. BRANCH CHIEF Raymond G. Leddy DATE " " "
C. CHAIRMAN, PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMITTEE DATE 1/10/47
D. (For the) ASSISTANT DIRECTOR DATE 10 Jan 47
E. CHIEF, SPECIAL FUNDS DATE

FORM NO. 33-1
SEP 1946

SECRET

SECRET

27 NOV 1968

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Birch D. O'NEAL
1 April 1967 - 22 November 1968

Mr. O'Neal has had years of experience in the field of special investigations, Domestic and foreign. This includes prior service with the FBI. Special complex and sensitive counterintelligence cases requiring detailed research and analysis are handled by Mr. O'Neal. He seeks economy where applicable and he is a competent supervisor.

James R. Hunt

James R. Hunt
Acting Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE:

Birch D. O'Neal

29 November 1968
Date

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
058553

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'NEAL, BIRCH D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 06/01/13	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer Ch	7. OFF DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/SIG		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. April 1968	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 [illegible] DR	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
058553

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'NEAL, BIRCH D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 06/01/13	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/SIG	8. CURRENT STATION WASH., D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
April 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 29 NOV 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

27 NOV 1967

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Birch D. O'NEAL
(1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967)

Mr. O'Neal has been Chief of the Special Investigations Group since its inception. As a former FBI employee he brought a wealth of investigative knowledge to the Staff. He continues to handle detailed research and analysis of special complex and sensitive counterintelligence cases in a highly effective manner. He is a competent supervisor and realizes the value of economy.

James R. Hunt
James R. Hunt
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE:

Birch D. O'Neal
21 Nov. 1967
Date

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

James Angleton
22 Nov 1967
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
058553

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'NEAL, BIRCH D		2. DATE OF BIRTH 06/01/13	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/SIG		8. CURRENT STATION WASH., D.C.	
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X CAREER	RESERVE / TEMPORARY	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)		X ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE	
SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):			
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1966		12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1965 - 31 March 1966			

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

JUL 1966

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Birch D. O'NEAL
(1 April 1965 - 31 March 1966)

Mr. O'Neal continues to be engaged in special complex and sensitive counterintelligence cases which require detailed analysis. His performance is always at a high level. He supervises his personnel competently and he follows good government economy practices.

James R. Hunt

James R. Hunt
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE:

Birch D. O'Neal

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

J. Angleton

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 058553

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'NEAL, BIRCH D		2. DATE OF BIRTH 06/01/13	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO-CI		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/SIG		8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See Attached Memorandum	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

21 APR 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

16 APR 1965

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Birch D. O'Neal
(1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965)

There has been no change in assignment during the reporting period. Mr. O'Neal has been engaged for the major part of the time in conducting and performing complex research in connection with several sensitive counterintelligence cases. His performance has continued at a high level without interruption. He is a competent supervisor and follows economical practices.

James R. Hunt
James R. Hunt
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE:

Birch D. O'Neal

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

J. Angleton
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
058553

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'NEAL, BIRCH D	2. DATE OF BIRTH 06/01/13	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO-CI	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI STAFF/SIG	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER
S

29 APR 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Birch D. O'NEAL
(1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964)

There has been no change in duties during the reporting period and the caliber of the performance of this career officer has continued at a high level without interruption. He is thorough and analytical and makes a material contribution to the accomplishment of the Counter-Intelligence mission of the Agency. He is alert to the necessity for economy and performs capably as a supervisor.

James R. Hunt Jr
James R. Hunt, Jr.
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

Birch D. O'Neal
EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

J. Angleton
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

15 April 1963

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Birch O'NEAL
(1 April 1962 - 31 March 1963)

Mr. O'Neal has continued in the position of Chief, Special Investigations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff during this reporting period. He capably performs and directs the work of this group, and during the past year has performed commendably in the handling of certain sensitive matters. He is thorough and reliable. Mr. O'Neal's continuity in this job increases the value of his services to the Agency.

James R. Hunt, Jr.
Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Birch D. O'Neal
Employee Signature

Reviewing Official:

J. Angleton
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

25 APR 1963

SEP 1962

23 August 1962

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Birch O'NEAL

1 April 1960 - 31 August 1962

1. There has been no change during the reporting period in the highly efficient performance of Mr. O'Neal in his position as C/CI/SIG.

2. We recommend his continuation in this assignment where continuity is a requirement.

James R. Hunt Jr.
James R. Hunt, Jr.
Acting Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Memorandum has been seen by employee.

SECRET

3 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Fitness Report

1. Fitness report was submitted in memorandum form on 20 December 1960 for the following person:

O'NEAL, Birch

2. There has been no change in assignment and the evaluation remains the same for the reporting period ending 31 March 1961.

Signed: S. H. [illegible]

S. Herman Horton
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

30 DEC 1960

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Birch O'Neal
1 April 1959 - 31 March 1960

1. Mr. O'Neal is in the same position, doing the same job, in the same efficient manner as was reflected in his last fitness report.

2. At some point in the future Mr. O'Neal would like to go overseas again. The CI Staff is perfectly happy to have him remain here indefinitely.

S. H. Horton

S. H. Horton
Acting Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCT
1959

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 158553

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'NEAL, Birch D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD/DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO- CI - Div Ch		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/SID

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 11 Feb 58 thru Apr 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Directs special investigations	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises small staff	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Coordination of most sensitive matters between CI and Office of Security	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares final reports and memos	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS		X					
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 5-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
[illegible] 6 3 11 PM '59
[illegible] ROOM

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Employee is and has been a senior employee for some time. No training recommended; he is already a senior and experienced officer.

Employee is an intense person, who does not relax enough. He should not be chief of a large station, nor supervise a large number of employees engaged in diverse work and having numerous problems.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 36	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Has outstanding rating; no weaknesses to discuss. Orally advised of contents.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 28 Sept. 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, CI Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE S. H. Horton S. H. Horton

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE J. Angleton James Angleton

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'NEAL, Birch D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD;DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/SID	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO/CI/CH

7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 11 February 1957--11 February 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐	SPECIAL (Specify)
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: A senior official with an outstanding rating. No weaknesses to discuss. Have advised him orally of contents.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify).
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 5 August 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR S. H. Horton S. H. Horton	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE DC/CI

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted [illegible]		14 Aug 58
Personnel [illegible]	RG	8/21/'58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL James Angleton	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/CI

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

This is a senior employee who is doing the same job he has done for years in the same competent manner. Therefore, the Fitness Report is the same.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

7. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 3 8 57 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS
- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (Do not rate [illegible] those who supervise a secretary only).
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Directs special investigations	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises small staff	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Coordination of most sensitive matters between CI Staff and Office of Security	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares final reports and memos	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

8. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that your read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'NEAL, Birch D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD:DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/SID	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO/CI/CH		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 11 February 1957--11 February 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 5 August 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Signed: S. H. Horton S. H. Horton	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE DC/CI

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL J. Angleton James Angleton	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/CI

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
3		A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2/3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
2/3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

24 mos.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 13 8 57 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

He is and has been a senior employee for some time.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None - is already a senior and experienced officer.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

He is an intense person, who does not relax enough. He should not be chief of a large station nor supervise a large number of persons engaged in diverse work and having numerous problems.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
X	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16 DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'NEAL Birch D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD/DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/SIU	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO-CI-CH		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 February 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 11 February 1956 - 11 February 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)		
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE			

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

→ Rating is so high - see no point in showing to him.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
☐	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 10 May 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR S.H. Horton S. H. Horton	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief, CI Staff

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
[illegible] 21 MAY 1957
[illegible] 6/11/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL J. Angleton James Angleton	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI Staff

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

6
INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 1 NOV 55 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

MAY 17
23 FEB '57

DIRECTIONS
- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Directs special investigations	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises small staff	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Coordination of most sensitive matters between CI Staff and Office of Security	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares final reports and memos	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): O'NEAL Birch D.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 June 1913
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD/DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/CI/SIU
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO-CI-CH
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 11 February 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 11 February 1956 - 11 February 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 10 May 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: S. H. Horton
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Deputy Chief, CI Staff

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: [illegible]
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: J. Angleton James Angleton
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, CI Staff

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
3		A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2/3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
2/3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ION OF PERSONNEL
MAY 17 2 33 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

24 mos.

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Is and has been a senior employee for some time.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None--is already a senior and experienced officer.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

He is an intense person, who does not relax enough. He should not be chief of a large station nor supervise a large number of persons engaged in diverse work and having numerous problems.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
X	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Original - Off/Pers.

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'Neal Birch D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT CI Staff/Office of Chief/SIU	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO-CI Chief/SIU		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 February 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 11 February 1955-11 February 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:
employee on trip -- will discuss on his return.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 17 Feb 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR S. H. Horton S. H. Horton	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief, CI Staff

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		2 NOV 1956
Reviewed by PUD		

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 25 OCT 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL James Angleton J Angleton	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI Staff

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: 5 is an overall rating. On his present job, he would be a 6.

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 29 9 35 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the most important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Complete reliability in handling sensitive matters	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 General DD/P ops ability	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Unusually good judgment	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Ability to evaluate and analyze CE data	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Alert for new ideas and leads	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Discretion	6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which effect development on present job.

No weaknesses. He is an outstanding employee.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Original Off of Pers.

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'Neal Birch D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT CI Staff/Office of Chief/SIU	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO-CI Chief/SIU		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 February 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 11 February 1955-11 February 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)	
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 17 Feb 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR S. H. Horton S. H. Horton	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief, CI Staff

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE [illegible] 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL James Angleton J. Angleton	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI Staff

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

BY DATE
Posted [illegible] 2 [illegible] 1956
Reviewed by [illegible]

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Twelve

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Can handle almost any GS-15 job in DD/P that does not require a particular language or speciality. Would be very good Chief of Station or Base. Is good supervisor.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 29 9 35 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None at present

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

No unusual factors

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	5	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5/	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

WH 5

CODED

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

Posting Res Card AK 20 APR 1955 8.2

Next report due Feb 56.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'NEAL Birch D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 June 1913	3. SEX Male	4. CAREER DESIGNATION SD-FI
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 11 February 1947	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO DDP *	7. DIVISION WH *	8. BRANCH III *
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT * ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION: Guatemala *		11. GRADE GS-0136.01-14
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 11 February 1955	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 28 February 1954 - 11 February 1955		

Area 080 (0136.01)

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION * Mr. O'Neal was on a Special Assignment with the Security Research Staff, Security Office from

2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION July 1954 to Feb. 1955

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*:

1. Conducted research on an individual counter-intelligence case of great importance to national security, utilizing and analyzing sensitive source material.
2. Conducted liaison with top officials of two foreign intelligence organizations relating to a sensitive counter-intelligence case.
3. Directed investigation and personally investigated sensitive aspects of a counter-intelligence case on a world wide basis.
4. Assisted in other counter-intelligence cases.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ *has* ☐ *has not been shown to the individual rated*

THIS DATE 11 March 1955	SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) Harlan A. Westrell

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) Paul F. Gaynor

FORM NO. 1 MAY 54 37-189 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF SECURITY
[illegible] 19 [illegible] AM 55

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether the phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X	
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.												X		
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.													X	
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.													X	
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.										X				
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.													X	
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.													X	
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.														X
14. GETS THINGS DONE.										X				
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.													X	
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.														X
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.													X	
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.										X				
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.										X				
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.											X			
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.												X		
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.													X	
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT													X	

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET													X	
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.												X		
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES: A "SPARK PLUG".										X				
29. TOUGH MINDED.													X	
30. OBSERVANT.													X	
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.												X		
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.										X				
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.													X	
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.										X				
36. DELIBERATE.												X		
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													X	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.														X
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.													X	
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													X	
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.														X
45. VERSATILE.										X				
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.												X		
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.										X				
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.														X
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.													X	

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

The ability to analyze a complex problem, arrive at a plan of action, and then implement the plan without omitting any detail relevant to the case.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

None observed.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAR 29 11 46 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Ability to concentrate and follow through on an assignment.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*) Mr. O'Neal will carefully study, plan and analyze a problem before taking action. This may initially create the impression of slowness, but because of superior planning, the net result is a high degree of efficiency.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

Mr. O'Neal was on TDY with this office. He is fully qualified for continued work in this office.

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

14-00000

[redacted] GS-12 6400.00 1 May 1950

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST, DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Case officer and staff work. Responsibility, under the Operations Officer, for action against Satellite targets for Vienna Station.

4. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.

	READING EXC	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
French	X			X			X		
German		X			X			X	
Spanish		X				X		X	
Portugese			X			X			X

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS (IF IN U.S. SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Base Chief	Salzburg or Western Europe

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT, WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW

28 January 1952
DATE

[redacted] O'Risal [redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM June '51 DATE TO 25 Jan 52

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☒ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES Base Chief or Ops chief directing other case officers.

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEE'S DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? GS-13

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK NOT OBSERVED ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE							X
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							X
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							X
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						X	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE							X
H. DISCRETION							X
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE						X	
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)							X
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT							X
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP						X	
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						X	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU:
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT

In the ten months Subj has been under my supervision he has shown an outsta
-ding ability to get work done, even under the pressure of an unusually heav
work load. Subj's willingness to take on additional duties and his indefatigable efforts to discharge all responsibilities are also considered ou
standing. Subj's operational and liaison experience show plainly in his dai
handling of ops problems. Subj's ability to roganize material and budget hi
time for greatest efficiency improved notably in the past months. Subj is
in every sense a senior intelligence officer.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEET)

29 January 1952
DATE

Morton A. Woolley
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER
Morton A. Woolley

app/JCC

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

Druck: F. SAILER Wien IX. Porzellangasse 41

Standard Form No. 51
August 1948
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50 R012.1

Orig

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 20 Sept 1950 based on performance during period from 20 Mar 1950 to 20 Sept 1950

Birch D. O'Neal (Name of employee) Intelligence Officer GS-130-13 (Title of position, service, and grade)

I&SS (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE ✓ if adequate − if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	CHECK ONE: Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☑ All others ☐

...... (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
...... (2) Mechanical skill.
...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
...... (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
..+.. (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
...... (7) Accuracy of operations.
..+.. (8) Accuracy of final results.
..+.. (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
..+..(10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
......(11) Industry.
......(12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
......(13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? ....) (Yes or no)
..+..(14) Ability to organize his work.
..+..(15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
..+..(16) Cooperativeness.
......(17) Initiative.
......(18) Resourcefulness.
..+..(19) Dependability.
......(20) Physical fitness for the work.

..✓.. (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
...... (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
..+.. (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
...... (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
...... (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
...... (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
...... (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
...... (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
...... (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
..+.. (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
...... (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

..+.. (A) Aptitude for Intelligence Profession
..+.. (B) Discretion
...... (C) ....

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	Adjective Rating	Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent	Rating official.. Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good	
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good	Reviewing official.. Excellent
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair	
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory	

Rated by .... (Signature of rating official) Chief I&SS (Title) 28 Sept 1950 (Date)

Reviewed by .... (Signature of reviewing official) Chief I&SS (Title) 28 Sept 1950 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 10.3.50 (Date) Report to employee G (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—38177-6

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED.

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☐ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☐ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRAIGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

DATE FROM	DATE TO

OCCASION FOR REPORT

ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ ☑ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☐ YES ☑ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☑ YES ☐ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES Second man at medium sized station

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☑ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION?

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK 'NOT OBSERVED' ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE					✓		
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK					✓		
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS				✓			
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS				✓			
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY					✓		
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE				✓			
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE				✓			
H. DISCRETION					✓		
I. INITIATIVE				✓			
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.					✓		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)				✓			
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION				✓			
M. TACT					✓		
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)				✓			
O. LEADERSHIP				✓			
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA					✓		
Q. MENTAL STAMINA					✓		

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -

DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☑ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☐

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

This officer has consistently demonstrated a lack of chief qualifications essential to a station chief. His production in an area potentially replete with intelligence, has been negative. His reporting on clandestine items is habitually days behind Embassy reports. He is totally incapable of writing an intelligent, understandable report. It is believed to be in the best interests of this organization to remove him from station chief category forthwith.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEET)

5 May 1949

DATE

Mary E. Kent

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] GS-12 6400.00 1 May 1950

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES [illegible]

Case officer and staff work. Responsibility, under the Operations Officer, for action against Satellite targets for Vienna Station.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT LIST TITLE LOCATION OF SCHOOL LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING EXC	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
French	X			X			X		
German		X			X			X	
Spanish		X				X		X	
Portugese			X			X			X

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS (IF IN ENSUY STATED)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Base Chief	Salzburg or Western Europe

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW

28 January 1952
DATE

[redacted] [redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM June '51 DATE TO 25 Jan 52

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☒ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF SO WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES Base Chief or Ops chief directing other case officers.

DO YOU CONCOUR IN EMPLOYEE'S DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF SO TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION GS-13

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK NOT OBSERVED ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE							X
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							X
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							X
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						X	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE							X
H. DISCRETION							X
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE						X	
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)							X
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT							X
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP						X	
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						X	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU:
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT

In the ten months Subj has been under my supervision he has shown an outsta-ding ability to get work done, even under the pressure of an unusually heav work load. Subj's willingness to take on additional duties and his indefatigable efforts to discharge all responsibilities are also considered ou standing. Subj's operational and liaison experience show plainly in his dai handling of ops problems. Subj's ability to rogenize material and budget hi time for greatest efficiency improved notably in the past months. Subj is in every sense a senior intelligence officer.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEET)

29 January 1952
DATE

Morton A. Woolley
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER
Morton A. Woolley

appr/gcc

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

Druck: F. SAILER, Wien IX, Porzellangasse 41

14-00000

Standard Form No. 51
August 1948
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.3.

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( ) *ac/*
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 20 Sept 1950 based on performance during period from 20 Mar 1950 to 20 Sept 1950

Birch D. O'Neal (Name of employee)
Intelligence Officer GS-130-13 (Title of position, service, and grade)

1438 (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE ✓ If adequate – If weak + If outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in italics except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in italics.	CHECK ONE: Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☑ All others ☐

...... (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
...... (2) Mechanical skill.
...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
...... (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
..+.. (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
...... (7) Accuracy of operations.
..+.. (8) Accuracy of final results.
..+.. (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
..+..(10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
......(11) Industry.
......(12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
......(13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? ....) (Yes or no)
..+.(14) Ability to organize his work.
..+.(15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
..+.(16) Cooperativeness.
......(17) Initiative.
......(18) Resourcefulness.
..+.(19) Dependability.
......(20) Physical fitness for the work.
..✓.. *(21) Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
...... *(22) Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
..+.. *(23) Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
...... *(24) Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
...... *(25) Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
...... *(26) Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
...... *(27) Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
...... *(28) Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
...... *(29) Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
..+.. *(30) Ability to make decisions.*
...... *(31) Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

..+. (A) Aptitude for Intelligence Profession
..+ (B) Discretion
...... (C) ....

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	Adjective Rating	Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent	Rating official.. Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good	
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good	Reviewing official.. Excellent
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair	
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory	

Rated by .... (Signature of rating official) Chief IOD (Title) 28 Sept 1950 (Date)

Reviewed by .... (Signature of reviewing official) Chief IOD (Title) 28 Sept 1950 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 10-3-50 (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—26177-6

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED.

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☐ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☐ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

DATE FROM	DATE TO

OCCASION FOR REPORT

ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☑ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☐ YES ☑ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☑ YES ☐ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES Second man at medium-sized station

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☑ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION?

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK 'NOT OBSERVED' ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE					✓		
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK					✓		
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS				✓			
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS				✓			
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY					✓		
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE				✓			
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE				✓			
H. DISCRETION					✓		
I. INITIATIVE				✓			
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.					✓		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)				✓			
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION				✓			
M. TACT					✓		
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)				✓			
O. LEADERSHIP				✓			
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA					✓		
Q. MENTAL STAMINA					✓		

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -

DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☑ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☐

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

This officer has consistently demonstrated a lack of the qualifications essential to a station chief. His production in an area potentially replete with intelligence has been negative. His reporting on [illegible] items is habitually lags behind Embassy reports. He is totally incapable of writing an intelligent, understandable report. It is believed to be in the best interests of the organization to remove him from station chief category [illegible].

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEET)

5 May 1947

DATE

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)
In complete charge of administering investigative work of station and supervising and administering clerical, stenographic, and investigative personnel, handling confidential sources of information, and liaison with State, Army, and Navy personnel.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED.- None

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
Spanish	x				x			x	

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Chief of Station	Caracas, Venezuela

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?
MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO
EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO
LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRAIGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

Birch D. O'Neal

25 March, 1948
DATE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
DATE FROM: 1 June 47
DATE TO: 16 Apr 48

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO
IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11
HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO
DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO
IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? In-grade promotions.

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK 'NOT OBSERVED' ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE						✓	
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						✓	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						✓	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						✓	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							✓
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						✓	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						✓	
H. DISCRETION						✓	
I. INITIATIVE						✓	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.						✓	
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						✓	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						✓	
M. TACT						✓	
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						✓	
O. LEADERSHIP						✓	
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						✓	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						✓	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -
DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

At the end of a year of operations, Mr. O'Neil's record corresponds with his previous achievements in the same class of work. He is an exceptionally steady, industrious and conscientious officer. He obtains results and has proved his ability ~~to handle all aspects of the job assigned.~~

~~Since his previous report, he has not expanded his intelligence coverage to the point desirable in an area of importance as that where he is working. This may be due partly to an insufficient number of assistants; and an increase in his family may also be a factor which has prevented him from increasing his output. In Embassy~~
(over)

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATACH EXTRA SHEET)

8 April 1948
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

A. THE REPORTING OFFICER IS DEFINED AS THE EMPLOYEE'S IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR, IN OTHER WORDS THE PERSON WHO IS PRESUMABLY BEST ACQUAINTED WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S WORKING EFFICIENCY. HOWEVER, DEPENDING UPON CIRCUMSTANCES, THE CHIEF OF STATION MAY NOT WISH TO ENTRUST THE IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR WITH THIS RESPONSIBILITY. IN ANY CASE, THE CHIEF OF STATION WILL CHANGE OR MODIFY THE RATING OF THE REPORTING OFFICER WHEN SUCH CHANGES OR MODIFICATIONS ARE CALLED FOR. THE CHIEF OF STATION IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACCURACY OF FACTS AND STATEMENTS WHICH APPEAR ON THE STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT. IN MANY CASES, ESPECIALLY IN A SMALL UNIT, THE CHIEF OF STATION MAY WISH TO FILL OUT ALL THE REPORTS HIMSELF.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT, THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL REPORTS, UTILIZING THE SAME FORM, WILL BE RENDERED:

A. UPON COMPLETION OF FIRST NINETY (90) DAYS OF SERVICE AT A STATION.

B. UPON RELIEF OR REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING SENIOR.

C. UPON DETERMINATION OR RECOMMENDATION THAT AN EMPLOYEE IN A FIELD STATION SHOULD BE REASSIGNED TO ANOTHER STATION OR RETURNED TO U.S. FOR REASSIGNMENT OR OTHER DISPOSITION. SUCH REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED SO AS TO REACH THE WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE AFTER SUCH REASSIGNMENT DETERMINATION IS MADE. IF POSSIBLE, THE REPORT SHOULD BE SENT IN AT LEAST THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT IN ORDER THAT ALL TIME POSSIBLE MAY BE DEVOTED TO APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION. IF CONSIDERATION OF REASSIGNMENT IS BEING GIVEN WITHOUT EMPLOYEE'S KNOWLEDGE, ITEMS 1 TO 6 WILL BE FILLED IN AS FAR AS POSSIBLE BY THE RATING OFFICER WITHOUT REFERRAL TO EMPLOYEE.

3. IN FAIRNESS TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE IMPORTANCE OF CAREFULLY PREPARED AND ACCURATE EFFICIENCY REPORTS CANNOT BE OVERSTRESSED. THE FOLLOWING BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RATING SHOULD ALWAYS BE KEPT IN MIND:

A. ALWAYS BASE YOUR JUDGMENT ON:

(1) WHAT YOU HAVE OBSERVED THE INDIVIDUAL DO OR FAIL TO DO.

(2) [illegible] D STRIKING INCIDENT.

[illegible] TIC UNDER CONSIDERATION.

[illegible] USED TO RATE ALL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES. BUT REPORTING OFFICERS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT DIFFERENT STANDARDS PREVAIL IN DIFFERENT ASSIGNMENTS WHEREAS IT IS NECESSARY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER POSSESS INITIATIVE, THIS SAME TRAIT IS NOT ALWAYS DESIRABLE, EXCEPT IN A MINOR WAY, FOR A TYPIST. THE RATINGS AND EVALUATIONS SHOULD BE IN REFERENCE TO THE JOB - THE ACTUAL WORK ASSIGNMENT FOR WHICH THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYEE IS BEING PAID. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO ARRIVE AT A JUST ESTIMATE OF THE QUALITIES OF THE PERSON REPORTED ON FOR THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE REPORT. AVOID EXAGGERATIONS AND SUPERLATIVES. THEY DETRACT FROM THE VALUE OF A REPORT AND ARE UNFAIR TO OTHERS.

B. BIASED OPINIONS BASED ON PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PREPARATION OF EFFICIENCY REPORTS IS AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF ALL SUPERVISORS OF EMPLOYEES, AND THE ACCURATE AND TRUE EVALUATIONS EXPRESSED THEREIN ARE A DIRECT REFLECTION UPON HIS OWN ABILITY AND QUALIFICATION FOR THE POSITION HE HOLDS.

C. NO REPORTS WILL BE RENDERED COVERING PERIODS OF LESS THAN 60 DAYS OBSERVED SERVICE.

4. REPORTS WILL NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL; HOWEVER, THE CLASSIFICATION MAY BE RAISED IF DEEMED ADVISABLE BY RATING OFFICER.

5. **REPORTS WILL NEVER BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON.**

DISPOSITION OF REPORTS

1. REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH CHIEF IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE REPORTING PERIOD.

2. IF THE REPORTING OFFICER IS THE CHIEF OF STATION, REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED BY HIM TO THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH CHIEF IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS.

3. IF THE REPORTING OFFICER IS NOT THE CHIEF OF STATION, THE REPORT WILL BE REFERRED TO THE NEXT IN COMMAND FOR REVIEW AND FINALLY TO THE CHIEF OF STATION FOR FORWARDING TO WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS.

4. UPON RECEIPT OF REPORT IN WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS, THEY WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE BRANCH CHIEFS PROMPTLY AND THEN REFERRED TO THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL FOR RETENSION IN THE PERSONNEL FILE OF THE EMPLOYEE.

A. IF A CHANGE OF PERSONAL STATUS IS REPORTED UNDER SECTION 6, ONE COPY OF SUCH REPORT WILL BE DETACHED AND SENT TO THE SECURITY OFFICE.

ANY DESIRED REMARKS OF REVIEWING OFFICER AND/OR CHIEF OF STATION

relations, however, he has scored great success and was the subject of a special commendatory letter written by the new Ambassador, Honorable Walter Donnelly, to the Department of State. His report writing is precise and clear but tends to be inclusive of too much detail. In this respect it is felt that he is following the practice of his previous employment with the FBI and that his training in the methods of our own organization was insufficient inasmuch as he departed for his post before full completion of the training course. A temporary assignment in Washington would be profitable to him in order to get the spirit and methods of revised intelligence operations and reporting.

He is a Chief of Station which this Branch particularly desires; and if he wishes to remain at his present post on termination of his contract, it is recommended that he be so reassigned inasmuch as he has developed a keen personal interest and corresponding knowledge of this very important area.

R.G. Leddy

Statement re Change in Number of
Dependents:

I hereby certify that on 16 July, 1947, there was born to me and my wife a son, the name of whom has been previously furnished to Washington.

14-00000

CHIEF OF STATION

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED.

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING EXC	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
SPANISH	✓				✓			✓	

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY LOCATION

NO PREFERENCE EXCEPT THAT IT BE FOREIGN

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☑ NO   NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☑ NO   EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☑ NO   LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☑ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRAIGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

1 June 1947 /s/ Burl D. O'Neal
DATE
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT DATE FROM DATE TO

OCCASION FOR REPORT ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES Chief of a larger station or of Desk at Headquarters.

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO   DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☐ NO   IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? CAF-15 - Chief of Station

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK 'NOT OBSERVED' ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE							✓
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK							✓
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						✓	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						✓	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY							✓
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE						✓	
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						✓	
H. DISCRETION						✓	
I. INITIATIVE							✓
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.							✓
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						✓	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION							✓
M. TACT							✓
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)							✓
O. LEADERSHIP						✓	
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						✓	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						✓	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU - DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☒

4.5

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

This Officer is one of our best chiefs of station. He has broad experience, sound judgment, excellent appearance and a good personality. By his ability, industry and directive ability, he commands respect personally and for the organization he represents. He rates as excellent in performing present duties and would be rated as outstanding were sufficient time to judge his long-term productivity, which has not yet elapsed.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATTACH EXTRA SHEET)

1 August 1947
DATE

Raymond G. Leddy
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): O'NEAL BIRCH DILWORTH

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): JUNE 1, 1913

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY:

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED AN "ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE"? ☒ YES ☐ NO

If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one. (See Instructions for Employees on page 4)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): Birch D. O'Neal

DATE: December 2, 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

PERSONAL AFFAIRS
BRANCH
DEC 3 11 13 AM '68
OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
APRIL 1968
FPM Supplement 870-1

14-00000

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
O'NEAL	BIRCH	DILWORTH	JUNE 1, 1913	258 05 6267

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: Serial # 058553

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): Birch D. O'Neal

DATE: February 16, 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

SECRET

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

SECRET
EYES ONLY

2 1 OCT 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Clandestine Services Career Service Board

SUBJECT : Promotion to GS-16 - Birch D. O'NEAL

1. Mr. O'Neal is our only candidate for promotion to GS-16. He supervises and performs important and complex counterintelligence duties which relate to the interests of the intelligence community.

2. Mr. O'Neal is a superior counterintelligence officer whose experience dates back to his service with the FBI during which time he was stationed in South America for three years. Since entering on duty with CIG in February 1947 he has been COS in Caracas and Mexico. Mr. O'Neal has been Chief, Special Investigation Group since February 1955.

J. Angleton
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

SECRET
EYES

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

5 JAN 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Birch D. O'Neal

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 1 July 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:
Birch D. O'Neal

Date: [illegible]

Career Service Staff
Office of Personnel
3 FEB 1956

FORM NO. 511. 1 APR 55

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

OV

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

SECURITY INFORMATION STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE	OFFICE WHD	DIVISION
	BRANCH OIA	SECTION

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
		DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
Organization		11 10	2	1947	[illegible]			15	0	5
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Washington, D.C.	10	1	1938	31	[illegible]	[illegible]	22	11	7
SCD-09-18-38										
Irving Bradley 05-20-51										
		Total Civilian Service						5	5	13

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
None									
Total Military Service									

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

22 February 1952
DATE

B. D. O'NEAL
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

OK

2/22/52

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
25	5	13

Agreement

AGREEMENT made this 29th day of November, 19 51, effective the 3 day of December, 19 51, by and between the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the Government), as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, and O'NEAL, Birch D. (hereinafter referred to as the Employee).

RECITALS

A. The Government desires the services of the Employee for CIA under circumstances requiring the Employee to receive a Foreign Service Staff Corps designation from the Department of State and proposes to send the Employee overseas to Guatemala City, Guatemala ____________________ for operations in the general area of____________________.

B. The Employee desires as an employee of the Government to serve CIA abroad under the supervision and control of the Assistant Director for Special Operations, CIA, (ADSO) and is willing to accept a designation in the Foreign Service Staff Corps with the obligations thereof.

In consideration of the premises, the mutual covenants and promises herein contained, and for other good and valuable considerations, the parties hereto agree as follows:

ARTICLE I. Relationship of Employee to the Department of State. The Employee, in so far as possible, shall abide by all the rules, regulations, and customs of the Foreign Service of the United States which affect personnel of the Foreign Service Staff Corps in order to appear as a normal member of the Foreign Service establishment.

1. The Employee shall rigidly comply with the provisions of Title X, Part A of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, prohibiting officers and employees of the Foreign Service from:

(a) Wearing uniforms;
(b) Accepting presents from foreign governments;
(c) Engaging in business abroad;
(d) Correspondence on affairs of foreign governments;
(e) Political, racial, religious, or color discrimination.

2. The Chief of the Foreign Service establishment and certain other key members of his staff will know about the Employee's status and relationship under the terms of the TOP SECRET agreement between the Department of State and CIA. Other personnel may discover that there are certain irregularities in travel orders, position numbers, pay accounts, and other internal administrative procedures of the Foreign Service. Nevertheless, the Employee shall not divulge his relationship to CIA except with the expressed approval of the ADSO. While serving abroad, he shall for normal administration be under the control of the Chief of the Foreign Service establishment to which he is attached, but for operations, including travel as specified below, he shall be under the control of CIA.

3. The travel of the Employee shall be governed as follows:

(a) For temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States within or beyond the Employee's stipulated area, he shall perform CIA operational travel as directed by the ADSO or his designee with the consent of the Chiefs of the Foreign Service establishment involved. TD travel customary and necessary in the performance of routine Foreign Service Staff functions may be performed without clearance from the ADSO.

(b) For any travel to the United States, either temporary duty or permanent change of station, the Employee shall travel only at the direction of the ADSO after clearance has been arranged through the State Department in Washington.

(c) All travel will be directed and performed in accordance with Foreign Service rules and regulations.

4. Although the Employee's Foreign Service Staff Corps title, location, appointment, Foreign Service class, and other pertinent information may be published in the Foreign Service list and other publications of the Department of State, such listings shall not affect his employment and the obligations and duties stipulated in this contract.

5. All payments to be made under this contract, including reimbursement for travel expenses, shall be made to the Employee by the Department of State except payments referred to in ARTICLE II, Section 4.

ARTICLE II. Relationship of Employee to CIA. Although for all intents and purposes it will appear as though the Employee is employed by the Department of State as indicated in ARTICLE I above, he shall in fact be employed by and under the operational control of CIA. In so far as possible, he will be expected to abide by the rules, regulations, customary practices, and courtesies of the Foreign Service, but his ultimate responsibility will be to CIA. In the event of any conflict of authority in the field between the Department of State and CIA, the matter shall be referred to the ADSO for resolution.

1. The line of authority for the Employee shall be as follows:

(a) Senior Representative of OSO at Foreign Service establishment.
(b) OSO Foreign Branch Chief in Washington.
(c) Chief of Operations, OSO.
(d) ADSO
(e) Director of CIA.

2. All travel shall be directed by the ADSO in accordance with ARTICLE I, Section 3. The Employee shall request appropriate Foreign Service clearance for travel through the Senior OSO Representative at the Foreign Service establishment, who shall be responsible for arranging such clearance.

3. It is understood and agreed that the Employee's overseas assignment is to be for a minimum period of two years from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, unless terminated by the Government for its convenience. If the assignment is terminated in less than twenty-four months at the Employee's request, the following shall prevail:

(a) If the Employee resigns in less than twelve months from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, he shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses involved in the transportation of himself, his immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the foreign station, and pay all such expenses for return to the United States. Such expenses for return to the United States and amounts expended by the Government on account of such travel and transportation shall be considered a debt due by the Employee to the United States.

(b) If the Employee desires to terminate between the twelfth and twenty-fourth month from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, he shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of himself, his immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the United States.

4. If deemed necessary by CIA, the Employee may be reimbursed or advanced funds for operational expenses. Such amounts must be advanced or reimbursement made in accordance with CIA regulations, which require a full accounting of the amounts expended by the Employee. Therefore, the Employee will be required to account fully for any such funds advanced or reimbursed in accordance with CIA regulations.

ARTICLE III. Overseas Allowances and Transportation Expenses. When specifically authorized by the ADSO, the expenses of travel and transportation of the Employee, his immediate family, household goods and effects, including personally owned automobile and other allowances, will be paid the Employee in accordance with the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and regulations issued thereunder by the Department of State. When authorized by the ADSO, the Employee shall be paid a quarters allowance, cost of living allowance, or special foreign living allowance in accordance with the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and regulations issued thereunder. The amount of quarters and cost of living allowances and the special foreign living allowance is set forth in Bureau of the Budget Circular A-8, which is amended periodically to reflect adjustments in price indexes. Therefore, such allowances will be subject to change, and the amounts paid will vary according to Budget Circular A-8.

ARTICLE IV. Annual and Sick Leave. The Employee shall be permitted annual leave, sick leave, and leave of absence in accordance with Title IX, Part D of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Under such Act, the Employee may be granted not to exceed sixty calendar days annual leave of absence with pay in each year. Annual leave which the Employee may receive and which is not used in any one year shall be accumulated for succeeding years until it totals 180 days. Sick leave with pay may be granted to the Employee at the rate of fifteen calendar days each calendar year and may be accumulated for succeeding years until it totals 120 days.

1. If the Employee is transferred from another Government Agency to this position, any annual or sick leave standing to his credit in such Agency, may be transferred, if appropriate, in accordance with E. O. 9837, 27 March 1947, issued pursuant to Section 935 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

ARTICLE V. Return to the United States. The Employee shall be ordered to the United States on leave of absence or permanent change of station upon completion of two years continuous service abroad or as soon as possible thereafter.

ARTICLE VI. Retirement. The Employee occupies a position within the purview of the Civil Service Retirement Act. Accordingly, deductions shall be made at the rate provided by law (presently ~~5%~~ 6) from the Employee's basic salary and placed in the Civil Service Retirement Fund. The Employee may not avail himself of the provisions of the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System, provided for in Title VIII of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

ARTICLE VII. Medical Care and Hospitalization. In the event of illness or injury to the Employee requiring hospitalization not the result of vicious habits, intemperance, or misconduct on his part, and incurred in the line of duty while assigned abroad, the expenses of treatment of such illness or injury at a suitable hospital or clinic, ~~or~~ and transportation expenses to such hospital or clinic may be paid by the Government in accordance with Title IX, Part E of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Under appropriate regulations, a physical examination of the Employee will be made, together with necessary inoculations, or vaccinations, or the expense thereof will be paid to the Employee.

1. In the event of the death or disability of the Employee, the Employee or his dependents shall be afforded the benefits of the United States Employees' Compensation Act of 7 September 1916, as amended.

ARTICLE VIII. Equipment. The Employee may be furnished technical equipment and supplies to assist in the rendition of services hereunder, including an automobile where necessary. The Employee shall be responsible for such equipment and supplies issued to him by CIA in accordance with CIA Property Regulations. All such material shall remain the property of the Government regardless of any apparently conflicting ownership or the manner of registration.

ARTICLE IX. Salary. The Employee shall receive a basic salary of $ 8481.00 (FCS-3) per year in accordance with Section 415 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. In-class promotions shall be granted to the Employee in accordance with regulations established in the Department of State pursuant to Title VI, Part E, Section 642 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Other changes in status will be made only as specifically authorized by the ADSO.

ARTICLE X. Continuance of Pay and Allowances. If the Employee is determined by CIA to be absent in a status of "Missing", "Missing in Action", "Interned in a Neutral Country", "Captured by an Enemy", "Beleaguered", or "Beseiged", he shall for the period he is determined to be in any such status be entitled to receive or to have credited to his account the same pay and allowances to which he was entitled at the beginning of such period of absence. Continuance of pay and allowances as specified above shall be as prescribed in the Missing Persons Act of 1942 (50 U.S.C.A. App 1001-1015, 7 March 1942).

ARTICLE XI. General. The Employee shall comply with the following provisions, and violation thereof by the Employee shall be deemed a breach of this contract.

1. In participating in the programs and activities of any private organization, the Employee shall make it clear that the Department of State has no official connection with such organization and that it does not sponsor or sanction the viewpoints which he may express. In general, his relations with private organizations shall be governed by applicable Foreign Service Regulations.

2. Neither the Employee nor the members of his family shall act as correspondents for American or foreign newspapers, press syndicates, or associations unless special authorization has been obtained in advance from the ADSO. He shall not write for publication any article or other manuscript on political or controversial subjects. Articles or manuscripts on nonpolitical or noncontroversial subjects shall be submitted to the ADSO for review and approval prior to their submission to a publisher.

3. Neither the Employee nor members of his family shall correspond privately on personnel or other official matters with members of Congress, or officers in the Department of State, CIA, or other Governmental agencies.

4. Members of the Employee's family shall not be employed in the same Foreign Service office except during grave emergencies or when special authorization has been obtained in advance of employment from both the Department of State and CIA.

5. Before contracting marriage with a person of foreign nationality, the Employee shall request and obtain permission from the appropriate officials in both the Department of State and CIA. Any such marriage with an alien without obtaining advance permission shall be deemed a breach of this contract and shall result in termination of service with the Government.

6. In the event the Employee desires to resign from the service overseas, he shall submit a written resignation addressed to the ADSO, who will take appropriate steps to clear the matter with the Department of State.

ARTICLE XII. Security. This contract contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act (50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as amended). Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Violation of this ARTICLE or any security agreement signed by the Employee with the Government shall result in immediate disciplinary action, which may include suspension, separation from Government service, and may subject the Employee to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act.

1. The termination of this contract will not release the Employee from the provisions of any security oaths which he may be required to take by CIA.

2. The Employee shall not publish, transmit, or divulge in any manner, information received by him as the result of his employment by the Government under this contract without specific written authority from the Director, CIA.

ARTICLE XIII. Orders and Directives. Orders and Directives received by the Employee from competent authority, including instructions received in briefing and training, shall be complied with by the Employee. No promises or commitments to the Employee of any nature whatsoever, beyond and in addition to the terms hereof, shall be binding on the Government unless and until such promise or commitment is reduced to writing and approved by an authorized official of CIA, and such writing placed with this contract thereby becoming an amendment hereto.

ARTICLE XIV. Amendments. The Government may at any time amend this contract and may terminate this contract upon thirty day prior notice to the Employee. If the Government proposes to amend this contract by reducing the salary provided for in ARTICLE IX (including class promotions, or other authorized increases, if any) and such reduction is unacceptable to the Employee, resignation by the Employee for such reason shall be considered as a termination of this contract for the convenience of the Government. Where the Employee is directed to proceed to a new post on a permanent change of station by the ADSO, this contract will be deemed to have been amended to the extent of such change.

ARTICLE XV. Special Provisions. The following special provisions shall apply to the Employee under this contract:

Part (a) of Section 3 of ARTICLE II shall not apply to employees who have served in a departmental position with CIA or who have served an overseas tour of duty with CIA, and in such case, Part (b) of Section 3 of ARTICLE II shall be deemed amended to read as follows: "(b) If the Employee desires to terminate or return to the United States prior to the expiration of twenty-four months from the date of his arrival at his overseas post of duty, he shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of himself, his immediate family, household goods and personal effects to the United States."

ARTICLE IX does not apply. The employee shall receive an annual salary of $9600.00 (GS-14), and, during the period of official duty overseas shall receive allowances based on such annual salary (including subsequent increases) computed in accordance with applicable Foreign Service Regulations. Initially, the sum of $8481.00 per annum (FSS-3) (plus in-class or class promotions) directly by the Department of State. The difference between the authorized CIA salary and the salary paid by the Department of State, plus the difference, if any, between allowances based on the authorized CIA salary and the allowances based on salary payments by the Department of State and paid by them, shall be paid to the employee in accordance with his written instructions.

A lump sum payment for annual leave is to be paid up to 2 December 1951. Sick leave is to be held in escrow until such time as subject reverts back to GS-status, at which time, accrued sick leave will be credited.

In the event any of the provisions in this Article are inconsistent with the provisions of any other Article in this contract, the provisions of this Article XV, shall govern and be determinative of the rights and obligations under this contract.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY: ______________________

CHIEF, PERSONNEL DIVISION (C)

Birch D. O'Neal

(Employee)

WITNESS: W J Webb

~~Foreign Branch Chief~~

CHIEF, OVERSEAS SECTION

APPROVED:

____

Chief of Operations

____

Assistant Director for
Special Operations

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.

Office of the Director

ER 2-2961a

19 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ASSISTANT DEPUTY, INSPECTION & SECURITY

SUBJECT: Appreciation for Work of CIA Personnel

1. It is a pleasure to forward the attached memorandum from Major General Ralph J. Canine, Director, Armed Forces Security Agency.

2. Please express my personal appreciation to each of the individuals mentioned therein for their excellent cooperation in connection with this operation.

/s/

WALTER B. SMITH
Director

Enclosure -
Memo dtd 12 Oct 51

COPY

File

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Armed Forces Security Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

In reply refer to

Serial: 1691

12 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Appreciation of Work of CIA Personnel

1. Between 1 August and 15 August 1951, in support of a special Armed Forces Security Agency operation, Mr. Edward F. Hall, Mr. Birch O'Neill, Mr. John Salb, and Dr. Raymond S. Hall executed their additional assigned duties in an efficient and admirable manner. They consistently demonstrated initiative, interest, and a spirit of cooperation which assured the success of this operation.

2. I am gratified by this further demonstration of support of the Armed Forces Security Agency by the Central Intelligence Agency and I should be grateful if you would express to these gentlemen my appreciation of a job well done.

/s/

RALPH J. CANINE
Major General, US Army
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency

COPY

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, BIRCH D. O'NEAL, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

2 October 1951
(Date of entrance on duty)

Birch D. O'Neal
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 2 day of October, A. D. 1951

at WASHINGTON, D. C.
(City) (State)

[SEAL]

Robert W. White
(Signature of officer)

(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—63100-2

14-00900

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1 PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*) 4703 CRESCENT ST. N.W. WEST CHEV CHASE MD.

2 (A) DATE OF BIRTH 1 JUNE 1913 | (B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*) BAINBRIDGE GEORGIA

3 (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY MRS. BIRCH D. O'NEAL | (B) RELATIONSHIP WIFE | (C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE 4703 CRESCENT ST. CHEVY CHASE MD. | (D) TELEPHONE NO. OL-6321

4 DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—55161-4

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

INFORMATION FOR APPOINTEE

NOTE.—Before he can be appointed, an applicant for a Federal position must meet certain requirements over and above the requirement that he be able to do the work he is employed to do. On the attached form you are to swear (or affirm) that you meet these requirements. In addition, there are certain restrictions upon your conduct as a Federal employee. They are set forth on this sheet. You should familiarize yourself with these restrictions and be guided by them. *Detach this portion of the form and retain it for your information and guidance.*

I. INFORMATION ABOUT APPOINTMENTS

Persons selected from competitive registers will receive either a temporary or a probational appointment.

For persons receiving a probational appointment, the first year of service is a probationary period unless a shorter period is fixed for the position by the Civil Service Commission. Satisfactory completion of probation is required for absolute appointment.

The completion of probation is required when a person who is reinstated or transferred has not previously completed a probationary period.

Persons receiving probational appointments are included under the Civil Service Retirement Act.

Appointments specifically limited to 1 year or less are usually considered temporary appointments.

For excepted appointments, a trial period may be required at the discretion of the employing agency.

II. MEMBERS-OF-FAMILY RESTRICTION

Except for persons entitled to veteran preference, no person may be probationally appointed to a position in the competitive service if there are two or more members of his family already serving in the competitive service under probational or permanent appointments. A family is defined by the Attorney General as persons who live under the same roof with the head of the family and form part of his fireside. When they branch out and become heads of new establishments, they cease to be part of the old family. Minors do not establish another family merely by living at an address different from that of their parents. An appointment is illegal if the appointee is disqualified by the members-of-family restriction.

III. APPOINTMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION

All probational appointments, reappointments, reinstatements, conversions to competitive appointments, inter-agency transfers, and certain temporary appointments are "subject to investigation" for an 18 month period. During this period, the Civil Service Commission has authority to instruct an agency to separate an employee for any of the reasons given below except that the Commission's authority is not limited by the 18-month period in cases described under Items 4, 5, and 8 below. The condition "subject to investigation" expires automatically at the end of 18 months of service unless an appeal on loyalty matters is pending. However, an employing agency may remove an employee for any of the reasons given below at any time.

Any of the following reasons constitutes sufficient cause for the removal of an employee from the service:

1. Conduct or capacity of such a nature that removal will promote the efficiency of the service.

2. Physical or mental unfitness for the position he holds.

3. Criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct.

4. Establishment of the fact that the employee has made intentional false statements or engaged in deception or fraud in examination or appointment.

5. Refusal to furnish testimony to the Civil Service Commission or its authorized representatives in regard to matters inquired of arising under the Civil Service Act, Rules, and Regulations.

6. Habitual use of intoxicating beverages to excess.

7. Reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States (see Section IV).

8. Any legal or other disqualification which makes the applicant unfit for Federal employment.

IV. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

Section 9A of Public Law 252, 76th Congress, approved August 2, 1939, otherwise known as the "Hatch Act," provides:

"(1) It shall be unlawful for any person employed in any capacity by any agency of the Federal Government, whose compensation, or any part thereof, is paid from funds authorized or appropriated by any act of Congress, to have membership in any political party or organization which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government in the United States.

"(2) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be immediately removed from the position or office held by him, and thereafter no part of the funds appropriated by any act of Congress for such position or office shall be used to pay the compensation of such person;"

Executive Order 9835 of March 21, 1947, provides:

"1. The standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States.

"2. Activities and associations of an applicant or employee which may be considered in connection with the determination of disloyalty may include one or more of the following:

'*a.* Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations therefor, or knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs;

'*b.* Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof;

'*c.* Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter the constitutional form of government of the United States;

'*d.* Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of documents or information of a confidential or nonpublic character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employment by the Government of the United States;

'*e.* Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States;

'*f.* Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.'"

The appointing officer will make available to you the list of organizations prescribed by the Attorney General upon your request.

Various appropriation acts contain a provision prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to pay the salary or wages of any person who advocates, or who is a member of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence. These acts provide that an affidavit shall be considered prima facie evidence that the person making the affidavit does not advocate, and is not a member of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence. These acts provide further that any person who advocates, or who is a member of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence and accepts employment the salary or wages for which are paid from any such appropriation shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both, and that this penalty shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other provisions of law.

The affidavit referred to above is one of those to which you are required to swear (or affirm) on the attached page.

V. STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Various appropriation acts provide that no part of the funds appropriated therein shall be used to pay the salary or wages of any person who engages in a strike against the Government of the United States or who is a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government. Such acts provide further that any person who engages in a strike against the Government, or who is a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government, and accepts employment the salary or wages for which are paid from any such appropriation, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both, and that this penalty shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other provisions of law.

One of the affidavits on the attached page to which you are required to swear (or affirm) pertains to this provision against striking against the Government.

VI. HOLDING STATE OR LOCAL OFFICE

Federal employees are prohibited from accepting or holding an office or position under State, territorial, county, or municipal governments. There are certain specific exceptions. They are published in Civil Service Commission Form 1236. Before any person appointed to the Federal service accepts or continues to hold any office or position under a State or local government, the matter should be presented to the appropriate authorities of the agency in which he is employed for a decision as to whether he properly may accept or continue to hold such office or position.

VII. POLITICAL ACTIVITY

The terms of the act of August 2, 1939 ("Hatch Act"), as amended, prohibit officers and employees in the executive branch of the Federal Government from using official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof. Further, such officers and employees are prohibited from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns. These prohibitions apply not only to permanent employees, but also to temporary employees, employees on leave of absence with or without compensation, and substitute employees during the period of active employment. Political activity identified with any political party in any election is prohibited.

Some of the forms of forbidden political activity are:

1. Serving on or for any political committee, party, or other similar organization.
2. Soliciting or handling political contributions.
3. Serving as officer of a political club, as member or officer of any of its committees, addressing such a club, or being active in organizing it.
4. Serving in connection with preparation for, organizing, or conducting a political meeting or rally, addressing such a meeting, or taking any other active part therein except as a spectator.
5. Engaging in political conferences while on duty, or canvassing a district or soliciting political support for a party, faction, or candidate.
6. Manifesting offensive activity at the polls, at primary or regular elections, soliciting votes, assisting voters to mark ballots, or helping to get out the voters on registration or election days.
7. Acting as recorder, checker, watcher, or challenger of any party or faction.
8. Serving in any position of election officer, in which partisanship or partisan political management may be shown.
9. Publishing or being connected editorially or managerially with any newspaper generally known as partisan from a political standpoint, or writing for publication or publishing any letter or article, signed or unsigned, in favor of or against any political party or candidate. (Ownership entirely disassociated from editorial control and managerial activities limited entirely to business management would not be regarded as being within this provision.)
10. Becoming a candidate for nomination or election to office, Federal, State, or local, which is to be filled in an election in which party candidates are involved.
11. Distributing campaign literature or material.
12. Initiating or circulating political petitions, including nomination petitions.
13. Assuming political leadership or becoming prominently identified with any political movement, party, or faction, or with the success or failure of any candidate for election to public office.

General statements as to certain activities which are considered as permissible on the part of Federal officers and employees:

1. *Voting.*—The direct language of the law specifically provides that all such persons retain the right to vote as they may choose.

2. *Expression of opinions.*—The right to express political opinions is reserved to all such persons.

NOTE: This reservation is subject to the prohibition that such persons may not take any active part in political management or in political campaigns.

3. *Contributions.*—It is lawful for any officer or employee to make a voluntary contribution to a regularly constituted political organization, provided such contributions are not made in a Federal building or to some other officer or employee within the scope of the act referred to above.

4. *Political pictures.*—It is lawful for any officer or employee to display a political picture in his home if he so desires.

5. *Badges, buttons, and stickers.*—While it is not unlawful for an officer or employee to wear a political badge or button or to display a political sticker on his private automobile (except where forbidden by local ordinance), it is felt that it is inappropriate for any public servant to make a partisan display of any kind while on duty, conducting the public business.

6. *Penalties.*—Persons appointed to positions in the Executive branch of the Federal Government are warned that the penalty for an established violation of the above mentioned political activity prohibitions is immediate removal from the service.

VIII. OFFENSES WHICH ARE PUNISHABLE BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT

Certain other statutes prohibit Federal officers and employees from engaging in various activities under penalty of fine or imprisonment, or both. The activities prohibited by such statutes relate to such matters as political assessments, political coercion and discrimination, and purchase and sale of office. The text of these statutes is set forth in Civil Service Commission Form 1236.

Some of the activities prohibited under penalty of fine or imprisonment, or both, are as follows:

1. Solicitation or receipt of political contributions by one officer or employee from another.
2. The giving or handing over of a political contribution by one employee to another.
3. Solicitation or receipt of political contributions in a Federal building by any person, whether or not an employee of the Government.
4. Solicitation or receipt by any person of political contributions from any person receiving any benefit under any act of Congress appropriating funds for relief.
5. Solicitation or receipt of anything of value, either for personal reward or as a political contribution, in return for the use of, or the promise to use, influence to secure an appointive office under the United States.
6. Payment, or the offer of payment, for the use of influence in securing an appointive office under the United States.
7. Promising employment, compensation, or other benefit made possible by act of Congress as consideration or reward for political activity.
8. Discrimination by an officer or employee in favor of, or against, another officer or employee on account of political contributions.
9. Depriving any person on account of race, creed, or color, or political activity, of compensation or other benefit made possible by any act of Congress appropriating funds for relief.
10. Disclosure for political purposes of any list or names of persons receiving benefits under an act of Congress appropriating funds for relief and the receipt of such a list for political purposes.

IX. PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

Appointing officers are required by the Civil Service Rules to act on all personnel matters "solely on the basis of merit and fitness and without regard to political or religious affiliations, marital status, or race."

X. INSTRUCTION OF APPLICANTS

Officers and employees of the Government are prohibited from instructing or teaching with a view to the special preparation of any person for civil-service examinations.

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1947)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY		WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Department or agency)	(Bureau or division)	(Place of employment)

I, BIRCH D. O'NEAL, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. 57, dated January 2, 19 4[illegible], filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

Birch D. O'Neal
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 20th day of March, A. D. 1950,

at Washington (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

Personnel Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS *(street and number, city and State)*: 4703 CRESCENT ST. N.W. WASHINGTON D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 1 JUNE 1913

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH *(city or town and State or country)*: BAINBRIDGE GEORGIA

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: MRS. BIRCH D. O'NEAL

(B) RELATIONSHIP: WIFE

(C) STREET AND NUMBER CITY AND STATE: 4703 CRESCENT N.W. WASHINGTON D.C.

(D) TELEPHONE NO.: OL-0321

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS *(Give street number, if any)*	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR WIT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED *(Check one)*	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service*		X
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—66100-1

FORM DSP-34
9-1-48
FORMERLY FS-372

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

BUDGET BUREAU NO. 47-R07-.1
APPROVAL EXPIRES FEBRUARY 28, 1951

THIS SPACE FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

____ PREVIOUS ____ CARDED ____ ACKNOWLEDGED
____ INDEXED ____ INVESTIGATED ____ ACTION
CODE ____________ OTHER ____________

INSTRUCTIONS—Answers to all questions must be typed or printed. All questions must be answered fully. If sufficient space has not been provided for your answer to any question, complete your answer under item # 37. Forward in duplicate.

DATE OF APPLICATION

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

POSITION APPLIED FOR

THIS SPACE FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden, if any)
O'NEAL, Birch Dilworth

2. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN KNOWN BY ANY OTHER NAME? ☐ YES ☐ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

3a. PERMANENT ADDRESS (Place from which transportation will be authorized if appointed. Street number and name)
211 Evans Street,

3b. CITY, POSTAL ZONE, STATE
Bainbridge, Georgia

4. STATE OF WHICH YOU ARE A LEGAL RESIDENT
Georgia

5. PRESENT ADDRESS IF DIFFERENT FROM ABOVE
4703 Crescent Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

PRESENT BUSINESS PHONE

PRESENT HOME PHONE
OL-0821

6. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)
June 1, 1913

7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, state, or country)
Bainbridge, Georgia

8a. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED?
-

8b. IF A NATURALIZED CITIZEN, PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE
-

9. SEX ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

10. HEIGHT 6 FT. 1 IN.

11. WEIGHT 185 LBS.

12. MARITAL STATUS ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ SEPARATED

13. WHAT IS THE LOWEST BASE SALARY, EXCLUSIVE OF ALLOWANCES YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ PER ANNUM

14. WHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE IF ANY ON YOUR IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY FOR DUTY IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD?
None

15. FULL NAME OF HUSBAND/WIFE (If wife, maiden name)
Frances Pauly O'Neal, formerly Frances Pauly

b. DATE OF BIRTH
April 30, 1920

c. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, state, or country)
Glenpool, Oklahoma

d. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. HOW WAS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED?
-

e. IF NATURALIZED, PLACE, DATE, AND NUMBER OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE.
-

16. DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH
Birch Dilworth O'Neal, Jr.	son	July 16, 1947
Melinda Pauly O'Neal	daughter	June 12, 1950
Frances Pauly O'Neal	wife	April 30, 1920

17. WHICH DEPENDENTS WOULD YOU WISH TO ACCOMPANY YOU ABROAD?
All

18a. FATHER'S NAME
Maston Emmett O'Neal

b. PLACE OF BIRTH
Bainbridge, Ga.

c. OCCUPATION
Lawyer

d. PRESENT ADDRESS
211 Evans Street, Bainbridge, Georgia

e. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DID FATHER EVER OBTAIN U.S. CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO -

19a. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME
Bessie Matthews

b. PLACE OF BIRTH
Thomaston, Georgia

c. OCCUPATION IF ANY
Housewife

d. PRESENT ADDRESS
211 Evans Street, Bainbridge, Georgia

e. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DID MOTHER EVER OBTAIN U.S. CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO -

20a. CAN YOU TAKE DICTATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO W.P.M.

b. ARE YOU A STENOTYPIST? ☐ YES ☒ NO W.P.M.

c. CAN YOU TYPE BY TOUCH SYSTEM? ☐ YES ☒ NO W.P.M.

d. NAME OTHER OFFICE MACHINES YOU OPERATE
none

21. MILITARY STATUS

a. IF YOU HAVE BEEN IN THE ARMED FORCES OR IN THE MERCHANT MARINE IN WHAT SERVICE AND BRANCH DID YOU SERVE? *(e.g. U.S. Army: Field Artillery)* -

b. SERVICE OR SERIAL NUMBER -

c. DATE OF ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY -

d. RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF ENTRY -

e. DATE OF HONORABLE DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION -

f. RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION -

g. PRESENT RATE OR RANK IF ON ACTIVE DUTY -

22a. WHAT PERTINENT FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS HAVE YOU TAKEN? *(Give year, title, and grade received)* -

b. DO YOU HAVE A PERMANENT CIVIL SERVICE STATUS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

c. IF NOW EMPLOYED IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GIVE PRESENT GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE GS-14 Effective 17 Sept. 1950

23. HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR A POSITION UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR TAKEN AN EXAMINATION FOR A POSITION UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE PARTICULARS UNDER ITEM #37.

24. HAVE YOU EVER HELD A POSITION UNDER A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? *(Including service in the Armed Services of a Foreign power)*

☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

25. OUTLINE YOUR TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE ABROAD GIVING DATES, PURPOSE, AND PLACES. *(If not while in the Armed Forces give number, date, and place of issuance of American passport.)*

See employment with Department of State at Bogota, Colombia, Mexico City and Caracas, Venezuela.

26. FOREIGN LANGUAGES *(Name and indicate the extent of your competence, i.e. Excellent, Good, Fair).*

a. LANGUAGE	b. READ	c. WRITE	d. SPEAK	e. UNDERSTAND
Spanish	good	good	good	good

27. EDUCATION

a. GRADE SCHOOL — CIRCLE HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED 1 2 3 4 5 6 [✓ 7] 8

	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED		DEGREES CONFERRED	MAJOR SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
b. HIGH SCHOOLS OR PREPARATORY SCHOOLS	Bainbrige High Bainbridge, Ga.	1926	1931	5 yrs.		Diploma	-	- 21 Units
c. COLLEGES OR UNIVERSITIES	University of Georgia Athens, Ga.	1931	1935	4 yrs.		A.B.	Political Science	-
d. OTHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OR TRAINING SCHOOLS	University of Georgia Law School, Athens, Ga.	1935	1937	3 yrs.		LL.B.	Law	-

28. EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS. *(In the spaces provided below describe every position which you have held since you first began to work. Start with present position and work back to the first position which you held. Account for all periods of unemployment and state reasons of any unemployment indicated) Use continuation sheet if more space is required.*

PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(Month, year)*

FROM: Dec. 1949 TO: present

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT *(City, state)*

Washington, D.C.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER

Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

2 officers and 1 clerical

NAME AND TITLE OF YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

General Walter B. Smith

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE

Desire to return to foreign service

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION

Legal Liaison Officer

SALARY OR EARNINGS

STARTING $ 7000 PER YR.

PRESENT $ 8800 PER YR.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Handling legal matters and liaison with all other departments and agencies of U.S. government. Highly technical work involving immigration & naturalization laws, visa regulations and related matters.

IF CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, M[illegible]PPROACH PRESENT EMPLOYER? ☒ YES ☐ NO

FORM DSP-34

Continuation Sheet

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year)
FROM Sept. 1942 TO Jan. 1945

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state)
Mexico City and Bogota, Colombia

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
Dept. of State

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
7 officers and 14 clerical

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane
Ambassador George Messersmith

REASON FOR LEAVING
To return to the Dept. of Justice

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Attache

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $4600 PER YR.
FINAL $ 5600 PER YR.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Political information gathering and reporting and handling cases involving the proclaimed list of blocked nationals and trading with the enemy.

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year)
FROM: Jan. 1938 TO: Sept. 1942

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state)
Washington, D.C.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
Dept. of Justice

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
3 officers and 2 clerical

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Attorney General Homer Cummings

REASON FOR LEAVING
To enter foreign service.

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Attorney

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $3000 PER YR.
FINAL $4600 PER YR.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
Handling and supervising the handling of many and various types of Federal laws.

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year)
FROM: July 1937 TO: Jan. 1938

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state)
Bainbridge, Ga.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER
Self

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU
1 clerical

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
-

REASON FOR LEAVING
To join Dept. of Justice

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
Attorney-at-law

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ - PER YR.
FINAL $2000 PER YR.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
General practice of law. Handling cases involving administration of estates, abstracts of titles, contracts, torts, wills and criminal trials.

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year)
FROM: TO:

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

REASON FOR LEAVING

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

REMARKS

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year) FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Attache	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ [illegible] PER YR. FINAL $ 7000 PER YR.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state) Caracas, Venezuela	DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK Was assigned to Political Section. Had frequent contact with high foreign government officials. Gathered and reported political information. Handled matters of special interest for the Ambassador.	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER 2 officers and 3 clerical		
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU Ambassador Walter J. Donnelly		
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR CIA had special need for technical knowledge and I accepted the offer.		
REASON FOR LEAVING		

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year) FROM: June 1946 TO: Feb. 1947	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Attorney-at-law	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ - PER YR FINAL $ 5000 PER YR.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state) Bainbridge, Ga.	DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK Engaging in general practice of law, handling cases involving contracts, torts, wills and administration of estates, abstracts of titles and criminal trials.	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER Self - associated with father.		
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU 1 clerical		
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR -		
REASON FOR LEAVING To return to foreign service.		

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (Month, year) FROM: Jan. 1945 TO: June 1946	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Attorney	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 5600 PER YR. FINAL $ 6000 PER YR.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City, state) Washington, D.C.	DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK Supervising and handling cases involving many and various types of violations of Federal law.	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER Dept. of Justice		
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU 5 lawyers and 3 clerical		
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Hon. Tom Clark, Attorney General		
REASON FOR LEAVING To return to private law practice		

29. OTHER POSITIONS HELD FOR LESS THAN THREE MONTHS AND PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. (List—Beginning with most recent)

DURATION		POSITION	NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER OR REASON FOR UNEMPLOYMENT	STARTING AND FINAL SALARY PER ANNUM
FROM	TO			
		-		

30. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION?
☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

31a. HAVE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO	b. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN UNDER TREATMENT FOR A MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISORDER? ☐ YES ☒ NO
c. WITHIN THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS, HAVE YOU FREQUENTLY USED INTOXICATING BEVERAGES TO EXCESS? ☐ YES ☒ NO	d. HAVE YOU EVER HAD TUBERCULOSIS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
e. WERE YOU EVER MEDICALLY DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED FORCES? ☐ YES ☒ NO	IF ANY OF YOUR ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES" GIVE FULL PARTICULARS UNDER ITEM #37. -

14-00000

31.(a) DOES YOUR FINANCIAL POSITION PERMIT DISCHARGE OF ALL DEBTS AS INCURRED? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "NO" STATE UNDER ITEM #37 THE NAMES OF CREDITORS, AMOUNTS DUE TO EACH, AND DATES ON WHICH THE OBLIGATIONS WERE CONTRACTED.	(b) IF NOW RESIDING ABROAD HAVE YOU EVER PAID A U.S. INCOME TAX? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE YEAR AND OFFICE OF LAST PAYMENT.

33. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION THAT ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE?

☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER ITEM #37.

34. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY CIVIL OR MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN THE UNITED STATES OR IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY *(other than for minor traffic violations where the fine did not exceed $25?)* ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF SO, STATE UNDER ITEM #37 THE NAME AND LOCATION OF THE COURT, DATE, AND DETAILS OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION.

35. LIST THREE COMPETENT AND RESPONSIBLE PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY DEFINITE INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY *(do not give names of supervisors listed in answer to questions no. 28 or 29).*

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
Hon. A.B. Conger	Bainbridge, Ga.	U.S. District Judge
Hon. Fletcher Warren	Dept. of State Washington, D.C.	Ambassador-Diplomat
Dr. Gordon Chason	Bainbridge, Ga.	Physician-Surgeon

36. MENTION HERE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS OR ACHIEVEMENTS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN THIS APPLICATION. INCLUDE SUCH ITEMS AS ANY BOOKS OR ARTICLES YOU HAVE WRITTEN, SPECIAL RESEARCH WORK, TECHNICAL SKILLS, HONORARY OR PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY MEMBERSHIPS, AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION YOU CONSIDER PERTINENT. YOU MAY INCLUDE ANY PERTINENT RELIGIOUS, CIVIC, WELFARE, OR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY WHICH YOU HAVE PERFORMED EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, SHOWING THE NUMBER OF HOURS PER WEEK AND NUMBER OF WEEKS PER YEAR IN WHICH YOU WERE ENGAGED IN SUCH ACTIVITY.

Phi Kappa Phi (Honorary Scholastic Fraternity)
Blue Key National Honor Fraternity
Phi Delta Phi (Legal Fraternity)
Decatur County Bar Association, Bainbridge, Ga.
Georgia Bar Association, Atlanta, Ga.
American Bar Association

37. USE THIS SPACE FOR COMPLETING ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE FOREGOING QUESTIONS, NUMBERING ANSWER TO CORRESPOND WITH QUESTIONS. USE EXTRA SHEETS OF PAPER IF NECESSARY.

#23. Application No. 6343 for oral examination under the War Manpower Act, made in approximately February 1947.

Presently under provisions of Civil Service Retirement Act.

Draft Status: None
Reserve Status: None

CERTIFICATION

False Statement on this Application is Cause for Dismissal.

I DO SOLEMNLY AFFIRM THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.

Sept. 5 '57
DATE

NAME AS USUALLY WRITTEN AND WHICH WILL BE USED AS OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

OSO

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME O'NEAL, Birch D.	NATURE OF ACTION Trans. Funds
TITLE OF POSITION Intelligence Officer	GRADE GS-13
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Departmental	

Subject was found physically ☒ fit ☐ unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position.

RECOMMENDATIONS: And Overseas Duty

Paul V. Haagland
SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

3 April 1950
DATE

FORM NO. 38-57
NOV 1948

14-00000

1073

(2

Form [illegible]
(November 1941)

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CERTIFICATE OF MEDICAL EXAMINATION

Applicant must fill in dotted lines below to heavy line

BIRCH D. O'NEAL (Name) — 211 EVANS ST. BAINBRIDGE GA. (Post office address)

Male (Sex) — June 1, 1913 (Date of birth) — MEDICAL. (Title of examination taken)

(Department and bureau in which you are to be employed) — Caracas, Venezuela (City or town in which you are to be employed)

1. Have you any physical defect or disease or disability whatsoever? yes

2. If answer is "yes" give details Malaria, Amebic dysentery

PHYSICIAN SHOULD FILL IN THE FOLLOWING

X 72 3/4 inches (Height, without shoes) — *185 pounds (Weight, in clothing) — 180. pounds (Weight, without clothing) — Males, with and without clothing; females, clothed, but without wrap or hat.

*To be taken for males only upon special written request of the official ordering examination.

Items checked (✓) were examined and found normal. Deviations from normal are noted. (See instructions on reverse side, numbered to correspond with items below.)

1. **Eyes:** Distant vision: Without glasses: Right: 20/20 Left: 20/20 With glasses if worn: Right: —/20 Left: —/20

Near vision:

What is the longest and the shortest distance at which the following specimens of Jaeger No. 1 and Jaeger No. 2 can be read by the applicant? If No. 1 is read with ease, No. 2 need not be given. Test each eye separately.

With the view of promoting health and efficiency and of minimizing accidents among Federal employees, the heads of the several executive departments and independent establishments having a medical personnel are directed to make such physical examination of applicants for (Jaeger No. 1)

Without glasses: R. 4 in. to 18 in. L. 4 in. to 18 in.
With glasses, if used: R. — in. to — in. L. — in. to — in.

and employees in the Federal classified service as may be requested by the Civil Service Commission or its authorized representative.
This order will supplement the Executive orders of May 20 and June 18, 1923 (Executive order, September 4, 1924). (Jaeger No. 2)

Without glasses: R. 4 in. to 18 in. L. 4 in. to 18 in.
With glasses, if used: R. — in. to — in. L. — in. to — in.

Evidence of disease or injury: Right no Left no. —

Color vision: Is color vision normal when Ishihara or other color plate test is used? yes.

If not, can applicant pass lantern, yarn or other comparable test? —

2. **Ears:** (Consider denominators indicated here as normal. Record as numerators the greatest distance heard.) Ordinary conversation: Right ear 20/20 ft. Left ear 20/20 ft. Evidence of disease or injury: Right ear no Left ear no. —

3. Nose, sinus disease, etc. ✓
4. Mouth and throat ✓
5. Gastro-intestinal ✓
6. Thyroid (especially in women) ✓
7. Heart and blood vessels ✓
   Blood pressure: Mm. Hg. systolic 128 Mm. Hg. diastolic 80. —
   Is organic heart disease present? no If organic heart disease is present, is it fully compensated? —
8. Lungs: Right ✓ Left ✓
   History of tuberculosis? no If so, has the disease been arrested for at least 1 year? —
   If there is a history of tuberculosis, is any type of collapse therapy being received at present? (If so, give full details under remarks.) —
9. Hernia none. — (If present, name variety: Inguinal, ventral, femoral, etc.; read definition on reverse before answering)
   If present, is it supported by a well-fitting truss?
10. Varicose veins none. (If present, state location and degree)
    Varicocele (*see note 10 on reverse side*) none
11. Feet: Is flat foot present? no Degree of impairment of function — (None, slight, moderate, severe)
12. Deformities, atrophies, and other abnormalities, diseases, or defects not included above Malaria [illegible] recurrence (9.42).
13. Scars of serious injury or disease appendectomy (McBurney). —
14. Nervous system (*see note 14 on reverse side*) ✓
    Is there any history of a "nervous breakdown"? no.
    If hospitalized, give name of hospital and location —
15. (a) Urinalysis (*see reverse side*) — (b) Venereal disease no.
16. Obtain from applicant statement of disabilities, past and present, give diagnosis and your comments under "Remarks."
17. Does Veterans Administration recognize service-connected disability in this case no (Yes or no) If "yes," cover in your comments.
18. Has examinee ever received disability retirement from U. S. Civil Service Commission? no. (Yes or no)

16—1023-1 **This certificate is to be returned to the official requesting the examination** [OVER]

14-00000

The aim of the Executive order September 4, 1921, under which this examination is made, is to obtain information as to the physical condition of appointees to the classified civil service with a view to promoting efficiency and minimizing accidents and claims under United States *employees'* compensation laws.

Notes for Examining Physician

WEIGHT.—Males, without *clothing*, and also in ordinary clothing without overcoat or hat (weigh twice); females, clothed, but without wrap or hat. If *overweight*, state whether due to bone and muscle or to fat.

HEIGHT.—Without boots or *shoes*, observe that no appliances are used to increase.

The examination should include the following observations:

1. **Eyes.**—Ptosis; discharge; *corneal* scar; pterygium. In recording distant vision consider *20 feet* as normal and report all vision as a fraction with 20 feet as numerator and the smallest type read at 20 feet as *denominator*. If glasses are used, record for each eye the *finding* with and without glasses. Near vision must be reported. *In* testing vision without glasses the applicant or appointee should be instructed to *remove the glasses at least one-half hour before testing uncorrected vision.*

2. **Ears.**—Evidence of middle ear or mastoid disease; condition of drums; discharge. In *recording* hearing, record 20 feet as normal distance for *conversational* voice and record deviation from normal as fraction with 20 as denominator and actual distance as numerator.

3. **Nose.**—Ability to blow *through* each nostril. If free, a speculum examination would *not* be indicated.

4. **Mouth and throat.**—Missing teeth, pyorrhea; tonsils, hypertrophy or disease.

5. **Gastro-intestinal.**—*Ulcers, inflammations, etc.*

6. **Thyroid.**—Presence of *tumor* in neck and tremor, exophthalmos; nervous high-strung *disposition*, especially in women.

7. **Heart.**—Murmurs. State whether functional or organic. If valvular disease exists, state *whether* or not it is fully compensated. Arteriosclerosis.

8. **Lungs.**—It is necessary that the auscultatory cough be used. If tuberculosis is present, state whether active or arrested; if arrested, state your opinion as to how long it has been quiescent. Sputum to be examined for tubercle bacilli in all suspected cases.

9. **Hernia.**—Give details as to size, location, etc., and whether well-fitting truss is worn. Inguinal hernia exists when ring is enlarged and on coughing visceral impulse is felt which follows the finger on withdrawal.

10. **Varicocele.**—If varicocele is present, state approximate size—*e. g.*, size of walnut, lemon, etc.

11. Flat feet of such a nature as to incapacitate or become aggravated by work or be alleged later to have been caused by accident or occupation. By "flat foot," as used in this form, is meant a weak foot with impaired function, the term being equivalent to "fallen or misplaced arch," an abnormal condition. Impairment of function is the point to be noted. An anatomically flat foot, but strong, is not disqualifying.

12 and 13. Scars, deformities, atrophies, and paralyses should be noted, but it is not important that small insignificant scars or blemishes which might be referred to as marks of identification be recorded.

14. This entry should include symptoms and full history of any mental or nervous abnormality.

15. Urinalysis to be made in case of persons over 40, and in all cases where arteriosclerosis, nephritis, or diabetes is suspected, and when obesity is found on examination.

Record of urinalysis, if made: *Sp. gr.* .... Albumen .... Sugar .... Casts ....

If tachycardia is present, give *pulse* rate: Sitting .... Immediately after exercise .... Two minutes after exercise .... *Cardiac reserve* ....
(Good, fair, or poor)

I have found this applicant ab*normal* under the following headings: ....

In my opinion, applicant is *capable* of performing duties involving Moderate physical exertion.
(Arduous, moderate, or light)

REMARKS:
History of malaria, last recurrence 1942.

(*Signature of applicant*) Birch D. O'Neal
(This space to be filled in, as a matter of identification, by the applicant in own hand writing and in ink, in the presence of the physician)

Washington D.C.
(Place of examination)

Feb. 11 - 1947 -
(Date of examination)

The examining physician must be a duly licensed doctor of medicine (M. D.)

Pedro A. [illegible], M.D.
(Signature of examining physician)

....
(If in Federal medical service, give title and branch)

Full time? .... Part time? .... Fee paid? ....

The personnel officer should fill in the blanks below before sending this form to the Commission for action

To be appointed in ....
(Department) (Bureau)

Title of position ....

Type of appointment (check): ☐ Original appointment ☐ Transfer ☐ Reinstatement ☐ Classification

Number of certificate upon which applicant's name appears (to be given in case of original appointment) ....

NAME	GRADE	SERIAL NO.	AGE	WARD

PART TO BE EXAMINED (OR TREATED)

CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS (INCLUDE OPERATIONS)

HOSPITAL	DATE	SIGNATURE
		, M. C.

Neg.

, M.C.

Film No. [illegible] Date 11 [illegible] 47

RADIOLOGIC REPORT

W D A G O Form 8-68 1 December 1944
This form supersedes W. D., M. D. Form MK-2, 9 June 1942, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

16-40777-1 U S GPO

OSS Form 1180b
(Rev. 5/12/45)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D. C.

FBT HKA rP9

11 February 1947 (5)

O'Neal, Birch D. was given a physical examination on this date and found qualified for

☒ Full Duty Overseas

☐ Limited Duty Overseas

☐ Duty in USA Only

Profile Serial (For Army EM only) ☐☐☐☐☐☐

Defects Noted:

Ulceration- left ankle and tarsal regions; result of 370 degree burn(26Dec47). This man is not qualified for overseas until the ulcer is healed, probably needs skin graft.
Feb 27-Skin graft, ulcer completely healed; fit for duty overseas.
Immunization completed 28 Feb 47.

Pedro M Souza Maj M.C.
PEDRO M. SOUZA, MAJ. M.C.

jd

(76991)

MEDICAL CLEARANCE

(CIVILIAN)

11 February 1947

CERTIFICATE NO. 1

This is to certify that **Birch D. O'Neal**

was given a physical examination on this date and found

fit - xxxxt for service outside the United States.

John R. Tietjen

JOHN R TIETJEN, 1st. Lt. MC

X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X-X

15 March 1947

CERTIFICATE NO. 2

This is to certify that **Birch D. O'Neal**

was given a physical inspection on this date and found

free of any communicable diseases.

John R. Tietjen

JOHN R. TIETJEN, 1st. Lt. MC

Explanatory Note: Certificate No. 1 is issued after a complete physical examination has been made to determine the individual's physical fitness for foreign service. Certificate No. 2 is issued after a physical inspection. It should be done within 48 hours prior to departure.

FORM NO. 37-30
JAN 1947

(230)

14-00000

SECRET
When Filled In

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO 058553	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) CNEAL BIRCH D	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH 06/01/13	5. SCHEDULE GRADE STEP GS-16-05
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT CI	9. LOCATION (City, Country) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
VENEZUELA	PCS XX	47/09/18	49/12/01
GUATEMALA	PCS XX	51/12/01	54/04/01
AFRICA	TDY XX	54/07/01	54/08/01
MEXICO	TDY XX	55/04/01	55/04/01
VENEZUELA	TDY XX	56/07/01	56/07/01
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY XX	56/10/01	56/11/01

CORRECTED BELOW

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
VENEZUELA	PCS	47/09/18	49/12/20
GUATEMALA	PCS	51/12/20	54/4/30
AFRICA & WESTERN EUROPE	TDY	54/7/26	54/8/27
MEXICO	TDY	55/4/19	55/4/28
EUROPE	TDY	55/11/8	55/12/10
VENEZUELA	TDY	56/7/17	56/7/24
EUROPE	TDY	56/10/24	56/11/19
MEXICO	TDY	60/10/20	60/10/25

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 2 Jun 67
INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	HISTORY, GENERAL	GA UNIV	35
BACH	LAW, GENERAL	GA UNIV	37

FORM 1-67 444J
Mfg 2-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

6 7 JUN ENTD

(4 51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III	EDUCATION (Cont'd)			
	HIGH SCHOOL			
LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)		YEARS ATTENDED (From - To)	GRADUATE
BAINBRIDGE HIGH	BAINBRIDGE GEORGIA USA		1927-1931	☑ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM. QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ATHENS, GA.	HISTORY		1931-1935	A.B.	1935	DON'T RECALL
2 LUMPKIN LAW SCHOOOL OF UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ATHENS, GA	LAW		1935-1937	LL.B.	1937	9 QUTS.
3						
4						

5 IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1 NONE				
2				
3				

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1 F.B.I. SPECIAL AGENTS WASHINGTON D.C.	INVESTIGATIONS - LAW ENFORCEMENT	10 JAN 1938	APRIL 1938	14 WEEKS
2 DITTO (PERIODIC IN-SERVICE	DITTO RETRAINING)			8 WEEKS TOTAL
3				
4 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP WASHINGTON D.C.	INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION	1947 FEB	1947 MAR	3 WEEKS
5				

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1 NONE				
2				
3				
4				
5				

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Ecuador	- temporary residence	1942-FEB-- June 1942		X	X		X
Colombia	" "	Oct 1942--June 1943		X	X		X
Mexico	" "	1942--Dec 1943		X	X		X
Venezuela	"	March 1947--Dec 1949		X	X		X
Guatemala	"	Dec 1951--Apr 1954		X	X		X
Western Europe	None	(Jul-Aug 1954 (Nov-Dec 1955			X X		X X
SOUTH AFRICA	NONE	(Oct-Nov 1956 JULY-AUG 1954			X X		X X
Mexico c1-60	None	April 1955 October 1960	Travel only				X X
Mexico	"	1962			X		

In temp. residence countries gained special knowledge police, investigative systems and practices, local politics, both historical and then current.

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

NONE

1 TYPING (WPM)
2 SHORTHAND (WPM)
3 INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY
4 INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1 LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Baseball - good
Football - good
Tennis - fair
Tract - fair
Fishing - good
Hunting - good

2 EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

None

3 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4 IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

Attorney at Law, State of Georgia 1937

5 FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue) 1937

6 LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue) NO OTHERS REQUIRED

7 LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

None

8 INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

None

9 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

Highschool and college debating and service club speeches ~~for FBI.~~

SECRET

SECTION VII — **MILITARY SERVICE**

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. — specify)

2. BRANCH OR CORPS

3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty) FROM TO

4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. — specify)

5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation if past service)

6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

MILITARY RESERVE NATIONAL GUARD STATUS None

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED		
1	University of Georgia, Athens, Ga.	Basic ROTC	1933	☐	RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
2				☐	RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
3				☐	RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
4.				☐	RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED
5.				☐	RESIDENT CORRESPONDENCE AGENCY SPONSORED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	MARITAL STATUS		
1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY	married		
2. NAME OF SPOUSE Last O'NEAL	First Gladys	Middle Frances	Maiden PAULY
3. DATE OF BIRTH 30 April 1920	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Glenpool, Oklahoma		
5. OCCUPATION Housewife	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER None		
7. CITIZENSHIP United States	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (COUNTRY(IES)) None	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED Birth	

SECTION X — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Birch D. Jr.	Son	Caracas, Venezuela	U.S.	Bethesda, Maryland
Melinda Pauly	Daughter	12 June 1950	U.S.	Bethesda, Maryland

SECTION XI — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
Society of Former Special Agents, FBI	New York, N.Y.	1946	1967
Kappa Alpha Order	University of Georgia, Athens, Ga.	1932	1937
~~" " " Alumni~~	~~Chapter, Washington, D.C.~~	~~1954~~	~~1967~~
I am a member of the National Genealogical Society, Sunderland Pl. Washington, D.C.			
Camellia Society of the Potomac Valley. ~~Kappa Alpha Social Fraternity~~			
Phi Kappa Phi National Scholastic Fraternity, University of Georgia			
~~Law School Alumni Society of University of Georgia~~ and Alumni Society			
and so far as I know, no other organization of any kind ~~excepting a church.~~			

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
5 May 1967	Birch D. O'Neal

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERI IC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE
21 January 1959

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
O'NEAL BIRCH DILWORTH

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
4623 High Street
Chevy Chase, Maryland

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
211 Evans Street
Bainbridge, Georgia

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
Oliver 4-6074

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
Temporary-Maryland; Permanent-Georgia

SECTION II PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
O'NEAL MASTON E.

2. RELATIONSHIP
Brother

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country).
Alice Street, Bainbridge, Georgia

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
Decatur County Courthouse, Bainbridge, Georgia

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
191 J

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
4

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
----

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
My mother should not be notified directly but only through one of my brothers or my sister

SECTION III MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE XX MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First) Gladys (Middle) Frances (Maiden) Pauly (Last) O'Neal

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
27 March 1945

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)
Tulsa Oklahoma USA

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)
220 East 27th Place, Tulsa, Oklahoma

7. LIVING
X YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH
----

9. CAUSE OF DEATH
----

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)
4623 High Street, Chevy Chase, Maryland

11. DATE OF BIRTH
30 April 1920

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
Glenpool Oklahoma USA

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY
----

14. PLACE OF ENTRY
----

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
USA

16. DATE ACQUIRED
Birth

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
Oklahoma

18. OCCUPATION
Homemaker

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR
-------- ------

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
----

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
----

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
American Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico 1940 - 1945

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): STEPHENS CHARLES PRESTON
2. RELATIONSHIP: First Cousin
3. AGE: 44
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Caracas, Venezuela - Manager Coca Cola Co. interests
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country): USA
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: Approximately 2 or 3 letters annually
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: May 1958

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO
2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.
3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO
4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.
5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
The City Bank	Penn. Avenue, Washington, D. C.
First State National Bank	Bainbridge, Georgia

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
USA

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First papers, etc.)*

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS
☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED *(Specify)*
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING *(Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)*

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HDQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING
England & So.Africa	Intelligence Services	July-august 1954	TDY		
Sweden		October 1956	TDY		
Germany		Oct.-Nov. 1956	TDY		
Italy, Greece		Week Each 1955	TDY		
France		Three days 1955	TDY		

SECTION IX — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING *(W.P.M.)*

2. SHORTHAND *(W.P.M.)*

3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING *(Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)*

SECTION X — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION *(Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.)*, INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of issue)*

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of issue)*

SECRET

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) March 1947 - December 1949
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT WH Division -DDP
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION Seven
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station - Intelligence Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Collecting and supervising collection of intelligence as Chief of Station

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) January 1950 - June 1950
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT WH Division - DDP
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 12
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Branch Chief - Intelligence Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Supervising and directing the collection and dissemination of intelligence information as Branch Chief

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) June 1950 - December 1951
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Office of Inspection & Security
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 5
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief, Alien Affairs Branch
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Liaison with Immigration and Naturalization Service and Passport and Visa Divisions of Department of State in relation to aliens of operational interest. Facilitating entry and exit and naturalization.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) January 1952 - April 1954
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT WH Division - DDP
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 7
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station - Intelligence Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Supervising collection and collecting intelligence as Chief of Station

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) June 1954 - 10 April 1955
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Office of Security
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION None
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Conducting special investigations for the Director of Security

(See page 6) (Use additional pages if required)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Frances P. O'Neal	Wife	1920		X	USA	Chevy Chase, Md.
Birch Jr.	Son	1947	X		USA	Chevy Chase, Md.
Melinda P.	Daughter	1950		X	USA	Chevy Chase, Md.

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

From 10 April 1955 to present I have been Chief of the Special Investigations Division of the Counter Intelligence Staff DDP conducting investigations and supervising five officers and four clerical employees in relation to investigations of a sensitive nature envolving operational security matters.

DATE COMPLETED: 21 January 1959

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: BIRCH D. O'NEAL Birch D. O'Neal

SECRET

14-00000

Standard Form 57—June 1948
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R046.

INSTRUCTIONS—Answer every question [illegible] fully and completely. Typewrite or write in INK. If you are applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and [illegible] directions. Mail this application to the office named in the announcement [illegible]. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION No.

1. Name of examination, or kind of position applied for.

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. Place of employment applied for:

4. Mr. Mrs. Miss (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
[illegible]irch Ellworth [illegible]

5. Street and number or R. D. number:
4[illegible] [illegible]ine Street

City or post office (including postal zone), and State.
[illegible], Georgia

ANNOUNCEMENT

6. Legal or voting residence (State): Georgia
7. Office phone No.: [illegible]
Home phone: [illegible]

8. Place of birth (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Bainbridge, Georgia

9. Date of birth (month, day, year): June 1, 191[illegible]
10. Age last birthday: [illegible]
11. ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. ☒ Married ☐ Single
13. Height without shoes: 6 feet 1 inches Weight 1[illegible] pounds

SELECTION No.

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No
If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Appor ☐ Non-appor	Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned	Entered register.
Notations.	App. Review: Approved:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.) ☐ 10 points ☐ Wife or Widow ☐ Disal. ☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		X
3 to 6 months?		X
6 to 12 months?		X
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— to Washington, D. C.?	X	
anywhere in the United States?	X	
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations.

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept: $ 6000 per year.
You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify: ☐ Occasionally ☒ Frequently ☐ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the spaces provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent [illegible] civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience).
(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.
(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (Month, year)
From: June 1, 19[illegible] To present time

Exact title of your present position: Attorney-at-law

Salary or earnings.
Starting, $ — per
Present, $ — per

Place of employment (city and State): Bainbridge, Georgia

Description of your work: General law practice

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Self

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Attorney-at-law

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: 1 - Secretary

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Not applicable

Reason for desiring to change employment: To enter foreign fi[illegible]

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16. CONTINUED

Dates of employment (Month, year) From [illegible] To [illegible]
Place of employment (city and State): Washington, D.C.
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Law enforcement
Number and kind of employees supervised by you: Up to 50, investigative & clerical
Name and title of immediate supervisor: J. E. Hoover
Reason for leaving: To return to practice of law.
Exact title of your position: Special Agent
Salary or earnings: Starting $ [illegible] per [illegible] Final $ [illegible] per [illegible]
Description of your work: Conduct of investigations of [illegible] of the [illegible] of the United States, collecting evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party in interest, and performing such other duties [illegible] by law.

Dates of employment (Month, year) From To
Place of employment (city and State):
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division:
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.).
Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
Name and title of immediate supervisor:
Reason for leaving:
Exact title of your position
Salary or earnings: Starting $ per Final $ per
Description of your work:

Dates of employment (Month, year) From To
Place of employment (city and State):
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, or division.
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.).
Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
Name and title of immediate supervisor:
Reason for leaving:
Exact title of your position
Salary or earnings: Starting $ per Final $ per
Description of your work:

Dates of employment (Month, year) From: To
Place of employment (city and State):
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division:
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.).
Number and kind of employees supervised by you.
Name and title of immediate supervisor:
Reason for leaving:
Exact title of your position.
Salary or earnings: Starting $ per Final $ per
Description of your work:

If more space is required, use a continuation [illegible] Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this [illegible] Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to [illegible]

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE. In order to [illegible] the [illegible] placements of war veterans detailed [illegible] the training and experience they have acquired in the Armed Services [illegible] for each service school you have attended. If you attended no special or technical schools while in the service write in Item (a) "N[illegible] service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all important changes in duty assignment, showing dates of such assignment.

(a) First Special Service School attended

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From To

Rating received at end of the training

(b) What were you taught in First Special Service School?

(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School):

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From To

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?

(e) Second Special Service School attended

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(f) What were you taught in Second Special Service School?

(g) Duty assignment after this training:

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From To

(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION —Circle highest grade completed: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 ⑫

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of:

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☐ Senior High School

(a) Give name and location of last high school attended

Bainbridge [illegible] School, Bainbridge, [illegible]

(b) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired.

-

(c) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended From—	Dates Attended To—	Years Completed Day	Years Completed Night	Degrees Conferred Title	Degrees Conferred Date	Semester Hours Credit
Univers[illegible] of Georgia, Athens, Ga.	History	1931	1935	[illegible]		A.B.	1935	?
Univers[illegible] of Georgia Law School	Law	1935	1937	[illegible]		LL.B.	1937	?

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
History	?	Law	?
English	?		
[illegible]	?		

(e) Other training such as vocational, business study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school), or "in-service training" in a Federal agency:

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended From—	Dates Attended To—	Years Completed Day	Years Completed Night
14 weeks F.B.I. training school for Special Agents				
Approximately five F.B.I. "In-service" schools of two [illegible]	[illegible]			

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages	Reading Exc.	Reading Good	Reading Fair	Speaking Exc.	Speaking Good	Speaking Fair	Underst'ng Exc.	Underst'ng Good	Underst'ng Fair
Spanish		x			x			x	
French			x			x			x

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?

Six weeks' intensive training in Spanish in F.B.I. [illegible] Latin [illegible]. French in school.

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries, indicate (1) names of countries (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e.g., business, education, recreation).

[illegible] Colombia [illegible] F.B.I.

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use such as operation of short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices.

Approximate number of words per minute in typing ...... shorthand ......

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)

☒ Yes ☐ No Give kind of license and State: Attorney-at-law Georgia

First license or certificate (year): 1937 Georgia

Latest license or certificate (year) 19[illegible] License permanent

22. Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application such as
(a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(b) your patents or inventions
(c) public speaking and public relations experience
(d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

Have had extensive public speaking and public relations experience, particularly as Assistant Special Agent in Charge of F.B.I. field office.
Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity.
[illegible]

[illegible]

23. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. (Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 17, EXPERIENCE.)

FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
2. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
3. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?		
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		
28. Since your 16th birthday have you ever been convicted or fined, or imprisoned or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail, for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes" list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes" give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes" give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating if retired from military or naval service.		
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county or municipality? If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 38.		
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by whom employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		
33. Have you ever had a nervous break-down? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? If your answer is "Yes" give complete details in Item 38.		
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?		
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?		
(c) Was service performed on an active full-time basis, with full military pay and allowances?		

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service.	Date of separation or separations.
-	-

Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	Serial No. In case, give grade or rating at time of separation.)
-	-

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (NO. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY, OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has a service-connected disability?		

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c) OR (d) IS "YES" AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19....

Agency

Title

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions (indicate item numbers to which answers apply).

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80).

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date January .., 1947.

Signature of applicant

(Sign your name in INK (use given name, initial, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name, as "Mrs. Mary A. Doe".)

GPO 16-47296-4

SECRET

TO : Security Officer, OSO

Date: 20 February 1950

FROM : COMMO

SUBJECT: Communications Debriefing of Birch D. O'Neal

The above named individual has been debriefed by this office and a copy of the debriefing statement is attached for inclusion in the individual files.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION:

L. WISNER RAY

cc with Attachment:

SKD ✓
CTD

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

SIGNAL SECURITY AND CONTROL SECTION

COMMUNICATIONS DEBRIEFING

I, BIRCH D. O'NEAL, do solemnly swear (or affirm) not to divulge any classified information concerning the communications of the Central Intelligence Agency as to organization, personnel, location, methods of operation, cryptographic systems, communications channels and facilities used.

I do further solemnly swear (or affirm) that I shall not discuss, divulge, publish or cause to be published any information concerning the cryptographic facilities, systems, or procedures employed by other United States Government Departments or Agencies of which I am cognizant by virtue of my communications duties with C.I.A.

I do further swear (or affirm) that I shall not discuss, divulge, publish or cause to be published any classified information or intelligence of which I am cognizant by virtue of my communications duties with CIA unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.

I have read the provisions of the Espionage Act and understand that after severing my relations with the Communications Division, C.I.A., I am still bound by that Act and if it is violated, I am subject to its penalties.

I do further solemnly swear (or affirm) that no classified papers, booklets, material, or equipment remain in my possession and that all communications properties, classified and unclassified, have been returned to the proper authorities of Communications Division, C.I.A.

I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

Signed: Birch D. O'Neal

Dated: 20 February 1950

Witness: Hugh A Dooley

Position: Chief, Security Section

Date: 20 February 1950

Form 2205

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions:

1. Answer all questions *completely*. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use a separate sheet for extra details on *any* question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Attach 2 recent passport size pictures to this form, date taken written on the back of each.
3. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will *not* receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME Miss / Mr. / Mrs. Birch Dilworth O'Neal TELEPHONE 312J

PRESENT ADDRESS 402 Pine St. (St. & No.) Bainbridge (City) Georgia (State) U.S.A. (Country)

LEGAL RESIDENCE 402 Pine St. (St. & No.) Bainbridge (City) Georgia (State) U.S.A. (Country)

B. NICKNAME None ANY OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? Not applicable

HOW LONG? Not applicable IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS Not applicable (When)

Not applicable (Where) Not applicable (By What Authority?)

C. DATE OF BIRTH June 1, 1913 PLACE OF BIRTH Bainbridge (City) Georgia (State) U.S.A. (Country)

RACIAL ORIGIN THROUGH MOTHER Anglo-Saxon THROUGH FATHER ANGLO-SAXON

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE? Not applicable

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # Not applicable ISSUED Not applicable (Date) BY Not applicable (Court)

AT Not applicable (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No WHAT? Not applicable

(663) HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? Not applicable ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? No

GIVE PARTICULARS: Not applicable

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS: Not applicable

E. LAST U.S. PASSPORT: NUMBER, DATE AND PLACE OF ISSUE Issued Washington D. C. 1942 actual date of issuance and number unknown.

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? one GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES: Was issued latter part of January or first part of February 1942 at Washington D. C.

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS? None

F. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? Not applicable

PORT OF ENTRY? ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY?

LAST U.S. VISA Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 33 SEX Male HEIGHT 6 feet 1 in. WEIGHT 185

EYES Brown HAIR Brown COMPLEXION Medium SCARS cut scar left cheek appendectomy

BUILD Slender OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES None

SEC. 3. FATHER (Give the same information for Step-father and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Maston (First) Emmett (Middle) O'Neal (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 402 Pine St. (St. & No.) Bainbridge, (City) Ga. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH March 24,1875 PLACE OF BIRTH Bainbridge (City) Ga. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED? At Birth WHERE? Bainbridge (City) Ga. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

OCCUPATION Attorney at Law LAST EMPLOYER Self

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS County Court House (St. & No.) Bainbridge (City) Ga. (State) U. S. A. (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM None (Date) TO (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE None

COUNTRY None DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

Solicitor of [illegible] Court of Bainbridge [illegible]04 to present excepting 1928 to 1932.

(663)

SEC. 4. MOTHER (Giv[illegible]e sa[illegible]tion for Step-mother on a se[illegible]sheet)

FULL NAME Bessie Birch Matthews (First) O'Neal (Maiden) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT. OR LAST. ADDRESS 402 Pine St, (St. & No.) Bainbridge (City) Georgia (State), U.S.A. (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH May 23, 1885 PLACE OF BIRTH Thomaston (City) Georgia (State) U. S. A. (Country)

CITIZENSHIP U. S. A. WHEN ACQUIRED? At Birth WHERE? Thomaston (City) Ga. (State) U. S. A. (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife and parttime music teacher LAST EMPLOYER self

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 402 Pine St. (St. & No.) Bainbridge (City) Ga. (State) U. S. A. (Country)

DETAILS OF GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN None

SEC. 5. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

FULL NAME Maston Emmett O'Neal Jr. (First) (Middle) (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 551 Academy St. (St. & No.) Bainbridge (City) Georgia (State) U.S.A. (Country)

FULL NAME Allan (First) Matthews (Middle) O'Neal (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS UNKNOWN (St. & No.) King of Prussia (City) Pennsylvania (State) U.S.A. (Country)

FULL NAME Mrs. Elisabeth Ann (First) O'Neal (Middle) Plowden (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 202 College St. (St. & No.) Bainbridge (City) Georgia (State) U. S. A. (Country)

SEC. 6. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE No MARRIED Yes DIVORCED No WIDOWED No

STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE

Neither separated nor divorced.

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE REQUIRED DATA FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES)

NAME Gladys (First) Frances (Middle;) Pauly (for wife, maiden) O'Neal (Last) PLACE Tulsa Okla. DATE OF MARRIAGE 3/27/45

(HER OR HIS) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 227 E. 27th Place, (St. & No.) Tulsa, (City) Okla. (State) USA (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 402 Pine St. (St. & No.) Bainbridge (City) Ga. (State) U. S. A. (Country)

(663)

SEC. 6. MARITAL STATUS (Cont'd)

DATE OF BIRTH April 30,1920 PLACE OF BIRTH Glennpool (City) ,Okla. (State) USA (Country)

RACIAL ORIGIN THROUGH FATHER French and German THROUGH MOTHER French andEnglish

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? At Birth WHERE? Glennpool, (City) Okla. (State) USA (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER U.S.Foreign Service

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS Dept. of State, (St. & No.) Washington (City) D. C. (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM None (Date) TO (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

Only government or foreign service has been as a clerk in the U. S. Foreign Service assigned to U.SEmbassy , Mexico City, 1941-1945.

SEC. 7. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Frank (First) Robert (Middle) Pauly (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 220 E. 27th Place (St. & No.) Tulsa (City) Oklahoma (State) USA (Country)

RACIAL ORIGIN French and German BIRTH 2/4/92 (Date) Edmond (City) Okla. USA (Country)

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED? At Birth WHERE? Edmond (City) OKLA. (State) USA (Country)

SEC. 8. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Grace Gladys (First) Merchant (Maiden) Pauly (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 220 E.27th Place (St. & No.) Tulsa (City) Oklahoma (State) USA (Country)

RACIAL ORIGIN French and English BIRTH August4,1891 (Date) LaFayette, (City) Ind. USA (Country)

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? At Birth WHERE? LaFayette, (City) Indiana (State) USA (Country)

SEC. 9. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

NAME None RELATIONSHIP AGE

NATIONALITY ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

NATIONALITY ADDRESS (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

NATIONALITY ADDRESS (St. & No.) (State) (Country)

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOO[illegible]AGE OR ADOPTION, WHO [illegible] ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF A FOREIGN POWER ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS:

NAME NONE RELATIONSHIP AGE
NATIONALITY ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
NATIONALITY ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
NATIONALITY ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE—U.S. OR FOREIGN:

NAME None RELATIONSHIP AGE
NATIONALITY ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
NATIONALITY ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
NATIONALITY ADDRESS St. & No. City State Country
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

SEC. 12. GIVE *FIVE* CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U.S.—(Give business addresses where possible)

NAME: Mr. Robert R. Gunn ADDRESS Milledge Ave. Athens Ga. (St. & No. City State)
NAME: Mr. A.B. Conger ADDRESS O'Neal Building Bainbridge, Ga. (St. & No. City State)
NAME: Mr. M.C. Barwick ADDRESS C&S Bank Building Atlanta Ga. (St. & No. City State)
NAME: Mr. R. G. Leddy ADDRESS [illegible] Building, Washington, D.C. (St. & No. City State)
NAME: Mr. Arthur M. Thurston ADDRESS [illegible] Building, Washington, D.C. (St. & No. City State)

(863)

SEC. 13. NAMES OF 5 PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES. NOT REFERENCES OR EMPLOYERS—(Give business addresses where possible)

1. NAME Mr. [illegible] ADDRESS: [illegible] Washington, D.C. St. & No. City State
2. NAME Mr. [illegible] Hill ADDRESS: [illegible] St. & No. City State
3. NAME Bernard [illegible] ADDRESS: Bainbridge, Georgia St. & No. City State
4. NAME Mr. Jack [illegible] Roy ADDRESS: [illegible], Georgia St. & No. City State
5. NAME Mr. Nathan Frankel ADDRESS: 50 Pine St., New York City St. & No. City State

SEC. 14. GIVE *THREE* NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME: Mr. Clifford Footen ADDRESS 306 South [illegible] Street, Bainbridge, Ga. St. & No. City State
NAME: Mr. Ernest Sullivan ADDRESS 700 Potter Street, Bainbridge, Ga. St. & No. City State
NAME: Mr. Dick Turner ADDRESS 404 Pine Street, Bainbridge, Ga. St. & No. City State

SEC. 15. EDUCATION

SCHOOL: Bainbridge Grammar ADDRESS Bainbridge City Georgia State U.S.A. Country
DATES ATTENDED: 1919 -1927 DEGREE Diploma
SCHOOL: Bainbridge High ADDRESS Bainbridge City Georgia State U.S.A. Country
DATES ATTENDED: 1927-1931 DEGREE Diploma
COLLEGE: University of Georgia ADDRESS Athens City Georgia State U.S.A. Country
DATES ATTENDED: 1931 - 1935 DEGREE A. B.
COLLEGE: University of Georgia Law School ADDRESS Athens City Georgia State U.S.A. Country
DATES ATTENDED: 1935-1937 DEGREE LL.B.

SEC. 16. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

U.S.A. Country F.B.I. Service Special Agent Rank 19[illegible] - 1946 Dates
Albany, New York Last Station - Serial No. Voluntary resignation Type of discharge - Com. Officer

REMARKS:

(663)

SEC. 17. SELECTIVE SERVICE [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION 4A ORDER NO. 814A APPROX. INDUCTION DATE Unknown

BOARD NO. 1 ADDRESS Bainbridge, Georgia

IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON Was deferred during the war upon request of The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

SEC. 18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED FROM ANY POSITION, OR LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE? PLEASE GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 19. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? No IF "YES," EXPLAIN:

DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS? I have and do on occasions take a drink of intoxicating liquor socially but am not addicted to its use nor do I use it excessively.

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE No.

SEC. 20. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME Not applicable

NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

First State National Bank of Bainbridge, Georgia

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? No GIVE PARTICULARS

Not applicable

(663)

SEC. 20. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND (Cont'd)

GIVE *three* CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

NAME: [illegible] Co. ADDRESS [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] (St. & No., City, State)

NAME: [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible] (St. & No., City, State)

NAME: Ihrlick Drug Co. ADDRESS Broad Street, Bainbridge, Ga. (St. & No., City, State)

SEC. 21. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 10 YEARS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 10 YEARS.

EMPLOYER National Youth Administration TITLE OF JOB Assistant Librarian

ADDRESS (Work actually performed at Univ. of Georgia, Athens, Ga.) (St. & No.) Washington D.C. (City) (State) U.S.A. (Country)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY Attending and maintaining Law Library

KIND OF BUSINESS: Funds disbursed by U.S. Government to aid deserving students. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Dean Alton Hosch

FROM: Sept. 1935 TO: June 1937 SALARY $ 20.00 PER Month

REASONS FOR LEAVING This was merely temporary work which naturally terminated upon my graduation from Law School.

EMPLOYER Self TITLE OF JOB Attorney at Law

ADDRESS 402 Pine Street (St. & No.) Bainbridge (City) Georgia (State) U. S. A. (Country)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY Actively engaged in the general practice of law

KIND OF BUSINESS: Law NAME OF SUPERVISOR Not Applicable.

FROM: July 17, 1937 TO: January 10, 1938 SALARY $ Not applicable PER Not applicable

REASONS FOR LEAVING To accept appointment as Special Agent of F. B. I.

EMPLOYER U. S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation TITLE OF JOB Special Agent

ADDRESS Washington D. C. (St. & No.) (City) (State) U. S. A. (Country)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY Investigating violations of the laws of the U. S.

KIND OF BUSINESS: Law Enforcement NAME OF SUPERVISOR J. E. Hoover

FROM: Jan. 10, 1938 TO: May 31, 1946 SALARY $ $3200 to $5600 PER annum

(663) REASONS FOR LEAVING Contemplated entering the [illegible] field or returning to the practice of law.

SEC. 21 CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY (Cont'd)

Accrued annual [redacted] a result of the above [redacted] expired Oct. 16, 1946

EMPLOYER Self **TITLE OF JOB** [illegible]

ADDRESS [illegible] Pine St., Bainbridge, Georgia, U.S.A. (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY General Law Practice

KIND OF BUSINESS: Law **NAME OF SUPERVISOR** [illegible]

FROM: June, 1946 **TO:** Present **SALARY $** [illegible] **PER**

REASONS FOR LEAVING

EMPLOYER Not applicable **TITLE OF JOB**

ADDRESS (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALTY

KIND OF BUSINESS: **NAME OF SUPERVISOR**

FROM: **TO:** **SALARY $** **PER**

REASONS FOR LEAVING

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS

St. & No.	City	State	Country	FROM:	TO:
1[illegible] Hancock St.	Athens	Georgia	U.S.A.	1936	1937
402 Pine St.	Bainbridge	Georgia	U.S.A.	1937	1938
William Len Hotel	Memphis	Tennessee	U.S.A.	1938	1939
Beaux Arts Apartments	New York City		U.S.A.	1939	1941
Tudor City Apartments	New York City		U.S.A.	1941	1942
Hotel Metropolitano	Guayaquil		Ecuador	1942	1942
Edificio Angel	Bogota		Colombia	1942	1943
Tlaxcala 159	Mexico, D.F.		Mexico	1943	1944
1202 Fortner Road	Alexandria	Virginia	U.S.A.	1944	1946
Schuyler Heights Apts.	Albany	New York	U.S.A.	Jan, 1946	June, 1946
402 Pine Street	Bainbridge	Georgia		June, 1946	to present

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

City or Section	Country	Purpose	DATES Month & Year	TO Month & Year
Guayaquil	Ecuador	F.B.I.	Feb. 1942	June, 1942
Bogota	Colombia	F.B.I.	Sept. 1942	Aug. 1943

(663)

SEC. 23 RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL (Cont'd)

City or Section	Country	Purpose	DATES Month & Year	TO Month & Year
Mexico, D.F.	Mexico	[illegible]	[illegible]	Dec.1946

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, LABOR UNIONS, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN OR SUPPORT OF ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED:

Name	St. & No.	City	State	Country
Society of Former Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation	30 Pine Street	New York City		U.S.A.
Phi Delta Phi (Legal Fraternity)		Athens	Georgia	U.S.A.
Kappa Alpha Order (Social Fraternity)		Athens	Georgia	U.S.A.
Blue Key Honor Fraternity		Athens	Georgia	U.S.A.

SEC. 25. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

CHURCH OF ATTENDANCE First Presbyterian Church

ADDRESS Bainbridge, Georgia **NAME OF MINISTER OR PRIEST** Rev. William Stewart

SEC. 26. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
Spanish	Fluent	Fluent	Fluent
French	slight	slight	slight

(663) **WRITE** ... **LANGUAGE** ... **SPEAK** **READ**

SEC. 26 GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS (Cont'd)

B. HAVE YOU ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING WITH RESPECT TO:

MOTOR VEHICLES? Driver only. (Excellent AIRPLANES? No RADIO? No

GIVE PARTICULARS

C. LIST *all* SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU; INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Hunting - Excellent

Fishing - Excellent

Swimming - Excellent

Golf - Fair

Tennis - Fair

D. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Yes. I have had considerable supervisory and administrative experience in the intelligence field, having been in charge of all F.B.I. personnel in Colombia and Mexico while in those countries. In addition, I supervised from Washington the counter-intelligence work of the F.B.I. in many Latin American countries during 1945, and in 1946 administered the work of the Albany, New York, Division of the F.B.I. as Assistant Special Agent in Charge. I feel qualified to undertake administrative work in foreign countries.

SEC. 27. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Mrs. Birch D. O'Neal RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS 40[illegible] Pine Street (St. & No.) Bainbridge (City) Georgia (State) (Country)

(663)

AL

SEC. 28. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

A. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO."

No

B. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT Bainbridge, Georgia DATE January 1, 1947
City and State

Frances Pauly O'Neal Birl N. O'Neal
Witness Signature of applicant

Applicant will not write below

COMMENTS OF INTERVIEWER:

SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY
Originating Official

(663) DATE

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Chief, Communications

DATE: 11/7/51

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Branch

SUBJECT: O'Neal, Birch D.

In reply to your memorandum this is to advise that Subject meets the current requirements for cryptographic clearance and is approved for such duties as of this date.

W.A. Osborne
W. A. OSBORNE

SED ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL file

SECURITY APPROVAL

To : Acting Chief, Personnel Division, Administrative Staff Date: 24 August 1950

From : Chief of Inspection and Security Staff Number: 30486

Subject: O'NEAL, Birch Dilworth - 30486

1. Note "X" below:

☐ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

☐ Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Subject is currently on duty in I&SS. This is to record security reapproval of him.

O.K.
P. Lane

Ermal P Geiss
ERMAL P. GEISS
Chief, Personnel Security ~~Division~~ Branch

Rec'd 8-25-50

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
MAY 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY OFFICE

Investigation Report

(2)

Subject: **O'NEAL, Birch D.**

Date: **20 January 1947**

To: **Mr. William E. Duggan (2)** ✓

Number: **30486**

1. Investigation directed by: **RHC**

2. Sources of information:

3. Recommendation:

Security approval recommended, though subject to the receipt of derogatory information at some future date. Interview waived.

By RHC
Security Officer
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

fgj
cc: Mr. Byron C. Sarvis

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(30243)

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE July 1971

[File no: A-15-45-31]

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: DCD/FIO/760

ROOM: 913 Key Bldg

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

/ 10. Wackenhut Corporation

HH 23731

Material retrieved through use of supplementary index.

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT NO. 00-A(S)-322 06270-74

DATE 19 March 1974

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

COUNTRY Algeria

SUBJECT Possible Identification and Surveillance of "CIA Agents" by the Algerian Security Service

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

SOURCE US citizen, a former intelligence officer who is employed with a firm that conducts business on a worldwide scale.

A representative of a US company with contracts in Algeria in early March 1974 held a personal conversation on business matters with a high level Algerian Foreign Ministry Official (other wise unidentified) in Algiers. The Algerian mentioned that his government has become increasingly concerned with the expanding presence in Algeria of US citizens, who are in the country as a result of the growing number of US business contracts. Almost in passing, the Algerian noted that his government is suspicious that many of the Americans might be US intelligence agents. In fact, he claimed that Algerian security authorities "already have identified six CIA Agents", and that these individuals "are under close surveillance". The US businessman did not want to appear too inquisitive, and so he did not probe for any further information on this matter. He is not able to provide the names of the individuals who are under suspicion.

Possible Identification and Surveillance of "CIA Agents" by the Algerian Security Service

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Support Branch/[illegible] Support Section
Room 909, Key Building - ext. 2208
Mr. Evan Ames

HH 26012

12 March 1974

AF/N/Algeria
ATTN: Polly Ann Nowell
6 C 35 Hqs.

Attached for your information is a copy of HIM-00-A(S)-322/06270-74. Source of report is former DCD Chief of the Miami Field Office. He learned this information from a co-worker who had just returned from Algeria. Source does not believe the man has any additional details.

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FIELD OFFICE: [illegible]

REQ. CODE:

CASE NUMBER:

FORWARDED (MO DAY YR): 0 3 1 1 4

REPORT SERIAL & NO.: 0 6 2 7 0 / 4

SUBJECT AND AREA

Possible Identification and Surveillance of "CIA Agents" by the Algerian Security Service

(ALGERIA)

RELEASED (NO. DAY YR):

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Justin F. Gleichauf
Wackenhut Corporation
3280 Ponce De Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

TYPE DOC.: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

* NOT DISSEMINATED

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same as above.

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT (47): [✓ 9]

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ PROCESSING ELEMENT (51): [✓ 3]

METHOD OF COLLECTION: INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT ☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below) ☐

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE): NO ☐ TO USSR ☐ FROM USSR ☐

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: —

DIRECTED TO	SUP	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
	X			EBAmes

FIELD COMMENTS

U.S. citizen, a former intelligence officer who is employed with a firm that conducts business on a worldwide scale.

Mr. Gleichauf, who as you know is the former Chief of the Miami and Dallas Field Offices, currently is employed with a company with extensive contractual arrangements overseas. He learned the information contained in this report quite by chance from a co-worker who returned from Algeria last week. Mr. Gleichauf believes that the co-worker does not have any further details.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Process sheet typed in OSS.
(DCO/Miami 12495)

AF/N/Algeria
CC 35

26012

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
J.F. Hennessey	PMainwaring	EBAmes	OSS

FORM 7-72 25. USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY 007622
EX-2 IMP. DET.

3

C O N F I D E N T I A L 111645Z MAR 74 INTEL
CITE DCD/MIAMI 12495
DCD/WASHINGTON
ATTN: SUPPORT BRANCH/CSS (EBANKS)
INTEL REPORT
SOURCE: JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF, WACKENHUT CORPORATION, 3870
PONCE DE LEON BOULEVARD, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA
FILED: 111645Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL [illegible]
COUNTRY [illegible]
SUBJECT [illegible]
"CIA AGENTS" BY THE ALGERIAN SECURITY SERVICE

SOURCE U.S. CITIZEN, A FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHO IS EMPLOYED WITH A FIRM THAT CONDUCTS BUSINESS ON A WORLDWIDE SCALE.

1. A REPRESENTATIVE OF A U.S. COMPANY WITH CONTRACTS IN ALGERIA IN EARLY MARCH 1974 HELD A PERSONAL CONVERSATION ON BUSINESS MATTERS WITH A HIGH LEVEL ALGERIAN POLICE [illegible] OFFICIAL ([illegible]) IN ALGIERS. THE ALGERIAN [illegible] THAT [illegible] INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH THE [illegible] IN ALGERIA OF U.S. CITIZENS, [illegible] IN THE COUNTRY AS A RESULT OF THE [illegible] OF U.S. [illegible] CONTRACTS. [illegible] THAT [illegible] IN FACT, [illegible] THAT [illegible]

SECURITY AUTHORITIES "ALREADY HAVE IDENTIFIED SIX CIA AGENTS", AND THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS "ARE UNDER CLOSE SURVEILLANCE". THE U.S. BUSINESSMAN DID NOT WANT TO APPEAR TOO INQUISITIVE, AND SO HE DID NOT PRESS FOR ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER. HE IS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE UNDER SUSPICION. END OF REPORT

2. FIELD REMARKS: MR. GLEICHAUF, WHO AS YOU KNOW IS THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE MIAMI AND DALLAS FIELD OFFICES, CURRENTLY IS EMPLOYED WITH A COMPANY WITH EXTENSIVE CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS OVERSEAS. HE LEARNED THE INFO CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT QUITE BY CHANCE FROM A CO-WORKER WHO RETURNED FROM ALGERIA LAST YEAR. MR. GLEICHAUF BELIEVES THAT THE CO-WORKER DOES NOT HAVE AN [illegible] [illegible].

3. C/O: J. F. [illegible] [illegible] ORIGINAL TYPED COPY OF [illegible] [illegible] IMPORT [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

()

14-00000

HH 20901

Julian [illegible] Data/Exported from El Salvador

HH-20901

George O. Musulin/tm

19 March 1970

cc: CI/LS

C/HH/2
3 B 4402 Hq.

Attached for your information
and possible interes , of
OD-A(S)-322/5120-70
enc'osure. Please adv he
collection of this in m
is of some operational
to your services. Thos of
incidents occur occas and
we can obtain detaile
information if desir
service specific cy
requirements which
in advance. We w
reply. Further
of this mater
your discret

2090

Julian [illegible] Ruiz/Reported from El Salvador

[illegible]-20901

George S. Musulin/tm

19 Mar

cc: LA/LS

C/WH/2
3 B 4402 Hq.

Attached for yo
and possible inte
OO-A(3)-332/6120-
enclosure. Pleas
collection of th
is of some operat
to your services.
incidents occur
we can obtain de
information if de
service specific
requirements whic
to advance. We wo
reply. Further d
of this materi
your discretio

on
y of

2090

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECT

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED
Z K I H					0

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Panamanian National, Julian NINO Ruiz, Deported
El Salvador/Limited Biographics
(Panama/El Salvador/Chile)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Henry I. Sayler, Development Manager
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
300 Bird Road
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORG. NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report

☐ Other Document ☐ Other (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)

☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

FIELD COMMENTS

ATTN: OSS

Please advise if this information is of interest. These type of incidents occur occasionally and we can obtain detailed information if desired.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

C/I

[illegible]/OSS

[illegible]

Case Officer

FORM 42 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

209-1

SECRET

COUNTRY: Panama/El Salvador/Chile

XMIM OOA(S) 322/06120-70

SUBJECT: Panamanian National, Julian NINO Ruiz, Deported from El Salvador/ Limited Biographics

13 March 1970

1. On 5 and 6 Mar 70 guard personnel from The Wackenhut Corporation were contracted to provide guard services for the subject to insure his departure from the US while changing planes at Miami International Airport. While supervising the guard service, the following information was obtained.

2. Subject is a Panamanian national, an alleged Communist, deported from El Salvador for political reasons. Government of Panama refused to accept entry of subject; Chile agreed to accept him. Subject had no passport or visa, only various "emergency" papers. Physical description: Black male, 5'6", 140 pounds, about 35 years of age, gold filled teeth.

3. Subject was being transported from El Salvador to Chile via La Chilean Airlines and arrived at the Miami International Airport at 221 hours on 5 Mar 70. He was taken to the Lan Chile VIP room where he w guarded until his time of departure at 0545 on 6 Mar 70 for his dest in Chile. There was to be a layover in Lima, Peru, where it was rea that subject might attempt an escape.

4. At the Miami International Airport subject was met by the Panam Consul General (name unknown) and the El Salvadoran Consul General, Ing Ricardo Dutriz, 208 Pan American Bank Building, 150 SE Third Avenue, Mi Florida, Telephone 371-8850. Both Consuls stated subject was being de ported for political reasons. El Salvadoran Consul stated that subje a criminal and a Communist; Panamanian Consul stated he was a crimin Both considered subject to be dangerous and both felt that he might an escape.

5. Subject's luggage contained a black beret with a red medalli it shaped like a shield with gold stitching on it which was not read

6. Subject allegedly was a member of a gang charged with mur and performing perverted acts on 20 people in El Salvador.

7. The attached paper contains a list of names, addresses, a numbers of individuals in Miami who subject was supposed to conta his arrival in the Miami area. When asked if he might do so, his re was denied by officials. However, the El Salvadoran Consul General a copy of the document and I complied with his request. Subject w aware of a copy being made as nothing had been said in front of hi ever, when the document was returned to him he immediately smelled if there was an odor of copier fluid; he was apparently satisfi copy had not been made as he said nothing and just quietly p away.

- end -

SECRET

HOTEL
EL SALVADOR
INTER-CONTINENTAL

Judith Herrera "La China"
teléfono de su casa 5319977 que de parte mía, saludos y que te ponga rápidamente en contac
con los panameños arnulfistas.-

Harmodio [illegible] Alvarado
3049 1/2 N. W. 9 Ave. Miami- Florida

Alberto "Tito" Barría Athanasiades
3712165 (que te ponga en contacto con los panameños) Saludos de mi parte.

Harmodio Arias Guardia
4465940

Carlos del Cid
25 N.E. 7 Street
Miami- Fla.- 33132

Manuel Román Morán
[illegible]
Tulito [illegible]
Sergio Jurado
[illegible]
Tuty [illegible]

En el Aeropuerto de Miami, en Taca trabaja [illegible], él te puede conectar con los panameños.- Si no es en TACA es en cualquiera de las otras compañías.-

Localizar al Doctor Carlos Young Adames Miami, quien se graduó en Chile y quien te direccione y ayudarte.-

Gilberto Zurita vive en el Hotel [illegible] en el Down Town de Miami

En Lima - Perú

Teléfono 5-6787 Saludos a Doña Rosa [illegible] de [illegible] y a Doña Pepita de [illegible] - les preguntas la dirección para [illegible] [illegible] donde [illegible].-

20901

THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION A-15-45-31

300 Bird Road
Coral Gables, Florida

PERSONNEL:

A142050 - Wackenhut, George - President

A154530 - Smyler, Henry I. Development Manager

~~A130680 - Chaves, Manuel J., (Jr.)., Lev Co.,~~

A179729 - Martinez, Marty

A180822 - Brodie, Robert Earle

17744
~~A197788~~ - Berchmans, Bruce (Jr.) - Director of International Operations.

A197788 - Berkmans, Bruce

A201550 - Kuncar, Edward Isa

REMARKS:

S154531 - Wackenhut Services, Inc., 3280 Ponce de Leon Blvd., Coral Gables, Florida

14-00000

15-45-31

S E C R E T 221915Z JUN 76 STAFF

JUN 22 3 45 PM '76

CITE DCD/HEADQUARTERS 15603

TO: PRIORITY DCD/MIAMI.

FROM: OSG/FRENCH

SUBJECT: NEW CASE 69505 - LA DIVISION REQUEST FOR CONACT OF WACKENHUT CORPORATION OFFICER

1. THIS CASE IS RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENT CONTROL NUMBER CFLA-7C0449 AND OBJECTIVE V.

A197988

19778

A1 LA DIVISION HAS REQUESTED DCD ASSISTANCE IN RECONTACTING BRUCE BERCKMANS, JR., DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF WACKENHUT CORPORATION, CORAL GABLES, FLA. LA DIVISION PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER: 3941 MIDWAY ST, MIAMI, TEL. (305) 443-2260. BERCKMANS IS A FORMER AGENCY NON-OFFICIAL COVER OFFICER WHO WAS ASKED TO RESIGN FROM THE AGENCY IN 1970.

/154

2. THROUGH AN LA DIVISION OFFICER, TOM CLINES, BERCKMANS HAS REQUESTED CONTACT WITH AN AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE AS HE HAS INFORMATION WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO THE AGENCY. THE NAME OF TOM CLINES MAY BE USED TO FACILITATE CONTACT WITH BERCKMANS AS THEY BELIEVE THAT BERCKMANS MAY HAVE INFORMATION ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN JAMAICA.

3. LA DIVISION HAS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS REQUEST IS ONLY IN RESPONSE TO BERCKMANS REQUES FOR CONTACT WITH HE AGENCY. LA DIVISION HAS NO OPERATIONAL INEREST IN BERCKMANS NOR HIS COMPANY. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL HAS CONCURRED IN CONTACTING BERCKMANS BY DCD MIAMI. E2 IMPDET CL BY 00637

S E C R E T

154531

DEN-263-75

Chief, Domestic Collection Division 25 June 1975

ATTN : Operations Services Group/OSS (SStetson)

Chief, Denver Field Office

Headquarters Inquiry re Private Intelligence Organization, Denver, Colorado

REF : Stetson/Walker telcon, 25 June 1975

1. As per referenced telcon, following your initial inquiry on 20 June 1975 we searched our memories for any clue to an organization in the Denver area such as the one described in the German newspaper article. It is quite likely that an organization staffed with ex-government types and performing such things as telephone taps for wealthy private citizens would have come to our attention through one of our many contacts in the area. We could think of none that matched your description and we let the matter drop.

#154537

2. On 24 June we received a phone call from a local agent of the FBI who had received the same information that you had passed on to us and was trying to run it down. We again denied any knowledge of such an organization. However, as the matter was rehashed among the DFO staff we recalled that a few months ago, shortly after the CIA expose first appeared in the New York Times, we received in the mail a brochure from The Wackenhut Corporation, 262 Havana, Denver, Colorado #154531 This organization was described as a private investigative service with capabilities beyond that of the average private investigator in that they are staffed with men and women formerly employed by the FBI, Secret Service and DIA. We also believe that under the list of services they offered was some type of electronic surveillance. Since this type of organization is of no interest to us we discarded the brochure and forgot about it until your inquiry prompted us to recall it.

3. We passed the above information on to the local Bureau office, stressing that this was indeed a long shot, that our memory of the contents of the brochure is vague at best, that we have no reason to believe that the Wackenhut Corporation is anything other than what it advertises itself to be, and that this is our best recollection but even at that we are not absolutely sure it was the Wackenhut Corporation that was mentioned in the brochure.

4. With this memorandum we merely wish to go on record with you as having passed the above information to the local FBI office in the form stated.

PJWalker/drl
E2 IMPDET CL BY 008582

JAMES M. SOMMERVILLE

SECRET

14-00000

15-45-31

JUN 23 10 57 AM '76

S E C R E T 231443Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13374

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS

ATTN: OPERATIONS SERVICES GROUP/OSD (FRENCH) FROM MAINWARING

15-45-31

SUBJ: CASE 65685 - LA DIVISION REQUEST FOR CONTACT OF WACKENHUT CORPORATION OFFICER

A# 12197788
54-3-13

REF : DCD/HEADQUARTERS 15633

I AM MEETING BRUCE [illegible], JR., AT [illegible] ON 24 JUNE 1976 AT WACKENHUT OFFICES. PLEASE ADVISE IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL PRIOR TO THE MEETING TO KNOW SOMETHING OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDERLYING THE FINAL STATEMENT IN PARAGRAPH ONE OF REFERENT. E2 IMPDET CL BY 011062.

S E C R E T

14-00000

15-45-31

JUN 29 10 22 AM '76

SECRET 291430Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13387

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS

ATTN: OPERATIONS SERVICES GROUP (FRENCH)

15-45-31

SUBJ: DCD CASE 65805 - LA DIVISION REQUEST FOR CONTACT OF WACKENHUT CORPORATION OFFICER

~~[illegible] 56-1-3-13~~ 4 A197288

FYI, BRUCE BERKMANS TELEPHONED ME AT MY HOME LATE ON 28 JUNE 1976 TO TELL ME THAT AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS ATTORNEY HE HAS DECIDED NOT TO SUE THE AGENCY.
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668
SECRET

1C

14-00000

15-45-31

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13377.

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS

ATTN: OSG (FRENCH)

SUBJ: CASE 65835

REF : DCD/HEADQUARTERS 13603

[illegible] 15-45-31

1. I MET BRUCE BERCKMANS AT HIS WACKENHUT OFFICE THIS MORNING AS SCHEDULED. BERCKMANS BEGAN THE INTERVIEW BY REQUESTING THAT I READ A MULTIPAGE LETTER WHICH HE IS THINKING OF SENDING TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL. IT IS A DETAILED STATEMENT OF GRIEVANCES STEMMING FROM HIS FORCED RESIGNATION AND INDICATES THAT HE IS CONSIDERING A SUIT AGAINST THE AGENCY. HE HAS IN FACT RETAINED COUNCIL, APPARENTLY ANOTHER FORMER AGENCY STAFFER, BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO PROCEED WITH LEGAL ACTION. OTHER ELEMENTS SHOULD PROBABLY BE INFORMED.

2. THE PRECEDING NOT WITHSTANDING, BERCKMANS, WHO IS FOND OF SAYING THAT HE RESIGNED FROM THE AGENCY BUT NOT THE UNITED STATES, OFFERED TO SERVE AS A FAIRLY TYPICAL DCD CONTACT WITH RESPECT TO THE INFORMATION HE DERIVES IN HIS REGULAR WACKENHUT DUTIES. BERCKMANS UNDOUBTEDLY HAS MANY USEFUL CONTACTS ESPECIALLY IN LATIN AMERICA AND SOON IN THE MIDDLE EAST. UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES THIS MIGHT BE A USEFUL INFORMATIONAL RELATIONSHIP.

3. I TOLD BERCKMANS, HOWEVER, THAT IN VIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE I FELT IT INAPPROPRIATE FOR US TO MAINTAIN ANY SYSTEMATIC RELATIONSHIP AT THIS TIME. SHOULD HE DECIDE NOT TO PROCEED WITH HIS SUIT AND OTHER THINGS FALL INTO PLACE, PERHAPS A FUTURE USEFUL CONTACT COULD BE ESTABLISHED.

4. IN DESCRIBING HIS DUTIES BERCKMANS DID DROP ONE MINOR PIECE OF INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL AGAINST THE CURRENT

PAGE 2 DCD/MIAMI 13377 S E C R E T

JAMAICAN SITUATION. THROUGH A SUBCONTRACTOR HIS COMPANY IS CONSIDERING A CONTRACT IN JAMAICA WHICH WOULD PROVIDE CUSTODIAL SERVICES FOR REVERE BAUXITE HOLDINGS WHICH THE COMPANY IS APPARENTLY PLANNING TO MOTHBALL. E2 IMPDET CL BY 011663

S E C R E T

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

15-45-31

[illegible]-125-73

Chief, Domestic Collection Division

3 December 1973

ATTN : Deputy for Field Operations (Starling)

Chief, Miami Field Office

Contact with ITT A 120

A-130680

1. In view of the considerable interest expressed from time to time in any Agency involvement with ITT the following information is submitted for the record. We have learned indirectly but apparently accurately that Manuel J. Chavez, Jr. has very recently left his position with the [illegible] and is now employed as a senior executive concerned with Latin American security matters for ITT. You will recall that Chavez was at one time a military assignee to the Miami Field Office and later served here briefly as a staff employee.

15-45-31

2. Needless to say, this office has not been in contact with ITT and we plan no professional approach to Mr. Chavez whatsoever. Local geography and routine courtesy are such that on occasion an unintended social encounter may occur. Should we meet Mr. Chavez again no official business will be conducted of any kind.

BRUCE E. [illegible]

BEM:paw

cc: OSS (Watts)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 004475

CONFIDENTIAL

20

15-45-31

S E C R E T 221915Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/HEADQUARTERS 15683

TO: PRIORITY DCD/MIAMI

FROM: USG/FRENCH

SUBJECT: NEW CASE 65825 - LA DIVISION REQUEST FOR CONACT OF JACKENHUT CORPORATION OFFICER

JUN 22 3 45 PM '76

1. THIS CASE IS RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENT CONTROL NUMBER CFLA-7C0449 AND OBJECTIVE V.

197788
19778
2154

A#

LA DIVISION HAS REQUESTED DCD ASSISTANCE IN RECONTACTING BRUCE BERCKMANS, JR., DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF WACKENHUT CORPORATION, CORAL GABLES, FLA. LA DIVISION PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER: 3941 MIDWAY ST, MIAMI, TEL. (305) 443-2260. BERCKMANS IS A FORMER AGENCY NON-OFFICIAL COVER OFFICER WHO WAS ASKED TO RESIGN FROM THE AGENCY IN 1970.

2. THROUGH AN LA DIVISION OFFICER, TOM CLINES, BERCKMANS HAS REQUESTED CONTACT WITH AN AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE AS HE HAS INFORMATION WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO THE AGENCY. THE NAME OF TOM CLINES MAY BE USED TO FACILITATE CONTACT WITH BERCKMANS AS THEY BELIEVE THAT BERCKMANS MAY HAVE INFORMATION ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN JAMAICA.

3. LA DIVISION HAS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS REQUEST IS ONLY IN RESPONSE TO BERCKMANS REQUEST FOR CONTACT WITH HE AGENCY. LA DIVISION HAS NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN BERCKMANS NOR HIS COMPANY. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL HAS CONCURRED IN CONTACTING BERCKMANS BY DCD MIAMI. E2 IMPDET CL BY 011637

S E C R E T

14-00000

15-45-31

OCT 2 12 15 Z 73

S E C R E T 021515Z OCT 73 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 12422

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: DEPUTY CHIEF, DCD (HORTON)

SUBJ: SEBASTIAN CHARLES VOLPE

A

179729

REF : HORTON/MAINWARING TELECON OF 2 OCTOBER 1973

A-1 [illegible] 1. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 1 OCTOBER 1983 I MET AT HIS REQUEST WITH MARTY MARTINEZ, A FORMER AGENCY STAFFER NOW EMPLOYED BY THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION. MARTINEZ SAID THAT HE HAD INFORMATION TO PASS TO US WHICH ACTUALLY ORIGINATED WITH THE DADE COUNTY ORGANIZED CRIME BUREAU AND WHICH WAS INITIALLY PASSED TO WACKENHUT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WACKENHUT WOULD IN TURN CONVEY IT TO THE AGENCY. PARENTHETICALLY, FOR THE RECORD, WE MAINTAIN SOME SLIGHT CONTACT WITH A FEW WACKENHUT EMPLOYEES, SEVERAL OF WHOM ARE FORMER AGENCY STAFFERS, BUT WE HAD NOT MET MARTINEZ PRIOR TO THIS MEETING.

179730

2. ACCORDING TO MARTINEZ, HE HAD BEEN TIPPED BY A CLOSE CONTACT IN THE ORGANIZED CRIME BUREAU THAT SEBASTIAN CHARLES VOLPE HAD BEEN APPREHENDED RECENTLY APPARENTLY IN THE COURSE OF INSTALLING A MIKE OR WIRE. THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND DATE ARE

PAGE 2 DCD/MIAMI 12422 S E C R E T

NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME. VOLPE IMMEDIATELY CLAIMED THAT HE WAS ON A MISSION FOR THE CIA AND APPARENTLY SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED CHARGES AND PUBLICITY, AT LEAST INITIALLY. A LOCAL FOUR-MAN PANEL OF JUDGES REVIEWED THIS MATTER, HOWEVER, AND AT LEAST ONE JUDGE HAS INDICATED HE DOES NOT BELIEVE VOLPE'S STORY.

3. WACKENHUT DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE NEXT STEP WILL BE BUT APPARENTLY THE ORGANIZED CRIME BUREAU WISHED TO ALERT THE AGENCY IN ADVANCE TO POTENTIAL ADVERSE PUBLICITY WHICH MAY ARISE AT ANY TIME. INFERENTIALLY, THE CRIME BUREAU APPEARS ALSO TO BE CONCERNED THAT VOLPE WAS REALLY INVOLVED FOR THE AGENCY.

A177726 A177728 A177727

(PPL)

4. VOLPE, BY THE WAY, IN ADDITION TO THE NAME ALREADY PROVIDED, IS KNOWN VARIOUSLY AS SAM VOLPE, CHARLES S. VOLPE AND JUST PLAIN CHARLIE VOLPE. HE HAS APPARENTLY STARTED SOME SORT OF SECURITY BUSINESS KNOWN AS ALEX ALERT. A POSSIBLE COMPLICATING FACTOR IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT VOLPE HAS BEEN THE TOP WIRE MAN FOR LOCAL STATE'S ATTORNEY RICHARD GERSTEIN. GERSTEIN, AMONG OTHER THINGS, IS KNOWN FOR HIS EFFORTS TO BRING LOCAL CONSPIRACY CHARGES AGAINST THE WATERGATE GROUP, A PLAN WHICH WE BELIEVE ARCHIBALD COX SUCCESSFULLY BLOCKED.

179731

179732

179733

PAGE 3 DCD/MIAMI 12422 SECRET

5. VOLPE, WE BELIEVE HAS ALSO ACTED ON BEHALF OF DADE COUNTY SHERIFF E. WILSON PURDY, AN EXTREMELY CONTROVERSIAL LOCAL FIGURE, KNOWN AMONG OTHER THINGS FOR EXTENSIVE USE OF TELEPHONE TAPS.

6. THE CIRCUITOUS ROUTE TAKEN BY THE ORGANIZED CRIME BUREAU TO PASS THIS INFORMATION IS POSSIBLY BEST EXPLAINED BY THE FACT THAT A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE BUREAU KNOWS THAT MARTINEZ IS A FORMER AGENCY STAFFER. IN ADDITION, WE ARE TOLD THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL HAS A DISLIKE OF AND DISTRUST FOR REGULAR LIAISON CHANNELS AT ANY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT.

7. AS DISCUSSED WE ARE REPORTING THIS FOR THE RECORD IN THE BELIEF THAT ANGUS THUERMER AND PERHAPS OTHERS MIGHT WISH TO BE FOREWARNED. WE PLAN NO FURTHER ACTION UNLESS REQUESTED BY YOU. E2 IMPDET CL BY 024476

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

15-45-31

DAL-108-72

1 May 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : USS (Watts)

Chief, Dallas Field Office

TSD Interest in Electronic Surveillance System

A-154531

1. A year or so ago, while in Miami, I forwarded some information on an electronic surveillance system developed by Wackenhut Corporation of Coral Gables, Florida. TSD was quite interested and sent two technicians to Coral Gables to check on the system and subsequently invited Wackenhut representatives to put on a demonstration in Washington, at Agency expense.

A130680

2. I recently met Manuel Chavez of Wackenhut, an old friend, and he stated that Wackenhut had not heard further from our people but he would like to advise that the system is now available on the market. He furnished a brochure concerning the product which is appended.

3. Would you please forward this to TSD. If I recall correctly one of the TSD representatives who visited Coral Gables was Paul Reilly.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG/jb

Attachment

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

15-45-31

SECRET

NOV 24 1 47 PM '70

S E C R E T 241600Z NOV 70 CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 2125

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: OSS (MUGULIN)

SUBJ: CASE 55539 - MINIATURE TRANSMITTERS

REF : CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 57573

A130680

WE WILL EXPECT RILEY AND ROHERER IN THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE ON 1 DEC 70. THEY WILL BE PICKED UP BY MANUEL CHAVEZ OF THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION AND TAKEN TO THE DEMONSTRATION.

SECRET

A154531

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

14-00000

15-45-31

SECRET

NOV 4 9 32 AM '70

S E C R E T 041330Z NOV 70 CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 2116

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: OSS (MUSULIN) A130060

SUBJ: CASE 55539 A B A15-45-31

B

MANUEL J. CHAVEZ, WACKENHUT CORP. ADVISES HE THAT NEW LOCAL FACILITIES FOR TESTING EQUIPMENT REFERRED TO IN MIM-160-73 SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY ABOUT [illegible] NOV AND HE SUGGESTS THAT THE DEMONSTRATION REQUESTED BY TSD TAKE PLACE ON [illegible] NOV. [illegible] ADVISE IF THIS IS AGREEABLE TO TSD SO THAT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE FIRMED UP.

GP-1

S E C R E T

IC

CONFIDENTIAL

F 15-45-31

MIM-178-70

29 October 1970

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : OSS (Masulin)

Chief, Miami Field Office

Miniature Transmitters

REF : MIM-160-70 of 21 Sep 70

S 15 45 31

S 15 45 31

1. Referenced memo reported on a miniature transmitter developed by Electro-Finders, Inc., a subsidiary of Wackenhut Protection Systems, Coral Gables, Florida.

2. Manuel J. Chavez has advised me that Electro-Finders, Inc., operations have been moved from California to Coral Gables and in case we have any interest in the equipment full particulars can be obtained through this office.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JPC/cse

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET F 15-45-31

Chief, Miami Field Office

29 October 1970

Director, Domestic Contact Service, OSS

B S 15 4531

New Case 55,539 - Electro-Finder's Incorporated/Car Locating System/
Request for Demonstration

REF: MDM-160-70 with attachments

1. This is new case opened to your office.

2. TSD/SDB is interested in the various Electro Finder's car locating equipment which are the subject of referent, as possible alternative to TSD's present capabilities in this field of interest.

3. If it is possible to do so please arrange for a demonstration of subject equipment for TSD sometime in mid-November 1970, at the convenience of representatives of Electro-Finder's Incorporated. If such a demonstration is not possible in Florida, without incurring any cost to TSD/Special Devices Branch, or in any case, if further discussion is desired, please advise and we will be glad to pursue the matter further with appropriate TSD components.

4. We appreciate your cooperation and support in this case.

JAMES R. MURPHY

GSMusulin/bm
cc: Services Div. (Control)

SECRET

SECRET

15-45-31

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : OSS (Maulin)

21 September 1970
MIN-160-70

Chief, Miami Field Office

Miniature Transmitters

REFS : MIN-145-70
Your Speed Letter of 3 September 1970

A142050 P?

B

1. On 21 Sep 70 Mr. George Wackenhut, President Wackenhut A154531 Protection Systems of Coral Gables, Florida invited me to a demonstration of a new device his company has developed, which may be of some interest to us and other Government agencies. The device involves a small transmitter, dimensions about 1/2" x 3/4", or less than the size of a half pack of cigarettes.

2. The transmitter can be used to track vehicles as well as persons. If used in a car reception varies from 2 - 3 miles in major high-rise metropolitan areas such as New York, to 5 - 6 miles in Miami. The central station could monitor a fleet of cars and determine where a given vehicle is.

3. If the transmitter is carried on a person, as in a heel, it would only have a range of 3/4 - 1 mile, but if carried at the waist it would have 1 1/2 - 2 miles. If used at the line of sight it would have a range of 8 - 10 miles.

4. The transmitter is operated on 40 [illegible] and is on the air 1 second of 5. Its signal can not be picked by on AM/FM receivers and the batteries are standard Mercury batteries which last 7 - 10 days.

5. The equipment was recently tested by the Los Angeles Police Department and a car with the transmitter was located in a 60-foot deep, three-layer parking garage in Los Angeles.

6. Some printed material describing the equipment is appended as of possible interest to TSD and other selected consumers.

7. FYI: ElectroFinders, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wackenhut.

MR 5-154531

2C

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:mbj
Attachment: Printed Material As Stated

~~B-67-353~~
~~F 14-20-50~~
F/ Wackenhut Services Inc
F 15-45-31

CONFIDENTIAL

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : Services Division

13 December 1967
MEM-294-67

Chief, Miami Field Office

B-67-353

Initial Contact with: Mr. John S. Ammarell, Jr, Vice President
Wackenhut Services Inc.
~~3280 Ponce de Leon Blvd.~~
Coral Gables, Florida
[Phone: 445-1481]

~~S 14 20 50~~
~~B-67-353~~
S 154531

1. On 27 Nov 67 Gus C. Guerrero met with Mr. Ammarell, Vice President for Wackenhut Services Inc., with offices at 3280 Ponce de Leon Blvd., Coral Gables, Florida.

2. Mr. Ammarell, by his position as Vice President, is cognizant of all contractual services in being with the company in foreign countries. Even though he does very limited traveling, members of his staff and Mr. George Wackenhut, President, do a considerable amount of traveling.

3. Mr. Ammarell will make arrangements for Guerrero to meet with Mr. Wackenhut and other members of the corporation whom he feels will be able to assist us.

4. The Wackenhut corporation provides various types of security services to private industry and government agencies. They are attempting to establish investigative and guard service agencies in several Latin American countries and are well established in Colombia at the present time.

5. Mr. Ammarell is most cooperative and even though he feels that some of the corporation security projects are privileged information he also feels that members of the corporation will be able, at times, to provide useful information.

JULIEN F. GLEICHAUF

GCG:mzb

Copy F/ # B-67-353 (John S. Ammarell, Jr)

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD/ RESIDENT OFFICE 1 2 3 4	ORGANIZATION NUMBER 9 6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	FORWARDED MO. DAY YR 21 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT SERIES & NO. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33		34 35 36
XMIM	154531		65131 65805	12206	OIR 3656476		

SUBJECT AND AREA

COVER AND RELATED OPERATIONAL LEAD/US COMPANY CONTRACT WITH SONATRACH

RELEASED MO. DAY YR 40 41 42 43 44

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Bruce Barkmann
Wackenhut Corporation
3200 Ponce De Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE DOC: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	A	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER, MISC.
5. COMBINED W/ITEM
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ. PROCESSING ELEMENT 51	52
1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
8	8
9	9

METHOD OF COLLECTION

XX	INTERVIEW		TRIP REPORT
	OTHER DOCUMENT		OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

EXCHANGES (COL. 35)

	1-EXCHANGE		3-COMMERCIAL
	2-BILATERAL		4. ARTICLE IV

DIRECTED TO	OSG	SREE	ICG	ETF	DESK OFFICER
	OSB				SOALHU

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Process sheet typed in OSG/OSB per MIAMI TWX 13718

AJAJA

INTERNAL USE ONLY

~~E-2 IMPDET CL BY 011668~~

MBO 55 56 57 58	KIQ 59 60 61	GRADE 62 63 64 65 66	INDIVIDUAL NO. 67 68 69 70 71 72	MA 73	TR 74	COUNTRY 75 76 77 78 79
			197788			

I/O	F.O. CHIEF	DESK OFFICER	BRANCH SECTION CHIEF
Mainwaring	Mainwaring	Almy	OSG/OSB

FORM 7-75 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 056687

(20-41)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4	B. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15	C. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT NO. A B C D E F 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	J U O 34 35 36
X M I M		6 1 1 1 1	0 3 1 3 4	A 0 6 4 1 8 7 4	

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
Students at the University of Miami

(Algeria)

EXTRA DISSEM RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA YR 40 41 42 43 44

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Robert Brodie
WACKENHUT CORPORATION
300 Bird Road
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A180822

ORGANIZATION NO. A-154531

45 TYPE OO-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X			Cross

FIELD COMMENTS

FR Atlanta has reiterated interest in anything we can develop on this group of Algerians at the University of Miami.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
BEMainwaring:paw	BEMAINWARING		

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

Control

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS 15-45-31

FIELD OFFICE		REQ. CODE	CASE NUMBER		FORWARDED MO. DAY YR		REPORT SERIES & NO.		JOINT	FUD
1 2 3 4		11 12 13 14 15	16 17 18 19 20		22 23 24 25 26		27 28 29 30 31 32 33		34	35 36
X M I M					0 3 1 1 4		0 6 2 7 0 7 4			

SUBJECT AND AREA

Possible Identification and Surveillance of "CIA Agents" by the Algerian Security Service

[redacted]

(ALGERIA)

RELEASED MO. DAY YR 40 41 42 43 44

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Justin F. Gleichauf
Wackenhut Corporation
3280 Ponce De Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A13347

ORGANIZATION NO. A15453/

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same as above.

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT			
47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	S	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	–	–	–
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	–	–	–
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

NO. PROCESSING ELEMENT			
51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3	O	S	S
4	A	L	N
5	F	O	R

METHOD OF COLLECTION			
☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TRIP REPORT
☐	OTHER DOCUMENT	☐	OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR.
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	SUP	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
	X			EDAmes

FIELD COMMENTS

U.S. citizen, a former intelligence officer who is employed with a firm that conducts business on a worldwide scale.

Mr. Gleichauf, who as you know is the former Chief of the Miami and Dallas Field Offices, currently is employed with a company with extensive contractual arrangements overseas. He learned the information contained in this report quite by chance from a co-worker who returned from Algeria last week. Mr. Gleichauf believes that the co-worker does not have any further details.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Process sheet typed in OSS.
(DCD/Miami 12495)

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION STAFF/DESK
J.F. Hennessey	BMainwaring	EDAmes	OSS

FORM 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
7-72

CONFIDENTIAL

(20-41)

CL. BY 007622
EX-2 IMP. DET.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4		B. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15	C. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20		FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT NO. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33		J 34	UO 35	36
XXXX			53601 61111		01144	A 002697A				

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
Students at the University of Miami

(Algeria)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Robert Brodie
WACKENHUT CORPORATION
300 Bird Road
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130822

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

45 TYPE DOC. GRAPHICS, MAPS PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	6	Y
2	P	O	L
3	G	1	L
4			
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	1	O
8			
9	M	1	S

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT

☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X			Gross

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

a) On several occasions FR Atlanta has expressed interest in whatever we might develop on Algerian Students in the Miami area. We hope to have more than this including some assessment data but this is at least a start.

b) The material originates not with the University of Miami but rather is from the files of Wackenhut.

c) A copy of this report is being sent directly to FR Atlanta.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

C S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
RHMainwaring:pcw	RHMAINWARING		

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4	B. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15	C. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT NO. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
X M I N		6 1 1 6 8	0 1 1 1 4	0 0 7 6 8 7 4

J U O
34 35 36

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Sensitive

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD
37 38 39

RELEASED
MO. DA. YR.
40 41 42 43 44

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Robert Earle BRODIE
Wackenhut Corporation
300 Bird Road
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A180822

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

45 TYPE DD-E
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Documentary

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT
47 48 49 50
0 E C O
1 S & T
2 P O L
3 M I L
4
5 S O C
6 G E O
7 B I O
8
9 M I S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA
51 52 53 54
1 S O V
2 I N T
3
4

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT

☒ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X		X	(Ames/Blake)

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

THIS IS SENSITIVE
E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
REH:ljh	REMAINWARING		

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY				FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4		B. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15	C. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT NO. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	J U O 34 35 36
X M I M			6 1 1 0 8 6 1 6 D K	0 1 1 1 4	E 0 0 2 6 7 7	

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Cuban Terrorist Program Designed to Affect US-Bahamian Relations

(Cuba/Bahamas)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Robert Earle BRODIE
Wackenhut Corporation
700 Bird Road
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A120822

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

45 TYPE DOC. GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

None

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	O	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	C
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	O	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA	51	52	53	54
1		S	O	V
2		I	N	T
3				
4				

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT

☒ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV.	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X		X	(Acca/Blake)

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

Reference: Mainwaring/Austin/Blake telecons of 10 & 11 January 1974.
Wackenhut Corp. offered this information gratuitously, for security reasons, they have made this look like a report to a client - thus, "addressee" and "firm" refer to CIA.
Beyond this report, local Miami officials, based on their clandestine activities, state unequivocally that this is one phase of a Cuban program to hurt Washington-Nassau relations.
Some of these names are known to other Agency components.
Copy to MI Station

A-7
E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

C/S EEMainwaring:ljb

F.O. CHIEF EEMAINWARING

CASE OFFICER

DIVISION/STAFF/DESK

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4): X M I M

B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15):

C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20):

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. (22 23 24 25 26): 0 2 1 6 3

REPORT NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): 0 3 7 1 4 7 3

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Presidential Aspirations of Jose Luis Cruz Sacazar

(Guatemala)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39):

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44):

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manuel J. CHAVEZ, Jr.
The Wackenhut Corporation
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130680

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT				
47	48	49	50	
0	K	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
1	[illegible]	A	T	
2	P	O	L	2. TOO GENERAL
3	M	I	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
5	S	O	C	4. OTHER/MISC
6	O	E	O	5. COMBINED WITH
7	D	I	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST
8	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
9	M	I	S	

AREA			
51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE): NO / TO USSR / FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER

FIELD COMMENTS

Another local source reports substantially the same thing

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

C/S: BEM:ljh

F.O. CHIEF: DEMAINWARING

CASE OFFICER:

DIVISION/STAFF/DESK:

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

14-00000

SECRET (When Filled In)

15-05-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4)	REQ CODE (11 12 13 14 15)	CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20)	FORWARDED MO. DAY YR (22 23 24 25 26)	REPORT SERIES & NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33)	DOIT (34)	UCO (35)
X M I M			06302	B 1671772		

SUBJECT AND AREA

Cabinet Reassignments/Possible Upcoming Government-wide Shakeup

(GUATEMALA)

RELEASED MO. DAY YR (40 41 42 43 44)

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manuel J. Chavez
The Wackenhut Corporation
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130186

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

45 TYPE OO-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 • NOT DISSEMINATED

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

None

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

None

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	–	–	–
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	–	–	–
9	M	I	S

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

NO PROCESSING ELEMENT 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3	O	S	S
4	A	L	N

METHOD OF COLLECTION

X	INTERVIEW		TRIP REPORT
	OTHER DOCUMENT		OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

OSS ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ OS
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	R. R. KELLER

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

This report and process sheet was typed in Headquarters from Miami TWX 12282.

10 JUL 1977

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
J. P. HENNESSEY	R. MAINWARING	R. R. KELLER	L. H. SNITZER

FORM 11-71 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

(20-41)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4)	B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15)	C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20)	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR (22 23 24 25 26)	27–33	J (34)	U.O. (35 36)
X H I N		5 5 5 3 9	1 2 0 2 1	B 3 6 1 2 0 7 1		

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
Boycott of Chilean Newsprint/Anti-Allende Propaganda

(Chile)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39)

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44)

45 TYPE DOC — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Manuel J. CHAVEZ
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130680
ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT					
47	48	49	50		
0	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN	
1	S	&	T		
2	P	O	L	2. TOO GENERAL	
3	M	I	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES	
4	-	-	-		
5	S	O	C	4. OTHER/MISC	
6	G	E	O	5. COMBINED WITH	
7	B	I	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST	
8	-	-	-		
9	M	I	S		

AREA			
51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	RHeller

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

07 DEC 1971

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
BEMainwaring:jek	BEMAINWARING		

(20-41)

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4): X M I M

B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15):

C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20):

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. (22 23 24 25 26): 0 3 0 2 1

REPORT NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): A 0 6 1 1 8 7 1

J U O (34 35 36):

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Background Information on Reverend Roger Veckemans, S J, Alleged Left-Wing Priest Affiliated with the Christian Democratic Party (Chile/Venezuela/Colombia)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39):

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44):

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manual J. Chaves
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130680

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

45 TYPE DOC: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50		AREA 51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN	1	S	O	V
1	S	6	T	2. TOO GENERAL	2	I	N	T
2	P	O	L		3			
3	M	I	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES	4			
4	-	-	-					
5	S	O	C	4. OTHER MISC				
6	O	E	O	5. COMBINED WITH				
7	B	I	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST				
8	-	-	-					
9	M	I	S					

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW
☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT
☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X			

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

ATTACHED MATERIAL FOR RETENTION.

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
JFGleichauf/csa	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)
7-69

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4: XMIN

B. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15

C. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26: 12100

REPORT NO. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33: E 3641870

J U O 34 35 36

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Chile: The Threat of a New Cuba

(Chile)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manuel J. Chaves
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130680

ORGANIZATION NO. 151531

45 TYPE OO-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

* 1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☒ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

I. DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	EMoller

FIELD COMMENTS

Material for retention.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FLEX
CASE
X-REF
FILES

1 6 DEC 1970

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
JFGleichauf/css	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4): X M I M

B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15):

C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20):

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. (22 23 24 25 26): 1 2 0 8 0

REPORT NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): B 3 6 2 6 3 7 0

J U O (34 35 36):

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Concern re Security of LAN-Chile Aircraft

(Chile)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39)

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44)

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manuel J. Chaves
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. 130680

ORGANIZATION NO. 121331

45 TYPE OO-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT	47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O	
1	S	S	T	
2	P	O	L	
3	M	I	L	
4	-	-	-	
5	S	O	C	
6	G	E	O	
7	B	I	O	
8	-	-	-	
9	M	I	S	

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA (51 52 53 54)

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT

☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
DIRECTED TO				X	RHeller

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FILE
CASE
X-REF
FILES

15 DEC 1970

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
JFGleichauf/css	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E.	RECEIVED MO DA YR (22-26)	(27-33)	I U O (34-36)
XNIM				X	11240	S 476470 B	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

LAN-Chile Officials Desire Background Checks on Employees to Determine Anti-Communist Sentiments

(Chile)

EXTRA DISSEM RECORD 37 38 39 | RELEASED MO DA YR 40 41 42 43 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Henry I. Smyler, Development Manager
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
300 Bird Road
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO A154530

ORGANIZATION NO A154531

45 TYPE OOE GRAPHICS/MAPS PUBLICATIONS/REPORTS/OTHER | 46 NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT | AREA

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO

ORGANIZATION NO

I. SUB SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO

ORGANIZATION NO

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

AIR FORCE REPORT

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FILE

8 DEC 1970

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
HLopez/csa	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

4

(20-41)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR.			U O
1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	16 17 18 19 20	21	22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33		34 35 36
X M I M				X	1 1 2 0 0	2 4 1 6 8 7 0		

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Key Positions in LAN-Chile Airlines Given to
Allende Regime Sympathizers

(Chile)

EXTRA DISSEM RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO DA YR 40 41 42 43 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Henry I. Suyler, Development Manager
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
300 Bird Road
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A-1545-0

ORGANIZATION NO. A-154531

45 TYPE DOC. GRAPHICS MAPS PUBLICATIONS REPORTS OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47 48 49 50

AREA 51 52 53 54

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Mr. Carlos Chavez, Station Manager
LAN-CHILE AIRLINES
Miami International Airport
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A158254

ORGANIZATION NO. A-99452

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

AIR FORCE REPORT

Please direct to:
International Division
(Miller).

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FILE
CASE
Y-REF K. D.
DATES 2 DEC 1970

C/S HLopez/ess

F.O. Chief JFGLEICHAUF

Case Officer

Division/Staff/Desk

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

4

(20-41)

2c

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY / FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED MO DA YR		I.U.O.
XMIM				X	1 1 0 90	3 3 4 1 9 7 0	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Status of Lorenzo D. ("Wimpy") Berry

(Dominican Republic)

EXTRA DISSEM RECORD / RELEASED MO DA YR

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manuel J. Chaves
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3300 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO A130680

ORGANIZATION NO A154531

TYPE OOR: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT / AREA

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO

ORGANIZATION NO

I. SUB SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO

ORGANIZATION NO

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

Please direct to: OSS

Copy passed to JMCOBRA locally.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FLEX ----------
CASE ----------
X-REF ----------
FILES ----------

13 NOV 1970

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
JFGleichauf/cas	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

4

(20-41)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY				FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4)		B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15)	C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20)	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. (22 23 24 25 26)	REPORT NO. A (27 28 29 30 31 32 33)	J U O (34 35 36)
X M I M				0 9 1 0 0	2 6 4 1 5 7 0	

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
List of Suspects of Subversive Activities

(Panama)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39)

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44)

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Manuel J. Chaves, Jr.
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130680

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

45 TYPE OO-E: (S) GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	O	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X			

FIELD COMMENTS

Supplemental to:
OOA(S) 322/26267-70

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY control used per request of source for protection.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FILE ____________
CASE ____________
X-REF ____________
FILES ____________

15 SEP 1970

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
JFGleichauf:pgs	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

14-00080

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY			FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4)	B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15)	C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20)	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. (22 23 24 25 26)	REPORT NO. A B C D E F G (27 28 29 30 31 32 33)	J I U O (34 35 36)
X M I N			0 9 0 3 0	A 2 6 2 6 7 7 0	

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Attempt to Establish Intelligence Apparatus in US

(Panama)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39)

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44)

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manuel J. Chaves, Jr.
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
8280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130680

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER — 3

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	D	T	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT

☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
NO
TO USSR
FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X			

FIELD COMMENTS

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

P

CASE ----------------
X-REF ----------------
FILES ----------------

10 SEP 1970

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
JFCleichauf/cas	JFCLEICHAUF		

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4: X H I B

B. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15

C. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26: 0 9 0 3 0

REPORT NO. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33: B 2 6 2 5 6 7 0

J U O 34 35 36

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

El Mercurio Fear of Urban Terrorism/Security Measures

(Chile)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manuel J. Chaves, Jr.
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130680

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

45 TYPE OO-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47 48 49 50

0 E C O
1 S & T
2 P O L
3 M I L
4 - - -
5 S O C
6 G E O
7 B I O
8 - - -
9 M I S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51 52 53 54

1 S O V
2 I N T
3
4

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW
☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT
☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV.	INT.	CASE OFFICER
				X	RHeller

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FLEX ________________
CASE ________________
X-REF ________________
FILES ________________

10 SEP 1970

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
JFGleichauf/esa	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(20-41)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4)	B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15)	C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20)	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. (22 23 24 25 26)	REPORT NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33)	34 35 36
X M I M			0 3 3 1 0	B 2 5 2 1 4 7 0	

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Alessandri Leading in Election Preference/Fear of Urban Terrorism

(Chile)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39) | RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44)

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manual J. Chaves
The Wackenhut Corporation
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard,
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. H-130680

ORGANIZATION NO. P-154531

45 TYPE DO-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER | 46 NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: 1/

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	DSS	GOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	RRHeller

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Report prepared in Headquarters from MDM TWX 2083.

INDEX ----------
CASE ----------
X-REF ----------
FILES ----------

02 SEP 19

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
JFGleichauf	JFGleichauf	LGWegenstein for Heller	LHSnitzer

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4): K M I H

B. RPQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15):

C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20):

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. (22 23 24 25 26): 0 8 0 7 0

REPORT NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): 2 3 8 6 7 7 0

A B: B

J U O (34 35 36):

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Deterioration of Internal Security Leads to Increase in Private Security Operations

(Colombia)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39):

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44):

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manuel J. Chaves, Jr.
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130680

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

45 TYPE OO-F: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	O	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW
☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT
☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	Kieller

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FLEX
CASE
X-REF
FILES

18 AUG 1970

C/S: JFGleichauf/css

F.O. CHIEF: JFGLEICHAUF

CASE OFFICER

DIVISION/STAFF/DESK

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

13-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4: X M I M

B. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15

C. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26: 0 8 0 7 0

REPORT NO. A B C D E F 27 28 29 30 31 32 33: B 2 3 7 1 8 7 0

J I U O 34 35 36

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Lack of Industrial and Commercial Security Problems/
Confidence in Government
(Ecuador)

EXTRA DISSEM RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manuel J. Chavez, Jr.
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. P-130680

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT					AREA			
47	48	49	50		51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN	1	S	O	V
1	S	&	T	2. TOO GENERAL	2	I	N	T
2	P	O	L		3			
3	M	I	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES	4			
4	-	-	-					
5	S	O	C	4. OTHER/MISC.				
6	G	E	O	5. COMBINED WITH				
7	B	I	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST				
8	-	-	-					
9	M	I	S					

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT

☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	Mueller

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FILE ----------
CASE ----------
X-REF ----------
FILES ----------

12 AUG 1970

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
JPGleichauf/cse	JPGLEICHAUF		

FORM 7-63 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4): XHIB

B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15):

C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20):

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. (22 23 24 25 26): 07220

REPORT NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): B 2221370

J / I U O (34 35 36):

D. SUBJECT AND AREA: Expectation of Allende Victory/Fear of Industrial Violence/Interest in Developing Industrial Security Measures (Chile)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39):

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44):

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Manuel J. Chaves, Jr.
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. H130680

ORGANIZATION NO. H154531

45 TYPE OO-B: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
G	E	C	O
1	S	B	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM:

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE): ☐ NO ☐ TO USSR ☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS:

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	RMeller

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS
28 JUL 1970

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
JFGleichauf/css	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4: XNIM

B. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15:

C. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20:

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26: 07150

REPORT NO. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33: D 2131770

J U O 34 35 36:

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
Background on Carlos Lacerda

(Brazil)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39:

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44:

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Manuel J. Chaves, Jr.
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130620

ORGANIZATION NO. A154531

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50		AREA 51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN	1	S	O	V
1	S	A	T	2. TOO GENERAL	2	I	N	T
2	P	O	L		3			
3	M	I	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES	4			
4	-	-	-					
5	S	O	C	4. OTHER MISC				
6	G	E	O	5. COMBINED WITH				
7	B	I	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST				
8	-	-	-					
9	M	I	S					

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
GO
TO USSR
FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	RHeller

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

20 JUL 1970

FILE
CASE
X-REF
FILES

C/S JFGleichauf/cas

F.O. CHIEF JFGLEICHAUF

CASE OFFICER

DIVISION/STAFF DESK

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REC. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR.	REPORT NO.	I U O
1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	16 17 18 19 20	21	22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34 35 36
X N I M				X	0 4 0 3	I 1 0 1 1 6 7	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Probable Soviet Mi-10 Helicopter at Medellin Airfield (Colombia)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manuel J. Chavez, Jr.
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A 130680

ORGANIZATION NO. A 154531

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER.

46 *NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	S	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	O	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. DUPLICATIVE/WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ XX Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Documents
☒ XX Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

Direct to: International Div (Rheller)

During our interview which resulted in OOB 321/06420-70 Mr. Chavez did not mention that he had a photo of the Soviet helicopter he saw in Colombia. He remembered that he had the attached photo when we were conducting a subsequent interview.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

08 APR 1970

FILE
CASE
X-REF
FILES

C/S JHennessey/css
F.O. Chief JFGLEICHAUF
Case Officer
Division/Staff/Desk

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

4

(20-41)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ. CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)
X M I M				X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22-26)	REPORT NO. D E K OTHER (27-33)	I U O (34-36)
0 3 3 1 0	D 0 6 4 2 0 7 0	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Presidential Elections/Student Riots at National University/Maintenance Problems with Soviet Supplied Trolley Cars and Jeeps/Huge Soviet Helicopter to be Used During Construction of Pipeline/Recent Insurgency (Colombia)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39)
RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Manuel J. Chavez, Jr.
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A-130680
ORGANIZATION NO. A-154531

45 TYPE CODE GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER
46 NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	B	S	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ XXX Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

Please direct to:

International Division
(Rieller)

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

08 APR 1970

FLEX ______
CASE ______
X-REF ______
FILES M

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
JHennessey/css	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

4

(20-41)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

K-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY					FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6 7 8 9 10	C. REQ. COOR 11 12 13 14 15	D. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	E. 21	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	I.U.O. 34 35 36
X M I M				X	0 3 2 7 0	0 6 4 1 7 7 0	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Increased Income Tax to Help Educational System/Development of Oil Field in the Northeast/Construction of Oil Pipeline/Foreign Squeeze Being Paid for Concessions/Rumored Danger of Nationalization of Foreign Holdings

RELEASED MO. DA. YR.

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address) (Ecuador)
Manuel J. Chavez, Jr.
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A130680

ORGANIZATION NO. A15153/

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

Direct to: International Division (Rueller)

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

03 APR 1970

FLEX

CASE

X-REF

FILES 171

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division Staff Case
JFHennessey/css	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

4

(20-41)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-4C-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22-26)	REPORT NO. R E K OTHER (27-33)	IUO (34-36)
X N I H			4 9 4 0 3	X	0 3 2 7 0	0 6 4 1 6 7 0	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

President Velasco Suffers Ill Health

(Ecuador)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)	RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40-44)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Manuel J. Chavez, Jr.
The Wackenhut Corporation
3280 Ponce de Leon Blvd.
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO. A-150680

ORGANIZATION NO. A-154531

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	A	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	–	–	–
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	–	–	–
9	M	I	S

* 1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	[illegible]	N	Y
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

Please direct to:
Int'l Div (Heller)

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

09 APR 1970

FLEX ----------
CASE ----------
X-REF ----------
FILES ----------

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
JFHennessey:pmv	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

4

(20-41)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15-45-31

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4 5): X M I N

B. REPORT NUMBER (6 7 8 9 10):

C. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15):

D. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20):

E. (21): X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DA YR. (22 23 24 25 26): 0 1 3

REPORT NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): 6 1 2 0 7 0

I.U.O. (34 35 36):

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Panamanian National, Julion NINO Ruiz, Deported from
El Salvador/Limited Biographics
(Panama/El Salvador/Chile)

NEW

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39):

RELEASED MO. DA YR. (40 41 42 43 44):

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Henry I. Smyler, Development Manager
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
300 Bird Road
Coral Gables, Florida 514-2050

INDIVIDUAL NO. 1 154530

ORGANIZATION NO. 1 154531

45 TYPE CODE: S GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO. CCW

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

1. OFFICIALLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHERWISE
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

ATTN: OSS

Please advise if this information is of interest. These type of incidents occur occasionally and we can obtain detailed information if desired.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

20 MAR 1970

FLEX ____
CASE ____
X-REF ____
FILES ____

121

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
GCGuerrero/css	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

4

(20-41)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

~~14-20-50~~

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS F15-45-31

FOR FIELD USE ONLY					FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6 7 8 9 10	C. REQ CODE 11 12 13 14 15	D. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	E. 21	RECEIVED MO DA YR 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT NO. F E R OTHER 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	IUO 34 35 36
X H I M I				X	1 2 2 2 7	3 7 7 6 3 6 7	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Growing Disharmony Between the Government and Business Community

(Colombia)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO DA YR 40 41 42 43 44: 01 18

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

George Wackenhut, President
WACKENHUT SERVICES INC.
3280 Ponce De Leon Blvd.
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO. MX S154531

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47 48 49 50

AREA 51 52 53 54

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ XX Interview

☐ Trip Report

☐ Other Document

☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
GGuerrero:pw	JFGLEICHAUF		L H Seltzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

(20-41)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Colombia

SUBJECT Growing Disharmony between the Government and Business Community

REPORT NO OO-B-321/37763-67

DATE DISTR. 10 Jan 68

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53900

DATE OF INFO. 4 Dec 67 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Colombia - 4 Dec 67 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE **US national, official of a US firm engaged in providing commercial services to business firms and industries. He travels frequently and has contacts among business executives and government officials.**

[This report was developed by an AFNIN Air Force representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. During a recent business trip to Colombia I had occasion to visit and converse with business executives, owners of industrial firms and government officials. Through conversation with such I gained the information presented below.

2. The majority of the business community, both big and small businesses, is not in complete harmony with the government of President Carlos Lleras. Most business executives confirm that under the previous Conservative Party administration there was a stimulation of interest in foreign investment, a factor which is causing the current administration immense problems due to restrictive legislation on the percentage of capital which may be removed from the country. It is the consensus of the business community that this law will be changed within the next eight months, as a result of pressure by the business community upon the government.

3. At the present time there is much discontent among owners of private business firms as well as among the employees about a proposed new law. Current legislation requires that employers place in a fund a certain percentage of employees earnings, which will be returned to the employee upon retirement or termination of employment. Under this arrangement the employer may make use of the money for investments or development of the firm or industry. The reason for the discontent is that the government is attempting to pass a law requiring all business firms and industries to pay, on a monthly basis to the government, the money received from the employees. Severance or retirement pay of an employee will then become a responsibility of the government. The business community is adamantly against this legislation because it will restrict much of business operation. Employees are equally against the legislation because they feel once the government collects the money it will be appropriated for other purposes and never returned to the people.

4. The government has stated that the money collected will be used for development of low and middle class housing, and rents collected from these developments will be placed in a fund for the payment of severance and retirement benefits.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L S YES

The dissemination of this document is limited to [illegible] of the USIB [illegible] agencies, and to those senior officials of [illegible] in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7 it may be [illegible] participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO [illegible] tions or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual [illegible] to the U. S. Government [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

~~4-20~~-50

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

F-15-45-31

FOR FIELD USE ONLY / FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ. CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR (22-26)	REPORT NO. B / E / K / OTHER (27-33)	IUO (34-36)
XMIMI				X	12277	3791967	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Factors Bearing on the Economic and Political Front/
Assessment of Insurgent Capability

(Ecuador)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39):

RELEASED MO. DA. YR (40-44): 011078

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

George Wackenhut, President
Wackenhut Services, Inc.
3280 Ponce de Leon Blvd.
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.:

ORGANIZATION NO.: S154531

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.:

ORGANIZATION NO.:

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.:

ORGANIZATION NO.:

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ XX Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM:

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: YES

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Dept.
GGGuerrero:esd	JFGLEICHAUF		[illegible]

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

(20-41)

[illegible] material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM   C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L   NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Ecuador

SUBJECT Factors Bearing on the Economic and Political Front/Assessment of Insurgent Capability

REPORT NO. 00-D-321/37919-67

DATE DISTR. 10 Jan 68

NO PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53900 (356)

DATE OF INFO. 4 Dec 67 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Ecuador/4 Dec 67 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US national, official of a US firm engaged in providing commercial services to private industry and government. He travels frequently and has contacts among business executives and government officials.

[This report was developed by an AFNIN Air Force representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. During a recent business trip to Ecuador I had occasion to visit and converse with several business executives and government officials. Through conversation with business colleagues I gained the information presented below.

2. The business community is in complete harmony with the administration of President Otto Arosemena Gomez. The efforts of the present government to encourage foreign business investment is considered to be the biggest plus on the side of the current administration. Evidence of the efforts made by the government and the success achieved is demonstrated by the joint venture of two major oil companies, Texaco and Gulf, in drilling for new oil deposits. Agreements were reached between the government and the oil companies for prospective drilling in an area northeast of Quito, approximately 30 minutes by helicopter. The first four holes resulted in four oil producing wells. This strike is considered the richest since the Venezuelan strike. The government is presently being flooded with requests for permits to continue oil explorations in the area. The requests are coming from US, Japanese and West German firms.

3. President Arosemena is in firm control of the Army, and all elements of his political machine. He would like very much to continue as President. The desire of Arosemena to continue as President takes on more meaning when consideration is given to the possibility that Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra may again be elected President. The business community does not look favorably on this possibility but most businessmen are quick to concede that Velasco has the inside track at this time.

4. There is no evidence of insurgent capability by any group at the present time. Guerrilla activity is practically nonexistent and is not considered a problem area for the Army or the government.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

~~14-20-50~~
F-15-45-31

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED Unclassified	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION REPORT	
TO: (For Collection Manager's Use) X-MIMI Heller	IR NUMBER 321/37919/67	IR DATE 680110
	SICR NUMBER OTHER REFERENCE Pool	DATE IR RECD BY ADDRESSEE 680117
THRU:	SUBJECT Factors Bearing on Economic and Political Event	DATE IR RECD BY EVALUATOR 9 Feb '68
	TARGET COUNTRY (S) EC	IR ORIGINATOR 356

NOTE TO EVALUATOR: Do not complete this evaluation unless you have responsibility for subject matter in the Report. Write appropriate number in boxes below:

A. USABILITY
1. GREAT
2. MODERATE
3. SLIGHT
4. NONE (See Remarks)

2

B. VALIDITY
1. PROBABLY TRUE
2. CANNOT JUDGE
3. DOUBTFUL (See Remarks)

2

C. HOW MUCH OF THIS INFORMATION IS BEING REPORTED FOR THE FIRST TIME
1. ALL
2. MOST
3. SOME
4. NONE

2

D. WAS REPORT RECEIVED BY REQUIREMENT SUSPENSE DATE
1. YES
2. NO
3. NOT APPLICABLE

3

E. REASON FOR EVALUATION
1. SICR OR DIRM III
2. REQUEST BY COLLECTOR
3. SELECTION BY COLLECTION MANAGER
4. INITIATIVE

4

F. IF REPORT WAS IN RESPONSE TO A SICR OR DIRM III ITEM, IT SATISFIED REQUIREMENT
1. COMPLETELY
2. PARTIALLY
3. NOT AT ALL

☐

REMARKS Use this space to amplify responses checked above. Comment, when appropriate, how reporting could be improved, how the information was or will be used, include suggestions for follow-up.

This report will serve as a worthwhile addition to our data base for Ecuador.

Insert special security precautions or markings and downgrading information.

EVALUATOR'S ORGANIZATION	CLASSIFICATION	DATE EVALUATED	NAME OF EVALUATOR
DIAAP-6A1	UNCLASSIFIED	23 Feb '68	Jon Heggan (1Lt.)

DD FORM 1 APR 66 1480 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967-271-072

SECRET
(When Filled In)

~~44-20~~-50

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS F-15-15-31

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ. CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22-26)	REPORT NO. (27-33)	IUO (34-36)
X M I M I				X	1 2 2 2 7	3 7 6 1 9 6 7	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Guerrilla Operations

(Colombia)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39)

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
George WACKENHUT, President
Wackenhut Services, Inc.
8280 Ponce de Leon Blvd
Coral Gables, Florida ~~B-67-353~~

INDIVIDUAL NO. New

ORGANIZATION NO S-154531

45 TYPE DOC: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50	*
0	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
1	S	A	T	2. TOO GENERAL
2	P	O	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
3	M	I	L	
4	-	-	-	4. OTHER/MISC.
5	S	O	C	5. COMBINED WITH
6	G	F	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST
7	B	I	O	
8	-	-	-	
9	M	I	S	

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	Q	V
2		N	Z
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
IRS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

P

C/S GCGuerrero;ms
F.O. Chief JFCleichauf
Case Officer
Division/Staff/Desk

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

GROUP 1

(20-41)

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM　　C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L　　NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Colombia　　REPORT NO. OO- B-321/37619-67

SUBJECT Guerrilla Operations　　DATE DISTR. 2 Jan 68

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES CIRL: C-DC7-59550

(356)

DATE OF INFO. 4 Dec 67 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Colombia - 4 Dec 67 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US national, official of a US firm engaged in providing services to industry and business firms. He travels frequently and has contacts among business executives and government officials in several foreign countries.

[This report was developed by an AFNIN Air Force representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. During a recent business trip to Colombia I had occasion to visit and converse with several business executives and government officials. Through such conversations I gained the information presented below.

2. Guerrilla activity within the country is presently confined to the following geographical locations. The Army of National Liberation (ELN) is operating in Departemento Santander Del Sur at a point nearest the Venezuelan border. This base of operations provides the group with numerous escape routes to Venezuela in cases of hot pursuit when engaged by elements of the Army. It also provides ease of operations in the exchange of necessities. There is considerable traffic in this area and all attributed to the ELN.

3. The leader of ELN is Fabio Vazquez Castano. He is the same person who hijacked a Colombian airliner and forced the pilot to fly him to Cuba. Vazquez is presently in Cuba. Victor Medina Moron is second in command, and is presently running the operations of the group. The ELN is dedicated to and followers of the Peking line.

4. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is presently operating along the borders of the Departamentos of Tolima and Huila in the Intendencia of Caqueta. The leader of this group is Manuel Morulanda, better known as "Tiro Fijo". This group is dedicated to and followers of the Moscow line.

5. All members of ELN and FARC are known to be Colombian nationals. The leaders of each organization have been trained in Cuba or in the Soviet Union.

6. Money and necessities for the ELN groups is being furnished by Cuba. Support for FARC is unknown. Numerous weapons have been left behind by FARC after engagements with the Army. These weapons are of Czech origin. However, most of the weapons in use by ELN and FARC have been acquired as a result of engagements with the Army.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES　　C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L　　GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification　　S YES

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7 it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

7. There is a new group, name unknown, operating in Los Altos Del Since in the northwest coast near the town of Sincelejo. This group is of no consequence and the Army has it under control. In the case of ELN and FARC the Army is usually aware of their whereabouts but cannot claim to have them under control.

-end-

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WACKENHUT CORP.
DCD FILE #65805

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIA
			[illegible]

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

Closed

[illegible]

Nº 65805

ACTIVATION AND CLOSURE

OFFICE	DATE OPENED	DATE CLOSED	OFFICE	DATE OPENED	DATE CLOSED	OFFICE	DATE OPENED	DATE CLOSED
BOSTON			MIAMI	22 June		ST. LOUIS		
CHICAGO			MPLS			SAN FRAN.		
DALLAS			N. Y.			SEATTLE		
DENVER			PHIL			SYRACUSE		
DETROIT			PITT			WASH		
L. A.						GENERAL CLOSURE		

REQUIREMENTS

INITIATOR	NUMBER	INITIATOR	NUMBER	INITIATOR	NUMBER
LA					

MONTHLY REVIEW

DATE	INITIAL	REMARKS
28 Je	JMc	Reply of DCD/Tkm. 13377 was received & [illegible] distributed to OGC + DDO Floyd Burdett x7493, ostensibly no further action required, will [illegible] feedback from OGC/DDO & wait few days before close case to [illegible].
2 July	JMc	22 [illegible] telephone [illegible] Golden who [illegible] future contact if can be avoided.
1 Jul	JMc	Manning advised contact [illegible]. Will [illegible] and [illegible] by Berkowi.
9 Sept	JMc	Manning advised he only requested mtg. as he had just returned from a trip abroad - Floyd Burnett C/LA/CAR/CAR1 and Tony Golden / DDO/OC posed no objection.

(RECORD RESPONSIVE REPORTING ON REVERSE SIDE)

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 006537

(13-36-42)

CONFIDENTIAL

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
NOTICE OF CASE CLOSURE

DISTRIBUTION (AS LISTED BELOW)

Chief, Operations Services Group/OSB Branch, DCD

DATE 30 June 1977

DCD CASE NUMBER 65805

THIS DIVISION HAS COMPLETED WORK ON THE ABOVE CASE NUMBER, FOR WHICH REQUIREMENTS WERE FURNISHED BY THE FOLLOWING CONTROL NUMBERS:

THE FOLLOWING REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED:

3. THIS CASE IS NOW BEING CLOSED:

XX☒XX a. ACTION COMPLETED

☐ b. OTHER (EXPLAIN)

4. SHOULD INFORMATION SUBSEQUENTLY BE RECEIVED RESPONSIVE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS CASE, THE RESULTING REPORTS WILL BE PUBLISHED.

5. QUESTIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO LINDA REINDL Linda Reindl DCD, TELEPHONE EXTENSION 2268.

EARL WALKER"
SIGNATURE

DISTRIBUTION:

☐ DDO/INT/RQ

DCD Field Offices (check as appropriate):

☐ Boston
☐ Chicago
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ Los Angeles

☐

XXXXXXX Miami
☐ Minneapolis
☐ New York
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ St. Louis

☐

☐ San Francisco
☐ Seattle
☐ Syracuse
☐ Washington
☐ All Field Offices

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET

Cover and Related Operational lead/US Company Contract
with Sonatrach

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Op[illegible] Services Group/[illegible]
910 [illegible] SO/Amy/mm-2203

65805

20 Decmeber 1976

NE/NA/A
6C18
ATTN: Bill Wagner

MIM-OBR-36564-76

Attached for your information.

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 006875

SEC[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD RESIDENT OFFICE	ORGANIZATION NUMBER	CASE NUMBER	FORWARDED MO. DAY YR	REPORT SERIES & NO.	POINT
X M I N		6 5 1 311 6 5 8 0 5	1 2 2 0 6	OIR 3 6 5 6 A 7 6	2

SUBJECT AND AREA

COVER AND RELATED OPERATIONAL LEAD/US COMPANY CONTRACT WITH SONATRACH

RELEASED MO. DAY YR: 1 1 1 1 6

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Bruce Berkmans
Wackenhut Corporation
3200 Ponce De Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

* NOT DISSEMINATED

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT *

1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ. PROCESSING ELEMENT

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

METHOD OF COLLECTION

XX	INTERVIEW		TRIP REPORT
	OTHER DOCUMENT		OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

EXCHANGES (COL. 38)

1 - EXCHANGE		3. COMMERCIAL	
2 - BILATERAL		4. ARTICLE IV	

DIRECTED TO	OSG	SREE	ICG	ETF	DESK OFFICER
	OSB				SOALMY

FIELD COMMENTS

(continued from headquarters comment)

However, DOD does state that it is prohibited to make specifications to members of a private detective [illegible]. While we are not sure of the [illegible] [illegible] prohibits, the [illegible] is [illegible] [illegible]. We believe you are still able to [illegible] piece of [illegible] we [illegible] [illegible]

INTERNAL USE ONLY

~~E-2 IMPDET CL BY 011668~~

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Process sheet typed in OSG/OSB per MIAMI TWX 13718

AJAJA

Bruce as you know this subject is at the highest priority. Also much interest is the Company coming to the State for study. All info on who they are, why they will be coming, how long they will stay, and where they will be staying, [illegible] will be appreciated.

(cont.)

MRO	KIG	GRADE	INDIVIDUAL NO.	NA	TN	COUNTRY
K I A						

S/O	F.C. CHIEF	DESK OFFICER	BRANCH SECTION CHIEF
Mainwaring	Mainwaring	Almy	OSG/OSB

FORM 25 7-75 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 006687

(20-41)

DEC 17 9 15 AM '76

SECRET 162040Z DEC 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13718

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

TO: OPERATIONS SERVICES GROUP (ALMY) FROM MAINWARING

WNINTEL/WOMACE INTERNAL USE ONLY

OIR-36564-76
SUBJECT/AREA: COVER AND RELATED OPERATIONAL LEAD/US COMPANY CONTRACT WITH SONATRACH (ALGERIA)
C/S: BRUCE BERKMANS
WACKENHUT CORPORATION
3200 PONCE DE LEON BOULEVARD
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA
METH OF COLL: INTERVIEW
FIELD COMMENTS: CONFIRMING STETSON/MAINWARING TELECON WE RECOGNIZE THAT DOI 52-10 MAY PRECLUDE THIS USE AS CURRENTLY INTERPRETED. ACTIVITY WOULD BE CONDUCTED THROUGH A SUBSIDIARY AND INVOLVES THE PROTECTIVE, NON-INVESTIGATORY, CLIMATE OF THE COMPANY.
I/O: B.E. MAINWARING
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668
SECRET

INTERNAL USE ONLY

S E C R E T 162032Z DEC 76 STAFF

DEC 17 9 15 AM '76

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13719

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

WNINTEL/WOMACE INTERNAL USE ONLY

MIAMI OIR-36564-76

SUBJECT: COVER AND RELATED OPERATIONAL LEAD/US COMPANY CONTRACT WITH SONATRACH

REF: DCD CASE 65835
DCD CASE 65131

1. US CITIZEN, A FORMER PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NOW AN EXECUTIVE WITH A MAJOR PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY.

2. SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION, MAJOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND PROTECTIVE ORGANIZATION, ARE IN THE FINAL STAGES OF NEGOTIATING A US$45 MILLION CONTRACT WITH THE ALGERIAN NATIONAL OIL AND GAS COMPANY, SONATRACH. THIS NEW CONTRACT RESULTS FROM AN EARLIER SURVEY PERFORMED BY WACKENHUT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ALGERIA. THIS EARLIER WORK INVOLVED STUDY OF 40 FACILITIES AND LOCATIONS, INCLUDING REFINERIES, PIPELINE TERMINALS, PORTS, OIL AND GAS FIELDS, POWER PLANTS, LNG PLANTS, LPG PLANTS, AND OTHER CRITICAL PRODUCTION AREAS. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ENCOMPASSED THE FOLLOWING:

A. EVALUATION OF THE CRITICALITY AND VULNERABILITY OF THE SITES

B. SECURITY FORCES ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

C. SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS AND EQUIPMENT

D. MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS AND EQUIPMENT

E. INDUSTRIAL BURN AND TRAUMA HOSPITALS

INTERNAL USE ONLY

F. PHYSICAL SAFEGUARDS

G. ACCESS CONTROLS

H. DETECTION SYSTEMS

I. INTERDICTION (RESPONSE) SYSTEMS

J. DISASTER AND EMERGENCY PLANS

K. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES

L. FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS

M. INSPECTION AND TESTING

N. NATIONAL PROTECTION STANDARDS

O. PREPARATION OF DETAILED SPECIFICATIONS FOR A REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL TENDER

P. PLANNING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY.

3. A COPY OF THIS FIRST SURVEY CAN PROBABLY BE ACQUIRED.

4. THE NEW CONTRACT, UNDER DISCUSSION, BUT ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE CONCLUDED, INVOLVES:

A. THE SERVICES OF NUMEROUS ON-SITE MANAGEMENT, TECHNICAL ADVISORY AND TRAINING PERSONNEL.

B. THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION, SELECTION AND PROCUREMENT OF DESIGNATED ITEMS OF SECURITY, SAFETY, FIRE PROTECTION AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT.

C. PROVIDING ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING PLANS FOR AN INDUSTRIAL BURN AND TRAUMA HOSPITAL, A FIRE DEPARTMENT, A SECURITY CONTROL CENTER, A SAFETY INSPECTION LABORATORY, A TRAINING INSTITUTE, AND AN EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE FACILITY; AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONSTRUCTION, EQUIPPING, AND OPERATION OF THESE FACILITIES.

D. PROVIDING DESIGN ENGINEERING PLANS FOR AN EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, AS WELL AS THE PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT, INSTALLATION, AND CHECK-OUT OF THE SYSTEM.

E. FURNISHING PRE-FABRICATED MODULAR STRUCTURES TO BE USED AS INTERIM FACILITIES FOR PERSONNEL LIVING QUARTERS AS WELL AS OFFICES AND OPERATIONS QUARTERS.

5. INTEGRAL TO THESE ARRANGEMENTS IS EXTENSIVE STAFFING WITH ON-SITE US PERSONNEL WHO WILL BE IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH SONATRACH OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS. A LONDON EXECUTIVE PLACEMENT COMPANY WILL HANDLE SOME STAFF SELECTION. THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE TRAINING OF ALGERIANS IN THE US, PROBABLY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI AND FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY (MIAMI).

6. THE PRECEDING WAS VOLUNTEERED FOR POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATION ON A VERY PRELIMINARY AND NONCOMMITAL BASIS. E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

SECRET

INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

Bruec Berkmans
DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Operations [illegible] Group/OSE
910 Key Bldg. - x-[illegible]
JFrench/mw

65805

13 September 1976

SA/DDO
2B1415
ATTN: Mr. Anthony Goldin

Attached for your information.

cc: Copy sent to C/LA/CARI

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 006875

SECRET

S E C R E T 101400Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13510

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

TO: OPERATIONS SERVICES GROUP/OSG (FRENCH) FROM MAINWARING

WNINTEL

SUBJ: DCD CASE 65805 - BRUCE BERKMANS

REF : MAINWARING/FRENCH TELECON OF 9 SEPTEMBER 1976, SAME SUBJECT

1. FOR THE RECORD, THE PRIMARY PURPOSE FOR BRUCE BERKMANS' REQUEST THAT I SEE HIM WAS TO ENABLE HIM TO REFER A POSSIBLE APPLICANT FOR STAFF EMPLOYMENT TO THE AGENCY. I WILL INFORMALLY RAISE THIS MATTER WITH THE PERSONNEL RECRUITER WHEN HE IS NEXT IN THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE. BERKMANS HAD NO PERSONAL INTEREST IN THIS MATTER AND WAS SIMPLY TRYING TO PLAY THE ROLLE OF A HELPFUL INDIVIDUAL.

2. HE ALSO REVIEWED SOME PROJECTS THAT HIS ORGNIZATION WILL BE INVOLVED IN BOTH LATIN AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. AS OF THIS DATE IT IS TO EARLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER WE MIGHT HAVE ANY INTEREST IN THESE MATTERS. RIGHT NOW WE HAVE NO REPORTABLE INTEL OR OPERATIONAL MATERIALS.

3. BERKMANS ALSO DISCUSSED HIS COMPANY'S APPROACH TO EXECUTIVE PROTECTION AGAINST THE THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THIS MAY BE STILL ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH HE MIGHT OCCASIONALLY VOLUNTEER A USEFUL ITEM.

4. AS NOTED EARLIER, SINCE HIS DECISION TO REFRAIN FROM ANY LITIGATION INVOLVING THE AGENCY, HE SEEMS TOTALLY RELAXED. MY PERSONAL APPRAISAL NOW IS THAT HE WILL POSE NO PROBLEMS FOR US IN THE FUTURE DESPITE THE UNPLEASANTNESS OF A FEW YEARS AGO.
E2 IMPDET.CL BY 011668
S E C R E T

14-00000

SECRET

JFRENCH/mw
2268

ROUTINE

15734

29 JUNE 1976 2:30 1 1

DCD/MIAMI

FROM: DCD/HEADQUARTERS (OSG/FRENCH)

SUBJECT: CASE 65805

REF : A) DCD MIAMI 13387, 29 JUNE 1976
B) MAINWARING/FRENCH PHONECON OF 29 JUNE

THE ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL FOR THE DDO FORSEES NO PROBLEM IN ACCEDING TO BRUCE BERKMANS' REQUEST FOR ANOTHER MEETING. IN FACT, IT MAY HELP DEFUSE THE SITUATION. ALL FUTURE REQUESTS OF THIS NATURE SHOULD BE REPORTED TO DCD HEADQUARTERS AND WILL BE HANDLED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

E-2 IMPDET CLBY 006875

SECRET

SECRET

CASE 65805

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Operations Support Group/OSB
[illegible]
JFrench/mw

6 July 1976

Office of Inspector
General - 2E24 HQS.

AAtached for your
information.

cc: Copy sent to
SA/DDO
LA/CAR

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 006875

RET

SECRET 021730Z JUL 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13398

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

ATTN: OPERATIONS SERVICES GROUP (FRENCH)

SUBJ: CASE 65805

REF : DCD/HEADQUARTERS 12734

JUL 2 3 09 PM '76

1. I MET AGAIN ON 2 JULY 1976 WITH BRUCE BERKMANS. IMMEDIATELY HE REITERATED WHAT HE HAD ALREADY TOLD ME ON THE TELEPHONE: AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS ATTORNEY AND CONSIDERABLE REFLECTION HE HAS DECIDED THAT HE WILL NOT SUE THE AGENCY OR ANY STAFFERS OR FORMER STAFFERS. HE ATTRIBUTES THIS DECISION TO WHAT HE CALLED THE INORDINATE COSTS IN BOTH TIME AND MONEY. HE ALSO VOLUNTEERED HIS FEELING THAT THE AGENCY WAS BEING KICKED FROM EVERY SIDE AND HE DID NOT WISH TO ADD TO THE PROBLEM.

2. BERKMANS WAS CONSIDERABLY MORE COMPOSED AND RELAXED AT THIS SECOND MEETING ALMOST AS IF HE WERE RELIEVED AT FINALLY HAVING COME TO A DECISION. HE THEN REPEATED WHAT APPEARS NOW TO BE A SINCERE OFFER TO ACT ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS AND IN A NONOPERATIONAL CAPACITY AS A NORMAL DCD CONTACT. HE MENTIONED VOLUNTARILY THAT HE HAD SOUGHT AND OBTAINED THE CONSENT OF HIS BOSS GEORGE WACKENHUT IN THIS RESPECT.

3. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT BERKMANS IS INVOLVED IN VARIOUS FOREIGN PROJECTS WHICH COULD BE OF INFORMATIONAL INTEREST TO US. I WAS, NONETHELESS, DELIBERATELY VAGUE AND NONCOMMITTAL WITH REGARD TO HIS OFFER. I AM, HOWEVER, LESS WARY OF SOME SORT OF RELATIONSHIP THAN I MIGHT HAVE BEEN BASED PURELY ON OUR FIRST INTERVIEW. IN ANY EVENT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WE WILL HEAR FROM BRUCE BERKMANS AGAIN. E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

SECRET

DCD Case 65805

Case 65805

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Operations Services Group/OSG
810 Key Bldg. - [illegible]

Jon French

2 July 1976

LA/CSB
Lloyd Burdett—3 B 4402 Hq.

cc: SA/DDO

Attached for your information is a copy of Miami TWX 13387.

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 006875

14-00000

file
Case 65805

JUN 29 [illegible] 1976

S E C R E T 291430Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13387

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS

ATTN: OPERATIONS SERVICES GROUP (FRENCH)

SUBJ: DCD CASE 65805 - LA DIVISION REQUEST FOR CONTACT OF
WACKENHUT CORPORATION OFFICER

FYI, BRUCE BERKMANS TELEPHONED ME AT MY HOME LATE ON 28 JUNE 1976 TO TELL ME THAT AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS ATTORNEY HE HAS DECIDED NOT TO SUE THE AGENCY.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

S E C R E T

☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CIA/DCD REQUIREMENT CONTROL SHEET

DCD CASE NO (1-6)	TO BR (7)	TO DSK (8)	(9-10)	DATE OPENED MO (11-12)	DA (13-14)	YR (15)	LINE (16)	DATE PROC MO (17)	DATE PROC YR (18)	TYPE (19)	VALID (20)	SUBJ (21)	AREA (22)	REQUIREMENT INITIATOR (23-26)	REQUIREMENT SERIAL NUMBER (27-32)	DATE OF DOCUMENT MO (33-34)	DA (35-36)	YR (37)	DIR (43)	INFO (44)
5 065806	3	9	[					6	6	S	2		7	CPLA	760449	06	23	6	9	

SUBJECT OF REQUIREMENT

Request for contact: Wackenhut Corporation

ROUTING	DATE	INITIALS		CATEGORY OF REQUIREMENT *(Desk Officer check one)*		
1. OSG/French				0 - ECONOMIC		5 - SOCIOLOGICAL
2.				1 - SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL		6 - GEOGRAPHIC
3. SV/CONTROL/CASE DESK				2 - POLITICAL		7 - BIOGRAPHIC
4.				3 - MILITARY	XXX	9 - MISCELLANEOUS

DCD ACTION ON REQUIREMENT *(Desk Officer check as appropriate)*

☑ I. Requirement is accepted for action, under the above DCD case number, on the following basis:
- ☑ A. It is being forwarded to the field. (Specify, under "Remarks")
  - ☑ 1. Capability is known or believed to exist.
  - ☐ 2. Capability is uncertain, but field resources suggest possibility of collection.
  - ☐ 3. No capability is believed to exist at present, but requirement will be used if capability develops.
- ☐ B. It will be retained at headquarters.
  - ☐ 1. The field is already alert to the need and will continue to report as information is obtained.
  - ☐ 2. Sources capable of at least partial fulfillment may become available; requirement will be drawn upon for their guidance.

☐ II. Requirement is not accepted for action, for reasons given under "Remarks." It ☐ will/will not ☐ be retained for information and use if opportunity develops.

☐ III. Decision is deferred, for reasons given under "Remarks," pending:
- ☐ A. Further discussion.
- ☐ B. Investigation of other collection potential.
- ☐ C. Investigation of other customer interest.
- ☐ D. Review (by originator) of latest information, including report(s) ____________
- ☐ E. Further development of the requirement.

REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DCD DESK OFFICER	
1 July 76	Jon M French	Classified by 006687. Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

COPY # 1 - RETAINED BY DESK OFFICER

FORM 3734
10-74 MFG 12-74 ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET (20-37)

SECRET

23 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCD/OSB

ATTENTION : Mr. Jon French

SUBJECT : Contact with Former Staff Agent

1. This will confirm our green line telephone conversation of 22 June 1976 concerning a recommendation that DCD contact Mr. Bruce Berckmans Jr., (201-309117), a former staff agent under the LPGLOBE program. Mr. Berckmans recently telephoned an Agency staff officer with whom he is acquainted, indicating that he had information of interest and needed to talk with some one from the Agency. Mr. Berckmans is currently employed by the Wackenhut Corporation in the Miami area.

2. We discussed this case with Mr. Anthony Goldin, Assistant General Counsel/DDO, who felt that a representative of the Agency should meet with Mr. Berckmans to see what he had on his mind. Mr. Goldin said we would not be in violation of any Agency regulations or guidelines since Mr. Berckmans was the one requesting the meeting. Mr. Goldin recommended that contact be made through an overt employee (DCD) rather than through the LA/Miami Station.

3. Upon learning of your two immediate intel reports on 22 June, from private investigator sources, concerning plans for possible assassination of Caribbean leaders, we felt there may be a connection between these reports and Mr. Berckmans' information. It is for that reason that we suggested that DCD might want to move rapidly on this matter.

4. As mentioned on the green line, Mr. Berckmans' address is 3941 Midway St., Miami, Florida; his telephone number is (area code 305) 443-2260.

L. Burnett

Lloyd C. Burnett
C/LA/CAR/CARI

E2 IMPDET
CL by 012913

SECRET

SECRET

23 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCD/OSB

ATTENTION : Mr. Jon French

SUBJECT : Contact with Former Staff Agent

1. This will confirm our green line telephone conversation of 22 June 1976 concerning a recommendation that DCD contact Mr. Bruce Berckmans Jr., (201-309117), a former staff agent under the LPGLOBE program. Mr. Berckmans recently telephoned an Agency staff officer with whom he is acquainted, indicating that he had information of interest and needed to talk with some one from the Agency. Mr. Berckmans is currently employed by the Wackenhut Corporation in the Miami area.

2. We discussed this case with Mr. Anthony Goldin, Assistant General Counsel/DDO, who felt that a representative of the Agency should meet with Mr. Berckmans to see what he had on his mind. Mr. Goldin said we would not be in violation of any Agency regulations or guidelines since Mr. Berckmans was the one requesting the meeting. Mr. Goldin recommended that contact be made through an overt employee (DCD) rather than through the LA/Miami Station.

3. Upon learning of your two immediate intel reports on 22 June, from private investigator sources, concerning plans for possible assassination of Caribbean leaders, we felt there may be a connection between these reports and Mr. Berckmans' information. It is for that reason that we suggested that DCD might want to move rapidly on this matter.

4. As mentioned on the green line, Mr. Berckmans' address is 3941 Midway St., Miami, Florida; his telephone number is (area code 305) 445-2260.

Lloyd C. Burnett
C/LA/CAR/CARI

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL by 012913

OGC
no problem
follow up [illegible]
- extension [illegible]
help defense
but not regular thing

~~[illegible]~~
~~X~~ 5309 Rm.
number

2B1415
OGC/DDO
A. [illegible]

called last night
decided not to [illegible]
voluntary [illegible]
OK

something terribly wrong
mentally ?

0800 Thur
or ~~[illegible]~~
Fri

confirm late today

[illegible] of our interview
one more [illegible]
[illegible] would be in any [illegible]

14-00000

JUN 23 10 57 AM '76

file
Case 65805

S E C R E T 231445Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13374

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS

ATTN: OPERATIONS SERVICES GROUP/OSB (FRENCH) FROM MAINWARNING

SUBJ: CASE 65805 - LA DIVISION REQUEST FOR CONTACT OF
WACKENHUT CORPORATION OFFICER

REF : DCD/HEADQUARTERS 15605

I AM MEETING BRUCE BERCKMANS, JR., AT 0800 ON 24 JUNE 1976 AT WACKENHUT OFFICES. PLEASE ADVISE IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL PRIOR TO THE MEETING TO KNOW SOMETHING OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDERLYING THE FINAL STATEMENT IN PARAGRAPH ONE OF REFERENT. E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668.

S E C R E T

NO - 23 Jun Miami FO advised

S E C R E T 241400Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13377

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS /INFO DIRECTOR

~~ATTN: OSS (FRENCH)~~

~~SUBJ: CASE 65805~~

REF : DCD/HEADQUARTERS 15603
RYBAT AKULE WUDISH

1. I MET BRUCE BERCKMANS AT HIS WACKENHUT OFFICE THIS MORNING AS SCHEDULED. BERCKMANS BEGAN THE INTERVIEW BY REQUESTING THAT I READ A MULTIPAGE LETTER WHICH HE IS THINKING OF SENDING TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL. IT IS A DETAILED STATEMENT OF GRIEVANCES STEMMING FROM HIS FORCED RESIGNATION AND INDICATES THAT HE IS CONSIDERING A SUIT AGAINST THE AGENCY. HE HAS IN FACT RETAINED COUNCIL, APPARENTLY ANOTHER FORMER AGENCY STAFFER, BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO PROCEED WITH LEGAL ACTION. OTHER ELEMENTS SHOULD PROBABLY BE INFORMED.

2. THE PRECEDING NOT WITHSTANDING, BERCKMANS, WHO IS FOND OF SAYING THAT HE RESIGNED FROM THE AGENCY BUT NOT THE UNITED STATES, OFFERED TO SERVE AS A FAIRLY TYPICAL DCD CONTACT WITH RESPECT TO THE INFORMATION HE DERIVES IN HIS REGULAR WACKENHUT DUTIES. BERCKMANS UNDOUBTEDLY HAS MANY USEFUL CONTACTS ESPECIALLY IN LATIN AMERICA AND SOON IN THE MIDDLE EAST. UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES THIS MIGHT BE A USEFUL INFORMATIONAL RELATIONSHIP.

3. I TOLD BERCKMANS, HOWEVER, THAT IN VIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH I ABOVE I FELT IT INAPPROPRIATE FOR US TO MAINTAIN ANY SYSTEMATIC RELATIONSHIP AT THIS TIME. SHOULD HE DECIDE NOT TO PROCEED WITH HIS SUIT AND OTHER THINGS FALL INTO PLACE, PERHAPS A FUTURE USEFUL CONTACT COULD BE ESTABLISHED.

4. IN DESCRIBING HIS DUTIES BERCKMANS DID DROP ONE MINOR PIECE OF INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL AGAINST THE CURRENT

JAMAICAN SITUATION. THROUGH A SUBCONTRACTOR HIS COMPANY IS CONSIDERING A CONTRACT IN JAMAICA WHICH WOULD PROVIDE CUSTODIAL SERVICES FOR REVERE BAUXITE HOLDINGS WHICH THE COMPANY IS APPARENTLY PLANNING TO MOTHBALL. E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668.

S E C R E T

5. FILE OSS CASE 65805

Lloyd Bandett
advised 24 Je 76
Relay DIR 24 Je 76

14-00000

JH/ms

SECRET

2268

PRIORITY

15603

22 JUNE 1976 1:00 1 1

DCD/MIAMI

FROM: DCD/HEADQUARTERS (JFRENCH/OSC)

NEW CASE 65805

SUBJECT: LA DIVISION REQUEST FOR CONTACT OF WACKENHUT CORPORATION OFFICER

1. THIS CASE IS RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENT CONTROL NUMBER CPLA-760449 AND OBJECTIVE V.

LA DIVISION HAS REQUESTED DCD ASSISTANCE IN RECONTACTING BRUCE BERCKMANS, JR., DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF WACKENHUT CORPORATION, CORAL GABLES, FLA. LA DIVISION PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 3941 MIDWAY ST, MIAMI, TEL. (305) 443-2260. BERCHMANS IS A FORMER AGENCY NON-OFFICIAL COVER OFFICER WHO WAS ASKED TO RESIGN FROM THE AGENCY IN 1970.

2. THROUGH AN LA DIVISION OFFICER, TOM CLINES, BERCKMANS HAS REQUESTED CONTACT WITH AN AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE AS HE HAS INFORMATION WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO THE AGENCY. THERNAME OF TOM CLINES MAY BE USED TO FACILITATE CONTACT WITH BERCKMANS. LA DIVISION HAS REQUESTED EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING OF THIS REQUEST AS THEY BELIEVE THAT BERCKMANS MAY HAVE INFORMATION ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN JAMAICA.

3. LA DIVISION HAS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS REQUEST IS ONLY IN RESPONSE TO BERCKMANS REQUEST FOR CONTACT WITH THE AGENCY. LA DIVISION HAS NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN BERCKMANS NOR HIS COMPANY. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL HAS CONCURRED IN CONTACTING BERCKMANS BY DCD MIAMI.

SECRET – SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTRACT PERSONNEL

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
RETURN FILE TO 5E-65

NOTICE: This is an Office of Personnel File and subject to 10 day limitation period. This file has been charged to MAGGIE ; and is due to be returned to CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, 5E-65 Hqs., x7841, as of 6/15/75.

adm

Mr. George Martin Rosnek

Dear Mr. Rosnek:

Reference is made to your contract with the U. S. Government as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 8 April 1979, paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" is amended by deleting the figure $37,270 as it appears therein and by substituting in lieu thereof the figure $41,270. Said paragraph ~~paragraph~~ is also modified to provide that subsequent augmentation of your basic fee, based upon the percentage increase authorized U. S. Government employees in the annual Legislative Pay increases, will be individually authorized by contract amendment at appropriate times as requested and certified by the responsible Government official, provided however, that your total compensation ~~[illegible]~~ under this paragraph does not exceed the equivalent of the salary ~~rate~~ Rate paid ~~at the~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~the top step of a GS-15.~~

At the top step of a GS-15.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Mr. George Martin Rosnek

Dear Mr. Rosnek:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 7 October 1979 paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" is amended by deleting the figure $41,270 as it appears therein and by substituting in lieu thereof the figure $44,159.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /s/ Gene L. Byrd
Contracting Officer

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

1/15/79

BF/CO

SECRET

5 OCT 1979

CI 321-79

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM: David H. Blee
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

THROUGH: Chief, Career Management Staff
Manpower and Support Branch/Contract

SUBJECT: Amendment to Contract for
George Martin Rosnek

1. Per paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" of subject's contract, effective 1 March 1970, as amended, it is hereby requested that the figure $41,270 be deleted and the figure $44,159 be substituted therein. This increase represents the percentage increase (7 percent) authorized US Government employees in the annual Legislative Pay increase effective 1 October 1979.

2. All classified Secret.

David H. Blee

David H. Blee

CONCUR:

9 oct 79

Chief, Career Management Staff   Date

APPROVED:

Chief, Contract Personnel Division   Date

CL BY 063765
RVW 5 Oct 99 DRV D9c.1

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Mr. George Martin Rosnek

Dear Mr. Rosnek:

Reference is made to your Contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 8 April 1979, paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" is amended by deleting the figure $37,270 as it appears therein and by substituting in lieu thereof the figure $41,270. Said paragraph is also modified to provide that subsequent augmentation of your basic fee, based upon the percentage increase authorized U.S. Government employees in the annual Legislative Pay Increases, will be individually authorized by contract amendment at appropriate times as requested and certified by the responsible Government official, provided however, that your total compensation under this paragraph does not exceed the equivalent of the salary rate paid at the top step of GS-15.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY /s/ Gene L. Byrd
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

George Martin Rosnek
George Martin Rosnek

11 APR 1979
Date

WITNESS:

11 APR 1979
Date

APPROVED:

David H.

12 APR 1979
Date

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

29 MAR 1979

CI 121-79

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM : David H. Blee
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

THROUGH : Chief, Career Management Staff
Manpower and Support Branch/Contract

SUBJECT : Amendment to Contract for
George Martin Rosnek

1. Action Requested: It is requested that the contract for Mr. George Martin Rosnek, an Independent Contractor, be amended to increase his compensation from $37,270 to $41,270 per annum effective 8 April 1979.

2. Background: In September 1978 Mr. Rosnek, a former senior officer of the KGB, raised with his case officer the question of prior financial commitments made to him by the Agency. Specifically, he claimed that the Agency still owed him $20,000 of an original commitment of $50,000 made to him at the time of his defection. This $20,000 claim has become an obsession with Mr. Rosnek and is likely to affect negatively his relationship with the Agency unless resolved to his relative satisfaction. Attached for background information are documents relating to Mr. Rosnek's claim.

3. After careful consideration of the equities involved in this case it is my belief that security considerations dictate that we settle Mr. Rosnek's claim in the following manner. I will approve an increase in his annual payment by $4,000 effective April 1979 (from $37,270 to $41,270). Thereafter, his annual compensation would be increased each October in the amount identical to the cost of living increase given to US Government employees. (This cost of living provision is currently in his contract). However, at such time

CL BY 063765
RVW 26 Mar 99 DRV D9c.1

SECRET

as Mr. Rosnek reaches the salary paid an employee in the top step of GS-15 (currently $47,500) his annual compensation would be increased only as the pay for that step increases.

4. All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

5. All classified Secret.

David H. Blee
David H. Blee

Attachments:
As Stated

CONCUR:

Chief, Career Management Staff

05 APR [illegible]
Date

APPROVED:

Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Date

SECRET

6

ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM : Steven K. Rubenstein
C/CI/A/DEF

SUBJECT : PDDONOR

REFERENCES : A. Memo Dated 16 February 1970
From DC/Security Research Staff

B. Memo Dated 14 August 1972
From DC/Security Research Staff

C. Acknowledgement and Release Form
Dated 12 July 1973

1. A careful review of the PDDONOR file substantiates the fact that there were three unequivocal financial commitments made to PDDONOR at the time of his defection in February 1964. These three commitments were:

a. He would be paid $25,000 for each of the two years he cooperated in place. Total $50,000.

b. He would receive $10,000 for his part in identifying William Vassal, a British Admiralty employee as a KGB agent.

c. He would receive $25,000 per year salary from the Agency.

2. The question at issue now is whether an additional commitment was also made to PDDONOR to the effect that the Agency would provide financial assistance to him to purchase a home. According to PDDONOR, on 30 January 1964 in Geneva prior to his defection in a conversation with his case officer, Mr. Tennent Bagley he stated, "I will arrive with what I have on my back - no home - no roof - no anything." The reply to PDDONOR was as follows: "This will be taken care of. It will be provided." This exchange in PDDONOR's view, constituted

☐ DCL ☒ RVW 14 Feb 99
DRV D9c.1 BY 063765

SECRET

what he believes was a commitment on the part of the Agency to provide him with financial assistance in the purchase of a home. A memorandum dated 16 February 1970, written by Mr. Bruce Solie describes this verbal exchange between PDDONOR and his case officer. (See Reference A). In addition, a memorandum dated 14 August 1972 also written by Mr. Solie (Reference B) states that "Nosenko stated that prior to his defection in Geneva, he discussed his future with Bagley and made three requests, these being:

a. Employment at $25,000 per year;

b. $50,000 in savings account;

c. Assistance in purchasing a house.

According to Nosenko, Bagley, a day or two later, informed Nosenko that his requests had been approved and Nosenko considers this constituted a valid verbal contract."

3. From PDDONOR's viewpoint therefore an additional commitment, quite separate and apart from the three listed in paragraph 1 was made to him. Consequently, he now argues that a payment made to him in July 1970, in the amount of $20,000 and which he used as a downpayment on a house, was the fulfillment of this additional commitment and not part of the $50,000 he was promised for his two years in place. This despite the fact that in the 14 August 1972 memorandum as Mr. Solie states in paragraph 5, . . . "Nosenko also considers that the assistance in purchasing furniture, a house, etc., which he has been given since 1969 should be considered as cancelling the matter of the $50,000.

4. What seems to have occurred is a change of position on PDDONOR's part. While previously acknowledging that the original $50,000 commitment had been met (paragraph 5 of Reference B) PDDONOR now takes the position that of the below listed payments only $30,000 should be applied against the $50,000 commitment. The July 1970 payment of $20,000 should be applied against a separate commitment to provide assistance in purchasing a home.

$2,000 in March 1964
$8,000 in May 1969
$5,000 on 1 July 1970
$20,000 on 1 July 1970 (According to PDDONOR this payment should not be applied against the $50,000 commitment)
$15,000 on 12 July 1973

Thus, according to PDDONOR's reasoning $20,000 is still due him as part of the original $50,000 commitment.

5. Several additional points should be noted. On 2 July 1973 PDDONOR signed an "Acknowledgment and Release" prepared by the General Counsel in which PDDONOR releases and forever discharges the US Government and the Agency from any claim for money promised to him. (Reference C). In addition, the issue of the $20,000 he says is still owed him does not surface in the file until September 1978, 14 years after his defection. The explanation of why this issue would arise at this late date is not clear from available records.

6. Attached are copies of those documents which impact on this issue. Because of the complexities of this case I recommend that we request the Office of General Counsel to review the entire case and provide a ruling on the legitimacy of PDDONOR's claim of $20,000. After such a ruling we can discuss our future course of action.

7. All classified Secret.

Steven K. Rubenstein
Steven K. Rubenstein

Attachments:
As Stated

ATTACHMENT

SECRET

OGC 79-02042
1 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM : John A. Rizzo
Assistant General Counsel

SUBJECT : Financial Commitments to PDDONOR/1

1. This is in response to your memorandum of 23 February 1979 which requests our opinion concerning CIA's existing financial obligations to PDDONOR/1, a former high-ranking KGB officer who defected to this country in February 1964 after having cooperated in place for the previous two years. Based on information contained in CI Staff files, there appears no question that the Agency made three documented, unequivocal promises to PDDONOR/1 at the time of his defection:

a) he would be paid a total of $50,000 ($25,000 per annum) in consideration for his previous two years' service in place;

b) he would receive a $10,000 payment for his part in identifying a certain KGB operative in the British government; and

c) he would be placed under contract for "an indefinite period" after his defection at a yearly salary of $25,000, with accompanying provision for retirement and other benefits.

Your memorandum seeks our assistance in resolving the issue of whether or not the Agency has, as PDDONOR/1 asserts, any current, independent obligation to pay PDDONOR/1 $20,000 based on an oral commitment made to him by a now-retired CIA officer at the time of his defection promising him the Agency's financial assistance in his securing a residence in this country.

ORIGINAL CL BY 035 779
☐ DECL ☒ REVW ON 28 Feb 99
EXT BYND 6 YRS BY same
REASON 3 d (3)

SECRET

ALL PORTIONS ARE CLASSIFIED SECRET

2. As you know, due to unforseen and extraordinary factors which arose shortly after PDDONOR's defection, the three documented commitments made to him as outlined in the previous paragraph were not fulfilled until some years after his defection. In this connection, the file indicates that PDDONOR/1 did not start receiving an Agency salary until March 1969, and that it was not until six years later that he began to be paid at the previously promised rate of $25,000 per annum. Accordingly, in order to belatedly satisfy in full the commitments originally made to PDDONOR/1 in 1964, lump-sum payments have been made to him on three occasions in recent years with the approval of senior Agency management. Briefly, these lump-sum payments consisted of: a) $125,000 (less taxes) in November 1972 to cover the balance owed for salary during the period April 1964 to March 1969; b) $15,000 in July 1973 to settle the remainder due on the $50,000 obligation to PDDONOR/1 for his service in place overseas prior to his defection; and c) $28,500 (authorized in April 1976 but evidently not paid until late last year) to cover the balance of his previously promised $25,000 annual salary for the period March 1969 - March 1975 as well as the $10,000 commitment originally made to PDDONOR/1 prior to his February 1964 defection (see paragraph 1(b) above) for his role in identifying a certain KGB operative in England.

3. As previously stated, the sole issue for consideration at this point revolves around PDDONOR/1's relatively recent assertion that CIA still owes him $20,000 as a result of a vaguely worded oral commitment made to him by a now-retired Agency officer in 1964 who promised that CIA would provide housing for PDDONOR/1 in this country following his arrival. In analyzing PDDONOR/1's contentions in this regard, we believe for the following reasons that the details surrounding CIA's July 1973 payment to him of $15,000 assume particular significance and do, in fact, firmly rule out any further, outstanding legal obligation to him with respect to payments to cover PDDONOR/1's eventual purchase of a home. Of course, the key consideration involved is the fact that the $15,000 payment was made following PDDONOR/1's execution of a quitclaim prepared by this Office through which he agreed to "release and forever discharge...the Central Intelligence Agency...from any claim for money promised to him for, and/or at the time of his defection, and from any and all other claims...in any form whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with his cooperation and association with... CIA prior to the date of this document, 12 July 1973."

Thus, the wording of the quitclaim is clearly and purposefully unconditional and is specifically intended to bar the kind of belatedly raised claim which PDDONOR/1 is making now.

4. In taking this position, we recognize that one could properly point out in rebuttal that notwithstanding the seemingly all-encompassing scope of the quitclaim, a further payment of $28,500 was in fact subsequently authorized for PDDONOR/1 in April 1976. However, as was noted in an internal OGC memorandum dated 1 April 1976 which concurred in this additional $28,500 payment, the real purpose of the 12 July release was to settle once and for all the issue of the balance of the $50,000 owed PDDONOR/1 for his two years of in-place cooperation prior to his defection. Accordingly, since the $28,500 payment was intended to satisfy other pre-existing commitments to PDDONOR/1 (i.e., back-salary owed for 1964-1969 as well as the $10,000 promised for his role in identifyig the KGB operative in England), this Office concluded at that time that the payment was legally permissible since it was outside the intended scope of the quitclaim and was being used to fulfill separate, fully documented promises of compensation made earlier to him.

5. By contrast, at the time that CIA made its July 1973 payment to PDDONOR/1 in return for his quitclaim, the available background materials contained in the files you have provided us leave little doubt that the issue of compensation to cover his purchase of a home was an intrinsic part of the calculations which led to the decision to authorize the $15,000 payment to him at that time. For instance, in the 25 June 1973 memorandum to Mr. Colby which contained the recommendation for the $15,000 payment, the Director of Security delineated some of the previous advances made to PDDONOR/1 in partial satisfaction of the $50,000 owed to him for the 1962-64 period. It was specifically noted in that connection that "[a]gainst this [$50,000] sum in April-May 1969, [PDDONOR/1] was given $8,000 as financial assistance for resettlement in the private economy and $25,000 in mid-1970 towards the purchase of a new house and other related expenses." (Emphasis added). These amounts plus an additional $2,000 which had been previously advanced were subtracted from the original $50,000 commitment, thus leading to the final figure of $15,000 that was subsequently paid to PDDONOR/1 in July 1973 and for which he readily signed the quitclaim releasing CIA from any further financial obligations to him. The Director of Security's memorandum went on to indicate that PDDONOR/1 "agreed" with these calculations; moreover PDDONOR/1's acknowledgment that CIA had previously fulfilled its

commitments to him regarding a house is more explicitly documented in a 14 August 1972 memorandum for the file from the Deputy Chief, Security Research Group, which quotes PDDONOR/1 as saying that he "considers that the assistance in purchasing furniture, a house, etc. which he has been given since 1969 should be considered as cancelling the matter of the $50,000". (Emphasis added).

6. Therefore, from all of the above, it must be concluded that, contrary to PDDONOR/1's assertions, CIA has long since fulfilled any promises which Agency representatives made to him prior to his defection concerning his housing in this country. Further, the available evidence clearly tends to indicate that PDDONOR/1 fully understood and accepted the fact that these obligations had been fully met at the time that he signed his quitclaim in July 1973. Thus, since the terms and scope of the quitclaim are fully controlling on the claim which PDDONOR/1 is asserting, we have determined that the Agency has no legal obligation whatsoever to pay him the $20,000 which he seeks.

7. As a final note, this Office recognizes that, notwithstanding the absence of any legal obligations, the particularly sensitive status of PDDONOR/1 within CIA may nevertheless give rise to an understandable desire in some quarters to make the $20,000 payment to him on security and/or moral grounds. We do not necessarily quarrel with such a view, nor do we mean to imply that CIA is legally precluded from, in effect, "waiving" the terms of the quitclaim if it so chooses. At the same time, it must be remembered that this Office was asked to prepare the quitclaim at issue in 1973 precisely in anticipation of a situation such as the one before us now. It is respectfully submitted that such documents will cease to have any future efficacy or credibility whatsoever if individuals such as PDDONOR/1 who are ostensibly bound by them perceive a willingness on the part of CIA to set aside these carefully worded and legally binding documents whenever a claim (no matter how ill-founded) is advanced. In short, we hope and trust that any decision to pay PDDONOR/1 the $20,000 at issue despite the quitclaim and documented evidence to the contrary will be based on truly compelling security or moral considerations.

John A. Rizzo

Mr. George Martin Rosnek

Dear Mr. Rosnek:

Reference is made to your contract with the U. S. Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 26 December 1978, paragraph five (5) entitled "Allowances, Travel and other Expense" is amended by the deletion of the last sentence in its entirety and by substituting in lieu thereof the following:

> "If in the course of this contract you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement of such expenses will be made on a commuted rate basis, based on constructive cost, while in the Washington metropolitan area. This commuted rate sum will not be reduced by any operational entertainment that may be provided to you."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

/s/ Gene L. Byrd

BY__________________________
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/s/
George Martin Rosnek

WITNESS:

/s/

APPROVED:

/s/

2(B) 88
1/9/79

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SOC-2

Mr. George Martin Rosnek

Dear Mr. Rosnek:

Reference is made to your Contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 8 April 1979, paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" is amended by deleting the figure $37,270 as it appears therein and by substituting in lieu thereof the figure $41,270. Said paragraph is also modified to provide that subsequent augmentation of your basic fee, based upon the percentage increase authorized U.S. Government employees in the annual Legislative Pay increases, will be individually authorized by contract amendment at appropriate times as requested and certified by the responsible Government official, provided however, that your total compensation under this paragraph does not exceed the equivalent of the salary rate paid at the top step of GS-15.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY ______________________________
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
George Martin Rosnek

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

GB/gb
4/10/79

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Mr. Bruce A. Bertotally

Dear Mr. Bertotally:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 3 October 1978 paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" is amended by deleting the figure $35,327 as it appears therein and by substituting in lieu thereof the figure $37,270.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /s/ [illegible] C. Brown
Contracting Officer

Prepared pursuant to amend of 9 Oct 1977. CI refusing initial request of Vasia Gmirkin. Division telephoned OPD not passed request to OPD. [illegible]

RCB/SP
10/12/78

Mr. George Martin Rosnek

Dear Mr. Rosnek:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 9 October 1977 paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" is amended by deleting the figure $33,000 as it appears therein and by substituting in lieu thereof the figure $35,327. Said paragraph is also modified to provide that subsequent augmentation of your basic fee, based upon cost-of-living increases, will be individually authorized by contract amendment at appropriate times as requested and certified by the responsible Government official.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY ______________________
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/s/ ______________________
George Martin Rosnek

2 Apr 78 ______________________
Date

WITNESS:

/s/ ______________________

2 Apr 78 ______________________
Date

APPROVED:

____

3 APR 1978 ______________________
Date

Mr. George Martin Rosnek

Dear Mr. Rosnek:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 16 February 1977 paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" is amended by authorizing you a one-time, lump sum taxable payment in the amount of $2,100.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY ______________________________
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/S/ ______________________________
George Martin Rosnek

2 Apr 78 ______________________________
Date

WITNESS:

/S/ ______________________________

2 Apr 78 ______________________________
Date

APPROVED:

____

3 APR 1978 ______________________________
Date

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Mr. George Martin Rosnek

Dear Mr. Rosnek:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 1 June 1977 paragraph five (5) entitled "Allowances, Travel, and other Expenses" is amended by expanding its scope to authorize the concurrent, voluntary, travel of your dependent wife, including the appropriate rate of per diem, when it is determined by the responsible Government official that such travel will support and best serve operational interests and objectives. The extent and destinations of such dependent travel will be as designated and defined by such official and, when in the course of such travel it is determined as a matter of operational necessity or as a matter essential to her health and well being that she remain at some particular place in the course of such travel while you continue on to specific geographical locations in fulfillment of operational missions, continuation of her per diem will be authorized for such periods. All monies advanced or reimbursed you hereunder by the Government and for the purposes herein indicated are determined to be additional income to you and as such considered to be taxable for Federal income tax purposes.

It is also understood and agreed by all concerned, and is herein so confirmed, that this amendment is in no way intended or should be construed as obligating your dependent wife to accompany you on travel abroad, under the terms of this agreement. It is also understood and agreed that the U. S. Government neither infers or assumes any liability of whatsoever nature concerning her health and well being if she freely elects to undertake such travel.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/S/
George Martin Rosnek

2 Apr 78
Date

WITNESS:

/S/

2 apr 78
Date

APPROVED:

3 APR 1978
Date

14-00000

OGC 78-0606
1-31-78

SECRET

Bertotally, Bruce A.

30 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

VIA: Office of General Counsel, O&MLD, Attention: Mr. John Rizzo

FROM: Charles W. Sandman
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Amendment for Mr. George Martin Rosnek

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Chief, CI Staff, dated 20 December 1977

1. (S) Referenced memorandum pertained to a formal request to amend Subject's contract to provide authorization for specific operational expenses.

2. (S) Paragraph five (5) of Subject's current contract, among other things, provided for "other expenses". It is our opinion that the intent here was to provide authorization for expenditures for "Operational" purposes. The language being general and non-restrictive in nature, it would follow that any expenditure deemed by you, as the operating activity, to be of an operational nature, and so authorized, would be within the framework of the authorization and that there would be no need to specifically identify and additionally authorize the item and/or its value. Accordingly no action is taken upon your request, it being presumed that you already have adequate contractual authority.

/s/ Charles W. Sandman

Charles W. Sandman

Concur:

/s/ John A. Rizzo

Office of General Counsel

Date:

8 FEB 1978

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - OGC/O&MLD
2 - OP/CPD

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 063837

Mr. George Martin Rosnek

Dear Mr. Rosnek

Ref. is made to your contract with the U.S. Govt., as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 26 Dec. 1973 paragraph five (5) entitled "Allowances, Travel and other Expenses" is amended by the deletion of the last sentence in its entirety and by substituting in lieu thereof the following:

> "If in the course of this contract you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement of such expenses will be made on a commuted rate basis, based on constructive cost, while in the in the Washington metropolitan area. This commuted rate sum will bot be ~~xxxxxxxx~~ reduced by any operational entertainment that may be provided to you."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

Signature..

SECRET

26 DEC 1978

CI 494-78

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

FROM : David H. Blee
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

THROUGH : Chief, Career Management Staff
Manpower and Support Branch/Contract

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment for
Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

1. Action Requested: It is requested that the contract for Bruce A. BERTOTALLY, an Independent Contractor, be amended by changing the last sentence of Paragraph 5, Allowances, Travel, and Other Expenses, to read as follows:

> "If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement of such expenses will be made on a commuted rate basis, based on constructive cost, while in the Washington metropolitan area. This commuted rate sum will not be reduced by any operational entertainment that may be provided to you.".

2. Background: Because of the current wording in paragraph 5 of BERTOTALLY's contract, C/PCS/CSS/B&F believes that a reduction in BERTOTALLY's commuted rate entitlement must be made when operational entertainment (meals) are provided him by his case officer. This interpretation is based on the present wording in the contract stating that reimbursement for expenses will be in "substantial accordance with CIA regulations." Since under CIA regulations a reduction in per diem is effected when meals are provided by the Government, C/PCS/CSS/B&F believes the language of the contract should be amended to permit operational entertainment (meals) to be provided to Subject without resultant deduction in his commuted rate reimbursement.

3. All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

David H. Blee

David H. Blee

CONCUR:

C/CMS

DERIVATIVE CL BY 063765
☐ DECL ☒ REVW ON 2 Dec 98
DERIVED FROM D9C.1

SECRET

Mrr Bruce A. Bertotally

Dear Mr. Bertotally

Ref. is made to your contract with the U.S. Govt., as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended, and with specific reference to the amendment effective 1 June 1977 pertaining to travel as authorized in paragraph five (5) entitled "Allowances, Travel and other Expenses." Effective 1 June 1977 the last sentence of said paragraph , the sense of which pertains to the imposition and the subjectivety of funds received under the contract to taxes, is deleted in its entirety.

Effective 25 Jan. 1978 said K is further amended by expanding the scope of paragraph four (4) , entitled "Compensation to provide for the authorization of a one time lump sum payment in the amount of $1404.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

14-00000

Mr. Bruce A. Bertotally

Dear Mr. Bertotally:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended, with specific reference to the amendment effective 1 June 1977 pertaining to travel as authorized in paragraph five (5) entitled "Allowances, Travel and other Expenses." Effective 1 June 1977 the last sentence of said paragraph, the sense of which pertains to the imposition and the subjectivety of funds received under the contract to taxes, is deleted in its entirety.

Effective 25 January 1978 said contract is furthur amended by expanding the scope of paragraph four (4), entitled "Compensation" to provide for the authorization of a one-time, lump sum payment in the amount of $1,404.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

/s/ [illegible] J. [illegible]
BY
Special Contracting Officer

RCB/hgB
1-30-78

20 DEC 1977

CI 659-77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM : B. Hugh Tovar
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

THROUGH : Chief, Career Management Staff
Manpower and Support Branch/Contract

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment for
George Martin Rosnek

1. Action Requested: It is requested that the contract for Mr. George Martin Rosnek, an Independent Contractor, be amended effective as of 1 January 1978 to pay him $50.00 per month for the use of his private living quarters as an office. It is also requested that Mr. Rosnek's contract be amended to include the interest payments on a car that he purchased so that he could be ready and available for work when we request him.

2. Background: When CI Staff assumed responsibility for Mr. Rosnek in July 1976, we noted that the Office of Security had an informal arrangement by which it reimbursed Mr. Rosnek $50.00 per month for the use of his private quarters as office space. It is now requested that this arrangement be incorporated into Mr. Rosnek's contract.

On 7 February 1977 former Chief CI Staff agreed to reimburse Mr. Rosnek for the interest payments on a car which he purchased so that he would be ready and available for work when we needed him. The monthly interest charge as of December 1977 is slightly less than $39.00 and it is

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012208

expected to decline steadily as the unpaid balance is amortized over the next two years. It is, therefore, requested that Mr. Rosnek's contract be amended to also include this payment.

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

B Hugh Tovar

B. Hugh Tovar

CONCUR:

C/CMS/MSB/C

23 DEC 1977

Date

SECRET

26 JAN 1978

CI 031-78

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM : B. Hugh Tovar
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

THROUGH : Chief, Career Management Staff
Manpower and Support Branch/Contract

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment for
Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

1. Action Requested: It is requested that the contract for Bruce A. BERTOTALLY, an Independent Contractor, be amended retroactive to 1 June 1977 deleting the last sentence of paragraph 3, concerning the taxability of operational travel by his wife, of a previous amendment effective 1 June 1977. It is further requested that a one-time payment of $1,404 to BERTOTALLY be authorized to offset the tax he is required to pay on the $3,100 which represents his wife's travel expenses on their last operational trip abroad, which appeared on BERTOTALLY's W-2 form for 1977 as additional taxable income.

2. Background: After CI Staff assumed responsibility for BERTOTALLY in July 1976, based on requirements developed by the field, he was asked if he would be willing to undertake occasional operational trips abroad for the purpose of briefing and lecturing friendly liaison services and other high-level foreign officials. BERTOTALLY agreed, but was adamant that he would only do so if the Agency would allow his wife to accompany him not only for purposes of companionship but also to enhance his security. Because this was his condition to such overseas operational travel and because it was felt her presence would contribute to his good morale, effectiveness in the performance of his mission, and also preclude his possibly creating potentially embarrassing incidents for us and the host liaison services; Chief,

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012208

SECRET

CI Staff made a personal commitment to BERTOTALLY that he could indeed have his wife accompany him on any operational trips abroad, if he chose to have her do so, and that her travel expenses would be borne by the Agency. It was understood that her travel expenses would be limited to the cost of her travel and per diem.

Subsequent to this agreement BERTOTALLY took three separate trips abroad accompanied by his wife and one quick trip to Mexico accompanied by his case officer. No problems developed following the first two trips. Vouchers submitted after each trip, claiming their joint costs as operational expenses, were honored without question. However, following their last joint trip abroad her travel expenses of $3,100 were interpreted as additional taxable income. BERTOTALLY considers this a violation of the commitment made to him and has demanded that the Agency pay him a sum equivalent to the additional Federal and state taxes he will have to pay as a result of our unilateral decision on this matter.

Presently we already have three separate trips abroad planned for BERTOTALLY during 1978. We are convinced that unless we reimburse him for the $1,404 additional tax he must pay for 1977 and assure him that his wife can accompany him on future operational trips abroad at Agency expense and without having such expenses declared as additional income, he will refuse to go on any more trips abroad on our behalf.

3. All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

B Hugh Tovar
B. Hugh Tovar

CONCUR:

C/CMS/MSB/C

26 Jan 78
Date

SECRET

Mr. Bruce A. Bertotally

Dear Mr. Bertotally:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 9 October 1977 paragraph four entitled "Compensation" is amended by deleting the figure $33,000 as it appears therein and by substituting in lieu thereof the figure $35,327. Said paragraph is also modified to provide that subsequent augmentation of your basic fee, based upon cost-of-living increases, will be individually authorized by contract amendment at appropriate times as requested and certified by the responsible Government official.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY / Rogers C. Brooks
Contracting Officer

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

RCB/NG6
1-13-78

SECRET

5 JAN 1978

CI 001-78

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION : **Chief, Contract Personnel Division**

FROM : **B. Hugh Tovar**
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

THROUGH : **Chief, Career Management Staff**
Manpower and Support Branch/Contracts

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment for
George Martin Rosnek

1. Action Requested: It is requested that the contract for Mr. George Martin Rosnek, an Independent Contractor, be amended retroactive to 9 October 1977 to increase his compensation from $33,000 per annum to $35,327. This represents a cost of living increase of 7.05 per cent. (It is further requested that a clause be included in Mr. Rosnek's contract to the effect that he is entitled to the equivalent of any future cost-of-living increases granted to Agency employees.)

2. Background: Mr. Rosnek was recruited by the Agency in Switzerland in 1962 and promised $25,000 per year while working as an agent in place. He later defected to this country. In July 1976 responsibility for him was transferred from the Office of Security to the CI Staff and he continues to be of great assistance to this Staff as well as to the FBI.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012208

SECRET

The remuneration that he receives from the Agency is his family's sole means of support. He was given cost-of-living increases in the past and when CI Staff assumed responsibility for him he was assured by the Chief, CI Staff that he would continue to receive such increases in the future. In early December 1977 he inquired why his pay did not already reflect the 7.05 per cent increase given to Agency employees in October. We believe it to be in the best interests of the US Government to honor all commitments made to him and to assure that he continues to identify himself positively with the Agency.

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

B Hugh Tovar

B. Hugh Tovar

CONCUR:

C/CMS/MSB/C

9 Jan 77

Date

SECRET

14 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM : Chief, PCS/CSS/B&F
Terrell W. Hutchison

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment - Bruce A. BERTOTALLY (P)

REFERENCE : A. Our Memorandum of 29 June 1977
B. Our Memorandum of 28 September 1977

In regards to referenced memorandums, we were telephonically advised by your office that subject's contract was being amended to provide that the travel expenses of subject's wife represented taxable compensation. As we are nearing the end of the tax year, it would be appreciated if the amendment could be provided in the near future in order that these payments can be included in subject's earning's statements. Thanks.

T. Hutchison
Terrell W. Hutchison

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061922

SECRET

29 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM : Chief, PCS/CSS/B&F
Terrell W. Hutchison

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment - Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

1. We are in receipt of a copy of subject contract amendment dated 27 June 1977. To administer the conditions of this amendment, there are two questions which come to mind:

a. The amendment provides that travel of subject's dependent wife may be authorized "when it is determined by the responsible Government official that such travel will support and best serve operational interests and objectives." Under the provisions of HR 22-2a (18) (now in the process of amendment), TDY travel for dependents of an employee must be approved by a Deputy Director. Further, under the OGC ruling 77-1264, TDY travel for a dependent "should not be authorized, save the Deputy Director's discretion. It should be changed to preclude any possible interpretation of which would give rise to TDY junkets for wives and dependents at Government expense." While it is recognized that subject is in fact an Independent Contractor, the entire subject of dependents TDY travel is a delicate issue, and because of this, we ask that your office identify the level of the "responsible Government official" who must approve the operational necessity travel of subject's wife.

REFERENCE

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 061932

b. Query, if the TDY travel of subject's wife is in fact properly approved, not as an operational necessity, but for matters "essential to her health", do these payments in fact become taxable income. The regulations define an Independent Contractor as a self-employed individual who may be paid a fee for certain services or products, and generally contracts provide for reimbursement for necessary operational expenses. We have no difficulty in certifying the wife's travel when it can be classified as an operational necessity. However, as both references provide authority only to Deputy Directors to approve dependent operational TDY travel, this also gives rise as to what level of authority is required to authorize travel for a dependent wife to accompany her husband on a TDY trip "as a matter essential to her health." It is requested that we be advised of the level of the "resonsible Government official" who can approve such travel. Further, as subject's contract draws a line between the operational necessity travel and that travel essential to her health, we would appreciate being advised if the non-operational travel payments for subject's wife represents taxable income.

Terrell W. Hutchison

PCS/CSS/B&F/TWHutchison:nr

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/Contract Personnel Division

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 011933

SECRET

28 September 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM : Chief, PCS/CSS/B&F
Terrell W. Hutchison

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment - Bruce A. BERTOTALLY (S)

REFERENCE : Our Memorandum of 29 June 1977

A response to our referenced memorandum (copy attached) would be appreciated.

Terrell W. Hutchison

28 September 1977

PCS/CSS/B&F/T. W. Hutchison:nrr

Distribution:
  Orig. & 1 - CPD
  1 - B&F files

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061922

7 Oct. 1977

As of this date a full search has been made of CPD for the whereabouts of subject's file. Our records indicate that it was charged out to Jim Harris in July probably in reference to question raised by Terry Hutchinson on dependent travel. He has searched and his secy has searched OGC with no success.

On 6 Oct Chuck Sandman John Rizzo and undersigned met with Brad Abernathy con- Terry's questions. We all agreed that any sums expended on Bertotally's wife travel should be considered as taxable additional income that in regard to his question re approval authority for travel - Chief CI. We also covered point as to travel of ou independent contractors in conformance with Govt rules and Reg. and Abernathy and John R. indicated acceptance of the situation.

Mr. Bruce A. Bertotally

Dear Mr. Bertotally:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 June 1977 paragraph five (5) entitled "Allowances, Travel and other Expenses" is amended by expanding its scope to authorize the concurrent, voluntary, travel of your dependent wife, including the appropriate rate of per diem, when it is determined by the responsible Government official that such travel will support and best serve operational interests and objectives. The extent and destinations of such dependent travel will be as designated and defined by such official and, when in the course of such travel it is determined as a matter of operational necessity or as a matter essential to her health and well being that she remain at some particular place in the course of such travel while you continue on to specific geographical locations in fulfillment of operational missions, continuation of her per diem will be authorized for such periods. All monies advanced or reimbursed you hereunder by the Government and for the purposes herein indicated are determined to be additional income to you and as such considered to be taxable for federal income tax purposes.

It is also understood and agreed by all concerned, and is herein so confirmed, that this amendment is in no way intended or should be construed as obligating your dependent wife to accompany you on travel abroad, under the terms of this agreement. It is also understood and agreed that the U. S. Government neither infers or assumes any liability of whatsoever nature concerning her health and well being if she freely elects to undertake such travel.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /s/ Rogers C. Brooke
Contracting Officer

E2IMPDET
CL BY: 063837

403/58
10/17/77

SECRET

17 October 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief PCS/CSS/B&F

FROM : DC/CPD

SUBJECT : Contract amended Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

REFERENCE : Your memorandum, subject as above, dated 29 June 1977

Your referenced memorandum raised two basic questions in regard to an amendment effected to the contract of Bruce Bertotally. To determine the answers a meeting was held 6 October 1977 with discussion and decision by those present: Brad Abernathy SSA/DDA, John Rizzo for the General Counsel and Charles Sandman with Rogers C. Brooks for CPD.

In subparagraph (a) of your memorandum you requested identification of the level of the responsible Government official who must approve the operational necessity travel of subject's wife. The Chief CI Staff was so identified.

Subparagraph (b) basically related to the taxability or non taxability of funds made available and relating to the dependent wife's travel. It was the consensus and agreement of all present that all such funds should be considered as additional compensation and taxable.

/s/ Rogers C. Brooks

Rogers C. Brooks

E2IMPDET
CL BY: 063837

SECRET

SECRET

28 September 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM : Chief, PCS/CSS/B&F
Terrell W. Hutchison

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment - Bruce A. BERTOTALLY (S)

REFERENCE : Our Memorandum of 29 June 1977

A response to our referenced memorandum (copy attached) would be appreciated.

Terrell W. Hutchison

28 September 1977
PCS/CSS/B&F/T. W. Hutchison:nrr

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061922

SECRET

29 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM : Chief, PCS/CSS/B&F
Terrell W. Hutchison

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment - Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

1. We are in receipt of a copy of subject contract amendment dated 27 June 1977. To administer the conditions of this amendment, there are two questions which come to mind:

a. The amendment provides that travel of subject's dependent wife may be authorized "when it is determined by the responsible Government official that such travel will support and best serve operational interests and objectives." Under the provisions of HR 22-2a (18) (now in the process of amendment), TDY travel for dependents of an employee must be approved by a Deputy Director. Further, under the OGC ruling 77-1264, TDY travel for a dependent "should not be authorized, save the Deputy Director's discretion. It should be changed to preclude any possible interpretation of which would give rise to TDY junkets for wives and dependents at Government expense." While it is recognized that subject is in fact an Independent Contractor, the entire subject of dependents TDY travel is a delicate issue, and because of this, we ask that your office identify the level of the "responsible Government official" who must approve the operational necessity travel of subject's wife.

SECRET

2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

b. Query, if the TDY travel of subject's wife is in fact properly approved, not as an operational necessity, but for matters "essential to her health", do these payments in fact become taxable income. The regulations define an Independent Contractor as a self-employed individual who may be paid a fee for certain services or products, and generally contracts provide for reimbursement for necessary operational expenses. We have no difficulty in certifying the wife's travel when it can be classified as an operational necessity. However, as both references provide authority only to Deputy Directors to approve dependent operational TDY travel, this also gives rise as to what level of authority is required to authorize travel for a dependent wife to accompany her husband on a TDY trip "as a matter essential to her health." It is requested that we be advised of the level of the "resonsible Government official" who can approve such travel. Further, as subject's contract draws a line between the operational necessity travel and that travel essential to her health, we would appreciate being advised if the non-operational travel payments for subject's wife represents taxable income.

Terrell W. Hutchison

PCS/CSS/B&F/TWHutchison:nr

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 261722

22 [illegible]

CI 375-77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM : B. Hugh Tovar
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

SUBJECT : Amendment to Contract for
Bruce A. BERTOTALLY (P)

1. Action Requested: It is requested that paragraph five (5) entitled "Allowances, Travel and other expenses" of Bruce A. BERTOTALLY's contract dated 1 March 1970, as amended, be further amended effective 1 June 1977 to permit his wife to accompany him on travel abroad.

2. Background: As an independent contractor Bruce A. BERTOTALLY's contract makes no provision for his wife to accompany him when traveling abroad at our request. This amendment will make such travel possible when at the option and direction of the Central Intelligence Agency it is believed that such travel will materially improve his cover and security and substantially contribute to the performance of his mission. The requested change in paragraph five (5) should in no way obligate BERTOTALLY's wife to accompany her husband on travel abroad nor does it assume any liability if she freely elects to make such travel.

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

Signed: Leonard McCoy
B. Hugh Tovar

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 019359

S E C R E T

SECRET

TBM

064510
20/127 5593

Mr. Bruce A. Bertotally

Dear Mr. Bertotally:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 June 1977 paragraph five (5) entitled "Allowances, Travel and other Expenses" is amended by expanding its scope to authorize the concurrent, voluntary, travel of your dependent wife, including the appropriate rate of per diem, when it is determined by the responsible Government official that such travel will support and best serve operational interests and objectives. The extend and destinations of such dependent travel will be as designated and defined by such official and, when in the course of such travel it is determined as a matter of operational necessity or as a matter essential to her health and well being that she remain at some particular place in the course of such travel while you continue on to specific geographical locations in fulfilment of operational missions, continuation of her per diem will be authorized for such periods.

It is also understood and agreed by all concerned, and is herein so confirmed, that this amendment is in no way intedded or should be construed as obligating your dependent wife to accompany you on travel abroad, under the terms of this agreement. It is also understood and agreed that the U. S. Government neither infers or assumes any liability of whatsoever nature concerning her health and well being if she freely elects to undertake such travel.

Reimbursement, payment and accounting for the foregoing shall be in substantial conformance with CIA rules and regulations.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

/s/ Rogers C. Brooks
BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

E2 IMPDET
CL by: 063837

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Bruce A. Bertotally

Dear Mr. Bertotally:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 March 1975, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> "You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of twenty-five thousand, two hundred fifty dollars ($25,250) per year."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY ____________________
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Bruce A. Bertotally

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

MICROFILMED
JULY 1[illegible]

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

SECRET

[redacted]

Dear [redacted]

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 March 1976, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> "You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Twenty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Thirteen Dollars ($26,513) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

[redacted]

April 8, 1976
Date

WITNESS:

8 April 1976
Date

APPROVED:

2 July 76
Date

Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in the Office of Security.

Edwin A. Reetz
Edwin A. Reetz
Chief, Budget and Fiscal Branch
Office of Security

MICROFILMED
JULY 1977

SECRET

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

Mr. Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

Dear Mr. Bertotally:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 1 October 1976, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

"You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Twenty-Eight Thousand One Hundred and Three dollars ($28,103.00) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY 12 OCT 1976
Special Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

Chief, Contract Personnel Division
October 12, 1976
Date

ACCEPTED:

/s/ Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

WITNESS:

Allen E. Harvey

12 October 1976
Date

APPROVED:

MICROFILMED
JULY 1977

Date

Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in CI Staff.

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

Ruth I. Malecki
Ruth I. Malecki 10/29/76
Personnel Officer
CI Staff

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

Mr. Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

Dear Mr. Bertotally:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 December 1976 said contract is amended by deleting the figures $12.50 and $603.52 as they appear in subparagraph (a) of paragraph six (6) entitled "Negotiated Benefits" and by substituting in lieu thereof the figures $18.75 and $900.04 respectively.

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/s/ Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

WITNESS:

9 Dec 1976

APPROVED:

Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in CI Staff.

Ruth I Malecki 12/14/76
Ruth I. Malecki
Personnel Officer

MICROFILMED
JULY 1977

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

Rec'd 12/15/76
TH

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

Dear Mr. BERTOTALLY

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 16 February 1977 paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" is amended by authorizing you a one-time, lump sum, taxable payment in the amount of $2,100.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Contracting Officer

Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in CI Staff.

Ruth I Malecki
Ruth I. Malecki
Personnel Officer
23 February 1977

MICROFILMED
JUL 1977

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

Dear Mr. BERTOTALLY

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 1 March 1977, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

"You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Thirty-three thousand dollars ($33,000) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

Pay Card adj
Pen adj 10/7/77

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY Charles W.
Special Contracting Officer

120

ACCEPTED:

George Martin Rosnek May 3, 1977
George Martin Rosnek Date

WITNESS:

Allen F. Harvey 3 May 1977
Date

APPROVED:

MICROFILMED
JULY 1977

B. Hugh Tovar 4 MAY 1977
Date

Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in CI Staff.

Ruth I. Malecki
Ruth I. Malecki
Personnel Officer

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

Mr. Bruce A. BERTOTALLY SECRET

Dear Mr. Bertotally:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 March 1973 said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Twenty-Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($22,250) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/s/ Bruce A. BERTOTALLY Date: March 16, 1973

WITNESS:

/s/ Bruce L. Solie Date: 16 March 1973

Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in the Office of Security.

Edwin A. Reetz 20 MAR 1973
Edwin A. Reetz
Chief, Budget and Fiscal Branch
Office of Security

SECRET

E2IMPDET
CLby: 026715

Mr. Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

Dear Mr. BERTOTALLY: 064010 20/71

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 March 1974, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> "You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($23,750) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY
Special Contracting Officer
Byron C Brooks

M
7/75

ACCEPTED:

/s/ Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

May 9, 1974
Date

WITNESS:

Bruce L Solie

9 May 1974
Date

APPROVED:

17 May 74
Date

Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in the Office of Security.

Edwin A. Reetz
Edwin A. Reetz
Chief, Budget and Fiscal Branch
Office of Security

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

14-00000

PRINT | AMENDMENT

PSEUDONYM: BERTOTALLY, Bruce A.

Nº 10392

SPONSORING COMPONENT Office of Security/SRS	CASE OFFICER Bruce L. Solie	EXTENSION 7682 RL 9126

PERSONAL DATA	EMPLOYMENT STATUS Independent Contractor	EFFECTIVE DATE 1 March 1969	CITIZENSHIP Alien
CURRENT PCS POST Washington, D. C.	FUTURE PCS POST (EFFECTIVE DATE) Washington, D. C.		DATE OF BIRTH

DEPENDENT INFORMATION (Names NOT Required) ATTACH FORM 313 OR W-4

RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDE WITH SUBJECT, IF NOT, WHERE

IS SPOUSE UNDER CONTRACT OR EMPLOYED BY WOFACT: YES ☐ NO ☒ | IF YES, PROVIDE PSEUDONYM

COVER DATA	EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVER N. A.	SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER	☐ YES ☐ NO

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ LNREAD ☐ OTHER (Specify)

NONOFFICIAL COVER: ☐ BONAFIDE ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ DEVISED ☐ OTHER (Specify) COVER FACILITY CRYPTONYM

COVER SALARY AND ALLOWANCES (Per Annum): SALARY $ ALLOWANCE $

PAY PERIOD USED BY COVER: ☐ WEEKLY ☐ BIWEEKLY ☐ MONTHLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY

TYPE OF TAX DOCUMENTATION TO BE ISSUED BY COVER

REMARKS (Pertinent to Personal or Cover Data)

WOFACT DATA — PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION: ☐ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD (EFFECTIVE DATE) (AMOUNT) $

WOFACT TO REPORT							DEVISED FACILITY ACCOUNT NO.
	☐	LNREAD 1099	☐	LNGOLD 1099	☐	DEVISED FACILITY 1099	
	☒	LNREAD W-2	☐	LNGOLD W-2	☐	DEVISED FACILITY W-2	

IF SUBJECT IS UNDER NONOFFICIAL COVER CONSULTATION WITH THE COVERT TAX COMMITTEE IS REQUIRED

For completion by Central Cover Staff: A TAX ASSESSMENT ☐ WILL Not Applicable ☐ WILL NOT BE ASSIGNED BY THE COVERT TAX COMMITTEE

COMMENTS # Prior to preparing Form W-2 call Mr. Reetz, X5345, for address

Income and social security taxes will be withheld.
O/SEC will handle filing of state estimated tax returns.

APPROVAL		AUTHENTICATION	
DATE	SIGNATURE CENTRAL COVER STAFF	DATE	SIGNATURE RESPONSIBLE OFFICER
Jun. 25 69	George S. Powell	6/25/69	Bruce L. Solie Bruce L. Solie

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. TO OFFICE OF FINANCE, COPY TO CENTRAL COVER, COPY TO FILE

FORM 9-66 313a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (30)

SECRET

NOTE: DETACH THIS PORTION OF FORM AND DISTRIBUTE SEPARATELY **Nº 10392**

IF SOCIAL SECURITY NO IS NOT AVAILABLE, HAVE FORM NO SS-5, "APPLICATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS," COMPLETED AS PROVIDED IN DETAILED PROCEDURES.	SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 577 - 74 - 5121	SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO
ADDRESS OF RECORD (IN U.S.) # See above	ADDRESS (Foreign)	

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. TO OFFICE OF FINANCE, COPY TO CENTRAL COVER, COPY TO FILE

FORM 9-66 313a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (30)

Empl # 064010

Per your request, the following is a breakdown of additional retroactive salary for the period 1 March -31 May 1977. This will be included with normal salary check for the month of June.

Gross	Fica	Fedtax	Stx	Net
1,224.27	*20.40	401.10	85.44	717.33

New normal salary effective 1-30 June 1977 is as follows.

Gross	Fica	Fedtax	Stx	Hosp	Net
2,750.00	0	608.07	170.08	18.75	1953.10

*Fica Max reached for tax year. Stopped effective 1 June 1977

MICROFILMED
JULY 1977

Roll 20

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED YES ☐ NO ☐	DATE 2 May 1975 LETTER NO.

TO : Chief, C&TD/OF

ATTN: Special Payroll Ops - Sandy Smith

FROM: OS/B&F - Edwin A. Reetz
4E71 Hqs

SUBJECT: Bruce A. BERTOTALLY #064010 - Independent Contractor

Attached is an amendment to Subject's contract increasing his compensation from $23,750 to $25,250 per annum effective 1 March 1975. Withholding of North Carolina state tax should be increased from $125 to $130 per month concurrent with the effective date of this amendment. I trust it is not too late to include the increase plus adjustment for March with his April pay. Your assistance is appreciated as always.

Edwin A. Reetz
SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 5-67 1831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

Mr. BERTOTALLY (P)

/s/

Bruce A. BERTOTALLY

MICROFILMED
JULY 1977

SECRET

Mr. Bruce A. BERTOTALLY (P)

Dear Mr. BERTOTALLY:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 March 1971 said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> "You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (19,500.00) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MICROFILMED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

Kenneth C. Rushmach
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/S/ Bruce A. BERTOTALLY Date: 12 February 1971

WITNESS:

/S/ Bruce L. Solie Date: 12 February 1971

Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in the Office of Security.

Edwin A. Reetz
Edwin A. Reetz 10 1971
Chief, Budget and Fiscal Branch
Office of Security

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Mr. Bruce A. BERTOTALLY [redacted]

Dear Mr. Bertotally:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended.

Effective 1 March 1972 said contract, as amended, is further amended as set forth below:

(a) The first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "COMPENSATION" is revised to read as follows:

"You will be compensated by the CIA at the rate of Twenty-one Thousand Dollars ($21,000) per year."

(b) Sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph six (6) entitled "NEGOTIATED BENEFITS" is deleted, and in lieu thereof the following is substituted:

"6(a): You presently have a private health insurance plan for yourself and your wife. It is understood and agreed that you will bear a portion of the total premium cost of said plan; this organization will bear the remainder. Your portion is herein established at $12.50 per month and will be deducted from contractual payments due you. The total annual premium cost of said plan is presently $603.52. If required, the Government's portion may be paid yearly, in advance."

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

Kenneth C. Rushmach
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/S/ Bruce A. BERTOTALLY Date: February 29, 1972

WITNESS:

/S/ Bruce L. Solie Date: February 29, 1972

Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in the Office of Security.

[redacted]

Edwin A Reetz 7 MAR 1972
Edwin A. Reetz Jr.
Chief, Budget and Fiscal Branch
Office of Security

DOC. MICRO. SER.

MICROFILMED

Mr. Bruce A. BERTOTALLY (P)

Dear Mr. BERTOTALLY:

Reference is made to your contract with the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, effective 1 March 1969. Effective 1 March 1970 said contract is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

MICROFILMED
JUL 0 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($18,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

6. NEGOTIATED BENEFITS.

a. You presently have a private health insurance plan for yourself and your wife paid until late December 1970. Prior to the expiration date of the current policy the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has the option of paying premiums on the current policy until 1 March 1972 or enrolling you in a health insurance program for selected contract individuals of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will pay the premiums on either insurance coverage until 1 March 1972. However, any new contract will include an appropriate clause providing that this organization will bear a portion of the total premium cost of any health insurance and you will bear the remainder.

b. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will endeavor to arrange for you to secure a term life insurance policy with a face value of $15,000.00. This policy contains no additional accidental death benefits. The premiums for the policy will be your personal responsibility. The current premium charge is $12.00 per month.

MICROFILMED
JUL [illegible] 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

c. (1) Subject to the priorities of work you are herein authorized twenty-one (21) work days vacation with pay per contract year to be taken only at times and places approved in advance by the Authorized Government Representative. Vacation time is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Payment for unused vacation time will not be authorized.

(2) If incapacitated for work due to illness, injury and the like, your compensation may be continued for periods not to exceed a total of thirteen (13) working days per contract year. Periods of absence in excess of three (3) consecutive days will require a doctor's certificate. Like vacation time, this benefit is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Cash payment in lieu of this benefit will not be authorized.

7. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

8. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

9. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1970 and shall be for a term of two (2) years. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of

3 yr

MICROFILMED
JUL - 0 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations imposed on you by paragraph 7 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

/s/ Kenneth C. Rushmack

Contracting Officer

Date: 6 March 1970

ACCEPTED:

/S/ Bruce A. BERTOTALLY Date: 6 March 1970

WITNESS:

/S/ Bruce L. Solie Date: 6 March 1970

Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in the Office of Security.

Edwin A. Reetz 19 MAR 1970
Edwin A. Reetz
Chief, Budget and Fiscal Branch
Office of Security

MICROFILMED
JUL - 0 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Bruce A. BERTOTALLY (P)

Dear Mr. BERTOTALLY,

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. To assist you in establishing yourself, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will assist you in procuring an automobile and necessary household furnishings, providing funds therefor, up to a maximum of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00). Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

MICROFILMED
JUL 20 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

5. PLACE OF RESIDENCE. In the interests of security, you will be required to live in such State, area, and house or apartment as is specifically approved by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY after mutual discussion and due consideration of all circumstances. All of the expenses of such leased house or apartment will be borne by you and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will not be obligated to pay any such expenses.

6. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

7. HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL CARE. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will provide you with reasonable insurance covering medical care and hospitalization equivalent to that which could be obtained through standard insurance policies; or, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY may provide directly such medical care and hospitalization.

8. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such

MICROFILMED
JUL 0 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

9. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

10. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1969 2 r. and shall be for a term of one (1) year. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance of the elapse of one (1) year. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations

MICROFILMED
JUL [illegible] 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

imposed on you by paragraph 8 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

Kenneth C. Rushmach
Contracting Officer

Date: ____________________

ACCEPTED:

____________________ Date: ____________________

WITNESS:

____________________ Date: ____________________

Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in the Office of Security.

Howard J. Osborn
HOWARD J. OSBORN
DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

JUL 1969

MICROFILMED
JUL [illegible] 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

ATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 13 APR 78

FILE NO.: 2205

SS NUMBER: 058-22-8472

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 59198

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO:
- IEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- X CHIEF, PCS/CSS (OPERATING COMPONENT FOR ACTION) ATTN: SUPPORT STAFF

REF.: RETIREMENT (CIA)

STATUS: X STAFF ☐ CONTRACT

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED X CANCELLED ☐ CONTINUED

SUBJECT: KENT, WILLIAM M.

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER (BLOCK RECORDS)

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER *(Specify)*

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ *(HHB 20-7)*

FORM 3254 *(HHB 20-11)* ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED.

SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR 240-*[illegible]

SUBMIT FORM 1323 [illegible] RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR* [illegible]

EAA. CATEGORY I [illegible]

SUBMIT FORM 2688 [illegible] CARD

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER (UNBLOCK RECORDS) X

X EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD

X FORM 3254 *(HHB 20-7)* CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED

X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 1 *(HHB 20-7)*

NA EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK.

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Subject will be acknowledged as CIA for entire period of employment and is not to reveal specific places or locations of cover assignments.

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD/TRB OR CPD CONTROL
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SRD
COPY 4 - OC/DO/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

mg

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER ..NCH, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 4-77 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET WN-SISM

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 021964

(13-20-43)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WILLIAM KENT
OPF - 1959-64

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: all material outside of the 1959 to 1964 period was not copied

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OF

SECRET

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET

OR CANCELLATIO
KSTOP

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Handle With Care

SECRET

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

S E C R E T

SECURITY INFORMATION

57

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE OF: KENT, William

FROM: Office of the Personnel Director

1. On 6 June 1952 this office arranged with National Selective Service Headquarters to have the above-named subject's active duty orders cancelled. This action was taken because, due to his training and experience, it was felt that the subject would be of more service to the United States as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency than he would be as a member of the Armed Forces.

2. Should the subject resign or otherwise be separated from CIA, please notify this office immediately in order that this cancellation action may be revoked and the subject will be made a free agent.

George E. Melcon
GEORGE E. MELCON
Acting Personnel Director

For the Use of PD(C) or PD(C)

Office of the Personnel Director notified on ________________ that the subject has resigned or otherwise been separated from CIA.

____
(Signature)

S E C R E T

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency, by reason of the sensitive nature of its work; must observe very strict security measures. I agree to honor the requests of CIA relative to my application whether it be accepted or rejected. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in CIA. If questioned directly, I will say that I have applied for positions in various government agencies, and if pressed for an answer will acknowledge that CIA is one of them but will attach no particular significance to such application. I agree not to disclose personnel procedures I have observed in CIA. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application to CIA.

Signed: William M. [illegible]

Date: July 11, 1951

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

AREA KNOWLEDGE (RESIDENCE OR STU

Prefers L.A. or Europe — any area

LANGUAGE FACILITY

Spanish + Italian fluent

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS (BE COMPLETE AND JUSTIFY DECISIONS, NOTE ANY UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.)

A tall slim boy, dark hair, brown eyes, sallow complexion - nice looking kid - State Dept cover type. He wants a job in govt although he has been warned by professors - that the salaries are limited, jobs are insecure etc as compared to private industry. He appears to be young but not as young as he actually is. Also wants intelligence type work. Speaks fluent Italian and Spanish - has worked in Latin America (El Salvador) and has graduated from Latin American Institute in New York. Told him starting salary was 3000, but I'm testing him at a GS-7

FORMS GIVEN: ☐ PHS ☐ MEDICAL ☐ RESERVE

E. McNamara

SIGN E OF INTERVIEWER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

THIS DATE 7/11/51

NAME William Morris Kent

REFERRED BY

HOME ADDRESS 2448 Washington Ave, New York 58, N.Y.

TELEPHONE Cy 86182

BUSINESS ADDRESS

TELEPHONE

DATE OF BIRTH 9 Mar 29

PLACE OF BIRTH Italy

CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED) U.S. - 1950 [illegible]

~~NAME OF SPOUSE~~ Came to U.S. in 1939 — [illegible]

DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED)

SALARY REQUESTED 3000

NO. OF DEPENDENTS

INTERVIEWER

EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES)

Received high school diploma in 1948 ([illegible] in U.S.)
2 yrs at Latin American Inst NYC

MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION, SPECIAL SKILLS, SALARY LEVELS)

MILITARY OCCUPATION (RANK, SERIAL NO., DATES OF SERVICE, DUTIES AND AREAS)

[illegible] ASA [illegible]

4-A - prev. military service

.0.
.951 37-117

CONFIDENTIAL

(4-11)

13

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

TO: CPD

12 July 1951

VIA:

Name of Candidate William M. Kent

Position Considered for Admin Clerk GS-6 Office FDI/OSO Interviewer Gresham

Personal appearance	Dignified....... ☑	Natural... ☑	Awkward...... ☐
	Well-groomed.... ☑	Clean..... ☑	Slovenly..... ☐
	Wide-Awake...... ☑	Stolid.... ☐	Apathetic.... ☐
	Impressive...... ☐	Ordinary.. ☐	Insignificant ☐
Personality	Persuasive...... ☐	Responsive ☑	Taciturn..... ☐
	Imperturbable... ☐	Steady.... ☑	Excitable.... ☐
	Cheerful........ ☑	Tranquil.. ☐	Dejected..... ☐
	Straight-forward ☑	Reserved.. ☐	Evasive...... ☐
	Modest.......... ☑	Complacent ☐	Conceited.... ☐
	Dominant........ ☐	Confident. ☐	Submissive... ☐

Is education adequate? Yes(✓) No( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes(✓) No( )

Area knowledge Has lived and worked in Latin America. Fluent Spanish and [redacted] Italian

Previous intelligence or related experience None

Salary level requested $ Lowest Salary Acceptable $

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons:

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification Background, motivation, personality

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: Admin Clerk Branch 1 Division FDI/OSO

Location: Guayaquil, Ecuador

Salary Level: $ 3100. GS-5

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: After suitable training and field experience subject may qualify as operations officer

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

J. L. Gresham
Signature of Interviewer

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-5) 42055

REQUEST DATE (6-11) 23 June 1966

YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30) 1929

GRADE (43-44) GS-13

ORGN. CODE (45-48)

TYPE OF APPL. (49)

HDQTRS. & FUND (50)

CLEARANCE (51)

RECRUIT. CODE (52-54)

VET PREF. & SEX (55)

NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) [redacted] Keott William M. (12-28)

POSITION TITLE Ops Officer

POSITION NUMBER (31-36)

OCCUP. CODE (37-42)

LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY) New Orleans, La.

ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH) DDP/WH/JMPOPLAR-12

TYPE OF APPLICANT ☐ REGULAR ☐ CONTRACT ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ MILITARY

CONVERSION ACTION SE-SA

IF OTHER, SPECIFY

NAME OF REQUESTER (OR OFFICIAL) Dow H. Luetscher
Dow H. Luetscher, Chief/CPD

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS ☐ HQS ☐ USF ☐ FF ☐ V

CLEARANCE REQUIRED ☐ PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP) Covert Security Clearance ☐ UV ☐ SECRET ☐ FULL

ATTACHMENTS ☐ PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ☐ PHOTOGRAPH(S) ☐ APPENDIX I ☐ APPENDIX II ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER ☐ REPORT OF INTERVIEW

VETERANS STATUS ☐ MALE - VETERAN ☐ MALE - NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - NON-VETERAN

Security#: 57514

Case Officer: Maurice Currie x6032

Clearance Memo to SA/Branch/CPD
Attn: Jo Ann Varney
5 E 69 x7170

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

FORM 3-61 377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-5) 73407

REQUEST DATE (6-11)

NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* (12-28)

YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30)

POSITION TITLE

RECRUIT. REQN. NO. (31-33)

LOCATION *(City, State, Country)*

ASSIGNMENT *(Office, Division, Branch)*

SUB-CATEGORY CODE (36)

TYPE OF APPLICANT ☐ REGULAR STAFF ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ SUMMER ONLY ☐ CONTRACT TYPE A ☐ MILITARY ☐ RE-EMPLOY. MIL. IF OTHER, SPECIFY:

OCCUP. CODE (37-42)

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS ☐ HQS ☐ USF ☐ FF ☐ V ☐ CF

GRADE (43-44)

ATTACHMENTS ☐ PHS ☐ APPENDIX I ☐ PHOTO(S) ☐ REPORT OF INTERVIEW ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER

ORGN. CODE (45-48)

VETERANS STATUS ☐ MALE-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE-VETERAN ☐ MALE-NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE-NON-VETERAN

TYPE OF APPLICANT (49)

INVITEE CLEARANCE REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO

HEADQUARTERS (50)

CLEARANCE REQUIRED ☐ PROVISIONAL FOR ☐ IAS ☐ OTHER *(Specify)* ☐ FULL

CLEARANCE REQUIRED (51)

NAME OF REQUESTER

RECRUITER'S CODE (52-54)

REMARKS:

VET PREF. & SEX (55)

PR. MIL. SERVICE (56)

LAST DIGIT ORGN. CODE (57)

REQN. NO. (72-74)

RECRUIT. SOURCE (75-79)

SPACE BELOW TO BE COMPLETED BY OS ONLY

APPROVAL GRANTED

☐ PROVISIONAL ☐ INVITEE

THIS IS NOT A CLEARANCE FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, MATERIAL, OR SECURE AREAS. A BUILDING BADGE OR AGENCY CREDENTIAL IS NOT TO BE ISSUED AT THIS TIME.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

DATE

CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION

FORM 3-67 377 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (9)

SECRET

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1976

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM	055196	37 325	V	GS 15 4	$37,167

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OJCS 06/30/77

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 05 DA. 23 YR. 77
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6 FUNDS ▶				
☒	V TO V	☐	V TO CF
☐	CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 7020 0008 0002
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/CMS
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER D CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: FS63
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYB
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS:

POSTED
30Jun'77

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150B
8-72 MFG. 3-76

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

"E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622" (4-51)

PLF 083077

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 08 28 77
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. **FUNDS** ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 7020 0008 0002
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

DDO/OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ASST DEP DIR-OPERATIONS/DEVELOPMENT
NON-OFFICIAL COVER STAFF
REFERRAL BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: FS63
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYB
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 37167
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 30125 ALPHABETIC DDO
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 05 09 29
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)
37. LONG. C… MO DA
…ALTH INSURANCE: HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. …
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGN…

FROM: CMS



DMB

FORM 1150
5-74 Mfg. 10-74

Use Previous Edition

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

1. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
059198	KENT WILLIAM	50 125		

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ
GS 15	4	$39.789	05/23/76	GS 15	5	$40.555	05/21/78			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

☐ I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE 17/3/78

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS BP

AUDITED BY

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

A11

L04 100 020

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12010 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 09 OCTOBER 1977

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM	0059198	CDDC	GS 15 4	$39,789

8659

JLS 062878

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2-28-78

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible] /408

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (INVOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 06 DA. 30 YR. 78
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. **FUNDS** ▶

	V TO V		V TO CF	
	CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7. FAN AND NSCA: 8020 0008 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PUBLIC LAW 88-643 SECTION 235(A)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

DDO/OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ASST DEP DIR-OPERATIONS/DEVELOPMENT
NON-OFFICIAL COVER STAFF
REFERRAL BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: FS63
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYB
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 40995
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqrs. Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 DA 09 YR 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0GU0000
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA ⇨

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

RMR

FORM 1150
5-74 Mfg 10-74
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (4-51)

S E C R E T

28 April 1960
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : **William M. Kent**

1. Cover arrangements ~~are in process, and/or~~, have been completed for the above named subject.

2. Effective **immediately**, it is requested that your records be properly (blocked) (~~re-opened~~) to (deny) (~~acknowledge~~) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of **15 April 1960**,
(Date)

Richard J. Biladeau, 2-1005, T-4, 8266.
(Name) (Room) (Bldg) (Extension)

HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Branch

cc:SSD/SO

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

S E C R E T

5-4-60

SECRET

File No. 2205
13 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : **William M. KENT**

1. Cover arrangements [redacted] have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 10 July 1961, it is requested that your records be properly blocked [redacted] to deny [redacted] Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. ~~This memorandum confirms an oral request of~~ ________

For GLENN E. MOORHOUSE
Acting Chief, Central Cover Group

cc: SSD/OS

FORM 1-59 1580a

MEMO … MAIN
SECRET
OP OF
(4-JAN60)

07-18-61
cr

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 14 Apr 70

FILE NUMBER: 059198

EMPLOYEE NUMBER:

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH

ATTN: C/WH/Support

REF:

SUBJECT: KENT, WILLIAM M.

OFFICIAL COVER:
- X BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
- ☐ DISCONTINUED

UNIT: US Army Staff Group

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)

A. TEMPORARILY FOR ____________ DAYS
EFFECTIVE DATE COB ____________

B. CONTINUING AS OF ~~COB~~ EOD

X SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (RHB 20-7)

X ASCERTAIN THAT Army W-2 BEING ISSUED. (RHB 20-11)

X SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)

X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)

X SUBMIT FORM 2688 ☒ AGK FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD

☐ CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)

DATE (as of COB)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (RHB 20-7)

☐ RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Dec 51 - Jun 52 DAC/Hq
Jun 52 - Jun 56 DAC/P[illegible]
Jun 56 - Jul 58 DAC/Hq
Jul 58 - Mar 60 STATE/
Mar 60 - Jul 61 NOC/Fie
Jul 61 - Aug 66 DAC/Hq
Sep 66 - Jun 67 NOC/Field (Domestic)
Jul 67 - Feb 70 NOC/Field (Domestic)

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - RCD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT EMF
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/FELSVC
COPY 5 - CCS - CHRONO
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
6-68

SECRET

(13-20-43)

LML: 15 JAN 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CANCELLATION OF NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 01 DA. 15 YR. 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH DIVISION
BRANCH 6
CA SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1855
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 26168
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51480 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 5-NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction, Cancellation Data: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0-WAIVER 1-YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
LWB 1-16-73

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 11-71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM 7 JAN 1973 TO 1 OCT 1972 UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11777, DATED 12 APR 1974.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM	059198	51 480	V	GS 14 5	$26,168

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM	059198	51 480	V	GS 14 5	$27,479

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059189	KENT, WILLIAM M	51 480 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	6. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	7. TYPE ACTION PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 14	6	$28,287	12-09-73	GS 14	7	$29,095	02-03-74			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/F.W.M. JANNEY

DATE: 31 JANUARY 1974

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Mfg. 3-65 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

WH

G-43

1. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
059198	KENT WILLIAM	51 460	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	7. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	8. TYPE ACTION SI	ADJ
GS 14	5	~~$26,168~~ 27,479	12/12/71	GS 14	6	~~$2[illegible]~~ 28,287	12/09/73		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE 12 Oct 73

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS nap

AUDITED BY

DEC 3 10 30 '73

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

DMS: [illegible] AUG 74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 08 DA [illegible] YR 74
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 **FUNDS** ▶ X V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 5221 0117 [illegible]
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PS
CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
NON OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH
AREAS SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]453
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D00
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: 29095
18. REMARKS:

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 1[illegible]
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 37525 ALPHABETIC PS
22. STATION CODE: 75513
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 DA 09 YR 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: WH

POSTED
AUG 26 1974 JHR

FORM 1150 Use Previous

SECRET 888

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (4-51)

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

KENT WILLIAM 059198 42354532

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM	059198	37 325	V	GS 14 7	$30,699

9 SEPT 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

IAL NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KENT WILLIAM

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT-CHANGE OF FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 08 DA. 27 YR. 75

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. **FUNDS**	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 6221 0117 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PLANS STAFF/CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
NON OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH
AREAS SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: BL12

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: 30699

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. Employ Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 37325 ALPHABETIC PS

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. Hdqtrs Code: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV. TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
- 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
- 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
- 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
- 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
19 SEP 1975

FORM 1150
5-74 Mfg 10-74

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

Lmp

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11883 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 12 OCTOBER 1975

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM	059198	37 325	V	GS 14 7	$32,231

KHN: 9 MAR 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 59198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION OF NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 03 DA 01 YR 76
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS				
	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 6221 0117 0012
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PS
CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
NON OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER DCM
12. POSITION NUMBER: FS63
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: 32251
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 15
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 37325 ALPHABETIC PS
22. STATION CODE: 75913
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 DA 09 YR 20
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV. PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
MAR 10
RCS

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
9-72 Mfg 8-73

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4-31)

AE0:25 MAY 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ECF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible] WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION-CHANGE OF FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 DA 27 YR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. **FUNDS** ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 3001 1117 [illegible]
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PLANS STAFF
CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
[illegible] OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER D CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: FS53
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [illegible]
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 [illegible]
17. SALARY OR RATE: [illegible]
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 37325 ALPHABETIC PS
22. STATION CODE: 7501
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO 05 DA 27 YR 73
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 05 DA 27 YR 7[illegible]
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
2 RCL

FORM 1150 9-72 Mfg 8-73 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CJCS 11/30/76

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]59198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KENT WILLIAM

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR: 1[illegible] [illegible]1 76

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6. FUNDS ▶	☒	V TO V	☐	V TO CF
	☐	CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 7221 0008 9002

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CMS
DDO/CMS/NOCB/REFERRAL SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: CPS OFFICER D CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: F563

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYB

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS
CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION FROM DQB TO DYB

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150B
8-72 MFG 3-76

Use Previous
Edition

SECRET

"E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622" (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 2 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM M	059198	51 075	V	GS 13 3	$12,915	$13,380

JUN 23 12 22 PM '65

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059198	KENT WILLIAM M	376 51 075 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	2	$12,495	06/21/64	GS 13	3	$12,915	06/20/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS KW AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [redacted] DATE 13 April 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

RZE: 28 DEC 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KENT WILLIAM M

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 12 19 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF SECTION 6	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0048	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 13380

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51075	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 05 03 29	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR REG PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059198	KENT WILLIAM	52 075 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-13	4	$13825	06-19-66	GS-13	5	$14250	06-19-66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ Emmett D. Echols

Date: 08 June 1966

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM M	059198	51 075	V	GS 13 5	$14,250	$14,665

WH/CA

G27

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059198	KENT WILLIAM M	51 075 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	3	$13,350	06/20/65	GS 13	4	$13,815	06/19/66			

JUN 22 2 08 PM '66

8. Remarks and Authentication

✓ NO EXCESS LWOP
✓ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS D.J. AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 6 April 66

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560E Mfg. 3-65

(4-51)

PJH: 10 AUG 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM M
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 07 DA. 30 YR. 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
PLANS AND OPERATIONS STAFF
SECTION B
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0646
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 14665
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1BD0091
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
08 [illegible]

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

PJH: 10 AUG 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAS

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] Kent, William M.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPT CAREER

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 07 DA. 31 YR. 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7135 0630 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
PROJECT ANNEX
U.S. FIELD
JMPOPLAR- 12

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 8001

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: 14665

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
OF-4b
15 AUG 1966

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13

20. Employ. Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51800 ALPHABETIC WH

22. STATION CODE: 75033

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. Hdqtrs. Code: 2

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 06 DA. 23 YR. 63

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 08 DA. 19 YR. 66

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE 1

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 00000

34. SEX: M1

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 1 (0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.)

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. 07 DA. 03 YR. 50

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. 01 DA. 02 YR. 52

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE C

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1 (0 - WAIVER 1 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 1
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 8

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES 2 - NO) CODE C NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS MO

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES 2 - NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

087066N

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

BJT: 17 MAY 67

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XXB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] Kent William M

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 05 DA. 07 YR. 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7135 0630 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS: EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

2 3 MAY 1967 Pe

POSTED ON
OF-4b

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:
20. Employ. Code:
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE; CODE: 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA ⇨

33. SECURITY REQ. NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. / RESV. / PROV. / TEMP.; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05 18 67 N

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BJT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

V: 15 AUG 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CB

ERIAL NUMBER: 53198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] Kert, William M

NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR): 07 30 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 8123 0109 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
U.S. FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
ORBIT OPERATIONS GROUP

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0203
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 14665

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
CPAS
SEP 1967

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 43620 ALPHABETIC DOD
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 2
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 05 09 29
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV. TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM WH

E. D. ECHOLS

POSTED
JS
8/14/67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51) (When Filled In)

FLW: 26 OCT 67

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] Kent, William M

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 10 DA 08 YR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V X CF TO CF ☐

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 8129 0109 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
US FIELD
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP
WASHINGTON BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0416

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: 14665

18. REMARKS:

✓ 1957

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. Employ Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 43500 ALPHABETIC DOD

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. Hdqtrs. Code: 2

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
RL
10-26-67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET PLW

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-5)

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Kent Williamson [redacted]	059198	43 500 CF	GS 13 6	$15,757	$16,809

DOD

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
059198	Kent Williamson [redacted]	43 500	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	5	$15,307	06/19/66	GS 13	6	$15,757	06/16/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Kent, Williamson	059198	43 500 CF	GS 13 5	$14,665	$15,307

PLW: 13 DEC 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted] Kent, William Jr
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 12 DA. 15 YR. 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ X CF TO CF ☐

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9123 0105 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD US FIELD INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP WASHINGTON BASE	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0410
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 3
17. SALARY OR RATE 18076	18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	22
20. Employ. Code	10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC	43500
21. OFFICE CODING — ALPHABETIC	DOD
22. STATION CODE	75013
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. Hdqtrs Code	2
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	05 09 25
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	12 15 68
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	12 15 68
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1. CSC 2. CIA 3. FICA 5. NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO, DA, YR)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (1 - WAIVER 2 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	
44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

JJB

POSTED
12-16-68

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

SF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
059198	Kent, William M [redacted]	93 500	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 14	3	$19,767	12/15/68	GS 14	4	$20,385	12/14/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Kent William M	059198	43 500	CF	GS 14 3	$19,767

BSJ: 16 FEB 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Kent Williamson
[redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 02 DA 07 YR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. **FUNDS** ▶	☐	V TO V	☐	V TO CF
	☐	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 0129 0109 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
U.S. FIELD
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP
WASHINGTON BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0416

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: 20385

18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. Employ Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. Hdqtrs. Code

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 DA 09 YR 29

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC / 2 - CIA / 3 - FICA / 5 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1BD0091

32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE / 1 - 5 PT. / 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER / 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES / 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES / 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
2 16 70

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition Mfg. 10-67

SECRET

BBG

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U.S.A.

BSJ: 16 FEB 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT CAREER
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 02 DA. 08 YR. 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. **FUNDS** ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 0135 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
PERU SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH.,D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1391
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 20335
18. REMARKS:

STAFF EMPLOYEE SPECIAL.

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51400 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 12 DA. 13 YR. 69
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 12 DA. 14 YR. 69
28. DATE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-CIA, 3-FICA, 9-NONE): CODE 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 00000
34. SEX: M1
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT): CODE 1
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. 07 DA. 03 YR. 50
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. 01 DA. 02 YR. 52
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV., PROV, TEMP): CODE C
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0-WAIVER, 1-YES): CODE 1 HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 058228472
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)): CODE 1
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 8
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO) CODE 0 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS MO
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
02-16-70 JJBC

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BBG

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE
CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM	059198	51 400	V	GS 14 4	$21,608

EVD: 17 APR 7

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 4 DA. 19 YR. 7
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

☐	V TO V	☐	V TO CF
☒	CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 235 62
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 5 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
PERU SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1391
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.1
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 216 8
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. Employ. Code: 1
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 514 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75 13
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 5 DA. 9 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. PROV. RESV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
4-20-70

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition
Mfg. 10-67

SECRET

BBG

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)
(When Filled In)

FVD: 12 MAY 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OKF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KENT WILLIAM

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS (CORR)

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 04 DA. 19 YR. 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
X	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 0235 0620 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
PERU SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1391

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: 21609

18. REMARKS
THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE 04/19/70 AS FOLLOWS: ITEM #3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION WHICH READ TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS TO READ REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
58	10	51400	WH	75013		1	05	09	29						

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-CA 3-FICA 5-NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE 16; MO. 04 DA. 19 YR. 70

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVED 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05-12-70

FORM 5-68 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY U.S.A.

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM	059198	51 480	V	GS 14 5	$24,888

G 43

NOV 22 1971

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
059198	KENT WILLIAM	51 400	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 14	4	$22,897	12/14/69	GS 14	5	$23,591	12/12/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Albert D. Wedemeyer

DATE 9 October 1971

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS BDC

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM	059198	51 400	V	GS 14 4	$22,897

G-36

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DCS 10/16/71

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 09 DA. 22 YR. 71

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235 0620 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH DIVISION
BR/6/CA SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1855

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10-19-71

Form 1150B
7-66 MFG. 11-70

Use Previous
Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

UCS 08/31/72

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059100
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIA
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DELEGATION OF N.S.C.P.
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA 01 YR 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6. **FUNDS**	X	V TO V		V TO CF	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3233 0.20 0002
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH DIVISION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1803
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ Code
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV. TEMP.; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-17-72

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY U.S.A.

PSC: 18 MAY 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM M
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 05 DA. 18 YR. 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 5
CA SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0892
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 9475
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64470 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
47. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
5-23-62

Form 8-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E.P. 18 May 62

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR_ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR_ST	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM M	059198	64470	V	12 3	$ 9475	12 3	$10105

ABM: 3 DEC 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM M
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 11 30 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 2
URUGUAY PARAGUAY SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0970
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 10105
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64350 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 05 09 29
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. COF
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

RBR 12/14/62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-81)

(When Filled In)

BAB: 21 JUNE 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM M
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA 23 YR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 2
URUGUAY, PARAGUAY SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0970
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 11150
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64350 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 DA 09 YR 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO 06 DA 23 YR 63
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 06 DA 23 YR 63
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 4 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
07/01/63 WK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

27 JUN 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

RZR: 19 AUG 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059138
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM M
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 08 19 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4235 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF
SECTION B
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0645
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 11150
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64075 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 05 03 29
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
08/27/63 WK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 19 AUG 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059198	KENT WILLIAM M	37G 51 075 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	1	$11,725	06/23/63	GS 13	2	$12,110	06/21/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 10 April 64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

PAYROLL BRA

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956; SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
KENT WILLIAM M	059198	51 075 V	GS 13 1	$11,150	$11,725

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059198	KENT WILLIAM M	64 350 V 2A	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	3	$10,105	05/13/62	GS 12	4	$10,420	05/12/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMRETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

14 Mar 6

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-57)

NJM: 11 JAN 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM M
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. DA. YR. 01 11 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF
SECTION B
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0646
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12495
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51075 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR 05 09 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1-11-65 HT

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCS 05/27/65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) KENT WILLIAM M	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 05 DA. 31 YR. 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0645	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13
		17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

POSTED
6-9-65

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 1-63 MFG 1-63

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

SECRET

CIA/DDO-HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS RECORDS
(File Title)

CIA PERSONNEL FILES
(RECORD NAME)

REEL NO. 58

ENDS WITH KENT, WILLIAM M.

FILE CUSTODIAN JG

DATE FILMED 26 AUG. 1980

SECRET

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-2)


POINT SIZE
4
6
Hq47j W9pe9 A7o7q Ge92
8
9ss9d L1cdg
33q7n E1t9g
6
Z35lg Hq47j Su1xi Y5a5o
4
POINT SIZE
1.0
1.1
1.25
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.5
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
4
6 IZC68 USM7P PN6SB OIKOG
8 XMBBO HWEKH XYAHQ SIDDS
10 VILNU MZHSF XMBBO HWEKH
12 6FRKM EB7AU FUDWM BOONF
14 C9E83 BI8AJ Z7QYI 0KJDQ
POINT
SERIF (BASKERVILLE) SIZE SANS SERIF(MICROFONT)
SHOULD MEASURE .25" AT REDUCTION
0
12x
16x
20x
24x
28x
30x

Photographic
Sciences

23 WEST MAIN STREET

FDT-59 JV

SECRET
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 6 Dec. 1951

Your Reference: L-2960

Case Number: 57514

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division

FROM: Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: KENT, William Morris

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the EOD procedures.

Mr. Dickmayer for 12/10

C. V. Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY

BH 8. 13 9:00
3 Jan 52

DEC [illegible] 51 [illegible]

gm

SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM NO. 38-101
JUL 1951

(5)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TO : Chief, Communications DATE: 11 Jan. 1952

FROM : Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: KENT, William Morris 57514

In reply to your memorandum this is to advise that Subject meets the current requirements for cryptographic clearance and is approved for such duties as of this date.

CVBroadley
C. V. BROADLEY

SED ✓

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

28 MAY 1952

Va [illegible]

TO : Chief, Personnel Division (Covert)

ATTENTION: Transactions and Records Branch

FROM : Chief, Special Security Division

SUBJECT : [redacted] (Pseudo)
#57514 OLIVER H. CORBUSTON

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 14 May 1952, in which a covert security clearance was requested to enable the WH Division to utilize the Subject's services as an Intelligence Officer (Staff Agent), in Fort Amador, Canal Zone. Reference memorandum indicated that Subject will be used on Project HYPOTHESIS, under military cover.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances", a covert security clearance is granted for the covert use of the Subject as described in your request as set forth in Paragraph 1 above.

3. The Subject is not to represent himself as, nor is he to be represented as, an employee of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-9. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA

Robert H. Cunningham Jr

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

SECRET

Discont

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 21 September 1955

Your Reference: C-1932 WH

Case Number: 57514

TO: Chief, Records & Services Division
Personnel Office

FROM: Chief/ Security Division
Personnel

SUBJECT: KENT, William Morris

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of EOD procedures.

Ermal P. Geiss

Ermal P. Geiss

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

(5)

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 2 October 1956

Your Reference: C-6163 WH

Case Number: 57514

TO: Chief, Records & Services Division
Personnel Office

FROM: Chief, /Personnel Security Division

SUBJECT: KENT, William Morris

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3.

Joe Kaye advised 10/5/56
rcs

W. M. Knott
W. M. Knott
m

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

STAFF AGENT CLEARANCE

DATE : 30 June 1966

YOUR REFERENCE: 42055

CASE NO. : 57514

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN. : Staff Agents Branch

SUBJECT : [redacted]

Kent, William M.

1. This is to advise that a security clearance is granted for the employment of the Subject as [redacted] GS-13, as Ops Officer by DDP/WH/JMPOPLAR at New Orleans, La.

Operations Officer

2. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of the Subject, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

3. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

4. As a part of entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged by your office.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

Steven L Kuhn

Steven L. Kuhn
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

FORM 10.62 1989

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(9.40)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 11 February 1970

YOUR REFERENCE: Request #73407 DDP/WH

CASE NO. : 57514

TO : Director of Personnel

ATTN : SA Branch/CPD

SUBJECT : KENT, William Morris

1. This is to inform you that Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulations 10-3 and 20-5 including access to classified information through TOP SECRET as required in the performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made for entrance on duty within 150 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐ Please advise Chief, Clearance Branch, extension 5620 when Subject enters on duty.

4. Conversion from Staff Agent to Staff Employee.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

for Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 3-66 1173 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Latin American Institute 900 Park Avenue N.Y.C.-N.Y.

SUBJECT		No. of Weeks	Grade
LANGUAGE SCHOOL			
SPANISH			
Grammar 1	2/49	16	92/92
Grammar 2	5/49	16	92/91
Grammar II	5/50	16	[illegible]
Conversation 3	5/49	16	92/90
Conversation I	2/49	16	85/86
Conversation 4	2/50	16	94/98
SP. Commercial Correspondence 1.	2/50	16	90/98
Diplomatic Correspondence			
SP. Word Study and Spelling	4/50	16	92/97
Translation Technique 3	5/50	16	85/90
Technique of Interpreting			
Bibliographic Research			
Cultural Background of Latin America			
Contemporary Latin American Thought			
Hispano-American Painting			
SPANISH JOURNALISM			
Style and Structure			
Foreign Reporting			
Script Writing and Translation			
Advertising Copy Writing			
Advertising Promotion			
PORTUGUESE			
Grammar 1			
Grammar 2			
Grammar 3			
Conversation 1			
Conversation 2			
Conversation 3			
Commercial Correspondence			
Diplomatic Correspondence			
Word Study and Spelling			
Translation Technique			
Technique of Interpreting			
Bibliographic Research			
GERMAN			
Grammar			
Conversation			
Commercial			

SUBJECT		No. of Weeks	Grade
FRENCH			
Basic			
Elementary			
Intermediate			
Advanced			
Commercial Correspondence			
ENGLISH			
Advanced English	2/49	16	97/82
Report Writing	5/49	16	88/90
English for Foreigners			
Business ~~English~~ [illegible]	5/50	16	[illegible]/95
Diplomatic Correspondence	2/50	16	85/100
Writing for Publication	2/50	16	94/95
DIPLOMATIC & ADMINISTRATION SCHOOL			
M. Banking	5/47	16	55/52
Economics	2/49	16	83/88
Finance			
Econ. & Pol. Geography	5/49	16	90/88
International Relations			
World Problems			
Latin American History			
American History [illegible]	[illegible]	16	58/5[illegible]
European History	5/49	16	98/88
Far Eastern History			
W[illegible]			
[illegible] History of [illegible]	5/50	16	80/83
Economic Resources of U. S.			
Admiralty Law			
International Comm. Law	[illegible]	16	83/87
Technique of Taking Exams			
Personnel Management			
Psychology	5/50	16	84/87
Sociology	5/50	16	86/88
~~[illegible]~~ Personality Ch. I	2/49	16	-/90
Advertising Princip.	4/50	16	81/90
Public Relations Princip.	4/50	16	95/92
Merchandising			
Diplomatic Etiquette			
Am. Hist I	2/49	16	80/88
Cont. Civiliz	2/49	16	85/82
Editing	2/50	16	95/95
Comml Sp. II	5/50	16	94/87
Pers. [illegible] II	5/50	16	91/90

SUBJECT		No. of Weeks	Grade
BUSINESS SCHOOL			
STENOGRAPHY (Gregg-Pittman)			
~~English I~~	~~5/49~~	~~16~~	~~90/33~~
Spanish			
French			
Portuguese			
Dictation & Transcription			
English French			
Spanish Portuguese			
TYPEWRITING			
English I			
English II	5/49	16	[illegible]/88
English III	2/49	16	87/85
Spanish			
French			
Portuguese			
COMMERCIAL SUBJECTS			
Bookkeeping	5/50	16	90/54
Secretarial Accounting			
Principles of Accounting			
Cost Accounting			
Accounting for Executives			
Business Machines			
Business Mathematics ~~Statistics~~	2/50	16	70/95
Business Etiquette			
Business Law	2/49	16	84/85
EXPORT			
Export Consular Documents			
Accounting for Export			
Credits & Collections			
Export Transportation			
Market Analysis			
Export Practice & Procedure	2/50	16	[illegible]
Air Freight Traffic			
Foreign Trade I			
Foreign Trade II			
~~Labor Relations II~~	~~5/49~~	~~16~~	~~85/82~~

Exc from CC II by Dr Angel

ATTENDANCE RECORD

Days Absent	
Times Tardy	

KENT, WILLIAM

U.S. Embassy
San Salvador, El Salvador

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Kent, William M.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 29	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-14	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/PS/CMG/NOC	9. CURRENT STATION Washington	10. CODE (ck one) ☒ HQS. ☐ DF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 January 75 - 31 October 75

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 November 75

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED *WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT,* PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. No

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Under the general guidance of Branch management, develops and implements a centralized system for finding suitable NOC personnel to fill specific vacancies; devises and implements procedures for identifying suitable NOC positions for unassigned NOC personnel	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains effective working relationships with various elements of the DDA such as Office of Personnel, Office of Medical Services, Office of Security and DDO's operating divisions concerning placement and assignment of personnel for NOC duties	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 As Chief of the Branch's Personnel Resources and Requirements Section, establishes and maintains liaison with the respective CIA components to develop data on nationality, background, education, language skills, professional specialties available to the Branch as aids to systematic NOC personnel searches and surveys	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Serves as Branch area referent for LA and AF Divisions. Monitors and reviews assignments, effectiveness, and problems of NOC officers in LA and AF Divisions. Recommends as appropriate concurrence or corrective actions in conformity with DO objectives and standards	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

E2, IMPDET CL BY 067327

(4)

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (contd) William M. Kent

Clandestine Service, one of my prime responsibilities is to try to reestablish the integrity of the current letter evaluations used in fitness reports and one of the first places for me to start is in my own Staff.

With that said, I do wish to underscore the fact that Mr. Kent is a responsible and responsive professional who knows what he has to do, does it with a minimum of fuss, writes clearly and to the point, is dedicated and in my judgment fully warrants an overall evaluation of strong. The above comments will be shown to the rater as well as the ratee.

SECTION D Narrative Comments (Continued)

languages (Spanish and Italian), and his admirable command of English prose which enables him to write crisp operational communications with speed and precision, all aid him in carrying out his responsibilities in a superior manner.

Subject does not become a victim of routine. In addition to developing the effective referrals system noted above, he has also on his own initiative created our own "skills bank" in which we are able to locate suitable NOC candidates, and those on board, in terms of needed professional or area experience, rare and esoteric language skills, etc. to the point that we can supply "leads" to divisions in a matter of minutes. (Several hundred NOC applicants and on-board personnel have thus been listed by skills bank criteria.)

Subject constantly seeks to make the NOC Branch a more meaningful and useful management tool. I find him a thoughtful and canny colleague, careful to observe in full the regulatory limits of our activity but quick to perceive opportunities to support and assist the divisions within those limits. He is a firm, fair, no-nonsense supervisor of Branch personnel. He speaks his mind, honestly but tactfully, when differences occur between him and me. It is my conviction that he is ready to enter into the upper reaches of staff and supervisory echelons of the Directorate and has by now proven that he is as adept at staff responsibilities as he was previously impressive in his field and desk operational responsibilities. In short, a comer and a cherished colleague.

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In February 1976, following the emergency hospitalization and retirement of my deputy, Subject became my new deputy, a position he has filled since that time in addition to performing most of the assignments he had been tasked with earlier. His undiminished energy and enthusiasm for his work is a hall-mark of his performance since that time. Subject has, on his own initiative, developed our referrals system (finding new NOC applicants and those on board for filling specific area priority needs) to a point where it is serving the entire Directorate with distinction and precision, especially in the "crisis" areas of NOC needs, such as Africa and Near East Divisions. Thanks to his creation of an orchestrated system of finding and "shopping" new-hire applicants with rare skills, we have also begun to serve the newly-created Clandestine Corps program with dozens of such applicants, in addition to serving normal area division NOC needs.

As a Branch supervisor, Subject deals with the entire spectrum of Branch activity in my absence with sureness and confidence. His broad operational background abroad, his near-native ability in two /continued/

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 14	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 24 January 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, NOC Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harris Greene Harris Greene

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☒ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent William M. Kent

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I became C/CMS on 1 October 1976 and thus my comments must be restricted to the October-December 1976 time frame. I have no basic disagreement with the narrative comments but do challenge the letter evaluations. While Mr. Kent's performance has been strong and he has amply demonstrated he is a GS-15 level officer capable of assuming greater responsibilities, I cannot concur that his performance "is so exceptional to requirements of the work and in comparison of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition". On purely technical grounds there is no other officer serving as DC/CMS/NOC and thus the comparison is invalid. Secondly, as Chief, Career Management Staff and administrator of the (contd)

DATE 26 January 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CMS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert D. Brown Robert D. Brown, Jr.

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Kent, William M.		3. DATE OF BIRTH 05/09/29	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer - Deputy Chief	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CMS/NOC		9. CURRENT STATION Hqs	10. CODE (ck one) ☒ HQS. ☐ DF	

6. SD: DYB

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 November 1975 - 31 December 1976

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1977

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED *WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT,* PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. No

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As head of the Branch's Referral Section, develops and implements a centralized system for locating suitable new-hire NOC personnel to fill specific NOC needs by area divisions; also does the same for unassigned NOC personnel as coordinator between area divisions.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As deputy to Chief, CMS/NOC, serves as latter's alter ego in absence of branch chief, and as his principal adviser in all matters concerning nonofficial cover in which the Branch is involved.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains effective working relationship with various Agency components including Office of Personnel, Office of Medical Services, Office of Security, etc., as well as serving as Branch senior officer in dealing with Central Cover Staff, concerning placement, assignment and appropriate cover for personnel under nonofficial cover.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 In charge of our Branch data bank on availability of NOC personnel and applicants by nationality, language skills, professional skills and specialties, foreign area experience etc.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

E2, IMPDET CL BY 007327 (4)

18 May 1977

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Mr. William M. Kent, Period: 1 January - 20 May 1977

1. As I depart from the assignment as Chief, Nonofficial Cover Branch, Career Management Staff, I should like to make a final comment on the performance of Mr. Kent who has served with me during the entire period of my assignment and who, since March 1976, has been my deputy. More specifically, the period since 1 January 1977 has been a trying one for this component and has culminated with its sudden transfer from one component (CMS) to another (ADDO/D).

2. During this most recent period, Mr. Kent has demonstrated his capacity for growth and leadership. He has himself handled virtually all of the transition aspects for the Branch, involving briefings and counsel for his new overall chief (the ADDO/D) and for his new branch chief. He has served in the past 30 days substantially as acting branch chief, given my fairly lengthy TDY absence abroad during that period. I can only reiterate my judgment in the last fitness report that Kent is a senior and mature supervisory officer, very well organized in his work habits and capable of making measured judgments and decisions. His continuity in all aspects of nonofficial cover and its ramifications makes him a valued and valuable staff officer. I would say his future contribution lies in the entire area of managing and guiding Directorate personnel. I have noted the clear progress he has made in the past year in taking supervisory decisions involving personnel, firmly and crisply.

3. Given his impressive field and Headquarters experience, Kent should be given an opportunity to display his worth in future Directorate assignments involving discretion, professionalism and maturity. I give him an unquestioned "Strong" for this final period he has served with me.

Harris Greene

Harris Greene
Chief
Nonofficial Cover Branch

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 18 May 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☑ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 18 May 1977	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I am in basic agreement with these comments and with the overall rating of Strong. Unfortunately, due to the physical separation of my office and that where Mr. Kent labors, I find it difficult to provide meaningful substantive comments. I have served as C/CMS only since 1 October 1976 and, while individual branches within CMS are widely dispersed, I have been lucky in having each managed and run by a senior experienced officer of supergrade rank. This was true in CMS/NOC and I am more than willing to accept C/CMS/NOC's evaluation of Mr. Kent. In my own dealings with Kent, I have found him to be responsive, informed, articulate and an excellent team player. I am also aware of certain innovations developed by him and implemented within CMS/NOC which have benefically contributed to the Directorate's NOC program. A good, solid officer with additional growth potential.

DATE 31 May 77	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CMS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert D. Brown Robert D. Brown, Jr.

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE 1 June 1977	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Kent, William M.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 05/09/29	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD DYB
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer - Deputy Chief	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CMS/NOC	9. CURRENT STATION Hqs		10. CODE (ck one) X HQS.	☐ DF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		CONTRACT		OTHER (Spec.)		TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

	ANNUAL		REASSIGN. MENT	X	SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
1 Jan 77 - 20 May 77

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. No

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT (ATTACHED)	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER 55

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY 007327

(4)

Section D (continued)

healthy skepticism enables him to contribute materially to the smooth, still on-going, transition from the old to the new way. In this context he has made invaluable suggestions on how we shall proceed in order to improve the operational efficacy of a NOC officer, as well as to ease the burdens imposed on the private life of a NOC officer.

3. Worthy of special note is the systematic and orderly fashion in which he tackled each new problem. These attributes resulted in his solving many of the thorny personnel problems which have confronted us of late. Mr. Kent's industriousness -- on the average he spends 10 hours a day in the office -- together with his legendary meticulousness have enabled him to set up an effective referral system through which we control the flow-through of both traditional and new NOC officers -- a most difficult and at times frustrating task.

4. As a deputy and acting branch chief he has been a firm and stern supervisor who exacts precision and perfection from his subordinates. The firmness and sterness, however, are tempered by a judicious application of human understanding or compassion in cases of "hard-to-place" NOC officers. His advice in solving many of these cases to the satisfaction of both the officer and the operational component involved was most welcome.

5. In sum, Mr. Kent has been a most effective deputy. As noted above, he has many outstanding traits and his overall performance has been a solid strong.

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

1. Having been appointed to my present position on 23 May 1977, this report covers seven months. In this time I have learned to appreciate Mr. Kent's excellent performance in supporting and guiding the mission of this branch. Considering the outstanding evaluation he received from my predecessor, it must have been a great disappointment to Mr. Kent that he was not advanced to become branch chief. I make this observation because Mr. Kent has never demonstrated his obvious disappointment to me. On the contrary, from the first moment he has shown extraordinary and enthusiastic willingness in providing the needed continuity to run this branch which controls the career progression of the NOC officer complement consisting of between 275 and 300 officers at any given time. No doubt the reader is aware of the intricate, complicated and at times confusing bureaucratic machinery which governs the NOC officer program. Mr. Kent has done a superb job in helping me understand and cope with this maze.

2. With the creation of the Office of External Development and concomitant issuance of new, precise and explicit regulations we now hope to streamline and simplify this bureaucratic machinery. Mr. Kent's knowledge of past practices coupled with his eagerness and at times

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 7	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Fitness Report O___ S 2 P___	
DATE 28 December 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, OED/NOC Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Gerard J. Hahn Hahn

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☑ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 28 Dec. 1977	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have not had the opportunity to observe Mr. Kent's performance as closely as the rating officer. However, the rater's comments strike me as being eminently fair and accurate. Mr. Kent has certainly performed well and his thorough and accurate presentations have indeed been impressive. Despite my somewhat limited association with Mr. Kent, but having full confidence in the rating officer's judgment, I have no hesitation in concurring in the overall rating of Strong.

DATE 29 December 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, OED	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Walter L. O'Brien W L O'Brien

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE 3 January 1978	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

Sec. 1e – Children's Passport

Sec. 13 – Obtained diploma from Pittsburg H.S. while in the Army through series of examinations given by the School

Sec. 14 – Draft Classification: 4A (Draft-exempt at present)
Duties in 25th Mecz. Cav. Rcn. Trp.: Military Policeman and voice radio operator M.P. Radio station.
Received special M.P. training immediately after assignment to 25th Mecz. Cav. Rcn. Trp.

Sec. 20 – Names in this section are of neighbors. I personally do not know these people except by sight. They do however know my parents a little better.

Sec. 21. d – Credit references given in this section are of my father. As I have no charge accounts nor am I in business I have no credit references in the U.S.

Sec. 23 – While living in Italy traveled with parents to: Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria.

While employed in El Salvador: visited Guatemala – April 1951 – 10 days

On way home (driving) from El Salvador traveled through: Guatemala, Mexico.

Sec. 18-19 – The following persons are persons who know me intimately as we lived in the same boarding house in El Salvador. They are all with the American Embassy in San Salvador with the exception of Sgt. Krebel:

Mr. James N. Leaken,
Miss Johanna C. Gaffney,
Sgt. Irwin Ast, U.S.M.C.
Sgt. Wilmer Krebel, U.S.A.
Miss Elizabeth Hunter

also: Mr. & Mrs. Robert Pittman
Tabacalera Morazan
San Salvador, El Salvador

Mr. William Wieland
U.S. Embassy
San Salvador, El Salvador

(over please)

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

NA

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Paul Kent

RELATIONSHIP Father

ADDRESS 2448 Washington Ave. (St. and Number) N.Y.C. 58 (City), N.Y. (State) U.S.A (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT New York City (City and State)

DATE July 16, 1951

Paul Kent (Witness)

William M. Kent (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

Inc

4. .... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

5. .... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

6. .... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

7. .... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? No

IF "YES," EXPLAIN:

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? ....

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

(None) NA

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR BANKRUPTCY? No
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: NA

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.
1. NAME Wallerstein and Schwartz ADDRESS 17 W. 36 Street N.Y.C. 1 N.Y.
2. NAME S. Goldner ADDRESS 15 E. First St. N.Y.C. 3 N.Y.
3. NAME M. Evers & Son ADDRESS 678 Courtland Ave. N.Y.C. 51 N.Y.

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM July 1951 TO Present 2448 Washington Ave. N.Y.C. 58 N.Y. U.S.A.
FROM Aug. 1950 TO July 1951 Casa Clark San Salvador El Salvador
FROM March 1944 TO Aug. 1950 2448 Washington Ave. N.Y.C. N.Y. U.S.A.
FROM Sept. 1939 TO March 1944 1950 Washington Ave. N.Y.C. N.Y. U.S.A.
FROM June 1939 TO Sept. 1939 Myers Cottages Pine Hill N.Y. U.S.A.
FROM April 1938 TO June 1939 220 W. 78 St. N.Y.C. N.Y. Italy
FROM 1935 TO Sept. 1938 Viale Romagna 157 Milan Italy
FROM TO

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM 1929 TO 1938 Milan Italy Home
FROM 1938 TO 1939 Varese Italy Home
FROM June 1949 TO Sept. 1949 Mexico City Mexico College
FROM Dec. 1946 TO March 1948 Otsu, Osaka Japan. U.S. Army
FROM 1950 TO 1951 San Salvador El Salvador Employment

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN OR AFFILIATION WITH ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCHES IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED.

1. Boy Scouts of America-Troop 139 Bathgate Ave. Bronx, N.Y. U.S.A.
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP 1943-1944-1945

2. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

3. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Mid'n. Donald C. Regan	BUS. ADD.	U.S. Naval Academy	Annapolis	Md.
	RES. ADD.	2934 Tiebout Ave.	N.Y.C.	N.Y.
2. Theodore Aecas	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	320 Wadsworth Ave.	N.Y.C.	N.Y.
3. Mrs. Alice Meyer	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	85 Pinehurst Ave.	N.Y.C.	N.Y.
4. Mrs. Ludwig Ilse	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	2447 Grove St. South	St. Petersburg	Fla.
5. Mrs. Margaret Parker	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	85 Pinehurst Ave.	N.Y.C.	N.Y.

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Helen Raynor	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	221 Miller Ave.	Freeport L.I.	N.Y.
2. Cyrus Pecoraro	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	528 So. 2nd Ave.	Mt. Vernon	N.Y.
3. Florinda Montana	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	262 E. Prospect Ave.	Mt. Vernon	N.Y.
4. Alfred Donado	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	12 Oak St.	Harrison	N.Y.
5. Sra. Eva Murela	BUS. ADD.	900 Park Ave.	N.Y.C.	N.Y.
	RES. ADD.			

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Mrs. Nelson	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	[illegible] Washington Ave.	N.Y.C. 58	N.Y.
2. Mrs. Simon	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	[illegible] Washington Ave.	N.Y.C. 58	N.Y.
3. Mrs. Frieda Scherer	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	[illegible] Washington Ave.	N.Y.C. 58	N.Y.

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME NA

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS None

E. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC. No

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE NA

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) — LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) —

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

School (College) Magazine & Newspaper: Several articles & stories; also cartoons
Honors at Graduation Latin American Institute:
General Excellence — Excellence Diplomatic Subjects —
Outstanding Service to the school award.

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

No

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

A. No

B. Resigned position in El Salvador under protest of employer whose desires were that I remained with the company

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Spanish SPEAK Fluent READ Fluent WRITE Fluent

LANGUAGE Italian SPEAK Fluent READ Fluent WRITE Fluent

LANGUAGE French SPEAK Slight READ Slight WRITE Slight

German Slight Slight Slight

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Track - High School Track Team; Baseball, Football (only as spectator)

Stamp Collecting Writing

Music and Dancing Breeding and raising tropical fish

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Some experience and travel in Latin America plus knowledge of Spanish would aid in work in Latin countries.

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

IBM Proof Machine

Writing Short Stories

Cartooning

Typing

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 50 SHORTHAND [illegible] - Unemployed

FROM Sept 1948 TO May 1950 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

~~EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY~~ Attended Latin American Institute

ADDRESS 200 Park Ave (St. and Number) New York City (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR Dr. Juvenal L. Angel (Pres.)

TITLE OF JOB NA. SALARY $ NA PER NA

YOUR DUTIES NA.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Graduated

FROM June 1948 TO Sept 1948 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY National City Bank of New York

ADDRESS 50th Street Branch (St. and Number) (City) N.Y.C (State) N.Y. - U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Banking NAME OF SUPERVISOR Don't recall

TITLE OF JOB I.B.M. Proof Mach. Oper. SALARY $ don't recall PER —

YOUR DUTIES Operated I.B.M. Proof Machine and had various clerical duties.

REASONS FOR LEAVING To attend Latin American Institute

FROM May 1948 TO June 1948 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.

ADDRESS 252 E. 161 St. (St. and Number) N.Y.C. (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Edu. Books Sales NAME OF SUPERVISOR don't Recall.

TITLE OF JOB Head Children's Books Dept. SALARY $ Commission PER NA

YOUR DUTIES In charge Children's Books Dept. To direct sales and sell children's Books

REASONS FOR LEAVING Foot Injury

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

U.S.A. (Country) Army (Service) T/5 (Rank) Oct. 5, 1946 - March 29, 1948 (Dates of Service)

Osaka, Japan (Last Station) RA 12264528 (Serial Number) Honorable (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: 25th Inf. Div. 25th Mecz. Cav. Rcn. Trp. (Military Police)

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 28 ADDRESS 1910 Arthur Ave. N.Y.C. 57 N.Y.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON N.A.

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS Army Security Agency (Enlisted Reserve Corps) Honor. Disch. - Military Police (N.Y. National Guard) Honorable Discharge.

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM Aug. 1950 TO June 1951 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Almacen y Libreria El Siglo

ADDRESS (St. and Number) San Salvador (City) (State) El Salvador (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Dept. Store NAME OF SUPERVISOR Edgar Schoening

TITLE OF JOB Manager SALARY $ 200 PER Month

YOUR DUTIES Advertising, Publicity, Store and Window Displays, Wholesale Shipments, Supervision of employees

REASONS FOR LEAVING No future with the Company

FROM July 1950 TO July 1951 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Commercial National Bank of N.Y.

ADDRESS (St. and Number) N.Y.C. (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Banking NAME OF SUPERVISOR don't Recall

TITLE OF JOB Translator SALARY $ 10.- PER day

YOUR DUTIES Translating letters and forms from foreign languages into English and from English into foreign languages. Five languages employed.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Hired on temporary basis while regular translator was on vacation.

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR ....

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 3000
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY ✓

FREQUENTLY ✓, CONSTANTLY ✓

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ✓

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ✓ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES ✓

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

NA

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

Elementary School, Leonardo da Vinci Milan Italy 1935 to 1938

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL St. Joseph ADDRESS Bronx, N.Y.C. (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1940-1944 GRADUATE? Yes

HIGH SCHOOL Fordham Preparatory ADDRESS N.Y.C. (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1944-1946 GRADUATE? No

High School: ~~COLLEGE~~ Pittsburg Evening H.S. ADDRESS Pittsburg (City) Calif. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

~~MAJOR AND SPECIALTY~~ ~~YEARS COMPLETED~~

~~DATES ATTENDED~~ 1946 ~~DEGREE~~ Graduated

COLLEGE Latin-American Institute ADDRESS N.Y.C. (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Spanish-Diplomatic Subjects YEARS COMPLETED 2

DATES ATTENDED 1948-1950 DEGREE Diploma Foreign Service Officer

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS Economics; Comm'l Law; Int'l Comm'l Law; Public Relations; American, European & Diplomatic History; Acct., Bookkeeping & Business Math; Eng. & Span. Comm'l Corresp; Translation Techniques; Spanish; Advertising; Writing; Export

~~CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS~~ College: Mexico City College - Mexico D.F. Mexico.

Summer Course 1949 - Import Export, Spanish, Journalism

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW NA

FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION LAST EMPLOYER

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME Silvio Brusegani RELATIONSHIP Uncle AGE 53
CITIZENSHIP Italy ADDRESS Via Sacco 10 (St. and Number) Varese (City) (State) Italy (Country)

2. NAME Eda Brusegani RELATIONSHIP Hunt AGE 47
CITIZENSHIP Italy ADDRESS Via Sacco 10 (St. and Number) Varese (City) (State) Italy (Country)

3. NAME Lilliana Brusegani RELATIONSHIP Cousin AGE 20
CITIZENSHIP Italy ADDRESS Via Sacco 10 (St. and Number) Varese (City) (State) Italy (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

None NA

1. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

2. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

General Interest Subjects and Short Stories (but not significant) published.

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NA

9. LIST ANY ~~[illegible]~~ PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

During employment in El Salvador

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

Received highest honors and 4 awards at Graduation from Latin American Institute: General Excellence, Diplomatic Subjects, Service to the School, and one other.

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): May 1956 to present
2. GRADE: GS-11
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: WH/III/Cuba
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NA
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: PP Ops Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

General support of Station KUCAGE activities. Initiating new KUCAGE programs for Station implementation. Liaison with other Headquarters components. Maintainance of correspondence with Station. Attendance at various OTR courses (Intelligence Orientation, World Communism, Anti-Communist Ops. completed to dat

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): September 55 to May 56
2. GRADE: GS-9
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: WH/ Station Panama City
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NA
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Station PP Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Assumed and reorganized Station PP program. Broadened existing assets and acquired new assets. Wrote Spanish language materials, drew cartoons, supervised publication of KUCAGE publication. Organized anti-Communist demonstrations. Acted as co-Case Officer of FI penetration agent.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): July 1954-September 1955
2. GRADE: GS-7
GS-9
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: WH/Station Panama City
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NA
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: FI Ops Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

In charge Water Travel Control program. Worked as member Air Travel Control team performing baggage searches, photographing documents, maintaining passenger and air travel records (all covertly). Regular and audio surveillances. CE work. Temporary cut-out, later co-case officer FI penetration agent.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): June 1952-July 1954
2. GRADE: GS-6 GS-7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: WH/Station Panama City
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NA
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: FI Ops Officer
5. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Same as 3, above, less CE Work and penetration agent handling.

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): Dec. 1951-June 1952
2. GRADE: GS-5
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: WH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NA
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: FI Ops Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Training. Also orientation at various desks.

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECTION VIII

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED															HOW ACQUIRED			
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
	R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK																		
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Spanish	X	X	X														X		X
Italian	X	X	X													X	X	X	X
French										X		X		X					X
German												X	X	X				X	

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

Spanish: 2 yrs., 20 hrs per week//Italian: 4 yrs. in Italian elementary schools.
French: 2 yrs., 5 hrs. per week.

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD

Limited

SECTION IX

GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE", INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Japan	General Knowledge only	1946-1948	X			X
Italy	General knowledge only	1929-1939	X	X	X	
Mexico	"	1949 1951	X	X X	X	
El Salvador	"	1950-1951	X	X		X
Panama	Political, Terrain	1952-1956	X	X		X

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

Japan: Military Service//Italy: Father in business in Europe//Mexico: attend College// El Salvador: Employment (Non-CIA)//Panama: CIA assignment//In addition to above have travelled in Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, Austria, Switzerland, Guatemala, Luxembourg.

SECTION X

TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
40		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

Mimeograph, Recordak

SECTION XI

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Writing: have had some materials published//Cartooning: since childhood// Raising and breeding tropical fish: considerable knowledge//Photography, stamp collecti

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

Training and experience in writing, cartooning, advertising, public relations, languages, travel, sales, etc.

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

Voice radio(operational) experience in the Army.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

NA

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)	6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)
NA	NA

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)
NA

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS
NA

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*
USA

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☒ OTHER *(Specify)*: Naturalization

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS
NA

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First papers, etc.)*
NA

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	? ☒	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/ HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Latin American Institute, N.Y.C.	Diplom. Subjects Language	Pub. Rel. & Comml.	1948	1950	? Yes	May 1950	191 Sem.Hrs.
Mexico City College, Mexico D.F.	Journ. Spanish	Hist.	June 1949	Aug 1949	No	No	9 Sem.Hrs.

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
Latin American Institute (see above)	Diplomatic			

4. MILITARY TRAINING *(Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)*

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
Military Police School	M.P. Training	1947		2 mos.

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE
Self Study, various fields.

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE *(From- and To-)* BY MONTH AND YEAR
NA

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
NA

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
NA

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
Department of Army, Cnal Zone, 1953-1955

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1
1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: [illegible]EGANI, Silvio
2. RELATIONSHIP: Uncle
3. AGE: 58(?)
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Varese, Italy
5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*: Italy
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: None
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: 1939

2
1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: BRUSEGANI, Enrico
2. RELATIONSHIP: Uncle
3. AGE: 57(?)
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Varese, Italy
5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*: Italy
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: None
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: 1939

3
1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: Families of above
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*:
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

4
1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*:
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*:
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME
NA

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*
Falls Church Bank	Falls Church, Virginia, USA

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

JAN

SECRET
(When Filled In)

159198

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE
4 February 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: Kent, William Morris

2. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State)*:
2608 N. Winchester Street
Arlington 13, Virginia

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State)*:
2608 N. Winchester Street
Arlington 13, Virginia

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: JEfferson 3-3899

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Virginia

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: KENT, Dorothy Bernadette

2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*: 2608 N. Winchester Street, Arlington 13, Virginia

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*. INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: NA

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: JEfferson 3-3899

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: NA

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: NA

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Mr. Paul Kent, 2448 Washington Ave., New York 58, New York (Father)

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS: NA

WIFE OR HUSBAND: *If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.*

3. NAME *(First)* Dorothy *(Middle)* Bernadette *(Maiden)* Martin *(Last)* Kent

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 17 May 1952

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)*: New York City, New York, USA

6. HIS *(or her)* ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: Manhattan, New York City

7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH: NA

9. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

10. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address, if deceased)*: Same as 2, above

11. DATE OF BIRTH: 12 November 1930

12. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*: Covington, Louisiana, USA

CODED FOR QUALIFICATIONS DATE 14 MAY 1958

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY: NA

14. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA

15. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*: USA

16. DATE ACQUIRED: NA

17. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)*: NA

18. OCCUPATION: Housewife

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)*: N.Y.Telephone Co. (former employer)

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: New York City

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SEC; 8 Step Father in law

Full Name: G. Arthur Dovey
Living
PRESENT ADDRESS: 355 N. Y. Ave., Jersey City, N.J.

DATE OF BIRTH: 1904

CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

OCCUPATION: U. S. N. Inspector (Civil Service)

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Evelyn (First) D. (Middle) Dovey (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 355 N.Y. Avenue, (St. and Number) Jersey City, (City) N.J. (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1911 PLACE OF BIRTH Lowell, Massachusetts

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Ketay Manuf Co, Inc LAST EMPLOYER N.Y.C, N.Y.

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME Harry Martin RELATIONSHIP Uncle AGE 43

CITIZENSHIP U.S. ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) California (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) U. S. Navy, Submarine Corps

2. NAME G. Arthur Dovey RELATIONSHIP Step Father IN LAW AGE 48

CITIZENSHIP U.S. ADDRESS 355 N.Y. Ave, (St. and Number) Jersey City (City) N.J. (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) Civil Service

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN)

OCCUPATION .... LAST EMPLOYER ....

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM .... TO .... BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Edward G. (First) (Middle) Martin (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 20 Oriole Drive, Springhill, Alabama (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 4 Feb 1908 PLACE OF BIRTH Covington, Louisiana

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ....

....

CITIZENSHIP .... WHEN ACQUIRED? .... WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Merchant Marine Pilot LAST EMPLOYER ....

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY?

PORT OF ENTRY? ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY?

LAST U. S. VISA (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE SEX HEIGHT WEIGHT

EYES HAIR COMPLEXION SCARS

BUILD OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE MARRIED X DIVORCED WIDOWED

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Dorothy (First) Bernadette (Middle) Martin (Maiden) Kent (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE New York City, N.Y. - 17 May 1952

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 521 West 180 St. (St. and Number) N.Y.C., (City) N.Y. (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 12 Nov 1930 PLACE OF BIRTH Covington, (City) Louisiana (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Secretary LAST EMPLOYER N.Y. Telephone Co.

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS 140 West St., (St. and Number) N.Y.C., (City) N.Y. (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM (Date) TO (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? ________ (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) Miss [✓ Mr.] Mrs. WILLIAM (First) M. (Middle) KENT (Last)

Telephone:
Office ________
Ext. ________
Home ________

PRESENT ADDRESS ________ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 2448 (St. and Number) Washington, AVE., (City) New York City, (State) N.Y. (Country)

B. NICKNAME ________ WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? ________

________ UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ________

HOW LONG? ________ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ________

________ (Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________ (City) (State) (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP ________ (Country) BY BIRTH? ________ BY MARRIAGE? ________

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. ________ ISSUED ________ (Date) BY ________ (Court)

AT ________ (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? ________ (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ________ TO ________ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ________ (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS ________

____

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ________ GIVE PARTICULARS:

____

FORM NO. 38-1
SEP 1950

OCCUPATION Asst. to husband LAST EMPLOYER None

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 506 E. 187 Street N.Y.C. N.Y. U.S.A.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM None TO NA BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

None . NH

1. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

2. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

3. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

4. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

5. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

NH

FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION LAST EMPLOYER

16—68838-1

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE
CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Paul (First) (Middle) Kent (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 2448 Washington Ave. (St. and Number) N.Y.C. 58, (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH March [illegible], 1895 PLACE OF BIRTH Metz (City) (State) France (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY Dec. 22, 1936 N.Y.

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A WHEN ACQUIRED July 12, 1944 WHERE? N.Y.C. (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A (Country)

OCCUPATION Manufacturer LAST EMPLOYER Paolo Ermolli, Varese, Italy

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 506 E. 187 Street (St. and Number) N.Y.C. (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM Oct. 1, 1915 (Date) TO Nov. 20, 1918 (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE Army

COUNTRY Germany DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

New York State Guard - 8th Inf. Regiment - 1944-1946

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Beatrice (First) (Middle) Kent (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 2448 Washington Ave. (St. and Number) N.Y.C. (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH April [illegible], 1901 PLACE OF BIRTH Monza Italy

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED June 16, 1937 WHERE? N.Y.C. (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY April 20, 1938 N.Y.

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? April 20, 1939

PORT OF ENTRY? New York ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? Germany

LAST U. S. VISA 3990 (Number) Immigration (Type) - Naples, Italy (Place of Issue) March 25, 1939 (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 22 SEX Male HEIGHT 6' WEIGHT 158

EYES Brown HAIR Brown COMPLEXION light SCARS Right forearm

BUILD Medium OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES Scar right knee

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE ✓ MARRIED — DIVORCED — WIDOWED —

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS NA

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.) NA

NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION LAST EMPLOYER

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM (Date) TO (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

Mr. Kent advised Contract Personnel Division this date that his date of naturalization should be 20 July 1950 and not as indicated on his Personal History Statement.

Cws

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME Miss Mr. Mrs. William Morris Kent — Telephone: Office / Ext. / Home CYpress 4 61

PRESENT ADDRESS 2448 Washington Ave. N.Y.C. 58, N.Y. U.S.A.

PERMANENT ADDRESS 2448 Washington Ave. N.Y.C. 58, N.Y. U.S.A.

B. NICKNAME Bill WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? William Rosenkranz

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? Rosenkranz was legal family name formerly

HOW LONG? 15 yrs. IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS Aug. 4, 1944 N.Y.C. N.Y. (Where?) Supreme Court, Bronx County (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH May 9, 1929 PLACE OF BIRTH Milan (City) (State) Italy (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. (Country) BY BIRTH? BY MARRIAGE? —

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. 6909991 ISSUED July 20, 1951 (Date) BY U.S. District Court (Court)

AT New York City (City) New York (State) U.S.A. (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? Yes (Yes or No) Germany (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? May 9, 1929 TO July 20, 1951 ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? None (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NA

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS: NA.

SEC. 9:

MOTHER IN LAW-

NAME - EVELYN D. DOVEY
LIVING
ADDRESS - 355 NEW YORK AVE., JERSEY CITY, NJ
DATE OF BIRTH: 2 NOV. 1910
CITIZENSHIP: US
OCCUPATION: DEFENSE WORKER

SEC. 8:

STEP-FATHER-IN-LAW-

NAME: G. ARTHUR DOVEY
LIVING
ADDRESS: 355 NEW YORK AVE., JERSEY CITY, NJ
DATE OF BIRTH: 1904
CITIZENSHIP: US
OCCUPATION: US NAVY INSPECTOR

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME .... RELATIONSHIP ....

ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Washington DC (City and State) DATE 23 May 1952

Arlene D. Boyd (Witness) William M. Kent (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62855-1

SEC. 9. STEP - MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME FLORENCE (First) — (Middle) MARTIN (Last)

LIVING ~~OR DECEASED~~ .... DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, ~~OR LAST~~, ADDRESS 20 ORIOLE DR., (St. and Number) SPRINGFIELD, (City) ALA. (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH ? PLACE OF BIRTH —

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? — WHERE? — (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION — LAST EMPLOYER —

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

OCCUPATION .... LAST EMPLOYER ....

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM .... TO .... BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. **FULL NAME** .... (First) (Middle) (Last) **AGE** ....

   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

2. **FULL NAME** .... (First) (Middle) (Last) **AGE** ....

   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

3. **FULL NAME** .... (First) (Middle) (Last) **AGE** ....

   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

4. **FULL NAME** .... (First) (Middle) (Last) **AGE** ....

   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

5. **FULL NAME** .... (First) (Middle) (Last) **AGE** ....

   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME EDWARD (First) G. (Middle) MARTIN (Last)

LIVING ~~OR DECEASED~~ .... **DATE OF DECEASE** — **CAUSE** —

PRESENT, ~~OR LAST~~, ADDRESS 20 ORIOLE DR., SPRINGFIELD, ALA. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 4 FEB 1902 **PLACE OF BIRTH** COVINGTON, LA.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

....

CITIZENSHIP US **WHEN ACQUIRED?** — **WHERE?** — (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION MERCHANT MARINE PILOT LAST EMPLOYER —

Amendment to PHS
Due to Marriage
Date: 17 May 1952

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ WILLIAM (First) MORRIS (Middle) KENT (Last)

Telephone:
Office ____
Ext. ____
Home ____

PRESENT ADDRESS ____ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS ____ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME ____ WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? ____

____ UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ____

HOW LONG? ____ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ____

____ (Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH ____ PLACE OF BIRTH ____ (City) (State) (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP ____ (Country) BY BIRTH? ____ BY MARRIAGE? ____

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. ____ ISSUED ____ (Date) BY ____ (Court)

AT ____ (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? ____ (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ____ TO ____ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ____ (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS ____

____

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ____ GIVE PARTICULARS:

____

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XIII

CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 6 9 06 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 3

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Dorothy B. Kent	Wife	1930		x	US	2608 N.Winchester St. Arlington 13, Va.
William M. Kent, Jr.	Son	1953	x		US	"
Paul E. Kent	Son	1954	x		US	"
Karen A. Kent	Daughter	1955		X	US	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED 5 February 1957

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED) NOTE: *SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.*	CASE OFFICER Maurice Currie	DIVISION WHD
	TELEPHONE EXTENSION 6032	DATE 15 June 1966

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See HR 20-44, HR 20-41, HR 20-7, HR 20-53, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)*

Normal

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)*	☐ PROPOSED	48. TYPE *(Check)*	XX PROPRIETARY	☐ CULTURAL	☐ COMMERCIAL	☐ TOURIST
	XX ESTABLISHED		☐ SUBSIDIZED	☐ EDUCATIONAL	☐ MILITARY	☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

NA ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)* ☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL XX NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION ☐ DAYS ☐ MONTHS ☐ YEARS	52. EFFECTIVE DATE 3[illegible] July 1966	53. RENEWABLE XX YES ☐ NO
54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)* NA	55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINAT NA ☐ YES ☐ NO	

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(CI, FI, PP, other)*

PP

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Service requirements of field stations and WH Division under cover of the Christian Fellowship Fund as described in Project JMPOPLAR-12.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Travel and residence in Europe and Latin America. Operational assignments in Latin America and USA under WH Division.

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐ TRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ COLLEGE *(No degree)* XX COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	XX			XX			XX		
Italian		XX			XX			XX	
French			XX			XX			XX

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGI

Italy

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Europe, Far East, Latin America

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

1950-1951 Store Manager, El Salvador, C.A., Salary $2,400, left for better position.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

[redacted] will be engaged in this Project for at least five years.

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST	CASE OFFICER Maurice Currie	DIVISION WHD
INSTRUCTIONS: Use HR 20-53 and HB 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.	TELEPHONE EXTENSION 6032	DATE 15 June 1966

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME [redacted] PSEUDO ☒ TRUE William m. Kent [redacted]

2A. PROJECT JMPOPLAR-12

2B. PERMANENT STATION New Orleans, La.

3. ALLOTMENT NO. 7135-0630

3A. FUNDS ☐ V ☒ XX UV

4. SLOT NO.

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES
Charles K. Morledge (P)
Douglas G. Gupton (alias at JMWAVE)

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. XXX YES ☐ NO *(If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)*
Staff Employee 1951-1952
[redacted] " 1952-1956
Staff Employee 1956-To Present

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE *(Type and date)*

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE XX OBTAINED ☐ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" NA YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES XX NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY *(Contract agent, contract employee, etc.)* [redacted] Staffe Employee

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP USA

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE 37

14. DATE OF BIRTH *(Month, day, year)* 9 May 1929

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE *(City and state or country)* Herndon, Virginia

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE *(City and state or country)* Same

17. MARITAL STATUS *(Check as appropriate)* ☐ SINGLE XX MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS *(Not including individual)* RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife - 35
Son - 12
Son - 11
Daughter - 10

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES XX NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE

21. VETERAN XXX

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY *(Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)*

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE

24. RANK OR GRADE

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES XX NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES XX NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY GS-13, Step 5

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL

29. COVER *(Breakdown, if any)* Former Dept. of Army, Dept. of State, Dept. of Army
Executive Secretary of Christian Fellowship Fund

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

COVER	CIA
XX YES	☐ YES
☐ NO	XX NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES *(NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)*

31. QUARTERS NA

32. POST NA

33. OTHER *Non-official cover premium pay

34. COVER *(Breakdown, if any)* None

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES XXX PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS XX YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED XX YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☐ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL XX YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife	USA	35	12 November 1930
Son	USA	12	6 September 1953
Son	USA	11	6 September 1952 1954
Daughter	USA	10	12 December 1953 1955

Approved by CS/CS Agent Panel
(Date) 7 July 1966
D M Collins
Secretary, CS/CS Agent Panel

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH XXX CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	**MARITAL STATUS**		
1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:			
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) [redacted] —	(First) DOROTHY	(Middle) BERNADETTE	(Maiden) —
3. DATE OF BIRTH 12 NOV. 1930	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) COVINGTON, LA. – USA.		
5. OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER —		
7. CITIZENSHIP US	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) —	9. DATE U. S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED —	

SECTION X **DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE**

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
WILLIAM M., JR.	SON	6 SEPT. '53 - PANAMA CANAL ZONE	US	
PAUL E.	SON	6 SEPT. '54 - PANAMA CANAL ZONE	US	
KAREN A.	DAUGHER	12 DEC. '55 - PANAMA PANAMA CITY	US	

SECTION XI **PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF M FROM
HERNDON ROTARY CLUB	HERNDON, VA.	1961
"	" "	1967
CATHOLIC ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION	WASHINGTON, D.C.	1966
CATHOLIC ASSN. FOR INT'L PEACE	WASHINGTON, D.C.	1966
FOREIGN POLICY ASSN OF N.O.	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	1966
INTERNATIONAL HOUSE	" " "	1966

DATE 9 January 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] William M Kent

SECRET

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - - CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
WESTERN EUROPE	CULTURAL	1929 - 1939		✓	✓		
JAPAN	CULTURAL	1946-47-48		✓	✓		✓
LATIN AMERICA	ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, POLITICAL	VARIOUS TIMES 1949 - 1964	1944 MEXICO	✓	✓	✓	✓

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM:
60		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER-SPECIFY:

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING *(comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc)*

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

CAMPING - GOOD TROPICAL FISH - GOOD &
FISHING - GOOD RAISING & SHOWING PUREBRED DOGS - GOOD
STAMP COLLECTING - GOOD TRACK-FAIR

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS *(indicate CW speed, sending & receiving)* OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☑ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. *(Provide license registry number if known)*

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE *(year of issue)*

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE *(year of issue)*

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(do NOT submit copies unless requested)*. INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)*

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

HAVE BEEN A CANDIDATE IN NON-PARTISAN TOWN COUNCIL ELECTIONS — THIS REQUIRED VARIOUS PUBLIC APPEARANCES AND SPEECHES.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 059198	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [redacted] Kent, Wm M.	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 05/09/29	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS -13-05
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE IOPS OFFICER	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDD	9. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
PANAMA	PCS-XX	52/06/01	56/05/01
PANAMA	TDY-XX	56/07/01	56/07/14
CUBA —TOTAL 3 MONTHS	TDY-64	57/06/01	57/08/01
GUATEMALA Total 6-7 weeks	TDY-64	58/01/01	58/01/01
VENEZUELA	PCS-46	58/08/01	60/03/23
WESTERN HEMISPHERE PERU	TDY-51	64/04/09	64/04/18

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 18 MAR 1968
INITIALS: FG.

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		

FORM

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESI-DENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGN-MENT
1.							
2.							

JAN 16 1 41 PM '69

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING *(WPM)*	2. SHORTHAND *(WPM)*	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY *(active)* ☐ STANDBY *(inactive)* ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨
			☐ RESIDENT
			☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

William M. Kent

DATE 31 December 1968

SIGNATURE O [redacted]

SECRET

LLC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information **only if there have been changes** *since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.*

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO. 059198	NAME [redacted] Kent, William M	DATE OF BIRTH 05/09/29

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*	YEARS ATTENDED *(From-To)*	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. *(Specify)*
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried)* SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden)*

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 6 1 42 PM '71
MAIL ROOM

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING *(WPM)*
2. SHORTHAND *(WPM)*
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM. ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☒ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY *(active)* ☐ STANDBY *(inactive)* ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1. Herndon Rotary Club	Herndon, Va.	1967	Present
2. Herndon Citizens Assn.	Herndon, Va.	1969	Present
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
5 April 1971	William M. Kerr

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PLW

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information **only if there have been changes** *since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.*

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
059198	Kent, William M.	05/09/29	D	GS-14

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*	YEARS ATTENDED *(From-To)*	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. *(Specify)*
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried)* SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden)*

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☒ ADD ☐ DELETE Beatrice Kent	Mother	30 Apr. 1901-Italy	U.S.	Same as employee
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V **GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL**

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

JAN 11 3 32 PM '72

SECTION VI **TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS**

1. TYPING *(WPM)*	2. SHORTHAND *(WPM)*	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM. ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII **SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS**

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII **MILITARY SERVICE**

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY *(active)* ☐ STANDBY *(inactive)* ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
5. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX **PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1. HERNDON ROTARY CLUB	HERNDON, VA	1961	PRESENT
2. HERNDON CITIZENS ASSN.	" "	1969	PRESENT
3.			

SECTION X **REMARKS**

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10 January 1972	William M. Kent

DDS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.
Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information **only if there have been changes since** *you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.*
If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.
Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
059198	Kent, William	05/09/29	D	14

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*	YEARS ATTENDED *(From-To)*	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. *(Specify)*
		MAJOR	MINOR				
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled Remarried)* SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden)*

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☑ ADD BEATRICE KENT ☐ DELETE	MOTHER	APRIL 30, 1901 MONZA ITALY	U.S.	11450 NO. SHORE DRIVE RESTON, VA. - APT. 317
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM
FEB 27 11 32 AM '73

GION RY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESI-DENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGN-MENT

TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

) 2. SHORTHAND (*WPM*)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM.
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

ATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

ELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
CTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

VE OR GUARD ORGANI- HICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD
NK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
ENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
OBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
5. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

AME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

REMARKS

b 1973

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
William M. Kerr

SECRET

BWS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
059198	Kent, William	05/09/29	D	GS-14

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*	YEARS ATTENDED *(From-To)*	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. *(Specify)*
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled Remarried)* SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Maiden)*

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☒ ADD ☐ DELETE BEATRICE KENT	MOTHER	30 APRIL 1901 MONZA, ITALY	U.S.	11450 No. SHORE DRIVE RESTON, VA.
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 19 June 1970

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): KENT, William M.

3. POSITION TITLE: C/WH/3/Peru

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WH/3

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6223

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- ☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- ☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- ☒ TDY STANDBY
- ☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ RETURN TO DUTY
- ☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
- ☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

- ☐ HDQS/TDY
- ☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

- ☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

- ☐ YES
- ☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Judy Kassler

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3 D 3102

EXT.: 5671

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified for tdy standby untilFeb. 1972.

DATE: 11 Sept/ 1970

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Don Farley PRO/OMS

FORM 2-69 **259** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
25 April 1975

2. NAME *(Last, First, Middle)*
Kent, William M. 5-24

3. POSITION TITLE
Ops Officer

4. GRADE
GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH
DDO/WOCOG

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.
9464

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☒ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE
Kathy Hill
Kathy Hill, LA/Trng

ROOM NO. & BUILDING
3D6317 Hqs

EXT.
7431

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified for TDY Stnadby until 1 November 1976.

DATE
28 May 1975

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF
William W. Golder, OMS/pro

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS

SECRET

☒ SECRET XX ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIE

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

(SCREENED AREAS WILL BE COMPLETED BY OMS)

OMS DATE

1. REQUEST DATE *(DA-MO-YR)* 28 Oct. 76

2. APPLICANT - HAS APPLICANT PREVIOUSLY BE SEEN BY OMS ☒ YES ☐ NO

DEPENDENT(S) x EMPLOYEE

3. NAME *(Last, First, Middle)* Kent, William M.

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 058-22-8472

5. CHART NO.

6. DOB *(DA-MO-YR)* 09 05 29

7. SEX M

8. GRADE GS-15

9. AFFILIATION CD

10. DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIVISION DDO/CMS/NOC

11. EMP. EXT. 4103

12. POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief, NOC Bran

COMPLETE 13-19 FOR EACH DEPENDENT TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN WITH EMPLOYEE ONLY IF 2 IS CHECKED "DEPENDENT(S)"

13. DEPENDENT NAME *(L-F-M)*	14. SOC SEC NO.	15. CHART NO.	16. DOB *(DMY)*	17. SEX	18. RELATIONSHIP	19. DEPENDE PREVIOUSL BY OMS *(y*

20. REQUESTED ACTION *(more than one action is acceptable)*

APPLICANT:	▨	PRE-EMPLOYMENT	▨	EOD		
ASSIGNMENTS:		O/S PCS	STATION		ETO/ETA *(DA-MO-YR)*	NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN
	X	O/S TDY	TYPE COVER		POSITION	
		O/S RETURNEE		FITNESS FOR DUTY		OTHER *(specify)*
	X	O/S TDY STANDBY		RETURN TO DUTY		
		O/S PLANNING		SPECIAL TRAINING		
SEPARATION:		RETIREMENT		MDR/CIARDS		MDR/CSC
ROUTINE		REGULAR ANNUAL	▨	EXECUTIVE ANNUAL	▨	MPT/PHE

21. COMMENTS

22. REQUESTING DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIV DDO/CMS/NOC

23. ROOM/BLDG GG 2709

24. EXTENSION 4103

25. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER William M. Kent

FOR OMS USE ONLY

FOR APPLICANTS

☐ APPROVE PROCESSING FOR EOD

☐ HOLD PENDING RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL MEDICAL INFORMATION *(form letter attached)*

☐ REQUEST PRE-EMP. MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ OTHER *(see comments)*

COMMENTS

TDY

DATE

OMS SIGNATURE

FOR OTHER ACTIONS

REQUESTED ACTION	QUAL	COND QUAL	DEFER	DISQUAL
TDY Stdby	XX			

OMS ASSIGNABILITY CODE 2B

EXAMINATION FACILITY 1A

COMMENTS

Expires 1 November 1978.

7 January 1977
William T. Golder, OMS/PEO

Nov 23 - 0845

DATE

OMS SIGNATURE

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

(SCREENED AREAS WILL BE COMPLETED BY OMS)

OMS DATE ▨	1. REQUEST DATE *(DA-MO-YR)*	2.	APPLICANT - HAS APPLICANT PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN BY OMS ☐ YES ☐ NO
			DEPENDENT(S) ☐ EMPLOYEE
3. NAME *(Last, First, Middle)*	4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	5. CHART NO. ▨	6. DOB *(DA-MO-YR)*
7. SEX	8. GRADE	9. AFFILIATION CD	10. DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIVISION
11. EMP. EXT. 4112	12. POSITION TITLE		

COMPLETE 13-19 FOR EACH DEPENDENT TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN WITH EMPLOYEE ONLY IF 2 IS CHECKED "DEPENDENT(S)"

13. DEPENDENT NAME *(L-F-M)*	14. SOC SEC NO.	15. CHART NO.	16. DOB *(DMY)*	17. SEX	18. RELATIONSHIP	19. DEPENDENT PREVIOUSLY SEEN BY OMS *(yes - no)*
		▨				

20. REQUESTED ACTION *(more than one action is acceptable)*

APPLICANT:	▨	PRE-EMPLOYMENT	▨	EOD		
ASSIGNMENTS:	☐	O/S PCS	STATION	ETD/ETA *(DA-MO-YR)*	NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN	
	☐	O/S TDY	TYPE COVER	POSITION		
	☐	O/S RETURNEE	☐	FITNESS FOR DUTY	☐	OTHER *(specify)*
	☐	O/S TDY STANDBY	☐	RETURN TO DUTY		
	☐	O/S PLANNING	☐	SPECIAL TRAINING		
SEPARATION:	☐	RETIREMENT	☐	MDR/CIARDS	☐	MDR/CSC
ROUTINE	☐	REGULAR ANNUAL	▨	EXECUTIVE ANNUAL	▨	MPT/PHE

21. COMMENTS

22. REQUESTING DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIV	23. ROOM/BLDG	24. EXTENSION	25. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER

FOR OMS USE ONLY

FOR APPLICANTS

☐ APPROVE PROCESSING FOR EOD

☐ HOLD PENDING RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL MEDICAL INFORMATION *(form letter attached)*

☐ REQUEST PRE-EMP. MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ OTHER *(see comments)*

COMMENTS

DATE OMS SIGNATURE

FOR OTHER ACTIONS

REQUESTED ACTION	QUAL	COND QUAL	DEFER	DISQUAL
BIANNUAL	XX			

OMS ASSIGNABILITY CODE 2B

EXAMINATION FACILITY HQ

COMMENTS

Next Bi-annual due 1 November 1979.

12 January 1978
James J. Graham, OMS/PEO

DATE OMS SIGNATURE

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION	OMS DATE	1. REQUEST DATE *(DA-MO-YR)* 8 May 78	2.	APPLICANT - HAS APPLICANT PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN BY OMS ☐ YES ☐ NO DEPENDENT(S) x EMPLOYEE

3. NAME *(Last, First, Middle)* Kent, William M.	4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 053-22-8472	[redacted]	6. DOB *(DA-MO-YR)* 9 May 29	7. SEX M

8. GRADE GS-15	9. AFFILIATION CD A11	10. DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIVISION DDO/OED/NOC	11. EMP. EXT. 4103	12. POSITION TITLE Operations Officer

COMPLETE 13-19 FOR EACH DEPENDENT TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN WITH EMPLOYEE ONLY IF 2 IS CHECKED "DEPENDENT(S)"

13. DEPENDENT NAME *(L-F-M)*	14. SOC SEC NO.	[redacted]	16. DOB *(DMY)*	17. SEX	18. RELATIONSHIP	19. DEPENDENT PREVIOUSLY SEEN BY OMS *(yes - no)*
		[redacted]				

20. REQUESTED ACTION *(more than one action is acceptable)*

APPLICANT:		PRE-EMPLOYMENT		EOD		
ASSIGNMENTS:		O/S PCS	STATION		ETD/ETA *(DA-MO-YR)*	NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY OR RETURN
		O/S TDY	TYPE COVER		POSITION	
		O/S RETURNEE		FITNESS FOR DUTY		OTHER *(specify)*
		O/S TDY STANDBY		RETURN TO DUTY		
		O/S PLANNING		SPECIAL TRAINING		
SEPARATION:	XX	RETIREMENT		MDR/CIARDS		MDR/CSC
ROUTINE		REGULAR ANNUAL		EXECUTIVE ANNUAL		MPT/PHE

21. COMMENTS

Mr. Kent is retiring effective 30 June 1978.

22. REQUESTING DIRECTORATE/OFFICE/DIV DDO/PCS/CSS/Personnel	23. ROOM/BLDG 1 D 4135 Hq	24. EXTENSION 7335	25. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER Robert F. O'Gahan

26. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

27. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

RETIREMENT XX

Retiree exam completed.

15 June 1978 James J. Graham PSD/OMS

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in thi declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*) Slaughter's Hotel 1625 16th Street N.W. Washington, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH 5/9/29

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*) Milan, Italy

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY Paul Kent

(B) RELATIONSHIP Father

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE 2448 Washington Ave. New York 58, New York

(D) TELEPHONE NO. CYpress 8-6

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled

8. Authorized instructions which you receive from CIA in briefing, training, or in any other way are a part of this memorandum of agreement and are incorporated herein to the extent that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

9. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with the Foreign Service of any status with the Foreign Service based on your services performed with that organization at the request of CIA.

10. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by CIA from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage law, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with CIA will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Patricia H Keefe
Personnel Office

Date: 22 July 58

ACCEPTED:

William M. Kent

Date: 22 July 1958

APPROVED:
G. M. STEWART
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

BY

Date: 22 July 58

with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of the Foreign Service. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of the Foreign Service except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with CIA regulations.

4. You are entitled by this agreement to the payment of a post differential and allowances, based upon your CIA or Foreign Service salary rate, whichever is greater. Payment of your salary, post differential and allowances by the Foreign Service will be full compensation for your services when the total amount is equal to or greater than that payable by CIA. Otherwise, the balance will be paid directly to you by CIA in a manner designated by you in writing and acceptable to CIA. The schedule of allowances applicable to your grade (CIA and Foreign Service) and post of duty are subject to unilateral adjustment by the Government.

5. Your status as a CIA employee will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with the Foreign Service, and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits, and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. All annual and sick leave which will have accrued to your credit at the time of integration into the Foreign Service will be held by CIA pending your transfer from the Foreign Service to CIA. While assigned to the Foreign Service you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, statutory leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of that organization. Upon completion of your integration in the Foreign Service your accrued leave will normally be transferred to your credit with CIA. If security conditions require that you be given a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount of any such lump-sum payment to the CIA at the time of your reinstatement including any withholding tax deducted by the Foreign Service.

b. Upon your integration in the Foreign Service, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six percent).

6. If the CIA considers it undesirable for you to continue the use of your Foreign Service cover, your services will be utilized whenever possible in some other appropriate capacity as designated by CIA, unless the circumstances are such as to warrant your termination for cause.

7. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with CIA rules and regulations.

C S

INTEGREE AGREEMENT

Mr. William M. Kent
Washington, D. C.

Dear **Mr. Kent**

This is a memorandum of agreement between you and the United States Government in regard to your employment by CIA. It is hereby mutually agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of CIA, at the present grade and salary of **GS-11 $7270** per annum, you will accept cover employment in the Foreign Service effective as of **23 July 58**. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to CIA, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of the Foreign Service in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to the Foreign Service is being effected at the class of **FSR-7** and salary of **$6435** per annum.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of **two** (**2**) years from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of CIA, and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by CIA in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of the Foreign Service. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by the Agency to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause either by the Foreign Service or CIA before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by the Agency to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause either by the Foreign Service or CIA before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent

Part III.—**DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS.** *(Complete for noncompetitive hires based on competitive status as quired by instructions in FPM Chapter S2.)* Employee has a competitive status. This determination is based upon the follow evidence:

NAME OF AGENCY	SIGNATURE AND OFFICIAL TITLE	DATE

PART IV.—DETERMINATION OF CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	TOTAL SERVICE *(Item 12)*	NONCREDITABLE SERVICE *(Item 13)*	CREDITABLE SERVICE *(Leave Purposes)*	ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE *(Present Agency)*	LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE *(Leave Purposes)*	SERVICE CO PUTATION D *(Leave Purp*
Years				52	1	50
Months				1	5	7
Days				2	24	8

PART V.—DETERMINATION OF CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES. ***(Complete onl those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditabl leave purposes.)***

	TOTAL SERVICE *(Item 12)*	NONCREDITABLE SERVICE *(Item 14)*	CREDITABLE SERVICE *(RIF Purposes)*	ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE *(Present Agency)*	LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE *(RIF Purposes)*	SERVICE CO PUTATION D *(RIF Purpo*
Years						
Months						
Days						

* Enter as the "Service Computation Date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF 7

REMARKS:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—66489-3

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1954
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1, R3, AND S2

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): KENT, WILLIAM M.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 MAY 1929

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	1952	JAN.	2				
SCD 7/3/50 verified 10/24/5[7]							

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U.S. ARMY	1946	OCT.	6	1948	MAR.	24	HONORABLE

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
- A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
- B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
- C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

5 Oct. 1956
(DATE)

William M. Kent
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 5th day of Oct (MONTH) 19 56 at Wash., D. C. (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

Keith E. Griffin

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
48	12	29
46	10	6
1	5	23

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 1 5 24

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

(*OVER*)

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1959

Dear Shef:

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for the outstanding help of the officers of your agency in Caracas, Venezuela to our protection detail during the recent inauguration of President Betancourt.

Specific mention should be made of Messrs. Jacob Esterline, William Patterson, and William Kent, whose untiring efforts were in no small way responsible for the safety of the U.S. delegation.

As always, it has been a pleasure to work with you and members of your agency, and we look forward to doing so again in the future.

Sincerely yours,

Tom

E. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security

Colonel Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

William M. - Dorothy B. Kent
Citizens National Bank of Herndon, Herndon, Va.
Republic Bank and Trust Co~~x~~., Herndon, Va.
Herndon Savings & Loan, Herndon, Va.

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Notify parents in case of emergency only if unable to contact wife within reasonable amount of time.

" changes made 20 July '66 "

SIGNED AT Hqs	DATE 7 April 1964	SIGNATURE William M. Kent

CONFIDENTIAL

TAR

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(Last)* Kent *(First)* William *(Middle)* Morris

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 058 22 8472

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED: New York, N.Y.

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. *(If appointed abroad)*:

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: Herndon, Va.

HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: Same

2. MARITAL STATUS *(Check one)*

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: New York, N.Y.

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 17 May 1952

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:

DATE OF DECREE:

IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED:

DATE SPOUSE DIED:

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State)*	TELEPHONE NO.	
Dorothy B. Kent	189 Van Buren St. Herndon, Va.	(703)437-3018	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
William M., Jr.	same	M	6 Sept 1953
Paul E.	same	M	6 Sept 1954
Karen A.	same	F	12 Dec 1955
NAME OF FATHER *(Or male guardian)*	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
Paul Kent	2448 Washington Ave. N.Y. 58, N.Y.	WE 3-4424	
NAME OF MOTHER *(Or female guardian)*	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
Beatrice Kent	same	same	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
Wife

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME *(Mr., Mrs., Miss)* *(Last-First-Middle)*: ~~Mrs. Kent, Dorothy Bernadette~~ FATHER (NOT WITTING)

RELATIONSHIP: ~~[illegible]~~

HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State)*: ~~189 Van Buren Street, Herndon, Va.~~

HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: ~~[illegible]~~

BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State)* AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: ~~Republic Bank & Trust Co., Herndon, Va.~~

BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION: ~~[illegible]~~

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? *(If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)*
Yes
YES ~~X~~ NO X

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? *(If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)*
YES ~~X~~ NO X

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? *(If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)*
YES ~~X~~ NO X

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

8 - DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: William M. Kent WK

SUBJECT : Commendation

You were mentioned particularly as one who performed your duties with distinction in support of the mission outlined in Project JMATE. Your cooperation, enthusiasm and the untiring application of your experience and knowledge with confidence and conviction has been a real credit to you and to your office. Even though you may have been subjected to disappointments and personal inconveniences, you gave more than is normally expected and your performance and contribution is worthy of special praise.

Thank you personally for this contribution.

JCKing
J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

4. While consideration has been given Mr. Kent with regard to an Honor and Merit Award, it appears more appropriate that he be granted a Quality Step Increase.

by Jacob D. Esterline
William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Secretary, CS Panel Section B

3 June 1966
Date

CONCUR:

Michael G. Mitchell
for DDP/OP

6 June 1966
Date

APPROVED:

for John J. Caldwell
Director of Personnel

7 June 66
Date

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1949)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, WILLIAM M. KENT, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

2 January 1952
(Date of entrance on duty)

William M. Kent
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 2nd day of January, A. D. 19 52,

at WASHINGTON, D. C.
(City) (State)

[SEAL]

Robert J. Hayes
(Signature of officer)

Appt Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

6. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of CIA. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by Civil Service rules and regulations.

J Mulcahy
Official authorized to sign letters of appointment.

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by CIA.

William M. Kent
Employee

2 Jan. 1952
Date

Form No. 51-104
June 1948

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Date 2 January 52

Dear WILLIAM M. KENT

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective

Position: ADMIN. CLERK

Base Salary: GS-5 $3410.

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave in accordance with Civil Service Commission rules and regulations, or such other provisions of law or regulations as may be established in lieu thereof.

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with CIA Regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside continental United States, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by CIA Regulations.

3. As a condition of your employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the continental United States. Each time you are so assigned, unless otherwise specified in advance by CIA, you will be required to remain at the post to which assigned for a period of 24 months from the date of arrival thereat, unless sooner transferred, reassigned or separated for reasons beyond your control. If you wish to return to the United States for personal reasons during that period, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

4. If this employment is for assignment to an overseas post, it is understood and agreed that, unless earlier separated for reasons beyond your control, you will remain in Government service for 12 months after your arrival at your first overseas post, and if you violate this agreement, any money expended by the United States on account of your travel and the transportation of your immediate family and household goods will be considered a debt due to the United States.

5. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of six months from date of employment. In the event

6. If you should receive any sums required under the terms of this letter of appointment from or through your cover instrumentality, such sums will be used to offset amounts due and payable by CIA. Sums thus received through your cover instrumentality are acknowledged and agreed to be payment by CIA within the provisions of this letter of appointment.

7. Your employment under this letter of appointment is subject to the availability of the appropriations for the functions of CIA. Upon termination of your cover employment, you will revert to normal staff employee status upon the effective date of the termination of your employment hereunder, unless for good and sufficient cause, such as misconduct or demonstrated incompetence, such reversion would be opposed to the efficiency and best interests of CIA. The termination of this appointment will not release you from the provisions of any security oaths you will be required to take.

8. Authorized instructions from CIA received by you in briefing or training will be deemed a part of this letter of appointment and are incorporated herein to the extent that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

9. Any additional provisions or arrangements will be contained in supplemental documents.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Personnel Division, Covert

ACCEPTED: [redacted]

Kent, William Morris

S E C R E T

Security Information

[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

[redacted] Washington, D. C. Sent, William Morris

1. Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 5.2 of the Confidential Funds Regulations, you are hereby appointed an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency in the capacity of a staff agent at a salary of $ 3795.00 grade GS- 6

This appointment will be effective 10 June 1952.

If security considerations permit, appropriate deductions will be made for retirement and withholding tax purposes. In any event, it shall be your responsibility to report income received from CIA hereunder in accordance with existing Federal income tax laws and regulations.

2. The conditions of your employment will be in accordance with established CIA procedures for an employee of similar grade and salary provided, however, that where necessary, in the interests of preserving your cover and the security of CIA, established procedures will not be followed in all details. However, there will be substantial compliance with such procedures. Termination of this appointment will be in accordance with established procedures.

3. Where authorized, you will receive living-quarters and cost-of-living allowances, travel and transportation expenses and other emoluments of your position with CIA. You will account for such allowances, travel, and operational expenses in substantial compliance with CIA regulations or the established policies of your cover facility whichever is directed by CIA.

4. For the purpose of your employment hereunder, you will be required to accept employment or adopt necessary cover other than with CIA in a manner directed by CIA. In the event the circumstances of your cover are altered to such an extent that CIA deems it undesirable to continue further use by you of such cover, it is intended that your services will be continued by CIA in some other appropriate capacity or position.

5. a. If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by CIA to evidence this relationship.

b. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way appear to amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

S E C R E T

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

Date: 6 June 1952

Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

1. In accordance with the policy of this agency, it is understood and agreed by me that I shall be required to serve a minimum term of two years from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, unless terminated by the Government for its convenience. If the assignment is terminated at my request in less than twenty-four months, the following shall prevail:

(a) If I resign in less than twelve months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses involved in the transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the foreign station, and pay all such expenses for return to the United States.

(b) If I resign between the twelfth and twenty-fourth month from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects and automobile to the United States.

2. Part (a) above shall not apply to employees who have served in a departmental position with CIA or who have served an overseas tour of duty with CIA, and in such case part (b) only shall apply, amended to read: "If I desire to terminate or return to the United States prior to the expiration of twenty-four months from the date of my arrival at my overseas post of duty, I shall pay all expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my immediate family, household goods, and personal effects to the United States".

/[redacted]

Witness:
Ernest W. Ryan

Kent, William Morris

SECRET
Security Information

Secty: King
Dahlgren
Dauzelberger
Newton + Lynell

FORM NO. 51-53
Dec. 1947
Replaces Form No. 55-2 which
may continue to be used.

CONFIDENTIAL

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 5 WILL BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE. TYPEWRITER WILL BE USED IF POSSIBLE.

1. NAME (PRINTED) LAST FIRST MIDDLE [redacted]	CAF RATING GS-7	SALARY $4205	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT TO PRESENT DUTY 16 June 1952

[redacted] DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Agent at the Air Travel Control Field Office at Tocumen International Airport, maintaining all water travel control on both the atlantic and pacific sides of the Isthmus, writing general operational reports and the monthly satellite travel reports, performing surveillances and acting as cut out for HYADIZ.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED.

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.

	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
Spanish	X			X			X		
Italian	X			X			X		
French			X			X			X
German			X			X			X

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Operations Officer	Panama
"	Mexico
"	Cuba
"	Guatemala

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRAIGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

8 June 1954
DATE

Kent, William Morris

[redacted]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

6. SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT DATE FROM 1 June 53 DATE TO 31 May 54

OCCASION FOR REPORT ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES Intelligence Officer O Operation after Headquarters training.

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION?

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK 'NOT OBSERVED' ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE					X		
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						X	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE					X		
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION					X		
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT					X		
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP					X		
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						X	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU - DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☒ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☐

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR [redacted]COMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

Corbuston [redacted]s reliable, willing and dependable and has done an excellent job at the airport.

Corb

~~Report prepared by Reingruber because~~ [redacted]~~s immediate supervisor is on home leave.~~

7. Your employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of 12 months from the date of employment. In the event either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be considered for other types of available employment for which you are suited, or your employment will be terminated.

8. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and available funds permit.

Ruth E. Griffin
Office of Personnel

I accept the above agreement as a
condition of my employment by CIA.

William M. Kent
(Employee)

5 October 1952
(Date)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Date **5 Oct 1956**

Dear **Mr. Kent:**

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective **8 October 1956.**

Position: **Area Ops Officer**

Base Salary: **$6390.00 per annum**

2. You will be entitled to receive annual and sick leave, retirement coverage and such other employee benefits as may be provided by Agency regulations or applicable Federal laws and regulations.

3. As a condition of your employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the continental United States. Each time you are so assigned, the duration of the tour of duty will be prescribed in advance and will normally consist of a period of 24 months. You will be required to serve the prescribed period of the overseas tour of duty from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty unless this tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience or it is terminated for circumstances that are considered by the Agency to be beyond your control.

4. If you terminate your assignment at an overseas post of duty for reasons within your control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at the overseas post of duty, it is understood and agreed that you will be liable for reimbursing CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred by the Government in the transportation of yourself, your dependents, household effects and automobile to your overseas post of duty, and you will pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

5. It is further understood and agreed that if you terminate your overseas assignment for reasons within your control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of your prescribed tour of duty, you will pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of yourself, your dependents, household effects and automobile to the United States.

6. If you wish to return to the United States for personal reasons during your overseas tour of duty, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this eclaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a riminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

RESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*): 2608 N. WINCHESTER ST. - ARLINGTON 13, VIRGINIA

) DATE OF BIRTH: 9 MAY 1929

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*): MILAN, ITALY

) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY	(B) RELATIONSHIP	(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE	(D) TELEPHONE NO.
DOROTHY B. KENT	WIFE	SEE #1, ABOVE	JE 3-3899

ES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN HE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO

so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. *If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.*

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATION-SHIP	MAR-RIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

NDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR ICIPALITY? *our answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
OU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF MBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR ER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *our answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, t is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary nvoluntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of rement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, tired from military or naval service.*		X
E YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATIS-ORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *our answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address mployer, date and reason in each case.*		X
YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR H YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *our answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense iolation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the alty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. ppointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY
	HAVE YOU RECEIVED OR DO YOU EXPECT TO RECEIVE, A LUMP-SUM PAYMENT FOR ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE UNDER PRIOR FEDERAL OR D. C. GOVERNMENT SERVICE?
	☐ YES ☑ NO
	HAS LEAVE PERIOD COVERED BY SUCH PAYMENT EXPIRED?
	☐ YES ☑ NO

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall ine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance e Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and Congress pertaining to appointment.

form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in con- with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the ng:

dentity of appointee.—It is the duty of the appointing officer to against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the tee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The tee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written exami- the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on laration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical ance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee so be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous ents.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—58160-2

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) Washington, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, William M. Kent, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

8 Oct 1956 (Date of entrance on duty)

William M. Kent (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 8th day of October, A. D. 1956,

at Washington (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

5 USC 16 & 16a

Ruth E. Griffin (Signature of officer)

Appt Clerk (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—55160-2

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

5 DEC 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: William M. Kent

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 27 December 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Career Service Staff
Office of Personnel

9 JAN 1957

Noted:

William M. Kent

Date: 18 December 1956

o. 511. 1 APR 55

(4)

20 DEC 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

ATTENTION : DDP/OP

SUBJECT : Request for Quality Step Increase (HR 20-37), Mr. William M. Kent, GS-13

1. On the basis of the information presented below, it is recommended that a Quality Step Increase be approved for Mr. William M. Kent.

2. Mr. Kent has made a most valuable contribution to the Covert Action mission of this Division. On occasion of the discovery of a Cuban arms cache in Venezuela in November 1963, of the January 1964 riots in Panama, of the April 1965 revolution in the Dominican Republic, of many other crises and situations which have developed, Mr. Kent immediately took the initiative within and outside this Division for the initiation and coordination of Covert Action efforts to safeguard the U.S. image and support U.S. objectives in each case; this, of course, without neglecting his other, routine, day-to-day responsibilities. Mr. Kent has been energetic, imaginative, and professional in his work to a degree much beyond that normally found or expected. He speaks excellent Spanish, and this has been an essential ingredient in his critical abilities in the handling of his assigned tasks.

3. Mr. Kent has been with the WH Division's Covert Action Staff since 1963. In 1964, he attended the Mid-career Executive Development Course No. 4. He has consistently maintained a very high level of competence, conscientious application, and strong dedication to his duties. In this connection, despite an illness which lasted from December 1964 to July 1965, he took only two days of sick leave and did not allow his work performance to suffer. There is every reason to believe that Mr. Kent's exceptional proficiency and effectiveness will continue.

SECRET

16 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Head, Clandestine Services Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - William M. Kent

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. As this award is designed to encourage excellence by recognizing and rewarding the employee, may I ask that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

for Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
O & 1 - C/WH Division
1 - C/CSPS
1 - OPF - KENT
1 - D/Pers Chrono
1 - C/PD

OP/DD/RP/PD/JJCaldwell:ksd (16 June 1966)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Dear Mr [redacted] Kent

In view of your contemplated cover assignment, you have been designated a Staff Agent. The purpose of this Supplement is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are so designated and to set forth certain rights and obligations incident to your status as an appointed employee.

1. Payroll Administration. As indicated in your Staff Agent Personnel Action, your present salary and grade are $14,[redacted] 666 .00 per annum and GS-13 5, respectively. As an appointed employee of the Government you are entitled to receive and retain only the salary, allowances and other benefits applicable to that status. However, certain procedural variations will be followed to preserve the security of your cover position.

(a) The gross emoluments that you receive from your cover activities will be retained by you as an offset against the gross emoluments due you from this organization. If cover emoluments ever exceed those due you from this organization, the overage is to be remitted to this organization on a monthly basis, unless a different period is specified.

(b) Your Federal income taxes will be withheld and reported in conformance with R 20-661 or any subsequent regulations or procedures promulgated by this organization. For your information, this organization shall withhold from the gross payments due you, Federal income taxes in an amount which, when added to the income taxes withheld by your cover facility, will equal the tax withholdings normally made from your gross taxable compensation with this organization. Taxes will be withheld from the differential due you by this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make tax remittances in conformance with HB 20-661-1.

(c) This organization will deduct from the gross payments due you an amount equivalent to six and one-half per cent (6 1/2%) of your gross salary for contribution to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. This amount will be deducted from the differential due you by this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make direct remittances to this organization in satisfaction of the required contributions. The Agency will not reimburse you for mandatory social security deductions required by virtue of your cover employment.

2. Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay. You are hereby authorized Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay in conformance with applicable organizational policies and issuances. For your information, currently this premium pay is ten per cent of your base salary and represents additional taxable compensation to you.

3. Place of Assignment. This Supplement is predicated upon a domestic PCS assignment under non-Governmental cover. Any deviation therefrom will require a new Supplement or an amendment hereto.

4. Security. [illegible] and all information [illegible] writing by the Government [illegible] lation of such [illegible] Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and [illegible] laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Don H. Luetscher
Personnel Officer

OHC.

S-E-C-R-E-T

AMENDMENT TO

Employee

SUPPLEMENT TO STAFF [redacted] PERSONNEL ACTION

FOR [redacted] Kent William M

[redacted] William M Kent

Dear [redacted] Mr. Kent

Reference is made to your Staff [redacted] Supplement, effective 31 July 1966.

Effective 30 July 1967 your authorization to receive nonofficial cover premium pay is terminated. As of that date, your Staff [redacted] Supplement is amended by deleting therefrom paragraph two (2).

All other terms and conditions of the Supplement remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Dan K. Luetzke

Personnel Officer

20 July 1966
Date

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT I AM AWARE OF THE PROVISIONS OF HANDBOOK 20-4, DATED 7 OCTOBER 196~~3~~4 CONCERNING THE PERSONAL CONDUCT OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES.

William M. Kent
[redacted]
Signature [redacted]
[redacted]

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN) [redacted] DoD

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE Kent, William M

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID < • 2	2. APPL. NO. 6-DIGITS •	3. NAME MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR •	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4 LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR •	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	> WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO-LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 5	• 059198	• COR	• C	• BK50	3	1	3	0	1	4	58

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST			
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR	> DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.
• BK50	7	0	7	0	0	4	67	• 02	02	67	7 APR 1967

30 MAR 1967

The authorization to process this employee's disclaim of proficiency in the language factors indicated on this form is contained in a memorandum on file and designated "Language Proficiency Disclaim File", located in the Qualifications Analysis Branch, Office of Personnel.

5A

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) [redacted]	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) /29	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY Kent, William M.	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print) William M Kent

[redacted]

DATE 21 March 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

APR 1 10 11 AM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) KENT WILLIAM M.	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) 5-9-29	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 058 22 8472
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED AN "ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE"? ☐ YES ☐ NO

If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one. (See Instructions for Employees on page 4.)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
William M. Kent

DATE
March 30, 1970

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

[illegible]

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
APRIL 1968
FPM Supplement 870-1
176-102

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I would very much like to continue in my present duties, dealing with varied nationalities and having a wide range of operational opportunities. Should a circumstance develop for Washington Base involvement in Covert Action work, particularly political action, I would like to be a part of it. My preference would also lie in continuing in my present [redacted] status and cover arrangement indefinitely.

Employee

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE)

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HQDTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY; INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION; INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

☒ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Washington Base concurs with [redacted] request that he remain in his present assignment for another tour.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

DO Division concurs in Subject's, and Base's, desire for another tour at Washington Base. Subject has been an effective case officer and his effectiveness should be still greater by virtue of his accumulated experience in the Base area.

DATE 1 May 69 TITLE DCDO/I SIGNATURE Stanley H. Gaines
Stanley H. Gaines

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT: 2nd tour approved.

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-338 DATED: 26 May 69

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: Charles B. Redmond (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

William M. Kent DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) [redacted]	DATE (from item S-1) 12 Feb. 1969	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) John G. Shaffer, Jr.	DATE (from item S-2) 12 Feb. 1969
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 17 February 1969	DISPATCH NUMBER: TM 198253 12 Feb. 1969	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1929	2. SERVICE DESIGN D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Ops Officer - GS-14/3	4. STATION OR BASE DO BASE WASHINGTON	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER WUINDIAN

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 1 August 1967	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

4 dependents, ages 38, 15, 14, 13

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

Educational facilities for my children and medical facilities for my wife.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (*see special note on transmittal form*). (*also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8*)

- - Initiate and develop contacts and operations in the Washington diplomatic and foreign press communities, encompassing all the major world geographical areas.

- - Handle recruited agents resident in the Washington area.

- - Establish and maintain self in commercial cover role. Perform cover duties.

- - Prepare operational correspondence and conduct routine administrative tasks.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

FORM 5-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

4. Mr. Kent has a first rate mind, a unique flair for SA operations, and unusual language capabilities. During the Chilean crisis period he demonstrated his dedication to duty, working eleven or twelve hours a day without complaint, and his ability to make effective use of his exceptional professional talents and experience while simultaneously exercising sound judgment and leadership in his management of Branch affairs.

5. In view of Mr. Kent's outstanding performance under tense and trying circumstances it is strongly recommended that he be granted a QSI.

David A. Phillips
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Chairman, DDO/QSI Panel — 15 Jan 74 Date

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel — 31 JAN 1974 Date

20 DEC 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, QSI Honor and Merit Award Panel

SUBJECT: Request for QSI:
William M. Kent, GS-14

1. It is recommended that Mr. William M. Kent be granted a Quality Step Increase in recognition of his outstanding performance as Chief of the SA Section and Acting Deputy Branch Chief of WH/6 during the tension-filled days which preceded and followed the Chilean military coup of 11 September 1973. The nature of Mr. Kent's service to the Agency during this period has been described more fully in his most recent fitness report, which evaluated his overall performance as "Outstanding."

2. Mr. Kent served as Acting Deputy Branch Chief of WH/6 for five months, from mid-June to mid-November 1973, while concurrently continuing to direct the large and important Chilean covert action program with exceptional competence. Mr. Kent thus was handling two exacting jobs simultaneously during the entire coup period. This was a time of particular tension for the Branch, since developments in Chile were of international importance and generated almost daily requests for special papers and briefings for top U.S. Government leaders. Mr. Kent performed at a consistently high level in both his SA and managerial capacities: his propaganda and political action guidance was timely, imaginative and effective, while his managerial decisions as provisional head of a 15-man branch reflected sound judgment and an across-the-board foundation in clandestine operations.

3. A self-reliant and exceptionally talented SA officer, Mr. Kent was personally responsible for the creation and implementation of two successful Division programs -- one in the political action and one in the propaganda field -- which have made an important contribution to the achievement of U.S. policy objectives with regard to Chile. These programs are being continued even though Mr. Kent has now left the Branch to handle an exacting new staff assignment.

E2, IMPDET
CL BY 024345

SECRET
EYES ONLY

3 November 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Commendation - Mr. William Kent

1. Mr. Kent was assigned to a high priority Task Force in WH Division from 21 September through 30 October.

2. During this period Mr. Kent assisted in the preparation of propaganda material and was in charge of black operations. Based on his knowledge of the Cuban Intelligence Service and Cuban modus operandi, Mr. Kent prepared several highly imaginative black operations and provided much needed advice to the Task Force on this subject. The biographic material he pulled together on a major proponent of our little drama was of exceptional value and was delivered to several U. S. as well as foreign newsmen who made extensive use of it. Mr. Kent is a well trained and resourceful Clandestine Service Operator whose work showed the stamp of professionalism and whose attitude was marked by a deep interest in his work. Mr. Kent is to be commended for his efforts on the behalf of the Task Force and for the unusual talent he brought to the job.

3. A copy of this commendation will be placed in Mr. Kent's personnel file.

William V. Broe
William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

EYES ONLY
SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES SEMINAR

Student: Kent, Willaim M.
Dates: 30 June - 2 July 1975

Employee Number: 059198
Office: PS

Service Designation: D

COURSE OBJECTIVES:

Upon completion of this Seminar, the participant should be able to:

1) Understand the evolution of the MBO concept.

2) Identify the elements of MBO and understand their utility.

3) Understand how MBO has been applied in certain large organizations.

4) Understand the major characteristics of the management system now used within each Directorate, particularly within his own Directorate.

5) Define significant differences and common traits in the practice of MBO among the Directorates of the Agency.

6) Describe actions which might be taken to improve and strengthen the application of MBO within the Agency.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD:

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the Seminar.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

Instructor
3 July 1975
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

S E C R E T

5 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Commendation of Mr. William Kent

During the last five months I have turned to Mr. Kent on two occasions to help the Latin America Division in connection with Senate Select Committee's investigation of covert action in Chile. When confronted with a need to produce a paper on Chile in a short timeframe, I instinctively turned to him. It was not only because he had expertise on Chile, due to service in the Chile Branch, but because he is highly skilled in written presentation. He organizes his material well and presents it in a lucid, highly readable manner. On the first occasion, he helped us prepare a paper that was eventually used by the Director in his presentation before the Senate Select Committee on 14-15 July. On the second occasion his contribution was used by the DDO in his appearance before the Senate Select Committee on 28 October. Both of these papers were excellent and have withstoood critical scrutiny.

Aside from Mr. Kent's ability to write I would like to take this occasion to record my overall high esteem for Mr. Kent as a professional and as a person. I have always considered him to be one of our more able and promising officers. His dedication is exemplary; he has spent untold extra hours of his time carrying out his duties. He has good judgment and common sense. Mr. Kent has a very attractive personality and excellent personal presence. From all standpoints he is an excellent officer that deserves to move ahead in the organization. I am convinced he has the ability and potential to do so.

signed
Raymond A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren
Deputy Chief
Latin America Division

cc: ✓C/CMG/NOC
C/LA/PEMS

S E C R E T

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009560

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

MANAGEMENT COMMUNICATION COURSE
(40 hrs., full-time)

STUDENT: William M. Kent

EMPLOYEE NO: 059198

SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

OFFICE : CMG

DATES ATTENDED: 24-28 January 1977

COURSE OBJECTIVES-CONTENT AND METHODS

The Management Communication Course is designed to enable students to improve managerial performance by applying communication theory and principles to daily management activity; use interpersonal communication techniques to deal more effectively with superiors, peers, and subordinates; identify and use management communication source/resource personnel within the Agency; and assess the effectiveness of communication within an organizational component.

The content of the course is presented with the use of TV, films, and relevant exercises supplementing group and individual participation. Current theory and practical application are stressed.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Charles E. Coughlin 31 JAN 1977

Chief Instructor Date

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAINING REPORT

OFFICE OF TRAINING

FUNCTIONAL TRAINING DIVISION

This certifies that William M. Kent (059198) has completed the two day Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Seminar for Supervisors held 17-18 August 1976. At the conclusion of this two-day session, each participant will be able to describe the following:

a) The EEO Program and reasons for its existence;

b) A supervisor's responsibility in implementing the program;

c) The procedures for processing EEO complaints;

d) The Agency's past record and the Agency's Affirmative Action Plans; and

e) The significance of Upward Mobility, Federal Women's, and Hispanic Programs in the overall EEO Program.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Donald R. Heady
DONALD R. HEADY
Course Administrator

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (*Last-First-Middle*) Kent, William M.	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* Self	CLAIM NUMBER 77-0324

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 1/17/77.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 2/9/77	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE Ernest L. Hardt

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 11-72 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

(4-21-35)

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING

FILE [illegible]

DATE 7 July 1978

TO: Retirement Operations Branch
Office of Personnel

RETIREE William M. Kent

CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Central Cover Staff the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT	☐	CIVIL SERVICE	☒	CIARDS	DATE 30 June 1978				
COVER	☒	OVERT ROUTINE	☐	COVERT *(OFFICIAL COVER)* LOCK-UP	☐	COVERT *(NOC)* SPECIAL	**RETENTION OF AWARDS** ☒	YES	☐ NO
CORRESPONDENCE	☒	OVERT	☐	COVERT	☐	THRU CCS			

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE	☒	U.S. GOV'T. CHECK			☐	OTHER *(Payment instructions follow)*
TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE	☒	CIA	☐	CSC	☐	OTHER *(MEMO FOLLOWS)*
REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION	☒	YES	☐	NO	☐	INTERNAL TRANSFER

INSURANCE

FEGLI	☒	OVERT	☐	COVERT	☐ MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD: GEHA

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE	☒	YES	☐ CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE	☐	YES	☐	NO	☒	OVERT	☐ COVERT
CREDIT UNION	☒	OVERT	☐	COVERT			

REMARKS:

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH
CENTRAL COVER STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

______________________ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FORM 7-77 3429 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 063851 (4-9-13)

7 - OFF. PERS. FILE ROOM

GS-6	$3795 p.a.	16 June 1952

2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SINCE LAST EFFICIENCY REPORT. (LIST MOST RECENT FIRST. DESCRIBE CONCISELY BUT FULLY)

Establishing and maintaining a tentative travel control system in the Darien District of Panama for travel through the Panama-Colombia frontier. Agent at the Air Travel Control Field Office at Tocumen National Airport. Performing surveillances and conducting investigations. Writing reports.

3. IF COURSES OF INSTRUCTION WERE COMPLETED DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, LIST TITLE, LOCATION OF SCHOOL, LENGTH OF COURSE AND DATE COMPLETED.

4. PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANG.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
Spanish	x			x			x		
Italian	x			x			x		
French			x			x			x
German			x			x			x

5. MY PREFERENCE FOR NEXT DUTY AFTER TERMINATION OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS: (IF IN US-SO STATE)

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Operations Officer	Mexico
Operations Officer	Cuba
Operations Officer	Guatemala

(LIST ONE OR MORE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE)

6. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS SINCE ORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT OR LAST REPORT - WHICHEVER IS LATER?

MARITAL STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE ☐ YES ☒ NO LEGAL ADDRESS ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS YES, ATTACH A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT IN DUPLICATE HERETO. IN THE CASE OF MARRIAGE, THE REPORT WILL INCLUDE NAMES, ADDRESSES, AND CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE, FATHER-IN-LAW, MOTHER-IN-LAW, BROTHERS-IN-LAW AND SISTERS-IN-LAW.

5 June 1953
DATE

Kent, William Morris
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTIONS 7 THROUGH 11 TO BE COMPLETED BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

DATE FROM: 16 Sept.52 DATE TO: 31 May 53

OCCASION FOR REPORT
ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT OF REPORTING OFFICER ☐ PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON ☐ COVERING INITIAL 90 DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT ☐

8. IS THIS EMPLOYEE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM ALL PRESENT DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IS EMPLOYEE BETTER QUALIFIED FOR OTHER DUTIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF SO, WHAT DUTY OR DUTIES Intell. Off. - Operations after Headquarters' training

DO YOU CONCUR IN EMPLOYEES DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES UNDER SECTION 2? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, EXPLAIN IN SECTION 11

HAS EMPLOYEE STRIVEN FOR PROFESSIONAL IMPROVEMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO DO YOU RECOMMEND EMPLOYEE FOR PROMOTION? ☒ YES ☒ NO IF SO, TO WHAT GRADE AND FOR WHAT POSITION? GS-7

9. FOR EACH FACTOR OBSERVED CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE HOW THE EMPLOYEE COMPARES WITH ALL OTHERS OF THE SAME CLASSIFICATION WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES ARE KNOWN TO YOU PERSONALLY. DO NOT LIMIT THIS COMPARISON TO THE OTHERS NOW UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. DO NOT HESITATE TO MARK 'NOT OBSERVED' ON ANY QUALITY WHEN APPROPRIATE.

RATING FACTORS	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
A. ABILITY TO WORK AND GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE					X		
B. INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM IN WORK						X	
C. SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS						X	
D. ABILITY TO GRASP INSTRUCTIONS AND PLANS						X	
E. ATTENTION TO DUTY						X	
F. JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE					X		
G. ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS AND GET THINGS DONE						X	
H. DISCRETION					X		
I. INITIATIVE						X	
J. ABILITY TO HANDLE AND DIRECT PEOPLE.					X		
K. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTIES (ITEM 2)						X	
L. ABILITY TO EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION						X	
M. TACT					X		
N. SAGACITY (NON-GULLIBILITY)						X	
O. LEADERSHIP					X		
P. PHYSICAL STAMINA						X	
Q. MENTAL STAMINA						X	

10. INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD HAVING THIS EMPLOYEE UNDER YOUR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION. WOULD YOU -

DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM? ☐ PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM? ☐ BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM? ☒ PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM? ☐

11. ENTER HERE ANY DESIRED REMARKS PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO THE EVALUATION OF THIS EMPLOYEE. OUTSTANDING ASSETS AND/OR SERIOUS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED ALSO REASONS FOR AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO REASSIGNMENT WILL BE GIVEN IF APPROPRIATE TO THIS REPORT.

(IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED ATACH EXTRA SHEET)

1 July 1953
DATE

(IF REVIEWING OFFICER OR CHIEF OF STATION DOES NOT CONCUR WITH THIS REPORT, EXCEPTIONS WILL BE STATED IN SPACE PROVIDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF)

Eldridge B. Crozier
SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER

L. T. Cady
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

No.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAR 7 9 40 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

AT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

1. Phases I, II, III.
2. CPO

HER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the port but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

IRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the rson has performed the duties of his job and rate m accordingly.

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME AREA? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

RECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade d type of assignment, how would you rate him on tentiality for assumption of greater responsibilies normally indicated by promotion.

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".									X					
29. TOUGH MINDED.									X					
30. OBSERVANT.									X					
31. CAPABLE.											X			
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.													X	
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.										X				
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.								X						
36. DELIBERATE.							X							
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.									X					
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X			
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.									X					
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.										X				
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.										X				
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.										X				
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.											X			

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

[redacted] has initiative to a high degree and takes pride in carrying out his duties well. He is keenly interested in inceasing his professional capabilities and shows considerable aptitude for this type of work.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

None outstanding.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAR 7 9 40 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.									X					
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.									X					
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.						X								
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.							X							
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.								X						
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.										X				
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.									X					
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.									X					
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA: CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.											X			
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.									X					
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.										X				
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.												X		
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.									X					
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.											X			
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.							X							
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.											X			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

WH

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:

1. *The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

Kent, William M

Roth 3/7/55

IT IS OPTIONAL [redacted] OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

[redacted]Agent)	1. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1929	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION FI Operations KUFIRE

4. GRADE GS-7b	5. STATION DESIGNATION *(Current)* Panama
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 November 1954	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* 1 June 1954 to 30 November 1954

SECTION II *(To be completed by field supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION Operations Officer	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 16 June 1952

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*

1. Navy liaison, including coverage and reporting of strategic materials transiting this area.
2. Water travel control, including reporting of satellite travel through this area, and assisting in air travel control.
3. Development of file material for CE leads and travel control check on persons of CE interest.
4. Cutout for one of the top CP penetrations in the area.
5. Occasional surveillances on persons of interest to the Mission.

POSTED ON
[illegible]

SECTION III *(To be completed at headquarters only)*

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER *(True)* Edward L. Anderson	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD *(True)* John H. Jenkins, Jr.
3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.	
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 21 JAN 19[illegible]	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES JCKing

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 JUL 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

No

CONT PERS DIV
FEB 23 3 41 PM '56

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 21 12 01 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

1. **World Communism**
2. **Anti-Communist Operations**

F. OTHER COMMENTS *(Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):*

Corbuston has demonstrated, amply, above-average aptitude for KUCAGE-type work.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS....REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

JUL 3 8 32 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).*
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 **Provides PP support and guidance to field**	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 **Has and uses language and area knowledge**	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 **Originates PP material and ideas for field**	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 **Prepares and handles Hqs.-field corresp. on PP and related matters**	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 **Co-ordinates with other Hqs. components on PP and related matters**	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 **Prepares project outlines, renewals etc.**	RATING NUMBER 5

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

A fertile ,imaginative mind combined with tremendous drive, good area knowledge and near fluency in Spanish, makes subject an ideal PP Ops officer for the WH area. He is a little too impetuous at times and somewhat "bullheaded" but both of these shortcomings can probably be attributed to his youth and vigor and should disappear with experience. Versatility is another factor in subject's favor as is dedication to job. His overall performance on the Cuban desk has been excellent.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KENT William M.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 May 1929
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/III
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer
7. GRADE: GS-11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 5 July 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 27 Dec 56 - 17 ~~Jun~~ May 57
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Subject out of country on extended TDY at time report prepared.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.

☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.

☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.

☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.

☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 19 June, 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: James B. ROLAND
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: C/WH/III/Ops

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
Posted Pos. Control Rw 8 JUL 1957
Reviewed by PDD Ka 7/8/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 30 June 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: R. N. DAHLGREN
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is a bright young officer who has made an outstanding contribution to the operations of the Station since his arrival on duty. He is unusually well motivated and energetic in his work. He has shown a high degree of imagination and intelligence in his direction of KUCAGE operations. He has handled his agents and other contacts in an exemplary fashion.

The only factor that has had to be discussed with Subject is his need for greater patience, tact and understanding in his dealings with fellow workers.

Subject has great potential which should not necessarily be limited to KUCAGE type activities. His abilities and attributes are of equal value to KUTUBE operations.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 22 3 21 PM '59
MAIL ROOM

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 1 December 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ William M. Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 1 December 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Jacob D. Esterline

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☑ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 17 Dec 59	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WHD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE J C King

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* KENT William M	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1929	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Venezuela	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL *(Specify)*

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1960

11. REPORTING PERIOD *From* 1 Jan 59 *To* 31 Dec 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Case officer responsible for two KUCAGE media projects.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Special KUCAGE target of opportunity, campaigns (eg. national elections, student congresses, etc.).	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Development and contact with two political action assets.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Development of contacts in Dominican revolutionary circles.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER *(Specify)*:							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

MAR 21 12 06 PM '63
MAIL ROOM

This employee is an outstanding, talented and dedicated individual who is original in his ideas and thorough in executing them. He has been placed in most difficult positions, particularly in the handling of incompatible people and groups which he has managed without alienating either side and on various occasions accomplishing the impossible by satisfying everyone concerned. His versatility, coupled with his language ability, makes him particularly important at this time; however, I believe that his potential has not been scratched. He is circumspective, intelligent conscious and possesses administrative ability.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 3	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION He was not available at the time.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR COB, JMASH	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Raymond J. O'Mara Raymond J. O'Mara

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing official has know subject and his work for several years and considers him to be an outstanding employee with tremendous career potential. The reviewing official would have rated him slightly lower than the rating official, however, although this does not mean to imply at all that the fitness report is not a valid one.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/4	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Jacob D. Esterline Jacob D. Esterline

SECRET

THIS REPORT COVERS A [illegible]IOD OF DETAIL TO DDP/WH/4/ - [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) KENT (First) William (Middle) M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 May 1929	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH, Branch 4	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	✓	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion request

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 21 Apr.60 To 12Sep60

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for the overall PP operations at JMASH	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Organizing indigenous newspapers as well as supervising their contents	7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Contacting, developing and supervising indigenous personnel for radio programs	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Coordinating all PA operations regarding AMRASP	7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Organizing and preparing scripts for both covert and overt radio programs	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 6

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Kent's greatest strengths are a good, analytical mind, skillful handling of agent personnel, fluency in languages, intimate background knowledge of targets and assets, strong loyalty up and down, good sense of humor. He has the ambition to go on to jobs calling for greater responsibility, and he has amply demonstrated his readiness to move on to such jobs.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 10 12 00 PM '61
MAIL ROOM

On occasion he may forget that good staff work includes not only defining problems but recommending sound solutions as well. This is only a transitory weakness that will be corrected by more experience and training.

The undersigned would be happy to have Mr. Kent as a colleague during any future assignment.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 1 August 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Mr. Kent departed JMWAVE prior to the preparation of this report.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Base, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert Reynolds Robert Reynolds

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 2 AUG 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH/4	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE R. K. DAVIS

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.												X		
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".										X				
29. TOUGH MINDED.								X						
30. OBSERVANT.									X					
31. CAPABLE.										X				
32. CLEAR THINKING.									X					
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												X		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.									X					
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.									X					
36. DELIBERATE.							X							
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.										X				
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												X		
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										X				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.									X					
43. HAS DRIVE.													X	
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.									X					
45. VERSATILE.									X					
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.									X					
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.									X					
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.										X				
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.								X						

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

[redacted] has initiative, originality, and "drive" to a high degree. These qualities, combined with the definite aptitude he has for KUCAGE-type work, have done much to pull the KUCAGE program at this Station out of the planning stage and to producing positive results.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

None outstanding.

SECTION IV

CONT. PERS. DIV
FEB 23 3 41 PM '56

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 21 12 01 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself. It acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you wish. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
SAMPLES B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.										X				
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.										X				
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.							X							
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.									X					
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.											X			
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.									X					
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.											X			
18. HAS STAMINA: CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.													X	
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.									X					
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.													X	
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.									X					
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.											X			
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.								X						
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.												X		

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

Kent, William M.

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY [redacted]	1. DATE OF BIRTH May 9, 1929	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION ~~[illegible]~~ DI

4. GRADE GS-9	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) Panama
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 31 December 1955	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* 1 December 1954 - 31 December 1955

SECTION II *(To be completed by field supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION Operations Office - KUTUBE (Staff Agent)	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 2 January 1952

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*

1. Acting Chief of KUCAGE operations since mid October 1955 and, for approximately three months before that time, personally planned and directed a very active KUCAGE campaign against the local CP-controlled labor organization.
2. Case Officer trainee on direct contact with one of Station's top local CP penetrations.
3. Liaison with indigenous persons and with ODYOKE officials as needed to carry out his duties.
4. Travel control and surveillance duties as directed.

POSTED ON
OF-40
2/24/56

SECTION III *(To be completed at headquarters only)*

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER *(True)* ANDERSON EDWARD L	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD *(True)* JENKINS, JOHN H
3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.	
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. Feb 15, 1956	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES JC King

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 SEP 54

SECRET

(4)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

6 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

OFFICE OF PERSONNE
JAN 23 9 45 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

A combination of youth, experience, drive and a fertile mind, among other att
would appear to indicate a bright future for Subject. The fact that he enjoy
has the qualifications for both FI and PP type work is anoth[illegible]act[illegible]
his favor, as is his facility for languages.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject has just completed Intelligence Orientation and World Communism cours
He is currently taking the Anti-Communist Ops course and hopes to get trainin
covert political warfare and covert economic warfare, prior to reassignment.
expected that Subject will be reassigned to the field (in an FI or PP capacit
upon completion of the present tour at Headquarters.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE

Subject is personable as well as versatile and should be able to adapt to vir
any job to which he might be assigned. He would probably be most valuable in
WH or WP capacity due to strong language and area knowledge qualifications.
of versatility and drive, he would be a good candidate for assignment as chie
small station or base requiring multiple talents.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job.
the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most p
the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in t
category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS: HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLI
INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN SIONS WITH ASSO
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	5	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECI GARDLESS OF OWN
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL O
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	X	24. WORKS WELL UNDE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEME
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CON
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS STRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOO TION OF HIS OFFI
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE AND CONTINUOUS S SION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): **KENT William M.**
2. DATE OF BIRTH: **9 May 1929**
3. SEX: **M**
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: **DI**
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: **DDP/WH/Branch III**
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: **Area Ops Officer**
7. GRADE: **GS-11**
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: **18 January 1957**
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): **2 July 1956 - 27 December 1956**

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 16 Jan. 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: James B. Noland **James B. NOLAND**
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: **Area Ops Officer**

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 16 Jan '57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: W. Galbraith **W. GALBRAITH**
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: **C/WH/III**

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☑ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 23 9 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Provides support and guidance to field on PP matters.	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Has and uses knowledge of area and language.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Coordinates with other Headquarters components on matters relating to PP.	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Develops and illustrates new ideas for use in Field PP effort(political cartoons,etc.)	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares periodic progress and status reports and originates dispatches to field.	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject's initiative and imagination, combined with Spanish language facility and area knowledge, have made him particularly valuable in his present capacity as Headquarters case officer for the complex and ever expanding PP program in Cuba. In addition to the usual support functions as a Headquarters case officer, he has originated a number of ideas which have been incorporated into the Cuban program. The rater has observed no significant shortcomings in subject. He is a little too impulsive at times, though much of this may be attributed to his drive, which is, in turn, probably his greatest asset.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

He is however, equally suited for work of an FI nature.

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) **KENT William M.**	2. DATE OF BIRTH **9 May 1929**	3. SEX **M**	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION **DI**
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT **DDP/WH/Branch III**	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE **Area Ops Officer**		
7. GRADE **GS-11**	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP **18 January 1957**	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* **2 July 1956 - 27 December 1956**	

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR		SPECIAL *(Specify)*	
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE			

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE *(Specify)*:
☒	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE **16 January 1957**	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR **James B. NOLAND** James B. Noland	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE **Area Ops Officer**

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE

25 JAN 1957

Posted Pos. Control

Reviewed by FID [illegible] 1-28-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 16 Jan '57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL **W. GALBRAITH** W Galbraith	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL **C/WH/III**

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

5

INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career mana
ment and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to
rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report
to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 da
hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST
completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" bel

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KENT William M.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 May 1929
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNAT: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/III
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer
7. GRADE: GS-11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 5 July 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 27 Dec 56 - 17 [illegible] 57
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 19 June, 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: James B. NOLAND
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: C/WH/III/Cuba

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 20 June 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: R. M. DAHLGREN
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICI

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume great responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHE LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If you answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTE SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closes to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note you rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE COMPLEX AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

DATE 3 JUL 1957
BY
Posted Pos. Change
Reviewed by FBD

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

(4)

OFFICE OF PERSONN...

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

12 mos.

JUL 2 8 32 AM '57

MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Based on youth, desire and contribution to date, subject would appear to have a bright future with the organization. His language and area knowledge make him particularly valuable in WH area, although he is also fluent in Italian, knows that area well and as indicated previously has attributes which should make him a valuable intelligence officer in most any area, whether in FI or PP capacity. It is rater's ~~opinion that talents can be utilized more advantageously in PP field.~~

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject has undergone considerable training during past year, taking such courses as World Communism, Anti-Communist Ops, Psychological and Economic Warfare. He plans to t take several additional courses including CE prior to reassignment to field during comin coming year; hopes to transfer to WH Division eventually.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

No limiting factors. Should adjust well in virtually any area.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

IRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret he words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To he left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the ategory number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

ATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	5	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	x	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
x	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

10 AUG 1961

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBE
CSPD

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KENT, William M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1929	3. SEX male	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNM DDP/WH, Br. 4,

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED	
PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED	

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)			

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 13Sep60 To 8June61

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best descr manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All empl with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outst

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervising JMWAVE PW Section composed of 7 staff or contract personnel.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Serving as Case Officer for a number of PW operations.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Planning PW operations against Latin America	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Handling Political Action contacts.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Planning PW operations against Cuba.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of sp duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Bas your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4
GETS THINGS DONE						X
RESOURCEFUL						X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X	
THINKS CLEARLY						
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X	
OTHER (Specify):						

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

Section F 3.

I agree with the rating officer that the subject has a great deal of enthusiasm and interest in his job and in many aspects performs his duties in a highly professional manner. I do not, however, for reasons stated below, believe that his over all rating should be higher than 4+.

While it is true that he demonstrates considerable imagination and energy, he is headstrong and develops prejudices that prevent him on occasions from being objective in handling operations. This in my opinion is due to his youth and lack of experience in dealing with a particular situation of the kind with which he is now faced. This is by no means meant to be a reflection on his qualifications or future potential.

I emphatically disagree with the last sentence of Section E for the reasons set out above. He should not be, at the present time, given greater individual responsibility but rather should be subject to close, strong supervision of a senior officer.

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 12 11 48 AM '62
MAIL ROOM

Subject has a unique flair for planning and conducting political action operations. His previous field experience in dealing with Latin American political action agents and his facility with the Spanish language have made him an unusually strong asset in the conduct of current operations in the Dominican Republic. His personality and background enable him to establish rapport with foreign nationals with remarkable ease. He uses imagination in developing new operations and is aggressive in follow-up procedures. He is well qualified for a Headquarters position which would give him greater individual responsibility.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent William M. Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 29 January 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WH/DR & H	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [illegible] P. Paxton

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attachment.

DATE 7 Feb 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH/3	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ned P. Holman Ned P. Holman

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FEB 1962

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
Recorded by CSPD
059193

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KENT William M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 May 1929	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH, Br. 4

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐ NOT ELIGIBLE	☐ MEMBER	☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING	☐ DECLINED	☐ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1962

11. REPORTING PERIOD *From* 9June61 *To* 31Dec61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Planning and development of CA operations on Dominican Republic Desk at Headquarters.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintaining current files on political personalities & keeping abreast of political developments by thorough examination of Dominican press media.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Personal contact with Dominican exile leaders in U.S. and recruiting & directing same for Agency use upon their return to Dom. Rep.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Using knowledge of Spanish to act as interpreter & translator in operational matters.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Writing position papers & project documents on CA operations for WH Division & use of senior staffs.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER *(Specify)*:							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERF[illegible]MANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses dem[illegible] in current position. Indicate suggestio[illegible] employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his t[illegible]ning. Describe, if appropriate, his potential f[illegible] development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and [illegible] to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

AUG 10 12 00 PM '61
REC'D ROOM

Mr. Kent's greatest strengths are a good, analytical mind, skillful handling of agent personnel, fluency in languages, intimate background knowledge of targets and assets, strong loyalty up and down, good sense of humor. He has the ambition to go on to jobs calling for greater responsibility, and he has amply demonstrated his readiness to move on to such jobs.

On occasion he may forget that good staff work includes not only defining problems but recommending sound solutions as well. This is only a transitory weakness that will be corrected by more experience and training.

The undersigned would be happy to have Mr. Kent as a colleague during any future assignment.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 1 August 1961
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: William M. Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 10
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: Mr. Kent departed JMWAVE prior to the preparation of this report.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.
☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE:
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief of Base, JMWAVE
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Robert Reynolds

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE: 2 AUG 1961
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, WH/4
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: R. K. DAVIS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

10 AUG 1961

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
CSPH

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KENT, William M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1929	3. SEX male	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH, Br. 4, D.C.	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED	
PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED	

9. TYPE OF REPORT

INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR	
ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE	

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 13Sep60 To 8June61

SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervising JMWAVE PW Section composed of 7 staff or contract personnel.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Serving as Case Officer for a number of PW operations.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Planning PW operations against Latin America	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Handling Political Action contacts.	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Planning PW operations against Cuba.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

During the approximately six months of Mr. Kent's association with WH/5, the Branch CA effort was almost exclusively concentrated on a special operation with which Mr. Kent was not directly concerned. His assigned task was to act as Headquarters case officer for those CA projects not directly involved in the special project and for peripheral aspects of some which were. He performed his assigned duties competently and demonstrated that in the graphic aspects of CA work he has few peers.

At the same time, Mr. Kent did not show any large measure of initiative in developing those projects assigned to him, and seemed to treat his assignment as a temporary one (as indeed it turned out to be) to which he was not fully committed and in which he was not overly interested.

Mr. Kent is a pleasant and cooperative officer who doubtless can perform capably in a position with supervisory responsibilities, although his duties with WH/5 gave him no opportunity to demonstrate his competence in this area.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 2/26/63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 2/26/63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, WH/5	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE J. S. Morgan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH/5	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE R. D. Gahagen R. D. Gahagen

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER ✓
059198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* Kent, William M	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 29	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH 5		8. CURRENT STATION Hq.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify):*

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify):*

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
18 May 62 - 15 Nov 62

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Continuing analysis and evaluation of CA projects - as many as ten, including two major projects, at one time.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of correspondence (cables, dispatches and memoranda) on CA projects under his responsibility.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with CA staff components (WH and DD/P) on matters concerning projects under his responsibility and on miscellaneous Branch CA matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Participation in CA operational planning, with special emphasis on graphic aspects.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Preparation of CA project renewal.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

28 FEB 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

KENT, William M.
(continuation of Section C)

For family medical reasons, Mr. Kent cannot accept a permanent overseas assignment at the present time.

He is not called upon to exercise supervisory functions; therefore, his ability in this regard has not been rated.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 27 10 57 AM '64
MAIL ROOM

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Kent has been under my supervision and has occupied his present position of responsibility for propaganda matters for less than four months, but in that time has demonstrated an unusual ability to provide imaginative, timely and useful propaganda guidances for covert field use. He is very sensitive and perceptive to the capabilities and limitations of WHD media operations and exploits their possibilities to the maximum. He has been particularly effective in the exploitation of leads provided by KUTUBE sources as the basis for "black" operations. In this regard he has shown great initiative, imagination and professional ability. Kent regularly makes sound suggestions for increasing the effectiveness and security of WHD media operations, and with more time on the job, and an increased knowledge of specific country operations, he should further improve his ability to assess and review WHD projects.

This officer is admirably suited for his present assignment; he is creative and an industrious worker, producing quickly and with a minimum of supervision; his guidances are well written and easily understood; and he has sole responsibility for his functional duties as part of a small three-man staff team. He has a friendly disposition and gets along well with his co-workers, although he is a person of strong convictions which he does not hesitate to express.

No further training is recommended at this time. His proficiency in Spanish is excellent and he uses that ability regularly in originating media operations, especially "black" operations.

(continued on attached)

SECTION D

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 24 February 1964

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: William M. Kent

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 4

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 24 Feb 64

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, WH/CA

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Herschel F. Peak
Herschel F. Peak

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The rating in specific duty number one of "outstanding" is very much deserved. Subject is an excellent idea man and writes quickly and to the point.

DATE:

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: WH/COPS

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: W Hood
W. J. Hood

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last) (First) (Middle)* KENT, William M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1929	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH P&O/B	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
15 November 1962 - 31 December 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Coordinate, monitor and originate propaganda guidances for use by WHD assets.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Review, assess and evaluate the effectiveness of WHD media projects.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordinate, monitor and originate black propaganda operations involving WHD, including their planning, conduct and support.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Provide materiel support for the conduct of media operations through KMFORGET channels.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

25 FEB 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

Midcareer Executive Development Course No. 4 20 Sept - 30 Oct 1964
(6 weeks, full-time)

Student :	William M. Kent	Office :	WH
Year of Birth:	1929	Service Designation:	D
Grade :	GS-13	No. of Students :	30
EOD Date :	Dec 1951		

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The Midcareer Executive Development Course, a part of the Midcareer Training Program, is designed to enable potential executive officers to develop and widen their understanding of the Agency, of the Government, and of international affairs.

The Course consists of three major segments, each of approximately two weeks duration. The topics covered through lectures, seminars, panel discussions and field trips are:

1. The functions, relationships and problems of various Agency components.
2. U.S. domestic problems and their effect on Government policy.
3. Current developments in key international affairs.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

No evaluation of the student is made during the course, and no final grade is given upon course completion.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Charles D. Ford 30 NOV 1964

Charles D. Ford Date

Chief, Midcareer & Senior Officers Courses

SECRET

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 1 10 38 AM '65
MAIL ROOM

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C
NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Kent has sustained the same high degree of competence, imagination and conscientious application to his duties noted in the last fitness report. He is unusually well qualified for his present job by reason of experience, knowledge and sensitivity to the Latin American culture and mentality. Although he is a person of strong convictions, not always tactfully expressed, it is to his credit that he has adapted to the role of a staff officer with admirable self-restraint and self-discipline.

Were it not for the fact that Mr. Kent cannot accept a permanent overseas assignment at this time for family medical reasons, he should now be considered for assignment to a senior position at a country desk preparatory to a Field Station assignment. Under these circumstances, Mr. Kent is making a valuable, perhaps even indispensable, contribution to the covert action mission of WHD and should remain in his present position for the immediate future.

No further training is recommended at this time. He completed the Midcareer Executive Development Course No. 4 during the reporting period.

Mr. Kent has no supervisory functions in his present position, but he appears to be capable of performing such duties. His security record is excellent and his cost consciousness is good.

SECTION D
CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 31 March 1965
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: William M. Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 8 mos.
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:
DATE: 3-31-65
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/WH/PO/B
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Seymour R. Bolten

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the rating of Mr. Kent. He has been energetic, imaginative and professional in his work. The only thing that I can add to the assessment is that Mr. Kent speaks excellent Spanish which has been an essential ingredient in his critical abilities in the handling of media operations for Latin America.

DATE: 31 March 1965
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Deputy Chief, WHD
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: R. W. Herbert
R. W. Herbert

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last) (First) (Middle)* KENT, William M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1929	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/P&O/B	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
1 January 1964 - 31 December 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Review, assess and evaluate the effectiveness of WHD media projects.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Coordinate, monitor and originate propaganda guidances for use by WHD assets.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with CA Staff and other CA components on propaganda and related operations in the WHD area.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assist WHD area desks to discharge their responsibilities in the propaganda and media field.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 31 MAR 1965	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 30 2 PM '65
MAIL ROOM

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Kent is indeed a professional in his field, an expert in propaganda operations which require area knowledge, technical know-how, and imagination. In a specialty where it is only too easy to go off the deep end, Mr. Kent has always kept his wits about him and avoided parochialism. He is a lucid writer who focusses on the essential. By nature, Mr. Kent is an impatient man who has certain biases which sometimes get into the way of his operational judgements. He is keenly aware of this and his efforts to remain as "uninvolved" as possible are commendable. In summary, Mr. Kent is a "doer" who in his field contributes much.

Mr. Kent has no supervisery duties to perform. He is highly cost conscious.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 6 December 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 2	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 6 December 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WH/CA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Gerard Droller

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur fully in this report. Mr. Kent is rated strong across the board. He definitely ranks on the high side in this category.

DATE 27 December 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL WHD/Executive Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donald C. Marelius

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KENT, William M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 29	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/CA	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See Instructions - Section C)*				
	SPECIAL *(Specify):*				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL *(Specify):*		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
1 January - 31 December 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category require positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing c probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes th manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employe with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Review, assess, and evaluate the conduct and effectiveness of WH media, youth and student, D&TO, and support projects.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Originate, monitor, and coordinate propaganda guidances for use by WH assets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with the CA Staff and other CA components on propaganda, youth and student, and other operations in the WH area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assist WH area Desks to discharge their responsibilities in the propaganda/media and youth and student fields.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

8 JAN 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
Aug 9 3 37 PM '66
MAIL ROOM

There is but little which can be added to the comments made in the fitness report covering the period 1 January to 3 December 1965; Mr. Kent is an excellent officer in his specialty; he holds strong opinions on certain issues, but - over the years - has learned to bend. His projected non-official cover assignment will utilize his talents for dealing with Latin Americans and for translating ideas and concepts into meaningful action. We wish him well.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 21 July 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WH/CA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Gerard Droller

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the above evaluation. Mr. Kent has proved to be a versatile officer and should be successful in his new assignment which requires independent judgment and initiative.

DATE 1 August 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL WH/Executive Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donald C. Marelius

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Kent, William M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1929	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/CA		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- XX CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- ANNUAL
- SPECIAL (Specify):
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- XX REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1966 - 29 July 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Provide advice and assistance to WH Case Officers in discharging their responsibilities in the media/propaganda and youth/student fields.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Originate, coordinate and monitor regional and country propaganda guidances and campaigns by WH assets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Review, assess and evaluate the development, conduct and effectiveness of WH media, youth/student, D&TO, and support projects, and projects of other Agency components operating in the WH area.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaise with the CA Staff and other Agency components on propaganda, youth/student, and other operations in the WH area.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

17 AUG 1966

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

5 OCT 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section A)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-14, [redacted] (Staff Agent)

William M. Kent

Kent

1. [redacted] who was a Staff Employee up to the time of his conversion to Staff [redacted] in July of this year, has been connected with the Latin American scene since he joined the Agency in 1951. Even before that time he had lived in some Central American countries. Thus, it is not surprising that he brought to his assignments a thorough knowledge of the social, economic, and political currents throughout the WH Division area.

Kent's

2. In handling many tasks at various levels of responsibility and different locations, one facet of [redacted]erformance has always been outstanding: he has an unusual ability to apply his imagination toward realistic and useful operations. To be specific: on occasion of the discovery of a Cuban arms cache in November 1963, of the January 1964 riots in Panama, of the April 1965 revolution in the Dominican Republic, and of many other crises and situations which have developed in the WH area [redacted] immediately took the initiative within and outside the Division for the initiation and coordination of covert action efforts to support U.S. (and Agency) objectives. In his last assignment prior to assuming his duties under nonofficial cover, his constructive analyses of this Division's covert action activities and conclusions therefrom have made a significant impact on the formulation of our operational posture. Kent's [redacted] task in his current assignment will be to find and develop channels to Latin American Christian Democratic individuals and groups which will require maturity and judgment, tact and operational know-how, creativeness and flexibility. His current assignment is and some others in the past were at a level of a GS-14 if not higher and thus the promotion of [redacted] to GS-14 is strongly recommended at this time.

Kent

by Jacob D. Esterline
William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

Not Approved
12/66

S E C R E T

6 January 1969

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Kent, William M

[redacted], GS-14; Employee Number 059198; DOB: 5 September 1929; Operations Officer; Career; Service Designation: D

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW: 1 January 1968 - 6 January 1969

MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 16

OVERALL RATING: Proficient

1. During this reporting period Subject has continued to maintain a state of more than satisfactory proficiency and has done a good job of establishing himself under unofficial commercial cover. He is always on the alert for new avenues of approach to targets of interest using his cover as access.

2. At present he is handling one quite sensitive penetration of an Embassy and to date has managed this case in a highly professional manner.

3. Subject is well motivated, takes a serious approach to his work and profits by his mistakes. At times he is inclined to take precipitate action and think later. However, he is most willing to learn and takes constructive criticism of his work in the proper spirit.

4. In order to increase Subject's value to the Washington Base, it is recommended, that when time permits, he be enrolled in the CI/CE and the Soviet Realities courses.

5. As of the present Subject has no supervisory responsibilities. He has proven to be sensibly cost conscious and submits his accountings promptly.

Rudolph E. Gomez

Rudolph E. Gomez
Chief
Washington Base

7 APR 1970

5 MAY 1970

S E C R E T

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS (Continued)

Subject devised a first-class cover relationship with the priority (REDTOP) target of this Base. For a period the relationship was close, and in our judgment it was wholly unsuspicious because Subject made it seem so natural. This was a very delicate operation which Subject handled with distinction.

Personal characteristics of this officer which should not be overlooked in this review are loyalty, responsiveness, willingness to accept any direction.

In conclusion I want to emphasize my conviction that this officer's assignments should be limited to the area for which he was trained and in which he feels confident: Latin America.

This officer is reasonably cost-conscious. I have had no opportunity to observe his capability for supervising other case officers.

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer to some extent has been a victim of his assignment. His undergraduate training in Latin American affairs was thorough and extensive. His employment with RVROCK for the next 16 years was Latin-oriented. His Spanish language is rated "native". Yet during the period under review he was diverted from Latin-American affairs toward a variety of higher priority targets. This re-orientation was not uniformly successful, and should not be continued, because Subject seems to have no natural interest in foreign nationals (with the apparent exception of Latin Americans) and in most foreign affairs (with the exception of Latin American affairs).

Subject's strongest characteristic is his ability to live and to utilize his commercial cover. He showed great aptitude and commendable imagination in devising new modes of commercial access to foreign nationals residing in Washington. For example his use of his cover was the matrix of several successful recruitments for which other case officers received the ultimate credit, even though the recruitments were based on this officer's discovery of the potential agents and his initial development of them before they were transferred. Conversely, when Subject retained the contacts through the development phase, the contacts languished.

(continued on separate sheet)

SECTION D

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: **20 February 1970**

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ William Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: **12**

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: **3 February 1970**

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: **Chief of Base**

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: **John G. Shaffer, Jr.**
(Signed in Pseudo on Form 45a)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This reviewing official concurs with the ratings and narrative comments. Subject tended to evince operational interest in individuals or situations that were rather marginal in terms of the mission of the Base. It is significant that during the course of his tour in the Washington Base, he has made no recruitments of foreign targets. His propensity for living his cover was so strong that it suggests his future operational utilization in the field should be in spotting and assessing rather than recruiting.

DATE: 6 March 1970

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/DOI/1

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Joseph J. Bulik

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Kent William
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 05/09/29
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-14
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/DO
8. CURRENT STATION: Washington Base

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
	SPECIAL *(Specify):*				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL *(Specify):*		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to): 7 January 1969 - 16 January 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M–Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P–Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S–Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O–Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	Spotting, developing and assessing new agent assets.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	Recruitment of agent assets.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	Handling (and exploiting) agent assets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	Utilizing commercial cover operationally.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5		RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6		RATING LETTER

27 AUG 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: P

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

policy, CCS will not okay engaging in recruitment activities people who are under cover of legitimate firms (such as my cover firm, WWIS). The risk, he said, is too great, adding that where recruitment responsibilities are envisaged, a devised facility cover rather than that of a real firm, is provided. He suggested that I call Mr. Will Burke, current Chief of the Corporate Cover Branch in CCS, for further details and confirmation.

5. I spoke with Mr. Burke on the morning of 29 June. In essence, he said the same thing that Biladeaux had said, allowing that there are occasional exceptions such as an instance where an officer assigned abroad might use an alias, or on the rare occasion where a person might, in effect, recruit himself. With specific reference to WWIS, when I had that cover recruitment activity was precluded.

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

APR 19 12

Subject has been under the supervision of Branch 6 since August 1966. In August Subject was transferred PCS to New Orleans where he was responsible for all aspects of the operation of proprietary foundation JMCLIPPER. During the reporting period, he has consistently demonstrated a high degree of enthusiasm and operational initiative. Although operating under instructions not to expand foundation activities too rapidly, he has not waited for an official "go-ahead" but has shown unflagging energy in planning operations for the period when JMCLIPPER could expand activities. He has shown an unusually keen perception of areas of CA operational needs and of imaginative thinking on how to fill these needs.

Subject has shown himself fully capable of exercising the self-disciplined and self-motivation necessary in an unofficial cover position. His proficiency in Spanish has been useful in meeting and entertaining Latin American travelers of potential operational interest passing through his city. He has handled his cover situation well. The cover office has been well run with no significant financial, administrative, or personnel problems having arisen during the period. Subject has exhibited an above-average cost consciousness.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject is assigned outside of the Washington area.	
DATE 31 March 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/WH/6	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Lee E. Patton Lee E. Patton

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the rating officer's judgement that Mr. Kent's performance has been characterized by exceptional efficiency. He demonstrated unusual energy and imagination in developing plans for expansion of JMCLIPPER activities. His detailed reporting was also commendable.

DATE 31 March 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH/6	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Paul E. Oberst Paul E. Oberst

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Kent, William M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 29	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/6	8. CURRENT STATION New Orleans		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
XXX CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
28 February 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 August 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Ops. Ofc. Responsible as [redacted] for directing all operations conducted through proprietary foundation JMCLIPPER	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Administration and financial control of JMCLIPPER	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Development and planning of new operational support tasks for JMCLIPPER	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervision of JMCLIPPER secretary and contract agent/trustee	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 28 April '67/pr. POSTED ON OF-4b	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 21 APR 1967 WP	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper. Kent

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 5 9 07 AM '68

In the past [redacted] has proven himself to be a dynamic and highly-skilled operations officer whose geographic area of specialization was WH and whose professional forte was propaganda and covert action activity. During his 5 months association with the Washington Base, this officer has continued to maintain a state of exceptional proficiency while establishing himself locally under unofficial commercial. He has done this with his usual high degree of energy, perception and seriousness. Having laid a firm operational base, it is expected that during the next reporting period the operational "take" from Subject will be equally firm. During his brief Base tour [redacted] has handled several selected operational matters within the area of his greatest competence and during the Fall meeting of the OAS acquitted himself with exceptional proficiency. Subject has no supervisory duties at present. He is cost conscious in all respects. It is expected that [redacted] will be able to provide meaningful assistance during the coming year in attacking those areas of priority operational interest assigned to the Base by Headquarters. In order to assist [redacted] in this and to enable the Base to utilize his many talents to the optimum, it is planned, when the Base operational climate allows, to have him take the Kent Soviet Realities course and the CI/CE course. [redacted] is well-motivated and does his best to become a meaningful member of the Washington Base.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
31 January 1968	[redacted] William M. Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
5		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
31 January 1968	C/OG/Washington Base	John H. Furfey

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As Reviewing Official I am in full concurrence with the evaluation given this employee as outlined above.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
31 JANUARY 1968	Chief of Base	Rudolph E. Gomez Rudolph E. Gomez

SECRET

SECRET

I certify that I have seen the above Fitness Report:

William M. Kent

[redacted] DATE: 3 March 1969

REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS:

I concur generally in this evaluation. Subject is always on the look-out for new leads. While in general this is commendable, it should be noted that his assessments are not in depth. It would be preferable if he concentrated on a few good prospects, leading to a solid recruitment, rather than enlarging numerically his stable of contacts.

Stanley H Gaines

Stanley H. Gaines 11 MAR 1969
DC/DO/I

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059198

SECTION A — GENERAL

Kent William W.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 05/09/29	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DO/Wash Base	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
	SPECIAL *(Specify):*				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL *(Specify):*		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
1 August - 31 December 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 To fully establish himself within the Washington area under a viable commercial cover and to take the necessary initial steps to exploit his position operationally as a Base support officer.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 To maintain operational contact with agents and targets of operational interest to WH Division as assigned.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 To provide operational entre into a large number of local religious, civic and academic groups which may become of greater operational interest to the Base in the future.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

9 FEB 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

6 January 1969

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Kent, William M
[redacted], GS-14; Employee Number 059198; DOB: 5 September 1929; Operations Officer; Career; Service Designation: D

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW: 1 January 1968 - 6 January 1969

MONTHS UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 16

OVERALL RATING: Proficient

1. During this reporting period Subject has continued to maintain a state of more than satisfactory proficiency and has done a good job of establishing himself under unofficial commercial cover. He is always on the alert for new avenues of approach to targets of interest using his cover as access.

2. At present he is handling one quite sensitive penetration of an Embassy and to date has managed this case in a highly professional manner.

3. Subject is well motivated, takes a serious approach to his work and profits by his mistakes. At times he is inclined to take precipitate action and think later. However, he is most willing to learn and takes constructive criticism of his work in the proper spirit.

4. In order to increase Subject's value to the Washington Base, it is recommended, that when time permits, he be enrolled in the CI/CE and the Soviet Realities courses.

5. As of the present Subject has no supervisory responsibilities. He has proven to be sensibly cost conscious and submits his accountings promptly.

Rudolph E. Gomez

Rudolph E. Gomez
Chief
Washington Base

7 APR 1970

5 MAY 1970

SECRET

Soft File

29 June 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Joseph Di Stefano

SUBJECT : Responsibilities During Assignment to DO/Washington Base (re Fitness Report Jan 69 - Jan. '70)

FROM : Mr. William M. Kent

1. During the early days of my assignment to DO/Washington Base, the matter of my cover was discussed a number of times with DO Personnel and CCS. Eventually, CCS came up with World Wide Information Services, Inc., of New York, as a legitimate firm which would provide me with the needed cover. It came out loud and clear during the discussions that this cover would allow me to spot, assess and develop targets of interest, and would allow me to handle recruited agents, but, because of the high risk involved in the use of a legitimate firm for cover purposes, I was not to engage in recruitments.

2. Despite its one limitation, the cover was ideal. Among other things, I:

a. Handled a recruited Venezuelan agent assigned to the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington;

b. Handled a recruited code clerk assigned to one of the embassies in Washington;

c. Contacted and assessed a high official of the Soviet Embassy, made arrangements to have him met by another Base Case Officer under alias who continued the development which eventually was to lead to a recruitment pitch;

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

d. Established contact and developed a third national employed by the Algerian Embassy, gained access to the Embassy, went all through it, drew a sketch of the interior of the premises including the location of the code room;

e. Made contact with and developed two Arab officials assigned to the Arab Information Office in Washington;

f. Made contact with and developed officials in the Polish, Czech, Hungarian and other Embassies; was on particularly good terms with the Poles;

g. Made contact and developed an official of the Pakistani Embassy;

h. Made contact, developed and turned over to another case officer under alias a Swedish national who was subsequently recruited and was to be sent to India to work on the Chicom target.

i. Maintained my cover in a manner which was completely devoid of suspicion during the entire period I used it.

3. When the Base moved to its new offices in Washington, the COB gave me my instructions. He told me that I should avoid making or maintaining contacts in the Church and Latin American communities in Washington; that I was not being assigned any geographical area on which to concentrate but would be expected to use my judgment, seek out persons who might be of interest, and take advantage of opportunities which might arise; that I would be given recruited agents to handle as the need arose; that, per the limitation concerning my cover, I was not to engage in actual recruitments, but was to spot, assess, and develop persons of possible interest who would be turned over to other case officers under alias for further development and recruitment.

4. On 28 June 1971, I called Dick Biladeaux of CCS who was involved at the time I was given the WWIS cover. While I did not, purposely, make specific reference to the matter at hand, in response to my query he said that as a matter of

SECTION C - Narrative Comments (continued)

and he is consistent and reliable in his performance. His writing is entirely coherent and always in good form, although occasionally a little too clever and glib for my tastes. He has an excellent understanding of personal and operational security and cover.

A word about versatility: Mr. Kent does indeed have near-native Spanish and a specific interest in Latin American affairs as noted in his previous fitness report; however, his general interests cover a much greater geographic and topical area and and he has no difficulty in quickly finding some common ground with persons of all backgrounds and nationalities. Although his job here in the branch rarely called for direct operational contacts, I have no reservations about his ability to develop, recruit and handle all types of persons of intelligence interest. He is presentable, sensible, well-spoken, and a definite credit to the Agency in his dealings with other elements of the U.S. Government.

Mr. Kent is an enthusiastic and energetic activist with now proven managerial abilities. His greatest asset is his quick, sharp and imaginative mind: His only shortcoming worthy of mention is a slight tendency towards impulsiveness in making decisions. My relationship with this officer has been such that we discussed operational and personnel matters and his handling of them at least several times a day; thus, special performance consultations with him were not considered necessary. His performance was fully up to our expectations of him and consistent with the high standards of responsibility and efficiency required in this branch.

SECTION C - Narrative Comments (continued)

and he is consistent and reliable in his performance. His writing is entirely coherent and always in good form, although occasionally a little too clever and glib for my tastes. He has an excellent understanding of personal and operational security and cover.

A word about versatility: Mr. Kent does indeed have near-native Spanish and a specific interest in Latin American affairs as noted in his previous fitness report; however, his general interests cover a much greater geographic and topical area and and he has no difficulty in quickly finding some common ground with persons of all backgrounds and nationalities. Although his job here in the branch rarely called for direct operational contacts, I have no reservations about his ability to develop, recruit and handle all types of persons of intelligence interest. He is presentable, sensible, well-spoken, and a definite credit to the Agency in his dealings with other elements of the U.S. Government.

Mr. Kent is an enthusiastic and energetic activist with now proven managerial abilities. His greatest asset is his quick, sharp and imaginative mind: His only shortcoming worthy of mention is a slight tendency towards impulsiveness in making decisions. My relationship with this officer has been such that we discussed operational and personnel matters and his handling of them at least several times a day; thus, special performance consultations with him were not considered necessary. His performance was fully up to our expectations of him and consistent with the high standards of responsibility and efficiency required in this branch.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUN 31 11 15 AM '71

Mr. Kent came to this branch from a non-official cover job which had little in common with the duties of a country desk chief. Moreover, he found himself in the sometimes difficult situation of taking over a position just vacated by the newly appointed deputy branch chief. Despite these, to him, minor obstacles, he called upon his close association with Latin American affairs for many years, his wealth of experience on WH country desks, and his inherent ability to deal successfully with people and situations in asserting leadership and quickly bringing the Peru Desk under his own independent control.

During the year that Mr. Kent served as Peru Desk Chief he domonstrated conclusively that he is equally talented in all fields of clandestine activity. There is little question that Covert Action is what he likes and does the best, as once more evidenced by a written commendation he received for this type of work while part of a special WH task force in September and October 1970; however, it should be equally noted that the FI and CI aspects of his job on the Peru Desk also received full interest and attention during his tenure. He is a good personnel manager and maintained high morale in his unit while working it hard and demanding high standards. He is not at all afraid of responsibility, he meets all deadlines without prompting,

(continued)

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 8 April 1971	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 1/2 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 8 April 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Acting Chief, WH/3	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Richard L. Conolly Richard L. Conolly

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have little to add to this comprehensive narrative with which I fully agree. I, too, have worked very closely with Bill for most of the period under review, which witnessed rather hectic days in the life of the Lima Station: it was comforting to be able to rely on his keen perception of latent trouble, clear analysis of events, and sound and/or imaginative, as the case demanded, proposals for approaching problems. Because he has the potential for career advancement, I would strongly recommend that he be soon transferred back to a "line" position, again with managerial responsibilities.

DATE 8 April 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WH/3	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Spera Alfonso Spera

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Kent, William	2. DATE OF BIRTH 05/09/29	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
17 January 1970 - 1 December 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M–Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P–Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S–Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O–Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of the Peru Desk, which encompasses overall Headquarters guidance and support of field operations. (DA10)	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises the preparation of cables, dispatches, project actions, special memoranda and other correspondence for FI, CI and CA activities in Peru. (DB10)	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordination of Desk activities with other components of the Agency and other U.S. Government departments. (DB40)	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Briefing and debriefing Headquarters and field personnel and other agencies' officers on Peruvian activities. (DM50)	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervision of four (4) Desk employees GS-05 to GS-13. (DM80)	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECTION C -Continued-

Mr. Kent has clearly projected his concern for the efficient use of Agency funds.

In November 1970 Mr. Kent received a commendation for his resourceful contribution to the Chilean Task Force.

Comments of Reviewing Official: (Continued)

Service. In addition, it must be noted that Mr. Kent thinks through every problem as it applies to his work. His thoroughness is of the highest nature. His depth of thought and study devoted to a given subject is rarely found among officers dealing with rapidly moving situations. His is unflappable yet flexible.

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Kent has competently directed the covert action activities of Branch 6 since being named Chief of the CA Section for the Branch in December 1970. He was selected for this position because of his aggressiveness in the CA field and especially because of his years of experience and success in the propaganda activity. In closely monitoring the actions of the Allende Government (GOC) Mr. Kent lived up to his reputation and demonstrated his unique ability to recognize propaganda vulnerabilities and to attack them with effective and imaginative propaganda guidance.

DS72 During his brief tour in the Branch Mr. Kent developed one economic warfare operation against the GOC which shows indications of partially satisfying the USG objective of discouraging foreign investment in Chile.

Mr. Kent is fluent in the Spanish language and on at least two occasions he has proven himself as a translator for two meetings between senior officials of the USG and Latin American officials.

Mr. Kent has effectively supervised the personnel of the CA Section which, besides himself, consists of two officers and one clerical. In the management of the Branch's covert action programs

SECTION D

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
2 June 1971	William M. Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
7 June 71	DC/WH/6	Basil A. Beardsley Basil A. Beardsley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

In my capacity as Branch Chief during the period January to April 1971, I had ample opportunity to observe the work of Mr. Kent and had the pleasure of working directly with him on a variety of sensitive and important activities. In addition to his highly imaginative yet realistic approach to the problem of Chile, he amply demonstrated his ability to deal with persons who were out to sell bills of goods to the Agency. His clear understanding of the role of the Clandestine Service protected the Agency from disagreeable encounters that might have resulted in compromises or embarrassments. His forte is clearly in the field of public relations and propaganda well-adjusted to the role of the Clandestine

/Continued/

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
8 June 1971	Chief, WH/COG	Lawrence Sternfield

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Kent, William M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 05/09/29	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/6	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 November 1970 - 31 March 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Direct the covert action program of the Branch and supervise the Section's personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Originate propaganda and operational guidance in support of Station operations and 40 Committee policy objectives. VA/V	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/TPF

SECTION C (Continued)

to inhibit foreign investment in Chile. The responses to the first phase of this operation were highly favorable and the initial reactions to the second phase have also been very favorable.

It should be noted that during this period Mr. Kent served for three months as the Acting Deputy Branch Chief, including two weeks when he was the Acting Branch Chief. In both of these positions he performed very capably, showing excellent judgment and managerial abilities in handling Branch-level matters. He showed similar managerial ability in his handling of the two officers and secretary in his Section throughout the rating period. He has consistently shown a high degree of cost consciousness in all phases of his work.

Mr. Kent displayed his talent for dealing with non-Agency personnel at a meeting of publishers from all over the hemisphere held during the latter part of 1971. At this meeting he skillfully handled several key Latin American assets with the result that some of the Agency's objectives for influencing the meeting were achieved under difficult circumstances.

In sum, Mr. Kent made a notable contribution to the Branch's efforts in 1971 and we are looking forward with pleasure to working with him in the coming year.

SECTION D (Continued)

responsible for the extent of the success in accomplishing Agency objectives. Mr. Kent, in my opinion is well qualified to assume a position with greater responsibilities.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Kent, William		2. DATE OF BIRTH 05/09/29	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/6		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
January 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
April 1971 - December 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Directs the Covert Action program of the Branch and supervises the Covert Action Section.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Originates guidances for political action and propaganda activities for Santiago Station and third-country Stations' use.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Initiates, prepares and directs third-country economic warfare operations aimed at the Chilean target.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinates with CA Staff and other Agency components on Covert Action operations conducted against Chile.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 27 JAN 1972	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JAN 26 9 27 AM '72

During the rating period Mr. Kent continued to direct in a highly effective manner the large-scale covert action program carried out by the Branch against the Chilean target, including political action operations, propaganda, economic warfare, black operations and a militant action group. Mr. Kent is uniquely qualified for his present job since he combines an active and imaginative mind with a background of twenty years of operational experience in the Latin American area. He also possesses an unusual degree of fluency in the Spanish language.

In addition to directing the Branch's overall covert action program, Mr. Kent personally handled the majority of the propaganda effort conducted by the Branch. He turned in a very strong performance in originating and coordinating propaganda guidances on the Chilean situation for use in the Western Hemisphere as well as other areas such as Europe. He showed a real flair for spotting propaganda vulnerabilities and then coming up with fresh ideas for the exploitation of these vulnerabilities. He particularly excelled in staying on top of fast breaking situations requiring a steady flow of propaganda guidance.

Mr. Kent also conceived and executed the second phase of an effective propaganda operation in the economic field which is designed

...continued...

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 21 January 1972	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William M. Kent

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 21 January 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/WH/6	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Albert D. Wedemeyer A. D. Wedemeyer

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

There is little that I can add to this performance rating and narrative comments. I agree with the rating officer's judgment. Mr. Kent is a self-starter with a very imaginative mind. I have closely observed his work on an effective propaganda operation in the economic field and found it highly successful and effective. His tenure as Acting Deputy Branch Chief left nothing to be desired. I was also personally associated with him at the hemisphere-wide publishers' meeting in late 1971. His professional conduct and good judgment during this meeting undoubtedly was

...continued...

DATE 24 JAN 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/6	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Earl J. Williamson Earl J. Williamson

SECRET

government's economic credibility both in Chile and abroad. These efforts undoubtedly have played a role in Chile's increasing difficulties in obtaining badly needed foreign financial assistance.

In the course of his duties Mr. Kent was called upon to meet and handle several key Chileans concerning matters affecting covert operations in Chile. In one case he made the first Agency contact with an important Chilean business leader who will be taken over shortly by the Santiago Station. This individual is a leader of the Chilean private sector which has become of increasing interest to the Station's operations.

Mr. Kent ably supervisied the activities of the two other officers and secretary in his Section during the rating period. In addition to his regular duties, he has frequently been called upon to fill in for the Branch Chief and/or the Deputy Branch Chief during absences of the latter two officers. In all such cases he displayed sound judgment and a thorough grasp of both the FI and CA operations being conducted in Chile.

In conclusion, it should be noted that Mr. Kent has turned in an unusually strong across-the-board performance during the highly active period covered by this report. It has been a real pleasure to have worked with an individual of this high competence and dedication.

government's economic credibility both in Chile and abroad. These efforts undoubtedly have played a role in Chile's increasing difficulties in obtaining badly needed foreign financial assistance.

In the course of his duties Mr. Kent was called upon to meet and handle several key Chileans concerning matters affecting covert operations in Chile. In one case he made the first Agency contact with an important Chilean business leader who will be taken over shortly by the Santiago Station. This individual is a leader of the Chilean private sector which has become of increasing interest to the Station's operations.

Mr. Kent ably supervisied the activities of the two other officers and secretary in his Section during the rating period. In addition to his regular duties, he has frequently been called upon to fill in for the Branch Chief and/or the Deputy Branch Chief during absences of the latter two officers. In all such cases he displayed sound judgment and a thorough grasp of both the FI and CA operations being conducted in Chile.

In conclusion, it should be noted that Mr. Kent has turned in an unusually strong across-the-board performance during the highly active period covered by this report. It has been a real pleasure to have worked with an individual of this high competence and dedication.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the past year Mr. Kent continued to direct the CA Section of the Chile Branch in the same highly effective manner noted in the previous fitness report. In this position he was responsible for directing the Headquarters support for WH Division's largest and most active covert action program. This program is generally credited with having achieved a number of successes during the past year in a wide variety of activities against the Chilean target.

Mr. Kent possesses an unusual combination of talent, language capability and experience that makes him one of the top CA officers in the Division. He is particularly effective in conducting propaganda work and his imaginative exploitation of the Chilean situation has been superb. As a result of his efforts, the Branch has been able to conduct a continuous and effective hemisphere-wide propaganda campaign against the Allende government during the past year. In addition, he has brought in key European stations to assist in this program on numerous occasions.

Among the more significant contributions made by Mr. Kent have been his activities in the economic field. He has successfully carried out a number of operations designed to damage the Allende

...continued...

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 Nov. 1972	William M. Kent

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
12 Months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
15 November 1972	DC/WH/6	Albert D. Wedemeyer Albert D. Wedemeyer

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with this evaluation. Subject's ability in the propaganda field particularly is exceptional. Blessed with a fertile imagination, he has an uncanny talent for coming up with an appropriate CA remedy to almost any problem. His knowledge and experience in the CA field is wide and deep, making him undoubtedly one of the best officers in this speciality in the Agency. The Branch is indeed fortunate to have his services.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 NOV 1972	C/WH/6	Stewart D. Burton

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Kent, William	2. DATE OF BIRTH 05/09/29	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/6	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- XX ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 November 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1972 - 31 October 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Directs the Covert Action program of the Branch and supervises the Covert Action Section.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Originates propaganda guidances for Santiago Station and third country stations' use.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Initiates, prepares and directs economic warfare operations aimed at the Chilean target. D-5-72	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinates with CA Staff and other Agency components on operations conducted against Chile.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 17 NOV 1972	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

Fitness Report - William M. Kent

Section D - Comments of Reviewing Official (Continued)

ability to act on his own and get things done, he also has a decided capacity for working as a team member.

While the Outstanding rating necessarily must be assigned sparingly, I believe it is merited in this case. Mr. Kent did a really superb job in the tension-filled days leading to the Chilean coup. His performance and intellectual abilities place him among the top 10% of SA officers in the Division and probably in the Agency.

As far as future assignments are concerned, I believe Mr. Kent is best qualified by experience and personal inclination to handle staff jobs calling for a large measure of political and economic astuteness. The new job he is taking over in the economic section of WH Division will test his talents, but I believe he has the growth potential to rise to positions of even greater responsibility.

operational experience. His ingenuity, originality and flare are balanced by sound common sense and enriched by his sense of humor and personal modesty. Mr. Kent was personally responsible for the creation and implementation of two important Division programs - one in the political action field and the other in the propaganda field, which were designed to influence foreign attitudes toward the Allende Government and to dissuade foreign governments from providing economic assistance to Chile. These programs were highly successful, and since the same techniques can be applied in support of the new Chilean military government, the programs are being retained and hopefully will continue to produce results which make an important contribution to the achievement of U.S. policy objectives.

Mr. Kent continued to supervise the SA Section in the same highly effective manner noted in previous efficiency reports. He also continued to meet and handle several key Chileans, including a top civilian adviser to the new Chilean government. He put in long hours, working eleven or twelve hours a day during crisis periods.

Mr. Kent's transfer to the economic section of WH Division will enable him to make fuller use of his talents in the specialized and important field of economic intelligence, in which he has a particular interest. It is, however, a severe loss to the Branch, which has benefited immeasurably from his imaginative yet level-headed approach to operational problems and challenges. He is much liked as well as respected by Branch 6 personnel and has contributed greatly toward maintaining the high morale and effectiveness of the Branch as a whole.

1. Agency and organizational designations
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

5. Employee[redacted] and social security account number when appropriate) LUE/[illegible] (OLIVER H. CORBUSTON)

[redacted] (P) [redacted]

2. Pay ro

3. Block No.

4. Slip No.

6. Grade and salary [illegible] [illegible]

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX____	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

Kent, William M.

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date [illegible]

15. Date for equivalent increase [illegible]

16. Old salary rate [illegible]

17. New salary rate [illegible]

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

Signature of other authorization

19. LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):

(Check applicable box in case of LWOP)

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126 [illegible]

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

13 Blue

16—61111-2 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME [redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1929

3. REQUEST NO.

4. DATE OF REQUEST [illegible] Jun 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Promotion (Staff Agent) Pert. [illegible]

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: JUL 5 - 1953 EJS

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Asst. GS-6	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Asst. GS-7
GS-6, $3,795.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-7, $4,205.00 p.a.
[illegible]/WH Branch III, Cent. Am. & Carib.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	[illegible]/WH Branch III, Cent. Am. & Carib.
Panama City, Panama	11. HEADQUARTERS	Panama City, Panama
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Slot No. 2
PROJECT [illegible]
COVERT - MILITARY

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) V. C. [illegible], Extension [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Dana B. Powell
Title: FI/CHO.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

FX

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: [illegible]
TO: [illegible]

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Posted OF 46 7/7/53 EJS

DOGS - 7/5/53
SAEOD - 6/10/52
CSEOD -
LCD - 7/27/51

APPROVED
PERSONNEL DIVISION (COVERT)
Effective: JUL 5 - 1953 EJS
DISTRIBUTION:
CSB (3) ✓
PERS. FLDR.
PI/T&R
SSD/I&SO
ORGN. CONCERNED
SPS/T&R
OTHER

22. CLEARANCES

	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
L. W. Burrows 6/30/53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

16—57339-2

[illegible] GS-7 [illegible]

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX____	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:

Kent, William M.

POSTED ON OF-4b [illegible] Aug 56

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by [illegible] 2 Aug 56

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
[illegible] Jul 56	5 Jul 55	[illegible]	[illegible]	____________ (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods): Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP) ☐ [illegible] status [illegible] ☐ WorCom [illegible] ☐ [illegible]

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP____

[illegible] of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

14 A

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (~~Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name~~, initial(s), and surname): [redacted]
Kent, William M.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 May 1929

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 22 Oct 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION (STAFF AGENT)
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 30 Jan 55
B. APPROVED: JAN 30 1955

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	INTELLIGENCE ASST. [redacted], [redacted]		INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, [redacted]
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-7, $4330.00 p.a.		GS-9, $5060.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH BRANCH III, CENT AMER & CARIB.		DDP/WH [redacted] PROJECT HYPOTHESIS
11. HEADQUARTERS	PANAMA CITY, PANAMA		PANAMA CITY, PANAMA
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary):
[redacted]
COVER - Military

Ar: the cancellation stamp [illegible] should have cancelled the accepted app action →

~~CANCELLED~~
THRU P. I. [illegible] 16 Jan 56

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): C/WH

C. ~~REQUEST APPROVED BY~~:
Signature: James P. Humphries (wmd)
Title: FS/CMO 10 Jan '55

D. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): P. C. BOWERS x4457

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				D:FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3525-55-051 TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 13 MAR. 1955
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: $5440

POSTED ON
1/24/55

APPROVED
SPECIAL CONTRACTING, ALLOWANCES
AND PROCESSING STAFF
Effective: JAN 30 1955

DISTRIBUTION:
OFD (2) ✓
PERS. FLDR. ✓
PI
SCD/IAND
ORGN. CONCERNED
SCAPS
OTHER

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	L	1-20-55
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY: John L. Bischoff

16—67329-2

[illegible] STEP INCREASE [illegible] CONFIDENTIAL [illegible]

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-320080

1. Agency and organizational designation: EDP/WH Kent, William M.

2. Payroll period

3. Block No.

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
[redacted]

6. Grade and salary
GS-9 $5440.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET P/
7. Previous normal													
New normal													
Pay this period													

0. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
dak 15 Feb 56

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

4. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18.
9 Jan56	30 Jan55	$5440.00	$5575.00	SERVICE AND CONDUCT [illegible] SATISFACTORY

(Signature or other authentication)

9. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Periods:

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In [illegible] period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised

Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

3B,

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP —— PERSONNEL COPY

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) [redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1929

3. REQUEST NO.

4. DATE OF REQUEST 3 May 1956

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: William M. Kent
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Promotion (STAFF AGENT)

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: JUL 1 1956 RLW

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Officer	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) [redacted] BAF 277.01
GS-0136.51-9 $5575.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $6390.00 p.a.
DDP/WH Project HYPOTHESIS	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch III [redacted]S
Panama City, Panama	11. HEADQUARTERS	Panama City, Panama STATION PANAMA CITY, PANAMA
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL (DI)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
New T/O

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
R. C. BOWERS X-4457

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Robert A. Shuler (WMH)
Title: EXCMO. 31 May '56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

SD-DI

15. SEX M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3525-53-001
TO: Same

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

6/28/56

APPROVED
JUL 1 1956

21. CLEARANCES

	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		6/26/56
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		6/1/56
E.		

REMARKS:

✓

F. APPROVED BY Ralph S. Pallerlu

JUN 1956

SECRET

16—57329-4

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

(WHEN FILLED IN

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)
WILLIAM M. KENT
[redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH
9 May 1929

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.

4. DATE
9 Oct 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)
Resignation (Staff Agent)*

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
7 Oct 1956

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR [illegible] LEGAL AUTHORITY
50 USCA 403j

FROM		TO
I. O. (FI) BAF-277.01	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-0136.51-11 $6390 p/a	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
DDP/WH Branch III Panama City, Panama Station	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Panama City, Panama	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD:DI

15. SEX
M

16. RACE
W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3525-55-051
TO:

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. REMARKS:

POSTED ON
OF-4b
dek 10 Oct 56

FOR DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

Ralph S. Pollock

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. [redacted] COPY
File

STANDARD FORM 50 (5 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

F.C. 2 Oct 1956
C-6163 reg

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. WILLIAM M. KENT 159198
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 May 1929
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 8 Oct 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 8 Oct 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

	FROM	TO
8. POSITION TITLE		Area Ops Officer RA-322-11
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY		GS-0136.01-11 $6390.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		DDP/WH Branch III Cuba Section
11. HEADQUARTERS		Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				BOC SD:DI

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: 7-3500-20
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 8 Oct 1956
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

20. REMARKS:

RC-004

DOG: 7/1/56
CSRCD: 1/2/52
LCD: 1/2/52
SCD: 7/8/50

PSI due 12/29/57

POSTED
10/16/56

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-373647

10/11/56

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
159198	KENT, WILLIAM M.	DDP/WH	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
11	1	$6390.	07	01	56	11	2	$6605.	12	29	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560b

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
159198	KENT, WILLIAM M.	DDP/WH	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
11	1	$6390.	07	01	56	11	2	$ 6605.	12	29	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
ROBERT N. DAHLGREN	28 Feb 58	Robert N Dahlgren Jr.

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Kent, William M.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 29	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD DYB
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer CH	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/OED/NOC Staff	9. CURRENT STATION Hqs	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS. ☐ DF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 June 77 - 3 Dec 77

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 02 January 1978

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of OED/NOC Staff	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As head of the Branch's Referral Section, develops and implements a centralized system for locating suitable new-hire NOC personnel to fill specific NOC needs by area divisions; also does the same for unassigned NOC personnel as coordinator between area divisions.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains effective working relationship with various Agency components including Office of Personnel, Office of Medical Services, Office of Security, etc., as well as serving as Branch senior officer in dealing with CCS concerning assignment and appropriate cover for personnel under nonofficial cover.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 In charge of our Branch data bank on availability of NOC personnel and applicants by nationality, language skills, professional skills and specialities, foreign area experience, etc.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2, IMPDET CL BY 054854

Bill, many thanks, and good luck to you in your new career.

CONFIDENTIAL

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This report covers approximately five and one half months since I submitted the last report on Mr. Kent. Unfortunately, and I do mean unfortunately, it will be the last fitness report written on Mr. Kent because he has elected to retire on 30 June 1978.

Although his retirement was just around the corner, Mr. Kent did not slacken his pace. On the contrary, in the last four months the NOC Branch has been besieged with a myriad of statistical reports from DDO management. Had it not been for the legendary meticulousness of Mr. Kent, coupled with his excellent tribal memory, the NOC Branch would have been hard-pressed to come up as promptly and as efficiently with the figures and facts as was the case. Much of it Mr. Kent and his staff had to accomplish while he was acting for me while I was on a 4 week TDY. He definitely excelled at running the branch during these four weeks.

In closing I would like to say that CIA is losing one of its finest officers in Mr. Kent. This may not be the proper vehicle for making the following statement, but I would like to state nevertheless and without any equivocation whatsoever, that seldom in my career of 31 years did I receive the kind of support and loyal counsel I received from Mr. Kent during the past 13 months.

SECTION D

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

Fitness Report Rating Profile
O 0 S 3 P 0 M 0 U 0

DATE: 12 June 1978

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, OED/NOC

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Gerard J. Hahn Hahn

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☑ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.

DATE: 21/6/78

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: William M. Kent
William M. Kent

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

There is little to add to the thoughtful and accurate comments of the rating officer. I share his sense of loss over the retirement of Mr. Kent. Mr. Kent performed in an exceptionally able manner throughout the period of time covered by this report. He was always quick and willing to respond and the results of his labors, without exception, were of a very high professional order. As indicated, he was of great assistance to the rating officer and to me as well, during this time. It is indeed unfortunate that the clandestine service is losing the experience and talent of Mr. Kent. However, he reached this decision on his own and, after careful consideration, opted for early retirement. Thus, I can only wish him well in his new endeavors and hope that everything works out for him as planned.

DATE: 19 June 1978

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, OED

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Walter L. O'Brien

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☐ HAVE NOT ☑ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE

DATE: 21/6/78

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: William M. Kent

FITNESS REPORT	NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classificatio if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Kent, William M.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 29	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD DYB

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer, Ch	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/OED/NOC	9. CURRENT STATION Hqs.

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		OTHER

11. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT Of Supervisor		SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO) 4 Dec 77 - 19 May 78	13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. ASAP

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the actio could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action take or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial action taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing simila work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of OED/NOC Staff	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As head of the Branch's Referral Section, develops and implements a centralized system for locating suitable new-hire NOC personnel to fill specific NOC needs by area divisions; also does the same for unassigned NOC personnel as coordinator between area divisions.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains effective working relationship with various Agency components including Office of Personnel, Office of Medical Services, Office of Security, etc., as well as serving as Branch senior officer in dealing with CCS concerning assignment and appropriate cover for personnel under nonofficial cover.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 In charge of our Branch data bank on availability of NOC personnel and applicants by nationality, language skills, professional skills and specialities, foreign area experience, etc.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: KENT, William M.

DATE: 13 July 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 27 December 51

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Administrative Clerk, (Typing) GS-5
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-5, $3100.00 per annum
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		FDT
BRANCH		NWC
OFFICIAL STATION		Guayaquil, Ecuador

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS W D Philippe 1-5-54	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION Thomas M. Fisher	PERSONNEL OFFICER R J Goodhart	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 2 January 52

SECURITY CLEARED ON 6 December 51

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 2 January 52

ENTERED ON DUTY 27 December 51

Robert J. Hayes
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Slot # 13. C ~~#0999~~ #1681 301

H. L. Gresham
Chief, FDT

COPY in PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANC..

JW

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 83-500339

William M. KENT

NATURE OF ACTION	DATE
Transfer	10 January 1952
	EFFECTIVE DATE
	3 February 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Admin. Clerk, GS-5	Admin.Clerk, GS-5
GRADE AND SALARY	~~GS-5 $[illegible] per annum (old)~~ GS-5 $3410.00 per annum (new)	GS-5 $3410.00 per annum
OFFICE	OSO	-
DIVISION	FDT	WH
BRANCH	NWC	Branch I
OFFICIAL STATION	Guayaquil, Ecuador	Maracaibo, Venezuela 3530

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Grace L. Greaves	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION P-534 Thomas M. [illegible]	PERSONNEL OFFICER Mulcahey	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

301

Slot No. 3

ACWH 10 January 1952

COPY IN PAYROLL FIL
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRA

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16—63206-1

(2)

William M. KENT

NATURE OF ACTION [illegible] Reassigment*

DATE 30 April 1952

EFFECTIVE DATE 11 May 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Admin. Clerk, GS-5	Intell. Asst, GS-5
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-5, $3410.00 per annum	GS-5, $3410.00 per annum
OFFICE	[redacted]	
DIVISION	[redacted] WH	WH
BRANCH	Branch I	Branch I
OFFICIAL STATION	Maracaibo, Venezuela	Curacao, N.W.I. 3535

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Grace L. Greaves	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION F. 600 Thomas M. Fisher	PERSONNEL OFFICER C J Goodheart	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS: Slot #3 - THIS REASSIGNMENT [redacted] FOR CONVENIENCE ONLY 303

Charles Ralph Newton
Chief, WH

POSTED
Jpw 13 May 52

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16--63206-1 (2)

NAME [redacted]

NATURE OF ACTION **Appointment - Staff Agent**

Kent, William M.

DATE 7 May 1952

EFFECTIVE DATE 10 June 1952 ~~Upon arrival at station~~

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Asst Intell. ~~Officer,~~ GS-6
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-6, $3795.00 per annum
OFFICE		
DIVISION		WH
BRANCH		III
OFFICIAL STATION		(#3531-001) Fort Amador, C.Z. (Project [redacted]

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION F599 Inf	PERSONNEL OFFICER Goodhart	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☑ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

Cover - military

301

C/WH

DATE

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16-63206-1

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME [redacted]

DATE 7 May 1952

NATURE OF ACTION Appointment - Staff Agent

Kent, William M.

EFFECTIVE DATE 10 June 1952
~~Upon arrival at station~~

	FROM	
TITLE		Intell. Asst ~~Officer~~ GS-6
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-6, $3795.00 per annum
OFFICE		
DIVISION		WH
BRANCH		III
OFFICIAL STATION		Fort Amador, C.Z. (Project Hypothesis) (#3531-001)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE

CLASSIFICATION F 599

Inf

PERSONNEL OFFICER

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

Cover - military

301

C/WH

DATE

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr., [redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 May 1929

3. REQUEST NO.: -

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 4 Nov. 52

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) [illegible]

Staff Agent Appointment (Correction)*

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 10 June 1952
B. APPROVED: 10 June 1952

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—	TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER		Intelligence ~~[illegible]~~, GS-6
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY		GS-6, ~~$3975.00~~ p.a. $3795.00
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		WH III
11. HEADQUARTERS		Panama City, Panama (#3531-001)
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Project - HYPO[illegible]
Cover - Military
*To show correct station. This action corrects all superseding actions to show correct station.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) CA[illegible]
~~[illegible]~~

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Davis B. Powell
Title: FI/PO.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO: ~~#3530-001~~

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

M. L. Shafer 11/4/52

16—67320-2

CONFIDENTIAL

28 JUN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

FROM : Kenneth Corbat
Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Involuntary Retirement - **Mr. William M. Kent**

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has been proposed by the Career Service concerned for involuntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j. This employee has been declared excess to the manpower requirements of his Directorate.

Grade: **GS-15** Position: **Operations Officer**
Career Service : **Operations**
Office/Division : **Office of External Development**
Date Proposed for Retirement: **30 June 1978**
Age at that Date : **49**
Years of Creditable Service : **27**
Years of Agency Service : **26**
Years of Qualifying Service : **5**

3. The Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommended that this proposal be approved.

/s/ Kenneth Corbat

The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

(Signed) F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

28 Jun
Date

Distribution:
0 - Return to ROB
1 - Applicant
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 009676

OP/RAD/ROB/S[illegible]awson:cs/3777 (26 June 19)

3589A (3-77)

23 AUG 1978

Dear Mr. Kent:

As you bring to a close your active career of service with the Central Intelligence Agency, I want to express appreciation for the many contributions you made to our Government and to the Agency.

Your service both domestically and in Latin America was characterized by a high degree of professionalism. The consistently fine performance which you exhibited during your career of over 26 years set an example for your associates.

I note that you received a number of Letters of Commendation and that twice you were awarded a Quality Step Increase in recognition of your sustained superior performance. Your record of accomplishment should be a lasting source of pride and satisfaction to you.

I want to join your many friends and colleagues in wishing you every success and enjoyment in the years ahead.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Mr. William M. Kent
836 Van Buren Street
Herndon, Virginia 22070

Distribution:
0-Addressee
1-OPF

Originator: Director of Personnel

OP/RAD/ROB/SELawson:mn(14 August 1978)

23 AUG 1978

SECRET
(When Filled In)

9 JUN 1978

ØCF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 June 1978

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 05[illegible]198

2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): Kent, William

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Retirement (Involuntary) CIARDS and Cancellation of NSCA

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 30 YEAR 78

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 8020-0008 | 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643 Section 235(a)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/Office of Deputy Director for Operations
Asst Dep Dir-Operations/Development
Non-Official Cover Staff
Referral Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Op[redacted]s Officer, Ch (15)

12. POSITION NUMBER: FS63

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYB

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 40,995

18. REMARKS

L.W.D. 30 June 78

CONCUR: Karen Wylle 6/21/78
CMS/MSB Date

George Moore
CMS/MSB

cc - Payroll

Co-ordinated w/Allen Ranochak/ROB
6/27/78

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry E. Walton
Henry E. Walton
C/PCS/CSS/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 20 June 78

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert E. O'Brien
DDO/CNS/PEB/SR

DATE SIGNED: 06/23/78

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CM-15

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. HQQTRS. CODE: X

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 05 09 29

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0,6,4,0,0,0,0

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR./RESV PROV./TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 28 JUN 1978
6-27-78 AWD

46. O P APPROVAL: William H. Bingham

DATE APPROVED: 6/28/78

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Retirement - Kent, William M. effective 30 June 1978

1. The retirement of Subject, effected as a result of a memorandum from the Head of his Career Service stating that he is surplus to the needs of the Service and that his retirement will be recommended under the provisions of the CIA Retirement and Disability System pertaining to involuntary retirement, in no way implies an adverse action. Subject voluntarily opted for involuntary retirement under CIARDS to qualify for an immediate retirement annuity.

2. Any inquiry received concerning the nature of the separation of Subject from the Agency should be confirmed simply as a retirement.

Kenneth Corbat
Kenneth Corbat
Chief
Retirement Affairs Division

STANDARD FORM 66
January 1972
PRESCRIBED BY U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Federal Personnel Manual Ch. 293
66-104

Reviewed 15 Sep 1966
68 apr entd (N)
71 apr entd (F)
74 Jan entd
76 Mar entd

Last Name First Name Middle Init.
KENT WILLIAM TERMINATED
SSN: 058-22-8472 DOB: 05/09/29

Coded for Qualifications
31 Aug 1965

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

[redacted]

C. Money

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ØCF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 May 76

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (Last–First–Middle): Kent William

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion ~~and~~ Change of Functional Category

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 23 YEAR 76

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS ▶ XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 6221-0117 0002

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PS
Career Mangement Group
Non Offical Cover Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS [redacted] Officer D CH (15)

12. POSITION NUMBER: FS 63

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQB

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 34, 441

18. REMARKS:
DQ5 to DQB

Hank Berthold by phone
LA Personnel

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JL Olmstead, C/CMG/MSB
DATE SIGNED: 18 May 76

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Jean K. Seslo
Paul B. Breitweiser, C/CM 14
DATE SIGNED: 5/18/76

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 37325 ALPHABETIC PS
22. STATION CODE: 95013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HOOTRS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 05 DA. 23 YR. 76
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 05 DA. 23 YR. 76

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OFGH 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR./RESV PROV./TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 05-19-76 DPh
21 MAY 1976

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Robert W.
DATE APPROVED: 05/21/76

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

Mr. Kent has also served as the field representative for a Latin America Division funding and cover mechanism. Mr. Kent's past service in a nonofficial cover status has well qualified him for his present Headquarters assignment at a time when nonofficial cover is taking on even greater significance in Agency operational planning.

c. Personal characteristics and qualifications. In fulfilling his various responsibilities, Mr. Kent has demonstrated that he is imaginative, perceptive, energetic, and a person of sound, independent judgment. He is extremely versatile and has a first-rate mind. Invariably, when a crisis situation arose and talent had to be mobilized within the Division, Mr. Kent was one of the first officers whose name came to mind. He writes quickly and with a polished style. During the past year, he was called upon on two occasions to draft papers concerning Agency involvement in Chile which were used by the Director and the Deputy Director for Operations in their presentations before the Senate Select Committee. Mr. Kent speaks and writes fluent Spanish in addition to speaking very good Italian and some French.

2. Mr. Kent meets all of the general and specific criteria for promotion within his category. He has a total of 24 years of Agency service, of which 23 years have been involved with operations. He has served overseas tours in Panama City and Caracas in addition to his domestic assignments in New Orleans, Miami, and Washington, D.C. He has successfully developed and managed new programs in the Covert Action and the Nonofficial Cover fields in which he is presently engaged. Mr. Kent is a man of enormous energy who is eager to take on challenging assignments. He has yet to reach his peak within the Agency. Mr. Kent has demonstrated that he is an effective supervisor, having served as Desk Chief, Acting Branch Chief, and Section Chief.

3. Mr. Kent is entering into competition for promotion carrying the strong recommendation of this Division as well as that of CMG/NOC. His rotational tour with the Nonofficial Cover Branch will end in July 1977. Because of family medical reasons, Mr. Kent is presently subject to a medical hold. Upon completion of his tour with CMG/NOC, he will return to the Latin America Division with a projected assignment in a senior staff position.

R.S. Sampson

Richard S. Sampson
Chief
Latin America Division

4 MAR 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, GS-14 Evaluation Board

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15, William M. Kent

1. This memorandum recommends the promotion of Mr. William M. Kent from GS-14 to GS-15. Mr. Kent is a 46-year old Operations Specialist who has been in grade since December 1968.

a. Performance in current grade. During the seven years that Mr. Kent has been in grade, he has served as a case officer assigned to the Washington Base of the Foreign Resources Division and, in the Latin America Division, as Chief of the Peruvian Desk, Chief of Covert Action activities for the Chile Branch, and Deputy Special Assistant in the Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations Staff. Since August 1974, Mr. Kent has been serving on a rotational tour with the Nonofficial Cover Branch of the Career Management Group (CMG/NOC). Mr. Kent has occupied a series of increasingly important positions since his assignment to Headquarters in 1970. During his tenure in the Chile Branch he was personally responsible for developing two important programs -- one in the political action field and the other in the propaganda field -- which were designed to influence foreign attitudes towards the Allende regime in Chile. These programs were highly successful. He received overall Outstanding ratings in his Fitness Reports for the period 1972-73 and for his work with CMG/NOC in 1975. Mr. Kent received a Quality Step Increase in 1974.

b. Potential. Throughout his Agency career Mr. Kent has demonstrated that he can assume broader and increased responsibilities and perform effectively in challenging situations. His special strengths lie in the Covert Action and Nonofficial Cover fields. He has distinguished himself in his ability to apply imaginative solutions to operational problems involving Covert Action. In particular, he is noted for his work in exploiting the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela in 1963, and to support U.S. actions during the January 1964 riots in Panama and the April 1964 revolt in the Dominican Republic.

E2, IMPDET
CL BY 018952

6. Kent has been in his present grade for the past seven years. He has clearly earned, and I strongly recommend that he be considered for, promotion to GS-15.

Harris Greene
Harris Greene
Chief
Nonofficial Cover Branch

CONCUR:

Chief, Career Management Group

12/31/75
Date

3. The above has been accomplished in addition to Kent's initially assigned responsibilities for close support of the NOC programs of two very active divisions, Latin America and Africa. This task calls for experienced and tactful direct cooperation with the NOC referents and senior operations officers in the divisions concerned. Ordinarily, such area division NOC responsibility would be a full-time job for an officer of this Branch. Kent handles this assignment, as well as his development of the referrals program, with dispatch and poise.

4. Kent's recent fitness reports will indicate his outstanding qualities. They include an enormous and enthusiastic capacity for work, a fine and precise writing ability, a genuinely rare imagination and a willingness to move far beyond the daily work requirements to get his job done, or to increase the value of his assigned task. This officer is constantly on the move to devise new and effective means of enhancing the nonofficial cover program. He has proven a patient and sympathetic guidance counsellor for numbers of officers either in the NOC program or those interested in it. It is to his credit primarily that we have created the referrals system which not only coordinates the reassignment of NOC personnel across division lines to appropriate new areas and opportunities, but also serves as a central clearing house for personalities who indicate interest in working for CIA in an non-staff capacity.

5. Kent's primary area of operational experience has been Latin America, including years of NOC officer status. A look at his file reveals over a half dozen commendations for unusual service and initiative. Linguistically he speaks native Spanish, very good Italian and some French. He has a supervisory ability far above the average, and has a highly developed diplomatic skill in his pursuit of new operational and staff goals which has stood him well on countless occasions. He is a harmonious and cooperative work colleague. Clearly he is a most unusual operations officer who has mastered staff skills and abilities to the point where he is capable of taking on a wide spectrum of future field or Headquarters assignments.

23 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Career Management Group

VIA : Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Mr. William M. Kent, Recommendation for Promotion

1. Mr. Kent has been on a rotational assignment to the Nonofficial Cover Branch from Latin America Division since August 1974. From the outset, he has displayed a most impressive ability to switch gears from his natural operational initiatives and to focus that initiative into his staff officer role. His rapid absorption of management and personnel principles and problems, with especial emphasis on the non-official cover program of the Directorate, has been remarkable even in an officer with his experience.

2. Specifically, Kent's innovative and imaginative drive has, in a relatively short period of time, enabled the Branch to create a NOC referrals section headed by him, in which he has become a principal DDO coordinator for hundreds of leads involving job applicants which are derived from letters written to the Agency, from our field recruiters, from the CT program, our management skills bank, and other sources. He has created, in his development of this referrals system, a language and job skills record of available applicants who do not fit any specific Agency criterion such as the Career Trainee program. Under his guidance, referrals files are prepared on specific applicants and are forwarded to all DDO components which he knows would be interested in the specific candidate. He handles all replies and indications of interest, and arranges that candidates of interest are cleared, contacted, interviewed, and assessed. Often he handles the contacting, interviewing and assessment himself. In its first full year of operation, his referrals system has assisted in placing impressive candidates in a variety of DDO field assignments.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 AUGUST 1977

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) KENT, WILLIAM

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 08 DAY 28 YEAR 77	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 7020 0008 0002	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDO/OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
OPERATIONS
ASST DEP DIR-OPERATIONS/DEVELOPMENT
NON OFFICIAL COVER STAFF
REFERRAL BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE ~~OPERATIONS~~ OPS OFFICER, CH (15)	12. POSITION NUMBER FS63	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DYB

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 4	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 37,167

18. REMARKS
FROM CMS

CONCUR: Karen Wykle 08-25-77
CMS/MSB Date

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Theadora H. Brummitt Theadora H. Brummitt	DATE SIGNED 24 Aug 77	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER CM/PE	DATE SIGNED 8/29/77

AC/PCS/CSS/Pers **SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL** DDO/CM-15

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 30125	ALPHABETIC ADDO	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS. CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 05 09 29	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. MTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—DRGN 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR./RESV PROV./TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION From: CMS D. Braun 8-29-77	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 30 Aug 77

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING: Responsible for the screening of personnel for assignment to desk, branch or staff; organized special Headquarters operational programs requiring the selection of personnel, the formulation and execution of training seminars, and direction of field administration; managed personnel matters and devised and instituted new systems and programs for spotting, selecting, recruiting, training and assigning personnel; provided career development guidance and counseling to Agency personnel. On occasion, was called on to lecture to training classes. During off-duty hours, gave classes in Spanish and Italian.

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS: In all phases of career, have conducted intelligence, political and economic research and analysis in support of operational activities.

EDUCATION: USAFI, Latin American Institute (New York), Mexico City College (Mexico). Emphasis on international affairs, international trade, journalism, public relations and advertising, languages. Numerous CIA-sponsored courses and seminars on varying aspects of management (MBO, EEO, etc.), economics, security, and other topics related to the intelligence craft.

TRAVEL AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES: Periods of residence and travel in Europe (as a child), Japan, and Latin America. Extensive travel in the United States. Fluent in Spanish and Italian, slight capability in German and French.

PERSONAL:

Community Service:

---Active in Little League, Cub Scouts, Boy Scouts
---Officer and President of PTA
---Fourteen years in Rotary International, variously as member of the Board of Directors, Committee Chairman, Vice President and President
---Founder, later President, Vice-president of town-wide citizens association
---Served on number of civic and mayoral committees

Interests:

[illegible]
gardening, etc.

Other:

Age: 48 Married, 3 children (ages 22, 23, 24)

RESUME

William M. Kent
536 Van Buren Street
Herndon, Virginia 22070

SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND: U.S. Army (1946-1948). Department store manager-trainee, El Salvador, Central America (1950-1951). Twenty-six years as an intelligence officer with the Central Intelligence Agency, covering progressively higher-level assignments in Latin America, Washington, D.C. and other domestic locations. Varied experience in both operational and staff assignments in areas of management, personnel recruitment and training, intelligence collection, liaison, propaganda and political action, field investigations.

OPERATIONS: Selected, assessed, recruited and trained operational assets in the field for intelligence collection purposes. Initiated and developed productive liaison and social connections with foreign political, military and business personalities, in almost all cases using foreign languages. Sent on special assignments to conduct on-the-spot field investigations, collected material evidence and corroborated suspicions. Organized, instituted and supervised individual, regional and world-wide propaganda and political action programs in response to high level directives and in consonance with U.S. policy objectives. Much of this work required a thorough knowledge and understanding of the psychology, culture, aspirations and motivation of foreign individuals and peoples in order to influence them, through verbal as well as written means, from one point of view or ideological preference, to another. Essential to the work were imagination, innovation and drive, as well as a complete understanding of a given subject, a knowledge of journalism and other media, and well-developed writing and verbal skills. Assignments required a willingness and ability to assume effectively and convincingly, a variety of roles; have served as a graduate student, an author, an American diplomat serving in an Embassy abroad, as the head of a voluntary organization, as a businessman, etc.

MANAGEMENT: In Washington headquarters and in the field, served in numerous middle level and senior management positions; have had responsibility for a 26-person operational branch; as a desk chief for overseas stations; as the responsible officer for major political action and propaganda operations; as recruiter and manager of human sources of intelligence; as liaison officer to high level exile and indigenous personalities; as a staff section chief, staff deputy chief, and staff acting chief; and as the deputy of a special assistant to a very senior Agency officer. Responsible for evaluating the work of subordinate personnel and for support and assistance to promotion panels. Planned, disbursed and accounted for operational budgets of up to several millions of dollars.

NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS
OS/EAB
28 apr 78

RESUME

William M. Kent
836 Van Buren Street
Herndon, Virginia
Telephone: Home - (703) 437-3162
Office - (703) 351-4104

SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND: U.S. Army (1946-1948). Department store manager-trainee, El Salvador (1950-1951). Twenty-six years (1952-1978) of experience as an officer with the Central Intelligence Agency, covering a variety of operational and staff assignments, domestic and foreign, ranging from intelligence collection, to propaganda and political action, to administration, personnel recruitment and training, and career management. Hold active Top Secret clearance.

EDUCATION: USAFI, Latin American Institute (New York), Mexico City College (Mexico). Emphasis on international affairs, international trade, journalism, public relations and advertising, languages. Numerous CIA-sponsored courses and seminars on varying aspects of management, security, economics, EEO, and other topics related to the intelligence craft.

TRAVEL AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES: Periods of residence in Europe, Panama, Venezuela, El Salvador. Travel to Cuba, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico. Extensive travel in the United State Fluent in Spanish and Italian, slight capability in German and Fren

PERSONAL:

Community Service:

- ---Active in Little League, Cub Scouts, Boy Scouts
- ---Officer and President of PTA
- ---Fourteen years in Rotary International, variously as member of the Board of Directors, Committee Chairman, Vice President and President
- ---Founder, later President, Vice-president of town-wide citizens association
- ---Served on number of civic and mayoral committees

Interests:

International affairs, writing, fishing and outdoors, gardening, etc.

Other:

Age: 48 Married, 3 children (ages 22, 23, 24)

NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS
OS/EAD
6 April 1978

C. Money

SECRET
(When Filled In)

0CF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 May 76

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (Last–First–Middle): Kent William
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion ~~and~~ Change of Functional Category
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 23 YEAR 76
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 6221-0117 0002
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PS
Career Mangement Group
Non Offical Cover Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS [redacted] Officer D CH (15)
12. POSITION NUMBER: FS 63
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQB
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 34, 441
18. REMARKS:

DQ5 to DQB

Hank Bertholdt by phone
LA Personnel

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JL Olmstead, C/CMG/MSB
DATE SIGNED: 18 May 76
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Jean K. Sesto
Paul B. Breitweiser, C/CM 14
DATE SIGNED: 5/18/76

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 37325 ALPHABETIC PS
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HOOTRS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 05 DA. 23 YR. 76
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 05 DA. 23 YR. 76
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OEGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 05-19-76

21 MAY 1976

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Robert W. [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 05/21/76

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

Mr. Kent has also served as the field representative for a Latin America Division funding and cover mechanism. Mr. Kent's past service in a nonofficial cover status has well qualified him for his present Headquarters assignment at a time when nonofficial cover is taking on even greater significance in Agency operational planning.

c. Personal characteristics and qualifications. In fulfilling his various responsibilities, Mr. Kent has demonstrated that he is imaginative, perceptive, energetic, and a person of sound, independent judgment. He is extremely versatile and has a first-rate mind. Invariably, when a crisis situation arose and talent had to be mobilized within the Division, Mr. Kent was one of the first officers whose name came to mind. He writes quickly and with a polished style. During the past year, he was called upon on two occasions to draft papers concerning Agency involvement in Chile which were used by the Director and the Deputy Director for Operations in their presentations before the Senate Select Committee. Mr. Kent speaks and writes fluent Spanish in addition to speaking very good Italian and some French.

2. Mr. Kent meets all of the general and specific criteria for promotion within his category. He has a total of 24 years of Agency service, of which 23 years have been involved with operations. He has served overseas tours in Panama City and Caracas in addition to his domestic assignments in New Orleans, Miami, and Washington, D.C. He has successfully developed and managed new programs in the Covert Action and the Nonofficial Cover fields in which he is presently engaged. Mr. Kent is a man of enormous energy who is eager to take on challenging assignments. He has yet to reach his peak within the Agency. Mr. Kent has demonstrated that he is an effective supervisor, having served as Desk Chief, Acting Branch Chief, and Section Chief.

3. Mr. Kent is entering into competition for promotion carrying the strong recommendation of this Division as well as that of CMG/NOC. His rotational tour with the Nonofficial Cover Branch will end in July 1977. Because of family medical reasons, Mr. Kent is presently subject to a medical hold. Upon completion of his tour with CMG/NOC, he will return to the Latin America Division with a projected assignment in a senior staff position.

R.S. Sampson

Richard S. Sampson
Chief
Latin America Division

SECRET

4 MAR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, GS-14 Evaluation Board

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15, William M. Kent

1. This memorandum recommends the promotion of Mr. William M. Kent from GS-14 to GS-15. Mr. Kent is a 46-year old Operations Specialist who has been in grade since December 1968.

a. Performance in current grade. During the seven years that Mr. Kent has been in grade, he has served as a case officer assigned to the Washington Base of the Foreign Resources Division and, in the Latin America Division, as Chief of the Peruvian Desk, Chief of Covert Action activities for the Chile Branch, and Deputy Special Assistant in the Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations Staff. Since August 1974, Mr. Kent has been serving on a rotational tour with the Nonofficial Cover Branch of the Career Management Group (CMG/NOC). Mr. Kent has occupied a series of increasingly important positions since his assignment to Headquarters in 1970. During his tenure in the Chile Branch he was personally responsible for developing two important programs -- one in the political action field and the other in the propaganda field -- which were designed to influence foreign attitudes towards the Allende regime in Chile. These programs were highly successful. He received overall Outstanding ratings in his Fitness Reports for the period 1972-73 and for his work with CMG/NOC in 1975. Mr. Kent received a Quality Step Increase in 1974.

b. Potential. Throughout his Agency career Mr. Kent has demonstrated that he can assume broader and increased responsibilities and perform effectively in challenging situations. His special strengths lie in the Covert Action and Nonofficial Cover fields. He has distinguished himself in his ability to apply imaginative solutions to operational problems involving Covert Action. In particular, he is noted for his work in exploiting the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela in 1963, and to support U.S. actions during the January 1964 riots in Panama and the April 1964 revolt in the Dominican Republic.

E2, IMPDET
CL BY 018952

SECRET

6. Kent has been in his present grade for the past seven years. He has clearly earned, and I strongly recommend that he be considered for, promotion to GS-15.

Harris Greene
Harris Greene
Chief
Nonofficial Cover Branch

CONCUR:

Chief, Career Management Group

12/31/75
Date

3. The above has been accomplished in addition to Kent's initially assigned responsibilities for close support of the NOC programs of two very active divisions, Latin America and Africa. This task calls for experienced and tactful direct cooperation with the NOC referents and senior operations officers in the divisions concerned. Ordinarily, such area division NOC responsibility would be a full-time job for an officer of this Branch. Kent handles this assignment, as well as his development of the referrals program, with dispatch and poise.

4. Kent's recent fitness reports will indicate his outstanding qualities. They include an enormous and enthusiastic capacity for work, a fine and precise writing ability, a genuinely rare imagination and a willingness to move far beyond the daily work requirements to get his job done, or to increase the value of his assigned task. This officer is constantly on the move to devise new and effective means of enhancing the nonofficial cover program. He has proven a patient and sympathetic guidance counsellor for numbers of officers either in the NOC program or those interested in it. It is to his credit primarily that we have created the referrals system which not only coordinates the reassignment of NOC personnel across division lines to appropriate new areas and opportunities, but also serves as a central clearing house for personalities who indicate interest in working for CIA in an non-staff capacity.

5. Kent's primary area of operational experience has been Latin America, including years of NOC officer status. A look at his file reveals over a half dozen commendations for unusual service and initiative. Linguistically he speaks native Spanish, very good Italian and some French. He has a supervisory ability far above the average, and has a highly developed diplomatic skill in his pursuit of new operational and staff goals which has stood him well on countless occasions. He is a harmonious and cooperative work colleague. Clearly he is a most unusual operations officer who has mastered staff skills and abilities to the point where he is capable of taking on a wide spectrum of future field or Headquarters assignments.

23 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Career Management Group

VIA : Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Mr. William M. Kent, Recommendation for Promotion

1. Mr. Kent has been on a rotational assignment to the Nonofficial Cover Branch from Latin America Division since August 1974. From the outset, he has displayed a most impressive ability to switch gears from his natural operational initiatives and to focus that initiative into his staff officer role. His rapid absorption of management and personnel principles and problems, with especial emphasis on the non-official cover program of the Directorate, has been remarkable even in an officer with his experience.

2. Specifically, Kent's innovative and imaginative drive has, in a relatively short period of time, enabled the Branch to create a NOC referrals section headed by him, in which he has become a principal DDO coordinator for hundreds of leads involving job applicants which are derived from letters written to the Agency, from our field recruiters, from the CT program, our management skills bank, and other sources. He has created, in his development of this referrals system, a language and job skills record of available applicants who do not fit any specific Agency criterion such as the Career Trainee program. Under his guidance, referrals files are prepared on specific applicants and are forwarded to all DDO components which he knows would be interested in the specific candidate. He handles all replies and indications of interest, and arranges that candidates of interest are cleared, contacted, interviewed, and assessed. Often he handles the contacting, interviewing and assessment himself. In its first full year of operation, his referrals system has assisted in placing impressive candidates in a variety of DDO field assignments.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 AUGUST 1977

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KENT, WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 28 YEAR 77
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 7020 0008 0002
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ASST DEP DIR-OPERATIONS/DEVELOPMENT
NON OFFICIAL COVER STAFF
REFERRAL BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ~~OPERATIONS~~ OPS OFFICER, CH (15)
12. POSITION NUMBER: FS63
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DYB
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 37,167
18. REMARKS:

FROM CMS

CONCUR: Karen Wykle 08-25-77
CMS/MSB Date

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Theadora H. Brummitt
Theadora H. Brummitt
DATE SIGNED: 24 Aug 77
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CH/PF
DATE SIGNED: 8/29/77

AC/PCS/CSS/Pers **SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL** DDO/CM-15

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
37	10	30125	ADDO	75013		1	05 09 29	

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—DRGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR./RESV PROV./TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 30 AUG 1977 From: CMS
D. Braun 8-29-77
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 30 Aug 77

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING: Responsible for the screening of personnel for assignment to desk, branch or staff; organized special Headquarters operational programs requiring the selection of personnel, the formulation and execution of training seminars, and direction of field administration; managed personnel matters and devised and instituted new systems and programs for spotting, selecting, recruiting, training and assigning personnel; provided career development guidance and counseling to Agency personnel. On occasion, was called on to lecture to training classes. During off-duty hours, gave classes in Spanish and Italian.

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS: In all phases of career, have conducted intelligence, political and economic research and analysis in support of operational activities.

EDUCATION: USAFI, Latin American Institute (New York), Mexico City College (Mexico). Emphasis on international affairs, international trade, journalism, public relations and advertising, languages. Numerous CIA-sponsored courses and seminars on varying aspects of management (MBO, EEO, etc.), economics, security, and other topics related to the intelligence craft.

TRAVEL AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES: Periods of residence and travel in Europe (as a child), Japan, and Latin America. Extensive travel in the United States. Fluent in Spanish and Italian, slight capability in German and French.

PERSONAL:

Community Service:

---Active in Little League, Cub Scouts, Boy Scouts
---Officer and President of PTA
---Fourteen years in Rotary International, variously as member of the Board of Directors, Committee Chairman, Vice President and President
---Founder, later President, Vice-president of town-wide citizens association
---Served on number of civic and mayoral committees

Interests:

[illegible] gardening, etc.

Other:

Age: 48 Married, 3 children (ages 22, 23, 24)

RESUME

William M. Kent
[illegible] Van Buren Street
Herndon, Virginia 22070

SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND: U.S. Army (1946-1948). Department store manager-trainee, El Salvador, Central America (1950-1951). Twenty-six years as an intelligence officer with the Central Intelligence Agency, covering progressively higher-level assignments in Latin America, Washington, D.C. and other domestic locations. Varied experience in both operational and staff assignments in areas of management, personnel recruitment and training, intelligence collection, liaison, propaganda and political action, field investigations.

OPERATIONS: Selected, assessed, recruited and trained operational assets in the field for intelligence collection purposes. Initiated and developed productive liaison and social connections with foreign political, military and business personalities, in almost all cases using foreign languages. Sent on special assignments to conduct on-the-spot field investigations, collected material evidence and corroborated suspicions. Organized, instituted and supervised individual, regional and world-wide propaganda and political action programs in response to high level directives and in consonance with U.S. policy objectives. Much of this work required a thorough knowledge and understanding of the psychology, culture, aspirations and motivation of foreign individuals and peoples in order to influence them, through verbal as well as written means, from one point of view or ideological preference, to another. Essential to the work were imagination, innovation and drive, as well as a complete understanding of a given subject, a knowledge of journalism and other media, and well-developed writing and verbal skills. Assignments required a willingness and ability to assume effectively and convincingly, a variety of roles; have served as a graduate student, an author, an American diplomat serving in an Embassy abroad, as the head of a voluntary organization, as a businessman, etc.

MANAGEMENT: In Washington headquarters and in the field, served in numerous middle level and senior management positions; have had responsibility for a 26-person operational branch; as a desk chief for overseas stations; as the responsible officer for major political action and propaganda operations; as recruiter and manager of human sources of intelligence; as liaison officer to high level exile and indigenous personalities; as a staff section chief, staff deputy chief, and staff acting chief; and as the deputy of a special assistant to a very senior Agency officer. Responsible for evaluating the work of subordinate personnel and for support and assistance to promotion panels. Planned, disbursed and accounted for operational budgets of up to several millions of dollars.

NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS
OS/EAB
28apr78

RESUME

William M. Kent
836 Van Buren Street
Herndon, Virginia
Telephone: Home - (703) 437-3162
Office - (703) 351-4104

SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND: U.S. Army (1946-1948). Department store manager-trainee, El Salvador (1950-1951). Twenty-six years (1952-1978) of experience as an officer with the Central Intelligence Agency, covering a variety of operational and staff assignments, domestic and foreign, ranging from intelligence collection, to propaganda and political action, to administration, personnel recruitment and training, and career management. Hold active Top Secret clearance.

EDUCATION: USAFI, Latin American Institute (New York), Mexico City College (Mexico). Emphasis on international affairs, international trade, journalism, public relations and advertising, languages. Numerous CIA-sponsored courses and seminars on varying aspects of management, security, economics, EEO, and other topics related to the intelligence craft.

TRAVEL AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES: Periods of residence in Europe, Panama, Venezuela, El Salvador. Travel to Cuba, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico. Extensive travel in the United State Fluent in Spanish and Italian, slight capability in German and Fren

PERSONAL:

Community Service:

- ---Active in Little League, Cub Scouts, Boy Scouts
- ---Officer and President of PTA
- ---Fourteen years in Rotary International, variously as member of the Board of Directors, Committee Chairman, Vice President and President
- ---Founder, later President, Vice-president of town-wide citizens association
- ---Served on number of civic and mayoral committees

Interests:

International affairs, writing, fishing and outdoors, gardening, etc.

Other:

Age: 48 Married, 3 children (ages 22, 23, 24)

NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS

OS/EAD
6 April 1978

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 April 1970

G-36

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KENT, WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: TRANSFER [redacted] to vouchered funds.
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 19 YEAR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0235 0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
PERU SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (14)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1391
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~20,385~~ 21608
18. REMARKS:

1 - Security
1 - Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 15Apr70
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 4-16

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51400 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HQQTRS. CODE:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 04-16-70 JBR
46. O.P. APPROVAL: James B. Russell
DATE APPROVED: 04-16-70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

p

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 May 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KENT, WILLIAM

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [redacted] REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS (Correction)

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 19 YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0235 0620

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
PERU SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1391

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 21,608

18. REMARKS

* To correct item 3 from "transfer to vouchered funds" to "reassignment and transfer to vouchered funds."

~~* To drop staff employee special.~~

1 - Security
1 - Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 7 May 70

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 4-8

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 38
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51400 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS. CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 16 MO. 04 DA. 19 YR. 70
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 05-11-70 JBR
46. O.P. APPROVAL: James B. Russell
DATE APPROVED: 05-11-70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 JANUARY 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KENT, WILLIAM ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CANCELLATION OF N.S.C.A.

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 15 YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐

7. FAN AND NSCA: 3235 0620 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH DIVISION
BRANCH 6
CA SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (13/14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1855

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 26168 ✓

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: H.L. Berthold, C/WH/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 9 Jan 73

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 10 Jan 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51480 ALPHABETIC WH

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. HDQTRS. CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 03 DA. 08 YR. 29

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG REG/OPT INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: WLB 1-11-73

46. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 1-15-73

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

15 JAN 1973

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OJCS 07/21/73

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KENT WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 07 DA. 01 YR. 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:
6. FUNDS ▶ ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4235 4532 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/WH DIVISION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1855
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition
8-72 MFG 9-72

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4-51)

CONFIDENTIAL

73-6596

10 DEC [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Kent

VIA : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Personnel Evaluation Panel Service

1. The Chairman of the Nonofficial Cover Board has reported to me on your recent service on the NOC Board Sub-Panel for the FY 1974 Personnel Evaluation of officers at the GS-12 level.

2. I take this means to thank you for this important service and to express my hope that it was as valuable an experience for you as it has been for many of your colleagues in the past. The continuing and unstinting contributions being made by persons such as you are helping the Directorate and the Agency not just in improved personnel evaluation but also in markedly enhancing our use of our most valuable asset.

William E. Nelson
William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

IMPDET CL BY 060947

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: William M. Kent

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase

1. My congratulations on the award to you of a Quality Step Increase. This award is in recognition of superior sustained performance and reflects great credit on you and the job you have been doing.

2. I am confident that your future performance will be of continuing high quality.

With personal best wishes,

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

CL BY 009668
E2, IMPDET

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] 7-31

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 July 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 98 0591[illegible] ✓

2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): KENT WILLIAM [illegible] ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 04 YEAR 74

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 5221- ~~5331~~-0117-0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY *(Completed by Office of Personnel)*:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PS
CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
NON OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH
AREAS SECTION

32V
H

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0053

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DOG

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 29,095 ✓

18. REMARKS

coord: H. Berthold /telecoord/
WH Pers

Home Base: WH

cc: Security

43
G

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: J.L. Olmstead, C/CMG/MSB

DATE SIGNED: 23 Jul 74

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul Breckner

DATE SIGNED: 24 JUL 1974

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
37	10	37325	PS	75013		1	05	09	29						

28. NTE EXPIRES MO.	DA.	YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—OBGN 3—FICA 5—NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO	DA.	YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-24-74 JR * from WH

46. O.P. APPROVAL: [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 1 Aug 74

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(4)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

9.17
9-2-75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 August 1975

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198 ✓

2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): Kent William [redacted] ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment--Change in Functional ~~[illegible]~~ Category

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 8 DAY 27 YEAR 75

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS ▶ XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐

7. FAN AND NSCA: 6221-0117 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/~~[illegible]~~ STAFF/ CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
Non Official Cover Branch
AREAS Section.

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Op~~s~~erations Officer ✓ (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: BL 12 ✓

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DQS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01 ✓

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 30,699

18. REMARKS

DQG to DQS

I concur in my Functional Career Category being changed from

B/OG to B/OS: William M Kent 25 August 1975
William Kent Date

Concur: Herb Berthold (By phone)
LA/Personnel
8/26/75

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JLOlmstead, C/CMG/MSB

DATE SIGNED: 8/18/75

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul B. Breitweiser, C/CM 14

DATE SIGNED: 8/26/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	37325	PS	7503		1	05 09 29	✓	

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA. YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3 SEP 1975 BL 8-27-75

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 09/04/75

FORM 5-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

SECRET

5 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Commendation of Mr. William Kent

During the last five months I have turned to Mr. Kent on two occasions to help the Latin America Division in connection with Senate Select Committee's investigation of covert action in Chile. When confronted with a need to produce a paper on Chile in a short timeframe, I instinctively turned to him. It was not only because he had expertise on Chile, due to service in the Chile Branch, but because he is highly skilled in written presentation. He organizes his material well and presents it in a lucid, highly readable manner. On the first occasion, he helped us prepare a paper that was eventually used by the Director in his presentation before the Senate Select Committee on 14-15 July. On the second occasion his contribution was used by the DDO in his appearance before the Senate Select Committee on 28 October. Both of these papers were excellent and have withstoood critical scrutiny.

Aside from Mr. Kent's ability to write I would like to take this occasion to record my overall high esteem for Mr. Kent as a professional and as a person. I have always considered him to be one of our more able and promising officers. His dedication is exemplary; he has spent untold extra hours of his time carrying out his duties. He has good judgment and common sense. Mr. Kent has a very attractive personality and excellent personal presence. From all standpoints he is an excellent officer that deserves to move ahead in the organization. I am convinced he has the ability and potential to do so.

signed
Raymond A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren
Deputy Chief
Latin America Division

cc: ✓C/CMG/NOC
C/LA/PEMS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009560

DD
3/4/76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 1 March 1976

1. SERIAL NUMBER	059198
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	KENT WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT and Delegation of NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 03 DAY 01 YEAR 76
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA	6221-0117 ~~0000~~ 0002
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDO PLANS STAFF CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP NON-OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH SP
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	OPERATIONS OFFICER D CH (15)
12. POSITION NUMBER	FS63
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	DQS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	14 7
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 32,231

18. REMARKS

Form 261 establishing new position number FS63 is in process of being issued. Amendment to 261 will authorize position classification authority of secret

JLeslie / CM-3/14

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL J. L. Olmstead C/CMG/MSB	DATE SIGNED 3-2-76	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Joan K. Leslie Paul B. Breitweiser C/CM -14	DATE SIGNED 3/3/76

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	37
20. EMPLOY CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC	37BX
21. OFFICE CODING — ALPHABETIC	FS
22. STATION CODE	15D13
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. HDQTRS CODE	1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	05 09 29
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP) CODE	
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE) / HEALTH INS. CODE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	DM 3/4/76 08 MAR 1976
46. O.P. APPROVAL	Robert W. Fa
DATE APPROVED	03/08/76

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

SECRET

7 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-14 - [redacted] William M. Kent

1. [redacted] William M. Kent a Staff [redacted] employee since July 1966, has been involved in Latin American area activities since coming with the Agency in 1951. Over the years he has developed an unusually thorough understanding of the political, social and economic realities of the area built on residence there before and after his entrance into the Agency. His fluency in Spanish has complimented this area knowledge and contributed to the superior performance which has characterized his work for this Division over the years.

2. The ability to apply imaginative solutions to operational problems in the CA field has been outstandingly demonstrated by [redacted] Kent during numerous crises in the area. On the occasion of the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in November 1963, the January 1964 riots in Panama, the April 1965 revolution in the Dominican Republic, and numerous other smaller crises situations, [illegible] [redacted] showed a high degree of initiative and professional competence in developing and coordinating covert action efforts in support of Agency objectives. Prior to becoming a Staff employee [redacted] Kent's constructive analyses of the Division's covert action activities have made a significant contribution to the development of a more effective operational program. In his present unofficial cover assignment he has continued to demonstrate a typically energetic, imaginative and enthusiastic operational approach. His current assignment is, and others in the past were, at the level of GS-14 and his promotion to GS-14 is strongly recommended by this Division.

Not Approved -
Jun 1967

William V. Broe
William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

XXB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

G 60

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 1 May 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Kent, William Jr. [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 07 YEAR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 7135-0630

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13

17. SALARY OR RATE: $

18. REMARKS: EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE

20. EMPLOY CODE

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. HDQTRS. CODE

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE: 2

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 05-15-67

46. O.P. APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 3 MAY 19

DATE APPROVED

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
OP-2

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VXB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 1 August 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Kent, William M. [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 30 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF XX CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 8129-0109
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

D
DDP/DOD
24 US FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION"
ORBIT OPERATIONS GROUP
(13)

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER [redacted]
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0203
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 14665 ✓
18. REMARKS:

To fill vacant position.

G
60 From: DDP/WH/US Field/positon no. 8001

Security Approval [illegible] 6/1/67
[illegible] 8/1/67

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch
Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO Pers. & Training
DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: J. M. Collins
DATE SIGNED: 9 Aug '67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	12	43630	DOD	75013		2	05 09 29		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.:
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE: 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV./TEMP. CODE:
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE: 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: From WH
R.8 9/9/67
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Don G. [illegible] ✓
DATE APPROVED: 9 Aug 67

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET Posted

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

14 AUG 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : [redacted] William M Kent

The Clandestine Services Agent Panel has approved the reassignment of [redacted] to DO/Washington, D. C. Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay (NCPP) should be terminated the effective date of this reassignment.

Dwight M. Collins
Dwight M. Collins
Secretary, Agent Panel

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XXB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 OCTOBER 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Kent William M.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 08 YEAR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8129-0109

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
US FIELD
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP
WASHINGTON BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (GS-13/14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0416

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 14665

18. REMARKS:

T/O Change

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO Pers. & Training

DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 12 Oct 1967

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.		
37	10	43500	DOD	75813		2	05	09	29				

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: RS

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 1[illegible] OCT 1967

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

XX8 **SECRET** (When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 December 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198 ✓
2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): Kent, William M. [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 15 YEAR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9129-0109
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
US FIELD
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP
WASHINGTON BASE
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER GS-14
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0416
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 18076 ✓
18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch
Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO Pers. & Training
DATE SIGNED: 11 Dec 68
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 12 Dec 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH ✓ MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
22	10	43500	DOD	25013		2	03	09	29	12	15	68	12	15	68

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—DRGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-12-68
46. O P APPROVAL: 036
DATE APPROVED: 12/12/68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

XXB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 February 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): Kent William M. [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 07 YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶

V TO V		V TO CF
CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0129 0109

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/~~WH~~ DOD
U.S. FIELD
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GROUP
WASHINGTON BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0416

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20,385

18. REMARKS

Virginia L. Lynch 10 Feb '70

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [redacted]

DATE SIGNED: [redacted]

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 11 Feb 70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. HOURS. CODE: 2

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OBGN 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1800091

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0. WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 2-9-70 WR

46. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 02/09/70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

30 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/PERS

THROUGH : CSPS/Agent Panel
WH/SS

ATTENTION : Carroll Hauver

William Kent
SUBJECT : Request to Payroll [redacted]
as Staff Employee Special

REFERENCE : Memorandum from C/WH dtd 26 January 1970
entitled "[redacted]

The referent memorandum approved by Chairman, Agent Panel, requested that [redacted] be converted to a staff employee with full access to the Headquarters building. Since [redacted] will remain under non-official cover, it is requested that WH Division initiate action to place [redacted] in the Staff Employee Special category to avoid interruption of his payrolling by a devised facility cover entity.

Willard F. Burke
C/CCS/DFB

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

XX F

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 February 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): KENT, WILLIAM
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (Career)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 08 YEAR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

G 36

6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0135 0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
PERU SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (14)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1391
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20,385
18. REMARKS:

VICE RICHARD CONOLLY

STAFF EMPLOYEE SPECIAL

C 12/54

Home Base: WH

Joyce Mayclin
CS PS/Agent Br. 11 Feb 70

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 5 Feb 70
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 2-11-70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQDTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
13	10	51400	WH	75013		1	05 09 29	12 15 68	12 14 69

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—CIGM, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE: 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA. YR:
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.: 00000
34. SEX: M 1
35. VET PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.) CODE: 1
36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA. YR.: 07 03 50
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR.: 01 02 52
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV PROV./TEMP CODE: C
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER, 1—YES): 1 HEALTH INS. CODE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 058 228472
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) CODE: 1
42. LEAVE CAT CODE: 8
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE: 0 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS: M 0
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE: — NO. TAX EXEMP.: — STATE CODE: —
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 02-11-70 JBR
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 9 Feb 70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

12 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: TRB & CSPS

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - [redacted]

William M. Kent Employee

Attached hereto is Subject's Annual/Reassignment of Supervisor Fitness Report covering reporting period 1 January 1968 - 6 Jan. 1969.

Virginia C. Lynch
Chief, DO Personnel & Training

1 Attachment, A/S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 August 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 559198 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KENT, William M.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT "And Transfer to Vouchered Funds"

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 20 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2635-5000-8021

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
3A
DDP/WH ~~[illegible]~~.
Branch 4
PA-Propaganda Sec.

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0707

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (13)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 (2)

17. SALARY OR RATE: 9215 ✓

18. REMARKS:
From: DDP/WH, Br.4, #0625

OSID
VB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Herbert V. Juul
HERBERT V. JUUL, C/WH/4/Pers. HVJ

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Orville C Dawson

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	64450	WH	75013		1	05 09 29		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED: 1 = YES 2 = NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 08/11/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 FEBRUARY 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198 ✓
2. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: KENT, WILLIAM M.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 DAY 13 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235-1000-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY *(Completed by Office of Personnel)*:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

3 DDP WH
BRANCH 3
CARIBBEAN SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER [illegible]
12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]-858
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS [illegible]
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 9215 ✓
18. REMARKS:

FROM: DDP/WH/4/PA PROPAGANDA SECTION/707/WASHINGTON, D. C. Tracy 3A

VB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: R. C. Bowers
R. C. BOWERS C/WH/PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED: 2/23/62

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Walter Potts
DATE SIGNED: 28 Feb 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOSTEL CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LE MO. DA. YR.
37	10	64400	WH			1	05 09 29		

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LOD: 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVER, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 03/12/62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Walter Potts
DATE APPROVED: 28 Feb 62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 MAY 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KENT, WILLIAM M.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 18 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235-1000-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 5
CA SECTION

6
4

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER 3

12. POSITION NUMBER: [redacted]-892

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS [redacted]

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 03

17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~$9215~~ 9475

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/3/CARIBBEAN SEC/BA-858/D. C. (unass)

STAFFING COMPLEMENT CHANGE.

rs

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: P C Bowers
P. C. BOWERS C/WH/PERSONNEL

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Orville C. Dawson

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROSTER CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	64470	WH			1	05 09 29		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 = CSC 2 = FICA 3 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA ⇨
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LOC 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 05/17/62

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Orville C. Dawson

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 26 November 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KENT, WILLIAM M.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 30 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235 1000 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
2
A
DDP WH
BRANCH 2
URUGUAY/PARAGUAY SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0[illegible]970
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $10,105
18. REMARKS:
FROM: DDP/WH/5/CA Sec/892/Hqs tray 4

Recorded by
CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: R C Bowers
R. C. BOWERS C/WH/Personnel
DATE SIGNED: 26 Nov 62
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: O. C. Dawson
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64350 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOOTRS. CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W Kearney 11/30/62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: O. C. Dawson
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

92 11-30

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 JUNE 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [redacted]59198 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KENT, WILLIAM M. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4235 1000 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF
(SECTION B)
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: [redacted]-645
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $11,150 ✓
18. REMARKS:

FROM: DDP/WH/2/URUGUAY/PARAGUAY SECT/970/Hqs Tray 2A

Recorded by
CSPD
[illegible]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [illegible] for
ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 1 Aug 63

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul R [illegible]
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 64075 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. ROSTER CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LSI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 2 = FICA 3 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: CODE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAREER/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREV. CIV. GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 = NO PREV. GOV. SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. OF EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: V. Kearney 08/09/63
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Paul R [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 6 Aug 63

FORM 4.62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 JUNE 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER [redacted]59198 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) KENT, WILLIAM M. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 06 DAY 23 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3235 1000 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 2 URUGUAY, PARAGUAY SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER [redacted] 970
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP 13 1	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 11,150 ✓

2A

18. REMARKS

FROM: SAME

Recorded by
CSPD
Dh

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL RDCashman ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS	DATE SIGNED 6/20/63	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Paul R Wilson	DATE SIGNED 20 June 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROUTING CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	64350	WH	75013		1	05 09 29		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR-RESV PROV-TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION J.D. Kearney 06/24/63	46. O.P. APPROVAL Paul R Wilson	DATE APPROVED 20 June 63

FORM 4.62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 JANUARY 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198

2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): KENT, WILLIAM M.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY YEAR 65

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5235-0620

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

37

G

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH"
PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF
SECTION B

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0646

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~$12075~~ 12,495

18. REMARKS:
FROM: (SAME tray)
SLOTTING CHANGE

Received by CSPD
CK

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: R. D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 1/6/64

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: A. Beasley

DATE SIGNED: 1-8-65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
37	10	510257	WH 1150.3			1	05	09	29						

28. NTE EXPIRES MO.	DA.	YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO.	DA.	YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.	36. SERV COMP DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	37. LONG COMP DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR-RESV PROV/TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVER 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 01/08/65

46. O.P. APPROVAL: A. Beasley

DATE APPROVED: 1-8-65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 DECEMBER 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059198
2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): KENT, WILLIAM M.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH ~~DEC~~ 12 | DAY 19 | YEAR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235 - 0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH OPERATIONS STAFF
PLANS & ~~OPS~~ ~~[illegible]~~
SECTION B
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER ✓ (GS-13)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0646 ✓
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D ✓
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01 ✓
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,380
18. REMARKS:

FROM: 0645

Recorded by
CSPD
[illegible]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN
C/WH/Personnel
DATE SIGNED: 20 Dec 65
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 12/22/65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	05 09 29		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12 23 [illegible]
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 12 28 65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 JUNE 1966

XAP

1. SERIAL NUMBER	059198
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	KENT, WILLIAM M.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH DAY YEAR)	07 30 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	~~6~~ 4235 0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH PLANS AND OPERATIONS STAFF SECTION B
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0646
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	13 ~~X~~ ~~4~~ 5
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ ~~13380~~ ~~13975~~ 14,665

18. REMARKS
FROM: SAME

Recorded by
CSPD
dyt

1 - ~~Sxxxxxxx~~ Security
1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	Robert D. Cashman C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED	6/20/66
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	
DATE SIGNED	8 July 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	45
20. EMPLOY. CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	
22. STATION CODE	
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. HDQTRS. CODE	1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	05 09 29
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE	1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	30 0091
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) CODE	
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0—WAIVER, 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	0805 66 1
46. O.P. APPROVAL	John C. Latau
DATE APPROVED	8/3/66

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

KXB

DATE PREPARED: 17 JUNE 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059198	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Kent, William M. [redacted]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Appointment Career EXCEPTED [redacted]	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 07 DAY 31 YEAR 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular [redacted]	
6. FUNDS ▶	☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	[redacted] V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7135 0630	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH Project Annex US FIELD JMPOPLAR-12	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION NEW ORLEANS, [redacted]. Louisiana		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER [redacted] 8001	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 ~~3~~ ~~4~~ 5	17. SALARY OR RATE $ ~~13380~~ ~~13818~~ 14,665 [redacted]

18. REMARKS

[illegible]

THE ABOVE POSITION IS BEING TRANSFERRED TO THE US FIELD TO ACCOMODATE SUBJECT.

6-12-54

1 - Finance
1 - Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Robert D. Cashman C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 6/20/66	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER for Dw Collins	DATE SIGNED 7 July '66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 13	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51800 ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 75033	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE 2	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. 05 DA. 09 YR. 29	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. 06 DA. 23 YR. 63	27. DATE OF LEI MO. 06 DA. 19 YR. 66
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE 1	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO. 00000	34. SEX M	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 1 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. 07 DA. 03 YR. 50	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. 01 DA. 02 YR. 52	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE C	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1 0—WAIVER 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE —	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. —		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 1 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE 8	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE 0	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS No	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO —	CODE —	NO. TAX EXEMP. —	STATE CODE —
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 0809066N	46. O.P. APPROVAL Dow H. Leutschagen	DATE APPROVED 11 July 66						

FORM 3-1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. William M. Kent
[redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 May 1929

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 28 Jun 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Resignation (Staff Agent)*
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: OCT 7 1956

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
I.O. (FI) BAF-277.01	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	
GS-0136.51-11 $6390.00 p.a. OK ort 10 Aug 56	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	
DDP/WH Branch III Panama City, Panama Station	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Panama City, Panama	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL (DI)	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
* To Be CONVERTED to STAFF Employee ~~seek other employment.~~

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): J. KOPLANOVICH X-8242

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Robert A. Shuls (WMH)
Title: FI/CMO 24 July 56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DI OK

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3525-55-051
TO:

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		7/13/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		7/26/56
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Don [illegible]. Luetscher

SECRET

16—57329—2

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19__—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. William M. KENT
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 9 May 1929
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 28 Jun 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Excepted Appointment
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 8 Oct 56

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BA -322-11
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-11 $6390.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch III Cuba Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL 12 (D)

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

(wmn)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): J. KOFLANOVICH X-8242

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: RW Adams
Title: CS/CSP

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DI OK

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: TO: 6-3500-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

OFFICE/DIV [illegible]
10/9/56
Date
Position [illegible]

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		8/13/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		9 Aug 56
E.		

REMARKS: Has not had BOC

F. APPROVED BY

DLReedy 7/26/56

SECRET

10—57350-2

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): MR WILLIAM M. KENT
3. Date Of Birth: Mo 5 Da 9 Yr 29
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS - EOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No -2): Code
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

VOUCHERED

14. Organizational Designations: DDP/WH
Branch III
Cuba Section
Code:
15. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D.C.
Station Code:
16. Dept.- Field (Dept - X, Usfld-, Frgn -): Code
17. Position Title: Area Ops Officer
18. Position No.: 322
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0136.01
21. Grade & Step: 11-1
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 6390
23. SD: DI
24. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr
25. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr
26. Appropriation Number: 8-3500-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: Resignation
Code:
28. Eff. Date: Mo Da Yr
29. Type Of Employee: Regular
Code:
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
Code:
32. Location Of Official Station:
Station Code:
33. Dept.- Field (Dept -, Usfld-, Frgn -): Code
34. Position Title:
35. Position No.:
36. Serv.:
37. Occup. Series:
38. Grade & Step:
39. Salary Or Rate: $
40. SD:
41. Date Of Grade: Mo 07 Da 01 Yr 56
42. PSI Due: Mo 12 Da 29 Yr 57
43. Appropriation Number:

Cancelled per Req of WH Div
Ltr 2 May 58

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): P. C. BOWERS, WH/Personnel Officer
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): H. C. MONTAGUE, X-8242
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	SK(MD)	11/22/57	D. Placement		11/22/57
B. Pos. Control	KN	11 DEC 1957	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Sheay	

Remarks

To seek other employment

FORM 5-57 1152a

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) Kent, William M. [redacted]	3. Date Of Birth Mo 5 Da 9 Yr 29	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
16. Dept.- Field Dept - Usfld- Fran - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv. 20. Occup. Series
21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate $	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr 25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr 26. Appropriation Number

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Excepted Appointment	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee ~~Staff Agent~~ Regular	Code	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

UNVOUCHERED

31. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station (DP)	Code	32. Location Of Official Station Havana, Cuba	Station Code 12-DP
33. Dept.- Field Dept - Usfld- x Fran - Code	34. Position Title Operations Officer (PP)	35. Position No. 395-~~11~~	36. Serv. GS 37. Occup. Series 0136.31
38. Grade & Step 11-1	39. Salary Or Rate 6390 $	40. SD DI	41. Date Of Grade Mo 07 Da 01 Yr 56 42. PSI Due Mo 12 Da 29 Yr 57 43. Appropriation Number 8-3545-55-055

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) PC Bowers
P. C. BOWERS, WH/Personnel Officer

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
H. C. MONTAGUE, X-8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		11/22/57	D. Placement		11/22/57
B. Pos. Control		11 DEC 1957	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

Cancelled per memo from WH Division dated 8 May 58 (attached)

FORM 5-57 1152a

SECRET

(4)

Classify According To Content.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo	Da	Yr	
	KENT, William M.	5	9	29		1	M				

7. SCD Mo	Da	Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo	Da	Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo	Da	Yr	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
				1						/					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/WH Branch III Cuba Section		Washington, D.C.	

16. Dept.- Field Dept - Usfld- Frgn - X	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
		Area Ops Officer	322	GS	0136.01 3

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	25. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	26. Appropriation Number
11-2	$ ~~6605~~ 7270	DI							8-3500-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT Transfer from V to UV	05	6 29 58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/WH Branch I Caracas, Venezuela Station	4650	Caracas, Venezuela	77003

33. Dept.- Field Dept - Usfld- Frgn - X	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
		I.O. (FI)	[illegible]-537-[illegible]	GS	0136.51 12

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	42. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	43. Appropriation Number
	$		07	01	56	06	28	59	8-3588-55-066

5

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) P.C. Bowers P.C. BOWERS WH/Personnel Officer	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) 650
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) JOHN WASHINKO X 8242	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		6/16/58	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		18 JUN 1958	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	P.C. Bowers	18 JUN 1958

Remarks W-4 & D-4 forms will be forwarded to UV payroll per Moreen - WH.
2 copies to Security.
Transfer from Vouchered to Unvouchered Funds. Sec. Conc by Knott 6/11/58 3/6/19

FORM 5-57 1152a (4)

SECRET

AS

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Mr. William M. Kent 5-9-29 FSA 6 6-26-58

Limited Appointment 7/23/58 Section 522.1
PL 724 79th as amended

Political Officer

Assistant Attache

FSR-7 $6435

Caracas

X Regular

5-pt
X

New
X

1-1011-110

M 9A-8011 XCSC 7/23/58 VA.

Execute SF-61a

Marital Status - Married - Three

Reserve Status - None

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo / Da / Yr		V to V		V to UV
		UV to V		UV to UV

1. Serial No.	2. Name (*Last-First-Middle*) KENT, William M	3. Date of Birth Mo 5 Da 9 Yr 29	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1X 10 Pt-2 Code /	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr

7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 0	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT. LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch I Caracas, Venezuela Station	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Caracas, Venezuela	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field Dept - Usfld- Frgn - X Code	17. Position Title IO/FI	18. Position No. 537	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.51

21. Grade & Step 11 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 7270	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo 10 Da 08 Yr 56	25. PSI Due Mo 06 Da 28 Yr 59	26. Appropriation Number 9-3588-55-066 5

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Integration Department of State	Code 58	28. Eff. Date Mo 7 Da 23 Yr 58	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 0M	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 4650	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code 77003

33. Dept.-Field Dept - Usfld- Frgn - X Code	34. Position Title Assistant Attache Pol Officer	35. Position No.	36. Serv. FSR	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step 7	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6435	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (*Name And Title*) OPSER/CCD/OCL	C. Request Approved By (*Signature And Title*) B. Eggleston Cover Officer
B. For Additional Information Call (*Name & Telephone Ext.*) B. Eggleston x8104	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

Standard Remarks

No file

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDIT

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 559198	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) KENT WILLIAM M	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 05 Da. 09 Yr. 29	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 01 Da. 02 Yr. 52
7. SCD Mo. 07 Da. 03 Yr. 50	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. 01 Da. 02 Yr. 52
					13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH I CARACAS, VENEZUELA STATION	Code 4650	15. Location Of Official Station CARACAS VENEZUELA	Station Code 77003
16. Dept. - Field (Dept -, USfld -, Frgn -) Code 5	17. Position Title ASST ATTA POL OFF I.O. (FI)	18. Position No. 0537	19. Serv. FSR GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.51			
21. Grade & Step 07 11 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6435 7270	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 01 Yr. 56
25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 3588 55 066		

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. 5 Da. 17 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code OM	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 4650	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code 77003
33. Dept. - Field (Dept -, USfld -, Frgn -) Code 5	34. Position Title Ops off	35. Position No. D-12	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.01			
38. Grade & Step 12 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 8330	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 5 Da. 17 Yr. 59
42. PSI Due Mo. 11 Da. 13 Yr. 60	43. Appropriation Number		

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) PCBowers
P. C. Bowers WH/Personnel Officer

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
John Washinko X8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	Orville C Dagrgan	5/8/59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	KW	14 MAY 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert E. Richards	14 MAY 1959

Remarks

OFFICE OF ...

MAY 11 1 53 PM '59

Recorded by
CSPD
MAY 5
'59

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

w/o file
JJB

(4)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
	KENT, WILLIAM M.	05	09	29		1	M	1				

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
				1											

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 4		WASH., D. C.	

16. Dept. - Field Dept - X USfld - Frgn -	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	1	ASST ATTA POL OFF OPS OFF	BA-625	FSR GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 12 1	$ 6600 8330	D	05	17	59	11	13	60	0135 1000 1000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	60 BB	~~COB~~ 4	~~16~~ 17	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 4	4617	WASH., D. C.	

33. Dept. - Field Dept - X USfld - Frgn -	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	OPS OFF	BA-625	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	D							0135 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) PC Bowers
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
JOHN WASHINKO X 8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	O. C. Dawson	4/18/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	WK	4-20-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	W. Kearney	4-20-60

Remarks Subject resigned from the Department of State effective 16 April 1960, COB.

Recorded by
CSPD
4-19-60

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
559198	KENT WILLIAM M	05	09	29		1	M 1	01	02	52	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
07	03	50		1	50 USCA 403 J				01 02 52		2

5

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH I CARACAS, VENEZUELA STATION	4650	CARACAS VENEZUELA	77003

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn -	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	ASST ATTA POL OFF OPS OFF	0537	FSR GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 12 1	$ [illegible] 6600 8330	D1	05 17 59	11 13 60	0135 5880 3000 ~~[illegible]~~

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	67	04 03 60	REGULAR	OM	

3

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 4	4617	WASH., D. C.	

33. Dept. - Field Dept -X USfld - Frgn -	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	ASST ATTA POL OFF OPS OFF	p-13 ~~[illegible]~~-625	FSR GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
07 12 1	$ 6600 8330	D			0135 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) PCBowers
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
JOHN WASHINKO X8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	C. C. Dawson	4/11/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	Wa	4-15-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		4-15-60

Remarks

Staffing Complement Change.

2 copies to Security.

Received
CSPD
4-14-60

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1152

SECRET

(4)

29 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary of S/W Training and Issuance of Materials.

AGENT : AMLASH/1

PLACE : Paris, France

DATE : 17-22 August 1962

TRAINER: Richard M. Fallucci, TFW C/O.

1. AMLASH/1 was instructed in S/W techniques by the undersigned in a Paris Station safehouse on 17 and 18 August, and was given an S/W review in the final briefing session held in the hotel room of Wallace A. Growery (Madrid Station C/O) on 22 August. Instruction was given in the use of carbon writing system No. 15136 and in the use of liquid developer system No. 56638. The "scorch" method of development was also demonstrated to A/1 as an alternate system. A total of five hours was devoted to this instruction.

2. A/1, who was recruited a short time prior to coming to Paris, was introduced to the idea of using S/W by the undersigned during discussions held in Copenhagen. Although for security considerations, he was skeptical at first about using such a means of communication, he was without undue effort convinced that any productive relationship depended upon his being able to communicate with his C/O on a regular basis through the medium of S/W letters sent through normal mail channels. It was apparent from his early questions that he was unfamiliar with the principles of S/W and clandestine communications in general. After further talks in Paris with Growery on 16 August, A/1 was fully prepared to accept the concept of S/W communications, and arrangements were made for this instruction to begin the following day.

3. The first training session on 17 August lasted a little more than two hours, and was devoted to an explanation of the S/W system of communication, including careful instruction in the preparation of a letter containing S/W. A/1 also prepared an S/W letter of his own under the supervision of the undersigned. He seemed to grasp readily the principles of the preparation of an S/W

SECRET

message and experienced only a little difficulty at first in remembering all the steps in sequence necessary for the preparation of an S/W message. He was generally attentive to the instruction given. However, in keeping with his temperment, he was a little impatient during the preparation of the S/W message itself upon the cover letter. At the end of this session, he demonstrated that he remembered the basic steps in a satisfactory manner, particularly considering that it was his first day in S/W instruction.

4. The second period of instruction took place in the same safehouse, lasting about two hours. This session was devoted to a review of the S/W procedures and the preparation by A/1 of another practice S/W letter. Following this, A/1 was instructed in the development of S/W messages, using the liquid developer No. 56638 The scorch system of development was also demonstrated. A/1 was impressed by the simplicity of the liquid developer and the immediate reaction which it produced. The undersigned developed one message; then A/1 was allowed to prepare the developer from its dry pill form and to develop a second practice S/W message for himself. Following the period devoted to S/W development, a general review of S/W communications was held, the basic points apparently being well-fixed in A/1's mind.

5. During the final formal meeting with A/1 on 22 August with Growery and the undersigned participating, the latter gave A/1 a general review of all the S/W procedures which were to be used in his contact with KUBARK. He also was provided with the following items:

A. Two sheets of S/W carbon paper (No. 15136)
B. Forty-seven pills of developer (No. 56638)
C. One tablet of writing paper provided by TSD and known to be compatible with the carbon sheets.
D. 3 No. 2 pencils of French manufacture.
E. One ball-point pen with water-resistant ink.
F. Two accomodation addresses: one in Madrid for regular contact; one in New York City for rapid emergency contact (see attached S/W data sheet).
G. Appropriate indicators (see S/W data sheet)

It is noted that A/1 did not have a secure accomodation address in PBRUMEN to give us at this time. He was told, however, that it was imperative that he provide one for us by S/W letter within two weeks of his return to PBRUMEN. This he stated he would do.

6. During the last S/W review, A/1 was shown a photograph of one of his practice messages which he had prepared. He was quite interested in seeing this, which served to illustrate a number of the training points which had been covered during previous instruction.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Generally, A/1 was an interested pupil and it is believed that he will be able to carry out the instructions in a proper manner. He is quite security conscious, a factor which it is believed, will add to his attempts to seek perfection in his S/W correspondence and in the secure storage of his S/W materials when not in use. It is also known that A/1 practiced his S/W techniques in his hotel room after leaving the 22 August meeting. This is known because he had an additional question to ask us at a brief meeting on 23 August.

7. It should also be noted that the TSD technician who developed A/1's practice letters recommends that for best results, all letters from A/1 be subjected to ammonia fuming before immersion in the developer.

Richard M. Fallucci

Richard M. Fallucci

Attachments:
  Agent S/W Record
  Form #H-55900

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

29 Aug 62

REPORT OF S/W TRAINING, PARIS.

AGENT S/W RECORD Date 29 August 1962

1. Agent Cryptonym: AMLASH/1

2. SW supplies issued to the Agent (date and quantity):
2 sheets of carbon S/W paper #15136 and 48 pills of developer #56638 both issued on 22 August 1962.

3. Cover correspondence to the agent will be in Spanish and handwritten or typed; from the agent will be printed or typewritten (in Spanish).

4. Location assigned for placement of S/W text: S/W text will be placed on the face of the cover letter; agent has, however, been instructed to check both sides of letters received for S/W. Letters from the agent on face of cover text.

5. Accommodation addresses:
To be supplied by agent in first S/W letter he sends (this to be by 15 September 1962 at the latest.)

Accommodation addresses for letters from the agent:

Regular accommodation address:

Senorita Maria Dolores Gomez
Apartado 12315
Madrid, Spain

Rapid/Emergency accommodation address:

Mr. Humphrey R. Boncavil
P. O. Box 892
General Post Office
NYC 1, N. Y.

Agents letters to be signed "Ramon".

6. Re-suppl arrangements:
If carbons lost: Agent writes cover letter to Madrid address in normal manner. Absence of S/W message indicates loss of carbons and Agent is to expect next letter he receives to be a re-supply of carbons (in the form of the letter itself).

If developer lost: Agent so indicates in letter to Madrid (in S/W): re-supply will take place through one of the three Dead Drops which Agent has been told to locate and report soonest by S/W. Identity of Drop utilized and date loaded to be conveyed to Agent through S/W message developed by "scorch" method... see below.

7. Required indicators:
   A. For presence of S/W on letters to the agent: All letters to agent will contain S/W.

   B. To indicate loss of writing materials: Carbon sheets: Agent writes to Madrid, letter with no S/W. Developer: Agent writes in S/W and so indicates.

   C. Indicate carbon re-supply by mail: Upon indication of loss of carbon sheets (see above), preferably the next letter sent to Agent will be a carbon sheet. In any case agent understands that any cover letter containing the word "finca" (Spanish for farm) has been written on a carbon sheet, which he is then to use for S/W correspondence as needed.

8. Optional indicators: Any letter received by Agent containing the word "hacienda" in the cover letter is understood to indicate that the S/W message contained therein is to be developed by the "scorch" system.

Danger or control indicators:

Letters from Agent: Any word, mark, phrase, etc., after the Spanish word "FIN" at the end of the S/W message indicates agent is under control.

Letters to the Agent: Acknowledgement of Agent's control indicator is to be made by duplicating his "control indicator" in the next S/W message to him.

AMLASH [illegible]

AGENT S/W RECORD **Date 29 August 1962**

1. Agent Cryptonym: AMLASH/1

2. SW supplies issued to the Agent (date and quantity):
   2 sheets of carbon S/W paper #15136 and 48 pills of developer #56638 both issued on 22 August 1962.

3. Cover correspondence to the agent will be in Spanish and handwritten or typed; from the agent will be printed or typewritten (in Spanish).

4. Location assigned for placement of S/W text: S/W text will be placed on the face of the cover letter; agent has, however, been instructed to check both sides of letters received for S/W. Letters from the agent on face of cover text.

5. Accommodation addresses:
   To be supplied by agent in first S/W letter he sends (this to be by 15 September 1962 at the latest.)

   Accommodation addresses for letters from the agent:

   Regular accommodation address:

   Senorita Maria Dolores Gomez
   Apartado 12318
   Madrid, Spain

   Rapid/Emergency accommodation address:

   Mr. Humphrey R. Boncavil
   P. O. Box 892
   General Post Office
   NYC 1, N. Y.

   Agents letters to be signed "Ramon".

6. Re-supply arrangements:
   If carbons lost: Agent writes cover letter to Madrid address in normal manner. Absence of S/W message indicates loss of carbons and Agent is to expect next letter he receives to be a re-supply of carbons (in the form of the letter itself).

   If developer lost: Agent so indicates in letter to Madrid (in S/W); re-supply will take place through one of the three Dead Drops which Agent has been told to locate and report soonest by S/W. Identity of Drop utilized and date loaded to be conveyed to Agent through S/W message developed by "scorch" method... see below.

7. Required indicators:
   A. For presence of S/W on letters to the agent: All letters to agent will contain S/W.

   B. To indicate loss of writing materials: Carbon sheets: Agent writes to Madrid, letter with no S/W. Developer: Agent writes in S/W and so indicates.

   C. Indicate carbon re-supply by mail: Upon indication of loss of carbon sheets (see above), preferably the next letter sent to Agent will be a carbon sheet. In any case agent understands that any cover letter containing the word "finca" (Spanish for farm: has been written on a carbon sheet, which he is then to use for S/W correspondence as needed.

8. Optional indicators: Any letter received by Agent containing the word "hacienda" in the cover letter is understood to indicate that the S/W message contained therein is to be developed by the "scorch" system.

Danger or control indicators:

Letters from Agent: Any word, mark, phrase, etc., after the Spanish word "FIN" at the end of the S/W message indicates agent is under control.

Letters to the Agent: Acknowledgement of Agent's control indicator is to be made by duplicating his "control indicator" in the next S/W message to him.

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

D. ATCH NO. HKH-A-3418

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana JR

DATE: 21 February 1957

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative
SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

Ref: HKH-W-2092, 8 February 1957

1. With regard to the contents of reference dispatch, which were communicated to the Subject, VAIVADA has no objections and is agreeable to conversion to the career agent category as described therein.

2. VAIVADA requests, however, that the plans already proposed for acquisition of U.S. citizenship by his wife be carried through. He, and the Station, believe that this step will provide him with greater security in non-official cover assignments. In addition, such action will minimize the red tape he must cut each time he has to obtain new visas for himself and family.

3. The Station will submit a new request for VAIVADA's training several months prior to the desired new training dates.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Distribution:
✓3-Washington
2-Files

20 February 1957

JRP/mfm

CS COPY

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881
~~19-1-1-7856~~

RI COPY

DBA 31173

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(1)

Miami, Florida
April 16, 1963

RE: CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

The April 9, 1963, issue of the "Miami News" carried an article entitled, "Exiles Say Miro To Quit". This article stated that informed exile sources claim that Dr. JOSE MIRO CARDONA would resign his post as head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The article said exile sources gave two possibilities for his resignation. One faction believed that MIRO's recent trip to Washington from which he returned Sunday (April 7) was to pin down the United States Government to a statement of positive policy regarding Cuba. Another school of thought was that the Council head was retiring from his post in protest of Government curbing of hit-and-run raids on the Communist island of Cuba.

The article went on to state that Dr. MIRO's leadership in the Council, aimed at uniting all Cuban exiles, has been burdened by problems since his appointment in March 1961.

On April 10, 1963, MM T-1, a former Cuban business executive, who is employed by the Cuban Revolutionary Council and who is a close personal friend of Dr. MIRO CARDONA, who has furnished some reliable information in the past, advised that an all-night session of the Council was held beginning April 9, and ending at about 6:00 A.M., on April 10, during which time MIRO CARDONA presented his resignation but the Council refused to accept his resignation and MIRO CARDONA was persuaded to remain as President of the Council.

MM T-1 said that MIRO's resignation consisted of a 25-page statement which was in effect an indictment against the administration of President JOHN F. KENNEDY of the United States. In rejecting his resignation, the Council backed up

CS COPY

19-124-25/2

MIRO but in the interest of both the United States and the Cuban exiles, decided upon a public statement which reads as follows:

"CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

"The Cuban Revolutionary Council, having studied the report of its President, Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, concerning present relations with the United States Government, agrees:

"1. Not to accept the resignation of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, and declare its full support for the basic plans contained in his resignation.

"2. To affirm that there is a serious crisis, brought about by the present policy of the government of this country.

"3. To express the Council's hope of overcoming the present crisis and calling upon all of America, including the United States, for moral and material support in their fight to regain their sovereignty and independence, and the strict fulfilment of American treaties and agreements, as well as the joint resolution of the U. S. Congress, calling for effective action against Soviet intervention in America.

"4. To affirm that the Council has always insisted, and still insists, upon the necessity of Cuban participation in the process of liberating Cuba. The only procedure which the Council would accept would be coordination of forces, on a plane of complete respect for national dignity. Cuba will never renounce her legitimate right to be in the first line of combat.

"5. To reaffirm their unshakeable decision to continue the fight against the Soviet-Castro regime, under any circumstances whatsoever.

"6. In these difficult times, the Cuban Revolutionary Council urges all Cubans to close ranks to achieve the national unity needed to hasten our march towards Freedom.

"Miami, April 10, 1963.

"Movimiento Democrata Cristiano
(Christian Democratic Movement)
JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE

"Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
(Movement for Revolutionary Recovery)
CESAR BARO

"Agrupacion Montecristi
(Montecristi Group)
FRANCISCO CARRILLO

"Unidad Revolucionaria
(Revolutionary Union)
FERNANDO FERNANDEZ CABADA

"Rescate Democratico Revolucionario
(Revolutionary Democratic Recovery)
RAUL MENDEZ PIREZ

"Movimiento Revolucionary 30 de Noviembre
(30th of November Revolutionary Movement)
ORLANDO RODRIGUEZ

"Accion Revolucionaria Democratica
(Democratic Revolutionary Action)
GERARDO QUESADA

"Frente Obrero Revolucionario de Cuba (FORDC)
(Revolutionary Labor Front of Cuba

"Military Section
JOSE E. MONTEAGUDO

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

"Sector Profesional
(Professional Section)
ENRIQUE HUERTAS

"Corporaciones Economicas
(Economic Branch)
Dr. TULIO DIAZ RIVERA
MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA
SERGIO CARBO
RICARDO LORIE
ANTONIO MACEO
ANTONIO SILIO, Secretary "

MM T-1 explained that when Dr, MIRO CARDONA returned to Miami from a trip to Washington, D. C., on Sunday, where he contacted high government officials, he came away with the feeling that:

1) The United States has no plan to free Cuba of Communism.

2) If the United States ever does formulate any plans, it will do so without consideration for the Cuban exiles in the United States.

3) The United States policy is now one of peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba.

MM T-1 said that in his opinion, the Cuban exiles are frustrated, confused, losing faith in the United States and there is a growing feeling of abandonment of them by the United States.

The April 10, 1963, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried a headline article entitled, "Miro Resigns as Exile Chief; Raps U. S. Policy". This article stated that MIRO CARDONA resigned because the United States refused to allocate fifty million dollars to train a Cuban invasion force, according to government sources. The article said that exile leaders close to MIRO said he resigned not only because of disagreement with United States policy, "but because he feels Washington does not have any concrete plans to deal with the dictator".

The April 11, 1963, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled, "Cuban Exile Council Vows to Continue the Freedom Fight". In this article it was stated that the Cuban Revolutionary Council had vowed to continue its fight against Castro-Communism whether the United States likes it or not. The article said that Dr. MIRO CARDONA denied reports from U. S. Government sources that he offered his resignation to the Council because the United States refused to allocate fifty million dollars to train a Cuban invasion force. The article stated that an informed source said that MIRO decided to quit "because of the change in the U. S. - Cuban policy".

The April 16, 1963, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled "JFK Accepts Demand, Fidel Says". This article by the UPI bearing a Havana dateline reported that FIDEL CASTRO told Cubans on Thursday (April 11) that the KENNEDY Administration has accepted one of his five demands for an end to tension in the Caribbean. This article stated that in a one hour and forty minute speech, CASTRO said that Washington in forbidding exiles to carry on further armed attacks on Cuba, has fulfilled one of "five points for peace" advanced by him and endorsed by the Soviet Union. The article then went on to state that FIDEL announced that there are still four conditions to be fulfilled and that acceptance of them is the only sensible thing the KENNEDY Administration can do. One of the five conditions, according to the article, is U. S. evacuation of the big Naval base at Guantanamo.

On the morning of April 15, 1963, Miami radio news broadcasts announced MIRO CARDONA would again offer his resignation to the Council on that same day.

CA 32042

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

On April 15, 1963, MM T-1 advised that he was positive that MIRO CARDONA did not intend to again tender his resignation on Monday, April 15, 1963, but was contemplating taking that action on the following Thursday, April 18, 1963. MM T-1 said that the Council was meeting on Thursday to take a definite attitude or tough line of action and that it was entirely probable that all of the members of the Council might resign in protest to the present policy of the United States with regard to the Cuban situation. He said that the present feeling of the Council towards the United States is basically "to hell with it".

MM T-1 expressed the personal feeling that U. S. policy towards Cuba is presently in a vacuum and consequently everything is at a standstill. The Cuban exiles in the Miami area feel that the U. S. is abandoning their cause and has now adopted a course of peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba.

On April 16, 1963, MM T-2, a Cuban exile who has furnished some reliable information in the past and who is associated with fellow Cubans who belong to several different organizations, advised that reaction among the Cuban exiles is "very bad against the United States". He explained that the Cuban exiles allege that President KENNEDY has made promises to help them in their fight against CASTRO but is now opposing them and consequently they feel that the U. S. is now committed to a policy of peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba. The Cuban exiles are fearful as to the future, confused as to why the U. S. has changed its policy and the exiles feel that they have been abandoned in their fight.

PROPERTY OF FBI - This memorandum is loaned to you by the FBI and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

19-124-25/2

PA

19-124-25/2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

458

DATE : 27 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: TFW 10(MR CHARLES MATT, TFW, NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1630 27 MAY)

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, S/C 2

RI Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated ✓
Branch copy filed as indicated
Marked

AFRyan

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 27 2216Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 41885

OPIM DIR CITE WAVE 4277

GYMOSE

1. MIAMI HERALD 27 MAY CARRIES FRONT PAGE ITEM BY JAMES BUCHANAN ENTITLED "MIRO FADES AS EXILE CHIEF: THREE LATIN LEADERS BEHIND RAY". ARTICLE FLATLY STATES MIRO AND COUNCIL HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY MANUEL RAY WITH BACKING GOV MONOZ MARIN, PRES ROMULO BETANCOURT AND FORMER PRES JOSE FIGUERAS, THAT RAY HAS TAKEN OVER POST "WITH THE BLESSING OF THE UNITED STATES". FURTHER, ARTICLES STATES "FROM VARIETY SOURCES HERALD LEARNED THAT MIRO WAS NOTIFIED OF CHANGE ONLY THIS WEEK" AND THAT RAYS REAPPOININMENT AS "CHIEF IN EXILE" CAME FROM "UNDERGROUND IN CUBA" ACCORDING TO JOAQUIN GODOY, PROVISIONAL MRP HEAD IN MIAMI. AFTER FURNISHING RESUME CUBAN ACTIVITIES SINCE ORIGIN OF AMBUD[1], ARTICLE CREDITS CUBANS IN MIAMI WITH SAYING "NEW MAN IN FIELD" IS ADOLF A. BERLE JR. WHO HAS BEEN SPECIAL ASST TO STATE DEPT AND IS ALSO "MEMBER OF PRES KENNEDY'S SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA". IMPLICATION BEING THAT BERLE IS RUNNING NEW UNITED STATES SPONSORED CUBAN EFFORT.

2. THIS RELEASE CAUSING SOME FUROR IN LOCAL CUBAN COLONY TO EXTENT AT LEAST ONE CPS AGENT DESTINED FOR ISOLATION TRAINING HAS ASKED TO BE RELIEVED IF THERE ANY TRUTH THIS STORY. MEANWHILE WAVE

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

RS Filing (check one):
No CS Report Value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated

RS Indexing (check one):
Marked ______ None required
Signature:

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

PAGE 2

WAVE 4077 IN 41885

CHECKS WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACTS HAS PRODUCED LITTLE OTHER THAN WILLIAM S. WIBALDA'S[2] STATEMENT THAT BUCHANAN JOURNALISTIC REPUTATION INDICATES HE INACCURATE AND SENSATIONALIST. AMCLATTER-1[3] AND PASSOVOY[4] ATTEMPTING DISCREETLY TRACE BUCHANAN SOURCE FOR "U.S. BLESSING."

3. BUCHANAN HAS PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED MIRO IE DURING RETURN PLAYA GIRON PRISONERS MIAMI. HAVE NO REAL INSIGHT INFO SIGNIFICANCE THESE ATTACKS BUT BELIEVE THEY COULD REFLECT BUCHANAN OR MIAMI HERALD ATTEMPTS FORCE CHANGES IN UNITES STATES POSTURE RE CUBA.

4. EXPECT ASTICLE WILL HAVE FURTHER REPROCUSSIONS AS IT SPREADS. WISH ALERT HQS THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY INITIATE ACTION DISCREDIT BUCHANAN STORY AS WELL AS REASSURE MIRO. WILL FORWARD SUGGESTIONS THIS REGARD AFTER WE HAVE OPPORTUNITY FURTHER ASSESS STORY'S IMPACT.

5. POUCHING CLIPPING 28 MAY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files [redacted]

DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Document Number 1271-1029
for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on [redacted] /The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States./

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on [redacted] in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project [redacted] with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

[redacted]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

104-10301-10000

TOP SECRET

JOHN A. McCONE

THE SIXTH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

By

Walter Elder

Edited by Mary S. McAuliffe, DCI Staff Historian

1987

The attached is a draft history
which has not been forwarded for
review outside the DCI History Staff.

WORKING DRAFT 99

Handle via [BYEMAN] Control System

CL BY BYE-1
DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM BYE-1

BY NO. 018-88
copy 2 of 2

TOP SECRET

1/mc

CHAPTER IV

In the meanwhile, Cuba remained a sore point for both the CIA and the Kennedys.

Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy asked General Maxwell Taylor to chair a small commission, consisting of Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleign Burke, to investigate. Highly critical of the piecemeal and acquiescent administrative decisions which had accompaned the operation's progress, the Taylor report was mild in comparison with the severely critical internal report prepared by CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick.

Robert Kennedy also produced a personal Bay of Pigs report to the President, which he discussed with McCone in late November 1961. The Attorney General was especially critical of Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, because Bissell had told the President the operation was likely to succeed. Robert Kennedy was also highly critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for spending only twenty minutes studying the planned operation before making its first report to the President endorsing the operation.

It is worth noting that McCone was the only official in the

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

1/mc

government privy to all the studies of the Bay of Pigs operation, including the Taylor report, Robert Kennedy's personal report, the Kirkpatrick report, and the views of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

McCone did not dwell on the Bay of Pigs after he took office, but he did draw several conclusions. Firmly believing the decision to go ahead was a mistake, he nevertheless thought it an even worse mistake to dismember the operation once underway, contending that the CIA should have appealed directly to the President to reverse the decision to stand down the air strikes. Concluding as well that the members of the Taylor commission had been too closely involved with the events to have sufficient perspective, he believed the CIA and JCS had to bear special responsibility for advising the new President to go ahead, since at that time these were the only two Washington organizations dealing with international affairs which possessed complete continuity.

Taking a detached view of the operation, McCone was able to concentrate on what the Agency could do to avoid similar mistakes in the future. Leery of large-scale operations involving the Agency's paramilitary capability, McCone strove, with mixed results, to remove the CIA from such enterprises. He also stressed the importance of planning an operation from beginning to end (an attitude which dominated his approach during the Cuban missile crisis). Finally, he insisted that the Agency's estimative function be privy to planned operations, providing early and frequent judgments.

Cuba, however, remained a subject of considerable concern. In April 1961, shortly after President Kennedy established the Taylor Commission, Presidential adviser Walt Rostow speculated that Cuba might join with the Soviet Union in setting up an offensive air or missile base. He additionally posed that Cuba might build its conventional military strength and develop its subversive network to threaten other Latin American nations from without and within. "Its ideological contours are a moral and political offense to us," he concluded, "and we are committed, by one means or another, to remove that offense...."

The Kennedy administration proceeded to address the situation directly. At a White House meeting which McCone attended in late November 1961, the President announced that General Edward Lansdale, acting under the direction of the Attorney General, had already begun to study possible actions to overthrow the Castro regime. These covert activities, explained Robert Kennedy, included anything possible to create internal dissension and discredit Castro. He then proposed that, to accomplish this goal, Lansdale head up a committee made up of representatives of Defense, State, USIA, and CIA, which would cut across organizational lines.

McCone decided that the administration and the Agency both seemed in a state of shock so far as Cuba was concerned. Although skeptical from the beginning about the Lansdale program's prospects for success, he nevertheless recognized that the CIA had a special role and responsibility so far as Cuba was concerned. He himself

1/mc

supported the notion of dynamic action, but urged that such action not be reckless. Consequently, he recommended that the Lansdale group report to the 5412 oversight committee, which was properly qualified to give political guidance and evaluate proposals for action. In addition, although McCone agreed the facilities of all agencies should be made available for such high-priority operations, he emphasized that these should remain in place and not be removed to form a new unit under Lansdale.

In this way, MONGOOSE, as it came to be known, was launched. With the White House's decision to go ahead (keeping the 5412 Committee fully informed), McCone proceeded to discuss the Lansdale operation with top Agency officials. Acknowledging that the project had to be closely held--Lansdale had asked that the CIA's representative, Richard Helms, report only to the DCI--McCone nevertheless stated he intended to skip no appropriate echelon of the Agency, as such a course would deprive him of the advice of other senior officers. Action would be at the Helms level, and the Agency would offer Lansdale all necessary support and assistance, but without excluding the participation of other Agency members within the strict security guidelines laid down by the President. Further, McCone directed the Board of National Estimates and the DD/I to undertake a continuing evaluation of MONGOOSE, viewing such precautions as a major step toward overcoming the compartmentation which had excluded the DD/I from any advance knowledge of the Bay of Pigs landing.

Significantly, McCone insisted on bringing analytical and estimative functions to bear on Cuban operations from the beginning. Further, he insisted that truly clandestine actions be small. Most importantly, he required that careful records be kept of actions and conversations, himself setting an example by keeping meticulous memoranda for the record.

MONGOOSE represented McCone's first working encounter with Robert Kennedy. The Attorney General, McCone immediately realized, was a dynamic force with a keen interest in the intelligence community, as well as a strong influence on the President. McCone became quite close to him. MONGOOSE also reinforced McCone's awareness of the extent of the administration's obsession with Cuba. He consequently accepted as a personal charge the administration's desire to overthrow Castro. He was not, however, about to allow Lansdale or anyone else dictate the use of CIA sources. Had he detached Agency resources for Lansdale's use, McCone would have lost control. He further insisted on the checks and balances of 5412 committee overview.

The Special Group (5412 Committee), made up of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other appropriate representatives, had been established in 1955 by National Security Council Directive 5412/2 to provide interdepartmental coordination of covert actions. In general, the Group's cognizance extended to any

1/mc

covert activity which, because of its impact, could, if exposed, reflect on the official position of the United States. Thus, a sizeable activity aimed solely at intelligence collection through clandestine methods could come under the Group's scrutiny. Conversely, small political actions, with little flap potential, could be undertaken without referring the activity to the Group.

The Kennedys, however, were sufficiently alarmed over the threat of Communist subversion and covert aggression that, in January 1962, another special committee, Special Group (Counterinsurgency), appeared. Largely the brainchild of General Maxwell Taylor, Special Group (CI) aimed at identifying those areas where an insurgent threat existed or threatened to emerge, directing the use of appropriate resources to counter that threat.

In practice, the CIA had always been reluctant to expose its activities to an interdepartmental body. The Defense Department had been similarly reluctant to submit its extensive program of peripheral reconnaissance flights to Special Group review, although, beginning in June 1961, the group began to consider these flights. The Special Group's influence depended, in the final analysis, on the attitude of the President and the Special Group chairman, as well as on the temper of the DCI. Allen Dulles served as an advocate for the CIA's proposed activities. John McCone took the position that, as DCI, he was a personal adviser to the President and thus free to approve or disapprove the CIA's proposals as he saw fit.

The entire Cuban situation was difficult from the outset, and

Ymc

McCone was careful to warn the President and Attorney General that he anticipated no quick or easy road to success. With 24 the approval of Ambassador Alphand, a close personal friend of McCone, the French embassy in Havana had agreed to serve as the Agency's Cuban eyes and ears, with Philippe de Vosjoli, SDECE's Washington representative, reporting directly to McCone. De Vosjoli reported that at least ninety percent of all Cubans supported Castro, while McCone added that of twenty-seven or twenty-eight CIA agents in Cuba, only twelve presently were in communication. Contact even with these was infrequent, and an additional team of seven, infiltrated in December, had been captured (with two featured on a television "confession" show).

Nevertheless, at a Special Group meeting in April 1962, McCone urged a review of our national policy toward Cuba and asked that we consider more aggressive action, including direct military intervention. Noting that various intelligence reports suggested that Castro was in deep trouble, he questioned whether the military strength of the Castro government was as large and as effective as had been understood. In response to objections that such a course might lose us friends in Latin America, McCone countered that a show of strength was more likely to win than lose us friends.

Shortly thereafter, McCone learned from the Attorney General that there was some movement afoot to exchange our prisoners from the Bay of Pigs for food. (Castro had offered to release the prisoners in exchange for a large quantity of drugs and medicines). Later, in

2/MC

early June, McCone suggested forming a committee to negotiate such a release. Robert Kennedy was generally sympathetic, but did not at that time request covert support for the project. The subject was left for further discussion, with an agreement that it would not be discussed with anyone in CIA, Defense, or State who was active in Cuba operations.

In mid-July, McCone and Robert Kennedy reviewed the Cuban situation in considerable detail. Kennedy thought that, although considerable intelligence had been acquired, the program's action phases had been disappointing. Shortly after, McCone had the opportunity to review MONGOOSE with the President. Since the beginning of February, McCone reported, nine intelligence collection teams (about half the originally-planned number) had been infiltrated into Cuba and maintained in place, thousands of Cuban refugees had been systematically interrogated in Florida, and a number of third-country agents recruited inside Cuba. U-2 overflights were being conducted on a regular two-a-month schedule. The operation was costing the CIA about $1 million per month in direct costs and even more in indirect support costs.

Although McCone was skeptical about the aims and operations of MONGOOSE, he believed the CIA bore a special responsibility to collect intelligence on Cuba. He therefore told the President that this collection effort had produced a substantial amount of hard intelligence on conditions inside Cuba, and a continuation would provide additional intelligence, possibly revealing opportunities for

1/mc

political, guerrilla or insurgent activities designed to overthrow Castro. McCone added, however, that many individuals felt that more dynamic actions were called for, including mass landings and military activity. McCone did not agree. Our intelligence, he said, did not support this point of view, and any such attempts would face disaster unless the United States was prepared to commit large military forces to support them.

In the meantime, Castro had officially cast his lot with the Soviet Union, and indications were increasing that the USSR was willing to invest substantial amounts of money, not only to keep the Cuban leader afloat, but to enhance his capability to create mischief for the United States. After 1 February 1962, our U-2 flights over Cuba increased from one to two per month, and intelligence reports revealed steady Soviet shipments of military as well as economic aid.

On August 4, McCone learned that eleven Soviet ships believed to be carrying arms were bound for Cuba. McCone asked for further details. On August 5, he received a breakdown on the ships, and he directed immediate U-2 coverage (which began the following day). According to reports, up to 5,000 Soviet technicians had arrived, in addition to military communications equipment. The preliminary U-2 readout, however, was not very helpful, and another flight was planned for August 11.

On August 10, McCone met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, presidential military adviser General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, Deputy Secrety of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Attorney

General. It was during this meeting, which approved intensifying MONGOOSE operations, that McCone first shared outside the CIA his fear that the Soviets might introduce offensive missiles into Cuba. His statement had little immediate impact. The experts unanimously and adamantly agreed that this was beyond the realm of possibility.

McCone's conclusion that the USSR might put offensive missiles into Cuba was set in motion by the continuing influx of Soviet military equipment. It was intensified by the arrival of Soviet personnel, then brought to a head by reports which suggested that the Soviet Union was preparing to install surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) there.

Why, asked McCone, would the Soviet Union place SAMs in Cuba? If the United States were to launch a military attack, the SAMs could be easily and quickly destroyed. The SAMs were not being put there to protect Cuban canecutters; therefore, McCone argued, their real purpose was to blind the United States by deterring further U-2 overflights. This action would then permit the Soviet Union to take further steps which they could reveal at a time of their own choosing.

McCone then asked himself what he would do if he were in Khrushchev's shoes. The United States and Soviet Union were balanced in nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, but the USSR had a decided edge in intermediate and medium-range missiles. These missiles could not, however, reach the United States from Soviet launch pads. The USSR had not deployed these missiles outside its borders, presumably because they could be redirected against the

Soviet Union if they fell into the wrong hands. However, Cuba was one place where the Soviets could safely put their missiles. As McCone put it, "If I were Khrushchev, I'd put offensive missiles in Cuba. Then I'd bang my shoe on the desk and say to the United States, 'How do you like looking down the end of a gun barrel for a change? Now, let's talk about Berlin and any other subject that I choose, including all your overseas bases.'"

McCone had confidence in the logic of his conviction and was prepared to alert the top policy levels. He recognized that he lacked hard evidence, but was convinced that the implications of putting Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba would be so serious for American national security interests that the contingency should be considered as soon as possible.

He stood absolutely alone.

At noon on August 21, he met with Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General, Maxwell Taylor, General Lyman Lemnitzer (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), and McGeorge Bundy to review the Cuban situation. He noted that since their last meeting on Cuba, the CIA had received intelligence indicating an enormous increase in Soviet military support to Cuba. Further, there now were indications of construction work by Soviet personnel, as well as technicians to handle the newly-delivered Soviet equipment. While the nature of the construction remained unknown, McCone warned that it could be missile sites. For, he emphasized, we had to consider the possibility that the Soviets would install offensive weapons in Cuba.

The group proceeded to consider various courses of action open to the United States should the Soviets place MRBMs in Cuba. McCone had a three-part proposal already in hand, calling for 1) an immediate aggressive political action program to awaken Latin America and the Free World; 2) a provocative action against Guantanamo or some other vital American interest, leading to instant United States retaliation; and, 3) immediate commitment of sufficient U.S. military forces to occupy Cuba, destroy the regime, free the people, and establish Cuba as a member of the community of American States. McCone noted that the group was reluctant to consider committing U.S. military forces, however, both because of the magnitude of the task and because of concern about Soviet retaliatory actions elsewhere in the world.

Reaching no conclusions on any course of action, the group at length asked McCone to brief the President on the situation. The following day, McCone reported in detail to the President, adding the personal report of De Vosjoli, who had recently visited Cuba. The President, who appeared quite familiar with the situation, expressed concern, but agreed with General Taylor and McCone that policy decisions should wait until the next day, when he would meet with his principal advisers.

On August 23, therefore, President Kennedy met with Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McCone to discuss Cuba. The President requested an analysis of the threat which offensive missiles located in Cuba posed to the United States and Latin America. He requested as well a continuing analysis of the numbers and types of Soviet and Oriental (as reported by De Vosjoli) personnel being introduced, the quantities and types of equipment, their probable uses, and all construction activity in Cuba. In response to the President's question about our ability to discriminate between SAM and surface-to-surface missile sites, McCone said we probably could not differentiate between SAM sites and 350-mile surface-to-surface missiles, but that MRBMs and IRBMs could be distinguished. McNamara noted that portable missiles could not be located under any circumstances.

The President wondered whether we should make a statement of our position in advance, outlining the courses of action open to us in the event that the Soviets should install missiles in Cuba. He also asked what we could do against such missile sites. Could we take them out by air action, or would ground action be required? Could they be destroyed by a substantial guerrilla action? He also asked what we should do in Cuba if the Soviets decided to precipitate a crisis in Berlin.

Secretary Rusk received approval for his proposal that the United States inform its NATO allies, particularly Canada, of the growing seriousness of the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, strongly opposed his recommendation to remove restrictions on MONGOOSE operations operating out of Guantanamo. McCone again proposed his three-part program to combat the current Cuban situation. After consideration, the President directed the Defense Department to prepare contingency plans for possible military action against Cuba. He and his advisors agreed, however, that no steps should be taken until full agreement was reached on a policy aimed at completely solving the Cuban problem.

Cuba was our most serious problem, McCone shortly afterward told Robert Kennedy, adding that, in comparison, he would readily give up our missile bases in Italy and Turkey. Cuba, he told the Attorney General, was more important than Berlin. It was the key to Latin America; and if Castro succeeded, then most of Latin America would fall to Soviet influence and domination.

1/mc

forty-eight hours should the President's terms not be met.

Sunday morning, October 28, with U-2 overflights continuing and no evidence of slow-down on the Cuban missile sites, Moscow broadcast yet another Khrushchev communique--this one announcing that, in the interest of world peace, the Soviet Union had agreed to dismantle and return the Cuban missiles under United Nations verification. Not waiting for the official text, the President drafted a quick acceptance. The immediate crisis was over.

* * *

Serious problems, however, remained. It had become clear to McCone that removing Castro no longer was an objective of American policy, and he was concerned that, as a result of Soviet military and economic aid, Castro would be left in a position to create much mischief. Since no agreement had been reached for on-site inspection, and the SAM system remained in place to limit aerial inspection, the DCI and intelligence community would not be able to verify the removal or check on possible future reintroduction of Cuban missiles. Further, the MONGOOSE operation, tasked with toppling Castro, was in disarray. Lansdale complained he was not being kept informed of JCS planning and that the CIA's Cuban Task Force was acting outside MONGOOSE channels. At the height of the missile crisis (on October 26), a high-level meeting on MONGOOSE agreed to recall intelligence collection teams and discontinue

Vmc

sabotage operations while relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were so delicate.

On November 3, McCone informed the Executive Committee that, despite indications that the missiles were being dismantled, there also were signs that the Soviets were taking steps which might represent a continuing threat to the United States. More IL-28s had been uncrated; some fourteen Soviet ships were en route to Cuba, and there were indications that the Soviets were proceeding with plans to develop a submarine support base at Banes. Stressing the unprecedented nature of the SAM system deployment and the fact that the system remained in place to provide a shield from aerial inspection, McCone emphasized that we did not and could not know the exact number of offensive missiles originally placed in Cuba or whether all in fact had been removed. Indeed, McCone pointed out, there remained a distinct possibility that missile complexes could be hidden from view in Cuba's caves.

98

The President listened to McCone's warning but appeared more concerned about the question of past intelligence failures. For by this time postmortems had begun to surface alleging either a near intelligence failure or the withholding of vital intelligence information on the Cuban missile build-up. Deeply concerned, McCone had already ordered an intensive internal investigation. Now the President himself requested a review of the entire intelligence community, seeking a judgment as to whether better intelligence and intelligence evaluation could have forecast Cuban developments more

2
9/MC

however, that the United States continue its surveillance and be prepared to act if a plane were shot down. 98

With the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners and the completion of Donovan's mission, McCone again pressed for low-level flights over Cuba--a recommendation supported by the USIB but opposed by both McNamara and Rusk because of its possible political consequences. Noting that the administration could not very well ignore the views of the DCI and USIB, President Kennedy proposed three sorties on a trial basis. But, after considering the pros and cons, the President on May 21 decided to postpone a subsequent low-level mission on the grounds of insufficient urgency.

Following the missile crisis, Cuban exile groups escalated their activities, but the Executive Committee was unable to come to a firm agreement on how to respond. Similarly, the Special Group to consider Cuban sabotage operations met with disagreement and indecision. It was clear McCone stood virtually alone in his view that the United States should sustain an aggressive approach towards Cuba, with the dual aim of getting rid of both the Soviet presence and Castro. No senior officials went so far as to propose that the covert action program be stopped; but the original impetus which had given birth to the program had all but disappeared.

American policy towards Cuba, and especially the Agency's role in supporting this policy, remained ambigious for the rest of McCone's tenure. Officially, the United States held the Soviet

24/mc

military presence in and Castro's control over Cuba to be unacceptable. Practically, however, the disposition to take strong actions had weakened. Instead, the administration was willing to accept the removal of the missiles as an adequate foreign policy achievement.

McCone never accepted this judgment; he never was comfortable with the policy restrictions placed on Cuban operations, and he never wavered in his conviction that in order to carry out the tasks levied on him as DCI, he needed the freedom to carry out intensive reconnaissance and covert operations.

Under President Johnson, there were flurries of concern about Cuba; but, after the missile crisis, the momentum had largely disappeared. The United States government turned its attention to other issues, and McCone found himself once again fully engaged.

CHAPTER XVIII

Shortly before the coup began, on 1 November 1963, Diem suddenly became cooperative.

Lodge and Admiral Harry Felt (CINCPAC) had been at the Presidential palace until almost noon. Rather than see Felt off at the airport, Diem asked if Lodge would remain. Lodge stayed, and Diem proceeded to tell him that he could understand President Kennedy's concerns about South Vietnam. Lodge should assure the President that he, Diem, was prepared to take almost any steps the United States considered appropriate to correct existing problems and improve relations.

Diem's concessions--if that was what they were--came too late. At about the same time, General Don's aide-de-camp directed Lou Conein to go at once to the Joint General Staff headquarters. Assigned a private telephone, Conein proceeded to provide a comprehensive, current and coherent account of the coup to the CIA station in Saigon. The station, in turn, informed Washington.

The first reports reached Washington shortly after midnight. By mid-morning it was clear the coup was likely to succeed. By this time, however, both Diem and Nhu were dead, and the President was concerned about the circumstances. When the facts became known, he said, he hoped the new government would be able to state that the Ngo brothers had either committed suicide or violated their surrender agreement, rather than been murdered in cold blood.

The President was also concerned that the new government might be tempted to offer anmesty to the Viet Cong. He consequently was emphatic that we watch with care the type of political leadership the military group might install. Warning against the installation of ultra-liberals or quasi-Communists with a free hand in political affairs, he remarked that he was more interested in an effective than a "pretty" government.

As a result, President Kennedy sent William Colby, in the capacity of Presidential representative, to Saigon--an assignment which McCone noted with pleasure as a mark of great confidence in both Colby and the CIA.

On November 18, McCone, Rusk, McNamara and Bundy flew to Honolulu to confer with Lodge and Harkins. McCone later reported that the formal briefing sessions had gone fairly predictably until an economist named Silver from AID had discussed the South Vietnamese economy, with its huge deficits and unfavorable balance of trade. This briefing triggered a lively discussion and the general conclusion that the Vietnamese economic situation was bleak, with no apparent solution in sight.

There was other bad news as well. In some areas, the Viet Cong reportedly had a better strategic hamlet and school system than the

1/mc

government. And it was clear to everyone present that the military situation was far from rosy, although Harkins tried to put it in a good light. The meeting decided that a major effort should be made to construct strategic hamlets and to wage anti-guerrilla warfare in the delta region, but McCone returned more discouraged than ever about Vietnam and believed McNamara and Bundy shared this impression. Lodge, McCone remarked, would emerge from Vietnam either as a fourteen-foot-tall political giant or as a thoroughly washed-up government official.

* * *

The end of the Diem era marked one kind of transition in Vietnam; President Kennedy's assassination, on November 22, marked another.

The day after the assassination, as official Washington and the world were trying to come to grips with the shocking news, McCone told his morning meeting that he knew very little about the new President's personal relationships around Washington or his position on current issues. In late August, Lyndon Johnson as Vice President had been opposed to ousting the Diem regime, but McCone had not even spoken with him since the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange.

McCone then reviewed the CIA memorandum on world reactions to the President's assassination and ordered that it be disseminated. He also reviewed the President's Intelligence Checklist and directed

//mc

that it be delivered to the White House as usual. Johnson was unaware of the checklist, having previously received the Current Intelligence Bulletin. McCone reported that Johnson had told McGeorge Bundy to carry on as before, and that the Agency should therefore continue to move its publications through the usual channels until directed otherwise.

In other ways, McCone attempted to carry on as before. Before the morning meeting, he had instructed Walt Elder to telephone Johnson's secretary to tell her that he would be at the White House at 9:00 a.m. as usual, to give the President his regular morning intelligence briefing. This message was relayed as a statement of fact. The only question was whether Johnson would be going to his old office in the Executive Office Building or to the Oval Office. The word came back that Johnson was on his way to the White House.

McCone accordingly was at the White House by 9:00 a.m. At 9:15, President Johnson arrived.

Johnson opened the conversation by recalling a long background of association and friendship with McCone. On a number of issues which had arisen since McCone had become DCI, Johnson said he and McCone had seen eye to eye. Expressing great respect for the CIA and complete confidence in McCone as DCI, Johnson said he wanted McCone to continue in the future doing exactly as he had done in the past.

After McCone in turn expressed his confidence in the President and stated his desire to support him in every way, he reviewed some

1/mc

of the items from the President's checklist, explaining the nature of the publication. Johnson asked that, for the next few days, McCone continue to brief him personally every morning and that senior CIA officials brief the President's staff. Johnson also directed that any urgent matter of importance be brought to his personal attention at any hour of the day or night. In this, he designated no intermediary.

That noon, McCone met with both Johnson and Bundy to relay the information that Lee Harvey Oswald had been in touch with the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico City. That evening, McCone reviewed this information with Secretary Rusk, in addition volunteering the Agency's assistance in coping with the flood of official visitors coming to attend the funeral. Rusk agreed to call on him for help.

After informing his November 24 morning meeting that he would make an effort to dispel the widely-held view that it was somehow "immoral" for the DCI to be seen openly in his role as a direct adviser to the President, McCone briefed Johnson for about twenty minutes in his private residence. The President, McCone suggested, should receive an early briefing on the Soviet long-range striking capability, air defense posture, and the condition of the Soviet economy. McCone also suggested that the President learn about the CIA's operational programs, adding that the Agency was watching Venezuela and Ecuador very closely because of Cuban subversive activities.

That afternoon, McCone met with the President, Rusk, Ball,

1/mc

McNamara, Bundy and Lodge to discuss the situation in Vietnam. Lodge reported that the United States was in no way responsible for the deaths of Diem and Nhu (had they followed his advice, he said, they would be alive today) and said he was hopeful about the future. The change in South Vietnam's government had been an improvement, and by February or March we would see marked progress.

McCone, concerned lest Lodge's statements leave the President with the impression that we were on the road to victory, disagreed. The Agency, he cautioned, had observed a continuing increase in Viet Cong activities since November 1, including military attacks. It had also observed a high volume of messages on the Viet Cong military and political communications networks, which could indicate preparations for sustained guerrilla attacks. Moreover, the new government's military leaders were having considerable difficulty in organizing the government's political structure and were receiving little if any help from civilians, who were staying on the sidelines in their traidtional role as critics. In consequence, McCone could not at this time offer an optimistic appraisal of Vietnam's future prospects.

Here, President Johnson observed that he approached the situation in Vietnam with some misgivings. A great number of Americans had questioned the United States' role in supporting the coup, and there were those in Congress who strongly believed we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these factors caused him considerable anxiety. He was not at all sure the United States had

1/MC

followed the right course in upsetting the Diem regime; but now that it was done, we had to see that we accomplished our objectives.

In addition, Johnson now told them, he had never been happy with American operations in Vietnam. The dissensions within the American community there displeased him, and he told Lodge that he wanted the situation cleaned up. Any official who did not go along with agreed U.S. policy there should be removed.

At this point, Bundy remarked that we were searching for a successor to William Trueheart as Saigon Deputy Chief of Mission. What was needed was a capable administrator to run the country team. In response, Johnson repeated that the Ambassador was in charge and that he, the President, was holding him personally responsible for the situation.

Vietnam's economy was the subject of particular concern, and McNamara now commented that the United States would have to be generous with its aid, not expecting the South Vietnamese government to produce miracles. Johnson replied that he supported the concept of generous aid but wanted it made abundantly clear that he did not think we had to re-make every Asian after our own image. Too often, he observed, when the United States became involved in the affairs of another country, it felt an obligation to reform the country along American lines. This, he said, was a mistake. He himself was anxious to get on with winning the war; he did not want so much effort devoted to so-called social reforms.

Following this meeting, Bundy issued a statement saying that the

United States would continue the late President Kennedy's Vietnam policies as they had been confirmed at a mid-November meeting in Honolulu. McCone also observed that, for the first time, he had received an indication of what the Johnson tone would be.

McCone did not brief Johnson on November 25, the day of President Kennedy's funeral, and at a State Department reception that evening, the President apologized to McCone for it. Were there were any developments which required his personal attention?, he asked. McCone replied that there were not and that he would call him if any developed.

The following day, McCone met with the President for about twenty minutes. Johnson asked whether all appropriate Agency resources were being made available to support the FBI's investigation of the assassination. He then told McCone with considerable contempt that certain Justice Department officials had proposed an independent panel, headed by someone like Thomas E. Dewey, to investigate the assassination. Johnson had rejected this proposal, only to learn that an identical plan would appear as lead editorial in the Washington Post. Furious at what he believed was a deliberate leak, he had finally succeeded in killing the editorial by intervening personally with Katherine Graham. 98

McCone met again with the President on November 28 for about thirty minutes. After reviewing the checklist, Johnson questioned him about South Vietnam, Venezuela, Greece, Turkey, Rumania and Yugoslavia. He asked McCone to recommend someone as Ambassador to

13-00000

SECRET

McCone History

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

CHRONOLOGY

10 November 1960	President-elect Kennedy announces that Allen W. Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover will continue in their positions.
17 April 1961	Landing at the Bay of Pigs
22 April 1961	Study group formed (Maxwell Taylor, Arleigh Burke, Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles) to examine Bay of Pigs operation.
4 May 1961	President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) reconstituted with James Killian as chairman.
28 June 1961	Taylor named Military Representative to the President and Chairman of the Special Group (5412).
30 August 1961	USSR resumes nuclear testing in the atmosphere
7 September 1961	President Kennedy confers with John McCone on nuclear issues.
19 September 1961	Kennedy asks McCone to become the Director of Central Intelligence.
27 September 1961	Kennedy announces the appointment of McCone.
13 October 1961	McCone becomes consultant; travels to the Far East until 23 October.

28 October 1961	Dulles and McCone visit Western Europe until 13 November.
21 November 1961	McCone meets with President and Robert Kennedy to discuss new program for Cuba.
29 November 1961	McCone sworn in by Chief Justice Warren
30 November 1961	McCone attends meeting of NSC committee on nuclear testing.
30 November 1961	McCone attends first meeting of United States Intelligence Board (USIB) as chairman.
1 December 1961	McCone attends first meeting of Special Group (5412) as DCI.
4 December 1961	McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric to discuss NSA and national estimates
5 December 1961	McCone establishes study group under Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr..
6 December 1961	Mrs. McCone dies.
11 December 1961	McCone meets with President Kennedy alone.
12 December 1961	McCone calls on J. Edgar Hoover.
13 December 1961	DDCI becomes CIA representative on USIB.
15 December 1961	McCone meets with Phillipe de Vosjoli.

27 December 1961	General Cabell announces retirement effective 31 January 1962.
5 January 1962	Schuyler, Coyne added to Kirkpatrick study group.
6 January 1962	McCone attends NSC meeting on Laos. ✓
8 January 1962	McCone meets with Joint Chiefs of Staff.
12 January 1962	McCone briefs General Eisenhower in Palm Desert.
15 January 1962	McCone's name submitted to Senate Armed Services Committee.
16 January 1962	President Kennedy issues letter of instructions to DCI.
16 January 1962	McCone meets with Ambassador Alphand 6 and Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg.
18 January 1962	Confirmation hearings begin
18 January 1962	DCI attends first meeting of Special Group (Counter-Insurgency).
19 January 1962	McCone meets with The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the PFIAB.
20 January 1962	McCone briefs President Truman at Mayflower Hotel.

22 January 1962	McCone meets with House Sub-Committee on CIA.
28 January 1962	McCone meets with Chiefs of Station from Western Hemisphere Division in Panama until 2 February.
31 January 1962	Senate confirms McCone by floor vote of 71-12; total vote is 84-15.
6 February 1962	McCone speaks to senior seminar at Foreign Service Institute.
8 February 1962	McCone meets with Senate Sub-Committee on CIA.
17 February 1962	Richard Bissell resigns as Deputy Director for Plans; succeeded by Richard Helms.
19 February 1962	Deputy Directorate for Research established as new directorate with Herbert A. Scoville, Jr. as head.
19 February 1962	McCone meets with Board of Inquiry chaired by Judge Prettyman to study implications of Powers' case.
22 February 1962	McCone meets with Major General Marshall S. Carter.
28 February 1962	Kennedy receives first briefing by Arthur C. Lundahl

7 March 1962	McCone presents Carter to President Kennedy; Carter named DDCI on 9 March.
30 March 1962	Robert Amory, Jr. resigns as Deputy Director/ for Intelligence.
1 April 1962	Office of General Counsel, Office of Legislative Counsel, and Office of Comptroller moved to Office of the DCI; John Bros~~e~~s named Comptroller.
10 April 1962	Kirkpatrick named to new position as Executive Director.
23 April 1962	Ray S. Cline named DD/I
3 May 1962	Jack Earman becomes Inspector General; Walter Elder named as Executive Assistant to the DCI.
15 May 1962	DCI attends meeting of National Security Council with Congressional leaders on American role in Laos. ✓
3 June 1962	McCone travels to Far East until 17 June; ✓ develops basi~~s~~c position paper on situation in Southeast Asia.
4 June 1962	Albert D. Wheelon, Jr. named Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence.

29 June 1962	McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget to review the projected intelligence community budget.
10 July 1962	McCone meets with Frank G. Wisner on latter's future.
12 July 1962	McCone discusses consultant status with Allen W. Dulles.
20 July 1962	President Kennedy briefed in detail on information derived from Anatole Golitsen.
27 July 1962	McCone becomes immersed in nuclear testing issue and the role of intelligence in the event of a treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere.
28 July 1962	McCone meets with [Prince 6 Souvanna Phouma of Laos.]
10 August 1962	At Cuban meeting, McCone makes first explicit statement outside Agency on the possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba.
10 August 1962	Najeeb Halaky proposes covert development of super-sonic transport.
21 August 1962	McCone warns senior government officials about offensive missiles in Cuba.

21 August 1962	McCone attends meeting to discuss intensified operations against North Vietnam. ✓
22 August 1962	McCone advises President Kennedy about possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba; also on 23 August with senior advisers present.
23 August 1962	McCone leaves Washington until 24 Sept.
29 August 1962	McCone marries Mrs. Paul Piggott in Seattle; SAMs in Cuba photographed.
7,10,13,16 and 19 September 1962	McCone sends cables reiterating his concern about missiles in Cuba.
24 September 1962	McCone meets with Robert Kennedy on ransoming brigade prisoners in Cuba.
27 September 1962	McCone meets with President 6, 11 [Ayub of Pakistan] in New York.
4 October 1962	McCone urges Special Group to direct U-2 coverage of Cuba.
9 October 1962	Special Group approves U-2 coverage.
10 October 1962	President Kennedy briefed on IL-28 crates; Kennedy orders limitations on dissemination of information about offensive weapons.

12 October 1962	SAC takes over U-2 overflights of Cuba.
14 October 1962	U-2 overflies San Cristobal MRBM site.
15 October 1962	NPIC identifies MRBMs
16 October 1962	McCone notified; returns from Seattle.
17 October 1962	McCone develops position paper on Cuba.
18 October 1962	IRBM sites identified.
18 October 1962	NSC Executive Committee divides into two study groups to consider "fast" and "slow" courses of action.
19 October 1962	Special National Intelligence Estimate concludes that USSR would not risk general war over Cuba.
19 October 1962	McCone develops position on measures beyond a blockade.
20 October 1962	Chinese Communists attack India
21 October 1962	McCone briefs Vice-President Johnson on Cuba.
21 October 1962	Briefers go to London, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa.
22 October 1962	Meeting with Congressional leadership just prior to President Kennedy's speech.
23 October 1962	President Kennedy signs blockade proclamation.

24 October 1962	Soviet ships near Cuba stop or turn.
27 October 1962 28 October 1962	Messages from USSR show willingness to avoid confrontation.
29 October 1962	McCone orders post-mortem on handling of intelligence.
2 November 1962	Cuban refugee reports on missiles in caves.
5 November 1962	President Kennedy requests review of intelligence handling.
9 November 1962	McCone meets with Rusk to protest nibbling away at approved operational programs.
14 November 1962	PFIAB requests post-mortem on intelligence handling.
17 November 1962	Kennedy and Eisenhower meet at McCone's residence.
20 November 1962	Kennedy announces lifting of the blockade.
4 December 1962	McCone meets with Gilpatric to discuss Air Force view of NRO.
17 December 1962	Kennedy approves concept of covert support to Congo government.

27 December 1962	Report on intelligence community's handling of intelligence relating to Cuban missile crisis completed for PFIAB.
2 January 1963	NPIC moves into Building 213.
3 January 1963	McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric to discuss A-11, SWITCHBACK, policy towards Cuba.
10 January 1963	Special Group reviews reconniassance over Cuba.
10 January 1963	McGeorge Bundy discusses DOD-CIA friction; raises Kennedy's concern over Chinese Communist nuclear potential.
17 January 1963	6,8 McCone meets with [Italian Prime Minister Fanfani].
21 January 1963	Meeting with President Kennedy on surfacing A-11.
27 January 1963	McCone meets with Chiefs of Station in Panama until 29 January.
30 January 1963	Col. Delsany, SDECE, admits charges of KGB penetrations and French espionage against US nuclear energy program.

1/mc

31 January 1963	McCone attends meeting with Kennedy to discuss European problems.
1 February 1963	McCone develops basic position paper on Europe.
6 February 1963	Public statement by DCI on Cuba before Stennis sub-committee; DOD public briefing.
10 February 1963	McCone travels to Paris and London until 17 February.
28 February 1963	McCone talks with Bundy on lack of policy towards Cuba and problems in the Middle East.
4 March 1963	Meeting with President Kennedy on Cuban reconnaissance gap.
11 March 1963	Meeting with President Kennedy on the Middle East with special reference to Yemen.
13 March 1963	McCone meets with the President and then the NSC to discuss Latin America and policy towards Cuba.
13 March 1963	McCone and Gilpatric sign new NRO agreement.

21 March 1963	McCone meets with Brockway McMillan, new Director/NRO.
25 March 1963	Meeting with President Kennedy to discuss special Agency operation aimed at exposing the KGB.
26 March 1963	Meeting with Dean Rusk to discuss the Middle East with special reference to Israel's nuclear potential.
29 March 1963	Executive Committee meeting on raids by Cuban exiles.
9 April 1963	McCone meets with Stewart Alsop for general background briefing.
11 April 1963	McCone develops basic position paper on responsibility for reconnaissance over denied areas.
11 April 1963	Special Group discusses sabotage operations against Cuba.
15 - 17 April 1963	President Kennedy, the Attorney-General, and the Secretary of State briefed on special operation against [24 French intelligence] service.

20 April 1963	At NSC meeting on Laos, President Kennedy requests study of increased pressures against North Vietnam. ✓
23 April 1963	Clark Clifford succeeds Killian as Chairman, PFIAB.
25 April 1963	President approves low-level reconnaissance flights over Cuba.
25 April 1963	Scoville submits resignation as DD/R effective 14 June 1963
26 April 1963	McCone travels to Paris, Rome, and Frankfurt until 8 May.
7 May 1963	Penkovsky put on trial in Moscow.
9 May 1963	NSC meeting on US support for India.
13-14 May 1963	McCone meets with Rusk to discuss support for [Mondlane] 6
14 May 1963	McCone meets with Clark Clifford.
15 May 1963	McCone meets with President Kennedy to discuss Penkovsky

1/mc

18 May 1963	McCone develops position paper on Haiti.
21 May 1963	McCone attends three meetings with President Kennedy; low-level reconnaissance over Cuba; high-yield, large megatonnage nuclear weapons; Haiti.
3 June 1963	McCone develops position paper for discussion with Gilpatric on Air Force push to take over all reconnaissance.
7 June 1963	McCone presents his view of the world in speech to National War College.
14 June 1963	McCone meets with Rusk to discuss relations with France.
19 June 1963	McCone attends three meetings with President Kennedy; the Profumo case; Laos; Cuba.
21 June 1963	McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy on British Guiana.
21 June 1963	McCone meets with Rusk to discuss covert program on Cuba.
25 June 1963	McCone develops position paper on the role of intelligence in a nuclear test ban treaty.

1/mc

26 June 1963	McCone notes Roy Tod's paper on an inventory of intelligence community assets.
1 July 1963	DCI's Scientific Advisory Board established under Dr. Kinzel.
9 July 1963	President Kennedy briefed on mosaic of [Israel], gas bomb in Yemen, and findings of the Purcell Panel on reconnaissance satellites.
10 July 1963	McCone writes McNamara on need to review intelligence community programs.
21 July 1963	McCone meets with Rusk to discuss DeGaulle.
23 July 1963	McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy to hear John J. McCloy report on the Middle East.
23 July 1963	Sgt. Dunlap commits suicide.
30 July 1963	McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy on Laos.
5 August 1963	DD/R re-constituted as DD/Science and Technology with Wheelon as head.

1/mc

5 August 1963	Nuclear test ban treaty signed in Moscow.
16 August 1963	McCone presents position on test ban treaty to Stennis sub-committee.
21 August 1963	McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy to discuss actions by Diem government against the Buddhests. ✓
24 August 1963	Department of State Telegram 243 sent to Saigon. ✓
26 August 1963	Saigon station officers in contact with Generals Khiem and Minh. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge presents credentials to South Vietnam government.
31 August 1963	John Richardson cables his view that there will be no coup.
2 September 1963	McCone reviews two papers on Diem government; one by William Colby; one by George Carver.
4 September 1963	McCone meets with McNamara and Rusk to discuss terms of reference for review of intelligence community programs.
9 September 1963	John Bross appointed Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation.

10 September 1963	McCone develops position paper for meetings with President Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy on Vietnam. ✓
11 September 1963	Huntington D. Sheldon cables his views from Saigon; McCone asks Agency experts to answer six basic questions on Vietnam. ✓
16 September 1963	Ambassador Lodge requests Lansdale as replacement for Richardson.
19 September 1963	McCone writes Lodge about COS Saigon.
19 September 1963	Colby briefs Special Group on re-vamping Agency operations in the Far East.
20 September 1963	McCone briefs McGeorge Bundy on plans to reorganize Saigon station and a covert program aimed at the KGB.
20 September 1963	McCone develops basic position paper on National Reconnaissance Program.
24 September 1963	McCone develops basic position paper on Agency role in Vietnam. ✓

3 October 1963	McCone asks John Richardson to return to Washington on temporary duty; Dave Smith acting COS Saigon.
5 October 1963	After hearing trip report by McNamara and Taylor, President Kennedy states publicly that war in Vietnam can be won by the end of 1965; McCone takes pessimistic view. ✓
7 October 1963	McCone meets with John Richardson.
9 October 1963	President Kennedy answers two questions at press conference about Richardson and the Agency.
16 October 1963	Far East Division develops basic paper on re-organization of Saigon station.
17 October 1963	McCone discusses role of Air Force and national intelligence assets with Gilpatric.
25 October 1963	McCone develops position paper for meeting with President Kennedy on coup plotting in Vietnam. ✓
1 November 1963	Diem government overthrown by Vietnamese generals. ✓

3 November 1963	President Kennedy orders Colby to go to Saigon as Presidential emissary.
12 November 1963	McCone, Helms meet with President Kennedy for basic discussion of Cuba; President is shown Cuban rifle captured in Venezuela.
18 November 1963	McCone attends conference in Honolulu on Vietnam until 21 November. ✓
18 November 1963	Executive Director and Comptroller functions merged under Kirkpatrick.
22 November 1963	President Kennedy assassinated in Dallas.
23 November 1963	McCone meets with President Johnson alone.
24 November 1963	McCone meets with President Johnson and Lodge on Vietnam. ✓
28 November 1963	McCone meets with President Johnson who asks that McCone play an active role as a policy advisor.
29 November 1963	McCone attends meeting with President Johnson on A-11.

5 December 1963	President Johnson holds first NSC meeting; McCone presents intelligence briefing.
6 December 1963	McCone meets with President Johnson to discuss COS, Saigon; Peer de Silva named; Johnson sends message to Lodge.
7 December 1963	McCone meets with President Johnson to discuss changing the image of the DCI and CIA.
12 December 1963	McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget to review the Agency's covert action program.
13 December 1963	McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric to discuss the need for economy in intelligence operations.
13 December 1963	McCone meets with Rusk and Harriman who approve concept of releasing information on Soviet economy.
16 December 1963	McCone visits Saigon to install de Silva - ✓ until 20 December.
21 December 1963	McCone presents his views on Vietnam to ✓ President Johnson.

27 December 1963	McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ Ranch; Johnson reiterates his views on McCone's policy role.
31 December 1963	McCone meets with General Eisenhower in Pasadena and again on 2 January 1964 to discuss President Johnson's budget plans.
4 January 1964	McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ Ranch to review meetings with General Eisenhower.
7 January 1964	McCone attends meeting to hear General Krulak discuss proposals for intensified operations against North Vietnam.
9 January 1964	Thomas Dale of The New York Times publishes article on Soviet economy with attribution to CIA; other newsmen briefed.
9 January 1964	McCone attends meetings with President Johnson on Panama.
13 January 1964	McCone develops position paper on how plan to release information on Soviet economy was mis-handled.

14 January 1964	McCone attends meetings on Robert Kennedy's trip to meet Sukarno.
14 January 1964	Cyrus Vance succeeds Roswell Gilpatric effective 28 January.
18 January 1964	McCone travels to Paris, London, Rome, Madrid, Bonn - until 1 February.
7 February 1964	McCone attends meetings on Cuban fishing boats and Guantanamo water supply.
11 February 1964	McCone develops position paper on reconnaissance after Air Force deployment to fly U-2s out of Clark Field.
28 February 1964	McCone develops position paper in preparation for trip to Vietnam. ✓
28 February 1964	McCone attends meeting with President Johnson on surfacing A-11.
4 March 1964	William Bundy succeeds Roger Hilsman as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
4 March 1964	USIB re-organized.

4-5 March 1964	McCone meets with General Eisenhower who discusses relations with de Gaulle.
6 March 1964	McCone travels to Vietnam until 13 March; McCone dissents on McNamara's trip report; reports policy disagreement separately ✓ to President Johnson.
17 March 1964	NSC meeting on Vietnam. ✓
1 April 1964	McCone develops basic position paper on NRP for use with Baker panel of PFIAB.
2 April 1964	At evening seminar, McCone develops position paper on operations against North Vietnam.
7 April 1964	McGeorge Bundy develops position paper on Covert Program Against Cuba for use in meeting with President Johnson.
22 April 1964	McCone talks to McGeorge Bundy about lack of direct briefings of the President by the DCI.
29 April 1964	McCone talks to President Johnson about lack of direct access.
2 May 1964	NSC meeting on Cuban overflights.

5 May 1964	McCone sets forth position on "The Invisible Government."
5 May 1964	McCone attends meeting with President Johnson on Cuba and Laos; remains for Tuesday lunch meeting with the President, McNamara, Taylor and Bundy.
6 May 1964	McCone attends meeting with President Johnson to consider General Khanh's statements about war footing and march north. ✓
14 May 1964	McNamara's report on trip to Vietnam discusses bombing North Vietnam. ✓
16 May 1964	McCone gives President Johnson Agency estimate on action against North Vietnam. ✓
18 May 1964	At meeting on Laos and Vietnam, Rusk raises question of when does the United States commit troops. ✓
24 May 1964	Meetings all day with President Johnson on Southeast Asia. ✓
25 May 1964	William Bundy paper on Courses of Action on Southeast Asia.

28 May 1964	McCone goes to Honolulu for meeting on Vietnam until 3 June.
4,5,6,7 June	McCone attends meetings with President Johnson on Laos with the President asking, "What comes next?"
6 June 1964	McGeorge Bundy and Michael Forrestal raise with McCone the possibility of an Agency program along pre-SWITCHBACK lines.
11 June 1964	McCone develops position paper on Southeast Asia. ✓
11 June 1964	McCone writes McGeorge Bundy about PFIAB report on NRP.
15 June 1964	McCone meets with President Johnson to suggest that McCone leave his post; President asks that he remain until after the election.
17 June 1964	McCone develops position paper on NRP.
30 June 1964	McCone issues guidance for developing requirements for reconnaissance satellites.

104-10301-10001 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by DDO

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
1946 - 1965

DDO HP 324

by

David R. McLean

Approved:

David A. Phillips
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Directorate of Operations
December 1973

VOLUME I

Copy No. 1: WH
Copy No. 2: O/DDO

SECRET

Latin American officers in Panama, and also supplied material for the US Army Intelligence School to use in training foreign students on Communism. Nine CIA officers lectured at a Fort Holabird course for senior Latin American officers in 1961, capping their presentation by producing a Soviet defector who spoke on the Soviet intelligence service.267/

CIA maintained a station in Havana throughout 1960 but faced increasing operational difficulties--some of CIA's own making. Probably the outstanding flap was the capture of three TSD technicians, caught in the act of planting a microphone in the New China News Agency office. An analysis of this operation, made when the technicians were released 18 months later, showed that they had ignored many of the basic rules of tradecraft. On the other hand, the Cubans had given them only perfunctory interrogations.268/

In 1960 the Havana Station consisted of [James A. Noel], chief of station; Arthur Avignon, deputy; about six case officers and as many secretaries. Life was unpleasant; Castro agents shadowed American Embassy personnel, monitored their telephone conversations, and tried to pump their children about what daddy was doing. As relations between the United States and Cuba deteriorated the station concentrated on support for the Cuban invasion then being planned, and on developing stay-behind assets. Frank Belsito and later Ralph Seehafer were designated as "stay-behind officers" and regularly reported on a dozen or so agents and nets, a few of which survived the station's closing.*

The break in diplomatic relations with Cuba was predictable, and during the fall of 1960 Embassy dependents were moving themselves and their household effects back to the United States. Avignon made a special trip on the Havana-Key West ferry to take out his personal car, silverware, and a $1,500 violin. Station files not absolutely essential were crated and shipped back to Headquarters. Case officers were working 15-hour days, seven-day weeks.

When the break came, the Embassy had three days' notice that it would close on 4 January 1961. The CIA station had just installed a new incinerator and managed to burn what files it could not ship to Key West on the attache aircraft. When they were not burning papers or smashing technical equipment, case officers were caching radios or making advance payments to agents left behind.

---

* One stay-behind agent, AMFOX-1, was still reporting in 1973 but WH Division believed he had been doubled.

On 4 January station personnel met at the Embassy, rode in convoy to the ferry, and sailed to the States. A few, like William J. Murray, had maintained houses until the end and lost everything in them.* 269/

This was the period when Fidel Castro, as yet unrestrained by his more cautious and practical Soviet advisors, was busily stirring up trouble in the Western Hemisphere and popularizing the phrase "exporting the revolution." A typical target was Honduras, the poorest and most primitive country in Central America. CIA's reaction was also typical of the "nation-building" and "institution-building" approach to countering subversion.

When Castro began his propaganda campaign in

---

* Two years later Congress authorized the Department of State to reimburse its employees the depreciated value of furnishings left in Cuba. Payments fell far short of replacement costs.

> of assets commencing with a close personal relationship between the station chief and the President of Mexico, high-level telephone taps, photographic surveillance, unilateral intelligence assets and a broad scale of covert action capabilities.

Within a week of the inspector's visit Frederick W. Cole was relieved as chief of station in La Paz, partly because of comments made by Ambassador Ben Stephansky, a former labor attache who had not worked closely with CIA. Lyle T. Shannon, COS, Panama City, left WH Division (perhaps coincidentally) a few months after the Inspector General had described him thus:

> The chief of station is a GS-18 who has served in many different posts in the Agency. He has been in Panama for about five years. A wide gap in human relations exists between the chief of station and his staff. He is coldly aloof and is reputed to brook no difference of opinion even on questions of operational procedures. He is a hard-driving administrator. His talents along this line are granted even by the Ambassador, who bluntly discredits his ability as an intelligence officer. 275/

Although the separate Task Force W (TFW) was not officially established until 8 March 1962, the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs operation were for all practical purposes conducted independently of WH Division and therefore are not covered in this history. There was an informal but understood shortcut in the chain of command; basic decisions were made at the DDP, DCI, or Presidential level. Although some of the key personnel were detailed from WH Division, the Cuban Headquarters unit was in another building and no one pretended that J. C. King was running the show.

Jacob D. Esterline, a veteran WH Division officer who later became deputy chief of the division, was chief of the Cuban unit during the buildup and invasion attempt, and took his orders from the DDP. When the Cuban unit was made officially autonomous as TFW and later as the Special Affairs Staff (SAS), it was headed first by William K. Harvey and then by Desmond FitzGerald, Bruce B. Cheever and John L. Hart, none of whom had previous service in WH Division. It was not until 1965 that the Cuban unit really lost its autonomy and again came firmly under WH Division.

Actual expenditures in FY 1961 illustrate the disparity between Cuban operations and the parent WH Division. In that year total obligations for Cuban operations were 99 $41,498,743, or almost four times the 99 $11,003,991 spent in the rest of Latin America. Except for Cuba 1961 was a representative year, and these were the obligations for regular stations throughout the hemisphere:

98

Brazil	$1,498,101	Colombia	$301,389
Mexico	1,384,505	Dominican Rep.	261,148
Venezuela	922,424	Costa Rica	231,351
Argentina	802,302	El Salvador	222,037
Chile	646,768	Honduras	103,820
Panama	579,310	Nicaragua	92,088
Uruguay	521,082	Haiti	77,675
Guatemala	418,778	Paraguay	54,606
Peru	380,422	West Indies	41,864
Ecuador	336,367	Puerto Rico	24,377
Bolivia	303,210		

276/

Until the nearly 1,200 prisoners taken at the Bay of Pigs could be ransomed with shipments of pharmaceuticals, CIA regularly supported their dependents in the United States. In the opinion of the General Counsel, if a dependent had sued, courts would probably have found that Cuban Brigade members were entitled to the benefits of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. Thus by mid-1962 CIA was disbursing $311,500 per month to the dependents, plus bonuses and medical care for invaders who managed to return. These expenses, however, were paid from special funds outside the WH Division budget.[277]

Probably Castro's attempt to export his revolution reached its peak in 1962. The first Castro-inspired guerrilla action in Latin America occurred in March of that year, when Indians in the interior of Peru attacked the towns of Huampani and Satipo. A Lima Station penetration agent identified their leader as Cuban-trained and reported that radios and weapons had been smuggled in from Cuba to start the attack.[278]

At year's end the US Government planned to assemble for the Organization of American States a white paper on Cuban subversion in Latin America, and in February 1963 WH Division chiefs of station met in Panama to discuss their contributions with the DCI. From this meeting came a picture of Castro's campaign of subversion.

Argentina reported that left-wing Peronists were an attractive target for Cuba; police had captured a group of terrorists organized and directed by John William Cooke, an ex-Peronist then in Cuba. Bolivia knew of 217 activists trained in Cuba within nine months and was looking forward to debriefing

98

1/N

Everyone breathed easier, and the Chief, WH Division, described the operation as "one of the most tightly held of our Cuban activities." Two years later the hold was not so tight, for on 26 March 1965 the New York Times front-paged a reasonably complete and accurate account of the great sugar-sabotage operation under the headline:

98

PRESIDENT KENNEDY BALKED
CIA PLOT ON RUSSIAN SUGAR

Press services picked up the story. United Press International doffed its cap to "enterprising U.S. agents," but added that "White House intervention foiled the Central Intelligence Agency's Caribbean melodrama." CIA, as usual, had no comment.283/

For across-the-board coverage of Cuba in the early 1960's the Mexico City Station was tops. Reporting on the Cuban Embassy, the COS said in February 1963:

> We intercept their mail, photograph all the people who go in and out of the Embassy, cover their telephones completely, and within a few hours of the conversations have resumes of all the phone calls. We cover their trash, and this has been found to be useful. And included in the usefulness was the discovery of a man who was doublecrossing us, who we thought was a good penetration of the Embassy.

1/RJ

CIA had seven different microphones in the Cuban Embassy, one hidden in a leg of the coffee table in the Ambassador's office. Like most audio operations, this one produced a lot of chaff, but it also yielded bits of operational information showing connections between the Embassy and local Communists and students. At the airport the station was getting photographs of all travellers to Cuba, plus about 300 photos per day of their passports and documents.

24

[Included in the take from the Cuban Embassy were the serial numbers of weapons bought by Communists for smuggling into Guatemala, plus the names and positions of the sellers. Complicating the exploitation of this information was the fact that the weapons had been sold by Mexican officials, and while the station wanted to stop the smuggling and apprehend the Communist smugglers it had no desire to upset sensitive relations with the Mexican Government.]

8 [Two high-level officers of the Cuban Embassy, one of them the cultural attache], were recruited CIA penetrations. The station had sent three agents into Cuba and was getting reports from them by secret

2/mc

writing. Meanwhile it was servicing 17 accommodation addresses for Headquarters and Miami.

In spite of all this, there was little exploitable evidence that Cuba was using Mexico as a base for subversion in the rest of Latin America. Mexico was the only Latin American nation to maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba in the face of an OAS resolution intended to isolate the island. Anxious to retain this bridge to the Western Hemisphere, Castro had ordered his Embassy to do nothing which might be considered offensive by the Mexican Government.[284]

No such restraint was applied to Venezuela, where Castro-supported terrorism was rampant. On 2 November 1963, on a tip from a campesino, the Servicio de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas (SIFA) found a cache of more than three tons of Cuban arms on a beach on the Paraguana Peninsula in northwest Venezuela. CIA learned about it promptly through liaison.

98

Jonathan G. Hanke, a Caracas case officer, brought sample weapons to Washington, where CIA was able to raise the serial numbers and Cuban Army insignia which had been ground off. Richard Helms,

1/RJ

blocs in the country: Barrientos, supported by the campesinos; General Alfredo Ovando Candia, supported by the army; and the Communists and leftists, supported by tough mine and factory workers. To have Barrientos elected, CIA first had to promote a credible election by underwriting the campaigns of both the selected winner and his token opposition at the polls.

98 The real question was whether elections would be held at all. In 18 months the La Paz Station spent $585,000, first to persuade the armed forces to clamp down on the leftists, then to persuade Barrientos to run, then to convince Ovando he should not interfere, and finally to promote enough political opposition to make the election plausible. In a genuine tour de force, COS Lawrence M. Sternfield produced what OAS observers called a democratic and honest election--and got the results from the electoral tribunal four days before the election.

On 7 April 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson presided at a White House meeting which laid down general guidelines for CIA action against Cuba. Others at the meeting included Secretary of State

(/PJ

Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, General Maxwell Taylor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Presidential Advisor McGeorge Bundy, DCI John A. McCone, DDP Richard Helms and FitzGerald. There was no question about charging CIA with the following types of activity:

1. Collection of intelligence.
2. Covert propaganda to encourage low-risk forms of active and passive resistance.
3. Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial.
4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements inside Cuba.
5. Indirect economic sabotage.

There was sharp disagreement, however, over whether CIA should continue infiltrating sabotage agents into Cuba. McNamara, Taylor and McCone favored more sabotage raids, but Rusk and Bundy feared that CIA raids might undermine the US "clean hands" posture in the OAS or give the Soviets an excuse for delaying turnover of their surface-to-air missile

(SAM) sites to the Cubans.

Finally Rusk recommended that CIA's raiding assets be kept in being but not actually used--at least until the OAS and SAM sites problems could be clarified. The President accepted this recommendation. Although CIA did try to keep its sabotage agents ready, the White House decision spelled the end of the Agency's sabotage (though not support and intelligence-collecting) infiltrations of Cuba.[306/]

Agency-sponsored radio propaganda aimed at Cuba reached its peak in early 1965 with an actual expenditure of about $1,500,000 and expansion still planned. The semi-notional Cuban Freedom Committee served as cover for Radio Free Cuba, which broadcast a total of 77 hours weekly from transmitters in Miami, Key West, and New Orleans.

Started in 1961, the Cuban Freedom Committee retained a public relations firm and spent $7,000 annually to establish its cover by soliciting *bona fide* public contributions. In its first year these totalled $5,000, but by 1965 public support had dwindled to $200. One of the difficulties was that any widespread US appeal for funds for Radio Free Cuba would perforce have to attack Castro, and might therefore be considered domestic propaganda exceeding CIA's charter.

Outside the committee, CIA operated a transmitter calling itself Radio Americas and broadcasting from Swan Island, and bought time for anti-Cuban broadcasts from three commercial stations. Programming on these four stations totalled 119 hours weekly in addition to the 77 on Radio Free Cuba.[307/]

Swan Island, roughly a mile and a half long and three-quarters of a mile wide, lies in the Caribbean 125 miles north of the Honduran coast. Both the United States and Honduras claimed sovereignty over the island in the 1960's. The US Weather Bureau had manned a weather station there since 1949, and CIA first set up a covert transmitter in 1954 to support its propaganda against the Arbenz regime in Guatemala.*

Apart from the question of its real impact—in Cuba and the psychological problems of a staff living in almost total isolation, the Swan Island transmitter raised a nightmare of cover complications. Operating as Radio Americas, it was supposedly under cover of the Vanguard Service Corporation, an Agency proprietary which offered no services, and the Gibraltar Steamship Corporation, another proprietary which operated no steamships. A Boston millionaire who claimed to own the island collected rent from the Vanguard Corporation, which could not afford to argue, but not from the Weather Bureau, which disputed his claim. Vanguard contracted with Coastal Air of Miami for one light-aircraft supply flight a week and with the Logistics Service Corporation of Philadelphia, a Philco subsidiary, to maintain the island facilities and transmitting equipment. All of this enabled CIA to play tapes and broadcast the commentaries of the three Cuban announcers stationed on the island, but it did not prevent Radio Habana from pinpointing the transmitter and calling it a CIA propaganda mechanism. 308/

---

* Under a 1971 agreement the US relinquished its claim to sovereignty but retained the right to operate a weather station.

98

Nevertheless in early 1965 Congressman Roman C. Pucinski (D-Ill.), a member of the Cuban Freedom Committee executive board, was pressing CIA to saturate

(/PJ

the Cuban airwaves and smuggle or airdrop transistor radios into Cuba to expand the audience. Inside the Agency FitzGerald politely rejected the congressional advice but pointed out that WH Division already was planning the University of the Air,* which would broadcast college-level courses to divide the loyalty of Cuban students.309/

98

Another congressional critic was Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.), perennial sponsor of bills to create a CIA Watchdog Committee and author of a January 1964 Saturday Evening Post article entitled "The CIA Is Getting Out Of Hand." In April 1965 FitzGerald and Seymour Bolten of WH Division met with the Senator to discuss the Christian Democratic social and political programs of the Catholic Church in Latin America. After this meeting McCarthy, a devout Catholic, considerably tempered his assessment of the Agency.310/

US relations with Cuba entered a new phase after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 when Agency

---

* This project was abandoned following press exposure of CIA's relations with American universities and student groups.

98

2/R

facilities provided the Kennedy administration with positive information on the buildup of Soviet missile capability on the island. This episode is documented elsewhere and is outside the scope of this present paper.

One of FitzGerald's major successes against Cuba was in the field of economic warfare--called the MHVIPER program in CIA. After a hurricane ripped through the island in 1964, Castro's economists and publicists began a campaign to persuade free-world sugar brokers that the Cuban sugar crop had been badly damaged and exports would be low. The object, of course, was to drive up sugar prices on the world market, on which Castro depended for hard currency to finance imports.

At first the campaign worked and sugar prices did skyrocket. But FitzGerald was not convinced, and sent Natalie Scott to London to study economic reports from the British Embassy in Havana. Partly on the basis of her research, the US Government's sugar-crop forecasters concluded that despite the hurricane Cuba would harvest more sugar than ever.

FitzGerald arranged to have a Department of

State official leak this general conclusion to the New York Times. Sugar prices dipped, but rallied when Castro indignantly denied the Times story. The Department then officially announced the US Government estimate that there would be no shortage of Cuban sugar. As it turned out, the US estimate was right.

After the official announcement world sugar prices dropped several cents per pound, and this time they stayed down. At a time when fluctuations of one cent a pound meant millions of dollars to the Cuban economy, publication of the essentially correct estimate upset Castro's attempts to manipulate the market.[311]

Late in the summer of 1964 the DDI told FitzGerald that the Department of State was inquiring informally about the possibility of setting up a CIA channel for plausibly deniable clandestine contacts with Cuba. FitzGerald replied:

> It seems to me that the establishment of a continuous two-way conversation with Fidel Castro at a time when we have nothing to convey to him would be a serious mistake.... It may be that Secretary Rusk feels that the present establishment of conversations with Fidel Castro should

> be considered in order to make sure that we will have the ability to speak to him when or if the time comes. On this score I do not feel there is any reason for worry. There are a number of ways in which we can communicate to Fidel Castro virtually at a moment's notice. 312/

Part of CIA's economic warfare against Cuba involved an elaborate scheme to supply tampered petroleum additives through an Agency mechanism in Antwerp. This was planned as subtle sabotage; after being mixed with Soviet petroleum the additives would surely but imperceptibly incapacitate Cuban machinery. Unfortunately, the doctored additives proved anything but subtle and the Cubans promptly discovered they were unusable. 313/

Also a failure was an attempt by Francis S. Sherry and William C. Boner, Jr., of the Cuban Operations Group (WH/COG) to persuade Detroit automobile executives to produce spare parts deliberately designed to break down. Sherry and Boner went to Detroit in early March 1965 and explained to manufacturing vice presidents that the defective parts could be sent to Cuba through third-country suppliers. But the automobile executives refused to cooperate; they feared that their companies' reputations would

95

be ruined if the doctored parts accidentally got into the wrong channels.[314/]

98

In the wake of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 and the active years of 1962-1964, anti-Castro operations began to diminish in 1965. Operations continued but at a slower pace. John L. Hart had the title of Deputy Chief, WH Division, for Cuba (DCWHD/C), and operated a large base in Miami with virtual autonomy. A chain of safehouses, training sites and boat-moorages stretched through the Florida keys to Key West. From these CIA launched maritime operations which regularly placed and retrieved agents from the Cuban coast, but whose intelligence product often did not justify the effort.[315/]

Meanwhile CIA ran a dwindling number of on-island intelligence agents, including some handled in cooperation with the US Navy base at Guantanamo, where hundreds of Cubans still worked by day and returned to Castroland at night. As the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) improved and expanded under Soviet tutelage, CIA agent networks were rolled up and even singleton

/RJ

agents dropped out of contact. Typical was Radio Habana's 12 May 1965 announcement that "31 counter-revolutionaries, members of a CIA espionage network" had been arrested. Of the 14 actually named in the broadcast, WH Division identified six who had worked with Juan Bautista Perez Luis (AMTAUP-10), chief gardener at the naval base and principal agent for CIA. Although he had been debriefed in Miami in January, Perez' location and status were not known in May.316/

Probably the most successful political operation in WH Division's history was the Chilean election of 4 September 1964 in which Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party decisively defeated Salvador Allende, Marxist leader of a Communist-dominated coalition.* Drawing on covert mechanisms established by Santiago Station years earlier, plus new procedures and assets developed for the election, the campaign to assure Frei's victory cost CIA about $2,600,000. Its success kept Allende at bay until 1970, when no such intervention by CIA was authorized.

45

---

* For a full description, see "The Chilean Election Operation of 1964, a Case History, 1961-1964." CSHP-1.

1/RJ

that FitzGerald had won the President's confidence in several meetings. Freeman, who had been in Mexico only a few months, apparently simmered down after his talk with the assistant secretary.[318]

98

The Mexico City Station devoted a major part of its time to running or supporting operations against Cuba; 47 percent of its cable traffic concerned Cuban operations. Mexico was the only Latin American country maintaining diplomatic relations with Castro and had the only direct air link to Havana. WH Division assigned top priority to recruiting agents in place in Cuba, and Mexico City Station not only ran its own operations but supported the tentative plans of other stations.

The variety and volume of technical operations created a heavy workload managing safehouses, listening posts, and vehicles. For photography alone the station had six base houses commanding the entrances to target embassies, two mobile photosurveillance trucks, and three agents trained in photosurveillance on foot. It was such projects that provided information on the visits of Lee Harvey Oswald, President Kennedy's assassin, to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico.[319/]

CIA's clandestine information on Oswald, including a photograph showing him in front of the Soviet Embassy, was turned over to the FBI, which promised to safeguard Agency sources and methods. Instead, the Bureau showed the photograph to Oswald's mother in Dallas and told her it was a CIA photo. The mother gave the press a garbled story about the photo, the FBI gave the press the correct story, and eventually CIA's clandestine information became part of the voluminous Warren Commission report on the Kennedy assassination. In the process Mexico City Station had to abandon its photosurveillance base houses, which had been thoroughly blown.[320/]

In the early 1960's WH Division built an extensive political polling mechanism around the Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, a proprietary whose project cryptonym was JMTUBA. From 1962 to 1966 the institute conducted 20 polls in nine Latin American countries. Their cost cannot be computed because many of the expenses were charged to other projects.

98

In FY 1965, for example, political polls in

4KU

SECRET

CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by DDP

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORICAL SERIES
CS HP 334

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
SOVIET RUSSIA DIVISION
1946-1965

by

[Frederick Walters] 03

August 1972

David H. Blee
David H. Blee
Chief, SB Division

VOLUME I

Copy No. 1: SB
Copy No. 2: O/DDP

SECRET

1/p

available to SR/CI/Research on that particular subject. Some of these studies were sterilized subsequently for passage to a wider list of recipients than the sensitivity of the original production permitted. Some studies were translated and given to foreign liaison services.* Many of these studies were the result of suggestions for research topics from other SR Division offices, CIA-wide components, and organizations outside the CIA.

98

Throughout the period of this history, SR/-Reports, in coordination with Chief,SR/CI, had responsibility for the dissemination of timely general CI reports on the RIS. The area division concerned disseminated CI reports on the RIS which were clearly of only local significance.

J. Warren Commission Studies

The President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, also known as the Warren Commission, through its General Counsel, Mr. J. Lee Rankin, frequently called upon the CIA for information

---

* Attachment C lists the more important studies disseminated by SR/CI/Research and its predecessor organizations.

(IR)

in 1964. SR/CI/Research Branch responded to many of these requests for information working through CI Staff which assumed managerial control for CIA communications with the commission. The branch furnished information to the commission on a wide variety of topics concerning the RIS, Lee Harvey Oswald, and Oswald's associates in the USSR.*

In a meeting between CIA representatives and Messrs. Allen Dulles and Rankin of the Warren Commission on 14 January 1964, Rankin asked that CIA draft questions to be included in a letter to the Soviet Government concerning the Oswald case. The questions were to be "not too technical," should be sent soon, and were to be phrased in generalities in order to allow the Soviets more flexibility than would a longer, more pointed letter based on concrete US Government findings. These questions constituted the first direct involvement of Wigren and his Research Branch in the commission's work.

The commission wished to account in detail for all of Oswald's activities outside the United

---

* See Attachment D.

States. Bagley, Chief, SR/CI, subsequently directed Wigren to begin a chronological tabulation of Oswald's activities in the USSR as collated from various sources. The commission made available to Wigren documents and reports already acquired from other US Government investigative agencies. The commission agreed in principle to honor CIA sensitivity classifications to documents originated in the Agency for use of the commission. The Agency's role was limited to written communications to the commission.[10/]

By 21 January 1964 Wigren and his colleages had prepared and transmitted the questions to the commission for relay to the Soviet Government. Soviet defector Petr Deryabin had contributed to this endeavor. The questionnaire had four basic parts. The first series of questions sought to make an assessment of Oswald's mental and physical condition. The Soviets were requested to furnish information on his medical treatment in the USSR while in the hospital following his suicide attempt in 1959 as well as any psychological evaluations of him. The second series of questions sought to assess Oswald's use of and dependence on weapons. He had owned a shotgun in the USSR and had joined a hunting organization there. The third series of questions sought to complete Warren Commission documentation of Oswald's background and career in the USSR. Those items particularly sought were his correspondence with the Soviet Government, Soviet Government documents issued to him concerning his request for asylum and permission to reside in the USSR, documents and registrations of his residence and employment in the USSR, and documents concerning his departure from the USSR. The final question asked whether Oswald had a police record in the USSR and requested information and documents if so.[11/]

A comprehensive SR/CI/Research paper on the Oswald case went to the commission on 25 January 1964. This was a detailed chronology of Oswald's sojourn in the USSR together with an alphabetical listing of persons in the USSR whom the Oswalds knew or mentioned. Identifying information was included whenever available. This chronology was in preliminary form but the commission urgently required collated material to support the taking of direct testimony. The source material for the chronology included personal documents, interviews, and official and private correspondence. Traces were based on CIA files and the Moscow and Minsk telephone directories. These preliminary name traces were also sent to the commission on the same day as the chronology.[12] The final version of the name traces based on a review of the Oswald papers came to over 150 names; the results were furnished to the commission in late March 1964.[13]

SR/CI/Research prepared for the commission at its request a paper survey of known data on Soviet use of assassination. This study was intended only for background information of commission members with the caveat that CIA as an organization did not believe that the Kennedy assassination was a Soviet-sponsored operation. Much of the material in the assassination study had been published previously within the Agency.[14]

A fortuitous aspect of the SR/CI/Research concerning the Oswald case occurred when [Mr. Alexander W. Brasko] of the branch discovered by accident a photograph of Oswald in Graphics Register in March 1964. Brasko was seeking photographs of buildings in Minsk, USSR, where Oswald was resettled by the Soviet Government after 1959. Brasko found a copy of a color transparency which showed in a casual setting a young man who bore a remarkable facial resemblance to Oswald and was wearing a shirt identical in pattern and color to a shirt Oswald was wearing in photographs found in his effects following the Kennedy assassination. (Figure 1, page 77). The photograph was taken by an American tourist in Minsk's Central Square in August 1961 at the Palace of Culture. Copies of the photograph were also furnished to the FBI. The Bureau interviewed the photographer and her companions who could contribute little to their original statements when first interviewed by Agency representatives following their Soviet tour in 1961 (not about Oswald, however, whom they did not recall). A copy of this photograph was published on page 268 of the Warren Commission's report.

Some of the reports prepared by SR/CI/Research were deemed suitable for publication in the Commission's

13-00000



Palace of Culture, Central Square, Minsk, USSR

(Oswald is the young man on the right)

Figure 1.

report in the public record, either as textual material or as footnotes backing up general comments. This required explicit permission from the DDP, and the rewriting or declassification of some material previously submitted to the commission. In August 1964 Warren Commission Assistant Counsel W. David Slawson requested permission to publish in the commission report some memorandums submitted to the commission by SR/CI/Research via CI Staff. Since some of the material submitted to the commission earlier was intended for background use only or contained operational information, the reports in question were resubmitted to the commission in sanitized versions modeled on the originals. The revisions were identified as coming from CIA and appeared primarily in textual and footnote material on pages 258 to 280 of the commission's report.*

K. National Intelligence Survey on USSR Intelligence and Security

An important, recurring document written in

---

* Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC: 1964.

Appendix C

Source References*

1. Survey of CE in SR Division, Volume II, by Robert H. Hicks, CI Staff. Aug 55. TS 110604.
2. FY 1955 USSR Operational Plan. TS 91403.
3. SR Division's Operational Program and Budget for the USSR, FY 1956-57. TS 107830.
4. Memo, Chief, SR for the DDP, sub: Field Trip Report, 3 Oct 55.
5. Survey of CE in SR Division, by Robert H. Hicks, CI Staff, Aug 55. TS 110604.
6. 1958 Inspection and Review Staff review of SR Division: "The Role of SR Division," 23 Dec 58. TS 153028.
7. Memo, I&R Staff for the DDP, sub: Inspection of SR/CE Staff, 22 Dec 58. TS 153026.
8. SR Division Operational Program, FY 1961, pp 16 ff. 22 Mar 60, TS 175603.
9. SR Division Notice No. 450, 17 Aug 61. See also CSHP 76, pp 57-64, for a more detailed discussion of the 1961 functional reorganization, and a list of the members of the Special Group which proposed it.
10. Memo of Conversation, 16 Jan 64; sub: CIA Work in Support of the Warren Commission; by Tennant H. Bagley.
11. XAAZ-22407, 21 Jan 64, sub: Questions to be submitted to the Soviet Government, filed in 201-288248 (Lee Harvey Oswald).

98

---

* Unless otherwise indicated, all source references may be considered classified SECRET.

1/PJ

12. XAAZ-22409, 25 Jan 64, sub: The Oswald Chronology, filed in 201-289248.

13. XAAZ-22410, 25 Jan 64, sub: Name List with Traces, and XAAZ-22416, 26 Mar 64; sub: Name List with Traces, 201-289248.

14. XAAZ-22414, 28 Feb 64; sub: Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping, 201-289248.

15. XAAZ-22420, 29 Apr 64, sub: Photo of OSWALD in Minsk, 201-289248.

16. RID AEPAGAN file 74-6-67/1, Archives Job No. 64-619/32.

17. 201-91182 (Irma Jung); SB/CI/P Archives DA file-Germany.

18. 201-96494 (Anatoliy Nikolayevich Krushin); SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Germany.

19. 201-46344 (Gennadiy Kotorovich); RID File 74-6-67/25, Archives Job. No. 65-117/79; SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Germany.

20. 201-89924 (Willi von Hohenegg); SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Germany.

21. 201-286975 (Guenther Faltlhansl); SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Austria.

22. 201-231917 (Calvin Floyd); SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Sweden.

23. 201-313667 (Olafur Eggertson Briem) SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Iceland.

24. 201-248427 (Guenther Schulz); SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Germany

25. 201-314343 (Carlo Gulino); also RID 48-6-28; SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Libya

98

1/R

SECRET

ATTACHMENT D

SR/CI/RESEARCH ITEMS
FOR WARREN COMMISSION

ATTACHMENT D

SECRET.

Attachment D

SR/CI/Research Items for Warren Commission

1.	21 Jan. 1964	Questions to be submitted to the Soviet Government.
2.	22 Jan. 1964	Questionnaire for Marina OSWALD.
3.	25 Jan. 1964	The "OSWALD Chronology".
4.	25 Jan. 1964	Name list with traces (preliminary version).
5.	5 Feb. 1964	Biographic information on Mrs. OSWALD and her relatives.
6.	5 Feb. 1964	Letter explaining appendix designations.
7.	8 Feb. 1964	Letter regarding OSWALD's weapon in the USSR.
8.	28 Feb. 1964	Soviet use of assassination and kidnapping.
9.	28 Feb. 1964	Soviet press reaction to the assassination of President Kennedy.
10.	26 Mar. 1964	Name list with traces.
11.	6 Apr. 1964	Response to "Certain Questions Posed by the State Department Files".
12.	21 Apr. 1964	Additions to the Chronology of OSWALD in the USSR.
13.	24 Apr. 1964	Lydia DIMYTRUK.
14.	29 Apr. 1964	Photo of OSWALD in Minsk.
15.	6 May 1964	Contacts between the OSWALDs and Soviet citizens, 13 June 1962 to 22 November 1963.
16.	8 May 1964	Marina OSWALD's notebook.
17.	3 Jun. 1964	Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD furnished by the Soviet Government.
18.	5 Jun. 1964	Allegations regarding Intelligence Training School in Minsk, USSR
19.	22 Jul. 1964	Apparent inconsistencies in material furnished the Commission by CIA and the Department of State.
20.	24 Jul. 1964	Yekaterina FURTSEVA.
21.	31 Jul. 1964	Length of time required for obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964
22.	7 Aug. 1964	Soviet hunting societies.
23.	28 Aug. 1964	Konstantin Petrovich SERGEIVSKY.
24.	9 Sept.1964	KGB footnote.
25.	10 Sept.1964	KGB Handling of Foreigners in the USSR.

SECRET

SECRET

26.	10 Sept. 1964	Acquaintances of the OSWALDs in Minsk.
27.	10 Sept. 1964	Financial aid for foreigners in the USSR.
28.	10 Sept. 1964	Secret training locations and procedures in the USSR.
29.	10 Sept. 1964	Rates of compensation in the USSR.
30.	10 Sept. 1964	Emigration and travel of Soviet nationals.
31.	11 Sept. 1964	Geographic-descriptive data on Minsk.
32.	11 Sept. 1964	Certain questions posed by State Department files.
33.	11 Sept. 1964	Soviet hunting societies.
34.	11 Sept. 1964	Length of time required for obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in Western Europe in 1964.
35.	18 Sept. 1964	Identification of persons appearing in FBI photo D 33-46.
36.	18 Sept. 1964	Passport and Visa office.
37.	18 Sept. 1964	Resettlement of US defectors in the USSR.
38.	18 Sept. 1964	Inturist hotels in Moscow.

104-10301-10004 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TOP SECRET

CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by
CIA History Staff

TS#795052
Copy 1 of 2

OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

VOLUME III

EVOLUTION OF CIA'S ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES, 1959-JANUARY 1961

(pages 1-203)

TOP SECRET

TS#795052

DCI-8

December 1979

Copy 1 of 2

PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
DO NOT DESTROY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

DCI-8

Volume III

EVOLUTION OF CIA'S
ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES,
1959-JANUARY 1961

December 1979

Jack B. Pfeiffer

Foreword

This is the third volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation and it focuses on the problems of establishing a policy for the United States Government as Fidel Castro and his cohorts came to power in Cuba.* The policy decided on by the US Government in March 1960 called for the displacement of Fidel Castro, and it was by no means a unilateral decision promoted by the Central Intelligence Agency -- although it is demonstrable that the Agency was far more perceptive than the policy making bodies in recognizing the threat to the Western Hemisphere posed by Castro's communist affiliation. Because the policy makers feared censure by the United Nations and/or the Organization of American States, the myth of "plausible deniability" was the caveat that determined the CIA would be the principal implementing arm for the anti-Castro effort. From inception to termination,

---

* The preceding volumes were:

I - Air Operations

II - Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

"deniability" would be the albatross around the necks of Agency planners; and from D-Day minus 2, (i.e., 15 April 1961) it became the strangling cord insuring the failure of the effort at the Bay of Pigs.

This volume describes the Agency's organization designed to accomplish the assigned task; and it records the interaction between the Agency and other government components (State and the military in particular), between the Agency and the White House, and among various CIA components as the program evolved. The relationships were sometimes less than harmonious. Particular attention is focused on the roles played by both President Eisenhower who authorized the anti-Castro program and Vice President Nixon who has been charged time and again -- unjustifiably as the record reveals -- with being the mastermind behind the operation.

Emphasis also is focused on the drastic change in the concept of the operation between the spring and fall of 1960. From April's plans for the infiltration into Cuba of small teams of Agency trained specialists in communications, sabotage, and paramilitary operations to provide training and guidance to anti-Castro dissidents, November's plans called for an amphibious landing with armor and combat air support to establish a lodgement on Cuba soil from which a provisional government (approved by State and ~~sponsored~~ controlled by CIA) could issue its clarion calls for US, UN, or OAS intervention.

Encompassed in this volume are the records of the policy level meetings which considered such items as funding the operation, possible use of US personnel in combat roles, the use of US bases for training or for operations, types of direct action programs (e.g., propaganda drops vs sabotage), and the host of other problems related to Castro's overthrow. It also makes clear that various US corporate interests played an active (sometimes overactive) role in support of the anti-Castro efforts of the Government.

This volume also examines official records in light of the allegations of the Senate Select Committee's investigations that the assassination plans being developed by the Mafia were a fundamental part of the official US Government program to overthrow Fidel Castro. There is no basis in fact for this ~~change~~ charge.

Finally, the reader of this volume should gain some insights to the character of various of the principal actors -- Agency and non-Agency -- who were involved most closely with the Government's anti-Castro policy during the period from its inception through the close of the Eisenhower administration. Not all of these impressions are flattering; but the author, who was in no way associated with the operation or the Directorate of Plans (now Operations), hopes that the presentation of the evidence has been as free from bias as possible.

Again the author wishes to acknowledge the valuable contributions of the other two members of the CIA History Staff, Mrs. Eulalie Hammond and Mrs. Sharon Bond, to the completion of this volume. Without their unfailing willingness to perform either the substantive research or the grimly mechanical tasks required in preparing a volume such as this, the task could have been interminable.

For any errors of fact or questionable interpretations, the author alone is responsible.

Volume III

Contents

Page

Foreword iii

Part I Background 1

A. Watching from the Sidelines . . 1
B. Castro Takes Over 17

Part II Castro Must Go 32

A. Organizing for Covert Action . . 32
B. Forging the Tool 80
C. Cooperation and Challenge . . . 104
D. Personnel and Training 126

Part III Changing Concepts 143

Part IV Presidential Resurgence 165

Part V Direct Action Programs 204

A. Propaganda 204
B. Sabotage and other Exercises . . 233

Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role 241

Part VII The Question of Assassinations . . . 277

Part VIII Conclusions 290

Appendixes

A. Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59 . . 296

Page

B. A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60 300

C. CNO Correspondence with Department of State and NSC:

1) Letter for Allen Dulles from Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60 TS (DD/P 0-1436) 311
2) Letter for Gordon Gray from Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60 313
3) Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60, sub: US Policy toward Cuba 318

D. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60, sub: Liaison with US Agencies on JMARC Activities 332

E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at Santiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961 335

F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959 337

G. Memorandum for DCI [for Briefing Vice President Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub: What We Are Doing in Cuba 344

Source References

Part I Background 347

Part II Castro Must Go 352

Part III Changing Concepts 366

Part IV Presidential Resurgence 369

Page

Part V Direct Action Programs 374

Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role 382

Part VII Assassination 386

Part VIII Conclusions 388

THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

Volume III Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, 1950 - January 1961

Part I

Background

A. Watching from the Sidelines

Fidel CASTRO RUZ was identified in one of the earliest reports in Agency files as "one of the young, 'student leaders' in Cuba, who manages to get himself involved in many things that do not concern him." 1/ Beginning in 1948, the activities of Fidel Castro came to be of increasing concern to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the United States Government (USG). By early 1960 the USG officially adopted a covert action program designed to remove the Castro government from control of the island of Cuba. The policy of the USG was to be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency and would culminate in the operations at the Bahia de Cochinos from 17-19 April 1961.

Beginning in 1948 and continuing even after the United States had formulated its official policy of removing Castro from the leadership of the Cuban Government, the principal questions faced by CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, by the Department of State, and by other concerned principals in the United States were: What is Fidel Castro? By whom is he controlled? What does he represent? Is he, or is he not, a Communist? The nature of the Agency's interest in answers to these questions is reflected in various of the records for the period beginning in the mid-1950's when it appeared that the Agency depended in considerable part on the reporting from the American Embassy offices in Havana.

Commenting on a report entitled "Antidemocratic Antecedents and Activities of Fidel Castro" prepared by President Batista's Military Intelligence Service (SIM) -- apparently in response to a request from the Buró de Represión a las Activadades Communistas (BRAC)* -- to the Counselor of the American Embassy (Amembassy) in Havana, Lincoln Vinton Chapin, told the CIA representative among other things, that:

---

* Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities.

> The SIM report is nothing more than a summary of allegations and accusations made against Fidel Castro during the period 1948-1950. This summary has apparently been slanted in an effort to make Castro a "Rojo," but the result is a rather poor one. 2/

The Department of State reporter refuted, on a paragraph by paragraph basis, all of the allegations which indicated that Castro had been tied in with Communists, or Communist sympathizers, ever since his university days; and in forwarding the report to Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the COS Havana indicated that he was furnishing the information because of renewed interest by the State Department in Fidel Castro. 3/

The tenor of State reporting continued in a similar vein well into 1957. Charges that Castro was a Communist could not be substantiated, but State did note that in his student days, he "was involved in gangster-type activities." 4/ Havana Embassy reporting also reflected another of the problems of continuing concern to the US Intelligence Community -- would Castro have sufficient force to oust Batista, and were his basic feelings toward the US friendly. 5/

In the mid-1950's, Havana Station ran seven approved FI projects, most of which were aimed at the Cuban Communist Party, the PSP (Partido Socialista Popular). Agency funds also were used to support the efforts of an anti-Communist organization engaged principally in propaganda activities. 6/

Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA's Inspector General, apparently accompanied US Ambassador Gardner and his party to a meeting with President Fulgencio Batista in the summer of 1956, a meeting which prompted the Cuban President to write to the DCI, Allen Dulles, in praise of the meeting.* 7/ In fact, Agency support for the peaceful transfer of power from Batista to a democratically elected successor and amnesty for Castro and his followers, as well as other anti-Batista dissidents, was proposed in a memorandum from the Inspector General in November 1957. 8/

---

* David R. McLean, a former member of the IG's Inspection Staff, attached a cryptic note to the copy of Dulles' letter of response to Batista, which he, (McLean) included in the file of miscellaneous documents on the Bay of Pigs, which were inherited by the present author. McLean suggested that Kirkpatrick helped organize BRAC, but the present author has not confirmed this story.

In view of subsequent developments, one interesting suggestion made by the Inspector General in November 1957 was the following:

> On the island of Cuba, probably only a US citizen, in some way known to be connected with the US Government and "assumed" to be backed by Washington, would have the ability to act as intermediary between the various opposition groups in the Batista Government and work out a possible "cease fire." This would have to be done covertly, and any results achieved either not ever publicly announced or certainly not advertised until after the election. Any public attempt to bring peace would be foredoomed to failure by each side probably indicating exorbitant demands and then being unable to withdraw from its announced position.* 9/

Although it may have had no relation to the Kirkpatrick memorandum, on 25 November 1957, less than a week following the Kirkpatrick memorandum, William Wieland of the Department of State notified Adolf Berle, one of the country's leading experts on Latin American Affairs and a former member of the

---

* It is interesting to speculate whether at this time Kirkpatrick was thinking of William D. Pawley, former US Ambassador to Brazil and Peru and an American businessman who operated significant enterprises in Cuba, to negotiate with Batista. Within a year's time, Pawley, who also stood high in the ranks of the Republic Party contributors, was designated to undertake such a mission to Cuba.

State Department, that he was enroute to Cuba, according to Berle, "to see whether anything can be done to bring the Cuban revolt to any kind of an orderly conclusion." 10/

Berle, with remarkable prescience, noted:

> It is rough going, anti-intervention is all right up to a point. But we are responsible for keeping order in the hemisphere quite aside from the proprieties, and a rather bolder policy in that regard seems indicated. 11/

By early 1958, the Agency had become sufficiently concerned about the pro-Communist orientation of Castro's government, and particularly the pro-Castro proclivities of his two principal deputies, Ernesto Che Guevara and Raul Castro Ruz, Fidel's brother, that penetration of the Partido Socialista Popular was a priority concern of the field. At least two agents were successfully placed in PSP ranks, and in March 1958, one Agency officer managed to join the Castro forces in the mountains for a period of two weeks and to observe their tactics in combat. In June 1958, Robert D. Wiecha, COB, Santiago de Cuba, got himself "captured" by Raul Castro's forces in order to be able to assist 29 US sailors and marines and 15 US businessmen who had been kidnapped by Raul Castro. In both instances, the Agency representatives returned unharmed; and both reported on the "radical" and anti-American nature of the Castro movement. According to one source, Wiecha found "definite communist overtones" among the Raul Castro forces.* 12/

Additional documentation of the pro-communist nature of the Castro organization was reported with great frequency during 1958 from contacts the Santiago de Cuba Base had in Oriente Province. Whether Castro's contingent was communist oriented or not, others such as Adolf Berle and his friends (both in and out of State Department), continued to reflect their concern about the possible ways to combat the growing strength of the Castro movement in Cuba. 13/ Berle was most hopeful that the Castro situation could be remedied by cooperation among Latin American liberals working in conjunction with some of the more enlightened Cubans who had broken with Castro (for example, Felipe Pazos and Pepín Bosch) with additional support from the OAS

---

* The historian for WH Division provided the figures on US captives shown here, but Hugh Thomas indicates 19 US businessmen and 27 servicemen were captured.

-- and only minor participation from the US Department of State. 14/

At a time when the Agency's fears about the Castro movement were increasing, a rather different proposal was put forward by the Chief of the Paramilitary Division, Political and Psychological Staff, of the Clandestine Service. Rather than trying to whip Castro, Alfred Cox suggested that perhaps the wisest move for the Agency would be to join Castro. It was apparent, according to Cox, that since Batista was on the way out, we should now try to remedy Castro's hostile attitude toward the United States because of our efforts to prop up Batista. To accomplish this, Cox suggested that:

> A practical way to protect United States interests in this matter would be to make secret contact with Castro, assure him of the United States sympathy with some of his objectives, and to offer him support. The individual chosen to make the contact should be of such background that it is clear that he speaks with the authority of the United States Government.
>
> Obviously, the support must be given covertly so as not to endanger United States relations with Batista. The most effective means of help to Castro would be arms and ammunition. Air dropping of

> this equipment might be dangerous from the security aspect. Allowing a shipload of equipment manned by a Cuban crew to evade our Coast Guard would probably be a better method. The most secure means of help would be giving the money to Castro, who could then purchase his own arms. A combination of arms and money would probably be best.* 15/

By late fall of 1958, when it became apparent that the Batista regime in Cuba was about to go under, the Agency in conjunction with the Department of State supported a plan to have Batista bow out more or less gracefully and to have the government of the country taken over, not by the Presidential candidate who had been elected in the rigged election, but by a junta pending subsequent free, democratic elections. When traveling to Miami with William Snow, an Assistant Secretary of State, and Henry Holland, formerly a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, met with William D. Pawley on 18-19 November 1958 to discuss a plan which would have Pawley travel to Cuba to meet with Batista in an attempt to convince him to bow out gracefully. Pawley was a long-time acquaintance and friend of Batista from the days when Pawley had been running the Cubana Airline.

---

* Not all Agency reporting out of the Cuban area was biased against Castro. One report in the fall of 1958 indicated that Castro definitely was not a Communist, citing as a reason for this: "Ninety-five percent of his followers are good Catholics. Three Catholic priests have joined Fidel Castro and his forces in the Sierra Maestra, and one has joined Raul Castro and his troops in the Sierra Cristal. The rebel forces under the Castros, therefore, have four chaplains, while the entire Cuban Army does not have a single chaplain. (Source comment: The United States should not be taken in by President Fulgencio Batista's attempt to label the revolutionary movement as Communist inspired, dominated, or influenced.)" 16/

The source for this evaluation of Castro was, as one might surmise, a Catholic priest.

In return for Batista's support for a friendly military junta -- nominally to be responsible for his ouster -- the representatives of the Department of State and the Agency agreed that Batista should be provided safety for himself, his friends, and his close cronies, particularly those whose lives would be endangered should there ever be a truly violent overthrow of the government. Batista also was to be provided protection for his personal assets in Cuba. Various individuals were identified as possible candidates for the junta, and, according to King, the objective was that various of these members would have sufficient political strength to weaken Castro's support.

Following the meeting in Miami, Pawley did undertake the mission to see Batista in Cuba. Arriving on 8 December in Havana he had a series of preliminary meetings with the Cuban Foreign Minister, who strongly supported the proposals that Pawley indicated that he was going to make. Unfortunately, however, the Foreign Minister told Pawley that it was unlikely that Batista would accept the proposals. The meeting between Pawley and Batista actually took place on 11 December 1958 when, according to the report from Havana station:

> Pawley met with Batista for two hours this evening. Laid his plan before Batista without pulling any punches. B[atista] took it calmly. He agreed with much of Pawley's analysis of situation, but said he could not take the junta way out. 17/

Batista made no promises, and went through the reasons why he couldn't possibly give up the office -- for fear of being called a coward and traitor; that there would be a blood bath; and that he had both moral and constitutional obligations. COS Havana noted Pawley's evaluation of the meeting as follows:

> Batista will not accept plan, and will make every effort turn government over to Rivera Aguero [the Batista candidate who had been named Presidential successor in a rigged election]. However, unfavorable developments may produce change of attitude on part of B[atista]. 18/

Following Pawley's visit with Batista, the situation in Cuba deteriorated rapidly and the policies of the US Government regarding Cuba were ambivalent. A representative of the Archbishop of Havana, Father Bez Chebebe, approached the American Consul in Santiago to float some proposals for resolving the differences between the two countries. The priest emphasized that although a Castro take over was inevitable:

> Both Fidel Castro and US interests had important stake in sugar crop and both undoubtedly wish resolve problems caused by present situation. Also said that there were matters now mostly minor on both sides which have been sources mutual irritation and misunderstanding and that these should be eliminated soonest, so that they would not grow to affect future relations, which Father considers inevitable. 19/

In addition, the representative of the Archbishop of Havana indicated to the Amconsul that:

> He though[t] US Government could profitably send person of confidence,

> not necessarily an official, to discuss mutual problems as discreetly as possible with Fidel. Implied that such would be well received. 20/

Despite the fact that the communist proclivities of Fidel Castro and his cohorts had been clearly stated by Agency personnel in Cuba, on 18 December 1958, COS Havana cabled Headquarters strongly supporting the position that the Archbishop of Havana's representative had proposed to the American Consulate, saying:

> Havana Station feels proposal merits serious State/CIA consideration. Operation this nature could pay big future dividends if fully qualified person could be found for job and dispatched quickly. Regardless how we may feel about Castro and his movement, both will be important political forces for a long time to come. Perhaps candidate could be found through National Catholic Welfare Organization. 21/

At about the same time this proposal was being put forward, WH Division had asked the Paramilitary Division (PMD) to establish a small contingency task force, capable of making air drops into Cuba. Two representatives of PMD, Lucious L. Rucker and William G. Redel were sent to Havana -- Rucker to locate and survey possible drop zones and Redel to get himself into position to see if he could locate dissidents who were both anti-Castro and anti-Batista. What WH hoped to accomplish, presumably, was that they could organize these anti-Batista and anti-Castro dissidents and get them armed in time so that they could prevent Castro from taking over the government if Batista should suddenly resign or decide to flee the country. 22/ On 31 December 1958, Paramilitary Division reported to WH Division that a Helio Courier was already in place in Key West with a backup Helio in Washington; a sterile C-54 had been requested from Europe; and the Office of Logistics would have an arms load rigged for a drop by 2 January 1959. 23/

It was not until the last week of December 1958 that President Eisenhower became actively involved in discussions and decisions affecting US policy toward Cuba. His interest was precipitated by a 23 December 1958 Memorandum on Cuba which had been prepared by the Acting Secretary of State and sent to Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, who discussed the memorandum with Eisenhower and the DCI on 26 December. The President apparently indicated that he had not been fully aware of the positions of State and CIA regarding Castro, and he suggested that meetings of the Special Group under NSC 5412/2 should be held on a weekly basis, with Cuba to be a regular subject for discussion.

Gordon Gray and Allen Dulles had some differences of opinion concerning the advisability of reading other individuals into the act. Gray suggested that the President's Board of Consultants (later the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) be made party to the discussions, but Dulles rather strongly suggested that there was a significant difference between the discussions which were intended for the Special Group 5412 on Covert Operations, and PFIAB responsibilities for general problems related to foreign intelligence. Dulles made the specific point that if the Board of Consultants was going to get involved in the details of planned covert operations, they were then in a position of reviewing US foreign policy. The discussion also seems to have verged on the right of Congress to attempt to oversee covert operations -- a point about which Eisenhower expressed himself very strongly, noting that such action by Congress would be an infringement of his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief. 24/

At 3:40 on the afternoon of 31 December 1958, there was another high level meeting attended by Messrs. Herter, Murphy, and Rubottom, Department of State; Irwin, Department of Defense; Admiral Burke, the CNO; General Cabell, DDCI; and Gordon Gray at which the Cuban situation was again discussed. Even as the meeting was in progress, Batista was preparing to flee Cuba; and possible US action, including direct intervention by US Marines, was among the topics that were discussed. There also was some suggestion that the US take the responsibility for naming members to a junta to succeed Batista, rather than permitting Fidel Castro and his followers to take over the Cuban Government. 25/

With some benefit of hindsight, Eisenhower recalled this period in the following manner:

> During the rush of these last events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the best interests of the United States. (Earlier reports which I had received of Castro's possible Communism were suspect because they originated with people who favored Batista.)
>
> "Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have penetrated the Castro movement," Allen Dulles said. "If Castro

> takes over, they will probably participate in the government." When I heard this estimate, I was provoked that such a conclusion had not been given earlier.

At another point, the ex-President wrote:

> Though our intelligence experts backed and filled for a number of months, events were gradually driving them to the conclusion that with the coming of Castro, Communism had penetrated this hemisphere. 26/

B. Castro Takes Over

During the first few weeks of 1959 following Castro's take over, there was a flurry of activity as Havana Station attempted to keep track of the changes in government. The Station seemed assured that it was cognizant of all of Castro's movements, especially on the developing military capabilities. In fact, when the US Army suggested that the Station provide support for the Army's covert collection of military intelligence under commercial cover in Havana, COS took strong exception to the proposals, emphasizing the Station's own capabilities in this area. COS was overruled by Headquarters, however, and General Cabell assured the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Army that while he was aware that Havana had objected to the Army's proposals, the COS nonetheless had been "instructed" to cooperate.* 27/

In these early weeks of 1959, US representatives in Havana were predicting that Castro would have a difficult time holding his government together, and among other things, one report emphasized the probability that Castro would soon find that he would have to get along with the United States. 29/ The most likely threat to relations with the United States was the existence of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, but neither CIA nor State Department representatives saw any threat to this installation, and this belief was supported in early March 1959 by a Special National Intelligence Estimate that, at most, Castro "sooner or later [is] likely to ask for major increases in the nominal rent now paid for the Guantanamo Base, revision of employment practices which appeared to discriminate against Cuban workers, and perhaps other changes." 30/

---

* An interesting side note to the discussions at this time was that the Army Attache apparently had planned to use a negro Lt. Col. who was on TDY in Havana to do a study of the new Castro Army. In a memorandum to the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, and to the Chief, Foreign Intelligence Staff, Al Cox, Chief, Paramilitary Division reported -- without ever using the term "black" -- that General Erskine (Army Special Forces) believed that a "color bar" did exist in the Caribbean area and that a better choice than Lt. Col. Reuben Horner, the black officer in question, could be made. 28/

In the early spring of 1959, as Castro made known that he was planning to visit the United States, COS Havana revealed ambiguous feelings about the importance of the Castro trip. He noted for Headquarters information that:

> Washington visit can make or break Castro. Unless he gets a strong helping hand from the United States, many serious observers feel his regime will collapse within a matter of months. 31/

Pointing to the serious economic difficulties of the new Cuban Government, COS Havana indicated that Castro's popularity was very low among the middle and upper classes, but at the same time he emphasized that Castro was "the idol of the masses." 32/ COS Havana did an excellent job of predicting how Castro would act when he arrived in the United States, suggesting that Castro would probably make his pitch, not to the heads of the State Department and to the press, but that he would appeal to the workers, the farmers, the students, and the masses in America to support his revolution. COS emphasized that Headquarters should make no mistake that the Castro Government, while not openly avowed Communist, was heavily infiltrated with Communists and had taken no stand in opposition to Communist positions, and, moreover, there was little question about who would eventually control the Cuban Government. COS did suggest that Headquarters give serious consideration to planting embarrassing questions with reporters to stick to Castro while he was in the US. 33/ Both the Department of State and COS Havana were in general agreement about the results of the Castro visit. COS Havana summarized one of his dispatches as follows:

> It would be unwise to assume from the minor indications to date that Fidel has undergone a serious change of heart as a result of his visit to the United States. 34/

In a memorandum to Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State noted that:

> Despite Castro's apparent simplicity, sincerity, and eagerness to reassure the United States public, there is little

> probability that Castro had altered the essentially radical course of his revolution. From his experience here, he has gained a valuable knowledge of American public reaction which may make him a more difficult man to deal with on his return to Cuba. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate this man. With all his appearance of naiveté, unsophistication, and ignorance on many matters, he is clearly a strong personality and a born leader of great personal courage and conviction. While we certainly know him better than before, Castro remains an enigma; and we should await his decisions on specific matters before assuming a more optimistic view than heretofore about the possibility of developing a constuctive relationship with him and his government. 35/

With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that in this period shortly following Castro's visit to the United States the COS Havana may have misjudged a significant development which surfaced almost immediately after Castro's return to Cuba. Remarking on an apparent rash of anti-Communist statements appearing in the Cuban press, one dispatch speculated that:

> These demonstrations obviously welcome, but possibly most significant aspect is demonstration once again, enormous power Castro, who with few words made anti-Communism popular position. By same token he could reverse trend at any time, and skeptics speculating that current stand is sop intended to make it more difficult for U.S. interests to protest effectively against stringent agrarian reform law. 36/

A follow-up dispatch within two days of that cited above provided a more accurate insight as to the depth of the struggle which was, in fact, being waged within Cuba between the pro- and the anti-Communist factions. Reporting on comments made by the Executive Secretary of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) with reference to the confusion among party members regarding statements that Castro had made while he was in the United States, Anibal Escalante laid it on the line that there was a struggle between the left and the right; and he emphasized that the conservative element was trying to take advantage of remarks which Castro had been forced to make while in the United States. According to the source reporting on Escalante's talk, Vice-President Nixon had told Castro that unless he broke his alliance with the Communists, the United States would cut off economic aid to Cuba; and this threat had struck Castro as so serious that he made some unwise statements. The source, however, noted that the liberal forces of the 26 July movement in the Directorio Revolucionario (the DR), were in control of the revolution, and that the duty of the PSP was to work toward unity and overcome the counterrevolutionaries. 37/

In a Special NIE of 30 June 1959 on *The Situation in the Caribbean through 1959*, the intelligence community again indicated that the internal situation in Cuba had not been decided. The SNIE commented:

> The Communists probably do not now control Castro, but they are in a position to exert influence in his regime, and to carry on further organizational work. 38/

Through the summer and into the early fall of 1959, the degree of Castro's commitment to Communism continued to be a major subject of discussion within the intelligence community; and in the weekly reporting that was begun by COS Havana in early June, this topic continually occurred. In August 1959, when the Deputy Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, Rudolph Gomez, assisted Leo Churn in the preparation of an "Urgent Report on Cuba" for distribution to members of the Research Institute of America, Castro's Communist association was prominently featured. At this time, and reflecting the views of both Western Hemisphere Division and the Department of State with whom Gomez had coordinated the paper, Fidel Castro was not considered to be a Communist. His brother Raul Castro, however, was clearly identified as a hard-core Communist.* 39/

The internal problem to which Anibal Escalante had referred in mid-summer came to a head in mid-October 1959 when Hubert Matos, a military leader in Camaguey Province and formerly a strong supporter of Castro, broke with Fidel over the increasing number of leadership positions which were being turned over to members of the Communist oriented PSP rather than to members of the 26 July Movement. Matos resigned as military leader of Camaguey on 19 October 1959 and was arrested on 20 October. During the months prior to his trial in December 1959, when he was found guilty of treason and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, a number of others who had been prominent anti-Batistianos also broke with Castro. Among these were Faustino Perez, Minister for Recovery of Illegally Acquired Property; Rufo López-Fresquet, Minister of Finance; Manuel Ray, Minister of Public Works; and Felipe Pazos, head of the National Bank who was removed by Castro and replaced by Che Guevera, whose expertise was in revolution not in banking. As Theodore Draper has said, this was the second civil war for Castro. 40/

---

* In view of the trend of recent years, it is interesting to note that the Church report found reason to be somewhat critical of the Senate Internal Security Committee (Sen. Eastland's Committee) for getting involved in matters which were principally of concern to the intelligence community. In this case, the Senate Committee was criticized specifically for taking Diaz Lanz, the head of Castro's Air Force who had defected, and questioning him before turning him over to the intelligence agencies for initial interrogation.

Coincidental to the internal squabble that led to Matos's resignation, the Deputy Chief of WH Division, Rudy Gomez, was in Havana (15-18 October 1959) promoting an increase in Station efforts to penetrate the PSP. In the course of this tour, the qualifications of the best of the agents who might conduct this penetration were reviewed with COS Havana and Station personnel. Gomez also pointed out that the anti-Communist efforts in Havana should not be limited to those who were FI or PP designees, but everyone in the Station was urged to take advantage of opportunities to push into the Partido Socialista Popular. In reporting on his visit with COS Havana, Gomez noted that the Ambassador and other members of the American Embassy in Havana also were very much interested in the program being advanced; and, in fact, asked Gomez if CIA could "send a qualified Communist expert to Havana to indoctrinate appropriate Embassy officers on Communist doctrines, particularly on their modus operandi and how Communists working under cover could be recognized." Upon his return Gomez received J. C. King's approval to comply with this request.* 41/

Even as Gomez was promising State's representatives in Havana assistance in understanding Communist activities, J. C. King, Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, was going forward to the Director of Central Intelligence with a memorandum complaining about the Department of State's failure to provide CIA with a policy action paper on Cuba -- a paper which, according to King, had been promised as early as May 1959, yet had not been received by the end of October. Nor was there any indication when such paper might be expected, despite numerous meetings with Department representatives. King also was particularly critical of the fact that Ambassador Bonsal had been called to Washington on two occasions, but in neither instance had he called on the Agency for consultation -- this despite the fact that there had been indications from the Department that such consultations were to be held. 42/

---

* It would appear from this request that both the DDP and State were remiss in the training of their overseas personnel. That the Station had to request Headquarters for support on such an issue is difficult to imagine.

The ambivalence regarding Castro's relation to the Communist Party was illustrated by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on 5 November 1959 in testifying at the hearings of the Judiciary SubCommittee which was investigating the "Communist Threat to the US through the Caribbean." In response to the question of whether Fidel was a Communist, General C. P. Cabell stated:

> Our information shows that the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist Party member or even a pro-Communist. On the other hand, they are delighted with the nature of his government, which was allowed the Communists opportunity -- free opportunity -- to organize, to propagandize, and to infiltrate. We know the Communists consider Castro a representative of the bourgeoise ... Our conclusion, therefore, is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist, however, he certainly is not anti-Communist. 43/

In an attempt to resolve, at least part of the dilemma a Related Mission Directive was approved on

6 November 1959 and "would remain in effect until further notice." The RMD stated in part as follows:

> For the moment, CIA operations should be carried out on the assumption that the revolutionary government is basically non-Communist, with legitimate reform goals that deserve US respect and support. Covert operations should support overt efforts to arrive at a rapprochement with the present government and to eliminate the conditions described above without resorting to forceful means.
>
> If it should be established that the Cuban government is Communist-led or Communist-dominated, or if that government cannot be swayed from adopting measures which intentionally or unintentionally accomplish Communist objectives, the question of direct attacks against Castro will be re-examined. In planning for such a contingency, each existing or new asset should be evaluated in terms of possible future utility from a paramilitary point of view, nor will the development or recruitment of assets be precluded merely because they lack a paramilitary capability. Under no circumstances would any asset be apprised of this contingency planning. In fact any disposition to undertake violent action should be promptly and emphatically discouraged pending a change in policy at the policy-making level. 44/

Even as the RMD was being dispatched to the field, another and more significant program was being evolved in Headquarters. On 11 December 1959, J. C. King, Chief, WH Division prepared a memorandum for the

Director of Central Intelligence, through the Deputy Director of Plans, forwarding a program having as its specific objective "The overthrow of Castro within one year, and his replacement by a junta friendly to the United States which will call for elections 6 months after assumption of office." To achieve this objective, Chief, WH/D put forward a program, to include among other items the following:

> 1. Clandestine radio attacks on Cuba, from liberal Caribbean countries.
>
> 2. Intrusion operations against Castro's TV and radio, to be mounted from within Cuba.
>
> 3. Formation of pro-US opposition groups to establish by force a controlled area within Cuba.

Colonel King then went on to suggest that:

> Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion Che Guevarra [*sic*], have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present government.* 45/

---

* The reader's attention is drawn to Appendix A (see page 296) which reproduces the original 11 December 1959 J. C. King memorandum to the DCI. In light of subsequent investigations, hearings, and publicity regarding the Agency's complicity in assassination

(footnote continued on following page)

As 1959 drew to a close, a final Special National Intelligence Estimate, "The Situation in the Caribbean through 1960," indicated that Castro was in to stay, despite internal difficulties. The SNIE saw no serious threat to Castro's continued rule, and it pointed out that if there was direct US intervention, "Most Cubans including the military, would react violently." 46/

As 1960 began, General Cabell, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, held a joint briefing

---

plots aimed at Fidel Castro and others, pages 2 and 3 of Appendix A show two significant corrections in Allen Dulles's own handwriting to the text submitted by Col. King. In paragraph 3d, the phrase "thorough consideration be given to the *elimination* of Fidel Castro" carries Dulles's pencilled correction making the text read "removal from Cuba" rather than "elimination."

At a later point in the same paragraph the original text said "many informed people believe that the *disappearance* of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present government". Mr. Dulles has substituted the word "removal" for the word "disappearance." These significant changes in the text on the original copy of King's memorandum -- which the author has recovered -- support the contention that the author has made in the Foreword to this Volume that the component (WH/4) officially charged with the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program was neither charged with nor responsible for programs designed to assassinate Castro in the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation. Colonel King's memorandum of 11 December 1959, with the pencilled corrections noted above, was concurred in by Richard M. Bissell and approved by Allen W. Dulles on 12 December 1959.

(8 January 1960) on Cuba for the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He reviewed the increasing hold that the Communist idealogy and those affiliated with the Communist Party were exerting the Castro government. At this time, the DDCI also discussed the need for increased covert and semi-covert programs aimed at Castro -- psychological warfare, political action, economic action, and para-military action, all of which had been conducted in some degree during the past year. 47/ This 8 January 1960 briefing can be used to denote the beginning of the serious anti-Castro programs by Central Intelligence Agency which would culminate at the Bay of Pigs.

Part II

Castro Must Go

A. Organizing for Covert Action (January-March 1960)

The first mention of a formal Agency structure to deal with the matter of Fidel Castro was noted by Colonel L. K. White, then Deputy Director for Support, in reporting on the DCI's morning meeting of 8 January 1960. White's diary noted:

> There was considerable discussion of the situation in Cuba, and the Director requested Dick Bissell to organize a special task force to insure that we were attacking this situation from all possible angles. 1/

The instruction was taken to heart, for on 18 January 1960 the WH Division organized Branch 4 (WH/4) as an expandable task force to run the proposed Cuban Operations. The initial Table of Organization totaled 40 persons, with 18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station, and 2 at Santiago Base. 2/

Named to head the new Branch in Western Hemisphere Division, was Jacob D. Esterline, recently returned COS, Caracas, Venezuela, and formerly one of the principals in Project PBSUCCESS, the operation which had resulted in the overthrow of the Communist-dominated government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Esterline was the choice of J. C. King, Chief, WH Division; and to the best of Esterline's recollection, toward the end of his two year tour in Venezuela he had been queried by King about remaining in Venezuela or coming back to Headquarters to work on the Cuban problem. It was shortly after his return to the States in January of 1960 that Esterline became Chief, WH/4. 3/

In addition to his participation in the Guatemalan episode and his extensive guerrilla warfare experience in World War II with the OSS, Esterline thinks that he got the job because J. C. King "had pretty much confidence in my judgment."* 4/ The relationship between Esterline and J. C. King, Chief, WH Division and the relationship between King and Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) during the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation has been the subject of considerable speculation ever since the close out of the invasion. It seems appropriate that some attention should be devoted to this subject before going further into detail about the evolution of the covert plans to oust Castro. One source close to the DDP at the time of the anti-Castro activity stated flatly:

---

* The author had heard that Esterline had been directly selected by the DDP, Richard Bissell, to be the head of WH/4. Bissell made no mention of this, and it is contrary to the story noted above, as told by Esterline.

> A task force was formed under Bissell, excluding J. C. King, Chief, WH/D, from having in fact any control whatsoever over the activity. 5/

The WH/D history states:

> There was an informal but understood short cut in the chain of command; basic decisions were made at the DDP, DCI, or Presidential level. Although some of the key personnel were detailed from WH Division, the Cuban Headquarter's unit was in another building; and no one pretended that J. C. King was running the show. Jacob D. Esterline ... was the Chief of the Cuban Unit, during the build-up and invasion attempt and took his orders from the DDP. 6/

Walter Elder, formerly Special Assistant to Allen Dulles at the time of the Bay of Pigs Operation has indicated that there was a deliberate attempt to keep King on the outer edges of the anti-Castro activity; but according to Elder, Col. King always knew what was going on and was thoroughly involved in the Bay of

Pigs activity from its inception until its conclusion.* 7/

Esterline himself declined to comment for the record on this particular speculation, but indicated that he was not sure what J. C. King was up to at all times. It is clear, however, that Esterline was in very close contact with Col. King throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.**

Additional insights concerning J. C. King's role in Bay of Pigs Operation have been provided by Richard D. Drain, who was Chief of Operations for WH/4, and by Richard Bissell, the DDP. Drain has stated:

> J. C. King never was told, I think for understandable reasons, to what extent he

---

* Elder suggested to the author that "they" wanted King out of the operation because of his strong Republican affiliations. "They" were never identified, but King was well acquainted with highly placed figures and contributors to the Republican Party.

** This will become most apparent in the subsequent discussion of the relationships between WH/4 and William D. Pawley. During the author's initial conversation with Esterline about the Bay of Pigs, Esterline did state, in a manner similar to Elder, that J. C. King was out of the mainstream of the anti-Castro effort, because he had known Republican Party affiliations. 8/ There was no elaboration indicating the impact of such affiliations on King's role, and there is nothing in the record to support this allegation.

was in it, to what extent he was not in it. Therefore, from time to time, he would protrude ... sometimes, saying that he was sorry to protrude; and then he would retract; and then he would be in; and then he would be out ... that's as a person. Then again, his Deputy, Ray Herbert, would call and say "I just don't understand Cable 18963 IN from Guatemala today. Would you come over and explain to me what that's all about;" and I would step out of the maelstrom of JMATE ... they were just working flat out ... and go over. There would be the old WH types doing their thing in the old WH way. Maybe two cables a week from the stations, and quite leisurely ... I think what had happened to J. C. King was that he had stayed overlong in the same job; and he was "Mr. WH," by Gawd. With the exception of first Guatemala and then Cuba, there was very little that ever happened in Latin America which got to be, given our other worldwide responsibilities in the DDP, a very front priority matter; and consequently, at Staff meetings, for example, they would go around and talk about the Soviet Union and China and Europe and even Africa. Then, if there was any time left, J. C. King would have his time at bat and report some relatively minor thing. Except in the case of Guatemala there was, as everybody knows now, a very substantial paramilitary operation which was run by Richard M. Bissell in his capacity as Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination.

I think that one of the many reasons ... and I never was able to get much in the way of history on Guatemala as an aid to the study of the Cuban operation ... while the latter was in process ... was

> that this had never set very well with J. C. King. He was divested of the Guatemalan experience, and particularly when it turned out to be a success ... PBSUCCESS was a success, through dumb luck more than anything else. J. C. ... couldn't take any of the bows for it. All right, that rankled, I am sure. Now this one comes along, and rather than expand WH/4, or whatever the hell it was, and leave this JMATE Project within that Branch, and build up that Branch -- oh, no. Once again the same man, Dick Bissell -- now, however, DDP instead of SAPC -- becomes the case officer for the thing; and his assistant, Tracy Barnes, is all over him. One of J. C. King's few very good men, Jacob D. Esterline, is pulled aside and made Chief of the project ... The old man had a great deal of *amour propre*, J. C. King did. He was very vain. He had all of the area expertise that one would like to see in a Division Chief, but he had been at it an awful long time. It was a very incestuous Division. In terms of the rotation, it was solely within WH. There were very few people in WH who had served outside of the Western Hemisphere, except in Washington. They were a tight-knit little group, and here now, for the second time running, one of their big chances to shine -- there was a lot of money and all that kind of stuff -- again had been taken away ... and it was ... it was tough. 9/

Where Drain implied that J. C. King was cut completely out of WH/4 activities and operations, Mr. Bissell had indicated that the situation was somewhat different. In the course of an oral interview, the former DDP responded to questions concerning J. C. King in the following manner:

> Question: I would like to clarify at this point J. C. King's relationship to the Bay of Pigs project. I have heard it on both sides -- that he was involved and that he was deliberately end-run.
>
> Mr. Bissell: There is no doubt in my mind that that was the case. I was going to say that both of the things that you have heard have an element of truth in them. There was a deliberate decision fairly early in the game -- I doubt if it was as early as March [1960. In fact,] I am pretty sure that it wasn't, [but] I am reasonably sure that the decision I speak of was made by some such date as June [1960] -- [that] Esterline would take charge of this Project and Esterline would have direct access to me. He would not be under the usual requirement of all the cases going through J. C. King. Now, as the scope of the scale of this operation increased, and with the passage of time, Esterline's direct channel to me came to be more exercised; and there was frequent interchange between Esterline and myself that didn't go through J. C. King in the sense of a command channel. On the other hand, J. C. was brought into all the consultations and was fully informed from the very beginning about this operation. His advice was sought and given, and I usually found it very good and followed it. I remember no specific case where either J. C. King's specific advice or general attitude toward the operation was inconsistent with, or in conflict with my own.

Question: Why did you make this decision with regard to Jake, coming directly to you and not going through King? Was it just a matter of great efficiency, or what precipitated that?

Mr. Bissell: I think it was in part on the model of the Guatemalan operation, and in part, I think, a feeling, probably on my own part -- in some degree perhaps on the part of Allen Dulles -- that J. C. was not effective enough to handle this kind of very fast moving, quite large scale, quite complex, paramilitary operation.

Question: Do you recall any instances where there was a serious conflict between what Jake wanted to do and what J. C. King thought should be done?

Mr. Bissell: I don't remember many, if any, and I believe that the relationships between Jake and J. C. were pretty good throughout. 10/

Certainly the written record bears out Bissell's contention that King was fully informed and that the relationship between King and Esterline was, if not love, at least mutually respectful.*

---

* The only point of contention between King and Esterline that surfaced in the records concerned the degree to which William Pawley should be involved in affairs related to the organization of the Cuban exiles. At one point, Jake suggested to the DDP that all contact with Pawley be cut off, but in sending Esterline's memorandum through channels, J. C. King noted that he was against cutting Pawley completely off from contact with WH/4. In fact, Pawley was in continuous contact -- even though in disagreement -- with both Jake and King until the close out of the operation.

Another of the questions which must be addressed in setting the stage of the Bay of Pigs operation is the failure of Richard Helms -- at that time Chief of Operations (COPS) for the DDP -- to become more than marginally involved in the Cuban project. Oral interviews again provided the best explanations, and, consequently, are entered into this record in rather full detail. Dick Drain, who became COPS/WH/4, made the following comments:

> Helms was COPS [Chief of Operations]. Either on his own volition, which I suspect or on order -- which I doubt -- Dick Helms completely divorced himself from this thing. I mean absolutely! The one time that I heard from Helms during this entire project was ... I am sitting down there in my chair, as COPS of the project, on a Monday, having spent the entire goddamned weekend working with the guy who is now the head of MI-6 -- Maurice Oldfield, who was then the MI-6 resident in Washington -- trying to get an airplane and some Cubans out of Montego Bay before the Brits in Jamaica came back from their long weekend ... I am sitting there congratulating myself that the plane is out, and the Cubans are out, and the British are back, and it hasn't hit the fan, and I get a telephone call from Dick Helms's long time secretary, "Mr. Helms would like to speak to you." Well, fine ... well, the whole thing on his part was so ... to me ... incredibly apologetic ... three times he said to me in different parts of the conversation ... "As you know, I have nothing to do with this project." What he did have to do with, ever since

> the Francis Gary Powers thing, he had been a member of an inter-Agency committee that met with periodic regularity to discuss air matters of any sensitivity. I guess he'd had enough to do with this project so that somebody [who] had [been] reading the cable traffic told him ... "Well, those nuts down in Quarters Eye seem to have lost an airplane this weekend." He was going to the regular committee meeting that afternoon, so he had to ask me the details ... very apologetically. The third time that he said, "You know I have nothing to do with this project," I said, "Well Mr. Helms, I don't want to be fatuous about this, but I wish to Christ that you did have because we could use your expertise." He said, "Hahaha ... yes, well thank you very much," and that was the end of that. He avoided the thing like the plague. One of the reasons may have been that, of course, life went on; and if Bissell was getting increasingly immersed in this one thing, somebody had to watch the whole worldwide store ... which of course Helms was damned good at. A less attractive suggestion is that Helms figured that there was a high likelihood that this thing would screw up, and he didn't want to have the tar baby around him. I don't know. 11/

Bissell, in responding to the question about Helms' role during the course of the Bay of Pigs, commented as follows:

> I think that he [Helms] saw most all of the cable traffic and I think he was pretty well informed as to what was going on, very well informed; but he was really out of the line of command on this operation. There was something of a tacit agreement between us, that he would be devoting himself to a lot of the other on

> going business of the DDP office, because this was taking a great deal of my time.
>
> Question: This was a tacit agreement, this wasn't a session in which you and Helms ...
>
> Bissell: Let me say this was probably not that explicit. I would make an observation here, and I don't want you to infer anything really beyond what it says, it was not particularly easy -- I did not find it particularly easy -- to discuss things clearly and derive a clear understanding with Dick [Helms] about the division of labor between us when he was my Deputy. I don't imply by this any sense of conflict or rivalry, but he would go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters, and I would go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters. We saw one another, of course, all the time. Quite often I would consult him about something that I was handling. I think rather less often he would consult me. I don't mean to imply however in that any kind of concealment from me -- I never had that feeling at all -- but it really was our habit during the whole time that we were in those positions that the division of labor between us was more tacit than explicit. 12/

Simultaneously with the decision to create a separate Branch in WH Division to handle the anti-Castro activity discussions were begun by both the Special Group 5412 and on an inter-agency basis as to the nature of the anti-Castro effort. Among the many questions raised early in the game was whether the US program should be overt or covert, with the overt implications being the ultimate application of US military force to oust Castro. DCI Dulles emphasized that contingency planning should be undertaken by the Special Group, without necessarily involving either the President or the National Security Council.

The Department of State was concerned that if Fidel Castro were deposed, perhaps his successors, Che Guevara and Raul Castro, would be even worse than Fidel. As reported in subsequent congressional revelations concerning CIA's role in assassination plots, it was during the Special Group Meeting of 13 January 1960 that the Director of Central Intelligence "emphasized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro, but rather actions designed to enable responsible opposition leaders to get a foothold." 13/

At this same Special Group Meeting, President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, predicted with uncanny accuracy the situation which would ultimately develop as one of the key weaknesses in the whole concept of the Bay of Pigs Operation. According to the report on the Special Group Meeting:

> Mr. Gray commented that a problem would be posed for administration officials if a decision should be taken to change our attitude toward Castro, as outlined earlier in the meeting. He acknowledged that any such decision must be kept highly secret, but he foresaw difficulties which would arise, for example, during testimony by the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury before Congress, at public gatherings, etc., if they should have to give an impression that the US was not doing anything about Cuba. 14/

This in fact, was the "damned if I do, damned if I don't" position in which Richard Nixon found himself in the Fall of 1960 and the position in which the United States found itself with reference to both the United Nations and the Organization of the American States throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs operation as the myth of "plausible deniability" overruled common sense. Following the initial Special Group meeting, there was a flurry of activity seeking some solid proposals; and in a CIA meeting of 21 January 1960, C. Tracy Barnes (the Assistant DDP for Action), J. C. King, Jake Esterline, and Dick Helms among others, discussed a whole series of issues which would be basic to the program from this time forward: identification of the principal Cuban leaders -- Ramon Barquin, Justo Carrillo, and Miro Cardona (who would eventually head up the principal anti-Castro organization supported by the Agency) were mentioned; radio propaganda operating out of either Third country or US areas was raised; the training program for both communicators and for PM trainers at Fort Randolph in the Canal Zone was discussed; and the possible acquisition of aircraft for support operations and the question of US business as a cover for the operations of the exile groups in the United States were all discussed. The possible involvement of US businesses to put overt pressure on the US government for the possible imposition of economic sanctions and as a covert means of raising money for the support of Cuban exile organizations also surfaced. This initial meeting also recognized the problem of trying to gain the support of the more liberal Latin American Governments (e.g., that of Betancourt in Venezuela). 15/

Al Cox, one of the senior officers in paramilitary operations was in attendance, and he would subsequently note:

> Stringent security precautions were placed on JMARC, including the exclusion of the PP Staff and other Agency components from all cable and dispatch traffic and from access to correspondence between

> the project and the office of the DDP ... In point of fact, such restrictive measures were somewhat meaningless insofar as keeping awareness of the project's activities away from PP/PMG. The A/DDP/P granted permission to PP/C/PMG to read the daily project traffic, (with Esterline's knowledge and permission). Esterline personally knew the majority of the PP/PMG senior officers, and in no time he had drafted six or seven of these, including the Deputy Chief, PMG, for assignment to JMARC ... This, of course, was valuable as a built-in penetration of JMARC in the best FI and CI tradition.* 16/

Early in February of 1960, Allen Dulles was briefed in general terms on the planning that was being initiated by WH Division, and at the same time J. C. King told the Director "that the Branch concept was used [in establishing WH/4] rather than the term Task Force for greater security and to simplify channels of command." The Director subsequently explained to the Special Group (3 February 1960) some of the activities that were being undertaken, noting that within the next week or two, the Group would receive a paper outlining the Agency's thoughts on the programs which had been initiated against the Castro Government.* 17/

---

* The crypt for the WH/4 anti-Castro operation was initially JMARC. Following compromise of this crypt, the project became JMATE (sometime in the period between 6-13 December 1960). Throughout this volume the project will be identified as JMATE, except in direct quotations.

The proposals of which the DCI had spoken were discussed in a DDP review session on 11 February 1960 which was attended by Tracy Barnes, Jake Esterline, Al Cox, Dave Phillips, and Jim Flannery. The focus was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry,** propaganda broadcasts, and funding. Noting that WH Division had roughly $50,000 available for immediate use, it was speculated that the "ultimate magnitude" of the anti-Castro effort might reach 3 million dollars -- an estimate that would, in effect, be some 40 million short of the eventual cost. It was stated, however, that funds would easily be obtainable from the Agency reserve to meet any shortages. At this planning session, the training program for the PM cadre at Fort Randolph in Panama was given minor attention; and here, too, the seeds were planted by Tracy Barnes for an attitudinal survey of "Cuban society" which could have (and should have) caused CIA planners to re-think the whole anti-Castro effort.* 19/

---

* In addition to the Special Group, which included a DOD representative, WH/4 worked directly with other representatives of DOD regarding current developments and the possible coordination of activities vis-a-vis Cuba. 18/

** "The big sugar sack?"

A very similar briefing, with somewhat more emphasis on possible paramilitary action, was given to a high level group from DOD on 12 February 1960; and the agenda for the 17 February 1960 meeting of the Special Group, again emphasized that the Castro Government was dependent on sugar revenues for both continuation of popular domestic and hemispheric subversion programs.** 20/ It was further suggested to the Special Group that dissidents within Cuba might also be stimulated to sabotage, with the ultimate result leading to Castro's ouster. 21/ The recommendation that the DCI made to the Special Group was as follows:

---

* This refers to the Lloyd Free Report, which is discussed subsequently in this Volume, see pp. 222-226.

** The DOD representatives who were briefed were the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Douglas; Mr. John Irwin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; General Erskine; and General Lansdale.

> That CIA be authorized to initiate operational planning, including covert spotting and assessment of potential agents, for eventual sabotage of both Cuban and American-owned sugar mills. Should this course of action prove feasible and desirable, the operation would be designed to deny Castro as much as possible of the revenues anticipated from the 1960 sugar crop. 22/

Interestingly enough, although the briefing for DOD had placed considerable emphasis on paramilitary planning, apparently no mention of the subject was made to the Special Group.

On 17 February 1960 when Allen Dulles presented the sugar sabotage plan to the Special Group, he emphasized that he was not asking for permission to engage in action, only that he was looking for a Special Group approval. Mr. Irwin (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) noted that he and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Douglas were all for the plan; and the Group agreed to present the plan to the Secretary of State and to Gordon Gray so that the latter could get the President's reaction.

President Eisenhower was less than enthusiastic about the sugar sabotage plan, reportedly doubting that the loss of sugar revenues would impact on

Castro's ability to continue to finance subversive activities in other Latin America areas. President Eisenhower also objected to the focus on economic sabotage, and he would not agree to the plan to identify assets specifically for sabotage operations against the sugar industry. Eisenhower was willing to support a program to identify assets for the sugar industry " and other things as well ... including even possibly things that might be drastic." In addition to identifying assets on a broad basis, the President also requested that a comprehensive covert action program be prepared by Mr. Dulles. This, it was suggested, should go to the Special Group; and if they approved the plans, then the President wanted to discuss them. In any event, action on the PM program would be delayed until Eisenhower returned from his upcoming Latin American visit and gave his specific approval.* 23/

---

* The Minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960 also noted that

> . Mr. Joseph Scott of State also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the same point.

This appears to have been one of the few instances where Department of State representatives indicated support for possible direct action programs rather than political solutions to the Cuban problem.

Despite the rather positive doubts that the President had about the sugar sabotage activity, J. C. King charged ahead almost immediately following the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960. On 18 February, King and Milo Perkins had a detailed discussion concerning the disruptive effects which might result from interference with the Cuban sugar operation. Perkins was planning meetings with Ambassador Hill and Thomas ("Tommy the Cork") Corcoran, and King brought to Perkins's attention that Corcoran had been willing and able to provide valuable assistance to the Agency in the past. Later in the month, Col. King met with Thomas Mann, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (subsequently Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs) who reportedly was in favor of both reduced sugar quotas and direct sabotage of Cuban sugar mills. According to King, Secretary Mann also would support both cut backs in US oil companies deliveries to Cuba and actions which might cut back on US tourist trade with the island. 24/

Col. King also consulted with former Ambassador William Pawley, whom he asked to make arrangements for the publication of *Diario de la Marina* in Miami, and also "to raise at least a portion of the money, which would be needed for this operation." In addition to Pawley, King also contacted Henry Holland in New York City, suggesting that Holland raise money, through Cuban exile Justo Carrillo, to help pay for the propaganda efforts of New York radio station WRUL. King agreed that Holland could tell prospective donors that the "money was going to be used on behalf of non-Batista groups who were going to make a serious effort to remove Fidel Castro." 25/

In addition to J. C. King's high level contacts, Jake Esterline and Mr. Dulles had a meeting with Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director of the US Information Agency who had requested a briefing on the current state of activities in Cuba -- Washburn was concerned lest there be a conflict of interests between USIA and the CIA's ongoing effort in the area. Washburn presented the Agency with a copy of some proposals which the State Department had approved for implementation by USIA in Cuba. USIA's pitch would be that the long-standing friendship between Cuba and the United States was being endangered by the infiltration of Communists and Communist ideology into Cuba -- at the same time not denying that the US was sympathetic to the need for a change in Cuba. The Director and Mr. Esterline agreed that it would be advisable for Mr. Washburn, who was planning to visit Cuba, to meet Jim Noel, COS Havana, and outline the USIA program for Mr. Noel's benefit.* 26/

As the propaganda activities were being pushed forward, as plans were being made for training Cuban exiles, and as the possibilities of sabotage, PM action, and other measures against Castro were being contemplated, a cautionary memorandum apparently was drafted by one of the individuals most closely concerned with the potential anti-Castro operations. The memorandum, undated and unsigned, reviewed the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in light of what was being planned for Project JMATE. It noted some of the similarities or differences with respect to the removal of Jacobo Arbenz in contrast to the possibilities of removing Fidel Castro; and in light of the ultimate tragedy at the Bay of Pigs, some of the key points made in this memorandum are worth repeating -- even though it is not known who read the piece. Among other things, for example, the author of the memorandum stressed "the unique coincidence of favorable factors" with reference to Guatemala and suggested that it was unlikely that any of these would operate with reference to Project JMATE.

---

* One result of the meeting with Washburn was a decision to turn over a planned USIA anti-Castro cartoon effort to CIA.

It was noted that the Guatemalan leadership was "unusually inept"; that "Communist support for Arbenz came from the local Communist Party, which was immature, badly led, and generally weak"; and, that "we had unbelievable luck." 27/ The memorandum also noted that there were a number of circumstances which would not recur during the course of the anti-Castro activity. Specifically pointing out that where Arbenz was a weak leader, Castro was obviously a strong leader; that Castillo Armas was a Guatemalan leader of high character and standing, but no one of similar stature had surfaced in Cuba to oppose Castro; and that in Guatemala Arbenz had made no changes in the armed forces of Guatemala, and when the crisis came, he could not depend on his army. Castro, on the other hand had eliminated the Batista influence, and filled the key military positions with his own followers and "introduced a system of intense ideological indoctrination." Furthermore, the unknown author pointed out that while Moscow's interest in Guatemala was compartatively mild -- the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico City was the nearest Soviet official available to the Arbenz Government -- in Cuba, the heavy economic and propaganda support from both Moscow and Peiping were a matter of record. 28/

The memorandum closed by pointing to three areas where the writer claimed that tactical -- not strategic -- errors were being made. It stated that the blunt propaganda attacks on Castro were forging all anti-US elements in Cuba into a united front and US efforts should be attempting to drive a wedge between Castro, as a victim of international Communism, and the Communists both Cuban and foreign. Secondly, it was pointed out that the propaganda broadcast out of US commercial radio stations, even if the time were legitimately being purchased by Cuban exile groups, would be a "kiss of death" for anyone who tried to deny US intervention in Cuban affairs. In part related to the propaganda activities, the planned use of US business groups as a cover for the Agency's support of the Cuban opposition, particularly the use of US business as a funding mechanism, was also hazardous in the eyes of the author of the memorandum under study. If the author was correct in assuming that this cover would not withstand careful scrutiny, it would mean that the anti-American contingents would have additional ammunition to use against the US. The memorandum suggested that many of these risks could be eliminated if propaganda activities were moved to Third countries and if fund raising activities were run out of Latin America or Western Europe. 29/

Based on the language, the familiarity with the Guatemala activity and the nature of the critique, it is probable that Tracy Barnes wrote the memorandum in question. The memorandum may have been prompted in part by the increasing attention which the OCB and the Cabinet had been giving to fire bomb attacks on the Cuban cane fields by light aircraft flying out of the United States. The Agency fully supported General Quesada's effort to put an end to such flights.* 30/

---

* Quesada was Director of the Federal Aviation Agency.

From 2 March 1960, when the Director briefed Vice President Nixon on Agency activities in Cuba and the state of Cuban affairs, until 17 March 1960, when President Eisenhower formally approved the covert anti-Castro plan, CIA personnel most closely involved in the anti-Castro effort were fully immersed in the efforts to define -- and refine -- a US policy which would be acceptable to President Eisenhower. In the course of this two week period, they were engaged in efforts to satisfy the 5412 Group, the National Security Council, and themselves that they had developed a viable program which would lead to the downfall and ouster of Fidel Castro and his principal cohorts, Che Guevara and Raul Castro, and the elmimination of Communism from the island of Cuba and, in effect, from the Western Hemisphere.

During this period of evolution of national policy, WH/4 held its first official meeting as a branch on 9 March 1960. J. C. King and Jake Esterline were in charge of the meeting and outlined the general nature of the programs that were going to be put into operation (propaganda activity, PM training, commo training) and they emphasized the need for cooperation and support from all of the offices that were represented at the meeting, including, among others, the Office of Training, the Office of Communications, the Comptroller's Office, the DDS, DPD, the PP Staff, Personnel (particularly the Military Personnel Division), and the Office of Security. At this initial meeting, Jake Esterline mentioned that Bob Reynolds, Deputy Chief, WH/4, Dave Phillips, Propaganda Officer, Phil Toomey, Political and Psychological Stategist, Bob Wedbee, the Economist, and Ed Stanulus, his Plans and Ops Officer, would be the principals who would be in contact with other Agency elements which would be called on for support. In addition, Esterline also noted that liaison channels would be established with other elements of the US Government, particularly with the Office of Special Operations of the Department of Defense. 31/

It was during the period between 8-17 March 1960 that the previously mentioned covert anti-Castro program which Allen Dulles had agreed (on 17 February 1960) to provide to the Special Group evolved. Among those in the Agency having a direct hand in preparing a suitable paper for the Director's presentation, were

C. Tracy Barnes, Richard Bissell, Dick Helms, Jake Esterline, J. C. King, and Tom Parrott, among others. Those who figured most prominently among the Special Group representatives at this time were Livingston Merchant, Department of State; John Irwin, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense; Admiral Burke, Chief, Naval Operations; and Gordon Gray, the President's National Security Adviser. Other than the more than a dozen memorandums and drafts and other papers related to the development of the policy paper, perhaps a note from Richard Helms to C. Tracy Barnes on 8 March 1960 best illustrates the seriousness with which the Agency approached the task of writing a paper for the Director. Mr. Helms's note to Mr. Barnes read as follows:

> Tom Parrott gave me for security late this afternoon the attached paper for the 5412 Group outlining the proposed covert action program against Fidel Castro. After reading it, I asked Tom to defer consideration of Cuba until next week since I feel that this document needs redrafting whether it is used by the Director for an oral briefing or handed to the designated representatives for their enlightenment.
>
> I think you will agree with me that the paper is poorly drafted and needs considerable pointing up in various

> places. I do not disagree with the listed recommendations in paragraph 6, but I do feel that the backup material in paragraphs 2 and 3 needs recasting. For example, the reference to a "short-wave radio station patterned after Radio Free Europe", is no way, in my opinion, to describe what we have in mind. Also the paragraph on covert economic action is not sufficiently precise and raises more questions than it answers. There are other points, but there is no sense in belaboring them in this note to you.
>
> May I ask that you take this matter in hand and advise WH how to put it in suitable shape for use by the Director with the 5412 Group next week. 32/

In the paper to which Mr. Helms referred the problem facing the US was stated rather simply as follows:

> To replace the present Government of Cuba, headed by Fidel Castro, with one that will be acceptable to the United States; and to cause this change to occur in such a manner that anti-US repercussions are not induced in Latin America. 33/

Throughout the discussion of the Agency's role in the anti-Castro activity, there was a tremendous concern that there be no "anti-US repercussions," not only in Latin America per se, but particularly among the Latin American representatives in the Organization of American States and in the United Nations. The constant quest for plausible deniability would become the holiest of grails -- constantly, and unsuccessfully, to be sought throughout the course of the operation by Agency planners.

The proposed paper for the Special Group (the paper which Mr. Helms found somewhat lacking) emphasized those areas highlighted in previous Special Group sessions -- anti-Castro propaganda, disruptions of the Cuban economy, including large scale sabotage operations, and the development of instructor cadres to provide both communications and PM training cadres to resistance groups already extant in Cuba. Interesting, too, is the fact that at this early stage of US planning mention was made of the offer from the Guatemalan Government of a training site for the PM cadres, or "action groups" as they were called. A financial annex included in the proposals for the Special Group indicated the need for $900,000 for the remainder of FY 1960 and $1.6 million for FY 1961.* 34/

---

* Apparently Mr. Helms failed to read the financial annex carefully enough, for the estimated requirement for fiscal 1961 which is shown as $1.6 million, was either a typographical error, or a mistake in addition -- the sum of the parts shown for FY '61 is $1.7 million. It also was noted that for the remainder of FY '60, the Agency reserve funds would have to be drawn on to meet these "non-program requirements."

As the paper was being prepared for Special Group consideration, J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division had forwarded a memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, providing him with additional information for use during the Special Group discussions; and the transmittal to the DCI recorded that this paper had been used to brief Mr. Nixon on 2 March 1960. King's memorandum covered much the same ground as the paper which went to the Special Group, but contained considerably more detail about the activities of the Castro Government which were directly aimed at overthrowing the legitimate governments and replacing them with Communist oriented governments. Col. King's paper also revealed that both Guatemala and Nicaragua -- the only two governments in Latin America which were to throw their full support behind the Agency's anti-Castro activity -- had made offers at this time for both radio time for anti-Castro broadcasts and, also, for training facilities for anti-Castro groups which the Agency might wish to sponsor. 35/

Despite President Eisenhower's previous objections to the over-emphasis on plans to sabotage Cuba's sugar industry, King's paper did reflect considerable emphasis on disruption of that economic sector. Another item which Col. King saw fit to include in his memorandum was the following:

> We have available, a drug, which, if placed in Castro's food, would make him behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damaging results to him.* 36/

Even as the Special Group was planning its sessions on the anti-Castro program, so, too, was the National Security Council being geared up for discussions of the same situation. Again, there was great concern over the question of possible loss of prestige should the US act independently of the international organizations. There also was interest in protecting US business and in the protection of US lives, and the question of viability of the Guantanamo Base was of considerable concern to the President's National Security adviser, Gordon Gray. The policy that Gray was advised to recommend to the National Security Council regarding US bases stated:

> Take action as necessary, including military action, to insure the continued

---

* For comments on this subject see Part VII of this volume.

> availability to the United States of bases and base rights in Latin America that are considered vital to the security of the United States. 37/

An additional aspect of the basic national security policy for Latin America which Gordon Gray was being encouraged to promote with the National Security Council on 10 March 1960 recommended that:

> In the event of an imminent or actual Communist seizure of control from within, take all feasible measure[s] to thwart it, including military action if finally required and appropriate to cope with the situation.* 38/

Following Gordon Gray's briefing of the National Security Council on 10 March 1960, President Eisenhower approved the following rather innocuous actions:

> 1. Every effort should be made to influence the other members of the Organization of American States to recognize the dangers involved in the Cuban situation and support action with respect to them.

---

* Mr. Gray also was advised to play both sides of the street for with reference to the disruptive efforts of non-Communist groups, the position he was being urged to promote was the following:

> The United States should be prepared, if required to protect US interests, to take similar actions against subversion or armed rebellion by non-Communist elements hostile to US interests.

> 2. The responsible Departments and Agencies should keep current plans to deal promptly with likely contingencies which might develop with respect to Cuba, especially those involving the safety of US citizens in the Guantanamo Base.
>
> 3. The developments with regard to the situation in Cuba should be reviewed by the Council each meeting, for the immediate future. 39/

Subsequent to the NSC meeting of 10 March 1960, Gordon Gray informed the President that the Special Group had set aside a 2-hour session on 14 March "to discuss the whole range of assets and possibilities in Cuba." 40/ Prior to the 14 March meeting, Messrs. Bissell and King received a somewhat strange memorandum from Allen W. Dulles offering "some suggestions as to possible added 'starters' for our Cuban paper; use your own judgment as to adding them." 41/ Among these starters was Dulles's suggestion that the International Transport Union somehow be induced to refuse to load "dangerous" munitions intended for Cuba and then Dulles made the following rather unusual suggestion:*

---

* In addition to the International Transport Union, Dulles also suggested that an attempt be made to induce Cuban laborers to resist unloading explosives that were sent to Cuba, but as he himself pointed out, Castro probably would use the Cuban Army should the dockworkers refuse to do the unloading.

> Stress point that while the dynamism is running out of the Marxist-Leninist revolution in Russia, it still remains in China. This explains ChiCom special interest in supporting the Cuban revolution and expanding it, with the ultimate aim of facilitating mass emigration of Chinese to the Latin American continent to meet their over-population problem. (This may be premature, but there may be something to it.) 42/

As promised by Gordon Gray, the Special Group Meeting of 14 March 1960 focused exclusively on the Cuban problem, and Mr. Dulles presented the members with the paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba." Much of the ground was already familiar to the participants, but the memorandum of the meeting reflects a number of items worth review. Even though Dulles's paper placed heavy emphasis on the propaganda needs, even greater emphasis was urged for covert and overt propaganda activities, not only through WRUL, the commercial broadcasting operation, but also through the efforts of USIA's programs for Latin America -- programs which apparently had been sharply curtailed in the recent past. The question of location for the Agency's covert broadcasting activity was again raised and discussed, the question being whether it should be somewhere in the Florida

Keys, in some Caribbean country, or elsewhere.

Somewhat more attention was focused on the paramilitary plans during this discussion than had occurred before, and Mr. Gray was particularly concerned by the Agency estimate that: "it appears no large scale paramilitary effort (other than wholly overt) will be feasible in less than 8 months"; and he wondered if a crash program was feasible to speed up the training program. 43/ The questions of economic sanctions, OAS and individual Latin American country involvement, the choice of the proper Cuban exiles to represent the government in exile, and the question of a budget -- the $900,000 for fiscal 1960 and the $1.6-1.7 million for 1961 were also the subjects of discussion.

One additional subject of disucssion at this Special Group meeting as recorded by Col. J. C. King was:

> What would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevarra[*sic*] should disappear simultaneously. 44/

In the reported context of the discussion it is not believed that the term "disappear" was a euphemism for assassination, but rather referred to the ouster of

Castro's government from political power. The paragraph which had raised the question then continued:

> Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were[*sic*] the Communists, and there was therefore the danger that they might move into control. Mr. Dulles felt that this might not be disadvantageous because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS. Colonel King said that there were few leaders capable of taking over so far identified. One possibility was Nunez Jiminez, the head of the Agricultural Reform Program. No other names were widely enough known to be mentioned.*

Other discussion, notwithstanding, the focus of Mr. Dulles's recommendations on 14 March 1960 was that the Central Intelligence Agency should be authorized to take a number of steps which were specifically related to the development of the guerrilla capacity of the anti-Castro groups, both within and without Cuba. The Agency should be responsible for broadening its contacts with such groups and attempting to unify them to direct their efforts against Castro. The DCI proposed that CIA should take the lead in assisting these groups to develop friendships among various of the Latin American Governments which were skeptical of Castro and that the Agency should be responsible for identifying and training -- in facilities in the United States or elsewhere -- those who would be the leaders of the Cuban guerrilla warfare groups. At the conclusion of the 14 March meeting, it was agreed that the Agency would revise the paper on the basis of the discussions and plan to present it to President Eisenhower later in the week. 45/

---

* This comment and one made five days earlier (9 March 1960) by J. C. King that "unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package -- which is highly unlikely -- this operation can be a long drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force" were discussed (pp. 93, 114-116) in SSC report on *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, and it is apparent from the recollections of the participants in the meetings that assassination was not the issue in these two instances.

As part of the effort to improve the paper on the proposed anti-Castro operations, the Agency prepared additional backup material which could be cranked into the version which would eventually go to the President. On 14 and 15 March, the records reveal copies of two drafts of such a paper, one of which was labeled as "revised version, done by [C. Tracy] Barnes, evening 14 Mar," which went into more detail on both the political opposition to Castro and on the propaganda activities that were being mounted against Castro. These papers also noted that paramilitary activity would "take the longest to become a usable asset." 46/ The most important difference between these papers and the covert action plan presented by Dulles was that the Financial Annex showed a sharp, upward increase in the anticipated costs for FY '61 -- from $1.6-1.7 million to $3.5 million -- with the heaviest increment coming in terms of the proposed paramilitary operation. The sum for PM operations was revised from an estimated $500,000 in Dulles's 14 March presentation to a total of $1.3 million for that same year.

From the time Allen Dulles enunciated the covert action plan (14 March) until President Eisenhower approved it (17 March), there was an interesting bit of bi-play between the National Security Council and the Special Group 5412. One of the principal concerns of the National Security Council was the proper US response should the Cubans try to intervene or interfere with operations of the Naval base at Guantanamo Bay, including a possible takeover of the Base. On 16 March 1960, after Gordon Gray had been fully apprised of the proposed plan for covert action submitted by Allen Dulles, Gray was the recipient of a briefing note from a member of his own Staff, Samuel E. Belk, for the planned National Security Council meeting of 17 March which again focused exclusively on the situation at Guantanamo Bay. It appears as though Mr. Belk, even though he was a member of the NSC Staff was completely in the dark as to the planning that had already been undertaken with regard to Castro's ouster. At a time when the President had already indicated that proposals for economic action or direct sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry were less than what he desired, Mr. Belk, for whatever reason, suggested again that with the new sugar legislation, perhaps Castro could be straightened out. In addition, Belk suggested a plan which was "unconventional and radical" -- having President Eisenhower send a message directly to Castro telling him that he was concerned over the deterioration of relations between the two countries and suggesting that Castro have private conversations with an emissary whom the President would personally designate.

Staffer Belk believed that this was a "can't lose" situation for the US. If Castro refused to meet with Eisenhower's representative, then he would be condemned throughout Latin America. The US on the other hand would receive the blessings of the OAS and the UN for its efforts. If Castro did agree to meet with the President's representative, then relations between the US and Cuba probably would be improved. 47/ Mr. Belk's suggestions apparently never went beyond Mr. Gray.

At 1430 hours on 17 March 1960, Mr. Dulles presented his covert action plan to a combined meeting of the National Security Council and the principals of the Special Group. In attendance with the President were Vice President Nixon, Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Rubottom, Secretary of Treasury Anderson, Secretary Irwin, Admiral Burke, Richard Bissell, Colonel King, Gordon Gray, Major John Eisenhower, and General A. J. Goodpaster. Based on General Goodpaster's report on the meeting:

> The President said that he knows of no better plan for dealing with this situation. The great problem is leakage and breach of security. Everyone must be prepared to swear that he has not heard of it. He said we should limit American contacts with the groups involved to two or three people, getting Cubans to do most of what must be done ... He understood that the effort will be to undermine Castro's position and prestige ...

> The President told Mr. Dulles he thought he [Dulles] should go ahead with the plan and the operations. He and the other agencies involved should take account of all likely Cuban reactions and prepare the actions that we would take in response to these ... The President said he would like some groundwork laid with the OAS to let the Latin American countries know that if the Cubans were to start to attack our people in Cuba we would be obliged to take action ...
>
> The President said that at the next meeting, he would want to know what is the sequence of events by which we see the situation developing -- specifically what actions are we to take. He said our hand should not show in anything that is done. In the meantime State should be working on what we can do in and out of the OAS ... Essentially, the job is to get the OAS to support us. 48/

During the course of this meeting, Secretary of the Treasury Anderson exhibited great concern over the welfare of the US firms which had investments in Cuba; and he was pushing for US intervention to protect these private property rights. The President, however, cut him rather short on this. Vice President Nixon, too, indicated some concern with the American business interests in Cuba; and suggested that steps might be taken to cut off the flow of new capital investment by US firms in Cuba, terminating private businesses already there, and reducing American tourism.* 49/

President Eisenhower's approval of the 17 March 1960 covert action program against the Castro regime thus set US policy. Briefly restated, the four major courses of action called for the formation of an anti-Communist exile political opposition located outside of Cuba which would be the focal point for all of the anti-Castro elements, provision for a powerful propaganda offensive against the island, perfection of a covert intelligence-in-action network organization within Cuba, and the development of a paramilitary force outside Cuba, with the necessary logistical support for covert military operations on the island.**

---

* Col. King prepared a memorandum on the same meeting, but, strangely enough, failed to include a list of the participants. The fact that the President, Vice President, and Secretary of State were in attendance could not be known from King's memo alone. 50/ Not in attendance at this meeting was Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4. This was one of numerous instances where higher level personnel -- in this instance, the DCI, Col. King, and Bissell -- were the principals in a meeting at which Esterline would seem to have been an equally legitimate participant.

** Even as President Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro effort a Special National Intelligence Estimate was in process and would state that Castro was not "demonstrably under the domination or control of the international Communist movement." (SNIE 85-60, 22 March 1960, p. 3. S.)

It is particularly important in light of changes which were subsequently made in the covert action plan to note the language of the approved policy with reference to the paramilitary operation:

> Initially, a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase, a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the US so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train, and lead resistance forces recruited there, both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance.

At no point in this Presidentially-approved plan for covert action by the Agency is there any hint of invasion. The paramilitary activity was clearly to be in the context of guerrilla warfare with leadership and training to the dissident activities inside Cuba being provided by Cubans trained by United States technicians.* Finally, with reference to the approved plan, the overall budget for the remainder of FY '60, and FY '61 of $4.4 million was approved with the caveat that should there be cost overruns, these could be drawn up from the Agency's reserve for contingencies.*

---

* Colonel Jack Hawkins (USMC) who was Chief, WH/4/PM correctly noted in his memorandum for record of PM operations for Project JMATE that:

> The only *approved, written policy* governing paramilitary action against Cuba is contained in paragraph 2d of the Policy Paper approved by the President on 17 March 1960." (Emphasis added by author.) 51/

---

* A copy of the approved Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime is given as Appendix B. (Appendix B, page 300). The reader is also urged to examine Appendix C, a set of correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Livingston Merchant, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. (Appendix C page 311.) Admiral Burke apparently had become extremely agitated about the rise of Castro to power in Cuba; and on 26 February of 1960, he had forwarded a paper on US action in Cuba, to both Secretary Merchant and also to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Irwin, in which the Navy's senior officer took it upon himself to examine the various options available to the United States to reassert itself in the Western Hemisphere vis-a-vis the growth of Communist power represented by Castro. Admiral Burke outlined a series of options that were available to the United States, such as multilateral action through the OAS, unilateral overt action by the US, or covert unilateral action by the US.

Leaning heavily on both the Monroe Doctrine and Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947) Burke made a series of recommendations covering the same ground -- propaganda, organization of the anti-Castro exiles who were in the US, or direct US military intervention -- which had already been considered at high levels and were already familiar to both Secretaries Merchant and Irwin. On 10 March 1960, Merchant replied to Burke's memorandum noting "a marked degree of similarity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people here concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cuba and the methods which are best calculated to achieve

(footnote continued on following page)

With reference to his action of 17 March 1960, President Eisenhower subsequently wrote:

---

this result." Merchant then went on to review the bidding that had already been done, particularly in the Special Group, on the question of how to handle Castro, emphasizing, of course, that State was very much concerned that precipitate action against Castro's government would work, if not immediately, certainly in the long run, to the detriment of the United States, particularly in its relations to the other governments of Latin America.

Whether the response did not satisfy Admiral Burke or whether he sincerely believed that the Navy, more than any other US Agency, should be principally responsible for setting US policy toward Cuba is not known. In any event, on 16 March 1960, he forwarded another set of proposals for US action in Cuba to both Gordon Gray, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and to Allen W. Dulles. Burke's comments on the transmittal sheets to these two individuals are interesting. To National Security Adviser Gray he wrote:

> Dear Gordon: Enclosed is my copy of a memorandum on U.S. Action in Cuba which may be of interest to you. Sincerely yours, Arleigh Burke.

To the Director of Central Intelligence he wrote:

> Dear Allen: Enclosed is a memorandum my Staff prepared containing some suggestions which might be useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not agree with quite all the comments contained in the memorandum but I know that you will forgive the impatient young lad for his desire to make sure no opportunity is left uncovered. Warm regards. Sincerely, Arleigh Burke.

Why one of the recipients was cautioned about "the impatient young lad" and the other was not is something

(footnote continued on following page)

> On March 17, 1960, less than two weeks after my return from Puerto Rico, I ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to begin to organize the training of Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala, against the possible future day when they might return to their homeland. More specific planning was not possible because the Cubans living in exile had made no move to select from among their numbers, a

---

of a mystery. Certainly the proposals by one J. E. Pond, Jr., reflect at least, Pond's youth and immaturity. For among other things in his memorandum, Mr. Pond suggested that the Navy: "Accept Mr. Merchant's offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral Burke of a complete briefing of State Department activities vis-a-vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod State to move faster." Or, with reference to action that the State Department should take, he suggested: "Brief all individuals and groups of U.S. nationals going to Latin America on the Kommunist [*sic*] threat in Cuba for further dissemination to host country personnel." Two items which had not appeared in other of the papers related to the evolution of US policy to oust Castro which were introduced by Mr. Pond, were that the IADB (Inter-American Defense Board) become involved in the anti-Castro effort -- an exceedingly naive suggestion considering that the members of this group were far from unanimous in condemning the Castro Revolution. And the second unique contribution of this paper which Admiral Burke saw fit to forward to two very senior members of the Executive Branch, was the spelling throughout the paper of Communist with a "K". These last proposals that Admiral Burke had forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence ended up in the files of Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. The memorandum having been sent down from Mr. Bissell's office, with the following notation to Col. King:

> Admiral Burke sent this over to the Director on the afternoon of 17 March, and the latter handed [it] to me. I do not believe it requires a reply, but pass it to you for any value it may have.

> leader whom we could recognize as the head of a government in exile.* 52/

---

* In preparing this comment, the former President apparently had to call on his own memory, on the memory of Gen. Goodpaster, and the memory of Gordon Gray. Based on his own recollections Eisenhower said that neither his own nor Goodpaster's records contained anything about the 17 March 1960 meeting. Similarly, Gordon Gray wrote to Eisenhower:

> You may recall that not so very long after I became your Special Assistant, in a meeting you had with Allen Dulles and me you gave instructions that activities of the so-called "Special Group" should not be recorded in any place except the files of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. You did not wish that there be other copies. It was for this reason that I did not seek a copy of the March 17th paper for my files, nor did I make notes at that meeting.
>
> Subsequent to March 17th, I began to make memoranda of every meeting on that particular subject because I had a hunch that someday these might be important, and I intended to put them in your hands at the appropriate time, understanding, of course, that you might wish to have them destroyed. Incidentally, there were no carbons or other copies made of these memoranda. By not making copies, and by planning to put the documents in your own hands for whatever disposition you wished to make of them, I sort of rationalized my violation of your instructions about not making such memoranda. I hope I need not assure you that it was not my practice to violate your instructions and this is the only instance of such that I can recall. 53/

B. Forging the Tool

Following President Eisenhower's approval of the anti-Castro program which had evolved from the numerous discussions, meetings, and briefings previously mentioned, the Agency's leadership then faced the problem of acting directly to implement the anti-Castro program. Problems which had been discussed philosophically prior to this time now had to be put to the test of practicality. Among the problems of principal importance during the period from March to September 1960 were the following:

The establishment of the leadership of WH/4 and the acquisition of personnel for WH/4;

Extensive coordination between Agency representatives and representatives of other US Government Agencies and, at the same time, a high level of intra-Agency coordination.

The initiation of a paramilitary training program for those Cubans who would be directly involved in helping to dispose of the Castro Government:

Attempting to establish project parameters and to give proper consideration to possible changes in the concept of the program as time passed;

And, finally, to retain the credibility and viability of the operation despite numerous wild haired proposals that were being put forward at various times during the months under study -- proposals which never should have been offered let alone given any serious consideration.

As previously noted, WH/4 was established by Col. King in January of 1960; however, it was not until 24 March 1960 that Mr. Bissell apparently officially got around to approving the new Branch, for in a memorandum for the Deputy Director for Support (DDS), it was noted:

> The SSA-DDS has advised of the DDP's approval of the creation of a new operational Branch, the abolishment of an existing Section, and the creation of a new Section within the WH Division Headquarters Staffing complement.

The 15 new positions required by the Branch would be more than offset by the decrease in the DDP complement.

The same memorandum indicated that the Wage and Salary Division of the Office of Personnel had approved the various grades that had been proposed and then the memorandum went on to state:

> The approval limits the usage of the requested positions to the duration of the

> Cuban crisis; after which all the positions in the new Branch and Section will be reviewed for reclassification purposes. 54/

The question of financing and budget for project JMATE had already caused concern among those responsible for the formulation of the anti-Castro policy, and soon after the President's approval of the project, the question of budget and finance surfaced. By 24 March 1960, the Deputy Director for Support noted that: "Jack Earman advised me that the Director had approved of the paper calling for the release of $900,000 from the reserve for Project JMARC." 55/ Indeed the Director had signed such a paper calling for the $900,000 as "an unprogrammed requirement for which other funds are not available." 56/

In his memo to the Comptroller concerning the release of funds from the Agency reserve, the Director was also careful to point out that it would be the responsiblity of Chief, WH Division to certify that the funds had been expended as specified for the project; that additionally, the DDP or his designee would have to approve each certification; that the only Headquarters file on the budget for the project would be maintained by WH/Division; and that the file would be complete as to the purpose of the expenditure, the date, those who were involved as payees, and any other details; and finally that access to this financial file would be "limited to persons specifically authorized by the Deputy Director (Plans)."* 57/

In the first meeting following the Presidential approval of the anti-Castro program, Jake Esterline called the members of WH/4 together to announce that the program had been given the crypt of JMARC; and he further pointed out that 1 May 1960 was the target date for the beginning of training at Fort Randolph in Panama. (This date was predicated on the assumption of a satisfactory report from the Inspection Team which was to travel to Fort Randolph on 27 March.) Medical and security officers were to be assigned to the training base and the communications link was to be established with Headquarters. In this early meeting, Esterline emphasized that training at the Fort Randolph and Fort Sherman areas of Panama was going to be extremely limited; and since there would be no training areas in the United States, third country training activities would need to be established. He emphasized again that secrecy was of paramount importance if the operation was to succeed, and stressed that the establishment of a Government-in-exile was a key point to making the planned operation credible. Esterline further indicated that such a government hopefully could be announced by the early part of April and that the Headquarters for such a government could be located either in Puerto Rico or Costa Rica.

---

* Unlike some suggestions that had been forwarded by the WH/4 Finance Officer, Michael King, the Director's Memorandum placed budgetary responsibility with the DDP and Chief, WH Division. Chief, WH/4 was not even included on the routing for the Director's Memorandum. The WH/4 Financial Officer, on the other hand, had suggested that certain of the responsibilities for approval of funding be given to the project Chief, or the Chief, WH/Division. 58/

Esterline also made an appeal for personnel to staff both the Panama training activity and Base Two, the Coral Gables Headquarters which later would be known as JMWAVE. One interesting point made at this first meeting was that:

> Mr. [Scudder] Georgia reported that the DDS Offices concerned had nominated nearly all of the personnel required by 1 and 15 April respectively. Action was being taken to make all these available at once ... [and] it was agreed that DDS representatives would meet once a week

> to review activities, determine the status of commitments, and prepare a brief report for Chief, Branch 4. 59/

In another Branch meeting soon after the one just mentioned, Esterline reemphasized, as he and others would do throughout the course of the operation, the need for security practices designed to protect the fact of Agency involvement in this covert operation. He also indicated the considerable degree of cooperation which already was being required from other services. Dave Phillips provided a specific example of this, emphasizing that without the close cooperation of the United States Navy, it would have been difficult to transport the two radio transmitters which were going to be installed on Swan Island. Moreover, Phillips reported that a crew of Seabees would be responsible for constructing the facilities to house the transmitters and the quarters for personnel who would conduct the propaganda effort from Swan Island. Because the activities then established on Swan Island were under the control of the Federal Aviation Administration, C. Tracy Barnes (the A/DDP/A) was to meet with the Director of FAA, Gen. Elwood Quesada, to clear with him the problems that were involved in establishing this Agency activity on the island. 60/ Coordination also had to be effected with the United States Coast Guard in order that there be no interference with maritime activities; and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was alerted to the need to facilitate the entry of Cuban defectors. 61/

As attempts were being made to establish the parameters for the operations against Castro, a most prescient memorandum was directed to Chief, WH/4 from Paul Oberst, Chief, Covert Action, WH Division. Oberst apparently had been associated with PBSUCCESS, the project which resulted in the ouster of the Arbenz Government in Guatemala in 1954; and recalling some of the "pitfalls and counter-productive aspects" of that particular operation, Oberst wrote as follows:

> I have the impression that our basic JMARC plan commits us to a rather firm timetable. In my judgment, we should have great flexibility in deciding the appropriate time for kicking off any paramilitary operations. Before such operations are initiated, we should have firm evidence that our propaganda and political action operations have irrevocably undermined Castro's prestige, both in *Cuba and abroad*. We should not initiate paramilitary actions until we are convinced that they will not enable

> Castro to recuperate lost prestige and rally local and foreign sympathy and support. Generally speaking, current area attitudes toward the Castro regime are satisfactory from our [CIA] point of view. However, this could change radically and rapidly, if there are any premature paramilitary actions. When the time comes for paramilitary activity, we should make every effort to conceal any invasion actions. To avoid or minimize Castro's counter propaganda, the paramilitary operations must appear to be an *internal uprising by dissident elements within Cuba.* This, of course, would require clandestine infiltration of personnel and arms before the hostitlities begin.
>
> In my opinion, Castro will inevitably charge the US with responsibility for JMARC operations, and many Latin Americans and other foreign observers will be inclined to accept such charges with or without supporting evidence. Therefore, what we need is a massive diversionary effort that will either obscure the fact of our involvement or make our involvement palatable. This diversionary tactic might be accomplished by exploiting unanimous Latin American revulsion toward the Trujillo regime ... If it became known, or strongly suspected, that we were supporting operations to bring about a transition to democratic government in the Dominican Republic, the waters would be suitably muddied, and a climate prepared for the Cuban effort.* 62/

---

* Debatable though Oberst's philosophy regarding the Dominican Republic might be, serious attention to his initial comments regarding paramilitary activities against Castro might have halted -- or at least seriously altered -- the operations which would ultimately conclude at the Bahia de Cochinos. As with other of the cautionary and restrained proposals which would be put forth prior to launching the invasion, little heed

(footnote continued on following page)

In mid-April of 1960 WH/4 made the first presentation for the DCI since the basic program had been approved by President Eisenhower in mid-March. In attendance in addition to the DCI were: Gen. Cabell, Mr. Helms (C/OPS), Herman Horton (CI Staff), and C. Tracy Barnes, Mr. Bissell's Deputy. This high level group was informed that broadcasting activity from Swan Island was scheduled to begin on 17 May 1960 and that very special operations were being carried out in order to provide stories for propaganda use. According to Dave Phillips who made the presentation

---

apparently was paid to Mr. Oberst's proposals.

About the same time that Oberst's memorandum was going forward, the DDP was calling for WH/4 to prepare daily progress reports as one way of eliminating the need for crash-type responses or actions. In discussing the contents of such reports, it was indicated that:

> The Progress Report should generally not exceed one page in length, and that we should not hesitate to include it in items which were not favorable to our progress, in other words, setbacks or handicaps which we might have encountered. 63/

Also, by way of keeping informed about developments related to the operation, Chief WH/4 instituted a series of weekly meetings with the operational elements of the DDP "for the purpose of insuring operational coordination similar to that achieved by the meeting of support elements every Tuesday morning." 64/

on propaganda, excellent results were being obtained. The reports on the evolution of the government in exile and the buildup of the stay-behind network and on paramilitary activity indicated that much work still remained to be done to get these activities off the ground. Further, it was pointed out to the DCI and the DDCI that budget estimates were rapidly escalating, principally because:

> Direct costs of nonexpendable equipment [were] being charged against the project which, in fact, was the major cause of the project's over-obligation. It was the opinion of all concerned that such property should be held on a Memorandum Receipt basis without cost to the project, and that charges, if any, should be reflected as direct costs only if property was found unserviceable or was not returned to communications stock supply after the project is terminated. The DCI was advised that this matter would be discussed with the Comptroller for resolution. 65/

Most important in connection with this briefing, was the DCI's comment that:

> With respect to personnel needs, he assured all, no matter whether personnel were overseas or in the US, he would arrange to obtain personnel required in support of JMARC. 66/

The meaning of Chief/WH/4's comments to the DCI, was made quite clear within a few days when Admendment No. 1 to the project was submitted to the Director for approval. The amendment concerned the need for more money and pointed out that:

> Not only has the initial $900,000 already been expended, but it is currently estimated that an additional $1.0 million is immediately required to carry the activity through 30 June 1960 ... Note is also made ... of possible contingencies amounting to an additional $1.4 million for which no funds are requested at this time. 67/

In addition to an early updating for the DCI, WH/4 also undertook to educate the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban problem very soon after the Eisenhower approval of the anti-Castro program. On 8 April 1960, General Cabell headed a CIA delegation including Mr. Bissell, Col. King, and Jake Esterline which briefed a very high level group of Department of Defense representatives in the JCS conference room at the Pentagon.* General Cabell made only introductory remarks, and the bulk of the briefing was conducted by Mr. Bissell with some assistance from

---

* Included among the Defense participants were Thomas Gates, Secretary of Defense; Gen. Twining, Chairman, JCS; Gen. Shoup, Commandant U.S. Marines; Admiral Burke; CNO; General Erskine, Chief, Special Ops, U.S. Army; Gen. White, COS/USAF; and Gen. Woolnough, representing COS/Army. 68/

J. C. King. Apparently Jake Esterline, the man who had the monkey on his back as project chief sat quietly by.

The suggestion which had been made by Paul Oberst that the "waters be muddied" by making it appear that the US was backing the anti-Trujillo forces in the Dominican Republic was not introduced during the course of this briefing of the JCS, even though the Dominican Republic was included as a part of the overall briefing. What did emerge with reference to the Dominican Republic was a concensus that if Trujillo were ousted, there was a strong possibility that Castro might move into the Dominican Republic where he probably would be received as a conquering hero.

In the course of the discussion which followed the briefing, Admiral Burke emerged as the principal "hawk," indicating his willingness to move fleet units into the Port au Prince, Haiti area because the suggestion had been made that if Castro went into the Dominican Republic it would only be a few days time before he also would be welcomed into Haiti. In addition, Burke made it quite clear that should the

Cuban government launch an attack on Guantanamo, the Navy was prepared to defend that base. In Burke's opinion, the Navy had adequate force available to do that.* 69/

Whether a direct result of this briefing of the JCS or not, there was a noticeable improvement in WH/4's relations with the military services before the end of April 1960. On 19 April, for example, $150,000 was to be funneled from the CIA's Director of Logistics to the Comptroller, US Army, ostensibly as a working fund for the 2750th Maintenance Unit, Fort Randolph, Canal Zone. This money, of course, was to be used for necessary construction, renovation, procurement of material, and hire of native labor as necessary to improve Fort Randolph as a training site for the PM insturctor cadre. 71/

Before the end of April 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved, in principle, the Agency's request for overflight photo coverage of the islands offshore of Cuba. The decision on this matter was taken up, not only with the Air Force, but also with J. Lampton Berry of the Department of State.* Although the authorization and plan for these overflights, presumably by the U-2, antedated the shootdown of Francis Gary Power's U-2 in the Soviet Union, it was recorded that:

---

* This briefing for the senior personnel in the Department of Defense, would have taken place in any event; but it may have been prompted by the reluctance of the designated DOD liaison officer with WH/4, Capt. Burns Spore (USN), to do much more than listen to WH/4's requests for the assignment of DOD personnel to the project and for real estate for use in the training program until he received a green light from the SecDef. 70/

> Ambassador Berry had called to say that the Department ... had approved the mission, but insisted that extremely tight security be exercised throughout and that Col. Benson (USAF/Operations) inform Ambassador Berry before each sortie so that the Department would be properly prepared to respond to any emergency. 72/

The first flight, incidentally, was tentatively scheduled for the weekend of 30 April - 1 May of 1960.**

In April of 1960, in addition to working with the Army, the Agency representatives also began to work with the Covert Limited Warfare Committee of the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense. One of the particular problems of concern in this relationship was that of covert sea transportation which might be necessary to lift anti-Castro forces back to the island of Cuba. Even though all the planning about which there is a record at this time concerned only cadres for guerrilla warfare training and the infiltration of communications experts, on 25 April 1960, Savilion Chapman of DDP's Maritime Branch met with a Captain Thomas (USN) and a Col. Anderson (USMC) who were members of the DOD/CIA Covert Limited Warfare Stockpiling Committee, and discussed among other interesting subjects:

---

* Berry was a Career Minister and former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (AE&P) to Ceylon who was at this time assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

** Powers was shot down over the USSR on 1 May 1960.

> The acquisition from the Navy of two Landing Ship-Tanks (LST) and four Air-Sea Rescue Craft (AVR), the training of the Cuban crews for these vessels, and the means of covert transfer of the vessels from the Navy to the Agency.* 73/

In addition to the requested overhead reconnaissance of the Cuban coastline by the Air Force, the

---

* It is rather strange that at this early date in April 1960 discussions were being held concerning the acquisition of LST's. There had been no discussions concerning the movement of a large body of Cuban troops back into their homeland; and, consequently, the discussion re LST's seems highly out of place.

Maritime Branch representatives also discussed beach gradient problems with the Marine Corps and representatives of the Navy's Hydrographic Office. It was ascertained that much work needed to be done in order to upgrade information suitable for planning the use of LST's for beaching and landing of troops and vehicles. 74/

In the weeks immediately following Eisenhower's announcement of the anti-Castro policy, the Department of State seemed to be operating in a world of its own -- making elaborate plans for Cuban briefings and the flow of information on Cuba's internal developments. On 25 March, for example, Roy Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, was the originator of an elaborate memorandum which provided a check list of current operations and ten categories of activity related to developments in Cuba. From the tenor of the paper itself, it seems as though Rubottom was ignorant of the Cuban issues before the Special Group, of the discussions among CIA, State, and Department of Defense, and of the President's approved plan for covert action. Nor was there any evident awareness of the various overt programs with reference to the Cuban problem. 75/ About this same time, Allen Dulles made known to the Special Group his displeasure that the Department failed to consult with the Agency prior to announcing the reappointment of Philip Bonsal as US Ambassador to Cuba. 76/

The Rubottom plan apparently had some impact, for by the end of April 1960, Gordon Gray was calling on Douglas Dillon, the Undersecretary of State, to find someone in the Department -- Dillon himself -- to be "constantly seized of the Cuban problem and who would take steps to assure that all of the activities of various groups were in harness and that all needed decisions were made when needed."* 77/ Mr. Gray also specified some of the problems which would face a Chief of Staff on the Cuban activity, noting:

> [Livingston Merchant] has set up two groups, one under the chairmanship of Mr. Mallory. In addition, there is the Special Group, of which Livie is a member, and in his absence Ray Hare sits. Further, there is a special activity

---

* This, of course, apparently ignores or disregards the creation of WH/4 and the responsibilities designated to the Agency by Gray's boss, President Eisenhower.

> proceeding under the chairmanship of Bob Anderson, with which you may or may not be familiar. Allen Dulles has a particular liaison with Bob in this matter. The Defense Department, of course, has many interests. 78/

The suggestion that Undersecretary Douglas Dillon be made Chief of Staff responsible for coordinating the programs with reference to Cuba did not sit well with the Agency; and after the matter had been surfaced at a meeting of the Special Group on 28 April, Chief, WH/4 prepared a memorandum stating in part with reference to Dillon:

> The Agency would not look with favor on this arrangement. Mr. Barnes and the Director, therefore, plan to go over to State on Monday afternoon [2 May 1960] and head off this new development. Mr. Barnes believes that a short paper setting forth what we are already doing in the fields of coordination and liaison should be adequate to support their point of view. 79/

Whether resistance to the suggestion that Dillon become Chief of Staff for the nation's anti-Castro program was in itself distasteful to the Agency or whether it was simply opposition to the idea that State should take over the direction of a program which would basically be carried out by the Agency is not revealed in the records. Presumably both elements entered into the picture. In any event, Gordon Gray seemed cavalier in disregarding the creation of WH/4 and the liaison arrangements which had already been made. (See Appendix D.)* But whatever the explanation, Mr. Dillon did not become Chief of Staff for the nation's Cuban program.

Although it was not included on the list of Agencies with which CIA maintained liaison and contacts at this time, mention should be made of the CIA-FBI contacts concerning Cuba. Technically the FBI was prohibited from engaging in intelligence operations overseas, but in mid-June 1960, Chief, WH/4 revealed that the FBI reportedly had plans for installing a stay-behind network -- using Mexicans and Cubans -- to be activated in case diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba were broken. Chief, WH/4 suggested that the CI Staff get in touch with the FBI Liaison Officer, Sam Papich and ask for an explanation of the Bureau's plan. 80/ About the same time that Chief WH/4 was evincing concern about FBI activities in Cuba, Chief, WH Division noted in a memorandum for the Acting Director of Central Intelligence that:

---

* Appendix D, page 332.

> A thorough investigation has been made of the relations between the Havana Station and the Havana Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It has been concluded that the operations of the FBI have neither interferred with nor conflicted with the Station's operations. 81/

Col. King's memo also stated the Bureau's long-time contacts in the Cuban area were a benefit to both the Bureau and to the Station pointing out that frequently the Station was called on to participate in, or actually undertake, the debriefing of various individuals who had come into the FBI offices to volunteer information. On occasion, the Bureau had even turned over specific operations to the Station.

Chief, WH Division went even further when, during the course of one of the weekly interdepartmental meetings in State, it was suggested by Mr. Gray and Mr. Mallory that the FBI was exceeding its jurisdiction, and that perhaps this should be brought before the NSC for consideration. Col. King reported that he remained non-committal at this time, but did point out that he thought the jurisdictional issue should be "soft-pedaled." He did say, however, that the memorandum he had prepared on this subject was being held in the files should questions about this particular Bureau activity ever be raised. King also recommended that the Agency not take the initiative in raising the question. 82/

Neither Col. King, nor anyone else involved in the anti-Castro operation ever registered a formal protest against the FBI's activities in the Havana area. By mid-summer 1960, the relationship became even closer, particularly as the Agency expanded activities at the Forward Operations Base, JMASH (later JMWAVE) in Miami. In one report concerning the number of the Cuban exiles in the Miami area who were under suspicion of -- or were -- working for Castro, or who were trying desperately to get support from one or another US Agency, an FBI agent made a rather interesting forecast to the CIA representative with whom he was exchanging information. According to the report from Miami, an FBI agent

> told me that his personal opinion was that it would be virtually impossible, if not completely impossible, to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime using Cuban exiles. He thought the only solution to the problem, and the one that stood the best chance of success, was to

> go in with the US Marines. He admitted that this was only his personal opinion, but he felt that in view of his experience and contact with the Cuban exiles, he had a good point. I could not help agree with him. 83/

Agent George Davis apparently was extremely interested in full cooperation with the Agency, quickly accepting the Agency representative's proposal that they visit the FBI offices once or twice each week to compare notes; and the CIA field representative, in turn, agreed to pass on to Mr. Davis in the FBI any information which the Agency might acquire pertaining to FBI interests.*

---

* The Forward Operations Base (FOB) opened in May 1960 in Coral Gables, Florida, and it was the second FOB that had been established since the formation of WH Division -- the initial base having been set up during the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in 1953-1954. In general, the Miami FOB paralleled the organization of Headquarters with FI, CI, CA, Support, and PM units. FOB reported directly to the Chief, WH Division, not to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4. Initially the satellite communications center for relaying commo between Headquarters and the field -- including facilities in the Florida Keys concerning the maritime operations -- was established; and ultimately the commo link would connect Headquarters with the operations in Guatemala and Nicaragua. The cover firm for the base, was Clarence A. DePew & Sons, a notional cover for an organization engaged in classified research.

A series of some 32 reports has been prepared on the FOB, and the reports are available through the Records Management Officer of WH Division. These

(footnote continued on following page)

In addition to its concern with the interests of other government agencies in the Cuban problem, in mid-summer of 1960 the Agency also was required to provide intelligence briefings for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates of the major political parties. While the intelligence briefings were scheduled to consider the world situation, considerable emphasis was being given to both Cuba and the Dominican Republic. In preparation for Mr. Dulles' briefing of the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, on 23 July 1960, WH/4 prepared a detailed Cuban briefing paper touching on the principal aspects of the exile organization, the propaganda plan, penetration of Cuba by personnel from communist countries (including the Soviet Union, Red China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany), and the play that Castro was making in the Latin American world for pro-communist sympathizers. In addition, emphasis also was given to the

---

reports deal basically with the period between 1962 and 1968; and while there is some feeling that the story of the Bay of Pigs operation should go into extensive detail on the initial operations of the FOB, this author has chosen not to do so, focusing instead on only those broad aspects of the problem relating to the Miami Base. 84/

planned program for paramilitary training and operations under the aegis of CIA. Insofar as can be determined, however, there is no indication that in his pre-election briefing of the Democratic Presidential candidates that Mr. Dulles went into any specifics on the Agency's anti-Castro plans. 85/

As mentioned previously, one of the continuing problems requiring coordination within the Executive Branch was the increasing budget demands for Project JMATE. From an estimate of some $2.5 million of budgeted and reserve funds, which had been made available for the program by mid-August of 1960, Mr. Bissell appeared at a special Group meeting, requesting that an additional $10.75 million be released from reserve funds to meet the ever-increasing needs, particularly for the paramilitary and propaganda programs. The decision of the Special Group following Mr. Bissell's appeal was that:

> This matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which

> should not be undertaken without a reasonable assurance that the operation was to go forward. 86/

On 22-23 August of 1960, after discussions with Mr. Stans and Mr. Macy, the Agency was notified that the requested $10 million for FY 61 would be made available from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies.* 87/

C. Cooperation and Challenge

As already mentioned, immediately following the Eisenhower decision to promote the anti-Castro program, there was a considerable degree of cooperation between CIA and other of the concerned Agencies -- the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and others. As WH/4 continued to expand and develop the various programs -- propaganda, covert action, staybehind networks, and paramilitary operations -- there were ever increasing contacts between CIA and the representatives of other government agencies. Perhaps the best way to describe the period from the summer of 1960 until the early fall was as a period of cooperation and challenge. Cooperation because the needs of the Agency represented National Policy. Challenge to most if not all of CIA's proposals -- proposals which concerned the nature of the propaganda effort, the size and make-up of the exile military force which was being organized, the location of training sites, the types of technical materiel (including aircraft) being requested, and, most important by the end of this period, the specific nature of the military operation which was to be mounted against Fidel Castro.

---

* One explanation for the sharply increasing demand for reserve funds may lie in the fact that materiel was being written off upon issue, rather than upon consumption -- an aspect of the operation that was explained to the author by William E. Eisemann, formerly Chief, Support WH/4. 88/

By early June 1960, the program for paramilitary training of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to 500 or more trainees -- even though the actual training of the initial instructor cadre at Fort Randolph in Panama had not yet begun and the FRD was only in the initial stages of negotiation for PM and commo training facilities in Guatemala. It was anticipated that the increased number of PM trainees would be recruited out of the Miami area, from other Latin American countries where Cubans had taken up residence, and from others who might be recruited inside Cuba. The emphasis on the PM training at this time was to be on weapons, demolitions, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare tactics; and the weapons familiarization was to be with the M-1 carbine, the Garand and Springfield rifles, the Thompson sub-machine gun, and the .45 Colt automatic pistol. This, of course, was the weapons mix in the Agency's stockpile of standard arms packs. 89/

It must be presumed that the call for increases in the number of PM trainees was related to the continued importation of Soviet weapons and technicians and the increasing strength of the Communist Party in Cuba. An NIE written in mid-June 1960 on "The Situation in Cuba," for example noted that the Castro regime was "deeply and increasingly influenced by Communists .. no longer any prospect of democratic government under his [Fidel Castro's] regime." As was past estimates, this particular NIE was unable to answer the question of whether Castro himself was a Communist. The NIE also mentioned that no strong opposition leader to the Castro regime had emerged, nor did the opposition at that time "pose a serious threat to the regime." One weakness touched on by the National Estimate concerned the Castro militia which was characterized as "only partially armed, and for the most part poorly trained ... [and] appears to have little, if any, effectiveness as an organized combat force in conventional operations." For either of the foregoing reasons, perhaps, an increase in the number of PM personnel might (a) assist in bringing a strong dissident leader to the fore, or (b) develop the capability to overcome the Castro militia. 90/

The question of an increased number of PM trainees surfaced in a late August briefing for President Eisenhower, Secretaries Gates, Dillon, and Anderson, and Generals Persons, Lemnitzer, and Goodpaster by the DCI and Mr. Bissell. After President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, summarized developments since the March announcement of the anti-Castro program, Mr. Dulles provided some specifics concerning the organization of the FRD and its principals, noting that the Headquarters for the FRD had been established in Mexico City, in lieu of the invitation of President Ydigoras of Guatemala to permit the FRD to operate from his country. Mr. Dulles noted that at this time, it was particularly important that the US presence in Guatemala not be revealed. When the discussion turned to the PM forces, the Department of Defense representative, Mr. Gates, made it quite clear that he was concerned about the possibility of US military personnel being involved directly in the military operations inside Cuba. Mr. Bissell responded that US military personnel in third countries would be used only as instructors -- not as cadre leaders for either an invasion or a guerrilla warfare effort.

Bissell did stress, however, that there was need for a standby force, preferably of non-Americans, with special training in guerrilla warfare to provide a leadership complement to the Cubans when "push" came to "shove," a recommendation that provoked some differences of opinion during the course of this briefing for the President when it was suggested that US officers might be required to direct these forces. Mr. Dulles proposed withholding this discussion until the Agency and the JCS could talk the matter over. Mr. Gray seemed to be determined that the issue of the force level and make-up be resolved at this particular time. According to his own report of his position at this meeting,

> Mr. Gray pointed out that it would be unwise to mount any kind of an operation without the determination to see it through and that an abortive effort would be worse than no effort at all. He therefore thought that if this backup force was essential to ultimate success, full consideration should be given to it at this stage in the planning. Mr. Dulles again urged that a decision on this be deferred.* 91/

In support of Mr. Gray and in some contradiction to Mr. Bissell's view that perhaps the Cuban PM force would be able to carry off the effort without any outside help, the President was reported to have indicated that

> He would go along so long as the Joint Chiefs, Defense, State, and CIA think we have a good chance of being successful. He wouldn't care much about this kind of cost [the $10 million increase noted earlier]; indeed, he said he would defend this kind of action against all comers and that if we could be sure of freeing the Cubans from this incubus, $25 million might be a small price to pay.

---

* In light of today's relations between the United States and other of the major world powers with the third countries, Gordon Gray displayed -- in the summer of 1960 -- a degree of foresight with which he has never been properly credited. For he noted at that time that if the US failed to deal firmly with Cuba, there was an obvious danger that other small nations would be encouraged to undertake harassments of the major powers. 92/

> The President concluded the meeting, by saying that he would like to urge caution with respect to the danger of making false moves, with the result of starting something before we were ready for it.* 93/

One of the most persistent problems which was to surface by early fall of 1960 concerned the need for the anti-Castro operation itself, and the bulk of the questioning came from the Department of State, principally from Thomas Mann, who soon was to become the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs. Mann already had been involved in some of the prior discussions concerning the anti-Castro activity in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for

---

* In his memorandum of a meeting with the President on 17 August 1960, Gordon Gray noted that in discussing the CIA meeting planned for 18 August, that in addition to Messrs. Dulles and Bissell, a third CIA officer might possibly be in attendance; and he also noted that the Vice-President had been invited to attend the briefing. According to Gray's record, however, neither the Vice-President nor the third CIA representative were in attendance at the briefing of 18 August. The attendance of the Director and Mr. Bissell, but with no CIA representative from WH/4, was further illustration of Jake Esterline's criticism that at too many high level briefings, CIA's representatives were individuals who, high ranks notwithstanding, were the furthest from the operation -- yet they were responsible for informing the nation's policymakers about the details of the anti-Castro program. 94/

It is also interesting to note that this off-the-record meeting which was arranged by Gordon Gray lasted only 23 minutes, and this included at least a short time for a brief discussion related to Francis Gary Powers. 95/

Economic Affairs. In early September of 1960, Chief, WH/4 learned from a member of the Department of State that Mr. Mann was going to ask for a restudy of the basic concept of JMATE, or, if he did not ask for that re-evaluation, he would ask for immediate review and rescheduling of the timetable for the JMATE operation. At this time and in view of the lack of progress both in developing any great cohesion within the FRD in organizing the dissidents within Cuba, the questions seemed in order. The reaction of Chief, WH/4 however, was that an attempt should be made to blunt Mr. Mann's efforts, noting for example:

> The degree to which we are already committed in JMARC would pose a monumental security problem alone if we were suddenly instructed to cease and desist from further activity. As of this moment, they have well in excess of 200 people engaged in air, ground, and communications training in Guatemala. Additionally, our across-the-board propaganda activities are being stepped up daily. A drastic rescheduling of either activity, therefore, could bring about serious repercussions. 96/

The precise nature of these "serious repercussions" was not spelled out. As time passed, however, it would be charged that the cessation of the Agency-sponsored training activities would loose a flood of

Cubans back into the exile community; and they would charge that the United States feared to undertake the task of ousting Fidel Castro. This, in turn, would mean that the US would lose face in the eyes of the Democratic Latin American republics. Jake Esterline speculated that Mann did not believe that the Cubans were willing to support an insurrection against Castro. A suggestion which was made to counter the possible Mann proposals was that:

> To strengthen our position, therefore, we are bending every effort to get at least one supply airdrop into the target country, prior to the Assistant Secretary's return to the United States ... Successful action in this area should weigh heavily on Assistant Secretary Mann's alleged new attitude. 97/

Just how one -- or even more -- successful air drops would in any way influence Mann's opinion about the receptiveness of the Cuban population to a possible insurrection effort was not explained. That there were dissidents on the island was unquestioned, the problem was the degree of strength and effectiveness that they might be able to demonstrate.*

---

* Fortunately for the continuation of Project JMATE, the hurry-up air drop to which Jake Esterline referred did not set the criteria for the continuation or dissolution of the project. This air drop was a complete

(footnote continued on following page)

Mr. Mann would continue to raise questions concerning the feasibility of discontinuing the training in Guatemala, and in on-going meetings with Agency representatives including the DCI, the DDP, Chief, WH, as well as Chief, WH/4 and others, Mann continued to raise questions about the effect on Project JMATE should all the American trainers and Cuban trainees be pulled out of Guatemala immediately. Mann also questioned the exact timing for Project JMATE. As he raised such questions, the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs was informed by CIA that they would much prefer that the training of the Cuban exiles take place in US bases, both for purposes of security and for efficiency. But they also pointed out that it had been the decision for the Special Group and the "highest levels" that such training should take place in third countries, rather than in the US. Mann persisted, however, suggesting that the question of maintaining the training base in

---

and total bust, the supplies being dropped to the guerrillas fell into the hands of Castro's forces; and the aircraft itself made a forced landing in Mexico and was not recovered. See Volume I of this history, Air Operations.

Guatemala or removing it to the US should be raised again with the Special Group. The Agency's representatives agreed to this suggestion "with the strictest proviso that no move from Guatemala could or should be made until adequate staging facilities in the Zone of the Interior have been prepared." 98/

Tracy Barnes put the question of moving the base from Guatemala to the Zone of the Interior in a somewhat different context than had been suggested by Esterline and J. C. King. Barnes recommended consideration be given, among other items, to:

> The fact that a move from the present training sites to the US should not be made too hurriedly and the importance of avoiding a decision at a later date that the training in the US is a bar to operational use. I realize that this latter point would be a complete contradiction of the present theory but, after all, there is an intervening election; and political views can shift so that everything possible should be done to avoid our getting ourselves into the box where we move to the US for one reason and then find that the US move is used against us to prevent or limit ultimate operations.* 100/

One additional point which was made by Jake Esterline and J. C. King in their conversations with

---

Source reference No. 99 not used.

Secretary Mann was that the sudden pullout of the training program in Guatemala might very well lead to the overthrow of President Ydigoras by the pro-communist elements which were already in evidence in opposition to the Ydigoras regime. It was indicated that should the troop training be moved from Guatemala to the United States, 300 Guatemalan troops would be trained as a special security force for the Guatemalan government. 101/

During these discussions in the late fall of 1960, Mann also raised the issue of economic sanctions which had been touched on in the early spring. At this time however, the Agency's representatives believed that Mann was talking in terms of a one to three year quarantine period, in an attempt to disrupt the Cuban economy -- a quarantine, however, which would not interfere with the flow of goods from the Communist countries. This was a point of some contention between State and CIA, with the Agency people convinced that the Soviet Union would make up any deficiencies that tended to impede seriously the economy of Castro's Cuba. 102/

In the context of a possible move of the training facilities to the United States, Chief, WH prepared a memorandum for the DDP indicating that the need for training bases to be located in the southern part of the United States should include an infantry training base capable of handling 3,000 men with range facilities, tactical training areas, an airfield for training air and ground crews in the utilization of B-26, C-46 and C-54 aircraft, aerial gunnery and bomb range facilities, and maritime training and staging facilities. It was suggested that the airfield logistical base should be located in southern Florida, and permission to use Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico to stage black over-flights to Cuba should be obtained. The maritime facilities would be located on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico and also in southern Florida.

In a meeting with the Special Group, the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence put forth the proposals concerning the movement of training bases to the United States; and although he was supported by the Department of Defense representatives -- Mr. Douglas and Gen. Lansdale -- Livingston Merchant of the Department of State, normally one of the hard liners of the Department, seemed to have ambivalent feelings at this time about the training program. Possibly Merchant was succumbing to Mann's arguments suggesting that the time for military action was so far down the line that US efforts should be concentrated on economic sanctions at this time. 103/ Adolf A. Berle, who would become one of the Kennedy administration's principal advisers on Latin America, also seemed to be swayed by Tom Mann's argument in favor of economic sanctions, Berle suggesting that the embargo be expanded to include the shipment of arms and ammunition both to Cuba and from Cuba to other parts of Latin America. 104/

Although it has been indicated that the Department of Defense would apparently support the Agency in its request for the establishment of training facilities in the continental United States, DOD did balk at the use of military personnel in third country areas in support of Project JMATE. Although Deputy Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas began to question whether his department had actually been committed to support CIA's anti-Castro effort, it seems clear that policy approval for the use of Department of Defense personnel in Project JMATE had been established with the approval of the President's comprehensive program of covert action against Fidel Castro in March 1960. 105/

The difficulties encountered with the Department of Defense concerning the assignment of Special Force trainers from the US Army to the Guatemalan training bases has already been spelled out in considerable detail in another volume, but even as the Department of Defense was taking a negative attitude toward the possible use of DOD personnel in either training or combat activities, the Agency was proposing the recruitment of either American or foreign volunteers to serve as combat troops for Project JMATE. The Bureau of American Republic Affairs of Department of State, however, put the quietus on the plan for obtaining foreign volunteers; but J. Foster Collins, the Chief of the Covert Action Staff, suggested to the Deputy Director for Plans that possibly he (the DDP) could convince Livingston Merchant of the need to re-examine the Department of State policy.*

---

* The problem of the Special Force trainers is discussed in Volume II of this history, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

Collins was particularly enthusiastic about the prospects for recruiting Germans, Greeks, and Turks to serve as volunteers; but in the end, State's view prevailed, and there were no contingents of either American or foreign volunteers. 106/

During the period of buildup and organization of WH/4 for the JMATE effort against Castro, the Agency encountered some problems with the US Navy, but none of these were as serious as the difficulties encountered with the Department of Defense per se, the Air Force, or the United States Army. The existence of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba presented an unusual situation in view of the planning that was taking place. Apparently, however, there was no disagreement between the Agency and the Navy that prohibited Guantanamo from being used to mount anti-Castro activities or from being used as a safe haven area for those who might have been detected engaging in sabotage, propaganda, or other anti-Castro activities. The purpose of such restrictions, of course, was to prevent the Cubans from claiming violations of the legal and binding international agreement between the United States and the Government of Cuba over the lease of Guantanamo Bay. So serious was this issue in fact, that the Agency agreed

> that all Cubans participating in overflights of Cuba would be told that Guantanamo Naval Base was not to be used as a safe haven, and that if they landed there, they would be turned over to the Cuban authorities. 107/

The Guantanamo Base also presented a major difficulty for the Department of State. Evidence of this surfaced in early October of 1960 when it was reported that during a meeting of the State Working Group on Cuba a suggestion was put forward that the US try to influence Latin American nations to approve US retention of the base. One proposal had been made that this be done through the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), where a resolution apparently was about to be introduced asking for a definition of the relations between Cuba and the USSR, with the expectation that this might force Cuba's resignation from membership on the IADB. According to Col. John F. Mallard, the Agency's liaison officer with the State Working Group:

> In addition, State desires that the IADB, make some statement on the importance of Guantanamo Bay to Latin American hemisphere defense. This statement would, in effect, give Latin American approval to U.S. retention of this base. 108/

This frame of reference concerning Guantanamo Bay led the Executive Officer of WH/4, Ed Stanulis, to prepare an extremely sharp memorandum for Chief, Western Hemisphere Division raising some questions which are as pertinent to CIA today as they were when they were raised in 1960. Stanulis wrote as follows:

> I realize that this Agency is an implementing arm of the Executive Branch and has no right or privilege in the area of formulation of U.S. national policy. I believe that within this framework we who are part of this Agency are permitted to comment on certain State Department or other Executive Department propositions that appear, on the basis of our own personal observations and experience, to be counter-productive to the best interest of the United States. I am convinced that the course of action, described in paragraph 1 [that the U.S. use the IADB to win Latin American support for the U.S. retention of Guantanamo] is in fact within this category.
>
> It is high time that the U.S. take an understandable public position in matters of international agreement, compact, contract, and treaty. The rights of the U.S. to the Guantanamo Bay area have been clearly and legally described in several documents which bear the signatures of the then reigning and cognizant governments of the United States and Cuba, respectively. Certainly the assistance of any single or plural Latin American national entity (ies) seems to me to be indicative of an admitted weakness on the part of the United States

> and its conviction of its legal international rights.
>
> I suggest that this Agency make known to the State Department its feelings in this matter, as described above (if addressees agree). I realize that considerable discussion could be waged in terms of legally and/or logically presenting our case. This memorandum is not intended to meet these requirements.
>
> One observation that might be included is the fact that the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, has on at least two occasions in U.S. mass media of sizable circulation stated that the United States would not tolerate any invasion of Guantanamo or hostile abrogation of our treaty arrangements to the base. I believe it is significant to note that no responsible member of the Executive Branch (including the President of the United States) has contradicted his statements. On the basis of this evidence, it would appear to me that the official overt position of the United States is crystal clear and we need not at this time place ourselves in a position of indebtedness or vulnerability with any other Latin American nation in terms of the Guantanamo issue. 109/

By early November 1960 Secretary of State, Christian Herter, had decided that the matter of Guantanamo needed to be discussed at a higher level; and, consequently, he introduced the subject on the agenda for the National Security Council meeting of 7 November 1960. The Secretary emphasized the need for coordination of military and political planning in case of an attack on the naval base. Herter indicated two extreme possibilities: one, that in case of an attack, the United States respond with only sufficient military force to protect the base itself; and another, that the United States decide that an attack on the base was in fact an act of war and apply such military power as necessary. Herter also suggested, of course, that there would be possible responses between the two extremes, with activities in the OAS or the UN possibly having some bearing on the US response -- the sort of contention that undoubtedly must have raised the hackles on Mr. Stanulis again. The Secretary of State did specify, however, that the US response to an attack on Guantanamo would be the result of a decision made by the President of the United States.

As will be pointed out subsequently, the Cubans would make charges about Guantanamo being the center for anti-Castro activities, and there would be a few instances where anti-Castro Cubans were able to find refuge within the confines of the base. Overall, however, there was a surprising degree of neutrality with respect to the naval installation during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation.

It is also important to mention at this time the Agency's relations with the Commander in Chief, CINCLANT, Admiral Dennison. Before the end of October 1960, the Admiral had made it clear to the Agency's representatives that he believed it impossible for him to conduct the affairs of the Atlantic Fleet in the Cuban area properly until he received further information -- specific information -- about the Agency's planned operations against Castro. When this report on Dennison was brought to the attention of the Chief of the Agency War Plans Staff, F. P. Holcomb, Holcomb assured the Admiral that any request for information which he cared to lay on the Agency would be promptly answered. By this time, Dennison indicated that he had already been in touch with General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, and the expectation was that such briefing on Cuban affairs by CIA was being laid on.

Holcomb, quite truthfully, indicated that neither he nor the Agency's liaison officer to CINCLANT, Commander Ray E. Millard, were privy to the planned operations of WH/4. Once having assured the Admiral of the willingness of CIA to cooperate and provide him with the necessary information, Holcomb then noted:

> It was the impression of the CIA officers present that Admiral Dennison is a cooperative officer and favorably and objectively inclined towards CIA, and that if his needs can be met, he will undoubtedly follow a positive and helpful course. 111/

On 2 November 1960, Richard Bissell, Jacob Esterline, and Colonel Jack Hawkins traveled to Norfolk to Admiral Dennison's headquarters. The CIA representatives received a general briefing by the Navy on contingency plans for Hispaniola and Cuba, and in return, they briefed the Navy on Project JMATE. Mr. Bissell gave an overview of the CIA operation, Esterline discussed the political and propaganda aspects, and Hawkins talked about the PM program, including the plan for a 1,500-man invasion force to seize a lodgement on the island of Cuba. Hawkins emphasized that this last objective could not be met until March or April of 1961.* 112/

---

* In a telecon with the author of this history on 15 May 1978, Admiral Dennison indicated that it was extremely late in the course of the Bay of Pigs operation before he received any briefing from CIA on the anti-Castro operation. He made it sound, in fact, as though he was not briefed until shortly before the

(footnote continued on following page)

D. Personnel and Training

From the time of the official approval of the anti-Castro policy by President Eisenhower until the collapse of the effort at the Bay of Pigs the question of personnel and personnel management for Project JMATE was of constant concern. Even though the Director of Central Intelligence "emphasized the significance of the Project, by saying that he would recall Agency personnel from any station in the world if the individual's abilities were required for the successful achievement of JMATE objectives," some of those who were closest to the personnel problem believed that DCI Dulles failed completely to keep that promise. 113/ Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 has remarked as follows:

> It was obvious that as the operation began to increase in size that the Divisions didn't have the personnel, the senior personnel, to staff out the organization; or if they did have them, they weren't about to release them from the

---

LSD (Landing Ship Dock) which was to carry the landing craft to the area of the Bahia de Cochinos was ready to load at the naval base at Vieques for the invasion. As the text above confirms, however, the Admiral was read into the act relatively early in the game and should have had plenty of time to make preparations for the activities of April 1961.

> things they were doing, because they were considered indispensable, which was probably correct. It was on that basis, I think, that when people like Dick Drain came back home from -- in Dick's case, I think he came in from Greece -- where he had a pretty good record -- but he was not returning to Headquarters to go into an assignment, and Dick Bissell put him in the operation with us. Gerry Droller had been around Headquarters for a long time, had been quite a bit of a replacement problem. He was very bright, he was a German specialist, had a pretty good political background; and Gerry and Howard Hunt, for whatever reason, were sort of selected, not by us, but they were told they were going to be the people who would handle the political aspects of the operation. 114/

Esterline also noted that the shortage of competent personnel became particularly critical when the operational concepts began to change and to expand. He claimed that when serious problems came up none of the GS-18 case officers were available to make decisions. 115/

Bill Eisemann, Chief/Support/WH/4, was more specific in his criticism of the personnel management for Project JMATE. After emphasizing that Colonel L. K. White, the Deputy Director for Support (DDS), did insure that the support elements got the best people for Project JMATE, "he [White], directed all Support office heads that if there was a need for any senior officer or any position to be filled that they would fill it without any hesitation whatsoever." 116/ But, in contrast, Eisemann pointed out:

> I can't say that was true on the operational side of the shop. A Contingency Task Force, a program developed by the Clandestine Services, was designed to make available Agency personnel who could be pulled out of any position that they were assigned to and moved into any urgent, high priority type of project. JMATE Project, was a high priority project; and the Contingency Task Force concept, in my opinion, failed at that point because the Clandestine Services did not provide the top quality people we needed for the position to be filled. After JMATE Project ... the Contingency Task Force was completely abolished. Many people in the Agency were designated from the Support and the Operational side to fill various positions as they would come up, but it didn't work from the Clandestine Services side. We had real problems, trying to get qualified ... top qualified people ... to do those jobs. In my opinion, the Contingency Task Force was a failure. It was set up and designed so that qualified personnel would be completely immunized and processed and ready to go with passports at any given time. But you couldn't get the people you wanted -- I'm talking about qualified key professionals in the Clandestine Services -- because the Division heads in the Clandestine Services would not release those people. 117/

Dick Drain, who became Chief of Operations for Project JMATE was among the severest of the critics with reference to the personnel assigned to Project JMATE. Pointing to his own case; Drain stated:

> I don't mean to be unduly immodest, but really, I didn't have any qualifications for this [WH/4] except that I was there and unemployed -- had no Spanish language whatsoever, and my entire exposure had been punching cows in Arizona in 1940. That doesn't really bring you up much on Latin America and latinos, and any of that ... I had never been on an amphibious operation, and if that was characteristic of my qualifications, it really characterized the whole damned operation ... about which, it seemed to me, there was a good deal of well-meaning hypocrisy. Allen Dulles, always meaning what he said, would say repeatedly, "now, I want the very best people assigned to this project ... there is nothing more important that we are doing than this; and I want directed assignments ... I want people pulled out of tours overseas if necessary, this thing must be manned." Everybody would solemnly nod and, then, much like the case of Vietnam ... humans being humans ... we would tend to get the people that the area Division Chiefs found "excess" -- which normally meant "found insufficient." With many notable exceptions, we did not get the very best people available. 118/

Although Drain levelled his broadside at all of the Divisions in the DDP, he was most critical of the Western Hemisphere Division:

> More of this staffing would have come from WH if there had been more competent people within WH. WH suffered, in my opinion, from a surfeit of ex-FBI officers who had been picked up at the time that the Agency took over from the Bureau in Latin America ... but there were damned few of them that had any particular experience ... One of the main things that plagued me was that I could never

> figure out, because nobody ever made it clear, where the hell the project stood vis-a-vis WH ... J. C. King never was told, I think for understandable reasons, to what extent he was in it, and to what extent he was not in it. 119/

As with other of the principals who were involved in the WH/4 effort, Drain was extremely complimentary of the Support element assigned to WH/4, stating as follows:

> This is a little ironic, because with Bissell as the DDP, you would have thought that if the directed assignment thing worked anywhere, it should have worked within the DDP. It worked less well there than it did within the DDS. Red White, soldierly like he was, took absolutely sincerely, what the Director said, when he said "I want the very best people assigned to this." So we got Mike King to run the finance, not some stumblebum with garters on his sleeve ... the best finance officer they had. Our logistics support and Bill Eisemann, they were really hand picked by Red White ... The DDS or the DDA, whatever they called it then, deserved very high marks for being uniquely the people to put their back into it. The DDI really wasn't asked; and that was too bad, because we could have used, it seems to me, some input from the DDI. Our own intelligence report structure was not bad. The Chief, FI was a nice old guy, Whedbee; and we had some reports officers who were quite competent in the DDP sense; but the thing was so compartmented from the DDI, in any event, that the idea of drawing down on DDI talent to get in on this, was not well received. I had suggested it because I had been

> in the DDI and I knew where the talent was. For example, on just such a mundane, but important thing, as topography and geography and beach stuff ... Christ, I well knew from the time that I worked for Lofty Becker ... that there was in old ORR ... in the geographic thing ... Jim [Brammell], ... Otto Guthe ... I mean, they would have been glad to supply people ... and we didn't ask. So you can't say that DDI didn't provide, unless you understand that they didn't provide because they really weren't asked.* 120/

Although the Agency's own personnel assignments have been criticized, the assignment of two of the key military personnel involved in the JMARC operation proved to be quite successful. Col. Jack Hawkins, United States Marine Corps, and Lt. Col. Frank Egan, United States Army, were in charge of the overall PM activity (Hawkins) and the PM training (Egan) for the Cuban exile brigade. Hawkins, who was serving on the Staff of the Marine School at Quantico, Virginia at the time that he was assigned to Project JMARC, had taken part in the battles of Bataan and Corregidor; had been taken prisoner with the fall of Corregidor; and escaped from the Japanese prisoner of war camp at Davao, Mindanao; and joined the Philippine guerrilla forces, leading raiding parties and harassing attacks against the Japanese army in the Philippines. After seven months of such activity, he was evacuated by submarine from the Philippines in November 1943 and was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for these actions. After returning to the United States for additional training, in November 1944 Hawkins again returned to the Pacific area where he was an assistant operations officer taking part in the assault and capture of Okinawa. For this service, he received a Bronze Star Medal. During the Korean conflict, he was Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines; and he led the Battalion in combat during the Inchon landing and in subsequent operations in Korea. For his participation in the Inchon-Seoul operation, Hawkins had received the Silver Star Medal for heroism. From March 1956 to the summer of 1959 when he entered the Naval War College, Hawkins had served as liaison officer with the Amphibious Forces Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia -- a pertinent assignment for his transfer to Project JMARC.

---

* Drain's suggestion that the DDI was left completely in the cold during the Bay of Pigs operation overstates the case. As early as January 1959 there is evidence that Mr. Helms agreed to cut the DDI in on "useful intelligence to which it would be well for the DD/I to have access" from State cable traffic on Cuba being carried over CIA channels. A "massive" study of Cuban telecommunications facilities prepared by ORR in the fall of 1960 led Mr. Bissell to send a memo of commendation for the Communications Branch through the DDI. Obviously the DDI knew something was afoot. 120a/

Lt. Col. Egan's military record showed a well-trained infantry officer who had served overseas in the European Theater during the course of World War II; an infantry officer including an infantry training officer in much of the period following World War II; and a staff officer in the Special Warfare Division of the United States Army in 1958, serving with the Director of Plans, in Washington from 1958 to 1960. Immediately prior to his assignment to Project JMATE, Colonel Egan had been on the Operations and Training Staff of a Joint Support Group, headquartered in Washington. Egan EOD'd with Project JMATE, 27 June 1960, and Hawkins on 29 August of 1960. 121/ Both officers received high marks from Mr. Bissell and Jake Esterline, and particularly from Dick Drain, who stated:

> I thought they [Hawkins and Egan] were first rate ... I mean first rate, not compared with the jaded World War II memory, but first rate in terms of officers then serving in the armed forces of the United States. The Hawkins selection was an excellent one. I don't myself, know how

> one could have found a better man. People have said ... "Well, the son of a bitch just worked out in the Philippines as a stay behind ... what did he know?" He knew a lot. He had written a book on guerrillas. He was sharp, he was smart, and honest, and not overly ambitious. I am sure that he saw this as a way to further his career, of course. Military men, I think, tend to maximize that more than Agency people. But that was not his motivation -- or his primary motivation. He had around him some really first rate help ... not very high ranking ... but we didn't need an awful lot of high ranking ... we needed some hard workers. Frank Egan, who went down to do the training, was the man that I would have picked. He was probably the most disputable of the bunch because he was pretty volatile. He has been condemned for leading the Cuban manpower to believe that they were going to get more support than he had any right to let them know about. Well, I wasn't there, but I know damned well that if I had been, I would have been priming up the Brigade to do this tough job, not by counseling them as to the difficulty of it ... at least, exclusively ... or, giving them lectures about now you will really have to do this on your own, because you are not going to get one iota of assistance from the armed forces. You don't normally train a group to conduct an operation of this sort by playing on their fears. If, down there at the end of the line -- first in Guatemala and then in Nicaragua -- Egan led them to believe that they were going to get them more help than he had any right to let them know, well, I can understand why that would have happened.* 122/

---

* With reference to Colonel Hawkins, Jake Esterline has noted:

(footnote continued on following page)

By way of illustrating some of the problems encountered in acquiring adequate personnel for the JMATE operation, on the very day that President Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro program, a memorandum was being sent to the Deputy Director for Plans from the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division noting that two individuals assigned to the Office of Training were urgently needed for service in WH/4. Colonel King reported to the DDP that although Colonel Matt Baird, Director of Training, was agreeable to the release of the two individuals to serve as PM trainers, Baird insisted that the men could not be

---

> I guess that it is only fair to say that that assignment [Project JMARC] cost him his general's star, and a good many other things in terms of his record. 123/

The author of this history attempted to arrange oral history interviews with Colonels Hawkins and Egan, but in neither case would the individuals consent to such interview. In addition, the author also asked each man if he would be willing to respond to a series of written questions, and neither would agree to this. It was made quite clear to the author that both individuals harbored considerable resentment about their relationships and association with the Agency at the time of the Bay of Pigs. In a similar manner, Col. John F. Mallard, United States Marine Corps who was Liaison Officer between the Agency and the Department of Defense, at the time of the Bay of Pigs, also rejected the author's request for either an oral interview or a response to written questions.

released until suitable replacements could be found to take over their tasks in the Office of Training. King, therefore, appealed to the Deputy Director for Plans for their immediate release. 124/

Not only did the Clandestine Service encounter difficulty in obtaining personnel from within its own units to serve in WH/4, it also appeared to draw blanks in terms of Cubans willing to volunteer for the struggle against Castro. In response to a November 1959 memorandum to all WH field stations and bases asking that they supply the names of Cubans who would be willing to work as agents against the Castro Government, WH/4/FI reported the results of its search, stating that as of June 1960:

> Many of the Agents who were proposed by other WH Stations for use in Cuba were either found unacceptable, or did not want to accept such an assignment. Other stations were unable to come up with any assets who might gain access to the desired targets in Cuba. 125/

The problem which Col. Baird had raised back in March concerning replacement for personnel who might be assigned to Project WH/4 was not actually resolved until June of 1960 when:

> Colonel White announced that DDS personnel on full time detail to JMARC

> would be transferred to the project Table of Organization, effective the beginning of the first pay period in July 1960. Employees on detail to the project from the Clandestine Services offices will not be transferred since DDP considers them temporary assignments with the personnel returning to their parent office when the project is completed. Colonel White pointed out, that although DDS personnel would be transferred to the project, thereby relieving slots in the various DDS elements, each office head should keep in mind that his employees will be returning to him, and he should plan accordingly. 126/

Colonel White's comments are quite understandable in view of the fact that of 104 personnel on duty with JMATE on 7-8 June 1960, only 32 were Clandestine Services careerists; and excepting a few with DDI career designations, the bulk of the personnel were Support careerists. By 14 June 1960, Colonel King was appealing to the DDP for an increment which would bring total JMATE personnel to 234, including 131 employees who were to be in the field. Apparently, however, the Deputy Director for Plans approved a total ceiling of only 158 staff personnel by the end of June 1960; and in August of 1960, Chief, WH Division forwarded a revised staffing guide, calling for a total of 274 positions and requesting that "as soon after 15 August as is possible, a total of 40 additional staff personnel" be added to the 158 who were then on duty -- making a new total of 198.

Although Mr. Bissell approved the recommended increment, he nonetheless wrote a memorandum to C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A, suggesting that Barnes and Dick Helms (surprisingly) take a close look at the JMATE staffing pattern to see if there were areas of duplication, particularly between the field bases and Headquarters. The DDP suggested that in the areas of FI and PM there might be slots in either the Forward Operations Base in Miami or in JMOARSMAN -- the Panama Training Site -- where possibly the staffs could be transferred during slack periods to conduct similar operations in other parts of the JMATE operation.* 127/

---

* Lest the reader be confused by the term "Forward Operations Base," this was the JMWAVE activity in the Miami area, which continued to operate subsequent to the Bay of Pigs. At the same time that the Bay of Pigs operation was getting under way, there was considerable emphasis from various individuals in Headquarters for establishment of a "Forward Command Post," which also might be located in the Miami area, possibly in the communications complex. Some even suggested the possibility of establishing a sub-command post in a third country. In any event, no Forward Command Post was established. 128/

By early November 1960, as the concept of the operation was shifting from one of guerrilla warfare and infiltration to invasion, the staffing pattern for WH/4 was again increased. Mr. Bissell authorizing a total of 308 positions. Even as he signed the approval, however, Mr. Bissell noted his reservations, saying:

> I have signed this request to indicate my approval, but do so with a good deal of concern. I realize that this is a very major and top priority activity and I also realize that the senior officers engaged in it continue to be heavily overworked. On the other hand, I am fearful that the addition of large numbers of personnel will not in fact reduce the load on those individuals who are most overworked, but may instead create additional burdens of management without contributing significantly to the success of the underlying activities. I am concerned also that we may be simply running out of suitable people in the Agency in certain categories. Accordingly, I urge you to re-examine even the double-starred positions in the staffing guide submitted with your request to see whether they are all in fact of a high order of essentiality.* 129/

---

* Much of the staffing problem, of course, traces back to the failure of the DDP to insure early on that only the best people be assigned to the WH/4 project. As early as August of 1960, it had been indicated that the DDP might be leaning toward the use of directed assignments, but nothing ever came of this. 130/

Even before Mr. Bissell's memorandum of early November 1960, indicating the possibility that experts in certain areas might no longer be available from within the Agency, proposals had gone forward requesting permission for the use of American contract personnel in the maritime operations. Unlike the brouhaha that was precipitated by the early suggestions for the use of American volunteers from the ground forces, the authorization for the use of US contracts in maritime activities apparently was granted without much debate. The statement of the requirements for the use of the US contracts indicated that US citizens would be put under contract to act not only as trainers for the crews of LCI's, LCU's, LCVP's, and SK's, but also, that they would serve in key positions

> as LCI captains, LCI diesel engineers, and LCU coxwains during training and operations, where qualified Cubans cannot be obtained. This would require their entering Cuban coastal waters and, on occasions, touching on Cuban beaches, when operations so require.
>
> It is essential for operations that these key positions be held by qualified and dependable men. At this time, it is not expected that Cuban trainees qualified for such positions or possessing the necessary aptitude and character to permit successful training will be found. If

> they are located, the use of U.S. contract personnel will correspondingly be cut down. Staff personnel will assist in the training of all crews but will not be used in operations. 131/

Not only were such contract employees authorized, but by early November 1960 a cable from Headquarters to the Forward Operations Base noted:

> In view degree risk involved rendezvous-type mission request Case Officer advise all Maritime contract personnel bonus this type mission be hereafter $100.00. Bonus for Cuban territory beach landings or caching would remain $500.00. 132/

By the early fall of 1960, the question of rotation of staff personnel for Project JMATE had become a serious matter. Many of those who had initially joined the project had come in on 90-day rotation periods, and in a cable to Headquarters, Ernie Sparks, the overall Liaison Officer for Project JMATE for COS Guatemala, requested that Headquarters approve a rotational plan since:

> Most personnel adjusted family and business problems to period they told they be absent and fact they on duty seven days a week as well as being confined to training areas which lack recreation facilities. 133/

Bill Eisemann, who was Chief of Support for WH/4, was particularly critical of the 90-day TDY assignments, saying:

> They [the DDP] would bring a man in, and then another man would come in to replace him. It was really a tremendous task to keep up with it, because a lot of these people had personal problems. In some cases they would cable and request release from their assignment for personal reasons. We attempted to satisfy most of these requests. Herb Juul was the assigned Personnel Officer within the project. He had to constantly keep a check on the location of our personnel, and when their time was up for replacement, he would then visit with the Clandestine Services, and also the Support components, and give them a listing of the names of potential TDY returnees. The Support components and Clandestine Services then provided names of people who would be replacements. That was a hell of a task, now, believe me. When you have a full time project running 15 months or more, you have people returning on a 90 day basis, and constantly being replaced ... you can't expect the greatest efficiency in operations. 134/

Part III

Changing Concepts

It has already been pointed out that the initial planning for paramilitary operations against Castro was to be based on extremely small units. Two or three man units, including a communicator, would be trained and infiltrated (or dropped) into Cuba to work with a dissident group. One trainer would be the adviser for the types of guerrilla warfare activities which the anti-Castro dissidents might undertake safely and reasonably securely. There had been some signs of dissatisfaction with this particular type of program prior to the summer of 1960. By the late summer of 1960 and through the fall there was to be a complete and radical shift in the concept of the paramilitary operations in which the forces backed by CIA should engage. In late August-September, there were some clues that changes in the nature of operations were being contemplated. During the last week of August and in the initial week of September 1960, Savilion Chapman claimed that he and a Col. Evans, Acting Chief, PMG/DDP, were "briefed by WH/4 planners on the approximate number of troops, tanks, and vehicles for which sea transport would be required." In that same period Lt. Col. Frank Egan and Commander Norman Imler of the WH/4 staff reported they asked the Maritime Branch to draft a memo to the DDP giving information on the foreign cargo vessels that would be required for troop transport, including their ownership, their costs, and on the methods of their acquisition. 1/

Inasmuch as Egan had been requested for the project to become the trainer for the PM forces, it was apparent that some changes were contemplated. The reference to the use of vessels for the transport of tanks would indicate that something beyond hit-and-run exercises were being contemplated. Before mid-October, Lt. Col. Egan and a representative of the Logistics Branch of WH/4 had spelled out some additional details for the Maritime Branch of Special Operations. At that time, according to Mr. Chapman's report, WH/4 was talking about deck loading of 3 LCV's, with 5 armored tanks, 5 2-1/2 ton trucks, one caterpillar dozer, and two gasoline tank trucks -- hardly type of equipment which would be required for 2-3 man guerrilla teams. 2/

By the first week in November 1960, it had become clear to the most senior planners of the anti-Castro effort -- Jake Esterline, J. C. King, Tracy Barnes, and Richard Bissell -- that decisions were going to have to be made about all aspects of the paramilitary program. The basic question being whether a paramilitary program under CIA aegis should be launched at Castro, or whether, at this time, such a program should become a joint operation between the Department of Defense and the Agency. In the discussion among Agency personnel, in the discussions between Agency personnel and representatives of the Special Group, and in discussions within the meetings of the Special Group, the whole gammut of options was being explored. Barnes, apparently deferring to Bissell, suggested that rather than small team activities something on the order of 10-20 man teams be formed and tried out. Barnes was very emphatic that what was needed at this time, was a willingness to run some risks -- including the risk of defeat. Barnes was critical of the Special Group, pointing out that the apparent belief of the Group was that every operation had to succeed; and that if there were "losses, failures, or mishaps," the Special Group seemed to want to cancel everything. This was contrary, completely, to Barnes' concept of operational activity. What both Barnes and Bissell supported in terms of the smaller team activity were that:

> The implementation of such teams would indicate whether the dissident elements in Cuba were likely to rally around such groups, once it had been established that such groups could provide guidance and supply for the anti-Castro activities.
>
> These teams also would provide a test of the Castro forces. Could Castro's militia or his army contain the guerrilla forces, if such forces were led by cadres trained by the Agency? Or would the Castro resistance crumble in the face of effective dissident elements? 3/

Even as this discussion was going on, it became clear that the small team concept was going to go by the board; and when the Agency tried to jump the option to a 3,000 man force for making a lodgment in Cuba in the conventional manner (e.g., amphibious assault), the plan was rejected by the Special Group in a meeting of 3 November 1960. The Department of Defense supported the Agency, but State objected and suggested that perhaps the point where covert intervention was possible had passed. Gordon Gray even went so far as to raise the possibility of a fake attack on Guantanamo as a means of justifying overt US intervention. It was at this same meeting that Mr. Livingston Merchant of the Department of State raised the question of whether plans were being made to assassinate Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Che Guevara -- at which point General Cabell, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, pointed out that such activities as assassination were extremely difficult to manage and that the CIA had no capability for such an operation. 4/

Even as the size of the Cuban exile force was being debated, Headquarters cabled to Guatemala (4 November 1960) that the small team concept had gone by the board and that planning should begin for training a conventional amphibious assault force of at least 1,500 infantrymen. Outlines sent to the infantry training base in Guatemala (JMTRAV), emphasized the need to instill an esprit de corps among the trainees. To do this JMTRAV was urged to provide for unit separation, competition in the military arts, and specific identities for the individual units through the use of scarfs, caps, or some other device. This new training program was to be instigated in November 1960 and to be completed by the end of January 1961. 5/

Even as the discussions over the changing concept were going on, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Plans were scheduled to brief President-elect John F. Kennedy on 18 November. 6/ The concept to be presented to the President was that a force of 600 men would be landed by LST on Cuban shores and that these men would move inland to create "a safe area in a mountain fastness. These men, with possibly another 600 man unit in another area, and those who joined them from within, would be resupplied by air drop." 7/ In addition, there would be new recruits in the pipeline to provide support for those who had landed. An airstrip in Nicaragua would be used to support air operations, and it was intimated that the US and possibly allied governments would recognize that the force lodged in Cuba and its nominal leadership was the Provisional Government of Cuba. 8/

One strange and contradictory note which appeared during WH/4's staff meeting on 15 November to plan the briefing for the DDP prior to his participation with the DCI in briefing the President elect was the following item stating:

> Our [CIA's] original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted. There will not be the internal unrest earlier believed possible, nor will the defenses permit the type strike first planned. Our second concept (1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action. Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we cannot staff nor otherwise timely create the base and lift needed. 9/

How, if in mid-November 1960 the concept of the 1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beachhead with an airstrip was envisioned by the senior personnel in WH/4 as "unachievable" except as a joint CIA/DOD effort, did it become "achievable" in March 1961 with only 1,200 men and as an Agency operation? What was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs

Operation in March 1961. Certainly there was no lessening in the controls that Castro had instituted, nor in the efficiency of the military forces and militia that he had at his command by April 1961.*

One of the principal problems posed by Project JMATE -- both before and after the concept changed in November 1961 -- was whether the training activity at JMTRAV and JMADD in Guatemala should be, or could be, continued without reflection upon the position of the United States Government. Thomas Mann of the State Department became increasingly concerned about this situation; and the discussions within the Special Group and among the concerned Agencies during the period from the middle of November until the end of the year, focused very frequently on this question. Considering the continuingly favorable reception to Agency activities from Ydigoras Fuentes, Guatemala's

?
60?

---

* During interviews with the author of this history, Messrs. Bissell, Esterline, and Drain had only slight remembrance of the details of these meetings of 15-16 November 1960 when they ruled out what would be, in effect, the invasion plan implemented in April 1961 at Playa Giron -- and at that time it was minus the joint support of the Department of Defense. This point was completely overlooked by both the Inspector General and the Taylor Committee post mortems on the Bay of Pigs.

President, State's concern that the training "places too much strain on the government of Guatemala" appear unrealistic. The Department's real concerns were with potential criticism from the OAS and the UN. Certainly Ydigoras was not interested in the removal of those military units which could most effectively guarantee his continued reign as President of Guatemala -- the Cubans in training for both air and ground activities.* 10/

Even as the Special Group was trying to determine whether or not the forces in training in Guatemala should be removed, the Agency proceeded apace with plans for the staffing necessary to put a 600-man strike force in training. Chief, WH/4 Personnel estimated that in addition to 14 staffers, there would be a requirement for 146 military personnel if such training were to succeed. Well prior to the officially agreed-to change in concept, Chief, WH/4 had anticipated a significant increase in funding for JMARC requesting of the DDP that:

---

* The internal situation in Guatemala vis a vis the training operations is discussed in detail in Volume II of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

> With your approval, in the interim period [as new budget estimates were being prepared], project funds will be used as required to meet operational necessity without strict adherence to the preliminary estimates of last June [1960].* 10a/

Although Mr. Bissell approved the request, he made this interesting comment:

> What is disturbing is that the overrun reported in your memorandum seems to have occurred long before you could be feeling any effect of the [planned expansion] in [PM] plans. 10b/

Contrary to suggestions that the President of Guatemala was concerned about the Cuban training activity, a cable of 22 November 1960 to the Director from Guatemala indicated that the ground training base was undergoing a major reorganization because permission for the establishment of a tactical training area at another of the *fincas* (estates) controlled by Roberto Alejos -- this one near San Jose -- was being undertaken. Inasmuch as Alejos was Ydigoras's right hand man and conducted the liaison with the WH/4 representatives for the establishment and operation of the Guatemalan training bases, the contradiction in positions between State and the Agency was obvious. 11/

---

* The increased budget being suggested was on the order of $42 million compared to $3 million being discussed in June.

As the Special Group discussions were going on, Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 was in Guatemala taking a first-hand look at the air and ground training bases. As noted in another volume, Esterline went strongly on record in support of the Office of Logistics engineer who had been responsible for the reconstruction of the airstrip at Retalhuleu. Jake noted that even though there had been a sizable cost overrun, the task had been performed on time under the most adverse weather conditions; and, consequently, suggestions from Headquarters that there had been gross inefficiency were unwarranted and unfounded.* Esterline's review of the situation at JMTRAV, the ground training base, indicated that the situation there was considerably more difficult than what he had encountered at the air training base. He noted, for example, that there was a severe lack of qualified senior trainers, stating:

---

* For details on construction of the airfield at Retalhuleu, see Office of Logistics, Engineering Staff, RECD, *Agency Engineering Activity, 1947-1966*, Vol. I, 63-67; Vol. II, 132-193. DDS/HS OL-11, Feb 72. S.

> While a few of these men [from the Domestic Operations Base in Miami] impress me as being good types, for the most part I found them to be too immature and lacking in experience to qualify for the job at hand. In any event, they are not in my judgment worth the $1,000 per month which we have to pay them. I would like most of them to be GS-4, 5, and 6 students that [*sic*] we trained at Fort Benning in 1951-52. Under no circumstances would I consider putting these people into Cuba with the Cubans.

In closing his report on the visit to Guatemala, Esterline presented the following critical observations of the situation as he saw it. Reflecting on the mission and on the resources available, he wrote:

> I also reviewed the problem in the light of the many gaps in policy approval for JMARC, all of which complicate project planning. By the time I arrived back at Headquarters, I had fairly well convinced myself that it is unrealistic for the project or the Agency to try to "go it alone" in opening up another major base in a third country to train from 1,500 to 3,000 Cubans for a major invasion effort. I discussed my thinking with Col. Hawkins at length, and found that he shared my view. As a result of this discussion, we re-evaluated our capability and presented you [the DDP] with the recommendation that we limit ourselves to preparing a force of 600 maximum to be used in the manner we outlined to you on 16 November. I still feel this recommendation is quite valid given the limitation on real estate that we are presently working under. If it turns out that we can acquire policy approval for the real estate in the interior,

> I would then agree that, with limited additional help from DOD, we could train a maximum of 1,200 and commit them along the line outlined during the 16 November meeting. Even our present scope of operations, however, continues to be endangered by the gambit that Mr. Mann and Mr. Merchant are engaged with in the [State] "Working Group." I cannot emphasize this too strongly: if we are required to evacuate Guatemala for reasons of high policy or because of the situation, the project will be seriously damaged unless we have immediately available real estate where these people can be put to work. 13/

Some relief would be provided for the ground training program with the opening up of Alejos *finca* near San Jose, but the adequacy of the training facilities for the ground forces would continue to plague JMARC through the course of the project. Moreover, even though the discussions concerning plausible deniability reached near fever pitch during the discussions of November 1960, at no point did the Special Group of presidential consultants ever step forward with a firm recommendation that the United States assume responsibility and so admit. The most persistent advocate of this position was Thomas Mann, of the Department of State, and why his proposals were never pushed more seriously is one of the unresolved questions concerning the Bay of Pigs Operation.*

Esterline's visit to the bases in Guatemala was almost immediately reflected in the correspondence between the field and Headquarters, with specific emphasis being placed on the assignment to the ground training base, JMTRAV, of senior training officers. Similarly it was stressed that there was a priority need to secure Special Force trainers from the Army, on an ASAP basis. Requirements for materiel jumped, particularly in the number of personal weapons which would be required for added numbers of troops in training. With the acquisition of the additional training site in Guatemala from Roberto Alejos, requests immediately came forward for trucks and jeeps to transport troops to these training areas. The field was aware that the increasing number of trainees would create problems, but at the same time, there were indications that the trainers were hopeful that the infiltration teams that had been developed could be held intact. 15/

---

* There also is evidence that at least one of the principal Agency planners, C. Tracy Barnes, contributed to the November confusion. At one point, when serious consideration was being given to the possibility of increasing significantly the training activity that might be done in Nicaragua, Barnes introduced what amounted to moral objections to the association -- or to strengthening the association -- with the Somoza Government. Barnes emphasized that this would go down hard with the more liberal elements in Latin America. 14/ This argument, of course, was very much in line with the position being advanced by the Department of State -- Thomas Mann excepted.

Just as there was confusion within the Headquarters area over the nature of the program, so, too, was concern reflected in the field's messages to Headquarters. A cable of 28 November 1960 from COS Guatemala to Headquarters requested:

> Recent cable traffic suggests major changes in near future and COS feels it would be of great assistance to have complete story to assist in dealing with Alejos and Ydigoras. 16/

Even as COS Guatemala was requesting information, the situation in Washington remained in a state of flux. On 29 November, Col. King made a specific attempt to obtain positive guidance through the office of the Deputy Director for Plans. Chief, WH/D, outlined his understanding of the paramilitary planning as follows:

> (a) On or about 1 February 1961, land by amphibious means a guerrilla force of about 600 trained Cubans to establish a perimeter defense and resistance center in a selected area of Cuba.

(b) Continue present operations of infiltrating small paramilitary teams to organize, train, and lead resistance forces and report intelligence information.

(c) Follow up this effort by providing air logistical support to the 600-man guerrilla force in Cuba and all additional guerrilla elements who join to collaborate with this force. 17/

Having outlined his understanding of the planning, Col. King then went on:

The following major questions must now be resolved by the Special Group or referred to the President for decision before proceeding further to implement the paramilitary aspect of this program as described above:

a. Does either the Department of State or the Department of Defense view the proposed paramilitary concept as not in consonance with policy or for any other reason open to question? If so, why and what alternatives are proposed; what course of action is approved?

b. If there is agreement as to the paramilitary concept, then is there agreement that training shall continue in Guatemala?

c. If continuance in Guatemala is disapproved, will DOD air-lift the present trainees at once from Guatemala to Saipan for training and provide similar air-lift for up to 300 additional men as they are recruited? The entire group would later be returned to a staging area in Nicaragua for the amphibious operation.

(d) Will the DOD also provide the following:

(1) Thirty-eight Special Force officers and enlisted men to be used as instructors in Guatemala or in Saipan, or both.

(2) One reactivated LST.

(3) Supplementation of logistic resupply air-lift to resistance after 1 February. (As detailed an estimate as can be made will be forwarded to DOD if the paramilitary concept is approved.) 18/

Col. King then closed this memorandum to Mr. Bissell by noting that if the paramilitary concept was approved, certain policy approvals would be required. These were listed as follows:

a. To use one Florida base, such as Opalocka, for air supply missions in support of guerrilla forces in the target country.

b. To use a small number of American civilian contract personnel in air and maritime operations. (No such personnel are to be used in ground operations.)

c. To mount air strikes against Cuban air and other military targets. 19/

Whatever else can be said, it is clear that by the end of November 1960, the original concept of the Agency's anti-Castro effort as one focussing on the use of small teams infiltrating Cuba and working with the dissident elements located within the country had gone by the board. What was now to be undertaken was an amphibious assault in strength -- the strength as yet to be determined -- with the concomitant requirement for heavy air support for resupply and possibly for military support as well. Indicative of the confusion which surrounded this period when the concept was changing were Jake Esterline's remarks shortly following the collapse of the Bay of Pigs when he testified before the Taylor Committee. It appears as though Esterline had been informed -- incorrectly as it turned out -- that in his testimony of 1 May 1961 Lt. Col. Frank Egan had indicated to the committee that the strike force concept has been in being since his EOD in June 1960.*

In rebutting what he thought Egan's testimony had been, Esterline reported:

> My recollection is that Lt. Col. Egan came to us about June 1960 and that he

---

* Egan had actually testified that following the Guatemalan revolt he had been sent down to organize the brigade, and he stated that the number of Cuban trainees had been on the order of 420 on 20 November 1960 and had risen to nearly 600 by the first week of December. 20/

arrived with certain ideas which he carried from the Pentagon on how best to tackle the Cuban problem. This, however, did not constitute JMATE policy. I am sure you [Col. Jack Hawkins] -- or more particularly, members of your staff -- will find that we had no approved philosophy of the operation within the Project until well in[to] September. The training program which Rocky Farnsworth conducted in Panama was directed solely toward training an instructor cadre in small unit or "guerrilla type" operations. This cadre, when it arrived in Guatemala, in addition to working on building the camp with Carl Jenkins, continued to train the first recruits in the same kind of training they had received.

Another example of my positiveness that we were not, at Project level, thinking of the strike operation is the first conversation that we held in my office in Barton Hall when I referred to the fact that the PM staff had been talking about the development of a strike operation, but that I, myself, was not convinced of it at the time and that I preferred to put small teams into existing units at the appropriate time. As I recall, you [Col. Jack Hawkins] had an open mind at that point; although without positive study of Cuba you leaned to the concept I outlined. It was at a somewhat later date, therefore (probably before the first of October), that we talked again and you [Col. Jack Hawkins] stated your conviction that Castro could not be overthrown without a major or catalytic effort being made against him. After deliberation, I came to the same conclusion, and we then began to think in terms of expanding the force to the strength of a reinforced battalion, more or less.

The foregoing is important only because General Taylor is going into very

> fine points in his analysis of government policy. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to get the record straight in this manner, and, although Lt. Col. Egan may have had in his own mind the idea of a strike operation -- and I believe he came to us with some idea on hitting the Isle of Pines -- this nevertheless was not approved Project or Agency policy until quite a few months later. In point of fact, as I look back over that period, I am sure during that period I found myself drifting along, devoting myself merely to creating basic capabilities in a variety of fields without any clear-cut idea of what national policy would permit us to do.* 21/

Richard Bissell who was the Deputy Director for Plans at the time of the Bay of Pigs operation has a rather more positive recollection of the change in concept, having noted:

---

* In a discussion with the author of this history in the fall of 1975, Esterline introduced another thought about the change in concept to wit:

That the small team concept had been planned to be put into operation early in November of 1960, and Esterline seems to believe that this would have been feasible. However, the Presidential election of that year made the Eisenhower administration extremely cautious about anything that might have an impact on the outcome of the election; and, consequently, such delays as were incurred gave added time for the build-up of Castro's internal forces. By the time that the election was over, it had become apparent that the small team concept was no longer viable. Esterline, in fact, suggested that the emphasis for the buildup in the brigade forces came from the White House. But even though Gordon Gray -- in various meetings of the Special Group during the period from November to the end of the Eisenhower administration -- did support the idea of increasing the size of the force, there is no evidence to indicate that pressure to do this came from the White House. 22/

> That decision as to the character of the operation was rather gradually modified during the late autumn [of 1960], and it's very difficult, even for someone who was close to those developments, to put a finger on the exact moment when a clear decision was made, or the circumstances, or, really, the people who made it. It was a decision rather forced by circumstances. 23/

When discussing the situation in October of 1975, however, Bissell volunteered the following observations about the change in concept for the operation. He said:

> One of the clearest impressions I have of the whole planning period and of this change in concept was that by November [1960] ... and I don't think Esterline bought this view either as completely or as soon as I did ... I [also] remember the feeling that I was well ahead of King ... in my belief that we had to place nearly exclusive reliance for the initial phase on whatever force it was possible to land. So, I also remember very clearly -- and I think as early as November -- where I think there were probably under 500 people in the brigade in training -- I remember repeatedly saying to Hawkins and Esterline that if we are really going to have to place this heavy reliance on a landing force, this is an all together preposterously inadequate number ... I remember being told that people did not see how it would be feasible to get up to the size I was talking about in the time period; but secondly ... I have a clear recollection that he [Jack Hawkins] had a lesser sense

of urgency at that point about a buildup in numbers than I did. I felt that I was consistently urging upon Hawkins the necessity of a larger buildup than the plans then contemplated, and I also remember, at a later stage in a somewhat similar fashion, urging upon Beerli, the necessity of a significantly larger air arm than his plans contemplated ... I think that Hawkins likewise felt that he had to rely on what the recruiting mechanism would turn up, which wasn't really his direct operation, and that he wasn't at all sure that he could get the sort of numbers that I was talking about. But I do remember an awareness of what seemed to me to be the inadequacy of our resources in the light of an altered concept of the operation. 24/

Part IV

Presidential Resurgence

The previous section of this volume has examined the activities that occurred during the period from the early fall through November of 1960, with the shift away from what was to be exclusively a guerrilla warfare type operation to a new concept emphasizing amphibious invasion. During this period most of the discussion and the decisions, aside from those within CIA, were at the level of the Special Group. The principals involved from the Department of State were at the Under Secretary/Assistant Secretary level at the highest, and at the Agency, both the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Plans were involved. On 29 November 1960 the level of involvement of the US Government escalated sharply with the sudden resurgence of interest on the part of President Dwight David Eisenhower. In contrast to the period from July 1960 through the Presidential election of early November -- when, as noted earlier, there was, at most, minimal attention to the developing anti-Castro program at the White House level --

suddenly the President emerged as one of the principal decision makers in the period prior to the take-over by the Kennedy administration.

When asked for an explanation of this sudden resurgence, Jake Esterline, then Chief, WH/4 stated:

> I can't explain it ... but I will say this, it probably had a political basis. They [the Republican administration] realized that they had lost, and they realized that they were going to have to brief a new administration along with the British on the things that had been going on. I suspect that they didn't want to brief on something that would emerge that they hadn't been giving anything other than their full support. I am guessing, but I would think that was a pretty good guess. 1/

On 29 November of 1960, the President had a meeting which included Messrs. Dillon and Merchant of State; Gates and Douglas of Defense; Gray and Goodpaster of his own Staff; and Dulles and Bissell of CIA. In his report on the session with the President, Mr. Bissell, the DDP mentioned among other things the following two points of particular interest:

> The President made it clear he wanted all done that could be done with all possible urgency and nothing less on the part of any department, ... and the President led a discussion as to how best to organize the total US effort against the target. There was some feeling that an

> overall coordinating executive might be desirable, but it was left that the Director would make Mr. Barnes available to work closely with a State Department officer to be designated. It was also felt desirable to use Mr. Pawley's services, initially in connection with Argentina's possible covert assistance. 2/

The points of view attributed to the President at this time by Mr. Bissell reflect very closely the position of William D. Pawley who had met with the President immediately prior to the President's session with State, DOD, and the Agency's representatives. According to Livingston Merchant, who had a long session with Mr. Pawley on the day prior to Pawley's meeting with President Eisenhower:

> Mr. Pawley said that two things are necessary, and I inferred that these would constitute his [Pawley's] principal recommendations to the President.
>
> (1) The President should appoint a single experienced individual (he said he was personally qualified and would be available for the job if asked) to conduct the entire covert operation. In this connection, he cited the role which he had played in the Guatemala case.
>
> (2) We should recruit several thousand good young Cubans in Florida and give them basic training. This could be done in five or six weeks, rather than months, according to him. He was extremely impatient at the thought of moving any Cubans who may now be in Central America, expressing himself

> forcefully as being sure their host would object.
>
> I asked if he was proposing overt intervention by US armed forces. He said absolutely not. The essence of his plan would be to land in Cuba, presumably in the next month or two, a force of 600 trained Cubans, following up this landing with additional Cuban elements and then installing a government in the bridgehead which would call on us for financial and logistics support. He mentioned a number of names which were unfamiliar to me of Cubans who he said are politically unblemished in Cuba, neither pinks nor reactionary rightists.* 3/

On 30 November 1960, a Special Group meeting was held at which time Gordon Gray:

---

* Considering that discussions within the Agency and within the Special Group had only recently arrived at the figure of 600 men for an invasion brigade, plus the fact that this brigade would establish a bridgehead from which a provisional government opposed to Castro might be announced, one might speculate on the source of Pawley's information. Jake Esterline has tended to denigrate the role played by Pawley during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation; but, nonetheless, throughout the course of the operation Jake was charged with maintaining close liaison with Pawley. JMATE records indicate not only the numerous face-to-face meetings between Pawley and Esterline during the course of the operation, but also reflect an amazing number of telephone conversations between the two during the life of the operation. In terms of the operational plan per se, Esterline appeared to be most cagy in handling this subject during the discussions with Pawley. The recorded conversations focus on the potential leadership for the FRD -- with Pawley's "best" leadership choices usually being far to the right.

> Solicited the Group's assistance in arriving at a concensus [*sic*] of views as to what exactly had been decided as a result of the high level meeting [the meeting with the President] of the day before. 4/

According to the memorandum on the meeting, there was agreement that the US would deny its participation in any training activities in Guatemala, that there would continue to be a prohibition on the training of Cubans in the United States, and that evacuation plans should be kept in readiness in case the Cubans in training in Guatemala had to be evacuated -- the plan to evacuate was not clear as to whether the Cubans would be taken into Florida as ordinary refugees or whether the evacuation would call for transporting the troops to our Saipan training base.

The problem that apparently created the greatest difficulty at this Special Group meeting was the President's suggestion that a single individual should be placed in charge of the anti-Castro program. The Special Group decided that there should be two individuals with principal responsibilities -- one to handle the overt and the other to handle the covert activities. After reviewing a list of potential candidates:

> It was finally decided that, taking all things into consideration, including the aspect of quick availability, Ambassador Willauer would probably be the best choice. On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr. Barnes. It was recognized that these nominees would have to be checked with Mr. Gray's associates. 5/

When Mr. Mann suggested that Ambassador Willauer might also assume responsibility for contacts with the FRD, Mr. Dulles rejected this out of hand, emphasizing that this liaison must be done covertly, and that it must be done by the Agency. There apparently was unanimous agreement that Mr. Pawley not be given any official status with the US Government, but no one objected to Pawley's plans to visit Argentine President Frondizi in his capacity as a private US citizen. 5a/

Following the President's suggestion of 29 November, Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon forwarded a memorandum for President Eisenhower on 2 December 1960 recommending that, because of the differences in responsibilities, two senior officials, rather than one, be charged with managing the anti-Castro program. Dillon suggested that Ambassador Whiting Willauer be named as a Special Deputy to Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs, Thomas Mann, to act as the officer responsible for the US Government's overt position vis-a-vis Cuba, and with the responsibility of coordinating the covert activities of the Agency into that US position. On the covert side Dillon followed the DCI's suggestion that C. Tracy Barnes should be appointed "to devote full time to the direction of the Agency's program with respect to Cuba, and to concert with Amb. Willauer." 6/

Dillon's memorandum then went on to recommend that the members of the Special Group -- Dulles, Gray, Douglas, and Merchant -- should continue to exercise general supervision over the covert operation and to provide the Agency with general guidance in the operation, and -- now at the tag end of the Eisenhower administration -- went on to say that the Group

> should continue and intensify its general supervision of the covert operation ... [and] maintain close and regular liaison with Secretary Anderson of Treasury or his designated representative ... [and] should meet, together with the member's individual principals, with you from time to time as it deemed necessary or as you desire. 7/

In response to this recommendation, the President wrote:

> I approve of the suggestions regarding the reorganization of the government's

> program with respect to that country [Cuba], except that I think Mr. Willauer should have a position directly subordinate to the Secretary of State for so long as Cuba remains a critical problem in our foreign relations. There should be no doubt as to the authority of the Special Assistant to the State Department (Mr. Willauer) to subordinate covert and overt activities, nor as to his responsibility for conveying policy guidance to the operating agencies. In their broad outline, these policies will, of course, be subject to the approval of higher authority. 8/

An interesting aspect of the Eisenhower memorandum is that he elevated the position to be assigned to Mr. Willauer from that of being a Special Deputy to Assistant Secretary Mann, the Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs, to that of being directly subordinate to the Secretary of State. When Thomas A. Parrott who acted as secretary for the Special Group meeting transmitted a copy of the draft of ~~Dulles~~' Dillon's proposed memorandum (for the President's signature) to Tracy Barnes, Parrott had been made aware of the possibility that Eisenhower was in favor of raising the position of Willauer. In an aside to Barnes in his transmittal note, Parrott indicated that even if Eisenhower did want Willauer made directly responsible to the Secretary of State, in fact: "He [Willauer] will be instructed that he darn well works for Mann anyway, regardless of the title."* 9/

Even as the negotiations just mentioned were underway, by early December 1960 the Agency's position on the nature of the PM action decidedly hardened. On 8 December at a meeting of the Special Group, Colonels Hawkins and Egan proposed a military program which combined the use of infiltrated small paramilitary teams as a test to see if the dissident elements would rally round and, also recommend a training program for a force of 600-750 men possessing extremely heavy fire power for amphibious assault. Prior to an amphibious invasion, however, it was agreed that there would be sorties into Cuban air space but the precise nature and number of these was disputable, ranging from possibly 100 a month for a three month period beginning on 15 January 1961 -- and including some B-26 sorties to bomb and strafe military targets -- to an undefined minimum of sorties for a three week period to soften up the opposition.

---

* The Agency apparently thought that it had a pretty good handle on Willauer because of his long term association as Executive Vice-President, President, and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Civil Air Transport (CAT).

In the course of these discussions of ground and air operations there were some interesting contradications among Agency spokesmen as to what was needed or what was wanted. Tracy Barnes seemed to have a great deal more to say than was warranted by his knowledge and apparent understanding of the planned action. In one discussion with Secretary Douglas, when Barnes was pushing for the use of an increased number of troops, he stated that the number of anti-Castro dissidents who might rally round the invaders would be no different if the size of the invading force were 600 men or 3,000 men. A rationale such as that and Barnes's comment to Gen. Lansdale when he forwarded one proposal --

> Please recognize that this proposal is a draft and is off the top of the head without any detailed knowledge of possible applicable regs and procedures --

help make understandable the consternation within the ranks of the Department of Defense concerning the Agency's understanding of which end was up.* 10/

---

* There was also an ongoing discussion during this time period regarding the assignment of US Army Special Force trainers to the Guatemala bases. This is discussed in detail in Volume II of this history, *Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy*.

In one of the longer and more detailed papers being prepared toward the close of the Eisenhower administration, the State Department drafted the political action recommendations and suggested collective action through the Organization of American States to effect the ouster of Castro. Failing in that, State then outlined a unilateral political action program for the United States. The paramilitary and covert action segments of this paper were prepared by the CIA. Neither the State nor the CIA paper introduced ideas that had not been thoroughly discussed. These recommendations were made just as if the Secretary of State, the Special Group, and the President had approved, or would approve, the courses of action that were being outlined. This being the case, it was suggested that the concurrence of the President-elect should be sought for the proposed program. In the best of all possible worlds one could hardly find fault with this optimistic approach -- in the pragmatic world it is difficult to understand that anyone would go on record with the expectation that such recommendations might be followed across changing political and administrative lines.* 11/

With WH/4 in the throes of revising the anti-Castro program on the basis of the increased efficiency of the Castro military forces, an SNIE, *Prospects for the Castro Regime*, was issued, belaboring the obvious -- that Castro was firmly in control of Cuba. The SNIE also proceeded to make the following observation about Castro's military forces:

> The militia's overall combat efficiency is low; many units are still on a part time training basis. However, there appears to be emerging a nucleus of well organized, well equipped, and well trained units loyal to Castro and strongly Communist-influenced; we believe that within the next 12 months or so, these units will develop into a reasonably effective security force. 13/

The estimate continued, noting that the Cuban Army was still disrupted and "combat effectiveness of the Air Force is virtually nil." 9/ The concept for Project JMATE, however, had shifted from small unit guerrilla warfare to invasion because of evidence of increased efficiency of Castro's forces and it would appear that the operators and the estimators were not making evaluations from the same intelligence information.

---

* President Eisenhower wrote that on 6 December 1960, "Senator Kennedy" came to the White House for a briefing and that among the subjects discussed was Cuba, this being one of the first three items that Kennedy wished to talk about and that: "He [JFK] had previously been briefed by Allen Dulles a number of times and had some familiarity with the details." 12/

Despite his promotion early in the month, it was not until 23 December 1960 that Ambassador Willauer called a meeting with the Agency's principals to explain both his role and some of the problems that he anticipated the President wanted him to handle. Apparently it was an inauspicious beginning, for according to a memorandum of the meeting:

> Mr. Willauer stated that his role, as explained to him by Secretary Herter, was to be that of the chairman and major shareholder of a corporate board with Mr. Tracy Barnes, the executive director for operations and minority shareholder. Col. King asked for clarification on this point, noting that Mr. Esterline is the director for operations for CIA with the chain of command going from the Director to Bissell to Col. King to Mr. Esterline. Mr. Barnes is a coordinator with the other interested agencies. Mr. Willauer agreed that this was the case, noting that he had used the term operations in the looser sense of overall coordination. 14/

Once having had the pecking order set straight, Ambassador Willauer then proceeded to a discussion of various problem areas, indicating his very strong bias in favor of Agency positions as opposed to positions being taken by the Department of State. For example, Willauer noted that there was a strong aversion to attempts to set a firm date for D-Day, with the opponents basing their arguments on the fact that the OAS would be sure to get in on the act and, moreover, that military planning should be deferred until it could be determined if the economic sanctions would work to Castro's disadvantage. On the question of economic sanctions Willauer pointed out to the people in State that since the Soviet Union was so strongly committed to support the Castro government, economic sanctions would have little or no impact on Castro's position. Willauer also argued that there was going to be revolutionary activity in Cuba, whether the US had a hand in it or not; and he emphasized that, in any event, the US would be blamed for it.

Both Jake Esterline and Col. Jack Hawkins pointed out that another reason for firming up the D-Day date concerned the logistics of the troop movement; and both urged as early a date as possible because of the already mentioned improvement in the military capability, equipment, and training of Castro's forces. Esterline also emphasized that most of the arguments urging delay of PM planning, particularly concern re the OAS, had been debated with State for months, and the time had come for direct action.

The WH/4 representatives also stressed that the period of training for many of the Cubans had been extended and re-extended, and that to hold them beyond 1 March 1961 increased the problem of maintaining high morale among the troops. Esterline took the position that the Cubans the Agency was training knew that the US had the force to throw Castro out any time that it so desired, but the months and months of training was indicative, to them at least, that the US was not really interested in the welfare of the anti-Castro Cubans.

During the 23 December 1960 meeting, Willauer's expertise and familiarity with air operations led him to ask almost immediately "why the project is 'so thin in the air'." Willauer was told that the rules of the game were that only Cuban air crews could be used, and this was the reason for the Agency's efforts to obtain permission to use contract American crews for both resupply and combat.* The air operations were the subject of considerable discussion. Concerning the possibility of launching air strikes for three days before the invading force landed, Willauer objected, pointing out that this would give the OAS ample time to get involved in the act. Willauer then raised the question of whether all of the tactical bombing could be done on D-Day. The answer to that from Col. Hawkins was "no," but Hawkins said that it could be done on D-2, if permission were given for dawn airstrikes to take out Castro's air force and military targets, with additional sorties during the course of D-1 and follow-up raids on D-Day prior to the landings. Moreover, Hawkins pointed out that if an attempt were made to withhold the airstrikes until D-Day, the Castro air force would have an opportunity to attack the ships which would be carrying the invasion troops.

In a similar manner, a strong case was made for the use of the Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua air base to launch strikes against Cuba. Apparently there was some discussion of limiting use of this base to only two or three days -- at least some of the State Department people pushed this idea -- but WH/4 pointed out that it was inconceivable in view of the nature of the planned air operations, that the air support operation could be in and out of Nicaragua in this period. It was pointed out to Willauer that efforts had been made to get permission to use US bases, or other closer bases to Cuba than Nicaragua, but without success. Willauer, himself was positive that no US bases would be made available for the strike against Castro.

---

* Hawkins wanted "pilots who can work over key targets without tearing up installations we will later need."

One other interesting aspect of this initial meeting with Willauer, concerned the transition between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. Willauer stressed that the ground rule at the Department of State was that the Kennedy people could not be sought out to discuss specific problems unless they initiated requests for information, and it was Willauer's opinion:

> That the only practical way to get decisions on the project before 20 January would be to have the Director [the DCI],

> whose position re the new administration is different than Mr. Herter's, to go to Mr. Kennedy in person and seek to get him committed. It would be very difficult for State people to try to approach Mr. Kennedy via Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bowles. 15/

During the 21 December 1960 meeting of the Special Group, Allen Dulles briefed the attendees on a meeting that he had participated in the previous day in New York, with a group of American businessmen. The meeting had been called by Henry Holland, who was one of the principal fund raisers for the FRD, and in attendance at this meeting were the Vice President for Latin America of Standard Oil of New Jersey, the Chairman of the Cuban-American Sugar Company, the President of the American Sugar Domino Refining Company, the President of the American & Foreign Power Company, the Chairman of the Freeport Sulphur Company, and representatives from Texaco, International Telephone and Telegraph, and other American companies with business interests in Cuba. The tenor of the conversation was that it was time for the US to get off of dead center and take some direct action against Castro.

Suggestions were made to sabotage the sugar crop -- the question being whether to burn the cane fields or ruin the refineries; to interrupt the electric power supply; and to put an embargo on food, drugs, and spare parts for machinery. Dulles opposed the embargo on food and drugs, but the feeling of the business group was that it was time to get tough and, hopefully, the blame for an embargo would be laid on Castro. Another interesting suggestion volunteered was that the US Navy should blow up a ship in Levisa Bay in order to force the shutdown of the nickel plant at Nicaro which formerly had been owned and operated by the US Government. 16/ In his usual cautious manner, Gordon Gray suggested that the Special Group not authorize any action until he had cleared the matter with his "associate."

This group of businessmen also indicated that they were going to undertake the publication of specific papers on issues and programs related to the post-Castro Cuba, which would be designed to help US policy planners. Mr. Dulles, of course, emphasized that policy planning was not his responsibility; this was the responsibility of the Department of State. He did comment that "what he was interested in was getting rid of Castro as quickly as possible and in this field he had direct responsibility and would welcome any ideas or suggestions on how this might be achieved." 17/

The high-level business group which Dulles met with was also extremely concerned about the possible orientation of any anti-Castro government in exile, particularly that it should not be left-oriented. Michael Haider, Standard of Jersey's Vice President for Latin America, for example, forwarded a memorandum to Col. J. C. King in early January 1961 identifying as members of an extreme leftist group which had formed in Miami to oppose Castro, Manolo Ray, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, Rufo López Fresquet, and Dr. Raul Chibás among others. Mr. Haider worried that unless more positive steps were taken to force the conservative Cuban exiles into a cohesive organization, that any post-Castro government would automatically be in the hands of the leftists.* 18/

In addition to strong positive suggestions from US businessmen, Brigadier General Lansdale, Office of

---

* Haider was consistent at any rate -- "leftists" with Fidel or "Fidelistas sin Fidel" were held to be equally bad for US business interests.

Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, also had some suggestions which he made to Mr. Bissell about the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program. For whatever reason, in late December 1960 Lansdale forwarded to Bissell a number of suggestions which had been presented to him by an Army reservist who had put in two weeks of active duty with OSO at Lansdale's direction researching Cuban political objectives. Inasmuch as the Agency had devoted many months to the study of this subject, and all other aspects of the anti-Castro effort, it appears a rather gratuitous insult that Lansdale would have forwarded this kind of paper to Bissell. 19/ What response, if any, Bissell made to this memorandum is not known.

The Special Group held its last meeting of 1960 on 29 December, and there were, in addition to the standing problem of the use of US air bases to support the operation against Cuba, the questions of the use of a Nicaraguan air base, the political organization of the Cuban exiles, and considerable discussion about the possibility of initiating action against Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. It was emphasized that Mr. Pawley was strongly in favor of intervention in the Dominican Republic, even suggesting that an overt operation against Trujillo be mounted concurrently with the Cuban operation. The members of the Special Group, however, were unwilling to buy this particular plan of action; but they did support Mr. Bissell's proposals for some limited covert action operations aimed at the Trujillo regime.

James H. Douglas, Deputy Secretary of Defense questioned the feasibility of "expanding the initial beachhead into a full-scale takeover of the Cuban Government"; but Mr. Bissell pointed out that such a project was unrealistic unless "One or all of the following situations develops: (a) overt support, (b) a major revolutionary uprising, (c) massive use of air support." 20/ The Group was apparently in agreement that the Agency should make every effort to insure that no abortive small-scale insurrections be attempted to overthrow Castro. 21/

In view of the fact that the US would break diplomatic relations with Cuba on 3 January 1961, the minutes of the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960 present an interesting historical problem. In summarizing Livingston Merchant's report of his meeting with President Eisenhower, on 28 December, the minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 29 December read as follows:

> The latter [President Eisenhower] made two points: (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of individual Latin American Governments, (b) it would be desirable, if possible, for US to break relations with Cuba, in concert with other countries some time before January 20th. 22/

In contrast to the suggestion that the US break realtions with Cuba, prior to the inauguration of Kennedy, General Goodpaster's record of the Merchant-Eisenhower meeting of 28 December reported that:

> He, [President Eisenhower] thought, however, that [Presidents] Frondizi, Prado, and others should take diplomatic initiative to get Latin American countries to take a position that they would like to remove Castro from power, but, lacking the means to do so, would like the US to take the lead. The President said it was clear to him that Latin Americans must be brought to see the necessity of action. He was inclined to think that it might be time to recognize the anti-Castro front as the Cuban Government. He added that he would like to see a definite move taken in this matter before January 20th, and said that the State Department should be thinking of some definite action that could be brought about before that time. 23/

"Thinking of some definite action" differs considerably from the suggestion that the President thought it would be "desirable" to break relations with Cuba prior to 20 January of 1961.

At the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960, it also was suggested by Mr. Merchant that the Group's membership for discussions on Cuba be expanded to include Ambassador Willauer, Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann, and C. Tracy Barnes. 24/ As already has been noted, in his retrospective view of the Bay of Pigs operation Jake Esterline was quite forceful in his opinion that the Agency's representatives at such high level meetings should have been someone like either himself or Col. Jack Hawkins who were the most knowledgeable about the status of the operation and, indeed, the whole operational plan.*

---

* It is the considered opinion of the author of this history that Esterline had a valid criticism. A review of the records of the Bay of Pigs Operation, indicates that one of the most voluminous correspondents was C. Tracy Barnes, that a great deal of the written material is repititious ad nauseam, and that Barnes belabored issues which were common knowledge to the principals in WH/4. Illustrative of this, for example, was a 28 December 1960 memorandum which Barnes wrote to Jake Esterline. It began as follows: "It has been a little while since we have had an internal DDP hoe down on your project. In the meantime, a number of important points have been raised." 25/

The memorandum then proceeded to run through all of the issues which, by this time, were common knowledge

(footnote continued on following page)

On 2 January 1961 Fidel Castro notified the United States Government that it would have to cut its Embassy staff in Havana to eleven persons. On 3 January 1961, President Eisenhower held a meeting at the White House to discuss the Cuban situation. In addition to the President, and the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the participants included the members of the Special Group, plus General Goodpaster, Mr. Bissell, Thomas Mann, and Tracy Barnes. Among principal questions, of course, were if and when the United States should break off diplomatic relations with Cuba; and after some initial hesitation, before the day was over the United States did break relations officially with the Cuban Government.*

---

to those who were even marginally involved in planning the anti-Castro operation and contributed nothing in particular to understanding of any of them.

Similarly, Barnes' memorandum for the DCI in preparation for a 3 January policy meeting, rehashed the same information that Barnes had presented to Chief, WH/4, just a few days before. 26/ Barnes appears to have suffered a severe case of verbal diarrhea.

* Before the firm decision was made to break diplomatic relations, there was great concern within the Agency that the COS, a communicator, and a PM officer, and possibly a fourth individual be retained as members of the Staff. 27/

The other subject of conversation was whether there now was cause or reason for direct US intervention in Cuba, and the decision was that no such action should be taken unless the Cuban Government took aggressive action against US citizens in Cuba or damaged official US property (e.g., Guantanamo). In the course of the discussion about the status of Agency planning for anti-Castro activities, the question was raised about increasing the number of trainees. This was ruled out pending the suitability of training sites to handle additional numbers. Training sites in the US still were denied, in part, again, because of the fear of compromising the US position in the Organization of American States or in the United Nations.

The high level White House meeting also agreed that it would be useful to brief members of the new administration, particularly the Secretary of State, but "no definite schedule was agreed upon but the concensus [*sic*] of the meeting was that appropriate briefings should be considered for the near future." 28/

In the few days following the 3 January decision to break relations with the Castro Government, the

Agency retained control of US communications out of Havana -- the Ambassador deciding that he preferred to relieve the female Department of State communications officer and retain the services of her male counterpart from the Agency. During this hectic period, the communications officer was instructed to pack up as much gear as possible and destroy that which remained. Even if all the gear were not destroyed, CIA's Director of Communications indicated "there would not be any extreme compromise." In any event, however, the last message from Havana Station -- on 7 January 1961 at 1638Z -- stated

> This last msg from HAVA Station. All files and crypto material destroyed ... on evening 6 Jan [1961] Swiss amb placed "Carta de Proteccion" notices on emb doors minimizing possibility takeover of bldg by GOC.* 29/

Even as the debate over the breaking of diplomatic relations was taking place within the Eisenhower administration, Col. Jack Hawkins addressed a memorandum to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 which provided an excellent summary of the policy decisions which needed to be made if strike operations were to be conducted against the Castro government. In the course of his eight page memorandum, Hawkins reiterated the need for resolution of the problem that had particularly bothered the Special Group -- that was whether the Kennedy administration was interested in following through on the plans that had been made. Assuming that the Kennedy administration did intend to follow through on the program which had been initiated, Hawkins suggested that considering the rapid build up of Castro's military forces the strike operations be conducted not later than 1 March 1961. The question of air strikes was basic to Hawkins's planning -- on this he was quite firm. In discussing the general question of air operations Hawkins said:

---

* Authorization for complete shutdown had been set for 0300Z on 7 January 1961. 30/

> It is axiomatic in amphibious operations that control of air and sea in the objective area is absolutely required. The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping makes its final run in to the beach. If this is not done, we will be courting disaster.

Then, by specific recommendations, Hawkins urged the following:

> 1. That the air preparation commence not later than dawn on D minus 1 Day.

2. That any move to curtail the number of aircraft to be employed from those available be firmly resisted.

3. That the operation be abandoned if policy does not provide for use of adequate tactical air support.

In order to insure the success of both the air strike and the air drop operations which would provide the logistical support for the troops holding the lodgment on Cuban soil, Hawkins urged, as he had in the past, authorization for the use of contract American pilots, the use of the airfield at Puerto Cabezas as an advance strike base, and the use of air bases in the United States for the launching of logistical flight operations.* 31/

Much the same ground indicated in Hawkins memorandum was rehashed in preparing Mr. Barnes and the DCI for a Special Group meeting of 5 January 1961.

---

* There is no indication that Hawkins ever changed his attitude about the need for the introduction of some US pilots into both the strike and logstics air operations, even though his much quoted cable of 13 April 1961 from Puerto Cabezas repeated the high praise for the B-26 pilots who were about to undertake the D-2 air strike. See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, *Air Operations*, Part III, A for discussion of the Hawkins cable in the context of the air operations.

Somewhat more emphasis than Hawkins had given to it was placed on the political organization and the needs for structuring the exile political group to conform accurately to the sentiments of those Cubans who did oppose Castro. Otherwise, much of the same focus was to be given to the questions regarding air bases, the size of the invasion force, and the number of trainees who could be accommodated in the camps, and other of the problems that had already been discussed time and time again. 32/ Similarly, in discussions prior to the 12 January 1961 meeting of the Special Group, much of this same ground continued to be replowed without any positive resolution by the Special Group members. 33/

During the course of the frequent sessions of the Special Group in the final weeks of the Eisenhower administration, the Director of Central Intelligence also was required to make a presentation before the CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on 6 January of 1961. Among other things, the record of this meeting stated as follows:

> Mr. Dulles then gave a fairly detailed picture of CIA action with respect to Cuba, mentioning the two-pronged program of

> propaganda including radio and publications and the paramilitary effort. Again he pointed out that this is an expensive program running to approximately $28 million. Mr. Dulles discussed the radio effort and paramilitary effort in some detail, indicating the numbers of Cubans being trained and the supply efforts and the bases. 34/

Because of the subsequent charges which would be made by historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and others writing on the Bay of Pigs, it is important to emphasize that among other CIA personnel attending this briefing was Robert Amory, Jr., the Deputy Director for Intelligence, who, according to Schlesinger and some of the later "experts," was supposed to be in almost total ignorance of any planning for an operation such as took place at the Bay of Pigs.*

---

* Other Agency personnel in attendance at this briefing were General Cabell, DDCI; Colonel L. K. White, Deputy Director for Support; Richard Helms, Chief of Operations for DDP; Emmett Echols, Director of Personnel, and John Warner, Legislative Counsel. It also should be noted that Mr. William A. Tidwell, Jr. of Amory's office was appointed in January 1961 to be Chief of the Office of Operations in Miami. 35/ Organizationally at this time, the Office of Operations was under the Deputy Director for Intelligence. In view of the efforts being made in the Miami area to recruit Cubans for training in the exile Brigade, it is inconceivable that Tidwell and the Deputy Director for Intelligence were not fully aware of the plans that were being made to unseat Castro until after the invasion had collapsed at Playa Giron.

On 10 January 1961, President Eisenhower got involved in a meeting concerning the planned operations against Castro. On that day the New York Times broke a story about the training of the Cuban troops in Guatemala. As the ex-President himself wrote:

> On the morning of January 10 [1961], the New York Times carried an article, with a map, describing the training of anti-Castro forces in Guatemala ... It told most of the story. I decided that we should say nothing at all about this article. Believing that my successor might want some day to assist the refugee forces to move into Cuba, I considered that we were limited in what we could say about them. 36/

Whether a meeting had been planned prior to the appearance of the *New York Times* article is not known, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did call on the administration to send a representative up to the Hill on 12 January 1961, in order to provide further explanation of the *Times* article. Of the two candidates being considered to appear before the Senate, Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, or DCI Dulles, it was decided to send Mr. Dulles to appear before the Senate Committee. However, President Eisenhower

> raised certain questions as to the right of a Committee to ask questions on foreign

> policy affecting the security of the United States. He [Eisenhower] commented that when this is demanded as a right you are "sunk," and wondered how much right have they got, inasmuch as the Constitution says that it is the responsibility of the Chief Executive. 37/

The culmination of the Special Group discussions, which had taken place with increasing frequency between mid-November 1960 and mid-January 1961, was the report of the Joint Planning Committee issued by Willauer on 18 January 1961. The conclusions were predictable -- there were decisions that needed to be made, but these could not be made until the new administration became fully aware of the extent of the anti-Castro programs that had been evolving. As Willauer himself said in his final memo:

> In the absence of these decisions, or at least most of them, there is a grave danger that the December 6 plan (updated) may have to be abandoned, as an *effective* means of overthrowing Castro without more overt support, and that the only practical course of action for the *physical overthrow* of Castro, will be either: (1) open U.S. war with Cuba, or (2) a seven-month overt training by the U.S. on United States soil of a Cuban-Latin American invasion force, which will be planned to strike with at least overt U.S. logistical support.* 38/

---

* Willauer probably meant to refer to the 8 December 1960 plan. See pp. 173 ff.

Perhaps best illustrative of the merry-go-round which the Special Group had been riding for at least two months was Willauer's closing statement:

> In our discussions we weighed without coming to a conclusion the advantages of a rapid, effective action by direct war in terms of getting matters over with without a long buildup of world opinion vs. the inevitability of such a build up under any seven month program. 38/

Having reviewed the meetings during the last few weeks of the Eisenhower administration, it is interesting to review the comments of some of those who were principally involved, as they looked back on that period. One of the most immediate responses was found in Fidel Castro's virtuoso performance for the Cuban television audience on 23 April 1961 when he explained the invasion to them. Among other things, Castro claimed:

> That on certain occasions, we have also been in danger of direct aggression. This danger always has been lurking about us and at certain times has gathered considerable support in the minds of leading circles of the United States. One of those moments when this type of direct aggression was very near was at the end of December [1960] and the beginning of [January 1961], and that is to say, during the last days of the Eisenhower administration. 40/

So concerned was Castro at this time that he put his armed forces in a state of alert for a two week period, covering the transition from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration. 41/

The other principal protagonist at this time, remembered it in a somewhat different manner. The former US President wrote of this period in the following manner:

> Covert training of exiles for any possible future operations against Castro was going forward. Units were growing steadily in strength and efficiency against the time when actual tactical planning could be undertaken. In December [1960], I suggested to the State Department that the time might be propitious for organizing a "front" against Castro among the refugees, with the United States recognizing the leader and his associates as the legal government of Cuba, with the priviso, however, that the exiles themselves would voluntarily select from their own number an acceptable "head of government." I added that if they could do so at once, I'd like to see recognition accorded promptly -- if possible, before January 20 ...
>
> So, to the incoming administration, we left units of Cuban refugees busily training and preparing hopefully for a return to their native land. Because they had as yet been unable to find the leader they wanted -- a national leader to be both anti-Castro and anti-Batista -- it was impossible to make specific

> plans for a military invasion, However, their hatred of Castro, their patriotism, and their readiness to sacrifice for the restoration and freedom in Cuba could not be doubted. 42/

In the statement just quoted, Eisenhower's emphasis was on the fact that during his administration all that took place was a training program -- that there was no specific plan for the invasion of Cuba. This was re-emphasized in an interview that he held on 10 September 1965 when he said: "There was no tactical or operational plan even discussed" when he turned the presidency over to John F. Kennedy. 43/

According to this same interview:

> The retiring President stressed that there had been no decision as to how the Cuban forces would be used, if at all. Eisenhower had made no commitments that might bind the new President in dealing with the Castro problem. In fact, the armed refugee group was still so small and relatively unprepared that it could easily have been disbanded if the incoming administration considered its existence unnecessary.

And, more specifically,

> Eisenhower felt that Kennedy shared his judgment that the new administration need not rush a decision regarding the Cubans. "At no time did I put before anybody anything that could be called a plan (to invade Cuba)," declares the former President. He emphasizes that there was "no mandate, no

> commitment by me, or by anyone in my administration," and he doubts that Kennedy felt "he was frozen to any position by me." 44/

Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, also supported his former boss when queried about the Eisenhower role in the Bay of Pigs activity, stressing that the emphasis during Eisenhower's administration was on training the Cuban exiles and providing them with equipment. Like the former President, Gray, too, said that there was "no military plan".

The definition of a military plan, however, seems to have focused on an actual site for the landing; and in this sense, Gray certainly was telling the truth because no such choice had been made at the time that Eisenhower left office. In his own words, Gray stated:

> There wasn't any military plan formulated by the time the Eisenhower administration went out. Of course, the President was fully aware of and conversant with the decision to train and arm individuals. And the concept was one that was sort of changing in the Eisenhower Administration. First we were thinking in terms of the old infiltration of small groups. Then they were thinking of the possibility of landing of people, unit sized groups. And no decisions had been reached at that time. It was only that

> there was training. That was clearly authorized, and it was clearly contemplated that there would be or could be a military action. But it simply was not true that Kennedy inherited a plan that he couldn't change. As a matter of fact, the planning that was done in his administration was changed. The Bay of Pigs was not the first landing point. That was changed. But none of that, no planning process in the Eisenhower administration had got to the point of discussing what would be the landing point. 45/

What both Gray and Eisenhower conveniently ignored, as has been pointed out in the preceding discussion, was the major change that was made in the concept in November of 1960. What was to have been an infiltration of numerous small teams of communicators and PM trainers became an amphibious invasion plan calling for a major enlargement of the exile Brigade and an air operations plan which would be critical to both the Brigade's landing and its ability to be sustained once ashore in Cuba. What was yet undecided as Eisenhower was succeeded by Kennedy were the issues which the Special Group had argued throughout the weeks from mid-November into January -- the number of troops that should be or could be trained, the facilities that would be available for training sites (possibly in third countries or in the United

States), the possible commitment of the United States personnel (as "volunteers" or contracts), and possible overt US intervention to remove Fidel Castro.* 46/

---

* Despite the availability of documentary records and autobiographical information about President Eisenhower's role in the anti-Castro program, it is interesting to the historian that the subject of the Bay of Pigs apparently was banned as a topic in oral history interviews conducted with Eisenhower and various of his senior subordinates who were close to the operation. Included among this group, in addition to Eisenhower himself, were James H. Douglas, Jr. (DOD), Thomas Mann (State), Gen. David Shoup (USMC), Thomas S. Gates, Jr. (DOD), and Livingston Merchant (State).

TOP SECRET
CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by
CIA History Staff

TS#795052
Copy 1 of 2

OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

VOLUME III

EVOLUTION OF CIA'S ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES, 1951-JANUARY 1961

(pages 204-388)

TOP SECRET

TS#795052

DCI-8

December 1979

Copy 1 of 2

PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
DO NOT DESTROY

Volume III

Contents

(pp. 204-388)

Page

Part V Direct Action Programs 204

A. Propaganda 204
B. Sabotage and other Exercises . . 233

Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role 241

Part VII The Question of Assassinations . . . 277

Part VIII Conclusions 290

Appendixes

A. Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59 . 296

B. A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60 300

C. CNO Correspondence with Department of State and NSC:

1) Letter for Allen Dulles from Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60 TS (DD/P 0-1436) 311
2) Letter for Gordon Gray from Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60 313
3) Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60, sub: US Policy toward Cuba 318

Page

D. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60, sub: Liaision with US Agencies on JMARC Activities 332

E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at Santiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961 335

F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959 337

G. Memorandum for DCI [for Briefing Vice President Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub: What We Are Doing in Cuba 344

Source References

Part I Background 347

Part II Castro Must Go 352

Part III Changing Concepts 366

Part IV Presidential Resurgence 369

Part V Direct Action Programs 374

Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role 382

Part VII Assassination 386

Part VIII Conclusions 388

Part V

Direct Action Programs

A. Propaganda

The desire of WH Division to undertake the propaganda operation against the government of Fidel Castro, antedated the formation of Branch 4 in the Division by more than two months; for on 27 October 1959 in a Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, J. C. King proposed:

> That CIA undertake clandestine propaganda operations targeted at Cuba. These operations would employ primarily radio broadcasts and other means of propaganda, and at informing the Cuban masses of the truth. 1/

Col. King's memorandum pointed out that representatives of various of the Cuban opposition groups organized in the United States had requested Agency assistance to set up propaganda operations directed against the Cuban mainland, and, in addition, he also indicated that he and the Director of Communications, Gen. McClelland, had his people studying the best methods for carrying out such propaganda broadcasts.

King's initial memorandum contained no information about potential locations of transmitters, personnel security, inter-Agency coordination or costs.

Almost immediately following the memorandum from Col. King to the Director, the subject of propaganda directed against the Castro government was introduced to discussions in the Special Group. Following the first such meeting at which the subject came up seriously, the DCI requested that WH Division provide more specifics on such matters as requirements for real estate, recommendations for someone to be in charge of the propaganda operations, the equipment that would be required, and how the broadcasting might be controlled. By mid-November, following additional discussions both within the Agency and by the Special Group, WH Division proposed that the broadcasts originate from the Yucatan Peninsula under the guidance of Manuel Benitez, and from Costa Rica under the Monte Cristi Group, headed by Col. Ramon Barquin. The presumption was that the Yucatan operation would be self-sufficient, but that the Costa Rican operation would be CIA funded, supported, and directly under Agency control. The estimated costs that were mentioned in mid-November 1959 were roughly $80,000 each for the operations in Costa Rica and Yucatan, plus an additional $12,000 for intrusion broadcasts which would originate within Cuba. 2/

Before the end of November, the plans to utilize the Yucatan peninsula had been abandoned because it was feared that the President of Mexico would not give his approval for such an activity; and by the early part of December, President Figueres of Costa Rica had made it clear that he did not want the propaganda operation to be set up in Costa Rica. Consequently, there was considerable discussion about the possibility of getting permission from President Betancourt of Venezuela to agree to permit the broadcasts from his country. Some members of the Special Group also suggested the possibility that the anti-Castro broadcasts might be originated from other of the Latin American countries, a project which Mr. Dulles discouraged because of the lack of suitable broadcast facilities that would be available in countries outside of the immediate Caribbean area. Somewhere along the line C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A and Mr. Bissell's right hand man, came up with the suggestion that broadcasts against Castro could be originated from continental United States. How Barnes came by this proposal is not known, for no such activity was ever given the slightest sanction. 3/

By early February of 1960, however, an equivocal agreement apparently had been reached with President Betancourt, for a memorandum from WH Division indicated that:

> One pilot [anti-Castro] tape has been made and has been played for the benefit of President Betancourt of Venezuela. He has agreed not to interfere if we initiate broadcasts from available transmitters in Venezuela. 4/

Even though thought had been given to the establishment of a special transmitting facility for the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), or whoever would run the anti-Castro broadcasts, Betancourt had made it clear that he would not permit the establishment of special new transmitting facilities in his country.

On or about 17 March 1960, the same date that President Eisenhower approved the formal anti-Castro program for the US Government, JMATE had prepared its propaganda program which, after outlining various phases of the activity, stated:

> It is planned to concentrate all capabilities available to the U.S. Government on the [Cuban] target. In addition, it will be necessary for CIA to create such unilateral, FRD, and third country operations as may be feasible and useful. All facets of psychological operations will be exploited through mass media means, including: radio, television, motion pictures, press and publications, books, leaflets, posters, handbills, and rumors. The major emphasis will be placed on gray materials. Liaison will be conducted as necessary with other U.S. Government agencies. Black operations will be carefully coordinated within CIA prior to implementation. All direct dealings with members of the FRD will be under unofficial cover. 5/

The outline of the propaganda program made it clear that funding of the propaganda operation was going to be a major problem, and it was also clear that CIA was going to be responsible for a considerable portion of this. But even as the propaganda program was being formulated, Col. J. C. King was in New York working with Henry Holland to approach a number of American businessmen whose companies had interests in Cuba. Their objective was to raise funds to support the FRD propaganda operations which might be operated through Station WRUL in New York, a station that was directed by Mr. Walter Lemon who worked closely with the CIA. Lemon, in fact, was ready to mount radio program operations almost immediately pending receipt of material and guidance from the Agency.* 6/

With reference to King's approach to Mr. John Loeb, of Loeb, Rhodes & Company, the businessman stated that he would contribute his personal funds to the anti-Castro propaganda effort; and in addition, he would approach the directors or heads of other companies that were also involved in Cuba -- individuals whom he thought were well enough off to make personal contributions. With reference to contributions of this nature:

> It was decided that personal contributions were most advisable because they would not require action and approval by Boards of Directors, and therefore could be most easily concealed. The sum discussed was $50,000.** 7/

The plan for private funding of WRUL was in trouble from the start. As early as April 1960, Chief

---

* Among those that Col. King met with on 15 March 1960, were Mr. John Loeb of Loeb, Rhodes & Company, Mr. Lapham of Banker's Trust Company, and the president of the Freeport Sulphur Company, Mr. Wright.

** Other companies, including American and Foreign Power Co. and the Freeport Sulphur Co., made donations in the company names and the Agency notified the Commissioner of Internal Revenue about the donations so that they could be treated as corporate tax deductions. 7a/

WH/4 had requested Chief, WHD's permission to obligate JMATE funds for support of the station; but Chief, WHD refused, indicating that private money would be available. In October 1960 a similar proposal was made and rejected for the same reasons. By December 1960, however, payment from JMATE funds was authorized because private funds were unavailable. 7b/

In terms of the broadcast facilities that were to be established under the propaganda program, CIA was to create and control both short and medium wave shipborne radio broadcasting operations, and to investigate the feasibility of an airborne radio transmitter capable of black broadcasts into Cuba.* Aside from the broadcast operations, there were a number of additional programs calling for printing facilities for the production of propaganda materials and secure editorial offices so that the propaganda materials could be prepared. 8/

---

* The airborne medium wave transmitter apparently was ruled out early in the planning stages because it was "a terribly expensive operation." Based on DPD's estimates, Phillips figured that three flights per week to six selected Cuban cities -- among others, Havana, Santiago and Cienfuegos -- over a two month period would show operating costs in excess of $83,000, plus an additional $60,000 for transmitting equipment on a C-54, and a cost of $250,000 if the C-54 were lost. 7c/

It was shortly after the formulation of the propaganda program that David A. Phillips became Chief of the WH/4 Propaganda Activity. Phillips had done propaganda work for the Agency at the time of the Guatemalan activity, but subsequently retired and had been in private business in Havana. According to his own story, he had intended to stay in private business; but in the course of Castro's rise to power, he was recontacted by Agency personnel and persuaded to take on the job of running the Agency's propaganda campaign against Castro.*

According to one interviewer:

> In the Guatemalan campaign, Phillips had worked with a handful of completely controlled Latin American propaganda writers, and had been able to develop a single credible propaganda line. Now, however, he had to work under Washington orders, to offer radio broadcasting time to all the major and competing Cuban exile groups. Much of the Phillips'

---

* For Phillips' own story of his employment and his re-employment by the Agency, see his book *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977).

> effort went into overcoming the idea that CIA financed radio programs should become a forum for the varying views of rival exile splinter factions. Phillips was principally in Washington ... [but] there were frequent trips to Miami and New York, and Phillips himself coordinated CIA covert broadcasting with Henry Loomis, Director of USIA's Voice of America. 9/

All indications are that Phillips had an excellent staff which was highly motivated and certainly extremely busy during the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.*

The key point in Dave Phillips's propaganda operation was to be the 50,000 watt radio transmitter located on the larger of the two Swan Islands -- this so called "larger" island being roughly 1 3/4 miles long by 1 1/4 miles wide. US possessions, the Swan Islands are located roughly 100 miles NE of Honduras in the Caribbean Sea. Already located on the island was a Federal Aviation radio beacon, and a Department of Commerce weather station. In April 1960, the cover story which was devised for the operation of the two radio transmitters (one 50,000 watts and the other 7,500 watts) was that the Navy was going to purchase scientific signal time from the Gibralter Steamship Company, an Agency proprietary, which was nominally the operator of a commercial radio station then being established.

---

* Among those who worked in Phillips's Political and Psychological Section in WH/4, were William Kent, John Isaminger, Phillip A. Toomey, Earnest I. Harrison, Paul Oberst, and Michael J. Maney. 10/ Illustrative of the desire to placate the various exile factions was the proposal by the Forward Operations Base to give the spokesmen of the factions air time on WRUL on a rotating basis to present the position of the particular group. FOB was to assume responsibility for WRUL programming on 1 December 1960, and was of the opinion that such programming would "have desired effect on creating semblance [of] united anti Castro opposition." 10a/

The loading of the transmitters, the unloading, the construction of the facilities to house the transmitters, and the installation of the transmitters was done by the Navy Seabees under the direction of Alfred Cromartie of CIA's Office of Logistics. James Burwell, a logisitcs officer who was thoroughly involved in the JMATE operation, reported that the construction activity at Swan Island required the movement of 180,000 pounds of equipment from the Washington Depot, aboard Agency trucks for delivery to Norfolk and the reloading aboard two LST's. In addition to locating the transmitters and constructing the facilities for housing the transmitters, a crude landing field also was cleared. The total time involved was approximately 20 days, and the cost was something under $225,000.

The first test signals from Swan Island were sent on 17 May 1960, and from that time until the close out of the Bay of Pigs Operation, the station was one of the two or three principal voices aimed at Castro's government. 11/ Shortly after the initiation of the broadcast from Swan, a true tempest in teapot was brewed over the question of whether or not export licences were going to be required for goods moving from the mainland to support operations at Swan Island. Involved in this brouhaha were the Department of Commerce, the US Customs Service, and numerous Agency components -- Cover Staff, Commercial Division, the Office of Logistics, and the Office of Security. Bill Eisemann, WH/4's Chief of Support, had his hands full! Common sense ultimately prevailed and the question of export licences was dropped. 12/

Even before Swan went into operation, there was some question within the government as to whether the CIA or the United States Information Agency should be principally responsible for propaganda broadcasts directed at Cuba. Within a few weeks following the beginning of operations at Swan, this question was resolved in a meeting in Senator Mundt's office which included representatives from the Agency, Mr. Abbot Washburn, the Director of the United States Information Agency, and various of Mr. Washburn's senior people. The meeting made clear that the Agency was doing medium wave broadcasting directly into Cuba. Although it was not specified at the meeting in Mundt's office, CIA also was supporting station WRUL, which had made a direct application on its own initiative for funding such broadcasts -- even though the Agency was behind such broadcasting and such financing. 14/

The Navy, however, got goosey about the cover story which was being presented. Despite a strong effort on the part of senior Agency representatives to convince Rear Admiral S. B. Frankel -- who was designated as the Chief representative of the Office of Naval Intelligence by Admiral Fauste, then Director of ONI -- the Navy declined further involvement in supporting the cover story.* The hassle with the

---

* The thrust of the Agency's 27 April 1960 briefing for Adm. Frankel was that the USN was already so heavily involved in the project that it would do them more harm than good to withdraw. Information on this meeting with the Navy and other information pertaining to the development of the Swan Island facility is contained in the sources listed under Reference 14/.

Navy was successfully resolved when the Agency found that through its own resources it would be able to provide for resupply of all of the Island's needs, including transportation of personnel between JMWAVE in Florida and Swan Island without undue difficulty.

The problem of security of the island -- particularly the fear that perhaps Castro would send saboteurs to the island -- was never put to any real test. In fact, what might have been the only serious security incident was most successfully resolved by Robert Overjord, the Security Officer for the island and the Deputy Chief of Base. The incident took place in July 1960 when a group of 14 Honduran students landed to assert a claim to sovereignty of the Swan Islands by the Republic of Honduras, and it was reported as follows:

> A potentially dangerous situation was averted by the tactful handling of the group by Mr. Overjord who persuaded them to leave their armament of 13 pistols and three submachine guns aboard their boat and conducted them on a tour of the island. The group leader indicated that he wanted to take a census of the population, and was furnished with pertinent information, with no divulgence of Agency interest in Radio Swan or its personnel. Upon completion of the census, the group was permitted to raise the Honduran flag, was given lunch

> and refreshments, and departed shortly thereafter. The good judgment and discretion of Mr. Overjord are felt to be directly responsible for avoidance of what could have been a serious incident involving loss of lives, or injury to Agency and other island personnel.* 15/

The question of the exact nature of the broadcasts from Swan was the subject of much discussion, both prior to the opening of the station and subsequent to its first broadcast. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, for example, called Jake Esterline, Chief, Project JMATE to report on conversation that he (General Cabell) had with "a person of considerable importance who was very familiar with Cuba," concerning the nature of the propaganda which should be aimed at the Cuban population. Cabell stated that according to this important person, if tapes of Castro's radio broadcasts could be acquired and then patched together for rebroadcasting to the Cuban population for hours on end, the effect would be "to bore the people horribly with Castro, but would also pointedly reveal the inconsistencies of his statements." Following receipt of this call from the Deputy Director, Esterline passed the word on to Dave Phillips with the comment that he thought perhaps such broadcasts might be used as filler during the intervals when Swan was not doing its regular broadcasts.* 16/

---

* The island was manned by 24 people, all but nine of whom were CIA personnel. The nine were unwitting technicians of the Philco Corporation.

By early August 1960, however, the official policy for the Swan propaganda broadcasts aimed at Cuba, was to be "the Revolution Betrayed." This theme was formalized by the Department of State; and at the direction of the Secretary of State, copies of a 105 page document addressed to this theme were presented to members of the National Security Council, to members of the Inter-American Peace Committee, and to US Embassies in the Latin American countries.

---

* COS Havana forwarded another suggestion for a possible propaganda attack on Castro based on a May 1960 issue of *Confidential* magazine, which apparently carried an article called "An American Mother's Terrifying Story -- Fidel Castro Raped my Teenage Daughter." It was COS Havana's suggestion that wide publicity be given to this article in the Spanish language, presumably including broadcasts from Radio Swan. 17/ Available records do not indicate whether this suggestion was adopted.

Instructions were that the Embassies could furnish copies of the document to the foreign ministers and to other high officials in their respective countries. Additionally, the NATO Council also received a copy of this document; and it was the hope of the Department of State that the document would have some impact on the upcoming meeting of the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere countries, which was to begin 16 August 1960 in San Jose, Costa Rica. According to one interview of WH/4's propaganda chief, Dave Phillips, the theme of the Revolution Betrayed

> Hammered across the idea that Castro had double-crossed the Cuban people by abandoning the programs and promises that originally won him support. None of CIA's propaganda, spoken or printed, ever urged the populace to rise up against Castro. This appeal, suicidal before the invasion, would be used when, and if, a Provisional Government obtained a lodgement on the island. 18/

According to Phillips's interviewer:

> Friendly third country diplomats in Havana monitored CIA's principal broadcasts and confirmed that the signals were loud and clear. To verify its audience the Swan Island radio offered simple gifts (ball point pens were a favorite) to any listener who would write to the station. Considering the police controls inside Cuba, listeners' letters were an act of defiance to the regime. There was a

> a flood of letters including, during freak radio propagation periods, requests for ball point pens from New Zealand.* 19/

Another evidence of the success of the Swan broadcasts was related to the Director of Central Intelligence by Col. King, Chief, WH Division, who pointed out that WH had a copy of a letter from a Cuban listener who, in the form of a letter bitterly attacking Swan, made it clear that the Swan broadcasts were coming in loud and clear. 21/

Before the end of the summer of 1960, Swan was on the air on both short-wave and medium-wave for a total of 10 hours a day, in addition to which they also began to utilize programs that had been prepared by the FRD. One problem which would plague Radio Swan -- as well as other elements of Project JMARC -- was the shortage of Spanish language capability. Among other evidence of the need to have someone with Spanish language capability immediately available at Radio Swan, were the following: A machine-run of Agency employees failed to surface anyone with sufficient Spanish language to undertake an announcer's job; inability to exploit the fatal shooting of a Venezuelan child by a pro-Castro goon, could not be turned to US advantage; and by mid-November 1960 WH Division was requesting that a requirement be laid on to the Department of Defense for a serviceman with native fluency in Spanish who could be used as an announcer at Radio Swan.*

---

* It appears that perhaps baseball cards also were going to be offered as an inducement to get listeners to indicate that they had picked up Swan's broadcast. A propaganda note from WH/4 for 9 August 1960, for example, reported: "M[aney] spoke to Ken Harris, Special Acquisitions. He has contacted a company making baseball cards who claim 'this most unusual order ever received.' Will get cards, but curious what was wrong with bubble gum." 20/

---

* In the instance of the death of the Venezuelan child, the pro-Castro Cuban press was able to get the story out before it could be broadcast from Radio Swan. The pro-Castro press claimed that the death had been caused by a counter-revolutionary. (Sources for the foregoing discussion related to the lack of Spanish language capability are listed in reference 22/.)

The lack of Spanish language capability was felt throughout the project, not only in the propaganda effort. As late as January 1961, for example, the training facility in the Canal Zone was pushing Headquarters for the services for a two week period of an Air Force sergeant who was fluent in Spanish. The training base wanted the sergeant to assist in briefing and debriefing an infiltration team. The request was denied, however, because there was a greater need for the man's services as an instructor at the air training base in Guatemala. 22a/ In another instance, a request from COB Miami for promotion of a clerical from GS-4 to GS-5 was based on the fact that "her services as a translator have been of the greatest importance to the Base since her arrival." 22b/

Despite the handicap imposed by the lack of Spanish language capability at the Station, Radio Swan was the most effective of the propaganda activities supported by the Agency; and with Station WRUL, New York, these Agency-sponsored radio broadcasts were the most effective means of providing the general Cuban population with anti-Castro ammunition. Additionally radio propaganda -- via both short and medium wave transmitters -- was to play an important role immediately following the landing of the anti-Castro forces on Cuban soil. 23/

Aside from radio broadcasts, other media activities in which WH/4 PP engaged were the newspaper *Avance in Exile* and the magazine *Bohemia Libre.* Both of these were published in Miami by the exile groups, and at one time *Bohemia Libre* was reputedly the most widely circulated Spanish language weekly in the world. Although barred in Cuba, selected items from both publications were broadcast by Swan or WRUL. 23a/

One of the strangest of all activities in which WH/4 PP engaged was a public opinion survey conducted by the Lloyd Free organization to assess the attitudes of the Cuban people toward the Castro regime. If WH/4's planners expected that the survey would show a strong core of internal opposition to the Castro government, they were to be sadly disappointed. Working with "a competent Cuban research organization" Free's report was based on a series of a thousand interviews with a cross section of the urban population of Cuba "both in Havana and in other cities, towns, and villages throughout the island." Among the findings of the Free survey, the following comments were included in the summary report of mid-August of 1960:*

> The great majority of Cubans surveyed felt that both they personally and their country were very much better off than during the days of Batista. *The prevailing mood was one of hope and optimism.*
>
> Attesting the apparently genuine enthusiasm of the great majority for the Revolution, the Castro Government and its program were the replies when the sample was asked about the *worst* aspects of life in Cuba today. Despite the fact that this question was designed to illicit unfavorable comments, *a very sizable majority named as the worst aspects of the present situation items which implied* sympathy or support for the present regime. At the top of the list (mentioned by one-third of all respondents) was regret or apprehension over the fact that there is opposition to the Revolution and to the Revolutionary regime; [and] that there are misguided counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries.

> Even in describing the worst aspects of the present situation, only 30% of all respondents mentioned items which could be construed as criticisms, explicit or implicit, of the Castro regime. Only a few such subjects received significant mention, with each being referred to by only a small minority of total respondents: e.g., the danger of or trend toward Communism (7%); criticism of the Revolution's program (7%); economic difficulties (7%); unemployment (6%); confusion and disorganization (5%).
>
> In view of the overwhelming popularity of the Revolutionary program, it is patently clear that *criticisms of Castro's program, as such, will fall very largely on barren, if not counter-productive ground.*

The only positive statements that appeared in the Free report, insofar as the objectives of WH/4 were concerned, were to the effect that successful attack on the Castro Government should be made in terms of the inability of the government to meet the projects it had outlined because of "the unwise and unrealistic means it is employing in the execution of its program"; and "the Revolution and its program are being perverted through the insidious influence of the Communists."*

---

* The information concerning the Free report, is contained in source reference 24/.

It is interesting to record the reaction within the Agency to the Free report:

> C/JMARC lamented the fact that the Lloyd Free report evidently has gotten into the hands of the Cuban Government and will probably be used with devastating effect at some point during the meeting [the upcoming OAS Conference scheduled for San Jose, Costa Rica]. He told ADDP/A that he felt the Department of State would have to be prepared to sacrifice Mr. Free's report on the proverbial "alter of gold." The point was made strongly to ADDP/A that the Free report, in fact, is not at all valid other than for a limited "sample" of the City of Habana. ADDP/A agreed, but said he did not think State should be made aware of the fact CIA actually paid for the report. He further indicated that he was still endeavoring to find out how the report -- copy of which CIA never received in full -- got out of control.* 25/

The substance of the Free Report appeared in the *New York Times* and also in a Peter Edson column which was reported to be syndicated in 600 newspapers. In passing this information on to the DDP, Chief, WH/4 suggested that "the survey, in the opinion of WH/4

---

* Chief, WH/4 apparently misread the significance of the Free report because, as the report points out, the most serious opposition was, in fact, in the Havana area, which included the heaviest sampling of opposition sentiment.

Prop, will be used in Cuban propaganda" -- something of an understatement!* 26/

---

* Logic would seem to indicate that if WH/4's principals could not subscribe to the results of Free survey's that WH/4/PP might have been tasked to make a serious study of the impact which Castro's propaganda and his achievements were having on the will of the Cuban public to resist outside interference. In an interview with the author of this history, Dave Phillips stated that Enno Hobbing had provided the editorial guidance for WH/4's propaganda efforts; but that to his (Phillips's) knowledge, no study ever was conducted of the Castro propaganda effort. In retrospect, Phillips indicated that this probably was an oversight. 27/

On the subject of surveys of questionable value during the Bay of Pigs Operation, mention should be made of a contract JMATE negotiated with Klein and Saks

> to initiate a survey of Cuba's present [May 1960] economic position that will also contain an outline of proposals that would sound [*sic*] as a platform for a successor government to the Castro regime. The cost, which will be borne by JMARC, will be about $20,000. This is merely the first phase of the projected comprehensive economic program.

Why, with CIA's in-house economic talent (in the Economic Research Area of the Office of Research and Reports) and the surfeit of government economists familiar with Latin America, WH/4 thought it necessary to negotiate an outside contract for a study such as indicated is truly incomprehensible! That the Klein and Saks contract was not blocked at the DDP or DCI level is equally incomprehensible. The company's "Preliminary Outline of Economic and Financial Government Platform to Serve the Interests of the People of Cuba and to be Compatible with the Interest of the Hemisphere and the Free World of Which Cuba is a Part" -- which was presented in typescript -- was 15 pages of platitudes about the best of all possible worlds. 28/

WH/4 PP also became involved in the propaganda activity that was intended to offset the planned visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Cuba in the summer of 1960. In an Eyes Only memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, Col. J. C. King informed Allen Dulles that it had been learned that Khrushchev had accepted an invitation from the Government of Cuba to visit that country. Working with Havana Station, a two-pronged program was being developed with the intention of either forcing the cancellation of the trip or indicating the opposition of the Cuban people to Communism. Havana Station was to be responsible for organizing church opposition to the visit, and WH/4 and other elements of WH Division would be responsible for instigating rumors throughout Latin America that an assassination attempt would be made on Khrushchev's life if he appeared in Cuba.

One of the WH/4's contacts suggested that leaflets should be prepared depicting the crucifix upside down, to signify the Soviet treatment of religion, and that these leaflets should be distributed widely through Cuba. 29/ There is no indication that this particular leaflet was ever devised, but in at least one instance, the Hammer and Sickle was used to form the 'T' in the word *Traidor* on a sticker that was being prepared for propaganda use. 30/ In anticipation of the possible visit, 10,000 stickers of an anti-Khrushchev, anti-Soviet nature were forwarded from Headquarters to Havana Station. The legend on one of these was "Cuba, Yes; Russia, No; Khrushchev, No;" and a second item showed a prisoner behind bars formed by the stripes of the Cuban flag with the words *Sin Palabras* -- "Without words."* 31/

Despite these advanced preparations, no opportunity was presented to utilize the propaganda stickers.** Although both Castro and Khrushchev were in attendance at the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, 19-28 September 1960, and even though Castro flew out of New York in an Aeroflot jet, the Khrushchev visit did not materialize at this time.***

---

* See following two pages for copies.

** More detailed information on propaganda leaflets and the dissemination of such materials by air drop is given in Volume I of this history, *Air Operations*.

*** Khrushchev flew from New York directly to Moscow at the close of the UN session. On 22 October 1960 in the course of an interview in Moscow with a Cuban journalist Khrushchev did state that he wanted to visit Cuba and its people as soon as possible. 31a/

If not particularly successful in projects other than Radio Swan, WH/4/PP cannot be charged with lack of imagination. Among other projects, it was proposed that the Office of Medical Services' psychiatric study of Fidel Castro be surfaced because the profile was not particularly flattering to the Cuban leader; and the Castro image also would have suffered if a disorienting drug could have been placed in Castro's food. These proposals were similar in intent to others aimed at the Castro "image" as revealed in the Senate Select Committee investigation of CIA plots against the Cuban leader.

In light of a rumor that had been picked up to the effect that the Cubans reportedly were painting some of their British Sea Fury aircraft with the American flag -- said planes to be used in a provocation action to discredit the United States -- WH/4 investigated the possibility of doctoring some photos of the Sea Furies with the flag being painted on in order to forestall any such provocations by the Cubans. Unfortunately, however, the Agency art shop pointed out that it would be technically infeasible to attempt to make such fake photos. With the idea in mind of a propaganda campaign aimed at terrorizing Castro's militia (and apparently at the request of Col. Jack Hawkins, Chief, WH/4/PM), WH/4/PP gave some thought to preparing a purported secret order to Castro's militia to establish an "elite suicide squad" which would fight on even after the defeat of the other troops. The gentleman who would later become infamous in connection with the Watergate activity, E. Howard Hunt, and Dave Phillips assessed the possibility of sending a white painted "flight of truth" airplane on a trip to several of the Latin American countries, bringing -- in a "Billy Graham type operation" -- the message of Castro's betrayal of the Cuban Revolution. But this esoteric plan, too, never got beyond the planning stage. 32/

None of the foregoing proposals however, were in the same league with the propaganda plan that came to be known as "the Dripping Cuban." The WH/4 Propaganda Notes for 19 August 1960 stated:

> P[hillips] dispatched cable on Special Operation to HAVA. (Cuban jumping ship in Bosphorous). 33/

In fact, the cable that Dave Phillips had originated was addressed not only to Havana, but also to

Istanbul, Ankara, and to the Forward Operations Base in Miami. Remembering that Dave Phillips himself was something of an actor, as well as a newspaperman, it is believed worthwhile to repeat this cable in its entirety. The cable read as follows:

> 1. FYI: HQS IS CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING OPERATION: SHORTLY AFTER A RUSSIAN BOAT HOMEWARD BOUND FROM CUBA PASSES THROUGH BOSPHOROUS A DRIPPING CUBAN CLIMBS ASHORE IN TURKEY. HE CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL PRISONER ARRESTED BY CUBANS IN HAVANA BUT SENT TO RUSSIA FOR IMPRISONMENT. CUBAN SUBJECT WILL CONTACT LOCAL LATIN AMERICAN CONSULS AND ISTANBUL PRESS FOR EXPLOITATION, THEN RETURN LATIN AMERICA. AFTER BRIEF BUT DRAMATIC EXPOSURE TO PRESS AN "ATTEMPT" WILL BE MADE ON SUBJECT'S LIFE. FOR THIS REASON HE WILL GO UNDERGROUND SO "THEY" WILL NOT LIQUIDATE HIM.
>
> 2. FOR HAVA: REQUEST STATION RECRUIT SUBJECT. OBVIOUSLY HE MUST BE SUPERB ACTOR WHO CAN CONVINCINGLY MAINTAIN ROLE IN SPITE OF SKILLFUL PROBING BY DUBIOUS NEWSMEN. HE MUST HAVE MEMORY CAPABLE OF RETAINING THOUSANDS OF "DETAILS" ABOUT HIS ARREST AND FORCED JOURNEY. HE MUST BE KNOWN IN HAVANA SO AS TO BE MISSED WHEN HE IS "ARRESTED." AN ARTICULATE STUDENT TYPE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. SWIMMING ABILITY DESIRABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL.
>
> 3. SUGGEST THAT IN RECRUITMENT, STATION STATE THERE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE CUBAN PRISONERS REALLY ARE BEING SENT RUSSIA, BUT THAT THIS CANNOT BE PROVED. THUS SUBJECT'S PARTICIPATION IN THIS PLAY-ACTING WILL BE JUSTIFIABLE DRAMATIZATION OF SOVIET CONTROL IN CUBA. STATION ALSO AUTHORIZED PROMISE FINANCIAL BACKING, LATER

> RETURN TO CUBA WITH FIGHTING GROUP, PERMISSION WEEKEND WITH ALL THE WORKS IN PARIS, ETC.
>
> 4. IN RECRUITMENT, IT SHOULD BE STRESSED TO SUBJECT THAT SUCCESS THIS OPERATION AND STATUS HIS POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LIMELIGHT DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON SECURITY. HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS MUST REALLY BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED (AND STATION MUST ASSIST IN SPREADING WORD OF HIS ARREST FOR SPECIFIC OFFENSE SO THAT FACTS WILL JIBE IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS.).
>
> 5. ADVISE SOONEST WHEN YOUR MAN IS SELECTED. HIS BRIEFING WILL BE IN PBPRIME. HOPE HE MAY BE RECRUITED IN TIME EXFILTRATE AMPAN BOAT DEPARTING HAVA END OF THIS MONTH.
>
> 6. FOR ANKA, ISTA: APPRECIATE YOUR CABLED ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE EXTENT COOPERATION LOCAL SERVICE AND NEWSPAPER ASSETS. SUGGEST HOWEVER NOT (REPEAT NOT) CONTACT NON-KUBARKERS UNTIL HEADQUARTERS CAN FORWARD OPERATIONAL PLAN. 34/

A memorandum on the outgoing cable quoted above went to Chief, WH/4 from Rudy Gomez, the Deputy Chief of WH Division on 24 August 1960. Gomez's memorandum read as follows:

> The DCI, General Cabell, and Mr. Helms discussed this cable on 24 August [1960] and concluded that since Fidel Castro is definitely identifying himself more and more with the Russians, it is not worth the candle to launch an operation such as that one proposed in subject cable. Mr. Helms said that we may discreetly try to find a body for this operation, providing we play it very carefully and do not

> let the body in on what we definitely have in mind; also, that any further cables which go out on this proposed operation are to be signed off by him.

Examined in retrospect, it would appear that Mr. Helms had good reason to be nervous about the proposal!* 35/

B. Sabotage and other Exercises**

Where WH/4/PP was successful in putting Radio Swan into operation and in supporting Station WRUL in

---

* This proposal provided another of the very few instances where Mr. Helms' name surfaced in relation to a Bay of Pigs related problem.

** Because so many of the sabotage activities of the Cuban dissidents were uncoordinated, uncontrolled, and did nothing to impede the extension of Castro's control or lessen his support, the author has tried only to illustrate something of the scope of those sabotage operations over which the WH or WH/4 could exercise a degree of control. In responding to the Taylor Committee's request for an assessment of the effectiveness of its sabotage program, the best that WHD could say was:

> There are numerous acts of sabotage reported from all provinces of Cuba. These acts included the burning of cane fields, damaging of power and communication lines and sugar mills, burning of schools and commercial buildings and damaging of petroleum and sugar refinery [*sic*]. It is extremely difficult to verify just what sabotage damage were [*sic*] the result of our team's [*sic*] activities; however, they have claimed the burning of cane fields, the firing of commercial stores, [high] tension lines, and the damage to the oil refinery at Santiago de Cuba was the result of a raider operation by one of our

(footnote continued on following page)

its broadcasts into Cuba, Project JMATE could claim no similarly successful or continuing program of sabotage and disruption. In fact, one of the earliest and most thoroughly discussed sabotage programs against Cuba -- disruption of the Cuban petroleum industry -- was a complete and total bust. Being suggested even before President Eisenhower's authorization of the anti-Castro program, attempts to sabotage and interfere with the operation of Cuba's petroleum refineries continued until well into the middle 60's -- with at least one of the sabotage "experts" displaying the same notable lack of success, but excess of foolishness, that characterized his activities during Project

---

> external action groups. In addition, we feel that a great deal of the other sabotage were [*sic*] the results [*sic*] of the demolitions we supplied to the various teams and other action groups in Cuba with which we were in contact. Approximately 10-15,000 lbs. of the over 100,000 lbs. of material [*sic*] placed in the hands of internal assets were demolitions supplies for sabotage action. 35a/

The attack on the Santiago refinery was led by Rip Robertson, but his exciting cable about the action greatly overemphasized the damage; and the plant operations were quickly restored to normal. At the time, however, the DCI reported it to the Special Group (Chester Bowles, Roswell Gilpatrick, and McGeorge Bundy) as a "successful" operation. 35b/ Robertson's cable is shown as Appendix E (p. 335).

JMATE. It is a story worth recording here, because of the extremely close and continuing relationship between one of the major US oil companies operating a refinery in Cuba, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (SONJ), and WH Division.

As early as 9 March 1960, the minutes of a Special Group meeting reflect conversations that both Allen Dulles and Gordon Gray had concerning the problems being faced by the major petroleum companies operating in Cuba -- SONJ, Texaco, and Shell -- and particularly the need for "discreet means of inter-company consultation" in order to avoid possible anti-trust prosecution. In a discussion of planned para-military operations against Cuba, it was reported that on 14 July 1960, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division was approached "by the Standard Oil Company. He [Chief, WH/D] indicated that it appeared that Standard will be willing to cooperate, perhaps even carry the ball on certain selected [sabotage] targets. DD/P gave authority to push this contact immediately."* 36/

---

* Paramilitary Operation Plan I, indicated that among the specific sabotage targets to be considered for attack in the period between 1 and 30 September 1960, were petroleum targets. 37/

By August of 1960, WH/D had approved a program of "subtle sabotage paying off, without resorting to the more risky and sensational type of sabotage." Unfortunately, however, there was a communications gap between the operations people and the intelligence analysts most familiar with the world petroleum industry and a number of demonstrably unworkable -- though subtle -- sabotage efforts came to naught.*

The Cuban petroleum industry also was looked to as an economic-political target as well as a sabotage target. When the US refineries operating in Cuba refused Castro's order to process Soviet crude oil, WH/4 began to think in terms of disrupting the flow of this crude to Cuba by pressuring Onassis and other independent shipping operators to refuse to carry the Soviet oil. It was predicted that such a plan would force the USSR (then facing a shortage of tanker bottoms in the world market) to transport its own crude to Cuba and to "provide technicians and make modifications in existing refineries to process their crude." This, in turn, was supposed to alienate Venezuela and Mexico, normally among Cuba's crude suppliers.* 39/

---

* The Agency's real petroleum expertise and knowledgeability -- both technically and economically -- on a worldwide basis was in the Fuels and Power Branch (later the Fuel's Branch) of the Office of Research and Reports (later the Office of Economic Research). Aside from the constant irritation of having to work half in the dark in response to WH/D or WH/4, ORR/F&P was constantly having to correct errors, to make apologies, or mend fences with the major US petroleum companies as a result of the lack of coordination between DDP and DDI components.

In addition to petroleum refineries as targets for sabotage, plans were also made to disrupt the Cuban microwave system. Unlike the plans to disrupt the Cuban petroleum industry -- which would directly involve properties of the international oil companies -- the sabotage program for the microwave networks, as late as February of 1961, specifically stated that attacks should be limited to the Cuban operated net with "hands off RCA and Dumont systems, which are to remain intact for later consideration." 40/ Also prohibited were attacks under Agency sponsorship on Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets located in Cuba. J. C. King protested that attacks on Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets by resistance forces not controlled by the Agency were far less efficient than such attacks would be if they were mounted through Agency efforts. 41/

---

* In fact, the Cuban refinery technicians themselves did an excellent job of adapting the plants to the use of Soviet crude. The former manager of the Standard Oil refinery commented to this effect after reviewing the all source intelligence materials available on the plant. He was pleased -- at least in one sense -- to note that Standard's training program has apparently been quite successful!

In addition to planning for sabotage, WH Division's anti-Castro activity also included extensive plans for the formation of goon squads throughout much of Latin America in an attempt to counter the pro-Castro elements of the various nations. This goon squad program also was of considerable interest to the Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell. Because of its areawide nature, the activities of the goon squads were run out of WH/D rather than out of WH/4. Among the operations which WH claimed credit for were the following: The disruption in Mexico City of about 400 Castro sympathizers gathered to celebrate the 26th of July movement through the use of stink bombs set off in the meeting place; in Lima, Peru a counter demonstration against some 200 Castro sympathizers also gathered to celebrate the 26th of July movement; and in San Jose, Costa Rica, "A meeting of the *Amigos de Cuba* was broken up by an agent at the Station, who sprayed the two principal speakers, prominent Costa Rican leftists with 'Who, Me?'."* 42/

Among other assets which Chief, WH/D chose to mention in the same context with the goon squads were the Secretary to the President of one Latin American country:

> Who can promote action of any of the National Security Forces.

In another country, an:

> Agency member integrated into the Public Safety Program serving as an Advisor to the President on Security matters is in a position to recommend police action to the President.** 43/

In what may have been a ploy intended principally to obtain a vessel for use in infil-exfil operations, rather than in direct action programs against Cuba, representatives of the Special Projects Group, Counterintelligence made a pitch to Chief, JMATE to acquire a vessel which -- for its acquisition, operational maintenance, crew, including incentive bonus would run roughly $200,000 for a 6-month period -- could also be used in deception operations against Castro. In responding to this suggestion from the Special Projects Group, Col. Jack Hawkins quickly put the quietus on this request, noting that it was doubtful that the Cubans had either enough sophisticated radar or commo gear so that they would react to "the false radar presentation, deceptive communications traffic, noise makers, signals, smoke, explosions, etc." Consequently Hawkins concluded:

---

* "Who, Me?" was an obnoxious scent.

** In light of subsequent investigations of CIA Activities by the Senate Select Committee in the mid 1970's, it is interesting that the reference to the "Action Squads" described above also included with reference to the Dominican Republic an agent:

> In contact with a group of dissidents capable of violent action, including assassination. This group has killed a number of agents of the *Servicio de Inteligencia Militar* (SIM), Dominican Secret Police. 45/

> In view of the high cost involved, and the other factors mentioned above, I do not concur in the acquisition of this craft for deception purposes as proposed in the reference. 46/

Part VI

Mr. Nixon's Role

Like so many other aspects of the Bay of Pigs story a great deal has been said about the role that Richard M. Nixon played in the operation during the course of his Vice Presidency, but woefully little solid evidence has ever appeared to verify either the *pros* or *cons* on the subject. Because of the continuing repetition of many of these stories, a careful search was undertaken of the voluminous CIA records of the operation in order to recover those items pertaining to Nixon's participation directly or indirectly -- through his aides, assistants, or correspondence -- in the Bay of Pigs operation.

During the course of his unofficial visit to the United States in the spring of 1959, Fidel Castro accepted the invitation of the Vice President of the United States to meet with Mr. Nixon in his official office in the Capitol for an informal discussion. Nixon has stated that the meeting was arranged at the request of the Secretary of State Herter, who suggested that the administration might profit if one of its leaders could gain additional inside information about what made Castro tick.

Nixon has said that he had a 3 1/2 hour meeting with Castro on 19 April 1959 and that as a result of the meeting, he prepared a 4-page secret memorandum and sent copies to President Eisenhower, Secretary Herter and to Allen Dulles.* 1/ In part at least, Mr. Nixon's version of the meeting with Castro was made public as early as November 1964 in an article he wrote for the *Reader's Digest*, and these views were repeated in somewhat more detail in his recent memoirs, *RN*. The thrust of the meeting was that Nixon was emphasizing the need for Castro to establish a democratic form of government as he (Nixon) understood it, with Castro on the other hand emphasizing that the type of government he believed in was that which was expressed most vocally by the people. Nixon's most widely known remark about Castro as a result of that meeting was his statement that: "Castro is incredibly naive about communism, or is under communist discipline." Reportedly Castro was not particularly enchanted with the meeting either, for according to a member of his party when Castro emerged from the meeting he "was angry. He swore and added, 'This man has spent the whole time scolding me'."* 2/

---

* In his *Reader's Digest* article of November 1964 Nixon indicated that copies of the memorandum went to the three individuals as noted in the text above, however, in his recent Memoirs, *RN*, Nixon states that a copy also went to John Foster Dulles. John Foster Dulles was technically Secretary of State until 22 April 1959, on which date he was succeeded by Christian Herter. At the time of the meeting between Nixon and Castro, however, Mr. Herter had been acting in Mr. Dulles' place. Dulles's death occurred 24 May 1959.

Subsequent to his meeting with Castro in April of 1959, Agency records do not reflect any particular interest on the part of the Vice President in Cuban activities until the end of January 1960. On 27 January, and again on 23 February, Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, briefed Gen. Robert Cushman, Mr. Nixon's Aide, at the Vice President's Office. Cushman made it clear that the Vice President was interested in supporting anti-Castro groups both within and outside of Cuba, including goon squads or other direct action groups to match against the pro-Castro groups in Cuba.

---

* It was only after making a direct request to Mr. Nixon that a copy of the memorandum was obtained. No copies were found in the files of CIA, State, or the Eisenhower Library. The copy obtained was from Mr. Nixon's personal files. The memorandum was, in fact, classified CONFIDENTIAL rather than SECRET. A copy of the memorandum is attached as Appendix F . 2a/

Among the other subjects discussed with General Cushman on 23 February 1960 were propaganda attacks on the Castro government and the possibilities of economic sanctions similar to those which had been suggested by former Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland, whose views on the need for economic sanctions had not only been discussed with Agency representatives, but also had been forwarded to the Vice President's office.

Another facet of the Agency's anti-Castro efforts which were of some interest to the Vice-President were CIA's relations with the Department of State, which obviously was not one of the Vice President's favorite organizations; but Col. King made it quite clear that all of CIA's actions were undertaken only after policy approval. 3/ After it was pointed out to Gen. Cushman that the Department of State's knowledgeability about Agency operations was on a strict "need-to-know" basis, even for the Ambassador in Cuba, Cushman then showed Col. King some derogatory information that the FBI had provided the Vice President about both Ambassador Bonsal and William Wieland of the Bureau of American Republic Affairs. Col. King's memorandum provided no details about the nature of this information, but the probability is that both were accussed of being too tolerant of Castro and communists. 4/

During one of these meetings in the early part of 1960, Gen. Cushman noted that the Vice President had suggested that possibly the Agency would want to consult with, or acquire the services of, Col. Edward Lansdale, a member of Gen. Erskine's Special Operations Staff in the Department of Defense. Lansdale's activities in helping to quell the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, apparently were well known to Nixon. 5/

On 2 March 1960, the Director of Central Intelligence gave Vice President Nixon a detailed briefing on "What We are Doing in Cuba." The 7-page briefing paper which had been given to the Director provided information on Castro's pro-communist proclivities, on the whole range of the anti-Castro propaganda effort which was being supported by Agency financing, and went into details concerning attempts to rally anti-Castro support, not only in the other Latin American nations, but in the Near and Far East and in Africa. Details were given on the preparations being made for resistance activities including the acquisition of training bases in third countries, and both Ydigoras Fuentes, President of Guatemala, and President Luis Somoza of Nicaragua were noted as having made offers of support for this country's anti-Castro activities.

Plans for economic warfare against Castro were also outlined for the Vice President. Delaying deliveries of necessary spare parts for the sugar industry, tightening credit by oil companies to restrict delivery of the essential petroleum products, and possible restriction in sugar quotas were mentioned as under study. One other item which was mentioned in this briefing for Vice President Nixon was the fact that the Agency had "a drug, which if placed in Castro's food, would make him behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damaging results to him." 6/ It should be emphasized that at the date of this briefing (2 March 1960), the United States did not yet have an *official* anti-Castro policy -- that would not come until 17 March of 1960. Subsequent to that announced policy, the author has found no other references to drugs or other types of attack which were being considered upon Castro's person, or the persons of any of the other Cuban leaders, as a part of the Agency's official program.*

There is some question as to whether it was the Director of Central Intelligence himself, or whether it was Mr. Bissell, or, perhaps, whether it was Col. King who actually briefed the Vice President on 2 March 1960. A stamp on the copy of the original Memorandum for the Director reads: "Noted by DCI 28 March 1960." This copy was sent to the DCI through the DDP and carries Mr. Bissell's initials. The carbon of the memorandum does not show this stamp and the presumption is that it was the Director who did the briefing. A third version of the memorandum is dated 8 March 1960 and was revised to read:

---

* See Part VII of this Volume of the History of the Bay of Pigs Operation for clarification of the definition of the Agency's *official* policy regarding the anti-Castro program, as contrasted to the *unofficial* program. The author assumes that regardless of reader's biases regarding the former Vice President, that the fact that he heard about this drug in the course of a briefing will not be construed to make him a member of a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other of the Cuban leaders.

> For the Director's use at the NSC 5412 Representatives Meeting which will consider the Cuban covert action program paper. (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon's briefing.)

This would seem to imply that perhaps the DCI did in fact do the briefing. While the briefer may not be positively identified, there is no question however, that the Vice President did receive a detailed briefing on the Agency's plan for action against Castro prior to the time of Eisenhower's formal proclamation.*

In addition to the meeting of 2 March when Mr. Nixon was briefed on the Agency's concerns about Cuba, the Vice President was also a participant in the 10 March 1960 meeting of the National Security Council when President Eisenhower emphasized that Cuba was a danger, that he wanted contingency plans drawn up, and that he wanted Cuba to be a subject for review at all future National Security Council Meetings. Mr. Nixon attended the 17 March 1960 conference when the President gave a formal "go" to the Covert Action Plan of the Agency which had been agreed to by the 5412 Group. Mr. Nixon's only reported comments during this meeting concerned the cutting off of new capital to Cuba, the pulling out of private American firms, and the possibilities of reducing tourism to stop the flow of American dollars into Cuba. 7/

---

* See Appendix G for copies of the first page of each of the three memorandums on the briefing of the Vice President on 2 March 1960. (For Appendix G see p. 344).

Perhaps one of the reasons why Vice President Nixon has been attributed with playing a major role in the Bay of Pigs activity has to do with the relationship between Nixon's office and Mr. William D. Pawley, former US Ambassador to Peru and Brazil and a US businessman with extensive investments in Cuba and interests in various other parts of Latin America. Pawley also was a principal contributor to the Republican party, particularly to Mr. Nixon's cause. Apparently hopeful of an appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs -- assuming a Republican party victory in the 1960 presidential election -- Pawley was a widely known conservative.

In the spring of 1960, shortly following President Eisenhower's decision to promote the anti-Castro program, Pawley's contacts with the Agency (particularly with WHD) and with Nixon's office became increasingly frequent and apparently quite close. On 21 March 1960, four days after formal approval of the anti-Castro program, Jake Esterline met with Pawley to plan a meeting to be held in Pawley's Miami residence which would include the DCI, Col. King, Gen. Cushman, and Walter J. Donnelly, Vice President of United States Steel and former ambassador to Venezuela as well as Mr. Pawley. Of the session with Pawley, Chief, WH/4 wrote:

> Details and the agenda were not discussed other than to say the principal emphasis would be on reviewing what work could be done throughout the hemisphere and public opinion on the pending operation against Castro. Mr. Pawley was told that the time had arrived for careful coordination of all activities; that permission had been granted for an all-out operation; a government in exile will be formed post haste; that the acceptable non-Batista groups will be put into contact with each other almost immediately; and that Mr. Pawley's contact, Rubio Padilla, will figure prominently in this effort ... It was carefully explained to Mr. Pawley that any action involving exiles now should be most carefully coordinated with Chief, WHD and Chief, Branch 4 to avoid any flaps.* 8/

---

* Esterline also mentioned in his memorandum that Pawley had provided some information on the Dominican Republic which he asked Esterline not to pass beyond CIA until he, Pawley, had the opportunity to give the information directly to Vice President Nixon.

The meeting mentioned in the foregoing paragraph was convened in Pawley's Miami residence on 1 April 1960, and the Agency's representatives briefed, among other things, on the problems being faced by the Cubans in exile who were trying to form a government. There was considerable discussion as to who should be the nominal leaders of this government in exile, with Pawley pushing in particular for Dr. Rubio Padilla and the Agency's representatives suggesting Dr. Antonio Varona. For the benefit of the Vice President's representative, it was stressed that none of the Latin American countries seemed particularly anxious to provide a base of operations for the government in exile. The group was informed by the Director of Central Intelligence and by Col. King that, in addition to US Government financing, arrangements were being made to have private confidential sources help defray the costs of the Cuban government in exile. Col. King pointed out that over and above a bond issue

> which will be floated in the name of the government in exile with Mr. Pawley's help, that donations are being made by private citizens and corporations. He indicated that confidential arrangements

> have already been made with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to permit individuals or corporate entities making donations to claim these donations as contributions to the US Government for tax purposes. He cautioned that this arrangement was being limited to a very small group. 9/

The question also was raised about the relationship of the anti-Castro program to the Organization of American States. Mr. Pawley suggested that rather than lean toward the OAS, better use should be made of the US Military Mission in the Latin American countries, especially having them pass the word on about the dangers of the Castro Government to one and all in the Western Hemisphere. Other items of importance that were discussed by the group were the planned propaganda program and "the present pathetic effort on the part of the Catholic Church to face up to the Communist plot in Cuba."

This meeting demonstrated that from the very outset of the formalization of a US anti-Castro policy Mr. Nixon was being fully informed of the plans that were underway to accomplish the US objectives, and that certain private American citizens were closely involved in the planning. Within a very short time after the April meeting at Pawley's residence, however, senior Agency personnel -- notably C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A -- began to question the Agency's relationship with Mr. William Pawley, particularly as Pawley's support for Rubio Padilla was apparently intended to establish a group of Pawley supported Cubans in exile in opposition to the FRD, the Agency's supported exile group. Barnes's concern was that if the US continued to support the extremely conservative element represented by Pawley's group, it would be charged that any anti-Castro action undertaken by the US would be "on the basis of protecting economic royalists."

What Barnes stressed to Mr. Bissell, the DDP, was the need for the US to decide whether or not it wished to be charged with supporting reactionary movements in Latin America, not only in Cuba, but in the rest of the Central American and Caribbean areas as well. Once having made up its own mind, Barnes suggested that CIA's position be worked out with State "and thereafter take it to Mr. Nixon, giving him at that time, a thorough and complete briefing so that there can be no doubt in his mind as to where we stand, and what we propose to do."* 10/

When Rubio Padilla and the FRD failed to get together, Pawley informed Chief, Western Hemisphere Division that he was withdrawing from support of the Agency's anti-Castro operation; and Pawley told Col. King that he intended to make his views regarding the FRD known to Vice President Nixon. In addition, Pawley also had a meeting with President Eisenhower on 12 or 13 May 1960 at which time he stated his opinions with regard to the Dominican Republic and probably with reference to Cuba. In view of Pawley's recalcitrance to continue to work on the funding of the FRD, the DDP, ADDP/A, Chief WH/D, Chief WH/4 and others, discussed the *pros* and *cons* of cutting off the communications channel between Pawley and the Rubio groups into Cuba -- a channel which was provided by the Agency's communications facility.

Chief, WH Division got the group to agree that the communications channel should be continued because it did provide a window to the activities of the Pawley group. Moreover, the Pawley group had a duplicate channel into Cuba and would not necessarily have been restricted by denial of the Agency channel. A restriction was placed on the transmittal of communications which would be prejudicial to CIA operations in Cuba; but it was agreed that Pawley should be advised of the cancellation of such messages by Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. The monitoring of such cable traffic, however, was to be the responsibility of Chief, WH/4, Jake Esterline.

---

* Mr. Barnes's thoughts probably were transmitted to Director Dulles for in a meeting of the Special Group on 19 May 1960, the DCI categorized the Cubans supported by Pawley as "unreconstructed reactionaries." 10a/

Because of Pawley's close ties to the Eisenhower administration, the Deputy Director for Plans agreed that the discussion regarding Pawley should be brought to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence and that Mr. Dulles should be urged to bring this matter before both President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon. 11/ By the first week of June 1960, however, Jake Esterline apparently had reached the end of his tether, for in a Memorandum to the DDP, he wrote:

> It is our firm conviction, based on months of discussion, that Mr. Pawley's views on the Cuban situation are highly

> personal and rigid. These views in our opinion are inimical to the best interest of the United States. Mr. Pawley has refused to budge from his position and has continued to seek official endorsement of his views at the high levels of the government. The flagrant disregard for security reflected in Havana cable 4820 dated 4 June 1960 requires Chief, JMARC to recommend that all contact with the Rubio-Pawley group be immediately and finally severed. If such action is not taken, no guarantee can be made for the security of the JMARC operation. In point of fact, the information in the foregoing message indicates that security already has been damaged severely. 12/

Among other things, the Havana cable which had aroused Chief, WH/4 stated that the following information was being circulated in anti-Castro circles in Cuba:

> US Government now backing Rubio group and no other group. Group has entre to Veep. For a time Pawley was having trouble with an Agency or Agencies who wanted [to] back another junta, but after Pawley offered [to] withdraw completely, he was talked out of doing so, and given assurance his group only would be backed, [and this] resulted resignation person backing other group. 13/

Headquarters prepared a priority cable to be sent to both Havana and to the Forward Operations Base, which had also picked up the disinformation being spread by the anti-FRD group. The text of the cable read in part as follows:

> You have been authoritatively advised that US Government is not (repeat not) backing Rubio group and that it has no intention of ever doing so. It complete fabrication that Pawley was given US Government assurance that only his group would be backed. No resignations of any kind occurred, nor are any foreseen. Mention Veep in such context and on this particular level sheer foolhardiness and can only reflect most adversely on those Cubans who guilty misrepresentation of facts and severest indiscretions. 14/

The cable apparently was never forwarded to either Havana or to Miami, presumably because of opposition from Col. J. C. King who had noted and initialed on his copy of the Memorandum from Jake Esterline recommending that all contact with the Rubio-Pawley group be "immediately and finally severed" the following: "I do not concur with severing of all contacts."* 15/

---

* As will be noted subsequently, whether it was political expediency or conviction that Pawley could actually do some good, the relationship among Pawley, Chief, WH Division, and Chief, WH/4 continued throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation. If anything in fact, the relationship between Pawley and Jake Esterline appears to have become mutually supportive, particularly as the operation drew to its unsuccessful conclusion.

On 20 June 1960 at the request of General Cushman, Jake Esterline joined him for lunch, the purpose being to provide the General with sufficient information on the state of the anti-Castro program so that he could bring the Vice President up to date from the time of the Miami meeting that had taken place at William Pawley's house.* Among the points covered were the developments related to the organization of the FRD and the fact that Mr. William Pawley's candidate, Señor Rubio, had decided not to join the Frente. According to Esterline's memorandum:

> Dr. Rubio's failure to join the Frente, however, has not held up progress in forming the junta, and/or the other important aspects of the operation.

General Cushman was told that the Frente's headquarters were to be established in Mexico, and it was on this occasion that Esterline introduced General Cushman to E. Howard Hunt, who was going to move to Mexico with the Frente.**

---

* The meeting of 21 March 1960.

** Insofar as can be determined, this probably was the first occasion on which Richard Nixon heard the name of E. Howard Hunt.

Chief, WH/4 also touched on the programs that were being beamed out of Swan Island, on the preparation being made for training paramilitary types, base communications, planned paramilitary activities, the choice of a Third Country's staging area, and that the operation was still scheduled to begin during the month of November 1960. Gen. Cushman noted that the Vice President requested this information in order to prepare for an upcoming NSC meeting at which he would be a senior official. The Vice President's aide also asked if there were any particular problems with relation to the operation that Chief, WH/4 wished to have brought to the attention of the Vice President. Esterline reported that the only problems that had occurred concerned political differences among the exiles, but that for the moment all factions seemed to be quiescent. Chief, WH/4 also indicated to Gen. Cushman "that much had yet to be done vis-a-vis other countries in the hemisphere to ensure that JMARC would have adequate support at the eleventh hour."* 16/

On 22 June 1960, General Cabell -- Acting DCI at the time -- briefed a special meeting of the National Security Council on the Cuban situation. The Vice

---

* Except for Guatemala and Nicaragua, such support would never be forthcoming.

President presided and the meeting was attended by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Director of the Office of Civil & Defense Mobilization, the Acting Attorney General, a representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, among others, Messrs. Bissell, King, Esterline, and McMahan of the Central Intelligence Agency.* 17/

A great deal of the briefing was devoted to the FRD and its leadership -- their policies, their background, and the internal difficulties and bickering. The propaganda picture also was discussed, with particular emphasis again on radio broadcasts from Swan Island. Gen. Cabell stated that the paramilitary plan was to develop a force of 500 men who would be divided into 25 20-man teams. The teams would go into Cuba to organize and to train indigenous dissident groups. Cabell emphasized that the implementation of the paramilitary program depended on the existence of viable dissident forces which "have not emerged in strength."

---

* Knight McMahan was on the Staff of the Deputy Director for Intelligence -- that component of the Central Intelligence Agency which, according to some of the "authorities" on the Bay of Pigs, was presumably uninformed and unaware of the Agency's anti-Castro program.

The ADCI also mentioned the plans to create an anti-Castro air force, but his comments about this air force (even at this time) were very much in error. According to General Cabell:

> Some trained Cuban fliers are currently available and we hope soon to have access to additional numbers. "Sterile" aircraft for their use have been mothballed by the Department of Defense and earmarked for CIA use. These craft can be made available in a matter of hours. 18/

As reported in an earlier volume of this history, neither the aircraft nor trained Cuban pilots would be available for missions against Castro's Cuba until late in the fall of 1960.*

In the NSC briefing, Cabell also made some interesting comments about the resistance that might be encountered in an attempt to oust Castro, emphasizing that intelligence reports had indicated that Cuba might organize "a 'foreign legion' comprised of highly trained regular military personnel, drawn from Communist nations, mainly the eastern satellites. Should this eventuality occur it would seriously affect the probable success of any purely clandestine paramilitary operations." Cabell then introduced a suggestion which would be heard right up to the time that the invasion fleet was being boarded -- that "volunteers" be acquired for the anti-Castro forces, such volunteers to be drawn from US Special Forces.* 18a/

---

* See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, *Air Operations*.

As the presiding officer at the special National Security Council meeting, Vice President Nixon raised a number of questions with the Department of State representatives concerning support that the Organization of American States would likely give to this country's anti-Castro efforts; and he also posed a series of questions concerning the economic pressures that the United States might put on Cuba. The questions concerned sugar, oil, and tariffs in particular; and the Vice President urged that "strong, positive action [be taken] to avoid becoming labeled "Uncle Sucker." 19/

---

* No such volunteers were permitted in the case of the ground forces, but in the last two days of the Bay of Pigs Operation such volunteers were accepted for combat air operations. See Volume I of this History, *Air Operations*.

On 1 July 1960, Jake Esterline received an interesting telephone call from General Cushman, containing two messages from the Vice President. First, Mr. Nixon was interested to know if there were any obstacles that the Agency was encountering vis-a-vis other agencies in support of JMATE; and if there were, the Vice President indicated that he personally would help to resolve such problems. The second request

> was a bit more sticky. Gen. Cushman said that the Vice President has commissioned him to keep Mr. William Pawley happy and, in connection with this, he has also been instructed to keep Mr. Pawley briefed on how things are moving. General Cushman said he realized that this is much against our desire, as concerns Mr. Pawley, but the fact remains that he [Pawley] is a "big fat political cat" and, as such, the Vice President cannot completely ignore him. 20/

Esterline allowed that he understood the General's problem and suggested that with a few hours advance warning the Agency would provide the Vice President, or the General, with such briefing materials as necessary for any given meeting with Mr. Pawley -- after first clearing the paper with the appropriate agency officials and within the security regulations that applied to Mr. Pawley. Esterline indicated in his memorandum that he immediately informed the Deputy Director for Plans, and the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Barnes, respectively, about the call from General Cushman.*

Jake Esterline apparently took the Vice President's offer to help CIA with difficulties it might have with other agencies to heart. In a memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes, concerning a more effective commercial cover for Radio Swan, it appears, from Barnes's response, that Esterline must have suggested that the services of Vice President Nixon be engaged to resolve a difficulty between the Agency and the FCC over the use of commercial advertising to make

---

* The following interesting comments also appeared in Esterline's memorandum on the conversation with General Cushman:

> This information [regarding Cushman's telephone call] could not be given to Col. King, as he had just departed on a three-day trip. This memorandum will be available to Col. King, however, upon his return Wednesday, 6 July.

Contrary to the opinions of many who have suggested that Col. J. C. King was read out of the anti-Castro operation, this memorandum would indicate that, in fact, extreme care was being taken to make sure that J. C. King was read into the act.

Swan appear more legitimate. Barnes, however, took exception and recommended that the US Government should consider overt sponsorship of the Swan broadcasts.* 21/

It was also in July 1960 that Vice President Nixon's office, principally through the person of General Cushman, first indicated an interest in the activities of one Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. Garcia was a Cuban exile who claimed to have extensive backing both within the Cuban community in Miami and among dissidents inside Cuba. At one point he claimed that he could raise a force of 2,000 men in the Miami area and 10,000 men inside of Cuba -- if he were given proper financial support for training and equipping these men. Garcia's name first came before the Agency in mid-June 1960 following a meeting he had with a Cuban exile who was an Agency contact. During this initial meeting Garcia claimed that he had large stores of military equipment in Spain, that he had additional promises of assistance from General Franco, and that he had contacts in the White House who had given him the "go ahead" for an invasion of Cuba!

---

* Whether the FCC was chastened by Mr. Nixon or whether a determination was made concerning the increased use of commercial advertising for Radio Swan is left in doubt. But Barnes's suggestion of official USG participation in Swan was rejected. A note from Esterline on the official routing slip from Barnes forwarding this memorandum read: "I believe Mr. Bissell reversed this position?" To this query King noted "Yes" on the buck slip.

Word of Garcia apparently got to the FBI, to General Cabell, and apparently to the Office of Vice President Nixon. In any event, on 9 July 1960 Jake Esterline met with Mr. Marshall Diggs, a Washington lawyer and Garcia's sponsor, where he was told of Garcia's grandiose plans to overthrow Castro. In a follow-up meeting in Diggs's office on 11 July, Mr. Phillip Toomey, WH/4/Prop met with Garcia, Cameron Pulley, and two reputed underwater demolitions experts. Garcia went into his act about how his force could overthrow the Castro Government, assuming that he could get some financial assistance for training and equipping the troops. Mr. Pulley proceeded to tell Mr. Toomey that Garcia's project was part of a program that was being promoted by former Senator Owen Brewster for the entire Caribbean area -- apparently a program designed to eliminate all the bad guys. Following another meeting on 13 July and after listening to Garcia denounce the FRD leaders as Communists -- as well as being unimpressed by his credentials -- on 15 July 1960, Marshall Diggs was informed that the Agency had no interest in supporting Mr. Garcia. On 20 July 1960, Chief, JMATE met with General Cushman to tell him that a full study had been made of the representatives of Señor Garcia; and as a result, the DCI probably would get in touch with Mr. Diggs and/or Senator Brewster and explain to them "the wisdom of their desisting from pushing Garcia as an outstanding Cuban military leader."

The subject dragged on, however; and at one point Mr. Pulley, who with Mr. Diggs and ex-Senator Brewster, was a strong supporter of Mr. Nixon, indicated that the administration's policies with regard to Cuba might hurt the Vice President in the upcoming election. Moreover Pulley also is reported to have indicated that a congressional investigation of the anti-Castro plan was possible. The Director of Central Intelligence was advised on 26 September that because of Garcia's threats to expose everything he had learned about possible Agency involvement in the anti-Castro effort, including the Cuban exile organization in the United States, that the time had come for Diggs and Pulley to be asked "to forego their efforts on behalf of Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga." This recommendation was approved by General C. P. Cabell on 13 October 1960.* 22/

Insofar as the available records show, the contacts between Vice President Nixon's office, and the

---

* More nonsense from Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga would surface again in the summer of 1961 following Castro's offer to free the Bay of Pigs prisoners in return for US tractors when Garcia bounced up with another proposal for the planned escape of the prisoners -- providing, of course, that he be given a bundle of bucks.

In fact, the hand of Garcia reached from beyond the grave to touch on the BOP operation. On 2 August 1976, almost a year after Garcia's death, the *Washington Star* carried a UPI dispatch saying that Rep. Thomas N. Downing (D., Va.) had affidavits claiming that:

> In return for support of the invasion [of Cuba] from Mario G. Kohly, a popular right-wing leader who was exiled from Cuba, then Vice President Nixon agreed in October 1960 to order the CIA to arrest the leftist leaders and turn them over to Kohly for "elimination" after Premier Fidel Castro was thrown out of office.

The affidavits reportedly came from a former CIA contract agent and Mario G. Kohly, Jr., son of the would-be invasion leader. These materials were supposed to have some bearing on House of Representatives's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy; but there is no indication that they were given any credence. 23/

Central Intelligence Agency -- except for the Garcia case -- for all practical purposes ended by August 1960.*

The only other significant involvement between the Vice President and the Central Intelligence Agency, prior to the change of administration on 20 January 1961, concerned a briefing of the Democratic candidates for President and Vice President of the United States, prior to the 1960 election. On 23 July 1960, following the Democratic convention, Allen Dulles briefed Sen. John Kennedy, and on 28 July Senator Lyndon Johnson. In his memorandum to President Eisenhower, who had directed that Dulles give these briefings, the DCI reported that in the two hour period for each briefing he had covered US relations with the Soviet Union, developments in the Berlin situation, in the

---

* Whether this reflects the concentration of the Vice President's activities on the upcoming November election, whether the principal contacts came to be maintained between Col. J. C. King and Nixon's office -- with the consequent reference memoranda being included in J. C. King's files, which have disappeared from the sight of God and man -- or whether, in fact, this is an accurate reflection of the limited contacts, the author cannot confirm. His inclination is to believe that the contacts probably were as limited as described above.

Congo, and in Cuba. Kennedy was briefed again on 19 September 1960, and again the briefing touched on relations with the Soviet Union and on the trouble spots in the world, including Cuba. The White House was informed of this briefing prior to the event; and subsequent to the briefing of Kennedy, Mr. Dulles reported on the meeting to both Jerry Morgan of the White House Staff and also to Brigadier General Andrew Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President. 24/

The exact nature of the briefings that Dulles gave to Kennedy on Cuba is of particular historical importance in terms of the election of 1960. In the last of the famous TV debates between candidates Nixon and Kennedy, Mr. Kennedy, in the course of condemning the Castro regime and suggesting that the United States take stronger action against Castro, made the statement that:

> We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus far, these fighters for freedom have had virtually no support from our Government. 25/

Based on his knowledge and interest in supporting the anti-Castro program that had been authorized by

President Eisenhower in March 1960, Nixon was put in a Catch-22 situation; for as he said:

> President Eisenhower had instructed Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, to brief the Democratic candidate on all operations, including Top Secret operations. I knew that Kennedy had already received two briefings from Dulles. I immediately had a member of my staff call the White House on the security line to ask if these briefings covered Cuba. A member of the White House Staff indicated they had. (Several months after the election, Allen Dulles was to state that his briefing of Kennedy had included Cuba but not the training program for Cuban exiles.) At the time of the debate, however, and after checking with the White House, I had to proceed with the assumption that Kennedy had been briefed on the secret program.
>
> I was faced with the heads-he-wins, tails-I-lose proposition. If in the TV debate I were to reveal the existence of the training program and point out that I had been one of its strongest advocates, I would pull the rug out from under Kennedy's position. But if I did so, the project would be doomed, and also the lives of the brave men, both inside and outside of Cuba, who were receiving training and assistance.
>
> I had only one choice: to protect the security of the program, I had to oppose Kennedy on his position of advocating that the United States openly aid anti-Castro forces inside and outside Cuba. 26/

It is interesting to observe that Nixon became more philosophical about the impact of the final TV debate with regard to the outcome of the 1960 election as time passed. In 1964 he would write "Most observers agree that our positions on the Cuban issue could well have been the decisive factor [in the outcome of the election]." But in his recent memoirs he expressed doubt that any single factor in such a close election could really have changed the outcome.* 27/

Following the TV debate in which Kennedy had raised the issue of assistance for Cuba, Nixon quickly lashed back at Kennedy. The result of the introduction of the Cuban issue into the late stages of the election campaign, struck sensitive nerves within the Agency; and on 26 October 1960, General Cabell met with Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, indicating that the discussion and debate about Cuban issues were touching on areas which, in the end, might be damaging to the nation's interest. On 27 October at the Special Group meeting, Mr. Gray reported that he had talked to "certain Nixon people in the White House" in an attempt to enlist their support to bring such discussions to an end. 29/

---

* In an interesting conversation with Fawn M. Brodie who is writing a Nixon biography, the author of this history, in response to Brodie's concern about the fact that Nixon knowingly lied to the American public, emphasized that plausible deniability was of real concern at the time of the TV debate. He also emphasized the Catch-22 aspect of the situation as explained by Nixon. The author also suggested to Mrs. Brodie that it seemed equally valid to infer that perhaps Kennedy had been leaked detailed information about the anti-Castro program and that he used this device to put Nixon in a corner during the TV debate. Arthur Schlesinger, of course, claimed that the Kennedy comments "were no more than a rhetorical flourish. Neither Kennedy nor his staff knew about the secret Cuban Army in Guatemala." 28/

It was not until 18 November 1960 that President-elect John F. Kennedy was fully briefed by Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, on the extent of the anti-Castro activities being planned by the United States Government. 30/ Mr. Nixon's misconception of the extent of the briefing that Kennedy had received in the pre-election period was not finally clarified however, until 20 March 1962 when Allen Dulles addressed a memorandum to John A. McCone, his successor as Director of Central Intelligence, stating as follows:

> I have read the portions of Mr. Nixon's book with regard to the intelligence briefings which he understood Senator Kennedy had been given by me with respect to Cuba during the campaign. I have also seen the White House statement issued today on this subject.
>
> There has been here, I believe, an honest misunderstanding. This was probably due to the nature of the message Mr. Nixon writes he received as to these briefings. The Cuban situation was, of course, dealt with in the briefings I gave to Senator Kennedy. The last briefing I gave him was over a month before the debate in which the issue arose.
>
> My briefings were intelligence briefings on the world situation. They did not cover our own Government's plans or programs for action -- overt or covert. 31/

As previously noted, however, by 1964, if not earlier, Mr. Nixon had accepted the fact that he had made an error in assuming that Kennedy had received a more detailed briefing than in fact he truly had.

By way of concluding this segment on Richard Nixon's involvement in the Bay of Pigs activity, it should be clear that by no stretch of the imagination was Nixon "the architect of the Bay of Pigs."* 32/

---

* A statement made to DCI Stansfield Turner by Fawn Brodie who attributed it to Tom Braden, an old CIA man, in a TV documentary on the CIA made by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

It is equally clear that Mr. Nixon, principally through his aide, General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., was fully read into the plans that were being developed by the Central Intelligence Agency for the ouster of Fidel Castro. This interest was especially strong in the period from the winter of 1960 through the late summer of 1960. It also should be apparent to the reader that while some of the Vice President's interest -- particularly in his insistence on placating William Pawley, especially in giving undue attention to Pawley's concerns that the Agency-sponsored Cuban-exile organization was being taken over by the pro-Communist groups -- was politically motivated, his basic concern was the fear of the establishment of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. Certainly his constant interest and offers to provide help for the Agency in its relations to other branches of the US Government fall into the latter, rather than the former, category. The unanswerable question, of course, is whether Cuban Communism would play such a large role in international affairs in 1979, particularly in the third world countries, if Richard Nixon had been elected President in 1960.*

---

* Indicative of the more forceful role that Nixon would have had the US play was the comment that he reportedly made to William Pawley several weeks before the 1960 election, when Nixon indicated that he favored breaking relations with Cuba -- at that time -- recognizing a Government-in-exile, and then assisting that Government in its efforts to oust Castro. 33/

Part VII

The Question of Assassinations

In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, Intelligence Activities, Richard M. Bissell, formerly CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, testified fully and completely to the role that he, Sheffield Edwards, and William Harvey played in negotiations with Robert Maheu and Mafia figures John Rosselli and Momo Salvatore Giancana on plans for the assassination of Fidel Castro. In addition to the individuals just named, it also appears highly probable that Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence (and possibly both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy) was aware that Castro was an assassination target. Unfortunately the Senate Committee Report and the media coverage of the investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency's participation in assassination plots made it appear that the Mafia involvement was a fundamental part of the Agency's response to President Eisenhower's March 1960 authorization for CIA to be principally responsible for the ouster of Fidel Castro. In fact, the activities of

Messrs. Bissell, Edwards, and Harvey, with Maheu and the Mafia remained strictly compartmented and isolated from the officially authorized Project JMARC -- the Project which came to be known as the Bay of Pigs operation. Bissell himself stated:

> I don't remember. I have no recollection that [there was] any specific other plot against Castro during this period when the Bay of Pigs operation was in preparation. I do remember my own feeling that the Mafia plot had a very modest chance for success, and that it was not something to be depended on in any way. I don't remember others. 1/

Bissell also told the author of this history that:

> Shef [Col. Sheffield Edwards, Director, Office of Security] would occasionally let me know what was going on [vis-a-vis the Mafia]. In effect, he and his immediate subordinate were case officers for that activity; and I don't think anybody else [was] involved. I think probably Tracy [Barnes] may have known about it, but I don't think anybody else involved with the Bay of Pigs operation knew anything about it, whatever. My recollection is that it never went to the Special Group, and that is the view of [McGeorge] Bundy.* 2/

---

* Interestingly enough, at the same time that Col. Edwards was concerned about the elimination of Castro, CIA's Deputy Director for Support, Col. L. K. White, noted:

> Shef Edwards and I met with General Cabell and Jack Earman [on 22 March 1961] to point out to them that we were not

(footnote continued on following page)

Jacob D. Esterline, who was Chief, WH/4, the component of Western Hemisphere Division specifically created to run the anti-Castro project, disclaimed either responsibility or knowledgeability about the Mafia connection.* 4/ Richard D. Drain, who became Chief of Operations for WH/4 was more voluble on the subject of the assassination attempts which were reported by the Senate Select Committee. In an interview which touched, among other things on the planned assassination of Castro by the Mafia-types Drain commented:

> furnishing the Director the personal protection which we should be furnishing in these critical times, particularly with regard to the dangers inherent in the Cuban situation. General Cabell agreed to talk with the Director about this, and to try to obtain his approval to increase Mr. Tighe's force to six people. 3/

* Esterline claimed that on one occasion as Chief, WH/4 he refused to grant Col. J. C. King, Chief, WH Division, a blank check when King refused to tell Jake the purpose for which the check was intended. Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN number from the Office of Finance and that the money was used to pay the Mafia-types. It was subsequent to the Bay of Pigs operation when he found out about this, and Esterline told the author of this history that he expressed his strong opposition to the funding of such activities to J. C. King. 5/

I've been giving you lessons here about [how] a COPS should know a little about everything ... Well, I promise you, until it came out in 1975, this allegation, at least, that Shef Edwards and Mr. Maheu were working with the Mafia to assassinate Castro, concurrent with the Bay of Pigs Operation, that is the first time I ever heard about it. Ever! ... My thought, when I saw this, was Jesus Christ, I must have been a little over-compartmented, because we had spent a considerable amount of nervous energy figuring out how are we going to get a shot at the old son-of-a-bitch concurrent with the landing. If anybody with whom I participated in planning for that ... something that we never had figured out how to do, because so many of our agents went down just prior to the invasion. If anybody that was involved in that ever spoke a word about any other exercise going on to get Castro, I never heard it; and my initial reaction when all this came out, during this last year was ... well ... why did they give me the idiot treatment? Then it occurred to me that maybe there was very good reason for me not to know. You don't need to know ... compartmentation ... even from COPS is not unheard of ...

Well, mind you, I am not saying what I've just said in any kind of pique; and I certainly don't want to leave you -- or this tape recorder -- with the impression that had I known about this, I would have been opposed. I must say, I don't think I would have enjoyed the instrument very much -- whereas we put out an awful lot of bullshit to the Cubans about the restoration of democracy and all that. Those Cubans, that were working with us were not, I submit, working for the re-establishment of the Mafia as a controlling factor in Havana. I had a helluva lot rather, in

> contemplating the assassination of Castro, contemplated in the way that we were contemplating it -- that is, can we get a Rip Robertson close to him? Can we get a really hairy Cuban -- I mean a gutsy Cuban -- to be infiltrated with this one thing in mind? We surveyed all of our agent material to see who could take a shot at him, but the assassination of that charismatic guy, coincidental with the invasion, would have been a highly desirable thing. Whether the instrument to be picked should have included the Mafia, I think I might have questioned at the time. It was part of my job ... to ask, "Now wait a minute ... What are we doing here? ... If this comes out ... what will we look like?" Not only to ourselves, which is important, but to the Cubans." 6/

In light of Drain's comments about the desirability of having the good guys in the white hats eliminate Castro, rather than the Mafia guys in the black hats, a specific attempt was made to see what the official records revealed about such plans. Although far from satisfactory or complete, there is evidence to indicate that the white-hatted guys would have had no objection -- as reported by Mr. Drain -- if a successful assassination attempt could have been made. Contrary to General Cabell's reported put down of Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant for Merchant's query about the possibilities of taking "direct positive action" against the Castro brothers and Che Guevara, WH/4 records reveal interest, and possibly limited, direct participation, in a number of such activities.*

For the most part, however, the various pieces of evidence that seemed to implicate WH/4 in assassination plots against Castro or other of the Cuban leaders proved to be cold trails. The peripatetic Howard Hunt claimed, even prior to the Senate investigations, that after a visit to Havana in the spring of 1960, he prepared a report recommending among other things that the Agency should:

> Assassinate Castro before or coincident with the invasion (a task for Cuban patriots) ... Barnes and Bissell read my report ... and said it would weigh in the final planning ... So far as I have been able to determine no coherent plan was ever developed within CIA to assassinate

---

* As the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Cabell pointed out to Mr. Merchant that such action was highly dangerous both in conception and execution, and, further, he indicated that it was beyond the Agency's capability. 7/ The Senate Select Committee chased its tail at some length over the interpretation of the term "direct positive action," as used by Merchant. Only someone (even a Senator) who consistently engaged and in omphaloskepsis would have a problem understanding the meaning to be anything other than assassination.

> Castro, but it was the heart's desire of many exile groups.* 8/

In another instance, it appeared possible that an agent named Rivero, a Cuban exile, might have been in training to make an assassination attempt because it was reported that he

> was taken to the Warrington [*sic*], Virginia firing range where he was checked out in the use of the Special .38 Airweight semi-hammerless pistol; British Welrod pistol, single shot, a 9mm parabellum with silencer; carbine with folding stock; and a 7.65mm British Welrod with silencer. He is to be also checked out this week in the use of a sporting rifle with telescopic lens attachment.

It was revealed subsequently that upon his reinfiltration into Havana, Rivero had two principal sabotage missions -- one against the Esso refinery and the other aimed at the Havana Electric Company. 9/

In mid-July 1960, there reportedly was an internal Cuban attempt on Castro's life, an attempt in which neither WH/4 nor the Mafia played a part. A cable from Santiago de Cuba reported:

---

* Hunt alleged that when he asked Barnes about the status of his recommendation he was told that it was "in the hands of a special group." Jake Esterline and Jim Flannery (Executive Officer of the DDP at the time of the Bay of Pigs) both disclaimed knowledge of any memorandum prepared by Hunt. A search of WH/4 records failed to surface any such report.

> On 15 July 1960, the Cuban Government uncovered a plot to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz on 26 July 1960 during his visit to Mina del Frio, an army camp in the Sierra Maestra mountains, between Bayamo and Manzanillo in Oriente Province. Three captains and approximately 100 soldiers had been arrested and more arrests are expected. 10/

In addition to Richard Bissell and Dick Drain, Jake Esterline the Chief of Project JMATE was also very emphatic in denying that assassination of Castro or the Cuban leaders was a part of the JMATE Program. In response to a question of whether various of the special arms that were being forwarded to the PM training sites were intended for use against the Cuban leadership, Esterline responded:

> No, I think it [silenced weapons in particular] is for hit and run operations, where they could do their maximum damage and get out without necessarily alerting people ... I know of no -- within JMARC as I knew it -- I know of no attempt, no plans that were made to assassinate. As a matter of fact, the constant battle with Cubans during those years was to tell them that we weren't going to get involved in any assassination, that if there was going to be an overthrow, it was going to be, obviously, a bloody operation; but no Cubans were going to be sent in there, to "make an assassination attempt." It was going to be a ground-roots revolution.* 11/

Some contradictory evidence, however, indicates that WH/4, if not principally responsible, was certainly aware of some sort of planned assassination activity. One of the principals of WH/4 recorded that on 24 February 1961 he:

---

* It is known that at least one assassination plot against Castro and his advisers -- an attack by four men using US rifle-grenades -- was proposed by anti-Castro Cubans to COS Havana, but the COS gave the originator of the plan "no encouragement whatsoever." 11a/

> Asked Ed [Stanulis], Dave P[hillips], [Ed] Hinkle, [Bob] Moore, and Jake [Esterline] why not proceed with Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination. 12/

Although the author of that remark was Chief of Operations for Project JMATE, he was unaware, as reported earlier in this chapter, of the Mafia connection; but he had indicated that one of his hopes was that the invasion might lead to the death of Castro.* In response to a specific question about the AMHINT program, all he could say was:

> I said that I was not failing to give some attention to the business of assassination. Now, here on the 24th of February, when I asked Ed, Dave Phillips, Hinkle, Moore, and Jake "why not proceed with Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination," either none of those bastards knew anything about Sheffield Edwards and Maheu in the Mafia ... or some of them did, and didn't see fit to say "Drain, take your AMHINT and stuff it. We've got this thing pretty well

---

* See pp. 279-281.

> covered." What I would love now [is] to see an outline of AMHINT.* 13/

A few days after the reference to the AMHINT assassination program, WH/4 Propaganda Notes contained the following statement: "I[saminger] phoned following line to Wilkinson from Swan: ... attempted assassination of Guevara"; and Chief Operations WH/4 made a cryptic note: "CI and D watch Gueverra [*sic*] assassination attempt." 15/ When asked about the possibility that WH/4 was directly involved in an attempt to assassinate Che Guevara, the former Chief of Operations for the project wrote:

> My only memory of this is that we did not plan a Che assassination, but must have gotten intelligence that an attempt on him had been tried, planned, discovered or speculated on. 16/

If one can assume that the statement "CI and D watch Gueverra [*sic*] assassination attempt" translates as "Counter-Intelligence and Division D watch Guevara assassination attempt" then the comment from Chief of Operations appears eminently sensible, for Counter-Intelligence and Division D (which was responsible for intercept traffic) would be the two most likely sources to pick up information should an attempt be made on Guevara's life -- particularly since such an item probably would not be reported overtly in the Cuban press or radio.

---

* The author of this history has unsuccessfully tried to track down this particular project. AMHINT was related to the work of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE), an anti-Castro organization inside Cuba. The only evidence that has been found which might have been related to an assassination attempt concerned an AMHINT request of 14 January 1961 for "Silenciadores Rifles de marilla telescopica." (A request for rifles with silencers and telescopic sights.) This might have had to do with a DRE plan to assassinate the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba rather than a plan to kill Castro. When the FOB in Miami heard about the plan against the Soviet official they "immediately sent ... [word] to AMHINT-1 forbidding planned 'atentado' [assassination]." 14/

One final item which was surfaced during the course of research concerning the possibility that WH/4 had actually included an assassination program as part of its operational planning concerns a carbon copy identified only as "Must Go List." The single sheet of unknown provenance lists and identifies in the following order eleven individuals:

Che Guevara - Minister of Industries
Raul Castro Ruz - Chief of Cuban Armed Forces, and wife, Vilma Espin de Castro
Blas Roca - International Communist leader and Secretary General of Communist Party
Ramiro Valdez Menendez - Minister of Interior (G-2)
Carlos Olivares - Deputy Foreign Minister
Carlos Raphael Rodriguez - Communist leader, editor of newspaper *HOY*
Lazaro Pena - Communist leader - labor movement
Abelardo Colome - Deputy in G-2
Captain Rogelio Acevedo - Chief of Militia
Anibal Escalante - Communist leader
Armendo Hart Davalos - Minister of Education, and wife, Haydee Santamaria de Hart

Pencilled in on the bottom of the paper is a note: "List forwarded E. L. by C/WH/4 in Nov [1960]."* When asked if he could identify the "Must Go List" the former Chief of WH/4 stated:

---

* A copy of the list follows p. 287. The list should read Armando, rather than Armendo, Hart.

> Well, I know all these people ... Some of them I know personally, like Armando Hart ... I entertained Hart in my home a number of times ... the miserable bastard. I have never seen that list in my life, but this is the whole top gang at that time. Now many of them were later eliminated from the power structure by Castro, and by Raul Castro ... They got rid of Olivares, and Roca was pushed aside ... Armando Hart was also half nuts at this point, and he still is. I guess he is still fairly prominent, but he is not really in the power structure. Abelardo Colome -- I don't even know who he is. I wish to help you, but I don't know. 17/

The former Chief of Operations for WH/4, in response to the question of whether the "Must Go List" meant anything to him, replied as follows:

> No! Huh! "List forwarded E. L. by Chief WH/4" ... Eddie Lansdale ... E. L. would be Eddie Lansdale. Chief, WH/4 was Jacob D. Esterline. In November, I was there ... No "Big Daddy." Well, whether this "Must Go" is in terms of the assassination, or in terms ... [of] nobody, none of these people must be allowed to have a role in the new government. I guess "Must Go" came to pass eventually in the case of number one on this list, Che Guevara. Raul ... I myself, contemplating the future government, thought it might be interesting to try to keep Raul in, with Fidel out. Capture what magic there was in the name of Castro, but do it with that little homosexual, instead of with Fidel, the real man. I

> don't even know the rest of these guys --
> Hart, Escalante, etc. 18/

By way of summarizing, it would appear that CIA's official anti-Castro program as reflected in Project JMATE did not include assassination as an integral part of its operational planning, but would not have been averse to eliminating Castro or other of the Cuban leaders if the opportunity had been afforded. Based on records, however, WH/4's principals were in no way privy to, or participants in, the Mafia assassination planning at the time of the Bay of Pigs.

Part VIII

Conclusions

This volume has traced the history of the CIA's official anti-Castro program from its inception in 1959 through the end of the Eisenhower administration in January of 1961. It emphasized that in the initial period when Castro's revolution was taking place, the Agency, reflecting the policies of the US Government, was caught betwixt and between -- to move *with* Castro or to move *against* Castro. Shortly following his takeover, it became clear that Castro had little or no intention -- nor apparently concern -- for establishing cordial relations with the "Colossus of the North." Instead, he turned to the Soviet Union and its allies for military, technical, and economic assistance. It became clear that a new philosophy was being introduced into the Caribbean basin and that this philosophy was directly contrary to the interests of the United States Government and to the governments of many of the Latin American nations, whether democratically governed or governed by dictatorships of the right.

As Castro's threats became more serious, and as increasing pressures were put on legitimate economic interests of the United States in Cuba, pressures within the United States Government led to a decision that Castro must go. With great concern about the impact any overt, anti-Castro activities by the United States Government would have on the United Nations and on the Organization of American States, it was decided that a covert plan of action would be adopted. This was the officially sanctioned program approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March of 1960. It broadly outlined the political, economic, propaganda, and paramilitary programs which would be implemented in an attempt to oust Fidel Castro. CIA was to be the principal action agent for the bulk of the program.

Once the official US position was announced, CIA made organizational plans to carry out the policy. A separate Task Force within the Western Hemisphere Division was established under the leadership of Jacob D. Esterline, on whose shoulder Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division perched and peered. Initial concepts of the Central Intelligence Agency called for a propaganda program to be run out of a radio station based on Swan Island and by Agency financed radio operations out of Station WRUL in New York City. Strong support was to be provided for anti-Castro publications launched in the area of Miami. Paramilitary programs initially called for the training of cadres of communicators and paramilitary instructors who would go into Cuba and provide leadership and training for the numerous dissident elements that reportedly were ready to move against Castro.

Unfortunately, however, as the summer of 1960 drew to a close, it became apparent that Castro's military strength and training programs were sharply improving and that the initial plan to infiltrate small teams to organize the dissidents no longer was feasible. Consequently, the concept changed to one of a landing in force, the acquisition of a defensible base in Cuba from which a Provisional Government might call for assistance from the United States Government if the invaders themselves could not arouse sufficient support to force the overthrow of Castro.

This volume emphasized that following his decision in March 1960 that there should be an anti-Castro program, President Eisenhower remained quiescent on the question of developments of the anti-Castro program until late in the fall, following the election of 1960 and the defeat of Mr. Nixon. At that time Mr. Eisenhower reinjected himself into the program and stimulated action to the point where some of CIA's planners hoped that -- in addition to the propaganda program which was already underway -- paramilitary operations might be initiated. Apparently this was feared by Castro, too, for in his famous TV broadcast on the Bay of Pigs he said:

> When our country was in danger of direct aggression and mobilized itself, it waited for the [Kennedy] presidential inauguration thinking that this man [Kennedy] would do something different, because all in all, we didn't understand why a man who assumed the administration of the United States would want to bear the guilt of someone else's mistakes.* 1/

This was not to be, however, for aside from considerable emphasis on the propaganda activity, there was only limited support for sabotage activities prior to the end of Eisenhower's administration. There was considerable concern over the necessary formalities of diplomacy in order that the United States not be involved in investigations by either the UN or the OAS for its anti-Castro program.

---

* Raul Roa, Castro's Foreign Minister charged that in the Eisenhower administration Vice President Nixon and General C. P. Cabell, ADCI, were two of the most vigorous proponents of direct action, with Cabell proposing air and naval protection for the invasion and, if necessary, use of US marines to hold the beachhead. 2/

Because it has been so widely publicized that ex-Vice President Richard Nixon was one of the principals in planning the Bay of Pigs Operation, this volume has attempted to put the role that Nixon played into the proper context*. It was the role of an interested senior officer in the Executive Branch, and by no stretch of the imagination could Nixon's role be construed to have had a major impact on the development of operational planning by the Central Intelligence Agency in its anti-Castro effort.

Similarly, because of the sensationalism which surrounded the Senate Select Committee's report on *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, including Fidel Castro and the implications that the Mafia plot was a part of the authorized planning for the Bay of Pigs Operation, thorough examination of the evidence was undertaken to determine if this allegation was supportable. It was not. The Mafia operation was run aside from, apart from, and independent of the formal anti-Castro program which was undertaken by CIA. At most, four or five senior officials -- Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, Shef Edwards, Bill Harvey, and possibly, Tracy Barnes -- probably were knowledgeable about the Mafia connection and Mr. Maheu.

In terms of Project JMATE itself, the few bits of information which indicate the possibility of assassination attempts against the Cuban leadership also fail to demonstrate any responsibility for their initiation on the part of WH/4. If anything, the evidence would indicate that WH/4's position was one of watchful waiting and wishful thinking that dissident Cubans would themselves eliminate the Castros and Che Guevara. The possibility, of course, that Agency-supplied weapons might be involved in such an attempt cannot be ruled out. 3/

Obviously it would be foolish to contend that those principally responsible for developing CIA's anti-Castro program would have objected to the assassination of Fidel Castro. On the other hand, this was not one of the basic concepts nor intentions of the official program of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Appendix A

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence

from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

NO.

DATE 11 December 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DD/P	12/11/59	12/15/59	RMB/59	
2. DCI	12/17/59	12/18/59	APPD/ GEO	
3. C/WH				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 12-56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

11 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Cuban Problems.

This memorandum requests approval by the Director of the recommendations contained in paragraph 3.

1. Estimate of the Situation.

a. A dictatorship of the far left is now established. It is not only unfriendly to the United States in oral criticism, but has taken action against American properties, both industrial and agricultural, which, if permitted to stand, will encourage similar actions against U.S. holdings in other Latin American countries.

b. We do and must expect a major increase in the scale and effectiveness of Cuban aid and participation in revolutionary actions against other countries of Latin America now friendly to the United States. In addition to those that have already been targets - Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, recent intelligence indicates a direct interest by Castro in Colombia and Peru. Betancourt's position in Venezuela would be gravely weakened by Castro successes, and it is believed only a question of time before an alliance would be established between the powerful Communist Party of Venezuela and the Castros.

c. Rapid nationalization of the banks, industry and commerce is reportedly contemplated. If this occurs, the small group in control will have at its disposition several hundred million dollars from the sale of the sugar crop early in 1960. Part of these funds may be used to further their revolutionary objectives against other countries of the Caribbean and South America.

d. Castro has lost the support of the upper class and most of the middle class. He probably still has a sufficient following from the masses to maintain control until further inroads can be made in his popular support and the opposition more effectively unified.

e. Propaganda action to reduce his following, while essential, in itself will probably not be enough to dislodge him. His approaching stranglehold on Cuba will be broken only by violent action.

f. It is my personal opinion that if Castro is successful in consolidating his position and remaining in power for two more years, lasting damage may occur to the United States' already weakened position of leadership in Latin America.

2. U.S. Objective.

The overthrow of Castro within one year, and his replacement by a junta friendly to the United States which will call for elections six months after assumption of office.

3. Recommended Action:

a. Clandestine radio attacks from Caribbean countries of the liberal group, working closely with us and using Cuban nationals for broadcasting.

b. Intrusion operations against Castro's TV and radio, to be mounted from within Cuba

c. The encouragement of pro-U.S. opposition groups, excluding Batista and Masferrer supporters, to establish by force a controlled area within Cuba. This would have the following advantages:

(1) It would permit the establishment of a radio station, long wave, which would reach all of the stations in Cuba. Since it would be on Cuban soil, the problems of joint operations with other countries would be eliminated.

(2) A controlled area would be a rallying point for the growing opposition to Castro in the same manner that the 26th of July movement in the hills of Oriente became the rallying point of many who turned against Batista.

(3) It would be a means of testing the strength and fibre of the opposition, and separating the men from the boys.

(4) The reportedly large fragmented elements of the constitutional Cuban Army would have a place to go.

(5) A sizeable guerrilla movement within Cuba would curtail Castro's plans for revolutionary action against other countries.

removal from Cuba

d. Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion Che Guevarra, have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present Government.

J C King
J.C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

cc: DDCI

CONCUR: 12 DEC 1959

Deputy Director (Plans)

The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date 12 DEC 1959

Appendix B

A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime

16 Mar 60

EYES ONLY
SECRET

This document is our basic policy paper. It was approved by the President at a meeting in the White House on 17 March 1960.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

16 March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.

2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the

Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supplemented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written material inside the country. (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hard intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals and groups as directed.

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

3. Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting and devisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the

opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent, non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S. support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

4. Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity (insofar as the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to have direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U.S. businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. $100,000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources. At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the council (as an obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional $2,000,000.

5. Budget: It is anticipated that approximately $4,400,000 of CIA funds will be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not

reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated requirements for FY-1960 funds is $900,000 with the balance of $3,500,000 required in FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.

THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

1. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance, i.e. they are for the revolution as originally conceived--many being former 26th of July members--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. They are anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution".

2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups. It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following points are suggested as a few possibilities:

a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino-Soviet influence.

b. Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based on free elections. There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression.

c. A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of the land must be put into effect.

d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in commerce and education must be eliminated.

e. Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated.

A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.

Tab B

EYES ONLY
SECRET

PROPAGANDA

1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. Private opposition broadcasts (i.e. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). Presidents Betancourt and Ydigoras have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from Caracas and Guatemala City. CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S.-controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future. Avance, a leading Cuban daily (Zayas' paper), has been confiscated as has El Mundo, another Cuban daily. Diario de la Marina, one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already been made to print Avance weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered.

4. Inside Cuba, a CIA-controlled action group is producing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel.

Tab C

FINANCIAL ANNEX

		FY-1960	FY-1961
I.	**Political Action**		
	Support of Opposition Elements and other Group Activities	150,000	800,000
II.	**Propaganda**		
	Radio Operations and Programming (including establishment of transmitters)	400,000	700,000
	Press and Publications	100,000	500,000
III.	**Paramilitary**		
	In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training	200,000	1,300,000
IV.	**Intelligence** Collection	50,000	200,000
	Totals	*900,000	3,500,000

*These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required.

Appendix C-1

CNO Correspondence with Department of State
and NSC:*

1) Letter for Allen Dulles
   from Arleigh Burke,
   17 Mar 60

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Ltr from Admiral Burke

FROM:

DD/P

NO.

DATE

18 March 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH Division			JCK	1. Admiral Burke sent this over to the Director on the afternoon of 17 March and the latter handed to me. I do not believe it requires a reply but pass it to you for any value it may have. RMBjr.
2.				
3. C/WH/4				
4. Whidbee handcarry				
5. [illegible] Hand Carry				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. CWH Cuba File				
10.				
11.				

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

0-1426

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

TOP SECRET

17 March 1960

PERSONAL - TOP SECRET

Dear Allen:

Enclosed is a memorandum my staff prepared containing some suggestions which might be useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not agree with quite all the comments contained in the memorandum, but I know that you will forgive the impatient young lad for his desire to make sure no opportunity is left uncovered.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Arleigh

ARLEIGH BURKE

The Honorable
Allen Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Appendix C-2

CNO Correspondence with Department of State and NSC:

2) Letter for Gordon Gray from
Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60

p. 21

21

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

TOP SECRET

16 March 1960

Dear Gordon:

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum on U.S. action in Cuba which may be of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,

Arleigh

ARLEIGH BURKE

The Honorable
Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

Enclosure

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
Op-62

Op-603D/jmr
16 Mar 1960

Op-603D
Via: Op-603

U. S. Action in Cuba (S)

1. The recommendations contained in the paper on "U.S. Actions in Cuba" were intended originally to provide the broad outline for a carefully laid out program for causing the Castro regime to be replaced by a friendly government. It was intended that State would logically control and coordinate all aspects and provide the guidance as to the specific actions required of the other departments of the government. The paper was not interpreted in this manner by those who received it and the search appears now to be for specific actions which can be used to accomplish the end desired.

2. The following are offered as possible specific actions which can be taken in support of our position on Cuba - You might desire to have OO inject these items into the NSC meeting, 16 March.

a. IADB - Chairman, or the Chief of the U.S. Delgation, attempt to have a delegation other than U.S. introduce a motion for the Board to consider the gap in hemispheric defense resulting from the Cuban situation or for the Board to recommend that the OAS study the influence of Kommunism in Cuba.

b. Commercial - Oil companies are not being paid by Cuba. State could request the oil companies to point out to the governments who produce the oil the effects on their economies of the loss of the Cuban market.

c. Schools and War Colleges - The Services could include in courses for foreign officers the effect on hemisphere defense of the establishment of a Kommunist dictatorship in Cuba.

d. Commercial - Do Latin Americans hold stock in the expropriated properties in Cuba? If so, State could request the companies concerned to include in their dividend mailings, information pointing out the effect on the companies' earnings and the stockholders' dividends of expropriation of property without compensation and, for the oil companies, non-payment for oil delivered.

e. State in conjunction with CIA, publish a weekly or bi-weekly letter documenting the actions of the Castro Government for the previous period. Included would be:

(1) Violations of human rights.
(2) Kommunist trends and actions.
(3) Dictatorial and undemocratic actions.

[illegible] document is
[illegible] prohibited
[illegible] outside of the

TOP SECRET

Copy 2 of 4 copies

Page 1 of 3 copies

Distribute this to:

(1) All U.S. diplomatic posts.
(2) Army, Navy and Air Force for further distribution to units or officers in contact with Latin Americans.

For use as talking points to:

(1) Discredit the Castro regime.
(2) Build support for the U.S. position.
(3) Alert Latin Americans as to the Kommunist aspects.

f. All Services - Prepare and distribute speech material suitable for inclusion in various types of addresses. Material should cover:

(1) Kommunistic aspects of present Cuban Government.
(2) Threat of Kommunism in Cuba to hemispheric defense.
(3) The dictatorial aspects of the Cuban regime.
(4) The Cuban regime's actions against the basic human rights.
(5) The strategic importance of the Guantanamo Naval Base.
(6) The logic of the firmness of the treaties by which we hold Guantanamo and the formal commitment of the Castro regime on taking power to honor Cuba's international commitments.

Distribute this material to the Services and to their Leagues and Associations for maximum use in public speeches.

g. IADB - have General Skaer, as Director of the Staff, IADB, inject into the monthly intelligence briefings at the IADB information on the latest Soviet Bloc actions and the progress of International Kommunism in Cuba.

h. State, in conjunction with CIA and the Service intelligence agencies, hold special briefings once each month on the general situation in Cuba with special emphasis on the Kommunistic aspects for the following:

(1) U. S. officials of the OAS and UN.
(2) U.S. personnel of the Staff of the IADB.
(3) Official U.S. personnel in Washington having duties involving close contact with Latin Americans.

i. All Services provide special briefings on a one-time basis along the line of h. above for officers and enlisted personnel of units proceeding to Caribbean or South American ports.

j. Navy endeavor to have a good reporter or author prepare a story containing the Navy's views on Guantanamo for publication in a national magazine with wide circulation in Latin America.

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with permission of the

11

k. Navy - Accept Mr. Merchant's offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral Burke of a complete briefing of State Department activities vis a vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod State to move faster.

l. State - Brief all individuals and groups of U.S. Nationals going to Latin America on the Communist threat in Cuba for further dissemination to host country personnel.

Very respectfully,

J. E. POND, JR.

Appendix C-3

CNO Correspondence with Department of State

and NSC:

3) Memorandum for the Special
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,
sub: US Policy toward Cuba

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MAR 16 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward Cuba

Enclosed is an exchange of letters on the above subject between Admiral Burke and Under Secretary Merchant, both of whom have authorized that I make the correspondence available to you for whatever help it may be in connection with the discussion of this subject at the Council meeting this coming Thursday.

Haydn Williams
Deputy Assistant Secretary

2 Encls
A/s

SECRET

[illegible]
10 Mar 60

Dear Arleigh:

I was much interested in your personal letter of February 26, 1960, on Cuba and the Caribbean situation, in which I noted a marked degree of similarity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people here concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cuba and the methods which are best calculated to achieve this result.

As you are doubtless aware from the briefing which Dick Rubottom and I gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 8, 1960, most of the courses of action suggested in the memorandum headed "Recommendations for U. S. Actions in Cuba," which you transmitted with your letter, were initiated some time ago and are constantly being intensified. To recapitulate, our own thinking on the Cuban situation as it relates to Communism and our own security interests has been as follows:

a. The maximum objective of International Communism--in the immediate future--is the consolidation of a radical, anti-American Revolution friendly to the USSR in Cuba and the utilization of Cuba as a base to promote similar revolutionary movements in the Caribbean. The minimum objective of the Communists, if they are unable to achieve the foregoing, is to make the United States pay as high price as possible for the elimination of the undesirable features of the Cuban Revolution. In particular, the Communists stand to gain by provoking us into armed intervention, or otherwise taking interventionist actions in violation of our commitments in a manner which could be made to appear as if the United States reacted the same way as the Soviets did in Hungary and other satellites.

b. Unless

Admiral Arleigh Burke,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Department of the Navy.

SECRET

I 12989/60

b. Unless we were indefinitely to occupy Cuba militarily, the only solution to the Cuban problem is necessarily the emergence of a Cuban leadership willing to and capable of governing the country along lines acceptable to the Cuban people and along lines consistent with basic U. S. policy with respect to Latin America. This will take time. On the one hand, it is doubtful that any Cuban Government which resulted from U. S. armed or other overt intervention could long survive our withdrawal. On the other, despite our own long-standing misgivings concerning Castro, it is an inescapable fact that he came into power with overwhelming support not only in Cuba but elsewhere in the hemisphere, including in this country. Although that support has largely evaporated in the United States—and, to a lesser extent, in responsible circles in the other Latin American Republics—Castro and, particularly, his reform program still enjoy very considerable support in his country. Cubans, even those disillusioned with Castro, have yet to find an alternative leadership which they believe would actually carry out the reform measures which public opinion still demands. Opposition elements tainted with collaboration with the Batista regime are still politically unacceptable and could not establish a stable government. Opposition groups that might be acceptable to Cubans are beginning to organize more effectively but, at best, it will be months before they are ready for vigorous action.

c. The primary objective of U. S. policy should be the acceleration of the creation of an effective, patriotic movement friendly to the United States within Cuba and among Cuban exiles to counter Cuba's current trend. The first task is to assure, insofar as we are able to do so, a climate in which responsible and friendly Cubans would find it worthwhile to oppose Castro policies which help the Communists and undermine good U.S.-Cuban relations. On the positive side, we should and are taking actions and making statements which would encourage such elements to organize more effectively and to expect our support and collaboration in their efforts to achieve political and economic progress for Cuba by taking a different road than the present Cuban regime's. At the JCS briefing, we gave an indication of the covert activities underway towards this end, as well as an indication of the extensive unattributed effort which has been underway for over a year to identify and expose to public opinion throughout the hemisphere the Communist aspects of the Cuban problem. On the negative side, our policies are guided by the principle that opposition to Castro's policies in Cuba will

increase

increase fairly rapidly if it is clear to Cubans that Castro himself is responsible for political and economic deterioration of the country. However, the consolidation of the opposition will be slowed down if Castro can succeed by wrapping the flag of patriotism and nationalism about himself in further convincing the Cuban people that the United States has aggressive designs on the Cuban nation as a whole and that the United States rather than Castro's policies is responsible for Cuba's difficulties. We must, therefore, exercise the greatest care that we do not unnecessarily transform the developing dissatisfaction of the Cuban people with Castro into a fight between the United States and Cuba, for no self-respecting Cuban could then afford to support us against his own country.

d. While we believe that inter-American action through the OAS and/or some economic action by the United States in defense of its rights may play an important role at the proper time, we must not let these possibilities cause us to lose sight of the critical fact that no solution will be possible until an alternative leadership is ready to move in. If the application of collective or unilateral pressures should bring the Castro Government down before an acceptable leadership is ready to take over, the probabilities are civil war or a take-over by even more Communistic elements. Either would bring us closer to armed intervention. Thus, while we are going ahead in the process of influencing the other American Republics to see the Communist and other aspects of the Cuban situation as we do and preparing the ground for possible Inter-American consideration of the Cuban problem, we intend to control the timing of any such meeting insofar as possible to coincide with the development of an alternative leadership. It is also the intention of the Administration to propose to the Congress that the President be given discretionary authority to alter sugar quotas in the national interest and we have developed and are putting into effect an action plan to obtain the release of the United States from certain other economic commitments which impair our ability to take action in the economic field when this could contribute to safeguarding our interest or to the creation of conditions favorable to a leadership opposed to Castro's policies.

With

With respect to all these matters, a most important element is time. Time is needed for Cubans to realize that the deterioration of their political and economic life is due to Castro's excesses, including his connections with International Communism. Time is needed for an alternative leadership to emerge and to organize effectively for action. Time is also needed further to awaken Latin American opinion to the dangers of the situation and for Latin American Governments to come around more to the point of view that the Cuban situation is a matter of common concern, not just a U.S.-Castro quarrel. We are using all available facilities to make this time as short as possible, but our experience in other difficult situations in the Near East and Central America indicate that immediate results are not to be expected. Meantime, we are going to have, we believe, to exercise restraint from taking actions which, while reflecting our own great sense of concern and urgency, would actually retard the process of change which we all desire.

I should point out also that, while action in the OAS at the right time may be desirable as a means of encouraging an alternative Cuban leadership, we would probably have to contend with Soviets in the United Nations. It is almost certain that the Cubans will try to anticipate or counter any U. S. approach to the OAS by going directly to the United Nations. Furthermore, actual "enforcement action" by the OAS would probably be brought up before the United Nations under Article 53 of the UN Charter even if we argued that any action taken by the OAS constituted only "recommendations" to governments. This reinforces our view that action in the OAS—which can be taken under the Charter by convoking a meeting of Foreign Ministers, as well as under the Rio Treaty and the Caracas Resolution—should primarily be viewed as a means of strengthening Cuban opposition to Castro's policies at the right moment rather than as a means of quarantining Cuba and waiting to see what happens. It would at present be somewhat difficult to bring a case against Cuba under the Caracas Resolution since the latest Special National Intelligence Estimate—which we have asked to be reviewed—does not find the Cuban Government to be Communist-dominated at present. If our own Estimate does not yet substantiate the case, it would be difficult in a short time to persuade less well-informed governments that "the political institutions" of Cuba are under International Communist control or domination.

As you are aware, our basic national policy (NSC 5902/1) views armed intervention as a last resort to be approved by the President when all else fails. We would be most reluctant to make or concur in such recommendation to the President until there had been a reasonable chance for all other solutions to be tested.

Thank you

Thank you again for sending me a copy of your memorandum. As you know, the NSC is keeping the Cuba problem under constant scrutiny, having discussed it in some detail at its January 14 meeting and again this morning. At the first of the meetings, the Secretary of State reviewed the policy toward Cuba which had been approved by the President, and the consensus of this morning's meeting was that this policy is essentially correct. We anticipate that, at future meetings of the NSC, there will be further discussions concerning Cuba to determine whether there should be a modification of policy toward that country. In view of the fact that today's NSC meeting indicated continued agreement on the validity of the policy discussed in January, it would appear unnecessary to develop new policy documentation at this time, especially as the proposals in your Navy memorandum closely parallel policies which are already underway. Should you, or your colleagues on the Joint Chiefs, desire a further briefing on our actions and operational plans to carry out the policy, I should be more than glad to arrange it.

Sincerely,

Livingston T. Merchant
Under Secretary for Political Affairs

26 FEB 1960

SECRET

SECRET - PERSONAL

Dear Livie:

I am becoming increasingly concerned over deteriorating conditions in the Caribbean. I am especially concerned over the present situation in Cuba, in whose security the Navy is directly interested by reason of this island's strategic location with respect to the sea approaches to the southern United States and the Panama Canal, and because of the location there of the Guantanamo Naval Base. Cuba appears to be in the process of falling under the domination of International Communism. Should this trend continue unchecked and a communist dominated or "front government" become a reality, a direct threat to the security of the United States would be presented. Additionally, a communist controlled state in Cuba would serve as a base of operations for the further spread of communistic influence in the Western Hemisphere having as its aim the isolation of the United States from Latin America.

Because of my concern, I am taking the liberty of sending you the attached paper as indicative of current Navy thinking in this matter, - namely that positive action to reverse the present trend should be initiated to the end that the communist threat is eliminated and a stable, friendly government established in Cuba. Action taken now in the case of Cuba will also facilitate and provide a foundation for any similar actions which may be necessary to prevent the spread of communism in Latin America and to stabilize other areas where unrest is appearing.

I am also sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to Jack Irwin.

Sincerely,

ARLEIGH BURKE

The Honorable Livingston T. Merchant
New State Department Building
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosure: Paper on U.S. Action in Cuba

Copy to: Mr. J. N. Irwin II, (OSD/ISA) w/enclosure

PERSONAL - SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
([illegible])

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. ACTION IN CUBA

INTRODUCTION

1. The Castro Movement in Cuba is a vehicle by which international communism appears to be gaining a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. If the present trend continues, it will soon be too late for the United States to stem the Soviet incursion into this hemisphere. This situation, in its many ramifications, presents an immediate threat to the security of the United States and to that of our important neighbors in North and South America. //

PROBLEM

2. What action can be taken to prevent the establishment of a communist state in Cuba and to restore a stable, friendly government?

BACKGROUND

3. The U. S. has never renounced the Monroe Doctrine. This was reaffirmed by Secretary of State Dulles in his address to the Nation on July 12, 1954, on International Communism in Guatemala. In that address, Mr. Dulles stated:

> "For several years international communism has been probing here and there for resting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics."
>
> "This intrusion of Soviet despotism was, of course, a direct challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most fundamental of our foreign policies."

The United States is bound by treaties which commit it to seek settlement of hemispheric disputes by peaceful means, but which also provide for action in the event of aggression either from outside the hemisphere or within. Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro, 1947, requires each contracting party to send to the Security Council of the UN complete information "concerning the activities undertaken ... for the purpose of maintaining Inter-American peace and security."

Article 6 of this treaty states:

> "If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack ... or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in

SECRET

> order to agree on ... the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent."

The Declaration adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Venezuela, March 1954, states:

> "That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for the meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties."

The 26th of July Movement succeeded in displacing Batista on 1 Jan 1959. Since that time the Castro regime has followed increasingly the classic strategy for establishing a communist state. The communist time table is delineated in American Embassy Havana Dispatch No. 903 dated 29 December 1959. The ruthless elimination of the opposition, assumption of dictatorial powers, suspension of elections, the "Hate America" campaign, the studied breakdown of the economy and confiscation of property, the initiation of relations and trade with the Soviet Union, the forbidding of anti-communist activity and the breakdown and reconstitution of the Armed Services and police are all typical communist maneuvers.

The majority of the Cubans are not yet committed to the acceptance of communism nor are they aware of the trend of the Revolution in this direction. The lower classes, however, continue to give full support to Castro and the Revolution.

It has not yet been proved that Castro himself is a communist. However, some of his principal deputies as well as other leaders are believed to be communists. In any case, individuals susceptible to communist influence are occupying key positions in the government as well as in all important organizations and trade unions. Two developments are noticeable. Communists are being appointed openly and are being elected (in trade unions) to key positions. Hidden communists in the 26th of July Movement are taking positions in seeming opposition to the open communists.

At present the Cuban Armed Forces are disorganized and apparently capable only of guerrilla warfare. Intelligence reports indicate that the Soviet Bloc may be supplying technicians to assist in training the new forces and supplying arms to the new government. There is no present indication that the fall of the Castro Government is imminent. If it should fall, however, the government would most probably emerge as a communist government because opposition leaders have been eliminated and there appear to be no leaders of stature remaining around whom anti-Castro/anti-Communist peoples could rally. Should Castro fall or be assassinated, mob action which would probably result would jeopardize the safety of Americans in Cuba. Finally, in the worst extreme, the possibility of direct support for Cuba by the Soviet Bloc, even to the extent of an open mutual security agreement, cannot be disregarded.

DISCUSSION

4. Three basic courses of action are open to the U. S.

A. Multilateral Action through the OAS.

B. Unilateral Overt Action by the U. S.

C. Covert Unilateral Action by the U.S.

//

All subsidiary actions, such as economic pressure and moral suasion, which will assist in achieving the objective should also be taken in addition to the above.

A. MULTILATERAL ACTION THROUGH THE OAS.

The machinery exists in the declaration and agreements of the OAS for the U. S. to request convocation of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS with subsequent investigation of the government in Cuba, and, if approval of the member states is obtained, intervention to prevent a Communist take-over.

(1) Advantages:

(a) It would be in consonance with our national policy and our treaty commitments under the OAS.

(b) It would strengthen the OAS and would reassure the Free World and the Latin American States of U. S. willingness to live up to commitments.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) Uncertainty of support for OAS action by other Latin American States.

(b) Delay in OAS action could result in a Communist controlled front government being a "fait accompli" in Cuba.

(c) Could result in the entire problem ending in the Security

Council of the UN where the Soviet Union has a veto.

B. UNILATERAL OVERT ACTION BY THE U.S.

The U. S. has the capability to seize Cuba by direct military action, and after a consolidation period, cause the establishment of a friendly, non-communist government.

(1) Advantages:

(a) It would be in consonance with the Monroe Doctrine, which is still basic U. S. policy with respect to the Western Hemisphere, and would solve the problem.

(b) It would serve notice to the world that the U. S. will not tolerate the establishment of a communist or communist "front" regime in the Western Hemisphere.

(c) It would re-emphasize to the world that the U. S. will not hesitate to act when its security is at stake.

(d) It would dispel any illusions by the world at large that the U. S. is unwilling and unable to act no matter what the provocation. It would also probably stop the "baiting of the U.S." in which some minor powers throughout the world indulge.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) It would violate our OAS commitments to seek settlement by peaceful means.

(b) It would lead to charges of aggression against the U.S., both in the OAS and in the United Nations, with the resulting possibility of UN and OAS action against the U. S.

(c) It would prove that the U.S. is not willing to abide by its treaties if U. S. interests dictate otherwise.

(d) It could isolate the U.S. from the other American States.

(e) It would violate the principle of non-intervention.

C. COVERT UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE U.S.

The U. S. could assist rebel groups covertly to overthrow the present government and re-establish a friendly government. Concurrently, it could take all possible measures to alert all friendly nations and the U.S. people and branches of the U. S. Government to the danger of the threat in order to discredit Cuba and bring world opinion to the side of the U.S.

(1) Advantages:

(a) U. S. would not be charged with aggression.

(b) If carried out successfully, Free World and Latin American opinion would be favorable to the U. S.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) There is no certainty of success.

(b) The effort might well come too late.

In considering and comparing the above courses of action, the basic assumption that the United States cannot and must not permit within the Western Hemisphere the establishment of any government dominated by the International Communists is paramount. Therefore, if other courses of action fail, the U. S. must, even in the face of adverse world opinion, take unilateral action to prevent such an occurrence.

Until the situation reaches the stage where direct unilateral action by the U.S. is the only means left, it appears that a combination of those parts of courses of action A and C which have a fair chance of success should be followed in order to utilize the prime advantage given under A, i.e., the cooperation and good will of the other American States.

CONCLUSIONS

5. The following conclusions are reached:

a. The establishment of a communist government, or a "front" government following communist precepts, in Cuba would be a direct threat to the security of the U. S. and would endanger hemispheric security.

b. The U. S. should initiate positive action to eliminate the threat before a communist or "front" government in Cuba is a "fait accompli."

c. Although the revolution still has the support of the masses, the resulting government in Cuba is following the path of international communism. Although they are not yet aware of the trend toward communism, Castro has the personal loyalty of the masses.

d. American holdings are being confiscated. American lives may be endangered if stable, responsible government is not ensured.

e. The Monroe Doctrine is still basic U. S. policy with respect to the Western Hemisphere.

f. Procedure exists under the Declaration of Caracas to request action by the OAS against a Communist threat to Hemispheric security.

g. The U. S. should proceed to document the extent of infiltration of communists into key positions in Cuba and the extent of extra-Western Hemisphere communist support of the present Cuban regime.

h. The U. S. should initiate a campaign to apprise all U. S. agencies, the U. S. public, and the other American States of the threat in order to gain support for any future action that may be taken.

i. The U. S. should covertly support the Cuban opposition.

j. The U. S., after having gained the required support, should present its case before the OAS in order that joint action by the members of the OAS may be taken to eliminate the communist threat and establish a friendly, stable government in Cuba.

k. The U. S., as a last resort, should take unilateral military action to eliminate the threat.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. To accomplish the above, the following plan of action is recommended:

a. Immediately document the communist time table and the communist take-over in Cuba.

b. Use all resources and media to make the U.S. and the other American States aware of the threat. The following should be utilized to accomplish this:

(1) Intelligence briefings of:

(a) U. S. Government officials.

(b) Newspaper representatives and editors.

(c) U.S. businessmen operating abroad and going abroad.

(d) The IADB members and Latin American diplomatic personnel and military attaches.

(e) The Catholic Church (possibly through the Apostolic Delegate).

(f) Church groups operating in Latin America.

(g) Latin American officials visiting the U. S. and U. S. installations.

(2) Orientation of radio broadcasts and news reports, both government and private.

(3) The U. S. Information Service.

(4) All country teams.

c. Covertly support the Cuban opposition. Select and groom trusted Cubans as appropriate to assume responsible posts in a friendly government.

d. Be prepared to use force to safeguard and evacuate U. S. Nationals should the situation deteriorate to the point where they are endangered.

e. When support has been gained, request, in conjunction with other members of the OAS, convocation of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS under the Terms of the Declaration of Caracas to:

(1) Seek OAS action to call on Cuba to place herself under OAS auspices "in order to preserve the revolution for the people and prevent communist take-over," and;

(2) Seek OAS action to intervene by force in the event the above fails, and;

(3) In whatever joint group is formed to accomplish the above, keep U. S. participation to a minimum in order to force the Latin American States to assume their responsibilities to the Hemisphere and to counter accusations of U. S. imperialism.

f. In the event time does not permit completion of the above, or as a last resort, be prepared to take unilateral military action to establish a non-communist government in Cuba.

Appendix D

Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60

p. 41 41

EYES ONLY

SECRET

COPY

2 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action

SUBJECT : Liaison with United States' Agencies on JMARC Activities

1. This memorandum contains information for the Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action.

2. The attached chart on liaison with other agencies of the United States' Government on JMARC activities is restricted to those contacts that are made on a regular basis, such as the weekly policy meeting with the Department of State, and to offices which, we must contact quite frequently to solicit their support, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

3. As you know, infrequent contacts are made at various other levels of the Executive Branch including:

a. Brigadier General Cushman, Vice President Nixon's military assistant.

b. NSC 5412 Representatives.

c. Certain United States' Senators and Representatives, particularly Senator George Smathers of Florida.

4. In the early stages of JMARC we had almost daily contact with Rear Admiral S. B. Renkin, USN, who was the action officer on the movement of two radio transmitters and construction of the broadcasting facility on Swan Island.

5. Through Raymond Millard [Mallard?], the Agency is in close touch with CINCLANT at Norfolk. Robert Reynolds, Deputy Chief, WH/4, has briefed selected senior officers on JMARC 4. Mr. Reynolds is the designated CIA alternate for the CINCLANT force under provisions of the Contingency Operations Plan for Cuba.

J. D. ESTERLINE
Chief, WH/4

Attachment:
Chart mentioned in paragraph 2.

SECRET

EYES ONLY

S E C R E T
EYES ONLY

COPY

OFFICE	NATURE OF DISCUSSION	CIA REPRESENTATIVE	FREQUENCY
	STATE DEPARTMENT		
Office Inter-American Affairs (ARA) (Mr. Rubottom)	Policy	Col. J. C. King	Weekly
Cuba Working Group (State, USIA) (Chaired by Ambassador Mallory)	Overt Programs	Robert Whedbee	Daily
Consular & Security Affairs (Mr. John Haynes)	Passports for Aliens	Mr. Pennington (OS)	As required
Office of Intelligence & Research (Ambassador J. Lampton Berry)	"Talent" Matters	E. A. Stanulis	As required
Inter-departmental Defector Committee	Cuban "Defectors"	Robert Whedbee	As required
Latin America Task Force (Chaired by John Hill (ARA)	Program Coordination	Paul E. Oberst	Weekly
	DEFENSE DEPARTMENT		
Office of Special Operations (Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN)	Defense Support	E. A. Stanulis Robert Young (CC)	As required
Office of Special Operations (Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN)	Briefing	J. D. Esterline	Weekly
Collateral Support Section, Office of Naval Intelligence (Cdr. Frank Day, USN)	Cover	Robert Young (CC)	As Required
Operations Branch, Collection Division, ACSI (Army) (Col. Stewart McKinney)	Cover	Robert Young (CC)	As required

S E C R E T
E Y E S O N L Y

Continued

COPY

SECRET

EYES ONLY

OFFICE	NATURE OF DISCUSSION	CIA REPRESENTATIVE	FREQUENCY
	UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY		
Director, Voice of America (Henry Loomis)	Coordination	David A. Phillips	Weekly
	IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE		
Office of the Director (Mr. Hennessey)	U. S. Entry of Cubans	Mr. Pennington (OS)	As required

SECRET

EYES ONLY

Appendix E

Attack on Petroleum Refinery at
Santiago de Cuba
13-14 March 1961

13-00000

(RIP [illegible] IN CUBAN WATERS

209

14 MAR 61

BELL

JMRIH

BELL 15

DO/P, COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, OC 6, BELL T/C

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 14 0920Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 3307

IM BELL KOLA WAVE CITE [illegible]

ZIP TAGBAR COMMO

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM BARBARA AT 140638Z: NR4 140600Z

333 BT

10. RE YOUR MSG NUMBER 49. CADICK SENDS.

[illegible] TEACUP DEBARKED 130045R MARCH [illegible] SNEAKED PAST SEVERAL

ICHES TO CAYO RATON. ISLAND COVERED WITH BRUSH AND TREES.

FIELD FIRE TO REFINERY WITHOUT DISTURBING OCCUPANTS TWO

USES SO MOVED TO MAINLAND NEAR REFINERY ENCOUNTERING STORM

NGE. BACKED OUT IN WATER TO 250 YARDS FROM REFINERY FOR CLEAN

OT. FIRED 7 TYPE 57 MILLIMETER SHELLS WITH FIVE HITS IN

CHIMNEY AND ONE TOWER STARTING ON FIRE. FIRED 200 ROUNDS

CALIBRE HITTING CRACKING PLANT AND CAUSING BRIGHT EXPLOSION

RGEST TOWER. TOWER CHARGE BLEW ON DEPARTURE. VIEW TOWER

SKED BY FACT TEACUP HUGGING BEACH ON WAY OUT BUT REFINERY

OW DARKENED AND TOWER LIGHTS DISAPPEARED. SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS

ARD FREQUENTLY ON WAY OUT. ENGAGED BY CONSIDERABLE SMALL ARMS

SMG FIRE ALL ALONG [illegible] DEFINITELY DOWNED FOUR [illegible]

[illegible] RIGEZ [illegible]

DATTAL MANSION FIRING AND WAS DROPPED INTO WATER. MOTORS ON

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE R 3343

SECRET

IN [illegible] PAGE 2

AT QUIT BUT RESTARTED IN FEW MINUTES. AT HARBOR ENTRANCE AT AST 2 50 CALIBRES AND 1 20 MILIMETER ENGAGED US PLUS PLENTY SMALL S AND ONE STRONG SEARCHLIGHT. LEFT SEARCHLIGHT POINTING OWN INTO WATER AND SILENCED 20 MILLIMETER BUT 50'S FOLLOWED ACUP OUT TO SEA WHERE BARBARA J MADE FINE PICK UP RIGHT ON ATION. OP COMPLETED AT 130400R.

[Time screwed up? See Par 1.]

2. AT NO TIME DID TEACUP FIRE AT ANY EXCEPT THOSE OBVIOUSLY AMING ABOUT PREVENTING TEACUPS DEPARTURE.

3. TEACUP COOLEST SEEN BY CADICK TO DATE. SUGGEST FOUR OF M ARE LEADER MATERIAL AND HQS COULD USE THEM IN PRE-INVASION [illegible] D MINUS ONE IF FOUR TEAMS ORGANIZED AROUND THEM.

END OF MESSAGE

13-00000

Appendix F

Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959

RICHARD NIXON

LA CASA PACIFICA
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA

July 27, 1979

Dear Dr Pfeiffer,

I am enclosing a copy of the summary of my conversation with Fidel Castro in 1959, as you requested in your letter of July 19th.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer
CIA Historian
Washington, D.C. 20505

enclosure, 4 pages

CONFIDENTIAL

April 19, 1959

Summary of conversation between The Vice President and Fidel Castro:

When Castro arrived for the conference he seemed somewhat nervous and tense. He apparently felt that he had not done as well on "Meet the Press" as he had hoped. He was particularly concerned about whether he might have irritated Senator Smathers for the comments he made with regard to him. I reassured him at the beginning of the conversation that "Meet the Press" was one of the most difficult programs a public official could go on and that he had done extremely well -- particularly having in mind the fact that he had the courage to go on in English rather than to speak through a translator.

The subjects we discussed were no different from those on which he had made public statements on several other occasions. A brief summary, however, might be of interest, particularly in view of the comments I made with regard to the positions he took.

I suggested at the outset that while I understood some reasonable time might elapse before it would be feasible to have elections it would nevertheless be much better from his viewpoint if he were not to state so categorically that it would be as long as four years before elections would be held. I urged him to state his position as being in favor of having elections at the earliest possible date and that four years would be the maximum amount of time that would elapse before elections were scheduled. He went into considerable detail as he had in public with regard to the reasons for not holding elections, emphasizing particularly that "the people did not want elections because the elections in the past had produced bad government."

He used the same argument that he was simply reflecting the will of the people in justifying the executions of war criminals and his overruling the acquittal of Batista's aviators. In fact he seemed to be obsessed with the idea that it was his responsibility to carry out the will of the people whatever it might appear to be at a particular time. It was also apparent that as far as his visit to the United States was concerned his primary interest was "not to get a change in the sugar quota or to get a government loan but to win support for his policies from American public opinion."

It was this almost slavish subservience to prevailing majority opinion -- the voice of the mob -- rather than his naive attitude toward Communism and his obvious lack of understanding of even the most elementary economic principles which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader he might eventually turn out to be. That is the reason why I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he had the great gift of leadership, but that it was the responsibility of a leader not always to follow public opinion but to help to direct it in the proper channels -- not to give the people what they think they want at a time of emotional stress but to make them want what they ought to have. I pointed out that it might be very possible that the people of Cuba were completely disillusioned as far as elections and representative government were concerned but that this placed an even greater responsibility on him to see that elections were held at the very earliest date, and thereby to restore the faith of the people in democratic processes. Otherwise, the inevitable result would be the same dictatorship against which he and his followers had fought so gallantly. I used the same argument with regard to freedom of the press, the right to a fair trial before an impartial court, judge and jury, and on other issues which came up during the course of the conversation. In every instance he justified his departure from democratic principles on the ground that he was following the will of the people. I, in my turn, tried to impress upon him the fact that while we believe in majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and that there are certain individual rights which a majority should never have the power to destroy.

I frankly doubt that I made too much impression upon him but he did listen and appeared to be somewhat receptive. I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily in terms of how this place in history would be affected by the courage and statesmanship he displayed at this time. I emphasized that the easy thing to do was to follow the mob, but that the right thing in the long-run would be better for the people and, of course, better for him as well. As I have already indicated he was incredibly naive with regard to the Communist threat and appeared to have no fear whatever that the Communists might eventually come to power in Cuba. He said that during the course of the revolution there had been occasions when the Communists overplayed their hand and "my people put them in their place." He implied that this would be the situation in the future in the event that the Communists tried to come to power. As a matter of fact, in his attitude toward Communism, both internally and from an international standpoint, he sounded almost exactly like Sukarno had sounded to me when I visited Indonesia in 1953. In our discussions of Communism I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of his own self-interest and to point out that the revolution which he had led might be turned against him and the Cuban people unless he kept control of the situation and made sure that the Communists did not get into the positions of power and influence. On this score I feel I made very little impression, if any.

Speaking to him from a personal standpoint I urged him at the earliest possible moment to bring good strong men into his government and to delegate responsibilities to them in the economic and other areas where he presently was making many decisions. I tried to point out that unless he did this he would have a workload which would be so great that he could not provide the leadership and the vision that the Cuban people needed for the great issues. I put as much emphasis as possible on the need for him to delegate responsibility, but again whether I got across was doubtful.

It was apparent that while he paid lip service to such institutions as freedom of speech, press and religion his primary concern was with developing programs for economic progress. He said over and over that a man who worked in the sugar cane fields for three months a year and starved the rest of the year wanted a job, something to eat, a house and some clothing and didn't care a whit about whether he had freedom along with it. I of course tried to emphasize that here again as a leader of his people, he should try to develop support for policies which could assure economic progress with freedom rather than without it.

He indicated that it was very foolish for the United States to furnish arms to Cuba or any other Caribbean country. He said "anybody knows that our countries are not going to be able to play any part in the defense of this hemisphere in the event a world war breaks out. The arms governments get in this hemisphere are only used to suppress people as Batista used his arms to fight the revolution. It would be far better if the money that you give to Latin American countries for arms be provided for capital investment." I will have to admit that as far as his basic argument was concerned here I found little that I could disagree with!

We had a rather extended discussion of how Cuba could get the investment capital it needed for economic progress. He insisted that what Cuba primarily needed and what he wanted was not private capital but government capital. He gave me some rather confused arguments as to why plants that were licensed and/or owned and operated by the government would serve the best interests of Cuba better than privately owned enterprises. I told him quite bluntly that his best hope as far as the United States was concerned was not in getting more government capital but in attracting private capital. I explained that government capital was limited because of the many demands upon it and the budget problems we presently confronted. I pointed out that private capital on the other hand was expansible and that he would be serving the interests of Cuba far better by adopting policies which would attract it. I pointed out that there was competition for capital throughout the Americas and the world and that it would not go to a country where there was any considerable fear that policies might be adopted which would discriminate against private enterprise. At this point he, at considerable length, tried to explain why he had said and done some of the things which had appeared to be anti-private enterprise up to this time. Here again on this point I doubt if I made too much of an impression.

He explained his agrarian reform program in considerable detail justifying it primarily on the ground that Cuba needed more people who were able to buy the goods produced within the country and that it would make no sense to produce more in factories unless the amount of money in the hands of consumers was increased.

He rather bitterly assailed the United States press for what he called their unfair reporting of the revolution after he came to power. I, of course, tried to explain that speaking from some personal experience, it was necessary to expect and to learn to take criticism both fair and unfair. I would not be surprised if his sensitivity with regard to ~~xxxxxxx~~ :iticism might eventually lead him to take some rather drastic steps toward curtailing freedom of the press in the future.

He also spoke rather frankly about what he felt was a very disturbing attitude on the part of the American press and the American people generally. His argument went along this line: "yours is a great country -- the richest, the greatest, the most powerful in the world. Your people, therefore, should be proud and confident and happy. But everyplace I go you seem to be afraid -- afraid of Communism, afraid that if Cuba has land reform it will grow a little rice and the market for your rice will be reduced -- afraid that if Latin America becomes more industrialized American factories will not be able to sell as much abroad as they have previously. You in America should not be talking so much about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba or in some other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa -- you should be talking more about your own strength and the reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any other kind of dictatorship."

In my turn of course I tried to explain that we welcomed the industrialization and development of Latin America, that one of our best customers was Canada, for example, which was highly industrialized and that as economic conditions improved in any country this was not only good for that country but good for us as well. I also tried to put our attitude toward Communism in context by pointing out that Communism was something more than just an idea but that its agents were dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power and to set up dictatorships. I also emphasized, however, that we realized that being against Communism was not enough -- that it was even more important that we make it by our actions, by what we say and what we do abroad that we convince people every place that we want to help them achieve economic progress in a climate of freedom.

Several other subjects were discussed but none that I think are worth noting at this point. Significantly enough, he did not raise any questions about the sugar quota nor did he engage in any specific discussions with regard to economic assistance. His primary concern seemed to be to convince me that he was sincere, that he was not a Communist and that his policies had the support of the great majority of the Cuban people.

My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed. The one fact we can be sure of is that he has those indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally. He seems to be sincere. He is either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline -- my guess is the former, and as I have already implied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy are less developed than those of almost any world figure I have met in fifty countries.

But because he has the power to lead to which I have referred, we have no choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction.

Appendix G

Memorandum for DCI
[for Briefing Vice President Nixon],
29 Feb 60

SECRET

28 Mar 60

29 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.

1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's use at meeting with the Vice President on 2 March 1960.

2. Intelligence

Some highlights of recent intelligence which justify the actions being taken or planned against Cuba are:

a. Rapid build-up of events which indicate slide toward Communist orbit and intensified efforts implement internal programs towards establishment Communist dictatorship. Public feeling among middle and upper class Cubans and students has reached new high on Communist issue and numerous station contacts ranging from left to right have declared that situation cannot be tolerated, and that they are now convinced Communists control Cuba.

b. The Chief of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico is on a trip through Central America to initiate activities for the establishment of a pro-Castro revolutionary movement in each country aimed at the overthrow of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover.

c. Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts to establish an operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombia with ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.

d. French intelligence reports "Che" Guevara is talking of including Martinique and Guadeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him.

29 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.

1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's use at meeting with the Vice President on 2 March 1960.

2. Intelligence

Some highlights of recent intelligence which justify the actions being taken or planned against Cuba are:

a. Rapid build-up of events which indicate slide toward Communist orbit and intensified efforts implement internal programs towards establishment Communist dictatorship. Public feeling among middle and upper class Cubans and students has reached new high on Communist issue and numerous station contacts ranging from left to right have declared that situation cannot be tolerated, and that they are now convinced Communists control Cuba.

b. The Chief of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico is on a trip through Central America to initiate activities for the establishment of a pro-Castro revolutionary movement in each country aimed at the overthrow of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover.

c. Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts to establish an operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombia with ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.

d. French intelligence reports "Che" Guevara is talking of including Martinique and Guadeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him.

8 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.

1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's use at the NSC 5412 Representatives Meeting which will consider the Cuba covert action program paper. (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon's briefing.)

2. Intelligence

Some highlights of recent intelligence which justify the actions being taken or planned against Cuba are:

a. Rapid build-up of events which indicate slide toward Communist orbit and intensified efforts implement internal programs towards establishment Communist dictatorship. Public feeling among middle and upper class Cubans and students has reached new high on Communist issue and numerous station contacts ranging from left to right have declared that situation cannot be tolerated, and that they are now convinced Communists control Cuba.

b. The Chief of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico is on a trip through Central America to initiate activities for the establishment of a pro-Castro revolutionary movement in each country aimed at the overthrow of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover.

c. Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts to establish an operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombia with ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.

d. French intelligence reports "Che" Guevara is talking of including Martinique and Guadeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him.

[[illegible] : JHP 22 Jan, 74

Source References*

Volume III

Part I
Background

A. Watching from the Sidelines

1. State, Amembassy Havana: Memo from V. Lansing Collins, 17 Nov 48, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. C.

2. Memo for Chief, WHD from COS Havana, 20 Dec 55, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. S. (HKH-A-2261)

3. *Ibid.*

4. State, Memo for Mr. Braddock from [Army?] Attache, 14 Oct 57, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. (Memo No. 185.) S.

5. State, Memo from Vinton Chapin, 19 Jun 57, sub: Biographic Information Concerning Fidel Castro Ruz. (Memo No. 869). C.

6. David R. McLean, *Western Hemisphere Division, 1946-65*, Vol. I, 191-192 (DDO/HP 324, 2 Dec 73). S.

7. Letter to General His Excellency Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar from Allen W. Dulles, 7 Jul 56. (ER-8-4007/a). U.

8. Memo (no addressee) from Lyman B. Kirkpatick, 19 Nov 57, sub: How to Bring Peace in Cuba. S.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Beatrice B. Berle and Travis B. Jacobs (eds), *Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971*, (N.Y., 1973), p. 681. U.

---

* Unless otherwise specified all sources are SECRET. Copies or notes of all sources cited are filed under HS/CSG 2632.

12. MR [no author], 27 Jan 61, sub: WHD Reporting on the Cuban Revolution and the Rise of Fidel Castro to Power, p. 6. S.

    McLean, *Western Hemisphere Division, op. cit.*, I, 213-216. S.

    Hugh Thomas, *Cuba, The Pursuit of Freedom* (N.Y. 1971), pp. 1000-1001. U.

13. Berle and Jacobs, *op. cit.*, pp. 685-686.

    Following CS reports (S):

    3,345,281, 13 Feb 58
    3,345,282, 13 Feb 58
    3,347,126, 4 Mar 58
    3,351,466, 15 Apr 58
    3,354,755, 12 May 58
    3,367,468, 21 Aug 58
    3,373,470, 10 Oct 58

14. Berle and Jacobs, *op. cit.*, pp. 685-686.

15. Memo for Chief, PP Staff from Alfred T. Cox, 25 Aug 58, sub: US Course of Action in Cuba. S.

16. TDCS 3/376, 032, 30 Oct 58, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz and Forces Strongly Catholic, Non-Communist. S.

17. MR from J. C. King, 20 Nov 58, sub: Cuba - Discussion of Pawley Proposal. S.

    Cables to Director from Havana: 9 Dec 58, HAVA
    0661 (IN 35522); 11 Dec 58, HAVA 006
    S.

61

p. 61

18. Cable to Director from Havana, 11 De
    0668 (IN 36486). S.

19. State, Incoming Telegram from Amconsul Santiago de Cuba, No. 341, 15 Dec 58. S.

20. *Ibid.*

21. Cable to Director from COS Havana, 18 Dec 58, HAVA 0704 (CHECK NO. 453). S.

22. Alfred T. Cox, *Paramilitary Activities at the Staff Level, 15 Sep 55 - 31 Dec 61*, II, 374-375 (CSHP 183, Mar 70). S.

23. Memo for Bob Dahlgren from Alfred T. Cox and Col. C. H. Heinlen, 31 Dec 58, sub: Support Arrangements. S.

24. Memo for the President from Acting Secretary [of State], 23 Dec 58, sub: Cuba. TS [no number]. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray Records, 1952-61, "Cuba" folder, Box 27(?).)

    [Minutes of] Special Group Meeting on Cuba [from Thomas A. Parrott?], 7 Jan 59. S.

25. [Minutes of] Special Group Meeting on Cuba [from Thomas A. Parrott?], 7 Jan 59. S.

    Handwritten notes on Department of State Meeting on Cuba [by Gordon Gray?], 31 Dec 59. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray Records, "Cuba" folder, Box 27.) U.

26. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (N.Y., 1965), pp. 521, 524. U.

B. Castro Takes Over

27. Cable to Havana from Director, 9 Jan 59, DIR 07542 (OUT 60805). S.

    Cable to Director from Havana, 15 Jan 59, HAVA 0900 (IN 47617). S.

    Memo for Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (Army) from C. P. Cabell, 6 Feb 59, sub: Proposed US Army Operation Against the New Cuban Armed Forces. (ER 11-409a.) S.

28. Memo for Chief WHD from Alfred T. Cox, 30 Jan 59, sub: Research Project on Castro Movement. S.

29. Cable to Director from Havana, 3 Feb 59, MSGNR 0984 (CKNR 747). S.

Memo for Mr. Braddock from [Army] Attache, 16 Feb 59, sub: Situation Report, Memo No. 412. S.

30. Board of National Estimates, Threats to the Stability of the U.S. Military Facilities Position in the Caribbean Area and Brazil, SNIE 100-3-59, 10 Mar 59, p. 1. S.

31. Cable to Director from Havana, 9 Apr 59, MSGNR 1191 (CKNR 004). S.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*, 13 Apr 59, MSGNR 2000 (CKNR 017); 15 Apr 59, MSGNR 2016 (CKNR 039). S.

34. Dispatch to Director from Havana, 15 May 59, HAVA 2161. S.

35. Memo for Gordon Gray from Robert Murphy, 1 May 59, sub: Forwarding Tentative Evaluation of Castro Visit. C.

36. Dispatch to Director from COS Havana, 26 May 59, HAVA 2197.

37. HKH-1964, 4 Jun 59, sub: Comments of Cuban Communist Leader on Castro's Trip to US. C.

Theodore Draper, *Castro's Revolution* (N.Y. 1962), pp. 48-57. U.

38. Board of National Estimates, The Situation in the Caribbean through 1959, SNIE 80-59, 30 Jun 59. S.

39. Memo for DCI from Rudolph Gomez, 4 Aug 59, sub: Mr. Leo Cherne. S.

Dispatches: To Director from Havana, 5 Jun 59, HAVA 2233, 5 Jun 59; To COS Havana from DIR, 9 Jun 59, DIR 30041. S.

40. Draper, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62, 65-69.

Thomas, *op. cit.*, pp. 1234-1271.

41. Memo for Col. King from Rudolph E. Gomez, 26 Oct 59, sub: Visit of Mr. R. E. Gomez to Havana, Cuba, 15-18 Oct 59. S.

42. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 27 Oct 59, sub: Discussions between the Department and Chief, WHD on Cuba. S.

43. US Senate, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Judiciary Sub-Committee Hearings on "Communist Threat to the US through the Caribbean," Part III Testimony of Gen. C. P. Cabell, pp. 162-163. U.

44. Dispatch for COS Habana and COB Santiago de Cuba from Chief, WHD, 18 Dec 59, sub: RMD -- Cuba, HKBW[?] 3214. TS (No number).

45. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59, sub: Cuban Problems. S. (DD/P 4-9871.)

46. Board of National Estimates, The Situation in the Caribbean through 1960, SNIE 80/1-59, 29 Dec 59, pp. 1, 4, 7, 13. S.

47. Office Memo to Doris from Pauline, 11 Jan 60, sub: General Cabell's Briefing of JCS-State, 8 Jan 60. S.

Source References

Part II

Castro Must Go

A. Organizing for Covert Action, Jan-Mar 60

1. L. K. White, *Diary Notes*, 8 Jan 60. S.
2. CIA Inspector General's Survey of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Oct 61, p. 5. TS 173040. (Hereinafter cited as I. G. Survey.)
3. Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, p. 2.*
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
5. Memo for James E. Flannery, 12 Dec 73, sub: Review of [E. Howard] Hunt's Book [*Give Us This Day*]. S.
6. David R. McLean, *Western Hemisphere Division, 1946-1965*, II, 242-243. (DDO HP 324, Dec 73.) S.
7. Conversation between Walter Elder and Jack B. Pfeiffer, 14 Jun 74. U.
8. MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 3 Oct 73, sub: Brief Conversation with Jake Esterline. C.
9. Oral History Interview: Richard Drain by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 8 Jan 76, Tape 1, pp. 6-8.
10. Oral History Interview: Richard Bissell by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 1, pp. 2-3.
11. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, *op. cit.*, Tape 1, pp. 15-16.

---

* This and all other Oral History Interviews conducted by Jack B. Pfeiffer are UNCLASSIFIED.

12. Oral History Interview: Richard Bissell by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 1, pp. 5-6.

    Proposed Agenda [for the] Special Group Meeting, 12 Jan 60. S.

13. MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 13 Jan 60, sub: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 13 Jan 60. S.

    US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, 20 Nov 75, p. 93. (94th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 94-465.) U. (Hereinafter SSC.)

14. MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 13 Jan 60, *op. cit.*

15. Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 21 Jan 60, sub: Cuba. S.

16. Alfred T. Cox, *Paramilitary Ground Activities at the Staff Level, 15 Sep 55 - 31 Dec 61*, II, 384-385 (DDO HP 183, Mar 60). S.

17. MR from J. D. Esterline, 2 Feb 60, sub: Meeting with the DCI. S.

    [MR from Thomas A. Parrott] 3 Feb 60, sub: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - Cuba. S.

18. MR from J. C. King, 26 Jun 60, sub: Meeting with DOD representative on Cuba. S.

    MR from E. Scott, 3 Feb 60, sub: Meeting, 3 Feb [60], 0900 hours - 1015 hours. S.

    Memo for the DDS from Bruce Cheever, 4 Feb 60, sub: Request for Special Allowance for CIA Representative to CINCLANT. S.

19. [MR from Jim Flannery?], 11 Feb 60, sub: A/DDP/P Review of Status of Plans for Cuban Operations. S.

    MR from J. D. Esterline, 12 Feb 60, sub: Briefing of Deputy Secretary of Defense on Cuba. S.

20. Memo to Designated Representatives Under NSC 5412/2 [from Thomas A. Parrott?] [15-16 Feb 60?], sub: Covert Action Operations Against Fidel Castro. S.

21. Memo to Designated Representatives under NSC 5412/2 [15-16 Feb 60?], *op. cit.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. [MR from Thomas A. Parrott?] *Minutes of Special Group Meeting - Cuba,* 17 Feb 60. S.

    Memo of Meeting with the President [on 17 Feb 60] from Gordon Gray, 19 Feb 60. TS 189337-1.

24. MR from J. D. Esterline, 18 Feb 60, sub: Conversation with J. C. King, 1100 hours, 18 Feb 60. S.

    MR from J. C. King, 25 Feb 60, sub: Meeting with Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Mr. Thomas Mann on Cuba. S.

25. MR from J. D. Esterline, 18 Feb 60, sub: Conversation with J. C. King, 1100 hours, 18 Feb 60. S.

26. MR from J. D. Esterline, 19 Feb 60, sub: Meeting with the DCI on Cuba. S.

27. Memorandum [no author, no date, presumed written between 24-25 Feb 60], sub: Covert Action Against Cuba. S.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

30. Minutes of OCB Meetings: 2 Mar 60; 9 Mar 60. S. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library Files of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Gordon Gray (A67-64), Box 67.)

31. MR [from E. A. Stanulis?], 9 Mar 60, sub: First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force. S.

32. Note to Mr. Barnes from Richard Helms, 8 Mar 60, sub: [Revision of 8 Mar 60 paper for 5412 Group]. S.

33. [Memo] to Designated Representatives Under NSC 5412/2 [from T. A. Parrott, 8 Mar 60], sub: Covert Action Operations Against Fidel Castro. S.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 8 Mar 60, sub: What We Are Doing in Cuba. S.

36. *Ibid.*

37. Memo for Mr. [Gordon] Gray from Samuel E. Belk, 9 Mar 60, sub: Cuba. (TS 189337-2). (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Clean-Up Files, Box 6 [Cuba].)

Briefing Note for NSC Meeting of 19 Mar 60, from S. E. Belk, 9 Mar 60, sub: Cuba. S. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Clean-Up Files, Box 6 [Cuba].)

38. Memo for Mr. Gray from Samuel E. Belk, 9 Mar 60, *op. cit.*

39. Memo for the NSC from James S. Lay, Jr., 15 Mar 60, sub: U. S. Policy Toward Cuba. TS (no number). (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Gordon Gray Records, 1952-61, "Cuba". Box [27?].)

40. Memo of Meeting with the President on 12 Mar 60 from Gordon Gray. TS (no number). (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Clean-Up Files, Box 7, 1960, Meetings with the President. Vol. I.)

41. Memo for Mr. Bissell and Col. J. C. King, from Allen W. Dulles, 14 Mar 60, sub: ["Starters" for Our Cuban Paper]. S.

42. *Ibid.*

43. MR from J. C. King, 15 Mar 60, sub: Special Group Meeting, 14 Mar 60. S.

    Memo to Designated Representatives Under NSC 5412/2 [14 Mar 60], sub: Covert Action Operations Against Fidel Castro. S.

44. MR from J. C. King, 15 Mar 60, sub: Special Group Meeting, 14 Mar 60. S.

45. *Ibid.*

46. Two draft papers on the Clandestine Service's anti-Castro efforts, 14 and 15 Mar 60. (15 Mar, 6 pp. plus Financial Annex; 14 Mar 60, 5 pp., no Financial Annex.) S.

47. Memo for Mr. [Gordon] Gray from S. E. Belk, 16 Mar 60, sub: Cuba (Briefing Note for NSC Mtg 17 Mar 60). S.

48. Memo of Conference with the President, 2:30 p.m., 17 Mar 60 from A. J. Goodpaster, 18 Mar 60. TS (no number). (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Clean-Up Files, Gordon Gray, *et al*, 1953-61, Box 40[?].)

49. *Ibid.*

50. [Memo from] J. C. King, 21 Mar 60, sub: Policy Meeting on General Covert Action Plan for Cuba, 17 Mar 60. S.

51. MR from Col. Jack Hawkins, 5 May 61, sub: Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba (CSHP 105). S.

52. Eisenhower, Dwight D., *Waging Peace* (New York, 1965), p. 533. U.

53. Letter to William Colby from Gordon Gray, 3 Dec 74, sub: Letter to Dr. Don Wilson. (ER 74-6355/4). U.

B. Forging the Tool

54. Memo for DDS from John E. O'Gara, 24 Mar 60, sub: Establishment of a New Branch and Section within Headquarters WH Division. S.

55. L. K. White, *Diary Notes*, 24 Mar 60. S.

56. Memo for Comptroller, CIA from Allen W. Dulles, 24 Mar 60, sub: Project JMARC. S.

57. *Ibid.*

58. Memo for J. D. Esterline from M. J. King, 18 Mar 60, sub: Branch 4 Financial Support. S.

Memo for Ed Stanulis from Mike King, 22 Mar 60, sub: Per Diem for Domestic Base. S.

59. MR - No. 2 [no author], 25 Mar 60, sub: JMARC. S.

60. MR - No. 3 [no author], 31 Mar 60. S.

61. *Ibid.*

Savilion H. Chapman, *The Cuban Invasion: Maritime Aspects, 1961*, p. 7. (CSHP 86, Nov 66.) S.

62. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from P. E. Oberst, 31 Mar 60, sub: JMARC - Timing and Tactics. S.

63. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from R[obert] Reynolds, 4 Apr 60, sub: Daily Progress Reports. S.

64. Memo for DDP from J. D. Esterline, 15 Apr 60, sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report for 14 Apr 60. S.

65. MR from Eleanor, 27 Apr 60, sub: DCI Briefing [by] WH/4, 14 Apr 60. S.

66. *Ibid.*

67. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 26 Apr 60, sub: Project JMARC, Amendment No. 1. S.

68. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub: Briefing of the JCS on Cuba and the Dominican Republic. S.

    Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 6 Apr 60, sub: Briefing of JCS on Operations in Cuba. S.

69. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub: Briefing of JCS on Cuba and the Dominican Republic. S.

70. MR from E. A. Stanulis, 10 Mar 60, sub: Meeting with Capt. Burns Spore, USN. S.

71. Memo for Director of Logistics from William E. Eisemann, 19 Apr 60, sub: Funding of JMARC-3.

72. Memo of Conversation from E. A. Stanulis, 27 Apr 60, sub: Aerial Coverage of Cuba and the Off-Shore Islands. S.

73. Chapman, *The Cuban Invasion, op. cit.*, p. 8.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

75. Memo for the Secretary [of State] from R. R. Rubottom, Jr., 25 Mar 60, sub: Coordination of Activities Relating to Cuba. C. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Gordon Gray, Records 1952-61, Box 29, Folder: "Cuba".)

76. Minutes of Special Group Meeting of 23 Mar 60 from T. A. Parrott, 24 Mar 60. S.

77. Memo for Honorable Douglas Dillon from Gordon Gray, 29 Apr 60, sub: Personal and Confidential. U. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Gordon Gray Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder: "Cuba".)

78. *Ibid.*

79. Minutes of Special Group Meeting of 28 Apr 60 from T. A. Parrott [29 Apr 60?]. S.

Memo for E. Stanulis from J. D. Esterline, 30 Apr 60, sub: Review of Coordination with other Agencies. S.

80. Memo for Chief, JMARC/CI from Jacob D. Esterline, 14 Jun 60, sub: Bureau Stay-Behind Activity. S.

81. Memo for Acting Director of Central Intelligence from J. C. King, 23 Jun 60, sub: Operational Activities of the FBI in Cuba. S.

82. MR from J. C. King, 30 Jun 60, sub: FBI Intelligence Operations in Cuba and Mexico. S.

83. Dispatch to Chief WHD from COB JMASH, 30 Aug 60, sub: Forwarding of Memorandum (UFGA-113). S.

84. Official Routing Slip for Bill Byrne from Don [Ewing], 6 Mar 69, sub: [Review of papers on JMWAVE]. S.

85. Memo for the President through the Secretary of State from Allen W. Dulles, 9 Jul 60, sub: [Briefing of Presidential Candidates] [ER-62-1750]. S.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Clean-Up Files (Gordon Gray, *et al*), Box 64, Actions by the President, Miscellaneous Action Notes, 18 Jul 60, "Telegrams to Sen. John F. Kennedy and Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson." U.

Memo for Mr. C. T. Barnes from John H. Dyer, 20 Jul 60, sub: Briefing Material. C.

Memo for Mr. C. T. Barnes from E. A. Stanulis, 21 Jul 60, sub: Cuban Briefing Paper. S.

Memo for the President from Allen W. Dulles, 3 Aug 60, sub: [Briefing of JFK, 23 Jul 60, and LBJ, 28 Jul 60]. ER-60-6067. S.

86. [Minutes of] Special Group Meeting [from T. A. Parrott], 11 Aug 60. S.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 12 Jul 60, sub: Project JMARC, Amendment No. 2. S.

Memo for George H. Reingruber (P) from J. C. King, 19 Jul 60, sub: Instructions for the Obligation and Expenditure of JMARC Funds. S.

Memo for the DCI from J. C. King, 19 Aug 60, sub: JMARC, Amendment No. 3. S.

87. [Memo for] Mr. Bissell from T. A. P[arrott], 23 Aug 60, sub: [Release of $10 million from the Agency Reserve for Project JMARC]. S.

88. Oral History Interview: William E. Eisemann by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 14 Nov 75, Tape 3, pp. 33-34.

C. Cooperation and Challenge

89. Cables to: MASH and RAND from Director, 6 Jun 60, DIR 33225 (OUT 82950); MASH from Director, 22 Jul 60, DIR 41283 (OUT 99274); OARSMAN, GUATEMALA, PANAMA, 4 Aug 60, DIR 43756 (OUT 54882). S.

90. NIE 85-2-60, The Situation in Cuba, 14 Jun 60, pp. 1, 5-6. S/NOFOR.

91. Memo of Meeting with the President on 18 Aug 60 from Gordon Gray, 22 Aug 60. TS 208101. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project Clean-Up Records of Gordon Gray, et al, 1953-1961, Box 40.)

92. Special Group Papers, 15 Apr 60 - 31 Dec 62, Vol. I, 30 Jun 60. S.

93. Memo of Meeting with the President on 18 Aug 60, *op. cit.*

94. Memo of Meeting with the President, 17 Apr 60 from Gordon Gray. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project "Clean-Up Records of Gordon Gray *et al*, 1953-61," Box 7, 1960 Meetings with the President, Vol. II, 22 Aug 60. TS (no number).

95. The President's Appointments, 1960 (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, A 70-29/1.) U.

96. Memo for DDP from J. D. Esterline, 7 Sep 60, sub: Attitude of Asst. Secretary of State for Latin America, Thomas Mann, on JMARC. S.

97. *Ibid.*

98. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Review of Cuban Situation for Asst. Sec. State for L. A., Thomas Mann. S.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 21 Oct 60, sub: Observation on Briefing of Asst. Sec. State, Thomas Mann, re JMARC/Guatemala Operations on 20 Oct 60. S.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Meeting with DCI and Asst. SecState for L.A., Thomas Mann, on Cuba. S.

99. Not used.

100. Memo for DDP/EMB from C. Tracy Barnes, 31 Oct 60, sub: Attached Paper for Special Group.

101. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Meeting with DCI and SecState for L.A., Thomas Mann, on Cuba. S.

102. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Review of Cuban Situation for Asst. SecState for L.A., Thomas Mann. S.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 21 Oct 60, sub: Observations on Briefing of Asst. SecState, Thomas Mann, re JMARC/Guatemala Operation on 20 Oct 60. S.

103. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 26 Oct 60, sub: JMARC U. S. Base Requirements. S.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 3 Nov 60, sub: Meeting with DDCI. S.

104. MR from J. C. King, 7 Nov 60, sub: Dinner with Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

105. MR from J. D. Esterline, 10 Sep 60, sub: Meeting with James A. Douglas, 9 Sep 60. S.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from E. A. Stanulis, 12 Sep 60, sub: Policy Approval for the Use of DOD Personnel in Project JMARC. S.

106. Memo for DDP from J. Foster Collins, 15 Sep 60, sub: Foreign Volunteers for JMARC. S.

Memo for Chief, WH Division from Alfred T. Cox, 12 Oct 60, sub: Recruitment of American Volunteers. S.

107. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 20 Sep 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 12-16 Sep 60. S.

108. Memo for Chief, WHD from E. A. Stanulis, 5 Oct 60, sub: Guantanamo Bay. S.

109. *Ibid.*

110. Briefing Note for NSC Mtg, 7 Nov 60 from CAH [Christian A. Herter], 4 Nov 60, sub: U. S. Policy Toward China. S.

111. Memo for DCI from F. P. Holcomb, 28 Oct 60, sub: Concern Expressed by Admiral Dennison, CINCLANT. S.

112. MR from J. Hawkins, 2 Nov 60, sub: Briefing this date at HQ CIC Atlantic and Supreme Commander, Atlantic on Project JMARC. S.

D. Personnel and Training

113. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 14 Apr 60, sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report. S.

114. Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, *op. cit.*, Tape 1, pp. 3-4.

115. MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 26 Oct 73, sub: Brief conversation with Jake Esterline. C.

116. Eisemann-Pfeiffer OH Interview, *op. cit.*, Tape 1, p. 2.

117. *Ibid.*, Tape 1, pp. 2-3.

118. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, *op. cit.*, Tape 1, p. 5.

119. *Ibid.*, Tape 1, pp. 6-7.

120. *Ibid.*, Tape 1, pp. 9-10.

120a. Memo for Executive Officer, DCI from Richard Helms, 19 Jan 50, sub: Dissemination of Intelligence to DD/I. (ER 11-552). S.

David Coffin, *Development of Economic Intelligence in the Office of Research and Reports*, 1950-1967, II, 44-45. (DDI/OER 2, Oct 74.) S.

121. Military biographic sheets on Hawkins and Egan. U.

JMARC Daily Progress Reports, 27 Jan and 29 Aug 60. S.

122. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, *op. cit.*, Tape 1, pp. 10-11.

123. Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, *op. cit.*, Tape 1, p. 5.

124. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 17 Mar 60, sub: Personnel Assignments to Branch 4, WH Division. S.

125. WH Field Memo. No. 12-60 to Chief: All WH Field Stations and Bases, from Oliver G. Galbond (P) 19 Feb 60, sub: Agent Candidates for Possible Use in Cuba. S.

Book Dispatch No. 1881 to All WH Field Stations and Bases from Chief, WHD, 22 Apr 60, sub: Recruitment of Cuban Nationals. S.

R and R to WH/FI from WH/4/FI, 12 Sep 60 forwarding FI activity reports for months of Mar through Aug 60. S.

126. DDS Chrono Files: Minutes of DDS Staff Meetings, 20 Apr, 18 May, and 29 June 60. S.

127. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 9 Jun 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 7 and 8 Jun 60. S.

Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 14 Jun 60, sub: Staffing Guide for JMARC. S.

Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 9 Aug 60, sub: Personnel Requirements for WH/4 - JMARC. S.

Memo for A/DDP/A from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 25 Aug 60, sub: Personnel Requirements for WH/4. (DDP-0-4402.) S.

128. MR from John F. Mallard, 6 Sep 60, sub: Meeting with Mr. Tracy Barnes. S.

129. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 5 Nov 60, sub: Personnel Requirements for WH/4-JMARC. (DDP-0-5858.) S.

130. JMARC Daily Progress Reports - Support, 19 Aug 60. S.

131. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 19 Oct 60, sub: Use of US Contract Personnel for JMARC Maritime Operations. S.

132. Cable to JMASH from Director, 9 Nov 60, DIR 10738 (OUT 90611). S.

133. Cable to Director from MADD, 1 Nov 60, MADD 8452 (IN 36407). S.

134. Eisemann-Pfeiffer OH Interview, *op. cit.*, Tape 1, p. 7.

Source References

Part III

Changing Concepts

1. Savilion H. Chapman, *The Cuban Invasion -- Maritime Aspects, 1961*, pp. 11-12. (CSHP 86, Nov 66.) S.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

3. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 2 Nov 60, sub: [Memorandum on Project JMARC]. S.

   Memo for DDP/EMB from Francis W. Barkley, 2 Nov 60, sub: WH/4 Paper for Submission to Special Group on 3 Nov 60. S.

4. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 3 Nov 60, sub: Meeting with DDCI. S.

   Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from T. A. Parrott], 3 Nov 60. S.

5. Cable to Guat from Director, 4 Nov 60, DIR 09972 (OUT 88974). S.

   Cable to Director from MADD, 5 Nov 60, MADD 0487 (IN 38552). S.

   Memo for Chief, TRAV from Jack Hawkins, 7 Nov 60, sub: Organization and Training of Strike Force. S.

6. Memo for C/CA from WH/4, 15 Nov 60, sub: Draft Cuban Operational Briefing [for] President-Elect. S.

   MR from Jack Hawkins, 2 Nov 60, sub: Briefing this date at Hq. CIC Atlantic and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. S.

   MR from Richard D. Drain, 16 Nov 60, sub: JMARC Meeting with DDP. S.

7. MR from Richard D. Drain, 16 Nov 60, sub: JMARC Meeting with DDP. S.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. Memo for General Maxwell Taylor from Allen W. Dulles, 1 Jun 61, sub: [Briefing of President-Elect, John F. Kennedy, 18 Nov 60]. S.

    Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 18 Nov 60, sub: Points re Cuba from Discussion at Special Group Meeting, Saturday, 19 Nov 60. S.

    Minutes of Special Group Meetings [from T. A. Parrott], 16 Nov, 19 Nov, and 23 Nov 60. S.

10a. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 26 Oct 60, sub: JMARC Budget. (DD/P 0-5866). S.

10b. Memo for Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 7 Nov 60, sub: JMARC Budget. (DD/P 0-5866). S.

11. Memo for Chief, WH/4 Support from Herbert B. Juul, 22 Nov 60, sub: Staffing Requirements for 600 Man Strike Force Training.

    Cable to Director from Guatemala, 22 Nov 60, GUAT 584 (IN 46427). S.

12. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 23 Nov 60, sub: Major Problems Confronting Operation JMARC. S.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 18 Nov 60, *op. cit.*

15. Cables to Director from JMTRAV: 23 Nov 60, TRAV 0141 (IN 46775); 25 Nov 60, TRAV 0148 (IN 47383). S.

16. Cable to Director from Guatemala, 28 Nov 60, GUAT 605 (IN 48628). S.

17. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 29 Nov 60, sub: Paramilitary Policy re Cuba. S.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*

20. Taylor Committee Reports, MR's of PM Study Group Meetings, 7th Meeting, 1 May 1961, p. 3. S.

21. Memo for Chief, WH/4 PM from Jacob D. Esterline, 2 May 61, sub: Straightening Out Dates of Strike Force Concept for the Taylor Committee. S.

22. Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 3, p. 39.

23. Oral History Interview for the John F. Kennedy Library: Richard Bissell by Joseph E. O'Connor, 25 Apr 67, pp. 3-4. U.

24. Oral History Interview: Richard M. Bissell, Jr. by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75.

p. 81

81

Source References

Part IV

Presidential Resurgence

1. Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, pp. 13-14.

2. MR from Richard D. Drain, 29 Nov 60, sub: JMARC Meeting with DDP. S.

3. Memo of Conversation with William D. Pawley from Livingston T. Merchant, 28 Nov 60. S.

4. Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A. Parrott], 30 Nov 60. S.

5. *Ibid.*
5a. Ibid., 6 Dec 60. TS

6. Memo for [Allen W. Dulles] from Livingston T. Merchant, 10 Dec 60, sub: Proposal to the President and President's Reply. TS (no number).

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. ~~*Ibid.*~~ Official Routing Slip for A/DDP/A from DDP/EMB, 1 Dec 60, sub: Draft of memo for President [illegible] from Dillon. TS.

~~10. *Ibid.*, 5 Dec 60. S.~~

10. Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A. Parrott], 5 Dec 60. S.
Memo for DDP/EMB from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 Dec 60, sub: Four JMARC Problems for 8 December Meeting of Special Group. S.

Memo for Gen. Lansdale from C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Dec 60, sub: [Problems for Special Group Meeting of 8 Dec 60]. S.

Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Dec 60, sub: Special Group Meeting, 8 Dec 60. S.

MR from Thomas A. Parrott, 8 Dec 60, sub: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 Dec 60. S.

11. Memo for Tracy Barnes from Joseph W. Scott, 8 Dec 60, sub: [A Suggested Program for Cuba]. TS (no number).

12. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (New York, 1965), pp. 603, 712. U.

13. SNIE 85-3-60, 8 Dec 60, Prospects for the Castro Regime. S/NOFORN.

14. MR from Michael F. Taylor, 23 Dec 60, sub: Meeting with Ambassador Wilhauer [*sic*]. S.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A. Parrott], 22 Dec 60. S.

    MR from R. E. Whedbee, 22 Dec 60, sub: Meeting arranged by Henry Holland, 21 Dec 60.

17. Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A. Parrott], 22 Dec 60. S.

    MR from R. E. Whedbee, 22 Dec 60, sub: Meeting arranged by Henry Holland, 21 Dec 60.

18. [Memo] for Attention of Col. J. C. King from Mike Haider, rec'd 10 Jan 61, sub: [Anti-Castro Leftists]. U.

19. Memo for Mr. Richard Bissell from BG Lansdale, 28 Dec 60, sub: Cuba. S.

20. Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A. Parrott], 29 Dec 60. S.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. Memo of Conference with the President, 29 Dec 60, from A. J. Goodpaster, 6 Jan 61. S. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, DDE Clean-Up Files, Box 51 - Cuba.)

24. Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 Dec 60, *op. cit.*

25. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 28 Dec 60, sub: [Cuba]. S.

26. Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 2 Jan 61, sub: Material for Policy Meeting on Cuba, 3 Jan 61. S.

27. Memo for Mr. Frank Devine from J. D. Esterline, 3 Jan 61, sub: Personnel for US Embassy in Havana. S.

Cable to Havana from BELL, 3 Jan 61, BELL 0174 (OUT 5669). S.

28. MR from C. Tracy Barnes, 3 Jan 61, sub: Outline of 3 Jan 1961 [White House] Meeting. S.

29. L. K. White, *Diary Notes*, 3 Jan 61. S.

Cable to BELL from Havana, 7 Jan 61, HAVA 7405 (IN 1184). S.

30. Cable to Havana from Director, 7 Jan 61, DIR 19746 (OUT 60701). S.

31. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from J. Hawkins, 4 Jan 61, sub: Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operations Against Government of Cuba. S.

32. MR from R. D. Drain, 4 Jan 1960 [*sic*], sub: Meeting with A/DDP/A. S.

Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 5 Jan 61, sub: Material for the 5 Jan Special Group Meeting. S.

33. Memo for ADDP/A from J. D. Esterline, 9 Jan 61, sub: Material for the 12 Jan [61] Special Group Meeting. S.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A. Parrott, 12 Jan 61]. S.

34. MR from John S. Warner, 9 Jan 61, sub: DCI Appearance before CIA Subcommittee on House Appropriations Committee, 6 Jan 61. (TS 174817).

35. Daily Progress Reports, WH/4/Support: June 1960 - March 1961: 28 Dec 60, 30 Dec 60, 3 Jan 61. S.

36. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, op. cit.*, p. 614. U.

37. MR from J. C. King, 11 Jan 61, sub: Meeting to Discuss Proposed Release to the Press re *NYT* Story of 10 Jan 61 on Training of Guerrillas in Guatemala. S.

38. Memo for Under Secretary Merchant from Ambassador Willauer, 18 Jan 61, sub: The Suggested Program for Cuba Contained in the Memorandum to You dated 6 Dec 60. S.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A. Parrott], 19 Jan 61. S.

39. Memo for Under Secretary Merchant from Ambassador Willauer, 18 Jan 61, *op. cit.*

40. *Playa Giron: Derrota del Imperialismo* (Habana: Ediciones R, 1961), I, 405. U.

41. *Ibid.*, 436.

42. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, op. cit.*, pp. 613-614.

43. *Newsday*, 10 Sep 65, p. 50. U.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

45. Interview with Gordon Gray by Paul D. Hopper, 19 Jul 67, Columbia University Oral History Project, Part 7, pp. 274-277. U. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library copy.)

46. The following Oral History Interview filed in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library:

OH-14	Dwight D. Eisenhower, 28 Jul 64.
OH-57	Thomas C. Mann, 23 Feb 68.
OH-117	Livingston Merchant -- Part I, 4 May 67; Part 2, 13 May 68.
OH-183	Thomas S. Gates, Jr., 3 Aug 67.
OH-206	Gen. David M. Shoup, 29 Aug 72.
OH-288	James H. Douglas, 23 Oct 72.

Source References

Part V

Direct Action Programs

A. Propaganda

1. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 27 Oct 59, sub: Propaganda Operations in the Caribbean.

2. Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 Oct 59 [from T. A. Parrott].

   Memo for A/DDP/A from Sherman Hoar, 29 Oct 59, sub: DCI Comments on Cuban Proposal.

   Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 3 Nov 59, sub: Operation Against the Regime of Fidel Castro.

   Memo for Acting Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 16 Nov 59, sub: Anti-Castro Broadcast Operations.

   Memo for DCI from R. E. Gomez, 17 Nov 59, sub: Anti-Castro Broadcast Operations.

3. Minutes of Special Group Meetings [from T. A. Parrott]: 18 Nov 59; 9 Dec 59.

   Memo for Chief, WHD from C. Tracy Barnes, 20 Jan 60, sub: Cuba (DD/P-0-308).

4. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 2 Feb 60, sub: Report on WHD Plans and Activities Concerning Cuba, etc.

5. JMARC Propaganda Program [March 1960]. S.

6. MR's from J. C. King, 15 Mar 60, sub: [Meetings with Messrs. Lemon, Loeb, Lapham, and Wright].

7. *Ibid.*

7a. MR from J. C. King, 9 May 60, sub: Freeport Sulphur Co. Contribution to Support of Anti-Castro Radio Program.

Memo for Mr. Lawrence R. Houston from J. C. King, 9 May 60, sub: Freeport Sulphur Co.

MR from J. C. King, 9 Aug 60, sub: Contribution to Cuban Broadcasting Program.

Ltr to Hon. Dana Latham, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 10 Aug 60 from John S. Warner.

Memo for Col. King from R. E. Gomez, 19 Aug 60, sub: Telecon with Henry Holland, 19 Aug 60.

7b. Memo for Chief, WHD from J. D. Esterline, 25 Oct 60, sub: WRUL Radio Effort.

Cable to Director from MASH, 19 Nov 60, MASH 1744 (IN 45083).

Cable to JMASH from Director, 23 Nov 60, DIR 13132 (OUT 95725).

Request for Payment of Confidential Funds to JMARC/ Finance from D. Phillips, 21 Nov 60.

Memo for JMARC/Finance from C/WH/4/Prop, 23 Nov 60, sub: WRUL Monthly Payments.

Cable to JMWAVE from BELL, 27 Dec 60, BELL 0022 (OUT 5074).

Memo for Chief, WHD from David A. Phillips, 25 Jan 61, sub: Approval for Continuing Payments from JMATE Funds for WRUL Radio Program.

7c. Memo for Chief, Ops Branch, DPD/DDP from Chester H. Vincent, 29 Apr 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report (DPD 3505-60).

Memo for DPD/AS from D. A. Phillips, 25 May 60, sub: Medium Wave Broadcasts from Aircraft (DPD-4426-60).

Memo for DDP from D. A. Phillips, 27 Jun 60, sub: Estimates for Aircraft Broadcasts to Cuba.

8. JMARC Propaganda program, *op. cit.*

9. MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, sub: Interview with David A. Phillips.

10. *Ibid.*

10a. Cable for Director from JMASH, 22 Nov 60, MASH 1805 (IN 46419).

11. Memo for C. T. Barnes from E. A. Stanulis, 21 Jul 61, sub: Cuban Briefing Papers.

12. [Memo for] Mrs. Geraldine S. DePuy, Director, Operations Division and John P. Hebrew, Director, Investigation Staff, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Dept. of Commerce from R. W. Lindsay, Intelligence Division, Investigation Staff, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Dept. of Commerce, 20 May 60, sub: Swan Islands (FC-2040; 2-37).

Ltr. for Harold W. Reeves, Collector of Customs, Tampa, Fla. from Geraldine S. DePuy, 25 May 60, FC-2650-FLB.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from Chief, WH/4 Support, 27 May 60, sub: Shipment of Supplies and Equipment to Swan Island.

MR from [R. S. Kraus?], 27 May 60, sub: JMHOPE.

13. MR from David A. Phillips, 27 Jun 60, sub: Briefing of Senator Mundt on CIA Radio Operations against Cuba.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from T. A. Parrott], 12 May 60.

14. Memo for Chief, WHD from William E. Eisemann, 27 Jun 60, sub: Administrative Plan for the JMARC/4 Phase of Project JMARC.

Phillips, David A., *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977), pp. 90-91. U.

MR from Richard R. Bennett, 22 Apr 60, sub: Proposed Implementation Plan for Cover Plan for JMARC/4.

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 25 Apr 60, sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report 22, 23, 24, 28 Apr 60.

R and R Sheet for E. Stanulis from David A. Phillips, 5 May 60, sub: Annex A, Operational Plan for JMARC/4.

Memo of Conversation from E. A. Stanulis, 28 Apr 60, sub: Cover for JMARC.

Burwell, James, *Logistics Support for Operations in Cuba, March 1960-October 1961*, DDS/HS OL-7, Apr 71.

15. [Memo from] WH/Security for Cuban History [May 61], sub: [Security of Swan Island].

16. Memo for Mr. David Phillips from J. D. Esterline, 29 Mar 60, sub: Random Notes of 29 Mar [60] which Require Attention.

17. Cable to Director from Havana, 30 Mar 60, MSGNR 3940 (CKNR 208).

Cable to Havana from Director, 9 Mar 60, MSGNR 18435 (CKNR 098).

18. MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, sub: Interview with David A. Phillips.

Memos for the NSC from James S. Lay, Jr., sub: U.S. Policy Toward Cuba: 20 Jul and 5 Aug 60. OUO. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gray, Gordon: Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder "Cuba.")

[Dept. of State, ARA], Progress Report on Cuba, 22 Jul 60. C. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gray, Gordon: Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder "Cuba.")

19. MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, *op. cit.*

20. WH/4 Prop Notes for 9 Aug 60.

21. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 1 Sep 60, sub: Radio Swan.

22. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 2 Aug 60, sub: Radio Swan. (DD/P 0-4013).

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 30 Aug 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 25-29 August 1960.

WH/4 Prop Notes for 23 Sep 60.

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 27 Sep 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 23-26 Sep 60.

Memo for Mobilization and Military Personnel Division from J. C. King, 19 Nov 60, sub: Request for Personnel from Department of Defense.

22a. Cables to BELL from RAND: 7 Jan 61, RAND 0172 (IN 1158); 10 Jan 61, RAND 0179 (1360).

22b. Dispatch to Chief, WHD from COB, JMWAVE, 20 Mar 61, sub: Request for Promotion/Fitness Report.

23. [Memo from] C. T. Barnes, 15 Mar 61, sub: Propaganda Effort.

23a. MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, *op. cit.*

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 May 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report, 28 Apr-5 May 60.

WH/4/Prop Notes for 20 Oct 60, 21 Oct 60.

24. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Aug 60, sub: Conversation with ADDP/A.

Free, Lloyd A., "A Summary Report on Attitudes of the Cuban People toward the Castro Regime" [August 1960]. (ER 60-5982).

25. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Aug 60, *op. cit.*

26. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 12 Aug 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 10 and 11 Aug 60.

27. Interview of David A. Phillips by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 11 Mar 75.

28. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 May 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 12-19 May 60.

    Klein and Saks, "Preliminary Outline of Economic and Financial Government Platform, etc," 17 Jun 60. U.

29. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 5 Jul 60, sub: Operational Exploitation of Khrushchev Visit to Cuba. (ER 60-5254).

    WH/4 Prop Notes for 5 July 1960, 6 Jul 60.

30. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 23 Aug 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 19-22 Aug 60.

31. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Sep 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 8 and 9 Sep 60.

31a. Information on Khrushchev destinations from John Zabotto, OCR/USSR Div/Pol-Mil Br., 23 Aug 78. U.

32. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 9 Aug 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 8 Aug 60.

    WH/4 Prop Notes for: 21 Oct 60; 1, 2, and 16 Nov 60; and 1 Dec 60.

    Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 29 Feb 60, sub: What We Are Doing in Cuba.

    Cable to JMASH from Director, 2 Dec 60, DIR 14634 (OUT 98992).

    Senate Select Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders* (94th Cong, 1st Sess, Rpt No. 94-465), 20 Nov 75, p. 72. U.

33. WH/4 Prop Notes for 19 Aug 60, 22 Aug 60.

34. Cable to Havana, Istanbul, Ankara, JMASH from Director, 19 Aug 60, DIR 46287 (OUT 60198).

35. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from R. E. Gomez, 24 Aug 60, sub: Outgoing Cable to Havana, Istanbul, Ankara, and MASH, OUT 60198 of 19 Aug 60.

B. Sabotage and Other Exercises

35a. [Information Requested for Green Study], Job 63-289, Box 1, Folder 9.

35b. MR [from T.A. Parrott], 16 Mar 61, sub: Special Group Meeting - Cuba.

36. MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 9 Mar 60, sub: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 9 Mar 60.

Ibid., Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 14 Jul 60.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 15 Jul 60, sub: Paramilitary Meeting with DDP.

37. Transmittal Slip to Chief, WH/D from [Chief] WH/4/PM, 21 Jul 60, sub: Paramilitary Op Plan 1.

38. Routing and Record Sheet to WH/FI from WH/4/FI, 12 Sep 60, sub: Monthly Reports of FI Activity, March-August 1960 (See Aug 60).

MR from [WH/4/PM?] 30 Nov 60, sub: Operation to Subtle Sabotage Oil and Kerosene in Storage [in Cuba].

Cable to BELL from WAVE, 31 Jan 61, WAVE 3322 (IN 3361).

39. Cable to Paris from Director, 23 Jun 60, DIR 36353 (OUT 89214).

40. MR [from J. C. King?], 29 Nov 60, sub: Sabotage [of] Cuban Television Services. TS (no number).

    Cable to JMWAVE from BELL, 24 Feb 61, BELL 1924 (OUT 9992).

    Cable to JMWAVE from Director, 24 Feb 61, BELL 1929 (OUT 5001).

41. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 1 Nov 60, sub: Request for Approval for Sabotage attacks against Soviet and Soviet Bloc Targets in Cuba.

42. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 18 Nov 60, sub: Development of Action Squads by WHD.

    Memo for Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 10 Nov 60, sub: Goon Squads.

43. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 18 Nov 60, *op. cit.*

44. Memo for Chief, JMARC from John D. Corbett, 12 Sep 60, sub: Approval of Special Operations.

    Memo for Chief, WH/4 from J. Hawkins, 14 Sep 60, sub: Special Operations.

Source References

Part VI

Mr. Nixon's Role in the BOP Operation

1. Richard M. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," *Reader's Digest*, Nov 64, pp. 283-286. U.

   Richard M. Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (N.Y., 1978), pp. 202-203. U.

   Theodore Draper, *Castro's Revolution* (N. Y., 1962), pp. 62-63. U.

2. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," *op. cit.*

   Nixon, *RN, op. cit.*, p. 202.

   Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, *My Fourteen Months with Castro* (Cleveland, 1966), p. 107. U.

2a. MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 18 Jul 79, sub: Telecon with Bob Zunzer re writing letter to Richard Nixon. U.

   Letter to Richard M. Nixon from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 19 Jul 79. U.

   Memo for Jim Pittman from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 5 Mar 79, sub: Memo of Meeting with Fidel Castro on 19 Apr 59 (ER 79-7295). U.

3. MR's from J. C. King: 27 Jan 60, sub: Meeting in Vice President's Office on Cuba; 27 Jan 60, Meeting with Mr. Henry Holland on Cuba; 25 Feb 60, sub: Meeting with General Cushman, Aide to the Vice President.

4. *Ibid.*, 25 Feb 60.

5. *Ibid.*, 27 Jan 60.

6. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 29 Feb 60, sub: What We Are Doing in Cuba.

7. Minutes of the 436th Meeting of the NSC [from Gordon Gray], 10 Mar 60. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray, Box 79-NSC, Minutes and Agenda 1960.) TS (no number).

   Memo of Conference with the President [on] 17 Mar 60 from A. J. Goodpaster, 18 Mar 60. TS (no number).

8. MR from J. D. Esterline, 30 Mar 60, sub: Contact with Mr. William Pawley in Miami, 21 Mar 60.

9. MR from J. D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub: Review of the Cuban Operation and Examination of Possibilities for Hemispheric Support for Liberal Governments (DDP 0-1956).

10. Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 17 May 60, sub: Project JMARC.

10a. [Minutes of] Special Group Meetings - Cuba [from Thomas A. Parrott], 19 May 60.

11. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 20 May 70, sub: Review of Swan Island Operation and [William D. Pawley's] Apparent Unilateral Decision to Work with Cuban Exiles Independent of CIA.

12. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 7 Jun 60, sub: Rubio-Pawley Group.

13. Cables to Director: from Havana, 4 Jun 60, HAVA 4820 (IN 48003); from MASH, 9 Jun 60, MASH 0041 (IN 49533).

14. Official Routing Slip to C/WHD from Gerard Droller [4 Jun 60].

15. Memo to DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 7 Jun 60, sub: Rubio-Pawley Group.

16. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 11 Jul 60, sub: Lunch [on 20 Jun 60] with General Cushman, Vice-Presidential Aide.

17. [Minutes of] Special Meeting of the NSC on 22 Jun 60 [from James S. Lay, Jr.]. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray: Records, 1952-61, "Cuba" folder.) TS (no number).

18. Routing and Record Sheet for Chief, WHD from Chief, WH/4, 21 Jun 60, sub: Copy of NSC Briefing Paper sent General Cabell on 20 June.

18a. *Ibid.*

19. Memo for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Jacob D. Esterline, 25 Jun 60, sub: Notes on Policy Discussion which Followed the CIA Briefing of the NSC on Cuba, 22 Jun 60.

    Memo for Mr. Jacob D. Esterline from James S. Lay, Jr., 29 Jun 60, sub: Esterline memo of 25 Jun 60. [Notes on Policy Discussion at Special NSC Meeting of 22 Jun 60].

20. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 1 Jul 60, sub: Telephone Conversation with General Cushman.

21. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Jul 60, sub: Swan Island Broadcasts.

22. Memo for DCI from Rudolph E. Gomez, 26 Sep 60, sub: Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. (ER 60-7645).

    Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 18 Jul 60, sub: Contacts with Mario Garcia Kohly.

    MR from J. D. Esterline, 20 Jul 60, sub: Briefing of General Cushman.

    WH/4 Prop Notes Jun 60 - Jul 61: 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 29 Jul; 1 Aug; and 11, 17 Oct 60.

    MR's from Robert W. Andrews, 23 and 26 Sep and 4 Oct 60, sub: William Jackson Powell.

23. Memo for Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor from Allen W. Dulles, 17 Jun 61, sub: Marshall Diggs Proposals on Behalf of Garcia Kohly.

Washington Star, 2 Aug 76. U.

24. Memo for the President from Allen W. Dulles, 3 Aug 60, [sub: Intelligence Briefing for Democratic Candidates, July 1960]. (ER 60-6067). U.

Memo for the Record from Allen W. Dulles, 21 Sep 60, [sub: Briefing of Sen. John F. Kennedy on 19 Sep 60].

25. *New York Times*, 21 Oct 60. U.

26. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," *op. cit.*, pp. 286-288. U.

Nixon, *RN, op. cit.*, pp. 220-221. U.

27. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," *op. cit.*, p. 288.

Nixon, *RN, op. cit.*, p. 221.

28. MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 1 Mar 78, sub: Meeting with Mrs. Fawn M. Brodie. U.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., *A Thousand Days* (New York, 1965), p. 225. U.

29. *New York Times*, 23 Oct 60. U.

MR from Thomas A. Parrott, 27 Oct 60, sub: Statements by Presidential Candidates.

30. Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 164. U.

Memo for C/CA from WH/4, 15 Nov 60, sub: Draft Cuban Operational Briefing: President Elect.

31. Memo for the Honorable John A. McCone from Allen W. Dulles, 20 Mar 62, sub: [Intelligence Briefing of President-elect Kennedy]. U.

32. Letter to Admiral Stansfield Turner from Fawn M. Brodie, 4 Jan 78. U.

33. MR [from WH/4], 15 Nov 60, sub: [Transcript of Tape of] Telephone Conversation between C/JMARC and William D. Pawley on 14 Nov 60.

Source References

Part VII

Assassination

1. Oral History Interview: Richard M. Bisssell, Jr. by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 2, p. 18.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

3. L. K. White, *Diary Notes*, 22 Mar 61.

4. Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75. (Untaped conversation.)

5. *Ibid.*

6. Oral History Interview: Richard D. Drain by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 8 Jan 76, [redacted] pp. 19-21.

7. MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 3 Nov 60, sub: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 Nov 60.

8. Hunt, Howard, *Give Us This Day* (New Rochelle, N.Y., Arlington House, 1973), pp. 38-39. U.

9. Daily Log - [WH/4] PM Section, 18 Jul 60; 14 Oct 60.

   [No author], Key to Map of Potential Paramilitary Assets, [no date, but after 6 Aug 60].

10. Cable to Director from SACU [Santiago, Cuba], 18 Jul 60, MSGNR 609 (CKNR 170).

11. Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, ~~op. cit., Tape 1,~~ pp. 16-17.

11a. Cable for Director from Havana, 9 Dec 60, HAVA 7133 (IN 14488).

12. Richard D. Drain, *Personal Notes*.

13. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, *op. cit.*, Tape 3, p. 60.

14. Job 63-605/58, Folders 1, 2, 3: AMHINT-Operations, 19-132-16/1-3.

    Cable to BELL from JMWAVE, 24 Feb 61, WAVE 3931 (IN 0915).

15. WH/4 Prop Notes for 27 Feb 61, 28 Feb 61.

    Richard D. Drain, *Personal Notes*, 28 Feb 61.

16. Letter to Jack B. Pfeiffer from R[ichard] D. D[rain], 24 Jan 76.

    Letter to Richard D. Drain from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 22 Jan 76.

17. Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, *op. cit.*, Tape 1, pp. 15-16.

    "Must Go List"

18. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, *op. cit.*, Tape 1, p. 21.

p. 100

Source References

Part VIII

Conclusions

1. *Playa Giron: Derrota del Imperialismo* (Habana: Ediciones R, 1961), I, 436. U.

   Maurice Halperin, *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro* (Berkley, 1972), p. 89. U.

2. *Playa Giron: Derrota, op. cit.*, III, 387. U.

3. Oral History Interview: Richard D. Drain by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 8 Jan 76, Tape 1, p. 21.

Description of JMWAVE Components

Support Branch

The Support Branch provided routine administrative services to JMWAVE. These included finance, logistics and records management and clerical support. The Branch had 19% of JMWAVE's staffing.

Operations Branch

The Operations Branch was divided into two sections, the FI Section and the Special Operations Section. Staffing, consisting of operations officers and clerical support, was 17% of JMWAVE's total.

The FI Section (Foreign Intelligence) was responsible for the collection of intelligence from the target country through covert HUMINT means.

The Special Operations Section was responsible for paramilitary operations.

Covert Action Branch

The Covert Action Branch was responsible for covert propaganda operations. Staffing was 10% of JMWAVE's total and consisted of operations officers and clerical support.

External Operations Branch

The External Operations Branch was responsible for collecting HUMINT on the target country through assets in areas other than the target country. Staffing was 13% of JMWAVE's total and consisted of operations officers and clerical support.

Reports Section

The Reports Section prepared intelligence reports for Headquarters and intelligence community consumers. Staffing was 10% of JMWAVE's total.

Technical Services Section

The Technical Services Section provided photographic support to JMWAVE. Staffing was 6% of JMWAVE's total.

Communicators

The communicators were responsible for secure communications between JMWAVE and Hqs. Staffing was 8% of JMWAVE's total.

JMWAVE ORGANIZATION


SECRETARY
CHIEF OF STATION
SECRETARY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STATION
COMMUNICATORS
SUPPORT BRANCH
OPERATIONS BRANCH
FI SECTION
SPECIAL OPS SECTION
CA BRANCH
EXTERNAL OPS BRANCH
REPORTS SECTION
TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION

4/10/98 - OKd
by DO/IRR
EW

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS - 1963


Deputy Director for Plans
Western Hemisphere Division
Western Europe Division
Soviet Russian Division
Eastern Europe Division
Africa Division
Far East Division
Near East Division
Special Operations Division
Technical Services Division
Domestic Operations Division
Counter-Intelligence Staff
Foreign Intelligence Staff
Covert Action Staff
Operational Services Staff
Special Activities Staff

4/10/98 OK by DO/IR8
EW

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS - 1961


Deputy Director for Plans
Western Hemisphere Division
Western Europe Division
Soviet Russian Division
Eastern Europe Division
Africa division
Far East Division
Near East Division
Technical Services Division
Development Projects Division
International Organizations Division
Counterintelligence Staff
Foreign Intelligence Staff
Covert Action Staff
Cover and Commercial Staff
Operational Services Staff

13-00000

JMWAVE ORGANIZATION



- SECRETARY — CHIEF OF STATION
- SECRETARY — DEPUTY CHIEF OF STATION
- 99 SIGNAL CENTER 4-COMMUNICATORS

SUPPORT BRANCH
- 1-Chief, Support
- 1-Secretary
- 1-Finance Officer
- 1-Finance Asst
- 1-Logistics Officer
- 1-Logistics Asst 99
- 1-Records Officer
- 1-Intel Asst
- 1-Clerk

OPERATIONS BRANCH

FI SECTION
- 1-Officer (Refugee Debriefings) 99
- 1-Officer (On Island Assets
- 1-Officer (Liaison with Local Services
- 1-Officer (FI Third Country)
- 1-External Ops Rep (AMOT)
- 2-Intel Assts (Management of On-Island Ops
- 1-Secretary Steno

SPECIAL OPS SECTION
- 2-Operations Officers
- 1-Training Officer
- 1-Property and Supply Assistant

99

CA BRANCH

99
- 1-Chief
- 1-Ops Officer (Radio)
- 1-Ops Officer (Pol Action Press and Publication)
- 1-Admin Asst
- 1-Secretary

EXTERNAL OPS BRANCH
- 1-Chief
- 1-Ops Officer
- 1-Ops Officer (JMCHALK)
- 1-Ops Officer (Referent with Station FI Branch)
- 1-Intel Asst
- 1-Secretary Steno 99

REPORTS SECTION

99
- 3-Reports Officers (One of these AMOT officer to handle AMOT reporting)
- 1-Secretary Steno
- 1-Clerk Typist

TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION

99
- 1-Photo General
- 1-IO Tech Aide
- 1-Clerk Typist

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

DRAFT

ARRB Request CIA-1

The following **Directorate of Science and Technology** documents can be Released in Full:

HR 1-11a	27March 1964 p. 15	Mission Statement for the Directorate for Science and Technology
	27 March 1964 fig.3, p. 14	Organizational Chart Office of the Deputy Director for Science and Technology
HR 1-11a	10 October 1969 p. 15	Mission Statement DS&T
	10 October 1969 fig.3, p. 14	Organizational Chart DS&T
HR 1-11a	10 February 1975 p. 15	Mission Statement DS&T
	6 August 1959 p. 21	Mission Statement Photographic Intelligence Center
	6 August 1959 fig.9	Organizational Chart Photographic Intelligence Center
HR 1-13h	16 August 1963 p. 49	Mission Statement National Photographic Interpretation Center
	16 August 1963 fig.16, p. 48	Organizational Chart NPIC
HR 1-13e	26 September 1966 p. 47	Mission Statement NPIC
	26 September 1966 fig.13, p. 46	Organizational Chart NPIC

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DRAFT

DRAFT

HR 1-11e	27 March 1964 p. 23	Mission Statement Office of Special Activities
	27 March 1964 fig.7, p. 22	Organizational Chart Office of Special Activities

The following **Directorate of Science and Technology** documents are pending Directorate re-review.

HR 1-11e	10 February 1975 p. 23	Mission Statement Office of Technical Service
HR 1	10 February 1975 fig.7, p. 22	Organizational Chart Office of Technical Service

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DRAFT

Prev HIS

HR 1-11a (#482)
10 Oct 69

11. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

a. **THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.** The Deputy Director for Science and Technology is responsible for conducting basic and applied research and development in the scientific and technical fields in support of the Central Intelligence Agency. This includes responsibility for liaison and contact with the scientific community as well as all Government agencies on matters of science and technology in intelligence as appropriate, and responsibility for furnishing technical planning, programming guidance, and support to other Agency components utilizing science and technology in support of their functions. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology is responsible for the operation of certain technical collection projects and for the research and development of the means used by them for technical collection; for the production of scientific and technical intelligence; and for research, development and, where appropriate, the operation of automatic data processing equipment in support of the Central Intelligence Agency and its mission; and is further responsible for the maintenance and operation of a center in which all information relating to foreign missile and space operations is collated, analyzed, and provided for the Director and other appropriate USIB agencies. The DDS&T shall operate a scientific career service to provide for the enhancement of career opportunities in the CIA, and shall direct and coordinate the Offices of Computer Services, ELINT, Research and Development, Special Activities, Scientific Intelligence, and Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center, and serve as Chairman of the CIA Research and Development Review Board. (See organization chart, figure 3.)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

HR 1, fig. 3
16 Oct 69

ORGANIZATION

OC #15 (#452)

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY


DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ASSISTANT DEPUTY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO DDS&T (COMOR)
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO DDS&T
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
OFFICE OF COMPUTER SERVICES
OFFICE OF ELINT
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
FOREIGN MISSILE AND SPACE ANALYSIS CENTER

27 March 1964 (182)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

11. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

a. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology is responsible for directing and coordinating the activities of the Offices of Scientific Intelligence, Research and Development, ELINT, Special Activities, Special Projects, and Computer Services, and the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center. His responsibilities include:

(1) Advising the Director of Central Intelligence on scientific and technical intelligence matters;

(2) Producing scientific intelligence;

(3) Coordinating, in a staff capacity, existing and proposed Agency research, development, and engineering (RD&E) plans and programs to insure responsiveness to Agency needs;

(4) Conducting liaison with the entire scientific community, including other Government agencies, on matters of science and technology relating to intelligence;

(5) Managing the "R" Career Service.

RESCINDED BY HR 1-11a
DATED 10 Feb 75 HIS 871

[redacted]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

RESCINDED BY HR 1, fig 3
DATED 12 Feb 75 HT S-871

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY


DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ASSISTANT DEPUTY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO DDS&T
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
OFFICE OF COMPUTER SERVICES
OFFICE OF ELINT
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
OFFICE OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
FOREIGN MISSILE AND SPACE ANALYSIS CENTER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RESCINDED BY HR 1-11a (HRS 1617)
DATE 5 OCT 83

11. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

a. **THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.** The Deputy Director for Science and Technology is responsible for directing and coordinating the activities of the Offices of Scientific Intelligence, Research and Development, ELINT, Development and Engineering, Weapons Intelligence, Technical Service, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center. His responsibilities include

(1) advising the Director of Central Intelligence on scientific and technical intelligence matters;

(2) producing scientific intelligence;

(3) managing existing and proposed Agency research, development, and engineering (RD&E) plans and programs to ensure responsiveness to Agency needs;

(4) conducting liaison with the entire scientific community, including other Government agencies, on matters of science and technology relating to intelligence;

(5) imagery interpretation and exploitation in correlation with other information to support intelligence production of the Agency and the Intelligence Community;

(6) managing the "R" Career Service.

~~SECRET~~

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 059687

Rescinded by R 1-130-7 dated 27 Feb. 19

R 1-130

~~SECRET~~

REGULATION NO. 1-130

ORGANIZATION
Revised 6 August 1959

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER

23. MISSION

The Director of the Photographic Intelligence Center is charged with producing photographic intelligence and providing photographic intelligence services in support of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community.

24. FUNCTIONS

The Director of the Photographic Intelligence Center shall:

a. Produce photographic intelligence in support of Agency and national scientific, military, economic, and geographic intelligence objectives.

b. Provide photographic intelligence support and services to the Agency and the intelligence community.

c. Maintain a photographic intelligence facility manned and equipped to provide complete analytic and technical photographic intelligence services in support of special collection and exploitation requirements.

d. Provide accommodations and services within the center for military-service and other Government representatives engaged in joint exploitation projects.

e. Assist in the evaluation of other intelligence sources through comparison with photographic data.

f. Conduct an active program of research and development in equipment and techniques for providing improved exploitation of photographic intelligence, coordinating such activity as appropriate with Agency, military-service, and other Government components.

g. Conduct liaison with and represent the Agency to Government and private organizations on photographic intelligence activities, coordinating such liaison as appropriate with interested Agency components.

h. Prepare photographic and photogrammetric intelligence collection requirements.

i. Assist in preparation of estimates of foreign capabilities in the field of photographic intelligence.

j. Perform such other functions related to photographic intelligence activities as may be directed.

25. ORGANIZATION

See organization chart, figure 9.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

H. GATES LLOYD
Acting Deputy Director
(Support)

DISTRIBUTION: AB

~~SECRET~~

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

R 1-130

REGULATION
NO. 1-130

ORGANIZATION
Revised 6 August 1959

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER


DIRECTOR OF PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF
SECURITY STAFF
COORDINATION CONTROL STAFF
DATA MANAGEMENT DIVISION
INDUSTRIAL-GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION
MILITARY-SCIENTIFIC DIVISION
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES DIVISION

Figure 9

Rescinded by
R1-130-7 dated
27 Feb, 1961

27149 8-59

~~SECRET~~

h. NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

(1) AUTHORITY. The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) was established by National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 8, dated 18 January 1961 and functions under the executive direction of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(2) MISSION. The National Photographic Interpretation Center is charged with producing photographic interpretation reports, providing photographic intelligence services in support of the national intelligence effort, furnishing such additional support to departmental and Agency interests as can be provided without degradation of national responsibilities, and promoting an integrated and coordinated interdepartmental effort in the exploitation of photography for intelligence purposes.

(3) FUNCTIONS. The National Photographic Interpretation Center shall:

(a) Produce photographic interpretation reports in support of the national intelligence effort and approved Priority National Intelligence Objectives to include preliminary rapid interpretation of photographic detail and comprehensive photographic analysis, utilizing, whenever possible, related collateral information.

(b) Provide as a service of common concern to the intelligence community photographic intelligence services in support of the national photographic intelligence effort, and, whenever practicable, furnish additional support to departmental and Agency interests.

(c) Maintain on a selective basis a consolidated central file of photographic data.

(d) Arrange for the exchange of photographs and photographic data with other photographic collections in the intelligence community.

(e) Make recommendations where appropriate to facilitate the coordinated development of compatible codes, indexes, and mechanized systems for the efficient recovery, selection, and collation of available photographic data.

(f) Prepare photographic and photogrammetric intelligence support requirements.

(g) Provide analytic and technical photographic intelligence services in support of special collection and exploitation requirements.

(h) Engage in or sponsor, as appropriate, the development of specialized equipment for the intelligence exploitation of photography, and shall provide information about such specialized equipment to interested elements of the intelligence community for their own possible use or further adaptation.

(i) Provide and maintain accommodations and facilities within the Center for photographic intelligence units of U. S. Intelligence Board components involved in national and departmental activities.

(j) Examine and make recommendations to the U. S. Intelligence Board, as appropriate, as to any special security controls required.

(k) Consult, as appropriate, with individual departments, agencies, and committees of the U. S. Intelligence Board on matters related to photographic intelligence exploitation activities.

(4) ORGANIZATION. See organization chart, figure 16.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER


DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
CIA/NPIC DET
DIA/NPIC DET
ASSISTANT FOR ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF
ASSISTANT FOR OPERATIONS
OPERATIONS STAFF
ASSISTANT FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS GROUP
ASSISTANT FOR PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT
PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
PUBLICATIONS DIVISION
COLLATERAL SUPPORT DIVISION
PRODUCTION SERVICES DIVISION

HR 1, fig. 16

HR 1 (Best) (4ES #308)

26 Aug 66

[redacted]

[redacted]

Revised: 16 August 1963

13-00000

HR 1-13 (See H.R. # 460)

9 July 69

c. NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

(1) MISSION. The National Photographic Interpretation Center is charged with producing photographic interpretation reports, providing photographic intelligence services in support of the national intelligence effort, furnishing such additional support to departmental and Agency interests as can be provided without degradation of national responsibilities, and promoting an integrated and coordinated interdepartmental effort in the exploitation of photography for intelligence purposes. (NSCID No. 8)

(2) FUNCTIONS. The National Photographic Interpretation Center shall:

(a) Produce photographic interpretation reports in support of the national intelligence effort and approved Priority National Intelligence Objectives to include preliminary rapid interpretation of photographic detail and comprehensive photographic analysis, utilizing, whenever possible, related collateral information.

(b) Provide as a service of common concern to the intelligence community photographic intelligence services in support of the national photographic intelligence effort, and, whenever practicable, furnish additional support to departmental and Agency interests.

(c) Maintain on a selective basis a consolidated central file of photographic data.

(d) Arrange for the exchange of photographs and photographic data with other photographic collections in the intelligence community.

(e) Make recommendations where appropriate to facilitate the coordinated development of compatible codes, indexes, and mechanized systems for the efficient recovery, selection, and collation of available photographic data.

(f) Prepare photographic and photogrammetric intelligence support requirements.

(g) Provide analytic and technical photographic intelligence services in support of special collection and exploitation requirements.

(h) Engage in or sponsor, as appropriate, the development of specialized equipment for the intelligence exploitation of photography, and shall provide information about such specialized equipment to interested elements of the intelligence community for their own possible use or further adaptation.

(i) Provide and maintain accommodations and facilities within the Center for photographic intelligence units of U.S. Intelligence Board components involved in national and departmental activities.

(j) Examine and make recommendations to the U.S. Intelligence Board, as appropriate, as to any special security controls required for photographic and related materials.

(k) Consult, as appropriate, with individual departments, agencies, and committees of the U.S. Intelligence Board on matters related to photographic intelligence exploitation activities.

(3) ORGANIZATION. See organization chart, figure 13.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER


DIRECTOR NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER
SUPPORT STAFF
ASSISTANT FOR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
ASSISTANT FOR OPERATIONS
ASSISTANT FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
ASSISTANT FOR TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
PUBLICATIONS DIVISION
INFORMATION PROCESSING DIVISION
COLLATERAL SUPPORT DIVISION
PRODUCTION SERVICES DIVISION

Dec 69

[redacted]

Revised: 26 September 1966 (308)

Page 24 missing

e. OFFICE OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

(1) MISSION. The Assistant Director for Special Activities is charged with the development and operation of certain highly sensitive technical collection programs.

(2) FUNCTIONS. The Assistant Director for Special Activities, shall:

- (a) Develop and operate special projects for the collection of intelligence by advanced technical means.
- (b) Stimulate the exploitation by the Agency of advanced technology to further the Office's mission.
- (c) Conduct research and development in methods for conveying advanced technical collection devices.
- (d) Establish and maintain liaison with appropriate civilian and Government agencies in order to keep abreast of developments which might affect the Office's activities, capabilities, or requirements.

(3) ORGANIZATION. See organization chart, figure 7.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES


ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL ACTIVITIES
DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR LIAISON
SECURITY STAFF
PROGRAMS STAFF
DEPUTY FOR TECHNOLOGY
DEPUTY FOR FIELD ACTIVITIES
ADVANCED PROJECTS DIVISION
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
ENGINEERING ANALYSIS DIVISION
CONTRACTS DIVISION
SUPPORT DIVISION
OPERATIONS DIVISION
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MATERIEL DIVISION
COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

APR 23 4 39 PM '71
REGULATIONS
CONTROL STAFF

~~SECRET~~

RESCINDED BY HR 1-11e (HRS 1617)
DATE 5 OCT 83

e. OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICE

(1) MISSION. The Director of Technical Service is responsible for close operational support of DDO operations through the development, engineering, testing and evaluation, production, storage, and deployment of equipment and techniques in the fields of audio, authentication, chemical communications, operational disguise, tracking and locating, nuclear detection, visual operations, behavioral activities, graphics, document analysis, etc. The Office of Technical Service evaluates foreign finds for the Intelligence Community as well as conducting analysis in the areas of operational support.

(2) FUNCTIONS. The Director of Technical Service

(a) provides equipment, personnel services, and materials in direct support of DDO operations, and certain approved overseas operations of other member agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community;

(b) develops, engineers, tests, and manages the production and stock storage of technical equipment for support of clandestine technical operations;

(c) evaluates foreign finds for the Intelligence Community, and performs such other services as may be directed by the DCI.

(3) ORGANIZATION. See organization chart, figure 7.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 059687

with a limited number of people. We believe the direction of the station is of high caliber, but not all the station effort is carefully directed at priority targets. Under current personnel ceilings, there is little hope of increasing the manpower available for this critical effort. Thus, both Headquarters and the station must carefully place emphasis on assignment of priorities and upon selective execution of the activities to meet those priorities.

Organization for Operations

98

5. The Mexico City Station approaches the classic type station in opportunities and in operations. It has high-level liaison operations, unilateral operations, joint operations with the host government, and Soviet, Satellite, Cuban, and indigenous Communist Party operations. It has local collaborative liaison with other U.S. agencies: the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the military. To accomplish this wide range of tasks, the station is organized into the Soviet Branch, Cuban Branch, Satellite Branch, Covert Action Branch, Communist Party Branch, and an operational catch-all which is called the "Operational Support Branch." This latter branch is headed by a senior operations officer who has two assistants, but the branch in reality is an extension of the chief of station's personal clandestine capabilities, giving force and effect to that facet of the chief of station's personality as an operator. The deputy chief of station, in addition to his administrative duties, also personally handles the operations of three projects.

Cuban Operations

6. Mexico City is the only direct air link which Cuba has with the Western Hemisphere. It is the major transit point for all air travel to and from Cuba. Approximately 150 persons per week travel each way to and from Havana via Mexico City. This fact plays a prime role in shaping the station's operational activities. [Significant] For example, over 70 per cent of the station's FI reporting on Cuban activities in the past year dealt with travel, both Cuban and non-Cuban, between Mexico City and Havana.

98

7. The station has no agents reporting from in place in Cuba. Two operations have had problems in loss of communications, but have some promise of future success. One agent, a Cuban refugee

DM3

now working in Mexico City, had recruited three sub-agents before leaving Cuba but his channel of communications with them has been severed. Another station agent is in a good position in Cuba to obtain intelligence from foreign telephone communications. The station will attempt to re-establish contact with him through a legal traveler to Cuba. The station has a number of sources with access to Cuba in third country nationals who are debriefed each time they return to Mexico City from Cuba. Best of these is a Western European who was the source of some 15 disseminated intelligence reports last year. He travels to Cuba four or five times a year and is contacted by a station case officer after each visit. An operation, presently under development, is aimed at exploiting the presence of a religious order. A recruited agent will be in the high levels of the Mission. It is expected that the Mission will have secure communications facilities as is the case in other countries. Primary control, however, will be maintained by Mexico City Station through contact with the agent each time he travels to Mexico City from Havana. 98

9. A major objective of station operations is the recruitment of personnel in the Cuban Embassy. There are about 20 Cubans on the embassy staff of whom six are believed to be members of the Cuban Intelligence Service. 24 As with operations directed against the Soviet Embassy, heavy reliance is placed upon surveillance through telephone, photo, physical, and audio operations as well as on access agents. The effort has been rewarded with some success albeit limited. One official has been recruited, but his value is generally low due to lack of access to information of prime importance and to a reluctance to accept operational assignments. A Mexican woman employee in the embassy is also a station agent, but she has no access to classified documents and provides only meager information. A recruitment pitch to another officer was unsuccessful and he was subsequently recalled to Cuba. Through station efforts a "hot mike" was successfully placed in a key office. Unfortunately, the target officer moved, and his old office is now being occupied by an officer of lesser potential, who is the supervisor of the recruited officer. This audio device is at the moment of little value except to provide an excellent check of the agent's activities. 24 24 24 08 08

10. As might be expected, Mexico City has a constant stream of refugees from Cuba, estimated at about 350 per month. Through an American contract agent the station runs the Cuban Refugee Reception and Orientation Center which screens refugees for possible 98

DM/B

operational leads and debriefs those with information of intelligence value. Heretofore this project has suffered from lack of adequate facilities and trained personnel. Only 29 positive intelligence reports were disseminated by Headquarters during the past year. It is planned to correct these deficiencies and expand capabilities to the end that the intelligence product will be improved and the operational leads increased. An experienced officer from the JMWAVE refugee center has been detailed to the station to assist in training the personnel there. 98

11. The station's Cuban case officers must devote a substantial effort to responding to requests for support from other stations, chiefly JMWAVE, with involvement in Cuban operations. Approximately 47 per cent of the station's cable traffic is concerned with Cuban operations. This volume alone is testimony to the relative effort which must be devoted to the support of Cuban operations originating in other CIA stations. The Cuban case officers in Mexico City feel that the requirements to keep abreast of day to day activities and to handle the volume of paper left insufficient time for planning and development of an effective station operational program. 24

OPEN

12. Operations are being conducted against the Cuban Embassy, and the results, while limited, are as satisfactory as may be expected in view of the target. Given Mexico City's strategic location astride the only direct air link to Cuba, more success should be achieved in recruiting agents in place in Cuba. This target has been assigned as Priority 1 to many Latin American countries and, if it is to be achieved at all, it is logical to expect that it will be done in Mexico City. To the extent possible, the Cuban case officers should be freed from the excessive support to other stations so they can concentrate on this target. The Chief, WH Division, should direct other stations to carefully screen Cuban requirements on Mexico City, with a view toward reduction of such requirements. 24 24

It is recommended that: No. 67

98 The Chief, WH Division:

a. Instruct the Chief of Station, Mexico City, to concentrate Cuban case officer efforts on developing agent assets resident in Cuba; and,

DW/s

evidence that the ambassador would strongly object to Agency support for IISE propaganda activities. In addition, of a total annual budget of $16,000, $6,000 goes for the salary of a U.S. businessman cutout (LIHUFF-1) while $6,000 goes to the support of MURO and $4,000 to support other activities of the IISE. This is an inordinately high sum for the services of a cutout in proportion to the total cost of the proposed project. These points, taken together, constitute a valid basis for terminating operations in connection with LIHUFF.

It is recommended that: No. 70

98

The Chief, WH Division, disapprove the proposal of Chief of Station, Mexico, for Project LIHUFF and direct him to terminate operations in connection therewith.

18. The station has a highly successful project directed at the rural and peasant targets. The principal agent is a Catholic priest through whose efforts an extensive network of regional organizations have been established including youth groups, credit unions, agricultural co-ops and peasant unions. Some 26 regional centers of the Mexican Institute for Social Studies, a project mechanism, have been set up and 12,000 people were enrolled in special training courses during the year. This operation is now largely self-sufficient but the station should continue to give it support and direction. The project shows promise of expanding into Guatemala where the Archbishop of Guatemala has asked for assistance and training to set up a similar organization. In view of the present lack of Agency-sponsored peasant projects in Guatemala, every effort should be made to exploit this possibility.

It is recommended that: No. 71

The Chief, WH Division, expand Project LINOOKE to include assistance in establishing a similar covert action project targeted on peasant groups in Guatemala.

Soviet Operations

19. Mexico is one of the four Latin American countries which maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union thereby permitting the establishment of diplomatic installations in these

DM/1

24

countries. Because of the relative ineffectiveness of the Mexican police and security services, Soviet activities in Mexico are not subjected to the same scrutiny as they are in the U.S. by the FBI 24 and in Canada by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Soviet personnel in Mexico thus have a freedom of movement which facilitates the conduct of clandestine operations targeted not only against the U.S. but also against other Latin American countries where there is no Soviet official presence. In addition, Mexico's long border with the U.S. has only minimum guards. Travel between the U.S. and Mexico is heavy and clandestine border crossing can be relatively simple. The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, therefore, assumes more than the usual interest normally attached to similar Soviet installations as targets for U.S. intelligence.

20. Soviet operations conducted by the station are directed 24 primarily at the personnel of the embassy. At the present time, there are fifty-one officers attached to the embassy of whom thirty- 24 three have been identified as members of either the KGB or the GRU. It may be assumed that dependents and nonintelligence personnel, by performing various support functions, swell the total of those engaged in intelligence assignments. In its operations against the Soviets, the station is heavily dependent upon technical collection through telephone taps, photographic coverage of the embassy, physical surveillance, and hidden microphones. These operations 24 produce masses of information daily on the activities of the Soviet 24 personnel, such as telephone conversations with persons outside the embassy, complete photographic records of the coming and going of 24 all persons--Soviet and non-Soviet--at the embassy, contacts of embassy personnel outside the embassy, etc. Because of the strict security indoctrination of Soviet overseas personnel, the bulk of this information is low-level and not disseminable as positive in- 24 telligence. Its chief value, aside from occasional items of intelligence interest or operational import, derives from its compilation 24 24 in depth to reveal patterns of activities and contacts, indicative of intelligence missions or associations, and to disclose behaviorial characteristics of individual Soviets which might be symptomatic 24 of a vulnerability to recruitment. By analyzing this material over a period of time, the station has identified Soviet officers in the KGB and GRU, and gained an insight into their modus operandi in executing intelligence assignments. This in itself is of value from a counterintelligence point of view even though exploitation 98 against Soviets has been limited. Also, by collating the mass of collected data into personality reports on persons attached to the Embassy, the station hopes to be able to detect, foster, and eventually exploit any vulnerability to recruitment or detection--the

number one priority of Soviet operations here as elsewhere in the world.

98

21. The station is seeking to supplement its collection through technical means with a program to acquire at least one access agent for each member of the Soviet Embassy staff. These access agents serve two purposes: first, they provide additional information on the activities and personalities of those with whom they are in contact; and second, they afford a channel for "getting at" a Soviet individual should it be found advantageous to bring some sort of recruitment pressure to bear on him. Consideration is now being given by the station to expanding the effort to recruit Mexican nationals who are known, through technical collection sources, to have been in touch with the Soviets on intelligence missions and to work through them to develop information on Soviet clandestine activities. Additional case officer strength will be needed if this approach is to be effective.

22. The station currently has six double-agent operations. Like most such cases they move slowly. The chief purpose in running these operations is to direct the agents into the U.S. where, in cooperation with the FBI, they might be used to identify Soviet illegals. Three of these double agents have all received intelligence assignments from the Soviets of an as yet undefined nature in the U.S. Another appears destined for some Soviet assignment in the Philippines. Since the Soviets have no official representation in the Philippines, it is hoped that this agent may be put in touch with illegals. Still another is considered a poor double agent operation by the station, but shows some promise of developing into a penetration of the Mexican Foreign Ministry. The sixth is rated very low as a station operation, and is being continued only at the specific request of the U.S. Army. The station's technical collection assets provide a useful means for checking these double agents in their contacts with the Soviets.

24 24 24

23. To evaluate properly the Soviet operations at Mexico City, which rely heavily on expensive technical collection devices would involve a basic assessment of the whole concept of Soviet operations, which is beyond the scope of this report. 24 Despite the exploitation of material collected by technical means for over ten years at the station, the primary objective of recruiting a Soviet national has not been achieved. 24 Although the station's knowledge of Soviet intelligence activities centered about the embassy in Mexico City has been greatly widened, it has led to little positive 24

24

08 24

DM/9

24

action to counter these activities as they might affect U.S. interests. While all the U.S.S.R. diplomatic missions are targets of vital importance for U.S. intelligence, the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City has special significance because of its proximity to the U.S. The Mexico City Station has attacked this target with determination and imagination. The Chief, SR Division, and his principal officers have commended highly the Soviet operations in Mexico City Station. The failure thus far to achieve the major objectives is testimony more to the impregnability of the target than to a lack of resourcefulness in attacking it. Thus, we believe that until some new methods, offering greater promise of ultimate success are developed, the present mode of attack should be continued at the present level. 24 24 24

24. Probably the most significant contribution which the station's operations against the Soviets in Mexico City has made to the U.S. security has been peripheral to the Agency's mission there. The embassy has long been a magnet for disaffected Americans who want for one reason or another to establish contact with the Soviets. Through its technical coverage of the Soviet Embassy, the station has been able to spot and, through subsequent action, to thwart a number of such Americans, several of whom might have done untold damage to U.S. interests had they not been apprehended. In this respect, the station works closely with the FBI. The Warren Commission's report on the assassination of President Kennedy made reference to information collected by station assets in connection with Oswald's activities in Mexico City. 08 24 24

Satellite Operations

98

25. The Satellite Branch, which is staffed by EE Division personnel, has been diverting much of its recent time from its EE targets to a Communist-Chinese presence in Mexico City. Although there is no official government representation by the Peking regime, the New China News Agency (NCNA) has several people in Mexico City. At least three of these individuals have been identified as CHICOM intelligence officers. Project STPESO is an audio operation against three rooms of their offices, and their telephone lines are tapped under the LIFEAT Project. Some of their mail has been examined through the LIKAYAK Project. The raw results of these operations have been forwarded back to Headquarters. The Mexico City Station has no capability for the translation of the material. As of the time of the inspection, the station had heard nothing from Headquarters

Im/10

responsible to control from the female operations officer who has recently been transferred to LILINK control. It is possible that this operation will be transferred to a covert action project, where some improvement is expected.

98 41. The station has a unilateral physical surveillance team, five of whom have been on the team for more than three years. Only one case of trouble has shown up in this project. One agent had to be terminated because he talked too much and tried to blackmail his case officer. The use of the polygraph has been most effective in control of this team, which has been generally effective.

Technical Operations

42. The station is heavily committed in the technical field with a large audio operation run jointly with the Mexican Government (LIENVOY), as well as a unilateral audio operation (LIFEAT). 24 24
The station has been imaginative in approaches to problems and willing to examine and experiment with the unusual. An example of this is the communications link between the station and the principal agent of LILINK, which will be discussed later. 24

43. The LIENVOY operation, previously mentioned in connection with Soviet operations, resulted from an approach six years ago from President Lopez Mateos. After considerable discussions, the operation was approved, providing the Mexican Government would include Soviet and Satellite targets, and such other communist targets as were obvious to the Mexican Government to be of concern to the United States. This project is manned by selected Mexican Army personnel, who are carefully screened and paid high incentive wages, reducing their vulnerability to bribery. Other privileges add to the high esprit de corps essential to such an operation. The unit is managed by a career agent who transmits the take regularly to the station by clandestine means. This project has been fruitful in intelligence reports and has been of value in operational leads and in CE/CI information. The project also has a visual surveillance and a photo-surveillance capability. It was this project which provided data on the actions of Lee Harvey Oswald in his famous visit to Mexico City. 24 29, 24 29 24 08 24

98 44. Obviously, the station cannot be content to have the Mexican Government knowledgeable of all its anti-communist operations. Therefore, the station has continued its unilateral audio

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

c. Exclude routine travel information and CI/CE information from TDCS and CS reports; and,

d. Use the cable channel only for reports that are perishable or are of special intelligence interest.

Organization for Administration

56. As in his direction of operations, the chief of station maintains a close personal hold upon the administrative life of his station. Such delegation as he makes does not include the granting of usual authority to a subordinate. For example, although the deputy has been delegated authority over the Registry, which will be discussed in detail later, in reality the chief continues daily activities which have a marked effect on the Registry. The station has a small, hard-working support section, handling financial and property matters, and the usual fine communications section.

98

57. Morale and health were generally good, although for a city as modern as Mexico there is an unusual amount of abdominal disorder known in Mexico City as "Montezuma's Revenge." The embassy furnishes adequate medicines, and medicines are available on the open market, although not always to be trusted. One incident was recently uncovered in which sulfur was capsuled and sold as an antibiotic. Medical facilities have recently been improved by the opening of a new hospital which meets United States standards. Physicians and surgeons are well trained and quite competent. Insofar as social life is concerned, morale in the station was excellent. Mexico City offers some of the finest social activities in the world, from honky-tonk to opera. There is local television, radio, and a great interest in music. There is a great deal of outdoor activity available--swimming, tennis, golf, exploration of ruins, and vast city parks. Some sports activities are comparatively expensive. Membership in country clubs is prohibitive except for persons on the diplomatic list.

58. One of the principal administrative problems facing the Chief of Station, Mexico City, is his Registry. The Registry handles the station files which are more complete than in any other station in the WH Division. There are more than 9,000 personality files and a vast accumulation of 3x5 card files (mostly biographic) which continue to increase at the rate of 23 linear inches per month. The station's present level of activity precludes any reduction in the card index file, but aperture cards

DW/1

are assisting in some reduction of the personality files. The Registry also handles the pouching. This task is also the largest in the WH Division, particularly in lateral pouching. On one occasion, at Headquarters' request, Mexico City handled the lateral
24 pouching to 35 stations and bases of one document.

98

59. The problems of the Registry are compounded by the lack of training provided personnel assigned to the Registry. Personnel problems in the Registry are many and diversified. First of all, with the limited number of personnel and the great burden of work, a large amount of overtime has been required. Secondly, it has been difficult to get people to accept an assignment to the Mexico City Registry because the tasks are dull, tedious, and infinitely demanding of the individuals' time. The morale in this section was poor. We made several recommendations to the chief of station pointing out to him a conscientious effort must be made by all members of the station to reduce the workload in the Registry. In this connection, we suggested that individual case officers accept the responsibility for periodic cleaning of files which they used, and of which they have the most intimate knowledge. We further recommended that maximum discrimination be used in determining material which should be filed and that wherever possible the sheer bulk of the filing be reduced. We further recommended that overtime be made voluntarily whenever possible, but that in any event personnel be provided with a full weekend off from time to time.

60. The chief of the Registry is the only senior person assigned to the Registry and has no deputy or other person competent to take his place during his temporary absence. The chief at the time of our inspection had taken very little time off, including weekends in the two years of his tour. We feel that one of the positions in the Registry should be re-evaluated for possible upgrading to includes the duties of deputy chief of Registry.

It is recommended that: No. 78

The Chief, WH Division, request the Director of Personnel to conduct a review of the function of Deputy Chief, Registry, Mexico City Station, to determine whether or not such a position should be established in an appropriate grade.

DM/2

61. We found the Registry to be a controversial matter between Headquarters and the chief of station. The newly assigned deputy chief of station, who primarily had supervisory responsibility over the chief of Registry, was making a determined effort to reduce the workload in the Registry and to seek means of relying upon Headquarters' files rather than station files. We were told that on several occasions, Headquarters had reached the point of demanding that Mexico City reduce its Registry to a size comparable to other stations. Each time such a decision was reached, there would be a concurrent flap which would prove the value of Mexico City's ability to instantly retrieve information from their files. One of the most noteworthy of such flaps took place in November 1963, when Mexico City's files brought forth detailed information on Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City.

62. The nature of Mexico City's operations, particularly its technical operations LIENVOY and LIFEAT produce [voluminous files.] 24
Until some system is devised for this [information] to be quickly 24
24 [digested and retrieved] in Headquarters, we believe that there is no alternative to the present system Mexico City is employing. However, we believe that a determined effort must be in Headquarters for [processing and retrieval of] such information.
24

It is recommended that: No. 79

98

The Chief, WH Division, in collaboration with the Chief, Records Integration Division, devise a system for reducing the volume of files held in Mexico City, while maintaining a capability for rapid retrieval from Headquarters of information essential to present and future operations in Mexico.

63. Mexico City is one of the great metropolises of the world and the booming economy of Mexico is reflected in its housing. It is difficult to find housing which compares exactly with United States housing because the Spanish tradition of servants' quarters, large space, and grand entertainment are a basic way of life. However, in such a great city, there is naturally a large selection of housing within this limitation. There are good apartments, but such apartments usually are more expensive than allowances will permit for single occupancy. Housing for officers and families is generally quite good, not plentiful, but with prudent selection, adequate housing can be found within reasonable range of the

IM15

The Special Investigations Group of the CI Staff (CI/SIG)

CI/SIG (the Special Investigations Group) did not exist prior to the establishment of the CI Staff in early 1955. Its major functions as described in CSI No. 70-1 of March 1955 are much more modest than the functions ascribed to it in a write-up by the Staff in early 1973. The 1955 description of functions is as follows:

> "Special Investigation Unit
>
> "Major Functions
>
> "Performs the CI investigation and analysis of any known or potential security leak in the Clandestine Services organization, whether in headquarters or in the field, from the standpoint of its effect on (1) existing operations, and (2) the cover of personnel. In performing this function, maintains close working relations with the Security Office, the latter being primarily concerned in such cases from Agency security rather than an operational security standpoint."

By 1973 the description of tasks which had been assigned to CI/SIG or which they had absorbed during the course of events over a period of nearly two decades provides a much broader range of functions and responsibilities. They are listed as follows:

> "CI/Special Investigations Group
>
> "1. Conducts research into the long-range validity of CIA operations in terms of known or potential hostile capabilities, including penetrations, and of Agency security.
>
> "2. Carries out coordination with the Office of Security in such cases.
>
> "3. Maintains and uses sensitive counterintelligence holdings, including certain Comint and defector materials, to match these against operational and personality data and thus to derive operational leads.
>
> "4. Coordinates and cooperates with counterintelligence and security elements of other departments and agencies of the USG to detect, tabulate, and take counter-action against hostile plans or approaches abroad for the recruitment of American officials (American Targets Program).

"5. Plays a direct role in sensitive counterintelligence liaison with closely allied foreign intelligence services on hostile penetration plans and operations.

"6. Reviews compatibility between cover and assignments of CIA staff members.

"7. Maintains central data on leaks to the news media and assists the Office of Security, as necessary, in determining the sources of leaks.

"8. Maintains central data on the nature and extent of known compromise of Agency staff personnel to intelligence services, whether liaison or hostile.

"9. Prepares studies of individuals, including 8 journalists whose foreign intelligence connections are a source of concern.

"10. Carries out additional and sensitive tasks as assigned by the C/CI."

The first chief of the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) (as it was called in CSI NO. 70-1) was Birch O'Neal, a former FBI officer who had transferred to CIA after World War II.* In the mid-fifties SIG had rather slim picking and appears to have spent most of its time investigating various aspects of the 1 LCMAYFOWL complex (the 6 Boris Morros case) as it affected US interests based on information the Agency acquired from foreign sources. Then in 1962 SIG received its biggest shot in the arm with the defection of Golitsyn who brought with him several dozen leads to American citizens including some supposedly in CIA. The handling of these leads was assigned to SIG by Angleton, including the information emanating from Golitsyn, which related to foreign countries. Thus O'Neal and his assistant, Jean Evans, played a major role in directing the handling of the Golitsyn leads (or "Serials" as Angleton invariably called them). The activity continued throughout the sixties reaching its apex in the period 1964-65 when the HONETOL investigations (of CIA staff officers) was at its most

---

*The term Special Investigations Group (SIG) became common usage in the sixties but no exact date can be assigned for this change.

3/MC

98

[Israel, and a contract agent in New York. In addition to the Office of the Chief (including two special assistants and a Secretariat) the Staff was composed of seven "Divisions" and four "Groups."]

For fiscal year 1958 the CI Staff budget was $24 [1,650,000]. The sum of $24 [1,800,000] was allotted for Fiscal Year 1959, and $24 [2,060,000] was to be requested for 1960. Specific figures were quoted in the appropriate sections for projects or support, such as travel. Otherwise the budget was almost solely for salaries of Staff personnel.

The survey next gave brief attention to deception, agreeing that it had to be carefully compartmented and that it best belonged in the CI Staff. On the subject of the ✓Special Investigation Unit, however, the survey took its first serious exception to the organization and operation of the Staff stating:

> "Hence, in order not to contaminate a senior staff (CI Staff) with Agency employee investigation and/or exploitation, this should be done by individuals with CE ability within a special section of the Office of Security. It is
>
> "Recommended that:
>
> "a. The DD/P release for assignment to the Office of Security several individuals, as may be appropriate, of proven CE ability to handle and exploit all cases of CE aspect involving Agency personnel;
>
> "b. SID and its function be eliminated from CI Staff; and
>
> "c. The DCI approve the above recommendations."

The survey team took special note of the Projects Branch of CI Staff, the section that handled the mail opening project. How it was operated and viewed in 1959 is not without interest in view of its subsequent role in the ✓"Family Jewels" issue when it was revealed to the ✓Rockefeller and ✓Church Committees. Thus it is revealing to note the 1959 survey found nothing wrong with

SB/MC

the mail opening program except they worried about its security and also thought it would be more effective if expanded. This is how the survey described the project in 1959:

> "a. The Project Branch conducts a project of censorship within the US of mail from the USSR which is called HTLINGUAL. Originally this project was developed by the Office of Security at the request of SR Division in 1952. Its purpose was to identify and to obtain samples of handwriting and basic background facts on long established correspondence between persons in the USSR and the United States. Such information was to be used operationally to sustain any communications with secret writing, which would likely pass the Soviet censors and could be picked up in the U.S.A. The interception is done at the central Post Office in New York, and the letters are delivered to the Agency for processing and return. As the need for Soviet communication camouflage lessened with the increase of legal travel to and from the USSR the Project was reoriented and expanded toward direct CI and FI goals in September 1956, and it was taken over by the CI Staff.
>
> "b. At present this group includes [five] 24 employees in New York and [fifteen] 24 at Headquarters. Those in New York are under the Office of Security; those in Headquarters under the CI Staff. The yearly cost is the total of the various salaries.
>
> "c. The primary purposes of this Project are to produce CE information, operational leads and any positive intelligence that can be gleaned from the mail.
>
> "d. The operation in New York photographs about 50,000 envelopes per month out of a total of about 200,000 letters coming from the USSR to individuals in the U.S.A. via New York. These films are forwarded to Headquarters and examined in the Projects Branch and some 10,000 of them are selected on the basis of Agency interest in the areas of origin in Russia. These 10,000 negatives are then made into prints, and the names of the addressees are recorded alphabetically on IBM cards. From the IBM cards RI makes a continuing record and a copy of this record of names is returned to the Projects Branch.
>
> "e. About 1,000 of these intercepts are opened per month in New York by the Office of Security, the letters verifaxed and copies sent to the Projects Branch at Headquarters. There is a watch list of some 500 names on file both in the Branch at Headquarters and in the Security Office in New York and any letters coming from or going to any of the names

3/MC

on this list are opened. This watch list is revised quarterly. It is made up of names of interest principally to CI, SR Division, and the Security Office, and includes names listed by the FBI.

"f. There are trained linguist-analysts in the Branch who extract information of interest from the intercepts, and the disseminability of this information is determined by the Chief of Projects Branch. At present the rate of dissemination from Projects Branch runs at an average of about 150 per month and the number is increasing. Sixty percent of these disseminations are positive intelligence. The disseminations are controlled by the Deputy Chief of CI Staff.

"g. SR Division has obtained valuable operational leads from this Project, and the FBI wants as much information as it can get by this means.

"h. There are 40 individuals in CIA who are officially cleared to know about this Project. These include members of SR Division, Office of Security, CI Staff, and RI Machine Records, COPS, DD/P, DD/S, Director of Personnel (due to his previous service in the DD/P) and the Chief, FI Staff. The DCI, DDCI and the IG Staff also have access to the Project.

"i. It would appear from present results that much more value could be obtained from this Project if more intercepts were opened. Project Branch is at present handling four times as much volume as it did in the past with the same number of personnel and at the same cost. Its staff at Headquarters is capable of handling 2,000 per month with the present T/O, but the New York staff could not supply that number of opened intercepts unless its personnel was increased. It is felt by the Branch that a rate of 4,000 intercepts per month would be a good future goal. It is estimated that this would require an increase of one interceptor, one secretary and one letter opener in New York and an addition to Project Branch at Headquarters of four linguist-analysts, four clerical personnel and one reports officer.

"j. The Office of Security, which works with Project Branch, is agreeable to the gradual expansion of the operation. It would be in favor of expanding at present to the extent of opening more intercepts, and taking samples of these intercepts for S. W. This could be done by the aforementioned increase of Security Office personnel in New York without an immediate increase in the Headquarters staff. It would be operationally much more feasible if a secure room could be obtained in the Post Office in New York for their sole use. Since the DCI made the original arrangement for this operation with the Chief Postal Inspector, any changes in the system of operation should be made in the same way. This is the only level at which such arrangements could be accomplished securely."

versus area division prerogative in the conduct of operations. Noting that there might have been some immediate reasons for the CI Staff to take on operational aspects in its efforts to increase CI activity, nevertheless it concluded these reasons were not necessarily based on the best operational and organizational procedures and methods. The normal staff functions, the survey opined, could be carried out effectively with a much smaller but highly experienced staff whose impact and counsel would more favorably be received by the operating elements of the DD/P. The team also concluded that there had been insufficient attention given to penetrating hostile intelligence organizations and recommended that:

> "Chief, CI direct the efforts of the CI Staff toward the development of programs for the aggressive pursuit of penetration activity against hostile intelligence services."

In a forward to the report, the Inspector General of the day, Lyman Kirkpatrick, directed special attention to one particular aspect of CI work.

> "The Special Investigation Division assists the Office of Security in using DD/P assets to trace leads concerning CIA employees. This is probably a necessary assist to the Office of Security but should be handled with the utmost of discretion and security. It would be very seriously damaging to the efforts of the CI Staff if it ever became known that it was engaged in any activities involving CIA employees. An analgous situation is the stir caused by the occasional misimpression created abroad that CIA reports on other US Government employees. Thus within CIA the Office of Security must be the sole unit to bear the stigma of being concerned with fellow employees."

Unfortunately this sensible warning was not heeded by CI Staff management, or by the management of the Clandestine Service as a whole for that matter. Instead, in the mid-1960s the CI Staff, with SIG in the vanguard, hypnotized by the allegations of Golitsyn, launched HONETOL - the active investigation of numerous Agency employees (five in particular) - with generally had written a provocative analysis that found Nosenko bona fide and challenged as incorrect the Monster Plot assessments to the contrary. Even more provocative, he had provided a copy directly to then DDCI Richard Helms when stymied within the Soviet Division in promoting his view. Kalaris first learned of this well after McCoy joined the staff, when McCoy himself told him. Angleton, on the other hand, was certainly not unaware of this part of McCoy's background, and it is likely that he and Rocca and Miler interpreted Kalaris's selection of McCoy as evidence that Kalaris was out to discredit them.

Kalaris, originally having been summoned home to take over temporarily until a replacement for Angleton could be found, had a title in the beginning as "Acting Chief, CIOPS." In March, Nelson told him, "We haven't found anybody yet," and as time went on it looked increasingly as if he and Colby were not going to find anyone. But by this time Kalaris was becoming intrigued with what he was doing, and with the potential of the job. He went back to [Brasilia] 10 to see his family in late March, and when he returned he told Nelson he would take the job on a permanent basis. In June, the "Acting" was dropped and Kalaris became Chief, CIOPS.

What Kalaris Found...

The State of Affairs

As he looked around, Kalaris found what struck him as a desolate situation. Mountains of traffic were coming in to the staff, but none of it seemed to be of much importance. The staff had no relationship with the Soviet Division or any of the other geographic divisions. If the divisions had any significant cases, Kalaris was unaware of them because the divisions were giving him nothing of substance. McCoy's arrival in the staff made this picture unmistakably clear since, fresh from SE Division and a position therein that made him privy to virtually all the division's sensitive cases, he was able to tell Kalaris what he was missing on the SE front.

It also before long became evident that there was an element of a two-way street in this situation. Soviet-East European cases were discovered in CI Staff files that the area divisions had never been informed of or had only limited information about. These included such cases as MORINE (a past FBI source of voluminous GRU operational documents who was known to the Soviet Division but whose operational leads had been shared neither with that division nor with the other geographic divisions in whose territory the Soviet agents were working); [KITTYHAWK] (a KGB officer who had contacted CIA during a visit to the United States several years back and who figured in a double-agent game being run by the FBI); [GRIDIRON] (Leslie James Bennett, former senior officer in Soviet counterespionage in the Canadian RCMP who had resigned from that service in 1972 under a cloud of suspicion engendered by the Angleton staff and its guru Anatoliy Golitsyn--a case never briefed to either SE or EUR Division); and [MHPIVOT], also known as [OZONE] 6, 8 ([Constantin Dumitrachescu, a Romanian] intelligence officer who defected in 11 [Israel] in 1972 and subsequently came to this country and was debriefed by CIOPS officers, but whose information and leads had not been furnished to the area divisions).

Many of the people in the staff had been hand-picked by Angleton. They had been in their jobs for a number of years and were well settled into their way of doing things. So

7 6/MC

well in fact that most had given up hope of ever going anywhere else or accomplishing anything new. Compartmentation was a way of life, and management was remote from the rank and file. Kalaris was appalled to learn that his chief of support, who had worked in the staff for four or five years, had never met Angleton; he had only seen him from a distance. The overall atmosphere seemed to Kalaris to be conditioned by doublethink and mirrors.

Compartmentation in the Angleton staff had been carried to such extremes, however, as to become counterproductive. With Angleton not disposed to be forthcoming with his successor, and Rocca and Miler taking their lead from him (and Hood already having left the staff and the Agency some months earlier), it was difficult for the Kalaris team to find out what the staff had been doing. Like the blind men and the elephant, the personnel below the top leadership had never been exposed to more than their own narrow slice of staff activities, and accordingly even with the best of will they were limited in what they were able to tell the new management. The MORINE case (see below) provided a vivid illustration of this point.

McCoy, with his Soviet Division background, was particularly struck at the almost total absence of Soviet expertise in the staff. There was no Russian language capability and no realistic area knowledge, and what experience there was in Soviet matters was dated and limited. This was the case not only in R&A, but in the Operations Group as well.

One of the first things Kalaris had to do after assuming office was find out what was in the safes and vaults in the Angleton premises. This ultimately took months, as there were several vaults and many safes containing among them large quantities of paper. All this had to be reviewed, and not only for the purpose of determining what it was all about. Significant segments of this material, it was discovered, were unique to the CI Staff and had never been integrated into the DO file and records system. Information from the mail-intercept program, for example, was indexed inside the CI Staff, but reflected nowhere outside. Other material largely duplicated files maintained by other elements. Some files contained mostly press clippings. Decisions had to be made and action taken, item by item, on indexing, transfer of files, determinations of what needed to be retained and what could or should be destroyed, etc. As the magnitude of this task became evident, arrangements were made for personnel from IMS to be detailed to the staff on a long-term basis to go through the material.

In a vaulted area across from Angleton's office a couple of safes were found for which no combination could be located, and which accordingly had to be drilled by specialists from the Office of Security. Kalaris rejects as untrue the image conveyed in Mangold's book about Angleton that has him personally leading SWAT teams of safecrackers as they went about opening the Angleton safes,* but it is correct that he was present during the drilling. He had never seen this operation performed before, and was interested to observe how it was done.

Some curious and some disquieting things turned up as the new team gradually made its way through the CI Staff premises.

--On the lighter side, in one safe two Bushman bows and some arrows were found. Concerned about the possibility that the arrows might be poisoned, Kalaris had them sent--

---

* Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior, Simon & Schuster, 1991, pp. 327-330

very carefully--to OTS for examination.* When they were returned, with a judgment that they were harmless, Kalaris gave them to Angleton as a personal memento.

---

* CI Staff Memo CI 136-75, 10 July 1975

--In a more serious vein, files were found on the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert F. Kennedy. These included autopsy pictures of the remains of Robert Kennedy. Although Nosenko's account of the KGB's involvement with Lee Harvey Oswald and his denial that the KGB had anything to do with the murder of John Kennedy might reasonably explain an Angleton interest in the John Kennedy assassination, neither Kalaris nor Blee, with whom Kalaris consulted on this bizarre finding, had any idea why Angleton had the pictures. Neither could they think of any reason why it was appropriate for CI Staff files to contain them. They were accordingly destroyed.

--Angleton's dogged pursuit, inspired by Golitsyn and his theories, of Soviet intelligence penetration of CIA had led to secret investigations, stretching over a period of many years, of over forty serving CIA officers. Known as the HONETOL cases, and later sometimes referred to in the popular literature as the Great Molehunt, this activity had produced extensive files in the CI Staff.* In addition, several hundred files were found on American citizens who were not CIA personnel but on whom Golitsyn analysis had similarly cast some sort of KGB shadow. Among the most noteworthy of these were files on W. Averell Harriman and Henry Kissinger. Most of these files were composed entirely of newspaper reports and a few FBI reports.

--Classified materials, in quantities that ultimately filled several packing boxes, were eventually found in Golitsyn's possession at his [upstate 10 New York] farm house. Some of this material consisted of personnel-type files on CIA staff officers. Golitsyn, who resisted returning these documents when Kalaris sent people to retrieve them, maintained that Angleton and Miler had given these files to him to review and to keep as long as he needed them, and he was not finished with them yet. Ultimately, all the files that were found were retrieved from Golitsyn, though it has never been possible to be certain that this represented all the files that he in fact had.

---

* The term "HONETOL," used as an acronym, allegedly derives from a combination of parts of the last name of FBI Director John Edgar Hoover and the first name of Soviet KGB defector and Angleton guru Anatoliy Golitsyn.

--A potentially explosive find surfaced in June: a bag of mail from the mail-intercept--HTLINGUAL--program. It had been the public exposé of HTLINGUAL and the MHCHAOS program, infiltration of domestic leftist and dissident groups in search of insidious foreign sponsorship, in a front page story by Seymour Hersh in The New York Times on 22 December 1974 that had precipitated Colby's decision to force Angleton's retirement, and led to establishment in 1975 of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities in the United States, and the Church (Senate) and Pike (House) committees to investigate CIA and its activities. Both these programs had been CI Staff responsibilities. CIA was receiving letters from citizens who believed CIA had intercepted their mail, a CI Staff representative had just finished briefing the Senate Select Committee Staff on the subject,* and Colby on 10 July would be making a statement on the mail-intercept program before the Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management Subcommittee of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee. The bag of mail was a hot potato. Kalaris's memorandum to ADDO Blee dated 3 July 1975 tells the story.**

27/16-7

"1. In the course of preparing for a move of CI Project materials from one vault to another, we found, on top of a shelf, a dispatch [dated] 27 March 1972 from [COS Panama City] to Chief WH. This dispatch forwarded 114 items mailed from the Soviet Union to various persons in the U.S.

3

---

*[Ernest Tsikerdanos] CI 088-75, 17 June 1975
** CI 113-75, 3 July 1975

3
R/MC

These had been in a package delivered to a doctor in the 10 [Canal Zone], who turned them over to the 16-7 [Station] which in turn forwarded them to Headquarters. The dispatch was passed to CI Staff by WH Division in 1972. A note on the dispatch indicates that CI Staff took no action other than to process the materials into its files; but the CI Project continued to hold the originals. At the time CI Project theorized that a mailing label on a package from [Olympus Corporation] 29 in New Hyde Park, New York, to the 10 [Canal Zone] doctor had fallen off the package for the doctor, and been erroneously fastened to the package containing the Soviet mail.

"2. This is the only case as far as we know in which the original mail has been held by this Agency. In all other cases we examined the mail, opened it surreptitiously, photographed it, and put it back into the mail channels for delivery to the addressee. Thus, this presents us with a peculiar problem. The letters have all been opened with a letter opener. We do not know at what point along the way the letters were opened.

"3. We solicit your advice. There seems to be at least two courses which we might pursue. We could send these items to the people to whom they are addressed, under cover of a letter explaining how we had acquired the mail and apologizing for our delay in forwarding it. Another course of action would be to reinsert the mail into the postal system by forwarding it under cover of a memorandum to the U.S. Postal Service. In the memorandum we would state that the mail came into our hands overseas, and was inadvertently held. The memorandum would further state that this Agency does not know at what point the mail was opened.

"Attachments: 114 Items

2 24 [Hungarian Custom's [sic] Declarations]

5/MC

1 U.S. Registered Mail/Return Receipt

85 Post Cards

25 Letters
24

1 [Swedish Custom's [sic] Declaration"]

--The person who brought the letters to Kalaris, the supervisor of the summer employee who actually found them, was known to be an Angleton loyalist, and Kalaris could see a trap unfolding in front of him if he mishandled the matter. The deliverer could be expected to tell Angleton just what was done with the letters, and Angleton to find ways to exploit any ill conceived decisions. After due deliberation, the staff of the Senate committee was informed, and on 16 July, not quite two weeks after the initial memorandum on this subject, the DCI sent the mail to the Postmaster General under cover of a letter explaining the situation. The Postmaster General in turn sent a copy of this letter, along with the actual mail and a letter of his own, to each addressee. The Postmaster General's letter referred to "apparent interception and acknowledged retention of this mail by the CIA," and described the matter as "a serious violation of your rights" and "abuse of the mails."* In due course some of the recipients wrote letters to the DCI asking whether CIA had dossiers on them.

In April a folder with some MORINE material was found in an R&A safe and delivered to McCoy, who, believing that he had stumbled upon an overlooked vein of counterintelligence gold, brought the matter to Kalaris's attention. MORINE in fact had not been overlooked by Angleton, but this was not apparent at the time. The discovery of this folder led to a memorandum to Nelson a few days later, entitled "Skeletons in the CIOPS Closet,"

---

* CI 180-75, 15 August 1975

1/MC

the staff, on its own and without coordination with the division, had passed to 24 [foreign liaison] a copy of a FISS containing division-controlled NOFORN information.

Paper and Records: Disposal and Reintegration

The paper-and-records problem was high on the agenda of issues that needed to be addressed. The quantity that the Angleton vaults and safes contained was almost overwhelming, and much of this had never been made available outside the staff. Integration of this unique data into the DO records system not only made common sense; it was an obvious prerequisite to the staff rejoining the directorate. Kalaris had no problem in principle with the concept of keeping certain information within the staff, as SE did with its [AESTORAGE] system, but the Angleton team had gone overboard. Whether for reasons of bureaucratic style or fear of penetration of the Agency, information of all kinds and from all kinds of sources had been held privately. All this had first to be reviewed to identify what was appropriate to retain and what was not, and the appropriate then made retrievable.

In the wake of the Rockefeller Commission investigation and the Church and Pike committee hearings, the Agency and the DO were busy writing regulations and providing guidelines to operating elements on what was and was not proper activity, particularly vis-à-vis US persons. For the CI Staff, this heavily involved definitions of subjects and activities that merited staff attention. Executive Orders would later provide a framework, albeit often maddeningly imprecise, for these questions, but the first of those addressing US foreign intelligence activitites, E.O.

2/MC

11905, was not issued until February 1976.* In the meanwhile, advice from the Hill and the lawyers supplied the framework. And there appeared to be hundreds, perhaps thousands of files in the Angleton staff that had been created and maintained according to criteria, e.g., anticommunism, that did not fit these guidelines.

Establishment of a guideline that counterintelligence files were not to be established and maintained solely on the basis of items in the press provided for elimination of a large percentage of the material that had been collected by the Angleton staff, prominent among this being files on Henry Kissinger, W. Averell Harriman, and some 30-40 US congressmen, among others. Common sense provided other working guidelines such as, for example, the simplistic role of thumb: if a file has some linkage to reality, retain it; if not, destroy it. People from RID were brought in to help decide what should go into the overall records system, and what did not belong there. Some of them effectively moved into the staff. And they were not the only outsiders to do this. In July 1975 the Department of Justice sent some lawyers to review the HTLINGUAL material, and when they discovered that there were 27 boxes of it in one of the staff vaults it was decided that the best place for them to do their work would be right there. Three desks were set up for them in the vault.

Some statistics from monthly reports at the time give a glimpse of the Augean task of dealing with all of this paper and records.

-- January 1976: Five Branch personnel spent 2-1/2 days reviewing all files held in the branch for a count of how many of these files were on US citizens. Total count was 1,018 files on Americans.

---

* Signed by President Gerald R. Ford, February 18, 1976.

-- March 1976: All (41 linear feet) Golitsyn file material held in records center has been recalled and a review begun. In May six more feet were acquired from SE.

-- July: CI/R&A Index currently contains about 255,000 cards, down over 11,000 in last ten months.

-- August: Golitsyn material has now been consolidated; about 15 linear feet have been destroyed.

-- September: Approximately 40,000 cards were destroyed; they duplicated a more complete index maintained by SE/CI.

-- October: CI/R&A index has been purged of all cards duplicated in DO main index--over 12,000 cards were removed and destroyed.

-- February 1977: Four ISG analysts were assigned to R&A to assist in the processing and integration of CI Staff records into the DO central system.

The "HONETOL" files appalled the new CI staff in their numbers and, as they were read, their scope and the hollowness of the reeds upon which they had been built.* HONETOL had not yet become notorious to the outside world, but inside it was perceived as a problem of major proportions. If, on the one hand, these files actually contained evidence of a penetration of CIA, this clearly was of vital importance. If, on the other hand, they did not, it was important that this be recognized and the files and suspicions appropriately dealt with. [Julian Fox] 3 a lawyer by education who joined the staff in late summer 1975, was assigned to study these files. A procedure was developed whereby he reviewed each one by one, and prepared a summary of its contents. This went forward to Kalaris with, in each instance, a recommendation on the cover sheet for disposition. On file after file these cover sheets ended up saying the same thing: that the file had been reviewed, that the conclusion had been reached that there was nothing of merit in it, and the file should be destoyed. The review of the file on Richard Kovich, for example, which was eight pages long, was dated 22 December 1975.* Kalaris, concurring, sent it to ADDO Blee with a handwritten note that the material in this case would be packaged and held with instructions that it should be destroyed as soon as the Senate released CIA from its embargo on destruction, and that the summary memo and cover sheet would constitute the only future record. The HONETOL files received steady but not priority attention. It took somewhat over a year for [Fox] 3 to make his way through all of them. Nothing of merit was found in any of them.

---

* The term "HONETOL" meant Golitsyn leads to a penetration of the United States--CIA as well as other US institutions. This led to two kinds of files: the leads themselves, as Golitsyn provided and described them (e.g., a file on the lead "Sasha"); and files on suspects, i.e., persons suspected of being the subject of a lead. Actual leads were very few; suspects were very many.

A special approach was developed to get the MORINE data into central indices. As a result of the compartmentation applied to MORINE in the Angleton staff, much of the existing MORINE information was squirreled away and not immediately appreciated. The rejuvenated exploitation program produced a flood of [ZRTAFFY] / correspondence with field stations, but this was slow to yield indexable material. It was not until the end of 1975 that a focused

---

* Richard Kovich was one of the three CIA staff officers most severely affected by the HONETOL witch-hunt.

3/mc

analytical effort on MORINE got underway. Beginning then with the cassette material (24 CC CPSU International Department trainee names), and later with country summary reports when analysis and liaison feedback fleshed out an understanding of GRU residency personnel and operations, MORINE data were provided by the staff to SE Division, which in turn conveyed them on to RID under SE Division document (SX) numbers as 1 AESTORAGE information. Names of GRU officers, code names and true names (where known) of agents and developmentals, support assets, etc. were indexed in this fashion.

* * *

People Responsibilities

The Kalaris staff inherited responsibility for a handful of defectors and certain contract personnel who had been working for the Angleton staff. This responsibility was not particularly welcomed, but it had to be dealt with.

The defectors were Golitsyn, Nosenko, Deryabin, and Rastvorov, 6, 8 and a former Romanian intelligence officer by the name of 6 Constantin Dumitrachescu, also known as 1 MHPIVOT/1. The Soviets were well known, at least by reputation, to the SE alumni on the staff, but the 8 Romanian was a total surprise. They had never heard of him.*

In early 1972 the 24 Israeli internal service (Shin Bet) had approached CIA through Angleton and asked for assistance in arranging the defection and resettlement of

---

* Chief, SE (Blee) had been aware of 6 Dumitrachescu's defection at the time, and had deduced, and ultimately obtained confirmation from the DDO, that Angleton had arranged to bring him to the United States and had him squirreled away.

8/MC

This would suggest that Angleton may have lacked the opportunity that others had had to observe the kinds of behavior Soviet defectors have displayed in sorting out who the important players are in matters affecting their future, and figuring out how to deal with them.*

--In the eyes of some who knew him, Angleton viewed himself more as chief of an operational entity than of a staff. Few gave him high marks as an effective staff, as opposed to operations, officer. His secret travels in Western Europe, not to mention to Israel, to meet with senior liaison officials with whom he had developed confidential relationships constituted a form of independent operational activity. The proposal, ultimately stillborn, in 1965 for Angleton to develop special counterintelligence units in Vietnam** displayed certain parallels with his conduct of counterintelligence abroad as Chief of the CI Staff in the way in which the local station would be effectively cut out and command channel and communications would run direct to counterintelligence headquarters in Washington. The proposed special counterintelligence (SCI) units for Vietnam were modeled after SCI units employed by X-2, the counterintelligence arm of the wartime OSS--where Angleton began his intelligence career. Perhaps those early experiences shaped in some way Angleton's later preference for conducting counterintelligence--by himself, without involvement of the area divisions and stations.

...and What To Do About It: Game plan

The Plan

In assessing the state of affairs in the staff, it did

---

* Angleton may have had some exposure, probably during the 1950s, to pre-War (1938) KGB defector Aleksandr Orlov.

** As described in Cleveland C. Cram's history of the CI Staff (to 1974), Vol.X, pp. 1004 ff.

1/mc

streamline our procedures."*

By 1976 the office of the Executive Officer of the Staff included a Privacy Act Section with four positions in addition to a three-person Records and Registry Section. (FOIA and Privacy Act requests were handled together.) But this by no means solved the problem. In the fall of 1977, as DO ceiling and personnel reductions were being meted out and the staff was trying to gear itself to getting along with less, the DDO was advised that the staff's Privacy Act Section was so strained and its personnel under so much pressure that henceforth it would not accept deadlines imposed by elements outside the staff. When requirements were received, the section would advise the requester how much time would be required to complete the work.

But normal FOIA and Privacy Act requests were not all; there were also specialty requests that had to be met. All had the common denominator of the staff's unique files and records. These included such matters as:

-- FOIA requests for information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald.** Handling these required the creation of a task force of 13 operations officers and analysts, plus clerical personnel, and their full-time efforts for over a month.

-- Requests for interviews and/or information from the Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees, and the Department of Justice.

-- A review of the Rosenberg case by a Federal court, which caused problems with regard to related VENONA

---

* CI 131-75, 9 July 75

** Nosenko's assertion that he was familiar with the KGB's assessment of and involvement with Oswald in the Soviet Union had led to endless debriefing, analysis, and cross-checking research on this subject.

United States: "In each case you open a file on there must be a demonstrable CI interest. Please assure that this guideline is followed meticulously."

Double Agent Branch -- Was charged with the conduct of and coordination on double agent operations abroad. Since the vast majority of DA cases were run by the US military services, the FBI, or--in some instances--foreign-liaison services, the branch was very heavily a coordinator rather than active runner of operations.

98

[Area Operations Branch -- Was charged with coordination with the area divisions on matters of CI interest, and with stimulating CI disciplines and practices in the area divisions and field stations. The centerpiece of the branch's activity was management and conduct of the CI Survey program. Consisting itself only of the branch chief and two clericals, the branch staffed its survey teams with detailees from the area divisions and CI Staff officers borrowed from other branches of the staff, both Ops and R&A.

Counteroperations Branch -- Was charged with operations designed to counter and disrupt the activities abroad of foreign intelligence services inimical to US interests. Charles Anderson, an LA Division officer who was brought in to the staff by Sternfield to head the branch, had had considerable experience in CA operations, and the branch's activities reflected this background. Virtually all had a clear CA character, from promotion of a book about the Tupamaros and terrorism in Uruguay, to a press campaign in Europe designed to expose the Curiel apparatus as an instrument of Soviet intelligence, to a paper on the Cuban intelligence residency in Chile during the Allende regime. Primary orientation was toward Latin America, with heavy focus on terrorist organizations and activities. Anderson's operations tended to be highly imaginative, often complex,]

1/MC

PAPER: THE IMS TEAM FINALLY GOES HOME

In May 1980 the IMS analyst group detailed to the CI Staff to deal with the paper inherited from the Angleton Staff finally completed its work and returned to IMS. In all, during the preceding four and a half years some 600 feet of CI Staff files had been reviewed, about 375 feet by IMS and 225 feet by CI Staff personnel The Analysis Group main index had been reduced from 500,000 cards in 1975 to 28,000.

DERYABIN RETIRES

Peter (Petr) Deryabin retired in January 1981 on the eve of his 60th birthday. One of the early group of KGB officers to come to the West following the death of Stalin in 1953, he had defected in Vienna in 1954. Since that time he had been continually associated with, and in effect a ward of the CI Staff. For a number of years he, along with other defectors,

DD/P 2-3032

7/23/62

Executive Registry
62-5265

25 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. On 20 July 1962, the Director and the Deputy Director (Plans) met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, William Langer, and J. Patrick Coyne to discuss certain aspects of the Agency's Political Action Programs. The Director sat with the Panel from 10:30 'til noon, the Deputy Director (Plans) was present from 10:30 to 12:30 and from 2:00 to 3:30.

2. The Director opened the discussion with a historical description of the Agency's covert financial support to political parties in the fight against Communism. He described in detail the procedures now in effect whereby Political Action Projects are originated, staffed out, and cleared with appropriate elements of Government. He pointed out that each project must have his approval prior to its circulation to the members of the Special Group. At this point, he digressed to inform the Panel that reconnaissance overflights are now approved by the Special Group and subsequently by the President. He said that this same procedure applies to peripheral flights although to a lesser degree. He terminated this part of the discussion by stating that in his opinion "all covert action programs are now handled in an orderly, correct manner".

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

SECRET

3. The Director then described in some detail Agency covert financial support in the recent 11[Peru] elections, the last 8[Greek] elections, and the 8[Finnish] election. He also described our activities in connection with the Italian political parties. Following this, he covered our plans for the upcoming 8[Brasilian] elections. He touched on our thoughts with regard to the political situation in 11[British Guiana].

4. At this juncture, the Director discussed Agency labor operations. He read to the group a short paper which outlined our support to anti-Communist labor unions in 11[France] and 11[Italy], our work through the 29[ICFTU], and our relationships with 8[American] labor and the assistance 24[United States unions] have given us.

5. Agency support to cultural organizations was raised by Dr. Langer, and the Director covered in some detail the current status of our support plus that of the Ford Foundation to the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the International Commission of Jurists. He touched on the Asia Foundation, and our desire to try to obtain the services of Mr. Livingston Merchant to head it.

6. In the time remaining to him, the Director went over with the Panel country by country an extended list of political parties and leaders supported by the Agency throughout the world. What he did not have an opportunity to cover in this list the Deputy Director (Plans) finished during the remainder of the morning and during the afternoon session.

SECRET

10/mc

7. Also in the afternoon, the Deputy Director (Plans) read to the Panel a paper on Operation Mongoose which the Director had used earlier in the day for briefing the President. This paper was used on the instruction of the Director. The Panel asked questions about Agency activity involving Cuba, all of which were answered with the exception of one having to do with the role of the Attorney General. This query was raised by Mr. Gray who recognized and gracefully accepted the fact that he was not answered directly.

8. Before the afternoon session adjourned, the Panel raised the question of the total dollar amount of funds expended annually for covert action. The Deputy Director (Plans) showed them a chart compiled by DDP-PG, dated 4 April 1962. This chart gives the precise dollar amounts expended annually. These figures vary from the Congressional ones since the support slice is not included.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:
Original - The Director
1 cc - Exec. Director
1 cc - C/CA-IO
1 cc - DD/P

13-00000

2-5767

11/9/62

Executive Registry
62-8090

2 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. On 1 November, the Deputy Director (Plans) met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to present a follow-up briefing on the Agency's political action programs since the one held on 20 July 1962. The meeting lasted from 2:30 to 4:45.

2. There was little discussion on Cuba. In response to Mr. Murphy's inquiry, I told him that a good intelligence job had been done but that I thought it desirable to have this studied by the Board on the basis of a paper which the Director was having prepared and which Mr. Kirkpatrick had assured Mr. Coyne would be submitted to the Board after the Director had had an opportunity to review it.

3. The 8 [Brazilian] election program was covered in considerable detail. Points covered were: (a) the reason for the program, (b) the manner in which candidates were chosen, (c) the amount of money involved, (d) the methods of funding, and (e) the coordination of State and the Agency on the entire scenario. Following the presentation of the factual elements, there was considerable discussion of the political situation in 11 [Brazil] and the direction in which that Government seemed to be tending.

2/mc

4. CIA-sponsored activities at the Helsinki Youth Festival was the next item presented. A full report was given which followed carefully the post-mortem written by the CA Staff.

5. As for CA activities in the remainder of Latin America, the following countries were covered: Dominican Republic, Chile, 11 [Peru], and 11 [Venezuela]. A [Haiti] and 11 [British Guiana] were then touched on, with particular reference to the sensitivity of the 24 [US-UK] cooperation on the latter.

6. In Southeast Asia, an up-to-date report was presented on operations in Laos, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam. Problems in connection with North Vietnamese operations were specifically identified.

7. On the 24 [Sino-Indian] conflict, the Panel was made aware of pending and current requests from the 29 [Indian CIB] for assistance in the training of guerrilla forces. The role of the Tibetans was also identified. In response to a query from Mr. Murphy, I said that I did not see any requirement at this time for an increase of our permanent establishment in 11 [India], expressing the opinion that any trainers and paramilitary experts which we might send could be covered for us by the 8 [Indians].

8. In Europe, CA programs in the following areas were updated: Berlin, France and Italy, 11 [Spain], 11 [Finland], and 11 [Cyprus].

12/mc

Mr. Murphy seemed particularly interested in the level of activity in Italy and our efforts to cut it back.

9. At one point in the briefing, I spoke of the change in status of the African-American Institute and told of our negotiations with the Ford Foundation on the Congress for Cultural Freedom. I mentioned the Department of State veto on passing funds to 6 [Holden Roberto]. There was some discussion of the Yemen and associated problems. Here, I simply gave an intelligence briefing on the Yemen and the effects of the revolution there on Saudi Arabia and the British position in the Aden Protectorate.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:
Original - Director, CIA
1 cc - Exec. Director
1 cc - Chief, CA
1 cc - DD/P

1/mc

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Office of the DD/P
Rm. 3-C-34—Hdqrs.

NO.

DATE 2 - NOV 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Executive Director	2 Nov	3 Nov	LBK	
2. DDCI	11/5/62 1305	11/9/62		
3. Ex. Dir. for files				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

GPO 1961 : O—593644

DD/P 3-1911

17 April 1963

Executive Registry
63-3249

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. On 15 April, at DDP's request, I met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to brief them on major covert action developments since their previous briefing on 2 November 1962. The meeting lasted from 10:00 to 12:15.

2. At Mr. Murphy's request, I began with a description of our electoral operations as 11 approved by the Special Group in Chile, the Dominican Republic, [Brazil] and Guatemala. 11 Mr. Murphy was particularly concerned with the situation in [Brazil] and both he and Mr. Gray found it difficult to understand why the State Department 6 continued to provide large-scale economic assistance when [Goulart] had to date refused to clean house of the Communists and fellow travelers both within the government and the labor movement. They were interested in knowing that we were in touch with some of the military leaders who are opposed to [Goulart] and they seemed to feel that a military coup at some point might be preferable to allowing a country [as large and powerful as Brazil] to drift into the hands of the opposition. Both gentlemen wished to know the amounts that we had expended in these electoral operations and our own estimate of the results. They did not question either the need for intervention or the size of our effort; although in the [Chilean] case Mr. Murphy wanted to be sure that we had evidence that the funds passed through [Italian] 8 hands actually reached the [Chilean] Christian Democrats.

3. Mr. Murphy then raised the 8 [Argentine] problem and said that he had been informed in New York that the State Department was putting considerable pressure on the 8 [Argentine] regime to persuade it to hold the elections scheduled for 9 [June] 1963. He questioned the wisdom of this pressure, pointing out that there was a real danger of the 8 [Peronistas] returning to power if the elections were held. He asked our opinion and I said that, despite the pressure, there was still considerable doubt whether the elections would actually take place.

10/mc

I added that the more responsible military were trying to work out with 8 the [Guido] government and the non-[Peronist] political parties a formula which would prevent the [Peronistas] from making large gains on the national level. 8

4. On the subject of [Haiti,] 11 Mr. Murphy felt that in so small a country action should be possible to remove [Duvalier] 6 and wondered why it had not been done. I pointed out that we had as yet no policy approval for such action but that we were active in identifying and making contact with opposition elements both within [Haiti] 11 and in exile. I described some of the difficulties, such as 6 [Duvalier's] control of the arms in the palace and his widespread penetration of opposition plotting that had just resulted in the rolling up of a coup attempt by [Haitian] 8 army officers.

5. Mr. Gray noted that he had seen in the newspapers a report of our recent decision to allow Radio Liberty to broadcast in Russian to the Soviet troops in Cuba. He was heartily in favor of such action but wondered how we were able to obtain approval of it when the Administration seems so anxious to avoid actions that might appear to be provocative to the Soviets. I informed him that there had, in fact, been some delay in obtaining the approval.

6. Both the gentlemen asked for detailed information on the structure and workings of the Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC) and asked whether we felt this committee in any way hampered or interfered with the approval process in the Special Group. I said that both Chief, WH and myself were well pleased with the way the LAPC operates and believed it to be highly useful.

7. I then briefed them on actions which were taken in Southeast Asia, particularly the measure to strengthen the border police in the 10 [north of India.] I told them that 6 [Nehru] was aware of these actions and they wanted to be certain Mr. [Bowles] was clearly instructed prior to his departure [as ambassador]. 6 8

8. Both men objected to press reports that certain Administration officials believed the Soviets to be exerting a helpful and restraining influence in Laos. I had to agree with them that it was hard to maintain such a view in the face of the increasing aggressiveness of the Pathet Lao, and I described the existing policy limits on our relations with [Phoumi] 6 and [Kong Le.] 6 I then described the present state of the Soviet-Chinese

13/mc

split and some of our efforts to exploit and exacerbate these tensions. Mr. Murphy asked for specific information on the extent of trade, if any, between China and the Soviet Union and the amount of the outstanding Chinese debt to the Soviets. I agreed to provide this via Mr. Coyne. Mr. Gray asked about the depth and extent of our intelligence from Peking and the China mainland, and was critical of the information supplied to us by the Chinese Nationalists. I said that intelligence operations in China were not my field but that I would make sure that a report on this did get to them.

9. I went on to describe the cultural ferment within Russia and recent action Khrushchev had taken to discipline the dissident writers and artists. They were very much interested in the actions we had taken to exploit this situation and particularly interested in the current issue of Encounter and in the account therein of the Khrushchev tirade at the recent art exhibition.

10. On Cuba I explained that I was not in a position to brief them in depth and any questions in this field would be handled by the Director or DDP. I did, however, brief them on the Krulak Committee and the recent meetings in Managua regarding measures that could be taken to limit the export of subversion from Cuba. (I have sent to them via Pat Coyne the CIA Memorandum on the present scope of the Cuban subversive training effort.)

11. I described the covert support to the [Italian] 8 political parties for the forthcoming parliamentary election as approved by the Special Group. Mr. Murphy had not previously known of the decision to lend some selective support to the [Nenni autonomists] and described this decision with some surprise "as quite a switch." 8

12. Finally, when informed of the policy limitations on our relations with the [Angolan Nationalists] and [Holden Roberto], 6 Mr. Murphy expressed himself as being in agreement with those limitations and seemed to feel that the best course to follow was to assist the [Portuguese] 8 Government in its attempts to control the situation. He said that he had met recently for the first time with [Roberto Holden] in New York last week and was not impressed by the man. 6

6/mc

13. The meeting was throughout a cordial one and I detected no evidence of a critical attitude towards the Agency's covert action program.

CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief
Covert Action Staff

Distribution:
Orig. - Director, CIA
1 - Exec. Director
1 - DDP
1 - C/CA

APR 12 10 01 AM '63

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
C/CA

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Exec. Director			LBK	
2. PFIAB				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

GPO 1961 : O—593644

13-00000

23 April 1963

13-00000

DCI

(CLASSIFICATION)

Copy 1
23
[BYE 4242-63]

Handle Via Indicated Controls

99
[BYEMAN]

....

....

....

Gave cy 2 of this document to Chas. Enright on 7 Aug 1964

8/19/98
Assassination Record
Michelle

....

....

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.

This document contains information referring to Projects:

CORONA .... 99 [TACKLE]

(CLASSIFICATION)

③

24 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1015, Tuesday, 23 April 1963

Present: Dr. Killian, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Clifford, Mr. Pace,
Gen. Doolittle, Mr. Gray, Dr. Langer, Dr. Land;
Staff members Messrs. Coyne and Ash;
From CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. FitzGerald,
Mr. Bruce Clarke, Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick

1. When Mr. McCone entered the room the group had been discussing the release of the American prisoners in Cuba, and it had been explained to the Board that the three CIA men who had been imprisoned had been released. Mr. Murphy had asked what their cover story had been and had been told that they represented themselves as conducting audio surveillance for commercial interests, and that their fictitious names had apparently held up during interrogation.

Mr. Murphy asked Mr. McCone the conditions of the release of the 22 and the DCI explained that at Castro's request we were trying to obscure the fact that there had been a quid pro quo in releasing the four Cubans in exchange for the 22 Americans. The Attorney General had arranged the release of the three Cubans who had been accused of, but not convicted of sabotage, and Mr. McCone had personally arranged the release of Molina with Governor Rockefeller, who had granted him executive clemency with deportation. Mr. McCone noted that the release of the three CIA persons was very important to the Agency, and that nothing in the agreement for the release involved any other commitments.

Mr. Murphy asked what the DCI thought was behind Castro's making these releases. Mr. McCone replied that it was probably domestic foibles, and that Donovan was the only thread open to the United States. Mr. Clifford asked if we had everyone out that we wanted. The DCI replied that he knew of no one else there that we wanted. He reported that Donovan had to make a statement that he would not return to Cuba, advised that he had no intention of returning at this time, and he would have to use another cover if he did return. Dr. Land asked why Castro did all this, and the DCI said we didn't really know, but one possibility offered by Donovan was that Castro apparently is interested in trying to reach some rapprochement with

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

the United States, that Donovan says he is not a Communist, and that Fidel didn't know how to go about making any accommodation with the U.S. because he was so closely surrounded by advisers who were watching everything he did. Mr. McCone said that Castro had specifically requested that the President, ~~the Attorney General~~ and the DCI be advised of his attitude. Mr. Clifford asked why Castro wanted the DCI to know, and Mr. McCone said he had no idea, because at no time during the Donovan negotiations was any indication given that CIA was being consulted or advised. Dr. Killian then suggested that the Board turn to the briefing on Cuba. Mr. McCone said there were several things he wished to discuss before going on to that briefing.

2. Mr. McCone reported that on coordination the NRO agreement was in effect and working pretty well. An agreement had been reached on the complete and comprehensive use of the NPIC facilities by DIA, and NPIC was developing well. The Special Group has expanded its review of counterinsurgency activities to include those of the DOD, and they are now cognizant of DOD activities in this field. In the field of current intelligence reporting, we are now attempting to correct the DIA and CIA bulletins and to establish one bulletin with increased DIA input and with DIA issuing addendum. Mr. McCone said this was supported at the DOD stage by the Secretaries. He noted that he was attempting to get all issues with the DOD settled by the 15th of May so that they can be fully implemented before Mr. Gilpatric leaves in June. He said that in the clandestine collection field the work of Defense was being fully and carefully coordinated on a regular basis. Mr. McCone said that reasonable progress was being made on the five areas of coordination. He said that he and Mr. McNamara had postponed the reorganization of USIB. It was going along all right as it was and they didn't see any point of creating problems on the Hill by a reorganization at this time.

16

3. Mr. McCone reported that recent CORONA and TACKLE flights over China produced the best photography we have ever had, and that he had not set up a formal briefing for the Board because of their busy schedule. He advised that there was one point concerning ICBM complexes in the Soviet Union which he wished to call to the attention of the Board. The last CORONA flight had revealed one new ICBM complex and this now located these installations in 18 separate places. He noted that these complexes ranged from four pads to possibly as many as 18. This might well indicate that 18 launching pads were standard, and if the support facilities are proportioned similar to the one with 18 pads, there might well be as many as 18 times 18 launching pads, or a total of about 450. Mr. McCone advised that at this time we were analyzing each one to determine the level of support facilities.

1/mc

The photograph was being reviewed for clearer guide lines as to construction time. He said he saw no reason to change the mid-'63 estimate of 125 to 150 launching sites, but there might be reason to change the future estimate. Dr. Langer asked how many sites there were with 18 pads and Mr. McCone replied, "Only one."

4. Dr. Land stated that CORONA was getting better and better, and he hoped that all of those in the pursuit of a better vehicle would not forget that CORONA is doing the job. Mr. McCone replied that this was true, and said that he had the schedule for satellite launchings which he would leave with the Board. This called for CORONA-M once a month to July, with an extra one in May, and CORONA-J once a month from May 1963 to July 1964, with two in September. If trouble develops with the "J" configuration, "M" can be continued once a month until March. The next [LANYARD] 99 shot is scheduled for early next month and will be followed by three more. The first 99 [GAMBIT] shot is scheduled in June, and will then be launched once a month through all of 1964. Mr. McCone noted that if there were future failures, there should be no hiatus and a maximum of only seven days' delay between shots.

5. Mr. McCone reported that the OXCART vehicle would have one more flight at Mach [2.5], 24 and then would be pushed up to its full speed and altitude. General Doolittle noted that the next [.6] 24 increase presented very serious engineering problems. Mr. McCone said that this was thoroughly understood but he wanted the Board to be apprised of the status.

6. Mr. McCone reported that he was establishing a panel to make a judgment as to what additional steps should be taken to bring satisfactory photography in the area of resolution. He noted that he felt we were dealing too much in optimistic hope at the present time, and that he wanted the best possible judgment as to the resolution that could be achieved from satellite photography in order to be weighed with the political decision of overflying the Soviet Union. [He stated that he had gone to Cambridge to see Dr. Edward Purcell in an effort to persuade him to chair a panel which would be composed of the best brains from both inside and outside the Government. He reported that he felt he must be able to tell the President when satellite photography would reach the desired resolution. Mr. McCone advised that he had a memorandum establishing the terms of reference of this committee which he would submit to the President's Board. He noted that there were many studies oriented toward the most exotic types of reconnaissance, including the best read-out, but that he wanted this committee to be completely impartial and objective and therefore was establishing it under his personal direction. He noted that he had the enthusiastic support

4/mc

of DOD in doing this. He said he would like the support of the President's Board and their thoughts on the terms of reference and the membership, including whether they thought some members of the Board might sit on the committee or whether this would present a conflict of interest, as the Board had apparently felt in a previous matter.]

Dr. Killian asked if this panel was supposed to look at the future potentiality of satellite photography, and Mr. McCone then read to the Board the terms of reference in his memorandum. He noted that he thought this panel should be constituted at this time because there were serious doubts in the U. S. Government about flying an aircraft over the USSR. Mr. Clifford asked if the panel would deal with politics, and Mr. McCone replied, "No." Dr. Land asked what the relations of the panel would be with NRO and Mr. McCone replied that NRO would support the panel. Gen. Doolittle noted that the Air Force had a committee on satellite survivability, and Mr. McCone said that he knew this, but felt that that committee was not full out and not devoting the effort that the seriousness of the problem warranted. Gen. Doolittle replied that he was a member of that committee and he thought they were giving the problem very serious consideration. Mr. McCone said he thought the problem involved a vast amount of work and he was concerned because all of the views were not being pulled together. He noted that what was necessary was to get an authoritative expression as to what resolution was required down to the nearest inch in order to determine the engineering of missiles. /

Mr. Land asked what Dr. Purcell had said, and commented that he thought such a panel would be all right if it was composed of four or five who knew what they were talking about. Mr. McCone replied that he was not sure he had been able to get Purcell, and that he might have to ask Dr. Land to persuade Purcell; Dr. Land replied that he might be able to do it.

7. [Mr. Pace asked whether there had been one or two U-2 flights over China. Mr. McCone replied that there had been two, and that they had produced some interesting results. These included progress on a possible gaseous diffusion plant. He noted that the preparations are just half those of the Soviet plant, of which it may be a duplicate. He said that this was not understood, and noted that, as presently constituted, the plant could not produce cascades to develop the quality of the top product. He noted that it could possibly be another process, metallurgical or textile, but on another area there were a large number of cooling towers. Mr. McCone advised that he had set up a special group under Dr. Roddis to study the Chinese nuclear energy program. This group has made a report in which they pointed out the paucity of the information available. However, they had put together]

98
24

1/mc

~~98~~ 24

[a whole lot of intelligence information and had come to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists were making a tremendous effort in this field and were possibly nearer the stage of exploding some device. He reported that the Board of Estimates was making a new estimate on the subject at this moment and that the program was being supplemented by intensive over-flights. Dr. Land asked whether the DCI saw any problems in using the A-12 over China, and Mr. McCone said that he didn't and, furthermore, that he personally didn't see any problem in using it over the USSR.]

8. Mr. McCone advised that he had taken some additional steps to pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets. He had established a Research and Development Review Board. He said that it didn't seem wise at this time to relocate OSI and TSD. The Office of Scientific Intelligence analyzes and makes estimates on the basis of incoming intelligence, and its removal from DD/I would take away an essential link in the process of that area. He said further that TSD was directly linked to the operational aspects of DD/P, and he didn't feel it should be removed from that area. He noted that the Research and Development Review Board would meet under General Carter biweekly and would provide cross fertilization and coordination. He said that he would provide a copy of the memorandum establishing this Board and read to the Board the membership.

1/mc

9. Mr. McCone then turned to a discussion of Cuba and stated that he was giving the Special Group this afternoon a study showing the results of 51 days' reconnaissance over Cuba and that this was disturbing when the four principal targets were analyzed. There were 59 occasions when weather precluded any readout of what was going on in these four Soviet military camps. Some of the camps were not seen for five or six days in a row and in one instance for as long as 12 successive days. Mr. McCone then read from the memorandum on reconnaissance over Cuba dated 23 April 1963 and said he would provide the Board with a copy.

The DCI then reported that James Donovan during a nighttime drive to Veradero had passed a convoy of 25 very large trucks, the type generally carried on railroad flatcars. Mr. McCone stated that an examination of the photography for that day and the following day provided absolutely no trace of the convoy. Dr. Land stated that the DCI's previous statement may have provided the answer as to where this convoy might be. The DCI said he planned to recommend low-level flights in order to provide more information.

10. At this point Mr. FitzGerald was asked to give his presentation on operations in Cuba. He commenced by displaying the chart which indicated the number of resident agents, illegal teams, legal teams, shipboard agents and penetrations of Cuban installations. He noted that the number of illegal teams had risen to three as a result of a successful operation on Sunday, and one of these teams had as many as 100 subagents with extensive coverage in the province of Pinar del Rio. Dr. Langer asked what the subagents were looking for, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that their coverage was mostly military. Mr. Murphy asked if these agents were all strictly collecting intelligence, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was their primary purpose at the moment, but the illegals could create a resistance net if this was desired. He pointed out that the policy at the present time precluded attempting to develop a large scale dangerous activity.

Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the penetration of Cuban installations were mainly [diplomatic] 29 installations and that some [14 Cuban diplomats] 24 were our agents. Mr. Clifford asked how the information was gotten out of Cuba, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that it was mostly by secret writing transmitted
10 to [Mexico City] by mail and then forwarded to Washington. He said there were four radios in Cuba and that we now had a greatly improved medium 24
speed transmitter that was quite small, [the size of about two cigarette cartons] and it could get a message off in just 60 seconds. He said that there was a smaller and better transmitter currently in the process of development.

4/mc

Dr. Land asked if the loss of this transmitter would compromise others. Mr. FitzGerald replied that it would not compromise any other agents except the one apprehended, and the DCI noted that it would simply compromise the instrument.

Mr. Murphy asked concerning the quality of substantive reporting, and Mr. FitzGerald noted that the 1,040 reports looked impressive, but it was quite true that this was not a true indication. 24 He said that some of the reporting was very good, and there were two [Cuban ambassadors] on the payroll who provided some first-rate reports and were closest to the bone in what Castro was thinking. Mr. Murphy asked if we had Castro's immediate entourage penetrated, and Mr. FitzGerald said his sister worked for us but that she didn't always have inside information. He pointed out that the 665 reports from resident agents were primarily on military targets, and the intelligence community felt they were really worthwhile as a supplement to overhead reconnaissance. General Doolittle asked if an illegal team was [two] 24 men and Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes". Mr. Murphy asked whether these agents provided information on Soviet troop strength and equipment, and Mr. FitzGerald replied in the affirmative. Mr. Clifford noted that with just two illegal agent teams in Cuba at this time we were back to where we started from in 1962. Mr. FitzGerald commented that the casualty rates were very high and referred to the charts "Legal Resident Agents in Cuba" and "Illegal Agent Development".

(At this point Mr. McCone left the meeting and Mr. Cottrell came in.)

Mr. Gray asked if the modest number of agents was a result of policy or operations. Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was primarily a result of operations and noted that it was not the result of lack of effort, but because of the high attrition rate and the dangers involved. He went over the lists of what had happened to the agents that were put in. He noted that it was presently planned to carry out approximately five operations a month. Mr. Murphy asked if there was evidence of organized resistance in Cuba. Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes", but they were now small bands scattered throughout the island. He noted that Castro had broken up the large country-wide resistance networks last summer. He then produced the chart entitled "Illegal Infiltration -- Exfiltration Operations" and commented on this. Mr. Murphy asked if the groups on the island committed sabotage, and Mr. FitzGerald said the policy presently precluded major sabotage operations and limited it to "subtle sabotage". Mr. Murphy asked what constituted "subtle sabotage", and Mr. FitzGerald described it as tying a rock to a wire and throwing it across high tension lines.

11. The Board then turned to Mr. Cottrell and asked him to describe the work of his group. Mr. Cottrell said the President had become concerned there were so many government agencies dealing with so many Cuban groups, and he had set up the group under Mr. Cottrell to coordinate all of this activity. He said that his immediate group consisted of a representative of Defense and CIA, and there were additional committees or groups reporting to them. He outlined the general policy guidance under which they were operating and under questioning from Mr. Murphy stoutly denied that the policy was basically defensive in nature, and it was directed toward getting rid of communism and Castro in Cuba. It was further explained that CIA's activities were coordinated through this group.

12. Dr. Killian then asked Bruce Clarke to give a brief report on the situation in Cuba, and with the aid of photographs Clarke analyzed the present Soviet troop strength on the island and explained how these figures were arrived at. At 12:00 this session was recessed to permit the presentation by DIA.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

LBK:drm:reg
Distribution:
cy #1 - DCI
#2 - DDCI
#3 - Ex Dir
#4 - ER

SECRET

Subjects covered in briefing 23 April 1963:

1. Discussion of the release of the three American prisoners in Cuba.

2. Coordination on NRO agreement - "in effect and working well".

3. Report on photographic results of Corona [and Tackle] 99 flights [over China] 10 mentioned there would be one more Ox flight at Mach [2.5] 24 and then be pushed to full speed and altitude.

4. Reported on establishment of Purcell Panel.

5. Discussion of U-2 flights [over China] 10 and results.

6. Establishment of R&D board to pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets.

7. Discussion of Cuba; DCI said plans to recommend low-level flights to provide more information.

8. FitzGerald gave presentation on operations in Cuba.

9. Cottrell described the work of his group.

10. Bruce Blark gave report on the situation in Cuba.

TOP SECRET

99 [BYEMAN]

⑤

[illegible] advised 1012 a.m.
22 april 1963.
LBK

20 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick LBK

DCI does not want to meet the Board with Cottrell and requests that you advise the Board that Cottrell is not privy to many operational matters. Your suggestions seemed agreeable to Mr. McCone.

WElder
W. Elder

SECRET

22 April 1963

SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, 10:15 A.M., 23 APRIL

to
11:15 A.M.

I **Coordination.**

a. NRO Agreement--currently in effect.
b. NPIC--agreement with DIA is fairly well solidified with not too many differences in opinion.
c. Counterinsurgency--new system whereby DOD goes to the Special Group now in effect.
d. Current Intelligence Reporting--now in negotiation stage with DIA.
e. Clandestine Intelligence Collection--close coordination between CIA and DIA now in effect.
6 USIB —

99

II **Recent CORONA Coverage plus Recent TACKLE Flights.**

Schedule of flights for 1963-1964

~~Recon over Cuba~~

III **Progress on OXCART.**

a. Establishment of the Purcell Panel.

IV **Scientific and Technical Intelligence in CIA.**

a. Report of the Roddis Panel on Chinese nuclear energy capabilities.
b. The CIA Research and Development Review Board.
Written [illegible]

V Policy on Cuba
Recon. over Cuba

SECRET

SECRET

Handle ~~via BYEMAN~~
~~Control System~~

17 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Tuesday, 23 April 1963

1. The President's Board has asked that you meet with them on the 23rd from 10:15 to 11:15. They have suggested that the later half of this period be devoted to a review of both operations and intelligence on Cuba and have suggested that Mr. Cottrell attend for that period.

2. Assuming that the question of the Board's charter and procedures will have been settled prior to the 23rd, I would suggest that you may wish to give them a quick review of outstanding matters including their recommendations and perhaps a briefing on the latest C‘_ and [T.] 99 flights.

Lyman Kirkpatrick
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

cc: DDCI

99
Handle ~~via BYEMAN~~]
~~Control System~~

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

23
[BYE ~~4241-63~~]

3

DA

Executive Registry
63-2540/

28 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director LBK

Reference the attached memorandum from the Director, I will of course be pleased to meet with the President's Board on Tuesday, 23 April, and would appreciate very much your informing Pat Coyne accordingly. I hope that you will be able to be present also in accordance with your normal procedures. If not, I would appreciate your appointing an appropriate representative. If you can find out in advance from Mr. Coyne just what the Board may want, it would be most helpful. In the meantime, please ask the staff to prepare appropriate briefing memoranda on whatever will be appropriate at that time.!!!

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Attachment:
Memo to DDCI from DCI dated 28 March 1963 (ER 63-2540)

MSC:blp
Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/att
1 - DDCI w/cy att
1 - ER w/cy att

13-00000

Executive Registry
63-2540

28 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

In discussions with Dr. Killian, he mentioned that his Board were meeting for one day. He had been advised that I would be in Europe at that time. The meeting date is April 23rd. Dr. Killian specifically requested that you be available for an hour or so on that date, and I said I would convey this request to you.

John

John A. McCone
Director

13-00000

[B4E 3759] 23
Cy #1

(CLASSIFICATION)

Handle Via Indicated Controls

99
[BYEMAN]

8/19/98
Assassination Record.
Michelle

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.

This document contains information referring to Projects:

2/mc

(CLASSIFICATION)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI ATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DCI	Noted	by DCI
2	Exec Dir	Approved	with
3	3 minor	changes	as
4	noted.		
5		WElder	
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Distribution to other than DDCI and yourself awaits your approval.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Executive Director	31 Dec 62

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

(40)

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

28 December 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the DCI with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Friday, December 28, 0930 a.m.

Specific
Subject : Discussion of Cuba

1. At 0930 Dr. Killian opened the meeting with a statement to the Director that the Board had read the report and appreciated the great amount of work that had been put into it. He commented particularly on the lucidity of the report and said the Board had also looked at the changes which had been sent to them this morning. The Director commented on page 90, the final conclusions, and said that he still did not feel sufficient attention had been paid to important indicators. Mr. McCone then said that there were one or two other subjects that he wanted to mention to the Board before getting into the Cuban report. These are covered in separate memoranda.

2. After coverage of the other subjects, Dr. Killian then asked Mr. McCone whether he had any further comments to make on the report. The Director, referring to conversation the previous evening, said he had no further comments and that he thought it was understandable why his personal position had not been included in the report. He noted that these were covered in his October 31 memorandum for the record which the Board had. Dr. Killian asked if the Board did have this and Mr. Coyne

[BYE 23
3759-62]
Cy#1

1/mc

noted that Dr. Killian had seen it at the previous meeting. Mr. McCone went on to say that the Board should realize that the people in receipt of his cables had been receiving intelligence on an hour to hour basis. Mr. Clifford noted that the Director's messages would be of tremendous interest in any Congressional investigation and thought that the Board should have copies of them. Mr. McCone replied that he realized this and would supply copies.

3. Mr. Gray asked if they could then turn to question 16. Dr. Killian asked the question, which was whether the existence of the Special Group had complicated the intelligence program and he noted particularly the detailed decisions made by the Special Group in relation to Mongoose. Mr. McCone replied no, in fact the Special Group had assisted. He noted the way it operated and said that the Augmented Special Group, with the Attorney General, served as authority to stimulate intelligence gathering through increased use of agents, refugee interrogations and third country activities. He noted that prior to Mongoose there had been a hiatus and that everything apparently had stopped after the Bay of Pigs. In December of last year there had been no interrogation of refugees, no agents and no Miami set up. At the instigation of the President, the Attorney General and himself, all of this had been built up. Mr. Murphy asked why operations against Cuba had stopped and whether this was for psychological reasons. The Director said it was psychological. There had been investigations and there was general discouragement. Dr. Killian said

wasn't there a similar danger now and that there seemed to be a general euphoria and a feeling of success. Mr. McCone said there was a great danger inherent in Cuba. The SAM sites were still there as well as many other things. He said a week ago Monday he had brought this up forcefully in the Executive Committee and the President had issued instructions that word be gotten to the Soviets that any interference with our reconnaissance over Cuba would bring an instant reply with action from the United States. This word was communicated by Stevenson to Kuznetsov and by Thompson to Dobrynin. He said that the present understanding is that we will fly two or more high level flights a day, or if weather or other reasons forestall these flights, there will be a request made to the President for low level flights. He noted that low level flights could escalate a critical situation.

4. Mr. Pace asked if there were any prohibitions on intelligence collection on Cuba today. Mr. McCone replied yes. We would like a more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration. He said he thought it was important that in the next three or four months there be extensive intelligence operations to find out the trend of developments in Cuba. He said he thought the Soviets might move completely out of Cuba, and certainly this was one impression they were trying to convey; or second, that they would recognize they had a good piece of real estate which they would want to maintain for subversion through Latin America, and a base of operations. This would involve a control of Castro and while they might not re-install offensive missiles, they will always have the

capability to do so. Mr. McCone said he was inclined to believe that the second alternative would be followed, and obviously the intelligence effort should be at a maximum to discover Russian intentions.

5. Mr. Murphy said obviously there should be an all out effort to penetrate the Cuban government. The DCI said yes, that every effort should be made to exploit cracks in the top in their monolithic structure and that more and more agents should be put it. He noted that only this week a team had been infiltrated and another team exfiltrated. Mr. Murphy asked how many there were in a team and the Director replied 24 three to five.

6. Mr. McCone went on to say that we are making extensive efforts to utilize third countries in the Cuban intelligence effort and mentioned the 8 British, 8 Canadians, 8 French, 8 Germans and one or two Latin countries. He said that he expected some invaluable information would be produced by discussions with Donovan and Noland. We already know that Castro had a fight with Che Guevarra. Castro also spent three hours with the captain of the 24 African Pilot and the captain had indicated that he wanted to talk to intelligence immediately on landing in Florida. Mr. McCone said that he intended to get the Special Group, immediately after the first of the year, to approve a program for extensive intelligence activities. He said that he did not believe that any efforts should be made at this time to stimulate an uprising and that all of our resources should be concentrated on intelligence collection.

TOP SECRET

6/mc

7. Mr. Pace asked whether this plan would include using Guantanamo. The Director replied that he did not recommend the use of Guantanamo. He noted that if it was used as a base for intelligence operations, and we got caught, Castro could mobilize world opinion against us. Dr. Killian said that Castro assumed that we used it in this way whether we do or not.

8. General Doolittle asked how frequently we are overflying Cuba now. The Director replied that there were two flights a day at present, but if the weather is bad and our program slips, there is authority to fly additional daily flights. General Doolittle asked how frequently this gave complete coverage of the island and Mr. McCone said that it worked out to about once a week. He noted that some areas such as harbors were covered more frequently, and that COMOR had worked out a system of priorities for aerial reconnaissance.

9. Mr. Pace then asked if we had studied the possibilities for the use of Guantanamo and what could be achieved in using it as a base for operations. The Director replied that we had made no such study.

10. Mr. Pace then inquired about restrictions on U-2 flights during September and said that apparently NO effort was made to penetrate critical areas by agents and therefore he thought we should have explored using Guantanamo. Mr. McCone pointed out that the operators had proposed a series of agent infilitrations from Guantanamo in August, but that this was not approved. Nobody at the policy level, including the JCS, would approve these operations.

11. Mr. Gray then asked if the situation in January looks different than it did in August, would there be accelerated operations. The Director said he would re-open the whole question if that was the case. Mr. Pace returned to the subject of Guantanamo and said that in his opinion if effective use could be made of it this should be done regardless of policy inhibitions. Dr. Killian asked if [Guantanamo was used for SIGINT] 24 purposes. Mr. McCone said that he was sure it was and referred to Mr. Kirkpatrick who read from [the NSA memorandum] 29 on their expanding activities in June, noting the additional positions activated in June and the fact that were there some [floating positions] 24 established near Santiago de Cuba.

12. Mr. Murphy then asked what was the difference between Mongoose and Mongoose B-plus. Mr. McCone replied that the first phase of the Mongoose operation was to determine the intelligence potential in Cuba. This was fairly successful despite extreme difficulties. He mentioned that there were 100,000 informers organized on a block and community basis throughout the island and that these people controlled ration cards and travel, thereby making all movement difficult. He said the second phase of the Mongoose operation considered three or four different levels of activity. "A" was the most violent, directed toward precipitating a revolution. "B" involved extensive sabotage. " B plus" was somewhere between the two and therefore involved even more activity, such as mining harbors. Mr. McCone said that his big problem

3/mc

is the question of United States policy. He did not wish to put CIA in the position of stimulating an uprising unless he was certain that U. S. policy would commit troops to back the uprising. He noted that on August 10, when he forecast MRBMs in Cuba to the Secretary of Defense, he had discussed the ramifications of an uprising in Cuba extensively. Dr. Killian asked who chaired the Special Group on Mongoose. Mr. McCone said he wasn't sure whether it was Bundy or the Attorney General and turned to Mr. Kirkpatrick, who didn't know.

13. Mr. Pace asked whether an assessment had been made of the accuracy of NPIC interpretations on Soviet missiles. He said he wondered whether there were flaws which might change some of our estimates. Mr. McCone replied that, quite to the contrary, there was no instance where NPIC failed. He said that, for example, the September photography of San Cristobol showed some construction equipment. In retrospect we know it was for developing missilesites, but the photography could be interpreted as being only a few trucks for agricultural purposes.

14. Dr. Killian said that he was very concerned about the clear implication that the Soviet Union would soon be developing better camouflage techniques. This, plus the lack of resolution in the photography, might pose considerable difficulties. Mr. McCone said that this was a different story. He noted that he was concerned about the adequacy of coverage of the Soviet Union. He noted that the targets for coverage were reviewed repeatedly, but at the present time of year the light was poor and the coverage was bad. He noted that there was a certain margin

allowed in the estimates to take into account missile sites that might not have been seen. The DCI said that NIE 11-8 had just been reviewed and that an amending memorandum would be issued shortly. He said obviously it was impossible to say precisely what was going on in the Soviet Union.

15. Dr. Killian said that he was terribly concerned about the fact that the public now seems to feel that we have swung all the way from a missile gap to a great superiority over the Soviet Union, and that this was obviously the wrong way. Mr. McCone said he agreed that this was definitely wrong. Mr. Murphy asked whether the government was putting out this information. Mr. McCone said he didn't know and that he felt it was wrong and dangerous and would develop complacency and might even result in an economy minded Congress cutting the Defense budget drastically. Mr. Murphy noted that it was implicit that we should have precise knowledge on what was going on inside Russia. Mr. McCone said that in his presentations to Congress he specifically made the reservation each time that there were obviously things we didn't know. Dr. Killian noted that even photography can be wrong and can give an erroneous impression; e.g., that nothing is there. Mr. McCone acknowledged that this was a danger. Dr. Killian asked whether Congress, the President and the Secretary of Defense understood this danger. Mr. McCone replied that he always stressed it, and he also stressed that intelligence was commencing to have almost absolute dependence on photography.

16. Mr. Pace commented that since November there had been 72 overflights of Cuba, and yet for a much greater length of time there had been no U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, which was a much more important target. He said that obviously there must be great gaps in our knowledge on the USSR. General Doolittle said it was even worse than that. He noted that CORONA had given no valuable intelligence on Cuba and that apparently the U-2 gave questionable intelligence so that low level reconnaissance was needed. The Director said this wasn't accurate, that the U-2 gave all of the intelligence that was needed to convince the OAS and our other allies. The low level flights were needed for backstopping possible military operations. Mr. Pace asked if it was correct that CORONA had produced no valuable intelligence on Cuba and Mr. McCone said that this was true. General Doolittle noted the closeness of the dangers and commented that if the Cubans had moved faster and gotten the camouflage up, we might never have discovered the missiles.

17. Dr. Killian noted that the time was drawing to an end and said that the Board would make a strong recommendation on an intensive research program [on sensors 24 to break through camouflage]

18. Mr. Murphy asked if the Director had noted any difference in the philosophy of the State Department in regard to intelligence. He noted that the Department had played quite a role during the Cuban

9/22/58
OK daB

~~Bob~~,
Substitute language
"technical details"

DM

crisis. Mr. McCone said yes, he thought there had been a change in the State attitude and noted that it and others had been quite timid on the U-2 and other intelligence activities. He said that he was having a recapitulation made of the inhibitions on intelligence operations which might interest the Board. He cited the fact that we had been prevented from covering 11 [China] North Vietnam and North Korea. However, He said that recently a second U-2 had been sent to 10 [Formosa] and that the wraps had been taken off 10 [Far Eastern] reconnaissance. On the other hand, every time there was an overflight State got very nervous and had made several telephone calls.

Clear up

19. Dr. Killian again expressed the Board's appreciation for the report and for Mr. McCone's taking the time to be with them. Mr. McCone replied that he would be happy to consider any suggestions the Board had concerning the report, except that he felt the conclusions should stand as presented. If, however, there were any additional substantive matters, there might well be additional conclusions that could be drawn.

20. This session was completed at 10:40.

Lyman Kirkpatrick
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

LBK:rm
Orig - DCI (PFIAB file)
cy 2 - DDCI (PFIAB file)
cy 3 - DD/P
cy 4 - DD/R
cy 5 - DD/I
cy 6 - IG
~~cy 7 - Exec Dir (PFIAB files)~~ destroyed 10 Jan 63

TOP SECRET

3/mc

104-10302-10019 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO.

COPY ______ OF ______

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1a

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

13-00000

TOP SECRET
NOFORN

-H Adm for [illegible]

COPY NO. 107

SC NO. 00556/63

9 December 1963

DAILY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

NOFORN

TOP SECRET

DAILY SUMMARY

9 December 1963

This summary of significant information has not been coordinated outside the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received, nor does time permit the complete evaluation of all reports which are included.

CONTENTS

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

Three independent clandestine sources have reported on the unloading of military equipment from the Soviet vessel METALLURG BAIKOV in Havana harbor on 19 or 20 November. (Page 1)

Soviet "coastal defense rockets" now belong to Cuban Army artillery forces, according to a recent speech by Raul Castro; however, Soviets still appear to be involved in the communications net which serves the cruise missile system. (Page 1) 24

FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH:

In a 6-7 December speech devoted mainly to education, Castro digressed to discuss the situation resulting from Venezuela's charge that the arms cache discovered on a Venezuelan beach last month had come from Cuba. Castro implied that the arms had been planted by CIA and are being used as a pretext for new action by the "imperialists and their lackeys" against Cuba. He expressed confidence that whatever the result, the Cuban revolution will not be defeated. (Page 2)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:

Faure Chomon Mediavilla is replacing Omar Fernandez as transportation minister; Major Jesus Montane Oropesa will be new communications minister. (Page 3)

06

Heavy rainfall has apparently caused damages to military facilities in Pinar del Rio Province and hampered travel in Oriente Province. 10 (Page 4)

10

4/17

THE PRESIDENT'S ASSASSINATION:

A Spanish-language daily in New York claims Madrid police are holding a self-confessed plotter against the late President. (Page 4)

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

10

A fire on a farm near Cardenas, Matanzas Province, has destroyed one acre of henequen. (Page 4)

08 [illegible] 29

An attempt has been made to shoot the chief of the PURS in Velasco, Camaguey Province. (Page 5)

10

A militiaman arrested in Guantanamo on 3 December for suspected counterrevolutionary activities has been freed. (Page 5)

29, 10 2

The DSE unit at Ciego de Avila has captured one insurgent and reports the surrender of another; a resident of Jucaro 10 has been arrested for cashing an out-of-circulation 50-dollar bill. (Page 5)

Thirty-two people attempting to flee Cuba were captured by Cuban security forces on 8 December; this may be related to an earlier report which stated that an undetermined number of residents of Las Villas Province fled the country from an unknown point of embarkation. (Page 6)

Several minor incidents of sabotage have been discovered on CUBANA aircraft. (Page 6)

A DRE leader in Mexico City announced that 126 Cuban militiamen were killed in a clash with guerrillas near Sancti Spiritus, Las Villas Province. (Page 6)

CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:

11 10

Spain has approved regularly scheduled Havana-Madrid flights by CUBANA airlines, according to an intercepted message. (Page 7)

SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:

The Argentine Government and the owners of the SS ANAMAR are determined that it will not take a cargo of Soviet-purchased coffee to Cuba. (Page 7)

13-00000

29

OAS DEVELOPMENTS: 08

The Brazilian OAS delegate informed his government on 5 December that several OAS delegates have been impressed by the Cuban claim that the weapons found in Venezuela last month had actually been planted there by the US. Apparently unaware that elaborate efforts had been made to erase all indications of the Cuban origin of the weapons, they wonder why Cuba would permit evidence of its involvement in sending arms to Latin American guerrillas to be traceable to Cuba. (Page 7)

08

The Venezuelan OAS ambassador dispatched an urgent message to his foreign minister on 6 December expressing misgivings as to the attitudes of members of the special OAS committee appointed to investigate Venezuela's charges against the Castro regime. (Page 8)

08 11

In relation to the investigation of the Venezuelan arms cache, the Brazilian delegate to the OAS has been instructed not to show "sympathy or excessive understanding in relation to Cuba." (Page 9)

SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS:

A clandestine source has reported, possibly as a current rumor, that Fidel Castro visited Moscow around 15 November; there is no current evidence that he made any public appearances in Cuba around that date. (Page 9)

BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

Five Polish merchantmen have been assigned to Cuban run. (Page 10)

The Soviet-made AN-12 transport has landed in Cuba. (Page 10)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

The Moroccan foreign minister has received a Cuban "good-will" mission for the second time; local expectation is that formal relations will be re-established shortly. (Page 11)

10

The President of Dahomey declined an invitation to attend the 1 January anniversary celebration in Cuba. (Page 11)

10/12

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

08 11

The Chilean ambassador in Venezuela is convinced of the accuracy of Venezuelan charges of Cuban subversion. (Page 11)

11

There is an additional report on the use of a Cuban transport plane to supply pro-Castro groups in Venezuela with weapons. (Page 12)

Cuban Chargé Lasalle in Bolivia is reportedly supplying weapons to the leftist section of the governing party, as the serious political crisis there becomes more intense. (Page 12)

A clandestine source has reported that two Cubans are with a group of Peruvian leftists currently hiding in Bolivia, and that Castro has agreed to provide money and guerrilla training for a rival group. (Page 12)

3/PN

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

Three independent clandestine sources have reported the unloading of military equipment from a Soviet cargo vessel, probably the METALLURG BAIKOV, on 19 or 20 November. This vessel was suspected of carrying a military cargo long before its arrival in Cuba. (See Daily Summary of 12 November.) It carried what was probably the eighth full military cargo to arrive in Cuba since the 1962 missile crisis. One source, a retired civil engineer whose reporting has been factual and in most instances based on personal observation, reported that the METALLURG BAIKOV unloaded "large quantities of arms and military equipment" in Havana on 20 November and left the next day. Another source reported that Havana longshoremen had stated that a Soviet ship, which they did not identify, had unloaded arms at Regla Wharf, Havana, on 20 November. A third source, an educated Cuban of Western European extraction who is a resident of Havana, reported that tanks were among the equipment unloaded from a Soviet vessel that arrived in Havana on 19 November. The three sources are probably referring to the same shipment. If the report on the delivery of tanks is true, this would be the second consecutive reported shipment of armored vehicles to Cuba. The ORENBURG reportedly delivered some 45 tanks on 23 or 24 October. (See Daily Summaries of 28 and 29 October.) It has previously been reported that another probable military shipment, the ninth, is now en route aboard the SLUTSK. (See Daily Summary of 3 December.) (CIA TDCS-DB-3/658,289, 6 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

The Soviet "coastal defense rockets" now belong to the Cuban Army artillery forces, according to a recent speech by Raul Castro. Cubans probably have been training in cruise missile operations since last spring, and the rotation and withdrawal of some Soviet naval personnel in September suggested that the cruise missile system was turned over to the Cubans at that time. 24 A Soviet communications net which probably serves the cruise missile system remains active, however, indicating that some degree of Soviet involvement continues. (CIA FBIS, 14 November, UNCLASSIFIED and NSA 2/-/CURUN/R16-63, 28 August, 1963, SECRET KIMBO)

99

2/PN

FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH:

Fidel Castro's speech of the night of 6-7 December was on the occasion of the graduation of women teachers for the literacy campaign. He devoted most of the 99 minutes to a discussion of the development of local education in Cuba. At one point, however, he made a moderately long digression to discuss Venezuela and the situation raised by Venezuela's discovery last month of a large cache of weapons, some of which have been traced to Cuba.

Castro stated that, while "the imperialists and their lackeys" charge that Cuba is promoting subversion in Venezuela, rebellion and subversion cannot be promoted from without. The Venezuelan revolution, he maintained, stems from the Venezuelan people's own disgust with their government and with its permitting the "imperialists" to plunder Venezuela's wealth and resources. If subversion could, in fact, be promoted from the outside, why, he asked, have all the resources of imperialism failed to subvert the Cuban Government?

Betáncourt, "that miserable lackey," is trying to incite the United States to take military action against Cuba, Castro charged. As a pretext the Venezuelans say they have discovered arms from Cuba on the Venezuelan coast, Castro stated. "Some of the arms," he said, "are said to have borne an effaced Cuban seal, and other arms are said to be bazookas, recoilless cannon, mortars. But Cuban mortars perchance? No! Yankee mortars! Yankee bazookas! Yankee recoilless cannon! Arms which we did not manufacture; arms which we did not buy!" Castro then went on, without specifically denying that the weapons had come from Cuba, by implying that the CIA had obtained Cuban arms from Cuban deserters and that it would not be difficult to plant these weapons in Venezuela. (Here he is obviously referring to the Belgian-made light rifles and submachineguns which have been identified as among those shipped to Cuba in 1959 and 1960.) With respect to the US-made mortars, bazookas, and recoilless rifles, Castro challenged the OAS investigating committee to "investigate thoroughly," make laboratory tests, trace the serial numbers, and then "they will be able to reach only one conclusion: that they belong to the CIA."

Castro then attempted to show the "brazenness" and inconsistency of those who would use the Venezuelan arms cache as a pretext to invade or to blockade Cuba when for more than four years the very same kind of subversive activity as is now being charged to Cuba has been perpetrated against Cuba--without any hemispheric attempt to punish the aggressors.

FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH - cont'd

"Things have changed quite a bit," Castro declared, "to attack or to blockade Cuba now would not be easy; we can defend ourselves; we are calm; we know what we have to defend ourselves with." Then, in an implied reference to the Soviet shipment of strategic missiles to Cuba last year, Castro declared: "When we hear some of these lackeys of imperialism talking so calmly about invading Cuba, when it has been only one year since the October crisis, they are once more proving us right and are once more justifying Cuba's taking defensive measures; this talk led to the October crisis." Castro then declared that "these men are so deceived by their own propaganda that...they cannot conceive of what any invader would meet here." A war against Cuba, he said, "would not end while there was a single mercenary soldier treading on our soil."

Castro then returned briefly to his views as to how peace can be assured in the Caribbean. "Whatever they want to discuss with Cuba," he said, "let them come and discuss honestly with Cuba; because we have stated the indispensable prerequisites for a peaceful atmosphere...in the Caribbean." Thus far, however, "they have answered with aggressions on top of aggressions." This course, he said, "is doomed to failure." (CIA FBIS Havana, 7 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:

A shake-up in the Cuban cabinet has moved Faure Chomon Mediavilla to the post of transportation minister; he succeeds Capt. Omar Fernandez, whose ministry was recently under attack by Castro for alleged inefficiencies and "vices." Major Jesus Montane Oropesa is replacing Chomon as communications minister.

Chomon, who served as Castro's first ambassador to the Soviet Union, took over as communications minister in March 1962. He is currently a member of the National Directorate of PURS. Fernandez, his predecessor, is reportedly moving to an unspecified position in the Ministry of Industries under Che Guevara.

Montane took part in the attack on the Moncada Barracks in 1953 and followed Castro to exile in Mexico. He took part in the GRANMA expedition of 1956 when he was captured and imprisoned. After the revolution, he reportedly received only a minor post in the government because he had talked too much in prison. His most recent post, dating from at least August 1962, has been as number two man in the Tourism Institute (INIT). He is said to be an ardent Marxist-Leninist, who preaches it at every opportunity. (UPI 63, 6 December, UNCLASSIFIED; background information: SECRET)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION - cont'd

10 Intercepted 08 Cuban military messages of 7 December indicate that 10 serious rain damage has occurred 24 in both Pinar del Rio 10 and Oriente provinces. Five unidentified military units in 10 Pinar del Rio reported the extent of damage to their defensive fortifications and facilities 24 in messages to the operations officer, apparently at fourth army headquarters in Pinar del 10 Rio. More than half the 24 trenches had been destroyed, the shelters and command posts at most of the units reporting had suffered serious damage, and division headquarters 24 reported that, while its facilities were still in good condition, the roads leading to it will have to be repaired. Meanwhile, in 24 10 Oriente Province 24 intercepts indicate that torrential rainfall had caused the rivers to flood making 10 travel difficult and had forced the closing of the Baracoa airport. (USN-856, 2/SL/CUM/R302-63, 8 December, SECRET KIMBO) 99 99

THE PRESIDENT'S ASSASSINATION:

The Reuters correspondent in Madrid has advised the US Embassy that he has been queried by a New York client about an 8 December El Tiempo report that Spanish police have detained a Cuban national--45-year-old Enrique Pascual Ruedolo Gongora, alleged to have arrived in Spain via an IBERIA flight from New York on 23 November--in connection with a plot against the late President Kennedy. Local police have confirmed detention of Ruedolo. However, they claim that he arrived in Spain on 29 November and to the best of their knowledge has absolutely no connection with the assassination. They maintain that he was expelled from the United States for undetermined reasons and is being held because he has been unable to arrange onward travel to Cuba. CAS is pursuing the matter in Madrid. (Am Emb Madrid, 1155, 7 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

A fire on 6 December on a farm near Cardenas, Matanzas 10 Province, destroyed 10 approximately one acre of henequen. 24 The chief of the 29 Matanzas Bureau of Public Order (BOP) informed 10 Havana in an 8 December intercepted message that the fire, "supposed to be sabotage," was put out by the Cardenas fire department. (USM 603) 2/YJ/CUP/R146-63, 8 December, SECRET KIMBO) 99 99 10

22|DJ

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST - cont'd

29

10 On 6 December the Department of State Security (DSE) unit in Moron informed provincial headquarters in Camaguey that on 5 December "they tried to shoot 24 down the chief of the PURS in 10 Velasco. .he escaped unharmed. Full details will be sent by 29 letter." The message did not indicate to whom "they" referred. (USM 603, 2/YJ/CUP/T922-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO) 99 99

The militiaman who was arrested in Guantanamo on 3 December for suspected counterrevolutionary activities (see 24 Daily Summary, 10 6 December) has been 24 freed. Sector E headquarters in Mayari Arriba informed First Army headquarters in San- 10 tiago on 5 December that Esteban Mendez Almaguer and Jose Joiret Aria, both identified as natives of Quijada, were released by the DSE. The reason for their release was not given. (USN 835, 2/LR1/CUM/R197-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO) 99 99 29, 10

The DSE unit at Ciego de Avila has captured one insurgent and reports the surrender of another. 10 On 6 December the 24 DSE provincial headquarters in Camaguey was informed that the insurgent Demetrio Armas Izquierdo was captured near Jatibonico. The message stated that Armas "was reportedly active in the Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara areas, and most recently in Camaguey. He belonged to an insurgent band led by one Carlo." The same message reported the surrender of Edmundo Almeida (see Daily Summary, 5 December), "previously associated with the bands of Juan Alberto," to the DSE unit at Jatibonico.

10

In addition, on 7 December Ciego de Avila reported the arrest of Jesus Marquez, a 39-year-old resident of Jucaro. Marquez is said to have cashed an "out-of-circulation 50-dollar bill, which he received from the US on 4 December 1963." 99 (USM 603, 2/YJ/CUP/R138-63, 6 December and 2/YJ/CUP/R140-63, 7 December, SECRET KIMBO) 99 99 am

An undetermined number of residents of Vegas de Palmas, San Antonio de las Veultas and Agiada de Moya, Las Villas Province, recently fled the country from an unknown point of embarkation. 24 Central Army headquarters in Santa Clara informed 10 Havana that the persons from Vegas de Palmas had been identified as: Lucina Manso, Rodobaldo Monteagua, and Moises Monson Garit, an ex-private in the revolutionary armed forces. Also mentioned as escapees were Feliz Perez, Inoes Lima. (USN 856, 2/SL/CUM/R301-63, 8 December, SECRET KIMBO) 99 99

24/PJ

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST - cont'd

In possible connection with the preceding item, 32 people attempting to flee Cuba were captured by Cuban 24 security forces on 8 December. (Fifth Army Headquarters) in 10 (Camaguey) informed (Havana) that a maritime patrol of the coastal vigilance observa10tion post captured a boat carrying 32 individuals in the area of Cayo Mariquibay, north of La Bahia de Punta Alegre. On the boat, which had left Caibarien three days earlier, government agents found Cuban and US monies as well as personal belongings. (USN 56, 2/SL/(CUM)-R303-63, 9 December, SECRET KIMBO) 49

A trained clandestine source who is a civil aviation expert with the Cuban Ministry of Transportation reports that several minor incidents of sabotage have been discovered on CUBANA aircraft. On 15 November a CUBANA IL-14 made a round-trip flight from Rancho Boyeros Airport to Nueva Gerona without a storage battery. The source comments that serious trouble would have resulted if one engine had stopped or had been feathered while en route. This incident may be related to various acts of subtle sabotage against CUBANA aircraft, such as stuffing exhaust tubes with rags or obstructing carburetor intakes.

In addition, the source reports that a CUBANA Britannia aircraft was sabotaged by Algerian personnel during a recent flight to Algiers. The hydraulic line was fractured forcing the crew to use manual controls to lower the landing gear for a stop in Madrid. (CIA IN 75941, 8 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

Press dispatches from Mexico City report that a leader of the Revolutionary Students Directorate (DRE) announced that 126 Cuban militiamen had been killed in a clash with guerrillas 12 miles south of Sancti Spiritus, Las Villas Province. Angel Gonzales said that "belated underground reports just received" indicated that the clash took place in mid-September when a guerrilla force ambushed a militia unit and killed 11 militiamen. The guerrilla forces lost 18 men, including Negro guerrilla leader Andre Startabull and three captains identified as Carlos Roca, Julio Garcia, and Sergio Perez. The Castro regime then sent 5,000 men supported by tanks, mortars, and helicopters to destroy the guerrillas. After two weeks of fighting, the entire guerrilla unit was destroyed but not until 115 other militiamen had been killed. There is no confirmation from COMINT or other sources of any action of the magnitude reported by the DRE. (AP-131, Mexico City, 7 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

4/PJ

CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:

Spain has approved regularly scheduled Havana-Madrid flights by CUBANA airlines, according to an intercepted message of 7 December. It was previously reported that the Spanish Government was unwilling to reduce these flights because it believes the connections are vital to Spain; however, the Foreign Ministry 29 said it would limit CUBANA flights to Havana-Madrid-Havana without stops in Algiers or Prague, and would refuse landing to Soviet-built CUBANA aircraft. (See Daily Summary of 18 November.) It has also been reported that CUBANA is assured of capacity passenger loads for the Havana-Madrid service and plans to pool 24 air freight from all of Western Europe for delivery to Havana via Madrid, thus assuring full payloads both ways. (See Daily Summary of 4 December.) (NSA 2X/O/QOD/T211-63, 8 December, SECRET SABRE; Background information: 99 NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:

Argentina is reportedly attempting to stop one of its ships--the SS ANAMAR--from delivering a cargo of coffee to Cuba, despite the fact that there are currntly no legal restrictions against Argentine ships calling anywhere in the world. The ANAMAR left Brazil on 1 November with a cargo of Brazilian coffee, purchased by the USSR and destined for Cuba. (See Daily Summary of 8 November.) The Argentine Foreign Ministry informed US Embassy officials that it was determined to prevent the ANAMAR from going to Cuba because of potential unfavorable press reaction. Argentina wants to avoid legal and financial entanglements in the matter; however, it is determined to stop the ship and is reportedly even considering some type of provocation which would force the ship to put into Puerto Rico. The owners of the ANAMAR are equally adamant that the ship will not go to Cuba; reportedly they had agreed to ship coffee from Brazil to some Central American country to pay some back bills, and were only informed later that the shipment would go to Cuba. According to the owners, the ship is now lying off the coast of Brazil awaiting resolution of the problem. The owners reportedly stated they will sink the ship rather than go to Cuba. (Am Emb Buenos Aires 1017, 4 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

29 OAS DEVELOPMENTS:

08.06

24

Brazilian OAS delegate Penna Marinho reported to his government from Washington on 5 December that several OAS delegates have been impressed by the Cuban claim that the weapons found in Venezuela last month had actually been planted there by the United States.

(61pJ

29

OAS DEVELOPMENTS - cont'd

24, 06

These delegates, Penna Marinho stated, "are wondering whether the Cuban Government would be so stupid as to send to Venezuela arms with the inscription 'Cuban Army' and the insignia of Cuba engraved on them" as indicated by the Venezuelan photographs shown at the OAS. 29 These delegates 24 believe, 06 Penna Marinho went on, that if Cuba had actually sent the arms to Venezuela it would first have removed any indication of their origin. This account indicates that the Brazilian delegate 06 and the others of whom he speaks are apparently unaware that considerable effort had, in fact, been made to erase all evidence of the Cuban origin of these arms. The 31 submachine guns found in the cache had their serial numbers and other identifying marks recently ground off. Venezuelan technicians, using a highly technical process, were able to raise the serial numbers and the Cuban shield on some of the weapons. In independent tests, US technicians were able to raise the numbers and shields on three of these weapons. The numbers correspond to those of weapons known to have been delivered to Cuba from Belgium in 1959 and 1960. Similarly, in the case of the 81 light automatic rifles of Belgian manufacture found in the cache, all identifying marks had been obliterated. In this case, one-fourth inch of molten brazing alloy had been used to cover the places where the numbers had been ground off and it was not possible to restore the numbers. However, Venezuelan military authorities have noted that these weapons are unique to those manufactured expressly for the Cuban Government by Belgium's Fabrique Nationale in 1959, when Cuba ordered 22,500 such weapons. (NSA 3/O/BLD/T2041-63, 6 December, TOP SECRET DINAR; background data: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

08

The Venezuelan OAS delegate dispatched a "personal, urgent, and confidential" message to his foreign minister 08 on 6 December expressing certain misgivings as to the attitudes of members of the special OAS 29 fact-finding committee with respect to the Venezuelan charges against the Castro regime which the committee was named to investigate. The 08 ambassador reported that he had just received "strictly confidential information" that the prevailing opinion within the committee is that it must investigate the entire subject of Cuban subversive activities in Venezuela, not limiting itself to the evidence on the Cuban origin of the arms cache found in Venezuela last month.

29

OAS DEVELOPMENTS - cont'd

08

The committee members, the ambassador stated, insist that it is essential for the Venezuelan Government to "present proof of the general Cuban conspiracy" against the Venezuelan Government 08 if the case against Cuba is to be proven. The Venezuelan ambassador added that "one of the most important members of the committee" had stated that the Venezuelan evidence on the Cuban origin of the arms cache is not airtight and "that the arms could actually have been resold by Cuba to someone else some years ago or stolen from Cuban arsenals.

The Venezuelan 08 OAS ambassador then stated that the editor of a "very important US magazine" had asked him in all seriousness on 6 December whether the arms could not have been planted in Venezuela by the CIA, as Castro has charged. The editor added that this question had been asked of him by "important persons" with whom he had discussed the problem. The Venezuelan ambassador 08 used this "to emphasize to his foreign minister 08 that he believes the Venezuelan Government must not dismiss this suspicion lightly. He pointed out that important persons in the United States," both in government and the press, have pointed out Venezuela's evidence on the arms cache may provide "the first opportunity" to confront the threat of Cuban subversion in the hemisphere. These 08 individuals may be critical of the Venezuelan Government, the ambassador warned, if its sticks to its demand that the investigation be limited to the arms cache evidence. (NSA 3/0/VED/T514-63, 7 December, TOP SECRET DINAR) 99

The Brazilian delegate 08 to the OAS 29 was informed of his country's position on the investigation of the Venezuelan arms cache, according to a 2 December intercepted message. The Foreign Ministry 29 informed him that "he was to "avoid any attitude which might seem to leave Brazil isolated in a position which could be interpreted as one of sympathy or excessive understanding in relation to Cuba." On the other hand, he was instructed not to "openly state the opinion that the matter falls exclusively under the competence of the Venezuelan security authorities." The 08 delegate was advised to delay his departure "until the situation is clarified." (NSA 3/0/BLD/T206-63, 6 December, TOP SECRET DINAR) 99

SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS:

Fidel Castro may have been in Moscow about 15 November for talks with Premier Khrushchev, according to a civil aviation expert who is apparently passing on a rumor he heard in Cuba. The source reported as background that Castro has not appeared on Cuban TV and did not meet people he apparently would have met if he had been in Cuba.

17/N

SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS - cont'd

There have been no reported Castro appearances around 15 November. On 7 November he talked with a group of students at Havana University and on 19 November he reportedly visited a PURS meeting in Matanzas. However, between these two dates there is no current evidence that he appeared on Cuban radio or TV, and Hoy carried no reports of his personal appearances in Cuba. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that he was indeed in Cuba in mid-November. (CIA IN 75946, 8 December, SECRET)

BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

Warsaw has assigned five merchantmen with a capacity of 44,000 tons to the Cuban - Central American trade, according to an announcement by Havana television. The ships, one of which is refrigerated, will be operated by CUBALCO--the Rostock-headquartered joint company chartered by Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Cuba to carry goods between Cuba and the northern satellites. In the words of Havana television, "the enterprise will be responsible for guaranteeing supplies to the first socialist country of America, thereby contributing to the defeat of the US economic blockade against Cuba." (CIA/FBIS, 7 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

24 24

Soviet air defense and Cuban civil air voice communications on 7 December reflected the arrival in Cuba of a Soviet-made AN-12. (See Daily Summary, 6 December). The following day, Prensa Latina announced that "the Cuban air force" had acquired a four-engine, turboprop craft with a 14,000-ton freight capacity for use in a service between Moscow and Havana. Prensa Latina said that the plane would be used to carry freight between the two capitals and "three or four stops at cities not yet announced by the Cuban consolidated aviation enterprise."

The references to the AN-12 being acquired by the "Cuban Air Force," followed by statements attributed to CUBANA officials as to its future employment, raise confusion as to whether it is to be used primarily for military or civil air purposes. As pointed out previously, however (see Daily Summary of 3 December), the AN-12 can be used interchangeably in both types of service. Its employment in bringing military cargoes to Cuba from the Soviet Union would be hampered, however, by range factors which would require it to refuel at two or more nonbloc airports between Cuba and the USSR. At these airports the aircraft could be subject to cargo inspections. (USA-71, 2/DG/CURUA/R-853-63, 7 December, SECRET KIMBO; CIA/FBIS, Havana, 8 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

99

3/R

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

The Moroccan foreign minister has received a three-man Cuban "good-will" mission for the second time and the Istiqlal's Nation claims that a resumption of formal diplomatic relations is imminent, according to the US Embassy in Rabat (see Daily Summary for 29 November and 6 December). According to a semi-official account of the meeting, which took place on 4 December, the Cubans reasserted their desire to normalize relations and professed a lack of hostile intentions against the Moroccan Government--which severed formal relations after Cuban "technicians" arrived in Algeria on 22 October. "Informed sources" in Rabat claim that the government is considering the Cuban demarché with "attention." The Nation explains that the Cubans now recognize that Morocco has not been the aggressor in the Algerian conflict and that they are "repentant" over their precipitous action in aiding Ben Bella. (Am Emb Rabat, 866, 6 December, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10

The President of Dahomey declined an invitation to attend the 1 January anniversary celebration in Cuba, according to an intercepted radiotelephone 24 conversation of 3 December. The
08 Dahomean ambassador in Paris received the invitation from his Cuban counterpart; however 10 the president declined because he said it was "hardly possible" for him to be in Cuba in January. It is not clear if Dahomey will designate an official representative to the celebration. 10 (GCHQ, K34/A/6/12/1963, 6 December, SECRET SABRE) 99

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY:

08 11

The Chilean ambassador in Venezuela informed his government, in an intercepted 2 December message, that he is convinced of the accuracy of the Venezuelan Government's charges of Cuban subversion in Venezuela. He pointed out that the heavy voting in Venezuela's 1 December national election demonstrates that the legal opposition in Venezuela is not implicated in the violence and terrorism. He also stated that the Castro regime is so thoroughly repudiated by Venezuelan public opinion that the Venezuelan Government has no need to use artificial means to stimulate anti-Castro feeling there. The
08 Chilean ambassador pointed out that many Venezuelan Communists are in Cuba and from there "they permanently incite rebellion" in Venezuela and Cuban propaganda supports their efforts. (NSA 3/O/Z-CLD/T104-63, 7 December, TOP SECRET DINAR NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 99

10/PJ

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY - cont'd

There is additional information on Cuban use of a DC-4 aircraft allegedly to supply Venezuelan guerrillas with weapons through British Guiana. A clandestine source who is a civil aviation expert and affiliated with the Cuban Ministry of Transportation reports hearing rumors to the effect that the recently refurbished CUBANA DC-4 with CUBANA registry number CUT-785 has been issued a "Guiana license," presumably a license for operation in British Guiana, and has been operated by military personnel. He adds that "it is said that clandestine flights have been made to Venezuela." The same source had previously reported the refurbishing of this plane and some others and indicated that extra fuel tanks had been installed on them. (CIA DD/P IN 75942, 8 December, SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

The Cubans are reportedly involved in the serious political crisis now under way in Bolivia, where a split between President Paz' section of the governing party and the leftist sector led by Vice President Lechin threatens serious civil disorder. Cuban Chargé Lasalle has given two boxes of arms to leaders of the left section of the party for use in the Catavi-Siglo mining area, according to information received by a clandestine source. The source, a medium-level member of the left section of the governing party who has excellent contact with national leaders of that section and who is apparently trusted by Lasalle, was given this information by a Bolivian labor leader who added that he had personally received the arms from Lasalle. The source reports that the arms are of German origin and had been stored in Lasalle's house in La Paz. (CIA DD/P La Paz, IN 76093, 8 December, SECRET)

Two unnamed Cubans are reportedly with a group of 18 members of the Peruvian Army of National Liberation (ELN) who are currently hiding in Bolivia, according to a usually reliable medium-level member of the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) who is in regular contact with MIR leaders. The members of the ELN may have been returning from training in Cuba, since several such groups from that movement have gone there in the past. According to Gonzalo Fernandez Gasco, leader of the MIR, his group will help them return to Peru by providing them with the necessary documentation. In return, the weapons owned by the ELN--automatic weapons and "San Cristobal" carbines--will be turned over to the MIR, reportedly in accordance with an order from Fidel Castro. Once the ELN youths are back in Peru, the MIR will look after them and try to convert them to the cause. The object is to eliminate the ELN as a rival force.

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY - cont'd

Possibly related to this reported plan to upgrade the MIR is a report from the same source that Fernandez said on 6 December that Castro recently sent money to the MIR leaders and offered to train more of its members in Cuba. Fernandez said that in the future, groups of MIR members will go alternatively to North Korea and to Cuba for guerrilla warfare training. (CIA Lima TDCS-3/566,-662, 6 December, and TDCS-3/566,947, 8 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

CONTROL NO. ____________

COPY ________ OF ________

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

20

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL . . .-	This Information has been Authorized for Release to . . .

13-00000

TOP SECRET CH, DM, for JM

NOFORN

COPY NO. 107

SC NO. 00555/63

6 December 1963

DAILY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

NOFORN

TOP SECRET

DAILY SUMMARY

6 December 1963

This summary of significant information has not been coordinated outside the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received, nor does time permit the complete evaluation of all reports which are included.

C O N T E N T S

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

An intercepted Cuban military message of 5 December indicated that the Cuban armed forces are giving courses in chemical warfare defense. (Page 1)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

Moscow press reports the OAS meeting on Cuban arms shipments. (Page 1)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:

Apparitions of Santa Barbara have been reported from Oriente Province. (Page 1)

08

The Portuguese ambassador in Havana reports his impressions of the reactions to President Kennedy's assassination. (Page 2)

10

Two government soldiers were killed in southern Oriente Province when a dice game, involving military and civilian personnel, was uncovered and fired upon by troops from Unit 24 1948. (Page 3)

Dolores Ibarruri, secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party, arrived in Havana from Moscow on 5 December, according to press reports. (Page 3)

CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, minister of INRA, has expressed serious dissatisfaction with Cuba's current agricultural situation and revealed that he disagrees with Castro's emphasis on "ultimate aims" in place of current "tactics." Rodriguez also informed the British ambassador that he had

3/N

CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - cont'd

opposed the Second Agrarian Reform Law and is willing to use "doctrinally unwelcome" measures to increase production. (Page 3)

Cuba is taking further steps to improve its fishing industry, including several construction projects in the Chuyima shipyards in the Almendares River, the launching of 18 fishing boats, and the sending of an (official mission) to (Spain) in connection with the fishing industry. 24 (Page 4) 11

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

Counterrevolutionary elements apparently attacked an observation post on (Cayo de Cristo) on a recent undetermined date. (Page 4) 10

A suspected counterrevolutionary was arrested on 3 December in (Guantanamo.) (Page 5) 10

CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE:

The Cuban ambassador to the USSR is in Havana for a short "vacation." (Page 5)

CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:

The Soviet-made AN-12 transport plane being ferried to Cuba reached Recife, Brazil, on 5 December, and left there for its last stop before it is scheduled to arrive in Cuba on 7 December. (Page 5)

SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:

The US Embassy in Beirut believes that Lebanon may act to curtail the use of its ships in the Cuban trade. This would result in a significant decline in Cuban shipping in free world bottoms. (Page 5)

CUBAN - CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS:

Wang Yu-ping has been named the new Chinese Communist ambassador to Cuba. He is a senior diplomat, but not as high ranking an individual as the recently appointed Chinese Communist ambassadors to Algeria and the UAR. (Page 5)

BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

A Bulgarian arms negotiator has returned from Havana to Sofia. (Page 6)

4/R

BLOC RELATIONS:

A four-man Soviet delegation to revise social science curriculum at Havana University has arrived in Havana. (Page 6)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:

The US consul in Antwerp has been informed by the Varmi Company of Brussels that it will not sell construction equipment to Cuba; there have been reports that such a sale, perhaps totaling $1 million, was being negotiated. Meanwhile, a Cuban group, which had probably planned to complete negotiations on the sale, was delayed because of lack of visas. (Page 6)

The US Embassy in Tokyo sees little hope of inducing the Japanese Government to interfere with the implementation of a contract under which Japanese private firms have reportedly agreed to purchase 325,000 tons of Cuban sugar. (Page 7)

The director of a Spanish optical firm has gone to Havana to negotiate the sale of movie projectors; he is being sponsored by CILASA. (Page 7)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

A Cuban good-will mission was received by the Moroccan acting foreign minister; the US Embassy believes this may presage the official re-establishment of diplomatic relations. (Page 7)

The Swiss ambassador believes that Frank Emmick's trial will be held shortly after the completion of the current OAS investigation of Venezuelan charges against Cuba; Emmick's preliminary hearing has been completed and the ambassador is trying to find a Cuban lawyer to defend him. (Page 8)

The government of Trinidad gave a "chilly reception" to a visiting Cuban official and turned down a suggestion for trade talks, at least for the present. (Page 8)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

24 10

The (Chilean Embassy) in (Havana) has received information from sources in Cuba it considers reliable which supports

2/R

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

Venezuelan charges that Cuba has been shipping arms to South America. (Page 8)

Havana Radio announced yesterday that pro-Castro guerrillas in the Dominican Republic have established "six operational zones"; Cuban exiles in Miami feel that the failure of pro-Castro terrorists in Venezuela may force him to turn to terrorism in the Dominican Republic. (Page 9)

Cuba is reportedly making preparations to recognize a Venezuelan government-in-exile, according to information received by an official (West German) service from a fairly reliable source with contacts in Havana. (Page 9)

The OAS Investigating Committee which is looking into the Cuban arms cache discovered in Venezuela does not intend to limit its investigation to the cache, but has expressed interest in looking into other evidence of Cuban activities directed against Venezuela. The Venezuelan Government has agreed to furnish all possible evidence on its complaint. (Page 10)

On 5 December an American woman told a minister in New York that her boy friend had left that day for an unknown destination in Central America from which he planned to fly in a pro-Castro Venezuelan coup on Saturday. (Page 10)

VN

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

An intercepted Cuban military message of 5 December indicated that the Cuban armed forces are giving instruction in defense against chemical warfare. An unidentified military unit in Las Villas Province reported the selection of two officers and four sergeants to attend a "chemical defense course." (USN-856, 2X/SL/CUM/T407-63, 6 December, SECRET SABRE)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

#4 99

Moscow has given rather standard treatment to the OAS meeting which heard the Venezuelan Government charge Castro with illegal arms shipments. On 4 December, TASS correspondent Leonid Shokin reported that "the weavers of plots against revolutionary Cuba are still at it...accusing it of delivery of arms to Venezuela for 'subversive purposes'." Shokin found "certain US circles are the most interested in this, as is evident from the fact that representatives of the US State Department declared at the meeting that the United States would 'firmly support' additional economic and diplomatic sanctions by the OAS against Cuba." He thought it unexceptional that "these provocative attempts were not supported by the largest Latin American countries" and warned that "such attempts to interfere in Cuban internal affairs are fraught with extremely harmful consequences for the cause of peace." (CIA/FBIS, Moscow, 4 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:

Several weeks ago there were CAS reports that the storm-tossed peasants of Oriente looked on Hurricane Flora as the vengeance of God--a God, who in the tradition of the Old Testament's stern and sometimes vengeful Jehovah, had loosed his fury on a people first seduced and now impressed by an alien regime. Now a report from the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay provides yet another insight into the frame of mind of the Cuban populace. While the incidents pictured in this report do not necessarily reflect anything other than a combination of religious fervor and superstition, they are significant to the extent that they reflect the unrest--and, perhaps a growing feeling of hopelessness and despair--current among the Cubans.

In any case, there are prevalent locally tales of St. Barbara's appearing several times to prophesy a change in the regime or admonish errant youths to mend their ways. /Barbara, virgin daughter of the heathen Diosorus, was beheaded by her father near Heliopolis in 235 A.D. for embracing Christianity. A fearful thunderclap is alleged to have greeted her execution. Symbolized by a windmill-like tower with three windows, the type of fortress in which her father was wont to confine her while he was absent from home, Barbara is the patroness of artillerymen and miners.

7/N

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION - cont'd

[In the Church's calendar, her feast is marked on 4 December. Apart from her significance in the Christian ritual, Barbara figures prominently in a neo-pagan cult known as the Santeria. Devotees of Santeria regard themselves as Catholics and believe that the names of the Catholic saints are translations into Spanish of the Nigerian names of African gods. Catholicism is viewed as the Spanish tribal version of Santeria. The association between Catholicism and Santeria is based on a largely superficial similarity between Catholic saints and the pantheon of African spirit gods. Saint Barbara is thought to be Shango, the God of War.]

According to one of these tales, a woman dressed in martyr's red stopped a bus outside Guantanamo City on 25 November, stepped inside and berated the Castro regime. The woman is alleged to have said that the Cuban people could not live forever in such misery and to have predicted that Castro would be taken from them sometime between 4 and 7 December. A militiaman passenger told her that she would be arrested when the bus arrived in the city. When it had, she'd disappeared. Continuing on to Caimanera, the bus stopped in the town square with the same woman sitting on one of the seats inside the vehicle. The militia again was summoned and again the woman was nowhere to be seen.

On 26 November the same woman allegedly appeared outside a school in Caimanera and admonished several children not to thrown stones at a nearby shack. The children fled into the school and the woman followed. Challenged by a teacher, the woman said she was Santa Barbara and vanished. The next day neither the teacher nor the children would return to the school, though it subsequently has been reopened. (COMNAVBASE GTMO, 01731/T1/JFK/3, 4 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

Fidel Castro was "frightened, if not terrified," by the possible consequences of President Kennedy's murder, according to the 06 Portuguese ambassador in Havana. 10 Cabling his government 24 on 27 November, the Portuguese diplomat 06 described what he called "a large movement of troops" late on the afternoon of the President's death--"they were sent to take up positions around Havana and the northern coast of the island." He found it surprising that Castro "jumped into the arena to denounce insinuations which were merely from news and nongovernmental agencies," but added that "it is the general opinion in diplomatic circles 24 that the assassination will be the spring which will unleash passions and violent and blind hysteria of the American people against Cuba and Russia and provide the excuse which up to now was lacking.... There is talk again about the coincidence of rumors concerning a crisis at the end of the year...." Finally, the ambassador noted that "the assassination did not cause a great deal of consternation in counterrevolutionary circles in the interior." 06 (NSA, 3/0/POD/T1463-63, 5 December, TOP SECRET DINAR)

99 um

71PJ

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION - cont'd

Two government soldiers were killed 24 in southern 10 Oriente Province on 3 December when members of Unit 1948 at an unidentified location within the 24 First Army area, uncovered and fired on a dice game, which apparently included personnel from their own unit. A 3 December message from military unit 1948 to South 24 Sierra Maestra Sector Headquarters stated that "when the players attempted to flee, the soldiers commenced firing without orders, causing the death of one unnamed player and the chief of organization and personnel of Unit 1948. 24 The message added that the bodies and the "civilian and military prisoners" were being sent to sector headquarters. (USN 835, 2/LR1/CUM/R196-63, 5 December, SECRET KIMBO)

99 aw4

Dolores Ibarruri, "La Pasionaria" of Spanish Civil War fame and secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party, arrived in Havana from Moscow on 5 December, according to press reports. Ibarruri, who resides in Moscow, was invited to Cuba by Castro during his visit to the Soviet Union. (The New York Times, 6 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, minister of INRA, has expressed serious dissatisfaction with Cuba's current agricultural situation and revealed that he disagrees with Castro's emphasis on "ultimate aims" in place of current "tactics." In a long talk with the British ambassador in early November, Rodriguez agreed "with surprising enthusiasm" that the two main problems facing Cuban agriculture were the lack of competent personnel to run the appropriated farms, and the lack of consumer goods which are necessary to stimulate production, especially by the remaining private farmers. Rodriguez had advised Castro that there were not sufficient agricultural experts to run the state farms which had been previously organized, and he had counseled against taking over medium-size farms (as the Second Agrarian Reform Law did) until sufficiently trained and experienced personnel were available; he commented on Soviet complaints about the low educational level of Cubans sent to the USSR for agricultural training. Rodriguez said that despite his advice, Castro had gone ahead with the Second Agrarian Reform Law for two "political" reasons: to push ahead with the progress of Cuba's Socialist economy, and to destroy the support for counterrevolutionaries which Castro believed existed among the "rural bourgeois." Rodriguez thought it ironical that US pressure on Cuba (presumably he meant aid to counterrevolutionaries) had forced Cuba to seize lands faster than it would otherwise have done. He also stated his belief that the seizure of medium-size farms would lead to a drop for several years in many branches of Cuban agriculture, particularly in market gardening and dairy farming.

6/17/

CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - cont'd

Rodriguez also agreed with the British ambassador that the second problem facing Cuban agriculture was the lack of consumer goods which were necessary to stimulate production. However, Rodriguez said that Cuba was in a vicious circle: farmers did not have incentive to produce because there were few consumer goods available, yet such goods could not be obtained until farm production had been raised. Rodriguez' main concern seemed to be the scarcity of many consumer goods; in fact, he admitted that he was willing to undertake temporary expediencies which might help raise production, even though they might be "doctrinally unwelcome." Rodriguez referred the ambassador to Lenin's New Economic Policy, and made no attempt to disguise his disagreement with Castro's insistence on "ultimate aims" instead of current "tactics." (British Embassy Havana, 13 November, CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Cuba is taking further steps to improve its fishing industry. A Havana radiobroadcast reported the completion of several construction projects in the Chuyima shipyards in the Almendares River in Havana, including a pier 307 meters in length, a concrete esplanade measuring 17,000 square meters with a capacity of 24 ships, two launching ramps, and the dredging of the Almendares River in front of the pier, pending partial completion, as well as several minor jobs. It also reported that the shipyard has launched 18 Lambda-75-class ships; 14 more are expected to be launched by January. 24 According to a 29 November intercepted message, an official mission in connection 10 with the fishing industry was expected to arrive in Madrid 10 in early December. The delegation 24 was composed of Jose Lavia and Juan de la Fe 06 Flores. (CIA FBIS 03, 6 December, 96 OFFICIAL USE ONLY; NSA 2X/O/CUD/T2523-63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)

99

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

Counterrevolutionary 10 elements apparently attacked the 10 Selva Marina observation post at Cayo de Cristo on a recent undetermined date. A partially garbled message from Central Army Headquarters 24 in Santa Clara informed Havana that personnel in the observation post, 10 located on a cay 10 off Isabela de Sagua, "repelled the aggression and caused the flight of the attackers. 10 . In a probe of the place by air, land, and sea, nothing more than some footprints were observed." Because of the garbles at the beginning of the message it is impossible to determine the time and nature of the attack. (USN 856, 2/SL/CUM/R297-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO)

99

(3/N

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST - cont'd

24

An unidentified military 10 unit informed First Army Sector E Headquarters at Mayari Arriba that a suspected counterrevolutionary had been arrested in Guantanamo. 10 The suspect, militiaman Esteban Mendez Almaquel, was arrested in the home of Genaro Moya on 3 December. Moya was identified as being implicated in the counterrevolution and as an informer. (USN 835, 2X/LR1/CUM/T675-63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)

99

CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE:

Carlos Olivares, Cuba's ambassador to the USSR, arrived by plane yesterday in Havana for what Prensa Latina described as a "short vacation." (CIA/FBIS, Havana, 5 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:

24

Intercepted civil aviation communications indicate that the Soviet-made AN-12 transport aircraft being ferried to Cuba from the Soviet Union is adhering to its schedule. It arrived at the Brazilian airport of Recife from Conakry on 5 December and left there the next day for Belem, Brazil. It is scheduled to leave Belem on 7 December for Havana. The intercepts also indicated that Jamaica has granted permission for the plane to use Kingston as a reserve landing point in the event of necessity. (USA-51, 2/J8/RUT/R894-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO)

99

SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:

The US Embassy in Beirut believes that Lebanon may act to curtail the use of its ships in the Cuban trade. This would result in a significant decline in Cuban shipping in free world bottoms because Lebanese companies provided ten of the thirty-two free world ships which called at Cuba in October. The Lebanese foreign minister planned to ask the cabinet for a provisional measure whereby he would be able to demand that all ships carrying Lebanese flag must call at Lebanon periodically and report their destinations. He believed this would cut the Cuban traffic quickly by 60 percent. Because US aid to Lebanon is almost nonexistent, the US Embassy believes that this Lebanese action would be prompted by motives of principle rather than fear of losing US aid, an action which is being discussed by the US Congress. (Am Emb Beirut 520, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

CUBAN - CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS:

A Havana Prensa Latina broadcast of 6 December announced that President Dorticos has assented to the appointment of Wang Yu-ping as Chinese Communist ambassador to Cuba. This is the first information indicating that Ambassador Shen Chien, who has served in Cuba since December 1960, is about to be replaced. The new Chinese Communist ambassador is a 53-year-old senior diplomat; since 1950 he has served three- to four-year terms as Communist ambassador in Rumania, Norway, and Cambodia. He is married and has two children.

6/N

CUBAN - CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS - cont'd

While he is, of course, a member of the Chinese Communist party, he is not a ranking party member. He appears to be a lower ranking person than newly assigned Chinese Communist ambassadors to such countries as the UAR and Algeria. The earliest biographic references to him have him as a member of the Chinese Communist Army in 1931. He subsequently became an army political commissar and rose to the rank of general. It is not unusual, however, for Chinese Communist diplomats to be generals. He speaks Russian, but there is no information that he speaks Spanish. For the last year and a half, however, he has been stationed in Peiping and he could have learned the language then. He accompanied Chinese Communist chief of state Liu Shoa-chi on the latter's visit to Cambodia last spring. (CIA FBIS Havana, 6 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY; BACKGROUND DATA: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

L.P. Kyuchukov, chief of the Engineering Directorate of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Trade, was to arrive in Prague from Havana yesterday and fly on to Sofia today. Kyuchukov, who is thought to have negotiated Bulgarian arms shipments to Cuba, was noted traveling between Havana and Santiago de Cuba on 21 and 23 November--the third time he has been in Cuba since November 1962. (DIRNSA, 2X/0/QOC/T2810-63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)

99

BLOC RELATIONS:

A 4-man Soviet delegation, headed by USSR Deputy Minister of Education Serafim Nikichev, arrived in Cuba on 5 December to spend a month "working on the curriculum of Havana University's School of Social Sciences." Nikichev was accompanied by "academicians" Aleksandr Smirnov, Vassiliy Rayike, and Maria Filipova. The group was welcomed at Jose Marti airport by the Rector and Deputy Rector of the university, Juan Mier Febles and Mariano Rodriguez Solveira, and the school's protocol specialist, Professor Pedro Canas. The delegation's trip to Cuba is the first tangible result of the Soviet-Cuban educational exchange agreement signed in Moscow two months ago. That agreement provides for the loan of Soviet academicians and educational administrators to Cuban schools, the exchange of students and instructors between the two countries, and the use of Soviet texts in Cuba. (CIA/FBIS, Havana, 5 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:

The US consul in Antwerp has been informed by the Varmi Company of Brussels that it will not sell construction equipment to Cuba; there have been reports that such a sale, perhaps totalling $1 million, was being negotiated. (See Daily Summary of 7 and 13 November.)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS - cont'd

The director of Varmi confirmed to US officials that he had been negotiating with a Spanish firm (probably CILASA) for the sale of US-origin construction equipment; after being informed that the material was destined for Cuba and having been warned of the consequences of such a sale, the director agreed on 2 December to stop negotiations. The US consul comments that it is not sure whether the knowledge of the eventual sale to Cuba or the fact of US intervention in the matter caused Varmi to stop the arrangements.

Meanwhile, a source with access to CILASA's files reported on 28 November that a Cuban comission headed by Rene Narbona of the Cuban tractor importing agency would be unable to arrive in Brussels on 30 November because of inability to obtain visas. This group had probably been scheduled to complete negotiations for the purchase of the Varmi construction equipment. (Am ConGen Antwerp 29, 3 December, CONFIDENTIAL; CIA Madrid TDCS-3/566,653, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

The US Embassy in Tokyo, in receipt of a report that private Japanese companies have contracted for 325,000 tons of Cuban sugar for delivery between July 1964 and June 1965, sees little prospect of inducing the Japanese Government to interfere with the transaction. The Japanese Government would have difficulty intervening because of the general world sugar shortage, the unavailability of sugar from other sources at comparable prices, and the political problem which rising sugar prices is causing the Ikeda administration. (Am Emb Tokyo 1688, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

The director of the Spanish firm Empresa Nacional de Optica, Vicente M. Cabanillas Gonzalez, left Madrid for Havana on a 29 November IBERIA Airlines flight. As reported earlier (see Daily Summary, 11 October), Cabanillas is negotiating through CILASA for the sale of a large quantity of movie projectors to the General Administrator of University Inspection in Havana. According to a CILASA employee with access to company files, Cabanillas' travel expenses are being paid by CILASA. Cabanillas had hoped to get a Cuban visa which would not appear in his passport, as he hoped to visit the US later. He was unable to arrange this, however, and finally had to accept the Cuban visa in his passport. (CIA, Madrid, IN 74453, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

A Cuban good-will mission was received by the Moroccan acting foreign minister on 2 December, according to information received by the US Embassy in Rabat. The mission was probably composed of Antoni Carrillo Carreras, Enrique Vian Audivert of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and Dr. Enrique Rodriguez Leoches, Cuban ambassador to Morocco. (See Daily Summary of 29 November for recent Cuban-Moroccan relations.)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS - cont'd

Despite the Moroccan announcement of its break in diplomatic relations with Cuba, the Cuban ambassador is still in Rabat and attends functions he normally attended. The chancery offices are open and the Cuban flag is flying. This situation has been a source of some embarrassment to the Moroccan Foreign Ministry. However, the US Embassy believes that the reception of the Cuban delegation by the Moroccan Government may presage the official re-establishment of diplomatic relations. An officer in the Spanish Embassy in Rabat believes this is entirely possible; he believes the Soviets are using their influence to keep the Cuban Embassy in Rabat. The US Embassy also feels that the Moroccan King may not feel he received sufficient benefit to justify continuing the break in diplomatic relations with Cuba. (Am Emb Rabat 860, 4 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

The Swiss ambassador in Cuba was informed by the deputy foreign minister that the preliminary hearing had been completed for the US citizen Frank Emmick, who reportedly will be charged with being a CIA agent. (See Daily Summary of 5 December.) The ambassador believes that Emmick's trial will be held shortly after the completion of the OAS investigation into charges by Venezuela of Cuban intervention in Venezuelan affairs. Currently, the ambassador is trying to find a Cuban lawyer to defend Emmick. He is considering the lawyer hired by the Canadian Embassy to defend the Cuban pilots Lippert and Milne, an attorney who handles Swiss Embassy affairs, or a member of the Havana University Law School faculty. (Am Emb Bern 363, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad, Tobago gave a "very chilly" reception on 4 December to a visiting Cuban official, Robert Gerardo Sanchez, commercial officer in the Cuban Consulate in Kingston. A Foreign Ministry official informed the US Embassy that Williams was annoyed that Sanchez had presumed on a scant acquaintance with him to visit Port-of-Spain, despite advice from the government of Trinidad that such a visit would be inopportune. Reportedly, the prime minister turned down Sanchez' suggestion for trade talks, on the grounds of Cuba's involvement with Venezuela and Trinidad, Tobago's delicate and difficult relations with Caracas. He did not, however, close the door on such discussions at some appropriate time in the future. The government of Trinidad expects Sanchez to leave the country soon. (Am Emb, Port of Spain 223, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES: 24 10

In a message of 3 December, the Chilean Embassy in Havana reported to its Foreign Ministry information it had received from "reliable sources" in Cuba on Cuban efforts to ship weapons to Venezuela and other Latin American countries.

2/12

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

The embassy 24 stated that "everything leads to the belief that" the arms recently discovered in 24 Venezuela had come from Cuba. According to one of the Chilean Embassy's sources, two ships had left Cuba at an unspecified date en route to British Guiana with "packages consigned as machinery consigned to an industrialist of known Communist tendencies whose property is adjacent to the Venezuelan border." Various of the Chilean 24 Embassy sources "accept the rumor" that the arms are of Belgian and British (sic) make and that the shipments have been made from various Cuban ports. The embassy 24 report also expressed the belief that Cuba not only sends arms to various points in South America, but also Cuban guerrilla leaders. (NSA 3/0/CLD/- T1129-63, 5 December, TOP SECRET DINAR) 99

Havana Radio announced yesterday that pro-Castro guerrillas have established "six operational zones" in the mountains around Santiago and Puerto Plata in the Dominican Republic. The Havana radiobroadcast credited the announcement to "the first communiqué issued by the command." Meanwhile, press dispatches from Miami report that most Cuban exiles feel that the Havana announcement is an attempt to cover up the failure of Castro terrorists to stop Venezuela's presidential elections last Sunday. Other exile sources predict that the announcement and the setback in Venezuela mean that the Castro regime will launch a concerted terrorist campaign against the military-installed provisional regime in Santo Domingo. Batista Falla, leader of the Cuban exile Christian Democratic Movement (MCD), said yesterday in Miami that the failure of terrorism in Venezuela "has put Castro in a difficult position and damages his chances in the rest of Latin America." He added that he expects Castro to "make desperate attempts to picture terrorism as successful, despite its miserable failure in Venezuela."

All reporting by the Dominican Government indicates that its forces are in effective control of the areas of guerrilla activity. About 40 insurgents of the outlawed pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) are said to have been captured, with only isolated bands yet to be apprehended. (UPI, Miami, A-11, 6 December, UNCLASSIFIED and Background Information, SECRET)

Cuba is reportedly making preparations to recognize a Venezuelan government-in-exile, according to an official West German service from a fairly reliable source with contacts in Havana. Reportedly, the Cuban Foreign Ministry is consulting the USSR and other bloc countries to induce them to recognize this government-in-exile. The Cubans, according to the source, do not expect the USSR and other countries to agree to this; nevertheless, the attempt is being made.

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

Although this is the first report on the possibility of a Cuban-sponsored Venezuelan government-in-exile, the Cuban radio and press have been emphasizing the slogan that the Betancourt government does not represent the people and that the real representatives of the people are to be found in the ranks of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). According to Cuban newspapers, Pedro Duno, a former professor of the Central University of Venezuela, arrived in Havana to join the "mission" of the FALN in Havana. (CIA Munich TDCS-3/566,731, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

The OAS Investigating Committee which is looking into the Cuban arms cache discovered in Venezuela does not intend to limit its investigation to the cache. The group has no intention to expand its study to cover domestic political aspects of the FALN or Communist Party activities; however, the members expressed interest in looking into such aspects as Cuban broadcasts inciting to violence, possible transfer of funds from Cuba, training of Venezuelans in Cuba in subversive techniques, and evidence of other clandestine arms shipments. In addition to examining the arms cache, the committee also voiced interest in hearing tapes of recent Cuban broadcasts, examining transcripts of interrogations and documents seized from captured terrorists, saboteurs, and guerrillas, talking to Venezuelan authorities responsible for combating terrorism and insurgency, and possibly interviewing some prisoners. In a meeting with the Committee, the Venezuelan foreign minister placed emphasis on verification of the Cuban origin of the arms cache, but also indicated his government would furnish all possible evidence on the Venezuelan complaint that the committee might want. (To Am Emb Caracas 485, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

An American woman told a Unitarian minister in New York on 5 December that her "boy friend," a former RAF flyer and soldier-of-fortune, has left for an unknown destination in Central America from which he will fly in a pro-Castro coup in Venezuela tomorrow. Dr. Walter Kring, minister at the All Souls Unitarian Church, told a USUN official yesterday that he had been approached by an American woman who asked him to get her story "into the proper channels." The woman stated that her friend left New York on 5 December by unknown means for an unidentified location in Central America. He told her that he would fly to Venezuela on 7 December in connection with a pro-Castro coup which she would read about in the Sunday papers.

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

Dr. Kring said that he was impressed by the woman's utter sincerity and normal behavior. He believed she was convinced of the truth of her story and of the honesty of her friend. The woman had apparently, at some earlier date, contacted the FBI in connection with her friend's participation or knowledge of a coup in Honduras. She later retracted her story because she felt it seemed "too implausible and silly." (USUN, New York 2376, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

CONTROL NO. ______________

COPY ________ OF ________

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

Handle Via ______________

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

______________ ______________ ______________ ______________

______________ ______________ ______________ ______________

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

TOP SECRET
NOFORN

COPY NO. 107
SC NO. 00546/63
25 November 1963

DAILY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

NOFORN

TOP SECRET

DAILY SUMMARY

25 November 1963

This summary of significant information has not been coordinated outside the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received, nor does time permit the complete evaluation of all reports which are included.

CONTENTS

FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH:

Castro's two-hour speech on 23 November was what he termed an "objective analysis" of the implications of President Kennedy's assassination. The speech reflected an apprehension that US policy toward Cuba may now become even tougher. He said the President's death was "serious and bad news" and sought to insinuate that "ultrareactionaries" in the US are exploiting the assassination--and may have been responsible for it--as part of their campaign for a more "aggressive" US policy against Cuba. (Page 1)

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

The Cuban defensive military alert, ordered immediately after the news of President Kennedy's death, remains in effect. (Page 2)

OTHER CUBAN REACTIONS TO THE ASSASSINATION:

The chargé of the Cuban Embassy in Chile says there is no doubt that CIA or "other Yankees" assassinated the President and that therefore a third world war will start. (Page 2)

The Cuban UN ambassador issued a statement early on 23 October expressing "profound displeasure" with which Cuba received news of the President's death. (Page 3)

08106 24

Foreign Minister Roa asked his UN mission for "all the data you have on Lyndon B. Johnson" and the reply was sent immediately. (Page 3)

OTHER CUBAN REACTIONS TO THE ASSASSINATION - cont'd

29

The Cuban Foreign Ministry instructed a number of Cuban diplomatic missions abroad on 22 November not to make "any statements." 24 (Page 3)

Che Guevara, in a 24 November speech, warned Cubans that "everything indicates that in the next months and years world peace will be threatened" as never before. (Page 3)

CUBAN SUPPORT FOR EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

The Venezuelan Government plans to hold a press conference on 26 November revealing the Cuban origin of the arms cache found in Venezuela early this month. (Page 3)

FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH:

Fidel Castro's two-hour speech on 23 November was what he termed an "objective analysis" of the implications of President Kennedy's assassination. The speech reflected an apprehension that US policy toward him may now become even tougher. He said the President's death was "serious and bad news" which could lead from "a bad situation to a worse situation." He pointed out that President Kennedy's alleged promise not to invade Cuba had been strongly attacked by those "ultrareactionaries" in the United States who, he said, are now using the assassination to create a climate of "anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban hysteria" designed to pressure the new President toward a Cuban policy "highly prejudicial to the interests of peace and of mankind."

Castro began his speech by stating that he "and the immense majority of human beings" react with "repudiation" to the assassination, which is not "a correct method of struggle." While the death of the imperialist system would make Cubans happy, "the death of a man, even if that man were our enemy, cannot make us happy...we must not confuse the systems with the men." He said,"we always cease our belligerency at death; we always bow with respect at death, even if it has to do with an enemy."

Castro declared that the assassination can only benefit "those ultrarightist and ultrareactionary sectors, among which President Kennedy could not be counted." These "most reactionary forces are now breaking loose within the United States," he declared. President Kennedy was a strong president who was able to control these pressures, but the new US president, because of the circumstances inherent in his assumption of the presidency, will not have the same strength and authority, Castro said.

Castro then read a series of US news dispatches referring to the Castro-Communist affiliations of the accused assassin. He said this was all part of the "reactionary" effort to create a climate of "anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban hysteria" in the United States. This climate of hysteria, he said, is designed to face the new President with an irresistible pressure toward a "more aggressive policy."

Castro then devoted considerable time in an attempt to throw doubt on the guilt of the accused assassin and to insinuate that Oswald, whether guilty or innocent, was actually a tool of the extreme rightists. "Is he really guilty? Is he a scapegoat? Is he a psychopath? Or is he perhaps a tool of the most reactionary US circles? Who is this man?

FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH - cont'd

Why did he go into action precisely when circumstances were least favorable for a left-wing fanatic to assassinate the US President?" Castro stated that his investigation of the "reports, statements, and publicity" on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in the United States failed to indicate that there was any chapter in Dallas or New Orleans and that "we never in our life heard of him (Oswald)." Castro then referred to US press reports on Oswald's attempt last summer to "infiltrate" the anti-Castro Student Revolutionary Directorate in the US and to DRE statements that Oswald was thought at that time to be "an agent of the FBI or the CIA." "They (the DRE leaders) must know, because they have many dealings with them, what FBI and CIA agents look like," Castro stated.

Castro then declared that, while Oswald may or may not be guilty, it is nevertheless possible that he was "an agent for the CIA or the FBI, as those people suspected" and could have been "a tool of the most reactionary sectors which may have been hatching a sinister plan, which may have plotted the assassination of Kennedy because they disagreed with his international policy." "What is behind all this? What sinister maneuver are they hatching behind all this? Who can be responsible for the assassination of President Kennedy? And who benefits from the assassination...except the worst reactionaries?" Castro warned that it is not possible at this point to answer these questions, "but we do say that it is suspect, that we must be cautious and vigilant and alert." Castro closed with the usual expressions of confidence that the Cubans will be ready to meet any new crisis with resolution. (CIA FBIS 06, 24 November, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

The Cuban defensive military alert, ordered immediately after the news of President Kennedy's death, remains in effect, but no unusual Cuban military activity has been noted. (NSA, various internal military intercepts, 22-24 November, SECRET KIMBO)

OTHER CUBAN REACTIONS TO THE ASSASSINATION:

A clandestine source reports that the chargé of the Cuban Embassy in Santiago de Chile said that there is no doubt that the CIA or "other Yankees" assassinated the President and that, as a result, a third world war will start. He also emphasized the need for Cuba to prepare for a possible US invasion. (CIA Santiago de Chile, TDCS 3/565,826, 23 November, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

OTHER CUBAN REACTIONS TO THE ASSASSINATION - cont'd

Carlos Lechuga, Cuban UN ambassador, issued a statement early on 23 November stating: "Despite the antagonisms existing between the Government of the United States and the Cuban Revolution, we have received with profound displeasure the news of the tragic death of President Kennedy. All civilized men are always saddened by happenings such as this. Our delegation before the United Nations desires to express that this is the sentiment of the people and the Government of Cuba." (UPI New York, 23 November, UNCLASSIFIED)

06\06

06 Cuban Foreign Minister Roa dispatched a message to Carlos Lechuga shortly after President Kennedy's assasassination asking Lechuga to "please send me at once all the data that you have 06 on Lyndon B. Johnson including his political connections, etc." 06 Lechuga replied immediately: "biographical data on Lyndon Johnson are in cable 24 (24) of Prensa Latina and in UPI dispatch 169 and supplements." He also referred Roa 06 to "Who is Who" which he had sent the Foreign Ministry earlier and said he will cable additional information later. 29 (NSA 3/0/CUD/T1382-63 and -T1381-63, 23 November, TOP SECRET DINAR)

99 29 24

The Cuban Foreign Ministry dispatched a circular message late on 22 November to a number of Cuban diplomatic missions 24 abroad stating only "do not make any statements." This was probably an attempt to prevent any comments on President Kennedy's assassination until the official Cuban line could be established. (NSA 3/0/CUD/T1380-63, 23 November, TOP SECRET DINAR)

99

Che Guevara, in a speech on 24 November, expressed apprehensions similar to those stated by Fidel Castro the night before. Guevara blamed President Kennedy's assassination and the killing of Oswald on reactionary forces in the United States and warned Cubans that a new, tougher policy against Cuba will be forthcoming from the United States. "Everything indicates that in the next months and years world peace will be threatened by the most unscrupulous, ferocious, and warlike monopolistic oligarchy--and with the most murderous potential --that the history of humanity has every known," Guevara said. (CIA FBIS, 25 November, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

A Venezuelan Government press conference tying the arms cache found in Venezuela earlier this month to Cuba is scheduled for Tuesday, 26 November, according to the US Embassy in Caracas. This is to be followed by a report to the OAS, probably on 2 December. (Am Emb Caracas 601, 24 November, CONFIDENTIAL)

(2/pJ

104-10302-10022 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TOP SECRET
NOFORN

Chief, Adm Staff
OCI for VM

COPY NO. 107
SC NO. 00550/63
29 November 1963

DAILY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NOFORN
TOP SECRET

DAILY SUMMARY

29 November 1963

This summary of significant information has not been coordinated outside the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received, nor does time permit the complete evaluation of all reports which are included.

CONTENTS

CASTRO'S SPEECH:

In his 27 November address, Castro first sought to exonerate his regime of complicity in the death of President Kennedy and then provided a decidedly optimistic assessment of Cuba's economic situation. (Page 1)

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

An unsuccessful combing operation was affected on the Isle of Pines for two persons who apparently escaped from the military prison there. (Page 3)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:

The Cuban Government may have instituted new controls on fishermen by eliminating night fishing along the north coast and by restricting fishermen to three and one half miles from the coast, according to two clandestine sources. (Page 3)

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

Three incidents of sabotage have been noted in recent intercepted messages--two in Matanzas Province and the third in Oriente. (Page 4)

A LCB operation against an insurgent band in Las Villas Province ended on 29 November without results. (Page 4)

Department of State Security (DSE) officials in Camaguey Province have been alerted to a possible clandestine escape attempt during the night of 28-29 November; militiamen have been instructed to mobilize at Playa Santa Lucia. (Page 4)

CUBAN EXILE AND REFUGEE ACTIVITIES:

Comandos L is considering an attack against a Soviet vessel in Cuban waters in the near future or when the seas become more quiet. (Page 4)

Cubanos Libres may be planning to hijack a ship in a raid that would be staged from Miami. (Page 5)

A small group of Cuban refugees may have attempted to infiltrate Cuba about 27 November, according to a prominentexile activist. (Page 5)

BLOC RELATIONS:

The Albanian ambassador spoke to a near-empty hall in Havana on 26 November at a celebration marking his country's national holiday; the audience was composed chiefly of Chinese embassy personnel, students, and journalists. The Cuban Government was represented by an official of the foreign cultural council. (Page 5)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

A three-man "good-will" mission is en route to Morocco to smooth Rabat's ruffled feelings over presence of Cuban troops in Algeria. (Page 6)

The director of the Cuban petroleum enterprise is scheduled to travel to Georgetown aboard the BAHIA DE TANAMO; an untested source in Georgetown reports that Cuba will supply fuel oil for the British Guiana Electricity Corporation. (Page 6)

Cuba may establish diplomatic relations with Somalia and is attempting to improve its relations with Tanganyika and Ghana, according to intercepted communications. (Page 7)

Two representatives of the Cuban National Association of Small Farmers are planning to attend a seminar in Chile. (Page 7)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:

Cuba is continuing negotiations for the purchase of large amounts of construction equipment, probably from the Varmi company of Brussels. (Page 7)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

The Venezuelan Government has announced the discovery of a large cache of weapons of Cuban origin; this provides the best evidence in recent years of major Cuban support for Latin American subversives. Havana radio immediately denied the charge. (Page 8)

CASTRO'S SPEECH:

Fidel's 27 November speech to the students at Havana University evidently had been scheduled some weeks ago, before the assassination of President Kennedy, and was intended as a fairly sweeping review of the country's economic situation, post-Hurricane Flora salvage operations and, lastly, the regime's plans for changes in the educational system. In fact, it was the third time in a week that Castro has addressed himself publicly and at length to the death of the late President and to imputations that the Castro regime was involved in any way. On 24 November Castro had displayed considerable apprehension that already strained US-Cuban relations would worsen markedly as a consequence of the assassination. We do not have an adequate text of Castro's seemingly impromptu remarks of 26 November to a group of high school students; but that speech apparently went little beyond his statement on the Sunday following Mr. Kennedy's death. The address of 27 November obviously was a carefully prepared refutation of charges of complicity between Castro's regime and Oswald.

Whatever the Cuban leader's intent, textual analysis of the speech neither proves nor disproves that he had advance knowledge of the plot. He is determined to indict unnamed "reactionaries" in the United States with conspiring to murder the President, using Oswald as their innocent dupe, and to frame Cuba in order to provoke punitive action by the US Government against the revolution. To this end, he presented a considerable body of "evidence"--much of it admittedly speculative--based on what is generally known about Oswald, the "normal" behavior pattern of paranoiacs, the weapon the killer used, the technical difficulties presented by the use of a telescopic sight, the 36-hour Dallas police interrogation of the alleged killer and, finally, Oswald's death at the hands of Jack Ruby in the basement of the Dallas police headquarters.

Castro rehearsed the details of Oswald's 27 September application at the Cuban consulate in Mexico City for a Cuban visa and protested the 23 November arrest of two employees of the consulate by Mexican authorities. (Castro's remarks were followed up on 28 November by the delivery of a formal protest by the Cuban Foreign Ministry to the Mexican Government--which rejected it.) Oswald's Dallas television interview in July, his attempts to infiltrate the pro-Castro Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and his street brawl with anti-Castro refugees in New Orleans--all were intended by those behind Oswald to mislead public opinion, according to Castro. And, finally, the decision of the Dallas police to "close" the Oswald case with the shooting of Sunday, 24 November, "demonstrates that the persons guilty of the death of Kennedy needed and urgently had to eliminate the accused at any cost...so that he would not talk...."

CASTRO'S SPEECH - cont'd

But, says the Cuban premier, the "shot has backfired." Alluding to statements made earlier in the week by physicians at Parkland Hospital, Castro claims that no one in a position to do so has said whether one or two bullets were used to kill the late President. He declared "they cannot establish which are the entry and exit wounds," implying that more than one assassin was involved and that the President was struck both from in front and behind.

In sum, while Castro obviously was well briefed and went to some length to select "evidence" proving the guilt of domestic reactionaries in the United States (conversely clearing himself of any involvement), nothing he said indicates advance knowledge of the crime or encompasses more factual data than can be presumed to have been gleaned from the press.

The balance of the 27 November speech, the part which Castro told his listeners comprised the address he originally intended to deliver, was devoted to a somewhat rambling assessment of Cuba's economic health. It can be summed up for the most part with the quote: "Things are progressing in our country and they are going well, despite the obstacles, despite the hurricane...." As he has done before, Castro blamed the sloth and ineptitude of the Cuban bourgeousie for the "mismanagement, lack of concern for expenditures, by lack of concern not only for the quantity but also the quality of what we produced" immediately after the fall of Batista. He reviewed the "tremendous ideological battle...it was a battle between ideas and theories..." within the regime during its first two years in power, said that the government officials had become too "argumentative," and admitted that for a time the regime had been incapable of compensating for the loss of trade with the non-Communist world. Today, he boasted, Cuba "can trade with any country in the world; we can offer an advantageous exchange because we no longer have to sell sugar to Japan, England, Spain, France and most of the countries with which we traded, take their dollars and use them to pay the Yankee imperialists." Instead, Cuba can plow back into its internal development revenue derived from foreign trade, and develop to the maximum the use of those natural resources which are in demand.

Attempts to bar Cuba from the world sugar trade, he said, have resulted only in increasing the price of sugar so that the Cubans --though exporting less--are able to realize proportionately greater profits from what they do sell and more than break even. "We have been able to get wonderful prices, and we have sold sugar for 1965 for approximately 10 cents. We have made sales for 1966 at approximately 10 cents." Though the Cuban sugar growers will be affected in some measure for several years by the attempts of nonbloc states to juggle sugar prices, "we shall be in a position /1970 or-71/ to resist any price decrease in the sugar produced in the cpaitalist world." By then, "we shall be in a position to surpass the 10-million-ton figure in sugar production...."

CASTRO'S SPEECH - cont'd

Returning to the post-hurricane economic dislocation, Castro promised that by 15 December of this year full food rations would be restored and in many cases allotments increased. He called for greatly increased mechanization of agriculture and the use of the latest methods of cultivation, appealed for more food production and the recovery of arable land lost through neglect and erosion. He demanded an end to public "vice," such as official bribe-taking, theft, pilferage, etc. In the field of social welfare, Castro praised medical students for "volunteering" to serve in out-of-the-way country posts for minimum terms of two years and prophesied that "as the number of graduate doctors increases, the need for the establishment of socialized medicine once felt as a social need will not be quite as great."

Castro concluded by appealing to Cuban youth to participate "in the great task of opening new frontiers in every field...you are in a revolution that will never end." (CIA FBIS 07 and adds, 28 November, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

Military headquarters on the Isle of Pines informed Armed Forces headquarters in Havana that two persons who had escaped, probably from the military prison, had not yet been recaptured. The 27 November intercepted message reported that an unsuccessful combing operation had been effected in an area indicated by two peasants who reportedly saw the escapees. (See Daily Summary of 26 November for information on other personnel being sought on the Isle of Pines.) (USN 856, 2X/SL/CUM/T405-63, 27 November, SECRET SABRE)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:

The Cuban Government may have instituted new controls on fishermen, by eliminating night fishing along the north coast and by restricting fishermen to three and one half miles from the coast. A Florida law enforcement officer was informed by the former administrator of a fishing cooperative at Isabela de Sagua that on 12 November it was rumored that no night fishing would be allowed on the north coast of Cuba after 17 November. Reportedly, those who were fishing at sunset were to anchor their boats or risk being fired upon. Another source received information thirdhand from an unidentified fisherman that in late November, Cuban fishermen were ordered by the Cuban general staff to do their fishing between three and three and one half miles from the coast. No confirmation has yet been received of these reported changes in fishing regulations. (CIA TDCSDB-3/658,077, 27 November, SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

Two additional acts of sabotage have been reported by Bureau of Public Order (BOP) officials in Matanzas Province. On 25 November nearly four tons of sugar cane were burned on the Araujo farm near Maguanito and on 27 November two empty houses were burned on the Angelina farm in the district of Maximo Gomez.

Meanwhile, First Army headquarters in Santiago de Cuba was informed by its southern sector Sierra Maestra headquarters that 87,000 arrobas of cane were burned on 17 November at Algeria del Pio near San Lorenzo in Oriente Province. (USM, 603, 2/YJ/CUP/R127-63, 28 November, SECRET KIMBO; and USN 835, 2X/LR1/CUM/T669-63, 26 November, SECRET SABRE)

On 27 and 28 November special anti-insurgent forces (LCB) in Las Villas carried out an operation against Menendez Esquijaro and his band near Sancti Spiritus. LCB field operations headquarters in Santa Clara was informed on 21 November that the operations had ended without results. (USM 603, 2X/UJ/CUM/T350-63, 28 November; and 2X/YJ/CUM/T351-63, 29 November, SECRET SABRE)

Department of State Security (DSE) officials in Nuevitas, Camaguey Province, were instructed on 28 November to mobilize militiamen into an "easily seen land patrol" at Playa Santa Lucia in order to prevent a clandestine escape attempt during the night of 28-29 November. DSE headquarters in Camaguey directed Nuevitas to coordinate the operation with LCP units and "to be especially watchful for boats." (USM 603, 2/YJ/CUP/R128-63, 29 November, SECRET KIMBO)

CUBAN EXILE AND REFUGEE ACTIVITIES:

Comandos L is considering an attack against a Soviet ship in Cuban waters, according to a member of a group of Cuban refugees who have provided useful reports. The raid, which was being discussed on 22 November, would take place in the near future or when the seas become more quiet. Reportedly, the plan would involve 15 men in three speed-boats who would rendezvous in international waters after leaving from three points along the Florida coast. In connection with the raid, Jesus Alvarez Amador picked up material on 22 November, including one box of fragmentation grenades, three magazines for a 20-mm. cannon and 87 rounds of ammunition for the same, and 15 ponchos. This equipment is being stored at the home of Jesus Vazquez, owner of Super Cake S.A., La Gran Via Bakers, Miami; Vazquez' home telephone number is 379-5218. Other weapons to be used in the operations are two 20-mm. cannons, one 57-mm. cannon, four machine guns, and two Garand rifles. Alvarez planned to go to West Palm Beach on 22 November to borrow some additional weapons. (CIA TDCS-DB-3/658, 110, 28 November, CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

CUBAN EXILE AND REFUGEE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

Cubanos Libres may be planning to hijack a ship in a raid that would be staged from Miami, according to a member of a group of Cuban refugees who have provided useful reports. The source reported that funds for the raid were to be raised at a dinner scheduled for 24 November in Le Tre Venezie restaurant, 472 West 9th Avenue, New York City. At the dinner, Cubanos Libres was planning to show films of their raids against Cardenas Bay in October 1962 and the Arechabala Refinery in June 1963. (CIA TDCSDB-3/658,109, 28 November, CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

A small group of Cuban refugees may have attempted to infiltrate Cuba about 27 November, according to a prominent exile activist who received the information from a close associate of a person involved in the attempt. Reportedly, a 20- to 22-foot speed-boat left Key Biscayne, Florida, the night of 26 November to rendezvous off Key Largo with a Cuban fishing boat and then proceed to an infiltration point on the north coast of Las Villas. The fishing boat is reportedly based in a shrimp fishery on the southeast coast of Key Largo. The persons involved in the operation were Manuel Pedro Gutierrez Cardenas, and presumably two infiltrees--Emilio Perez Fernandez and Luis Aguiar Perez. Two crew members, known only by nicknames, were "Comacho" and "Vascoy," possibly Jose Bascoy Barrios. (CIA TDCSDB-3/658,104, 27 November, SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

BLOC RELATIONS:

The Albanian ambassador to Cuba, Josif Pogace, delivered a speech to a nearly empty hall in Havana on 26 November. A Polish correspondent in Havana informed Warsaw that the speech, in celebration of Albania's national holiday, was attended by only 80 people, mostly Chinese Communist embassy personnel, students, and journalists. Cuba was represented by an official of the Cuban foreign cultural council. The Polish correspondent reports that the audience applauded the ambassador's words on the subject of "contemporary revisionism" and "the revisionist blockade of Albania" but reacted with silence to his attack on "false guarantees for Cuba." (CIA FBIS 105, 27 November, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

The Castro regime, which has yet to acknowledge publicly the Moroccan Government's severance of diplomatic relations following the arrival of Cuban troops in Algeria in late September, is attempting to placate Rabat. On 26 November, Foreign Minister Raul Roa advised the secretary general of the Moroccan Foreign Ministry that a three-man "good-will mission," composed of Dr. Antonio Carrillo Carreras, Enrique Vian Audivert of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and Dr. Enrique Rodriguez Loeches, the Cuban ambassador to Morocco, would leave for Rabat the next day "to begin conversations with your illustrious government with a view to clearing up the unfortunate misunderstandings which may have arisen...." The Moroccans, who since breaking off formal diplomatic relations have become alarmed by the realization of the extent to which they depend on their sugar imports from Cuba and the dislocation which the loss of these imports would entail, probably will give the Cuban delegation a sympathetic hearing. Nevertheless it is unlikely that Rabat will agree at this time to return an ambassador to Cuba or to disavow publicly its renunciation of diplomatic ties so long as Cuban troops remain in Algeria.

On 21 November, Rabat instructed one of the junior members of its embassy who had remained in Cuba when the ambassador departed to remain at his post until he had closed out all financial dealings with Cuban banks, etc., and to forward pertinent documents on his activities to Morocco's Permanent Mission to the UN. Two days later the secretary general of the Moroccan Foreign Ministry cabled Havana that his government was inclined to receive a Cuban good-will mission. (NSA, 3/0/MRD/T329-63, 21 November; 3/0/MRD/T329-63, 23 November; 3/0/MRD/T335-63, 26 November, TOP SECRET DINAR)

The director of the Cuban Government - owned Consolidated Petroleum Enterprise, Salvador Salas Portuondo, is scheduled to travel to Georgetown, British Guiana, on a Cuban vessel. On 21 November Cuban shipping headquarters in Havana informed the captain of the BAHIA DE TANAMO that Salas would be traveling to Georgetown from Santiago de Cuba. Meanwhile, an untested source who is a member of the board of the British Guiana Electricity Corporation reports that GIMPEX has been awarded the contract to provide fuel oil for the electricity corporation for 1964. GIMPEX, Jagan's party's trading enterprise, reportedly intends to import the oil from Cuba. The electricity corporation will pay $240,000 for the oil. (USM-84, 2X/0/CUC/T406-63, 27 November, SECRET SABRE; and CIA TDCS-3/566,043, 28 November, CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS - cont'd

Cuba may establish diplomatic relations with Somalia and is attempting to improve its relations with Tanganyika and Ghana, according to intercepted communications. In a 27 November intercepted message, the Somali Government informed its United Nations representative that the Council of Ministers had approved the establishment of relations with Cuba, and instructed him to determine the level at which the Cubans wanted to exchange representatives. In a 26 November message, the Cuban Foreign Ministry requested its Prague embassy to obtain customs exemptions for three personnel who were on their way to Tanganyika. Cuba does not currently have diplomatic representatives in Tanganyika and the Cubans may be on a good-will mission which is expected in that country. (See article above on good-will mission to Morocco.) The three Cubans--Juan Felipe Benemelis Varona, second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Accra, Nevris Vernier, attaché at the embassy in Accra, and Jose Antonio Benitez Cabrera, an attaché of the Cuban Embassy in Prague--were scheduled to arrive in Prague on 27 November. In another intercepted message of 25 November, Havana instructed its ambassador in Ghana to sign a cultural pact with Ghana during the first part of December. The Cuban representative was told to sign the Ghanaian-inspired pact "out of political considerations." (NSA 3/0/SOD/T202-63, 27 November, TOP SECRET DINAR; NSA 2X/0/CUB/T2439-63, 27 November, SECRET SABRE; NSA 3/0/CUD/T1385-63, 27 November, TOP SECRET DINAR)

The Cuban Government requested Chilean visas for two members of National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP)--Juan Jorge Valdez Paz and Adelfo Martin Barrios--to attend a "cooperative seminar" (sic; possibly, seminar on cooperatives) to be held in Santiago. An 11 November intercepted message stated that their visit would last 15 days. (NSA 3/0/CLD/T1086-63, 27 November, TOP SECRET DINAR)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:

Cuba is continuing negotiations for the purchase of large amounts of construction equipment, probably from the Varmi company of Brussels. (See Daily Summary of 7 November for details of Varmi's offer.) According to an employee of the Spanish export-import firm CILASA who has access to the company's files, a seven-man Cuban delegation was expected to arrive in Brussels on 30 November with authorization to let contracts. The group reportedly plans to examine, disassemble, and test the equipment and has a total budget of $3.5 million. (It was previously reported that Varmi has offered to sell $1 million worth of construction equipment.)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS - cont'd

The delegation is also interested in visiting European manufacturers of spare parts for the machines; they were principally interested in visiting Spain. The members of the delegation are Rene Narbona from the Cuban enterprise for the import of machinery, in addition to representatives named Respall, Hernandez, Rodriguez, Alemida (sic), Duran, and Morales. They were to stay at the Hotel Metropole in Brussels. (CIA Madrid IN 69382, 28 November, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

The discovery of a large cache of weapons of Cuban origin, announced by Venezuelan authorities on 28 November, provides the best evidence in recent years of major Cuban support for Latin American subversives.

The Venezuelan foreign minister has announced that Caracas will lay formal charges concerning the arms cache before a special meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers scheduled for December. Following this, Caracas will ask that the Council of the Organization of American States be convoked for consultation on the matter.

There is definite proof to support the Venezuelan claim that the weapons came from Cuba. The approximately three tons of weapons include light automatic rifles and submachine guns identified as among those shipped to Cuba from Belgium in 1959 and 1960. There were also mortars, bazookas, recoilless rifles, and ammunition of US manufacture.

Communist documents seized by Venezuelan authorities earlier this month indicate that the equipment was destined for the Venezuelan Communists' paramilitary arm, the Armed Forces of National Liberation.

The cache was found on 1 November on a beach in Falcon State, scene of the most active guerrilla effort. The Venezuelan Government assumes that the weapons were sent from Cuba by sea. This is not confirmed, but Cuban fishing vessels were used to transport weapons to South America during the latter part of October, according to several recent clandestine reports.

For more than three years, the Castro regime has tried to avoid actions that would clearly implicate it in direct support of Latin American subversives. This exception seems to demonstrate either the high degree of urgency which Castro now gives to his subversive effort, or his estimate that the Venezuelan situation now is ripe for a final offensive.

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

A Havana radiobroadcast immediately denied that Cuba was involved in the arms-infiltration attempt. The broadcast, which quoted no official source, stated that "this is a new campaign of President Romulo Betancourt against Cuba and its revolutionary government, blaming the Cubans for the explosive situation in his country and the instability of his government." (SECRET)

Date: 11/29/99
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10302-10024
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CIA-DI-FILES

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : OCO/CIA
TO :
TITLE : DRAFT OF PAPER ON INTELLIGENCE RELATIONS WITH THE LBJ WHITE HOUSE
DATE : 00/00/
PAGES : ~~30~~ 31
SUBJECTS : LBJ WHITE HOUSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/22/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK-M-02:F2 1998.09.22.16:16:07:576120: ARRB REQUEST. CIA-9.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENT

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

CONTROL NO. ____________________

COPY ____________ OF ____________

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

_______________ _______________ _______________ _______________

_______________ _______________ _______________ _______________

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

2V

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

TOP SECRET

The Johnson Era Begins

For most employees of the Federal government, work continues unchanged when a new man moves into the White House. Employees of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Labor-Management Services Administration, or the Commodity Exchange Authority all go about their jobs in their accustomed ways, ~~even~~ though changes of administration policy can ultimately have an effect. Even ~~The~~ the pattern of most intelligence work--collection and the production of finished intelligence for a considerable number of officials--remains ~~unaffected~~ undisturbed. But for those who are turning out intelligence specifically for the President, everything is apt to change as soon as a ~~himself, the appearance of a~~ immediate new Chief Executive takes over. ~~signals the onset of a whole new ballgame.~~ How wide-ranging will ~~be~~ the new President's interest in ~~foreign affairs~~ foreign countries and in international relations be? How much intelligence appetite will he have for? ~~will he want great~~ Will large and frequent servings be in order, or modest portions only as absolutely ~~needed~~ required? Will he want ~~only~~ merely facts, or facts plus interpretation and analysis?

TS

Separated or homogenized? Is he willing to read a regular intelligence document, or does he prefer to be briefed?

In each of the previous administrations, OCI had established a satisfactory channel directly to the President. However, the system had never carried over from one incumbent to the next. Eisenhower did not want the personal weekly briefing from the Director that Truman had received; the General/preferred to be briefed in the setting of weekly meetings of the National Security Council. Kennedy did/not like to use the NSC with any regularity. Instead he found just what he wanted in the personal, daily intelligence Checklist devised for him five months after he entered office.

The Checklist system worked so well with Kennedy that OCI and the Director naturally hoped to continue it with Lyndon Johnson, especially as it became apparent that Johnson, like his predecessor, was not going to have regular NSC meetings. Eventually OCI succeeded, but ~~only~~ this was after many months of frustration. It was only when ~~certain~~

he had a firm hold of his administration and when certain foreign situations forced themselves upon his attention that President Johnson discovered the usefulness of a daily current intelligence document.

For a few days after the assassination of ~~John~~ President Kennedy, ~~AD/CI Smith~~ ~~personally~~ R. J. Smith took the Checklist to ~~Mr~~ McCone at East Building at 8:30x a.m. The Director then held a staff meeting, after which R.J. Smith/personally took the Checklist to Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton in the White House. ~~For about three weeks after the abrupt change of administrations,~~ The briefing of President Johnson from the Checklist, however, ~~McCone met daily with President Johnson partly with the purpose of briefing him from the Checklist.~~ was done by McCone, who saw the President daily for about three weeks after the assassination. 1/

Although OCI had provided more detail and background information ~~in~~ than usual in its first intelligence books for President Johnson, McCone/ ~~within two days~~ on 24 November passed the word through DDI Cline that ~~he would like to see~~ there should be more but shorter items. ~~(Two weeks later Bromley Smith was still urging that OCI leave out the background data and return to a normal Checklist.)~~ McCone said the President expected that topics appearing in the Checklist would be followed up in later issues; therefore, OCI should make even negative reports.

Cline, presumably reflecting the Director's wishes, said that the Checklist that day should cover military activity in South Vietnam, the fighting in Laos, ~~the~~ Soviet ICBM developments, and problems in the Berlin air corridors and ~~in~~ Venezuela.

Around the middle of December, ~~members of the White House staff, using the Checklist, tried to~~ ~~take over the~~ ~~intelligence~~ when McCone stopped seeing the President daily, the White House staff ~~briefings~~ tried to get ~~him~~ the President to read the Checklist. ~~but~~ They were largely unsuccessful, ~~tried to get the Checklist~~ although McGeorge Bundy was able to do some oral briefing, Checklist in hand. On 16 December, Gen. Clifton told ~~Checklister~~ OCI's John Heidemann, "If we can't penetrate this sort of wall today or tomorrow, we'll just have to try something else." In this cloudy atmosphere, the sun came out occasionally. On the 18th, Clifton said that the staff had finally managed to get the President to read "the books"--probably two or three issues.

At Christmastime, the President went to his Texas ranch and shortly after Christmas had Chancellor Erhard as a visitor for several days. The PICL was cabled to the ranch each day. The report was limited to notes covering important developments and any information that might be useful in the talks with Erhard. The President returned to Washington on 5 January, and the next day Gen. Clifton, who had been at the ranch, ~~xxid~~ told Heidemann that he had been able to get the Checklist to the President with some regularity once Erhard had gone.

On 8 Januaby, however, Clifton was having difficulties again--the President had/not read the intelligence document since leaving Texas. Clifton thought there would be a little let-up in the press of business after that day's State of the Union speech. He ~~What was evidently happening was that the President found time for the Checklist only when there wasn't a press of other business. Clifton~~ asked Philip Kennedy for a special report, briefly treating important and still-current ~~proxxxxx~~ problems that were covered in the books the President ~~didn't~~ hadn't read. ~~xxx~~ ~~Clifton~~ ~~also talked at length on the problem of the President not getting his reading done.~~ Clifton thought, in fact, that it would be good to try the system of giving the President a summary of significant intelligence twice a week.

OCI quickly put together an experimental President's Intelligence Review, covering the period 4-9 January. This was taken by Richard Lehman, the Assistant for Special Projects, to Gen. Clifton on 9 January. Clifton thought the Review was the best solution to the problem of the President's intelligence reading. He and Bundy were agreed that the President would not accept a daily intelligence briefing. The President had instructed Clifton that the DCI was to see him whenever he wished but that otherwise the President relied on Bundy and Clifton to stay on top of the intelligence. Because the President was likely to ask them with no warning for the latest ~~intelligence;~~ word, the daily Checklist had to continue. Clifton ~~seemed receptive to OCI's proposal to send the Checklist to six or eight additional persons. He also~~ suggested that the Checklist periodically include a special blue- or green-bordered page containing an operational report. 2/

The next morning Gen. Clifton called Lehman to report that the White House was very pleased with the Review, ~~which he~~ and wanted it continued. It had been tried on the President at breakfast and it had "worked like a charm." 3/

~~InxFebruary~~

Because the President was not reading the Checklist every day,
it sent a few more than
~~its contents known~~ to~~more~~
DCI McCone wanted ~~[illegible] a few~~/high-level officials ~~to know of its~~
of~~ten sensitive~~
/~~contents beyond~~ the small circle of readers in Kennedy's time--the
Secretaries of State and Defense, McGeorge Bundy at the White House, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Therefore he obtained permission in
additional
February to extend the dissemination to four ~~more~~ top officials in the
plus
State Department, two more in Defense, one on the Joint Chiefs staff, ~~and~~ the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney-General. 4/
Besides ~~doing the~~ semi-weekly Review and the PICL, OCI was
~~Things went along on~~
~~on the basis of [illegible] OCI's production of the new~~
writing memoranda in response to requests from the
White House staff, and
~~semi-weekly Review and~~, ~~the President's occasional reading of the daily~~
DCI McCone was
~~Checklist [illegible] and~~ briefing~~s~~ ~~of~~ the President from time to
time~~by [illegible]~~. The Checklist writers still took the publication to
Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton each morning and received their comments,
plus occasional playback from the President. When ~~[illegible]~~ unusually
in the PICL
interesting items/caught his eye, Clifton would make a point of bringing
them to the President's attention. On 21 January, for example, he

reacted immediately to the "quotable Khrushchev" item and said he would get right to the President with this. A few days later he instructed OCI to keep the White House "up to the minute" on Cyprus developments. "Hours will make the difference," he said.

Gen. Clifton told James Hanrahan on 28 January that he had talked with the President about the President's Intelligence Review and Mr. Johnson had said it ~~is~~ was just fine. He ~~finds~~ found it a very valuable supplement to his occasional briefings from the DCI and he wanted it continued without change.

Insert * from next page

Early in 1964, the President drew his aides Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti into the intelligence picture. He wanted one of them present when he read the Review at breakfast and he was reported occasionally as discussing Checklist items with them. Although the ~~OCI~~ PICL writers continued to meet and talk with Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton, it began to look as though Moyers and Velenti were taking the documents to the President.

Insert on p. 8

On 25 March the President's plans to spend a weekend in Texas prompted Gen. Clifton to comment that Mr. Johnson read his intelligence while at the ranch; he ~~is~~ was often up and ~~up and about~~ by 8:15 a.m. asking for it. But it ~~is~~ was hard to catch him in Washington. The next day Clifton said that it was not necessary for the OCI representatives to meet him at 9:30 a.m.; the book did not move upstairs that fast. He asked that the meetings take place at 10 in the future.

James C. Graham, Acting AD/OCI, took up with DDI Ray Cline the possibility of ~~his~~ inviting Moyers to CIA headquarters for lunch and a briefing. Cline wanted first to discuss the White House problem with McCone, but ~~first wanted~~ asked Graham for a little memorandum on how things were going. 5

OCI ~~then~~ drew up a statement for Cline making the principal points that it had no way of knowing whether ~~we were meeting~~ it was meeting the President's needs because ~~we~~ it had no feedback from him, in contrast to the situation under Kennedy. The reason for this was that ~~our~~ OCI's contacts at the White House did ~~do~~ not deal directly with the President on intelligence matters.

OCI wondered how it could establish close links to the President's immediate staff. 6/

~~What was McCone's position? Did mayors come out?~~

~~look up red borders~~

Things remained in ~~an unpredictable~~ a confused state for the next few months, with only occasional indications that OCI's presidential publications had hit the mark. Clifton ~~remarked~~ commented in May that the *Review* was the best means of reaching the President, although he said the *PICL* registered at times when Valenti was interested in an item. One day when the *PICL* was heavy on the side of bad news, Clifton said, "It's no wonder the President doesn't want to read this stuff--it annoys you." There were days when the President read and initialed both the *Review* and the *PICL*. From mid-year on, ~~thxxR~~ Mr. Johnson made frequent ~~political~~ Campaign trips around the country. Clifton, who was usually with him, said he had more luck getting the President to read his intelligence on the return flights than on the way out, when Mr. Johnson was reviewing his speeches.

As the election neared, Secretary of State Rusk expressed some concern to McCone about the security of the *Checklist* and seemed to prefer that dissemination be limited to the President, Secretary of Defense McNamara and himself. T~~he DDI was asked to follow up~~ McCone passed the word down

and also conveyed his
~~He~~ ~~of~~
on this matter. ~~and was informed xxxxxxx at the same time that~~ McCone's
feeling ~~felt~~ that the President should read the Checklist daily, ~~xx~~ or have it read to him, and should not depend on the semi-weekly Review. 7/

¶ AD/CI R. J. Smith responded in a memorandum of 5 November 1964. ~~to the DCI through the DDI.~~ ~~Smith~~ He believed ~~felt~~ that the Agency would have a graceful way of dropping some of ~~its~~ the Checklist readers ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ if the publication were to undergo a transformation in which it would acquire a new name, a new cover, and a new format. It would become President Johnson's publication, specifically designed to meet his needs. To increase the ~~xxxxx~~ chances of its being read by the Chief Executive, it would be ~~xxxxxxxx~~ produced to conform to the President's working habits and would be ~~by being~~ delivered in ~~for~~ late afternoon. ~~delivery so that it could be part of his evening reading.~~

Smith noted that the Review, which Mr. Johnson "usually reads," was timed ~~produced xxxxxxxxxxx~~ for his evening perusal. Smith also noted the importance of finding a way to establish direct contact with the President so that OCI could get feedback and thus avoid ~~so that it would not~~ writing in a vacuum. 8/

The PDB Appears

Smith's proposal for a new publication was accepted and was rapidly put into effect. The last Checklist was dated 30 November 1964 and the next day the first issue of the President's Daily Brief (PDB) was delivered to the White House. In substance it resembled the PICL, but it had a fresh appearance, and it ~~xxx~~ came out late in the afternoon instead of ~~the~~ early in the morning. Jack Valenti sent this first issue back to McGeorge Bundy saying that the President read it, liked it, and wanted it continued. Dissemination was cut back, so that the only persons receiving the PDB outside the White House were the Secretary ~~x~~ and Under Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary and one Assistant Secretary, the Treasury Secretary, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Gen. Carroll.

~~In place of the semi-weekly Review, the Highlights of the Week was begun,~~ The semi-weekly Review was dropped, but by 16 December the DCI ordered that ~~the~~ a summary ~~xxxxxxx~~ of ~~the~~ OCI's Current Intelligence Weekly Review be included ~~in~~ with each Friday's PDB. The summary, titled Highlights of the Week, lasted only until 26 February 1965, ~~Bromley Smith~~ having

Check this

failed to arouse presidential interest.

In the ensuing weeks and months, OCI was naturally watching for indications of the success or failure of the restyled daily for the President. On 13 January, PDB writer Thomas Patton~~xxPDBxxxxxxx~~ noted that Bromley Smith wrote "The President" in the upper right corner of Copy No. 1. Patton asked whether Smith would like OCI to type this on. ~~Nxxxxx Smith~~ No, said Smith, putting it on in long-hand gave it a human touch.

On 19 January, the format of the Brief was changed as a result of discussions between McGeorge Bundy and Ray Cline. Bromley Smith said he ~~was~~ liked the new format and he thought the South Vietnam item was "exactly right." The President was not interested in the names of generals and ministers and didn't follow such details.

[illegible]

Further experiments in ~~format~~ page size followed a talk McCone had with the President, but nothing came of them. There was even a sample Brief that the President could put in his pocket, though the thought of having sensitive material handled this way made Bromley Smith groan.

In mid-February, Bromley Smith said that the Vietnam Situation Report, which OCI had begun sending to the White House daily at 8 a,m., was proving to be very useful; it was going up to the President every morning.

¶ It should not be imagined that the PDB writers ~~did not~~ always transacted their business with Bromley Smith in tranquillity. (Occasionally there was a certain amount of commotion ~~in~~ ~~when the PDB'ers were there~~ around ~~Bromley~~ Smith's office/because of people coming and going to different meetings in the White House. One day Smith closed his door, explaining that ~~[illegible]~~

> Bundy might be able to work this way with all the Indians charging in all the time, but I Can't, especially since I was here till after 11 last night waiting for the President to leave.

Put Dom Rep in here

¶ ~~[illegible]~~ one day Smith unburdened himself/about ~~about~~ problems for himself and the Agency. One of them was the occasional flow of raw clandestine information directly to the President, who "eats up information" and has a "very short reaction fuse."/ ~~And yet time was of the essence.~~ Smith recognized the need to get important intelligence to the President as soon as possible, but thought the ~~Smith felt there should be a~~ flow should be controlled by a "city editor" somewhere who could make a/timely package of all~~s~~ the many types of information, including the operational. At another time, he reiterated/to PDBer Joseph O. Matthews how short the reaction ~~x~~ times had become at the White House. He also

The Impact of Santo Domingo

On 24 April 1965 events took place that resulted in an improvement in the standing of OCI publications in the White House. On that day an uprising began against the provisional government of the Dominican Republic. The US fear that Communists might seize control of the country led to the prompt dispatch of Marines to Santo Domingo. ~~President Johnson wanted a steady flow of intelligence~~ By coincidence, the day they landed --28 April-- was also the day that Admiral William Raborn was sworn in as DCI, succeeding John McCone. President Hohnsom could hardly get enough intelligence on the Dominican situation, and Admiral Raborn was determined to provide the best service possible. The day after he took office, the Admiral ordered the establishment of a CIA task force on the Dominican Republic under E. Drexel Godfrey, chief of OCI's Western Area. As directed, it provided "complete and around-the-clock CIA intelligence support to the White House." Its first task each day was to brief Raborn to put him in readiness to deal with calls from the White House. Periodically throughout the day and night it issued round-up situation reports, and when necessary, spot reports of particular developments. All these reports were teletyped to the White House, ~~and~~ They were read by the Mr. Johnson, who was described by Bromley Smith as a President "who eats up information." OCI, of course, continued to put out its regular publications. It was during the Dominican crisis that word was received that the President's Daily Brief had taken firm root in the White House. Bill Moyers said on 21 May that the President read it "avidly." 9/

The increased tempo of intelligence service to the Chief Executive prompted further consideration of the proper route to him. ~~Mr. Johnson,~~ ~~the No. 1 recipient. DDI Ray Cline and~~ DDCI Richard Helms and DDI Ray Cline agreed that a "greased channel" through ~~McGeorge~~ Bundy should be established for the PDB and any other reports the DCI wants to be sure the President sees. 10/ AD/CI Jack Smith commented on 20 May that a "greased channel" already appeared to exist for the PDB. 11/

the NSC Staff (McGeorge Bundy, Bromley Smith, and the ~~McGeorge Bundy, as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs,~~ White House Situation Room) should be the place of entry for intelligence for ~~Mr. Johnson,~~ the President, although information copies could be sent to Moyers and Valenti. Helms and Cline said that

The hectic atmosphere in the spring of 1965, with the Dominican situation coming on top of growing difficulties in Vietnam, caused the men in the White House to ask more of intelligence and to ~~tended to produce sharper reactions in the White House to intelligence and to~~ react to it more sharply. Bromley Smith said the President has a "very short reaction fuse." He wanted to hear first from official sources and not from the press about major developments, so rapid dissemination ~~is~~ was essential. ~~He~~ Smith also warned that OCI would soon be asked to report on every coup and to cover all present and potential trouble spots with high precision. He said that in the future, OCI's reports would not say that the Valencia regime is shaky, but that "Valencia is going to be overthrown by a coup on the umpteenth July by X in Toonerville." Since this would be asking the impossible in most cases, Richard Lehman, OCI's Assistant for Special Projects, went to see Bill Moyers. He explained that ~~it was possible for~~ OCI ~~to~~ could write 50 pages of intelligence warnings a day, thereby taking out insurance against any possible contingency, but that the office did not believe this would really serve the President. Lehman said OCI tried to be highly selective in warning of coups and the like. Moyers expressed understanding of

OCI's difficulties, and the fire died down. 12/ This episode had an amusing sequel about eight months later when Bromley Smith pondered the series of army coups in the republics of West Africa. He said he didn't think the President wanted or needed to be informed in advance of every threatened coup. "Otherwise," he said, "you could fill the book with that sort of thing."

— INSERT from page below / Insert

The system now seemed to be working satisfactorily. OCI was fairly confident that the PDB was being read regularly by the President, and ~~it~~ the writers on the PDB team received useful suggestions, ~~and~~ criticisms, and reactions, usually from Bromley Smith, when they ~~it~~ delivered the publication each day. ¶ One day in June 1965 the first paragraph of the lead item in the PDB said "Accumulating information suggests that Hanoi is bringing North Vietnam to a state of semi-mobilization." The second paragraph ~~said~~ explained that Hanoi's action was far short of classic mobilization for offensive operations; ~~therefore~~ OCI considered the move defensive and was therefore inclined to discount the view of one ~~Briton~~ British expert who thought a large-scale attack would soon be made across the 17th parallel. President Johnson and Gen. Clifton at the time

Insert on p. 19

The system for supplying current intelligence to ~~the~~ President Johnson was now working better than ~~at~~ previously. ~~under Lyndon Johnson~~ ~~OCI was fairly confident that the President was reading the PDB regularly.~~ To be sure, ~~Nevertheless~~ OCI did not benefit from the steady ~~from the~~ Presidential playback it had enjoyed ~~from~~ under John Kennedy. ~~It did not, in fact, usually receive the direct reactions of the men—Moyers and Valenti—who were closest to Mr. Johnson.~~ On the other hand, ~~therefore~~ OCI was fairly confident that the President was reading the PDB regularly, and the writers on the PDB team received useful suggestions, criticisms, and reactions—usually from Bromley Smith—when they delivered the publication each day.

were at the LBJ ranch. Late in the afternoon, the PDB received a phone call from Bromley Smith, who said that Gen. Clifton had called from the ranch. He had been shaken by the ~~The~~ first sentence of the Vietnamese item and ~~had shaken Clifton, who was also~~ was concerned about the whole piece. The President was out on the lake and was not expected back for several hours. Clifton at first felt he should summon the President to shore. Smith discussed the matter with the PDB writer, Thomas Patton, and there was further conversation with Clifton, who decided simply to add the word "but" after the first sentence and continue with the somewhat reassuring second sentence. The case was a vivid illustration ~~illustrated again~~ of the potentiality of the PDB for causing excitement in the White House entourage.

Comment?

Comment?

Foreign developments often provoked spirited reactions from Bromley Smith, but it was not often that he expressed surprise at the nature of the ~~kind of~~ intelligence he was reading, substance apart. One such occasion, however, came when the PDB ran an item about dissension between Rumania and the Soviet Union. An intercept revealed that Ceausescu and Maurer had complained to Shelepin that the USSR acts on the international scene without consulting its allies, just as in Stalin's time. The Rumanians cited the 1962 missile adventure in Cuba and Soviet positions on disarmament. Shelepin agreed that more coordination was needed. Smith was particularly interested in this item and remarked ~~that it was "fantastic"~~ to PDB writer Archer C. Bush that it was "fantastic" that we could get this kind of information.

Bromley Smith now and then modified or rewrote items when he felt that they might confuse or unduly alarm the President. In December 1965, for example, President Johnson ordered a halt in the bombing of ~~North~~ Vietnam ~~[illegible]~~ in the hope of getting negotiations started. A PDB item reported that Hanoi had broadcast a tough restatement of its position, making no reference to the pause in air strikes. Smith, ~~afraid~~ afraid that ~~the President~~ this would be ~~interpreted~~ taken as a rebuff to the President's efforts, reworked the text to avoid this interpretation since the ~~[illegible]~~ broadcast did not constitute ~~an~~ a fully official government statement.

~~It was clear at various times that there was a~~

Quite clearly, the White House staff cringed at bad news from Vietnam. When the PDB reported in April 1966 that "the political situation appears to be rapidly worsening" in South Vietnam and averred that Ky might soon have to take drastic measures to restore authority or make major concessions to the Buddhists, Smith remarked that the article was pessimistic, and that he had later information. It was, of course, one of the perils of the PDB operation that the White House sometimes had ~~later~~ fresher reports from the field. Smith handed John Heidemann cables reporting that Ky was going to formulate a new constitution and that the State Department looked upon this ~~as~~ as hopeful. Heidemann agredd that OCI had written in ignorance of this information, but added that offhand he would not be optimistic.

A few days later Smith read that "There was no real improvement in the situation today..." and said "You're going to break the President's heart; he thinks things are much better today." When he finished the whole disheartening report, he tossed the book in the air, whistled, and said, "We'll have fun tonight. But that's no reason for not writing it as you see it."

Smith had cause for unhappiness again when the PDB had to repprt that a Pakistan official felt that his country was ~~seriously, if temporarily,~~ drifting apart from the US and would probably establish closer relationships with the Soviet Union. Smith told PDB writer Allen Valpey that this article was a "shocker" and that Walt Rostow would be disturbed by it. (Rostow had replaced McGeorge Bundy in April 1966.)

Although John McCone had not taken up a White House suggestion ~~in Kennedy's time~~ that the President's daily give occasional coverage to CIA activities, Admiral Raborn as DCI did adopt this practice. Bromley Smith reacted negatively to these reports, however, apparently believing that President Johnson did not like them. He particularly objected in 1966 to a PDB Annex explaining enthusiastically how CIA used a portable ultra-violet light device in Vietnam to detect guerrillas who had recently handled weapons before mingling ~~innocently~~ with innocent villagers. Smith did not want the Agency to "advertise" in the PDB. He believed ~~that~~ if the President should be informed of some CIA activities, the DCI should send him a memorandum.

B/=1 By this time R.J. Smith was DDI, E. Drexel Godfrey was D/OCI and Richard Lehman was DD/OCI. Bromley Smith met with them and the PDB writers

Late in July 1966 Bromley Smith said that he had some ideas about the PDB and would like to get together with all the writers. ~~He met with them and the OCI leadership~~ ~~the DDI~~ in the Langley building on 3 August. He prefaced his remarks by ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ expressing his satisfaction with the way the President was being served; he had no criticisms. He explained, however, ~~[illegible]~~ that while the President "tolerates" anonymous documents, he is much more responsive to a personalized document. He wondered whether the Brief could be signed by Mr. Helms, now DCI. Then it would become a personal link between the President and the Director. In regard to content, Smith said the PDB did not have to alert the President to impending crises over which he would have no control. Rather, Smith thought the PDB could be most useful by ~~carrying items that give a~~ rendering pithy judgments on situations with which the President is or will be faced. Smith said these judgments would be accepted; OCI did not have to support them with argumentation or evidence. Smith emphasized that the Brief writers had to be fully up on US policies and should read presidential speeches. He felt the President is kept adequately informed of

Vietnamese military developments by other means; the PDB should carry more Vietnamese political and economic items. ~~xX~~Smith urged that the Brief have more coverage of Europe and said that Panama was another subject high on the priority list. 13/

OCI promptly set about adopting Smith's suggestions as to content, and Smith soon commented that he ~~had~~ noticed the change. 14/

→ (what about Helms signature?)

Back to Morning Delivery

A major ~~change~~ alteration in the PDB system occurred at the end of February 1967. Seemingly all that was involved was that President Johnson decided that he would rather get the Brief in the morning than in the evening. However, this change in delivery time forced other changes. The President wanted the Brief at 6:30 a.m., just before he began reading the newspapers. This meant that OCI's closing time on the book was 5 a.m. Nonetheless, the PDB had to be written in full knowledge of ~~the~~ what was in the morning press. As ~~D/OCI~~ E. Drexel Godfrey~~x~~ commented, the schedule ~~x~~put "the highest premium on making the publication up to the minute." 15/

Because the ~~PDB~~ Brief now had to be delivered to the White House Situation Room by 6 a.m., the PDB writers ~~xxxxx~~ no longer had a member of the President's staff up and available to receive the book and comment on it. This meant that there was no point in having the writers ~~making~~ make the trip to the White House. From this time on, the PDB was delivered by couriers. To make up for the loss of the morning conversations with Bromley Smith, an OCI staff member would visit him occasionally to check on how things were going, and there was also communication by phone.

Shortly after the changeover to the ~~PDB~~ new schedule for the PDB, commenting on the President's reaction, Bromley Smith, ~~xxxxxxxxxOCIxxxx~~ said emphatically that "we are much more certain now that he's reading it." He also made a point he was to make several times subsequently, which was that he disapproved of annexes to the Brief. He was afraid that if the Brief were burdened with an Annex, the President would put it aside for later reading--and then not

Smith thought it was an excellent idea for the Brief to summarize the conclusions of "important" national estimates. 16/

get back to it. In Smith's view, the PDB should be of a length which the President could whip through quickly. It would be better if annex-type reports were sent down separately. ~~16/~~

Smith continued to admonish OCI writers now and then about the words and phrases they employed in the PDB. He admitted that ~~that~~ it was hard to know where to draw the line, but he ~~cautioned that~~ ~~the staff should be careful about~~ did not like "hopping mad," nor, on another occasion, did he care for a description of India as an "unwilling bride." As a rule of thumb, he said the writers should avoid seeming frivolous or lighthearted.

At the President's request, OCI on 7 September 1967 began to attach to the Brief a Special Report on North Vietnam that dealt mainly with the effects of the war. ~~Its title was~~ The only copy to go outside of the Agency was addressed: "For Bromley Smith - Eyes Only for the President." Beginning with the issue of 6 October, this Special Report carried a new section on North Vietnamese treatment of political attitudes toward the war, expressed in statements and demonstrations.

In November DCI Helms talked with Drexel Godfrey and Richard Lehman about the PDB. The Director expressed great satisfaction with both the Brief and the Special Report. He said the latter was "really hitting the mark." He urged that OCI try harder to come up with items on the personalities of men familiar to the President, who, Helms said, thinks in terms of personalities. Helms also asked that the PDB give more attention to coming visits of world VIPs to Washington and to each other.

No major changes in the PDB were made during President Johnson's time after the introduction of the Special Report on North Vietnam~~ese Report~~. To all appearances, the Brief had evolved into a document satisfactory to the President, and it kept serving its purpose throughout the rest of the administration.

All OCI analysts who have worked on the PDB are familiar with a photograph of President Johnson sitting in the White House with Lady Bird and holding his first grandson. In his hand is an issue of the President's Daily Brief, ~~which he appears to be reading.~~ This homey picture epitomize~~d~~s the position ~~that~~ OCI hoped the Brief ~~had~~ occupied in the White House. And perhaps it did.

Subhead

The importance to a President of a steady flow of first-class intelligence is self-evident. Whatever scope and depth of information he can obtain from the public media, he still needs the intelligence that comes from the utilization of sensitive technogical means and clandestine operations. He is entitled to objective appraisals based on all sources, public and governmental. In planning American positions and actions, he ~~[illegible]~~ ~~seeks~~ should have the most souhdly based estimates of the possible and probable development of ~~how~~ foreign situations. ~~are likely to develop.~~

CIA and its predecessor, the CIG, have met these presidential intelligence needs. What they have furnished the Presidents has been determined by the interplay between the intelligence organization and the White House. The Agency has been ~~[illegible]~~ eager to ~~[illegible]~~ learn what each President wanted in terms of subject matter, timing, format, and style, and it has tried to meet these requirements. ~~For the most part, it has tried to give each President just what he wanted, and not bother him with anything else.~~ ~~has~~ ed ~~minor matters~~ At the same time, the Agency has fulfilled its obligation ~~CIA, having the intelligence in its possession before the President, has been obligated~~ to see that the President ~~he receives the reports~~ intelligence to bring to the President's attention things he didn't know he wanted but which CIA recognized the President must have.

~~it has not been foreseen and requested.~~

he ~~must have, even if~~ ~~it does not fall within any category of requested information.~~ There has probably never been complete agreement between CIA and the White House on what the President really needs to know, but a degree ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ of mutual toleration usually prevails so that a President will accept ~~read~~ some things he isn't particularly interested in and CIA will ~~xxxxx~~ carry on certain lines of reporting simply out of regard for a President's ~~supply a President with certain reporting~~ idiosyncracies.

In serving Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, CIA's Office of Current Intelligence f~~ound a direct line to the Chief Executive~~ was able to get ~~[illegible]~~ its message directly to the Chief Executive,

~~although the method was~~ [illegible] ~~preferences.~~

although the method was adjusted to accord with each President's preferences.

More pages
because of
Coversheets that
were left out
Before

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

21 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. Iraq

a. The new 21-man cabinet appears to be a coalition of Arab nationalist elements including four members of the moderate wing of the Baath Party. The regime is still dominated by the military, with eight cabinet posts.

b. The new prime minister, Tahir Yahya, is sympathetic to the Baath Party, and both the Baathists and the Egyptians feel they can trust him.

c. The political affiliation of eight of the new ministers is not known, but the key interior post is in the hands of an anti-Baathist nationalist.

NBR

2. Indonesia

a. Defense Minister Nasution has been ordered by Sukarno to make conciliatory statements on Malaysia while on his trip abroad.

b. The Dutch chargé who reported this explained that Nasution was chosen for this job because Sukarno was irritated with the ultra-tough line the defense minister has taken.

NBR

(Cont'd)

2/BR

c. The chargé has no information on the motives behind this switch. Our embassy thinks it may be a move to pave the way for exploratory talks by Foreign Minister Subandrio at Bangkok with his Thai and Philippine counterparts. It may also be meant to provide a more receptive attitude for Nasution's visit here.

NBR

d. Our embassy thinks Nasution went in for his Malaysia sabre rattling on Sukarno's orders, or at the very least, with the president's tacit support. Sukarno may feel Nasution has stolen some of his thunder.

3. Congo

a. Adoula still did not get around to announcing the expulsion of all Soviet and Czech embassy personnel yesterday. However, his people managed on Tuesday afternoon to corral and hog-tie the Soviet counselor and press attaché before they could eat-up all the incriminating papers in their possession.

b. The Russians are now being held at Ndolo prison. The Congolese surete says the seized papers include, among other things, minutes of a "liberation committee" meeting of opposition politicians in Brazzaville, and a document showing Soviet payments to this group.

NBR

(Cont'd)

2/BR

c. The Belgian ambassador thinks these papers are probably genuine. He says the Russians have made the mistake of underrating the Congolese and have stumbled into a surete trap.

NBR

d. The Congolese also picked up two Czech diplomats but have since released them. This morning they arrested the correspondent of the Soviet news agency.

4. **Ethiopia-Congo**

a. Haile Selassie is planning to withdraw all Ethiopian troops from the Congo in January, according to the commander of his ground forces.

b. The two battalions of Ethiopians provide the guts of the UN operation. They had been slated to stay until June and are likely to be very difficult to replace.

c. The Emperor reportedly ordered the withdrawal on grounds that the troops are urgently needed in Ethiopia, particularly in view of the Soviet military accord with Somalia.

NBR

d. Our ambassador has asked to see the Emperor, as well as the prime minister and foreign minister, to press for reconsideration.

NBR

5. Yemen

a. Military activity has slackened but the stalemate continues.

b. Egypt still has about 32,000 troops in Yemen, and Saudi Crown Prince Faysal believes Nasir will not withdraw any significant number of them before 4 January when the extension of the disengagement agreement expires.

c. Faysal is preparing to resume aid to the royalists at that time; he is stockpiling quantities of arms and ammunition along the border.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

NBR

6. Turkey

(1D

a. The opposition Justice Party, heir of the old Menderes regime, appears to have won a victory in Sunday's nationwide local elections on the basis of incomplete returns.

b. The collapse of Prime Minister Inonu's coalition government appears increasingly likely. Though a new coalition may be formed, there will be considerable resistance to the retention of Inonu as prime minister.

NBR

(Cont'd)

21BR

c. Justice Party members will be putting on pressure for early national parliamentary elections. However their party leaders do not believe the Turkish military, which ousted Menderes in 1960, would permit them to take over if they won new elections.

d. They will probably try to work out some rapprochement with the armed forces.

NBR

NBR

NOTES

A. Cuba The U-2 which flew yesterday's mission over Cuba crashed while returning, about 40 miles north of Key West. Air and sea rescue craft were sent to the scene. An air rescue unit sighted an unopened parachute, a life raft, and oil slick in the crash area. The pilot is presumed lost. There is no indication that the plane was attacked.

B. Berlin Local East German troops acting without higher authority appear to have been responsible for turning high powered searchlights on pilots taking off from West Berlin's Tempelhof airfield on 14-16 November. There were five such incidents. A message of 16 November instructed border guard elements to discontinue such acts. There have been no further incidents reported since. NBR

C. Albania-USSR A Radio Tirana broadcast has accused Khrushchev of personally releasing Barghoorn for fear that Moscow's wheat deal with the US might collapse. The Albanians are on record as preferring to eat grass rather than to kowtow to the West, but they are not above eating Chinese wheat acquired from Western sources. NBR

D. Iran-USSR The Soviet Union's timing seems to be off in Iran. Government sources have reported that a twin engined plane was shot down in Iranian territory ~~yesterday~~ Tuesday by Soviet jet fighters who violated Iranian air space. The Iranians say that the plane was on a photographic mission in connection with the NBR

(Cont'd)

3/BR

government's land reform drive. The pilot was injured and his two passengers were killed. The incident comes at a time when Soviet President Brezhnev is visiting Tehran. He addressed a joint session of parliament today.

NBR

E. Venezuela Police seem to have restored order in downtown Caracas, but terrorism continues elsewhere. The slum district of Caracas to which the terrorists retreated is under virtual martial law. Among other things, the Dupont paint warehouse at Maracaibo was set afire and totally destroyed.

NBR

F. World Peace Council The WPC meeting in Warsaw next Thursday may wind up in another free-for-all. The Chinese Communist delegation, although not intent on disrupting the conference, plans to attack the WPC president's report given to a committee meeting in Vienna last September. The Japanese delegates plan to give general support to the Chinese and will try to forestall a vote on the Moscow test ban treaty.

NBR

3/BR

DOCUMENT OF INTEREST

Debriefing of Professor Frederick Barghoorn

For The President Only - Top Secret

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

NBR

1. Iraq-Syria, 19Nov

CIA IN {63952, 19Nov
64101, 19Nov
64393, 20Nov

a. Although sporadic gunfire continued through the night in Baghdad, the army is in control.

b. Arif has plans to announce the make-up of his cabinet today. It will probably contain some "mild" Baathists.

CIB

c. He permitted Syrian strongman Hafiz and Michel Aflaq, the founder of the Baath Party, who were caught in Baghdad by the coup, to fly back to Damascus yesterday after the Syrian radio suddenly stopped vilifying the newest Iraqi regime.

d. Arif and his colleagues obviously hope to reach an understanding with the Syrian regime. We doubt very much if they are interested, however, in the meaningful political and military unity the previous regime was aiming for.

conversation with Neuhauser, 19Nov

e. An intercepted message indicates that Syrian army units, now in Iraq, are getting ready to go home.

f. The retention of Baathists in positions of power in Baghdad also tends to ease the threat to the party in Syria.

(INTERCEPTS)

NBR

2. Venezuela

C1B

plus

intercept from 962M, -19Nov

a. The Communist effort to frustrate the presidential election (1 December) continues.

b. An illegal transmitter was heard yesterday in Caracas calling for a 48-hour general strike and urging listeners to arm themselves against the Betancourt government.

c. Roving bands of Communist-led terrorists sought to enforce the generally unsuccessful strike with gunfire. There were at least nine deaths (some reports go as high as 19). Guerrilla activity in rural areas is also being stepped up.

NBR

d. The government has jailed an added 200 extremists in the wake of yesterday's violence and plans are afoot to detain 1,500 more.

e. The army is being held in reserve in the Caracas area.

(includes Intercepts)

3. South Vietnam

08

C1B

a. Ton That Dinh, whom we had earlier identified as the least reliable of the generals' group, is trying to use his position as security minister to build himself an independent political base.

(Cont'd)

UBR

b. He has been visiting provincial cities to "explain" the military takeover and receive expressions of loyalty. He has continued to spread the idea that the coup was largely his own doing.

c. Dinh has directed provincial chiefs to submit to him daily reports on local politics. (INTERCEPTS)

d. This is going on while other members of the regime are squabbling about who should be in the "council of sages" and what it should do.

4. **France-Israel**

a. We have picked up further details on the surface-to-surface missile system which a French firm is developing for the Israelis.

NBR

Air Attache, Paris
1 832 0200 63
30 Sept 63

b. The firm, Marcel Dassault, is to produce and test fire 25 missiles between July 1964 and July 1965. An actual production contract for perhaps 250 missiles will be drawn up late in the period if all goes well.

(Cont'd)

NBR

c. Design requirements call for the delivery of a 1,600-pound warhead to a maximum range of 300 miles with a CEP slightly in excess of half a mile. A conventional warhead would not make military sense under these specifications.

5. Egypt

a. Pamphlets and posters bitterly lampooning Nasir, especially for his involvement in Yemen and Algeria, have appeared on the streets of Cairo and Suez.

NBR

note from Jim Young
19 Nov

TDCS 3/565,064
18 Nov

IN 63025
18 Nov

b. Such public expression of anti-Nasir sentiment is highly unusual.

c. It is still in a very low key, however, and there is no sign of organized opposition.

d. We do not consider Nasir to be in any immediate danger of overthrow, though he could be forced to modify unpopular policies if the discontent spreads.

NBR

6. Bolivia

a. The return last week of Vice President Lechin, who has been on ice as Bolivia's ambassador in Rome, will heat things up in La Paz.

b. The city has already witnessed four minor demonstrations which Embassy La Paz attributes to left-wingers encouraged by Lechin's presence.

c. Lechin, who has ambitions to replace President Paz, intends to tour the country to rally his political forces, now in disarray as a result of some astute moves by Paz.

d. If Lechin decides after these soundings to come out openly against the president, he will try to arrange a series of strikes early next year to point up his strength.

TDCS 3/564,966
15 Nov
IN 61659, "
La Paz 677 "
CID, 19 Nov

NBR

7. Cambodia

a. Sihanouk may have finally painted himself into a corner on US aid.

b. He has followed up yesterday's emotional public renunciation with an official request to our embassy for talks on the subject.

by phone from State,
20 Nov

NBR

(Cont'd)

2/BR

orally from Ed Hanck 19 Nov

c. We are always reluctant to predict just what Sihanouk will do next, but he may hope, perhaps expect, that the US will press him to retain some of our aid, even on his terms.

NBR

VBR

13-00000

NOTES

CIA IN 94006 19 Nov
Moscow's 1718 20 Nov

A. **Congo** A clandestine source tells us that Adoula will finally announce this morning the expulsion of all personnel of the Soviet and Czech embassies. This move has been hanging fire ever since security officials turned up evidence several weeks ago implicating personnel of these embassies in antigovernment activities. The Congolese ambassador in Moscow has been directed to destroy his classified files.

NBR

C 1B

B. **USSR** A new series of extended range missile tests seems to be upcoming. Three Soviet range instrumentation ships left Petropavlovsk nine days ago and are apparently headed for the more distant Pacific impact area, 6,500 miles from Tyuratam. There has so far been no announcement closing the area. (INTERCEPTS)

NBR

Hong Kong's 935 18 Nov

C. **Sino-Soviet** Peiping has been quick to exploit the opening provided by Barghoorn's release. To the Chinese this affair is an object lesson in how Khrushchev knuckles under to US pressure without getting a thing in return.

NBR

C 1B, plus R. Jack Smith X
08

D. **USSR-Cuba** The five passenger ships we mentioned in last Thursday's *Checklist* have docked and departed. Some of them brought in rotational troops and all of them took out Soviet personnel. We cannot strike a firm balance on the basis of the evidence we now have, but it is possible that as many Soviets went out as came in. (INTERCEPTS)

24

(Cont'd)

5/BR

13-00000

E. Czechoslovakia-Mali We have an intercepted message from the Malian ambassador in Prague reporting incidents between Czechs and Malians a week ago Sunday. There were, the ambassador notes, "only six wounded on the Malian side." (INTERCEPT)

BD 3882

NBR

F. Japan Ikeda does not appear to be in any particular trouble in tomorrow's elections. The long-range trend toward the left in popular vote will probably be apparent, but Ikeda's Liberal Democratic Party should retain a safe majority in the next Diet. The leftists have tried to turn rising prices and last week's twin disasters into election ammunition, but without marked success.

CIB

NBR

G. Indonesia Djakarta is trying to round up support for making Sukarno's little Olympics, the "Games of the New Emerging Forces," a permanent thing. In making a pitch along these lines to the Philippine ambassador, a high Indonesian official candidly admitted that Djakarta views this sort of athletic competition as a means of achieving political ends. (INTERCEPTS)

State, Dig sum
19 Nov

NBR

H. Israel The Israeli foreign office says Ben Gurion is denying the Sulzberger account in last Saturday's New York Times of Ben Gurion's "hints" about experiments in "military atomics" at Dimona. Ambassador Barbour is not entirely convinced of this, however, and recalls Ben Gurion's oft-expressed opinion that it does no harm to let Nasir worry about Dimona.

Tel Aviv 580
18 Nov
NY Times, 16 Nov

NBR

I. Brazil A new round of army promotions and shifts in command are due to be announced Monday. Anti-Goulart elements fear, probably with good reason, that their ranks will be further thinned. Congenital plotters on the far right are talking coup yet again.

TDCS
3/565,256
19 Nov

NBR

5/BR

13-00000

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. ____________

COPY ________ OF ________

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

____________ ____________ ____________ ____________

____________ ____________ ____________ ____________

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

22 NOVEMBER 1963
~~TOP SECRET~~

In honor of President Kennedy
for whom the President's Intelligence Checklist
was first written on 17 June 1961

For The President Only ~~Top Secret~~

For this day, the Checklist Staff can find no words more fitting than a verse quoted by the President to a group of newspapermen the day he learned of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Bullfight critics ranked in rows
Crowd the enormous plaza full;
But only one is there who knows
And he's the man who fights the bull.

For The President Only ~~Top Secret~~

13-00000

THE WHITE HOUSE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

WHASA

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

TOP SECRET DINAR
CLASSIFICATION

22 NOV 63
DATE

FROM: CIA/OCI

TO: EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

INFO:

CITE________________

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST, 22 NOVEMBER 1963

PAGE______OF______

WHASA FORM 12
1 JAN 61

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST--22 NOVEMBER 1963

1. USSR:

Mil. Div Hilites, 21 Nov

A. "GRIFFON", THE SOVIET ANTIMISSILE DISPLAYED IN THE 7 NOVEMBER MOSCOW PARADE, APPEARS DESIGNED ONLY FOR USE WITHIN THE ATMOSPHERE.

B. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF PHOTOS OF THE MISSILE INDICATES IT WEIGHS ABOUT 2,000 POUNDS LESS,AND HAS LESS THRUST THAN ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED.

NBR

C. ITS PROBABLE BEST PERFORMANCE ALTITUDES ARE FROM 50,000 TO 100,000 FEET, AND IT IS NOT THEREFORE COMPARABLE TO THE HIGHER THRUST NIKE-ZEUS SYSTEM.

2. CAMBODIA:

S/S Phnom. Penh 391 395 394

BD-471

Reuters 102

A. SIHANOUK HAS GIVEN THE FRENCH IN PHNOM PENH FOREWARNING THAT HE PLANS TO REVIVE HIS NEUTRALITY GUARANTEE PROPOSALS.

B. HE WANTS THE TWELVE GENEVA CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS TO MEET IN SOME ASIAN CITY, "AT THE GREAT POWERS' EXPENSE," TO WORK OUT A NEUTRALITY GUARANTEE DECLARATION.

NBR

C. THE FRENCH SAY THEY PLAN TO RESPOND FAVORABLY AND HOPE WE WILL TOO,LEST SIHANOUK OTHERWISE TAKE THE FINAL IRREVOCABLE STEP INTO THE COMMUNIST BLOC.

(CONT'D)

2/BR

D. MEANWHILE PEIPING HAS DECLARED IT WOULD GIVE "ALL-OUT SUPPORT SHOULD CAMBODIA ENCOUNTER ARMED INVASION INSTIGATED BY THE US OR ITS VASSALS."

E. [redacted] MINISTER OF DEFENSE LON NOL HAS INTIMATED TO GENERAL TABER THAT THE CAMBODIAN MILITARY DOES NOT APPROVE OF TERMINATION OF US AID. CAMBODIAN MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE US RETAINS A RESERVOIR OF GOOD WILL WITHIN THE COUNTRY'S MILITARY.

NBR

3. NOTES:

FBIS 21

A. CUBA-US: A PRENSA LATINA ITEM YESTERDAY DATELINED NEW YORK, SAYS THE STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA HAS STARTED ORGANIZING ANOTHER TRIP, HOPEFULLY TO INCLUDE AS MANY AS 500 STUDENTS THIS TIME. OVER 100 ARE SAID TO HAVE APPLIED SO FAR.

IN 66089
Memo from Col. Anderson

B. U-2 CRASH: SALVAGE OPERATIONS CONTINUE ON THE WRECKAGE OF THE U-2. THERE IS STILL NO TRACE OF THE PILOT, CAPTAIN HYDE, WHO EVIDENTLY EJECTED SOMETIME BEFORE IMPACT.

Copenhagen 383

C. DENMARK-USSR: DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER HAEKKERUP, VISITING KHRUSHCHEV ON THURSDAY, PRESENTED HIM WITH A MADE-IN-DENMARK ROCKING CHAIR, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD NOW BE POSSIBLE TO ROCK IN RHYTHM IN BOTH THE KREMLIN AND THE WHITE HOUSE. APPARENTLY KHRUSHCHEV WILL BE MAKING HIS SCANDANAVIAN TOUR NEXT SPRING.

NBR

(CONT'D)

2/BR

FBIS 11
CIWR
7Nov

D. JAPAN: YESTERDAY'S JAPANESE ELECTION DID NOT CHANGE THE GENERAL BALANCE BETWEEN CONSERVATIVES AND SOCIALISTS IN THE DIET. WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO MAKE A DETAILED ANALYSIS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT IKEDA'S POSITION WITHIN THE PARTY MAY BE SOMEWHAT LESS SECURE. THE SOCIALISTS GAINED A FEW SEATS, BUT FELL SHORT OF THEIR GOAL OF BREAKING THE "ONE-THIRD BARRIER."

NBR

S/S
Djakarta
1127

E. INDONESIA-US: INDONESIAN OFFICIALS ARE LETTING IT BE KNOWN INDIRECTLY, VIA THE OIL COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES, THAT SUKARNO MAY WELL HOLD UP SIGNATURE OF THE LAW RATIFYING OIL CONTRACTS WITH THE BIG THREE UNTIL THE US POSITION ON AID TO INDONESIA IS "CLARIFIED." US AID THEY SAY WAS PROMISED BY WILSON WYATT AS PART OF A "PACKAGE DEAL" FOR SETTLING WITH THE OIL COMPANIES.

NBR

2/BR

file
✓ Johnson

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. **South Vietnam**

Note from Ed Hauck 22 Nov

C1B

a. Vietnamese Communist efforts to discredit the new Saigon regime stayed in high gear this week.

b. The number of armed attacks was off from the high of the previous week but still some 50% above the year's weekly average.

c. These attacks have been, for the most part, small-scale efforts directed against the government's paramilitary forces in the villages. They have been designed more for their psychological impact than for immediate military gain.

d. A high volume of messages on Viet Cong military and political communications nets indicates a probable continuation of this effort.

e. The new government is responding by stepping up its own military operations. It is also setting about the hard job of revamping the Diem government apparatus and harnessing broader popular support for the war effort.

f. The generals have been dealing fairly effectively with

(Cont'd)


CARIBBEAN SEA
CURAÇAO
BONAIRE
GRENADA (U.K.)
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
Port of Spain
GOLFO DE VENEZUELA
LAGO DE MARACAIBO
Maracaibo
Cabimas
CARACAS
La Asunción
Carúpano
Cumaná
Barcelona
Carúpito
Maturín
Tucupita
El Tigre
Puerto Ordaz
El Sombrero
Barquisimeto
San Lorenzo
Trujillo
Guanare
Encontrados
Mérida
Barinas
Cúcuta
San Fernando de Apure
Puerto Ayacucho
COLOMBIA
BRITISH GUIANA
BR. GUIANA
BRAZIL
VENEZUELA
Selected railroad
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
12
10
8
6
4
2
630730

NBR

VBR

their new responsibilities. There are, however, a few signs of dissension within this group and between it and civilian politicians.

g. One of the more ambitious and troublesome figures is the able but opportunistic General Ton That Dinh, the new Minister of Security. He has been travelling about the country spreading the idea that the coup was largely his doing and seems bent on developing his own independent base of power. He is a man to watch.

h. The new regime has also embarked on a purge of high military officers who sided with Diem during the Buddhist crisis and failed to get on the right side soon enough. (INTERCEPTS)

2. Venezuela

orally from Godfrey Lundigan

OCI memo 11 Oct 63

a. The death toll from the terrorist outburst in Caracas last Tuesday and Wednesday now stands at about 30.

b. This is the high water mark thus far in the campaign of the Castro-supported Communist extremists to disrupt the national elections a week from tomorrow.

NBR

(Cont'd)

NBR

c. The Betancourt government has struck back hard. Its new unified command over the security forces, set up at US urging, passed this initial test with flying colors.

d. At least 500 extremists were arrested and the round-up is still going on. Their removal will hamper the Communist drive against elections in major cities like Caracas.

e. We now expect the elections to be held on schedule, a considerable achievement under the circumstances. The elections will be followed, however, by a Communist effort to prevent the March inauguration of the victor.

f. The rub here is that none of the presidential candidates commands President Betancourt's considerable assets for dealing successfully with the harsh realities of Venezuelan politics. The constitution prevents Betancourt from succeeding himself.

g. In the background, as always, looms the military, which could intervene if the president-elect shows signs of being soft on communism.

NBR

NBR

CUBA

Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Sites


HAVANA
HAVANA EAST
Mariel
Artemisa
Santiago de las Vegas
Remedios
SAN JULIAN
(Training site)
Isle of Pines
Holguin
Santiago de Cuba
U.S. Naval Base
▲ New site
● Unchanged site
Estimated range
0 50 100
NAUTICAL MILES

34095

11 OCTOBER 1963

SECRET

3. USSR-Cuba

BD 0357
22 Nov

Mil Div hilites
22 Nov

OCI Briefing note
21 Nov

a. In the past week we intercepted Cuban military messages which show that Cuban interpreters are now posted at several surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites on the island. 24 24

b. We think this means that on-site training of Cubans has begun on schedule. Field training is to last six months, after which the SAM system may be turned over to Castro.

c. In the past month some 1,500 Soviets arrived in Cuba. Most of these were probably SAM experts, sent to monitor the training.

d. Prior to their coming, we had detected no more than a few hundred Soviet military personnel entering Cuba since the October crisis last year.

e. We estimate that at least 15,000, and probably closer to 18,000, have been withdrawn in the intervening 13 months, leaving, very roughly, 4,000 to 7,000. Those remaining are for the most part advisors whose main functions are to train and supervise Cubans in the use of weapons turned over to them.

(Cont'd)

21BR

COMMUNICATION ROUTES BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND BERLIN



Kiel
Stralsund
Hamburg
Buechen
Schwanheide
Lauenburg
Horst
Bremen
Prenzlau
Neuruppin
SOVIET
POLAND
Wittenberge
Liebenwalde
Wriezen
Stendal
Tathenow
EAST BERLIN
BERLIN
Vorsfelde
Oebisfelde
Hannover
Canal
Helmstedt
Marienborn
ZONE
Magdeburg
Jueterbog
Cottbus
Dessau
FEDERAL
Walkenried
Ellrich
Halle
Kassel
REPUBLIC
Herleshausen
Wartha
Hoenebach
Gerstungen
Probstzella
OF GERMANY
Ludwigstadt
Gutenfuerst
Toepen
Hof
Frankfurt
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Limit of Polish Administration
Railroad
Autobahn
Road
Canal
Air Corridor
Control Points for Allied Traffic:
▲ Soviet
▲ Allied
Interzonal Border Crossing Points:
△ East
△ West
MILES
KILOMETERS
100

UNCLASSIFIED

Boundaries are not necessarily those

NBR

\IBR

f. All Soviet weapons introduced into Cuba last year have been withdrawn or turned over to the Cubans. The only significant exception is the SAM system. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

4. **Berlin**

a. We have had an indication that Soviet harassment of Allied access routes to West Berlin will shift this weekend to the air corridors.

CIB submission

b. The Soviet man at the Berlin air traffic control center told the Allied representatives yesterday that Soviet transports would be using the air corridors for brief flights during the next five weekends.

c. Moscow has tried on a number of past occasions to assert its right to restrict Allied use of the air corridors. In early 1962, the Soviets attempted to reserve "blocks" of air space for their own use. They have since demanded that Western flights stay between stipulated altitudes, that we file flight plans in advance and provide prior notice of border-crossing times.

(Cont'd)

13 00000

[redacted]

d. This sort of harassment stopped in the spring of 1962 when Soviet leaders became convinced that the US was interested in a serious discussion of a Berlin settlement. Moscow may hope that the threat of more of this sort of harassment will jog the US into talks on Berlin.

5. **Iraq-Syria-UAR**

a. It now appears that President Arif's role in last Monday's coup in Baghdad may have been virtually that of a bystander.

Bagdad 571

b. According to our latest information, Arif was wakened early that morning and given five minutes to join up. Tahir Yahya, now prime minister, was reportedly the organizer.

NBR

c. Whatever Arif's role may have been, the coup was primarily an effort by the Iraqi Army to curtail the activities of the extreme wing of the Baath Party. The Baath is an Arab nationalist political organization, active throughout the Arab world, which has been ruling Iraq and Syria.

(Cont'd)

NBR

d. The coup group has not thrown all Baathists out of the government; there are party members in the new cabinet.

e. Syrian Baathists have welcomed this retention of their Iraqi brothers. Their attitude springs from the recognition that the Baath in Syria cannot stay afloat without support from Iraq. Even so, we hear talk of coup plotting in Damascus.

C\B, 21NW

TDCS 3/565, 576
22NW

f. The reaction of Nasir's Egypt, which passionately desires to see the Baath go under, has been exactly the opposite. Cairo has been backing off its all-out support for the coup ever since the new cabinet was announced.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

CIB

NBR

NBR

13-00000

SOVIET EXTENDED RANGE IMPACT AREAS


TYURATAM
USSR
ARCTIC OCEAN
CANADA
UNITED STATES
CHINA
VLADIVOSTOK
SEA OF OKHOTSK
BERING SEA
SEA OF JAPAN
KOREA
JAPAN
APPROX. 4900 NM
APPROX. 6500 NM
NORTHERN IMPACT AREA
Midway Islands
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
Johnston Island
PACIFIC OCEAN
SOUTHERN IMPACT AREA
AUSTRALIA

NBR

TOP SECRET
DINAR

33741

NBR

NOTES

A. **USSR** New activity involving Soviet range instrumentation ships in the Pacific appears to be forthcoming. Three instrumentation ships left Petropavlovsk 12 days ago and are apparently headed for the more distant Pacific impact area, 6,500 miles from Tyuratam. We are looking for extended range ICBM tests but we do not exclude a space event. There has so far been no announcement closing the area. (INTERCEPTS)

C/L
20 Nov

NBR

B. **Congo-USSR** Soviet embassy personnel have not yet left Leopoldville, but their departure is expected momentarily. They were ordered out of the country after the Congolese turned up good documentary evidence of their complicity in anti-government plots. One of the items taken off a Soviet diplomat the other day was a letter from an anti-Adoula leader now in Brazzaville asking for funds and arms to overthrow the Leopoldville government.

TDCS
3/565, 591
22 Nov

NBR

C. **Britain** The Labor Party scored again in the Dundee West by-election Thursday, increasing its 1959 majority of 719 to a thumping 4,955. Heartened by this, Labor is now pushing for general elections at once. Prime Minister Home is not likely to accede.

Cont. on
Briefs
22 Nov
R9 "

NBR

D. **Ecuador** The military junta which has run Ecuador since July may be about to come unstuck. We have a report that one of the less savory members of the group, air force Colonel Freiles, will try to take over full control this weekend. We are not sure of the reliability of this report, but Freiles is known to have been making motions in this direction.

DO-A 3,283,819
22 Nov

CIWR
8 Nov

NBR

(Cont'd)

NBR

SOVIET EARTH SATELLITE VEHICLES - COSMOS SERIES

1962 - 1963

SECRET

1962

	APPROXIMATE TIME OF LAUNCH (GMT)	LAUNCH SITE	PERIOD (MINUTES)	APOGEE (N.M.)	PERIGEE (N.M.)	ORBITAL INCLINATION	STATUS
Cosmos 1 (Sputnik 13)	**12:00:00 (EST.) 16 Mar '62**	**Kapustin Yar**	**96.35**	**529**	**117**	**49°**	**Decayed 25 May '62**
Cosmos 2 (Sputnik 14)	**1715:18 6 Apr '62**	**Kapustin Yar**	**102.5**	**842**	**115**	**49°**	**Decayed 19-20 Aug '63**
Cosmos 3 (Sputnik 15)	**0400:12 24 Apr '62**	**Kapustin Yar**	**93.8**	**389**	**124**	**49°**	**Decayed 17 Oct. '62**
Cosmos 4 * (Sputnik 16)	1002:56 26 Apr '62	Tyuratam	90.6	178	161	65°	Recovered 29 Apr '62
Cosmos 5 (Sputnik 17)	**0259:49 28 May '62**	**Kapustin Yar**	**102.75**	**865**	**110**	**49°**	**Decayed 2 May '63**
Cosmos 6 (Sputnik 18)	**1600:00 (EST.) 30 June '62**	**Kapustin Yar**	**90.6**	**194**	**148**	**49°**	**Decayed 8 Sept '62**
Cosmos 7 * (Sputnik 19)	0918:30 28 July '62	Tyuratam	90.1	199	113	65°	Recovered [illegible] Aug '62
Cosmos 8 (Sputnik 22)	**0500:00 (EST.) 18 Aug '62**	**Kapustin Yar**	**92.93**	**326**	**138**	**49°**	**Decayed 17 Aug '63**
Cosmos 9 * (Sputnik 26)	0940:00 27 Sept '62	Tyuratam	90.9	191	163	65°	Recovered [illegible] Oct '62
Cosmos 10 (Sputnik 27)	0900:01 (EST.) 17 Oct '62	Tyuratam	90.2	205	113	65°	Recovered [illegible] Oct '62
Cosmos 11 (Sputnik 28)	**0655:00 (EST.) 20 Oct '62**	**Kapustin Yar**	**96.1**	**497**	**132**	**49°**	**Decayed 6 June '63**
Cosmos 12 (Sputnik 32)	0924:40 22 Dec '62	Tyuratam	90.45	243	114	65°	Recovered [illegible] Dec '62

1963

	APPROXIMATE TIME OF LAUNCH (GMT)	LAUNCH SITE	PERIOD (MINUTES)	APOGEE (N.M.)	PERIGEE (N.M.)	ORBITAL INCLINATION	STATUS
Cosmos 13 (Sputnik 34)	0830:00 21 Mar '63	Tyuratam	89.77	182	11[illegible]	[illegible]° 58'	Recovered 29 Mar '63
Cosmos 14 (Sputnik 36)	**1059:59 13 Apr '63**	**Kapustin Yar**	**92.1**	**276**	**143**	**48° 57'**	**Decayed 29 Aug '63**
Cosmos 15 * (Sputnik 37)	0829:58 22 Apr '63	Tyuratam	89.77	203	93	65°	Recovered 27 April '63
Cosmos 16 (Sputnik 38)	0850:00 (EST.) 28 Apr '63	Tyuratam	90.4	213	[illegible]	65° [illegible]	Recovered [illegible] May '63
Cosmos 17 (Sputnik 39)	**0300:00 (EST.) 22 May '63**	**Kapustin Yar**	**94.8**	**425**	**140**	**49°**	**In orbit, silent since 31 May '63**
Cosmos 18 (Sputnik 40)	1034:07 24 May '63	Tyuratam	89.44	163	[illegible]	65° [illegible]	Recovered [illegible] June '63
Cosmos 19 (Sputnik 43)	**0600:00 (EST.) 6 Aug '63**	**Kapustin Yar**	**92.2**	**280**	**146**	**49°**	**In orbit, transmitting**
Cosmos 20 (Sputnik 44)	0929:58 18 Oct '63	Tyuratam	89.[illegible]	163	[illegible]	[illegible]	Recovered [illegible]
Failure	**24 Oct '63**	**Kapustin Yar**	-	-	-	-	-
Cosmos 21 (Sputnik 46)	0623:39 11 Nov '63	Tyuratam	[illegible]	124	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Cosmos 22 (Sputnik 47)	1034:25 16 Nov '63	Tyuratam	90.[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Recovered [illegible]

NBR

NBR

E. **Thailand** Prime Minister Sarit, who suffers from an incurable liver disease, is failing. Doctors attending him, including one of our own, give him no more than six months more. Sarit has attempted to arrange for an orderly succession when he does go. The chances of this are not good; Thai politicians and military figures are already jostling one another for position.

IN 66316
22 Nov

Bangkok
823
22 Nov

NBR

F. **USSR** Cosmos 22, launched a week ago, was recovered yesterday. It is the eleventh unmanned satellite to be recovered. All recoverable satellites have been launched from Tyuratam, the main Soviet missile test center, and recovered after three to ten days aloft. A series of non-recoverable satellites has been fired from Kapustin Yar.
(See Chart)
(INTERCEPTS)

CIB

x

NBR

NBR

13-00000

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. ________________

COPY ________ OF ________

~~Handle Via~~

~~COMINT~~

~~Channels~~

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

__________ __________ __________ __________

__________ __________ __________ __________

~~NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

13-00000

file

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

24 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. North Vietnam - South Vietnam

S/S Vientiane 623
~~[illegible]~~
IN 66678
Saigon 1068
S/S Paris 2506

a. North Vietnamese leaders are pressing their campaign for neutralization of South Vietnam.

b. They can count on Cambodia's support. Prince Sihanouk has said he believes neutralization of South Vietnam to be the only way to keep his country and the rest of the area from falling eventually into Communist hands.

c. The French feel the same way. Indeed, Souvanna Phouma reportedly told a closed session of the Laotian National Assembly that the French were urging him to support Hanoi in this.

d. Moreover, according to one of our clandestine sources, the North Vietnamese have talked Souvanna into backing the neutralization proposition in the UN.

e. The troublesome Polish ICC delegate in Laos, Marek Thee (who will be going home soon), has just returned to Vientiane from Hanoi and is trying, with somewhat less success, to enlist British support too.

(Cont'd)



LAOS
International boundary
Province boundary
National capital
Province capital
Railroad
Road
Track or trail
0 25 50 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
UNCLASSIFIED
Boundaries and names are not necessarily cogniz. U.S.G
BURMA
NORTH VIETNAM
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
SOUTH VIETNAM
PHONG SALY
NAMTHA
LUANG PRABANG
HOUA PHAN
XIENG KHOUANG
SAYABOURY
VIENTIANE
KHAMMOUANE
SAVANNAKHET
SARAVANE
CHAMPASSAK
ATTOPEU
Ha Giang
Lao Kay
Cao Bang
Bac Kan
Ning-ming
Lai Chau
Muong Ou Neua
Yen Bay
Lang Son
Thai Nguyen
Mon Cay
ILE DE KE BAO
Phong Saly
Muong La
Dien Bien Phu
Son La
Phu Lang Thuong
Hon Gay
Muong Sing
Namtha
HANOI
Hai Duong
Haiphong
ILE CAC BA
Hoa Binh
Muong Sai
Ban Sop Ngum
Phu Ly
Nam Dinh
Ninh Binh
Sam Neua
Ban Houei Sai
Luang Prabang
Thanh Hoa
Ban Ban
Khang Khay
Plaine des Jarres
Phou Khoung
Xieng Khouang
Cua Rao
Sayaboury
Ban Ta Viang
Vang Vieng
Muang Nan
Vinh
Pak Sane
Ha Tinh
CAP MUI RON
Muang Phrae
VIENTIANE
Lak Sao
Nong Khai
Nhommarath
Uttaradit
Udon Thani
Muang Nakhon Phanom
Thakhek
Dong Hoi
Dan Sai
Muang Sakon Nakhon
Demarcation Line
Dong Ha
Tchepone
Bo Ho Su
Quang Tri
Muang Phitsanulok
Seno
Muong Phine
Mukdahan
Savannakhet
Hue
Muang Yasothon
Saravane
Ban Thateng
Muang Ubon
Warin Chamrap
Pakse
Surin
Attopeu
Khong
Bo Kham
BANGKOK
Samut Prakan
Chachoengsao
Ban Aranyaprathet
Poipet
Stung Treng
GULF OF
Buri
Sier
TONLE SAP
MEKONG
Black River
Red River
102
104
16
14

f. As part of the same campaign, the North Vietnamese have told the French they believe sentiment is growing in the US for withdrawal of US forces. They reportedly plan to keep the heat on to encourage it.

g. Hanoi is at the same time trying quietly to encourage the belief that it is ready to be reasonable.

h. To hear Thee tell it, North Vietnamese leaders feel that neutrality for South Vietnam and eventual reunification is the only way they, too, can escape from Peiping's clutches.

2. Laos

Vientiane 622, 614
Moscow 1726
BD 1643
Verbal from Hauck

a. As is usual in Laos, the tentative agreement for a cease-fire reached last week between Kong Le and Pathet Lao commander Singkapo came to naught.

NBR

b. Each side accuses the other of planning to use a cease-fire to screen preparations for larger attacks.

c. There is scattered fighting in the Plaine des Jarres. Lao Army, neutralist, and Meo guerrilla elements are jointly engaged in a limited offensive in the Vang Vieng

(Cont'd)

NBR

13-00000

area north of Vientiane on Route 13. They hope to gain control of that town and its small airfield.

d. We have been anticipating an expansion of the fighting with the recent advent of the dry season.

NBR

3. Cambodia

S/S Paris 2520
IN 67064, 67049
DIA, 23 Nov
S/S Phnom Penh 394
Phnom Penh 404, 403
BD - 4277, 4803
BD - 0676
Reuters 82, 66, 67
22 Nov

a. Sihanouk knows his actions against us have increased his vulnerability to the Communist bloc, and he is looking to the French to bail him out.

b. He has intimated that aid from France would be most welcome, and he has asked that French advisors stay on.

NBR

c. He apparently hopes that the availability of French aid will enable him to keep his balance with the Communists and fend off their pressure.

d. The French have told our Embassy in Paris that plans are afoot for French Defense Minister Messmer to go to Cambodia in January.

(Cont'd)

21BR

YEMEN


Khamis Mushait
Abha
SAUDI ARABIA
Zahran
Najran
Qizan
Abu Arish
Saddah
Al Muwassam
Harad
Maydi
Kayda
Hajjah
Umran
KAMARAN (U.K.)
SANA
Marib
Sirwah
Jihannah
Harib
Area of Recent Clashes
RED SEA
Al Hudaydah
BAYHAN STATE
Dhamar
Ibb
Qatabah
TAIZZ
Mocha
ADEN
GULF OF ADEN
ETHIOPIA
FR. SOM.
STATUTE MILES
100
630827 6
SYRIA
JORDAN
IRAQ
Cairo
U. A. R. (EGYPT)
Ras Banas
Red Sea
SAUDI
Riyadh
Jidda
Mecca
Taif
ARABIA
SUDAN
Khartoum
Sana
YEMEN
ADEN
ETHIOPIA
Addis Ababa

UNCLASSIFIED

e. Sihanouk's actions toward the US have not been universally popular. This is particularly true among government officials, the business community (who have reason to fear stepped-up nationalization), and the military, where the US retains a considerable reservoir of goodwill.

NBR

f. Indications are that Sihanouk will try to win fuller support by creating new feuds with neighboring South Vietnam and Thailand. This is a gambit he has used to advantage in past difficulties.

4. Yemen-Egypt

IN 64695
S/S Taiz 307, 308, 306
S/S Cairo 1186

a. A number of Yemeni leaders have told us they want the Egyptians to get out of the Yemen. They want to be left alone to solve their own problems.

b. This is especially true of those Sheikhs with large tribal followings.

NBR

c. A general uprising against the Egyptians is not likely at the moment, but the longer they remain, the greater the possibility of major pro-government tribes deserting to the royalists.

(Cont'd)

2/BR

PARTY COMPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT OCTOBER 1963



63110

d. Nasir, with some 30,000 troops in the Yemen, has grudgingly promised to pull out 5,000 before the end of the year. So far there has been no sign he is preparing to do so.

e. So far as we can tell, Faysal has kept to his promise not to supply the Royalists before the latest extension of the UN observation mission runs out on 4 January.

f. But he has made plain his intention to resume supplying them thereafter. There has been a substantial build up of Saudi supply points north of the border.

NBR

5. Italy

Reuters 122, 154
verbal from
Dave Lubke
S/S Rome 1479
IN 65830

a. The Christian Democrats and Socialists have finally reached an agreement on cabinet assignments and a program for a "centerleft" coalition government.

b. Negotiations were especially tough, but apparently President Kennedy's death acted as a catalyst to bring the two together.

NBR

(Cont'd)

2/BR

c. We do not yet have any information on how differences in key issues such as MLF were worked out.

d. With Moro premier, Nenni will probably become vice-premier. Saragat, who is pro-US and pro-NATO, is most likely to be named Foreign Minister.

NBR

NBR

NOTES

A. **India-USSR** The Indian military attache in Moscow feels that the Russians are dragging their feet in the matter of military assistance for India. Meanwhile, we have a report (not yet confirmed) from New Delhi that Defense Minister Chavan has decided to look to us hereafter for fighter aircraft.

CIA
New Delhi
CX-278-63

NBR

B. **USSR** Our Embassy in Moscow has gotten word of strikes recently at Ryazan, near Moscow, and in Leningrad. The cause of the Ryazan incident is not clear, but bread shortages apparently were behind the Leningrad strikes. Similar disturbances were reported last month from several points in southern Russia.

SR/
Notes
21 Nov
Moscow
Weeka 46
15 Nov

NBR

NBR

PIC 25 Nov

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CIA/IPC		
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
David C. Hunphrey/LBJ Library	6/23/93

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

NLJ 94-484 (#3)

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-083/93 B]

COPY 1 OF ______

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-381
Document # 3

3

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. South Vietnam

a. Vietnamese Communist forces kept up their high post-coup level of activity over the weekend.

b. The most significant action was an attack early yesterday morning against a US special forces training camp some 30 miles from Saigon.

c. When the smoke cleared after a sharp fight, four US soldiers were missing and at least 35 South Vietnamese were dead.

d. Late yesterday morning, the Viet Cong shot down two aircraft supporting a government operation in the extreme south, and damaged twelve more. Two more Americans are missing in this action.

e. Back in Saigon, the new regime's troubles with the ambitious General Ton That Dinh continue.

f. He is still angling to get control of the important strategic hamlet program and has yet to give up command of the Third Corps, which the generals assigned to another of their number earlier in the month. This corps is of particular significance in that it surrounds Saigon.


Manila
BURMA
CAMBODIA
South Vietnam
South China Sea
PHILIPPINES
THAILAND
MALAYSIA
Kuala Lumpur
BRUNEI
Sabah
Sarawak
MALAYSIA
Celebes Sea
SINGAPORE
RIAU ISLANDS
SUMATRA
BORNEO
CELEBES
INDONESIA
Java Sea
Djakarta
Banda Sea
JAVA
TIMOR
INDIAN OCEAN
MALAYSIA
CONFIDENTIAL
0
MILES
1000
631124
34176
AUSTRALIA

2. **Indonesia-Malaysia**

a. Sukarno is beefing up the subversive aspects of his confrontation campaign against Malaysia.

b. Intercepted Indonesian messages indicate that regular army units will shortly begin infiltration operations across the border into Sarawak and Sabah.

NBR

c. Seven thousand regular army troops in Indonesian Borneo, the messages show, are getting an intensified course in guerrilla tactics. This training is to be completed next month.

d. Other messages speak of the arrival, beginning today, of a battalion of regulars from West Java. (INTERCERPTS throughout)

3. **Venezuela**

a. The weekend was marred only by sporadic and minor acts of terrorism in several cities. Government security forces have the situation generally under control.

b. The Venezuelan Air Force is stepping up its efforts to track down and destroy intruder aircraft. The Venezuelans are convinced that planes have been ferrying supplies to pro-Castro guerrillas in the mountains of the northwest.

NBR

(Cont'd)

2/BR


VENEZUELA
630919 5
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
12
10
8
6
4
2
CURAÇAO
(Neth.)
BONAIRE
GRENADA
(U.K.)
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
Port of Spain
COLOMBIA
Amuay
El Cardón
Coro
Maracaibo
Cabimas
San Lorenzo
Trujillo
Encontrados
Mérida
Barinas
Cúcuta
Barquisimeto
Guanare
San Felipe
Valencia
Maracay
Caracas
Los Teques
San Carlos
San Juan de los Morros
El Calvario
San Fernando de Apure
La Asunción
Carúpano
Cumaná
Barcelona
Puerto La Cruz
Caripito
Maturín
El Tigre
Tucupita
Puerto Ordáz
Puerto Ayacucho
BRITISH GUIANA
COLOMBIA
BRAZIL
BRAZIL
BR. GUIANA

c. The Betancourt government has scheduled a press conference tomorrow to break the story that a three-ton cache of Cuban arms has been unearthed. A formal accusation against Cuba is to be made before the Organization of American States a week from today.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

NBR

4. Iraq

a. The air of tension in Baghdad dissipated somewhat after the government lifted the curfew and once again permitted private vehicles on the streets.

b. Neither the city nor its new rulers are, however, at ease. Troops are still very much in evidence.

c. The new regime apparently is not convinced that the hard core of the Baath Party and its paramilitary supporters have been put down for good.

NBR

5. Syria

a. We have information that a showdown between the moderate and extremist factions of the ruling Baath Party in Syria is fast approaching.

NBR

(Cont'd)

3/BR

b. A clandestine source identifies Prime Minister Hafiz as the leading figure on the side of moderation. General Umran heads the doctrinaire extremists.

c. It was a split along the same lines that brought about the Baath Party's fall from power in Iraq.

NBR

6. Italy

a. Premier-designate Moro expects that the program for a "center-left" coalition government will be approved today by the four parties involved.

b. Details of the foreign policy planks are not yet available, but they were drafted with the thought that the death of President Kennedy makes it more important for Italy to play an active role within the Western alliance.

NBR

c. After the program has been approved, the final selection of a cabinet can be undertaken. This could take the rest of the week.

2 NBR


CAIRO
JORDAN
IRAQ
KUWAIT
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL ZONE
UAR
(EGYPT)
RIYADH
SAUDI ARABIA
Aswan
Ras Banas
Yenbo
Medina
Jidda
Mecca
Taif
Khamis Mushait
Najran
Qizan
Sadah
Boundary undefined
SANA
Marib
Al Hudaydah
Al Bayda
TAIZZ
ADEN PROTECTORATE
ADEN
ETHIOPIA
0
STATUTE MILES
400
6308013
SAUDI ARABIA
Abha
Zahran
Najran
Qizan
Sadah
Harad
Maydi
Major road
Other road or track
0
STATUTE MILES
100
UNCLASSIFIED
Wadi al Jawf
Abs
Hajjah
Umran
Raudha
Marib
Sirwah
Jihannah
Harib
SANA
KAMARAN (U.K.)
Al Hudaydah
Ibb
Qatabah
Ad Dali
Al Bayda
TAIZZ
Mocha
ADEN PROTECTORATE
ADEN
ETHIOPIA
FRENCH SOMALILAND

YEMEN

7. UAR-Yemen-Egypt

a. The Saudis told our embassy in Jidda yesterday that a Saudi village near the Yemeni border was attacked Thursday by Egyptian aircraft.

b. It was the second time this month that Yemeni-based Egyptian aircraft have struck across the border into Saudi Arabia.

c. As in the previous cases, the Saudis have lodged a formal complaint with the UN Observation Mission.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

NBR

NBR

NOTES

A. **Oswald** Press stories to the effect that Lee Harvey Oswald recently visited Mexico City are true, according to our information. Oswald visited both the Cuban and the Soviet embassies on 28 September. He was trying, we are told, to arrange for visas so that he could travel to the USSR via Havana. He returned to the US on 3 October.

B. **Brazil** A new round of military promotions and reassignments will be made public today. The present instability of the Brazilian political scene is reflected in the numerous reports of coup plots which this event has precipitated.

NRR

24

C. **USSR** At last report the three Soviet range instrumentation ships were dead in the water 500 miles south of Johnston Island, roughly the same position they occupied for last year's extended range ICBM shots. No announcement closing this area of the Pacific to shipping has been made and there is no activity as yet at the Tyuratam missile test center, but we look for some action in the next few days. (INTERCEPTS)

24

D. **Algeria** We have a report from a good clandestine source that a group of army officers is plotting with Defense Minister Boumedienne to overthrow Ben Bella. A growing estrangement between the two has been apparent for some time, but this is the first good indication that Boumedienne is making common cause with those who wish to turn Ben Bella out of office.

(Cont'd)

3/BR

E. Australia - Communist China Peiping has signed contracts for just over one million tons of Australian grain to be delivered early next year. We had been expecting the Chinese Communists to enter the market, since they had another mediocre grain crop this year. Peiping has been buying close to five million tons of grain for the past several years. NBR

F. Congo We hear that the Soviet Embassy in Leopoldville had booked 75 places on a flight to Brussels last Saturday. There is still no information on whether any Soviet Embassy officials have actually departed, however. NBR

G. Berlin There was no new harassment of Allied access routes to Berlin over the weekend. A total of 16 flares were fired last evening near Tempelhof Airfield, but we connect these with Communist efforts to prevent escapes from East Berlin. East German police were observed stringing barbed wire in the same area a short time later. NBR

H. Laos The neutralists claim to have made significant gains in their limited offensive in the Vang Vieng area. They have not, however, been able to dislodge the Pathet Lao from positions within artillery range of the town's airport.
(Includes INTERCEPTS) NBR

4BR

13-00000

PJc 26 Nov

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CIA/IPC		
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
David C. Hunphrey/LBJ Library	6/23/93

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

NLJ 94-484 (#4)

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-084/93 B]

COPY 1 OF

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-381
Document # 4

4

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

26 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. Iraq-Syria

a. The shaky new accommodation between the two countries following the recent coup in Iraq has been threatened by Syria's action in granting asylum to Ali Saleh Saadi, the exiled leader of the extremist wing of the Iraqi Baath.

b. Saadi had arrived in Syria unannounced following a brief stay in Madrid. On Friday, Iraq sent a message asking Syria to expel him on grounds that sheltering him was a breach of agreement.

c. Both regimes continue to be troubled with internal dissension with affairs in one deeply tangled with those in the other.

NBR

d. In Syria, as we mentioned yesterday, the Baathist regime is split between moderates who desire a broadening of the government's power base, and a doctrinaire faction which wants to keep all control of the government in Baathist hands.

e. In Iraq, the pull is more away from the Baathists. Two ministers have threatened to resign unless the government adopts an openly pro-Egyptian policy. Nevertheless the government feels secure enough to ease up on curfew and transport restrictions imposed since the coup.

(Cont'd)

NBR


Luang Prabang
Nam Khan
Muong Khao
Muong Kheung
Ban Song Hoc
Lat Bouak
Ban Ban
13
7
PLATEAU DU TRAN NINH
Muong Soui
Nong Pet
Phou Keng
Khang Khay
Phou Khoun
7
Phong Savan
Nong Het
Muong Phanh
PLAINE DES JARRES
Dong Danh
Lat Houang
Xieng Khouang
NORTH VIETNAM
Muong Kassy
4
Ban Ta Viang
Tha Thom
Nam Ngum
Vang Vieng
L A O S
Ban Namone
Nam Nhiep
Ban Hin Heup
13
Pak Sane
13
THAILAND
LAOS
SECRET
Road
Track or trail
VIENTIANE
THAILAND
Nong Khai
0 10 20 30 40
STATUTE MILES
34247
6311 25 2

NBR

f. Iraq has announced that the military union with Syria remains in force, and that a new commander of the joint armies will be announced soon.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

2. Laos

a. Intercepted neutralist messages on Sunday reported that government forces had finally secured Vang Vieng and its airfield, long held by the Pathet Lao. They also told of the capture of Ban Namone farther south on Route 13.

NBR

b. The neutralist, rightist Lao Army, and Meo tribal guerrilla forces hope to sustain their coordinated clearing action until remaining Pathet Lao pockets in this area north of Vientiane are cleared.

c. Such operations in Laos have often been followed by a Communist riposte. We have a few indicators that something could be up on the Communist side, but these are so far very tenuous indeed.

d. One such indicator is a stand down in the last two weeks on the Hanoi-controlled military communications net in Laos which could

(Cont'd)

2/BR

point to a change in the disposition or strength of Communist forces. Other enemy nets are normal.

e. There are also unconfirmed reports of North Vietnamese troop reinforcements in the Plaine des Jarres.
(INTERCEPTS)

NBR

3. **South Vietnam**

a. According to press reports, Viet Cong attacks on Sunday wiped out two of the government's strategic hamlets in the central highlands about 250 miles north of Saigon.

b. More than 1,000 inhabitants in the hamlets--who are minority tribesmen--are missing and possibly have fled into the mountains. They abandoned a significant quantity of weapons to the Viet Cong.

c. These attacks not only suggest continued erosion of the government's programs to win over tribal support, but also signal that stepped-up Viet Cong pressure against the new regime is spreading to the north.

(Cont'd)

NBR

22 OCTOBER 1963 ICBM FIRING FROM PLESETSK


PLESETSK
ICBM IMPACT AREA
TYURATAM ICBM TEST RANGEHEAD
U S S R
ARCTIC OCEAN
NORTH SEA
NORWAY
SWEDEN
FINLAND
BALTIC SEA
BARENTS SEA
KARA SEA
LAPTEV SEA
EAST SIBERIAN SEA
BERING SEA
SEA OF OKHOTSK
SEA OF JAPAN
BLACK SEA
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
TURKEY
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
MONGOLIA
CHINA
KOREA
40
60
80
100
120
140
160

TOP SECRET DINAR
631027

32609 6-62

NBR

NBR

d. This Communist effort is aimed at discrediting the post-Diem regime before the new leadership is able to get its feet on the ground and capture the loyalty and respect of people in the provinces.

e. Although the Viet Cong still continues to draw its main strength from local recruiting, a steady stream of cadre and training personnel continues to make its way to the south from North Vietnam along the Laotian border.

f. We are now reasonably sure that at least 784 persons infiltrated from the north during 1963 and the actual total may be much higher.

4. USSR

a. There have been no further developments in Soviet preparations for a series of extended range ICBM shots to the Pacific. NBR

b. We probably should have had by now an announcement closing an area roughly 500 miles south of Johnston Island to shipping. We suspect the Soviets may have delayed it in order not to appear to be rattling rockets immediately after President Kennedy's death.

(Cont'd)

NBR

c. The USSR may repeat last year's performance of multiple firings from a prototype operational complex at Tyuratam. Three such launchings were attempted at five-minute intervals in May 1963; two succeeded.

d. We also do not rule out the possibility of firings from operational sites as opposed to the test center at Tyuratam. We observed the first such firing on 22 October from the Plesetsk site, roughly 400 miles northeast of Moscow. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

NBR

5. USSR-Berlin

a. Embassy Bonn feels that the Soviet Union may be seeking at least a temporary modus vivendi on the autobahn without prejudicing its juridical position, which can be used to cause difficulties there in the future.

b. The embassy bases this on the Soviet replies to the Western notification to the USSR on 29 October regarding harmonized convoy procedures--two oral statements on 16 November and a note of 21 November.

NBR

(Cont'd)

2/BR

c. The Soviet note was designed to make a record, showing that the USSR exercises "control" of the autobahn and that the recent incidents resulted from US refusal to comply with "existing procedures."

d. On the other hand, the Soviet procedures described in the oral replies seem to reflect actual Allied practices, though there is enough ambiguity to afford the USSR flexibility in any future actions.

NBR

6. Brazil

a. The danger of an immediate coup against the Goulart regime has receded with the reported decision of Second Army Commander General Bevilaqua not to join the coup plotters.

b. Bevilaqua, who has been something of a storm center, may have been asked to hand over his command today as part of a series of reassignments made by President Goulart to keep the military off balance.

NBR

c. On the other side of the coin, there is widespread belief that Goulart himself will at some time resort to a coup to establish an authoritarian regime.

(Cont'd)

NBR

d. As one example Raneiri Mazzilli, President of the Chamber of Deputies and next in line for the presidency, told Ambassador Gordon on Saturday that he profoundly mistrusts Goulart's intentions and intends to maintain the strictest congressional vigilance.

NBR

e. Our station in Brazil believes that Goulart is living in a dream world. He seems either out of touch with reality or very poorly informed. Public opinion is not with him and the tradition that political power should only be transferred constitutionally is very strong in the army, coup reports notwithstanding.

f. The biggest danger from this quarter is that the opposition may resort to some illegal act, giving Goulart the excuse to take over.

NBR

NOTES

A. Ethiopia-Congo Haile Selassie has acceded to our ambassador's request and is rescinding his earlier decision to withdraw the 1,743-man Ethiopian contingent from the UN force in the Congo. NBR

B. Communist China - Africa The Guinean ambassador in Peiping has it unofficially that Premier Chou En-lai will leave in mid-December for a tour of some Afro-Asian countries. He is to stop first in Egypt and then visit several other African countries including Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. Chou would be the highest ranking Chinese leader ever to visit Africa. (INTERCEPTS) NBR

C. Indonesia-Philippines Two good sources have reported that President Sukarno plans to go to Manila this Thursday to confer with Philippine President Macapagal. No reasons have been advanced for the visit. Our chargé guesses that it is an Indonesian move to head off Philippine recognition of Malaysia. NBR

D. Venezuela The terrorists have struck again, this time firing six US-owned oil and gas pipelines near the northeastern city of Puerto la Cruz. The elections are still on for Sunday, and we look for a maximum effort from the pro-Castro terrorist organization. NBR

E. Congo We now have word that 49 members of the Soviet Embassy, including dependents, left Leopoldville on Saturday aboard a Sabena flight for Brussels. They are expected to book onward passage for Moscow. It is reported that the Congolese will allow one Russian without diplomatic status to stay to look after Soviet property. NBR

5/BR

27 Nov

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CIA/IPC		
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
David C. Hunphrey/LBJ Library	6/23/93

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

NLJ 94-424 (#5)

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-085/93 B]

COPY 1 OF ______

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

______ ______ ______ ______

______ ______ ______ ______

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-381
Document # 5

5

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

SECRET

SECRET


HAVANA
ISLE OF PINES
Nipe Bay
U.S. Naval Base
CUBA
● SAM SITE
0
100
NAUTICAL MILES

63 11 26 6

SECRET

1. Cuba

a. Cuban tents are now beginning to appear at a number of the SAM sites--further evidence that training of Cubans in operation of SAM equipment has begun as scheduled.

b. High-altitude photography taken this past weekend shows these tents at six SAM sites in western Cuba. These sites are in addition to those at which we noted the presence of Cuban interpreters as we reported on Saturday.

c. This training should be completed by next May or June.

d. Just before the training started, we noted a series of moves involving the relocation of eight of the SAM sites.

e. The purpose, it appears, was to shift the mission of the system from an area defense of the island as a whole to point defense of specific targets, particularly Havana. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

24

2. Syria-Iraq

a. Syrian leaders have acceded to pressure from Iraq and have expelled Iraqi Baathist extremist Ali Saadi. He has gone to Athens

NBR

2/BR



PARTY STRENGTHS IN TURKISH ELECTIONS
(as % of total vote)

631125

b. This is an earnest of the desire of moderate Baathist leaders in Damascus to preserve workable relations with Iraq, partly as a counterbalance to Cairo and partly to preserve what remains of Baathist influence in Baghdad.

c. Intercepts show at least some Syrian troops will remain in Iraq at the request of Iraqi officials.

d. Preparations had been under way for these forces to withdraw; retention of at least some in Iraq is another sign that both regimes hope to preserve something of the relations they once had. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

NBR

3. Turkey

a. Prime Minister Inonu's coalition government is about to collapse.

b. It has long been shaky. Last week it was dealt a severe setback when the opposition Justice Party, heir of the Menderes regime, emerged from local elections as the country's majority party.

NBR

(Cont'd)

ZIBR

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE



631021 2A

NBR

SOVIET GRAIN PRODUCTION

(million metric tons)

	ALL GRAINS		WHEAT ALONE	
	Soviet Official	US Estimate	Soviet Official	US Estimate
1958	141	125	77	63
1959	126	100	69	55
1960	134	100	64	46
1961	137	115	67	55
1962	148	115	71	57
1963	---	100-110	---	42-46

631021 2B

CONFIDENTIAL

NBR

c. Now the Peasant Party, one of the three in the coalition, has voted to pull out, and probably will do so as soon as Inonu gets back from Washington. Another partner, the Turkey Party, has wanted to pull out, and apparently has stayed in only because of pressure from the military.

d. A new coalition is at least a theoretical possibility, with a number of independents taking the place of the Peasant Party, but Inonu probably would not be prime minister.

NBR

e. The military are working for an all-party coalition. This way, they feel, they could keep tabs on the Justice Party, but the Justice Party is not likely to buy this arrangement.

f. As matters now stand, the military would take over the government itself before it would let the Justice Party form one.

4. USSR wheat

a. Soviet President Brezhnev has told the Iranian prime minister that the decision to buy wheat abroad was taken to avoid lowering reserves, which he has described as ample for one or two years. We think the situation is more serious than that.

NBR

(Cont'd)

21BR

b. This year's harvest was clearly very bad. The weight of evidence suggests that Soviet grain stockpiles have been far drawn down this year and are not sufficient to protect the country from another poor harvest.

c. Our estimate is that total grain production each year since 1958 has been well below that year's level of 125 million tons, while the population has continued to grow.

d. We have seen from intercepts signs of extensive slaughtering in anticipation of fodder shortages during the winter. This runs counter to Khrushchev's oft-stated plan to build up the livestock industry.

NBR

e. We have also noted that the extensive wheat purchases weaken the USSR's gold reserves at a time when it hopes to expand its imports of machinery for a huge chemical fertilizer program.

f. In addition, we have seen signs of stringent measures to protect the grain supply, accompanied by public discontent in some areas over the absence of bread.

(Cont'd)

NBR

[illegible]

5. **Communist China - Argentina**

a. Peiping last week contracted for some 300,000 tons of wheat (cost about $20,000,000) from Argentina.

b. This adds to the 1,000,000 tons just contracted for with Australia, but is still far below the 5,000,000 tons the Chinese have normally imported in recent years. Additional suppliers will be hard to find.

c. A large sale, apparently involving some $56,000,000 worth of meat, is apparently also being arranged. This is interesting, not only for the sizeable foreign exchange outlay, but also for the concern it shows for improving the diet of the mainland's urban population.

d. The same caloric value could be obtained from grains at a fraction of this cost. (INTERCEPTS throughout)

NBR

NBR

6. Czechoslovakia-USSR

a. Czech President and party boss Novotny has gone to Moscow, evidently for economic talks, judging by the composition of his delegation.

b. Novotny's background of Stalinist excesses have put him on the wrong side of Khrushchev. They also have given rise to control problems, particularly in the fractious Slovak party where pressures for liberalization have made their mark.

c. Party problems and Novotny's leadership may thus also come under review.

NBR

d. A curious sign of the times is the fact that, although President Novotny is in Moscow, the presidential flag has remained up at the official residence. It might simply have been an oversight, but the symbolism will not be lost to the people in Prague.

7. Cambodia

a. Cambodia, as expected, has asked the Geneva co-chairman to call the Geneva conference participants together (in Djakarta) to discuss measures "to ensure the internationally guaranteed and controlled neutralization of Cambodia."

NBR

(Cont'd)

NBR


Khamis Mushait
Abha
SAUDI ARABIA
Zahran
Najran
Sabya
Abu Arish
Qizan
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
Sadah
Al Muwassam
Harad
Maydi
Washha
Wadi al Jawf
Abs
Rayda
Hajjah
Umran
Marib
KAMARAN (U.K.)
SANA
Sirwah
Jihannah
Harib
YEMEN
RED SEA
Al Hudaydah
BAYHAN STATE
Dhamar
Ibb
Qatabah
Al Bayda
Ad Dali
TAIZZ
Mocha
ADEN PROTECTORATE
GULF OF ADEN
ADEN
ETHIOPIA
FR. SOM.
0 25 50 MILES
SYRIA
LEB.
JORDAN
IRAQ
Cairo
U.A.R. (EGYPT)
Ras Banas
SAUDI
Riyadh
Jidda
Mecca
Taif
Red Sea
ARABIA
SUDAN
Khartoum
Sana
YEMEN
ADEN
FR. SOM.
SOM. R.
ETHIOPIA
Addis Ababa

13 SEPTEMBER 1963

33905

b. Last year when this came up, the French were inclined to go along with some such idea.

c. They have indicated to us that they still feel Sihanouk should not be turned down, and Sihanouk is obviously hopeful that they will exert pressure on us and the British.

d. Sihanouk seems to be hoping for at least a rump session attended by conferees who are willing to do his bidding.

NBR

8. Egypt-Yemen

a. An Egyptain military message reporting to Cairo on operations in Yemen this past weekend indicated that poison gas (referred to as "ghurab" in Egyptian military traffic) was used against royalist tribesmen in the northwest.

b. This is the first time we have noted its employment since last summer, although another intercept shows that the Egyptian command has continued to authorize its use.

NBR

(Cont'd)

2/BR

c. It is basically a tear gas, but in such highly concentrated form that it has caused the death of a number of Yemenis.
(INTERCEPTS throughout)

NBR

9. Congo

a. Opposition leftist Congolese exiles, operating from Brazzaville across the river, are reported to be plotting to assassinate Congolese Premier Adoula and some of his ministers.

b. It is supposed to happen sometime after 8 December.

c. Meanwhile, agents are being infiltrated with money to buy off opposition to a takeover immediately thereafter by radical nationalist Gbenye.

NBR

d. Adoula's government already knows that this group of left-wing subversives, which now numbers about 50, is being helped by the Communist bloc.

e. It operates fairly freely in the loose circumstances which now obtain in Brazzaville. Its activities may soon become a serious source of friction between the two countries.

2/BR

(SC-NLT-085/93 B11)

NOTES

A. **South Korea** With 85 percent of the vote in, Pak Chong-hui's Democratic Republican Party has already won an absolute majority in the National Assembly elections held yesterday. NBR

B. **Venezuela** The country's three major presidential candidates were the targets of unsuccessful assassination attempts yesterday as Communist-led terrorists moved into the final week of desperate attempt to wreck next Sunday's elections. A US Embassy official was also the intended recipient of a "Christmas package" containing a bomb. Yesterday a US rubber warehouse was set afire and destroyed by terrorists. NBR

C. **Indonesia-Philippines** We have what is about as sure a sign as we can get that Sukarno will be going to Manila as reported yesterday. A reliable source tells us Sukarno has sent advance word to two of his favorite Philippine girl friends that he will be arriving on 28 November. NBR

D. **Indonesia-Malaysia** Indonesian-inspired press reports yesterday claimed a British military plane was shot down near the North Borneo border. British Intelligence tells us the story is concocted; no aircraft are reported missing. NBR

E. **Cuba** The alert in the Cuban military which we noted immediately after President Kennedy's death has been lifted. (INTERCEPT)

(Cont'd)

4/BR

F. **Cambodia** Cambodia is cutting its diplomatic representation abroad to a bare minimum as an austerity measure following curtailment of US aid. Sihanouk announced last week that this would be done, saying that missions in Communist countries would not be affected since those countries "protect" Cambodia. Curiously enough, among the missions being closed down are those in New Delhi and Rangoon. (Includes (INTERCEPTS)

NBR

G. **USSR-US** Pravda this morning reports on Gromyko's talks with President Johnson, giving top play to Senator Fulbright's remarks about the desirability of a meeting between the President and Khrushchev.

NBR

2/BR

DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST

I. De Gaulle on NATO strategy.

II. Common Market official appraises President Johnson. (Sensitive INTERCEPT)

NBR

VBR

13-00000

FIC 28 NOV

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CIA/IPC		
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
David C. Hunphrey/LBJ Library	6/23/93

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

NLJ 94-484 (#6)

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-088/93 B]

COPY 1 OF

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-381
Document # 6

6

✓

President
Read
during briefing
by McCone
BKS

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

[SC-NLJ-088/93 B1]

OFFICIAL USE ONLY


72
70
68
66
64
62
60
12
10
8
6
4
2
CURAÇAO (Neth.)
BONAIRE
Amuay
CARIBBEAN SEA
GRENADA (U.K.)
TOBAGO
COLOMBIA
GOLFO DE VENEZUELA
Coro
Maracaibo
Cabimas
Ule
LAGO DE MARACAIBO
CARACAS
La Guaira
Carupano
TRINIDAD
Port-of-Spain
Valencia
Maracay
Mene Grande
Quiriquire
Maturín
Tucupita
Cúcuta
Río Apure
Río Orinoco
Ciudad Bolívar
Río Arauca
Río Meta
Río Caroní
Río Caura
BRITISH GUIANA
COLOMBIA
VENEZUELA
Selected railroad
34168 10-63
50
100
200 Miles
50
100
200 Kilometers
BRAZIL
Río Negro
Río Uraricoera
BR. GUIANA
BRAZIL
Río Branco

NBR

NBR

[SC-NLJ-088193 B1:]

1. **Venezuela**

a. The country's six presidential candidates have swung into the home stretch of their campaigns. So have the terrorists, who are still trying hard to sabotage next Sunday's vote.

b. There is little doubt that the terrorist effort has all-out Cuban support. Castro looks on Venezuela as his prime target in Latin America and would do everything in his power to prevent President Betancourt from finishing his term.

c. So far, the terrorists have tried to intimidate the candidates by harassing political rallies, bombing their party headquarters in various cities, and threatening them with assassination. They have tried to scare voters from the polls by creating a general atmosphere of lawlessness. Kidnappings, like the one yesterday morning of Colonel Chenault, are part of the pattern.

NBR

d. The government counterattack is under the personal direction of Betancourt, who is as determined to finish out his term and turn over power to a freely-elected successor as Castro is to prevent this.

(Cont'd)

NBR

[SC-NLJ-088/93 B/1]

e. Yesterday it was announced that the carrying of firearms by anyone outside the security forces was forbidden until the elections are over.

f. Some 3,000 reservists have been called up to protect the polls. Leaves are being cancelled and all security forces are maintaining a high state of alert.

NBR

2. South Vietnam

a. We now have a fuller account from official US sources of the Viet Cong attack on two mountain villages mentioned in Tuesday's Checklist.

b. This account makes it clear that the earlier press versions, which spoke of 1,000 missing villagers, were highly colored.

c. Our present information is that the attack, in company strength, was successfully repulsed. The Viet Cong suffered some 30 casualties; government losses were six killed, three wounded and 39 missing.

(Cont'd)

NBR

(SC-NLJ-088/93 B1)

d. As is usual in these cases, the villagers began to trickle back once the Viet Cong left.

e. This episode aside, we see a number of indications that the Communists will try to sustain the higher level of military activity they have kept up since the coup.

f. The Communist radio has called for more attacks in an effort to destroy strategic hamlets and "develop" Viet Cong forces. In support of this, Viet Cong communications traffic has been unusually heavy and has involved a large volume of high priority traffic and special alert patterns. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

3. Israel

a. We have some reason to believe that the Israelis are developing a surface-to-surface missile of their own.

b. A reliable clandestine source says that an Israeli representative is trying to buy US stable platforms for the inertial guidance system of a missile with a range of 300-350 miles. He wanted delivery in six to twelve months. There have been several earlier reports that

NBR

(Cont'd)

NBR

(SC-NLJ-088/93 B/1)

Israel is buying missile components in the US and England.

c. We think this missile program is independent of another Israeli venture: Tel Aviv's contract with a French firm, Marcel Dassault, for the development of a system which will be able to deliver a 1,600-pound warhead to a maximum range of 300 miles.

NBR

4. USSR-India

a. Moscow has promised the Indians to ship the equipment for one surface-to-air (SAM) training site early next month.

b. The Soviets had agreed to provide eight SAM sites. The rest will probably not be sent until the Indians have learned to handle the equipment about a year from now.

NBR

c. As we noted last Sunday, there are some Indians who have doubts about the Soviet willingness to live up to the letter of their military aid agreements with New Delhi.

(Cont'd)

ZBR

[SC-NLJ-088/93 B11]

d. They call into question especially the contract for the Soviets to set up in India a facility to assemble MIG fighters--an enterprise which has appeared somewhat impractical from the beginning.

e. We do note, however, that Soviet aircraft specialists working on the project were still in New Delhi in early November. (INTERCEPTS)

NBR

5. Burma

a. Ne Win has followed up his action in breaking off talks with the Burmese Communists by arresting over 700 of their number.

b. Ne Win had been trying to lure the faction-ridden Communists into a "national front." However, he found the demands of the Communist negotiators, some of whom had only just returned from long exile in Peiping, to be impossible.

c. This will probably lead to renewed fighting between the army and Communist guerrillas in the hills.

NBR

d. More trouble can also be expected from the rebellious ethnic minorities like the Karens and the

(Cont'd)

NBR

(SC-NLJ-088/93/3/11)


South Vietnam
NORTH VIETNAM
CHINA
BURMA
LAOS
THAI.
CAMB.
VIETNAM
PHILIPPINES
MALAYA
SARAWAK
INDONESIA
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
TONLE SAP
Mekong
PHNOM PENH
Quang Tri
Hue
Da Nang
Quang Nam
Quang Ngai
Kontum
Pleiku
An Khe
Qui Nhon
Song Cau
Cheo Reo
Tuy Hoa
Ban Me Thuot
Nha Trang
Da Lat
Loc Ninh
Phan Rang
Tay Ninh
Phuoc Vinh
SAIGON
Phan Thiet
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Chau Phu
Cho Lon
My Tho
Vung Tau
Isle de Phu Quoc
Rach Gia
Can Tho
GULF OF SIAM
Quan Long (Ca Mau)
Bac Lieu
0 STATUTE MILES 150
34235

Kachins, whose demands for greater autonomy have been rejected in Rangoon.

e. US officials on the spot doubt that the army, hobbled by poor leadership and its many political responsibilities, will be any more effective in dealing with the problem this time than in past anti-insurgency campaigns.

NBR

6. Cambodia

a. Sihanouk has signed an accord setting up regular air service between Cambodia and Communist China. A similar agreement with Hanoi is in the works.

b. These lines are significant largely as gestures by Peiping and Hanoi to bolster Sihanouk's sense of importance. Neither would be a paying proposition commercially and both could flounder before the first paying passenger enplanes unless rights to overfly Laos can be obtained. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

NBR

7. Greece

a. It looks more and more as if Papandreou, who squeaked through to a narrow upset victory over ex-premier Karamanlis in the 3 November elections, will not be able to form a government.

NBR

(Cont'd)

3/BR

(SC-NLJ-OSE/93 B11)

b. His party does not have a parliamentary majority, so he needs support from either Karamanlis' party on the right or from the Communists. The military has apparently been pressing Karamanlis to withhold that support. He does not need much urging.

c. The military has also let it be known that it would consider Papandreou's acceptance of Communist support as sufficient reason for a coup d'etat.

d. In addition to this military string-pulling, the royal family is also meddling--not for the first time. Should Papandreou fail to form a government, the palace intends to pass the mandate to Karamanlis, believing that he too would fail.

e. This would then open the way, the palace calculates, for a compromise premier more amenable to palace influence.

NBR

8. Brazil

a. President Goulart and his opponents are keeping political tensions in Brazil high.

NBR

(Cont'd)

21BR

(SC-NLJ-088/93 B11)

b. Comments by Goulart, that "social disaster" is sure if his program is not passed soon, have drawn sharp rejoinders from moderate and conservative figures and have fed rightist coup plotting.

c. Strains are also growing in the military following the arrest of a young officer who refused last month to execute an order to arrest Governor Lacerda, a leading conservative spokesman and likely presidential candidate.

NBR

NBR

(SC-NLJ-O88/93B1.7

[redacted]

NOTES

A. USSR Simultaneous activity this morning on the Tyuratam missile test range, satellite tracking nets and Soviet space support ships in the Atlantic probably represented an attempt to launch an unmanned earth satellite. The launch apparently failed on the pad or was cancelled at the last moment. It may be tried again soon. (INTERCEPTS)

NBR

B. Rumania-US Rumanian officials are about to award a US firm, Ferguson and Company of Cleveland, Ohio, a $32 million contract to help build the huge Galati steel plant. The Rumanians are pressing ahead with this project in the face of Soviet efforts to discourage it in various ways, most importantly by refusing to underwrite the scheme to any substantial degree.

NBR

C. Turkey The New Turkey Party has followed the Peasant Party in withdrawing from the present three-party coalition government. This means that the coalition has to all intents and purposes collapsed, even though no formal action will be taken until Prime Minister Inonu returns from Washington this weekend.

NBR

D. Thailand The Thai doctors attending Sarit now admit for the first time that the Prime Minister is in critical condition. Our doctor agrees with this prognosis. US officials in Bangkok believe that the most likely successor would be Thanom Kittikachorn, now deputy prime minister and minister of defense. Thanom is not likely to last long, however, since he is neither a strong personality nor a figure of great weight in the military hierarchy.

NBR

(Cont'd)

N/BR

(SC-NLJ-088/93 B1)

[redacted]


MELILLA
MOROCCO
TUNISIA
ALGERIA
LIBYA
UAR
(EGYPT)
SPANISH SAHARA
MAURITANIA
MALI
NIGER
CHAD
SUDAN
SENEGAL
GAMBIA
PORT. GUINEA
GUINEA
UPPER VOLTA
SIERRA LEONE
IVORY COAST
GHANA
TOGO
DAHOMEY
NIGERIA
LIBERIA
FR. SOMAL.
ETHIOPIA
SOMALI REPUBLIC
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CAMEROON
RIO MUNI
GABON
CONGO
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
UGANDA
L. RUDOLF
KENYA
L. VICTORIA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
RWANDA BURUNDI
TANGANYIKA
ZANZIBAR
CABINDA
L. TANGANYIKA
L. NYASA
ANGOLA
FED. OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND
MOZAMBIQUE
MALAGASY REPUBLIC
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
BECHUANALAND
SWAZILAND
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
BASUTOLAND

[SC-NLJ-068/93 B/1]

E. Indonesia-Philippines A Philippine foreign office man states that everything was set, as we noted yesterday, for Sukarno to visit Manila today. This official says, however, that the visit was postponed as a result of Macapagal's decision to attend President Kennedy's funeral. NBR

F. Indonesia Djakarta is giving every indication that it will hold up final action on the long-pending oil contracts with US companies in an attempt to smoke us out on the question of US aid policy toward Indonesia. NBR

G. Rwanda-Burundi Tribal refugees from Rwanda, now in Burundi, seem bent on making trouble between the two countries. Some 3,000 of their number were reported yesterday to be moving toward the frontier. They have little military capability, but blood could flow and require UN intervention. NBR

H. USSR-Congo As a further token of the withdrawal of Soviet diplomats we have noted that the Soviet diplomatic communications link between Moscow and Leopoldville was shut down last Saturday. (INTERCEPTS) NBR

4 NBR

[SC-NLJ-055/93 B10

13-00000

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. ____________

COPY ________ OF ________

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

________ ________ ________ ________

________ ________ ________ ________

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

13-00000

file

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

29 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET



SOVIET EXTENDED RANGE IMPACT AREAS


PLESETSK
4500 NM
TYURATAM
USSR
KAMCHATKA
ARCTIC OCEAN
CANADA
UNITED STATES
MONGOLIA
CHINA
VLADIVOSTOK
SEA OF OKHOTSK
Petropavlovsk
BERING SEA
KOREA
SEA OF JAPAN
JAPAN
APPROX. 4900 NM
NORTHERN IMPACT AREA
6200 NM
Midway Islands
APPROX 6500 NM
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
Johnston Island
PACIFIC OCEAN
SOUTHERN IMPACT AREA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
AUSTRALIA

NBR

NBR

TOP SECRET
DINAR

13-00000

†

CIB

1. **USSR**

a. TASS has finally announced that the USSR will conduct another series of ICBM firings to the Pacific during the period 2 December to 25 January.

b. Since our last mention of this subject, we have picked up indications that some of the firings this time may be made from operational launchers rather than from the Tyuratam rangehead.

NBR

c. There has been unusual traffic on the strategic rocket forces communications link between the operational site at Plesetsk and Moscow similar to that which preceded the firing last October from Plesetsk to Kamchatka.

d. In addition, some intercepted telephone conversations have implied that the firing ranges would be different this time.

e. We also have some fragmentary evidence that the forthcoming firings may be the object of a special tracking or detection project. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

VBR

of National Liberation (FALN) will probably increase their efforts to disrupt the constitutional succession, which would be the first in Venezuela's history.

f. Meanwhile, in the wings are the military leaders who may well intervene if they find Betancourt's successor not to their liking.

+ TDCS 3/566,049, 045

Caracas 624

g. Though President Betancourt has taken personal charge of the search to locate Colonel Chenault and those responsible for his kidnapping, his efforts so far have come to nought. The only news has been from a Caracas editor who had a call yesterday morning from a woman saying the colonel was safe.

NBR

3. Cuba-Venezuela

C/B

a. The discovery of a large cache of weapons of Cuban origin, announced by Venezuelan authorities yesterday, provides the best evidence to date of major Cuban support for Latin American subversives.

b. There is definite proof to support the Venezuelan claim. The three tons of weapons found include light automatic rifles and

(Cont'd)

VBR

[redacted]

1[redacted]00

submachine guns identified as among those shipped to Cuba from Belgium in 1959 and 1960. There were also mortars, bazookas, recoilless rifles, and ammunition of US manufacture.

c. Communist documents seized by Venezuelan authorities earlier this month reveal that the equipment was destined for the Venezuelan Communists' paramilitary arm, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN).

d. The cache was found on 1 November on a beach in Falcon State in the north, scene of the most active guerrilla effort. The Venezuelan government assumes that the weapons were sent from Cuba by sea.

e. Caracas will lay formal charges concerning the arms cache before a special meeting of Latin America Foreign Ministers scheduled for December. After that it will ask that the Council of the Organization of American States be convoked for consultation on the matter.

4. Communist China - Afro-Asia

a. More information on Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's Afro-Asian swing is beginning to leak out.

Bamako 138
BD 4975

b. The Egyptians are expecting him on 8 December, according to the Algerian ambassador to Cairo.

c. The press in Mali says Chou, accompanied by Foreign Affairs Minister Chen Yi, will visit Algeria, Mali, Ghana, Guinea, Somalia, Tanganyika, and Albania.

NBR

d. The Pakistanis have just informed our ambassador that they have agreed to a state visit by the two Chinese in mid-February at the conclusion of their two month tour.

(including intercepts)

Karachi 1044

5. Cuba

a. Another London shipping firm says it is willing to abandon its Cuban trade.

b. Embassy London has been advised by Papadakis and Co., Ltd. that it is prepared to keep its two ships involved in the trade from calling at Cuban ports when their charters run out next January.

DCI checklist

(Cont'd)

NBR

c. Papadakis is probably asking the same price for its action as Basil Mavrolean did recently--removal of its ships from the US blacklist. Papadakis operates 19 ships totalling more than 200,000 tons.

d. Mavrolean's vessels account for almost half the present British tonnage calling at Cuban ports and are the largest single element of free world shipping to Cuba.

e. The outcome of Mavrolean's offer is not yet clear.

1[redacted]00

NOTES

A. **South Korea** President-elect Pak Chong-hui's success in winning control of the unicameral legislature in Tuesday's elections improves prospects for smooth operation of the new constitutional government. However, political stability will still depend on Pak's willingness to rule with moderation. If he interprets this victory as a popular mandate to pursue an aggressive authoritarian program, he could provoke serious unrest.

CIB

NBR

B. **Indonesia-Philippines** President Sukarno's visit to Manila is on again for 4 December, according to the Indian ambassador to Djakarta. He assumes its purpose is to head off Philippine recognition of Malaysia.

Djakarta 1157

NBR

C. **Thailand** Prime Minister Sarit appears to have taken a further turn for the worst. Our station reported yesterday that he was flown by helicopter to a Bangkok hospital from his seaside villa. Police escorts described his condition as critical and rumors that he had died spread through the city.

TDCS DB 3/658/113 R73

NBR

D. **Rwanda-Burundi** Prompt action by Burundi security forces appears to have halted the march of tribal refugees on Rwanda that we reported yesterday. There is little doubt that the refugees, who carried only a handful of modern arms and were poorly organized, would have been badly mauled by Rwandan troops if they had crossed the frontier.

Usumbura 281

NBR

(Cont'd)

U/BR

1[redacted]0

E. Colombia Pro-Castro members of the terrorist National Liberation Army (ELN) are believed responsible for the recent wave of bombings in Colombia's major cities. At least a dozen bombs were set off in Bogota during the last two nights. Two of the bombs failed to explode after being placed close to the residence of the chief of US Naval Mission

DIA

NBR

1/BR

13-00000

PJC 30 Nov 6

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CIA/IPC		
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
David C. Hunphrey/LBJ Library	6/23/93

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

NLJ 94-484 (#8)

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-089/93 B]

COPY 1 OF

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-381
Document # 8

8

Ret'd from
Mrs Roberts
12/10/63

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. **Venezuela**

a. Election campaigning ended at midnight, but boosters for the several candidates continued to mill about streets of Caracas in defiance of terrorist threats to shoot anyone who ventured out for the next three days.

b. The terrorists, it seems, were all but drowned out by the carnival air.

c. The FALN, meanwhile, is trying to bargain off Colonel Chenault for as high a price as it can, demanding variously release of all its comrades, of all women detained by the government, and of the six hijackers who have been returned from Trinidad to custody in Venezuela.

NBR

2. **Sino-Soviet dispute**

a. The Chinese Communists will have nothing to do with the idea of bilateral talks with the Soviets under present circumstances.

b. Chinese party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping, one of the select few in Peiping's ruling circle, recently told a group of visiting Latin Americans that such a meeting could accomplish nothing.

NBR

(Cont'd)

2/BR

c. Teng put the issue of another meeting of world Communist parties even deeper into limbo by saying that Peiping would be in favor only when assured of the support of a majority of the world parties.

d. Moscow, for its part, has apparently stopped thinking about another gathering of world Communist party representatives.

e. The feelers it put out after the conclusion of the test-ban treaty were received coldly by some of the fraternal parties. They felt such a meeting could only make matters worse with the Chinese.

NBR

f. Indeed, Peiping saw this to be Moscow's purpose, and when the idea failed to take hold, the Chinese took it to be a setback for Khrushchev personally.

g. Their reaction to Khrushchev's subsequent call for a cessation of open argument was to press the offensive, and this they have been doing in roundly abusive terms since.

(Cont'd)

VBR

TOP SECRET DINAR
6 SEPTEMBER 1963
33881


Area of Main Map
USSR
Sea of Okhotsk
Bering Sea
Komsomolsk
CHINA
Vladivostok
KAMCHATKA PENINSULA
Klyuchi Impact Area
BERING SEA
250 NM Second Track
Launch Position 8 April
KOMANDORSKIYE IS.
285 NM First Track
Impact Point
Petropavlovsk
Approximate Launch Positions - 27 June & 27 August
SEA OF OKHOTSK
Ballistic Missile Submarines in the Petropavlovsk area
6 "G"-Class
3 "Z"-Conversions
60
56
52
152
160
164
168

Submarine Ballistic Missile Launches in the Soviet Far East

NBR



"G"-Class Submarine

NBR

h. The forthcoming Afro-Asian visits by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi have awakened suspicions that the Chinese are in hot pursuit of a second Bandung-type conference--a more rewarding enterprise from their point of view.

NBR

3. USSR

open ~~[illegible]~~
"ballistic
missiles"
only

a. Yesterday and on Thursday, we detected what we believe to have been operational training launches of standard 350 nautical mile submarine-based ballistic missiles.

~~2X~~/NBR

b. Two and possibly four missiles were fired from submarines based in the Petropavlovsk area to the impact area at Klyuchi.

c. Seven similar instances have been detected previously this year, and there may have been others. (INTERCEPTS)

NBR

4. Kenya - Communist Bloc

a. The Soviet Bloc will soon gain an important propaganda outlet in Nairobi, communications hub for East Africa.

b. Plans are for a state-controlled news agency to be set up by the Kenyan government when it

NBR

(Cont'd)

N
S
A
4

4/BR

achieves independence on 12 December. This will fall under the jurisdiction of communications minister Oneko, who has well developed contacts within the Soviet Bloc.

c. TASS has already agreed to equip the new agency, and Kenyan requests for further financial and technical help are being discussed in Prague and Moscow.

NBR

d. Kenyan journalists have been training in Prague and, on return, will find ready employment in the new agency.

5. Czechoslovakia-USSR

a. Czech President Novotny returned from Moscow on Thursday after signing a renewal (for another 20 years) of the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance.

b. He apparently got little else out of Khrushchev. The final communique was conspicuously cool.

NBR

c. There were no Soviet concessions, nor were there the usual references to Czech "progress" or to public support for Novotny's leadership.

2/BR

6. South Vietnam

a. The first suicide by burning to occur under the new regime was witnessed today by bystanders at a crowded intersection in Saigon where a young girl went up in flames.

b. A note she left behind said she was protesting the war of Vietnamese against Vietnamese. At the intersection are three villas which house the ICC delegations.

c. There were no Buddhist overtones.

d. Some think the Viet Cong encouraged her, but if they did, they did not write her script. They would have said it is the Americans who are fighting the Vietnamese.

NBR

NBR



South Vietnam
ARMY CORPS BOUNDARIES

CHINA
BURMA
LAOS
THAI
CAMB
VIETNAM
PHILIPPINES
MALAYA
SARAWAK
INDONESIA
NORTH VIETNAM
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
TONLE SAP
Mekong
PHNOM PENH
Quang Tri
Hue
Da Nang
Quang Nam
I Corps
Quang Ngai
II Corps
Kontum
Pleiku
An Khe
Qui Nhon
Song Cau
Cheo Reo
Tuy Hoa
Ban Me Thuot
Nha Trang
III Corps
Da Lat
Loc Ninh
Tay Ninh
Phan Rang
Phuoc Vinh
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Phan Thiet
Chau Phu
Cho Lon
SAIGON
Capital Military District
My Tho
Vung Tau
IV Corps
Isle de Phu Quoc
Rach Gia
Can Tho
GULF OF SIAM
Quan Long (Ca Mau)
Bac Lieu
SECRET
0 STATUTE MILES 150
33753

NOTES

A. **South Vietnam** Plans are now afoot to shuffle South Vietnam's Corps commanders so that General Khanh, considered by General Harkins to be the best of the lot, will take over in the crucial delta (IV Corps) area. General Dinh, the ambitious Minister of Security, is still resisting pressure to relinquish command of the III Corps area, and is not involved in the current shuffle.

B. **Cuba-USSR** There are about 8,000 Soviets in Cuba, 5,000 of these military, according to a bloc official in close touch with Soviets in Havana. The figures are close to our own estimate of 4,000 to 7,000. Some withdrawals continue.

C. **Cambodia-Vietnam** Sihanouk seems to feel that cutting off his nose to spite his face was not enough. Now he says he will formally recognize North Vietnam if the US does not silence the Khmer Serei radio. South Vietnam will cut Cambodia's primary access to international markets via the Mekong river if he does. (INTERCEPT)

NBR

D. **Indonesia-Cambodia** Sukarno apparently plans to go to Cambodia on an official visit following his trip to Manila. The Cambodian ambassador in Djakarta has advised Phnom Penh that Sukarno plans to leave for Manila on 6 December and directly from there for Phnom Penh on the 10th. He will stay three days. (INTERCEPT)

NBR

(Cont'd)

21BR

E. **Coal and Steel Community** Coal and Steel community members at their next meeting on Monday will probably vote to raise community steel tariffs by an average of nine percent. This would bring the tariffs of each member into line with Italy's, the highest in the community. Only the Dutch oppose the idea.

NBR

F. **British Guiana - Cuba** GIMPEX, trading arm and source of funds for Jagan's party, has worked out a deal to supply the country's major electric utility next year with fuel oil from Cuba. Texaco and Esso have been the traditional suppliers.

NBR

G. **Brazil-US** A press report from Rio cites "well informed sources" to the effect that Goulart plans soon to invite Mrs. Kennedy to visit Brazil so that Brazil can pay her the honors which it had planned to render the late President.

NBR

H. **Cuba-Morocco** A three-man Cuban delegation is on its way to Morocco to try to patch up relations broken by Morocco because of Cuba's assistance to the Algerians in their border war. (INTERCEPTS)

NBR

c//BR

DOCUMENT OF INTEREST

The effect in France of the President's death.

104-10302-10030 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992



27 December 1963

SC No. 00624/63
Copy

WEEKLY REVIEW

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

52728703

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7, the document must be handled within the framework of the limitation so imposed.

CONTENTS

(Information as of 1200 EST, 26 December 1963)

THE COMMUNIST WORLD

Page

SOVIET TRADE ACTIVITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WEST 1

Within a week after the central committee approved Khrushchev's plan for the chemical industry, Soviet traders apparently had their instructions and were renewing contacts in the industrial West.

CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS' AFRICAN TOUR 2

While Chou En-lai and Chen Yi have been able to project an aura of Afro-Asian amity during the first two weeks of their two-month tour, they have not scored comparable successes in the political or economic fields.

EAST GERMAN REACTION TO RELAXATION OF BERLIN TRAVEL 3

The East German people, while elated over the holiday travel arrangements in Berlin, are publicly voicing hope that they may be permitted to visit their relatives in West Berlin and West Germany.

NORTH KOREA IMPROVES AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY 4

Pyongyang has more widely dispersed its supersonic MIG-21s, has acquired relatively sophisticated new radar, and has equipped its IL-28s with an improved blind bombing and navigational system.

NORTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

This military force, primarily a ground army with no tactical air and little naval capability, is nevertheless the most formidable in Southeast Asia. Its most notable achievement is its highly specialized capability to support and maintain insurgency operations in adjacent countries. (Published separately as Special Report SC No. 00624/63B)

ASIA-AFRICA

ENTHUSIASM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME FLAGGING 5

The military regime is beginning to take steps to make its counterinsurgency effort more effective, but the generals still seem to have little idea of how to rally significant popular support.

LAOS 6

Communist forces have moved to erase recent gains by rightist units in central Laos. Neutralist and Pathet Lao representatives are continuing their efforts to ease tension between the two factions.

ASIA-AFRICA (continued)

Page

FRENCH CABINET MINISTER TO VISIT CAMBODIA 7

Armed Forces Minister Messmer's visit in early January is designed primarily to strengthen French influence in the wake of Sihanouk's call for an end to the US aid program.

ARABS PLAN NO OVERT ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI PROJECT 8

Arab military chiefs apparently feel that overt military action against Israel's Jordan River diversion project is not feasible, but sabotage of its facilities may be attempted.

CYPRUS DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN 9

The new outbreak of fighting on Cyprus is a reaction to President Makarios' determination to change the constitution so as to limit the role of the Turkish minority.

BREAKUP OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

The ten-year-old federation is being dissolved on 31 December because its black African population has persistently opposed it as a device to perpetuate white rule. Its dissolution will end London's hopes for an economically integrated, multiracial state and increase the danger of bitter clashes between white and black nationalists in its three erstwhile constituent territories. (Published separately as Special Report SC No. 00624/63A)

AREA NOTE 10

Saudi Arabia

EUROPE

THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS 11

Agreements reached on agricultural policy on 23 December are apparently sufficient to discourage De Gaulle from breaking up the community. The agreement on a position for the Kennedy Round is not necessarily favorable to the US.

UK-US FRICTIONS OVER SHIPPING POLICY 12

The British Government has advised shipping circles not to comply with US demands for information relating to rate discrimination against US exports.

WEST GERMAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 13

Willy Brandt has again taken the center of the political stage with the success of negotiations to open the Wall for the holiday season. He has been named acting chairman of the SPD.

EUROPE (continued)

Page

AREA NOTES 14
NATO and Iceland

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

DOMESTIC POLITICS IN CUBA 15

Castro has cautiously continued efforts to reduce the influence of the Moscow-oriented Cuban Communists, who are said to have banded together to work clandestinely against him.

DOMINICAN REGIME FACES NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGES 16

The killing of 15 guerrillas by army troops apparently removes the insurgent threat but could provoke dangerous political repercussions. The head of the provisional government has already resigned.

BRAZIL 17

Appointment of Ney Galvao as finance minister reduces the already slight prospect that Brazil's critical financial problems would be handled effectively. Other cabinet changes may follow.

AREA NOTE 18
Bolivia

SOVIET TRADE ACTIVITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WEST

Within a week after the central committee approved Khrushchev's plan for the chemical industry, Soviet traders apparently had their instructions and budget allocations and were renewing their activity in trade circles of the industrial West.

Contracts for fertilizer installations, plastics and synthetic plants, petrochemical equipment, and mining machinery are already in various stages of negotiation. Officials in Bonn report they have under consideration a proposal by a West German consortium to supply the USSR with $400 million worth of petrochemical equipment. A Soviet mission is negotiating with the British Imperial Chemical Industry (ICI), which heretofore has supplied the USSR with technical know-how. ICI reportedly has offered to deliver equipment and processes for the production of fertilizers, herbicides, rubber chemicals, and plastics. Negotiations also are under way for large numbers of Japanese chemical fertilizer plants.

Another Western consortium, involving US equipment and processes, is discussing delivery of a large oil refinery. In addition, contracts for a wide range of other machinery and equipment will probably soon be signed. These contracts apparently had been postponed until the new chemical equipment buying program was presented to the plenum and allocations for various trade corporations for next year were approved.

The Soviet need for additional credit to finance planned expanded purchases is crucial. The USSR presumably can generate sufficient funds to meet down payments on sizable orders. However, credit arrangements must be set now to spread out the heavy crush of payments which otherwise would fall due in 1965-66 when equipment contracted for next year will be delivered. Soviet ability to increase hard-currency reserves is not likely to improve in the near future. Moscow's current grain imports will reduce its gold reserves by 25 percent. If these continue beyond mid-1964, the Soviet hard-currency position will be under further strain.

Despite the bleak foreign exchange prospects for the USSR, Soviet officials appear hopeful that Western competition for Soviet orders will be adequate to foster Western governmental and banking opinion favorable to more and longer term credit. Moscow may also hope that a continuation of its relatively restrained foreign policy will be helpful in this context. While viewing the USSR as an acceptable commercial risk, the banking community has heretofore been unwilling to extend credits beyond a five-year period because of uncertainty about future political developments. (SECRET)

CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS' AFRICAN TOUR

With two weeks of their projected two-month tour of Africa completed, Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi can claim high marks for their efforts to project an aura of Afro-Asian amity and to identify Peiping with African aspirations. There is no evidence, however, that they have scored any comparable success in the political or economic fields.

The joint communiqué issued on 21 December at the conclusion of the Chinese leaders' visit to Cairo contains few surprises, and reports from Algiers suggest that discussions with Ben Bella are following predictable lines. Thus far the Chinese have attempted to minimize differences, play up past contacts, and press such themes as militant struggle against colonialism and "US imperialism."

In both Algiers and Cairo, Chou's hosts sought to demonstrate their nonalignment by actions designed to play down the impact of the Chinese leaders' arrival. Chou was greeted in Cairo with a 21-gun salute, but Nasir was not on hand. In Algeria, Ben Bella was on hand to greet his guests, but the top-level delegation he sent to the Soviet Union just before Chou's arrival is receiving more publicity than the Chinese guests.

It has become increasingly apparent that a major objective of the trip has been to undercut Soviet influence throughout the continent. Criticism of the USSR was reportedly a recurrent theme in Chou's four lengthy talks with Nasir. Nasir reportedly said that Chou talked about the USSR the way the Soviets used to talk about the US. He accused the Soviets of trying to colonize China, of breaking political and economic promises, and of becoming tools of the US, and he warned that any Afro-Asian country which became dependent on Moscow would suffer the same fate as Peiping.

In Algeria, Chou sounded a similar note. He cited China's early support for Algerian revolutionaries--support which actually pre-dated that of the USSR. He has also undoubtedly scored Soviet unreliability. The Chinese may be pressing the Algerians to use some of the $50-million credit offered in October. This offer was made to counter a $100-million Soviet credit offered earlier the same month.

Sino-Soviet rivalry for African support also flared at the UN, where Peiping outmaneuvered Moscow on the question of enlarging the representation in principal UN organs to accommodate the African bloc. Soviet delegate Fedorenko had attempted to make it appear that the Chinese were opposed to the African-sponsored expansion plan because they insisted that any change in the UN be tied to Peiping's own admission to the Security Council. The USSR found itself holding a suddenly emptied bag, however, when Peiping loudly repudiated Fedorenko's statement and accused the Soviets of using the issue as a pretext for opposing Afro-Asian demands.

Chou can be expected to capitalize on this during next week's visit to Morocco and in subsequent stops in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. No details of Chou's itinerary beyond Rabat have been made public by Peiping. Such secrecy may well be prompted by security considerations. Chinese officials were apparently seriously shaken by the abortive plot to kill Liu Shao-chi in Cambodia last spring. The Chinese envoy in Cairo reportedly told Nasir of concern for Chou's safety and asked that travel plans during the Chinese leader's visit to the UAR not be made public. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

EAST GERMAN REACTION TO RELAXATION OF BERLIN TRAVEL

Reaction of East Germans to the agreement to let West Berliners visit relatives in East Berlin is hopeful but still fairly cautious, judging by reports from local party officials.

The party central headquarters, obviously concerned that the agreement might have domestic repercussions, ordered district officials to submit immediate reports and detailed follow-ups on reactions to this partial relaxation of travel curbs imposed in connection with the building of the Berlin Wall. Most of the responses state that the people are elated but are publicly voicing hope that they may be permitted to visit their relatives in West Berlin and West Germany. Many East Germans express hope that the present move will be followed by other relaxations--a reaction probably quite unpalatable to the regime.

Public comment--at least as reported by the various party headquarters--is still fairly cautious: One party member in Magdeburg said: "The reason we don't let our citizens go to West Germany is that we are afraid they will defect." But he was promptly silenced by comrades who parroted the party line on "the terror against our GDR citizens in West Germany."

Public expression of dissatisfaction with harsh travel and internal controls has been recurrent in recent months, reaching a peak prior to the 20 October parliamentary elections.

The people's reaction to the pass agreement with West Berlin points up one of the regime's major problems: how to project an image of itself as a sovereign state and of East Berlin as its capital without increasing discontent among its population, who still risk shooting if they attempt to escape to West Berlin. (SECRET KIMBO)


CHINA
CHONGJIN
Yalu
NORTH
KOREA
KIMCHAEK
SINCHANGNI
UIJU
NAMSI
SAAMCHAM
PUKCHANGNI
SONDOK
CHONGJU
PYONGNI
SUNAN
MIRIANI
WONSAN
KOREA BAY
Pyongyang
PYONGYANG
ONCHON
HWANGJU
CHANGJON
SEA OF JAPAN
SINGYE
PYONGGANG
Demilitarized Zone
KOKCHONGNI
YONAN
KAESONG
Seoul
YELLOW SEA
SOUTH KOREA
TSUSHIMA
QUELPART ISLAND
SAM site
Bomber elements
Fighter defense elements
Combined command headquarters
Radar station
East coast filter center
Early warning radar coverage
TOP SECRET DINAR
27 DECEMBER 1963
0 MILES 100
34447

NORTH KOREA IMPROVES AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY

North Korea has recently taken several steps which significantly strengthen its air defenses. MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet fighters, which were first detected only at Pukchang-ni airfield, now are being stationed at other airfields. Pyongyang has also apparently just acquired a large number of relatively sophisticated types of radar sets. In addition, the North Korean bomber force, which has a total of about 100 IL-28 (Beagle) jet light bombers, is in part now equipped with, and has been training with, an improved blind bombing and navigational system.

Testing of and flight training with the new fighters--10 to 14 of which were apparently obtained from the USSR in the fall of 1962--were first noted in communications intelligence in June 1963. Since that time the MIG-21s have been detected frequently in flight activity involving ground controlled intercept exercises.

Beginning in October, MIG-21s have been noted operating from Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea. Their deployment to this airfield places supersonic fighters on both the east and west coasts of North Korea.

The North Koreans have recently expanded their radar coverage. Six new types of radar, at least one of which is believed to be exclusively of Chinese Communist manufacture, have been detected. For the present these radars will apparently supplement rather than replace North Korea's original three types--Kniferest A, SCR-270, and Token.

The identifiable new types include Kniferest B, Spoonrest A, and a new type of Chinese Communist origin which is probably a substantial modification of the SCR-270. Spoonrest A is sometimes used as the acquisition radar for surface-to-air missile sites, but it is also used in an early warning role and is probably intended for that use in North Korea. Acquisition of these new radars reflects North Korea's efforts to extend the range of its early warning detection system. To improve height-finding capability, Pyongyang has also introduced more sophisticated radars such as Rockcake and Stonecake.

Another improvement in North Korea's air capability is the equipment of about twenty IL-28s with an improved blind bombing and navigational radar system designated Shorewalk. When properly used, this system permits precision navigation and blind bombing without the use of ground communications which would betray the direction of the flight and the target designation. (TOP SECRET DINAR)

ENTHUSIASM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME FLAGGING

Communist guerrilla activity increased only slightly in connection with the third anniversary, on 20 December, of the Viet Cong's Liberation Front, despite advance Communist propaganda exhortation for a major military effort. The Viet Cong continued to direct attacks and harassing activities primarily at strategic hamlets.

South Vietnam's new government is showing extreme sensitivity to discussion of a "neutralist solution" to its insurgency problem. The Communists' Liberation Front has repeatedly proposed such a settlement, and the idea is gaining new advocates as a result of Cambodia's call for an international conference. Saigon's military rulers last week closed down a newspaper which was expressing interest in neutralism. However, editorials in the vernacular press, even though attacking neutralism, have kept the debate in the public eye. On 20 December, Saigon students--possibly encouraged by the regime--demonstrated against neutralism.

On the military front, the government is beginning to take some steps to overcome the lethargy that has affected its counterinsurgency effort since the coup. A long-range pacification program has been launched in one of the most troublesome provinces in the northern part of the country, and broad command changes have been introduced in two provinces south of Saigon where security has been deteriorating.

In the political field, the government has named 60 members of the civilian advisory Council of Notables. Returned exiles apparently are not represented, and there is a dearth of direct provincial representation. Many appointees, however, are prominent political, professional and lay religious leaders who could provide effective guidance to the regime if they are given a chance.

Apathy and disenchantment over the new government are widespread among such key elements as middle-grade officers, students and politicians. Criticism centers on the lack of firm direction by the ruling generals, on repeated reshuffling of local officials deemed incompetent, corrupt or close to the Diem regime, and on the rise in Viet Cong activity. There are signs that junta members themselves are beginning to share the disillusionment of some circles with Premier Tho's provisional cabinet, which is described as ineffective and regional in outlook.

Leading generals nevertheless seem to have few effective steps in mind to rally popular support. Three generals recently complained to US officials that they were having trouble finding qualified Vietnamese to fill government positions and that press criticism of their efforts was unhelpful. General "Big" Minh, the chief of state, has indicated a personal distaste for a prominent role, and has asserted that the people would gradually come to appreciate the new government as problems were solved on a province-by province-basis. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

LAOS


CHINA
Ssumao
CHINA
Nam
Phong Saly
Hou
NORTH VIETNAM
BURMA
Dien Bien Phu
Nam Tha
HANOI
Muong Sai
Sam Neua
Ban Houei Sai
Mekong
Luang Prabang
Ban Ban
7
P'cine des Jarres
Xieng Khouang
Sayaboury
4
7
Vang Vieng
GULF OF TONKIN
Vinh
13
8
Pak Sane
Kam Keut
Lak Sao
VIENTIANE
8A
Mekong
Nhommarath
12
Thakhek
12A
Tchepone
SOUTH VIETNAM
Savannakhet
9
THAILAND
13
23
Saravane
Pakse
23
Attopeu
Road
Track or trail
Railroad
0 STATUTE MILES 100
CAMBODIA
34435

CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

LAOS

Communist forces have moved to erase recent gains made by rightist units in central Laos. Pathet Lao troops, reportedly supported by substantial numbers of North Vietnamese, on 19 December captured Kam Keut and the nearby airfield, three days after occupying the key route junction at Lak Sao. Right-wing messages have described a key rightist parabattalion as "completely smashed." Communist units have advanced south of Lak Sao toward neutralist positions along Route 8-A, but there have been no indications that they intend to press their advantage by a major drive on Nhommarath, which is still held by rightist forces. In other areas, there have been reports of only limited activity, involving scattered skirmishes and artillery exchanges.

Meanwhile, neutralist and Pathet Lao representatives are continuing their efforts to negotiate an easing of tensions between the two factions. At a meeting on 20 December in the Plaine des Jarres, both sides called for an "early" meeting between Premier Souvanna and Prince Souphannouvong. They also agreed, in principle, that elements of the coalition government should be transferred from Vientiane to the royal capital at Luang Prabang, which would be neutralized and placed under tripartite control. Both factions reiterated their support for the formation of a mixed police force in a neutralized Vientiane.

General Phoumi's right-wing faction, which was not represented at the meeting, remains skeptical of Pathet Lao intentions. Phoumi apparently believes that an agreement for the neutralization of Luang Prabang is unlikely, but he may join in talks on the subject. He has indicated, however, that the neutralization of Vientiane is contingent on the willingness of the Pathet Lao to allow free movement in areas of Laos now under their control. (TOP SECRET DINAR)

* * *

FRENCH CABINET MINISTER TO VISIT CAMBODIA

Armed Forces Minister Pierre Messmer's visit to Cambodia from 4-7 January is designed primarily to strengthen French influence there in the wake of Prince Sihanouk's call for an end to the US aid program. Messmer's high-level entourage, which includes the chiefs of the Foreign Ministry's Indochina and Cultural and Technical divisions, will probably recommend some increases in aid, but De Gaulle apparently has no intention of taking on any large new commitments.

French-grant aid to Cambodia since 1956 has amounted to only $15 million. Current assistance is threefold: a military training mission of at least 250 men; cultural aid in the form of a university mission and 319 teachers in Cambodian schools; and the maintenance of about 40 experts in the fields of health and public works. In addition, a number of French nationals hired by the Cambodian Government hold positions of considerable influence in the Ministry of Finance, the Treasury, and the premier's office, and are among Prince Sihanouk's advisers.

Paris has indicated it has no intention of equaling the US aid program. Any increase in military aid probably would be limited to reconditioned and obsolete equipment, such as trucks and light armored vehicles. Increased cultural and technical assistance probably would include further help for the French university mission, more teachers, and 30 or 40 additional technical experts, especially agriculturalists.

The extension of French aid will be complicated by Cambodia's claims for compensation for losses incurred as a result of the 1958 devaluation of the French franc. Since 1958 France has asserted that a large-scale aid program would be impossible until there is agreement on an exchange rate, but a compromise may now be in sight.

Sihanouk has sought French help in maintaining Cambodia's policy of neutrality, and in recent talks with the US and the UK, France has supported his call for an international conference on Cambodian neutrality, despite US objections. Indeed, De Gaulle has consistently sought to meet Sihanouk more than half way, and Paris may now encourage Sihanouk to press this issue. (CONFIDENTIAL)


ISRAEL'S
JORDAN RIVER
DIVERSION PROJECT
Canal or conduit, proposed or under construction
Demilitarized Zone
LEBANON
Litani
Hasbani
Dan
Baniyas
SYRIA
Pumping Station
(Under Construction)
Haifa
Tunnel
Reservoirs
Tunnel
Tunnel
Yarmuk
ISRAEL
Jordan
JORDAN
Mediterranean
Sea
Tel Aviv - Jaffa
Jerusalem
DEAD
SEA
GAZA
STRIP
NEGEV
DESERT
0
STATUTE MILES
30
34446
LEBANON
SYRIA
Mediterranean
Sea
ISRAEL
Jordan
Dead
Sea
NEGEV
DESERT
JORDAN
UAR
(EGYPT)

CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

ARABS PLAN NO OVERT ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI PROJECT

The Arab states evidently do not plan any overt military action against Israel when in late January or early February the Israelis begin pumping tests for their Jordan River diversion project, but sabotage of the project's facilities may be attempted.

The Arab military chiefs who met in Cairo in mid-December apparently decided that direct military attacks are not feasible. The chiefs reportedly agreed, however, that the states bordering on Israel should mount independent and uncoordinated clandestine operations.

The Arab League Defense Council, which meets in January, probably will approve this recommendation, but its implementation is another matter. Egyptian, Jordanian, and Lebanese officials have indicated privately that their governments have no intention of taking aggressive action of any kind against the Israeli project.

Nasir, however, told the Canadian ambassador in early December that he was worried that Syria might act unilaterally and present the other Arab states with a dilemma. Damascus will be under strong pressure to fulfill its threats against the Israeli scheme, particularly in view of the close proximity of the Syrian border to Israel's pumping station on Lake Tiberias.

Nasir's wariness about becoming involved in a war with Israel over Jordan waters was also evident in a speech he made on 23 December. He emphasized that the problem is political rather than military in nature and that the chiefs of staff cannot solve it. He called for a summit meeting of Arab presidents and kings to seek a solution.

Israel, according to the chief of Israeli military intelligence, considers there is an outside possibility that Syria might bomb or shell the pumping facility's transformer station. However, the Israelis believe the primary threat stems from former Palestinians now living in Syria, Jordan or Lebanon, who might make a dramatic effort to sabotage the project even though they probably could not cause serious damage. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

* * *

CYPRUS DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN

Fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, which began on 21 December and was continuing on 26 December despite efforts to obtain a cease-fire, is the culmination of a steady growth of tension on the island during the past few weeks. The new tension followed President Makarios' presentation to Turkish Cypriot leaders of proposals for changing the Cyprus constitution. The proposals, which essentially involved removing the guarantees to the Turkish minority that had been written into the Cyprus settlement of 1959, were rejected by the Turkish Government even before the Turkish Cypriots had made their views known.

Most of the initial fighting appears to have been between Greek Cypriot police and the Turkish underground, and to have taken place in the Turkish areas of Nicosia.. The situation there deteriorated progressively during the week, as the police lost control to extremist groups of irregulars from both communities. A cease-fire, to be supervised by the British, had not been effective as of the morning of 26 December. Fighting had also continued at the port city of Larnaca; the rest of the island was quiet but tense.

In the face of these developments, the Turkish Government threatened to exercise its right under the 1959 agreement to intervene on Cyprus. Three Turkish jet fighters flew over Nicosia on 25 December, and Turkish naval units appeared off the island. Part of the 650-man Turkish garrison on Cyprus left its barracks to move into one of the Turkish quarters of the capital. Part of the 950-man Greek contingent then moved to protect Greek areas. The situation evidently prodded Athens and London into a more active role, and Greek, Turkish and British forces on Cyprus have been placed under a unified British-led command. Britain has announced it is sending 150 additional troops.

The violence may make leaders of both sides more cautious in pressing political demands. Soon after the outbreak, Makarios told the US ambassador he would go more slowly in pushing his constitutional revisions. Both ethnic groups, however, will be further embittered--particularly the Turkish community, which is believed to have suffered much the heavier casualties. (CONFIDENTIAL)

AREA NOTE

Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince Faysal appears to have weathered his latest dispute with King Saud without making any concessions. The details of a new arrangement between the two are not known, but Faysal is still firmly in control of the government. Royal Guard elements which the King ordered to positions around his palace at the height of the dispute have now been withdrawn.

The dispute centered on Saud's attempt to resume personal control of the government, which he relinquished to Faysal a year ago when his health broke. The immediate issues were variously reported to have been the new budget, which cuts funds allotted to the royal family, and Faysal's refusal to give cabinet posts to two of Saud's sons.

In blocking Saud's challenge, Faysal apparently was supported by most of the important members of the royal family. Throughout the crisis the Saudi regular army remained under the orders of the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, a Faysal adherent. Some observers have reported that the King's action has actually served to strengthen Faysal's position. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

* * *

THE TARIFF DISPARITIES ISSUE

The tariff disparities issue which has plagued preparations for the Kennedy Round for many months originates in the fact that there are substantial differences between the EEC and US tariffs on individual items, even though over-all tariff levels are roughly the same. Because the EEC common external tariff was arrived at by averaging the tariffs of the member states, the EEC tariff schedule is characterized by the absence of "peaks and lows"; in the US schedule, on the other hand, the rates vary much more, and some individual tariffs remain very high in comparison with those of the EEC. Accordingly, the EEC and the French in particular have long insisted that a 50-percent cut in tariffs by both the US and the EEC would leave the US with substantial protection on certain items and deprive the EEC of bargaining power to effect their future reduction.

The disparities issue was believed to have been settled at the GATT ministerial meeting last May with a formula which provided that tariffs on industrial items would in general be reduced equally and across the board, except that "special rules" would apply "where significant adverse effects on trade would result from disparities in tariff levels." In fact, however, this formula merely shifted the argument to the problem of determining what disparities are "significant" or "meaningful in trade terms." Because the "special rules" would mean in most cases a smaller tariff reduction by the EEC than by the US, the EEC has attempted to maximize the area to which these rules would apply while the US has sought to minimize their application.

After lengthy negotiation, a GATT subcommittee reached a considerable measure of agreement last month on a formula which would identify a "significant" tariff disparity in the first instance as one in which the high rate is at least 30 percent of value and at least 10 percent above the lower rate. Because this formula would identify some 850 US items as eligible for "special treatment," the subcommittee proposed seven additional qualitative criteria which would reduce considerably the number of eligible items. The three to which the US attaches special importance would (1) require that there be substantial imports of the item concerned from the high tariff country into the low; (2) exclude items where there are substantial imports into the high tariff country; and (3) exclude items on which the low tariff country maintains quotas.

The formula approved by the EEC on 23 December would substitute for the 30/10 criterion a 2/1 formula. A disparity would be identified as one in which the high tariff is twice as high as the low one, apparently with the additional qualification that, in most cases, there would have to be a ten-point percentage spread between the two rates. This formula would provide for special treatment for far more than 850 items, including items of special US export interest. The arrangements for qualitative criteria also seem to have been modified to the US' disadvantage.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS

The Common Market appears to have averted disaster for the second time in less than a year. The eleventh-hour agreements reached on agricultural policy on 23 December are apparently sufficient to discourage De Gaulle from carrying out his threat to break up the community. Moreover, the Germans and Dutch succeeded in extracting limited commitments from Paris on EEC participation in the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations. These agreements do not cover all the outstanding issues, however, and the manner in which they were reached will leave a residue of bitterness. Nor is it certain that major US interests have fared well.

The main agricultural elements in the "package" deal are the regulations concerning intracommunity trade in beef, rice, and dairy products and the rules governing the community farm fund. Their effect is to open the large West German market to farm exports of France, Italy, and the Netherlands--generally at a substantial advantage over the exports of nonmembers. Although approval of these and the financial regulations is an important step forward, the key question of grain price unification is still unsettled. Further consideration of the formula proposed by Commissioner Mansholt has been delayed until next year.

The agreement on a Kennedy Round position is likewise an advance for the community, but from the US view not necessarily favorable. On the long-standing problem of tariff "disparities," the EEC adopted a formula which would exempt from the proposed 50-percent linear reduction in tariffs a far larger number of items than the US hoped for. The EEC position on farm products in the trade negotiations--although an improvement over the initial Mansholt proposals--also leaves much to be desired from the US view. In general, the EEC proposes that, if its levy system operates in such a way as to cause difficulties for the exports of nonmembers, then the EEC Commission will be called on to propose "appropriate," but unspecified, measures. These would not apply if it is technically impossible to determine how much protection is actually involved in the levy system.

The general relief within the community which greeted these agreements reflects both the depth of the crisis and some optimism that the Common Market's unity may have been restored. The prominent role played by the EEC's commission in achieving the compromise has in particular encouraged those who hope to strengthen the community's institutional structure.

In France the conviction was evidently widespread, however, that both Bonn and The Hague were quite prepared to see the French "leave" the Common Market, and in the event of its breakup, to seek alternative ties with the Outer Seven. Moreover, while it may prove healthy that Bonn "stood up" to De Gaulle in this instance, its motive was strongly colored by a desire to protect its inefficient farmers. Nor does it augur well for US-EEC relations that the French blame the US for much of the opposition they encountered. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

UK-US FRICTIONS OVER SHIPPING POLICY

British shipping and official circles are incensed over recent US demands for information relating to rate discrimination against US exports. The British Government has advised against compliance on the grounds that this information is commercially confidential, and that the US cannot demand what the UK Government cannot obtain.

Following a recent congressional investigation into alleged rate discrimination against American exports, the US Maritime Commission asked the North Atlantic Freight Conference to explain the differentials on a long list of items, setting a 20 January deadline for compliance under penalty of heavy fines. The US position is that US exporters are being penalized because outward rates are higher on the average than the inward rates.

British and other shipping lines regard the differentials as economically justified. The tonnage of US exports is much greater than import tonnage, and shipping lines--anxious to avoid half-loaded or in-ballast westbound voyages--have traditionally charged lower rates for items imported into the US than for exports from this country.

Thus, what are seen as American efforts to regulate international shipping lines in order to improve the unfavorable US balance of payments have caused increasing rancor in Britain. Before Parliament adjourned for its Christmas recess on 20 December, some Conservative MPs called for retaliatory restrictions on US ships arriving at UK ports. Although the MPs did not specify what restrictions they had in mind, the government cannot afford in the present pre-election period to leave itself open to charges that it is not attentive enough to domestic interests.

The Douglas-Home government, while hopeful of some compromise before the 20 January deadline, is busily lining up international support. At the recently concluded conference of transport ministers of 10 European maritime nations, Britain proposed that Japan be invited to join the united front of European maritime countries in a general protest against US shipping policies, thereby aligning roughly three quarters of the world's shipping business against the US position. Japan agreed to do so, and the collective protest was filed with the State Department on 23 December. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

WEST GERMAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The opening of the Berlin Wall during the holiday season and the death of Social Democratic Party (SPD) chairman Erich Ollenhauer have placed Willy Brandt once again in the center of the German political stage.

The agreement to open the Wall resulted from Brandt's unceasing efforts to ease conditions for Berliners. His willingness to reach agreement with the East Zone authorities on the pass issue is being criticized by some Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leaders and by the CDU-oriented press in West Germany. Brandt, however, is banking on the expectation that most West Germans, like the Berliners, will approve his action. He has even hinted that there may be further negotiations with the East Germans to extend the period of the passes beyond the 5 January cutoff date. There is also speculation that both East and West Germany will find the pass agreement a model for agreement on other issues.

Brandt, who was the most logical choice, was named acting chairman of the SPD immediately after Ollenhauer's death on 14 December. Deputy Chairman Herbert Wehner has proposed that Brandt's position be formalized at a special party convention next month. Fritz Erler, the party's foreign and defense expert, is slated to take Brandt's place in the hierarchy as second deputy chairman. As the SPD leader, Brandt would stand to be candidate for chancellor in the 1965 general elections. If current opinion polls are any indication, the SPD will give the CDU a strong race in that contest.

Brandt, however, has not yet committed himself, since to accept the SPD chairmanship might require him to resign as mayor of Berlin and move to Bonn. In so doing he would have to operate at a distance from his political bastion.

Whatever Brandt decides, the SPD is bound to miss the conciliating influence of Ollenhauer, who was able to hold together the often highly antagonistic factions of the party. Brandt, with his ideas of greater flexibility in foreign policy, may be expected to clash more frequently with Wehner, who--despite his Communist past--has come to represent the SPD's right wing. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

AREA NOTES

NATO: The NATO ministerial meeting in Paris, which ended on 17 December, avoided serious discussion of the more contentious issues facing the alliance. There was, for instance, only passing reference to the matter of nuclear sharing. While NATO's military posture was generally recognized as still inadequate, the Force Planning exercise--which is designed to help correct this situation--was not discussed at all. The dispute over basic strategy, the chief stumbling block to the exercise, was put off until after De Gaulle's press conference sometime in January.

All but the French agreed that the alliance should explore possibilities of negotiating with the Soviets on outstanding East-West issues. The Germans, as usual, indicated some reservations because of their sensitivity regarding Berlin and German reunification. The question of restricting Western credits to the Soviet bloc was reserved for future consideration. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Iceland's near general strike was settled on 21 December when labor and management agreed to a 25-percent wage increase. The 11-day work stoppage was led by Communist-dominated unions seeking, as in the past, to force the resignation of the Conservative - Social Democratic government by discrediting its economic policies. The settlement is regarded as a political victory for Prime Minister Benediktsson's government, since the Communists were unable to maintain a solid grip on labor.

The settlement, however, will intensify inflationary pressures and will probably force Benediktsson to take extraordinary measures to maintain economic stability. For political reasons he will try to avoid another currency devaluation, but it is doubtful that the government can maintain its economic stabilization program without resorting to this measure. (CONFIDENTIAL)

DOMESTIC POLITICS IN CUBA

Fidel Castro is continuing his effort to reduce the influence of the veteran Communists who were leaders of the Moscow-oriented, pre-revolutionary Communist party of Cuba. Castro's campaign against them, launched in a bitter attack in March 1962, subsequently seemed to lose steam. Recent reports from knowledgeable clandestine sources, however, indicate that the old liners are again on the defensive and are likely to suffer further in government shake-ups which may be in the offing. Castro nevertheless continues to move slowly in order to avoid undue disruption within his regime.

The only major veteran Communist figure to remain in Castro's good graces is Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the head of the National Agrarian Reform Institute. Rodriguez' position has actually been strengthened in recent weeks with the raising of his job to cabinet level. He has evidently convinced Castro of his personal loyalty and of his ability as an administrator. It is also possible that Rodriguez performs a useful and trusted liaison role between Castro and Soviet leaders. He returned to Havana on 22 December after a two-week trip to the USSR and several Soviet satellites where, according to press accounts, he was in contact with high-ranking Communist Party officials.

The old-line Cuban Communists remain strong, according to a recent clandestine report, in the intermediate and lower echelons of the military and party hierarchies. Wherever possible, they continue their "sectarian" efforts to secure positions for their comrades at the expense of Fidelistas. A clandestine source reported hearing "rumors" in high regime circles late last month that veteran Communists have banded together in clandestine cells to work against Castro.

Che Guevara continues to be the Cuban leader most openly critical of the Soviet Union and the most insistent on the "necessity" of accelerating the revolution in Latin America. Fidel Castro is said to agree with Guevara's position, but awareness of Cuba's own self-interest still compels him to be more cautious in pursuing policies that could be interpreted as anti-Soviet. It nevertheless remains a key regime policy to encourage Communist revolution in Latin America.

A clandestine source who is a high-level Cuban diplomat asserts that Cuban leaders privately recognize that popular discontent with the regime is widespread. He claims, however, that they are confident their unpopularity has reached its nadir, and that they are beginning to make up lost ground. They expect, for instance, that economic difficulties--a major source of discontent--will be largely overcome within three years. The strategy of the government, this source reports, is to hold on until the economy improves and until Cuban subversive efforts elsewhere in Latin America result in the establishment of one or more Communist allies in the hemisphere. Then, the regime feels, it will be secure. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

DOMINICAN REGIME FACES NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGES

The killing of 15 guerrillas by Dominican Army troops on 21 December apparently removes the last pocket of insurgents opposing the government. However, the incident could provoke dangerous political repercussions.

Emilio De Los Santos, head of the governing military-installed triumvirate, resigned in protest over what he regarded as the brutal and unnecessary killing of the insurgents, including the president of the pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group. The army commander of the area in which the incident took place insists the deaths were the unavoidable result of a fire fight. If stories of armed forces "brutality" become widespread, however, they could provoke dangerous hostility toward the regime from rank-and-file Dominicans, who recall the repressive measures of former dictator Trujillo.

The resignation of De Los Santos precipitated frantic maneuvering within the government among civilian and military elements. Only the prompt appointment of Foreign Minister Donald Reid to the vacant post in the triumvirate appears to have helped avert a serious political crisis for the moment.

The triumvirate has asked the cabinet--which was chosen from and is responsible to six minority political parties--to resign to permit the appointment of a more independent group. This move has prompted strong protests from four of the splinter parties backing the regime, who stand to lose patronage; the outcome is unclear.

However, the National Civic Union, the only sizable party in the government, backs the cabinet reorganization. More important, the key leaders of the armed forces are providing the triumvirate with their support, which could prove crucial in a political showdown. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

* * *

BRAZIL

Further changes in the Brazilian cabinet are expected following the resignation last week of Finance Minister Carvalho Pinto. A moderate leftist, Ney Galvao, was appointed Pinto's successor, but there remains a possibility that Leonel Brizola--who had been actively pushed for the post by the extreme left--may eventually receive some ministry. There is widespread belief in the army that War Minister Jair Ribeiro will also be replaced in the near future. As one responsible Brazilian commentator has remarked, with Goulart "every minister is an interim one."

Ney Galvao's appointment actually reduces the previously slight prospect that Brazil's critical financial problems would be handled effectively. Galvao's qualifications in the economic field are weak at best and his record as head of the Bank of Brazil does not command confidence within the business community. Before taking his new post, he served as minister without portfolio in charge of coordinating foreign trade policies, a job he performed without any particular distinction.

Although his views are perhaps somewhat to the right of Goulart's, Galvao can be expected to toe the adminstration line faithfully. Moreover, Galvao's appointment may be a temporary expedient designed to allay fears that Brizola would succeed Pinto. Galvao is a personal friend of Brizola and there is speculation that Brizola will, in fact, eventually move into the Finance Ministry.

The new finance minister inherits almost insurmountable economic and financial problems. Chief among these are a rampant inflation that may see the cost of living increase 80 percent this year, and a staggering foreign debt involving approximately $1 billion in payments due over the next two years.

The severity of the economic situation and Goulart's apparent intention to assume greater personal direction over financial policies increase the possibility of radical measures that might be detrimental to foreign creditors and investors. Goulart reportedly is considering nationalization of all public utilities and cancellation of mining concessions. Measures such as these could lead to further deterioration of Brazil's economic position. (SECRET)

AREA NOTE

Bolivia: The political competition between Bolivian Vice President Juan Lechin and President Victor Paz Estenssoro is bound to intensify sharply as each maneuvers to line up support for the presidential nomination at next month's convention of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). Lechin probably still hopes to pull an upset by dislodging Paz or at least to demonstrate sufficient strength to assure himself of retaining his vice-presidential post. Paz seems certain, however, to be able to control the party's convention, assure his renomination, and designate his own running mate.

If the forthcoming convention repudiates Lechin, he may well withdraw from the MNR and establish a "popular front" political party. He probably could count on the support of political groups ranging from leftist extremists to disgruntled factions within right-wing parties. It would seem unlikely, though, that these disparate groups could coalesce into an organization powerful enough to defeat Paz' well-organized machine in the elections set for June. (SECRET)

* * *

13-00000

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

KENT EXTRACT

Mr. William M. Kent joined the Agency in December 1951. He had previously received a degree in diplomatic and public relations from the Latin American Institute, New York City and had served time in the U.S. Army from 1946 to 1948. He graduated from the Latin American Institute with the highest honors and 4 awards.

Mr. Kent was initially assigned to the Office of Special Operations as a clerk typist and, 11 after six months, in June 1952, was assigned to [Panama] as an intelligence officer under non-official cover. In July 1956 he returned to Headquarters where he worked as an area operations officer in the Western Hemisphere Division. After a successful stint in the Cuba 16-17 section he was assigned as an operations officer, to [Caracas]. After an excellently productive tour in 16-17 [Caracas], Mr. Kent was selected to join JMWAVE in Miami. There he really shone as attested to in the following quote from his fitness report: "He has been placed in most difficult positions, particularly in the handling of incompatible people and groups which he has managed without alienating either side and on various occasions accomplishing the impossible by satisfying everyone concerned." After his tour in Miami, he headed several sections in Headquarters in the Western Hemisphere Division. In 1967 he was transferred to New Orleans and then to the Washington Base. In both places he worked under [non-official cover] 24 From 1970 until his retirement he served in several capacities ranging from the planning and guiding of Covert Action programs to occupying managerial positions. During these eight years he received seven strong and three outstanding overall ratings. Of special note are the various commendation and laudatory reports concerning Mr. Kent's performance during the "Chilean crisis". Because of his excellent performance during the Chilean crisis he again was asked to help the Latin American Division during several investigations. He performed admirably as reflected in a commendation written by the Deputy Chief of LA Division on 5 December 1975: "When confronted with a need to produce a paper on Chile in a short timeframe, I instinctively turned to him. It was not only because he had expertise on Chile, but to service in the Chile Branch, but because he is highly skilled in written presentation. He organizes his material well and presents it in a lucid, highly readable manner. On the first occasion, he helped us prepare a paper that was eventually used by the Director in his presentation before the Senate Select Committee on 14-15 July. On the second occasion his contribution

4/IN

CONFIDENTIAL

was used by the DDO in his appearance before the Senate Select Committee on 28 October. Both of these papers were excellent and have withstood critical scrutiny."

Mr. Kent has now left the Agency after 26 years of distinguished service as an operations officer and as a manager both in the field and at Headquarters. On the occasion of his retirement, it is appropriate that Mr. Kent's career achievements be suitably recognized. It is recommended that he be awarded the Career Intelligence Medal in recognition of his long and distinguished service.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

1 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby

SUBJECT: Special Activities

1. Following our recent conversation, I have searched my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples of activities which to hostile observers or to someone without complete knowledge and with a special kind of motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities exceeding CIA's charter.

2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962, DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify their sources for classified information which was appearing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA, orally, which I did. I understand more complete information on this operation is available from the Director of Security. I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of what precise actions were taken, what information was gained, what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.

3. As a result of a developing relationship with ~~Philippe de Vosjol~~i, the SDECE representative in Washington, and also as a result of certain information conveyed by Anatole Golitsen, James Angleton, with the approval of Dick Helms, agreed to mount a counterespionage operation against the French Embassy in Washington. This involved breaking and entering and the removal of documents from

SECRET/SENSITIVE

E2,3 IMPDET CL BY 007789

EYES ONLY

the French Consulate. On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally on the operation without going into operational details. Later on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed. Actual breaking and entering occurred somewhat later, and on 15 April 1963, DCI McCone met with President Kennedy alone and briefed the President on the details of this new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney General was briefed and he agreed that he would not mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed. On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secretary of State Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed reservations about the propriety of such an operation. He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations with McCone on 17 April 1964, 28 May 1964, and 14 June 1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the French be informed directly that we knew about their espionage operations in the United States and ask them to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and President John F. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara was also present, and there is no record that he had previously been made aware of this operation.

4. Although certain activities never got beyond the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation. One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear installations. Outside the United States Government, General Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign installations in this country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected

exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy, and generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting taking place in the presence of the Attorney General. It is clear that the FBI was opposed to any such proposal then, as now, and the plan never went forward.

5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured the cooperation of several prominent US business firms in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but knowledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.

6. On 17 April 1964, Mr. Robert B. Anderson came to DCI McCone on behalf of American business interests, offering to insert some $300,000 to try to secure a favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly after this approach, Mr. Clyde Weed of Anaconda Copper Company made a similar proposal to McCone in connection with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of American business could not be accepted, it being neither a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business. This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations and private business.

/ 7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy, McCone injected the Agency, and particularly Cord Meyer, into the US labor situation, and particularly to try to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and Walter Reuther. Cord Meyer steered a very skillful course in this connection, but the Agency could be vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back, or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's wishes.

8. There are three examples of using Agency funds which I know to be controversial. One was the expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike Misko~~r~~vsky, George MacManus, and James Smith. Second, as you well know, when Lou Conein received his summons to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on 1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him. My impression is that the accounting for this and its use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at one of the early Special Group meetings attended by McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His general position was that such expenditures were not within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow such spending only on the direct personal request of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or the White House.

9. I raise these issues of funding because I remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000 for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.

10. Under the heading of old business, I know that any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried about the fact that conversations within the offices and over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's

tenure, there were microphones in his regular office, his inner office, his dining room, his office in East Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven Street. I do not know who would be willing to raise such an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this score.

11. Also under the heading of old business, I well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet Union. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs, and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced with surprisingly little excitement at the time.

12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was a special arrangement with the Office of Communications whereby the Director's office gained access to non-CIA traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball, Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did. Ben Read in the Secretary of State's office and I spent several weeks putting this one to rest.

13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know, operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of his activities could be misunderstood. One example was his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and Maria Callas flown from Rome to Athens on Air Force KC 135. Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John

Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety of this action.

14. The use of Fairways Corporation aircraft has been remarkably secure, but DCI McCone himself forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the San Francisco airport for the Republican National Convention in 1964 aboard the Grumman Gulf Stream with the highly visible tail number N 8 E. This was, I explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate charter, but he didn't like it.

15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift and a luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps indicative of the press's relations with him. However, in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher and the authors to change things. They did not change a comma, and I doubt that this old saw will ever sing again.

16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI, would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters.

17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that allegations from any quarter which cast these things in the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention, and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight. If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point

out that I was very much in the position of the enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers were aware of these activities and better able to judge their propriety and possible impact or misinterpretation.

WElder

WALTER ELDER

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Sidney Gottlieb Chief, TSD	EXTENSION 2331	NO.	DATE 8 May 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Carl E. Duckett DDS&T				SECRET
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				SECRET 00214

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology

SUBJECT : TSD Support to Other Agencies

1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for Operations.

2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency for International Development, and the White House.

98

3. [While varying widely among the different recipients, these services have included training and materials, and in a few instances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance, secret writing and related communications, personal protection, alias documentation and questioned document examination, disguise, concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detection, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.]

98

4. [In most instances requirements for this support are received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels. Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is required.]

5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059098

2/mc

98

6. [Issuance of forged personal identity documentation by TSD is controlled according to two broad criteria: type of requester; and type of documentation requested. A request for denied area documentation from a DDO Area Division is honored after proper validation. Free world documentation may require some extra coordination however. A Swiss passport would not be issued without coordination with the EUR Swiss Branch; an Irish passport would not be issued for use anywhere in the Commonwealth area without the approval of the British Desk; Hong Kong documentation is not to be used in Hong Kong unless approved by Hong Kong Chief of Station.]

7. Unless ordered otherwise by higher Agency authority, no U.S. documentation is issued by TSD Headquarters without prior coordination with the Office of Security and the Central Cover Staff. TSD/Regional Bases require at least the validation of U.S. documentation requests by the COS, or his designated representative, of the requesting Station. Because it could be used in order to obtain [a U.S. passport in alias, no U.S. Birth Certificate is issued without approval of the DDO via Central Cover Staff. Backstopped major credit cards] are issued by Office of Security, not TSD. 24

24

8. Provision of [forged] documentation to non-DDO requesters, whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires approval of non-TSD offices. [Support to the military for instance would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs Staff.]

98

9. [Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded of the outstanding documentation.]

98

Sidney Gottlieb
Chief
Technical Services Division

Attachment
Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee, w/att

END OF ROLL

PERS 79-1222

A11x 790112

all T-1-12-79

8 January 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Annual Fitness Report - George Joannides
Operations Officer
cb GS-16
ESN 064818 23
DOB 5 July 1922
067180743

1. This Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report is prepared in accordance with HR 20-20, for the period mid-June 1978 through 12 January 1979. The occasion of the Fitness Report is the retirement of the rating official.

2. The undersigned was detailed in mid-May to serve as the Agency's Principal Coordinator for work with the House Select Committee on Assassinations. As it became apparent that the volume of the work required assignment of additional full-time personnel, the decision was made that one experienced officer was needed to handle the DDO account. A senior officer experienced in DDO work and available to serve for several months was requested. Mr. Joannides was known to the undersigned by reputation, although not personally, and arrangements were made for his detail to the work. While there is no way to outline the qualifications that one should have for this sort of work, it became quickly clear that Mr. Joannides was the perfect man for it.

3. Mr. Joannides was responsible for a new procedure in recording of exchanges with the HSCA. As it developed, the Agency's logs and records on the status of requests by the HSCA and the Agency's responses became the only reliable record; it was clear that the HSCA often did not know the status of business in this respect and time and time again had to come to this office for clarification. Beyond that early contribution to the ordering of the affairs of the office, Mr. Joannides handled day-to-day follow-ups of requirements by telephone with the DDO focal point as well as throughout the DDO. Further, the firm position that he took with the young investigators in response to aggressive harassment on some occasions was exactly what the situation called for. A person of his maturity and experience handled the job exactly as required by the situation. If the peculiar nature of the work did not call on Mr. Joannides for all the talents of his wide experience, it nonetheless was his experience and quick perceptions that ensured a superior performance. His advice and

2/mc 1/19

counselling on courses of action to cope with unique situations was always sound and responsible.

4. The work in this assignment provided little occasion for Mr. Joannides to demonstrate attitudes on either EEO matters or economy, considerations that are required by regulation for comment in Fitness Reports. As a result, no comment is made.

5. Not because of the demands on his superior talents, but because of the cool efficacy with which he handled an unusual special assignment, Mr. Joannides' work is evaluated as Outstanding.

S. D. Breckinridge

I certify that I have seen the comments in the Narrative section of this memorandum.

George Joannides

8 Jan 79
Date

KC 1/14

gm
cjr

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER [064818] 08

SECTION A GENERAL

Joannides, George

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 7-5-22	3. SEX M 99	4. GRADE [GS-14]	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and manages the Station's covert action branch which employs [ten] 24 staff officers and [seven] 24 contract employees.	99 [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Serves as senior case officer for a student project which involves distribution of printed propaganda, production of radio programs, and the development of political action programs.	99 [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains liaison with the FI, CI and PM branch chiefs, in order to insure that the Station's covert action effort is appropriately supporting the missions of the other branches.	99 [P]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts production and security reviews on the Station's covert action operations.	99 [P]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	[S] 99

8 JUN 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9/mc

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject is a hard working, dedicated and effective officer who has proven by performance that he can accomplish assigned operational tasks in allowable time limits. The period covered by this fitness report represents Subject's initial Agency exposure to those first echelon management responsibilities which are implicit in a branch chief's assignment in a Station that has 24 [313] employees. Subject responded to the challenge of the first echelon supervisory responsibilities in an exemplary manner. Subject managed a branch that had a yearly budget of two million four hundred thousand dollars. These funds were judiciously spent on printed propaganda, white and black radio programs, and on political action operations which were implemented via labor, student and professional groups. Subject has the knack of judiciously blending quality with quantity and in this melding effort, Subject reflected cost consciousness and effectiveness in the use of personnel, space equipment, and funds. Subject has a distinct flair for political action operations and can translate policy directives into meaningful action programs by all of his assets. Subject has the ability to delegate authority and to appropriately fix responsibility with those officers whom he supervises. In the management field, Subject's only discernible weakness is a tendency to be abrupt with subordinates. It is believed that this minor shortcoming will be overcome with the acquisition of added experience in the field of personnel management. On balance therefore, Subject's overall performance as a supervisor and as an intelligence officer warrants an 99 evaluation of "[Strong]"

(CONTINUED)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 4 8 05 AM '64
MAIL ROOM

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 May 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/[redacted] (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Although I have had few chances to personally observe [redacted] work, I concur in the supervisor's comments and rating due to my general impression of [redacted] capabilities and performance of duty received in occasional meetings extending over a number of years.

DATE 1 June 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, WH (SA)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Bruce B. Cheever Bruce B. Cheever

SECRET

2/mc

CONTINUATION SHEET

Section C - Narrative Comments

Subject has additional growth potential as an intelligence officer and as a first echelon supervisor of individuals doing a basic intelligence task. Ethnic origins, foreign language fluency and experience acquired to date generally dictates a career for Subject in the general arena of Greek operations. While the major thrust of Subject's career orientation should be geared toward Greece and its related problems, it is believed that it is essential that, on a periodic basis, Subject be directed into non-Greek areas of interest, in order that the continued challenge of new horizons will stimulate Subject to develop to his full capacity. In practical terms, this means that out of any eight-year time cycle, at least two years should be spent by Subject on non-Greek or even non-European affairs. This officer has the potential to be a broad-gauged officer but he must be stimulated and led in that direction which will fully harness the totality of his potential.

The rating officer would be pleased to have Subject work with him at any other Field Station that might be entrusted to the rating officer.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 56 [064818]

SECTION A Joannides, George E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Jul 1922	3. SEX M	4. GRADE [GS-14]	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL XX REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*:

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)* 1 January 1963 - 31 July 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of Branch handling (in absence of Chief) all aspects of political action and psychological warfare activity and supervising [fourteen] case officers and clerical personnel.	RATING LETTER [O]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer for student project involving political action, propaganda, intelligence collection and a hemisphere-wide apparatus.	RATING LETTER [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
17 Oct 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER [S]

17 OCT 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

6/MC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Reference is made to paragraph C of subject's previous fitness report dated 10 January 1963 which is still applicable. During the period covered by this report subject has done an excellent job in the handling of a significant student exile group which hitherto had successfully resisted any important degree of control. Under subject's direction an exile teachers' group reached a high level of effectiveness in the propaganda field and was turned over to another case officer.

Subject has effectively terminated unproductive operations in the prop field (one magazine and a news letter) and is building up Station radio capability directed at the maintarget.

His high professional standards, complete comprehension of the problems faced by the Station and strong urge to win in our struggle with the opposition make it a distinct pleasure to see him take over as Chief of the PW branch.

[redacted]

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE JUL 31 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Walter D. NEWBY (signed in pseudo on Fld. Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 15 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 31 July 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, PW	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert K. TROUCHARD (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL – The Reviewing Officer is familiar with Subject's work based primarily on discussions with Subject and Subject's supervisor, general observation of Subject during the past year and frequently reviewing his completed work. Subject is an extremely hard working, dedicated individual with an ability to develop rapport quickly with his contacts. Subject works long hours including weekends without complaining and is always available when there is a job to be done. Subject has demonstrated those qualities of management, initiative, drive and devotion to duty that are necessary to perform the many and varied tasks of a fast and continually changing situation. The Reviewing Officer concurs with the Rating Officer's overall evaluation of [Strong]"

DATE SEP 24 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Frederick J. INGHURST (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

1/mc

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

No change from previous report submitted 19 January 1963.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	**BY EMPLOYEE**	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 27 March 63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Walter D. NEWBY (signed on Field Transmittal)	
2.	**BY SUPERVISOR**	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 27 March 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, PW Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert K. TROUCHARD (signed on Field Transmittal)
3.	**BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 2 April 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed on Field Transmittal)

~~SECRET~~

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

mm

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER ~~037747~~ [064818] 08

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Joannides, George E. [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 July 1922	3. SEX Male 99	4. GRADE [GS-14]	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE US Fuia		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
☐	SPECIAL *(Specify):*				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL *(Specify):*		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)* 1 January 1963 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

Annual fitness report covering the Period 1 January - 31 December 62 still current.

POSTED ON OF-?? d
10 Apr 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER

16 APR 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2/M

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Stf Agent

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
08 [064818] ~~037747~~

SECTION A Joannides, George E. **GENERAL**

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 July 1922	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE [GS-14]	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1962 - 31 December 1962

SECTION B **PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of Branch handling (in absence of Chief) all aspects political action and psychological warfare and supervising [fifteen] case officers and clerical personnel. 24	RATING LETTER [O]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case Officer for student project involving political action, propaganda, intelligence collection and hemisphere-wide apparatus.	RATING LETTER [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Case Officer for teacher's organization engaged in hemisphere-wide press and radio propaganda.	RATING LETTER [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case Officer on project producing news letter aimed at press outlets in Latin America.	RATING LETTER [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains contacts with key elements of a veteran's type organization as a developmental project.	RATING LETTER [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
[illegible]
26 Feb 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER [S]

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9/mc

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject's strengths lie in his ability to analyze a problem quickly and skillfully, to strip it of unnecessary detail and to render a decision without waste of motion. He has contributed greatly to the efficiency of the Branch by eliminating unproductive ventures, counseling the members and promoting the principles of correct tradecraft. He has been successful in resolving complicated problems involving control of an unruly group. He has a strong personality and firm convictions about the proper manner of carrying on covert operations and voices his convictions without fear. He is an excellent supervisor and is respected by the members of the branch for his forthrightness and his sober judgment and sound advice. His handling of agents and contacts on the outside both directly and indirectly mixes to a proper extent firmness and friendliness. In short he is a distinct asset to the clandestine services both administratively and operationally.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 19 JAN 63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Walter D. NEWBY (signed on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 19 JAN 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief/PW - JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert K. TROUCHARD (signed on Field Transmittal)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Subject is an unusually competent officer in the field of covert action operations in that he blends a flair for this activity with sound tradecraft principles and a firm adherence to valid reporting techniques. Subject is dedicated and hard working and he has proven by performance that he is willing to work long hours in order to accomplish his operational objectives. Subject's overall performance warrants an evaluation of "strong". Subject has growth potential both as an intelligence officer and as a first echelon supervisor of individuals doing a basic intelligence task. Subject's activities come to the attention of the reviewing officer on a weekly basis.

DATE FEB 15 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed on Field Transmittal)

SECRET

1/mc

CLASSIFICATION

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD	DATE 28 JANUARY 75
SUBJECT SEE FILE NUMBER →	FILE NUMBER 526113

IF THIS FILE IS PULLED, DO NOT TAKE ANY ACTION WITHOUT ALSO CONSULTING THE FOLLOWING FILES ON RELATIVES AND ASSOCIATES:

(DUE TO WATERGATE ASSOCIATION OF 526113 (NOVEL, GORDON DWAYNE):

GOMEZ, LOUIS H., SR	OS# 925945	(ASSOCIATE)
BACCUZZI, ANDRES RENEE, JR	OS# 190442	(COUSIN OF 925945)
BACCUZZI, JANET ELNORA	OS# 107919	(SPOUSE OF 190442)

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE
E. EVANS OS/3/F	

FORM 7-62 1954 (40)

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

13-00000

INFORMATION REQUEST FLAG

THIS FORM IS USED TO SAFEGUARD FROM INADVERTENT DESTRUCTION RECORDS THAT ARE INVOLVED IN FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT OR PRIVACY ACT REQUESTS, LITIGATION, OR MATTERS UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OR CONGRESS. IT MUST BE FILED IN THE FRONT OF A FOLDER TO LIST ALL DOCUMENTS IN THE FOLDER RELATED TO A SPECIFIC REQUEST *(one form for each request)*, OR AS A SINGLE ATTACHMENT TO EACH INDIVIDUAL DOCUMENT. IT MUST NOT BE REMOVED FROM THE DOCUMENT OR FOLDER UNTIL THE RECORD SERIES IS DUE FOR DESTRUCTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED RECORDS CONTROL SCHEDULES AT WHICH TIME DISPOSITION OF FLAGGED RECORDS WILL BE CHECKED WITH THE COMPONENT RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICER AND OTHER AUTHORITIES AND WILL BE DEPENDENT ON THE STATUS OF EACH REQUEST.

TYPE OF REQUEST

	PRIVACY ACT		CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS		OTHER *(specify)* OGC 2/85
	FOIA		DEPT. OF JUSTICE INVESTIGATIONS		
	LITIGATION		MANDATORY CLASSIFICATION REVIEW		

REQUESTER	REQUEST NO.
SUBJECT OF REQUEST NOVEL, Gordon	DATE OF REQUEST 1979

DOCUMENTS SUBJECT TO REQUEST - INCLUDE FILE NO., SYMBOL, DATE AND SUBJECT

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

☐ CONTINUED ON SEPARATE PAGE

REMARKS

☐ CONTINUED ON SEPARATE PAGE

DATE OF COMPONENT RESPONSE	DATE APPEALED *(if applicable)*

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM FROM THIS FILE

FORM 9-77 4016

INFORMATION REQUEST

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
NOVEL, Gordon

FROM: Curtis R. Rivers (C) DC/OSB 4E27 Hqs.	EXTENSION 1788	NO. #526 113 DATE 31 August 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/OSB	1 SEP 1983	1 Sept	JM
2. DC/SSD	1 SEP 1983	9/1	CHB
3. C/OSB	1 Sept	1 Sept	JM
4. DC/OSB	1 Sept	9/1	
5. Susie			
6. please do O/C [illegible]			
7. & close			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

In response to the attached Incident Report dated 29 August 1983, the undersigned, on 30 August 1983, telephonically contacted Sergeant Haas, who is the supervisor of Detective Arthur Trollinger in Fort Lauderdale's Organized Crime Division. Several attempts to contact Detective Trollinger on 29 and 30 August 1983 had been unsuccessful. Sergeant Haas was advised that a Gordon Novel, believed to be identical to the Gordon Novel of interest to Fort Lauderdale's Organized Crime Division, is not now nor has he ever been an employee or employed in any capacity ~~to~~ WITH the CIA. The undersigned added that since the late 60's, Gordon Novel has periodically claimed employment with the CIA. Sergeant Haas advised that Gordon Novel is a suspect in a "bomb threat case."

No further action is contemplated regarding this matter, and it is recommended that this case be closed.

Curtis Rivers

Concur in closing
JM

Case closed.
CHB

CL BY 235 967
DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM COV 1-82

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM:

Headquarters Security Branch
Security Duty Office

INCIDENT REPORT

Date of Incident 29 August 1983
Time of Incident 1245 Hours

Date of Report 29 August 1983
Time of Report 1430 Hours

Name NOVEL, Gordon W. (U) **Grade** NA **Office** NA

DOB: 07 February 1938

Incident Request for Office of Security Assistance (U)

(305) 761-2314

Summary of Information:

Received a call from Detective Arthur Trollinger, Ft. Lauderdale Organized Crime Division, who requested Office of Security assistance in verifying the employment of SUBJECT with the Central Intelligence Agency. Caller provided the following information. (U)

SUBJECT, a convicted arsonist with ties to organized crime, is in the Ft. Lauderdale area. He is claiming to be affiliated with the Agency and under this guise has approached several companies specializing in electronic surveillance. It is for this reason that caller wishes to verify SUBJECT's employemt. (U)

Caller provided the following description of SUBJECT:

DOB: 07 February 1938
HEIGHT: 5'8"
WEIGHT: 177 LBS.
HAIR: BROWN
EYES: BLUE

Advised caller a report of his call would be made and forwarded to the appropriate office for any action deemed necessary. (U)

ACTION TAKEN:

As stated. Copies forwarded to C/SSD for appropriate action. (U)

Contacted and briefed Curt Rivers, SSD, who requested a copy of this report. (C)

A check of SRD indices reflects (2) two hits in name of SUBJECT and OSDO indices reflects (1) hit in name of SUBJECT. (U)

BHS BHS
Reporting Officer

LDA
Chief, Headquarters Security Branch

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

FORM 7-82 1798 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY 039183
DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM COV 1-82

```
COMTEN NO. 4  LINE EF

*** RUFFING COMPUTER CENTER 63.2 ***

PLEASE ENTER SWITCHING CHARACTERS:   SANCA
CONNECTED

COMTEN NO. 4  LINE EF

*** RUFFING COMPUTER CENTER 63.2 ***

DM072
^


ENTER PASSWORD


REQUEST BEING VALIDATED


J                                                          HITS=         2
   NOVEL,GORDON                                        OS  67  M0526113

   /Y M

   /Z 2103152

   ------

   NOVEL,GORDON DWANE                                  OR  76  M0592178

   /Y M  /D LTR 21OCT76 VOL 4 OGC RECORDS SEARCH REQ

   /Z 2743598

*** END OF HITS
```

NOVEL, Gordon
414 Baybrook Dr.
Seabrook, Texas
713-474-5108

Subject advised that he had an economic formula which would slove the world dollar dumping crisis.

IR - 9 February 1973

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) NIS Report on US Persons

FROM: 3 CEBehrens C/PCS/LCG 2E03	EXTENSION 1064	NO.	DATE January 24, 1980

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Bill O'Donnell Office of Security Liaison GH-02			
2.			
3. Security Support Div.	31 JAN 1980	1/31	ED
4. 4E27			
5. C/SSD	31 JAN 1980	1/31	
6. ADD/PSI ~~C/OPS/PSI~~	1 FEB 1980 1/31	2/1	RW
7.			
8.			
9. C/SAG - for Review & Action ~~[illegible]~~ as necessary			
10. DElsner			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached is NIS report, which I believe is the only copy sent to this agency. This is of no interest to the DDO but may be of interest to someone in Security

CEB

3-5 Novell has been of interest to SAG. Suggest the NIS memo be forwarded to SAG for info ED.

I concur with SAG referral. Edwards

#9. We ought to clarify with NIS that he was never employed with CIA

RWLong
A/DD/PSI

10. Please handle.

REFERENCE

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1/mc

WARNING

THE ATTACHED DOCUMENTATION IS THE PROPERTY OF THE:

NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

AND IS PART OF THE NIS INVESTIGATIVE FILES SYSTEM WHICH IS EXEMPT FROM VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT (5 U.S.C. 552a). REQUESTS FOR ACCESS TO OR DISCLOSURE OF THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) MUST BE REFERRED TO THE DIRECTOR, NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE. SECNAVINST 5211.5 SERIES REFERS.

BY HAND

DATE: 18 JAN 1980

SERIAL:

FROM: Director, Naval Investigative Service

TO: Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Director for Operations Policy & Coordination Staff, ATTN: Liaison Control, Room 2E0308, Washington, D.C.

SUBJ: NOVEL Gordon/Civilian

ENCL: (1) NAVINVSERVO New Orleans NOR dtd 09 Jan 1980

1. UNLESS NOTED BELOW, THE ATTACHED DOCUMENTATION MAY BE DISCLOSED ONLY TO DOD PERSONNEL WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES REQUIRE ACCESS THERETO. IT MUST NOT BE FILED IN PERSONNEL SERVICE RECORDS OR RETAINED IN OTHER FILES EXCEPT ON A TEMPORARY BASIS. IT IS FURNISHED FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSE AND SUBJECT TO THE DISPOSITION INDICATED:

☒ Final Report for any action deemed appropriate. Any prior reports not enclosed have been previously furnished.

☐ Pending Report for any future action deemed appropriate. Any prior reports not enclosed have been previously furnished.

☐ ~~No action re~~quired. Information is of official interest.

☒ Destroy when it has served the purpose for which provided.

☐ ~~Return to~~ sender within 30 / 60 days.

☐ Return in sealed envelope marked to be opened only by:________________.

Usrey

D. E. USREY

BY DIRECTION

IT IS CERTIFIED THAT THE RECORD COPIES OF THE ATTACHED DOCUMENTS ARE BEING RETAINED IN THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH SECNAVINST 3820.2 SERIES AND DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.27 SERIES.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

If Classified OPNAVINST 5510.1 Series Applies

NIS Document Cover Sheet (NIS Form 5000/7 (12-75))

UNCL

NIS OPERATIONS REPORT

DATE: 01-09-80

009182Z

CODE: 08H0

CONTROL: 01-09-80N08-H067-INTC/F

STATUS: ONLY

DISTRIBUTION: //EI-N0022//

COPY TO:

MADE AT: NISO NEW ORLEANS

MADE BY: S/A G L DUFFY

REQUESTER:

SUPPLEMENTAL DATE:

SEX: M

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

MILITARY SERVICE NO.:

BIRTH (DATE) (GPC) (PLACE):

NI TITLE: S/NOVEL, GORDON/CIVILIAN (DIRC SENSITIVE)

DOI - 4-8 JAN 1980
DPA - 4-8 JAN 1980/NEW ORLEANS, LA
EVAL: F-6
SOURCE: VARIOUS

1. ON 4 JANUARY 1980 THE REPORTING AGENT RECEIVED A CALL (IN HIS ABSENCE) FROM AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS GORDON NOVEL. HE INDICATED TO THE PERSON TAKING THE CALL THAT THE SUBJECT TO BE DISCUSSED WAS "WASHINGTON". THE REPORTING AGENT RETURNED THE CALL AND IN THE ENSUING CONVERSATION NOVEL INDICATED THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN A "COMMERCIAL VENTURE" AND FELT THAT THE RESULTS MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO "ONI". HE INDICATED, IN ESSENCE, THAT HIS PROJECT INVOLVED OUTFITTING A "FAST PATROL CRAFT" WITH VARIOUS MEANS OF TESTING DEFENSE SYSTEMS (NFI). HE INDICATED THE TAKE FROM THIS PROJECT WOULD PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE DATA ON A VARIETY OF WORLD-WIDE DEFENSE SYSTEMS. HE INDICATED THE BRITISH WERE INVOLVED IN A SIMILAR PROJECT.

2. DURING THE CONVERSATION HE MENTIONED, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THAT HE FELT "ONI" WOULD BE THE AGENCY WITHIN THE NAVY TO RECEIVE HIS INFORMATION. WHEN THE MISSION OF NIS WAS EXPLAINED TO HIM HE EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT "ONI" NO LONGER EXISTED AND THAT NIS HAD NO POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MISSION.

3. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS CONVERSATION NOVEL FREQUENTLY REFERRED TO "MY COMPANY". WHEN ASKED A DIRECT QUESTION REGARDING THE IDENTITY OF HIS COMPANY HE SAID YOU KNOW "THE COMPANY, CIA". HE EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE WITH CIA AND STATED THAT SHOULD HE EVER INVOLVE HIMSELF IN A CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE NAVY HE WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY OF HIS INFORMATION TO BE PASSED TO CIA.

4. AT THIS POINT THE REPORTING AGENT INDICATED TO MR. NOVEL THAT NIS WOULD HAVE NO INTEREST IN HIS PROJECT; THAT POSSIBLY SOMEONE ELSE WITHIN THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MIGHT BE INTERESTED AND THAT IF THE REPORTING AGENT LEARNED OF SUCH HE WOULD RECONTACT NOVEL.

5. THE PHONE NUMBER LEFT BY NOVEL WHEN HE INITIALLY CALLED SEEKING THE REPORTING AGENT IS 504-831-2015. THE NOVEMBER 1979 GREATER NEW ORLEANS TELEPHONE DIRECTORY INDICATES THAT 831-2015 IS THE TELEPHONE

CLASSIFICATION: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

N.OR PAGE 1

WARNING ATTACHMENT (1)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

CONTENTS MAY BE DISCLOSED ONLY TO PERSONS WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES REQUIRE ACCESS HERETO. CONTENTS MAY NOT BE DISCLOSED TO THE PARTY(S) CONCERNED WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION FROM THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.

13-00000

UNCLA

NIS OPERATIONS REPORT	DATE 01-09-80	009 18 20Z

CODE 08HQ	CONTROL 01-09-80N08-H067-INTC/F	STATUS ONLY	
DISTRIBUTION			COPY TO
MADE AT		MADE BY	
REQUESTER		SUPPLEMENTAL DATE	

SEX	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	MILITARY SERVICE NO.	BIRTH (DATE)	(GPC)	(PLACE)

NI TITLE

S/NOVEL, GORDON/CIVILIAN (DIRC SENSITIVE)

NUMBER FOR TOM, JEFF OR MICHAEL TEACHWORTH, 936 LAKE AVENUE, METAIRIE, LA (A SUBURB OF NEW ORLEANS). IT WAS DETERMINED THAT SUBJECT OBTAINED REPORTING AGENT'S NAME AND PHONE NUMBER AFTER HE MADE AN INITIAL TELEPHONIC INQUIRY OF THE ASAC, NISRA WASHINGTON. DURING THIS CONTACT NOVEL INDICATED HE LIVED IN NEW ORLEANS BUT HE DID NOT REVEAL THE NATURE OF HIS INTEREST.

6. A DCII CHECK OF SUBJECT AND OF THE VARIOUS TEACHWORTHS (CONDUCTED WITH LIMITED IDENTIFYING DATA) WAS NEGATIVE. A CHECK OF THE NUISANCE FILES AT NISHQ REGARDING NOVEL AND THE TEACHWORTHS WAS ALSO NEGATIVE.

7. ON 8 JANUARY 1980 AN ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE WHICH REPORTED LEGAL ACTIONS INVOLVING ONE GORDON NOVEL WITH RESPECT TO HIS CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ARSON. PRESENT LEGAL ACTION REPORTEDLY INVOLVES NOVEL'S APPEAL OF THE CONVICTION AS WELL AS HIS ATTEMPT TO GAIN PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE STATE OF LOUISIANA DURING THE APPEAL PROCESS. INFORMATION IN THE ARTICLE INDICATES THAT NOVEL WAS CONVICTED IN LATE 1978 TO THREE YEARS IN PRISON AS A RESULT OF HIS INVOLVEMENT IN A PLAN TO FIRE BOMB A NEW ORLEANS BUILDING DURING EARLY 1976.

8. NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH NOVEL IS CONTEMPLATED ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING AND THIS INFORMATION IS REPORTED MERELY TO PROVIDE A RECORD OF HIS CONTACT WITH NISO NEW ORLEANS.

THE PROVISIONS OF DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.27 (SECNAVINST 3820.2B) APPLY TO THIS DOCUMENT. USN AND OTHER DOD RECIPIENTS MAY RETAIN THIS REPORT NOT LATER THAN 31 DEC 1980.

CLASSIFICATION FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY					
NOR	PAGE 2 LAST		KN	GLD	GLD

WARNING

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

CONTENTS MAY BE DISCLOSED ONLY TO PERSONS WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES REQUIRE ACCESS HERETO. CONTENTS MAY NOT BE DISCLOSED TO THE PARTY(S) CONCERNED WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION FROM THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY — NAVAL INTELLIGENCE — NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE 20 Aug 1981
TO: Ops Support Branch 1HF	
ROOM NO. 4E-27	BUILDING Headquarters

REMARKS:

FYI

MR. SULLIVAN —

PLS PULL FILE ON ~~H~~NOVEL. DON'T SEE ANY ACTION EXCEPT TO ADVISE FOIA OFFICE.

Done 24 Aug 81 WAJ
notified WARREN Priestly

FROM: Chief, Central Staff/DCD

ROOM NO. 913	BUILDING Key	EXTENSION 3767

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

8/24 Routing to SAG for info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14 August 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Gordon Novel

Gordon Novel called the New Orleans office on 13 August 1981. Ronald Farris was away on Annual Leave and had arranged to have his calls forwarded automatically to the Houston Field Office's listed telephone number. When the call was answered with the Houston number, Novel indicated that he was calling the New Orleans office. He was told that Farris was out of the office for a week and his calls were being relayed to Houston. Novel asked how he would go about obtaining his personal Agency file under the Freedom of Information Act. He was told that he should address a letter to Freedom of Information Coordinator with his request. He then indicated that he had done this already, and the information sent to him was so severely edited and sanitized that it was difficult to make sense of it. He did, however, discover that it contained information that was erroneous and he asked how to go about refuting the misinformation and/or correcting the file. It was suggested that he write a letter detailing the discrepancies and request that a change be made. He did not seem interested in doing that and promptly changed his line of questioning. He asked how he would go about contacting the Director of the Agency directly. He was told that he should use the local representative, Mr. Farris, to relay any information he might wish to get to the Director. Novel indicated that he had only talked to Farris once, but was anxious to bypass the usual channels to avoid having his information mishandled or misconstrued. He was told that Farris was a highly qualified representative of the Agency and the proper individual to contact regarding information he wished to get to the Director's attention. He gave a small sinister chuckle and replied, "We'll see about that," then hung up.

Colleen R. Webb
DCD/Houston Field Office

CC: Chief, Central Staff
New Orleans Resident Office

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ~~☒ CONFIDENTIAL~~ ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Pending Litigation - Gordon Novel

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO. / DATE
Raymond M. Reardon Security Analysis Group	6009	29 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/SAG	29 Apr 77		Bk
2. C/OPS/PSI	29 APR 1977	4/29	D
3. DD/PSI	4/29/77		[illegible]
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8. C/SAG	11 May 77		Bk
9. Reardon			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

26 FEB. 1974 contacted verbally to Jameson who was advised that 31 Dec 1974 was correct date. Bruce Solie

2-3

Suggest we brief D/OS at next morning meeting because of the alleged involvement of former D/OS.

D

OCS

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ~~☒ CONFIDENTIAL~~ ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

29 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Analysis Group

FROM : Raymond M. Reardon

SUBJECT : Pending Litigation - Gordon Novel

1. Gordon Novel is a somewhat notorious figure who first came to the attention of this Agency during the Garrision Investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy. From time to time he has claimed to be a CIA employee or to be acting on behalf of the CIA. He has never been employed by the Agency and has had no contacts with the Agency except for occasional visits to Domestic Collection Division offices. He has been in several scrapes with the law, most recently in October 1976 when he was on trial for conspiracy to firebomb several buildings in New Orleans. Mr. Novel has now filed a civil suit claiming alleged violations of his rights and interference with his personal affairs. He is not suing the Agency but he has named Mr. Howard Osborn as a defendant. Mr. Osborn has been in touch with the Office of General Counsel seeking representation by the Justice Department since he feels his being named in the suit probably resulted from his official duties with the Agency.

2. On 27 April 1977 Mr. George Jameson of the Office of General Counsel contacted the undersigned to inquire whether we had a file on Novel and if the file showed any reason why Mr. Novel should have named Mr. Osborn as a defendant in the suit. Mr. Jameson was given a rundown on the nature of the information in Novel's file and was also provided with Mr. Osborn's retirement date, ~~26 February 1974~~ 31 Dec 74. Mr. Jameson mentioned that most of the alleged activities complained about by

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 007472

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Novel occurred in 1975 and there is no apparent reason for Novel having singled out Mr. Osborn as a defendant. Mr. Jameson also requested traces on two individuals who are alleged to have been involved in this matter--Larry Blanscett and Bridget Pfiffer. He was advised that the Office of Security had no record of either of these individuals.

3. Mr. Jameson indicated that we would probably be receiving a formal request for pertinent information as this case develops, but he merely needed a preliminary ✓ reading in order to determine if Mr. Osborn should be defended by the Department of Justice in this litigation. Aside from indexing the names of Blanscett and Pfiffer to Novel's file, no further action is contemplated by the undersigned.

Bruce Solie
for
Raymond M. Reardon
Security Analysis Group

cc: Osborn File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Raymond M. Reardon Deputy Chief Security Analysis Group	EXTENSION 1468	NO.	DATE 14 February 1980

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/SAG				The attached was prepared based on C/OPS/PSI request that we advise NIS that Subject has never been employed by the CIA. Ray Reardon
2. C/OPS	2/14	2/14	Rwj	
3. DD/PSI	14 FEB 1980	2/15		For Signature & Release to NIS
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

FORM 1-79 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

15 FEB 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Naval Investigative Service
Department of the Navy

FROM: William R. Kotapish
Acting Director of Security

SUBJECT: Gordon Novel

Reference is made to your memorandum of transmittal dated 18 January 1980 which forwarded a Naval Investigative Service Operations Report dated 9 January 1980. The report dealt with a contact of your New Orleans Office with one Gordon Novel. According to the report, during his contact Mr. Novel indicated that he had a relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency. This is to advise you that a check of the appropriate records of the Central Intelligence Agency has determined that Mr. Novel is not and has never been an employee of this Agency.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

Edward Jones

for William R. Kotapish

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - AD/Security
1 - OS Registry
1 - SAG
~~1~~ - Novel File

OS/PSI/SAG/RMR:jan (14FEB80)

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

21 OCT 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

ATTENTION : Mr. John K. Greaney

FROM : Edwal Jones
Deputy Director of Security
Personnel Security and Investigations

SUBJECT : Gordon Dwane Novel; Lawrence B. Rohde;
Allen D. Bell, Jr.

1. Reference is made to your 20 October 1976 priority request (OGC 76-5787) which asks that the Office of Security search its indices to determine if any of the above-named individuals have ever been employed by the Agency. Reference is further made to our telephonic response to you on 20 October 1976 confirming that none of these individuals have ever been employed by the Agency.

2. This memorandum will serve to confirm the referenced telephonic response. Office of Security indices contain no record in the name of Lawrence B. Rohde, which was also searched in the variation of Lawrence B. Rhode. The Office of Security does maintain files on Gordon Dwane Novel and Allen D. Bell, Jr., and a brief summary of the information contained within these files appears below:

a. Gordon Dwane Novel, SF#S26 113

Mr. Novel has a long history of leaving the impression that he is either employed by or associated with the CIA. Mr. Novel has not, however, ever been an employee of the Agency in any capacity. The Office of Security file on Mr. Novel was established in 1967 by virtue of his involvement with the Garrison investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy. During the ensuing period Mr. Novel has both telephoned and written to the

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 063483

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OS 6 4555/A

Agency with various proposals, none of which have been followed-up by the Agency. Most recently, Mr. Novel was in contact with the Domestic Collection Division (DCD) in New Orleans, Louisiana, in October 1975 and February 1976 to volunteer various proposals. Mr. Novel's proposals were rejected by DCD, and Mr. Novel was requested to refrain from future contact with that office.

b. Allen D. Bell, Jr., SF#648 216

Mr. Bell is President of Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Incorporated, Springfield, Virginia, and has appeared widely in the news media as a "wiretapping expert," most recently in connection with the Watergate hearings. Mr. Bell has never been employed by the Agency. The Office of Security file on Mr. Bell was established in 1970 based on a request from the Technical Security Division, Directorate of Operations (TSD) for a Contact Security Approval. Cited approval was granted in November 1971, although Mr. Bell's file does not reflect the specific purpose for the request nor if Mr. Bell was actually contacted. Mr. Bell was also of interest to DCD in October 1973; however, the specific purpose of this interest is not contained within Mr. Bell's file.

3. As indicated, a review of our records failed to disclose any indication that Mr. Novel, Mr. Rohde, or Mr. Bell have ever been employed by the Agency in any capacity.

Edwal Jones

Edwal Jones

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Addressee
  1 - OS Registry
  1 - DD/PSI
  1 - SAG
  1 - OGC File
  1 - Bell File
  →1 - Novel File

OS/PSI/SAG/JSHUNT:jan (21OCT76)

FORM NO. 238 REPLACES FORM 35-1
1 MAY 56 WHICH IS OBSOLETE

DOCUMENT CONTROL

(13-40)
MFG 1-76

SEC. CL.:
ORIGIN: Assoc. General Counsel,
CONTROL NO.: OS 6 4555

DATE OF DOC	DATE REC'D	DATE OUT	SUSPENSE DATE	CROSS REFERENCE OR POINT OF FILING
10/20/76	10/20/76			OGC 76-5787

TO D/Security; D/Personnel
FROM John K. Greaney
SUBJ. Gordon Dwane Novel

DEADLINE--COB 20 Oct 76

ROUTING	DATE SENT
AD/Sec	10/20
DD/PSI	10/20

COURIER NO.
ANSWERED
NO REPLY

1

Novel Admitted Bunker Theft, Rhodes Is Told

Continued from Page 1

New Orleans to Houma at night in a Lincoln automobile owned and driven by Gordon Novel and in a panel truck.

"AFTER ARRIVING at the site of the bunker, which was leased by Schlumberger Well Services Corp., the defendant, Gordon Novel, Sergio Arcacha Smith, David W. Ferrie, and others, unnamed, unlawfully entered it by cutting the lock with a pair of bolt cutters which had been brought along for the purpose.

"After entry into the bunker (they) took various forms of explosives and munitions. Thereafter they returned to the city of New Orleans with the stolen munitions."

The extradition papers also included a photograph of Novel identified by a former girl friend, Marlene Mancuso, 42 Oaklawn dr., Metairie, who had dated Novel in 1961.

THE DOCUMENTS also contain a copy of the simple burglary charge leveled against Novel and Arcacha by the sheriff of Terrebonne Parish. The affidavit was signed by Capt. Bert Boyne.

Meanwhile, the DA's office said a new figure in the investigation scheduled for questioning today was interviewed last night by a Garrison aide.

A DA's office spokesman declined to say what questions were asked or what information was obtained from the man.

He is Juan M. Valdes, a self-described Latin playwright who figured in one of the city's more sensational murders. A subpena was issued for him yesterday.

Valdes in the summer of 1964 discovered the mutilated body of Dr. Mary Stults Sherman, a women physician who occupied the same St. Charles ave. apartment building where the summoned witness lives.

HE WAS investigating smoke coming from the Sherman apartment when he stumbled onto the body. Dr. Sherman's killer, who has never been found, tried to burn the body.

Garrison would not comment on what questions will be asked Valdes.

Another Latin, 30-year-old Carlos Quiroga, spent two hours and ten minutes before the grand jury yesterday and emerged without comment. NR

QUIROGA, a Cuban exile, was once a close friend and associate of a fugitive witness from the Garrison inquiry, 44-year-old Sergio Arcacha Smith.

Novel Admitted Bunker Theft, Rhodes Is Told

An affidavit filed with new extradition papers sent to Columbus, Ohio, claims that Gordon Novel admitted his part in a burglary of a munitions bunker in Houma in 1961.

The new extradition papers were sent to Ohio Gov. James Rhodes as part of Orleans Parish Dist. Attorney Jim Garrison's efforts to bring Novel back to Louisiana on a burglary conspiracy charge.

Garrison wants Novel in connection with his investigation of President Kennedy's assassination.

James L. Alcock, an assistant district attorney, said in the affidavit:

"The said Gordon Novel responded to questioning by Jim Garrison, district attorney for the Parish of Orleans, and William Gurvich, investigative aide to Jim Garrison, that he and the parties named herein did in fact commit the conspiracy and burglary outlined above." NR

In the body of the affidavit, Alcock declared that Novel, Sergio Arcacha Smith, David W. Ferrie and other unnamed persons "did conspire, agree, and combine to burglarize a munitions bunker located in Houma, La."

He said the conspiracy was entered into in New Orleans at the home of Arcacha.

Alcock said that the men went to Houma on or about Aug. 21, 1961.

"The trip was made from

(Turn to Page 4, Column 5)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL

New Orleans States-Item
25 May '67

X

Shaw Trial Attorneys Ordered to Keep Quiet

NEW ORLEANS (AP)—Criminal District Court Judge Edward Haggerty Jr. today ordered the prosecution and defense in the Clay L. Shaw's Kennedy assassination conspiracy trial to refrain from pre-trial publicity. He told them to quit discussing evidence.

The judge said at a news conference he would invoke the canons of professional ethics "to prevent the flow of prejudicial pre-trial publicity" from either Shaw's attorneys or from Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison's staff.

He said the arraignment of Shaw, indicted by the grand jury March 17 on charges of conspiring to assassinate President John F. Kennedy, probably will be held next week.

Haggerty said the same security measures in effect at Shaw's preliminary hearing earlier this month would be used at the arraignment. Reporters needed special credentials to cover the hearing and cameras were barred.

(Meanwhile, Gordon Novel issued a telephone challenge to Garrison today to prove by lie detector that the probe is not a fraud, United Press International reported.

(Ne)

(Novel, who left New Orleans shortly before the grand jury was to subpoena him last week, would not say where he was calling from. Novel reportedly took a lie detector test in McLean, Va., over the weekend, to back up his charges that the investigation is a fraud.)

Haggerty has said he does not believe the Warren Commission report on the assassination can be admitted as evidence mainly because the commission's witnesses could not be cross-examined.

FIGURE IN CASE FOUND STRICKEN

BISMARCK, N. D. (UPI)—David R. Kroman, an attorney who had promised to make disclosures about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy at a news conference tonight, was found today partially paralyzed by an apparent epileptic seizure.

(NB)

Kroman, 43, a onetime lawyer for the Minnesota Insurance Department and an unsuccessful independent Democratic candidate for attorney general in the last Minnesota election, is on trial in U.S. District Court here charged with fraud and conspiracy in the collapse of the American Allied Insurance Co., of St. Paul, Minn.

Kroman had called a news conference for 7 p.m. today when he said he would tell of his private investigation into the assassination of Kennedy.

It was not known what Kroman intended to say. A state highway patrolman found Kroman in his locked car at 4 a.m. 24 miles east of Bismarck. Kroman was paralyzed and incoherent, the policeman said. A loaded shotgun was across the attorney's knees.

Kroman was taken to a Bismarck hospital, where a doctor said Kroman apparently had suffered an epileptic seizure.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

Wash. Star
27 Mar '67

Garrison Seeking Two As Arms Theft Plotters

NEW ORLEANS, La. (AP) — Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison has asked Canadian and Texas authorities to arrest two men charged in an incident which Garrison's office says "may or may not be related" to his probe of the Kennedy assassination.

Garrison telegraphed arrest warrants yesterday to Montreal for Gordon Novel and to Dallas, Tex., for Sergio Arcacha Smith, based on charges of conspiring to burglarize a munitions bunker in 1961.

Garrison obtained a warrant for Novel's arrest last week as a material witness in the probe of President John F. Kennedy's assassination.

The new charge accused Novel and Arcacha of conspiring with David W. Ferrie to commit simple burglary of a munitions dump in Houma, about 40 miles southwest of New Orleans.

Garrison has alleged that Ferrie, Lee Harvey Oswald and Clay L. Shaw plotted in mid-September 1963 to kill President Kennedy. Oswald and Ferrie area dead. Shaw, 4, a retired New Orleans executive, has been indicted on a charge of conspiring to kill the president.

The warrants for Novel and Arcacha were signed by Criminal Dist. Court Judge Thomas Brahney, who set bond at $5,000 for each. Novel already had a $50,000 bond awaiting him on the warrant for his arrest as a material witness.

Arcacha, head of the anti-Castro Cuban Revolutionary Council in New Orleans in 1961, said in Dallas he does not know whether he will fight extradition to New Orleans. But he added, "It is a shame that in this country they do this to honest people."

The Shaw case is scheduled for arraignment Wednesday.

Wash Star
1 April '67

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

13-00000

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

3/24

New Orleans Probe Figure In D.C. Area

By United Press International

NP

Gordon Novel, the "missing witness" in New Orleans Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison's investigation of an alleged Kennedy assassination conspiracy, popped up in a Washington suburb yesterday and took a lie detector test on his charge that the Garrison investigation was a "fraud."

The operator of the polygraph test, Lloyd Furr of McLean, Va., said Novel "passed" the lie test. "He showed no deceptions," Furr said.

"Do you honestly believe Garrison's conspiracy prosecution is a fraud," Furr said he asked Novel. "Yes," he said Novel replied.

Novel, a former nightclub operator, left New Orleans shortly before a grand jury investigating the assassination tried to subpoena him.

In New Orleans, Judge Matthew Braniff has issued orders for Novel to post a $50,000 bond as a material witness or be arrested as a fugitive.

Novel's connection with the Garrison investigation has never been precisely spelled out.

Wash Star
27 Mar 67

1/22/68

GORDON NOVEL

13-00000

Garrison Orders Arrest Of 'Plot' Probe Witness

NEW ORLEANS, La. (AP)—Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison's office today ordered the arrest of Gordon Novel, former owner of a French Quarter bar, as a material witness in the investigation of President John F. Kennedy's assassination.

Novel, 29, was subpoenaed to appear before the Orleans Parish grand jury yesterday in connection with Garrison's probe. He did not appear and could not be found here.

Novel later turned up in Columbus, Ohio. He left there today saying he was going to Chicago.

The arrest order for Novel followed the grand jury's indictment yesterday of Clay L. Shaw, retired business executive, on a charge of "willfully and unlawfully conspiring" to murder Kennedy.

In an affidavit, the district attorney's office alleged that Novel fled New Orleans while under subpoena. It said he severed his business ties and stated publicly that he had no intention of returning.

Afraid of "Harassment"

In Columbus, Novel said he did not want to return to New Orleans, without a guarantee of immunity from "harassment." He was quoted as describing the Garrison investigation as "a fraud" and as saying he first helped the district attorney but that "Garrison double-crossed me."

("What my friend Mr. Garrison is conducting is not a normal investigation but is a political, police state inquisition," United Press International quoted Novel as saying.

(When Novel left Columbus this morning, he left a note behind for reporters. It said: "Gentlemen, due to pressure from New Orleans I had to leave. I will prove my statement in Chicago in due course.")

Novel appeared before the grand jury March 16. Earlier he told newsmen he thought Garrison wanted to question him about activities "during 1962 which are related to Mr. Sergio Arcacha Smith."

Arcacha, now living in Dallas, Tex., said he never heard of Novel. Arcacha headed an anti-Castro group here in 1961. 1961.

Big Bond Recommended

In its affidavit, filed with Criminal District Court, the district attorney's office said Novel should be placed under sizable bond or the grand jury will "be deprived of a most important and material witness."

The arrest order was signed by Criminal Dist. Court Judge Matthew S. Braniff.

Novel owned the Jamaican Inn Bar, a lounge on North Rampart Street on the fringe of the French Quarter. He sold the property Sunday.

In another development today, Criminal Dist. Court Judge Edward A. Haggerty Jr. was named to preside at the murder conspiracy trial of Shaw, 54, who will spend the Easter weekend on the Mississippi Gulf Coast with Garrison's approval.

Garrison has said he will prove that the Kennedy assassination resulted from a New Orleans-based conspiracy. He commenced his investigation last October.

Shaw, who retired in October 1965 as managing director of the International Trade Mart here, has been free on $10,000 bond since his arrest March 1.

Shaw was discharged from Southern Baptist Hospital here last night after being treated for fatigue and an old back injury. He entered the hospital Saturday.

Garrison had said earlier he would bypass the grand jury and file a bill of information before bringing Shaw to trial.

Garrison already had won a ruling from a three-judge state court panel that sufficient evidence was presented at a preliminary hearing to warrant holding Shaw for trial.

Russo Appears

Shaw was charged yesterday in a grand jury true bill with "willfully and unlawfully conspiring with David W. Ferrie, Lee Harvey Oswald and unnamed others to murder John F. Kennedy."

(Shaw's attorney said last night his client would plead not guilty to the indictment and would request a bill of particulars in the case, UPI reported. Shaw is to be arraigned next week.)

Perry Raymond Russo, 25, star witness for Garrison in last week's emotional court hearing, made a surprise appearance before the grand jury before the announcement of the indictment.

Russo told the three-judge court last week he heard Shaw, Ferrie and Oswald plotting in mid-September 1963 to kill Kennedy. Shaw is the only one of the conspirators named in the indictment who is still living.

Ferrie, 47, was found dead in bed here Feb. 22. Ferrie was under investigation at that time by Garrison.

The Warren Commission concluded that Oswald was the sole assassin of Kennedy in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963. No evidence could be found, the commission said, of a conspiracy but it said that it could not categorically establish that there was no conspiracy.

Oswald was shot in the basement of the Dallas police station by Jack Ruby two days after the assassination.

Wash Sta
23 Mar '67

copy done
in Shaw file &
Sergio Arcacha Smith file
for Gordon Novel's files

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL

Garrison Orders Arrest Of 'Plot' Probe Witness

NEW ORLEANS, La. (AP)—Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison's office today ordered the arrest of Gordon Novel, former owner of a French Quarter bar, as a material witness in the investigation of President John F. Kennedy's assassination.

Novel, 29, was subpoenaed to appear before the Orleans Parish grand jury yesterday in connection with Garrison's probe. He did not appear and could not be found here.

Novel later turned up in Columbus, Ohio. He left there today saying he was going to Chicago.

The arrest order for Novel followed the grand jury's indictment yesterday of Clay L. Shaw, retired business executive, on a charge of "willfully and unlawfully conspiring" to murder Kennedy.

In an affidavit, the district attorney's office alleged that Novel fled New Orleans while under subpoena. It said he severed his business ties and stated publicly that he had no intention of returning.

Afraid of "Harassment"

In Columbus, Novel said he did not want to return to New Orleans, without a guarantee of immunity from "harassment." He was quoted as describing the Garrison investigation as "a fraud" and as saying he first helped the district attorney but that "Garrison double-crossed me."

("What my friend Mr. Garrison is conducting is not a normal investigation but is a political, police state inquisition," United Press International quoted Novel as saying.

(When Novel left Columbus this morning, he left a note behind for reporters. It said: "Gentlemen, due to pressure from New Orleans I had to leave. I will prove my statement in Chicago in due course.")

Novel appeared before the grand jury March 16. Earlier he told newsmen he thought Garrison wanted to question him about activities "during 1962 which are related to Mr. Sergio Arcacha Smith."

Arcacha, now living in Dallas, Tex., said he never heard of Novel. Arcacha headed an anti-Castro group here in 1961. 1961.

Big Bond Recommended

In its affidavit, filed with Criminal District Court, the district attorney's office said Novel should be placed under sizable bond or the grand jury will "be deprived of a most important and material witness."

The arrest order was signed by Criminal Dist. Court Judge Matthew S. Braniff.

Novel owned the Jamaican Inn Bar, a lounge on North Rampart Street on the fringe of the French Quarter. He sold the property Sunday.

In another development today, Criminal Dist. Court Judge Edward A. Haggerty Jr. was named to preside at the murder conspiracy trial of Shaw, 54, who will spend the Easter weekend on the Mississippi Gulf Coast with Garrison's approval.

Garrison has said he will prove that the Kennedy assassination resulted from a New Orleans-based conspiracy. He commenced his investigation last October.

Shaw, who retired in October 1965 as managing director of the International Trade Mart here, has been free on $10,000 bond since his arrest March 1.

Shaw was discharged from Southern Baptist Hospital here last night after being treated for fatigue and an old back injury. He entered the hospital Saturday.

Garrison had said earlier he would bypass the grand jury and file a bill of information before bringing Shaw to trial.

Garrison already had won a ruling from a three-judge state court panel that sufficient evidence was presented at a preliminary hearing to warrant holding Shaw for trial.

Russo Appears

Shaw was charged yesterday in a grand jury true bill with "willfully and unlawfully conspiring with David W. Ferrie, Lee Harvey Oswald and unnamed others to murder John F. Kennedy."

(Shaw's attorney said last night his client would plead not guilty to the indictment and would request a bill of particulars in the case, UPI reported. Shaw is to be arraigned next week.)

Perry Raymond Russo, 25, star witness for Garrison in last week's emotional court hearing, made a surprise appearance before the grand jury before the announcement of the indictment.

Russo told the three-judge court last week he heard Shaw, Ferrie and Oswald plotting in mid-September 1963 to kill Kennedy. Shaw is the only one of the conspirators named in the indictment who is still living.

Ferrie, 47, was found dead in bed here Feb. 22. Ferrie was under investigation at that time by Garrison.

The Warren Commission concluded that Oswald was the sole assassin of Kennedy in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963. No evidence could be found, the commission said, of a conspiracy but it said that it could not categorically establish that there was no conspiracy.

Oswald was shot in the basement of the Dallas police station by Jack Ruby two days after the assassination.

Wash. Star
23 Mar. '67

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Director of Security 4E-60 Hqts.		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
John K. Greaney, OGC 7D-07 Hqts. x-7531	10/20/76

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 (40)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

OGC 76-5787

20 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
Director of Personnel

FROM : John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

SUBJECT : Gordon Dwane Novel

1. Gordon Novel is scheduled for prosecution in New Orleans on 27 October on charges stemming from a conspiracy to firebomb some buildings on Canal Street. He was mentioned extensively in the James Garrison investigation of the Kennnedy assassination in 1967. Subsequently, Novel filed suit against Garrison and later against Playboy Magazine for an article they published which identified Novel as a CIA employee. In 1969 the Agency submitted a certificate signed by the then Director of Personnel, Robert S. Wattles, which certified that Gordon Novel had never been employed by the CIA (copy attached). It may be necessary to submit a new certificate for the upcoming trial in New Orleans. You are requested to search your files to determine whether there is any record of employment.

2. There are two additional defense witnesses that we would appreciate a search as to any employment relationship:

(a) Lawrence B. Rohde
530 "N" Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C.
Employed by: Commonwealth Pug Corporation

(b) Allan D. Bell, Jr.
President, DEKTOR C.I.S. Incorporated
5054 Blue Ridge Avenue
Annandale, Virginia

OS 6 4555

It is my understanding that these names have all been traced as a request from the Domestic Collection Division with negative results. However, I would appreciate a written response to those traces by close of business 20 October so that certificates can be prepared.

3. It is possible that a witness from the Office of Personnel may be required to appear in New Orleans as a rebuttal witness to testify that there was no employment relationship with Gordon Dwane Novel, but this is subject to negotiation with the prosecutor.

John K Greaney

John K. Greaney

Enclosures

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

CERTIFICATE

I, Robert S. Wattles, am Director of Personnel for the Central Intelligence Agency, and in that capacity have custody of the personnel records of the Central Intelligence Agency. These personnel records are maintained in the State of Virginia. I have directed that a diligent search of the Central Intelligence Agency personnel records be made to ascertain if Gordon Dwane Novel has ever been employed or considered for employment by the Central Intelligence Agency. The diligent search has been completed and indicates that Gordon Dwane Novel, at his request on 22 December 1967, was interviewed as an applicant for employment by a member of the Office of Personnel, Central Intelligence Agency. The search indicates also that, based on the information supplied at such interview, the interviewer did not recommend employment and his application for employment was not further processed by the Central Intelligence Agency. The personnel records of the Central Intelligence Agency contain no record of employment of Gordon Dwane Novel by the Central Intelligence Agency.

In testimony whereof, I hereunto sign my name this 1st day of May, 1969.

Robert S. Wattles
Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency

STATE OF VIRGINIA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF FAIRFAX)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of May, 1969.

Isabel M. Peterson
Notary Public

My commission expires My commission expires 24 September 1969.

(SEAL)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Robert S. Wattles, whose certificate is attached hereto, was at the date thereof custodian of the personnel records of the Central Intelligence Agency. In witness thereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Central Intelligence Agency to be affixed at Fairfax County, in the State of Virginia, this 2d day of May, 1969.

(SEAL)

Lawrence K. White
Lawrence K. White
Executive Director-Comptroller
Central Intelligence Agency

STATE OF VIRGINIA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF FAIRFAX)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2nd day of May, 1969.

Isabel M. Peterson
Notary Public

My commission expires My commission expires 24 September 1969.

(SEAL)

3

Mr. [Swann:] At the request of Helen, Mr. Kuhn's office, Policy Coordination Staff, ext 1623, I asked for a name trace and the files on the following, and gave your name:

Mistretta, Vincent
b. 13 Jan. 1913, Brooklyn NY
FBI has a continuing investigation on Subject who has been interviewed and advised of contacts with CIA between 1970 and 1975. He named two people: 6 [R.T. Conway] and a Dr. Jerry Berger. They--the FBI--want to know if we have these people or any information on this man.

SRD is sending file on Mistretta, covert subject 857074; has nothing on Dr. Jerry Berger; there are three files which suggest the [R.T. Conway]: 6 two on 6 [Robert Conways] one of which is a retired file, and one on a ["Red" Conway]. 6

Do you want any or all of those?

Novel, Gordon Michael
b. 7 Feb. 1938 in San Antonio, Texas
Lives in Houston, Tex. at 414 Baywood Paced Drive.

FBI has an active investigation on the Subject and they disseminated a memo dated May 27, 1976 on the Subject but it may or may not have come to Security. SRD is sending his file up.

jane macauley

Oct. 12, 1976

Ordered 6
[Red Conway] from SRD
6 [Robert Conway] 278-632
73-028-7014
+
6 [Robert Conway] 21987
630-067-001
} from retired files

8/mc

FORM NO. 10
EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Copy to file & Gordon Novel -

) : Chief, Security Research Staff, OS — DATE: 18 April 1967
TTN : Mr. Bruce Solie

ROM : Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Services Division)

JBJECT: District Attorney Garrison's Investigation Into Alleged Conspiracy to Assassinate President Kennedy -- NO-112-67

EFER : DCS Memoranda dated 6 and 11 April 1967, Same Subject

1. The enclosed self-explanatory memorandum and attachment from our New Orleans Office may be of interest.

2. Copies of the enclosures and the newsclippings mentioned have also been forwarded to Mr. Joseph Goodwin. We regret that we are unable to furnish your Office with copies of the clippings and suggest that you coordinate with Mr. Goodwin if they are of interest to you.

3. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia L. Thorne, Extension 2738.

Virginia L. Thorne
for B. FRANK YOUNG
Chief, Services Division

Enclosures: As stated above

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

NO-112-67

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service DATE: 28 March 1967

FROM : Chief, New Orleans Office

SUBJECT: District Attorney Garrison's Investigation into Alleged Conspiracy to Assassinate President Kennedy

1. I enclose herewith a memo from Dorothy A. Brandao to me concerning a news broadcast on Saturday, 25 March 1967, in which CIA is mentioned. I also enclose two clippings from the New Orleans Times-Picayune, dated 26 and 27 March 1967, which refer to a lie detector test administered to one Gordon Novel in McLean, Virginia.

2. I was out of town on Saturday, 25 March 1967, and did not hear the news broadcast referred to in Mrs. Brandao's memo.

Lloyd A. Ray
LLOYD A. RAY

LARay/gn

Encl. - to Mr. Goodwin, 3 Apr 67

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

Memo for Mr. Ray:

In Channel 6's news broadcast at 6-6:30 PM, Saturday, 25 March 1967, the local newscaster announced that NBC had located Gordon Novel and had interviewed him in "Washington." The film then switched to a front view of Novel seated in an armchair and showing him answering questions posed by someone off camera. (a) The latter asked if Garrison had promised Novel anything in exchange for his testimony. Novel said that Garrison had asked him if he needed money and had volunteered to give him whatever financial assistance he needed. (b) The interviewer asked what was Garrison's motive in prosecuting the case. Novel eventually said that it was purely political. But before that, he said that Garrison reminded him of Huey Long and of Dr. Goebbels, from what he had read. The interviewer asked this question a second time, couching it in somewhat different terms - what did Garrison hope to accomplish, what was his motive. Novel said that that was a matter of conjunction (conjecture), that he might ---- bring in CIA ------.

At the conclusion of the Washington interview, the film returned to the local newscaster. The latter stated that NBC had informed the NO station that Novel had submitted to a polygraph test in connection with the interview and "had passed it."

The attached clippings from the 26 and 27 March issues of the Times-Picayune do not mention the substance of the NBC interview. These articles refer to NBC's having contacted Novel in McLean, Virginia, rather than Washington, D.C.

26 March 1967
D.A.B.

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Gordon NOVEL

FROM: [George N. Swann] 3
OS:SSD:OSB
4E27

EXTENSION: 5365

NO. 526113

DATE: 1 September 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/OSB	3 Sept			
2. DC/SSD	9/7			
3. C/OSB	8 Sept			
4. Mr. [Swann] 3				④ Close case
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

closed and filed 9-[illegible]

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

2/mc

1 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

3

FROM : [George N. Swann]
Operations Support Branch/OS

SUBJECT : Gordon NOVEL
SFN 526113

1. On 31 August 1976, Major Robert Foster, Defense Intelligence Agency (telephone 11-50418), contacted Mr. Robert Hopkins, Office of Security Liaison Officer, seeking information concerning Subject. He explained that the Subject, while residing in a local motel, had been overheard in a telephone conversation ~~to~~ with a girl. They discussed large amounts of money with the indication it was illegally obtained. Also, in this discussion, Subject mentioned that due to this girl's information, he was arrested by the CIA in February 1976.

2. On 1 September 1976, Major Foster was contacted by the undersigned and advised that the CIA had knowledge of the Subject, but that he had never in any way been connected with the CIA nor had we ever arrested him. Major Foster was informed that the Subject has a long history of impersonating CIA agents or abusing the CIA's name during his activities. It was explained that based on our information, Subject appeared to be somewhat irrational.

3. Major Foster advised that he also felt the Subject was a "nut" and appreciated the information offered by the CIA.

3

[George N. Swann
George N. Swann]

Distribution:
Orig - Subject File
1 - Chrono
OS:SSD:OSB:GNSwann/jb

2/mc

SUBJECT: Gordon NOVEL
SFN 526113

No further action believed necessary:
WKR, C/OSB

Concur C/ESD - RV Long
9/7/76

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Gordon Novel

FROM: 3 [George N. Swann] OS/OSB 4 E 27	EXTENSION 5365	NO. #526 113	DATE 8 April 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DC/OSB				
2. ✓ C/OSB	8 Apr 76			
3. DC/SSD	4/9/76		JWK	
4. C/OSB 3	9 Apr 76			
5. Mr. [Swann]	9 April 76		GNS	
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

2/mc

8 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Operations Support Branch

SUBJECT : Gordon Novel
#526 113

REFERENCES : Domestic Collections Division Memoranda
dated 25 February 1976 & 1 March 1976

1. According to the referenced Domestic Collections Division (DCD) memoranda, the New Orleans DCD Office had considered proposals from Subject in October 1975 and on 9 February 1976 which were rejected. During the last contact, the DCD representative requested Subject not contact him again.

2. DCD requested Office of General Counsel (OGC) guidance if they should be contacted by the press concerning Subject's arrest for conspiring to detonate incendiary devices in a downtown New Orleans building. OGC recommended that they acknowledge receiving a proposal from Novel which had been rejected. DCD was also informed that Subject had never been employed by the Agency, with the understanding that this might also be made known to any inquiring reporters or United States Attorney. DCD stated that they were pleased with this guidance, since it allowed them to respond candidly to any immediate inquiries and also serves to disassociate the Agency from the difficulties in which Subject now finds himself. It appears that the only action taken in this case is the OGC guidance supplied to DCD and the only CIA interest in Subject is based on his contact with the New Orleans DCD Office.

3

George N. Swann

George N. Swann

Distribution:
Orig - Subject File
1 - Chrono
OS:SSD:OSB:alb

1/mc

Gordon Novel
#526 113

Subject has had no association w/ CIA but has been of past peripheral interest to DCD in light of his notoriety in the Garrison case. No action necessary in OSB. C/OSB

Noted: close case JWK DC/SSD

13-00000

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DC/OSB		
2	C/OSB		
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

According to DCD memo dtd ~~1 March 1976~~ 25 Feb 76 and 1 March 76 ~~they had~~ the New Orleans DCD office had considered a proposal from NOVEL in Oct 75 and 9 Feb 76, which [illegible] ~~at which time~~ the DCD representative advised NOVEL not to contact him again.

DCD requested OGC ~~guan~~ guidance if any media enquiries should materialize and ~~they~~ it was recommended ~~that~~ they acknowledge they had received a proposal from NOVEL and had rejected it. DCD was also informed that ~~[illegible]~~ NOVEL had never been employed by the Agency.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[Swann]3	

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

1/mc

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

NOVEL, Gordon

FROM:

DCD Security Liaison Officer
Room 806B Key Building

EXTENSION: 2738

NO. 526 113

DATE: 23 March 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CD/I&C Branch, OS ATTN: Sarah K. Hall, CD/5 Room 3E36 Headquarters	3/24/76	3/29/76	skh
2. C/SS	29 Mar 76		
3. ADC I & CB	3/29/76		
C/ICB	3/29/76		
4. DC/CD		3/30	
5. C/CD	3/30/76		
6. DC/SSD (4E-33 Hqs.)	3/31/76		JWK
7. C/SSD	3/31/76		
8. C/OSB Action	1 Apr		
9. Mr. Swann 3			
10. George -			
11. pls handle.			
12. Ward			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

REF: DCD/NO 42-76 and 43-76

Copies of the referenced memoranda and attachments are forwarded for your information.

Anne Redman

FYI -
Subject was in touch with DCD New Orleans Office - Oct 75 - Feb 76.
Request for NAC's never submitted or guidance could have been given DCD.
skh

Mr. Greene

#8 - ~~D~~ Determine what action is being requested and what is CIA interest in Novel matter

C/SSD - RN Long
3/31/76

E2 IMPDET CL BY 025342

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1/mc

NO-42-76
25 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Gordon Novel's Arrest on Bomb Conspiracy Charges/Claim of CIA Association

REF : (a) NO-39-76 dated 20 February 1976, Subject: Gordon Novel
(b) [Houck]Watts Telecon of 24 February 1976, Same Subject
3

1. The US Attorney in New Orleans, Gerald Gallinghouse, called the New Orleans Resident Office on 24 February 1976 to advise me that Gordon M. D. Novel had been arrested by agents of the US Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau (ATF) for conspiring to detonate incendiary devices in a downtown New Orleans building on Mardi Gras, 2 March 1976. Novel had apparently described such a plot in a conversation he unwittingly held with an undercover ATF agent.

2. I confirmed to Gallinghouse that I had had a number of contacts with Novel since October 1975 concerning a proposal which Novel had offered for CIA consideration. I told Gallinghouse that the proposal had been rejected by the Agency, but that I had again seen Novel on 9 February 1976 to accept additional material in support of his proposal. At that time, I also asked Novel not to contact me again. I assured Gallinghouse that at no time had Novel been an Agency employee, nor had he ever had any formal relationship with the Agency. Gallinghouse thanked me for explaining the nature of our relationship with Novel, and he suggested that he might recontact me later if necessary for more details.

3. In the referent telecon, I briefed the Deputy Chief of Operations, Ed Watts, on the development and asked him how I should respond if Gallinghouse sought access to the office file on Novel. Mr. Watts recommended that I try to avoid giving the US Attorney direct access to the file, but that if Gallinghouse should ask to review the file, I should refer the request to Headquarters for resolution.

4. Mrs. Gordon Novel called shortly after my conversation with Messrs. Gallinghouse and Watts. She said that her husband had asked her to call me to insure that federal authorities were aware that her husband had been actively discussing a proposal for the Agency with me. Mrs. Novel said that her husband had been denied bond, and that he hoped his contacts with a DCD officer might somehow convince federal authorities that he could be safely released on bond after all. Otherwise, she said, he might be detained through the Mardi Gras holiday as a precaution. She assured me that Novel had made no effort to persuade the authorities that he is a CIA officer or employee.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 003820

CONFIDENTIAL

1/mc

5. So far, there has been no publicity given to Novel's arrest or the charges against him. We will continue to monitor the situation for any further developments suggesting a formal relationship between the Agency and Novel.

3
[PETER HOUCK]

PHouck/slm

cc: DCD, Deputy Chief of Operations (Watts)
✓DCD, OSG/OSB [Hale] 3
DCD, Information Control Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

2/mc

13-00000

CON

HH 97211 243H 27696

NO-43-76
1 March 1976

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
TN : Deputy Chief of Operations (Ed Watts)

Chief, Dallas Office/
New Orleans Resident Office

Gordon Novel

3 3
F : (a) Houck/Watts and Greaney/Houck telecons of 1 March 1976
(b) NO-42-76 dated 25 February 1976, Same Subject

1. Attached are copies of two local news items concerning the recent arrest of Gordon Novel for the illegal possession of an explosive device and for conspiracy to bomb several buildings in downtown New Orleans. In the article dated 1 March and in recent television news coverage of the affair, Novel has been quoted as saying that he is involved in an important US Government intelligence project and is in frequent contact with an official of the Defense Department. As we reported in the referent memo, Novel told the US Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau (ATF) agents who arrested him that he was working on a CIA project, a claim he said they could verify by calling the New Orleans Resident Officer.

2. So far, there have been no public statements linking Novel's recent activities to the Agency. In the referent telecons, however, we requested guidance in responding to any media inquiries which might materialize. John Greaney, Office of General Counsel, recommended that we acknowledge, if asked, that Novel had offered the Agency a proposal which had subsequently been rejected. Mr. Greaney also confirmed that Novel has never been employed by the Agency, a fact which we might also make known to any inquiring reporters or to the US Attorney, if necessary. We are pleased with this guidance, since it allows us to respond candidly to any media inquiries, and it also serves to disassociate the Agency from the difficulties in which Novel now finds himself.

3. We will keep you informed of any further developments in this matter which relate to the Agency or to our contacts with Novel.

J. WALTON MOORE

FHouck/slm

Attachment: As stated

cc: Office of General Counsel (John Greaney)
✓SCD/OSG/OSB (Craig Hale)
3

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 003820

CONFIDENTIAL

3/mc

Monday, March 1, 1976 The States-Item New Orleans

Novel claims Defense tie

Businessman Gordon Novel, accused of plotting to firebomb downtown buildings during Carnival, claims he is involved in an "enormous project" with "a gentleman in the Defense Department."

Asked if the "enormous project" was linked to his arrest, Novel said, "Well, something is behind this. I think I know what it is but I would rather not say."

Novel, identified as a financial consultant with the Langford Land Co. here whose name surfaced nine years ago in former Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison's Kennedy assassination probes, made his comments during a weekend jailhouse interview.

Novel was arrested Feb. 21 and charged with possessing a destructive device. He has been held without bond since then, pending a hearing Wednesday.

Affidavits filed in federal court allege that Novel tried to hire an undercover federal agent to firebomb five buildings during Mardi Gras, when large crowds would hamper firemen. Novel called the charge "insane."

"It's so insane that the government realizes the only way that it can make a case is to allege that I'm insane," he said. Novel said he was willing to take a lie detector test and to submit to questioning under truth serum.

He said he has been "deeply involved" in "counter-intelligence" operations in the past, but did not elaborate.

"I know enough about the intelligence community to one day play a major political role in it," Novel said.

IN 1963, Garrison accused Novel of conspiring with a Cuban refugee to steal explosives from an oil company storage site. Garrison's investigation linked Lee Harvey Oswald, the President's accused assassin, with a vaguely defined Cuban liberation movement.

Novel sued Garrison for $50 million, claiming his reputation had been damaged but the suit was later dropped.

Asked if the current charges bore any relation to the assassination probe, Novel's lawyer, Servando C. Garcia III, said: "It's a mistake. It's not related to anything."

"We absolutely plan to plead him innocent and put on a defense," Garcia said. "The facts the U.S. Attorney has can be explained."

Prosecutors allege that Novel tried to hire undercover agent W. Lloyd Grafton to firebomb several downtown buildings at the height of Tuesday's Mardi Gras celebration, when fire trucks would be hampered by crowds.

AGENTS REPORTED seizing a can of alcohol, balloons, gunpowder, fuses and matches from Novel's office on the 40th floor of a downtown building, along with diagrams of the buildings involved.

"That's absolutely untrue," Novel said in the television interview. "They found nothing when they searched my office."

Documents filed in federal court indicated Novel, a real estate financial consultant, was "having a few problems" with some of the downtown property which was supposedly the intended target of the firebombing.

Garcia said he hoped to have his client released on bond at Wednesday's hearing. He said there was no reason to keep Novel in jail indefinitely.

Gordon Novel Seized

By ED ANDERSON

New Orleans businessman Gordon Novel remained in federal custody Friday on charges of possessing "a destructive device" in connection with an alleged plot to firebomb and destroy in succession "several" buildings in the Central Business District during the height of Carnival festivities.

Documents in federal court here reveal that Novel — identified as a financial consultant with the Langford Land Co. — was having "a few problems with some of the property located within the (downtown) project area. . ."

Although no formal motive for the alleged planned bombings was given, sources said that Novel was trying to obtain the properties.

The only building cited by the court documents as a target for the alleged attacks was the Federation of Churches Building, located at 330 St. Charles Ave.

The sources said the bombs were never planted in the five downtown buildings and Novel — a figure in ex-Orleans Parish Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison's investigation into the assassination of the late President Kennedy — was arrested Feb. 21.

He is now being held without bond as a federal inmate at the New Orleans Police Department's House of Detention.

The court papers also indicate Novel tried to hire undercover agent W. Lloyd Grafton of the U.S. Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) as the person to carry out the plan.

Sources said the plan was "to firebomb the buildings in sequence" during parade times "when the fire department equipment could not be brought into the Central Business District. . ." One source said the plan "was to put them (bombs) off in sequence . . . one after the other."

The dates and other locations of the four buildings allegedly targeted for the attacks were not given.

The documents, however, said the buildings were located in a three-block area of the One Shell Square Building on Poydras Street.

Novel's request for a bond hearing

Cont. In Sec. 1, Page 14, Col. 1

New Orleans Times-Picayune

28 February 1976

Continued from Page 1

was co[illegible]ed Friday by U.S. Magistrate Ingard O. Johannesen until 4 p.m. next Wednesday.

The complaint against Novel claims that when the defendant was arrested last week, he was in possession of "an incendiary device," consisting of a can of alcohol, balloons, a can of black powder, timed fuses and other equipment.

Also confiscated, according to sources, were maps and diagrams of the buildings to be hit.

Novel was arrested after ATF agents learned the device was not registered.

The court documents also claim that although Novel was unaware Grafton was an undercover federal agent, he tried to hire Grafton for the plan at $1,000 and a year's free rent in an apartment.

Reportedly, Novel and two other men were supposed to meet with Gov. Edwin Edwards last Saturday in Baton Rouge to discuss the possibilities of getting a world's fair for New Orleans.

"I had a luncheon scheduled (last) Saturday at the mansion with some people to talk about the exposition," the governor said. "But the name Novel doesn't ring a bell.

"Only one man showed up Saturday. He said the others couldn't make it and asked if we could re-schedule the meeting. I didn't even ask why they couldn't make it. . ."

An aide to the governor said the governor's office was trying to determine if one of the three men was Novel.

He said records of the appointment show only the time and subject matter of the meeting.

The aide added that Novel may have been one of the three, but he could not be certain.

According to the documents, the ATF Bureau received information "from a confidential informant" of the alleged plan.

Grafton, posing as a prospective "hit man," made arrangements to discuss the plans with Novel on Feb. 4.

The affidavit for a search warrant — signed by Johannesen — said Grafton was told by Novel that Novel "had several buildings he wanted destroyed in the New Orleans, La. area. . . ."

The papers also show that on Feb. 6, Grafton met Novel at Novel's home, 1718 Lakeshore Drive, where Novel allegedly said "he had made a firebomb for an individual to burn the first building he wanted destroyed, but that man failed to do the job. . . ."

The identity of that person was not revealed in the documents.

Novel said he "had a few problems with some of the property located within the (downtown) project area and that was where Grafton would come in . . .," according to the affidavit.

The documents showed that Grafton met Novel again at his Plaza Tower office on Feb. 11 [illegible]d the two "discussed the firebombin[illegible] five buildings within the downtown area."

At that time, according to the documents, Novel allegedly showed Grafton the equipment as well as what Novel supposedly described as "illegal wiretapping equipment."

At that meeting, the papers claim, Novel allegedly agreed to give Grafton "the contract" to destroy the five buildings.

That same day, the documents indicate, Novel supposedly pointed out the first building targeted for the alleged attack, and later took Grafton to "the building located between St. Charles and Camp Street."

According to the papers, Novel allegedly explained to Grafton "how difficult it would be to get inside the building."

At another meeting Feb. 13 between the two in Novel's office, the documents said, Novel drew a diagram of the first targeted building which was described as being "accross the street from One Shell Square."

Presumably, that building was the Greater Federation of Churches Building.

On that same date, the records allege, Novel told Grafton "the fire should be on the second floor in order for the roof and floor to burn completely."

It was then, according to the affidavit, that Grafton agreed to the plan for $1,000 and the free apartment.

According to the records, Novel also presented Grafton a notebook, containing "a plan project of approximately three blocks near the One Shell Square Building" which was also to be part of the alleged scheme.

After their series of meetings Novel was arrested by the ATF agents Feb. 20.

Novel was denied bail the next day and the government — led by Asst. U.S. Atty. Al Winters — was granted a motion that Novel be examined by a psychiatrist to determine his competency in the proceedings.

Defense attorney Servando C. "Sonny" Garcia III — a law partner of Municipal Court Judge Eddie Sapir, has urged that bond be set for his client.

In documents filed with the court Garcia called Novel "a man well respected in the community" who is "regularly employed as a financial consultant," and a family man.

☒ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ~~SECRET~~ ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Gordon NOVEL, aka: Gordon Novel Rose, Gordon Michael Duane Novel, Godfrey N. Rose

FROM: DCD Security Liaison Officer Room 806 B Key Building	EXTENSION 2738	NO. DATE 15 August 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CD/I&C Branch, OS ATTN: Sarah K. Hall, CD/5 Room 3E36 Headquarters	8/20/75	8/22/75	skh
2. AC/SS	8/22/75		Gm
3. AC/I4CB	8/25/75		
4. C/SSD (4E-33 Hqs.)	8/26/75		JWK
5. C/OSB	8/24/76		JWG
6. FILE			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

REF: DCD/CLV-121-75 dtd 17 July 75

Referenced memorandum with attachments is forwarded for your information and records. Please note marked portions on pages 2 and 3 of attachment #2.

Anne Redman

4. Files on Gordon Novel - 526113 and on Noah Dietrich - 429052 - attached. skh

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

~~SECRET~~

E2 IMPDET CL BY 000520

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CLV-121-75

TO : Chief, Domestic Collection Division
ATTN: Information Control Branch (Redman)

DATE: 17 July 1975

FROM : Chief, Detroit Field Office
BY : Robert B. Noble, Cleveland Resident Office

SUBJECT: Correspondence of Possible Interest to Office of Security

REF : Durbin/Noble Telecon, 17 July 1975

1. On 15 July 1975, an agent of the Cleveland FBI contacted the Cleveland Resident Office concerning the attached correspondence. The Bureau had received the letters the same day, and because there were several references to the Agency, the agent thought that our office should be informed. Copies of the correspondence are attached for your information and retention.

2. The FBI agent who discussed this matter with us stated that he had been told that the author of the four-page letter was a "professional wiretapper", had previously been convicted to transporting illegal wiretap equipment across state lines (into Nevada), and was suspected of illegally obtaining and selling "classified information". Cleveland FBI plans no action at this time other than further investigatory work on the individual.

3. The Cleveland RO plans to do absolutely nothing about this matter other than forwarding the information to Headquarters. The agent was informed of and agreed to this course of action, he was thanked for his concern and the matter was dropped.

Robert J Lavey
ROBERT J. LAVEY

Bob
RBNoble:it

Attachment: As noted

File: FBI-Cleveland

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 027201

~~SECRET~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

COPIES TO: Mr. D. R. McCurdy
District Manager-Corporate Security
Ohio Bell Telephone Company
1000 Erieview Plaza
Cleveland, Ohio 44114

Mr. B. R. Campbell
District Security Manager
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company
3675 T Street, Room 108
Sacramento, California 95816
Mr. J. B. Heil, Jr.
Staff Supervisor-Security
The Ches. and Pot. Telephone Company
1710 H Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Mr. G. A. Larkin
General Security Manager
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
1010 Pine Street, Room 1030
Saint Louis, Missouri 63101

Attachment #1

Southwestern Bell

James M. Vaughan, Jr.
Security Manager

P. O. Box 5521
Dallas, Texas 75222
Phone (214) 747-5311 Ext. 3354

July 9, 1975

Mr. J. F. Doherty
Director-Corporate Security
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
195 Broadway, Room 2005
New York, New York 10007

Re: Gordon Michael Duane Novel, aka
Gordon Novel, Gordon Novel Rose,
G. N. Rose, Godfrey N. Rose
MI
Dallas Area File: 25-169-D

Dear Mr. Doherty:

Enclosed is a Xerox copy of a letter received by special messenger on July 7, 1975, from Gordon Novel, making certain demands on Southwestern Bell, AT&T and companies serving Columbus, Ohio, Reno, Nevada and Washington, D. C. (See page 4, paragraph 3)

Mr. Novel's letter has been reviewed by our company Legal Department and a decision has been made not to reply in writing. Mr. Horak, the manager handling Novel's account, is to contact Novel and advise him verbally that his letter has been referred to higher management, and that copies of this letter have been forwarded to the telephone companies serving the cities he mentioned for any action they deem appropriate. Mr. Novel's propensity for filing suit was one of the main considerations for choosing this course of action.

Should any of the recipients of this letter decide to contact or write Novel I would appreciate being notified prior to your doing so. Our Legal Department wants to be kept abreast of any response made to his demands as it might affect the company's course of action.

Very truly yours,

Original Signed By
James M. Vaughan, Jr.

Enclosure

JMV/va

3170 Royal Lane
Dallas, Texas
July 6, 1975

Mr. James Horak, Manager
Mr. Jim Vaughn, Security Supervisor
Mr. Carleton C. Wright, Jr., Security Supervisor
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
308 South Akard Street
Room 1103
Dallas, Texas 75202

Gentlemen:

Due to the rapidly accelerating national sensitivity of my historical personal interests, as well as the magnitude of political, intelligence and financial involvements for which I am legally responsible to my associates, I deem it wise to contact your office for the following reasons:

It is imperative that your files be revised in order to cease reflecting purposeful disinformation, slanderous irregularities and obvious inconsistencies about my activities. This data has been maliciously accumulated by your business and security offices during the past seven years while illegally intruding and interfering in highly sensitive industrial and political counterintelligence research in which I was involved. To accomplish this, A. T. & T. has used misrepresentation and a fraudulent legal technicality covering "anticipated" financial loss to the phone company. (My phone bills have always been paid promptly.)

The police tactics used by your offices--harrassment, intimidation, threats, extortionary demands--have been verified throughout Texas and in Washington, D. C. However, the highly sensitive nature of the work in which we are currently involved could, conceivably, pose a threat to national security because of this invasion of privacy where our phone calls are concerned.

[illegible]

Attachment #2

My associates and I are currently involved with:

1) The House and Senate investigations of the federal intelligence community, i.e. domestic assassinations and Watergate Tape related matters;

2) Technical and political research and communication assistance for the National Wiretap Commission (Title-3 Oversight);

3) Communications and business matters related to CIA, concerning recent meetings I attended in Paris, France, with high-level Soviet Aerospace, Trade and Communications officials;

4) A joint research study and military weapons marketing project for the Department of Defense;

5) A research study project for N.A.S.A. on an extremely advanced Top Secret Space Propulsion and Vehicular Design System;

6) Extensive pre-production research for a pro-CIA TV-film series in Hollywood;

7) Exclusive long-term research and development, including projected investment costs, in the Department of Transportations' $20-billion T.F.C. network plans;

8) Research and mortgage-investment development in a $70-million office and hotel complex in downtown New Orleans, Louisiana;

9) Personal, legal and security responsibility for the imminent settlement of the $50-million litigation between Messrs. Howard Hughes and Noah Dietrich;

10) Current interest in the acquisition of a major D-FW region aerospace and manufacturing concern;

11) The distinct possibility that I will be selected by the President of the United States as the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The foregoing projects, and our involvement with them, can be verified and will be verified if the activities of which I am complaining do not cease immediately.

Relative to the recent meeting in my private study at my Dallas residence, July 2, 1975, I have reviewed my records and do not find a willing nor direct acknowledgment of the R. B McMasters billing responsibility, alleged by Mr. Horak in his letter of the same date, written on plain watermarked stationery bearing questionable signature. That purportedly official telephone company document claims that I owe your company $1,041.42. I deny any responsibility for the reason that Mr. McMasters personally effected the installation of the phone at 3055 Leahy (243-6382), in his name and as an officer of the now-defunct Genesis Corporation. I have caused approximately $20,000 to be paid to Mr. McMasters, privately and corporately, for his unsuccessful business ventures and I have no intention of assuming responsibility for something else I do not owe in Mr. McMasters behalf. He and the Genesis Corporation were personally and corporately responsible for the bills for that phone and I am certain your records will reflect same.

My records reflect that hundreds of vindictive, disparaging and slanderous long-distance telephone calls were placed by your company's collection operators alleging that I did owe the bill. These calls caused me and my associates severe personal and financial damages. I demand that the mistake be corrected in writing. I will furnish you the list of names and addresses.

Relative to the telephone number at 3170 Royal Lane, 214 358-2802, I acknowledge that G. N. Rose and Gordon Novel are one and the same person. I am certain that you have been aware of this for many months. My family and my attorney assure me that Gordon Novel is the legally incorrect one. Since I have lived 37 years as Gordon Novel, I do not wish to have it changed in court to suit some idiosyncrasy of your legal department.

The bills for this number are current and have been promptly paid, in cash, on time since it was installed last year. Your inconsistent--off again, on again--policy, and now escalating deposit demands, are probably negotiable, but only in accordance with the following terms:

Upon instructions from my attorneys, I am formally demanding that your office and A.T.&T. furnish written assurance, in affidavit form, that neither your Dallas office nor its Columbus, Ohio, Reno, Nevada, and Washington, D. C., counterparts has at any time within the past seven years surreptitiously intercepted or monitored by wire any aural conversation of Gordon Novel/G. N. Rose without the authorization of a Federal, State or Judicial Municipality Legal Court Order, in accord with the provisions of Title-III of the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1968.

If such legal written assurance is not forthcoming from your office within seven (7) working days, we have instructed our Washington, D. C., attorneys to file appropriate federal civil actions personally against some individual security and management officials and against Southwestern Bell and A.T.&T.

I further request that the outgoing call service at 214 358-2802 be temporarily suspended, but that incoming calls be allowed to accumulate on the Dictaphone Ansaphone and GTS coupling service you recently installed and for which I was charged.

In the event you do not wish to honor your tariff regulations and community service responsibilities, available to other customers, you are then requested to suspend, until further notice from either our attorneys or from me, the paid-for service and notify all callers, including A.T.&T. executives with whom I am currently involved, that the party (i.e. Gordon Novel/G. N. Rose) can be reached at 214 358-5353 or 522-1323. Any other action will be answered by injunctive litigation.

These security measures are being taken at great inconvenience to a number of people. I am certain you understand by now that I am very serious about the matters discussed in this letter.

Sincerely,

Gordon Novel Rose
Senior Associate
NOAH DIETRICH & ASSOCIATES

~~SECRET~~

```
CTL NO 9064    REQUESTOR HALL          OFFICE CD5                    21AUG75
N9064 NOVEL,GORDON

  NOVEL,GORDON                                           OS  67  M0526113 ✓
  /Y M
  /Z 2103152
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
N9064 ROSE,GORDON NOVEL

  ROSE,G                                                 CR      R0166467
  /D ITS APP B P3
  /Z 1121747
  -------------------------[✓ NI]--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
N9064 ROSE,GODFREY N

  ROSE,G                                                 CR      R0166467
  /D ITS APP B P3
  /Z 1121747
  -------------------------[✓ NI]--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
N9064 NOVEL,GORDON MICHAEL

  NOVEL,GORDON                                           OS  67  M0526113 ✓
  /Y M
  /Z 2103152                                                          dup
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
N9064 HORAK,JAMES

   NO RECORD AS SUBMITTED ABOVE
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
N9064 VAUGHN,JAMES M(JR)

  VAUGHN,JAMES                                           OR  52  R0057972
  /D CHR MAZELLA,JOHN ANTHONY  /L ILL,CHICAGO 4149 W WABAMSIA  /Q 28
  /Z 1375670
  -------------------------[✓ NI]--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
N9064 WRIGHT,CARLETON C

  WRIGHT,C C                                             CR  49  R0167201
  /D FBI 03NOV49 P4 KERN,HELMUTH  /T DR
  /Z 1469993
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
```

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

```
CTL NO 9064    REQUESTOR HALL          OFFICE CD5                    21AUG75
N9064 DIETRICH,NOAH

  DIETRICH,NOAH                                          OR  72  M0619690
  /Y M  /D ART SEP72 LADIES HOME JOURNAL IRVING,CLIFFORD
  /Z 2578772
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  DIETRICH,NOAH                                          CR      R0065008
  /D EXHIBIT A RAMO,SIMON
  /Z 0314897
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  DIETRICH,NOAH                                          OS      E0429052
  /B 28FE889 BATAVIA WIS  /L CAL,BEVERLY HILLS
  /Z 0314895
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  DIETRICH,NOAH                                          CR  54  R0114544
  /D LFO 02DEC54 P4 WOOLRIDGE,DEAN EVERETT
  /Z 0314896
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
N9064 MCCURDY,D R

  MCCURDY,DICK                                           OS  69  C0580696
  /A MCCURDY,HUGH RICHARD  /Y M  /S 295165435  /B 04OCT26 PHILADELPHIA PA
  /L 69OHI,COLUMBUS  /E BATTELLE MEMORIAL INST  /O 69SCIENTIST  /C USA
  /Z 2337316
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  MCCURDY,DOREEN                                         OS  74  R0635564
  /A KLINE,I DOREEN  /Y F  /S 521281426
  /K KLINE,GEORGE WILLIS+R0631883+SPO  /B 25JUN23 WAS DC   /L 74ARI,MARANA
  /E CAL AIR NATL GUARD  /O 59CLK  /C USA
  /Z 2669678
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------

N9064 CAMPBELL,E R

  CAMPBELL,E R                                           OR      R0061693
  /D NBR MUNSELL,WILLIAM ORVILLE
  /L COL,DENVER 2170 S JOSEPHINE+BELL TELEPHONE CO  /T MR  /Q 28
  /Z 0190908
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  CAMPBELL,EAN                                           OR  56  R0105144
  /P 025554  /D PGR 25JAN56 GRANT,THEODORE F  /L 53CAL,MONTEREY
  /Z 0190910
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  CAMPBELL,EARL                                          OS  68  G0363001-2011
  /Y M  /B 25MAR43   /T ENLM  /E USA  /R SER 14  /O 68MIL
  /Z 2258424
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
```

~~SECRET~~

S~~ECRET~~

```
CTL NO 9064    REQUESTOR HALL         OFFICE CD5                   21AUG75
N9064 CAMPBELL,E R

   CAMPBELL,ED                                          CR  68  R0517007
   /D MEM 06SEP68 ORTEGA,ROBERT
   /Z 2242108
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
   CAMPBELL,EDUARDO                                     CS  64  R0741692
   /A RODRIGUEZ CAMPBELL,EDUARDO  /B 15   CUB  /W 67-0297009
   /Z 0190919
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
   CAMPBELL,EDWARD                                      OR  64  R0266988
   /D PAMPHLET 20JUN64 P4 TOCSIN
   /Z 0190922
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
   CAMPBELL,EDWARD                                      OR  69  U0364014
   /Y M  /D PAM FEB69 P1 MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
   /Z 2300178
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
   CAMPBELL,EDWARD                                      CR  70  R0894039
   /Y M  /D RPT 24JUL70 BRADY,ALLEN
   /Z 2539196
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
   CAMPBELL,EDWARD RYLAND                               OS      R0194039
   /B 25NOV39   VIR  /W 70-0422012
   /Z 0190936
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
   CAMPBELL,EDWIN R                                     CS      R0099254
   /B 13FEB25 CALDWELL NJ   /W 68-0293005
   /Z 0190941
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
   CAMPBELL,ELIZABETH                                   OR  45  R0024126
   /D RPT 24FEB45 P3 DONG,KINGMAN  /R NIW R018278
   /Z 0190950
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
   CAMPBELL,ELIZABETH RATYNSKI                          OS  65  R0460971
   /A RATYNSKI,ELIZABETH MARY  /Y F  /S 029329477
   /B 15JAN43 NEW BRUNSWIC NJ   /C USA
   /Z 2233532
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
   CAMPBELL,ELLEN                                       CR  58  R0169415
   /D PD  04AUG58 P9 I AND N COT,PIERRE MRS
   /Z 0190965
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
   CAMPBELL,ELLIS                                       OS      G0363001-1035
   /T JR  /E INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE  /O USE
   /Z 0190966
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
   CAMPBELL,ELMORE                                      CS  63  R0306755
   /B 02JUL27 BUFFALO NY
   /Z 0190967
   -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
```

~~SECRE~~T

~~SECRET~~

```
CTL NO 9064    REQUESTOR HALL        OFFICE C05                   21AUG75

N9064 CAMPBELL,E R

  CAMPBELL,ELSIE                                         CS      R0081313
  /B CIR08 CAMDEN NJ    /W 69-0374012
  /Z 0190968
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,ELSIE                                         OS      G0363001-187
  /E INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE+BALTIMORE,MD   /O USE
  /Z 0190969
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,ELTON R                                       CR  51  R0084602
  /D FBI 07MAY51 IVES,STEPHEN B
  /Z 0190971
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,EMNIS                                         OR      R0087255
  /D SOR SMITH,VIRGINIA EMMA PALMER  /L VIR,MANASSAS+FALLS CHURCH TEL OFF
  /Q 28
  /Z 0190974
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,EMORY                                         OR      R0104113
  /D CHR ELLIS,MARION LEROY  /L NY ,NYC 606 W 116 ST APT73
  /E HARDWARE INS CO+EMPIRE STATE BLDG+NEW YORK,NEW YORK  /Q 28
  /Z 0190973
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,ERNEST                                        OR      R0137418
  /D CHR PERRY,HAROLD EUGENE   /L TEN,BAXTER   /Q 28
  /Z 0190977
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,ESMA                                          CS      R0281268
  /B 04JUL23 CLEVELAND OHI  /W 73-0373019
  /Z 0190983
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,ETHEL                                         CS      R0156872
  /A JACKSON,ETHEL CAMPBELL  /B 24JUL21 WAS DC
  /Z 0190985
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,EUGENE                                        OR  54  E0400739-CP
  /D FBI 20SEP54 P1 WAGLEY,CHARLES  /T DR
  /Z 0190988
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,EUGENE                                        OS  71  CC609344
  /Y M  /S 308340171  /B 03APR32 BUSY KY   /L 71CAL,SANTA ANA
  /E MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRO  /C USA
  /Z 2485094
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,EUGENE                                        OR  47  RC048180
  /D FBI 28NOV47 P6 ARNOLD,MARY ROSE FURMAN  /Q 28
  /Z 0190989
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
```

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

```
CTL NO 9064    REQUESTOR HALL         OFFICE CD5                 21AUG75

N9064 CAMPBELL,E R

  CAMPBELL,EUGENE                                         CR  54  R0254911
  /D TRE 20SEP54 WAGLEY,CHARLES DR  /T DR
  /Z 0190990
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,EUGENE                                         CR  55  R0254911
  /D ST  16MAY55 P5 WAGLEY,CHARLES W  /T DR
  /Z 0190991
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,EVA                                            CS  65  R0763357
  /A ZAWADOWSKA,EVA  /Y F  /X POL  /B 17DEC34 ESSEN GER  /L LEB,BEIRUT
  /E MACMILLAN AND CO LTD  /C USA
  /Z 9018051
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  CAMPBELL,EVERETTE                                       OR      R0071331
  /D CHR SEACRIST,JOHN PAUL  /L WV ,SPRINGDALE  /Q 28
  /Z 0190999
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------

N9064 HEIL,J B

  HEIL,JOHAN                                              OS  66  M0489574
  /A SZYMONCZYK,STANISLAV  /B 15MAR92 CECHOVICE CSR
  /Z 2009540
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  HEIL,JOSEPH                                             CR      R0119193-2
  /D SERIAL 34  /T JR
  /Z 0541879
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  HEIL,JULIUS                                             OR      R0134823
  /D CHR HAAS,DALE RAYMOND  /L ND ,CLEVELAND  /T JR  /Q 28
  /Z 0541883
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------

N9064 LARKIN,G A

  LARKIN,G A                                              CS      R0047606
  /A FORSTER,GERTRUDE ANN  /Y F  /S 014205666  /B 27DEC26 LOWELL MAS
  /C USA  /W 72-0256002
  /Z 0736898
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  LARKIN,GEORGE                                           CR  57  R0161888
  /D WFO 23SEP57 P4 MORFIT,RICHARD
  /Z 0736925
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  LARKIN,GEORGE                                           OS  65  A0468471
  /A LARIN,GEORGE  /Y M  /B 05OCT34 SHANGHAI CHN  /L 65NY ,JORDANVILLE
  /C AUL
  /Z 9043287
  -------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
```

~~SECRET~~

S~~ECRET~~

```
CTL NO 9064    REQUESTOR HALL        OFFICE CD5                      21AUG75

N9064 LARKIN,G A

  LARKIN,GERALD                                          OR   52   R0039224
  /D MEM 14JAN52  /W CHG TO CAB
  /Z 0736927
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  LARKIN,GERTRUDE                                        OS        R0047606
  /A FORSTER,GERYRUDE LARKIN  /B 27DEC26 LOWELL MAS  /W 72-0256002
  /Z 0736928
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------

N9064 DOHERTY,J F

  DOHERTY,JAMES                                          CR   61   R0218009
  /D NFO 21DEC61 P2 THALMAYER,JOHN CARL
  /Z 0321797
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  DOHERTY,JAMES F                                        CR   62   R0218009
  /D NFO 09FEB62 P7 THALMAYER,JOHN CARL
  /Z 0321801
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  DOHERTY,JAMES FRANCIS                                  CS   64   R0383528
  /Y M  /B 26JUL29 CINCINNATI OHI  /L 64PA ,PHILADELPHIA
  /E PHILADELPHIA BOARD OF EDUCATION  /O 64TEAC  /C USA
  /Z 0321802
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  DOHERTY,JIM                                            OR   70   M0341208
  /Y M  /D RPT 24NOV70 US NATL STUDENT ASSOC
  /Z 2470293
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  DOHERTY,JOAN                                           CR   60   R0215341
  /D WFO 25JUL60 P3 EZEKIEL,RAPHAEL  /W 71-0771008
  /Z 0321808
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  DOHERTY,JOHN                                           OS        G0363003-281
  /R COMMON NAME FILE
  /Z 0321809
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  DOHERTY,JOHN                                           CR   60   R0208978
  /D ST  16JAN60 P2 BYRNE,THOS R
  /E INTERNATIONAL LABOR CENTER ST JOHNS COLLEGE+ANNAPOLIS,MD  /O DIR
  /W 71-0380013
  /Z 0321810
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  DOHERTY,JOHN F                                         CR   60   R0212000
  /D RPT 21JAN60 ICA HELLER,PHILIP A
  /Z 0321813
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  DOHERTY,JOHN FRANCIS                                   OS        M0357658
  /Z 0321814
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
```

S~~EC~~RET

13-00000

~~SEC~~RET

```
CTL NO 9064    REQUESTOR HALL          OFFICE CD5                  21AUG75
N9064 DOHERTY,J F

  DOHERTY,JOHN FRANCIS                                    OS       R0002927
  /B 14JAN02 BROOKLYN NY    /Q 28  /W CHG TO FCH
  /Z 0321815
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  DOHERTY,JOSEPH                                          OR       F0409443
  /D THERMOFAXED COPY OF LETTER RUSSIAN SUMMER SCHOOL,MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE
  /Z 0321823
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
```

~~SEC~~RET

13-00000

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

Laser to Destroy Tapes Was Eyed

By Jack Anderson

Former presidential aide Charles Colson once considered firing a high-voltage Buck Rogers-style cannon at the White House to erase the taped conversations of Richard Nixon.

Such a mission impossible would have wiped out the evidence on the White House tapes which led to Mr. Nixon's resignation. Colson, however, contends he never seriously pondered putting the scheme into action.

Despite this denial, Colson did meet twice with an industrial research consultant, Gordon Novel, and discussed the possibility of using an experimental "degaussing cannon" to fire a gigantic magnetic pulse at the White House tape storage room. A rough design of the ray gun, named after a magnetic measurement, was even drawn up.

"Novel talked about driving by the White House and demagnetizing all the tapes," Colson told us from prison through friends. "It was something that he said would fire three blocks."

Novel, who is also an electronics expert, told us he was visiting Colson in March on an unrelated legal matter when the talk turned to the tapes.

Colson, he said, told him tapes at the White House and the CIA "could cause the President grief." Novel mentioned the "degaussing cannon" and Colson urged him to look into it. Colson insists he gave the consultant "no encouragement."

Novel, however, obviously thought he had a mandate from Colson. He journeyed to El Paso, Tex., and spoke with Jack Prentice, innovative research and design chief for Jetco, Inc. Jetco already was marketing a metal detector using "degaussing" principles.

Prentice told Novel, and confirmed to us, that he had built a prototype cannon and could construct an operational one for $25,000 to $30,000. Prentice believed that because the tapes belonged to the President, there would be no crime in erasing them if Colson, acting for the President, okayed it.

The Jetco specialist drew up a simple plan for the "degaussing cannon," using capacitors, a switch, a parabolic reflector and a special heat resistent coil. The electronic artillery piece could be housed in a van, or mounted in a light plane or helicopter.

On March 21, Novel wrote Colson that he would "forward by hand courier the known facts on the El Paso erasure matter," the code name for the "degausser."

Shortly thereafter, the industrial consultant flew to Washington again and talked to one of this area's best known electronics men, Allan Bell, president of Dektor Counterintelligence and Security. Bell threw cold water on the mission, calling it "iffy" and "impractical."

At its best, advised Bell, the bizarre device would obliterate a few layers of tape, leaving the rest intact. At worst, it would destroy huge quantities of other taped material and scramble all computer "memories" in its path.

One part of the scheme was to bombard the CIA—and the irresistible jolt of magnetism might blot out priceless files of Russian and Chinese agents and other espionage and security matters.

In his report to Colson, Novel said hiding in the heavy woods near the CIA, or "degaussing" the tapes from the tank-van while they were in transport, offered a better chance of success than magnetically bombarding the CIA or the White House from a plane.

But as Novel recalls it, he and Colson mutually decided not to pursue the plan because of its danger to national security tapes and computers near the target tapes.

Colson scoffs at the idea that the magnetic beam ever came that close to development. "I laughed at it," he said. "It was a little bit of comic relief." But Mr. Nixon might have had fears Colson would be a sucker for just such farout ideas. In the transcripts, Nixon said Colson "loves the action . . . Colson would do anything."

Footnote: Colson and Novel also discussed a caper to patch H. R. Haldeman's voice onto a tape along with an actor who would imitate President Nixon and make false confessions. The fake tape would be sent with a phony authenticating note from an allegedly disgruntled Secret Service man to the Senate Watergate committee which, Colson surmised, would leak it. Then he and Novel would reveal the tape was fraudulent and the hoax would tend to discredit the whole case against Mr. Nixon. Colson said it was true he discussed this idea. "Wouldn't that be a great gag!" his statement said.

Baker's Bombshell—Bobby Baker, the former Senate aide who went to prison in a celebrated scandal of the early 1960s, has completed more than half of a book that will embarrass some present senators.

Now a successful businessman, Baker insists he isn't writing a cruel book about those who condemned him. Indeed, the book will contain many warm anecdotes about prominent political figures.

But the book will charge that Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), now the Senate's "Mr. Clean," twisted arms for political funds when he was the Republican Senate campaign chairman.

Baker will chide the present apostle of political reform, Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) for voting consistently against reform in times past.

Baker also will point out that Sen. Carl Curtis (R-Neb.), who saw no great wrong in President Nixon's conduct, lashed out against the Democrats involved in the comparatively small-potatoes Baker case.

The former Senate boy wonder hopes to publish his book after the din of Watergate dies down.

© 1974, United Feature Syndicate

See reference to in 554 579 Technical Communications Corp

(When Filled In)

INCIDENT REPORT

FROM:
BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

DATE [illegible]

TIME [illegible]

NAME [illegible] GRADE -- OFFICE --

INCIDENT Offer of information TIME 2320 PLACE
Seabrook, Texas
phone 713-474-[illegible]

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

Subject advised that he had an economic formula which would solve the world dollar dumping crisis.
[illegible] advised him that a report would be made of his offer and he would be contacted if the Agency was interested.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

ACTION TAKEN:

As stated above.

REPORTING OFFICER

CHIEF, BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DISTRIBUTION:
ORIG: DD/SEC (PTOS)
COPY: C/PHY. SD
COPY: C/PSD
FILE: BSB/PHYS. SD
COPY:

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

FORM 9-67 1798 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(36)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

12/12/72

Walter Sheridan — Democrats' Investigator? or Republicans' Countermeasure?

Richard E. Sprague
Hartsdale, N.Y. 10530

See next page

> *"The NBC broadcast of June 19, 1967" put on by Walter Sheridan "will probably stand for years as a symbol of the lengths to which some powerful outside interests will go in order to interfere with state government."*

Walter Sheridan has recently been hired by the Democratic National Committee to head their investigation of the Watergate bugging caper. In view of the importance of this assignment, it would seem worthwhile to examine Mr. Sheridan's performance in past investigations.

"Getting" Hoffa, and False Testimony

Walter Sheridan first came into national prominence in 1961 when he spearheaded Robert Kennedy's drive against Jimmy Hoffa, during Robert's tenure as Attorney General. Sheridan pursued a relentless, no mercy shown, course of action to "get Hoffa", and get him he did. In the course of this crusade, some rather dubious techniques were used; which later came back to haunt Mr. Sheridan. The prime example was the "uncovering" of a key witness against Hoffa, one Grady Partin of New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Partin was some years later accused by a grand jury of giving false testimony against Hoffa.

The Watergate Incident

On June 17 at 2:30 a.m., five men were arrested in the offices of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate Hotel, Washington, D.C. They had broken into the office, and were found with electronic surveillance devices, cameras for photographing documents, etc; they were wearing surgical rubber gloves. They were arrested by police.

These five men were James W. McCord, Jr., Bernard L. Barker, Frank Sturgis, Eugenio R. Martinez, and Virgilio R. Gonzales.

Their connections reach to the Republican Party, the Committee to Re-Elect the President, President Richard M. Nixon, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other persons and organizations.

Beginning in August 1972, "Computers and Automation" has been publishing articles on the Watergate Incident and its ramifications, because of the threat that this incident represents to democracy in the United States, and the importance of seeking the truth about it and pinning down the responsibility for it.

"Getting" Garrison

Mr. Sheridan's most notable performance came in 1967 and '68 when he was an executive producer for NBC-TV news. Sheridan produced a one-hour NBC special on Jim Garrison's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy and the trial of Clay Shaw for conspiracy to murder the President. The program, broadcast on June 19, 1967, was a highly biased, provably dishonest, personally vindictive, attack on Garrison defending Shaw. The Shaw trial did not take place until February, 1969, a year and a half later.

Arrest by Garrison and Indictment by Grand Jury

Walter Sheridan was arrested by Garrison on July 7, 1967, following the NBC Special, and indicted by a grand jury on two counts. The first was attempted bribery and intimidation of a witness. Rick Townley of station WDSU, the NBC affiliate in New Orleans, was arrested and indicted with Sheridan on the same charges. The federal government, especially the Justice Department, made sure that Garrison was never able to bring Sheridan and Townley to trial. The indictments are still open.

If the Sheridan trial ever does take place, the conviction should not be too difficult. Here are the facts, as reported by both New Orleans newspapers, the Times Picayune and the States Item, in 1967 and summarized in "The Kennedy Conspiracy" by Paris Flammonde, Meredith Press, 1969.

Sheridan and Townley, having been assigned by NBC to cover the Garrison-Shaw case, became personally and directly involved. The indictments for bribery, suppressing and altering evidence, and interfering with the trial, did not begin to tell the entire story. NBC top management, Frank McGee, the narrator of the special, and others at NBC, fully backed up Sheridan, until [illegible] of the lies, bribes and fakes in the program were revealed.

Apology by NBC for Lies Told by Two "Witnesses"

Frank McGee later had to apologize on NBC for lies told by two of Sheridan's "witnesses" on the special. Sheridan and Townley paid them to give statements against Garrison. The FCC ruled that NBC had to give Garrison equal time after Garrison made an appeal, because the special had not been a news program, but an NBC-Sheridan vendetta against Garrison. NBC did give Garrison 30 minutes (the special was one hour) to respond at a later date in 1967.

To illustrate Sheridan's and NBC's techniques in the case, at one point the President of NBC helped in the bribery efforts by calling Mr. Gherlock, head of Equitable Life Insurance Co. in New York. Gherlock was asked for assurance that Perry Russo, who worked for Equitable in Louisiana, would cooperate with NBC on the Garrison special. Russo was the key witness in the Shaw trial whom Sheridan and Townley tried to bribe.

To remind the reader about the Shaw trial, Jim Garrison opened an investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy in late 1966. Senator Long of Louisiana had convinced Garrison that a conspiracy had existed. Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in New Orleans prior to the assassination, along with the strange actions of David Ferrie, on the day of the assassination, attracted Garrison's attention. He had not made his investigation public, but a curious newspaper reporter named Rosemary James broke the story after a few months of effort. Clay Shaw's other identity, Clay Bertrand, had already been uncovered by Garrison, and his involvement in the planning for the assassination had already been suspected by early 1967.

Party in David Ferrie's Apartment

Perry Russo attended a party in David Ferrie's apartment where Clay Bertrand, Ferrie, someone resembling Lee Harvey Oswald and others had discussed the possibility of assassinating President Kennedy. He became the key witness when Garrison arrested Shaw on March 1, 1967, and a grand jury indicted Shaw on March 22 following two hearings on March 14 and March 17 by a three judge panel and a four judge panel, recommending that Shaw be held for trial.

Effort to Have Russo Change His Testimony

Sheridan and Townley both made up their minds, along with most of the news media and the Justice Department, that Garrison had to be stopped at all costs. They decided to really go to work on Perry Russo, since his testimony was all important.

Townley tried to get Russo to change his testimony at the Shaw trial to make it seem that Garrison had hypnotized him and had then asked him leading questions to get Russo to testify against Shaw. Townley and Sheridan went to Russo's house, his office, and met him at other places. They badgered him and attempted to bribe him. They pressured and threatened him. They used every trick in the book to try to get him to change his testimony.

They threatened him with being discredited, made to seem insane, and perhaps fired from his job. They offered him a chance to work closely, for high rewards, with NBC in Sheridan's all-out effort to get Garrison. Sheridan told Russo, "We're going to destroy Gar[illegible]on and his case along with him." Townley told Russo that he could get Shaw's lawyer, Dymond, to go easy on him at the trial, if he would alter his testimony. He told Russo that his employer had promised NBC that no retaliation would be taken against Russo if he cooperated with NBC. However, he might be fired if he didn't cooperate.

Sheridan told Russo that NBC could set him up in California where Russo always wanted to live, if he helped bust up the Garrison probe. Sheridan said NBC would pay his expenses to California and to live there, would protect his job, would get Russo a lawyer, and would guarantee that Garrison would never extradite him back to Louisiana.

Gordon Novel, Worker for the CIA

Another important witness in the Shaw trial was Gordon Novel, a bugging and electronics expert who worked for the CIA. Garrison tried to subpoena him, but he left New Orleans and fled to Ohio. Garrison was never able to extradite Novel from Ohio to Louisiana in spite of Novel's public statements that he knew who had killed David Ferrie. (Ferrie died mysteriously shortly after Garrison's probe became public knowledge.)

Walter Sheridan told Perry Russo that NBC had helped Novel escape Garrison's clutches by flying him out of Louisiana to McLean, Virginia (home of the CIA). NBC paid for a lie detector test to be administered to Novel in McLean. The test was supposed to prove that Novel was telling the truth when he said he knew nothing about the Kennedy case. Sheridan told Russo that NBC would do the same thing for him that they had done for Novel, namely, make sure that Novel would never be extradited to Louisiana to testify. Since Novel never was extradited and since Governor Rhodes of Ohio blocked his extradition making Governor McKeithen of Louisiana extremely angry, it would seem that Sheridan was right NBC did possess a lot of clout.

Sheridan and Townley also went to work on Gordon Novel's former wife, Marlene Mancuso. She was another important Shaw trial witness, because of her knowledge about Novel's CIA activities and a burglary of a munitions dump in Houma, Louisiana. Townley called her and tried to convince her to grant a taped interview for use on the NBC show. He said Garrison was going to be destroyed and that she should cooperate with NBC.

The NBC Special on June 19, 1967

The NBC-Walter Sheridan special on June 19, 1967, titled "The JFK Conspiracy — The Case of Jim Garrison", was packed with Sheridanese. Here are the principal examples:

1. A lawyer named Dean Andrews in New Orleans had played a key role in the Shaw trial because Clay Bertrand had telephoned him in a hospital shortly after the assassination and asked him to represent Lee Harvey Oswald. Andrews told so many different stories about Clay Bertrand that the truth was difficult to determine.

Frank McGee asked Andrews on the program about Clay Bertrand and whether he was Clay Shaw. Andrews said Bertrand was actually Eugene C. Davis, a bar owner in New Orleans. Sheridan's coup quickly blew up in his face when Davis denied the whole thing. When the trial finally took place, Shaw was pegged as Bertrand by a woman who saw him sign his name as Clay Bertrand.

Bundy Lying

2. Sheridan's second attempt was to attack the credibility of Vernon Bundy, a witness for the prosecution who had seen Oswald and Shaw together on the New Orleans lakefront (Lake Pontchartrain). Sheridan cooked up two "witnesses" against Bundy. NBC presented John "the Baptist" Cancler, a burglar and Miguel Torres, also a burglar, who had been acquainted with Bundy.

Sheridan paid Cancler and Torres to make statements on the program. Cancler said that Bundy had indicated to him that his story regarding Oswald and Shaw was not true. Torres asserted that Bundy's testimony was "an out-front lie". Cancler said he had been approached by members of Garrison's staff to "plant" something in Shaw's house. Torres claimed that he had been asked (by Garrison) to testify that Shaw had made homosexual advances toward him and also that Shaw was Bertrand.

Frank McGee reported that NBC had discovered Bundy was lying during his polygraph test and Garrison knew it but let him testify anyway.

Cancler Sentenced to 18 Years

Following the TV show, Cancler was called before the Orleans Parish grand jury and asked to repeat his accusations under oath. Cancler took the fifth amendment, refusing to reiterate his TV charges. The jury foreman immediately took Cancler before a judge and asked him to repeat. Cancler again took the fifth and was found guilty of contempt of court and fined $500 or one year. Apparently Sheridan had paid him a lot more than $500. Two weeks later Cancler was handed a third convinction and sentenced to eighteen years as a multiple offender.

Miguel Torres was also brought before a grand jury and took the fifth when he was asked, "Were the statements you made on national television on NBC in June 1967, concerning the district attorney, true?"

James Alcock, Garrison's assistant district attorney who handled the Shaw trial, said to the judge, "Torres and Cancler just tell the television and Walter Sheridan about it. When they have an opportunity to do something they take the fifth amendment."

Sheridan Could Not Get Russo to "Cooperate"

3. Sheridan himself appeared on screen to discuss Perry Russo. He could never get Russo to change his mind and cooperate, so Sheridan interpreted for the audience what Russo had told him. He stated that Russo told him that his testimony against Shaw may be a combination of truth, fantasy and lies.

Andrew Sciambra, Garrison's assistant district attorney who interviewed Russo, delivered a memo to Garrison, detailing Walter Sheridan's efforts to bribe and threaten Russo. The statements made by Russo to Sciambra were very incriminating about Sheridan. The net result of all Sheridan's efforts were that Russo stuck to his story at the trial.

Fred Leemans, "Witness"

4. Sheridan's last "witness" on the show was Fred Leemans, another bar owner (Sheridan seemed to specialize in bar owners) and former Turkish bath operator. Leemans said that his original statements given to Garrison about Clay Shaw were not true and that his psyche began to trouble him. The morality of his actions began to weigh upon his mind. Perhaps a little of Sheridan's green stuff weighed even more heavily. At any rate he recanted his claim that Clay Shaw had come to the Turkish bath, that he (Leemans) had associated the name Bertrand with Shaw, and that on occasion he had been accompanied by a young slightly-bearded man whom he called "Lee". Leemans said on TV that Garrison had offered him $2500 for his testimony.

The New York Times telephoned Leemans following his appearance for an interview. He refused to speak about his NBC bit, conceding that he had arranged to give the Associated Press the exclusive story. He said, "After all, I have to get something out of all of this." On hearing this line, one of Garrison's staff smiled and said, "Ah, now that's the Fred Leemans we all recognize."

Bribing and Attempting to Bribe Witnesses

In addition to bribing and attempting to bribe witnesses, Sheridan also had meetings with one of Garrison's part-time investigators, William Gurvich. Garrison found out about the meetings and did not give Gurvich all of the information he wanted.

Jim Garrison said about Sheridan and the NBC broadcast, "Aside from the fact that it insulted the intelligence of every American, it was a very clear attempt to prejudice in advance possible jurors in the case. This program will probably stand for years as a symbol of the lengths to which some powerful outside interests will go in order to interfere with state government." ☐

Unsettling, Disturbing, Critical . . .

Computers and Automation, established 1951 and therefore the oldest magazine in the field of computers and data processing, believes that the profession of information engineer includes not only competence in handling information using computers and other means, but also a broad responsibility, in a professional and engineering sense, for:

— The reliability and social significance of pertinent input data;

— The social value and truth of the output results.

In the same way, a bridge engineer takes a professional responsibility for the reliability and significance of the data he uses, and the safety and efficiency of the bridge he builds, for human beings to risk their lives on.

Accordingly, Computers and Automation publishes from time to time articles and other information related to socially useful input and output of data systems in a broad sense. To this end we seek to publish what is unsettling, disturbing, critical — but productive of thought and an improved and safer "house" for all humanity, an earth in which our children and later generations may have a future, instead of facing extinction.

The professional information engineer needs to relate his engineering to the most important and most serious problems in the world today: war, nuclear weapons, pollution, the population explosion, and many more.

file

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

Novel, Gordon OS-526113

NOVEL,GORDON
CR 69 R075149-2437
/Y M /D MEM 18APR69 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GENL
/Z ~~2298262~~

NOVEL,GORDON
OR 70 M601153
/Y M /D LST P5 06JUL70 GARRISON CASE
/Z ~~2436576~~

NOVEL,GORDON
SR 69 S332959
/Y M /D SER 2420
/Z ~~2289130~~

NOVEL,GORDON DUANE
OR 69 R209626
/Y M /D MEM 22DEC69 CIA IMPERSONATION FILE
/Z ~~2379707~~

NOVEL,GORDON
OR 69 M535449
/Y M /D CLP 15FEB69 OPEN CITY GARRISON,JAMES
/Z ~~2292704~~

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

Novel, Gordon

526113

/N NOVEL,GORDON OR E402897-A
/YM
/D CLP 20SEP67 NEW ORLEANS
STATES ITEMS SHAW,CLAY L

/N NOVEL,GORDON OR R101572
/YM
/D CLP 12JUL67 SHERIDAN,
WALTER J

/N NOVEL,GORDON OR M535449
/YM
/D MEM 28SEP67 P3 GARRISON,
JAMES

67

/N NOVEL,GORDON OR M351164-6
/YM
/D CLP 26MAR67 WAS STAR
OSWALD,LEE HARVEY

/N NOVEL,GORDON OR M535449
/YM
/D CLP 22FEB68 N O STATE
TIMES GARRISON,JAMES

/N NOVEL,GORDON OR R039094
/YM
/D MEM 14AUG68 P2 GUGAS,
CHRIS

526113

8

~~2228565~~ 68

13-00000

526113

[redacted]

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

~~SECRET~~

Name as it Appears in News Media	True Name &/or akas	File #	DPOB	Status	Source	Allegation
NOVEL, Gordon	NOVEL, Gordon	526113		No relationship to CIA	Tass-5/27/67	NOVEL worked for CIA in 1961, per NOVEL's attorney.
NUTINI, Hugo	NUTINI, Hugo Gina aka Hugo Nutini-Paredes	490072	Chile 1930	No clearance; OO/C interest 1966	Rude Pravo 8/29/65	North American spy of Chilean origin.
MUSSINI, Hugo					FBIS Moscow broadcast, 9/23/65	US spy in Chile, acting as scientist.
NUTTER, G. Warren Dr.	NUTTER, Gilbert Warren	49372 (o&c)	Topeka, Kansas; 3/10/23	Staff empl. 1951-1952; Consultant 1952-1953	Abilene, Texas Reporter-News 3/28/65	Formerly Division Chief for CIA
ODELL, Bruce	ODELL, Bruce Taylor	89084	Boston, Mass. 10/30/28	Staff empl.	FBIS, Cairo broadcast 8/20/68 re AMIN trial	CIA agent in Cairo, arrested by Egyptians.

Comment: In the absence of positive identifying information, the above individual should, in most cases, only be considered as a probable identification with the Subject of interest.

For Security Office Only: For additional information on the name as it appears in the clipping refer to OS file #535 525

SO/SRS

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

8 February 1968

SUBJECT: NOVEL, Gordon
(See also FURR, Lloyd B.)
(See also ARCACHA-SMITH, Sergio)

ALLEGATION:

Gordon NOVEL, former owner of a French Quarter Bar in New Orleans, was subpoenaed by GARRISON as a material witness in March 1967 but NOVEL moved to Columbus, Ohio and has avoided extradition. GARRISON charged NOVEL with burglary of the Houma Munitions Bunker in 1961 together with David FERRIE and ARCACHA-SMITH. NOVEL claimed this was a CIA operation but later his attorney denied the story.

SOURCE:

Numerous news items, the latest dtd in October 1967.

CIA CONNECTION:

None

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

OS INDICES RESULTS:

Subject's file contains newspaper clippings dating from March 1967 when GARRISON charged him with conspiracy in connection with a burglary of a munitions bunker at Houma, Louisiana in 1961 together with David FERRIE and ARCACHA-SMITH. To avoid arrest, NOVEL left New Orleans, first going to McLean, Virginia where he was given a lie detector test by Lloyd B. FURR, a private detective. (See summary on FURR). This incident tended to give credence to NOVEL's initial claim that he was working for CIA because of the Agency's proximity to McLean, Va.

After NOVEL vacated his New Orleans apartment in March 1967 a letter written by him was found under the linoleum on a sink drainboard by the new tenant, a girl who turned it over to her boy friend, who gave it to a professor at a New Orleans university who in turn gave it to a reporter on the New Orleans STATES-ITEM, Hoke MAY.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Hoke MAY was granted a Covert Security Approval in April 1958 for unwitting use by Project FJINDULGE. MAY was not to be directly employed by FJINDULGE but was to be used in connection with his position with a private firm which handled work for the Project. The letter was presumably written to a "Mr. WEISS" in CIA and referred to classified DOUBLE-CHEK activities in 1961 in which NOVEL claimed he was involved. This matter was reviewed by CI/R&A at the time the matter received publicity and it was determined that DOUBLE-CHEK was created by the Agency for the sole purpose of making payments to the widows of American flyers who participated in the Bay of Pigs. No connection with NOVEL could be established. NOVEL knew Sergio ARCACHA-SMITH who was New Orleans head of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico, an Agency created and supported anti-Castro organization. Although ARCACHA-SMITH had no Agency clearance, NOVEL could have gained an impression from him that he was employed by CIA.

In October 1967 NOVEL was granted immunity from arrest by GARRISON on the Houma Bunker burglary charge and returned to Louisiana to testify before the East Baton Rouge Parish Grand Jury in their probe on crime and labor troubles in the State of Louisiana.

DETAILS:

The Agency had no connection with the Houma Munitions Bunker. However, an Agency training site was located at Belle Chasse, Louisiana and Colonel Thomas BURBANK, State of Louisiana Police Superintendent, was one of the Louisiana officials witting of Agency affiliation with Belle Chasse. It is noted from news items concerning NOVEL's testimony before the Louisiana Labor probers in October 1967, that Colonel BURBANK was also a witness at the same time, although, there is no mention that BURBANK and NOVEL knew each other. BURBANK testified that every Louisiana sheriff was notified to "clean up" gambling and other vice in Louisiana.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE 23 May 1969
TO: SRS (Indices)	
ROOM NO. GE-31	BUILDING Hqs.

REMARKS:

Please index the attached to the file of NOVEL, Gordon - #526113 and return to undersigned.

FROM: Sarah Hall		
ROOM NO. 4E-13	BUILDING Hqs.	EXTENSION 7683

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 FEB 55 (47)

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INCIDENT REPORT

FROM: BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

dup

DATE 29 April 1969

TIME 2010 hours

Mrs. Betty Adams
8800 Elm Ct.
NAME Galaway, Ohio
879-8510

GRADE NonAgency

OFFICE NA

INCIDENT Request for Information Re Gordon Novel

TIME 2010 hours

PLACE Galaway, Ohio

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

1. Mrs. Adams called the Agency to request employment verification of one Gordon Novel. Questioned as to her reason for the request, Mrs. Adams replied that Novel is a friend of her son, Frank Adams, Jr., age 27 and that she is looking out for her son. If Novel does in fact work for this Agency she intends to drop her investigation of him, but if he does not she will make every effort to end the friendship.

2. A cursory check of available records showed no listing for Novel and Mrs. Adams was advised accordingly. She then provided, at some length, a review of her efforts to check on Novel, including contact with the FBI and Ohio police. In her investigation she has been told to have nothing to do with Novel and to stay away from him. She has also learned that he was in some way connected with the "Garrison and Kennedy trial" through Mr. Jerry Winer, an attorney in the trial. From Novel's wife, Mrs. Adams was informed that Novel works for the CIA. Hence, her call to Washington tonight.

3. Mrs. Adams was again informed that Mr. Gordon Novel is not an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. The call was then terminated.

ACTION TAKEN:

4. Later checks of SR&CD records show that a file on Gordon Novel is maintained on a permanent basis by SRS. The file number is 332-959.

Michael A. Belt
MICHAEL A. BELT
REPORTING OFFICER

for Charles B. Goodwin
ROBERT D. BUCKLEY
CHIEF, BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

3,3

DISTRIBUTION:
ORIG: DD/SEC (PTOS)
COPY: C/PHY. SD
COPY: C/PSD
FILE: BSB/PHYS. SD
COPY:

FORM 9-67 1798 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

(36)

2/mc

13-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/SRS	5-22-69	
2	Tighe	5/22/69	
3	Mrs HAll	5/22/69	
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C.R.S.	5/21

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

20 May 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Gordon Novel
#526113

1. On 20 May 1969, the Director of Security advised that he had received a call from Mr. Bienvenu, Director of Security, National Security Agency, regarding a possible impersonation by Subject. According to Mr. Bienvenu, an ex-Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, Mr. Russell L. Aufrance, 3256 South Union Avenue, Alliance, Ohio, 44601, had called Mr. Mathison and advised that a contact of his had stated that Subject had shown a CIA credential and indicated that he was employed by the Agency. Mr. Aufrance advised he called the National Security Agency to bring this matter to the attention of the highest security officials in Washington and that if anyone wished to contact him they should call him before 5:00 p.m., this date.

2. After reviewing Subject's file and confirming that Mr. Aufrance was an ex-Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, I briefed the Director of Security who requested that I call Mr. Aufrance and advise him that we were knowledgeable of Subject and that on other occasions he had inferred he was employed by CIA. In addition, that we intended to turn this information over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for investigation since the FBI had jurisdiction on such impersonation cases.

3. I later briefed Mr. Fred J. Cassidy, FBI/Liaison, who suggested that I advise Mr. Aufrance to report the information to local FBI agents. In Mr. Cassidy's presence, I called Mr. Aufrance who repeated what he had told Mr. Mathison. He also stated that Subject's wife is now separated from him and is suing him for divorce in Columbus, Ohio. She has stated that Subject is armed, carries a

5/23/69

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

tear gas weapon and some kind of a .22 caliber pistol, concealed as a fountain pen. She stated that Subject is leaving Columbus for Reno, Nevada, where he intends to open a gambling establishment. In further discussion with Mr. Aufrance, he indicated his source was a friend of Subject's wife and from other statements he made, it is believed that his source is Thomas F. Hughes, Jr., who was interviewed by the Chicago Field Office on 18 April 1969.

4. After further discussion with Mr. Aufrance during which he indicated he was leaving for a fishing trip in Canada and would not return until Sunday, 25 May 1969, it was agreed that he would contact the local Federal Bureau of Investigation and brief them regarding Subject and that I would, meanwhile, alert FBI Headquarters/Washington, which could follow-up with the local office.

5. I then provided Mr. Cassidy with all pertinent information regarding Mr. Aufrance's telephone call and all information on Subject. Mr. Cassidy will keep us advised.

A. C. Sheridan

Arthur C. Sheridan
Acting Deputy Director of Security
for Personnel Security

Gordon Novel

AUFRANCE, Russell L. (1951-55)

Res: 3256 South Union Avenue, Alliance, Ohio 44601

Bus: Research Associates, Incorporated, 50 South
Maple, Akron, Ohio

Regional Manager - Investigator

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INCIDENT REPORT

FROM:
BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE 29 April 1969

TIME 2010 hours

NAME Mrs. Betty Adams
8800 Elm Ct.
Galaway, Ohio
879-8510

GRADE NonAgency

OFFICE NA

INCIDENT Request for Information Re Gordon Novel

TIME 2010 hours

PLACE Galaway, Ohio

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

1. Mrs. Adams called the Agency to request employment verification of one Gordon Novel. Questioned as to her reason for the request, Mrs. Adams replied that Novel is a friend of her son, Frank Adams, Jr., age 27 and that she is looking out for her son. If Novel does in fact work for this Agency she intends to drop her investigation of him, but if he does not she will make every effort to end the friendship.

2. A cursory check of available records showed no listing for Novel and Mrs. Adams was advised accordingly. She then provided, at some length, a review of her efforts to check on Novel, including contact with the FBI and Ohio police. In her investigation she has been told to have nothing to do with Novel and to stay away from him. She has also learned that he was in some way connected with the "Garrison and Kennedy trial" through Mr. Jerry Winer, an attorney in the trial. From Novel's wife, Mrs. Adams was informed that Novel works for the CIA. Hence, her call to Washington tonight.

3. Mrs. Adams was again informed that Mr. Gordon Novel is not an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. The call was then terminated.

ACTION TAKEN:

4. Later checks of SR&CD records show that a file on Gordon Novel is maintained on a permanent basis by SRS. The file number is 332-959. ?

Michael A. Belt
MICHAEL A. BELT
REPORTING OFFICER

3
ROBERT D. BUCKLEY
CHIEF, BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DISTRIBUTION:
ORIG: DD/SEC (PTOS)
COPY: C/PHY. SD
COPY: C/PSD
FILE: BSB/PHYS. SD
COPY:

5/6/69

FORM 9-67 1798 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(36)

1/mc

Chicago Field Office
18 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters

SUBJECT: NOVEL, Gordon
(Impersonation of Agency Officer)

1. There is no case number. The case was generated by events that took place in the Chicago, Illinois area. No special requirement was levied by Headquarters; however, it was coordinated with Headquarters.

2. At approximately 4:15 p.m., 18 March 1969, Mr. Sam SIMPSON, Chief, Domestic Contacts Service (DCS) Field Office in Chicago, Illinois, contacted the Chicago Field Office and advised that Mr. Robert FAY, Special Agent with the Chicago FBI Office, had called the DCS Office with reference to some person by the name of "Mr. ROSE" (phonetic) who purportedly represented himself as a CIA representative in some telephonic contacts with the office of Mr. Tom HUGHES, President of M. F. Hughes Oil & Coal Company, in Chicago. The "Mr. ROSE" reportedly told Mr. HUGHES' office that he was with the CIA and that it was urgent that Mr. HUGHES come tonight to Room 551, Ambassador East Hotel, Chicago, on an important matter. (Subsequently, Mr. HUGHES was identified as Mr. Thomas F. HUGHES, Jr., born 1926 in Chicago; Owner and President of the above family firm; former Owner of the Playboy Club in New Orleans, Louisiana).

Agent FAY was contacted by the Chicago Field Office and he advised that nothing of value had been obtained by "Mr. ROSE", therefore, the FBI had no grounds for an impersonation case and could not officially enter the case. Agent FAY said that he had instructed Mr. HUGHES to refuse the invitation to go to Room 551, Ambassador East Hotel, and that if "Mr. ROSE" called again, that Mr. HUGHES should contact Agent FAY. Agent FAY further advised the Chicago Field Office that he had verified through the front desk at the Ambassador East Hotel that a "Mr. ROSE" was a registered guest for Room 551 and that he was from the "St. Louis suburban area".

4/22/69

3. At 2:00 p.m., the next day (19 March 1969), with the prior approval by and coordination with Headquarters (Mr. Tim HARRINGTON), Mr. Thomas F. HUGHES, Jr., previously mentioned, was interviewed under Agency cover at the Sage's East Restaurant, 181 East Lake Shore Drive, Chicago. The place of interview was designated by Mr. HUGHES. Sage's East is an expensive and popular eating establishment on Chicago's Gold Coast, a neighborhood of fashionable hotels, apartment houses, shops, entertainment establishments, etc.

4. Mr. HUGHES' demeanor around Sage's East indicated a great deal of familiarity with the premises and personnel. Obviously, he is a regular patron with special privileges. For instance, without permission, he walked into a closed-off section of the restaurant and selected a table for the interview. He then beckoned a waiter to bring two cups of coffee.

5. Assistant Special Agent in Charge James E. MACKEY, Jr. conducted the interview with Mr. HUGHES.

6. Mr. HUGHES is about 43 years of age and about 5'8" in height, 155/160 pounds, dark blond (or even light brown) hair, which he wears short and combed straight down. He is neat and trim, walks with confidence and agility, and appears conscious of his appearance. He was dressed in a powder blue suit, white turtle neck shirt and dark loafers. He moved around and talked with a smooth, confident, self-assured manner. Based upon his physical appearance, dress, speech and personality, he could be described as a "swinger", "jet setter", "party guy", etc. His conversation touched stylish and action-oriented restaurants, night clubs, places of entertainment, Playboy Clubs, etc. He was very cooperative and volunteered to assist in any manner.

7. Mr. HUGHES said that he is President and Owner of the M.F. Hughes Oil and Coal Company, 3134 East 90th Street, Chicago, a business that dates back to his grandfather. He said that he took the business over several years ago, upon the death of his father, and built it into a successful, profitable operation. Most of his time is spent on outside sales work. He spends very little time in the office. He has a telephone in his auto and prefers to have his office screen the telephone calls before giving them to him to answer. The day-to-day internal operation of business is handled by his office staff. He believes he contributes more to his business,

by working on the outside.

8. In addition to his coal company, Mr. HUGHES stated he has various other business interests in Chicago, Florida and other parts of the United States. He is a partner in a real estate venture in the Ft. Lauderdale, Florida area. Mr. HUGHES claims a part-ownership of the Maryland Hotel in Chicago.

9. Mr. HUGHES said that he is a personal friend of Mr. Hugh HEFNER, founder and operator of the Playboy Club chain. Mr. HUGHES said that for a few years in the early 1960's, he was the owner of the Playboy Club in New Orleans, Louisiana. He founded the New Orleans Playboy Club and later, disposed of it because it was unprofitable.

10. Mr. HUGHES said he has been estranged from his wife for several years. She has refused to give him a divorce. The wife lives in Chicago with the children of the marriage. Mr. HUGHES said he has an apartment in the Carriage House, Chicago.

11. Mr. HUGHES further said that he is "not perfect" and it is no secret that he has been involved with a lot of women over a period of years. Mr. HUGHES indicated that women seem to be attracted to him. He admitted being a "soft touch" for people in need.

12. Mr. HUGHES claimed contacts with a number of important people in politics, entertainment, business, sports and society. He said he is a personal friend of entertainer Frank SINATRA. Mr. HUGHES claimed that people are always calling on him for political and business favors. These people think he can get things done.

13. Mr. HUGHES said that between 3:00 p.m. and 6:15 p.m. on 18 March 1969, his office received telephone calls (four) from a "Mr. ROSE" or a "Mr. BARRON" calling for "Mr. ROSE", requesting that he come to Room 551, Ambassador East Hotel, for some urgent matter. On two of the calls, the caller identified himself as a CIA Representative. The above calls were taken by either his secretary (Marilyn) or his office manager (Mr. WARD).

14. After the last call, Mr. HUGHES said he tried to call Agent FAY at the FBI, but he was gone for the day. Mr. HUGHES then called Room 551, above hotel, and asked "Mr. ROSE" what the matter was all about? What was so urgent? Was he with the Central Intelligence Agency? Was he with the United States Government? Mr. HUGHES said "Mr. ROSE" avoided the point blank question of whether he was with the Central Intelligence Agency. "Mr. ROSE" parried the direct question with the remark, "I said CIA". Mr. HUGHES further related that "Mr. ROSE" wasn't going to admit he was representing the Central Intelligence Agency. Then Mr. HUGHES told "Mr. ROSE" that the whole matter was so

suspicious that he has turned it over to the FBI. The conversation was then concluded.

15. Shortly thereafter, according to Mr. HUGHES (also confirmed by Mr. FAY), a person who identified himself as Gordon NEVILLE, NEVEL OR NOVEL called the FBI Office and said he registered in Room 551 at the Ambassador East and that he was in Chicago on a matter involving James GARRISON and a legal action against Playboy Magazine for defamation of character or some such vague explanation. Agent FAY was recontacted by CFO regarding the above telephone call, but he was unable to add to, or clarify the details of the call. Agent FAY said he prepared a brief memorandum on the case and closed it.

16. Mr. HUGHES said he has suspected all along that the telephone calls were either made by, or instigated by one Gordon NEVIL, NEVILLE or NOVEL (HUGHES professed only phonetic spelling; however, Headquarters, after an indices check, later said that it was probably Gordon NOVEL, who had previously owned a bar in New Orleans and who had previously claimed an affiliation with the Agency).

17. Mr. HUGHES said that he has a little background on Gordon NOVEL and it may have a bearing on the recent events. Mr. HUGHES said that about three years ago, he met one Abbey MULLIGAN a native of Tennessee, who was then working as a bunny in the Playboy Club in Chicago. Abbey has also worked at Playboy Clubs in New Orleans, Cincinnati, London and other places. A few years ago, Abbey married NOVEL, whom she met in New Orleans. Since that time, Abbey and NOVEL have made their home in the Columbus, Ohio area. They have had a lot of fights and arguments and have been separated on several occasions, Abbey has filed for a divorce. Presently, Abbey is living in Columbus with her parents, the John MULLIGANS.

18. Mr. HUGHES further related that NOVEL lives by his wits and is not to be trusted; that NOVEL engages in "private eye" work of questionable practices; that he (NOVEL) reportedly taps telephones, "bugs" rooms and takes photographs, all of which are in connection with questionable activities; and that NOVEL, in the past, according to Abbey, has claimed working for the Agency.

19. Mr. HUGHES further related that he has no romantic interests, such as marriage, with Abbey and looks upon her as a good friend. Last summer, Mr. HUGHES arranged for Abbey to spend a few weeks in the Ft. Lauderdale area. Mr. HUGHES was there also. Mr. HUGHES said that he made elaborate precautions to make sure that Abbey couldn't be traced directly from Columbus to Florida. He had Abbey fly to Chicago and then catch another plane to Florida. Somehow, Mr. HUGHES further related, NOVEL found out about their trip to Florida, according to Abbey.

20. In conclusion, Mr. HUGHES said that NOVEL is a very, very shady character who is not to be trusted. Mr. HUGHES has never met NOVEL. Based upon what he knows about NOVEL, he believes NOVEL would engage in extortion, bribery, blackmail, etc.

21. Attached herewith is Exhibit 1, a Xerox Copy of the registration of one Charles BROZ, party of two, in Room 551, Ambassador East Hotel, Chicago, from 15 to 18 March 1969. BROZ was registered from Apartment C, 10069 Puttington, Affton, Missouri. (Note: There is a phonetic similarity between "ROSE" and "BROZ").

22. The files of the Credit Bureau of St. Louis, also serving Affton, Missouri, reflected the following information in the name of one Charles BROZ, no middle name listed, whose spouse was indicated as Beverly. He was first placed on record in June 1956, with information updated to January 1968, had a total of five accounts in the interim period, high credit of $3,208, all rated as satisfactory.

23. In January 1968, BROZ was owner of the Sportsway Barber Shop, 1809 Pestolozzi Street, and his wife, a Registered Nurse, was employed at Bethesda Hospital. The additional other addresses were on record: January 1966, 1218 Iron Street; 17 October 1962, 705 Brevits Street; June 1961, 3848-B Illinois Street; and December 1960, 3912 Illinois. No additional pertinent information was on file.

24. The records of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department revealed one Charles R. BROZ, 4177 Itaska Street, age 35, listed as a Superintendent, was arrested for speeding on 15 December 1943 and fined $5.00 plus costs; he was previously detained for speeding 19 January 1941, and fined $7.00 and costs on 28 January 1941. No other information was a matter of record.

25. The files of the St. Louis County Police Department and the St. Louis County Sheriff's Office, both covering Affton, Missouri, were searched and reflected no information in the name of Charles R. BROZ.

26. The files of the Missouri State Auto Registration Office, State Headquarters, Jefferson City, Missouri, were searched by Clarence RIPPETO, Assistant Supervisor, and reflected no registration information in the name of Charles R. BROZ for the year 1969. Index book records indicated that one Charles R. BROZ, 1218 Iron Street, St. Louis, Missouri, purchased a 1966 Mercury on 31 January 1966 and for the years

4/28/69

1967 and 1968, was registered with Missouri auto license AG 1283. No other information was on file.

27. Captain Robert E. WESSEL, Chief, Intelligence Division, St. Louis County Police Department, obtained the following information from a reliable confidential informant, employed by the County Division of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company: Charles R. BROZ, residing at 10069 Puttington Drive, Apartment C, Affton (Lakeshire) Street, St. Louis County, Missouri, 63123, has unlisted telephone number 638-1149. His business connection is that of a partner with one Ray CAMPBELL in the Arco Auto Electric Service, 1811 Pestolozzi Street, St. Louis, Missouri, with telephone PR 1-8811. No additional information was filed.

28. Records of the Dun and Bradstreet Office in Chicago contained a file on the M. F. Hughes Oil and Coal Company, above shown address in Chicago, Illinois. Thomas F. HUGHES, Jr. is listed as President. The firm has 100 employees, a net worth of $914,000, annual sales of $3,000,000 and was founded by the family in 1900. Thomas F. HUGHES, Jr. is also listed as the President of Heidco Coal Company, Inc. Dun & Bradstreet records also show that in 1961, he was President of Playboy Club of New Orleans.

29. The criminal records of the Chicago Police Department were checked in the name of Thomas F. HUGHES and there was no record.

30. A reliable, confidential source, who is personally acquainted with Thomas F. HUGHES, Jr. furnished the following observations on HUGHES: That HUGHES was born and reared in the South Shore area of Chicago; that HUGHES inherited the family business, Hughes Oil and Coal, and has built it into a successful business; that HUGHES seems to have an income sufficient to maintain a 30 foot boat, patronize the smart and expensive restaurants and night clubs, live in an expensive apartment and dress in a stylish fashion; and that HUGHES has a reputation for "liking the ladies" and is a steady patron of the Playboy Club and other night spots. HUGHES is regarded as a "man about town" who entertains frequently around the night club circuit. His tastes are expensive. The confidential source further related that HUGHES may have some effeminate mannerisms, but nothing derogatory was known in that regard. The confidential source further related that he has always wondered about the source of HUGHES' money. HUGHES has various business investments, including some apartment buildings and an interest in the Maryland Hotel. The source pointed out that the Maryland Hotel has always been identified as having ownership in the Chicago syndicate. The source speculated that HUGHES may be a front man or have some support from the Syndicate; however, he (confidential source) has never known HUGHES to be involved in any Syndicate operations or activities.

31. The Chicago Field Office did not attempt to further develop the various leads in Chicago, Columbus, New Orleans, etc. in accordance with Headquarters instructions.

32. The Chicago Field Office is considering the case closed and RUC.

James E Mackey Jr

[RALPH G. ORCUTT] 6
Special Agent in Charge

Attach:
Exhibit 1

kmc

NAME BROZ, M/M

3/15 ARRIVAL DATE

ADDRESS

1/6
31/8
DEPARTURE DATE

CITY & STATE

TWIN @ 26.00 WEST

PAID 15

05.67

HOTELS AMBASSADOR

FIRM OR TRAVEL AGENT MR CHARLES BROZ
APT C
ADDRESS 10069 PUTTINGTON
CITY & STATE AFFTON, MISSOURI 63123

I WILL DEPART ON 3-1

Charles R Broz
SIGNATURE OF GUEST

Loew's hotels

551		2
ROOM NUMBER	NAME	NO. OF PERSONS

ROOM RATE	CODE	CLERK	FOLIO
27 04		JL	10 343

37

25899

TO OUR GUEST

- CITY AND STATE TAXES IF APPLICABLE WILL BE ADDED TO YOUR CONFIRMED ROOM RATE.
- MONEY, JEWELRY AND OTHER VALUABLES MUST BE PLACED IN OUR SAFE DEPOSIT BOX, OTHERWISE THE MANAGEMENT WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY LOSS.

Exhibit T

NAME BROZ, M/M

3/15 ARRIVAL DATE

ADDRESS

3/18/7 DEPARTURE DATE

15

CITY & STATE

TWIN @ 26.00 WEST

PAID

05.67

HOTELS AMBASSADOR

FIRM OR TRAVEL AGENT MR CHARLES BROZ
APT C
ADDRESS 10069 PUTTINGTON
CITY & STATE AFFTON, MISSOURI 65123

I WILL DEPART ON 3-1

Charles R Broz
SIGNATURE OF GUEST

oew's hotels

551		2
ROOM NUMBER	NAME	NO. OF PERSONS

ROOM RATE	CODE	CLERK	FOLIO
27.04		JJ	15 345

37

TO OUR GUEST

- * CITY AND STATE TAXES IF APPLICABLE WILL BE ADDED TO YOUR CONFIRMED ROOM RATE.
- * MONEY, JEWELRY AND OTHER VALUABLES MUST BE PLACED IN OUR SAFE DEPOSIT BOX, OTHERWISE THE MANAGEMENT WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY LOSS.

25899

— EXHIBIT I —

CREDIT
INFORMATION REQUESTED ______/______/______ DATE $ ______ AMOUNT

CREDIT APPROVED ______/______/______ DATE   ______ INITIAL

RECORD OF CHECKS CASHED

DATE	AMOUNT	BANK NUMBER	CASHIER	APPROVED
/ /				
/ /				
/ /				
/ /				
/ /				
/ /				
/ /				
/ /				
/ /				
/ /				

69 MAR 15 PM 8 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Contacts with Representatives of Public Media

Listed below is a summary of contacts with representatives of public media reported by Agency personnel for 26 February 1969.

Media Representative	Agency Contact	Remarks
Jess Cook TIME magazine	Mr. Goodwin	Mr. Cook was briefed on Vietnam by George Carver.
Gordon Novel Columbus, Ohio	Mr. Goodwin	Mr. Novel asked if he could have an affidavit stating that he had never been employed by CIA. Mr. Goodwin said he would contact our legal people and ask that someone phone Mr. Novel.
Kenneth Gilmore READER'S DIGEST	Mr. Goodwin	Mr. Gilmore said that Dave Phillips had mentioned the possibility of a rundown on the Cuban episode (Cubans who escaped through Guantanamo). Their man, Bill Shulz, has returned after talking to several people and he would like to talk to Dave. Mr. Goodwin said he would be in touch.
Peter Grose NEW YORK TIMES	Mr. Goodwin	Mr. Grose asked the chances for a Cairo and general Arab world background briefing for Raymond Anderson who has been in Moscow and who will leave for Cairo in a week or two. Mr. Anderson will be in Washington tomorrow afternoon and Friday. Mr. Goodwin confirmed a briefing for 28 Feb.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13-00000

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE	13 November 1968
SUBJECT NOVEL, Gordon	FILE NUMBER 526 113

According to FBI liaison check through Mr. Cregar, 11/13/68, Gordon Duane NOVEL (fugitive witness in Garrison's probe of the assassination of President Kennedy) was born 2/7/38, New Orleans, Louisiana.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE
Appraisal Section	Maxine Casebolt

FORM 7-62 1954

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

15 August 1968

SUBJECT: MAY, Hoke Smith

Subject was granted a Covert Security Approval on 22 April 1958 for unwitting use with Project FJINDULGE. Subject was not directly employed by FJINDULGE but was to be used in connection with his position with a private firm which handled work for the Project. At the time of the clearance Subject was employed by Tobias and Company, a public relations firm in Charleston, South Carolina.

A newspaper clipping from the New Orleans STATES-ITEM for 26 May 1967 reported how a letter written by fugitive witness Gordon NOVEL (GARRISON investigation into the assassination of former President KENNEDY) came into the hands of Hoke MAY, STATES-ITEM reporter. A copy of this clipping is attached.

Subject was born 11 April 1930 in De Kalb County, Georgia. He attended the University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, September-December 1947 and again from March-June 1948 but withdrew because of poor scholarship. He was employed as an office boy in the news department of the NEW YORK TIMES in New York City from October 1948 to March 1949. Other employments are as follows: SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, Savannah, Georgia from March 1949 to January 1950; INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE, Atlanta, Georgia, August 1950 to October 1951; Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Marietta, Georgia (as publicist), October 1951 to April 1952. From April-June 1952 Subject was political campaign manager for C. Baxter JONES in his unsuccessful campaign for U. S. Congressman from Georgia. From March 1952 to December 1953 Subject was employed by the ANDERSON INDEPENDENT, Anderson, South Carolina; December 1953 to December 1957, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Charlotte, North Carolina. He won the "Big Story Award" while with the OBSERVER.

Subject is the grandson of former Georgia governor and U. S. Senator, Hoke MAY.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

OLLOWS DEVIOUS PATH

Letter by Novel Adds to Mystery

A letter written by fugitive witness Gordon Novel added a new cloak-and-dagger twist today to the Kennedy assassination probe.

Attorney Steven Plotkin said Novel actually wrote the communication. Further, he said his client was working for the Central Intelligence Agency here in 1961.

But Novel called the letter a "trap" set for Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison, who is attempting to bring Novel back to New Orleans for questioning.

WHATEVER THE authenticity of the document, the circumstances of its discovery read like a chapter in a who-done-it.

The letter came into the hands of States-Item reporter Hoke May. This is how it happened:

The letter turned up when two girls were doing their spring housecleaning. It was well hidden in the fugitive witness's French Quarter apartment.

SO WELL HIDDEN, in fact, that a team of Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents and officers from Garrison's investigative squad missed it when they searched the rooms after Novel left town in March.

The girls, who rented the Novel apartment after his departure, found it during a thorough housecleaning and refurbishing session.

One of them turned it over to her boy friend. He, in turn, showed it to his professor at a New Orleans university.

The professor is a friend of May's.

THE LETTER was addressed to a Mr. Weiss and probably was written in late January or early February of this year, judging by the time sequence it describes.

When a copy was sent to him, Plotkin reviewed its contents, spoke to his client and told the States-Item Novel had drafted the letter.

He said, "Everything in the letter as far as Novel is concerned is actually the truth."

The contents of the missive are compounded of cryptic references, code names and a plea for Weiss to get Novel "out of this mess" by an unspecified date in March of 1967.

THE LETTER appears to be a draft which later might be recopied or typed. There is no indication it was ever mailed, however, and Plotkin said he does not know whether the draft was sent "to the addressee."

Presumably, Weiss is connected with the CIA.

Novel departed New Orleans about mid-March after receiving a subpena to testify in Garrison's Kennedy death plot investigation. He went to McLean, Va., the headquarters of the CIA.

HE WAS MET there by a former official of the Justice Department who now works for one of the radio-television networks.

The 29-year-old former bar owner took a lie detector test at McLean and ducked under cover for another few days, a time when he was reported to be in Montreal.

His next appearance was at Gahanna, Ohio, a Columbus suburb where he was arrested April 1 on a warrant from Garrison who charged him with conspiracy to burglarize a munitions dump at Houma in 1961.

AN INDEPENDENT handwriting expert says the letter is in Novel's handwriting. The expert, Gilbert Fortier of New Orleans, compared the penciled letter with other samples of Novel's writing and printing.

"It is my conclusion that the same person who wrote the handwriting specimens also wrote the draft to Mr. Weiss," Fortier asserted.

He said he checked especially for the possibility the letter might be a forgery but concluded it was not probable.

"It was written too easily and too freely to have been forged," Fortier said.

THE LETTER to Weiss begins:

"This letter is to inform you that District (Attorney) Jim Garrison has subpenaed myself and an associate to testify before his Grand Jury on matters which may be classified TOP SECRET. Actions of individuals connected with DOUBLE-CHEK CORPORATION in Miami in first quarter of 1961."

(The authoritative book, "The Invisible Government," identified Double-Chek Corp. of Miami as a CIA front organization which recruited pilots and other Cuban personnel for the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961.)

"WE HAVE NO current contact available to inform of this situation," the letter continues. "So I took the liberty of writing you direct and apprising you of current situation . . . expecting you to forward this through appropriate channels . . .

"Our connection and activity of that period involved individuals presently . . . about to be indicted as conspirators in Mr. Garrison's investigation.

"We have temporarily avoided one subpena not to reveal Double-Chek activities or associate them with this mess. We want out of this thing before Thursday 3/ /67. Our attorneys have been told to expect another subpena to appear and testify on this matter. The Fifth Amendment and/or immunity (and) legal tactics will not suffice."

"MR. GARRISON is in possession of unsworn portions of this testimony. He is unaware of Double-Chek's involvement in this matter but has strong suspicions. I have been questioned extensively by local FBI recently as to whether or not I was involved with Double-Chek's parent holding corporation during that time. My reply on five queries was negative.

"Bureau unaware of Double-Chek association in this matter. Our attorneys and others are in possession of complete sealed files containing all information concerning matters.

"In event of our sudden departure, either accidental or otherwise, they are instructed to simultaneously release same for public scrutiny in different areas . . .

"APPROPRIATE counter action relative to Garrison's inquisition concerning us may best be handled through military channels vis (a) vis D.I.A. man. Garrison is presently colonel in Louisiana Army National Guard and has ready reserve status. Contact may be had through our attorneys of record, Plotkin, Alvarez, Sapir."

Plotkin confirmed that he

New Orleans
States-Item
26 May '67

SECRET

14 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Research Staff/OS

SUBJECT: GUGAS, Chris - #O&C 39094
(GARRISON Investigation)

The attached summary on Subject was prepared for CI/R&A per their request of 28 June 1968. Because of its contents, it may be of interest to the D/OS. These undesirables all seem to make each other's acquaintence in some way or other.

Sarah K. Hall
SRS/OS

Attachment as Stated

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

14 August 1968

SUBJECT: GUGAS, Chris

Subject is identified as a California investigator who administered a polygraph test to Edgar Eugene BRADLEY who has been charged with conspiracy by GARRISON.

Subject was born 12 August 1921 at Omaha, Nebraska. He is a former Agency employee who EOD in October 1949 as a GS-9 Intelligence Officer. Subject resigned his staff status in February 1951 and became a staff agent with Project ENDOMORPH in Turkey from March 1951 until July 1952. (His wife Anne Claudia GUGAS nee SETARO was granted a covert security clearance in February 1952 for use in a clerical capacity in the Middle East.)

In his assignment with Project ENDOMORPH in Turkey, Subject was a source of constant embarrassment in his contacts with Turkish police officials. 8 He was boastful, indiscreet, lacking in sound judgment, knew little or nothing in the fields in which he was self-professedly an expert and was guilty of security breaches in failing to maintain his cover. In one incident he made recommendations of police reorganizations to be made by province governors in Turkey; whereas, in Turkey, the Police 8 Department is a national organization and not subject to the dictates of the province governors. This caused much ill will and friction with the Turkish police.

Subject professed to be an expert in his knowledge of the polygraph machine and claimed he had two years' experience with the Los Angeles Police Department prior to his employment with the Agency. However, it was developed that instead of this claimed experience, he had actually spent one or two weeks in a detective school connected with the Los Angeles Police Department where he received below average grades.

In October 1952 he approached an Agency employee regarding a new type of technical equipment and this conversation led to the disclosure by Subject that he was employed by the Agency in a covert capacity; that he was teaching lie detection techniques to foreign police departments without being authorized or competent to do so. Subject was briefed in December 1952 with stress placed on the importance of living up to his security responsibilities and exercising utmost precaution in protecting the covert interests of the Agency.

In spite of the strong warnings given him in this interview, Subject again became involved in an incident of official embarrassment to the Agency.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

4/mc

In March 1953 he misrepresented himself as a polygraph operator with the "State Department Secret Police". This misrepresentation was made at a time when the Department of State was not authorized to have a polygraph machine and Congressional legislation was pending at the time regarding such authorization. As a result of this misrepresentation, Subject was afforded another security interview in March 1953. He explained that his cover company sold equipment to foreign countries through the Mutual Aid Program and supplied consultant services to the State Department but Subject denied that he ever represented himself as a State Department polygraph operator. After the security interview Subject was also assessed by an Agency psychologist (March 1953) and was found to be egotistical, emotionally unstable, possessed of a need to build himself up in the eyes of others and gave either exaggerated or completely erroneous information as to his past positions. His intelligence quotient was found to be comparatively low in relation to those of other Agency employees. In April 1953 termination of his employment was recommended.

Subject resigned 29 April 1953 "to accept a position in California. Washington climate is not agreeable to his family."

In April 1964 Mr. J. Kirk BAREFOOT, Director of Security, McKesson and Robbins, Skokie, Illinois, informed the Agency he had been a witness to unauthorized disclosures of classified information made by a group in a cocktail lounge in Omaha, Nebraska. The individual making the disclosures about ENDOMORPH activities abroad under Agency sponsorship was identified as Leonard HARRELSON. Subject, who was then Director of Public Safety for the City of Omaha, Nebraska, was one of the group and it was believed that he was responsible for supplying the classified information to HARRELSON about ENDOMORPH activities.

Leonard HARRELSON is a private investigator specializing in hypnotism and the use of the polygraph machine. In 1964 he was employed by the Keeler Polygraph Company in Chicago, Illinois. In 1954 HARRELSON was in partnership with Lloyd B. FURR in a private detective agency known as the American Bureau of Investigation, Tower Building, Washington, D. C. Lloyd B. FURR is the polygraph operator who gave a lie detector test to Gordon NOVEL, hostile witness subpoenaed by GARRISON. The test received newspaper publicity as being given at "McLean, Va." in March 1967. (Summary on FURR attached).

HARRELSON is believed to be a person of poor morals. He was given a medical discharge from the Army as a psychoneurotic in 1949 and had been court-martialed twice for impersonating non-commissioned officers of a rank higher than he possessed. In his business partnership with FURR, HARRELSON would misrepresent himself as being with the FBI by covering the word "American" when presenting his credentials and just showing "Bureau of Investigation".

Incidentally, the informant, J. Kirk BAREFOOT mentioned above, was disapproved for Agency employment in 1951 because of falsification of his PHS, and questionable maturity, judgment, discretion and honesty.

A. NOVEL is Polygraphed by Lloyd FURR on Garrison's Charges.

Gordon Dwane NOVEL, already a fugitive witness in the Garrison inquiry, is reported in the Washington press of 27 March 1967 as having been polygraphed the previous day on the case under investigation by Garrison. According to the press reports, NOVEL submitted to a polygraph examination conducted at McLean, Virginia by Lloyd FURR. In statements to the press, FURR indicated there was no indication of deception to NOVEL's charges that Garrison's case is a "fraud".

B. Lloyd FURR's Relationship to Richard L. BAST and REDEX.

Lloyd FURR, a former District of Columbia policeman and now a private detective, is a self-proclaimed polygraph "expert" and sound device specialist. He has received publicity in the past for planting sound devices for the late Fulton Lewis, Jr. in the St. Mary's County vice case in 1953 and in 1958 when he discovered listening devices being used against Bernard Goldfine. In 1964, information was received that a Washington, D. C. firm, REDEX, operated by FURR and Richard L. BAST, was attempting to sell electronic equipment to Communist China via an agent in Hong Kong. (TSD had unclassified contact with FURR in 1962 to see equipment offered for sale by FURR.)

C. Richard L. BAST and REDEX.

Richard L. BAST, a Washington, D.C. private detective, gained notoriety in 1965 by turning up a missing witness, previously unlocated by the Department of Justice, in connection with the Bobby Baker case. He is known to operate at least four enterprises: 1) CAPITAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, a private detective agency; 2) REDEX VIETNAM, INC., a firm which imports a variety of commodities ranging from liquor to automobiles into South Vietnam, including, of late, U.S.-recruited "go-go" girls for a Saigon nightclub he is planning; 3) REDEX CORP., a firm which sells almost anything to anybody abroad, other than South Vietnam; and 4) CONSOLIDATED ARMAMENTS, INC., a firm which sells small arms to foreign governments and private individuals abroad. BAST also produces and distributes with sensitive audio and counteraudio devices in the U.S. and overseas. BAST, described as "unscrupulous and untrustworthy", is known to have attempted to contract with another private detective/for planting a remote-controlled bomb in the headquarters of the Haiti Secret Police, and has been reported to have undertaken similar extreme assignments for exile groups from Haiti and the Dominican Republic. (Based on derogatory information on file, DCS, in March 1967, decided against previously contemplated contact with BAST as a source of information on Asia.)

D. BAST, REDEX, and William W. TURNER of RAMPARTS

CIA Staff has provided information that during January 1967, William W. TURNER, who identified himself as a free-lance writer, visited the offices of the Asia Foundation, requesting information for a magazine article. He stated that he had been asked by Sol Stern of New York to gather information for an article in the New York Times. During his visit, however, it became obvious that TURNER was primed to ask questions about the financing of the foundation, rather than its actual purpose or activities. When TURNER concluded the interview he left a calling card with the firm name "REDEX-PACIFIC". He explained he had to have new cards printed. TURNER, reportedly dismissed from the FBI in 1961, is noted to have authored an article in the November 1966 issue of RAMPARTS Magazine in which he describes alleged wiretapping, surreptitious entry, etc., performed by him while with the FBI. Sol Stern, whom he claimed to represent, is assistant managing editor of RAMPARTS Magazine.

E. Role of FURR and BAST in CIA Meeting of Exile

(The foregoing has attempted to detail the contact of NOVEL with FURR, FURR's connection with BAST, and a possible connection between BAST's organization and RAMPARTS. The following indicates the only CIA involvement in the chain which might be exploited in subsequent attempts to link CIA to the entire affair in question.)

3

On 2[illegible] April 1965, [Robert E. Owen] then Chief, WE/3 and now Paris Station, directed a memorandum to the Chief,

SECRET

WH/6 in which he documented a conversation he had on 27 April 1963, with Raymond CASSAGNOL, an anti-Duvalier exile from Haiti. In the memorandum he relates that the conversation took place in the home of Richard L. BAST whom Owen had met through a neighbor, Lloyd FURR.

The memorandum relates CASSAGNOL's background, family, political stance, etc. Reported as significant by Owen is a 3 statement by BAST that the following week BAST would be sending a shipload of arms to a CASSAGNOL-affiliated group in the Dominican Republic.3 Owen noted: "Raymond CASSAGNOL gives appearance of thinking well of Richard BAST. According to CASSAGNOL, his brother, Jacques, also knows BAST and respects him. Thus BAST, in spite of certain personal shortcomings from the intelligence standpoint, does represent an established channel to at least one segment of the Haitian opposition to Duvalier. Since according to his own statement, BAST is supplying arms to CASSAGNOL's groups, further transactions of this type via BAST presumably would not be difficult to arrange." He also provided detailed information on what he learned of BAST, noting that BAST had mentioned Dominican distrust of State and AID and the fact that "CIA double-crossed them" (the Dominicans).

3
An FBI report on BAST dated 19 June 1963 reports that Owen, "Foreign Service Reserve Officer, USDS" (his cover) had reported 16 May 1963 his attendance at dinner at BAST's home on 27 April 1963.3 Owen told of his meeting with CASSAGNOL, BAST's intention to sell arms to the Dominican Republic and Haitian exiles, etc. He also reports that on 7 May 1963, BAST asked him to perform some translation work. The translation, he stated, related to BAST giving a power of attorney to one Luis [illegible] Martinez of the Dominican Republic to prepare documentation for legal establishment of REDEX CORPORATION, C. por A., a DR branch of BAST's firm. According to Owen, 3 40% of the stock was to be held by the head of the DR National Security Agency, the head of the DR secret police, and an individual well connected with Dominican Republic police and intelligence groups. BAST is also noted to have told Owen 3 of an offer BAST had made to "bug" the office of the Dominican

SECRET

6/mc

Secretary of State for the Armed Forces on behalf of Juan Bosch. BAST did not indicate to [Owen] if had performed the job.
3

(There is no record of a clearance having been issued for utilization of Richard L. BAST or REDEX.)

1/mc

SECRET

15 January 1968

SUBJECT: BRADLEY, Edgar Eugene
(See also BRADLEY, Leslie Norman)

ALLEGATION:

Edgar Eugene BRADLEY, field representative for an Eastern radio evangelist, Dr. Carl MCINTIRE, was arrested on 25 Dec 1967 on a charge by GARRISON of being a conspirator in a plot to assassinate President KENNEDY.

SOURCE:

News media articles for 22, 24, 26, 28 Dec 1967 and 8 Jan 68.

CIA CONNECTION:

None. Personnel records reveal there was an applicant by the same name as Subject but the file was destroyed in Dec 1966 as it was 2 yrs old. Subject's employer, Carl McINTIRE was approved for contact use in Nov 1954 but according to Contacts Office, he was never used by them as he was reported to be unreliable.

OS INDICES RESULTS:

Negative for Subject.

His employer, Carl McINTIRE, was approved (caution) for contact use on 22 November 1954. However, according to Domestic Contacts Office, he was not used by them as he was reported to be unreliable. His file reflects that he is an extreme Rightist. He spoke on "How Communism is Using the Churches" in Hollywood, California on 14 December 1954. On 30 April 1954 an article in the New York Herald Tribune quoted him as saying "the seriousness of Communism in the churches is far greater than we realize". TIME magazine for 16 May 1954 identified him as the founder and head of the small American Council of Christian Churches which it described as "the farthest tip" of the right wing of American Protestantism. The LUTHERAN magazine for 30 December 1954 stated that the Revised Standard Version of the Bible has been a target of incessant attack by Carl McINTIRE and his "Twentieth Century Reformation Hour" broadcasts.

DETAILS:

Subject has alleged that his arrest by GARRISON is a case of mistaken identity. NEWSWEEK magazine for 8 January 1968 reported that it seemed possible indeed that GARRISON had him mixed up with two other men. "(One is a sometime New Orleans pilot named BRADLEY who was once jailed in Cuba for anti-Castro activities. The other, an ex-con who used the alias BRADLEY and who chanced to be arrested on a bad-check charge in Dallas on 22 November 1963.)"

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

13-00000

Tighe CI
2/26
Mrs Hall

Washington Field Office
21 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: HDQS

SUBJECT : (Information concerning New Orleans probe--
Kennedy assassination) NOVEL, GORSON

1. Please refer to previous news items on this topic.

2. Enclosed are news items of possible interest concerning recent developments.

for James J McCabe
JOHN D. NOBLE, Jr.
Special Agent in Charge

Attachments: New Orleans Topic Clippings,
dated 17 February 1968.

☐ DDS/IOS
☑ ADDS/IOS
☐ SA-DD/IOS
☐ C/ID
☐ DC/ID
☐ C/ID/
☐ C/[illegible]D
☐ DC/OSD
☐ C/OSD/
☐ C/SAD
☐ C/AAS
☑ C/SRS
☐ A&TS
☐ FILES

13-00000

HUMAN EVENTS
March 1968

Garrison's 'Baseless Fraud'

The former chief investigator in the New Orleans assassination "plot" testified last week that District Attorney Jim Garrison's conspiracy theory is a "baseless fraud."

William H. Gurvich, who worked with Garrison for seven months in probing the Kennedy assassination, swore that the entire "plot" was a figment of the D.A.'s imagination. He testified in an Ohio extradiction hearing in which Garrison sought the return for testimony of Gordon Novel, a former New Orleans resident. Gurvich also said that:

- Garrison once predicted the assassination probe would end with the suicide of his chief defendant, Clay Shaw, who is charged with conspiracy.
- Another defendant, Edgar Eugene Bradley, has been confused by Garrison with a second Edgar Bradley, an anti-Castro pilot. But Gurvich said investigation indicated that neither Bradley played any part in the assassination.
- Garrison once ordered Gurvich to arrest, handcuff and assault two NBC newsmen, Walter Sheridan and Richard Townley, who had expressed skepticism of the Garrison probe.

Front Page Edit Page Other Page /

NEW ORLEANS, LA.
STATES-ITEM
FEB 22 1968
E-137,843

Novel 'Tired Fighting,' Will Return to N.O.

Gordon Novel, long-sought witness in the Kennedy assassination probe, says he will return to New Orleans.

Novel, a former nightclub owner, left the city abruptly last year when District Attorney Jim Garrison sought to question him. But he said yesterday in Columbus, Ohio, he is "tired of fighting" and will appear before the grand jury here March 7 and 8.

HOWEVER, Novel said he knows nothing he can tell the jury in connection with Garrison's allegation that the slaying of President John F. Kennedy was plotted in New Orleans.

"I think it's time to bring this to a head. I want to have a home and raise a family," Novel said at a news conference with his wife, former Playboy bunny Abby Mulligan.

Garrison contends Novel and Kerry Thornley, the former French Quarter waiter charged yesterday with perjury, both were connected with the federal government here before the assassination. Novel, Garrison has claimed, worked for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Thornley, Garrison said yesterday, was "part of the covert federal operation operating in New Orleans" in 1963, along with Lee Harvey Oswald, Thornley's one-time Marine Corps buddy.

The perjury charge grew out of Thornley's statements that he never saw Oswald here during 1963.

GARRISON contends that persons associated with the CIA killed the President.

In an interview made public yesterday in which Garrison was questioned by a Dutch television reporter, the DA was quoted as saying "the next U.S. President who tries to put the brakes on the war machine" will also be slain.

Garrison was quoted on The Netherlands Television Foundation by Willem Oltmans as saying Kennedy was killed by "elements" of the CIA and the organization then tried to cast suspicion on others.

"This manner of organizing a murder is standard procedure with the CIA," Garrison was quoted as saying.

GARRISON was quoted in the Dutch interview as saying that he had to speak out in Europe "because it is impossible in America.

"The U.S. press is controlled to such an extent by the CIA that we no longer can say the truth. They throttled us," he was quoted in the broadcast on the program 'Panoramiek.' "

The television foundation quoted Garrison as saying he assumed President Lyndon B. Johnson knew of the CIA's alleged involvement because the Warren Commission was comprised of persons Garrison said were favorable to the CIA.

13-00000

The Times-Picay

Serving America's International Gateway Since 1837

AP), National News and
nd AP WIREPHOTO NEW ORLEANS SATURDAY MORNING, FEBRUARY 17, 1968

une

PARTL
and warmer, colde
showers, variable
becoming norther
the Weather Bure
ed Saturday, 52-56
42; low, 40. Weat
Page 8

Second-Class Postage Paid
at New Orleans, La.

Y TANKS SP
CON THIE



ALLEN DULLES
Former CIA chief subpenaed.

Number Two [illegible] ever committed any burglaries and am most certainly not a material witness except to Mr. Garrison's attempts to fraudulently and maliciously involve myself, who was his former personal chief of security in his alleged investigation of the alleged conspiracy to allegedly assassinate John F. Kennedy.

Number Three—I have never stated to anyone that I ever consciously worked at any time for or with the CIA.

Number Four—In reference to his new subpena, I, personally, haven't read it so I will just have to see it before deciding whether to play my game or his.

Number Five—Perhaps if President Johnson and the CIA pay my extensive personal financial losses for defending the Warren Report this past year and guarantee the probable needed bond requirements for perjury, which is the charge I believe Mr. Garrison is immune from granting immunity on, I may return to testify to Mr. Garrison about his fraud and involvement in the death of David Ferrie.

"I don't believe Mr. Garrison will take a lie detector test or allow me to testify to his fraud and his involvement on one, or on his truth serum or on his hypnosis before his grand jury. Perhaps if he invites me to a duel in some place other than Louisiana he may find me far more cooperative, and I don't mean a duel with words."

The subpenas for both Novel

COVERT PENETRATION

In calling for Dulles' appearance, Garrison said that the former official was CIA director when the organization's present methods of operation were developed, and that those techniques "have included the covert penetration of much of the fabric of American life—including schools, organizations of many types, news agencies and even churches."

The Warren Commission, according to Garrison, was formed to "conceal the involvement of the CIA in the assassination," and commission members "appear to have participated in this tableau on the ground that national security would be jeopardized if the truth were known by the people of this country."

The DA additionally charged that the commission purposely destroyed or never reported other important evidence such as bullets found in Dealey Plaza just after the shooting of Kennedy on Nov. 22, 1963.

"This office intends to demonstrate," Garrison said in conclusion, "that the CIA made a mistake in using Orleans Parish as a staging area for the assassination and that the federal government has made an equall bad mistake in attempting conceal this fact and in attem ing to obstruct justice in leans Parish."

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGR
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

DULLES, NOVEL SUBPENAED

Continued from Page 1

by the Warren Commission to have been the lone assassin of Kennedy.

Garrison also asserted that he has succeeded in identifying the assassination of President Kennedy as an operation conducted by elements of the CIA. The DA further charged that the Warren Commission suppressed certain documents which may have a bearing on the case.

Garrison also claimed that while Dulles was heading the CIA his organization worked at buying trucks and other vehicles from a New Orleans firm to use in the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba and used Oswald's name. Oswald was in Russia at the time.

GRANTED IMMUNITY

The subpena request further stated that Novel, former operator of a Rampart st. lounge, had enlisted CIA aid in order to avoid having to return to New Orleans for Garrison, and that the late David W. Ferrie was employed by the CIA while Dulles was at the helm.

Ferrie died last Feb. 22. He was named by Garrison as being one of the alleged conspirators in plotting the murder of Kennedy.

In his statement to The Times-Picayune, Novel outlined his position on Garrison's latest move in five points. The text of Novel's statement follows:

"Number One—My primary business in New Orleans was, and still is, in the electronic intelligence equipment manufacturing field. I am not a night club owner. That was merely a hobby.

"My customers, beside the United States government, were many Louisiana politicians, including Mr. Garrison, and the governor and the office of the mayor of the city of New Orleans. My personal stereo and monaural tape library is extensive.

and Dulles say they will be granted immunity from arrest in Louisiana on matters which may have occurred before their entrance into the state to comply with the subpena order.

Dulles now lives in New York and Novel has been residing in Columbus, Ohio, since fleeing Louisiana last year.

The call for Novel also alleges that he was an associate of Ferrie, and had visited many times with attorney Dean A. Andrews Jr., who has since been convicted of perjury after testifying in connection with the probe.

LINKED TO BRADLEY

"Information has been given to the DA's office which located Novel at No Name Key in Florida, where a number of CIA employes were training for an invasion of Cuba," the request added.

It further says that Novel has associated with Edgar Eugene Bradley of North Hollywood, California, the second living man, along with retired New Orleans businessman Clay L. Shaw, to be charged by Garrison with conspiring to kill President Kennedy.

"Gordon Novel, by his own public admissions, sold his business and left the city to avoid not only the aforedescribed subpena (of March 17, 1967) but also a new subpena which he knew had been issued but not served," continued the request.

"Subsequent to the issuance of the warrant (for his arrest as a material witness), Gordon Novel disguised himself in the clothing of a member of a particular religious order and by stealth and furtiveness returned to the state of Louisiana and removed his auotmobile."

OVEL CALLED

Garrison Asks Dulles to Testify March 7, 8

A new subpena and a renewed subpena were issued Friday by District Attorney Jim Garrison in his Kennedy assassination probe—the first for a former Central Intelligence Agency director, and the second for a long-sought former bar operator alleged to have CIA connections.

The new Grand Jury subpena issued by Garrison's office was for Allen W. Dulles, head of the controversial CIA until Sept. 27, 1961, who is asked to appear before the Orleans Parish Grand Jury March 7 and 8 to give testimony in connection with the DA's investigation of the death of President John F. Kennedy.

The other subpena again called for the appearance of Gordon Novel. Earlier efforts by Garrison to have Novel return here to testify have been unavailing.

NOT DECIDED

Friday night, Novel told The Times-Picayune by telephone from Columbus, Ohio, that he had not read the new subpena and had not yet decided whether to "play my game for his (Garrison's)."

Novel also said that he "may return to testify in New Orleans if President Lyndon B. Johnson and the CIA pay for his personal financial losses" incurred over the past year while included as a figure in the investigation.

The subpenas for both Dulles and Novel were issued through the court of Criminal District Judge Matthew S. Braniff.

'BY CIA ELEMENTS'

In asking for the Dulles subpena, Garrison's office claimed that he would have "pertinent knowledge as to substantial reports that Lee Harvey Oswald was an agent and-or employe of the CIA." Oswald was said

(Cont. in Sec. 1, Page 14, Col. 3)

13-00000

NEW ORLEANS STATES-ITEM
New Orleans, La.
16 February 1968

326113

Dulles Called in Probe

The district attorney's office today issued a grand jury subpena for Allen W. Dulles former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to appear before the jury March 7 and 8 in connection with the probe of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

A new subpena also was issued today for Gordon Novel, former New Orleans nightclub owner. Previous efforts to get Novel back to New Orleans to testify have been unsuccessful.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY JIM GARRISON said his office "has succeeded in identifying the assassination of President Kennedy as an operation conducted by elements of the CIA," and said both Dulles and Novel were needed to testify about CIA activities.

Both subpenas were issued through Criminal District Judge Matthew S. Braniff.

The request for the Dulles subpena alleges that Dulles was CIA director until Sept. 27, 1961, and as such "would have pertinent knowledge as to substantial reports that Lee Harvey Oswald was an agent and-or an employe of the CIA."

THE DOCUMENT SAID POSSIBLE information relative to CIA knowledge or contact with Oswald (named by the Warren Commission as the sole slayer of the President) was suppressed in certain commission documents.

It charges that while Dulles headed the CIA, the organization negotiated with a New Orleans firm for the purchase of trucks and vehicles to use in the CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and used the name of Lee Harvey Oswald, who was at that time in Russia.

THE SUBPENA REQUEST QUOTED a copyrighted story in the States-Item April 25, 1967, as making public Novel's claim to have been employed by the CIA during Dulles' tenure as chief. "Gordon Novel fled the state to avoid testifying and sought to enlist the aid of the CIA in preventing his return," the document said.

The request said "David W. Ferrie, who has been named in an indictment as a conspirator to the murder of John F. Kennedy, was an employe of the CIA at a time when Allen Dulles was the head of the CIA. Among other things, he was a flying instructor in Guatemala prior to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion."

Dulles was never called before the Warren Commission, the document said.

The document said it was issued for the purpose of being presented to a judge in New York, "where said Allen W. Dulles now is, upon proceedings to compel said Allen W. Dulles to attend and testify . . ."

Both the Dulles and Novel subpena requests contain provisions granting the men immunity from arrest and process service while in Louisiana on matters which arose prior to their entrance into the state to answer the subpenas.

IN THE PAST, Garrison has refused to grant Novel such immunity. Novel has said he would be willing to return if it were granted.

The Novel subpena request says Novel now lives in Columbus, Ohio.

It alleges that Novel "by his own admission in public statements is affiliated with the CIA."

It further alleges that Novel "has been established to be a frequent visitor of and associate of attorney Dean A. Andrews who has been convicted of perjury in connection with his testimony relative to the conspiracy to murder John F. Kennedy."

ALSO, IT says he was an associate of Ferrie in connection with CIA activities.

"Information has been given to the DA's office which located Novel at No Name Key in Florida where a number of CIA employes were training for an invasion of Cuba," the request said.

It also says Novel has been identified by a witness as a frequent visitor of Edgar Eugene Bradley in North Hollywood, Calif. Bradley has been charged in Orleans Parish as a conspirator in the Kennedy slaying.

Novel, the request says, has been identified by various witnesses as having been in various places in Dallas in 1963 which are under investigation by the DA's office.

"Gordon Novel has information on gun-running activities involving Clay L. Shaw who has been indicted by the Orleans Parish Grand Jury as a conspirator to the murder of John F. Kennedy, and Jack Ruby, whom it is commonly accepted is the slayer of Lec Harvey Oswald," the document says.

IT SAYS Steven Plotkin, Novel's attorney, when pressed for information relativ to the gun-running activities asserted the attorney-client privilege and named Gordon Novel as the client involved.

The document requests that Novel be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of the state of Louisiana to assure his attendance.

It says Novel was subpenaed to appear before the grand jury March 17, 1967, and adds:

"Gordon Novel, by his own public admissions, sold his business on the weekend and left the city to avoid not only the aforedescribed subpena but also a new subpena which

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

10/5/98

Continued

he knew had [illegible] issued but not served."

It says Novel was charged as a material witness and a warrant issued for his arrest, and goes on:

"**SUBSEQUENT** to the issuance of the warrant, Gordon Novel disguised himself in the clothing of a member of a particular religious order and by stealth and furtiveness returned to the state of Louisiana and removed his automobile.

"Subsequent to his having fled Louisiana, Gordon Novel traveled in secret to various places in the U.S. in the company of a member of a national news medium who aided and abetted Novel in his flight. Further, Novel has sought the aid of governmental agencies, particularly the CIA, to prevent his return to New Orleans."

Garrison, in a statement accompanying the subpenas, said Dulles was head of the CIA when its present techniques were developed.

"These techniques, although it is not generally known, have included the covert penetration of much of the fabric of American life — including schools, organizations of many types, news agencies and even churches," Garrison said.

The DA said witnesses familiar with the CIA's operations in a "geographical corridor" from California through Texas and Louisiana, eastward to Florida are particularly important because "this office has succeeded in identifying the assassination of President Kennedy as an operation conducted by elements of the CIA."

HE SAID virtually every key witness, defendant and potential defendant in the case has turned out to be originally from that "geographic strip."

Garrison said the Warren Commission was formed to "conceal the involvement of the CIA in the assassination." The commission members, he said, "appear to have participated in this tableau on the ground that 'national security' would be jeopardized if the truth were known by the people of this country."

Other evidence which possibly would have led to discovery of CIA involvement, Garrison said "was simply destroyed outright or never reported—such as the finding of bullets in Dealey Plaza immediately after the assassination."

SOME CIA employes, he said, were "accidentally" arrested at the scene and later released "without undue attention." He said his office has now identified the CIA employes involved and "is engaged in constructing cases against them."

He concluded:

"This office intends to demonstrate . . . that the CIA made a mistake in using Orleans Parish as a staging area for the assassination and that the federal government has made an equally bad mistake in attempting to conceal this fact and in attempting to obstruct justice in Orleans Parish."

ALLEN DULLES

GORDON NOVEL

26 FEB 1968

~~SECRET~~

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

8 February 1968

SUBJECT: NOVEL, Gordon
(See also FURR, Lloyd B.)
(See also ARCACHA-SMITH, Sergio)

ALLEGATION:	CIA CONNECTION:
Gordon NOVEL, former owner of a French Quarter Bar in New Orleans, was subpoenaed by GARRISON as a material witness in March 1967 but NOVEL moved to Columbus, Ohio and has avoided extradition. GARRISON charged NOVEL with burglary of the Houma Munitions Bunker in 1961 together with David FERRIE and ARCACHA-SMITH. NOVEL claimed this was a CIA operation but later his attorney denied the story.	None

SOURCE:

Numerous news items, the latest dtd in October 1967.

OS INDICES RESULTS:

Subject's file contains newspaper clippings dating from March 1967 when GARRISON charged him with conspiracy in connection with a burglary of a munitions bunker at Houma, Louisiana in 1961 together with David FERRIE and ARCACHA-SMITH. To avoid arrest, NOVEL left New Orleans, first going to McLean, Virginia where he was given a lie detector test by Lloyd B. FURR, a private detective. (See summary on FURR). This incident tended to give credence to NOVEL's initial claim that he was working for CIA because of the Agency's proximity to McLean, Va.

After NOVEL vacated his New Orleans apartment in March 1967 a letter written by him was found under the linoleum on a sink drainboard by the new tenant, a girl who turned it over to her boy friend, who gave it to a professor at a New Orleans university who in turn gave it to a reporter on the New Orleans STATES-ITEM, Hoke MAY.

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

Hoke MAY was granted a Covert Security Approval in April 1958 for unwitting use by Project FJINDULGE. MAY was not to be directly employed by FJINDULGE but was to be used in connection with his position with a private firm which handled work for the Project. The letter was presumably written to a "Mr. WEISS" in CIA and referred to classified DOUBLE-CHEK activities in 1961 in which NOVEL claimed he was involved. This matter was reviewed by CI/R&A at the time the matter received publicity and it was determined that DOUBLE-CHEK was created by the Agency for the sole purpose of making payments to the widows of American flyers who participated in the Bay of Pigs. No connection with NOVEL could be established. NOVEL knew Sergio ARCACHA-SMITH who was New Orleans head of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico, an Agency created and supported anti-Castro organization. Although ARCACHA-SMITH had no Agency clearance, NOVEL could have gained an impression from him that he was employed by CIA.

In October 1967 NOVEL was granted immunity from arest by GARRISON on the Houma Bunker burglary charge and returned to Louisiana to testify before the East Baton Rouge Parish Grand Jury in their probe on crime and labor troubles in the State of Louisiana.

DETAILS:

The Agency had no connection with the Houma Munitions Bunker. However, an Agency training site was located at Belle Chasse, Louisiana and Colonel Thomas BURBANK, State of Louisiana Police Superintendent, was one of the Louisiana officials witting of Agency affiliation with Belle Chasse. It is noted from news items concerning NOVEL's testimony before the Louisiana Labor probers in October 1967, that Colonel BURBANK was also a witness at the same time, although, there is no mention that BURBANK and NOVEL knew each other. BURBANK testified that every Louisiana sheriff was notified to "clean up" gambling and other vice in Louisiana.

NEW ORLEANS, LA.
STATES & ITEM

E-161,094

APR 25 1967

Novel Says Munitions Theft 'Set Up' by Agency—

Evidence Links CIA to DA Probe

(Copyright 1967, by The New Orleans States-Item, The Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. and The Dayton (Ohio) Daily News.)

Do the long tentacles of the Central Intelligence Agency reach deep into Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison's Kennedy death plot investigation?

There is mounting evidence they do, and at least one Garrison probe figure intends to use CIA connections as part of his defense.

Still others linked to the Garrison investigation have been named as acting for the super secret espionage organization — as informers, as couriers and munitions carriers.

EVEN THE INVESTIGATION'S PIVOTAL figure, 54-year-old Clay L. Shaw, has had CIA connections attributed to him. Shaw, charged with complicity in Kennedy's death, was linked with the CIA by an influential Italian newspaper.

The strongest CIA ties lead to Gordon Novel, a 29-year-old fugitive witness who is fighting extradition at Columbus, Ohio.

Novel, a one-time New Orleans bar owner and electronics expert, has told a number of friends and intimates he was a CIA operative and will use this role to battle Garrison's charges.

This story is the joint effort of Hoke May, David Snyder, Ross Yockey, and Rosemary James of the States-Item and R. T. Endicott of the Dayton (Ohio) Daily News.

The defense will be laid down, Novel says, if he is returned to New Orleans to face accusations that he burglarized an oil service company's munitions bunker in nearby Terrebonne Parish.

NOVEL'S ATTORNEY AT NEW ORLEANS, Steven Plotkin, would not deny his client's reported statements.

"I will neither confirm nor deny them," Plotkin said.

Novel is free in Columbus on $10,000 bond. He was arrested April 1 in suburban Gahanna, Ohio, on Garrison's warrant charging he helped plan the munitions burglary in 1961.

He is accused both of conspiracy and burglary along with 44-year-old Sergio Arcacha Smith of Dallas, once the leader of a militant anti-Castro organization in New Orleans. Garrison charges they conspired with another key JFK probe figure, David W. Ferrie, to stage the munitions theft.

Ferrie was a strange, hairless former airline pilot who died of what the Orleans Parish coroner called "natural causes" five days

Continued

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

NOVEL, GORDON

New Orleans DA said Ferrie "one of history's most important men."

The charges against Novel and Arcacha are spinoffs from Garrison's main investigation. The prosecutor has called Novel "a very important witness" and has filed a material witness warrant against him.

Novel, who has to be one of history's most loquacious fugitives, has carried on a running long-distance feud with the man who wants him to do his talking before a grand jury. He repeatedly has called Garrison's investigation a "fraud" and a "fiction."

He has held a number of press conferences and submitted himself to a series of lie detector, truth serum and psychological tests to prove he is telling the truth. A psychologist at Columbus says mental tests indicate he is.

TO POLYGRAPH OPERATORS AND TO friends and associates, Novel has said the munitions burglary was no burglary at all — but a war materials pickup made at the direction of his CIA contact.

Publicly, Novel called the munitions incident "the most patriotic burglary in history" during a recent news interview. He immediately was shushed by his Columbus lawyer, Jerry Weiner.

Even more recently, Novel restated his charges against Garrison in a bylined story carried by The Dayton Daily News. Cryptically, he said, "I think Garrison will expose some CIA operations in Louisiana." He did not elaborate.

His oft-repeated but unpublished account of how the explosives disappeared describes the bunker he says he helped empty as a CIA staging point for munitions destined to be used as part of the abortive Bay of Pigs attack on Castro's Cuba in April, 1961.

PRIOR TO THAT DISASTROUS CIA-staged operation, Novel says, he was working for the intelligence service at New Orleans. Part of his job, he contends, was to operate the Evergreen Advertising Agency as a front for CIA communications.

With funds funneled to him by the CIA, Novel says he prepared special radio commercials used on 300 stations in the U.S. and Canada. Their cryptographic messages, he claims, were to alert agents to the invasion date. The commercials advertised aluminum Christmas trees, he says, and the key alert code names were "Star Christmas Trees" and "Holiday Trees." In late 1960, $72,000 worth of radio time was placed by the agency.

On the day the munitions were picked up, he says, he was called by his CIA contact and told to join a group which was ordered to transport munitions from the bunker to New Orleans. The key to the bunker, he says, was provided.

HE SAYS HE MADE THE TRIP in his own automobile, a Lincoln, and met several people there — all of them allegedly acting for the CIA. He identifies them as Ferrie, Arcacha, several Cubans, and another figure in the case.

They loaded the boxes of ordnance on trucks, he continues, and returned to New Orleans where the explosives were dropped in three spots — Ferrie's home, Novel's office building and the office of a stormy former FBI agent and New Orleans police official, Guy Banister, who died of a heart attack in the summer of 1964.

A friend of Banister's, a man whose word is considered reliable, told a reporter in New Orleans he saw 50 to 100 boxes of munitions in Banister's Lafayette st. office early in 1961.

Banister was a private detective then, operating a company called Guy Banister Associates. His friend said he saw the munitions in a storeroom-office, in boxes marked with the name "Schlumberger."

HE SAYS FIVE OR SIX OF THE BOXES were open. Inside, he says, were rifle grenades, land mines and some "little missiles" of a kind he had never seen before.

The friend said he remonstrated with Banister because "fooling with this kind of stuff could get you in trouble." He added:

"Banister said no, it was all right, that he had approval from somebody He said the stuff would just be there overnight, that somebody was supposed to pick it up. He said a bunch of fellows connected with the Cuban deal asked to leave it there overnight."

Banister's friend said this happened well before the April Bay of Pigs invasion.

The munitions, Novel says, were picked up and consolidated soon after the New Orleans drops. He says they eventually were taken by boat to Cuba for use in a diversionary operation staged in conjunction with the Bay of Pigs attack.

Cuban sources in New Orleans say the cadre of Cubans trained by the CIA on the city's West Bank in 1961 was sent to Varacoa to make a diversionary assault. The attack did not come off because Castro militia was waiting and took the group prisoner.

NOVEL'S ACCOUNT OF THE explosives caper sharply conflicts with Garrison's charges against Arcacha and Novel. The DA's accusation says the burglary took place after Aug. 1, 1961—three months after the Cuban disaster.

The DA accuses the two men of conspiring to burglarize a bunker at an abandoned military base at Houma. Garrison's bill of information says the bunker was leased by the Schlumberger Well Services Co. of Houston.

Schlumberger officials say they know nothing of any CIA operations in connection with their magazine, where oil field service equipment and certain low yield explosives are stored.

As to the date the Houma burglary happened, no one seems to know or will say exactly when it took place. Schlumberger says it has no records. The Houma police say their records are missing, and the Terrebonne Parish DA, Wilmore Broussard, will not reveal the date he charges Arcacha and Novel burglarized the Houma bunker. He said it is "material evidence" in his case.

PLOTKIN SAYS HE MADE A TRIP to Houma to get the date of his client's alleged offense and could not obtain it.

Shaw, a tall white-haired retired New Orleans businessman, who stoutly denies participating in a plot to kill Kennedy, was managing director of the International Trade Mart. He was with the organization for 19 years and in a favorable position to observe the movements of international commerce through America's second-ranking seaport.

On March 4, Paese Sera, an afternoon newspaper in Rome, carried a story which said Shaw is a director of a firm known as World Trade Center Corp. The newspaper, which is leftist in its political leanings, claimed the company was a CIA front operation.

It said the company moved its operations from Switzerland to Rome and has since transferred its offices to Johannesburg, South Africa, where it is still in existence.

APR 25 1967

1/27/68

Continued

13-00000

THE SAME STORY, MINUS THE CIA allegation, was published in Rome's conservative newspaper De La Sera, on March 5.

Incidental to his own story, Novel tells intimates the CIA may have asked Shaw to observe the traffic of foreign commerce through New Orleans.

In Ohio, Novel continues to live his free, loquacious life while waiting for the uncertain extradition machinery to grind away between governors' offices at Baton Rouge and Columbus.

He lives in a rent free apartment, drives a used car with dealer's tags and continues to promise he will send "Garrison down the drain" when what he says is the full truth is revealed.

Novel Not CIA Agent--Weiner

The Columbus, Ohio, attorney for Kennedy death plot investigation figure Gordon Novel said today that his client was never an agent for the CIA.

Attorney Jerry Weiner was commenting on a copyrighted story in the States-Item and the Dayton (Ohio) Daily News which reported evidence of links between Novel and the CIA.

"It's utterly ridiculous," he said. "Novel is not now and never has been a CIA agent."

At Dallas, Sergio Arcacha Smith declined comment on Novel's quoted account of the mysterious munitions incident at Houma in 1961. He told a reporter he would not have "anything to say about anything."

At Washington, meanwhile, the CIA was mum on the story.

1/27/68

APR 25 1967

31 MAY 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: GARRISON and the Kennedy Assassination;
Gordon Dwane NOVEL

1. Summary of contents.

Gordon Dwane NOVEL has both claimed and denied affiliation with CIA. A thorough records check has shown no such affiliation. It seems plausible that the NBC is supporting and financing NOVEL in order to win a large audience for a later expose of GARRISON. In support of this plan NBC or NOVEL may have exaggerated his presumed relationship with Sergio ARCACHA Smith (who was also not CIA-employed) into an Agency affiliation and may have staged a dramatic ambush in Nashville. The NBC program, however, is reportedly still weeks away, and meanwhile GARRISON is attacking CIA vehemently.

2. Gordon Dwane NOVEL and his lawyers reportedly have claimed that he was associated with CIA, but have then denied such an association. One lawyer later reiterated the claim.

3. The files of the following Agency components have been checked for any record of Gordon Dwane NOVEL, including alternative spellings. All checks were negative (CIA held no information about NOVEL before the GARRISON probe started.)

a. RID.
b. CI/OA.
c. Office of Security.
d. WH/Cuban Operations Group.
e. Domestic Contact Service.
f. Interagency Source Register.
g. Domestic Operations Division.
h. Archives.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4. NOVEL remains mysterious. Although the press has devoted much space to him, few facts have emerged. He has been described as a 29 year old former owner of a bar in the French quarter of New Orleans and as an expert in electronics. (New Orleans States - Item, 25 April 1967.) An FBI report (DDB-79248, 27 April 1967) terms him a former electronics salesman.

5. Nothing has been printed about the source or sources of his money since he left New Orleans for Columbus, Ohio, in mid-March 1967. It is known, however, that he is at liberty on a $10,000 bond. The New Orleans States - Item said on 25 April 1967 that NOVEL lives in a rent-free apartment in Columbus and drives a used car with dealer's tags.

6. The Washington Daily News of 27 March 1967 stated that during the weekend of 25-26 March NOVEL was in the Washington area (actually it was McLean, Virginia, a site which might have been chosen to land an air of plausibility to his claims of working for CIA). There he was given a polygraph examination by a private detective named Lloyd FURR. (Comment: As the Office of Security reported on 1 May 1967, the Washington firm REDEX is operated by FURR and Richard L. BAST, who is described as "unscrupulous and untrustworthy". BAST produces and sells, among other things, audio and counter-audio devices. The fact that NOVEL was a salesman of electronics gear suggests the otherwise unsupported hypothesis that he may have had an earlier relationship with REDEX, BAST, or FURR.)

7. On 29 March 1967 the New Orleans FBI office reported (file 89-69) that NOVEL had made a long distance call to that office from an unknown place. Among his remarks was the comment that he had "not furnished GARRISON with any information about 'double check' of Miami, which he inferred was a fringe Cuban operation in the Miami area but did not further identify." (Comment: Operation Double Chek appears on pp. 95, 76, 82, 84, 88, 89, 90, 146, and 246 of The Invisible Government, by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. The book erroneously

describes Double Chek as a cover and funding mechanism for recruiting and paying American flyers who participated at the Bay of Pigs. The General Counsel has informed CI/R&A that in fact Double Chek was created after the deaths of the flyers for the sole purpose of making payments to their widows.)

8. FBI memorandum DBB 76600, 29 March 1967, reported another long distance call by NOVEL to the New Orleans office. NOVEL said that Walter SHERIDAN, who is a Washington NBC news reporter, had the number of the telephone at which NOVEL could be reached. He also said that when he was given the polygraph test in Virginia, SHERIDAN was present. He added that he had given SHERIDAN information about polygraph tests run by GARRISON's staff.

see P's 5, 6,

9. An 8 May 1967 memorandum from the Associate General Counsel states that he was given information about the GARRISON investigation by a Washington lawyer named Jack Miller, that Walter SHERIDAN was the source of Miller's information, that NBC has done a thirty minute show on GARRISON, and that it plans an hour-long show "for a few weeks from now". The show is expected to "bury" GARRISON.

10. In addition to his reference to Double Chek, NOVEL and his lawyers have made direct but contradictory statements about CIA.

a. "I think Garrison will expose some CIA operations in New Orleans." (New Orleans *Times - Picayune*, 19 April 1967.)

b. NOVEL reportedly stated to a representative of a well known news media "that he was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and that the burglary of the munitions bunker at Houma, Louisiana, was not an actual burglary." He contended that CIA had made arrangements with the SCHLUMBERGER Well Drilling Corporation to keep ammunition, bomb casings, and other material in that bunker. He "indicated that he (NOVEL) and /Sergio/ Arcacha Smith are still employed by the CIA." NOVEL and others took bomb casings and other items from the bunker about three months after the Bay of Pigs. (Source: FBI memorandum, New Orleans office, 20 April 1967.) (Comment: Careful checking has shown that CIA did not have a contract with

3/27/68

SCHLUMBERGER, as NOVEL has alleged, and did not have any munitions or similar materials stored with SCHLUMBERGER or at the Houma Air Base.)

c. The above "war materials pickup" was made by NOVEL and others "at the direction of his CIA contact." Part of NOVEL's job for CIA "was to operate the Evergreen Advertising Agency as a front for CIA communications". NOVEL prepared special radio commercials for use in the United States and Canada...to alert agents to the date of the Bay of Pigs invasion." Among code words used by NOVEL were "Star Christmas Trees" and "Holiday Trees". His agency placed $72,000 worth of radio time in 1960. (AP, New Orleans, 25 April 1967.) (Comment: As was previously reported, there is no record of the "Evergreen Advertising Agency". WH/COG queried a knowledgeable staff employee, now COS in Santo Domingo, 16-10 who replied in Santo Domingo 16-10 3473, 12 May 1967, that NOVEL's allegations are not true; that he had never heard of NOVEL, his agency, or the code words; and that although "some meaningless code phrases were used on JMHOPE for psych reasons only", they were not sent out over U.S. commercial stations. The cable added that the Cuban Free Committee did contract time for routine exile broadcasts on a New Orleans station. It is clear, however, that NOVEL's allegations do not concern such broadcasts.)

d. Steven PLOTKIN, NOVEL's lawyer in New Orleans, said that he would neither confirm nor deny NOVEL's claims of CIA employment. His lawyer in Columbus, Jerry WEINER, said, "It's utterly ridiculous. NOVEL is not now and never has been a CIA agent." (New Orleans States - Item, 25 April 1967.) P.5

e. On 25 April 1967 NOVEL himself said in Columbus, "The statements that I worked for the CIA are absolutely incorrect...." (AP, 25 April 1967.)

f. NOVEL's New Orleans attorney, Steve PLOTKIN, said he "served as an intermediary between the CIA and anti-Castro Cubans in New Orleans and Miami before the April, 1961, Bay of Pigs invasion. Plotkin maintained, though, that Novel had 'little or nothing to do with the Bay of Pigs invasion and certainly had absolutely nothing to do with the assassination of President Kennedy.'" (The Washington Post, 26 May 1967.)

11. On 7 May 1967 NOVEL again telephoned the FBI's office in New Orleans. He said that in the near future GARRISON would accuse the FBI of possessing originals of five letters: one from Clay SHAW to David FERRIE, one from Lee Harvey OSWALD to SHAW, one from FERRIE to Jack RUBY, one from RUBY to OSWALD, and one from Senator and former Attorney General Robert Kennedy to FERRIE. He added that GARRISON has a typewriter which FERRIE owned in 1963 and also has two typewriters, personal and business, belonging to SHAW. He said that GARRISON's chief investigator, William GURVICH, has (NR) a close relative, living in Russia, who was instrumental in designing the MIG. He remarked that GARRISON plans to subpoena an attorney, fnu MARTIN, allegedly associated with CIA. He said that Layton Patrick MARTENS was the "other" marine probably involved in the Houma bunker burglary. (FBI memorandum DBB 80563, 9 May 1967.) (Comment: Mr. Arthur Dooley of CI/R&A knew a Walter SHERIDAN (See P 3) who is believed identical with the Walter SHERIDAN of this report, who was an FBI special agent, and who worked for Senator Robert Kennedy when he was Attorney General.)

12. On or about 11 May 1967 GARRISON accused two lawyers, one of them PLOTKIN, of receiving CIA money. "We know that Mr. Plotkin has been receiving money, if only through an intermediary, from the CIA." Both lawyers denied the charge. (New Orleans, AP, 11 May 1967.) GARRISON later broadened this charge to include all defense attorneys. "Every lawyer involved in this case, without exception, involved in the attempts to derail the investigation, has been connected by us with the Central Intelligence Agency, Garrison said." (Washington Post, 29 May 1967.)

1/27/68

13. On 22 May 1967 NOVEL telephoned an unidentified person in New Orleans and said that at 0200 hours on 21 May he and a friend of eleven years, Gary EDWARDS, were sitting in a radio station truck in Nashville, Tennessee. Bullets were fired at the truck. Neither man was struck by a bullet, but both were cut by flying glass. The Nashville police found the glass in the left door of the truck shattered and four or five indentations made by bullets on the right side of the truck's paneling. They said that the first report to them was made by Charles F. WALKER, president of radio station WKDA, who said that NOVEL had been wounded by a sniper and that he had come to Nashville at the request of WKDA and had agreed to disclose information that "would blow the New Orleans investigation wide open." A Nashville police detective said five shots were fired at the truck and that traces, apparently of blood, were found. However, Nashville authorities noted that Mr. WALKER first telephoned them thirteen hours after the alleged incident. By then NOVEL and EDWARDS were allegedly in Bowling Green, Kentucky. Efforts made in Kentucky to verify NOVEL's claim that his injuries had been treated at a hospital were unsuccessful. WALKER said that just before the shooting NOVEL was on the verge of returning to Columbus. He said that NOVEL and EDWARDS left Nashville immediately after the shooting and that EDWARDS was proceeding to Washington. EDWARDS' real name, according to another but unidentified spokesman for the radio station, is Gerald MUNDY. (New Orleans States-Item, 22 May 1967.) (NR)

14. Several newspapers have carried the story that NOVEL is suing GARRISON for $50,000,000.

15. JMWAVE was asked to show a Miami Herald photograph of NOVEL to a well placed and well informed asset, AMOT/2, without devulging NOVEL's name or making any statement about him. JMWAVE 7427, 27 May 1967, reported that AMOT/2 did not recognize the photo and could not identify the person whose likeness he saw. The purpose was to test the possibility that NOVEL had been involved in CIA activities under another name.

16. It is requested that the Office of the Assistant to the Director advise CI/R&A whether it has any information about Walter SHERIDAN.

7708

Gerald MUNDY @ Gary EDWARDS, and any association between them, as well as any information about whether Station WKDA in Nashville is affiliated or otherwise associated with NBC.

17. If the surmise that NBC is building up NOVEL as a latter day David who is to slay the jolly green giant is correct, then a CIA exposure of NOVEL's claims of Agency affiliation as false might be damaging to our own interests. On the other hand, the likelihood that an NBC anti-Garrison program is still weeks away from presentation is disturbing. A recent Harris survey (Washington Post, 29 May 1967) shows that 66% of the persons queried now believe that the assassination was not the work of one man but was rather part of a broader plot or conspiracy. The Garrison probe is termed a major contributor to the growing public doubt. GARRISON's venemous attack on CIA during his ABC interview of 28 May 1967 was preceded by a barrage of earlier charges and will predictably be followed by more.

18. There may be a shadow of justification for NOVEL's claim of association with CIA. He has asserted that he knew Sergio ARCACHA Smith and that ARCACHA was one of the participants in the pickup at the Houma bunker. Our records show that CIA never recruited or paid ARCACHA directly. He was, however, the delegate of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD, or Democratic Revolutionary Front) in New Orleans. He reported to FRD headquarters in Miami by mail. The FRD was created with CIA assistance, guidance, and financial support in May 1960. Its leader was Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona. He or his assistants may have passed funds to ARCACHA, who may have briefed or even employed NOVEL. see P.8

19. On 28 May 1967 NOVEL sent the following telegram to the DCI:

> "Richard Helms
> "Central Intelligence Agency McLean Vir
> "Attn UNCLE Hdqrs Good Guys Div. Regarding Garrison conspiracy case; code reference JACKASS. Dear Richard. Today according to the jolly green giant (Mr. Garrison) 'You are paying my legal fees in Louisiana and Ohio.'"

1/27/68

"Since my attorneys are crying and pressing me because of not being paid for my various legal wrecking moves on his jolly big fraud, I am going to instruct them to send you chaps immediately an itemized bill. If, and I do mean if, Garrison is correct, I am going to instruct the same attorneys to sue the h--- out of your bad guys in the accounting department for welching on your debts. Instead of a no comment S.O.P. reply, how about a public ha-ha.

"P.S. Right now I don't think sending him to Viet Nam is a good idea in view of national interest anymore. Perhaps Rome he could reopen the case on Caesars assassination. He believes Brutus and Cassius were framed. Like in his words, 'beyond a shadow of a doubt, absolutely.'" Truly yours, Gordon Novel.

UNCLE H---S.O.P. Ha-ha P.S.

The partial sentence reading "...I am going to instruct the same attorneys to sue the h--- out of your bad guys in the accounting department for welching on your debts", quoted out of context, would reinforce NOVEL's false claim to affiliation with CIA. It will be interesting to note whether he releases this telegram to the press.

Addendum

It has been noted that NOVEL probably served as an FBI informant for an unknown period before he left New Orleans in mid-March 1967. FBI report DBB 73269, New Orleans office, 21 February 1967, is ascribed to a "confidential source who in the past furnished insufficient information to determine reliability." This source describes the group that carried out the theft from the Houma bunker as consisting of his own ex-wife (but not himself), his partner (unidentified), Sergio ARCACHA Smith, David FERRIE, two ex-marines, and another man, also unidentified. He also said that one of the cars used for the trip to Houma was his own 1956 Lincoln Supreme. This report contains no mention of CIA. The New Orleans States - Item of 25 April 1967 quotes NOVEL as saying that CIA ordered him to join the group, which he identified as consisting of ARCACHA, FERRIE, several Cubans, and "another figure in the case". He is also quoted as saying that he made the trip in his own car, a Lincoln.

Raymond G. Rocca
C/CI/R&A

13-00000

NEW ORLEANS STATES-ITEM

Attorney Admits Novel CIA Agent

Continued from Front Page

righted story April 25.

Garrison has charged that persons connected with the CIA became angry at Kennedy and plotted his death at Dallas. He has charged the CIA with fomenting a "monstrous coverup" and duping the Warren Commission.

PLOTKIN SAID NOVEL'S CIA WORK had "little or nothing to do with the Bay of Pigs invasion and certainly had absolutely nothing to do with the assassination of President Kennedy."

The attorney said Novel worked as what he termed "chief of security" for Garrison before "his forced departure from New Orleans."

But the lawyer declared his client actually was serving as a double agent in the employ of a "national news media."

When Novel left here in mid-March, he went first to McLean, Va., to take a lie detector test. McLean is the headquarters of the CIA.

Plotkin said Novel has tapes, photographs and other data which will be released shortly and will "prove beyond any shadow of a doubt that Mr. Garrison's investigation is a fraud and a hoax."

HE SAID NOVEL has turned the information over to a national news medium and that tape recordings and other matters in Plotkin's possession will be released in case Novel dies.

In the handwritten letter draft found in a hiding place at Novel's former French Quarter apartment, the fugitive witness tells "Mr. Weiss":

"Our attorneys and others are in possession of complete sealed files containing all information concerning this matter. In the event of our sudden departure, either accidental or otherwise, they are instructed to simultaneously release same for public scrutiny in different areas . . ."

At the same time, the letter speaks of taking "appropriate counteraction relative to Garrison's inquisition concerning us . . ."

It suggests that the business of handling Garrison may best be carried on "through military channels vis a vis the D.J.A. man."

D.I.A. is the abbreviation for Defense Intelligence Agency, an organization established by President Kennedy to supervise CIA after the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.

Speaking of the letter draft today, Plotkin said the "letter was intended to the addressee of th letter."

"As to the contents of the letter or whether the letter was actually sent, I don't know," he added.

"NEVERTHELESS," Plotkin admitted, "the only comment is that everything in the letter as far as Novel is concerned is actually the truth."

Plotkin said the purpose of the letter was to inform "the person to whom the letter was addressed . . . of activities going on in Louisiana."

Garrison has charged that Plotkin and other lawyers representing figures in the Kennedy inquiry are being paid by the CIA. Plotkin has denied the allegation.

THE LETTER draft, which a handwriting expert says was written by Novel, is a strange concoction of clipped phrases, cloak and dagger terminology and veiled references to "top secret" activities.

It begins:

"This letter is to inform you that District (Attorney) Jim Garrison has subpenaed myself and an associate to testify before his Grand Jury on matters which may be classified TOP SECRET. Actions of individuals connected with DOUBLE-CHEK CORPORATION in Miami in the first quarter of 1961."

The recent book, "The Invisible Government," which carries details of CIA operations, identifies Double-Chek of Miami as a CIA front.

On page 79, the book declares that Double-Chek was the company through which pilots and other persons connected with anti-Castro Cuban operations were recruited.

"We have no current contact available to inform of this situation," the Novel letter draft continues. "So I took the liberty of writing you direct and appraising you of current situation . . . expecting you to forward this through appropriate channels."

Although the draft is undated, the sequence of events it relates places its writing sometime in late January or early February.

It tells of "avoiding" one Garrison subpena but says that attorneys have warned other subpenas are to follow.

"The Fifth Amendment and/or immunity (and) legal tactics will not suffice," the letter states.

New Orleans
States-Item
25 May '67

13-00000

CIA AGENT,
ORNEY ADMITS

LEANS
ITEM
AY 25, 1967 PRICE 10c

OVE
ATT

NEW OR
STATES
20—NO. 297 THURSDAY, M

S-I Uncovers Letter

By JOHN McMILLAN AND HOKE MAY

Gordon Novel's New Orleans attorney today said his client worked for the Central Intelligence Agency here in early 1961.

The public statement by Steven Plotkin followed the States-Item's discovery of a letter which Plotkin said was written by Novel and apparently directed to an official of the CIA.

Plotkin reported that Novel drafted the penciled letter, which was found in the 29-year-old former tavern owner's one-time French Quarter apartment.

(Related Story on Page 1)

In the letter, Novel tells a "Mr. Weiss" that he wants to be taken "out of this mess" by an unspecified date in March of 1967.

Novel, whom Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison has called an important witness in his Kennedy death plot investigation, disappeared from New Orleans in mid-March.

HE WAS ARRESTED APRIL 1 AT Gahanna, Ohio, on a warrant charging him with conspiracy to burglarize an oil service company's munitions bunker at Houma in 1961.

Since that time, he has been free on $10,000 bond while fighting extradition from Ohio.

Today, Plotkin said his client served as an intermediary between the CIA and anti-Castro Cubans in New Orleans and Miami prior to the April, 1961, Bay of Pigs invasion.

Novel's role as a CIA operative was first disclosed by the States-Item in a copy-

(Turn to Page 14, Column [illegible])

13-00000

'IMMUNITY TIME TOO SHORT'

N.O. States-Item 20 Oct 67

Novel Rejects Labor Probe Bid

(States-Item Bureau)

BATON ROUGE—Much sought-after witness Gordon Novel has refused to testify before the state Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry investigating labor troubles in the Baton Rouge area.

Novel testified at length yesterday before the East Baton Rouge Parish Grand Jury in connection with its probe of organized crime.

Afterwards, East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney Sargent Pitcher said the jury dismissed Novel and he is free to leave the state. It was not known whether he left immediately, but when the labor probers asked Novel to testify, his attorneys told them the witness' 48-hour period of immunity from arrest in Louisiana wouldn't stretch far enough to permit such testimony.

NOVEL, also sought by Orleans Parish DA Jim Garrison in his probe of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, was granted the 48-hour immunity as his condition in return for telling what he knew about organized crime.

Attorneys for Novel and the labor probe commission agreed commission investigators could interview Novel after he leaves the state.

Novel's grace period was to expire some time today. If he were still in the state he would be liable to arrest on Orleans Parish charges of conspiracy to commit burglary, of being a fugitive witness, and a Terrebonne Parish charge of simple burglary.

THE LABOR probers sought to question Novel at the request of Edward Partin, Baton Rouge Teamster leader, who has figured in the board's investigation.

In a nine-hour session before the jury yesterday, Novel had time to tell all he knew about crime, corruption, Garrison and anything else he deemed pertinent.

However, at a lengthy press conference afterwards he tossed out a lot of innuendos, ducked specifics, said Clay Shaw was a "patsy," and declared he had been offered a bribe to help free imprisoned Teamster boss Jimmy Hoffa.

Shaw is the retired New Orleans businessman accused by Garrison of conspiring to kill President John F. Kennedy.

THE JURY dismissed Novel after listening to him on and off from 10:15 a. m. to 7:30 p. m. yesterday. It is scheduled to resume its work today.

Novel was brought to the state from Columbus, Ohio, where he took refuge after fleeing the grasp of Garrison. He was brought in by a Baton Rouge sheriff's department plane.

Pitcher said he was not free to comment on what ac-

[Turn to Page 4, Column 7]

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

Novel, Gordon

States-Item

Novel Rejects Labor Probe Bid

Continued from Page 1

tion the jury might take on Novel's testimony.

THE BATON Rouge jury has been studying organized crime, the Hoffa affair and unsolved bombings.

Novel was flanked by five attorneys during the press conference. The five, including Steve Plotkin of New Orleans, and Jerry Weiner of Columbus, met frequently outside the jury room with Novel during the day.

The 29-year-old former New Orleans lounge owner would testify for a while, leave the grand jury room for a brief period, and tell his attorneys what had transpired, and then return to the room.

He left the grand jury building for about 20 minutes during the day to bring material from his room at a motel near the state capitol. Sandwiches were brought into the jury room for lunch.

NOVEL declared — when asked for specific information on crime and corruption—that an effort had been made by an investigator in New Orleans to get him to provide an affidavit saying Walter Sheridan had used bugging equipment against Hoffa.

Sheridan is a former Justice Department investigator who became an investigative reporter for the National Broadcasting Co. and helped produce a program critical of Garrison.

Novel said both money and withdrawal of charges in New Orleans against him in New Orleans were offered.

NOVEL, who claims to be a former employe of the Central Intelligence Agency, declined to reveal the source of his income since he left Louisiana. He said he had money at the time.

He also said he, himself, is paying his battery of attorneys, one of whom Garrison insists is being financed by the CIA.

When asked what specific evidence he had to support his charge that Garrison's Kennedy investigation is a fraud, Novel said he had once discussed with the DA the means of obtaining a con-

deceased pilot Garrison says was a key part of the assassination plot.

Novel said that on Feb. 21 Garrison proposed a three-part plan to get Ferrie's "confession."

MUCH OF his information on crime in the state, Novel said, was turned over to Life Magazine before his grand jury testimony.

Most of the information on several tapes, relates to the Garrison probe "and will be made available at the proper time," Novel said.

Novel said he would like to testify at the conspiracy trial of Shaw, now scheduled next February.

"This is the patsy of the century," he said of Shaw. Of the probe, he said "from A to Z it is a fraud."

Burbank Orders State Vice Cleanup

State Police Superintendent Col. Thomas Burbank says he has notified every Louisiana sheriff to "clean up" any illegal gambling or other vice.

However, Burbank told newsmen yesterday there does not seem to be a lot to clean up—in the way of gambling, anyway.

There is no big syndicate gambling operation dominating Louisiana insofar as the state police know, said Burbank.

His comments came just before he went before the Orleans Parish Grand Jury to report on recent state police investigations of alleged organized crime.

Earlier the jury heard Dist. Atty. William Cahn of Nassau County, New York.

Cahn said he came here to testify in detail about a multi-million-dollar layoff betting syndicate which included a New Orleans center.

Acting Dist. Atty. Charles Ray Ward said the syndicate's center used to be in New Orleans, but moved to an adjoining parish because of pressure from the DA's office.

Ward said there is no evidence the betting is part of any Cosa Nostra network.

Because there is no evidence that key bookie operations now [illegible] in Orleans Parish

22/6

13-00000

TWO GRAND JURIES PUSH CRIME PROBE

Times-Picayune

Burbank, Cahn, Novel Give Testimony

20 Oct 67



COL. THOMAS BURBANK
Appears Before Grand Jury

The grand juries of Orleans and East Baton Rouge Parishes continued their twin probes of organized crime in Louisiana Thursday by calling a string of prominent personalities to testify.

Included in the notable parade were state police Supt. Thomas Burbank, Nassau County (New York) District Attorney William Cahn and former New Orleans bar operator Gordon Novel, who gained fame as the elusive witness in District Attorney Jim Garrison's presidential assassination probe.

Novel testified before the East Baton Rouge jurors, while Burbank and Cahn huddled with the Orleans jurors during a lengthy testifying session in the afternoon.

Prior to entering the grand jury room, Burbank maintained that, to his knowledge, there is no syndicated gambling

GORDON NOVEL

operation dominating the state. He admitted there may be small-time betting [illegible]

SHERIFFS NOTIFIED

[illegible]bank disclosed that his of[illegible] has notified every [illegible] in the state that the state government expects them to clean up any illegal gambling operation and other vices which may be in existence.

Burbank said he was doubtful whether Louisiana could rid itself entirely of such crime, but indicated that it was possible to tone down the criminal element. He said there are many other states that need "cleaning up" more than Louisiana.

Cahn, who uncovered a multi-million dollar national gambling ring operating in Nassau County and other areas, including New Orleans, went before the grand jury in mid-afternoon. During a press conference Wednesday, Cahn contended the gambling ring was still in operation.

In Baton Rouge, Novel flew

Cont. in Sec. 1, Page [illegible], Col. [illegible]

GRAND JURIES PUSH PROBE

N.O. Times Picayune

Continued from Page 1

into the capital city from Columbus, Ohio, under immunity from arrest. In his possession was a tape recording which he said would make his testimony sensational.

WOULD TAKE TEST

Surrounded by lawyers, Novel refused to talk with newsmen except to say that he would take a lie detector test to back his statements to the grand jury.

In a related happening Thursday in Austin, Tex., a hearing was set for Nov. 21 to decide whether Texas should extradite New Orleans contractor D'Alton Smith to face charges of offering a $25,000 bribe to Aubrey Young, a former aide to Gov. John J. McKeithen.

Young was mentioned in one of a series of articles in Life Magazine which asserted that organized crime was rampant in the state. The articles triggered the grand jury investigations.

In the Orleans probe, Asst. Dist. Atty. Charles Ray Ward denied Thursday that the gambling ring uncovered by the Nassau district attorney was still operating in New Orleans. Ward said pressure from the local district attorney's office had caused the operation to move to a neighboring parish.

REASON FOR SUBPENA

Ward emphasized that Burbank was subpenaed for questioning to determine if any significant information has been gathered concerning New Orleans in the state police investigation into organized crime.

He said the state police has been conducting an extensive investigation in the city during the past 10 days.

In New Orleans, Baton Rouge and throughout the state, strong doubt has been voiced by authorities over whether Novel actually has the "sensational" information he claims. Novel is said to have taped conversations in the governor's office after having been hired by Young to "de-bug" the governor's suite.

Baton Rouge DA Sargent Pitcher did not appear to be impressed with Novel's information after having lengthy talks with him. He gave no [illegible] Novel would tell the grand jury.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

1/22/68

Young has stated that he brought in Novel to determine whether McKeithen's phones had [illegible]

LABOR BOARD PROBE

In another development, the Labor-Management Board of Inquiries came into the picture to question Novel at the suggestion of Baton Rouge Teamsters boss Edward G. Partin. The board is investigating labor racketeering in the area.

The board's chief counsel, Camile Gravel, and its chief investigator, A. Harry Roberts, talked with Pitcher to see if an agreement could be worked out for a meeting with Novel. Also present at the conference were Novel's attorneys.

Failure of the board to interview Novel, said Partin, would be "continuing proof that the main endeavor has been to make me and Local 5 scapegoats."

Gravel said he was uncertain whether he could subpena Novel because of the immunity granted him.

There was an indication that Novel may also testify before the grand jury on Friday. According to Pitcher, Novel would remain under the immunity as long as he is in Louisiana for grand jury appearances.

LONG STATEMENT

Novel, presently under indictment by the Orleans Parish Grand Jury for conspiracy to commit burglary, once issued a lengthy statement saying that he knew of criminal influence and activity in Louisiana.

In his desire to have Novel returned to the state to testify, McKeithen gave Pitcher $3,500 from his law enforcement fund to finance Novel's return.

The only indictment handed down so far by the grand jury in Baton Rouge has been against Smith. The indictment charged that Smith committed public bribery by offering Young $25,000 to set up a meeting between himself and Partin, whose testimony was valuable in sending Teamsters head James R. Hoffa to prison.

In New Orleans, Ward said that the reported gambling ring uncovered by Cahn was not limited to the Crescent City.

"It is not limited to New Orleans and probably exists in every major city in the United States," said Ward. "These lay-off bookie operations involve every city in the United States and several in Canada where there is any betting on pro or college sports," he added.

HANDBOOK BETTING

Asked if handbook betting could be termed as organized crime, Ward replied: "There is not one bit of evidence to indicate that this is part of any Cosa Nostra or Mafia network.

"As a matter of fact, our evidence indicates that this is the typical layoff bookie operation, necessary wherever bets are made, in which small bookies who have received bets that are too large phone the bets to a larger operator," Ward said.

Ward, who is presently acting as district attorney in Garrison's absence, said that although no large-scale gambling operations are now operating in New Orleans, "this does not mean that you cannot make a bet on an athletic event in Orleans Parish and that this bet will not be called to a book by use of a telephone.

"You can make a bet in any city in the United States including New Orleans, but the books themselves are not operating in Orleans Parish."

Because there is no evidence that key bookie operations now exist in Orleans Parish, Ward concluded, "I do not expect any immediate indictments to be issued by the grand jury."

13-00000

Gordon Novel in Baton Rouge

[illegible] 1967

BATON ROUGE, La. (AP) — Traveling in the sheriff's plane, Gordon Novel arrived here Wednesday from Ohio. He testifies Thursday before the East Baton Rouge Parish grand jury in its probe of organized crime.

Accompanied by his Columbus, Ohio, lawyer and another man, Novel was hurried from the airport to Dist. Atty. Sargent Pitcher's office, where a conference stretched more than two hours.

Plainclothes sheriff's deputies were stationed around the building in a tight security guard.

The East Baton Rouge Parish sheriff's plane picked up the three men in Columbus for the flight to Baton Rouge.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

GORDON NOVEL

13-00000

States Item 19 Oct 67

Star Crime Witnesses Face Juries

Louisiana Supt. of State Police Thomas Burbank has been subpenaed to appear before the Orleans Parish Grand Jury at 3 p.m. today.

The statewide probe into allegations of organized crime in Louisiana resumes today with a New York district attorney testifying here while long sought witness Gordon Novel appears before the Baton Rouge grand jury.

William Cahn, who said yesterday upon his arrival from Nassau County where he is district attorney that New Orleans plays a key role in a $100-million-a-year gambling operation, is scheduled to take his evidence before the grand jury here.

In Baton Rouge, meanwhile, the elusive Novel, who fled the state just ahead of a subpena from Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison, returned to Louisiana last night under a shield of immunity from arrest during his stay. He has promised con-

See JURY — Page [illegible]

Jury

States Item 19 Oct 67

Continued from Page 1

siderable information about crime in the state.

CAHN, who held a press conference in Garrison's office, said he had brought evidence with him concerning a sports betting syndicate touching New Orleans, Miami, Nassau County and other cities.

He said the syndicate does more than $100 million a year business in his jurisdiction alone. He said most of his information was obtained by wiretapping, which he called the most effective way of gaining information about illegal operations.

He said that his evidence concerns in part a college football coach who allegedly bet $20,000 on his own team. Although he refused to name the coach publicly, he said he might reveal the name of the coach to the grand jury.

IN BATON ROUGE, Novel talked for four hours last night with East Baton Rouge Parish Dist. Atty. Sargent Pitcher after his arrival from Columbus, Ohio, where he has been living since selling his lounge and fleeing the state. Garrison had sought Novel in connection with his investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy.

The far-reaching probe into organized crime in the state was launched last month after Life magazine published articles saying that crime and corruption were flourishing in Louisiana.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

Gordon Novel

13-00000

States-Item
13 Oct 67

Novel to Testify Oct. 20 Before BR Grand Jury

(Special to the States-Item)

BATON ROUGE—Gordon Novel, the former New Orleans lounge owner who claims to have important information concerning organized crime in Louisiana, is scheduled to testify before the grand jury here Oct. 20.

Dist. Atty. Sargent Pitcher said yesterday that the stage is set for the elusive Novel's return to Louisiana from Columbus, Ohio, where he sought sanctuary from New Orleans Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison, who subpoenaed him in connection with his investigation into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

NOVEL HAS been granted immunity from prosecution on his return to the state.

Yesterday Pitcher and several member of the grand jury listened to a [illegible]-minute interview with Novel which has been tape recorded by a Baton Rouge radio station. Jules d'Hemecourt, the news director of WJBO, said the station's files on organized crime have been subpoenaed by the grand jury.

Meanwhile, Gov. John J. McKeithen has signed a request for extradition of D'Alton Smith, a New Orleans contractor arrested in Texas. The grand jury indicted Smith on a charge of public bribery.

The indictment accuses Smith of offering [illegible] to Aubrey Young, a former aide to McKeithen, to introduce him to set up a meeting between Smith and Edward G. Partin, a Baton Rouge Teamster official.

Partin has said he was of[illegible] changes his [illegible] capacity [illegible] jury tampering in 1964.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

34

— October 1967

'LIFE' REPORTER GRANTED STAY

12 October 1967

Court Holds Up Grand Jury Appearance

Times-Picayune

An order staying appearance of David L. Chandler, a Life Magazine writer, before the Orleans Parish Grand Jury was issued about 1:20 p. m. Wednesday, 10 minutes before his scheduled appearance.

The Louisiana Supreme Court issued the stay order until further order of the court and gave Chandler five days to file necessary documents in support of his application.

Also, self-admitted former Ku Klux Klan leader Jules Kimble testified before the East Baton Rouge Parish Grand Jury which is investigating both the May bombing of the home of AFL-CIO president Victor Bussie and allegations that organized crime is being conducted in Louisiana.

Kimble has said he can name three persons who plotted to bomb Bussie's Baton Rouge home and the Port Allen home of a Negro school teacher active in civil rights work.

JUDGE TESTIFIES

In New Orleans, Municipal Court Judge Andrew G. Bucaro was locked in with the grand jury here for about an hour. The jury adjourned for the day shortly after 4 p.m. but did not report to a judge.

Cicero C. Sessions, Chandler's lawyer, appealed to the Supreme Court after Criminal District Court Judge Matthew S. Braniff overruled a motion to quash Chandler's subpena.

Judge Braniff gave Chandler's attorneys until 11 a.m. Monday to file an appeal, but in the meantime refused to stay the matter.

He originally set a deadline of 11 a.m. Friday, but changed the date when he learned Chandler is under another subpena to appear in Vidalia at 9 a.m. Friday before the Concordia Parish Grand Jury.

Chandler's attorney also filed a motion that Chandler be allowed to have his lawyer present in the grand jury session. Other motions filed for Chandler were to recuse District Attorney Jim Garrison and his staff, to compel Garrison and the grand jury foreman to state in open court the crime under investigation and to quash Chandler's grand jury subpena, and a motion asking for a copy of questions and answers elicited from Chandler during questioning by Assistant District Attorney Charles Ward Jan. 26.

REFUSAL ALLEGED

Ward reacted sharply to Chandler's attempt to avoid a grand jury appearance, saying that in effect Chandler "has refused to testify and tell the truth claiming that the truth would tend to incriminate him.

"It is unbelievable that a man who is directly responsible for charging that organized crime is flourishing in New Orleans should claim the 5th Amendment just as a common criminal would."

Chandler told The Times-Picayune late Wednesday afternoon that, although the Concordia Parish subpena was served on him, he "talked it over" with the Concordia district attorney and was actually going to appear voluntarily.

"We (Chandler and his attorney) don't mind testifying before grand juries in cases where threats have not been made," said Chandler. He claimed that threats were made against him by Garrison as a result of references to organized crime in New Orleans made in the Life articles.

The motion to recuse said Life stories on organized crime and other stories concerning Garrison's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy have been publicly denied by Garrison or members of his staff.

This showed personal animosity on Garrison's part, it said, "which is inconsistent with the impartial administration of justice."

It charged the district attorney had his office illegally misuse the grand jury's subpena power by having Chandler subpenaed to appear before the jury Jan. 26 when he was not actually wanted by the jury.

OATH ALLEGED

The motion said Chandler was required to make a sworn statement to Ward, "who castigated him for his investigation and threatened him with criminal prosecution."

It charged Garrison wants to get Chandler in front of the grand jury to entrap him and then prosecute him for perjury. It also alleged that Garrison is pursuing a scheme to prevent Chandler "from pursuing his privilege under the First Amendment to investigate crime" as a news reporter.

The third motion said Chandler was informed that the district attorney said he is going to arrest Chandler and prosecute him criminally.

It said the subpena violates Chandler's right to remain silent and not give evidence against himself.

The Supreme Court, after granting the stay order and five days for Chandler to answer, gave the district attorney three days after that to file a return with the court.

The twin Orleans-East Baton Rouge probes Wednesday included questioning by investigators of C. H. Downs, aide to Gov. John J. McKeithen, about a Capitol telephone which allegedly was used for conversations between rackets figure Carlos Marcello and former McKeithen aide Aubrey Young.

Before Kimble's testimony he was tranported to Baton Rouge from New Orleans where he was under $5,000 bond in Parish Prison on charges of impersonating a state police trooper.

Young, until recently an inmate of Southeast Louisiana Hospital in Mandeville, has turned state's evidence in the East Baton Rouge Parish Grand Jury investigation.

INDICTMENT MADE

The jury returned an indictment against former New Orleans contractor D'Alton Smith for public bribery in an alleged offer of $25,000 to Young to arrange a meeting in an effort to purchase freedom for convicted Teamster head James R. Hoffa.

In the questioning of Downs, it was pointed out that his office was in the section that served as the governor's office at the time of the alleged telephone calls between Marcello and Young. The governor's office complex has since been moved higher in the Capitol building.

Life Magazine claims that there may have been up to 60 conversations between Young and Marcello on the telephone involved, but Young has testified that only two such calls took place.

McKeithen has reclaimed a colonel's commission from Joseph Marcello, Carlos' brother, which he said was issued in error.

In a related issue, East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney Sargent Pitcher said Wednesday he was not able to reach an attorney for Gordon Novel in Columbus, Ohio, to make final plans for Novel's return here to testify before the grand jury in Baton Rouge.

Jerry Weiner, Novel's attorney, told Pitcher that he would call him at 9:30 a. m. Wednesday to discuss Novel's return, but the call never came.

Novel, former New Orleans night club operator, agreed to return to Louisiana to give testimony in Baton Rouge if he is given immunity from arrest in connection with Garrison's probe. He is also wanted by Garrison for questioning in the Kennedy murder. Immunity has been granted.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

NOVEL, GORDON

13-00000

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

Crime Probe Resumed By 2 Juries

States-Item

11 Oct 67

Two grand juries—one here, the other in Baton Rouge—return to secret session ~~today~~ in their probe into accusations of organized crime in Louisiana.

Scheduled to appear before the Orleans Parish Grand Jury was David Chandler, the area representative of Life magazine, which launched the probe with several articles alleging that organized crime's influence reached into high governmental offices.

In Baton Rouge the jury goes into session prepared to hear this week from the man who claims he holds the key to sensational disclosures concerning organized crime in Louisiana.

EAST BATON Rouge Parish Dist. Atty. Sargent Pitcher said that Gordon Novel, a former New Orleans lounge operator, has agreed to return from his sonctuary in Columbus, Ohio. Novel fled the state last March just ahead of a subpena from Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison, who wants to question him in connection with the investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy.

See JURY— Page 4

Jury--

States-Item

Continued from Page 1

11 Oct 67

Pitcher said Novel's Ohio lawyer ha daccepted a new set of documents assurnig Novel of immunity from arrest while back in the state. Novel demanded and was given signed affidavits from Gov. John J. McKeithen and various district attorneys saying he would not be arrested while here, Pitcher said.

Meanwhile in Jefferson Parish, Dist. Atty. Frank Langridge has announced that he will open an investigation into charges of organized crime, using investigators on his office staff.

Landridge said he may call the grand jury into the investigation, depending on evidence developed by his investigators. Several weeks ago Langridge said he was going before the jury with the Life magazine charges. However, he later said he would wait until he learned what evidence was developed by Gov. McKeithen.

"I'm sure there's not organized crime in th eparish but I'm going ahead with the investigation anyway," he said yesterday.

ALTHOUGH he said he has not been apprised of the governor's evidence, Langridge said he is willing to cooperate with the governor and to assist state police in their investigation.

In another matter the Orleans grand jury will hear charges against Richard Brown, 21, Negro, 318 S. Dorgenois, and Henry Johnson, 19, Negro, 2507 Beelmont, both accused of the murder of Police Sgt. Lloyd Verrett.

NOVEL GORDON D.

13-00000



Novel Appearance in Louisiana Is Agreed by Attorney-Pitcher

BATON ROUGE, La. (AP) — Dist. Atty. Sargent Pitcher said Tuesday Gordon Novel's attorney agreed to his appearance before a grand jury probing influence on Louisiana government here.

Pitcher said attorney Jerry Weiner of Columbus, Ohio, had told him the only thing remaining that could prevent Novel from coming here later this week to testify was whether anything on his own docket would permit it.

"He will call me in the morning and let me know if we have a deal," Pitcher said.

Weiner agreed a new set of documents assuring Novel of immunity from arrest while in Louisiana were what he had specified, the district attorney said.

The grand jury returns into session Wednesday.

Novel, wanted for questioning in New Orleans Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison's Kennedy assassination probe, has claimed he has sensational information for the grand jury here.

He found refuge in Columbus, Ohio, when the Orleans Parish [illegible] subpoena for him to testify in the Kennedy assassination probe.

The local district attorney prepared an earlier set of documents seeking to calm Novel's fears of arrest here, but Novel demanded and was given signed affidavits from the [illegible] various prosecutors.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

NOVEL, GORDON D.

THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, NEW ORLEANS

Extradition Moves Are Made

Baton Rouge DA Seeking Smith, Novel

By JACK OWENS

BATON ROUGE, La. (AP)—The district attorney here Monday made first formal moves toward extradition of Dalton Smith from Denton, Tex., where he surrendered on a grand jury indictment for public bribery.

Dist. Atty. Sargent Pitcher also circulated a document intended to give Gordon Novel additional assurance that he will not be arrested in the New Orleans Kennedy assassination probe if he comes here to give what he calls sensational testimony about racketeering.

"If necessary, I will give him a personal escort," Pitcher said of Novel.

The former New Orleans barkeeper has found refuge in Columbus, Ohio. Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison of New Orleans has sought without success to question him in his Kennedy assassination probe.

Pitcher advised the district attorney at Denton that he expected extradition request papers for Smith to be signed later this week by Gov. John McKeithen.

SMITH INDICTED

Smith was indicted by the East Baton Rouge Parish Grand Jury in its probe into published claims that racketeers exercise influence over state government.

He was accused of offering Aubrey Young, former aide to McKeithen, $25,000 to influence him in his post, an offer which authorities said was part of an effort to buy freedom for former Teamster Union President James Hoffa. The former Teamster boss was imprisoned for jury tampering.

A man who said he was Smith turned himself in to authorities at Denton, and was released on $1,500 fugitive bond. His attorneys have offered to produce him whenever a court hearing is set on his extradition.

Smith is the only person so far indicted by the grand jury, which has recessed its probe until Wednesday.

Young has said he received telephone calls from Carlos Marcello, New Orleans area rackets figure, in McKeithen's office.

He has said he arranged for Smith a meeting with Edward Grady Partin, local Teamster official who claims he was offered $1 million to change his testimony so Hoffa could be freed.

And Young has said he once engaged Novel to install electronic debugging equipment in McKeithen's office, where he served as McKeithen's security officer.

TRIP TAKEN

Pitcher has been working for more than a week to get Novel back here to testify. He took a trip to Chicago, and he has contacted Novel's attorney several times to make arrangements that will satisfy him.

Already, the district attorney has gotten letters from the governor, Garrison and other prosecutors assuring that Novel will be allowed to tell what he knows to the grand jury here without being jailed on other charges.

Pitcher cited a reciprocal law effective in both Ohio and Louisiana that guarantees immunity from arrest for such grand jury witnesses brought in from other states.

Still, this apparently was not enough to satisfy Novel by his attorney. He asked for sworn affidavits from all concerned.

Pitcher agreed to provide a "round robin" affidavit. He began circulating such an affidavit to McKeithen and the several district attorneys involved for signatures. He expects to hand it to Novel's attorney within the week.

Pitcher also made available to Novel the official parish airplane for transportation into East Baton Rouge Parish and back to Ohio without setting down in any other jurisdiction, along with personal guards from his office.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

13-00000

DA SAYS STATE FUNDS PLEDGED IN CRIME PROBE

Times Picayune

Elusive Novel Will Be Granted Immunity

7 Oct 67

Gov. John J. McKeithen's two-pronged investigation into organized crime in Louisiana headed for a weekend lull late Friday with these developments:

—East Baton Rouge District Attorney Sargent Pitcher said that McKeithen has agreed to grant him state funds for the East Baton Rouge Parish Grand Jury probe into crime.

Pitcher said that McKeithen put up $1,500 from his special law enforcement fund to help cover probe expenses.

—Elusive Gordon Novel, who contends he knows a lot about organized crime and criminals in the state, will be granted immunity by McKeithen and Orleans Parish DA Jim Garrison for a visit to Baton Rouge next week, Pitcher said.

—Life Magazine reporter David L. Chandler has been issued a subpena to appear before the Orleans Parish Grand Jury at 10 a.m. Wednesday.

—Gov. McKeithen and one of his opponents in the coming gubernatorial race, U. S. Rep. John Rarick, both addressed the Association of Louisiana Electric Cooperatives in Baton Rouge, commenting on the probe of alleged organized crime.

YOUNG RELEASED

—Pitcher said that former McKeithen aid, Aubrey Young, a key figure in his probe, has been released from custody of the Southeast Louisiana State Mental Hospital at Mandeville.

The East Baton Rouge grand jury met most of the day Friday but returned no indictments when it adjourned about 4:30 p.m. until 9:30 a.m. Wednesday.

Pitcher went to Chicago and said he found out many valuable things from the visit concerning organized crime. He said he was going to tell the grand jury Friday, but grand jury sessions are secret so the Pitcher information was not available to the press.

Novel, wanted by Garrison and McKeithen in connection with his statements concerning the John F. Kennedy assassination probe of Garrison, told Pitcher he would come back to Louisiana from Columbus, Ohio, if granted immunity from arrest regarding the JFK murder investigation.

Pitcher said Novel will have immunity from arrest while in Louisiana and freedom to return to Columbus, or wherever he wants to go. He said the immunity is limited to arrest on any other charges and does not extend to anything involving his appearance.

Only one person has been indicted as result of the crime probes in New Orleans and Baton Rouge. That was D'Alton Smith, a former New Orleans electrical contractor who is accused of public bribery in offering $25,000 to Young to arrange a meeting.

Smith posted a $1,500 fugitive bond in Denton, Tex., and is still at large. A bond of $25,000 has been set for him in Baton Rouge on the bribery charge.

The Orleans Parish Grand Jury, which opened a probe into Life Magazine's charges of organized crime in New Orleans, has not returned an indictment.

McKEITHEN SPEAKS

In his talk Friday before the ALEC, McKeithen stated: "I would never betray the confidence the people have placed in me. If your faith in me has been shaken at all, I want you to know you are looking at a man who has never had anything to do with them (racketeers), and I will never have anything to do with them."

He said there is no doubt that calls came from Carlos Marcello, "if not to the governor's office, to the office next door."

Young has claimed he received two such telephone calls, but Life says as many as 60 may have been placed on a particular telephone. The House speaker's office was next door to the governor's office at the time of the alleged calls.

Addressing the group before McKeithen, Rarick charged that the public is being hoodwinked. "We must think and act for ourselves," he added.

TS PROBE

If the federal government is actually interested in combatting crime, the congressman continued, federal grand juries should be probing crime conditions in Louisiana. He said illicit narcotics traffic, gambling and some interstate prostitution all come under the federal government's jurisdiction.

"The federal government handcuffs our police officers, then accuses us of being the home base of the Costa Nostra," Rarick concluded.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

NOVEL, GORDON



T-P-2[illegible]

DA SAYS STATE [illegible] FUNDS PLEDGED IN CRIME PROBE

Times Picayune

Elusive Novel Will Be Granted Immunity

7 Oct 67

[illegible] John J. McKeithen's two-pronged investigation into organized crime in Louisiana [illegible] for a weekend lull late [illegible] with these developments:

[illegible] Baton Rouge District Atty. Sargent Pitcher said [illegible] McKeithen has agreed to [illegible] state funds for the Baton Rouge Parish Grand Jury['s] into crime.

[illegible] said that McKeithen [illegible] 500 from his special [illegible] fund to help [illegible] expenses [illegible]

[illegible] Gordon Novel, who [illegible] knows a lot about [illegible] and criminals [illegible] will be granted [illegible] McKeithen and [illegible] DA Jim Garrison [illegible] visit to Baton Rouge [illegible] Pitcher [illegible]

[illegible] reporter Da[illegible] been issued [illegible] before the [illegible] Jury at [illegible]

[illegible] grand one of [illegible] coming [illegible] U. S. Rep. [illegible] addressed [illegible] Electric Louisiana [illegible] in Baton [illegible] probe [illegible] on the [illegible] crime [illegible] organized [illegible]

[illegible]

Pitcher [illegible] Keithen [illegible] former Mc[illegible] key figure [illegible] Young, [illegible] been released [illegible] had [illegible] custody of [illegible] Mental [illegible] State [illegible]

[illegible] Jury [illegible] grand [illegible] Fri[illegible] when it adjourned [illegible] until [illegible] day [illegible]

Pitcher [illegible] said he found [illegible] things [illegible] concerning organized crime [illegible] grand jury [illegible] Pitcher [illegible] Novel [illegible] in connection

Cont. on [illegible] Page [illegible], Col. 1

Continued from Pa[illegible]

[illegible] his statements con[illegible] F. Kennedy [illegible] Pitcher of Garrison [illegible] Louisiana would come [illegible] if granted [illegible] Columbus [illegible] rest regarding [illegible] investigation [illegible]

Pitcher said [illegible] immunity from [illegible] in Louisiana [illegible] return to Columbus [illegible] ever he wants to go. He [illegible] the immunity is limited to arrest on any other charges and does not extend to anything involving his appearance.

Only one person has been indicted as result of the crime probes in New Orleans and Baton Rouge. That was D'Alton Smith, a former New Orleans electrical contractor who is accused of public bribery in offering $25,000 to Young to arrange a meeting.

Smith posted a $1,500 fugitive bond in Denton, Tex., and is still at large. A bond of $25,000 has been set for him in Baton Rouge on the bribery charge.

The Orleans Parish Grand Jury, which opened a probe into Life Magazine's charges of organized crime in New Orleans, has not returned an indictment.

McKEITHEN SPEAKS

In his talk Friday before the ALEC, McKeithen stated: "I would never betray the confidence the people have placed in me. If your faith in me has been shaken at all, I want you to know you are looking at a man who has never had anything to do with them (racketeers), and I will never have anything to [illegible] with them."

He [illegible] there is no doubt that [illegible] calls came from Carlos Marcello [illegible]

Young has claimed he received two such telephone calls, but Life says as many as 60 may have been placed on a particular telephone. The House speaker's office was next door to the governor's office at the time of the alleged calls [illegible]

Addressing [illegible] Rarick charged McKeithen [illegible] being [illegible] the public [illegible] "We [illegible] ourselves [illegible]

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

13-00000

Orleans Jury Crime Probe Is Recessed

The Orleans Parish Grand Jury has adjourned its probe of organized crime until next Thursday. The adjournment came after the jury heard an all-star cast of witnesses including the governor and a rackets figure.

Gov. John J. McKeithen said he had no startling revelations during his 90 minutes before the jury yesterday, but "I answered all the questions freely and was glad to do it."

THE GOVERNOR DEMANDED a widespread investigation in the state after Life magazine reported that organized crime was rampant in Louisiana.

The man who Life labeled as the crime kingpin, Carlos Marcello, also testified yesterday. "Lies, all lies," was all he would say when newsmen asked him about Cosa Nostra operations.

The jury also heard Marshall Brown, state Democratic national committeeman

Continued from Page 1

room about five minutes. He declined comment afterwards.

The governor was accompanied by State Police Superintendent Col. Thomas Burbank and two state troopers. McKeithen has been under special guard following a threat against his life.

"WE ARE ANXIOUS to get the facts," he told newsmen outside the grand jury room. "We have no secrets. We will tell everything we know."

Asked if he and District Attorney Jim Garrison are still friends, McKeithen replied, "I hope so. I am running for reelection."

Garrison has hotly disputed claims that organized crime exists in New Orleans. The governor added, "I never specified that organized crime is in Orleans Parish. We've got crime in Louisiana and we are going to get rid of it. Orleans Parish is part of Louisiana."

IN A SEPARATE aspect of the crime probe, fugitive witness Gordon Novel had a promise from Louisiana authorities that he may return to the state without arrest to testify about organized crime.

Efforts to extradite Novel from Ohio to testify in Garrison's probe of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy have been unsuccessful.

Novel claims to have sensational disclosures regarding the crime probe, and offered to testify if protected from arrest in the Kennedy probe.

East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney Sargent Pitcher said yesterday that other prosecuting authorities have consented to give Novel immunity from arrest if he

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

1/23/68

NOVEL, GORDON

13-00000

JURY CALLS BROWN IN N.O. CRIME PROBE

Times Picayune

Subpena Served Directing Governor to Appear

5 Oct 67

The name of J. Marshall Brown, Democratic national committeeman from Louisiana, was added to the list of those scheduled to appear before the Orleans Parish Grand Jury in its probe of organized crime.

A subpena was issued for him by the District Attorney's Office Wednesday.

Deputies of Criminal Sheriff Louis A. Heyd Jr. said Brown's subpena, which directs him to appear at 11 a.m. Thursday, was served personally in New Orleans.

Earlier Wednesday, chief deputy's assistant Barney Kilbride served a subpena directing Gov. John J. McKeithen to appear at 2 p.m. Thursday on William V. Redmann, executive counsel to the governor, in Baton Rouge.

Previously Jefferson Parish racket figure Carlos Marcello and two of his brothers, Samuel and Peter, were also subpenaed to appear Thursday.

Meanwhile Wednesday, East Baton Rouge District Attorney Sargent Pitcher, conducting his own crime investigation, said in Chicago that he has met with "tremendous success and accomplishments" on a trip to gather information about organized crime.

YOUNG ACCOMPANIES

Pitcher, who said details will be made public at the proper time, was accompanied to Chicago by Aubrey Young, a former aide to McKeithen.

Young's testimony before the East Baton Rouge Grand Jury has led to one indictment already in that jury's investigation of organized crime.

McKeithen was attending the Washington Parish Fair in Franklinton when his subpena was served. Redmann said the governor would have appeared on invitation without the subpena.

District Attorney Jim Garrison Tuesday first had invited the governor to appear in New Orleans, then subpenaed him.

Garrison, when asked why he issued the subpena, said, "Originally I was following protocol and then I decided this is no time for protocol.

"We want to find out what these allegations of organized crime are all about and, so far, nobody seems to know except what they read in Life Magazine.

ETHICS UNIT TO PROBE

"We are going to call everybody we think can shed some light on this thing. If we have to we'll call the ambassador to the United Nations."

Also Wednesday the head of the State Police announced that the identity of a person who made a telephone call threatening McKeithen's life is known.

Col. Thomas Burbank described the man as a mental case and said that he is from New Orleans. Police have the man under observation, Burbank said.

Col. Burbank also announced

Cont. in Sec. 1, Page 18, Col. 2

1/27/68

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

NOVEL, GORDON

13-00000



Subpena Server Seeking Governor

Orleans Parish Chief Deputy Sheriff Bobby Kilbride today was seeking to serve a subpena on Gov. John J. McKeithen to testify before the grand jury here on racketeering influences.

Kilbride was scheduled to go to Baton Rouge today to try to see the governor.

District Attorney Jim Garrison first said he was inviting McKeithen to testify, then issued the subpena, returnable tomorrow.

THE GOVERNOR, who under the law cannot be forced to testify, has said he would be glad to talk with the grand jury if he could be of help.

Meanwhile, East Baton Rouge Parish DA Sargent Pitcher went to Chicago to question Gordon Novel, the elusive witness sought by Garrison in his probe of the assassination of President John Kennedy.

Pitcher took with him an assistant and the foreman of the East Baton Rouge grand jury, which is also probing [illegible]

McKEITHEN HAD urged Pitcher to make every effort possible to get testimony from Novel, who claimed he would make sensational disclosures in a suit to be filed in Chicago [illegible] against Garrison and others.

Novel once installed electronic de-bugging devices in the governor's office, and carries a card naming him a colonel on the governor's staff.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Today's Chuckle

A man is in love when he wants to call a girl by his last name.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

[illegible] resumed its crime probe this morning. Telephone company officials were expected to bring in records sought by the jury in connection with the testimony of Aubrey Young, a former aide to McKeithen.

YOUNG ALLEGEDLY received calls while still on the governor's staff from rackets figure Carlos Marcello.

Young testified for two days last week. The jury indicted D'Alton Smith, a New Orleans contractor, for public bribery. The indictment said Smith offered Young $25,000 to influence him in his position.

Pitcher said the alleged bribery attempt was connected with an effort to try free the Jimmy Hoffa, the Teamster boss in prison for jury tampering.

Smith surrendered yesterday in Denton, Tex., and was

Jury—

Continued from Page 1

put under $1,500 fugitive bond.

IN ANOTHER development, McKeithen ordered the [illegible] police credentials of [illegible] (Zip) Chimento, an investigator for [illegible] Parish [illegible] picked up. A state police spokesman said the order was carried out.

The move resulted from statements by Life Magazine about Chimento in one of several articles on racketeering. Life said Chimento was a collector for Marcello's jukebox firm before joining the DA's staff.

[illegible] said Chimento was one of the best employes [illegible]

[illegible] WORLD [illegible]

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

NOVEL, GORDON

13-00000

Oct 67

PICAYUNE, NEW ORLEANS, LA., SUNDAY MORNING, O

Novel Believes Young Is Scapegoat in Probe

Speaks of Action in State from Ohio

BATON ROUGE, La. (AP)—Gordon Novel, sought for questioning in New Orleans Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison's Kennedy assassination probe, said Saturday a former aide to Gov. John McKeithen is an obvious scapegoat in a probe of criminal influence on state government.

Novel described Aubrey Young as "one of the finest people I know as a human being," adding: "It looks like he is talking pretty good. Maybe he's trying to pay some people back."

Novel, reached in Columbus, Ohio, said the crime investigation is intermixed with the assassination probe, which he called a Garrison hoax.

He offered to return to Louisiana and testify in the crime probe if given immunity from Garrison, who has tried without success to have Novel extradited.

WON'T HEAR ME

He can give valuable information, Novel said, but "a lot of people down there don't want to hear me talk."

Novel was asked if he supplied Life magazine with information on telephone conversations between Young and Carlos Marcello, New Orleans area rackets figure.

"I would rather not say," Novel said. "Is that a pretty big rumor down there now? The people of Louisiana haven't seen anything yet."

Young, who turned state's evidence which has led to the indictment of one man for bribery, is a former security officer for McKeithen. He had testified two days before the East Baton Rouge Parish grand jury.

Young bought bugging and debugging equipment from Novel in [illegible] for the governor's office, Novel said. Young also is the person who gave him a controversial brigadier general's commission on the governor's staff.

SHARK AFTER SHARK

McKeithen has said Young denied giving Novel the commission and the governor has denied having any connection with Novel, a former New Orleans [illegible] operator.

Novel said the crime investigation is like a pool of sharks after each other.

He said he will file suit Friday, Oct. 13, in Chicago for libel against Garrison, Truth and Consequences, the group financing the Garrison probe, and Playboy magazine. He said these persons probably will have to go to Chicago.

He promised later to expose prominent Baton Rouge and New Orleans persons in what he called a graveyard party, "in which a corpse in a coffin will be dug up."

Novel said also he will shed light on the selection of the domed stadium site in New Orleans, "who selected the site and why."

NOVEL, GORDON

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

BROWN CALLED IN CRIME PROBE

Continued from Page 1

he has turned over to the Louisiana Commission on Governmental Ethics an investigation into the activities of State Police Capt. Roland Coppola of Lafayette. Coppola was suspended as a troop commander after Life reported he associated with rackets figures.

Gordon Novel, who has figured prominently in Garrison's Kennedy death plot, said Wednesday he has offered to testify before the East Baton Rouge jury on organized crime provided immunity from Garrison be guaranteed.

GOING TO OHIO

Pitcher had said he was going to go to Columbus, Ohio, to ask Novel about his claim of having information. He planned to go on to Ohio from Chicago.

Novel said he sent a wire to Pitcher. The telegram follows:

"Dear Sir: Upon consulting with my noted attorney, Mr. Jerry Weiner of Columbus, Ohio, pertaining to your recent statements relative to my 'putting up or shutting up' I hereby formally offer to come to Baton Rouge, La., immediately to testify about matters relative to my recent press statement and your belated investigation and will furnish facts, figures, documents, plans, recordings, etc. about these [illegible] where I am currently being fraudently prosecuted for such time as is necessary to render the data and testimony before your grand jury and am permitted to return at my free will to the state of Ohio without any further persecution and political harassment.

how many at that time, Pitcher said.

A federal court hearing on a bid for a new trial for international Teamsters boss James Hoffa was held in Chicago. The bid is at the center of Pitcher's jury investigation.

D'Alton Smith, former New Orleans [illegible], has been indicted on a charge of perjury as a result of the investigation.

Young allegedly was offered $25,000 to arrange a meeting between Smith and Baton Rouge Teamster boss Edward Partin.

SURRENDER TOLD

According to Partin the meeting was to get him to change his testimony which was instrumental in sending Hoffa to federal prison.

The East Baton Rouge sheriff's office reported that a man identifying himself as Smith surrendered in Denton, Tex., and posted a $1,500 fugitive bond.

Wednesday, [illegible] Smith's attorney [illegible] reported ready to produce him in court at Denton.

The East Baton Rouge jury is also investigating influence Marcello may have had in telephone conversations between him and Young.

Pitcher said no link has been established between Marcello's calls and the Partin affair. He said one of his investigations is into organized crime in East Baton Rouge [illegible] and that the other is a bribery charge.

WORKING ON BOTH

"We are working on both. I can't tell whether they have any linking or not at this time," Pitcher said.

New Orleans Criminal District Court Judge Malcolm V. O'Hara was also involved in the Hoffa case. At the Chicago hearing, O'Hara testified that he was the companion of Zachary Strate, a convicted felon, who paid his expenses.

The federal grand jury in New Orleans is probing that aspect of the case.

Life Magazine in a series of articles first disclosed the connection between Young and Smith and between Young and Marcello. Young became a star witness with the grand jury following his dismissal from the governor's staff.

[illegible] the necessary immunity document or shut up. Sincerely, Gordon Novel."

PLEDGE OF ACCORD

Meanwhile, Pitcher had sent a telegram to Weiner in Columbus, offering to meet Novel anywhere in the nation and examine Novel's information.

"Your refusal to accept this reasonable request can only be interpreted as an admission on your part that you have attempted to sensationalize fictitious or nonexistent evidence or to obtain immunity for yourself from crimes best known to yourself," Pitcher said.

Pitcher told Novel if his information was of value he was confident Gov. McKeithen, Garrison and other state prosecutors would honor his request for immunity from arrest while in Louisiana to testify before the Baton Rouge Grand Jury.

Pitcher said Garrison had been advised of the reply and had given his "complete pledge of cooperation and accord."

The East Baton Rouge jury, which met Wednesday, was expected to recess until Pitcher returns, probably Thursday or Friday. Telephone company officials were expected to take records in connection with testimony by Young to the jury.

INVOLVES MANY

"All I have to say is that the trip to Chicago has been marked with tremendous success and accomplishments," Pitcher said. "The details and significance of our findings will be revealed later, when the time is appropriate."

He flatly stated, "when it comes out, it will be real good."

His Chicago information involves many more people in the investigation, but he was unable to disclose who and

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

To Mr. Stevens

Solie Bb [illegible]

minor point of possible interest to Mr. M. Stevens in re Novel/May, etal, is info we had that draft letter was found (allegedly) under piece of linoleum covering sink drainboard rather than a rug. Also still question of who may have written draft letter and, of course, and most importantly, why Novel may be trying to link himself to CIA is obscure - to say the least.

JM
10 July 67

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

~~SECRET~~

Chief, SRS 5 July 1967

M. D. Stevens

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

OSWALD Case
MAY, Hoke Smith, # 167314

1. Note in the attached New Orleans States-Item articles that it reportedly was to Hoke MAY, a reporter of that newspaper, that an incriminating letter which Gordon NOVEL allegedly wrote to a Mr. WEISS, who was "presumably connected with CIA," was delivered.

2. According to the States-Item articles of 26 May 1967, the letter, which appeared to be a draft, had been found under a rug in an apartment occupied by NOVEL prior to his departure from New Orleans in about mid-March 1957, and had been turned over to the boyfriend of one of two girls who found it while cleaning the apartment. The boyfriend had turned it over to his professor at a New Orleans university who is a friend of Reporter Hoke MAY, and he delivered it to MAY. (NOVEL's attorney has stated that NOVEL worked for CIA in New Orleans in 1961).

linoleum covering sink drainboard

3. Hoke MAY, without question, is Subject who in April 1958 was granted a Covert Security Approval for unwitting use by Project FJINDULGE. MAY was not to be directly employed by FJINDULGE but was to be used in connection with his position with a private firm which handled work for the Project.

4. Investigation of Subject by this Agency in February/March 1958 reflected nothing of a derogatory nature. It did indicate, however, that he has in the past had an interest in politics and in 1952 was employed as political campaign manager in the unsuccessful race of a candidate for Congress from Georgia. Subject's grandfather was a Governor of Georgia and later a Senator from that State. Subject has been employed by various newspapers, including the New York Times (October 1948-March 1949). There is no information in Subject's file subsequent to his Covert Security Approval dated April 1958.

M. D. Stevens

MDS:apk

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

FOLLOWS DEVIOUS PATH

'Letter' by Novel Adds to Mystery

A letter written by fugitive witness Gordon Novel added a new cloak-and-dagger twist today to the Kennedy assassination probe.

Attorney Steven Plotkin said Novel actually wrote the communication. Further, he said his client was working for the Central Intelligence Agency here in 1961.

But Novel called the letter a "trap" set for Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison, who is attempting to bring Novel back to New Orleans for questioning.

WHATEVER THE authenticity of the document, the circumstances of its discovery read like a chapter in a who-done-it.

The letter came into the hands of States-Item reporter Hoke May. This is how it happened:

The letter turned up when two girls were doing their spring housecleaning. It was well hidden in the fugitive witness's French Quarter apartment.

SO WELL HIDDEN, in fact, that a team of Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents and officers from Garrison's investigative squad missed it when they searched the rooms after Novel left town in March.

The girls, who rented the Novel apartment after his departure, found it during a thorough housecleaning and refurbishing session.

One of them turned it over to her boy friend. He, in turn, showed it to his professor at a New Orleans university.

The professor is a friend of May's.

THE LETTER was addressed to a Mr. Weiss and probably was written in late January or early February of this year, judging by the time sequence it describes.

When a copy was sent to him, Plotkin reviewed its contents, spoke to his client and told the States-Item Novel had drafted the letter.

He said, "Everything in the letter as far as Novel is concerned is actually the truth."

The contents of the missive are compounded of cryptic references, code names and a plea for Weiss to get Novel "out of this mess" by an unspecified date in March of 1967.

THE LETTER appears to be a draft which later might be recopied or typed. There is no indication it was ever mailed, however, and Plotkin said he does not know whether the draft was sent to the addressee."

Presumably, Weiss is connected with the CIA.

Novel departed New Orleans about mid-March after receiving a subpena to testify in Garrison's Kennedy death plot investigation. He went to McLean, Va., the headquarters of the CIA.

HE WAS MET there by a former official of the Justice Department who now works for one of the radio-television networks.

The 29-year-old former bar owner took a lie detector test at McLean and ducked under cover for another few days, a time when he was reported to be in Montreal.

His next appearance was at Gahanna, Ohio, a Columbus suburb where he was arrested April 1 on a warrant from Garrison who charged him with conspiracy to burglarize a munitions dump at Houma in 1961.

AN INDEPENDENT handwriting expert says the letter is in Novel's handwriting. The expert, Gilbert Fortier of New Orleans, compared the penciled letter with other samples of Novel's writing and printing.

"It is my conclusion that the same person who wrote the handwriting specimens also wrote the draft to Mr. Weiss," Fortier asserted.

He said he checked especially for the possibility the letter might be a forgery but concluded it was not probable.

"It was written too easily and too freely to have been forged," Fortier said.

THE LETTER to Weiss begins:

"This letter is to inform you that District (Attorney) Jim Garrison has subpenaed myself and an associate to testify before his Grand Jury on matters which may be classified TOP SECRET. Actions of individuals connected with DOUBLE-CHEK CORPORATION in Miami in first quarter of 1961."

(The authoritative book, "The Invisible Government," identified Double-Chek Corp. of Miami as a CIA front organization which recruited pilots and other Cuban personnel for the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961.)

"**WE HAVE NO** current contact available to inform of this situation," the letter continues. "So I took the liberty of writing you direct and apprising you of current situation . . . expecting you to forward this through appropriate channels.

"Our connection and activity of that period involved individuals presently . . . about to be indicted as conspirators in Mr. Garrison's investigation.

"We have temporarily avoided one subpena not to reveal Double-Chek activities or associate them with this mess. We want out of this thing before Thursday 3/ /67. Our attorneys have been told to expect another subpena to appear and testify on this matter. The Fifth Amendment and/or immunity (and) legal tactics will not suffice.

"**MR. GARRISON** is in possession of unsworn portions of this testimony. He is unaware of Double-Chek's involvement in this matter but has strong suspicions. I have been questioned extensively by local FBI recently as to whether or not I was involved with Double-Chek's parent holding corporation during the time. My reply on five queries was negative.

"Bureau unaware of Double-Chek association in this matter. Our attorneys and others are in possession of complete sealed files containing all information concerning matters.

"In event of our sudden departure, either accidental or otherwise, they are instructed to simultaneously release same for public scrutiny in different areas.

"**APPROPRIATE** counteraction relative to Garrison's inquisition concerning us may best be handled through military channels vis (a) vis D.I.A. man. Garrison is presently colonel in Louisiana Army National Guard and has ready reserve status. Contact may be had through our attorneys of record, Plotkin, Alvarez, Sapir."

Plotkin confirmed that he has tapes and records held in

New Orleans
States-Item
26 May 67

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

DA Seeking Copies of 'CIA' Letter by Novel

Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison today asked for copies of a letter purportedly directed to the Central Intelligence Agency by fugitive witness Gordon Novel.

The letter, which Novel's lawyer said was written by his client, came into the possession of the States-Item. It was reported to have been found in Novel's former apartment in the French Quarter.

It apparently was written before Novel's departure from New Orleans after he was subpenaed to testify in Garrison's Kennedy death plot investigation.

NOVEL, WANTED both as a material witness and on charges of conspiracy to burglarize a munitions dump at Houma, is free on $10,000 bond at Columbus, Ohio, awaiting an extradition hearing.

A copy and transcript of the pencilled draft were given to Steven Plotkin, Novel's New Orleans attorney, early this week. Yesterday, Plotkin said his client worked for the Central Intelligence Agency here during 1961.

Plotkin said Novel wrote the draft, and added, "everything . . . as far as Novel is concerned, is actually the truth."

But Novel appeared to contradict his lawyer late yesterday when he said the letter was a "final trap" for Garrison.

"Mr. Garrison has finally fallen into the last trap. I thought his fine Cajun gumshoes were going to miss it. Under the rug ha, ha"

ACTUALLY, THE letter was delivered to the States-Item by a college professor who is a friend of a reporter on the staff. A student gave it to him, and the student received the letter from a girl friend who is renting Novel's former apartment. It was found under linoleum on the kitchen sink drainboard.

Hoke May

Noting a story about the letter in yesterday's final edition, Garrison asked the States-Item to give his office copies. He would not comment further.

The statement by his attorney that Novel worked for the CIA here confirmed a report of the witness' government activities published first in the States-Item on April [illegible].

Garrison has charged the CIA with engaging in a "monstrous coverup" following the Kennedy assassination and of duping the Warren Commission into inaccurate conclusions.

The Warren Commission concluded that Kennedy was slain by a Communist-oriented, disgruntled youth, Lee Harvey Oswald. It said it could find no evidence that Oswald was aided by anyone.

GARRISON HAS said that Latin adventurers employed in CIA-sponsored anti-Castro operations killed Kennedy out of anger over an abrupt end of their support by the U.S. government.

Plotkin said Novel worked with the CIA as an "intermediary" with anti-Castro Cubans, but he said his client's CIA activities "had little or nothing to do with the Bay of Pigs invasion and certainly had nothing to do with the assassination of President Kennedy."

Sunday, Novel told police he was fired upon several times by a hidden sniper in Nashville, Tenn. He said he was wounded by flying glass. A Nashville radio-TV newsman who was with him told the same story.

In the letter draft, which Plotkin said Novel wrote, the 29-year-old former bar owner asked "Mr. Weiss" to get him out of "this mess" by an unspecified date in March.

The letter says the writer had received one subpena to testify in the Garrison probe but has been able to avoid it. It adds that attorneys have informed him other subpenas would be issued.

The letter asks Weiss to help him so that he will not have to reveal "top secret" activities of an organization he refers to as Double-Chek Corp. of Miami.

New Orleans States-Item
5/26/67, (7)

1019

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

NAME OF SUBJECT: Gordon Novel's file (Oswald case)

FILE NO.:

KEY TO ANALYSIS SYMBOLS*
NI = NOT IDENTICAL
I-ND = IDENTICAL - NOT DEROGATORY
U-ND=UNABLE TO IDENTIFY-NOT DEROGATORY
SA = SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS (To be completed by requester)

✓	SEARCH NAMES AS WRITTEN	☐	SEARCH OVERT CARDS ONLY
☐	SEARCH NAME VARIATIONS (Record known to exist)	☐	SEARCH COVERT CARDS ONLY
☐	SRD/CAB ANALYSIS OF FILES	☐	SEARCH SUBJECT CARDS ONLY
☐	INDICES CHECK ONLY (Do not pull files)	☐	SEARCH ALL CARDS

NO.	NAME - LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE (Type or print)	SOURCE DOCUMENT	PAGE	RESULTS OVERT	RESULTS COVERT
1	SHERIDAN, WALTER	Wash NBC reporter - Novel said had tele. No.	③, 6		
2	PLOTKIN, STEVEN	Rocca memo 5/31/67 - Novel's N.O. lawyer	P3	NR	
3	WEINER, JERRY	" Novel's Columbus Ohio lawyer	P4	NR	
4	GURVICH, WILLIAM	" Garrison's chief investigator	P5	NR	
5	GURVITCH, "			NR	
6	GOURVICH, "			NR	
7	GOURVITCH, "			NR	
8	MARTENS, LAYTON PATRICK	" Roomed with [illegible] Ferrie	5	see Oswald file clip. 4/6/67	
9	WALKER, CHARLES F.	"	6		
10	MAY, HOKE	Clipping 5/26/67			

NAMES CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

NO.	FILE NO.	TYPE	REFERENCE DOCUMENT	PAGE	ANALYSIS* OR CHARGEOUT
			(attached to memo July '67)		

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

RESULTS CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

REQUESTER (Name - Component - Extension): Stevens SRS

DATE COMPLETED:

APPROVE FOR FILING (Initials):

FORM 1-63 745 REPLACES FORMS 745, 1734, AND 1735 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

INDICES SEARCH REQUEST

~~SECRET~~ GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (38-43)

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

```
CNTL NO 1019   REQUESTOR STEVENS      OFFICE SRS                     09JUN67
CNTL1019 SHERIDAN,WALTER                                             DOB       P99
  SHERIDAN,WALTER JAMES                                    OS  BC  R101572 ✓
```

Does not appear ident.

```
  /Z 1204373
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  SHERIDAN,WALTER JAMES                                    CS  BC  R095190-988 ✓
  /B  NY 20NOV1925
  /Z 1205205
```

Flag sheet by WAO noted all papers pulled & filed in from Covert #95790 to Overt #101,572

```
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
CNTL1019 PLOTKIN,STEVEN                                              DOB       P99
  NO RECORD AS SUBMITTED ABOVE
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
CNTL1019 WEINER,JERRY                                                DOB       P99
  WEINER,J                                                 OR  BC  U364060
  /D DW  19JAN35 P8   /L *MAS,BOSTON
  /Z 1418999
```

No reason to believe would be ident.

```
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
CNTL1019 GURVICH,WILLIAM                                             DOB       P99
  NO RECORD AS SUBMITTED ABOVE
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
CNTL1019 GURVITCH,WILLIAM                                            DOB       P99
  NO RECORD AS SUBMITTED ABOVE
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
CNTL1019 GOURVICH,WILLIAM                                            DOB       P99
  NO RECORD AS SUBMITTED ABOVE
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
CNTL1019 GOURVITCH,WILLIAM                                           DOB       P99
  NO RECORD AS SUBMITTED ABOVE
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
```

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

```
CNTL NO 1019   REQUESTOR STEVENS     OFFICE SRS                        09JUN67
CNTL1019 MARTENS,LAYTON PATRICK                                      DOB      P99

  MARTENS,LAYTON                                        OR  67  M351164
  /Y M  /D CLP 06APR67 WAS DAILY NEWS OSWALD,LEE H
  /Z 2095255

  --------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
CNTL1019 WALKER,CHARLES F                                            DOB      P99

  WALKER,CHARLES F                                      OR  65  C408647 ✓
  /B S HILL VIR 24FEB1935  /D LTR 20OCT65 WTC
  /Z 1396953

  --------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  WALKER,CHARLES FERGUSON                               CS  65  R471801 ✓
  /B WINCHESTER MAS 24OCT1926  /C USA  /O *USE  /Y M  /E DIA
  /Z 1398332

  --------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  WALKER,CHARLES                                        OS  66  R447296 ✓
                        a misc. file (cards only) on
  /Z 1396947
                        various Charles Walkers (too numerous to check)
  --------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  WALKER,CHARLES                                        OR  54  R070225
  /Q 28  /D SOR ELLIOTT,CHARLES SPENCER  /R MAY OR MAY NOT BE IW E000764-GC
  /L *DC ,WAS 316 5TH ST SE                 Wouldn't seem ident
  /Z 1396949

  --------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
CNTL1019 MAY,HOKE                                                    DOB      P99

  MAY,HOKE SMITH                  Ident                 CS  BC  R167314 ✓
  /W 65-0583013
  /Z 0844952                 (See memo 5 July 67)

  --------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  MAY,H L                                               OR  BC  R000691
  /T  MR+PRES  /Y M  /W 67-0343019  /E MAY DRUG CO+MAY BLDG+PITTSBURGH,PA
  /D RPT 05OCT44 P2 PERVY,ADOLPHE
  /Z 0844912                              not checked

  --------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
  MAY,H S                                               OR  BC  M351533
  /D FBI 06JUL54 P2 RICHEMOND,PIERRE
  /Z 0844913                              not checked

  --------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO-------------------------
```

~~SECRET~~

13-00000

CLASSIFICATION

Zighe

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD	DATE
SUBJECT	FILE NUMBER

[redacted]

WASH. POST
5-26-67

[redacted]

Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination, worked for the Central Intelligence Agency in early 1961, Novel's attorney said yesterday.

The attorney, Steve Plotkin said Novell served as an intermediary between the CIA and anti-Castro Cubans in New Orleans and Miami before the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Plotkin maintained, though, that Novel had little or nothing to do with the Bay of Pigs invasion and certainly had absolutely nothing to do with the assassination of President Kennedy.

Garrison has charged that the CIA fomented a monstrous coverup to dupe the Warren Commission in its investigation of the assassination.

Plotkin made his statement after the New Orleans States-Item said it had discovered a letter written by Novel apparently to a CIA official named "Mr. Weiss" and asking that he be taken "out of this mess" in March of this year.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE
	NOVEL, GORDON

FORM 1954
7-62

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

13-00000

Novel Admitted Bunker Theft, Rhodes Is Told

Continued from Page 1

New Orleans to Houma at night in a Lincoln automobile owned and driven by Gordon Novel and in a panel truck.

"AFTER ARRIVING at the site of the bunker, which was leased by Schlumberger Well Services Corp., the defendant, Gordon Novel, Sergio Arcacha-Smith, David W. Ferrie, and others, unnamed, unlawfully entered it by cutting the lock with a pair of bolt cutters which had been brought along for the purpose.

"After entry into the bunker (they) took various forms of explosives and munitions. Thereafter they returned to the city of New Orleans with the stolen munitions."

The extradition papers also included a photograph of Novel identified by a former girl friend, Marlene Mancuso, 42 Oaklawn dr., Metairie, who had dated Novel in 1961.

THE DOCUMENTS also contain a copy of the simple burglary charge leveled against Novel and Arcacha by the sheriff of Terrebonne Parish. The affidavit was signed by Capt. Bert Boyne.

Meanwhile, the DA's office said a new figure in the investigation scheduled for questioning today was interviewed last night by a Garrison aide.

A DA's office spokesman declined to say what questions were asked or what information was obtained from the man.

He is Juan M. Valdes, a self-described Latin playwright who figured in one of the city's more sensational murders. A subpena was issued for him yesterday.

Valdes in the summer of 1964 discovered the mutilated body of Dr. Mary Stults Sherman, a women physician who occupied the same St. Charles ave. apartment building where the summoned witness lives.

HE WAS investigating smoke coming from the Sherman apartment when he stumbled onto the body. Dr. Sherman's killer, who has never been found, tried to burn the body.

Garrison would not comment on what questions will be asked Valdes.

AR

Another Latin, 30-year-old Carlos Quiroga, spent two hours and ten minutes before the grand jury yesterday and emerged without comment.

QUIROGA, a Cuban exile, was once a close friend and associate of a fugitive witness from the Garrison inquiry, 44-year-old Sergio Arcacha Smith,

---

Novel Admitted Bunker Theft, Rhodes Is Told

An affidavit filed with new extradition papers sent to Columbus, Ohio, claims that Gordon Novel admitted his part in a burglary of a munitions bunker in Houma in 1961.

The new extradition papers were sent to Ohio Gov. James Rhodes as part of Orleans Parish Dist. Attorney Jim Garrison's efforts to bring Novel back to Louisiana on a burglary conspiracy charge.

Garrison wants Novel in connection with his investigation of President Kennedy's assassination.

James L. Alcock, an assistant district attorney, said in the affidavit:

"The said Gordon Novel responded to questioning by Jim Garrison, district attorney for the Parish of Orleans, and William Gurvich, investigative aide to Jim Garrison, that he and the parties named herein did in fact commit the conspiracy and burglary outlined above."

In the body of the affidavit, Alcock declared that Novel, Sergio Arcacha Smith, David W. Ferrie and other unnamed persons "did conspire, agree, and combine to burglarize a munitions bunker located in Houma, La."

He said the conspiracy was entered into in New Orleans at the home of Arcacha.

Alcock said that the men went to Houma on or about Aug. 21, 1961.

"The trip was made from

(Turn to Page 4, Column 5)

vBL, GORDON

New Orleans States-Item
25 May '67

CIA HISTORICAL/REVIEW PROGRAM

13-00000

[illegible]

MAY 15 1967

Lane Stalks Out of Parley With Novel

COLUMBUS, Ohio (AP)— Author Mark Lane and Gordon Novel, figures in controversies surrounding the death of President John F. Kennedy, had harsh words for each other after Lane stalked out of a meeting he had sought to discuss the New Orleans assassination probe.

Lane, author of "Rush to Judgment," first book challenging the validity of the Warren Commission report, yesterday met privately with Novel, wanted in New Orleans as a material witness in Dist. Atty. Jim Garrison's Investigation.

Novel's Columbus attorney, Jerry Weiner, said the meeting, arranged at Lane's request, involved mostly questioning of his client by the author. When Novel started to question Lane, Weiner said, the author refused to answer.

Both men talked freely with reporters afterward.

Novel, a former New Orleans night club operator, branded Lane a "publicity man for Jim Garrison" and asserted he is "doing propaganda work for the district attorney."

Lane charged that a sodium amytal (truth serum) test given Novel in Columbus a few weeks ago was "rigged." Lane said Novel "hedged on questions" he answered during the test and that he "wasn't telling very much."

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

1/22/68

NOVEL, GORDON

MAY 1 5 1967

Lane and Novel Confrontation Produces Heat, but Little Light

By Abe Zaidan

Special to The Washington Post

COLUMBUS, Ohio, May 14—Clearly, the spirit was not in keeping with that warm, deep-down-inside feeling of Mother's Day.

Mark Lane, the author, lecturer and critic of the Warren Commission Report, hissed that he had been libeled, and left in a huff.

Gordon Novel, whom New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison has described as a key witness in the Kennedy assassination probe, fumed that Lane was nothing more than a "propagandist" for Garrison anyway.

Jerry Weiner, Novel's Columbus attorney, glumly allowed as how he might have spent the morning on the golf course if Lane hadn't insisted on the rendezvous with his client. But then he went into detail about Novel's pending libel suit against Garrison and his circle of financial backers in New Orleans.

The only show of cordiality came when an office secretary asked for Lane's autograph. He responded graciously.

The encounter in Weiner's law offices this morning started when Lane asked to talk with Novel before driving on to Denison University at Granville, Ohio, for an afternoon lecture.

What got Lane really worked up was a 17-point questionnaire that Weiner's private investigator, Stan Greenbaum, distributed to the handful of newsmen while Weiner, Lane and Novel talked things over behind closed doors.

The questionnaire, which Novel wanted Lane to answer while strapped to a lie detector, was a masterpiece of Red-baiting.

His loyalty challenged, Lane put newsmen on notice that the statement was libelous. He accused Weiner of "unethical" conduct.

Weiner, who revealed equal surprise at Novel's assault, apologized. But Lane assured everyone that he would never come back. By this time, Weiner was saying he wouldn't invite Lane back anyway.

Lane said he came to discuss the case with Novel because of the author's continuing interest in it. But he said he was leaving with reason to believe that Novel is not "at all being frank."

He charged that an earlier lie detector test which purported to clear Novel of involvement in the assassination conspiracy was "rigged by segments of the media." This, he said, plainly meant the National Broadcasting Co. and Hearst Headline Service, who paid for the test.

"If Novel has nothing to hide, he ought to appear before the grand jury in New Orleans," Lane contended.

"If I went there," Novel responded indignantly, "I'd be incarcerated for life."

Novel is facing extradition on charges that he burglarized a munitions dump in Houma, La. He has maintained that Garrison's whole case has been a fraud. Lane has been saying that Garrison has the case wrapped up.

And Greenbaum plaintively remarked to everyone this morning that "it's nice to know we're on the right side. We're the ones who are defending our Government."

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

1/27/68

NOVEL, GORDON

104-10305-10005

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

23 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Bruce L. Solie
Chief, Security Analysis Group

SUBJECT: NAGELL, Richard Case
#264 170

1. This memorandum identifies those Office of Security files which were reviewed by House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members in conjunction with the HSCA's investigation into the deaths of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. Under procedures established with the HSCA, certain items of information were not reviewed by HSCA staff members. These items were placed in envelopes, sealed, appropriately identified, and put back into the security file prior to HSCA review. Office of Security personnel reviewing these files should maintain the integrity of each envelope below so that interested parties may know what was and was not reviewed by HSCA staff members.

3. In some instances, the above files contain material marked in the lower right-hand corner with a green circular dot. This mark should alert Office of Security personnel to the fact that this material was located and placed in the file at the time of the HSCA review and was seen by an HSCA staffer(s). This material should not be removed from the file.

4. Attached to this memorandum is a review sheet which identifies the name of the HSCA reviewer(s) and the date of his review.

5. Questions regarding the above procedure and/or the HSCA's review should be directed to the Security Analysis Group.

(BD w/o

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
9/2/98 dd

✓ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Bruce L. Solie

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

ILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: NAGELL, Richard Case
264 170

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1958 - 1975

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OS/Sag

ROOM: 4E-13

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Five sealed envelopes

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

~~SECRET~~

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

Registered Mail

August 12, 1975

Ms. Penelope Grenoble, Editor
Los Angeles Free Press
5850 Hollywood Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90028

Dear Ms. Grenoble:

This letter is in response to the distortions and outright falsities printed about me in the article written by William W. Turner, titled BANK ROBBER, 'MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE' LINKED TO JFK ASSASSINATION PROBE, which appeared in the July 25-31 edition of the Los Angeles Free Press

I request that the Free Press either print a retraction of such lies and distortions or publish this letter.

Mr. Turner, who spent ten years as a Special Agent of the FBI, is not unfamiliar to me. He has authored similar articles, both during my imprisonment in the United States and while I was detained in the German Democratic Republic, in which he knowingly and purposefully cited numerous lies about me. He has proved himself adept at putting words in my mouth and misquoting his sources of information to lend credence to his major untruths, a skill he probably developed while serving with the Bureau's intelligence-security division. His recent claims cause me to wonder whether or not he ever left the FBI.

Professor Richard H. Popkin, from whom Mr. Turner obviously collected much of his latest baloney, is a character that I feel should either purchase a hearing aid or consult a psychiatrist. Each of my so-called discussions with him (all but one occurred over the telephone) were duly tape-recorded by me, and if he did in fact assert what Mr. Turner has attributed to him about me, then he too is a liar.

I am listing the following facts in rebuttal to the Turner-Popkin fable:

The "papers" that I "carried" when arrested did not show me to be a "decorated hero of the Korean War," nor did they reveal anything about "a career in Army intelligence." More to the point, the documents found in my possession and under my control (some of which were returned to me only last year by the FBI) ensured my incarceration for a longer period than I had anticipated. They also guaranteed my being held practically incommunicado for many months (for eleven months I was not even permitted to read a newspaper), not to mention the curtailment of my most basic constitutional safeguards.

My contacts with Lee Harvey Oswald did not entail any "friendship," nor were they effected for the purpose of establishing rapport.

After my acquittal (in 1968, not in 1967) I did not "drop from sight," as Mr. Turner, the FBI and the CIA damn well know.

I have never stated to anybody, either verbally or in writing, that in 1963 I was an agent for the CIA, although in 1974 I did state, under oath, that I thought I had been functioning for the CIA during part of 1963. Mr. Turner is also aware that less than two months after President Kennedy's death FBI agents confronted me with their suspicion that I had "acted as an unregistered agent for a foreign power," inferring that I was a spy for one of the Cuban intelligence services (several years later the CIA, through one of its "former" case officers, accused me of having been a Soviet spy; still later, one FBI agent suggested that I had worked for the Chinese).

The registered letter that was dispatched at my instance to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover in September 1963 (not necessarily on the 13th) revealed sufficient details to warrant an immediate investigation (if not the arrest) of Lee Harvey Oswald and two Cuban refugees. I certainly "assumed" that some "action" would be taken by the FBI.

I was not the least bit "frantic" about anything in September 1963. I did not set foot inside the Republic of Cuba during that month. To my knowledge I have never talked to any "Castro aides." The main distinction between some American intelligence officers that I knew and hired killers were the procedures utilized in murdering their victims and/or the methods used to disassociate themselves and the U. S. government from their crimes.

I had no fear of being implicated "in the planned assassination" at the time of my arrest or prior thereto.

The two letters that I mailed to James L. Rankin, General Counsel to the Warren Commission, were not sent through "private channels." They were sent through proper jail authority.

I have never claimed that I "squirreled away a snapshot of (myself) with Lee Harvey Oswald taken in Jackson Square in New Orleans in 1963. I have never stated that I am "willing to surface and tell (any) story to Congress" or to anybody. And I did not reveal any details about Mr. Oswald to Professor Popkin that are "new" or unknown to the FBI.

Richard C. Nagell

Richard C. Nagell

Bank robber, 'Manchurian Candidate' linked to JFK assassination probe

ED. NOTE: Recent exposure of what many consider to be improper CIA activity, both at home and abroad, has reawakened interest in decade-old challenges to official versions of the assassinations of John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King. As new facts also begin to emerge, Congress faces growing pressure to reinvestigate the JFK assassination.

What follows are the strange stories, disclosed here for the first time, of two figures — Richard Case Nagell and Luis Angel Castillo — long of interest to assassination researchers.

WILLIAM W. TURNER

SAN DIEGO, (PNS) — On Sept. 20, 1963, a rangy man with a vertical scar on his forehead strode into the State National Bank in El Paso, Tex., and requested $100 in travelers' checks. Before the teller could comply, he whipped out a pistol and fired two shots into the ceiling. Then he waited to be arrested.

Police quickly realized that the suspect, Richard Case Nagell, 32, was no ordinary bank robber. Papers he carried showed that he was a decorated hero of the Korean War who had gone on to a career in Army Intelligence before being discharged with the rank of captain in 1959.

Why had he pulled the non-robbery?

Last week Dr. Richard H. Popkin, a philosophy professor at Washington University in St. Louis, stepped off a plane in the nation's capital lugging a briefcase containing documents illuminating the strange case of the man who shot a bank. Also crammed into the briefcase was a thick sheaf of papers relating to a bizarre "Manchurian Candidate" episode in the Philippines in 1967.

Both the El Paso and Manila incidents, Popkin said in an interview before leaving for Washington, were linked to the Dallas assassination of John F. Kennedy on Nov. 22, 1963. They would "crack the case wide open," he predicted.

The slight, bearded academician was stopping in Washington to present his discoveries to Attorney General Edward Levi and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities before going on to a conference of learned philosophers.

The Second Oswald

Popkin is no stranger to the JFK investigation. In 1966 he published *The Second Oswald*, which chronicled several instances of someone impersonating the man later accused of slaying the president. At the time the book gained scant attention, but recently it was disclosed that as early as June 3, 1960, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover himself wrote an interdepartmental memorandum citing evidence of an Oswald imposter. The FBI knew Oswald at that time as a defector to Russia, and, some conspiracy theorists believe, as a possible CIA agent.

Popkin said he had been in touch with Richard Nagell, now living near San Diego, and had learned about Nagell's friendship with Lee Harvey Oswald. Nagell has fascinated assassination researchers ever since an FBI report filed with the Warren Commission quoted him as saying he had met with Oswald in Mexico City and Texas. But the former intelligence officer had been inacessible. He remained in prison for the El Paso caper until his conviction was reversed for insufficient evidence in 1967, after which he dropped from sight.

Nagell's Version

Nevertheless, researchers were able to glean some picture of Nagell's significance from his defense pleadings and cryptic letters from prison.

In August 1963 Nagell, working as a CIA agent, learned of a domestic plot to assassinate the president, involving Oswald and anti-Castro Cubans. He informed his CIA superior but feared nothing would be done because he lacked details. On Sept. 13 he dispatched a letter warning J. Edgar Hoover of the plot but again assumed no action would be taken.

As Nagell understood it, Kennedy was to be shot in

(please turn to page 33)

INATION

(continued from [illegible] *e 4)*

Washington about Sept. 26 (as it turned out, JFK left Sept. 25 for a whirlwind tour of the West). Frantic, Nagell flew to Havana on Sept. 19 to see if Castro aides could shed light on the assassination plot, but the only advice they could offer was to execute Oswald in the hope that would stop the plan.

But Nagell left Cuba deciding that he "was an intelligence agent, not a killer." Flying to El Paso via Mexico City, he walked into the bank the next day for "the sole purpose of having myself arrested and detained by federal authorities" — apparently fearing that his association with Oswald would implicate himself in the planned assassination.

Nagell was in the El Paso jail when Kennedy was shot in Dallas two months later. He sent an offer to testify before the Warren Commission through "private channels" but received no reply.

Dedicated Leftist

In his recent discussions with Popkin, Nagell has revealed new details about Oswald. He first met Oswald, he said, in the late fifties at the U.S. naval base at Atsugi, Japan, where Oswald was a Marine Corps radar specialist. They became friends but didn't encounter one another again until August 1963 when Nagell learned of the plot against Kennedy.

Disputing claims that Oswald had ties with the CIA, Nagell believes that Oswald was a dedicated leftist who was duped by anti-Castro exiles involved in the conspiracy. Posing as Castro G-2 intelligence agents, the exiles wheedled Oswald into becoming a "fall guy" by playing on his Castro sympathies, painting Kennedy as anti-Castro and promising that he would be spirited to Havana after the assassination.

Nagell told Popkin he met with Oswald both in Mexico City and New Orleans, hotbeds of the anti-Castro movement. "Nagell claims he has squirreled away a snapshot of himself with Lee Harvey Oswald taken in Jackson Square in New Orleans in 1963," Popkin asserted. "In the picture are two other men, both anti-Castro Cubans, who were pretending

If this photograph does exist it would lend credibility to Nagell's account. And Na[illegible] is willing to surface and te[illegible]is story to Congress, Popkin says, provided protective conditions are met.

"Manchurian Candidate"

Popkin is also convinced that the Manila "Manchurian Candidate" case was connected to the JFK assassination. On March 2, 1967, a man named Luis Angel Castillo was detained by the Philippine National Bureau of Investigation after he had contacted left-wing Huk guerrillas. Questioned under truth serum and hypnosis, Castillo blurted out a tale of having been taken to a building in Dallas, Tex., the day Kennedy was shot, handed a rifle assembled from components hidden in a bowling bag and instructed to fire at a man in an open car sitting next to a lady. The signal to fire would be given by mirror flashes.

The story caused a brief sensation at the time. The Manila *Times* bannered: "'JFK Plotter' in Manila!" Wire service dispatches to the United States said Castillo was a "Cuban-trained Communist agent" who hadn't shot because he heard that a man named Joe "had already shot the man in the open car." The story was so implausible that it quickly died.

Not long ago the hypnotist who conducted the interrogation of Castillo for the Philippine authorities arrived in this country under the name Vincente R. Sanchez. When Popkin took a look at his reports, his eyes popped.

The reports termed Castillo a "zombie" — a hypnoprogrammed robot.

Double-Agent Network

Sanchez extracted Castillo's rambling story over a period of weeks. Castillo, then 28, was inducted around 1960 into a "Special Operations Group" which afforded him paramilitary training. In 1961 he participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion, as a pilot for the CIA. Thereafter he infiltrated a double-agent network, posing as a Communist in Venezuela and liquidating a Communist agent in Mexico.

In talking about the JFK assassination, Castillo — despite some disjointed phrases — was nevertheless able to describe in some detail

shoot and how his control agent ordered, "They got him already. Let's get out of here." After the rifle was disassembled and stuffed in the bowling bag, he was hustled into the car which had brought him to the building. It stopped twice within blocks to pick up other men.

In 1967, according to Sanchez, Castillo was programmed to assassinate Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos after openly associating with the leftist Huks — which would implicate them in the assassination. Popkin points out that this is a similar ploy to the one Nagell attributed to the anti-Castro Cubans' use of Oswald.

Until recently, the Castillo episode might have seemed a logcial impossibility. But the release of the Rockefeller Report, with its revelations about secret CIA projects to induce behavior modification in unsuspecting subjects, make the possibility of a "Manchurian Candidate" more than mere fantasy. (In the Robert Kennedy assassination, Dr. Bernard Diamond, who examined Sirhan Sirhan for the defense, testified that he believed Sirhan was hypnotized at the time of the shooting.)

Although the current whereabouts of Castillo is unknown, the Sanchez reports contain the names of six persons who supposedly ran his network, including the "control officer" and a woman who hypnotized him. Popkin's own investigations have shown that these people do exist.

Through Popkin their stories have now been passed on to the Attorney General and the Church Committee.

William Turner's latest book, The Cuba Project, *the story of the CIA's secret war against Castro, will be published this fall by Houghton Mifflin.* ☐

FILE
SAME Birthday

KRAMER, JOE

[redacted]

[illegible]

KRAMER,JOE
OR 69 M341008
/Y M /B 05AUG30
/D LST 18JUN69 P23 DEFECTORS MACHINE LST
DEFECTORS FILE
/Z ~~2319006~~

EXTRACT

U.S. DEFECTOR MACHINE LISTING - JULY 1973

RICHARD CASE NAGELL

SECRET

```
*************************************************************************************
R     00A00 A 137202                        201-0746537
R     00A00 B  NAGELL                       RICHARD              CASE           T
R     00A00 C   USA/NEW YORK                GREENWICH            05 AUG 30      M
R     00A00 D   USA
R   M 48A01 A                                                    SOB
R   M 63A01 A                                                    EXACT
R   M 63A01 X   A3 ATTEMPTED SUICIDE SEVERAL TIMES
R   M 69A02 A                                                    ABROAD
R   M 69A03 A                                                    ZOI?
R   M 48A01 B  NAGELL                       RICHARD              CASE           T
R   M 51A01 B  KRAMER                       JOE                                 A
R   M 54A01 B  CRAMER                       JOE                                 V
R   M 59A01 B  NOLAN                        ROBERT               C              A
R   M 62A01 B  CRANE                        JOE                                 A
R   M 48A01 C   USA/NEW YORK                GREENWICH            05 AUG 30      M
R   M 48A01 D   USA                         J-543069             NEW YORK       24 MAY 68
R   M 59A01 X   E1-DISMISSED FROM JOB JUN 62
R   M 62A01 E  E4 FLUENT                                                        JAPANESE
R   M 48A01 G  PRIVATE SN 12 115 891
R   M 48A01 X   G1  ENLISTED AS PRIVATE 48/DISCHARGED AS SERGEANT 51
R   M 48A01 [illegible]   G1 TO ACCEPT COMMISSION
R   M 48A01 H   ARMY USA
R   M 48A01 N   USA                                              48             51
R   M 48A01 Q   STATIONED IN NEW YORK/NEW JERSEY AND OVERSEAS
R   M 48A01 U   AGENCY                      201 SUMMARY                         20 MAR 69
R   M 51A01 G  CAPTAIN SN 2028346
R   M 51A01 H   ARMY USA
R   M 51A01 N   USA/NEW JERSEY              FT DIX               51             59
R   M 51A01 Q   HONORABLY DISCHARGED OCT 59
R   M 51A01 U   AGENCY                      201-SUMMARY                         20 MAR 69
R   M 51A01 X   GRANTED TOP SECRET CLEARANCE 22 SEP 55/ASSIGNED CIC
R   M 54A01 L   L4 FACIAL SCARS FROM PLANE CRASH                                HEAD
R   M 54A01 M   WALTER REED HOSPITAL
R   M 54A01 N   USA/DISTRICT                WASHINGTON           NOV 54         APR 55
R   M 54A01 Q   HERE FOR TREATMENT OF INJURIES NOV 54-APR 55
R   M 54A01 U   FBI                         DBA-63177                           04 FEB 64
R   M 54A01 X   SOLE SURVIVOR AIRPLANE CRASH 28 NOV 54 SUFFERED
R   M 54A01 Z   X1 FACIAL DISFIGUREMENT/GIVEN PSYCHIATRIC EXAMS
R   M 59A01 G  SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR
R   M 59A01 H   ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL/DEPARTMENT OF
R   M 59A01 M   LEEWARD AVENUE                                                  4037
R   M 59A01 N   USA/CALIFORNIA              LOS ANGELES          59             62
R   M 59A01 Q   RESIDENCE
R   M 59A01 U   AGENCY                      201 SUMMARY                         20 MAR 69
R   M 62A01 M   EMBASSY USA
R   M 62A01 N   MEXI                        MEXICO CITY          62             UNK
R   M 62A01 Q   VISITED EMBASSY/VOLUNTEERED INFORMATION
R   M 62A01 U   FBI                         DBA-24397                           02 OCT 62
R   M 63A01 M   EL PASO COUNTY JAIL
R   M 63A01 N   USA/TEXAS                   EL PASO              63             UNK
R   M 63A01 Q   ARRESTED ATTEMPTING TO ROB BANK
R   M 63A01 U   AGENCY                      201-SUMMARY                         20 MAR 69
R   M 63A01 Z   CHARACTERIZED AS MENTALLY UNSTABLE
R   M 68A01 M   CONSULATE USA
R   M 68A01 N   SUIS                        ZURICH               68             UNK
R   M 68A01 Q   VISITED CONSULATE 4 AND 5 JUNE
R   M 68A01 U   AGENCY                      ZURI-1331                           06 JUN 68
R   M 68A01 X   APPEARED PSYCHOTIC/POSSIBLY DANGEROUS
R   M 68A02 N   EGER                                             68             UNK
R   M 68A02 Q   HELD HERE 4 MONTHS
R   M 68A02 U   FBI                         DBC-43667                           18 FEB 69
R   M 68A02 X   TAKEN OFF TRAIN GOING TO W BERLIN BY E GERMANS JULY 68
R   M 68A02 Z   X1  MADE REMARKS EAST GERMANS CONSIDERED DEROGATORY
R   M 69A01 M   CONSULATE USA
R   M 69A01 N   SUIS                        ZURICH               69             UNK
R   M 69A01 Q   VISITED MAR 7 FOR ASSISTANCE/THREATENED EXPOSE US GOVT
R   M 69A01 U   AGENCY                      ZURI-1629                           17 MAR 69
R   M 69A01 X   CLAIMED WORKING FOR US GOVT ON SECRET MISSION
R   M 69A01 Z   X1  TO MEET JAPANESE IN GENEVA
R   M 69A02 M   CONSULATE USA
R   M 69A02 N   SPAN                        BARCELONA            69             UNK
R   M 69A02 Q   HERE MAR 10/THREATENED EXPOSE US GOVT
R   M 69A02 U   AGENCY                      ZURI-1629                           17 MAR 69
R   M 69A03 N   USA/NEW YORK?               NEW YORK             69             UNK
R   M 69A03 Q   PLACED NOTICE IN UNDERGROUND NEWSPAPER AUG 69
R   M 69A03 U   STATE                       DST-18786                           05 SEP 69
*************************************************************************************
```

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO	DATE 27 March 1969 LETTER NO.
TO : Mr. Paul Gaynor, C/OS/SRS ATTN:	FROM: N. Scott Miler, CI/SIG	

The attached telegram from American Embassy, Madrid, may not have come to your attention. It may be of some significance in connection with information about a Richard Case NAGELL with akas your office sent to the FBI 7 April 1964 (Solie originated) and Richard FECTEAU.

N. Scott Miler
SIGNATURE

REPLY	DATE

To Murphy
What went t FBI?

See Buck-Slip

To Tighe LOT 4/1/69

Mrs Hall Info

Mr Tighe no further action by DC/SRS or FIOB on this. For your Info.

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 1831

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

18 January 1968

SUBJECT: NAGELL, Richard Case

ALLEGATION:	CIA CONNECTION:
Richard Case NAGELL, "a highly decorated infantry Captain in the Korean War", alleges that he became a CIA agent. He said he fired the gun in the bank at El Paso, Texas because he wanted to be in custody when the assassination of President KENNEDY took place. NAGELL charged that "the FBI illegally seized from him evidence crucial to his defense, such as notebooks containing the names of certain CIA employees, photographs, two Mexican tourist cards (one in the name of Joseph KRAMER, the other in the name of Albert HIDEL) and receipts for registered mail, including the one for the letter sent HOOVER warning of the assassination. NAGELL claimed he was instructed to "arrow" the patsy, that is kill him (OSWALD) after the assassination. He contended he got cold feet and this was his reason for the attempted bank robbery, he would rather be arrested than commit murder and treason. The article alleges that while it was suggested in court that an airplane crash NAGELL survived mentally affected him, he was given intelligence training after the crash. Also, NAGELL complains he has been salted away because of what he knows.	None; although, Subject was of interest to OS in 1964 and early 1965 because of information furnished to the Agency by the FBI that he had in his possession the names of six CIA employees at the time of his arrest for bank robbery at El Paso, Texas on 20 September 1963.

~~GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

SOURCE:

1968 RAMPARTS
Article by William
W. TURNER

OS INDICES RESULTS:

Subject became of interest to the Office of Security in March 1964 when the FBI informed the Agency that Subject had in his possession at the time of his arest for bank robbery at El Paso, Texas on 20 September 1963 the name of Richard FECTEAU (an individual by this name was captured by the Chinese Communists and is now in prison in China) and of six Agency employees. Research failed to reveal any reason why NAGELL had these names in his possession. It was concluded that while NAGELL is unquestionably unbalanced, his story of being involved in espionage is not fully contradicted by evidence. He could have been contacted by a Soviet agent while in Washington, D. C. in December 1962 or while he was in Mexico City in September and October 1962. His file contains mostly FBI reports dated 1962 and 1964 and in these are documented his history of mental instability and physical complaints stemming from the plane crash. Attached is a chronology dated 3 March 1965 made from the information contained in the FBI reports. At the time this security research was conducted, it was recommended that NAGELL be personally interviewed by a representative of OS in the hope that NAGELL might reveal how he came into the possession of these names but no further action is indicated in his file and this interview was not undertaken.

DETAILS:

Subject's file reflects no Agency interest in him prior to March 1964 when the names of CIA employees were found in his possession when arrested for bank robbery.

The RAMPARTS claim that he received intelligence training after the plane crash is true. The crash occurred 28 November 1954 and he graduated from Army Intelligence School, Ft. Holabird, Maryland on 15 August 1955. He served in Korea and Japan as a member of the U. S. Army Counterintelligence Corps, terminating about 1958. A Lt. Col. Ned W. GLENN who served with NAGELL personally in Korea advised that NAGELL was not stable mentally and that this instability was probably due to brain damage suffered in the airplane crash.

The RAMPARTS article's claim that NAGELL said he fired the gun in the bank at El Paso, Texas because he wanted to be in custody when the assassination took place is not completely in conflict with a statement NAGELL made on 1 January 1964 which was, however, after the assassination. (see page 4 of chronology)

The RAMPARTS article's allegation that the FBI took from NAGELL a notebook containing the names of CIA employees is true.

NAGELL's complaint that he was "salted away" is open to speculation. A ten year prison sentence does appear harsh, considering the documented brain damage he suffered in the B-25 plane crash while he was in the U. S. Army.

~~SECRET~~

26417

Richard Case NAGELL

Chronological Record of Activities

5 Aug 1948:	Entered Army (18 years old) "Brilliant Korean War Record" "Many Campaign Awards"
28 Nov 1954:	Sole survivor of plane crash. Suffered facial disfigurement; given psychiatric exam.
15 Aug 1955:	Graduated from Army Intelligence School, Ft. Holabir Maryland. Served as advisor to ROK Army in Korea. Concerned with intelligence activities; served as a mer of U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps in Japan, Sen and Tokyo, terminating about 1958. A Lt. Col. Ned W. GLENN, Deputy G-2, U.S. Navy, Japan, advised on 24 March 1964 that he had served personally in Korea with NAGELL. GLENN advised that NAGELL was not stable mentally and that this instability was probably due to damage to brain tissues suffered in an airplane crash during the Korean War.
29 Oct 1959:	Honorable Discharge - Captain, U.S. Army
14 Dec 1959:	Employed by Department of Alcoholic Beverage Contro of State of California as a special investigator.
8 June 1962:	Suspended by ABC, State of California
27 June 1962:	Dismissed by ABC
16 July 1962:	Shot in chest "while making a meet" between Malibu and Oxnard. Refused to identify assailants or furnish information to police, subsequently, filed Civil Rights complaint against police. Withdrew request for hearing so he could get money from state of California consisting retirement contributions and accumulated leave.
17 Aug 1962:	Issued tourist card at Los Angeles, California.
24 Aug 1962:	Entered Mexico through Ciudad, Juarez.

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

28 Sept 1962: Appeared voluntarily at American Embassy, Mexico City, tense, nervous, agitated and antagonistic. Inter alia-stated he had been approached in Mexico City for recruiting, refused to say by whom on behalf of what country. Stated that one job of this sont would be in New York. He volunteered that he fully realized that what he was saying could be used against him in any court or prosecution. He stated that he was "bitter, disgusted, disillusioned and disaffected". Stated he knew the full significance of the term disaffected. He stated that if he did go to some other country, it would cost the United States millions. He stated that he was "through being a good citizen" and thought that he had gotten a "dirty deal all around."

1 Oct 1962: Again appeared at American Embassy, Mexico City, wanting to know what had been done in regard to getting the state of California to pay him the money due him. Was sent to protection section. Asked what section of Embassy he should contact to renounce his United States citizenship. Was advised by collection section that they could not intercede for him in collecting money from state of California. Appeared in passport and citizenship section and asked what the penalty would be for going to an Iron Curtain country and what effect it would have on his citizenship. Was advised that such action would be violation of federal law.

28 Oct 1962: Left Mexico City, Mexico.

16 Nov 1962: Advised FBI in New York City he wanted to expose Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control in California.

15 Dec 1962: Advised FBI in Jacksonville, Florida, that he had been approached shortly before in Washington, D.C., by individual believed to be working for Soviets. NAGELL at this time was noted to be in an inebriated condition - vague in answering questions.

20 Dec 1962: 22 Jan 1963: NAGELL at Bay Pines, Florida VA Hospital. Condition diagnosed as "chronic brain syndrome associated with brain trauma with behavioral reaction characterized by passive aggressive and paranoid features".

24 Jan 1963: Asked FBI in Miami if his Cuban or Russian sources gave him a pistol with silencer and microfilm if he would be permitted to return same to his contact so he could be of further use to U.S. Government. He stated that in August or September 1962 he met a man from Maryland in Mexico City who introduced him to individuals whom he believed may have been Soviet Agent.

19 April 1963: Advised FBI in Los Angeles, California, that he had taken his former wife to court for failure to comply with court order giving NAGELL visitation rights with children.

4 June 1963: NAGELL appeared at the Out Patient Clinic and was referred to the Neurological Clinic for treatment. His condition was diagnosed as "depression, tearful, nervous, rigid". Would only utter words "Got to see my kids".

20 Sept 1963: NAGELL arrested in El Paso, Texas, on charge of attempting to rob State National Bank. Slashed wrist night of 9/20/63. NAGELL consistently denied he had tried to rob the bank; stated that the fact that he fired two shots in the ceiling proved he had not been trying to hit anyone. He stated that he was certain that "all of my problems have been solved for a long time, and now I won't have to go to Cuba".

A notebook which the Subject had on his person when arrested made reference to Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the names of purported CIA agents and other information. Cell mate in jail reported that NAGELL disclosed to him that NAGELL, during confused period after discharge, decided everything against him in Los Angeles and made arrangements with Communist Party in Los Angeles to pick up visa and passport from contact in El Paso and eventually end up in Czechoslovakia. NAGELL reportedly attempted suicide three times enroute to El Passo but lost nerve.

(Noteworthy that State Department records reflect issuance of Passport to NAGELL on 7 August 1962 at Los Angeles, California, and that on 9 July 1963 NAGELL signed affidavit that his passport had been lost or stolen. He was issued a new passport on 6 August 1963.)

4 Nov 1963: El Paso Herald-Post article states that NAGELL told U.S. District Court that he did not attempt to hold up the bank. "I had a motive for doing what I did" NAGELL told Judge, "but my motive was not to hold up the bank. I do not intend to disclose my motive at this time."

19 Dec 1963: Subsequent to President's assassination, Subject claimed acquaintance with OSWALD and wife. Marina OSWALD on 1/18/65 disclaimed any knowledge of NAGELL.

1 Jan 1964: NAGELL furnished a signed statement:
"... In September 1962, while I was in Mexico City, a representative of a foreign government preposed to me that I participate in an act; such act being a criminal offense and inimical to the best interest of the United States. At that time, I refused such proposal. In May 1963, another representative of the same foreign government made the same proposal to me. At that time, I agreed to such a proposal."
"In September 1963, I was informed by an American, known to me as an Agent of the same foreign government, that arrangements for my participation in the aforementioned act were completed. At that time, I refused the aforesaid proposal.
Approximately one week later, I was instructed by this same person to either participate as previously agreed or derrogatory information pertaining to me would be disclosed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Thereupon, I agreed to follow the instructions of this person, although I did not intend to do so. This existing situation actuated my conduct of September 20, 1963, for which I was arrested and am presently charged.
I did not actually attempt to rob any bank. I thought that my arrest would provide an immediate, though temporary, solution to the problem with which I was confronted.
I am not guilty as charged."

24 Jan 1964: NAGELL arraigned in connection with indictment for bank robbery and was committed for 30 days for the purpose of psychiatric examination.

9 June 1964: Sentenced in U.S. District Court, El Paso, Texas to serve 10 years.

17 June 1964: NAGELL swallowed several sleeping pills while lodged at the El Paso County Jail.

13-00000

24 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NAGELL, Richard C.
AIN 0 264 170

On 23 October 1997, the undersigned met with Mr. Gary Brennanmen, Historical Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency and Ms. Kathleen M. Combs, Assassination Records Review Board.

Ms. Combs reviewed the Office of Personnel Security's security file of subject.

3

W. Curtis Chaloner
OPS/CD/IMB

1/mc

~~SECRET~~

FORM 681G

```
NTL NO 6051   REQUESTOR HALL        OFFICE SRS                    15JAN1968
CNTL6051 NAGELL,RICHARD CASE                                      DOB    P99

  NAGELL,RICHARD CASE                              OS   64  M264170
  /A CRAMER,JOE
  /A KRAMER,JOE
  /A CRANE,JOE
  /A NOLAN,ROBERT C   /B        CIR1930   /Y M
  /Z 0933604

  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
  NAGELL,RICHARD C                                 OR   64  R264170
  /T  MRS
  /A NAGELL,MITSUKO/MRS   /Y F   /D FBI 12JUN64 P1 NAGELL,RICHARD CASE EX-SPO
  /Z 0933603

  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
```

~~SECRET~~



Play

CREDIBILITY GAP

Meny Americans suspect that a few important officials in Washington have been having a grand old time tossing out fibs on every conceivable topic. If you're one of these Americans, here at last is your chance to join in the fun.

Th[illegible]t-moving game, invented by two angry professors, permits you to uncover an entertaining variety of bureaucratic untruths and win your way to the Truth Vault.

What's in the box? Two sets of cards — a Citizens' playing deck and an Administration pack of lies, 4 liberty-bell counters, 90 truth trophies, dice, rules and a colorful game board richly sprinkled with amusing inscriptions.

Pleasantly competitive? Yes! Strategy? Of course. Adult? Very! — yet simple enough for a 13-year old to enjoy as well. Two, three or four can play individually or as teams. Anyone can come from behind to win with dramatic suddenness. Game time: 30 to 90 minutes.

Price, $5.95 Unconditionally guaranteed. Smile and chuckle over the game for a week. Then, if you can bear to part with it, return it and we'll send back all your money.

AMHERST GAME COMPANY
Box 5, South Pleasant Street
Amherst, Mass. 01002

Gentlemen: I enclose $5.95 plus 55¢ for packaging and shipping. Send immediately my CREDIBILITY GAP game. If I so desire, I'll send it back at the end of a week and receive prompt refund in full.

Name ______

Address ______

City
State ______ Zip ______

☐ GIFT IDEA: Enclose $16.95 and we'll send three copies of Credibility Gap — all [illegible]ping costs paid by us. You save $2[illegible]ame refund guarantee.

R 1

brought in a rifle to have a telescopic sight mounted; he produced a repair tag in that name as confirmation (Report, p. 315). Garland G. Slack and other target shooters patronizing the Sports Drome Rifle Range reported that a man resembling Oswald had practiced there as late as November; the man made himself obvious, at one time incurring Slack's displeasure by firing on his target (Report, pp. 318-319).

An incident at Downtown Lincoln-Mercury is highly revealing. Immediately after the assassination, salesman Albert Guy Bogard reported to the FBI that a man giving the name Lee Oswald, who closely resembled the accused assassin, came into the showroom on November 9. Remarking that in several weeks he would have the money to make the purchase, he test-drove an expensive model on the Stemmons Freeway at 60 to 70 miles an hour. Both Bogard and another salesman, Oren Brown, wrote down the name Oswald so that they would remember him if he called back. A third salesman, Eugene M. Wilson, recalled that when the man purporting to be Oswald was told he would need a credit rating, he snapped, "Maybe I'm going to have to go back to Russia to buy a car" (Report, p. 320).

Given a lie detector test by the FBI, Bogard's responses were those "normally expected of a person telling the truth." Nevertheless, the Warren Commission dismissed the incident by noting that Oswald supposedly could not operate an automobile and that on November 9 he allegedly spent the day drafting a lengthy letter to the Soviet Embassy. It evidently never considered the possibility someone might be impersonating Oswald. But Bogard will never identify the impersonator. He stuck to his story in news interviews, and subsequently was beaten to within an inch of his life by an unknown assailant and arrested by the Dallas police on seemingly trumped-up bad check charges. He retreated to his native Louisiana, where on St. Valentine's Day 1966, he was found dead of exhaust fumes in his automobile.

The main ingredients of the patsy theory are wrapped up in a story that has gradually filtered out of Leavenworth Penitentiary. The story is that of inmate Richard Case Nagell, and paradoxically, the most cogent confirmation for it is the manner in which he wound up sentenced to ten years in federal custody.

Nagell was a highly decorated infantry captain in the Korean War who, he claims, subsequently became a CIA agent. It is a matter of record that in 1957 he was seriously injured in a plane crash in Cambodia, which tends to support his contention, since Cambodia was not exactly a tourist playground. On September 20, 1963, Nagell walked into a bank in El Paso, Texas, fired a gun into the ceiling, and then sat outside waiting to be arrested. He says he staged the affair because he wanted to be in custody as an alibi when the assassination took place. It was a desperate measure, he admits. But he had sent a registered letter to J. Edgar Hoover warning him of the impending assassination, which he says was then scheduled for the latter part of September (probably the 26th in Washington, D.C.), and the letter had gone unanswered.

There is an incredibly brief FBI interview report stating, in part, that on December 19, 1963, Nagell advised, "For the record he would like to say that his association with OSWALD (meaning LEE HARVEY OSWALD) was purely social and that he had met him in Mexico City and in Texas" (CD 197). Another

PROTEST BUTTONS!

NAPALM MAKES MILLIONAIRES • CAUTION: MILITARY SERVICE MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH • "WHAT ME WORRY?" (photo LBJ grinning) • SAVE LIVES NOT FACE • "HAD ENOUGH?" (photo Reagan smiling) • COME BACK TRUMAN, ALL IS FORGIVEN • MY GOD IS ALIVE, SORRY ABOUT YOURS • IS THERE INTELLIGENT LIFE ON EARTH? • Peace symbol • peace dove* or wreath*

SNOOPY SNIFFS AEROPLANE GLUE • FLOWER POWER* • END POVERTY, GIVE ME $10 • WE LOVE YOU, CHARLIE BROWN • KEEP AMERICA GREEN, PLANT GRASS* • EVEN I LIKE SEX • A PILL IN TIME SAVES NINE • LOVE* • I'M NO. 3, I DON'T TRY AT ALL • POT* • CLEAN AIR SMELLS FUNNY • BAN THE BRA • CHASTITY IS ITS OWN PUNISHMENT • LSD: FLY UNITED* • ZAP! YOU'RE STERILE*

*Button has groovy artwork.

Largest selection in U.S., OVER 500 TITLES @ 25¢ each, 5/$1, 200/$25. FREE LIST!

POSTERS too! Rock groups, film stars, psychedelic, etc. Stamp brings list.

ARIES
Box 666R Aptos, California 95003

LOVE SYMBOLS
International symbols of love and peace, handsomely cast and hung from imported leather thong

ARABIAN LOVE BELLS (#LB-1,2) Encircled in delicately hand-carved flowers.—$1.50

#LB-2 #LB-1

onze
PEACE SYMBOL
(PE-4)—Internationally recognized symbol of brotherhood and love.$2.50

ANKH (#A-3)—Oriental charm of happiness. Underground symbol of secret meaning.$1.50

LITTLE FLOWERS (#FL-5) Brilliantly enameled on a delicate, gold-filled chain.$2.50

CUDIES HEART SHOP
10512 1st Ave., Inglewood, Calif. 90303
I am enclosing $___ for
#PE-4___#A-3___#LB-1___#LB-2___#FL-5___
Add 25c for postage and handling.
NAME___
ADDRESS___
CITY___STATE___ZIP___

NUDE PSYCHOTHERAPY

Now available! A personal detailed account of the first experimental NUDE PSYCHOTHERAPY marathon, written by a participant, reveals the happenings at a scientifically conducted weekend session involving 3 nudists and 17 non-nudists. Only $1.

ELYSIUM Institute
5436 FERNWOOD AVENUE DEPT. RAM8 1
LOS ANGELES, CAL. 90027

report states that when the prisoner was being led from court on January 24, 1964, he "made wild accusations to newspaper reporters, accusing the FBI of not attempting to prevent the assassination of President Kennedy . . ." (CD 404).

That the charges may not be so wild is indicated by the fact that the government threw the book at Nagell, a first offender who says he expected to be charged only with discharging a firearm on government-protected property. Since his sentencing, he has been shuttled between Leavenworth and the federal medical center (a euphemism for mental institution) at Springfield, Missouri. While the government has suggested in court that his airplane crash mentally affected Nagell, the fact remains that he was given intelligence training *after* the crash. What Nagell alleges is damning not only to the FBI, but to the CIA. In brief, he says that the motive for the assassination was Kennedy's move in the direction of a rapprochement with Castro, which was a rank betrayal in the eyes of anti-Castro elements. As he puts it, an anti-Castro group in New Orleans and Mexico City, code name Bravo Club, decided to give Kennedy a "Christmas present" to be delivered September 26, a date that was postponed. A party was required. Two members of Bravo Club approached Oswald while he was working at the Reily coffee firm in New Orleans in the summer of 1963, and appealed to his ego in setting him up as the patsy. When the "delivery" site was shifted to Dallas, Bravo Club enlisted the aid of a Dallas "subsidiary," Delta Club.

Meanwhile the CIA got wind of the plans and sent several agents into the field to ascertain whether they were "for real." Nagell says he was one of the agents dispatched. Within a short time, he claims, he was pulled in. It had been verified that the plans were authentic, that "*gusanos* [anti-Castroites] were making the watch tick," and that the sum of the plot was right-wing in nature. Nagell says that he was instructed to "arrow" the patsy, that is kill him, *after* the assassination. At this point, he contends, he got cold feet and bailed out. "I would rather be arrested than commit murder and treason," he declared in a self-prepared petition for *habeas corpus*.

In the petition, Nagell asserts that he used the pseudonyms Robert Nolan and Joseph Kramer in the U.S. and three foreign countries under the authorization of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He states that the files of the FBI and the CIA contain information that Oswald was using the aliases Albert Hidel and Aleksei Hidel. He charges that the FBI illegally seized from him evidence crucial to his defense, such as notebooks containing the names of certain CIA employees, photographs, two Mexican tourist cards (one in the name Joseph Kramer, the other in the name Albert Hidel), and receipts for registered mail, including the one for the letter sent Hoover warning of the assassination.

When Nagell complains he has been "salted away" because of what he knows, he just might be making the understatement of the year.

[THE ELIMINATION OF A PATSY]

"I DIDN'T KILL ANYBODY . . . I'm just a patsy," Oswald shouted to newsmen while in police custody. A marked patsy, contends Garrison—one who was not supposed to have lived long enough to utter his cry of innocence. But something had misfired, and Oswald fell not into the hands of his would-be executioners, but into the comparative safety of the Dallas jail. The denouement presented a crisis that the conspirators could solve only by pressing police buff Jack Ruby into service.

Although the Warren Commission concluded that Oswald ducked into his Oak Cliff rooming house to pick up the .38 revolver, later confiscated from him in the Texas Theater, it did not explain why, if he had gone to work at the School Book Depository that morning intending to kill the President and escape, he did not take the revolver with him. That he made a beeline to his rooming house for the sole purpose of getting the revolver speaks of a man who desperately wanted to protect himself from treacherous comrades rather than from the police. Notwithstanding the mild resistance he put up in his refuge in the Texas Theater, Oswald's demeanor in custody gave every indication that he would resolve the great riddle—given the time.

Oswald does not appear to be the only double-cross victim of that bloody afternoon: the evidence is persuasive that someone other than the accused assassin killed Officer J. D. Tippit, a friend of Jack Ruby, whose patrol area included the Harlandale Street section headquar-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Research Section/CB/PSD

DATE: 18 April 1958

FROM : L. J. Dunn

SUBJECT: DUGAN, Emmet E. - GF-6-371, page 22

As matter of information you may be interested in knowing that the DDP initiated a request through the CIA Library to obtain all newspaper clippings which pertain to the death of Subject. Miss Barbara Wade (X 2457) advised on 18 April 1958 that the Library has articles from the Washington Post on March 14 & 16; New York Times on March 16; New York Mirror on March 17; and Christian Science Monitor on March 15.

L. J. Dunn

L. J. Dunn

22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13-00000

N.Y.-3 way
elw 3/25/58

GI Death Probe Turns to Poison

TOKYO, March 15 (AP)—The United States Army said today one of its intelligence agents, whose body was found floating in Tokyo Bay, may have been poisoned after handing his insurance policy to his wife and disappearing.

Dugan

M/Sgt. Emmet E. Dugan, 39, of Crafton, Pa., left his wife Feb. 4 in a Tokyo hotel with the policy and personal papers, saying:

"If I don't return, you'll need these."

His body was found last Wednesday. The Army said there were indications he was dead before hitting the water more than two weeks ago.

["The possibility of poison is not being overlooked," the Army said, the United Press reported. "Extensive pathological tests will be conducted on body samples."]

Japanese newspaper speculation ranged from the possibility that Dugan was murdered while investigating Chinese Communists in Japan, to a Japanese police report that he had been undergoing psychiatric treatment.

As usual, the Army maintained silence on Dugan's work as an intelligance agent. But a spokesman termed Dugan "a fine soldier" and denied he had any psycopathic troubles. The infantry veteran had finished Chinese language training last year and was assigned to an intelligence unit for the first time.

The Army said Dugan and his wife, Maud, came to Tokyo Feb. 4 by train from Camp Zama near Yokohama. The sergeant had a pass to visit the capital. That night he left his wife. She said they planned to borrow money on the policy.

Then, the Army said, Dugan went to an Army camp north of Tokyo, drew $40 in advance pay and sold his typewriter to a Japanese dealer for $22. He stopped at the camp's noncommissioned officers' club, lost $39 playing slot machines and vanished. There was no wallet on the body when it was found.

Dugan was first listed as absent without leave but on March 1 this was changed to missing because the Army was convinced he was absent through no fault of his own.

Mrs. Dugan, a former Red Cross worker he met in Korea, has returned to Crafton.

Washington Post
3/16/58

22

to me



N. Y. Times
MAR 15 1958

2 HUNTED IN TOKYO IN DEATH OF A G. I.

Special to The New York Times.

TOKYO, March 14—The Tokyo police are reported to be searching for an unidentified Chinese and a Caucasian foreigner in connection with the suspected murder of a United States Army sergeant assigned to intelligence work.

A body in civilian clothes found floating in Tokyo Bay Wednesday was identified this morning as that of M/Sgt. Emmet E. Dugan, 39 years old. He had been missing from his intelligence unit in Yokohama, twenty-five miles south of Tokyo, since Feb. 4.

An examination indicated the man had been dead two weeks. An autopsy conducted by United States Army surgeons yesterday sugested he had died before he was thrown into the water. Except for a bruise on the forehead, his body bore no marks of external injury, but there was no sea water in his lungs, as there would have been had he died of drowning.

Sergeant Dugan's wife returned to the United States last Monday by military aircraft. An Army spokesman said he had no "definite" knowledge that the sergeant was engaged in "investigative activity" at time of his death. He could have been a victim of robbery, he added.

Tokyo Bay Yields Body Of GI Intelligence Aide

TOKYO, March 14 (Friday) (UP)—The body of a 39-year-old United States Army intelligence agent, missing since Feb. 4, has been found floating in Tokyo Bay, the Army said today. The Army added it was possible that the agent had been murdered.

The body, fished out of the Bay by a Japanese policeman on Wednesday, had been tentatively identified as that of a master sergeant attached to the Intelligence Support Center at Camp Zama, near Tokyo. The Center coordinates all United States Army intelligence work in Japan.

The name of the victim was not immediately released.

Japanese newspapers quoted police as saying the sergeant was investigating Communist activities in Japan at the time of his disappearance, but the Army declined to confirm this.

The Army spokesman said a preliminary autopsy indicated the man was dead before he entered the water.

Washington
3/14/58
m

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/R&A/Hartman 2C-29	EXTENSION 6748	NO.	DATE 17 April 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Chief, SRS Office of Security	4-20-70		
2. Mr. Paul Gaynor			
3. [Milligan] 3	4/20/70		mm
4. Mrs Hall	4/20/70		
5. ~~SR/CI~~			
6. Hall			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Paul,

This material arrived attached to a dispatch from [Berlin.] 10 I thought you might want to index Richard Case NAGELL as a crank because he is mentally deranged. He was the sole survivor of an air crash of a military craft in ca. 1956 and suffered brain damage. He has claimed CIA employment but was never connected with the Agency.

after review or action

3 — 4 — please return ~~so that we can have this considered to [illegible]~~

~~5 - [illegible]~~

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

2/mc

13-00000

MAN IN THE MIDDLE

The inside story

(WHAT THE CONTROLLED PRESS AND OFFICIAL REPORTS FORGOT TO MENTION)



altered that he announced himself in o court to be a Communist. He had made one serious

WILLIAM R. MARTIN
COUNSELOR AT LAW
INTERNATIONAL TRADE MART
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

23 November

ichard C. Nagell
75 Grand Avenue
urst, Long Island
York

: Mr. Nagell:

gistered lette
too have bee
my f
tod

again, because th
the exact date
Special Agent of the F
gation into the assassin
himself as a member of th
answer any questions, at
Mr. White. And I made it
Secret Service in the prese
I think this can be checked
Secret Service - because that
Service Division, U.S.
was known as
well

ed States
FOR THE FIFTH CIRC

No. 21620

RICHARD CASE NAGE

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee.

tates Court of Appea
R THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 24152

RICHARD CASE NAGELL,
Ap

versus

Nagell also refused t
actives yesterday afte
refused to sign a stat
plainclothesman put it
us the time of day."

Sincerely yours,

Ricey

communis
he bank
ested
on

refused to
other than to say
ion, however tempora
considered at the

The Warren Commission
The Assassination of Kennedy

THE WASHINGTON POST. Oct. 25, 1968

E. Germany Frees U.S. Ex-Officer

BERLIN, Oct. 24 (AP)—East Germany has released a former U.S. Army captain it held for four months.

Informed sources said Richard Case Nagell, 38, was delivered at a border-crossing point between East and West Berlin yesterday in the presence of East Berlin attorney Wolfgang Vogel; attorney Ricey S. New of Washington and an official from the U.S. Mission in West Berlin.

A U.S. spokesman said Nagell left by plane today for the United States. Nagell was described as a Californian and a former U.S. Army captain who left the service in 1959. In 1954, he was the sole survivor of an airplane crash near Friendship Airport that killed servicemen.

Informed sources said Nagell was taken off a train by the East Germans four months ago while he was on his way from West Germany to West Berlin through East Germany. Apparently he made some remarks which the East Germans considered derogatory, the sources said.

Arrangements for Nagell's release were handled by Vogel, New, West Berlin attorney Juergen Stange and various government officials, the sources reported.

The U.S. Mission had not disclosed that Nagell was being held. He was not brought to trial and apparently no specific charges were brought against him, the sources added.

He was reported in generally good condition on his release.

and activities
of the United States,
ns by the Secret Service regarding

brief FBI interview stating, in part, that on December 19, 1963, Nagell advised, "For the record he would like to say that his association with OSWALD (meaning LEE HARVEY OSWALD) was purely social and that he had met him in Mexico City and in Texas" (CD 197). Another report states that when the prisoner was being led from court on January 24, 1964, he "made wild accusations to newspaper reporters, accusing the FBI of not attempting to prevent the assassination of President Kennedy . . ." (CD 404).

he three
ere given
Garrison. It was on
able to separate yo
flooding the off
those days. I was
of our meetin

the three
ight have
to visiting y
staff and aske
of my opinions.

I have today spoke
Mr. Garrison, and le
be away for a week of
three volumes in the m

I do not take the New Yor
thearticle to which you re

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY HOSPITAL, BERLIN
APO 09742

AEUHM-BLN
LO 4-68

SUBJECT: Travel Authorization

Mr. Richard C. Nagell, ID #AF516

1. Under the provisions of USAR
ent AFSTPEBI, dtd 16 Feb 65

RICEY S. NEW, JR.

"Your Life Will Be in Danger," Chinese Trader Warned Du

you've
interested
The time

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
BUREAU OF PRISONS

SAOMR

Classification Form 18-Copy
Rev. January 1955

Committed Name NAGELL, Richard Case

CLASSIFICATION STUDY
(Continued)

Register Number 0-1029

The record also alleges that he worked for approximately one year for an unpopular political party. The unpopular political party being implied as the Communist Party. Nagell, in the course of his interview,

was first tried in 1964. The charge was then, a
now, entering a federally insured bank with intent
rob in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). He was con
victed as charged. Later, the court held a full

Mr. Richa
Grand

1. The old In
passed out "F
stamped with th
2. The building
anti-Castro group
was used by the la
linked Oswald
old U.S. Cou
house.
B. Ref
sum

UNITED STA
FEDERAL B
201 E
New York
Decer

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

C. Nagell
nue
New

Army Denies CIA Link

EL PASO HERALD POST, September 21, 1963

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

/car

CS COPY

NW#140 EGBA-89473

200-120-102

28 January 1970
Washington, D.C.

An editor of a trade journal, whom I first met while on an intelligence assignment in Latin America, has urged me for some time to make public the facts dealing with my involvement in a conspiracy to murder the late Chief Executive, John F. Kennedy, in 1963 and the circumstances surrounding my arrest and imprisonment in the United States and East Germany. For reasons that are more personal than advisable I can think of little else that I would like to do better. But with the copious amount of documentation and background material on hand, that I feel should be adduced to in any valid treatise of the subject, it would require writing no less than a tome, an undertaking for which I am hardly qualified. Then, too, there is a growing skepticism on my part concerning the kind of reception that a topic of this sort would elicit from a society long since inured to violence, corruption and injustice. Still, after over six years of relative silence, I've decided that I must say something about all this, if only to answer the lies and distortions concocted about me in the press. Thus, I have compiled this small booklet, a throwaway, which may be easily discarded at the whim of the reader. In it I've taken the liberty to set forth a reproduction of one of the least sanitized references to my case that has appeared in the news media, an article printed last summer in the OVERSEAS FAMILY, a weekly tabloid catering to U.S. servicemen in Europe. I have utilized this particular article as a vehicle to tell a bit of my side of the story by writing an addendum to it.

R. C. Nagell

'I want to find my children'

Ex-Army spook who fingered Oswald claims Uncle Sam hides his family / by Thomas C. Lucey

UNCLE SAM has given Richard Case Nagell three Purple Hearts — one earned on Christmas Day — and a medal for heroism in combat.

But what this ex-Army counterspy and alleged CIA undercoverman wants is that Uncle keep a promise to locate his wife and two small children.

The 38-year-old former officer hasn't seen them since 1963.

Officials inside the Federal Government — most likely FBI and CIA agents — know where they are and deliberately isolated him from his family, the tall, lean chain-smoker claims.

Nagell became separated from his Japanese-born wife Mitsuko Takahashi and their children, Teresa, now 9, and Robert, now 8, when he was arrested for robbing an El Paso, Tex., bank in September 1963.

He staged the robbery and immediately surrendered to the police, Nagell claims, because he had refused to kill Kennedy-assassin Lee Harvey Oswald and was afraid he would be killed himself.

The ex-Army captain was convicted of the crime and sent to Leavenworth, but Mrs. Nagell was never told where he was.

Since then Nagell has been written about in national American magazines and has worked his way inside a political prison in Communist East Germany for the CIA.

Two major magazines intimated that Nagell had been insane.

New Orleans district attorney Jim Garrison allegedly interviewed Nagell three times in his controversial probe of what he called the plot to kill Kennedy.

However, despite all the publicity about Nagell, no public mention has been made of his charges that:

- ► FBI special agents who questioned Mrs. Nagell about her husband while he was in prison said they didn't know where he was;
- ► The CIA used the promise of reuniting Nagell with his family as part of the incentive for him to undertake a one-man CIA assignment inside East Germany.

Nagell came to Europe in February 1969 on a hunch that the path to his family started in West Berlin. In Zurich he was almost killed, he says. In Barcelona, he was watched. And in West Berlin he was attacked in a side-street bar by two strangers — one of whom had been following him for two days — and hit on the top of his head so hard a molar cracked in half.

Fearing that the next attacker might murder him and reassured that the Government would finally keep its promise this time, Nagell flew home to the United States.

Now he's back where he started in 1963 — when he tipped off the FBI that Oswald was planning to assassinate President Kennedy.

Working through a source with access to documents on the Nagell case, The FAMILY has been able to reconstruct this incredible story of the spy who couldn't come in from the cold.

RICHARD CASE Nagell first went to work for the CIA as an informant in August 1962.

"Some publications have identified him as a CIA agent," the **FAMILY** source said. "But Nagell never claimed to be a CIA agent. For the year that he worked off and on for the CIA the first time, he was never told what he was. But it was in the capacity of an investigator or informant."

Nagell had a good background for investigative and undercover assignments.

In the Army, he was a CIC captain who worked in field offices in the United States and with the then super hush-hush Field Operations Intelligence in Japan and Korea.

He had made captain with a battlefield commission during the Korean War at the age of 22 — possibly the youngest man to earn that distinction. Nagell served two volunteer combat tours as an infantryman in Korea, signing up for the second as soon as he returned to the States from the first. It was in Korea that he won the Bronze Star and three Purple Hearts.

During a subsequent tour in the Far East with the CIC and FOI, Nagell met and married his Japanese wife in the spring of 1959. Being married to a foreign national meant an automatic removal from intelligence work so Nagell decided to leave the Army.

For two years he was a California state special investigator, working on fraud cases and liquor violations.

In the summer of 1962 he left that job to work for the CIA.

His last assignment was to penetrate the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, where he met Oswald. Nagell also briefly investigated Oswald's Russian-born wife Marisa.

Nagell considered Oswald intelligent, "but some right-wingers were using him by feeding his ego. They made him think he was a big man, important. Oswald himself was definitely a left-winger, leaning toward Mao or maybe even Castro. He wasn't pro-Moscow. He hated the Russians.

"And when Oswald said he was going to do something, you knew he meant it."

In September Oswald told Nagell, "We will kill him before the month is out."

The "we," according to Nagell, were Oswald and two Latins — possibly Cubans — who belonged to anti-Castro organizations in the United States. "Him" was President Kennedy.

Nagell reported the threat to a man known only as Bob, his CIA contact. According to The FAMILY's source, "Nagell's instructions were to take care of Oswald. He told him he was an intelligence man, not a killer, and he couldn't kill Oswald.

"Threats were made to Nagell which indicated to him that he had better do what he had been instructed to do.

"Instead, he wrote about Oswald's assassination plans to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover in Washington. Hoover didn't reply, but Nagell didn't expect him to. He wanted that letter as a matter of record.

"After Nagell's tip, the FBI questioned Oswald and released him as not being a danger or a threat."

Two months later Nagell heard the assassination news bulletin on the radio. "The FBI screwed up!" he explained. "That was Oswald!" This was before there was any public mention of Oswald.

"After the assassination the FBI tried to clean their skirts," The **FAMILY** was told. "FBI agents insisted to Nagell that he hadn't told them this about Oswald or that about Oswald. But he had."

By this time Nagell was in Leavenworth penitentiary.

On Sept. 20, 1963, six days before what Nagell thought was to be the assassination date, he went into an El Paso bank, shot one bullet into the ceiling and waited outside to be arrested. He expected to be held briefly for discharging a firearm on Federally insured property. By that time the assassination would be over and he'd be safe.

Apparently Nagell felt police custody would keep him safe from the CIA and from the assassins. He feared the CIA because he didn't "take care of" Oswald. He feared the assassins because he might be considered one of them.

But the police held Nagell longer than six days.

He was tried twice, in May 1964 and September 1966, for attempted robbery with force and violence and sentenced to the maximum of 10 years.

"I was bum-rapped," Nagell complained.

"The court instructed that any attorneys retained by his relatives would have to come under the supervision and control of court-appointed attorneys," The **FAMILY's** source said. "In effect, this denied him counsel of his choice all during prison."

As prisoner A-83286-L, Nagell was allowed to write to only his sister and a friend. He couldn't get an explanation why he wasn't allowed mail from or to his wife and children. "They don't explain to you in Leavenworth penitentiary," the source smiled. "All you have to do is be there."

The source continued:

"In 1966 Nagell's sister wrote that she had had a letter from his wife. She wanted to know where her husband was and why hadn't she heard from him.

"Here is the sticky part. In Mrs. Nagell's letter she said the FBI had questioned her a few days before about her husband's activities in the Army. The FBI knew where Nagell was but didn't tell his wife."

The letter had been sent from a Hollywood post office box and Nagell tried unsuccessfully to trace it after he got out of Leavenworth.

On April 29, 1968, after 4½ years in prison, Nagell was released after he had won an acquittal on appeal and flew to New York.

"We pulled a lot of strings to get your freedom," said a man who met Nagell when he landed at Kennedy Airport. The man and his nontalking partner gave Nagell $500 in $20 bills. "More will come where this comes from," the unidentified man promised. "We appreciate your cooperation in prison."

"To this day," the source told **The FAMILY**, "Nagell

Richard Nagell: a self-deluded crank or

Copyright 1969, Thomas C. Lucey. Reproduction in whole or in part strictly prohibited without the prior written permission of the author.

Richard Nagell

Jim Garrison

Oswald and guards

CAST OF CHARACTERS: Richard Nagell was questioned by New Orleans D.A. Jim Garrison because Nagell claims he fingered Kennedy assassin Lee Harvey Oswald while working for the CIA. Nagell also says U.S. Government officials isolated him from his two children after the assassination.



Nagell's children

the victim of dagger-in-the-back CIA tactics?

still has not got the money promised him for his imprisonment in the United States."

In New York Nagell kept an appointment with a CIA official he knew only as Buchel. The CIA official told Nagell he had heard that his wife had divorced him while he was in Leavenworth.

"It might be true," the source noted, "but wouldn't it be nice for Nagell to know for sure. He assumes his children are still with his wife."

Nagell met Buehel to be briefed for another CIA assignment.

Why did he go back to the CIA?

"It was the only practical thing for him to do," the source said, "because of his financial situation."

Almost a month to the day after he arrived in New York Nagell jetted to Zurich.

"During his last week of discussions with Buehel and another man in New York," The FAMILY's source said, "it was Nagell's understanding that he was to have himself arrested by East German authorities. All he had to do was buy a train ticket from Zurich, Switzerland, to East Berlin. The train would go through East Germany and he would be arrested.

"The main objective of his imprisonment was twofold; One concerned a U.S. naval officer who had allegedly defected and Nagell had to find out if he was there. But his main purpose was to get as much information as possible on techniques of interrogation and methods of treatment of the MfS (East German Ministry for State Security)."

Everything went according to the CIA's plan — up to a point.

In Zurich, Nagell reported to his CIA contact in the American Consulate General. About the only thing the CIA agent seems to have said to Nagell was to ask him the train compartment number on his reservation. Nagell told him, No. 46.

Early in the morning of June 10, 1968, around 12:30 a.m. to 1:30 a.m., Nagell's train stopped after crossing the East German border.

"He could hear people get on the train and clomp down the aisle, directly to his compartment," the source said.

"There were two men in uniform and two men in civilian clothes. They asked Nagell for his passport—by name. Then they asked for his transit visa. He didn't know what they were talking about. So they took him off the train because he didn't have a valid transit visa.

"They drove to Erfurt (an East German city), where Nagell was held for three days in a safe house (a private home used as a cover for intelligence purposes). There some men in civilian clothes questioned Nagell.

"Next he was driven to an East Berlin political prison for extensive interrogation. They accused him of espionage and said they were going to try him.

"Nagell had been told that if he was in East Germany for over three months, his release would be effected by the agency (CIA), but he was not told how. On his own he started to play crazy because he was there over four and a half months and he began to think there was another reason for his being there. He felt the CIA had deserted him and that, quite frankly, he had been sent to Germany to get him out of sight or to get rid of him.

"He was released on October 23. He didn't know he was going to be released until he was taken out of prison and driven to a Berlin checkpoint identified to him as Sandkrugbruecke."

Waiting to meet Nagell were, according to the source:

- Andor Klay, head of the Eastern Affairs Section of the U.S. Mission in Berlin;
- Wolfgang Vogel, a well-known East Berlin lawyer who participated on the Feb. 10, 1962, exchange of Soviet master spy Col Rudolf Abel and American U2 pilot Francis Gary Powers and other spies and accused spies:
- Ricey S. New, a wealthy Washington lawyer, supposedly "a representative — not a member—of the CIA";
- Bruce A. Flatin, head of the U.S. Berlin Mission's public safety section, allegedly "a longtime CIA member—and Flatin is not his real name";
- Dr. (Capt — now Maj) George Raymond Babineau, a psychiatrist at the U.S. Army hospital in Berlin, who appeared in civilian clothes, and
- An unidentified man.

Nagell was driven to the U.S. Mission at 170 Clay Allee and interviewed by Babineau. "That was probably because Nagell had played crazy with the East Germans," the source said.

Washington lawyer New was also present.

"Somebody brought Nagell a cup of coffee," the source continued. "Nobody else had coffee. Nagell drank a small portion of his coffee. It was black but it tasted more bitter than ordinary coffee. Approximately five minutes later he began feeling sleepy and thought he was under the influence of a drug. He went to the bathroom and looked at his eyes in a mirror. They were almost pinpoints and he was feeling exceedingly sleepy.

"Back in the room he asked, 'Did anybody put something in my coffee?'

"Dr. Babineau said no; New said nothing. Nagell began to feel so sleepy he had to occasionally stand up to stay awake. Finally, he asked to be examined by a civilian psychiatrist if there was any question of his sanity.

"'No,' the doctor said, 'as far as I'm concerned you're free to go.'

"New spoke to the doctor in a corner — the doctor kept shaking his head no — and then New told Nagell, 'I think you ought to leave for the United States. The German newspapers are going to pick this thing up any moment and might want to talk to you. I don't think you should talk to them.'

"Nagell said he wanted to go back to Zurich first to pick up his belongings — to be exact, certain documents in a safe deposit box. Nagell keeps records, plenty of them."

When Nagell was driven to Tempelhof Airport, New accompanied him and waited until he boarded the plane. Some time during their talk New asked Nagell about his disability—Nagell was getting a 60 percent disability for service-

(Continued on Next Page)

ELAC

STEREO CARTRIDGE STS 444-E

one of the finest cartridges ever produced.

Remember: Elac created the first... the very first... moving-magnet stereo cartridge. It is the original, basic, design principle now used by most, if not all, manufacturers of moving-magnet stereo cartridges today!

See your nearest Audio Club or write to:

ALLIED GENERAL STORE GMBH, 6451 WOLFGANG/HANAU, Eugen-Kaiser-Strasse 11, Tel. 0 61 81 / 5 65 93

13-00000

Newest
and
Biggest
Value at
Bad Aibling
Baden-Baden
Berlin
Bitburg
Darmstadt
Herzo
Incirlik
Iraklion
Kitzingen
O'gau
Rothwesten
Stuttgart
Wiesbaden

Your Audio Club has the

NEW 110-WATT SCOTT 342C

The World's Most Advanced Receiver




"Perfectune" light snaps on when you're correctly tuned!
"Wire-wrap" connections eliminate solder joints!
Quartz Crystal lattice filter IF strip never needs alignment!
New IC in Multiplex section!

More value – thanks to Scott's newly developed assembly techniques. Printed circuit modules snap into the main chassis for instant servicing!

New F/C/O circuitry – for virtually distortion free listening, even at low volume levels. Extra power, especially when you connect extra speakers. Scott also features a silver-plated FET front end, Integrated Circuit IF strip, IC preamplifier, FET tone control and all-silicon output circuitry.

GET FULL DETAILS AT YOUR AUDIO CLUB
AND CHECK THE AMAZING LOW MILITARY PRICE!

SCOTT®

Scott International, Maynard, Mass. 01754

The Nagell Affair . . .

'You must get out of Berlin!'

(Continued From Page 13)

connected injuries — and New promised him help in getting a disability retirement.

"But," the source added, New also told Nagell: "'Of course, this (offer of help in getting a disability retirement) is predicated on your staying away from the news media.'"

On the afternoon flight to Stuttgart Nagell fell asleep, convincing him that he had been given a drug or a barbiturate.

Because of fog he didn't get to Zurich until 4 a.m. and "he was feeling extremely sick," the source said. "He rested for a few hours and went to the U.S. Consulate General. New had told him to stay away from the consulate in Zurich because 'they will question you and send it to Washington.' Nagell couldn't understand New's reasoning, but he went to the consulate to get a doctor, not to tell them about Berlin. He was drastically sick and wanted a doctor. He thought he was dying."

Referred to a civilian doctor, Nagell was told "he had been given an overdose of Seconal, a most potent sleeping drug."

Nagell was sick for about six days.

Meanwhile, he was also waiting to hear from New, who had promised to phone him in two or three days. Nagell had told him he wanted the search for his family to be agreed upon before he returned to the States.

Twice Nagell called New's room at the Berlin Hilton. First New was "unavailable," then he had checked out for the U.S. (Later, back in Washington, New allegedly explained it had been "unadvisable" to go to Zurich because the East Germans might have tapped his phone and he didn't want them to know Nagell was there. Nagell didn't buy that.)

With New hot showing up to discuss the search for his family, Nagell violated his instructions and went to the consulate for help.

On his first visit Nagell found "they had a classified file on him and knew he had been in East Berlin," the source continued. "But he refused to answer questions about his imprisonment and told them about New's promise.

"The next time, he told the consulate he was angry that he had not heard from New and that if he didn't get help he was going to the news media. This is when he was offered State Department help in locating his family — predicated on his early return to the United States. Nagell agreed and flew back to New York."

In New York, Nagell waited about two or three weeks to hear from the State Dept. When he didn't he contacted a State Dept. agency in New York and was allegedly told that a letter would be sent to Washington.

"That was the last time Nagell heard from them," the source said. "He never received a copy of the letter to Washington, as promised, and they were always unavailable when he called."

Meanwhile, Nagell was seeing New in Washington and called in person at the State Dept.

"They told him that the State Department didn't have the facilities to search for the children," the source said, "but on account of the circumstances surrounding the case and 'because one of our employes apparently made a promise in Zurich,' they would conduct a search for his children and determine whether he was married or divorced.

"He never heard from them again. When he called they were quote unavailable unquote."

Through a lawyer in New's office, described as a luxurious suite visited by Pentagon officers in civilian clothes, Nagell got an appointment at the VA for "a-two-and-a-half-minute physical with his clothes on," according to the source. "Two hours later he was awarded a 100 percent disability allowance for a nervous condition.

"Nagell went back to New and told him they wanted to tag him (Nagell) with a nervous condition to destroy his credibility."

For good reason, Nagell worried that a nervous condition might be used to tag him as a nut who didn't know what he was talking about.

In July 1968, while Nagell was in the Communist prison, Edward Jay Epstein, author of a book on the Warren Commission, wrote an article in the New Yorker magazine attacking New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination.

Epstein described Nagell as "another witness found in the mail (of crank letters, publicity seekers and bogus tips) . . . an inmate of a Federal institution for the criminally insane in Springfield, Miss. . . . court records indicated that Nagell had suffered brain damage in an airplane crash in 1957."

Nagell's rebuttal:

- He was sent to the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield to determine whether he could stand trial and when he was up for parole;
- On each occasion he was found mentally competent;
- In 1954 (not in 1957) he was the only survivor of a B52 crash at Baltimore's Friendship Airport (not in Cambodia, as reported in Ramparts magazine by former FBI agent William W. Turner);
- After hospitalization he returned to Army Intelligence School, received a top secret clearance and was assigned to the CIC;
- A June 17, 1966, psychiatric report from the Springfield Medical Center stated there was no "evidence or finding suggestible of brain damage."

All this runaround in Washington convinced Nagell that no one in the States was going to help him find his family. He decided to return to Europe.

In Zurich someone tried to kill him

On Feb. 21 of this year he flew from Mexico City to Zurich. But the vice-consul who had promised State Dept. help last fall was no longer there. Nagell asked for the man he claimed to be the CIA station chief. He, too, was gone.

Sent to the consulate's political section, Nagell told them of the promises he'd been given and threatened to go to Swiss newspapers about a CIA agent in Bern, the Swiss capital.

"A member of the consulate asked Nagell to give them two weeks and telexed Washington," the source said. "But then one night there was an attempt on Nagell's life and he left for Barcelona the next day.

"There he contacted the U.S. Consulate General and told them why he had left Zurich and asked that Zurich's reply from Washington be sent to Barcelona.

"Nagell was in Barcelona for two weeks. But then he realized he was being watched and left to see an ex-Army intelligence officer at the American Embassy in Madrid.

"Again he stayed for two weeks. The embassy gave him no satisfaction, not even telling him what Washington had said. So he decided to go back to Berlin where this thing started and made some promises to himself — one of them being that if he didn't find his children he would go to the news media."

He was referred to Andor Klay and Bruce Flatin, two of the men who had met Nagell when he came from East Berlin, and eventually to a Kenneth Hill in the passport section.

"A week or two later," the source continued, "they finally got confirmation from Washington that they had been unable to locate Nagell's children so far but were continuing their efforts.

"So he finally agreed to go back to the States as long as the State Department was continuing their efforts."

Pointing out that he had spent a great deal of his money "running around," Nagell asked for Government transportation home and was refused.

On April 19 or 20 Nagell realized he was under surveillance.

"Around 10:30 on the night of April 22, Nagell was walking down Kurfuerstendamm when he lost his tail," the source continued. "They just disappeared. He didn't try to lose them.

"Nagell then went down a side street and into a small restaurant with a bar.

"He ordered a beer and was standing at the bar, talking to a guy on his right, when he saw the door open and two men came directly toward him.

"Nagell was getting ready to tell the men he didn't speak German when he saw one pick something out of his pocket and swing at him. Nagell turned and was hit on the back of the head."

Police took Nagell to the Albrecht Achilles Hospital. When he told the Germans he thought he had been hit by the CIA, "they called an American from the CID, a British representative (apparently the side street was in the British Sector) and a member of the Berlin political police."

Around midnight Nagell went to the U.S. Mission and asked for Hill in the passport section. Instead, he got the Army staff duty officer and a CIC agent.

"He gave his bloody shirt and T-shirt in a bag to the CIC agent," the source said, "and told him to give it to Hill.

"'If something happens to me,' he told the agent, 'the responsibility is going to be pinned because I'm going to the papers.'

"Back in his hotel, Nagell was worried that he was going to be killed."

In the morning he went to the Army hospital and then to Hill in the consulate.

"Hill had the bloody clothing. 'You must get out of Berlin,' he told Nagell. 'We cannot give you protection here. The German police think it's either mistaken identity or the MfS.'

"'Last night I thought somebody wanted to kill me,' Nagell replied. 'Now I take it as (only) a warning.'"

(Later, Hill told The FAMILY he considered Nagell merely "a private American citizen traveling abroad." He added: "Ninety-nine and a half percent of his story is fantasy." Hill confirmed that he had received Nagell's bloody clothing and that Nagell had come to him with a stitched-up head wound. But he would only say that the attack "is his story, not that I have any other story about it.")

But shortly after that Nagell was placed on orders as an ambulatory patient and sent on the Berlin duty train to Frankfurt. His orders also put him on a military flight back to the States.

That's where he apparently is now.

But he still doesn't know if he's married or divorced and the whereabouts of his children.

OVERSEAS FAMILY article, I have not sought to refute or confirm each and every assertion made by its author, Thomas C. Lucey. Mr. Lucey, despite his citing a substantial number of inaccuracies, has nonetheless depicted a vast area of what may be termed the fundamental truth. With this in mind, I have tried to set the record straight only insofar as it pertains to those inaccuracies - and omissions - which in my opinion reflect adversely on the whole.

In order to view Mr. Lucey's account in a somewhat different perspective, I shall begin by advising that I first went to work for the Central Intelligence Agency much earlier than August 1962. It was during the winter of 1955-56, while assigned as a Case Review Officer with the Counter Intelligence Corps at Los Angeles, that I was initially recruited into the CIA's farflung network of informants and agents, one of a number, I suppose, within the Defense Department's intelligence community who helped the Agency keep an eye on its not always tame competitor. My recruitment was handled by a Herbert Leibacher, an agent of the CIA's Los Angeles office, and a Joe DaVanon, later identified to me through photographs as an official from CIA headquarters, then located on "E" street in Washington, D.C. Motivated by a degree of naivete and the Agency's subtle reminders that I owed a greater duty to my country than to the military establishment, I served as a non-paid, confidential informant off and on until my resignation from the Army in October 1959. A complete description of the information I supplied to the Agency during my military career would only add to what must perforce become a lengthy addendum; may it suffice to say that it did not always seem germane to intelligence affairs, but when it did it consisted mainly of an assortment of data that for so-called discretionary reasons was seldom passed on to the Agency (or for that matter, to our own higher echelons) through regular channels.

Mr. Lucey's statement, "Being married to a foreign national meant an automatic removal from intelligence work so Nagell decided to leave the Army," is misleading and incorrect in its entirety. The only military intelligence organization from which an individual is normally removed subsequent to marrying a foreign national is the CIC - primarily a security type organ - and this rule does not necessarily apply when the agent is an enlisted man or warrant officer. As a commissioned officer, I was declared ineligible for further duty with the CIC effective 14 April 1959, a full year after my marriage to a foreign national. I was not barred from assignment to other, even more sensitive, MI organizations such as Field Operations Intelligence, then the clandestine espionage department of military intelligence. As for the reasons I left the Army, they were clearly if euphemistically explained in my second letter of resignation, dated 31 August 1959, namely: "I desire to tender my resignation because I wish to further my civilian education. It is not possible for me to pursue the curriculum of which I am desirous while on active duty. Also, compassionate reasons of a personal nature exist for desiring to tender my resignation at this time."

My patronage under the CIA did not end with my discharge from the Army and ensuing employment in December 1959 as an investigator for the State of California; in fact, henceforth I was offered remuneration for my services, however nominal it sometimes was. What my new tasks comprised is of no real pertinence to this addendum or to later developments, except perhaps to mention that one of my contacts said he worked out of "Domestic Intelligence," possibly the forerunner of the present-day Domestic Operations Division, which illegally keeps tabs on a wide range of American civilian organizations and activities. I should also point out that I did not quit my position with the State of California "to work for the CIA," as implied by Mr. Lucey. I was dismissed, in June 1962, at my own option and in my opinion for doing my job. (The following month I was shot through the right chest during an altercation with a person whose identity I have never disclosed . . . . not through the left chest by myself, my wife, an Alcoholic Beverage Control inspector then under investigation or by a Los Angeles police officer "because of communistic implications," as has been reported at various times by various sources).

For the next year, from approximately the middle of August 1962 until my arrest in

Texas on 20 September 19 I was employed by the Agency in a capacity which can be accurately described as that of an agent, in every sense of the word. My assignments varied and necessitated travel to three Latin American nations and many states, including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. They also necessitated my taking on cover employment for one week in New York and for about ten weeks in Los Angeles, though usually I posed as a tourist, an investigator for the Immigration & Naturalization Service or as a researcher for a private firm, the appropriate credentials being furnished to me by the CIA. To sum it up briefly, I operated in Mexico City at the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis in an effort aimed chiefly at the Soviet government; I conducted inquiries relative to "dissident" members of several Cuban refugee groups based in the United States; I checked out an alleged connection between a Miami resident named Eladio Del Valle and New Orleans CIA informant Sergio Arcacha-Smith; I investigated an associate of the now deceased right-wing extremist David W. Ferrie of New Orleans, as I did the activities of left-wingers Vaughn L. Snipes and his wife, Priscilla, near Venice, California, and others; I conducted a surveillance on a man, said to have been an ex-CIA employee, observed talking to MRP leader Manuel Artime and former Cuban senator/racketeer Rolando Masferrer; I inquired into an allegation that Marina Oswald intended to divorce her husband and return to the U.S.S.R. (although I never stated that I met her personally, as was reported by the FBI and Secret Service); and I performed courier duties and acted as a cut-out. At the time of my arrest I was operating in an undercover role, having become involved in a domestic-inspired plot to assassinate President Kennedy and, leastwise ostensibly, other highly-placed government officials.

Mr. Lucey goes on to state that my last assignment at the time "was to penetrate the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, where he met Oswald." Such statement is also incorrect. I was never a member, bona-fide or otherwise, of the FPCC. And my conversations with FPCC functionaries like Steve Roberts, an official of the Socialist Workers Party at Los Angeles, could hardly be construed as a penetration. Furthermore, I had been introduced to Mr. Oswald long before the FPCC came into existence, albeit under an assumed name.

As to the allusion that I told "Bob" I was an intelligence man, not a killer, therefore I couldn't kill Mr. Oswald, while the reference is true its connotation is deceptive. I had killed before and I had participated in homicides under the auspices of both MI and the CIA (one instance being the part I played in the February 1958 abduction-interrogation-murder of an FOI agent, a U.S. soldier, MSGT Emmett E. Dugan, from Crafton, Pa., suspected of having defected in place to the Chinese), under the guise that an American variation of the Soviet "wet affair" was the only alternative, that it was either essential to some overall intelligence effort or in the best interests of our national security. And it was a similar-sounding argument, ultimately reduced to a threat, that was advanced to me by Robert Graham as an incentive to dispose of Mr. Oswald in September 1963. But my refusal to do so had absolutely no bearing on the reason for effecting my arrest in the manner I chose, nor did it engender in me fear of reprisal by the CIA.

Pertaining to my arrest and convictions at El Paso, Texas, which the official spokesmen and the press have so neatly labeled as being for "bank robbery," let one of the government's own spurious records, the appelate court decision that finally yawned a judgement of acquittal in my case, give its version: "The charge was then, and is now, entering a federally insured bank with intent to rob." What the record aptly ignores is the fact that two juries, incensed by the prosecution's innuendoes in and out of the courtroom (and by the ramifications of perjured testimony and a false Bureau of Prisons report made available to the jury during its deliberations at the second trial - though never formally admitted into evidence) that I was a Communist, no doubt a very red spy, twice convicted me of having "intended" to take by force and violence one hundred dollars worth of Travelers Cheques from a bank teller.

I shall not herein attempt to list even generally the injustices to which I was subjected by a corrupt judicial system, nor shall I bother to enumerate the cruelties

... detained in sundry Texas jails and at Leavenworth Penitentiary. Most of them are adequately detailed in my 1967 Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, sworn to and subscribed before William R. Martin (a former member of the CIA's Dirty Tricks Division, who by his own admission is still in "the reserves"). But I shall opine that if President Kennedy had not met his demise when and where he did, I would not have been brought to trial on charges of commiting a felony.

While my return to the fold of the CIA in May 1968 may have been the only "practical thing" for me to do, it definitely was not predicated on my financial situation, as a few old bank account passbooks will substantiate (I am not quite the mercenary that Mr. Lucey has portrayed). Nor was it because of any peculiar allegiance to those who had tossed me on the scrap heap for the sake of expediency 4½ years earlier, love of country, masochistic tendencies or wont of further intrigue. And while it remains axiomatic in my mind that the sole requisite for one's use by the Agency is his qualification to fit into whatever may happen to be the scheme of things, even this did not apply in my circumstance, not really. I agreed to go back out into the cold, so to speak, strictly for personal reasons and I think the explanation is wisely left at that for now.

My mission inside East Germany - if indeed it was a mission - was neither as well-defined nor as elementary as Mr. Lucey has perceived. I am sure the CIA knows all it needs to know about American defectors in Berlin and the modus operandi of the MfS. In fact, the mission was not directed against East Germany, per se. Preparations bore the trademarks of an authentic, even typical, Agency project targeted in the main to another nation. That I was unable to comprehend the German language, that I had been a recent, unwilling guest of the U.S. Attorney General, branded a Communist in the public records, etc., merely served to strengthen an already plausible cover built up by chance rather than by design. Paradoxically, the chinks in the armor were that the cover was not wholly untrue, the MfS (unlike the FBI) not in the least irresponsible to the laws and policies of its government. In the past I had engaged in certain covert intelligence activities hositle to other socialist states, to which - as an integral part of my cover - I freely confessed. Oddly enough, however, my mentors from Langely had neglected to tell me during the briefings that these previous activities constituted a violation of the criminal statutes of the GDR, warranting a maximum penalty of death upon conviction. By inadvertence or by plan I found myself in a not altogether unfamiliar predicament. If I had confessed to my real mission, assuming that it was genuine, without doubt I would have been spared execution, probably even escaped long-term imprisonment. Instead, I selected what I considered to be a better alternative . . . . and gained my freedom. As for my treatment by the MfS, from begining to end it was far more gentle than that experienced beneath the cudgel of the U.S. Department of Justice.

With regard to my marital status and my children, the foremost area that Mr. Lucey appears to have exploited, I have never claimed that "Uncle Sam hides my family" or stated that FBI and CIA agents deliberately isolated me from my wife and children; nor have I claimed that the Agency used the promise of reuniting me with my family as part of the incentive for accepting the assignment in the GDR. My accusations in this respect centered around my children and they were leveled at the State Department as the result of a promise made to me shortly after my release from the GDR. Since returning to the United States last spring a reliable source has informed me that my wife was granted a final decree of divorce at some period during my imprisonment in the USA and although I have never been served with a copy of the decree or other notification of divorce (or notice of a divorce hearing) I see no cause to dispute the advisement.

Lastly, concerning the aspersions cast on my sanity, at this writing permit me to say only that I have never in my life been certified psychotic by any U.S. medical authority or adjudicated mentally-incompetent in a court of law, notwithstanding the conflicting legal and medical opinions as to my mental condition on the day of my arrest in Texas, over six years ago.

* * *

200-120-102

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 26 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	SR S	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4	6 SD	9	IDII
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY: 53 PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION: EUR 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, CI/RA, SECUR 4, CA/PROP, CA 5

#079

15-18

S E C R E T 151047Z MAR 69 CITE [ZURICH] 1629

20-10

DIRECTOR INFO [BERN]

Mrs Hall

17 MAR 69 IN 15450

REF DIRECTOR 83209

3/17/69

1. NAGELL LAST APPEARED AT ZURICH CONSULATE MORNING 7 MARCH AND STATED THAT IF HE RECEIVED NO SATISFACTION BY FIVE O'CLOCK THAT AFTERNOON HE WOULD CARRY OUT HIS THREATS AND EXPOSE US GOVERNMENT ON RADIO, TELEVISION AND IN THE PRESS.

2. HE THEN DISAPPEARED, NOTHING FURTHER HEARD FROM HIM AND, NO PUBLICITY GIVEN. MORNING MONDAY 10 MARCH CONSULATE ZURICH ADVISED BY TELEPHONE FROM US CONSULATE BARCELONA THAT NAGELL HAD APPROACHED THEM AND MADE SIMILAR THREATS.

3. FILE: 201-746537.

S E C R E T

SECRET

2/mc

13-00000

MK
RIG: MARY KOUREMBIS
NIT: E/AS/S
T: 7963/9108
ATE: 12 MARCH 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

SECRET

	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		5	
2	SRS	6	IDH
3		7	
4	OSD	8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 24 PER SSP #102

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-746537

ONF: EUR-6 INFO FILE, VR. DDP, ADDP, CI, CAS, CI/IC-2, CI/RA, SECUR-4, CI, RI/AN, CS/DO, CA/PROP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 23 17 MAR 69 3

CITE DIRECTOR 83209

15-10
~~BERN~~ ZURICH INFO BERN
~~25-10~~, 20-18 15-10
INK MHORDER WOMUSE

Mrs HA

20-12
REFS: A. BERN 4908 (IN 07192)
B. DIRECTOR 80955

1. FOR RECORD ON NAGELL PLEASE ADVISE US IF HE [redacted] AIRED GRIEVANCES ON RADIO/TV AS THREATENED.

~~2. BERN: PLEASE PASS ZURICH.~~

2. FILE: 201-746537.

END OF MESSAGE

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/E/AS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO. 3/MC

13-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

31 **SECRET**

RIG: JERRY SEIGEL
NIT: E/AS/S
T: 7963/9108
ATE: 5 MARCH 1969

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2	OSD	6	
3	SRS	7	1D/1
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 33 PER SOP # 102

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-746537

Tighe

ONF: EUR 6 INFO FILE, VR, R/AN, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CAS, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/RA, FI2, SECUR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 06 00 03 MAR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 80955

PRIORITY ~~20~~ 15-18, 18

O [BERN] ~~INFO [ZURICH]~~

4 ~~20~~ 15-10

INK MHORDER WOMUSE

~~20~~ 15-18

Mrs Hall

REFS: A. [ZURICH] 1610 (IN 03310) ✓
B. [BERN] 4908 (IN 07192) ✓

~~20~~ 15-10

13

1. INFO REF A PASSED LNERGO 28 FEBRUARY 1969. NO INFO SUBJECT'S FILE SUBSEQUENT DIRECTOR 06625 ~~DATED~~ JUNE 1968 EXCEPT FOR PARA 3 BELOW.

2. SUBJECT HAS NEVER HAD ANY WOFIRM CONNECTIONS. NO EVIDENCE ANY CURRENT LNHARP RELATIONSHIPS (ISR HAS NO RECORD). PAST HISTORY INDICATES HE FABRICATOR AND MENTALLY DISTURBED INDIVIDUAL.

3. NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED WAS FACT SUBJECT SERVED JAPAN EARLY 1958 WITH 441ST CIC DETACHMENT. WAS RELIEVED CIC DUTIES IN APRIL 1958 DUE MENTAL INSTABILITY AND CLEARANCES REVOKED. JUNE 1968 LNGOLD REQUESTED WOFIRM TRACES ON SUBJECT AND REFERRED TO LNERGO. PRESUME THIS REQUEST STEMS FROM HIS APPROACH AMCONGEN ZURICH JUNE 1968 AND DETAILED INFO ALREADY KNOWN CONSULATE. 18

4. [BERN] PASS [ZURICH] WHEN COB RETURNS.

5 ~~4~~. 15-10 FILE: 201-746537. 15-18

END OF MESSAGE

NAGELL, RICHARD CASE

CI/OPS/EUR B. R. Young
C/CSA
CI/SO

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

John Berg
C/E/AS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO. 6/mc

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 29

SECRET (When Filled In) 5

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2	DRS	7	
3		8	IDI
4		9	
5	OSD	10	

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

CSDO

BY: T AT: 1215 Z

DISSEM BY 46 PER ____ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PRECEDENCE

ACTION EUR 6

☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/RA, CA5, CA/PRO

#054

SECUR 4: CCS 2

S E C R E T 280751Z CITE ZURICH 1610 28 FEB 69 IN 03310

15-10 15-18

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, BERN T

INKMHORDER WOMUSE

REFS A. DIRECTOR 06625 JUNE 1968

15-18

B. ZURICH 1331 (IN 25955) NR

1. CONSULATE WILL BE REPORTING ON VIA STATE CHANNELS ON VISIT TO CONSULATE 27 FEB OF RICHARD CASE NAGELL, AKA JOE CRAMER, JOE CRANE, ROBERT C. NOLAN 201-746537. HE WARNED INTERVIEWING CONSUL THAT UNLESS PROMISES MADE TO HIM BY US OFFICIALS WERE HONORED HE WOULD REVEAL TO THE PRESS ENTIRE STORY OF HIS ALLEGED CONTACTS WITH WOFIRM AND WOULD EXPOSE INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM HE HAD DEALT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

2. UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY BASE WILL, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, LEAVE THIS MATTER STRICTLY TO CONSULATE. BERN PLEASE ADVISE LNERGO.

15-10

3. MOST RECENT STATE MESSAGE WAS US MISSION BERLIN 2567 OF 26 OCTOBER 68.

S E C R E T

~~Sheila with call~~

264170

SECRET

4/mc

S~~ECRET~~

```
CTL NO 3065    REQUESTOR PARRISH      OFFICE ID/1                         04MAR69

N3065 NAGELL,RICHARD CASE                          T= S

  NAGELL,RICHARD CASE  Sarah Hall                         OS  64  M264170
  /A CRAMER,JOE
  /A KRAMER,JOE
  /A CRANE,JOE
  /A NOLAN,ROBERT C   /Y M   /B CIR30    /W CHG TO SRS
  /Z 0933604
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO--------------------------
```

S~~ECRET~~

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
EUR

BY: di AT: 1810 Z

DISSEM BY: 5 PER #

ACTION
EUR6

☐ RID COPY

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

1		6	
2	SR 5	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5	OSD	10	ID

PRECEDENCE

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CI, CA5, CI/IC2, CI/RA 4, SEC/R 4, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CCS2, FI2

420

S E C R E T 051726Z MAR 69 CITE BERN 4908
15-10

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ZURICH
15-18

5 MAR 69 IN 07192

INK MHORDER WOMUSE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 06625, 10 JUNE 68

15-18
B. ZURICH 1610 (IN 03310)

MRS HALL

1. ON 5 MARCH SUBJ AGAIN CONTACTED ZURICH CG AND IN EVEN MORE THREATENING FASHION CLAIMED HE HAS RADIO/TV TIME EVENING 6 MARCH AND WILL TELL ALL ABOUT HIS ALLEGED WOFIRM CONTACTS UNLESS HE RECEIVES ASSURANCE THAT PROMISES MADE BY US OFFICIALS WILL BE HONORED. CONSIDER THIS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE BUT REQUEST HQS CONFIRM PRIORITY THAT SUBJ HAS HAD NO WOFIRM OR OTHER LNHARP TIES.

2. FILE DEFER.

S E C R E T

SECRET

3/mc

SECRET

13 December 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: NAGELL, Richard Case - #264170

REF: State Dept. Airgram No. A-903 from Berlin - Subject: Psychiatrist's Report on Richard Case NAGELL, U. S. Citizen Released by GDR

Reference airgram furnishes background information on Subject and fills in gaps in the chronology of events in Subject's life of interest to the Agency. Of particular note is the fact that Subject was acquitted on 29 April 1968 after his claim of temporary insanity at the time of the crime found support in the expert testimony of a noted American neurologist, Dr. Edwin WEINSTEIN. An article in the January 1968 issue of RAMPARTS by William W. TURNER implied that NAGELL had been involved in the assassination plot against President KENNEDY and that he had been "salted away". Subject denied any involvement in any conspiracy and denied that he had any information of use to GARRISON. Subject alleged that his fear that the CIA might try to "eliminate" him was planted in his mind by Mr. GARRISON. (See page 2 of interview report). On page 3 of the interview report Subject states he no longer believes that it is realistic to think that the CIA was trying to kill him.

George R. BABINEAU, Cpt., MC, the psychiatrist at the U. S. Army Hospital, Berlin who interviewed Subject, was granted a continuing liaison clearance on 17 October 1968 at the request of DDP/E/G/IS.

Dr. Edwin A. WEINSTEIN was security approved as a continuing contact through SECRET for the Medical Staff on 13 July 1965. WEINSTEIN is with the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D. C.

Ricey S. NEW, Jr., NAGELL's attorney who was present during the interview, is with the Washington, D. C. law firm of NEW, MACKEY and GEORGE. Newspaper clippings from the WASHINGTON STAR for 17 March 1966 and the NEW YORK TIMES for 29 August 1965 reflect that NICEY has been associated with East Berlin attorney, Wolfgang VOGEL and West Berlin attorney, Juergen STANGE, in a number of cases involving the release of Americans from East Germany. According to an FBI report dated 3 February 1967 these releases usually involved the payment of specified sums of money and VOGEL and STANGE were allegedly reaping large monetary benefits for their services.

Sarah K. Hall

Sarah K. Hall
SRS/OS

Att. Ref.

12/16/68

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY 12 DEC 1968 ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Raymond G. Rocca
C/CI/R&A

EXTENSION: 1653

NO.

DATE: 10 December 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Office of Security D/S 4E60		13 DEC 1968		
2. DD/Sec	17 DEC 1968	12/18		
3. DD/OS	30 Dec			
4. C/SRS	12-30-68			
5. Tighe	1/7/68			
6. Mrs Hail	1/7/68			
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ ~~SECRET~~ ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

13 DEC 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Garrison and the Kennedy Assassination:
Richard Case Nagell (201-746537)

1. Subject was born 5 August 1930 at Greenwich, New York City, N. Y. He is a U. S. citizen with passport J 543069.

2. Subject is not associated with CIA and has not been so associated.

3. He entered the U.S. Army on 5 August 1948, his eighteenth birthday. His military career was distinguished. He was awarded many military decorations for his service in Korea. He was never AWOL or court-martialled.

4. On 28 November 1954 Subject was one of six men in a B-25 which crashed near Friendship Airport. Nagell was the sole survivor. The plane was not found for 11 1/2 hours. Nagell suffered severe injury to the head and facial disfigurement. He was honorably discharged from the Army on 20 October 1959 with the rank of captain. In December 1959 he was employed as a special investigator by the Department of Alcoholic Control, State of California. He was dismissed from this position in June 1962. In July 1962 he was shot in the chest but refused to provide the police with further information. In August 1962 he went to Mexico City. In September and again in October 1962 he appeared at the American Embassy in Mexico City. He asked for help in collecting money from the State of California. He claimed that he had been approached for espionage recruitment while in Mexico City but refused to provide any particulars. He said that he wanted to renounce his U.S. citizenship. He left Mexico City on 28 October 1962. On 16 November and 15 December 1962 he was in touch with the FBI in New York City and Jacksonville, Florida. During the latter meeting he said that he had been approached in Washington, D.C., by someone whom he considered to be working for the Soviets.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

5. In December 1962 and January 1963 Nagell was examined at the VA hospital at Bay Pines, Florida. The diagnosis was "chronic brain syndrome associated with brain trauma with behavioral reaction characterized by passive aggressive and paranoid features." (An FBI memorandum of 12 June 1964 noted that Nagell was considered mentally disturbed by his mother, his brother, an ex-wife, and a friend. The mother, who said that she had been under psychiatric care for several years, described Subject's brother, Louis, as an almost hopeless alcoholic.)

6. On 20 September 1963 Subject was arrested in El Paso, Texas, on the charge of having tried to rob the State National Bank. A cell mate concluded from Subject's remarks that he had become a Communist Party member after his discharge from the army, that he had attempted suicide three times after his arrest, and that he had made arrangements with the CP in Los Angeles to pick up his passport in El Paso so that he could go to Czechoslovakia.

7. In a letter of 6 January 1964 Nagell advised the FBI in El Paso that in September of 1963 he had been instructed by an agent of a foreign government to comply with an agreement made in May 1963 to participate in a criminal offense against the U.S. or be exposed to the FBI. It was this threat, said Nagell, that led him to try to hold up the bank. The reference appears to be to the assassination of President Kennedy. At any rate, sometime after the assassination Nagell claimed that he had known both Oswald and his wife. Pictures of Nagell were shown to Marina Oswald on 18 January 1964. She said that she did not know him.

8. At the time of his arrest Subject had in his possession a notebook which made reference to "Medical Aid to Cuba", the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee," the names of six persons alleged to be CIA agents, and other information. The FBI informed the Office of Security on 12 March 1964 that at the time of arrest Nagell also had a list of six names, marked CIA. The names were F. Parker, Mrs. Guthries, C. Churchill, J. Sloss, E. Leibacher, and J. Davanon. It was later determined that Richard Fecteau also appeared on this list, where he was marked as "Lynn, Mass.", and "DAC (CIA)".

a. Our records show that Richard G. Fecteau was aboard an American plane shot down over Manchuria in November 1952 and that he is serving in Peiping a twenty year sentence on spy charges. Fecteau, an OPC employee, was quoted in the press as saying that he worked for CIA.

b. F. Parker was not identified. He may possibly be John Floyd Parker, an Agency employee in 1964 who was in Japan in 1952.

c. There is no pertinent identifiable information about Mrs. fnu Guthries. She may be Frances Agnes Guthrie, an Agency employee in 1964.

d. C. Churchill was not identified. He may be Creighton Churchill, who was in Japan in 1952.

e. J. Sloss may be John Richard Sloss, an Agency employee in 1964.

f. E. Leibacher could be identical with Ernst Leibacker who in 1964 was in the Los Angeles field office of the DCS.

g. J. Davanon may refer to Joseph Frances Davanon, also in the Los Angeles field office at the time.

9. John Floyd Parker, Frances Guthrie, Ernst Leibacker, Joseph Frances Davanon, and John Richard Sloss all stated to the best of their knowledge they had never met Nagell. It is possible, however, that Nagell knew or knew of Parker, Churchill, and Guthrie through their work in the Far East. As for Leibacker and Davanon, Nagell lived in Los Angeles in 1962.

10. On 16 April 1964 Nagell sent to the FBI a letter claiming that in September 1963 he had sent to the Bureau a registered letter signed "Jack Kramer". The 1964 letter implied that the 1963 letter had warned the FBI about the impending assassination. The FBI, of course, did not receive such a letter.

11. In January 1968 William T. Turner stated in an article in Ramparts, "The Garrison Commission on the Assassination of

President Kennedy", p. 56, that Nagell was then still confined at Leavenworth, that he had been a highly decorated infantry captain in the Korean War, and that he claimed to have become a CIA agent thereafter. Ramparts shifted the plane crash in which Nagell was injured from 1954 and Maryland to 1957 and Cambodia. The article repeated the allegation that he staged a phony holdup in order to be under arrest when the assassination occurred.

12. On 6 June 1968 the American Consulate in Zurich cabled Washington to say that Richard Case Nagell, passport J 543069, had appeared at the consulate on 4 June and had said that he was working for a secret U.S. Government agency on a mission to Geneva, where he was to meet some Japanese. He asked for money. He returned to the consulate the next day, was incoherent, and seemed psychotic. He claimed that on 14-16 May 1968 he had been interviewed by District Attorney Jim Garrison. He said that Garrison had warned him that he was in danger of being killed and that he wanted to inform CIA that he was in Zurich.

13. On 7 September 1968 another William Turner piece was printed by Ramparts under the heading " [Assassinations] Epstein's Garrison". It referred to Nagell as a former U.S. intelligence agent and repeated much the same story that it had told in January. Turner and Ramparts may have been unaware that Nagell was out of jail by then.

14. On 25 October 1968 the Washington Post reported that after holding Nagell for four months, the East Germans had released him on 23 October at an East-West Berlin crossing-point. Nagell left by plane for the U.S. on 25 October. "Informed sources" said that Nagell was taken off a train en route through East Germany to Berlin because he made some remarks which the East Germans considered derogatory.

15. On 31 October 1968 State forwarded the text of a report by a U. S. Army psychiatrist who examined Nagell on 23 October. Nagell said that he was on active duty with the army from 1948 to 1959 and that from 1953 to 1959 he was an officer in military intelligence. He also provided accurate information about the 1954 plane crash and its results -- among them, in his own words, his "unstable personality and immature or impulsive behaviour". He said that he draws 64% disability pay. He lost his job in California because one night in 1962, while drunk, he tried to break down the door of the apartment of his estranged wife.

After his confused attempt in 1963 to rob the El Paso bank, he spent 4 1/2 years in prison. He was examined by Dr. Edwin Weinstein,

~~SECRET~~

a noted American neurologist, who found his electroencephalograms abnormal, and as a result he was released from prison on 29 April 1968.

Nagell said that because of the Ramparts article of January 1968 he was paid a visit by Jim Garrison. He told Garrison that he had no information of any use to him. The interview left him, however, with two fears: that Garrison might try to subpoena him and that CIA might try to "eliminate" him. (By the time he was providing this information in Berlin Nagell was well aware that he was not involved in any conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.) He said that his fear of CIA was planted in his mind by Mr. Garrison.

After his release he went to New York, where a sister lives. He was almost hit by a car driven without lights and decided to go to Europe to escape being killed by CIA. In June he appeared in Zurich. He next set out for West Berlin but was taken off the train on 11 June 1968. For several months he was repeatedly asked to admit that he was a spy. Eventually he concluded that the only way to obtain his release was to pretend that he was mentally ill. He did so, was examined by a psychiatrist, and was released.

"He no longer believes that it is realistic to think that the CIA was trying to kill him." He termed himself "chronically paranoid". The Army psychiatrist concluded "Currently he is not psychotic and seems competent in a legal and psychiatric sense . . . . "

Nagell's final remark was, "Well, I'll tell you one thing, that's the last time I ever take a train through East Germany."

~~SECRET~~

Originated by: DC/CI/R&A:DEPratt:dlm 10 December 1968

Distribution:
Orig - DDP
- 1 - Office of General Counsel
- 1 - A/DCI
- 1 - Office of Security
- 1 - DCS (Attn: George Musulin)
- 1 - FBI via C/CI/R&A
- 1 - CI/R&A chrono
- 1 - DP chrono

~~SECRET~~

20 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/R&A
CI Staff

SUBJECT : Richard Case NAGELL

Attached for your information is ~~the~~ memorandum dated 26 March 1964 from Mr. Solie of this staff listing the names of seven persons found in an address book by the FBI on the occasion of their arrest of Richard Case NAGELL.

I have noted in longhand on the attachment the names of those individuals on whom we have a record. The others are designated either unidentifiable or no record.

Cecil C. Tighe

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. R. J. Leonard   26 March 1964

Chief, Research Branch/SRS

NAGELL, Richard Case

1. Attached is a copy of a 2 October 1962 memorandum from the FBI in regard to Richard Case NAGELL.

2. SA Alexander W. NEALE, Jr. of the Washington Field Office, FBI, has informally advised the undersigned that NAGELL has been arrested on the West Coast for bank robbery, is going to be tried in the near future for the alleged crime, and that NAGELL had in his possession the following information:

Richard FECTEAU - OS record
    (Lynn, Mass)
    DAC (CIA)

CIA
Mr. S. PARKER - U.I.
Mrs. GUTHRIES - N.R.
Mr. C. CHURCHILL - U.I.
Mr. J. DAVANON - OS record
Mr. J. SLOSS - OS record
Mr. E. LEIBACHER - OS record

3. A check of SO Indices has revealed no record of NAGELL, and an RI check only disclosed the attached FBI report. Please recheck SO Indices on the subject, have a file set up on an expedite basis, and on an expedite basis identify the above individuals as to whether any have any connection with this Agency. The above Richard FECTEAU may be identical to the individual who was captured by the Chinese Communists and is now in prison.

4. Also check with Mrs. THORN of OO/C to determine whether OO/C has any record of NAGELL. It is believed that very possibly some

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

of the above individuals may be connected with the Los Angeles or San Francisco Field Office of OO/C, but at the present moment limit the check with Mrs. THORN to determine if they have any record of Richard Case NAGELL.

Bruce L. Solie

BLS:jrg

28 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: NAGELL, Richard Case - #264170

REF: 1. State Telegrams No. 258355 to U. S. Mission Berlin dtd 19 Oct 1968 and No. 2538 from Berlin dtd 22 Oct 1968

2. Clipping from WASHINGTON POST dtd 25 Oct 1968

Subject is one of the characters in the GARRISON case. See summary dtd 18 January 1968 in his file. He was arrested for bank robbery at El Paso, Texas on 20 September 1963 and sentenced to Leavenworth penitentiary. In June 1968 CIA received a cable from [Bern] 15-16 in which NAGELL was quoted as telling the CONGEN he wanted them to "inform CIA he in Zurich".

The details of how and why NAGELL is in Europe, in particular East Berlin, are missing. State Telegram No. 2538 from Berlin states that the charges are still unknown. "Basic documents -- are still in hand of State Security authorities."

Subject was released by East German authorities together with one Leon Burris JAMES. An intensive review of JAMES' file (#266602) failed to reveal any connection between JAMES and Subject. State Department reported both cases simultaneously because JAMES and Subject are currently in the same situation in East Berlin. JAMES is also mentally unstable and has cause embarrassment abroad for the State Department since 1964. He was of Agency interest in 1965 because he had in his possession while in Switzerland the names of two Agency employees who were in a covert status. It was never determined how JAMES obtained these names.

Sarah K. Hall
Sarah K. Hall
SRS/OS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

12/2/68

1/mc

[illegible]

E. Germany Frees U.S. Ex-Officer

25 OCT 1968
WASHINGTON POST

BERLIN, Oct. 24 (AP)—East Germany has released a former U.S. Army captain it held for four months.

Informed sources said Richard Case Nagell, 38, was delivered at a border-crossing point between East and West Berlin yesterday in the presence of East Berlin attorney Wolfgang Vogel; attorney Ricey S. New of Washington and an official from the U.S. Mission in West Berlin.

A U.S. spokesman said Nagell left by plane today for the United States. Nagell was described as a Californian and a former U.S. Army captain who left the service in 1959. In 1954, he was the sole survivor of an airplane crash near Friendship Airport that killed five servicemen.

Informed sources said Nagell was taken off a train by the East Germans four months ago while he was on his way from West Germany to West Berlin through East Germany. Apparently he made some remarks which the East Germans considered derogatory, the sources said.

Arrangements for Nagell's release were handled by Vogel, New, West Berlin attorney Juergen Stange and various government officials, the sources reported.

The U.S. Mission had not disclosed that Nagell was being held. He was not brought to trial and apparently no specific charges were brought against him, the sources added.

He was reported in generally good condition on his release.

~~SECRET~~

```
CTL NO 5046    REQUESTOR HALL         OFFICE SRS                    05NOV68

N5046 JAMES,LEON BURRIS                              T= S

  JAMES,LEON BURRIS                                    OS  67  G363004-185
  /A JAMES,LEO PAUL
  /A NELSON,THOMAS
  /A JOHNSON,HOLDEN  /Y M  /L 67CAL,LOS ANGELES  /T JR  /R SER 2
  /Z 2113602
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  JAMES,LEON BURRIS                                    OS  64  M266602
  /A NELSON,THOMAS GEORGE  /B 23NOV44   CAL  /T JR
  /Z 9023755
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
```

~~SECRET~~

7 Sept 1968

SIRHAN'S MOTIVES

Unlike Lee Harvey Oswald, Sirhan Sirhan has lived to tell of his motivations—but he has chosen to remain silent. The only other potential source of information is his family, which had not spoken to the press.

Mahmoud Abdel-Hadi, an Egyptian correspondent for Akhbar Elyoum in Cairo, recently gained access to Sirhan's family. Based upon information supplied him by the family, he has written exclusively for RAMPARTS *the following account of Sirhan's motivations and the strategy he plans for his trial.*

Because of the forthcoming trial and the difficulty of dealing with this subject without emotional involvement, the editors of RAMPARTS *have elected to present this information of historic interest to our readers without display, and in as objective a form as possible.*

BECAUSE I AM AN ARAB I was able to break through the barrier of suspicion that had stopped other journalists cold and obtain the first in-depth interviews the Sirhan family has given since the assassination. From their comments and from what Sirhan has said to them, a picture of the man and his motives begins to emerge, replacing the misleading portraits which have swamped the U.S. press.

The fact that Sirhan has not publicly discussed his trial is no accident. It is his own strategy, something he developed after thinking about it for long hours in his specially made jail cell. In fact, he has confided to his family that he will never make *any* statement unless special provisions are made for the courtroom proceedings. What Sirhan wants is, quite simply, publicity. He wants the major television networks to be allowed to broadcast the entire trial. If they do this, he says, he will tell all. "And if they refuse?" his brother Adel recently asked him. "Then I shall go to the gas chamber—silent," Sirhan replied.

To understand why Sirhan is indeed capable of such an act, one must understand that he is first and foremost an Arab, born in Palestine and consumed with interest in the Middle Eastern conflict. He is deeply committed to making his trial a public and political forum for the Arab position.

College educated, articulate and a voracious reader, Sirhan is confident about his own ability to cope with his predicament. His eldest brother, Shereif, told me that Sirhan studies the intricacies of his case as many as ten hours a day in his cell. Shereif recalls that Sirhan recently said to him, "I do not need a lawyer. I understand my case and know how to defend myself." But even so, Attorney Russell Parsons is defending his client, and doing it on Sirhan's own grounds. "The main issue," Parsons told me, "is to answer this question: why, for what reason, did Sirhan kill Robert Kennedy? There are 100 witnesses who saw Sirhan shooting Mr. Kennedy, but no one seems to know why he did it."

Sirhan and his attorney hope that the defense—presuming that the television networks are allowed into the courtroom—will show that Sirhan did not have "malice aforethought" in shooting Kennedy because the act was a political gesture, and that Kennedy, to Sirhan at least, was merely a symbol. His brother Adel notes that "if Sirhan was just an assassin, he could have done it in another way, just by having a gun with a telescope. He went to the Ambassador Hotel expecting to get caught; that is why he left his notes at home. I believe that Sirhan *wanted* to get caught so that he *could say what he believes.*"

WHEN I FIRST TRIED to meet with the Sirhan family, I was refused. Security is extremely heavy around them, and they are understandably wary of new faces. Later, when I finally obtained an invitation to meet with them, Mrs. Sirhan apologized, I believe for having been inhospitable to a fellow Arab.

This family, which fled Jordan to seek greater safety and security than it had known, is now living in terror. They are somewhat at a loss to understand the events which have suddenly catapulted them into history. None of the four brothers goes to his job; they all feel that death follows them everywhere, and they move carefully, with a heavy guard. "Why don't you just leave this country?" I asked Shereif. "Where shall we go?" he answered. "To whom shall we leave our brother? Our land is under Israel's occupation." Shereif clarified his statement: "Our brother is in jail; we have to stay."

I sensed not only the Sirhans' confusion, but also some bitterness. They have not received any aid from the Arab countries, as they originally thought they might. Parsons is also somewhat surprised; he had hoped that the various local Arab consulates would help defray court costs.

Indeed, Los Angeles' Jordanian consul, who visited Sirhan in jail at Sirhan's request, indicated to me that the accused assassin had expected the Arab people to treat him as a hero. However, except for some Palestinian extremists, his act has been universally repudiated by the Arab world. One Arab newspaper has said editorially, "We don't feel any responsibility for this. It is the society that fed him with hostility, the society that gave him the gun, that is responsible." Members of the Arab Students' Association, of which Sirhan was once an officer, feel that the killing of Kennedy was a terrible mistake. One of them said to me, "What are we going to do with the rest of the American candidates? Kill them all because they want to help Israel?"

Still, the Sirhans' friends are primarily Arab, and they live in an atmosphere that is more Arab than American. The entire family spent a good deal of time discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict. The mother says that Sirhan was the most sensitive and the most involved during these discussions. Adel says that Sirhan once saw a television report of Robert Kennedy addressing the members of the Neveh Shalom Temple in Portland, Oregon. While in the synagogue, Kennedy, wearing a yarmulke, declared that the United States must help Israel against aggression from whatever source.

"Unlike the South Vietnamese," Kennedy said, "the Israelis have shown they are willing to fight for their own survival. Indeed, Israel is the very opposite of Vietnam: the Israeli government is very democratic, effective and free of corruption. Its people are united in its support." The senator then urged the Johnson Administration to proceed at once with the sale of 50 Phantom jet fighters to the Israeli Air Force and to cut off economic aid to the Arab countries. This whole episode made Sirhan very angry, Shereif recalls. "He left the room putting his hands on his ears and almost weeping."

Continued on page 8

Continued from page 6

I asked Sirhan's mother why she thought her son had shot Kennedy. "Everything in this country was helping Sirhan," she maintained. "It was pushing him to the danger point. Everything, the propaganda of the Zionists, everything, was against his country, against his people."

Adel described Sirhan's current state of mind: "He feels he has done a terrible thing, but he feels now it is too late to be sorry. Now he wants Americans to listen to something they have never listened to."

And at their first meeting in the jail, Sirhan's mother said to him, "Shame on you. Why have you done such a thing?" He replied, "It's too late to speak of it. But all the Americans will know why."

—MAHMOUD ABDEL-HADI

[Assassinations]



EPSTEIN'S GARRISON

TWO SUMMERS AGO a tandem attack on the Warren Report all but relegated that work to the fiction section of your local library. The first was Mark Lane's *Rush to Judgment*, which convincingly demonstrated—using the Warren Commission's own evidence—that Oswald could not have done it alone, and drew the first dim outlines of the conspiracy theory. The second was Edward Jay Epstein's *Inquest*, which exposed the rather shoddy inner workings of the Commission and laid bare the tortured logic it finally employed to dispel notions of a conspiracy.

Both books became best sellers, but their authors have since gone different ways. Lane, who shuttered his law practice and struggled for years to get his manuscript published in the United States (it was first published in Britain), has stumped the country in support of District Attorney Jim Garrison's theory that the assassination was carried out by an anti-Castro paramilitary team supervised by persons with CIA affiliations. Epstein, whose book was a converted Cornell University master's thesis—the subject was urged upon him by his mentor, Andrew Hacker—has emerged as one of Garrison's most fervid accusers. His vehicle is The New Yorker: in the issue of July 13, he delivered a 25,000-word blast at Garrison, calling the DA's investigation a fraud.

The New Yorker article had its genesis over a year ago, when the author showed up at Garrison's office in New Orleans. According to Chief Investigator Louis Ivon, Epstein spent about 48 hours in town, some three hours at the office, and hasn't been seen since. Much of what he writes about has occurred since this touch-and-go visit and is obviously hearsay on his part, yet he writes with the authoritative tone of a participant. Undoubtedly this technique is convincing to his audience, which assumedly is unfamiliar with the intricacies of Garrison's investigation. But to those familiar with the facts, the article is badly slanted.

For example, Philosophy Professor Richard Popkin of the University of California at San Diego, author of the book *The Second Oswald* (propounding the theory of an Oswald double) and "Garrison's Case" in The New York Review of Books (September 14, 1967), recently commented on the article:

"I found it a queer mix of facts, half-facts, rumors and very dubious information from people hostile to Garrison. Epstein has compressed all this to make it look like everything's on the same level. I think it would take an awful lot of work to disentangle what he's saying on almost any page as to how much of it has a factual base, how much of it is rumor that he has heard from people, how much of it are charges that have been made by people like [William] Gurvich [who volunteered to work on the investigation without pay, passed himself off as the Chief Investigator, then turned on Garrison] against Garrison, which haven't been substantiated anywhere except by Gurvich's statement of them. And also that he tends to take facts and information and rumors and so on, that occurred over a year and a half's period, and compress them all into simultaneous events, so that a statement made by Garrison at one time is pounced upon on the basis of information or statements he made a year and a half later in a totally different context. So I think it's a quite unfair presentation, which has some factual base, but which also has a lot of very dubious elements in it."

One of the dubious elements is Epstein's version of the testimony of Dean Andrews Jr., a colorful attorney who numbers among his former clients Oswald (who wanted his undesirable discharge from the Marine Corps rectified) and the late David William Ferrie, a central figure in the Garrison investigation. The day after the assassination, Andrews told the Commission he received a phone call from a man he knew as Clay Bertrand, whom he described as a "lawyer without a briefcase" for local homosexuals. Bertrand asked him to go to Dallas and defend Oswald. Garrison contends Bertrand is Clay Shaw, whom he has charged with conspiracy.

According to Epstein, Andrews initially gave the FBI "several different descriptions" of Bertrand, and finally admitted that Bertrand "was merely a figment of his imagination." Later, before the Commission, Andrews stated that he had recently seen Bertrand in a bar and, Epstein says, described him as "a boy" who was "five feet eight inches" and had "sandy hair." "No other clues to Bertrand's identity turned up, however," writes Epstein, "and Wesley J. Liebeler, a Commission lawyer who conducted the investigation in this area, said he was convinced that no such person existed."

An objective reading of Andrews' testimony, however, reveals that he told the FBI that Bertrand was "approximately six feet one inch to six feet two inches in height, brown hair, and well dressed"—a description that closely matches the tall, aristocratic Shaw. As for Bertrand being a figment of his imagination, Andrews declared, "That's what the Feebees [FBI] put on." He recounted that G-men had pestered him to the point where he told them, "Write what you want, that I am nuts. I don't care." As for his later remark to the Commission's Mr. Liebeler that Bertrand was only five feet, eight inches, Andrews explained that "this time I was looking for the fellow, he was sitting down." Nowhere does he refer to Bertrand as a "boy." Epstein was perhaps confused by his exclamation: "I don't play Boy Scout and measure them."

In his superficial examination of Gar-

Continued on page 12

Sketch by Mary Morhoff

Continued from page 8

rison's case, Epstein evidently failed to check the police records prepared upon Shaw's arrest. Thoroughly shaken by the arrest, Shaw blurted out, according to Patrolman Aloysius Habighorst, that he had used the alias "Clay Bertrand." The alias was duly entered on the fingerprint card and booking sheet.

One of the most fascinating characters in the conspiracy drama is Richard Case Nagell, a former U.S. Intelligence agent who claims he encountered Oswald in Mexico City in 1963, and had been instructed by his spy superiors to determine if the rumors of an assassination attempt had any foundation. Nagell says he learned that the first attempt against Kennedy was scheduled for September 26 in Washington, D.C., and that Oswald (who crossed the border into Mexico the day before) was to be set up as the "patsy" and shot in front of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. When the anti-Castro paramilitary team could not penetrate the Presidential security in Washington, Oswald got a reprieve. But Nagell, who says he was sure the attempt would come off but failed to get the FBI to listen, faked a bank robbery in El Paso on September 20 so that he would be arrested and in federal custody when the assassination occurred.

Epstein dismisses Nagell as being mentally unbalanced, noting that "court records indicated that Nagell had suffered brain damage in an airplane crash in 1957" and that, following the bank episode, he was "an inmate of a federal institution for the criminally insane in Springfield, Missouri." As he does so frequently throughout the article, Epstein delivers a version which if developed fully would throw a different light on the matter. Nagell *was* in a plane crash, but he was given Intelligence training *after* his recovery, indicating that he had no permanent brain injury. Moreover, the fact that he stood trial implies that he was legally sane. Recently, he was released from Leavenworth Penitentiary—he had been at Springfield only temporarily.

The publication of the Epstein article came at an opportune time for Clay Shaw. Obtaining advance copies, his attorneys entered it as evidence before a three-judge federal panel which was hearing arguments that the DA was "conducting a reign of terror" and "persecuting" the defendant. Apparently the panel was unimpressed, for it unanimously rejected the defense's argument and ordered the case to trial.

If Garrison does get his day in court—a day Epstein has struggled to deny him—chances are his case will hold up better than *The New Yorker*'s brief for the defense.

—WILLIAM TURNER

[Law]

"HERE COME DE JUDGE"

CONSIDER THE REVOLT ON THE LEFT if the following occured:

The President, on the eve of his abdication, arranged to accept the resignation of the chief justice of the United States Supreme Court in order to replace him with the President's former lawyer, then an associate justice;

As a parlay, the President submitted to the Senate the name of his oldest hand-holding crony to fill the vacancy created by the promotion of his former lawyer;

The chief justice, who had written a famous report designed to satisfy the people that the assassination of the President's predecessor was sans conspiracy and the sole act of a demented mind, conditioned his resignation on the Senate's approval of the appointments;

The President's ex-lawyer, when called to testify before a Senate committee, conceded that during his three years on the high court he had continued to act as the President's advisor;

That pursuant to this role, he had sat in on numerous cabinet-level meetings, but that he had merely "summarized" the views of others for the benefit of the President;

That as a justice he had dressed down a prominent businessman who had criticized war spending, though whether his call was made at the President's request he could not say and remain faithful to the Separation of Powers;

That the businessman had retracted his statement, though in the end it proved to be accurate;

That the justice could not answer questions concerning his judicial opinions since the Constitution specifies that members of Congress may not be questioned about their acts in any place other than in Congress;

That despite this asserted Constitutional bar, the justice pointed to his dissenting vote against extending the one-man-one-vote principle to local government as proof of his devotion to State's rights;

That although he had been at the President's disposal as advisor-summarizer, he had never been involved in discussions that could conceivably reach the Court;

That the issues under discussion at the top-level meetings had ranged from the Vietnam War to riots in the cities;

That the justice had voted to jail draft card burners and had voted against taking up for consideration the legality of the war;

That he voted to give the police sweeping rights to stop-and-frisk suspects on suspicion alone;

That within two months of his proposed elevation he had authored a booklet, "Concerning Dissent and Disobedience," which limited the *moral* right to disobey laws to those "basically offensive to fundamental values of life or the Constitution" and held that even in such cases no legal defense could be urged, but jailing must be willingly accepted;

That shortly after that book was published, the justice denounced, in a rare interview from Washington, the activities of some of the Columbia University protestors as "totally inexcusable from the point of even primitive morality";

That during his first term on the Court, he cast the deciding vote upholding the conviction and five-year sentence of Ralph Ginzburg for "pandering" a non-obscene magazine;

That during each of his three terms he nearly always voted for business interests and against efforts to cut down the trusts;

That throughout his years on the Court he was widely rumored to have been one of the President's most hawkish advisors on the Vietnam War.

Consider the revolt on the left if anything like this happened in 1968.

—SIDNEY E. ZION

13-00000

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/SRS	6-12-68	BH
2	DC/SRS	6-13	BA
3	Mrs HAll	6/13/68	sbh
4	Mrs Hall	7/15/68	sbh
5			
6	TIGHE		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

The attached report by Mrs. Hall based on cable traffic re appearance of a Richard NAGELL in Zurich raises question for FBI. Is NAGELL in GARRISON investigation still in prison, or is he one and the same person in Switzerland?

Since FBI has been advised by Bern Station do not believe check is necessary. Bls.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO	DATE
Cecil C. Tighe	6/12/68

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

SECRET

12 June 1968

6/12/68

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LEOB/SRS

SUBJECT: NAGELL, Richard Case - #264170

15-18

REF: IN Cable 25955 dtd 6 June 1968 from [Zurich]

OUT Cable 06625 dtd 7 June 1968 to [Zurich]

15-18

Reference cables concern the claim of an individual appearing at the Consul General's office in Zurich, Switzerland on 4 June 1968 that he is one Richard Case NAGELL. NAGELL was sentenced to a 10 year term for bank robbery on 9 June 1964 and is supposedly in a federal prison in Missouri.

GARRISON interviewed Subject as a witness in his investigation according to a news clipping from the CHICAGO AMERICAN dated 2 January 1968. The clipping is marked in Subject's file which is attached. This file also contains a copy of the summary dated 18 January 1968 pre~~e~~pared in research on the GARRISON CASE.

It would be of interest for documentation of Subject's file to ascertain from the FBI if Subject is still in prison.

I did not receive reference IN Cable 25955 initially. Attached is a copy I obtained from OS Cable Desk. However, the original copy was routed to SRS and it is possible some one else on the Staff is already handling the matter.

Sarah K. Hall

Sarah K. Hall
SRS/OS

Att. as Stated

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

2/mc

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFI MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 28 | ROUTIN /OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1		6	
2	SRS	7	
3		8	
4	OSD	9	
5		10	

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

DVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

SSEM BY 5 PER #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

TION ☒ RID COPY

INFO:

EUR 6

FILE, VR, DDP ADDP CI CA5 CI/IC2 CI/RA

SECUR 4 DDP ADDP CSDO FI CI/OPS

SECRET 061027Z JUN 68 CITE ZURICH 1331 15-18

6 JUN 68 IN 25955

DIRECTOR INFO BERN 15-10

INK MHORDER WOMUSE

1. SUBJ, RICHARD CASE NAGELL, DPOB 5 AUG 30 NEW YORK CITY, US PASSPORT NUMBER J 543069, CAME TO CONGEN 4 JUNE, INTERVIEWED BY VICE CONSUL. TOLD INCOHERENT STORY ABOUT "WORKING FOR US GOVEERNMENT SECRET AGENCY ON MISSION TO GENEVA WHERE TO MEET JAPANESE". WANTED CONGEN ASSISTANCE TO GET MONEY WHICH CLAIMS HAD DEPOSITED NEW YORK BANK BEFORE DEPARTURE US. SUBJECT WAS TOLD BY VICE CONSUL CONGEN COULD NOT ASSIST.

2. SUBJ RETURNED TO CONGEN 5 JUNE, ASKED FOR POLITICAL OFFICER, THUS WAS REFERRED TO TEGETHOFF BY RECEPTIONIST. SUBJ MADE ASSUMPTION TEGETHOFF WAS WOFIRM, WHICH DENIED. SUBJ PUITE INCOHERENT, IN FACT, APPEARS PSYCHOTIC POSSIBLY DANGEROUS. CLAIMS WAS INTERVIEWED BY NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT ATTORNEY GARRISON 14-16 MAY ON CONNECTION "CIA AND PRES KENNEDY ASSASSINATION." SUBJ CLAIMS GARRISON TOLD HIM HE IN DANGER BEING KILLED. THEREFORE WANTS "INFORM CIA HE IN ZURICH."

PAGE 2 ZURICH 1331 SECRET 15-18

3. ABOVE FYI. CONGEN REPORTING SEPARATELY.

SECRET

SECRET

3/mc

ORIG: MARY KOUREMBIS
UNIT: E/AS/S
EXT: 7963/9108
DATE: 7 JUNE 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	SRS	6	
2		7	
3		8	DH
4	OSD	9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-746537

CONF: EUR 6 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR . DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CS/DO CI/IC 2, CI/RA, CA 5, SECUR 4, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 07 22 59 Z JUN 68 CITE DIRECTOR 06625

Sayman Tighe 6/11/68
Mrs Hall

15-18 15-10
TO [ZURICH] INFO [BERN]

INK MHORDER WOMUSE

REF: [ZURICH] 1331 (IN 25955)*
15-18

1. RICHARD CASE NAGELL, AKA JOE CRAMER, JOE KRANE, ROBERT C. NOLAN, 201-746537, WELL KNOWN TO LNERGO. SUBJECT ENTERED US ARMY 1948 HONORABLY DISCHARGED CAPTAIN 1959. DURING KOREAN CONFLICT RECEIVED MANY CAMPAIGN AWARDS. SOLE SURVIVOR AIRPLANE CRASH NOVEMBER 1954, SUFFERED FACIAL DISFIGUREMENT AND GIVEN SEVERAL PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATIONS. MOTHER, BROTHER, FORMER WIFE, AND FRIEND OF NAGELL ALL CONSIDER HIM TO BE MENTALLY DISTRUBED. NO INDICATION NAGELL INVOLVED IN ESPIONAGE, COMMUNIST PARTY, OR FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE ACTIVITY.

2. IN 1964 LETTER TO LNERGO NAGELL REFERRED TO ANOTHER LETTER WHICH HE ALLEGEDLY WROTE TO LNERGO IN 1963 RE OSWALD. LNERGO FILES CONTAIN NO RECORD OF 1963 LETTER. NAGELL IMPRISONED ON BANK ROBBERY CHARGE AND HAS ATTEMPTED SUICIDE.

3. WE ASSUME BERN PASSING REFERENCE INFO TO FBI ~~LNERGO.~~

END OF MESSAGE

C/EUR CI/STAFF C/E/AS

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO. 3

SECRET

18 January 1968

SUBJECT: NAGELL, Richard Case

ALLEGATION:

Richard Case NAGELL, "a highly decorated infantry Captain in the Korean War", alleges that he became a CIA agent. He said he fired the gun in the bank at El Paso, Texas because he wanted to be in custody when the assassination of President KENNEDY took place. NAGELL charged that "the FBI illegally seized from him evidence crucial to his defense, such as notebooks containing the names of certain CIA employees, photographs, two Mexican tourist cards (one in the name of Joseph KRAMER, the other in the name of Albert HIDEL) and receipts for registered mail, including the one for the letter sent HOOVER warning of the assassination. NAGELL claimed he was instructed to "arrow" the patsy, that is kill him (OSWALD) after the assassination. He contended he got cold feet and this was his reason for the attempted bank robbery, he would rather be arrested than commit murder and treason.The article alleges that while it was suggested in court that an airplane crash NAGELL survived mentally affected him, he was given intelligence training after the crash. Also, NAGELL complains he has been salted away because of what he knows.

CIA CONNECTION:

None; although, Subject was of interest to OS in 1964 and early 1965 because of information furnished to the Agency by the FBI that he had in his possession the names of six CIA employees at the time of his arrest for bank robbery at El Paso, Texas on 20 September 1963.

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

SOURCE:

1968 RAMPARTS
Article by William
W. TURNER

OS INDICES RESULTS:

Subject became of interest to the Office of Security in March 1964 when the FBI informed the Agency that Subject had in his possession at the time of his arest for bank robbery at El Paso, Texas on 20 September 1963 the name of Richard FECTEAU (an individual by this name was captured by the Chinese Communists and is now in prison in China) and of six Agency employees. Research failed to reveal any reason why NAGELL had these names in his possession. It was concluded that while NAGELL is unquestionably unbalanced, his story of being involved in espionage is not fully contradicted by evidence. He could have been contacted by a Soviet agent while in Washington, D. C. in December 1962 or while he was in Mexico City in September and October 1962. His file contains mostly FBI reports dated 1962 and 1964 and in these are documented his history of mental instability and physical complaints stemming from the plane crash. Attached is a chronology dated 3 March 1965 made from the information contained in the FBI reports. At the time this security research was conducted, it was recommended that NAGELL be personally interviewed by a representative of OS in the hope that NAGELL might reveal how he came into the possession of these names but no further action is indicated in his file and this interview was not undertaken.

DETAILS:

Subject's file reflects no Agency interest in him prior to March 1964 when the names of CIA employees were found in his possession when arrested for bank robbery.

The RAMPARTS claim that he received intelligence training after the plane crash is true. The crash occurred 28 November 1954 and he graduated from Army Intelligence School, Ft. Holabird, Maryland on 15 August 1955. He served in Korea and Japan as a member of the U. S. Army Counterintelligence Corps, terminating about 1958. A Lt. Col. Ned W. GLENN who served with NAGELL personally in Korea advised that NAGELL was not stable mentally and that this instability was probably due to brain damage suffered in the airplane crash.

The RAMPARTS article's claim that NAGELL said he fired the gun in the bank at El Paso, Texas because he wanted to be in custody when the assassination took place is not completely in conflict with a statement NAGELL made on 1 January 1964 which was, however, after the assassination. (see page 4 of chronology)

The RAMPARTS article's allegation that the FBI took from NAGELL a notebook containing the names of CIA employees is true.

NAGELL's complaint that he was "salted away" is open to speculation. A ten year prison sentence does appear harsh, considering the documented brain damage he suffered in the B-25 plane crash while he was in the U. S. Army.

13-00000 Page Page Page //

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
AMERICAN

E-439,360
S-494,503
JAN 2 1968

Mabley's Report:

Garrison Case-Can We Afford Not to Listen?

BY JACK MABLEY

THE INVESTIGATION INTO the assassination of President Kennedy is being reopened. It is being conducted by a prosecutor with the power of subpena and a grand jury with the power to indict.

JIM GARRISON

It would be better for the country if the federal government were making the investigation rather than a New Orleans official who has been accused of being unstable and of seeking headlines.

However, the federal government shows no signs of wanting to reopen the matter, and the prosecutor, Jim Garrison, appears to be quite insistent on carrying it thru.

A number of writers and self-appointed investigators also are dissatisfied with conflicting facts and unanswered questions, and they continue to publish evidence to rebut the Warren commission conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald alone was involved in the assassination.

ONE OF THE MOST persistent critics of the Warren conclusion is Ramparts magazine. This is a liberal, no, a radical publication which represents the viewpoint of a small minority. However, it has done some effective investigative reporting, particularly in exposing the CIA infiltration into college activities.

Ramparts assigned an investigator, William W. Turner, who they say is a former FBI agent, to spend 9 months looking into the New Orleans evidence.

"I have worked closely with the D. A. [Garrison] and his staff," Turner reports. "In my opinion, there is no question that they have uncovered a conspiracy."

The gist of the New Orleans case is that Oswald was involved with a heterogeneous group of adventurers, anti-Castro Cubans, and radical righters who included members of the Minutemen and American Nazis.

Their common cause was to encourage or mount a revolt in Cuba against Castro. They also were strongly anti-communist.

There is no question this group existed. Garrison has evidence that Oswald was part of it. Garrison's investigators have evidence that Oswald's pro-Russian leanings actually were a front, or a disguise to conceal his real role as an anti-communist.

GARRISON BELIEVES THAT Oswald was schooled in covert operations by the CIA while in the marine corps at Atsugi naval station in Japan. Supporting evidence is Oswald's proficiency in the Russian language, the source of which was never explained, the ease with which he entered Russia, and the lack of censure by the government on his return, or by the marine corps in his discharge.

In effect, Garrison feels Oswald was either a CIA agent or was involved with CIA activities.

The New Orleans group was angry at President Kennedy because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation and because they thought Kennedy wasn't sufficiently anti-communist.

Garrison has dozens of witnesses he will subpena to fit bits and pieces into the puzzle. Individually, many can be dismissed as unreliable, but collectively they raise many questions that an objective observer would like to see resolved.

It certainly is within the power of the federal government to disprove every one of these witnesses' stories, if they can be disproved. Presumably, the federal government does not want to dignify Garrison's allegations with formal denials.

IF THERE IS ANY substance to Garrison's charges, two powerful agencies of the federal government stand to be discredited. Garrison has interviewed one witness, Richard Cass Nagell, a highly decorated Korean war veteran who claims to have been a CIA agent, who says he sent a registered letter to J. Edgar Hoover warning him of the assassination plot. If this is true, Hoover and the FBI would be guilty of dreadful dereliction of duty.

The CIA and CIA fronts are deeply involved in the activities of the men Garrison believes plotted the President's murder.

Turner, the Ramparts investigator, believes powerful government agencies are doing everything in their power to discredit Garrison.

Ten persons involved in the case have died, most of them violently, since the assassination. All went to their graves with information Garrison considers pertinent to his investigation.

Unless Garrison is killed or removed from office in some way, it is difficult to see what can stop him from airing these stories, probably in a court of law so that the public may judge their validity.

NOTE

ARRB approved redactions in last document of this package

STATE DEPT TELEGRAMS RE RICHARD NAGELL

1) DATED:
   1) 25 MAR 1969
   2) 16 APR. 1969
   3) 17 APR. 1969
   4) 22 MAY. 1969

2) PSYCHIATRIST'S REPORT, STATE AIRGRAM FROM BERLIN DATED 29 OCT. 1968

3) STATE DEPT. TELEGRAMS DATED 19 OCT. 1968 AND 22 OCT. 1968

13-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 6-6-69

TO: Mr. Murphy

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:

File on Richard Case Nagell, #264170, is permanent to Sarah Hall. This is a James Garrison Case.

FROM: Janet

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE -3

TO: Janet

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:

Check of SRs has no FFOB has file on This or can't assign it. If not run Traces but don't pull files

Jim

FROM:

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

99146 **Department of State** **TELEGRAM**

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY 40 PER # TOTAL COPIES: 19

FILE, RF. ONE, OCI/OES, HR/ofs
CR/E, INDICO, OER2, DCS, SECUR
EUR3, CI

CONFIDENTIAL HCG639

PAGE 01 STATE 069053

17
ORIGIN SCS 04
INFO OCT 01,EUR 08,SCA 01,PPT 02,CIAE 00,INR 07,NSAE 00,RSC 01,
DODE 00,TRSY 11,/035 R

66665
DRAFTED BY:SCA:SCS:HLUPPI/WRJOCHIMSEN
APPROVED BY:SCS:HOBART LUPPI
PPT:MR. RITCHIE (PHONE)
--------------------- 075118

R 022142Z MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMCONSUL ZURICH
USMISSION BERLIN

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 069053

PARIS PASS USSS

REF: BERLIN 754; STATE 62744 - RICHARD NAGELL

1. IF NAGELL STILL FRANKFURT OR INQUIRES AT ADDRESSEE POSTS HE MAY BE INFORMED DEPARTMENT ATTEMPTED TO TRACE WIFE BUT WAS UNABLE TO DO SO.

2. A SEARCH OF THE AVAILABLE PASSPORT FILES DISCLOSED NO RECORD ON MITSUKO TAKAHASHI NAGELL.

GP-4. ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL

92224 **Department of State**

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY 9 PER # TOTAL COPIES: 28 **TELEGRAM**

FILE, RF, OCI/WES, OCI/OR3 CR/E, ONE, OER2, SECUR
EUR3, FE2 CI, CI/PS, FI, DDP

SECRET HCG117

PAGE 01 MADRID 01429 181241Z

41
ACTION SCS 04
INFO EUR 17,SCA 01,VA 01,L 03,CIAE 00,DODE 00,INR 07,NSAE 00,P 04,
RSC 01,USIA 12,PPT 02,SY 03,FBI 01,/056 W
--------------------- 114417
R 171704Z APR 69 ZFF BERLIN ZURICH
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO USMISSION BERLIN
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5522
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL ZURICH

To Murphy Mrs Hall

SECRET MADRID 1429

ROME FOR VA OFFICE EUROPE

SUBJECT: WELFARE:RICHARD CASE NAGELL

REF: BERLIN 668

1. IN INTERVIEWS WITH CONSULAR OFFICER ZURICH FEBRUARY 27 AND 28 NAGELL MADE USUAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST USG PARTICULARLY FBI AND CIA, AND PUBLICITY THREATS.

2. NAGELL SUBSEQUENTLY VISITED CONSULATE BARCELONA MARCH 10, AND MADE FIRST OF SEVERAL VISITS EMBASSY MADRID MARCH 20 WHERE HE TALKED AT GREAT LENGTH WITH P&W OFFICERS, DEFENSE ATTACHE, CHIEF CONSEC, AND MADE BUT DID NOT KEEP APPOINTMENT WITH CULTURAL ATTACHE.

3. ACCORDING CAS, NAGELL IS NOT AND HAS NEVER BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH CAS. INFO FROM DEPT: NAGELL'S MENTAL AFFLICTION ORIGINATED IN BRAIN DAMAGE SUFFERED AIR CRASH NOVEMBER 1954. DIAGNOSIS DATED 4 FEB 1955: "PARANOID PERSONALITY, PASSIVE AGRESSIVE PERSONALITY REACTION.

4. ACTIVITIES IN MADRID: IN INTERVIEW WITH THREE CONSULAR OFFICERS NAGELL ACCUSED USG AGENCIES OF "LEANING ON HIM" AND DEMAND OFFICERS PASS THE WORD AROUND TO "LAY OFF" OR HE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MADRID 01429 181241Z

WOULD BLOW UP. ALSO ASSERTED DEPT HAD BROKEN PROMISE LOCATE WIFE AND CHILDREN, REPEATED THAT CHILDREN ONLY THING IN WORLD THAT MEANT ANYTHING TO HIM, THAT IF HE COULD NOT FIND THEM HE WOULD TAKE LEAVE OF THIS WORLD AND WOULD TAKE SOMEBODY WITH HIM. IN LAST MEETING WITH CONSUL APRIL 7 CONSUL HAD TWO MARINE GUARDS PRESENT VIEW USAF PSYCHIATRIST'S ADVISE TO TAKE NO CHANCES WHATEVER. NAGELL UPSET BY GUARDS PRESENCE AND BY CONSUL'S REFUSAL PERMIT HIS TAPING RECORDING INTERVIEW AND TO SHOW HIM REGULATIONS PROHIBITING RECORDING. NAGELL BELABORED PATIENT CONSUL FOR NEARLY TWO HOURS. CONSUL INFORMED HIM THAT DEPT HAD ENDEAVORED LOCATE WIFE AND CHILDREN WITHOUT SUCCESS, AND PROMISED TO QUERY DEPT WHAT SPECIFIC STEPS DEPT HAD TAKEN THIS MATTER. NAGELL FINALLY SAID HE WOULD LEAVE SPAIN BECAUSE OF CONSUL'S ACTION (USE OF GUARDS) AND REQUESTED THAT REPLY FROM DEPT BE FORWARDED PARIS WHERE HE WAS GOING. ALSO INFORMED CONSUL HE WOULD "GET HIM", BUT THROUGH POCKETBOOK, BY SUING HIM IN US. IN THIS INTERVIEW NAGELL DENIED HAVING MADE THREATS OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, ONLY "PROMISES" OF PUBLICITY AND OF "PLAYING FOOTSIE WITH CERTAIN SOURCES" IF DEPT DID NOT LOCATE CHILDREN. PRIOR DEPARTURE FROM MADRID NAGEL SENT CONSUL POST CARD WITH MESSAGE IN JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND WRITING, WHICH TRANSLATED MEANS "WITHOUT EYES WE CANNOT SEE", AND SALUATION IN SPANISH MEANING "GOOD LUCK".

5. DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST IN LAST MADRID INTERVIEW: (1) CONSUL TOLD NAGELL GENTLY HE (NAGELL) NEVER EMPLOYED BY CAS. NAGELL INSISTED YES, HE COULD PROVE IT, BUT CONSUL DID NOT PURSUE SUBJECT. (2) NAGELL SEVERELY CRITICIZED STATE DEPT FOR PERMITTING CAS AGENTS INTO ITS MIDST IN FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS, SAID HE KNEW OF AT LEAST TWO CAS AGENTS IN ZURICH AND THAT CAS NOT RPT NOT SUPPOSED TO HAVE AGENTS IN SWITZERLAND. (3) NAGELL HAD ANOTHER STORY WHICH COULD BE OF INTEREST TO NEWS MEDIA: HE ALLEGED THAT IN 1957, "IN TIME OF PEACE", HE HAD BEEN COURIER OF TREASURY PLATES FROM US TO JAPAN FOR COUNTERFEITING NORTH KOREAN CURRENCY.

6. COPIES OF RELEVANT CORRESPONDENCE FOLLOW BY POUCH.

GP-1. MCAULIFFE

SECRET

13-00000

92140 **Department of State** **TELEGRAM**

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY 12 PER # TOTAL COPIES: 19

FILE, RF. ONE, OCI/WE 5, DCS, SECUR, INDICO, CR/E, EUR 3, CI, OCI/EED 3

CONFIDENTIAL HCF755

PAGE 01 STATE 059324

17
ORIGIN SCS 04
INFO EUR 08,SCA 01,VA 01,L 03,CIAE 00,INR 07,NSAE 00,RSC 01,DODE 00,
/025 R

DRAFTED BY: SCA:SCS: AMHARTL
APPROVED BY: SCS - HOBART LUPPI
SCS - WRJOCHIMSEN
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION: EUR/GER
66667

--------------------- 113473

to Murphy
Mrs. Hall

R 172201Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION BERLIN
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL ZURICH

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 059324

ROME FOR VA

REF: BERLIN 668 RICHARD NAGELL

1. FEBRUARY 27 AND 28, 1969 NAGELL CALLED CONGEN ZURICH STATING HE HAD BEEN ENTICED RETURN US IN 1968 WITH PROMISES HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN WOULD BE LOCATED. ON MARCH 10 NAGELL APPEARED CONGEN BARCELONA REQUESTING INFO RE WIFE AND CHILDREN.

2. NAGELL APPEARED AT EMBASSY MADRID MARCH 21 WITHOUT FUNDS. REQUESTED HIS SISTER, MRS. GAMBERT, BE ASKED SEND HIM DOLS 75 FROM HIS BANK ACCOUNT FOR TRUST FUND WITH DEPARTMENT AND THAT SISTER CASH HIS MONTHLY CHECK FOR HIM AND CABLE THE MONEY TO HIM CARE AMEXCO MADRID. APRIL 3 VISITED EMBASSY AGAIN RE HIS VA CHECK AND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE ADMISSION TORREJON AFBASE HOSPITAL FOR QUOTE NERVOUS CONDITION UNQUOTE. ACCUSED DEPARTMENT AGAIN OF BREAKING ITS PROMISE HELP HIM LOCATE WIFE AND CHILDREN. LAST CALLED EMBASSY MADRID APRIL

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

```
CTL NO 3034     REQUESTOR HALL          OFFICE SRS                        24APR69

N3034 NAGELL,MITSUKO TAKAHASHI

  NAGELL,MITSUKO                                               OR   64   R264170
  /A TAKAHASHI,MITSUKO
  /A NAGELL,RICHARD C/MRS  /Y F
  /D FBI 12JUN64 P1 NAGELL,RICHARD CASE EX SPO  /T MRS
  /Z 0933602
  ---------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO----------------------------
```

~~SECRET~~

9C943 **Department of State** **TELEGRAM**

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY 12 PER # TOTAL COPIES: 23

FILE, RF. ONE, OCI|WE 5, OCI|FED 3, OER 4, SECUR, DCS, INDICO,
CR|E, EUR 3, CI

CONFIDENTIAL HCG655

SR file

PAGE 01 BERLIN 00668 161130Z

21
ACTION SCS 04

INFO EUR 17,SCA 01,VA 01,L 03,INR 07,CIAE 00,NSAE 00,P 04,USIA 12,
DODE 00,PPT 02,/051 W

098049

R 161100Z APR 69
FM USMISSION BERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4104
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL ZURICH

No [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN 0668

ROME FOR VA

SUBJECT: WELFARE: RICHARD CASE NAGELL

REF: BERLIN 2567

1. NAGELL HAS RETURNED TO BERLIN. HE CALLED AT MISSION APRIL 10 AND AGAIN APRIL 14. SINCE HE WAS OBVIOUSLY IRRATIONAL CONSULAR OFFICER URGED HIM TO CALL ON ARMY PSYCHIATRIST IN BERLIN FAMILIAR WITH HIS CASE, WHICH HE DID APRIL 15. PSYCHIATRIST SAYS HE IS MENTALLY ILL AND SHOULD BE HOSPITALIZED.

2. NAGELL SAID HE RETURNED TO BERLIN BECAUSE HE HAD "CONNECTIONS" WITH LOCAL PRESS WHO WOULD PUBLICIZE HIS "COMPLAINTS" AGAINST US GOVT (LACK OF MEDICAL AND DENTAL TREATMENT, LACK OF ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING FAMILY IN US, "TRUE" ROLE OF WASHINGTON LAWYER RICEY NEW, ETC.).

3. IN VIEW NAGELL'S HISTORY OF IMPRISONMENT IN EAST GERMANY, FORMER INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND MENTAL CONDITION (FOR WHICH HE IS APPARENTLY ENTITLED TO FULL VA BENEFITS) WE CONSIDER NAGELL'S PRESENCE IN BERLIN UNDESIRABLE (BOTH FOR HIMSELF AND FOR US GOVT) AND HOPE WE CAN PERSUADE HIM LEAVE OF HIS OWN ACCORD. ANY INFORMATION ON HIS ACTIVITIES SINCE LEAVING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SCS - Mr. Wallace Clarke

September 5, 1969

SY/PrS - Keith O. Lynch

201-746537

NAGELL, Richard Case

no 201

Reference is made to your memorandum of April 25, 1969 concerning your request to locate Mrs. Mitsuko Takahasi NAGELL, the wife of Subject.

Efforts by the SY Los Angeles Field Office to locate Mitsuko Takahashi NAGELL, aka Mrs. Richard Case NAGELL, aka Mitsuko TAKAHASHI, met with negative results.

Attached for your information and retention is a copy of an SY memorandum dated September 2, 1969 which indicates that an individual identified only as R.C. NAGELL placed an advertisement in the East Village Other, a New York underground newspaper, which makes obscene reference to both the Central Intelligence Agency and SY.

Attachment:

As stated

(1) C/SRS

2 Murphy

3. Mrs Hall

cc - Central Intelligence Agency
United States Secret Service
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. Johnson PPT

Previous record on NAGELL

DST
18786

CONFIDENTIAL

1 ATT H/W

201-746537

STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, O/SY
Thru: Chief, O/SY/E

DATE: September 2, 1969

FROM : L.G.Marcell, O/SY/E

SUBJECT: Item in East Village Other, August 20, 1969

This past weekend, I visited a friend who had just returned from New York City, bringing back a copy of a New York underground newspaper, the East Village Other, dated August 20, 1969.

Out of curiosity, I paged through the paper and, on page 17, found a so-called classified section, consisting generally of ads for male and female artists models and offerings of books alleged to instruct one in the art of synthesizing hallucinogenics.

In the personal columns of this section, the following was noted, a verbatim transcript of which is set forth:

> "Caught In The Act. Notice to the CIA and all SY shitheads who participated in Project Purple Shaft: After that fiasco in the GIR you worms did your best to screw, blue and tattoo me. You even tried to have my ass dusted in Berlin . . . you fuckups. Now its my turn to do a little shafting.
>
> Cordially, R. C. NAGELL."

Card indices in SY/E reflect no indication that anyone named R. C. NAGELL or any variation thereof, including NAGLE or NOGELL, has ever been granted clearance in this office.

A check in SY files reflected a record on Richard Case NAGELL, born August 5, 1930, who apprently is identical with the individual who authored the above item. A cursory review of the file reflects that NAGELL has been of interest to both the FBI and the Department in recent years.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1969
DIV. OF SECURITY

While NAGELL may be something of a crackpot, the item does appear to contain somewhat of an implied threat. For this reason, the information is forwarded for your consideration and for any action which may be considered necessary.

Attachment: SY file on Richard Case NAGELL

DST
18786

Group 1

Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

Input to US Defector
Machine Program
25 Sep. 69 - Hcs

CS COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

O/SY/E: LGMarcell

201-746537

Department of State TELEGRAM

81491

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY 33 PER # TOTAL COPIES: 26

FILE, RF. OCI/WES, OCI/EED3

ONE, INDICO, CR/E, DCS, OER2, OBGI2, HC, SECUR

EUR3, C, DDP, CS/DO

28 Mar 69 S10

CONFIDENTIAL HCM231

PAGE 01 MADRID 01109 252147Z

84 -S
ACTION SCS 04
INFO SCA 01,EUR 08,FBI 01,SY 03,PPT 02,SSO 00,INR 07,CIAE 00,NSAE 00,
L 03,/029 W
--------------------- 103605

O 251816Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5385

CONFIDENTIAL MADRID 1109

~~CORRECTED COPY LIMDIS CAPTION DELETED)~~

SUBJ: NAGELL, RICHARD C.

1. DOB POB UNKNOWN. RICHARD C. NAGELL, PPT J543069, ISSUED 5/24/68, ADDRESS 8225 GRAND AVENUE, ELM HURST, N.Y. 11373, VISITED CONSULATE GENERAL IN BARCELONA ON MARCH 10, AND VISITED THE EMBASSY ON MARCH 21. DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH ROBERT S. DRISCOLL, CONSUL OFFICER, NAGELL REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

2. IN THE SUMMER OF 1968, NAGELL WAS ARRESTED ON A TRAIN ENROUTE TO BERLIN FROM FRANKFURT. HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY PLACED IN CONFINEMENT IN EAST GERMANY AND HELD THERE AS A PRISONER UNTIL OCTOBER 1968. AFTER HE WAS RELEASED, HE CROSSED INTO WEST BERLIN, WHERE HE WAS DEBRIEFED AT THE U.S. MISSION BY STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES, ONE OF WHOM HE SUSPECTED TO BE AN EMPLOYEE OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY. HE ALLEGED THAT HE WAS "WORKED OVER" BY HIS EAST GERMAN CAPTORS, WHO SUSPECTED THAT HE WAS WORKING FOR ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY. NAGELL CLAIMED THAT AT TIME OF HIS ARREST, HE WAS TAKEN FROM HIS TRAIN COMPARTMENT "BY NAME".

3. NAGELL CLAIMED THAT DURING DEBRIEFING, HE WAS PROMISED ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING HIS CHILDREN WHOM HE SAID WERE RESIDING WITH THEIR MOTHER SOMEWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES. HE CLAIMED THE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT KEPT ITS PROMISE, AND DEMANDED THAT THE EMBASSY IN MADRID TAKE ACTION TO HELP LOCATE HIS CHILDREN, WHOM HE SAID ARE THE ONLY THINGS THAT MEAN

7

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY PER # TOTAL COPIES:

FILE, RF,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MADRID 01109 252147Z

ANYTHING TO HIM.

4. NAGELL THREATENED TO HAVE HIMSELF ARRESTED BY SPANISH POLICE, OR DEFECT TO EAST GERMANY IF HE DOESN'T RECEIVE ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. SOURCE. NAGELL CLAIMED THAT HE HAS LEFT "VERY COMPROMISING" CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS WITH "FRIENDS" IN SWITZERLAND WHO WILL FORWARD THEM TO THE "APPROPRIATE" NEWSPAPER REPRESENTATIVES, ONE OF WHOM HE SAID IS LUDWIG MORELLI, WHOM NAGELL CLAIMED IS DERSPIEGAL REPRESENTATIVE IN ZURICH.

5. NAGELL CLAIMED TO BE A FORMER ARMY OFFICER WHO HELD THE RANK OF CAPTAIN. HE ALLEGED THAT HIS ARMY SERIAL NUMBER IS 02028346, THAT HE WAS DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMY ON OCTOBER 29, 1959, AND THAT HE IS RECEIVING 100 PERCENT DISABILITY FROM THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION. INSANITY

6. NAGELL EXPLAINED, IN A RATHER ARTICULATE MANNER, THAT HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY THE FBI SHORTLY AFTER PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION IN 1963, AND THAT HE HAD BEEN IMPRISONED, UNJUSTLY IN HIS OPINION, IN THE FEDERAL PENITENTIARY, LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS, UNTIL EARLY 1968 AT WHICH TIME HE HAD BEEN ACQUITTED AND RELEASED. HE SAID THAT THE REASON WHY HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN THE FIRST PLACE WAS THAT HE HAD WORKED WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD IN AN ASSIGNMENT WITH A "U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY."

IT WAS A LONG STORY, HE SAID, AND HE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE ME ALL THE DETAILS, BUT INSTEAD WANTED TO ASSURE ME THAT HE HAD BEEN IN THE "INTELLIGENCE GAME" FOR A LONG TIME. NAGELL ALSO STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN HELD IN THE FEDERAL PENITENTIARY FOR SUCH A LONG PERIOD BECAUSE HE REFUSED TO REVEAL TO THE FBI ANY INFORMATION ABOUT HIS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES-- AND THAT FURTHERMORE HE WAS VISITED BY CIA AGENTS WHILE IN PRISON WHO CAUTIONED HIM TO KEEP HIS MOUTH SHUT ABOUT HIS TIES WITH OSWALD.

7. REQUEST COPY OF OM FROM ZURICH TO DEPARTMENT PERTAINING TO SUBJECT, AND REQUEST CHECK OF APPROPRIATE SOURCES IN NAME OF SUBJECT AND ADVISE OF RESULTS SOONEST.

MCAULIFFE

NOTE: LIMDIS CAPTION DELETED PER MR. HARRIS, S/S-O 3/25/59

4/8/69

CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000

5/5-56

AIRGRAM

PS-7-1 US-[illegible]

NAGELL, Richard CASE

FILE DESIGNATION

RS/R	REP	AF	ARA
EUR	FE	NEA	CU
INR	E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID	
AGR	COM	FRB	INT
LAB	TAR	TR	XMB
AIR	ARMY	NAVY	OSD
USIA	NSA	CIA	

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION:

OCT 31 P 5 44

COPYFLO-PB[illegible]

Original to be Filed in ____________ Decentralized Files.

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

HANDLING INDICATOR

CONFIDENTIAL

D/OS

A-903

NO.

SRS

4455090368

RECEIVED

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BONN

OCT 31 4 08 PM 1968

Limited Distribution

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : USBER, Berlin

DATE: October 29, 1968

SUBJECT : Psychiatrist's Report on Richard Case Nagell, US Citizen Released by GDR

REF : Berlin A-901, October 24, 1968

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO. ____ SERIES B

A detailed statement prepared by the psychiatrist of the U.S. Army Hospital in Berlin, dated October 23, 1968, has been received on the results of an examination of Richard Case Nagell.

The full text of the psychiatrist's findings is transmitted in the enclosure.

MORRIS

Ak

Enclosure
Text of psychiatrist's findings.

Group 4 - Downgraded at three-year intervals. Declassified 12 years after date of origin.

CONFIDENTIAL

POST ROUTING

TO:	Action	Info.	Initials
AMB/PO			
DCM			
POL			
ECON			
CONS			
ADM			
AID			
USIS			
FILE			

Action Taken:

Date:

Initials:

FORM 10-64 DS-323

For Department Use Only
☑ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:	Drafting Date:	Phone No.:	Contents and Classification Approved by:
EAS:AKlay:dh	10/28/68		EAS:AKlay Ak

Clearances: Ak MIN:DKlein

O - 12634

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Background

My initial contact with Mr. Nagell was when he was expelled from the DDR by the East German officials who forcibly propelled him toward us over the borderline into West Berlin. As we initially escorted Mr. Nagell back to US Army Hospital Berlin in the US Mission vehicle, he seemed unsure of where he was, and who we were, as well as being angry and belligerent about his treatment by the East Germans. In the course of the two hour interview which was then conducted at the hospital, Mr. Nagell gradually regained his composure and gave a more cooperative and coherent history. At his insistance, the interview took place in the presence of the attorney Mr. Ricey S. New, Jr., who acted in an unofficial capacity as a legally oriented "friend."

The salient aspects of Mr. Nagell's history are as follows. He says he was on active military duty (Army) from 1948 until 1959. For the first three of these years he was an enlisted man, and for the last six he was an officer, working in military intelligence. In 1954 he was the sole survivor in a plane crash which resulted in a brain concussion, numerous physical injuries, and prolonged military hospitalization. Mr. Nagell now claims that he believes it was this head injury which resulted in his "unstable personality and immature or impulsive behaviour." He attributes to this instability his marital difficulties and his decision to resign his commission in 1959, something which he now considers unwise. At the time of his leaving the service he was not awarded a disability pension, but he says that he was later able to successfully petition the VA for a "64% disability." He claims that he had never seen a psychiatrist during his military career.

From 1959 to 1962 he says that he worked for the State of California as an investigator for various bureaus. His marital difficulties had increased and his wife insisted on separation, keeping with her their two children. Nagell says that one night in 1962 he became intoxicated, and tried to break down the door to her apartment. On this basis he says he lost his job and says that for the next year he "just drifted," apparently without motivation to work, supporting himself on his disability pension and financial aid from his sister. He is not certain about whether or not the divorce from his wife has ever been legally completed.

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

In September 1963 he was accused of committing an act which he now says was bred out of his feeling of hopelessness and desperation. He claims that in a confused way he attempted while armed to rob a bank and was easily apprehended. For the next 4 1/2 years followed a complicated series of trials, appeals and retrials. In addition to spending these years in prison, he also had at least three prison hospitalizations for psychiatric observation. His appeals apparently hinged on his contention that he was "temporarily insane" at the time of the crime. He was not considered insane at any time during his imprisonment, and his claim to temporary insanity found support in the expert testimony of a noted American neurologist, Dr. Edwin Weinstein. Dr. Weinstein apparently interpreted Nagell's EEG's (electro-encephalograms) as being abnormal and argued that Nagell had developed a "paranoid personality, and instability" on the basis of his brain injury. This contention was apparently disputed by other expert witnesses, but in any case Nagell was officially acquitted on April 29 of this year.

Nagell says he then went to the New York area, where his sister (his closest relative) resides, but he claims an additional complication in his life had risen in that he had once been an "acquaintance" of Lee Harvey Oswald, and had been implicated in a possible plot to assassinate President Kennedy in an article in RAMPARTS magazine which appeared in January 1968. Mr. Nagell firmly denies that he was involved in any way with any such conspiracy, and was in fact imprisoned at the time of the assassination. On the basis of this magazine article Nagell says that Mr. Garrison, the attorney general from New Orleans who is arguing that a conspiracy existed in the assassination, came up to New York to interview him. Nagell says that he denied that he had any information of use to Mr. Garrison, but that the interview left him with two fears. One fear was that Garrison might subpoena him to testify in the New Orleans proceedings, and the other fear was that the CIA might try to "eliminate" him, a suspicion which he says was planted in his mind by Mr. Garrison. He says that soon afterwards while walking down a street at night in New York City he was almost run over by a car without lights. He interpreted this as being an attempt at murder by the CIA and in some haste left the country for a tour of Europe.

In June, shortly thereafter, he discussed with an American consular official in Zurich his recurrent fear that the CIA was going to "hit" him. His next travel point was to West Berlin, and on June 11, 1968, while his train was traversing the DDR, he says that he was taken off the train and illegally detained. He is not certain why he was taken off the train but admits to having talked freely on the train to other passengers about his life history, and he was also carrying with him a heavy portfolio of all of his Army and government records involved with his service career, disability, and imprisonment. For several months Nagell claims that he was interrogated by the East Germans and repeatedly asked to confess his role as a spy or government agent. Eventually, Nagell says that he concluded the only way to be released would be to feign mental illness, which he says he proceeded to do. This was several weeks ago and he says he was soon examined by an East German psychiatrist and events were set in motion which culminated in his release today, four and one-half months after his detention began.

Mr. Nagell's plans for the future center around returning to the United States and beginning an appeal to the government to grant him a psychiatric disability pension, as well as for his physical disability, on the basis of his head injury. He no longer believes that it is realistic to think that the CIA was trying to kill him.

Mental Status Exam

Mr. Nagell is a tall, 38 year old male who shows the evidence of a prior head injury in the form of extensive scars on the left side of his face, facial asymmetry due to seventh nerve injury, reconstructive surgery on his left ear, etc. In addition he shows some healed incisions on his left wrist which he claims were superficial lacerations self-inflicted at the time of his first imprisonment in 1963, and again a few weeks ago in the DDR. He denies that in either instance he seriously intended to kill himself. He is of superior intelligence and shows a remarkable memory for dates and names. Initially he was belligerent, angry, and suspicious of every effort made to help him. Over the span of two hours, he gradually became more cooperative and rational. He is in his own terms a "chronically paranoid person" by which he means that he is always highly suspicious and tends to impute intentions where none may exist. Despite his

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

overall suspiciousness, and his fears about the CIA, there was no overt evidence of psychosis. His nutritional state and general well-being both appeared to be good.

Summary

In summary then we seem to be dealing with a person who has had a personality disorder for a number of years, manifested by emotional instability, impulsive behaviour, a tendency to be litigious, and a general suspicious or paranoic orientation. It is difficult to know how much of what he is saying is factual, but it may be that in June of this year he was becoming "borderline" or even delusional in his thinking about possible attempts on his life, and this probably explains his flight to Europe. Currently, he is not psychotic and seems competent in a legal and psychiatric sense to negotiate his own affairs and be a free citizen again.

His own closing words provide a lighter note to what otherwise has been a complicated and serious mishap. "Well, I'll tell you one thing, that's the last time I ever take a train through East Germany!"

/s/

George R. Babineau
CPT, MC
Psychiatrist
U.S. Army Hospital, Berlin

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

```
CTL NO 2036    REQUESTOR HALL        OFFICE SRS                 11DEC68

N2036 NEW,RICEY S(JR)

  NEW,RICEY S                                     OS  66  M451129
  /L DC ,WAS  /T JR  /O ATTY
  /Z 2021595
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------

N2036 WEINSTEIN,ECWIN

  WEINSTEIN,ECWIN                                 DR  57  E413494
  /D WAS SCHOOL CF PSYCHIATRY  /T DR
  /Z 1419454
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  WEINSTEIN,EDWIN                                 CR  57  R154557
  /D ACS 30APR57 P20 JAFFE,ADRIAN
  /Z 1420401
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
  WEINSTEIN,EDWIN A                               OS  65  C463298
  /B 18FEB09 OMAHA NEB  /L 65MD ,BETHESDA
  /Z 1419455
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------

N2036 BAEINEAL,GECRGE R

  BABINEAU,GECRGE RAYMOND                         OS  68  G363001-1999
  /Y M  /T CAPT  /E ARMY  /R SER 5  /O 68MIL  /C USA
  /Z 2250142
  ------------------------NI--I/ND--U/ND--SA--CO------------------------
```

SECRET

13-00000

15584

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY PER: 202 TOTAL COPIES: 17

RF, [illegible], D/OCI 6, D/ONE, DDB D/CRS, C/EUR, D/OSR, D/OBGI C/[illegible]
C/CA

~~SECRET~~ HCM869

PAGE 01 BERLIN 02538 221750Z

46
ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00,SSO 00,/070 W

028709

Mr. send copies to SOVIE & Germany

murphy

R 221710Z OCT 68
FM USMISSION BERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3311
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

SECRET BERLIN 2538

LIMDIS

SUBJ: US PRISONERS IN EAST GERMANY - RICHARD CASE NAGELL AND LEON BURRIS JAMES file

REF: STATE 258355

1. RICEY NEW CALLED AT MISSION OCT 21 AND OUTLINED BOTH CASES IN SENSE REFTEL.

2. VOGEL INVITED RICEY NEW AND MISSION OFFICER TO CALL AT HIS EAST BERLIN OFFICE OCT 22. STANGE NOT IN ACTION DUE TO INJURIES SUFFERED IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LAST WEEK.

3. AT CONFERENCE IN HIS OFFICE, VOGEL STATED NAGELL RELEASE SCHEDULED BY EAST GERMAN AUTHORITIES FOR OCT 23 AT 0930, TO TAKE PLACE AT SANDKRUGBRUECKE CROSSING POINT. "THE RELEASE WILL BE UNCONDITIONAL AS AN EXPRESSION OF GOODWILL," ACCORDING TO VOGEL.

4. VOGEL DESCRIBED NAGELL CONDITION AS "NOT GOOD AT ALL, FREQUENTLY QUITE BAD, ACCORDING TO PHYSICIAN WHO WILL BE WITH HIM WHEN HE IS DELIVERED BY AMBULANCE." VOGEL WILL DELIVER NAGELL TO RICEY NEW WHO WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY MISSION OFFICER AND CHIEF PSYCHIATRIST US ARMY HOSPITAL, BERLIN.

5. WHEN DELIVERY MADE DEPARTMENT WILL BE INFORMED IN BRIEF FLASH TELEGRAM. NO RPT NO PRESS STATEMENT WILL BE ISSUED BY MISSION.

✓

~~SECRET~~

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change to ______
☒ Declassify in part and excise as shown
☒ Declassify ☐ After ______
EO 12958, 25X ( )( )( )
☐ With concurrence of ______ (not) (obtained)
IPS/CR/IR by ______ Date 9/23/98

Department of State

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY PER # TOTAL COPIES: **TELEGRAM**

FILE, RF.

SECRET

PAGE 02 BERLIN 02538 221750Z

6. VOGEL EXPRESSED HOPE THAT CASE OF JAMES COULD ALSO BE CLOSED IN SIMILAR FASHION "WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS." CHARGES STILL UNKNOWN IN BOTH CASES BUT VOGEL EXPECTS TO HAVE IN NEAR FUTURE "BASIC DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE STILL IN HANDS OF STATE SECURITY AUTHORITIES" AND WILL INFORM US.

GP-3. MORRIS

SECRET

14554

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY 521 PER: JUD TOTAL COPIES: 18

FILE RF, C/IR, ESO, D/OCI 6, D/ONE, DDP, D/CRS, D/OBGI, C/EUR, C/SB, C/SPA, C/CI

SECRET HCM582PAGE 01 STATE 258355 A

S/S

Mr. [illegible]

19 Oct 68

1 C/SKS

2 C/F10

reply

ORIGIN SS 70

INFO CCIE 00, 010 R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/GER:HRPHELPS
APPROVED BY: GER:MR. JOHNPOLL
SCA:MR. SMITH (DRAFT)
EUR:MR. CUHAN

011460

R 200072 OCT 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION BERLIN
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

266602

S E C R E T STATE 258355

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: U.S. PRISONERS IN EAST GERMANY - RICHARD CASE NAGELL AND LEON BURRIS JAMES

1. RICEY NEW INFORMED DEPARTMENT OCTOBER 18 THAT NAGELL WILL BE RELEASED OCTOBER 23; WILL REQUIRE IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ATTENTION DUE TO MENTAL CONDITION. RICEY NEW ARRIVING BERLIN AFTERNOON OCTOBER 21 AND WILL COORDINATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH MISSION.

2. RICEY NEW ALSO INFORMED BY VOGEL THAT ANOTHER AMCIT, LEON BURRIS JAMES, BEING DETAINED IN EAST GERMANY ON UNSPECIFIED CHARGES. AS MISSION AWARE FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES WITH HIM, JAMES HAS [LONG HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS AND HAS BEEN IN FREQUENT DIFFICULTIES IN MANY COUNTRIES OVER LAST FIVE YEARS OR SO. HE WAS CONVICTED OF PASSPORT FRAUD IN JANUARY 1966 AND IS CURRENTLY UNDER INDICTMENT FOR VIOLATION OF TITLE 18 USC SECTION 1542. A WARRANT HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR HIS ARREST. MOST RECENT EPISODE OF WHICH DEPARTMENT AWARE WAS HIS DEPORTATION FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO FRG IN APRIL THIS YEAR. A SUMMARY OF JAMES' ADVENTURES AND ARRESTS IS BEING AIRPOUCHED.] WE HAVE INFORMED RICEY NEW IN A GENERAL WAY OF THIS BACKGROUND.

insert [here follows personal information concerning Leon Burris James]

3. RICEY NEW WISHED TO INFORM USBER HIMSELF OF STATUS OF THESE

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR RELEASE BY Dept. STATE ON 12/15/98

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change to
☒ Declassify in part and excise as shown
☐ Declassify ☐ After 20 Yrs
Privacy EO 12958, 25X ( )( )( )
☐ With concurrence of (not)(obtained)
IPS/CR/IR by Date

10/6/98

Department of State

TELEGRAM

..E SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY PER # TOTAL COPIES:

E, RF,

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 258355

CASES SO MISSION OFFICERS SHOULD NOT INDICATE PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF NAGELL RELEASE OR JAMES LATEST ARREST. GP-3. RUSK

SECRET

13-00000

Memo Re John Richard Sloss

INFO Re NAGELL FROM

This memo has Been

EXTRACTED AND PUT

INTO NAGELL FILE

SECRET

Chief, Research Branch, SRS

3 MAR 1965

Robert J. Leonard

John Richard SLOSS
#34490

GIST: SLOSS, a staff employee since 1948, has recently been repolygraphed with inconclusive results, having reacted to questions regarding disclosure of classified information, association with a communist sympathizer, and homosexuality. He has also been involved with cooperation in an extramarital affair which culminated in a blackmail attempt on one of the parties. His name is perhaps identical with a name among six names of Agency employees found on a mentally disturbed and disaffected former CIC intelligence officer who alleges contact with Russian and Cuban Intelligence agents. Details of these questionable areas in regard to SLOSS are set forth below. Recommend intensive and thorough investigation of SLOSS including surveillance of activities.

DETAILS: 1. Mr. John Richard SLOSS, born 24 September 1919 at Cleveland, Ohio, has been a staff employee of this Agency since 1948. His parents are American born. He graduated from Yale University in 1941 and was assigned to Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, as an instructor, from January 1943 to July 1945. He attended Columbia University, School of International Affairs and the Russian Institute from 1946 to 1948, receiving an M.A. Degree in International Affairs.

2. SLOSS is currently a Special Intelligence Duty Officer in OCI, GS-14. During his assignment in Germany 1953-1955 and on a TDY to Germany in 1958, he had been authorized to deal with foreign intelligence elements in the OCI overseas liaison program. SLOSS was polygraphed in 1950 and 1953 with favorable results; in 1955 with unfavorable results; and twice in 1964 with inconclusive results regarding giving CIA documents or classified information to unauthorized persons, contact with a possible communist sympathizer, and engaging in homosexual activities since working for CIA. He was granted a "Q" Clearance in October 1963. His Top Secret Clearance was certified to the White House on 23

NAGELL

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

February 1965 in connection with a visit to a Presidential relocation site.

3. The name of John SLOSS may be identical with the name J. SLOSS found on the person of Richard Case NAGELL when arrested in connection with a bank robbery in El Paso, Texas, on 20 September 1963. A notebook found on NAGELL made reference to Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the addresses of Foreign Embassies, the names of purported CIA agents and other information. Although NAGELL is unquestionably mentally unbalanced, he tells a story of being involved in espionage which is not fully contradicted by evidence. There is no apparent explanation of why the name J. SLOSS as well as five other names of CIA personnel should have been in the possession of Richard Case NAGELL. The weird story of NAGELL is contained in a chronological listing of his activities appended to this memorandum.

4. A review of the Security file on SLOSS in connection with the Richard Case NAGELL matter revealed that SLOSS, for the past few years, 1960-1964, had provided his apartment as a place of assignation in the adulterous relationship of Philip Barry KENNEDY, a GS-15 Intelligence office, assigned to OCI and Mrs. Betty BARKER, 6 a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from 19 October 1953 until 26 July 1962. The relationship between Kennedy 3 and Barker 6 was disclosed on 19 May 1964 6 when KENNEDY 3 reported to the Office of Security that Mrs. BARKER had received a strange telephone call from an unknown male on 18 May 1964 who advised her that he knew what was going on between her and her boy friend and that he had pictures. The unknown caller attempted to blackmail Mrs. BARKER into meeting him. Mrs. BARKER apparently told her husband the whole story and informed KENNEDY. 3

3, 6

5. It is noteworthy in the SLOSS-KENNEDY-BARKER matter that SLOSS has been involved in cooperating in an unlawful and immoral activity which, according to the direct testimony of one of the parties, (believed to be true because the report was against her own interest) resulted in a blackmail attempt against her in May 1964.

6. Of particular concern should be the results of the latest two polygraph examinations, the validity of which, because of medication including a tranquilizer type drug and alcohol in the Subject's system, was deemed to be inconclusive.

7. During the 1955 polygraph examination, the Subject admitted to homosexual desires but stated that these had never caused a personal problem and had never resulted in his participation in a homosexual act. During the 24 April 1964 examination, the Subject showed consistent reactions to the homosexual question which indicated deception. During

11

10/mc

further specific questioning on 22 May 1964 covering the various homosexual areas however, there were no strong reactions to indicate that Subject might be practicing deception on the specific question regarding engaging in homosexual activities since working for CIA.

8. In connection with the phase of questions concerning contact with any possible communist sympathizer, the Subject reflected overall disturbance indicating that all the questions obviously bothered him and that deception was being practiced within that phase. The polygraph operator noted that there were outstanding reactions to the following two questions:

> 20 b "Other than your comments about FISHER, during your undergraduate period at Yale did you have any contact with any Communist or Communist sympathizer?
>
> Answer: No."
>
> 20 e During your CIA employment, have you had any contact with any Communist or Communist sympathizer?
>
> Answer: No."

9. It is particularly noteworthy that during his examination on 22 May 1964 when asked nine questions as to whether he had been acquainted with certain individuals, Subject only reacted when he answered "no" to having been acquainted with Jerry SEVERN and Ilya WOLSTON. These names had been submitted to Subject based upon pure conjecture that there possibly might have been some connection with these individuals at Camp Ritchie Military Intelligence Training Center. Since the fact that both Jerry SEVERN and Ilya WOLSTON have cooperated with Soviet Intelligence should have been unknown to SLOSS and he declared he is not acquainted with them, there should have been no reason for him to react to these names. The polygraph operator states that SLOSS was not pressed further regarding FISHER (whom he had characterized as "left of center") or his own possible knowledge of SEVERN or WOLSTON since it was obvious that SLOSS was beginning to feel harassed on this matter and stated that he did not enjoy being asked these questions.

10. During SLOSS' interview on 4 April 1964, SLOSS reflected consistent reactions on the questions:

> "Since working for CIA, have you given CIA documents or classified information to unauthorized persons?"

"Have you ever deliberately given classified information on documents to any unauthorized person?"

In explanation, Subject said he was bothered by this idea, but that he had no knowledge of any particular situation wherein he had divulged information to anyone who was unauthorized to receive it or who would have used it against the Agency's interest. On the test administered on 22 May 1964 to resolve any possible compromise to communist or foreign intelligence organizations, it was determined that there were no significant reactions to relevant questions in this area.

11. It should be especially noted that the polygraph operator, during the 4 April 1964 interview, detected an odd smell on Subject's breath and noted his flushed face, frequent silly grins and lethargic movements, suggesting that the Subject may have been slightly intoxicated. The operator did not ask during this interview whether the Subject had taken any drug or alcohol prior to the interview but recalled an incident wherein the Subject when arrested for drunken driving in 1963 had produced evidence that he was a diabetic and had taken medication prior to the incident. Consequently, during the second interview on 22 May 1964, Subject was questioned regarding his physical health. He replied that he had stopped taking medication for diabetes in November 1963. He explained that he took three or four diuretic pills. He specifically denied that he had taken any other drug, narcotic or alcohol. When this question was asked during interrogation, he reflected reaction indicative of deception and then admitted that for breakfast he had taken one glass of vodka with some orange juice. He stated that he drank vodka for breakfast sometimes whenever he was tense or nervous over anything.

12. The polygraph operator in his report concluded that the "validity of final test charts is held in question and there is no strong evidence that the specific areas of concern have been conclusively resolved at this time. It is recommended that a further study be conducted on this case and that information resulting from such a study be sent to IRD for possible reinterview of the Subject and polygraph resolution".

13. SLOSS has indicated reactions indicative of deception during the polygraph examinations. In one specific question where these reactions were present, he admitted to lying. This was in the question as to whether or not he had taken any alcohol prior to the examination.

~~SECRET~~

CONCLUSION:

1. SLOSS has lied in his most recent polygraph examination and has evidenced indications of deception in areas concerning divulging classified information to unauthorized individuals, association with a communist sympathizer and homosexual inclinations. SLOSS' reaction to the names of Jerry SEVERN and Ilya WOLSTON has not been fully explored. The polygraph operator has recommended further investigation and a repolygraph because the recent tests are inconclusive.

2. SLOSS has been involved in an immoral and illegal extramarital activity between a Staff employee and a former Staff employee where one of the parties was subjected to a blackmail attempt.

3. The name J. SLOSS (possibly identical to Subject) appeared on a list of CIA employees found on the person of a self-designated "disaffected American" arrested by the FBI for bank robbery in September 1963. This individual (mentally disturbed) with previous intelligence experience has declared that he was approached by Soviet Intelligence while and/or after he was in Mexico City in September 1962.

4. It is suggested that the extent of the adverse security implications concerning SLOSS is such, that if SLOSS is ever found to be a security risk, the failure at this time to pursue an aggressive investigation of all his contacts and activities to resolve all areas of doubt could possibly lead to a conclusion that we have been remiss in our duties. The undersigned recommends the following action:

a. That physical and technical surveillance of at least two weeks duration be made of SLOSS to determine his contacts and activities after working hours.

b. That current seven way National Agency Checks be made on SLOSS.

c. That Richard B. FISHER, a friend of SLOSS', characterized by him as having been involved in radical and left of center ideas while an undergraduate at Yale, be fully identified, his present location be ascertained and the degree of his association with SLOSS be determined by a personal interview with FISHER.

d. That Richard Case NAGELL be personally interviewed by the undersigned in the hope that by a sympathetic approach he may reveal how he came into the possession of the name J. SLOSS and other employees of CIA.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

e. That police and credit checks be made on SLOSS in the Washington, D.C. area; Baltimore, Maryland; New York City; Cleveland, Ohio; Chicago and El Paso, Texas.

f. That listed references, Charles L. 6 VENABLE, 3 Philip B. KENNEDY and Richard LEHMAN 6 previously interviewed in September 1963 in connection with a "Q" Clearance of SLOSS, be reinterviewed by the undersigned with intensive emphasis on SLOSS' activities and acquaintances outside of working hours.

g. That SLOSS be repolygraphed with unrelenting pressure on previously unresolved matters.

Robert J. Leonard

Attachment:
Bio on NAGELL

SECRET

3/mc

13-00000

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

FBI REPORTS

1) DATED OCT. 2, 1962 RE RICHARD CASE NAGELL
2) DATED FEB 4, 1964 " " " "
; FILE No. EP (EL PASO) 65-951
3) DATED MAR. 17, 1964 RE RICHARD CASE NAGELL
; FILE No 65-23126, NEW YORK OFFICE
4) DATED FEB 4, 1964 RE RICHARD CASE NAGELL
; FILE No EP 65-951 (SAME DATE AS No 2 ABOVE BUT SEPARATE REPORT

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

DDA 65895

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: THOMAS J. DOWLING
Office: New York, New York
Date: MAR 17 1964
Field Office File No.: 65-23126
Bureau File No.:
Title: ① RICHARD CASE NAGELL 201-746537

Character: ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis:

Confidential informants familiar with certain phases of Cuban and/or Communist activities in the NYC area, when contacted during February, 1964, advised that the subject is unknown to them. Subject's sister, Mrs. ELEANORE GAMBERT, when interviewed on 2/28/64, advised that subject last stayed at her home during the latter part of 1962. She indicated that she knows of no subversive activity on the part of the subject, and stated further that she would have nothing to do with him if she ever found out he had ever been involved in such activities. She advised subject maintains a metal-type foot locker at her residence, and has maintained it at her home for a number of years. She hoted that she does not know the contents of this foot locker nor is she even aware of whether it is opened or locked.

- P -

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
9/27/98 [illegible]
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Nw
Leonard
BK

DETAILS

CS COPY

201-746537

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Confidential informants familiar with certain phases of Cuban and/or Communist activities in the NYC area, when contacted during February, 1964, advised that the subject is unknown to them.

FD-302 (Rev. 1-25-60)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA~~T~~ON

1

Date 3/9/64

Eleanore Gambert was contacted at her home located at 82-25 Grand Avenue, Queens, New York, on February 28, 1964, by Special Agents Thomas J. Dowling and Benjamin P. Grogan, who identified themselves to her as Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. She was told that the Special Agents wished to talk to her about her brother, Richard Case Nagell; that she would not have to speak with the interviewing agents; that anything she might say could be used in court; and that she had a right to counsel before making any statement. Mrs. Gambert advised that she had no objection to being interviewed and that she would cooperate in any way possible.

She advised that her brother, Richard Case Nagell, last resided with her in her home for a 5 or 6 week period which ended just prior to Christmas, 1962. While in New York, he was for the most part unemployed and seeking a position. She noted that he did obtain a position as a store detective but that this lasted for only several days when he decided that this was not the type of investigative work he wanted to do.

When questioned as to whether or not she knew of any activity on the part of her brother which could have been of a subversive nature, she stated that she knew of no such activity; that she did not believe her brother capable of taking part in such activity; and that if she ever became aware that he was engaging at any time in such activity she would have nothing to do with him.. At this point she noted that approximately a month prior to the interview she had received several letters that were returned to her from El Paso, Texas, which she had written to her brother, indicating that he was no longer at the El Paso County Jail. She subsequently received a letter from her brother indicating that he was at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri. She noted that she answered this letter immediately, but has not as yet heard from her

On 2/28/64 at 82-25 Grand Avenue Queens, New York File # NY 65-23126

by SAS BENJAMIN P. GROGAN and THOMAS J. DOWLING : kgm Date dictated 3/5/64

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65845

2

brother. She stated that she expected to hear from her brother immediately after he received her letter and the fact that she has not heard has made her uneasy. She noted that she offered, if permitted, to visit him, and that she hoped to ascertain as a result of this visit, the reason he attempted to rob a bank in El Paso, Texas, on September 20, 1963. She advised that she has had no reason to believe that her brother is not responsible for his actions, and she noted that in one letter he wrote to her that the bank robbery attempt was a pre-meditated action on his part. She advised that her brother has been in a depressed state of mind ever since he had been accused of taking a bribe and fired from his position with the California State Liquor Authority. She noted that she believed, as her brother claims, that this purported bribe was set up to remove her brother from his position with the California State Liquor Authority because of his honesty and failure to handle investigations as insturcted by superiors.

When questioned as to whether or not her brother, Richard Case Nagell, maintains any type of property at her residence, she advised that he does maintain a military type metal foot locker, and that he has maintained it at her residence since his discharge from the United States Army. She noted that as this foot locker is her brother's property, she is not aware of its contents, although she believes it contains mementoes of his military service, including his medals and a complete uniform. She advised that she does not even know whether or not the foot locker is open or locked.

It is noted that during the course of the interview of Eleanore Gambert, her husband, Louis Gambert was present.

13-00000

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DBA 63177
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: SA DAVID J. REID Office: EL PASO
Date: February 4, 1964

Field Office File No.: EP 65-951 Bureau File No.:

Title: RICHARD CASE NAGELL

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
9/27/98 [illegible]

☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Character: ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis: Background: Subject entered U.S. Army 8/5/48 and honorably discharged as Captain 10/29/59. Received many campaign awards during Korean conflict. Sole survivor airplane crash 11/28/54, suffered facial disfigurement and given psychiatric examination. Subject claimed he was released from employment by State Beverage Department, Los Angeles, California, 6/8/62, having been accused of taking $20,000 bribe. Subject refused furnish police details of his shooting by unidentified assailant on 7/16/62 and subsequently filed Civil Rights complaint against police. In September, 1962, subject advised U. S. Embassy, Mexico City, he had been approached for recruiting in Mexico City, refused to elaborate, did not desire to return to U. S., was "bitter, disgusted, disillusioned and disaffected." Said if he did go to some other country it would cost U. S. millions, was "through being a good citizen" and thought he had gotten a "dirty deal all around." Advised FBI in New York City on 11/16/62 he wanted to expose Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control in California. Advised FBI in Jacksonville, Fla. on 12/15/62 he had been approached shortly before in Washington, D. C., by individual believed to be working for Soviets; contacted CIA in Virginia for instructions, was sent to Miami, Fla., by his Soviet contact and said he believed he was actually working for Soviets. Subject's condition diagnosed at VA Hospital, Bay Pines, Fla., in January, 1963, as "chronic brain syndrome associated with brain trauma with behavioral reaction characterized by passive, aggressive and paranoid features." Asked FBI Miami on 1/24/63 if his

CS COPY

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

201-746537 50-500

Cuban or Russian sources gave him a pistol and microfilm, would he be permitted to return same to his contact so he could be of further use to U. S. Government. Claimed to be constantly under surveillance. Advised FBI in Los Angeles on 4/19/63 he had taken former wife to court on same date for failure to comply with court order giving subject visitation rights with children. Subject's condition diagnosed by VA, Los Angeles, on 6/4/63 as "depression, tearful, nervous, rigid. Would only utter words 'Got to see my kids.'" Attempted Bank Robbery: Subject arrested 9/20/63 in El Paso, Texas, on charge of attempting to rob State National Bank, El Paso, same date in violation Section 2113, Title 18, USC. Slashed wrist night of 9/20/63, felt he needed psychiatric treatment, highly emotional when interviewed, given to spells of crying, stated unable to get on feet since discharge from U. S. Army. Cell mate said subject apparently became member Communist Party during confused period after discharge, decided everything was against him in Los Angeles and made arrangements with Communist Party in Los Angeles to pick up visa and passport from contact in El Paso and eventually end up in Czechoslovakia. Subject reportedly attempted suicide three times enroute to El Paso but lost nerve. Advised FBI in El Paso on 1/6/64 he was instructed by agent of foreign government in September, 1963, to comply with agreement made in May, 1963, to participate in criminal offense against United States or be exposed to FBI, which caused subject to act as he did on 9/20/63. Subject ordered sent to Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri, on 1/24/64, by USDC, El Paso, for 30-day period to undergo psychiatric examination. Alleged Connection with LEE HARVEY OSWALD: Subsequent to President's assassination, subject claimed acquaintance with OSWALD and wife. On 1/18/64, MARINA OSWALD disclaimed any knowledge of subject. Description and Identification Record: Set out. SUBJECT HAS ATTEMPTED SUICIDE.

- P -

EP 65-951

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Chronological Record of Subject's Background	3 - 30
Attempted Bank Robbery and Aftermath	30 - 49
Alleged Connection with LEE HARVEY OSWALD	49 - 50
Description	50 - 55
Identification Record	55

89248

DETAILS: AT EL PASO, TEXAS:

Investigation in this matter is based on statements made by the subject subsequent to his arrest in El Paso, Texas, on September 20, 1963, on a bank robbery charge. Subject hinted that he might have been attempting to go to Cuba and that he really did not have the intention of robbing the State National Bank but committed the act due to the direction he had taken toward going to Cuba. A notebook which the subject had on his person when arrested made reference to Medical Aid to Cuba, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the names of purported CIA Agents and other information.

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contained a full-page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening in Cuba," placed by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revolutionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press.

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, Dr. CHARLES A. SANTOS-BUCH identified himself and ROBERT TABER as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and TABER obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the afore-mentioned advertisement.

On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. However, during the past year this source observed there has been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that today their influence is negligible.

On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that the National Headquarters of the FPCC is located in Room 329 at 799 Broadway, New York City. According to this source, the position of National Office Director was created in the fall of 1962 and was filled by VINCENT "TED" LEE, who now formulates FPCC policy. This source observed LEE has followed a course of entertaining and accepting the cooperation of many other organizations including the CP and the SWP when he has felt it would be to his personal benefit as well as the FPCC's. However, LEE has indicated to this source he has no intention of permitting FPCC policy to be determined by any other organization. LEE feels the FPCC should advocate resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States and support the right of Cubans to manage their revolution without interference from other nations, but not support the Cuban revolution per se.

The CP and the SWP have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF SUBJECT'S BACKGROUND

August 5, 1948

A review on October 17, 1963, of the Military Service Records on file at the Military Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri, indicated that RICHARD CASE NAGELL, Serial Number 12 115 891, enlisted in the United States Army on August 5, 1948.

November 28, 1954 to April 8, 1955

On September 30, 1963, EP T-1 furnished the following information regarding RICHARD CASE NAGELL:

The subject underwent treatment at the Walter Reed Hospital, Washington, D. C. as a result of an airplane crash on November 28, 1954, in which the subject was involved. The subject was the sole survivor of this crash. The subject was admitted to Bolling Air Force Base Hospital in Washington, D. C. in a comotose condition. When examined by a doctor on March 17, 1955, at Walter Reed Hospital, the subject was conscious, confused and hostile, complaining of a pain in his head. The subject was depressed and expressed the wish that he had died in the crash. Subject had facial disfigurement as a result of the crash. The subject was suspicious of questions asked him. When subject was examined on April 8, 1955, the hostility had disappeared and his suspicions had been lessened. His responses at that time were regarded as normal.

In 1960 the subject's sister, Mrs. GAMBERT, 8225 Grand Avenue, Elmhurst, Long Island, New York, indicated that the subject could then be contacted through Post Office Box 76121, Sanford Station, Los Angeles, California. She indicated that the subject had been discharged from the United States Army in November, 1959. She also indicated that the subject still complained of head injuries and when he was tired he had a twitch in one eye as well as some loss of mobility in his other eye.

When contacted on September 30, 1963, EP T-1 was of the opinion that the subject still apparently needed psychiatric treatment. He said he was unable to evaluate the subject's activities subsequent to 1955 in view of the fact that no contacts had been made with the subject since that time.

The above information as furnished by EP T-1 can be made available only upon the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. The identity of the person to be subpoenaed is Lieutenant Colonel JOHN J. WARD, Registrar, Walter Reed General Hospital, 6825 16th Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

April, 1956

In April, 1956, Captain CHARLES STANLEY, Administrative Vice Detail, Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles, California, advised that one RICHARD C. NAGELL had questioned two of his officers at a Japanese restaurant which they were checking in regard to well known Oriental gamblers. When the officers refused to answer NAGELL's questions, NAGELL displayed a card purporting to be an identification card of Counter-Intelligence. Nothing of value was obtained by NAGELL.

October 29, 1959

A review on October 17, 1963, of the military service records on file at the Military Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri, indicated that RICHARD CASE NAGELL, serial number 02 028 346, was honorably discharged from the United States Army as a Captain at Fort Dix, New Jersey, on October 29, 1959, by reason of unqualified resignation.

After having enlisted in the United States Army on August 5, 1948, with serial number 12 115 891, NAGELL was honorably discharged on the first occasion on August 1, 1951, as a Sergeant at Fort Benning, Georgia, to accept a commission in the United States Army Officers'Reserve Corps. NAGELL was appointed and commissioned a Second Lieutenant on August 2, 1951, under serial number 02 028 346, and entered on active duty on the same date at Fort Benning, Georgia. While serving on active duty as an officer, he was appointed a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army Officers' Reserve Corps on November 14, 1952.

The service records indicated that NAGELL served in the United Nations Summer-Fall Campaign in Korea, the Second Korean Winter Campaign in Korea, the Korean Summer-Fall Campaign in 1952, the Third Korean Winter Campaign in 1953, and the United States Summer-Fall Campaign in 1953. He was awarded the Korean Service Medal with one Silver Star, the National Defense Service Medal, the United Nations Service Medal, the Bronze Star Medal, the Purple Heart with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Expert Infantry Badge, the Parachute Glider Badge, the Combat Infantryman's Badge, and the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation.

His character and efficiency ratings ranged from unknown to superior, and there is no record of courts-martial or absence without official leave.

December 14, 1959

On December 15, 1962, the subject advised Special Agents of the FBI at Jacksonville, Florida, that he began his employment with the State Beverage Department in Los Angeles, California, on December 14, 1959.

March 28, 1962 and May 14, 1962

On September 23, 1963, EP T-2 made available the records of the United States Veterans Administration Hospital, Sawtell , California, which were found to contain the information that the subject was admitted to the hospital on March 28, 1962, and again on May 14, 1962, complaining of foreign matter in his eyes.

The above information can be made available only upon the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. The identity of the person to be subpoenaed is HAROLD G. COBB, Chief, Registrar Division, Veterans Administration Admission Center, Los Angeles 25, California.

May 31, 1962

The FBI Identification Record of RICHARD CASE NAGELL, FBI number 631 219 E, dated September 21, 1963, contains the information that the subject was arrested by the Los Angeles, California, Police Department on May 31, 1962, on a drunk charge. No disposition is shown on the record.

June 8, 1962

On December 15, 1962, the subject advised Special Agents of the FBI in Jacksonville, Florida, that in June, 1962, he was accused of taking a $20,000 bribe by the State Beverage Department, Los Angeles, California, and was released from his employment on June 8, 1962, for refusing to answer questions. The subject said he talked to the FBI in Los Angeles regarding the possibility of his dismissal being a violation of his civil rights.

July 16, 1962 to July 23, 1962

On September 23, 1963, EP T-2 made available the records of the United States Veterans Administration Hospital, Sawtell , California, which were found to contain the information that the subject was admitted to the hospital on July 16, 1962 for a small caliber gun shot wound in his right chest. The subject was released on July 23, 1962, according to the records, which further indicated that the subject furnished only vague information regarding this matter.

The above information can be made available only upon the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. The identity of the person to be subpoenaed is HAROLD G. COBB, Chief, Registrar Division, Veterans Administration Admission Center, Los Angeles 25, California.

July 30, 1962

On July 30, 1962, the subject advised Special Agents of the Los Angeles Office of the FBI that he was residing at 4037 Leeward Avenue, Los Angeles, California, and that he was on suspension from the Alcoholic and Beverage Control (ABC), State of California. He stated that on April 1, 1961, he transferred from the Department of Employment to the ABC and had been employed since that time as a Special Agent, until his suspension on June 8, 1962.

NAGELL stated that on May 30, 1962, he and his wife had a domestic argument and, as a result of this, the police were called and he was arrested for being drunk. NAGELL claims he was not drunk and that the Los Angeles Police Department was "rousting him." NAGELL was able to make bond the same night and the next morning went to Internal Affairs, Los Angeles Police Department, because he was mad at the previous night's treatment and made some general complaints to them about Los Angeles Police personnel. NAGELL stated that he did not make any specific complaints and told Internal Affairs he would contact them at a later date to furnish them more detailed information.

NAGELL advised that he then went to his superiors and advised them of what had happened. As a result of all of this, NAGELL stated he was placed on suspension on June 8, 1962, on charges of creating a disturbance for being drunk and making allegations to the Los Angeles Police Department, which he later stated were not true.

NAGELL stated that he is presently unemployed, awaiting a hearing on his suspension. He stated that he hopes to be reinstated so he can clear his name and then he will resign his position. NAGELL advised that on the evening of July 16, 1962, he was returning from Oxnard, California. He noticed an automobile on two occasions behind him, and at about 8:00 PM stopped his car on the highway near Malibu, California. Two men from the car jumped into his car. They were dressed in business suits, and he thought at first they were police officers. One of the men asked him where his gun was, and he told the man it was locked in the glove compartment. He gave this man the key to his glove compartment, and while the man was opening the compartment, NAGELL took his gun from his waist. The man struggled with NAGELL for the gun and four shots were fired, one hitting NAGELL in the chest. The man said that if NAGELL had not grabbed for the gun he would not have been shot.

NAGELL advised that these men drove him to a medical center in Malibu, California, and left him. NAGELL stated that he then drove himself back to Los Angeles, California, and ended up at the Veterans Hospital, Sawtell, California. NAGELL stated that he is sure now that the men were not police officers. He stated that he does not know who shot him or why he was shot.

As a result of the shooting, detectives from the Los Angeles Police Department came to the hospital to question him. He stated that he did not like their attitude and refused to tell them any details. The investigating officers impounded his 1957 Ford and also took all of his personal belongings he had with him at the time, including his driver's license, Social Security card, and Selective Service Registration. NAGELL stated that on July 25, 1962, he received a money order from a relative, and because he had no identification was unable to cash it. He advised that he has a quick temper and that this situation made him "hot under the collar." For this reason he contacted the FBI, complaining that his civil rights had been violated in hopes that the FBI would contact the Los Angeles Police and facilitate the return of his property. Later, on the same day of July 25, 1962, the Police Department did return all of his property except the automobile, which was returned on July 26, 1962.

Mr. NAGELL stated that in retrospect he believes that the Police Department did have a right to take the above items in line with their investigation. He stated that if it would be possible, he would like to rescind his original complaint. Mr. NAGELL declined to furnish a signed statement.

The following article appeared in the Santa Monica Outlook of July 18, 1962:

> "Police Probe Mystery Shooting of Detective
>
> "West Los Angeles police today are investigating the strange shooting of RICHARD C. NAGELL, 32, former investigative officer for the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.
>
> "NAGELL, in satisfactory condition in Veterans' Hospital in West Los Angeles with a bullet wound in the chest, isn't talking, according to police.
>
> "Officer JIM MAXWELL said he received a call Monday from NAGELL asking that the California Central Investigative and Identification Bureau be notified that he had been shot. Then NAGELL hung up.
>
> "A few moments later, a second call came in from a witness who said that a man suffering from a bullet wound had driven up to him and asked for directions to a hospital.
>
> "At the Veterans' Hospital, officers found:

"NAGELL being treated for wounds from a bullet which had penetrated into his chest and out his back.

"Powder burns and a hole in NAGELL's shirt.

"A .32-caliber bullet embedded in the back of the driver's seat of NAGELL's car.

"A dent in the roof and a hole in the upholstery in NAGELL's car, which were caused by a second bullet, officers believed.

"NAGELL would say only that his wound was not self-inflicted, officers said.

"Detectives are continuing to investigate all possibilities of the case."

September 28, 1962 and October 1, 1962

On September 28, 1962, the subject appeared of his own volition at the American Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico, and volunteered the following information:

Although he declined to furnish a local residence address for himself in Mexico City, he stated he could be contacted through a friend named ARTHUR GREENSTEIN, Room #415, Hotel Luma, whom he said he contacts every day. He also exhibited his Tourist Card Number 152087, which listed his address as 4037 Leeward Avenue, Los Angeles, California. This card showed that it had been issued at Los Angeles on August 17, 1962, and that NAGELL had entered Mexico through Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, on August 24, 1962. The card also reflected that he established his identification by exhibiting United States Passport Number C526729.

He related that he had formerly been employed by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of the State of California as a Special Investigator. He stated that as a result of his investigation of some large cafes and bars in the Los Angeles area, one of which he named as the Mauna Loa, and some controversy which he had had with officers of the Los Angeles Police Department during the course of his investigations, he had been suspended on June 8, 1962, and later, on June 22, 1962, had been dismissed.

He mentioned that on July 15, 1962, "while making a meet" between Malibu and Oxnard, he had been shot in the chest. In connection with this latter incident, he exhibited a brief newspaper clipping which mentioned that he had refused completely to identify his assailants or furnish information which would assist the police in identifying and locating the person or persons involved.

He stated further that on August 6, 1962, he had withdrawn his request for a hearing so that he could get the money which he alleged was due him from the State of California, consisting of $800.00 retirement contributions and $300.00 for unused accumulated leave.

He stated that he felt he had been "let down" by the United States Government, both in the United States and during the time he had been in Mexico. He stated that representatives of the United States Government could have assisted him in obtaining his money from the State of California, but were only interested in soliciting from him information concerning hoodlums and other lawless elements, for the giving of which information he "could get his head blown off." He stated that he felt he had been let down by the United States Government in Mexico because nothing had been done by the Embassy in regard to his requests to have it assist him in collecting this money, which he alleged was due him from the Stateof California. He said that he himself had sent letters to California asking for payment of this money.

By way of further background, he claimed to have served in the United States Army from August 5, 1948, (then 18 years old) until October 29, 1959, and had held the rank of Captain between the ages of 22 and 29. He stated that he had received an honorable discharge and had been wounded three times in the Korean War. He stated that he made the major mistake of his life when he did not re-enlist and continue in the Army. Besides combat duty in the Infantry, he worked as an Investigator in the Counter Intelligence Corps.

He mentioned that he spoke Japanese fluently and had been married to a Japanese woman, who he said was divorcing him in California. He also complained in this connection that the California Courts had awarded the custody of their children to her.

He stated that he thought he had been approached here in Mexico City for recruiting, but although asked specifically in this regard, refused to state by whom or for what or on behalf of what country. He stated that one job of this sort would be in New York. He volunteered in so many words that he fully realized that what he was saying could be used against him in any court or prosecution. He stated that he had almost made up his mind definitely that he would leave Mexico, but that he would not go back to the United States. He stated that he did not care to return to the United States. He stated that so far he had "done nothing inimical to the United States." He stated that he was completely "disaffected," and that he knew the full significance of that term. He also stated that he was "bitter, disgusted, disillusioned and disaffected." One thing, he said, that he could say was that if he did go to some other country, it would cost the United States millions. He stated that he was "through being a good citizen" and thought he had gotten a "dirty deal all around."

He was told to go to the Protection Section in regard to any problems in Mexico as an American citizen. He stated that he had been to the Protection Section and would not go there again, and that the way he was feeling, he would not go back to the United States. He said that he had nothing to go back for, and that his dismissal record would prevent him from getting a good job anywhere in the United States. He mentioned that the only job he had ever worked at was that of an investigator.

50 520

He also mentioned that the Veterans Affairs Attache in the American Embassy had his military record in connection with a request he had previously made to attend Mexico City College on the G.I. Bill, but to do that he would have to enroll first and pay tuition himself which he could not do in view of his financial straits.

He stated at first that he was behind in his hotel bill, but later indicated that he had been keeping his hotel charges paid. He also mentioned that he had previously obtained a small loan from the American Benevolent Society, which he had since repaid.

In regard to finances, he stated that he was receiving $150.00 disability pension a month because of wounds received in the Korean hostilities during which he was wounded three times.

He stated that he had come to the Embassy to state his side in case something should happen and was told that the statements he was making would be made a matter of record with the Embassy. He was advised not to do anything he might regret, to which he replied, "What have I to lose?" He stated that unless he received the $1,100.00 soon, that the State of California owed him, he was going to some other country, and that it would not be the United States, but he refused to say what for or what the country might be, even through specifically questioned as to whether he had in mind Russia or Cuba. He said he wanted to have the Embassy know how he felt, but added, "I'm not going to lay my head down on the chopping block."

It was noted that he was very tense, nervous, agitated and antagonistic throughout this interview.

On October 1, 1962, this same individual reappeared at the American Embassy and wanted to know what had been done in regard to his case. When asked what he meant by this, he stated he meant in regard to getting the State of California to pay him the money due him. He was told that at his request, he had been permitted to make statements on the previous occasion for the purpose of having those statements made of record with the Embassy and he was assured that this was being done. However, he was told that for any assistance in regard to his financial situation in Mexico, he should contact the Protection and Welfare Section to see if that section could be of any assistance. At first he stated he would not visit the Protection Section again, but on leaving he stated he was going there and also asked what section of the Embassy he should contact to renounce his United States citizenship.

A short time later on October 1, 1962, he did contact the Protection and Welfare Section, where he was advised that the section could not intercede for him in the collection of his alleged debt from the State of California.

Shortly thereafter, he appeared in the Passport and Citizenship Section, where he refused to give his name but asked what the penalty would be for going to an Iron Curtain country and what effect it would have on his citizenship. He was advised that such an action would be a violation of Federal law.

NAGELL also on October 1, 1962, appeared in the Office of Veterans Affairs, American Embassy, Mexico City, and stated that he was withdrawing his request for G.I. educational benefits as a Korean veteran.

A short time later on October 1, 1962, he left with the Embassy a copy of his letter of August 7, 1962, to the State of California Personnel Board, which, for the purpose of further background, is set out in its entirety as follows:

"August 7, 1962

"State Personnel Board
"801 Capitol Avenue
"Sacramento, California

"Gentlemen:

"I hereby withdraw my appeal of the punitive action taken against me for dismissal by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control. I withdraw my request for a hearing in this matter by the State Personnel Board.

"I hereby state that the sole reason for this withdrawal of my appeal and request for a hearing is because of my financial situation. Continued, and what I consider to be unjustified, postponements of my hearing have created a situation in which I cannot afford to meet my daily living expenses until August 30, 1962, the most recent date given to me as the date of my hearing. Also, I am unable to obtain employment in Los Angeles because of the stigma attached to my dismissal.

"Previously, I had hoped to remove such stigma by showing at the hearing that my dismissal was not only improper, but that the alleged reasons for my dismissal were exagerated, distorted, and untrue, and the result of vindictiveness on the part of certain senior members of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control after it came to their attention that I intended to disclose to the State Attorney General's Office adverse information pertaining to corruption within said Department and the liquor industry here in Southern California.

"I request that my retirement contributions and reimbursement for unused leave be forwarded to me at the below listed address as soon as practical.

"Yours truly,

"/s/ RICHARD C. NAGELL

"RICHARD CASE NAGELL
"Box 76121, Sanford Station
"Los Angeles 5, California"

November 16, 1962

On November 16, 1962, the subject advised Special Agents of the New York City Office of the FBI that he was a Special Investigator for the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC), State of California, Los Angeles, California, and had been dismissed in June, 1962, for his failure to answer questions pertaining to allegations he made concerning corruption within that organization.

NAGELL stated he was presently residing with his sister, ELEANOR GAMBERT, 82-25 Grand Avenue, Elmhurst, Queens, Long Island, New York, telephone number HA 6-6830, and was attempting to obtain employment in the New York area. NAGELL advised his present objective was to have the California ABC exposed, and he was willing to furnish "court room testimony" that would result in the prosecution of many Los Angeles hoodlums and their attorneys, who have acted as go-betweens in securing alcoholic beverage licenses through payoffs.

NAGELL advised that he was shot in July, 1962, as a result of his refusal to "lay off" the Mauna-Loa investigation; however, he declined to disclose the details concerning the actual shooting.

NAGELL stated he had furnished some information to the State of California investigators assigned to the California Attorney General's Office; however, nothing was accomplished through this.

NAGELL appeared overwrought and obsessed with a desire to expose the ABC, and, as a result, clear his name. He stated this situation has caused a separation between himself and his wife and children, who are still residing in Los Angeles.

NAGELL advised he had spoken with SA "DICK" RICHARDS of the Los Angeles Office on three or four occasions; however, he had given limited information to him, due to personal circumstances at the time. He requested that apologies be conveyed to SA RICHARDS for not "going all the way" on revealing all he knew concerning individuals in whom SA RICHARDS expressed an interest.

The following information was presented by NAGELL to the interviewing Special Agent on two typewritten sheets:

"As of the aforementioned date, and prior thereto, responsible authorities of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control were aware of the foregoing information. The two agents who handled special ownership investigations in the Los Angeles Metropolitan area (consisting of 3500 licensees) were OWEN J. MC CARD, a hanger-on and close friend of WILLIAM G. BONELLI, former Director of SBE, and myself. During the course of my investigations I received pressure from both MC CARD and certain superiors to fluff off on certain investigations, and to press others - depending on the licensee or who the hoodlums were in back of the business concerned. This I did not do. In my opinion this resulted directly in my dismissal from the department, regardless of what other ostensible reasons were tendered. It is a fact that I was shot as a result of one of my investigations even though it could have been avoided by myself. Certain reports of investigations which I turned in were not forwarded thru proper channels; some of them were destroyed; I was pulled off of some investigations before their completion (which were not reassigned); certain licensees were notified that I was investigating them; and I was aware of bribes being offered in quite a few instances. Some of the attorneys who acted as go-betweens in these affairs were as follows:

"Murray Choitner
Paul Angelillo
Michael Flynn
Nate Snyder
Harry Weiss
a Mr. Hall
Carl Sturzenacker
Goodwin J Knight

"Los Angeles:

"Following is a partial list of persons who are not qualified to hold alcoholic beverage licenses, but who in fact owned businesses, partly or completely, which were licensed (or which were in the process of being licensed) as of August 21, 1962.

"Morris Bort
Mickey Cohen
Martin Cusimano
Rudy Cleye
Sam Cuda
Louis Dragna

"Herman Duboff
Carlo Fiorentino
Sam Hollock
Mickey Koomer
Johnny LaGuardia
Joe Neil
Harry Nishimoto
Fred Sica
Joe Sica
Nick Simponis
Fujiko Thomas
Oscar Wakefield
Benson Wong
Esther Wright

"Following is a partial list of licensed premises (or premises in the process of being licensed) whose businesses were owned, partly or completely, by unqualified persons, or in which such persons held a controlling interest, as of August 21, 1962.

"Beverly Hilton Hotel
Black Bear Cafe
Black Orchid
Blarney Castle
Carlo's Little Italy
Date Room
Dorando's Pizza House
El Rancho
Figer 8
Harold's 901 Club
Imperial Gardens
It Club
Jerry Lewis'
The Largo
Mama Lion
Mauna-Loa
Moulin Rouge
My Place
New Ginza
Papa Lion
Sherry's
TJ's Cafe
The Abbey
The Annex"

November 28, 1962

On November 28, 1962, the subject contacted the New York City Office of the FBI and advised as follows:

The subject stated that he believed that the Superior Court of Los Angeles County did not give him a fair chance to be heard when it granted his wife MITSUKO NAGELL (nee TAKAHASHI) an interlocutory divorce decree on November 19, 1962, of which he had just received notice. NAGELL claimed that he was aware of the divorce proceedings and, in fact, did appear during preliminary hearings and actually entered a cross-complaint but it was his understanding that the actual trial would not take place until December next. He stated that he left California in August, 1962, and went to Mexico, where he remained until October 28, 1962. He claimed that his wife's attorney knew this and apparently brought the case on prematurely so that he would be deprived of his day in court.

NAGELL claimed that he has written a protest to the court granting the divorce, claiming he was deprived of his right to be heard and to have a jury trial. He stated that he is consulting the Legal Aid Society and the Veterans Administration concerning this matter since his Army pension is his only current income.

December 15, 1962

On December 15, 1962, the subject advised Special Agents of the FBI in Jacksonville, Florida, that he had served as a captain in the U. S. Army and had been involved in intelligence investigations for the CIC for approximately seven years. He said he served in Japan for most of his period of time and married a Japanese woman named MITSUKI NAGELL from whom he is presently divorced. He advised that during 1957 and 1958 he became acquainted in Japan with one Doctor CHAKAO FUJISAWI, a professor of Political Science at Tokyo, Japan, University. He said this person was a member of the Cabinet Research Office (CRO), a rightist organization. He said this person is presently in the United States, place unknown and deems him detrimental to the safety of the internal security of the United States. He said in either 1958 or 1959 he directed an anonymous letter to the FBI in Washington, D. C. relative to the above information concerning FUJISAWI. He stated he was discharged honorably from the U. S. Army on October 29, 1959, and subsequently became employed on December 14, 1959 by the State Beverage Department in Los Angeles, California. He said in June, 1962, he was accused of taking a $20,000 bribe by the State Beverage Department and was released from his employment on June 8, 1962, for refusing to answer questions. He stated he talked to the FBI in Los Angeles regarding the possibility of his dismissal being a violation of his civil rights.

NAGELL advised that he went to Washington, D. C. where he resided until recently. He stated while in Washington, D. C. he had been approached by an individual whom he felt was either a Special Agent of the FBI or a Soviet Espionage Agent. He said he met this person in a bar in Washington, D. C., located at 811 14th Street NW, Washington, D. C. He said this person talked of Domestic Intelligence and also talked of giving him an intelligence assignment. He said the more he thought this matter over he was positive that this individual works for the Soviets.

He said that in September, 1962, he was invited to attend a reception at the Russian Embassy. He could not identify the individual who invited him to the reception. He advised that he contacted the Central Intelligence Agency at either Langley, Virginia, or Elwood, Virginia, and used the name of JOE CRAMER or KRAMER during this contact with CIA. He said he told them of the above information and wanted some advice as to whether to go through with such an assignment. He said he was to meet this individual who was to give him the assignment at the above-mentioned bar on 14th Street, and in order to be recognized, he was to place three nickels on the bar in line with a dime placed directly over the middle nickel. He said the CIA told him that since this matter involved domestic rather than foreign intelligence he should refer this information to the FBI.

He stated he went to the above bar and there was contacted by the same person and was told to go to Miami, Florida, to a bar and wear a red sweater, where he would be contacted relative to an assignment.

It is to be noted that during the entire interview with NAGELL, he was noted to be in an inebriated condition and was very vague in answering questions. He was unable to identify by name any of the individuals he discussed and was also unable to furnish a physical description of any of these individuals. In addition to being slightly inebriated he also gave the impression to the interviewing agents of being mentally unbalanced.

NAGELL stated he is presently residing at the Holiday Inn, Jacksonville, Florida, and would be there for the next few days. He said he is presently driving a 1959 Ford which bears California license MYU 890. He said he has no living relatives except his former wife, who resides at 440 South Union Avenue, Los Angeles, California, and his sister, ELEANORE GAMBERT, 8225 Grand Avenue, Elmhurst, New York.

NAGELL advised that he believes in connection with his contacts that he is actually working for the Soviets. He could furnish no information as to a specific assignment given him other than that he was to go to Miami and sit in a bar which he is unable to identify and wait to be contacted by a Soviet Agent. He said he spoke Japanese and Russian fluently and is well versed in the Spanish language. He said he was shot in June, 1962, but refused to discuss any of the incidents surrounding the shooting. He said his auto has several bullet holes in it. He furnished a photograph of himself.

On December 17, 1962 efforts were made to locate NAGELL for reinterview; however, it was determined that he had checked out of the motel and left no forwarding address.

December 20, 1962 to January 22, 1963

On November 25, 1963, EP T-2 made available clinical records regarding the subject covering the period when the subject was a patient at the Veterans Administration Hospital, Bay Pines, Florida, from December 20, 1962, to January 22, 1963. One clinical record contained the following information:

"INTERIM SUMMARY (INTERSERVICE)

"1. HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: This 32 year old white male veteran of Korean War was admitted to Ward 1-5-S on 12-20-62 because of complaints of headache and lapses of memory. He claims these since an airplane accident he had had in

1954 with head injury and brain concussion. He said he was admitted to Walter Reed Hospital for a period of approximately six months and at that time he was unconscious for approximately twenty days. This accident left him with a left facial paralysis and some difficulty in his memory. Since two weeks ago his headache is worse and he complains of it all the time. He feels more nervous and looks as though he is in real emotional distress with periods of depression.

"2. PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Revealed a well nourished, well developed patient with periods of depression during which he cries and sometimes said that he wishes he were dead. Other times, he looks angry and anxious. He is well oriented as to time and place, but sometimes needs to look in a small booklet to remember dates or names. Sometimes during the conversation he stops and tries to remember what he wanted to tell - at that time it seems that he is not able to continue and cries. Blood pressure 120/80, pulse 68, height 6'1" and weight 175 pounds. Pupils are equal and normal reaction to light and consensual reflex. He shows a left facial paralysis, a residual from the head injury. Lungs are clear. Heart in good tonus and sinus rhythm. No edema. Abdomen is flat, soft, no masses and organs not palpable. Neurological examination is normal except a left facial paralysis and some staggering during Romberg procedure. Optic fundi was normal, peripheral vision by confrontation is normal.

"3. LABORATORY AND X-RAY FINDINGS: Skull and chest x-ray essentially negative. EKG normal. EEG without a definite abnormality. The spinal fluid shows a total protein of 55 mg.% without any increase of globulin, 1 ymph, and serology negative. Pressure was 80 mm^{3} of water. Routine laboratory study normal. A psychological evaluation done by Dr. Martin reports some defect in the intellectual sphere with inability to integrate and a waxing and waning of alertness, which he said resembles that seen in epileptoid individuals.

"4. COURSE IN HOSPITAL: During the time he was in this ward, this patient complained of headache more of the time and said they only stop during the time he is asleep. Most of the

60-500

time he looks depressed, but sometimes angry. He wrote many letters about different subjects and some of these, it seems, emanate from a patient who is under the effect of a depressive feeling. The patient was transferred to Ward 22-4-S on 1-15-63.

5. TRANSFER DIAGNOSES AND PRESENT STATUS:

1. Chronic brain syndrome secondary to brain concussion in 1954.	Treated	Unchanged.
2. Behavorial reaction passive-aggresive type with paranoid traits.	Untreated	Unchanged.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS: Transfer to 22-4-S."

Another clinical record made reference to the above mentioned clinical record and stated "Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Interim Summary (Interservice) dated 1-15-63 remain unchanged, with the following addendum:

"4. COURSE IN HOSPITAL (Cont'd): This patient was transferred to the open section of the Psychiatric ward after having been seen by the Chief of the Psychiatric Service on two occasions. At that time the Neurological Service felt that patient had received maximum hospital benefit from their viewpoint and because of his hostility and irritability that he should be placed on the Psychiatric ward for further observation. He complains frequently of not receiving the attention that he felt he should have and that he wasn't getting the privacy that he also thought he should have. On his initial interview he refused to discuss why he was in the hospital, saying that he had been through all this before. He relates that he did not want to attend the group psychiatric conferences because he did not want anyone to know about his private business. He insisted 'I am entitled to a private interview if I want one.' He was somewhat withdrawn on the ward and showed poor inter-personal relationship. One of his chief complaints while being on this ward was his headaches and he related that they were getting worse. He stated 'Nothing that they give me here is doing any good.' After several days of listening to his demands a better rapport was established and a private interview was given him. He seemed well oriented in all spheres. Speech was of normal flow and coherent. He showed no flight of ideas. He denied delusions or hallucinations. No suicidal or homicidal tendencies were elicited. He states that his main trouble is 'headaches which I have had continuously recently.' He also complains of 'dizziness, and at times an unsteady gait.' These symptoms are sometimes associated with a transient loss of memory. During the interview his retention and recall were good. Sensorium was intact. When I asked him what he thought was wrong he said 'I think my trouble is physiologic.' When I asked him what he meant by physiologic he stated 'My trouble is all due to my head injury.' He felt reassured when I told him that I thought some of his symptoms were due to that mishap. Although he smoked continuously during the interview he related quite a story about his Army activities and his domestic situation, but was somewhat evasive about the trouble he was in while in California, especially the trouble involving the F.B.I. and some shooting event. He was presented before the Psychiatric stand and at first was somewhat reluctant to answer questions and when asked a question that was not due to his liking he would relate 'this is my private life.' During the Staff Conference he said 'you Psychiatrists are all stereotyped.' During the Staff Conference, however, his mood was one of friendliness and not one of depression, although he will occasionally get irritable when supposedly asked a personal question. After the interview at the Staff Meeting he approached me saying 'that he did not want any of the nurses aides to know about his business and that was the reason why he refused to give out any information.' He further related that he keeps everything in a little book that he has done or said because he has a poor memory, although some of these memory deficits were not brought out in the interview with him. He was advised to stay on the ward for another week or two for further observation but he felt that he did not have to since nothing more could be done for him. He also said the reason for him wishing to leave was that 'he had a job in mind and was going for an interview.' Since his insight and judgment were unpredictable at times and although no psychotic behavior was noted, it was felt that he could leave the hospital AMA. In view of the chronic nature of his illness the future prognosis must be guarded as to a possibility of a permanent future social economic adjustment. Patient discharged A.M.A. on 1-22-63.

"5. FINAL DIAGNOSIS AND PRESENT STATUS:

1. Chronic brain syndrome associated with brain trauma (by history of) with behavioral reaction characterized by passive aggressive and paranoid features. Treated. Unchanged.

    (a) Precipitating Stress: Unknown.
    (b) Predisposition: Moderate, by history of, frequent hospitalizations and interviews for his present type of behavior.
    (c) Psychiatric Incapacity: Minimal. Patient is competent at this time.

"6. RECOMMENDATIONS: That this patient should remain in a hospital for further observation. However, if he so desired, he could go A.M.A. to seek further NP care when indicated.

"7. PRESENT STATUS OF SC DISABILITY: Not examined for rating purposes."

The above mentioned clinical record from the Veterans Administration Hospital in Bay Pines, Florida, can only be made available upon the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. The identity of the person to be subpoenaed is HAROLD G. COBB, Chief, Registrar Division, Veterans Administration Admission Center, Los Angeles 25, California.

January 24, 1963

On January 24, 1963, the subject was contacted by Special Agents of the Miami, Florida, Office of the FBI at Northeast First Avenue and Fifth Street, Miami, at which time he stated that his name was JOE KRAMER. He was sitting in his 1957 Ford hardtop, black and white in color, bearing California license MYU 890.

Subject was very reluctant to furnish any information but identified himself as RICHARD CASE NAGELL, a former Special Agent for the Liquor Control Office, State of California, Los Angeles Office, and a former Captain in the United States Army with experience in intelligence work with the CIC.

Subject stated he wished to be advised if he was given a pistol with a silencer and possibly some microfilm by sources - Cuban, Russian or both - from Mexico City through a Cuban in Miami - if he would be permitted to return these items to his contact so he could be of further use to the United States Government. Subject stated he did not want to cooperate fully with the United States Government or anyone else. He gave the impression that he was better at determining what the enemy is up to than the agencies regularly handling these matters, except the FBI. He stated the FBI is the only agency that has treated him well.

Subject stated within the next few days the individual with the gun would contact him and he would immediately contact the FBI, provided the gun could be returned to him in time to make the delivery to whomever he had to deliver it. When pressed for details subject was very evasive and vague.

No promises were made to the subject and the espionage statutes and the registration act together with other laws were explained to him and he acknowledged he was fully aware of their provisions.

Subject stated he was discharged from the Liquor Control authority in California under false charges of accepting bribes. Immediately thereafter, he left for Mexico because he was disgusted with the United States. In August or September, 1962, he met a man from Maryland in Mexico City who introduced him to individuals whom he believed may have been soviet agents. He refused to give descriptions, names or other details. When questioned on specific points he became mysteriously evasive.

Subject claimed he had the names of all Americans involved in activities against the United States in a safe deposit box, the key to which he gave to a close friend in the event of his death.

When subject was questioned concerning the details of possible microfilm he might deliver, he stated that maybe there would not be any microfilm, and that was a conclusion on his part that microfilm would be delivered with the pistol. He also stated he did not know what the gun would be used for but since he was not stupid he thought it might be used to kill someone with. Subject tore off the corner of a $10.00 bill and offered it to the interviewing agents to be used as identification in contacting him when he would later call the FBI for a meeting. He suggested that the corner of the $10.00 bill be shown to a bartender in a bar that he would name and then a waiter could let him know that a friend wanted to see him. The agent stated this would be unnecessary and he agreed to call the office January 25, 1963.

Subject was highly critical of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency in Mexico, but trusted the FBI and claimed he had contacts with FBI Agents in Mexico City, Los Angeles and Jacksonville.

Subject furnished his driver's license which gave his address as Box 76121 Sanford Station, Los Angeles, California. His date of birth on the license is August 5, 1938 and the address to notify in the event of emergency was 3751 6th Street, Los Angeles, California.

Late in the interview, subject reluctantly furnished his temporary address in Miami which is Room 303, Holiday Inn, 2500 Brickell Avenue.

Subject stated he is constantly under surveillance, that he has not been under the care of a psychiatrist and that he might return to Mexico City.

April 19, 1963

On April 19, 1963, the subject contacted the Los Angeles, California Office of the FBI and furnished the following information to a Special Agent of that Office:

The subject stated that he and his wife obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce in Los Angeles County on October 16, 1962. He said that one of the terms of this decree was that he was to have 'reasonable visitation' rights with his two small children. He said that his wife has not complied with this court order so he had her subpoenaed into court for contempt.

Subject said that he and his wife appeared in court on April 19, 1963, and a female judge, name not known, listened to the matter with subject acting as his own attorney. He said that the Judge interrupted him and instructed him to obtain a lawyer before the proceedings would continue. Subject advised that he argued with the Judge to no avail.

Subject said that he is unemployed and has no funds to hire an attorney. He said that he went to the Legal Aid Society and California Bar Association to obtain an attorney but neither would furnish counsel.

At this point in the interview, the subject became emotional and quite rude. He said that the Judge cannot order him to hire an attorney if he does not want one and to do so is a violation of his civil rights. He raved on that he was well aware of the law and demanded that the FBI investigate the judge involved.

Subject was informed of the provisions of the Civil Rights Statutes and told that he should discuss this case with the United States Attorney, Los Angeles, if not satisfied.

The subject then left the office with no further comment about the matter. He mentioned as he was leaving that if he did not get a job in the near future, he was going to "blow the lid off"concerning Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Sheriff's Office, Los Angeles County District Attorney and the California Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.

It is noted that subject at first refused to give his address. He then stated that he had lived in Mexico City, D.F. until about 30 days ago. He then gave his Los Angeles address as Post Office Box 75801, Sanford Station, Los Angeles. He then said he lived at 610 South Oxford Street, Los Angeles 45.

June 4, 1963 and August 14, 1963

On September 23, 1963, EP T-3 advised that the medical records, Veterans Administration (VA) Outpatient Clinic, 1031 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California, contained the following information regarding the subject:

On June 4, 1963, NAGELL appeared at the Outpatient Clinic and was referred to the Neurological Clinic for treatment. His condition was diagnosed as "depression, tearful, nervous, rigid. Would only utter words 'Got to see my kids.'"

On August 14, 1963, NAGELL appeared at the Outpatient Clinic, complaining of "impairment of vision, left eye." Records indicate foreign matter removed from eye and NAGELL discharged. An appointment for September 16, 1963, was made for NAGELL, but he failed to keep this appointment.

Records indicate the following service-connected injuries have been entered on NAGELL's records:

Multiple scars, left face and head
Reconstructed left ear canal
Paresia (paralysis), partial, left facial nerve
Lagophthalmos - left (defective hearing bilateral)
Multiple scars, left forearm, left buttocks, right
  leg, and right knee
Tracheotomy
Fractures, right and left mandibles (jaw)
Brain concussion
Right hypertropia

The above information can be made available only upon the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. The identity of the person to be subpoenaed is Mrs. MARGUERITE COFFEE, Chief of Medical Records, VA Outpatient Clinic, 1031 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California.

August 23, 1963

On August 23, 1963, Assistant United States Attorney THOMAS R. SHERIDAN, Los Angeles, California, advised that one RICHARD C. NAGELL had been employed as a taxi cab driver in Beverly Hills, California, during recent weeks and claimed to have formerly been an officer in the CIC Division of the United States Army. Mr. SHERIDAN said NAGELL had claimed recently to Special Agents of the Intelligence Division, Internal Revenue Service, and to Mr. SHERIDAN that he, NAGELL, had carried messages to various persons in the Beverly Hills area, including JOHN BEBER, of Brand Motors, and others connected with the Friar's Club in Beverly Hills. Mr. SHERIDAN indicated that much of the information NAGELL had furnished could also be found in newspapers and other publications, except information which could not be proved or disproved, such as NAGELL's carrying of messages. Mr. SHERIDAN indicated that he was skeptical of the reliability of NAGELL.

ATTEMPTED BANK ROBBERY AND AFTERMATH

An individual identified by material in his possession as ROBERT CASE NAGELL was brought to the El Paso Office of the FBI at 4:55 PM on September 20, 1963 by Patrolmen W. L. WESTFALL and JAMES S. BUNDREN, El Paso Police Department. At that time NAGELL was advised that he was suspected of a felony crime within the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI, that he did not have to make any statement, that any statement he did make could be used in a court of law against him, and that he had a right to consult an attorney. No threats or promises were made by anyone to secure a statement from NAGELL.

NAGELL requested permission to telephonically contact an attorney in Los Angeles, California, at about 5:00 PM. This request was immediately granted, upon which NAGELL stated, "No, I don't want to call that shyster." He then asked the time on the west coast and on the east coast.

Although refusing to directly discuss the attempted hold up of the State National Bank, El Paso, NAGELL stated that he had fired two shots in the bank "to keep anyone from following me." He stated that he was an excellent shot, and the fact that he had fired the two shots into the ceiling proved he had not been trying to hit anyone. He stated that he was certain that "all of my problems have been solved for a long time, and now I won't have to go to Cuba." This statement was not further explained. When requested to explain this statement, NAGELL refused, stating "I can see this is going to be a frame, which is to be expected in our capitalistic system."

When asked for his motive in attempting to hold up the bank, NAGELL stated that he was unhappy with the American judicial system, because he had attempted, through judicial procedures, to get to see his two children, a girl 3½ and a boy 2½, in custody of his divorced wife, and the California court had not executed an order in keeping with his request.

NAGELL advised that he had been living in Mexico until a short time ago.

In regard to his Army career, NAGELL stated that he had resigned his commission as a Captain, effective October 29, 1959. He said that at the time he resigned he was on the list for promotion to Major. He further advised that he entered the U. S. Army on August 5, 1948 at Albany, New York. He said he was drawing 60% compensation from the government and had been declared disabled to the extent of 63%.

He advised that he had been assigned Enlisted Army Serial Number RA 12115891, Officers' Serial Numbers 02028346 and 01438346. He stated that the last serial number had been assigned to him when he had been assigned to counter-intelligence. He advised that he had been trained in the Army Counterintelligence School. He said that he had been assigned to Field Operations Intelligence and had taught interrogation.

In addition, NAGELL stated that he had been wounded on three separate occasions in connection with his service in the Korean campaign, and he had received three purple hearts. Continuing he advised that he received a battle field commission.

On September 21, 1963, Assistant United States Attorney FREDERICK J. MORTON was furnished the facts of the case involving the attempted robbery of the State National Bank of El Paso, on September 20, 1963, and Mr. MORTON then authorized the filing of a complaint charging the subject with bank robbery.

On September 21, 1963, a complaint was filed before United States Commissioner HENRY C. CLIFTON, El Paso, Texas, charging NAGELL with violation of Section 2113, Title 18, United States Code, in that NAGELL did on September 20, 1963, at El Paso, Texas, enter the State National Bank of El Paso, a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, organized and operated under the laws of the United States, and make a felonious attempt by force and violence and putting in fear by use of a .45 caliber revolver, one PATSY CLYDINE GORDON, an employee of the said bank to take a thing of value, to wit, Travelers Cheques, which were in the care and custody and controlled by the said bank.

The subject waived hearing and stated that he did not desire to be represented by an attorney. Commissioner CLIFTON set bond in the amount of $25,000, in lieu of which the subject was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal and placed in the El Paso County Jail.

On September 21, 1963, RICHARD CASE NAGELL was interviewed at the El Paso County Jail subsequent to a hearing before U. S. Commissioner HENRY C. CLIFTON, ElPaso, Texas, at which hearing the charges of bank robbery filed against him were read to him by the United States Commissioner and at which time he was advised of his right to counsel.

NAGELL was again advised as to the identity of the Special Agents of the FBI who were desirous of interviewing him and was told that he did not have to make any statement and that any statement he made could be used against him in a court of law. He was also advised that he had the right to consult an attorney and that no threats or promises would be made to him to induce him to make a statement.

In the presence of El Paso Police Department Detective THOMAS F. MC CONNELL, JR. and his partner, NAGELL stated that he desired to talk to Special Agents of the FBI. He stated that he did not desire to talk in the presence of anyone else and Detective MC CONNELL and his partner then departed.

NAGELL started off his conversation by saying that when he had appeared before the US Commissioner just prior to this interview, that he had "pled not guilty" since he did not know what else to do. He stated that he did not desire to be represented by an attorney and that he did not care what happened to him. He exhibited his left wrist, the inside of which was covered with a great number of superficial wounds to the skin. He stated that the night before while he was in the El Paso City Jail he had used a piece of tin in an attempt to cut his wrists. He said he had lost about a pint of blood.

He stated that when he entered the State National Bank of El Paso on the afternoon of September 20, 1963, that he would not have taken any money. He said that to the best of his recollection he had been in El Paso for several days and had made an attempt to find a former war buddy of his named JOSE C. IBARRA, who formerly resided at 904 South Hill Street in El Paso. He stated that he had made inquiry at this address, but IBARRA had moved and he was not able to find out where he had gone. He said that he had known IBARRA in 1948 and 1949 when both of them were Sergeants in the Army. Continuing, he advised that he had driven to El Paso from San Diego, California. NAGELL stated that he had not eaten in three days because he did not feel like doing so. When asked if he desired food he stated that he was afraid that it would make him sick if he attempted to eat.

NAGELL stated that he wanted to point out that he had in the past received psychiatric treatment and that in 1955 he had been hospitalized at Walter Reed Army Hospital as a result of the crash of an Air Force B-25. He advised that he had been the sole survivor of this crash and had spent a considerable length of time in the hospital. He advised that Doctor EDWIN A. WEINSTEIN, a civilian doctor assigned to the Neuropsychiatric Center at Walter Reed Hospital had treated him and had a considerable amount of information as to his mental condition. Continuing, he advised that he did not think that he was crazy, but that he felt that he needed psychiatric attention and advice because of the fact that he was highly emotional and at times he could not remember what he was saying or where he was for short periods. He stated that he had requested admission to the psychiatric ward at the Veterans' Hospital, Brentwood, Los Angeles, California, however, he was not granted admission and he stated that to the best of his recollection he made this request in May or June of 1963. He pointed out that all of his medical records could be obtained at the Veterans Administration Regional Office, 1380 South Sepulveda Boulevard, Los Angeles, California.

He further advised that he had been hospitalized at the Veterans' Hospital, Bay Pines, Florida, from December 20, 1962 until January, 1963, at which time he was discharged against medical advice. He stated that he had been confined in this hospital as a result of "spells" that he had been having and that he was in the hospital for observation.

NAGELL was highly emotional, was given to spells of crying, and stated that he had not been able to get his feet on the ground since his discharge from the United States Army in 1959. In this connection, he stated that his wife was a Japanese and that he had resigned his commission as a Captain in the United States Army since she was extremely unhappy with his being assigned to the Infantry. He said that he had resigned the commission and that after the divorce had been granted, he had not been allowed to see his two small children because he had not been able to pay the required alimony.

He stated that he had been employed by the Alcoholic and Beverage Control in California, but had lost his job in 1962. He said that he had not worked since then and actually was not able to do any kind of work because of the time he had spent in the Army. He stated that the only job that he was prepared for was that of an investigator since he had learned this as a Counter-Intelligence Corps representative of the U. S. Army. He stated that he had been shot through the chest in 1962 in Los Angeles, California, but that the shooting was a result of a private matter and he did not care to discuss it further.

He stated that lately he had been too upset to be even considered for a job and then intimated that he had gone into the State National Bank "so that they would take him back in the hospital." He stated that he was not in the bank to get any money and that he fired the shots to keep anyone from following him. He said that he had used the names of JOE KRANE and ROBERT C. NOLAN and advised that he had used the name of NOLAN while in the Military Intelligence.

NAGELL further advised that he had been suffering from a headache for several days and stated that he had been taking some kind of pills that were furnished to him by the Veterans' Administration, but that he was out of these pills and did not know what they were. He requested an aspirin, which was obtained for him. In response to a question as to whether or not he desired to see a doctor, he stated that he did not.

In the September 21, 1963, issue of the El Paso Times, an article appeared on page 1-A entitled "Veteran Tries Daring Bank Robbery." The article contained a sub-caption "Fires Two Shots As Clerk Flees From Counter." The article states, "A 34-year-old battle-scarred Korean war hero, armed with a .45 Colt, made a daring but unsuccessful attempt to rob the State National Bank about 4:30 PM Friday, firing two shots as he ran out of the crowded bank.

"Detectives and FBI Agents going through the suspect's suitcase found photostatic copies of numerous certificates and commendations showing he had acquired an outstanding military record in 11 years of service with the U. S. Army in Korea. A photostat showed he had been honorably discharged from the Army at Fort Dix, New Jersey, October, 1959, with the rank of Captain.

"Other military papers found in NAGELL's suitcase showed he had been awarded the Purple Heart three times for wounds received in battle with the enemy in Korea. Other papers also disclosed he had been awarded the Bronze Star for meritorious and outstanding service in Korea.

"Speaking to FBI Agents and other officers NAGELL admitted he had entered the Army as a buck private and was in line for promotion to major when he was given his honorable discharge. He told agents he spoke Russian, Japanese and Spanish fluently.

"His Army papers disclosed NAGELL had graduated with honors from the Army Military Intelligence School, from a special leader's course, and had served in the counter intelligence corps (CIC). He had records showing he had been given top secret security clearance on September 22, 1950."

The September 22, 1963, issue of the El Paso Times contains an article on page 1-A entitled "NAGELL Pleads Not Guilty." According to the article, "City jailers reported NAGELL has refused to eat his meals since he was booked in jail. They also reported the prisoner attempted to cut his wrists in his City Jail cell Friday night by using a tin can converted to an ash tray.

"After he was turned over to the custody of Sheriff BOB BAILEY, jailers were instructed to maintain a close watch on the prisoner and stop him from making any attempts on his life.

The September 26, 1963, issue of the El Paso Times contains an article on page 7-A entitled "NAGELL To Take Sanity Test at La Tuna." According to the article, "Former Army Captain RICHARD CASE NAGELL, 34, charged with bank robbery in an unsuccessful attempt to hold up the State National Bank, will be taken to La Tuna Correctional Institution Thursday for a sanity test.

"He will be examined by Dr. R. J. BENNETT on the motion of Assistant U. S. District Attorney FRED MORTON, who obtained an order authorizing the check up from U. S. District Judge R. E. THOMASON.

"MORTON said the preliminary investigation indicated that a psychiatric examination would be necessary before the government could proceed further in the case. The investigation showed that NAGELL was the sole survivor of a military plane crash, that since his discharge he had visited several FBI offices offering "highly secret" counterintelligence information, and earlier this year had been under psychiatric care in Florida for a month."

On September 27, 1963, Staff Sergeant (E-6) PHILIP J. DALY, US Army, RA 32 293 739, presently assigned to the 4th Enlisted Student Battery, School Support Command, Fort Bliss, Texas, stated that he served in the same detachment in Tokyo, Japan, with RICHARD CASE NAGELL, the 441st CIC, during the spring of 1958, from approximately February to May, when he (DALY) returned to the United States. He has had no contact with NAGELL since that time.

There was only a normal acquaintance between a Captain (NAGELL) and a Master Sergeant (DALY) during this period of time.

DALY first met NAGELL on a temporary duty trip to Sendai, in northern Japan, where NAGELL had been sent to replace the Operations Officer. NAGELL stated at that time that he was being shunted into a corner.

DALY next met NAGELL about a month later in Fort Drake, Tokyo.

All enlisted men of the 441st CIC Detachment thought that NAGELL was slightly unbalanced, and was not a normal officer. The reputation among the enlisted men was to stay away from NAGELL.

The November 4, 1963, issue of the El Paso Herald-Post contained an article on page 1 entitled "Holdup Suspect 'Fires' Lawyer." According to the article, "RICHARD CASE NAGELL charged in U. S. District Court with an attempt to hold up the State National Bank told the Court today he did not attempt to hold up the bank.

"'I had a motive for doing what I did,' NAGELL told Federal Judge R. E. THOMASON. "But my motive was not to hold up the bank. 'I do not intend to disclose my motive at this time.'

"NAGELL, 33, told Judge THOMASON that he is a veteran of the Korean War, that he was injured three times, and that 'I am a 64 per cent disabled veteran.'

"The accused man was before the court on a petition filed by his own hand for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was being held prisoner illegally.

"NAGELL asked Judge THOMASON to discharge Attorney JAMES HAMMOND, who had been appointed by the court to represent NAGELL. Judge THOMASON granted the request, after telling NAGELL that Mr. HAMMOND is considered an able, conscientious member of El Paso Bar. NAGELL had refused to talk to Mr. HAMMOND before the hearing opened.

"The matter of whether NAGELL would consent to undergo psychiatric treatment was discussed, and NAGELL said he would be willing to go to La Tuna Federal Correctional Institution, and that:

"'I will obey all their rules but I will not cooperate for any psychiatric examination except an examination conducted by a psychiatrist for the Veterans Administration.'

" Judge THOMASON said he would name a psychiatrist from William Beaumont Army Hospital to examine NAGELL. The Judge said he would appoint another attorney to represent NAGELL."

On November 18, 1963, the subject filed a writ of habaes corpus in the United States District Court in El Paso. NAGELL requested interview with a Special Agent of the FBI. On interview, NAGELL furnished the following signed statement:

"11/19/63
"El Paso, Texas

"I, Richard Case Nagell, do hereby make the following free and voluntary statement to Edward Joseph Murphy and George E. Aiken, who have identified themselves to me as Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They have advised me that the information furnished herein may be used in court. No threats, promises or force of any kind was used to get me to make this statement.

"I was born in Greenwich, N.Y. on August 5, 1930.

"I was arrested on September 20, 1963, in El Paso, Texas. On September 21, 1963, I was arraigned before the United States Commissioner in El Paso, Texas, on a charge of bank robbery, at which time I entered a plea of not guilty and was bound over for indictment by the Federal Grand Jury. Bail was set at $25,000. On September 21, 1963 I was incarcerated in the El Paso County jail, where I since have been and am presently confined.

"On September 24, 1963, the United States District Court ordered that I be given a psychiatric examination to determine my mental competency to stand trial, and that if determined necessary by the examining psychiatrist, to conduct such examination, to be committed to the Federal Correctional Institution, La Tuna, Texas, for a period not exceding two weeks.

"On November 4, 1963, the court nullified that part of the aforesaid order, pertaining to the committment, and re-ordered that I be committed to Beaumont Army Hospital, El Paso, Texas, for said psychiatric examination.

"On September 24, 1963 and again on November 4, 1963, the U.S. District Court ordered that further prosecutive action against me, be deferred until such time as the Court is in receipt of the results of said psychiatric examination.

"As of this date I have not received the aforementioned psychiatric examination nor have I been committed to either of the aforementioned institutions for such examination, nor have I been indicted by the Federal Grand Jury.

"I believe that an unnecessary and undue delay has occurred in bringing me to trial, as a result of my reluctance to participate in a psychiatric consultation and/or examination. I believe that this is a violation of my right to a speedy trial as guaranteed to me by Amendment 6 of the Constitution.

"In relation to the foregoing statement, I believe that I, as an accused person, am not required by law to emit any statement or to answer any questions, whatsoever, to any person, whomsoever, including a psychiatrist, psychologist, or physiologist, nor that I am required by law to participate in any examination, test or activity, verbal, written or otherwise, if I do not so elect. To be coerced to do so, is a violation of my rights under Amendment 5 of the Constitution.

"An attempt has been made to indirectly coerce me to incriminate myself, by a court appointed psychiatrist known to me as Doctor Bennett, in that he queried me as to my motive for committing the alleged offense and stated to me that if I did not give him such information, I was being uncooperative, and that I might have to be sent to Springfield Medical Center, if I did not cooperate with him.

"I further believe that I am being coerced into taking psychiatric examination and/or consultation by the resulting undue delay in bringing me to trial.

"I have read this statement consisting of this and 3 other pages, and it is true and correct.

"/s/ Richard Case Nagell

"Witness:

"/s/ Edward Joseph Murphy, Special Agent FBI, El Paso, Texas, 11/19/63

"/s/ George E. Aiken, Jr Special Agent, F.B.I, El Paso, Texas 11/19/63"

On November 19, 1963, Assistant United States Attorney FREDERICK J. MORTON, El Paso, advised that there is no validity to subject's allegation inasmuch as Title 18, Section 4244, U. S. Code, states that upon a motion by the United States

50-[illegible]

Attorney, the defense attorney, or upon its own motion, the court shall cause the accused to be examined as to his mental condition where it is felt that he may be presently insane or otherwise mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or to properly assist in his own defense. Assistant U. S. Attorney MORTON advised that according to this Statute, the examination can be made with or without the consent of the accused. Assistant U. S. Attorney MORTON stated that the subject has constantly refused to cooperate with psychiatrists and has refused to even speak to them, and that this refusal on his part has held up any possible psychiatric examination, necessitating postponing further action.

The subject, who is still incarcerated in the El Paso County Jail, sent the following note to SA THOMAS B. WHITE, JR. of the El Paso Office of the FBI, which reads as follows:

"Mr. White -

"When one's actions are motivated by an ideological conviction, he cannot deviate from his pursued path simply because society may censure it as wrong. But when he becomes disillusioned with such ideology, and an existing situation so dictates, he must initiate immediate corrective action as befits circumstance and as best he knows how.

"I have always acted from a principal of love for my country, and this same principle actuated my conduct of September 20th, however inappropriate or incomprehensible it may appear.

"/s/ Richard C. Nagell"

The December 10, 1963, issue of the El Paso Times contained an article on pages 1 and 3-A entitled "Says Bank Holdup Try 'Patriotic'." According to the article, NAGELL had submitted several handwritten petitions to the Judge of the United States District Court in El Paso. The article states, "In one petition, dated December 5, he wrote, 'I have always acted from a principle of love for my country and this same principle actuated my conduct on September 20, 1963, however inappropriate or incomprehensible it may appear. God and I, and also the FBI, know that I am not guilty.'

"NAGELL is accused of pulling a gun on a teller at the bank. When the teller fled, NAGELL is alleged to have fired two shots into the bank ceiling.

"NAGELL had previously indicated he might submit to examination by a psychiatrist at William Beaumont General Hospital. But at the hearing it was brought out he refused to do so now.

"Judge THOMASON then overruled his motion for a writ and asked that NAGELL's case be taken before a Federal Grand Jury. Previously the judge had ordered that all prosecution be deferred until an examination report on NAGELL's mental competency was obtained.

"The judge said NAGELL's argument on the bond 'more thoroughly convinces the court you need psychiatric help.'

"When NAGELL was returned to the jail, he would not tell reporters why he entered the bank. As in the past he said he would not disclose his motive.

"FRED MORTON, Assistant U. S. District Attorney, said Monday afternoon that the case will probably be taken before a U. S. Grand Jury in January in San Antonio."

On January 3, 1964, GEORGE NORMAN STANGA was contacted and interviewed at the El Paso County Jail after he contacted the El Paso Office of the FBI and specifically requested that he be interviewed regarding RICHARD CASE NAGELL. At the time of the interview, NAGELL was incarcerated at the El Paso County Jail as a Federal prisoner for the crime of bank robbery.

STANGA stated that since his arrest and incarceration at the El Paso County Jail for bad checks, he has become quite friendly with RICHARD CASE NAGELL. He stated that NAGELL was a very mixed-up individual, but that he enjoyed the company of STANGA and confided in him. He went on to say that NAGELL had recently confided in him to the extent that he had told him why he attempted to hold up the State National Bank of El Paso, Texas. NAGELL told STANGA that after his release from the United States Army, he drifted from job to job and became more and more mentally confused as to his political, religious, and economic allegiances. During this confused period, NAGELL apparently became a member of the Communist Party of the United States and told STANGA that he did some minor work for this organization prior to his trip to El Paso. NAGELL also explained to STANGA that he divorced his wife during this period, and after making several scenes with his wife, was barred by court order from seeing his children. During this period of his life, NAGELL told STANGA that he lived in the Los Angeles, California, area.

NAGELL explained to STANGA that he came to El Paso, Texas, after making a decision that everything was against him in Los Angeles and that he should attempt to leave the United States for a Communist country in Europe. In line with this decision to leave the United States, NAGELL made a contact with the Communist Party in Los Angeles, and arranged to meet a courier or contact man for the Party in El Paso, Texas. This contact man was allegedly to have a visa and passport for NAGELL so that he might leave the United States and eventually end up in Czechoslovakia. NAGELL then left the Los Angeles area and drove to El Paso, Texas. He told STANGA that during this trip, he stopped by the side of the road on at least three occasions and attempted suicide with a pistol which was in his possession. He explained to STANGA, however, that he did not have the guts to do it and just let things drift along. After arriving in El Paso, Texas, NAGELL said that he got a hotel room and again attempted suicide with the revolver. He again did not have the nerve to "pull the trigger" and decided that the best way to commit suicide would be by leaving the hotel and having a "shoot-out" with a policeman. He left the hotel room, got in his car, and proceded down the streets of El Paso looking for a policeman who looked like he would shoot it out with him. NAGELL told STANGA that he did not see a patrolman, however, and decided that he would enter the State National Bank of El Paso and cause a big ruckus because he knew that a policeman was in the building guarding a Treasury Department money display. NAGELL entered the bank and fired two shots into a wall and then left the bank, fully expecting to be shot down by a passing policeman. However, he escaped to his car, which was parked in an alley, and gave up peaceably when arrested by the policeman who was guarding the money display in the bank. NAGELL told STANGA that his robbery of the bank was purely a suicide attempt and that he had no intention of robbing the bank for any monetary gain.

In addition to the Communist activities mentioned above, STANGA reported that NAGELL told him of a number of rolls of microfilm which contained names, meeting places, and other activities of the Communist Party, which were in his possession. NAGELL explained that these microfilms were hidden in a gas mask (Japanese type) which was located at his sister's house in New York City. He went on to say that these microfilm are hidden in the salve container which is afixed to the gas mask. NAGELL also explained to STANGA that he had not given this information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation because he felt they would indict him as a spy and put him in jail for life.

On January 6, 1964, the subject furnished the following signed statement:

"1/6/64
"El Paso, Texas

"I, Richard Case Nagell, do hereby make the following free and voluntary statement to Edward Joseph Murphy and Lawrence W. Gorman, who have identified themselves to me as Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They have advised me that I do not have to make any statement and that any statement that I do make may be used against me in a court of law. They have advised me that I may have an attorney if I desire. No threats, promises, force, or inducements of any kind have been used to get me to furnish this statement.

"I was born on August 5, 1930 at Greenwich, New York.

"The following statement is relative to the motive which actuated my conduct on September 20, 1963.

"In September 1962, while I was in Mexico City a representative of a foreign government proposed to me that I participate in an act; Such act being a criminal offense and inimical to the best interests of the United States. At that time I refused such proposal. In May, 1963, another representative of the same foreign government made the same proposal to me. At that time I agreed to such a proposal.

"In Sept. 1963, I was informed by an American, known to me as an agent of the same foreign government, that arrangements for my participation in the aforementioned act were completed. At this time I refused the aforesaid proposal.

"Approximately one week later I was instructed by this same person to either participate as previously agreed or derrogatory information pertaining to me would be disclosed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Thereupon I agreed to follow the instructions of this person, although I did not intend to do so. This existing situation actuated my conduct of September 20, 1963, for which I was arrested and am presently charged.

"I did not actually attempt to rob any bank. I thought that my arrest would provide an immediate, though temporary solution to the problem with which I was confronted.

"I am not guilty as charged.

"I have read this statement consisting of this and two other pages, and which I have initialed, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

"/s/ Richard Case Nagell

"Witness:

"/s/ Edward Joseph Murphy, Special Agent FBI, El Paso, Texas, 1/6/64

"/s/ Lawrence W. Gorman, Special Agent FBI, El Paso, Texas 1/6/64"

On January 15, 1964, Mrs. FRANCES NAGELL, 856 South Catalina, Los Angeles, California, telephonically advised a Special Agent of the El Paso Office of the FBI that she was the mother of the subject and that she had heard on the evening before about the bank robbery charge filed against the subject.

She stated that she last saw the subject in August, 1963, at which time subject indicated he wanted nothing to do with his relatives and no interference with his private life. She commented that her son had had a brilliant career in the military service up until the time of the plane crash near Washington, D. C. following which he was unconscious for three weeks in the Walter Reed Hospital in Washington. Upon his recuperation from those injuries, he underwent a complete personality change.

On January 24, 1964, the subject was arraigned before the United States District Court in El Paso in connection with the two-count indictment returned January 8, 1964, in San Antonio, Texas, charging NAGELL with bank robbery. Assistant United States Attorney FREDERICK J. MORTON filed a motion before the U. S. District Court under Section 4244, Title 18, United States Code, to have the subject committed for psychiatric treatment. U. S. District Judge HOMER THORNBERRY granted the motion and ordered the subject committed to the

Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri, for a period of 30 days for the purpose of psychiatric examination. The subject advised the court that he would not cooperate with the psychiatrists at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield.

While being removed from the United States District Court House in El Paso, Texas, enroute to the El Paso County Jail on January 24, 1964, and while in the custody of the Deputy United States Marshals, the subject accused the Assistant United States Attorney of violating his constitutional rights. This accusation was a repetition of numerous accusations which the subject had previously made against the Assistant United States Attorney, according to Assistant U. S. Attorney MORTON.

On January 24, 1964, Assistant United States Attorney FREDERICK J. MORTON, El Paso, advised that he had received information on a confidential basis a short while before to the effect that there was a man incarcerated in the El Paso County Jail under a Federal charge of attempted bank robbery by the name of RICHARD CASE NAGELL who was a Communist and who was about to defect to Russia when arrested. Mr. MORTON related that the story was generally that NAGELL, a retired Army Captain who served with distinction in the Korean War in combat and with CIC, became embittered with the United States and our form of government partially due to the alleged denial of visitation privileges of his children, custody over whom was awarded to his Japanese wife by California divorce decree. He allegedly turned over secret material to Soviet agents while in the Military Service. He was supposed to obtain a passport to Russia here in El Paso from a Communist agent but was so distraught over the possibility of never again seeing his children that he considered suicide or some other drastic means of preventing his defecting that he went in a bank in El Paso, asked for $100.00 in cashier's cheques, pulled a gun which caused the teller to run, and fired two shots high into the wall and fled. At the time of his arrest, he called the policeman a "capitalistic s.o.b." and has stated that what he did was done out of "love for country." Other than that he has made no statements concerning the bank robbery except to say that he did not intend to take any money. He has refused to talk to a psychiatrist and fired two court appointed attorneys. His court room appearances have convinced all that he is intelligent and competent mentally but extremely confused and disturbed. He files motions and writs almost daily, which are well written and lawyer like.

At the time of his arrest, September 20, 1963, a notebook was taken from him containing what purport to be various codes, CIA and FBI agents' names, Soviet and other Communist embassy addresses and names, and the addresses of various other people and organizations, including the Los Angeles address of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee." NAGELL has supposedly recently received a 1963 Information Please almanac with a scrambled message. Mention is made of this in the notebook.

NAGELL is supposed to have located at the address of his sister, Mrs. ELEANORE GAMBERT, 82-25 Grand Avenue, Elmhurst 73, Long Island, New York, HA 6-6830, a trunk in which a Japanese gas mask is contained. In the salve box of this mask are supposedly 4 rolls of microfilm containing the names of various Communist Party members, agents, couriers, their activities, etc. A man by the name of FRED JOHN (BENJO), an insurance agent in California, is supposed to get these things from NAGELL's sister in the event of NAGELL's death. The sister supposedly knows nothing of the contents and is not a Communist. NAGELL recently wrote a letter to this Mr. JOHN in California mentioning the almanac bit. Mr. MORTON said he rejected an offer of a deal for information purportedly furnished by NAGELL to the FBI regarding Communists in exchange for favorable consideration made through NAGELL's prior court appointed attorney on the basis that the information was of no value. Mr. MORTON's confidential source told him that NAGELL's prior contacts with the FBI were not revealing because they were made by him solely to determine what the FBI knew of him.

RICHARD CASE
NAGELL
50-500

ALLEGED CONNECTION WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD

On December 19, 1963, the subject advised Special Agents of the El Paso Office of the FBI that "for the record" he would like to say that his association with LEE HARVEY OSWALD was purely social and that he had met OSWALD in Mexico City and in Texas. NAGELL refused to comment further regarding this matter.

On January 2, 1964, the subject advised a Secret Service Agent and a Special Agent of the FBI in El Paso, Texas, that he had been acquainted with MARINA, the wife of LEE HARVEY OSWALD. Subject further pointed out that OSWALD was having marital difficulties with MARINA. The subject stated that he knew "certain things" in the Fort Worth-Dallas area. He said he wanted to let the Secret Service know that someone like OSWALD was in that area, however, he knew nothing of OSWALD's intention to assassinate the President. The subject stated that the requests made by prisoners in the El Paso County Jail for interviews were at times honored and at other times they were not.

The above interview was conducted with the subject in response to a request made by this subject to be interviewed by a Secret Service Agent. The Secret Service Agent was introduced to NAGELL and he attempted to interview NAGELL, however, NAGELL stated that the information he originally desired to report to the Secret Service was "too late now."

On January 23, 1964, an Agent of the United States Secret Service, El Paso, Texas, advised that an Agent of the United States Secret Service in Dallas, Texas, had displayed a photograph of the subject to Mrs. MARINA OSWALD, wife of LEE HARVEY OSWALD, on January 18, 1964. This photograph was taken of the subject on September 21, 1963, at the El Paso County Sheriff's Office. Mrs. MARINA OSWALD carefully

NOTE: THIS MAN IS A
MENTAL CASE ACCORDING TO HIS
MAIN FILE - AND [illegible]

examined the photograph and then stated that she did not know the individual who appeared in the photograph and had never seen him before. Mrs. OSWALD was advised of the name and aliases of the subject and she stated that she did not know anyone by any of those names.

On January 24, 1964, while the subject* was being removed from the United States Court House in El Paso to the El Paso County Jail for incarceration and while in custody of the Deputy U. S. Marshals, the subject made wild accusations to newspaper reporters, accusing the FBI of not attempting to prevent the assassination of President KENNEDY and stating that the FBI had questioned him regarding LEE HARVEY OSWALD. These statements were made by the subject in a shouting manner on the elevator enroute to the El Paso County Jail and within earshot of the newspaper reporters, according to AUSA MORTON.

* ARRESTED FOR ATTEMPTED BANK ROBBERY

DESCRIPTION

The following desriptive information regarding RICHARD CASE NAGELL was obtained through interviews with NAGELL and his acquaintances, observation, and record checks:

Names	RICHARD CASE NAGELL, also known as Joe Cramer, Joe Kramer, Joe Krane, Robert C. Nolan
Race	White
Sex	Male
Nationality	American
Date and place of birth	August 5, 1930, Greenwich, New York
Height	6'2"
Weight	180 pounds
Build	Medium
Hair	Reddish-brown
Eyes	Brown
Scars and marks	Left eye slants downward toward outside; 2" vertical scar in front of left ear; half circle shape scar commencing in left eyebrow and extending down to cheek

Parents	LOUIS NAGELL, born Norway, deceased; FRANCES KAUFMAN NAGELL, born United States, 856 South Catalina, Los Angeles, California (January 15, 1964), resided 22 First Street, Troy, New York as of August 5, 1948
Brother	LOUIS NAGELL, Syracuse, New York (as of August 23, 1950)
Sisters	Mrs. ELEANORE GAMBERT, 82-25 Grand Avenue, Elmhurst, Long Island, New York (as of December 15, 1962) Mrs. NORMAN LE BEAUF, Ogdensburg, New York (as of August 23, 1950)
Stepsister	ELEANORE HOPPER, 8222 Ankener Avenue, Elmhurst, Long Island, New York (as of February 19, 1951)
Uncle	HOBART KAUFMAN, Delaware Avenue, Albany, New York (as of August 5, 1948)
Residence	Box 75801, Sanford Station, Los Angeles 5, California
Social Security No.	104-24-8340
Army Serial No.	RA 12115891 (Enlisted) 02 028 346 (Officer) 01 438 346 (Officer)
Army Service Record:	August 5, 1948, Private, resigned as Captain, October 29, 1959, Fort Dix, New Jersey
Service Decorations:	Bronze Star; Purple Heart (two clusters)
Divorced wife	MITSUKO TAKAHASHI, born July 16, 1939, Japan, married March 20, 1958, United States Consulate, Tokyo, Japan, residence 533A "B" Street, Fort Dix, New Jersey, (as of February 30, 1959); Apartment 12, 440 South Union Street, Los Angeles, California (as of July 30, 1962 while separated)

Divorced wife (cont'd)	Wife granted interlocutory divorce, November 19, 1962, Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California; 440 South Union, Los Angeles, California (as of December 15, 1962)
Children	TERESA DOLORES NAGELL, born June 28, 1959, Fort Dix, New Jersey ROBERT LAMONT NAGELL, born November 20, 1960, Los Angeles, California.
Education	Hackett Junior High and Albany High School, Albany, New York, graduated 1948, two years of college while in service
Employment	New York Central Railroad, July, 1948, to August 4, 1948, Albany, New York; December 14, 1959 to June 8, 1962, State Beverage Department, Los Angeles, California; As of August, 1963, cab driver, Beverly Hills, California
Residences since January 1, 1937	January 1, 1937 to December, 1941, Route 1, Glen Falls, New York; December, 1941 to June, 1948, 140 New Scotland Avenue, Albany, New York; July, 1948 to August, 1948, 304 Madison Avenue, Albany, New York; 8222 Ankener Avenue, Elmhurst, Long Island, New York (as of August 1, 1951); 1533A "B" Street, Fort Dix, New Jersey (as of December, 1959); P. O. Box 76121, Sanford Station, Los Angeles, California (as of 1960 and as of August 20, 1962);

Residences (cont'd)

4037 Leeward Avenue, Los Angeles, California (as of July and September, 1962);
Mexico City, D. F., Mexico (subject claimed this residence from August, 1962 to October 28, 1962. On a subsequent occasion, subject claimed this residence for a period lasting until about March 15, 1963);
Washington, D. C. (subject claimed this residence during period subsequent to June, 1962, and prior to December, 1962;
8225 Grand Avenue, Elmhurst, Queens, Long Island, New York (as of November 15, 1962, and again on December 7, 1962);
Holiday Inn, Jacksonville, Florida (temporary residence as of December 15, 1962);
Room 303, Holiday Inn, 2500 Brickell Avenue, Miami, Florida (temporary residence as of January 24, 1963);
610 South Oxford Street, Los Angeles, California (as of April 19, 1963);
Box 75801, Sanford Station, Los Angeles, California (as of July 26, 1963);
3751 6th Street, Los Angeles, California (no date given);
2830½ West Boulevard, Los Angeles, California (no date given);
2712 Saturn Street, Los Angeles 19, California (no date given);
20245 Cajon Boulevard, San Diego, California (no date given).

Bank Account	Security First National Bank, Wilshire and Virgil Branch, Los Angeles, California (date not known)
Languages spoken	Subject claims to speak Russian, Japanese and Spanish fluently (as of September 21, 1963)
United States Passport	C526729
Address to notify in case of emergency	3751 6th Street, Los Angeles, California (appeared on driver's license as of January 24, 1963)
Character references	Miss ELIZABETH B. CAMPBELL, 39 Academy Road, Albany 3, New York (September 19, 1950), Mrs. IRENE TEMPLETON, 48 Parkwood Street, Albany, New York (September 19, 1950); Mr. KENNETH A. ZELLER, 301 New Scotland Avenue, Albany, New York (September 19, 1950); Dr. HARRY E. PRATT, Albany High School, Albany, New York (September 19, 1950); Mr. WAYNE HALLAR, Albany High School, Albany, New York (September 19, 1950)
Credit references	WILLIAM SLOANE HOUSE (YMCA), West 34th Street, New York, New York (August 23, 1950); Times Square Hotel, West 43rd Street, New York, New York (August 23, 1950), Mrs. NANCY TURNER, Providence Street, Albany 3, New York (August 23, 1950)
Automobile	1957 Ford hardtop, black and white, bearing California license MYU 890 (in possession of this automobile when interviewed January 24, 1963, in Miami, Florida)

Automobile (Cont'd)	Records of the Division of Motor Vehicles, Los Angeles, California, reflect 1957 Ford sedan with 1963 California license LVZ 076, vehicle identification number C7LT138540, registered to RICHARD C. NAGELL, Box 76121, Sanford Station, Los Angeles, California, in December, 1962 or January, 1963. 1963 California license OCZ 155 for identical vehicle registered to RICHARD C. NAGELL, Box 75801, Sanford Station, Los Angeles, in February or March, 1963 (in possession of this vehicle when arrested in El Paso on September 20, 1963)

IDENTIFICATION RECORD

The following is the FBI Identification Record for RICHARD CASE NAGELL under FBI number 631 219 E, dated October 3, 1963:

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
Army	Richard Case Nagell RA 12 115 891	8-5-48 Albany NY		
Camp Holabird Baltimore MD	Richard C. Nagell #--	FP 1-27-54		
PD Los Angeles Calif	Richard Case Nagell #LA 616 479-N	5-31-62	drk	
USM El Paso, Texas	Richard Case Nagell #2248-A	9-21-63	Sect #2313 bank rob	

13-00000

DBA

603177

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

202 U. S. Court House
El Paso, Texas 79901
February 4, 1964

RE: RICHARD CASE NAGELL, Aka.
ESPIONAGE - X

Re Report of SA DAVID J. REID at El Paso, Texas, dated February 4, 1964.

EP T-1 through EP T-3, contacts with whom have been insufficient to judge the reliability of their information, are in a position to have official access to the medical records of the United States Army and the Veteran's Administration pertaining to the subject.

The sources used to characterize the Fair Play for Cuba Committee have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

201-7465

~~SECRET~~

UNNN

FR 0219

DE 0687/24 86/2351Z

R 262350Z ZEA

BT

XXXXX-ZEA

TWO TWO SIX WA

send to Bob Leonard
& R Stoff
4E-13

CIA HIS

S E C R E T TDIG 262330Z

WA CITE LANG 6294

INDEX (THORNE) FROM DEVANON

SUBJ: RICHARD CASE NAGELL

REF : (A) LANG 6280
(B) WA-63394
(C) WA 63519

ON 20 MAR 64, FBI-LA ADVISED US THAT OUR EXPRESSION (REF A) CLOSED THE MATTER FOR THEM, AND THAT FURTHER AGENCY CONTACTS, IF ANY, WOULD PROBABLY BE VIA FBI-WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE.

S E C R E T

CFN: 6294 THORNE DEVANON RICHARD CASE NAGELL 6280 63394 63519 20 64 FBI-LA REF A FBI-WASHINGTON

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

RR 0215

DE 0647/12 12/2105Z

R 121007Z ZEA

BT

XXXXX ZEA

TWO ONE TWO WA

[illegible]

3/19/64 [illegible]

MAR 12 4 09 PM '64

S E C R E T TDTG 121000Z

WA CITE LANG 8236

SUPPORT FROM DAVANON

SUBJ: RICHARD CASE NAGELL — no record in OS —

FYI FBI-LA REPORTED TODAY (12 MAR 64) THAT SUBJECT WAS ARRESTED IN EL PASO IN CONNECTION WITH A BANK ROBBERY. IN HIS POSSESSION HE HAD A LIST OF SIX NAMES MARKED "CIA." THEY INCLUDED:

F. PARKER

MRS. GUTHRIES

C. CHURCHILL

J. SLOSS ✓

E. LEIBACHER ✓

J. DAVANON ✓

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

NOT NECESSARILY IN THAT ORDER. US ATTORNEY IN EL PASO WANTS CIA INTERVIEWED AS TO CIRCUMSTANCES, IF ANY. WE ADVISED FBI NO RECORD IN OUR INDICES AND NO PERSONAL RECOLLECTION OF SUBJECT. SUBJECT DESCRIBED AS "NUT" ONCE SURVIVED AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, AND HAS RUN IN AND OUT OF BUREAU OFFICES IN PAST. WE NOTE THE CURRENT AGENCY DIRECTORY LISTS A JOHN SLOSS, POSSIBLY IN THE WATCH OFFICE.

13-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

~~SECRET~~

CL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. R. J. Leonard

DATE: 26 March 1964

FROM : Chief, Research Branch/SRS

SUBJECT: NAGELL, Richard Case

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

1. Attached is a copy of a 2 October 1962 memorandum from the FBI in regard to Richard Case NAGELL.

2. SA Alexander W. NEALE, Jr. of the Washington Field Office, FBI, has informally advised the undersigned that NAGELL has been arrested on the West Coast for bank robbery, is going to be tried in the near future for the alleged crime, and that NAGELL had in his possession the following information:

Richard FECTEAU
(Lynn, Mass)
DAC (CIA)

CIA
Mr. S. PARKER
Mrs. GUTHRIES 1911 - INT OFF - CURR INTELL 15 10 Contract 14 15
Mr. C. CHURCHILL Joseph F 1919 10 Contract
Mr. J. DAVANON John R 1909
Mr. J. SLOSS
Mr. E. LEIBACHER Ernst

3. A check of SO Indices has revealed no record of NAGELL, and an RI check only disclosed the attached FBI report. Please recheck SO Indices on the subject, have a file set up on an expedite basis, and on an expedite basis identify the above individuals as to whether any have any connection with this Agency. The above Richard FECTEAU may be identical to the individual who was captured by the Chinese Communists and is now in prison.

4. Also check with Mrs. THORN of OO/C to determine whether OO/C has any record of NAGELL. It is believed that very possibly some

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

of the above individuals may be connected with the Los Angeles or San Francisco Field Office of OO/C, but at the present moment limit the check with Mrs. THORN to determine if they have any record of Richard Case NAGELL.

Bruce L Solie

Bruce L. Solie

BLS;jrg

13-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

NAME OF SUBJECT	FILE NO.

KEY TO ANALYSIS SYMBOLS*
NI = NOT IDENTICAL
I-ND = IDENTICAL - NOT DEROGATORY
U-ND=UNABLE TO IDENTIFY-NOT DEROGATORY
SA = SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(To be completed by requester)*

☐	SEARCH NAMES AS WRITTEN	☐	SEARCH OVERT CARDS ONLY
☐	SEARCH NAME VARIATIONS *(Record known to exist)*	☐	SEARCH COVERT CARDS ONLY
☐	SRD/CAB ANALYSIS OF FILES	☑	SEARCH SUBJECT CARDS ONLY
☐	INDICES CHECK ONLY *(Do not pull files)*	☐	SEARCH ALL CARDS

NO.	NAME - LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE *(Type or print)*	SOURCE DOCUMENT	PAGE	RESULTS	
				OVERT	COVERT
1	CHURCHILL, C (male)	UI			
2	DAVANON, JOSEPH	Record # 70905			
3	FECTEAU, RICHARD	Record			
4	GUTHRIES, FNU (FEMALE)	NR			
5	LEIBACHER, ERNEST	Record			
6	NAGELL, RICHARD	NR			
7	PARKER, F (male)	UI			
8	SLOSS, J (male)	Record			
9					
10					

NAMES CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

NO.	FILE NO.	TYPE	REFERENCE DOCUMENT	PAGE	ANALYSIS* OR CHARGEOUT

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

RESULTS CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

REQUESTER *(Name - Component - Extension)*	DATE COMPLETED	APPROVE FOR FILING *(Initials)*

FORM 1-63 745 REPLACES FORMS 745, 1734, AND 1735 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

INDICES SEARCH REQUEST

~~SECRET~~ ~~GROUP 1 Excluded from [illegible] downgrading and declassification~~ (38-43)

~~SECRET~~

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: 24 March 1964

SUBJECT: SLOSS, John Richard
#34490

1. Subject, a GS-14 in OCI, has been with the Agency and predecessor organizations since 1949. He was recently investigated under procedures of the Reinvestigation Program, and he was granted a Q clearance as of 21 October 1963.

2. On 19 March 1964, Mrs. Virginia Thorne, OO/C advised that one Richard Case Nagell (OS-HR) had been picked up in the El Paso, Texas area for bank robbery. As Nagell had in his possession a list of six names, with "CIA" written after them, the Bureau inquired as to whether Nagell might possibly be an Agency employee. Two of the individuals named were OO/C Los Angeles employees who never heard of Nagell. The other names were those of F. Parker (EPIX), Mrs. Guthries (HR), C. Churchill (OS-HR) and J. Sloss.

3. On 19 March I telephonically contacted Subject and inquired as to whether he had ever heard of Nagell. He replied in the negative. When I further explained the entire situation, Subject still held with the view that he has absolutely no recollection of Nagell, although it was a curious coincidence that he had been in the El Paso area in January of this year, at which time he and his mother spent three days with an old girlhood friend of Subject's mother.

4. This memorandum is for the purpose of making my brief discussion with Subject a matter of record. It is not necessarily derogatory to him.

Leo J. Dunn
Special Assistant/PSD

:eih

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

13-00000

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DBA 63177
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

To Howard

Copy to:

Report of: SA DAVID J. REID Office: EL PASO
Date: February 4, 1964

Field Office File No.: EP 65-951 Bureau File No.:

(1) Title: RICHARD CASE NAGELL

[illegible] TASK FORCE
9/27/98 da
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Character: ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis: Background: Subject entered U.S. Army 8/5/48 and honorably discharged as Captain 10/29/59. Received many campaign awards during Korean conflict. Sole survivor airplane crash 11/28/54, suffered facial disfigurement and given psychiatric examination. Subject claimed he was released from employment by State Beverage Department, Los Angeles, California, 6/8/62, having been accused of taking $20,000 bribe. Subject refused furnish police details of his shooting by unidentified assailant on 7/16/62 and subsequently filed Civil Rights complaint against police. In September, 1962, subject advised U. S. Embassy, Mexico City, he had been approached for recruiting in Mexico City, refused to elaborate, did not desire to return to U. S., was "bitter, disgusted, disillusioned and disaffected." Said if he did go to some other country it would cost U. S. millions, was "through being a good citizen" and thought he had gotten a "dirty deal all around." Advised FBI in New York City on 11/16/62 he wanted to expose Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control in California. Advised FBI in Jacksonville, Fla. on 12/15/62 he had been approached shortly before in Washington, D. C., by individual believed to be working for Soviets; contacted CIA in Virginia for instructions, was sent to Miami, Fla., by his Soviet contact and said he believed he was actually working for Soviets. Subject's condition diagnosed at VA Hospital, Bay Pines, Fla., in January, 1963, as "chronic brain syndrome associated with brain trauma with behavioral reaction characterized by passive, aggressive and paranoid features." Asked FBI Miami on 1/24/63 if his

GS COPY

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

201-746537 ~~50-500~~

Cuban or Russian sources gave him a pistol and microfilm, would he be permitted to return same to his contact so he could be of further use to U. S. Government. Claimed to be constantly under surveillance. Advised FBI in Los Angeles on 4/19/63 he had taken former wife to court on same date for failure to comply with court order giving subject visitation rights with children. Subject's condition diagnosed by VA, Los Angeles, on 6/4/63 as "depression, tearful, nervous, rigid. Would only utter words 'Got to see my kids.'" Attempted Bank Robbery: Subject arrested 9/20/63 in El Paso, Texas, on charge of attempting to rob State National Bank, El Paso, same date in violation Section 2113, Title 18, USC. Slashed wrist night of 9/20/63, felt he needed psychiatric treatment, highly emotional when interviewed, given to spells of crying, stated unable to get on feet since discharge from U. S. Army. Cell mate said subject apparently became member Communist Party during confused period after discharge, decided everything was against him in Los Angeles and made arrangements with Communist Party in Los Angeles to pick up visa and passport from contact in El Paso and eventually end up in Czechoslovakia. Subject reportedly attempted suicide three times enroute to El Paso but lost nerve. Advised FBI in El Paso on 1/6/64 he was instructed by agent of foreign government in September, 1963, to comply with agreement made in May, 1963, to participate in criminal offense against United States or be exposed to FBI, which caused subject to act as he did on 9/20/63. Subject ordered sent to Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri, on 1/24/64, by USDC, El Paso, for 30-day period to undergo psychiatric examination. Alleged Connection with LEE HARVEY OSWALD: Subsequent to President's assassination, subject claimed acquaintance with OSWALD and wife. On 1/18/64, MARINA OSWALD disclaimed any knowledge of subject. Description and Identification Record: Set out. SUBJECT HAS ATTEMPTED SUICIDE.

that the actual trial would not take place until December next. He stated that he left California in August, 1962, and went to Mexico, where he remained until October 28, 1962. He claimed that his wife's attorney knew this and apparently brought the case on prematurely so that he would be deprived of his day in court.

NAGELL claimed that he has written a protest to the court granting the divorce, claiming he was deprived of his right to be heard and to have a jury trial. He stated that he is consulting the Legal Aid Society and the Veterans Administration concerning this matter since his Army pension is his only current income.

December 15, 1962

On December 15, 1962, the subject advised Special Agents of the FBI in Jacksonville, Florida, that he had served as a captain in the U. S. Army and had been involved in intelligence investigations for the CIC for approximately seven years. He said he served in Japan for most of his period of time and married a Japanese woman named MITSUKI NAGELL from whom he is presently divorced. He advised that during 1957 and 1958 he became acquainted in Japan with one Doctor CHAKAO FUJISAWA, a professor of Political Science at Tokyo, Japan University. He said this person was a member of the Cabinet Research Office (CRO), a rightist organization. He said this person is presently in the United States, place unknown and deems him detrimental to the safety of the internal security of the United States. He said in either 1958 or 1959 he directed an anonymous letter to the FBI in Washington, D. C. relative to the above information concerning FUJISAWA. He stated he was discharged honorably from the U. S. Army on October 29, 1959, and subsequently became employed on December 14, 1959 by the State Beverage Department in Los Angeles, California. He said in June, 1962, he was accused of taking a $20,000 bribe by the State Beverage Department and was released from his employment on June 8, 1962, for refusing to answer questions. He stated he talked to the FBI in Los Angeles regarding the possibility of his dismissal being a violation of his civil rights.

NAGELL advised that he went to Washington, D. C. where he resided until recently. He stated while in Washington, D. C. he had been approached by an individual whom he felt was either a Special Agent of the FBI or a Soviet Espionage Agent. He said he met this person in a bar in Washington, D. C., located at 811 14th Street NW, Washington, D. C. He said this person talked of Domestic Intelligence and also talked of giving him an intelligence assignment. He said the more he thought this matter over he was positive that this individual works for the Soviets.

GARVINS GRILL

He said that in September, 1962, he was invited to attend a reception at the Russian Embassy. He could not identify the individual who invited him to the reception. He advised that he contacted the Central Intelligence Agency at either Langley, Virginia, or Elwood, Virginia, and used the name of JOE CRAMER or KRAMER during this contact with CIA. He said he told them of the above information and wanted some advice as to whether to go through with such an assignment. He said he was to meet this individual who was to give him the assignment at the above-mentioned bar on 14th Street, and in order to be recognized, he was to place three nickels on the bar in line with a dime placed directly over the middle nickel. He said the CIA told him that since this matter involved domestic rather than foreign intelligence he should refer this information to the FBI.

He stated he went to the above bar and there was contacted by the same person and was told to go to Miami, Florida, to a bar and wear a red sweater, where he would be contacted relative to an assignment.

It is to be noted that during the entire interview with NAGELL, he was noted to be in an inebriated condition and was very vague in answering questions. He was unable to identify by name any of the individuals he discussed and was also unable to furnish a physical description of any of these individuals. In addition to being slightly inebriated he also gave the impression to the interviewing agents of being mentally unbalanced.

NAGELL stated he is presently residing at the Holiday Inn, Jacksonville, Florida, and would be there for the next few days. He said he is presently driving a 1959 Ford which bears California license MYU 890. He said he has no living relatives except his former wife, who resides at 440 South Union Avenue, Los Angeles, California, and his sister, ELEANORE GAMBERT, 8225 Grand Avenue, Elmhurst, New York.

NAGELL advised that he believes in connection with his contacts that he is actually working for the Soviets. He could furnish no information as to a specific assignment given him other than that he was to go to Miami and sit in a bar which he is unable to identify and wait to be contacted by a Soviet Agent. He said he spoke Japanese and Russian fluently and is well versed in the Spanish language. He said he was shot in June, 1962, but refused to discuss any of the incidents surrounding the shooting. He said his auto has several bullet holes in it. He furnished a photograph of himself.

On December 17, 1962 efforts were made to locate NAGELL for reinterview; however, it was determined that he had checked out of the motel and left no forwarding address.

December 20, 1962 to January 22, 1963

On November 25, 1963, EP T-2 made available clinical records regarding the subject covering the period when the subject was a patient at the Veterans Administration Hospital, Bay Pines, Florida, from December 20, 1962, to January 22, 1963. One clinical record contained the following information:

"INTERIM SUMMARY (INTERSERVICE)

"1. HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: This 32 year old white male veteran of Korean War was admitted to Ward 1-5-S on 12-20-62 because of complaints of headache and lapses of memory. He claims these since an airplane accident he had had in

13-00000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24-390

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

October 2, 1962

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/6/98 [illegible]
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

C (1)

RE: RICHARD CASE NAGELL

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Above named individual appeared of his own volition at the American Embassy, Mexico City, on September 23, 1962, and volunteered the following information concerning himself:

Although he declined to furnish a local residence address for himself in Mexico City, he stated he could be contacted through a friend named ARTHUR GREENSTEIN, Room #415, Hotel Luma, whom he said he contacts every day. He also exhibited his Tourist Card Number 152087, which listed his address as 4037 Leonard Avenue, Los Angeles, California. This card showed that it had been issued at Los Angeles on August 17, 1962, and that NAGELL had entered Mexico through Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, on August 24, 1962. The card also reflected that he established his identification by exhibiting United States Passport Number C520729.

He related that he had formerly been employed by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of the State of California as a Special Investigator. He stated that as a result of his investigation of some large cafes and bars in the Los Angeles area, one of which he named as the [illegible], and some controversy which he had had with officers of the Los Angeles Police Department during the course of his investigations, he had been suspended on June [illegible], 1962, and later, on June 22, 1962, had been dismissed.

act of any in Mexi, 1962 re possible
[illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ satellite country

~~Confidential~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
ON 10/6/98 (JFK)

Indy - H

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EC COPY

50-500

He mentioned that on July 15, 1962, "while making a meet" between Malibu and Oxnard, he had been shot in the chest. In connection with this latter incident, he exhibited a brief newspaper clipping which mentioned that he had refused completely to identify his assailants or furnish information which would assist the police in identifying and locating the person or persons involved.

He stated further that on August 6, 1962, he had withdrawn his request for a hearing so that he could get the money which he alleged was due him from the State of California, consisting of $800.00 retirement contributions and $300.00 for unused accumulated leave.

He stated that he felt he had been "let down" by the United States Government, both in the United States and during the time he had been in Mexico. He stated that representatives of the United States Government could have assisted him in obtaining his money from the State of California, but were only interested in soliciting from him information concerning hoodlums and other lawless elements, for the giving of which information he "could get his head blown off." He stated that he felt he had been let down by the United States Government in Mexico because nothing had been done by the Embassy in regard to his requests to have it assist him in collecting this money, which he alleged was due him from the State of California. He said that he himself had sent letters to California asking for payment of this money.

By way of further background, he claimed to have served in the United States Army from August 5, 1948 (then 18 years old) until October 29, 1959, and had held the rank of Captain between the ages of 22 and 29. He stated that he had received an honorable discharge and had been wounded three times in the Korean War. He stated that he made the major mistake of his life when he did not re-enlist and continue in the Army. Besides combat duty in the Infantry, he worked as an Investigator in the Counter Intelligence Corps.

He mentioned that he spoke Japanese fluently and had been married to a Japanese woman, who he said was divorcing him in California. He also complained in this connection that the California Courts had awarded the custody of their children to her.

[redacted]

He stated that he thought he had been approached here in Mexico City for recruiting, but although asked specifically in this regard, refused to state by whom or for what or on behalf of what country. He stated that one job of this sort would be in New York. He volunteered in so many words that he fully realized that what he was saying could be used against him in any court or prosecution. He stated that he had almost made up his mind definitely that he would leave Mexico, but that he would not go back to the United States. He stated that he did not care to return to the United States. He stated that so far he had "done nothing inimical to the United States." He stated that he was completely "disaffected," and that he knew the full significance of that term. He also stated that he was "bitter, disgusted, disillusioned and disaffected." One thing, he said, that he could say was that if he did go to some other country, it would cost the United States millions. He stated that he was "through being a good citizen" and thought he had gotten a "dirty deal all around."

He was told to go to the Protection Section in regard to any problems in Mexico as an American citizen. He stated that he had been to the Protection Section and would not go there again, and that the way he was feeling, he would not go back to the United States. He said that he had nothing to go back for, and that his dismissal record would prevent him from getting a good job anywhere in the United States. He mentioned that the only job he had ever worked at was that of an investigator.

He also mentioned that the Veterans Affairs Attache in the American Embassy had his military record in connection with a request he had previously made to attend Mexico City College on the G.I. Bill, but to do that he would have to enroll first and pay tuition himself which he could not do in view of his financial straits.

He stated at first that he was behind in his hotel bill, but later indicated that he had been keeping his hotel charges paid. He also mentioned that he had previously obtained a small loan from the American Benevolent Society, which he had since repaid.

[redacted]

[redacted]

In regard to finances, he stated that he was receiving $[illegible] disability pension a month because of wounds received in the Korean hostilities during which he was wounded three times.

He stated that he had come to the Embassy to state his side in case something should happen and was told that the statements he was making would be made a matter of record with the Embassy. He was advised not to do anything he might regret, to which he replied, "What have I to lose?" He stated that unless he received the $1,100.00 sum, that the State of California owes him, he was going to some other country, and that it would not be the United States, but he refused to say what for or what the country might be, even though specifically questioned as to whether he had in mind Russia or Cuba. He said he wanted to have the Embassy know how he felt, but added, "I'm not going to lay my head down on the chopping block."

It was noted that he was very tense, nervous, agitated and antagonistic throughout this interview.

There is set out below a physical description, based on personal observation and his statements during instant interview.

Name:	RICHARD CASE NAGELL
Citizenship:	United States
Age:	About 34
Height:	6'3"
Weight:	About 150 pounds
Build:	Medium
Hair:	Reddish-brown; straight; receding hairline; parted on left side and combed straight back on right side.

[redacted]

Eyes:	Hazel
Service Status:	Korean hostilities veteran, receiving $150.00 wounds disability
Former Occupation:	Special Investigator, State of California, Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
Civil Status:	In process of being divorced
Languages Spoken:	Besides English, he claims to speak Japanese fluently
Addresses:	4037 Leeward Avenue and Box 76121, Sanford Station, Los Angeles 5, California
Scars and Marks:	Left eye slants downward toward outside; vertical scar in front of left ear; half-circle shaped scar commencing in left eyebrow and extending down to cheek
Attire:	Well dressed in solid brown light-weight suit

On October 1, 1962, this same individual reappeared at the American Embassy and wanted to know what had been done in regard to his case. When asked what he meant by this, he stated he meant in regard to getting the State of California to pay him the money due him. He was told that at his request, he had been permitted to make statements on the previous occasion for the purpose of having those statements made of record with the Embassy and he was assured that this was being done. However, he was told that for any assistance in regard to his financial situation in Mexico, he should contact the Protection and Welfare Section to see if that section could be of any assistance. At first he stated he would not visit the Protection Section again, but on leaving he stated he was going there and also asked what section of the Embassy he should contact to renounce his United States citizenship.

A short time later on October 1, 1962, he did contact the Protection and Welfare Section, where he was advised that the section could not intercede for him in the collection of his alleged debt from the State of California.

Shortly thereafter, he appeared in the Passport and Citizenship Section, where he refused to give his name but asked what the penalty would be for going to an Iron Curtain country and what effect it would have on his citizenship. He was advised that such an action would be a violation of Federal law.

NAGELL also on October 1, 1962, appeared in the Office of Veterans Affairs, American Embassy, Mexico City, and stated that he was withdrawing his request for G.I. educational benefits as a Korean veteran.

A short time later on October 1, 1962, he left with the Embassy a copy of his letter of August 7, 1962, to the State of California Personnel Board, which, for the purpose of further background, is set out in its entirety as follows:

"August 7, 1962

"State Personnel Board
"801 Capitol Avenue
"Sacramento, California

"Gentlemen:

"I hereby withdraw my appeal of the punitive action taken against me for dismissal by the

24397

[redacted]

Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control. I withdraw my request for a hearing in this matter by the State Personnel Board.

"I hereby state that the sole reason for this withdrawal of my appeal and request for a hearing is because of my financial situation. Continued, and what I consider to be unjustified, postponements of my hearing have created a situation in which I cannot afford to meet my daily living expenses until August 30, 1962, the most recent date given to me as the date of my hearing. Also, I am unable to obtain employment in Los Angeles because of the stigma attached to my dismissal.

"Previously, I had hoped to remove such stigma by showing at the hearing that my dismissal was not only improper, but that the alleged reasons for my dismissal were exaggerated, distorted, and untrue, and the result of vindictiveness on the part of certain senior members of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control after it came to their attention that I intended to disclose to the State Attorney Generals Office adverse information pertaining to corruption within said Department and the liquor industry here in Southern California.

"I request that my retirement contributions and reimbursement for unused leave be forwarded to me at the below listed address as soon as practical.

"Yours truly,

"/s/ RICHARD C. NAGELL

"RICHARD CASE NAGELL
"Box 76121, Sanford Station
"Los Angeles 5, California"

[redacted]

FBI REPORTS

1) DATED 12 JUNE '64, RE RICH. C. NAGELL
BUR FILE NO: 64-48933

2) DATED 24 JULY '64, RE RICH. C. NAGELL
BUR FILE NO: 64-48933

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

DBA 75519

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Los Angeles, California

June 12, 1964

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. LA 65-7445

Title	RICHARD CASE NAGELL
Character	ESPIONAGE - X
Reference	Report of SA JAMES H. HOOSE, JR., dated as above at Los Angeles, California.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

201-746537

13-00000

75519

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: JAMES H. HOOSE, JR.
Date: 6/12/64
Office: Los Angeles, California

Field Office File No.: 65-7445
Bureau File No.: 64-48933

Title: ① RICHARD CASE NAGELL
201-746537

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
9/27/98 dal
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Character: ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis: Mother, brother, former wife, and friend of RICHARD NAGELL all consider him to be mentally disturbed. No indication NAGELL involved in espionage, Communist Party, or "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" activity. NAGELL told his brother he had been to Cuba and once jokingly told his former wife he was thinking of going to Russia. Information concerning NAGELL's bank accounts set forth. SUBJECT HAS ATTEMPTED SUICIDE.

- RUC -

DETAILS:

Mrs. MITSUKO NAGELL, nee
Mitsuko Takahashi, aka
Mrs. Richard C. Nagell
(divorced from RICHARD C. NAGELL)

On February 3, 1964, Mrs. MITSUKO NAGELL furnished the following information to SAs JAMES H. HOOSE, JR., and JOSEPH DOYLE POWELL at her residence at 440 South Union Avenue, Apartment 12, Los Angeles, California:

She filed for divorce from RICHARD NAGELL in Los Angeles on April 19, 1962, but has not received the final decree. NAGELL stayed out late nights, beat her, never gave

To Lenard
Bk Indy

CS COPY

Solie
201-746537

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

her any money, and did not like the children. She believes NAGELL's mother resides in the Los Angeles area, but she does not know the mother's address and has never met her. She repeatedly asked NAGELL to introduce her to his mother, but he always refused to do so.

Mrs. NAGELL stated NAGELL never exhibited any political interest, never mentioned communism or the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee," or Cuba. Once in the summer of 1963 NAGELL was mad about something unrecalled and jokingly said he was thinking of going to Russia, but Mrs. NAGELL is certain this was said in jest.

Mrs. NAGELL is of the opinion there is something mentally wrong with NAGELL. He would fly into violent rages without apparent reason. She pointed out that her television set has a split plastic case and stated NAGELL hit the set with his fist once while angry and this resulted in this damage.

Although NAGELL did not like his children, during the marriage, he has frequently complained about not being with them since the divorce. He sends them cards from various places in the United States, but has never since the divorce furnished support for the children or Mrs. NAGELL. As a consequence, Mrs. NAGELL has been supporting herself and the children through employment as a waitress and has to board the children out.

On March 6, 1964, Mrs. NAGELL stated to SA HOOSE that she never knew NAGELL to be involved in espionage in any manner. She further commented that they were always in financial difficulty during their residence in the United States. During the marriage NAGELL had a bank account at the Bank of America, Wilshire and Vermont, Los Angeles, but Mrs. NAGELL doubts there was ever much money in the account. She said that since the separation in April of 1962, NAGELL has sent her a total of about $180.00.

There is no information in the files of the Los Angeles Office of the FBI identifiable with Mrs. MITSUKO NAGELL.

Mrs. FRANCES M. NAGELL,
nee Frances Kaufman
(mother of RICHARD C. NAGELL)

On March 5, 1964, Mrs. FRANCES NAGELL furnished the following information to SAs JAMES H. HOOSE, JR., and PHILIP J. REILLY at her residence at 856 South Catalina Avenue, Apartment 104, Los Angeles:

Mrs. NAGELL stated that for many years and for various reasons, none of which relate to this case, there has been dissension in the family. However, until the time that RICHARD NAGELL was in the airplane crash, they had gotten along well together. Since the crash there has been a marked change in RICHARD NAGELL, and Mrs. NAGELL is certain her son has some form of mental trouble.

She saw RICHARD in Chicago, Illinois, in 1954, and she moved to Los Angeles in May of 1955. It was then seven years before she heard directly from him or saw him. She ran into RICHARD by chance on the street in Los Angeles, saw that he needed help, and thereafter tried to give him both moral and financial assistance.

Mrs. NAGELL gave her son $1,000.00 on one occasion and much smaller amounts on other occasions. He never expressed appreciation for this help. RICHARD never seemed to have enough money. She does not know if he had a bank account or not.

Mrs. NAGELL was trying to locate RICHARD after he had disappeared for several days. She knew he could often be found at The Happy Rabbit, a beer joint at 2709 West Sixth Street, Los Angeles. She went there and found RICHARD, and he flew into an uncontrollable rage because she had gone inside this bar, claiming it was no place for a decent woman. Mrs. NAGELL stated it was really not that bad a place. She became definitely convinced after this incident that there was something seriously wrong with her son. But even prior to this time she observed RICHARD became extremely angry over nothing, and he would cry without explaining what was troubling him.

After above mentioned incident, RICHARD again would have nothing to do with her. She kept track of him through her other son, LOUIS, who is a year and a half older than RICHARD. Mrs. NAGELL was in a way happy to have the boys get together after years of estrangement. She described LOUIS as being an almost hopeless alcoholic. She thought since both sons had serious problems, they might be able to help each other. LOUIS has told her, however, that he was never able to straighten out RICHARD.

She stated that RICHARD never discussed communism, never mentioned Cuba or the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" or gave any indication he was in any manner involved in espionage.

On March 9, 1964, Mrs. NAGELL informed SA HOOSE that she wanted to point out that RICHARD had never physically abused her, that the abuse was always vocal. She also mentioned that she herself has been under psychiatric care for several years, and she does not think her problem has yet been eliminated.

There is no information in the files of the Los Angeles Office of the FBI identifiable with Mrs. FRANCES NAGELL.

LOUIS KAUFMAN, true name
LOUIS NAGELL (brother of
RICHARD C. NAGELL)

On March 5, 1964, LOUIS KAUFMAN furnished the following information to SAs JAMES H. HOOSE, JR., and PHILIP J. REILLY at his residence at 10130 Samoa Avenue, Tujunga, California, telephone 353-1224:

LOUIS stated he got in trouble at age 16 and since that time has used his mother's maiden name as his last name. He considers himself to be the "black sheep" of the family and has had little contact with other family members until the last year or two. At one time in Korea he discovered he was in the same army outfit as his brother, RICHARD, and looked him up. RICHARD was an officer in intelligence while LOUIS was an enlisted man, and RICHARD did not want to have much contact with LOUIS. However, when their mother told RICHARD that LOUIS had cancer of the throat in 1962, RICHARD went to LOUIS and offered to help him. LOUIS later discovered he did not have cancer and also discovered that RICHARD was the one who needed help. LOUIS frequently saw RICHARD in 1962 and until about August of 1963 when RICHARD left the Los Angeles area.

LOUIS considers RICHARD to be mentally disturbed. He recalled an afternoon when both were at The Happy Rabbit and the newspapers carried an account of the burglary of the local armory. RICHARD told LOUIS he had pulled the burglary and had some machine guns in his car parked on the street near the beer joint. LOUIS immediately said he would like to see the machine guns and the two of them welked out to the car. LOUIS saw no guns and upon asking RICHARD where they were the latter replied he did not know what LOUIS was talking about. RICHARD said he had no recollection of telling LOUIS anything about guns or burglarizing any armory. In addition to this LOUIS said that RICHARD was usually in a state of deep depression. RICHARD complained about his wife divorcing him and about his employment problems.

RICHARD never spoke in favor of communism but he did say that he thought the American government should do more for him in view of his army service. He never mentioned Russia. When RICHARD returned from Mexico City in 1962, he told LOUIS he had gone to Cuba from Mexico. He gave no reason for having made this trip. LOUIS has no information indicating RICHARD was ever involved in espionage. He never heard RICHARD mention the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee."

LOUIS does not know if RICHARD had a bank account; he does know RICHARD usually was broke.

There is no information in the files of the Los Angeles Office of the FBI identifiable with LOUIS KAUFMAN.

FREDERICK HOWARD JOHN
(friend of RICHARD C. NAGELL)

FRED JOHN furnished the following information to SA JAMES H. HOOSE, JR., on March 9, 1964:

201-746537

JOHN resides in a boarding house at 817 South Catalina Avenue, Los Angeles. He is employed by the Hartford Insurance Company, 548 South Spring Street, Los Angeles.

He has known RICHARD NAGELL for about one year. He met him through BILL LYNN of the California Alcoholic Beverage Controll at The Happy Rabbit. JOHN does not know any members of NAGELL's family nor does he know of any other close friends of NAGELL.

NAGELL left Los Angeles the first or second week of September, 1963. Just before leaving he told JOHN he would be traveling and asked him to share his Post Office box so he could forward on the government disability checks which he receives monthly. He also asked JOHN to mail him an almanac whenever it was convenient as he liked to refer to the almanac from time to time as a general source of information. JOHN complied with both requests. Near the end of each month JOHN has sent the checks to NAGELL at a Post Office box in El Paso, Texas. He also sent him an almanac with a yellow cover as he recalls it. JOHN did not mark or alter this almanac in any way.

JOHN recently received a form letter from a hospital in Missouri, informing him he had been named as a correspondent authorized to communicate with RICHARD NAGELL. JOHN has received no indication that NAGELL is in any sort of trouble, and he wondered what was behind the hospital letter.

JOHN has never heard anything about his receiving four reels of microfilm or any personal papers should NAGELL die. JOHN does not have a key to any safety deposit box and does not know if NAGELL does or does not have a safety deposit box. JOHN has heard NAGELL mention his sister but knows nothing concerning any Japanese gas mask or anything else stored with her which is to be turned over to him upon NAGELL's death.

About a month or two after NAGELL left Los Angeles he wrote to JOHN, probably just on one occasion, and that concerned paying the rent on the joint postal box.

JOHN is of the opinion NAGELL is a paranoiac in that he is depressed at the manner his ex-wife treated him and the manner in which the local, state, and Federal governments have treated him. JOHN definitely considers NAGELL to be mentally disturbed.

JOHN has never heard NAGELL speak in favor of communism or Cuba. He has never heard of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee." JOHN has no indication NAGELL was ever involved in espionage.

NAGELL never had much money, just his income from driving a Yellow Cab and from his disability check. JOHN does not know if NAGELL had a bank account.

There is no information in the files of the Los Angeles Office of the FBI identifiable with FRED JOHN.

BANK ACCOUNT INFORMATION

On March 5, 1964, LA T-1, whose information may not be made public except upon issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, stated RICHARD C. NAGELL had commercial checking account number 002-857 at the Wilshire - Virgil Branch of the Security First National Bank, Los Angeles.

The account was opened October 2, 1961, with a deposit of $350.00, closed January 31, 1963, no balance. NAGELL gave a bank reference of Bank of America, Wilshire - Vermont Branch, Los Angeles. Upon opening, residence was given as 4712 Saturn Street, telephone WE 4-2739.

LA T-1 recalls NAGELL vividly as he caused a commotion every time he came in the bank. He would shout at the tellers, complain about the service, and threaten to report the tellers to the management. On one occasion a girl teller working next to LA T-1 wore a red dress to work on a day that NAGELL was in the bank. NAGELL shouted at the girl that only a prostitute would wear a red dress.

LA T-1 thinks some local finance company has been trying to locate NAGELL recently to collect a debt.

On March 9, 1964, LA T-2, whose information may not be made public except upon issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, stated RICHARD NAGELL opened commercial checking account number 9-4492 on November 6, 1959, at the Wilshire - Vermont Branch of the Bank of America, Los Angeles. NAGELL gave his address as the Cloud Motel, 3400 West Third Street. His bank reference was the Union Bank, Mount Holly, New Jersey, and he apparently exhibited New Jersey driver's license number 44342. Opening deposit was $900.00, and the account was closed September 27, 1961.

On February 28, 1962, RICHARD NAGELL opened checking account number 3-2873 at this same bank with a deposit of $143.10, the account being closed on July 16, 1962. During part of this time it was a joint account with MITSUKO NAGELL.

INFORMATION FROM INFORMANTS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION

On March 9, 1964, SA WILLIAM J. MC CAULEY was advised by the following that they had no information concerning RICHARD NAGELL:

ANTHONY F. LIBERATO, Investigator, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, who is cognizant of many Cuban activities in Los Angeles.

MANUEL GONZALEZ, 1070 West Kensington Road, Los Angeles, who headed the pro-Castro movement in Los Angeles 1960-1961.

MAYER G. ROYAL, 5825 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles, who is acquainted with some activities of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee," Los Angeles.

LA T-3, who is cognizant of many Cuban activities in Los Angeles.

LA T-4 and LA T-5, who are familiar with Communist Party activity in the general area where RICHARD NAGELL has resided in Los Angeles.

There is no information of substance in the files of the Los Angeles Office of the FBI identifying NAGELL with any Communist Party, Cuban, or espionage activity.

JOHN NOBURO MIYAKI (JACK MIYAKI) stated on March 23, 1964, to SA HOOSE that he and his wife, CAROLINE MIYAKI, reside at 645 North Westmoreland Avenue, Los Angeles, California. MIYAKI did not recognize name or photograph of RICHARD NAGELL. When further descriptive data was furnished MIYAKI, he recalled he had met NAGELL on one occasion about a year ago at The Happy Rabbit, a beer joint at 2709 West Sixth Street, Los Angeles

NAGELL told MIYAKI he either was or had been a Yellow Cab driver, that he had a Japanese wife who had divorced him. MIYAKI said he possibly told NAGELL he worked as a machinist at Aero-Space Manufacturing Corporation, 3825 Cohasset Street, Burbank, California, but cannot recall having told NAGELL anything else. MIYAKI stated he thinks NAGELL left the bar at the same time he did which may account for NAGELL having MIYAKI's license number. MIYAKI drives a cream colored 1962 Buick Special, four door, license JOG 823. (California Department of Motor Vehicles verifies this license is for this car.) MIYAKI said he does not work on any classified material and has no clearance. MIYAKI was born in Japan, naturalized in Hawaii on January 21, 1954, certificate number 7121559.

MIYAKI is of the opinion he and NAGELL only conversed about ten or fifteen minutes on this one occasion, and he has no information apart from above concerning NAGELL.

There is no information in the files of the Los Angeles Office of the FBI identifiable with JOHN (JACK) MIYAKI or CAROLINE MIYAKI.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

80190

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy to:

Report of: SA DAVID J. REID
Date: July 24, 1964
Field Office File No.: EP 65-951

Office: EL PASO
Bureau File No.: 64-48933

(1) Title: RICHARD CASE NAGELL

201-746537

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 9/27/98 dl

☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Character: ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis: Subject described by a former acquaintance in the United States Army in Korea as having had a brilliant war record but as not stable mentally, this instability probably being due to brain tissue damage resulting from an airplane crash during the Korean War. With regard to names found in the possession of the subject when he was arrested on September 20, 1963, U.S. Army, Japan, advised that the subject had previously served in Korea and Japan and that it was not unusual for individuals to retain lists of persons in such areas for future reference. U.S. Army, Japan, also advised that the reason for some names in the subject's possession at the time of his arrest could not be assessed. On June 9, 1964, subject sentenced in the United States District Court, El Paso, Texas, to serve ten years under the provisions of Section 4208 (a) (II), Title 18, U.S. Code, for violation of Section 2113, Title 18, U.S. Code. Subject attempted suicide on June 17, 1964. SUBJECT HAS ATTEMPTED SUICIDE.

- C -

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SCD/GCL
ON 10/6/98 (JFK)

No [illegible]
Have names indexed

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

CS COPY

5 Aug 1964

201-746537

Solie

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DETAILS:

AT TOKYO, JAPAN:

At the time of the arrest of Richard Case Nagell in El Paso, Texas, on September 20, 1963, on a bank robbery charge, he had many papers and documents in his possession. These papers and documents were reviewed and were found to contain the following notations:

Murai Jun- (Cabinet Research Office- C.R.O.) (National Rural Police Agency) (Private Secretary to P.M. Yoshida) (Intelligence Agency in China)- Now in Tukuoka- SHI

Tsio Sai Fue
Literature Dept.
Tohoku Daigaku
(Naikaku Chosa Shitsu)

Hoshiyama Sadao (Lee Chang Suk)
c/o Maruei Pachinko
169-1 Baba-Machi, Choshi-Shi
Chiba-Ken, Japan

Kin Kai Go
(Kinka So)
#2-3 Ginza, Chuo-Ku
Tokyo-To (56-5330)

Nicolai G. Eroshkin (FMR)
Military Attache- Soviet Embassy
Tokyo

Envelope addressed to: Capt. Robert C. Nolan, Advisor, FROKA Det. HID with return address of Col Lee Churl Hi, CO, HID, ROKA

X

CS COPY

201-746537

EP 65-951

Ikejiri Setagatakú
(Tel. 41-2449) Tokyo

Utsumi Koetsu- Chief of Liaison Section, Miyagi Prefectural Gov't.

Kanemaru Makoto- Chief of Public Safety Section, Guard and Rescue Dept, 2nd Regional Hqs, Maritime Safety Bureau (MSB) (Shiogama-shi, Miyagi-ken.

Tomita Takeji, Chief of 2nd Investigative Section, Tohoku Regional Public Safety Investigation Bureau (PSIB)

Konno Saburo- Chief of 1st Investigative Section, Tohoku Regional PSIB

Suzuki Kinji- Head of Guard Section, Public Safety Dept, Tohoku Regional Police Bureau (Police Superintendent)

Matsumoto Ryosuke- Head of General Affairs Division, Tohoku Regional Police Bureau (Senior Police Superintendent)

Akiyama Jiro- Chief of Tohoku Regional PSIB

Matsumoto Shogo- Chief of Miyagi Prefectural Police Hqs (Senior Police Superintendent)

Matsumoto Takehiro- Chief Procurator of Sendai Higher Procurator's Office

9/10/64

65-951

Kuriyama Matsuichi- CG, 6th
Div. JGSDF

See P. 5 Sugaya Eijiro- Chief of 2nd
Regional Hqs, MSB

Kudo Masumi- Chief of Public
Safety Dept. Tohoku Regional
Police Bureau

Tsuchiya Kyuji- Chief of Sendai
Immigration Control Agency,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Fukuhara Yukinori- Vice-Chief
of 2nd Regional Hqs, MSB

Ishimaru Hotaro- Chief of Guard
and Rescue Dept, 2nd Regional
Hqs, MSB

See P. 5 Murai Jun- Director of Tohoku
Regional Police Bureau

[redacted] DUPLICATE

#2-3 Ginza, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to
Tel. 56-5330

Photograph with name Lee Chang Suk underneath. Along side of photograph is the name Hoshiyama Sadao, C/o Maruei Pachinko Store, 169-1 Baba-machi, Choshi-shi, Chiba-ken, Japan

Kaji Wataru

9/12/64

Murai Jun
Director, Tohoku Regional Police Bureau

Mr. Masui
Chief, Crime Prevention Section, Criminal
Department, National Police Agency

An envelope addressed to: Capt
Robert C. Nolan, Advisor,
FROKA det, HID with return
address of Col Lee Churl Hi,
CO, HID, ROKA

Four photographs identified on the back
as follows:

See P 4

Akiyama Jiro
Kuriyama Matsuichi
Sugaya Eijiro
Murai Jun

In addition, the subject had in his possession at the time of his arrest on September 20, 1963, a piece of paper containing the listing of what appeared to be United States Army Officers and their serial numbers. One section of this paper was listed under the heading "Third Operations Group".

On March 24, 1964, Lieutenant Colonel NED W. GLENN, Deputy G-2, United States Army, Japan, advised that he had known the subject personally and had served in Korea with the subject. GLENN noted that his name appeared in one of the above mentioned photographs of papers which were found in the possession of the subject when arrested in El Paso on September 20, 1963. GLENN stated that he and the subject had been attached to an Intelligence Branch of the United States Army in the Far East during the period of their acquaintance.

GLENN explained that the names in parentheses in one of the above mentioned photographs were "code names" used by members of Army Intelligence Units in Korea in order to protect their real identities from informants.

GLENN also advised that the subject was not stable mentally and that this instability was probably due to damage to brain tissues suffered in an airplane crash during the Korean War in which the subject was the only survivor. GLENN stated that the subject, in fact, did have a brilliant war record, which was the reason for his assignment to Army Intelligence in spite of what should have been an obvious psychological defect.

GLENN pointed out as an example of the subject's instability that the subject had turned in allegations against an Intelligence Officer in Korea, which became the subject of extensive investigation. GLENN added that the subject was subsequently transferred to another Army unit and upon reporting to that unit, was greeted in a friendly way by his new Commanding Officer, who told him he hoped the subject would enjoy his new assignment and that he, the Commander, would do all he could to make it a worthwhile tour of duty for the subject.

To this, NAGELL allegedly replied that the Commander had certainly better see that this was the case as, NAGELL told him, he made a practice of keeping a record of every move made by his Commanding Officer and if he stepped out of line one whit at any time, it would be made the subject of an immediate report to higher headquarters.

GLENN made available a letter from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2/G-3, United States Army, Japan, which was in answer to a request for information regarding the subject and which contained the following information:

SUBJECT, after graduation from the Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, in August 1955, served as an advisor to the First Republic of Korea Army and subsequently in Sendai, and Tokyo, Japan, terminating in about 1958. These assignments were concerned with intelligence activities, as an advisor to the ROK Army in Korea, and as a member of the US Army Counterintelligence Corps in Japan. During the latter tour of duty, the counterintelligence unit was designated the 3rd Operations Group, with Headquarters in Tokyo and Detachment B in Sendai, as referred to in photographic inclosures to your letter.

In assignments of this nature it is common practice for members to become acquainted with personnel of various Japanese security agencies, such as are mentioned in March 5 Memorandum of the FBI, El Paso, Texas. It is not unusual for individuals assigned counterintelligence duties to retain lists of these persons for reference in the event they are again reassigned to the area, or for dispatching cards or thank you notes from the United States. This would appear to be the reason for SUBJECT having kept the list of agency personnel, although to have retained the list for a number of years after leaving the service appears unusual. The names Kaji, Wataru and Jack Cannon were known to the public as the results of allegations of illegal intelligence operations that were publicized in the Japanese press, but SUBJECT'S reason for including those names in HIS lists cannot be assessed. Also, no reason can be given for the two or three miscellaneous names in NAGELL'S file.

The list of Americans mentioned in one of the photographic attachments pertains to US personnel in the intelligence field. It appears that the subject maintained a roster of those persons with whom he would or had contact, which is not unusual. Information contained on those rosters, particularly that portion indicating code names, was and is regarded as classified information by this office.

Files of the Counterintelligence Repository, USARJ, disclosed no information relative to NAGELL or of his aliases.

AT EL PASO, TEXAS:

On June 9, 1964, Federal Judge HOMER THORNBERRY, United

DBA
80170

States District Court, denied the motion for a new trial and sentenced the subject to serve ten years under the provisions of Section 4208 (a) (II), Title 18, United States Code, which provides that the subject can be released under parole at any time it is deemed advisable. This sentence was for violation of Section 2113, Title 18, United States Code.

The June 17, 1964 issue of "The El Paso Herald Post", contained an article entitled "Inmate 'Serious' After Suicide Try". According to the article, the subject swallowed several sleeping pills while lodged at the El Paso County Jail on June 17, 1964. According to the article, NAGELL was to be kept under observation all night and was to be transferred to the William Beaumont General Hospital from the La Tuna Federal Correctional Institution Hospital unless his condition improved.

The article further stated that Deputy U.S. Marshal JACK GRAVES said seconal pills had been prescribed for the subject and that the subject evidently had been hoarding them.

RICHARD CASE NAGELL, AKA Born-8-[illegible]-30, Greenwich, NY.
JOE CRAMER
JOE KRAMER
JOE CRANE
ROBERT C. NOLAN

Nagell claims around the middle on 1962, he was in Washington, D C. and he had been approached by an individual whom he felt was either a Special Agent of the FBI or a Soviet Espionage Agent. He said he meet this person in a bar in Washington, D.C. located at 811 14th St, NW. He said this person talked of Domestic Intelligence and also talked of giving him an intelligence assignment.

On 28 Sept 62 appeared at Am Emb Mexico City
tourist card issued at LA on 17 Aug 62
Entered Mexico on 24 Aug 62.

Nagell claims in September, 1962, he was invited to attend a reception at the Soviet Embassy. He states he contacted CIA at either Langley, Virginia, or Elwood, Virginia, and used the name of JOE CRAMER or KRAMER during this contact with CIA. He said he told CIA the above information and wanted some advise as to whether to go through with such an assignment. CIA told him to see the FBI.

Nagell said he went to the above bar and there was contacted by the same person and was told to go to Miami, Florida, to a bar and wear a red sweater, where he would be contacted.

Certain material was seized from Nagell when he was arrested on bank robbery charges on 9/20/63.

AT CIA

The following names were located on material and papers taken from Nagell/

RICHARD FECTEAU, LYNN, MASS
(DAC) (C.I.A.)
R 58244 (MASS) (JAN. 63)

C.I.A.
1. Mr.F.PARKER
2. Miss GUTHRIES
3. Mr. C. Churchill
4. Mr. J. DA VANON — CIA - L.A
5. Mr. J. SLOSS
6. Mr. E. LEIBACHER — CIA - L.A -

10/2/62 fbc

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

c/
FECTEAU
SLOSS

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

7 APR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Mr. William O. Cregar

SUBJECT : Richard Case Nagell, aka
Joe Cramer
Joe Kramer
Joe Crane
Robert C. Nolan

Reference is made to a memorandum from your Bureau dated 2 October 1962, captioned as above. Representatives of your Washington Field Office have advised that Richard Case Nagell is currently under arrest for bank robbery and that the following names and information were contained on material and papers in the possession of Nagell:

RICHARD FECTEAU, Lynn, Mass
(DAC) (C.I.A.)
R 58244 (MASS) (Jan. 63)

C. I. A.
1. Mr. F. PARKER
2. Miss GUTHRIES
3. Mr. C. CHURCHILL
4. Mr. J. DA VANON
5. Mr. J. SLOSS
6. Mr. E. LEIBACHER

The records of this Agency have been searched in regard to the above individuals with the following results:

4/13/64

GROUP 1
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

"Richard Fecteau, Lynn, Mass." is undoubtedly identical to Richard George Fecteau who is in prison in Communist China. Fecteau was taken prisoner by the Communists during an Agency operation in November 1952.

"Mr. F. Parker" may be identical to John Floyd Parker, current Agency employee, who was born 2 January 1898, Louisville, Kentucky.

"Miss Guthries" may be identical to Frances Agnes Guthrie, born 29 February 1908, Charleston, West Virginia, who is also currently employed by this Agency.

"Mr. C. Churchill" may be identical to Creighton Churchill who was born 1 October 1912, Cornish, New Hampshire, whose present address is not known and whose address in 1952 was 27 West 44th Street, New York City.

John Floyd Parker and Frances Guthrie have been interviewed in regard to any knowledge of Nagell but neither individual has any recollection of having ever met Richard Case Nagell. Guthrie was employed by this Agency in Japan in the 1950's. Creighton Churchill and John Floyd Parker were in Japan in 1952 to interview and debrief United States servicemen who had been held prisoners of war by the Communists.

In view of the background of Nagell in the Far East, the possibility exists that Nagell could have obtained the names of Parker, Guthrie and Churchill in the approximate 1952 period, although a specific statement concerning this cannot be made in view of the limited information concerning Nagell.

"Mr. E. Leibacher" and "Mr. Da Vanon" are believed to refer to Ernst Leibacker and Joseph Frances Davanon of the Los Angeles Field Office of this Agency. Your Los Angeles Field Office has been previously aware that Leibacker and Davanon have no personal knowledge of Nagell. There is no record of any past interest in Nagell by this Agency.

"J. Sloss" may refer to John Richard Sloss who was born 24 September 1919, Cleveland, Ohio and is currently employed in Headquarters by this Agency. John Richard Sloss has been interviewed in

~~SECRET~~

regard to any knowledge of Nagell and has advised that he has no recollection of having met any individual by that name. If John Richard Sloss is identical to "J. Sloss," it is not possible from available information to even speculate as to how the name came into the possession of Nagell.

In view of the fact that Richard George Fecteau is currently in prison in China and the indication that the other six names listed above may refer to Agency employees, it is requested that the above information not be disseminated outside your Bureau. It does not appear that the above information could affect either the prosecution of or the defense of Nagell on the charge of bank robbery, and disclosure of the above information could create a later cover problem for this Agency, as well as directing additional attention to the position of Fecteau.

It would be appreciated if your Bureau would advise this Agency of any information brought to your attention concerning how the above names came into the possession of Nagell.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

R. L. Bannerman
Director of Security

OS/SRS/BruceLSolie:jrg - 6 Apr 64

RICHARD FECTEAU	# 59201
JOHN FLOYD PARKER	# 1050
FRANCES AGNES GUTHRIE	# 42291
CREIGHTON CHURCHILL	# 46575
JOHN RICHARD SLOSS	# 34490
ERNST LEIBACHER	# 67460

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Security Research Staff, OS
ATT: Mr. Robert Leonard

DATE: 27 March 1964

FROM : Acting Chief, Contact Division, 00

SUBJECT: NAGELL, Richard Case -- Arrest in El Paso/List of Names Marked "CIA".

REF : Telephone conversations between Mr. Robert Leonard and Mrs. Virginia Thorne, 26 and 27 March 1964.

1. Enclosed for your records and any action you may consider appropriate, are copies of self-explanatory teletypes from our San Francisco, Office concerning Subject's arrest in El Paso.

2. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext-2202.

Virginia L. Thorne
for JOHN W. MCCONNELL

ENCLOSURES: As stated above.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

RR 0215

DE 0647/26 26/2351Z

R 262330Z ZEA

BT

XXXXX ZEA

TWO TWO SIX WA

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

MAR 27 11 27 AM '64

S E C R E T TDTG 262330Z

WA CITE LANG 8294

INDEX (THORNE) FROM DEVANON

SUBJ: RICHARD CASE NAGELL

REF : (A) LANG 8280

(B) WA-63394

(C) WA 63519

ON 20 MAR 64, FBI-LA ADVISED US THAT OUR EXPRESSION (REF A) CLOSED THE MATTER FOR THEM, AND THAT FURTHER AGENCY CONTACTS, IF ANY, WOULD PROBABLY BE VIA FBI-WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE.

S E C R E T

CFN: 8294 THORNE DEVANON RICHARD CASE NAGELL 8280 63394 63519 20 64 FBI-LA REF A FBI-WASHINGTON

BT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

CREIGHTON CHURCHILL **WOODSTOCK, VERMONT**

18 April 1964

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

J. FLOYD PARKER #1050
TEL EXT 7876
CREIGHTON CHURCHILL #4657

Dear Floyd:

It was good to hear from you, to learn you are still at the old shop; etc.

I got your letter yesterday in New York, and while driving the 300-odd miles hoped that my subconscious would perhaps come out with a peal of a bell regarding an individual named Ed Nagell. But no bellsrang.

I have only a small hunch -- a piccolo-toot in my memory. When I worked for the shop I once went to see Mr. James Bennett, Director of Federal Prisons, (with whom I had once shared a table on an ocean liner, years before). You can guess why I wanted to see Bennett: I was seeking ways for birds to fly out of cages. Bennett mentioned a guy (with a questionable record, as far as he was concerned) who claimed to know us, you and me, what we were doing., etc. etc. He had aproached Bennett " as from us". Ed Nagell -- the name -- rings a piccolo-toot on this, but only that. Incidentally, I filed a report on the incident when I got back to the shop.

I am often in New York -- at the Harvard Club -- and should you ever be in town, give me a ring. It would be fun to see you. I met Harry Osterweis in a restaurant the other day -- fater some many, many years. You may remember him.

I have recently become an author on Wines. After a year in France in 1959, I wrote a book on French wines which was published by Knopf, and am about to bring out one on wines of the world with MacMillan in September. That is about the extent of my news.

My best to you.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

Attached bio summary on NAGELL was received from SRD 11/27/79 - after House Select Committee on Assassinations review

PLEASE DO NOT SEPARATE THIS MEMO FROM THE ATTACHED

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

264170

Richard Case NAGELL

Chronological Record of Activities

5 Aug 1948: Entered Army (18 years old)
"Brilliant Korean War Record"
"Many Campaign Awards"

28 Nov 1954: Sole survivor of plane crash. Suffered facial disfigurement; given psychiatric exam.

15 Aug 1955: Graduated from Army Intelligence School, Ft. Holabird, Maryland. Served as advisor to ROK Army in Korea. Concerned with intelligence activities; served as a member of U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps in Japan, Sendai and Tokyo, terminating about 1958.

A Lt. Col. Ned W. GLENN, Deputy G-2, U.S. Navy, Japan, advised on 24 March 1964 that he had served personally in Korea with NAGELL. GLENN advised that NAGELL was not stable mentally and that this instability was probably due to damage to brain tissues suffered in an airplane crash during the Korean War.

29 Oct 1959: Honorable Discharge - Captain, U.S. Army

14 Dec 1959: Employed by Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of State of California as a special investigator.

8 June 1962: Suspended by ABC, State of California

27 June 1962: Dismissed by ABC

16 July 1962: Shot in chest "while making a meet" between Malibu and Oxnard. Refused to identify assailants or furnish information to police, subsequently, filed Civil Rights complaint against police. Withdrew request for hearing so he could get money from state of California consisting of retirement contributions and accumulated leave.

17 Aug 1962: Issued tourist card at Los Angeles, California.

24 Aug 1962: Entered Mexico through Ciudad, Juarez.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

28 Sept 1962: Appeared voluntarily at American Embassy, Mexico City, tense, nervous, agitated and antagonistic. Inter alia-stated he had been approached in Mexico City for recruiting, refused to say by whom on behalf of what country. Stated that one job of this sort would be in New York. He volunteered that he fully realized that what he was saying could be used against him in any court or prosecution. He stated that he was "bitter, disgusted, disillusioned and disaffected". Stated he knew the full significance of the term disaffected. He stated that if he did go to some other country, it would cost the United States millions. He stated that he was "through being a good citizen" and thought that he had gotten a "dirty deal all around."

1 Oct 1962: Again appeared at American Embassy, Mexico City, wanting to know what had been done in regard to getting the state of California to pay him the money due him. Was sent to protection section. Asked what section of Embassy he should contact to renounce his United States citizenship. Was advised by collection section that they could not intercede for him in collecting money from state of California. Appeared in passport and citizenship section and asked what the penalty would be for going to an Iron Curtain country and what effect it would have on his citizenship. Was advised that such action would be violation of federal law.

28 Oct 1962: Left Mexico City, Mexico.

16 Nov 1962: Advised FBI in New York City he wanted to expose Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control in California.

15 Dec 1962: Advised FBI in Jacksonville, Florida, that he had been approached shortly before in Washington, D.C., by individual believed to be working for Soviets. NAGELL at this time was noted to be in an inebriated condition - vague in answering questions.

20 Dec 1962: 22 Jan 1963: NAGELL at Bay Pines, Florida VA Hospital. Condition diagnosed as "chronic brain syndrome associated with brain trauma with behavioral reaction characterized by passive aggressive and paranoid features".

24 Jan 1963: Asked FBI in Miami if his Cuban or Russian sources gave him a pistol with silencer and microfilm if he would be permitted to return same to his contact so he could be of further use to U.S. Government. He stated that in August or September 1962 he met a man from Maryland in Mexico City who introduced him to individuals whom he believed may have been Soviet Agent.

19 April 1963: Advised FBI in Los Angeles, California, that he had taken his former wife to court for failure to comply with court order giving NAGELL visitation rights with children.

4 June 1963: NAGELL appeared at the Out Patient Clinic and was referred to the Neurological Clinic for treatment. His condition was diagnosed as "depression, tearful, nervous, rigid". Would only utter words "Got to see my kids".

20 Sept 1963: NAGELL arrested in El Paso, Texas, on charge of attempting to rob State National Bank. Slashed wrist night of 9/20/63. NAGELL consistently denied he had tried to rob the bank; stated that the fact that he fired two shots in the ceiling proved he had not been trying to hit anyone. He stated that he was certain that "all of my problems have been solved for a long time, and now I won't have to go to Cuba".

A notebook which the Subject had on his person when arrested made reference to Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the names of purported CIA agents and other information. Cell mate in jail reported that NAGELL disclosed to him that NAGELL, during confused period after discharge, decided everything against him in Los Angeles and made arrangements with Communist Party in Los Angeles to pick up visa and passport from contact in El Paso and eventually end up in Czechoslovakia. NAGELL reportedly attempted suicide three times enroute to El Passo but lost nerve.

(Noteworthy that State Department records reflect issuance of Passport to NAGELL on 7 August 1962 at Los Angeles, California, and that on 9 July 1963 NAGELL signed affidavit that his passport had been lost or stolen. He was issued a new passport on 6 August 1963.)

4 Nov 1963: El Paso Herald-Post article states that NAGELL told U.S. District Court that he did not attempt to hold up the bank. "I had a motive for doing what I did",NAGELL told Judge, "but my motive was not to hold up the bank. I do not intend to disclose my motive at this time."

19 Dec 1963: Subsequent to President's assassination, Subject claimed acquaintance with OSWALD and wife. Marina OSWALD on 1/18/65 disclaimed any knowledge of NAGELL.

1 Jan 1964: NAGELL furnished a signed statement:
"... In September 1962, while I was in Mexico City,a representative of a foreign government preposed to me that I participate in an act; such act being a criminal offense and inimical to the best interest of the United States. At that time, I refused such proposal. In May 1963, another representative of the same foreign government made the same proposal to me. At that time, I agreed to such a proposal."
"In September 1963, I was informed by an American, known to me as an Agent of the same foreign government, that arrangements for my participation in the aforementioned act were completed. At that time, I refused the aforesaid proposal.
Approximately one week later, I was instructed by this same person to either participate as previously agreed or derrogatory information pertaining to me would be disclosed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Thereupon, I agreed to follow the instructions of this person, although I did not intend to do so. This existing situation actuated my conduct of September 20, 1963, for which I was arrested and am presently charged.
I did not actually attempt to rob any bank. I thought that my arrest would provide an immediate, though temporary, solution to the problem with which I was confronted.
I am not guilty as charged."

24 Jan 1964: NAGELL arraigned in connection with indictment for bank robbery and was committed for 30 days for the purpose of psychiatric examination.

9 June 1964: Sentenced in U.S. District Court, El Paso, Texas to serve 10 years.

17 June 1964: NAGELL swallowed several sleeping pills while lodged at the El Paso County Jail.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

3rd Agency Material

Contains Copy of Letter, Dated 24 Apr 1970,
Which Nagell Sent To Francis X. Plant,
Spec. Asst. Office, Under Secretary of The Army
— Subject was his Complaint Against The
Army Re Lack of A Complete Medical
Exam, As Well As his Claim To
having Participated in The Matter
involving MSgt. Emmett E. Dugan

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Ludlum CI/LSN

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. ~~Chief Defense Branch~~				
2. ~~DDP~~				Attached are from Ken Koeber of Army Pls route on to Security.
3. CI Staff			JM	
4.				
5. C/JKO ~~/DDP~~	10 JUN 1970		AWM	
6.				
7. OS / Wes. Brian		16 June	D	
8.				
9. Mrs Sarah Hall SRS	6/22/70			
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1 TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ATTN: MR. JAMES LUDLUM	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	DATE	COORDINATION
2	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CON-VERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

The attached is forwarded for your information since your Agency is mentioned by Nagell, the writer of the letter to Mr. Plant, Special Assistant, Office of UnderSecretary of the Army.

Nagell was at one time in CIC.

It seems that he may be mentally unbalanced.

Nagell's dossier is available in Security Divison, OACSI DA for your review if desired.

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM Taro Yoshihashi, CI Div, OACSI DA	DATE 4 Jun 70
	PHONE x77017

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

★ GPO : 1969 OF—352-829 5041-101

24 April 1970

Francis X. Plant
Special Assistant
Office, Under Secretary of the Army
Room 1E520, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Plant:

In further reference to my letter from Switzerland: During our conversation of 6 April you made it clear that I must step back into time and prove the existence of a condition over ten years ago that could and should have been resolved by the Army then . . . . a feat that is all the more complicated by the ABCMR's refusal to interview the appropriate witnesses, view certain pertinent records and to place the blame for my not receiving an adequate medical examination where it belongs.

I believe what you really meant to say was that in my particular case (as opposed to others much less valid) the function of the Board to correct an injustice does not apply.

So if this assumption is fact, as I have every reason to feel it is, then you may pass on to the Secretary that before my case is closed the Army will be confronted with a scandal that will make France's Dreyfus affair seem inconsequential by comparison. I am not quite the fool that apparently I have been taken for.

Very truly,

Richard C. Nagell
Richard C. Nagell

P.S. Enclosed are some xerox copies of several documents which your housecleaning office might find of interest. The originals, together with numerous other documents and the details about them, are safely locked away.

deceptive. I had killed before and I had participated in homicides under the auspices of both MI and the CIA (one instance being the part I played in the February 1958 abduction-interrogation-murder of an FOI agent, a U.S. soldier, MSGT Emmett E. Dugan, from Crafton, Pa., suspected of having defected in place to the Chinese), under the guise that an American variation of the Soviet "wet affair" was the only alternative, that it was either essential to some overall intelligence effort or in the best interests of our national security. And it was a similar-sounding argument, ultimately reduced to a

70

[illegible]
May Have Killed Himself

By LARRY SAKAMOTO
INS Staff Writer

Japanese police raised the possibility yesterday that the U.S. Army intelligence agent whose body was fished out of Tokyo Bay March 12 may have committed suicide.

Thus far, both Japanese and U.S. military police investigators have announced that they are up against a "stone wall" in gaining cluues to the death of M. Sgt. Emmett E. Dugan, 39, of Crafton, Pa.

A Tokyo police official said yesterday in connection with the case:

"There is one definite possibility that Dugan was not murdered, as is generally believed, but may have committed suicide.

"We are pursuing our investigation into possible suicide with utmost thoroughnes."

Dugan, whose wife has returned to the United States earlier was believed murdered by Communist agents.

Although U.S. Army officials declined comment, Tokyo newspapers reported that Dugan was engaged in undercover investigation of the flow of U.S. military equipment into the hands of the Chinese Communists.

Tokyo police officials revealed yesterday—and the U.S. Army confirmed—that they have asked Army authorities in the U.S. to question Mrs. Maud Dugan in order to exhaust all possibilities.

An Army spokesman at Camp Zama, said 2nd Army Headquarters at Ft. Meade, Md. had been asked by Japanese police to contact Mrs. Dugan.

Some of the questions which Japanese police wanted put to Mrs. Dugan were those concerning a description of the tiepin, watch, contents of his wallet and clothes of Dugan when he disappeared.

Dugan disappeared Feb. 4 after leaving his wife at a Tokyo hotel.

Supporting the theory that Dugan may have committed suicide, a Tokyo University pathologist said it is "possible" for a person to drown himself without water being found in person's lungs if the body is in an advanced stage of decomposition.

An authopsy revealed no water in Dugan's lungs.

Police authorities said "the cause of death has not been determined but we are fairly sure that he did not die of suffocation or poisoning."

When Dugan said goodby to his wife on Feb. 4. Indications are that he sensed death was near when he handed her an insurance policy, saying, "If I don't return, you'll need these."

Meanwhile, the Army spokesman said "nothing new" has been uncovered in the case thus far.

Dugan spoke fluent Chinese and was known to have many "contacts" among Chinese living in Japan.

GENUINE


백
100
0ㅈ 222242
朝鮮中央銀行
백원
100
百

COUNTERFEIT


백
100
ㄱㄴ 123699
朝鮮中央銀行
백원
원백
100
百

Re: Teams 25 & 26, U.S. Army Coordinating Detachment (USACRAFE 8177 A.U.), Korea. 1956-1957. And R[illegible]A HID operations sponsored and directed by U.S. Military Intelligence.

"Completely true!"



UNC Rejects Red Kidnaping Charge

1956

PANMUNJOM, Korea (AP)—The U.N. Command Saturday labeled "completely false" a Communist charge that an armed raiding party from the Republic of Korea broke into a North Korean village and killed a farmer and kidnaped a teen-age boy.

"There is no evidence that these actions were done by the military personnel of the U.N. Command," U.S. Maj. Gen. Matthew K. Deichelmann told Communist North Korean members of the Military Armistice Commission.

He said the Communist claim could have been manufactured for propaganda.

• • •

MAJ. GEN. Chung Kok Rok, senior Communist delegate to the commission, demanded immediate return of the 17-year-old North Korean boy allegedly kidnaped Feb. 2.

Gen. Chung also handed the U.N. side a list of 150 North Koreans it claimed have been kidnaped from North Korea since the Korean war ended three years ago.

Deichelmann said the roster was accepted and would be studied.

• • •

"I MERELY pointed out that it was a well-known fact that many thousands of unhappy people living under an inhuman regime risked their lives to escape to the land where they live according to their conscience," he added.

The North Korean side called the 74th meeting of the Armistice commission to complain of the alleged Dec. 2 kidnaping.

Deichelmann said "it is entirely

Partying Red Chinese ROK Guests, U.N. Char

MUNSAN-NI, Korea (UP)—The U.N. Command Military Armistice Commission discloses that Red Chinese troops created a shooting incident at a moon festival party with a Republic of Korea patrol in Korea's Demilitarized Zone Sept. 20.

A UNCMAC announcement said one ROK soldier was wounded in the shooting, and the Communists alleged one Chinese soldier was killed.

It said testimony given by the three ROK soldiers involved in the incident "has placed responsibility (for the incident) upon the Communists."

The ROK soldiers told their story to the MAC joint observer team which conducted on-the-spot investigations Sept. 22 and 23 and met again Thursday at Panmunjom to complete the investigations.

• • •

THE INCIDENT took place about five miles northwest of Kumhwa on the east central sector of the truce front.

The shooting started at a "party" between three Chinese Communist and three ROK troops patroling the Demilitarized Zone. Originally the ROK soldiers were invited to meet the Communist soldiers on morning of Sept. 19, the m festival day.

The ROK and Chinese C munist troops sat down fa each other across the demar tion line and talked about moon festival the night befor

• • •

THE ROK soldiers testified Chinese produced some food wine and also suggested that lay aside their rifles to cre a more friendly atmosphere.

After about an hour's conv sation, the UNCMAC announ ment reported the ROK sold as saying, the ROK patrol le rose and told his two men leave when a fourth Chi Communist soldier hiding am the trees opened fire on the R patrol and wounded one in back.

The ROK patrol leader, announcement said, then dr his pistol and fired into Communists as he ran cover.

The ROK soldiers said that Chinese fired more shots in brief incident.

• • •

THE ANNOUNCEMENT s the Communists denied there a fourth Chinese and clai that one of the three Chi soldiers was killed and a sec was wounded.

The MAC announcement s the Communists presented one witness whose account of incident conflicted sharply the testimony given by the R soldiers. The Chinese did ad ey brought food and win "party," the announcem d.

An American sponsored and directed attempt to kidnap a Chinese soldier (Intelligence Agent) during peacetime: 20 September 1956.

Quite a story behind this one, since one of them was an American officer.

UNC Dismisses Red Infiltration Charg

MUNSAN-NI, Korea (UNC/MAC)—A United Nations Command representative Friday branded as "wholly without foundation" Communist charges that two persons allegedly under UNC orders, had crossed the military demarcation line into North Korean territory on Apr. 27, 1957, to perpetrate "hostile acts."

Lt. Col. James H. Dyson, senior member of the UNC component of the team that conducted an investigation, informed his Communist counterpart:

"Complete and careful examination and checking of the testimony and evidence in this case shows clearly that the conclusions contained in your report are not substantiated by evidence."

• • •

COL. DYSON was referring to to an on-the-spot investigation of the alleged incident, conducted by a Military Armistice Commission joint observer team May 23.

According to Communist claims, two armed personnel crossed the military demarcation line disguised in uniforms of soldiers of the Korean ples Army and penetrated a 1,000 yards into Communist ritory on the night in ques before being stopped by C munist Demilitarized Z police.

One of the persons was rested while the other esc to the south, Communist nesses said.

• • •

CHARACTERIZING the all tions of the Communists as c pletely unfounded, Col. D expressed denial of the cha "in the strongest pos terms."

[illegible]

R. C. Nagell
Box 2337, Grd Cen Sta
New York, N.Y. 10017
U.S.A.

[illegible] kennen

90 PLANETARIUM UND STERNWARTE
DEUTSCHE BUNDESPOST BERLIN

90 PLANETARIUM UND STERNWARTE
DEUTSCHE BUNDESPOST BERLIN

Mr. Francis X. Plant
Special Assistant
Office, Under Secretary of the Army
Room 1E520, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20300

USA

XXX

CPT ROBERT C. NOLAN, ASN 01438346 = CPT RICHARD C. NAGELL,
ASN 02028346

*Team 26, Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Far East (C-CRAFE)

*ACRAFE
*USACRAFE
HID
FOI
CIC

LIAISON SECTION, ARMY COORDINATING DETACHMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.
PM
6 MAY
1970

Mr. Francis X. Plant
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary
of the Army
Room 3E520, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310

~~SECRET~~

Chief, Research Branch, SRS 3 MAR 1965

Robert J. Leonard

John Richard SLOSS
#34490

His name is perhaps identical with a name among six names of Agency employees found on a mentally disturbed and disaffected former CIC intelligence officer who alleges contact with Russian and Cuban Intelligence agents.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

3. The name of John SLOSS may be identical with the name J. SLOSS found on the person of Richard Case NAGELL when arrested in connection with a bank robbery in El Paso, Texas, on 20 September 1963. A notebook found on NAGELL made reference to Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the addresses of Foreign Embassies, the names of purported CIA agents and other information. Although NAGELL is unquestionably mentally unbalanced, he tells a story of being involved in espionage which is not fully contradicted by evidence. There is no apparent explanation of why the name J. SLOSS as well as five other names of CIA personnel should have been in the possession of Richard Case NAGELL. The weird story of NAGELL is contained in a chronological listing of his activities appended to this memorandum.

Spec Grp
File

26 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on Special Group Meeting, 26 March 1963

98

1. [Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Comparative result of high-level versus low-level photography were demonstrated by Mr. Lundahl. After considerable discussion, it was decided that the matter would be held in abeyance for a week pending further developments on the Donovan matter. In general, Gilpatric's attitude was against low-level on the basis of Defense intelligence needs, but would agree if State felt periodic low-levels would establish "right of access". Johnson expressed general objection at this time. McCone expressed two prevailing viewpoints within CIA, but recommended proceeding with low-level. Bundy agreed to put the matter to higher authority for final decision. McCone suggested he was willing to accept responsibility for further delay.

Action: Matter to be reconsidered each week.]

98

2. [Reconnaissance of Indonesia. State, Defense, and Bundy all opposed overflying Indonesia. McCone recommended we support the British effort and it was agreed that the matter would be put to higher authority for decision.]

98

3. [Monthly Report of NRO was reviewed. McCone reported in detail on the failure of recent CORONA shots; specifically referred to failures of January, February, and March, and the fact that November and December were not usually productive of good photography. He advised Special Group that new estimates of Soviet capability could not be made until the Fall, rather than in June and July as is customary. He advised that the next flight was scheduled for Saturday, 30th of March, and it will be a standard CORONA. Gilpatric reported that adequate emergency back-up arrangements were being made, and delays of a type occurring in the last 90 days would not be recurring.

McCone reported the difficulties incurred with the U-2 generators and brushes and the fact that this had caused a standdown of flights in the Far East, but not in Cuba. Condition was reported as having been corrected and the North Korean, North China flight is on a weather alert.]

3/mc

4. The two papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs on sabotage operations and additional covert programs were returned for consideration by the Cuban Affairs Committee. It was noted that the Cottrell Committee had not acted on these papers. The procedure adopted was for Cottrell Committee action and recommendations in much the same way that we now get Ambassador endorsement of covert activities elsewhere. There was a general concensus that actions against Cuba shipping would not be final although it would be an irritant, since plan called for damaging and making ships inoperative rather than destroying them. Several details of the additional Covert Action Program were discussed. The paper is to be revised and reviewed by the Cottrell Group.

98

5. [Col. Steakley reported on the results of several recent Elint missions, and Elint destroyer operations in the Far East and Elint operation into the Baltic. Dr. Scoville reported on the Chasse operation.]

98

6. [Question was raised as to the results from overflights over Laos.

Action: I would like a thorough briefing on this as I have heard nothing on this.]

98

7. [It was reported that SAC seriously questioned CIA's conclusion that the SA-3 sites in Russia are low-level intercept ground-to-air missile sites. Apparently SAC has prepared a report on this. Gilpatric noted the March 18th CIA memorandum reaffirming our conclusions.

Action: DD/I must pursue this matter and explore with SAC their reasons for questioning our conclusions. This is the second time in weeks that these conclusions have been questioned. Advise me.]

JAM/ji

3/mc

26 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) meeting, 25 April 1963

Attended by Bundy, Johnson, Gilpatric, McCone

1. **CIA weekly report on our activities was reviewed without comment. No requests were made. No actions are needed.**

98

2. **[Extensive discussions of DCI's recommendations for low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Gilpatric raised the question of political consequences. Johnson responded that** Mr. **Hughes had submitted a paper to him indicating the Soviets would take a harder line under these provocations.** He reported that Thompson appeared to feel that low-levels would be used as a basis to halt withdrawal and possibly intensify the situation in Laos and elsewhere and that our interests would be adversely affected. I took the position that intelligence requirements were such that low-levels must be continued. It was agreed to go to higher authority with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense present. Arrangements were made for a meeting about 6:30, 25 April.]

3. Mr. FitzGerald presented the proposed new covert policy toward Cuba, reviewing the situation and specific operations in considerable detail. The Group were impressed with the planning. They were not prepared to act, and suggested the matter be discussed with higher authority, and also that action be withheld until the Standing Group had further deliberated on the question.

98

4. [Covert action in the Congo was discussed. Bronson Tweedy reported briefly. The CIA proposal was approved.]

98

5. [The proposed feint operations of GROSBEAK were discussed in some detail. Colonel Steakley suggested this operation might prejudice their ELINT operations. However, it was agreed that the exercise would be undertaken during the May dark-of-the-moon period and the results reported back to the Special Group prior to reaching a decision for reaching approval of continuing operations. Jorgenson was instructed accordingly.

ACTION: CIA is authorized to undertake this operation; it should be watched carefully, reported accurately and fully, and brought before the Special Group at the time we're considering the June operations.]

3/mc

98

6. The status report on the Italian elections was briefly discussed. Approval was expressed on the manner in which this had been handled. Apparently, the political observers on Mr. Bundy's staff views coincided with those reported by the Rome Station.

98.

7. McCone reported on the proposed plan for the April 30-May 1 meeting on British Guiana. Mr. Bundy and Mr. Johnson expressed the view that it was important that the strike be continued. They were concerned that it might be settled prior to May 30 and CIA was instructed to look into this and jointly with MI6 take such action as might be indicated as desirable to ensure the continuation of the strike. Mr. Bundy expressed the view that the $10,000 a day figure in the CIA paper would be cheap if a continuation of the strike for a protracted period would ensure the fall of Jagan and the destruction of his political support.

> ACTION; McCone should discuss with Helms and, if desirable, to arrange for a discussion with Fulton by Cline or by McCone in Paris over this coming weekend.

JAM/bd (tape)

2/mc

Spec. Grp file

11 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting, 11 April 1963

98

1. [Reconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam was reviewed. The Group expressed approval of the CIA program. They authorized two flights over Laos and North Vietnam on the assumption that one of the NEFA flights would cover the extreme western targets desired by Sarit. If, on the other hand, the four India - Communist China border flights were not executed at this time, then CIA was authorized to fly three flights over Laos and North Vietnam to cover all of the targets desired by both Sarit and COMOR.]

98

2. [Status of negotiations for India - Communist China reconnaissance was reported. It was agreed that this question should be pursued further by CIA. No immediate action was indicated. Dr. Scoville reported that no further information would be forthcoming from either India or Thailand until about the 20th of April.]

3. Cuban operations. The proposed infiltration-exfiltration operations, past and projected, were reviewed and approved. The proposed program of sabotage and harrassment, both the general program and the detailed plan, was discussed at length. It was reported by Mr. Bundy that this program was developed more or less at the direction of higher authority. It was not the intention of higher authority to approve and authorize specific actions; what he was seeking was detailed information concerning our capability and what might be expected on a series of operations which were within our capability. I took the position, which was supported by Alexis Johnson (somewhat less vocally, however) that I questioned the advisability of proceeding with the program until we had crystallized the total policy designed to remove the Soviets from Cuba and also remove Castro. I said I was not clear as to how this was to be accomplished, nor did I feel that there was any agreed series of actions designed to meet this end objective. Therefore, it appeared to me that we are projecting a few of the annoying operations, none of

which would permanently impair the facilities under attack nor would they seriously impair Castro's economic or military posture and, hence, serve no useful purpose. Furthermore, I estimated that under the laws of averages, a number of the teams would be rolled up and they would as they had in the past attribute the whole thing to the U.S. Government and the CIA. Since we had stood down the ALPHA 66 and others, more or less disenfranchised ourselves from the Cuban colony in Miami as a result of the Miro Cardona incident, we would have no plausible denial and in fact would find ourselves in a rather difficult position. It was agreed this matter should be further studied and reported on next Thursday, and possibly discussed with higher authority on Friday. An important part of this issue is the SNIE now under preparation which has to do with the future of Castro.

ACTION: I should discuss this subject with General Carter and some of the Senior Staff on Friday morning to prepare an agreed CIA position and also to schedule the completion of the SNIE.

4. North Vietnam monthly report was accepted.

98

5. [The funds for Kong Le were approved. However, Alexis Johnson was asked to go back to Ambassador Unger with an insistent message that Phoumi support Kong Le with money now in which came from the United States. However, if this appeal failed, the support recommended in the paper should be given for a limited period of time.]

98

6. [The covert annex to the Bolivian internal defense plan was remanded because the Special Group (CI) had remanded the basic internal defense plan. However, there was no objection expressed to the annex but it must not be construed that the Special Group approved any subjects covered in the annex.]

98

7. [The Colombian internal defense plan was not considered.]

98

8. [Colonel Steakley submitted a report on inadvertent overflights by reconnaissance since 1 January 1961. This report was noted. DCI raised the question as to why he had not been informed. Apparently this was an oversight as written procedures had been established by Colonel Steakley for prompt informing of all members of Special Group when instances of this type occurred. Apparently, Alexis Johnson was]

4/mc

98

[informed by Colonel Steakley's office and he was under the impression that I was informed. However, he was on leave and therefore did not know that I had not been informed.]

98

9. [British Guiana situation was opened up for discussion and placed on the agenda for next week. Alexis Johnson reported on Mr. Burdette's position, substantially parallelling Helms', with the effect that he was disappointed in the British position, that he felt time had run in favor of Jagan, and they would like an appeal made to Macmillan. Bundy took exception. McCone stated that CIA felt much as Johnson reported and furthermore objected to the British plan to involve CIA in its own political actions which would be attributable both whether they succeeded or failed. It was agreed to place subject on agenda for next week.]

ACTION: Subject should be carefully reviewed by staff.

JAM:bd

2/mc

14-00000

SECRET - EYES ONLY

24 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group 5412 Meeting - 23 May 1963

98

1. [After general discussion the North Viet Nam paper as presented by Colby was approved with the exception of Item b. State took the position that work with isolated ethnic groups in North Viet Nam should not be undertaken unless specifically approved by the Department. Defense raised the question of more extensive operations than anticipated by CIA and indicated that the JCS had developed a plan which would be submitted to the Secretary of Defense and then to the Special Group. I raised the question as to whether the General Harkins command working with the South Viet Nam army could conduct truly covert operations north of the 17th parallel, pointing out that if such actions were attributed to either the United States or the South Viet Namese, then the North Viet Namese with their substantial military organizations could retaliate against the South Viet Nam with punishing consequences. The JCS plan was not formally presented. No actions were taken ~~either~~ although it is expected that it will be presented in the near future.

ACTION: General Carter has had this matter under consideration with Admiral Riley. We should receive and study the JCS plan immediately upon its approval.]

2. Defense indicated that the Army have developed plans for large-scale operations against Cuba involving sabotage. No presentation was made however the Special Group was advised that such a plan would be forthcoming.

98

3. [Plan for disposing of the 14,000 sacks of sugar in Puerto Rico was discussed. I explained the actions being taken by DDP under FitzGerald's direction and indicated the sugar would probably be sold by the Soviets to a New York sugar broker who would in turn sell it to a non-U.S. port. The 800 bags in question would be disposed of.]

98

4. [I reported the current status of British Guiana as outlined in the attached paper.

ACTION: Mr. Bundy asked that Mr. Helms follow British Guiana closely and keep in close communication with me and with him.]

ER-63-331-E E

3/mc

SECRET-EYES ONLY

98

5. [The probable position of the Nenni Socialists at their July Congress was discussed.

ACTION: CIA was requested to explore the possibility of political action at this time designed to influence a favorable decision by the Congress concerning the Party's support of NATO and the West as contrasted with the taking of a neutral position. As an alternate possibility, it was suggested that the Party might be influenced to refrain from making support of NATO an issue on which the Government might be brought down. Such a course would make it possible for the Christian Democratic Party to conduct its support of NATO even though the CD are closely associated with the Nenni Socialists.

McCone stated that Mr. Karamessines would report on this matter at the earliest possible time.]

98

6. [After a brief discussion on conditions in Haiti, Mr. Bundy stated that NSAM ______ would be issued and would impose on CIA certain responsibilities for covert action among exile groups.

ACTION: CIA should immediately study the prospect of creating an exile group around dependable leadership, prepare a plan, estimate of cost, and a forecast of success of intervention in Haiti and make specific recommendations on course of action if one is indicated. Care should be taken not to initiate action until policy has been agreed upon at appropriate levels of Government and of higher authority. Under no circumstances should a course of action by tied to a particular date or be otherwise] inflexible.]

98

7. [After a brief discussion of the overflight problem in India, Special Group urged that CIA seek an appointment with Amb. Bowles prior to his departure in order to acquaint him with the background of this program, the history of the attitude of the Indians, the current status and all other dimensions of the problem so that he will be fully informed upon his arrival in New Delhi and will not necessarily be prejudiced by the views of Amb. Gailbraith.]

JAM/mfb

3/mc

SECR[illegible] ONLY

27 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - 27 June 1963

98

1. [In connection with the scheduled monthly overflights, Johnson brought up the question of overflights on Laos and North Viet Nam, stating that he understood the COMOR requirements for Laos had been completely filled and nothing was left over, but there was a requirement for one flight on North Viet Nam. McCone answered he was not sure but would check up. It was agreed that any unfilled requirements on Laos would be taken care of.]

98

2. [Reference use of ChiNats in North Viet Nam, this is O.K., providing the use is part of a South China mission which then passes over North Viet Nam, because weather conditions permit, and then exits. State would not agree to a straight North VietNam-Laos flight flown by ChiNat pilots because of the political implications if anything happened.]

98

3. [The program for Labor Training in Spain was O.K.]

4. The Cuban program was reviewed by Mr. FitzGerald and was approved. McCone brought up the question of extensive coastal defenses being built up by the Cubans as evidenced by the arrival of new PT boats and advised the Group that we must plan contingent methods for evading such coastal defenses. Also McCone stated that he had asked for a review of all reports for the last 90 days because of his continuing concern over the large number of unexplained reports we are getting on Cuba which indicates some ominous situation might be developing.

JAM/mfb

3/mc

14-00000

DCI

(CLASSIFICATION)

Handle Via Indicated Controls

99

[BYEMAN]

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.

This document contains information referring to Projects:

(CLASSIFICATION)

1/mc

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Special Group (5412) - 8 August 1963

Present were: McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Alexis Johnson,
General Carter and Paul Eckel

98

1. [Reconnaissance Requirements for Current Contingency in the Far East

The requirements for overflights were approved subject to the following:

For the Sino-Indian border when a base becomes available. Bundy wanted to know if we were ready for a high-level approach to Nehru. I asked him to hold off until we had taken a better reading and our team had returned. As to the Mainland of China, to include Manchuria, Bundy did not want to go near the Soviet border and felt that 10 or 15 miles was entirely too close. He had no objection to anywhere over the Mainland of China providing we kept well clear of the Soviet border. I told him that if we did this we would not be meeting the requirement to keep track of anything occurring on the Sino-Soviet conflict along the border and the general consensus was that we could do without this type of reconnaissance rather than run the risk of an incident. The Group established a "bank of two" missions for operations against Laos, north of the 17th parallel, and against North Vietnam. There appeared to be no problem about replenishing the bank when it was drawn down. The mission against Laos south of the 17th parallel was approved. The mission for covering North Korea was approved as a high priority requirement subject only to the return of Secretary Rusk.]

2. Cuban Operations of August

Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Special Group along the lines of his briefing notes (SAS 63-481 of 7 August). Everything was approved except that State had an opportunity to reclama the sabotage operations if they felt the need--Johnson said he would know definitely by Sunday (presumably thinking that Rusk may have had some private conversations with Khrushchev that could indicate the need for soft pedaling actions in Cuba).

23
[BYE-4284-63]

#1

98

3. [The covert action project for Bolivia was approved.]

98

4. [Matt Baird put on a fine briefing on CIA counterinsurgency training. Bundy indicated he would reassure the Attorney General and I do not think we will have any further problem as to outside inspections or overseeing of our training program.]

5. There was no discussion of the minutes or next week's agenda.

98

6. [I reported on the high-level coverage of Cuba in accordance with the Reber memorandum, and I also gave them a briefing of our U-2 carrier operations to include the pornographic pictures.]

M. S. C.

3/mc

SECRET

19 JUL 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Special Group 18 July 1963

PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. John A. McCone
Mr. Roswell Gilpatric
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Thomas A. Parrott
Mr. Desmond FitzGerald

1. The undersigned was present at this meeting only for the brief item on Cuba which involved the final decision whether or not to postpone the two external sabotage operations planned for 26 July. Mr. Bundy referred to the fact that the Agency representatives had previously stated that they would prefer, in terms of the morale of the case officers and agents, to have a decision to postpone made at the earliest possible moment rather than to have such a decision reached at the last minute. Mr. Bundy stated that in light of this he felt it reasonably certain that Higher Authority would consider that negotiations in Moscow were proceeding in a sufficiently favorable manner to warrant a postponement decision at this time. Mr. Bundy said that if the undersigned did not hear from him during the course of the day Higher Authority's decision to postpone could be assumed. Mr. Bundy further said that it was only fair to warn that there might be a resumption of Moscow negotiations at a later date -- perhaps August -- and that these resumed negotiations might in turn call for postponements. (Mr. Bundy did not call and the operations have been postponed until approximately the 15th of August.)

GROUP 1
Excluded [illegible] automatic
[illegible] and
[illegible]

SECRET

2. On the morning of the 19th of July the undersigned called Mr. Bundy and confirmed this fact and said that a field message now indicated the possibility of an internal sabotage operation to take place on the 26th. Mr. Bundy said that such an operation would be perfectly acceptable and that the only bar was on "across water" operations. Mr. Bundy also added that Higher Authority asked him to convey to us the fact that Higher Authority, in reaching the decision to postpone, was well aware of the morale problem that might result among the Agency case officers and therefore had considerable difficulty in reaching the decision. Mr. Bundy authorized the undersigned to quote Higher Authority accordingly to any staff personnel concerned and to add that Higher Authority retains his enthusiasm and interest in the program.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

14-00000

SECRET

30 AUG 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Special Group 29 August 1963

PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
General Marshall Carter
Mr. Roswell Gilpatric
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Thomas A. Parrott
Mr. Bruce B. Cheever

1. Mr. Johnson opened the discussion of the paper "Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups" (i.e., Support to Commandos L) by commenting that he was under the impression that Mr. McCone had indicated at the last Special Group Meeting that he would look into the proposal further and that Mr. Johnson wondered what his views now were.

2. Mr. Cheever was not able to express Mr. McCone's personal views on this matter, but pointed out in general terms the reasons why we considered the proposal desirable as a supplement to the already approved program. Further discussion centered on the question of the use of British territory and the possibility of attribution of the raids to the United States. No mention whatsoever was made regarding the question of attacking Cuban ships. After an inconclusive discussion, Mr. Johnson reiterated his desire to hear Mr. McCone's personal views on the proposal. Mr. McBundy concurred and the question remains open until the next Special Group Meeting.

3. Mr. Cheever has the distinct impression that State continues to be completely opposed to this proposal and hopes Mr. McCone will "shoot it down" for them, whereas it is believed that Defense will concur but will not "front-run" the proposal. Mr. Bundy appears open-minded on the matter.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DDCI has copy

4. Mr. Cheever briefed the Group on the operation to remove and destroy the "Streatham Hill" contaminated sugar. The briefing covered the chronological details from initiation of negotiations for purchase until completion of the dumping of the sugar at sea. Identities of the various brokers, cover companies, etc. were not asked for nor revealed. The Group expressed its satisfaction with the operation. (Mr. Parrott had previously advised Mr. Cheever that Mr. Bundy did not desire a paper on this matter.)

5. The after-action report on the Casilda/Santa Lucia operations was briefly discussed. Mr. Johnson questioned the motives for the amount of material abandoned on the scene. Mr. Cheever commented that while it was unfortunate that the material had been left, it was explainable in terms of the reaction of soldiers under fire and especially those in their first fire fight. The Guatemala press release on "Commando Mambises" was favorably commented on by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Bundy asked about the comment in the after-action report that "One cannot predict what Castro's ultimate reaction or reprisal will be." Mr. Cheever stated some of the people who closely study Castro believed that he would be personally furious over the attacks and that one could expect more reaction than had appeared to date. In response to Mr. Bundy's question whether there would be additional operations of this type next month, Mr. Cheever advised that several were in the planning stage, but that until he talked to our people coming up from Miami this weekend, he could not be certain but that he doubted we would ask to mount any the next moon period. Mr. Cheever mentioned the cancellation of the scheduled South Coast Caching operation due to the Cuban alert, the execution of the three members of the DOGGO team, and the probable doubling of the ATHENA team. Mr. Bundy asked if the Attorney General had been briefed on Casilda/Santa Lucia. When advised to the contrary, he asked that this be done when the Attorney General returns to Washington next week (week of 3 September).

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
Acting Chief
Special Affairs Staff

WE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1963

SECRET EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Covert Operations Against Cuba - Security Within the Government

As you know, in August the U. S. Government directed two "exile" raids against targets in Cuba. From the evidence now available, it appears that our security, with respect to U. S. participation in these operations, was excellent.

While there will always be public speculation as to the extent of U. S. involvement in raids of this type, I think we would all agree readily that it is important that there be only speculation, and no direct knowledge. Unfortunately, the maintenance of a high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the numbers of people within the Government who have to know a little or much about a U. S. -directed raid against Cuba. For example, without counting CIA personnel and secretarial and staff personnel of other agencies, there were probably over 20 people in the Executive Branch who knew details of the August raids while many other people were generally acquainted with the U. S. involvement. Among others, the Navy knew where the attack boats were going; the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS knew about the "comings and goings" of the raiders; a few DOD people, who had to procure special equipment for the raids, could presumably surmise that something was going on somewhere; and a few intelligence watch officers and press officers were told, for their background, that the U. S. Government was aware of the raids.

I think there are two important, if obvious, security lessons we have learned from the August raids -- one, that it is in the nature of the problem that many people probably have to know something about such raids; and two, that these people apparently can maintain adequate security. At the same time, in view of the truth that security leaks are more likely to occur when substantial numbers of persons are involved, it seems essential to me that we constantly convey the high importance of security to others who are privy to information about our covert activities against Cuba. May I ask that members of the Special Group take such steps within their areas of authority as they think appropriate, and may I in particular urge that the Central Intelligence Agency, as executive agent for these enterprises, emphasize the importance of security to all those with whom it has necessary business on these matters, so that we can maintain the high level of security set in these recent operations.

McGeorge Bundy

DCI
kw2

1 October 1963

NOTES FOR MR. McCONE:

98

1. [DDP has prepared for your information a summary of General Chiang Ching-kuo's visit to the U.S. Attached to this summary are the four most important papers as follows:

   a. Your position paper;
   b. CIA commitments paper;
   c. Memorandum for the record on DDP briefings;
   d. Record of conversation with the President.

   The visit is considered to have been a success and Chiang Ching-kuo returned with an understanding that any abrupt move by his government to recover the mainland with military force would not be supported by this country. Chiang Kai-shek has accepted the position paper and CIA's commitments paper, and our station is now working out cooperation on intelligence and operational activities against the mainland.]

98

2. [In commenting on the proposal to send Dr. Cavanagh to Rome, Bill Harvey suggests that Cavanagh be certified to the Vatican as your personal representative, and suggests you might do this through Cardinal Cicognani or Archbishop O'Connor. Request your guidance.]

98

3. [DDP has run another assessment of the reliability of the documentary material provided by Penkovskiy and see no reason to change their statement of 31 May to USIB that it was "a most serious penetration of Soviet officialdom and one that will hurt them for years to come". Helms suggests you have this assessment checked with DDI and OSI and if they concur, re-assure USIB along the above lines.]

4. Dez FitzGerald briefed the Joint Chiefs recently on his overall program against Cuba. In the discussion the main thing that emerged was General LeMay's view that the present program was far too small to

3/mc

overthrow Castro. General LeMay wondered why we did not use bombings. There was also a discussion of Navy and Air Force programs to protect raiders in international waters and in the event of hot pursuit. It was agreed that further planning would be conducted.

98

5. [John Warner has reviewed the record of recent congressional debates on the test ban treaty and finds 13 senators made reference to you. No one criticized you. Senators Pastore, Humphrey, and Anderson praised you.]

98

6. [John Warner has prepared a recommendation based on his reading that our standing in Congress is currently on the decline. He suggests that you meet privately with such members as Russell, Saltonstall, Vinson, and Arends to seek advice and develop a strategy for public statements by these members and other Subcommittee members.]

98

7. [Mr. Kirkpatrick has forwarded a memorandum on efforts to obtain a replacement for Colonel Grogan.]

8. Dick Helms has forwarded a memorandum of his briefing of the Bureau of Budget officials on the Agency's covert action programs. McGeorge Bundy attended and offered 2 opinions: (a) that there be a regular annual briefing of the Special Group on covert operations as a whole, and (b) that during the present period of apparent detente there might well be very good reasons for investing even greater resources in covert actions.

98

9. [John Bross has forwarded a memorandum for the record on your meeting with Generals Carter, Blake, and Carroll about personnel security. Bross is presently drafting a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on this subject which is being reviewed by Houston and Bannerman.]

98

10. [Mr. Gilpatric has written you a letter confirming his conversation about assigning Frank Hand as Special Assistant to General Carroll. I suggest I pass this to General Carter for Agency action.]

W. Elder

V/mc

[illegible] ONLY

18 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 303 Committee Meeting - 18 June 1964

1. Item I: Autonomous Operations

This was raised in view of Manuel Ray's request for $25,000 and indications that he is attempting to make a new expedition to Cuba in a chartered ship. Various courses of possible action with Ray were discussed, ranging from cutting him off altogether to giving him the money. It developed that Ray is acting inconsistently with the agreement with him which was that he would operate outside the United States. Therefore it was decided that we would tell him that he must abide by the agreement, that he must find a base of operations outside the United States and if he does we will endeavor to secure the release of his ship which is now in Puerto Rico, and that we will give him financial support.

2. With respect to Artime, 24 it was pointed out that Artime's operations are very costly. CIA has put $4.6 million into this operation this year - the future bill will be large, but not as great. FitzGerald reported that Artime planned one hit and run operation a month, but he noted he would be lucky if he could pull off one every 3 months. Bundy seemed to feel Artime was more of a threat than an operator and should be maintained for that purpose and operations discouraged. FitzGerald pointed out this is not practical. It was agreed to proceed with Artime recognizing that U.S. or CIA support of him would probably be "blown". Furthermore it was suggested that he be cautioned to be careful and not follow unduly reckless courses of action.

3. There was a long discussion on the implications of the CIA June 10th memorandum reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders. This report was taken most seriously by the group. It was felt that the purpose of advising us through CIA of these plans was to put us on notice and therefore we should not fail to take appropriate precautionary actions to see that no assassination attempt of which we had knowledge was carried out. It was decided that appropriate authorities, i.e. Department of Justice and the FBI, should be notified and urged to take appropriate action against the individuals involved.

I took the position that we are overly exercised, that I was inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than definite plans. Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed, I would have investigated the sources and the credibility of the whole thing before taking action. However the group were more concerned than I and therefore planning to discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover.

V/W

I pointed out that copies of the Memorandum had been sent to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice but there had been no conversation on the subject.

ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally.

4. Prior to the meeting Mr. Vance asked my opinion of using the 22 million psyops leaflets which inadvertently had been printed on U.S. manufactured white sulphite paper, all as reported in MACV cable MAC SOG 5050 dated 18 June 1964 (IN 09143). I told Vance that I felt we should go ahead. It was too bad it had been done this way, but it is one of those things that a person not thoroughly acquainted with this type of operation might overlook. He was in agreement and presumably will instruct the release of the leaflets.

Jam/mfb

6 TOP SECRET

NON-CIA TELETYPED MESSAGE 09143 1 of 3

ACTION: FE 1-8

TEIF034

18 JUN 64 00 10Z

OO RUEPIA

A

DE RUMSMA 1647F 18/0641Z

O 180627Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE

RUEPDA/SECSTATE

RUEPDA/OSD

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC

ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON

RUHPA/CAS HONO

BT

9-DCI
10-DDCI
11-DDP
12-ADDP
13-SOD
14-FILE
15-VR
16-RF

TS 941

18 JUN 64 IN 09143

TOPSECRET MAC SOG 5050

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SPECIAL HANDLING SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR SULLIVAN, OSD FOR MCNAMARA AND ANTHIS WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND HELMS, JCS FOR GEN TAYLOR, INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB LODGE AND NES, CINCPAC FOR ADM FELT.

A. OPLAN 34A

1. IN ORDER TO MEET OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES FOR JUNE AND JULY PSYOPS LEAFLET DROPS, TWENTY TWO MILLION LEAFLETS

#9

TOP SECRET

WERE PRINTED ON SIXTEEN POUND US GRADE WHITE SULPHITE PAPER. THIS WAS NECESSITATED DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF OTHER PAPER SUITABLE FOR IHIGHSPEED LEAFLET PRESS.

2. UNLESS THESE PRINTED LEAFLETS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR DISSEMINATION OVER NORTH VIETNAM UNDER SCHEDULED OPLAN 34A OPERATIONS NUMEROUS PSYOPS OPPORTUNITIES EXPLOITABLE UNDER PRESENT LIGHT OF THE MOON PERIOD WILL BE MISSED AND TIMELINESS OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEAFLETS WILL BE LOST.

3. REALIZE SUBJECT OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL BECOMES INVOLVED HERE BUT FEEL IN THIS CASE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTION TO UNITED STATES MUST BE JUDGED IN LIGHT OF FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES:

A. PAPER STOCK USED IS STANDARD US MANUFACTURE OBTAINED THROUGH US ARMY QUARTERMASTER SOURCES AND IS ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE ON WORLD MARKET FOR SALE TO ANY CONSUMER. MAP SUPPORTED FORCES SUCH AS ARVN OR OTHERS COULD HAVE ACCESS TO SAME TYPE PAPER.

B. ANY DESIRE TO ATTRIBUTE OPLAN 34A ACTIONS TO US COULD BE MORE READILY SUBSTANTIATED BY DRV PRODUCING AGENT PERSONNEL OR MORE CRITICAL ITEMS LOST IN SOME PREVIOUS TEAM OPERATIONS.

C. PAPER STOCK ITSELF IS NOT ONLY ATTRIBUTABLE ITEM, BUT ALSO OFFSET PRINTING PROCESS EMPLOYED WITH OTHER TYPE PRINTED MATTER.

D. IN ESSENCE ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO IMPRESS DRV THAT PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED BY MAJOR POWER. USE OF US PAPER AND INDIRECT INDICATION OF US INVOLVEMENT

TEND CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BASIC OBJECTIVE.

E. ONLY CHEMICAL ANALYSIS COULD ASCERTAIN THAT PAPER USED IS U.S. MANUFACTURED STOCK.

F. IN ANY EVENT, U.S. BLAMED BY DRV FOR ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS THEY CHOOSE TO PUBLICISE AND U.S. IN EACH CASE COULD CHOOSE TO DENY OR IGNORE ACCUSATIONS.

4. REQUEST APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH DISSEMINATION OF PREPARED LEAFLETS AT THIS TIME AND UNTIL SUITABLE FOREIGN SOURCE PAPER STOCK CAN BE OBTAINED WHICH SHOULD BE WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

5. IN ORDER TO MEET CURRENT JUNE SCHEDULE REQUEST REPLY WITHIN 48 HOURS.

GP-1

BT

3 April

4/14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting (5412) - 2 April 1964

1. Briefly reviewed the status of North Viet Nam operations 34A. All concluded that the results have been negative and disappointing. I took the position this was to be expected but that now the period of organization had past, we might get some better results.

98

[The CIA IDEALIST-TACKLE program was approved except for the North Korean flight. Defense interposed an objection to this flight on the grounds that they were nearing agreement for the release of helicopter crews which have been held in North Korean custody.

ACTION: This particular flight should be withheld. USIB and most particularly DIA should be informed in the meeting On Wednesday, the 8th.]

98

2. [Discussed the problem of captains and crews for the SWIFT and NASTY craft and the necessity of withdrawing the German mercenaries and the Swedish captains. This was recognized as a must. It was agreed that substitution of Chinese Nationalist captains was acceptable on an interim basis.

ACTION: DDP to arrange with Secretary Vance for appropriate actions by the Department of Defense through their representatives in Taiwan for the recruitment, movement, compensation and care of these captains.]

98

3. [Reviewed DoD peripheral reconnaissance which was approved after extended discussion of capabilities of the new radar in Cambodia. It was agreed that the field would be instructed to carefully observe operation of this radar to determine whether the U-2s were being picked up by it. If this turned out to be a regular practice by the Cambodians, the matter should be resubmitted for reconsideration.

ACTION: The field should follow this carefully with MACV.]

98

4. [Review of ground rules for U-2 in North Viet Nam as outlined. Secretary Vance's paper was approved.]

4/MC

98

5. [The recommendation to overfly Laos was held in suspension. DoD was asked to bring in specific details of the particular 34A operations which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing the operations by means of overflying Laos. State held very positive view against Laotian overflights.]

6. The proposed infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba were approved. Mr. FitzGerald was warned not to cache arms with agents felt to be under Castro control. He stated that this particular Cache involved money and other things, but no arms. The caching of small quantities of arms elsewhere in Cuba was approved. Memorandum on the operation of autonomous exile groups was noted and no instructions were given to restrain these operations. The overall question of future sabotage operations was discussed. Mr. Bundy agreed to bring the matter before the President and senior Cabinet officers promptly.

98

7. [The Chilean political action as outlined in the CIA paper of April 1st was approved. It was pointed out that since the paper was drafted, COS and Ambassador in Santiago had reached an agreement about the handling of funds.]

98

8. [Proposed political action in Zanzibar was approved. Mr. Waller gave a brief account of the results of the favorable negotiations with the British. Understood thtat implementation of this paper was to be coordinated with the British in accordance with agreement reached in London.]

OTHER MATTERS:

98

1 [Statement was made that a CIA U-2 was "painted" with radar on February 24th, implication being that the CIA U-2 was in the vicinity of Phnom Penh.

ACTION: I would like to know the facts on this.]

98

2. [Question was raised about need for continuing the 30 mile intrusion into Cambodia and Laos. Indications were that the photography had produced no useful information for MACV.

ACTION: This question should be studied and brought up for discussion at meeting on April 9th. I should cable Carter to investigate fully.]

JAM/mfb

5/mc

27 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of 5412 Group

98

1. [The question of the extent of the SAC planes operations in South Vietnam was discussed against the background of Dr. McMillan's letter of February 26th.

1. Overflights of South Vietnam -- O.K.

2. Overfly that part of North Vietnam which is within 30 miles of South Vietnam or of the coast line.

3. That part of Laos which is within 30 miles of the South Vietnamese border.

4. That part of Cambodia which is not more than 30 miles from South Vietnam.

With respect to 4., instructions were to be given that the primary purpose of the flights was to survey border activity and the 30 mile shot is provided to give range and operational flexibility. I felt in reviewing McMillan's proposal that if the SAC planes were to go as far north as the 21st parallel, then they should go all the way to the China border and the proposed CIA operation out of Takhli should be abandoned. This raised the question of whether civilian or military planes and pilots should be over North Vietnam to the extent which could not be explained as being "off course". All agreed that the SAC Air Force operations should be either limited as outlined above or should cover the entire country. It was decided to refer the matter to higher authority for decision. I interposed no objection to SAC's overflight of North Vietnam but merely took the position that if they went as far north as proposed by McMillan, they should cover the entire country.]

2. The program of infiltration and exfiltration of Cuba was approved with the exception of one operation -- operation #434 -- about which Mr. Cheever explained that he thought the agents we were resupplying were under Cuban control and the resupply operation was for the purpose of deception. It was agreed that the resupply should be confined to money and

1/mc

medicine and that the small amount of arms involved should not be cached. Otherwise the operation was approved.

Alexis Johnson and Mr. Bundy raised questions of the consequences of finding an arms cache or knocking over an infiltration at the time of the OAS debate on the Venezuelan problem. Arguments were persuasive that we should go slowly during this period. I read from the February 25th Cuban checklist of the deterioration of the spirit of the people of Cuba, the feeling that we were about to recognize the Castro government and the apathy toward further resistance as evidence of the price we are paying for slow-downs and deferments of action against Cuba. I said that I thought our Cuban program was in complete disarray. We had no policy or covert operations. We now are hesitating on infiltration and exfiltration, our economic denial program was failing, while Castro is making significant progress.

98

3. [The forcast of NRO activities for March was approved.]

98

4. [The status report on political action in Kenya was approved.]

JAM/mfb

2/mc

13-00000

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

File

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

Attached is a paper which I would like to table for discussion at the next meeting of the 5412 group.

Cyrus Vance
Cyrus R. Vance

Attachment

Mr Jessup,
circulate
Will you circulate to members &
ask UA Johnson's people to bring Mann
or Kearn. Alexis talk chiefly with him
McGB

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba

The objective of the U. S. Government is to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba. In accomplishing its objective, the U. S. is not willing to risk nuclear war or, at this time, substantial deterioration in its relations with its Allies, or significant escalation in tensions between this country and the Soviets. Thus, any covert U. S. program should be set at a level that is not likely to incur such risks. Such a program would appear to be a low-risk, clandestine program of harassment and sabotage directed against Cuba. In addition, a program of higher risks seems justified when it is directed against Cuban subversion of Latin America.

Actions Against Cuba

1. Sabotage. A low level campaign of sabotage and harassment against Cuba might include such targets as the Canete Saw Mill, smaller POL storage plants (such as the one at Pilon), the Nazabal warehouse and pier, and ships (such as barges or Cuban patrol boats). Where possible, it would seem desirable to make the raids appear to have come from within Cuba. Cuban ships outside Cuba can be sabotaged by discreet means (such as placing sand in gears or sugar in fuel).

2. Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba.

a) Initiate a more comprehensive program of overt and covert pressure against Free World firms trading with Cuba. In this connection, develop a comprehensive list of firms doing business with Cuba, check them against known DOD off-shore and foreign purchase suppliers so that appropriate retaliation can be applied against those suppliers.

b) Place unactivated incendiary and explosive devices in cargoes and on ships bound for Cuba and subsequently "tip off" port or shipping officials so that they will search and discover the devices with the attendant publicity.

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

COPY No. 1 of 6 COPIES

3. Covert Economic Activities.

a) Intensify covert activities directed against critical commodities destined for Cuba with resort, if necessary, to carefully considered and controlled preclusive buying.

b) Make it known discreetly through the press that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing with Cuba, suggesting without saying so that these records constitute a potential "blacklist."



c) Form a group of responsible and qualified Cuban exile businessmen to maintain pressure on firms trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have no future in a post-Castro Cuba.

4. To the extent possible, encourage dissidence among different factions in Cuba - Peking, Moscow, Nationalist -- by spreading rumors, internal and external sabotage designed to accomplish this purpose (such as actions against homes of leaders, etc).

Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America

1. Develop a list of vulnerable Cuban agents in Latin America against whom a concentrated program of bribery, blackmail and coercion can be instituted.

2. Carefully select key Latin American members of the Havana-Peking school and institute a program of kidnapping, and personal and physical harassment, while attempting to attribute these acts to rivals who support Moscow. Institute the reverse process as a retaliatory program against Moscow supporters.

Any of the foregoing activities would be conducted against a background of U. S. propaganda (black, white and gray) and political activity designed to increase internal dissension within Cuba, to support economic isolation of Cuba, to avoid splitting with our allies over the Cuban issue and to reduce, and perhaps eliminate, Castro subversion of Latin America. In addition, surveillance activities should be significantly stepped up.

1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 1, File #

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
	Apr 6	DCI, Fubini, Bross	Lunch--M/R to be prepared by Mr. Bross
	Apr 7	DCI, Sen. Brewster	Breakfast at Hqs. M/R to be prepared by Warner.
	Apr 7	DCI, Sen. Saltonstall Warner, Helms	M/R to be prepared by Warner.
--	Apr 8	DCI, [Gen. Dethleffsen C/Intel Directorate W. German Intel Serv.] [Dr. Klaus Ritter, Gen. Quehlin,] R. Jack Smith Bronson Tweedy	See TAPE #121
~~48~~	~~Apr 8~~	~~DCI, Harriman,~~ Helms, G. Fields	M/R ~~to be prepared~~ by Glenn Fields ~~--Also M/R~~ by DCI ~~--[Tshombe~~ & Nyerere, Brazzaville; Equatorial Africa ~~& French; Zanzibar~~] Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
	Apr 8	DCI, Dr. John Foster	Met at the Residence--
--	Apr 9	DCI, Amb Jack Hood Vaughn, Rufus Z. Smith, Herbert & Cline	See TAPE # 122
	Apr 9	DCI, Amb. Kohler	At the residence--
--	Apr 10	DCI, Wm. Manchester Chretien	Met in DCI's ofc See TAPE #123
	Apr 13	DCI - Sec Def, Black, Dillon .. SST	(see separate SST file)
--	Apr 14	DCI, [Augustine Edwards,] [Chile], FitzGerald, Herbert	See TAPE # 124 [Edwards is a newspaperman in Chile)]
~~48.5~~	~~Apr 14~~	~~DCI, Hadyn Williams,~~ Russell Smith (Asia Found) Helms, Lapham, Ned Barnes	~~M/R to be~~ prepared by ~~Helms?~~ ~~Barnes~~ Destroyed MBeard 1/28/72
--	Apr 15	DCI, Secy Vance	Lunch/meeting with Vance See TAPE #125
~~48.6~~	apr 16	DCI, Cannon Comte Warner	Briefed Cannon Comte (M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by Warne See Congressional Comte File
~~49~~	~~Apr 16~~	~~DCI, Robt. Anderson~~	~~Met with Anderson in Bundy's ofc - campaign funds to [Panama]~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
	Apr 16	DCI, Ch Justice Warren, Sen Cooper Stern, Rankin, Willens	Met in DCI's office
--	Apr 18	DCI, SecDec, Black, Dillon, Lindbergh, et al	re: SST (Accompanied by Alexander) (see separat SST file)
--	Apr 21	DCI, Ted Lewis, Ch, Wash Bureau, NY Daily News Chretien	M/R to be prepared by Chretien See TAPE #
	Apr 21	DCI, Frank Wisner	
~~50~~	~~Apr 22~~	~~DCI, Pres, Rusk, McNamara Majority & Minority Ldrs~~	~~Breakfast Mtg at White House (See M/R #22 of Pres. File)~~

9/mc

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
50	22 Apr	DCI, Pres, Rusk, McNamara, Majority & Minority Ldrs	Breakfast meeting at White House (See M/R #22 in President's File)
~~51~~	~~22 Apr~~	~~DCI, Rusk~~	Destroyed M Beard 1-28-72 ~~Cambodia-Laotian border, Italian SecGen of NATO,~~ visit of [~~Eshkol,~~ Cyprus,"] Brazil, Barrington of Burm Italian ~~talk deal, exchange of W and L.~~]
~~52~~	~~22 Apr~~	~~DCI, Eisenhower~~ Destroyed M Beard 1-28-72	~~Organ. of Pres. office, Soviet Military & Economic~~ strength, Sino-Soviet Dispute, SVN, [Cyprus, Zanziba] " " presidential elections (~~SEE SEPARATE FILE MARKED, "M/R #52 - Mtg w/Eisenhower - 22 Apr 6~~
~~52.5~~	~~27 Apr~~	~~DCI, Gen. Pakravan~~ (Iran), Conway, Critchfield	~~See TAPE #127 also M/R prepared by Critchfield.~~ Destroyed M Beard 1-28-72
--	28 Apr	DCI, David Wise & Tom Lambert of Herald Tribune & Paul Chretien	Luncheon meeting - M/R to be prepared by Chretien See TAPE #129
--	28 Apr	DCI, Dr. McMillan	See TAPE # 128
~~53~~	~~29 Apr~~	~~DCI, McNamara~~	Destroyed M Beard 1-28-72 Col. ~~Walters, problems w/satellite reconnaissance,~~
~~54~~	~~29 Apr~~	~~DCI,~~ [~~Archduke Otto~~] 6	Destroyed M Beard 1-28-72 [~~Baodai~~] 6 ~~and Vietnam;~~ [~~Angola, Mozambique~~] 11, 11
	30 Apr	DCI, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Wheelon	re: types of aircraft--M/R to be prepared by Wheelo No M/R per Wheelon - see M/R of 5 May mtg attended by DDCI + Wheelon (M/R in Wheelon's ofc)
--	1 May	DCI, [Gen. Dogu (Turkish] 6, 8 Intel), Phil Dibble, Bill Doyle	See TAPE # 131
	1 May	DCI, Mr. Bundy	Lunch at Bundy's ofc--
~~55~~	~~2 May~~	~~DCI, Secy McNamara~~	Destroyed M Beard 1-27-72 ~~SST, ECM equip. over Cuba, OXCART~~
--	2 May	Paragraphs 1-4 in SST file DCI M/R	PFIAB Report on NRO (see "NRO Package" in NRO File)
~~56~~	~~3 May~~	~~DCI,~~ [~~Mrs. Fleur~~ Cowles Montague-Meyer] 6	[~~Harold Wilson, Labor Govt, England~~] 6, 8 ~~and his relationship with the Soviet Union~~ Destroyed M Beard 1-28-72
--	4 May	DCI, [Sir Kenneth Strong] 6 [Alan Crick,] 6 Cline	See TAPE # 132
~~56.5~~	~~4 May~~	~~SecState, AG, Bundy~~ A. Johnson	Destroyed M Beard 1-28-72 ~~re: Angola and Mozambique M/R prepared by~~ Glen Fields
~~57~~	~~5 May~~	~~DCI Memo~~	Destroyed M Beard 1-28-72 ~~Re: The Invisible Government, by Wise and Ross~~
~~57.5~~	~~5 May~~	~~DCI, Meany, Meyer~~	~~M/R to be prepared by Cord Meyer~~ [~~Chile, Brit. Guia~~] " " Brazil, SVN Africa etc Destroyed M Beard
--	~~7 May~~	~~DCI,~~ [ex-Pres Somoza] 6, 8 Col King	Re: Cuba? See TAPE # 134
~~58~~	~~11 May~~	~~DCI, Clyde Weed,~~ Brinkerhof & parttime Helms, FitzGerald, Col King	re: Elections in Chile Also ~~see TAPE #135~~ M Beard Destroyed 1-28-72

12/mc

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
--	13 May	DCI & Bundy	re: NRO report and NSAM on Communications
	14 May	DCI, Rankin (No MR expected)	Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms) ~~M/R to be prepared by Mr. Helms)~~ Helms saw Commission transcript & returned it to the Comm.
--	14 May	DCI, Bundy	
~~58.1~~	~~14 May~~	~~DCI, Scotty Reston~~ Yerxa, Frankel, Szulc, Helms, Cline Chretien	~~Lunch at N. Y. Times ofc M/R to be prepared by~~ Chretien- Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
--	15 May	DCI, Gov. Rockefeller Kent	Presidential candidate briefing - ~~M/R to be prepare by Dr. Kent~~
~~58.3~~	~~15 May~~	~~DCI, David Wise,~~ Tom Ross, Kirkpatrick Chretien	~~See TAPE # 136 re: The Invisible Govt.~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
~~58.5~~	~~15 May~~	~~DCI, Hedley Donovan~~ Chas Murphy, Tom Griffeth, John Steele, Geo. Hunt, Cline, Helms, Chretien, Elder	~~Working dinner at residence -- M/R to be~~ prepared by Elder Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
~~58.7~~	~~17 May~~	~~DCI, Rusk, McNamara~~ Harriman, Wm Bundy McNaughton	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 ~~Southeast Asia -- settled on cable for Lodge~~
59	18 May	DCI, Rusk, McNamara Wm & Mac Bundy	Southeast Asia --Laos & SVN; US forces to Thailand; T-28's; military action against NVN; telecon to Amb Unger
~~60~~	~~18 May~~	~~DCI, Wm. Hearst, Jr.~~ Conniff, Considine, Kaplan, Warner, Chretien	~~Lunch--M/R to be prepared by Warner or Chretien~~ Sov Policy & Mil posture; Sino-Sov Rift; Diem coup; SEA; Cuba; Bay of Pigs; Sov Economy; U-2 & All MBeard to EK to destroy - 1-28-72
--	18 May	DCI, Fubini	(Partially taped) TAPE #137
--	19 May	DCI, Sam Papich	SEE TAPE #138
--	19 May	DCI, Russell Comte	M/R to be prepared by Warner (see Congressional conts...)
~~61~~	~~19 May~~	~~DCI, J. J. McCloy~~	~~Dinner at residence -- re: Oswald~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
	21 May k	DCI, Joe Alsop	Lunch at residence
--	21 May	DCI, Gov. Scranton	Presidential Candidate Briefing
~~62~~	~~25 May~~	~~DCI, Gen. Eisenhower~~	~~Briefed at Gettysburg~~ Destroyed
	27 May	DCI, Mike Forrestal	Lunch at residence
	28 May	DCI, Mr. Greenwood	Friend from Seattle, Wash.
	28 May	DCI, Dr. McMillan	See TAPE # 139
~~63~~	~~25 May~~	~~DCI paper~~	~~Notes on draft memo of May 25th re SVN~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72

CONTINUED IN FILE #4

File #4
Page 1
1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
64	1 Jun	DCI memo	2 May Repoet of President's Board on NRO
65	1 & 2 June	HONOLULU Mtgs	Oservations and Agreed Actions on SVN
--	3 June	DCI, Gov. Harriman	Lunch
	4 June	DCI, [Gen. Meir Amit (Israel)] 6/11 Ephraim Levy, Helms, Angleton, [Millett] 3 [John Hadden] 3	See TAPE # ~~139~~ 140
65.2	4 June	DCI, Colby	Mtg in Sit Room on Laos M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by Colb
65.5	5 June	DCI, Colby	White House Mtg on SEA (M/R prepared by Colby)
	5 June	DCI, For Min Quat (Vietnam) Colby, [Paragellis] 3	See TAPE # 141
--	4 June	Rusk, McNamara, Bundy et al	Mtg at State Dept fr 8:30 to midnight?
66	6 June	McGeorge Bundy	Problems re getting Joint Resolution to commit troops to Laos. Problems with Clifford Report recommendations. Provisions for CIA's re-entry in active role in SVN;
66	6 June	Mike Forrestal	DCI request for research of SEATO Agreement. Also attached memo fr Forrestal re AID Rep for Saigon
	9 June	Joseph Alsop	Dinner at Alsop's residence--
67	10 June	DCI, Colby	Mtg in Sit Mr re Laos & SVN (M/R to be prepared b Colby)
68	11 June	DCI Memo	Thinking paper for internal mtg on Course of Action in Laos
69	12 June	DCI, Mr & Mrs. Henry Luce	Memos used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME No Distribution
70	15 June	DCI, Colby, Cooper	ExCom Mtg on SEA M/R prepared by Colby DCI [illegible]
	15 June	DCI, W. W. Rostow	Lunch in SDR
	15 June	DCI, Amb. Bowles, James Grant, Dep Asst Secy For NE; Meyer, Critchfield, [Loch Phillips] 3	See TAPE # 142
- -	16 June	DCI, Mahon Comte Houston	(See Congressional Comte file)
~~70.5~~	~~17 June~~	~~DCI, John Steele,~~ Ed Reingold, Richard Clurman, Chretien, Geo Daniels, Helms	~~Luncheon M/R to be prepared by Chretien~~ (Background papers) Destroyed M Beard 1-28-72
71	17 June	DCI, McNamara	at Pentagon--SEA; SST; NRO
	17 June	DCI, Peter Grace, Walter Donnelly, Col King, FitzGerald	at residence M/R to be prepared by FitzGerald [illegible]

3/mc

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
--	18 June	DCI, House Armed Services subcomte	Briefed committee--see Congressional Comte File
--	19 June	DCI, Amb Blair et al	Luncheon--
	19 June	DCI, Dr. Fubini	See TAPE # 143
72	21 June	DCI, Secy Rusk	Cyprus; SEA; briefing Harold Wilson; Congo
	22 June	DCI, Amb Gordon (Brazil) FitzGerald	See TAPE # 144
~~73~~	~~22 June~~	6,8 ~~DCI, [PM Inonu]~~	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 ~~Luncheon at White House--re: Dr. Z. Peykoe,~~ Professor of Medicine [at Turkish University] Z9
	23 June	DCI, Adrian Fisher, Dr. Scoville	See TAPE # 145
73.5	23 June	DCI, Drew Pearson, Kent, R. J. Smith	M/R to be prepared by ~~Smith or Kent~~ Smith. Adds little to what has already been said in his colum
74	24 June	DCI M/R	Discussions re Joint Resolution by Congress in Connection with SEA
74.5	25 June 1	DCI, Dr. Land Panel	Mtg in Conf Rm--M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by Wheelon re: FULCRUM Also see TAPE #146
75	25 June	DCI Memo	Re memo of 19 June to SecDef proposing changes in wording of Presidential Directive as proposed by PFIAB on NRO
76	26 June [illegible]	DCI Memo McMillan, Fubini Wheelon, Maxie	Talking paper for Meeting w/Fubini, McMillan, re: FULCRUM project incorporation into NRP Also see TAPE # 147 Also M/R by Wheelon att
77	26 June	DCI, Gen. Kuehlin, Eric Eisenstadt	to say good by to Gen. Kuehlin. M/R to be prepared by Eisenstadt (discuseed Soviet agriculture)
78	28 June	DCI, Secy Rusk	Laos, communication fr 6 [Pres Segni]; 6 [Sihanouk] contact in Paris
79	29 June [illegible]	DCI, Sulzberger, Sr. Arthur Sulzberger, C. L. Sulzberger, et al	Lunch in N. Y. -- CIA publicity, The Invisible Govt. estimates, Bay of Pigs situation, coordination - 5412 Committee, SVN/Laos
80	29 June	DCI, Secy McNamara Secy Vance	NRO
80.1	7 July	DCI, DDCI, Bross, Clark, Kirkpatrick, Wheelon	Heads of Agency Budget Preview--M/R to be prepare by Clark -Third Party COMINT, Missile & Space Intell, Advanced Tech Research, CIA commo support to NCS & State
80.2	8 July	DCI, Robert Kleiman of TIME, R. Jack Smith	Lunch--M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by R. Jack Smith
	8 July	DCI, Mr. Wm. Webster	Mtg in East--
80.3	8 July	DCI, Marengo, Foster McNamara	Informal session of the Principals--nuclear vehicle freeze verification

CONTINUED IN FILE #5

4/mc

C

26 March 1963

ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT:

The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered that they at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague. McCone stated that indicators were conflicting. On the one hand, certain information such [as the recent Brazilian] intercept and report of Castro's own statements would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual and continuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubans were trained and became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment. This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing Soviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.

JAM/ji (taped)

1/mc

The President then suggested a meeting be held this afternoon to determine a number of matters.

1. We should establish what our contacts are with the groups so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down the operations.
2. A policy statement which State is undertaking.
3. The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.
4. Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this originated in the Bahamas.
5. The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.

At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, Cottrell, Douglas Dillon, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigratio ~~immediate~~ officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:

1. Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where they are, and what can be done about them.
2. Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami. Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.
3. Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some of this.
4. Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives, arms, etc.
5. FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped with DF-equipment to locate the stations.
6. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete standdown before any attempt was made to guide the groups.
7. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize the plane.

Excerpt from President's Press Conference -- April 3

THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is that they did not come from the United States. We have already indicated that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a useful purpose. It seems to me in some ways they strengthen the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba and justify repressive measures within Cuba which might otherwise not be regarded as essential. So that we have not supported this and these men do not have a connection with the United States Government. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to get back home and who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases the chances of freeing Cuba.

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

John A. McCone

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

Draft letter to the President
from the Secretary regarding
the problem presented by
Cuban refugee groups

The President has called an NSC Executive Committee Meeting for Friday, March 29 at 12:30 p.m. to discuss the problem posed by Cuban refugee groups.

The Secretary has asked me to make available to you the attached proposed letter from him to the President which will serve as a basis for discussion at tomorrow's meeting. The letter has not yet been signed by the Secretary but presumably will go to the President in its present form. If any substantive changes are made at the time of signature I shall so inform you.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

Group I
Excluded from
automatic down-
grading and de-
classification

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington

DRAFT LETTER
TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING FRIDAY, MARCH 29 at 12:30 p.m.

Dear Mr. President:

I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control.

Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which caused substantial damage to a Soviet vessel may complicate our relations with the USSR without net advantage to us.

I therefore propose several measures which could impede or deter further attacks of this nature.

First, the intelligence community could increase its efforts in Miami to develop hard information about projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs authorities charged with investigation of violation of arms control.

Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis of this information can stop and search the vessels. (They now do this, and picked up about 50 men and four boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated, and participants arraigned if a violation of law has

The President,

The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL

occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels to facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operations in the Miami area would be helpful.

Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami could quietly inform suspects in the exile community that the United States intends to intensify enforcement of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.

Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegal radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in connection with these raids.

Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our plans to try to control these activities and express our understanding that the British Government has become increasingly concerned about the possibility that British territory in the Bahamas may be used for these raids and may be considering action to police these areas more effectively.

These measures have not been discussed with any of the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments be called to discuss the problem.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

March 28, 1963

#2-1

29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Cuban Raids

1. Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambrey, Alpha 66, and Lamba 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.

2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U.S. areas.

3. The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious courage and dedication. Apparently the organizations are building up and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.

4. Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate problems with Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint, are undesirable. However, successful harrassment will create very considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion of their presence with the United States.

5. Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the Intelligence Community, it is my personal view that a concerted and publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw more public and press criticism in the United States than would result from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government from them through denial of both responsibility and control.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

28

13-00000

#29

SECRET

29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting - 12:30 p.m. - 29 March 1963

IN ATTENDANCE: All present, plus Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and others

The President raised the question of what should be our policy on hit-and-run raids and asked my views. I reported my views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships, etc. On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized raids.

Dillon stated that we could not stop them because of the number of ports, small ships, inadequate coast guard facilities, etc. McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by utilizing military resources. As a second alternative he suggested we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should disassociate ourselves from responsibility. The Attorney General outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance thought that we should try and guide the operation away from attacks on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets. The Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other. He felt the military should immediately study that which should be done to stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized raids.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

R 9/23/98

SECRET

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded or declassified when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY
SOURCE		CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE		
COPY NO.		LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES		
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS		

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE	OFFICE/DIV.	DATE

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED *(OUTSIDE CIA)*	
TO		BY *(Signature)*		TO	
BY *(Signature)*		WITNESSED BY *(Signature)*		BY *(Signature)*	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

TOP SECRET

Noted by DCI

TOP SECRET

#6

Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council
Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S. is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are part of NATO, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.

Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount importance in reaching judgments -- both by the USSR and the US. Our big problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike. In looking back, it was really that it presented us with an immediate crises and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and disadvantages of alternate cources of action. That is what we should do in any other struggle with the Soviet Union -- and I believe we will be in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the alternatives. You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war. It is important that we have time to study their reaction. We should continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us.

The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba. Cuba might be our response in some future situation — the same way the Russians have used Berlin. We may decide that Cuba might be a more satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready — although this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should be in our national interest. The planning by the US, by the Military, in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba in mind in the coming months and to be ready to move with all possible speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had Berlin to limit our actions.

98

In thematter of Europe, [the US has been faced since 1958 with deGaulle's position. . . . . nuclear veto by French .... President Eisenhower reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by the NATO nations — the NATO nations would not act. ... no agreement between the Three. That decision this Administration also supported. However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western World as an equal. If we had given him atomic weapons he would be difficult to deal with.]

98

De Gaulle [did not question our support of Western Europe because we have maintained strong representation there, but the French have not. They have not been aggressive as we have been and, therefore it is not a distrust of us that we will desert Europe but it is that he feels that France should assert a position as a strong France and cease its growing reliance on the U.S.]

2/mc

98

Having made such proposals to the US and Great Britain and been turned down, he has made the same turn to Germany. This is not so bad as it has prevented Germany moving to the East. And, historically, Germany's trade has been to the East. There is not much harm to us in this position. With Great Britain joining the Common Market, this would strengthen Europe but France will not let them in at this time. If G.B. does go in, it will cost us a good deal in trade, but it will be good for the stability of Europe. France keeping Britain out is a setback for us, but a more severe setback for G.B. They are going to have a difficult time in Europe. It is our interest to strengthen Europe and the unilateral concept, and deGaulle is opposed to this. By strengthening the multilateral concept, it strengthens NATO and increases their dependence on us. This strengthens our invluence in Europe and gives us the power to guide Europe and keep it strong. The events of the past two weeks makes it important for us to support the multilateral concept and that is why deGaulle is more opposed to it. It will be difficult to work this out, but it is important that we do so. But we should not be wholly distressed.

98

98 After all we have done for France in so many ways, deGaulle has opposed us in many places throughout the world - in NATO, in the Congo and other places -- but he is there and we have to live with it. One way we can dO so is to strengthen the mutilateral force and NATO.

Our negotiators on trade matters will have to be very careful to protect our interests. Our trade balance is of great concern and is not under control. If we get down to the $12 billion coverage of our national reserve we will be in trouble. We will have pressure on the dollar and pressure from the Congress and they will begin to follow a much narrower policy. We will 98

4/MC

98

[We will be very tough about the actions that Europe takes. We maintain large forces in West Germany. If West Germany does not maintain sufficient forces but instead concentrats on agricultural production for instance to our detriment, we must take a strong position. At present we are paying half of Norway's air and sea power for instance and supporting NATO, and they are "living off the fat of the land" while we are paying for their protection. In the coming months we must concentrate on howwe can protect the interests of the United States. We have pursued a very generous policy. We have lost our economic power over these countries. Now we are running out and if the French and others get atomic capacity they will be independent and we will be on the outside looking in. Do not think that the Europeans will do anything for us even though we have done a lot for them. So we must have all our representatives looking out very strongly for the U.S. interests. We must be sure our economic house is in order and use our military, policital power to protect our own interests.]

Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. [There is criticism about our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. the Pakistanis are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If they joined the Chinese we would have no free south Asia. The Pakistannis are struggling against the Indians and the Afganistans. They will use or attempt to exploit our power. Our interest is to make a strong sub-continent. We will use the country that can help further that aim. We have used India lately. We do not like their present leadership, but we can use them. While doing this we have moved away from the Pakistannis and they are moving closer to the Chinese and against the Indians. We have not been able to persuade] 98

2/mc

98

the Pakistannis or the Afganistans to chance their policy on India. These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot do much about it -- we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp. We must keep our ties with Nassir and others, even though we do not like the leaders themselves.

With regard to AID which is going forward under General Clay, we hope we can tie this whole concept of aid to the safety of the United States. This is the reason we give aid. The test is whether it will serve the United States and if we can equate it to that. AID is not a good word. Perhaps we can describe it better as Mutual Assistance -- though this is an old term. Some countries can go it alone, but we must do all we can. We must make every effort to keep a country out of the communist bloc. It is more difficult to get a country out of a communist bloc once it is in. It sometimes seems hopeless. The Congress may cut the heart out of Foreign Aid and this is a great danger to the safety of the United States. Even the French give more aid than we do on a per capita basis. We will probably take a cut, but we do not want to hurt our Defense effort. We would not like four or five countries to suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of aid. We must look this over very carefully and put aid on the basis it will best serve our own interest.

98

Turning to the domestic scene, [we will have a deficit of about $12 of $12½ billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit down and we have in the past three years. Except for Defense and Space and Interest on the Debt we have increased the National Budget but it has been increased less than it was under the previous Administration. With the tremendous movement from the country to the cities, we have had many problems. While the costs have increased, the receipts have dropped. We have only increased about 1% a year in the growth rate during the past ten years. This is serious, particularly with the great increase in population.]

98

I think this Tax Bill [is very important. If we get another recession in this country it will have a bad effect on the gold reserve. It will have a bad psycological effect on the people of the U.S. And when we see the strong position that Mr. Khruschev is taking with regard to agricultural and other domestic sections of the economy -- and if we just drift, we will look very bad to other nations.]

Furthermore, the deficit [is a reflection of the fight in the hot and cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. If we go to a deficit of $12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for the United States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we will be in much better shape. All of these matters -- the tax program, AID, defense, etc. are all related.] 98

98

The Military [are disturbed because of our failure to go forward with certain programs. For instance: The B-70, Nike-Zeus, Skybolt. As a matter of fact, we are going forward with a large program and there is a limit to how much we can do, and if the necessity develops we will do more]

4/mc

98

This Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been appropriated for Space and Defense — and perhaps we should spend more.

98 One of our big jobs will be to persuade our colleagues in Europe to to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two 98 or three days — if we have sufficient force to fight and supply for ninety days and those around us can ohly fight for two or three days, then we should take another look. France carries their burden abroad, but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of the United States as well as the interests of the Free World. If we grown weak economically, our influence will grown less and less and if that happens, our Free World's position will grown weaker. De Gaulle is basing his whole position on the position of the United States. He can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe and he can bank on it.

98

Mr. Foster is engaged in the Test Ban. We might be successful here if the Russians need it and if they know that we will change this if the Chicoms develop an atomic capacity. If they do we will have great difficulty in protecting Asia. If the Test Ban Treaty is successful it will inhibit the Russians from starting a nuclear war and if so we should make every effort to conclude the treaty. But if the nuclear test ban includes only the Russians and the U.S. it is not worth very much. We should support Foster all we can until we see where it is going. If we get a successful treaty, we will fight it through if it will help us. (On the Hill ?)

- - - - - - - - - -

Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously. Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this Administration.

4/mc

File WE

23 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting on the Multi-lateral Forces - 5:30 p.m.,
22 March, 1963

ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries McNamara, Gilpatric,
Rusk, Ball, General Taylor, Ambassador Merchant,
Mr. McCone, Mr. Kaysen and several others

The purpose of the meeting was to receive Ambassador Merchant's report on his visits to the Capitals. Merchant reported qualified success, indicating reservations by the German, Italians and British for various reasons, the two most prominent ones being:

a. Problem of control;
b. Use of surface ships versus submarines.

A long discussion ensued in which it was evident that there was no clear-cut decision on the part of those in attendance as to the extent of the control of the United States versus control by European countries since it seemed to mean that control should shape up so that missiles could not be fired without United States clearance; on the other hand the United States should not be able to unilaterally decide to fire the missiles. However, no country or group of countries exclusive of the United States should be likewise able to fire them.

There was a difference of opinion between State and Merchant on the one hand, and of the President on the other, as to whether Merchant's discussions should be reviewed with the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Joint Committees at this time. The President was insistent that no approach be made to Congress at this time. Merchant dissented from this viewpoint but agreed to the President's directive.

It was felt that the final expression of viewpoints should be sought from the Germans and the Italians, and it was agreed to draft a letter to Adenauer seeking an expression from him, with a similar letter to the Italians, though it was thought that no opinion should be sought from the Italians because of the impending election.

[illegible]

With respect to submarine versus surface ships, McNamara restated the opinion that surface ships were better and were quite invulnerable because they would operate in coastal waters where several thousand ships of all types would be operating and therefore the missile ships could not be readily identified and attacked.

The President seemed to feel that the multi-lateral forces idea was not going to go any place; as he wound up, he seemed to be thinking more of how the idea could be put to bed without its failure being used against the United States or his administration to the advantage of de Gaulle and others who held stricly to the "European control" idea.

No action was required on our part. I expressed no viewpoint at this meeting.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

JAM/mfb

1A

19 December 1963

Noted by DCI.
W Elder

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Cuba at 1100 on
19 December 1963

1. Included in the meeting were Acting Secretary of State Ball, Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Secretary Cyrus Vance, Secretary Douglas Dillon, Ambassador Thompson, General Wheeler, Mr. Donald Wilson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. Ted Sorensen, Mr. John Crimins, Mr. Gordon Chase, Mr. George Ready, Mr. Bill Moyers, General Carter, Mr. Helms, and Mr. FitzGerald.

2. The President, after full discussion, postponed any sizable operations by FitzGerald, primarily to avoid any possible embarrassment to our OAS negotiations on the Venezuelan arms cache. We are authorized to continue to put forward proposals for operations and also to continue preparations for air ops. The main thrust was to greatly increase political action with Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, and others in an effort to promote greater economic blockade.

3. Mr. Bundy later stated that his analysis of the meeting was that the President would continue to approve smaller FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively unrewarding if they would assist in keeping up the morale of the troops on shore, of our agents, and otherwise help in keeping the ball rolling.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

2 9/23/98

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at the White House 19 December 1963

PRESENT: The President

The State Department: Under Secretary George W. Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs John H. Crimmins.

The Defense Department: Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance.

Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Wheeler.

USIA: Deputy Director Donald M. Wilson.

The Treasury Department: Secretary Douglas Dillon.

The White House Staff: Executive Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy, Messrs. George Reedy and Williams Moyers.and Gordon Chase.

CIA: General Marshall S. Carter, Messrs. Richard Helms and Desmond FitzGerald.

1. The President arrived at the meeting approximately five minutes early -- prior to the arrival of several members of the group including Mr. Bundy. Without a formal introduction I commenced the scheduled briefing on the Agency Cuban program at the urging of the President and despite the activities of the Presidential photographer.

2. The President appeared interested in the number of agents inside Cuba but made no particular comment concerning the program until the subject of economic denial was introduced. He asked to be told what additional measures could be taken to step up the denial program. I said that the

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

principal soft spots among free world countries appeared at the present time to be Canada, the U.K. and Spain. The President requested a memorandum setting forth specifics concerning leaks of economically strategic items from these three countries together with recommendations as to what could be done to stop these leaks. He requested Under Secretary Ball to prepare to make demarches to the governments of these three countries as well as any others engaged in the Cuba trade contrary to our interests. He appeared particularly interested in the subject of economic denial and returned to it several times.

3. After hearing a brief description of our progress in connection with promoting disaffection among the Cuban military, the President said that it did not seem to him that we had gone very far along this line and that one day those concerned in Cuba matters, including himself, would have to face the "grand jury" (of domestic public opinion) to account for our progress in our attempts to find a solution to the Cuban situation. I pointed out that the program being presented was, with the exception of the economic denial item, entirely a covert program and, if run at full capacity, would tax the capabilities of the clandestine services -- in other words, that if new and broader measures against Cuba were to be undertaken, they would have to be within the overt field.

4. After a brief description of the sabotage and harassment program the subject of the proposed Matanzas raid was discussed. After hearing the pros and cons the President stated that he did not feel that the present time was a good one to conduct an operation of this magnitude which carried a less than 50 percent chance of success. He said that he felt that such an operation, if pinned directly on the U.S., might cause the Soviets to move in the wrong direction with respect to Cuba, i.e, increase their economic aid or their military presence. Recognizing that a cessation of raids would have a bad morale effect within Cuba, he agreed that low risk operations, with admittedly lower economic and psychological impact, should be conducted. He further stated that planning for such operations as Matanzas should be continued. General Wheeler raised the possibility of air strikes against major targets by autonomous groups. This was discussed and it was agreed that in view of the fact that preparations would take at least three months, these preparations should proceed and the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have been perfected.

5. On the question of autonomous groups the President asked the cost of these operations (five million dollars). He also asked the cost of Cuban operations for the current year (21 or 2 million dollars) and the total Agency budget.

6. The intelligence summary concerning Cuba prepared by General Carter for the meeting was examined.

7. Mr. Bundy then reviewed current U.S. policy vis-a-vis Cuba. He then went down a check list of possible new courses of action taken from the Department of State paper prepared for the December 13 Standing Group meeting. Unilateral actions presented were:

(1) Air attacks by our autonomous groups. No further discussion.

(2) Selective relaxation of U.S. controls against exile groups in Florida. No comment on Mr. Bundy's generally unfavorable presentation.

(3) Military feints. No comment on generally unfavorable presentation.

(4) Low-level reconnaissance flights. Comment by Assistant Secretary Martin concerning the value of keeping open the franchise for low-level flights. Acknowledgement of certain value to the intelligence community. No decision requested.

(5) Extension of efforts to eliminate free world shipping from the Cuba trade. No decision requested.

(6) Presidential declaration concerning U.S. policy on Cuba designed to stimulate anti-Castro dissidence in the armed forces. Mr. Bundy's comments indicated that there was room for a stronger statement than that made by President Kennedy in Miami.

(7) Talks with the Soviets and the Cubans. Not elaborated and no comment.

(8) Other forms of covert actions. Not specified or elaborated.

8. In connection with bilateral and multilateral actions involving the cooperation of the OAS and nations of the Caribbean, Mr. Bundy stated that the nature and import of the recently discovered arms cache in Venezuela constitutes a point of departure for such actions as search and seizure on the high seas or an OAS-sponsored quarantine against arms shipments. Mr. Helms then briefly described the nature of the arms cache and the plans involving those arms as set forth in captured Venezuelan communist documents. Mr. Helms showed a map prepared from those documents indicating the manner in which the arms would have been used to tie up the city of Caracas during the recent election. Mr. Martin then briefed concerning OAS action with regard to the arms cache. He said that the committee appointed by the OAS to investigate had called for additional evidence from the Venezuelan government which would take two to three weeks to assemble. He said that he felt that the OAS report would be out in mid-January although the question of Cuban defense against the Venezuelan charges had not yet been resolved. Mr. Bundy referred to the efforts being made to increase the effectiveness of surveillance of arms smugglers in Central America and referred to the possibility of an OAS-sponsored search and seizure on the high seas.

9. Under Secretary Ball stated that the Department of Justice has warned that a number of students, some of more respectable stripe than the last group which visited Cuba, were planning to try to visit Cuba during the Christmas vacation and that there is evidence of larger numbers planning to do the same thing during the summer. He said that the Attorney General was bothered by this and had suggested the relaxation of present rules concerning travel to Cuba. Mr. Ball said that the Department of State is tentatively opposed to such relaxation particularly because of its effect on Latin American countries. The President strongly concurred with the Department of State position. He said that he did not propose to change or relax present regulations.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

14-00000

F6

13 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 13 December - 9:30 a. m.

1. Introduced General Carter but was unable to explain his responsibilities.

2. Introduced Peer de Silva. The President spoke briefly of what he expects of the Station and the representatives of the Government in the Saigon community.

98

3. Reviewed the Checklist. [I emphasized (a) the dangers of the hostages in Bolivia, stating however that while 21 lives are extremely important, nevertheless, we must avoid a policy decision the consequence of which might mean the lives of an undertermined thousands of people in the future. In fact I was saying we must not give the Communists the upper hand in this argument. I explained the critical location of the prisoners, and (b) I called the President's attention to the international oil situation and the deadlock between OPEC and the international oil companies and the opening that this is affording the Italians and possibly the French.]

98

4. [Noted Item C in the notes, stating we felt, from sensitive sources, Spinelli's observation was incorrect but there was a possibility of a sufficient withdrawal by the Egyptians to make a favorable demonstration of intentions by which we could persuade Fiasal to withhold military aid to the Royalists for an extended period of several months.]

NOTE: Carter and de Silva left the room at this time.

98

5.[I told the President that subject to Rusk's approval, I intended to issue a series of articles on the weakness of the Soviet economy, drainage on their gold supply, over-commitments on foreign aid, etc. for the political figures who are wavering between leaning on the]

3/mc

Soviets or the West, such as Sukarno and certain South American countries, so that they will understand they are not leaning on very much when they lean on the Soviets.

6. Explained that I had given a complete briefing to General Eisenhower and conveyed to the President General Eisenhower's expression of friendship and support.

7. Discussed briefly my talk with Robert Kennedy and urged the President to send a message to Kennedy but not to see him until after the first of the year. I asked for the President's approval to invite Kennedy to accompany me to Saigon.

> NOTE: This invitation has been extended but Kennedy felt it was untimely because of personal family commitments, responsibilities to Jackie, concern on the part of his wife, Mrs. Kennedy, and for other reasons.

8. Mr. Bundy joined in part of these discussions. The President asked what the Attorney General intended to do, that is, stay on or leave. I told the President the Attorney General intended to stay on as Attorney General, but it was not clear to what extent the President wished him to become involved in the activities outside the area of the Office of the Attorney General, such as, intelligence work, NSC problems, counter insurgency matters, etc. I explained to the President that I had told Bobby he could not bring back the intimacy of relationship with the President which he had had with his brother because that was a blood relationship, not an official relationship. A type of relationship which is seldom found between brothers and never found between officials, either in business or government.

9. I gave the President a copy of the memorandum on Soviet Foreign Aid.

JAM:mcm

1/mc

62

6 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 9:45 - 6 December 1963

The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning the procedures on MLF.

Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb. Merchant, Admiral Ricketts and General Goodpastor present at the briefing. Rusk reported that a group of "young Republicans" opposed the MLF.

Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional leaders in small groups, but to intimate that no government, including the United States Government, is committed to the MLF program.

98

[Rusk gave an optimistic report on progress and stated the most important objectives of the MLF was to give the Germans a sense of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including the United States.]

98

[McNamara stated that Mr. von Hassel had advised him that the MLF was a "must" or else the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an independent course in developing their own national nuclear weapons resources. Rusk indicated that failure to proceed with the MLF might force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons. McNamara stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force will have a military (?) utility and will permit a reduction in planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost.]

The President then suggested a briefing of Congressional leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon. [I brought up the question of security and pointed out the dangers. The President asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I possibly could without endangering sources and methods.] 98

ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al.

3/mc

98

[The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorge Bundy and McCone. I discussed the foreign aid figures as included in the 6 December memorandum and the special report on Soviet Foreign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that I would prepare for the President some special graphics which would show Soviet foreign, economic and military aid, both extensions and draw-downs, to non-Communist countries and Cuba.

> NOTE: Mr. Rostow raised the question earlier as to the validity of comparing our aid figures with USSR's aid figures because the latter did not include aid to satellites. His position is that since we include aid to NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece, South Korea, etc., we should examine USSR aid to their satellites in addition to Cuba. This should be examined. I do not know whether the figures are available.]

The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the following comments:

98

1. [I expect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover underground tests and it was quite possible they would soon make claims for vast improvements in seismology. I mentioned the recent information on the LASER beam.]

98

2. [I pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation stating the fact that the Khmer Serei clandestine radio had been located in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were broadcasting unfavorably against them.]

98

3. [I noted the additional indicators of possible conflict over Malaysia.]

I then explained to the President the source of our information that the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, was attempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief Justice Warren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into the assassination of the President. I stated that this report comes from a very reliable penetration and we evaluate it quite highly. ←

We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon. I stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me, but that I felt it was only a good move if he was to remove Ambassador Lodge. He felt that to do this would have political repercussions and would be

4/MC

tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the military junta, that it would indicate President Johnson's support of Diem rather than the present authorities. Therefore he stated he could not move to remove Lodge but hoped that Lodge would remove himself and become a candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would be the nominee. (Note: I told the President he wanted things too easy). I told the President that Lodge would destroy de Silva if he opposed his assignment or did not like him, or wished to get rid of him. The President said he would communicate most emphatically with Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write an appropriate communication. I told the President this would do no good, that Lodge was absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and he had resorted to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower administration and that he never failed to use the newspapers in order to expose an individual or block an action. I therefore could only conclude that if he was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to stay with David Smith as Chief of Station, who is a most competent officer but young and not fully experienced, but this proposal did not meet his request that the best and most experienced man we can find be placed on the job. The President said he would exercise the full power of his office to keep Lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South Vietnam are so great that CIA should have a "four-star man" on the job and that is what he wanted.

JAM/mcm

3 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President at his residence on Sunday, Dec. 1 - 10:00 o'clock - about 30 minutes. No one was in attendance.

1. Reviewed a series of reports. There was no Checklist. ✓

98

2. [The President asked about news from Venezuela, particularly concerned about Chenault.]

98

3. [Briefly reviewed a clandestine report from Bonn as a means of indicating sources to CIA not available to others.]

98

4. [Reported to the President that the UN Commission to Saigon felt a bit critical towards the U.S. presence; however we are in some doubt as to whether they will include such criticism in their public report.]

5. Briefly reviewed the final report on the Alvarado case in Mexico City.

6. The President then brought up the question of men in government. Emphasized the need for men, particularly young men. I urged the President to discuss this matter with the Business Council and with the AFL-CIO group. He said that meetings would be arranged this coming week.

98

7. [I advised the President that I was to meet with Halaby to pursue the SST problem.]

98

8. [I requested the President to instruct Bundy that Memorandums of Conversation with Heads of State should be distributed to me automatically. Also that the State Department be instructed to send such Memorandums to me. The President agreed.

NOTE: This should be followed up by Mr. Cline. Bundy will apparently discuss this matter later with the President who agreed that such distribution should be automatic except in very special circumstances in which he wished distribution held to his own personal files for reasons of his own choice. I could take no exception to this decision.]

9. We should contact Hoover concerning identification of people sending in ads and letters to the Dallas newspapers.

NOTE: I should call Hoover concerning this.

JAM/mfb (tape)

5/mc

TOP SECRET

2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
EYES ONLY--NO DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 30 November 1963

Throughout the conversation the President mentioned a number of very personal problems and asked my help and also asked that Bundy and I act as a team in trying to help him solve some of his problems.

1. He indicated that there must be some Cabinet changes. By inference he made reference to the Attorney General, but not by direct statement. Apparently he is waiting for the Attorney General to decide what role, if any, he wishes to play in the Johnson Administration.

98

2. [He stated that Secretary Celebrezze is very anxious for a judgeship and that he, Johnson, was extremely favorably impressed with Sargent Shriver and thought he would be an excellent Secretary of H. E. W. This was enthusiastically endorsed by both Bundy and myself.]

3. He raised the question of whether Mrs. Kennedy might be a very able ambassador.

98

4. [He was deeply critical of the handling of Ayub. He questioned whether Ball was the proper man to have gone forward to negotiate with Ayub. He felt that we needed a new ambassador and he asked for recommendations, the name of an ambassador who could handle that Embassy, and more particularly handle Ayub. At this point he asked that Bundy and I work together in searching out names of individuals who might be helpful in a number of critical areas. I protested his criticism of Ball, stating that I felt that Ball had done a very good job in his mission to Pakistan. The President expressed the highest regard for Ayub.]

2/mc

98

5. [He then turned to a discussion of Latin America. Expressed criticism of the Alliance for Progress. Stated that Moscoso was not the man to handle it and he should be replaced and asked who could be his replacement. He also stated that we had not handled the OAS positively enough. He was very critical of our ambassador to the OAS, Acting Ambassador Ward Allen, and asked for recommendations for a replacement.]

6. Throughout the conversation it appeared that President Johnson is not going to be satisfied with the organization as it is now composed and that he will make changes, and at the same time he does not intend to make changes just for the sake of change nor does he intend to move in the "hangers-on of the last 20 years." Apparently he has had a vast number of approaches from people who he termed to be political hacks and said he didn't want any part of any of them.

JAM:mcm

(tape)

1/mc

wZ

2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 11:00 a.m., November 30th, in attendance Mr. Bundy, meeting lasted approximately 1 1/2 hours

98

1. Reviewed the Checklist. The President immediately raised the question of what we were doing about Colonel Chennault. He expects most serious public reaction and has a feeling that we are "drifting" on this situation. I assured him we and the Venezuelan government were doing all that was possible. However, he requested more positive action on a report on the actions being taken.

NOTE: Wish a full report from the station for Sunday morning briefing.

2. No other Checklist items raised any serious questions.

3. The President again raised the question of what we were going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th, September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy meeting on Monday.

NOTE: DD/P and WH should prepare full recommendations for positive actions which might be taken unilaterally with the Caribbean states or with the OAS for my use in the policy meeting.

4. I reviewed the report from Mexico City station, 27 November, advising the number of Soviets in Cuba, indicating that this report which we thought was quite responsible more or less verified our own current estimates.

5. Reference the Oswald matter, reviewed with the President CAS Mexico City 7127 reporting on the interrogation of Alvarado. We briefly discussed the composition of the Review Board announced by the President on the 29th. Discussion of the Oswald situation was inconclusive and no action required.

98

6. [The President then brought up the question of Pakistan and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community's feeling of concern and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting between Ayub and General Taylor. The President made no comment but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack Pakistan. The President expressed the greatest of confidence in Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India. He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner.]

7. I reviewed our Cuban overflight program advising the President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which flights were being carried on.

98

8. [Reviewed briefly the TACKLE China overflight and stated these had been stood down since the loss of the last plane but we intended to resume which the President thought was proper.

> ACTION: I wish flight plans to meet COMOR priority in targets for at least two flights for submission to the Special Group next Thursday.]

98

9. [I advised the President that the ChiCom-India border flights had been completed and that we now planned to brief the Indians, Thailand and very possibly Pakistan. I stated the equipment had been withdrawn from Takhli.]

3/mc

98

10. [I advised the President that the CORONA mission was up and would be brought down on Monday. Also suggested that at an early opportunity I brief him on the CORONA program.]

98

11. [Reviewed the Venezuela overflight plan as outlined in memorandum for the Special Group and President approved.

NOTE: I have communicated this approval to General Carter and instructed him to proceed.]

JAM:mcm

(tape)

2/mc

TOP SECRET

29 November 1963

Late developments on the Mexico City investigation of Oswald's activities

---

1. Results of the first interrogation of Silvia Duran have been received. Reveals nothing other than confirmation of Oswald's effort to secure authority to enter USSR via Havana. His requests were refused.

2. Result of second interrogation of Silvia Duran has not as yet been received.

3. FBI dispatched a man from Washington to Mexico City at the request of Ambassador Mann.

4. The Nicaraguan, Alvarado, has been turned over to the Mexican authorities for questioning, by the CIA station at the specific request of the FBI.

   NOTE: CIA Headquarters refused this turn-over until FBI request received because FBIis in control of the investigation.

5. Alvarado's story becoming increasingly questionable because of a public statement carried by Mexico City radio and press prior to Alvarado's entering the picture, to the effect that Oswald had received $5,000 from the Cuban Embassy.

To be used by DCI in meeting with the President at 10:30 on 29 November 1963 with Secty. McNamara and Bundy.

CE

29 November 1963

Noted by DDCI & LBK

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at his residence with President Johnson
10:00 a.m. - Thursday - November 28th.
for approximately 30 minutes

1. The President reviewed the Checklist and made the following comments:

98

a. [Are we doing all possible to keep Venezuelan authorities informed? I reviewed briefly our penetrations and our activities.]

b. What is the real future in South Vietnam? The President expressed the desire for an objective appraisal and any recommendations that I might have for modification of policy, changes of personnel and draw up a rough estimate of what is the outlook. The President continues to be concerned over public reaction and Congressional reaction against our activities in South Vietnam. The President is obviously opposed to Lodge (his opposition goes back to conflicts in the Senate). He asked for recommendations as to who would be a good man and who could run the American team.

He noted Item b. in the Check list and I pointed out the press exaggeration and distortion which appeared in the New York Times. He asked that I personally meet with the head of the Times in New York, pointing out how such distorted reports seriously damage the American interests. I stated that I would do this.

98

[We discussed Item 2.f. having to do with the high level of communications traffic and I stated that this could be considered as an unfavorable indicator.

The President noted without comment report on Israel, USSR, India military aid and Burma.]

98

c. [The President asked what the outlook was with Greece. I told him that we expected that Karamanlis would eventually be restored to power. The President stated that he had vigorously opposed our]

1 2 - noted by
DDCI + Kirkpatrick
.. 11

3/mc

98

[withdrawal of assistance to Karamanlis, which he felt had a great deal to do with his loss of office.]

98

d. [I pointed out to the President that we could expect some trouble in Brazil.]

98

e. [The President asked about the future of Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey. I stated that we expected that his government would fall and that he would lose office soon after his return.]

98

f. [I repeated to the President briefly my meeting with President Macapagal which is covered in a separate memorandum prepared by Mr. Colby.]

98

g. [Also I raised the question of the importance of our taking iniative in the Indonesia matter by working with Macapagal. We might bring Indonesia round and also straighten out the Malayasia problem.]

2. The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro. He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations. In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study carefully various courses of action.

98

3. [The President then raised the question of the deal between the Rumanian government and the Ferguson company for the procurement of a steel mill and asked whether I thought this was a good thing. I replied affirmatively, stating that in my opinion economic relations with the satellites would tend to break down the closemess of ties between the satellites in Moscow and this should be a very definite policy effort on our part. I noted that Moscow had discouraged the Rumanian steel mill because it did not fit into their pattern of economic integration of the satellites and the Soviet Union. The President then stated that he agreed that we should attempt to pull the satellites away. He then brought up the question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best man who could serve as Ambassador to Yugoslavia who would be able to "win the girl away from Khrushchev." He said that in his opinion this man should be an experienced, able man, perhaps in his 50's and preferably a Republican, who could carry the confidence of the Republicans and a personality who could win Tito's confidence and allegiance. I responded by stating that I would prepare a list of competent people who I felt could]

6/mc

98

[serve in this capacity and also in others. In this connection, the President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment. His request for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yugoslavia and the satellites is along the same line as to who would be a good representative in South Vietnam.]

4. The President asked concerning our relationships on the Hill. I said that they were excellent. The only problem was a continual harangue for a Joint Committee on Intelligence. I said that I felt that if Senator Russell would expand his Committee to include Fulbright and Hickenlooper, and Vinson expand his Committee to include two members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the issue would be put to rest. The President said he thought this was a good idea and that he would speak to both Fulbright and Russell about it.

98 5. [I then reviewed the brochure on the OXCART by giving the President a broad picture of this development. I explained that surfacing of it was a problem which had been under consideration by Defense and CIA which I had discussed with President Kennedy. I said that McNamara was pressing for a rather early release but that President Kennedy felt that the timing of the surfacing was of very great importance. I said that I felt that the timing was even of greater importance now and I had some reservations about surfacing this vehicle in the first few days of President Johnson's administration. The President seemed to agree and suggested that McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and I meet with him on Friday for a discussion of this problem.]

No arrangements were made as to the time of Friday morning's briefing.

JAM/mfb (tape)

2/mc

26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 25 November and 26 November

1. On Monday, November 25th, there was no briefing of the President, although there was a short visit with him at the State reception on Monday evening. The President then expressed regret that events of the day prevented a briefing and asked if there was any development requiring his attention. I replied there was none and would call him if any developments came to my attention.

2. On Tuesday, the 26th, I briefed the President, reviewing all items on the Check List and the world reaction summary contained in the Bulletin. Briefing and discussion on other matters consumed about 15 or 20 minutes.

3. The President asked if our entire applicable resources had been made available to the FBI in connection with their report, which he had ordered. I replied affirmatively.

NOTE: I should call J. Edgar Hoover concerning this.
(DCI did this at 11:20 on 11/26/63)

4. The President asked my appraisal of the situation in Vietnam. I replied that I was less optimistic than was the report received from Ambassador Lodge.

5. Mr. Bundy stated the first order of business was to assist State and assign a Deputy Chief of Mission capable of running the Country Team and the American official community. Bundy recommended Mr. Sullivan, Harriman's deputy. The President plans to have a man in position not later than January first.

6. McCone stated that there remained a number of individuals in Saigon who continued to be troublemakers and should be removed. Bundy confirmed this and stated actions were to be taken. No names were mentioned.

NOTE: Apparently the President's appointment secretary will be a Mr. Moyers. We should get to know him.

7. The President noted with some considerable contempt the fact that certain people in the Department of Justice had suggested to him on Saturday that an independent investigation of the President's assassination should be conducted by a high level group of attorneys and jurists, probably headed by Governor Dewey. President Johnson rejected this idea, and then heard that the identical plan was to be advanced in a lead editorial in the Washington Post. The President felt this was a deliberate plant and he was exceedingly critical. He personally intervened, but failed with Mr. Al Friendly and finally "killed" the editorial with Mrs. Graham.

JAM/TMLee/mfb

25 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: South Vietnam Situation

ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball,
Messrs. Bundy and McCone, Ambassador Lodge
Nov 24th - 3 PM Exec Office Bldg.

1. Ambassador Lodge reported that the change in government had been an improvement, that he was hopeful over the outlook, that he expected a speedup of the war, he thought by February or March we would see marked progress. Lodge stated that we were not involved in the coup, though we put pressures on the South Vietnamese government to change its course and those pressures, most particularly on indications of withdrawal by 1965, encouraged the coup. Lodge stated that there were indications that North Vietnam might be interested in arrangements which would be of a nature satisfactory to us. He did not elaborate. He that that everybody was very happy after the coup and showed some pictures of the crowds in Saigon. He mentioned that Gen. Don would be here and that those talking with him should influence him to put on all the pressure he could. He spoke most highly of the Papal delegate and his intention to see the Pope on Wednesday. He carried with him a letter from the Papal Delegate and also from the Bishop of Saigon, apparently praising the actions in upsetting the Diem government. Lodge said he saw dangers of an anti-Christian move and this was his purpose in seeing the Pope. He made a point that Bishop Thuc had engaged in serious persecutions involving the imprisonment of a great many people, including three Catholic priests. He also made the point that Can, Diem's brother, also engaged in a variety of activities of persecution and the execution of individuals and that Can had, on his own premises, a burial ground for his victims. Lodge said that we were in no way responsible for the death of Diem and Nhu, that had they followed his advice, they would be alive today. He said that he saved Can from assassination and that Bishop Thuc was out of Saigon under orders from the Papal delegate. (Note: I question whether the Papal delegate can order a Bishop out of a country.) The tone of Ambassador Lodge's statements were optimistic, hopeful, and left the President with the impression that we are on the road to victory.

The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)
Reviewed on 9/22/98

I see no basis for CIA's objection.

At this point McCone stated that our estimate of the situation was somewhat more serious. We had noted a continuing increase in Viet Cong activity since the first of November as evidenced by a larger number of Viet Cong attacks. We also noticed with considerable concern a high level of message volume on the Viet Cong military and political networks and this might quite possibly reflect preparations for further sustained guerrilla pressures. Furthermore I stated that the military were having considerable trouble in completing the political organization of the government and were receiving little if any help from civilian leadership. Indeed it seemed to us that the competent civilians were staying on the sidelines and continuing their traditional role of critics rather than turning in and being helpful. I concluded by stating that we could not at this point or time give a particularly optimistic appraisal of the future.

The President then stated that he approached the situation with some misgivings. He noted that a great many people throughout the country questioned our course of action in supporting the overthrow of the Diem regime. He also noted that strong voices in the Congress felt we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these facts give the President considerable concern. He stated that he was not at all sure that we took the right course in upsetting the Diem regime but this was a decision that he did not have to make as it was a fait accompli. He said now that it was done, we have to see that our objectives were accomplished. (Note: The inferences were that, left to his own devices, he would not have supported the courses of action which led to the coup.)

The President then stated he has never been happy with our operations in Vietnam. He said there had been serious dissension and divisions within the American community and he told the Ambassador that he was in total charge and he wanted the situation cleaned up. He wanted no more divisions of opinion, no more bickering and any person that did not conform to policy should be removed. At this point Mr. Bundy stated that we were searching for a replacement for Truehart and what we wanted was a capable administrator who could run the Country Team. The President again repeated his insistence that the Ambassador was the Number One man and he, the President, was holding the Ambassador personally responsible.

Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined the economic situation and that he felt we must give generously of economic aid and must not ask the South Vietnamese government to do the impossible at this particular time.

The President then said that he supported this, but at the same time he wanted to make it abundantly clear that he did not think we had to reform every Asian into our own image. He said that he felt all too often when we engaged in the affairs of a foreign country we wanted to immediately transform that country into our image and this, in his opinion, was a mistake. He was anxious to get along, win the war - he didn't want as much effort placed on so-called social reforms.

Note: I received in this meeting the first "President Johnson tone" for action as contrasted with the "Kennedy tone". Johnson definitely feels that we place too much emphasis on social reforms; he has very little tolerance with our spending so much time being "do-gooders"; and he has no tolerance whatsoever with bickering and quarreling of the type that has gone on in South Vietnam.

The meeting was followed by a statement to the press which was given out by Bundy to the effect that we would pursue the policies agreed to in Honolulu adopted by the late President Kennedy. A picture was taken of the President with Lodge, McNamara, Rusk and Ball.

JAM (tape)/mfb

References: 1. IN-66988, 23 Nov 63
2. SC No. 11709/63, 18 Nov 63
Subj: The Military Situation in South Vietnam

McCone position

Pres- approach with urgency

People question commi
Congress get out

Both Gov Pres. concern

Never happy with operation

clean up and win - no diversions

[illegible] [illegible]

And personally responsible

McN -
Economic aid
done: ask impossible

Pres
don't reform

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 November 1963

DAILY BRIEF

*South Vietnam: The accelerated tempo of Viet Cong activity in the post-coup period continues.

While the 149 Viet Cong attacks recorded during the week ending 18 November are a drop from the previous week's record high of 233, the number is still about 50 percent above normal for this year. The attacks continue to be on a small-scale. They are targeted primarily against strategic hamlets and outposts, with government paramilitary forces bearing the brunt.

24

Continuing high message volumes on Viet Cong military and political networks may reflect preparations for sustained guerrilla pressures.

The Saigon government apparently is proceeding with a purge of military officers holding high military, intelligence, and provincial posts under Diem. On 22 November it announced the suspension of 31 officers. Some of these are under arrest. The purges may be partly in response to the demands of student and Buddhist groups seeking revenge against prominent figures who sided with Diem during the Buddhist crisis. (TOP SECRET DINAR)

99

Hopeful
speed up war
Feb. March
Progress

Permanence or NON

Not involved in
Coup but
put on pressure

everybody happy
after Coup

[illegible] - put
overall pressure

Papal delegate
communication
see Pope

Danger of
anti Christian
move

Those engaged
in persecution
including 3
Catholic priest

Can - own
cemetery -
persecutions

Not responsible for
death of people

4A

14-00000

26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson - Sunday, November 24th at 10:00 a. m.

I briefed President Johnson at his residence at 10:00 a. m. Briefing consumed approximately 20 minutes. Reviewed the Checklist and I made the following points:

98

1. I explained the space event. [Soviet ships are in place which would indicate a long range ICBM test. However, the ranges are not up, the area is not cleared and therefore the possibility is that a planned ICBM or Lunar shot has been deferred.]

2. I stated I felt the President should, at an early opportunity, receive a briefing on Soviet long range ~~defensive~~ offensive capability, their current air defense capability and the status of the Soviet economy.

3. I referred briefly to our estimate of the Cuban situation, the condition of their economy and our operational plans against Cuba.

4. I stated that we are watching Venezuela and Ecuador with great care. I gave the President a copy of the November 24th Summary of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination.

JAM:mcm

1/mc

25 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson, November 23rd, about 9:15 a.m. The conversation lasted approximately 15 minutes.

1. The President entered Mr. Bundy's office alone and no one was present during the conversation.

2. The President opened the conversation by recalling a long background of association and friendship with me personally, his respect for the Agency, the fact that on a number of issues that had arisen since I took office as DCI he and I had seen eye to eye, he had complete confidence in me and expressed the wish that I continue in the future exactly as I have in the past.

3. I confirmed my confidence in him, my desire to help and support him in every way and my willingness to continue in the future as I have in recent months.

4. The President then asked of any world developments. I reviewed details of the Checklist with him and explained the institution of the "President's Checklist" with which he was not familiar. I stated that we would continue the publication of the Checklist in the future as we had in the past.

5. It was agreed that for the next few days I would brief the President in the morning personally and that senior staff officers would brief the President's staff each morning as I have in the past. The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no intermediary.

6. At 12:30 I went to the President's office in the Executive Office Building to tell him of the information received from Mexico City. In attendance was Mr. Bundy. Following this I had a brief exchange with President Eisenhower who was visiting with President Johnson at the time.

7. This evening I called Secretary Rusk and reviewed with him the information received from Mexico City, most particularly the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald. I explained to Rusk the information that we had transmitted to the FBI and to the authorities in Dallas. Rusk had not known of these developments prior to my communication with him.

8. I offered the assistance on the part of Mrs. McCone and me personally and also the Agency in connection with the appropriate handling of official visitors arriving from all over the world who might overwhelm the State Department's capacity. Rusk appreciated this offer and said he would call on me. He further said that there may be visitors we would like to meet with and, if so, he would make appropriate arrangements. He indicated that he intended to avoid having all incoming visitors appear as guests of the United States. Each had their own embassy to take care of them, however, he thought there might be some obligations in which I could be helpful. He said that following the Arlington service on Monday afternoon he would hold a reception in the Department which would be in the form of some kind of a buffet and this would be the extent of any planned activities. He thought it was quite probable that the President would meet with several Heads of States at various times on Tuesday and Wednesday.

JAM:mcm
(tape)

104-10306-10020 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

1105

General Carter:

Here is your written message. I have taken no actions.

Elder

SECRET

30 October 1962

URGENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter

At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President directed as follows:

1. CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercize every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made. This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.

2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down operations during the next several days.

3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.

> NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26) and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these operations should be suspended for the next several days.
>
> NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M.

4. The President requested that all the principals who are attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days. Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan. (This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.)

SECRET

SECRET

30 October 1962

URGENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter

At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President directed as follows:

1. CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercise every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made. This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.

2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down operations during the next several days.

3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.

> NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26) and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these operations should be suspended for the next several days.
>
> NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M.

4. The President requested that all the principals who are attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days. Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan. (This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.)

SECRET

The above has been communicated to you by telephone. This memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementation by you.

/s/

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

JAM/mfb
Orig & 3cc to addressee
1cc - DCI chrono
1cc - DCI #5 file

SECRET

The above has been communicated to you by telephone. This memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementation by you.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

13-00000

SECRET-EYES ONLY

November 14, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter, DDCI

Attached is a copy of a memorandum for my file outlining policy decision in connection with the Cuban prisoner transaction. In your absence this memorandum was discussed with Messrs. Helms, Houston, Miskovsky and McManus, and upon receiving final approval from higher authority at 1:45, Mr. Houston was instructed by me to initiate appropriate actions.

It is exceedingly important that great care be exercised to minimize the publicity and to emphasize humanitarian interest on the part of the United States Government in securing the release of the prisoners. Both the President and the Attorney General are anxious that the explanations given the Cuban Families Committee be handled with great care. I agree with this and urge that extreme caution be taken to avoid attribution or CIA implication in this matter.

SIGNED

John A. McCone
Director

Attachment

JAM:at
1 cc - DCI Chrono
✓1 cc - DCI Memoranda
1 cc - Memo for the Record

SECRET-EYES ONLY

[illegible] ONLY

14 November 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN PRISONERS.

The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney General at 10:30 a.m., on Thursday, November 14, at the DCI's request.

McCone explained that he had had dinner the evening before with Mr. Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury, legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry Association).

Mr. Foley had questioned DCI concerning the negotiations for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some 50 million dollars in drugs, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with members of the industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed at length at the Industry's Board of Trustees meeting in New York on November 16th.

Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding of the Government's position, most particularly in view of Cuban developments of the last three weeks.

After explaining to Foley the background of the transaction I told him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a topic of current discussion among members of the Industry.

In the meeting with the Attorney General I expressed grave concern over the situation, pointing out that CIA had 20 million dollars on covert deposit in the Bank of Canada 29 and that two Letters of Credit had been issued by the Bank, one in the amount of 10 million dollars to Pfizer 29, and one for seven million dollars to Merck. 29 As long as this money was on deposit and the letters outstanding, there was a danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug industry, or both. Despite the fact that no official government

3/mc

connection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the Administration and CIA in the negotiation because of recent press stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles) identifying Administration and CIA activities and citing the exact amount of 17 million dollars as representing the Government cost of the drugs. I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members of the drug industry made it almost a certainty that "leaks" would come from industry sources as long as the letter of credit were outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan's denials.

Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if an article appeared indicating we were still pursuing this transaction, the American public and a great many others would be confused and disenchanted.

For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange for the bank to withdraw the Letters of Credit, and for the withdrawal of a substantial part of the money from the [Bank of 29 Canada]. Also advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that action be commenced today.

The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of action.

We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families Committee and possibly to Miro Cardona that we were in no way abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the negotiation aside pending further developments on other important problems involving our Cuban relationship.

McCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher authority. The latter was communicated to the DCI by telephone at 1:45 p.m.

Copy to General Carter w/
covering memo

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

1/JMc

November 6, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Cline, DD (I)

SUBJECT: Castro as a Threat to the Americas.

I think that in analyzing Castro's potential in the Western Hemisphere as covered by paragraphs 9 through and including 21, we should consider his posture and potential under various alternatives of possible United States decisions and probable Soviet policies.

Let us assume for the moment that the United States meets the exact letter of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange and no more. This would mean the withdrawal of IL 28s, the halting of the establishment of a submarine base, and some acceptable form of inspection verifying the removal and assuring against the reintroduction of offensive devices, U.S. commits not to invade. At this point U.S. commitment on propaganda, sabotage, guerrilla activities and other actions designed to overthrow Castro is not very clear, but I think that we can assume that such activities if attempted would be no more successful in the future than they have been in the past, which is about zero.

Having reached this point, the Soviets have at least three alternatives:

One, they can abandon Castro, reduce military and economic aid, cut their losses, and in such event Castro would soon collapse. Current intelligence does not support such a probable Soviet course of action, otherwise they would not be disposed to leave such quantities of extremely valuable modern military hardware, including the SAM sites, communications equipment, and extensive Naval and ground equipment and a large number of technicians.

Second, they could maintain about the same level of economic and military support as in the past, although I would feel this could not be a very reasonable assumption from the standpoint of military support as the presence of large amounts of additional military equipment, including those mentioned above, would necessitate a higher level of military support than before in order to provide operational readiness, training, maintenance, spare parts, replacements, etc. This does not mean more economic support although I think Castro could insist upon it on the grounds that Soviet equipment is a burden to him and of course Dorticos alluded to this in statements in New York.

Third, the Soviets having accomplished one of their objectives, that of securing a U.S. guarantee against invasion, will increase their military and economic aid so that all military materiel will be workable at all times and the Castro economy will be reasonably well off.

Under each of these alternatives, Castro's posture and his effect on the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries will differ vastly and I would suggest that your paper be oriented so that it will project for the benefit of policy makers the consequences, favorable or unfavorable, under these several alternatives.

It is my personal opinion that Mikoyan will return to New York in a few days and will announce an agreement for some perfunctory Red Cross ground inspection of the missile sites and nothing else, will deny any intention of a submarine base, will dismiss the IL 28 issue as wholly beyond the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement, will indicate that all Soviets are leaving Cuba except economic and agricultural advisers, and will state most persuasively that the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement has been fulfilled to the letter and demand our non-invasion commitment.

He will then build Castro up and indicate Soviet intention for supporting in every way and to go right down the line with him.

Castro will feel secure, his political and military structure will be manageable, and Cuba will be used by Castro and the Soviets more aggressively in the future than it has in the past in disturbing Western Hemisphere countries.

This is the situation I fear, and I think our policy makers whose negotiations are trending toward the establishment of a set of conditions and commitments which will make the third case mentioned above a probability, should have the benefit of our thinking as to the consequences. In doing this, equal attention should be given to the first two alternatives.

In further reference to the paper, the historical background is excellent, the country by country annex useful, although if time permitted we might get the chiefs of station to give the current view of their contacts as Win Scott did. The inventory of equipment is useful but I propose that it be broken down into three columns, a pre-July 1st, 1962, added since July 1962, and the total as of now.

John A. McCone

26 September 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: CIA activities in South Viet Nam

1. Prior to January 1962 the CIA maintained a modest station in South Viet Nam, the purpose of which was to support the Ambassador and Headquarters with reports on the internal situation in South Viet Nam, the activities of the Viet Cong and the Communists and their threat to the government, and to assist the government in its internal security problems. Among other things we trained and equipped Special Forces whose mission was to conduct a variety of unconventional activities such as the infiltration of V.C. centers, interdiction of supply routes, interfering with V.C. communications, sabotaging V.C. efforts, harrassment, etc.

The CIA station created about a dozen training centers throughout South Viet Nam in which selected nearby villagers would be trained in community defense and civic action. It issued arms and thus provided the actual defense of the strategic hamlets created in the areas. These activities were carried on with the support of the U.S. Special Forces. As the activities expanded, a determination was made to shift prime responsibility to the military, with CIA in support, and the switch has been accomplished successfully. About 75,000 South Viet Namese have been trained.

CIA created a South Viet Namese intelligence organization, established a civilian intelligence system and trained the personnel. In addition the Agency assisted in the development of intelligence apparatus within the SVN military.

In addition a variety of activities were supported designed to assist the basic objective of winning the war.

Without exception all CIA programs in South Viet Nam were coordinated with the Ambassador and also in Washington. CIA took no unilateral actions nor involved itself in designing policy. CIA has been represented at all policy meetings in Washington, including NSC and Executive Committee meetings and all of the McNamara-Pearl Harbor meetings held to review progress. The activities of the station were examined by all inspection teams such as General Wheeler's mission, General Krulak's several missions, Mr. Forrestal's missions, etc. At no time prior to recent surge of critical publicity have CIA's activities in Saigon been reported other than cooperative and an integral part of an accepted and agreed policy.

2. CIA Reporting.

In June 1962 I traveled extensively in South Viet Nam. I reported upon my return that repressive measures of the Diem/Nhu regime were causing considerable criticism and that there was danger of a coup. This situation was watched carefully by our CIA station and at frequent intervals we reported that the image of the regime was tarnishing and hence its effectiveness was questionable. A number of estimates and a great number of reports and appraisals were issued, each one warning that the deterioration of the regime's popularity gave rise to serious question concerning the future trend of the war and CIA warned that unless corrective measures were taken by the regime to improve its image, it was quite possible the war would be lost or that a popular uprising would cause the removal of the regime. For 18 months at frequent intervals rumors of coups were received by our station and were reported to the Ambassador and to Washington. Throughout this period our Chief of Station at the direction of the Ambassador met once every two weeks with Ngo Dinh Nhu, explored all problems relating to the situations in which we had a common interest, and reported to the Ambassador. Contacts were also maintained with many groups in South Viet Nam, with military leaders and with knowledgeable citizens.

A review of the reporting over 18 months and resulting estimates bear out that the Agency consistently warned of the deteriorating situation and the possible consequences.

During this period we also analyzed the progress of the war and the thrust of our reporting was to the effect that as the American advisers were able to exercise their influence on the South Viet Namese military, and our Embassy and General Harkins were able to persuade Diem to reorient and redeploy his forces, gradual but consistent favorable progress was made.

3. Attitude of the Station and Others

In any difficult situation involving guerrilla warfare where progress can not be measured in territory won or lost, and in casualties and prisoners, differences of opinion among observers arise. Likewise Americans required to work with a stubborn and authoritarian regime often become exasperated by the difficulties involved. Furthermore Americansaccustomed to our civil liberties, freedoms, and the rights of the individual are shocked by the conduct of a government which deprives the individual of these privileges. Finally an American community living among natives, many of whom are viciously critical of the government (and this is the case in Saigon and Hue), are bound to be influenced by, and to a degree espouse, these criticisms.

For these reasons there have been serious differences within the American community.

Within the CIA station there are differences of opinion. Some feel the cause is hopeless with the Diem regime in power. Others feel it best to go along with the regime until a better one appears. The reporting has been, however, consistent and has coincided with the views of Ambassador Nolting.

Within AID and USIA there have been strong differences of opinion and the same is true of the Embassy staff. On the other hand, the military which is devoted to the single task of defeating the Viet Cong, had turned its back on political problems and concentrated on military problems and have been steadfast in refusing to be deterred by internal political issues.

Many people have become highly emotional, have talked too much and have given the impression of very deep splits.

orig - used by DCI at Reston luncheon - 9/26/63
2 cc - W. Elder

4. Situation in the last several weeks.

The Hue incident on May 8th was a serious setback for the Diem Government. The agreement with the Buddhists on June 16th was designed to improve the situation. The agreement was never carried out. Increasing agitation by the Buddhists culminated in the raids on the pagodas on August 21. This was carried out apparently at the direction of Nhu by the Special Forces, some of whom are in the Saigon - Hue area and by the military. In this connection it is to be noted that neither MACV nor CIA maintained absolute control over the deployment of the Special Forces and it is to be noted that substantial units of them were deployed to the north and engaged in their regular assignments.

The action on August 21 broke the camel's back as far as those in the United States Government who felt that the cause would be lost if the Diem regime remained. Therefore, a cable was sent to the Ambassador instructing him to insist on effective reforms including reducing the influence and authority of the Nhus and if this could not be accomplished by persuasion to take such action as would accomplish this objective even though it meant removing the regime.

The fault in this instruction was that there existed at the time no firm estimate as to the possibility of successfully reforming the regime and no plan for a successor regime.

At this point CIA was asked by the Ambassador and General Harkins to query certain military leaders and to determine whether the resentment had created a body of opinion among the military, the Security Forces and the public that would carry off a coup and establish a new government. CIA reported this condition did not exist. During the week of August 26 and without taking a position as to whether the regime should or should not be removed, the Agency urged care and deliberation. It pointed out that to act precipitously and without assurance of success a civil war would inevitably result, the war against the Viet Cong would be lost and the Communists would take over.

This position was highly exasperating to those who wished to move precipitously. It is for this reason that the advocates of action to move precipitously without coordination and without intelligence support are now carrying on a campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency and the Station.

see page 5

13-00000

2 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

You will note from the very brief memorandum of my discussion with Secretary Rusk that he made two requests -- the first, a study of the reasons for lack of action of the Communists in Southeast Asia. This is a matter I discussed at this morning's meeting and I hope that we can have an OCI memorandum on my return.

The second question was concerning clandestine channels to Castro, the Chinese Communists and Hanoi. This should be given serious thought by DDP. Each situation differs. I am sure we could, if we desired, open up a channel to Castro. The Peiping and Hanoi situations are more difficult. In one respect there is a channel open to Peiping through Warsaw, but it is not effective. Perhaps the [Taipei Station] 13-6 would have some thoughts 8 on this. Also, there is a channel to Hanoi through the [Canadian] representative on the ICC; however this obviously is an "official" channel and is not very productive. I think it would be well to go over this matter with Dick Helms when he returns.

Secretary Rusk expects comments on both these points next week.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

Attached:
Copy of MR on Discussion with Secretary Rusk

[illegible]

#5 file

2/mc

SECRET
EYES ONLY

2 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 2 January 1964.

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.
Colonel Steakley was present for Items 3 and 4.

1. Cuba - Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations During January 1964.

The infiltration/exfiltration operations in the January 1964 forecast were approved. Three sabotage operations, numbers 3111, 414, and 417, were approved by the Special Group subject to the concurrence of higher authority. Decision was deferred on a sabotage operation, number 413, against the petroleum refinery and storage facilities near Santiago. Mr. Johnson said that before he could exercise judgment as to the importance of this operation he must have an analysis as to what effect the total or partial destruction of this refinery would have on Cuban petroleum production and economy generally. The Group agreed that such an analysis should be prepared and be presented along with this sabotage operation for Special Group action at its next meeting.

2. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations During December 1963.

Mr. FitzGerald reviewed the accomplishments during the month of December. He emphasized a successful exfiltration activity of a recently activated ratline. This is the second time in two months that this ratline has successfully exfiltrated agents in danger of arrest. He also gave a resume of the underwater demolition operation (number 3117) which damaged a Cuban PT boat (Soviet-type P-6). Also, during the same operation self-destroying anti-boat mines were placed in the harbor entrance to inhibit pursuit. One of the mines was detected resulting in a Cuban government directive to all ports to take precautionary measures.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET
EYES ONLY

3. DOD Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast. 98

Mr. Johnson presented a paper dated 30 December 1963 expressing the State Department's concern regarding a number of the missions described in the January 1964 schedule of the Joint Reconnaissance Center. Mr. Johnson enumerated the types of missions which he regarded as particularly sensitive, such as: (a) coordinated or dual missions involving two planes in the same area at the same time; (b) those flown too close to Soviet territory; (c) radical changes in altitude of planes while under surveillance of Soviet radar; and (d) other radical variations of route.

Mr. Johnson listed 14 BOX TOP missions on which State Department needed further study before approval would be given. These missions are as follows: Jane, Paula, Ruby, Cliff, Alf, Eric, Marvin, Frank, Dwight, Karl, Lloyd, Everett, Hugh, and Calvin. The Special Group requested a coordinated position on these missions as to their necessity and whether they can be run without a significant or provocative pattern change while under Soviet radar surveillance. This coordinated position is to be presented to the Special Group at its next meeting. All other missions in the JRC forecast were approved.

98

4. NRO Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast.

The NRO forecast (paper dated 20 December 1963) was approved as presented. General Carter gave a resume of the excellence and uniqueness of the information obtained in the "T" and "C" series.

5. The North Vietnam Working Group. 98

Mr. Johnson reported that the Interdepartmental Working Group on North Vietnam Operations has about concluded its report. All members of the Special Group agreed that the report should be critically noted at the highest levels of the Government. It should then be reviewed by the Special Group and presented to higher authority for decision.

Paul Eckel
Paul Eckel

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

SECRET
EYES ONLY

3/mc

SECRET

EYES ONLY

10 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 9 January 1964

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

The Attorney General and Mr. FitzGerald were present for Items 1 and 2.

Colonel Steakley and Mr. Kiefer were present for Item 3.

1. Cuba - Consideration of Sabotage Operations.

Mr. FitzGerald requested the Special Group to approve a sabotage operation against the petroleum refinery and storage facilities near Santiago. The proposal was disapproved.

Another sabotage proposal was made by Mr. FitzGerald against a sawmill located on the north coast of Oriente Province. The attack is to be conducted by a commando team which will place incendiaries and demolitions at critical locations throughout the installation. A second target, which may be attacked as security factors permit, is a large floating crane which has been anchored in the area and which appears to be used in loading ore from a near-by mine. This operational proposal with its two targets was approved subject to the concurrence of higher authority. Also, it was the consensus of the Group that the views of higher authority should be obtained on what is desired generally in the field of sabotage activities in Cuba.

2. Cuba - Proposed Clandestine Intelligence Operations.

The Department of the Army requested approval for two operations: (a) the establishment of a clandestine net using the Second National Front of the Escambray, and (b) the infiltration of a radio operator agent into Cuba. CIA has agreed to provide support for both these proposals. The two operations were approved.

See special minutes
for additional item

SECRET

EYES ONLY

98

3. Revised January Peripheral Reconnaissance Schedule.

The JRC paper dated 8 January 1964 was approved as amended. No change was made in the following BOX TOP missions: Jane, Paula, Ruby, Eric, Marvin, Frank, Dwight, Lloyd, Karl, Everett, and Hugh. Operations Cliff and Alf were amended resulting in the cancellation of Operation Cliff. Mission Calvin's track was changed permitting it to approach the Latvian coast no closer than 25 nautical miles rather than 20 miles as originally proposed.

Mr. McCone raised the question of the increasing number of flights authorized by the JRC. Colonel Steakley said that the number of supporting flights required for every reconnaissance platform was largely responsible for the increase. He also pointed out that there is currently a review of COMOR requirements for Cuba being prepared to determine whether they can be eased in order to permit a considerably lessened operational schedule.

98

4. Monthly Report No. 12 on North Vietnam.

This report was noted by the Special Group.

Paul Eckel

Paul Eckel

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

2/mc

wR

31 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Proposed Cuban Operations for February 1964

Special Group members approved by telephone the following infiltration/exfiltration operations proposed for February: Numbers 411, 415, 421, 422, 423, 425, 3121, and 3126.

Operations involving sabotage (Numbers 414, 424, 3111, and 3112) were not considered by Group members pending an overall review of Cuban operations, now completed but not yet studied.

Peter Jessup

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Vance
- Mr. McCone

MSC

SECRET
EYES ONLY

14 February 1964 File

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 13 February 1964

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Mr. Thomas A. Mann, and Mr. Desmond FitzGerald were present for Item 1.

Lt. General Marshall A. Carter was present for Items 1 and 2.

1. Cuba - Covert Activities.

A lengthy discussion took place on covert action potential to weaken the Castro regime. The first part of the discussion constituted an exchange of opinion of a general nature.

The following points were emphasized: Continued covert action received support although divergence on the level of activity was registered. There was a consensus that the present level of operations was no longer effective in attaining the basic objective of toppling Castro but harassment might keep the regime off balance. There was an area of disagreement on proofs of effectiveness of current and past measures.

Mr. Bundy summarized the dilemma by noting that the high risk, dangerous operations are the rewarding ones and the low noise, innocuous operations prove to be unrewarding.

Mr. Mann emphasized that considerably more homework had to be completed before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled). Mr. Bundy indicated that a Cabinet level meeting with higher authority would have to be held eventually to determine how far the United States was willing to go. Mr. Bundy turned the discussion to the specific Department of Defense paper.

On Sabotage, Mr. Vance stated that he could speak for the Secretary of Defense; his attitude had turned to a harder line.

On Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba, paragraph 2.a. was considered work in progress. On paragraph 2.b. the attitude was negative, particularly as to ships of other than Cuban flag.

On Covert Economic Activities, paragraph 3.a. is part of the present program. Paragraphs 3.b. and c. are part of an overall blacklisting problem which remains to be explored.

On Encouraging Dissidence Among Factions, the consensus was to intensify these activities.

Actions against Cuban Subversion in Latin America, paragraphs 1 and 2: A good look should be taken at this type of activity and a determination should be made on a country-by-country and case-by-case basis.

On the last paragraph of the paper, it was decided that these efforts constitute work in progress with the exception of shipping surveillance which is under active study by the Department of Defense. A paper on this problem will be ready next week. It was understood that this was an expression of members' opinion on types of action but that specific operational proposals would be submitted to the Special Group as heretofore.

Mr. Bundy then asked Mr. Mann to prepare papers covering the major issues of Caribbean surveillance, the blacklisting of firms trading with Havana, covert actions, and types of retaliation.

2. Review Programs

On the review programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan, and China, it was agreed that the papers as prepared were the most useful way to present the material to members. Mr. Vance indicated he had a number of questions in depth but that he would not take the time at this meeting. Mr. McCone then directed that the area specialists would be made available at Mr. Vance's convenience to answer any questions he might have. Mr. Bundy concluded that since a time factor was not involved, formal approval of these papers could be made at a future meeting. Mr. Johnson remarked that State had already registered its approval. 98

Peter Jessup

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone

17

24 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 20 February 1964

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

98

The "Proposed Covert Funding of the Somali Parliamentary Elections" was approved by the Special Group.

The previously considered review program papers on France, Japan, Tibet, Taiwan, and China also were approved.

The minutes of the Special Group meeting of 13 February 1964 were modified at the request of Mr. Vance in the following context: In paragraph one under "Cuba - Covert Activities," subheading Sabotage, the phrase "he fully supported the paper under discussion" has been substituted for "his attitude had turned to a harder line."

Peter Jessup

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone

See Special Minutes
for additional item

1/mc.

13-00000

28 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 27 February 1964

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. Bruce Cheever was also present for Item 1.

1. Cuba

The Special Group approved the following infiltration/exfiltration and/or caching and resupply operations: Numbers 411, 3121, 415, 422, 431, 3126, 432, 423, 416, 433, 434, and 3122, with the proviso that in regard to Number 434, a double agent operation, the cache would contain money and medicine but no weapons in case the Cubans decide to terminate the operation and publicize the cache.

The four sabotage missions, specifically Numbers 414, 3111, 424, and 3119, were again placed in abeyance pending eventual resolution by higher authority of the entire problem of higher noise level operations.

98

2. [Kenya

The Political Action Operation on Kenya was approved without discussion.]

Peter Jessup

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone

Please see special minute for additional items.

1/mc

✓

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 2 April 1964

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.
Mr. John Waller was present for Item 3.
Colonel Ralph D. Steakley was present for Item 4.

1. Cuba - Proposed Operations during April 1964.

In discussing the proposed Cuban operations for the month of April 1964 and three separate papers submitted to all members for noting, the following conclusions were reached: The five infiltration/exfiltration operations were approved as were the five caching operations. However, the five sabotage proposals were tabled.

Referring to the paper entitled, "Status of Sabotage and Raiding Capability against Cuba," Mr. FitzGerald emphasized the economic and morale aspects of maintaining this potential and the influences of deterioration when it remains in stand-by status. Mr. Bundy then stated that the time was overdue for submitting to higher authority the entire question of covert operations against Cuba. The problem of autonomous exile groups and their potential for conducting operations on their own and the momentum of these groups even if support should be cut off was also discussed. It was clear that the groups headed by Artime and Ray constitute a considerable threat.

Mr. Bundy indicated that next week he would call a meeting with higher authority and the Secretaries of Defense and State. Mr. FitzGerald would outline the current status of operations against Cuba, and it was hoped that definite policy lines could be determined for future covert activity against Castro.

98

2. Chile - Support for Chilean Presidential Elections of 4 September 1964.

The paper, "Support for Chilean Presidential Elections," was approved. Mr. FitzGerald announced that a solution to the slight difference of opinion between Ambassador Cole and the CAS in Santiago

Please see special minute
for additional items.

ONLY

98

had been reached and that attribution of U.S. support would be inferred but there should be no evidence of proof. Mr. FitzGerald indicated that this was operationally feasible.

98

3. Zanzibar - Proposed Political Action

The paper on Proposed Political Action in Zanzibar was approved. Mr. Waller gave a short briefing on the operational climate which emphasized the cooperative attitude of the British services and the growing likelihood that Jomo Kenyatta could be persuaded to support the West more actively.

98

4. JRC Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast.

The JRC Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast for April 1964 was approved.

Peter Jessup

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone

3/mc

E[illegible]Y

SECRET

23

BYE 2656-64
28 APR 1964
Series B, Copy 1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Overflight of Cuba on 1 May

1. Although it may, in fact, have little substance, the thought occurs that if Castro is seriously considering a "shoot-down" of a U-2, from a propaganda standpoint he could not select a better time than 1 May, the traditional Communist holiday, and more significantly the Fourth Anniversary of the "infamous" Francis Gary Powers incident.

2. From a psychological viewpoint, identification of a new U-2 shoot-down with that incident on May Day four years ago might have considerable appeal to Fidel and might conceivably influence his judgment in reaching a determination to take such action.

3. Recognizing that this association is rather tenuous, it might still be worth considering a stand-down of U-2 overflights on that one day. This would not seriously impair our intelligence effort and it would deprive Castro of the opportunity to exploit this rather unique circumstance should he have any inclination to do so. OK?

James A. Cunningham Jr.

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Deputy Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

SECRET

1/mc

SECRET
EYES ONLY

1 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 30 April 1964

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Vance, General Carter/and Mr. McCone.

Colonel J. C. King and Assistant Secretary of State Mann were present for Item 1.

Mr. Bruce Cheever and Mr. Theodore Shackley were present for Item 2. Assistant Secretary Mann was also present for Item 2.

98

1. [The Chilean Situation

a. During a 35-minute discussion of the 4 September Chilean election, Assistant Secretary of State Mann and Colonel J.C. King outlined some of the problems and prospects for the Frei candidacy. Colonel King, who had recently returned from Santiago, outlined some of the covert efforts planned or underway which included financial support to Frei, Italian CDU assistance, emphasis on the woman's vote, Catholic and labor union assistance, fragmentizing the opposition Socialist party, distribution of propaganda, and possible assistance from long-standing United States industrial interests.

b. Some of the obstacles faced by the democratic forces were underscored: the strong Chilean anti-clerical tradition, the unimpeded rise in the cost of living, the formidable outside support being afforded Allende, the political apathy of the military and the third man candidacy of Duran.

c. The Special Group decided: (a) that contact should be made with Ambassador Cole to urge his return for a visit in the coming weeks, (b) that talks with American business interests should proceed to determine the amount and method of their support, and (c) It was further decided that higher authority would be apprised of the closeness and importance of this Chilean election and that the Group itself would continue to review the problem in the coming weeks.]

2. The Current Cuban Operational Climate and the Proposed Operations for May 1964.

a. A 25-minute briefing was provided on Cuban operations by the Chief of CAS, Miami, Mr. Theodore Shackley. He gave a thorough summary of the policy framework in which programs have been established and provided detail on the techniques used to accomplish these missions. He enumerated successes achieved to date and indicated the types of difficulty encountered.

1/mc

The briefing was well received and members expressed the opinion that the session had been extremely useful.

b. The Special Group approved the proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba during May 1964.

98

3. [Recruitment of Chinat Personnel for Maritime Operations of 34-A.

a. On the proposal to recruit Chinat personnel for maritime operations of 34-A, Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone were in favor and felt that enactment of the maritime program was long overdue. It was noted that the Ambassador had already registered approval. State, however, requested that the matter be held in abeyance until the return from Ottawa on 1 May of Alexis Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk. Mr. Hughes felt that the introduction of additional Chinese Nationalists into this theatre was not in accordance with existing policy. Mr. Bundy was of the opinion that the proposed temporary introduction of 64 persons for sea operations was not a significant number.

b. As the minutes were going to press on 1 May, the Secretary of the Special Group was informed by telephone that State Department agreement was obtained with the following proviso: That an intensive and high priority effort on training of South Vietnam Nationals be undertaken as rapidly as possible "for future maritime operations."]

4. [Action 29 - OPLAN 34-A 98

Action 29, OPLAN 34-a, proposed by DOD was disapproved.]

5. [Monthly Forecasts 98

a. The NRO Monthly Forecast for May 1964 was approved.

b. The JRC Monthly Forecast for May 1964 was approved.]

Peter Jessup

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone

3/mc

EYES ONLY

6 JAN 1964

FROM THE COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS

TO THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Standby Capability for the Launching of Propaganda Leaflet Balloons

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to present for your consideration and approval, a proposal to modify the current status of the CIA propaganda balloon launching capability. If approved, CIA proposes to cease the rental of helium and tanks, which will mean that if utilization of the capability is desired, either Department of Defense will have to provide the helium or it will have to be commercially procured at the time. These alternates are considered acceptable.

2. BACKGROUND: In the fall of 1962 the CIA as part of the MONGOOSE program, as approved by the Special Group (Augmented), developed a covert capability for the launching of propaganda leaflet balloons targetted against Cuba. The capability consisted of a properly outfitted merchant vessel, ostensibly chartered and operated by Cuban exiles. In December 1962 and in the early months of 1963, several proposals were made by the CIA to utilize this capability

but each time they were tabled for further consideration. In April 1963 a specific proposal to launch propaganda balloons on May Day 1963 was submitted to the Special Group and on 9 April 1963, the proposal was disapproved by higher authority (see Memorandum for Members of the Special Group from Mr. Thomas Parrott, dated 9 April 1963). In view of the prevailing situation, the CIA proposed to dismantle the capability as it was expensive to maintain and its security was sure to deteriorate. However, at the 18 April 1963 meeting of the Special Group, several members of the Group felt that in a crisis such a capability might be useful and it was agreed the CIA would stockpile the balloons, helium and other equipment and be prepared to mount operations as required utilizing U.S. Navy or other vessels and crews, to be provided by the Department of Defense. (See Minutes of 18 April 1963 Meeting of the Special Group.) In accordance with this directive, the CIA has stored the required equipment and has been keeping helium on hand on a rental basis.

3. The annual expense for maintaining this capability on a standby basis has been approximately 99 [$30,000] of which 99 [$18,500] has been for the rental of helium tanks and compressor. A review of the capability leads the CIA to the

2/mc

conclusion that the capability can be maintained at an acceptable degree of readiness without having the helium tanks on hand. In the event utilization is desired, the Department of Defense would be able to provide the helium as well as the launching vessels and crews or if necessary, helium could be commercially procured within the time factor necessary to ready the other components of the system. The CIA therefore proposes to terminate its current arrangements for the rental of the helium tanks and compressor.

4. It is requested that approval be granted for the CIA to proceed, as outlined in paragraph 2 above, with the termination of rental contracts for helium tanks and compressor.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

4 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 4 June 1964

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

98

1. [Italy

At the request of Mr. McCone, the paper on the covert action program in Italy for FY-1965 was deferred until he had time to study it more carefully.]

2. NSAM 303

NSAM 303 was circulated and the new designation for the Special Group 5412, the 303 Committee, was noted.

3. [North Vietnam 98

a. The DOD paper dated 19 May 1964 entitled "North Vietnam Operations" was discussed at some length.

b. Each annex of the paper was noted. In Annex A, Physical Destruction Target List, the members concurred in Mr. Vance's recommendation to accept all targets with the exceptions of 1, 5, and 7. Target 5 was bracketed with Nos. 14 and 15 in Annex B and is subject to the same treatment indicated below.

c. In Annex B, Psychological Operations, the listed targets were approved except that Nos. 14 and 15 were to be examined further by DOD and CIA on the operational level. Mr. McCone stated that in regard to the Meo tribesmen (No. 14) this had been a CIA operation for some months and should be continued to be handled in the same way. He further felt that tribal operations of this type should be done covertly.

d. In regard to Annex C, Intelligence Operations, the targets 1, 2, and 3 were approved and the Committee agreed to Mr. Vance's veto of target 4.]

See Special Minute
for Additional Item

SECRET
EYES ONLY

2/mc

4. Cuba

This minute also notes the telephonic approval obtained from all members on 30 May for a single emergency exfiltration operation in and out of Cuba scheduled for early June.

Peter Jessup

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Vance
- Mr. McCone

SECRET
EYES ONLY

22 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 18 June 1964

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Mann and Mr. FitzGerald were also present.

A general discussion was held on problems arising from increased activities on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent adventurers, purported plots to assassinate Castro and the general edginess and instability on the island.

None of those present appeared to feel that it was either realistic or practical to sever connections with or to withdraw support from the two principal emigre organizations, those of Artime and Ray.

The recent escapades and overall capabilities of Manolo Ray were deplored but it was agreed first: that steps should be taken to get the Puerto Rican authorities to release his ship; second: that he should be promptly advised in accordance with the stated policy established by the late President to cease forthwith all activities from the United States Mainland and find himself a new base of operations; third: no monies would be forthcoming, specifically a requested $25,000, until point two above has been accomplished. No help was to be offered in finding Ray a new Caribbean base. Mr. Mann was particularly interested that Ray not be encouraged to transfer to the Dominican Republic because of the fragility of the regime.

The next subject discussed was the recent visit of Major Oliva to both the Attorney General and Assistant Secretary Mann. It was pointed out that Oliva is both a zealot and a man of integrity and that his only interest in life is leading a return to his homeland. Any attempts to put Oliva into business would be expensive and undesirable at this time. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would ask the Attorney General if he would be willing to dampen Oliva's ardor.

The activities of Artime from Nicaragua were discussed next. Alexis Johnson pointed out that Artime raids could conceivably provoke Castro into utilizing Cuban SAM sites; he said this possibility should not be discounted. But it was also pointed out that Artime's recent sugar mill raid succeeded in leading Castro to mobilize many persons involved in important sugar harvesting and thus constituted a successful economic warfare byproduct.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

It was estimated that Artime's schedule of one operation per month was overly optimistic; one every three months was about all Artime could accomplish. The decision was to drive home to Artime that his greatest value was not in hazardous hit-and-run actions but in his survival as a continuing psychological threat in being.

Mr. FitzGerald, in discussing the current situation in Cuba, stated that he believed the regime was in considerable difficulty. There has been a large increase in the number of executions and mass arrests. He also cited the fact that an entire CIA Pinar del Rio net has been rolled up by Castro's security forces and the key man executed. The sugar and crop prospects were not good, the world price having dropped. Some of the members were surprised at this picture and stated it did not seem to conform to the daily bulletins. Mr. McCone said that he would ask for a SNIE on the current situation in Castro Cuba.

A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement.

Peter Jessup

Distribution:
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Vance
- Mr. McCone

file -
Spec. Grp
minutes

28 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuba

The Executive Committee met on Friday, January 25th, and approved the new policy as outlined by the Coordinator.

Decisions bearing on covert operations were reached as follows:

1. The Special Group will have the responsibility of continuing review of the program for infiltration of covert intelligence agents. Progress will be regularly checked with the Group. Higher authority made a particular point of saying that, although the objective of "intensified covert collection" is approved, nonetheless, CIA should not feel it is under pressure to "get good men killed" in the process. In other words, the advantages to be gained from intensified collection must be continually weighed against the risks. This will be done by the Special Group.

2. The Attorney General expressed great interest in the extent to which key members of the Brigade will be brought into planning and current operations. He thought that they should be thoroughly consulted on plans for intelligence teams and he indicated that he will personally keep an eye on progress in this regard.

3. The use of propaganda balloons was disapproved at this time. It apparently was not clear as to exactly how far CIA should go in maintaining its current capability for launching balloons.

******

At Mr. Bundy's suggestion I had a long talk with Cottrell on Saturday, the 26th. We discussed in particular the method of operation with the Brigade. I pointed out some of the security aspects that would have to be watched, but expressed the opinion that a workable method of operation could be devised so that the Brigade leaders could provide motivation and could feel a sense of participation, without having to bring them so closely into the details of target areas, dispatch, commo, etc., as to constitute a security hazard. I cited the Agency's experience with the NTS as a possible guideline in this regard. We agreed that after Mr. FitzGerald returns from Panama, about the first of February, the three of us should discuss this matter further.

TAP

TOP SECRET

SECRET
EYES ONLY

8 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 8 February 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman, and Mr. FitzGerald

1. Agent Operations in Cuba

Mr. FitzGerald discussed with the Group the CIA paper of 6 February which recommends a total of five maritime infiltration/exfiltration operations during the next thirty days.

He emphasized that these black operations are entirely of an intelligence nature and that they should be viewed only as a supplement to intelligence coverage accomplished by other means. In the latter connection, the point was made that information obtained by agents of this type can contribute to the targeting of aerial reconnaissance sorties and can assist in making the process of photo interpretation more meaningful.

Mr. FitzGerald also emphasized that the teams now proposed are comprised of only one to three agents. He noted that the agents available are particularly well motivated, and that those whose primary motivation was toward action rather than intelligence have been weeded out.

The consensus of the Group was that while agent operations of this type cannot be considered as a primary or major source of intelligence, nonetheless this type of operation is consistent with U.S. objectives in the Cuba situation and that approval of these five should be recommended.

(These missions were approved by higher authority, 9 February 1963.)

98

2. Subsidy to Venezuelan Newspaper

Mr. McCone reported on financial arrangements which have been made in connection with subsidy of the Venezuelan newspaper, which

SECRET
EYES ONLY

1/mc

98

[was approved at the meeting of 31 January 1963. He said that Agency funds on deposit with the Morgan Guaranty, which will serve as collateral against the bank's loan to the new entrepreneur of this newspaper, would draw interest at 4%, while the purchaser will pay the commercial rate of 6%. The Chairman expressed satisfaction with this arrangement.]

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

1/mc

28 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 28 February 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3

98

1. [Reconnaissance - DOD Monthly Forecast

The Group had no objection to the BOW TIE missions as planned. Mr. McCone alluded, however, to the unexplained military activity that is going on in eastern China, and asked about the capability of BOW TIE to check on this. It was pointed out that the BOW TIE program consists of comparatively shallow penetration which would probably not reach the kind of military target Mr. McCone had in mind. Accordingly, Colonel Steakley was asked to confer with COMOR to find out whether requirements exist for deeper penetration in the area, and if so to bring in an appropriate proposal to the Special Group.

In connection with project AMOS, Mr. Johnson read a message from Lord Home to the Secretary of State. Home said that while the RAF and the Air Ministry will be glad to have the advantage of the intelligence resulting from the mission, nonetheless this represents a departure from the previous pattern of flights in the area. Additionally, the flight will, according to Home, go closer to the coast than the RAF is allowed to go. He was willing to agree to the mission, provided it was not viewed as establishing a precedent, and on the stipulation that Secretary Rusk personally accepts the risk entailed. Mr. Johnson said that Secretary Rusk is willing to accept this risk.

The Group approved AMOS, subject to check by Mr. Bundy with higher authority, and on the understanding that the Group will have a chance to take a last look at it shortly before the scheduled date of 19 March. Colonel Steakley was also asked to report to the Group on the results of the mission. (This mission was later approved by higher authority.)

In this connection, Mr. McCone commented on the great importance of obtaining intelligence on the Soviet low-level SA-3 system. The Group agreed that this is a high-priority requirement, in order to]

1/mc

/

98

[provide a basis for estimating accurately the chances for successful low-level penetration of the USSR. Mr. McCone will arrange to have a USIB paper prepared on this subject.

The Group noted the DESOTO destroyer voyage, which will now include a courtesy call at Djakarta.

Colonel Steakley told the Group that CINCLANT has tried out the MELON PATCH photography missions, operating under the ten mile restriction which was laid on by the Special Group at its meeting of 31 January. It is now apparent to CINCLANT that adequate photography of the desired areas cannot be obtained at that distance. The Group agreed that the ten mile restriction should remain in force. In coming to this conclusion they made the point that in case of real need for this type of coastal intelligence, there would be adequate time to obtain it after an emergency actually was in effect; and further, any such information collected now would have to be up-dated before operations could be mounted based on it.

The revised RED DOG missions, to be flown in C-47's, and the proposal to fly some BRASS KNOB missions from the Canal Zone, were approved.

Colonel Steakley was asked to give the Group a report on the results obtained from the last mission into the Sea of Okhotsk.

Colonel Steakley told the Group that the JCS will make no recommendation on low-level coverage of Laos (ABLE MABEL) until after the results of the Agency effort explained below.

The Group made a point of saying that although the time is not now propitious for covering the COMOR priority targets in Cuba with low-level flights, it may well prove desirable to do this on fairly short notice. Therefore this matter should be kept under constant review by operating elements.]

2. [Reconnaissance - CIA Monthly Forecast 98

Mr. McCone told the Group that the weather has suddenly opened up over North Vietnam and that the mission to cover that area, via Laos, which was approved by the Special Group on 17 January, will actually be launched tonight. He said that after this is completed the airplane will be ferried to Taiwan in accordance with the discussion at the meeting of the 25th of February, transiting Laos on the way. Mr. McCone also reported on the recent successful GROSBEAK mission.]

2/mc

3. [Removal of Soviet Troops 98

Mr. McCone said that we still do not know very much about the removal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Mr. Bundy stated that the official government position is that available information is insufficient to justify any change in the estimated figures of Soviets on the island. He added that no change can be made in these figures without specific approval by higher authority.]

4. Testimony on Cuba

Mr. McCone commented on the difficulties encountered by officials who are required to testify before Congressional committees on the Cuban situation, in light of the propensity of these committees to question witnesses on statements made by other officials. Mr. Bundy recognized that this is a problem and said that in an attempt to alleviate it he has had several documents brought together. These include a compendium of the President's remarks on the subject; the DCI's report to the Killian Committee; a report by Assistant Secretary Martin; and most recently, the CIA-prepared paper on subversion in the hemisphere. He added that the basic responsibility for coordinating public statements rests with the Secretary of State.

98

5. [Italy - Status Report on Election Operation

The Group noted that this project is progressing, but is still in its early stages.]

6. [Chile - Proposed Political Action 98

The Group approved the proposal dated 25 February, subject to approval by higher authority. (This was later granted.)]

7. [Agency Operations in Latin America 98

Mr. Gilpatric inquired as to the feasibility of mounting intelligence or other operations against selected military personnel in Latin America. Mr. McCone said that some of this is being done but that he will have it studied further.]

8. Progress on Cuban Operations

Mr. McCone told the Group that none of the five agent operations approved by the Group on the 8th of February has been successful. He noted that there have been a number of aborts due to weather,

4/mc

failure of equipment, and failure of rendezvous plans. He said that efforts are continuing to carry out these operations successfully, but indicated some unhappiness with the results to date and the prospects of success. He alluded particularly to the qualities of the agent personnel.

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

SECRET
EYES ONLY

14 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Approval of Cuba Papers

All members of the Special Group have now approved the following memoranda from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:

a. "Covert Propaganda to Stimulate Passive Resistance and Low-Risk, Simple Sabotage," 8 March 1963.

b. "Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations in Cuba - 15 March 1963 to 15 April 1963," 11 March 1963.

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET
EYES ONLY

26 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 26 March 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Dr. Scoville, Mr. McMillan, and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-5.

Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 1.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.

98

1. Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba

In connection with the USIB recommendation for resumption of low-level coverage of Cuba, Mr. Lundahl showed the Group examples of the additional information that can be obtained from low-level photography as contrasted with high-level coverage. This had to do particularly with identification of materiel, spotting of personnel, etc.

Mr. McCone emphasized that low-level coverage would give us additional information on the numbers of Soviet troops and possibly on Soviet intentions, and similar subjects, but that it would not represent a qualitative shift in the body of intelligence available. It would not reveal anything that would be of major security interest to the U.S. and which could not be picked up by high-level coverage.

Mr. McCone also referred to the progress of certain negotiations which have been holding up active consideration of low-level photography. He said that there are differences of opinion among people closest to this situation as to what the effect of resumption of such photography actually might be on the negotiations.

Mr. Gilpatric said that Defense is not convinced of the urgency of this proposition and would not favor it at this time, unless others feel that there is an overriding political reason for undertaking the project. He said that he would prefer to see this capability reserved for identifying the type of threat that we might otherwise not be aware of, or used at a time when there was some political advantage to be gained by low-level flights.

See special minutes for additional item

SECRET
EYES ONLY

1/mc

98

Mr. Johnson said that the Secretary of State does not believe that there is any foreign policy reason for mounting the operation at this time, and in fact the Secretary and other high officials in the Department feel that from a policy point of view it would be inadvisable now.

The Group then agreed that the resumption of low-level coverage would not be recommended at this time, but that it would be kept under weekly review.

2. Reconnaissance, Indonesia 98

The Group noted the intelligence justification for this proposal and the political objections to it, and the Chairman agreed to discuss it with higher authority as an example of a situation where clear-cut differences of interest exist. He said that if there was any doubt from that quarter he would have all the principals participate in further discussion with higher authority. (The proposal was later disapproved by higher authority.)

3. Peripheral Reconnaissance Operations 98

a. Colonel Steakley gave the following brief reports on a number of peripheral missions:

(1) The ELINT coverage of the Sea of Okhotsk produced good results. He said that this area is now so well covered with radars that consideration should probably be given as to whether the rules requiring an abort in case of an AI lock-on should be relaxed.

(2) The AMOS mission, directed against SA-3's in the Baltic, did not result in any ELINT take from the radars associated with the SA-3's. He said that some question now arises as to whether these weapons are in fact SA-3's or perhaps a later generation of the SA-2.

(3) A DESOTO destroyer mission off the Soviet Maritime Provinces resulted in Soviet instructions to shut down their radars when the ship approached.

b. The Group approved four missions (UNA, DANIEL, FLOYD and GEORGE) using new ASD-1 equipment. This includes two in the Baltic area, one in the Black Sea, and one flying from England to the Black Sea.

3/mc

4. [ELINT Balloons 98

Dr. Scoville gave the Group details of the operation in the Sea of Japan, employing balloons against TALL KING radars. He said that the results indicate that perhaps these radars are not as efficient as we had thought, but that further analysis is proceeding.]

5. Covert Operations, Cuba

a. Procedures

Noting that the shipping sabotage paper of 19 March had not been considered by the Cottrell committee as a body, the Special Group asked that such proposals be considered in that way before submission to the Special Group. In passing the recommendations to the Special Group it should be indicated what the position of the various Cottrell members was, just as is done in the case of political projects coordinated with State and the ambassador. Each member of the Cottrell committee would see to it that his own agency staffed the paper in the normal way for submission to the Special Group.

b. Sabotage of Shipping

The substance of the 19 March paper was then considered. Mr. McCone raised a question as to exactly what the U.S. objective now is in this and related fields, and questioned in addition whether we may be trying to manage exile groups too closely.

There was some discussion as totthe actual value of carrying out the proposed sabotage, that is whether enough damage could be done to hurt the Castro regime seriously. The consensus of the Group seemed to be that activity of this kind should not be undertaken if it could be expected to yield only small gains, but that if its effect would be really significant then that would be a different matter.

Considerable doubt was expressed about the proposal for sinking and setting fire to ships. None of the members felt that there was any particular objection to the use of abrasives or other damaging materials.

The proposal was then remanded for group consideration by the Cottrell committee. This committee is asked to look at the proposal in relation toeeverything else that is going on or is under serious consideration, in order to assess its true potentiality. Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to modify the proposal to the extent

1/mc

of considering possible unilateral action as opposed to using an exile group as a cutout. Mr. Bundy will explore exactly what the feeling of higher authority is with respect to relations with exile groups.

c. Additional Programs

Mr. Johnson mentioned the activities of the NTS, which has been broadcasting in Russian to the Soviet troops over Radio Caribe in the Dominican Republic. Mr. FitzGerald agreed to add this to the possibilities listed under radio broadcasting.

Mr. Johnson questioned the extent to which proposition b., involving inciting Cubans to commit aggressive acts against Soviet personnel, is in accord with current objectives.

On the matter of propaganda balloons, most members of the Group felt that these might be useful in connection with the particular target mentioned - the May Day concentration which is expected in Havana. Mr. Johnson had some reservations which he wanted to check out further in the Department. It was agreed that should State take a favorable view, then the matter would be presented to higher authority.

As to the request for Defense training facilities, Mr. Gilpatric asked that Mr. FitzGerald discuss the needs with Secretary Vance. Mr. FitzGerald said that the principal requirement which cannot be met in CIA facilities is adequate space for weapons training. Members of the Group recalled that the objection to the use of Defense facilities at the time it was presented during the MONGOOSE period, was that this would make it difficult, if not impossible, to deny official U.S. involvement. Mr. Bundy said that he saw no objection if the purpose was to train Cubans for eventual open hostilities, but thought that in this case the objective might be better achieved by having them undergo regular U.S. Army training. The other members agreed.

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

13-00000

TOP SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION)

BYE-12693-63
Cy 1

Handle Via Indicated Controls

99

BYEMAN

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.

This document contains information referring to Projects:

CORONA IDEALIST

TOP SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION)

1/N

SECRET
EYES ONLY

asl

4 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 4 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hughes

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1 and 2.

Commander Yates was present for Item 1.

1. [DOD Peripheral Reconnaissance 98

The DOD monthly forecast of peripheral reconnaissance activities was noted. Special note was taken of mission ULCER GULCH, which all members approved. Consideration of YANKEE PASHA was deferred for at least a week because of certain points raised by the Secretary of State. Mr. Bundy said that he himself would normally have no objection to this operation but that conditions at the moment make it inadvisable to go ahead at this precise time.

Colonel Steakley was asked to brief the Group on the special navigational safeguards which would be used in the YANKEE PASHA operation, at a later meeting when Mr. Johnson could be present.

Commander Yates briefed the Group on certain submarine operations. Mr. Gilpatric undertook to assure himself that adequate procedures exist for notifying members of the Special Group and other key officials in the event of an untoward incident.]

2. [Reconnaissance Missions, Far East 98

Mr. McCone briefed the Group on the results of two recent missions. He pointed out that there are now no authorizations outstanding for high-performance reconnaissance in the Far East.

The recommendations in the NRO paper for the Special Group, dated 4 April, were approved with the exception of 7. b (Laos), which was deferred for later consideration. Mr. McCone agreed to mention these approvals to higher authority, but it was felt that no further formal approval was required.]

SECRET

2/mc

SECRET
EYES ONLY

98

[All members of the Group expressed their interest in getting on with plans for resuming FALCON missions. It was noted that one of the principal problems in this area is the question of a base. It was agreed that we should probably approach this from the point of view of obtaining a standby agreement with the Indian Government to permit staging in and out of that country. Dr. Scoville said that a message had gone out to the field on this point last night. The Chairman asked that word be sent to the Ambassador that high-level interest in this proposition does exist in Washington.]

3. [Status Report on Italian Elections 98

CIA's paper of 1 April was noted.]

4. [Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba 98

The Group took no action on this subject.]

5. [Covert Subsidy for Kong Le 98

At Mr. Hughes' suggestion, it was agreed that CIA should look into the possibilities of a covert payment to Kong Le.]

6. Cuban Operations

The Group recommended approval of the following papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:

a. Sabotage of Shipping, 19 March, as amended by a memorandum from the Deputy Coordinator, 2 April 1963.

b. Russian Language Broadcasts, 2 April 1963.

c. Propaganda Inciting Cubans within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops, 2 April 1963.

Mr. Bundy and Mr. FitzGerald will obtain final approval from higher authority.

TA Parrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

SECRET
EYES ONLY

4/mc

9 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Status of Approvals for Covert Actions, Cuba

1. Propaganda Inciting Cubans to Commit Acts Against Soviet Troops

Approved by higher authority, on the understanding that the propaganda will be non-attributable to the United States.

2. Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Shipping

This was approved by higher authority. It was noted that the suggestion for external explosive charges had been deleted from the proposal approved by the Special Group last week. (This will be considered along with other suggestions in an over-all sabotage paper, in accordance with decisions reached at the special meeting of 3 April.)

3. Soviet Language Broadcasts

The Radio Liberty proposition has been approved, with the understanding that there will be no "opening fanfare" in connection with the inauguration of the program; if a ceremony is unavoidable it must be played in a low key. The proposal for a Unidad Revolucionaria program is disapproved. The suggestion for intrusion on Radio Moscow broadcasts is disapproved.

4. Leaflet Balloons

This proposal has been disapproved by higher authority.

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

SECRET
EYES ONLY

11 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1 - 3.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4.

1. Reconnaissance, Northern Laos 98

It was agreed that the proposal for this coverage, which was contained in the NRO paper of 4 April and which was deferred last week, should be approved.

Mr. McCone mentioned the difficulties which have arisen with Sarit, noting particularly that he is unwilling to give permission for the renewed use of Takhli until certain Thai officials return to Bangkok from Paris, which will be around the 20th of this month. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility of basing the aircraft in the Philippines or Taiwan, if the Takhli possibility should fall through completely.

The DCI said that if it proves impossible to mount missions designed to cover the Sino-Indian border, then three will be required for Laos and North Vietnam. If on the other hand the Sino-Indian missions are run, then only two additional ones would be required to cover Laos and North Vietnam, since some of the area could be covered in the process of the Sino-Indian coverage.

Mr. Bundy will clear these proposals with higher authority.

2. Coverage of Sino-Indian Border Area 98

Dr. Scoville reported on the difficulties encountered in obtaining Indian approval for staging aircraft through that country, stressing the fact that the chief of the intelligence service will not be available in India until the 16th of this month, and no decision can be expected before then. He said that the time before the onset of the monsoon season is getting short. Dr. Scoville said that efforts are continuing to get staging approval from the Indians, as well as approval from the Thais to base in Takhli.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

98

3. Inadvertent Overflights by Reconnaissance Aircraft

Colonel Steakley distributed a memorandum listing the four inadvertent overflights of Soviet territory by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, since January 1961.

He commented that in previous years the rate of such incidents was considerably higher. Mr. Bundy asked him to provide for the Group in the next week or so a recapitulation of such incidents, going back to approximately 1949.

Colonel Steakley said that both CINCPAC and the Joint Reconnaissance Group believe that the incident of 10 April, when an ELINT aircraft flew over one of the Kuriles, appears to represent a violation of established procedures and instructions. CINCPAC has asked for a full report.

Mr. McCone questioned the efficacy of the system of advising Special Group members of such incidents. Colonel Steakley said that a procedure has been specified and he undertook to provide a copy to Mr. Parrott for the information of the Group. He said that he would take special measures to make sure that these instructions are followed.

4. Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald expanded orally on the paper of 9 April, giving a summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program, and outlining proposals in this field for the next month. The Group approved this projection. In response to a question about the status of Manolo Ray's people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch with him from time to time, and that any plan he has to offer for activity against Cuba will be sympathetically received, but that he has not to date come up with any such proposal.

The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 11 April, on the three papers being considered at today's meeting were noted. The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. With specific reference to the comment that a proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the target date of the 20th or 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known. He said that of course no activity of this kind would be allowed to interfere with those negotiations at this stage.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage. The Group agreed that the papers before it were responsive to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the light of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals, etc., etc.

With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups, it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma. Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly responsibility for such acts. The U.S. is thus placed in the position of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.

Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also commented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more effective than the usual run.

It was decided that probably Friday, the 19th of April, a presentation should be made to higher authority at which time all responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected and the benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the preparation of this paper.

5. [Annexes to Internal Defense Plans 98

The Colombia annex was noted. In view of the fact that the basic IDP for Bolivia had earlier been remanded for revision by the Special Group (CI), the covert annex for that country was held over until the overt plan is considered by the CI Group.]

6. [North Vietnam Operations 98

The monthly report was noted and approved.]

7/MC

68

18 April 1963

ER-63-3278

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 18 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

The Attorney General, General Taylor, Mr. Murrow, and Mr. FitzGerald were present for Item 1.

1. Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald said that in view of the postponement of the meeting tentatively set for tomorrow with higher authority, the proposed sabotage actions for April will be cancelled and two caching operations, in Pinar del Rio and Matanzas, will be substituted. The Group approved this.

Mr. FitzGerald told the Group that in view of the negative decision on balloons, he was proposing to dismantle the capability, which is expensive to keep in being. He said that if it were desired to start the program up at any time after dismantling, it would take about three months. A number of members of the Group felt that in a real crisis balloons could be of considerable value. Accordingly, it was agreed that balloons and helium should be stockpiled, with the idea that if a situation should arise in which balloons would be useful, launching could be accomplished by a U.S. vessel, without worrying too much about attribution under those circumstances. In commenting on his opposition to the earlier proposition, Mr. Murrow said that he believes that balloons can be useful as a part of an integrated program.

The Group then turned to discussion of the papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16th, 17th, and 18th. It was noted that there had not been time for adequate staffing of these papers and that the principals had not been able to examine them carefully. In this connection, Mr. McCone said that he wanted the Office of National Estimates of CIA to review the papers, in light of their estimative content. It was thus agreed that the papers should be staffed and sharpened up for presentation at next week's meeting. Mr. Johnson suggested that a possible format might be to produce one paper which would be prefaced by the guidelines currently contained in the Coordinator's paper of April 18th. This would be followed by a summary of sabotage capabilities and the pros and cons of various types, and then recommendations.

Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we have a clearer picture of what the over-all policy toward Cuba is likely to be for the next six months to a year and a half. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the noise level which would be involved in many of these proposals would be considerably more than it has been to date, and he felt that we must decide whether we are willing to accept this. He added that he did not feel that such a development would necessarily be bad, but it would certainly be different from the low-level activities prevailing now. He was not sure whether, or to what extent, it would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy. In this connection, Mr. Johnson said that he particularly likes the proposals for supporting internal resistance operations, since these will not generate a high noise level.

Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the paper of April 17th, on a "Maximum Covert Action Program" consists basically of sabotage and harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command. He mentioned some of the difficulties that would flow from supporting one group and not others. Mr. McCone said that if such groups become active, it will be obvious that they have U.S. support because it is well known that they do not have adequate assets now. He and Mr. Bundy agreed that, despite the fact that some Central American governments might be used as cutouts, the U.S. would be blamed for their activities and this must be clearly recognized before embarking on such a course. They felt additionally that we must be sure that such a program would contribute to over-all policy objectives.

Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald referred to the CIA estimate that time is running in favor of Castro, and Mr. FitzGerald said that some of these activities are designed to slow down or possible stop the trend of events in his favor.

It was noted that the program for shipping sabotage, which has already been approved, is in process of possible implementation. It was agreed that this process should not be interrupted.

2. [Reconnaissance of Laos 98

A COMOR paper, suggesting that certain targets in Southern Laos be included in the proposed missions for Northern Laos, was distributed and no objection was expressed to it. Mr. Bundy noted that he had not yet had an opportunity to clear the original proposal with higher authority.]

1/mc

SECRET
EYES ONLY

25 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 25 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-4.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1-5.

Mr. Jorgensen was present for Item 3.

Mr. Tweedy was present for Item 6.

96

1. [Forecast of NRO Activities for May

This forecast was noted.]

2. [Reconnaissance of Laos and Vietnam 98

Mr. McCone referred to a paper prepared by the JCS at the request of the Secretary of Defense, outlining a possible schedule of reconnaissance missions over Laos and Vietnam, which seemed to Mr. McCone to be unduly heavy. Mr. Gilpatric explained that the paper had been drawn up as an annex to a draft contingency plan, and was responsive to a direct request from the Secretary of Defense to indicate a sizeable capability for high-level reconnaissance for intelligence purposes. Mr. Gilpatric added that it is clearly understood that such activity would not represent a "show of force," and that the latter would require low-level activity. Mr. McCone agreed with this point and emphasized the unusual sensitivity of any high-level reconnaissance of denied areas.

Mr. Gilpatric assured the Group that these plans are all of a contingency nature and that at this point they are by no means approved.]

3. [Proposed "Feint" Operations, GROSBEAK 98

Mr. Jorgensen summarized the paper of the 22nd of April. He said that these proposals are frankly regarded as experimental.]

SECRET
EYES ONLY

3/mc

98

Colonel Steakley said that from the JCS point of view, such feints might represent a tactical advantage, in that they could divert enemy defenses from actual operations. On the other hand, the JCS procedures are designed so as not to be provocative in connection with peripheral and BOW TIE missions. He felt that this proposal, which is frankly designed to be provocative, could have the effect of inducing quicker and more intensive reaction to the JCS flights.

On the understanding that the feint activities would be closely coordinated with military missions in the area, it was agreed that the proposed program should be tried for the month of May. At the end of this period, a report on the results will be made to the Special Group.

4. Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba 98

The DCI said the USIB unanimously reaffirmed yesterday the priority intelligence requirements for low-level coverage of Cuba. Mr. Bundy added that there is high-level interest in reviewing this situation.

Mr. Johnson said that in the view of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, the Soviets would interpret a resumption of low-level flights as an indication of the adoption by the U.S. of a harder line toward Cuba. More significantly, Ambassador Thompson is very much opposed to such resumption at this time; he feels that this could result in a reduction in the rate of withdrawal of Soviet troops or a Soviet decision to withdraw none at all in the future, and it might affect Soviet policy in Laos in a manner adverse to U.S. interests. The importance of the Harriman mission with respect to this last proposition was noted. Mr. Johnson said we should know the results of the Harriman mission in a day or two.

It was agreed that the matter would be discussed with higher authority this afternoon.

5. Proposed New Policy and Program toward Cuba

Mr. McCone opened the discussion of this topic by pointing out that the overt and multilateral pressures now being applied to Cuba are useful; on the other hand, while they will slow Castro down they will not hurt him critically, and the interest of our allies in maintaining such pressures will almost certainly erode as time passes. Similarly, any sabotage program can hurt the Castro government, but not lethally; and in order to be effective at all, it must be done on

2/mc

a continuing basis and cannot be subjected to a stop-and-go treatment. The DCI went on to say that any such activity is bound to be attributed to the United States and if we are to carry through with it, we must be prepared to accept the accompanying noise level. He said that a sabotage program will not be entirely beneficial to U.S. interests; on the minus side, there is the fact that this will complicate the running of intelligence operations and it could result in Cuban retaliation. Additionally, Mr. McCone said he is not in favor of extreme types of sabotage such as complete destruction of crops, contamination of water supplies, etc. He would prefer open intervention to this kind of thing.

The DCI said that the combination of economic and other pressures with sabotage activities, might provide a feasible climate for a successful attempt to fragment the Castro organization. He foresaw the possibility of such fragmentation leading to assumption of power by a military dictatorship, which would probably be friendly to the U.S. In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that we have a line on certain high-ranking officers who are not entirely sympathetic to the regime. He pointed out, however, that a major operational obstacle to capitalizing on this situation is the difficulty of persuading individual Cubans of this type to place their trust in each other. In addition, we will have to be able to assure them that the U.S. will be sympathetic to possible successors to the present government, even though such people may have been former Castro supporters.

Mr. FitzGerald touched on the proposed support to selected Cuban exile groups, for autonomous operations, as being one of the key points of the possible new program. He made the point that there is no use in the U.S. trying to deny that it backs such operations, since it will be accused of this in any case, and the accusations will be generally believed; further, such a posture is not detrimental to U.S. interests. Mr. Bundy agreed with this point. He added, however, that a "scenario" will have to be worked out, clearly indicating who in the government should respond to accusations in this field and what in general they should say.

Mr. Bundy questioned a statement in the paper to the effect that covert action which might be used as a pretext for overt military intervention is ruled out. Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald said that the purpose of this statement was to indicate that the covert program is not specifically directed toward the end of providing such a pretext, but that it is not intended to preclude such a situation if it should turn out to be desirable at some time in the future.

Mr. FitzGerald then described a number of possible sabotage operations. In this connection, he pointed out that the paper contains a proposal for the placing of limpets, carrying suitable delay mechanisms, on the outside of Cuban ships so as to explode at sea.

He noted that Secretary Vance does not particularly like this proposition because of the possibility that the explosions would be attributed to torpedoes. While recognizing the validity of Mr. Vance's argument, Mr. Gilpatric felt that this risk was acceptable.

The Chairman summed up the preliminary reactions of the Group to the proposals as follows:

a. The proposition for dealing with selected exile groups is a good one, but the method of dealing with them will have to be more carefully defined.

b. There is no objection to limpets, subject to further technical studies.

c. Surface attacks on Cuban ships do not appear particularly attractive, nor do shore-based attacks of a similar nature.

d. Externally mounted hit-and-run attacks against land targets appear worthwhile. The operations in this category which can be run in May, will be discussed with higher authority. Refineries and power plants seem to be particularly good targets. Operations of this kind will be especially valuable if done in conjunction with other resistance activities.

e. Internal resistance should be stimulated, again in conjunction with related operations.

6. Covert Action, Congo

The CIA paper of 19 April was approved with little discussion. The Chairman said that his only concern was whether we are committed to spending money at this rate forever. Mr. Tweedy said first that if the Adoula government should fall, it would probably be in the U.S. interest to support a successor government in a somewhat similar way and, secondly, he pointed out that there are no firm commitments made, although of course the recipients do come to expect a subsidy.

Mr. Bundy said he would mention this project to higher authority. 98

7. Final Status Report, Italian Election Project

Mr. McCone ran over the highlights of the prognostication for the Italian elections, as summarized in the CIA paper of the 22nd of April. He noted that virtually all the allocated money will have been passed by this time. Mr. Bundy said that the CIA forecast is generally consistent with reports he has had from Italian sources.

VR

8. British Guiana

98

Mr. McCone said that representatives of CIA and of MI-6 are scheduled to meet on the 30th of April and the first of May. They will consider: an up-to-date assessment of the situation; a proposed British operational plan; alternative proposals if thispplan proves not feasible; identification of Indians who might provide alternative leadership to Jagan; the division of operational responsibility; and an inventory of operational assets.

The DCI said it is estimated that a continuation of the current strike would require expenditures on the order of $10,000 a day. The Group felt that if this could result in the defeat of Jagan, it would be well worth it. Accordingly, Mr. McCone undertook to look into the situation immediately and to assure that support for the strike is not cut off, pending a broader decision. He said he might see James Fulton of MI-6, during his forthcoming trip to Europe, to coordinate views.

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

Spec Grp File

26 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Proposed New Covert Policy and Programs Toward Cuba

As a follow-up to yesterday's Special Group discussion on the proposed new covert policy and programs toward Cuba, the following decisions have been made:

On Item 1. of the summary from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 19 April, additional planning and consultation is approved. This will include further refinement of the Rules of Engagement (in this connection, also see the minutes of yesterday's meeting); an assessment of the capabilities of specific groups; and an estimate of the scale and scope of activities which selected groups could carry out successfully.

Item 2.a. of the above-mentioned paper is approved. To the extent possible, it is desired that the Special Group be informed in advance of specific proposals under this heading. It is recognized that this will in many cases not be feasible.

Item 2.b. is disapproved.

Further planning for individual elements of Item 2.c. is approved, with the understanding that targets will be justified in terms of their usefulness rather than with regard to the noise level they might generate. Specific operations will be referred back through normal channels (i.e., the Special Group in the first instance) for final approval before execution.

Item 2.d. is approved.

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

missions (both contained in papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 7 May).

There was no objection by the Group to any of the infiltration/ exfiltration operations. This approval includes the seven CIA operations, the infiltration of a radio operator in support of the U.S. Army, and approval of rendezvous opportunities which may arise without adequate time to bring them to the Group. The Group also noted Mr. Cheever's description of a proposed exfiltration to be carried out by the MRR, with some support by CIA.

With regard to the two sabotage missions, Mr. Cheever said that he thought the chances were excellent of carrying them out successfully. He said, however, that the critical problem would arise the following morning, when sea and air interception might well take place. He emphasized that under the circumstances that could be expected in the aftermath of such sabotage, the Cubans might well disregard any territorial limits in the course of hot pursuit of the saboteurs. He added, in answer to questions, that there is no doubt that Cubans would recognize these operations as being externally mounted, and that the agents would certainly talk if captured.

Mr. Cheever mentioned three possible operational plans which might minimize the danger of capture by Castro forces, but emphasized that these were by no means operationally well-designed nor was he recommending them, and further that they did not come within any existing policy approvals.

The feeling of the Group was that the damage that could be done to the Cuban economy by successful execution of either of these missions was not sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages. The Group recognized that the responsible CIA operators feel themselves under obligation to continue to develop suitable proposals, and they thought that CIA should be encouraged to keep on doing this. The difficulty of maintaining agent morale in the face of continued inaction was recognized. Mr. Cheever was commended for his frank and explicit outlining of the pros and cons.

4. Cuba - NTS Broadcasts

Mr. McCone and Mr. Cheever said that CIA does not object to the Department of State's proposal to subsidize NTS broadcasts from the Dominican Republic, addressed to Soviet troops in Cuba. They pointed out that this concurrence is subject to the caveats that the Agency will be unable to accept responsibility for monitoring and control of the content of the broadcasts, and that contact with the NTS will have to be made through its headquarters in Frankfurt, rather than directly with the U.S. representative of the NTS. With these understandings, the proposal was approved.

98

5. [Political Action, Bolivia

The CIA paper of 3 April 1963 on the above subject was approved.]

6. [Air Proprietary, East Africa 98

The CIA paper of 3 May 1963 on the above subject was approved.]

7. Intelligence on Cuba

Mr. McCone said that he is concerned about gaps in U.S. intelligence on Cuba. He said that this leads him to favor resumption of low-level reconnaissance. The other members of the Group felt that under existing circumstances, this type of reconnaissance will not meet the needs that Mr. McCone perceives. Mr. Johnson suggested that penetrations of the Cuban Government would be more productive in trying to assess Castro's possible intentions.

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

2/mc

SECRET
EYES ONLY

9 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 9 May 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville was present for Items 1 and 2.

Captain Dankworth was present for Item 1.

Mr. Cheever was present for Items 3 and 4.

1. Peripheral Reconnaissance 98

The Group approved operation YANKEE PASHA, which had been originally presented at the meeting of 4 April and deferred at that time, with the understanding that the aircraft would not approach the Soviet coast closer than 15 miles.

2. Reconnaissance of the Sino-India Border 98

With particular reference to an incoming message from Ambassador Galbraith, the Group noted that the Indians had refused to grant staging rights in India or to allow refueling over that country. In light of this, all members of the Group felt that plans for these missions should be shelved for the time being. Mr. McCone noted that the aircraft now at Takhli will, therefore, depart before the 17th of May, the date on which SEATO exercises begin.

The Group specified that in conveying the decision to the Indians it should be made perfectly clear that the standdown is due to their own view of the urgency of such coverage, not to any reluctance on our part.

(The point was made that in the meeting of the CI Group, just concluded, an allegedly improved road network south of Tchepone, in Laos, had been mentioned. The CI Group had felt that harder intelligence should be obtained on this network. Dr. Scoville undertook to make sure that this target is highlighted in planning for additional high-performance coverage of Laos.)

3. Cuba - Proposed Agent Operations

Mr. Cheever outlined in some detail the infiltration/exfiltration operations proposed for 15 May to 15 June, and the two possible sabotage

2/mc

13-00000

6 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 6 June 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric (Items 1-7), and Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1 and 2.
Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 2.
Mr. George Miller was present for Item 5.
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 7.
Mr. Karamessines was present for Items 8 and 9.

1. DOD Reconnaissance 98

With respect to the two PAYSTATION missions which were deferred last week, the Group decided that the 12-mile proposal should be scrapped and that the 30-mile one should be flown for ELINT only.

2. Reconnaissance of Cuba 98

Mr. Lundahl showed the Group sample pictures from the two PEG LEG missions of 5 June.

Mr. McCone said that before making any recommendation as to further missions of this kind, he wished to have the USIB consider the matter. In the meantime CIA and DIA are analyzing the results.

Mr. Lundahl and Colonel Steakley raised the question of the advisability of including some color film in future missions. The Group felt this kind of thing should be left to the best judgment of the operators.

3. Far East Reconnaissance 98

Mr. McCone reported that two out of the existing four authorizations for high-performance reconnaissance of China have been exhausted. It was agreed that the "bank" should be restored to the original four.

It was noted that no further requirements now exist for this type of reconnaissance of Laos, but there are some targets remaining in North Vietnam.

3/MC

4. [Reconnaissance of the Middle East 98

Mr. McCone reported that the British will probably not approve the request to use an RAF base on Cyprus for high-performance coverage of Middle East areas. He said that the feasibility of using Wheelus is being explored and that a new recommendation will be forthcoming to the Group.]

5. [ELINT Collection 98

Mr. Miller briefed the Group on ELINT projects OARAGE (Cuba) and MOONBEAM (Japan). No objection was voiced to either proposal.]

6. Channels to Castro

The Group discussed various possibilities of establishing channels of communication to Castro. All members of the Group agreed that this is a useful endeavor. Mr. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro should not be made privy to any official U.S. positions, while Mr. McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely secret so far as the public is concerned. It was agreed that proposals of this kind which are particularly unusual, would be discussed with the Special Group in advance.

7. Cuba Operations

Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of infiltration/exfiltration operations during May, and on proposals for the coming month. The latter were approved.

8. [Italy, Assessment of Results of Election Operation 98

Mr. Karamessines discussed with the Group the results of the recent Parliamentary elections in Italy, and the effect of the election project, so far as can be ascertained. He elaborated on the CIA paper of 4 June.]

9. [Italy, Proposed Aid to PSI Autonomists 98

Mr. Karamessines briefed the Group further on the proposal to give aid to Nenni and his autonomist group of the PSI, as outlined in the CIA paper of 1 June.]

4/mc

98

[The Group agreed to recommend approval of this project to higher authority. Mr. Bundy will take this up on Monday, June 10th. He suggested that in the meantime all necessary preliminary alerting be accomplished, so that Nenni can be informed in the event of favorable action, before the meeting of the PSI Central Committee on June 12th.]

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

1/mc

13-00000

SECRET

20 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 20 June 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Hughes.

Colonel King was present for Item 3.
Mr. Colby was present for Item 4.
Mr. Critchfield was present for Item 6.

98

1. [Reconnaissance of Southeast Asia

Mr. McCone reported that all high-performance missions scheduled for this area had been held up during the past week, due to bad weather.]

2. Sabotage Program, Cuba

In connection with the new Cuba sabotage program approved yesterday, Mr. McCone suggested that CIA make a report to the Special Group every two weeks. The Group agreed with this procedure. They felt that such a report need not be in written form nor very elaborate, and that it should consist of a briefing on activities during the preceding period and those planned for the next one. Mr. Bundy commented that keeping the Group informed in this way constitutes protection to the operators, since all agencies concerned are thereby given a continuing feeling of just what is going on.

3. [Haiti - Political Action 98

The CIA paper of 17 June was approved. Mr. McCone said he has some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for Duvalier, but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order to prevent Haiti eventually going very far to the left. Colonel King, in support of the paper's recommendations, said that in his opinion we have no feasible alternatives but to cooperate with Bosch in attempting to unseat Duvalier, and that if this is not done we are likely to end up with a far worse situation.

Mr. Hughes told the Group that the State Department shares the reservation about the quality of alternatives, but it also recognizes the necessity of taking some action. He said the Department is principally worried about the possibility that the U.S. hand in any such operation might be revealed.]

2/mc

98

Colonel King cautioned that we will not be in a position to know how many useful exiles can be recruited until we give it a try. Mr. McCone and Colonel King said that probably the most promising way in which the desired objective can be obtained is eventually to accomplish the defection of significant elements of the Army, the Palace Guard, etc.

4. Monthly Report on North Vietnam Operations

Mr. Colby gave a report on results of operations during the past month, and those planned for the immediate future.

5. Congo - Training of Special Army Unit 98

The Group approved the State-CIA proposal to hold the Congo paramilitary project, originally approved on 29 November 1962, in abeyance.

98

6. Iraq - Soviet Materiel Objectives and Related Problems

The Group approved the recommendations contained in CIA's paper of the 19th of June.

Mr. McCone pointed out that this sort of action could conceivably lead into considerably broader activities, and emphasized that the proposal immediately at hand is carefully limited. The Group agreed that approval of these recommendations does not imply any sort of commitment to additional actions.

7. Plans for Immediate Future 98

Mr. Bundy asked Mr. McCone to act as Chairman of the Special Group next week, if he wishes to have a meeting. During the time that the Presidential party is away, DOD peripheral flights, particularly in the European area, should be carefully screened.

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

4/mc

that the U.S. government stands behind previously-expressed commitments to ensure that India does not use its own increased military strength to mount an attack on Pakistan.

It was agreed that State and Defense should draft a paper for higher authority, outlining this proposed approach to the Pakistan government, with a CIA representative participating in the drafting of the paper to the extent necessary to assure that the intelligence interests and the views of the Special Group are adequately reflected.

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

1/mc

13-00000

SECRET
EYES ONLY

27 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 27 June 1963

PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Gilpatric.

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3.
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.

98

1. [British Suggestion Regarding Reconnaissance Flights

The Group reviewed the message received from the British Foreign Office through the British Embassy, suggesting that during the period of the Harriman-Hailsham visit to Moscow reconnaissance flights be suspended, as well as the suggested draft reply presented by Mr. Johnson. The Group approved the language of the reply, the gist of which was that while appreciating the UK suggestion, we do not find it possible to agree to suspend all such flights. We believe that most of them have virtually no risk, and that to cancel all of them would break a routine long familiar to the Soviets; we might then find it difficult to resume. However, we undertake to screen with particular care all flights scheduled during the period of this visit, so as to reduce selectively to a minimum those which might be regarded by the Soviets as sensitive.

In the course of the discussion of these messages, the members of the Group agreed that probably the British motive in making the suggestion is to provide a political gesture that would be apparent to the Soviets. From this point of view, the pattern of DOD peripheral flights was examined and the conclusions were that: (a) Particularly sensitive flights are scheduled sporadically. Therefore, no isolated definite pattern in any one area that would be noticed by the Soviets if cancelled and that would provide political impact on Soviet leaders, can be identified. (b) A world-wide stand-down during the period of the visit could accomplish this purpose, but would be undesirable for the reasons set forth in Mr. Johnson's draft. (c) Peripheral flights in particularly sensitive areas (i.e., Baltic Sea, Black Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk) are subject to Soviet reaction in the form of identification intercept by fighters. However, it is believed that these have become sufficiently routine so they are not brought to the attention of high levels of]

See special minutes
for additional items.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

1/MC

98

[the Soviet government. (d) In the case of the Sea of Okhotsk, however, no flights will be scheduled during the visit. Baltic flights will be very carefully reviewed. Black Sea flights should not require cancellation. In general, all flights around the Soviet periphery will be subject to special review during this period.]

2. [NRO Forecast 98

The NRO monthly forecast for July was approved.]

3. [Use of Chinese Pilots in Southeast Asia 98

The NRO paper of 25 June, proposing the substitution of Chinese Nationalist pilots for Americans for the high-performance coverage of North Vietnam and Laos, was discussed.

Mr. Johnson said that the State Department's view is that if Chinese Nationalist missions out of Taiwan are so scheduled as to cross over the border into North Vietnam from time to time, they have no real objection (on the understanding that the cover story would be that the pilot had strayed off course.) On the other hand, the Department is unable to concur in any deep penetration into the southern part of North Vietnam, or into Laos. The latter country is considered particularly sensitive in this respect.

In light of the State position, the Group agreed to proceed as at present with the modifications suggested by Mr. Johnson.]

4. [Spain - Labor Program 98

The CIA paper of 21 June was approved as presented.]

5. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations

Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of the previous month's operations.

Mr. McCone called particular attention to the continuing buildup of fast patrol boats in the Cuban inventory, and said that in light of this we must begin to draw contingency plans for alternate methods of delivery of agents and supplies against the eventuality that the patrol boats may become too great a hazard. He suggested the possibility of such means of delivery as submarines.

4/mc

Mr. McCone went on to say that continuing reports are now being received, alleging the existence of various exotic items of materiel in Cuba. No one report appears to stand up, but he has directed that all such reports for the past ninety days be examined in total context, so as to see whether on this basis any possible pattern might emerge. Mr. McCone added that he personally feels very uneasy about the situation in Cuba.

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

11 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 11 July 1963

PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Johnson, ~~Mr. Gilpatric, and~~
Mr. William Bundy and Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Item 1.
Mr. R. Jack Smith was present for Item 2.
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 2 and 3.
Mr. Colby was present for Items 4 and 5.

98

1. [Peripheral Reconnaissance

The Group approved the agreement reached last week between State and the JRC on the handling of certain possibly sensitive operations during July. Specifically, REX 1 and 2 were approved with the understanding that the nearest point to the Kuriles would be 15 miles instead of 14, at the northern end of the track. URBAN and RAY were approved, in light of the fact that overt flight plans will be filed.

It was noted that the Chiefs had already deferred operations YANKEE PASHA, VERNE and THOMAS at least until after completion of the Harriman mission.

Of the three new missions presented by JRC, RED DOG/HAWKEYE and the special photographic operation in European Turkey were approved as presented. Mission RAINHAT-Track 2 was approved with the stipulation that the nearest point to the target country will be 12 miles rather than 10.

The British note concerning proposed reconnaissance of the Soviet Northern Fleet (British name, Operation BARGOLD) was discussed. Colonel Steakley stated that the standard British restrictions on such operations are that no aircraft will approach closer than a quarter of a mile or will go under 500 feet, but he said that we have been unable to determine whether the current restrictions, mentioned in the British note, are more stringent than this. He told the Group that U.S. rules provide for no harassing action and for no flights below 2000 feet (this height limit being primarily because of flight safety, in view of the expected presence of British aircraft at a lower level). The Group felt there is no objection to overflying Soviet vessels under these conditions, despite the apparent British ban on this for their own aircraft.]

1/mc

98

State will inform the British Minister that we propose to proceed in this manner.

2. Cuba - Status of Soviet Personnel and Materiel

Mr. McCone reminded the Group that he had asked for a review of intelligence reports on the situation inside Cuba over a 90-day period, so as to see whether any possible pattern might emerge. He said this review is just now being completed, it having involved examination of 30,000 to 40,000 separate reports. He expects a draft to be available to him by Monday or Tuesday. This will probably take the form of an Agency memorandum, but DIA will be asked to review it.

The Chairman said that the Cuban situation will be of great importance in connection with Governor Harriman's negotiations; accordingly, he asked that an informal reading on the results of this review be made available as soon as possible, before a formal paper is fully completed.

Mr. Smith then summarized CIA's latest views on the status of Soviet personnel and equipment. He said that there is insufficient evidence on which to base any change in the current estimate of 12,000 to 13,000 Soviet troops. He said that it appears the Soviets are now engaged in training Cubans for eventual transfer of Soviet equipment to them. No combat equipment has been seen leaving Cuba, since last fall.

Mr. Smith added that the equipment which was seen leaving on 6 July appears on close examination by photo interpreters to be communications and generator vans, rather than missile guidance equipment.

8

Mr. McCone said that the Japanese Ambassador to Cuba has expressed his conviction that some offensive Soviet missiles still remain in Cuba. CIA and State will debrief the Ambassador on this point today.

3. Cuba - Agent Operations

Mr. FitzGerald told the Group about two additional infiltration/exfiltration operations which were carried out in the last days of June, after his last report. He then mentioned highlights of proposals for the next month. These proposals, as presented in the Coordinator's paper of 9 July, were approved.

2/mc

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that by the 26th of July the Harriman negotiations in Moscow might have reached a crucial stage; he asked how flexible are the sabotage operations planned for that day (as explained by Mr. FitzGerald to the Standing Group on Tuesday). He said he was not suggesting that any change in the basic guidance for sabotage operations is indicated, but it is evident that in times of particular sensitivity all potentially provocative activities should be subject to review.

In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that because of light factors these operations could not be run any later than July 28th, in this month's moon period. He pointed out that if it should appear that it would be advisable for political reasons to postpone the operations until the August dark-of-the-moon period, then as much advance notice as possible should be given the agents, in order not to damage their morale unduly. It was agreed that by the time of next week's Special Group meeting it should be possible to make some kind of judgment about the possible progress of the Harriman talks, and that a decision could be made at that time whether or not to postpone these particular operations.

4. Vietnam - Monthly Status Report

Mr. Colby outlined the results of the past month's agent operations. In summary, he said that he believes the covert propaganda activities are beginning to catch on, but that so far there is not a great deal of tangible result to report in the sabotage field.

5. [Tibet - Status Report 98

Mr. Colby expanded briefly on the paper of the 8th of July, on the status of projected Tibetan agent operations. He emphasized that the trainees will be sent back to India in the very near future, and that discussions will then take place jointly with the Indians as to details of overland infiltration into Tibet. Planning for air drops of agents is being deferred until sufficient operational intelligence can be built up to permit reasonable decisions.]

[6. Guatemala - Covert Annex (Revised) to Internal Defense Plan 98

This annex was noted by the Group. Particular attention was called to the agreed assessment that the Arevalo threat no longer exists.]

Jay Parrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

18 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 18 July 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Colonel King was present for Item 2.
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 3.
Mr. Sheldon was present for Item 4.

1. Reconnaissance 98

Mr. McCone reported that during the last week no high-performance missions were flown in the Far East, due to bad weather.

2. Haiti - Political Action 96

Mr. McCone and Colonel King reported that the following changes have taken place in the Haitian picture since the Special Group approved, on June 20th, the proposal to reach a covert understanding with President Bosch on the use of Haitian exiles in the Dominican Republic. The developments are:

a. It has been demonstrated that these exiles are of very little use, because of insecurity, lack of cohesive purpose or of adequate leadership, etc.

b. President Bosch has now decided that he is unwilling to allow such an exile force to use his country as a base for military operations against Duvalier.

c. Duvalier's own capabilities have improved greatly, due to such things as: the widespread purge of potentially-dissident Army officers; clearance of the border areas; and, most recently, the elimination of the Barbot brothers.

Colonel King said that everyone concerned with the project agrees that Duvalier must be removed in some manner or other. However, in light of the factors mentioned above, operating elements have concluded that the existing plan is unworkable, and that it is best to switch to a different kind of operation. This would include in the first instance, training of selected exiles in intelligence collection, in communications, and in cross-border operations. Such training

2/mc

98

could be given at a base in the Continental U.S. or in Puerto Rico; support and facilities may be required from DOD. The long-range objectives would be to establish a clandestine organization capable of gathering intelligence and eventually building up and arming an effective opposition in Haiti; to establish friendly relations with, and if necessary, support individuals capable of playing a constructive role in a future Haitian government; to encourage and support individuals and organizations who are both anti-Duvalier and anti-Communist; and to attempt to spread dissension among Duvalier advisers and to subvert some of them.

Colonel King emphasized that the $200,000 already approved would cover the training activities, but that it is impossible to estimate now how much the subversion operations might require, if suitable opportunities should be identified.

The Group agreed to recommend this new course of action to higher authority.

(There was no objection by higher authority to the program as presented, in the light of the changed conditions.)

3. Cuba - Sabotage Operations

Mr. FitzGerald was asked to reschedule tentatively for the middle of August the special operations planned for the 26th of July, in light of the negotiations going on in Moscow. Mr. Bundy cautioned that it is entirely possible that by the middle of August the negotiating process might have gone into another phase which would make it necessary to cancel the operation once more.

4. Technical Installations - Pakistan 98

The Group considered the CIA paper of 17 July, with attachments, which outlined the difficulties which have been encountered recently in getting the Pakistani government to go along with expansion of our special intelligence facilities in that country. Mr. McCone emphasized his feeling and that of the USIB as a whole, that any wasting of this asset would represent a very serious loss to the intelligence community.

After some discussion the Group agreed that the best method of approach is to make it entirely clear in presenting the proposed three-year MAP program to Pakistan authorities that the maintenance and expansion of U.S. intelligence facilities at Peshawar is an essential part of the bargain. It can also be reaffirmed to Ayub at that time

2/mc

15 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 15 August 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. FitzGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 1, 2 and 5.C.

Dr. Whelan, Colonel Ledford, and Mr. Cunningham were present for Items 3 and 4.

1. A Non-Violent Program to Inhibit Free World and Neutral Trade with Cuba

The operational proposal dated 12 August, was approved by the Special Group, with the two changes in wording made by the State Department. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that to make this operation convincing, a "big bang" on a Cuban ship will be carried out before the operation is implemented. He further pointed out that in paragraph 2.a. of the paper, the reference to "real ... sabotage" applied to Cuban shipping only. Item 2.c. in the operational proposal was thought to be of low priority and is to be placed at the bottom of the list.

2. Cuba - Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups

Mr. FitzGerald recommended that the paper dated 13 August be submitted at this time for discussion only rather than decision by the Special Group. This recommendation was made because the members of the Group had not been given sufficient time to study the proposal. The paper had been presented in hasty fashion because CIA had received reports that the exile group in question was beginning to scatter and prepare for an operational program not influenced by CIA.

There was some discussion of the effects of using a British island for launching these operations and as to the desirability of striking Cuban shipping on the high seas. Decision on this operation was deferred until the next meeting.

See special minutes for additional items

98

3. Defensive Armament for GROSBEAK Aircraft

The Special Group approved the paper of 11 August as presented, subject to confirmation that the sidewinder heat-seeker missile, already compromised, would not lead to a security problem should a GROSBEAK plane be lost.

4. GROSBEAK Overflight of Laos 98

The proposal was approved to overfly Laos in order to fulfill COMOR requirements for radar order of battle information in support of current and future missions.

5. Miscellaneous Items 98

A. Mr. McCone briefly described the current status of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RadLib). He stated that he hoped there would be no change in the State Department policy with respect to the radios because of the extensive commitments, international agreements, and political implications in RFE and RadLib. Mr. McCone indicated that there appeared to be a feeling in some quarters of the Department of State that, because the U.S. may be entering a period of "detente" with the Soviet Union, efforts should be made to reduce the causes of tension and conflict. Since the two radios are major irritants to the Soviets, CIA should, therefore, modify or reduce some of these activities. The Special Group opined that this was not the time to change U.S. policy with respect to RFE and RadLib. Mr. Johnson said he would look into this further.

B. The matter of the Soviet attempt to establish a consolidated headquarters at Lietzenburger Strasse in West Berlin, was raised by Mr. McCone. He opposed such a development forthe following reasons:

(1) The formation of such a headquarters would lay the groundwork for future Soviet claims to an equal footing with the U.S. in West Berlin.

(2) Its establishment would severely handicap CIA operations against the USSR target in West Berlin.

(3) Such a center would improve on the USSR's ability to concentrate its operations against Western targets.

(4) It would in effect increase Soviet prestige in West Berlin.

3/MC

SECRET
EYES ONLY

98

[Mr. Bundy stated he was aware of the problem and believed that the British who had been reluctant to support the position of the U.S. and the French, now concurred that a refusal to the Soviets should be made. This concerted action, it was believed by the Group, would succeed in preventing the Soviets from establishing such a consolidated headquarters.

C. Mr. FitzGerald reported that recent discussions held with Artime have indicated that he is somewhat disgusted with Luis Somoza who has not behaved sensibly, but that he does have respect for his brother, General Anastasio Somoza, with whom he can deal more rationally. Artime will make greater use of Costa Rica in order to decrease his operational commitments in Nicaragua and increase his security.]

Paul Eckel
Paul Eckel

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

SECRET

1/MC

8 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 August 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 1.
Mr. Herbert was present for Item 2.
Mr. Baird was present for Item 3.

1. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations

Of the 13 Cuban operations approved by the Special Group, 2 are to be externally-mounted sabotage operations which will be subject to possible reconsideration up to 12 August 1963. The other 11 operations approved are designed to meet the need for expanded intelligence collection activities and to develop viable internal resistance organizations.

Mr. FitzGerald made a special report on Luis Somoza's conversations with exile leaders. Somoza wants the Cuban exiles to begin aggressive harassment operations against Castro and indicated that the Nicaraguan government was willing to give them a base as well as support, including military aid. Somoza intimated that this may result in Castro's launching an offensive against Nicarague. If this occurs, Somoza would expect U.S. protection and possibly intervention. Mr. FitzGerald further stated that Manuel Artime, leader of the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery, would be in the U.S., at which time all aspects of his program would be examined. In order to avoid unfavorable complications with Somoza, two operational changes will be suggested:

a. Artime should concentrate on getting resistance started inside Cuba and de-emphasize armed attack and external sabotage.

b. Artime should shift the main weight of his operations to Costa Rica. There should be no break, of course, between Artime and Somoza.

In this connection Mr. Johnson raised the Costa Rican Foreign Minister's question regarding Artime. It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald would work out the language of the reply with Mr. Cottrell, giving as

See special minutes
for additional items

much encouragement to Costa Rica's support of Artime as possible without showing his activities.

General Carter mentioned the eagerness of William D. Pawley to implement an operational plan against Cuba, purportedly designed to create a situation which might ultimately require U.S. intervention. The consensus of the Special Group was that an independent operation organized by Pawley, would not be desirable. Efforts should be made to bring him into CIA's current operational thinking.

Mr. FitzGerald also reported that the Attorney General had sent Mr. Harry Ruiz Williams to the Agency to present a plan which turned out to be a series of 4.2 mortar attacks on the Cuban coast mounted from Guatemala. It was agreed that such attacks, in addition to being impractical logistically, would also tend to give substance to the "Somoza plan" and therefore should be discouraged.

2. Bolivia - Covert Action 98

The CIA paper of 2 August was approved.

3. CIA Training Activities 98

Mr. Matthew Baird, Director of CIA's Training Activities, made an oral report on CIA's counterinsurgency training and courses. Mr. Baird emphasized that ever since the establishment of the Office of Training in January 1951, CIA has concentrated on the covert aspects of training. It has not duplicated in any way courses offered by the Department of Defense, the Foreign Service Institute or universities. During fiscal 1963, CIA sent over 2000 students to 1275 courses at 166 government and educational institutions. In addition, during the same year, CIA trained 4214 students in 432 runnings of 64 different courses, all directly or indirectly relating to counterinsurgency.

Mr. Baird said that strong emphasis has always been placed on resistance operations and guerrilla and paramilitary activities. The method of instruction in CIA is based on case studies of current operations. CIA trained, during fiscal 1963, 150 junior officers (with a drop out of less than four per cent) and gave instruction to 174 foreign personnel in counterinsurgency, or directly related fields.

Mr. Bundy raised the question as to how CIA courses were inspected. General Carter replied by pointing out that these courses are continuously inspected by the Inspector General, the President's Board of Consultants, and the Deputy Director, Plans, who heads up the clandestine services.

2/mc

98

[The consensus was that Central Intelligence was meeting its counterinsurgency training obligations and that because of the covert character of the training, an inspection team external to CIA was probably not desirable.]

Paul Eckel
Paul Eckel

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- General Carter

1/mc

SECRET
EYES ONLY

29 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 29 August 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1 and 2.
Mr. Cheever was present for Item 3.

1. Monthly Reconnaissance Forecasts 98

a. NRO

The NRO forecast for September was approved as presented, with one exception. This had to do with the second Laos/North Vietnam flight, which had been requested in order to "replenish the bank." Mr. Johnson asked that he be briefed on the results of previous reconnaissance in this area so that he could weigh the value of the product against the political risk involved.

It was noted that this procedure will not delay operations, since one approval remains outstanding for Laos/North Vietnam.

b. DOD

The DOD September forecast was approved with the exception of the proposed trip of the USS THOMASON. Mr. Johnson objected to the proposal to transit the Kita Uruppu Suida Passage. He said that the Department is in favor of continuing to exercise our rights of free navigation in the Sea of Okhotsk; but the projected voyage of the hydrographic ship REHOBOTH satisfies this requirement. Further, U.S. merchant shipping does transit the Passage. In view of these considerations, he did not believe it desirable at this time to send a U.S. warship on this route. The Group concurred with Mr. Johnson's position.

General Carter said that in view of certain other indications recently received, YANKEE PASHA is considered by the intelligence community to be even more urgent than before.

Mr. Johnson raised a question about the mission of the USS STATEN ISLAND in the Chukchi Sea, asking whether the objective could not be met by staying 15 miles from shore rather than 12. Colonel

SECRET
EYES ONLY

1/mk

98

Steakley explained that the mission of the ship is to obtain information on hydrographic "stations" located 12 miles out and that the restriction suggested would not enable the vessel to accomplish this. Mr. Johnson then concurred.

Colonel Steakley briefed the Group on certain sensitive reconnaissance operations.

Colonel Steakley gave a brief summary of the deployment of MIG fighters in the China coastal areas. He said that as of now there are no MIG-21's in the area, the MIG complement consisting of 17's and 19's. He saw no need to revise any of the projected BOW TIE missions because of these fighters.

2. Negotiations for Indian Base 98

The Group noted the report from New Delhi that the Indian Intelligence Service finds itself unable to give assurances to the Prime Minister about the security of personnel on the projected temporary base at Char Batia, and that approval for use of this base has, therefore, been withheld.

Mr. Gilpatric and General Carter pointed out that the DIA is anxious to have the Sino-Indian border area covered, because this has not been done since January. General Carter said that he had intended to have the USIB reassess the priority of this requirement at its meeting yesterday, but that other matters had made it impossible to bring it up.

The Group felt that this should be discussed with USIB next week. They agreed, however, that in the absence of a really persuasive case for the priority of the requirement, it would be inadvisable to attempt to run the operation once more out of Takhli without Indian assistance. They felt that other things being equal, it would be preferable to revert to the original proposal of having a permanent Indian base available in December.

3. Cuba

a. The Group then turned to consideration of the paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 12 August 1963, "Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups." In answer to questions, Mr. Cheever said that the project for support of Commandos L would be useful but not essential. He felt that the economic damage which this group might inflict would probably be comparatively minor. On the other hand there would be some psychological advantages to be gained, and also such operations would serve to keep the Cuban security forces busy.

2/mc

In view of the personal interest expressed by Mr. McCone in the project when it was tabled at the meeting of 15 August, it was agreed that no decision should be made until after the DCI's return.

b. Mr. Cheever briefed the Group on the successful disposal of the contaminated sugar which has been in Puerto Rico.

c. Mr. Cheever discussed the "After Action Report" on the two sabotage operations conducted the middle of August. Mr. Johnson commented on the amount of materiel that had been left behind at the site of one of these operations, and asked whether it is possible that the Cuban agents did this deliberately, in order to involve the United States. Mr. Cheever acknowledged this possibility, but felt that it had simply been a question of "green troops" behaving in this manner their first time under fire.

The Chairman asked that an estimate be prepared, assessing Castro's probable reaction to this sabotage. He also asked Mr. Cheever to see that the Attorney General is briefed on the results of the operations.

98

4. [Costa Rica - Re-establishment of Institute for Political Education

The CIA paper of 26 August was approved as presented.]

5. [GROSBEAK Armament 98

[redacted]

h make it clear
o the Chinese
GROSBEAK aircraft
verification that
al can, therefore,]

Thomas A. Parrott

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
General Carter

2/mc

5 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 5 September 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.
Mr. Colby was present for Items 3-5.

1. Cuba - Agent Operations

Mr. FitzGerald commented on several reports from inside Cuba, which indicate that the morale of the people was raised considerably as a result of the Santa Lucia and Casilda sabotage operations. He cautioned that some of these reports might be somewhat overdrawn, but it appears certain that the sabotage did have a beneficial effect in this way.

He then discussed with the Group the general philosophy of these operations, and plans for the future within the capabilities of the available agents. Among other things, he pointed out that there is a limited number of targets on or near the coast and that the most attractive ones are, at the same time, the most difficult to attack; the available teams are not yet ready for assignments of this difficulty. On the other hand, smaller and more vulnerable targets are being selected. It is proposed to hit a lumber mill in September.

Mr. FitzGerald went on to say, in connection with the scope and pace of these operations, that it would not be desirable to knock out all available targets in the near future, even if it were possible to do so. This is because this type of attack is designed to stimulate resistance inside Cuba, apart from whatever intrinsic value it might have.

The Group agreed with the approach. They felt that the reaction to the two missions in August was most satisfactory and that it is essential to keep this sort of thing up, selecting a limited number of worthwhile targets. Mr. Bundy commented particularly on the silence that had been maintained by the agents, which has resulted in the noise level being of a different character than might have been expected otherwise. Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to proceed with a relatively soft target, such as a lumber mill.

See special minutes
for additional items

There were some questions as to the feasibility of having somewhat larger teams, but Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that that is not practicable now. Mr. Bundy suggested that special attention be given to electric power installations to the extent that adequate assets are available for that purpose. He also noted that the two August operations had been carried out in a professional and sophisticated manner, which leads naturally to the accusation of Agency sponsorship. He urged that to the extent possible attempts be made to vary the method, for example by launching the attack from the shore side rather than from the sea, as Mr. FitzGerald had previously said will be the case with the lumber mill. Mr. Bundy felt that in this way the "CIA signature" might be blurred.

The Group then discussed the paper prepared by the Board of National Estimates, on possible Castro reaction to sabotage operations. No issue was taken with the conclusions of this paper, but there was some discussion as to how the Soviets would react to any requests made of them by Castro to assist him in combatting sabotage. In this connection, Mr. McCone called attention to the increasing currents of tension between the USSR and Cuba.

Mr. FitzGerald then summarised the results of last month's infiltration/exfiltration operations and those proposed for next month.

2. Cuba - Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Group

The Group then turned to further discussion of the paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated August 13, on the subject of Comandos L.

In response to objections stated at earlier meetings to the use of a British base, Mr. FitzGerald said that it would be feasible to take off from a point in the northern Bahamas, rather than from one of the keys very near Cuba. This would considerably reduce the dangers of hot pursuit.

Mr. Johnson said that purely apart from the British problem, whether or not such a change in location would alleviate it, he does not feel that the type of activity proposed accomplishes the agreed objective of reaching internal resistance elements.

The Chairman, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone all felt that support of this group in the manner outlined, should be considered as action additional to that designed to contact the resistance. Further, they felt that it would be perfectly feasible, and in fact necessary, to avoid any involvement with the British in this matter. It was finally decided that Mr. Bundy would discuss the proposal with higher authority, noting the reservations expressed by Mr. Johnson. In the event of favorable reaction by higher authority, Mr. Bundy will talk further to Mr. Johnson.

Mr. McCone said that he would like to see more activity of this general nature and asked whether this could be accomplished if larger numbers of Cuban personnel were obtained. Mr. FitzGerald replied that the problem is not numbers, but the degree of training and competence. In this connection, he noted that the Artime group should be ready to go in November.

3. [Interdiction Operations Along Route 7 98

Mr. Colby briefed the Group in detail on the successful interdiction of Route 7 in Laos by a thousand-man force of Meos, in early August. He pointed out that the success achieved could be attributed to adequate operational intelligence, security, size of the group, and the support of the Parus.]

4. [North Vietnam Status Report Number 7 98

Mr. Colby touched on the highlights of agent activity in North Vietnam during August, and on plans for similar activity during the coming month.]

5. [Operations in Denied Areas of the Far East 98

Mr. Colby said that a review has been made of experience with agent operations in the denied areas of the Far East, including North Korea, China, Tibet and North Vietnam. He said that as a result of this review, serious doubts have arisen as to the results that can be expected from small teams, either in intelligence or in action. He said that he proposes to discuss with the DCI in the near future, certain changes in the method of operation in such areas. This might take the form of concentrating on developing a spirit of resistance rather than on a search for resistance elements or on carrying out minor sabotage. It might also involve much larger groups of people. In this connection, he pointed to the success of the thousand-man operation against Route 7.]

3/mc

98

Mr. Gilpatric noted that the Wheeler report, recommending the use of South Vietnamese nationals for activities of this nature in North Vietnam, is to be discussed next week with the Joint Chiefs. Mr. McCone suggested that the Chiefs should be briefed by Mr. Colby.

TaParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

1/mc

13-00000

SECRET
EYES ONLY

303 file
7.6

24 October 1963

See 418

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 24 October 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Mr. Helms was also present.
Mr. FitzGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 2-3.

98

1. United States Evaluation Board (USEB)

Mr. Helms reported that the USEB was established in 1950 by a National Security Council Intelligence Directive. The Board was required to perform certain functions in connection with U.S. cover and deception programs. Membership on the Board was limited to the Service Departments, FBI, CIA, JCS, and the Department of State.

According to Mr. Helms the USEB has not met in recent years. However, it was agreed by the Special Group that its functions had considerable significance and should be continued. Since USEB was originally organized only to deal in the military sphere, it was recommended by Mr. Helms that a new directive be written and coordinated, which would encompass all national deception programs, and be submitted to the Special Group for approval. It was also determined that the new USEB would report to the Special Group.

Is this the proper place? Why not DCI?

2. Cuba - Forecast of CIA Sabotage Operations

The proposed sabotage operations for November through January was noted by the Group. The operation plan against petroleum storage facilities in Niquero was deleted and an operation against a sawmill located at Canete in Northern Oriente Province, was substituted. Specific operational proposals for November will be submitted to the Special Group for approval at the next meeting.

3. Cuba - Proposal for Air Strikes Against Cuban Targets

This operational proposal was deferred by the Special Group pending an estimate to determine the Cuban reaction to an air strike on the Santiago refinery, and specifically what effect it might have on the U.S. reconnaissance operation. CIA will prepare the estimate.

See special minutes
for additional items

SECRET
EYES ONLY

4. Cuba - Reappraisal of Previous Proposals for Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups

Mr. FitzGerald informed the Group that CIA is dropping its earlier proposal to support Commandos L, due to the crackdown on exile raids by various U. S. and British government agencies. He recommended that a plan of "selective relaxation" be adopted, designed to relax current stringent controls on selected anti-Castro groups in order to avoid all raids being charged to CIA.

The suggestion is that the "selective relaxation" be accomplished by authorizing CIA to tell appropriate U.S. enforcement agents that certain activities are of interest to CIA and should not be molested. CIA would not actually get involved but would simply screen these groups to permit some freedom of movement on the part of the better ones. This would be without the knowledge of the groups.

Mr. Johnson raised the question of difficulties of controlling exile groups should any group succeed in engaging in activities not to the liking of the U.S. Government. This possibility was admitted.

Mr. FitzGerald cited the Manolo Ray group as one group which a "selective relaxation" would assist. This autonomous group is receiving financial and limited logistic assistance from CIA, and desires to mount an infiltration operation from Florida. He has good connections in Cuba and should be urged to proceed. Mr. Bundy stated he was not enthusiastic about Ray operating from U.S. territory. Mr. Bundy stated he would discuss this proposal with higher authority.

5. Cuba - Infiltration Operation

Mr. FitzGerald reported that one of the small boats used in the 21 October infiltration operation reached Mexico and is in the hands of local authorities, friendly to us. There were three persons on board, one dead, one injured, and the other all right.

The fate of the second small boat is unknown. The mother ship which escorted the two small boats was attacked, but evaded its attackers and escaped. There is a possibility that some team or boat crew members may have been captured and if so, a "show trial" may be expected.

98

6. Proposal to Form and Support a Political Action Committee on Religious Freedom in the USSR

This project was not approved as proposed. It was agreed that the concept was sound but there should be further exploration as to

SECRET
EYES ONLY

98

whether private capital could not be used instead of government funds. The project was referred back to CIA with the suggestion to explore whether the World Council of Churches or the National Council of Protestants and Jews might be interested in obtaining and contributing funds for carrying out the aims set forth in the paper.

7. Cyprus - Political Action 98

This operation was approved although the Special Group members agreed that until after the elections there should be no new effort to initiate operational activity among the Greek veterans.

8. Vietnam - Coup Plotting

Mr. McCone expressed his fear that the top U.S. diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved in conversations between General Don and Conein. Such involvement could destroy Conein's usefulness and involve Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins in operations difficult to deny.

The Special Group authorized the sending of a coordinated message to Lodge and Harkins emphasizing (a) the setting up of a more secure system of contacts with General Don and other Vietnamese military; (b) the preparation of an Embassy assessment of General Don's status, the group he represents and future plans; (c) the tightening of control over the Don/Conein meetings.

Special Group members agreed that they should firm up their policy thinking with respect to Vietnam before Ambassador Lodge returns to Washington, and then hear what Mr. Lodge has to say on what courses of action should be taken.

(Signed)

Paul Eckel

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

SECRET
EYES ONLY

7/mc

6 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Special Group, 5 November 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

The Attorney General, Mr. Helms, Mr. Cheever, Dr. Wheelon, and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1 and 2. The Attorney General and Mr. Helms were present for Item 3.

1. Cuba - Sabotage Operation in Southeast Pinar (No. 3105).

Mr. Helms briefed the Group on the background of the mission and on events leading up to the infiltration attempted on 21-22 October. On the basis of available information, the best estimate is that Castro's security forces penetrated the reception committee and laid a trap which resulted in the capture of some personnel.

The subsequent press coverage of this affair renders the further operational use of the mother ships REX and LIDA to be undesirable in the immediate future.

2. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations

Mr. Cheever presented a low-key sabotage operation, No. 3111, against a warehouse and pier on the north coast of Cuba. This activity is to be carried out by a small commando team which will land on the pier and the warehouse.

Mention was made by Mr. Cheever of some problems with British patrols which have unwittingly exposed some of CIA's operations. Mr. Bundy stated that he would mention this to the British Ambassador and CIA would follow up on a service-to-service level in order to prevent further unnecessary incidents.

In addition, the Special Group tentatively approved two other operations. These are No. 3112, a sabotage operation against a sawmill located in northern Oriente Province and No. 3115, the infiltration of a radio operator to provide communications for a ratline.

Mr. Bundy has placed the above three operations on a "fail safe" basis pending concurrence in each case by higher authority.

See special minutes
for additional items

3. Cuba - Peace Feelers

Mr. Bundy stated that is has come to the attention of the White House that Castro would like to have a talk designed to bring about some kind of "arrangement" with the U.S. To hear what Castro has to say and to know on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of some use to the U.S. Mr. Bundy suggested that for this initial talk Mr. William Attwood, currently on the staff of Mr. Stevenson at the United Nations, might be a likely candidate since Mr. Attwood has been in touch with Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia, the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Also, Attwood has a fairly friendly relationship with Castro based on previous acquaintance.

In the Group discussion which followed it was thought inadvisable to allow Mr. Attwood, while on the UN staff, to get in touch with Castro. The suggestion was made that he might be removed from his official UN status and then go to Cuba for the ostensible purpose of writing an article for Look magazine. In this way it might be learned how badly Castro might want a detente with the United States.

It was suggested by Mr. Helms that it might be profitable to "war game" this problem and look at it from all possible angles before making any contacts.

A further suggestion was made by Mr. Bundy that Dr. Rene Vallejo Ortiz, Castro's aide and personal physician, might be flown to Mexico with Castro's proposals and discuss them with the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City.

The Attorney General emphasized that as a prelude to all this the U.S. must require some fundamental steps such as the end of subversion in Latin America and removing the Soviet troops in Cuba before any serious discussion can take place about a detente.

Mr. McCone stated that it might be possible to use again Mr. James Donovan who is known to have excellent relationships with Dr. Vallejo. Vallejo might be flown to the UN for such talks or better still Donovan could go to Cuba.

It was decided by the Special Group members not to try to reach a firm decision at this time but to study the problem for several days and attack it again.

Paul Eckel
Paul Eckel

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

SECRET
EYES ONLY

✓

6 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Cuban Operations

At a special meeting of the Special Group on 5 November, it tentatively approved, subject to higher authority concurrence, three Cuban operations scheduled for implementation on 8, 10, and 13 November. On 6 November higher authority disapproved all Cuban operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before 12 November. The two operations dated 8 and 10 November are therefore disapproved.

Paul Eckel
Paul Eckel

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Noted by DDCI

12 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuban Operations

A meeting was held this morning with higher authority on the above subject. Present were: Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Cheever, and Mr. Shackley.

Mr. McCone gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba. He stated that the military is generally loyal to Castro. There have been some disorders but not very extensive. Castro's internal security forces appear to be well organized. He has developed a system of informers which is becoming increasingly effective. The economic situation is deteriorating largely because of the enforcement of economic sanctions, and Hurricane "Flora" although its damage was not as great as originally thought. The Soviets appear to be continuing the gradual withdrawal of personnel from Cuba although recently 1,000-2,000 troops have come in. There now seems to be a kind of "Soviet MAAG" program concerned mainly with training Cubans in all types of military activity including the handling of missiles. There has been some removal of the more sophisticated types of electronic equipment. Some new tanks have arrived in Cuba, estimates run from 25 to 50.

Mr. FitzGerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings: (a) Covert Collection, (b) Propaganda, (c) Economic Denial, (d) Disaffections in the Military, (e) Sabotage and Harassment, and (f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups.

(a) Covert Collection. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that inside Cuba CIA has three kinds of agent activities: (1) "singleton" (2) collection nets, and (3) agents involved in "black net" operations. While there is encouraging improvement in the geographical spread of these agents, there is still, understandably, a fairly heavy concentration of agents in the Havana area.

A question was raised as to how many agents in all of these activities have been lost. Mr. FitzGerald said that in the neighborhood of 25 had been either captured or killed in the past year.

The reasons for these casualty figures are the increasing effectiveness of Castro's internal security forces and discovery brought about when agents try to obtain food. No matter how good the documentation, an outsider in a community is viewed with suspicion.

(b) Propaganda. The activities of CIA in this field are the mailing of leaflets and radio broadcasts. Some 30-40,000 leaflets per month have been mailed and during a day there are 32 hours of programs emanating from seven different stations. It is believed that there is a very excellent listening public. The programs appeal to people in a wide variety of jobs and professions. There is some jamming but it is spasmodic and generally confined to Havana.

(c) Economic Denial. Mr. FitzGerald reported that the U.S. economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy. Mention was made that the economic denial program would be more effective if the Canadians were willing to cooperate. Up to now they have not gone along with U.S. efforts, and they are supplying many items essential to Cuban economy. The UK and Spain are continuing to deal in certain types of goods required by the Cubans. Commodities going into Cuba in 1962 from the free world reached $101 million. While this represents less than in 1961 the amount is still too high.

(d) Disaffections in the Military. While the military is loyal to Castro as has been noted there are indications that some leaders would like to break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity. Mr. FitzGerald commended a CIA-DIA task force which prepared a report covering some 150 Cuban military leaders. Out of this figure there are some 45 which look interesting from CIA's operational viewpoint. Mr. FitzGerald reported that CIA is in touch with three persons who are in the military or who have highly placed contacts in such circles. The aim is to use these three individuals to establish contact with military personnel inside Cuba. The principal aim is to get military leaders who have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to dare to talk and plot Castro's downfall with each other.

(e) Sabotage and Harassment. Mr. FitzGerald mentioned four successful sabotage operations against a power plant, oil storage facilities, a sawmill, and an underwater demolition operation against a floating crane in one of Cuba's harbors. It is believed that the publication of these successful sabotage activities in the Cuban press has tended to raise appreciably the morale of the people. Also, such sabotage continues to keep pressure on the Castro regime and adds to the growing economic problems facing the country.

(f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups. The question was asked from where would the autonomous groups operate. Mr. FitzGerald replied that they would operate from outside U.S. territory. He mentioned two bases of the Artime group, one in Costa Rica and the other in Nicaragua. Also it was hoped that the autonomous group under Manolo Ray would soon get itself established in a working base, possibly Costa Rica. Mr. FitzGerald said that much could be accomplished by these autonomous groups once they become operational.

A question was asked as to what decisions remain to be made. Mr. FitzGerald replied that we were looking for a reaffirmation of the program as presented, including sabotage and harassment. When asked what was planned in sabotage for the immediate future, he said that destruction operations should be carried out against a large oil refinery and storage facilities, a large electric plant, sugar refineries, railroad bridges, harbor facilities, and underwater demolition of docks and ships. The question was also raised as to whether an air strike would be effective on some of these principal targets. The consensus was that CIA should proceed with its planning for this type of activity looking toward January.

The State Department raised questions with respect to sabotage activities in Cuba. The thought was advanced that there may be a relationship between such hit and run attacks on Cuba and the delay of American convoys en route to Berlin. A further question was posed as to the over-all importance to the United States of sabotage operations, especially since it is so difficult to keep them from being directly attributable to the U.S. It was thought that the hit and run type effort might in fact invoke loss of support inside Cuba and may even result in bringing more Soviet troops back into Cuba. Somehow the U.S. must pin responsibility for these activities on Castro. The U.S. in fact must be ready to retaliate when it can be fairly well established that Castro is attempting with arms, money and men to foment Communist uprisings in any Latin American country.

The consensus was that since CIA's sabotage operation is in the main low cost and since it does worry the Castro regime, denies him some essential commodities, stimulates some sabotage inside Cuba and tends to improve the morale of the Cubans who would like to see Castro removed, CIA should proceed with those operations planned for the coming week end (November 15 through 17).

The view was expressed that CIA, in connection with the Department of Defense, should concentrate on attempting to catch Castro red-handed delivering arms to Communist groups in Latin American countries. It was determined that during the next 90 days from this date an attempt would be made by means of air patrols and surface ships to identify ships carrying arms for Castro to Latin American countries. It was hoped that a ship with Cuban arms could be picked up. Conversations are to be initiated by the Secretary of the Navy with CIA to map out a three-month operation against Cuban shipping. It was also determined that the Colombian and Venezuelan governments should be asked to join with the U.S. in developing a joint patrol designed to identify ships carrying weapons from Cuba destined for revolutionary groups in Latin American countries.

Paul Eckel

Paul Eckel

SECRET
EYES ONLY

15 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 14 November 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

General Taylor and Dr. MacMillan were present for Item 1.
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 2 and 3.

98

1. [U.S. Support of Foreign Paramilitary Forces

General Taylor proposed that an ad hoc group be formed consisting of a representative from CIA, Department of State, and Department of Defense to review U.S. programs involving support of foreign paramilitary forces. The countries given in the following list have internal security problems and all have received U.S. support for paramilitary organizations:

Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Ecuador
Venezuela
Peru
Guatemala
Iran
Iraq
Cambodia
Thailand
Laos
Indonesia
Pakistan

The Special Group approved General Taylor's recommendation. Mr. Bundy suggested that the agencies concerned make recommendations for membership on the ad hoc committee to the Secretary of the Special Group. This committee will arrange for reviewing programs in the above-mentioned countries and prepare briefings, reports, and recommendations for Special Group action.]

2. Cuba - Modification of Revised Schedule of Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations for the Month of November 1963.

Approval was granted by the Special Group for the following:

Operation No. 31111: The exfiltration of a previously-infiltrated agent.

Operation No. 3711: The exfiltration of two members of an existing resistance net.

See special minutes for additional items

Operation No. 31110: A sea rendezvous with Cuban fishermen for the purpose of establishing a ratline into Cuba.

Operation No. 31112: An exfiltration operation to be accomplished by members of the DRE using MRR-owned vessels.

3. Cuba - CIA Request for Department of Defense Support of Autonomous Operations.

Operation approved.

4. [Laos - Review of the Total CIA Program. 98

The paper on the above subject was noted by the Special Group.]

5. [Tibet - Status Report. 98

The paper on Tibetan operations was submitted by Mr. McCone to the Special Group for information. Since the paper was concerned with collecting intelligence no Special Group action was required.]

6. [North Vietnam - Monthly Report No. 10. 98

This report was noted by the Special Group.]

Paul Eckel
Paul Eckel

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

3/mc

EYES ONLY

ecember 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 6 December 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Also present were Mr. Helms and Mr. Cheever.

Cuban Operations.

Mr. Cheever briefed the Special Group on Cuban operations proposed for December. Approvals were granted for the following:

Operation No. 3121: The infiltration of agents for the purpose of establishing a base on an off-shore key for a ratline.

Operation No. 3113: The infiltration of a team, including a radio operator, designed to establish operational contacts with Cuban military personalities.

Operation No. 3114: The infiltration of an agent into and exfiltration of agents out of an existing internal net.

Operation No. 3122: The placing of a 3,000-pound cache of arms, ammunition, and demolitions in support of an existing internal resistance organization.

Operation No. 3123: The infiltration of a team to further develop an existing ratline.

Operation No. 3117: An underwater demolition operation designed to sink or damage a Kronstadt or other Cuban patrol vessels while in anchorage.

Operation No. 3124: The placing of a 100-150 pound cache of radios and weapons on the northern coast of Cuba.

Operation No. 3126: The infiltration and subsequent exfiltration of a team which will attempt to establish contacts for the development of a ratline.

The two sabotage operations, No. 3125, against a sugar central, and No. 3116, against the transformer yard of an electric power plant, were deferred by the Group for further discussion at its next meeting.

Paul Eckel
Paul Eckel

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

SECRET
EYES ONLY

13-00000

SECRET

[illegible] LY

5 December 1963

CE WL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Cuban Operations

Special Group members approved by telephone on 5 December the following:

a. Operation No. 3711, the exfiltration of three members of an existing resistance net.

b. Operation No. 3118, the infiltration of a five-man team for the purpose of sabotaging a railway bridge.

c. Operation No. 31110, the establishment of a ratline into Cuban ports.

(Signed)

Paul Eckel

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

EY[illegible] LY

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

Thu **31**

LAST MONTH

NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30					

DECEMBER—1959						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

JANUARY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00	NSC Mtg. Cancelled	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

Out of City

Out of City

New Year's Eve Party w/ the Jeffersons

Bush

Fri **30**

LAST MONTH						
SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

OCTOBER—1959						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

NEXT MONTH						
NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30					

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45	Mr. Obie Webb	1:00	
9:00	Mr. Benesch	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Visit Bldg Site
10:00		2:15	Col. White & Gates
10:15		2:30	Mr. Carman Lloyd
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mtg - Dr. Kistiakowsky's	3:15	
11:15	275 EOB office	3:30	x [Alden Chapin] 3 (JOT)
11:30		3:45	John Hart
11:45		4:00	xx [Gyalo Thondup] 3, DDP
12:00		4:15	+ Mr. Hart
12:15	Alibi Club Mtg re Membership	4:30	
12:30	Lunch - Alibi Club	4:45	
12:45		5:00	John Case & Adm Kelly

7:3. Min. Casey - 2723Q

8 - Dinner w/ Min. & Mrs Casey - Aust. Bettie 2723Q

The Kinkaids, The Beales, Wayne Jackson

Will ask: The Bruces, McGuires, Mrs. Longworth, The Jerry Greenes, The Jack Irwins

303 **Friday, October 30, 1959** 62

2/MK

FRIDAY

OCTOBER						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

18

NOV. 1960

DECEMBER						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

Mon 19

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

OCTOBER—1959						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30					

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00	The President	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	Operation Alert	2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	Leave for High Point	2:45	
10:45	at 10:30. All Agency Heads	3:00	
11:00	to afternoon of 10/20	3:15	
11:15		3:30	Return to Wash, DC
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	USIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

8- Dinner at the Tracy Barnes home, Inf.
3410 Volta Pl.

292 Monday, October 19, 1959 73

Bush

Sat-Sun **11-12**

LAST MONTH

JUNE						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30				

JULY—1959						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
8:45			1:00		
9:00			1:45		
9:15			1:30		
9:30			1:45		
9:45			2:00		
10:00			2:15		
10:15	c		2:30		
10:30	[de Marenches]		2:45		
10:45			3:00		Mrs. Foster
11:00			3:15		Dulles
11:15			3:30		
11:30			3:45		
11:45			4:00	Mr. Kafka	
12:00	Sen. Hayden		4:15		
12:15	133 SOB		4:30		
12:30	Mr. Sheldon		4:45		
12:45	et al		5:00		Cocktails -
					Mrs. Ackerman

7:30
7/11: Dinner w/ Sen. & Mrs. Bush. (Mr. D. only)
7/12: 6 - Supper w/ Mrs. Eleanor Dulles Informal
Baltimore - Mrs. Dulles

1/mc

13-00000

Dinner w F.J.

Cherne & Gomez

Fri **20**

LAST MONTH

FEBRUARY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28

MARCH—1959						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

NEXT MONTH

APRIL						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	** Lunch - Dr. Herbert York
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	~~Staff Mtg.~~	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Ben Shute, Thorne &
10:00		2:15	Meek re "Dewark"
10:15	Gates Lloyd	2:30	Duggan, Timm, Fenimore, ~~Harper~~
10:30	3	2:45	Leo Cherne & Gomez
10:45	[Robert Reynolds], Cuban	3:00	Sir Patrick Dean,
11:00	Desk	3:15	Briance, Cabell, Bissell
11:15		3:30	Sheldon, Scoville, Paul Barnes, Cram, Kent
11:30	xd	3:45	
11:45	Kenneth Miller	4:00	Gen. Balmer & DDCI
12:00	Award Presentations	4:15	
12:15		4:30	Governor Harriman
12:30	Justin O'Donnell	4:45	et al
12:45		5:00	

6:30-8:30 Reception - Emb of Tunisia - 5131 Broad Branch Rd

8 Dinner w/ Mrs. Fowler for Lawrence Lowman

2903 N. Blk tie

79 Friday, March 20, 1959 286

1/mc

Tue 23

5:08
Pill
for DCI

Sen & Mrs. Bush

LAST MONTH

MAY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

JUNE—1959						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30				

NEXT MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Mr. Amory	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Geo. Messersmith
10:00	Mr. Gregerson & John	2:15	3:00 - 4:00
10:15	Hart	~~2:30~~	Manpower Discussion
10:30	USIB Mtg.	2:45	IG & Deputies
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	4:00
11:15		~~3:30~~	Movie (Training) Sugg. Awards Prog.
11:30		3:45	117 Central
11:45		4:00	Mr. Brundage
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	NSC Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

5:15 OCB Briefing

Dinner at home for the Walter Robertsons
14 Guests (The McElroys, Sen & Mrs. Bush,

174 Tuesday, June 23, 1959 191

The Tom Gates, The Brosio's (?)).

Reviewed by Michelle 5/4/98

Box 10 Folder 140

Tue — LAST MONTH

JUNE—1959

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30				

30 — NEXT MONTH

MAY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

JULY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45	180-4151 DD/P, DD/I, DD/S, Warner	2:00	
10:00	Briefing - CIA Armed	2:15	
10:15	3140 HO Services Subcom	2:30	
10:30	USIB Mtg. (DDCI)	2:45	Paul & Bissell 82-2625
10:45		3:00	Amb. Gufler (Ceylon)
11:00		3:15	(Arthur Jacobs)
11:15		3:30	OCB Briefing
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	~~Reserved for Gen. Taylor~~
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Briefing - Rand Corp. Conf Rm.

6 - Mtg Bd of Trustees, FSEF & SAIS - 1830 - 19th - hold

8 - Dinner w/ Mrs. John Laylin, Blk tie (At farm - Vienna)

DCI mtg

FEBRUARY						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29					

FRIDAY

5

FEBRUARY

36 9:00 General Erskine 330

10:00 Kilday Comm.

1- Lunch - John Hanes
2:30 Adml. Martell
3:15 Boy Scout Presentation
~~3:30 Mr. Parrott~~
4 - Cord Meyer

Dinner w/ Mrs. Margaret Bryan

Bush

SATURDAY

JANUARY						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

6

FEB. 1960

MARCH						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

37 APPOINTMENTS 329

7 A. M.
8 A. M.
9 A. M.
10 A. M. Dr. Scoville
10:30 Mr. Helms
11 A. M. Mtg - Secy Herter's off.
12 Noon
1 P. M.
1:30 Lunch - Mr. Rauhni
2 P. M. 2723 Q
3 P. M.
4 P. M.
5 P. M.
6 P. M.
8:00 - Dinner - Sen. Bush - Alibi - Bl.

APRIL						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

FRIDAY

29

APRIL

120 9:30 Staff Mtg 246

11:30 Mr. Amir-Ibrahimi + Mr. Paul
Press. Cons., Iran Emb.
12- Mr. Parrott

3:00- Amb. Jones, Djarkarta + DDCI

4:00 Leo Cherne + DC/IO.
John Richardson, Jr.
4:30- Hans Oprecht - [Robt. Crowell] 3
6 Schuller (home)
6-8: Reception, Japanese Emb.
8:00- Dinner- Robert Bliss in honor of
Bl. Archduke Otto-(Mr + Mrs D.)

SATURDAY

MARCH						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

30

APR. 1960

MAY						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

121 245

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

JULY						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

FRIDAY

22

JULY

204 9:30 Staff Mtg. 162

10:30 Joint Chiefs of Staff

11:45 Mr Parrott

12:15 Special Meeting at State

1 Chris Herter

3:00 Harvey E. Bumgardner, Debriefing

3:30 Mr. De Vosjoli

3:45 Mr. Copley

Amb Summers (Luxembourg)

4:00 Mr Robert Miller (State) + Team

DDCI

4-30 - Kennedy Briefers

6-7: Dinner w/ Amb + Mrs. Lacy

Inf.

SATURDAY

				1960
T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4
7	8	9	10	11
14	15	16	17	18
21	22	23	24	25
28	29	30		

23

JULY 1960

AUGUST						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

APPOINTMENTS 161

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. Senator John Kennedy
Hyannis Port

11 A. M.

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

JULY						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

WEDNESDAY

27

JULY

209 157

9:30 Staff Mtg

10:15 Sir Patrick Dean

11 - Mtg. Budget

11:30 Gerald Miller, DDCI, Lemn

12 - Azzam Pasha & Mr. Paul

1 - OCB Luncheon

2 - Leave for Texas to brief Sen. Johnson

6-8: Cocktails w/Steve Millett
Anderson House
Fraser Wilkins for Mrs. A.

THURSDAY

JUNE						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

28

JULY 1960

AUGUST						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

SEPTEMBER			1960			
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

MONDAY

19

SEPTEMBE

263 9:30 Sprague Comm. 103

10:45 Sen. Kennedy Briefing
3307 N

5:30

-5 Bob Kleberg
5:45 Mr. Kent - Hotel

TUESDAY

AUGUST						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

20

SEPT. 1960

OCTOBER						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

9:45 Mr. Bissell

SEPTEMBER					1960	
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

THURSDAY

22

SEPTEMBER

10 - ADCI, ~~AAP~~, AD/SI, Col. Beerli

266 10:45 [Verne ³Gresham] C/FE 3 100

11:15 Messrs. McCoy, [McCobb] [Mitchell] 3

3 [Stan Vac] & C/FE

11:45 Medal Presentation

12:15 Special Mtg. - State

1:30 Tom Bale lecture room

~~2~~ 3

3-[John H. Whitman]

3:30- Gen. Bakhtiar, C/Iranian Sec. Service

DDCI & C/NE

4:30 Amb. Young (The Hague)

5:15 Charles Willis

5/mc

FRIDAY

AUGUST						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

23

SEPT. 1960

OCTOBER						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

OCTOBER						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

FRIDAY

7

OCTOBEI

281 Hold - BREAKFAST - Dr Wolff 85

9:30 Staff Mtg.

11.30 - Frank Holcomb, Chief War Plans Staff
(Former [C/S Buenos Aires]) 27, 21-29

12:00 Drs Cole + Tietzen

1:00 Lunch - Dr. Wolff

3:00 Secy. Gates, DDP, C/FE

4:00 Dr. Halvard Lange, C/WE

5:00 Atty Gen. Hans Fuerst
C/EE - Henry Schardt

8:00 Reception - Bakhtiar Wedding - Shoreham HOTel

7.30 - 830 Nixon - Kennedy debate -

1/mc

SATURDAY

SEPTEMBER 1960						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

8

OCT. 1960

NOVEMBER 1960						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

282 APPOINTMENTS 84

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M.

10:30 Henry Hyde

11 A. M.

12 Noon

1 P. M. Lunch - Mr. Von Gaevernitz

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M. Soc Cir - Dinner

after dinner - French Embassy Leightons →

NOVEMBER						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

WEDNESDAY

16

NOVEMBER

321 45

9:30 Staff Mtg.

11- Adm. Jerauld Wright

11:30 Hugh Cunningham + C/EE

12- Mr. Proudfit, Bissell, King

12:30 - OCB Briefing

1 - OCB Luncheon

OCB Mtg

3:50 Messrs. [Briance]^{6} + [^{6}Oldfield]

4:15 Cuba briefing

5 - NSC Briefing

7/mc

NOVEMBER						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

THURSDAY

17

NOVEMBER

322 44

9:00 NSC Mtg. Augusta, Ga.

To Palm Beach

THURSDAY

OCTOBER						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

17

NOV. 1960

DECEMBER						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	39	30	31

APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

NOVEMBER 1960

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

FRIDAY

18

NOVEMBER

323 9:30 - 11:30 Brief Senator 43
Kennedy - Florida

8:00 - Dinner - David Bruce
Bl. - (Mr. + Mrs. D)

13-00000

SATURDAY

OCTOBER						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

19

NOV. 1960

DECEMBER						1960
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	39	30	31

324 APPOINTMENTS 42

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M. {Mr Alisen — Gen Keuklin

9:30 {Gen Dettledeffcon + Mr Graaen

10 A. M. Special Mtg - State

11 A. M.

11:30 Norman Paul

12 Noon [Locke Campbell] + C/EE

3

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

1/mc

13-00000

Box 3
Folder 42

Season's Greetings 1961

Reviewed by Michelle 5/1/98

SATURDAY

NOVEMBER 1960						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

31

DEC. 1960

JANUARY 1961						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

366 APPOINTMENTS 0

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M.

11 A. M.

11:30 Mtg at W. H. "Laos"

12 Noon

1 P. M. Lunch - Mrs. Bryant

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

JANUARY 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

* * * * * * *

TUESDA

3

JANUAR

3 9- Mtg- Pres. Off. (off the record) 362
Mtg of Principals at W.H.

12- Amb Burden, C/WE, C/AF

3:30 USIB Briefing
4:30 NSC Briefing- (Cannon Committee)
5:15 OCB Brf.

JANUARY						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

TUESD

10

JANUA

10 355

10:30 USIB Mtg

2:15 Secy McNamara
3:00 White House
3:30 [illegible]
4:00 John Steele (Time)
430 NSC Brf
5:15 OCB Brf

7:00-Cocktails - CANUS-61 Conf.
Ft. McNair Off. Club - Inf.
7:30 Dinner w/ Gen. & Mrs. White
Blk tie. Bolling AFB, Officers Club

JANUARY						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

THURSD

26

JANUA

26 9 30 - Murry Main 339

12³⁰ Lunch - Am. Bar Ass'n. Statler
2:40-4:10. Briefing - The President
5:20 Juan Carlos Quagliotti, Mr. Morse & Mr. Briggs

6-8: Reception - Emb of India

JANUARY 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

FRIDA

27

JANUA

27 338

9:30 Staff Mtg.

11:30 Mr. Critchfield
12 - Ralph V. Reid (Rex Reid)

12:30 Lunch - Alibi

2:30 Mr. Vonpate
3:00 Amb. Gufler (Ceylon)
Mr. Blee
3:30 Briefing on Cuba - DDP et al
4:30 Briefing on Vietnam - DDI et al
+ David Smith of DDP

Go to Hospital

7:00 State of the Nation Dinner Blk tie
(Reception at 6:00) Sheraton Park

SATURDAY

BER 1960			
W	T	F	S
	1	2	3
7	8	9	10
14	15	16	17
21	22	23	24
28	29	30	31

28

JAN. 1961

FEBRUARY 1961						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28				

APPOINTMENTS 337

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. The President - Cuba
So. Vietnam

11 A. M.

12 Noon

1 P. M. Lunch - Chas. Murphy + Mr. Elder

2 P. M.
2:30 Gen. Latrock

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

Dinner at the Gary National

JANUARY 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

SUNDA

29

JANUAR

29 10 Pres. Cuba - Sat.
South Vietnam -

12-1:30 Cocktails for the Seligmans
at the Julian Eisensteins

5- Reception at the White House
6-8 Walter Lippmann's
8:00- Bl. - Dinner - British
Embassy for Sir Patrick Dean
(Mr. & Mrs. D.)

JANUARY						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

TUESDA

31

JANUAF

31 9:30 Staff Mtg.

10:30 USIB Mtg.

2:30 Ted Kennedy

4:00 Leane + David Heller

4:30 NSC Briefing

SATURDAY

				1961
T	F	S		
5	6	7		
12	13	14		
19	20	21		
26	27	28		

18

FEB. 1961

MARCH						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

APPOINTMENTS 316

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. [illegible]

10:15 Mtg-White House

11 A. M.

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

8: Reception Amb of Nepal

6 P. M. Shoreham Terr. Banquet Rm

8- Dinner w/ The Herters

MARCH						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

WEDNES

1

MARC

60

305

9:30 Staff Mtg.
11:30 Mr. Parrott
12 Naval Briefing
1:00 - Lunch - Gen. Clarke
DC Commissioner
Large Dining room

3:00 Saul Pett + Mr. Claussen

4-5: Nat'l Cdr. Am. Legion, Wm. R. Burke, Mr. McAnally, Mr. Hauck, Mr. Claussen
5 - Briefing for Mtg of Principals

7:30 ~~[illegible]~~ - Bl. - 4700 Chain Bridge Road ~~[illegible]~~
Dinner w/ the Atty Gen + Mrs. Kennedy

MARCH 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

FRIDAY

3

MARCH

62 9:00 New Zealand P. M. Holyoake 303

10:30 Speak at Marine Corps School Quantico, Virginia

2:45 The President

6:00 Mr. Lloyd Free - 2723 Q

Dinner w/ Mrs. Magruder for Mr. Praeger

MARCH						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

THURSD

9

MARCI

68 297

(9:00 Briefing - Amb. Gavin (France)
C/WE. Mr. [[illegible]] 3

12:15 Dr Cole & Dr. Tietjen

1- Lunch, Mr. John McCone

2- Amb. A. J. Drexel Biddle (Spain)

3- ~~White House~~ Briefing - Cabinet. DDP. C/FE
Mr Cord Meyer - briefing

5- Swearing in - Amb. Merchant
(Canada)

Ymc

Mrs. Dulles in Santa Fe

SATURDAY

UARY 1961				
T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4
7	8	9	10	11
4	15	16	17	18
1	22	23	24	25
8				

11

MAR. 1961

APRIL						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

APPOINTMENTS 295

M.

M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. - Pres. Kennedy - Vice Pres. ~~Sec. Fulbright~~
DDP - Barnes

11 A. M.

12 Noon Alibi

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

Gridiron Club Dinner - White tie

13-00000

MARCH						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

TUESD
14
MARCH

73 9:30 M. Jacques Chaban-Delmas
10 - Paul Hoffman + Mr. [[illegible]]
3
10:30 USIB Mtg.

1 - Lunch, Sen. Pell

3
3 - Messrs. [Rochschild], Bissell,
Bell, Dudley, Pfeiffer, C/IO

4:30 Cabell, Bissell, Barnes, Gen Gray
W. H. Rep. re Cuba
6:00 Mr. Parrott

8:00 - Inf. - Dinner - Dr. Kamel
UAR Emb. (Mr. Dulles
alone)

2/mc

MARCH						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

74

WEDNESD

15

MARCH

291

9:30 Staff mtg.

11:30 Park Armstrong

12 Bill Webster

1- Lunch, Ernst Mogens-Jensen
C/Danish IS

2:30 Dr. Kent

3- Robert Abdesselam + C/WE

3
~~4- [illegible]~~

4 - mtg - The White House - DDCI

8 30
Dinner at Home

1/MC

MARCH 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

THURSD

16

MARCI

75 290

9:30 Mr. Kirkpatrick

(~~10:30 Reception - Unification of Italy - State Dept. Auditorium~~)

10:45 Adm. Burke

12- Special Gp Mtg.

1- Lunch Mr. Bundy's Off.

2:15 DDCI, DDP, Barnes, Esterline

4- Mtg at W.H., Cabell, Bissell, Barnes

6:30-8:30 Cocktails, Brit Emb.

13-00000

MARCH			1961			
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

MONDA

20

MARCH

79 286

9:30 Staff Mtg.
11:30 Hugh Farley, Dr. Kent, C/FE, Rody
12:15 AP Photographer + Claussen
12:3 Ted McCray (lunch)
2:30 Briefing - Amb. Gufler (Finland)
3:00 - M. Jacque Piette - Mr [Dulin] 3
4 - John Scali
4:30 USIB Briefing
5:30 White House
DDP + C/FE

MARCH						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

TUESDA

21

MARC

80 285

(10:30 USIB Mtg

1- Lunch + Briefing - Secy Connally (Navy
to
3-
2:30 Mtg at W.H. "Laos"

5:00 Briefing - Mr. Parrott

6:00-7:00 - Reception - Dr. Kent - Sheraton Park

7:30 Dinner - Secy McNamara for Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson
Bl. -
(Stag) 3E880 Pentagon

MARCH			1961			
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

WEDNES

22

MARC

81 284

9:30 Staff Mtg.

11:30 Ray Cline

2:00 Congressional Leaders
Secy Rusk + Vice Pres.
P-38-Capitol

3- Briefing, Amb. Macomber
4- Gen. Cabell, Col. White, Gen McClelland
4:30 Dr. Lorenz Stucki
5:00 Mr. Zuckerman, DDI + AD/SI
5:30 Mr. Sheldon

MARCH						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

THURSD

23

MARCH

82 283

10 - Dr. Karl Brandt
10:30 Philip Clark (State)
11 - Henry Mann
11:30 Briefing - Mr. Parrott
12 - Special Gp mtg.
1 - Lunch - Mr. Bundy's off.
3 - Wm. Hillman
3:30 V.F.W. Rep. -
4:00 Chas. Spofford
4:30 [James King] C/Sta. Barnikis, Mili
4:45 Dr Kent
5:00 Col. Edwards + Mr. Harvey

1/mc

SATURDAY

Y 1961		
T	F	S
2	3	4
9	10	11
16	17	18
23	24	25
*	*	*

25

MAR. 1961

APRIL.						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M.

11 A. M.

12 Noon

12:45 The President

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

3:30 Tennis, Mrs. Ackerman
The Norman Pauls

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M. 8: Reception, Greek Emb.

Dinner w/ The Hunts

(9:30 Arr. Wash. from N.Y

MARCH						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

WEDNESDAY

29

MARCH

88 10:00 NSC Mtg 27

11:30 DDCI - Col Edwards - Mr. Winters + McCord

(12:00 FOSTER COLLINS

12:45 Philip Coombs + Dr. Kent

1- Lunch, Peyton Ford

2:30 Hugh Cumming

3:00 Amb. Henry Taylor + C/EE

4:00 Mtg at W.H., DDCI, DDP + Barnes

5:30 Mr. Papich

8:00 - Bl.

Dinner w/ Mrs. Francis Biddle

per Mrs. D.

(8:30 White House

APRIL						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

WEDNESD

5

APRIL

95

10 - Dr. Tietjen
(11:30 Briefing - Mr. Parrot
12:00 - Mrs. Oswald Lord
12:30 Medal Presentation - Mr Van Slyck
12 45 Fredi Rheinhardt Lunch.

2:30 Amb. Francis Willis
(Ceylon)

3:30 Frederick King - OSS Chandler
DDCI

5:30 Elizabeth Von Thurn
6:00 Edw. R. Murrow

8:00 - Dinner - British Emb.
Bl in honor PM Macmillan
(Mr. & Mrs. D.)

APRIL						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

THURSD

6

APRIL

96 9.15 White House - 269

10:30 Special USIB Mtg.
12:30 Briefing - Mr. Parrott
1- Lunch, Mr. Bundy's off.
2- Special Gp. Mtg.
DDP + C/FE
3- Amb. Reischauer Brf. (Japan)
3:30 Whitney Shepardson
4:00 Ed Kretzmann, Berne + Mr. Schardt
4:45 Gen. C. Rodney Smith + C/IO

APRIL						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

WEDNESI

12

APRIL

102

9:30 Staff Mtg.

10:15 Mr. Bissell et al

12:30 Lunch & Briefing - Sec'y Goldberg

3:30 Leonard Shapiro & Jack Maury

5 Wohltat (Shoreham)

545 President -

6-8: Tulip Reception - Neth. Emb.

8 - Dinner w/ the Coleman Jennings

Blk tie

APRIL 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

TUESDA

18

APRIL

108 9.00 Breakfast Blair House - Kennedy 257.

10:30 USIB Mtg.
12:00 The White House

2:30 Briefing, Amb. Loeb - Peru
3:00 Phil Emb. presenting Legion of Honor to Mr. Ackerman

3:45 Col. King + Mr. Herbert
4:30 Cabell, Bissell, Barnes, Rastow, King
5:30 The White House
5:15 Briefing - Mr. Parrott

6:30-8:30 Reception for Mr. Lochrie Mr. + Mrs. Frost, Hosts
8:00 - White tie - Secy + Mrs. Rusk for P. M. Caramanlis State Dining Rooms - Dept of State

APRIL 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

WEDNESD

19

APRIL

109

9:30 Staff Mtg.

12:30 The President

12:45 P.M. Manley (Jamaica)

1 - Lunch - P.M. Manley

2:30 Mrs. Rudolph von Ripper

3:15 Col. White

3:30 Gen Cabell, Gene Winters, et al

4:00 Mr. De Pogoli

5:30 White House -

5:45 Gen. Frontistic, C/EE + Mr.
ADCI, Milton, Erickbeck

6:45 Mr. Nixon, 4308 Forest Lane

8 - Dinner w/ Sen + Mrs. Monroney
Berkie

APRIL						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

THURSDA

20

APRIL

110 255

10:30 Amb. John L. Rice, Netherlands
11:00 Cong. Cannon
12:30 Mr. Parrott
1- Lunch, Mr. Brinkhoff
2:00 Special Gp Mtg.
2:30 Bfg, Amb MacArthur, Belgium
3- Col. Nicanor Jiminez (Manila)
C/FE
3:30 The President
4:00 Mr. Karamessines - DDCI
5:00 William Tharp - DDCI
5:15 DDP, Barnes, C/WH, Stamulis
6:30 Mr Cannon + Bradley
7:00 John Steele
7:30 Cocktails
8- Dinner for Mr. Lochnis - [illegible] Club
7:30 Annual Spring Dinner - Alibi

MAY						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

TUESDA

16

MAY

136 229

10:00 Gen. Taylor
Committee

1:00 - Pres. Kennedy + Gen. Taylor
Adm Burke
Lunch

3:30 - William Hillman - Col. Grogan
4:00 Gen. Lemnitzer -
4:30 - Peter Maas - "Look" (c1)
Col Grogan - Jean Evans

5:30 - Charles Bartlett + Col. Grogan
6:00 - Amb. Julius Holmes
2723 Q

8:00 - Dinner - Australian Emb
Bl. for Hon. H. H. Townley, Min. Def.

MAY						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

* * * * * * *

WEDNESI

24

MAY

144 221

9:15 Mr. Parrott

9:30 Staff Mtg

11:30 - Amb. Willauer

12:00 - Mr. Sam Halper (Time-Life)
Col. Grogan + Arch Bush (OC!)

12:30 Lunch - Amb. Pawley

3:00 Richard Linthicum (Cyprus)

3:30 Wm Scott + C/WH

4:30 Killian com.

5:00 Salvador de Madariaga

5:30 - Amb. Karl Rankin (Yugoslavia) + C/EE

6:00-8:00 Canadian Embassy - Queen's Birthday

8:00 - Bl -

Dinner w/Amb + Mrs Beale for Indian Amb.

MAY 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

MONDA
29
MAY

149 9:30 Staff Mtg. 216

11:00 – House App. Committee
DDCI – DD/S
Mr. Saunders – Helms
~~Mason~~ – Eiseman

3:00 Norris Darrell at Mr. Belin's

~~4:30 NSIC Briefing~~
~~5:15 Mr. Parrott~~
6:30 Messers Angleton + Hunt 2723Q

8 Bob Thayer-Dinn

JUNE						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

164

TUESD

13

JUNE

10:30 USIB Mtg.

1:00 - Lunch, Amb of Vietnam for Secy of State, Thuan

3:30 NSC Mtg.

5:15 Mr. Parrott - Briefing
6 - The President -

7.00 Tennis Supper Belins?
8:00 - Supper - Kermit Roosevelts Inf

JUNE						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

THURSD

15

JUNE

166 9:45 Sec State Thuan (Vietn 199
DDCI + C/FE
10:30 Amb. Geo Laking, N.Z.
11:15 Harry Rositzke + DDCI
12 - Ivan White + C/OPS
12:30 Gen Griffiths + DDCI
1245 Walt Rostow - Lunch

3:30 William Hillman + Grogan
4:30 The President (at the Mansion
6:15 Amb. Galbraith, DDP

7:30 Dinner w/ Mr. + Mrs. Helms

SATURDAY

1961		
T	F	S
4	5	6
11	12	13
18	19	20
25	26	27
*	*	*

17

JUNE 1961

JULY						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

APPOINTMENTS 197

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. 6

11 A. M. [J. Monnet]

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M. – Secty State –

4 P. M.

5 P. M. Tennis - Belins –

7:30 Party at the Robert Kennedy's

6 P. M.

5-8: David Dulles Engagement Party

1/mc

JUNE					1961	
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

MONDA

19

JUNE

170 9:30 Staff Mtg. 195

11- Amb. Radean (UAR)
11:45 USIB Brf.
12:30 NESC Brf.
1:00 Lunch - George Carey (OO)
2:30 Henry Suydam
2:00 Col. Butler
3:15 [Conrad La Gueux] C/Lt. Ranger + DDCI
4- The President
4:30
↓
7:45 Women's Press Club Dinner
Mr. & Mrs. Dulles

1/mc

JUNE						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

TUESDA

27

JUNE

178 10:00 USIB Principals 187
10:30 USIB Mtg.

12:30 Lunch, Secretary Udall

3 Linc Gordon -
4 - Col. Y (Vietnam)
4:30 - The President at Mansion
5:15 - Mr Parrott
7:30 6:00 Harry Kern
Dinner - Mrs Gross -
Bl. tie

JUNE						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

WEDNESD.

28

JUNE

179 9:30 Staff Mtg. 186

11- Pat Coyne

12:00 Mtg - The President

12,45 Hanson Baldwin

2:30 Brf., Amb. Philip Kaiser (Senegal)

3:30 The President

~~5- Gen. Lederer + C/EE~~

7:45
Dinner at home - Arthur Dean

(Pres. Bd Meets

JUNE 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

FRIDA

30

JUNE

181 9:30 Staff Mtg. 184

11- Adm. Frost

(11:30 Adm Doyle ([illegible])

12- Blood Donation award

1- Lunch, Adm. Hervey

3- Amb. Dearborn

4- Dr. Harold Wolff

5- Carlos Gonzales & C/WH

JULY						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

TUESDA

11

JULY

192 173

9:30 USIB Briefing

10:20 General Taylor

10:30 USIB Meeting

2 Atty - General -

3 - Mr. Campaigne, Alfred Vanderbilt & C/IO

4:30 Mr. Schreyer Briefing

6:10 Depart from Pier 1, Naval Weapons Plant

8:15 Dinner for Pakistan Pres. Ayub

Mt. Vernon, White Dinner Jacket

Pres. + Mrs. Kennedy, Hosts

JULY 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

THURSDA

13

JULY

194 171

7:45 Pres. Ayub, Blair,
10 - ADDCI
11:30 Chad Braggiotti
12:00 Amb. Robt. McKinney
12:45 Elmer Staats + DAP
1:00 - Lunch - Elmer Staats

4 - NSC Meeting

6 - Mr. Angleton

JULY						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

FRIDAY

14

JULY

195 9:30 Staff Mtg. 170

11:00 The President

12:15 Warren Rogers + Col. Grogan

2- Greet Incoming JOT Class

2:30 Mr. Elder

3:30 The Pres. Secy McNamara, Gen. Lemnitzer

5- Mr. Durkee

(

JULY						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

WEDNES

19

JULY

200 9:30 Staff mtg. 165
10:45 Bfg for Spec. Gp.
11- Briefing, Amb. Snow (Paraguay
(11:30 Don Levine & Jack Maury
12:15 Amb. Zahedi (Iran)
1- Lunch Amb. Tyler
2:30 Amb. Trimble & D/FE (Cambodia)
3:00 The Pres., Sec State, Sec Def, Atty Gen
4:00 - NSC (Berlin)

6 - Mr. Papich

JULY						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

THURSDA

20

JULY

201 164

10:00 - NSC Mtg.

12:15 Webster Panel

12:30 Briefing for Special Gp.
1 - Luncheon - Mr. Bundy's off.
2:30 Special Gp Mtg.
Gen Taylor

5:00 - The President
Steering Committee
on Berlin

Dean - Dinner

JULY						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

MONDA

31

JULY

212 153

9:30 Staff Mtg
11 00 - Gen'l Lansdale
11:30 R. Jack Smith (Promotion)
11:45 Bill Harvey
12:15 Gordon Stewart
100 Lunch - White House in honor
VP & Mrs Chen, Rep of China

2:15 } 4: Gardner Conf
2:30 }

4:00 Mr. Bannerman
4:30 USIB Briefing
5:30 Mr. FitzGerald

(

AUGUST 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

* * * * * * *

WEDNESD

2

AUGUS

214 9:30 Staff Mtg. 151

(

11:30 Mr. Tweedy

12:30 M. de Vasjoli

2:15 Howard Hunt

2:30 - Brf. - Amb. to Leopoldville
Edmund A. Gullion

3:00 Mr. Marengo (Briefing)

4:00 Secy. Rusk's office
Steering Group (Berlin)

— Mr. Maury

8:00 - Bl. - Dinner - Chinese V.P.
Chen, host - Mayflower
Grand Ballroom

AUGUST						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

THURSD

3

AUGUS

215 150

~~8:00 The President - W.H.~~

10:00 Courtney Evans + Sam Papich + Mr Harvey.

11:00 - Mr. Marengo

11:30 - Gordon Stewart

12:30 Briefing - Mr. Schreyer

Home for lunch

1:30 Special Gp Mtg.

2:30 - Disarmament Committee

Sec/State Conf. Room

↔

6:30 Bellins - Tennis + Dinner -

Mr. Walter Rostow

AUGUST						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

THURSDA

10

AUGUST

222 143

10:00 Cord Meyer + Mr. Blum
11:30 The President
12:30 Hard - Special Group Briefing
~~1:00 Hard Lunch Mr. Bundy's Offi~~

2:00 Special Group
3:30 Mr. Eckhardt, Pakistan
4:00 William Hillman
4:30 Bob Donovan + Col. Grogan
5:00 Mr. Blum
6:00 Tennis - British Embassy
8:00 - Dinner at the Bissells
Inf.

(

AUGUST						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

THURSDA

17

AUGUST

229 136

(9:30 Mr. Helms
11:30 Gen. Rodney

2- Special Gp Mtg.

3:15 Mr. Schreyer

4- Mtg of Prins on Disarmament
Pres. office

5:00- The President (Steering Group-Berlin)

Advisory Comm - Woodrow Wilson School

7:00 Dinner at Princeton.

DCI will stay at Princeton.

AUGUST					1961	
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

230

FRIDAY

18

AUGUS

135

mtg at Princeton

2: Return from Princeton

2:30 Mr. Bill Harvey

AUGUST						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

SUNDA

20

AUGUS

232 133

8:15 Lv. for Gettysburg
to brief Gen. Eisenhower

3:15 Lv. Getty. Gen.

AUGUST 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

MONDA

21

AUGUS

233 930 - Deputies Mtg 132

~~1030 Sen. Dodd debriefing~~

11 00 Gen Taylor's Office

12:30 Bfng for 2:30 Mtg

2:00 Mr Bill Harvey

2 30 Senate Armed Services &
Approp Subcommittee

7:30
Dinner - Chinese Emb - Inf.

AUGUST						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

FRIDA

25

AUGUS

237 128

9:15 Staff mtg.

11 - Dir. Brown

~~11 Mtg. [illegible] (SEC)~~

12:00 Pres.

① Averell Harriman -

2:30 Osborne

330 Tom Parrott

(at home)

Dinner, Jake Lloyd

AUGUST						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

TUESDA

29

AUGUST

241 124

9:30 Joe Charyk -
11- Mtg, The Pres. in SEA

2:15 Mtg - Gen Taylor, Gen Lemnitzer, Dr. Wiesner

4:30 Mr. Pforzheimer
5:15 Spec. Gp. Bfg
6 - Jack Maury & Mr. Osborn

AUGUST						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

WEDNESD

30

AUGUS

242 9:30 Staff Mtg. 123

Tracy Barnes 3

11 - Messrs Raymond [McCafferty], [Enright] 3

4 - Gen Taylor

4:30 USIB Bfing

5:30 The Pres.

Tennis + Supper - Amb Caccia + the Belins - 2723 Q

2/mc

AUGUST 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

THURSD

31

AUGUS

243 9:30 Dr. Scoville 122

10 - mtg at the White House

10:30 USIB Mtg. (+ ACI + AD/SI)

11:30 Spec. Gp Bfng

11:45 Mr. Bissell

12:30 Lunch Secy McNamara + Secy Gilpatric

2 - Spec. Gp Mtg.

3: Mtg, Cuban Task Force - Mr. Goodwin's off. + Tracy Barnes

5 - mtg - Gen Taylor, Amb. Johnson, Mr McMorrow

6-9: Reception - Emb of Malaya

SEPTEMBER					1961	
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

WEDNESI

20

SEPTEMB

263 102

9:30 Staff Mtg
11:30 Mr. Wallenberg
12:30 Cord Meyer
1:00 Lunch - George McGhee
for Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong
3:00 Brf. - Amb. Gordon (Brazil)
3:30 Gen. Taylor
4:00 White House
5:15 USIB Brf.

6.30 Chris Herter

5:45 Reception - Pres. of Peru
3001 Garrison St

SATURDAY

1961			
W	T	F	S
2	3	4	5
9	10	11	12
16	17	18	19
23	24	25	26
30	31		

23

SEPT. 1961

OCTOBER						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M.

10:45 Mr. Nardone + C/WH

11 A. M. Howard Hunt

11:30 Gordon Stewart + Dave Murphy

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

7:30 Dinner - Mrs. Lane - Inf.

6

goes

SEPTEMBER						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

269

TUESDAY
26
SEPTEMBER

96

12 - Mr. Helms & Mr. Maury
12:15 - Genl. Bruce
2:30 Special Group Brf.
3:30 Mr. De Vosjoli
4:30 Mr. McCone

7^{30} Bush

OCTOBER					1961	
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

276

TUESDA

3

OCTOBE

1- Lunch, Harold Linder

3:00 Special Group Brf.
3:45 Gordon Stewart
4:15 - White House

(

OCTOBER						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

* * * * * * *

WEDNESDAY

4

OCTOBER

277 9:00 Gen. Eisenhower 88
9:45 Staff Mtg
11:00 Air Vice Marshal Raza
(Pakistan) C/NE
11:30 C/IO + Dudley Bonsal
12:30 Gen. Anders - C/EE + [Paul]3
1:00 Lunch - Gen. Anders (Haynes]
2:00 M/G. George Bush
c/Jusmag - Greece
2:30 H&IB. Brfg DDP + C/FE
4:30 Leave for New York

8:00
Dinner - Mr + Mrs John Hughes
Bl. - 63 E. 74th

1/mc

OCTOBER					1961	
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

WEDNESD

11

OCTOBEI

284 81

9:30 Staff Mtg
10:45, Mtg w/ the Pres (SEA
12:30 Brig. Riaz Hussain & C/NE
1 - Lunch, Cornelius, Alan Ryan (Conway
2:00 Special Gp Bfing

3 - [Robin Hedbie] 3

4:30 USIB Brf

7:15 - Inf. - Helms -
Dinner
afterdinner - Iranian Emb.

1/mc

OCTOBER 1961

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

FRIDAY

20

OCTOBE

293

9:00 Dave Murphy
10:00 The President
11:00 DIA Organization
12:00 Tom Schreyer

2:30 Special Gr. Mtg
Situation Room
White House

5:00 - Deputies' Mtg

NOVEMBER			1961			
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

318

TUESDA

14

NOVEMB

47

1030 Pres -
11:30 NSC Bfng
1:00 Lunch - John Starnes (JIC)

4:00 Special Group Brf.

5:15 Mr Amory (NSC Brf.)

8:00 - Dinner - Sec Rusk -
for Gen Park - Blair House
(Stag) Bl. tie

NOVEMBER						1961
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

TUESDA

21

NOVEMBE

325 40

10:30 . USIB Brf.

1.00 White House—

2:30 Special USIB Mtg.

4- mtg at White House

5- Spec. Gp. Bfng

5:30 } J E. Hoover - Stag Party
-7:00 } Sheraton Carlton

10:00 Min. Von Lilienfeld - Crystal Rm. [illegible]
Brf.

8:00 - Dinner - Per Jacobsson
1925 F St. Blk tie

NOVEMBER			1961			
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

MONDA

27

NOVEME

331 9:30 Staff mtg. 34

2- John Scali & Col. Grogan
2:30 Mr. Millett
2 55 Baird
3:30 Mr. Staats' office
Alexis Johnson
Edward Murrow
DCS

5:30 The President

6:00 Mr. McCone & G. Meany
2723 Q

7:30 Stag Dinner at the
Alibi for Mr. Dulles [illegible]

Tue 11

LAST MONTH

JUNE						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

JULY—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	USIB Briefing	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Atty. Gen. Kennedy
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	USIB Mtg.	2:45	
10:45		3:00	*Mr Campaigne & Alfred
11:00		3:15	Vanderbilt & CIO
11:15		3:30	Cord Meyer
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Mr. Helms & Mr. Maury
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Briefing - Mr. Parrott
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6:10 Depart from Pier 1, Naval Weapons Plant
8:15 Dinner for Pakistan Pres. Ayub. Mt Vernon. White dinner jacket
Pres. & Mrs. Kennedy, Hosts.

Fri 14

JULY—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

LAST MONTH

JUNE

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

NEXT MONTH

AUGUST

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Greet Incoming Class
10:00		2:15	of JOT's,
10:15		2:30	Mr. Elder
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mtg w/ The Pres., Sec	3:15	
11:15	State, Sec Def, Gilpatric	3:30	The Pres., Secy McNamara
11:30	Hilsman & DD/P	3:45	Gen Lemnitzer
11:45		4:00	~~Go to Airport to see~~
12:00		4:15	~~Mr. Ely party off.~~
12:15	Warren Rogers & Col. Grogan	4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Mr. Durkee

7:15 - Dinner - Charles Murphy

Wed **19**

LAST MONTH

JUNE						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

JULY—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Amb Tyler (alone)
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Gordon Stewart - "Berlin"
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	Amb. Trimble (Cambodia
10:30		2:45	ICA/FE + Mr. Myers c/ Ctr. Phnom Penh
10:45	Mr. Bissell, Barnes, Collins	3:00	The Pres., Sec State,
11:00	Briefing Amb. Snow (Paraguay)	3:15	Sec Def, Atty Gen.
11:15		3:30	
11:30	Don Levine + Jack Maury	3:45	
11:45		4:00	NSC mtg on Berlin
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Amb. Zahedi (Iran)	4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6 - Mr. Papich

7 - Mr. Hunt

8 - Dinner - Mr. Hunt - 3200 L.

~~Fay Bette~~
~~Vet 10~~

Thu 20

JULY—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

LAST MONTH

JUNE

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

NEXT MONTH

AUGUST

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Mr. Bundy's
9:00		1:15	off.
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	NSC Mtg - Rpt of NESC	2:15	
10:15		2:30	Special Gp Mtg.
10:30		2:45	300 EOB
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	Gen Taylor
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Webster Panel & Av.	4:30	
12:30	DDCI Scoville	4:45	
12:45		5:00	The President - Berlin
			O'Donnell's off.

Dinner at home - Arthur Dean

201 Thursday, July 20, 1961 164

Bush

Fri **28**

LAST MONTH

JUNE						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

JULY—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

A. M.

8:45

9:00 Parrott

9:15

9:30

9:45

10:00 - Indonesian Brf.

10:15 Economic Survey Team

10:30

10:45 6.

11:00 - King + [Harrison]

11:15 [illegible]

11:30

11:45 IG - NACI

12:00

12:15

12:30

12:45

P. M.

1:00 Lunch - F. King

1:15 Chandler

1:30 Col. White

1:45 King + Harrison

2:00 - Gen McClelland

2:15

2:30 →

2:45

3:00 ▲ Spencer Taggart XX 8443

3:15

3:30 John Hart-Brown

3:45 TDY Rabat Tweedy

4:00 Promotions - Huizenga [Bennett] Bush 3

4:15 - [Mitchell] 3 + [Miller] 3

4:30 - Amb. Myron Cowen

4:45

~~5:00~~ 5:15 Lloyd George

6:00 Mr Bissell

7:30 - Dinner - no dress - Frances Pickens Miller

Freddie King - staying at 2723 Q

2810 P ad. 6-3231 [illegible] 5867

209 **Friday, July 28, 1961** 156

4/mk

Mon **31**

JULY—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

LAST MONTH

JUNE

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

NEXT MONTH

AUGUST

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Mr & Mrs Dulles at White House honoring
9:00		1:15	VP & Mrs Chen, Rep of China
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	Gardner Cox
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	67742 Dan Lansdale	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30	R. Jack Smith (Supergrade	3:45	
11:45	" Wm. Harvey promotion) [illegible]	4:00	Bob Bannerman
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Gordon Stewart	4:30	USIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

5 30 Mr. FitzGerald

Dinner at Lorne - Arthur Dean and Mr McCloy

Light lunch w/milk

Wed

2

61-6261

LAST MONTH

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
JULY						
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
SEPTEMBER						
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

5/4/56

Large

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	Howard Hunt
10:15		2:30	Brf. Amb to
10:30		2:45	Pi Congo - Leopoldville
10:45		3:00	→ Mr. Mairengo
11:00		3:15	Brf.
11:15		3:30	
11:30	- Mr. Tweedy	3:45	- Attorney Gen.
11:45		4:00	Meeting of Steering
12:00		4:15	Group - Secy Rusk's office
12:15		4:30	
L 12:30	- Mde Vasigali XX	4:45	Gordon Stewart
12:45		5:00	

3 AUG 1961

5:30 Mr. Maury

8:00 - Dinner - Bl. - Chinese V P Chen
Mayflower - Grand Ballroom

Schreyer
2044
K

Thu 3

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

8:00 The President w/ Sheldon

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch at home w/ Mrs D
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	xx Spec Group Mtg:
9:30		1:45	(will meet there Bissell
9:45	William Harvey	2:00	Gen McClelland & Edwards)
10:00	Courtney Evans + Sam Papich	2:15	xx (Mtg. of Principals)
10:15	+ Mr Harvey	2:30	Disarmament Cmte -
10:30		2:45	Sec State Conf. Room
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mr Marengo	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30	Gordon Stewart + Mr Ralph Brown	3:45	
11:45	(Berlin)	4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Mr Schreyer - Brief	4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6:30 Tennis w/ [illegible] & dinner

215 Thursday, August 3, 1961 150

Thu 10

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		~~Hold~~ P. M.	
8:45		1:00	~~Lunch Mr. Bundy's~~
9:00		1:15	~~[illegible]~~
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	Special Gp Mtg.
10:00	Bob Blum + ~~C/FE~~	2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	Mr. Dehardt [illegible]
11:30	Mtg w/Pres. (Mil Cong	3:45	Pakistan
11:45	on SEA Planning for	4:00	Adm. [illegible] + Col.
12:00	DDCI, DDP, C/FE [illegible]	4:15	Grogan
12:15		4:30	Bob [illegible] + Col Grogan
12:30	Briefing for Special Gp	4:45	N Y [illegible]
12:45	Mtg.	5:00	

6 - [illegible] - [illegible] Conf. (Rostow + Bundy)

8^{00} Dinner at Bissell's - Informal

13-00000

Heggen

Fri 11

AUGUST—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

LAST MONTH

JULY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	XX Dep Dir-Gen
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Mr Richards
9:00		1:15	[Australian Security Intell Org.]
9:15		1:30	DDCI A host
9:30	~~Staff Mtg.~~	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	Mtg w/ Pres. on Brit.	2:15	
10:15	DDP Guiana	2:30	L. N. Y.
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Col. Meyer & Col. Edwards	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30	Mr. Heggen + IG	3:45	
11:45		4:00	Party for Mr. Heggen
12:00		4:15	
12:15	1:25	4:30	
12:30	Lv for N.Y.	4:45	
12:45	via Aerocommander	5:00	

29

223 Friday, August 11, 1961 142

1/mc

Fri 18

Call [illegible] notary

LAST MONTH

JULY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.

8:45
9:00
9:15 Mtg at
9:30
9:45 Princeton
10:00
10:15
10:30
10:45
11:00
11:15
11:30
11:45
12:00
12:15
12:30
12:45

P. M.

1:00
1:15
1:30
1:45
2:00 Returned from
2:15 Princeton via Aero-Commander
2:30 Wm. Harvey
2:45
3:00
3:15
3:30
3:45
4:00
4:15
4:30
4:45 Thomas Hogan, Notary
5:00

at lunch Arthur Dean ([illegible])
Mr Angleton ([illegible])

Sat-Sun **19-20**

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
8:45		8:15 Lv for Gettysburg Pa. w/ the [illegible]	1:00		
9:00			1:15		
9:15			1:30		
9:30			1:45		
9:45			2:00		
10:00			2:15		
10:15			2:30		3:15 Atty General here
10:30			~~2:45~~		
10:45			3:00		
11:00	James Cosley from Cecil Hourani & Bronson Tweedy		3:15		
11:15			3:30		
11:30			3:45		
11:45			4:00		
12:00			4:15		
12:15			4:30		
12:30			4:45		
12:45			5:00		

Sat 8/19 - Dinner at Jim Hunt's
3210 S St NW.

231 **Sat., August 19, 1961** 134 232 **Sun., August 20, 1961** 133

Mon 21

AUGUST—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

LAST MONTH

JULY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Small D.R.
9:00		1:15	Lloyd, [illegible], Mason
9:15		1:30	[illegible], Carey, Cabell Bissell
9:30	Staff Mtg	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Bill Harvey
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	Bfng of Senate Armed
10:30	~~Briefing - Gen Todd~~	2:45	Services + Appropriations [illegible]
10:45		3:00	212 Old SOB
firm 11:00	Gen Taylor's office re	3:15	180-3871
11:15	"Propaganda" Watty Con,	3:30	
11:30	Tom Hughes, State, MR Anderson, USIA	3:45	
11:45	Rm 300 E.O.B.	4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30	Bfng for N.S.C. Mtg.	4:45	
12:45		5:00	

1:30 Dinner at Chinese Emb - Inf. Stag. 3225 Woodley Rd.
Mr. FitzGerald will also attend.

13-00000

Tue **22**

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	Spec. Gp. Briefing
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	Sam Scott & John [illegible]
11:00		3:15	Mr. Russell
11:15		3:30	R. A. Denney
11:30		3:45	
11:45	Gen. Bradley	4:00	Mtg - Gen Taylor, Atty
12:00		4:15	Gen., Mr. Murrow, Alexis Johnson
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

5:30 Tennis & supper w/British Amb. & Jack McCloy

Fri **25**

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Amb. Harriman
9:00		1:15	+ Bfng ODCI/FE, ~~DDI~~
9:15		1:30	Abbot Smith
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	Brown
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	Mr. Osborn
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Dr. Brown (Med. Staff)	3:15	
11:15		3:30	Tom Parrott
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00	The President	4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

Tue **29**

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Dr. Charyk 4E886	1:45	
9:45	River ent.	2:00	
10:00		2:15	Mtg - Gen Taylor, Gen
10:15		2:30	Lemnitzer, Dr. Wiesner
10:30	Mr. Kirkpatrick	2:45	& AD/SI
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mtg - The Pres. on SEA	3:15	
11:15	& C/FE	3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Mr. Pforzheimer
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Bfng for Spec. Gp.

5:30 Wm Boyle, C/S, Ankara
6 - Jack Maury & Mr. Osborn
7 Tracy Barnes

7:30 Drinks at Mrs Magruder's

Wed **30**

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45	x x Tracy Barnes	3:00	
11:00	Walter Raymond [Chas. 3	3:15	
11:15	Enright], [Arthur McCafferty]	3:30	Haircut
	(Aipon X 4853)		
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Gen Taylor
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	USIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	
		5:30	The Pres.

6 - Supper + Tennis at home - Amb. Caccia + the Belin

2/mc

Thu 31

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00	Debriefing, Gen Bruce	1:15	
9:15	Clark, ONE	1:30	
9:30	Mr. Scoville	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Spec. Gp Mtg.
10:00	Mtg at the W. H. & AD/SI	2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	NSIB Mtg (ADCI to	2:45	
10:45	take)	3:00	Mtg, Cuban Task Force
11:00		3:15	Mr. Goodwin's off.
11:15		3:30	Tate, Woodward,
11:30	Spec. Gp Bfng	3:45	Bell, Schlesinger Tracy Barnes
11:45	Mr. Bissell	4:00	2nd fl W Conf Rm
12:00		4:15	West Wing, W.H.
12:15		4:30	
12:30	Lunch - Secy McNamara	4:45	
12:45	+ Secy Gilpatric (Pent 3E880, Pvt ent.) 11-55261	5:00	Mtg - Gen. Taylor, Amb. Johnson, Mr. Murrow ~~& Mr. Herbert Little~~

6-9: Reception - Emb of Malaya - 2701 Albemarle

6:15 Ostrow & Murphy

8:15 Dinner at home - John McCloy - 27238

243 Thursday, August 31, 1961 122

Wed 20

LAST MONTH

AUGUST						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

SEPTEMBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

NEXT MONTH

OCTOBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

call Roy Garthoff

8:15 - John McCone - breakfast at DCI's

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - George McGhee
9:00		1:15	for Hans. Fish Armstrong
9:15		1:30	8th Flr. - Secy's Dining
9:30	[illegible] Mtg.	1:45	Room. (State)
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	Brf. Amb. Gordon
11:00		3:15	(Brazil)
11:15		3:30	Gen. Taylor
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Mtg at Taylor's office
12:00	Cord Meyer	4:15	Gen. Cabell
12:15		4:30	
12:30	Bill Harvey	4:45	
12:45		5:00	

5:15 USIB Ch.
6:30 Gov. Herter

5:45 - Reception - Pres. of Peru - 3001 Garrison St
Mr + Mrs D

13-00000

Tue 26

LAST MONTH

AUGUST						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

SEPTEMBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

NEXT MONTH

OCTOBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

Lunch
Helms

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	Spec. Gp. Bfg.
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	John McCone
12:00	Mr. Helms & Mr. Maury	4:15	
12:15	Amb. David Bruce	4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6 - McCone, DCI, Col. White & Chandler to Bldg.

7:30 Dinner w/ Mr. & Mrs. Pres. Bush & John McCone

Tue **3**

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

OCTOBER—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Harold Linder
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	Special Gp Bfng
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	Gordon Stewart
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	Mtg at White House
12:15		4:30	Cabinet Rm. (Norstad
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

Maj. Gen. George Bush

Wed

OCTOBER—1961

4

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Gen Anders
9:00	Gen. Eisenhower, Statler	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Bfg - Maj Gen Geo Bush
10:00		2:15	C/JUSMAG, Greece
10:15		2:30	USIB Briefing
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Air Vice Marshall Lyn + C/NE	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30	Kindley Boncil + C/IO	3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Lv. for N. Y. via Aero-Commander
12:30	Gen. Anders C/EE +	4:45	
12:45	[Paul Haines] C/Polish Desk Mr. Latomerski	5:00	

8:00 Dinner - Mr + Mrs John Hughes - Bl

63 E. 74th

Staying at Drake Hotel, Suite 1212.

1/mk

Sat-Sun 7-8

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

OCTOBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
8:45			1:00		
9:00			1:15		
9:15			1:30		
9:30			1:45		
9:45	Mr Shelton		2:00		
10:00	Mr Amory		2:15		
10:15			2:30		
10:30	Gen. Miller		2:45		
10:45	Elint Staff		3:00		
11:00	+ H/OSI + HDSI		3:15		
11:15	Mr Harvey		3:30		
11:30			3:45		
11:45			4:00		
12:00			4:15		
12:15	Wm Bundy +		4:30		
12:30	Dr Kent +		4:45		
12:45	Amory		5:00		

280 Sat., October 7, 1961 85 281 Sun., October 8, 1961 84

Tue 10

LAST MONTH						
SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

OCTOBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

NEXT MONTH						
NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15	K K	1:30	Adm De Florez
9:30	Col. Holland	1:45	K K
9:45		2:00	Joan Rohrer & Mr. Larocque
10:00	USIB Bfng	2:15	
10:15		2:30	Special USIB Mtg.
10:30		2:45	
10:45	Dave Murphy	3:00	
11:00	Mtg w/ the Pres. on Berlin Mil. Planning	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	~~Mr. Fitz Gerald~~
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Dr. Scoville

5:30-7:30 Reception - Japanese Emb.

5:30 Gov Harris

6- Mtg of Principals NESC

Secy State

Secy Def

Dinner at home for the Arthur Dalters -

(Leon will help)

The Harlans regret - previous engagement

Wed 11

OCTOBER—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Cornelius Ryan
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Special Gp Bfng
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	3
10:45	Mtg w/ the Pres on	3:00	[Bob Whedbee]
11:00	Pres. Off. + KD/SEA	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
✓12:00 30	Brig. Riaz Hussain +	4:15	
12:15	Alan Conway. C/NE	4:30	USIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

7:15 Dinner - Mr. + Mrs. Helms. Inf. 3901 Fessenden, NW
Iranian Emb. after the Helms Dinner

1/mc

~~Do letters for DC~~

*see my Bulich + Dunker

Fri

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

OCTOBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

20

NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	→ Family Dining Room
9:00	Dave Murphy	1:15	
9:15		1:30	–
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	– White House	2:15	
10:15	Cabinet Room	2:30	– Special Gr.
10:30		2:45	Situation Room at White House
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00	– Tom Schreyer	4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	Deputies Mtg
12:45		5:00	~~[illegible]~~ ~~Award Ceremony~~

~~5:30 Mr Archer~~

6:00 Mr Schreyer

Tue 14

LAST MONTH

OCTOBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

NOVEMBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

NEXT MONTH

DECEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

A
Tedesci
X 6345

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - John Starnes
9:00		1:15	Chmn - Canadian JIC
9:15		1:30	Large Dining Rm.
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	The President	2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Spec. Gp Bfng + Mr. McCone
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30	NSC Bfng.	4:45	
12:45	Col. King + L.A. Survey Team	5:00	NSC Bfng

8 - Dinner - Secy Rusk for Gen Pak - Blair House
Stag. Blk tie.

Leaves city

Fri 1

LAST MONTH

NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

DECEMBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

NEXT MONTH

JANUARY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

A. M.	P. M.
8:45	1:00 Lt. Lunch in office
9:00	1:15
9:15	1:30
9:30	1:45
9:45	2:00
10:00 Tom Ross + David Lucal	2:15
10:15	2:30
10:30	2:45 David Murphy
10:45	3:00 [Geo. Merten] 3
* 11:00 [Geo. Merten] 3 (has C.S. file)	3:15 (Note: D. Murphy was
11:15	3:30 given C.S. official file on [G. Merten] 3
11:30 — Frank Reynolds	3:45 to review & return to MOD.)
11:45	4:00
12:00	4:15
12:15	4:30
12:30	4:45
12:45	5:00

6:15 Attorney General
Rm 5115 Justice (10th St Gate

Dinner for TSD Research Bd (Alma de Flory)
Alibi Club 7:30 - Informal

3/mc

Sat-Sun **30-31**

LAST MONTH | **NEXT MONTH**

DECEMBER—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

NOVEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

JANUARY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
8:45			1:00		
9:00			1:15		
9:15			1:30		
9:30			1:45		
9:45			2:00		
10:00			2:15		
10:15			2:30		
10:30			2:45		
10:45			3:00		
11:00			3:15		
11:15			3:30		
11:30			3:45		
11:45			4:00		
12:00			4:15		
12:15			4:30		
12:30			4:45		
12:45			5:00		

[redacted]

? [illegible] ?

12/31 - New Year's Eve. Dinner - Mrs & Mr. Walter Lippmann

364 Sat., December 30, 1961 1 **365 Sun., December 31, 1961 0**

LAST MONTH

DECEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

JANUARY—1962						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

NEXT MONTH

FEBRUARY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28			

8:45	1:00
9:00	1:15
9:15	1:30
9:30	1:45
9:45	2:00
10:00	2:15
10:15	2:30
10:30	2:45
10:45	3:00
11:00	3:15
11:15	3:30
11:30	3:45
11:45	4:00
12:00	4:15
12:15	4:30
12:30	4:45
12:45	5:00

1 Monday, January 1, 1962 364

Bush

Tue **9**

LAST MONTH

DECEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

NEXT MONTH

FEBRUARY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28			

8:45		1:00	Lunch - T. Barnes
9:00		1:15	(Lge. Dining Rm)
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	Mr Lewis Gulick AP
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Sir John Wheeler Bennett
12:30		4:45	(2723 Q)
12:45		5:00	

5:30 - Sen Prescott Bush

9 Tuesday, January 9, 1962 356

104-10307-10006 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

EYES ONLY
SECRET

D

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP

14 APRIL THROUGH 14 OCTOBER 1962

Task Force W
Foreign
Intelligence
Branch

EYES ONLY
SECRET

III. WHAT TARGETS WAS THE AGENCY ABLE TO COVER AND WITH WHAT FREQUENCY AND CONTINUITY?

The following remarks apply to agent coverage only, that is, coverage by means of individuals on the island of Cuba, or elsewhere in the world. Audio devices or telephone taps on Cuban installations abroad or Cubans living abroad have produced intelligence which has served operational ends, in other words, information which has provided critical data used in the spotting, assessment and recruitment of agents. Due to the standard security measures taken in most official installations, these technical operations have been able to provide only a limited amount of positive intelligence. In general, agents have produced information essentially in accordance with their known access at the time of recruitment. Responsibility for many of the agents dealt with during the present reporting period was simply assumed by TFW from past efforts against Cuba. In many instances, these agents had been recruited strictly on an "availability" basis, and indeed had no particular access. A major effort was made at the inception of TFW to winnow out those persons who could make no contribution and to redirect those who could. This process of redirection, which was conducted via time consuming and generally inefficient S/W channels, resulted in the conversion of a number of heretofore unusable agents into sound, pertinent reporting sources. Though, in most instances, TFW operations officers had never had personal contact with these agents, they succeeded in inducing many of them to spot, develop and recruit sub-agents. This technique succeeded, despite the obstacles involved in vetting candidates and advising agents via S/W means. In regard to the recruitment of new agent assets during the reporting period, TFW was able to be guided by specific, priority needs. Accordingly, the many new assets acquired were chosen because of specific access to target personalities or institutions. The assigned targets and extent of coverage are indicated below.

A. Military

During the reporting period, in the latter half, the Agency's major effort to obtain intelligence from agent sources, centered on Cuban military affairs. The reporting obtained covered matters ranging from military policy to detailed OB. Almost every agent contributed to this effort, with the consequence that the coverage of military matters was wide-spread and continuous. Despite the fact that 95% of this information was provided via S/W (much of it from totally untrained sub-sources who had no military experience), such was the detail and volume of the data, that our agents were able to give us highly significant information on troop and materiel movements, location and nature of military sites, etc. The following agents served as the major sources of military information during the reporting period:

08

1. Cuban insurance executive, who had a large and diversified net, provided intelligence in late June 1962 which specifically anticipated the massive Soviet military build-up which ultimately took place in Cuba. Throughout the build-up itself this agent provided an almost continuous stream of OB intelligence on missile, maritime and air phases of the build-up. He provided the initial reporting on delivery of IL-28's to the island.

2. A relative of a former Cuban president whose government connections provided him on several occasions with information on attitudes of various military factions toward Castro and the Soviets. Agent also provided some detailed missile OB.

08

3. U.S. citizen who established contact with a resistance chief in Pinar del Rio during July 1962, provided, in the course of several reports,10 an inventory of Soviet installations throughout the province. The maintenance of communication with this agent was extremely arduous in virtue of his most exposed position.

08

4. A Havana surgeon who took special horseback trips to cover the Soviet installation at Torrens Reformatory.

5. A former lawyer, resident of Santiago provided information on Cuban armymmine laying along roads in Santiago area, as well as on Soviet troops and materiel movements.

6. A western diplomat who provided photographs of Soviet-occupied hotels in Havana, Soviet troop and materiel movements in the Havana area.

7. A Cubana official who provided comprehensive data on state readiness of Cubana air materiel.

8. A merchant in Camaguey who had provided general observational reporting on military activities in his area.

9. A former wife of a Cuba Airlines pilot who has contacts among Cuban Airline pilots from whom she obtained some air OB.

10. A shipping clerk at Cardenas harbor reported sporadically on activities at the port.

11. A construction company employee at Guantanamo Naval Base reported on Cuban OB in the environs of the base.

12. A public accountant in Havana who is the leader of a counter-revolutionary group, reported military information acquired through his group contacts.

13. A Havana bartender who reported considerable quantities of OB data obtained from his large circle of varied acquaintances in Havana area.

14. A retired railroad official reported data on rail shipments.

4/PJ

15. A lawyer in Havana reported on Rancho Boyeros Airport in Havana where a certain airline is one of his clients.

08 08

16. A pineapple firm manager in Pinar del Rio recruited in July 1962 reported on military developments in his area.

17. A Cuban employee of a foreign embassy recruited in July 1962 in Havana reported some OB information which was obtained through casual contacts.

10

18. A customs inspector at Jose Marti Airport in Havana was the source of good reporting on Sov/Bloc cargo shipments to Havana, including military cargos.

19. A physician in Havana who reported on military movements.

20. A Cuban Airlines official, with limited access, reported Air OB.

21. A foreign intelligence service staff officer in Havana reported military OB.

22. A second foreign intelligence service staff officer in Havana reported military OB.

23. A number of maritime assets who have reported on Sov/Bloc military cargo deliveries to Cuba.

b. Political. Throughout the reporting period, the Agency was able to produce intelligence on Cuban political affairs at the ministerial level and above. This intelligence was derived essentially from sources who had but limited access to persons of high rank or in key positions. This type of access placed a premium on Agent elictation skills and the ability to distinguish between rumor and fact, plus an aptitude for remaining afloat in dangerous waters. The most significant political information was provided by the following agents:

08

1. An official in the Ministry of Economics who, in the 08 capacity of advisor to Ernesto GUEVARA was able to glean information on Cuban political affairs.

2. A relative of a former Cuban president who through this connection and his own social position is able to maintain contact with high-level officials in Cuba.

08

3. A Cuban doctor who gives medical treatment to Cuban officials and who is reporting limited intelligence, by direction, until he is able to develop direct access to important high-level officials.

6/N

08

4. A cultural attache of a West European Embassy in Havana who picks up information from other diplomats and from Cuban contacts on political matters. A sub-agent of this asset has also been a source of medium-level political information.

5. A West European Ambassador in Cuba who provides political information he obtains from foreign and Cuban contacts.

08

6. A Cuban Ambassador in Western Europe who has been reporting with utmost detail and frequency on high-level political matters of which he is aware.

7. The Ambassador to Cuba of a Latin American country who reports political intelligence obtained through his Cuban and foreign contacts.

06

8. A former protege of Raul CASTRO who retains contacts with government leaders and who is a new asset developing his reporting capabilities on political matters.

10

9. The Ambassador in Cuba of a North African country who has provided high-level political information.

08

10. A Cuban lawyer in Santiago whose brother-in-law, a high-ranking official, provided intelligence on GOC/Soviet relations.

24 11. A staff officer of a foreign intelligence service assigned to a cover position in a Havana Embassy who has produced some political intelligence responsive to our requirements.

12. A Cuban manager of an intervened U.S. company who has relatives in the PSP and in the government. To date, his reporting has covered general political developments.

08 08

13. A librarian and teacher who is a relative of a former justice of the Cuban Supreme Court and who has high-level government contacts. This agent has been reporting political personality data and some political information.

08

14. A Cuban Ambassador in Western Europe who has reported political information to which he has access.

15. In addition, there are a number of agent penetrations in Cuban diplomatic establishments overseas who provide a variety of miscellaneous political information concerning Cuban activities in the areas concerned.

9/N

21

c. Economic. The Agency was able to produce a continuous amount of intelligence from Agent sources on the Cuban sugar, oil and transportation industries, much of which was in the form of statistical summaries. In a number of instances, this intelligence was provided by agents who had direct access to this information by virtue of their jobs. We also have been able to get continued reporting on general economic conditions and foreign trade. Among the most significant agents reporting economic information were:

08

1. A Cuban (insurance) salesman, previously noted, who through his extensive contacts and sub-agents has been able to provide information on sugar production, (insurance) affairs and the Cuban banking system. 08

08 08

2. An official of the (Ministry of Economy), (a close associate of Che GUEVARA) who has provided useful economic intelligence.

3. A relative of a former Cuban president, previously noted, who has provided detailed import-export figures; detailed documentary reports on petroleum.

08

4. (A high-level) official of Cubana Airlines who reportedly provided high-level information on Cubana Airlines, particularly financial and materiel affairs.

08

5. A resident of Mexico and (director of an Italian-controlled pharmaceutical) firm who travels to Cuba where he has good contacts in the Ministry of Industry, who has reported economic information.

6. A Dutch businessman who has access to Cuban economic officials and who has provided useful economic information.

7. U.S. trained Cuban engineer who provided detailed reports on (petroleum) industry.

08

d. Sociological and General Conditions. The Agency has provided a steady and relatively heavy flow of intelligence covering such matters as the state of resistance activities, mood of the populace, living conditions, etc., from agents in nearly every Cuban province. A survey of agents reporting this type of information has not been completed, because almost all of our agents have reported on this low priority topic from time to time.

4. Within the Terms of the Agency's Mission, What Target Was It Unable to Cover and Why?

a. Paragraph 3 above sets forth in general the degree to which the major Cuban targets were covered during the reporting

7/1/1

period. The key military, political and economic targets were clearly defined and assiduously pursued by TFW. The immense pressure of time must continuously be borne in mind if the attack on the Cuban problem is to be granted its full perspective. Even before TFW assumed responsibility for collection against Cuba, it was clear that intelligence on Soviet, Satellite and Chinese Communist Cuban policy and maneuvers would be formulated and planned at the highest level in the respective governments. Equally clear was the fact that the clandestine search for insights into the Cuban policies of these governments would enjoy only as much success as the clandestine search for any intelligence regarding any policies of these governments. Time restrictions alone ruled out the hope that adequate coverage of these key denied area targets could be achieved. As a consequence, every facet of the TFW collection program was geared to the search for top priority Cuban intelligence; from sources in the free world and on the island every agent or agent candidate was evaluated in terms of his access to such intelligence. Translated into espionage terms, this meant that every agent or candidate was examined sharply to determine whether and how he could help penetrate the GOC, the Cuban armed forces or the managerial and policy levels of the Cuban economy. Below is an account of the success of this effort; it will be seen that most major target areas were under direct, specific assault.

b. Political.

1. Cuban Communist Party: 8 In late May a close relative and confidant of the Chief of the Cuban Communist Party was singled out and developed by a Cuban principle agent. The candidate provided highly valuable information throughout the summer of 1962. Though the information was obtained indirectly by the agent it was but a portion of what he could produce. Thus the ultimate aim of the operation was to effect the candidate's direct recruitment. The drive toward this goal continues, and though we are optimistic that the 6 months effort thus far invested will result in the direct recruitment of a high-level
29 Communist Party member, it would be inaccurate to say that as of the close of the reporting period, the Party had been penetrated at a significant level. 29

2. GOC Ruling Circle.

(a) In May 1962 TFW spotted a Cuban legal traveller whose brother-in-law has been a member of the GOC from its inception. The agent was recruited under specific instructions to attempt to induce his relative to report on GOC policy matters. Though TFW had only 12 hours with the agent

3/n

2-3

before dispatching him to Cuba, he has attempted to carry out his instructions. By October he had succeeded in eliciting significant information from the target, and was confident his full recruitment was simply a matter of time. One inhibiting feature affecting the pace of this operation is the fact that the agent lives in Santiago while his relative, the target, is a resident of Havana. Unquestionably the full recruitment of the target could help fill an important gap in our reporting on GOC activities.

(b) In June 1962 TFW obtained a lead to a person very closely related to Fidel CASTRO. Throughout the summer extensive but necessarily circumspent negotiations were conducted to bring this person to Mexico where full recruitment, training and briefing would be possible. The negotiations culminated in success. The agent was met and trained by Agency personnel in September and early October and dispatched to Cuba on 15 October with the specific mission of reporting on the thoughts, plans and activities of the CASTROS and other leading GOC figures. Since the target, prior to recruitment did not possess the kind of political awareness which would have led him systematically to observe those GOC personalities to whom he had matural access, the Agency was denied any prime political intelligence from this source during the reporting period.

Juanita

(c) Throughout the summer 1962, TFW received various reports, the tenor of which were that Ernesto 'Che' GUEVARA would like to defect from Cuba. Each report proved, upon closer inquiry, to be groundless, until we learned in late September that a Mexican industrialist had claimed GUEVARA had asked him in 1961 for assistance in leaving Cuba. Though many of the facets of this disclosure tallied with other known data, exploitation of this exceedingly important lead was hamstrung by the inability to aline a qualified agency officer with the widely travelling Mexican. This lead illustrates well the frustrations involved in pursuing high-level targets within a rigid time framework, and with a limited number of available personnel. It also illustrated the need to persist, when the target is of sufficient importance, in the follow up of "far-out" leads.

3. Military

(a). In late July TFW recruited a Cuban legal traveller expressly because of his close relationship with a member (of the Cuban General Staff).06 Once again only a few hours was available in which to train the agent. Nevertheless, during August, September and October the agent persisted in his efforts

Juanita

?

release

to develop the target and was able to provide significant OB at the same time. Neither this, nor the other efforts to penetrate the Cuban military at high-level, however, had met with full success by the end of the reports period.

06 (b) The Cuban lawyer recruited in May 1962 (see paragraph 2a above) developed a second target in September, a former member of the Cuban General Staff now awaiting reassignment. The agent was instructed to recruit and train this military Officer in S/W. At the end of the reporting period it was not possible to determine the success of this potentially excellent operational development.

(c) Included in this discussion is the partially successful recruitment of a Cuban army engineer who is stationed in Santiago. The agent cited in (2b above) has been in contact with this target, a captain, since July 1962, but has not succeeded in completing the full recruitment. He has obtained OB from the captain, but we feel the operation will not have reached its full potential until the captain has been trained in S/W and is reporting directly to us.

(d) Since mid-August the Agency has been pursuing a lead to the G-3 of the Cuban Army. The basis of this pursuit was fitted together from innumerable reports, and finally centered, in early October, on a plan to try to effect the recruitment using a letter from a former army and prison comrade. By cut-off data, the developmental activity had reached the point where the only remaining matter was to deliver the letter into the hands of the Officer.

3. Economic. The Agency has striven to identify key figures in the Cuban economy and to develop access to them as rapidly as possible, wherever the opportunity has arisen. Oil, Nickle and Sugar Industries have been assigned to us having the highest priority.

(a) Petroleum: 08 TFW recruited and sent to Cuba in January a yound U.S. trained engineer. In May 08 he reported he had obtained a position in the Institute of Petroleum 29 Too lowly himself to be of major value, we have steadily guided him 24 in an enterprise aimed at recruitment of the chief of the petroleum industry. The families of the two man had been close friends. The effort involves many imponderables and must be carried out via S/W. Still, the major aim is deemed worthy of the investment. Meanwhile the agent has been able to provide intelligence of increasing value.

51hW

26

(b) Nickle Industry: The seat of this important industry unfortunately is in two small towns in Oriente province. Lightly populated areas which are of strategic importance always pose rugged operational obstacles. The nickle towns are no exception. Numerous well-meaning persons in the U.S. have attempted to help us obtain access to this critical target. Yet not until late September was the Agency able to turn up (by virtue of a New Orleans recruitment) a source of viable leads to key personnel. By cut-off date, however, we had not been able to bring any lead to function. Most promising is a lead to the technical supervisor of the Nickle complex.

08

(c) Sugar: Two former high-level penetrations of the Sugar Industry defected to the U.S. soon after the inception of TFW. Throughout the summer it was not possible to identify a suitable candidate to replace them. A New York source in early October succeeded in placing us in touch with the chief sugar technician in Cuba. This operation should be fully productive by Christmas 1962. 08

2/12

26

27

To illustrate the results of this operational data, we have recently been preparing the recruitment in place or defection of one of the principal officers of the Cuban Foreign Service in Europe. We have been able to develop the proposals through an already defected diplomat and the effectiveness of his approach and a reading on the diplomats reactions can be provided to us independently by three other agents in close contact with him as well as through a technical surveillance operation.

G. Liaison

The most fruitful 10 liaison relative to the Cuban target has been conducted with European and a few of the Latin American 10 services. Specifically, the following services have been the most cooperative and helpful: The British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, and Chilean.

Some of these services are working closely with the Task Force both in Washington and Miami, cutting corners on procedure, protocol and actually exceeding their own official instructions. This has been particularly true after the announcement of the President on 22 October 1962. The degree of this effort is remarkable and runs all the way from full cooperation to an outstanding exertion of personal commitment, resourcefulness, and imagination to find ways to help our effort.

To cite only a few of the current FI operations developed through liaison services, the Spanish service has given us (4 24 resident agents (including 2 diplomats). 24 The French service has provided us with one resident diplomat who communicates directly with us by W/T. 24 The Danish and Dutch services, have given us control of maritime assets calling at Cuban ports, and they have also participated in joint 24 operations using legal travellers. 24 In addition to mounting 24 operations against Cuba, several European 10 services have provided secure diplomatic courier services for the transmittal of our own 24 agents' communications and for the infiltration of S/W and W/T and other materials to our agents inside Cuba. 24 Services in Belgium and Holland have been particularly helpufl in the development of an operation to deny Cuba access 24 to an 24 urgently needed solvent for petroleum products. To date it appears that efforts to make this product unobtainable to the Cubans has been successful. 24

In general, the 10 West European services have been cooperative in assisting us to mount operations against Cuba and against installations in their own territory. 10 Latin American services, have been most helpful in developing operations against Cuban targets in their own countries, apparently because of the Latin 10 Americans' increasing concern with the threat of Cuban subversion on their territory.

36/17J

V. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES, EITHER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN THE AGENCY'S COVERAGE CAPABILITY, WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING THE PERIOD.

The initial, significant change effected by the Agency to increase and improve its Cuban intelligence coverage capability was to establish a Cuban Task Force at Headquarters and to staff it with experienced intelligence officers. These officers were selected from other operating Divisions within the Agency. Many of them spoke Spanish and all of them have had extensive experience in various intelligence assignments both at Headquarters and in the Field. This newly created Task Force was charged with the responsibility to direct, advise, support, and/or coordinate all phases of the Agency's intelligence operations directed against Cuba.

At the same time, the Task Force Field Station in Miami was strengthened considerably with increased numbers of experienced staff officers and facilities for mounting intelligence operations against the Cuban target. This concentration of experienced personnel into the Cuban Task Force, both at Headquarters and at the Miami Field Station, was a positive and significant effort to increase the Agency's intelligence coverage capability in order to satisfactorily fulfill the priority requirements and tasks which had been levied on the Agency as a result of the Communist takeover in Cuba.

To further improve our ~~coverage~~ capability, the Agency communications office set up a special facility in Miami to (intercept 24 electronically internal communications) within Cuba. These (intercepted communications) are processed in Miami and then forwarded directly to Headquarters, Miami Field Station, (and to NSA for action and/or further dissemination) The (NSA) disseminates to the other members of the intelligence community 29 the information that has been intercepted and processed by this special Agency communication facility. This facility cooperates and coordinates its operations closely with (NSA) and is used (by NSA) to assist in the (interception) of (internal communications) in Cuba. 29 24 24 24

In addition to setting up within the Agency an organization whose primary mission is concerned with all phases of intelligence operations directed against Cuba, all other operating Divisions within the Agency wdre directed to give top priority attention to the development of intelligence operations against Cuba. This has resulted in the diversion of certain assets who had the requisite access to Cuban targets as well as the experience or capability.

7/17J

The response of the various Agency components, both by Headquarters Desks and by the Field Stations, has been most satisfactory and has aided the Task Force considerably in the performance of its assigned mission. Within the Task Force, selected officers have been designated to assist, advise, and coordinate on all phases of Cuban intelligence operations with the various geographic division desks. This arrangement has provided for a continued, increased coverage capability of the Cuban target by insuring a regular review of current, developmental, and planned intelligence operations of all available Agency intelligence assets which could be directed against Cuba.

The above points are ones that reflect significant changes which have taken place during this period. In addition, it should be pointed out that there has been an intensification and concentration of all operational techniques applicable to the particular type and character of the Cuban target. There has been a substantial increase in the recruitment and training of agent assets. There has been an extensive increase in the establishment and use of clandestine communications methods and channels. The use of SW, one way voice radio, and WT as methods of communicating with agents inside Cuba has been greatly expanded. And since certain Western Nations 24 still maintain Embassies in Havana, 24 courier channels for the delivery of letters and packages 24 by the diplomatic pouch have been developed and are being used extensively. 24 The above points are discussed elsewhere in this paper but they are mentioned here briefly in the context of being closely related to significant changes in the Agency's intelligence capability.

4/N

VI. WHAT SUPPORT FOR COLLECTION FACILITIES-WAS REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES? HOW WAS IT SECURED FROM THEM? WAS IT TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE? WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WAS LACKING?

The conduct of intelligence collection operations often has depended on timely and effective support from other U.S. government agencies. Several government agencies provided support to intelligence operations directed against the Cuban target on both a regular and a standby basis. In fact, each and every request for policy approved support was granted and carried out rapidly and effectively. For example, the Department of State has expedited the issuance of visas on selected cases at our request as well as granting visa waivers to individuals of operational interest to the Agency. In addition, Foreign Service personnel interview, debrief, and attempt to establish the bona-fides of potential intelligence assets who voluntarily contact a U.S. Embassy or Consulate. This is often done alone and some times in collaboration with an agency officer prior to introducing the agency officer for further development and exploitation as the case may require. These types of support are provided regularly by the Department of State and contribute considerably to the effectiveness of many complex intelligence operations.

Another U.S. government agency which has given invaluable support to the Agency's intelligence collection operations is the FBI. The FBI has provided biographic data, investigative reports, and operational leads to individuals of known or potential operational interest. This support has been maintained on a regular and continuing basis. Close liaison relations between the FBI and this agency are maintained at Headquarters and at various Field Stations. This close liaison has resulted in a better understanding of the needs and requirements of each Agency in the successful accomplishments of their separate responsibilities as well as providing a rapid channel for providing support and assistance when requested.

The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has facilitated the entry into the U.S. of persons of operational interest to the Agency; and has provided guidance and support for cases which involve unusual alien residence and/or naturalization proceedings. Liaison with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service is particularly close and harmonious at the Miami Field installation where the bulk of the cases involving persons of operational interest to us originates.

Reports provided on a regular basis by the National Security Agency have been a source of operational leads which have been followed up for 29 the development of collection assets. The disseminations by the N.S.A also serve as an effective means of checking selected information and activity that has been provided by other sources of information. The 29 NSA also collaborates in the 24 dissemination of certain information with the CIA communication facility in Miami, an Agency unit engaged in the electronic interception and processing of Cuban Internal Communications 24 24

Liaison with the aforementioned U.S. government agencies is maintained on a continuing and regular basis both at the Headquarters level in Washington, D.C. and at appropriate field installations by designated Agency components. It has been our pleasurable experience that these agencies, in addition to others such as the Department of Agriculture where specific operations required guidance in their particular fields of competence, have provided timely, effective, and professional support and guidance, in support of policy approved intelligence collection operations as required in the national interest. Without such support, the task of intelligence collection would have been in many instances much more difficult and, in many cases, impossible

5/hJ

VII. AGENT SUMMARIES

The scope and nature of the Agency's Foreign Intelligence operations is most clearly seen in the character, personal ambition and caprice of the human material present, namely the agents involved. The following sketches of the individual agents engaged in these operations have been compiled in recognition of the vital ingredient which these human beings bring to an appreciation of the Agency's FI operations. It will be noted that a majority of the agents work, or have been worked, out of Miami, the city which has been the center of anti-Castro Cubans, the major pool of potential agents, since 1959.

Other geographical areas are represented in mathematical sequence, in fact according to the number of Cuban exiles in residence at a given place. This same mathematical order applies with reference to the jobs these agents hold. Thus, if a Cuban has a function, the performance of which is important in sustaining the island, hence important to the Cuban Regime, the Agency has sought the services of this man as its agent. 24 For this reason, several agents are in the employ of the airlines and of merchant 24 marine shipping businesses. So too, with diplomacy. Every foreign diplomat now accredited to the Regime in Havana has been examined by the Agency as a prospective agent. Forty percent of these diplomats were approached. Of this number about one half took our bait and have accepted assignments which range from marginal involvement in "intelligence" (e.g., using their diplomatic immunity to carry our materials), to active participation in our operations.

Finally, one type of Cuban who played an influential, though limited, role during the past six months was the defector (who is not mentioned elsewhere in this paper). The defector is the official who for one reason or another cannot remain in or be persuaded to remain in place and report on his job. Owing to the nature of this particular person, it is difficult to draw hard lines between those who genuinely reject their Government and those who merely quit in self-interest, but during the past six months, the Agency tapped in on the defections of about ten Cubans of consequence, profiting from their information in all cases and from their psychological exploitation when circumstance would permit.

2/N

A

D
R
A
F
T

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two" course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelligence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue. (Validity of this assumption is questionable)

II. OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.

2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.

3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.

4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.

5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.

6. The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.

7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.

8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the (131) 24 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

ypv

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean and Israeli. Direct approaches to several of these services either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the services underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make greater use of their national assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the Vatican.

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

16 IN

particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the (twenty) 24 officers and crew members aboard (six) 24 Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running (12) 24 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional (20) 24 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can gain access and concerning whom we have any reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral operations and where appropriate in conjunction with liaison services.

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in (Chile), (Italy), (Mexico), (The Netherlands), (England), (Uruguay), (Greece), (Spain), (France), (and Canada). No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and wherever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such installation worthwhile.

14/pN

8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their (seaborne) intercept coverage of Cuban communications. 24

9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable/prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are (65) 24 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this (65) 24 the survey we have conducted indicates that (23) 24 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these (23) 24 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of (65) 24 are bein individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

61N

10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del 24 Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.

11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

SPLITTING THE REGIME

B./1 Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further expldtation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations: Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

2, Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementation of related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/GYROSE
Operational Debriefings

MICROFILMED JUL 17 1962 DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None. 201 → Doc. CUBA

Reference: UFGA-4088. Re possible use of Sub by U.S. Gov. Agency

During the month of May 1962 the following persons, processing through the CAC, were considered to be of operational importance to JMWAVE.

1. Rafael *ARRIBAS Rodriguez (A 12 895 148). Subject, a former Medical Products Salesman, had contacts with two employees of the Post Office in Cuba. The leads he provided were considered marginal and dropped for further operational exploitation.

2. Jose Francisco *AZOR Ores (A 12 911 733). Subject, a Former rural census taker for the INRA, is undergoing a thorough debriefing on OB and cartographic information by the AMOTs.

3. Manuel CABRERA Rodriguez (A 12 911 477). Subject, a former railroad worker in Camaguey and ex-Rebel Army Battalion Commander, was debriefed on positive intelligence information. The results of this debriefing were forwarded to Reports for dissemination.

4. (Dr) Jaime *CARBONELL Rivero (A 12 907 852). Subject, a former night club owner in Havana, submitted two plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. The results of this debriefing were forwarded to Headquarters in UFGA-4176, dated 31 May 1962. att.

5. Abel Julio *COLIMORIO Vasquez (A 12 971 774). Subject, a former Naval Chauffeur and member of the FND, is being debriefed on operational leads and positive intelligence.

(22557)06 FR Re visit of Sub to U.S. ~~[illegible]~~

6. 06 (Rafael Rinaldo *DIAZ Veira) (A 12 444 465). Subject, a 06 (pharmacist) and co-owner of a (medical testing clinic in Pinar 06 del Rio,) was recruited, trained in SW before he returned to Cuba. JMWAVE plans to start a new collection network centered

(continued)

Distribution:
3-Headquarters

CS COPY

INDEX

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
25 June 62	JUL 9 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-4543

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-40
19-120-33

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

4/RV

around this agent into the medical profession in Havana and Pinar del Rio. Subject had come to PBPRIME to visit his son who had been injured in an automobile accident.

7. Carlos Fernando *GALBAN Perez (A 12 895 062). Subject, a former theatre employee in Havana, was contacted by fnu 06 *LLANO a private detective in Havana who was his neighbor, just prior to his departure and asked that, when Subject arrived in Miami, he contact Freyre JORGE in the Catholic Bureau in Miami. Allegedly LLANO had information concerning airfields, pilots and radar 06 installations which he wanted to send to Freyre JORGE. Upon contacting the Catholic Welfare Bureau, Freyre JORGE was 06 unknown to them. At the request of JMWAVE, Subject wrote 06 to LLANO in order to obtain more information concerning LLANO's potential. JMWAVE is waiting for an answer to this letter. 06

8. Antonio *GOICOCHEA Cosculluela. Subject, a former member of the Legal Department of Cubana, was debriefed on positive intelligence and on the activities of AMWARM-1. The result of the intelligence portion of the debriefing is being disseminated.

06 CAC

9. Antonio *GOMEZ Hernandez (A 12 419 493). Subject, a medical doctor, returned to Cuba without giving any indication of his plans to CAC, consequently JMWAVE was too late in recruiting him; however, he is scheduled to return to PBPRIME about November. It is possible that Subject will return again to Cuba at that time. If this proves to be the case, serious consideration will be given to recruiting him.

10. Ruben Arturo *HERNANDEZ Garcia (A 12 911 621). Subject was an MRAC coordinator in Santa Fe, Isle of Pines. Several leads of marginal value were provided.

CAC

11. Jose *MONTALVO Urruti (A 12 911 895). Subject, a pediatrician, came to PBPRIME to visit his daughter who is in a Miami high school and to visit a patient. Subject has an invalid wife and one son currently serving in the Isle of Pines prison after he was captured at Playa Giron. Although he originally expressed an interest in working as an ODYOKE singleton in PBPRIME once he returned, he later changed his mind.

12. Tomas *OLIVERA Gandoa (A 11 266 803). Subject, a former Naval Chauffeur and member of the FND, is being debriefed on operational leads and on positive intelligence concerning the Cuban micro-wave system.

13. Valentin *PADRON (A 12 900 229). Subject, a former grocer in Las Villas, was debriefed on operational leads and positive intelligence. The leads which subject provided were considered marginal for further exploitation. Subject had planned to return to Cuba legally but was prevented from doing so for family reasons.

14. Jesus Gregorio *PEREZ, CKA 183. Subject, working an independent resistance network in Cuba, specialized in exfiltration of friends and members of his group. He offered to exfiltrate any technicians and professional people. After debriefing him, Subject was turned over to the PM Branch for exploitation.

201-325597 08 FR Re possible use of sub. by U.S. [illegible] Agency

15. Federico Gaspar *SALVADOR Rodriguez 06 Subject, a dentist from 08 Camaguey came to PBPRIME to attend the funeral of his father. He was recruited and trained in SW before he returned to Cuba. He will be used as a communications link for the AMTAUP Net.

FP

16. Gumercindo *SIMON Sanchez (A 12 911 019). Subject, a former chauffeur in Las Villas, offered to provide bona fides for contacting "Titi" MARTINEZ, 06 a communicator for Capt. Felix *TORRES, a militia commander in Remedios, Las Villas. Subject

10/nJ

06

also offered to re-infiltrate to contact (MARTINEZ). Subject could not provide sufficient detailed biographic data on 06 (MARTINEZ) with which to risk using a KUBARK internal asset to contact him. An investigation was initiated through the AMOTs to determine more biographic data so serious consideration could be given for contacting (MARTINEZ) 06

O/C

17. Manuel Felix SUAREZ Pozo (A 12 903 186). Subject, a lawyer and a former underground member in Havana, was debriefed further on operational leads. Letters to the more important members of his group have been written in an effort to establish communications and to exploit their operational potential.

NT

18. Miguel Archangel *SUAREZ Valdez (A 12 895 991). Subject, a former resistance group member, was debriefed further on operational leads and is currently expecting a courier from the resistance group leader in Havana, who allegedly has agents who have access to a Soviet COMINT station.

in Cuba

19. Miguel Angel *YANES Garcia (A 12 903 525). Subject, a former employee in the Ministry of Public Works and a member of the FND, was debriefed for operational leads and positive intelligence. Subject refused to reveal any FND assets in Cuba and he had only margianl intelligence to provide.

END OF DISPATCH

3/R

SECRET

November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC)
Encrypted AMBUD

Job # 64-239/53
File #19-124-25
Inclusive Dates: 61 thru 64
Volumes: 14

1. Description:

A organization formed in New York City on 22 March 1961 under the guidance of the U.S. Government for the purpose of unifying the various exile groups in the U.S. File smacks of exile disappointment in U.S. Government's policy which seemed to abandon plans to liberate Cuba. (See attached.) Material concerns resignations, coalitions, agreements, in-fighting, political aspirations of the various players, organizational structure and financing.

2. Findings:

WAVE 6617 (IN 98730) dated 1 April 1963:

Cable from WAVE to Headquarters. Stated that the exile colony is in an uproar over notices to the Cuban exile action leaders prohibiting travel outside of Dade County. Reaction among exiles appears universal over this issue and was anti-U.S. and anti-Kennedy. Even though notices only sent to selected leaders, the order was interpreted as applicable to all exiles and the beginning of co-existence.

LAD/JFK Task Force

Attachment:

b. UFGA 3926 dated 1 May 1962: 19-124-25

Dispatch from JMWAVE to Headquarters, which forwarded (not attached) a paper prepared within the Station on-the subject of the restructurization and revitalization of the C.R.C. Noted that "the Station had major concern with regard to the extent and scope of non-CIA support, in the clandestine field, to the CUBAN exiles and to the CUBAN underground. It would appeciate info furnished by Hqs. or other field stations."

03

(Marty Miller) -Researcher

c/pv

SECRET

MEMURANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMCANOE

Job # 65-535/28

File # 19-6-91

Dates included:

Volumes: 11

1. Description:

This project concerns U.S. contacts for a resistance group in Cuba. Support of the Unidad de Liberacion Nacional (ULN) and their plans and efforts to overthrow CASTRO. Principle players are:

AMCANOE-1	(201-0283570)	Eduardo GARCIA Molina
AMCANOE-2	(201-0726572)	Enrique Alfredo GARCIA Molina.
AMCANOE-3	(201-0727185)	Antonio Jose RAMIREZ Mendez, captured and executed in Jan 64;
AMCANOE-4	(201-0729621)	Armando SOSA Rodriguez
AMCANOE-5	(201-0727186)	Marcelino PEREZ Diez
AMCANOE-6	(201-0729610)	Orlando OROPESA Perez
AMCANOE-7	(201-0729080)	Benjamin ACOSTA Valdes, captures tried and killed by firing squad 15 Sept 63.
AMCANOE-9	(201-)	Juan AMESTOY Dominguez, killed 29 Sept 63 in a gun battle.

2. Review of these files turned up the following documents:

TDCSDB-3/654-571, dated 9 May 63: Concerns efforts of Cuban lawyer Paulino A SIERRA of Chicago to unify exiles and an offer by Chicago businessmen to support the overthrow of CASTRO.

Memo for the Record dated 3 March 1964: a friend of AMCANOE-1 who is a businessman and ship owner, with interests in a slot machine business (placing them in gambling houses), placed him in contact with elements of the underwrold, through a former St. Louis police officer. Through the police officer there was reportedly a tie-in with the Cosa Nostra. The latter reportedly offered to assassinate CASTRO at a price of $150,000 dollars.

UFGA-15233, dated 15 April 1964: Report on a Byron CAMERON who said that he represented an unidentified group of persons who had made contact with two Cuban gangsters who were willing to kill Fidel CASTRO. CAMERON reportedly was associated with a Mr. S.W. TYLER (no identifiable traces) of Caribbean Producer, Inc., Miami Springs, Fla., and Herbert F. JENNE (no traces) with the firm F.A. Johnson, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

UFGA-15954, dated 11 May 1964: CAMERON mentioned contact with unidentified group willing to assassinate selected Cuban leaders: Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO and Che GUEVARA. CAMERON made fairly clear that the MAFIA was involved.

Jane Zerance
Researcher

SECRET

February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: JMARC Program

Job # 62-705/8

File # 19-120-15/2

Dates Included: 1960-61

Volumes: 9

1. Description:

These files concerned all the support activities for the training and supply of all the infiltration forces in 1960-61.

2. Findings:

a. MASH 1470 (IN 38669) 6 Nov 60:

The deputy of Manuel ARTIME (AMBIDDY-1) reported that 06 Eduardo OJEDA Camaraza had contacted AMYUM/AMRUNG complex in Havana for help in accomplishing mission and if his bona fides were not established AMRUNG/AMYUM may arrange to kill 06 OJEDA as he was either very untrustworthy or positive CASTRO penetration/provocateur.

b. RIMM 5846, 4 June 1961:

Radio message received from agent # 84 - "Functionary Italian Embassy by the name of MORATORI says he works for one intelligence org. of yours, he says he is in contact with Martin Elena and others and that you have plans for invasion within 30 days after killing Fidel, advise if we can confide in MORATORI."

2/TJ

c. BELL.0897 (OUT 9804) 6 June 1961:

"MORATORI unknown to us. Do not confide in him. MORATORI's information of pending invasion within 30 days after killing Fidel not true. Beware of rumor mongers and provocateurs."

LAD/JFK Task Force

Chris Hopkins

Attachments: a/s

03

Researcher: (Martin Miller)

13-00000

19-120-15/2

03

DATE : 6 NOV 60

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMASH

ACTION : WH 9 (MR. ISAMINGER, WH NOTIFIED AT 1545, 6 NOV.)

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☒ None required ☐
Signature: Thompson

NOV 6 1838Z 60

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 38669

OPIM DIR INFO PRITY HAVA CITE MASH 1470

JMNET

REF A. MASH 1466 (IN 38221)

B. TRAV 0083 (IN-26165)

1. FOLL FROM MANOLIN GUILLOT (AMBIDDY-1 DEPUTY) MORNING 6 NOV:

A. FNU RECAREY 06 COUSIN OF ONE OF GUAT TRAINEES, ARRIVED MASH FROM HAVA AFTERNOON 5 NOV. SPECIFIC MISSION TO ESTABLISH BONA FIDES EDUARDO OJEDA CAMARAZA. 06

B. RECAREY 06 TOLD AMBIDDY COMPLEX MASH OJEDA 06 HAD MADE CONTACT AMYUM/AMRUNG COMPLEX HAVA FOR HELP IN ACCOMPLISHING MISSION. IN ATTEMPT ESTABLISH OWN BONA FIDES HAD TOLD PERSONAL STORY IN SOME DETAIL INCULDING MASH RECRUITMENT, TRAV TRAINING, PBPRIMER ADVISORS, NAMES OF SOME TRAINEES, MISSION IN CUBA ETC.

C. TOLD HAVA CONTRACTS NEEDED HELP BECAUSE HE NO LONGER HAD ACCESS FAMILY FINCA, OPS CLIMARE NOT WHAT HE HAD EXPECTED.

2. RECAREY 06 PLANS RETURN HAVA MORNING 7 NOV. AS SITUATION NOW STANDS:

A. MASH CAN ESTABLISH BONA FIDES THROUGH MASH AMBIDDY CONTACTS WHICH WILL GUARANTEE SOME DEGREE AMRUNG/AMYUM COOPERATION BUT AT EXPENSE CONFIRMATION ANY CLAIMS OJEDA 06 MAY HAVE MADE RE TRAINING, ETC.

COPY

FORM 4-58 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(35)

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

61P

B. IF BONA FIDES NOT ESTABLISHED AMRUNG/AMYUM MAY ARRANGE KILL (OJEDA) 06 AS EITHER VERY UNTRUSTWORTHY OR POSITIVE CASTRO PENETRATION/PROVOCATEUR.

3. PLS ADVISE AS TO DESIRED MASH ACTION OR TDY CASE OFFICER ZABOTH TO HANDLE. BELIEVE MASH CAN DELAY (RECAREY) 06 RETURN 24/48 HRS.

RE Filing (check one):
[illegible] ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

END OF MESSAGE

S/C NOTE: BEING SERVICED FOR DUPLICATE MSG NUMBER.

RI COPY

JB

3rd folder

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMBRUSH Organization

Job # 63-345/6
File # 19-5-6
Dated included: Apr 61 - Jan 62
Volumes: 1

1. Description:

Revolutionary Council Anti-Castro Security and Counter-Intelligence Team.

2. Findings:

No findings in relation to the terms of reference.

Of possible interest: A document dated 19 August 1961 source: AMPAL-1, hand carried to Hqs. from WAVE in August 1961. The document mentions "Cuban Communist penetration agents in all branches of importance of the U.S. Government" ... Mentions a possible "Castro penetration into the Frente (FRD - Revolutionary Democratic Front) and U.S. activities".

3. Other Agencies with Knowledge of this Activity:

Apparently, none.

03
(Barbara Boyle)
Researcher

02 [CDH comment: Check out Eugenio MARTINEZ again. (SL)IPSTREAM-1 said in 1976 that one Eugenio MARTINEZ was working for the Cubans. A Eugenio MARTINEZ was involved in the Watergate; a former JMWAVE Station agent.]

z|N

[illegible]
from WAVE to HQ
by Victor Wallen, Dec. 1961 Secret AmiPriz-1

2. August 19/61
Enclosed find an approximate list of expenses that (Armando Munero) 06 gave me for consideration. However, he would like to talk it over as to the rest of his stay in the U. S.

(Armando Munero) 06 enclosed a note he asked to have sent over, "La Voz d las Americas" (onda corta--short wave). This is supposed to be some sort of signal to his O. P. C. group in Cuba to get behind and cooperate with information and sabotage.---------

I did not talk to him as yet since I am awaiting word from you as t this Monday's meetings with him.-----

③ August 19/61
Jacinto Luzarraga, a friend from Cuba and former sugar mill owner, and father-in-law of Lino Fernandez (MRR, now in jail at the Isle Pines), told me that Dr. (Antonio Valdes Rodriguez) 06 (30th of Noviembr Movimiento) was taken to jail after returning to Cuba from Miami last time here, and not as yet released. Jacinto arrived here wi his wife and 3 grandchildren about 5 days ago. He was formerly a member of the famous old Cuban A B C group. It should be remembe that Dr. (Valdes) 06 received training in S/W, his last trip here.-----

④ August 19/61
Ben Volpe, now working at Holiday Tours, Biscayne Blvd., Miami, t me that his father, having come from Cuba a few days ago, told hi that Federico Claramont, 1100 10th St., Miami Beach (living close them), is a suspected member of Castro's G-2 and known as such si being in Cuba. He arrived in the U. S., Miami, as a political ex which is a cover for his true mission here, and status.------

5. August 19/61
Jacinto Luzarraga and his relative told me that it is being rumor that since only men are taken to Opa Locka by Immigration for 48 Fidel Castro is sending in many G-2 women instead of men for his clandestine operations here, between here and Cuba. I also heard rumored that some of these agents are sent to tie in with Communi in the U. S., various regions of the U. S. I have no other info. this as could not find out more since it was told to me as a rumc

6. August 19/61
(Armando Munero) 06 told me that he gets information from his uncle Guillermo Rojas, a long time Cuban Communist who is presently wo in the Imprenta Nacional at Havana. He helped (supposed to be one

5lN

Cont'd.6.-- the main) organize the library of the Communist throughout Cuba
His uncle told him that Kruschev promised Fidel Castro that he
have missles in Cuba(this was a few months ago). Also, his unc
that the Russians have spies in the Pentagon that pull for Fide
Castro, and they have already plenty of agents bel nging to the
Communists in all branches of importance of the U. S. Gov't., a
even in the CIA. He said that all people in Cuba that worked w
the CIA were picked up through their agents and those presently
working with same are being watched closely. (Munero) told me th
9 he is kind of suspicious of Eugenio, his being Cuban and because
a sort of sixth sense, as he calls it.-------------

06

⑦ August 19/61

-Bart told me last week that Juez Garceran was the one that sent
letter you received to Carlos Prio as he recognized the handwrit
on both envelopes. The above judge told Bart that some have bee
given Salvo Conductos to Mexico and that the Italian Embassy is
emptying out some. This judge is the one that made the list of
people held up in the Italian Embassy, that you received from Ba

-Bart told me that he thought that Alberto Del Junco(MDC),that I
in touch,with is getting aid from someone from the U. S. Gov't.
Del Junco's sister saw him this past Friday night at his home an
gave him $5,000.00 in U. S. Dollars(money) to send through the Po
to Cuba to be given to her brother down there. She didn't want t
disclose to Bart where and from whom she received the money, and
only said that it was from his group(MDC) here. Bart thinks that
this is not true. He sent the money down already.

-Enclosed(marked in pencil, #7) find photostatic copies of letters
sent to Oscar Diaz from former F.Castro Pres. Urrutia and from a
Macaroni that Bart knows. It is self explanatory in Spanish and
Bart says that he knows that the air strips shown on enclosed map
are truely in existence. Bart received these photostatic copies
to his suggesting same to Oscar Diaz upon delivery. I couldn't tr
this letter to you a few nights ago as he had to deliver same in a
hour of the time I visited him. However, I suggested his trying t
stand by when the letter was opened. Oscar Diaz liked Bart's idea
making photostatic copies of same and Bart asked for one for himse

(over)

Cont'd. 3.-

②

It seems that Captain Despain wants to break up the Intell.Servi
of the Frente due to lack of funds, says Dr. F'dez. However, d
having tried to find out whether this Captain Despain was Ernest
we were not sure. Having been introduced upon our 2nd visit las
Friday, 9:30 A. M.(first visit was 2 days previously at 9:30 A.M
we were presented to Ernesto Despain, the person we were looking
some time now(due to his relations with Ceferino Alvarez(G-2) an
Josefina Socarras(Ceferino's girl friend, of whom I have been wri
abo ut for some time now). We started to get places, with all fu
cooperation, the first time there as we spoke only to Dr. F'dez.
second time, with Despain present, we felt that we should not go
many details. Dr. F'dez. told us that Despain was planning on s
him with a delegation to Puerto Rico. I feel, as well as Frank,
this Dr. F'dez.(around 60 yrs. old) is a person that could very e
organize his office to be of very valuable service against Castro
his Communists here in the States, as well as in Latin America wh
they already have their own agents operating. It is felt that De
is trying to get Dr. F'dez. out of the way because he recognizes
importance of the planned Intelligence Service the Frente , throu
F'dez., xxx which could produce a very strong arm against Castro.
Dr. F'dez. says that they are now working on the ABC form as used
against a former president of Cuba known as Machado. Enclosed is
an idea of how this group functions and are placed into many walks
life of importance to this cause. Their work is mainly of Intell
Service and in a form of cooperating with the U.S.Gov't. in all wa
possible without trying to get monies, if possible, to function. H
presently trying to get donations to $300.00 to keep his office go
for a month. Upstairs in the same building, they have radio opera
(very well experienced) continuously monitoring all phases of impo
ance in Cuba(sugar mills, etc.). Frank asked Despain if the file
had in his hands was for us. Despain was caught a little off bounds
as he became somewhat unnerved, but soon rallied and opened the fil
showing data on boats, but taking great pains to keep us from seein
the contents. I didn't want to press the point arousing any suspic
Dr. F'dez. introduced me as a Joe Anderson, FBI man. I had formerl
cautioned him against referring to me as anything special, which he

(3)

Cont'd.8-----did anyway. I let it go at that to see the developments as it w
no use to refute him again. However, when we parted, I did menti
him again that he should not do so at random as I did not think i
necessary nor what we had agreed upon. Dr. F'dez. did say so as
introduced us to Despain as his Jefe(chief) and wanted to show hi
loyalty at the same time explaining to him that he was cooperatin
with us in all ways possible against Castro and Communism, which
plainly seen that Despain didn't like at all. Despain sat silent
no questions asked, hard, eyeing us as if waiting to see how far
FBI had gotten into matters of the Frente. I did not ask the Dr.
questions I wanted to and only said that I would like to be in to
with him at all times. Enclosed you will find photostatic copies
letters sent by Cubans here to Prague and the answers of same. Y
told me to ask him how he got this information. Idid not feel th
should have done so at the moment. However, I will be in touch w
Dr. F'dez. again soon as I said I would. I will not go to the of
of this Intell. again as I was almost seen by a Frank Paez, Pepe
Aguero's friend. Pepe Aguero is Paula Grau's husband, now here.
turned my head away, I think, in time. Dr. Fdez. says that he ha
of more information to give me and that loads of stuff reaches hi
daily, all of which he can turn over to me for study. He said th
will get for me CIA files that the Frente has hidden and want to
with him. I feel, if Despain, is out of the way, I could do much
getting what is needed of them. I do not feel safe with him arou
I may be wrong, but that is the way I feel about security with h
I promised to return the enclosed photostatic copies but feel tha
of the files can be taken over for copy for the asking, as Dr. F'
said he would cooperate to the fullest.

Dr. Jose Julio Fernandez: Office(9 to 11 A.M.):FR-1-5133
Home(from 8 P.M. to 8 A.M.):HI-4-1853
Frente(from 11:30 A.M. to 1 P.M.):
FR-4-2630-38-39

He holds a Frente Carnet No. 102, Frente Revolucionario Democratic
(F.R.D.), Delegacion de: El Salvador(Rescate) and receives $200.0
monthly as a salary from the Frente.

8. August 19/61

Frank Arias has given me the following information(about DESPAIN).

Captain(Lieutenant, known formerly as) Ernesto Despain, head of t Frente Intelligence Service at ~~159~~ 174 14th Lane, Miami, with entranc in back of building at 197 15th Street, off Brickell Ave., worked for with Ceferino Alvarez(G-2, known as) in Government Insurance(Segu Gobierno) and formerly in the now non-existent BANSECO(branch of National Bank of Cuba). Josefina Socarras worked with them also Seguro del Gobierno . I have written of Josefina before through findings of Frank, who knew them all in Cuba(not Despain directly, only his family). This Captain Despain is an intimate friend of Ceferino and Josefina(planning to go to New York soon). She has b trying to get something started here, as reported before. It is strongly urged that this Josefina be surveilled constantly as I, as well as Frank, think that she is affiliated with Castro's cland activities here in the States. She received monthly checks from th Centro Refugiado. Captain Despain is planning on going to join th U. S. Army. He is definitely strongly suspected of giving everyth of Intelligence to Castro and is tied in with the Communist and Cas groups here. He may even soon plan to disappear from the scene and should not be allowed to get off easily. He has been keeping Dr. Jose Julio Fernandez from organizing his anti-Castro and Anti-Commi files due to lack of funds(says Despain). It seems that this was ju an excuse before and was done to keep the ball functioning as shoul be. I think that this Dr. Jose Julio Fernandez is very sincere an is innocently giving everything into the hands of Despain without knowing. How Despain got into this position is not known by us yet. As far as we are concerned he is a Castro penetration into the Frent and U. S. activities.

The above is the result of being sent to see Dr. Jose Julio Fernande head of Intelligence Servence of the Frente(as told us by Former Cuban Grl. Socallanes, friend of Frank). I went with Frank to try t find out about a woman whose son(one of two of them) had taken data and pictures for Castro of all (MOST) military and naval installations in t State of Florida.

cautioned him against referring to me as anything special, which he

Cont'd.8--- Enclosed find the groups belonging to the Frente that was writt for me by this Dr. F'dez.

Enclosed find(#8 marked)"Reporte and Informe"(2 sheets) given me Dr. F'dez. to show what they are doing now.

Dr. D'dez. informed me of the following:

(a). A Communist militant; Alberto Iglesias, 425 Cedar Lane, E Meadow, New York(Phones:IV-1-4368 and IV-6-4547). He is a Resident of the U. S. for more than 20 years. He has his business,"American Welding and Boiler Works Co.". This i man to be watched as he even uses his business as a front.

(b). Mario Garcia, Miami Ventilated Awning Co., Inc.(works at); presently asking Immigration permission to go to Cuba and considered as one of Fidel Castro's heads here with a gre many ties.

Enclosed find a break down of expenses of the Frente Intell. Offi given me by Dr. F'dez., my asking him for same. Frank Aries is helping the Dr. get funds for the maintenance of this office for least another month. I think that this set up should be taken i study. --------

9. August 21/61

Enclosed find marked #9, 2 documents, given me by Emanuel Carvaja last night which are self-explanatory in Spanish. One is a list exiles in their Costa Rican Embassy in Havana, and the other is a document(copy) signed and given today to the Minister of Foreign Relations of Cuba in Havana. It seems that there was very much discussions concerning same amongst the foreign diplomats in Cuba The Egyptian Embassador(RAU:Syria, etc.) went to the first meetin the diplomats had in Habana concerning the new monetary exchanges He first agreed strongly with the rest and promised to sign the enclosed type document concerning the new $ exchange in Cuba. T first meeting was held last Monday, Aug.13th, and they met again a second time on Thursday in order to sign. He(name not known by Carvajal) then refused to sign and did not even show up which indi ted to the remainder of the diplomats that his money must have bee exchanged in the full amount to keep him off the list of signature The Swiss Charge D'Affairs informed at the same meeting, to the Diplomats, that he received information from his Government that t Swiss Gov't. was checking all present Cuban bank accountants exist in Switzerland and were readying themselves to act accordingly in case the Cuban Gov't. should not reach any agreement in regards to the exchange with the Diplomats.

Cont'd. 9-- - The Japanese Embassador said he informed his Gov't. about these difficulties as a protest against the behavior of the Cuban Gov' This he told at the Diplomatic meeting.

- About a week ago, there was a hunger strike at the Brazilian Emb by the exiles there. However, they gave up as a gesture to only obedience to the Embassador. They protested against not receivi salvo conductos and other things.
- This coming week, Monday or Tuesday, the Diplomats again are get together at a meeting to protest before the Cuban Gov't. about t lax and ~~purposefull~~ designing ways of handling this affair, and remind the Gov't. of their obligations in extending the courtesy according International agreements.
- Carvajal asked me not to mention this, but later said that he informed us about Embassador Quiros leaving Havana this Thursday as he was being recalled by the Costa Rican Gov't. for consultati Carvajal will be in charge of the Embassy for the time, but said he didn't expect the Embassador to return as he is taking his fa and house hold items.

He also told me again that Eduardo Odio, Costa Rican Consul in Havana, was a person not to be trusted by many experiences they h already had with him.

– DO NOT MENTION CROWN NOW!

06

{(ARMANDO MORALES) WIFE CALLED LAST NIGHT SAYING HE ENTERED CUBA THROUGH AIRPORT WITHOUT ANY MISHAPS! HE AND SHE WERE TOLD TO INFORM ME OF SAME!)

I have money for him? if you want to give it to him

~~[illegible] mention~~

– Thurs. or Sat - [illegible]

ARG-MEX-CR- [illegible]

to [illegible]

JPW

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ACTION: C/WE 2 (WE NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1400 22 APR 63 UG)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, C/SAS 5, S/C 2

S E C R E T 221452Z 15-26 15-6

OPIM DIR INFO PRITY (HAMB) (FRAN) CITE (HAGU) 3698 IN22804

15-20

RYBAT KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMLEG

22 APR 1963

REF DIR 33866

1. REF DISCUSSED BY STA WITH EDMENT AND WARMBOLD. DUE INABILITY AND UNDESIRABILITY (USING 24 LIAISON) AND LACK OF INDEPENDENT ASSETS WITH ACCESS TO CUBAN SHIPS, ONLY POSSIBILITY IMPLEMENT REF AT THIS TIME BY USE OF AMLEGS. IF SUCCESSFUL OP MOUNTED, ASSUME FOLL POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES ALREADY CONSIDERED BY HQS:

A. UNLESS ACTION TAKEN ON NUMBER OF CUBAN VESSELS AT ROUGHLY SAME TIME AMLEGS USED FOR ANY SPORADIC ACTIONS ON ONLY SOME SHIPS WILL PROBABLY BE RELUCTANT CONTINUE ACTIVITIES FOR KUBARK. IN GENERAL BELIEVE AMLEGS WILLING COOPERATE THIS EFFORT ONLY IF THEY CONVINCED IT PART OF "FINAL EFFORT" OVERTHROW CASTRO. (AMLEGS 12 AND 29 EXPRESSED GENERAL DISILLUSIONMENT OVER ODYOKE RESTRICTIONS SIMILAR ACTION BY EMIGREES IN PBPRIME AND FOUND IT DIFFICULT RECONCILE OUR REQUEST FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE THIS OP WITH APPARENT ODYOKE POLICY STOP OTHERS FROM CARRYING OUT SIMILAR ACTIVITY.)

B. IF CASTRO GOVT SUSPECTS SABOTAGE, LIKELY HE WILL ATTEMPT REPRISALS IN SIMILAR KIND AGAINST WESTERN CARRIERS, SUCH AS PAA FLIGHTS. ALSO, CUBAN G-2 LIKELY ATTEMPT MAJOR EFFORT BREAK AMLEG COMPLEX (WHICH WILL BE SUSPECTED) AND MAY TAKE REPRISALS AGAINST KUBARKERS ODACID INSTALLATIONS THEREBY IDENTIFIED.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

C. IF 11 DUTCH AUTHORITIES SUSPECT SABOTAGE OPS ORIGINATED 10 ROTTERDAM, IN SINGLE INSTANCE POSSIBILITY EXISTS CONVINCE THEM CUBAN EMIGREE GROUP AND NOT KUBARK INVOLVED, BUT AS SIMILAR ACTIONS CARRIED OUT IN FUTURE HIGHLY UNLIKELY THEY WOULD ACCEPT THIS PLOY. ALSO, ALMOST CERTAIN 11 DUTCH AUTHORITIES WOULD DRASTICALLY INCREASE SECURITY IN PORT AREA WHEN CUBAN VESSELS HERE, THUS MAKING FUTURE CONTACT ANY AMLEGS VERY DIFFICULT. SIMILAR SITUATION MIGHT OBTAIN 11 BELGIAN AND 11 GERMAN PORTS AS CONSEQUENCE. (DUTCH INTEL AND SECURITY SERVICES HIGHLY AWARE KUBARK KEEN INTEREST DUE 24 TO THEIR HEAVY INVOLVEMENT OTHER ACTIONS AGAINST CUBAN TARGET.)

2. RE SPECIFIC ACTION AGAINST 99 HAVANA #14 OB (WHICH ARRIVED ROTTERDAM 19 APR AND DEPARTING DIRECT TO HAVA 26 APR), SABOTAGE RAISED BY WARMBOLD AND EDMENT WITH AMLEGS 12 AND 29 WITH FOLL RESULTS:

A. AMLEG 12 IS OBVIOUSLY RELUCTANT TAKE PART SABOTAGE ACTION UNLESS ASSURED MANY OTHER COUNTRYMEN CARRYING OUT SAME TYPE ACTION OTHER AREAS. HE NOT WILLING TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT CAUSE DEATH ANY CREW MEMBER. HE DISTURBED BY RECENT NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS ODYOKE POLICY AND WANTS CLARIFICATION PURPOSE SABOTAGE ACTION. HE NOT INTERESTED ACTION IF IT PART OF GENERAL HARASSMENT CAMPAIGN NOT CONNECTED TO MAJOR ODYOKE PLAN OF ACTION. BELIEVE POSSIBLE HE WOULD BE MORE AMENABLE IF SOME INDICATIONS SUCH A PLAN OCCURRED PRIOR HIS NEXT VOYAGE.

B. AMLEG 29 APPEARED GENUINELY INTERESTED PERFORMING INTERNAL SABOTAGE ON SHIP BUT 06 AS CHIEF ENGINEER WOULD REQUIRE COLLABORATOR 24 IN ENGINE ROOM SINCE HE DOES NOT TAKE 24 REGULAR ENGINE ROOM DUTY AND HIS PRESENCE 24 THERE ALWAYS FOR SPECIFIC INSPECTION WHICH OBSERVED BY MEN WHO ARE ON DUTY. HIS MOTHER IN PBRUMEN ON VERGE NERVOUS BREAKDOWN AND ACTION HIS PART NOW WOULD REQUIRE HIS IMMEDIATE

12/PN

DEFECTION WHICH HE NOT WILLING DO BECAUSE OF MOTHER. IF ANOTHER
24
ENGINE ROOM AMLEG TRANSFERRED HIS SHIP PRIOR NEXT VOYAGE HE WOULD BE WILLING CAUSE SERIOUS DAMAGE WHICH COULD PLAUSIBLY BE EXPLAINED AS NATURAL ACCIDENT OR BREAKDOWN.

3. BELIEVE AMLEG 29 WOULD POSSIBLY BE WILLING TO PLANT FOUR-HOUR DELAY EXPLOSIVE "CLAM" TO ONE OF 34 DRUMS OF "TETRAHYDROFURAN" WHICH TO BE LOADED ON DECK. MANIFEST LISTS SUBSTANCE AS HAVING FLASH POINT OF MINUS 20 DEGREES CENTIGRADE. CLAM WOULD BE PLANTED AFTER SHIP ARRIVES HOME PORT. HAVE NOT DISCUSSSED THIS ACTION WITH AMLEG 29 YET. PLS ADVISE OPIM PRIOR NEXT MEETING WITH AMLEG 29 WHICH SCHEDULED EVENING 23 APRIL. AMLEG 9 SHIP WILL DEPART
24
FOR HAVANA 26 APRIL. 15-6

5. EDMENT REMAINING HAGU PENDING REPLY.

6. SINCE OBVIOUS UNPREDICTABLE, SERIOUS AND FAR REACHING LOCAL CONSEQUENCES CAN FLOW FROM ANY STAGE IMPLEMENTATION REF ACTION, REQUEST COMMENT RE ANY INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO CHIEF OF MISSION RE THIS MATTER OR GUIDANCE TO BE FOLLOWED IN BRIEFING HIM BY STA PRIOR ENGAGING IN REF TYPE PROGRAM.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *APPROVAL HAD BEEN GRANTED FOR SABOTAGE OF CUBAN SHIPS.

3/17

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1035, 22 APR JEV)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 221152Z

OPIM DIR INFO PRISY WAVE (FRAN) KAUS CITE [illegible]

RYBAT TYPIC (CALL

15-20 15-26 20-6

22 APR 63 IN 22657

21 10

1. AMLEB 29 MET (IN ROTT BY VARMBOLD AND AMLEB 1 ON 20 APR. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT RECRUIT IDEN A AS PLANNED BECAUSE IDEN B TOLD HIM IDEN A IS NOW BEING WATCHED CLOSELY DUE HIS RECENT ATTEMPTS TO RESIGN FROM MILITARY. A 29 HAD NO FREE TIME TO SEE AND MAKE OWN ASSESSMENT IDEN A SITUATION DUE SERIOUS ILLNESS MOTHER AND HIS REQUIRED PRESENCE ABOARD SHIP DURING REPAIRS.)

08

2. INFO IN REF OBTAINED BY AMLEB 29 FROM IDEN C. REQUEST TRACES. SHE IS FORMER GIRL FRIEND OF AMLEB 29 AND PARENTS ARE NEIGHBORS. SHE VERY ACTIVE IN RESISTANCE GROUP WHOSE NAME SOUNDS LIKE "FRENTE LIBERACION NACIONAL - FRENTE LIBERACION ESCAMBRAY." A 29 SEES HER IN HAVANA EACH TIME HOME ALTHOUGH SHE SPENDS CIRCA TWO OF EVERY THREE WEEKS WITH GRANDPARENT IN MATANZAS.

3. A 29 CERTAIN IDEN C WOULD ACCEPT RECRUITMENT BY HIM TO WORK WITH ODYOKE. VARMBOLD SEEING HIM AGAIN EVENING 23 APR. REQUEST OPIM PERMISSION PRIOR NEXT MEETING WITH A 29 TO INSTRUCT HIM TO RECRUIT IDEN C, TRAIN AND GIVE HER SW AND ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED FOR IDEN A.

SECRET

GROUP 1

6/pd

13-00000

Amy

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1035, 22 APR LIG)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 221152Z

CPIN DIR INFO PRITY WAVE FRAN MADR CITE (MAGU) 3696

22 APR 1963 IN22624

RYBAT TYPIC (CALL)

REF MAGU 3695 (IN 22657)

IDEN A: (ANTONIO CONCEPCION.)

IDEN B: (MANUEL JUSTO RUINOS), BROTHER-IN-LAW OF (ANTONIO CONCEPCION). SEE PREVIOUS INFO ON (RUINOS) FROM AMLEG 29.

IDEN C: (NORMA FLORES), DOB CIRCA 39, RESIDES WITH MOTHER AND FATHER AT (CALLE NO. 18332, ENTRE PRIMERA Y SEGUNDA, RESIDENCIAL MONTERREY, SAN MIGUEL DEL PADRON, GUANABACOA,) HABANA. RESIGNED FROM JOB AS TEACHER IN (UNIVERSITY OF VILLANOVA IN HAVANA IN 62.) HAD PBPRIME VISA PRIOR BLOCKADE BUT BLOCKADE NULLIFIED CHANCE TO LEAVE. FATHER FORMER (SERGEANT IN BATISTA ARMY) NOW GARDENER. SISTER, (NANCY FLORES), DOB CIRCA 36, IS OFFICE CLERK IN (LA ISLA DE CUBA DEPARTMENT) STORE, HAS APPLIED FOR PBPRIME VISA. GRANDFATHER AND UNCLE LIVE IN MATANZAS.

SECRET

copy

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWN-

14/R/

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMLEO
Unsuccessful Exfiltration Attempt by M/V ADA, 9-12 May 1964

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: None, FYI

References:
A. BARR-1606, dated 13 May 1964
B. BARR-1607, dated 13 May 1964
C. WAVE-6458, dated 13 May 1964
D. WAVE-6433, dated 13 May 1964
E. WAVE-6463, dated 13 May 1964
F. BARR-1612, dated 14 May 1964
G. BARR-1614, dated 14 May 1964
H. BARR-1619, dated 15 May 1964
I. UFGA-15986, dated 20 May 1964
J. WAVE-6844, dated 21 May 1964
K. UFKA- 130, dated 14 May 1964

GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. During the past year and a half AMLEO-3 has been placated, and kept under control, by the continuous effort of KUBARK to assist him in obtaining asylum for his wife and family in a third country diplomatic installation in Cuba. Since the failure of the last asylum attempt for Mrs. AMLEO-3 in March 1964, as reported in reference I, and the refusal of Mrs. AMLEO-3 to even consider taking asylum without advance guarantees of a salvo conducto; AMLEO-3 lost what little optimism he had remaining for a safe method of bringing his wife and children out of Cuba. After the failure of the asylum attempt in March 1964, Mrs. AMLEO-3 again renewed her attack upon AMLEO-3 by phone and letter, urging him to rescue her by any means at his disposal, and by her efforts she has successfully convinced him that his family will escape only if she can arrange an exfiltration mounted from inside the island, or if AMLEO-3 sends someone to get her or comes himself to exfiltrate her and their children. Up until recently the C/O has been able to persuade AMLEO-3 that undertakings of this nature were foolhardy unless carried out by trained maritime assets skilled in clandestine infiltration and exfiltration, and equipped with the proper vessels and support to carry out the mission successfully. Now that the KUBARK asylum efforts have been discontinued, and AMLEO-3 is aware that KUBARK will not sponsor any maritime

Continued.....

CS COPY

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

Distribution:
3 | WHSA

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
25 May 1964

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 2 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-15995

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-75/3
19-6-75/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-15995

exfiltration attempts to rescue his family, he has decided that he would prefer to terminate his relationship with KUBARK so that he can carry out such exfiltration attempts on his own in a completely independent manner.

2. Since November 1963, JMWAVE has noted in all AMLEO progress reports that Mrs. AMLEO-3 was dabbling in exfiltration attempts inside Cuba, and has also successfully managed to pry funds out of AMLEO-3 in attempts to buy her way into such efforts. As a result AMLEO-3 has borrowed money from AMSHED-1 and family relatives in the U.S. attempting to support his wife in these attempts, and is now in debt to these individuals to the tune of $4-$5,000.00. On 5 May 1964, AMLEO-3 informed his C/O that he had recently heard from his wife via the (Japanese diplomatic courier channel) and in her letter she had told him that she planned to participate in an exfiltration attempt from inside the island the weekend of 10 May 1964. AMLEO-3 requested the C/O to alert QKMAGNET to this attempt, and said that he expected to have confirmation of the attempt by 1900 hours on 10 May 1964. Nothing was heard from AMLEO-3 the night of 10 May 1964, but the following morning, at 0840 hours 11 May 1964, AMLEO-3 contacted the C/O and gave him the following information:

> "The exfiltration of my family will begin on the night of 11 May 1964, and the group will consist of some 11 adults and children. They plan to depart from Playa de Guanabo, between Havana and Matanzas, during the night of 11 May 1964 and expect to arrive in Key West, Florida sometime on 12 May 1964."

AMLEO-3 claimed he knew nothing about what type of boat the group planned to use, nor the exact time of departure, route the boat would follow, etc. It was not until 13 May 1964, that AMLEO-3 mentioned to Bruce P. VEDDER and Leon C. FLUTEO, during a routine operational meeting, that he had sponsored and masterminded the aborted exfiltration operation, and that the operation had been mounted from the U.S., and not from inside the island, as he had previously claimed to the C/O.

3. On 14 May 1964, the C/O contacted AMLEO-3 and requested an explanation of his sponsorship of the exfiltration operation. AMLEO-3 claimed he no longer felt bound to confide these activities on his part to KUBARK, since KUBARK had refused to continue its effort to rescue his wife and family from Cuba, and furthermore that he would continue such unilateral exfiltration efforts with or without KUBARK help until he either rescued his family from Cuba, or died in his attempts to do so. AMLEO-3 claims he organized the trip of the M/V ADA by passing himself off as a PBPRIMER, and utilized the following individuals in the operation.

A. Mario REMIS, probably identical with Mario REMIS-CAMEJO, A-12 834 780; PDOB, Havana, Cuba on 6/20/23; who formerly resided at Calle 130A, #36506, Wajay, Marianao, Havana, Cuba; came to the U.S. from Cuba in August 1962 departing from Guanabo by small boat with five other Cuban refugees. AMLEO-3 claims he used this individual as his principal organizer in the expedition, and REMIS had agreed to go into Cuba acting as a guide and leader of the group. REMIS had previously resided in an area close to AMLEO-3's home in Wajay, Cuba and had agreed to go to A-3's home and bring his family out. REMIS did recruit and organize the boat crew, but at the last minute supposedly was unable to make the trip because of other committments and instead turned his responsibilities over to the next individual Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos.

B. Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos is the owner of the M/V ADA, and brought the boat out from Cuba in his escape in November 1963. Since REMIS could not make the trip, he and A-3 reportedly briefed RODRIGUEZ on the location of A-3's home in Wajay, and supplied him with a recent photograph of Mrs. AMLEO-3 and her children, and AMLEO-3 wrote a bona fides message in his own handwriting on the back of the photograph and also listed his home address without revealing (he says the true name of his wife. (This photograph was brought back by RODRIGUEZ and returned to AMLEO-3). RODRIGUEZ then reportedly agreed to lead the infiltration mission, and personally contact AMLEO-3's family and the family of Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla in Guines, Cuba and take them to the exfiltration point. RODRIGUEZ also planned to bring out his fiancee, and the other boat crew members had agreed to bring out one or two relatives each, the total number of passengers was not supposed to exceed 15 persons.

C. Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, Romelio LOPEZ Sosa, and AMBIG-4 were recruited by RODRIGUEZ for the mission, and supposedly AMLEO-3 did not have contact with them prior to the mission, nor were they witting that he was one of the sponsors of the mission. AMBIG-4 was to bring out his father, mother, sister, younger brother, and his own and LOPEZ's fiancees; BLANCO his wife and daughter; RODRIGUEZ, his fiancee, and the wives and children of AMLEO-3 and Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla. AMLEO-3 has never been informed by his C/O that AMBIG-4 was a KUBARK asset, and AMLEO-3 has never indicated in any way that he knew AMBIG-4 was a KUBARK asset. Since the boat in question, the M/V ADA, was not equipped with a radio set, AMBIG-4 was obviously not desired for use as a radio operator by the group.

4. AMLEO-3 informed the C/O that he had previously warned his wife that something was to happen the weekend of 10 May 1964, and that someone would be coming to see her with bona fides from him. Mrs. AMLEO-3 also was instructed to supply this contact man with all the pesos she had at her disposal, since the infiltrees reportedly were able to take in only $170.00 worth of pesos with them. Since the abort of the mission, Mrs. AMLEO-3 has talked to A-3 by phone at least three times, and she claims no one ever contacted her; that no one has bothered her since the failure of the mission; and that she is reportedly not under control or surveillance by the Cuban Intelligence Services.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF UNSUCCESSFUL EXFILTRATION MISSION OF M/V ADA

4 May - 8 May 1964

5. During this period the gasoline, food, and other necessities were purchased along with four sets of green fatigues which the group bought in a local Army/Navy store. They were also equipped with two Colt .45 Cal pistols, one P-38 pistol, one Browning automatic .38 Cal pistol, and 250 rounds of ammunition for the four weapons. These weapons were taken on the mission for self defense purposes only. The boat, the M/V ADA, was located at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Florida.

9 May 1964

6. On 9 May 1964, at approximately 1800 hours, the M/V ADA departed from Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Fla for Cuba. The crew was made up of Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos, Rogelio LOPEZ Sosa, Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, and AMBIG-4. The M/V ADA was enroute to Cuba during the remainder of 9 May 1964, and nothing unusual reportedly occurred during the voyage.

10 May 1964

7. The infiltration crew arrived in Cuba at a point approximately ½ mile east of Playa Guanabo on 10 May 1964 at 1625 hours. There was no beach per se at this spot but reefs from 6 to 9 feet high They had difficulty mooring the boat because the water was turbulent at the base of the reefs. In broad daylight, all four went ashore and walked across the highway 'Via Blanca'. There were several empty trenches between the highway and the coast line, but the group could detect no vigilance in the area. LOPEZ was left hidden in the bushes near the highway, while the other three proceeded into Guanabo to 06 meet RODRIGUEZ' contact. (in the CAC debriefing LOPEZ named one Paulo MARTINEZ as RODRIGUEZ' contact in Guanabo. AMLABEL-1 states he asked the name of this contact several times, but each time LOPEZ

maintained that he did not know. AMLEO-3 also refused to tell the C/O who the inside contact man in Guanabo was for the group. LOPEZ may have let the name slip during his CAC debriefing, or else fabricated a name.)

8. LOPEZ began to count cars to while away the time. During the period 1630-1900 hours LOPEZ counted 38 6X6 type trucks with approximately 50 militia each, all travelling in the direction of Matanzas. One other truck, containing about 15 negroes and 6 whites, who LOPEZ states were not Cubans, was observed going in the same easterly direction. LOPEZ states that the traffic was unusually heavy in both directions. RODRIGUEZ returned about 1900 and he and LOPEZ went back to the boat. RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that he had been able to get transportation for both AMBIG-4 and BLANCO; AMBIG-4 to Quivican and BLANCO to Artemisa where their respective families are located. RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ took the boat out about a mile, shut off the engine and went to sleep. (The above information in para 8 is the version AMLABEL-1 obtained from LOPEZ.)

9. In the AMLEO-3 version of this period, again acquired from LOPEZ, AMLEO-3 reported the following activity: Upon his return to the boat about 1900 hours, RODRIGUEZ saw LOPEZ and told him to wait and then RODRIGUEZ returned to Guanabo to see his fiance and reportedly to establish contact with friends of A-3 in the GOC. A-3 would not say how these contacts were carried out, but due to the time factor it is assumed they could only have been done by phone. A-3 claims the contacts were as follows:

A. A high level civilian official of the GOC, with the rank of Comandante probably in MINCONS, who is willing to collaborate with the Rebel Army in exile, and willing to furnish their infiltrated agents with official GOC vehicles to travel anywhere in the provinces of Havana, Pinar del Rio, or Matanzas in order to carry out their missions.

B. Some unnamed high level Cuban military officers.

A-3 claims that these officials are willing to listen to the Rebel Army exiles, but do not intend to do anything positive with them unless they demonstrate their power by eliminating AMTHUG-1, or carrying out some type of strong action that would prove they had strong outside backing. AMLEO-3 stated that he would be more than willing to collaborate with KUBARK in furthering contact with these unnamed individuals if KUBARK would support him in a future exfiltration to rescue his family from Cuba. AMLEO-3 refused to provide any further information relative to these supposed inside contacts of his. AMLEO-3 states that RODRIGUEZ returned to the boat about 2330 hours on 10 May 1964, and then he and LOPEZ boarded the boat and went out to sea for the night. A-3 also stated that LOPEZ told him that at least eight local fisherman dropped by to look at the boat while it remained at the reef, and nothing was done to insure the cooperation of the fishermen nor did LOPEZ attempt to hold them at the spot to prevent their informing on the infiltration to local security authorities.

11 May 1964

10. After putting out to sea, RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ slept during the night and awoke the next morning, 11 May, at about 1130 hours to find themselves directly across from the city of Matanzas. They returned to the Guanabo area about 2030 hours. (LOPEZ said the boat would only do about 4 to 6 knots). They took the boat back close to the original landing place, waited to see some light signals indicating all was clear, and when they didn't see them they decided to go in anyway and investigate. When approximately 20 yards off shore, they were fired upon by automatic weapons and a spotlight came on searching for them. The boat party was not hit by the fire and retreated to the open sea.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-15995

11. The boat then travelled east for approximately two to three miles down the coast from Guanabo, and they attempted to land on the beach again. Due to large rocks and heavy surf they decided not to attempt a landing and instead anchored the boat beyond the surf line (about 30 yards out) and both RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ swam into the beach. RODRIGUEZ went inland and caught a bus to Guanabo, and they went back to the safehouse of Paulo MARTINEZ 06 At the safehouse he found the pickup team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4, and some 28 people whom they had acquired as passengers. These passengers were all relatives of BLANCO and AMBIG-4, and BLANCO and AMBIG-4 told RODRIGUEZ they had been unable to locate the homes of Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla and AMLEO-3 and therefore had not been able to contact these families. They then returned the bona fides photos and messages to RODRIGUEZ to take back to AMLEO-3 and GOMEZ. (AMLEO-3 commented bitterly on this point stating that AMBIG-4 and BLANCO probably went to their own homes first, and after seeing the number of their relatives who wanted to come, never even tried to find his home nor that of GOMEZ.) RODRIGUEZ, AMBIG-4, and BLANCO agreed upon another exfiltration point to the east of Guanabo, and arranged recognition signals. RODRIGUEZ then returned to the boat, leaving AMBIG-4 and BLANCO to convoy the passengers in three cars to the exfiltration point.

12. RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ arrived at the exfiltration point about 30 minutes after the appointed hour of 2300, and halted the boat about 100 meters offshore. They saw a light on top of the reef at which point RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that the light was the proper signal. (When asked about the recognition signals, LOPEZ stated that he did not know what the exact signals were, but that they involved 2 or 3 lights and an exchange of names. He maintains that RODRIGUEZ handled all these details). They brought the boat right up to the reef at which point they were fired upon from the top of the cliffs from the directi of the highway. (AMLABEL-1 asked LOPEZ how they had planned to get women and children down these steep cliffs. LOPEZ replied that the difficulties involved had not occurred to them. By the same token, they had no extra food on board the boat to feed the families.)

13. RODRIGUEZ shouted to LOPEZ to jump overboard to use the boat as protection against the rifle fire. LOPEZ states that RODRIGUE was hit as he jumped overboard. RODRIGUEZ could not swim because of his shoulder wound. On RODRIGUEZ' command, LOPEZ (who by this time had RODRIGUEZ around his neck) started to swim toward shore. LOPEZ decided this avenue of escape was foolish, and turned back toward the boat. LOPEZ pulled RODRIGUEZ aboard. He then claims that the rifle (FAL) and machine gun fire was redirected, at this point, in toward land rather than out to sea toward their boat. LOPEZ states that this diversion was the only thing which saved them.

14. LOPEZ started the motor and was proceeding north when he saw the signal lights of 6 or 7 small boats ringed in a semi-circle in front of his boat. LOPEZ apprised RODRIGUEZ (laid out flat on the deck) of this new development. Even though bleeding and barely conscious RODRIGUEZ asked LOPEZ if he could see the lights of Matanzas City. LOPEZ said he could. RODRIGUEZ advised him to head toward Matanzas hugging the coastline. The patrol craft (or fishing boats) had since extinguished their lights. LOPEZ followed his advice and several hours later arrived off Matanzas City having eluded the patrol craft. RODRIGUEZ then told LOPEZ to turn the boat to the left until the compass showed "N", straighten out and follow that course to Key West. Three or four of the gas tanks had been pierced by the barrage, and there was barely enough gas left to make it to Key West. Their last remaining water tank was also shot up. They arrived at approximately 1730 hours at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Fla. on 12 May 1964.

15. Upon arrival in Key West, Fla, RODRIGUEZ was hospitalized and X-Ray pictures disclosed that the bullet had entered above his right shouder blade and came out on his right side and penetrated thro his arm. He had four cracked ribs, and it appeared that his right lung was not punctured, but there was some blood between his lung and the pleura and the Subject was operated on successfully the morning

of 13 May 1964. RODRIGUEZ has since been moved to Miami, and is now hospitalized at Mount Sinai hospital, Miami, Florida. His condition is now satisfactory.

AFTER ACTION REPORTS

16. After the abortive exfiltration attempt by the M/V ADA, various relatives of people involved began to receive telephone calls and telegrams from Cuba reporting on the arrest or safety of various individuals. The following excerpts were taken from various BARR cabl and debriefings of Romelio LOPEZ Sosa and AMLEO-3:

A. On 13 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 visited Tomas RODRIGUEZ Fuentes, of 1021 Margaret Street, Key West, former Captain with the National Police in Havana who had received a telegram from his daughte Elsa OLIVERA, at 0920 hours 13 May 1964. (She was supposed to have co out with BLANCO and AMBIG-4 in the exfiltration). The telegram stated (English translation) "Congratulations, we are well, love to all, embrace. Your daughter.", and supposedly indicated the daughter was safe.

B. On 14 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 was told by Daniel RODRIGUE Santos that Valentin BLANCO, relative of Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, had received three telegrams from Cuba: the first on 10 May stated "Armando arrived all is well" ; the second on 11 May stated, "Armando departed, all is well"; and the third on 13 May stated, "Yesterday's cable no good, Armando admitted or hospitalized", meaning Armando BLANCO had been picked up by Cuban authorities.

C. On 14 May 1964, AMLEO-3 called the C/O and informed him that the 14 year old son of Mario REMIS (see para 3 A above) had called his father in Miami at 1130 hours that same date, and told him he had been arrested along with his mother and some other people while trying to leave Cuba, and that the police had let the children free, but continued to hold the adults under arrest. Reportedly only one car had been picked up near the exfiltration point, and the people in the other two cars had supposedly escaped arrest for the time being As of 23 May 1964, no other information has been reported to KUBARK on the fate of BLANCO, AMBIG-4, or the passengers who were at the exfiltration point.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON TRIP OF THE M/V ADA

17. As noted in paragraph 8 of reference J, various operational inconsistencies still exist in the account submitted above re the exfiltration trip of the M/V ADA to Cuba. WAVE is of the opinion that some of these inconsistencies can be attributed to genuine confusion of facts by the principal source of information, Rogelio LOPEZ Sosa, (who did not see the infiltration team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4 again after their infiltration inland), and the withholding of facts by AMLEO-3 who considers this activity was his own personal business and had nothing to do with KUBARK. Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos is probably more knowledgeable of exactly what occurred during the infiltration, but due to his illness AMSWIRL-1 was not able to interrogate him in Key West, and reportedly RODRIGUEZ is still very ill and KUBARK does not consider it worthwhile to attempt an interrogation of him at this time. It is also believed that RODRIGUEZ will withhol information he considers privileged, and it has been noted that AMLEO-3's principal organizer of the expedition, Mario REMIS, has been visiting RODRIGUEZ daily in Mount Sinai hospital in Miami, Fla. Since the two infiltrees, BLANCO and AMBIG-4, are either under arrest or in hiding it is doubtful that their inside activities relative to AMLEO-3's family etc., will ever be completely clarified.'

18. As noted in paragraph 9 of reference J, AMLEO-3 continues to look for methods whereby he may exfiltrate his family from Cuba, and has reached the point where he is no longer rational in his reasoning re the risk factors to himself or his family. AMLEO-3 is

definitely acting out of desperation, and although he does not desire to burn all his KUBARK bridges behind him, he feels that he must since KUBARK will not permit him to undertake such activities while under ou control. WAVE's position on the matter has been fully stated in paragraph 9 of reference J. On 22 May 1964 WAVE requested BARR to contact AMSWIRL-1 and inform him that KUBARK was desirous of having him insure that the M/V ADA was not permitted to carry out further family rescue missions to Cuba at this time.

Anthony B.
Andrew K. REUTEMAN

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

Rpt on [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT RYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMLILAC
Report on Activities of AMWORLD

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : NONE.

1. AMLILAC/33 obtained the following information from IDEN A and IDEN B, former members of the AMWORLD Group. The date of the information is mid-july 1964.

a. IDEN A was an instructor in a commando section headed by IDEN C, in a camp located near IDEN D. He was given the job of instruction in the AR-15 and AR-10 rifles. Since no manuals were available he had to use the book, Small Arms of the World. The men in IDEN C's command are unhappy because they do not trust the planning judgement of IDEN C. The second in command, IDEN E, is so hated by the men that when IDEN C leaves the camp he has to take IDEN E with him.

b. The Intelligence Chief of AMWORLD is IDEN F. He maintains that the prerequisite for men in the INTEL section is personal loyalty to AMBIDDY/1. At one time a PBPRIMER, who works with AMBIDDY/1, presented IDEN F with a list of men for duty in the Intel section. IDEN F accepted the list and the men but after the PBPRIMER left he transferred the men to other sections. Recently IDEN F arrested a man in the Group and charged him as a spy for AMBANG/1. The man was physically beaten and jailed. Later IDEN F admitted he made a mistake, released the man, gave him several hundred dollars and told him to forget the incident.

CONTINUED

Attachment: U/S/C
3 cys, IDENS

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee w/att U/S/C

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
3 Sept 64

DATE DISPATCHED
SEP 10 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-17603

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

c. The Navy section is composed of a Chief, IDEN G, Chief of Operations, IDEN H, and Assistant Chief of Operations, IDEN I. The morale of the ship's crews is low and many of them state that they will jump ship at the first port of call. A large powered barge is anchored at the Navy Base and contains all the arms, and ammunition. There is a staging base in IDEN J. A new base of ships is being set up in IDEN K along with an airstrip. Teams for operations will be flown to this base from IDEN J, go by ship on the operation, return to this base, and then fly back to IDEN J.

d. For operational briefings AMWORLD uses the same photos KUBARK uses (The men who have worked for KUBARK and AMWORLD are aware of this.).

e. AMBIDDY/1 spends most of his time flying around Central America in a light plane. He has hired IDEN L, a free lance PBRUMEN photographer, to film the camps and activities and to publicize AMWORLD.

f. IDEN M stated that AMBIDDY/1 acknowledged that he planned one operation per month for the next 3 months and then make an all out push with the guerrilla teams. IDEN M commented that if things did not improve AMWORLD would not be in existence 3 months from now.

g. AMWORLD has 3 large houses in the capital of IDEN J for recreation. Small groups are escorted to these houses from the camps. There is no limit to expenses for drinking and eating.

h. The chief engineer f[redacted]r the group is IDEN N. He is in charge of building the airstrips.

i. The infiltration team with the mission of assassinating AMTHUG/1 is headed by IDEN M. Date of the operation is unknown.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:
UFGA-17603, 3 September 1964

IDEN A: Humberto CASAS
IDEN B: Tulio LEISECA
IDEN C: FNU ACEBO
IDEN D: Puerto CABEZAS
IDEN E: Reynaldo GARCIA
IDEN F: "Chino" MOLE
IDEN G: Manoline GUTIERREZ
IDEN H: Ricardo "The Mexican", ex-crewman of the BEE
IDEN I: Generoso BRINGA
IDEN J: Nicaragua
IDEN K: Dominican Republic
IDEN L: Guayo HERNANDEZ
IDEN M: Marco ULLOA
IDEN N: "Juan Jose" ABREU

AMFAUNA 26

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACC PLIS
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

MICROFILMED
JAN 20 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE AKR

SUBJECT OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMFAUNA
AMFAUNA-26 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference: UFGA-11700, dated 14 October 1963

Operational Developments:

1. Seven SW messages were received from AMFAUNA-26 during the period, and two were sent to her. Two SW messages written by AMFAUNA-2 no. 34 and no. 36, have not been received and it is not known what has happened to them. It has been observed that mail to and from Cienfuego is very slow and uncertain; SW message no. 10 sent to AMFAUNA-26 on 6 November did not reach her until 22 December.

2. A continuing effort was made during the period to activate AMFAUNA-26's OWVL and medium speed radio systems. OWVL transmissions were begun on 16 October with message no. 1 warning AMFAUNA-26 of the arrest of AMFAUNA-14 the week before (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963) and the fact that AMCUTLER-2 was under surveillance. AMFAUNA-26 was unable to receive this message. In her SW message no. 35 of 25 October, she reported that her radio set is calibrated in meters instead of kilocycles and she had been unable to find the correct frequency. JMWAVE then sent AMFAUNA-26 instructions for converting kilocycles to meters, and began transmitting dummy messages, giving AMFAUNA-26 a simple code for reporting by commercial telegram whether she was receiving them, and whether and with what books she was able to decipher.

3. Two sets of deciphering materials had been sent to AMFAUNA-26. One package was buried by AMGLEN-9 in Pinar del Rio Province (see WAVE-5887 of 16 October 1963), and AMFAUNA-26 was informed of its location in OWVL message no. 1 of 16 October and SW message no. 10 of 6 November. A previous set of number groups had been sent to her by SW early in

Continued............

Distribution INDEX
3 - Hqs

F

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
9 Jan 1964

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 15

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-13428

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-50/3
19-6-50/3

12

October. It now appears that AMFAUNA-26 never received either of these sets of groups. As of 22 November when AMFAUNA-26's sister Olga arrived in Mexico (see paragraph 5), AMFAUNA-26 already had in her possession the letter containing the groups written in SW, but either had tried and failed to develop it, or had hesitated to try to do so, not knowing in what strength to use the reagent and erroneously thinking that this was a critical factor. As mentioned previously, AMFAUNA-26 did not receive SW message no. 10 until 22 December; on the following day she sent an open telegram to the son of AMFAUNA-32 in Miami, confirming her willingness to travel to Pinar del Rio and recover the material. It is not known whether she actually did so.

4. It had been planned, once AMFAUNA-26 was receiving OWVL and her ability to recover caches confirmed, to have AMWEE-1 cache AMFAUNA-1's radio and to inform AMFAUNA-26 of its location by OWVL. Events did not permit this.

5. AMFLORA-1 sent a telegram to his JMWAVE area accommodation address on 16 November 1963, reporting that his wife, the sister of AMFAUNA-26, was due to arrive in Mexico City on 20 November. Mexico City Station was so informed on 18 November (see WAVE-7762), but by the time confirmation arrived (MEXI-7031 of 23 November) the lady had already departed for Caracas. The oral messages which she brought from AMFAUNA-26 therefore did not reach JMWAVE until 20 December when HVCA-10780 was received. This dispatch transmitted a typewritten note from AMFLORA-1's wife containing the following information:

a. AMFAUNA-26 had run out of developer pills. (In retrospect, this does not seem to be true, because AMFAUNA-26 was evidently able to develop SW message no. 10 which she received on 22 December (see paragraph 3). What AMFAUNA-26 had probably been trying to convey was that she was running very short of pills. AMFAUNA-1 does not remember how many he gave her, but the most probable number appears to be twelve.)

b. AMFAUNA-26 had been unable to develop the SW message containing her cipher groups, because she had not been told how to mix her reagent.

c. AMCUTLER-2 was very worried by the fact that AMFAUNA-14 had been telephoning her frequently, and was afraid that AMFAUNA-14 was betraying her to the DSE.

d. AMFAUNA-26 was uneasy about being left in Cuba without a responsible leader to report to.

e. AMFAUNA-26's cover was wearing very thin, due to indiscretions by AMFAUNA-31.

6. In her SW message no. 29, which was received at JMWAVE on 21 October, AMFAUNA-26 reported that AMFAUNA-38 had been arrested on 7 September and taken to Santa Clara. At 0200 hours on the following morning, fourteen policemen came to AMFAUNA-26's house and searched it on the pretext of looking for a burglar. However, the only part of the house which they searched was the part inhabited by AMFAUNA-26.

7. In her SW message no. 30, AMFAUNA-26 reported the full names of two individuals who had approached her sub-agents AMFAUNA-29 and AMFAUNA-31, claiming to be doing underground work against CASTRO. These persons are one Amable SANCHEZ Borroto and one Raul SIMON Delgado. While neither JMWAVE nor Headquarters (DIR-78835 of 30 October 1963) had any traces on these persons, JMWAVE has a carded reference to a sensitive source document which carries the full name of Amable SANCHEZ Borroto and the implication that he enjoys the confidence of the Cuban Government. Unfortunately, an error was made in typing the card, and the document is unrecoverable. In SW message no. 10, AMFAUNA-26 was told to be careful with the person.

MIS card for Botto identified by
1st cuba
Δ cuba 201-[illegible]

8. On 12 October 1963, AMFAUNA-26 was in Havana where she saw AMCUTLER-2. About 23 or 24 October she was again in Havana and again saw AMCUTLER-2. On both occasions the problems posed by the arrest of AMFAUNA-14 were the prime topic of discussion.

9. In outgoing SW message no. 9 of 30 September, AMFAUNA-26 had been asked to investigate a Cuban naval officer named Carlos *LOPEZ Avalos with a view to forming an opinion as to his political attitude. She reported in SW message no. 37 of 3 November that all reports on this individual were derogatory except for one given by AMLAME-5. This report reached AMFAUNA-26 via AMFAUNA-31 who got it from a man identified only as Ramon *PEREZ who said that AMLAME-5 had told him that he had a contact to the Swiss Embassy, and that LOPEZ was already connected with people outside of Cuba and had recently performed a great service for the counterrevolution. at cuba See doc re: contact w/ 201-71777

A cuba, Cienfuegos [illegible]

10. When the arrest ~~of AMCUTLER-2~~ became known to JMWAVE (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963), the son of AMFAUNA-32 was asked to phone his mother in Cienfuegos and instruc her to tell AMFAUNA-26 to go into hiding. On 3 January the son reported completion of the call and said that his mother had told him that AMFAUNA-26 had been arrested on 29 December and taken to the Santa Clara prison.

11. The reason for AMFAUNA-26's arrest remains obscure, or rather there are so many acceptable explanations that the problem is to select the right one. She could have been implicated by AMFAUNA-38, as would seem to be suggested by the fact that her house was searched immediately following AMFAUNA-38's arrest; if so, however, it is hard to explain why AMFAUNA-26 herself was not arrested until three and one-half months later. She could have been denounced by AMCUTLER-2 who was herself arrested two or three days before AMFAUNA-26's arrest; this seems unlikel in view of the fact that AMCUTLER-2 and AMFAUNA-26 are friends, that when AMCUTLER-2 reaches the point where she is ready to implicate other members of the AMFAUNA net she could be expected to begin with people who are not her friends, and that at least one such person (AMFAUNA-25) was known to be at liberty as recently as 4 January 1964, as were two of the cutouts between AMFAUNA-26 and AMCUTLER-2 (AMFAUNA-32 and AMFAUNA-33). AMCUTLER-2 is believed to have been under surveillance by the DSE, at least sporadically, between 12 and 24 October (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November, and December 1963), and AMFAUNA-26 could have been observed and identified when she visited AMCUTLER-2 during this period and marked for subsequent arrest and interrogation in connection with AMCUTLER-2's activities. AMFAUNA-26 could have made an attempt between 22 and 29 December to recover the cached cipher groups (see paragraph 3), and either been detected in the act or arrested while trying to contact AMCUTLER-2 on the same trip; in this case, however, it would seem that the DSE would not have transported her all the way back to Santa Clara but would have kept her in Havana for concurrent interrogation with AMCUTLER-2. The open telegram sent to the son of AMFAUNA-32 on 23 December was rather indiscreet and could have caused difficulties for the sender, but some of these difficulties ought in this case to have brushed off on AMFAUNA-32 herself, and as of 3 January 1964 she was still at liberty.

201-332765 201-329604 Luis PUIG Tabares

12. Information received from HULAKE-1 on 8 January 1964 indicates that a general roundup began in Cienfuegos on 26 December, possibly in connection with a suspected plot against the life of Fidel CASTRO, and that at least seventeen persons had been taken. One of these persons appears to be AMLAME-5. To the best of JMWAVE's knowledge, neither AMFAUNA-26 nor AMLAME-5 had been involved in any plot against the life of Fidel CASTRO, but both could have been high on a general suspect list. The only known factor common to both AMLAME-5 and AMFAUNA-26 is the Ramon *PEREZ mentioned in paragraph 9. AMLAME-5 evidently was extraordinarily indiscreet when he talked with this man. AMFAUNA-31 has also spoken with him, and according to the oral message brought out by AMFAUNA-26's sister (see paragraph 5-e) AMFAUNA-31 has been habitually indiscreet. Ramon PEREZ was thus in a position to denounce both AMLAME-5 and AMFAUNA-26. If so, AMFAUNA-31 also ought to have been implicated, and it is perhaps significatn in this connection that, of all of

Joaquin ROSQUETE Rodriguez

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-13428

AMFAUNA-26's sub-agents, AMFAUNA-31 is the only one believed to be in hiding as of 3 January (see WAVE-9940 of 4 January).

13. There has been no previous mention of Ramon PEREZ in the AMFAUNA operational reporting, and JMWAVE has no identifiable traces on him. AMFAUNA-1 was asked about him on 6 January, and produced the following information which he had obtained from Antonio Remigio *ESTRADA Diaz (born 1 October 1939, Cienfuegos), now residing at 1425 S.W. 5th St., Apt. 10, Miami, and a former collaborator of the AMFAUNA net in Cienfuegos. Ramon PEREZ is an employee of the Consolidado de Transporte, lives on Calle Arguelles in Cienfuegos between Prado and Gacel, and has a son, name unknown, who drives a taxi. Re: subject identifying Ramon Perez to 201-291[illegible]

14. On 5 and 6 January 1964, warning messages were sent to AMFAUNAs 29, 30, 31 and 33 by Antonio Remigio ESTRADA Diaz and by AMFAUNA-1 (see WAVE-0045 of 7 January 1964).

Production:

15. The following reports were made:

UFG-3918	Loading of a Ship at La Isabela with trailers Carrying 40-foot Long Covered Objects
UFG-3941	Relocation of Radar Installations & Other Activities at the Cienfuegos Surface-to-Air Missile Site, Las Villas Province
UFG-3947	Installation of an unusual Light at Cifuentes SAM Missile Assembly Base, Las Villas Province; Dress, Habits, & Expected Departure of Soviets at Cifuentes
UFG-3948	Increase in the Number of Tanks & Soviet Personnel at the Sagua la Grande SAM Missile Site; Relocation of a Sagua la Grande Soviet Headquarters
UFG-3974	Departure of Soviets from the Remedios Area; Movement of Trucks, Guns, & Soviet Personnel in Las Villas Province
UFG-3998	Military Defense Measures at Cayo Loco, Las Villas Province
UFG-4088	Arrival of Unexplained Vehicles at Las Auras, Cienfuegos & Dismantling of that Base
UFG-4141	Cuban Military Occupation of Former Soviet Camps Near Yaguaja & at Fincas La Puntilla, La Bajada, & Rojas
UFG-4180	Removal of Some Equipment & Personnel from the Soviet Base at Itabo, Las Villas Province
UFG-4266	Field Comment Only
UFG-4272	Alleged Transfer of all Cuban Militiamen to the Central Army. New Defense Measures Along the Southern Coast of Las Villas Province

Expenses:

16. Three separate remittances each of $270.00 or a total of $810.00 were sent to AMFAUNA-26 during this period. By previous agreement one quarter of the money was to be given to AMFAUNA-32 and three-quarters was to be retained by AMFAUNA-26. The first two remittances were sent to AMFAUNA-32 by her son, and each was acknowledged by telegram. The third remittance, at the telegraphed request of AMFAUNA-26, was sent to AMFLORA-1 in Caracas. Evidently his wife came to some arrangement with AMFAUNA-26 before she left Cuba.

Future Plans:

17. Communication will be maintained with AMFAUNA-33, first by telephone and later if possible by clandestine means, for the purpose of

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-13428

learning the status and whereabouts of affected members of the AMFAUNA-26 group. As soon as the situation has crystallized, the whereabouts of burned agents learned, and secure communications established, an attempt will be made to exfiltrate endangered personnel.

End of Dispatch

FORM 8-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 5

SECRET

10 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Requirements Briefing to FBI Informant Going to Cuba

1. In accordance with arrangements previously made with the FBI by SAS/CI/Liaison, the undersigned went to New York on 8 July to brief an FBI informant who is going to Cuba for two weeks. I had a short session at the FBI office in NYC with Dale Schwant, the case officer, and we then met with the informant for about two hours in a room at the Prince George Hotel. The informant had been told that I would be at the meeting and that I represented the Agency, but I was not introduced to him by name.

65

2. The FBI informant - Victor Thomas * Vicente - is an American-born Puerto Rican born in NYC in 1930. He has been under FBI control for nearly 3 years penetrating the three pro-Castro organizations in NYC: the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC); the Casa Cuba, and the Jose Marti Club. Though the first two years Subject was only a marginal asset, in the last six months he has become a valuable penetration for the FBI into the above 3 organizations as well as the Cuban UN delegation, having apparently won the complete confidence of the pro-Castro leaders and Cuban officials in NYC. Recently he was asked to join the CPUSA. Subject works as a 08 shipping clerk in a coffee plant in Brooklyn. He has the appearance and other attributes, according to Dale Schwant, for the role of pro-Castro revolutionary. The Cubans have expressed an interest in his moving to Cuba to work. He is willing to go but his wife is against it, but idea is still alive.

Cuban Sponsorship

10 09

3. Subject is leaving NYC for Mexico City on 13 July and he expects to go on to Cuba illegally on 15 July. The Cuban Ambassador to the UN, Raul Primellas, has arranged for a Cuban visa to be ready at the embassy in 10 Mexico City, and also passage to Habana on a Cubana flight. Subject is also

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

9/RJ

08 05

armed with a letter of introduction from the National Director of the FPCC, Vicent Theodore Lee. On 6 July the 3 pro-Castro organizations named above held a party for Subject and raised $100.00 for his trip.

Informant's Contacts in Cuba

4. Subject will contact several friends in Cuba who are milicianos, one of them in Santiago, Oriente Province. They were fellow activists in pro-Castro organizations in NYC who have returned to Cuba. He also has been given (by his Cuban friends) the address of a family whose son is the chauffeur of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Arrangements have also been made for Subject to talk to the American Communist in Habana, Robert Williams. Subject, who will be accompanied by his wife on this trip, has been instructed by his Cuban superiors to take a camera with him to take pictures of Cuba for showing at organizational meetings in NYC. Something similar had been done previously by the head of the FPCC on his trip to Cuba in December 1962. The note-taking in connection with the photos will be a device enabling Subject to record intel information difficult to remember.

5. I briefed Subject during a two hour period using as a guide the attached requirements outline, prepared with 06 Henry Kitchens, SAS/Intel/Requirements, and Antia Potocki, SAS/CI/Sov-Sat. I had also discussed Subject's mission to Cuba with SAS/SO/Rodriguez and DC/SAS/EOB. I stressed, as did the FBI case officer, that while fully exploiting his militia and other contacts for the desired information, he must always be guided by security considerations. After an agent role for three years, Subject expressed confidence in his ability to ~~in~~ carry~~ing~~ out his mission successfully.

6. I should add that I was very cordially received at the NYC FBI office and that Mr. Schwant was most cooperative. I referred to our memorandum to his headquarters indicating that the Agency had a world-wide program to 24 send controlled CP and front penetrations on missions to Cuba, and I expressed the hope that this might be only our first joint effort. He agreed wholeheartedly, adding that he personally would be particularly happy to cooperate if Subject informant should move permanently to Cuba and play the role of resident agent. As soon as Subject returns from Cuba Mr. Schwant will let us know and arrange for the debriefing.

L.D.S.
Louis De Santi
SAS/CI/CP

Attachment: Herewith

SECRET

3/RS

13-00000

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMSANTA Project

Job # 65-427/38 Box 7

File # 19-6-73/3

Volumes: 5

1. **Description:**

Coverage of Castro Communist regime through use of existing Communist Party and front penetration assets. File was opened in December 1962.

2. **Findings:**

Memo for the Record dated 10 July 1963 by Louis De Santi SAS/CI/CP

FBI informant 05 Victor Thomas VICENTE, 08 Puerto Rican citizen, who penetrated CP's in NY City left NY for Cuba 08 via Mexico as guest of ICAP. Was debriefed by CIA staffer Lou DeSanti upon return to U.S. in 09 July-Aug 63. 05 VICENTE stated he had interviews with CASTRO and Che GUEVARA. 05 VICENTE penetrated the FPCC, the Casa Cuba, and Jose Marti Club in New York City. Page 127 of IG 1967 report mentions unnamed Puerto Rican who claims he participated in Castro inspired assassination plot in Dallas. Don't know if 05 VICENTE could be that individual.

Attachment:

LAD/JFK Task Force

Researcher: KGB

3. Checked 05 VICENTE 201-23 731222.

6/Rs

Requirements Outline

1. Details of Cuban-Soviet agreements and Castro-Khrushchev understandings re:

   a. Soviet economic aid

   b. Soviet military presence

   c. Cuban rapprochement and posture vis-a-vis U. S.

   d. Training of Cubans in Soviet bloc to man weapon systems under Soviet command; question of whether Cubans to acquire command control over these weapons systems.

   e. How far and how fast is Castro to go in exporting violent revolution in Latin America.

2. Demobilization of regular militia and what relation it has (if any) to the take-over by Soviets of some internal security functions.

   a. What part or percent of militia has been demobilized.

   b. To what extent has civilian militia been disarmed of automatic weapons.

   c. Have Soviets actually taken over control of police stations in certain cities or towns. Which cities.

   d. Purposes behind demobilization and disarming of militia.

      (1) To minimize resistance potential?

      (2) Are Soviets telling Castro to put more people to work on the farms and they will take care of internal security?

   e. Reaction of milicianos to demobilization and disarming.

3. Hard information on missiles (all types) and Soviet troops. (Differentiate between facts and propaganda for foreign and/or domestic consumption.)

4. Communism:

a. Secret existence of PSP

b. PURS - when First Congress to be held

c. Reactions of rank and file party members - and general public - toward Fidel and Soviet Union.

d. Economic conditions, popular support of regime especially in provinces and outlying areas

e. Pro-Soviet or pro-Chicom alignments of party leaders or rank and file.

5. Addresses of places where Subject is taken to attend meetings, lectures, get instructions, etc. --- also, of his contacts and Communist leaders.

6. ICAP, its role in this trip

a. Contacts and methods of arranging illegal trip in Mexico

- person in charge
- financing
- route

b. Arrival in Habana

(1) Who there to receive him

(2) Entry formalities; what papers or forms to fill out, etc.

(3) Guided tour or free to go any place on his own; lodging arrangements, etc.

c. What Soviets, Sats, or foreign Communists does he meet

d. Take note of, and bring back if possible, any materials printed in Soviet Bloc or Red China.

e. What use are Soviets/Cubans making of American defectors in Cuba; what role are they playing.

Exclud [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 02

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : RIO DE JANEIRO

ACTION: C/SAS 3

INFO : DDP, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

S E C R E T 181909Z

18 DEC 63 IN 83322

DIR INFO WAVE CITE RIOD 2944

DRYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMSTRUT

06,08

1. AMSTRUT-1 VISITED 13 DECEMBER BY (MARIO ROGERIO MESTRINHO DE MELLO OFFICIAL IN BRAZILIAN EMBASY) HAVANA NOW ON LEAVE (RIOD.) 10

06 (MESTRINHO) REPORTED FOLL:

08,06

A. (BRAZILIAN EMB BASTIAN PINTO INTOXICATED) MORE FREQUENTLY AND FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME.

B. WIDE RUMOR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT FIDEL CASTRO AFTER HIS T.V. APPEARANCE ON 6 DECEMBER RESULTED KILLING MAN NEXT TO HIM. CASTRO UNINJURED. WOULD-BE KILLER STILL AT LARGE.

C. RECENT BRAZILIAN FOREIGN TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS RESULTING DIFFICULTIES BRAZIL COMMIES DESIRING VISIT CUBA. NO DETAILS GIVEN.

D. WIDE RUMOR CUBAN JOSE "PEPE" GLANUZA MET LEE OSWALD IN MEXICO BEFORE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. (ALSO KEY'D [illegible])

06

E. (MESTRINHO) RETURNING CUBA LATE JANUARY 1964. AGREED TAKE PERSONAL ITEMS REQUESTED BY A-1'S FRIENDS.

06 06

2. (MESTRINHO) ALSO DELIVERED TO A-1 LETTER FROM (MARIANNA ARGUELLES) WHO WROTE:

A. COMDTE ELIGERO ALEN[illegible]IRA, FORMER CHIEF OF POLICE IN HAVANA HAS NOT YET RETURNED FROM ALGIERS WITH GROUP CUBANS WHO WENT THERE

SECRET

19-6-26/3

GROUP 1

FOR TRAINING MISSION.

08

B. HUSBAND RAUL DIAZ ARGUELLES, WHO STILL STRONG DE TROITE, WILL SOON GO WITH CLASS TO MOSCOW FOR SIX MONTHS ADDITIONAL TRAINING AFTER FINISHING COURSE SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOOL ON CUBA.

06

C. MARIANNA WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW SHE CAN AGAIN WRITE TO "PANCHO." COMMENT: A-1 SAYS THIS INDICATION MARIANNA WANTS TO COOPERATE WITH ANTI-COMMUNISTS AGAIN. 6

3. IN ANOTHER LETTER, AMSTRUT-2 WROTE A-1 FOLL:

A. SHE HAD HEARD FROM "FRIENDS" AND HAS FURNISHED REQUESTED DATA TO OBTAIN THEIR (TRAVEL) DOCUMENTATION, BUT TO DATE NO ACTION.

B. HER SITUATION VERY DIFFICULT, BUT VOICED STRONG HOPE CUBA WOULD EVENTUALLY OVERCOME ITS CURRENT PROBLEMS. SAID A-1 WAS RIGHT ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER MOTHER DIED. LETTER OTHERWISE HOLIDAY GREETING.

06 24

4. A-1 SAID MESTRINHO WHO HAD BROUGHT LETTERS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE AMBASSADOR PINTO, DID NOT KNOW CONTENTS, NOR BELIEVED TO HAVE KNOWN ORIGINATORS OTHER THAN 06 MARIANNA ALEMJEIRA. A-1 HAS CONFIDENCE MESTRINHO 24 AS BEING TRUSTED COURIER. A-1 HOWEVER ADVISED 06 MESTRINHO ACTED VOLUNTARILY UPON REQUEST FROM HER FRIENDS, SINCE A-1 HAS WRITTEN NO LETTERS AS PER KUBARK INSTRUCTIONS.

5. SINCE A-1 INTENDED TO PURCHASE LOCALLY SHOES, SAOP, SHAMPOO, ROLL FILM, ETC., REQUESTED BY 06 MARIANNA ALEMJEIRA STATION OFFERED TO SUPPLY SAME AS FAVOR A-1

6. OTHER THAN NOTED ABOVE, DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY INTEREST MESTRINHO AS COURIER FOR RIOD.

SECRET 24

10/PJ

11 OCTOBER 1964

MGE 27. RECEIVED YOUR RM 44 AND 45. WHEN WE SAID THAT JUAN MANUE FERNANDEZ (A-27) COULD NOT BE INSTRUCTED, IT WAS BECAUSE HE EXPEC TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. IN THE SAME MGE, WE ASKED YOU THAT HE BE SEPARATED FROM THE JAGUAR GROUP. HE WANTS TO LEAVE CUBA BECAU HE THINKS THAT CUBAN COMMUNISM WILL LAST A LONG TIME BEFORE BEING ELIMINATED FROM POWER AND THAT LIFE IN CUBA IS DIFFICULT FOR ALL MEN WHO DO NOT SUBMIT TO ITS DOCTRINE. THAT'S WHAT HE TO US. WHEN WE TOLD YOU OF OUR DESIRE TO TAKE LUIS RODRIGUEZ INTO OU JAGUAR GROUP, WE DID SO ASKING YOUR PERMISSION. AFTERWARD WE WI TELL HIM YOUR DECISION IN THIS CASE. WE FURTHER PROPOSED THAT HE (RODRIGUEZ) BE GIVEN NUMBER A-27 WHICH WAS ABANDONED BY FERNANDEZ. WE REMEMBER. WE ARE AWAITING YOUR AUTHORIZATION T INSTRUCT A-35 IN SW. WE KNOW OF NO CASES OF OFFICIALS WHO ARE IN PRISON FOR AFFECTING THE ECONOMY. ON THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST FIDEL, WE KNOW THEY TOOK TWO CIVILIANS WOUNDED BY SHOOTING TO THE CALIXTO GARCIA HOSPITAL. MOMENTS LATER, TWO XXXXXX SOLDIERS FROM FIDEL'S GUARDS PRESENTED THEMSELVES IN SAID HOSPITAL TAKING AWAY THE WOUNDED. WE DO NOT KNOW MORE DETAILS. IN THE LAST DAYS OF LAST MONTH, 70 TRACKED TANKS ENTERED A CAMP LOCATED BETWEEN SANTA MARIA DEL ROSARIO AND EL COTORRO. THE TA WERE TRANSPORTED ON TRAILERS FROM WHERE WE DO NOT KNOW. (A-24) THE 4TH OF OCTOBER, THE RUSSIAN SHIP "SIRHOTE ALIN" ENTERED THE MARIEL PIER COMING FROM THE USSR WITH TOTAL CARGO OF CHEMICAL FERTILIZER IN BULK. REPORT JULIO CAMBAS WHOSE SECOND last NAME IS TEXCIDO. XXX REPEAT. SECOND last NAME OF JULIO (TEXCIDO). A-7 = A-9.

SPB
12/01128-06
LX 1958

name requested how

THE CREW OF THE SHIP IS SOVIET AND NORMAL. THE NEWS OF THE FLEEIN(OF COMMANDANT "CONTRERAS", CHIEF OF THE CUARENTENARIO BASE, TOGETHER WITH A GROUP OF OFFICERS AND FRIENDS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. THERE ARE NUMEROUS PERSONS UNDER ARREST IN SAID BASE FOR NOT HAVING PREVENTED THEIR FLIGHT. ANOTHER SIMILAR GROUP FLED FROM THE GRAMMA BASE. ALL THE DESERTERS FLED IN CUBAN NAVY LAUNCHES. WE SUSPECT THAT AT THIS MOMENT, THEY ARE IN U.S. TERRIROTY. IF IT IS SO, WE ARE VERY HAPPY BECAUSE OF THE GREAT DEAL THESE REPENTANT ONES KNOW. A-7 = A-9 = A-15. TO BE CONTINUED IN 28. ALSO REPORT ON NATIONAL BANK. GREETINGS. JUAN.

END END END

SDB
2-101080-64
vX. 1923

OUTGOING

6

SECRET

Charge: Classification Control: ROUTINE

Date: 11 JULY 63

DIST: 1 - SIG
1 - CHRON
1 - INDEVOUT 3 OPS
01

20-18 20-10 20-11

ZURC INFO BERN CITE GNVA CN 18/

DOMARK FROM MIDDAUGH

RYBAT INDEVOUT 3 01

24

1. AS PART OF NEW G-2 COOPTED STATUS SUBJ MUST PROVIDE BOOKS ON ESPIONAGE. HE HAS SENT SUCH AS HE AND WE HAVE ACCESS TO IN LOCAL SHOPS AND HAS URGENT NEED TO SEND MORE VERY SOON. WE PLANNING ASK LONDON MAKE EXHAUSTIVE PURCHASE BUT IN MEANTIME HAVE NEED PASS HIM CIRCA TEN FOR IMMEDIATE POSTING TO G-2. 24

15-18

2. CAN YOU AT EARLY POINT RANSACK ZURC BOOKSTORES FOR ANY TYPE OF WORK ON ESPIONAGE OR COUNTER ESPIONAGE OF LITERALLY ANY COUNTRY. WORKS CAN INCLUDE HISTORIC ITEMS LIKE WORLD WAR I BLACK ROOM, WORLD WAR II LIKE BREAKING OF JAPANESE CODE, OPERATION NORTH POLE IN HOLLAND, AND WHAT HAVE YOU, AS WELL AS WORKS BY COMMUNIST DEFECTORS AND THE NEWER CROP OF ESPIONAGE STUDIES. THEY MUST BE IN ENGLISH OR FRENCH.

3. BOOKS HE HAS ALREADY SENT INCLUDE: RESEAU DE SPIONS, L'HISTOIRE DE GESTAPO, CIA, MI 5, SECRET WAR, MANUEL DE ESPIONS, HER MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE, TREASON IN TWENTIETH CENTURY, AND SEVERAL UNIDENTIFIED BOOKS ON FASCISM.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE PHONE CALL AS SOON AS YOU KNOW HOW MANY BOOKS YOU CAN GET. MAIL BOOKS COMMERCIALLY TO MIDDAUGH PRIVATE ADDRESS.

ORIG: MIDDAUGH SECRET RELEASED: ELMARD

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

FORM FS 413P
3-1-55

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".

68-6-

8/BR

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/4/ExO	NO.
	DATE 5 July 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/Prop				
2. (~~TOOMEY~~)03				
3. (MANEY)03				
4.				FILE TEMPO KHRUSHCHEV VISIT
5. PROP				
6. Alice			AMS	Summary [illegible] [illegible] (K3) next trip
7. Kay				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				to 7 — File Guidance
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 476731

2/PN

SECRET

5 JUL 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Exploitation of Khrushchev Visit to Cuba

1. This memorandum is for the Director's information only and does not require action.

2. An invitation by the Government of Cuba to Khrushchev to visit that country has been officially accepted, but as yet no definite time has been set. There has been speculation that Khrushchev would arrive in Habana for the 26th of July celebrations, while a press report, confirming a statement of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, predicts the arrival for August. Earlier reports had suggested December 1960 or January 1961 as possible dates.

3. It is felt that a successful visit by Khrushchev to Cuba would assist further in the establishment of a solid Soviet understanding with that country, with disturbing overtones on the possible establishment of closer Soviet relationships in other parts of Latin America. For this reason it is desirable to prevent the visit or to counteract it by a show of massive opposition by the Cuban people.

4. On 21 June the Habana Station was asked for its views on possible plans. In the exchange of cables that has followed, the Station and Headquarters are now in agreement that the best course of action lies in two operations. First, a massive church manifestation or rally to be called for some other purpose would afford the people of Cuba an obvious way to express their protest. Second, the instigation of rumors that Khrushchev's life will be in danger while in Cuba from a well-planned assassination attempt would be propagated from other Latin American countries.

5. Because of the need of avoiding action in Cuba in this matter that would imperil Station assets, it has been determined that such assets would be used only as a means of instigating the church to hold the rally.

6. The latest report from Habana indicates that plans are going satisfactorily. Bishop Boza Masvidal is described as enthused about the

06

06

idea. With Jose Lavasilda, a prominent lay leader, he is now visiting Camaguey to solicit the support of the local Bishop. Lavastida 06 will seek similar support in Santiago. Tentative plans call for a congress or rally on Assumption Day, 15 July.

7. The Station has asked that the entire effort begin with Cuba, without initial outside support from Cuban exile groups or the sponsors of the anti-Castro programs on Station WRUL. A cable has been sent to 16-11 Bogota to have the CELAM 29 spark similar rallies throughout Latin America. WH press assets will be called upon to support these and the Cuban assets when plans are firmer.

24

8. The Argentine liaison service will be asked to send one of its contacts in the field of journalism to Habana to contact officials and to visit the offices of the New China News Agency. He will be instructed to ask Communist staff members there what substance there might be to rumors he has heard that an assassination attempt on Khrushchev will take place. The same technique is being used through three Cubans living in Miami who are in constant contact with Cuba. Speculation on such attempts will be surfaced on the WRUL program and in certain controlled Latin press media.

J. C. King
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

EHHinkle:lrh
5 July 1960

Distribution:

Original and 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - DDP
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/4
1 - Originator
1 - WH/4/Crono

5/PJ

Mr.

[illegible]

Hawke

2 July 1960

TO : C/WH/4

Subject: Khrushchev Visit to Cuba

1. Background. An invitation to visit Cuba has been extended to Khrushchev by the Government of Cuba. The invitation has been accepted, but do definite time has been set. There has been some speculation that Khrushchev would arrive in Havana in time for the celebrations of the 26th of July. The press has reported that he will arrive in August (a date confirmed by a statement of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico). Other reports say the visit will not take place for several months, probably in December or January. In any event we must plan for the possibility of the July visit.

It has been stated from several sanguine quarters that we should "do the same thing to Khrushchev that the Japs did to Eisenhower". This is a completely unrealistic dream.

It is true that a successful Khrushchev visit to Cuba would be the final stone in the construction of a solid Soviet base in Cuba, with disturbing overtones for the possible construction for more Soviet ideoligical bases in all of Latin America. For that reason we are trying to do what we can to prevent the visit, or at least to show a massive ~~sk~~ opposition to it.

2. ExploitationPlans. On 21 June Hqs sent a cable to Havana asking for views on possibility of a major effort to force cancellation of the visit. A resulting series of cables shows that the station and headquarters are now in agreement that our best hope lies in

a. A massive Church manifestation or rally, which though called for some other purpose, would be to the people of Cuba an obvious way to express their protest. And

b. from outside Cuba, instigating of rumors that Khrushchev's life will be in danger ~~for~~ from a well-planned assassination attempt.

3. Mr. Helms has told ~~k~~ us that he wants CIA to undertake no action that will imperil Station assets. This injunction was placed on us while we were exchanging cables with Havana. The result is that station assets are actively instigating the church to hold the rally. A [illegible] cable from Headquarters has instructed the station to continue this course of action as long as there is "safety in numbers", i.e., as long as it is a church action rather that an AMPALM one.

13-00000

4. The latest cable from the field (IN 18883) 06 reports that that plans are going satisfactorily. Bishop Boza Masvidal is ~~XX xx~~ "enthused" about the idea. With Jose Lavastida, 06 a ~~px~~ prominent lay leader, he is now visiting Camaquey to solicit the support of the local ~~xxx~~ Bishop. Jose Lavastida, 06 a promient lay leader, is in Santiago to seek the help ~~k~~ of the Santiago Bishop. Tentative plans call for a congress or rally on Assumption Day, 15 July.

The station has asked that the entire effort at least begin within Cuba, without ouside support from FRD or WRUL.

5. Hemisphere Plans. A cable has gone out to 29 CELAM, (in 16-11 Bogota, asking this Church organization to spark similar rallies throughout Latin America. JMRAKE assets will be called upon to support these and the Cuban meeting when ~~xx~~ plans are firmer.

On the assassination ~~xxxx~~ angle: 01 BIOGENISIS, a controlled 16-29 agent in B.A., is soon to visit high officials in Havana. He has been instructed to ask these leaders what substance there might be to the rumors he has heard that an attempt will take place.....Rivas, a friend of Rudy Gomez, is using the same ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ technique through three Cubans living in Miami who are constant contact with Cuba.

Speculation on the assassination attempts will be surfaced on the WRUL program, in AMPACA'S paper, etc.

David A. Phillips

7/17/

CLASSIFIED MES

32 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: DIRECTOR Relay to Paris (FYM) INFO ATTN: ONTECH

FROM: HAMBURG

ACTION: C/EE 3 (EE NOTIFIED AND COPY ISSUED AT:1145, 30 OCT 63 OJ)

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/SAS 5, RF, VR EOB

SECRET 301202Z 30 OCT 63 IN 5047

PRIORITY DIR INFO FRAN LOND BRUS HAGU MADR WAVE CITE HAMB 3880

01

[illegible] AYXIS ZPYAGON (CASAILOR) MHAPRON

REF HAMB 3879 (IN 50361)

IDENTITY A - 06 (ISIDRO CONTRERAS) COMMANDING OFFICER OF 08 (PINAR DEL RIO NAVAL DISTRICT WITH 08 HQS IN BAHIA HONDA.) CLASSMATE AND VERY CLOSE FRIEND OF 08 (CHIEF OF NAVAL OPS AZTERAIN) WHO APPEALED TO HIM TO TAKE PRESENT POSITION.

IDENTITY B - FNU 06 (IGNARRA MATARRAN) COMMANDING OFFICER OF 08 (EASTERN NAVAL DISTRICT (ORIENTE)).

IDENTITY C - 06 (JOSE PONCE) FORMER COMMANDER OF 08 ("ARMY OF THE CENTER") WITH HQS IN 10 SANTA CLARA. BEGAN SIX MONTH 08 (GUIDED MISSILE COURSE) IN 10 [illegible] FORTRESS JULY 63 WHICH BEING CONDUCTED BY HIGH SOVIET ARMY OFFICERS. 06 (PONCE) TOOK PART IN GRAMMA LANDING AND IS BROTHER IN LAW OF 06 (RAMIRO VALDEZ) 08 (MINISTER OF INTERIOR.)

IDENTITY D - 06 (ORLANDO FERNANDEZ) REFERRED TO AS 08 ("SABORIT") BY FRIENDS, 08 (COMMANDER) IN NAVY NOW EMPLOYED AS 08 (EXECUTIVE) IN 08 (MAMBISAS) HQS IN HAVANA.

IDENTITY E - FNU 06 (JOMARON), BORN CIRCA 31, 08 (CAPTAIN) IN NAVY EMPLOYED AS 08 (EXECUTIVE OFFICER) TO IDEN B ABOVE. WIFE, WHOSE 08 (BROTHER) KILLED WITH REBELS AT BAY OF PIGS, NOW IN US WITH TWO CHILDREN.

[illegible] SAME (4)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

24/PJ

IDENTITY F - JOSE CASTANERA, BORN CIRCA 39, COMMANDER WHO HOLDS NO FIXED TITLE IN HAVANA ARMY HQS.

IDENTITY G - ROMAN ALVAREZ, MAMBISAS DIRECTOR.

IDENTITY H - ENRIQUE CAMARA, BORN CIRCA 31, CHIEF OF POLICE IN SANTA CLARA, MULATTO, MONCADO VETERAN AND LANDED WITH GRANMA.

IDENTITY I - FNU SAURET, BORN CIRCA 33, CAPTAIN IN ARMY EMPLOYED IN HAVANA POLICE HQS. FORMER MEMBER CASTRO ARMY IN SIERRA MAESTRA DURING BATISTA REGIME.

IDENTITY J - JOSE SUAREZ, BORN CIRCA 25, NICKNAME PEPE, NOW COMMANDER SERVING WITH WESTERN ARMY IN PINAR DEL RIO. MONCADA VETERAN. ORGANIZED RESISTANCE IN HAVANA DURING BATISTA REGIME.

IDENTITY K - ENRIQUE SANTANA, BORN CIRCA 28, CHIEF OF POLICE IN WESTERN CUBA. MONCADA VETERAN. MARRIED WITH FIVE CHILDREN IN CUBA.

IDENTITY L - FNU BENTURA, BORN CIRCA 26, MEDICAL DOCTOR EMPLOYED IN HAVANA HOSPITAL WHICH TREATS POLICEMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES EXCLUSIVELY. ALSO WORKS AS HAVANA PORT DOCTOR WHO BOARDS EACH VISITING VESSEL. WIFE, NAME UNKNOWN TO SURCE, IS ALSO MEDICAL DOCTOR IN HAVANA. HE VETERAN OF ESCAMBRAY ACTION AGAINST BATISTA.

IDENTITY M - PEPIN ARRUTI, SEE HAMB 3820.

IDENTITY N - ORLANDO MIRRET, BORN CIRCA 33, FORMER FIRST LIEUTENANT IN ARMY, FOUGHT WITH UNIDENTIFIED RESISTANCE GROUP IN ESCAMBRAY AGAINST CASTRO FORCES DURING FIRST HALF 63. NOW IN HIDING IN HAVANA.

IDENTITY O - FNU OJEDA, BORN CIRCA 23, FORMER LIEUTENANT IN CASTRO ARMY, FORMERLY FOUGHT AGAINST BATISTA IN SIERRA MAESTRA.

30/170

WITH IDEN N ABOVE FOUGHT DURING FIRST HALF 63 IN ESCAMBRAY AGAINST CASTRO FORCES AND NOW HIDING IN HAVANA.

IDENTITY P - FNU LLANERAS, BORN CIRCA 28, FORMER CAPTAIN OR LIEUTENANT IN CASTRO NAVY NOW UNEMPLOYED IN HAVANA. MONCADA VETERAN AND WORKED IN UNDERGROUND IN HAVANA AGAINST BATISTA. ARCHITECT BY PROFESSION.

IDENTITY Q - ROBERTO ROQUE NUNEZ, BORN CIRCA 18, LT COMMANDER IN NAVY SERVING NOW AS CHIEF OF "COMMANDOS" (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED). GRAMMA VETERAN.

IDENTITY R - PEDRO MIRET, BORN CIRCA 25, COMMANDER IN ARMY AND CHIEF OF CABANA FORTRESS. MONCADA VETERAN. FORMER MINISTER IN CASTRO GOVT.

IDENTITY S - FAUSTINO PEREZ, BORN CIRCA 23, COMMANDER IN CASTRO ARMY IN HAVANA HQS. GRAMMA VETERAN AND FORMER MINISTER IN CASTRO GOVT.

10

SECRET

(7/PJ

SECRET

October 1976

SUBJECT: Review of ZRRIFLE File

Job # 69-S-551

File No. None

1. Folder entitled personality sketches:

Tab M - Harold MELTZER

Harold MELTZER with aliases was involved in the rackets with upper echelon "hoodlums" throughout the U.S. (Pg. 1 Encl. 3 dated 19 Dec 1960.) "In 1959 he furnished information to our QJWIN California office but has not since cooperated with us. N.B. he has the background and talent for the matter we discussed but it is not known whether he would be receptive."

Tab Y - Hanna YAZBECK

YAZBECK lived in Beirut and worked for QJWIN's office intermittently during the past 10 years (dates not given - possibly 51-61.) YAZBECK's chief bodyguard from 50-58 (not named) was a convicted murderer. The bodyguard was murdered. States that YAZBECK has an available pool of assassins.

2. ZRRIFLE/Administrative Financial Folder

22

a. QIRT 2173 dated 13 October 1960, Att. Top Secret

08

01 DEPIGRAM (Italian Interpol Representative) as source and spotter for Corsicans. Altman to pick his brain and pinpoint his ability to do this job for us, but once selection made, DEPIGRAM to be eliminated. 01

b. Memorandum dated 31 January 1961

QJWIN recruited Frankfurt 1 November 1960 to undertake one-shot mission to Belgian Congo. Mission potentially involved great personal risk.

c. Memorandum dated 25 October 1961

QJWIN salary payment. States QJWIN not U.S. citizen.

4PV

d. Memorandum to W.K. Harvey dated 3 July 1962

Page 2. "Despite COS Luxe's viewpoint, I happen to know that QJWIN can do more spotting in Corsican circles whenever we want him to."

e. LUXE 0573 (IN 77918) dated 2 March 1963

Para. 2. Contact with QJWIN put off until 8 March. Headquarters reminded that despite repeated request, no correspondence received re this "operation" in past 8 months.

f. Memorandum to C/FI from William Harvey dated 27 June 1963

"As far as ZRRIFLE aspects this op, which have been covered under the QJWIN authorization for security reasons and with which Fletcher Knight is fully familiar, except for one precautionary 'life line', aspects of this case have been terminated and need no longer be considered part of this project."

g. OLLA 1974 dated 24 April 1964

QJWIN has been terminated amicably. Para 2 - "QJWIN's personal history reflects major instability and the habit of hedging his bets is undoubtedly part of his character. This does not imply a security breach. There is nothing to indicate that he has discussed his CIA relationship with anyone except, perhaps his wife."

LAD/JFK Task Force

SECRET

17 September 1975

SUBJECT : Responses to SSC Request for Additional Information on Project ZRRIFLE

REFERENCE: William G. Miller Letter to Mr. Walt Elder, 3 September 1975

Response:

02 02

1. a. The cryptonym FUTUBE is apparently a garble and FUTURE is probably meant instead. This is a cryptonym belonging to LA Division assigned to a U.S. citizen formerly of operational interest to us. His true name should not be divulged because, according to our records, he still resides abroad in the country against which he was targeted as a reporting source. Revelation of his identity and of his past association with us would be dangerous to his security.

   b. The cryptonym KUTUBE referred to FI Staff, now known as the Operations Staff.

02

   c. The cryptonym DMLIVID was assigned to a sensitive foreign operational target personality whose identity should not be revealed for reasons of his personal security.

2. a. LAURICLE was an action indicator for FI/D.

   b. Monroe B. ROZENEY, Ed JOUVENOY, Wanda CRICKARD and James N. RABNEY are all pseudonyms. ROZENEY and JOUVENOY are pseudonyms assigned successively to the same individual, IDENTITY A. This officer is currently actively employed in clandestine operations under official cover. During the period in question he was stationed in western Europe as an operations officer. CRICKARD was the pseudonym of IDENTITY B, who resigned in 1970. During the period from 1960 to early 1962 she was assigned to Headquarters and an African field station as a clerk. CRICKARD resigned for the first time in March 1962 and rejoined the Agency in mid-1963, when she was assigned to a South American Station under State Department cover as a Reports Officer.

32

SECRET

4/RS

RABNEY was the pseudonym of an Agency officer who is currently active in a sensitive nonofficial cover agent role in Europe. During the 1960-63 period he served as an operations Officer at Headquarters and in Europe.

3. Mr. Harvey was issued the pseudonym Daniel M. PRESLAND in 1956 and he used this pseudonym until he retired in 1967. This is the only pseudonym he used in connection with the ZRRIFLE Project and Cuban operations. Mr. Harvey was issued the alias William WALKER in May 1962 and he continued to use it while he was Chief of Cuban operations until he was reassigned in June 1963. There is no indication in the file that Mr. Harvey used this alias in connection with the ZRRIFLE Project. There is no record that Mr. Harvey was ever issued or used a cryptonym.

IDENTITY A: {Oliver M. Silsby} 03

IDENTITY B: {Elizabeth A. McNeill} 02

2/Rs

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: DDCI 1-

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

FROM:

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO . 1957—O-439445 (47)

13-00000

(CLASSIFICATION)

Ex. Registry
65-1507/2

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

In reply refer to
Action Memorandum No. A-459

Date 7 April 1965

TO : Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Agreement Between the United States Secret Service and the Central Intelligence Agency Concerning Presidential Protection in the United States

REFERENCE: Memorandum from DDCI to DD/I, DD/P, and DD/S, dated 8 June 1963, subject: The CIA Role in Support of Presidential Trips Abroad

ACTION MEMORANDUM

1. Attached for the information of addressees is a copy of subject agreement developed by the Chief of the Secret Service and me, in accordance with the recommendations of the Warren Commission and the actions of the President's Committee on the Warren Report.

2. The Deputy Director for Plans is responsible for insuring Agency compliance with this agreement and for maintaining the active liaison with the Secret Service. The staff function in this regard is being performed in the Counter Intelligence Staff of the DD/P. All Agency components in liaison with the Secret Service are to keep the Counter Intelligence Staff informed of their dealings with the Secret Service. The Counter Intelligence Staff will provide advice to other Agency components who receive requests for support from the Secret Service.

3. This agreement does not amend or alter current Agency policy as expressed in my memorandum of 8 June 1963 concerning support of Presidential trips abroad. An additional agreement with the Secret Service, involving CIA and other Government agencies dealing with Presidential travel abroad, is in process of development.

(Signed) Marshall S. Carter
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

SUSPENSE DATE:

Attachment

cc: OGC
n/s
C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION)

Executive Registry
65-1507

CONFIDENTIAL

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

I. Purpose of Agreement

A. The purpose of this Agreement is to define the types of information, administrative assistance and support to be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the United States Secret Service so that the Service may best fulfill its responsibilities to protect the person of the President of the United States while he is in the United States. The CIA role in support of Presidential trips abroad is the subject of a separate Agreement with the Secret Service.

B. The terms of this Agreement shall be applied to the protection of members of the President's immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, the Vice President-elect and former Presidents.

II. General Responsibilities

A. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the person of the President. It undertakes to identify individuals who, because of their individual propensities or characteristics, are dangerous or who may pose a threat to the person of the President. It arranges whatever action is required to counteract any threat to the person of the President posed by such individuals.

[illegible]

B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter intelligence. It gathers and maintains biographic and other data on organizations and individuals, official and non-official, for the purpose of performing its statutory functions. It also originates, and receives from other sources, reports on organizations and individuals. However, the Agency has no police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers or internal-security functions.

III. Information to be Reported by CIA

A. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service information that comes into its possession of the type set forth in Appendix A to this Agreement concerning individuals coming to its attention of the classes set forth in Appendix B to this Agreement. The information may be furnished in more than one report, and in emergency situations priority attention will be given to its preparation and delivery.

B. After reporting an individual to the Secret Service, the CIA will thereafter--unless the Secret Service otherwise requests--report to the Secret Service additional information which it thereafter receives or obtains concerning such individual.

C. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service intelligence and intelligence information that becomes available concerning:

(1) Groups outside the United States which advocate assassination of government officials as a political weapon and which appear to constitute an existing threat to the President or any persons named in Article I, Paragraph B. above;

(2) Sabotage and assassination training by hostile intelligence services or groups and the identity of persons so trained who appear to constitute an existing threat to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B. above;

(3) Plots in the United States or abroad to assassinate a Chief of State or other high official.

D. This agreement shall be reviewed by representatives of the CIA and the Secret Service annually, or at such more frequent occasions as either the CIA or the Secret Service may request, to make certain that the system of reporting is both practicable and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Deputy Director of the CIA and the Chief of the Secret Service.

IV. Provision of CIA Personnel to Protect the President

A. On occasion the use of a large number of armed officers is required to carry out the protective functions of the Secret Service due to such factors as the size of the crowds, the number of persons to be protected or the existence of a national emergency. At such times CIA may, at the request of the Secret Service, detail some of its security officers to the Secret Service in order to augment the Service's capacity to carry out its protective functions in the most secure manner.

B. Such officers detailed by the CIA will be designated officers of the Secret Service under the direction and operational control of the Chief of the United States Secret Service. No person shall be so detailed unless he has qualified in the use of firearms either in accordance with standards established by the Chief of the United States Secret Service, or in accordance with standards established by the Director of Security of the CIA. Persons so detailed will be authorized to carry firearms and to perform such other protective functions and duties as are authorized by law, as provided by section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, as amended.

V. Implementation of Agreement

A. The Secret Service and the CIA undertake to maintain an active liaison to insure the prompt passage of available information concerning individuals reported to the Secret Service by the CIA and evaluated by the Secret Service as dangerous to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B. Furthermore, in order to effect the best possible security of such persons, the Secret Service and the CIA will take such steps as are necessary to insure that the terms of this Agreement are fully carried out.

Central Intelligence Agency

Dated: 27 March 1965
By ______________________
Marshall S. Carter
Deputy Director

United States Secret Service

Dated: [illegible]
By ______________________
James J. Rowley
Chief

APPENDIX A

Information to Be Furnished on Individuals Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

1. Identification Data - to the extent available to CIA, name or names of individual (including prior legal names, aliases and pseudonyms), address, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment and marital status;

2. Reason or Reasons for Reporting - statement of the class or classes in Appendix B, which the individual reported fits;

3. A summary or excerpts, as appropriate, of such portions of any CIA file on an individual reported which cause him to fit any class or classes in Appendix B.

APPENDIX B

Types of Individuals to Be Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

1. Individuals who have made threats of bodily harm against, or have attempted to cause bodily harm to, officials or employees of Federal, state or local Governments or foreign government officials while they are residing in or planning an imminent visit to this country; provided that such threats or acts are made against the Government official or employee because of his official status;

2. Individuals who threaten or attempt to redress a real or imaginary grievance against Federal, state or local Governments or any employee or official thereof by other than legal means;

3. United States citizens who defect or indicate a desire to defect;

4. Nationals of any country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc (including the USSR and Communist China) located in the United States, and who have escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto, and who have been of special interest or value to the United States, and who cannot be eliminated as a possible source of danger to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B;

5. Subversives, communists, racists and fascists in the United States who meet one or more of the following criteria:

(a) Evidence of emotional instability or irrational or suicidal behavior, particularly in persons who have a record of transitory residence or employment;

(b) Expressions of strong or violent anti-United States sentiment;

(c) Prior acts (including arrest or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.

The term "subversives" shall mean persons (including members of the Communist Party and Communist front organizations) who knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States or the government of any state, district or possession thereof or the government of any political subdivision therein by force or violence or by the assassination of any officer of any such government.

LAST MONTH

1963 OCTOBER 1963						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

1963 NOVEMBER 1963						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

NEXT MONTH

1963 DECEMBER 1963						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

Friday 22 November

[illegible] (ask [illegible])

A.M.		P.M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00	~~Intelligence Briefing~~	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	Cabin	2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	General Carter returned from ISO
12:00		4:15	due to death of
12:15		4:30	Pres Kennedy
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

MEMORANDA

LAST MONTH

1963			OCTOBER			1963
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

1963			NOVEMBER			1963
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

NEXT MONTH

1963			DECEMBER			1963
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

Sat. - Sun. 23-24 November

A.M.		P.M.	
SAT 8:30	w/ DCI Helms, Cline, R. Jack Smith, Col. White, Dr. Wheelon, Mr. Kirkpatrick at EAST		
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15	Whip, Helms, Cline, LBK — at East	1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		SAT 2:15	Mr. Bross, Mr. Kirkpatrick, Mr. Elder, Mr. Knoche
10:15 SAT	Met w/Wheelon + Kirkpatrick at Langley. Colonel White joined for a while	2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
SAT 12:30	Went to White House to pay respects to President Kennedy w/Mr Kirkpatrick	4:45	
12:45		5:00	

MEMORANDA

SUNDAY — 8:30 meeting at East Bldg w/DCI & Intell Briefing briefers. General Carter left at 12:00 for 12:15 meeting at DCI's house; then he was to go home
(w/Cline, Colby, + Elder)

327 Sat, Nov. 23, 1963 38   328 Sun., Nov. 24, 1963 37

LAST MONTH

1963			OCTOBER			1963
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

1963			NOVEMBER			1963
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

NEXT MONTH

1963			DECEMBER			1963
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

Monday 25 November

8:30 DCI, Karamessines & J. Smith clinic — at East

A.M.		P.M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	Left to pick up Mrs. Carter and Mrs. McCone to go to	2:15	
10:15	St. Matthew's	2:30	
10:30		2:45	Returned from Funeral after going to Quarters
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	3:30 Mr. Helms
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00	President Kennedy's funeral at St. Matthew's	4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

MEMORANDA 6:30 Stag Cocktail - Dinner hosted by General Burns and Dr. Montague — Army Navy Town Club (Red Room) in honor of visiting British JIC team, Informal

(DDI will stop by for a drink — in any [illegible] no other engagement)

Cancelled due to death of President Kennedy

14 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February

1. Present were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Mann, General Carter, Mr. FitzGerald, and Peter Jessup. General Taylor and Mr. FitzGerald were present only for the Cuban item.

2. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Bundy, General Taylor mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson an upcoming trip of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk, Fort Bragg, and Panama. After some jocular bantering, Mr. Johnson vetoed the Panama portion of the trip, with General Taylor hoping that this denial was purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility that he might go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there. He stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information from the Ambassador and that while he and Mr. McNamara might be going out later as a follow-up to their December trip, he felt the need to go now. General Taylor pointed out that there have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while. In any event, he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM committee headed by Sullivan would want to make such a trip. General Taylor seemed reluctant to have Mr. McCone go at this time. Mr. Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with Mr. McCone early next week.

4. The first item on the agenda was a discussion of the Vance memo of 10 February on "Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba." Mr. Vance stated that he was strongly for this course of action, that the risks were minimal, and that

the JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it. Mr. Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the paper had been sent to the Cuban Coordinating Committee in accordance with usual procedures. Mr. Vance stated that the committee knows all about it and are for it. Mr. McCone stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba and that this particular paper really does not go far enough. He pointed out that our economic denial program was eroding away and that the courses of action proposed by Mr. Vance's memo gave Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation without really accomplishing anything. Mr. Vance stated that prior activities in this regard had created great consternation in Cuba, and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof. Mr. McCone pointed out the many times that we have had to stand down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise level. General Taylor said that what we really must do is to reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President that a program of this type must be continued. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated to the President, along with Secretary Rusk, that they were not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that Mr. McNamara had reversed his position. Bundy pointed out that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache. Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthrow of Castro. At about this point both Mr. Mann and Mr. McCone stated that we should do everything possible to create provocations and distressing actions against Castro. Bundy stated that the low risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have too high a risk. Mann stated that we need to do a lot more homework before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled) and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet Meeting with the President to discuss this whole matter. The agenda item was left as follows:

a. Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work on the Vance paper and on other alternative courses of action to include pros and cons, noise levels, estimated results, etc.

b. Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution which was prepared during Martin's time.

c. As to the specific paragraphs of the Vance memo, Bundy indicated his personal views (not an Administration commitment) that items 1 and 2a were OK; 2b for Cuban ships only; 3a should be intensified; 3b and 3c were directly connected to a separate blacklist enterprise; 4 was OK. As for actions against Cuban subversion in Latin America, on paragraph 1 we should see just what our opportunities are, and on paragraph 2 CIA should determine just what we think the local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities might be.

Finally, after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance requirements for Cuba, General Taylor and Mr. McCone decided to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, and to take a fresh reading on the matter on Monday. Action: DD/I to cover the low-level matter over the weekend, DD/P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo.

5. The next item was a very cursory review of the covert action programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan, and China. Mr. Vance asked how we could measure the effectiveness of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could not be really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor. Mr. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of activity and he would appreciate some briefings by the action officers. (It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to have Colby and Bill O'Ryan make appointments with Secretary Vance specifically to discuss French operations and our Far Eastern operations.

6. Mr. McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U-2 aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February which was not given any distribution. Mr. McCone said that ever since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance flights over denied and unfriendly territory or covert flights over

friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organization and resources to be used, either SAC or CIA. Mr. Vance stated that NRO was involved and that upon receiving the urgent requirement from CINCPAC for this single flight and upon learning that the Taiwan assets were stood down because of fuel control problems, the JCS, Mr. McNamara, and he had agreed that SAC should fly the flight. He stated that Mr. McAfee of the State Department had been informed on Sunday night and that the Base Commander in the Philippines also knew about it. He stated that there were only two targets concerned and that with luck they could be obtained with a single flight. Mr. McCone pointed out that the question had not been raised with him by Steakley as to military aircraft or sanitized aircraft nor was he aware of the cover plan that might be utilized in the event of difficulties. Mr. Vance stated it would be the regular cover plan of a weather ship off course. Vance said this was a one-shot problem only and that as soon as it was completed, the planes and crews would be withdrawn. He said both he and McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC had sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single mission. He said they could understand the need for two airplanes in case one aborted but certainly not this large contingent. He said this had no connection with the South Vietnam broad coverage mapping and that the Taiwan assets should be used for this.

7. It was apparent that all were in agreement that the Director of Central Intelligence had the responsibility for approving requirements for photo coverage and for determining the appropriate resources to be used for this coverage whenever it required overflights of denied or hostile territory or whenever it required covert flights over friendly territory. Mr. Bundy stated that the DCI should prepare the necessary directive to this effect and circulate it to the other members of the Special Group for their approval at the next meeting. Action: DD/S&T

to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest, most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Distribution:
Original - DDCI
1 - Elder/Enright
Paras 1-5 to Mr. Paul Eckel DDP/SGO
Paras 6 & 7 - DD/S&T

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Notes by LC
[illegible]

18 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964
at the White House

1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that there would be a meeting with the President at 3:15 p.m., in the White House to discuss the most recent revision of his proposed statement to the Geneva Conference, and that I was expected to be there. Upon arriving at the meeting place I was handed a draft by Adrian Fisher. It subsequently developed that McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and the President must have had this draft for at least long enough to have thoroughly reviewed and considered it. In any event, I read it immediately and was struck by the fact that in those areas of the original draft as given to Mr. McCone by Dr. Scoville in which the DCI had taken exception, ameliorating language had been inserted in the new draft to considerably temper and meet objections of Mr. McCone. The draft was now much more a speech by the President as to what he hoped might develop as a result of mutual give and take rather than a statement of U. S. policy and definite intentions.

2. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied by Bill Moyer and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk, McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.

3. The President opened by stating that he had read the revised draft and wanted to know if there were any objections to it. Dr. Seaborg pointed out that he had some hesitancy about opening totally his closed-down plants for international inspection (paragraph 3, page 3) but that there were many ways of determining whether or not the reactor was in fact shut down -- he simply did not want to give carte blanche to inspectors overrunning the entire plant. This position was adopted. Dr. Seaborg then

said that he wanted it understood that the closing down of the plants was not necessarily a permanent commitment and that whenever it became necessary or desirable, in the absence of international agreement to the contrary, we should retain complete freedom of action to reopen a reactor any time we chose. This position was agreed.

4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that he had been working steadily the last few days to get agreement in the Pentagon on a paper substantially in accord with this draft and that the only thing that now gave them a problem was subparagraph (c) on page 4 as to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He said if this could be deleted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense would buy the paper. Their concern was that we would get so involved in these zones that we would lose freedom of action to shift nuclear weapons through the Canal Zone, for example, or by air through overflights. Secretary Rusk pointed out that they had discussed this a number of times before, that it was nothing new, and that he would hope we could establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa for example. The President said that when the crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on nuclear-free zones was eliminated.

5. I then stated that the President should know that there was on record a letter from Mr. McCone pointing out some problem areas that could develop in a number of these points, particularly as to our getting backed into a position of letting up on the need for full and adequate verification. I further said that aside from the intelligence aspects of the problem, there were certain policy matters as regards reaction of West Germany, and particularly France, that should be considered. The President then asked for Mr. McCone's letter and glanced through it rather hurriedly. General Taylor asked to see the letter and he did the same. I then gave a copy to Secretary Rusk, particularly pointing out those portions of DCI's letter concerning his membership on the Committee of Principals and his reservations at the policy

level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter. (Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked all afternoon and most of the night in revising the original draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he thought that they had moderated their language and weasel-worded the statement adequately to meet DCI's objections.) The President then asked me if I had any specific, further objections to the statement now that the nuclear-free zone problem had been eliminated and that the DCI's letter was on record. I stated that depending upon what was actually finally determined as an international agreement, we might be in serious trouble on verification but that this problem would come later. I felt that as a statement by the President there was adequate protection in future negotiations to ensure the best interests of the United States. (I subsequently checked with Adrian Fisher who assured me that there was no backoff in ACDA and State from the requirement for adequate verification and that the additional words inserted in the latest draft were specifically to meet DCI's prior objections. In other words, DCI's letter of comment is a matter of record with the President and the other principals at the meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intelligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was obvious that he had his tongue in his cheek in this regard to indicate that we not only covered our rear but our flanks as well.) The President then directed a number of actions as regards Congressional briefings, preparation of a talk for him to make to the American public in explanation of his Geneva Conference statement. In connection with this speech for American consumption, he directed that it be prepared so that any tenant farmer could understand it -- ten words per sentence, four sentences per paragraph, and four-letter words throughout.

6. This ended discussion of the Geneva Conference statement.

7. New subjects:

a. There was then a discussion of a letter to Khrushchev but I was not aware of the contents nor were the contents mentioned. The discussion revolved around the date at which such a letter would be made public.

b. The President then expressed his great concern over the emergent situation in Panama. He said that he had proposed injecting himself directly into the problem yesterday with a public statement and approaches to the OAS specifically to lay down publicly exactly what the facts were as regards Panamian aggression, intrusions into the Zone, killing of American soldiers with rifle bullets by snipers while they were armed only with bird shot, etc., etc. He said that he had been dissuaded from this course by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and others. He said he was shocked to read in this morning's New York Times a story (presumably the Tad Szulc article) that pretty well covered exactly what his proposals were. He said he still felt it was a good idea and that he thought Harriman, Rusk, McNamara, Johnson, and others should assemble small groups of Latin American Ambassadors and tell them what he, the President, wanted to tell them. He thought it was an even better idea if he did it himself. I did not get the impression that a decision was made in this regard nor do I think any action will be taken as a result of this meeting. Unfortunately the discussion centered then on the security aspects of leaks to the public and the President expressed in no uncertain terms, with great persuasiveness and even more emphasis, his unhappiness at his complete inability to say anything to anyone without its immediately being in the papers or getting around town. He made some very pointed comments reflecting on the integrity of the State Department and of the Department of Defense in this regard. He felt the situation had become extremely serious in the past two months since he had become President and did not recall any such problem when he was meeting periodically with President Kennedy. He said he was prepared to clean house wherever necessary to overcome this. Secretary Rusk pointed out that this had been going on for twenty years and was nothing new and McNamara agreed. The President thought it was worse than he had ever seen it before and that in his 22 years on the Armed Services Committee and around the Hill he had never been involved in anything like this nor had he ever been bothered by reporters once he had made it clear that he was not the talking kind. No decisions were taken, no actions directed although both Rusk and McNamara indicated they would immediately take whatever steps were feasible to improve the situation.

c. The President then reverted to Cuba and said that he questioned seriously whether these sabotage efforts were the proper thing for the U. S. to be doing. He thought they were both hypocritical and ineffectual and while he understood the need for some of them to maintain the morale of internal dissidents to the Castro regime and to maintain the morale of Cuban exiles, he thought probably these considerations were outweighed by the hypocrisy of our seeking peace and talking peace and conducting this sort of activity on the side. Rusk said that he had never been in favor of this program and had the same doubts the President did. McNamara said that he too had never been in favor of this program and questioned our participation. I stated that while this program was conducted by the CIA, every action taken had the full approval of the Special Group on which the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were adequately represented and that the program was designed in part for the specific purpose of generating internal sabotage and dissidents with a view to creating as many problems as possible for Castro and with a view to getting an escalation of anti-Castro activities in Cuba, that over the long run any type of effort such as this was an irritant to Castro and that such action had some effect, even though slight, on the Cuban economy. I said that over the long run you could not expect the Castro regime to fall from these actions alone but that every little bit helped, and that we had noticed over the past four months a considerable increase in sabotage actions generated from internal Cuban elements over which we exercised no control. I said that I could not take exception to the fact that this policy was a hypocritical one in the light of a peace offensive although I did not feel we were trying to make peace with Castro. I also pointed out that sabotage activities in North

Vietnam likewise had hypocritical aspects. At this point Mr. McNamara demurred and said North Vietnam was an entirely different matter but he gave no reasons therefor and this point was not developed further. General Taylor noted that in connection with sabotage operations they kept Castro constantly on the alert and kept his forces heavily occupied running hither and yon. The President noted that this was probably true but so little gain in it and generally seemed disaffected with sabotage efforts. Rusk pointed out that there was some value in maintaining some pressure of this type since to completely desist would eventually lead Castro to believe that he was immune from retaliation. The President then directed that he wanted a complete review of our Cuban policy and some new, imaginative thinking developed. I stated that this was presently heavily in train in all appropriate agencies of the Government, and Rusk and McNamara nodded their agreement. The President said he would want to meet as soon as people had drawn up their proposals. In connection with Cuba the President noted that he continued to desire the most drastic pressures on our Allies to insist upon their cooperation and assistance and compliance in our economic denial program against Cuba. He said that Segni and Erhard had both assured him we could count on the full cooperation of Italy and West Germany to cease any further Cuban trade. He said he wanted similar discussions prepared for him whenever he met these leaders and for our leaders to take the same line in any discussions they might have.

d. There was minor discussion as regards the situation in ~~North~~ South Vietnam with no one indicating any great enthusiasm or any great surge of hopefulness as to the present situation. The President stated he was most unhappy to be making a speech indicating that things were improving and then to have a USIA spokesman and an Embassy spokesman state in Saigon that things were falling apart. He said somebody was getting poor advice as well as poor information and he was inclined to think it was he. He said that he was new in the job and that he had in the past several months based his actions on the advice and guidance he had received from his principal advisers whom he considered professionals and experts in their fields. He said he was beginning to have serious doubts that his own judgment had been wrong in a number of cases although he was the first to admit that he had been wrong in the past throughout his life at various times and was certainly no more immune than anyone else from making mistakes. I got the distinct impression that he was mighty unhappy with some of the actions he has taken as a result of recommendations from State. I also got the feeling that from here on out he is much more liable to use his own intuition and prescience as to what should be done and what should not be done in the daily operations of his actions in the foreign policy field.

e. Turning to more pleasant matters, the President noted that the dinner he had given for the Congressional Committee leadership had been a complete success and that he was going to repeat it again on the 23rd and the 30th. He had received nothing but highly favorable accolades from the people who had attended and many of them indicated it was the first time they had ever been in the White House and certainly the first time they had had an adequate briefing by the Administration leadership. The President said that he had received a phone call saying that he should continue this and he was certainly going to do so. He had also been promised that at least in large measure as a result of this briefing he would have a tax bill reported out by Wednesday. The President then said we could do a lot better. He told Rusk and McNamara that they should take a nap in the afternoon prior to these two dinners so they would be much fresher and more alert -- that they had done an A No. 1 job but not quite up to the caliber that they had put on for the labor leaders -- in his mind that performance could not have been better. The President said he had planned for the briefing to be twenty minutes and that instead it had lasted an hour. He said that this was entirely too long and that Mr. McCone alone had spoken for seventeen minutes. He then said that for the next two dinners he was going to have only two briefers and the briefing would be scheduled for fifteen minutes and that twenty minutes was the absolute maximum he would sit still for. He said he wanted Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara to work this out together, with Mr. McNamara covering both the U. S. military and the Soviet military as covered by Mr. McCone, and Rusk covering the Soviet economy and the world roundup as covered by Rusk and McCone at the last hearing. I subsequently checked with Bill Moyer to determine whether this was a change from the President's instructions to Mr. McCone or whether it might have been an oversight. Mr. Moyer stated that the President had given much thought to this and since Mr. McCone would be away, he had changed the system to the one just enumerated. This makes abundant sense to me under the circumstances and I considered any further discussion either with Moyer or the President inappropriate.

8. The meeting then broke up at 4:15 because the President had to go out to dedicate a building.

9. The foregoing notes are in a single copy and will be shown only to the Director upon his return. Any actions indicated will be directed by me at the Monday morning meeting. I will send a very short, sanitized report of this meeting to Mr. McCone by cable.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

13-00000

~~[illegible]~~

4 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Johnson on 31 December 1963

1. The background as to the purpose of this visit is covered in my Memorandum for the Record dated 1 January on my visit to Independence to see Mr. Truman.

2. We departed Kansas City airport in the early afternoon of 31 December, arriving at the Johnson City airport shortly before 3:00. This airport was built by President Johnson in his own back yard and was subsequently turned over to Johnson City as their airport. We were taken to the Johnson residence and made comfortable in the combination office-sitting room just off the dining room. Coffee was served and in a few moments the President and Mrs. Johnson joined us. After appropriate welcoming to the ranch, Mrs. Johnson retired to her household chores.

3. Mr. Murphy briefed the President on our discussions with Mr. Truman and reported to the President Mr. Truman's desire to help in any way he could during the coming year. Mr. Murphy followed generally the comments indicated in my previous memorandum as put forward by Mr. Truman. I thought he gave a much too favorable report on Mr. Truman's condition and mental agility. This was understandable to me since Murphy is one of the junior old cronies of Mr. Truman. The President asked me for my reaction and I gave it substantially in accordance with the last paragraph of my Truman memorandum. I told the President that I certainly felt Mr. Truman was willing to do anything he could or was asked to do to assist President Johnson; that my own reaction was that Mr. Truman was in some respects senile and living 90% on memories and his past. I stated that I thought there was certainly nothing wrong with Mr. Truman's mind or alertness but that I felt some caution should be exercised in just how Mr. Truman's assets might be utilized. The President made no comment except to note

wryly that he himself occasionally had problems with his memory but that he did not think he was yet living with it entirely. The President then noted that we should have been briefing Mr. Truman more often and that perhaps had we done so, it would have prevented the type of article he had recently published about the CIA. The President then stated that he wanted President Hoover, President Eisenhower, and President Truman briefed monthly on the international situation as well as on the domestic situation and what his programs were. (Action: This requires follow-up with the White House and possibly a discussion between Mr. McCone and the President since Mr. McCone indicated informally that he thought once a month was too often and that, in any event, while CIA can handle the international situation, we should have some other agency handle the domestic situation.)

4. The President then made a number of statements which seemed to be in part his philosophy of operations and in others a repetition of his conversation with Erhard. It was difficult to separate when he was repeating what he had said to Erhard and when he was stating a Johnson principle.

5. The President stated that he was much taken with Erhard and that he thought him a smart, articulate German who was much more appealing than Adenauer. Erhard apparently attempted to feel the President out as to his reactions to various statements and positions taken by deGaulle. The President got the impression that Erhard was initially trying to play off deGaulle against the President. Mr. Johnson told Erhard that as far as he, Mr. Johnson, was concerned, he was going to do everything possible to promote a peaceful world but without in any way relaxing either our guard or our military strength; he was prepared to walk around the world if necessary to promote peace when he was convinced that such walking would assist -- on the other hand, he had no intention of making trips just to cultivate friends and promote the giving away of U. S. resources in an effort to entice people to join our camp; if they wanted to come in willingly with their eyes open, he would welcome them but he felt it was time for other nations to do some thinking on their own and to make their

own judgments without the need for U. S. persuasion in the form of concrete financial and military aid. Accordingly, the President intended to stay home and do his own heavy thinking as to just how he can best promote peace -- if this led to trips, then he would take trips. If people wanted to come to see him to talk about peace or other matters, he would be delighted to receive them but there must be something worthwhile to talk about and something that will lead in the proper direction. He said that during his lifetime the United States had been forced to fight two wars because of Germany and that he was not going to allow any situation to develop which might lead in that direction again so long as he was President. He said he would not be a party to any shilly-shallying in that direction and that Germany must make up its own mind and see which way they intend to go. If it were going to be toward deGaulle, then say so. If it were going to be toward the United States and its concept of a free world, then say so and prove it by putting more effort into their actions in this regard -- more effort in the way of more money and more support of United States policies. He told Erhard that this was the way he felt and there was no point in Erhard trying to play off deGaulle against President Johnson nor to try to get Germany in the middle between those two nations. The President said that Erhard apparently accepted this frank talk and for the rest of the visit never once mentioned deGaulle.

6. The President then directed that Salinger acquire from USIA and CIA a roundup of world reaction as to Erhard's visit. He said that if we did not make any money on that deal, we might just as well fold up our tent insofar as influencing foreign visitors was concerned because he, the President, had really put out and had really talked turkey to Erhard -- which was the only way he, the President, knew how to talk. He said that this administration was being criticized for either having no foreign policy or a poor one and that he therefore wanted as much publicity as possible on the highly favorable aspects of the Erhard visit. (I subsequently had a CIA report prepared and forwarded to Salinger on 1 January, pointing out that it was an initial report and that a real reading on Ambassadorial and Governmental reactions would be coming along

later since it takes more time to acquire these from somewhat sensitive sources.

7. The President then went on to say that people seem to have the impression he was going to sit back and try to keep things on an even keel so as not to disturb the upcoming election. He said that this was a wrong impression for people to have and that he intended to do everything he possibly could to ensure maintaining and augmenting the great forward momentum that President Kennedy had been developing toward world peace and proper domestic policies. He said that this was a time for real action and that the United States must get itself out of this trend of thought that it sits back and reacts to others' actions rather than creates actions of its own. He is tired of reacting -- he wants to act and let others react to him and this is one of the things he intends to think about during upcoming months. He therefore urges the most imaginative thinking possible both in and out of Government to see how best his ends can be attained. He pointed out that this was not going to be easy because this was an election year and lots of people would be looking for ways to attack him and his policies. He said, however, that he could not sit by and watch this opportunity for promoting peace and understanding among nations to dissipate simply because it was an election year in which he would be politically involved.

8. The President then said that he had been totally dissatisfied with what the State Department had proposed he send to Khrushchev and he had therefore sat down at the desk (pointing) and had in his own handwriting composed the New Year's message to Khrushchev. He intended to continue to promote every possibility for a basis of understanding looking toward peace and again reiterated that any agreement would never be at the expense of our own security.

9. He then asked me for a briefing of any current situations that he should be brought up to date on. I brought him up to date on Cyprus, on Cuba, and on South Vietnam since he had indicated that he had read recent Checklists.

10. As to Cuba, he stated his dissatisfaction with our present policies and actions connected therewith and said that shortly after his return to Washington, and probably after the State of the Union message, he wanted a comprehensive review of the Cuban situation and our policies and he wanted the most imaginative and forward thinking people put to work on seeing what else could be done. He did not feel the sabotage efforts would ever really result in any ultimate goals for U. S. interests but was prepared to accept some of them if they promote internal dissidents and assisted the morale of the people we were working with in Cuba. He stated he was not at all satisfied with the Governmental actions taken thus far to curtail free world trade with Cuba. He said he had told Erhard that he could not tolerate West German trade with Cuba and that Erhard had assured him that while it was very small, he would put a complete stop to it as soon as he returned to Germany. The President directed that thorough preparation be made so that when Pearson visits the United States, Mr. Johnson can take him on in the same manner and similar preparations should be made for other free world countries doing appreciable business with Castro.

11. There was then a discussion with Staats and Murphy about some sort of pork barrel program which was to be canceled and which Hubert Humphrey and Elvis Stahr had taken violent exception to. Apparently the President had received a vitriolic letter from Elvis Stahr about this matter because he commented that he now understood why Stahr had made such an inadequate Secretary of the Army. The lines of action directed by the President as to preparation of responses was not a matter for CIA.

12. There was then a discussion as to some sort of adjustment in tax procedures which, by reducing a figure from 15 to 14, would save some $800 million this year. Neither Mike Forrestal nor I heard this loud and clear but I think it had to do with adjusting withholding tax deductions. In any event, no decision was reached by the President and the conversation was directly with Staats and not for the rest of the group.

13. The President then turned to Indonesia and stated that he was faced with the necessity of making a decision as to whether or not it was in the national interest to continue aid to Indonesia. This decision had to be made by him in accordance with the foreign aid bill just passed. He said he wanted in writing from Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. McCone their recommendations as to what his decision should be. He also wanted to get reactions from Senator Russell and several other Congressional leaders. He quoted a figure of $25 million which was involved. (Action: The wheels are grinding in the Agency to come up with a pro and con and consequences paper for the Director upon which he may make his recommendation to the President. The figures are somewhat confused and the actual amount appears to be in the neighborhood of $60 million. Mike Forrestal has these figures pretty well tied down and points out that the Presidential decision does not require any action on PL 480 funds.)

14. The President then stated that he was totally dissatisfied with the proposed program for alleviating poverty which apparently suggested that he ask Congressional authorization for a lump sum of money which he would administer through some sort of newly-created poverty administration. He said he wouldn't touch it with a ten-foot pole and that if he proposed anything like that on the Hill, they would laugh him out of court and it would probably bring a defeat in the Democratic party in the upcoming elections. He would give absolutely no consideration to anything which could possibly result in graft or pork barrel activities. Any program for the relief of poverty must be designed to get right down to the grass roots out where the poverty actually exists and must be handled by existing Federal, State, and community organizations which are geared in this direction. He mentioned specifically the possibility of utilizing the Bureau of Public Roads and other similar Federal and State organizations. He said that if roads are to be built, they should be built into and out of poverty-stricken areas and to provide access to schools and hospitals and such human needs activities and not, repeat not, for the improvement of major trunk lines and highways. He thought perhaps the people who were receiving this

type of aid could be utilized in the construction of these roads where they would see the results of what they were doing and the purpose of it. He stated that any attempt to organize a new administrative entity to handle this matter would not even get off the ground before the year was out and would merely result in more Government people on the payroll and more bureaucracy. He directed an immediate reappraisal of his program for the relief of poverty and coming up with an entirely different concept for his approval. Mr. Staats and Mr. Murphy indicated they would follow through on this.

15. The foregoing covers all pertinent points to the best of my recollection. I shall write a separate memorandum of the tour President Johnson gave us of his ranch and with particular attention to the fact that he built and paid for every improvement on the place out of his own pocket, including the runway, the runway lights, and the dam across the river.

MSC

Ranch

Airport
Pedernales River -
Born - Cemetery -
Cattle - Lincoln Cont.
Guns -
No Secret Service.
Mrs. Johnson -

President:

M/R

Erhardt - much taken - smart - articulate - appealed more than Adenauer - Pres says he's going to stay home + think of ways to get peace - If others want to come talk OK - but he not make trips just for trips - He want Peace do anything to get it but never at expense of our own Security - told Erhardt not to play off de Gaulle against US - Germany to say which way they go - put more into it or We had to fight 2 World Wars because of Germany - this Pres. wasn't going to be a party to any shilly shallying like that - Then Erhardt was OK -

Pres. wants round-up from FBIS (CIA) and USIA on world reaction to Erhardt visit - said if didn't make money on that deal might as well give up - we get criticized as to foreign policy - build up a story - highly favorable reporting -

1 January 1964

Paragraphs for message to DCI

Mr. Enright handled sending of message on 2 Jan

1. The President has not yet approved the 1965 budget and it is being extremely closely held. Agency requirements totaled $122 billion and BOB cuts reduced it to $103 billion. Further cuts are quite obviously in the mill. The '65 total request will be less than '64 and expenditures will likewise be less than '64. There will be departmental reductions in Defense, State, AEC, Agriculture, with increases in HEW and Labor. With relation to Gross National Product, the '65 budget will be the smallest since 1951. This will be the first time in ten years that there has been a decrease in personnel, amounting to approximately 100. The smallest increase during this period was 7200 in 1957.

2. Major legislative proposals will be those that are left over from last session, such as Civil Rights Bill, tax cut, etc. New programs will include a procedure for attack on poverty, new program for aid to education below college level, new program for medicare, preparation for next year's foreign aid bill, etc. Major emphasis on human needs continues.

3. The President wishes to conduct an all-out review of our Cuban policy after returning to Washington. He particularly wants a more imaginative approach with hard-nosed emphasis on economic denials through pressures on third countries. This in line with his statements at recent Cuban meeting at White House.

4. President personally wrote New Year's message to Khrushchev, released today.

5. President faced with decision on whether or not to continue $25 million aid program to Indonesia. As you know, this is primarily civic action. He wants a study of pros and cons with recommendations in writing from you, Secretary of State, and others. Also wants reaction from Senator Russell and others on Hill. Will take up when he returns.

6. Salinger will send me tomorrow the memoranda he wrote on conversations with the Russians as to President's intentions.

7. President established outstanding rapport with Erhard and things are looking up in that area.

8. President greatly concerned over continuing situation in South Vietnam.

9. President wants General Eisenhower, Mr. Truman, and Mr. Hoover briefed monthly on international and domestic affairs. Stated that had President Truman been getting these regularly, he probably would not have authorized publication of CIA article. In connection with Truman article, this matter not argued at Independence.

10. President much interested in foreign reaction to Erhard talks. We furnished roundup news media reaction to Salinger today.

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank — TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document — Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

[redacted]

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY
SOURCE	MEMO FOR THE RECORD R. D. SHEA 25 May 1961	CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE		
COPY NO.		LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES		
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS		

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY	
OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE AND OFFICE	DATE
Mr.Shaffer						Shaffer	5 June
Mr.Dildine						W G Dildine	June 5
Mr.Kirkpatrick							
Mr. Shea							

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED	DESTROYED	DISPATCHED *(OUTSIDE CIA)*	
TO	BY *(Signature)*	TO	
BY *(Signature)*	WITNESSED BY *(Signature)*	BY *(Signature)*	
DATE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

FORM NO. 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 APR 55 (OP-2) 12-59

TOP SECRET

(40)

2 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Dave Morales, GS-14, Chief of CI Section, Miami Base, 25 May 1961

1. Morales, who was born in Arizona of Indian and Spanish parents and is bilingual in Spanish and English, former football player, arrived in Miami in October 1960 after spending two years at the Havana Station. He appears to have done a unique CI job in organizing, within the Frente, the future intelligence service for the new government of Cuba that the invasion force expected to install. He also organized two other groups. He did this with the help of a Chilean instructor that was supplied by headquarters, and with materials training that WH/4/CI Section, Mr. Simmons, sent down to him.

2. The principal group were 39 selected, highly educated Cubans, who were trained as case officers to form the future intelligence service. They are known as the "AMOTS". After being trained they were employed by Morales in doing a series of highly important tasks for the good of the station. These were as follows:

a. Penetration of the local anti-Castro organizations.

b. Penetration of the pro-Castro organization in Miami, the so called 26th of July organization.

c. Preparation of biographical information on all prominent persons in the Frente.

d. Carding some 200,000 Cubans in the period of three months.

e. A special section of the AMOTS monitored all radio transmissions coming from Cuba. This amounted to eight stations that were covered on a 24 hour a day basis.

f. Screening of all persons recruited for the ~~grade~~ Brigade (but this work first started in November 1960, and by that time 300 or 400 men had already gone to camp). This AMOT screening of the military trainees really amounted to a field check since the various cases were discussed with Cuban sources of information present in Miami.

g. Mail censorship. All mail coming from the military camp in Guatemala was censored by this group before being released for transmittal to Cuba.

h. Four of these were sent back to Cuba with instructions to report on CI targets; chiefly the secret service and the police.

3. The second group trained by Morales were 100 selected Cubans who were given training as future CI officials and civil government officials. Of the 100 thus trained, 61 were sent to the camp in Guatemala for training with the brigade. They accompanied the brigade on the invasion, and of the 61 only two were lost, nine were caught and the rest got out, due to the circumstance that most of them were on the steamer Lake Charles which owing to the developments at the beaches did not land its troops. These men were given the job of penetrating inland as fast as possible with the troops and identifying and seizing records and documents of the Castro government. Following that they were to set up the temporary civilian government of Cuba. This group were ~~was~~ known as the AMFATS. The members of this group were brought back to Miami where they are now living privately. The third group were the AMCHEERS, a group of approximately 100 older, nonpolitical individuals, who received training from Morales as a reserve in intelligence personnel. Eighty of these had been trained by April 1961 for eventual legal return.

4. Morales stressed that POA's had been received on members of all three groups and that the AMOTS received tradecraft training far in excess of that received by the average Agency staff employee.

5. After the invasion the Frente leaders endeavored to change the AMOTS into a political organization and remove the chief leaders of the AMOT group. Such a development had been anticipated by the base and prior to that action all files, the most valuable part of the AMOT organization had been microfilmed (see my interviews with Simmons for more details on this protective maneuver). The chief AMOTS who were thus removed by the Cuban leaders are still organized under Morales as a shadow intelligence organization.

6. Personnel shortages. Morales accomplished all of the foregoing with the aid of only two girls, one a GS-9 analyst. He tried in vain for more than three months to get a junior case officer assigned, but in vain. This request was forwarded through Simmons, the CI Chief in WH/4. Morales tried to get one or both of two JOTs who were in Miami on TDY, but the JOT office refused to release them tha on the ground that it would interfere with their training. Morales feels that these young officers would have learned more in

three months under him than they would learn in three years of formal training. As a result of being so short handed, Morales had to work about 14 hours a day, seven days a week. Otherwise, however, he received excellent support generally, both from Headquarters and the other sections of Miami Base.

7. As for suggestions for better operation in the future, Morales made two points. (a) the screening of military trainees should start at a much earlier point than was done this time; (b) more adequate number of personnel should be furnished.

Shea

R. D. Shea

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank — TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document — Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

[redacted]

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY
SOURCE	MEMO FOR THE RECORD R. D. SHEA 1 June 1961	CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE		LOGGED BY
COPY NO.		
NUMBER OF PAGES		
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS		

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY	
OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE AND OFFICE	DATE
Mr.Shaffer						Shaffer	9 June
Mr.Dildine						W J Dildine	6/12
Mr.Kirkpatrick							
Mr.Shea							

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED	DESTROYED	DISPATCHED *(OUTSIDE CIA)*	
TO	BY *(Signature)*	TO	
BY *(Signature)*	WITNESSED BY *(Signature)*	BY *(Signature)*	
DATE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

FORM NO. 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 APR 55
(OP-2) 12-59

TOP SECRET

(40)

TOP SECRET

5 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Clark Simmons, Chief of WH/4's CI Section, 1 June 1961

(This memorandum should be read after Morales interview)

1. Simmons is a dedicated CI type having spent the last 11 years chiefly on CI matters largely under OTR auspices. He spent two years in Egypt, 1954 to 1956, setting up and training the Egyptian CI Staff, apparently starting from scratch. He has been with OTR since then and came to WH/4 in mid-April 1960. He is about to be transferred to the WH Division Staff and his replacement will be Louis Napoli who will head the new combined FI/CI Section of WH/4. He stressed that the charter of the new combined section will give CI the right to interfere in any operation. This will be spelled out explicitly, thus countering the difficulties that Simmons had in dealing with the PM Section prior to the invasion. Bob Andrews will stay on for CI matters and Seehafer will head the FI part, both under Napoli.

2. AMOTS (future Cuban intelligence service trained by Morales at Miami). This idea started when Anderson of WH Division Staff told Simmons that he had a Chilean CI officer who was available for training Cubans. Drawing on his Egyptian experience, Simmons drew the AMOT plan and prepared the training materials and sent them to Morales for execution. It was Morales who subsequently conceived the idea of training the AMFATS (future CI service) and the AMCHEERS, a reserve intelligence corps consisting of substantial older men. These matters are discussed in detail in my memorandum on Morales. Morales also organized a group of former Cuban diplomats presently in Miami to have them available when a new government is set up. Subsequent to the invasion the AMOTS have been substantially changed by Cardona. He has replaced the top AMOTS by political appointees who have no skill in tradecraft. The top men thus fired had anticipated such a move, and, in addition to microfilming 120,000 cards, they removed all cryptonyms and all memoranda of conversation between them and Morales with the result that the new service doesn't know the identity of the AMOTS who are presently in Cuba. The AMOTS initially numbered 96. The Miami Base now has from 18 to 22 of them of whom ~~a~~ four are inside Cuba with 14 subsources; all of them producing FI and CI reports. By December 1960 the AMOTS had produced 1,800 intelligence reports and 750 radio monitor reports.

not controlled by Cardona or Varona

TOP SECRET

3. In dealing with the Miami Base, Simmons stuck strictly to the relationship between Headquarters and a foreign station. His command channel was, of course, via Chief of WH/4 to the Chief of Miami Base to Morales. He and Morales understood each other perfectly and there was no ~~other~~ obstacle of any sort in their collaboration. There was no second-guessing or double case offering in CI matters.

4. Simmons and his section ran a number of CI ops directly from Headquarters. He referred to the following:

a. A certain lady of easy virtue who had a vast acquaintance among the top Castro people.

b. A Greek sailor who for eight years has worked for the Agency as a penetration in Communist maritime unions in various countries.

c. A certain former Spanish intelligence officer, Amshad, who has been living in Havana in the home of the chief of G-2. Unfortunately, an expected Castro official appointment did not materialize and this operation has not proved to be of much value.

d. A former U.S. negro citizen now in the Cuban service.

e. Juan Orta, former chief of Castro's executive office, now out of office.

5. Simmons gave me the attached copies of four basic documents.

Tab A - WH/4 counterintelligence plan, June 1960

Tab B - Counterintelligence plan for an FRD security service, late August 1960

Tab C - CI program for future project, 20 April 1961 - [illegible]

Tab D - Counterintelligence assets, 29 April 1961

In addition, Morales gave me a copy of a dispatch summarizing Miami's CI assets currently in Cuba, (Tab E).

6. Relations with PM Section: Simmons' relations with the PM section seem to have been marked with a considerable amount of friction, perhaps more than always results from the resentment operators feel at the inhibiting influence of the CI man. Thus whenever a PM agent was lost, a CI man would analyse the files and draw a damage sheet showing what the agent knew, etc. Simmons showed me a large file containing about 50 of such cases. This work was made more difficult because the PM people kept only very skimpy records. A CI representative, Rothwell,

also went over all incoming radio messages from agents to scrutinize for the use of freedom signals. When the absence of such signals was pointed out to PM they would sometimes claim that the agent had merely forgotten them. CI was able to stop all cable traffic to such agents when under suspicion. After a while Rothwell was delegated to be the CI contact with the PM people, and due to his quiet methods and competence he gained a fair share of their confidence and the work proceeded more smoothly.

7. Simmons and his section prepared a 225-page study* of Castro's intelligence organization. This document was distributed generally throughout the U.S. intelligence community, as were also some extensive studies on Cuban block wardens. They also issued CS/CI information reports and Simmons gave a number of briefings to higher-ups. They were able to identify 14 provocative activities by the Cuban services in the U.S., Dakar and Havana. They identified a U. S. employee of the U.S. Embassy in Havana as a Castro penetration agent in 1960.

* This document contains the identities of 492 Castro G-2 staff officers.

8. From September 1960 to January 1961 Simmons spent half of his time working on the case of the three ST ESCALATE members, i.e., the audio and development team which was arrested in Cuba and is still under arrest. If these men had checked in with the CI Branch before departure they would have been warned not to go. Simmons regards this matter as of the greatest potential danger to the Agency, e.g., if these men should be sent to Moscow to be milked.

9. Simmons described the following difficulties he had had:

a. His section was not fully staffed until October 1960, although he went to the greatest lengths to get additional people. He first had a machine run made for a list of CI personnel having a knowledge of Spanish. He checked the records of the individuals thus disclosed. He sent the names thus selected to the WH/4 personnel officer who made a great effort, but in no case was he able to get a man taken off his present job. He feels that the DD/P should in the future tell all his senior officers of the importance of such a project so that the latter will cooperate when their valuable ~~is~~ requested. After borrowing Melberg from covert training for two TDY trips, Simmons could not face going to Marchand with a further request, and instead asked Jack Earman in the DCI's office to help him get Melberg for another trip. The Director of Training complained of this irregular procedure. If Mr. Bissell had so informed his senior officers, Simmons feels that they would have received better cooperation. The result of lack of personnel was that they all worked six or seven days a week. Simmons knows of no case of a directed assignment to the project. As it was, he personally had to spend 80 per cent of his time on administrative matters with the result that he could only spend 20 per cent of his time on operations. His final T/O was four case officers, four analysts, two clerk-typists and one secretary.

b. Working space was also a great problem. From May through September 1960 they were working seven or eight in a single room.

c. Dr. Willets, chief of the JOTP refused to release two JOTs whom Morales wanted as assistants in Miami. One of these is named Ben Ramirez and is very fluent in Spanish.

10. For the future Simmons recommends:

a. That an LCFLUTTER operator be assigned to each base permanently, not withstanding the expense. The need for such a man at times can be very urgent.

b. There should be one cleared Staff D room containing all relevant files so that the entire job can be done in one room. This means all Staff D files involved, all operating cards, personality and report cards, so that, for instance, a CI analyst can go there and do a complete job in perfect security. The Staff D yield was a "gold mine".

c. If CI section had been told the time and place of the invasion they could have checked their records on the area and the adjacent areas and have given the brigade recommendations for document seizing, etc. in the towns that would be passed through.

11. Despite "difficulties referred to above, Simmons feel that the results of his section's work were very good, and that one indication of this is that the upper echelons of the Agency sent him many matters for handling that were not strictly of a CI nature; for instance, inquiries from the DCI, from Congress, etc.

12. In cases where the CI Section discovered that an agent communicating by radio was not using his safety signals, CI would help the PM or other section to handle that agent in subsequent communications so that he would be kept alive. This sometimes required that requests by the agent for supplies be complied with. In one case LUGLOG. Simmons was intent on preserving the man so that he could be used at the end for purposes of deception. The agent requested an air drop and it was decided to comply. Simmons said that Gen. Cabell disclosed to the Cuban aircraft a crew that was to make the air drop that the agent was a double agent. Accordingly the crew did not even go near the drop, nor did PM Section advise Simmons until four days later that this had occured. The result was that the man was immediately taken off the air and Simmons had indications that he was shot. If Simmons had been advised earlier of the failure to make the drop, he could have tried by a suitable message to explain the omission.

R. D. Shea

13-00000

ca. Jun 60

JMARC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN

TAB 4

I. MISSION

To develop and/or maintain and extend, through agents and other covert means, intelligence coverage of the organization, personnel, target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of the Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party; to similarly develop intelligence coverage of activities affecting the Caribbean area which are conducted by the U.S.S.R., by the U.A.R., and by the Chinese Communists or other pro-CASTRO officials and groups; to protect current and future CI, FI and CA operations through analysis of their operational plans and through examination of new operational proposals; and to coordinate designated CI matters with the CI Staff and with staff and geographic components of WH Division.

II. REFERENCE

JMARC OPERATIONAL PLAN

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

It is essential that an aggressive counterintelligence program be devised and implemented to ensure sound operational security for JMARC operations. The JMARC counterintelligence effort will, therefore, be directed towards acquiring information concerning the organizations, personnel, target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of foreign intelligence and security services active in the Caribbean area; towards analyzing JMARC operational proposals and steps in light of what is learned about opposition intelligence capabilities and activities; and towards containing inimical activities directed against JMARC assets and operations.

IV. ORGANIZATION

The following personnel and facilities are required for successful attainment of JMARC CI objectives.

a. **Personnel:** One senior CI officer; four operations officers; five analysts (three with a proficiency rating of "high" in reading Spanish); three clerk typists; one secretary. Initially, two case officers and one analyst should be sent to the JMARC Forward Operations Base (FOB) to carry out assigned tasks discussed below. Two analysts (with at least high proficiency rating in reading Spanish) will be assigned to the task of screening certain information reports. Two analysts (one senior) and a clerk typist will form a records unit for the CI Section at Headquarters; two operations officers and a clerk typist will form an operations unit for the CI section at Headquarters.

b. **Facilities:** The CI section a t Headquarters will require working space for ten personnel and for the following heavy office equipment: eight desks and chairs; eight standard typewriters; one card safe; three four-drawer safes. Standard office supplies should be provided. The CI operations unit at the FOB will require support commensurate to its size.

V. PHASING

A. PREPARATORY PHASE

1. **Principal Objectives:** To acquire current CI information on opposition services in Caribbean area through developing counterintelligence operations and through recording CI information.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. The Branch/4/CI officer will:

(1) Keep Chief, Branch/4 informed on CI requirements, opportunities and developments affecting his branch.

(2) Keep FI Deputy, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff, and the latter's appointed staff representatives (Victor Wallen, Robert Brown, Paul Burke, and Birch O'Neal), informed on CI matters in which they have an agreed interest (see below).

(3) Direct assistance CI personnel in performance of those jobs relating to the responsibilities cited below.

(4) Carry out such other tasks which may be assigned to him by Chief, Branch/4.

The senior CI officer and individual section officers designated by him will accomplish the following:

(1) Familiarize themselves with selected Branch and CI Staff redord assets and with designated branch and division personnel pertinent to their responsibilities in order to effectively exploit these assets and to coordinate work on CI operations with the appropriate persons.

(2) Familiarize themselves with current CI operations affecting Cuba which are directed by Branch/4, by CI Staff, and/or by WH Division with the objective of assuming responsibility for these.

(3) Plan, coordinate, initiate and conduct CI operations not specifically assigned to Paul Burke or Birch O'Neal of CI Staff.

(4) Prepare draft CI requirements for FI/D analysts (accomplished). In addition, prepare or locate and forward to other Branch/4 officers pertinent CI requirements and operational guidance papers pertinent to these officers' assigned responsibilities. (To date, I have forwarded my own study on "Utilization of Exile Groups in Clandestine Operations" to Jerry Droller.)

(5) Prepare an operational summary format for use by operations officers reviewing cases (accomplished).

(6) Prepare a defector register format card (accomplished) and organize and maintain a register of defectors.

(7) Exploit certain research and operational support assets of the Clandestine Services in order to help all Branch/4 sections in the achievement of their objectives. To this end, one analyst will work on materials controlled by CI Staff.

(8) Examine current operations and/or programs in the FI and CA fields in order to ensure that CI opportunities are fully exploited and to identify operational security threats and to recommend sound courses of action which will prevent or counter such threats.

b. CI Staff components (cited in each instance) will have the following responsibilities:

(1) Chief, SID, CI Staff: Action responsibility for penetration and double agent operations against Cuban Intelligence and Security Services at home and abroad (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/4/CI and all traffic will be released by WH/4.

(2) Deputy Chief, ICG, CI Staff: Action responsibility for penetration of Cuban Communist Party via third countries, using Cubans as agents (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/4/CI and all traffic will be released by WH/4.

(3) Victor Wallen, Operations Division, CI Staff: Responsibility for compiling records and studies on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services. To this end, Victor Wallen will:

(a) Prepare and maintain a briefing notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services (accomplished).

(b) Prepare a guide for screening WH/4/Reports personality cards and other record assets in order to identify suspect persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine activities (accomplished).

(c) Prepare lists of suspect persons and maintain these lists on a current basis for exploitation by all Branch/4 sections and other Agency components with operational interest. (Initial lists have been prepared in 13 books).

(d) Prepare or assemble CI requirements, as requested, which pertain to the maintenance of CI notebooks on the Cuban services. (Initial requirements have been drawn up for Ernie Sparks use.)

(4) Deputy Chief, CI/ICG: Responsibility for compiling records and studies on Cuban Communist Party. To this end, questionnaires have been prepared for Agency officers assigned the task of interrogating persons knowledgeable of Cuban Communist Party personnel and activities.

(5) WH/FI will prepare studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad.

2

B. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE

1. Principal Objective: To advance our knowledge of opposition services and to develop a security service for the Cuban Government in exile.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. WH/4/CI: During this second phase, WH/4/CI personnel will:

(1) Screen operational correspondence and cable traffic for leads to CI operations against the Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party and forward pertinent leads and CI information to appropriate CI Staff component and/or authorized security officers of agencies of U.S. intelligence community.

(2) In coordination with Political Action Section of WH/4, outline an organization for a security intelligence service for the Cuban Government-in-Exile and list its functions in detail.

(3) Continue and/or complete all tasks cited in Phase I.

(4) Staff the FOB with two operations officers and one analyst to perform those functions necessary to the initiation and conduct of secure CI operations and CI protection activities.

b. CI Staff: The SIG, ICG, and OPS/WH, as indicated, will carry out the following activities:

(1) Revise the notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services as required (OPS/WH).

(2) Prepare organizational studies and blacklists of Cuban Intelligence and Security Services personnel, and black lists of persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine activity, in

three categories of sensitivity for use by the Agency, by designated members of the United States intelligence community, and by authorized components of the Cuban Government-in-Exile. (OPS/WH)

(3) Revise lists of suspect persons as required. (OPS/WH)

(4) Prepare special studies on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and on the Cuban Communist Party and other groups and organizations active in the Caribbean area, as required. (OPS/WH)

c. WH/FI will continue studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad.

VI. COORDINATION

Coordination on CI operations and on operational support activities which involve WH/FI, CI Staff and WH/4/CI will be effected by senior CI officer of WH/4. Communications on these matters will be by telephone and/or personal meetings. CI aspects of WH/4/FI and CA operations will be discussed by appropriate section officers and the senior CI officer or the latter's designates.

Prepared [illegible] Sept

TAB B

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN FOR AN FRD SECURITY SERVICE

I. MISSION

To select, assess, organize, train on-the-job and support FRD personnel for a security service capable of protecting the FRD, its personnel, installations, secrets and activities from sabotage, subversion and espionage.

II. REFERENCES

B

A. Project Operational Plan

B. Project Political Action Plan

C. Project Counterintelligence Plan

D. Project Counterintelligence Budget for Fiscal Year 1961

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

It is essential that the Agency create an aggressive service for FRD-Project activities. Since there is no certainty that the leaders of the FRD will achieve and hold responsible positions in a new Government of Cuba, and since there is an everpresent threat that political or operational flaps may destroy the FRD as an effective Project instrument, it is essential that the Agency's role in creating an FRD security service be carried out under cover of the BENDER-CARR group. It is also essential that the leaders as well as rank and file members of the FRD pay more than lip service to the requirements of an effective security apparatus, even though these requirements dictate a need for major changes in the modus operandi of individual members. To this end the BENDER-CARR group must direct the FRD to accept, in return for its support, controls and limitations which must be imposed by the security service if operational security is to be achieved.

The Agency's objectives in establishing and supporting a security service for the FRD are:

A. To protect its operational interests in the FRD; and

B. To acquire counterintelligence information through participation in FRD operational security activities.

The security service of the FRD will have as its objectives:

A. Screening all personnel holding significant FRD positions;

B. Screening new adherents to the FRD;

C. Maintaining pertinent file information on FRD personnel;

D. Maintaining physical security of FRD installations;

E. Staffing FRD debriefing centers;

F. Enforcing personnel security regulations;

G. Indoctrinating FRD members on personal security;

H. Monitoring malcontents; and

I. Acquiring both positive and counterintelligence information.

To build a security service for the FRD capable of attaining Agency and FRD objectives, it is necessary for the Agency:

A. To supervise the selection, assessment and training of eight candidates;

B. To identify and select secure office sites in Miami, New York, Washington and Mexico City, and to procure a secure safehouse training site in Miami;

C. To create an organization which can fulfill assigned security functions.

D. To supervise the training of thirty-two additional candidates to staff the organization;

E. To support the organization through the BENDER-CARR group by providing sanitized record data, special training, financial backing, and, at need, operational facilities; and

F. To supervise through the BENDER-CARR group the organization's day-to-day activities.

To implement the plan for an FRD security service, BENDER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York will be briefed on the plan for an FRD security service. The Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, will be directed by BENDER to select seven officers to be processed for jobs with the service. Processing will include medical examination, polygraph, and psychological assessment of the candidates. They will later be briefed on the objectives and functions of the security service by a representative of the BENDER-CARR group. They will be trained on-the-job by a Chilean ex-police officer who will be recommended to the FRD by the BENDER-CARR group. The training will cover subjects pertinent to the service's day-to-day security responsibilities as spelled out in the organizational plan. The FRD security components in Mexico City, Washington and New York will be initially assigned one officer each from the first group of eight candidates. The remaining five candidates will be assigned to Miami. Of those candidates subsequently trained for the security service, two additional men will be assigned to Washington; six to New York; six to Mexico City; and eighteen to Miami.

IV. ORGANIZATION

The organizational structure of the FRD security service and of the Agency's related support structure are outlined in Attachment "A"; the facilities and personnel required to staff and support these structures are discussed below:

A. Facilities

1. Security office sites in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York. (These will be selected by the Office of Security; the Office of Security will identify these sites to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will direct their use by appropriate FRD components.)

2. A training site will be selected in Miami by the Office of Security and identified to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will recommend it to the Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.

3. One four-drawer safe will be acquired by the Office of Security for use in each office site in the above-named cities.

4. Appropriate office supplies will be assembled by the FRD component in each site.

B. Foreign Personnel

1. A Chilean police officer has been selected and recruited as training officer for the security service. The BENDER-CARR group will recommend him to the FRD for this job as an individual who, in its experience, is best suited for the job, and as one who is most acceptable to the BENDER-CARR organization.

2. The BENDER-CARR group will direct Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, to immediately select seven officers for processing and training prior to assignment in the FRD security service. Later, thirty-two additional officers will be selected for processing and training.

C. Staff Personnel

1. BENDER-CARR representatives will deal directly with Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, in all matters pertaining to the security service.

2. Project CI officers will provide through BENDER-CARR representatives all advice, guidance and support to the security service and its chief.

V. PHASING

A. Preparatory Phase (25 August - 15 September):

1. Primary Objective:

To implement the plan for the security service by selecting, assessing and training an initial cadre of eight officers, including chief of the proposed service.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Advise BENDER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York, by dispatch where appropriate, before 26 August, of the Agency's plan and objectives regarding an FRD security service.

b. Advise Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, through BENDER, to select seven officers to participate with him in processing and training for assignment to the FRD security service.

c. Procure from each candidate a complete PHS, a certification of health dated this year, and three letters of recommendation from as many FRD sponsors.

d. Arrange for polygraph examination of candidates through the Project security office.

e. Procure through the Project security office an appropriate training site in the Miami area which will accommodate a minimum of eight trainees and an instructor.

f. Assign trainer to Miami after BENDER gets concurrence of Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.

g. Arrange for Project CI officer in Miami to brief trainer on his assignment.

h. Quarter trainer in training site.

i. Advise FRD representative to purchase minimum office supplies from list to be provided by the Project CI officer.

j. Provide trainer with a curriculum and a training schedule which encompass on-the-job application of techniques and skills.

k. Discuss with Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, the organization and functions of the proposed security service.

l. Initiate training of eight candidates (including Chief of the service) and processing of others.

m. Get signed secrecy agreement and loyalty oath from each student.

n. Identify and assess (for recruitment) potential agent candidates as Agency-controlled sources.

B. Development Phase: (16 - 30 September)

1. Primary Objective:

To build the security service in a way which will enable it to perform its assigned functions.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Assign trainees to FRD components in the cities named above.

b. Complete processing of remaining candidates.

c. Procure secure office sites in the cities named above or check the sites previously selected.

d. Initiate training of remaining candidates.

e. Activate a records center in Miami and provide it with sanitized record data.

f. Forward physical security plan and physical security regulations to Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, through BENDER.

g. Forward operational security regulations for security service to Chief, through BENDER.

h. Forward administrative procedures (involving communications among FRD elements, document controls, etc.) to Chief, through BENDER.

i. Give remaining trainees their security service assignments.

j. Recruit candidates selected in Preparatory Phase.

C. Action Phase (30 September on):

1. Primary Objective:

To identify and contain rabid CASTROITES, Cuban Communists, members of the Cuban Security Services, and Orbit espionage and sabotage personnel.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Move the security apparatus into Cuba with the FRD.

b. Provide FRD security service with black lists and record data pertinent to the above objective.

c. Monitor FRD security activities through the BENDER-CARR group.

D. Consolidation Phase:

1. Primary Objective:

To direct the FRD security service in its efforts to maintain public security and to contain foreign services activities.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Request existing security units in the country to stay on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets, and security force facilities.

b. Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists affecting CASTRO security personnel to the FRD.

c. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba.

VI. COORDINATION

The above plan will be coordinated with the Political Action, FI, and Support Sections of the Project.

VII. SUPPORT

See SUPPORT ANNEXES.

13-00000

FOR FUTURE
(present) TAB C

20 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT : CI Program for JMATE Project

1. Objectives:

a. To add to our knowledge of objectives, operations and assets of the CASTRO services.

b. To bring about the defection of selected key personalities in the Castro Government and military services.

c. To plan and mount deception operations involving Agency-controlled double agents and W/T play backs. To date, four W/T operators in Cuba are deemed suspect. The fate of our two double agents, who may have accompanied the BRIGADE in its assault on Cuba, will be determined during the course of the next few days. It is anticipated that other candidates for double agent operations will be identified in the States; their exploitation will be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

d. To support and direct the AMOT Intelligence and Security Service in Miami in the fulfillment of agreed upon objectives.

e. To support and direct 44 AMOT officers and agents now in Cuba, in the collection of intelligence pertinent to Project needs, and in the fulfillment of such other covert action assignments which may be deemed within their competence.

f. To introduce into Cuba unilaterally-controlled counter-intelligence agents.

g. To intensify the Project's Communist Party penetration program.

h. To increase counterintelligence operations run into Cuba in conjunction with liaison services of friendly countries.

i. To counter the espionage, subversive and sabotage operations directed by the Castro services against other States within the Western Hemisphere. This to be done in conjunction with the services of these countries with which we maintain liaison.

C

2. Assets:

a. AMOT Security Service: The AMOT complex is made up of 97 AMOT staff and clerical personnel, 34 AMFASTS (security-counterintelligence teams) located in the Miami area, and 63 AMCHEERS (senior Cuban citizens drawn from banking, commercial and ranching circles in Cuba), also located in Miami.

b. An Agency-controlled Communist Party penetration agent located in Havana.

c. An Agency-controlled agent with access to leftist and Communist circles in the Western Hemisphere, now in New York City.

d. An agent candidate with access to engineering circles in Havana, who will be available for assignment in Cuba in June of this year.

e. A third country agent under diplomatic cover now assigned to, and in place at, Havana.

f. Other CI assets Inside Cuba:

Through the AMOT and other clandestine channels approximately 30 individuals, the majority of whom are Army officers, had indicated a willingness to defect in place and help the opposition forces when the strike came. Although the rebellion was crushed before it could advance sufficiently for the 30 individuals to fulfill their commitment, it may be assumed that some of these people are still willing to cooperate and may be recruited for the purpose of furnishing information now denied us and possibly for performing certain operational functions such as establishing nets and recruiting agents. At the Granma Base, for example, where approximately 4,000 troops are stationed (according to AMOT-34), three captains have indicated willingness to cooperate. The Infantry commander agreed to try to take the base and the nearby cadet school. Assuming that he had that capability, it may be further assumed that he could recruit agents and informants at these bases.

Other possible assets of this type include the chiefs of the Fourth and Fifth INRA Zones in Pinar del Rio and the Chief of Police in Santa Clara, Las Villas Province.

In addition we have on hand a list of potential defectors who have shown disillusionment with CASTRO, and who have been approached but who have not yet declared themselves. It is possible that the turn of events may have heightened their disillusionment; may be worth trying to recruit them at this time.

4. Problems and Resolutions:

a. AMOT-KUBARK Relationship. The Agency must recognize the possibility of strained feelings because of the failure of the invasion. It is believed that the Agency representative in Miami will be able, because of his excellent personal relationship with the Chief of the AMOT service, to maintain a satisfactory working relationship.

b. Status of AMOT Agents in Cuba. The Agency must anticipate the need to exfiltrate AMOT agents now in place in Cuba in the event their positions become untenable.

c. Operational Climate. The Agency must anticipate the development of an increasingly unfavorable operational climate inside Cuba in view of the increased security measures being implemented by the Castro services.

d. Compromised Agent Assets Inside Cuba. The Agency must assume that the paramilitary assets inside Cuba have probably been compromised by Castro security counter measures taken at the time of the invasion. Each of these assets or net must be examined to determine their continued usefulness. The inclusion of trained CI officers, such as the AMOTS or [illegible], in various teams infiltrated into Cuba can serve to ferret out and neutralize identified penetrations.

Clark W. Simmons
Chief, WH/4/CI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/4/CI Chrono

13-00000

SECRET

TAB D

29 April 1961

MEMORANDUM TO : Chief, WH/4/OPS
FROM : Chief, WH/4/CI
SUBJECT : [illegible] Intelligence Assets
Reference : [illegible] Capabilities in [illegible] (dated 28 April 1961)

[illegible] "CI Program For JMATE Project", dated 20 April 1961. This paper was prepared at the request of Chief, WH/4 on 20 April 1961, to indicate CI capabilities in the post-strike phase.

D

SECRET

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Task Force W

NO.

DATE 10 July 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Deputy Director (Plans)				
2. Mr. Elder for DCI				By Hand
3.				
4. ER-file				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				EYES ONLY
10.				
11.				SECRET
12.				BY HAND
13.				
14.				
15.				180151

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

EYES ONLY

SECRET

EO 62-4791

10 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Juana (Juanita) CASTRO Ruz

1. ACTION: None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. In connection with Task Force W efforts to split the Cuban leadership, some time ago we targeted Juana Castro Ruz, half-sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz. A number of reports have been received indicating that Juana Castro Ruz opposed the strong communist nature of the Cuban regime and was prepared, at least to some extent, to cooperate with anti-regime elements. In May 1962 we reestablished contact with and recruited Mrs. Virginia Leitao De Cunha, Cuban born wife of the Brazilian ambassador to the USSR and a long time personal friend of Juana Castro Ruz.

3. On 11 June 1962, on our instructions, Madame De Cunha proceeded to Havana where she maintained frequent contact with Juana Castro Ruz and other prominent Cuban leaders until 1 July 1962. She discussed the current regime quite frankly with Juana Castro Ruz and, according to Madame De Cunha, she obtained Juana's agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban communist regime, short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raul and Fidel. According to Madame De Cunha, Juana has agreed to proceed to Mexico or the United States in this connection and return to Cuba after discussions with "the Americans".

4. We are making the necessary arrangements with Madame De Cunha to have Juana Castro Ruz proceed to Mexico as soon as possible in order that we may attempt a direct recruitment. You will be kept advised of any future developments of importance in this case.

William K Harvey

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

C/TFW

SECRET

EYES ONLY

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic

downgrading and

declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Executive Registry
62-310

FROM:
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
1317 Barton Hall

NO.

DATE 10 January 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. ~~DCI~~ DDCI 203 Admin. Building	Admin File			orig to DDCI - 1/13/62
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

180085

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY
SECRET

DD/S-2-0171
DD/S-62-0173

Executive Registry
62-310

10 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : Project JMATE

REFERENCES : a. Recommendation approved by the President, 4 August 1961, Subject: Covert Action Program Against Cuba

b. C/WHD Memorandum to DCI, Subject: Action with respect to the Agency Reserve for Contingency held by the Bureau of the Budget, approved by DCI 19 October 1961

1. The references cited established the current JMATE activity and obtained funds in the amount of $5.36 millions to operate the project during the period 1 July - 31 December 1961.

2. As set forth in paragraph four of reference "b" it is intended that the financial and audit requirements of this project be regularized to the extent possible consistent with operational requirements.

3. In the Project Authority, reference "a", on 4 August 1961, and in subsequent discussions, the President approved covert operations including the funding of various persons, groups, or activities, Cuban and non-Cuban, which, in our opinion, may be able to advance the over-all objectives of JMATE. These individuals, groups, and activities are and will be many and varied. In many instances we will be able to exercise little or no control over the funds, materiel, arms, or equipment given such entities nor receive any suitable accounting from them.

SECRET

4. I have, therefore, authorized the Deputy Director (Plans) to pass to such persons, groups and activities, such JMATE monies, materiel, arms and equipment as in his opinion may be necessary to support such persons, groups and activities. The Deputy Director (Plans) is authorized to delegate this authority to the COP/DDP, the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the Chief, WH/4, and Chief, JMWAVE, as he may desire.

5. Funds advanced in accordance with this authority shall be accounted for in accordance with normal Agency requirements except, that, with respect to activities not controlled or administered by the Agency, such as those described in paragraph 3 above, certifications by the person passing funds to the activity may be accepted as final accounting when approved by an official designated above. Such certifications shall state the amount passed, date, and general purpose of the payment, and that further accounting is not practical.

6. During the Project development, writing of sub-projects as set forth in paragraph four of reference "b" will be deferred. In lieu, thereof, the project will provide you with copies of reference "a" which will be supplemented by more formal documentation when specific projects evolve as determined by the Deputy Director (Plans). With the exception of the activities cited in paragraphs three and four above, activities which in the opinion of the Deputy Director (Plans) lend themselves to regularization through administrative plans or fiscal annexes will be so documented.

7. This authority does not amend regulatory authorities in respect to administrative matters covering Agency personnel.

SIGNED
JOHN A. MC CONE
Director

CONCUR:

/S/
Comptroller

12 Jan 62
Date

/S/ CPC
DDCI
Date [illegible]

CC: DDCI
DDP
DDS
Comptroller
C/Audit Staff

13-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Base, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/JMATE/AMCT
Status Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For information and files

1. Following is a brief summary of JMWAVE/KUDESK current assets in the Target Area (CUBA):

a. AMCT-34: Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Habana. We are maintaining contact via SW. Subject had a W/T set, cached it and no longer has access to it. AMRYE-1 has been instructed to deliver another one to him.

b. AMCT-48: Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Oriente Province. We are in contact with Subject via a cutout at the Guantanamo Naval Base.

c. AMCT-106, 107 and 108: These three Subjects are sisters. They provide AMCT-34 with operational intelligence in Habana.

d. Rolando MANGUART Julia: Subject is an AMCT sub source in Pinar del Rio. Subject is currently reorganising his assets in that Province.

e. Jose Manuel FERNANDEZ Quintana: Subject is an AMCT sub source in the Port of Habana.

f. Violeta MACIAS is an AMCT live drop in Habana and is still active.

g. Norberto MARTINEZ is an AMCT sub source and is active in Habana and Pinar del Rio Provinces.

2. JMWAVE/KUDESK current and future plans are to continue to support and direct the existing assets it has in Cuba as outlined in paragraph 1 above. Moreover plans are now in motion for the following:

a. Exfiltrate, either legally or black, MANGUART and MARTINEZ for further training and return to the target area

E

Distribution:
3- WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
22 May 61

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA- 1639

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-5-3

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIGINATING

b. Recruit and dispatch in the near future of at least four other agents to the target area.

c. Exfiltrate AMOT-68 for training and return to the target area. Plan is also to provide him with a trained radio operator.

3. WAVE/KUDESK is in the process of reorganizing both the AMOT and AMFAST complex as follows:

a. AMOT is being reorganized as a unilateral anti-Castro Cuban Security Service.

[redacted]

7. In support of other Base JMWAVE Sections, the KUDESK Section will develop and recruit assets for use in the target area. An example is making available at least twelve AMOT/AMFASTS for commando type raids on the Cuban coast and mainland.

8. WAVE/KUDESK will continue its primary mission of:

a. The detection, identification and neutralization of hostile intelligence action.

b. Provide security checks on agents, potential agents and assets, and

c. Provide, with the security section of Base JMWAVE, security checks on ODYOKE covert relationship with Cubans and Cuban organizations. In addition the KUDESK Secti will continue to develop an apparatus to be used as an Agent Corps which can be use in the rollup of Castro and Communist agents, [illegible] support of the post-Castro government. AMOTS, AMCHEERS, AMFASTS and AM[illegible] will be the main source for thi

122

SECRET

21 May 1976

File: SSC/LA

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Walker
A/SA/DDO

FROM: Arthur C. Close
Deputy Chief, Cover & Commercial Staff

29

SUBJECT: CIA Relations with [Lykes Steamship] Company

REFERENCE: Review Staff Memorandum (RS-76-0421/A), dated
19 May 1976

1. Cover and Commercial Staff (CCS) files reveal that three CIA employees served under cover of the [Lykes Steamship] Company during all or part of the period 1962 through 1964. One Agency officer was placed abroad under [Lykes] cover from 1961 to 1968. A second served under the same cover from 1953 to July 1962 before leaving the Agency to take a bona fide position with the company; he later agreed to assist the Agency as an intermittent source in Europe from 1964 to early 1967. A third officer was placed with [Lykes] in this country in 1961 and underwent training in anticipation of an overseas assignment; he was withdrawn the following year when the assignment abroad was cancelled.

6

2. There is no reference to Mr. [Owen Barnell] in CCS files.

Arthur C. Close

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 061088

SECRET

5/mc

121

SECRET

File: SSC/LA

20 May 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO

FROM : Jackson R. Horton
Chief, Domestic Collection Division

29, 6

SUBJECT : SSC Request for Information on Lykes Brothers Steamship Company and Owen Johnson Darnell

REFERENCE : Review Staff Memorandum 76-0421/A dated 19 May 1976

29 1. The Domestic Collection Division (DCD) utilizes the Lykes Brothers Steamship Company primarily as a source of foreign intelligence information. Secondarily, DCD provides introductions for Cover and Commercial Staff officers to Lykes Brothers officials for operational discussions and, on occasion, obtains assessment data from Lykes Brothers sources on foreigners of potential operational interest. 29 Correpondence in the DCD file on this company for the year 1962, 1963 and 1964 was confined to responses to military services requests for the registration of various Lykes Brothers employees in the Interagency Source Register and memoranda concerning a proposal to utilize an employee of Lykes Brothers, who was a member of a U.S. delegation to the USSR, for the collection of foreign intelligence information on the Soviet Union.

2. DCD records indicate that Owen Johnson Darnell was considered a "source lead" in years prior to 1965 but he was never used as a source. His file was routinely destroyed in June 1971, along with other files on "source leads" which had been inactive for five years, as authorized by Chief, DCD.

Jackson R. Horton

JACKSON R. HORTON

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

SECRET

7/mc

CONFIDENTIAL

2

30 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Chief, CI Meeting with Mr. Paul Wallach, Chief Counsel of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

This meeting occurred on Wednesday, 29 October 1975 as a result of concern on the part of Senate Select Committee officers that the Agency was not forthcoming with file material related to the Lee Harvey Oswald case, i.e., the assassination of President Kennedy. The following points were made by the principals as indicated.

Chief, CI - To open the meeting Mr. Kalaris made it clear that the Agency is anxious to demonstrate that we have nothing to hide and that all pertinent material was made available to the Warren Commission. He added that the procedure for making material available to the Senate Staff posed certain problems with regard to sources, methods and liaison, which were delaying the turnover of material. He then presented several examples of the sanitization process in which cables taken directly from the 201 file were edited so that all evidence of source, method and liaison information was removed.

Chief Counsel - As an opening reply Mr. Wallach stated that his position was that he considered that the Senate Committee should have the same access as the Rockefeller Commission. He added that in his discussions with several senators on his committee they had mentioned reports that a Rockefeller reviewing official by the name of Belin who had had access to the original file, had appeared on several talk shows and was going to write a book based on his review of Agency holdings on the Oswald case.

Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then pointed out that there were certain particularly sensitive aspects of the material which could not be released for use outside of the building.

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 064737

He gave two examples of this. One was the fact that the Mexican Government security liaison contact on the case was the current President of Mexico. He said, and Mr. Wallach agreed, this was obviously a matter which had to be protected. The second case was the Mexican Government penetration of the Cuban Embassy. Again Mr. Wallach agreed.

Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then suggested that the answer might very well be for the Senate Committee review officers to work with the original file with the exception of those particularly sensitive items which would either be sterilized or summarized. Mr. Kalaris added that to establish the sensitivity of these items he would be willing for the sterilizations/summarizations to be spot checked against the originals by the Senate reviewers.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach conferred with his colleagues and then agreed that this would be acceptable. He did inquire as to approximately how many such items there would be. He was informed by Mr. Kalaris that it was somewhat difficult to access but that there should not be more than 100 such items.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that it would be necessary for his people to take notes, but he would agree that these notes not be taken from the building. The purpose of the notes is simply to allow the reviewers to keep track of where they have been and what they have seen. It was agreed at a minimum that their notes would be checked with us.

Chief, CI - At this point Mr. Kalaris called Mr. Blee and requested approval of the above procedure. Mr. Blee concurred.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that his people would tab those sterilized or summarized items which they wanted to discuss and we would confer with them on those points.

Comment

Mr. Wallach mentioned that Mr. Proctor (DDI) is a family friend and he wanted to make contact by phone.

At the end of the day the reviewers returned the three files of other agency documents and offered their notes for review. It was agreed they would return on Monday to start reviewing files and that we would have at least 15 volumes ready for them. Mr. Wallach was to call on Friday to confirm our readiness.

R. Wall

Robert G. Wall
Deputy Chief, CI/OG

cc: Chief, CI
ADDO
SA/DDO
Review Staff - Walt Elder

SECRET (When Filled In) EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 53 PER #

ACTION EUR 6 ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/IC2, CI/OPS, CI/RA, SECUR 4, CA/PROP, CA 5

#079

S E C R E T 151047Z MAR 69 CITE ZURICH 1629

DIRECTOR INFO BERN

17 MAR 69 IN 15450

REF DIRECTOR 83209

1. NAGELL LAST APPEARED AT ZURICH CONSULATE MORNING 7 MARCH AND STATED THAT IF HE RECEIVED NO SATISFACTION BY FIVE O'CLOCK THAT AFTERNOON HE WOULD CARRY OUT HIS THREATS AND EXPOSE US GOVERNMENT ON RADIO, TELEVISION AND IN THE PRESS.

2. HE THEN DISAPPEARED, NOTHING FURTHER HEARD FROM HIM AND, NO PUBLICITY GIVEN. MORNING MONDAY 10 MARCH CONSULATE ZURICH ADVISED BY TELEPHONE FROM US CONSULATE BARCELONA THAT NAGELL HAD APPROACHED THEM AND MADE SIMILAR THREATS.

3. FILE: 201-746537. (NAGELL)

S E C R E T

SECRET

1-1241

SECRET

SX/P 24633

Executive Registry 68-5160/1

20 NOV 1968

XAAZ-35926

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Letter for Director from Sir Charles Spry (ASIO)

1. Attached is a sealed letter from Sir Charles Spry, Director General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (who provided a copy of the letter to the Chief of Station, Melbourne), and a suggested reply for your signature.

2. Sir Charles' letter to you recommends against declassification of the Warren Commission document CD-971, which refers to our investigation of anonymous telephone calls to the Canberra Embassy before and after the assassination of President Kennedy.

3. I consider the points made by Sir Charles in his letter to be valid and accordingly recommend against the declassification of CD-971 in the foreseeable future. CI Staff concurs with this recommendation.

/s/ [illegible] E. Nelson

William E. Nelson
Chief, Far East Division

Attachments, 5
- A. Letter from Sir Charles Spry
- B. Letter Replying to Sir Charles Spry
- C. [illegible] 3808, subject: Declassification of Warren Commission Document CD-971
- D. Copy of CD-971
- E. [illegible] 3826, subject: Request for Release of Warren Commission Document

cc: DDCI

DDP/FE/PMI/AN:Amos Taylor, Jrl:arc (19 November 1968)
Distribution
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
2 - DDP
1 - ADDP
1 - C/CI Staff
1 - CFE
1 - CFE/PMI
1 - CFE/PMI/AN

RECORD COPY

26 Nov 68

SECRET

201-289248 38-1

SECRET

68-5160/ii

DD/P 8-4635/1

26 NOV 1968

FILE

Sir Charles C. F. Spry
Director General
Australian Security Intelligence Organization
G. P. O. Box 5105BB
Melbourne

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 15 October recommending against the declassification of Warren Commission document CD-971. I might mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968) was in anticipation of further pressure for the release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is not, at the present time, any intention to release CD-971.

Should the question be raised at some future time, the points made by you in your letter provide every reason to keep the document out of the public domain.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
Orig - Addee
2 - DCI
1 - DDCI
2 - DDP

cc: DDCI

1 - ADDP
1 - CFE
1 - PMI
1 - PMI/AN

Signature Recommended:

[illegible]
Deputy Director for Plans

2 [illegible]
Date

DDP/FE/PMI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X 5502):aib (25 November 1968)
5681

39-1

201-289248

~~SECRET~~

IP 8:46351

26 NOV 1968

Sir Charles C. F. Spry
Director General
Australian Security Intelligence Organization
G. P. O. Box 5105BB
Melbourne

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 15 October recommending against the declassification of Warren Commission document CD-971. I might mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968) was in anticipation of further pressure for the release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is not, at the present time, any intention to release CD-971.

Should the question be raised at some future time, the points made by you in your letter provide every reason to keep the document out of the public domain.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

CORRES RELATING TO THIS / INCLUDING NAVY Ltr OF 27 June 68 TO RELATIVE / FILED IN MAIN OSWALD FILE

Document Number 1042-947c

for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

cc: DDCI

Signature Recommended:

[illegible] 1968

Deputy Director for Plans

1 - ADDP
1 - CFE
1 - PMI
1 - PMI/AN

2 [illegible] 1968
Date

Distribution:
Orig - Addee
2 - DCI
1 - DDCI
2 - DDP

DDP/FE/PMI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X 5502):aib (25 November 1968)
5681

40-1

~~SECRET~~

24 OCT 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Supplementary Information on James Earl Ray

REFERENCE: DDO Memorandum for DCI dated 23 October 1975
Subject: Background for Rather Interview -
James Earl Ray

Dick Ober (then in CI) who wrote all the early Ray cables, recalls that he had numerous discussions with the FBI on the matter, and is certain that whatever we did was undertaken at the request of the FBI. Because of the fast moving situation, most of his discussions with the FBI were on the phone, and not the subject of written memoranda. The paper clipped outgoing cable in referring to Eric Galt (the man initially identified by the FBI as the assassin of Dr. King) requests "addressees make every effort determine if Galt is or has been in your area. Information para one should be passed to liaison and any other likely sources. FBI requests that any information reported be evaluated as to reliability and that as much detail as possible be provided. Cable any positive reply priority to HQS. and pass to legal attache if any in your country." There is a scribbled note in the file, presumably in Ober's hand, which reads: "4. Ray fingerprints: FBI agreed to my proposal we send to field for liaison." Ober, also logically points out that the FBI would not have provided us later with a fingerprint formula (see attached cable), a detailed physical description and photos unless they wanted this passed on to overseas liaison services. (Note that our cables did not go, for example, to Ottawa or Mexico City.)

David H. Blee
Associate Deputy Director
for Operations

Attachments

~~E2 IMPDET~~
~~CL BY 0357~~68

13-00000

ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CIOP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 18 Apr 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER ORIGINATOR

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/CI ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR CS/RF, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/EUR, C/WH, C/FE, C/NE

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 19 01 32 Z

(elite) (reference number) CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION

Book

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, ~~CARACAS~~ CARACAS, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, [illegible] HELSINKI, HONG KONG, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE, RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH.

RYBAT WOMUSE

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY LNERGO CONCERNING SUSPECTED ASSASSIN OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. NAME ERIC STARVO GALT, ALIAS HARVEY LOWMYER, ALIAS JOHN WILLARD, BORN 20 JULY 1931, HEIGHT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TO

RAY
cc Assassin
cc CSDO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#________

CONF:

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RI

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:

FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pi

TO CITE DIRECTOR 92664

FIVE FEET ELEVEN INCHES, WEIGHT 160-175 POUNDS, MEDIUM BUILD, BROWN HAIR, PROBABLY CUT SHORT, BLUE OR HAZEL EYES, MEDIUM COMPLEXION, RACE WHITE. OCCUPATION: HAS CLAIMED EMPLOYMENT AS SEAMAN. REMARKS: NOTICEABLY PROTRUDING LEFT EAR; REPORTEDLY IS A LONE WOLF; ALLEGEDLY ATTENDED DANCE INSTRUCTION SCHOOL; HAS REPORTEDLY COMPLETED COURSE IN BARTENDING; CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

2. WILL POUCH PHOTO OF GALT TO ANY ADDRESSEE DESIRING IT. ADVISE.

3. GALTS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHILE HAVE NO REASON BELIEVE GALT HEADED FOR YOUR AREA, DESIRE COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES MAKE EVERY EFFORT DETERMINE IF GALT IS OR HAS BEEN IN YOUR AREA. INFORMATION PARA ONE SHOULD BE PASSED TO LIAISON AND ANY OTHER LIKELY SOURCES.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______ PER______ #______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO______ BRANCH ☐ FILE R

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (P

CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO

LNERGO REQUESTS THAT ANY INFORMATION REPORTED BE EVALUATED AS TO RELIABILITY AND THAT AS ~~MX~~ MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE BE PROVIDED. CABLE ANY POSITIVE REPLY PRIORITY TO HQS AND PASS TO LEGAL ATTACHE IF ANY ~~AT~~ IN YOUR COUNTRY.

DC/CI (in draft)
(Mr. Hunt)
E/COPS

WH/FI (by phone)
(Mr. Smyth)
DC/FE (by phone)
(Mr. Smith)

DDP Richard Ober by direction/S.H.

for C/NE R Ober

~~X~~CI/OP/DO Richard Ober

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

29 NOV 78

9. OLC/HSCA Mr. Breckinridge	30 Nov 78			Donald F. Vogel
10.				
11. DDCI		14 DEC 1978		
12. Don Vogel DCSE/ORA				
13.				
14.				
15.				

9 [illegible]
SE Ex[illegible] paper
on KH
I concur in above
suggestion. Still trying to
set up meeting with Stokes.

Executive Registry
78-9213/1

Talked to Stokes
HSCA will
drop this matter.
12/14.

14 DEC 1978

SECRET SENSITIVE

BY HAND

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY
FILE Spec Int F #5

SECRET SENSITIVE

DD/O 78:7248

Executive Registry
78-7213

29 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations
Acting Chief, Soviet/East European Division

FROM : Donald F. Vogel
DCSE/ORP

SUBJECT : Talking Paper for Briefing Chairman Stokes, HSCA, on KITTY HAWK

SIGNED BY : Donald F. Vogel
DCSE/ORP

CONCURRENCE : Deputy Director for Operations

ORIGINATED BY : Donald F. Vogel
DCSE/ORP

ACTION :

DISTRIBUTION : Original - DDCI
1 - Executive Registry (dummy copy)
1 - DDO
1 - ADDO
1 - DDO Registry (dummy copy)
1 - C/CI
1 - AC/SE
1 - DCSE/ORP

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007117

SECRET SENSITIVE

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY
FILE # Spec INT F8

DD/O78:7248

Executive Registry
78-7213

29 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations
Acting Chief, Soviet/East European Division

FROM : Donald F. Vogel
DCSE/ORP

SUBJECT : Talking Paper for Briefing Chairman Stokes, HSCA, on KITTY HAWK

1. The Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee on Assassination, Mr. G. Robert Blakey, has requested access to "all reports and documents referring to an operation code named KITTY HAWK," which Mr. Blakey describes as "a project concerning the debriefing of a Soviet defector and a KGB analysis of the Kennedy assassination." You propose to provide Chairman Stokes an oral response to this request.

2. Chairman Stokes may be informed that "KITTY HAWK" is not a defector but is a very sensitive in-place KGB source with whom we have not had recent contact but who is known to be alive and well. There has been some mention of KITTY HAWK in the press in connection with the current investigation of the fate of Nicholas SHADRIN, an FBI-CIA double agent who disappeared in 1975 while in Vienna for a meeting with the KGB. In spite of the unfortunate publicity, however, KITTY HAWK has apparently been able to survive KGB scrutiny thus far, and we continue to abide by the Director's statutory obligation to protect his identity.

3. We have reviewed our holdings on KITTY HAWK and have found no reference to any "KGB analysis of the Kennedy assassination" or any other information pertinent to the Committee's interest. Discussion of the assassination of

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007117

President Kennedy took up only a small portion of the time spent in debriefing KITTY HAWK. You may wish to inform Chairman Stokes that in 1966 KITTY HAWK volunteered his impression that Kennedy's assassination "was planned and carried out by VIP's, possibly due to Kennedy's opposition to Texas oil interests." He added that he believed that the KGB was embarking on a "disinformation" campaign to have the assassination blamed on President Johnson, but he had no specific details of this campaign. KITTY HAWK also said that he was "personally well acquainted" with Lee Harvey Oswald's background because he had helped prepare the file on Oswald which was turned over to the United States Government by the Soviet Government. KITTY HAWK was not questioned further on this point, and there is no further reference in the KITTY HAWK file to any KGB or Soviet Government activity with respect to the assassination.

4. Although strictly speaking it is not relevant to this inquiry, you should be aware of the fact that KITTY HAWK supported Nosenko's bona fides by reporting that Nosenko had done the KGB considerable damage (more than Golitsyn) and that the KGB was looking for Nosenko and intended to kill him if they found him. This is pertinent because those who hold to the theory that Nosenko was a plant tend also to subscribe to the belief that any KGB source or defector who supported Nosenko's bona fides was also KGB-controlled. Introduction of KITTY HAWK into the assassination controversy can only serve the purpose of obfuscation.

Donald F. Vogel

Donald F. Vogel

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Operations

29/11/78

Date

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1999

SECRET

Executive Registry
78-3793/2

OLC 78-3613
December 6, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DCI Meeting with Chairman Boland of HPSCI, 5 Dec. 1978

At the Director's request, he met with Chairman Boland accompanied by the Legislative Counsel in the HPSCI offices. He asked to brief the Chairman alone on two private matters.

1. With respect to the first, the Kampiles Case, the DCI informed Chairman Boland of the sensitive source information involved in the case after the Chairman indicated that he was interested in this information. The DCI reminded Chairman Boland that the DDCI had offered to brief him when the Kampiles Case first broke but that the Chairman had not deemed it necessary to receive the information at that time. After the communication, Chairman Boland agreed with the DCI that it might be best not to brief Mr. Mazzoli or other Members of the Committee. The DCI informed the Chairman that he might have some personal difficulty with Mr. Mazzoli on the question during his first appearance in the New Year, but it was agreed that the DCI would be able to make his explanations. (S)

2. The DCI briefed Chairman Boland on a personal matter and indicated that he had briefed Chairman Bayh on the same question. (C)

3. Messrs Latimer and O'Neil joined the meeting at this point. The DCI discussed the Iranian situation, the alleged intelligence failure and the hand-written memo from the President. He indicated that the President's displeasure had not been directed at him personally, but at the subject of political reporting in general, both overt and covert, and Chairman Boland described the answer which he had given to ABC News a week ago on this point. The Chairman had apparently stated that political reporting was an Embassy function and not one solely the responsibility of the Intelligence Community. (C)

4. Charters: The DCI asked HPSCI to get involved in the Charters questions at an early stage and not wait for the Senate to finish its work. Because of the Church Committee legacy there are likely to remain some important differences between the Senate and the Administration on Charters questions on which the DCI stated it would be helpful to have the HPSCI view during the negotiation process. Tom Latimer then asked that we make sure we keep him supplied with all the position papers that have been developed by the Working Group which we agreed to do. (C)

5. Finally, the DCI discussed the Authorization Bill and our hope that an FOIA repealer and a provision permitting our security people to carry guns be included. Mike O'Neill later called back to obtain our language on these questions which we have agreed to supply him.(C)

From the standpoint of the Committee, Chairman Boland asked whether we had had any extensive involvement with SAVAK during the reporting period on Iran. The answer was negative with respect to Iranian domestic

SECRET

REGISTRY
Spec INT 8

activity. Secondly, the Chairman brought up the question as to whether we had received any report from Guyana about the goings on at Jonestown at the time of the Ryan incident. The Director replied that our Chief of Station had picked up some information on Jonestown subsequent to the incident and had passed it to the State Department since it involved U.S. persons. Later Tom Latimer and Charlie Rose asked me for a full readout of our information from Guyana so that the Committee would be in a position to state clearly what the limitations on our knowledge in that area are. (C)

Frederick P. Hitz
Legislative Counsel

DISTRIBUTION: DCI
DDCI
DDO
ER
MP(OLC)
OLC Record Copy
FPH Chron

ORIGINAL CL BY 532-112
☐ DECL ☒ REVW ON 12/7/98
EXT BYND 6 YRS BY 532-112
REASON 3D3

HALPERN, SAM
Interview by Brian Latell, Michael Warner
7 APRIL 1998

MW: This is the interview with Sam Halpern, done by Brian Latell and Michael Warner in the spaces of the Center for the Study of Intelligence on the 7th of April, 1998.

BL: Sam, you told me that you read recently the IG report on the Bay of Pigs.

SH: I did, and the responses....

BL: Which were recently declassified by the Agency, and you told me that you had never seen it before, and that had you seen it when you were running Operation Mongoose you would have learned some critical lessons. You said that it was a shame that you had not seen it.

SH: That's right. Neither did Bissell; I mean, neither did Harvey and neither did Ted Shackley. Harvey's dead so I couldn't ask him, but I asked Ted the other day whether he had ever seen the report, and he said no he had never seen it and nobody had ever talked to him about it. So here you have the man in charge of a new Cuban Bay of Pigs SIC Operation, although we weren't going to send in 1,000 troops. And you have the guy in charge of the whole thing, Bill Harvey, and of course the DDP himself, Dick Helms. Helms by that time....When we were doing Mongoose, none of the three people, none of the three senior people ever saw the damn thing. I think McCone was wrong not to let those three people, at least those three people, see the thing, because the sections dealing with the organization and management of the whole Bay of Pigs Operation had lessons for what we were doing in Mongoose, and we were running the same kind of operation in terms of trying to overthrow a foreign government.

BL: What, in particular, would you have done differently? What specifically, what lesson specifically applied to Mongoose?

SH: I think one of the biggest things was a Governmental structure and what and how it was done, and how it was done under Mongoose. Fortunately under Mongoose CIA was not the main target of the Government structure. We were part of a Government-wide operation, as opposed to the Bay of Pigs. The Bay of Pigs as I read the report was basically a CIA operation supported to some extent by the Defense Department and politically by the State Department. In Mongoose it was totally different in that directions - all directions - came from the White House, basically Bobby Kennedy, through the voice of a fellow called General Edward Landsdale. But in terms of the management of the thing, one of the best things that ever happened in Mongoose was that the three senior people who were involved in this, namely John A. McCone as DCI, Dean Rusk as Secretary of State, and Bob McNamara as Secretary of Defense, refused, flat out, to follow the original concept of Mongoose, which was that Ed Lansdale would be set up as Chief of Operations reporting to Bobby Kennedy, the Attorney General. All the other agencies of Government - the three I mentioned plus Commerce, Treasury, USIA, and God knows how many other pieces - would all have detailed men, money, and material to Lansdale, in effect creating a brand new agency. The three senior members of the cabinet that I mentioned, except for the Director, three senior members said "no, we can't do that. Congress appropriates the money to us and we're responsible for the money and the manpower and the material. We'll put our shoulders to the wheel, we'll follow all your orders, but only through command channels." That's what made Mongoose different than the Bay of Pigs. In the Bay of Pigs the CIA stood out like a sore thumb, and in Mongoose CIA was subdued in terms of just being part of a whole series of people that were involved. In terms of the organizational structure, and the management of the thing, I think that with Harvey, particularly, in charge, and with Helms as his boss as DDP, we avoided one problem automatically in there were two senior men who organized our part of Mongoose the way we in the Agency had always done in terms of headquarters and the field station. We regarded Miami, which was headed by Ted Shackley, as almost the equivalent of headquarters. It was JMWAVE. He had more people under his command than we had in the branch, or in the task force up in Washington. I think he ended up with about 600 staffers including commo and logistics and God knows what else.

BL: So you did solve that problem?

SH: We solved that problem.

BL: Because the IG report criticized the Bay of Pigs Operation because of the poor coordination/communication between Miami and Headquarters.

SH: We did it without knowing that. We set up our organization without knowing what way they had done it before. It was sheer luck. You had Harvey and you had Helms. Two old hands in the DDP business, and that's the way we set it up. But I think if we had known what the problem was in the Bay of Pigs operation I think we would have been helped a bit, in terms of at least watching out for that because there could have been a real problem if somebody had said it back here, "Hey you're doing it all wrong you know; you can't have a station in the United States." Well, in this case we didn't even ask anybody, and we didn't ask Landsdale, and we didn't the President, and we didn't ask Bobby, we just did it our way, and with the support of a guy called Larry Houston, CIA's General Counsel, who said, "Set it up any way you want to," in effect. "You guys are responsible and you are reporting to the President; go, and go with God." And we did. But I think we would have felt a lot more, at least I would have felt more comfortable, in knowing that we weren't going to face some of the problems that Jake Esterline had faced. One of the things we didn't have to worry about, and Jake did have to worry about, is this business of the air support. We weren't worrying about air support, because we weren't operating in Air Branch or anything like that. Jake's problem, for example - which Bissell thought he had solved by that memorandum that he wrote in October of 1960 where he set up the command relationship between DPD and Branch 4....It's fine on a piece of paper, but I asked Jake specifically "How'd it work?" He said it didn't. Those things just don't happen the way you write them on a piece of paper and dictate in a memorandum.

MW: Development Plans Division, DPD, acted as an independent entity and basically answered to the DDCI Cabell.

SH: Well, first they answered to a guy called Bissell. It was Bissell's private air force, and he ran it as his private air force. Fortunately we didn't have to worry about that one, but Jake did, and all the memorandums in the world didn't help any on that one. Listening to

Jake on that - in terms of trying to get air support - it was basically on a person-to-person basis. It's what you can wheedle out of somebody and get them to do it the right way instead of being able to command them and not having to spend your time massaging a guy's back. That's one of the key problems I thought, and also Jake's relationship, or Washington's relationship with Miami, was obviously, if you read the report, and even the rebuttal, I thought it was very confusing. Case officers did not know really who their boss was. Maybe they should have looked at who was writing their fitness reports, I suppose is one way, but it was too haphazard. We tried to organize it, again it was sheer luck. We tried to organize it, as I say, as if Miami was a foreign station and Ted had all the rights and privileges of a Chief of Station abroad. The fact that he was in the United States didn't bother us at all; we never thought of it that way. Largely because you've got a guy like Harvey in charge, who, despite the fact that he was a gruff SOB, had a heart of melted butter when it came to his own troops. He would never let anybody, at any level, blast at one of his troops without himself, in effect, taking out of his guns and shooting the SOB who did it.

I'll give you a perfect example of that. I was on a telephone call to J.C. King, and J.C. was chewing me out on the phone about something I wasn't even involved in, but anyway he chewed me out. I finished my conversation with him, if you want to call it that, hung up, and at that time Harvey buzzed me to come in and see him. So I came in and I must of had a hang-dog look on my face or something, and he looked up at me and he said, "What's the matter with you?" I said J.C. just chewed the ass out of me. He said, "For what?" I said, "Nothing, I wasn't even involved." He didn't ask any questions. He picked up the phone and dialed to J.C. Himself. Before I could say anything he started to read J.C. the riot act, in only his language, which makes paratroop language look like a church meeting. In effect he said, "Look, if there is anybody that's going to chew out my troops, I'm going to chew out my troops. Don't you ever do that again without checking with me first. If you've got trouble with some of my troops you talk to me and not to them." Moves his arm as if he is slamming down the receiver. I think J.C. must have lost his ear then. It was awful. Ok, you got a guy like Bill Harvey in charge - Jake couldn't do that. But Jake for example, Jake and Col. Jack Hawkins both resigned from the Bay of Pigs operation up in the Agency. Bissell took them to his house, on a Sunday morning, talks them into reneging and staying with the

Agency and staying with the operation. Both of them said "This isn't going to work, it's useless."

BL: This was exactly when Sam?

SH: About a week before the invasion, I don't even know the date but it happened on a Sunday.

BL: What was the precipitating issue that caused them to reach that?

SH: Air.

BL: The air strikes?

SH: Yes, the cut on the air support.

BL: The reduction of the air strike?

SH: Yes, the reduction. It was quite clear, Jake says, and I've also talked to Hawkins now. He's a great guy, I don't know if you've ever met him? He's 80 something at the moment and he's still sharp as a tack. Anyway, it was the lack of air and Bissell said, in effect, "If you guys quit I'll just appoint two other people in your place and we'll go on anyway so why don't you stay and see what you can do to help." So he talked them back into the Agency and they stayed. But the whole point was that they are convinced - and I am now absolutely - that Bissell never told the President what the troops, Hawkins and Esterline, were saying, and what their opinions were in all this stuff. He never did.

BL: What's your view, Sam, about why Bissell did not?

SH: I think he was so imbued with the operation that he thought, as many people have said now, that he thought that Kennedy could never let it die and he'd send the troops in, he'd send the Marines in if it came to that. Plus, I think Bissell really thought he had a deal going on an assassination plot of some kind. It makes no sense that all of these things wouldn't bother him - including not talking to the President again, in Rusk's office on the telephone, that whole story - makes no sense, makes no sense at all without an assassination plot in the background. And the worst thing to me, and looking at that damn report again, why they didn't say, when the President and Rusk said "Trinidad looks too professional, find some other place."...At that point I would have just blown my stack. Bissell may not be the kind of person to blow his stack, but anyway I would have blown my stack. If you want a non-professional job, then go pick some people off the street and do a job. I mean, we're professionals. If you don't like what we are doing, fine; go get somebody else, but I would never have agreed to move from Trinidad to a place that has to have an airfield on it, that's going to take B-26's when everyone knows there is no such place on the bloody island. So they found a little spot of ground near the Bay of Pigs after spending four days looking at the maps. That's crazy. It makes no sense at all. And why Bissell went along with all this stuff. Again, from a purely management point of view and organizational point of view, Bissell never used Hawkins the way he should have as a staff officer for Christ's sakes. You take your staff officer to the meetings with you. You don't know the details - you are not the guy who knows military tactics or strategy, for God's sakes. Bissell may be great at U-2'S and SR-71's, and he may have been able to put all the ships in his head during the war, but you don't know military tactics and strategy.

MW: Hawkins was at those meetings. Hawkins came out here about a month ago - Lee Strickland [CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator] had him out. Hawkins said he was at the meetings but he wasn't allowed to talk. He said it was agony because he just sat there and watched Bissell mangle the military aspects and he was wondering why the Joint Chiefs, some of them who were there at the meetings, didn't speak up - why the Generals who were advising Secretary of Defense McNamara didn't speak up. He found out afterward from a classmate of his (because he was a Marine - and he had a classmate from some military class who was on the staff of General Shoup, the head of the Marine Corps) that McNamara wouldn't allow any of them to talk either. They were afraid; they were cowed, and they wouldn't speak up for fear they'd show up McNamara.

SH: It was worse than I thought it was. This is ridiculous. You don't run an operation that way.

BL: Sam, another kind of key point in the IG report is that the DO's Chief of Operations - Dick Helms, I guess - was not involved in the Bay of Pigs planning.

SH: That's right.

BL: The report, rather pointedly, complains that Helms should have taken the opportunity to become involved, but that, on at least one, perhaps more than one occasion, he did not. He seemed to prefer not being involved. Is this a lesson that you all took to heart with Mongoose, and was that criticism of Helms fair? Was it accurate?

SH: I think it was accurate from what I know, being somebody on the sidelines during the operation, since I was enjoying life in Tokyo at the time. When it all came through and Jake was knocking his ass off here, I know...But yes, I think Dick probably did the right thing, for a very simple reason. Somebody had to take care of the rest of the world, from a command point of view. If Bissell was spending his time on the Bay of Pigs, plus the U-2, plus SR-71, plus Corona, there isn't much time left for Bissell to worry about the rest of the world. Secondly, Helms knew his troops, the personnel more or less, in the Clandestine Service. He knew the good ones from the bad ones or the mediocre ones. That's one thing that I fault him on, in that he knew that the Division Chiefs' protective association, and the Staff Chiefs' protective association, were sending off to the Bay of Pigs operation, which they all knew about, obviously, but they were sending off their second-best, their has-beens, the guys who had stacked arms, and just kind of washing their hands of the whole thing. That's one thing, which is not in the report itself, but that's one thing that I knew, as just a case officer and having my own ears and fingers out in the wind. When we started on Mongoose, that's one thing I knew - at least I wasn't going to be involved in - is letting the Division Chiefs and the Staff Chiefs palm off on us all the cast-offs. I went to Des Fitzgerald, whom I knew very well, because I had been his Executive Officer, and I said to Des "You and the other Division and Staff Chiefs ought to be ashamed of yourselves in what you did." I said "I don't know the troops in the other Divisions and Staffs, but I do know something about the Far East Division Staffers, and you did the wrong thing. You didn't send the best troops you had. And I'm not saying you had to give them all your best troops," because there's another big world out there in addition to Cuba, there's still the

Soviet Union, there's still China, etc....When Bill Harvey came aboard I have him the same story and the same pitch, and I said "Bill, we're going to have to come up with better people and the way to do this is you go to Dan Debartele"- who was then the Clandestine Service Personnel Officer, the big wheel at "Career Manglement" as we called it in those days. I said "Get from Dan, at each appropriate GS level, GS 9's, 10's, 11's, 12's, and so on, right up the line, and get from him from each component of the CS, Staffs and Divisions, get from him the promotion list from each component, including those that made it and those that didn't quite make it but they're near the middle - are near the top - and they might make it the next time around. It's from those lists that we're going to pick our people. I think we can get anybody we want to but bearing in mind there's still a big world out there and the Soviet Union comes first, regardless of what the President says about Cuba." Harvey looked at me and listened, didn't say a bloody word, and I left. The next day when I came back into his office he was stacked high with personnel jackets which he had gotten from Dan in terms of what I had said. You go and get the top lists of who was recommended for what, and you pick from those. In addition to that, obviously Harvey knew he wanted Ted Shackley down in Miami. He was only a GS-14, I think, at the time he was sent down. I think he may have been a GS-13 for all I know. Ted knew some of the good people from the Eastern European Division, the old EE. That's how we built a different kind of a cadre than Jake was forced to take. He had some good people, there's no question about that, and that, shown in the DDP's rebuttal to the IG report are some of the senior officers they had, but they also had some guys who were not top notch. I don't have the list in front of me now, but I remember when I showed Dick Helms....From the beginning of the Mongoose nonsense, Dick Helms came over to take a look at what we had, and this was in December of 1961, when he suddenly found himself being told by McCone, the new DCI, that he, Helms, was now McCone's man on Cuba. That was told to him, by McCone, at a morning staff meeting up in the Director's office. At which, my boss, Goshen Zogby (we were still Branch 4 but it was Cuba and all the Caribbean Islands and Zog was there) our Branch Chief at a morning DCI staff meeting, was most unusual. But anyway, he was there and he told me the story about how Helms looked like a thunderbolt had hit him when McCone said, "By the way you're my man on Cuba." Just like that. Helms, who had stayed away from the Bay of Pigs (I'm still on your question) and he was right to do that, I think, because he wasn't going to get anywhere with Bissell in charge, he knew that. Bissell was a one-man operator and Helms knew exactly what to expect from Tracy Barnes.

BL: But the complaint is that, I think, in the IG report, Kirkpatrick's complaint about Helms is that Helm's did not ring the alarm bells.

SH: He should have. Yes, I saw that, but I don't think you can blame Helms, because he did stay away from it so he didn't know what alarm bells to ring. Is it personnel? Is it your operational approach? Is it the air field? Is it the air support? Is it the troops on the ground? What is it you want him to ring alarm bells about? He didn't know. He had no idea. I'm not trying to defend him from that point of view; maybe he should have forced his way in, which would have meant a real confrontation with Bissell. And with Allen Dulles looking the other way, Helms might not have found himself in any position to argue with anybody - he might have been out. So I think you've got to give....I think Kirk, CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick, was wrong in that particular aspect. Yes, the guy who's third in line should maybe say something to the guy who's second in line, but not when it's a closed corporation. I know people who argue both ways on this one, and I have too, but I think in the end you come down, saying that somebody had to watch the rest of the world, number one. And number two, no matter what Helms would have said to Bissell about the quality of the personnel....As I was about to say, when Helms came over to Quarters I, where we were in Branch 4 for Mongoose, and I showed him the roster of the people who had been on the Bay of Pigs, literally he went down the list saying, "hhhmmm, oh no, no, NO, hhmm, no it couldn't be." I just didn't say a word. There were three people in the room, Zog and me (and Zog is dead unfortunately), and Helms. And he's going down the list of people, including those we have left, in Mongoose. Of course, why do we have them left - because nobody wanted them. Nobody wanted those extra people. And Helms said, "Is this what you have left to work with?" Zog said, "Yes sir. That's what we have left." That's when he picked up the phone. I'll tell you, it's the funniest thing. He picked up the phone, called J.C. King and said, "As of now Cuba is no longer part of WH Division. You have all the rest of the islands but Cuba is separate reporting to me." Boom. This is before Harvey comes along. This was well before. So Zog and I find ourselves a task force without calling ourselves a task force. The word Mongoose didn't come along until much later.

MW: What was the impression about IG report at the time? In the trenches? There must have been rumors. What did you know about it?

SH: We didn't see it. All we knew about it was that it was a bad report; that Kirk had taken the knives out and was really murdering Bissell and Jake. Nobody mentioned J.C. J.C. was off on the sidelines as far as everybody was concerned. Everybody in the room was Jake (lost words)... and I don't think Hawkins' name was kicked around much, but Bissell's name sure as hell was, and Tracy Barnes' name was kicked around as the two masterminds, with Jake getting most of the blame because he's the guy doing the work. Theoretically that's what we thought anyway. And remember that I had just gotten back from Saigon when all of this thing hit. The rumors where....sure they were there, but nobody had any facts. All we had was rumors. The rumors mostly came from the WH Division. So you had to sort of figure out whether they were really telling you what the report said, or whether they were making it up or what have you. And everyone knew there was no love loss between Kirk and Bissell in the first place.

BL: Sam, another of the points the IG report makes is that the DDP did not consult with the analysts - especially with regard to Castro's survivability, his popularity, the effectiveness of his security forces, and so on - and they recommended that that become a standard practice before covert actions were implemented in the future. Did you all have a lot of consultation with the DI, or with ONE, through Mongoose?

SH: Oh yes. There was no problem on that. Yes we did. And as a matter of fact we like to think that Sherman Kent's September 1962 estimate, the famous September NIE, when he was sure that the Soviets were not going to put missiles into Cuba, came about as a result of our prodding the DDI side of the house in terms of doing some kind of an estimate because things down there looked pretty strange. We didn't know what the Hell was going on. We said so frankly "We're getting all these crazy reports." Ted and his people were doing a fine job in providing us with all this crazy stuff that's going on in the island, and the OpaLocka - the Caribbean Admissions Center - was doing a fine job with providing us the stuff from all the refugees coming out. Everything looked like there was something screwy going on but we don't know what, literally. I don't know who it was who got a hold of DDI Ray Cline, to say "how about an estimate of some kind." Ray was the wrong guy because Ray and Sherman didn't see eye to eye on anything. But anyway the word got around, and I think we can take credit for prodding Sherman and his staff to do an estimate on all of these crazy reports that nobody could figure out what the hell's happening.

MW: You mean the many reports from Cubans coming out of Cuba about missiles being seen here or there and everything else.

SH: Yes, there was all kinds of stuff coming out. They were seeing planes when no planes had arrived yet. The reports were confusing to say the least. And somebody, without an ax to grind, like the DDI's supposed to be, had to put it together.

BL: Were there cleared DI officers who knew about Mongoose, who knew why (overlapping sound) going on?

SH: I don't know if we kept a record of that, but obviously the DDI knew; Sherman Kent knew, and I think the Cuban desk officers knew. There were enough. We weren't playing that kind of a game. The Pentagon did. I know that for a fact. The Pentagon really had Mongoose - cleared officers to do things. Colonel Wright, for example (the guy who actually pushed through the report that targeted the U-2), he's the guy who presented the (lost word??). We did it on the grounds that it's in our report and it would look bad if we did it. Nobody listened to us, so we had Colonel Wright do it. He was very happy to do it, and he later took credit for the whole damned thing. He never mentioned CIA in his own biography that he wrote about what he had done. The report came in - he never knew where the report came from - but a report came in! Anyway, no, we kept our DDI counterparts pretty well informed on what the hell, not what we were doing, but in terms of what the U.S. Government was doing, so that everybody was putting their shoulder to the wheel - that kind of thing. We didn't get into the details. We later did, when, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Des Fitzgerald took over, Des actually brought down, I forget the guy's name - he was a very, very senior elder statesman of the DDI, and Des went out of channels without so much as a "By your leave to anybody, and a lot of the troops objected, and Des - made available to this gentleman the true identities, plus the source descriptions we used for the assets.

BL: This was a DI person? Milton Brown?

SH: No, it wasn't Milt. I know Milt. No it was somebody else. Gray-haired gentleman. Elderly statesman kind of thing.

MW: But a Cuban expert?

SH: Not really, no. He was just a good analyst and a good estimator. Anyway, Des made available everything, against every single solitary rule or procedure you can imagine. He just brought him down and said "Look, here are all of our sources, true names, ranks, positions, everything. And this is the kind of by-lines we are using for these people. You sit and look at this stuff and see if it's worth disseminating. See if it's worth putting out. We've been putting it out, but tell us. What do you think when you see it? Des did this to avoid this constant nonsense we used to get from the DDI types, which was "You can't tell us the source, so we can't really understand the information without knowing who the source was."

BL: Was it Archer Bush?

SH: No, that doesn't sound right.

MW: When was this; when did this happen?

SH: Right after Des came aboard in early 1963. After the Missile Crisis.

MW: So he wanted a real (cut off)

SH: He wanted a totally honest appraisal from somebody without an ax to grind. If we did it in-house and the Task Force - or the SAS, we were suddenly called - or in Miami, nobody would listen to it. You can't do it that way. And if we did it to the DDI as a whole....There are lots of arguments back and forth between DDI and DDP types, and that wasn't fair. So pick one guy who's an honest fellow - and everyone knows he's honest, he's not going to be swayed one way or the other - and literally stick him in a room and say, "Here, everything, and tell me what it's like."

MW: The degree of communication between the DDP and DDI on Mongoose is apparently a lot more that it was during the Bay of Pigs Operation.

SH: Oh, much more.

MW: Years ago, when I started amassing the documents that we put together into the Bay of Pigs collection, I wanted to know if there was anything left in the branch over in the DI. So I called up whoever was the Cuban analyst - this would have been, probably, early 1993. I don't remember the analyst's name (I could probably look it up), but he told me - and I don't know if this is true or not. The folklore in the branch was that whoever it was that had been one of the Cuban analysts was called in the Saturday before the invasion because there were all these news stories about Cuban defector pilots having bombed the air field in Havana and then flown to Key West and here they are, they have their planes on the ground and now they are defecting to the United States and this is a big news story. He came in and wrote it up for the current publications at the time and gave it to his editors, and at the last minute somebody came over from the DDP and said "Wait guys, that's a covert action. Those are our planes, those are our pilots, those are B-26's we painted with Cuban markings. This is all a big hoax. You don't need to be reporting this to the President or you're going to look silly." So apparently this has been handed down at the Cuban desk by word of mouth.

SH: It sounds true.

MW: I don't know it that's true or not. You probably know better than I do.

SH: It sounds true. Those things have happened. That's one thing we made sure in Mongoose we didn't do. I can go back to another operation that I was involved in long before we had things like Mongoose and Bays of Pigs and what have you. This is the Indonesian operation in support of the Sumatra colonels in 1957 and 1958. I personally, on my own authority... I never checked with Al Ulmer, who was my Division Chief, or anybody else. I happened to know the DDI/OCI person on the desk on Indonesia, Jeanette Marr. I knew her from OSS days. I used to call her up and we double-talked and I kept her fully informed of anything that might suddenly appear on the horizon without going into the details of our operation or anything like that. She wrote the President's Daily Brief sections on Indonesia and a guy called Cabell insisted on calling the Sumatran colonels "patriots." Everyone else in the Government called them "rebels."

MW: This was the DDCI?

SH: Cabell, yes. He was known as "Rice and Beans" Cabell. Same guy. He insisted on the PDB using the word patriots. Jeanette hated it. She couldn't do anything about it obviously - Cabell insisted. Look at the old PDB's and you'll see that they have patriots, not rebels. We could double-talk because of patriots and it worked fine. When Mongoose came along there was no question in my mind....at least, I would have done the same thing unless Bill Harvey had said "Don't talk to them," but he never did. Bruce Cheever, who was Bill's deputy, thought you had to bring them in, too, to let them know what's going on. You don't go into details of an operation, you don't go into details of your sources. The only guy that ever did that was Des. That was 1963. His final report to Des was simply, "You guys are shooting yourselves in the foot. This information is very good, not just good but very good and you are masking it all with all these crazy by-lines. I know you can't give the true name but you can at least change the by-line somehow." This is what Des used later when he became DDP for a couple of years, to change all the by-line systems throughout the whole DDP. We started to give better descriptions of the sources. Some of these things had some benefits. But coming back to this crazy report, let me come back a second....

BL: The IG report....

SH: In the IG report, the thing that bothered me, too, in there, in reading the IG report was the fact that so many of the case officers - if it's correct - seemed to be confused as to just what the hell they were doing and why they were doing what they were doing. I don't think we ever had that in the Mongoose show. We had Ed Marelius up here in Washington as the Chief of the FI Branch. We had Seymour Bolten as head of the Covert Action Branch, PP, Psychological Warfare Branch. We had Art Maloney as head of the PM Branch. Hal Swensen as head of the CI Branch. These were all very senior guys who were well regarded by everyone, and they were honest as the day is long, and they wouldn't take any horseshit from anybody, and ran a very tight ship. So the case officers here at this end, and we had case officers working against Cuban targets in from Washington, but they never ran across the Cuban case officers that Ted was running down in Miami. They each knew their fields. They each worked with each other. They kept each other informed so they didn't cross each others trails. That's something I think we did, I think from second nature, but it would have been nice to know, in that, from that report, that we were at least not doing something that we were wrong in doing, or doing something that we shouldn't have done. That report makes it clear that we did just the right thing. That everybody knew what the hell their piece was. I don't know if that's correct. The DDP's rebuttal doesn't really face that particular question about the case officers and where they looked for their guidance. It kind of sloughs it off more or less. To me it made no sense for, as I say, for the three senior guys in the Mongoose thing not to have seen that report so that they could be sure that they weren't making some of the same mistakes. McCone, I know, and Cabell, were trying to hide the whole thing. Within limits I agree with them, but not....You don't have to put it on the bulletin board like they've done now. It's on the internet.

SH: (Conversation in progress).....poisonous pesticide and it was available in any hardware store you wanted to go to or Sears or what have you, and it was available in Havana or other parts of Cuba. It was done all over the world and the little bottles that it used to come in actually had a skull and crossbones, the old symbol for poison. The idea was the needle would be so fine that it would be just like a little tiny scratch and if AMLASH would get close enough to Fidel to use that to scratch him and at the same time have the Black Leaf 40 enter the bloodstream. How much you have to put in, or what have you, I never found out. Never asked. Manny Gunn gave all the technical details to Nestor Sanchez to pass on to AMLASH. When Nestor offered the ball-point pen to AMLASH he looked at it very disdainfully, and he said when Nestor tried to explain about the Black Leaf 40, AMLASH, who was a medical doctor in his own right, said "I know all about that. You don't have to tell me all about that." He said, "Come on, you fellows can come up with something better than that." And as far as I know he never took the pen. Although if he had been a double agent I think he would have taken the pen to use at some kind of public trial, so he could show the evidence that the United States was behind it. The fact that he never took the pen, to me, is pretty good evidence that he was not a double agent. I don't think to this day that he ever was. In addition to that particular one thing that I know I was involved with Nestor, on and with Manny Gunn. The one thing that I don't know enough about is when we had to assign an officer to Bobby Kennedy, to be used by Bobby Kennedy to make contact with Mafia types in this country and in Canada. That Bobby Kennedy would pick and set the appointment time and place and our case officer would then go and meet whoever this person was and come back and report to Bobby Kennedy. The theory behind this apparently was that Bobby had some bright idea that the Mafia must have left some kind of stay-behind network in Cuba because of all of their interests that they had in Cuba when Fidel came in: prostitution, gambling, drug running and whatever else was involved. He said they must have had a good stay-behind network and we could get some decent information to what's going on. Well just to give you the QED of this, we never got any information that was worth disseminating. I never saw any information at all from it. The case officer I picked....Apparently the way the request came was from Bobby to General Marshall Carter, who was then DDCI, to Bill Harvey, Bill Harvey to me, to pick a case officer to assign to Bobby. I sat with Bruce Cheever and then, of course, with Bill himself and we decided on a guy named Charles Ford, Charley Ford. Charley was a huge man. Very stocky, make a very good lineman on any football team, and he know how to handle himself in any kind of problem. We figured he was the best kind of guy. Charley and I sat and we figured out he's got to have some kind of name to use - we can't use Charley Ford. But Charley also had some handkerchiefs and some shirts with CF on it, and rather than risk an exposure of some kind, Charley and I sat in my office, the ground floor of the building, and we said "How about Charley Rocky Fiscalini." And ever since then, I always called Charley, til he died, "Rocky." We came up with Fiscalini. There are two different ways of spelling it. I spelled it FISCALINI and Angie Novella, Bobby Kennedy's secretary, spelled it on her appointment log, FISCOLLINI, which is probably more ethnic than mine. But anyway, Fiscalini is the way you pronounce it. So Charley went off and he made several trips in the United States, and I know he made at least one if not more in Canada - I think it was Toronto. All at the behest of Bobby. Either Bobby himself would talk to Charley on the phone, or Angie Novella would call Charley on what we euphemistically called a secure phone - nothing more than an outside line that we had in the front office of Task Force W - it was a big bullpen where we had four or five secretaries. Bill Harvey's office here [motions with his hands]. Bruce Cheever's office here. Mine over here, and the secretaries out in what we called the bullpen. There was a big section in here where we had a bunch of special assistants, and Charley Ford was one of those who sat in here. There were about four or five guys in there doing all kinds of different things. Charley never, as far as I know, never spoke. I know he never spoke to me about who he saw - what they talked about - and I never never saw any intelligence information to disseminate, and as far as I know Charley never had any intelligence information to disseminate. To us it was a waste of time and effort, plus we were putting a man in real danger, since, from pure tradecraft point of view we wanted to control, the meeting time and the meeting place. We wanted to set it up, and we don't want to walk into a hornet's nest without knowing who or what we're seeing. I have mentioned this to several people, without mentioning Charley Ford's name until recently, and I'll tell you why in a minute. I mentioned it to Scott Breckenridge, and Scott mentioned it in his last book that he put out. I mentioned it to a fellow by the name of Goldfarb, who was an attorney on Kennedy's staff at the Justice Department, and Goldfarb wrote a book in which he quotes me on this, and then he also says he doesn't believe me and he doesn't know why I'm making these kinds of stories up.

MW: He's defending Bobby Kennedy.

SH: Oh, absolutely, no question about that. I mentioned it to other people along the way and I even mentioned it to Seymour Hersh when he was putting his book together "The Dark Side of Camelot." If you look at, I forget what page it is, there's a footnote there. Sy was the one who found, in doing his researches, he found, as a result of the Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board, and all the documents that were produced as a result of that, Angie Novella, in her log - her appointment and telephone log for 1962 - puts down General Carter, Charles Ford (Fiscalini), for a date, for a meeting with Bobby Kennedy. I've got documentary proof now. I'd like to shove it under Goldfarb's nose, but anyway....Hersh puts that as a footnote in his book in which he says until he, Hersh, was able to show me the log. I had always refused to mention the name of the individual who was the case officer. The fact that Kennedy was involved in trying to work with the Mafia at the same time....He, Goldfarb, couldn't believe that Kennedy would be working with the Mafia at the same time he's trying to send them to jail. "He's your boss" I would say to Goldfarb, "he wasn't my boss, I can't figure him out any better than you can." Now I'm told by Chuck Briggs that in the pile of paper that he's looking at now - as a result of the AARB nonsense - they have found two memorandums from the Church Committee - the Schwieker subcommittee of the Church Committee. I had forgotten that I had testified before the Schwieker Subcommittee. Chuck now tells me that not only did I testify - and he's looking at my transcript of my testimony - but he also has Charley Ford's testimony. Where Charley....I don't know what he says - Chuck hasn't shown it to me - but he says "That is there, it's in great detail, it's longer than yours, so obviously Charley must have told the Schwieker committee what I'm telling you now." That he actually was assigned to Bobby and did what Bobby had asked him to do. Which is to go meet Mafia types. What they said, unless Charley says in his testimony - and all this is under oath - I don't know what Charley said, but you guys go ahead and look at it. I haven't got the clearances yet until it's declassified. Can't even look at my own testimony. Oddly enough, I told this to Chuck when he called me and gave me the date. I looked at my old calendars - I keep all my old calendars. I never had any calendar that I kept while I was working but ever since I left the job, over 20 years ago, I've been keeping good records on my calendar. Anyway, there it is, April something, 1976. Written right in the little box, Schwieker Subcommittee. I called Chuck back and I said, "you're right, I did testify." People have said that, as a result of this, that Charley and Bobby must have been working on using the Mafia in some kind of assassination plots. Check what Charley says in his testimony; I don't know what they did. They never said. Charley never talked to me about that. He would always stick his head in before he left on another trip, "I'm off again, Sam. Bye." The reason I know he went to Canada - I think it was Toronto - was because he came in for the first time and said, "I'm leaving the country." I said "Where the Hell are you going?" He says "Canada." Charley was a damn fine officer, and I'm awfully sorry he died so early.

In terms of talking about assassination plotting, it gets kind of hairy after a while. It's hard to know when to stop, and you don't even know when you start something. I remember under Des; when Des came in on that Monday morning for example, on this crazy business of the sea shallots had been all over everywhere....Again it was a Monday morning and he had just come in from driving his VW with his foot through the floorboards. When he got on those highways he was murder. This is what always made me think somewhere during those weekends he must have seen Bobby, because he came in all charged up. I asked him over and over again, not just once but several times, where the heck is this pressure coming from? I don't see it myself except through you. He said "It's coming from high places." He never said Bobby. It's coming from outside the agency, and Des is an honest guy, I can't say he's making this up. Why would he be doing that? So I have to assume he's getting it from somebody who's got the authority to tell him, without going through the chain of command. It's a surmise on my part; I can't prove it.

BL: Who up the chain of command knew about Charley and Bobby?

SH: Carter. Marshall Carter, the DDCI.

BL: And that was all?

SH: As far as I know. Helms never knew. I know that much.

MW: Fitzgerald?

SH: No. It was all over by then. Charley's activities stopped after the Missile Crisis.

MW: Ok, ok. Fitzgerald didn't come in until 1963.

SH: January 1963.

MW: McCone?

SH: Unless Carter told him.

MW: Why would Carter be in the loop and not McCone?

SH: I don't know. I'm looking at Angie Novella's logs, that's the only way I know Carter's in the loop. It says Carter, right there.

MW: You sure it's our Carter?

SH: Yes, Marshall Carter. Take a look at the page. I've got a copy of the page at home, I should have brought it.

MW: Send us a fax.

SH: All right, I'll dig it up. You may have to remind me again. I got it through the courtesy of Sy Hersh. It is now available as a public document. When I saw that, as a matter of fact I hadn't yet gotten it....Sy once called me when he was still doing his research on the book, and we had talked about a guy working for Bobby, and he kept on asking me, who? who? who? I said "Not me, I'm not going to tell you the name." He called me on the phone one morning and he said, "How does Fiscalini strike you?" I said, "where in the goddamned hell did you ever get that name?" He told me. He said "It's from Angie Novella's appointment logs." I said run that by me again, slowly. Well because it's got Ford and Fiscalini but it could be Ford. He gave me Fiscalini. There were only two guys in the world that I knew of that had that name. We never told Harvey, we never told Bruce Cheever. Didn't need to. Theoretically we were professionals.

MW: You just had it because you had to clear it. You basically had to sign his vouchers and make sure his travel was getting paid for and everything.

SH: That's all we did. If you've got the finance records you can find out where he went and every time he went, but if I know Charley he probably fixed it up in such a way. I'm trying to remember the vouchers. He fixed it up in such a way that that didn't really show. He wouldn't ask for stuff. When Sy said "Fiscalini", I said "You got me hands down." I said "It's the only time I ever lied to you." It was true. It was the only time I ever held anything back. When I start talking I know my limits.

BL: Did you lie to him or you just didn't tell him?

SH: I hadn't told him. I must have never told him the name. He's got a note to that effect; a footnote on that same page where he talks about this operation in the book. If you've got the book around I'll show you. In terms of assassination plots, first of all they're few and far between. In terms of getting involved in one of these things. Being in the business we were in, with the old rules and regulations that we had - and we didn't have to worry about a Senate Intelligence Committee and a House Intelligence Committee - we did lots of things just by feel, by gosh and by golly. As Larry Houston told me when the Church committee started to expose lots of things, Larry said, "Sam, I told you. You should have talked to me about a lot of these things. We wouldn't be here today." I said, "Yeah, Larry, and you know why we didn't talk to you in those days? Because you would have stopped a lot of us from doing things." He says, "Very right." That's the way life was, and I'm sure that there are other officers.... I'm just one of many who were involved in different parts of the world, doing a whole variety of things, with almost no way to pin down somebody saying, "I authorized X, Y, or Z." That goes even for State intelligence collection, because some of the intelligence collection was done by some screwball ideas.

BL: Sam, you've just talked about Bobby Kennedy and CIA and Mafia assassination plotting against Castro. Many scholars have concluded, though on just circumstantial evidence, that Jack Kennedy was also fully witting, if not involved in assassination plotting against Castro. Do you have a view about that?

SH: Yes, I agree with the people who say the same thing because I can't imagine Bobby on his own without telling Brother Jack some of the things he's done, and including probably Jack being the inspiration for some of the things that Bobby finally did. I think they were so close together. There's a new book out, it's not new anymore this is now 1998, this came out in the Fall of 1997 - it's _Robert Kennedy: Brother Protector_. You got it?

MW: No.

SH: The author is a fellow by the name of Hilty. University of Tennessee Press. It's got some of the weirdest stuff in it that you can think of. I only read the parts that I know something about, namely

Mongoose and its antecedent follow-on. He's got so many mistakes in there it's not even funny. On the first 24 pages there are 19 errors. Most of them serious ones. Including calling AMLASH a double agent. He doesn't know the language; he doesn't know what he's talking about. AMLASH was never a double agent by anybody's stretch of the imagination. A lot of other stuff, but even he says he's partially protecting the Kennedy image as well as everybody else. Even he says in there the same thing, that based on his researches there's no question that what one knew the other knew. They always worked in tandem on all subjects. The problem that Goldfarb had, for example - because he was one of the Lawyers attacking the Mafia, trying to put them in jail - and he just couldn't....He was sitting in my living room and he just couldn't understand, and he kept on saying, "how could Bobby tell me to put the Mafia in jail when he's working with them?" I said, "I don't know how he could do that. You worked for him, you tell me." But he did. I couldn't prove it then, but if you guys ever release those Charley Ford memo's and my memo, at least we've got two statements done under oath before the Senate Intelligence Committee, or the Church Committee really, where at least it's being discussed. I don't see how anybody, on any of this stuff, particularly after the Bay of Pigs Operation, dealing with the Agency, I don't think anything was said or done between the two guys that the other one didn't know. They had to. Bobby may have stayed away from the Agency up before the Bay of Pigs, but after the Bay of Pigs he was always Johnny at the rathole on everything. Didn't understand what he was doing either, in many cases.

BL: Sam, is there anything else before we adjourn?

SH: I don't know. You guys ask and I'll try and answer.

MW: I've exhausted my....I've fired my shots.

SH: I still like reading those two reports, and I agree completely, by the way, between the Kirkpatrick report and the Bissell rebuttal. I think McCone was right to say that the truth is somewhere in-between. I honestly think if I had been a case officer, or been involved like Jake was, if the President said "Don't go to Trinidad find some stupid place to go," I would have, really, I would have said "Not me sir, find somebody else to do it." That's number one, and that's an important one. Because for example, I'm the guy who told General Carter to tell somebody, and I didn't know who the hell it was, he was not supposed to tell until I found out later, it was Ike, Eisenhower, in our Sumatra operation... We were involved in all kinds of crazy nonsense, including air, by the way. Cabell didn't get involved in that, thank the Lord. It was Civil Air Transport planes we were using. A suggestion came to me, through Cabel's office, to me, about something going to be done, I forget exactly what it was, but something ought to be done in the field to make things easier for the rebels. I'll call them rebels. It made no sense at all. Actually had no relation to reality in the field. I didn't even bother checking with anybody, I just decided on my own. It won't work, it doesn't make any sense and the people out there will think we are crazy. Cabell said, it finally got to Cabell talking to me, "Ok Sam, whatever you say is fine." I find out later that the suggestion came not from Cabell but from Ike, through Gordon Gray, who was then the National Security Council guy, through the Agency and down to me. I was the Exec. Why they didn't call Al Ulmer I don't know - maybe he wasn't there - but anyway I get the draft. If they had said the President wants you to do such and such I might have given him a different answer. Ike's got a good military background, better than mine, for God's sakes. That's the one nice thing I liked about this Agency, and always have. I hope it's around, you can really speak your mind.

MW: Sometimes.

SH: Well, all right. Things may have changed. I've been out 20 years, but in my day we screamed bloody murder and we screamed bloody murder about Mongoose. We screamed bloody murder about other things, believe me, over the years, and when it didn't make sense we said so. So help me, Trinidad and then the cutting 80% of the air support, I don't know if Bissell really understood the meaning. He may have thought that by the time they would land Castro would be dead. That's fine, but if you're running a vest pocket operation like that, you had better be sure, and you don't take the chance with 1,500 men or 1,400 men whatever hit the beaches. Bissell was no kind of a guy to - let alone Tracy Barnes - to be involved in assassination plotting. They didn't know what the hell they were doing. Tracy wouldn't know. The record is clear, and it's even in the Church Committee report, for Christ's sake, that a message came from headquarters to the Havana station, when it was still there, talking about assassination. The very next morning, when someone saw the confirmation copy, a flash went out saying "Ignore the message." Who the hell wrote the message, Tracy. I mean that is the silliest thing I've ever seen. The last thing in the world you want on paper. Just like when Lansdale talked about elimination of leaders in the August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). Puts it in writing and Harvey goes through the roof. It's all out there now, but that's the kind of people who don't know what the hell it's all about. They never tried.

BL: Sam, thanks so much. We appreciate you coming in.

SECRET

INTERVIEW WITH
SAM HALPERN

Ralph E. Weber

23 October 1987
30 October 1987

SECRET

Interview with Sam Halpern

23 and 30 October 1987

INTERVIEWER: As one looks into the background of the Congressional investigations, what in your mind do you see as the most important factors for bringing about the Congressional Investigations in 1975? It is an awfully large area.

MR. HALPERN: I think if you look into the history of the background of why the thing started it began long before the Seymour Hersh articles. The Congress was planning to go into something like this anyway for a whole variety of reasons. I think Morton Halperin and his group on the outside as well as the ACLU and liberal Senators (particular Senators) were itching to get at this for a long time. I am trying to think of the name of the (he is now a Washington Post reporter) investigative reporter (I'm trying to think of his name but I can't) who was in Government for a while, didn't like what he saw largely as a result of the Vietnam War. Oh, Walter Pincus.

INTERVIEWER: Walter Pincus?

MR. HALPERN: Walter Pincus had quite a bit, I think, to do in the background in organizing this whole effort. And not many people realize that the title (it is a long winded title) of the Church Committee was actually a title that was prepared by the staff people months before the Church committee was even heard of or even Senator Church knew what was going on.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: It will take me some time to look for it but remind me to look for it. I put together some language on this many years ago in terms of the inner-workings, what was going on behind the scenes among the staff people in the Senate to look into intelligence across the board. CIA was just one of the targets, I guess one of the main targets, but not the only one. And it was just a happy (from their point of view), a happy combination of circumstances. Seymour Hersh was looking at different things and had access to different sources and wrote those two stories in December of '74, which just dovetailed beautifully with what they were trying to do and brought together what they needed and what they wanted. And that is where the title came from something the Church group came up with the title. It was the staffers and the various other committees who had worked this out months before. And by the summer and early fall of '74 these guys were ready to go and when views from the Church Committee impetus came, there it was. They had the title, they had the paperwork, they had everything done, and they just pushed it through.

INTERVIEWER: Do you feel their efforts along these lines even pre-date the Watergate investigation?

MR. HALPERN: Well I don't know if it pre-dates the Watergate or not. I can't say. I just don't know. I think there were some possibilities of going in tandem with the Watergate. But I don't think that the Watergate problem itself was what these guys were interested in but I wish I could identify them better. They were targeting against intelligence as such and they succeeded.

INTERVIEWER: And some of it was disillusionment with the . . .

MR HALPERN: Disillusionment with the Vietnam War. No question about that. There was another guy. The name was Paul and the reason I say that - the last name was Paul - because we, in the working of the intelligence officer, we had a hell of a time with two Congressional teams that used to go out for Congressional committees -- these were staffers. One was made up of Pincus who later became the Washington Post guy. Pincus and Paul (I am trying to remember what the first name of Paul was) but we always regarded them Pincus and Paul: P squared.

INTERVIEWER: That is P-A-U-L?

MR. HALPERN: P-A-U-L, yes. And they were problem children in terms of having to advise the field; the State Department had a similar problem advising the Embassies on how to handle these guys and how to brief them, what to brief them. We weren't trying to hide anything, or kid them or lie to them or anything like that, but it was a matter of how you really work with these people to try to get them to understand what you are trying to do. These guys were always traveling around Southeast Asia, in particular, and it was mostly during the Vietnam War problem. And the second team (we called them L&Ms) first the L stood for - Lowenstein was the L (and I'll be damned if I can think of what the M was). But I think in looking into The New York Times in 1973 and 1974 long before the Watergate thing and the Church Committee business began, these guys were always floating around as Congressional staffers. I forget if they were the Senate or the House but anyway they had these two teams which were real problems in terms of the Executive branch of the government having to deal with the Congressional branch of the government. The old conflict of foreign policy that lives in the Constitution. I think the Constitution was made that way, to have the stresses and strains that we still see today.

INTERVIEWER: Were these teams looking at the domestic?

MR. HALPERN: No, no. This was all foreign.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, all foreign.

MR. HALPERN: They were all looking at foreign at that point. They had nothing with the Church nonsense and MHCHAOS. It was all in the foreign affairs field. And they were mucking around all over the place trying to get into stuff which we held as classified both we the State Department, the Defense Department, what have you. Including the use of the Meo tribes in Laos, it came out some money was involved, people were using Air America was used, all that kind of stuff. These people were not representatives of the then Intelligence Oversight Committees and with the advice of the then Oversight Committees (the four of them we had) we had to be careful as to what we told these people from different committees of the Congress. The four oversight committees were jealous of their prerogatives you could imagine particularly in the days when you had real strong men running the Congress and they did not want all of these other committees, in terms of jurisdictional fights, mucking around in what they were supposed to be handling it. And so somehow we were caught in the middle of the jurisdictional fights in the Congress at the same time we were handling classified stuff we didn't know how far you can go with these people. They weren't cleared for a lot of stuff. So they were real problem children. And these two teams were the precursors to what later became the Church and Pike Committees.

INTERVIEWER: Well, were these teams attached to particular committees or subcommittees?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, well they were representatives of particular committees. I just can't remember what the committees' names were.

INTERVIEWER: OK, right.

MR. HALPERN: It didn't really matter to us. They were not part of the four oversight committees.

INTERVIEWER: They were not?

MR. HALPERN: They were not.

INTERVIEWER: OK.

MR. HALPERN: And the oversight committees, maybe that was one of the problems, didn't do much oversight as you well know. And as a matter of fact I remember these reports from DCI's coming back saying, "I got nobody to talk to up on the Hill. They won't listen. All they want to do is give me money and personnel. And they say, you know, "Go do your job." And so this is true. I have heard that from senior officers in the jobs I have held at staff meetings over and over again. The Director came back again and he doesn't have anybody to talk to. Nobody wants to listen. Nobody wants to know. And there is Senator Stennis and Saltonstall and all of those others.

INTERVIEWER: And Russell?

MR. HALPERN: And Russell who sat on the floor of the Senate. You know there are certain things you have to just accept and not know about. Or Goldwater even today, when he was chairman of the Senate Committee said, "This Committee shouldn't exist." So the four oversight committees never gave us any trouble really except toward the end, they were very clear about one thing. I think it was Russell who told I think Dick Helms, DCI -- and you can check the record on this one I'm sure -- who told him, "this is the last year," (I forget what year it was, I guess it must have been '71 or something like that.) This is the last year we are going to fund those Meo tribes for you. It's getting too big. Turn it over to the military," you know, "and lose it in the Defense budget." Because it got to over a hundred million dollars and all that kind of stuff, I guess in those days that was a little big.

INTERVIEWER: Well did you have the impression besides Pincus that Paul and L&M were also Vietnam veterans or. . .?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know if they were Vietnam veterans as such. I think they did not like what was going on in Southeast Asia. And the so-called Secret War wasn't a secret in Laos. It wasn't a secret war, for God's sakes. How could it be secret if the press was writing about it?

INTERVIEW: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: It was the press that gave it the name Secret War. The Senators and the Representatives, they knew what the hell they were appropriating. I mean, at least the committee members did when they put down money into the budget, and all the budgets and all that money was cleared by Congress. The CIA doesn't print its own money for God's sakes. Somebody had to appropriate the money, and it was there. And as a matter of fact it was (what the heck is his name) Saltonstall, I think.

INTERVIEWER: Symington?

MR. HALPERN: Symington. I'm sorry. Symington was the guy who later got Dick Helms in trouble in '73 in front of the Church Multinational Corporation Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee and not his own committee. It was Symington, Christ, he reviewed the troops out in Laos. Bob Jantzen who was then Chief of Station, Bangkok, arranged for (I forget who the heck was Chief in Laos and Vietnam), but anyway, he went up to the Meo tribes and reviewed them and then he goes, "I never heard of things like this." What are you going to do with them when they do when they do that? So, but that is much later. I mean, earlier than the Church Committee itself, the one we all know about. But this was all background in terms of, I think, it was the Vietnam war basically that got people upset, the problem of the war.

INTERVIEWER: Did you also have the feeling that there was a different attitude that threat of the Soviet Union wasn't as great. Not necessarily seen that way in the Agency but outside the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Oh. By that time people were looking at Vietnam. They weren't looking at the Soviets. There is no question. I am talking '73, '74. There was no question about that. The spirit of Detente may have something to do with that. The spirit of Glassboro, do you remember Glassboro, NJ?

INTERVIEWER: Sure, yes.

MR. HALPERN: Johnson, which began even before Henry and Nixon and what have you. But I think that all, I think, was totally overshadowed by Vietnam. I think that was one of the big problems, the Vietnam War.

INTERVIEWER: And you saw this not only in the public but also in the Congress.

MR. HALPERN: Uh huh. No question. No question. I don't think Congress ever really understood -- well, I know they never understood what Jim Angleton was talking about on counterintelligence. Hell, for that matter very few people in the Agency I think really understood that one. And I didn't have any appreciation of it either until I got into the job as the Exec for the DDP. Because unless you see an overall world picture it is hard to imagine this big thing happening around you when you are worrying in one little area. But anyway, I honestly think it was Vietnam that upset the apple cart. Watergate just added to it.

INTERVIEWER: Just added to it.

MR. HALPERN: The frosting on the cake I suppose or the whip cream on the banana split. Whatever you want to call it. But I think with Vietnam that hurt most of all.

INTERVIEWER: So even if Watergate hadn't occurred, it was moving toward investigation.

MR. HALPERN: It would have been. No question. No question. Because if I remember it correctly, the P&P and L&M teams were concentrating on Southeast Asia and looking into what the US Government as a whole was doing, not just CIA, but they didn't like anything that was going on in that area and I think that is what began gnawing away at the thing and broke it apart.

INTERVIEWER: OK.

MR. HALPERN: You know in terms of an operation these guys did a magnificent job in terms of their objectives. They, in effect, were able to stop the whole machinery of government and wreck the intelligence system in the entire community, not just CIA. And it is going to take of couple of generations to rebuild it. If we ever can. You can't go home again. That is for sure. But to rebuild what we had at one time is going to take at least a couple of generations. Hell, it took us 25-30 years, that's a whole generation to get the thing organized and then it came apart. It really came apart. And a lot of this, because of the Vietnam, also had an effect not just inside the government but it had the effect of the recruits you got. Even as early or late, whichever way you want to look at it, from about 1970 on, we had been in the war in Vietnam, for five years by then. The recruits, the new people coming in, who passed all the tests and what have you, and been through the first training courses and what have you, and they were on their first assignments from the desks or some of them even going overseas for instance. The ones that I saw, and I made it my practice sitting in the DDP's office as the Exec, to talk to as many young officers as I could. Always had an excuse: a cable who was coming up for release by the DDP, or going up to the DCI coming through the channels, I always was able to call the guy who wrote the thing. I didn't care about the guy who coordinated, I was interested in who wrote it. And to talk to them. If you have to stop let me know.

INTERVIEWER: No, we are fine, keep going.

MR HALPERN: Anyway, I used to talk to these fellows and women to see what made them tick and it was a very difficult job listening to them many times when they had all these bright ideas about intelligence, how you could do this and how you could do that. And I had to bite my tongue and say, "Well, wait a minute. You know, we tried that 25 years ago or 20 years ago and it didn't work." And you couldn't just dampen their spirits by pouring cold water every time they would come up with an idea, and yet somehow you had to try to get them interested enough to look into the history of what happened and how you did this and how you couldn't do this and how, why certain things would seem beautiful when you dream them up and write them down on a piece of paper. In the real world it just don't work. And we learned the hard way. All of us. Trial and error. But you hope that the next group coming up didn't have to go through that same torture if they would look at the record. And my concern was that very few people were borrowing stuff out of the registry. Very few people were interested in going back into the history of what took place and certain activities. And you can't get it all out of a classroom.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: And this was one of the things that bothered me while I was in that job for those last few years is that: how do you pass on the experiences so that people understand and learn without feeling that they are being pushed down, without feeling that they are being squashed? Because you want initiative. Half the business in dealing with human beings is initiative and I don't know enough about the technical side but I know enough about the human side. But you have to stop them. Why spin wheels? Why push a lot of paper through if they're going to be disapproved anyway? And yet keep them interested enough. And that's a tough job.

INTERVIEWER: And were these recruits, say, '70's - were they much different from those that you would have had in the '60's?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, the early '60's.

INTERVIEWER: The early '60's?

MR. HALPERN: Before the Vietnam war. A lot of people were coming in, and I blame the educational system for this, in terms of the teachers they had. And I discovered this to my horror, as I mentioned earlier, about the Colorado business -- the teachers there were worse than the students. Facts don't mean anything to them. For example in Colorado it seemed to be, it was perfectly all right for the students and the faculty to use the Church Committee documents to prove one of their points about how bad CIA was or how bad DIA was or what have you. But when I tried to use the same documents quoting different pages, that was wrong. I wasn't allowed to do that. "That's just junk. That doesn't mean anything." And I looked at them and I said, "I thought I was at a university where you are supposed to be able to argue from text." No, it was all right for them to do it but not all right for me to do it.

INTERVIEWER: It fit in their pattern.

MR. HALPERN: Yea, and so, you know, what do you do?

INTERVIEWER: Were these recruits coming in in the early '70's and so on --

MR. HALPERN: The early '70's.

INTERVIEWER: Are they more questioning, are they . . .?

MR. HALPERN: No, that was one of the things that bothered me. One of the things that struck me, both male and female, when they came in most of them, when we got into discussions about operations or what have you, they seemed to be more concerned about when they were going to become a division chief, a station chief, and when they were going to become DDP and then eventually, "how do I get to be DCI?" And finally after all of that is over, "What about my pension rights?"

INTERVIEWER: That's already coming?

MR. HALPERN: Yea, in the very beginning in '71, '72, '73, and at least '70, '71 and '72 when I was more concerned about talking to them because by '73 we were having difficulties with the Schlesinger turnover and what have you. But this was one of the things that struck me very strong, and I was bothered by it, and these were the best of the applicants. They had already been through all of the machinery and all the screening processes and what have you and these were the shining stars from the academe, and I was concerned about that. But again, what do you do?

INTERVIEWER: Were others troubled as well?

MR. HALPERN: Yea, some of my colleagues were. They picked it up the same way I did except on a different level. They were doing it in the branches or in the staffs, most in the branches, or in the area units and I was looking from across the board. But it was the same idea. We used to kick this around at lunch. How do you get instilled into the new group, the upcoming generation, the guys who are going to take over from us, that there is more to this business than worrying about your pension? I tried to tell some of them, look some of us are going to be in this business their whole career and never see the DCI's office let alone be the DCI. And so I said, "In all organizations not everybody can be the field marshall. Some of them have to be privates and stay as privates our whole career." And that didn't go down at all.

INTERVIEWER: It didn't go down?

MR. HALPERN: No way. No way. You know it was frightening then and I guess it is even more frightening now. I don't know what the situation is now but its a bad show. I don't know. Maybe we were brought up in a totally different generation. I don't know different backgrounds. I don't know whether it was things like the Depression or World War II or what, but we all had a different -- we all wanted to get promotions; sure, we all wanted more money; sure, we all wanted honors and titles and God knows what else and medals but. . .

INTERVIEWER: I wondered the same thing.

MR. HALPERN: You didn't sort of aim what the hell you were doing. "Hey, if I do this right I'll get a medal." Or again, you may have thought maybe a couple of these good things I do I'll get a promotion or something like that. Yea, but that's normal. But you didn't do it for the purpose of the promotion. And here these people are talking to me about: how do I get to this and how do I get to that. I guess it's called career planning or something. I have been through a lot of that, by the way, on career planning from a personnel point of view, trying to chart out people's whole careers, and I thought that was for the birds. How do you sit there and say in 25 years from now he is going to be in X, Y, and Z. Maybe you can do it.

INTERVIEWER: That will come in with Schlesinger?

MR. HALPERN: That came in with Bill Colby. Management by Objective and all of that kind of nonsense.

INTERVIEWER: I've got some questions on that coming up.

MR. HALPERN: But I remember specifically, and you had better cut and paste this tape I think, but I remember, for example, when Colby's Management by

Objective started coming out, one of the articles that was given to us, written by a Britisher I believe, had a whole series of things -- things not to do if you are going to go into Management by Objective. And we all looked at this thing -- we, I mean, all of my colleagues -- every single one of these points, things not to do before you go into Management by Objective, we had already done. So how can we go into this thing? We went into it anyway.

INTERVIEWER: Damn the torpedoes.

MR. HALPERN: Oh yea. It was great stuff.

INTERVIEWER: And was their a feeling -- again when you talk about these new, these young officers coming on in the early '70's -- was there still a feeling of family or is that a term that really. . .?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, that is a good old term. "Band of Brothers" is a better term. We really felt, all of us did, we were a Band of Brothers. Oh, sure, we had arguments and fights and all of that kind of stuff, competition on who was going to get what job, who was gonna be chief of station or who was gonna do this, but we still felt ourselves a band of brothers. I like that term better than family. Maybe other people use family but we were different. We were guys who had gone through the war and had started from scratch, building an organization and building a concept which was mainly an intelligence service. And particularly us in the Clandestine Service, long before we got into this covert action nonsense but anyway we were interested in how you collect intelligence using human sources and with technical support, but anyway, we were building a service. We thought we were. An important one. And even though it only produces a very small percentage of the total take of the US Government, we thought it was an important take. It was never going to match something like Ultra or this overhead reconnaissance. You couldn't possibly. But we were zeroing in what we called the hard targets and the intentions and plans more than anything else. And as that kind of a group we were all, "We came up the hard way" kind of thing. And we felt closer together as a result of that.

INTERVIEWER: And did the Band of Brothers include everyone in the Agency or was it -- ?

MR. HALPERN: No, it was just the Clandestine Services.

INTERVIEWER: Just the Clandestine Services.

MR. HALPERN: And as a matter of fact a lot of us in the Clandestine Services, I wasn't one of them, a lot of us felt that we should not be part of CIA. We should be separate. Totally separate and not be involved with anybody else. And that was one of the fights that went on for a long time between the DDI and the DDP in that most of the DDI people felt (and the top brass particularly felt) that the DDP should be an adjunct of the DDI, responding only to DDI requests for information and in effect be the DDI's library and research staff. You know, find out if the bridge is still standing between "x" and "y" in the middle of Uganda or something like that. And we felt differently. The DDI felt that they were the national intelligence analyst group and we felt that we were the national intelligence collector's group -- human sources.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: And drew big arguments on that. Big fights. And DDI always felt that we (DDP) should disseminate intelligence that we collect only to the DDI. They would decide who else was going to get the information. We thought that was a farce. We were everybody's collector from the President on down and it was up to the President to tell us who else to give the information to. And sometimes they did, like the Cuban missile crisis. And the President stopped the distribution all across. Completely.

INTERVIEWER: Was there any feeling -- you talked about the Band of Brothers in Clandestine Service - was there any similar feeling in the DDI?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know. You'd have to ask somebody there that could tell you. Because I am in effect the Johnny-come-lately to the DDP because I started out in OSS and R&A, and then moved from R&A over into the SSU, the SI side -- the Secret Intelligence side. And I know when I was in R&A our feeling then was we were part of OSS, the whole thing, and even though the SI people didn't always tell us what they were doing, we found out later that we shouldn't know. At least I found out later. There was a good reason why we shouldn't know. We could work with them and we worked very well with them in terms of providing intelligence support for their operations in the field in Southeast Asia, which was my beat, and we would sit and work with the officers who were going out (not the agents) but the officers going out to do the job, and when I was in Ceylon (again R&A) we worked very closely together with them in terms of planned operations against various parts of Japanese held territory. And we wrote all kinds of papers for them and pulled together all kinds of stuff, and the question was in those days we felt more like we were all part of OSS and OSS was a brand new thing. At least that is the attitude I felt from talking to my friends about it, even as a part of R&A. But later when it became a bigger outfit (a peacetime outfit) it was more -- well, we were part of CIA in DDP but we felt for good and sufficient reasons that it would be better if we could work out some decent cover so we'd be on the outside totally devoid and divorced from the government. I don't know, the number of times we had study groups planning on how to do this, to have a real clandestine outfit working outside the government, with proper communications obviously and clearances and what have you. We talked about Colorado before in one of the papers -- go out to Colorado somewhere. You know, way out in nowhere. This was in the '40's -- the late '40's -- or go to some other part of the country and get hooked up by telephone or wire or what have you long before all of this computer nonsense. Or even get buried in New York City, Wall Street, or one of those huge monstrosities that existed even then as a private company somewhere. And do actual company business -- be a real business, but also run your operation. Well, this has been tried so many times in terms of study groups and nothing has ever come of it. Nothing.

INTERVIEWER: Didn't even come close.

MR. HALPERN: No. You couldn't get people willing to provide you the money, the material, work out all of the legal aspects and it was really a hell of a job when you consider you have the salaries and social security and workman's compensation and how do you work out decent pensions for people and making a career out of it and all that kind of stuff. You could do it for a few (as we have done over the past years). We used to do anyway. We'd have decent proprietaries. We'd run our own insurance companies and all that kind of stuff and provide lifetime pensions for people and work on a system that would work. But you could do it for a few and we did. I don't know what they are doing today, and I am not interested in knowing. But to do it for a mass, it would be tough -- very, very, very tough. So when you talk about brothers or family, as we got bigger the DDP-DDI split was very evident and, as a matter of fact, at one time, believe it or not, in the very early days DDP case officers on the desks were not even allowed to talk to DDI analysts because we thought, in those days, we thought the DDI analyst would be able to convince the clandestine operator enough so that pretty soon the clandestine operator was captive of the analyst and would be doing his research for him. And we had plenty of calls from DDI analysts which in effect, the answers were in the Library of Congress, for God's sake go get them. We are not going down there and get them for you and we are not going to burden the field people with going to get those kind of figures for you. They are right there. Go get them. And we had lots of fights about that. Oh yea.

INTERVIEWER: I suppose there must have been a lot of tension?

MR. HALPERN: There was. There was. Because we kept saying the DDI analyst was supposed to do their own research; do your own job. And I said in the first place, and I remember I got into some arguments with some of them, and I am sure my colleagues did too, that collecting intelligence via a clandestine mechanism is the most expensive, time-consuming way of collecting a piece of information. You have to have long lead time, you don't have a whole bunch of agents in various departments of foreign governments so that you can just press buttons and get answers out of them. And it takes time to identify what you are looking for. And our job is a selected job and you have to go for the hard targets. I am not interested in finding out the railway statistics for you or the tonnage of wheat that goes through ports, for God's sakes. We can get that from the Department of Agriculture or Commerce or something. This is a very, very expensive way to do business. This is why we had to set up actually a requirements staff which screened requirements so that we wouldn't get flooded with this nonsensical stuff that should be done by somebody in the US Government, don't get me wrong, but not the Clandestine Service. The collector has got to be so fine-tuned that it is only after you've tried everything else that you go for this particular thing. And don't expect the answer tomorrow morning. So we had a whole mechanism just in the screening process. As a result the orders went out, "Don't talk to each other." Well, over a number of years we finally broke that down which I thought we should have.

INTERVIEWER: When would you say what point of time was it pretty well broken down?

MR. HALPERN: It began to be broken down -- let me give you two examples. One in 1957 and '58 when I was involved as the Exec then for Far East Division of the DDP. We were involved in an operation in Indonesia with the Colonel from Sumatra and later the Colonel from Celebes. I told my boss I was going to do this and he said fine. I personally knew from the war -- from the OSS days -- the analyst in the DDI, and I think it was OCI, who was on the Indonesian desk. And I kept her very well clued on important developments in the operation as it was going along so that she wouldn't be caught short by things and would be able to watch what went into the President's Daily Brief and went into the daily stuff and I mean it worked fine. But that was on a one-to-one basis. And how much she told the DDDI personally, that was up to her. I wasn't going to tell her how to run the show. But it never was on a DDP-DDI basis, you see, the two got together and said, "Here's the operation." No way. The second time we were breaking it even more was after the Cuban Missile Crisis. After the Cuban Missile Crisis. 1963 now -- we have moved about five or six years.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: Des Fitzgerald was transferred from Chief of the Far East Division to take over from Bill Harvey on the Cuban operation. Under Bill it was called TFW (Task Force W) and under Des Fitzgerald it was called Special

Affairs Staff. This was after Operation Mongoose and Des had an uneasy feeling that the intelligence we were collecting on Cuba was just not being accepted by the analysts. And it wasn't. Well, it wasn't a picture and it wasn't COMINT. The analyst only believed pictures and COMINT. And maybe today they believe telemetry or something, I don't know, maybe if it's not a picture it is something else. Anyhow, if it wasn't technical in one way or another, Cuban sources, the hell with them. And they were just being washed out. And Des took it upon himself (and he was the kind of guy who would do these things without getting approval or clearances). He decided he would ask the DDI to send a senior officer down to (I say down because we were in the basement of the building) to come to us on SAS, and Des would make available to this one man (a very senior guy -- I don't remember who; my memory has gone bad), would make available true identities of all sources, and that created holy hell within the DDP because, obviously, it went up and down the line and Des' colleagues (as division staff chiefs) thought he was crazy, and it was just a really big battle royal on this thing, but Des being Des said, "The hell with it, I'm going to do it. They're my sources, I'm responsible, it's my operation, and goddamnit, you have to give credit where it is due." Dick Helms supported him against the argumentation by all the other senior officers. Nobody else wanted to go along with this.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: So this guy came down and he sat for days, weeks, I don't know, and he had access, believe it or not. I thought he was crazy. I thought Des had lost his marbles. The one thing you protect is sources. Allen Dulles is supposed to have said, he would even lie to the President if necessary to protect a source. And that was sacrosanct. You don't tell anybody your sources, for God's sakes. You don't even tell the guy who's sitting and working next to you who your source is. But anyway this was done and after (I wish I could remember his name), anyway, after this fellow had gone through all this nonsense and all the information, he came up with a report that simply, in effect, said to the DDI people involved, "You don't know what you are missing. These are honest, bona fide sources by and large and," he said, "I think you are crazy for not using them." So from that point of view it starts to break down. The animosity, the differences of approach on how you work this thing, and it was a good thing from that point of view, and I must say not one of our sources was ever revealed by this man. He kept it, you know - integrity.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: And he became one of us, in effect. OK, he knew the sources. He knew more than I did and I was the Exec. I never asked for sources. But Des also had another thing as part of this program. Des started to expand what is called the source description on the disseminations. We used to have just a one liner or something like that, the guy had access on it. And we ended up by writing a short paragraph about the source, without identifying the source, which in effect gave the reader some idea of the source's reliability, his access to this particular type of information, how long he had been around with us, and, in effect, we're telling you this is good, bad or indifferent.

INTERVIEWER: They were a tested source.

MR. HALPERN: Yes. And without going into that numbering system or the grading system which is hard to work with. And this was a departure. And this was a test again. And only on the task force we began that before it became DDP-wide and the DDP hierarchy was opposed to that too. Because if you work with us long enough and you don't change these by-lines often enough, somebody can sit and pretty much zero in on who the source is. And it is a hell of a lot of extra work. Believe me, a hell of a lot of extra work. But Des insisted. Again being Des, and then when he became DDP, he put that system in effect throughout the DDP. And unfortunately he was in the DDP only a short period before he died in July of '67. So when you're talking about the time frame of breakdown, it began in '63. Des took that system into WH when he became the Division Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, as it's called now LA. And then he took it into the DDP when he became DDP in '65.

INTERVIEWER: My goodness.

MR. HALPERN: And he remained there until 1967.

INTERVIEWER: Gee. That's good background.

MR. HALPERN: So best when you are talking about breakdown of the dispute, or the fight between the two, there were very valid reasons for both sides to maintain the position that they had at the time. I can see their side. Having been from R&A, I can understand what their problem was, like I understand our problem on the collecting side. And so, but gradually, I don't know what the system is today and how it works, but anyway we began to break it down, but it took, well, it began in '47 and took until '67. 20 years. What you've got is two different worlds. And this is one of the reasons I keep telling journalists who talk to me, we're both in the same business. You are collecting information, and you want to protect sources. That's what we are doing. You do it to get a Pulitzer Prize and we do it to protect the United States.

It took all this time because of the very firm positions held by both sides. It took all this time to get a better approach, a more reasoned approach, to talk to each other, and both sides still maintained their respective jobs.

INTERVIEWER: And Des was a key figure.

MR. HALPERN: Des was a very key figure in this and he was doing this mostly on his own. He had a hell of a lot of opposition. And, as I say, even his closest allies, and I was his Exec, and I thought he was crazy. And I told him so. I said you know you are giving away the store.

INTERVIEWER: And Helms backed him?

MR. HALPERN: Finally. It took a lot of doing, but Helms backed him. Helms said, "All right, let Des try as an experiment. He'll be the guinea pig. Let's see what happens." And I must say if the DDI man who was chosen (it was a very senior, goddammit), he'd been around a long time and had a marvelous reputation. And a man of integrity and all of that, and boy he proved it. But if he had broken, if he had slipped even just telling the DDI himself the identities of some of the sources, the thing would have fallen right flat on its face. But simply because of this one individual being who he was in terms of an honest man, knew what the job was, he knew what had to be done and he kept it all to himself.

INTERVIEWER: Great.

MR. HALPERN: He knew more about our sources when he was finished with the job than Des did.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: Well, Des didn't know what the sources were. He knew them by cryptonyms. You know, "Radiator," yea he is the guy from the army. You know. Or "Lamb," he's the guy that gives the stuff on the Mig-22 or 21. You know, that's all you needed to know. But this guy knew who the sources were. He knew them by name, rank and serial number. And it was an unbelievable thing that was done.

INTERVIEWER: And no leaks.

MR. HALPERN: Not a bit. That was the most important thing. And I guess he knew what he was up to and he knew what the consequences of leaking were. The experiment would have dropped dead in its tracks and nobody would have ever tried it again. Ever. So it worked. But that's what finally broke it. So, as I say, you were up to '65, '66, '67 when Des was DDP.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Earlier we were just touching on Congressional committees and there are some critics who say the Congressional committees overseeing the Agency before 1975 were "blind and toothless watchdogs; that members of Congress were unaware or unconcerned about Agency excesses." What are your views with regard to Congressional oversight of the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Well, in those days the four committees were not blind, were not toothless and they were not whatever the other phrase you had there. The four groups were largely controlled by senior members of Congress who really ran the Congress in those days. And their concern was: a) not themselves getting to know too much of the secrets that went on; and b) they felt largely, you pick good people, you give them a job to do, you give them the tools to do it and don't muck around with them. Particularly, in this particular field. Maybe it was ignorance. I don't know. But that was the general attitude. As I say and as I have said before, I have had enough reports from my bosses. The DCI was dying to talk substance with some of these leaders on the Hill, and they did not want to listen. And that, I think, was wrong. Maybe they could have helped. Maybe it would have been different. I don't know. But they weren't blind and they weren't toothless. They were deliberate on that part. And they didn't deliberately blind themselves. They were taken in a little, I think, sometimes when we used to show them all kinds of little goodies and fancy gidgets and gadgets and secret devices and what have you, just like show and tell. And I used to have to prepare some of these things or get the stuff from the agent or from rest of the DDP for the goodies -- and we called them goodies -- to show the Hill. Well, they weren't always interested in seeing even those things.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: Well, "We know you're doing a good job. Go. Go. Go."

INTERVIEWER: These goodies might be radios or. . .?

MR. HALPERN: Could be radios, could be concealment devices, secret writing devices -- all kinds of gadgets with different kinds of bugs in them. And obviously they got smaller, and smaller, and smaller, and smaller they got more and more heisted into looking at them, but it also meant goodies in terms of good intelligence we picked up. I differ completely with Admiral Turner who said that the years he was a DCI he never saw a piece of intelligence that was worth the life of anybody. I differ with him about that. There was some intelligence which I think was worth more than the life of a person. I can give you an example of that later. But, the committees, I think, deliberately didn't want to get involved. They weren't lined up or held us for fools. I don't think they were fooled a bit. They knew what they were doing. They wanted it that way. And they kept it that way. And even in the staffs in those days of those committee people were limited staffs who were cleared for all this kind of stuff, and they were not interested in jogging, or pushing, or goading their bosses into unnecessary mucking around of what the hell was going on. They just weren't. Usually the staff directors of each of the small units were the only ones cleared for most of things and sat in on the meetings.

INTERVIEWER: They were cleared by the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Oh sure.

INTERVIEWER: They went through the whole, the background. . .?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know if . . . They weren't given polygraphs. That's for sure. At least I don't think so. How they did the clearances I never asked. But anyway, they were cleared. So that, people say they were taken into camp. I don't think that is the proper phrase. My own feeling is there was a different attitude. They weren't out to do investigative reporting, in effect, for themselves. They weren't looking for titles, they weren't looking for television headlines. They were just trying to do an honest day's work, quietly, peacefully and get enough information to know about the budget then they got all the budgetary information they wanted, all the budgets went through them without an exception. No question about that, they knew exactly where every penny was and approved it and what have you and all these so-called covert operations were always cleared with the proper committee. The committees had to alert the OMB in those days, the BOB really, the Bureau of the Budget. The BOB wouldn't release money for some of our activities until they got the word from the committees on the Hill.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, the four committees. So we didn't have a pot full of money that we could just willy nilly use.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have a contingency fund? Modest.

MR. HALPERN: Well, the contingency fund was up on the Hill. I mean, it was controlled by the Hill. And it is today, I believe. But before you get money released by the BOB, somebody up there had to say OK. And that happened on every one of the operations I know about. In the Far East, I don't know about the European ones, I am sure the system is the same. It was a well-oiled machine. Sure, they didn't ask the kind of questions that are asked today, but they knew what the operation was.

INTERVIEWER: There was a feeling between the Agency and the Congress that there was good liaison?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yes. It was overt. Completely. Always. It worked very well indeed. And the system worked so that the Legislative Counsel, whether it was Pforzheimer or John Warner or anybody else, they knew who to call within the DDP, for example. If they were sitting up on the Hill and one of the members -- could be a Senator or Representative of the committees -- wanted to know something, they knew who to call, and when I had the job they usually called me for the DDP because I was able to get them the answer and it worked very well. In case someone didn't know everything, they knew where to get the information. And when Congress asked you gave it to them.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think this was also a reflection of the view that the Agency and the Congress both saw the Soviet threat as a real threat?

MR. HALPERN: I am not sure that was part of it. It may have been. But that's a conjecture on my part. I think it was more the people we were dealing with on the Hill had also been through the same things most of us had been through. They are all part of the same generation. We were all working together in terms of protecting the country. At least we thought we were protecting the country. The business where some of this falls down is when we started, because we had to, start working operations more in the United States in order to get assets to go abroad, and once you start that you're touching a very sensitive area and we all knew that. And we'll talk about that later. We'll talk about MHCHAOS.

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: But until then the consensus was, you know, we've got to have a united front, we've got to find out what's going on in the world, we're getting more involved in the world, and we all need to help each other. And I don't think -- yeah, the Soviet threat was there but it was different, I think, it was a different -- I mean, we weren't expecting the Soviets to march over the border except very early in the late -- right after the war in the '40's when you had the Berlin blockade and that kind of stuff. Yeah, at that time people were expecting the Soviet troops to come marching not only into Bonn but also into Paris. But that didn't last into the '50's. It was a totally, sure there was a Soviet threat abroad and later a Chinese Communist threat in Southeast Asia, no question of that. And there was a matter of, I guess when Dean Rusk said many years later in the '60's, something about, there is a dirty war going on in the alleys of the world in which we don't see, but he said it's important, and, yeah, we were there.

INTERVIEWER: Was there much more cooperation?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah, it was total. What broke it down was the Vietnam war again and I guess Watergate. When '74 came around, I mean the Congressional elections of '74 came, and you had a totally different bunch of guys coming in, and Congress became 435 on one side and 100 on another side. Totally independent kingdoms and principalities. And you had no cohesion and no control. I think that's when it all broke. You couldn't go to two or three guys on the Congressional Hill and say, "Here are the facts, this is what we think we ought to do about it. If you agree, fine; if you don't agree, fine. Tell us." But these guys could sit up there and they could say, okay, they can commit the Congress. As a cohesive unit, they could get those votes when they needed them. And if somebody, some freshman Congressman said, "Hey, I want to know about this." "We'll tell you later buddy, you can't vote." And it worked. Today, there is no way you could do it. We haven't been able to do it since the Congressional election of '74. But coming back to what I said earlier though, those guys who were working in the committees in advance of what later became the Church Committee on Intelligence, they were with the old crowd but they were beginning to break apart then and they were working within the framework, and what helped them, obviously, was a totally new Congress in '75. And all hell broke loose.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, yes, and it still. . .

MR HALPERN: And it still hasn't been put back together. Even Tip O'Neill couldn't control it. In all what, he had 30 years up there or more, and he couldn't control it. And until you get -- I'm not even talking consensus now -- but until you get back to some kind of a better hold on a Congress so that you don't have these independent kingdoms and fiefdoms and they work together more as a cohesive unit on various activity -- talk about special interest groups -- that's where they need them up there. They have to get together. I don't care whether it's a special interest group on social security and on medicare and on intelligence and on something else and on something else but you've got to have better control.

INTERVIEWER: It's really fragmented.

MR. HALPERN: It's very fragmented. You can't run a government that way. Impossible. You don't know who to talk to. And even with the Intelligence

Committee, I remember, for example, Senator Huddleston, who was on the Church Committtee and later was on the Intelligence Committee. During the days of the Church Committee he was talking about, "You can't just have CIA or the intelligence people talk to a couple of people up on the Hill and that's it. You've got to talk to everybody." After he'd been on the Intelligence Committee for a while, and I've got his clippings somewhere in my stack of clippings, Huddleston said, "The Congress, the members of Congress" -- he was addressing his own buddies -- "the members of Congress have to accept us on the Intelligence Committee as your surrogates." And that is all we were trying to do. In an intelligence community to have an intelligence committee be the surrogate -- and there was four of them -- be the surrogate for the whole Congress. But Huddletson when he was on the Church committee said, "You can't do that, you can't do that. We all have to know." Well, he found out personally.

INTERVIEWER: He finally changed.

MR. HALPERN: He changed his mind.

INTERVIEWER: That's neat.

MR. HALPERN: So you know, that's all they were saying. And it finally, it took him a long while to get around to it, but he finally did it.

INTERVIEWER: Some get educated faster than others.

MR. HALPERN: That's right. So when you talk about. . . The '74 break, I think, was a big thing, a big thing. And I think if the election of Congress in '74 had gone a little bit differently, and there hadn't been that total break and disorder up on the Hill, the disarray I call it, which all began with the Vietnam business and aided by the Watergate -

INTERVIEWER: And Nixon resigning in '74.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, he did in '74. He was pardoned in, what, August of '74. But I think if the election had gone differently, and there had been some control under the Congress -- more cohesion -- the Church Committee and Pike Committee might have been prepared a little better. I don't know. I'm just guessing. Obviously we can't rewrite history.

INTERVIEWER: No reruns.

MR. HALPERN: No reruns, no reruns. None at all.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about some indications that younger Agency officers were troubled by certain domestic practices such as mail openings in the years before 1974.

MR. HALPERN: That's correct.

INTERVIEWER: Were you aware of these tensions?

MR. HALPERN: Oh sure. They were all over the place. When the MHCHAOS program began, I think it began in what -- I'm trying to think now -- '69, '70 something like that?

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: '70, something like that. Anyway, yes, this was very much felt by all the officers, well not all but a good majority of the officers. They didn't like the idea of following Americans abroad unless we had some real hard evidence that such and such was happening with an American and Soviet agent or whatever. But then you had the old question of the chicken and the egg. How do you find out whether the guy is alone until you follow him? Where do you begin? How do you get to the point where you know he is involved until you start somewhere? Obviously it got out of hand in terms of the number of people we started to follow and look at. But it basically began as a way of getting support and finding assets in this country (leftists assets) who could go abroad as bona fide leftists as reporting mechanisms. It was all targetted abroad. We never targetted it here in the United States. I think the record of the Committee proves that, even the Rockefeller Commission or what have you. And this was something new, we'd never tried before on a massive scale, and we worked very closely with the FBI on this. And most of the files we opened up were names the FBI gave us with duplicate copies of what they had in their files on a lot of these Americans with leftists leanings and what have you. The officer corps in the DDP didn't like it, thought we were going beyond our charter, obviously thought we were trying to become a Gestapo, in effect, in the United States. And that was never the case. The appeals from various officers from various levels, and it was intensive argumentation, both here and abroad, the appeals went up the line. There was no intention of trying to dampen down the arguments or the objections or the concerns. The appeals went up, not once, but several times -- right up to Helms, the Director -- each and every time these things were examined again, looked at again, and orders came down to continue in terms of: our target is abroad, not the United States. Everything we are doing here has to be geared to something abroad. And we even changed procedures on a lot of this stuff. It was tightly held information, the cables were tightly held, and MHCHAOS itself as an indicator. (The MH was just a digraph of the DDP-wide activity.) Everything was done on special channels, special cable channels, special pouch channels. It wasn't given wide distribution at all. Well, everyone knew the program was going on. We had many a staff meeting about this, DDP staff meetings. There was a lot of tension, no question about that.

INTERVIEWER: And was the tension just with the young officers or. . .?

MR. HALPERN: No. It was up and down throughout.

INTERVIEWER: Throughout?

MR.HALPERN: Including some of the old hands who didn't like the system, didn't like the program. And even those who understood that this was basically geared abroad as a counterintelligence operation, just didn't think that we should be involved in it. We preferred to have the Bureau or somebody else get involved in it. But again, you talk about turf battles and equity or what have you, a lot of the liaison services abroad -- the foreign liaison services -- we had a deal with. Many of them didn't want to work with the Bureau and only wanted to work with us. And you can't have both agencies suddenly hitting the same foreign service and asking the same questions. It just gets silly. So there were lots of problems on this one and the officers, as I say, even some of the old hands, didn't like it. They wanted to go back to doing the normal collection job and not go looking for what amounts to, you know, Bolsheviks with bombs under the bed. And that tension was there and I think it continues, and even under Bill Colby who modified the program even more in '73, in late or middle '73 with Schlesinger and Colby. But the program by and large continued in a slightly reduced fashion and a different terminology and with much more emphasis on doing that over there than in the States. I think it's the kind of thing that, you know, you're damned if you do and you are damned if you don't. I don't think we ever convinced everybody that what we were doing was within bounds and, obviously, we had the information, the information wasn't going anywhere. Nobody was going to court on it, nobody was going to get shot, nobody was going to get put in jail. I mean, we were just pulling it all together.

INTERVIEWER: Would you say dozens of officers knew about this?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, hundreds of them.

INTERVIEWER: Hundreds of officers.

MR. HALPERN: Sure. I think everybody in the DDP knew about it. They didn't see the traffic, but they knew about it.

INTERVIEWER: They knew about it?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. It was common hall gossip and lunch room gossip and what have you. And as I say, there was lots of opposition to it by senior officers as well as -- well, in the first place a lot of the senior officers thought that we were taking our time and effort and our assets away from the important job, which was the Soviet target. You know, it takes time, it takes people, and it takes money. And you only have so much that you can do in 24 hours a day, and you can't do everything. That's why you end up with what we used to call a Related Mission Director for the priority - trying to do things in some kind of priority order. And you can't just pick the easy ones. You know, you would get a bad report card if you pick only the easy ones. You've got to pick some of the hard ones too.

INTERVIEWER: Where was it thought that these orders came from, relative to . .?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, they knew, people knew where the orders came from. They knew it was a Presidential directive. Nothing was hidden from them. Oh, no question about that. This was a part of the Johnson presidential requirement. What he was looking for was evidence of Soviet or domestic upheaval in the United States. We couldn't find it. And no matter, and every time we told him that, he said, "Intensify your efforts." You know, and as Dick Helms has said, you know, "I only have one president at a time. That's where I get my orders." So what do you do? And if Dick said that I'm not going to do it, there would be a new DCI in 24 hours -- or thereabouts.

INTERVIEWER: And I think your point that it went up and down wasn't just the younger. . .

MR. HALPERN: No, no. It was up and down on the entire hierarchy. There were pro and con argumentation and what have you. Now they say a lot of the older hands are saying, you know, "We haven't got time to do everything for God's sakes. Which is more important: the Soviet target or to find out if there are a couple of bucks coming into the country? People are going to be in the streets anyway whether they get Soviet money or not." I mean, it doesn't take very much to get people into the streets in this country, as you can see. And that is part of the breakdown. And that is Vietnam. Not Watergate. You know, Kent State didn't happen until 1970. We'd been in the war since '65 basically. And I remember arguing with my National War College colleagues, the military and the State Department guys and what have you, and I said when we went in. . . Let's see -- the Marines went in in March of '65 in Danang. The class didn't start until August of '65. I was with the class of '66, so we'd been in there a few months. And we went to a briefing in one of the secure rooms down in the bowels of the Pentagon. And this was DCSLOGS (Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics) DCSLOGS, and they had a big briefing for us. We were all senior officers in the War College with clearances and what have you, and they were telling us -- this is October of '65 -- they had the usual Colonels with pointers attached showing us the charts for what they were planning for Vietnam. And the graphs were going like this for five years. The number of troops that were going to be in Vietnam -- five years! I looked around at my buddies and I said, "What the hell is going on here? We just got there! How the hell you are planning a five year war? You guys are crazy!"

I said, "This country -- the only time it's had a war longer than four years was the American Revolution. You are not going to have the support of the American people if you go that long. It's crazy! You can't plan five years ahead." They had half a million men. Five year plan. This wasn't out in public, obviously, in October '65. If the American public or the Congress knew about that, there would have been a revolt right then. And I told them, I argued with my buddies who were members of the State Department -- not military, State Department. "Oh, Sam, you don't understand the American people. They'll go along with you as long as you do it. It'll be slow, sure." I said, "No way. You mark my words. If you plan that way, it's crazy. If you're going to go fight a war, fight a war. Don't tickle them." Anyway, what you had there in '65 when we went into the war, and I think Johnson thought with the American flag flying nobody was going to dare do anything with him, and everybody melted in the background. But by '70 you had lost the consensus in this country. Totally. And Kent State just added to it. I don't blame Nixon for Kent State. Obviously nobody can. Crazy National Guardsmen with young kids, sensitive triggers, and unfortunate deaths. But that just added to it.

INTERVIEWER: And you have all the street rioting and civil rights issues.

MR. HALPERN: Civil rights is another one in '68. But that wasn't really part of the Vietnam problem. That was a totally separate issue. And when you add it all together, it was just bad. So that when Johnson says, "I want to find out about Soviets supporting all of this stuff," I think he was crazy. But he wouldn't listen. And so we had to keep going. And so the Officer Corps in the Clandestine Services didn't like being taken away from their job. And we didn't like being. . . I know this was a big problem too, the Vietnam station got bigger and bigger and bigger and bigger -- it was crazy. We even had what was called a Vietnam levy. Des Fitzgerald decided, when he became DDP, he was going to have each division and staff charged with producing so many bodies. And I mean bodies.

INTERVIEWER: To go over.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. To go to Vietnam. Because it got bigger and bigger and you had to have men all over the bloody country. And so he wanted some good, some bad, and some middle. But he didn't want all bad. You know, and that kind of stuff. And so, we were putting our assets into one little place and it was the most important thing, sure, I understand, but that wasn't the main target or what the hell CIA was in business for. We weren't, at least the clandestine side wasn't supposed to be out there fighting a war. It's crazy. And so the people were objecting to that. The officer corps was objecting to the Vietnam levy. On top of that comes CHAOS and CHAOS really takes us away from more of our normal activity and who the hell is going to worry about the Soviet target in terms of intelligence collection. And by that time, more than just Soviet targets, a lot of other targets too. So yeah, there was a lot of opposition.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Do have any feeling about the Presidents. Do you feel that they knew about the mail opening program?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, in a general way.

INTERVIEWER: In a general way.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, Presidents don't ask detailed questions. They don't normally ask that kind of stuff. They just want to know, they want to see a piece of paper. They want to know what is going on. And if he is bringing in something hot, he might ask, "Hey, how'd you get this?" But, let me give you another example, not a President but a Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. We put out at one point, Des was DDP at the time, we put out a very good report from an asset from behind the Curtain, if I can still use the old phraseology. And so, it was a good report. And suddenly we get a call, the DDPs, not the office but the DDP mechanism, gets a call, a requirement he get a call from somebody in the State Department asking for the identity of the source. The guy comes hot footing it up to me and says, "Sam, the State Department wants to know the source." I said, "Who in the State Department? State Department wants to know. Tell me who." "Secretary wants to know." I said, "Oh, okay. You have whoever you were talking to tell the Secretary to call Des Fitzgerald or Dick Helms. It's simple." "I can't say that." I said, "Well, if you can't, I will. The man is crazy. We don't give sources." And so, I go in and tell my boss that such and such is going to happen. He might get the call from Dean Rusk on the secure line. I tell him what the story is, and he says, "Okay I will wait for the call." And sure enough, I happened to be in the office on something else when the call came later that day, and it was Dean Rusk. And I could tell from the conversation what is going on. And it points out that Dean Rusk didn't want to know the identity of the source, never asked for the identity of the source. All he wanted to know was how good is this piece of information. And Des said, "I'll put my arm in the fire up to the shoulder blade. It's a good source." Knew what he meant. End of conversation. You know, Presidents don't ask, Secretaries of the State don't ask for details that they shouldn't. They know that. And they've been around long enough. I mean, I don't know about Jimmy Carter, but the other guys don't. And so, I think Presidents knew in general terms that there was mail opening, wire tapping, and that kind of stuff. Well, they engaged it themselves for God's sake, not the mail opening but the wire tapping, and bugging offices or bug somebody elses or tell somebody to bug somebody. Hell, it started with Roosevelt himself, you know, nothing new.

INTERVIEWER: Was the mail opening program known very extensively in the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: No. I'll give you an example. I didn't know it.

INTERVIEWER: You did not know it?

MR. HALPERN: I did not know it and even when I was Exec to the DDP I knew some operational cryptonyms, and all I know was that they were good sources of information. I never asked beyond that. And nobody ever told me beyond that and I had no reason to know. I didn't. As a matter of fact, to give you an example of how naive I was, when I was called back, right after I retired in early '75 to help on getting ready for the Congressional investigations, which we didn't even know was going on at the time (this was January of '75), the newspaper stories were talking about mail openings and that kind of stuff. And I was silly enough and foolish enough to say to the security guy I was dealing with -- the security officer (the Office of Security ran HTLINGUAL) -- that what we were doing was in support of trying to get information about how the Chinese or the Russians were operating and what it took to get documentation and all that kind of stuff -- what you needed. Hell, perfectly honest. I didn't know what the hell was going on. And all I know is that the security guy said, "Yeah Sam yeah yeah that's a good idea. We'll think about that yeah Sam that's a good idea yeah yeah we'll think about that." They never said anything at that point that they were running a real mail coverage and what have you. And I didn't know that I was doing the normal, you know. This is what you were in an operation for. But it was more than that, obviously. So, it was not widely known.

INTERVIEWER: No. No.

MR. HALPERN: Information. You might have had access like I did to information and you knew a good source or a bad source.

INTERVIEWER: And you might know the information came from HTLINGUAL.

MR. HALPERN: No. I never heard the cryptonymn.

INTERVIEWER: Never heard the cryptonymn. Okay.

MR. HALPERN: Didn't even need that. All I knew is that it was a good source.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How would you characterize morale in the Agency in the two to three years just prior to the Church and Pike Hearings.

MR. HALPERN: Oh, I think it was largely unsettled because in '73 you had the turnover under Schlesinger.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: And it was unsettling, totally unsettling. In the end of '72 when Schlesinger was announced as the new man on the block and everybody knew Helms was out, from there on it was utter turmoil and debacle. Both in the DDP and God knows, where else.

INTERVIEWER: The worst you had seen?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yes. Totally. Never had anything that bad before. Unbelievable. It was bad. And we had had reduction in forces before throughout the Agency from time to time. We had a "701 Program," it was called, one of them I remember. And several others from time to time. You had reduction programs and it was bad in those days. But nothing like '73. Absolutely nothing. All hell broke loose.

INTERVIEWER: Bad in the sense that he was going to cut a thousand or two thousand?

MR. HALPERN: Bad in terms that the leadership had no trust in us.

INTERVIEWER: Which leadership are you referring to, Sam?

MR. HALPERN: Schlesinger/Colby, obviously. Leadership no longer had any trust in us. They were treating us like dirt. No appreciation of what we had done or what we could do. No reason and no appreciation that we even exist. They wanted to wipe us out. Then, of course, the personal aspect of it -- my job and where am I going to go from here and do I get a pension or don't I get a pension -- and so on. And it was awful. Unbelievably awful both here and abroad. And I don't know what happened when the Halloween Massacre under Turner came around. That I guess must have been equally dramatic. But in '73 none of us had ever seen anything like that before. When, you know, everybody's life work was suddenly up for grabs. And it was just a horrible mess.

INTERVIEWER: Well, was there a feeling that President Nixon, while Helms was Director, that President Nixon was supportive of the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, yeah there was. Largely because, I don't know if it was Nixon, but it was Kissinger who supported the Agency. And most of us knew that most of the foreign policy was coming out of Henry anyway. But with Nixon's support of course. And he had Nixon's chops to do what he had to do or wanted to do. But by and large we worked very closely, as an Agency with Kissinger. We provided all kinds of support, assets, did all kinds of things at his request and so on. I was on the phone to Al Haig, for example, although I never met him, but was on the phone almost daily when he was still a Colonel on the Kissinger staff doing all kinds of things. And exchanging papers with him via the new (I forget what it was called in those days) long distance xerography but it was totally encrypted. We had one machine up in the Ops Center and he had one machine up in his Ops Center in the White House, and at first we were standing at the machines separately waiting for the piece of paper (nobody else was allowed to see the paper). So, you know, we worked together as a team. And the Agency, I mean at least the Clandestine Service side of it worked very closely with them. And I remember right after Nixon was sworn in in January of '69.

INTERVIEWER: '69 when he came in?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, he came in in '69. There was a meeting -- Nixon, Mitchell, Kissinger, Helms, and Tom Karamessines in the White House.

INTERVIEWER: Was Rogers there?

MR. HALPERN: No.

INTERVIEWER: No, Rogers?

MR. HALPERN: You mean the Secretary of State? No. Who is he? He didn't count. You know that. I mean the history books are full of that now. No, Mitchell was there. I don't know why but he was the Attorney General but I don't know why he, at least, the Attorney General nominee. But anyway, he was there. I got this from Tom. As Tom's Exec, Tom came back and reported on the meeting. And there was a very close bond right there established. Nixon then Kissinger asked a lot of questions as to our capabilities, our assets and what we could do to help and what have you on different aspects, and Tom was asked to give the details. Dick knew some but he didn't know all the details because he was out of the job for a number of years. When they came back, they had marching orders. It worked.

INTERVIEWER: So that in '73 when Helms is out, that's the big big change?

MR. HALPERN: Yes. As I say that began in '72 right after the election. Nixon had his own raid but that is another story. But there was when Schlesinger came in it was just a traumatic, really traumatic, experience.

INTERVIEWER: Was Schlesinger known to the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: No, just by reputation.

INTERVIEWER: Just by reputation. And that was?

MR. HALPERN: Bad. Because of the things he had done in the Atomic Energy Commission and the Bureau of Budget. And his whole approach. Totally impersonal. The new "machine man" kind of thing, you know, the mathematical brain or whatever -- oh, I guess machine is a better stated cause.

INTERVIEWER: So that reputation was known and therefore. . .

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah, not only known but it was, you know -- immediately the phone calls went out all over town asking, "What about this, who is this guy, what's he like?" And everything we got back was bad. Bad, bad, bad, bad, bad. . .

INTERVIEWER: And then Colby will support Schlesinger while. . .

MR. HALPERN: Oh, he not only supported him but he was one of the guys who made inputs of the information for whatever attitude Schlesinger had on the whole thing. Now Schlesinger's attitude about what he did totally changed since he's out of government, since Helms' out of government, and everybody else. It was 180 degree switch.

INTERVIEWER: For Colby?

MR. HALPERN: No, for Schlesinger.

INTERVIEWER: Schlesinger.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. And I tried to tell them. See I was Exec to Colby for about 3 months, and I tried to tell my friends -- who wouldn't believe it -- don't blame Schlesinger for what is happening to the DDP. Blame Colby. It was all Colby. He's the guy who was pushing this. And in effect even says so in the book, if you read the book, where he says he told Schlesinger he'd take care of cleaning up the DDP. You know, he knows that function. Well, yeah that's true.

INTERVIEWER: What three months were you serving Colby?

MR. HALPERN: February, March, April and part of May of '73. When I was his Executive.

INTERVIEWER: And did the tensions simply grow after Schlesinger and Colby are working away. . .

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. It lasted until. . . Well, Schlesinger left early. He left in June of '73. And it lasted even afterward. The thing didn't get settled down for a long while.

INTERVIEWER: Continuing on?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, it continued. Became public.

INTERVIEWER: And then people being separated from the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: And I saw how some of those separations of some senior officers were done. And believe me, it was brutal. Brutal and awful.

INTERVIEWER: Brutal in the context of?

MR. HALPERN: No sense of personalities. No sense of humanity. No sense of the dealing with individual problems. We used to be a Band of Brothers.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: I think I said that before.

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: That stopped with Schlesinger and Colby.

INTERVIEWER: Now that stopped throughout the Agency or . . .

MR. HALPERN: I don't know about the rest of the Agency.

INTERVIEWER: But it stopped in the clandestine . . .

MR. HALPERN: Let me talk about what I know about.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: I can conjecture about that other ...

INTERVIEWER: Right, yes.

MR. HALPERN: My conjecture is almost as good as yours. Maybe a little bit better having lived there all these years.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: But, no, I am talking basically what I know about clandestine subjects. It was awful. I mean, even old friends were just, you know, ignored, looked down upon. Given no consideration whatsoever. In the old days we took care of each other as a Band of Brothers does. We helped each other.

INTERVIEWER: And this included what sorts of things?

MR. HALPERN: You mean the helping?

INTERVIEWER: Uh huh.

MR. HALPERN: Oh, if a guy had a family problem, we'd worry about his next assignment so that the family problem was taken care of. If a guy had a medical problem he didn't want people to know about, talk about, we helped him with that. People with husband and wife problems, we'd help on that. There were even problems with kids. We'd help with that. Drugs, somebody impregnating somebody -- what do you do about that kind of thing. We'd try to look out after each other. That didn't mean we didn't have professional rivalry and all of that. There was a lot of that, believe me. Who got what job and who got what promotion. But basically, when the chips were down, we were helpful to each other. We tried to find interpretations of rules and regulations to assist each other, even financially, so that you weren't so out-of-pocket on a lot things and the government might be able to help. If somebody had a problem, you know, if he was abroad for example, and something happened to a family member back here, we'd suddenly call the guy back on TDY -- we had a big important problem to worry about and discuss with him. You know, that kind of stuff.

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: All perfectly legal, and it was all, we used to, as a matter of fact, we in the DDP used to look at some of our support officers and administrators and what have you in terms of how well they were able to interpret the regulation in order to help us out with a job, whether it was a personal thing, or a professional, or an operation or what have you, and I remember one of them. I'd pick up the phone and say, "Charlie, here's my problem: I've got to get from point A to point B and I've got to do it fast." "Jesus Christ. All right. I'll call you back." And within the hour, or whatever it took him, he'd say, "You go from A, to A Prime, to A Prime 2, to A Prime 3, and then you end up in B over there, and you'll get there and you'll be fine and it won't take you any time. You'll just go. Just do it my way." I said, "Fine. You prepare the papers. I'll sign them." And that's the way it worked. You know, a Band of Brothers. We knew what we were doing in terms of trying to get the job done and stay within the bounds of the Agency.

INTERVIEWER: And if somebody came up for retirement, and they might need some. . .

MR. HALPERN: I think, we'd try to, well, in the early days when you didn't have the bulk of people suddenly coming out, you'd even try to help them find a job. Pick up the phone, call friends, connections, what have you. And it was done. Now later, when it came into the hundreds, you couldn't do it, obviously. And then everybody fell by the wayside. But it was a totally different attitude; instilled right away when Schlesinger came along. Some of his language is even being quoted in the newspapers and magazines. I don't know if he said the words that way but anyway things like: "I am not interested in people, I am interested in the United States taxpayer." Well, we were interested in the taxpayer too, but that didn't come first. Maybe that was wrong but at least we didn't think so. Considering the time and effort most of us put into that place, I don't think Uncle Sam was ever on the short end of the stick.

INTERVIEWER: And so someone being separated might not know he was being separated until . . .

MR. HALPERN: Until it hit him.

INTERVIEWER: Until it hit him.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. I remember Colby, for example, taking home with him, which he shouldn't have done but he did, stacks of personnel folders to, you know, be the great decider. This guy goes, this guy stays.

INTERVIEWER: So the morale was not very good?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, it was nonexistent. Nonexistent, less than nonexistent.

INTERVIEWER: Gee.

MR. HALPERN: '73 was a bad year. A very bad year.

INTERVIEWER: '74?

MR. HALPERN: Well, I don't know. In '74 it probably got a little bit better. Things were settling down a little bit under Colby. And we weren't quite so much under the gun. About that time most of the people had been separated.

INTERVIEWER: And was that harshly, that separation issue, is that Agency officers were coming back from Vietnam.

MR. HALPERN: Partly that. But only partly. We had a program under Tom Karamessines and under Helms. We knew that we were going to have to bring back a lot of people from Vietnam gradually, and we started actually, believe it or not, we started earlier than most people give us credit for to plan for this kind of reduction in force in Vietnam, the Far East Division, and gradually try to sort of spread the officers back to their proper divisions and areas, and we knew it was going to take a long time. And we knew we were going to have to reduce the total strength -- we were getting cut budget wise anyway and personnel slot wise. But it was a long range program. We were going to do it over a period of time. We weren't going to do it in a day. And it was a totally different approach. One with humanity, one totally without humanity. And I think we were right in feeling that we owed the guys, after all of their years and effort, some consideration. And, you know, there are perfectly legal ways and means of using the personnel rules and regulations and financial rules and regulations to ease the passage.

INTERVIEWER: And make it more gradual.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, and make it more gradual and make it easier on people, and what have you. And, look, even Schlesinger had to go to Congress to get the number of retirees' positions opened under the CIA Retirement Act. He had to get those numbers raised to take care of the mass of people he was suddenly getting rid of. And he didn't even know that initially. And that was finally brought to his attention, that a lot of these people could take us to court if you just throw them out without giving them the CIRA benefits. And so they went to Congress, and Congress upped the figures (with a little bit of doing). I mean, that was one of the things, you know, just sheer humanity.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: You know.

INTERVIEWER: The Ramparts article on the Agency and the National Student's Association.

MR. HALPERN: '67.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. Was that very harmful to the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Yes. Very much so.

INTERVIEWER: The flap was?

MR. HALPERN: It was a big flap obviously. We had to cut back on a lot of operations.

INTERVIEWER: Involving students?

MR. HALPERN: Well, the students was only one of it because if you remember the Ramparts exposure went far beyond student activity.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

MR. HALPERN: It covered all kinds of things -- labor unions, women's organizations, religous groups -- you name them and we were involved in some way or another. And practically all of those had to be dismantled. The DDP, then Des Fitzgerald, just before he died as a matter of fact, came up with a term call "Surge Funding." S-U-R-G-E funding. And what we were able to do, all legal and all checked out with Katzenbach and the Attorney General and everybody else, was in order to ease the way for a lot of these activities that we were involved with, we gave them extra money, a pile of money kind of thing, you know you are on your own from now on. Here, get going. Start up. And so we really did a big dismantling job. And it was very, very painful. Not only for the people involved in the activities, and including the officers who were the case officers running the thing from inside, but it hurt the overall effort. And one of the things, for example, even Congress finally recognized the need and picked up the RFE and Radio Liberty -- or Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty -- and is now run by the government instead of CIA funding it. It's still the same money from Congress, except they now call it something else and they have a broadcasting committee that oversees it. You know, no difference except it doesn't have those nasty letters -- CIA -- involved.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: So that's the running of it. And that used to be one of the biggest costs of our covert action operations. Those and the any paramilitary activity you get into. That's where the money goes.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: Intelligence operations don't cost much, propaganda operations don't cost much and so on. So it did have a tremendous impact, no question. '67 Ramparts.

INTERVIEWER: And this was fairly new in Helms' term of office wasn't it?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, Helms was the DCI then. Yes, '67.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about, the question is raised sometimes: how are reforms and real or potential abuses processed within the Agency in the decades before 1975?

MR. HALPERN: In practically every case that I know of, at least it went through the entire chain of command. Usually the IG was involved, and then the Legal Counsel got involved. And people were demoted, people were fired, people were reassigned. It all depended on what the gravity of the situation was and there were all kinds of different activities including some people who did nothing more than try to swipe a few bucks. And some of those went to court actually.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: And, in those days, we could do, with the help of the judge, have the trial _in camera_ so it didn't get a lot of publicity. But we went through all the ins and outs on a lot of this stuff and depending on what the situation was, the General Counsel would take it over the Attorney General if necessary. It all depended on what happened. But there was every effort made first to try to clean it up inside the organization, inside CIA if possible. And if not you went outside and got whatever help you needed and invoked whatever laws were necessary to make sure something like this didn't happen again, and people were told. Usually you didn't get the names of the individuals involved, we always tried to protect that. And it wasn't just because of privacy or anything like that, it's the nature of the business. You don't talk about names. But the kind of activity were usually well publicized at staff meetings and passed down the line. So you tell people so these things don't happen again. You can't always be sure they don't, but you try.

INTERVIEWER: And how about the comment I had read earlier that Helms was betrayed by Nixon, that if Helms had gone along on Watergate and all that type of thing he would have kept his job?

MR. HALPERN: Well, that sounds, it's a plausible theory, but I don't think so. I don't think it was in the cards because my own feeling is that Nixon was ready for a change, and he was ready to just clean house. Because look at the rest of his changes on personnel throughout the government after the '72 election. I mean, it was just all those crazy things. He just felt he wanted to have a new team. I personally don't think that that would have made much difference with Helms. I mean, Nixon and Helms in terms of keeping him on the job. I think he was ready for a new guy anyway.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever hear how Schlesinger happened to be chosen?

MR. HALPERN: No, I don't know, except that in '70 or '71 he was the deputy in OMB and he wrote a directive, well, he wrote a study and not a directive, changing the intelligence community relationships and the Director's relationships to the intelligence community and therefore I think he was considered an expert on the intelligence community and national security policy and so on. And when they were looking for a new boss, I would think that there he was sitting over at Atomic Energy which Nixon probably didn't know what he was doing over there anyway. And so he did in 1970 or '71, I think it was '71, a study and a report and moved him over.

INTERVIEWER: Had it ever been mentioned that maybe he was Kissinger's choice?

MR. HALPERN: I haven't heard that. I would doubt it. I would doubt it. Very much. I just hadn't heard that one before.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. All right.

MR. HALPERN: That's a new one. I presume some of your other sources mentioned that to you.

INTERVIEWER: I don't know. There was simply speculation.

MR. HALPERN: No, I don't think so. I would be very surprised if that turned out to be the fact.

INTERVIEWER: Okay.

MR. HALPERN: Henry doesn't take credit for it in his books. That's for sure.

INTERVIEWER: And he would.

MR. HALPERN: And those are nice, big, two heavy tomes. If you forgot, I've got them right down here.

INTERVIEWER: I haven't worked my way through all of them yet.

MR. HALPERN: He was supposed to have written a third one you know. But he never has.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right? A third one is coming?

MR. HALPERN: The third one is going to be on intelligence and national security.

INTERVIEWER: Oh really.

MR. HALPERN: But he never did it.

INTERVIEWER: It has not been written? Not yet anyway.

MR.HALPERN: Not yet.

INTERVIEWER: How about the Schlesinger memo of May 1973 regarding improper practices in the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: That's Colby's memo. Schlesinger put his name to it, but it's Colby's memo.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. So, written by Colby?

MR. HALPERN: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: And signed by Schlesinger?

MR. HALPERN: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: And the results of the memo are sometimes called the "Family Jewels" or "693 List"?

MR. HALPERN: That's right. That's right.

INTERVIEWER: How was that memo received?

MR. HALPERN: Well, I think in several ways. One of the ways was some people were shocked and surprised that anybody would put it all on a piece of paper. Number 1. Some accepted it as just another order and filled out all kinds of stuff. I accepted it in terms of reading the words that were in there. I never responded to it. Because it didn't apply to me, as far as I was concerned, because none of the things that I had ever done were, as far as I was concerned, beyond the pale, beyond the law, beyond interpretation of the law or anything like that. And so it depended on how you wanted to read and interpret the language. Because if I remember correctly it said something about things that you did that you thought were beyond the charter or outside the regulations or something like that. But I don't remember anything I ever did beyond that, so I didn't respond to the thing. I never answered it. And I'm sure that I wasn't the only one who didn't answer it.

INTERVIEWER: Was there much talk about it at the time?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah, a lot of talk. Obviously. What's this all about? Why? All that kind of stuff.

INTERVIEWER: Was it thought that it was related to a management style or related to Watergate or related to . . .?

MR. HALPERN: No, I think it was written in terms of the Watergate business, in terms of a CYA-type activity - "Cover Your Ass" Activity. I heard, again obviously, I talked about it to a lot of people, and they talked to me about it. And I told them what I was doing. I told them I wasn't going to reply to the thing, I didn't need to as far as I was concerned, but I left it up to each individual that talked to me to make it up in his own mind. I don't know how many did or didn't, but I think it was in terms of a CYA thing, in terms of: here's a new man on the block, Schlesinger, and he wants to know what happened since Genesis. You know, doesn't he have anything else to do? He's got a whole Agency and a whole new world to conquer. What the hell is worried about all that stuff for? So, I think it was basically in terms of, at least the guys I talked to or talked to me, it was a CYA activity on the part of Schlesinger who didn't want to get blind sided by something that might have happened that CIA would be accused of. But the attitude was, what the hell is he worried about, it is not on his watch. If there is something is wrong, and even if CIA is accused of it, it's not on his watch. Nobody can hold him responsible for it. If it happened, even two years ago, what the hell. I mean, so. It might have happened under somebody elses aegis, and CIA takes the heat, but he could say, you know, it wasn't me. I wasn't around. So that was the general attitude. And as I say, a lot of people responded like good soldiers and wrote all kinds of tomes about things they thought were wrong, and not all of them were accepted. I mean that 690 whatever thing. . .

INTERVIEWER: Yes, it's a list which is simply the number of pages that. . .

MR. HALPERN: Yes, and these things were each on a page if I remember correctly. And these were the ones that Bill Colby finally accepted as going quote beyond the pale unquote. But even then when Bill issued his kind of after action directives, there were a whole bunch of stuff. He said, you know, these don't count. Even though I've got them, these don't count because they are not beyond anything -- they are perfectly legal and all that kind of stuff and perfectly proper. In some of these he said, we are going to stop these completely, some of these we are going to modify (and CHAOS was one of them). He didn't stop it completely. At least not initially. And these, he said, have no bearing. So his own orders, later after he got all this stuff together, when he finally tallied them all up, they were just, you know, "no," "maybe," "yes."

INTERVIEWER: At the time the memo came out, was it known that Colby was the author or the drafter of it? Do you recall by chance?

MR. HALPERN: My friends wouldn't believe me. I knew. But . .

INTERVIEWER: You knew that he drafted it?

MR. HALPERN: His hand was there all the way. Now maybe he didn't do all the drafting, but it was his initiative or what have you.

INTERVIEWER: And your friends thought it was Schlesinger?

MR. HALPERN: Yes. Oh, Schlesinger was getting all of the rap, which I thought was all wrong. All wrong. From the firing of everybody -- or a lot of people -- to this kind of stuff. And it was Bill who was the guy who was pushing Schlesinger into this kind of stuff. And Schlesinger was willing to be pushed, don't get me wrong, and he wanted to do a house cleaning and a sweep, and all that kind of stuff, but without Bill it wouldn't have gotten half as far. I'm sure.

INTERVIEWER: Why was Bill doing that?

MR. HALPERN: That's a good question. People have asked me that continuously and I don't know. Some people have said that partly it was because of his daughter's problem. And you know she died very early on when he was DDP -- DDO; sorry: I get my terminology confused by the dates. And I don't believe that because his daughter's psychological problem was there long before, even when he was in Vietnam and she was in Vietnam. So I really don't know. Other people say that Bill was just being a good novice. Some people said he's going to end up in the monastery some day, even though he's got a new wife and all that, new company, and what have you. But, I've had all kinds of interpretations, but I don't even know if Bill knows why.

INTERVIEWER: And at that time it was as much a mystery as . . .?

MR. HALPERN: Well, at that time everybody thought it was Schlesinger.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, I see.

MR. HALPERN: That Schlesinger was the Big Bad Wolf. And sure he was but he was aided, and abetted, and goaded by one William Colby. And why Bill did it, I just don't know.

INTERVIEWER: Was there any sign of that before Schlesinger came in? In other words while Helms was still there? Was Colby . . .

MR. HALPERN: Not to the same extent. But Bill first came -- when I first got to know him -- was in 1956.

INTERVIEWER: That early?

MR. HALPERN: '56, yes. '56. Des Fitzgerald met Bill Colby when Bill was a case officer in the Rome station. And Des came back thinking Colby walked on water. The greatest thing since little apples. And he wanted him in the Far East Division right away. Well, he made some arrangements, and he got Bill into the Far East Division and assigned him as Deputy Chief of Station of Saigon. The Chief then was Nick Natsios. And Bill went out as Deputy Chief. And Vietnam then became his career -- God knows how many years. Ten years or more. And we in the Far East Division -- we the case officers and the operators in the Far East Division, the troops -- while Bill was here in

Washington getting acclimated to what FE was all about, who the people are and what have you and the various talks and the various comments and what have you, and later while he was out in Saigon, we regarded him as a great "nation builder" -- quote unquote. That he was not a clandestine operations officer in terms of espionage or counterintelligence. He never understood counterintelligence. Even to this day I don't think he understands counterintelligence. And I don't think he knew what a recruitment of an agent was -- even the fact that I haven't recruited many myself. But if you look at his book, he says the first agent he recruited in Italy was a member of the Communist Party. He recruited him as a reporting source, as strictly an intelligence agent, not as a propaganda CA officer. And you read his book and he talks there about his, Bill's, problem -- whether this is the right thing to do, and how can he live with himself, and manipulating a human being and all that kind of stuff. And it's very clear that he is not an intelligence operations officer. He is a great boy scout and he is a great guy for quote nation building unquote.

INTERVIEWER: When you say nation building, what do you mean by that, Sam?

MR. HALPERN: He wants to help other countries become like the United States. He wants, you know, the Declaration of Independence and Thomas Jefferson . .

INTERVIEWER: Democracy.

MR. HALPERN: Yes, and everybody vote. One man, one vote. Without any regard at all for the history and the social mores and background and customs of the country. Where votes in most cases don't mean anything. And it's silly. You work by chieftains and what have you and tribal systems and the whole business.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: But Bill wants to build nations. And its very laudable and maybe some government agency ought to build nations. And maybe he ought to be in the AID, or ICA in the old days, or the Red Cross or wherever. But not as a clandestine operations officer, trying to collect intelligence and recruit human beings to be your agent, your spy. A lot of us in the old FE Division on the working level thought, there is going to be trouble with this guy.

INTERVIEWER: Did you meet him in '56 then?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, sure. Yes I was Des' Exec then too.

INTERVIEWER: I see.

MR. HALPERN: In FE. So, a lot of us thought this was a problem guy but Des wants him around, and Des is the boss, so what the hell. There's nothing we can do. You know, maybe he'll learn something under Nick we used to say. Nick was a tough old Greek, old hand and he knew the business. In fact, he was a poet.

INTERVIEWER: So it was thought that maybe he'd change.

MR. HALPERN: Yes, but he didn't. Bill never changed. And so a lot of us -- well, for example, Bill, when he was Division Chief in FE -- I wasn't even in the Division at that point -- but Bill had an idea, for example, on how the OCI's Daily Intelligence Report should look. He thought it ought to be like a tabloid newspaper and even had a dummy made up for this thing. Well, it was laughed out of court at the time. Bill kept that dummy until he became DCI and he put it into effect. It became what is now called the National Intelligence Daily although I am told it is no longer in the newspaper format. That was changed as soon as Casey came aboard. But that is Bill for you. Once he gets something in his head, you don't change him.

INTERVIEWER: Tenacious?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, very, very.

INTERVIEWER: Well did you have much contact with him after '56?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, I didn't have too much contact with him in '56 until 1961 when I was shot down by Dick Bissell and Des Fitzgerald. Bissell was then DDP and Des was Chief, FE. I was enjoying life in Tokyo -- my one and only overseas full time tour and I was having a good time in Tokyo. And suddenly I got shot down to a place called Saigon. Which I had known about before during World War II and all that kind of stuff, but anyway, I got shot down on a special operation to work with the ASA teams, which is the Army version of NSA (Army component rather). And this is because Ed Lansdale, who was then in General Erskine's office at the Pentagon, had a bright idea. This was before the US was fully committed. There were 3,000 Americans -- men, women and children from all agencies -- including the military -- in Saigon in the summer of '61 when I got down there. Saigon was still a nice, sleepy, old French town. It was a lovely place. There were parts of Saigon that you couldn't go. And you couldn't go to parts of Chalons because there were VC all over you, but anyway, it was a nice area. But this was a crazy idea that Ed Lansdale had sold the brass in Washington and it didn't make any sense, but anyway, there we were. And I was shot down to work as liaison officer between the station and the ASA teams. I got to make some very good friends, as a matter of fact, as a result of that and Bill Colby was Chief of Station.

INTERVIEWER: Oh?

MR. HALPERN: And one of the things we did, and the first thing, the first place, I built the first war room, or officer room (if you want) in the

Embassy. It didn't even have one at the time. The only one that was in town was the one on G-2 under General McGarr. And what the hell was the G-2 officer, Colonel someone, I can't remember. Anyway, so I built a war room for Bill so we could plot and have handy our own operations (we were running into the North at that time and none of them worked but we tried) and at the same time decided to take a look at what the hell the target was, what the enemy was. And I built a second war room or had built rather a second war room in the Embassy where me and my military friends, the head of the ASA team, the SSO in Saigon, I forget his name, Major something or other, and we got sent down to us from Japan, from the Army in Japan, an order of battle specialist whose specialty was actually the Chinese Communist, the PRC army, a military breakdown, and he came down to go over the order of battle aspects of the VC. And I had put up on the wall, all four walls in this room that we built in the Embassy, a 1-50,000 set of maps of South Vietnam only. And then we took all of the information, from any source whatsoever, good, bad, or indifferent, including COMINT, and all the liaison junk we were getting from the South Vietnamese government, any of our own reporting, the US, all agencies and we actually physically plotted every piece of information on maps. And the order of battle specialist made his usual 5X8 order of battle cards and correlated to the maps. So that you could look at the map and go to the card or take the card and go to the map. And we came up with a figure of VC effectives in the field of over 18,000. That doesn't sound like much today, but this was the summer of '61. And the agreed-upon figure was 10,000. Everybody in the US Government used the figure of 10,000. I think they've been using it ever since the war began with the French. But anyway, 10,000 was the figure. And we came up with almost double. All holy hell broke loose. Bill Colby -- and I was on TDY from Tokyo. Dick Bissell had offered to have my family come with me and all that kind of stuff but I said uh uh. I'll go down from Tokyo, the family can go home. And they did. But when this 18,000 figure hit, the G-2 in Saigon refused to accept it, General McGarr refused to accept it, Ambassador Nolting (I guess it was) refused to accept it, and Bill Colby refused to accept it. And I said to Bill -- and they wouldn't let us send the information out. They just refused. They thought it would be best to transmit the information to our respective Headquarters. That is the NSA type, the SSO type, and back to CINCPAC and so on. And I said to Bill, I said, "Bill, this is silly. First of all, I'm here TDY. I've got my own ticket, airplane ticket, I've got my own passport. I can be out of here unless you shoot me on the way out. I'll be at Tan Son Nhut whenever I want to. And you know me well enough, Bill. I'll get to the first available CIA station, which is either Hong Kong, Manila, Bangkok, or Singapore. I get into the Commo shack, and my message will be in Washington within minutes. And I think you know that my relationship with Des is such that he will at least listen to me -- he may not accept what I am telling him -- but he will at least listen. And I know in the meantime you can say, 'Get the guys with the white coats and what have you to get Sam. He's gone crazy, he's mad, he doesn't know what he is talking about, he's gone beyond the veil.' I know all of this, Bill. But I think Des will give me a hearing even wrapped in one of those --"

INTERVIEWER: Straight jackets.

MR. HALPERN: Straight jacket. He looked at me and he knew me well enough and I knew him and he says, "Okay, Sam, what do you want to send?" "I want to send back we got 18,000. You know, and tell them how we got it. And give them the facts. I'm not trying to make policy. I'm just here to get the information. We're the intelligence officers, that's what our job is." He said he can't send 18,000. I said, "What is this? Some kind of a Persian rug merchant bargaining or something? What do you want to send? We can't go with 10 anymore. That's gone. We've got 18." Well, to make a long story short, we ended up, just like Sam Adams later, many years later, but he was in the hundreds of thousands, I was in the tens of thousands, and so we ended up whereby, I think we said something like -- we compromised, no question about that -- something like 14, 15 effectives, plus support troops, just like Sam, it's exactly the same play as Sam Adams except much smaller figures and much earlier. This was 1961. But the total figure, if you add it all up, you ended up with an 18,000. That much I got through. But again it was a stretched-out thing. So when the message finally went out, it went out in several channels. I mean, to CIA, the military and to State Department. Everybody got it. When it got to CINCPAC I'm told that almost like a bomb hit the place. And the next thing we knew was a message saying, "Colonel so and so from CINCPAC Staff is arriving to discuss this latest nonsense," or something like that. It was just, you know, crazy. And this Colonel had been on the Vietnam desk for CINCPAC, but he served in Vietnam -- with the French when they were there. And he was the expert as far as CINCPAC was concerned. So when we were saying 10,000, we were in effect flying in his face. We were becoming idiots. It was off base. We didn't know this guy from Adam. And to show you how we felt, me and my buddies, these three other military guys, when the Colonel arrived -- I was the only civilian and these guys were all majors. They were, you know, "There's a colonel coming." So I was the guy chosen to, and I volunteered too. Okay, we meet this guy and we bring him in. And I said, "Colonel, here's the war room, there are the maps, there are the order of battle cards. All the information is cross-indexed, so if you look at the cards you can find it on the map, if you look at the map, you'll find it on the cards. We'll just leave you here. See where we went wrong." We went off and got drunk. And I mean drunk. It was a bad one. But anyway, we said, "The hell with this nonsense." I got my military buddies out of the range of fire. And the four of us went off. We came back, I think it was the next day, but anyway, when we came back the Colonel said something to the effect of, "I wouldn't have believed it." And I said, "We didn't make it up. It's all there. You had it all in Honolulu. Everybody in Washington has had the same information. We didn't make up any new stuff. It's the same stuff everybody is using. We just added it up and you guys didn't. That's all. Everybody was using pieces, using the magic figure it appeared was made up some years ago. Times have changed. The enemy has doubled its strength right under our very noses." That was my one nice big session with Bill Colby. That's what we started out on. And so that's when we finally sent the messages out after this Colonel was here, then we sent the messages which had that 18,000. It was a long total, but anyway. And Bill and I have been on a fighting relationship ever since, I think. I never mentioned it to him and he never mentioned it to me again. It was done and that was it. Then I left.

INTERVIEWER: You left?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah, I left at the end of '61 -- well, not the end because I arrived back in Washington. Well, even after that, Bill Colby made me in effect the third man down in the station because he and his Deputy, Ed Barbier who is now dead, were just swamped with paper -- release of documents, release of cables, relief of dispatches, what have you. They were working 20 hours a day and it was getting crazy. I said, "Bill if it is one thing in the world I can do -- and everybody knows I can do it -- I can move paper for you. Get it out of here. And you know damn well you'll see the ones you are supposed to see. And let me get rid of the junk." And so he gave me releasing authority. And I sat there as a station officer, because I said, "Bill, you know, my job with the military is finished. And, you know, what do I do next?" He wanted me to stay on and I didn't feel like staying on. And so I sent a wire back to Washington, and he agreed. I said, in effect, "My job is done here, I did what you asked me to do. What is my next assignment?" Just like that. And they finally said, "Come on back to Washington." And I came back to Washington and briefed everybody. But anyway, that was my relationship with Bill. I knew him well enough then. He's just a different kind of a guy. A nice guy. Easy to talk to, easy to get along with, but very opinionated, very firm in what opinions he holds, he holds, period. And it's a hell of a job to try and get him to change his mind. I'll give you a simple thing. He was running air operations, dropping agents into North Vietnam. And one night I remember we were in the communications shack (communications room). And he had sent an "Ops immediate" and didn't get an answer. The plane was warming up on the field, waiting to go. And they had to get a "yes" or "no" to go. I said, "Bill, they haven't answered in over an hour, for

God's sakes, hit them again." He said, "Oh no, you can't do that." "What do you mean you can't do that? Send another message. What the hell, it doesn't cost you anything. It doesn't hurt. Tell them you are still standing by." And he said, "Well, they know that." And I said, "Bill, send them a message. The message could have gotten lost in Manila." He said, "Nothing like that ever happens at Clark Field," actually. He said, "Nothing like that happens." Well, in this case it did, it actually did get lost because of the way they had to handle, "man handle," these tapes in those days. And I've been there and saw the way these guys were working, down to there skin, I mean, they didn't have their shirts on, even undershirts. And it was sweaty and hot even with the air conditioners going in those days (room air conditioners). And these big perforated tapes were around their necks and what have you. One of them got lost and if it happened to be an "Ops M" then, it was too bad.

INTERVIEWER: An Ops M?

MR. HALPERN: Operational Media was the precedence. You had "Routine," "Priority," "Operational Media slash" something like that.

INTERVIEWER: Okay.

MR. HALPERN: There were several routing precedences, basically. And we got to call them Op M simply because you didn't want to say Operational media all the time. And one of them got lost. You know, they weren't "Flash" messages, which I hope won't get lost ever. But I finally had to convince Bill just to send another message back saying, "I need an answer." And it took a hell of a long while. It took longer than it should. It took almost two hours for me to tell him, "Get the goddamn message out." And we got a message back, and the first thing it says is, "Didn't get your reference. What are you talking about?" So we had to hit them again. You know, explain what happened. And, but that's an example of. . . He's reluctant. You know, if he's got a firm view of something, it's tough to get him to change his mind.

INTERVIEWER: When did you work with him again after that?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, actually --

INTERVIEWER: Saigon.

MR. HALPERN: That was '61 and I guess the next time I worked with him again very closely was when I was for three or four months his his Exec. When he came back from Saigon, and Dick make him the Executive Director Comptroller, I had some dealings with him because I was the Exec in DDP and just working with him. It wasn't that close in terms of the way I did in Saigon, the way I did later in his own office. . . I just saw him the other day as a matter of fact at a meeting. I was in town. We're still friends. We say hello to each other.

INTERVIEWER: And you were his Exec for three or four months.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, he took over from Tom in February of '73 and I was reassigned out of his office, I think it was May '73. So it's March, April, May -- three months for sure -- and a couple of weeks in February and a couple of weeks in May. So it's roughly three, three to four months.

INTERVIEWER: So you were there when that memo was being prepared?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: Uh huh.

MR. HALPERN: That's why I keep saying, I keep telling my friends, "You're blaming the wrong guy!"

INTERVIEWER: You have reason to know.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. And you see part of my problem too was, and this was true later when Bill took over, and even that summer, and later when he took over as the DCI, he was talking in terms about one Agency. He wanted one big Agency. He didn't want this split between DDI and DDP and the DDA and the DDS then and now they have S&T. One big Agency. Everybody know everything. And I said, "What are you going to do, tack all the cables up on the bulletin board? Put all the operations up on the bulletin board so everybody can read all this stuff?" And this lasted for a little while, like a couple of months, I think. And finally it even finally began to sink in on a guy called Bill Colby. Jesus, there have got to be some compartmentations somewhere. And we've got to stop all this, everybody know everything. He wanted one Agency, one Agency. All does not run a. . . That was part of Turner's problem. Read Turner's book. And read my review of Turner's book if you haven't. I'll give you a copy. Turner could never understand it. He couldn't understand why he had all these different Directorates, which he for some crazy reason called branches. And he still talks about it as branches. He didn't understand that they're simply separate activities. Each one of those things, except the DDA, can be its own independent Agency. Literally. And the DDA simply supplies the men, money, material (the three m's) for everybody. And at one time, at least in the early days, 80-85% of what the DDA did for a living, they did for the DDP.

INTERVIEWER: That high a percentage?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, and that was before DDS&T came along.

INTERVIEWER: Right, yeah.

MR. HALPERN: And I said, in those days, I said, "Well, why the hell don't we just absorb them, make them part of us, you know, as part of our command?" And that led to another big hoorah, but we never did get command. But they did. Eighty-five percent of their activity was for us.

INTERVIEWER: Did you, at the time Bill Colby was talking about one big Agency. . .

MR. HALPERN: '73, '74.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, why?

MR. HALPERN: Well, because of what we were talking about before. The difference of views, the different cultures involved, in both what the collector and the analysts. And then of course you had the new thing called technicians -- technical people -- which is a totally different aspect, even for us in the DDP. Our technicians were our TSD types or the commo types. And we did some SIGINT of our own and that kind of stuff, but with the use of the commo guy, the operators of the machines. We weren't into overhead reconnaissance and things like that, for God's sakes, and other black box activities, except even the black boxes, they asked us to deliver in many parts of the world. We had to do the drops, we had to get them in either by hook or by crook and things like that into the right location and all that kind of stuff. So there was a marriage there. But basically, as I said, each one of these three Directorates could honestly, and you could come up with good rationale for making separate Agencies of each one of them. And so when Bill talks about one Agency, one big family, he was trying to merge us all together and make us, like Turner says in his book, he wanted to make everybody be able to do everybody else's job. Well, that is kind of silly.

And as I point out in my review of his book, I said, "You don't take an artillery officer and make a submarine captain out of him. Or vice versa. Sure, you can do it over a period of training, but if a guy wants to be a sub captain, he goes into the sub service. He doesn't join the artillery. And vice versa." And I said, "You know, people are not that changeable."

INTERVIEWER: Were you surprised when Colby tried to do this?

MR. HALPERN: No. Not really. I am never surprised at anything Bill Colby wants to do. Never.

INTERVIEWER: And that dates back to '56?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. That dates back to '56. And I wasn't the only FE officer who saw it in '56. Believe me.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right? That early on?

MR. HALPERN: You could spot it. We did. I am not unique in this. Talk to some of the old FE hands and see what they tell you. Just don't take it from me.

INTERVIEWER: How about the, we will come back to that later, how about, did you have much of anything to do with the Rockefeller Commission?

MR. HALPERN: No. I didn't have anything at all. None of it. I read their report. I'll show you my copy. It's all marked up. They've got so much misinformation in there, it's not even funny. I mean, even they're screwed up. I mean the nature of the business. It's like Robin Winks, he's got a lot of misinformation in there, Ranelagh got a lot of misinformation. People just can't get . . . If I wrote a book, I'd have a lot of things wrong if I started to go outside of things I personally know about. You know, all you can do is conjecture. And how do you sort the wheat from the chaff? You are going to have a hell of a job.

INTERVIEWER: I think so. Okay. How about moving towards the Hearings. One writer said about Mr. Colby that Mr. Colby believed salvation for the Agency lay in cooperation with the investigations, while other intelligence professionals thought intelligence secrets were forever.

MR. HALPERN: I'm with the second group.

INTERVIEWER: You are with the second group.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. And I will refer you to Colby's own book in which he says -- this is before the Church Committee was created -- January the 15th, 1975. Colby went to testify in public before the, I think it was the Armed Services, it might have been Appropriations. I forget now. I think it was Russell or Vinson, I forget the exact person. But anyway, and he says in his book after he testified, after he testified in which he exposed for the first time, even though the law didn't require him to do that, by the law, as a matter of fact, you're supposed keep secret the organizational structure and breakdown of CIA. Colby blew it for the first time, exposed the whole organizational structure in public and went far beyond even that for the first time in public testimony. And he says in his book, on the way back from the Hill going to his office in Langley, it suddenly dawned on him that he might stop off at the White House and alert them to what he has just done so that the news doesn't hit them cold. And in my book, that in effect damned the hell out of Bill Colby. Because as a serving officer, as a serving DCI, his first port of call even before he went near the Hill would have been to go into the President's office, I don't care who the President is, his boss and say, "Boss, this is what I've been asked to do, this is what I intend to do. Is it okay with you?" He never did. By the time it got to the White House, it was too late to do any kind of damage control or approach it a totally different way, and the President may not have wanted to, because Ford wasn't the strongest guy in the world, may not have wanted him to say anything. He may have wanted him to invoke Executive immunity or whatever. But Colby by doing what he did, by testifying first, cut the feet out from under the President. The President had no choice except to continue. And after that Colby just went on and on and on and on and on. And never held back. And he had every reason to hold back, particularly in the public hearings. Executive hearings, it might have been different. But in public hearings, you know, in my book he went far far beyond what he needed to do.

INTERVIEWER: Was there ever any talk when these. . .

MR. HALPERN: And I was out of the Agency by then.

INTERVIEWER: You were out?

MR. HALPERN: By '75.

INTERVIEWER: When the materials were gathered, "Family Jewels," ever any talk about why that didn't get over to the White House or apparently he had briefed, he Colby, had briefed some committee, but did not fill the White House in.

MR. HALPERN: I don't know. I don't know. I was back in the Agency in January '75, because I retired December 31, '74. My sidekick and buddy, Seymour Bolton, who is now dead, unfortunately, may he rest in peace, also retired December 31, '74, but he went back to work right after the new year. To start, we didn't know that a Church Committee and he didn't know that a Church Committee was being created and what have you, but he knew that there was going to be problems in terms of the two Hersh articles. And Seymour convinced several of the powers that be in the Agency, including Bill, and then he finally convinced me to come on back to the Agency to help out, pulling together the stuff, because they kind of felt that I knew where the poop was. I knew roughly where it was hidden, perhaps even what safe it was in, and maybe what the hell the color of the paper was. And so I agreed to come back, and so I was in there in January of '75 and stayed on until about March, I think, maybe April '75 when it dawned on me, that this is silly, a waste of time on my part because I was getting responses to my queries from all the Directorates, I mean, I was getting substantive responses from all the Directorates except one -- the DDO. And I knew damn well where the hell the information was, that they had the information. In most cases I did. And I wasn't getting it. And the rationale I was given by several of the officers in the DDO was that, "We're not sure" -- or roughly like this -- "We're not sure what Bill Colby is going to do with this information. We don't trust him. What do you want comment for?" So I mentioned this a couple of times to Bill and he kind of said, "Okay, okay." I thought, "This is crazy." And I finally wrote him a letter, and I sent it to his home, not to the office, because I know what the hell happens with paper shuffling. Because I've done enough of it in my day. And I said to Bill, "I quit for a very simple reason. You are no longer the DCI." I said, "I agree with the guys in the DDO in that nobody knows what you are going to do with this information. But in my book you are still the commanding officer. And it is up to us as troops to give you the information you ask for. What you do with it is up to you. It is your conscience, not ours. So since you are not acting as the DCI and insisting that you get the information you need or you want, there's no point in me hanging around. I'm retired and I'm going out of your life." And I walked out.

INTERVIEWER: My goodness. Was it Scotty Miler also, didn't he retire in December?

MR. HALPERN: 31, 1974, and Bill Hood did too and Ray Rocca did too. Well a lot of guys went out. I think there were over 200 of us from the DDO that went out December 31, 1974. Largely, there was a lot of reasons, but one of the big reasons was the fact of the numbers, the retirement numbers. Just turned out to be right because there was a big increase coming up and if you left by that date you got a little bit extra and that kind of stuff. So everybody walked out at the same time. I was surprised when I got the figures from the retirement people what the hell I would be getting. So I figured I might as well go out in December then, too. And this was long before the Hersh articles appeared that we put our papers in.

INTERVIEWER: That you had made your decision?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, we all did. Of course, you had to have your papers in at a certain time anyway. And in my case, see, I wasn't on the CIARDs initially. And I had to write a special memorandum to try to convince the powers that be in DDO and in personnel and in the Director's office that the things I had done which were not overseas -- I didn't have enough to qualify.
I had to explain and get their approval for the activities I had done earlier done a lot of it in the States, even while serving in Washington -- to equate X number of years abroad that I needed. And I forget the exact figures. But anyway, and that paper had to be put in long before the Hersh article appeared. And low and behold, they wanted to get rid of people and I was a

super grade. I was a GS-17. They figured they would get another slot, and so they let me go. They made me a member of CIARDS. And as a result of being CIARDS, when I told the retirement people what would happen if I was CIARDS, then they gave me a new figure on my retirement which went up by a goodly proportion. I said, "I have no idea."

INTERVIEWER: What is CIARDS?

MR. HALPERN: CIARDS is that Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System.

INTERVIEWER: Okay.

MR. HALPERN: C-I-A-R-D-S. It's the name of the bill in 1964 which set up this earlier retirement for certain people with certain qualifying service. And so it's called CIARDS. And I can take it right out of the title of the act. It has been amended a number of times since then.

INTERVIEWER: What would you say the most difficult demands were in conducting the Congressional investigations in '75 as you may have sensed at the time?

MR. HALPERN: Sensed is a good word and also when I testified. I always felt that when proper people in Congress ask questions, you gave them the answers. That's why I'm opposed to this Ollie North/Pointexter nonsense and what they did was wrong in the way they, you know, handled the Congress. And Bill Casey was wrong on that. Congress, for good or bad, for good or evil, they are the ones who set it up. They are the ones who make the rules. You've got to live by the rules. Otherwise, you'd have chaos. And so the biggest problem I felt, and still feel today, and felt at the time that I was testifying, is that yeah, I am giving you the truth and it is up to you, Mr. Congress, to keep that information privileged. I don't want it all over the street. And one of the worst things that I thought that Frank Church did was after every single executive session up on the Hill, including the one I was at, he had a television show right after the meeting broke up. They were waiting for him outside the door with cameras and lights. And we, you and I, as American citizens paid for all of the electricity involved because they were all plugged into the walls. But I saw it there as I came out. Fortunately, nobody ever stopped me going out. I don't know what the hell, what it was, but maybe it was because I looked so nondescript or so ignorant or whatever, because when I left that meeting, I thought there they were in the hall and walked right by them. And they were waiting for some big shot and I wasn't a big shot. A little shot, or a little punk anyway. And I walked in, walked right by them, stepping over all the wires and all their legs because they were sitting there leaning against the wall like this, you know, and snoring some of them. And I went into the men's room, and I didn't have on my award pin from the Agency and had just an ordinary dumb old blue suit, I think it was. And I went right by them, went into the john, did my business, came out, walked by them the other way, and got out of there. And that night I see Frank Church on television telling about all this stuff they had just heard. Not once, he never mentioned my name. My name was never mentioned except, I was told later, in the late edition, a late city edition of The New York Times in New York, in one of the stories my name appeared. And I was in the executive session. Nobody should have known my name. Somebody gave somebody, somebody inside gave somebody outside, my name. And it was there on one line. Except I have gone to look at The New York Times index a couple of times and they've got my name listed in that year, '75, but the page number is all wrong. So it's one of those historical things that you will never find. You'll never find it unless you know exactly where to look. The index will not lead you to my name, even though it says that you should find it there. It's not the only time I have had trouble with The New York Times index. So when you talk about the biggest problem, the biggest problem is security and leaks. That is the biggest problem on the Hill. And the Hill, I think, is beginning to realize that, maybe they have, and I think the more they talk about the joint committee with a small professional staff, they will be going in the right direction. I've argued for it and have written about that, too, about a single committee, a joint committee, for years now, and maybe they'll get to it. It's going to be tough but maybe they'll get to it.

INTERVIEWER: What was your feeling in the executive session in which you were being questioned?

MR. HALPERN: I felt that I was dealing with a bunch of nincompoops and idiots.

INTERVIEWER: On the part of the staff?

MR. HALPERN: Staff and the Senators present. Goldwater was the only one that I thought had a feeling for what was going on. Schweiker was an ass. Huddleston and Mondale were totally incompetent on this particular subject, maybe because he was new. I testified in June of '75. I would have thought by that time they would have gotten some briefings from their own staff as to what the hell was going on. About what was going on. I'll give you an example. I mentioned somewhere along the way, I forget what the specific was, but I mentioned something about female case officers. And I was interrupted by Mondale and Huddleston with kind of a learing kind of a question. "And what do female officers do?" I just looked at him and I said, "What any other case officer does. They do exactly the same thing. No more, no less. They're Chiefs of Station, they're Deputy Chiefs of Station, they're ordinary Case Officers, they pound the street, they write reports, they handle paper, they do everything everybody else does. They recruit people. They handle people, they manipulate people. What else did you expect them to do?" You know, the whole approach was, "Female case officers?" That really set me off and if I hadn't been constrained to where I was, I would have really let go in my better language, and I didn't. I tried to hold off.

INTERVIEWER: How did they happen to have you come and testify?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know for sure. I think it was because Helms was being called back so many times for the various committees, that he was almost like a yo-yo from Teheran as Ambassador. And I think he practically had a commuter ticket on some of the airlines the way he was coming back and forth. And on one of his trips, he asked me to brief him, and Tom Karamessines, a matter of fact, about the background on the Cuban Missile Crisis and some of the activities during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The whole Operation MONGOOSE thing. Particularly MONGOOSE which was very hot at that particular point. And a few other details. The brass isn't suppose to remember details. That's what they got guys like me around for. That's what I get paid for. So I talked to Dick and talked to Tom and gave them as much as I could. And I just guessed that somewhere along the way in their private discussion or private testimony the stuff that wasn't the public stuff, before you get in front of the public television and what have you, Dick must have said or Tom must have said, "and if you want any more detail get a hold of Sam." Or something like that, I guess. And so sure enough, I get the call. I didn't care. I got nothing to hide. Because I'm proud of what I did all these years. And so if they don't like it, that's tough. Change the system. And that's how I think I got picked. And I remember when the Church Committee began, one of my retired colleagues, and his wife who is also a retired colleague, his wife was on the Committee staff. She arranged a dinner party with several of the new staff types - this is the Church Committee not the Pike Committee. Seymour Bolton called the Pike Committee guys a bunch of young whippersnapper, snot-nosed kids. Really. The staff on the Church Committee was a little bit better. Anyway, at this dinner party, my wife came along too. But anyway, I was the target of the night, obviously, and everybody zeroed in on me, before dinner and after dinner and everything else. In terms to the approach to this whole business, where do we go from here and how. And I pointed out that they were in a totally different environment than they've ever been before, telling them this was a different kind of a game, and I said, "You are going to be surprised at the fact that you are not going to find very much paper around. And you are not going to find whole treatises like you do in law cases and what have you." And I said, "You are going to see my name and my initials on literally thousands of pieces of paper. But I'd be willing to bet you're not going to find more than a smattering of any substance before that initial or before that name. You are going to find all kinds of references to 'as we discussed' and 'why don't we talk about this' and, you know,' let's see what we can do about this', 'why don't we talk about this sometime in the future'. You are going to find very meaningless comments." And the guy said, "Don't you guys ever put anything in writing?" I said, "We can, but if we can avoid it, no." And he said, "Well, how do you get approvals for projects?" And I said, "You write a project, and that you'll find. You'll find lots of stuff, lots of projects that we did. Some of them are one pagers, some of them are ten pages. But that's not what makes the whole place operate." And the whole purpose was to try to get me, I suppose, to tell them how to find things and what to look for. You know, I don't have to tell them. First of all, I wasn't witting there under oath, in the first place. And when I got under oath, yeah I told them the truth. They didn't like to hear it. I got into a big shouting contest with a guy called Gary Hart. He was sitting in the background. He wasn't even -- he was sitting with the staff, as a matter of fact. I guess that was part of his popularism or something. And he made some remark in the back there and I shouted back at him. I didn't give a damn. I made some remark about the Operation MONGOOSE we were talking about at the time and I said this was, as far as I was concerned, this was American foreign policy made by the President. And this voice in the back, I later found out it was Gary Hart, said something about, "Hey, well that doesn't make American foreign policy." I said, "As far as I'm concerned if the President says that is what we are doing and the Attorney General agrees, that's what we are doing. That's foreign policy." You know, and Church cut off.

INTERVIEWER: Was Mathias there, do you remember at all?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, yes he was there. He didn't bother me much. I think it was Mac that was there. I know Schweiker was there and I know Goldwater was there.

INTERVIEWER: Tower?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, Tower was there. He didn't say much.

INTERVIEWER: No.

MR. HALPERN: It was mostly Church and, of course, F.A.O. Schwarz as the Staff Director. Yeah, that was a funny one too. I'd been called to talk to Schwarz on the Staff first in the morning, a crack of dawn kind of thing. And I got down there. And this was in the old, oh, what the hell is the building, the Senate building, not the Rayburn Building, the other one.

INTERVIEWER: Cannon?

MR. HALPERN: No. No. The one next to the -- it's on the corner. Big building, before they built the Hart Building. Well, I forget. It was the guy who came up with that -- from Indiana, I think it was, or Illinois -- but anyway, they had taken over the auditorium in that building and they were a so-called secure area. They had safes and what have you all over the place and they had taken the seats out and what have you. And I was in there, I went in there, talking to Schwarz and some of his cohorts, then suddenly out of the clear blue sky he says, "Well, let's walk over to the Capitol Building. The Committee is going to go into session and they want to talk to you." And I said, "You mean just like that?" He said, "Yeah, you got nothing to hide, have you?" And I said, "No, I got nothing to hide." He said, "Yeah, I was thinking you might as well go and talk to them directly." So after spending a couple of hours with Schwarz and company, I was ushered across the street and we walked all the way over to the Capitol Building and went up to the fourth floor or whatever it was and testified that night. I was told to stand up, and sworn in, and we went to town.

INTERVIEWER: And you didn't know that you were going to do that before? Oh my.

MR. HALPERN: I had no chance to talk to a lawyer or anything like that. Not that I cared. It didn't bother me. But it was a lousy way to do business, and it wasn't according to the rules at the time, because I had the rule book, procedures, and what have you and it wasn't what I was supposed to be able to do. And they were supposed to give me a notice for that and that kind of stuff. But I didn't want to stop the proceedings.

INTERVIEWER: Was it a very long session that you were in?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, it was all day.

INTERVIEWER: The executive?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, it was the executive session. I think it was, I don't know, several hours. I mean, I got out late in the afternoon. After five o'clock or later.

INTERVIEWER: Was Bill Miller involved at all?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, Bill was there, yeah Bill was there. And Schwarz was there, and a lot of the other staffers were in the back. That's why I thought Gary Hart was a member of the staff. He was sitting with the staffers. And it should have dawned on me that a staffer wouldn't have dared shout that way across the heads of the guys in front of him -- the Senators. And Schwarz was at the table, too. But the rest of the guys were in the back. Why Gary Hart sat in the back I'll never know to this day.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have any impression that what you had said in that session went beyond that session?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. Because I started to open up on MONGOOSE, on Ed Lansdale's connection, and the fact that this was not a CIA operation, regardless of what anybody might want to tell them, that it was a government-wide operation and it was run right out of Robert Kennedy's office, by Robert Kennedy, and even Landsdale was not in charge. He was the chief of staff to Kennedy, Robert Kennedy. It was run right out of Kennedy's office and Robert and Jack Kennedy were one practically, and that McCone, McNamara and Rusk had each refused to go along with one of Landsdale's ideas that even Kennedy couldn't force on them. And that was, originally, Landsdale's idea for MONGOOSE was for each of the agencies in town to detail men, money, and material out of the Agency to what amounts to a new MONGOOSE agency under Landsdale and Kennedy. And McCone was the first to have said, "Hell no." He said, "That money was appropriated by Congress under my command, my responsibility. It stays with me. We'll work with you and we'll help you and we'll be part of your team kind of thing. But I can't relinquish control over men, money, and material as appropriated to me." And McNamara said the same thing and Rusk said the same thing so that they didn't achieve creating a brand new Agency in effect. And this was all brand new to the guys sitting around that table. It might not have been new to Schwarz, who seemed to understand something about Landsdale's role, because when I started to talk about Landsdale being in command and being in direct communication with us and issuing orders directly in the name of Kennedy, etc., etc., I remember Church saying to Schwarz, "Is General Landsdale available anywhere?" And Schwarz saying something, "Yes sir. We have tracked him down, he lives in..." I think he said Falls Church or something. He lives in Virginia anyway, "and we're trying to get in touch with him to have him come here." And a little later on he did come and testify. But this was seen like brand new stuff to them. This was June, mind you. And one of the things they were after was Rogue Elephant running operations against Cuba. And it had been written about quite a bit and all that kind of stuff. And they didn't have a clue. And they didn't like the idea that, as far as I was concerned, the Kennedy boys were in charge. And they were running the war. And we were fighting a war against Cuba, undeclared or otherwise, but we were fighting a war. I said if we were sending people in to create sabotage activities inside Cuba, we were blowing things up, people got killed on both sides, on their side and our side. And I said -- that's when I got into a fight with Hart. I remember that now. And that was foreign policy as far as I was concerned. And that's Hart said, "It wasn't, the Congressman is involved." I said, "The hell with that." I said

Congress was providing the money. And we didn't create our own money. We didn't create our own weapons. And they knew what we were doing. And so, that was, I remember now, that was the fight with Hart.

INTERVIEWER: And did they push the issue whether John F. Kennedy knew about all these activities?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, with me as far as I was concerned. Yeah, I said I assume that the Attorney General reported to the President and Landsdale reported and Landsdale did not leave his office. He was in General Erskine's office in the Pentagon. And he didn't leave his office. He stayed there physically and in that office but he directed activities from there in the name of the President and the Attorney General. That was MONGOOSE, I said. And it is all written up now in the Church Report. They finally got all the stuff straight, pretty much straight. There are some errors in it. But I try to correct them. It doesn't always work. But that was one of the things that bothered me, the Senators themselves were being led around as they usually are, I think, by the staff. They don't have enough time in the day I suppose to do all of these things. And the staff, even by June, is just beginning to get their feet wet on something like this. And they were looking into other operations. One was an Indonesian operation which was brought under Eisenhower's aegis. And I think they were hoping to use that again as another example of a Rogue Elephant. But my own feeling, and they never talked to me about that, although they should have. They talked to a lot of other people and I guess they figured by the time they talked to enough people they didn't have to talk to me, because the record on that is so complete. You talk about paper. Now that one we had plenty of paper on, because everything was done by cables and memos. And it was so complete and so accurate, in terms of starting with the

President's approval, Eisenhower's approval, and all the things that we did through the then 5412 Committee, and the papers on that were clear, and all the cable traffic was clear, that they figured there was no way they were going to pin that on CIA as a CIA operation because that was again, State, CIA and Defense all working as a team. We were carrying the main load at that level, but everybody was involved. No question. And all the record was there, so I guess they couldn't use that as a Rogue Elephant operation. The reason they hit the MONGOOSE one, I think, was because, Cuba being Cuba, the assassination efforts and that kind of stuff, they had to keep it back.

INTERVIEWER: And it seemed to me that there was some mention along the way that the Agency was not going to call back people from retirement to participate in the investigations.

MR. HALPERN: That's correct. And the Agency did nothing to help anybody, even serving officers without giving them any legal assistance. They were told to go get their own lawyers.

INTERVIEWER: They didn't get support?

MR. HALPERN: And that also broke the Band of Brothers, and there wasn't anything left by then. This was '75 now. But the Agency made it very clear in their memoranda and the Notices, the Headquarters Notices they issue to all employees that you are on your own, you get your own lawyers, etc., etc. You got no help from the Agency. Which was not true in the old days. Not true at all. There was a completely adversarial relationship that was developed.

INTERVIEWER: So no legal support.

MR. HALPERN: None whatsoever. You can, hell, go ask Paul to get you the old Notices that was put out on the Committee. No legal support whatsoever. Not even advice. Colby released everybody from their oaths by the way -- from their secrecy oaths in terms of testifying to Congress. Well, hell, first of all I think that was a silly thing to do because when you, even the oath itself that you sign, the secrecy oath, look at the one you signed. It doesn't say anyting about withholding anything from Congress. In addition to which Congress has made it very crystal clear in the laws they passed since then that nothing in here is to imply in any way you were to withhold any information from Congress, through duly authorized Congressional requests. Correct.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: So he shouldn't have issued that one about releasing you from your oath when testifying before Congress. That's nonsense, utter nonsense.

INTERVIEWER: And I imagine the people were really, I suppose, surprised that they didn't get any legal . . .

MR. HALPERN: Oh, very much surprised. Particularly the retirees. Every time a retiree, you know, tried to get in touch with the Agency to get some kind of help or guidance, what do I say, what do I don't say. You got nothing. You were on your own.

INTERVIEWER: Were there any lawsuits that you were involved in?

MR. HALPERN: No. There were lots of lawsuits that other people were in. I think Tom K's estate is still involved in several and I think Dick Helms is involved in several. So on, there goes it. I called them the kook cases, but they are legal cases.

INTERVIEWER: And they are real.

MR. HALPERN: And they are real. And they are going through courts and what have you, no question about that. The courts have not thrown them out. But, in terms of testifying before the Congress, a lot of the people were called in. Like me, I'd never testified before Congress.

INTERVIEWER: It was your first time.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. First time. And so far my only time thank the Lord. But I don't care about going before them again. They walk on water, they don't walk on water any more than I do. And the old story about they put on their pants one leg at a time like I do. Well, what the hell.

INTERVIEWER: Did they contact you at all after the Hearing relative to any of the testimony?

MR. HALPERN: No. No. You are given copies of the testimony and then you are allowed to make corrections on it because: a. the tape doesn't always work, and b. the guy who is listening and talks into it doesn't always get it. And sometimes the repartee is so fast nothing can catch it. And that happened with my argument with Gary Hart. That is totally missing from the written record. But you know, so, life goes on. But that is what you get and then you are allowed to adjust it and send it back or you can take it back and argue with them, or what have you.

INTERVIEWER: They didn't give any indication that you might have to come to a public hearing?

MR. HALPERN: No. I'm not big enough for that. I'm all over the Church Committee Report. I'm listed as the "Executive Officer to" or the "Executive Assistant to" or whatever phraseology. And that has been blown by Tom Powers and God knows how many other people. I didn't blow it but a lot of other people did. So, it doesn't take long to put two and two together.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about some people say that the intelligence collection and analysis were seriously impaired during the year of investigation because of the man hours spent in preparing and transmitting responses to the committees. Did you . . .

MR. HALPERN: I wasn't in there so I can't say. But I would say based upon what I know about the bureaucracy, it had to have a bad impact, a very adverse impact on: a. the morale of the people, b. the initiative of the people, which goes to zero or less than zero, you know, why should I stick my neck out kind of thing. It's got to then badly impact on any prospective agent you might want to recruit. A foreigner's got to have rocks in his head to be willing to work for the US Government these days in a clandestine capacity. And if I were a Case Officer today, I'd have to think about the sanity of the guy I am trying to recruit. Doesn't he read the newspapers? Doesn't he watch television? In my day, we were able to protect the identities of a source. Really protect the identity of a source. And there were really, literally, no more than a handful of people who knew the true name of an individual. They might know something about the guy's background, his capabilities, his access, that kind of stuff. A person might never ask but even if they did it would go in one ear and out the other. We usually referred to sources by their cryptonyms. And that was good enough for us. And that goes all the way up to Director. True names were things that you just don't talk about. And so in this day and age though, I'm not sure they can protect the true name of an individual. I was told, this is all hearsay, I was told that during the Carter administration that true names of agents were requested by and given to staff members of the White House staff. They obviously had the authority to ask for it and somebody gave it to them. I don't know how often that was done, but it was done enough. The mere fact that the cryptonym, mind you the cryptonym, of Hussein, King Hussein, from Jordan was front page of The Washington Post and that scared the pants off them. And that was early on in the Carter administration. That scared the pants off Carter and, what the hell was his name -- Jody Powell, who was the press officer and Brzezinski -- to the point where they even made public statements about, you know, you've got to protect all this kind of relationships and what have you and what have you. Where Senator Moynihan said Jimmy Carter suddenly discovered CIA, which he campaigned against. You remember his litany about Watergate, Vietnam, and CIA were part of Jimmy Carter's campaign litany. Then Moynihan said something to the effect of: "Jimmy Carter, despite the campaign, has suddenly discovered that the CIA is now his." You know.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: But, I think, so when you are talking about the impact inside and the impact on operations, let alone what you do in terms of the amount of paperwork that had to be generated to supply the requests from the Hill. God, well, Scott Breckinridge, I guess you want to talk to him about that?

INTERVIEWER: Yes I will.

MR. HALPERN: Scott and Seymour Bolton were the team and they had a staff. And it was created by Walt Elder, was part of that, to help funnel papers to and from the Hill. And that became an industry all of its own. I'm sure, I mean, just without even having been there, I know enough about the bureaucracy as to how it works. And it had to be. And it was a continuing operation. And it creates a hell of a lot of trouble among the troops and the secretaries and the clerks and everybody else involved. You don't have time to do anything else. So how do you carry on the job of collecting intelligence?

INTERVIEWER: Was there any, in your last year or two with the Agency, that you knew of, comments by intelligence services of other countries? Any indication that they were becoming anxious or apprehensive about . . .

MR. HALPERN: Just the bare beginnings of that because, you see, the Freedom of Information Act wasn't actually amended until '74 and didn't go into effect until, I think it was, December of '74. Just as I was getting ready to leave. And we all knew that was going to be a problem. A real problem. And it became a problem. All you've got to do is read the testimony of George Cary, John McMahon, Admiral Inman. Well, you can go through the old great hearings. The amount of bad impact, adverse impact, it had with various intelligence services around the world. Particularly our old friends. And I'm sure it's gotten worse rather than better. With books like Woodward's book and so on and the continuing leaks. But I must say from where I sit on the outside, and I am only guessing, most of the leaks seem to come from the Executive Branch of government. I'm not just talking the White House but I'm talking the whole slew at all levels rather than the Hill. The Hill has got its problems but the Hill is doing more in terms of protecting itself, and protecting the information that's given than the Executive Branch has been able to do.

INTERVIEWER: More recently?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. And over the last ten years. It's quite clear. You just, you know, you do this with a sixth sense and a gut feeling. You can tell what's right and what's wrong and what's true and what's false. More or less. You can't be totally right but you get a pretty good estimate or a feel on this thing. And so help me, the Executive Branch is a rotten sieve all over the place. Much worse than in my day.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. It's not just me or my guys, it's all the way through the government. The Executive Branch everybody talks, that's all. On all kinds of stuff. It's not just. . .

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, we're going to come back to that.

MR. HALPERN: All right. It's not just one Agency. By a long shot. And I think the Hill is making better strides on this and think they are beginning to realize and have for a number of years, a number of them anyway. Even what I told you about Huddleston. You know, you Members the Congress, trust us as your surrogates. Well, okay, that's a step forward. Instead of trusting 535 guys, you gonna trust 135. Well, that's a big step forward. And I say 135 because I am adding up staffs as well as members of Houses and both committees. And don't forget, and people -- most of them -- do forget, that in addition to the two intelligence committees, you still have Appropriations in both Houses, you have Armed Services in both houses, and they still jurisdictionally ain't going to give up. But they get clued in about what's going on, but it's far more than just a two bit leak. Remember that.

INTERVIEWER: In practice.

MR. HALPERN: In practice. Don't kid yourself. Far more people know and they are better, they are beginning to learn, they are handling themselves much better, they have control of the stuff. Look at the Iran/Contra stuff. Very little stuff leaked from the Hill. What you've got is what they want you to get. They are controlling that stuff. Very well indeed. They are controlling the pieces of paper, they are controlling the reproduction machines, the xeroxes and all that kind of stuff. Much better than the Executive Branch is doing. Yeah, sure, they are a smaller group. You know, they've only got 18 or 19 thousand people on the Hill to begin with and it's a hell of a lot better than what CIA must have: at least 16,000 probably. Alone. So look at the Pentagon, look at the State Department.

INTERVIEWER: Isn't it interesting that time after time when one talks about leaks or when one reads about it, frequently an article in newspaper stories, the Congress is oftentimes the bad guy, the executive department is not very bad.

MR. HALPERN: Well, that's why I'd take another look at that article and it leaked the information in it and read it again. And sometimes you wonder, hey, it probably didn't come from the Congress, because they are tightening up. Not every staff member, for example, on the committees has access to all the information anymore. That's been true for quite a while. Not every Senator or Congressman can come and -- well, they better not take anything away from the Hill. None of them can take even their notes away. They're not supposed to make notes of what the hell they are reading. So the days of looseness up on the Hill have long since gone on this kind of stuff.

INTERVIEWER: There have been some real improvements on it.

MR. HALPERN: They have learned the hard way. And they really mean it. And they realize that their own reputations are at stake. Which I think has a big thing going for it. And I hope they get to a joint committee someday, and remember that the House committee staff is, in effect, a small professional staff now. It's not run the way the Senate committee is run. It's a smaller group, they've been there a longer time and the staff director, Latimer, Tom Latimer, has been there from the beginning. It's his second career. I knew Tom when he was one of the guys up on the seventh floor in the Agency and over at the White House with Kissinger. And he worked his way up, but anyway, that is another story. But he's been there as a pro, minding his P's and Q's. He has a very small staff. I think there are a total of a dozen people, all told. They are all pros. I mean, former professionals from one agency or another. Which is unlike the Senate committee which is still more or less beholden to each Senator and the staff guy really is a Senator's appointee. And the staff director doesn't have much control over him. It's a different story. So it will give you something to watch. And maybe as a result of the Iran/Contra stuff, they must be having a hell of a time coming up with their report. Oh God, they must be fighting like cats and dogs!

INTERVIEWER: That's the impression I get from snippits in the newspaper column.

MR. HALPERN: The reports now are at least three weeks overdue. And you know, they could have had a minority or majority report. They must be having a real go through on that one.

INTERVIEWER: I just happened to think when you were mentioning the earlier and, I'm not sure that it may be coming up a little bit later, were you surprised when Mr. Colby agonized for a time over Mr. Helms' testimony and the decision to turn the testimony over? Were you surprised at that?

MR. HALPERN: Uh huh. Really something.

INTERVIEWER: You didn't think he would?

MR. HALPERN: I didn't think he would. I didn't think he should. But I'm told by one of the principals involved, namely John Warner, who was then Legal Counsel or General Counsel . . .

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, General.

MR. HALPERN: ...that Bill had no choice at that point. I've talked to John about this, I listened to his argumentation. I'm no lawyer. And I still find it hard that something couldn't have been done about that.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, he spoke about that to me and put it on tape.

MR. HALPERN: Yes, John is an honest man. I'm not saying anything about that. John said by the time it got to that point he couldn't advise Colby in any other way from a legal point of view. He had to tell him to go. And that I find very hard to accept. Although again, as we said before, times have changed. And times change and poor Dick was caught in the middle. Absolutely caught in the middle.

INTERVIEWER: He sure was. What about certain issues raised by the Church and Pike Committees? What are your thoughts about certain of them such as mail opening?

MR. HALPERN: Well, I think they did not prove the case, that it was illegal. And take as my text the fact that the Justice Department, in looking into this after the Church Committee and after spending God knows how many months and years looking into this thing, had to decide even under the Carter administration there wasn't anything we could do. There wasn't enough evidence one way or the other and when you had Postmasters General who testify. Some testified it was totally illegal. But some say it was perfectly legal. Nothing wrong with it. We knew what was going on and we agreed. And that's got nothing to do with whether the President is approved or not. When you have a difference of view from postmasters themselves, how the hell can you go to court on that? So, oh sure, it was another one of those headline grabbing things. And as somebody said, I don't know of anybody who was hurt by the fact that the mail was opened. Either physically, or legally, financially or any other way. And in most cases, we didn't even know it happened until years afterwards. And in some cases I think they had perfectly good justification to go look at somebody's mail.

INTERVIEWER: All right. And how about the drug experimentation. Did that come as a surprise to you?

MR. HALPERN: That was a surprise to me and it was a surprise to a lot of people. And a lot of people, I think, took very great personal affront in the fact that they, because they were a part of CIA, were now and forever more tarred with this kind of thing. I don't like it. I didn't like it when I heard about it for the first time. Particularly some of the nasty details about the two-way glass and getting a drunk in a bar and giving him something and following him to see what he did and that kind of stuff. But I also know the people involved in some of it and I know Sid Gottleib very well and I know Knoche very well and I can't imagine them doing this because they are a bunch of sadist or a bunch of Dr. Frankensteins who like to pull wings off of flies and watch the flies flop around. Nothing like that at all and I think if you look at Sid's testimony, at Gottleib's testimony, before the Kennedy Health Committee a couple of years after all this nonsense, in which he pointed out that we were really trying to find out what the hell the Soviets might have been up to when they used drugs. LSD was a completely new and untried substance. We didn't know what the hell it was. All we knew was that the Soviet were buying up a hell of a lot of it out of the Swiss drug houses, pharmaceutical houses. We didn't know what the hell it was going to do. We didn't know what the hell it was going to do to anybody. And we had to find out. Sid's example of American diplomats being disoriented when they were in Moscow coming out and not knowing what the hell hit them. And I think that what we were trying to do, or what they were trying to do rather, was to find out what the hell it was all about. And what was this new weapon that was going to be possibly used against us: a. How could we defend ourselves, and b. how would we use it if it was a proper weapon. And yeah, I was surprised. But I didn't take it the way a lot of guys took it. I remember during those several months when I was in there in early '75 in the building trying to get some answers for Colby, which he kind of didn't want, when some friends of mine stopped me in the hall and started to berate the living hell out of me, because since I worked in the DDP's office, therefore, I knew everything. But obviously I didn't. They didn't know that. But anyway, and therefore, I was part of this thing. And how could I and how dare you and all that kind of stuff. And really a shouting match in the hall.

INTERVIEWER: And they figured you knew.

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. Well, that didn't bother me. But I knew I didn't know. And they were also attacking Sid through me and they knew I was a good friend of Sid's. And I was trying to defend the point as I did just a few minutes ago with you. They wouldn't listen. And these were old friends. Go way back. I mean, a part of my generation. It was just something that they felt was beyond the pale. And maybe they are right, but I don't think so. I was asked once without knowing it at the time, I was asked by Sid if I would partake in a drug experiment where I would be given something and I would not know what I was given or when I was going to be given it. And I said, "Sid, I've got other things to do with my time. I've got to be responsible for the forces, the people who are down there. I can't be out of action. I don't know what's going to happen. Maybe nothing will happen. But I can't take a chance."

INTERVIEWER: And he was talking about you taking the drug at work then?

MR. HALPERN: He didn't say.

INTERVIEWER: Oh that's right.

MR. HALPERN: He didn't. All he said was, "If you are willing to take part in the experiment, you will be given a drug. You won't know what it is and won't know when you get it. I said, "Sid, I can't take a chance. I've got too many important things here. Not that the world is on my shoulder or anything like that. But I've got a job to do and I can't take that chance."

INTERVIEWER: Was the Olson case new to you?

MR. HALPERN: Totally, absolutely totally.

INTERVIEWER: You knew nothing about that earlier?

MR. HALPERN: All I know is what I have read. It was quite clear. Olson had agreed to do exactly what I had agreed not to do. He was a scientist for God's sakes. He was a medical guy or something. At least he knew drugs and he knew what the hell he was getting into. He let himself in. He was going in as a guinea pig in an experiment. And sure, I'm sorry that something happened to him but he knew what he was letting himself in for.

INTERVIEWER: But you had heard nothing about it until the case broke?

MR. HALPERN: No. This was one of those things that everybody assumed because I was in the job I held for seven years that I knew everything in the Clandestine Service. And it was the furthest thing from the truth. Quite often, you can ask my wife about this, quite often I'd be held in the office long after, without even being able to do my own paperwork, because my door was always open, everybody knew it. And people would come in at all hours, particularly after hours, and they'd want to sit and talk. And I was told more things about things I should never have known about. Had no reason to know. Didn't want to know. Had plenty on my mind. And I couldn't do anything about it. But they wanted to talk. And in a way they were letting off steam. And in a way they expected me to screen whatever their problem was to give to the DDP. And little did they know that very little of what they told me ever got to the DDP. He had plenty of things on his plate, too. But in any case, it is the kind of a job where you have got to be available to everybody. At least the way I ran it. And you learn a lot of stuff. Very unofficially, you know. But it never went anywhere. And so my head was full of a lot of stuff but not everything. And I remember once my boss came down from the Hill -- this was Fitzgerald. And this was that time that Colonel Grogan who was the public affairs officer had written a letter in Helms' name attacking Senator Fulbright. Remember that crazy thing?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

MR. HALPERN: Well anyway. Dick had signed it or Grogan had signed it or something like that. All hell broke loose and Helms had to apologize and Des came down from the morning staff meeting and he called in me and he called in the secretary and he said, "I don't want to ever see a piece of paper that Sam hasn't seen first." And I said, "That's crazy, Des." He said, "What's the matter, can't you take the work?" And I said, "Yeah, you know better than that. But that's wrong." I said, "Your staff chiefs and your division chiefs have got to know that they've got a private line to you personally without my kibitzing. After you've seen a piece of paper if you want to give it to me to staff out I'll do whatever you want me to do with it. Fine. But they've got to be able to talk to you privately." And he looked at me and he said, "Yeah, yeah." And he never said anything about it again. So, I didn't know everything. But I didn't need to know everything. That's crazy. Oh sure, while Des was there I ran operations for Des as his case officer and case officer for him. He didn't tell his deputy, Tom Karamessines, who didn't know anything about it. It was up to me after Des died to go in and brief Tom on a bunch of activities that Tom may have known about but not officially and to clue him in. And then he had to do the same thing in turn to Cord Meyer when Cord became the deputy. So no, I didn't know everything that went on. And I never claimed that I did. The only thing I couldn't do was that I couldn't stop people from unloading on me. They had to have somebody to talk to so I let them talk.

INTERVIEWER: Nice to have somebody. How about the assassination. Did that business surprise you when it came out?

MR. HALPERN: No, because I was involved with one. Some of the others that I hadn't known about, yeah sure, it wasn't in my area. So I wasn't involved and I didn't know. The one I was involved in was the one, I guess the (I'm forgetting the crypts for these), the one against Castro. One of the ones against Castro. I did not know about the use of the Mafia by Bill Harvey.

INTERVIEWER: You didn't know about . . .

MR. HALPERN: No, Bill, you think I was tight lipped. He could run rings around me.

INTERVIEWER: I can imagine.

MR. HALPERN: He'll teach you lessons in how to keep your mouth shut. Oh brother, that guy was great. No, but I wasn't the only one personally. I was the one who testified on that to the Church Committee. I was one of the guys that testified about that to the Church Committee. AMLASH. And I know the case officer involved, the doctor involved who prepared the hypodermic pen, etc. So, you know, yeah, that didn't surprise me at all. And the fact that there were other attempts on other people around the world, that didn't surprise me what had happened. Because I knew enough about what the hell the system was all about and I remember that one of the reasons I was even less surprised is in those several months that I came back in early '75, I saw the original papers about the ZR/RIFLE activity and the fact that one of the first things that John Kennedy, John, not Robert, asked Dick Bissell for in January '61 after he had gotten inaugurated, one of the first things was an assassination capability. Nobody in particular in mind. Just an assassination capability. "Create one please." And that's when Bissell got ahold of Bill Harvey and ZR/RIFLE was created. I didn't know, I'd never heard of it until after the thing hit in '75. But I had seen the original paper, so by the time the Church Committee had announced it all, yeah, I was aware of it.

INTERVIEWER: And LASH. You got involved in that one?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. I remember that one. I didn't see, I didn't know LASH. I don't speak Spanish. But I know the case officer, and I was the one who took the case officer to see the doctor and there was another thing the Committee, the Church Committtee guys, when I was talking to them, couldn't understand a medical doctor getting involved in the preparation of a hypodermic to kill somebody. And they wondered, was he a medical doctor? I forget which one of the guys said that. But I said, "Yeah, he was an MD." His job was to help us in operations from a medical point of view. He wasn't a Ph.D, he was a medical doctor. "Oh really." You know, they just had signs of and visions of Buchenwald and Auschwitz and God knows what else. But yeah, I took the case officer to see the doctor because I knew the doctor pretty well. A lot of activity. A lot of assassination activity. We needed medical support of all kinds. You'd be surprised how much you need medical support in operations. And it was the doctor who came up with idea of the Black Leaf-40. I don't think the Church Committee should have published that. As it was I don't know whether it's still available but it was a publicly available poison that you could buy in any drug store. And to tell the whole world how to use it to kill somebody I thought was crazy. Totally unnecessary to get their point across. They did not have to reveal that. I thought that was ill advised on their part. But yeah, I took the case officer there and the doctor who spent, I think he was up all night making that damn acid, which LASH didn't take anyway to begin with. He thought it was crazy. It may have been. But you know, the assassination didn't surprise me.

INTERVIEWER: Had there been any of that kind of talk before Kennedy, in other words, the Eisenhower Administration?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah, sure. If you look at the Church Committee report you'll see it's there.

INTERVIEWER: Last time we were talking about, just as we were winding up, we were talking about assassinations and LASH, and so on, and wondering at that time, that time being discussing LASH, was there much of a sense of anxiety about this kind of approach?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, if by anxiety you mean concern that the thing might leak . . .

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. There always was and this is why it was so tightly held. If you are thinking about using anxiety in terms of morality, no. Because as far as we were concerned, I think most of the guys on the Task Force, we were at a war with Cuba. I mean, when you start sending in people to shoot up somebody else's country and blow up parts of somebody else's country and they take losses, I mean human losses, and we take human losses, that's war as far as I am concerned. I don't care what you call it, call it police action, call it something else, but anyway, we were at war. And of course, some people could even call it by today's terminology, terrorism. International t4rrorism. We weren't targeting market places, though, and bus stations and things like that obviously. We were going after industrial plants, power plants, sugar plants. Things like that. But people did get hurt on both sides. So yes, there was that kind of an anxiety in terms of keeping our hand out of the assassination plots as much as possible. Having been involved in only one of them, I have no idea, for example, if Bill Harvey was mucking around with Rosselli of the Mafia. Bill knew how to keep a secret. And even though I was his Exec, I had no idea and I know his deputy had no idea at all. And as a matter of fact the deputy didn't have any idea of the AMLASH operation.

INTERVIEWER: Did not?

MR. HALPERN: Did not. There were four people that I knew of. Oh, I think the deputy knew that the case officer involved was meeting with AMLASH sure. But that was strictly as an intelligence operation. And maybe as a political action operation. But not assassination. There were four people who knew about the assassination aspects. I think I mentioned to you. The case officer, me, the doctor to whom I introduced the case officer to prepare the pen, and my boss, Fitzgerald. Those were the four. And I don't even think that Des told Helms about the pen. That's a technical detail. How much else he told him, I have no idea. I never asked him, he never mentioned, so we went on ahead and did our business. But yeah, there was anxiety in terms of trying to maintain a secure operation, a sensitive operation, and that was it. I mean, we were really trying to hang onto what the heck we were doing.

INTERVIEWER: How about when the Hearings occurred. Suppose those Hearings, this is an iffy question --

MR. HALPERN: Go ahead.

INTERVIEWER: Had occurred back in '62 or '63.

MR. HALPERN: Well, it would be into '63 because that's when we started.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, '63, '64. You think the quote outrage unquote would have been different?

MR. HALPERN: It's hard to say. It would depend upon the circumstances in which the Hearings were held. And what kind of a circus atmosphere there was. If it were a simple executive session kind of look-see and the Senators or the Representatives involved were not running for President -- some of them like Church did, and others -- depends on a whole atmosphere. It's hard to say. I think, and if our own President hadn't been assassinated, with or without attribution to Cuba or Oswald or KGB or God knows what else. If it were just simply an operation gone bad and Congress was looking into it, I just doubt in the '60's, the early '60's I'm talking about '60-'65, whether there would have been quite as much brouhaha about the whole thing. People wouldn't have liked it when you talk about assassination, obviously, but remember when it took place in '75, ten years later, you've got to remember there is a whole Watergate, ten years worth of Vietnam, and a couple of years worth of Watergate involved. The Vietnam thing worst of all changed the attitudes completely. Because we only went in with Marines in '65. Sure we were in Vietnam long before that; we've been there ever since '54, for God's sake, but actually before that, from '45 on until the end of the war. But I think it would have been a totally different atmosphere. You know, conjecture.

INTERVIEWER: Sure, yeah.

MR. HALPERN: A "What if . . ." kind of thing.

INTERVIEWER: But I think your point about the assassination of Kennedy is . .

MR. HALPERN: Made a big difference.

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: And Vietnam made a big difference.

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: After 10 years of that stuff, people were fed up.

INTERVIEWER: Were you surprised in '75, '76 about the Congressional reaction to this topic - the assassination?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yes, yes, yes. But only surprised in the sense of its vehemence more than anything else. And not all of the Senators and not all the Representatives involved had that same attitude. There were some of them, like Barry Goldwater, for example, for good or for bad, and others. You know, I understand that this is what sometimes has to happen with governments. And even when, well, take it up to today when you have Metzenbaum, this great liberal that prides himself as being a liberal of the liberal. And he says, "You know, it might not be a bad idea to knock off Qadhaafi." Where the hell is he coming from? You know. And who the hell is going to do it if not something like CIA? But you talk to him about the morality aspects of it, it's like Church being pro-covert action and anti-covert action. So is Metzenbaum for assassinations or isn't he for assassinations? If he is going to pick and choose then that isn't all right. I mean, this is silly. But that kind of attitude has always bugged the hell out of me.

INTERVIEWER: Me too.

MR. HALPERN: I don't mind, like Hersh, you're against using human spys? Fine, stay that way all the way through.

INTERVIEWER: Right, be consistent.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, that's right. But don't go saying it's all right to shoot somebody, but not shoot somebody else. Or whatever, however the hell else you want to do. And I remember we were arguing even at the time of '75 and '76 when we were discussing, how do you think Admiral Yamamoto died during World War II? We picked up, using COMINT, where the hell Yamamoto was going to be. And we deliberately sent out P-38s at extreme ranges of the P-38s with just enough gas maybe to come back on, if they were lucky enough with no maneuverability really. They had to know the exact spot to go get them. And the orders were "Get Yamamoto." That's killing a guy. That's deliberate murder. Sure, we were in the middle of a war where people get killed all the time. Well, as far as we were concerned on Cuba, we were at war. Castro was a target. I don't see no difference, I don't see any difference between going after and specifically killing the leader of a country, or killing some poor Joe private at the end of the line and I don't even know his name. And I'm shooting at him and he is shooting at me. I mean, that's ridiculous. I mean, what the hell, you are going out there the kill somebody. I don't care what you call it.

INTERVIEWER: They keep looking for a declaration of war.

MR. HALPERN: Well, that went out with the Indians, a thousand years ago. The Japanese didn't use it against the Russians in

1905, they didn't use it against us in 1941. I mean, this is, you know, archaic that's all. Life doesn't work that way. And the Germans didn't do it against Poland in 1939 either. And the British and the French did it against Germany after that, but that was silly. People are, you know . . . You asked about, was I surprised? Yeah, I was surprised because I . . .

INTERVIEWER: You didn't expect that?

MR. HALPERN: I didn't expect that kind of hypocrisy. That's all. On the part of so-called leaders of a country. And these guys claimed to be leaders of a country. And that's being sheer hypocrites.

INTERVIEWER: That theme continues on.

MR. HALPERN: As I say, Metzenbaum, what was it, 1985 when we hit Lybia, or '86, whatever? And Metzenbaum suddenly, of all people, to suddenly say, "It'd be a good idea to knock off Qadhaafi."

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about employing journalists. Did that topic . . .

MR. HALPERN: Journalists to us are the same as any other human being. They are a source. Or an access to the source. And if the guy wants to work for you, why stop him? I think any American citizen or non-American citizen, I don't care who he is, if they want to help the United States Government, more power to them. I don't care whether he wears a collar turned around or whether it's a woman or a child or anybody. If you start breaking up and defining certain groups of people that you don't touch, pretty soon you can fine-tune that to the point where there isn't anybody in the world you are allowed to go talk to, do any work for you. And that is crazy. From the very beginning, we always had rules against using Peace Corps, Ford Foundation, Red Cross, I don't know, a whole bunch of humanitarian organizations. And that we understood. So we didn't. You know, we followed orders. No problem with that. Because certain activities were just off limits. But we never sorted journalists. Journalists and clandestine operators are in the same business. We're trying to get information. We protect sources. That's the whole purpose. You know, that's the first thing the journalist says -- protect the source. That's what we do. Except we don't use the terms, you know, talk on background and all that kind of stuff.

INTERVIEWER: What about the reaction to that? Did that surprise you?

MR. HALPERN: No that didn't surprise me. I knew the hypocrisy on that was going to be quite clear and always was. It's like academics. I mean, that's crazy.

INTERVIEWER: That was the next one I was going to bring up. Same thing.

MR. HALPERN: Same thing.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: I mean, an academic. We're not forcing people to do these things. No point in forcing anybody. If you get an agent that you are forcing to do something, I'd question the value of the information that he gives you. But if somebody volunteers and wants to work for you, I don't care what he does for a living. Except if you are keeping him we are staying away from the humanitarian, eleemosynary organizations. Okay, that's a ground rule. We'll live with it. And we stay away. And we've had people from those kinds of organizations come and offer help and we tell them, "Sorry, we can't do it. If you want to go give the State Department whatever information you pick up, go ahead. They will be glad to have it. But we can't do it."

INTERVIEWER: Good.

MR. HALPERN: You know the thing that the whole '75, '76 circus era, and I call it circus era, confirmed to me is that maybe I am just being a cynic. It just confirmed to me the hypocrisy of the political world. It's just unbelievable. Unbelievable. They hold executive sessions -- they mean executive session -- they're supposed to. And Frank Church comes out after every single one of them for the cameras and gives a brief summary of what took place. That's not, in my opinion, that's not executive session. Executive session is, you know, no comment. You walk away from the cameras. You don't go near the cameras if it's executive session. If not, what the hell, make it a public session. He's doing it anyway.

INTERVIEWER: What about the Church Committee and its focus on covert action? One view that was expressed is that there was a worldwide network of offices engaged largely in what -- this again was a critic's view -- largely excessive, self-defeating busy work.

MR. HALPERN: Oh, that's nonsense.

INTERVIEWER: Nonsense?

MR. HALPERN: Utter nonsense. Most people didn't go near covert action in any sense of the word. Not even political action. Most people were trying to do a simple job of intelligence collection basically. A few were trying to do counterintelligence, but it was a tougher job, much tougher job. And these others who were involved in covert action in terms of planting editorials or news stories or working with political parties in foreign countries and what have you. It wasn't busy work. None of this stuff was made up by anybody. These are all approved activities up and down the line. Sure, not all the nitty-gritty, the details of everything were approved up on an upper level then what are you going to even approve back here in Washington by a desk officer. The guy in the field has got to have some leeway in what he does and how he does it. You can't tell him where to meet an agent and you can't tell him how many drinks to have when he goes out to dinner with him and things like that. Although some people tried. And it pretty soon backfired. Particularly it backfired if the guy who was on the desk before was trying to tell somebody what to do or not to do when he got out in the field. He found out soon enough on his first tour of duty that you don't do that.

INTERVIEWER: Memory was there.

MR. HALPERN: But boy, I'll tell you. But on the other hand I don't think it was busy work any more than it was busy work to try to collect intelligence. Most of the stuff was done against requirements. Somebody wanted some information, somebody wanted something done. And the guy in the field had to figure out how to do it. And some of it was very wasteful. It's like a war. War is a wasteful business. And this is a wasteful business. As I think I mentioned the other day, collecting intelligence by clandestine means is the toughest, most expensive, most time-consuming way to collect intelligence. But it has got to be done. And you are going to make a lot of mistakes. And you are going to loose a lot in the way. And you are going to waste a lot of time and effort and money, no question about that, to collect the little bit of information. And a lot of the information you are going to collect is going to be useless, totally useless. But there is going to be a few nuggets somewhere along the way. I think we have figured out, people have estimated -- God knows he can't do it -- for the non-denied area countries, I think it was estimated that clandestine collection produces no more than 5-10 percent of the total take. That's a small percentage when you consider the amount of information that rolls into this government. And particularly with overhead reconnaissance and with SIGINT. That's a hell of a lot of stuff that's pouring in. And maybe Seymour Hersh is right. Maybe you can do without that 5 percent. I don't know. But I don't want to try. He is willing to try. But a lot of it is wasteful. No question about that. You got an Army, you got a Navy, you got an Air Force. If that ain't waste, my God. But when you need them, oh, you need them.

INTERVIEWER: It takes time.

MR. HALPERN: You've got to have lead time. And this is why I remember we were talking in terms of clandestine collection. Why we try so damn hard, particularly in the beginning, being purists to not even talk to the DDI analysts because we might get captured by them and become their researchers or their legmen, running around in the middle of Africa finding out where the hell the wheat fields were or the bridges were up or down or the railways weren't operating or what. And you can go to the Library of Congress and spend two or three months and dig it all out. So we'd try to keep away from those guys for years. And the whole requirements mechanism was created to screen all these requests. And from all over the government for information on things happening abroad. And I'm sure the analysts thought we were a bunch of nuts not wanting all these things to do. But we didn't. You know clandestine collection is a tough goddamn job if you are going after hard targets. It's not cocktail gossip. In fact, the Russians used to say, get me a piece of paper, get me a document. That's what you want. You want some foreign government's document. You don't want somebody's opinion or ideas of what the hell he thinks is happening in a cabinet meeting. You want the minutes of the cabinet meeting. And we are theoretically in business for strategic intelligence, not even tactical stuff. We left that for the military and the State Department.

INTERVIEWER: So just strategic?

MR. HALPERN: We were designed as a collection of strategic intelligence. That means the top stuff. That means intentions. Much more so than counting trucks or counting airplanes. And we did both. We pulled the overhead reconnaissance. And it's the worst kind of way to collect information. That's all I keep saying. So, this so-called busy work, I think is a misinterpretation of the fact that a lot of the work that was done was utterly useless. But that's the nature of this business. And it still is to this day.

INTERVIEWER: Very good.

MR. HALPERN: Sorry.

INTERVIEWER: No, very good. What about any reflections on the competence of the Senate members on the Church Committee?

MR. HALPERN: Of the Committee members themselves?

INTERVIEWER: Uh huh.

MR. HALPERN: Well, I don't remember all the Committee members.

INTERVIEWER: Church, and we've got Mondale . . .

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, go ahead.

INTERVIEWER: And Goldwater, and Philip Hart, and Gary Hart, Huddleston, Mathias, Schweiker, and Morgan and I think I mentioned Mondale. Howard Baker.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, Baker.

INTERVIEWER: Any of those at the time strike you as . . .

MR. HALPERN: Well, I can't talk from personal knowledge except that one time that I testified before them. I think I mentioned to you, Huddleston and, this was in June of '75, maybe they were just new guys on the block for all I know, but they theoretically were on business since the end of January or early February at least. And maybe they didn't have decent staff officer to brief them. But the impression I got was that this was being done by these guys solely on gut feeling, pure emotion, thinking in terms of James Bond, and no real knowledge or feeling, even, for an appreciation of what the business was all about. It was all out of books. In terms of Ashenden, the secret agent, goes way back. But it was that kind of fiction stories, and movie impressions that these guys were using in terms of asking the questions and in terms of what they thought intelligence was all about. They had no concept. I would have thought by June, at least, they would have had some chance to have talked to people -- knowledgeable people and fair people -- to just learn what the hell the business is all about. What are we talking about, including covert action. But it was all in terms of a circus atmosphere, I think. I mean, it was just -- I was appalled. I shouldn't have been. I should have known better. Basically, in terms of some of the guys who never even bothered to find out what they could, or even the few members who were on the four committees that were, or theoretically, doing oversight. And it wasn't there. No appreciation at all. And every time something came up, it was always "OH, REALLY!" You know, great astonishment when you were trying to tell them a fact. Like when I mentioned the fact, you know, we've got female case officers as deputy chiefs of station and chiefs of station. And that came as a great shock and surprise to them. I don't know what they thought. I wasn't able to get into their brains and find out. But this was not true of Mathias, though. Not true of Barry Goldwater.

INTERVIEWER: Tower?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know. Tower didn't sit in the day I was sitting there. This is based with the guys around the table. I mean, they were in kind of a horseshoe and I was in a long table facing the horseshoe. And I was alone. And here were all of these guys with their staffers and what have you around them, behind them, mutterings and what have you. Schweiker, oddly enough, Schweiker made some sense. He seemed to have a better appreciation than Huddleston or Mondale. Gary Hart was just a fly flitting in and out, kind of. He didn't really know what the hell it was all about. Phil Hart, again, was very moralistic about the whole thing, including collecting intelligence using human sources. He was quite sure that that was the way to go. At least that was the impression I had. Maybe I am wrong, but that was what I felt. Mondale was the worst, I thought, in terms of his approach to the thing. Then again, I don't know who his staff officer was or who was briefing him beforehand.

INTERVIEWER: When you say worst, you mean; informed or not informed?

MR. HALPERN: It seemed to me ill informed.

INTERVIEWER: Ill informed.

MR. HALPERN: Ill informed. And by the time they were talking to me, as I say, I think it was June of '75, hell, I'm a junior officer of all of the brass that went up to that place for debriefings or testimony or what have you. I would have thought by that time they would have had a better appreciation of what the hell the world is all about. And how foreign policy is made and conducted. And what international relations is all about. And just, I'd send them back to International Relations 101 in Political Science 101 or some junior college somewhere. It was just pathetic. I'm no great brain. But at least I went through City College in New York where I had some decent professors who taught me what the hell the world was like.

INTERVIEWER: What about the Pike Committee?

MR. HALPERN: I had nothing to do with the Pike Committee.

INTERVIEWER: Nothing at all?

MR. HALPERN: Thank the Lord! Nothing. All I know is what I heard from friends of mine, including Seymour Bolton who had a lot to do with them because he was the Agency contact with them. And both committees as a matter of fact. He and Scott

Breckinridge and, I guess, Walt Elder were involved, too.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

MR. HALPERN: And just to listen to the kinds of -- well, the Representatives themselves were bad enough but on top of that they hired, I think Seymour used the phrase something like "kids with drippy noses who weren't even out of their swaddling clothes." And these were the staffers who were running around like crazy. You know, they were having fun in their bare feet trying to upset all the apple carts and what have you. And it was just, he said it was impossible to talk to any of them. You know, intelligence officers, my God, they were worse than the devil. Which was not quite true of the guys on the Senate staff. The Senate staffers were deliberately involved, I think, in wrecking the intelligence community. I think for whatever reason -- political or whatever -- but I think, as I said before, in terms of the buildup as to what was happening, including in December of '74 even before the Hersh stories, having a bill to create the same committee that the Church Committee finally turned into with the same title, they were doing this deliberate work. And so the Senate staffers always seemed to be better read, better educated, better organized. They were deliberately doing something. They knew what they were after. And I must say they ran a very good operation. A good covert operation. They go to the head of the class. Whereas the House staffers, the Pike Committee, they were just a bunch of kids mucking around causing trouble. Didn't know what the hell they were doing.

INTERVIEWER: And the motivation of the Church staff members?

MR. HALPERN: I wish I could prove one way or the other. I just don't know. It all seemed to end up at one point, which was destroy, destroy, destroy. Muck up, muck up, muck up. And they did. They were very effective at it. And all I say is, you know, if it looks like a duck, acts like a duck, squawks like a duck, it's got to be a duck. And I don't know whether they were involved with the far left or the far right or what have you, but there sure looked like some political motivation there somewhere. I can't prove what I am saying. It is just a conjecture. It is a theory.

INTERVIEWER: And you felt that at the time?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. Yeah. Felt that very much at the time. And since, I have never gotten that out of my head. They were deliberately active in destroying something. And I think my theory, and it is a theory, in reference back is probably correct because it's quite clear that after the circus and after the Senate and the House both created their respective committees, the Senate in '76 and the House in '77, in very short order, wiser heads prevailed among the Senators and the Representatives. I don't know about the staffers. But the staff, some of it changed. There's some of them still there. And if you take a look and you'll see that even under the later years of the Carter administration, talking about '79 and '80, the Committees started to give the Intelligence

Community more and more and more budget and personnel slots. More money and more people. I think they were trying in some way repair the damages that they saw themselves -- finally when they saw and new faces that had been done and I think they were kind of feeling guilty about the whole thing. As a body.

INTERVIEWER: You think the hostage situation in Teheran?

MR. HALPERN: I think that helped. That helped in terms of getting concerned. But it was more than that and it happened before the hostages began. They started to come around in terms of, and I know just from friends, in terms of the Intelligence Community as a Community was starting to get more money and slots than they could handle -- than they really needed. Congress was just "Use it, use it, use it." And so by the time Casey comes along in '81 and he gets lots of credit for more money for the community. Baloney. Well maybe he did. He did. But the momentum was there beforehand. You know. And Congress was pushing stuff into the Community. Not just CIA, but the whole Community. Look, the Pike Committee and the Church Committee, I think both of them, maybe just the Church Committee recommended abolishing DIA. Well, take a look at DIA today with a brand new building and everything else. I mean, Congress insisted to keep it that way after the circus period. And so there is a whole new attitude that came after this '75/'76 circus era. And it was just a bloody mess. But the damage was done. And you don't build intelligence organizations overnight. Again, you need time. It took us in my generation a whole generation. And we had a war to start with to help us go and get off the mark a make connections and contacts and friends and all that kind of stuff abroad. And that one was destroyed. Whether it's ever, I don't know, maybe it will take another generation to rebuild. Who knows. Or more. So the attitude, I think, was that maybe we in Congress went too far. And we've got to redress to balance. Which is what they were doing for a good long while.

INTERVIEWER: You sense any role of President Carter in this?

MR. HALPERN: I'm not sure. I don't know. All I know is the end result was the money started to come and the slots started to come. Well, for example, I think it was in '77, Congress refused to give the FBI additional slots for counterintelligence officers. And that is public's information. It was brought out in hearings and what have you and you've got to be a nut to read all that crud. But when you get interested in a subject, you browse through it. I've got some. I haven't got anywhere near what Walter's got. I may have 1 percent of what he's got. But you read it in the newspapers. You know, you don't have to go very far. And Congress deliberately and literally said "no" to the request from the Bureau for more personnel to watch all these Soviets and satellite countries and their offices in this country.

INTERVIEWER: In 1977?

MR. HALPERN: I think it was '77. And later on, of course, they were part of the Intelligence Community, they got their slots, they got their money. Just like CIA did, DIA did, every. . . NSA did, everybody. But now I guess with everybody tightening up the belt they will suffer too. And maybe it is about time. You can do just so much. It takes, for example, you talk about rebuilding. I have estimated, and I think other people have estimated similar figures, it takes about seven years before a clandestine service officer in intelligence collection, let alone counterintelligence, can be considered to have been around long enough to be a decent officer.

INTERVIEWER: Seven years?

MR. HALPERN: Well, look at it. You come in. You got about a year, off hand, about a year of training. You've got a first tour of duty on a desk or maybe overseas. But anyway, and that's a two or three year hitch. That gives you four years. You ought to have a little bit more training somewhere along the way. Like another half year, at least. That isn't much. Preferably another year. That's five years. Your second tour, whether on a desk or overseas. You can't do both at the same time. So one has to be here and one has to be abroad. Another two or three year hitch. Have I got my seven?

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: And then some. So it doesn't happen overnight. And you can't expect, particularly in this day and age, you can't expect a guy you bring in, I don't care if he's got a Ph.D. and he's got Phi Beta Kappa and he's got everything else under the sun. And he's a great academician. He's been through everything. He knows it all. And he knows all the sixteen languages you need to have before you bring him in. You don't have to waste time teaching him a language. You can't suddenly throw him overseas and say, "Okay aboard operations, collect me the intelligence on what the hell the Saudi's are going to do about oil prices tomorrow." It won't work. It just won't work. You've got to have a feel for what the hell is going on. They've got people on the desk now, I'm told, who've never been in the country that they are assigned to. They don't even know what the hell is going on there. They may know it from books. But that is not good enough.

INTERVIEWER: You have to build up your contacts.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. And take over contacts from somebody else and be able to prove to the foreigner you are dealing with that you are as good as the guy who recruited you. Things like that. You see I make one of those points in that book review I gave you on Turner's book. You can't do it overnight. It won't work. And it didn't work. So when you are talking about seven years for an officer, that's a minimum -- seven years before he is even ready to really do something and become a decent all around officer, both Headquarters and field. You've got a long way to go before you rebuild when you suddenly lose 200 people at one pop. Or with Turner, 800 slots get wiped out like that. 820 as a matter of fact.

INTERVIEWER: Was that the number that left?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, you'll see why -- I've got to make a note on that number. I'm not going to give it to you now. You'll read it. And when people up on the Hill or other people say, you know, "What's so tough about going out and collecting intelligence?" Try it. It just doesn't work the way it is done in the movies.

INTERVIEWER: It takes a lot of experience.

MR. HALPERN: You need experience, you need to have somebody you can talk to, somebody who has been around before.

INTERVIEWER: Judgment.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. And initiative. Lots of initiative. And that's where you get people who say, because of that initiative, "Look at that idiot. He spent six months and nothing has come out of it." Yeah, it's wasteful. You've got to try. But I would rather have a guy go out on his own trying things, than me having to sit at a desk or using a bull whip to push him out, or dragging him out by the ears. He's got to have enough initiative to go out and do it on his own. This is what all these things that have happened. And are still happening. And all the attacks on the Intelligence Community people and what have you. I don't care whether it is CIA or FBI or what have you. It's all the same problem. You know, the officer who has got to start saying, "You know, why should I stick my neck out? You know, if I could just do it the careful way I'll get my promotion. I'll move ahead slowly. I'll push the paper." But collecting intelligence is not a paper job. You've got to go out and talk to people. It's talking to human sources. It's working with humans. It's different than sitting in the laboratory coming up with a black box. And some of the black boxes, at least, we used to have to have humans put the black boxes in the right places. Some of the operations that we had where we were trying to drop them in the right places from overhead -- as a matter of fact, to give you some idea of the problem, one of the operations was called JAVELIN. You know what a javelin is?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sure.

MR. HALPERN: And that's what we were trying to do at one point for our operation with black boxes. To get the black box in the precise point where the black box had to be. Technical stuff is very good when it works. But it's got to be so damn precise many of the times that it is almost impossible. It works in the laboratory. Fine. Beautiful. And you can set up experimental conditions and demonstration conditions. Easy when you have total control. Try to do it in the real world.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, with it's traffic lights.

MR. HALPERN: Just use your imagination.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: Try to do it in the real world. And so the problem of training an officer and experience of an officer and getting people back into the business and making your contacts and all that goes with it. Yeah, our generation was not bad.

INTERVIEWER: It's truly a profession isn't it?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. That's what we have been trying to tell people. And that is why we have been trying, I think with a little bit of success, very little, starting to get in academe, in this country at least -- it's pretty hard in some other countries -- but in this country to try to get academics to understand government, history, political science courses, international relations courses, you name it. After all these years they have been missing abet in terms of the impact of intelligence by all governments, I don't care who they are, on foreign policy and foreign activities. You read history books in the 1930's, '40's, '50's, '60's. And then in the '70's beginning barely to mention the fact that there might have been some intelligence action, that some information a government didn't know or did know, which made a big impact. And until ULTRA broke in '72, I think it was, nobody had a clue. And yet thousands and thousands and thousands of people had been involved in ULTRA.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, somebody called it the missing dimension, the intelligence role.

MR. HALPERN: That's it. Sure it's a profession. It has been a profession for a couple of thousand years that I know of. The people haven't regarded it as such.

INTERVIEWER: Textbooks just . . .

MR. HALPERN: Totally ignored it. Way off in limbo.

INTERVIEWER: I still, from time to time, look at different diplomatic textbooks. There is no mention in them about the Black Chamber that Yardley was running out of New York City in the 1920's. They don't mention it.

MR. HALPERN: It wasn't mentioned. It wasn't thought of. It's impact on the Washington Naval Conference. We knew what the hell the outside was going to do. And the fact that, for example, we had some good operations in terms of -- and not all intelligence is strictly politics or military. Economics is a big one. We had some good, but I won't even tell you which one it is, even though it's on a classified tape. But you can find it later. We had a good penetration of a foreign government's economic delegation through a conference of ours on trade. And we had dead to rights, we had the text of their negotiating positions, what they could say, how far they could go. Everything. The whole "shmear." The State Department Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission from that particular country, our Ambassador from DCM, refused to believe the information we gave them. Literally, said, "That's impossible. You couldn't possibly have gotten this. Somebody is making it up for you. And you are paying them good money" and all that kind of stuff. But we weren't paying him any money. The guy didn't know and we weren't about to tell him. This was one of those things where the agent, it was done simply on friendship and loyality of the case officer which had developed over a long period of time -- family relations, family friends and all that kind of stuff. Anyhow, the State Department said this is nonsense. The US Trade Representative said this is nonsense. "If the Ambassador wouldn't believe it, why should I believe it." Well, the negotiating went on bit by bit, bit by bit, day after day. It developed everything. All they had to do was look at the information and the guy was following the text. It was unbelievable. And fortunately, fortunately, before the conference was over the US representatives believed what the hell we had told them and were able to work out a deal in such a way that the US benefited by it by $700 million. It's a simple little watering operation. So it takes time to work these deals in terms of not all sources require lots of money. And not all sources are the kind of people you just walk in and say, "You work for me." It takes time to develop and what have you. And the guy was doing it simply out of friendship and loyalty to an individual. It wasn't the US he was concerned about. And it wasn't his own country he was concerned about. Just mutual friendship. Maybe they have got them today, too. Maybe they have got that operation, too. I hope so. It takes time.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, I think some textbooks almost present the world as though everything that's said in the United Nations, that's the sum total of what's going on about all the backstages . . .

MR. HALPERN: Well, it's more than backstages, too, Ralph, because I remember Professor Janowsky at City College. He said, you know, we all sit around and we study things. Great documents, like the Monroe Doctrine. And as if somebody sat around and thought this up one day. And it's like coming off of Mount Sinai. You know. And he said, "Most of these things are done by people like you and me." He said, "I don't know what you had for breakfast. Whether you had a fight with your wife. Whether you had a cold and a headache that day." And a lot of these decisions are done this way. And they are made at the spur of the moment. They are human decisions by human beings. And I remember very clearly, I was still wet behind the ears, this is 1948 or '49, '49 I guess it was. I happened to be the desk officer in Indonesia (Clandestine Services). And we had very good operations. This was, oh yes, the Dutch police action, I guess, in '49. And we had a very good agent in Indonesia who was able to follow and keep us very current, almost minute by minute, actually hour by hour the location of where the Dutch were taking the Indonesian political leader that they had captured in Jakarta. And where they were moving him, from city to city to city to city or town to town to town to town and where they finally put him. And I was going over regularly because I didn't want to trust the telephone. And I was going over from the old building around the well known Reflecting Pool. I was grabbing the intelligence and it was in raw form. We didn't even bother going through the Reports Board in those days which had to clear everything go out, be sure the commas and the semicolons were in the right places and what have you. And I had some hot intelligence that I got permission from my boss just take it over to my opposite--well, he was more than my opposite number, he was the Chief of the

South East Asia desk -- all the Southeast Asian countries -- William S.B. Lacey, W.S.B. Lacey. Nice guy. Nice big moustache.

INTERVIEWER: L-A-C-E-Y?

MR. HALPERN: L-A-C-E-Y I think. Yeah, Bill Lacey. And I was all of 26 or 27 at that time. And I kept bringing this stuff over to him. Piece by piece. As we got it. I was wearing a path between us and the State Department and the Reflecting Pool where we were. And I saw how US policy toward the Dutch and hanging onto Indonesia, how that changed like that. Bill Lacey said to me, he said, "The Dutch should have told me -- not the US -- should have told me that they were going to do this and what they were going to do with the political leaders. They should not have surprised me." Sure, Bill. I said, "I'm not involved in that, I'm just giving you the poop. You are making the policy." He says, "You're damn right, Sam." He says, "As of now Indonesia is going to be a free country. And we are not going to stop the Indonesians. We are not going to help the Dutch anymore. They didn't tell me that they were going to do this."

INTERVIEWER: Oh wow.

MR. HALPERN: There's American foreign policy.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, exactly.

MR. HALPERN: Right there. You know, Bill didn't have to sit around with a lot of people, a lot of staff. I'm sure he went and got whatever he needed to do to get the thing approved and nobody knew the difference.

INTERVIEWER: Good point.

MR. HALPERN: So. You know. And the academics in this country have never caught on. Maybe they are catching on slowly now.

INTERVIEWER: Slow.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, very slow. That there is an impact on this stuff. You got humans and humans and humans. And that's all there is. And I think, for example, Roy Godson, started in 1978, at Georgetown on the National Strategy Information Center. And he has a number of academics come almost every year up in Maine.

INTERVIEWER: And he is running another one this summer.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. Okay, that's beginning to have an impact. I don't know how many thousands of academics there are in the colleges and universities. But he is just barely scratching the surface. And it has taken him 10 years.

INTERVIEWER: He ran the first one up at Bowdoin in '81. I was up there.

MR. HALPERN: Okay. There is one. I was one of the guys -- he asked me to come to tell them about the intelligence of '78 which I did. And unfortunately Angelo Codevilla got a hold of him too and so changed Roy Godson's views, but at least we got started on this thing. And I attended a lot of those seminars that he started in '78 and '79 and so.

INTERVIEWER: Were they local?

MR. HALPERN: They were all here, but he brought in people from all over and they had a good foundation.

Godson was the first guy to get a group together. And you know, he is now regarded as a great intelligence expert. And I keep kidding him about that. But he doesn't -- you know, he knows something. But he has never been in the business. He doesn't really appreciate it. Anymore than Angelo Codevilla knows what the hell is going on. But at least he had the foresight to start something like this going. And he got a lot of good people involved. From former intelligence officers, to current intelligence officers, he got a lot of people with a lot of experience to write good papers and mediocre papers and bad papers. Mine's a lousy one that I did, the first one on clandestine collection, because it was being done -- I mean, I did it -- for the lowest common denominator. You know, it's like trying to teach somebody ABC's. There's no point in using a lot of high "falootin" jargon. So it is, from an intelligence professional point of view, it's a very weak paper -- mine on clandestine collection. Because it just barely skims the surface. It doesn't go into the details at all like we've been discussing. But at least Roy was very good in pushing this idea, trying to get academics to look at this new dimension. And it has to be. There has been a tremendous gap. Just like there was a gap on the military aspects of World War II until you got a hold of the ULTRA aspect. And as somebody said, they have to rewrite all the history books. Sure they do. And they ought to rewrite all the history books for everything else in terms of the missing dimension of intelligence and its impact throughout history. Whether it's Moses or . . .

INTERVIEWER: Or George Washington.

MR. HALPERN: Anybody. And people are beginning very slowly to pick it up. Very slowly.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, I am encouraged. Slow.

MR. HALPERN: It's is going to take a generation in there. Easily. Easily. And I am told that there are still academics in this country who won't touch intelligence.

INTERVIEWER: I am told that too.

MR. HALPERN: They think it is a dirty name and a dirty business. You don't have to be involved in it, for God's sake, to do some research and look at what the heck happened. And what made people come up with certain decisions or not come up with a decision. You know, it's been there.

INTERVIEWER: Strange. They sometimes will deal with Congress and Congressional elections and there is an awful lot of skulduggery that goes on in that process. And they don't seem to realize that that happens.

MR. HALPERN: That happens all the time. And I guess maybe what you need is an Ida M. Tarbell to do a study on politics or intelligence or foreign affairs like she did on Rockefeller. You know, wake people up. Or even do a Beard -- economic interpretation of the Constitution. Do an intelligence interpretation of foreign affairs. I don't care what you call it. But it is there. Nobody is hiding it. Not any more we aren't. And you can go back, like you did in your book, you can go back, it's there in the record book. Go find it. It's a hell of a job. It's a lot of work. A tremendous amount of work. I don't envy anybody wanting to go into the OSS records, those that have been declassified in the Archives now. Horrible, horrible.

INTERVIEWER: They will. Little by little.

MR. HALPERN: Little by little.

INTERVIEWER: What about this, Sam. Earlier, well, the late '70s in an interview one of the Agency Directors said that the Agency is part of the President's bag of tools, and my question is: Do you see the Agency as also part of Congress' bag of tools?

MR. HALPERN: No, it is the President's pretorian guard and everything that means. It's an executive tool of the government. Well, it's a tool of the executive branch of the government. It is not a tool, in my opinion, of the legislative branch of the government anymore than it is the judiciary branch of government. You've got three branches in this system. And I know a lot of my friends do not agree with me. And a lot of my close chums have testified on the Hill about, if the Congress should be in with the President on directing: a. foreign policy, b. intelligence, c. the military, etc., etc. I don't think you can work that way. Our system can't operate that way. You've got to have an executive on top who is answerable to the people and to the Congress for his actions. But you can't have 535 so-called elected representatives plus 18,000 staffers second-guessing what the President and his entire government bureaucracy is doing day by day, hour by hour, minute by minute, second by second. It won't work, it just can't work. The Executive has to take the responsibility in my opinion. For what it does, the good, the bad, and the indifferent. Not everything the Executive does is right in my opinion. For example, I think that the mining of the harbors in Nicaragua was the silliest goddamn thing those guys ever did. And I was involved in operations similar to that -- deliberately and directly. But you target. If you want to go for ships target the bloody ships. We did. We made some successes, we had a lot of failures. A lot of waste motion. No question. And I remember some of my buddies who had been retired were called back -- a few of them had been in Latin American affairs, and also covert action, paramilitary affairs, and covert action affairs and political action, also covert action -- were called back for a session with the guys running the Nicaraguan activities. And among the things they were beating the bull about was, what about mining the harbors. And without exception, I am told every single guy they called back for consultation in this meeting -- 4, 5, maybe a half dozen -- every single guy said, "Oh Christ, don't go anywhere near that. That's silly." At the end of the conference they were told the mining of the harbors had already started. And as one of my friends said, "What the hell did you call us in for, then?" So not everything the Executive does is right. Obviously. At least I don't think it is right. Nixon's forcing the Agency to go after Allende in 1970 without any kind of lead time, at the last second, was absolutely stupid. And we told them that. But the orders were to go, so we went. And there are lots of other examples of that. But again, under our system you've got to have the Executive make the errors. You can't have Congress sitting around and deciding what the President, what the hell he is supposed to do. It's like, take Metzenbaum and Qadhaafi. So one day Metzenbaum says, "Yeah, we go after Qadhaffi, let's go get him." The next day there is another problem with somebody else, Mr. XYZ in some other country, and Metzenbaum says to the President, "Oh no, you can't touch him, he's a friend of mine!" Well, what the hell. You can't have that kind of nonsense. The President is responsible. I don't care who the President is. Whether it is Reagan or you or me or the next guy. That's the system we've got. And I don't think that CIA or the Intelligence Community has got to or should be part of the side pocket of the reference library of the Congress. Sure, give them the intelligence reports that you give everybody else. You go up and tell them what's going on in the world. They can have NIE's if they want to read NIE's. They can have Special NIE's if they want to read those. But when it comes to decision making, based upon that stuff, uh uh. That's the President's responsibility. And whether it's covert action or whether it's collecting intelligence, that's his job. It was up to Ike Eisenhower, for example, to tell them, "Okay, fly the U-2. I know I'm going to see Khrushchev in Paris. Go fly that U-2." And he did. Can you imagine trying to ask? Who do you talk to in Congress? Which committee do you go to? In the old days, at least, you had maybe a handful of guys in each House who had some kind of control over the House or the Senate. And you could work with them. Who do you go to today? Look at what happened yesterday. Jim Wright couldn't even get a bill through. And he had to muck around with the clock -- literally change the clock of the calendar day on the business of the tax bill. So one minute they have to announce that the vote is, I think, 206 to 205 against, and Jim Wright stops the day's activity -- literally stops it on the clock -- gets ahold of some guy -- I forget the Representative's name -- twists his hands or his arms or his balls for all I know, and the next thing you know there is another vote. And the vote is now 206 to 205 and the bill is passed.

INTERVIEWER: In favor.

MR. HALPERN: You know. But who the hell do you go and talk to in Congress when you say, should the Agency be part of the Congressional team? No, it can't be.

INTERVIEWER: Then how about this statement, this is a statement someone made: "Since the mid-1970's, some say, the CIA is poised nearly equidistant between the Executive and the Legislative branches and Congress may actually have more influence today on CIA priorities and how much money is spent rather than the Executive Branch."

MR. HALPERN: I've seen that statement. I know who made it and I don't agree with it. It may be the truth. He may be absolutely right in what the situation is today. I think that's wrong. I realize CIA and every other member of the Community has to go to Congress to get his money, his men, and his material. I understand that. And you've got to play favorites and you've got to butter-up people and all that kind of stuff. But as far as being in between the Congress and an Executive in terms of running an intelligence organization, it's dead wrong. It belongs to the Executive. It's a part of the Executive. And it is in every other country that I know of. It's not the Congress that runs the business. It's the President that runs the business. You can't be in physically, and literally, and actually they may be in between. He is absolutely right. But that's a wrong system. And if that's the way it is going to continue, you are not going to have an intelligence organization.

INTERVIEWER: Really in trouble.

MR. HALPERN: I think so. Who is your boss? If Congress tells you to do something and the President says don't do it, what do you do?

INTERVIEWER: Your're equidistant like the old story of ancient times that if you put a mule midway between two stacks of hay, the mule would starve to death.

MR. HALPERN: I am serious. What do you do? Congress says do this. The President says don't do that. What do you do? Do you go to the Congress, listening to some of the guys on television and reading what they say and listening to some of their speeches, or if the President tells me to do something that I don't think is right, I'll come running up here to the committee right away and tell you all about it. Okay, then the President has no confidence in the man and there is a new Director. Okay. On the other hand if the Congress tells the Director to do something and he doesn't tell the President, then what? So, if you've got a strong President, that Director is out on his ear too. And I use specifically Bill Colby in 1975. On January 15th, 1975, and it's in his book, so I am not saying anything special. Bill Colby goes to the Hill before the Stennis Committee, the Senate Armed Services, and blows his gut all over the place. The entire organization of CIA, men, women and children are all laid out for everybody to see, despite the fact that the law, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 says he doesn't have to do this. So he just gives the whole store away. Maybe no great damage was done, but anyway, he does it. "On their way back from the Hill," says Bill in his book, "something dawned on me. Gee, I'd better stop off at the White House and tell them what I've done." Now if I had been President Ford, there would have been a new Director that afternoon. Bill worked for the President. He doesn't work for himself. His commanding officer is the

President of the United States and not the Congress of the United States. And he should of at least had the decency, the plain ordinary decency and courtesy, on the way to the Hill, to stop off at the White House and say, "Hey, this is what I plan to do on the way up." He does it in reverse and there isn't a thing that the President can do at that point. His hands are tied. He may have agreed with Bill. He may have disagreed. I don't know. But that's not the way you run an organization.

INTERVIEWER: He had no options by the time he found out about it.

MR. HALPERN: That's not the way you run an organization.

INTERVIEWER: It's a good example.

MR. HALPERN: So coming back -- if that's where they are today and if Judge Webster is now equidistant between the Hill and -- well, Gates is in between. I know who's involved. If they are at equidistant now, they are nowhere. Absolutely nowhere. They either work for the President, or they don't work. And I've used the term "pretorian guard," and I mean that. And it may be the wrong way to run the system. Then my comment is, "Change the system." That's all. And I am perfectly willing to take a look at any system they want to propose.

INTERVIEWER: What about this statement: "Sharing intelligence with Congress is one of the surest guarantees of CIA's independence and objectivity."

MR. HALPERN: No way. I don't understand that at all. I don't see how the two have anything to do with each other.

INTERVIEWER: I think that was made in a recent speech.

MR. HALPERN: Yes, it was. I know. But I still don't understand how that can follow. If the comment is meant to refer to the fact that a DCI can cook the books like Casey has been accused of doing, in terms of presenting the information to the President, I don't see how that is going to wash. If you've got an analyst who believes in one view of a certain event, and the Director tells him to change his view, you're a lousy analyst. Sure, he might want to keep his job and all that kind of stuff, but going up to the Congress and telling them, I think such and such and my Director thinks differently, is not going to keep things honest in any sense of the word. The Director can still tell the President what he thinks. And that's where the decision is made on any particular activity. I don't think even the crazy people in Congress say they are going to make all the decisions. Take a look at the case of John Horton on the Mexico business. I don't know the details at all. I know John very well and he has never talked about any of this stuff, except what he said in the public press. I read that and I've seen him on television and what have you. But even when the House Committee, the Intelligence Committee, after the brouhaha of John having left, when the House Intelligence Committee examined the situation to see whether Bill Casey actually did cook the NIE as was alledged -- John never alledged this but other people have -- if I remember correctly, and I think I've got the clipping somewhere, the

House Intelligence Committee said they had looked at all their drafts, they looked at the final version, and there wasn't any cooking. So what the hell are people talking about, the best way to insure objectivity is to bring Congress into the act. This is nonsense. That's the trouble with a lot of this stuff. People think that you have got to get the Congress to look at things, and therefore everybody be very careful, otherwise somebody is going to say, "Well, you didn't do it right." Well, this is nonsense.

INTERVIEWER: Why do you think there is so much more talk about the Congress being involved in the process?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, Congress has always been, always wanted to be, in the history of the country, ever since the Constitution was written they've wanted to be involved. Go back to the Jay Treaty, when the House of Representatives insisted on seeing all the documentation of the Jay Treaty. And the President said, "No way, the Senate gets it." And the Senate got it. The Senate got everything they wanted. It was months later before they decided what to do with it. But you start with Washington.

INTERVIEWER: And they debated that whole treaty in secret.

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. That's right. But the House wanted to get into the act. And thank the Lord we had a strong President who said, "The Constitution is very clear. I have to work with the Senate on advise and consent. Not you, the House. Go away."

INTERVIEWER: Do you feel the Congress is more involved in the last 10 years?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, they've been pushing harder and harder and harder and harder. Now again, let's change the system if you don't like it. It's been a rough one starting out, you know, 200 years. They have been battling the same fight. Nothing has changed. If you haven't seen it, you ought to take a look at three volumes done by Professor Goldsmith called The Growth of Presidential Power.

INTERVIEWER: I haven't seen them.

MR. HALPERN: Well, I've got them if you want to look at them, take the time later. You can browse through them. And it starts out with this business of the Jay Treaty and goes right on through. It doesn't cover every minute of the government's history.

INTERVIEWER: The tensions between. . .

MR. HALPERN: This book is dated 1974 so it stops with the Huston Plan. But I don't see Congress, at least the way I understand the system and the way it operates. Congress has a chance to do more than they have been doing. I think it's wrong for them to get into the act. They always have the power of the purse. That is very clear. And they can stop what they don't want to see happen. They haven't got the guts most of the time to do that. This is what happened, you know, in Vietnam. Nobody declared war. You know, Vietnam conflict, I suppose, is a fancy word for it, or the Korean police action or

Or whatever you want to call it. Ask the poor guys who were on the other end of the line who are dead. But whatever you call it, Congress didn't have the balls to cut it off when they wanted to cut it off. It took them until '75, '73 first, to do it. Well, by jingo, you can't run governments this way. You know, you've got the power of the purse, use it. If you want to get into the act of being an executive, goddammit, stop paying the President of the United States. Don't send him any checks.

INTERVIEWER: I bring this up in class.

MR. HALPERN: Sure. Close his bank account. Take away his credit card. Don't give him any money. Close down the White House. Paint it black. You know, make up your mind what you want to do. If you want to follow this system, there's going to be tension between the two branches of government forever. And the judiciary sits on the side, and look at the tension that was there initially before you had the great decisions about whether or not the Supreme Court is going to declare something unconstitutional or not. Nobody was sure how that was going to work. And that always hasn't worked smoothly either. Now we've come to accept it more and more and more and more. And everybody has calmed down about it. In terms of the role of the Supreme Court, it wasn't written into the Constitution. It developed. Now as far as executive and legislative, nobody has come up with a simple way of handling that one.

INTERVIEWER: Do think that more intelligence data and so on has been going to Congress in the last decade? Is it your impression?

MR. HALPERN: My impression is that it has. Just by reading the newspapers you can tell that the stuff has been going up there by, not by the bushel basket loads, it has been going up by the truckload. And I wouldn't be surprised if their computers are hooked up so the stuff goes instantaneously. So I'm sure. First of all they are on distribution for the NID, The National Intelligence Daily, as I am told, I mean, I read in the paper. Even that shouldn't be available to me and the press. Why the hell should I know about it? It doesn't do me any good as a citizen to know that my Congressman can read the National Intelligence Daily along with another 1,000 or 1,500 people in the Executive Branch. What the hell good is that going to do? And I don't know how many people on the Hill have access to it. And I shouldn't know. I hope they don't get the PDB. At least in my day we used to use the PDB as a vehicle for providing the President and a handful of other people, like the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, with intelligence which didn't normally get into the normal distribution channels. It was a very simple, convenient method for doing that. And we did it specifically with President Nixon. From the very first, well, he was inaugurated on the 20th. The 21st there was a meeting in his office, and it was agreed right then and there that we would put certain sensitive information in the PDB only and he would be able to tell by a certain phrase we used. And nobody else except those several people in the room knew it. So that even the other people that got copies of the PDB didn't know exactly what the hell that phrase meant. And it was good hot intelligence from a good source. You can't, you know. If they give that kind of stuff to the Congressional people, including the committee, specifically just the intelligence committees, I don't see why. There is no reason for it. They are not involved with the day to day running of the government as much as they'd like to be. In which case leave the Senate and become President.

INTERVIEWER: Maybe more of them are trying to play a larger role in making foreign policy.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, okay. They've got a perfect right to give their advice to the President of the United States. He, theoretically, makes the policy, whoever he may be. His staff doesn't, the Secretary of State isn't supposed to do it, and nobody else is. According to the way I read the rule book the President of the United States makes foreign policy.

INTERVIEWER: What about this statement, Sam, an officer said, "Congressional investigations in 1975 especially were like being pillaged by a foreign power only we had been occupied by the Congress with our files rifled, our officials humiliated, and our agents exposed."

MR. HALPERN: Right on. Absolutely correct.

INTERVIEWER: You feel that is an accurate appraisal?

MR. HALPERN: It was exactly the same way as when the Soviets got into the Tsarist's files and exposed all the secret treaties and everything else. It's exactly the same thing. I have no objection to their coming in and looking at the stuff. I have great objection to their taking a bunch of stuff and splattering it all over the television tube and the front pages of all the newspapers. There is a big difference. I see no reason why you can't clear the necessary people on the Hill to do whatever is necessary in terms of the oversight. But that doesn't mean they're coming into camp, but then damn it, handle the information exactly the same way the rest of us have always handled the information.

INTERVIEWER: How about the Church Committee Report?

MR. HALPERN: I thought that was awful. And if you read the Congressional Record, and if you haven't you should take a look at it, but the Congressional Record of the executive session -- it was first an executive session of the Senate -- to discuss whether the committee Report should be released. And as one of the Senators, I forget who he was now, maybe I can dig it up, said that when you've got a hundred copies of your Report (printed Report) already on each one of our desks, there is no way that this Report is going to stay secret even if we vote to keep it secret. And it was that kind of discussion that went on all morning. To show you what they finally did, they finally released the Congressional Record right away, after they made their vote. And they pointed out, this is silly, you can't stop this thing. It should have never been printed. The point was made that this thing should never have been printed until we had voted. And we should have read this thing kind of in draft, in typescript form. Not even everybody having a copy. I mean, some of the Senators had some sense. If you've got this kind of decision to make, whether a Congressional document is to be published, don't publish it. I mean, don't print the damn thing first and then ask us. Ask us first. And Church's view was, "As a committee chairman, I had a right to do it." Well, under the rules of the Senate that's true. You know, judgment. Well, obviously, this stuff came out and it shouldn't have come out. I use a very simple example. There is no reason under God's green earth why they had to talk about Black Leaf-40 being the chemical to be used by AMLASH. Why couldn't they just say some commercially available insecticide or pesticide, whatever it was? Why specifically name that thing? I don't know how many people even read the thing. But, you know, some idiot could pick up Black Leaf-40 and decide, "Hey, this is a good way to kill somebody." It's got nothing to do with intelligence. And that's why I think that it was irresponsible, and I think that statement is an absolutely good statement and is absolutely correct. And particularly as far as the Pike Committee is concerned. That thing was a shambles. And those kids were running around in their bare feet, not even their stocking feet, in their bare feet having a ball. Throwing the stuff up in the air.

INTERVIEWER: How about a couple of the Senators, Church and Mondale, have emphasized that accountability to the President and to the Congress was needed. And they were referring to the Agency.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, I think you have to have accountability. And we always thought we had accountability. We went and got our money from Congress to do all the convert action that everybody is objecting to now. They didn't object then. I mean, those handful of guys didn't. I mean, the so-called Laos Secret War. They provided every penny. We don't make our own money. We don't print our own money. We might print somebody else's counterfeit money but that is another story. But the Congressional leadership knew. Again, under the ground rules that the Congress laid down we always had oversight. Four oversight committees. We reported to those four oversight committees. If they didn't want to listen, if they didn't want to ask questions and if they didn't want to know more, that's their problem, not ours. We've got a war to fight, kind of. But we keep on going. When they stop us, we stop. And yeah, you've got to have Congressional Oversight. The system we've got, fine. But oversight is oversight. Oversight does not mean management. Not in my opinion anyway. Oversight does not mean daily running of the office. And I am told that there are guys on the Hill, and they've got badges just like the next guy. They've got all the clearances. They've got badges and they go in. They run around. They have access to everything. And I think that's crazy. That is micro managing. And there is no reason for that. None at all. I just don't believe in mucking up the system. If you want to change systems, say so. All the way around. If you want to run the government, get rid of the President and have it. We always didn't have a President running things. There was something in the old days, the Continental Congress. They ran everything. The President of the Continental Congress was in effect the President. And you had Congressional Committees that ran things. But even they operated in secret when it came to intelligence. Look at the record. And they didn't tell everybody everything in Congress. The Congressional people knew in the Continental Congress that the small committees that they created to handle the confidential and secret stuff were their surrogates. And hell, I think I mentioned to you the other day, Huddleston finally, on a committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee, turned to his Congressional colleagues and said, "You have to accept us on your Committee (Intelligence Committee) as your surrogates and you can't know all the things that we know." Well, that's what we have been saying all along. Not everybody can know everything. And you can't have it that way, that's all. And I must say, the Senate Committee, I think which is better even than the House Committee in some things, does not allow its staffers equal access to all papers, even now. They've learned. It's compartmented. This is the way it should be. Yeah, so talking about Congressional Oversight, yes, if it's oversight. Not management.

INTERVIEWER: Bob Woodward in his last book, Veil says the Church investigation plus the Carter Administration crushed the spirit of the CIA.

MR. HALPERN: Well, not having been inside during the period, it's hard to talk. In terms of being on the outside looking in with some vague idea of what the hell it is like inside, I would say yes. There is no question about that.

INTERVIEWER: Did you see it, did you witness any crushing in '75?

MR. HALPERN: Well, I was on the outside.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, that's right. You went back.

MR. HALPERN: This has to be impressions and gut feelings and that kind of stuff in talking to people. Yeah, it was a bad time, no question about that. Very bad. Including guys who were retired like me who were under the gun for the kinds of things we did. And also I have been talking to people inside who felt that if it wasn't for guys like us, the new guys inside wouldn't be under the gun now. And therefore they turned their venom on us. And I was specifically attacked by a couple of guys, I mean, verbally attacked, for some of the things, in terms of, you know, if you guys hadn't done all those nasty things, we wouldn't be under fire now.

INTERVIEWER: And these were Agency officers?

MR. HALPERN: Agency officers. Serving officers at the time.

And that's quite clear. Read Harris Greene's book, Inference of Guilt. And if you read that you get a feeling for what some of the insiders felt about us former insiders. I think his last job was Deputy IG before he retired. He'd been around for a long time. He's written a lot of books. All fiction so far. All except for one, he hasn't published it yet. He is trying to find a publisher. But this gave you, this Inference of Guilt gives one a very good feeling, I think, of how the insiders, serving officers, male and female, felt about us old-timers who were now out. And it was a very strong feeling that, you know, if they hadn't done it we would be all right. So there wasn't any great love lost between . . .

INTERVIEWER: That must have been a miserable time.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, it was pretty rough. And I think for both sides. And a lot of the officers, even the retired guys, as well as the serving guys, who didn't know a lot of the activities. And I didn't know of the activities either. Hell, I didn't know about the MKULTRA, the drug thing at all, even where I sat. We used to have compartmentation in those days because even as the Exec to the DDP, there's lots of things I didn't know about until I read about them in the Church Committee and other places. I just had a better way of putting them into context. But anyway, yeah, there were lots of things that were going on that I didn't particularly like when I read about them. I have a better feeling for why the people had to do what they were doing at the time. What they did and why some of these things took place. Where that's not true of many of my colleagues and friends who even in a kidding way would say to me things like, "What the hell did you do that for, Sam?" And I pointed out, "Number one, I didn't do it; number two, I didn't even know it was going on; but number three, yeah, I approve now and I know what happened." And I gave them a defense for it. That didn't wash at all. So it's kind of rough even among . . .

INTERVIEWER: Was this in the period '75, '76?

MR. HALPERN: '75, '76, '77.

INTERVIEWER: There is practically none of that feeling now?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know what it is now. I know Harris Greene stayed on until the late '70's, I think, maybe even the early '80's. And so Harris' book, Inference of Guilt, wasn't even published then. Could you cut that off for a second... Inference of Guilt came out in '82, so he probably stayed on until at least '80, something like that.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Good, I'll look at the book.

MR. HALPERN: It will give you some idea. I wrote a brief review of that somewhere, I think it appeared in Periscope or something. But, you'll get, I think, a feeling for this relationship of the serving officers versus the old hands.

INTERVIEWER: All right, the Church Committee believed the overall intelligence budget should be published. Was that viewed as a serious issue in the Agency? By those ...

MR. HALPERN: Who were then serving? From what I gather it was. And the Agency even under Turner objected to it. The Carter Administration even objected to it. And even going back into that period, Colby objected to it when he testified. All the Directors have objected to it. You can't do it even with an overall figure. The only budget figure that I know of that is actually published every year is the budget figure for the Intelligence Community Staff. And that doesn't matter whether they have a hundred people or a thousand people. What the hell. That's simple enough because they don't get engaged in any activities. You can't split the CIA budget up into this much for DDI, this much for S&T and this much for so on and so forth. The minute you start mucking around with that, you take the next year and the year after that and the year after that, people start asking lots of questions. And foreign governments try to figure out, why is it going up, why is it going down? And pretty soon there is going to be demands for more and more more and more breakout. And you can't have that kind of stuff if you're going to run an intelligence organization. I remember many years ago the British Parliament use to pass a one penny, a one penny, budget for confidential matters. Period. And the British penny, not our penny. But anyway, one penny. That's the best way to do it. The country wants a budget figure, we'll give them a budget figure.

INTERVIEWER: That was their solution.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, give them a one cent figure. I don't care. Or a dollar figure. One dollar. No more. But you can't start putting out a bunch of figures like that.

INTERVIEWER: I don't know if we touched on it last time or not -- the murder and funeral of Richard Welch and it's impact on the Congressional Committee's work. Some say this lessened the Committee pressure and won public opinion over to the side of the Agency. Did you?

MR. HALPERN: Well, being on the outside and having been at Dick's arrival at Andrews field that night when his plane came in, I don't know whether it lessened pressure from Congress. I think it did have an impact on public opinion, and I think that can be checked by looking at the old tapes in the old news broadcasts and looking at the headlines and the stories in the responsible newspapers -- The Los Angeles Times, The Chicago Tribune, The New York Times, The Washington Post, etc. -- and ordinary papers across the country and Walter Cronkite's broadcast and things like that. And I think you will find overall, there was a pulling back from the constant drumbeat of CIA being evil, CIA evil, CIA evil. I'm not sure if it had too much of an impact on Congressional Hill. Particularly the Church Committee and the Pike Committee. Particularly the Pike Committee more than the Church Committee. It had some, but I don't think it really stopped them. They kept going.

INTERVIEWER: All right, what about your impressions of Mr. Colby's cooperation with the Church and Pike Committee.

MR. HALPERN: I knew you were going to ask that sooner or later. I think Bill was wrong. Dead wrong. Obviously he thinks he was right. Two different approaches, two different men looking at the same problem. I don't think Bill had to go out of his way to, in effect, open up everything without by your leave from the President. It was his way of doing it from the very beginning from January even before the Church Committee began, from January 15th with Stennis. He did it. He carried on that way. Why he did, I don't know. I never asked him. He probably feels if he hadn't, things would have been worse rather than better. But I don't think so. Henry Kissinger held the line on the Pike Committee getting access to a lot of State Department stuff. He gave in some. But there was a big fight about it. And I would have preferred to see a big fight made by Colby on getting access to all the stuff on the Agency rather than just give it away. First of all I would rather have seen a President take this to the Supreme Court. The whole business. And maybe he would have lost. Who knows? Again, we are at a "What if . . ." question. But I think Colby was dead wrong to go as far as he went. Absolutely dead wrong. To this day there are a lot of people who think he was wrong. A lot of people defend him. And I have friends on both sides. And everybody knows where I stand. And I still see Bill from time to time. We are still friends and all that kind of stuff. We say hello, sit at the same table, and everyting else. We just have a different view on how to run the show, in other words.

INTERVIEWER: And it never did go to court, did it?

MR. HALPERN: No. No President had the guts. Well, talking about Congress not having the guts to use the power of the purse. The other side, the Presidents don't like to go to the Supreme Court for this kind of stuff. Particularly after Nixon lost on the tapes. It's a tough one. They went to the Court the Pentagon Papers and they lost that one. And they might have lost the next one. I don't know. But that is the only way you find out in this system. And we've got to find out. Otherwise we are just going to keep on this ballet we were involved in forever. And you know, I can ballet with the next guy. But sooner or later you're going to have to . . .

INTERVIEWER: The ballet is still on?

MR. HALPERN: Oh sure, it's still on. But somewhere, somehow, you're going to have to make a decision someday. And I'm afraid we're going to make a decision only after some great catastrophe. And that's not the way to do it, I don't think. If we have to wait for a catastrophe every time we are going to be really down the tubes. I'll give you another simple one. Lincoln suspened habeas corpus. The Constitution says you can't do this. He did it. And he said, you know, "Sooner or later, if we lose the war, there won't be any country to worry about anyway. And I'll take my chances with Congress afterwards." He had the guts, the fortitude to be President and make a decision. Nobody stopped him during the war. And after the war it was approved. Don't give a damn and all that kind of stuff, but anyway, it's the same thing here. Somebody has got to decide. You've got to go and find out, otherwise you are going to have this ballet all the time. And I can't see Judge Webster standing up better than Bill Colby on something like this. Maybe I'm wrong. I hope I'm wrong. First of all, I hope we never get to that again. But it's a possibility. You've got to fight it. I'm glad to see, for example, that the Administration and Judge Webster has come forth and objected to the Glenn Bill on putting the GAO, in all of its glory and majesty, right in the middle of CIA's finances. I don't know where that bill is going to go but it is somewhere in committee now. But at least initially the Administration said, "No way." But we'll see what happens.

INTERVIEWER: As far as the cooperation by Colby at the time it was going on, in other words, it was going to the committees, you were surprised?

MR. HALPERN: I am never surprised at anything that Bill Colby does. Never. I've been around Bill long enough and close enough not to be surprised. I objected to it. I mean, I couldn't go ahead and grab him by the scruff of the neck or anything. I was in no position to do that. But I was loud and vociferous in my statements to the people who were willing to listen among my colleagues. Some of them said, "Bill had no choice. He had to do that." And I kept saying, "Not that way." He may have had to reluctantly and over a period of time give up a piece of paper and another piece of paper and another piece of paper. But you don't suddenly open the door to the safe and say, "Go in, fellas, and enjoy yourselves." He took stuff up there by the bushel barrel full. It was crazy.

INTERVIEWER: Now some of the records had been gathered for the Rockefeller Commission and then were moved over to the Senate Commission wholesale.

MR. HALPERN: That's true. That was by Presidential Order. The President runs the show. It's perfectly okay. It's like I said in early '75 when I was trying to collect stuff for Bill Colby, the DCI, information in answer to all the charges that were coming up in the press in those days. I didn't know what he was going to do with them. And I had the same qualms that my buddies had, in terms of, if we give it to Bill, God knows what the hell he will do with the stuff. My answer was simply, "He's the boss. You've got to give it to him. And if you don't, you might ruin your job. Okay the stuff, just give it to the Rockefeller Commission." There was a Presidential Commission reporting to the President. The documents belong to the President. It's up to him if he wants to put them on a bulletin board out in front of the White House. That's up to him. That's his job. He's got the legal power to declassify every piece of paper in the government. Fine, go ahead and do it. You are the boss. I think you are crazy, but go ahead and do it. And the same difference between the Congressional Committee, Presidential Commission. I'm sorry. Maybe I'm simplistic in my approach to the legalisms involved or the operation of an organization. Somebody has got to make rules and regulations and procedures. And somebody has got to follow them. Not everybody can be all things to all men at all times.

INTERVIEWER: What about the suggestion by someone that Mr. Colby was responsible for exposing the CIA to the public?

MR. HALPERN: Well, that's just the consequence of what he did. That's all. It's easy. He did that, as I say, from January 15th, '75, when for the first time the entire organization of the Agency was laid out for public view.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think he was hopeful that the material he was supplying would not be publicized, would not be given out by the Committee?

MR. HALPERN: He was in an open session. He knew it.

INTERVIEWER: Well, that one.

MR. HALPERN: The Stennis Committee. He knew exactly where he was. Open session. And that's why it dawned on him as he left, as he says in his book, "On the way back from the Hill it dawned on me, that's probably on the ticker tapes now, on the wire services now. I better go stop by and tell somebody what I have just done."

INTERVIEWER: Did you see any signs of that sort of attitude earlier on with Bill?

MR. HALPERN: With Bill? No, not to that extent. Not in the sense of kind of freewheeling. No, that never came through. But I wouldn't have been surprised at whatever Bill did on that kind of stuff. It always surprised the hell out of me. I mean, it never surprised the hell out of me, what he did. It was strange in many cases, but he was a strange man. Probably still is.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, how about relationships between Colby and Angleton. Strained?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. Very strained. Very strained. I don't know how far back it goes as far as the Italian business is concerned, because Italy was one of Jim's early bailiwicks.

INTERVIEWER: I mentioned before lunch, Angleton-Colby relations. Angleton-Helms relations?

MR. HALPERN: Very, very good.

INTERVIEWER: Very, very good?

MR. HALPERN: Always have been.

INTERVIEWER: Good working relationship between the two of them.

MR. HALPERN: Oh sure, they had their differences in views on lots of subjects including the Nosenko case and a lot of others, but by and large it was excellent.

INTERVIEWER: Other than Mr. Colby, who was the most influential person from the Agency in dealing with these Committees?

MR. HALPERN: I have no personal knowledge of that so I am not sure. I would guess that the three guys who were set up to be the liaison. Breckinridge, Bolton and Elder I presume were the most influential guys because they were in daily touch with the staff as well as the Senators and Representatives. I forget who was technically the boss. I think it was probably Scott. The boss of the office on the paper. And Seymour was a consultant or contractor or rehiree or whatever it was because he had retired.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, he had? I didn't know that.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, he had retired with me and 250 other guys from the DDP on December the 31st, 1974.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, he had too.

MR. HALPERN: And then he got called back and rehired on January the 1st or January the 2nd, whatever it turned out to be, for this kind of stuff even before the Church Committee was created. So I guess of all of those in terms of staff officers, I guess those three were the guys who were more intimately involved than anybody else. But I may be, you know, dead wrong on that.

INTERVIEWER: And that was 200 plus that left at the end of December?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, regular retirement. I mean, the retirement computations as a result of the cost of living allowances that were then growing along every six months or so made it so that it was economically crazy not to retire. You were better off to do what Seymour did, which was retire one day and come back on contract the next day because it worked out that way much better. Better financially, that is. So a lot of guys just took advantage of it long before the business of the Church Committee came into existence. And you had to have your papers in quite a while before the December 31st retirement date so that they could do all the processing and everything, get the approvals and processing and what have you because it wasn't automatic. You had to go through the usual bureaucratic chain of command to get approval to retire. So most of these people had been thinking about retirement for some time. It had nothing to do with the Schlesinger cleaning up in '73, this was a year later in '74. So a lot of guys were planning it and just kept on looking at the financial statistics from the retirement branch to see when the best time was to go. And so it suddenly ended up with about 200 or 250 from the DDO alone. And we all went out at the same time.

INTERVIEWER: You served Tom Karamessines until February of '73?

MR. HALPERN: That's right. And then Bill Colby after that.

INTERVIEWER: Then Colby after that?

MR. HALPERN: Until about May of '73.

INTERVIEWER: Until May of '73. And then what Sam?

MR. HALPERN: Then my next assignment was as the Senior

Personnel Officer. Mainly, my job was worrying about assignments for senior personnel. That means the super grades, GS-15s and above for the DDO. I prepared all the necessary paperwork and make recommendations to the DDO as to next assignments and what have you. I did that for, well, sorry, correction. I first was given a job by Colby and Bill Nelson who was then the DDO while Bill was in limbo waiting to get sworn in. I mean, Colby was in limbo. My next assignment, actually, was to do a study of DCS which Colby had just incorporated into the DDO. It had been under the DDI for years. And the DDO, that is, the Directorate suddenly had another component, totally new component. They didn't know what to do with it. For years they had been trying to get their hands on it, we had been, even under Tom K. And no decision had been made. And Colby, one of the first things he did was to just transfer. The same time he transferred TSD, the technical people into the DDS&T, he transferred the DCS into the DDO. And so I was asked to look into it and come up with a paper saying, you know, what's this animal we now own? What do we have here? And so I did it and I think it took me two or three months to do a study. And I visited quite a number of the field bases, field offices throughout the country. Talked to a lot of people and talked to a lot of people in Washington and wrote a paper. And then it was after that that I was made the Senior Personnel Officer -- or officer for senior officers -- in the DDO. And one of the conditions that I had made in doing the study on DCS, that come what may with my report, whether it was a good report or a lousy report, I didn't want people to assume that once I made the report that I would move in and take over DCS, you know. Being charged with having doctored the report, I said, "I want it clearly understood I am not going to be assigned to the DCS when this is over." And everybody agreed. Scouts honor, cross my heart and hope to die, all that kind of nonsense. Hand on the Bible and what have you. And after I did my personnel job, which I am not a personnel officer and I didn't like it but I did it as long as I was told to do it. And so and behold, when I was stirring around saying, you know, "This isn't my job. There must be something else you guys have for me to do." And behold, when Jim Murphy retired in '73 and Jack Horton was moved up from Deputy Chief of DCS to Chief of DCS, I was detailed as the Deputy to Jack Horton. And so in early '74, late '73, early '74, I was made Deputy Chief of DCS and then made another trip to the stations for other reasons, because I was looking at them from two different points of view. And that's what I was doing. And then when I retired, I retired as Deputy Chief of DCS.

INTERVIEWER: Good, I didn't have that gap. As you look to the past, how was counterintelligence affected by the Hearings?

MR. HALPERN: I think that were affected, I'm just guessing again, because on was on the outside, but my guess is it was probably affected even more drastically than the rest of the shop largely because of the MHCHAOS program, the mail opening program, and because of Jim Angleton being charged with being the gray eminence and spook and God knows what else. I think it was probably badly hurt. Much more so than the others.

INTERVIEWER: Badly damaged?

MR. HALPERN: Badly damaged. And particularly with Colby saying that he never got anything out of counterintelligence. Jim Angleton could never convince him about counterintelligence. Bill just didn't understand it, that's all.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about Mitch Rogovin? Any notions as to how he influenced the . . .

MR. HALPERN: I have no idea. No personal knowledge whatever. What I would be giving you is hearsay.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, how about Director Schlesinger's relations with Congress?

MR. HALPERN: Well, as far as I know Jim was only in the job from February '73 to June '73. I have no idea what those relations were. First of all, I was bouncing around mostly as Colby's Exec and we had enough troubles worrying about what to do with Jim. Colby knew pretty well because it was mostly Colby's ideas that Jim was signing-off on as it affected the DDO. I just don't know what his relationships were really. I wasn't close enough to get near. I can give you a gut feeling. But that's no help.

INTERVIEWER: And how about during that time, Colby's relation with Congress?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know. I don't think there were very many. I think everything was handled through Jim. Because in those days, officers below the rank of the Deputy Director and Executive Director, very few officers as such ever had any direct relations with the Congress. Bill Broe as the IG, under Schlesinger, was the first guy, first officer below that top level who was directed to testify in Congress on the Chile affair because Bill had been Chief of the WH Division when it all took place. And so, Bill's contacts with Geneene of ITT, for the substantive of issue, I believe Bill was the first guy who . . . Schlesinger changed the ground rules right away. And I think he was the first guy. Other Directors had taken officers up there with them to testify in executive session, classified hearings and briefings. Dick Helms took Ted Shackley, for example, to testify about a number of things. I think one of them was the Laos war and another one on Vietnam and so on. But aside from that kind of, the Director doing the briefings with a staff officer to assist him, in effect, I think Bill Broe was the first, I believe he was the first, officer to testify in his own right under oath, etc. And then his testimony was declassified almost immediately and published.

INTERVIEWER: And the Director was present?

MR. HALPERN: I don't remember whether he was present or not.

INTERVIEWER: So this was a. . .

MR. HALPERN: It was a change.

INTERVIEWER: Big departure?

MR. HALPERN: Vast change. I believe Bill in '73 was under Schlesinger, the first guy. I'm almost certain of that.

INTERVIEWER: Do you happen to know who was Congressional liaison at that time?

MR. HALPERN: It would have to be . . . I don't know who the heck -- I don't know offhand. I don't remember. John Warner would know. Give John a buzz and ask him. Or the record would show in the Agency who the heck was on what job. I'm trying to think and I don't remember offhand. It may be in the public hearings for that matter. I just don't know. I've got them in there somewhere. But I think it would be easier for you just to check. Because that was a wide thing and it was an unclassified officer.

INTERVIEWER: Okay how about, some suggest, I approached it a little bit differently a little bit ago, that Mr. Colby's cooperation saved the Agency from very serious harm.

MR. HALPERN: Run that by me again.

INTERVIEWER: Some suggest that Mr. Colby's cooperation saved the Agency from very serious harm. Some going so far as to say it might have been dismantled. Is that a common view?

MR. HALPERN: Well, I'll tell you, if it is it's a new one on me. I know it's a view, but all I can say to those who hold that view is, what the hell do they regard as damaging to the Agency? If Bill didn't do the damage to the Agency, what the hell did? I don't think the Congress would have dismantled the

Agency under any circumstances. If, by dismantling, basically you say get rid of the clandestine side, because I think even the silliest guy on the Hill always said you've got to have analysis, research and analysis. That's DDI. And I think they are all pretty smart enough to say, "Well, we've got to have those bloody things up in the sky. And we've got to have technical stuff." You know everybody is for technical stuff. And the DDA simply provides the the money and the office space and the paper clips. So the only thing that would be dismantled would be to wipe out clandestine activities. And I don't think anybody on the Hill seriously considered wiping it out completely. Controlling it, reducing it, putting it under some kind of further Congressional constraints, yeah, that was going to happen. Moving it out of CIA and making it a brand new agency by itself, yeah, there was talk about that kind of thing. But where the hell would they put it? In the White House? Well, that's possible. Look at the nice mess with got with North and you can imagine that in spades. So those people who hold the view that Colby's frankness, if that's the word to use, or cooperation with the Congress, saved the Agency from real damage, I don't know what the hell damage is then. Sorry Ralph, you asked.

INTERVIEWER: I asked, you bet.

MR. HALPERN: I think people like that have got rocks in their head. I don't know what the hell they are imagining.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me, on a scale from 1 to 15, with 15 tops, how would you rate Mr. Colby's work in the investigation?

MR. HALPERN: In the investigation?

INTERVIEWER: In the investigation -- Congressional, Pike, Church.

MR. HALPERN: In relation to what? I am not trying to hold back. In relation to what? In relation to harm to the Agency, harm to the community? Helping in Congress? Hurting the President? I'm not sure.

INTERVIEWER: In relation to the Agency, and if you will the health of the Agency, the strength of the Agency.

MR. HALPERN: Oh, I'd give him no more than a 5. No more. My Lord. I think he did a lot of damage. I think he aided and abetted the kinds of anti-intelligence activities, and anti-intelligence feelings on the Hill. And I forget whether it was Kissinger or Rockefeller who made that, maybe it's a apocryphal remark, to Colby about, you know, do you have to go to Confession all the time? That's my attitude as far as Colby is concerned.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to read a statement and see what you think of it. This is a statement that was made to Mr. Colby in December of 1975. And I am quoting, "It has been my experience and judgement that if you, Mr. Colby, are asked precisely the right questions, you will give an honest answer. You do not lead us into those areas which would help us know what the right question was to ask. You do not make it easy for us to ask the right question." This is a Congressman, Sam.

MR. HALPERN: I know.

INTERVIEWER: "Anyone who thinks you have been running back and forth to Capital Hill with briefcases bulging with secrets which you are eager to bestow upon us hasn't sat on my side of the desk."

MR. HALPERN: Do you want me to comment?

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: I think the person who made that comment didn't realize how much he was getting. He may have been ignorant of what the intelligence business was all about, what the profession was all about, what the Community was all about. And he may have thought that Colby wasn't giving him the keys to the guardhouse. But in fact I think he was. Again, I wasn't there at the time so I am only guessing. But I think he did give them keys. I think the Congressman who made that comment thought that there should have been a hell of a lot more. I think he was living in a dream world. He didn't realize how much he was getting from Bill. As I said before, I would have preferred if the Congressmen really had to dig and burrow and argue for every piece of paper. That's a personal view and I think that I would, if I had been there I would have tried to see what we could do to keep it that way. I must say I can image Seymour Bolton trying to convince Bill Colby about not pushing things forward and not rushing things. And maybe he succeeded in holding back some stuff or at least delaying production of some stuff. But I can imagine Colby totally overruling Seymour most of the time or some of the time. I don't know. But I can't imagine Bolton, knowing Seymour very well indeed, that Seymour would want to go rushing foward with this thing because if nothing else, Bolton was a political animal. He had the best political sense of many guys there.

INTERVIEWER: He did?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, he was terrific on this. He was basically a political action officer and always was. And particularly in Germany, he knew the German scene very well indeed. And the German leaders very well indeed, some of whom were on his payroll. But that is another story. Or had been on his payroll, let me put it that way. Years ago. Anyway, I can see Colby saying, "Oh I know better than that, Seymour. I know how to handle those guys. Let me handle it my way. And I'll handle it my way." But Seymour would be a good staff officer and provide Colby with all the information that Colby should have. And it would be up to Bill then to make the decision on what to do. That Congressman, I think, thought there was much more and thought that probably Bill was holding out on him. My own gut feeling, and it is purely that, was that Bill did not hold out. And he wasn't trying to hold anything back. I think he really believed, probably to this day, that he did the right thing by making things easier by showing a cooperative spirit, by putting things forward, and I think the other apocryphal statement I made, you know, about, do you have to go to confession everyday is the other side to that same question. And the Congressman, I think, was just full of delusions. That's about all I can say.

INTERVIEWER: How about your reflections on media coverage of the Congressional investigations? Do you feel they were objective?

MR. HALPERN: Well, obviously not. They were not objective. They were all hype. Nothing but hype. If you looked at some of the stories that appeared in the print media and the radio and television media, the headline always had to have those three nasty letters, CIA. I don't care what it was. They always dug up a CIA headline. You take a look at the obituary pages of The Post and New York Times and invariably if somebody died -- God knows where and God knows how long they'd been sick, with cancer or had an accident, got killed in a car crash -- and if they happened to have been in CIA even as a logistics officer or a finance clerk or a courier, and if they could dig out the word CIA, that would be in the headline. "CIA Courier Dead" or "CIA Officer Killed" or so and so. It was always the CIA. It use to make me sick to my stomach to watch these things on television. To this day I can't watch Tom Brokow without remembering some of his absolute awful, asinine statements that he made as a great pontificator on all of this stuff. Dan Rather was bad enough but he wasn't on top then. It was Walter Cronkite. But Dan was always covering this thing. He was bad, but he wasn't quite that bad. I think Brokaw was the worst.

INTERVIEWER: Daniel Schorr, was he . . .

MR. HALPERN: Schorr was a bad one all the way through. They were always looking for that CIA headline. It could have something to do with some other Agency but if it was intelligence, CIA always got the hook. Let me give you a perfect example of what I am talking about. You remember, I'm sure, the famous picture of that so-called assassination gun? The dart gun --

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: --that Church was holding up and Tower was looking over the side and what have you. And first of all, Bill Colby should never have brought that up on the Hill. He shouldn't have taken it up there. But it was labeled to this day, and it's even in the John Ranelagh book, and I tried to get him to correct it in the paperback but he couldn't because, I think, because of the fact that there was a caption under a photograph and to change a plate like that is very expensive for a publisher. John tried to make some changes in the text, not the caption under the photograph, but in the text itself to indicate what I was trying to tell them, that by dammit, it was not the CIA gun. The gun happened to have been found in one of the safes at CIA when these young kids were running around in the safes in their bare feet. And in the testimony on the Hill before the Church Committee, it appears in the bloody same book that the testimony of Colby's in, two days later, two or three days later, Dr. Senseney of the Special Operations Division of the Department of the Army at Fort Dietrich, Maryland, Dr. Senseney testified. And in high dudgeon practically when he said, "That's not a CIA gun. I'm the guy who developed the gun. I developed it and not for CIA. I developed it for the entire US Government and it had nothing to do with Operation MONGOOSE or Cuba. It wasn't even developed then. I developed it for the Special Forces in Vietnam in 1965. It's my gun. We did it. It's an Army gun." But no, you'll never find it in history today. It's always a CIA gun. It's going to be a CIA gun until you and I are dead and long after. They can't correct the history books. And it's all in the same bloody, green covered set of hearings where Dr. Senseney says, "It's my gun."

INTERVIEWER: How does Senseney spell his name? You know?

MR. HALPERN: I'll give it to you. Hold on.

INTERVIEWER: The machine is back on.

MR. HALPERN: I'm not making this up. This is Volume I of the Church Committee Hearings and oddly enough the title of the Volume is "Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents." And that subject has got nothing to do with the dart gun. Anyway, Bill testified with that dart gun nonsense and he had with him at the time Sayre Stevens and Mitch Rogovin on September the 16th,

1975. On September the 18th, 1975, two days later, Dr. Charles A. Senseney, spelled S-E-N-S-E-N-E-Y. He was Department of Defense employee formerly in a Special Operations Division at Fort Dietrich, Maryland. And if you'll wait a minute I'll give you the actual page number of that. I've been trying to get this damn thing. People won't listen to me and nobody will.

INTERVIEWER: Well I am and the machine is and we'll get it out to the public.

MR. HALPERN: If you'll hang on one minute -- here it is. This is what I wrote to John Ranelagh and I sent it to him in this form. He took 80 percent of these 38 pages when he put out his paperback. Anyway, I'm saying this, "Re the photo of Senator Church holding a dart gun. The gun was not a CIA gun. It was not developed in the early 60's. It was not developed as part of Operation MONGOOSE. See Church Committee Hearings, Volume I, Testimony of Charles A. Senseney, Department of Defense, Special Operations Division, September 18, 1975, Pages 159 to 177. . . The gun was developed long after MONGOOSE which was run from October 1961 to October 1962. It was developed in 1965 for Special Forces in Vietnam and was available for all interested government agencies." Quote unquote. And there's the text. But the media two days later never mentioned a word about, "Two days ago we gave you a report about that dart gun. We called it a CIA gun. Oops, we made a mistake. It's not a CIA dart gun." You think Colby as DCI even tried to put out a correction to the press, a notice saying, "Hey fellas, please put even a little half-inch box in somewhere on page 55." CIA didn't do a thing. And I hold Bill responsible for that and I'm sorry to be so strong about it. But that is Bill's fault. He brought that bloody gun up there. He knew what they were doing. He saw the headlines as well as you and me, and the print media and the television media, the electronic media and the radio. He never did anything at all to try to correct the record. At the time it might, big might, big question mark, might have had some impact on some of the media to say, "OOPS, it wasn't a CIA gun, it was a Department of Defense gun." Never. Never! I tried to do it in my own little way. I didn't have a chance to even start. I've told everybody that I could think of including Bill Colby the same story I am telling you. I said, "I am not making it up. It's all in the same green document."

INTERVIEWER: Does he mention that in his book? I don't remember that. Does he mention that in his book? Does Bill Colby mention this? I don't think so.

MR. HALPERN: He never made any attempt to correct the record. Sure the gun was there. I'm not denying that. But it wasn't a CIA dart gun or the CIA assassination gun. Nobody in the media tried to correct the record. Church didn't, obviously. Never. But the guy who should have done something is Bill Colby. And I hold Bill personally responsible for not doing anything about it.

INTERVIEWER: I'm glad to get it on the record.

MR. HALPERN: It's on the record. I've had it on the record so many times with people. I've told this to Seymour Hersh. But he didn't believe me until he did his own homework. He didn't even believe in looking at my copy. It wasn't here in this house. I was out with him. I do my homework. And when I've got, you know, I said, "_I'm_ not saying this. Here, you read it." He had to do his own homework and he finally told me at another subsequent session, he said, "Yes, you were right, Sam." I said, "I didn't make it up." And I don't know Senseney from a hole in the wall. You got me at the wrong moment.

INTERVIEWER: I'm glad to get it.

MR. HALPERN: I'm getting hot under the collar.

INTERVIEWER: That's fine. That's fine.

MR. HALPERN: I don't mind, you know, taking blame for something we did. And there is no blame in having a dart gun, by dammit. I think Senseney was right to have perfected one. The fact that we didn't use it and nobody else used it, that's another one of those wasted things, wasted efforts maybe. But if suddenly somebody needed -- well, we did use it, I'm sorry. But not as an assassination weapon. We used it against dogs.

INTERVIEWER: Right, guard dogs.

MR. HALPERN: The guard dogs were put to sleep in at least one operation.

INTERVIEWER: You know in Spy Catcher there is mention of a dart gun. And I wondered when I read that whether the British had worked on it and then we did? I wasn't sure.

MR. HALPERN: According to Senseney, he did this on his own. He and his laboratory types. I don't know Senseney. It's all in here. Read the written report.

INTERVIEWER: All right. I'm going to.

MR. HALPERN: You know, it's like this business I told you about my being out in Boulder, Colorado at the World Affairs Conference. Perfect example. It's okay for somebody to use the Church Committee Reports to damn CIA, but I can't use the same bloody report to defend CIA. So where the hell do you go?

INTERVIEWER: In one hell of a circle, that's for sure.

MR. HALPERN: That's for sure. Round and round and round. Anyway, you caught me at a wrong moment.

INTERVIEWER: No, it's fine. Tell me, why do you think the press was playing all CIA up and playing CIA . . .?

MR. HALPERN: I think part of the same business of being anti-establishment, anti-government. Remember, this is after Vietnam, after Watergate. It all adds up. Attack, attack, attack, attack, attack.

INTERVIEWER: Anti-secrecy?

MR. HALPERN: Well, partly. Sure. Remember, the Freedom of Information Act was just beginning to be used. And it's part of the whole business, it's against the establishment. And one of the guys who was on the Church Committee staff, one of the staffers, Rick Inderfurth, I think is his name.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

MR. HALPERN: Okay, you know that name?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, I do.

MR. HALPERN: Well, after the Church Committee business, his next job was in the media on television as a correspondent.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, I didn't know that.

MR. HALPERN: Guys were looking for other jobs. So, you know looking out for their future. I don't object to that but I hate for them to have gotten ahead over the dead bodies of the Intelligence Community. I mean, it's a little bit beyond the pale as far as I'm concerned.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, how about the writings of Seymour Hersh. Significant factor?

MR. HALPERN: Yes. If nothing else The New York Times -- and The New York Times still has an impact -- and when you have two big front page stories like that, it's going to make an impact. And it did make an impact. And particularly when he had the help, and he admits it, and Colby admits it, he had the help of the DCI, Colby, who confirmed to him a lot of the stuff he had about some of the activities in New York, some of which were wrong. And Colby didn't even know they were wrong. But Colby went ahead. This is part of Colby's problem again -- giving away more than he has to give away. Why the hell he talked to Hersh beats the hell out of me.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about certain newspapers. Were they especially harsh in their treatment of CIA during the time?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. I don't know of any that wasn't. There may have been some around the country.

INTERVIEWER: Christain Science Monitor, maybe?

MR. HALPERN: Nope. Oh no, no, no, no. The Monitor was along with everybody else. They were a part of the pack. And I've got all the clippings. The Monitor was part of the pack.

INTERVIEWER: Wall Street Journal?

MR. HALPERN: That I don't know. I don't read the Wall Street Journal religiously. I used to read The Monitor, The Post, and The New York Times very religiously. I found that I: a. couldn't afford them all, and b. my clippings were overflowing the room anyway, and I just read The Monitor and The Washington Post and, of course, Time magazine.

INTERVIEWER: Washington Star? Was that . . .

MR. HALPERN: The Washington Star was going but they were all on the attack. Nobody wanted to be left out. Everyone, they all wanted to be part of the show. And that's why you had the television and the radio, all the different channels. I don't care what, all the news broadcast. It was almost as if everybody said, "This is the time fellas and we are all going to make headlines." And they were all looking for headlines no matter what it was. Good, bad, or indifferent. They didn't care about the facts. This was one of the reasons that AFIO was created -- we called it ARIO when we first began under Dave Phillips -- to try to put some kind of moderation and some kind of factual sense into some of these guys who had absolutely no concept of what the hell they were doing, what they were talking about. It was just like the Representatives and the Senators who didn't have any idea except that they all thought this was James Bond fun and games stuff. And there was no leavening of any kind of criticism. And what we were trying to do, at least in the AFIO side or the ARIO side, was to have a place where the media could come and talk to us. And we weren't going to give away any secrets. And we didn't. But to put things in perspective, put things in context. Try to explain to them what the hell that terminology was, what the definitions were, what covert action was. You know, nobody knew.

INTERVIEWER: AFIO or ARIO ran a questionnaire with its membership. Do you know whatever happened to the questionnaire?

MR. HALPERN: The questionnaire was put out at the request of one of the members who was doing some kind of a study -- a Ph.D. or a Masters or something. He was doing a paper. And this was a part of his paper. And I don't know what the results were. I never saw the finished product. But you can check with the office and see if they have it.

INTERVIEWER: I saw some mention in one of the Congressional documents, Dave Phillips in testimony, maybe for government operations.

MR. HALPERN: Well, it may have been. But again, Dave wasn't running the questionnaire. That was an individual member's effort and using AFIO as a means of getting it out to the membership in kind of one fell swoop. He didn't have any way of getting -- I don't know what the membership was, maybe a thousand or fifteen-hundred something like that -- he wouldn't have any way of reaching that many people as a private individual. So we sent out the questionnaire that he prepared. And as a matter of fact I don't think I even responded to it because I thought some of the questions were silly. And I didn't see any point in answering silly questions.

INTERVIEWER: You didn't save it?

MR. HALPERN: No, I didn't. I'm sorry.

INTERVIEWER: I'm just curious because from the testimony there are some percentages.

MR. HALPERN: Dave may have. You might ask Dave. Dave may have saved it. I don't know if the office itself saved it. They weren't very history-minded in the office.

INTERVIEWER: How about your impressions regarding support from the White House during the Congressional investigations?

MR. HALPERN: Again, from the outside looking in . . .

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: I don't think the White House was very supportive, or at least as supportive as they might have been. But I think I've always thought that they might have been more supportive if Colby had been more honest with the White House in the very beginning. And the beginning to me is January 15, 1975, before the Church Committee. And read Colby's book about that. I mean, he himself says, you know, says he was out of step, basically. And if I were sitting in the White House, why would I suddenly think that this guy was going to work with me. You know, he cut my feet off at the stumps, at the hips, the first time around. And there is no way I can pull him back now. I think the White House was concerned, I think Henry Kissinger was concerned about the fact of the loss of emphasis and the loss of capability in the Intelligence Community and how to stem that particular problem. And if you remember, Ford came out with his own plan of reorganizing the Community and took a bit of the wind out of the sails of the Church Committee, which I thought was a smart thing to do. It may have been cosmetic and it may have been simply a deal. But by that time he was dealing with Bush in '76, a different kind of a guy. And well, an Executive Order came out under Ford in

February of '76 and it's called the Bush paper. It wasn't. I mean, Bush couldn't possibly, even with his staff, have written a new Executive Order in the couple of weeks that he was in the office. It had to be the one that was prepared by Colby and his staff or his staff officers. So that was basically the order that came out in '76 with a Bill Colby related order, an attempt to do something. But again, why should the White House and all of it's parts gone out of its way to work with a guy they weren't sure of? Now when Bush took over in '76 it's a different story. But by that time the damage had been done. It was '75 when the damage was done, not '76, because by '76 the Hearings had died down, the coverage had died down, and it was only starting to come up again when they started to show these green books and the reports and the Hearings and by that time it was the middle of '76. But it doesn't take long to destroy an Intelligence Community. You know, boom.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever hear anything of the role of Mr. Haig?

MR. HALPERN: Not much. Not much. At least I don't remember. I think by that time Al was out of town. Wasn't he in Europe at that time? By '76?

INTERVIEWER: By '76, he would have been.

MR. HALPERN: Yes, he would have been in Europe by that time. So I don't remember hearing of Al very much.

INTERVIEWER: That's right. He went off to Europe. How about this: A number of observers believe the Congressional Hearings in this year of investigation were a real watershed in CIA history.

MR. HALPERN: Oh sure. Before the deluge and after the deluge. No question. No question. We thought we had a problem in '67. That's about nine years earlier, eight years earlier when we had the Ramparts flap. And that was a tremendous flap. And I think we discussed that last time and I'm on tape on that. But that was the first big real problem we had, big war issue. I mean, the Bay of Pigs was bad enough, but that was limited, by comparison, to the Ramparts flap which was worldwide in its significance; and covered a whole variety of subjects, in terms of the different covers we had used and in terms of the different things we had done. Even though it was all covert action. But by '75 we weren't just talking covert action. The Bay of Pigs was also covert action. It just happened to be paramilitary activity of covert action, but it was covert action. But by '75 you are getting into intelligence, you are getting into counterintelligence, you're getting the whole "shmear," let alone the CA stuff, the covert action stuff. So '75 was the first time there was across the board from A to Zed and back again. And it was the kitchen sink, soup, apples, nuts, everything. And it wasn't just CIA, it was the entire Community, which even hurt worse than that.

It included things like NSA, which up until then had been really sacrosanct. And they blew stuff in NSA like, I wish I knew the detail. But all you've got to do is read the stuff and can have a feel for what the hell went wrong there. They blew more than they should have.

INTERVIEWER: There was a comment by Bob Woodward in Veil that Bill Colby in the Hearings, his real success was that he protected NSA.

MR. HALPERN: Oh, I've got hearings in there about NSA and NSA being on the firing line, and I know the staff officer who helped prepare most of the testimony by the Director of NSA at the time, General something or other. I forget his name right now. The guy who did most of the work had been a college classmate of mine at the National War College, Jack Harding. And it hurt very badly all the way around. And Colby couldn't have possibly protected them.

INTERVIEWER: Woodward overstated it.

MR. HALPERN: And as a matter of fact, I think part of the problem, again sitting on the outside, was that each of the agencies in turn had to protect their own domain and their own activities. And no DCI, I don't care who he was, could have been able to coordinate and alter the extent of trying to come up with a solid front. I think if he did there might have been some law which said you are in collusion. So you can't, you know, you are not allowed to defend yourself together. I don't know, I'm just guessing.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about the Congressional investigations -- affect Agency morale a lot or . . .

MR. HALPERN: Well, I can only assume again from the outside that they had to. I know people talked to me about it from people who were inside, talking to me on the outside, in terms of what its done in terms of morale. I think as I said before, the feelings of, if you guys who had been here before hadn't done those nasty things, we wouldn't be under the gun. We are back to square one on that.

INTERVIEWER: Sure. Okay. The issue of oversight. Do you believe that oversight by two select committees is preferable to the earlier oversight by six to eight committees?

MR. HALPERN: We never had six to eight as such. There were four committees of Congress which had oversight, two in the House and two in the Senate. There was under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment six to eight committees we reported to. I wasn't involved anymore. But anyway, the Agency had to report on covert action. It was a separate subject.

INTERVIEWER: Right, good distinction.

MR. HALPERN: So that there never were more than four oversight committees as such. And now we are down to two. And I have been on public record and in print favoring one committee. As long as you are going to have committees, have one. But people forget that even when you have only two now, we still have to -- remember the Agency still reports to Foreign Affairs, briefs them on foreign affairs. The House Armed Services Committee still gets special reporting. The Appropriations Committees in both the House and the Senate are always involved with everything. So you've got four committees right now anyway. Minimum. In practical daily life. You've got to go to Appropriations and nobody in Congress is ever going to keep Appropriations out of anything. And on top of that, then there is Government Operations. I could go on forever. So boiling it down to even one joint committee, it'll help some, but it won't solve the problem. But it is better than having two, with two separate staffs.

INTERVIEWER: Okay how about, do you think it is practical for the Congress to be informed of the covert activities of the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, within limits, within reason. They are not, as I said before, they are not part of the Executive and they are not going to be -- I hope they are not going to be -- in charge of or as part of making the decision whether you are going to do something or not. And whether that is cover action or whether that is sending the Marines in, you can't have them sitting there telling you you can do it or you can't do it. Not if you are going to be a President.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, what about this one, Sam, and you've really been very, very patient. I really appreciate it. What are the lessons that you think are to be learned from the Church and Pike investigations? Either institutional lessons, that is the Agency or. . .

MR. HALPERN: I think first of all you need one, I think if you are going to have an oversight it should be one joint committee, a small oversight committee, not very many numbers either in staff or in Representatives and Senators. The Director has to be honest with these guys. He has got to tell them lots of things that he normally wouldn't tell them, I think. And what he tells them has to be cleared with the President before he tells them, except for the normal mundane things like normal budget stuff and normal personnel figures. No President should get involved in that. It's silly. But in terms of specific activities, whether intelligence collection or counterintelligence or covert action, don't dummy up with Congress. On the other hand, you've got to build a rapport where there are certain things they are not going to ask you about -- they shouldn't ask you about -- such as identities of agents; and that kind of thing. Such as the kind of liaison arrangements you make with foreign governments. Yeah, they might consider it as a treaty and, therefore, it comes under the treaty making power. It's advise and consent powers of the Senate. But I think they've got to bite the bullet themselves and realize that certain things are not for discussion even at that level. I think a DCI has to glad-hand the people on the Hill -- not all 100 of them in the Senate or 435 in the House, obviously. But the House and the Senate have got to have some delegation of their responsibilities, their authority and what have you to a handful of people And that can't change every six months or every two years. There are going to be some guys who are going to stay there for a while. And that's why the arguments against the joint committee because the House of Representatives has an election every two years. But a lot of guys are in there for life, basically. They come from safe, what the British would call safe boroughs, you know, safe districts. It's only the rare thing that's going to change it. So there has got to be some kind of give and take on this. And they've got to grow into this real world, on the Hill, that certain things you just don't ask about particularly in the intelligence and the counterintelligence field. You know, if a Congressman says, "Tell me who the Soviet spies, who the Soviets have recruited on my staff." Uh uh. You don't tell them that if you've got any good hard information, not until you are absolutely certain and not until you've got some kind of an operation running to control the damn thing and play them back or whatever the situation is, because these guys, the first thing they do is fire the guy. That's the last thing in the world you want to do if you are running a counterintelligence operation. So you've got to have give and take on this kind of stuff. You've got to play games with these guys on the Hill. You've got to wine them and dine them and breakfast them, or whatever the phrase is. I think the DCI, whoever he is, has got to be able to work with a select group of people on the Hill who have got to have the confidence of the rest of their colleagues, whom they can trust and who can understand, like Huddleston says, that not everybody in Congress is going to know everything that these guys are going to know. These guys in turn are going to have to understand that they can't know everything either. There are some things that you just don't talk about. And I'm not talking about these big covert action operations and what have you. They'll hear about those when it comes to passing the money for a particular political action operation or a paramilitary operation. Those things take lots of dough. It's like in the old days the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty took lots of money to run those radios. And Congress knew what the hell was going on. And Congress knew that RFE and RL were advertising in this country from the very beginning for American donations by American citizens to fight Communism via the radio airwaves. And I don't know if that was legal or not to this day, but I guess nobody objected. And they didn't object in the Church Committee to this thing. Except that now that it is run by another part of the US Government, that makes it okay. It's the same thing.

INTERVIEWER: Same government.

MR. HALPERN: Same government. Same people involved. Same appropriations and all that kind of stuff. I don't understand, honestly, as a citizen, what the hell the big difference is. So, but in terms of the future, there has got to be some kind of better rapport than developed as a result of the Church and Pike Committee which was strictly adversarial. And you can't have that and run intelligence. I don't care whether it's NSA, DIA, CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, Drug Enforcement Agency. Any of them. And what is it, there are 11 or 12 components in the Community at the moment and all of them have, you've got to understand, what in the hell the world is all about. And you can't have all of this stuff going up on media coverage. And you can't have it be used to help somebody's election prospects.

INTERVIEWER: Both in the Executive and in the Congress.

MR. HALPERN: And the Congress. And the leaks, I am sorry to say, most of the leaks come from the Executive side. I'm sure of that. And I've been writing on that, too. And at least from sitting on the outside, and I don't know whether I am right or wrong, but my own gut feeling is that the leaks as they appear in the press -- and I don't know for the last 10 years what, you know, what really is classified. I've got a feeling for it, that's all. After 32 years in the business you kind of understand some of this stuff. But most of the stuff is coming off of the Executive Branch. Somebody is trying to get some kind of yea or nea. Or some pluses. And you can't run it that way. I'm sorry. I'm not looking for an Official Secrets Act, but something that has a better control over who says what, how, where and when. So Church and Pike Committees, if there is going to be any pluses out of those two circuses -- and they were nothing but circuses -- it's got to be along those lines. A greater confidence, greater working together, and a better understanding between the two branches of government that this is a serious life and death business, particularly these days. And if you've got some decent intelligence, I don't care whether it's technical or human -- intelligence is intelligence -- it might save us all in the long run if we know in advance and then can use it in advance. Lots of times Presidents have misused good intelligence. Or wouldn't believe good intelligence. I gave you one example, not a President, but senior officials at the State Department refused to believe intelligence. And I can give you plenty of examples within CIA, the DDI wouldn't believe human source intelligence because it wasn't a picture and it wasn't SIGINT. And chapter and verse, over and over again. And plenty of times the human source reporting was wrong. I'm not saying it's right every time. But there are lots of examples where it was and it wasn't accepted. But there has got to be a better acceptance that this is a profession, not just in CIA. I'm talking about the Community. Around the world there are thousands of people involved and they are all not out to butter their own sides on this thing. And they are trying to help. And you've got to give them a chance. And you've got to work with them and you've got to trust them. As I said many years ago to somebody, I forget, and he put it in the newspaper and he shouldn't have, but he did, I used the phrase something about, "Someday somebody has got to trust somebody sometime" or something like that. And that may come out of all these damn hearings. Take a look at the Iran-Contra Hearings which really just blew you away on the kinds of things that were going on. And partly because the people involved in the White House staff had no concept of what the hell it was all about, what the intelligence business was all about, what covert action was all about. And when you had Senator, oh, who the hell was it, Senator Nunn, I think it was Senator Nunn, try to explain to Admiral Poindexter what the principle of plausible deniability was all about, so help me, Poindexter didn't have a cotton-pickin' clue! I sat here watching this thing and got sick. Watching it. He had no concept of what he was talking about. Senator Nunn knew a hell of a lot more than he did. And he was trying gently to lead him to the correct conclusion of what the definition is. And these guys were from hunger. Neither North nor Poindexter had ever had any experience in intelligence work at all. And here they were running this country's separate intelligence network. And it was unbelievable and frightening. Very frightening.

INTERVIEWER: You think also, in these lessons to be learned that the relationships between the Agency and the press -- of course, the Agency can only offer, I suppose offer -- and what I am suggesting here is how one develops trust between the Agency and the press.

MR. HALPERN: And the press?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, and the same thing maybe with the public.

MR. HALPERN: It's hard. It's hard. I think it's easier for something like AFIO to do that kind of creation of trust because AFIO has got no ax to grind. It's true, we know less and less about what's actually going on inside specific operations. And that is as it should be. Even though a guy might retire one day and come into AFIO the next day and start talking to the press, he has got enough sense not to get involved in specifics. And it took AFIO a long time to develop a spirit of cooperation and integrity with the media that are the, more or less, solid media, the honest media -- not the kooks -- to accept an AFIO statement about something in terms of, you know, good, bad, or indifferent. At first they didn't. It took us several years to develop this rapport and I give Dave Phillips a lot of credit for this -- whereby you talk to these guys and try to prove, you know, we've got no axes to grind. We're not trying to hide anything. We've got nothing to hide. And try to help them understand why some of these activities go on the way they do.

INTERVIEWER: And the same thing with the universities and colleges?

MR. HALPERN: You try. You try wherever you can. But that's a tough job. Particularly if you get universities and colleges that don't want to have anything to do with intelligence. That's a dirty thing. And there a lot of them like that. Well, you heard Bob Simmons at the AFIO convention talking about the use of academics and intelligence work and all that kind of stuff as if they are a separate breed of cat. Well, they are not, not in my opinion anyway, even though they might think they are. You know, dirty their linen and tar one academic, and no academic can go abroad anymore because everybody will assume that they are all intelligence agents. Nonsense. Nonsense. If you are going to Russia or you're going to Africa or wherever you go, if you start asking the wrong questions even if you are an honest-to-goodness, nothing more than a political scientist trying to do a research job in the middle of Wagadodo, you ask the wrong question there, you're going to get your head handed to you. You don't have to be in any way even near the United States Government. Or any other government. Sure, the easiest way the Russians have it is if they charge that everybody in the Peace Corps is a CIA agent, which they did at one time. And a lot of people believed them. Or everybody in the Red Cross is a CIA agent or everybody who is an academic from wherever is a CIA agent. And pretty soon, you know, everybody is a CIA agent. One of the problems I think Casey had with the Congressional Hill, and again this is sitting from the outside, is he kind of gave them the back of his hand, which automatically creates an adversarial situation. I don't know how much time he spent wining and dining them. I mean, having them out to breakfast. I remember Directors like Allen Dulles or Dick Helms or McCone and others used to have members of Congress up there on the Agency top floor at the dining room where they had lunch, or breakfast in the Director's dining room. And, you know, tried to talk to them man to man. And tell them a thing or two that they'd want to know and ask them questions. And try to work out some kind of dual relationship without having them become co-equal managers. That's the big problem. I've got no objection to telling a guy who is an elected Representative of the United States, if he is one of a handful of people picked by his colleagues to be privy to all the secrets they need to know to help run the place, within limits, without micro-managing the thing. Yeah, bring them into the thing. Tell them a thing or two. Try to teach them what it is all about and why it is important that they keep their bloody mouths shut.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think, again from the outside, in the last 10-12 years, in other words, since the investigation, do you think the Agency has changed much, has learned much?

MR. HALPERN: Well, if Casey is the example, no. I don't know what has happened since, but I would hope that somebody is trying to work out some kind of better relationship.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think Turner?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, I don't think Turner had any real, maybe he did, but I can't see it.

INTERVIEWER: It wasn't evident.

MR. HALPERN: I think Turner is such a blow-hard that I don't see how in the hell he could have done it, really. I watched and listened. I was up there several times when he was up there testifying on a number of bills, on charter legislation and things like that, which is a tough time to be around. I think that AFIO, with all due modesty, AFIO people like Walter Pforzheimer and Larry Houston and John Warner and others who had good connections on the Hill going back to the year one on the subject and who were believed up on the Hill and accepted on the Hill -- even some of the staffs couldn't dent that particular characteristic of these three guys -- I think they had a very good chance and they did influence some people because they were listened to. They didn't have to be accepted all the way through, obviously, but at least when these guys talked, people on the Hill, most of the staffers --

particularly on the Senate side, not the House side, which was a mess -- and the Senators themselves understood that these were three men of integrity and honesty. And who were trying to explain things to them. And who literally had no axes to grind. They weren't going to get a promotion out of this.

INTERVIEWER: And they trusted them.

MR. HALPERN: And they trusted them. And they were honest. And my own feeling is, you know, you don't lie to the Congress. Literally, you don't tell them a bald-faced lie. I would never have done what North did or what Abrams did. I mean, it was absolute nonsense. It's not only heresy, it's suicide. If you can't tell them, you say, "I can't tell you." Pure and simple. "I cannot tell you. And if you want to know, please talk to my boss. Ask my boss that question." Well, I know the law says that I am supposed to tell you. I've got to tell you. Well, okay sometime along the way you have to take a chance and say, "I can't tell you. And if I go to jail, I go to jail." But that is not easy to do, obviously. But you don't deliberately lie to these people. That's all. And the system is, if you've got to tell them and then they blow it, well, okay, it's on their head and you've blown it. This is one of the things about it is hard to be an intelligence officer in terms of, these days, trying to be sure you can convince the guy you are trying to recruit or the person you are trying to recruit, male or female, that you can protect their identity. And I'm not so sure that's possible these days. Maybe it is. I hope it is. I knew it was possible in the old days. But I'm not so sure after what I read so much these days whether it is or isn't.

INTERVIEWER: Which is again an important observation relative to the last 10-12 years.

/ / SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: EUR/NG (393) INFO: CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGEUR, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC,
EUDORECORD, EUR/COPS, EUR/DCCI, EUR/LGL, EUR/NGUK, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD,
ORMS/EUR, RYBAT, FILE, CIC/EUR (2/W)

98 2262774 ASO PAGE 001 IN 2262774
TOR: 301620Z JUL 98 LOND 19048

S E C R E T 301621Z JUL 98 STAFF

CITE LONDON 19048

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMITED DISSEM EUR/NG INFO CIC/EUR, EUR/NGUK, EUR/LGL, EUR/COPS

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED DECLASSIFICATION OF BSS DOCUMENT FOR RELEASE TO
* <JFK>BOARD

REF: DIRECTOR 908321 98 2225461

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE ADVISE NEXT STEPS ON REVIEW/RELEASE
OF BSS DOCUMENT PER PARA 3 IN LIGHT OF BSS' STRONG OBJECTIONS.

2. REF DOCUMENT DESCRIBING 1963 INTERVIEW BY A BSS OFFICER OF
MRS. LILLIAN SLOBODA WAS PASSED TO H1L/5 LIZ HOLEHOUSE MORNING 30
JULY. IN TWO SUBSEQUENT PHONE CONVERSATIONS, WHICH WERE FOLLOWED UP
WITH A TELEX, HOLEHOUSE ADVISED THAT BSS HAD REVIEWED THE 1963
DOCUMENT (CSCI-3/778,353) AND THE CASE, AND BSS DOES NOT/NOT CONCUR
*WITH THE RELEASE OF A SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT TO THE<JFK>
REVIEW BOARD. TEXT OF BSS TELEX 766 OF 30 JULY OUTLINING BSS'
OBJECTION TO RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE INFORMATION GIVEN TO THE SECURITY SERVICE BY MRS. SLOBODA,
AS RECORDED IN THE INTERVIEW REPORT, WAS GIVEN TO US IN CONFIDENCE
AND PASSED TO THE U.S. AUTHORITIES IN CONFIDENCE ALSO. ON THE
GROUNDS OF ITS AGE AND THE PERSONAL NATURE OF ITS CONTENT, WE WOULD
NOT PUBLICLY RELEASE SUCH A REPORT IN THE UK AND ASK THE U.S.
AUTHORITIES TO WITHHOLD IT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE IN THE USA."

3. PLEASE ADVISE FOR STATION AND BSS INFORMATION WHAT HAPPENS
NEXT WITH DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENT. HOLEHOUSE HAS
*ASKED WHETHER, IN FACT, WE CAN DENY RELEASE TO THE<JFK>REVIEW BOARD
GIVEN BSS OBJECTIONS. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER EXPLANATION
HQS CAN PROVIDE FOR BSS ON THE REVIEW BOARD'S INTEREST IN SOVIET
DEFECTORS. BSS IS SOMEWHAT PUZZLED BY THE REQUEST TO RELEASE THIS
*PARTICULAR DOCUMENT SINCE THERE IS NO APPARENT CONNECTION TO THE<JFK>
*<ASSASSINATION>OTHER THAN THE TIME FRAME.

4. FILE: NONE. DECL ON: X1, CL REASON: 1.5(C), CL BY: 0491759 DRV LIA 1-87.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: EUR/NG INFO: CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGEUR, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC,
EUDORECORD, EUR/COPS, EUR/DCCI, EUR/LGL, EUR/NGUK, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD,
RYBAT, FILE, CIC/EUR (2/P)

98 2225461 ASO PAGE 001
TOT: 272154Z JUL 98 DIRECTOR 908321

SECRET
STAFF 272154Z DIRECTOR 908321
TO: IMMEDIATE LONDON.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM EUR/NG INFO CIC/EUR, EUR/NGUK, EUR/LGL,
EUR/COPS

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED DECLASSIFICATION OF BSS DOCUMENT FOR RELEASE TO
*<JFK>BOARD

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE PASS PARAS 3-4 MESSAGE TO BSS AND ADVISE WHETHER THERE ARE SERIOUS OBJECTIONS TO RELEASE OF BSS DOCUMENT (BEING FAXED SEPARATELY).

2. HQS IS FAXING (OR E-MAILING, IF POSSIBLE) DOCUMENTS FOR STATION AND BSS REVIEW.

* 3. THE DO<JFK>REVIEW TEAM ADVISED EUR/NG THAT A 1963 BRITISH SECURITY SERVICE DOCUMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN ATTACHED TO A CIA DOCUMENT, IS SCHEDULED TO BE RELEASED AT THE END OF THIS WEEK (31
*JULY) TO THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>REVIEW BOARD. THIS DOCUMENT (CSCI-3/778,353) DESCRIBES A MARCH 1963 INTERVIEW BY BSS IN HALIFAX OF LILLIAN SLOBODA, WIFE OF VLADIMIR O. SLOBODA, WHO WAS A DEFECTOR TO THE USSR. THE BOARD IS INTERESTED IN DOCUMENTS IN CIA POSSESSION PERTAINING TO DEFECTORS TO THE SOVIET UNION AROUND THE
*TIME OF OSWALD AND THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> EVEN THOUGH CIA OBTAINED THE DOCUMENT FROM A FOREIGN FRIENDLY SERVICE, IT WOULD THUS BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DENY RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENT IN FULL.

4. WITHIN THAT CONTEXT, EUR/NG REVIEWED THE DOCUMENT AND PROPOSES REDACTION OF ALL REFERENCES TO BSS, CIA AND FBI (LEGATT LONDON RECEIVED A COPY OF THE INTERVIEW RESULTS IN 1963). THE PASSAGES WE WANT TO REDACT ARE HIGHLIGHTED ON THE FAXED COPIES WITH BRACKETS. WE CERTAINLY WILL FORWARD TO THE DO REVIEW TEAM ANY ADDITIONAL DELETIONS REQUESTED BY STATION AND/OR BSS. ABSENT THESE FEW PASSAGES ABOUT US/UK INTELLIGENCE, THE DOCUMENT DOES NOT APPEAR TO AFFECT CURRENT CIA EQUITIES; ON ITS FACE, IT ALSO DOES NOT APPEAR DAMAGING TO UK INTERESTS. ALTHOUGH WE ARE EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION GIVEN TO US BY

FOREIGN SERVICES, RELEASE OF A SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT WOULD NOT PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE OUR LIAISON RELATIONSHIP OR COMPROMISE SENSITIVE SOURCES/METHODS.

5. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE A RESPONSE BY HQS COB THURSDAY, 30 JULY, SO WE HAVE FRIDAY FOR DISCUSSIONS IF BSS HAS SERIOUS OBJECTIONS TO RELEASING THIS DOCUMENT IN EVEN A SANITIZED FORMAT.

6.. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2051283, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0101020330
ORIG: EUR/NG(XEASTLI,39474); REL: EUR/NG (SHAFFER).

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 98-1333007 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CE/EXO INFO: CE/LGL, CE/R/IO, CE/ST, CE/STR, CE/STSWE, CE/WUMB, CEDORECORD, DC/CE, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, CE/R, CE/W, (3/P)

98 1333007 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 012139Z MAY 98 DIRECTOR 795035

~~SECRET~~
STAFF 012139Z DIRECTOR 795035
TO: PRIORITY MOSCOW INFO MINSK.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CE/EXO INFO CE/R, CE/R/IO, DC/CE, CE/LGL, CE/WUMB

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

*SUBJECT: <ASSASSINATIONS>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD AND DEPT OF STATE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN APPROACHING FSB/SVR FOR OSWALD FILE

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: WOULD APPRECIATE STATION THOUGHTS ON *BELOW PROPOSAL TO APPROACH FSB/SVR SEEKING ACCESS TO FILE ON<LEE> *<HARVEY ((OSWALD)).>

* 2. THE<ASSASSINATIONS>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD (ARRB), ESTABLISHED BY PUBLIC LAW 102-526 IN OCTOBER 1992, HAS THE PRESIDENTIAL MANDATE TO IDENTIFY, SECURE, AND MAKE AVAILABLE ALL *RECORDS RELATED TO THE<ASSASSINATION>OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY.> THE IDENTIFIED (DECLASSIFIED) RECORDS WILL BE HOUSED IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION. CE HAS HAD SOME DEALINGS WITH THE ARRB, BEGINNING WITH THEIR REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO THE RESTRICTED MOSCOW STATION HISTORY FROM THE 1960'S. THE ARRB'S PREMISE IS TO DECLASSIFY AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE, EVEN *DOCUMENTS ONLY MOST TANGENTIALLY RELATED TO THE<KENNEDY> *<ASSASSINATION.>

3. PL 102-526 SPECIFICALLY STATES:
"THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD CONTACT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RUSSIA AND SEEK THE DISCLOSURE OF ALL RECORDS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE RECORDS OF THE KOMITET GOSUDARSTVANNOY BEZOPASNOSTI (KGB) AND THE GLAVNOYE *RAZVEDYVATELNOYE UPRAVIENIYE (GRU), RELEVANT TO THE<ASSASSINATION> *OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY,>AND CONTACT ANY OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENT *THAT MAY HOLD INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE<ASSASSINATION>OF *<PRESIDENT KENNEDY>AND SEEK DISCLOSURE OF SUCH INFORMATION."

4. THE ARRB HAS REQUESTED STATE AND AGENCY HELP IN GETTING ACCESS TO THE KGB RECORDS ON OSWALD. THE RECORDS, ORIGINALLY HELD

~~SECRET~~

*IN MINSK, WERE FLOWN TO MOSCOW IN '63 FOLLOWING THE<ASSASSINATION,> THEN RETURNED TO MINSK WHERE THEY ARE STORED TODAY. WHEN APPROACHED BY STATE AND THE ARRB, THE BELARUSIANS HAVE SHOWN SAMPLES FROM THE FILE BUT HAVE NOT AGREED TO ARRANGEMENTS TO COPY. THE ARRB CHARTER EXPIRES ON 30 SEPT 98 AND THE OLD KGB FILE(S) IS A MAJOR OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENT. STATE HAS MANAGED TO GET THE SUBJECT AS THE NUMBER ONE TALKING POINT ON VICE PRES GORE'S RECENT CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS. THE BELARUSIAN RESPONSE WAS TO TRY IT AGAIN LOCALLY IN MINSK, OFFERING INCREASED "COPY FEES".

5. THE ARRB CHAIRMAN HAS COME BACK TO STATE TO ASK THEY CONTACT THE AGENCY WITH THE FOLLOWING REQUEST: CAN THE STATION CHECK WITH THE FSB/SVR TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RUSSIANS RETAINED *A COPY OF THE<LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>KGB FILE IN MOSCOW? CAN WE GET ACCESS TO THE FILE AND, PRESUMABLY, OBTAIN A COPY FOR THE ARRB? WE NOTE THAT THE ARRB WILL PROBABLY PUSH HARD TO DECLASSIFY THE RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS AS WELL. OBVIOUSLY SUCH A REQUEST COULD HAVE SEVERAL IMPLICATIONS WHICH WE MUST CAREFULLY CONSIDER, I.E., THE RUSSIANS MIGHT ASK FOR FILES OF THE ROSENBERGS OR OTHER NOTORIOUS PERSONALITIES. THE HQS CONTEXT IS THAT WE ARE GRAPPLING WITH THE ARRB ON A VARIETY OF OTHER SERIOUS DECLASSIFICATION/DISCLOSURE ISSUES AND WE MIGHT BE ABLE IN A BETTER NEGOTIATING POSITION IF WE COULD BE SEEN AS ASSISTING THEIR EFFORTS TO GET THE OSWALD FILE.

6. OBVIOUSLY SUCH AN ACTION HAS TREMENDOUS IMPLICATIONS AND WE WELCOME A FULL DIALOGUE FROM STATION ON THIS MATTER.

REGARDS.

6. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 714549, CL REASON: 1.5(D), DECL ON: X5, DRV FROM: LIA 3-82.

CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100952954
ORIG: CE/EXO(CHENGMD,39263); AUTH: AC/CE/R (BANNERMAN); COORD: C/CE/R/IO (ZERRUSEN), C/CE/WUMB (WARD); INFO: CE/LGL (WATSON); REL: DC/CE (LEVEN).

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

MHFNO: 98-0828136 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CE/WUMB INFO: CE/LGL, CEDORECORD, DC/CE, MDSX, NODISSEM,
ODPD, PCS/CAB, RYBAT, FILE, C/PCS, CE/W, CED/CIC (4/P)

98 0828136 ASR PAGE 001
TOT: 131832Z MAR 98 DIRECTOR 728291

SECRET
STAFF 131832Z DIRECTOR 728291
TO: MINSK.

FROM: NO DISSEM CE/WUMB INFO CE/W, CE/LGL, CED/CIC, PCS/CAB,
DC/CE, OGC

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT JYVAPOROUS

*SUBJECT: <ASSASSINATION>RECORD REVIEW BOARD (ARRB) MEETINGS WITH BKGB.

REF: MINSK 17622 98 0748996

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE SEE BELOW.

2. REF WAS REVIEWED BY CE/LEGAL AND DISCUSSED WITH OGC/LITIGATION STAFF. BASED UPON THIS REVIEW, STATION MAY AGAIN
*FACILITATE A MEETING BETWEEN THE BKGB AND THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD
*REVIEW BOARD (ARRB) WHO IS LOOKING INTO THE<ASSASSINATION>OF
*PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY,>AND THE TIME<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>SPENT IN MINSK. HOWEVER, STATION SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN MEETINGS OR ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HAS BEEN DONE IN THE PAST AND IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR ROLE IN THIS MATTER.

3. ACCORDING TO REF, ARRB MEMBERS MET WITH THE FOLLOWING BKGB OFFICIALS IN OCTOBER 1996. TRACES, PER REF REQUEST, ALSO FOLLOW:

A. ALEKSANDR ((ABLAMEIKA)), PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, BKGB: ALEKSANDR VIKTOROVICH ((ABLAMEYKO)) (201-1479298), BORN 31 AUG 1961, MINSK, TRANSLATOR/REFERENT, BKGB.

B. GENNADIY ((NARKEVICH)), A DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, BKGB: AGREE WITH REF THAT THIS IS PROBABLY GENNADIY SEMYNOVICH ((NARKOVICH)), VARIANT NARKEVICH (201-1482358) WHO HAS SERVED AS CHIEF OF THE USA DEPARTMENT AND CHIEF OF THE KGB SECTION FOR MOGILEV REGION. FYI, WE FOUND TWO OTHER BELARUSSIANS NAMED GENNADIY NARKEVICH (OR VARIATIONS THERE OF). THE ARE:

(1) GENNADIY V. ((NARKOVSICH)) VARIATION ((NARKEVICH)), EXPORT CONTROL OFFICIAL AND DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE

SECRET

STATE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS (SCFER) (DOI: 1993-94).

(2) GENNADIY VIKENTOVICH ((NARKEVICH)) VARIATION ((NARKEWICZ)), BORN 3 JAN 1938, COUNSELOR BELARUSSIAN EMBASSY, WARSAW (DOI: 1996).

C. LEV ((PIMENAU)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI), BKGB: NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES.

D. ALEKSANDR ((VERAS)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI), BKGB: NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES.

4. FILE: 227-002-001; 201-1482358. INDEX: ALL-NAMES. CL BY: 0536008, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100912330
ORIG: CE/WUMB(BOYERJU, 52904); AUTH: CE/W (DYMAN); COORD: CE/LGL (WATSON); REL: CE/W (DYMAN).

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 98-0748996 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: CE/WUMB (276) INFO: CE/LGL, CEDORECORD, DC/CE, DCCE/OPS, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/CE, PCS/CAB, FILE, C/PCS, CE/W, CED/CIC (4/W)

98 0748996 ASR PAGE 001 IN 0748996
TOR: 061335Z MAR 98 MNSK 17622

~~S E C R E T~~ 061332Z MAR 98 STAFF

CITE MINSK 17622

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT DISSEM CE/WUMB INFO CE/W, CED/CIC, PCS/CAB, DCCE/OPS, DC/CE, CE/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL JYVAPOROUS

*SUBJECT: BKGB ACCESS SUPPORT TO USG<ASSASSINATION>RECORD REVIEW BOARD

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE SEE BELOW; TRACES ON SUBJS IN PARA 5; GUIDANCE ON ARRB-BKGB ACCESS REQUEST.

2. ON MORNING 6 MAR 98 POLECON OFFICER AND DCM MET WITH COS TO
ALERT HIM TO POSSIBLE NEED FOR STATION SUPPORT TO FACILITATE FUTURE
MEETING(S) WITH BKGB BY EMBASSY OR OTHER USG PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN
*FOLLOWUP INQUERIES ON BEHALF OF USG'S<ASSASSINATION>RECORD REVIEW
BOARD (ARRB). ARRB IS CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED AND FUNDED BODY
*LOOKING AT ALL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO<ASSASSINATION>OF PRESIDENT<JOHN>
*F.<KENNEDY.> OF INTEREST IN MINSK ARE RECORDS HELD BY THE BKGB
*RELATED TO<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>AND THE TIME HE SPENT HERE. ARRB
APPARENTLY WANTS COPIES OF ALL THESE BKGB RECORDS TO MAKE THEM
AVAILABLE FOR SCHOLARLY REVIEW AND RESEARCH PURPOSES.

3. PER POLECON OFFICER, THE ARRB CHAIRMAN (A RESPECTED RETIRED FEDERAL JUDGE) HAD REPORTEDLY MADE INQUERIES HERE IN OCTOBER 1996, AT WHICH TIME STATION HAD, WITH HQS CONCURRENCE, FACILITATED BKGB MEETINGS (BUT STATION WAS APPARENTLY DIRECTED BY HQS TO AVOID ALL OTHER INVOLVEMENT). BKGB TOOK REQUEST FOR COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS UNDER REVIEW, BUT NO DOCUMENTS WERE EVER PROVIDED. WHEN PRESSED, BKGB SAID THEY WOULD ANSWER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, BUT THEIR "PRIVACY LAWS" WOULD NOT LET THEM RELEASE RECORDS WHICH RELATE TO LIVING BELARUSSIANS (PER POLECON, THIS SPEFICALLY INCLUDED OSWALD'S FORMER WIFE, MARINA). ARRB PRESENTED LENGTHY LIST OF DETAILED, LEGALISTIC, AND (WHAT POLECON OFFICER, HERSELF A LAWYER, DESCRIBED AS) ONEROUS QUERIES. BKGB NEVER RESPONDED.

~~SECRET~~

4. EMBASSY UNDERSTOOD THAT LEGISLATIVE MANDATE FOR ARRB HAD EXPIRED IN FALL 1997, SO DID NOT FOLLOWUP FURTHER. HOWEVER, MANDATE WAS APPARENTLY EXTENDED TO FALL 1998, AND ARRB'S INTEREST IN BKGB INFORMATION HAS BEEN REACTIVATED. ARRB TEAM MAY WISH TO COME TO MINSK TO TRY AGAIN TO OBTAIN THESE RECORDS FROM BKGB, OR AT LEAST GET EMBASSY TO REVITALIZE EFFORTS TO DO SO.

5. FOR THE RECORD (AND HQS TRACES), AT THE TIME OF THE ARRB'S OCT 1996 MEETINGS WITH BKGB, ARRB MET PRINCIPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING BKGB OFFICIALS:

-- ALEKSANDR ((VERAS)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI)
-- LEV ((PIMENAU)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI)
-- ALEKSANDR ((ABLAMEIKA)), PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPT.

AT SOME POINT DURING MEETINGS THEY WERE JOINED BY:

-- GENNADIY ((NARKEVICH)) (PHONETIC), A DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, BKGB. (THIS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY IDEN.)

REQUEST HQS TRACES ON FOUR BKGB OFFICERS ABOVE.

6. COMPLICATING ALL THIS IS FACT THAT AT SOME POINT, AUTHOR NORMAN MAILER (APPARENTLY WITH EMBASSY ACCESS ASSISTANCE) WAS GIVEN ACCESS TO (SOME/ALL? OF) THE BKGB'S OSWALD RECORDS, WHICH MAILER REFERS TO EXTENSIVELY IN HIS BOOK "OSWALD'S TALE: AN AMERICAN MYSTERY," PUBLISHED IN 1995. AFTER THE FACT, PER POLECON OFFICER, BKGB REALIZED THAT MAILER MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROFITS FROM THIS BOOK, AND THAT THE BKGB HAD GOTTEN NOTHING FOR PROVIDING ACCESS TO THEIR RECORDS, THUS THEY REPORTEDLY FELT THEY HAD BEEN CHEATED.

7. BALL IS NOW IN STATE'S COURT, BUT THEY AND EMBASSY EXPECT THAT REQUEST WILL BE FORTHCOMING FROM ARRB IN NEAR FUTURE, AND THENCE TO STATION, TO FACILITATE MEETINGS WITH BKGB ON THIS MATTER. TO BE A BIT AHEAD OF THE CURVE, REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE AND AUTHORIZATION AS APPROPRIATE.

8. FILE: 227-002-001; 201-1482358. DECL ON: X1. CL REASON: 1.5(C). CL BY: 0702653. DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

Date: 01/04/00
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10326-10014
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PROJECT FILES

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : WITHHELD
TO : DIRECTOR
TITLE : WITHHELD
DATE : 02/25/98
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : JFK ASSASS.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/03/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK-M-11:F1 1999.02.03.11:31:38:873120: CIA CORRESPONDENCE RE ARRB

CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENT

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: NE/NAOE (273) INFO: AF/EXO, AF/HG, C/NE/NAO, CIC/AF, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGAF, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC, LIMITED, MDSX, NE/NAOCI, NE/NAORE, NEDORECORD, ODPD, ORMS/AF, RYBAT, FILE, AF/OPS (3/W)

98 0651289 ASR PAGE 001 IN 0651289
TOR: 251439Z FEB 98 ADDI 22385

SECRET 251436Z FEB 98 STAFF

CITE ADDIS ABABA 22385

TO: DIRECTOR, CAIRO.

FOR: LIMITED DISSEM NE/NAOE INFO NE/NAORE, NE/NAOCI, AF/HG, AF/OPS, CIC/AF

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT FCSTANDARD

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF RECENT CONTACTS WITH FCSTANDARD/32

REF: A. DIRECTOR 699262 98 0626779
B. CAIRO 85035 98 0176920

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLS SEE PARA 2.

2. REF A WAS USEFUL AND MUCH APPRECIATED. WITH CAIRO STATION'S CONCURRENCE, C/O TONY P. RAGL WOULD LIKE REF A OFFER OF BACKGROUND INFO ON SUDAN, AND HQS TALKING POINTS ON OTHER TOPICS TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJ. C/O WILL PROVIDE ASSESSMENT OF FCSTANDARD/32 (SUBJ) SEPARATELY. C/O AND SUBJ HAVE BEGUN DISCUSSING SUDAN AND LIBYA, AND SUBJ HAS BEGUN VISITING C/O'S RESIDENCE (REPORTED SEPARATELY). PLS ENSURE REF B IS FILED IN SUBJ'S FILE (IT WAS INADVERTENTLY FILED AS FCSTANDARD/1).

3. 12 FEBRUARY: SUBJ PHONED C/O AT HOME AND, WITHOUT MENTIONING NAMES OR PLACES, RECOMMENDED A MEETING. C/O MET SUBJ FROM 2330-0200 HOURS AT CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB. SUBJ WAS NOT SURE IF A SAUDI INTEL OFFICER WAS POSTED TO ADDIS. SUBJ ASKED IF C/O LEARNED ANYTHING ABOUT A VISITING RUSSIAN DELEGATION (C/O HAD NOT, SEE PARA 5). SUBJ SPOKE OF JOGGING ON LOCAL STREETS AND C/O GAVE HIM A CAN OF PEPPER SPRAY TO WARD OFF STRAY DOGS.

4. 16 FEBRUARY: U.S. EMBASSY RECEPTION: C/O INVITED SUBJ TO U.S. EMBASSY'S NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION (MOVED FROM 4 JULY TO 16 FEB DUE TO HEAVY LOCAL RAINS IN JULY). SUBJ POINTED OUT ISRAELI SECOND SECRETARY RAMI ((HATAN)), ADDING HATAN HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED IN ADDIS AND SUBJ THOUGHT HATAN WAS SHIN BET AND WORKED WITH ISRAELI SECOND SECRETARY ELIEZER "ELI" ((YITZHAKY)).

5. 19 FEBRUARY: SUBJ PHONED C/O AT EMBASSY, SUGGESTED MEETING

AT CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB (0030-0330). SUBJ PAID FOR DRINKS. HIS SPOUSE MAY RETURN TO ADDIS CIRCA EARLY MAY. SUBJ SAID HE WAS DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM EGYPTIAN BUSINESSMAN SAFAH (PHONETIC) AND ADDED, "BEFORE I LEAVE ADDIS, I HAVE A LOT TO TELL YOU. I'LL TELL YOU WHEN THE STORY IS FINISHED. A LOT GOES ON HERE." SUBJ MENTIONED ISRAELI TRADE FAIR AT SHERATON HOTEL 25-26 FEBRUARY (THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC COUNSELOR WAS INVITED). REGARDING RAMI HATAN, SUBJ SAID HE WAS AWARE HATAN WAS SINGLE, LIVED IN BOLE AREA, WAS A FIRST TOUR OFFICER. THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION (PARA 3) WAS HERE FOR ETHIOPIAN TANK (T-55) REFURBISHMENT; RECENT ISRAELI DELEGATION WAS HERE TO BID ON T-55 AND AIRCRAFT REFURBISHMENT (CORROBORATED BY 2/00/1607-98, 191934Z FEB 98; AND 2/00/1584-98, 191609Z FEB 98). SIX OROMO OPPOSITIONISTS WERE EXTRADITED FROM DJIBOUTI TO ETHIOPIA. FOREIGN MINISTER MOUSSA IS VISITING ADDIS WEEK OF 23 FEBRUARY; HE IS A WOMANIZER AND MAY VISIT CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB. HE HAS THREE BODYGUARDS, BUT THEY ARE NOT "PROFESSIONALS." SUBJ PAID EQUIVALENT US$ 60 TO BLOOD TEST LOCAL GIRLFRIEND HELEN, "SHE'S ALL RIGHT." REGARDING SALARY, SUBJ IS PAID "PRETTY WELL" AND WORKS HARD TO "EARN THE PAY." UPON PARTING, SUBJ SAID, "SLEEP WELL, I WON'T SAY HAVE NICE DREAMS BECAUSE WE (I.E., INTEL OFFICERS) DO NOT HAVE NICE DREAMS."

6. 20 FEBRUARY: LATE DINNER WITH SUBJ AT LION CLUB, THEN CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB. TWO BUSINESSMEN (A SAUDI NAMED SALAH LNU WHO DEPARTS ADDIS WEEK 23 FEBRUARY, AND A JORDANIAN NAMED MAHMOUD LNU, BOTH CONCORDE REGULARS) JOINED SUBJ AND C/O. BUSINESSMEN SPOKE OF EXPORTING ETHIOPIAN CATTLE TO SAUDI ARABIA, ALSO SPOKE OF HORSES AND CAMELS. SUBJ'S EMBASSY OFFICE IS BEING REMODELED BY AN ETHIOPIAN INTERIOR DESIGNER, A SUBORDINATE WATCHES THE DESIGNER AT ALL TIMES. SUBJ WILL HAVE C/O OVER TO THE OFFICE ONCE IT IS FINISHED. SUBJ WILL BE BUSY WEEK OF 23 FEBRUARY DUE TO VISIT OF MOUSSA.

7. 21 FEBRUARY: C/O VISITED SUBJ'S HOME AND OFFICE (WHICH WAS BEING PAINTED; HAD ONLY CHAIRS AND A BOOKCASE; MAHMOUD LNU, AN EGYPTIAN, SUPERVISED ETHIOPIAN PAINTER). IN SUBJ'S LIVING ROOM WERE MEMENTOS FROM THE U.S. MARINE CORPS BALL (AMERICAN FLAG PLACE SETTINGS, CHAMPAGNE FLUTES). FCSTANDARD CHIEFS POSTED ABROAD HAVE USE OF A GOVERNMENT VEHICLE, AS DOES SUBJ. C/O APOLOGIZED FOR NOT PHONING, SUBJ REPLIED C/O COULD CALL AT HIS HOME ANYTIME, UNANNOUNCED. HE UNDERSTOOD C/O'S AVERSION TO PHONES, AND ADDED ETHIOPIANS TAP DIPLOMATS' OFFICE AND HOME PHONES. DURING CONVERSATION WITH C/O, SUBJ TURNED ON TAPE PLAYER FOR SOUND MASKING AND EXPLAINED HIS HOME HAD NOT YET BEEN TESTED FOR BUGS (A SIMPLE TEST IS TURN OFF ALL APPLIANCES AND CHECK ELECTRIC METER; THERE IS ALSO A MORE SOPHISTICATED TEST). SUBJ PHONED SPOUSE IN CAIRO AND HAD C/O SPEAK WITH HER. SUBJ GAVE C/O TWO SMALL GIFTS (MARBLE HEAD OF NEFERTITI AND PAPYRUS PAPER PAINTING). SUBJ'S BROTHER-IN-LAW (A POLICE MAJOR) IS NO GOOD, HE ASKS HIS FATHER-IN-LAW FOR MONEY. SAUDI ATTACHE WADIE A. AL-((THAGAFI)) MAY BE THE SAUDI INTEL OFFICER IN ADDIS, BUT SUBJ IS NOT YET SURE. ISRAEL IS NO GOOD; ISRAEL WAS *BEHIND THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> SUBJ CHEATED ON HIS WIFE ONLY THREE TIMES (ALL IN ADDIS IN THE LAST EIGHT MONTHS; HE FEELS GUILTY BUT REMAINS FOND OF HIS LOCAL GIRLFRIEND HELEN, WHOM HE DOES NOT BRING HOME FOR FEAR HIS HOUSEHOLD HELP WOULD TELL HIS SPOUSE). OWNER OF CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB SMUGGLES MERCURY (NFI), HAS GOOD CONNECTIONS AMONG ISRAELIS AND ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT.

---

8. 22 FEBRUARY: A LENGTHY, SUBSTANTIVE CONTACT AT C/O'S RESIDENCE WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

9. FILE: FCSTANDARD/32; 027-009-095. CL BY: 2195330. CL REASON: 1.5(C). DECL ON: X1. DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 98-0650682 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

SECRET ERP:

STAFF

ACTION: NE/NAOE (272) INFO: AF/EXO, AF/HG, C/NE/NAO, CIC/AF, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGAF, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC, LIMITED, MDSX, NE/NAOCI, NE/NAORE, NEDORECORD, ODPD, ORMS/AF, RYBAT, FILE, AF/OPS (3/W)

98 0650682 ASR PAGE 001 IN 0650682
TOR: 251339Z FEB 98 ADDI 22381

S E C R E T 251337Z FEB 98 STAFF

CITE ADDIS ABABA 22381

TO: DIRECTOR, CAIRO.

FOR: LIMITED DISSEM NE/NAOE INFO NE/NAORE, NE/NAOCI, AF/HG, AF/OPS, CIC/AF

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT FCSTANDARD

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF RECENT CONTACTS WITH FCSTANDARD/32

REF: A. DIRECTOR 699262 98 0626779
B. CAIRO 85035 98 0176920

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLS SEE PARA 2.

2. REF A WAS USEFUL AND MUCH APPRECIATED. WITH CAIRO STATION'S CONCURRENCE, C/O TONY P. RAGL WOULD LIKE REF A OFFER OF BACKGROUND INFO ON SUDAN, AND HQS TALKING POINTS ON OTHER TOPICS TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJ. C/O WILL PROVIDE ASSESSMENT OF FCSTANDARD/32 (SUBJ) SEPARATELY. C/O AND SUBJ HAVE BEGUN DISCUSSING SUDAN AND LIBYA, AND SUBJ HAS BEGUN VISITING C/O'S RESIDENCE (REPORTED SEPARATELY). PLS ENSURE REF B IS FILED IN SUBJ'S FILE (IT WAS INADVERTENTLY FILED AS FCSTANDARD/1).

3. 12 FEBRUARY: SUBJ PHONED C/O AT HOME AND, WITHOUT MENTIONING NAMES OR PLACES, RECOMMENDED A MEETING. C/O MET SUBJ FROM 2330-0200 HOURS AT CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB. SUBJ WAS NOT SURE IF A SAUDI INTEL OFFICER WAS POSTED TO ADDIS. SUBJ ASKED IF C/O LEARNED ANYTHING ABOUT A VISITING RUSSIAN DELEGATION (C/O HAD NOT, SEE PARA 5). SUBJ SPOKE OF JOGGING ON LOCAL STREETS AND C/O GAVE HIM A CAN OF PEPPER SPRAY TO WARD OFF STRAY DOGS.

4. 16 FEBRUARY: U.S. EMBASSY RECEPTION: C/O INVITED SUBJ TO U.S. EMBASSY'S NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION (MOVED FROM 4 JULY TO 16 FEB DUE TO HEAVY LOCAL RAINS IN JULY). SUBJ POINTED OUT ISRAELI SECOND SECRETARY RAMI ((HATAN)), ADDING HATAN HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED IN ADDIS AND SUBJ THOUGHT HATAN WAS SHIN BET AND WORKED WITH ISRAELI SECOND SECRETARY ELIEZER "ELI" ((YITZHAKY)).

5. 19 FEBRUARY: SUBJ PHONED C/O AT EMBASSY, SUGGESTED MEETING

AT CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB (0030-0330). SUBJ PAID FOR DRINKS. HIS SPOUSE MAY RETURN TO ADDIS CIRCA EARLY MAY. SUBJ SAID HE WAS DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM EGYPTIAN BUSINESSMAN SAFAH (PHONETIC) AND ADDED, "BEFORE I LEAVE ADDIS, I HAVE A LOT TO TELL YOU. I'LL TELL YOU WHEN THE STORY IS FINISHED. A LOT GOES ON HERE." SUBJ MENTIONED ISRAELI TRADE FAIR AT SHERATON HOTEL 25-26 FEBRUARY (THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC COUNSELOR WAS INVITED). REGARDING RAMI HATAN, SUBJ SAID HE WAS AWARE HATAN WAS SINGLE, LIVED IN BOLE AREA, WAS A FIRST TOUR OFFICER. THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION (PARA 3) WAS HERE FOR ETHIOPIAN TANK (T-55) REFURBISHMENT; RECENT ISRAELI DELEGATION WAS HERE TO BID ON T-55 AND AIRCRAFT REFURBISHMENT (CORROBORATED BY 2/00/1607-98, 191934Z FEB 98; AND 2/00/1584-98, 191609Z FEB 98). SIX OROMO OPPOSITIONISTS WERE EXTRADITED FROM DJIBOUTI TO ETHIOPIA. FOREIGN MINISTER MOUSSA IS VISITING ADDIS WEEK OF 23 FEBRUARY; HE IS A WOMANIZER AND MAY VISIT CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB. HE HAS THREE BODYGUARDS, BUT THEY ARE NOT "PROFESSIONALS." SUBJ PAID EQUIVALENT US$ 60 TO BLOOD TEST LOCAL GIRLFRIEND HELEN, "SHE'S ALL RIGHT." REGARDING SALARY, SUBJ IS PAID "PRETTY WELL" AND WORKS HARD TO "EARN THE PAY." UPON PARTING, SUBJ SAID, "SLEEP WELL, I WON'T SAY HAVE NICE DREAMS BECAUSE WE (I.E., INTEL OFFICERS) DO NOT HAVE NICE DREAMS."

6. 20 FEBRUARY: LATE DINNER WITH SUBJ AT LION CLUB, THEN CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB. TWO BUSINESSMEN (A SAUDI NAMED SALAH LNU WHO DEPARTS ADDIS WEEK 23 FEBRUARY, AND A JORDANIAN NAMED MAHMOUD LNU, BOTH CONCORDE REGULARS) JOINED SUBJ AND C/O. BUSINESSMEN SPOKE OF EXPORTING ETHIOPIAN CATTLE TO SAUDI ARABIA, ALSO SPOKE OF HORSES AND CAMELS. SUBJ'S EMBASSY OFFICE IS BEING REMODELED BY AN ETHIOPIAN INTERIOR DESIGNER, A SUBORDINATE WATCHES THE DESIGNER AT ALL TIMES. SUBJ WILL HAVE C/O OVER TO THE OFFICE ONCE IT IS FINISHED. SUBJ WILL BE BUSY WEEK OF 23 FEBRUARY DUE TO VISIT OF MOUSSA.

7. 21 FEBRUARY: C/O VISITED SUBJ'S HOME AND OFFICE (WHICH WAS BEING PAINTED; HAD ONLY CHAIRS AND A BOOKCASE; MAHMOUD LNU, AN EGYPTIAN, SUPERVISED ETHIOPIAN PAINTER). FCSTANDARD CHIEFS POSTED ABROAD HAVE USE OF A GOVERNMENT VEHICLE, AS DOES SUBJ. ETHIOPIANS TAP DIPLOMATS' OFFICE AND HOME PHONES. DURING CONVERSATION WITH C/O, SUBJ TURNED ON TAPE PLAYER FOR SOUND MASKING AND EXPLAINED HIS HOME HAD NOT YET BEEN TESTED FOR BUGS (A SIMPLE TEST IS TURN OFF ALL APPLIANCES AND CHECK ELECTRIC METER; THERE IS ALSO A MORE SOPHISTICATED TEST). SUBJ PHONED SPOUSE IN CAIRO AND HAD C/O SPEAK WITH HER. SUBJ GAVE C/O TWO SMALL GIFTS (MARBLE HEAD OF NEFERTITI AND PAPYRUS PAPER PAINTING). SUBJ'S BROTHER-IN-LAW (A POLICE MAJOR) IS NO GOOD, HE ASKS HIS FATHER-IN-LAW FOR MONEY. SAUDI ATTACHE WADIE A. AL-((THAGAFI)) MAY BE THE SAUDI INTEL OFFICER IN ADDIS, BUT SUBJ
*IS NOT YET SURE. ISRAEL IS NO GOOD; ISRAEL WAS BEHIND THE<JFK>
*<ASSASSINATION.> SUBJ CHEATED ON HIS WIFE ONLY THREE TIMES (ALL IN ADDIS IN THE LAST EIGHT MONTHS; HE FEELS GUILTY BUT REMAINS FOND OF HIS LOCAL GIRLFRIEND HELEN, WHOM HE DOES NOT BRING HOME FOR FEAR HIS HOUSEHOLD HELP WOULD TELL HIS SPOUSE). OWNER OF CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB SMUGGLES MERCURY (NFI), HAS GOOD CONNECTIONS AMONG ISRAELIS AND ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT.

8. 22 FEBRUARY: A LENGTHY, SUBSTANTIVE CONTACT AT C/O'S RESIDENCE WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

9. FILE: FCSTANDARD/32; 027-009-095. CL BY: 2195330. CL

REASON: 1.5(C). DECL ON: X1. DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 98-0650682 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET ERP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: NE/NAOE (272) INFO: AF/EXO, AF/HG, C/NE/NAO, CIC/AF, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGAF, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC, LIMITED, MDSX, NE/NAOCI, NE/NAORE, NEDORECORD, ODPD, ORMS/AF, RYBAT, FILE, AF/OPS (3/W)

98 0650682 ASR PAGE 001 IN 0650682
TOR: 251339Z FEB 98 ADDI 22381

SECRET 251337Z FEB 98 STAFF

CITE ADDIS ABABA 22381

TO: DIRECTOR, CAIRO.

FOR: LIMITED DISSEM NE/NAOE INFO NE/NAORE, NE/NAOCI, AF/HG, AF/OPS, CIC/AF

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT FCSTANDARD

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF RECENT CONTACTS WITH FCSTANDARD/32

REF: A. DIRECTOR 699262 98 0626779
B. CAIRO 85035 98 0176920

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLS SEE PARA 2.

2. REF A WAS USEFUL AND MUCH APPRECIATED. WITH CAIRO STATION'S CONCURRENCE, C/O TONY P. RAGL WOULD LIKE REF A OFFER OF BACKGROUND INFO ON SUDAN, AND HQS TALKING POINTS ON OTHER TOPICS TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJ. C/O WILL PROVIDE ASSESSMENT OF FCSTANDARD/32 (SUBJ) SEPARATELY. C/O AND SUBJ HAVE BEGUN DISCUSSING SUDAN AND LIBYA, AND SUBJ HAS BEGUN VISITING C/O'S RESIDENCE (REPORTED SEPARATELY). PLS ENSURE REF B IS FILED IN SUBJ'S FILE (IT WAS INADVERTENTLY FILED AS FCSTANDARD/1).

3. 12 FEBRUARY: SUBJ PHONED C/O AT HOME AND, WITHOUT MENTIONING NAMES OR PLACES, RECOMMENDED A MEETING. C/O MET SUBJ FROM 2330-0200 HOURS AT CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB. SUBJ WAS NOT SURE IF A SAUDI INTEL OFFICER WAS POSTED TO ADDIS. SUBJ ASKED IF C/O LEARNED ANYTHING ABOUT A VISITING RUSSIAN DELEGATION (C/O HAD NOT, SEE PARA 5). SUBJ SPOKE OF JOGGING ON LOCAL STREETS AND C/O GAVE HIM A CAN OF PEPPER SPRAY TO WARD OFF STRAY DOGS.

4. 16 FEBRUARY: U.S. EMBASSY RECEPTION: C/O INVITED SUBJ TO U.S. EMBASSY'S NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION (MOVED FROM 4 JULY TO 16 FEB DUE TO HEAVY LOCAL RAINS IN JULY). SUBJ POINTED OUT ISRAELI SECOND SECRETARY RAMI ((HATAN)), ADDING HATAN HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED IN ADDIS AND SUBJ THOUGHT HATAN WAS SHIN BET AND WORKED WITH ISRAELI SECOND SECRETARY ELIEZER "ELI" ((YITZHAKY)).

5. 19 FEBRUARY: SUBJ PHONED C/O AT EMBASSY, SUGGESTED MEETING

SECRET

AT CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB (0030-0330). SUBJ PAID FOR DRINKS. HIS SPOUSE MAY RETURN TO ADDIS CIRCA EARLY MAY. SUBJ SAID HE WAS DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM EGYPTIAN BUSINESSMAN SAFAH (PHONETIC) AND ADDED, "BEFORE I LEAVE ADDIS, I HAVE A LOT TO TELL YOU. I'LL TELL YOU WHEN THE STORY IS FINISHED. A LOT GOES ON HERE." SUBJ MENTIONED ISRAELI TRADE FAIR AT SHERATON HOTEL 25-26 FEBRUARY (THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC COUNSELOR WAS INVITED). REGARDING RAMI HATAN, SUBJ SAID HE WAS AWARE HATAN WAS SINGLE, LIVED IN BOLE AREA, WAS A FIRST TOUR OFFICER. THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION (PARA 3) WAS HERE FOR ETHIOPIAN TANK (T-55) REFURBISHMENT; RECENT ISRAELI DELEGATION WAS HERE TO BID ON T-55 AND AIRCRAFT REFURBISHMENT (CORROBORATED BY 2/00/1607-98, 191934Z FEB 98; AND 2/00/1584-98, 191609Z FEB 98). SIX OROMO OPPOSITIONISTS WERE EXTRADITED FROM DJIBOUTI TO ETHIOPIA. FOREIGN MINISTER MOUSSA IS VISITING ADDIS WEEK OF 23 FEBRUARY; HE IS A WOMANIZER AND MAY VISIT CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB. HE HAS THREE BODYGUARDS, BUT THEY ARE NOT "PROFESSIONALS." SUBJ PAID EQUIVALENT US$ 60 TO BLOOD TEST LOCAL GIRLFRIEND HELEN, "SHE'S ALL RIGHT." REGARDING SALARY, SUBJ IS PAID "PRETTY WELL" AND WORKS HARD TO "EARN THE PAY." UPON PARTING, SUBJ SAID, "SLEEP WELL, I WON'T SAY HAVE NICE DREAMS BECAUSE WE (I.E., INTEL OFFICERS) DO NOT HAVE NICE DREAMS."

6. 20 FEBRUARY: LATE DINNER WITH SUBJ AT LION CLUB, THEN CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB. TWO BUSINESSMEN (A SAUDI NAMED SALAH LNU WHO DEPARTS ADDIS WEEK 23 FEBRUARY, AND A JORDANIAN NAMED MAHMOUD LNU, BOTH CONCORDE REGULARS) JOINED SUBJ AND C/O. BUSINESSMEN SPOKE OF EXPORTING ETHIOPIAN CATTLE TO SAUDI ARABIA, ALSO SPOKE OF HORSES AND CAMELS. SUBJ'S EMBASSY OFFICE IS BEING REMODELED BY AN ETHIOPIAN INTERIOR DESIGNER, A SUBORDINATE WATCHES THE DESIGNER AT ALL TIMES. SUBJ WILL HAVE C/O OVER TO THE OFFICE ONCE IT IS FINISHED. SUBJ WILL BE BUSY WEEK OF 23 FEBRUARY DUE TO VISIT OF MOUSSA.

7. 21 FEBRUARY: C/O VISITED SUBJ'S HOME AND OFFICE (WHICH WAS BEING PAINTED; HAD ONLY CHAIRS AND A BOOKCASE; MAHMOUD LNU, AN EGYPTIAN, SUPERVISED ETHIOPIAN PAINTER). FCSTANDARD CHIEFS POSTED ABROAD HAVE USE OF A GOVERNMENT VEHICLE, AS DOES SUBJ. ETHIOPIANS TAP DIPLOMATS' OFFICE AND HOME PHONES. DURING CONVERSATION WITH C/O, SUBJ TURNED ON TAPE PLAYER FOR SOUND MASKING AND EXPLAINED HIS HOME HAD NOT YET BEEN TESTED FOR BUGS (A SIMPLE TEST IS TURN OFF ALL APPLIANCES AND CHECK ELECTRIC METER; THERE IS ALSO A MORE SOPHISTICATED TEST). SUBJ PHONED SPOUSE IN CAIRO AND HAD C/O SPEAK WITH HER. SUBJ GAVE C/O TWO SMALL GIFTS (MARBLE HEAD OF NEFERTITI AND PAPYRUS PAPER PAINTING). SUBJ'S BROTHER-IN-LAW (A POLICE MAJOR) IS NO GOOD, HE ASKS HIS FATHER-IN-LAW FOR MONEY. SAUDI ATTACHE WADIE A. AL-((THAGAFI)) MAY BE THE SAUDI INTEL OFFICER IN ADDIS, BUT SUBJ *IS NOT YET SURE. ISRAEL IS NO GOOD; ISRAEL WAS BEHIND THE<JFK> *<ASSASSINATION.> SUBJ CHEATED ON HIS WIFE ONLY THREE TIMES (ALL IN ADDIS IN THE LAST EIGHT MONTHS; HE FEELS GUILTY BUT REMAINS FOND OF HIS LOCAL GIRLFRIEND HELEN, WHOM HE DOES NOT BRING HOME FOR FEAR HIS HOUSEHOLD HELP WOULD TELL HIS SPOUSE). OWNER OF CONCORDE NIGHTCLUB SMUGGLES MERCURY (NFI), HAS GOOD CONNECTIONS AMONG ISRAELIS AND ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT.

8. 22 FEBRUARY: A LENGTHY, SUBSTANTIVE CONTACT AT C/O'S RESIDENCE WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

9. FILE: FCSTANDARD/32; 027-009-095. CL BY: 2195330. CL

REASON: 1.5(C). DECL ON: X1. DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

MHFNO: 98-0480597 SECRET SENSIND: PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: IMS/ESG (021) INFO: CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGEUR, CIC/LA, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC, DC/EUR, DO/IRO, EUR/DCCI, EUR/SG, EUR/SGF, IMDORECORD, LA/FIG, LA/FIGSC, LA/LGL, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/EUR, FILE, C/EUR, C/LA, CE/R, CE/R/XO, CIC/EUR (7/W)

98 0480597 ASO PAGE 001 IN 0480597
TOR: 091712Z FEB 98 PARI 17502

S E C R E T 091717Z FEB 98 STAFF

CITE PARIS 17502

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMITED DISSEM IMS/ESG INFO DO/IRO, CHIEF/EUR, DC/EUR, CHIEF/LA, LA/FIG, LA/FIGSC, CIC/LA, EUR/SG, CIC/EUR, EUR/SGF, C/CE/R/XO

SLUGS: WNINTEL

*SUBJECT: <JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD (ARRB): CONTINUED PROTECTION OF COVER

REF: DIRECTOR 674771 98 0430861

TEXT:

COMBINE: COMPLETE

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE ADVISE IF WE CAN BE OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE STATION RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS POSED REF:

A. IF THE STATION IS UNDECLARED, WOULD THIS DISCLOSURE LEAD TO CLOSER EMBASSY SCRUTINY OF OTHERWISE INTERFERE WITH OPERATIONS?

WERE THE ARRB RELEASES TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE USE BY PARIS STATION OF STATE COVER, THIS MIGHT CALL FOR FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES BY OUR UNILATERAL, UNDECLARED OFFICERS UNDER STATE COVER BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

-- FRENCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ARE AWARE OF THE FACT THAT WE HAVE USED OFFICIAL COVER HERE AND WILL ACT WHENEVER THEY BELIEVE THAT WE ARE USING OFFICERS UNDER THAT COVER IN A MANNER HARMFUL TO FRENCH INTERESTS. WE TAKE PAINS TO ENSURE THAT THE FRENCH DO NOT SEE US AS A THREAT TO THEM LOCALLY. HOWEVER, OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THIS COVER COULD WELL PROVIDE TO POLITICIANS OR JOURNALISTS THE AMMUNITION WITH WHICH TO COMPELL AN INVESTIGATION OF OUR ACTIVITIES HERE. ADDEES WILL RECALL THAT THE 1995 PARIS 'FLAP', IN WHICH SIX STATION OFFICERS WERE REMOVED FROM PARIS, WAS DRIVEN IN LARGE MEASURE BY AN UNSCRUPULOUS POLITICIAN LOOKING FOR HEADLINES.

INTEGRATED STATE COVER OF OUR SMALL GROUP OF UNILATERAL OFFICERS IS AMONG THE STATION'S MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ACCESS TO NON-FRENCH TARGETS. OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OUR USE OF OFFICIAL COVER IN PARIS COULD PROMPT THEM, OR THEIR RESPECTIVE SECURITY OFFICERS, TO REVIEW THEIR AMERICAN TARGETS.

B. OTHERWISE IS THE CIA UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE HOST GOVERNMENT TO REDUCE PRESENCE, OR MORE FULLY DECLARE PRESENCE, OR UNDERTAKE NO UNDECLARED ACTIVITIES? DESCRIBE PRESENCE. DESCRIBE THOSE ACTIVITIES TO RESTRICT THE CIA (E.G. SERVICE TO SERVICE, LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES, OPPOSITION POLITICAL INITIATIVES, AND MEDIA ACTIVITIES.)

TO DATE, THE FRENCH HAVE NOT DEMANDED THE IDENTITIES OF ALL STATION PERSONNEL; HOWEVER, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS POSSIBILITY DUE TO OUR EXPECTATION THAT THE FRENCH MAY DECIDE TO MIRROR ACTIONS OF OTHER EUROPEAN SERVICES WISHING TO RESTRICT CIA PRESENCE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. ARRB DISCLOSURES WOULD SERVE AS A POSSIBLE CATALYST FOR FORCING THIS ISSUE BETWEEN US AND THE FRENCH.

C. DESCRIBE SOME PARTICULAR ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE IMPERILED?

UNILATERAL ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE STATION'S UNDECLARED OFFICERS, OUT-OF-COUNTRY CASE OFFICERS AND NOC'S ARE COMPARTMENTED AND CANNOT BE DISCUSSED IN THIS CHANNEL. WE DEFER TO EUR/SG RE PROVISION OF SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL DETAILS.

D. ARE THERE NEW INITIATIVES WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT AND SERVICE WHICH COULD BE IMPERILED? DESCRIBE.

FORWARD MOVEMENT ON OUR JOINT WORK WITH THE FRENCH SERVICES, MOST IMPORTANTLY IN COUNTERTERRORISM, WAS SLOWED IN THE YEAR FOLLOWING THE 1995 DEMARCHE. OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, WE HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE WILLINGNESS OF THE FRENCH SERVICES TO RESUME ACTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE LIAISON. OF PARTICULAR NOTE ARE OUR CURRENT JOINT COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVES, (E.G., SUPPORT FROM THE FRENCH INTERNAL POLICE/INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, THE DST AND RG, OF CTC'S 17 NOVEMBER TASK FORCE THROUGH TECHNICAL AND PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE OF 17N TARGETS LOCATED IN PARIS), AND AN IMPORTANT NEW INITIATIVE WITH THE FRENCH EXTERNAL SERVICE, THE DGSE, TO WORK JOINTLY AGAINST RUSSIAN SVR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS IN LOCATIONS WHERE OUR COMBINED RESOURCES WOULD BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE PRESS OR WITHIN THESE SERVICES REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF UNDECLARED UNILATERAL ACTIVITIES IN FRANCE WOULD PLACE AT RISK THE CURRENT MOMENTUM WE HAVE WITH THE FRENCH SERVICES IN THESE AREAS.

E. IS CIA PRESENCE INHERENTLY SENSITIVE BECAUSE OF HOSTILE POPULATION ELEMENTS OR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES?

THE FRENCH PRESS IS GENERALLY NEGATIVE REGARDING ANY ASPECT OF CIA PRESENCE IN FRANCE. FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND SERVICES, THE DISTINCTION THEY HAVE DRAWN IS BETWEEN UNILATERAL OPERATIONS THAT TOUCH ON FRENCH AREAS OF INTEREST AND SOVEREIGNTY, IN OTHER WORDS, THE ACTIVITIES OF OFFICERS UNDER STATE COVER AND/OR NOC'S, AND THOSE JOINT AREAS OF OPERATIONAL ENGAGEMENT WHICH THE FRENCH BELIEVE SERVE MUTUAL INTERESTS. AS WE HAVE SEEN HISTORICALLY, WHEN THE FRENCH DISCOVER THE FORMER, THEY TAKE QUICK INVESTIGATIVE AND DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO CLOSE THESE OPERATIONS DOWN.

F. IS THERE POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILE USE (E.G. RUSSIAN OR CUBAN) TO DISCREDIT US EMBASSY AS A "NEST OF SPIES" OR SIMILAR?

THIS IS A POSSIBILITY, BUT WE WOULD EXPECT THAT ANY HOSTILE EXPLOITATION WOULD BE SEEN IN PRESS PLACEMENT/PROPAGANDA RE A "NEST OF SPIES" VICE A DIPLOMATIC PROTEST. WE WOULD NOT EXPECT THAT SUCH PRESS COVERAGE, IF UNSUBSTANTIATED, WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OUR SERVICE-TO-SERVICE OR GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS. IF SUCH PRESS EXPLOITATION BY HOSTILE SERVICES DREW ON SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE EXAMPLES OF PARIS STATION'S USE OF STATE COVER, IT COULD NEGATIVELY IMPACT OUR ABILITY TO SUSTAIN SOME UNILATERAL ACTIVITY DUE TO A POSSIBLE INCREASE OF FRENCH SCRUTINY OF OUR OFFICERS (SEE BELOW).

G. HAVE THERE BEEN PAST IMBROGLIOS OVER CIA PRESENCE OR ACTIVITIES THAT THIS RELEASE COULD RESURRECT?

AS NOTED ABOVE, IN EARLY 1995 THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DEMARCHED THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE OVER INCOMPATIBLE ACTIVITIES OF A STATION NOC AND SEVERAL UNDECLARED OFFICERS. THE FRENCH REVEALED INVESTIGATIVE MATERIAL (INCLUDING THE RESULTS OF PHYSICAL AND TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE AND PHOTOGRAPHY OF OUR OFFICERS) THAT BULWARKED THEIR CONTENTION THAT PARIS STATION WAS RUNNING UNILATERAL OPERATIONS TARGETING FRENCH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS BY OFFICERS UNDER EMBASSY COVER AND NOC'S. THE FRENCH PRESS COVERAGE WAS EXTENSIVE AND HOSTILE. BY THE TIME THE FRENCH CONCLUDED THEIR SERIES OF DEMARCHES, THEY HAD INDICATED THEIR DESIRE FOR THE RECALL OF SIX STATION OFFICERS.

WE HAVE GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ENSURE THAT ANY/ALL UNILATERAL ACTIVITY IN FRANCE IS CARRIED OUT UNDER STRINGENT OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES TO PROTECT SUCH ACTIVITIES AGAINST FRENCH COUNTER-ESPIONAGE CAPABILITIES. WHILE WE VIEW THIS AS AN ONGOING REQUIREMENT, ANY PRESS OR SERVICE APPREHENSION REGARDING OUR PRESENCE, SUCH AS COULD RESULT FROM ARRB TYPE RELEASES, COULD FORCE US TO FURTHER RESTRICT OUR UNILATERAL OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS -- SOMETHING WE WISH TO AVOID.

H. HAVE OFFICIAL USG RELEASES SUCH AS FOIA EVER APPEARED IN THE LOCAL MEDIA (E.G., JAPAN AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING OR PERU AND FOIA RELEASED CONCERNING VLADIMIRO MOTESINOS TORRES). REFERRED TO BY HOST GOVERNMENT EITHER ON THE RECORD OR OFF THE RECORD.

CURRENT STATION PERSONNEL HAVE NO RECOLLECTION OF SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE RECENT PAST. WE DEFER TO HQS FOR ANY ADDITIONAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

3. PLEASE ADVISE IF WE CAN PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND.

4. FILE: NONE. DECL ON: X1; CL REASON: 1.5 (C); CL BY: 0707476
DRV HUM 4-82

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 98-0457370 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

~~SECRET~~ ERP: 2

STAFF

ACTION: IMS/ESG (020) INFO: CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGLA, CIC/LA, DO/IRO, IMDORECORD, LA/FIG, LA/FIGSC, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/LA, FILE, C/LA (3/W)

98 0457370 ASP PAGE 001 IN 0457370
TOR: 061908Z FEB 98 BUEN 55099

S E C R E T 061900Z FEB 98 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 55099

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMITED DISSEM IMS/ESG INFO DO/IRO, CHIEF/LA, LA/FIG, LA/FIGSC, CIC/LA

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: CONTINUED PROTECTION OF OUR USE OF COVER

REF: DIRECTOR 674771 98 0430861

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI ONLY AND IN RESPONSE TO REF.

2. THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION WHICH OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZES THE FACT OF STATE COVER WILL BE A DELICATE ISSUE ACROSS THE DO, AND --ALTHOUGH DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS IN THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD (ARRB) ARE LIMITED TO ONLY FOUR COUNTRIES-- THE WORLD-WIDE USE OF STATE COVER MEANS THE IMPLICATIONS WILL BE WIDELY FELT. IN THIS SENSE IT IS ALMOST SELF-DEFEATING TO ARGUE FROM FOUR SPECIFIC CASES (MOSCOW, PARIS, MEXICO CITY, AND BUENOS AIRES) AND EXTRAPOLATE FOR THE WHOLE DDO. NEVERTHELESS, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO RESPOND TO REF FROM THE BA PERSPECTIVE.

3. OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF CIA USE OF STATE COVER IN ARGENTINA WILL PREJUDICE UNILATERAL OFFICERS' COVER AND ACTIVITY, WHICH --AS IN MOST STATIONS-- IS THE COVER AND ACTIVITY WHICH MATTERS THE MOST IN THAT THESE OFFICERS TEND TO HANDLE THE MOST SENSITIVE PENETRATIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. OUR UNILATERAL OFFICERS ALSO HANDLE STATION'S NON-OFFICIAL COVER (NOC) OFFICERS. THUS BY DEFINITION THE UNILATERAL ACTIVITY CARRIED OUT BY THESE OFFICERS IS NON-COMPATIBLE, AND WOULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO STATION'S RELATIONS WITH OUR VARIOUS LIAISON SERVICES. CURRENTLY, STATION IS ENJOYING A PERIOD WHEREIN --AS A RESULT OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT HERE IN LATE 1997, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PRINCIPAL LIAISON SERVICE'S VISIT TO HEADQUARTERS IN NOV 97-- LIAISON HAS DECIDED TO RE-ORIENT ITS ACTIVITIES AWAY FROM SMALL LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS IT HAS WITH VARIOUS EUROPEAN SERVICES AND MORE TOWARDS CIA. THIS STRATEGIC SHIFT, WHICH COULD HAVE LONG-TERM BENEFITS FOR CIA, WILL BE DASHED WHEN LIAISON SEES THAT WE RUN NON-COMPATIBLE OPERATIONS IN BUENOS AIRES. THE TRUST THAT TAKES AN

SECRET

ENDLESS NUMBER OF MEETINGS TO BUILD WILL BE GONE WITH THE FIRST PUBLICATION LOCALLY CONFIRMING OUR USE OF STATE COVER.

4. MOREOVER, BILATERAL U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN CLOSER; THESE WOULD BE TARNISHED, NOT IRREPARABLY BY ANY MEANS, BUT UNNECESSARILY, BY OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF CIA USE OF STATE COVER. HISTORICALLY RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA HAVE BEEN STRAINED, AND IT IS ONLY DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS THAT A NEW PRESIDENT AND HIS BOLD FREE-MARKET REFORMS HAVE PUSHED ARGENTINA SQUARELY INTO THE DEMOCRATIC ORBIT. CURIOUSLY, THE CLOSE POLITICAL RELATIONS AND OUR STEADILY-IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH LIAISON MEANS THAT BOTH PARTIES --EMBASSY DIPLOMATS AND SENIOR LIAISON OFFICERS-- WONDER WHY WE NEED TO SPY HERE IF WE CAN GET VIRTUALLY ANYTHING WE ASK FOR FROM LIAISON OR FROM ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. INDEED, IN THIS RELATIVELY OPEN, COMFORTABLE ENVIRONMENT, AN INDICATION THAT STATION WAS WORKING ON INCOMPATIBLE LOCAL TARGETS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY DAMAGING.

5. AT THE RISK OF BORING THE READER WITH DETAIL, EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IS SO OPEN A WORKPLACE THAT THERE IS NO REAL CLEARED ACCESS AREA (CAA), BUT RATHER A "HYBRID" CAA, TO USE THE RSO'S PHRASE. THIS MEANS THAT FSN'S HAVE LONG HAD OFFICES ON THE THIRD FLOOR, WHERE THE *<EXECUTIVE>OFFICES AND REPORTING OFFICES (INCLUDING STATION) ARE LOCATED. NEEDLESS TO SAY, STATION IS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE LOCAL CONFIGURATION OF OFFICES, SINCE IT TENDS TO IDENTIFY OUR UNILATERAL OFFICERS. IN THIS ENVIRONMENT, WHERE EMBASSY OFFICERS DO NOT HAVE A FULL APPRECIATION OF THE ROLE/NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE IN SUCH AN OPEN, FRIENDLY SOCIETY, OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF CIA'S USE OF STATE COVER WOULD ONLY REAFFIRM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. OUR FEW UNILATERAL OFFICERS WOULD ESSENTIALLY THEN BE DECLARED. STATION WOULD HAVE TO ATTEMPT TO CHANGE OUR COVER PROFILE BY OBTAINING MORE NOC OFFICERS WHILE REDUCING THE NUMBER OF UNILATERAL C/O'S. AS HEADQUARTERS IS AWARE, UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES THERE ARE FEW NOCS, AND THE SELECTION AND TRAINING OF NEW ONES TAKES YEARS AND IS EXPENSIVE. IN THIS SCENARIO, BUENOS AIRES WOULD NEVER RECEIVE ENOUGH PRIORITY TO WARRANT SENDING THREE NOC OFFICERS TO REPLACE THE THREE UNILATERAL SLOTS WE CURRENTLY HAVE. THE END RESULT WOULD BE THAT WE WOULD COLLECT VERY LITTLE INTELLIGENCE ON MAJOR PORTIONS OF OUR OPERATING DIRECTIVE (OD). SPECIFICALLY, INTERNAL POLITICAL REPORTING, WHICH IS A FIRST PRIORITY OBJECTIVE, WOULD BE ZEROED OUT, AND REPORTING ON THE WP AND ES TARGETS, BOTH SECOND PRIORITY OBJECTIVES, WOULD BE NON-EXISTENT. THIS WOULD BE A SERIOUS LOSS TO THE USG, SINCE OUR WP REPORTING HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN THE ONLY MEANS OF LEARNING TO WHAT EXTENT THE ARGENTINES ARE RESPECTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND NOT REBUILDING THEIR MISSILE PROGRAM. ON THE ES TARGET, WE WOULD LOSE SIGNIFICANT REPORTING ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND THE IMPACT OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE AMERICAS. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, WE WOULD LOSE THE TRUST OF KEY HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND OF SOME SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS, WITH THE PREDICTABLE RESULT THAT IT WOULD TAKE YEARS TO REBUILD THE RELATIONSHIP.

6. IN TERMS OF A SECURITY THREAT, BUENOS AIRES REMAINS THE ONLY CAPITAL IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE THAT HAS BEEN THE VICTIM OF TWO HIZBALLAH BOMBINGS, KILLING HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE. A TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE EXISTS IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA OF ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND PARAGUAY, WITH TIES INTO BUENOS AIRES AS WAS PROVEN TWICE. TWO

OR THREE TIMES PER YEAR STATION OBTAINS REPORTING OF ANOTHER THREAT ON LOCAL JEWISH OR U.S. INTERESTS, INCLUDING THIS EMBASSY. IN THIS ENVIRONMENT, PUBLICATION OF CIA USE OF OFFICIAL COVER MIGHT ENDANGER PEOPLES' LIVES, SPECIFICALLY STATION OFFICERS'. HAMAS, GAMA'AT AL ISLAMIYAH, AND HIZBALLAH ARE ALL ACTIVE LOCALLY. IN ADDITION, ARGENTINA HAS AN ARAB POPULATION OF OVER 700,000. IN THE DIPLOMATIC WORLD, THE CUBAN EMBASSY IS LARGE AND ACTIVE; WE ARE CERTAIN THEY WOULD SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY U.S. COVER GAPS. STATION HAS NOT HAD ANY SIGNIFICANT COVER GAPS IN THE PAST, AND THUS ANY ONE OF THIS MAGNITUDE WOULD HAVE A LARGE IMPACT.

7. STATION HOPES THE ABOVE IS USEFUL IN MARSHALING ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PUBLICATION OF THE ARRB RECORDS.

8. FILE: NONE. DECL ON: X1. CL REASON: 1.5(C) CL BY: 0705909 DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET
MHFNO: 98-0430861 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ /
SECRET ERP:

STAFF

CONF: IMS/ESG INFO: CE/R/IO, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGEUR, CIC/CEGLA, CIC/LA, CIC/OG, CIC/OGUCT, CIC/PRC, DC/EUR, DO/IRO, EUR/DCCI, EUR/SG, EUR/SGF, IMDORECORD, LA/FIG, LA/FIGSC, LA/MXG, LA/MXO, LA/MXSTB, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/EUR, C/LA, CE/R, CE/R/XO, CIC/EUR (7/P)

98 0430861 ASO PAGE 001
TOT: 041406Z FEB 98 DIRECTOR 674771

SECRET
STAFF 041407Z DIRECTOR 674771
TO: IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, PARIS, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS AIRES.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM IMS/ESG INFO DO/IRO, CHIEF/LA, LA/FIG, LA/FIGSC, CIC/LA, CIC/EUR, EUR/SG, EUR/SGF, CHIEF/EUR, DC/EUR, C/CE/R/XO

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: CONTINUED PROTECTION OF COVER AS METHOD

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NEED YOUR RESPONSE NLT 9 FEBRUARY, TO MEET THE BOARD-IMPOSED DEADLINE.

* 2. THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD (ARRB) IS A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR RELEASING *ALL RECORDS RELATING TO THE<ASSASSINATION>OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY> WITH A VERY FEW LIMITED EXCEPTIONS. THE MOST RELEVANT EXCEPTION FOR THE AGENCY IS WHERE THERE IS "...CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE THREAT TO THE CONDUCT OF US INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THAT DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL AN INTELLIGENCE METHOD CURRENTLY UTILIZED AND NOT OFFICIALLY DISCLOSED."

3. LAST WEEK, THE DDA AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION WERE CALLED TO TESTIFY ON THE CONTINUED WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION THAT WOULD OFFICIALLY CONFIRM THAT CIA UTILIZES STATE (INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY CONSULAR) COVER. THIS CASE IS MADE DIFFICULT BY THE FACT THAT STATE COVER IS SO WIDELY DISCUSSED IN THE PUBLIC MEDIA INCLUDING THE MANY BOOKS AUTHORED BY FORMER CIA EMPLOYEES; HOWEVER, THE USG HAS NEVER OFFICIALLY RELEASED THE FACT OF STATE COVER. ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS BRIEFED IN DEPTH, THE BOARD HAS REQUESTED ADDITIONAL CONCRETE DAMAGE VIS-A-VIS THE COUNTRIES SPECIFIED IN THE DOCUMENTS AT ISSUE--MOSCOW, PARIS, MEXICO CITY AND BUENOS AIRES.

4. ACCORDINGLY, WE NEED YOUR SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT OF THE DAMAGE THAT COULD ARISE IF OFFICIAL USG DOCUMENTS WERE RELEASED WHICH CONFIRMS CIA USE OF STATE COVER. THAT DAMAGE COULD TAKE THE FORM OF HARM OR INTERFERE WITH CURRENT DIPLOMATIC INTERESTS. THE

FOLLOWING QUESTIONS MAY ASSIST IN THE FORMULATION OF YOUR RESPONSE. OF COURSE, INPUT FROM STATE COLLEAGUES WOULD BE WELCOME (AND IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT STATE FEELS VERY STRONGLY ON THIS ISSUE AND HAS ALSO FILED A PERSONAL STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE).

(A). IF THE STATION IS UNDECLARED, WOULD THIS DISCLOSURE LEAD TO CLOSER EMBASSY SCRUTINY OR OTHERWISE INTERFERE WITH OPERATIONS? GIVE EXAMPLES.

(B) OTHERWISE, IS CIA UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE HOST GOVERNMENT TO REDUCE PRESENCE, OR MORE FULLY DECLARE PRESENCE, OR UNDERTAKE NO UNDECLARED ACTIVITIES? DESCRIBE PRESENCE. DESCRIBE THOSE ACTIVITIES TO RESTRICT CIA (E.G. SERVICE TO SERVICE, LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES, OPPOSITION POLITICAL INITIATIVES, AND MEDIA ACTIVITIES.)

(C) DESCRIBE SOME PARTICULAR ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE IMPERILED?

(D) ARE THERE NEW INITIATIVES WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT AND SERVICE WHICH COULD BE IMPERILED (E.G., COUNTER-NARCOTICS WHERE PREVIOUSLY NONE)? DESCRIBE.

(E) IS CIA PRESENCE INHERENTLY SENSITIVE BECAUSE OF HOSTILE POPULATION ELEMENTS OR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES?

(F) IS THERE POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILE USE (E.G., RUSSIAN ON CUBAN) TO DISCREDIT US EMBASSY AS A "NEST OF SPIES OR SIMILAR?

(G) HAVE THERE BEEN PAST IMBROGLIOS OVER CIA PRESENCE OR ACTIVITIES THAT THIS RELEASE COULD RESURRECT?

(H) HAVE OFFICIAL USG RELEASES SUCH AS FOIA EVER APPEARED IN THE LOCAL MEDIA (E.G., JAPAN AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING OR PERU AND FOIA RELEASED CONCERNING VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS TORRES). REFERRED TO BY HOST GOVERNMENT EITHER ON THE RECORD OR OFF THE RECORD.

5. FILE: NONE. INDEX: NONE. CL BY: 2103140, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: LOC 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100880721
ORIG: IMS/ESG(KNUTSOM,44596); AUTH: C/IMS/ESG (FREDRICK C. WICKHAM); COORD: CE/R, LA/MXO, LA/FIGSC, EUR/SGF,; INFO: DO/IRO; REL: C/IMS/ESG (FREDRICK C. WICKHAM).

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET FRP: , , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CE/BOGYA INFO: CE/BOGB, CEDORECORD, DCCE/BA, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, C/CE, CE/BOG, CE/BOGBT, CE/BOGIS, CED/CIC (7/P)

97 9265318 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 301610Z SEP 97 DIRECTOR 522218

SECRET
STAFF 301610Z DIRECTOR 522218
TO: PRIORITY BELGRADE.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CE/BOGYA INFO CE/BOGIS, CE/BOG, CED/CIC, DCCE/BA

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: TRACE RESPONSE - NIKOLA KAVAJA

REF: BELGRADE 20520 97 9106046

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI ONLY.

2. PER REF, HQS HAS CONFIRMED THAT NIKOLA ((KAVAJA)) IS THE SUBJECT OF 201-0764698. PROVIDED BELOW ARE EXCERPTS FROM THE EXTENSIVE NVTAG SOURCE REPORTING COMPILED ON KAVAJA OVER THE YEARS. BASED ON OUR REVIEW, THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT KAVAJA HAS EVER BEEN IN CONTACT WITH TQHIGHROAD. PER PARA 5 REF, BELOW INFORMATION CAN BE SHARED WITH THE RSO AND COM.

3. FOLLOWING IS DRAWN FROM DIRECTOR 824658 DATED 17 FEB 84:

A. NIKOLA ((KAVAJA)) WAS BORN 3 OCTOBER 1933 IN ISTINIC, YUGOSLAVIA. AFTER HIGH SCHOOL HE GRADUATED FROM THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY ACADEMY. BETWEEN 1947 AND 1952, HE SERVED AS A FIGHTER PILOT WITH THE YUGOSLAV AIR FORCE, HOLDING THE RANK OF FIRST LIEUTENANT. IN THE COURSE OF THIS SERVICE HE BECAME DISENCHANTED WITH THE COMMUNIST REGIME AND WAS COURT-MARTIALED. HE WAS ACCUSED OF BEING A MEMBER OF A SECRET ANTI-COMMUNIST, TERRORIST ORGANIZATION COMMITTED TO OVERTHROWING THE COMMUNIST REGIME OF YUGOSLAVIA, AND WAS ALSO CHARGED WITH THE<ASSASSINATION>OF THREE BORDER GUARDS (KAVAJA DENIED BEING GUILTY OF THIS CHARGE). HE WAS FOUND GUILTY AND SENTENCED TO EIGHTEEN AND ONE-HALF YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT.

B. ON 15 AUG 57, KAVAJA ESCAPED FROM PRISON WITH ANOTHER YUGOSLAV. THE TWO MEN CROSSED INTO AUSTRIA ON 21 AUGUST 57 AT DOLJNA RADONJA. THEY PROCEEDED TO SALZBURG AND TURNED THEMSELVES IN TO THE POLICE. AFTER SPENDING 21 DAYS IN JAIL THEY WERE GRANTED POLITICAL ASYLUM. KAVAJA THEREAFTER WORKED AS A PAINTER AND JOINED A LOCAL ANTI-COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION IN AUSTRIA. HE

MARRIED MARIE ((MOSEC)) ON 13 JUNE 59. FIVE DAYS LATER, SHE LEFT HIM AND MOVED TO BRITISH COLUMBIA. HE HAS NEVER OBTAINED A DIVORCE FROM HER, THOUGH HE CONSIDERS THAT THEY ARE SEPARATED. HE REMAINED IN AUSTRIA UNTIL 15 AUGUST 61 WHEN HE DEPARTED FOR THE U.S.

C. KAVAJA WORKED IN THE U.S. AS A PART TIME PAINTER FOR VARIOUS EMPLOYERS IN THE PATERSON, NEW JERSEY AREA FOR NEARLY EIGHT MONTHS. DURING NOVEMBER 1962, KAVAJA LEFT PATERSON FOR CHICAGO, WHERE HE TOOK A JOB WITH THE SERBIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL (SND). HIS DUTIES INCLUDED SUPPORT FOR THE EMIGRE PUBLICATION "SLOBODA," AND ACTING AS CUSTODIAN AND WATCHMAN FOR THE BUILDING. HE SAID A WATCHMAN WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE COUNCIL CONSIDERS THE YUGOSLAV CONSULATE IN CHICAGO TO BE AN ENEMY. AS PART OF HIS SALARY, KAVAJA WAS PROVIDED FURNISHED QUARTERS IN THE BUILDING. KAVAJA REMAINED WITH THE SND UNTIL DECEMBER 1963. FOR THE NEXT THREE MONTHS HE SUPPORTED HIMSELF BY TAKING ODD JOBS PAINTING.

D. IN MARCH 1964 KAVAJA DROVE WITH A FRIEND TO CALIFORNIA. AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA, THEY WERE ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF A .45 CALIBER AUTOMATIC PISTOL WHICH KAVAJA HAD LEFT ON THE BACK SEAT OF THE AUTOMOBILE. THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DETAINED KAVAJA FOR TWENTY DAYS. A LOCAL BUSINESSMAN WHO INTERPRETED AT THE HEARING FOR KAVAJA, INDICATED THAT KAVAJA WAS "CRAZY AND A LOUDMOUTH," WHO WAS INTENT ON KILLING CASTRO. AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM JAIL HE RETURNED TO CHICAGO, AND THEN TO PATERSON TO WORK ON OBTAINING HIS CITIZENSHIP.

E. IN OCTOBER 64 HE RETURNED TO CHICAGO. SOMETIME BEFORE THE SUMMER OF 1966, HIS LIVE-IN (MARRIED) GIRLFRIEND GAVE BIRTH TO A DAUGHTER IN PATERSON. IN JUNE 1977, YUGOSLAV CONSULATE GENERAL, CONSULAR OFFICER TOMISLAV DJORDJEVIC, CONSIDERED TO BE SDB OFFICER BASED IN NEW YORK, LEARNED FROM THE CHICAGO CONSULATE THAT KAVAJA AND HIS GROUP OF RADICALS MAY BECOME ACTIVE, AND AS A RESULT WAS KEEPING CLOSE WATCH ON THEM. IN NOVEMBER 1977, NEW YORK CONSULATE OFFICIAL PETAR G. ((BOZINOVIC)), ALSO CONSIDERED TO BE SDB, WAS COLLECTING INFORMATION ON KAVAJA, AND MENTIONED THAT HE HAD BEEN ADVISED THAT KAVAJA WAS INSTRUCTING EMIGRES ON HOW TO MAKE BOMBS. ON 4 AUGUST 79, AT A MEETING OF YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS AT THE NEW YORK CONSULATE GENERAL, KAVAJA WAS A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION. DJORDJEVIC, HIS SUCCESSOR (AND SDB OFFICER) NJEGOSLAV ((PANTELIC)), CONSULAR OFFICER NINO ((KOPAC)), OSMAN ((GASI)), AND CONSUL GENERAL VESELIN ((VESKOVIC)) DISCUSSED ACTIVE ANTI-REGIME EMIGRES IN THE AREA. THEY INDICATED THAT KAVAJA HAD RECENTLY HIJACKED AN AIRPLANE OUTSIDE CHICAGO TO NEW YORK CITY, AND THEN TO SHANNON, IRELAND, WHERE HE SURRENDERED TO THE IRISH AUTHORITIES. DURING THIS MEETING, THEY AGREED THAT KAVAJA, WHO WAS AT THE TIME IN A U.S. PRISON, DESERVED TO BE PUNISHED. DJORDJEVIC DISPLAYED A SERBO-CROATIAN REPORT ON KAVAJA ENTITLED "WHO ARE THE TERRORISTS - SOPO - END OF ONE CONSPIRACY."

F. ONE SOURCE WHO TRAVELED TO YUGOSLAVIA IN APRIL 1981 REPORTED HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY THE SDB. HE WAS ASKED AMONG OTHER THINGS TO IDENTIFY YUGOSLAV EMIGRES WHO VISITED KAVAJA IN JAIL.

IN 1964 KAVAJA TOLD ONE SOURCE HE IS UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM WHEREVER IT IS FOUND. HE PROFESSED GREAT ADMIRATION FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY BUT FELT THAT MORE THAN MERE WORDS WERE NEEDED IF AMERICA WAS TO WIN OUT OVER COMMUNISM. KAVAJA INDICATED THAT HE WAS A MAN OF ACTION. HE ADDED THAT HE HAS DEDICATED HIMSELF TO THE ERADICATION OF COMMUNISM AND THAT AN OPPORTUNE TIME, HE WILL ACQUIRE AND CARRY A PISTOL, AS A PATRIOT, NOT AS A CRIMINAL, FOR USE AGAINST THE HEAD OF ANY COMMUNIST STATE INCLUDING TITO, KHRUSHCHEV AND CASTRO, REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES TO HIMSELF OR HIS RELATIVES. KAVAJA INDICATED THAT IN OCTOBER 1963 HE HAD STALKED TITO AT NEW YORK CITY, WILLIAMSBURG, AND WASHINGTON FOR *THE PURPOSE OF<ASSASSINATING>HIM. HE WAS DRESSED IN THE BLACK CLERICAL GARB OF A PRIEST, AND HE WAS ARMED WITH A .45 CALIBER PISTOL AND 48 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION. HE SAID HE NEARLY SUCCEEDED IN HIS EFFORT IN WILLIAMSBURG, BUT WAS THWARTED WHEN TITO LEFT THE AREA BY HELICOPTER RATHER THAN BY CAR. KAVAJA INDICATED THAT THE *COMMUNIST PARTY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LATE<PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S> *<ASSASSINATION.> IT WAS ALSO HIS OPINION THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FREQUENT BLACK RIOTS IN THE EAST. KAVAJA MENTIONED THAT HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES FELT THAT THE TIME HAD COME WHEN FORCEFUL AND AFFIRMATIVE STEPS MUST BE TAKEN, IF THE WORLD WAS TO AVOID A COMPLETE TAKE-OVER BY COMMUNISM.

G. ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED THAT KAVAJA APPEARED TO BE SOMEWHAT "DIFFERENT" FROM THE AVERAGE MEMBER OF THE SND, AND HE APPEARED TO HAVE MORE OF AN AGGRESSIVE NATURE. THE SOURCE INDICATED THAT KAVAJA WOULD PROBABLY DO THINGS OTHER PEOPLE WOULD NOT DO. ON ONE OCCASION KAVAJA CONFIDED TO THE SOURCE THAT HE HAD BEEN PAID NEARLY USD 3,000 BY A SERBIAN ORTHODOX BISHOP TO KILL TITO. THE DEAL INVOLVED HIS KIDNAPPING A FORMER LEADER OF THE USTASHI MOVEMENT RESIDENT IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA TO AVENGE THE SERBS KILLED DURING WORLD WAR II BY THE USTASHI. HOWEVER, HE DID *NOT SUCCEED IN THIS<ASSASSINATION>PLAN BECAUSE, WHILE HE WAS STAKING OUT THE MAN'S RESIDENCE, HE WAS APPREHENDED BY THE POLICE AND ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF A HANDGUN.

H. ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED THAT KAVAJA FREQUENTLY PROMISED TO COMMIT SOME ACT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST A COMMUNIST PERSON AND ON THIS BASIS COLLECTED MONEY FROM THE SERBS. HOWEVER, BECAUSE HE HAD NOT YET DELIVERED, SERBS IN THE CHICAGO AREA WERE DISENCHANTED WITH HIM.

I. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER SOURCE, KAVAJA WAS DESCRIBED AS AN OPPORTUNIST, A BULLY, AND AN UNTRUSTWORTHY TYPE OF PERSON WHO WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN HIMSELF. WITH REGARD TO KAVAJA'S CLAIMS OF BEING AN ANTI-COMMUNIST, THE SOURCE ADDED THAT HE HAD NO INFORMATION ON HIS POLITICAL SYMPATHIES, EXCEPT THAT HE WAS EXTREMELY PREJUDICED AGAINST NON-SERB SLAVS. HE WAS REPORTEDLY NOT LIKED BY FELLOW SERBS, BUT FEARED BY THEM BECAUSE HE HAD THE REPUTATION OF BEING A FIGHTER AND ONE WHO USUALLY PICKS ON MEN WHO ARE EITHER SMALLER OR OLDER THAN HE. HOWEVER, THE SOURCE INDICATED THAT SOME SERBS ~~VIEWED KAVAJA AS A HERO.~~

4. ACCORDING TO CIA 823841, DATED 02 SEP 84, TQHIGHROAD

RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM AUSTRIAN LIAISON FOR INFORMATION ON NIKOLA KAVAJA. THE AUSTRIANS CARRIED SUBJECT AS A TERRORIST WHO MAY TRY TO DISRUPT THE SARAJEVO OLYMPIC GAMES USING AUSTRIA AS A STAGING AREA. THEY PLANNED TO ENTER INFORMATION INTO THEIR COMPUTERS AT BORDER CROSSING POINTS TO ENABLE THEM TO PREVENT KAVAJA FROM ENTERING YUGOSLAVIA VIA AUSTRIA.

5. ON 31 JUL 93, NVTAG PROVIDED AN ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL FOR YUGOSLAVIAN TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH WAS SENT TO SEVERAL TQHIGHROAD STATIONS. THE ASSESSMENT WAS NOT PART OF THE U.S. TERRORIST THREAT WARNING SYSTEM, BUT JUST INTENDED TO PROVIDED INFORMATION TO ALL RECIPIENTS. IN THIS ASSESSMENT, NVTAG EVALUATED THE YUGOSLAVIAN DIPLOMATIC AND NON-OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE ASSESSMENT MENTIONED KAVAJA AS ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. KAVAJA WAS ALSO MENTIONED TO BE A MEMBER OF SOPO.

6. FILE: 201-0764698. CL BY: 2184825, CL REASON: 1.5 (C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100792925
ORIG: CE/BOGYA(XDEBRUC, 51706); AUTH: DC/CE/BOGYA(DEL PRINCIPE);
INFO: CE/TRG(FRREEMAN); REL: C/CE/BOGYA(PIPKIN).

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

104-10326-10026

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: EUR/IBIL (714) INFO: CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGEUR, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC, EUDORECORD, EUR/FRS, EUR/FRSF, EUR/IBII, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/EUR, RYBAT, FILE, CIC/EUR, DCEUR/CI (3/W)

97 8745117 ASR PAGE 001 IN 8745117
TOR: 070622Z AUG 97 ROME 31799

SECRET 070616Z AUG 97 STAFF

CITE ROME 31799

TO: DIRECTOR INFO PARIS.

FOR: LIMITED DISSEM EUR/IBIL INFO EUR/FRS, CIC/EUR

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT VYSWORD TRACE

SUBJECT: VYSWORD REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS ON JEAN RENE SOUTRE AKA MICHEL ROUX, OAS CAPTAIN

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: CONFIRM DECLASSIFICATION AND AVAILABILITY OF DOCUMENTS

2. PER MEMO (NR 04/46) FROM THE VYSWORD FIRST DIVISION (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE/COUNTERTERRORISM) VYSWORDS HAVE REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING/CONFIRMING AVAILABILITY OF SEVERAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ORGANIZATION SECRET ARMIE (SAO) CAPTAIN JEAN MARIE ((SOUTRE)) (ALSO SPELLED ((SOUETRE)). THE VYSWORDS NOTE THAT PER THE "INTERNET" THESE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN DECLASSIFIED AND ARE AVAILABLE IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES IN COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING REQUESTED ON BEHALF OF CERTAIN (UNNAMED) MAGISTRATES IN MILAN. VYSWORDS SPECIFICALLY ASK FOR AVAILABILITY OF THE FOLLOWING:

A. FBI 46 PAGE REPORT ON JEAN SOUETRE AKA MICHEL ((ROUX)) DATED 22 NOV 63, RECORD NR. 180-10110-10054, AGENCY FILE NUMBER *<025-JFK.>

B. CIA ONE PAGE DOCUMENT MENTIONING JEAN RENE SOUETRE (NO DATE), RECORD NR. 180-10142-10273, CIA FILE NR 023-025-024.

C. CIA 3 PAGE DOCUMENT DATED 1 APR 64 RE "FORTH WORTH, TEXAS," "MICHEL ROUX," "DALLAS, TEXAS," AND "MICHEL MERTZ/EXTRADITION," RECORD NR 104-10002-10042, CIA FILE NR. 201-0289248.

D. CIA ONE PAGE DOCUMENT DATED 1 APR 64 RE JEAN SOUETRE, RECORD NR. 180-10001-10374, CIA FILE NR. 000111 (SIC).

3. WE ARE NOT KEEN TO GET INTO CHASING SUCH DOCUMENTS DOWN FOR VYSWORD. WE INTEND TO RESPOND THAT VYSWORD SHOULD WRITE DIRECTLY TO

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES TO OBTAIN THEM. HOWEVER, WE WOULD LIKE CONFIRMATION THAT THESE DOCUMENTS HAVE INDEED BEEN DECLASSIFIED, ARE AVAILABLE AT NATIONAL ARCHIVES, AND THAT INFORMATION TO THIS EFFECT HAS BEEN POSTED ON THE INTERNET. (FROM THE LOOKS AND DATES OF THE *DOCUMENTS, THEY MAY BE RELATED TO THE<JFK ASSASSINATION> INVESTIGATION). THANKS.

4. FILE: 043-002-012/03. CL BY: 0541440. CL REASON: 1.5(B). DECL ON: X5. DRV LIA 1-87.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10326-10027
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PROJECT FILES

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : WITHHELD
TITLE : WITHHELD
DATE : 06/30/1997
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS : ARRB RELEASE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/03/99
COMMENTS : JFK-M-11 : F1 : 1999.02.03.14:12:41:293120 : CIA CORRESPONDENCE RE ARRB. CORRECTED TO 2 PAGES VICE 4.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10326-10027

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: DC/OCC, LA/CAG, LA/FIG, LA/FICCC, LIMITED,
MDSX, OCDORECORD, ODPD, FILE, C/LA/RB5, DC/LA/RB5 (3/P)

---

97 8380127 ASO PAGE 001
TOT: 302055Z JUN 97 DIRECTOR 408414

S E C R E T
STAFF 302055Z DIRECTOR 408414
TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CHIEF/OCC INFO LA/CAG

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDES IN COSTA RICA.

* 2. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING THE INFORMATION BELOW ASAP TO IDEN.

TEARLINE---
----

27 JUNE 1997

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526 *OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THOSE EXCEPTIONS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE ACT FOLLOW. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR PERSON(S)YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU

BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE ADVISE THE OFFICER WHO DELIVERED THIS LETTER TO YOU. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. (SEE FOLLOWING GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE RECORDS.) IF THE BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT.

SINCERELY
YOURS,
[redacted]
[redacted]

FOLLOWS ARE THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS:

*DISCLOSURE OF<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS OR PARTICULAR INFORMATION IN *<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS TO THE PUBLIC MAY BE POSTPONED SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS ACT IF THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT--

(1) THE THREAT TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES POSED BY THE *PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>IS OF SUCH GRAVITY THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SUCH PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL--

(A) AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHOSE IDENTITY CURRENTLY REQUIRES PROTECTION

(B) AN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE OR METHOD WHICH IS CURRENTLY UTILIZED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WHICH HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY DISCLOSED, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; OR

(C) ANY OTHER MATTER CURRENTLY RELATING TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRABLY IMPAIR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

*(2) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL THE NAME OR IDENTITY OF A LIVING PERSON WHO PROVIDED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD POSE A SUBSTANTIAL RISK TO THAT PERSON;

*(3) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CONSTITUTE AN UNWARRANTED INVASION OF PERSONAL PRIVACY, AND THAT INVASION OF PRIVACY IS SO SUBSTANTIAL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST;

*(4) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD COMPROMISE THE EXISTENCE OF AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFIDENTIALITY CURRENTLY REQUIRING PROTECTION BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AGENT AND A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL OR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC

INTEREST, OR

*(5) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL A SECURITY OR PROTECTIVE PROCEDURE CURRENTLY UTLIZED, OR REASONABLY EXPECTED TO BE UTILIZED, BY THE SECRET SERVICE OR ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

TEAR
LINE--
----

3. BECAUSE OF THE TIME CRITICAL NATURE OF THIS REQUIREMENT, REQUEST THAT YOU ASK IDEN FOR AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE AND REQUEST THAT RESPONSE BE CABLED BACK TO HEADQUARTERS VIA IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE.
ALL PREVIOUS RECIPIENTS OF THIS LETTER HAVE HAD CONCERNS OR QUESTIONS; FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:

*A. WHY IS MY NAME IN THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS?
WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY BUT YOUR NAME MAY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN A CABLE OR DOCUMENT, OR YOU MAY HAVE COORDINATED OR SIGNED A CABLE
*OR DOCUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE<ASSASSINATION.>

B. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?
IT MEANS YOUR NAME WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL
*DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE<ASSASSINATION.> THE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA) WITH THE NAME REMOVED AND IF WE DO NOT MAKE A COMPELLING CASE THE PRESIDENTIAL BOARD WILL RELEASE NEW VERSIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS WITH THE NAMES.

C. WHAT EXACTLY DOES "RELEASE" MEAN?
IT MEANS THE GENERAL PUBLIC WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE DOCUMENT VIA NARA. THERE ARE PROFESSIONAL RESEARCHERS WAITING FOR ACCESS TO THE MATERIAL SO THAT THEY CAN RESEARCH THE VARIOUS CONSPIRACY THEORIES. WE KNOW OF SOME ORGANIZATIONS THAT WILL MOST LIKELY PUT THE INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SYTEMS SO IT CAN BE EASILY SEARCHED.

D. WHAT IF I DON'T WANT MY NAME RELEASED?
YOU AND WE WILL HAVE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED REVIEW BOARD THAT YOUR SITUATION MEETS THE CRITERIA PROVIDED IN THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS. (TO BE ABSOLUTELY FRANK, THIS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DO AND THE VERY FEW CASES WHICH WE HAVE WON HAVE BEEN BASED ON VERY SPECIFIC AND COMPELLING REASONS.)

E. WHAT DO I DO NEXT?
IF RELEASE OF YOUR NAME IS NOT A PROBLEM, PLEASE ADVISE. IF YOU DO NOT WANT YOUR NAME RELEASED, YOU NEED TO ADVISE US OF THAT FACT AND EXPLAIN IN DETAIL WHY RLEASE WOULD BE HARMFUL TO YOU AND NATIONAL SECURITY. WE HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST RELEASE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COVER MECHANISM WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE, AND WE

WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT. THE BOARD HAS NOT BEEN AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BECOME SYMPATHETIC TO A PRINCIPLE-BASED ARGUMENT.

F. IF MY NAME IS RELEASED, WHAT ABOUT MY COVER STATUS?
THE IMPACT OF THE RELEASE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF YOUR TRUE NAME AND THE AGENCY WILL HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE THE VIABILITY OF CONTINUED COVER PROTECTION.

[redacted] DRV FROM: COV-2-87.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100727595
ORIG: OCC/EXO/[redacted]

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 97-7895762 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: AF/SG (634) INFO: AFDORECORD, CIC/AF, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGAF, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/AF, RYBAT, FILE (2/W)

97 7895762 ASR PAGE 001 IN 7895762
TOR: 141025Z MAY 97 HARE 74725

SECRET 141026Z MAY 97 STAFF

CITE HARARE 74725

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMITED DISSEM AF/SG INFO CIC/AF

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT BRACERB

SUBJECT: CONTACT REPORT WITH - BRACERB/17, 201-0969314

REF: A. HARARE 74714 97 7885941
B. HARARE 74711 97 7884733

TEXT:

1. A. PARTICIPANTS -
ASSET CRYPT: BRACERB/17
TYPE ASSET: RECRUITED
C/O: PHALEN
OTHER(S):
B. OPS ALIASES USED -
ASSET ALIAS:
C/O ALIAS:
OTHER(S) ALIAS:
C. DATE OF MEETING: 12 MAY 97
D. TIME OF MEETING: 1545-1630
E. TYPE OF MEETING: PERSONAL
F. (1) PLACE(S) OF MEETING: COS RESIDENCE PATIO
(2) MAP GRID:
G. NEXT MEETING -
DATE: 13 MAY 97
TIME: 1045
TYPE: BRUSH PASS
* PLACE: <EXECUTIVE>HEALTH CLUB LOCKEROOM
MAP GRID:
ALTERNATE:

2. A. OPERATIONAL: SEE REF A REGARDING UPCOMING HQS TRIP. COS RETURNED A/17 AND SPOUSE'S PASSPORTS WITH 10 YEAR MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS, WHICH PLEASED AGENT. A/17 GAVE COS UPDATED TELTAP REPORT FROM UNILATERAL SUBSOURCE BRCOYOTE/1. AGENT REPORTED THAT NEXT WEEK HE

SECRET

WILL BE TDY IN MALAWI WHERE HE WILL HAVE A SITDOWN SESSION WITH MAC; COS URGED A/17 TO GET MORE FI/CI ON SANDF EFFORTS AGAINST ZIMBABWE, ADDING THAT THE LAST REPORT WAS WELL RECEIVED. COS ALSO TASKED AGENT ON ZAIRE.

B. INTELLIGENCE: WRITTEN REPORT FROM SUBSOURCE MAC, WHO OBTAINED FROM VPMARTIAL/1 IN LUSAKA. WILL REPORT SEPARATELY. A LENGTHY AND BIZARRE ACCOUNT OF<JFK>CONSPIRACY WRITTEN BY NECROMANCER ROY ROBIN ((MULLINS)), DPOB: 24 JUN 42, ENGLAND, A FORMER CIO OFFICER. BEFORE RAISING THE TOPIC, A/17 ASKED COS NOT TO LAUGH, AND COS PROMISED, ONLY TO BREAK HIS WORD ONCE HE STARTED LEAFING THROUGH THE CONTENTS. A/17 JOKED THAT HE WOULD NEVER FORGIVE COS, WHO RETURNED THE DOCUMENT TO AGENT.

C. ADMINISTRATIVE -
SALARY:
AGENT OPS EXPENSES:
C/O OPS EXPENSES: DRINKS AND SNACKS
OTHER:

D. PLANS AND OTHER ACTION ITEMS: NEED TO PAY BRCOYOTE/1'S NEXT SALARY. PER REF B, CONFIRM WIRE TRANSFER OF ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGE FOR SUBSOURCE MAC. PASS FUNDS FOR AGENT'S TRAVEL, SET FOR BRUSHPASS NEXT DAY.

E. COMMUNICATION PLAN (CHANGES ONLY) -
SCHEDULED:
ALTERNATE:
VARIANT:
EMERGENCY CONTACT -
C/O TO AGENT:
AGENT TO C/O:
RESERVE:
RECONTACT -
C/O TO AGENT:
AGENT TO C/O:

3. A. SECURITY/CI -
C/O PROBLEMS/INCIDENTS: NONE
AGENT PROBLEMS/INCIDENTS: NONE
ATMOSPHERICS: SUPERB. AGENT IS EXCITED ABOUT HIS U.S. TRIP.

B. ASSET VALIDATION/OPS TESTING:

C. SDR ROUTES -
(1) SDR GOING -
BEGIN TIME:
BEGIN LOCATION:
BEGIN MAP GRID:
MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
COMMENTS:
(A) COVER STOP NUMBER 1:
MAP GRID:
TIME OF STOP:
TIME OF DEPARTURE:
MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
COMMENTS:
(B) COVER STOP NUMBER 2:
MAP GRID:
TIME OF STOP:
TIME OF DEPARTURE:

MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
COMMENTS:

(2) SDR RETURNING -
RETURN TIME:
RETURN LOCATION:
RETURN MAP GRID:
MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
COMMENTS:

(A) RETURN COVER STOP NUMBER 1:
MAP GRID:
TIME OF STOP:
TIME OF DEPARTURE:
MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
COMMENTS:

(B) RETURN COVER STOP NUMBER 2:
MAP GRID:
TIME OF STOP:
TIME OF DEPARTURE:
MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
COMMENTS:

CL BY 0721195 CL REASON 1.5C DECL ON X1

4. FILE: BRACERB/17. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

MHFNO: 97-7236799 SECRET SENSIND:

SECRET

FRP: ,2, , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: C/OCC (321) INFO: EUR/GA, EUR/LGL, LIMITED, MDSX, OCDORECORD, ODPD, ORMS/EUR, FILE (O/W)

97 7236799 ASP

PAGE 001
TOR: 131758Z MAR 97

IN 7236799
BONN 99857

SECRET 131756Z MAR 97 STAFF

CITE BONN 99857 (BLACKANUM ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMITED DISSEM CHIEF/OCC INFO EUR/GA, EUR/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: DIRECTOR 258926 97 7161666

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI.

2. ACOS CONTACTED SUBJECT REF WHO VISITED HER IN THE STATION AFTERNOON 12 MARCH. HE READ REF TEARLINE AND WENT THROUGH REF PARA 3 A-F QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. SUBJECT SAID THAT IN HIS CASE, GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE MIGHT BE FOUND UNDER SUBPARAS 3 AND 4. HE NOTED THAT HE IS LIVING OVERSEAS UNDER COVER AND THAT REVELATION OF HIS ASSOCIATION WITH TQHIGHROAD WOULD INVADE HIS PRIVACY AND COULD POSE A SECURITY PROBLEM. SUBJECT ALSO ASKED FOR ANY INFORMATION REGARDING THE DOCUMENTS WITH WHICH HIS NAME IS ASSOCIATED, AS HE HAD NO RECOLLECTION AT ALL OF ANY INVOLVEMENT WITH
*AN INVESTIGATION OR CORRESPONDENCE RELATED TO THE<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION.> FOR THE RECORD, SUBJECT'S ADDRESS PROVIDED IN IDEN REF IS ACCURATE.

3. CL BY 0526335 CL REASON 1.5 (C). DECL ON: X1.

4. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE: 1

MHFNO: 97-7175531 SENSIND:

SECRET ERP: 2, , , , , ,

/ /

STAFF

ACTION: C/OCC (320) INFO: LA/FIG, LA/FIGCC, LIMITED, MDSX, OCDORECORD, ODPD, ORMS/LA, FILE, C/LA/RB4, DC/LA/RB2 (3/W)

97 7175531 ASP PAGE 001 IN 7175531
TOR: 072251Z MAR 97 SJOS 36861

SECRET 072251Z MAR 97 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 36861

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMITED DISSEM CHIEF/OCC INFO LA/FIGCC

SLUGS: WNINTEL

*SUBJECT: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH FORMER EMPLOYEE CONCERNING<JFK>
* <ASSASSINATION>RECORD COLLECTION ACT

REF: DIRECTOR 256618 97 7145484

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: FYI.

2. ON 7 MARCH 1997, COS MET WITH IDEN TO REF (SUBJECT) TO PASS SUBJECT REF TEAR LINE ALERTING HIM THAT HIS NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO PUBLIC UNDER
*<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORD COLLECTION ACT. SUBJECT READ THE TEAR LINE CAREFULLY AND ASKED QUESTIONS WHICH WERE COVERED IN THE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN REF. SUBJECT SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE RELEASE OF HIS NAME. SUBJECT NOTED HE HAD BEEN COS IN SAN JOSE IN 1971 WHEN HE WAS SUBJECT OF A PNG ACTION BY HOST GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS HEAVILY PUBLICIZED IN THE LOCAL PRESS. THEREFORE, HE FEELS HE IS ALREADY WELL KNOWN IN COSTA RICA AND FURTHER PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WILL NOT DO HIM ANY HARM. SUBJECT WAS IMPRESSED AND GRATEFUL THAT TQHIGHROAD PROVIDED HIM WITH A HEADS UP ON THIS ISSUE.

3. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2024831, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82
END-OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: DC/OCC, EUR/GA, EUR/LGL, LIMITED, MDSX,
OCDORECORD, ODPD, FILE (0/P)

97 7161666 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 070023Z MAR 97 DIRECTOR 258926

S E C R E T
STAFF 070023Z DIRECTOR 258926
TO: PRIORITY BONN.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CHIEF/OCC INFO EUR/GA, EUR/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDES IN WACHTBERG-PECH.

* 2. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING THE INFORMATION BELOW TO IDEN.

-----------------------------TEAR LINE-----------------------------

4 MARCH 1997

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526 *OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THOSE EXCEPTIONS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE ACT FOLLOW. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR PERSON(S) YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU

BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE CONTACT BETH MILLS AT (703) 356-0285 OR 1-800-447-2211 OR VIA LETTER TO P.O. BOX 1626, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20013. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. (SEE FOLLOWING GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OR RECORDS.) IF THE BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BECAUSE THE BOARD MUST COVER HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, IT WILL BE CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS AT AN ACCELERATING PACE AND WE CANNOT PROJECT WHEN IT MAY REVIEW A DOCUMENT CONTAINING YOUR NAME. THEREFORE, PLEASE CONTACT ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF APPROPRIATE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED BETH MILLS)

FOLLOWS ARE THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS:

*DISCLOSURE OF<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS OR PARTICULAR INFORMATION IN
*<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS TO THE PUBLIC MAY BE POSTPONED SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS ACT IF THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT--

(1) THE THREAT TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
*POSED BY THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>IS OF SUCH GRAVITY THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SUCH PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL--

(A) AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHOSE IDENTITY CURRENTLY REQUIRES PROTECTION

(B) AN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE OR METHOD WHICH IS CURRENTLY UTILIZED, BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WHICH HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY DISCLOSED, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; OR

(C) ANY OTHER MATTER CURRENTLY RELATING TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRABLY IMPAIR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

* (2) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL THE NAME OR IDENTITY OF A LIVING PERSON WHO PROVIDED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD POSE A SUBSTANTIAL RISK TO THAT PERSON;

* (3) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CONSTITUTE AN UNWARRANTED INVASION OF

PERSONAL PRIVACY, AND THAT INVASION OF PRIVACY IS SO SUBSTANTIAL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST;

* (4) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD COMPROMISE THE EXISTENCE OF AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFIDENTIALITY CURRENTLY REQUIRING PROTECTION BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AGENT AND A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL OR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST; OR

* (5) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL A SECURITY OR PROTECTIVE PROCEDURE CURRENTLY UTILIZED, OR REASONABLY EXPECTED TO BE UTILIZED, BY THE SECRET SERVICE OR ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

------------------------------TEAR
LINE---------------------------

3. IF STATION WANTS, YOU MAY OFFER IDEN THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATING WITH HEADQUARTERS VIA CABLE TRAFFIC RATHER THAN BY TELEPHONE OR LETTER. IN MANY CASES THE RESPONSE CONTAINS SENSITIVE IF NOT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. ALL PREVIOUS RECIPIENTS OF THIS LETTER HAVE HAD CONCERNS OR QUESTIONS; FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:

*A. WHY IS MY NAME IN THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS?
WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY BUT YOUR NAME MAY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN A CABLE OR DOCUMENT, OR YOU MAY HAVE COORDINATED OR SIGNED A CABLE
*OR DOCUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE<ASSASSINATION.>

B. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?
IT MEANS YOUR NAME WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL
*DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE<ASSASSINATION.> THE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA) WITH THE NAME REMOVED AND IF WE DO NOT MAKE A COMPELLING CASE THE PRESIDENTIAL BOARD WILL RELEASE NEW VERSIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS WITH THE NAMES. THE FIRST REVIEW OF NAMES WILL BE THIS SUMMER AND IT WILL CONTINUE AS DOCUMENTS ARE REVIEWED. ONCE THE BOARD RULES THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION MUST BE RELEASED IN 30 DAYS.

C. WHAT EXACTLY DOES "RELEASE" MEAN?
IT MEANS THE GENERAL PUBLIC WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE DOCUMENT VIA NARA. THERE ARE PROFESSIONAL RESEARCHERS WAITING FOR ACCESS TO THE MATERIAL SO THAT THEY CAN RESEARCH THE VARIOUS CONSPIRACY THEORIES. WE KNOW OF SOME ORGANIZATIONS THAT WILL MOST LIKELY PUT THE INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS SO IT CAN BE EASILY SEARCHED.

D. WHAT IF I DON'T WANT MY NAME RELEASED?
YOU AND WE WILL HAVE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED REVIEW BOARD THAT YOUR SITUATION MEETS THE CRITERIA PROVIDED IN THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS. (TO BE ABSOLUTELY FRANK, THIS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DO AND THE VERY FEW CASES WHICH WE HAVE WON HAVE BEEN BASED ON VERY SPECIFIC

AND COMPELLING REASONS.)

E. WHAT DO I DO NEXT?
IF RELEASE OF YOUR NAME IS NOT A PROBLEM, YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING. IF YOU DO NOT WANT YOUR NAME RELEASED, YOU NEED TO ADVISE US OF THAT FACT AND EXPLAIN IN DETAIL WHY RELEASE WOULD BE HARMFUL TO YOU AND NATIONAL SECURITY. WE HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST RELEASE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COVER MECHANISM WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE, AND WE WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT. THE BOARD HAS NOT BEEN AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BECOME SYMPATHETIC TO A PRINCIPLE BASED ARGUMENT.

F. IF MY NAME IS RELEASED, WHAT ABOUT MY COVER STATUS?
THE IMPACT OF THE RELEASE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF YOUR TRUE NAME AND THE AGENCY WILL HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE THE VIABILITY OF CONTINUED COVER PROTECTION.

FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2224018, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100640333
ORIG: CHIEF/OCC(WILLMSC, 32357); AUTH: DC/OCC; COORD: EUR/LGL (CRAWFORD); REL: EUR/GA (BERLIN).

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: DC/OCC, LA/MXG, LA/MXO, LA/MXSTB, LIMITED, MDSX, OCDORECORD, ODPD, FILE, C/LA/RB5, DC/LA/RB5 (3/P)

97 7157685 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 061858Z MAR 97 DIRECTOR 257906

SECRET
STAFF 061858Z DIRECTOR 257906
TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CHIEF/OCC INFO LA/MXG

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEES WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDE IN MEXICO.

* 2. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING THE INFORMATION BELOW TO IDENS A AND B.

-----------------------------TEAR LINE-----------------------------

4 MARCH 1997

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526 *OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THOSE EXCEPTIONS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE ACT FOLLOW. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR PERSON(S) YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU

BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE CONTACT BETH MILLS AT (703) 356-0285 OR 1-800-447-2211 OR VIA LETTER TO P.O. BOX 1626, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20013. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. (SEE FOLLOWING GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OR RECORDS.) IF THE BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BECAUSE THE BOARD MUST COVER HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, IT WILL BE CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS AT AN ACCELERATING PACE AND WE CANNOT PROJECT WHEN IT MAY REVIEW A DOCUMENT CONTAINING YOUR NAME. THEREFORE, PLEASE CONTACT ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF APPROPRIATE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED BETH MILLS)

FOLLOWS ARE THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS:

*DISCLOSURE OF<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS OR PARTICULAR INFORMATION IN
*<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS TO THE PUBLIC MAY BE POSTPONED SUBJECT TO
THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS ACT IF THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE THAT--

(1) THE THREAT TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS, OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
*POSED BY THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>IS OF SUCH
GRAVITY THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SUCH PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL--

(A) AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHOSE IDENTITY CURRENTLY REQUIRES PROTECTION

(B) AN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE OR METHOD WHICH IS CURRENTLY UTILIZED, BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WHICH HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY DISCLOSED, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; OR

(C) ANY OTHER MATTER CURRENTLY RELATING TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRABLY IMPAIR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

* (2) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD
REVEAL THE NAME OR IDENTITY OF A LIVING PERSON WHO PROVIDED
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD POSE A
SUBSTANTIAL RISK TO THAT PERSON;

* (3) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD COULD
REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CONSTITUTE AN UNWARRANTED INVASION OF

PERSONAL PRIVACY, AND THAT INVASION OF PRIVACY IS SO SUBSTANTIAL
THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST;

* (4) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD
COMPROMISE THE EXISTENCE OF AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFIDENTIALITY
CURRENTLY REQUIRING PROTECTION BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AGENT AND A
COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL OR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC
INTEREST; OR

* (5) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD
REVEAL A SECURITY OR PROTECTIVE PROCEDURE CURRENTLY UTILIZED, OR
REASONABLY EXPECTED TO BE UTILIZED, BY THE SECRET SERVICE OR
ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT
OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

------------------------------TEAR
LINE----------------------------

3. IF STATION WANTS, YOU MAY OFFER IDENS THE POSSIBILITY OF
COMMUNICATING WITH HEADQUARTERS VIA CABLE TRAFFIC RATHER THAN BY
TELEPHONE OR LETTER. IN MANY CASES THE RESPONSE CONTAINS
SENSITIVE IF NOT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. ALL PREVIOUS RECIPIENTS
OF THIS LETTER HAVE HAD CONCERNS OR QUESTIONS; FOLLOWING ARE
ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:

*A. WHY IS MY NAME IN THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS?
WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY BUT YOUR NAME MAY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN A
CABLE OR DOCUMENT, OR YOU MAY HAVE COORDINATED OR SIGNED A CABLE
*OR DOCUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE<ASSASSINATION.>

B. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?
IT MEANS YOUR NAME WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL
*DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE<ASSASSINATION.> THE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN
RELEASED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
(NARA) WITH THE NAME REMOVED AND IF WE DO NOT MAKE A COMPELLING
CASE THE PRESIDENTIAL BOARD WILL RELEASE NEW VERSIONS OF THE
DOCUMENTS WITH THE NAMES. THE FIRST REVIEW OF NAMES WILL BE THIS
SUMMER AND IT WILL CONTINUE AS DOCUMENTS ARE REVIEWED. ONCE THE
BOARD RULES THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION MUST BE RELEASED IN 30 DAYS.

C. WHAT EXACTLY DOES "RELEASE" MEAN?
IT MEANS THE GENERAL PUBLIC WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE DOCUMENT VIA
NARA. THERE ARE PROFESSIONAL RESEARCHERS WAITING FOR ACCESS TO
THE MATERIAL SO THAT THEY CAN RESEARCH THE VARIOUS CONSPIRACY
THEORIES. WE KNOW OF SOME ORGANIZATIONS THAT WILL MOST LIKELY PUT
THE INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS SO IT CAN BE EASILY SEARCHED.

D. WHAT IF I DON'T WANT MY NAME RELEASED?
YOU AND WE WILL HAVE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED
REVIEW BOARD THAT YOUR SITUATION MEETS THE CRITERIA PROVIDED IN
THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS. (TO
BE ABSOLUTELY FRANK, THIS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DO AND THE
VERY FEW CASES WHICH WE HAVE WON HAVE BEEN BASED ON VERY SPECIFIC

AND COMPELLING REASONS.)

E. WHAT DO I DO NEXT?
IF RELEASE OF YOUR NAME IS NOT A PROBLEM, YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING. IF YOU DO NOT WANT YOUR NAME RELEASED, YOU NEED TO ADVISE US OF THAT FACT AND EXPLAIN IN DETAIL WHY RELEASE WOULD BE HARMFUL TO YOU AND NATIONAL SECURITY. WE HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST RELEASE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COVER MECHANISM WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE, AND WE WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT. THE BOARD HAS NOT BEEN AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BECOME SYMPATHETIC TO A PRINCIPLE BASED ARGUMENT.

F. IF MY NAME IS RELEASED, WHAT ABOUT MY COVER STATUS?
THE IMPACT OF THE RELEASE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF YOUR TRUE NAME AND THE AGENCY WILL HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE THE VIABILITY OF CONTINUED COVER PROTECTION.

FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2224018, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON:
X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100639620
ORIG: CHIEF/OCC (WILLMSC, 32357); AUTH: DC/OCC; REL: LA/MXG. (

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

MHFNO: 97-7153251 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: DC/OCC, LA/FIG, LA/FIGSC, LA/LGL, LIMITED, MDSX, OCDORECORD, ODPD, FILE, C/LA/RB5, DC/LA/RB5 (3/P)

97 7153251 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 061358Z MAR 97 DIRECTOR 257221

S E C R E T
STAFF 061358Z DIRECTOR 257221
TO: PRIORITY CARACAS.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CHIEF/OCC INFO LA/FIGSC, LA/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDES IN CARACAS.

* 2. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING THE INFORMATION BELOW TO IDEN.

------------------------------TEAR LINE------------------------------

4 MARCH 1997

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526 *OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THOSE EXCEPTIONS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE ACT FOLLOW. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR PERSON(S) YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU

SECRET

BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE CONTACT BETH MILLS AT (703) 356-0285 OR 1-800-447-2211 OR VIA LETTER TO P.O. BOX 1626, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20013. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. (SEE FOLLOWING GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OR RECORDS.) IF THE BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BECAUSE THE BOARD MUST COVER HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, IT WILL BE CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS AT AN ACCELERATING PACE AND WE CANNOT PROJECT WHEN IT MAY REVIEW A DOCUMENT CONTAINING YOUR NAME. THEREFORE, PLEASE CONTACT ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF APPROPRIATE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED BETH MILLS)

FOLLOWS ARE THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS:

*DISCLOSURE OF<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS OR PARTICULAR INFORMATION IN
*<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS TO THE PUBLIC MAY BE POSTPONED SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS ACT IF THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT--

(1) THE THREAT TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
*POSED BY THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>IS OF SUCH GRAVITY THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SUCH PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL--

(A) AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHOSE IDENTITY CURRENTLY REQUIRES PROTECTION

(B) AN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE OR METHOD WHICH IS CURRENTLY UTILIZED, BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WHICH HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY DISCLOSED, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; OR

(C) ANY OTHER MATTER CURRENTLY RELATING TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRABLY IMPAIR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

* (2) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL THE NAME OR IDENTITY OF A LIVING PERSON WHO PROVIDED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD POSE A SUBSTANTIAL RISK TO THAT PERSON;

* (3) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CONSTITUTE AN UNWARRANTED INVASION OF

PERSONAL PRIVACY, AND THAT INVASION OF PRIVACY IS SO SUBSTANTIAL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST;

* (4) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD COMPROMISE THE EXISTENCE OF AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFIDENTIALITY CURRENTLY REQUIRING PROTECTION BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AGENT AND A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL OR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST; OR

* (5) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL A SECURITY OR PROTECTIVE PROCEDURE CURRENTLY UTILIZED, OR REASONABLY EXPECTED TO BE UTILIZED, BY THE SECRET SERVICE OR ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

------------------------------TEAR
LINE---------------------------

3. IF STATION WANTS, YOU MAY OFFER IDEN THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATING WITH HEADQUARTERS VIA CABLE TRAFFIC RATHER THAN BY TELEPHONE OR LETTER. IN MANY CASES THE RESPONSE CONTAINS SENSITIVE IF NOT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. ALL PREVIOUS RECIPIENTS OF THIS LETTER HAVE HAD CONCERNS OR QUESTIONS; FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:

*A. WHY IS MY NAME IN THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS?
WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY BUT YOUR NAME MAY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN A CABLE OR DOCUMENT, OR YOU MAY HAVE COORDINATED OR SIGNED A CABLE
*OR DOCUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE<ASSASSINATION.>

B. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?
IT MEANS YOUR NAME WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL
*DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE<ASSASSINATION.> THE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA) WITH THE NAME REMOVED AND IF WE DO NOT MAKE A COMPELLING CASE THE PRESIDENTIAL BOARD WILL RELEASE NEW VERSIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS WITH THE NAMES. THE FIRST REVIEW OF NAMES WILL BE THIS SUMMER AND IT WILL CONTINUE AS DOCUMENTS ARE REVIEWED. ONCE THE BOARD RULES THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION MUST BE RELEASED IN 30 DAYS.

C. WHAT EXACTLY DOES "RELEASE" MEAN?
IT MEANS THE GENERAL PUBLIC WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE DOCUMENT VIA NARA. THERE ARE PROFESSIONAL RESEARCHERS WAITING FOR ACCESS TO THE MATERIAL SO THAT THEY CAN RESEARCH THE VARIOUS CONSPIRACY THEORIES. WE KNOW OF SOME ORGANIZATIONS THAT WILL MOST LIKELY PUT THE INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS SO IT CAN BE EASILY SEARCHED.

D. WHAT IF I DON'T WANT MY NAME RELEASED?
YOU AND WE WILL HAVE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED REVIEW BOARD THAT YOUR SITUATION MEETS THE CRITERIA PROVIDED IN THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS. (TO BE ABSOLUTELY FRANK, THIS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DO AND THE VERY FEW CASES WHICH WE HAVE WON HAVE BEEN BASED ON VERY SPECIFIC

AND COMPELLING REASONS.)

E. WHAT DO I DO NEXT?
IF RELEASE OF YOUR NAME IS NOT A PROBLEM, YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING. IF YOU DO NOT WANT YOUR NAME RELEASED, YOU NEED TO ADVISE US OF THAT FACT AND EXPLAIN IN DETAIL WHY RELEASE WOULD BE HARMFUL TO YOU AND NATIONAL SECURITY. WE HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST RELEASE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COVER MECHANISM WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE, AND WE WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT. THE BOARD HAS NOT BEEN AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BECOME SYMPATHETIC TO A PRINCIPLE BASED ARGUMENT. INSTEAD, THEY REVIEW EACH CASE ON ITS MERITS AND THAT IS WHY YOUR INPUT, IN AS SPECIFIC DETAIL AS POSSIBLE, IS CRITICAL IF YOU WISH YOUR NAME NOT TO BE RELEASED.

F. IF MY NAME IS RELEASED, WHAT ABOUT MY COVER STATUS?
THE IMPACT OF THE RELEASE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF YOUR TRUE NAME AND THE AGENCY WILL HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE THE VIABILITY OF CONTINUED COVER PROTECTION.

4. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2224018, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100639235
ORIG: CHIEF/OCC(WILLMSC,32357); AUTH: DC/OCC; COORD: LA/LGL (EATINGER); REL: LA/FIGSC.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: DC/OCC, EA/CTIO, LIMITED, MDSX, OCDORECORD, ODPD, FILE (0/P)

97 7147525 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 060123Z MAR 97 DIRECTOR 257065

SECRET
STAFF 060123Z DIRECTOR 257065
TO: PRIORITY HONG KONG.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CHIEF/OCC INFO EA/CTIO

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDES IN HONG KONG.

* 2. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING THE INFORMATION BELOW TO IDEN.

------------------------------TEAR LINE------------------------------

4 MARCH 1997

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526 *OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THOSE EXCEPTIONS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE ACT FOLLOW. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR PERSON(S) YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU

BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE CONTACT BETH MILLS AT (703) 356-0286 OR 1-800-447-2211 OR VIA LETTER TO P.O. BOX 1626, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20013. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. (SEE FOLLOWING GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OR RECORDS.) IF THE BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BECAUSE THE BOARD MUST COVER HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, IT WILL BE CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS AT AN ACCELERATING PACE AND WE CANNOT PROJECT WHEN IT MAY REVIEW A DOCUMENT CONTAINING YOUR NAME. THEREFORE, PLEASE CONTACT ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF APPROPRIATE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED BETH MILLS)

FOLLOWS ARE THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS:

*DISCLOSURE OF<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS OR PARTICULAR INFORMATION IN
*<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS TO THE PUBLIC MAY BE POSTPONED SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS ACT IF THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT--

(1) THE THREAT TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
*POSED BY THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>IS OF SUCH GRAVITY THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SUCH PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL--

(A) AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHOSE IDENTITY CURRENTLY REQUIRES PROTECTION

(B) AN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE OR METHOD WHICH IS CURRENTLY UTILIZED, BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WHICH HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY DISCLOSED, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; OR

(C) ANY OTHER MATTER CURRENTLY RELATING TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRABLY IMPAIR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

* (2) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL THE NAME OR IDENTITY OF A LIVING PERSON WHO PROVIDED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD POSE A SUBSTANTIAL RISK TO THAT PERSON;

* (3) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CONSTITUTE AN UNWARRANTED INVASION OF

PERSONAL PRIVACY, AND THAT INVASION OF PRIVACY IS SO SUBSTANTIAL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST;

* (4) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD COMPROMISE THE EXISTENCE OF AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFIDENTIALITY CURRENTLY REQUIRING PROTECTION BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AGENT AND A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL OR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST; OR

* (5) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL A SECURITY OR PROTECTIVE PROCEDURE CURRENTLY UTILIZED, OR REASONABLY EXPECTED TO BE UTILIZED, BY THE SECRET SERVICE OR ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

------------------------------TEAR
LINE----------------------------

3. IF STATION WANTS, YOU MAY OFFER IDEN THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATING WITH HEADQUARTERS VIA CABLE TRAFFIC RATHER THAN BY TELEPHONE OR LETTER. IN MANY CASES THE RESPONSE CONTAINS SENSITIVE IF NOT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. ALL PREVIOUS RECIPIENTS OF THIS LETTER HAVE HAD CONCERNS OR QUESTIONS; FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:

*A. WHY IS MY NAME IN THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS?
WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY BUT YOUR NAME MAY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN A CABLE OR DOCUMENT, OR YOU MAY HAVE COORDINATED OR SIGNED A CABLE
*OR DOCUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE<ASSASSINATION.>

B. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?
IT MEANS YOUR NAME WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL
*DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE<ASSASSINATION.> THE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA) WITH THE NAME REMOVED AND IF WE DO NOT MAKE A COMPELLING CASE THE PRESIDENTIAL BOARD WILL RELEASE NEW VERSIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS WITH THE NAMES. THE FIRST REVIEW OF NAMES WILL BE THIS SUMMER AND IT WILL CONTINUE AS DOCUMENTS ARE REVIEWED. ONCE THE BOARD RULES THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION MUST BE RELEASED IN 30 DAYS.

C. WHAT EXACTLY DOES "RELEASE" MEAN?
IT MEANS THE GENERAL PUBLIC WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE DOCUMENT VIA NARA. THERE ARE PROFESSIONAL RESEARCHERS WAITING FOR ACCESS TO THE MATERIAL SO THAT THEY CAN RESEARCH THE VARIOUS CONSPIRACY THEORIES. WE KNOW OF SOME ORGANIZATIONS THAT WILL MOST LIKELY PUT THE INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS SO IT CAN BE EASILY SEARCHED.

D. WHAT IF I DON'T WANT MY NAME RELEASED?
YOU AND WE WILL HAVE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED REVIEW BOARD THAT YOUR SITUATION MEETS THE CRITERIA PROVIDED IN THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS. (TO BE ABSOLUTELY FRANK, THIS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DO AND THE VERY FEW CASES WHICH WE HAVE WON HAVE BEEN BASED ON VERY SPECIFIC

AND COMPELLING REASONS.)

E. WHAT DO I DO NEXT?
IF RELEASE OF YOUR NAME IS NOT A PROBLEM, YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING. IF YOU DO NOT WANT YOUR NAME RELEASED, YOU NEED TO ADVISE US OF THAT FACT AND EXPLAIN IN DETAIL WHY RELEASE WOULD BE HARMFUL TO YOU AND NATIONAL SECURITY. WE HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST RELEASE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COVER MECHANISM WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE, AND WE WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT. THE BOARD HAS NOT BEEN AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BECOME SYMPATHETIC TO A PRINCIPLE BASED ARGUMENT.

F. IF MY NAME IS RELEASED, WHAT ABOUT MY COVER STATUS?
THE IMPACT OF THE RELEASE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF YOUR TRUE NAME AND THE AGENCY WILL HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE THE VIABILITY OF CONTINUED COVER PROTECTION.

4. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2224018, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100639136
ORIG: CHIEF/OCC(WILLMSC,32357); AUTH: DC/OCC; REL: EA/CTIO(TWOMBLY).

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: DC/OCC, LA/FIG, LA/FIGCC, LIMITED, MDSX,
OCDORECORD, ODPD, FILE, C/LA/RB5, DC/LA/RB5 (3/P)

97 7145484 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 052149Z MAR 97 DIRECTOR 256618

SECRET
STAFF 052149Z DIRECTOR 256618
TO: PRIORITY SAN JOSE.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CHIEF/OCC INFO LA/FIGCC

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDES IN COSTA RICA.

* 2. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING THE INFORMATION BELOW TO IDEN.

-----------------------------TEAR
LINE-----------------------------

4 MARCH 1997

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526
*OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THOSE EXCEPTIONS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE ACT FOLLOW. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR PERSON(S) YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU

BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE CONTACT BETH MILLS AT (703) 356-0285 OR 1-800-447-2211 OR VIA LETTER TO P.O. BOX 1626, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20013. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. (SEE FOLLOWING GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OR RECORDS.) IF THE BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BECAUSE THE BOARD MUST COVER HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, IT WILL BE CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS AT AN ACCELERATING PACE AND WE CANNOT PROJECT WHEN IT MAY REVIEW A DOCUMENT CONTAINING YOUR NAME. THEREFORE, PLEASE CONTACT ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF APPROPRIATE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED BETH MILLS)

FOLLOWS ARE THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS:

*DISCLOSURE OF<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS OR PARTICULAR INFORMATION IN *<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS TO THE PUBLIC MAY BE POSTPONED SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS ACT IF THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT--

(1) THE THREAT TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES *POSED BY THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>IS OF SUCH GRAVITY THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SUCH PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL--

(A) AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHOSE IDENTITY CURRENTLY REQUIRES PROTECTION

(B) AN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE OR METHOD WHICH IS CURRENTLY UTILIZED, BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WHICH HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY DISCLOSED, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; OR

(C) ANY OTHER MATTER CURRENTLY RELATING TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRABLY IMPAIR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

*(2) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL THE NAME OR IDENTITY OF A LIVING PERSON WHO PROVIDED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD POSE A SUBSTANTIAL RISK TO THAT PERSON;

*(3) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CONSTITUTE AN UNWARRANTED INVASION OF

PERSONAL PRIVACY, AND THAT INVASION OF PRIVACY IS SO SUBSTANTIAL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST;

* (4) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD COMPROMISE THE EXISTENCE OF AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFIDENTIALITY CURRENTLY REQUIRING PROTECTION BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AGENT AND A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL OR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST; OR

* (5) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL A SECURITY OR PROTECTIVE PROCEDURE CURRENTLY UTILIZED, OR REASONABLY EXPECTED TO BE UTILIZED, BY THE SECRET SERVICE OR ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

------------------------------TEAR
LINE----------------------------

3. IF STATION WANTS, YOU MAY OFFER IDEN THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATING WITH HEADQUARTERS VIA CABLE TRAFFIC RATHER THAN BY TELEPHONE OR LETTER. IN MANY CASES THE RESPONSE CONTAINS SENSITIVE IF NOT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. ALL PREVIOUS RECIPIENTS OF THIS LETTER HAVE HAD CONCERNS OR QUESTIONS; FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:

*A. WHY IS MY NAME IN THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS?
WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY BUT YOUR NAME MAY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN A CABLE OR DOCUMENT, OR YOU MAY HAVE COORDINATED OR SIGNED A CABLE
*OR DOCUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE<ASSASSINATION.>

B. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?
IT MEANS YOUR NAME WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL
*DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE<ASSASSINATION.> THE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA) WITH THE NAME REMOVED AND IF WE DO NOT MAKE A COMPELLING CASE THE PRESIDENTIAL BOARD WILL RELEASE NEW VERSIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS WITH THE NAMES. THE FIRST REVIEW OF NAMES WILL BE THIS SUMMER AND IT WILL CONTINUE AS DOCUMENTS ARE REVIEWED. ONCE THE BOARD RULES THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION MUST BE RELEASED IN 30 DAYS.

C. WHAT EXACTLY DOES "RELEASE" MEAN?
IT MEANS THE GENERAL PUBLIC WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE DOCUMENT VIA NARA. THERE ARE PROFESSIONAL RESEARCHERS WAITING FOR ACCESS TO THE MATERIAL SO THAT THEY CAN RESEARCH THE VARIOUS CONSPIRACY THEORIES. WE KNOW OF SOME ORGANIZATIONS THAT WILL MOST LIKELY PUT THE INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS SO IT CAN BE EASILY SEARCHED.

D. WHAT IF I DON'T WANT MY NAME RELEASED?
YOU AND WE WILL HAVE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED REVIEW BOARD THAT YOUR SITUATION MEETS THE CRITERIA PROVIDED IN THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS. (TO BE ABSOLUTELY FRANK, THIS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DO AND THE VERY FEW CASES WHICH WE HAVE WON HAVE BEEN BASED ON VERY SPECIFIC

AND COMPELLING REASONS.)

E. WHAT DO I DO NEXT?
IF RELEASE OF YOUR NAME IS NOT A PROBLEM, YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING. IF YOU DO NOT WANT YOUR NAME RELEASED, YOU NEED TO ADVISE US OF THAT FACT AND EXPLAIN IN DETAIL WHY RELEASE WOULD BE HARMFUL TO YOU AND NATIONAL SECURITY. WE HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST RELEASE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COVER MECHANISM WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE, AND WE WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT. THE BOARD HAS NOT BEEN AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BECOME SYMPATHETIC TO A PRINCIPLE BASED ARGUMENT.

F. IF MY NAME IS RELEASED, WHAT ABOUT MY COVER STATUS?
THE IMPACT OF THE RELEASE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF YOUR TRUE NAME AND THE AGENCY WILL HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE THE VIABILITY OF CONTINUED COVER PROTECTION.

FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2224018, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON:
X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100638758
ORIG: CHIEF/OCC(WILLMSC,32357); AUTH: DC/OCC; REL: LA/FIGCC>

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: DC/OCC, EUR/FRS, EUR/FRSF, LIMITED, MDSX,
OCDORECORD, ODPD, FILE (0/P)

97 7145001 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 052116Z MAR 97 DIRECTOR 256520

S E C R E T
STAFF 052116Z DIRECTOR 256520
TO: PRIORITY PARIS.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CHIEF/OCC INFO EUR/FRSF

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDES IN PARIS.

* 2. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING THE INFORMATION BELOW TO IDEN.

-----------------------------TEAR
LINE-----------------------------

4 MARCH 1997

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526 *OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THOSE EXCEPTIONS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE ACT FOLLOW. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR PERSON(S) YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU

BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE CONTACT BETH MILLS AT (703) 356-0285 OR 1-800-447-2211 OR VIA LETTER TO P.O. BOX 1626, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20013. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. (SEE FOLLOWING GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OR RECORDS.) IF THE BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BECAUSE THE BOARD MUST COVER HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, IT WILL BE CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS AT AN ACCELERATING PACE AND WE CANNOT PROJECT WHEN IT MAY REVIEW A DOCUMENT CONTAINING YOUR NAME. THEREFORE, PLEASE CONTACT ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF APPROPRIATE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED BETH MILLS)

FOLLOWS ARE THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS:

*DISCLOSURE OF<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS OR PARTICULAR INFORMATION IN
*<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS TO THE PUBLIC MAY BE POSTPONED SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS ACT IF THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT--

(1) THE THREAT TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
*POSED BY THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>IS OF SUCH GRAVITY THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SUCH PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL--

(A) AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHOSE IDENTITY CURRENTLY REQUIRES PROTECTION

(B) AN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE OR METHOD WHICH IS CURRENTLY UTILIZED, BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WHICH HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY DISCLOSED, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; OR

(C) ANY OTHER MATTER CURRENTLY RELATING TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRABLY IMPAIR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

* (2) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL THE NAME OR IDENTITY OF A LIVING PERSON WHO PROVIDED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD POSE A SUBSTANTIAL RISK TO THAT PERSON;

* (3) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CONSTITUTE AN UNWARRANTED INVASION OF

PERSONAL PRIVACY, AND THAT INVASION OF PRIVACY IS SO SUBSTANTIAL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST;

* (4) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD COMPROMISE THE EXISTENCE OF AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFIDENTIALITY CURRENTLY REQUIRING PROTECTION BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AGENT AND A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL OR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST; OR

* (5) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL A SECURITY OR PROTECTIVE PROCEDURE CURRENTLY UTILIZED, OR REASONABLY EXPECTED TO BE UTILIZED, BY THE SECRET SERVICE OR ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

------------------------------TEAR
LINE----------------------------

3. IF STATION WANTS, YOU MAY OFFER IDEN THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATING WITH HEADQUARTERS VIA CABLE TRAFFIC RATHER THAN BY TELEPHONE OR LETTER. IN MANY CASES THE RESPONSE CONTAINS SENSITIVE IF NOT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. ALL PREVIOUS RECIPIENTS OF THIS LETTER HAVE HAD CONCERNS OR QUESTIONS; FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:

*A. WHY IS MY NAME IN THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS?
WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY BUT YOUR NAME MAY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN A CABLE OR DOCUMENT, OR YOU MAY HAVE COORDINATED OR SIGNED A CABLE
*OR DOCUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE<ASSASSINATION.>

B. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?
IT MEANS YOUR NAME WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL
*DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE<ASSASSINATION.> THE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA) WITH THE NAME REMOVED AND IF WE DO NOT MAKE A COMPELLING CASE THE PRESIDENTIAL BOARD WILL RELEASE NEW VERSIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS WITH THE NAMES. THE FIRST REVIEW OF NAMES WILL BE THIS SUMMER AND IT WILL CONTINUE AS DOCUMENTS ARE REVIEWED. ONCE THE BOARD RULES THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION MUST BE RELEASED IN 30 DAYS.

C. WHAT EXACTLY DOES "RELEASE" MEAN?
IT MEANS THE GENERAL PUBLIC WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE DOCUMENT VIA NARA. THERE ARE PROFESSIONAL RESEARCHERS WAITING FOR ACCESS TO THE MATERIAL SO THAT THEY CAN RESEARCH THE VARIOUS CONSPIRACY THEORIES. WE KNOW OF SOME ORGANIZATIONS THAT WILL MOST LIKELY PUT THE INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS SO IT CAN BE EASILY SEARCHED.

D. WHAT IF I DON'T WANT MY NAME RELEASED?
YOU AND WE WILL HAVE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED REVIEW BOARD THAT YOUR SITUATION MEETS THE CRITERIA PROVIDED IN THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS. (TO BE ABSOLUTELY FRANK, THIS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DO AND THE VERY FEW CASES WHICH WE HAVE WON HAVE BEEN BASED ON VERY SPECIFIC

AND COMPELLING REASONS.)

E. WHAT DO I DO NEXT?
IF RELEASE OF YOUR NAME IS NOT A PROBLEM, YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING. IF YOU DO NOT WANT YOUR NAME RELEASED, YOU NEED TO ADVISE US OF THAT FACT AND EXPLAIN IN DETAIL WHY RELEASE WOULD BE HARMFUL TO YOU AND NATIONAL SECURITY. WE HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST RELEASE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COVER MECHANISM WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE, AND WE WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT. THE BOARD HAS NOT BEEN AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BECOME SYMPATHETIC TO A PRINCIPLE BASED ARGUMENT.

F. IF MY NAME IS RELEASED, WHAT ABOUT MY COVER STATUS?
THE IMPACT OF THE RELEASE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF YOUR TRUE NAME AND THE AGENCY WILL HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE THE VIABILITY OF CONTINUED COVER PROTECTION.

FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2224018, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100638682
ORIG: CHIEF/OCC(WILLMSC,32357); AUTH: DC/OCC; REL: EUR/FRSF

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 97-7144608 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: DC/OCC, EA/J, LIMITED, MDSX, OCDORECORD, ODPD,
FILE (O/P)

97 7144608 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 052046Z MAR 97 DIRECTOR 256353

SECRET
STAFF 052046Z DIRECTOR 256353
TO: PRIORITY TOKYO.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CHIEF/OCC INFO EA/J

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDES IN KASHII-DAI.

* 2. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING THE INFORMATION BELOW TO IDEN.

-----------------------------TEAR
LINE-----------------------------

4 MARCH 1997

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526 *OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THOSE EXCEPTIONS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE ACT FOLLOW. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR PERSON(S) YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU

SECRET

BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC
RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE CONTACT BETH MILLS AT (703) 356-0285
OR 1-800-447-2211 OR VIA LETTER TO P.O. BOX 1626, WASHINGTON, D.C.
20013. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A
COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. (SEE FOLLOWING
GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OR RECORDS.) IF THE
BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED
ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BECAUSE THE BOARD MUST COVER HUNDREDS OF
THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, IT WILL BE
CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS AT AN ACCELERATING PACE AND WE CANNOT
PROJECT WHEN IT MAY REVIEW A DOCUMENT CONTAINING YOUR NAME.
THEREFORE, PLEASE CONTACT ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF APPROPRIATE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED BETH MILLS)

FOLLOWS ARE THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF
RECORDS:

*DISCLOSURE OF<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS OR PARTICULAR INFORMATION IN
*<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS TO THE PUBLIC MAY BE POSTPONED SUBJECT TO
THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS ACT IF THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE THAT--

(1) THE THREAT TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS, OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
*POSED BY THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>IS OF SUCH
GRAVITY THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SUCH PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL--

(A) AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHOSE IDENTITY CURRENTLY REQUIRES
PROTECTION

(B) AN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE OR METHOD WHICH IS CURRENTLY
UTILIZED,
BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WHICH HAS NOT BEEN
OFFICIALLY
DISCLOSED, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE
CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; OR

(C) ANY OTHER MATTER CURRENTLY RELATING TO THE MILITARY
DEFENSE,
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE
UNITED STATES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRABLY
IMPAIR
THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

* (2) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD
REVEAL THE NAME OR IDENTITY OF A LIVING PERSON WHO PROVIDED
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD POSE A
SUBSTANTIAL RISK TO THAT PERSON;

* (3) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD COULD
REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CONSTITUTE AN UNWARRANTED INVASION OF

PERSONAL PRIVACY, AND THAT INVASION OF PRIVACY IS SO SUBSTANTIAL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST;

* (4) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD COMPROMISE THE EXISTENCE OF AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFIDENTIALITY CURRENTLY REQUIRING PROTECTION BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AGENT AND A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL OR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST; OR

* (5) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL A SECURITY OR PROTECTIVE PROCEDURE CURRENTLY UTILIZED, OR REASONABLY EXPECTED TO BE UTILIZED, BY THE SECRET SERVICE OR ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

------------------------------TEAR LINE----------------------------

3. IF STATION WANTS, YOU MAY OFFER IDEN THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATING WITH HEADQUARTERS VIA CABLE TRAFFIC RATHER THAN BY TELEPHONE OR LETTER. IN MANY CASES THE RESPONSE CONTAINS SENSITIVE IF NOT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. ALL PREVIOUS RECIPIENTS OF THIS LETTER HAVE HAD CONCERNS OR QUESTIONS; FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:

*A. WHY IS MY NAME IN THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS?
WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY BUT YOUR NAME MAY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN A CABLE OR DOCUMENT, OR YOU MAY HAVE COORDINATED OR SIGNED A CABLE
*OR DOCUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE<ASSASSINATION.>

B. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?
IT MEANS YOUR NAME WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL
*DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE<ASSASSINATION.> THE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA) WITH THE NAME REMOVED AND IF WE DO NOT MAKE A COMPELLING CASE THE PRESIDENTIAL BOARD WILL RELEASE NEW VERSIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS WITH THE NAMES. THE FIRST REVIEW OF NAMES WILL BE THIS SUMMER AND IT WILL CONTINUE AS DOCUMENTS ARE REVIEWED. ONCE THE BOARD RULES THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION MUST BE RELEASED IN 30 DAYS.

C. WHAT EXACTLY DOES "RELEASE" MEAN?
IT MEANS THE GENERAL PUBLIC WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE DOCUMENT VIA NARA. THERE ARE PROFESSIONAL RESEARCHERS WAITING FOR ACCESS TO THE MATERIAL SO THAT THEY CAN RESEARCH THE VARIOUS CONSPIRACY THEORIES. WE KNOW OF SOME ORGANIZATIONS THAT WILL MOST LIKELY PUT THE INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS SO IT CAN BE EASILY SEARCHED.

D. WHAT IF I DON'T WANT MY NAME RELEASED?
YOU AND WE WILL HAVE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED REVIEW BOARD THAT YOUR SITUATION MEETS THE CRITERIA PROVIDED IN THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS. (TO BE ABSOLUTELY FRANK, THIS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DO AND THE VERY FEW CASES WHICH WE HAVE WON HAVE BEEN BASED ON VERY SPECIFIC

AND COMPELLING REASONS.)

E. WHAT DO I DO NEXT?
IF RELEASE OF YOUR NAME IS NOT A PROBLEM, YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING. IF YOU DO NOT WANT YOUR NAME RELEASED, YOU NEED TO ADVISE US OF THAT FACT AND EXPLAIN IN DETAIL WHY RELEASE WOULD BE HARMFUL TO YOU AND NATIONAL SECURITY. WE HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST RELEASE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COVER MECHANISM WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE, AND WE WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT. THE BOARD HAS NOT BEEN AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BECOME SYMPATHETIC TO A PRINCIPLE BASED ARGUMENT.

F. IF MY NAME IS RELEASED, WHAT ABOUT MY COVER STATUS?
THE IMPACT OF THE RELEASE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF YOUR TRUE NAME AND THE AGENCY WILL HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE THE VIABILITY OF CONTINUED COVER PROTECTION.

FILE: NONE CL BY: 2224018, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON:
X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100638618
ORIG: CHIEF/OCC(WILLMSC,32357); AUTH: DC/OCC; REL: EA/J
(KNOWLTON)

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: DC/OCC, DO/IRO, EUR/IBII, EUR/LGL, LIMITED, MDSX, OCDORECORD, ODPD, PCS/CL, FILE (0/P)

97 7142690 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 051815Z MAR 97 DIRECTOR 255911

SECRET
STAFF 051815Z DIRECTOR 255911
TO: PRIORITY MILAN INFO PRIORITY ROME.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CHIEF/OCC INFO EUR/IBII, PCS/CL, DO/IRO, EUR/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDES IN TRIESTE.

* 2. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING THE INFORMATION BELOW TO IDEN.

-----------------------------TEAR LINE-----------------------------

4 MARCH 1997

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526 *OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THOSE EXCEPTIONS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE ACT FOLLOW. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR

PERSON(S) YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE CONTACT BETH MILLS AT (703) 356-0285 OR 1-800-447-2211 OR VIA LETTER TO P.O. BOX 1626, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20013. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. (SEE FOLLOWING GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OR RECORDS.) IF THE BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BECAUSE THE BOARD MUST COVER HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, IT WILL BE CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS AT AN ACCELERATING PACE AND WE CANNOT PROJECT WHEN IT MAY REVIEW A DOCUMENT CONTAINING YOUR NAME. THEREFORE, PLEASE CONTACT ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF APPROPRIATE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED BETH MILLS)

FOLLOWS ARE THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS:

*DISCLOSURE OF<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS OR PARTICULAR INFORMATION IN
*<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS TO THE PUBLIC MAY BE POSTPONED SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS ACT IF THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT--

(1) THE THREAT TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
*POSED BY THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>IS OF SUCH GRAVITY THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SUCH PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL--

(A) AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHOSE IDENTITY CURRENTLY REQUIRES PROTECTION

(B) AN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE OR METHOD WHICH IS CURRENTLY UTILIZED, BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WHICH HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY DISCLOSED, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; OR

(C) ANY OTHER MATTER CURRENTLY RELATING TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRABLY IMPAIR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

* (2) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL THE NAME OR IDENTITY OF A LIVING PERSON WHO PROVIDED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD POSE A SUBSTANTIAL RISK TO THAT PERSON;

* (3) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD COULD

REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CONSTITUTE AN UNWARRANTED INVASION OF PERSONAL PRIVACY, AND THAT INVASION OF PRIVACY IS SO SUBSTANTIAL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST;

* (4) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD COMPROMISE THE EXISTENCE OF AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFIDENTIALITY CURRENTLY REQUIRING PROTECTION BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AGENT AND A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL OR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST; OR

* (5) THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORD WOULD REVEAL A SECURITY OR PROTECTIVE PROCEDURE CURRENTLY UTILIZED, OR REASONABLY EXPECTED TO BE UTILIZED, BY THE SECRET SERVICE OR ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD BE SO HARMFUL THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

------------------------------TEAR
LINE----------------------------

3. IF STATION WANTS, YOU MAY OFFER IDEN THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATING WITH HEADQUARTERS VIA CABLE TRAFFIC RATHER THAN BY TELEPHONE OR LETTER. IN MANY CASES THE RESPONSE CONTAINS SENSITIVE IF NOT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. ALL PREVIOUS RECIPIENTS OF THIS LETTER HAVE HAD CONCERNS OR QUESTIONS; FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:

*A. WHY IS MY NAME IN THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS?
WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY BUT YOUR NAME MAY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN A CABLE OR DOCUMENT, OR YOU MAY HAVE COORDINATED OR SIGNED A CABLE
*OR DOCUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE<ASSASSINATION.>

B. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?
IT MEANS YOUR NAME WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL
*DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE<ASSASSINATION.> THE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA) WITH THE NAME REMOVED AND IF WE DO NOT MAKE A COMPELLING CASE THE PRESIDENTIAL BOARD WILL RELEASE NEW VERSIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS WITH THE NAMES. THE FIRST REVIEW OF NAMES WILL BE THIS SUMMER AND IT WILL CONTINUE AS DOCUMENTS ARE REVIEWED. ONCE THE BOARD RULES THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION MUST BE RELEASED IN 30 DAYS.

C. WHAT EXACTLY DOES "RELEASE" MEAN?
IT MEANS THE GENERAL PUBLIC WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE DOCUMENT VIA NARA. THERE ARE PROFESSIONAL RESEARCHERS WAITING FOR ACCESS TO THE MATERIAL SO THAT THEY CAN RESEARCH THE VARIOUS CONSPIRACY THEORIES. WE KNOW OF SOME ORGANIZATIONS THAT WILL MOST LIKELY PUT THE INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS SO IT CAN BE EASILY SEARCHED.

D. WHAT IF I DON'T WANT MY NAME RELEASED?
YOU AND WE WILL HAVE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED REVIEW BOARD THAT YOUR SITUATION MEETS THE CRITERIA PROVIDED IN THE GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS. (TO BE ABSOLUTELY FRANK, THIS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DO AND THE

VERY FEW CASES WHICH WE HAVE WON HAVE BEEN BASED ON VERY SPECIFIC AND COMPELLING REASONS.)

E. WHAT DO I DO NEXT?
IF RELEASE OF YOUR NAME IS NOT A PROBLEM, YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING. IF YOU DO NOT WANT YOUR NAME RELEASED, YOU NEED TO ADVISE US OF THAT FACT AND EXPLAIN IN DETAIL WHY RELEASE WOULD BE HARMFUL TO YOU AND NATIONAL SECURITY. WE HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST RELEASE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COVER MECHANISM WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE, AND WE WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT. THE BOARD HAS NOT BEEN AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BECOME SYMPATHETIC TO A PRINCIPLE BASED ARGUMENT.

F. IF MY NAME IS RELEASED, WHAT ABOUT MY COVER STATUS?
THE IMPACT OF THE RELEASE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF YOUR TRUE NAME AND THE AGENCY WILL HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE THE VIABILITY OF CONTINUED COVER PROTECTION.

4. APPRECIATE STATION'S ASSISTANCE WITH THIS MATTER.
REGARDS.

5. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2224018, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100638337
ORIG: CHIEF/OCC(WILLMSC,32357); AUTH: DC/OCC; REL: EUR/IBII.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 97-6569968 SENSIND: RYBAT

SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA/CAGRR (147) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEGLA, CIC/LA, DDO/WO, IID, IIDIRPS, LA/CAGAB, LA/RR, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, ODPR, RYBAT, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/W)

97 6569968 ASP PAGE 001 IN 6569968
TOR: 102355Z JAN 97 BOGO 72820

SECRET 102350Z JAN 97 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 72820

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT LA/CAGRR INFO LA/CAGAB, CIC/LA, LA/RR, IID

SLUGS: WNINTEL INTEL ZRWAHOO LWDISSEM

SUBJECT: ACCOMPANYING OPS CABLE FOR HLB-15257

REF: A. BOGOTA
B. BOGOTA 72819 97 6569966 (HLB-15257)

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST UPGRADE OF GIDARK/56'S ACCESS DESCRIPTION, PER PARA THREE BELOW.

2. GIDARK/56 (D/56) COLLECTED REF INFORMATION IN THE COURSE OF HER DUTIES AS PERSONAL ASSISTANT TO DIRECTOR OF COLOMBIAN ARMY INTELLIGENCE JAIRO DURAN ((PINEDA)) NINO. D/56 RECEIVED THE REMARKS ON WHICH REF IS BASED DURING LATE DECEMBER CONVERSATIONS WITH COL. PINEDA, INCOMING INTEL CHIEF COLONEL REYNALDO ((CASTELLANOS)), AND DIRECTLY FROM GENERAL MANUEL ((BONETT)). D/56 HEARD BONETT'S COMMENT ABOUT DEA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION DIRECTLY FROM HIM DURING A LATE DECEMBER MEETING. D/56 ALSO SPOKE TO BONETT'S PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVISOR MONICA ((HARA)), AND TO GENERAL HAROLD ((BEDOYA)). D/56 SPEAKS TO HARA AND PINEDA REGULARLY IN THE COURSE OF HER NORMAL DUTIES AND D/56 SPOKE TO BONETT AND BEDOYA IN LATE DECEMBER HOLIDAY PARTIES. D/56 PASSED REF TO C/O STOCKMIER ON 8 JAN 97 DURING A REGULARLY SCHEDULED OPS MEETING.

3. REF PROPOSED SOURCE DESCRIPTION UPGRADES D/56'S ACCESS FROM INDIRECT TO GOOD. D/56 TOLD C/O STOCKMIER THAT SHE KNOWS NEW ARMY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR CASTELLANOS, HAS SPOKEN TO HIM, AND HAS ACCEPTED HIS OFFER TO KEEP EMPLOYING HER AFTER PINEDA LEAVES FOR MOSCOW IN COMING WEEKS. GIVING THIS CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT, WE THINK HER ACCESS IS FAIRLY DESCRIBED AS GOOD IN REPORTS ABOUT THE ARMY. IN REPORTS ABOUT OTHER NON-ARMY TOPICS WE PROPOSE CONTINUED USE OF "INDIRECT" ACCESS IN HER SOURCE DESCRIPTION.

4. REF IS ORCON BECAUSE IT HAS REMARKS MADE PRIVATELY BY BONETT

SECRET

HIMSELF, AND ACCESS TO SENIOR OFFICERS WHO ARE CLOSE TO BOTH BONETT AND BEDOYA.

5. FILE: GIDARK/56. CL BY 2171434; CL REASON 1.5 (C);. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: CE/W/MB (318) INFO: CE/COPS, CE/W/ST, CEDORECORD, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, CE/W (3/W)

96 5992807 ASR PAGE 001 IN 5992807
TOR: 121307Z NOV 96 MNSK 16094

S E C R E T 121305Z NOV 96 STAFF

CITE MINSK 16094

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CE/W/MB INFO CE/OPS, C/CE/W, CE/W/ST

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT GTDANCER

SUBJECT: STATION ACTIVITY REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1996

REF: MINSK 16093 96 5992714

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: HQS COMMENTS WELCOME.

2. FOLLOWING IS MINSK STATION ACTIVITY REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1996. REF REPRESENTS STATION ACTIVITY REPORT FOR 23-30 SEPTEMBER. SEE ALSO STATION'S OCTOBER REPORT ON CI/SECURITY.

3. LIAISON OPERATIONS

-- JYVAPOROUS: STATION REPORTED ON GENERAL TOPICS RE CPIC CONTACT WITH BND, MEETINGS, ETC. (MINSK 15872, 15904, 15988, 15937, 16016).

O DEMARCHE: COS RECEIVED A DEMARCHE FROM DC/JYVAPOROUS RE NVTAG PITCH AND SURVEILLANCE ON THE BELARUS CG IN NEW YORK. IN ADDITION, THEY CHARGED STATION HAD AT LEAST 15 OFFICERS IN BELARUS IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS "CONDUCTING OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY" WHO WERE NOT DECLARED BY COS. THESE PROBABLY REPRESENT SVVITAMIN TDYERS. (MINSK 15891, 15899, 15915, 16020, 16026)

O REFERENDUM: COS SUBMITTED TWO REPORTS BASED ON JYVAPOROUS CONTACTS RE THE REFERENDUM CRISIS IN BELARUS (MINSK 15944/EBM-00070, 15945, 15958/EBM-00072, 15959).
O BSNIC: STATION PROVIDED EXTENSIVE SUPPORT FOR THE ATTENDANCE OF TWO JYVAPOROUS OFFICERS AT BSNIC V AND DEBRIEF (MINSK 15892, 15897, 15982)

-- JYPICKET: GENERAL REPORTING ON MEETINGS, PASSING ON

BSNIC, ASSISTANCE (MINSK 15995, 15942, 15992, 16031).

O REFERENDUM: FOR THE FIRST TIME, JYPICKET/2 STEPPED OUT OF HIS BRIEF AND PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT REPORT PREDICTING THE UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL COMPROMISE (MINSK 15952/EBM-00071, 15953) HE ALSO OFFERED TO BROKER INTRODUCTIONS FOR COS TO NSC OFFICIALS HE KNOWS.

4. GENERAL OPS SUPPORT:

-- STATION PROVIDED HEADS UP RE TRAVEL OF A SENSITIVE ASSET WHICH RESULTED IN EXCELLENT REPORTING (MINSK 1124).

-- STATION RESPONDED TO WARSAW CABLE RE UOP/CI REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON BELARUSIANS AND VIENNA REQUEST FOR TRACES (MINSK 16029, 15994)

5. HQS REQUIREMENTS/SUPPORT

-- STATION PROVIDED GROUND TRUTH AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REPORTING ON MINSK DURING REFERENDUM CONGRESS' IN MINSK (MINSK 15967/EBM-00073, 15968, 15977/EBM-00074, 15978)

-- STATION PROVIDED ATMOSPHERIC CABLES TO HQS SURROUNDING THE REFERENDUM SITUATION, NATO AMBASSADORS SCANDAL, AND NUCLEAR ICBM WITHDRAWAL (MINSK 15960, 15961, 15969, 15882, 15884, 16005).

-- STATION REPORTED ITS 1996 ANNUAL FIELD PROGRAM PLAN (MINSK 15930).

-- THE SIX-MONTH OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR MINSK STATION WAS SUBMITTED TO HQS (MINSK 15873).
-- STATION RESEARCHED AND PROVIDED COMMENTS ON SEVERAL INTELS UTA-00147, EAV-18791, CNY-03569 (MINSK 15881, 15928, 16017).

-- LIAISON RECORD REVIEW BOARD INPUT AND LIAISON EXCHANGE ISSUES (MINSK 15997, 15974)

6. EMBASSY

-- STATION RELAYED AMBASSADORIAL REQUEST FOR REGULAR UPDATES ON THE STATUS OF THE SS-25 ICBM'S IN BELARUS (MINSK 15940).

*-- STATION BROKERED CONTACT FOR EMBASSY TO SUPPORT THE<JFK>
*<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD VISIT (MINSK 15996, 16006).

-- GUIDANCE REQUESTED ON BROKERING CONTACT FOR AMBASSADORIAL MEETING WITH C/JYVAPOROUS (MINSK 16007).

7. ADMINISTRATIVE

-- COS HOUSING: AS EXPECTED, EMBASSY LOST THE HOUSE AND OFFERED COS A CRAMPED FOURTH FLOOR APARTMENT (NO ELEVATOR) SIMILAR IN SIZE TO HIS CURRENT INADEQUATE QUARTERS. COS HAS NOW SPENT 14 MONTHS IN HIS TEMPORARY QUARTERS AND THE FAMILY SITUATION IS DIFFICULT (MINSK 15877, 15906, 15920, 15979, 16011).

-- EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION: MASSIVE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CHANCERY CONTINUES AND FOR A TWO DAY PERIOD CLOSED THE BUILDING DUE TO SUSPECTED ASBESTOS (MINSK 15898, 15905, 15916).

-- COS MADE AN EMERGENCY OVERNIGHT MEDIVAC TO VILNIUS TO HAVE SUTURES PUT IN HIS DAUGHTERS FOREHEAD (MINSK 15929).

-- THOUGH ANOTHER VEHICLE IS NEEDED, STATION FELT HAVING TWO VEHICLES IN ITO'S NAME WAS NOT A VIABLE ANSWER TO THE ABUSE HIS POV WAS SUFFERING (MINSK 15922).
-- STATION COORDINATED ON THE PROPOSED TRAVEL OF THE REGIONAL FINANCE OFFICER (MINSK 15972).

-- COORDINATION BEGAN FOR COS' TRAVEL TO CE DIVISION COS CONFERENCE (MINSK 16004).

-- BUSY MONTH WITH TDY'ERS. AS MENTIONED IN LAST MONTHS REPORT NONE HAD VISAS. INCLUDED WERE RADIATION DECTOR INTALL TEAM, FSS/SEB UPGRADE TEAM, SECURITY "RED" TEAM, WATCHSTANDERS FOR EMBASSY, AND EUCA OPS OFFICER (YEARLY INSPECTION AND CONSULTATIONS). ALTHOUGH VERY BUSY, ALL WENT WELL. EUCA OPS OFFICER IN PARTICULAR GOT A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT STATION IS FACING.

8. FILE: 227-120-008. CL BY: 0593899 CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1 DRV HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 96-5816647 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP:

STAFF

ACTION: CE/W/MB (282) INFO: CEDORECORD, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE (2/W)

96 5816647 ASR PAGE 001 IN 5816647
TOR: 251416Z OCT 96 MNSK 16006

SECRET 251415Z OCT 96 STAFF

CITE MINSK 16006

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT C/CE/W/MB

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT GTDANCER

SUBJECT: RECORDS REVIEW BOARD MEETING WITH JYVAPOROUS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 994616 96 5808231
B. DIRECTOR 993882 96 5803438
C. MINSK 15996 96 5793319

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE. FYI.

2. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF REF A, COS TELEPHONED *JYVAPOROUS/3 (V/3) RE<JFK ASSASSINATION>REVIEW BOARD ACCESS. HE SAID JYVAPOROUS ALREADY RESPONDED TO THE EMBASSY DIP NOTE THEY RECEIVED FROM THE MFA. V/3 SAID THE NOTE HAD BEEN ANSWERED POSITIVELY. NOW THAT THE ISSUE WAS BEING HANDLED OFFICIALLY VIA MFA, V/3 STATED THE ISSUE SHOULD CONTINUE IN DIP CHANNELS. COS CONCURRED, RELAYED SAME TO EMBASSY POLOFF ON THE ACCOUNT, AND EXTRACTED STATION FROM THE QUESTION.

3. STATION APPRECIATED HQS IMMEDIATE FOOTWORK TO SUPPORT EMBASSY'S PROBLEM. THANKS AND REGARDS.

4. FILE: 227-002-001. CL BY: 0593899 CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1 DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 96-5793319 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: ,2, ,4, , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: CE/W/MB (272) INFO: C/ORMS, CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, CTC/COPS, CTC/IFC, CTC/OOG, CTC/RTB, CTCARCHIVE, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/CTC, CTC/ELB, DC/CTC (5/W)

96 5793319 ASO PAGE 001 IN 5793319
TOR: 231740Z OCT 96 MNSK 15996

SECRET 231740Z OCT 96 STAFF

CITE MINSK 15996

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CE/W/MB

SLUGS: WNINTEL GTDANCER

*SUBJECT: <JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS TEAM

REF: SECSTATE 220406

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: IMMEDIATE REPLY.

2. EMBASSY HAS ASKED COS TO APPROACH TYVAPOROUS RE *ACCESS TO<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS RESIDING IN THEIR ARCHIVES IN MINSK. APPARENTLY NORMAN MAILER WAS GIVEN ACCESS TO DO RESEARCH FOR HIS BOOK ON THE SUBJECT TWO YEARS AGO. EMBASSY ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN ACCESS OVER THE PAST YEAR *HAVE BEEN FUTILE. A TEAM FROM THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD IS ARRIVING 29 OCT TO MEET WITH GOB OFFICIALS ON THE SUBJECT AND EMBASSY WOULD LIKE TO GET THIS JOB DONE.

3. COS MUST ADMIT CARRYING WATER FOR THIS EMBASSY IS A SOMEWHAT DISTASTEFUL CHORE, BUT IS WILLING TO DO THE NEEDFUL (IF ONLY FOR THE PLEASURE OF HAVING EMBASSY CONCEDE THEY COULD NOT ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION WITHOUT NWBOLTON). STATION DOES NOT SEE ANY PROBLEMS, BUT IN ORDER TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS IN TIME AN IMMEDIATE CONCURRENCE IS REQUESTED. THANKS AND REGARDS.

4. FILE: GUNGA DHIN. CL BY: 0593899 CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1 DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 96-5536596 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: EA/PAMSI/A INFO: C/ORMS, DC/EA, EA/LGL, EADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/EA, EA/XO (3/P)

96 5536596 ASO PAGE 001
TOT: 272220Z SEP 96 DIRECTOR 960961

SECRET
STAFF 272220Z DIRECTOR 960961
TO: IMMEDIATE CANBERRA.

FROM: LIMIT EA/PAMSI/A INFO EA/LGL, CHIEF/EA, DC/EA

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN DEMARCHE TO USG REGARDING US LEGISLATION ON DECLASSIFICATION

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE FAX BY COB 2 OCT A COPY OF THE 1995 AUSTRALIAN DEMARCHE TO THE USG REGARDING LEGISLATION ON THE DECLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS. ADDITIONALLY, WE WOULD APPRECIATE STATION'S RECOLLECTION OF LIAISON'S REACTION TO THE US LEGISLATION AS WELL.

* 2. THE<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY>REVIEW BOARD<(JFK>BOARD) ESTABLISHED
*BY THE PRESIDENT TO DECLASSIFY ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE<JOHN>
*F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION>HAS COME ACROSS TWO AUSTRALIAN DOCUMENTS (AND FOUR CIA DOCUMENTS) WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO DECLASSIFY WHICH REVEAL THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGENCY-AUSTRALIAN LIAISON RELATIONSHIP . THE REVIEW BOARD HAS BROAD AUTHORITY TO DECLASSIFY DOCUMENTS
*RELATED TO THE<JFK>COLLECTION REGARDLESS OF THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OR THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SUBSTANCE. IT HAS COME TO OUR ATTENTION THAT THE BOARD HAS REVIEWED THE TWO AUSTRALIAN DOCUMENTS AND THE FOUR CIA DOCUMENTS AND DEEMED THEM APPROPRIATE FOR RELEASE. GIVEN THE OBVIOUS SENSITIVITY OF OUR LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH AUSTRALIANS, OGC IN COORDINATION WITH EA/LGL AND EA/PAMSI, IS PREPARING A MEMO TO THE BOARD REQUESTING THEY NOT RELEASE THE FIRST TWO DOCUMENTS BECAUSE THE DOCUMENTS ARE THE PROPERTY OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT. INSTEAD WE ARE WILLING TO PROVIDE SUMMARIES OF THESE DOCUMENTS OMITTING ANY MENTION OF THEIR AUSTRALIAN ORIGIN OR OF THE EXISTENCE OF A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO SERVICES. THE AGENCY DOCUMENTS WHICH MAKE REFERENCE TO OUR LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WOULD BE REDACTED TO TAKE OUT ALL REFERENCES TO AUSTRALIA.

* 3. IN OUR EFFORT TO PRESENT A SOLID CASE TO THE<JFK>BOARD, THE MEMO INCLUDES A STRONG ARGUMENT THAT EVEN APPROACHING THE AUSTRALIANS ON THE ISSUE OF DECLASSIFICATION OF AN AUSTRALIAN DOCUMENT WILL STRAIN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM. OUR ARGUMENT

SECRET

WILL ENUMERATE THE THE UNFAVORABLE REACTION THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE HAD TO RECENT DISCLOSURES AND AGENCY REQUESTS FOR PERMISSION TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION PASSED TO US BY THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICES. EXAMPLES WE INTEND TO CITE INCLUDE THE DUTY TO WARN ISSUE WHERE THE AUSTRALIANS WERE ADAMANT ABOUT NOT GIVING PERMISSION TO DISCLOSE THEIR INFORMATION BECAUSE OF SOURCE PROTECTION ISSUES, THE ASIS CONCERN ABOUT THE BOOK PUBLISHED BY A FORMER AGENCY EMPLOYEE THAT ALLUDES TO A LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AUSTRALIANS, THE RECENT DEMARCHE EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT A FORMER AGENCY OFFICER ALLEGEDLY DISCLOSED CLASSIFIED AUSTRALIAN INFORMATION (AN ALLEGATION THE DDCI ASSURED THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD BE THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED) AND THE DEMARCHE IN 1995 BY THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT RAISING CONCERNS ABOUT OUR U.S. DECLASSIFICATION LEGISLATION AND WHETHER THE LEGISLATION PROVIDES ADEQUATE GUARANTEES ABOUT NOT DISCLOSING INFORMATION PASSED TO US BY FOREIGN SERVICES WITHOUT EXPRESS AUTHORIZATION FROM SUCH FOREIGN SERVICES. WE WILL ALSO MAKE REFERENCE TO A RECENT APPROACH BY THE AUSTRALIANS ASKING FOR OUR OKAY IN THEIR DECLASSIFYING SOME OF OUR DOCUMENTS, AND OUR STRONGLY-WORDED RESPONSE DENYING PERMISSION AND ARGUING THAT SUCH DISCLOSURE WOULD BE A BREACH OF TRUST.

* 4. IN ORDER TO BOLSTER OUR POSITION WITH THE<JFK>BOARD, REQUEST STATION OBTAIN A HARD COPY OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEMARCHE ON THE DECLASSIFICATION LEGISLATION THAT CAN BE ATTACHED TO THE MEMO. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH HARD COPY EVIDENCE FROM THE AUSTRALIANS WILL BOLSTER OUR ARGUMENT SIGNIFICANTLY. WE ARE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE ACTUAL TEXT OF THIS DEMARCHE IN HQS.

5. THE BOTTOM LINE HERE IS THAT WE DO NOT WANT EVEN TO APPROACH THE AUSTRALIANS ABOUT DECLASSIFYING THE AFOREMENTIONED DOCUMENTS. WE HOPE OUR MEMO CONVINCES THE BOARD THAT, IN LIEU OF RELEASING THE DOCUMENTS, SUMMARIES THAT OMIT ALL REFERENCE AUSTRALIA WILL SUFFICE.

6. FYI: OUR FALLBACK POSITION IF THE BOARD TURNS DOWN THE CONCEPT OF SUMMARIES, IS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT RELEASE THE AUSTRALIAN DOCUMENT, EVEN IN REDACTED FORM, WITHOUT AUSTRALIAN PERMISSION; FURTHER, THAT IF WE SEEK AND ARE DENIED PERMISSION AND THE BOARD NONETHELESS PROCEEDS WITH THE DECLASSIFICATION, IT WILL HAVE A TREMENDOUS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICES. IN SUM, OUR GOING-IN POSITION IS WE WANT TO AVOID RAISING THE SPECTER WITH THE AUSSIES THAT THE AGENCY MAY HAVE TROUBLE PROTECTING THEIR SECRETS. IF THE BOARD TURNS DOWN OUR INITIAL PROPOSAL AND INSISTS WE SEEK AUSTRALIAN PERMISSION TO DECLASSIFY, WE WILL DO SO. IN SUCH AN EVENT, OUR LEGAL PEOPLE BELIEVE A STRONGLY-WORDED DOCUMENT FROM THE AUSTRALIANS REFUSING PERMISSION WOULD PROBABLY PERSUADE THE BOARD NOT TO RELEASE THE AUSTRALIAN DOCUMENT. WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED ON HOW THIS IS PROGRESSING AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER GRIST FOR THE MILL AS WE CRAFT OUR MEMO TO THE BOARD AS WELL AS THE TEXT OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEMARCHE ON DECLASSIFICATION LEGISLATION.

7. FILE: 005-002-004. CL BY: 715410, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 2---84.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 1.0.2.>
RELNO: DORELS0100525051
ORIG: EA/PAMSI/A(HERGENR,39998); COORD: EA/LGL(PATTERSON);
REL: C/EA/PAMSI(HOPTIAK).

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 96-5388761 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , ,

/ /

STAFF

CONF: EA/J INFO: C/ORMS, DC/EA, DCEA/CI, EADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, PAS, FILE, EA/XO (2/P)

96 5388761 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 131946Z SEP 96 DIRECTOR 941533

SECRET
STAFF 131953Z DIRECTOR 941533
TO: PRIORITY TOKYO.

FROM: LIMIT EA/J INFO DC/EA, DCEA/CI, D/PAS

SLUGS: ~~WNINTEL~~

*SUBJECT: NEW STORY ON<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>AND CIA IN JAPAN

REF: TOKYO 30260 96 5367593

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SUGGEST COS HAVE EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER REFER THE UPI CORRESPONDENT TO THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF.

2. IN DISCUSSING REF WITH THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF, PAS THOUGHT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO TREAT UPI CORRESPONDENT AS THEY WOULD ANY OTHER REPORTER WHO SEEKS A COMMENT ON A STORY OR FACT PERTAINING TO NWBOLTON. THEREFORE, PAS RECOMMENDS THAT COS TELL THE EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER TO SUGGEST THAT THE UPI CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS HIS QUESTIONS TO PAS AT (703) 482-7677 AND ASK TO SPEAK TO A MEDIA SPOKESPERSON. BASED ON THE UPI CORRESPONDENT'S QUESTIONS, PAS MAY THEN REFER THE REPORTER TO HISTORICAL RECORDS OR OTHER OUTSIDE OFFICE.

3. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2164121, CL REASON: 1.5 (C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 1.0.2.
RELNO: DORELS0100513880
ORIG: EA/J(BRYSNBS,35162); AUTH: DC/EA/J(CONNELLY); REL: DC/EA/J(CONNELLY).

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 96-5367593 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / ~~SECRET~~ ~~FRP: , 2, , , , ,~~

STAFF

ACTION: EA/J (223) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC, DC/EA, EADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, PAS, FILE, CIC/EA, EA/XO (3/W)

96 5367593 ASP PAGE 001 IN 5367593
TOR: 120802Z SEP 96 TOKY 30260

S E C R E T 120758Z SEP 96 STAFF

CITE TOKYO 30260

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT AC/EA/J INFO D/PAS, DC/EA, C/EA/CI

SLUGS: ~~WNINTEL~~

*SUBJECT: NEWS STORY ON<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>AND CIA IN JAPAN

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE PROVIDE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF
*PROJECT OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION>PAPERS.

2. EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER ADVISED COS AT RECEPTION LAST NIGHT THAT LOCAL UPI REPORTER IS ABOUT TO FILE A STORY BASED ON LOCAL RESEARCH AND AN INTERVIEW WITH A RETIRED MARINE OFFICER WHO CLAIMED
*TO BE<LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>COMMANDER IN JAPAN THAT OSWALD WAS RECRUITED BY CIA WHILE STATIONED WITH THE MARINES IN JAPAN IN THE 1950S. UPI CORRESPONDENT OFFERED PRESS OFFICER A CHANCE TO COMMENT. PRESS OFFICER DECLINED. COS SUGGESTED THAT MUCH, IF NOT ALL PAPERS ON OSWALD'S PERSONAL HISTORY HAVE BEEN DECLASSIFIED FOR USE BY MEDIA,
*RESEARCHERS AND<ASSASSINATION>BUFFS AS PART OF OVERALL<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION>DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAM. COS ALSO RECALLED THAT THE UPI REPORTERS STORY, IN SOME FORM, ALSO HAS ALREADY BEEN WRITTEN. HENCE, AS A LONG SHOT AT KEEPING A CIA-RELATED STORY FROM SURFACING IN JAPAN, THEREBY PROMPTING JAPANESE JOURNALISTS TO PURSUE THE SAME INFORMATION, COS SUGGESTED TO PRESS OFFICER THAT SHE PASS NUMBER OF THE HISTORICAL OFFICE AT HEADQUARTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH PUBLIC QUERIES TO THE REPORTER, ADVISING THAT HIS SCOOP MAY, IN FACT, BE OLD NEWS.

3. WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE NAME AND/OR NUMBER THAT UPI REPORTER COULD CALL AT HEADQUARTERS HISTORICAL OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR
*<JFK ASSASSINATION>INQUIRY DECLASSIFICATION. IF THERE IS ANOTHER OFFICE AT NATIONAL ARCHIVES OR ELSEWHERE THAT HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH INQUIRIES, THAT WOULD BE FINE AS WELL. THANKS FOR THE HELP.

4. CL REASON 1.5(C); DECL X1

~~SECRET~~

5. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

/ / * E-O * SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: EUR/GAEXT (227) INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/LGL, EYESONLY, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, DDO (2/W)

96 5328306 ASR PAGE 001 IN 5328306
TOR: 091105Z SEP 96 VIEN 42162

S E C R E T 091057Z SEP 96 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 42162 (EVESON ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT EUR/GAEXT INFO EUR/LGL, OGC/OFLD, OGC/OSD

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - MEETING WITH JOHN WHITTEN

REF: A. DIRECTOR 931349 96 5315663
B. 6 SEP STU-III BETWEEN ACOS/LOCHT

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FOR THE RECORD. ALSO PLEASE ADVISE IF WE NEED TO TAKE ANY FURTHER STEPS SUCH AS ALERTING RSO AND/OR CONGEN ON WHITTEN'S STATE OF MIND AND INTENTIONS.

2. FOR THE RECORD, C/O NOBLEHORSE WAS MOST RECENTLY CONTACTED BY JOHN WHITTEN ON 26 AUGUST 1996. (C/O FIRST BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH WHITTEN IN NOV 95 WHEN ACTING AS LIAISON BETWEEN WHITTEN AND *HQS CONCERNING<JFK ASSASSINATION>BOARD MATTERS.) WHITTEN, OBVIOUSLY VERY UPSET, INFORMED C/O THAT HIS WIFE OF 55 YEARS HAD DESERTED HIM AND MOVED BACK TO THE U.S., THAT SHE WAS SUING HIM FOR ONE-THIRD OF EVERYTHING HE OWNED AS SUPPORT, AND THAT SHE WAS ACCUSING HIM OF THEFT OF PROPERTY (JEWELRY). HE REMARKED FURTHER THAT HIS CHILDREN HAD TURNED AGAINST HIM AND SIDED WITH HIS WIFE, AND THAT HIS HEALTH WAS CONTINUING TO DETERIORATE. WHITTEN ALSO SAID THAT HIS WIFE WAS NOT PLANNING ON SUING HIM FOR DIVORCE AS SHE WOULD LOSE ALL OF THE MEDICAL BENEFITS THAT SHE NOW HAS BY VIRTUE OF HIS RETIREMENT STATUS. WHEN C/O ASKED HOW HE COULD HELP, WHITTEN SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE C/O EITHER IN C/O'S OFFICE OR HAVE C/O DROP BY FOR A VISIT. WHEN C/O BRIEFLY HESITATED, WHITTEN QUICKLY ADDED THAT HE HAD SOME INFORMATION TO PASS ALONG WHICH C/O "MAY OR MAY NOT BE INTERESTED IN, BUT PROBABLY NOT," BUT THAT THIS WAS THE MAIN REASON FOR HIS CALL. C/O SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CHECK HIS SCHEDULE AND WOULD GET BACK TO HIM IN A DAY OR TWO.

3. RECOGNIZING A NEED TO EXTRICATE C/O AND STATION FROM FURTHER UNNECESSARY CONTACT (AFTER INITIAL CONTACT IN NOV 95, WHITTEN CALLED C/O ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, AND LOCAL DATT ONCE, TO OFFER DATED AND SKETCHY INFORMATION; HE ALSO ONCE REFERRED TO NOBLE HORSE AS A "CASE OFFICER" ON THE PHONE ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT LATER

REMEMBER IT), IT WAS DECIDED THAT C/O SHOULD VISIT WHITTEN AT HIS HOME, HEAR HIM OUT AND THEN INFORM HIM THAT CONTACT SHOULD BE DROPPED FOR BOTH HIS AND C/O'S SECURITY UNLESS AN EMERGENCY AROSE. FURTHER, C/O WAS TO TRY AND PUT WHITTEN IN CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTION. AFTER MAKING ARRANGEMENTS, C/O VISITED WHITTEN'S HOME ON THE MORNING OF 28 AUGUST. DURING A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL TWO-HOUR AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTE DISCUSSION, WHITTEN RECOUNTED ALL OF THE DETAILS OF HIS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, MANY OF THEM QUITE PERSONAL AND INCLUDING ACCUSATIONS AND COUNTER-ACCUSATIONS INVOLVING HIS WIFE AND HIS CHILDREN, REMINISCED ON HIS PAST WORK EXPERIENCES, AND SPOKE OF HIS RESOLVE TO COMMIT SUICIDE. AS IT TURNS OUT, HE DROVE HIMSELF WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY TO THE NETHERLANDS IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR WITH THE INTENT OF HAVING HIMSELF EUTHANATISED. HE CHANGED HIS MIND, HOWEVER, AFTER HAVING REALIZED THAT HE HAD, IN FACT, MADE THE TRIP BY HIMSELF; WHEN HE RETURNED HOME, HOWEVER, THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN HE AND HIS SPOUSE BEGAN IN EARNEST (SHE, APPARENTLY, DID NOT APPROVE OF THE EUTHANASIA PLAN).

4. DURING THE DISCUSSION, IN WHICH WHITTEN BROKE DOWN IN TEARS SEVERAL TIMES, HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS DETERMINATION NOT TO MOVE BACK TO THE U.S. ACCORDING TO HIM, SHOULD HE DO SO HIS FAMILY WOULD HAVE HIM PLACED IN A NURSING HOME - A FATE WHICH HE IS ABSOLUTELY NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT; AS AN ALTERNATIVE, HIS WIFE HAS INDICATED TO HIM THAT HIS FAMILY MAY INSTEAD BE ABLE TO ARRANGE FOR A SMALL APARTMENT FOR HIM IN WHICH TO LIVE, BUT THAT SHE WOULD PAY ONLY OCCASIONAL VISITS AND WOULD NOT LIVE WITH HIM. (THE LATTER REMARKS WERE MADE BY HIS WIFE DURING AN UNANNOUNCED TRIP BACK TO AUSTRIA IN CA. JUNE 96. AT THAT TIME, THE WIFE DID NOT INFORM WHITTEN OF HER PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY, BUT WHITTEN LEARNED OF IT THROUGH A FAMILY FRIEND. AFTER A CONFRONTATION IN WHICH WHITTEN BEGGED HER TO STAY, HIS WIFE BROKE DOWN, TOOK SOME MOMENTOS FROM THE APARTMENT AND LEFT.) THIS SECOND ARRANGEMENT WAS ALSO NOT SUITABLE TO WHITTEN.

5. AFTER COLLECTING THE INFORMATION THAT WHITTEN HAD (WHICH STATION BELIEVES WILL BE OF LITTLE OR NO USEFUL VALUE), C/O EXPLAINED TO WHITTEN THAT FOR SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, IT WOULD BE BEST IF HE NO LONGER CONTACTED C/O EXCEPT IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY, BUT INSTEAD DEALT WITH EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTION. C/O SAID THAT HE WAS SORRY HE HAD TO DO THIS AS HE HAD ENJOYED GETTING TO KNOW WHITTEN, BUT THAT THE CONSULAR SECTION WAS BETTER EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THESE KINDS OF PROBLEMS. WHITTEN RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT C/O NEED GO NO FURTHER IN TALKING ABOUT SECURITY AS HE HIMSELF WAS A "STICKLER" ON THE SUBJECT DURING HIS CAREER AND COMPLETELY UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF C/O'S REMARKS. THAT HAVING BEEN SAID, HE INDICATED THAT THE CONSULAR SECTION HAD ALREADY BEEN IN CONTACT WITH HIM REGARDING THE JEWELRY THEFT AT THE REQUEST OF WHITTEN'S DAUGHTER. ALTHOUGH THE DEPUTY THERE HAD INFURIATED WHITTEN BY MAKING CERTAIN REMARKS TO HIS DAUGHTER, WHITTEN HAS APPARENTLY ALREADY ESTABLISHED SOME RAPPORT WITH THE CONGEN AND HAD AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE HIM IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

6. WHITTEN WAS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT HE MAY HAVE MORE "CONFIDENTIAL" INFORMATION TO PASS ALONG, AND ASKED WHAT ACTIONS HE SHOULD TAKE IN THE EVENT HE HAS SOMETHING OF VALUE FOR STATION. AT HIS OWN SUGGESTION, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CONTACT LOCAL RSO AS WAS

EMBASSY PROCEDURE "IN HIS DAY" AND PASS IT TO THEIR OFFICE. HE SAID THAT WHILE HE WOULD NOT ASK FOR C/O BY NAME, IF HE HAD SOMETHING IMPORTANT HE WOULD DEMAND THAT IT BE PASSED TO STATION.

7. TURNING ONCE AGAIN TO DOMESTIC ISSUES, WHITTEN INDICATED THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO COMMIT SUICIDE AS HIS HEALTH IS MISERABLE, HE IS IN A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF PAIN AND HE NO LONGER HAS ANYTHING FOR WHICH TO LIVE; HOWEVER, HE SAID HE NOW PLANS ON WAITING FOR A TRIAL DURING WHICH HE WILL PERSONALLY CONDUCT SOME EXAMINATIONS IN ORDER TO DIRECTLY CONFRONT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN IN AN EFFORT TO GET THEM TO "ADMIT TO THEIR LIES." SHOULD ANY TRIAL OR AGREEMENT END IN JUDGMENT IN HIS WIFE'S FAVOR, WHITTEN CLAIMED HE WOULD NO LONGER BE IN A FINANCIAL POSITION TO CONTINUE TO LIVE IN AUSTRIA. WHITTEN SPOKE OFTEN OF SUICIDE AS A WAY TO END BOTH HIS PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL PAIN. C/O WAS LEFT WITH THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT HIS RESOLVE ON THIS MATTER IS FIRM; WHETHER HE WAITS FOR TRIAL OR NOT IS A MATTER OF PURE SPECULATION. C/O TRIED TO REMIND WHITTEN THAT WHILE HIS BODY MAY NO LONGER FUNCTION SO WELL, HIS MIND WAS OBVIOUSLY STILL SHARP. C/O THEN ASKED, NOT IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY BUT AS ONE HUMAN BEING TO ANOTHER, THAT SHOULD WHITTEN EVER SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATE SUICIDE, HE DIRECTLY CONTACT C/O FIRST. WHITTEN COUNTERED BY SAYING THAT C/O MAY BE ABLE TO DISCERN WHEN THE TIME HAS COME. HE SAID HE HAS KEPT ALL OF HIS DIARIES FROM WWII THROUGH 1953, HAVING INTENDED TO SOMEDAY WRITE HIS MEMOIRS. WANTING TO KEEP ANY FUTURE PROFITS FROM HIS FAMILY, HE SAID HE NO LONGER HAS PLANS TO DO SO BUT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO DIE WITH THEM LEFT FOR THE AUSTRIANS TO FIND; THEREFORE, HE WOULD PASS THEM THROUGH THE RSO. IN THE EVENT THAT THIS OCCURS, THIS WILL BE A SIGNAL THAT HE INTENDS TO GO THROUGH WITH THE SUICIDE.

8. AS C/O GOT UP TO LEAVE, WHITTEN, AGAIN IN TEARS, THANKED C/O FOR HIS PROFESSIONALISM AND HIS HELP, AND REMINDED C/O THAT HE HAD ENTERED INTO A MOST HONORABLE PROFESSION. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN MOST HIGHLY IMPRESSED WITH REF IDEN, WHOM HE ALSO CONSIDERED A TRUE PROFESSIONAL. HE ASKED THAT C/O PASS ALONG A *SPECIAL NOTE OF THANKS AS THE OUTCOME OF THE<JFK>MATTER HAD "RESTORED HIS FAITH IN THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM." WHITTEN BADE HIS FAREWELL BY NOTING IT WOULD BE THE LAST TIME THAT THE TWO WOULD MEET, AND WISHED C/O A GOOD LIFE.

9. FYI, REF INFORMATION THAT WHITTEN WAS STILL SEEKING AN ATTORNEY RUNS COUNTER TO A STATEMENT HE MADE TO C/O. ACCORDING TO WHITTEN, BOTH HE AND HIS WIFE WERE RETAINING LAWYERS IN FLORIDA WHERE SHE IS NOW RESIDENT. FURTHER, AS OF THE DATE OF THE ABOVE MEETING, SERVICE OF WHITTEN REGARDING THE SUPPORT MATTER HAD NOT YET BEEN ACCOMPLISHED ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE WAS EXPECTING THE PAPERWORK AT ANY TIME. WHITTEN DID SPEAK OF MAKING A PAYMENT, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE MONEY WAS INTENDED AS A RETAINER FEE OR AS A PAYMENT TO HIS WIFE. HE HAS JUST PURCHASED A FAX MACHINE TO MORE QUICKLY DEAL WITH LEGAL MATTERS, AND THE DAY PRIOR TO C/O'S MEETING HAD LIQUIDATED MANY OF HIS FINANCIAL HOLDINGS TO KEEP HIS FAMILY FROM THEM. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT A VIENNESE SOCIAL WORKER VISITS WHITTEN FIVE DAYS A WEEK TO CLEAN AND RUN ERRANDS AND THAT WHITTEN GETS HIS MEALS FROM THE AUSTRIAN EQUIVALENT OF MEALS-ON-WHEELS; THUS, WHILE HE HIMSELF IS VIRTUALLY IMMOBILE, HIS

APARTMENT REMAINS LIVABLE AND HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE IN DANGER OF STARVATION. THE GREATEST THREAT TO WHITTEN MAY BE BURGLARY; ACCORDING TO HIM, THE JEWEL HEIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY THREE SLOVAK YOUTHS WHILE HE SLEPT. WHITTEN CLAIMED THAT WHILE THE AUSTRIAN POLICE HAVE MADE AN APPREHENSION, HIS FAMILY SIMPLY REFUSES TO BELIEVE THIS AS NONE OF THE STOLEN GOODS WERE RECOVERED AND NO OFFICIAL CHARGES HAVE YET BEEN FILED.

10. FILE: 785-120-034.

CL BY: 618711
CL REASON: 1.5(C)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 96-4653466 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: EUR/PLANS (694) INFO: EUDORECORD, MDSX, NR/OPSB, NR/ORG, OCC/CRG, OCC/RB, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE (0/W)

---

96 4653466 ASP PAGE 001 IN 4653466
TOR: 031305Z JUL 96 NEWA 20442

SECRET 031358Z JUL 96 STAFF

CITE NEWARK 20442

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT EUR/PLANS INFO OCC/CRG, NR/ORG, NR/OPSB

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT FASTTRACK MXLETTER

SUBJECT: CONTINUATION OF PAYMENT TO C/LPAVERT FOR E-MAIL ACCOUNT

REF: A. NEWARK 19245
B. DIRECTOR 415240

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE ADVISE IF THERE IS INTEREST IN C/LPAVERT RENEWING HIS COMPUSERVE ACCOUNT PER BELOW.

2. ON 25 JUNE 1996, C/LPAVERT CALLED STATION AND ASKED FOR RECENTLY RESIGNED C/O GERALD K. HAUSELNAN REGARDING WHETHER HE SHOULD RENEW HIS COMPUSERVE ACCOUNT. ACCORDING TO REF A AND AS REFLECTED IN HIS MOU, LPAVERT RECEIVED US$1,700 AS AN ADMINISTRATION FEE FOR THE E-MAIL ACCOUNT WHICH HE OPENED ON NWBOLTON'S BEHALF.

3. PER REF B PARA 3, WE NOTED THAT C/LPAVERT TOLD IC MACDONALD E. ZAPPLEY IN AUGUST 1995 THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT
*NWBOLTON WAS INVOLVED IN THE<ASSASSINATION>OF<PRESIDENT>
*<KENNEDY.> IN LIGHT OF THAT REMARK, EUR DECIDED NOT TO USE THE ACCOUNT FOR A SENSITIVE FIELD ASSET BUT RATHER FOR AN APPLICATION OF LESS SENSITIVITY. REF B ADVISED FURTHER THAT THE ACCOUNT MIGHT BE DROPPED AFTER THE FIRST YEAR.

4. STATION HAS HAD NO CONTACT WITH C/LPAVERT SINCE 20 SEPTEMBER 1995. PLEASE ADVISE IF STATION SHOULD REQUEST C/LPAVERT RENEW HIS ACCOUNT, WHICH IS DUE TO EXPIRE IN AUGUST.

5. CL BY 0535054; CL REASON: 1.5 (C); DECL ON: X1; DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

6. FILE: CS-6754; 201-1490579.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 96-4491072 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: EA/KNXO (158) INFO: AF/EXO, CIC/AF, EA/KCI, EADORECORD, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, AF/OPS, AF/SG (3/W)

96 4491072 ASR PAGE 001 IN 4491072
TOR: 181132Z JUN 96 HARE 71720

SECRET 181128Z JUN 96 STAFF

CITE HARARE 71720

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT EA/KNXO INFO EA/KCI, AF/SG, CIC/AF, AF/OPS

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT BRMODEL

SUBJECT: BRMODEL/1 CONTACT WITH DPRK LANGUAGE TRAINEE--MONEY, BOOTS,
* AND<ASSASSINATION>VIDEOS.

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.

2. DURING MEETINGS ON 13/14 JUNE, BRMODEL/1 (M/1) RELATED TO IOO BALLANGER SEVERAL FASCINATING TIDBITS ABOUT NORTH KOREAN LANGUAGE TRAINEE ((LI)) SONG-AN (SUBJ), WHO CONTINUES TO SEEK REGULAR CONTACT WITH M/1. SUBJ IS STILL SELLING CIGARETTES AND BOOZE TO M/1'S FRIEND, (FNU) ((CHIKOMBE)), WHO RUNS THE ROSE AND CROWN NIGHTCLUB IN HATFIELD. M/1 CHARACTERIZED HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJ AS ONE OF DEEP TRUST, ALTHOUGH M/1 SAID HE IS AWARE THAT THERE ARE STILL LIMITS TO WHAT HE CAN ASK SUBJ. LI WANTS M/1 TO LOAN HIM ZD 1,200 TO HELP MAKE HIS MONTHLY INCOME QUOTA FOR THE EMBASSY. IOO GAVE M/1 ZD 1,000 (ABOUT US$100) FOR PASSAGE TO SUBJ AND TOLD M/1 TO MAKE SURE SUBJ KNOWS THERE IS QUID PRO QUO INVOLVED IN THE "LOAN."

3. SUBJ HAS MADE SEVERAL REQUESTS TO M/1 FOR PERSONAL ITEMS, INCLUDING SIZE EIGHT COWBOY BOOTS. MOST INTRIGUINGLY, SUBJ HAS
*REQUESTED THAT M/1 PROVIDE HIM WITH VIDEO OF<ASSASSINATIONS>OF
*FOREIGN LEADERS, PARTICULARLY THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.>IOO COACHED M/1
*TO FIND OUT WHY SUBJ REALLY WANTS VIDEOS ON<ASSASSINATIONS,>AND TOLD M/1 THAT--DUE TO THE POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS--ENWBOLTON WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THEM.

4. M/1 SAYS THAT SUBJ HAS CONFIDED HE IS ALSO AS A MEMBER OF A "PROTECTION UNIT," AND M/1 BELIEVES THIS IS BEHIND HIS REQUEST FOR
*VIDEOS OF<ASSASSINATIONS.>M/1 NOTED THAT HE TELLS SUBJ THAT HE WORKS IN A PROTECTION UNIT (VICE BRCHIPPER), ALTHOUGH THE NORTH KOREANS IN THE PAST HAVE TREATED M/1 AS A BRCHIPPER OFFICER, DESPITE HIS DENIALS. M/1 GUESSED THAT THIS MAY BE A WAY FOR SUBJ TO LET HIS

SECRET

SENSIND: RYBAT

MHFNO: 96-4491072

COVER SLIP, WHILE STILL MAINTAINING A FIGLEAF. IOO ASKED M/1 TO PUSH SUBJ ON THIS ISSUE AND DISCUSS M/1'S TRAINING IN NORTH KOREA IN ORDER TO ELICIT MORE INFO ON SUBJ'S (PROBABLE INTEL) BACKGROUND.

5. ALSO, ON THE SUBJECT OF VIP PROTECTION, SUBJ CLAIMED TO M/1 THAT HE MET PRESIDENT ROBERT ((MUGABE)) DURING A VISIT MUGABE REPORTEDLY MADE TO THE NORTH KOREAN EMBASSY TO INVITE THE DEAR LEADER ((KIM)) CHONG IL TO THE WORLD SOLAR SUMMIT. (STATION NOTE: MUGABE DOES NOT VISIT EMBASSIES AS A RULE, AND THIS IS PROBABLY AN INSTANCE OF SUBJ INFLATING HIS--AND HIS COUNTRY'S--IMPORTANCE.

6. CL BY 2198002. CL REASON 1.5(C). DECL ON: X1. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

7. FILE: BRMODEL/1.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

/ / * E-O * SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: EUR/GA INFO: DC/EUR, EUR/LGL, EYESONLY, MDSX, OCC/OSG, ODPD, FILE, DDO (2/P)

96 4016553 ASR PAGE 001
TOT: 021354Z MAY 96 DIRECTOR 758224

S E C R E T
STAFF 021354Z DIRECTOR 758224
TO: VIENNA.

FROM: LIMIT EUR/GA INFO EUR/LGL, OGC/OFLD, DC/EUR, OCC/OSG, OGC/OSD

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - APRIL 1996 MEETING BETWEEN JFK BOARD ATTORNEY AND JOHN WHITTEN

REF: A. VIENNA 34962 96 3666955
B. DIRECTOR 702048 96 3616677

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYIO.

2. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS THE MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD PREPARED BY IDEN B REF B CONCERNING THE INTERVIEW WITH JOHN WHITTEN AND IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR EDIFICATION.

ON 22 APRIL 1996, FROM APPROXIMATELY 1000 TO 1600, IDENS REF B SPOKE WITH JOHN WHITTEN AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN VIENNA. IDEN A CONDUCTED THE INTERVIEW BY SHOWING WHITTEN VARIOUS DOCUMENTS AND *HIS PRIOR TESTIMONY BEFORE THE<HSCA.> WHITTEN WAS EAGER TO HELP THE BOARD IN ANY WAY HE COULD AND EVEN OFFERED TO COME TO THE U.S. IF NEED BE. IDEN A CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE USEFUL TO TAKE WHITTEN'S DEPOSITION AT A LATER DATE. ALTHOUGH WHITTEN HAD IN GENERAL A GOOD MEMORY, IDEN A FELT HE DID NOT ADD ANYTHING *OF SIGNIFICANCE TO HIS PRIOR TESTIMONY BEFORE THE<HSCA.> AFTER THE INTERVIEW, WHITTEN TOOK IDENS TO HIS APARTMENT AND THEN LATER TO A RESTAURANT WITH HIS WIFE. IDENS LEFT WHITTEN ABOUT 1900.

WHITTEN WAS EXTREMELY WORRIED AND UPSET ABOUT THE RELEASE OF HIS NAME AND ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE INTERVIEW WAS ON THE VERGE OF TEARS. ALTHOUGH IDEN B WAS EXPECTING HIM TO BE ANGRY WITH CIA AND THE BOARD, INSTEAD, HE CLEARLY FELT HURT AND BETRAYED. HIS OBVIOUS PHYSICAL PROBLEMS ADD TO THIS FEELING OF BEING VULNERABLE. PHYSICALLY HE IS NOT WELL; HE IS PARALYZED ON HIS LEFT SIDE AND HAS GREAT DIFFICULTY WALKING. ON A MAP, HE POINTED OUT HIS APARTMENT AND INDICATED WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE SERIOUS THREATS TO HIS SAFETY SHOULD HIS AFFILIATION WITH CIA BECOME KNOWN. WITHIN A BLOCK OF HIS APARTMENT HE POINTED OUT THE

HEADQUARTERS OF THE KURDISH WORKERS' PARTY (PKK), THE ANARCHIST PARTY, AND A BAR WHERE MANY MIDDLE EASTERNERS WOULD CONGREGATE. HE THEN POINTED OUT THESE PLACES TO IDENS WHEN WE WENT TO HIS APARTMENT. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO WAY HE COULD DEFEND HIMSELF FROM ANY ATTACK.

WHITTEN ALSO STATED THAT HE HAS BEEN RETIRED FOR ALMOST AS LONG AS HE WORKED FOR THE CIA, AND THAT HE HAS A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT LIFE NOW IN VIENNA. HE AND HIS WIFE HAVE LIVED IN VIENNA APPROXIMATELY 25 YEARS. HE IS A MEMBER OF VARIOUS MUSICAL AND ART SOCIETIES. HE SINGS IN A PROMINENT VIENNA MEN'S CHOIR. HE HAS PUBLISHED VARIOUS ARTICLES ON MUSIC (HIS SPECIALITY IS JOHANN STRAUSS). HE HAS RECEIVED MANY MEDALS FOR HIS WORK IN THE ARTS IN VIENNA WHICH WE SAW WHEN WE WENT TO HIS APARTMENT.

WHITTEN IS ALSO GREATLY WORRIED ABOUT THE FACT THAT HE COMMITTED PERJURY WHEN APPLYING FOR AUSTRIAN RESIDENCY BY STATING HE WORKED FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT. HE BELIEVES THIS COULD SUBJECT HIM TO CRIMINAL PENALTIES IN AUSTRIA. HE STATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, SHOULD HIS AFFILIATION BECOME KNOWN, HE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE AUSTRIA. ON OTHER OCCASIONS, HE STATED THAT HE WOULD TURN HIMSELF IN TO THE VIENNESE AUTHORITIES AND OFFER HIS SERVICES AS A CONSULTANT TO THE POLICE OR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. HE OBVIOUSLY WAS EXTREMELY DISTRAUGHT AND WAS VOICING WHAT HE BELIEVED WERE HIS OPTIONS SHOULD HIS NAME BE RELEASED BY THE BOARD, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT DECIDED ON A PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHITTEN WAS ADAMANT THAT NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENS HE WOULD NEVER BETRAY THE CIA BY TELLING ANYONE ABOUT HIS WORK AS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

BY THE END OF THE EVENING, WHITTEN STATED THAT HE FELT MUCH BETTER ABOUT THE STATE OF EVENTS. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, IDEN B HAD ASSURED HIM THAT CIA WAS DOING EVERYTHING TO PROTECT HIM AND IDEN A STATED HE WOULD ARGUE FOR HIS PROTECTION TO THE BOARD. HE CLEARLY LOOKED UPON IDENS AS HIS ALLIES IN THIS PROCESS AND EVEN STATED THAT HE HAD A "WONDERFUL" DAY TALKING TO IDENS. IDENS LEFT HIM, THEY BELIEVE, FEELING HAPPY AND CONFIDENT ALL WOULD TURN OUT WELL.

AFTER THE MEETING, IDENS SPOKE ABOUT HOW THIS ISSUE WOULD BE HANDLED BY THE BOARD. IDEN A BELIEVED THAT IT WAS MORE THAN LIKELY THAT THE BOARD WOULD AGREE TO PROTECT HIM AND THAT HE WOULD MAKE THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT HE COULD TO THEM. THE BOARD WILL MAKE ITS DECISION IN IT'S NEXT MEETING IN MID-MAY. IDEN B DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR ANYONE FROM CIA TO COME DOWN TO THAT MEETING. WE AGREED THAT SHOULD THE BOARD MAKE THE REPREHENSIBLE DECISION OF RELEASING WHITTEN'S NAME, THAT WE COULD NOT IMAGINE A STRONGER CASE ON WHICH TO BRING AN APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT.

3. IDEN B EXTENDS HER THANKS TO THE STATION FOR ARRANGING THE INTERVIEW AND HER HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS. SHE SAID EVERYTHING WENT EXTREMELY SMOOTHLY. HQS WILL APPRISE STATION OF BOARD'S DECISION REGARDING WHITTEN (PROBABLY MID-MAY). REGARDS.

4. FILE: 785-120-034. INDEX: NONE. CL BY: 0666970, CL

REASON: 1.5C, DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 1.0.2.>
RELNO: E409396
ORIG: EUR/GAEXT(HUMPHJA,45591); AUTH: EUR/GA(VOLZ); INFO:
EUR/LGL(CRAWFORD), OGC/LD(CIPRIANI-SUB),; REL: EUR/GA(VOLZ).
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / * E-O * SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: EA/J (299) INFO: DCEA/OPE, EYESONLY, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/EA, DDO, EA/XO (4/W)

96 3620327 ASO PAGE 001 IN 3620327
TOR: 260842Z MAR 96 TOKY 24344

S E C R E T 260832Z MAR 96 STAFF

CITE TOKYO 24344

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT C/EA/J INFO CHIEF/EA, DCEA/OPE, EA/XO

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - FOR C/EA/J - OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF TOKYO STATION

REF: DIRECTOR 700784 96 3598980

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING INTO THE *TALKING POINTS TO BE USED IN THE PRESENTATION TO THE<JFK> *<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD.

2. AMBASSADOR MONDALE, THE EMBASSY AND THE STATION STRONGLY OPPOSE RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE EXISTENCE OF A CIA STATION IN JAPAN. SUCH ACTION COULD HAVE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR US-JAPAN RELATIONS AT A TIME WHEN A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED. IT ALSO WOULD RISK REIGNITING EARLIER CONTROVERSIES OVER ALLEGED CIA WIRETAPPING OF THE MAN WHO IS TODAY THE PRIME MINISTER AND OVER PAST CIA FUNDING FOR THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. PUBLIC CONFIRMATION WOULD, WITHOUT A DOUBT, DISRUPT COOPERATION WITH JAPANESE LIAISON SERVICES ON IMPORTANT COUNTERTERRORIST AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES. BY MAKING THE STATION THE OBJECT OF GREATER PUBLIC AND POSSIBLY OFFICIAL SCRUTINY, IT WOULD LOWER THE CONFIDENCE OF EXISTING AND NEW SOURCES IN OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR IDENTITY AND SECURITY.

3. IMPACT ON US-JAPAN RELATIONS: THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PUBLICLY ADMIT THAT IT COLLECTS INTELLIGENCE, AND AS A COROLLARY, DOES NOT ADMIT TO HAVING LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS WITH US INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. TOKYO AVOIDS PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BECAUSE IT KNOWS THAT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IS ANATHEMA TO THE LEFT WING OF THE JAPANESE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND ANY ADMISSION WOULD GIVE THE LEFT NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTACK THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WHICH WAS THE RULING PARTY FROM 1955 TO 1993 AND IS TODAY THE PARTY OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE LEADING PARTY WITHIN THE RULING COALITION. ANY OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION THAT CONTRADICTED EARLIER JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

DENIALS OF CIA PRESENCE IN JAPAN WOULD BE USED AS A CLUB BY THE LEFT TO ATTACK LDP SUPPORT FOR THE US-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN JAPAN. WITH A STATE VISIT BY THE US PRESIDENT FAST APPROACHING AND DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS OVER US BASES IN OKINAWA LIKELY TO CONTINUE INTO 1997, THIS WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY BAD TIME TO OPEN THE DOOR TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT US ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN JAPAN.

4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CIA PRESENCE WOULD ALSO REVIVE OLD CONTROVERSIES THAT HAVE LARGELY RECEDED FROM THE HEADLINES. IN 1995, THE PRESS MADE A MAJOR ISSUE OF CIA FUNDING FOR THE LDP IN ITS FORMATIVE YEARS. ANYTHING THAT LENT CREDIBILITY TO THE STORY WOULD BE A SERIOUS POLITICAL LIABILITY FOR THE LDP. THEN FOREIGN MINISTER AND LDP PRESIDENT KONO YOHEI PERSONALLY ASKED AMBASSADOR MONDALE THAT THE US GOVERNMENT NOT RELEASE DOCUMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT. KONO EXPLAINED TO AMBASSADOR MONDALE THAT THE LDP CAN DEAL WITH RUMORS AND EVEN UNCONFIRMED LEAKS, BUT OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF CIA ACTIVITY IN JAPAN WOULD BE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AFFAIR, THREATENING TO DAMAGE BOTH THE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS THE US-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. KONO EXPLICITLY IMPRESSED ON THE AMBASSADOR THE NEED FOR THE US GOVERNMENT TO HOLD THE LINE AGAINST DISCLOSURE.

5. IN THE FALL OF 1995, A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ALLEGED THAT THE CIA HAD WIRETAPPED HASHIMOTO RYUTARO, WHO HAS SINCE BECOME PRIME MINISTER. IN RESPONSE TO THE ENSUING PRESS QUERIES, JAPANESE OFFICIALS OF THE CONCERNED MINISTRY DISMISSED THE STORY AS IMPLAUSIBLE. IF THE US GOVERNMENT DECLASSIFIES A DOCUMENT THAT CONFIRMS CIA PRESENCE IN JAPAN, IT WOULD HAND THE JAPANESE PRESS NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO REOPEN THE ISSUE OF ALLEGED ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND ATTACK THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FRIENDS WITHIN THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

6. DISRUPTION OF LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS: THE JAPANESE SERVICES GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO KEEP THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH US INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SECRET. IN THE CASE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THOSE RELATIONSHIPS, ALL CONTACT COULD BE SEVERED IN THE EVENT OF DISCLOSURE AND EMBARRASSMENT. SUCH A RUPTURE IN THE RELATIONSHIP DEFIES EASY REPAIR. THE SOUTH KOREAN AGENCY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING, WHICH SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED JAPANESE LIAISON WHEN IT KIDNAPPED OPPOSITION POLITICIAN KIM DAE JUNG FROM TOKYO OVER TWO DECADES AGO, IS STILL TREATED AS A PARIAH TODAY.

7. IMPACT ON CONTINUING OPERATIONS: OUR ONGOING COOPERATION WITH A JAPANESE LIAISON SERVICE IN PURSUIT OF A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUP COULD BE TOTALLY DISRUPTED BY DISCLOSURE. EXTREMELY IMPORTANT US LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE EQUITIES ARE AT STAKE IN THIS COOPERATIVE ENDEAVOR. THE TERRORIST GROUP IS PROBABLY NOT AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF US INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR PURSUIT. DISCLOSURE THAT REMINDED THEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF US-JAPANESE COOPERATION AGAINST THEM COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO OUR ABILITY TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE ON THE GROUP.

8. IMPACT ON SOURCES: STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AT LEAST ONE
*SOURCE PREDATES THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> PUBLICITY ABOUT CIA PRESENCE AND ACTIVITY, EVEN IN THE PAST, OFTEN CAUSES SOURCES TO WONDER ABOUT

OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR SECURITY. OLDER SOURCES, NOT SURPRISINGLY, SEE EVEN PUBLICITY ABOUT THE PAST AS SOMETHING THAT COULD FOCUS ATTENTION ON THEM AS INDIVIDUALS.

9. CL REASON: 1.5 (C); DECL ON: X1.

10. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / * E-O * SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: EA/J INFO: DCEA/OPE, EYESONLY, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/EA,
DDO, EA/XO (4/P)

96 3598980 ASO PAGE 001
TOT: 231431Z MAR 96 DIRECTOR 700784

S E C R E T
STAFF 231431Z DIRECTOR 700784
TO: IMMEDIATE TOKYO.

FROM: LIMIT C/EA/J INFO CHIEF/EA, DCEA/OPE, EA/XO

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF TOKYO STATION

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE PROVIDE STATION'S EXPEDITED COMMENTS.

2. ON 22 MARCH WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE PRESIDENTIALLY *APPOINTED<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD HAS DECLARED ITS INTENTION TO RELEASE THE FACT THAT CIA HAD A STATION IN TOKYO IN THE EARLY 1960'S. APPARENTLY THERE IS SOME CORRESPONDENCE OR CABLE TRAFFIC FROM THE EARLY 1960'S ON THE SUBJECT THAT INCLUDES TOKYO STATION ON THE DISTRIBUTION LINE. WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN THE ACTUAL TRAFFIC BUT WE HAVE BEEN TASKED WITH PROVIDING COMMENTS ON HOW THIS ACTION WOULD "AFFECT CURRENT OPERATIONS, LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS, ASSETS, JAPANESE/AMERICAN RELATIONS, ETC." GIVEN THE PRESS SCRUTINY OF CIA ISSUES IN JAPAN, THERE IS NO DOUBT IN OUR MIND THAT SUCH A RELEASE WILL BE NOTICED BY THE JAPANESE MEDIA.

3. PLEASE PREPARE YOUR ARGUMENTS IN AS COMPLETE A MANNER AS POSSIBLE. WE RECOMMEND THAT QUOTES FROM AMBASSADOR MONDALE, SUPPORTING STATION'S POSITION, SHOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED. ACCORDING TO THE INFORMATION PROVIDED US, THE ADDO HAS ADDRESSED THE BOARD TWICE, MOST RECENTLY LAST MONDAY WHEN HE BRIEFED THEM ON WHY WE CANNOT REVEAL OUR INSTALLATIONS IN SCANDINAVIA, INDIA AND AUSTRALIA EVEN 30 YEARS AGO. THE BOARD ACCEPTED OUR ARGUMENTS ON SCANDINAVIA AND INDIA BUT REJECTED AUSTRALIA. ONCE THE BOARD OVERRULES US, OUR ONLY RECOURSE IS TO APPEAL TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

4. ONCE WE HAVE STATION'S ARGUMENTS IN HAND WE WILL PREPARE THE NECESSARY MEMORANDUMS TO SUPPORT YOUR POSITION. FOR THE SAKE OF STRUCTURE, WE ASK THAT YOU ORGANIZE YOUR ARGUMENTS ALONG SUBTITLED THEMES SUCH AS IN PARA 2 ABOVE, INCLUDING THE RECENT PRESS ATTENTION ON CIA ACTIVITIES AND THE HISTORICAL REFUSAL OF

LIAISON COUNTERPARTS TO PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE OUR PRESENCE. FYI, THE BOARD MEMBERS ARE ALL TOP SECRET CLEARED.

5. OUR DEADLINE ON THIS MAY BE VERY SHORT SO PLEASE EXPEDITE YOUR RESPONSE. WE APPRECIATE YOUR UNDERSTANDING.

6. CL REASON: 1.5(C); DECL: X1.
7. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 1.0.1.>
RELNO: E376810
ORIG: EA/J(BROWN,32616); REL: C/EA/J(BROWN). CL BY 704447.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 96-3469532 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: EUR/SEC (706) INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/F, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, CIC/EUR (2/W)

---

96 3469532 ASR PAGE 001 IN 3469532
TOR: 121730Z MAR 96 PARI 97616

S E C R E T 121726Z MAR 96 STAFF

CITE PARIS 97616 (STIEGLER ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT EUR/SEC INFO EUR/F, CIC/EUR

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: POSTCARD RECEIVED BY AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE; FYI.

2. AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN RECENTLY RECEIVED A POSTCARD (POSTMARKED 22 FEB 96) THROUGH THE APO FROM AN INDIVIDUAL IN MINNESOTA. ALTHOUGH THE AMBASSADOR'S NAME AND ADDRESS (U.S. EMBASSY - PARIS, C/O THE DEPARTMENT'S WASHINGTON ADDRESS) ARE HANDWRITTEN, THE ENTIRE MESSAGE ON THE BACK OF THE POSTCARD IS STAMPED. MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

BEGIN QUOTE:
* THE CIA<ASSASSINATED PRESIDENT>
* <KENNEDY>ON ORDERS FROM THE
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
HEADQUARTERED IN NEW YORK CITY.
DAVID ROCKEFELLER IS "CHAIRMAN" OF
THIS GROUP. WRITE HIM AT CHASE-
MANHATTAN BANK, ONE CHASE PLAZA,
NEW YORK CITY, 10005, AND HAVE
A GOOD DAY! END OF QUOTE

3. THE POSTCARD IS NOT SIGNED; INSTEAD IT HAS A PRINTED ADDRESS LABEL AFFIXED ON THE BACK WHICH READS:

H.H.D.

212 W. THOMPSON, APT. 303
W. ST. PAUL, MINN. 55118

4. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2161689 CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL

SECRET

MHFNO: 96-3469532 SENSIND: RYBAT

ON: X1 DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: C/OCC (171) INFO: EUR/LGL, EUR/SA, MDSX, OCC/OSG, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, DC/EURN, C/PCS (3/W)

96 3377691 ASR PAGE 001 IN 3377691
TOR: 041414Z MAR 96 VIEN 33696

S E C R E T 041408Z MAR 96 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 33696 (EVESON ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, C/EUR/SA, EUR/LGL, OGC/OSD, OGC/OFLD, DC/EURN

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT IVTROVE

*SUBJECT: FURTHER RESPONSE FOR<JFK>RECORDS COLLECTION ACT

REF: A. VIENNA 28456
B. DIRECTOR 493642
C. DIRECTOR 493658

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.

2. WITH THE RECENT PUBLIC REVELATION CONCERNING WEAPONS CACHES IN AUSTRIA, REF C[IDEN CONTACTED STATION AND REQUESTED THAT THE FOLLOWING BE FORWARDED TO HQS IN FURTHERANCE OF HIS REQUEST THAT HIS *NAME NOT BE PUBLICLY RELEASED IN CONNECTION WITH THE<JFK> *<ASSASSINATION.>]C/O NOBLEHORSE VISITED IDEN'S RESIDENCE ON THE MORNING OF 27 FEBRUARY 96 TO COLLECT A HANDWRITTEN NOTE (BEING POUCHED TO HQS VIA TM 902-980) THE CONTENTS OF WHICH ARE AS FOLLOWS:

FEB
27, 1996

TO BERT MILLS
*SUBJ: (IDEN) AND THE<KENNEDY>FILES

ANOTHER REASON FOR NOT DISCLOSING MY NAME HAS ARISEN. IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1950'S, I WAS FOR SEVERAL YEARS THE CASE OFFICER FOR OUR OPERATION INVOLVING FRANZ ((OLAH)), CHIEF OF THE LABOR UNION IN AUSTRIA. AFTER HE AND THE WOODWORKERS' UNION HAD GONE INTO THE STREETS IN 1950, ARMED WITH CLUBS, AND BEATEN BACK A RUSSIAN-LED COMMUNIST WORKERS PUTSCH TO OVERTHROW THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT, THE VIENNA STATION TOOK UP CONTACT WITH OLAH, A FEARLESS ANTI-NAZI AND ANTI-COMMUNIST, AND GOT HIM TO ORGANIZE PARAMILITARY GROUPS TO HARASS THE SOVIET ARMY IF IT SHOULD ATTACK THE WESTERN (BRITISH, FRENCH, AND USA) OCCUPATION ZONES IN AUSTRIA. HIS MEN WERE TRAINED

BY US IN OUR ZONE OF AUSTRIA AND THE NEW ORGANIZATION WAS GIVEN RADIOS SO THEY COULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH US AND EACH OTHER.

OUR PARAMILITARY PEOPLE PUT CACHES OF WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, FOOD, AND UNIFORMS INTO THE GROUND IN OVER 70 PLACES IN THE U.S. ZONE AND ELSEWHERE. OLAH'S GROUP WAS TO BE GIVEN THE LOCATION OF THE CACHES WHEN THE RED ARMY MOVED.

RECENTLY THE US GOVERNMENT REVEALED TO THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT THE EXISTENCE OF THESE CACHES AND THE EMBASSY GAVE AUSTRIAN OFFICIALS THE LOCATIONS OF THESE CACHES. AUSTRIAN PRESS, RADIO, AND TV COVERAGE OF ALL THIS HAS BEEN GENERALLY FAVORABLE AND EVEN GRATEFUL. OLAH'S INVOLVEMENT IS KNOWN FROM HIS MEMOIRS AND FROM STATEMENTS HE MADE DURING HIS TRIAL IN THE 1960'S (HE WAS TRIED, CONVICTED, AND SERVED ONE YEAR FOR USING A LABOR UNION SAVINGS ACCOUNT AS SECURITY FOR A LOAN TO BUY THE KRONEN ZEITUNG, A TABLOID WHICH NOW HAS THE LARGEST CIRCULATION IN AUSTRIA. THE TWO MEN, ((DICHAND)) AND ((FALK)), HE CHOSE TO RUN THE PAPER, THEN TOOK IT OVER AS THEIR PERSONAL PROPERTY, BECOMING ALMOST THE RICHEST MEN IN AUSTRIA. DICHAND LATER SOLD OUT TO FALK AND FOUNDED ANOTHER TABLOID.

IN ALL OUR CLANDESTINE MEETINGS WITH OLAH, HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS TWO "SECRETARIES," JOSEF ((LAS)) AND HEINRICH ((DAURER)). LAS WENT TO JAIL FOR THE SAME OFFENSE AS OLAH AND DAURER MAY HAVE, TOO.

AT NO TIME WERE OUR NAMES (I WAS SUCCEEDED AS CASE OFFICER BY PAUL VON MARX, THEN UNDER STATE COVER IN VIENNA AND NOW RETIRED IN BERN, SWITZERLAND). I DON'T THINK OLAH KNEW OUR TRUE NAMES, BUT HE KNEW I WAS IN THE EMBASSY.

FROM A TV SHOW THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 26, 1996, I LEARNED THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO EAGER YOUNG AUSTRIAN HISTORIANS WORKING TO LEARN ALL THE FACTS ABOUT THIS CASE. ONE HAD SHEAVES OF TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS FROM THE STATE AND DEFENSE DEPTS. BEARING ON U.S. SCHEMES TO RE-ARM AUSTRIA.

IF MY NAME IS REVEALED, IT WILL BE RECOGNIZED BY SEVERAL AUSTRIAN OFFICERS I HAVE KNOWN FOR YEARS. AUSTRIAN TELEVISION CAN SHOW SEVERAL LENGTHY INTERVIEWS WITH ME ON THE 1993 OCCASION OF THE 150TH JUBILEE OF THE VIENNA MEN'S SINGING SOCIETY, WHICH I HAVE BELONGED TO SINCE 1972. OLAH, LAS, AND DAURER CAN ALL RECOGNIZE ME.

(SIGNED
- REF C IDEN)

3. THE MARGINS OF THE LETTER ALSO CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING: (I AM ALSO WELL KNOWN TO MANY PEOPLE IN AUSTRIAN TV.)

4. FILE: 785-120-034.
CL BY: 618711
CL REASON: 1.5(C)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

STAFF

ACTION: NR/PGO (522) INFO: C/NR, C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/NR, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC, CP/NR, CTC/COPS, CTC/IFC, CTC/MSB, CTC/OOG, CTCARCHIVE, LIMITO, MDSX, NR/ATA, NR/CEG, NR/ECON, NR/EX, NR/EX/E, NR/EX/W, NR/KRG, NR/TCOM, NRDORECORD, ODPD, FILE, C/CTC, DC/CTC (3/W)

96 3312306 ASR PAGE 001 IN 3312306
TOR: 271506Z FEB 96 MINN 19681

SECRET 271349Z FEB 96 STAFF

CITE MINNEAPOLIS 19681

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT NR/PGO INFO CHIEF/NR, NR/ES, NR/EX/W, NR/EX/E, NR/ECON, NR/TCOM, NR/KRG, CP/NR, NR/CEG, NR/ATA, CIC/NR

SLUGS: WNINTEL MXBLAZE

SUBJECT: NO CONTACT STATUS OF STATION CONTACTS AND ASSETS

REF: A. DIRECTOR 654551 96 3268629
B. DIRECTOR 742844

TEXT:

1. PER REF A REQUEST, FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF STATION CONTACTS AND ASSETS WHO ARE CURRENTLY IN NO CONTACT STATUS.

A. ((ANDREGG)), MICHAEL
GROUND ZERO,
ST. PAUL, MIN.
IN 1992 PRODUCED AND BROADCAST ON LOCAL CABLE ACCESS TV AN ANTI-NWBOLTON FILM LINKING NWBOLTON TO THE *<ASSASSINATION>OF<JFK,<MLK> ETC. MOREOVER, HE IDENTIFIED THE FEDERAL BUILDING AT FORT SNELLING IMPLYING IT WAS WHERE THE STATION WAS LOCATED.

B. ((AWNI)), WALID MOHAMMED
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, PHARMACEUTICALS
HENNEPIN COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER
MINNEAPOLIS, MN.
DPOB: 20 SEP 55, BAGHDAD, IRAQ
ACCORDING TO LOCAL FBI, IN MID/LATE 1980'S SUBJ WAS THE DISTRICT LEADER FOR AREA BATHISTS. HE REPORTEDLY WAS ACTIVE IN A NOW DEFUNCT UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA STUDENT GROUP, THE GENERAL UNION OF PALESTINIAN STUDENTS, AND CHAPTER PRESIDENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ARAB STUDENTS. THE FBI SAID AWANI FUNNELED MONEY FROM BAGHDAD TO LOCAL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. HE HAD A GREEN CARD IN 1983 AND MAY NOW BE A U.S. CITIZEN.

C. ((BOSROCK)), RONALD M.
H. B. FULLER COMPANY
ST. PAUL, MN.
DPOB: 22 OCT 1938, BATTLE CREEK, MI.

21 JULY 89 SUBJECT TOLD C/O THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO BE A SOURCE.

FILE: 201-1254083

D. ((DICKEY)), DENNIS B.
DIRECTOR, FAR EAST TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
TOL-O-MATIC
MINNEAPOLIS, MN.
DPOB: 15 AUG 42, MINNEAPOLIS, MN.

C/O RANGOON CALLED TOL-O-MATIC ON 26 AUG 88. WAS TOLD BY SECURITY OFFICER THAT SUBJECT HAD BEEN ACTING STRANGELY AND WAS GOING TO SEE PSYCHIATRIST. RECOMMENDED CONTACT BE DROPPED.

FILE: 201-1259101.

E. ((FEKETE)), DANIEL W.
<EXECUTIVE>VICE PRESIDENT, MINNEAPOLIS OPERATIONS
AIRCRAFT SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL (ASI)
MINNEAPOLIS, MN.
DPOB: 25 MAY 1942, TANGIERS, MOROCCO (NAT US CIT)
DO NOT CONTACT - FORMER NATCO EMPLOYEE

F. ((FUHR)), EBERHARD JOHN
1060 27TH AVE SE, APT D,
MINNEAPOLIS, MN.

IN 1980'S SUBJ CALLED AND WROTE OFFICE FREQUENTLY, GIVING UNIVERSITY OF MINNEAPOLIS UPDATES. CONSIDERED A KOOK.

G. ((GRUENBERG)), MICHAEL
PRESIDENT, ENDOTRONICS,
COON RAPIDS, MN.

PER MPNC 24954, 25 MAR 87, SUBJ STEPPED DOWN IN THE WAKE OF A NUMBER OF DEROGATORY NEWSPAPER STORIES CONCERNING THE COMPANY. STATION HAD NOT BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE NEW CEO AND DID NOT PLAN TO HAVE ANY CONTACT WITH THE COMPANY IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE, EVEN THOUGH REPORTING CONCERNING CHINESE AND SOVIET PURCHASES OF CELL PROGRAMS HAD BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY ANALYSTS. TERMINATED CONTACT WITH COMPANY UNTIL THE MATTER WAS FULLY RESOLVED.

FILE: 201-1258076.

H. ((HALLEY)), J. WOODS
PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS

SEPT 89 FBI ADVISED THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS NOT COOPERATIVE.

I. ((HOOPER)), ALAN B.
PROFESSOR OF GENETICS

SEPT 89 FBI ADVISED THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS NOT COOPERATIVE.

J. ((KWO)), DAVID W.
3M, RIKER LABS PHARMACEUTICAL
DPOB: 2 JUN 35, SHANGHAI (NAT. U.S. CIT)
FORMER NWBOLTON EMPLOYEE. TERMINATED IN 1973 BECAUSE OF SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES AND SALES OF ITEMS FOR MONETARY GAIN.

K. ((MAPP)), GORDON A.
VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
THERMO KING CORPORATION
BLOOMINGTON, MN.
DPOB: 21 MAR 46, NASSAWADOX, VA.
PER NC/MINNEAPOLIS 12687, 29 SEP 92,
SUBJECT WAS UNCOOPERATIVE.
FILE: 201-1268151; 301-3131263.

L. ((MARZOLF)), LYNN M.
VICE PRESIDENT, CHIEF FINANCE OFFICER
KENSINGER INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION
ST. PAUL, MN.
SUBJ DOES NOT WANT CONTACT WITH STATION.
FILE: 201-1261295.

M. ((MOUROUKIAN)), RICHARD E.
DIRECTOR, CLIENT SERVICES SYSTEMS
HONEYWELL INC.
MINNEAPOLIS, MN.
DPOB: 5 NOV 39, SHANGHAI, CHINA
SUBJECT NOT COOPERATIVE.
201-1255214; 301-136898.

N. ((O'BRIEN)), KEIRAN W.
DANNY'S CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
SHAKOPEE, MN.
DPOB: 21 OCT 37, BELLE PLAIN, MN.
SUBJ NOT COOPERATIVE, HOSTILE AND SUSPICIOUS.

O. ((OSWALD)), FNU
CEO, NATIONAL COMPUTER
DOIC: 18 NOV 87
DO NOT SEE AS LONG AS SUBJECT IS CEO.

P. ((QUIST)), B. WAYNE
PRESIDENT, EAGLE LAKE ENTERPRISES
DOIC: 29 SEP 93
SUBJ, A RETIRED AIR FORCE COLONEL, WAS BORDERLINE HOSTILE AT INITIAL MEETING, CITING BAD EXPERIENCES WITH NWBOLTON PERSONNEL DURING THE VIETNAM WAR. C/O DID NOT ANTICIPATE ANY FURTHER CONTACT. (SEE NR/MINNEAPOLIS 15213, 18 OCT 93)

Q. ((SHAPIRO)), ELSA
PROFESSOR OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
MINNEAPOLIS, MN.
DURING ONE-TIME DEBRIEF SEPT 87 SUBJ INDICATED SHE DID NOT WANT CONTINUING CONTACT.

R. ((STAGEBERG)), JAMES
STAGEBERG PARTNERS, INC.
MINNEAPOLIS, MN.
MET IN JUN 87. DECLINED OFFER OF FURTHER MEETINGS.

S. ((WANTA)), LEO
AKA LEO VANTA
PRESIDENT,
AMERICHINA GLOBAL MANAGEMENT GROUP
APPLETON, WISCONSIN

PER DIR 749175, 22 JUL 89, SUBJ AN NWBOLTON AGENT IMPOSTER AND NON-VIOLENT CRANK. SUBJECT IS NOT TO BE MET BY STATION PERSONNEL. HAD APPROACHED FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND NWBOLTON ASSETS WITH OFFERS TO SELL VARIOUS NON-EXISTENT GOODS.

T. ((WEIBEL)), FRIDERICK (FRITZ)
PRESIDENT, TECH-TRADE CO.
MINNETONKA, MN.
DPOB: 26 MAY 56, SOLOTHURN, SWITZERLAND (NAT. U.S. CIT.)

IPMS RECORD DID NOT CONFIRM SUBJECT'S U.S. CITIZENSHIP (SEE DIR 492608, 8 JUN 87)

FILE: 201-1260191

U. ((WOODWARD)), VAL W.
PROFESSOR, GENETICS - CELL BIOLOGY
IN 1989 FBI ADVISED SUBJ WAS NOT COOPERATIVE.

2. CL BY: 0622961, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1.

3. FILE: 100-120-404. DECL DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ PAGE: 1

MHFNO: 96-3123036 SENSIND: ~~RYBAT~~

/ /

~~SECRET~~ FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: C/EUR/NOR (729) INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/LGL, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, DC/EURN, CIC/EUR (3/W)

96 3123036 ASO PAGE 001 IN 3123036
TOR: 081248Z FEB 96 COPE 94608

~~S E C R E T~~ 081247Z FEB 96 STAFF

CITE COPENHAGEN 94608

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT EUR/NOR INFO DC/EURN, CIC/EUR, EUR/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

REF: DIRECTOR 633349 96 3117723

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE PARA 2.

2. THE FAX STATION RECEIVED APPEARS TO BE INCOMPLETE. IT CONTAINED A COVER SHEET, A ONE-PAGE COPENHAGEN CABLE STATING "NO TRACES" AND THE FIRST PAGE OF A DIRECTOR CABLE REQUESTING TRACES ON *<LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD)).> UNLESS THE MISSING PORTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR CABLE HAVE SOME BEARING ON DENMARK, STATION CANNOT MAKE A CASE AGAINST RELEASE OF THIS MATERIAL. WE WOULD INSIST, HOWEVER, THAT CRYPTS BE DELETED - AS REF INDICATED WOULD BE THE CASE.

3. PLEASE KEEP US APPRISED OF DATE THESE DOCS WILL BE RELEASED SO THAT STATION MAY INFORM AMBASSADOR AND OUR LIAISON SERVICE CHIEFS.

4. CL BY: 0716497 CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1

4. FILE: 021-120-004/1. DECL DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

MHFNO: 96-3101938 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: , , 4, , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: CE/R/ISP (114) INFO: C/ORMS, CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, CTC/COPS, CTC/IFC, CTC/OOG, CTCARCHIVE, D/OSE, EUR/BCIR, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, OSE/RAD, FILE, C/CTC, CE/IS, DC/CTC (4/W)

96 3101938 ASR PAGE 001 IN 3101938
TOR: 062041Z FEB 96 OTTA 90713

SECRET 062038Z FEB 96 STAFF

CITE OTTAWA 90713

TO: DIRECTOR INFO MOSCOW.

FOR: LIMIT CE/R/ISP INFO EUR/BCIR, OSE/LD, D/OSE, OSE/RAD

SLUGS: WNINTEL INTEL

SUBJECT: OPS INTEL: ISIW INTERVIEW REPORT ON GEORGI ENEROVICH MAMEDOV

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE REVIEW THE FOLLOWING DEBRIEFING REPORT FROM THE CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS'S INTERVIEW PROGRAM, CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL CAN UK US AUS NZ EYES ONLY, DATED 08 JANUARY 1996, NUMBERED ISIW 922-1-7. ADVISE IF WE SHOULD
RESUBMIT ANY OF THE FOLLOWING IN INTEL FORMAT. THIS REPORT MAY BE SHARED WITH DI ANALYSTS. THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED DURING AN OVER TWO HOUR CAR RIDE BETWEEN MONTREAL AND OTTAWA.

- CONFIDENTIAL-WNINTEL--NOFORN--REL CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ

COUNTRY: RUSSIA

SUBJ: GEORGI ENEROVICH MAMEDOV, DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DOI: DECEMBER 1995

SOURCE: A CANADIAN OFFICIAL WHO HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHAT INFORMALLY WITH MAMEDOV.

SUMMARY: NONE.

1. SOME OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS: GEORGI ENEROVICH ((MAMEDOV)) IS UNPRETENTIOUS AND TRAVELS LIGHT; FOR A THREE-DAY TRIP HIS LUGGAGE CONSISTED OF ONE GARMENT BAG WHICH HE HANDLED HIMSELF. AS HEAD OF A DELEGATION, HE EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR

SECRET

MEMBERS WHO DID NOT SPEAK ENGLISH AND HOPED PROVISIONS WOULD BE IN PLACE TO ENABLE THEM TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE SCHEDULED MULTILATERAL MEETINGS. HURRYING TO A RECEPTION SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL FOLLOWING A LONG FLIGHT, HE DID NOT WISH TO BE LATE BUT NEITHER DID HE WANT TO LEAVE OTHER DELEGATES FAR BEHIND. WHEN IT WAS MENTIONED THAT THEY WOULD HURRY ONCE THEY SAW HE WAS READY, HE COMMENTED -- WITHOUT ANY HINT OF REGRET -- THAT EVERYONE WAS DEMOCRATIC NOW AND IT NO LONGER WORKED THAT WAY.

2. HE EVIDENTLY HAS A GREAT INTEREST IN, AND RESPECT FOR, THE JAPANESE, REFERRING TO THEM AS A SPECIAL CIVILIZATION. AT THE RECEPTION, HE AND JAPANESE DELEGATES AGREED TO MEET LATER THAT NIGHT FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN SPITE OF SOME BADLY NEEDED REST.

3. A PERSON WHO LIKES TO ESTABLISH A ONE-ON-ONE RAPPORT, HE EXPRESSED A REGRET AT NOT SPEAKING SPANISH SINCE LATIN AMERICA IS ONE OF HIS MAIN AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. HE NOTED THAT LATIN AMERICANS DO NOT REALLY OPEN UP WHEN SPEAKING THROUGH INTERPRETERS. TIME CONSTRAINTS PREVENT HIM FROM LEARNING SPANISH AT PRESENT.

4. ECOLOGY - A SPECIAL CONCERN: MAMEDOV SHOWED A PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR ECOLOGY AND NOTED THAT RUSSIA WOULD NEED HELP IN DEALING WITH ITS PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA. HE RUEFULLY COMMENTED THAT MAN WAS THE ONLY CREATURE THAT WOULD DESPOIL HIS ENVIRONMENT. THE PROBLEM WAS A GLOBAL ONE AND REQUIRED CONCERTED COOPERATION ON AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.

5. PROBLEM AREAS FOR RUSSIA: ACCORDING TO MAMEDOV, RUSSIA'S CURRENT OPEN BORDERS MAKE THE COUNTRY VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST INCURSIONS (IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN WERE MENTIONED) AND TO THE OVERFLOW ONTO RUSSIAN TERRITORY OF BORDER CONFLICTS. WHEN PROBLEMS BEGAN IN AZERBAIJAN, IRAN SENT FIGHTING UNITS ACROSS THE BORDER TO ASSIST AZERIS; RUSSIA WAS NOT NOTIFIED. THE PROXIMITY OF THE CONFLICT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS POSSIBLE ESCALATION IS VERY WORRISOME. THE CIVIL WAR IN CHECHNYA HAS THE POTENTIAL OF BECOMING MORE SERIOUS AND IS A VERY TROUBLESOME ISSUE.

6. THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION: MAMEDOV ASSESSES THAT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, WILL BE STRENGTHENED THROUGH COMMERCIAL TIES. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA STILL HAVE 50% GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT. THE BANKING SECTOR IS MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL-STYLE BANKING. YOUNG MANAGERS (MID 30'S) ARE INTRODUCING NEW IDEAS, WHILE OLDER EXPERIENCED STAFF PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. THE CURRENT PERIOD IN WHICH RUSSIA IS BEING ROBBED BY SOME, IS SYMPTOMATIC OF TRANSITIONAL UPHEAVAL AND IS COMPARABLE TO THE POST CIVIL WAR ERA IN THE UNITED STATES WHEN A NUMBER OF ITS CITIZENS ACQUIRED WEALTH. IN THE 1960'S, THE U.S. WENT THROUGH A STAGE OF MILITANT LABOR UNIONISM ASSOCIATED WITH MOB ACTIVITIES. A CASE IN POINT, THE ACTIVITIES OF HOFFA AND HIS ALLEGED ORDERING OF THE *<ASSASSINATION>OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY>OFFERS AN ILLUSTRATIVE

EXAMPLE. (FIELD COMMENT: THE SOURCE PROVIDED THE QUALIFIER ON
*THE "ALLEDGED" NATURE OF MOB INVOLVEMENT IN THE<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION,>WHICH MAMEDOV APPARENTLY REPEATED AS IF IT WERE
ESTABLISHED FACT.)

7. COMMENTS ON TERRORISTS: TERRORISTS, EVEN THOSE WHO OPERATE UNDER THE GUISE OF RELIGIOUS FERVOR, NORMALLY HAVE AN UNDERLYING FINANCIAL MOTIVE ACCORDING TO MAMEDOV. RUSSIA, AS OTHER COUNTRIES, IS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED THAT ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS BE IN PLACE TO PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM ACQUIRING NUCLEAR MATERIALS. RUSSIA ALSO WANTS TO SEE AN IMPROVED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH TERRORISTS AND PREVENT THEM FROM TAKING ADVANTAGE OF LEGAL LOOPHOLES.

8. MAMEDOV ALSO MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON SEVERAL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

((ZYUGANOV))- ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS AND THE RESULTING DISCONTENT HAVE ENHANCED HIS CHANCES AT THE PRESIDENCY. IT WOULD NOT BE OF CRITICAL CONCERN SHOULD HE WIN THE COMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SINCE THE COMMUNISTS HAVE UNDERGONE A TRANSFORMATION AND WOULD NEITHER BE ABLE NOR WILLING TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK. THE NEW RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS WOULD BE SIMILAR TO ITALIAN COMMUNISTS BUT MAMEDOV WOULD DREAD TO SEE AN ITALIAN-TYPE POLITICAL SCENARIO IN RUSSIA. THE RETURN OF COMMUNIST PRESIDENTS IN POLAND, HUNGARY AND ROMANIA HAS NOT CAUSED DISRUPTIONS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH WESTERN NATIONS, NOR SHOULD THIS HAPPEN WITH RUSSIA.

((ZHIRINOVSKY))- A POLITICAL HOOLIGAN, ZHIRINOVSKY HAS LOTS OF FINANCIAL BACKING. WITH HIS ATTENTION-GRABBING ANTICS, HE PROVIDES A DIVERSION WHILE OTHER ELEMENTS CARRY ON THEIR UNSAVORY (I.E. CRIMINAL) ACTIVITIES. IT REMINDS ONE OF THE RUSSIAN TALE WHERE TWO CHARACTERS DISTRACT A CROWD WHILE THE THIRD IS BUSY RIFLING THEIR POCKETS. ZHIRINOVSKY HAS PRESENTED NO SERIOUS PROGRAM TO PERMIT HIM TO ATTRACT SUFFICIENT VOTES.

((LEBED))- WITH HIS BASS VOICE AND PRONOUNCEMENTS THAT APPEAL TO THE DISCONTENTED, HE HAS EARNED SOME POPULARITY, BUT HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COME UP WITH SOLID PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE AND WILL NOT BE A SERIOUS CONTENDER FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

9. RELATIONS WITH CANADA: MAMEDOV FAVORS CLOSER TIES WITH CANADA AND PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE. THE HALIFAX SUMMIT AND ((YELTSIN'S)) BACKING FOR STRONGER ECONOMIC COOPERATION WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD (I.E. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S BLESSING IS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE THINGS HAPPEN). THE NORTH IS AN IMPORTANT COMMON FACTOR. FOR RUSSIA, DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR NORTHERN SEA ROUTE WILL BE A HIGH PRIORITY AS IT WILL PROVIDE A SHORTER LINK TO INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING ROUTES. ECOLOGICAL CLEAN-UP WAS ALSO MENTIONED IN THE CANADA/RUSSIA CONTEXT BECAUSE OF ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY.

2. FILE: 014-005-039. CL REASON 1.5(B). DECL ON: X5
DRV LIA-1.
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

/ /
SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: EUR/BNL INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/LGL, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD,
PCS/CL, FILE (0/P)

96 2985818 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 262320Z JAN 96 DIRECTOR 615577

SECRET
STAFF
TO: PRIORITY THE HAGUE. 262318Z DIRECTOR 615577

FROM: LIMIT EUR/BNL INFO EUR/LGL, PCS/CL

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: TRACE RESPONSE ON DUTCH JOURNALIST

REF: THE HAGUE 13519 96 2762623

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FOR STATION BACKGROUND ONLY. RESPONSE TO REF QUESTIONS RE THE SHARING OF INFO WITH LIAISON WILL BE PROVIDED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

2. HQS BELIEVES SUBJECT TO BE IDENTICAL TO WILLIAM LEONARD ((OLTMANS)), (DPOB 10 JUNE 1925, HUIZEN, THE NETHERLANDS), WHO WAS ASSIGNED 201-0155221 ON 27 FEBRUARY, 1957, ON THE OCCASION OF A NAME CHECK REQUEST AGAINST PNINFINITE FILES FROM NVGIFT. AT THE TIME, OLTMANS WAS OSTENSIBLY A CORRESPONDENT FOR AN OBSCURE DUTCH WEEKLY PUBLICATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK. HIS REPUTATION AT THE UN WAS SUCH THAT HE WAS OSTRACISED BY THE DUTCH DELEGATION AND FELLOW DUTCH NEWSMEN FOR HIS OPENLY PRO-INDONESIAN PUBLIC STAND ON THE DUTCH GUINEA QUESTION. HE ALSO CLAIMED TO WORK FOR AN UNKNOWN NEWS SYNDICATE IN THE UNITED STATES, BUT NONE OF HIS COLLEAGUES COULD CLAIM TO HAVE SEEN ANY OF HIS WRITINGS PUBLISHED. HIS MAIN INCOME SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DERIVED FROM PUBLIC LECTURES IN THE UNITED STATES ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS , ESPECIALLY MATTERS TOUCHING ON ASIA IN GENERAL, AND INDONESIA SPECIFICALLY. HE CLAIMED HE GREW UP IN INDONESIA, AND THEREFORE KNEW THE AREA AND ITS "CONDITIONS" WELL. IN ADDITION, HE WAS CONSTANTLY SEEN WITH WHAT A WESTERN SOURCE WOULD CALL "THE WRONG CROWD", AND HE HAD EXCELLENT CONTACTS WITH ALL THE COMMUNIST DOMINATED COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CUBA AND WAS ON INTIMATE TERMS WITH ELEMENTS SUCH AS THE GUINEANS, THE INDONESIANS, AND THE EGYPTIANS.

3. ACCORDING TO DIRECTOR 243172, 12 JANUARY 1987, ONE OF THE LAST ENTRIES IN OLTMANS' FILE, "OLTMANS HAS BEEN A THORN IN OUR SIDE FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. HE HAS HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. HE IS INDEPENDENTLY WEALTHY BY VIRTUE OF HIS FAMILY HAVING HAD A VIRTUAL MONOPOLY ON THE QUININE TRADE AT ONE TIME. HE IS HIGHLY INTELLIGENT BUT PECULIAR, AND WHETHER OR NOT HE WAS EVER IN THE PAY

OF THE SOVIETS, HE CERTAINLY HAD BEEN A FERVENT SUPPORTER OF THEIR CAUSES." THE FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS TAKEN FROM SUBJECTS RATHER LARGE HQS FILE.

4. HE STUDIED BRIEFLY AT YALE UNIVERSITY AND WAS EXPELLED FOR MISBEHAVIOR (NFI). FOR A SHORT TIME THEREAFTER, HE WORKED FOR UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL AND "DE TELEGRAFF", A MAJOR DUTCH DAILY NEWSPAPER, BUT WAS FIRED FROM BOTH. IN 1956, HE MARRIED AN AMERICAN GROUND STEWARDESS, AND IN ON 10 JUNE 1958, HE WAS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES IN NEW YORK CITY AS A PRA, A STATUS WHICH HE HELD UNTIL AT LEAST 1987. IN 1960, HE DIVORCED HIS WIFE, AND IN 1961, WAS LIVING WITH A PHILIPINO MALE.

5. NUMEROUS FIELD REPORTS INDICATE THAT IN 1956, OLTMANS ARRANGED AN INTRODUCTION FOR HIMSELF TO INDONESIAN PRESIDENT ((SUKARNO)) WITH WHOM HE THEN TRAVELED THROUGH EURPOPE IN 1956 AS SUKARNO'S GUEST. HIS TRIP FROM INDONESIA TO THE U.S. IN FEBRUARY 1957 WAS PAID FOR BY THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT, AND ALL INDICTIONS WERE THAT HE WAS BEING USED AS A TOOL BY THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO CARRY ON PROPAGANDA IN THE U.S. AND AT THE UN. DURING THE PERIOD 1960-1961, HE SHUTTLED BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES.

6. SUBJECT NEXT APPEARS IN OUR RECORDS IN 1968, WHEN HE TELEPHONED THE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY (USIA) IN THE HAGUE TO ADVISE THEM THAT HE WAS ANTI-AMERICAN AND TO GIVE THE USIA INFORMATION ON ANTI-AMERICAN DUTCH GROUPS IN THE NETHERLANDS.

7. IN 1972, SUBJECT PLANNED TO MAKE A FILM ON ECOLOGY IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND VISITED THERE 23-26 JANUARY TO MAKE THE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS. AT THIS TIME, THE DUTCH SERVICE CLAIMED THAT OLTMANS HAD A FIVE YEAR RETAINER FROM THE RUSSIANS AS AN OVERT PR MAN. THERE IS NO INDICATION IN THE FILE THAT THE FILM WAS EVER MADE.

8. IN MARCH AND APRIL 1977, OLTMANS GAINED A GREAT DEAL OF PUBLIC ATTENTION IN THE U. S. AND THE NETHERLANDS WHEN HE TESTIFIED
*BEFORE THE U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES<ASSASSINATIONS>COMMITTEE ON
*THE LATE GEORGE DE ((MOHRENSCHILDT))'S CONNECTION WITH<LEE HARVEY>
*<((OSWALD))>AND THE MURDER OF PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<((KENNEDY)).> IT HAD LONG BEEN KNOWN THAT DE MOHRENSCHILDT, AS PART OF THE DALLAS RUSSIAN-SPEAKING COMMUNITY, WAS CLOSE TO OSWALD. OLTMANS HAD LONG BEEN CULTIVATING DE MOHRENSCHILDT AS A NEWS SOURCE AND FRIEND. IN JANUARY, 1976, DE MOHRENSCHILDT WROTE OLTMANS THAT HE WAS PREPARING A BOOK ON HOW HE (DE MOHRENSCHILDT) WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR OSWALD'S
*<ASSASSINATION>OF<KENNEDY.>

9. IN MAY 1983, THE DUTCH SERVICE HAD A TELTAP (WHICH THEY CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE AS IT INVOLVED ONE OF THEIR OWN CITIZENS) ON OLTMANS WHO SEEMED TO REVEAL SOME INTERESTING TIDBITS , SOME OF WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED GOSSIP, BUT WHICH MIGHT BE OF SERIOUS INTEREST TO ANALYSTS WATCHING THE INTERPLAY OF HIGH LEVEL SOVIET PERSONALITIES, PARTICULARLY WHEN HE TALKED TO HIS LEFTIST DUTCH FRIENDS. THE QUESTION OF OLTMANS'PRA STATUS CAUSED HQS TO REQUEST A STANDDOWN ON FURTHER ELICITATION OF INFO DERIVED FROM THE DUTCH SERVICE TELTAP ON OLTMANS UNTIL A REVIEW OF LEGAL ASPECTS COULD BE MADE. IT BECAME HQS UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS TELTAP WAS BEING

CONDUCTED BY THE DUTCH SERVICE FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES AND THAT THEIR INTERESTS WERE INDEPENDENT OF ANY NWBOLTON INTERESTS. SINCE INFO OF INTEREST TO NWBOLTON WAS THE BYPRODUCT OF THE TELTAP, AND NOT INFO CONCERNING OLTMANS HIMSELF, THE HAGUE STATION COULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE INFO OFFERED AND TO REQUEST ADDITIONAL AND MORE DETAILED INFO CONCERNING SOVIET INTENTIONS WITHOUT SPECIFYING THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS TO BE ACQUIRED. THE BASIS FOR THIS DECISION WAS THAT A) OLTMANS HIMSELF WAS NOT THE SUBJECT OF NWBOLTON INTEREST AND B)NWBOLTON WAS NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE TELTAP.

10. ON 16 JANUARY 1987, SAN FRANCISCO STATION ADVISED THAT SUBJECT HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN BROKERING HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS BETWEEN A LARGE U.S. COMPUTER MANUFACTURING COMPANY AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP AND SUPPORT AND ENHANCED RUSSIAN MICROCOMPUTER MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY.

11. ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1987, FBIS MONITORED THE ACTIVITY OF SUBJECT IN MARTINIQUE WHER HE WAS MEETING WITH SURINAMESE CITIZENS AND ACCUSED FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS OF FAVORING THE SURINAME REBELLION.

12. OLTMANS NEXT APPEARS IN A PRESS RELEASE OF 20 MAY 1992 WHEN HE SOUGHT REFUGE AT THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY IN PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AFTER HE WAS ALLEGEDLY ACCUSED BY SOUTH AFRICA'S SECRET SERVICE OF BEING AN AGENT FOR NWBOLTON, SAYING HE HAD GONE TO THE EMBASSY FOR "PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE: I FEEL UNSAFE HAVING BEEN BRANDED A CIA AGENT". HE ALSO SAID THAT HIS APARTMENT HAD BEEN BROKEN INTO AND BUGGEDAND MANY OF HIS PROJECTS HAD BEEN TORPEDOED BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN BRANDED AN NWBOLTON AGENT.

13. CL REASON: 1.5 (C), DECL ON: X-1.

FILE: 201-155221. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

ORIG: EUR/BNL(RICHSNC,39188); AUTH: DC/EUR/BNL (O'DONOVAN); COORD: EUR/LGL (FRED); REL: C/EUR/BNL. CL BY 0528417.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / DISSEM PER SOP # 122 SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

INTEL

CONF: IID/NOPRNT INFO: EUR/BCIR, EUR/IB, IIDIRPS, INTELOUT, LA/COG, LA/MCGCEN, MDSX, NCREPORT, NR/EX, ODPD, ODPR, FILE (0/P)

---

96 2899457 ISR PAGE 001
TOT: 190508Z JAN 96 DIRECTOR 604608

SECRET NOFORN
INTEL 190508Z DIRECTOR 604608
TO: HOUSTON, MIAMI, HAVANA, MADRID, LONDON, NEW YORK, WDC, QUARRY HEIGHTS.

WNINTEL DEFERRED INTEL MXBLAZE MXSANCTUARY SLMERLIN ZRWAHOO

SUBJECT: RELAY OF INTEL CABLE

FOLLOWING IS TD-OO-K-323/01241-96 FOR DISSEMINATION PER FIELD DISSEM LINE, BASED ON AND REPLACING HOUS 24338 (CTO-08768).
LIAISON: OKAY FOR PASSAGE TO JLLAD.
NO FILE. DECL: X1 CL REASON 1.5(C) DRV FROM HUM-4 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER.

COMMENTS: NONE

TD-OO-K-323/01241-96

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN

DIST: 18 JANUARY 1996

COUNTRY: CUBA

SUBJ: SUSPECTED CUBAN SECURITY PENETRATIONS OF THE CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS/DISSIDENT MOVEMENT IN CUBA

DOI: 1992 - MID AUGUST 1995

SOURCE: CUB-04298 IS A MID-LEVEL TECHNICIAN WHO HAD EXTENSIVE CONTACT WITH DISSIDENT GROUPS IN CUBA. UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, INFORMATION REPORTED IS FROM DIRECT OBSERVATION OR GOOD SECONDARY SOURCES. SOURCE DID NOT REPORT A SECURITY CLEARANCE.

SUMMARY: LEADERS OF THE CUBAN CIVIC CURRENT (CORRIENTE CIVICA CUBANA), A DISSIDENT GROUP IN CUBA, SUSPECTED THREE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP, AND THE FORMER HUSBAND OF A GROUP MEMBER, OF BEING CUBAN SECURITY SOURCES OR PENETRATIONS. THE LEADERS OF THE DISSIDENT GROUP DID NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC EVIDENCE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS WERE CONNECTED TO CUBAN SECURITY, BUT INCIDENTS IN WHICH EACH OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE INVOLVED LED THE LEADERSHIP TO BECOME SUSPICIOUS OF THEM.

TEXT: 1. AS OF MID AUGUST 1995, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CUBAN

DISSIDENT GROUP, CUBAN CIVIC CURRENT (CORRIENTE CIVICA CUBANA - CCC), WAS CERTAIN THAT THE CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS HAD ATTRACTED THE ATTENTION OF CUBAN SECURITY, PRIMARILY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MININT), AND THEY BELIEVED THAT MININT WAS TRYING TO PENETRATE DISSIDENT ORGANIZATIONS. CCC MEMBERS CONCERNED OVER THE GROUP'S SECURITY TAGGED FOUR INDIVIDUALS WHO EXHIBITED BEHAVIOR OR ACTIVITIES IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS OR DISSIDENT ORGANIZATIONS THAT SUGGESTED THAT THEY WERE ASSOCIATED WITH MININT. THE INDIVIDUALS WERE JORGE ((GONZALES)), VLADIMIRO ((ROCA)) ATUNEZ, GUILLERMO ((FERNANDEZ)) DONATES, AND RAFAEL ((ALCIDES)).

2. THE CCC LEADERSHIP WAS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT JORGE GONZALEZ, OF THE CHRISTIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MOVIMIENTO CRISTIANO LIBERACION), HEADED BY OSVALDO ((PAYA)) SARDINAS, WAS A CUBAN SECURITY PENETRATION. DIRECTORS OF THE CCC NOTED THAT HIS QUESTIONS WERE USUALLY SO PENETRATING AS TO SUGGEST INSIDE KNOWLEDGE. A TRUSTED MEMBER OF THE CCC WAS DIRECTED AGAINST GONZALEZ, PROVIDING HIM WITH MOSTLY BOGUS INFORMATION KNOWN ONLY TO THE CCC MEMBER AND THE CCC LEADERSHIP. RECORDS OF THE DATE THE INFORMATION WAS PASSED WERE KEPT BY THE CCC. THE INFORMATION LATER SURFACED THROUGH MININT DURING THE COURSE OF MININT INTERVIEWS OF DETAINED CCC LEADERS. THE CCC LEADERSHIP BELIEVED THAT GONZALEZ MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN VENEZUELA AS OF MID AUGUST 1995.

3. VLADIMIRO ROCA OF THE CUBAN DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST CURRENT (CORRIENTE SOCIALISTA DEMOCRATICA CUBANA), WHO IS ONE OF THE CLOSEST ASSOCIATES OF ELIZARDO ((SANCHEZ)) SANTACRUZ OF THE CUBAN COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION (COMISION CUBANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y RECONCILIACION NACIONAL), CAME UNDER CCC SUSPICION AFTER AN INCIDENT IN 1992. IN THAT YEAR, SHORTLY AFTER THE LETTER BY CUBAN PROFESSIONALS TO THE IBERIAN AMERICAN SUMMIT WAS PRESENTED, CCC CHIEF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR VLADIMIR ((MARTINEZ-AMORES)) ALVAREZ WAS VISITED AT HIS HOME BY TWO MININT OFFICERS. THE TWO OFFICERS WERE NAMED "MARCIAL" AND "DANIEL." THE SENIOR OF THE TWO, DANIEL, REMARKED THAT ELIZARDO SANCHEZ WAS A U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENT. IN DUE COURSE THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED BY MARTINEZ-AMORES TO SANCHEZ IN THE PRESENCE OF VLADIMIRO ROCA. AROUND DECEMBER 1992, DURING AN "INTERVIEW" BY MININT OF A CCC MEMBER, MARCIAL MADE A STATEMENT THAT INDICATED THAT HE KNEW THAT HIS INITIAL REMARKS TO MARTINEZ-AMORES ABOUT SANCHEZ HAD BEEN PASSED TO SANCHEZ. WHEN IT WAS REPORTED TO SANCHEZ THAT MININT HAD MADE THIS STATEMENT, HE ATTRIBUTED IT TO TECHNICAL COVERAGE IN HIS HOME ASSOCIATED WITH AN LP OPPOSITE HIS HOME. THE CCC WAS NOT CONVINCED BY THIS EXPLANATION AND THEREAFTER KEPT ROCA AT A DISTANCE, AS THEY ASSUMED THAT IT WAS ROCA WHO HAD PASSED THE INFORMATION TO THE MININT. (SOURCE COMMENT: ONLY ROCA, SANCHEZ AND MARTINEZ-AMORES KNEW THAT SANCHEZ HAD BEEN TOLD, AND BOTH SANCHEZ AND MARTINEZ-AMORES WERE TRUSTED MEMBERS OF THE CCC.)

4. CCC'S SUSPICIONS CONCERNING ROCA HAVE GROWN STRONGER IN LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS:

A. CCC MEMBER FELIX ((DIAZ)) WAS DENIED A REQUEST FOR

A VISA TO THE U.S. BY THE U.S. INTERESTS SECTION. THE REPORTED GROUNDS FOR DENIAL WERE THAT DIAZ HAD NOT SUBMITTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE VISA. ROCA WAS HEARD TO TELL DIAZ THAT HIS REQUEST HAD BEEN UNDERMINED BY FELIX ((BONNE)) CARCASSES, THE CCC LEADER. BONNE DENIED THIS ACTION, SAYING THAT HE WOULD HAVE HAD NO INTEREST IN UNDERMINING DIAZ.

B. IN EARLY 1993, JORGE GONZALEZ, A CLOSE FRIEND OF ROCA, INFORMED THE CCC LEADERSHIP THAT AN AUTHORESS, IDENTIFIED AS MARIANA ((BADELL)) (PHONETIC), WAS PREPARING A BIOGRAPHY OF CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL ((CASTRO)) AND WANTED TO MEET BONNE. THE REASON FOR SUCH A MEETING IN CONNECTION WITH A BIOGRAPHY OF CASTRO WAS NOT CLEAR, BUT THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN GONZALEZ' HOME, AND INCLUDED BADELL, BONNE, AND MARTINEZ-AMORES. THE CCC LEADERS NOTED THAT BADELL APPEARED TO BE UNCOMFORTABLE DURING THE COURSE OF THE MEETING. SHE STATED THAT SHE HAD HAD LUNCH WITH AN OFFICIAL OF THE SPANISH EMBASSY IN HAVANA, WHO WAS ASSISTING HER WITH THE BIOGRAPHY OF CASTRO BY PUTTING HER IN TOUCH WITH ONE CARLOS ALBERTO ((MONTANER)) IN MADRID, WHO WOULD EDIT THE BOOK. SHE DECLINED TO IDENTIFY THE SPANISH OFFICAL, BUT DESCRIBED HIM IN SUCH DETAIL THAT BOTH BONNE AND MARTINEZ-AMORES RECOGNIZED HIM AS JORGE ((DE ORUETA)), A LONG-TIME CONTACT OF THE CCC. WHEN THE CONVERSATION WAS RELAYED TO DE ORUETA BY THE CCC, HE RECALLED BADELL HAD BEEN INTRODUCED TO HIM BY VLADIMIRO ROCA'S WIFE. HE FURTHER RECALLED THE LUNCH AND MENTION OF THE BOOK, BUT DECLARED THE MONTANER INFORMATION TO BE SPURIOUS. THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SUGGESTED TO CCC SECURITY PERSONNEL THAT THERE WAS COORDINATION AMONG INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF BEING DIRECTED BY CUBAN SECURITY.

C. IN 1993 A GROUP OF DISSIDENTS, INCLUDING BONNE, WAS INVITED TO THE HOME OF PIOTR ((MIKISKA)) (PHONETIC), FIRST SECRETARY AT THE CZECH EMBASSY, TO ATTEND A VISIT FROM THE CZECH VICE CHANCELLOR. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS KIND OF CONTACT WAS ANATHEMA TO THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.) THE CZECH INVITATION TO BONNE WAS SENT THREE DAYS IN ADVANCE BY WORD OF MOUTH VIA ROCA. BY COINCIDENCE, ANOTHER CCC REPRESENTATIVE VISITING MIKISKA WITHIN A DAY OR TWO OF WHEN THE INVITATION WAS RELAYED TO ROCA WAS ASKED ABOUT THE INVITATION TO BONNE, AS BONNE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE CZECH EMBASSY. THE CCC REPRESENTATIVE INCLUDED THE QUERY REGARDING THE INVITATION IN HIS REPORT OF THE MEETING TO THE CCC, GIVING BONNE HIS FIRST NOTIFICATION THAT THERE HAD EVEN BEEN AN INVITATION. ROCA FINALLY PASSED THE MESSAGE TO THE HOME OF GEORGINA DE LAS MERCEDES ((GONZALEZ)) CORBO, ONE OF BONNE'S CHIEF ASSISTANTS, TWO HOURS PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE FUNCTION.

D. IN MID 1995, REINALDO ((ROQUE)) MALHERBE OF CCC REPORTED THAT VLADIMIRO ROCA'S WIFE WAS UNDERMINING ELIZARDO SANCHEZ BY PASSING AROUND STORIES THAT HE HAD BEEN WITHHOLDING ORGANIZATIONAL FUNDS, INTENDED FOR THE SOCIALIST CURRENT, FOR HIS PERSONAL USE. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS RUMOR CAMPAIGN MAY HAVE *CONTRIBUTED TO SANCHEZ' REPORTED RESIGNATION FROM THE<EXECUTIVE> COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST CURRENT.)

E. REPORTING ON RADIO MARTI FROM MIAMI AROUND MID 1995 ALLEGEDLY REFERRED TO VLADIMIRO ROCA AS AN AGENT OF CUBAN STATE

SECURITY. ROCA HIMSELF WAS REPORTED IN CUBAN DISSIDENT CIRCLES TO HAVE STATED THAT HE WAS A LONG-TIME FRIEND OF MAJOR GENERAL FABIAN ((ESCALANTE)) FONT, WHO WAS REPORTEDLY THE CHIEF OF THE MININT DIRECTORATE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (DCI). (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ESCALANTE FONT NOW HEADS THE MINISTRY'S HISTORY COMMISSION AND IS *KNOWN FOR HIS INQUIRIES INTO THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY> ASSASSINATION, THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION, AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.)

5. GUILLERMO FERNANDEZ DONATES IS A CIVIL ENGINEER WHO WAS CLOSE TO GUSTAVO ((ARCOS)) BERGNES OF THE CUBAN COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (COMITE CUBANO PRO DERECHOS HUMANOS). HE WAS SUSPECTED OF BEING A MININT SOURCE AND A PROVOCATEUR BY THE CCC LEADERSHIP. HE JOINED THE CCC ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF ARCOS BECAUSE FERNANDEZ WAS A MEMBER OF THE PROFESSIONAL CLASS. (SOURCE COMMENT: MANY MEMBERS OF THE CCC ARE PROFESSIONALS.) THE CCC INITIALLY BECAME SUSPICIOUS OF FERNANDEZ BECAUSE HE HAD A HISTORY OF ARRESTS IN WHICH HE WOULD BE PLACED WITH VARIOUS GROUPS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. IN PRISON HE WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE A FIGHT WITH A GUARD OR COMMIT AN INFRACTION OF REGULATIONS AND BE REMOVED BY THE AUTHORITIES FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION. EACH TIME HE EMERGED FROM PRISON HE SEEMED TO BE IN EXCELLENT HEALTH AND WELL FED.

6. ADDITIONALLY, SEVERAL OTHER ANOMALIES HAVE CAUSED THE CCC LEADERSHIP TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF FERNANDEZ:

A. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, FERNANDEZ HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE CCC TO COMMUNICATE ITEMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO ARCOS. SUBSEQUENT ELICITATION OF ARCOS BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CCC LED THEM TO BELIEVE THAT INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FERNANDEZ TO ARCOS WAS OFTEN GROSSLY INACCURATE. WHEN APPRISED OF THIS SITUATION, ARCOS DISMISSED CCC COMMENTS AS BEING SIMPLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

B. IT HAS BEEN NOTED BY THE CCC LEADERSHIP THAT FERNANDEZ WAS FRIENDLY WITH JORGE GONZALEZ AND WITH VLADIMIRO ROCA. FERNANDEZ WAS PRIVY TO THE ACTIVITIES PLANNED BY SOCIALIST CURRENT, THE GROUP TO WHICH ROCA BELONGED, BY HIS ASSOCIATION WITH ROCA. REINALDO ROQUE, A MEMBER OF THE CCC, WHO WORKED WITH SOCIALIST CURRENT, NOTED THAT WHEN THE GROUP WAS SCHEDULED TO MEET, IT WAS CHALLENGED BY CUBAN AUTHORITIES SO OFTEN THAT THE AUTHORITIES MUST HAVE BEEN APPRISED OF ITS SCHEDULE. EITHER FERNANDEZ OR ROCA (OR BOTH) COULD HAVE BEEN PASSING SUCH INFORMATION TO THE AUTHORITIES.

C. ON ONE OCCASION, TO THE SURPRISE OF THE CCC, FERNANDEZ, A KARATE PRACTITIONER, INVITED THE ENTIRE CCC MEMBERSHIP TO GO TO THE CIUDAD DEPORTIVA (SPORTS CITY) TO AN EXERCISE FIELD TO WORK OUT. CCC SECURITY PERSONNEL NOTED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE ASSEMBLED ALL OR MOST OF THE CCC MEMBERSHIP IN HAVANA IN AN OPEN AREA WHERE IT COULD BE OBSERVED AND PHOTOGRAPHED. THE INVITATION, COMING AS IT DID AS A ONE-TIME OPPORTUNITY WITH NO PRECEDENT, FUELED SUSPICIONS WITHIN THE CCC AND THE INVITATION WAS DECLINED.

7. A SERIES OF EVENTS INVOLVING RAFAEL ALCIDES, A NOTED

CUBAN POET AND FIRST HUSBAND OF TERESA ((FERNANDEZ)) MARDONES (A MEMBER OF THE CCC), WAS SIGNIFICANT TO THE CCC BECAUSE IT CALLED INTO QUESTION WHERE ALCIDES' LOYALTIES LAY. ALCIDES AND FERNANDEZ HAD ONE CHILD, A SON, TOGETHER BEFORE THEY WERE DIVORCED AROUND LATE 1993. FERNANDEZ HAD REMARRIED AND WAS LIVING WITH RONALDO ((ROQUE)) (COUSIN OF REINALDO ROQUE), AND ALCIDES WAS SPENDING CONSIDERABLE TIME AT THE ROQUE RESIDENCE, PRESUMABLY TO BE WITH HIS SON. THE CCC BECAME CONCERNED WITH THE SECURITY OF THE SITUATION AS FERNANDEZ WAS PRIVY TO CCC INFORMATION AND WAS ASSESSED AS BEING EMOTIONAL AND TENDING TO CONFIDE TOO MUCH. MARTINEZ-AMORES WAS DISPATCHED BY THE CCC TO FEEL OUT ALCIDES, AND REPORTED THAT HE SPOKE COHERENTLY AND LOGICALLY AGAINST THE CURRENT REGIME. MARTINEZ-AMORES APPEARED TO BE REASSURED. SUBSEQUENTLY HOWEVER, IN CONVERSATION WITH ALCIDES, REINALDO ROQUE LEARNED THAT ALCIDES WAS PART OF A DELEGATION OF THE CUBAN NATIONAL UNION OF WRITERS AND ARTISTS (UNION NACIONAL DE ESCRITORES Y ARTISTAS DE CUBA - UNEAC) THAT VISITED MADRID SOMETIME AROUND 1994. WHILE THERE, ALCIDES SAID THAT HE WAS INVITED WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER UNEAC DELEGATES TO LUNCH WITH CARLOS ALBERTO MONTANER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE LUNCHEON WITH MONTANER MUST CERTAINLY HAVE RECEIVED CUBAN GOVERNMENT APPROVAL, AND THE GROUP MUST HAVE INCLUDED CUBAN SECURITY PERSONNEL.) ALCIDES TOLD ROQUE THAT ON HIS RETURN TO CUBA, HE ATTENDED THE FUNERAL FOR A SISTER (NFI) OF FIDEL CASTRO AND DELIVERED THE FUNERAL ORATION. FOLLOWING THE FUNERAL, HE WAS OBSERVED TO BE EMBRACED BY MINISTER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES GENERAL RAUL ((CASTRO)) RUZ.

POC: ECC, HOWARD, SECURE X-43770, STU III (703) 506 7687.

ACQ: (LATE OCTOBER 1995)

DISSEM: FIELD: SENT TO; USCINCSO, USCINCACOM, AIC, USCINCTRANS, USCINCSOC, JSOC.

WARNING: REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

DECL: X1 CL REASON 1.5(C) DRV FROM HUM-4 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET.>
RELNO: E320080
ORIG: IIDIRPS

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

Date: 11/29/99
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10326-10059
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PROJECT FILES

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : HEADQUARTERS
TO : WITHHELD
TITLE : WITHHELD
DATE : 01/19/96
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS : ESCALANTE FONT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/04/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK-M-11:F2 1999.02.04.09:44:28:733120: CIA CORRESPONDENCE RE ARRB

CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

/ / **** MTD REPORT ***. SECRET FRP: , ,3,4, , , ,

CONF: IID/NOPRNT INFO: AFSMETS, CAC/TIS, CPAS/VIP, CTC/IFC, CTCARCHIVE, FBIS/NFS, FBIS6, IIDIRPS, IRL, MDSX, NCI/OPS, NCI/PIO, NCREPORT, NHTC/LA, NPC/CGR, NPC/IFC, NPCEDC, NR/EX, ODPD, ODPG, ODPR, ODPS, ODPW, ODPX, ODPY, OFL/PED, OMA/CSG, OMS/DIR, OPCTR/EURA, OPCTR/LA, OPCTR/TERR, OTE/PERS, PWSTAFF/BR, SA/DCIFIR, TDSORT, ZZA, FILE, CTC/CCB, MILTD (3/P)

96 2899456 MSR PAGE 001
TOT: 190508Z JAN 96 CIA 604607

SECRET WNINTEL NOFORN
190508Z CIA 604607
TO: NPIC WASHDC, DIRNSA, SECSTATE WASHDC//INR//, DIA WASHINGTON DC, DA WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC, CSAF WASHINGTON DC, TREASURY DEPT, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, DOEHQ//IN//, DEPT OF JUSTICE COMMAND CENTER WASH DC//OIPR//, DIRNACIC, SECRET SERVICE//ID//, ONI WASHINGTON DC, COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC, DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION//S-60//, COMCOGARD GRU KEY WEST FL, COMLANTAREA COGARD NEW YORK NY//AI//, USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM, USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA, AIC NORFOLK VA, COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//, USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL, USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB.

SERIAL: TD-OO-K-323/01241-96

PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN

DIST: 18 JANUARY 1996

COUNTRY: CUBA

SUBJ: SUSPECTED CUBAN SECURITY PENETRATIONS OF THE CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS/DISSIDENT MOVEMENT IN CUBA

DOI: 1992 - MID AUGUST 1995

SOURCE: CUB-04298 IS A MID-LEVEL TECHNICIAN WHO HAD EXTENSIVE CONTACT WITH DISSIDENT GROUPS IN CUBA. UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, INFORMATION REPORTED IS FROM DIRECT OBSERVATION OR GOOD SECONDARY SOURCES. SOURCE DID NOT REPORT A SECURITY CLEARANCE.

SUMMARY: LEADERS OF THE CUBAN CIVIC CURRENT (CORRIENTE CIVICA CUBANA), A DISSIDENT GROUP IN CUBA, SUSPECTED THREE MEMBERS OF THE

GROUP, AND THE FORMER HUSBAND OF A GROUP MEMBER, OF BEING CUBAN SECURITY SOURCES OR PENETRATIONS. THE LEADERS OF THE DISSIDENT GROUP DID NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC EVIDENCE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS WERE CONNECTED TO CUBAN SECURITY, BUT INCIDENTS IN WHICH EACH OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE INVOLVED LED THE LEADERSHIP TO BECOME SUSPICIOUS OF THEM.

TEXT: 1. AS OF MID AUGUST 1995, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CUBAN DISSIDENT GROUP, CUBAN CIVIC CURRENT (CORRIENTE CIVICA CUBANA - CCC), WAS CERTAIN THAT THE CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS HAD ATTRACTED THE ATTENTION OF CUBAN SECURITY, PRIMARILY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MININT), AND THEY BELIEVED THAT MININT WAS TRYING TO PENETRATE DISSIDENT ORGANIZATIONS. CCC MEMBERS CONCERNED OVER THE GROUP'S SECURITY TAGGED FOUR INDIVIDUALS WHO EXHIBITED BEHAVIOR OR ACTIVITIES IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS OR DISSIDENT ORGANIZATIONS THAT SUGGESTED THAT THEY WERE ASSOCIATED WITH MININT. THE INDIVIDUALS WERE JORGE ((GONZALES)), VLADIMIRO ((ROCA)) ATUNEZ, GUILLERMO ((FERNANDEZ)) DONATES, AND RAFAEL ((ALCIDES)).

2. THE CCC LEADERSHIP WAS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT JORGE GONZALEZ, OF THE CHRISTIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MOVIMIENTO CRISTIANO LIBERACION), HEADED BY OSVALDO ((PAYA)) SARDINAS, WAS A CUBAN SECURITY PENETRATION. DIRECTORS OF THE CCC NOTED THAT HIS QUESTIONS WERE USUALLY SO PENETRATING AS TO SUGGEST INSIDE KNOWLEDGE. A TRUSTED MEMBER OF THE CCC WAS DIRECTED AGAINST GONZALEZ, PROVIDING HIM WITH MOSTLY BOGUS INFORMATION KNOWN ONLY TO THE CCC MEMBER AND THE CCC LEADERSHIP. RECORDS OF THE DATE THE INFORMATION WAS PASSED WERE KEPT BY THE CCC. THE INFORMATION LATER SURFACED THROUGH MININT DURING THE COURSE OF MININT INTERVIEWS OF DETAINED CCC LEADERS. THE CCC LEADERSHIP BELIEVED THAT GONZALEZ MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN VENEZUELA AS OF MID AUGUST 1995.

3. VLADIMIRO ROCA OF THE CUBAN DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST CURRENT (CORRIENTE SOCIALISTA DEMOCRATICA CUBANA), WHO IS ONE OF THE CLOSEST ASSOCIATES OF ELIZARDO ((SANCHEZ)) SANTACRUZ OF THE CUBAN COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION (COMISION CUBANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y RECONCILIACION NACIONAL), CAME UNDER CCC SUSPICION AFTER AN INCIDENT IN 1992. IN THAT YEAR, SHORTLY AFTER THE LETTER BY CUBAN PROFESSIONALS TO THE IBERIAN AMERICAN SUMMIT WAS PRESENTED, CCC CHIEF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR VLADIMIR ((MARTINEZ-AMORES)) ALVAREZ WAS VISITED AT HIS HOME BY TWO MININT OFFICERS. THE TWO OFFICERS WERE NAMED "MARCIAL" AND "DANIEL." THE SENIOR OF THE TWO, DANIEL, REMARKED THAT ELIZARDO SANCHEZ WAS A U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENT. IN DUE COURSE THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED BY MARTINEZ-AMORES TO SANCHEZ IN THE PRESENCE OF VLADIMIRO ROCA. AROUND DECEMBER 1992, DURING AN "INTERVIEW" BY MININT OF A CCC MEMBER, MARCIAL MADE A STATEMENT THAT INDICATED THAT HE KNEW THAT HIS INITIAL REMARKS TO MARTINEZ-AMORES ABOUT SANCHEZ HAD BEEN PASSED TO SANCHEZ. WHEN IT WAS REPORTED TO SANCHEZ THAT MININT HAD MADE THIS STATEMENT, HE ATTRIBUTED IT TO TECHNICAL COVERAGE IN HIS HOME ASSOCIATED WITH AN LP OPPOSITE HIS HOME. THE CCC WAS NOT CONVINCED BY THIS EXPLANATION AND THEREAFTER KEPT ROCA AT A DISTANCE, AS THEY ASSUMED THAT IT WAS ROCA WHO HAD PASSED THE INFORMATION TO THE

MININT. (SOURCE COMMENT: ONLY ROCA, SANCHEZ AND MARTINEZ-AMORES KNEW THAT SANCHEZ HAD BEEN TOLD, AND BOTH SANCHEZ AND MARTINEZ-AMORES WERE TRUSTED MEMBERS OF THE CCC.)

4. CCC'S SUSPICIONS CONCERNING ROCA HAVE GROWN STRONGER IN LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS:

A. CCC MEMBER FELIX ((DIAZ)) WAS DENIED A REQUEST FOR A VISA TO THE U.S. BY THE U.S. INTERESTS SECTION. THE REPORTED GROUNDS FOR DENIAL WERE THAT DIAZ HAD NOT SUBMITTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE VISA. ROCA WAS HEARD TO TELL DIAZ THAT HIS REQUEST HAD BEEN UNDERMINED BY FELIX ((BONNE)) CARCASSES, THE CCC LEADER. BONNE DENIED THIS ACTION, SAYING THAT HE WOULD HAVE HAD NO INTEREST IN UNDERMINING DIAZ.

B. IN EARLY 1993, JORGE GONZALEZ, A CLOSE FRIEND OF ROCA, INFORMED THE CCC LEADERSHIP THAT AN AUTHORESS, IDENTIFIED AS MARIANA ((BADELL)) (PHONETIC), WAS PREPARING A BIOGRAPHY OF CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL ((CASTRO)) AND WANTED TO MEET BONNE. THE REASON FOR SUCH A MEETING IN CONNECTION WITH A BIOGRAPHY OF CASTRO WAS NOT CLEAR, BUT THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN GONZALEZ' HOME, AND INCLUDED BADELL, BONNE, AND MARTINEZ-AMORES. THE CCC LEADERS NOTED THAT BADELL APPEARED TO BE UNCOMFORTABLE DURING THE COURSE OF THE MEETING. SHE STATED THAT SHE HAD HAD LUNCH WITH AN OFFICIAL OF THE SPANISH EMBASSY IN HAVANA, WHO WAS ASSISTING HER WITH THE BIOGRAPHY OF CASTRO BY PUTTING HER IN TOUCH WITH ONE CARLOS ALBERTO ((MONTANER)) IN MADRID, WHO WOULD EDIT THE BOOK. SHE DECLINED TO IDENTIFY THE SPANISH OFFICAL, BUT DESCRIBED HIM IN SUCH DETAIL THAT BOTH BONNE AND MARTINEZ-AMORES RECOGNIZED HIM AS JORGE ((DE ORUETA)), A LONG-TIME CONTACT OF THE CCC. WHEN THE CONVERSATION WAS RELAYED TO DE ORUETA BY THE CCC, HE RECALLED BADELL HAD BEEN INTRODUCED TO HIM BY VLADIMIRO ROCA'S WIFE. HE FURTHER RECALLED THE LUNCH AND MENTION OF THE BOOK, BUT DECLARED THE MONTANER INFORMATION TO BE SPURIOUS. THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SUGGESTED TO CCC SECURITY PERSONNEL THAT THERE WAS COORDINATION AMONG INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF BEING DIRECTED BY CUBAN SECURITY.

C. IN 1993 A GROUP OF DISSIDENTS, INCLUDING BONNE, WAS INVITED TO THE HOME OF PIOTR ((MIKISKA)) (PHONETIC), FIRST SECRETARY AT THE CZECH EMBASSY, TO ATTEND A VISIT FROM THE CZECH VICE CHANCELLOR. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS KIND OF CONTACT WAS ANATHEMA TO THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.) THE CZECH INVITATION TO BONNE WAS SENT THREE DAYS IN ADVANCE BY WORD OF MOUTH VIA ROCA. BY COINCIDENCE, ANOTHER CCC REPRESENTATIVE VISITING MIKISKA WITHIN A DAY OR TWO OF WHEN THE INVITATION WAS RELAYED TO ROCA WAS ASKED ABOUT THE INVITATION TO BONNE, AS BONNE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE CZECH EMBASSY. THE CCC REPRESENTATIVE INCLUDED THE QUERY REGARDING THE INVITATION IN HIS REPORT OF THE MEETING TO THE CCC, GIVING BONNE HIS FIRST NOTIFICATION THAT THERE HAD EVEN BEEN AN INVITATION. ROCA FINALLY PASSED THE MESSAGE TO THE HOME OF GEORGINA DE LAS MERCEDES ((GONZALEZ)) CORBO, ONE OF BONNE'S CHIEF ASSISTANTS, TWO HOURS PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE FUNCTION.

D. IN MID 1995, REINALDO ((ROQUE)) MALHERBE OF CCC REPORTED THAT VLADIMIRO ROCA'S WIFE WAS UNDERMINING ELIZARDO

SANCHEZ BY PASSING AROUND STORIES THAT HE HAD BEEN WITHHOLDING ORGANIZATIONAL FUNDS, INTENDED FOR THE SOCIALIST CURRENT, FOR HIS PERSONAL USE. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS RUMOR CAMPAIGN MAY HAVE *CONTRIBUTED TO SANCHEZ' REPORTED RESIGNATION FROM THE<EXECUTIVE> COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST CURRENT.)

E. REPORTING ON RADIO MARTI FROM MIAMI AROUND MID 1995 ALLEGEDLY REFERRED TO VLADIMIRO ROCA AS AN AGENT OF CUBAN STATE SECURITY. ROCA HIMSELF WAS REPORTED IN CUBAN DISSIDENT CIRCLES TO HAVE STATED THAT HE WAS A LONG-TIME FRIEND OF MAJOR GENERAL FABIAN ((ESCALANTE)) FONT, WHO WAS REPORTEDLY THE CHIEF OF THE MININT DIRECTORATE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (DCI). (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ESCALANTE FONT NOW HEADS THE MINISTRY'S HISTORY COMMISSION AND IS *KNOWN FOR HIS INQUIRIES INTO THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY> ASSASSINATION, THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION, AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.)

5. GUILLERMO FERNANDEZ DONATES IS A CIVIL ENGINEER WHO WAS CLOSE TO GUSTAVO ((ARCOS)) BERGNES OF THE CUBAN COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (COMITE CUBANO PRO DERECHOS HUMANOS). HE WAS SUSPECTED OF BEING A MININT SOURCE AND A PROVOCATEUR BY THE CCC LEADERSHIP. HE JOINED THE CCC ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF ARCOS BECAUSE FERNANDEZ WAS A MEMBER OF THE PROFESSIONAL CLASS. (SOURCE COMMENT: MANY MEMBERS OF THE CCC ARE PROFESSIONALS.) THE CCC INITIALLY BECAME SUSPICIOUS OF FERNANDEZ BECAUSE HE HAD A HISTORY OF ARRESTS IN WHICH HE WOULD BE PLACED WITH VARIOUS GROUPS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. IN PRISON HE WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE A FIGHT WITH A GUARD OR COMMIT AN INFRACTION OF REGULATIONS AND BE REMOVED BY THE AUTHORITIES FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION. EACH TIME HE EMERGED FROM PRISON HE SEEMED TO BE IN EXCELLENT HEALTH AND WELL FED.

6. ADDITIONALLY, SEVERAL OTHER ANOMALIES HAVE CAUSED THE CCC LEADERSHIP TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF FERNANDEZ:

A. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, FERNANDEZ HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE CCC TO COMMUNICATE ITEMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO ARCOS. SUBSEQUENT ELICITATION OF ARCOS BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CCC LED THEM TO BELIEVE THAT INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FERNANDEZ TO ARCOS WAS OFTEN GROSSLY INACCURATE. WHEN APPRISED OF THIS SITUATION, ARCOS DISMISSED CCC COMMENTS AS BEING SIMPLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

B. IT HAS BEEN NOTED BY THE CCC LEADERSHIP THAT FERNANDEZ WAS FRIENDLY WITH JORGE GONZALEZ AND WITH VLADIMIRO ROCA. FERNANDEZ WAS PRIVY TO THE ACTIVITIES PLANNED BY SOCIALIST CURRENT, THE GROUP TO WHICH ROCA BELONGED, BY HIS ASSOCIATION WITH ROCA. REINALDO ROQUE, A MEMBER OF THE CCC, WHO WORKED WITH SOCIALIST CURRENT, NOTED THAT WHEN THE GROUP WAS SCHEDULED TO MEET, IT WAS CHALLENGED BY CUBAN AUTHORITIES SO OFTEN THAT THE AUTHORITIES MUST HAVE BEEN APPRISED OF ITS SCHEDULE. EITHER FERNANDEZ OR ROCA (OR BOTH) COULD HAVE BEEN PASSING SUCH INFORMATION TO THE AUTHORITIES.

C. ON ONE OCCASION, TO THE SURPRISE OF THE CCC, FERNANDEZ, A KARATE PRACTITIONER, INVITED THE ENTIRE CCC MEMBERSHIP TO GO TO THE CIUDAD DEPORTIVA (SPORTS CITY) TO AN

EXERCISE FIELD TO WORK OUT. CCC SECURITY PERSONNEL NOTED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE ASSEMBLED ALL OR MOST OF THE CCC MEMBERSHIP IN HAVANA IN AN OPEN AREA WHERE IT COULD BE OBSERVED AND PHOTOGRAPHED. THE INVITATION, COMING AS IT DID AS A ONE-TIME OPPORTUNITY WITH NO PRECEDENT, FUELED SUSPICIONS WITHIN THE CCC AND THE INVITATION WAS DECLINED.

7. A SERIES OF EVENTS INVOLVING RAFAEL ALCIDES, A NOTED CUBAN POET AND FIRST HUSBAND OF TERESA ((FERNANDEZ)) MARDONES (A MEMBER OF THE CCC), WAS SIGNIFICANT TO THE CCC BECAUSE IT CALLED INTO QUESTION WHERE ALCIDES' LOYALTIES LAY. ALCIDES AND FERNANDEZ HAD ONE CHILD, A SON, TOGETHER BEFORE THEY WERE DIVORCED AROUND LATE 1993. FERNANDEZ HAD REMARRIED AND WAS LIVING WITH RONALDO ((ROQUE)) (COUSIN OF REINALDO ROQUE), AND ALCIDES WAS SPENDING CONSIDERABLE TIME AT THE ROQUE RESIDENCE, PRESUMABLY TO BE WITH HIS SON. THE CCC BECAME CONCERNED WITH THE SECURITY OF THE SITUATION AS FERNANDEZ WAS PRIVY TO CCC INFORMATION AND WAS ASSESSED AS BEING EMOTIONAL AND TENDING TO CONFIDE TOO MUCH. MARTINEZ-AMORES WAS DISPATCHED BY THE CCC TO FEEL OUT ALCIDES, AND REPORTED THAT HE SPOKE COHERENTLY AND LOGICALLY AGAINST THE CURRENT REGIME. MARTINEZ-AMORES APPEARED TO BE REASSURED. SUBSEQUENTLY HOWEVER, IN CONVERSATION WITH ALCIDES, REINALDO ROQUE LEARNED THAT ALCIDES WAS PART OF A DELEGATION OF THE CUBAN NATIONAL UNION OF WRITERS AND ARTISTS (UNION NACIONAL DE ESCRITORES Y ARTISTAS DE CUBA - UNEAC) THAT VISITED MADRID SOMETIME AROUND 1994. WHILE THERE, ALCIDES SAID THAT HE WAS INVITED WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER UNEAC DELEGATES TO LUNCH WITH CARLOS ALBERTO MONTANER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE LUNCHEON WITH MONTANER MUST CERTAINLY HAVE RECEIVED CUBAN GOVERNMENT APPROVAL, AND THE GROUP MUST HAVE INCLUDED CUBAN SECURITY PERSONNEL.) ALCIDES TOLD ROQUE THAT ON HIS RETURN TO CUBA, HE ATTENDED THE FUNERAL FOR A SISTER (NFI) OF FIDEL CASTRO AND DELIVERED THE FUNERAL ORATION. FOLLOWING THE FUNERAL, HE WAS OBSERVED TO BE EMBRACED BY MINISTER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES GENERAL RAUL ((CASTRO)) RUZ.

POC: ECC, HOWARD, SECURE X-43770, STU III (703) 506 7687.

ACQ: (LATE OCTOBER 1995)

DISSEM: FIELD: SENT TO; USCINCSO, USCINCACOM, AIC, USCINCTRANS, USCINCSOC, JSOC.

WARNING: REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

DECL: X1 CL REASON 1.5(C) DRV FROM HUM-4 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET.>
RELNO: E320079
ORIG: IIDIRPS

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

Date: 11/29/99
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10326-10060
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PROJECT FILES

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : WITHHELD
TITLE : WITHHELD
DATE : 01/19/96
PAGES : 6
SUBJECTS : ESCALANTE FONT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/04/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK-M-11:F2 1999.02.04.09:47:25:750120: CIA CORRESPONDENCE RE ARRB

CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENT

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

/ / SOP#103. SECRET FRP: , , ,4, , , ,

INTEL

CONF: NR/ECC INFO: CIC/AG, CIC/TA, CTC/COPS, CTC/IFC, CTC/TRGCTB, CTCARCHIVE, DDO/TMO, DDO/WO, EUR/BCIR, EUR/IB, EUR/RR, HQDISSEM, IID, IID/NOPRNT, IIDIRPS, INT/CC, INT/RQ, INT/RR, LA/COG, LA/COGEO, LA/COGIO, LA/COGRR, LA/COGSO, LA/RR, MDSX, NCREPORT, NR/EX, NR/NOPRNT, NRDORECORD, ODPD, ODPR, ORMS/TMO, SOGMB, FILE, CE/EE/CS, CTC/TRG, DC/LA, IMS/IRS (5/P)

---

96 2899455 ISR PAGE 001
TOT: 190508Z JAN 96 DIRECTOR 604606

SECRET
INTEL 190508Z DIRECTOR 604606
TO: HQSDISSEM.

WNINTEL DEFERRED INTEL MXBLAZE MXSANCTUARY SLMERLIN ZRWAHOO

SUBJECT: DOCOPY OF INTEL CABLE

95 2641513 ISR PAGE 001 IN 2641513
TOR: 192010Z DEC 95 HOUS 24338

TD-OO-K-323/01241-96
CTO-08768

CITE HOUSTON 24338 ZNY XXXXX

TO: DIRECTOR INFO MIAMI, HAVANA, MADRID, LONDON, NEW YORK, WDC, QUARRY HEIGHTS.

WNINTEL DEFERRED INTEL MXBLAZE MXSANCTUARY SLMERLIN ZRWAHOO

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR HQS REVIEW. SEE ALSO HOUSTON 24339 WHICH DOES NOT AFFECT DISSEM. LIAISON: OKAY FOR PASSAGE TO JLLAD. DECL: X1 CL REASON 1.5(C) DRV FROM HUM-4.

1. CTO-08768 TD-OO-K-323/01241-96
2. CUB-04298
3. LA
4. 0569675
5. N/A
6. INDEX: DEFER
7. FILE: CU04298
8. ANTWINE
9. DIRECTOR 446882
10. N/A
11. 83108
12. HOUSTON
13. NR/ECC
14-17. N/A
18. POL
19. GOOD

SECRET

FILED: 192004Z DEC 95

DO STATIONS: HOUSTON 24338

IID COMMENT: PLS REVIEW THE FIELD DISSEM LINE AND THE PLA (PLAIN LANGUAGE ADDRESS) SECTION. THESE TWO SECTIONS MUST/MUST MATCH. CORRECT AS APPROPRIATE. KCO. RO REPLY: I FORWARDED DO COPY TO LA/COG RO EMPAKERIS FOR GUIDANCE, SINCE HE ORIGINALLY PRESCRIBED THE ADDRESSING FOR THIS REPORT. HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS STUMPED, DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS WRONG, SAID THE REPORT HAD LA'S STANDARD CUBA DISSEM LIST. REGARDS, HOWARD. (X-43770)

SECRET WNINTEL NOFORN

CIA

TO: NPIC WASHDC, DIRNSA, SECSTATE WASHDC//INR//, DIA WASHINGTON DC, DA WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC, CSAF WASHINGTON DC, TREASURY DEPT, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, DOEHQ//IN//, DEPT OF JUSTICE COMMAND CENTER WASH DC//OIPR//, DIRNACIC, SECRET SERVICE//ID//, ONI WASHINGTON DC, COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC, DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION//S-60//, COMCOGARD GRU KEY WEST FL, COMLANTAREA COGARD NEW YORK NY//AI//, USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM, USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA, AIC NORFOLK VA, COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//, USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL, USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB.

SECRET/WNINTEL/NOFORN
SERIAL: TD-OO-K-323/01241-96
PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN

DIST: 18 JANUARY 1996

COUNTRY: CUBA

SUBJ: SUSPECTED CUBAN SECURITY PENETRATIONS OF THE CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS/DISSIDENT MOVEMENT IN CUBA

DOI: 1992 - MID AUGUST 1995

SOURCE: CUB-04298 IS A MID-LEVEL TECHNICIAN WHO HAD EXTENSIVE CONTACT WITH DISSIDENT GROUPS IN CUBA. UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, INFORMATION REPORTED IS FROM DIRECT OBSERVATION OR GOOD SECONDARY SOURCES. SOURCE DID NOT REPORT A SECURITY CLEARANCE.

SUMMARY: LEADERS OF THE CUBAN CIVIC CURRENT (CORRIENTE CIVICA CUBANA), A DISSIDENT GROUP IN CUBA, SUSPECTED THREE MEMBERS OF THE

GROUP, AND THE FORMER HUSBAND OF A GROUP MEMBER, OF BEING CUBAN SECURITY SOURCES OR PENETRATIONS. THE LEADERS OF THE DISSIDENT GROUP DID NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC EVIDENCE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS WERE CONNECTED TO CUBAN SECURITY, BUT INCIDENTS IN WHICH EACH OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE INVOLVED LED THE LEADERSHIP TO BECOME SUSPICIOUS OF THEM.

TEXT: 1. AS OF MID AUGUST 1995, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CUBAN DISSIDENT GROUP, CUBAN CIVIC CURRENT (CORRIENTE CIVICA CUBANA - CCC), WAS CERTAIN THAT THE CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS HAD ATTRACTED THE ATTENTION OF CUBAN SECURITY, PRIMARILY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MININT), AND THEY BELIEVED THAT MININT WAS TRYING TO PENETRATE DISSIDENT ORGANIZATIONS. CCC MEMBERS CONCERNED OVER THE GROUP'S SECURITY TAGGED FOUR INDIVIDUALS WHO EXHIBITED BEHAVIOR OR ACTIVITIES IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS OR DISSIDENT ORGANIZATIONS THAT SUGGESTED THAT THEY WERE ASSOCIATED WITH MININT. THE INDIVIDUALS WERE JORGE ((GONZALES)), VLADIMIRO ((ROCA)) ATUNEZ, GUILLERMO ((FERNANDEZ)) DONATES, AND RAFAEL ((ALCIDES)).

2. THE CCC LEADERSHIP WAS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT JORGE GONZALEZ, OF THE CHRISTIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MOVIMIENTO CRISTIANO LIBERACION), HEADED BY OSVALDO ((PAYA)) SARDINAS, WAS A CUBAN SECURITY PENETRATION. DIRECTORS OF THE CCC NOTED THAT HIS QUESTIONS WERE USUALLY SO PENETRATING AS TO SUGGEST INSIDE KNOWLEDGE. A TRUSTED MEMBER OF THE CCC WAS DIRECTED AGAINST GONZALEZ, PROVIDING HIM WITH MOSTLY BOGUS INFORMATION KNOWN ONLY TO THE CCC MEMBER AND THE CCC LEADERSHIP. RECORDS OF THE DATE THE INFORMATION WAS PASSED WERE KEPT BY THE CCC. THE INFORMATION LATER SURFACED THROUGH MININT DURING THE COURSE OF MININT INTERVIEWS OF DETAINED CCC LEADERS. THE CCC LEADERSHIP BELIEVED THAT GONZALEZ MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN VENEZUELA AS OF MID AUGUST 1995.

3. VLADIMIRO ROCA OF THE CUBAN DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST CURRENT (CORRIENTE SOCIALISTA DEMOCRATICA CUBANA), WHO IS ONE OF THE CLOSEST ASSOCIATES OF ELIZARDO ((SANCHEZ)) SANTACRUZ OF THE CUBAN COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION (COMISION CUBANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y RECONCILIACION NACIONAL), CAME UNDER CCC SUSPICION AFTER AN INCIDENT IN 1992. IN THAT YEAR, SHORTLY AFTER THE LETTER BY CUBAN PROFESSIONALS TO THE IBERIAN AMERICAN SUMMIT WAS PRESENTED, CCC CHIEF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR VLADIMIR ((MARTINEZ-AMORES)) ALVAREZ WAS VISITED AT HIS HOME BY TWO MININT OFFICERS. THE TWO OFFICERS WERE NAMED "MARCIAL" AND "DANIEL." THE SENIOR OF THE TWO, DANIEL, REMARKED THAT ELIZARDO SANCHEZ WAS A U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENT. IN DUE COURSE THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED BY MARTINEZ-AMORES TO SANCHEZ IN THE PRESENCE OF VLADIMIRO ROCA. AROUND DECEMBER 1992, DURING AN "INTERVIEW" BY MININT OF A CCC MEMBER, MARCIAL MADE A STATEMENT THAT INDICATED THAT HE KNEW THAT HIS INITIAL REMARKS TO MARTINEZ-AMORES ABOUT SANCHEZ HAD BEEN PASSED TO SANCHEZ. WHEN IT WAS REPORTED TO SANCHEZ THAT MININT HAD MADE THIS STATEMENT, HE ATTRIBUTED IT TO TECHNICAL COVERAGE IN HIS HOME ASSOCIATED WITH AN LP OPPOSITE HIS HOME. THE CCC WAS NOT CONVINCED BY THIS EXPLANATION AND THEREAFTER KEPT ROCA AT A DISTANCE, AS THEY ASSUMED THAT IT WAS ROCA WHO HAD PASSED THE INFORMATION TO THE

MININT. (SOURCE COMMENT: ONLY ROCA, SANCHEZ AND MARTINEZ-AMORES KNEW THAT SANCHEZ HAD BEEN TOLD, AND BOTH SANCHEZ AND MARTINEZ-AMORES WERE TRUSTED MEMBERS OF THE CCC.)

4. CCC'S SUSPICIONS CONCERNING ROCA HAVE GROWN STRONGER IN LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS:

A. CCC MEMBER FELIX ((DIAZ)) WAS DENIED A REQUEST FOR A VISA TO THE U.S. BY THE U.S. INTERESTS SECTION. THE REPORTED GROUNDS FOR DENIAL WERE THAT DIAZ HAD NOT SUBMITTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE VISA. ROCA WAS HEARD TO TELL DIAZ THAT HIS REQUEST HAD BEEN UNDERMINED BY FELIX ((BONNE)) CARCASSES, THE CCC LEADER. BONNE DENIED THIS ACTION, SAYING THAT HE WOULD HAVE HAD NO INTEREST IN UNDERMINING DIAZ.

B. IN EARLY 1993, JORGE GONZALEZ, A CLOSE FRIEND OF ROCA, INFORMED THE CCC LEADERSHIP THAT AN AUTHORESS, IDENTIFIED AS MARIANA ((BADELL)) (PHONETIC), WAS PREPARING A BIOGRAPHY OF CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL ((CASTRO)) AND WANTED TO MEET BONNE. THE REASON FOR SUCH A MEETING IN CONNECTION WITH A BIOGRAPHY OF CASTRO WAS NOT CLEAR, BUT THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN GONZALEZ' HOME, AND INCLUDED BADELL, BONNE, AND MARTINEZ-AMORES. THE CCC LEADERS NOTED THAT BADELL APPEARED TO BE UNCOMFORTABLE DURING THE COURSE OF THE MEETING. SHE STATED THAT SHE HAD HAD LUNCH WITH AN OFFICIAL OF THE SPANISH EMBASSY IN HAVANA, WHO WAS ASSISTING HER WITH THE BIOGRAPHY OF CASTRO BY PUTTING HER IN TOUCH WITH ONE CARLOS ALBERTO ((MONTANER)) IN MADRID, WHO WOULD EDIT THE BOOK. SHE DECLINED TO IDENTIFY THE SPANISH OFFICAL, BUT DESCRIBED HIM IN SUCH DETAIL THAT BOTH BONNE AND MARTINEZ-AMORES RECOGNIZED HIM AS JORGE ((DE ORUETA)), A LONG-TIME CONTACT OF THE CCC. WHEN THE CONVERSATION WAS RELAYED TO DE ORUETA BY THE CCC, HE RECALLED BADELL HAD BEEN INTRODUCED TO HIM BY VLADIMIRO ROCA'S WIFE. HE FURTHER RECALLED THE LUNCH AND MENTION OF THE BOOK, BUT DECLARED THE MONTANER INFORMATION TO BE SPURIOUS. THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SUGGESTED TO CCC SECURITY PERSONNEL THAT THERE WAS COORDINATION AMONG INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF BEING DIRECTED BY CUBAN SECURITY.

C. IN 1993 A GROUP OF DISSIDENTS, INCLUDING BONNE, WAS INVITED TO THE HOME OF PIOTR ((MIKISKA)) (PHONETIC), FIRST SECRETARY AT THE CZECH EMBASSY, TO ATTEND A VISIT FROM THE CZECH VICE CHANCELLOR. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS KIND OF CONTACT WAS ANATHEMA TO THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.) THE CZECH INVITATION TO BONNE WAS SENT THREE DAYS IN ADVANCE BY WORD OF MOUTH VIA ROCA. BY COINCIDENCE, ANOTHER CCC REPRESENTATIVE VISITING MIKISKA WITHIN A DAY OR TWO OF WHEN THE INVITATION WAS RELAYED TO ROCA WAS ASKED ABOUT THE INVITATION TO BONNE, AS BONNE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE CZECH EMBASSY. THE CCC REPRESENTATIVE INCLUDED THE QUERY REGARDING THE INVITATION IN HIS REPORT OF THE MEETING TO THE CCC, GIVING BONNE HIS FIRST NOTIFICATION THAT THERE HAD EVEN BEEN AN INVITATION. ROCA FINALLY PASSED THE MESSAGE TO THE HOME OF GEORGINA DE LAS MERCEDES ((GONZALEZ)) CORBO, ONE OF BONNE'S CHIEF ASSISTANTS, TWO HOURS PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE FUNCTION.

D. IN MID 1995, REINALDO ((ROQUE)) MALHERBE OF CCC REPORTED THAT VLADIMIRO ROCA'S WIFE WAS UNDERMINING ELIZARDO

SANCHEZ BY PASSING AROUND STORIES THAT HE HAD BEEN WITHHOLDING ORGANIZATIONAL FUNDS, INTENDED FOR THE SOCIALIST CURRENT, FOR HIS PERSONAL USE. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS RUMOR CAMPAIGN MAY HAVE *CONTRIBUTED TO SANCHEZ' REPORTED RESIGNATION FROM THE<EXECUTIVE> COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST CURRENT.)

E. REPORTING ON RADIO MARTI FROM MIAMI AROUND MID 1995 ALLEGEDLY REFERRED TO VLADIMIRO ROCA AS AN AGENT OF CUBAN STATE SECURITY. ROCA HIMSELF WAS REPORTED IN CUBAN DISSIDENT CIRCLES TO HAVE STATED THAT HE WAS A LONG-TIME FRIEND OF MAJOR GENERAL FABIAN ((ESCALANTE)) FONT, WHO WAS REPORTEDLY THE CHIEF OF THE MININT DIRECTORATE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (DCI). (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ESCALANTE FONT NOW HEADS THE MINISTRY'S HISTORY COMMISSION AND IS *KNOWN FOR HIS INQUIRIES INTO THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY> ASSASSINATION, THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION, AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.)

5. GUILLERMO FERNANDEZ DONATES IS A CIVIL ENGINEER WHO WAS CLOSE TO GUSTAVO ((ARCOS)) BERGNES OF THE CUBAN COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (COMITE CUBANO PRO DERECHOS HUMANOS). HE WAS SUSPECTED OF BEING A MININT SOURCE AND A PROVOCATEUR BY THE CCC LEADERSHIP. HE JOINED THE CCC ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF ARCOS BECAUSE FERNANDEZ WAS A MEMBER OF THE PROFESSIONAL CLASS. (SOURCE COMMENT: MANY MEMBERS OF THE CCC ARE PROFESSIONALS.) THE CCC INITIALLY BECAME SUSPICIOUS OF FERNANDEZ BECAUSE HE HAD A HISTORY OF ARRESTS IN WHICH HE WOULD BE PLACED WITH VARIOUS GROUPS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. IN PRISON HE WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE A FIGHT WITH A GUARD OR COMMIT AN INFRACTION OF REGULATIONS AND BE REMOVED BY THE AUTHORITIES FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION. EACH TIME HE EMERGED FROM PRISON HE SEEMED TO BE IN EXCELLENT HEALTH AND WELL FED.

6. ADDITIONALLY, SEVERAL OTHER ANOMALIES HAVE CAUSED THE CCC LEADERSHIP TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF FERNANDEZ:

A. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, FERNANDEZ HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE CCC TO COMMUNICATE ITEMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO ARCOS. SUBSEQUENT ELICITATION OF ARCOS BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CCC LED THEM TO BELIEVE THAT INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FERNANDEZ TO ARCOS WAS OFTEN GROSSLY INACCURATE. WHEN APPRISED OF THIS SITUATION, ARCOS DISMISSED CCC COMMENTS AS BEING SIMPLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

B. IT HAS BEEN NOTED BY THE CCC LEADERSHIP THAT FERNANDEZ WAS FRIENDLY WITH JORGE GONZALEZ AND WITH VLADIMIRO ROCA. FERNANDEZ WAS PRIVY TO THE ACTIVITIES PLANNED BY SOCIALIST CURRENT, THE GROUP TO WHICH ROCA BELONGED, BY HIS ASSOCIATION WITH ROCA. REINALDO ROQUE, A MEMBER OF THE CCC, WHO WORKED WITH SOCIALIST CURRENT, NOTED THAT WHEN THE GROUP WAS SCHEDULED TO MEET, IT WAS CHALLENGED BY CUBAN AUTHORITIES SO OFTEN THAT THE AUTHORITIES MUST HAVE BEEN APPRISED OF ITS SCHEDULE. EITHER FERNANDEZ OR ROCA (OR BOTH) COULD HAVE BEEN PASSING SUCH INFORMATION TO THE AUTHORITIES.

C. ON ONE OCCASION, TO THE SURPRISE OF THE CCC, FERNANDEZ, A KARATE PRACTITIONER, INVITED THE ENTIRE CCC MEMBERSHIP TO GO TO THE CIUDAD DEPORTIVA (SPORTS CITY) TO AN

EXERCISE FIELD TO WORK OUT. CCC SECURITY PERSONNEL NOTED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE ASSEMBLED ALL OR MOST OF THE CCC MEMBERSHIP IN HAVANA IN AN OPEN AREA WHERE IT COULD BE OBSERVED AND PHOTOGRAPHED. THE INVITATION, COMING AS IT DID AS A ONE-TIME OPPORTUNITY WITH NO PRECEDENT, FUELED SUSPICIONS WITHIN THE CCC AND THE INVITATION WAS DECLINED.

7. A SERIES OF EVENTS INVOLVING RAFAEL ALCIDES, A NOTED CUBAN POET AND FIRST HUSBAND OF TERESA ((FERNANDEZ)) MARDONES (A MEMBER OF THE CCC), WAS SIGNIFICANT TO THE CCC BECAUSE IT CALLED INTO QUESTION WHERE ALCIDES' LOYALTIES LAY. ALCIDES AND FERNANDEZ HAD ONE CHILD, A SON, TOGETHER BEFORE THEY WERE DIVORCED AROUND LATE 1993. FERNANDEZ HAD REMARRIED AND WAS LIVING WITH RONALDO ((ROQUE)) (COUSIN OF REINALDO ROQUE), AND ALCIDES WAS SPENDING CONSIDERABLE TIME AT THE ROQUE RESIDENCE, PRESUMABLY TO BE WITH HIS SON. THE CCC BECAME CONCERNED WITH THE SECURITY OF THE SITUATION AS FERNANDEZ WAS PRIVY TO CCC INFORMATION AND WAS ASSESSED AS BEING EMOTIONAL AND TENDING TO CONFIDE TOO MUCH. MARTINEZ-AMORES WAS DISPATCHED BY THE CCC TO FEEL OUT ALCIDES, AND REPORTED THAT HE SPOKE COHERENTLY AND LOGICALLY AGAINST THE CURRENT REGIME. MARTINEZ-AMORES APPEARED TO BE REASSURED. SUBSEQUENTLY HOWEVER, IN CONVERSATION WITH ALCIDES, REINALDO ROQUE LEARNED THAT ALCIDES WAS PART OF A DELEGATION OF THE CUBAN NATIONAL UNION OF WRITERS AND ARTISTS (UNION NACIONAL DE ESCRITORES Y ARTISTAS DE CUBA - UNEAC) THAT VISITED MADRID SOMETIME AROUND 1994. WHILE THERE, ALCIDES SAID THAT HE WAS INVITED WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER UNEAC DELEGATES TO LUNCH WITH CARLOS ALBERTO MONTANER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE LUNCHEON WITH MONTANER MUST CERTAINLY HAVE RECEIVED CUBAN GOVERNMENT APPROVAL, AND THE GROUP MUST HAVE INCLUDED CUBAN SECURITY PERSONNEL.) ALCIDES TOLD ROQUE THAT ON HIS RETURN TO CUBA, HE ATTENDED THE FUNERAL FOR A SISTER (NFI) OF FIDEL CASTRO AND DELIVERED THE FUNERAL ORATION. FOLLOWING THE FUNERAL, HE WAS OBSERVED TO BE EMBRACED BY MINISTER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES GENERAL RAUL ((CASTRO)) RUZ.

POC: ECC, HOWARD, SECURE X-43770, STU III (703) 506 7687.

ACQ: (LATE OCTOBER 1995)

DISSEM: FIELD: SENT TO; USCINCSO, USCINCACOM, AIC, USCINCTRANS, USCINCSOC, JSOC.

WARNING: REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

DECL: X1 CL REASON 1.5(C) DRV FROM HUM-4 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET.>
RELNO: E320078
ORIG: IIDIRPS

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 95-2349364 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: C/ORMS, D/OGC, EA/TIB, LIMITO, MDSX, OCC/OSG, ODPD, OGC/LD, FILE, C/PCS (2/P)

95 2349364 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 202257Z NOV 95 DIRECTOR 534168

SECRET
STAFF 202257Z DIRECTOR 534168
TO: PRIORITY BANGKOK.

FROM: LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, OGC/LD, OGC/OFLD, EA/TIB

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDES IN BANGKOK.

* 2. BASED ON OUR COMPLIANCE WITH PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING INFORMATION INCLUDED BETWEEN TEAR LINES TO IDEN.

------------------------------TEAR LINE--------------------------------

NOVEMBER 20, 1995

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526 *OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATON OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR

SECRET

PERSON(S) YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE CONTACT BERT MILLS AT (703) 356-0285 OR 1-800-447-2211. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE THE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. IF THE BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BECAUSE THE BOARD MUST COVER HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, IT WILL BE CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS AT AN ACCELERATING PACE AND WE CANNOT PROJECT WHEN IT MAY REVIEW A DOCUMENT CONTAINING YOUR NAME. THEREFORE PLEASE CONTACT ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF APPROPRIATE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED BERT MILLS)

-----------------------------TEAR
LINE-----------------------------------

2. HQS WOULD PREFER THAT IDEN PASS RESPONSE TO STATION OFFICER FOR FORWARDING TO HQS VIA THIS CHANNEL. APPRECIATE STATION'S ASSISTANCE.

3. CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1 DRV FROM: COV 2-87

FILE: 785-120-034. DECL OADR DRV COV 2-87.>

RELNO: E283629

ORIG: OCC/OSG (MATHIAS,37076); AUTH: OCC/OSG (BURGGRAF); INFO: CHIEF/PCS (MASSENGALE), OGC/LD (EATINGER), OGC/OFLD (CRAWFORD),; REL: EA/TIB (AHR). CL BY 0489932.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , ,4, , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: C/OCC (129) INFO: C/ORMS, CTC/COPS, CTC/IEB, CTC/IFC, CTC/TRGCTB, CTCARCHIVE, EUR/LGL, EUR/SA, LIMITO, MDSX, OCC/OSG, ODPD, FILE, C/CTC, C/PCS, CTC/TRG (4/W)

95 2326398 ASR PAGE 001 IN 2326398
TOR: 171655Z NOV 95 VIEN 28456

S E C R E T 171648Z NOV 95 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 28456

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, C/EUR/SA, EUR/LGL, OGC/OSD, OGC/OFLD

SLUGS: WNINTEL

*SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS COLLECTION ACT

REF: A. DIRECTOR 493642 95 2040015
B. DIRECTOR 493658 95 2040060

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.

2. ON 14 NOVEMBER 1995, C/O NOBLEHORSE DELIVERED REF TEAR LINE INFORMATION AS REQUESTED. REF IDEN THEN ASKED FOR TIME TO FORMULATE HIS THOUGHTS AND SUBMIT THEM ON PAPER. ALTHOUGH NOBLEHORSE EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD PREFER HE PASS THE RESPONSE DIRECTLY TO C/O, HE WAS APPARENTLY SO ANGERED OVER THE CONTENTS OF REF, THAT HE LATER TRIED TO CONTACT BERT MILLS DIRECTLY AND WITHOUT SUCCESS. ON 15 NOVEMBER, REF IDEN PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE IN WRITING, WHICH IS BEING POUCHED TO HQS VIA TM 902-825:

NOV 14, 1995

TO BERT MILLS:

I OBJECT VIOLENTLY TO THE REVELATION OF MY NAME REGARDLESS OF THE LAW. HERE ARE SOME REASONS:

1. I EMIGRATED TO AUSTRIA TWICE, FIRST IN 1971 AND AGAIN IN 1983. BOTH TIMES I HAD TO FILL OUT AND SWEAR TO LENGTHY FORMS ABOUT MY BACKGROUND. I USED MY RETIRED STATE COVER BOTH TIMES, THEREBY COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE UNDER AUSTRIAN LAW. MY OLD FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROTECT ME HAVE ALL RETIRED OR, EVEN MORE, DIED. AUSTRIAN JUSTICE IS NOTORIOUSLY IMMUTABLE. DO YOU WANT ME TO GO TO JAIL?

2. LIVING SINCE RETIREMENT IN AUSTRIA FROM 1971 TO 1980 AND FROM 1983 TO THE PRESENT, I HAVE ACHIEVED HIGH POSITIONS IN VIENNA'S MUSICAL BODIES, BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE JOHANN STRAUSS SOCIETY AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE VIENNA MEN'S SINGING SOCIETY, AND I AM PERSONALLY KNOWN TO SEVERAL RECENT AUSTRIAN PRESIDENTS, MANY REPORTERS AND RADIO FIGURES. I SUFFERED A DISABLING STROKE IN DECEMBER 1993 AND MY WIFE AND I, BOTH 75, CAN CONTINUE TO EXIST HERE BECAUSE OUR 2000 SQ. FT. APARTMENT IS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF 2 POST OFFICES, SEVERAL SMALL SUPER MARKETS, MY FAMILY PHYSICIAN, OUR DENTIST, MY UROLOGIST, AND AN EYE DOCTOR AND OPTICIAN. WE ARE WITHIN WHEEL CHAIR DISTANCE OF THE CONCERT HALLS AND THE OPERA. WHERE CAN YOU DUPLICATE THIS FOR ME?

3. DURING MY ACTIVE CAREER IN VIENNA AROUND 1959 I INTERROGATED AND BROKE AN INTELLIGENCE SWINDLER WHO HAD BEEN A NAZI ASSASSIN. I PROMISED HIM SECRECY IF HE CONFESSED, BUT THE US ARMY PUT OUT A "BURN NOTICE" ON HIM, FORCING HIM TO MOVE TO GERMANY. I AM SURE HE WOULD LOVE TO FIND ME AND SHOOT ME.

4. VIENNA IS FULL OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL *<ASSASSINATIONS,>EVEN OF A CITY COUNCILMAN, BY THEM IN RECENT YEARS. UNDER AUSTRIAN LAW, I, AS A FOREIGNER, CANNOT EVEN GET A PISTOL LICENSE. YOU MUST KNOW ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING AND KILLING OF OUR COLLEAGUES AROUND THE WORLD.

4. I HAVE TWICE TESTIFIED BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ABOUT *THE<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION.> THEIR FULL REPORTS SIMPLY CALLED ME THE "DESK OFFICER" AND THAT HAS SEEMED TO SATISFY EVERYONE. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF YOU DO EXPOSE MY NAME, I WILL NOT EVER TALK TO ANY JOURNALISTS OR SO-CALLED HISTORIANS.

5. IF MY NAME IS EXPOSED, I WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LEAVE VIENNA, WITH THE WHOLE HOUSE FULL OF FURNITURE, PICTURES, LIBRARY, CLOTHING, ETC. WHICH I PACKED AND PAID TO HAVE MOVED OVER HERE IN 1983. BECAUSE OF MY STROKE, I WILL BE UNABLE TO DO ANY PACKING AND THE MOVE WILL BE VERY EXPENSIVE. WHERE CAN I RESETTLE IN A 2000 SQ FT. APT. SO CONVENIENTLY LOCATED.

6. MY WIFE AND I LOVE LIVING HERE FOR MANY REASONS, AND LEAVING WOULD BE A CRUEL AND NEEDLESS FATE.

7. I REGARD THIS LAW AS DISHONORABLE AND UNWORTHY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. IF YOU DECIDE AGAINST ME, I WANT TO APPEAR BEFORE THE BOARD AND EVEN THE PRESIDENT, WHOM I HAPPEN TO ADMIRE. I WILL PAY MY OWN WAY BACK TO DO SO. I SERVED IN WWII AND NEVER SPARED MYSELF; IN THE OUTFIT I WORKED HARD, WAS FEARLESS IN DEALING WITH MY SUPERIORS (CORD MEYER AND DICK HELMS CAN TESTIFY TO THAT) AND MY ADVERSARIES. I WOULDN'T EVEN THINK OF THREATENING TO EXPOSE THINGS TO PRESSURE YOU. I WILL BE EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY OR TWO, FAMILIAR WITH OUR AFFAIRS, TO REPRESENT ME. I WILL NOT DENY, THAT I CONSIDER YOU AND EVERYONE ELSE IMPLEMENTING THIS LAW TO BE ENGAGING IN DISHONORABLE CONDUCT, UNWORTHY OF OUR GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

8. IN THE LATE 1960'S WHILE SERVING IN VIENNA UNDER TOM KARAMISSINIS, I WAS ORDERED BY HQ TO REVEAL TO AUSTRIAN MILITARY

INTELLIGENCE THAT A LOW-RANKING AUSTRIAN DIPLOMAT SERVING AS THEIR INFORMANT IN BUDAPEST HAD ALSO BEEN RECRUITED BY US AND WAS REPORTING TO US. I REFUSED TO CARRY OUT THIS ORDER AND OFFERED MY RESIGNATION. TO ME, IT WAS DISHONORABLE TO BETRAY A YOUNG AGENT WHO HAD ACCEPTED OUR RECRUITMENT AND PUT FAITH IN OUR PROMISE OF SECRECY. TO MY MIND AN AGENCY WITHOUT PRINCIPLES CANNOT SURVIVE AND INDEED SHOULD NOT SURVIVE. TOM KARAMISSINIS, PERHAPS ONE OF THE LAST HONORABLE MEN TO SERVE WITH US IN HIGH POSITION, FIRED A STRONG CABLE BACK AND THE SHAMEFUL ORDER WAS RETRACTED.

9. I HAVE INVESTED ABOUT $50,000 IN MY APARTMENT, IN KEY MONEY AND IMPROVEMENTS. IF I LEAVE, I WILL LOSE ALL OR MOST OF THIS. OUR LAST MOVE TO VIENNA COST ME ABOUT $15,000 IN SEA FREIGHT AND INSURANCE. I WILL NEVER GET ON MY KNEES AND ASK TO BE MADE WHOLE IF YOU EXPOSE ME, BUT I MAY REPORT TO THE COURTS. I AM A RETIRED MEMBER OF THE VIRGINIA BAR.

10. LET ME REGALE YOU WITH AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE HISTORIANS MINDLESS DRIVE TO KNOW EVERYTHING CAN LEAD TO A PROUD COUNTRY'S DISGRACING ITSELF. DURING WWII WHEN WE WERE INTERROGATING GERMAN POW'S, WE PROMISED THEM NO ONE WOULD EVER LEARN THEY HAD "SPILLED THEIR GUTS," AND WE ALL BELIEVED WE WERE BEING HONEST. BUT ALMOST 25 YEARS AFTER WWII THE BRITISH DECLASSIFIED ALL THE ADI(K) REPORTS (THAT'S WHAT THEY WERE CALLED, AND EVEN THE "ROOM CONVERSATIONS," TRANSCRIPTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS POWS HAD IN THEIR ROOMS, EVEN INCLUDING THE EXTREMELY VALUABLE SPEECHES MADE BY HIGH-RANKING LUFTWAFFE OFFICERS TO THEIR HIGH-RANKING FELLOW POW'S AT "COCKFOSTERS" MANSION. NEWCOMERS WERE VISITED BY THE OLD HANDS FOR A MONTH TO MAKE SURE THEY WEREN'T STOOL PIGEONS, BEFORE THEY WERE GIVEN THE PRIVILEGE OF ADDRESSING THEIR FELLOW OFFICERS ON SOME IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WAR. THE EXCELLENT BRITISH MIKES PICKED IT ALL UP.

IN RECENT YEARS, AT LEAST ONE LUFTWAFFE VETERAN ASSOCIATION, THAT OF J.G.2, THE RICHTHOFEN GESCHWADER, SENT PEOPLE TO LONDON TO GET COPIES OF THE INTERROGATION REPORTS OF THEIR PILOTS. THEY DID IT CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WERE SO SHOCKED AT THE VAST AMOUNT OF VITAL DATA REVEALED BY THEIR BUDDIES THAT, IN ACUTE REVULSION, THEY STOPPED LOOKING. I ASSUMED THEN THAT "EVERYONE" HAD "TALKED," WHICH IS TRUE.

11. I AM 75 YEARS OLD PARTLY PARALYZED ON MY LEFT SIDE FROM A STROKE IN DEC. 1993. I WAS NEARLY FULLY REHABILITATED WHEN, IN MAY 1994, I WAS HIT BY CONSTANT MUSCLE SPASMS ALL UP AND DOWN MY LEFT SIDE. THIS RATHER RARE CONDITION, BASICALLY A SUDDEN SUPER-HUMAN TIGHTENING OF ALL THE MUSCLES, WITH AFTER EFFECTS LASTING UNTIL THE NEXT SPASM, HAVE MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO STAND UP, WALK, OR EVEN SIT UP FOR VERY LONG. IN A FEW DAYS, WHEN ALL THE MANY MEDICINES ARE HERE, WILL BEGIN A 20-WEEK HOMEOPATHIC CURE FOR THE SPASMS UNDER DR. SCHRAMM, A LEADING SPECIALIST HERE. I CAN'T VERY WELL LEAVE FOR 20 WEEKS.

YOU WILL BE CONTACTED MOMENTARILY BY ONE OF MY ATTORNEYS. I WILL ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH MY CONGRESSMAN AND SENATORS.

WITH BITTER RESOLVE,
(SIGNED - REF B IDEN)

3. REF IDEN HAD ALSO ATTEMPTED TO PUT THE ABOVE INTO "CABALESE," BUT BECAME TOO TIRED TO FINISH IT. NONETHELESS, REF IDEN ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE ALSO BE PASSED:
1. SAW SUBJ IN HIS APT NOV 14. CORDIAL

2. REASONS: SUBJ HAS EMIGRATED PRIVATELY TO AUSTRIA TWICE, 1971 AND 1983, USING RETIRED STATE COVER ON SWORN AUSTRIAN FORMS THUS COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE BY AUSTRIAN LAW. HIGH OFFICIAL HERE WHO COVERED FOR HIM NOW DEAD. WOULD FACE SCANDAL TRIAL, JAIL, AND DEPORTATION.

3. SUBJ PROMINENT IN LOCAL MUSIC CIRCLES, RADIO, TV, AND POLITICS AND MILITARY, GREAT SCANDAL POTENTIAL.

4. SUBJ INVESTED 50 THOUSAND DOLLARS IN APT AND WOULD LOSE IT IN HURRIED DEPARTURE, PLUS EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS TO Z1, AND OWN FARES.

5. SUBJ NOW 75 HAD CRIPPLING STROKE DEC 93. WIFE ALSO 75 ABLE TO CARRY ON BECAUSE STORES, DENTIST, DOCTOR, UROLOGIST OF SUBJ, POST OFFICE ALL IN WALKING DISTANCE OF APT. CANNOT DUPLICATE THIS IN Z1.

6. SUBJ WOULD BE ENDANGERED BY ISLAMIC GROUPS HERE WHO HAVE *<ASSASSINATED>SEVERAL INCL ONE CITY COUNCILMAN. EMBASSY GETS THREATENING PHONE CALLS. AS FOREIGNER SUBJ DENIED AUSTRIAN PISTOL PERMIT. SUBJ ALSO ENDANGERED BY FORMER NAZI ASSASSIN AND INTEL SWINDLER HE INTERROGATED AND BROKE 25 YEARS AGO, PROMISING HIM SECRECY; BUT US ARMY PUT OUT BURN NOTICE, FORCING NAZI TO MOVE TO GERMANY.

7. SUBJ HAS TESTIFIED FULLY BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES, TERMED "DESK OFFICER," OWN ROLE MINOR. ALTHO PUT IN CHARGE OF AGENCY INVESTIGATION BY HELMS THEN DDO, HIS WORK WAS SABOTAGED BY ANGLETON WHO WITHHELD HUNDREDS OF BEST FBI REPORTS AND CONFERRED DAILY WITH FBI WITHOUT PRESENCE OF SUBJ, ALL IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF HELMS ORDERS.

8. SUBJ AVERS HE WILL NEVER THREATEN TO EXPOSE AGENCY. EVEN IF SURFACED WILL DENY EVERYTHING.

4. FILE: 785-120-034.
CL BY: 618711
CL REASON: 1.5(C)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: ALA/LI/CAM, CCDORECORD, CIC/LA, CIC/OGTOB, D/OGC, LA/CSCMED, LA/MCG, LA/MCGCEN, LA/MCGMXB, LA/MCGRR, LA/MRSRMB, LA/NARC, MDSX, OCC/OSG, OCC/RB, ODPD, OGC/LD, ORMS/LA, SMFO, FILE, C/LA/RB5, C/PCS, DC/LA/RB5 (4/P)

95 2263468 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 111719Z NOV 95 DIRECTOR 524828

SECRET
STAFF 111719Z DIRECTOR 524828
TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY.

FROM: CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, OGC/LD, OGC/OFLD, LA/MCGMXB, LA/MCGCEN, LA/SA, LA/MCG

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEES WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDE IN MEXICO.

* 2. BASED ON OUR COMPLIANCE WITH PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING INFORMATION INCLUDED BETWEEN TEAR LINES TO IDENS A AND B.

--------------------------------TEAR LINE---------------------------------

NOVEMBER 9, 1995

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526 *OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATON OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT

BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR PERSON(S) YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE CONTACT BERT MILLS AT (703) 356-0285 OR 1-800-447-2211. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE THE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. IF THE BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BECAUSE THE BOARD MUST COVER HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, IT WILL BE CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS AT AN ACCELERATING PACE AND WE CANNOT PROJECT WHEN IT MAY REVIEW A DOCUMENT CONTAINING YOUR NAME. THEREFORE PLEASE CONTACT ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF APPROPRIATE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED BERT MILLS)

------------------------------TEAR LINE----------------------------------

2. HQS WOULD PREFER THAT IDENS PASS RESPONSES TO STATION OFFICER FOR FORWARDING TO HQS VIA THIS CHANNEL. APPRECIATE STATION'S ASSISTANCE.

3. CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1 DRV FROM: COV 2-87
.. FILE: 785-120-034. DECL OADR DRV COV 2-87.>

RELNO: E277867
ORIG: OCC/OSG(MATHIAS,37076); AUTH: OCC/OSG (BURGGRAF); COORD: LA/MCGMXB (CADENA), LA/MCGCEN (BECK), LA/SA (HAYES); INFO: CHIEF/PCS (MASSENGALE), OGC/LD (EATINGER); OGC/OFLD (CRAWFORD); REL: LA/MCG (MALLET). CL BY 0489932.
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

MHFNO: 95-2246909 SENSIND: SECRET

PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: , , ,4, , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: C/OCC (127) INFO: C/ORMS, CTC/IEB, CTC/IFC, CTCARCHIVE, EUR/LGL, EUR/SA, LIMITO, MDSX, OCC/OSG, ODPD, FILE, C/PCS (2/W)

95 2246909 ASR PAGE 001 IN 2246909
TOR: 091118Z NOV 95 VIEN 28362

SECRET 091113Z NOV 95 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 28362 (EVESON ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, C/EUR/SA, EUR/LGL, OGC/OSD, OGC/OFLD

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

REF: A. VIENNA 27471 95 2046254
B. DIRECTOR 493642 95 2040015

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLS ADVISE AS PER BELOW.

2. REF A WAS A REQUEST FOR FURTHER INFORMATION TO ASSIST IN *COMPLIANCE WITH PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS COLLECTION ACT. QUERY WHETHER HQS WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE REQUESTED INFORMATION? PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE: 785-120-034.

CL BY: 618711
CL REASON: 1.5(C)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 95-2046254 SENSIND:

SECRET FRP: , , ,4, , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: C/OCC (117) INFO: C/ORMS, CTC/IEB, CTC/IFC, CTCARCHIVE, EUR/LGL, EUR/SA, LIMITO, MDSX, OCC/OSG, ODPD, FILE, C/PCS (2/W)

95 2046254 ASR PAGE 001 IN 2046254
TOR: 201302Z OCT 95 VIEN 27471

SECRET 201301Z OCT 95 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 27471

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, C/EUR/SA, EUR/LGL, OGC/OSD, OGC/OFLD

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

REF: DIRECTOR 493642 95 2040015

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLS PROVIDE INFO REQUESTED BELOW.

2. DCOS EVESON IS PREPARED TO DELIVER REF TEAR LINE TO ASSIST *IN COMPLIANCE WITH PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSASSINATION>RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, BUT FOR MEETING PLANNING PURPOSES WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER INFO HQS COULD PROVIDE ON REF IDEN'S RETIREMENT/RESIGNATION. WAS SEPARATION AMICABLE? FYI, WE HAVE LOCATED A LISTING FOR REF IDEN IN THE LATEST EDITION OF THE VIENNA PHONE DIRECTORY.

3. FILE: 785-120-034.

CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1 DRV FROM: COV 2-87.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , ,4, , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/OCC INFO: C/ORMS, CTC/IEB, CTC/IFC, CTCARCHIVE, EUR/LGL, EUR/SA, LIMITO, MDSX, OCC/OSG, ODPD, FILE, C/PCS (2/P)

95 2040015 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 192210Z OCT 95 DIRECTOR 493642

SECRET
STAFF 192210Z DIRECTOR 493642
TO: PRIORITY VIENNA.

FROM: LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, C/EUR/SA, EUR/LGL, OGC/OSD, OGC/OFLD

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATION ASSISTANCE

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST STATION CONTACT FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO RETIRED UNDER COVER AND RESIDES IN VIENNA.

* 2. BASED ON OUR COMPLIANCE WITH PRESIDENT<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992, HQS REQUESTS STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING INFORMATION INCLUDED BETWEEN TEAR LINES TO IDEN:

----------------------------TEAR LINE---

OCTOBER 6, 1995

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

PLEASE BE AWARE THAT YOUR NAME APPEARS IN DOCUMENTS THAT ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER PUBLIC LAW 102-526 *OF 26 OCTOBER 1992, THE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. THIS MANDATES THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING YOUR NAME WHERE IT APPEARS, UNLESS THE ORIGINATING AGENCY CAN PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED BOARD THAT ONE OR MORE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS APPLY. EVEN THEN, THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE POSTPONED FOR NO MORE THAN 25 YEARS. THE ACT IS VERY PRO-RELEASE AND REQUIRES A BALANCING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

UNDER THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT, YOUR NAME CANNOT BE REDACTED FROM THE DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED UNLESS WE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THIS RELEASE WOULD POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO

YOU PERSONALLY, YOUR FAMILY, OR ANY SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OR PERSON(S) YOU MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IN THE PAST. IF YOU BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE RAISED FROM THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, PLEASE CONTACT BERT MILLS AT (703) 356-0285 OR 1-800-447-2211. YOU WILL NEED TO PROVIDE THE PERTINENT DETAILS SO THAT A COMPELLING CASE CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD. IF THE BOARD ORDERS THE RELEASE OF YOUR NAME, ITS RULING CAN BE REVERSED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT. BECAUSE THE BOARD MUST COVER HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, IT WILL BE CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS AT AN ACCELERATING PACE AND WE CANNOT PROJECT WHEN IT MAY REVIEW A DOCUMENT CONTAINING YOUR NAME. THEREFORE, PLEASE CONTACT ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF APPROPRIATE.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED BERT MILLS)

--------------------------TEAR LINE--

2. HQS WOULD PREFER THAT IDEN PASS RESPONSE TO STATION OFFICER FOR FORWARDING TO HQS VIA THIS CHANNEL. APPRECIATE STATION'S ASSISTANCE.

3. FILE: 785-120-034. DECL OADR DRV COV 2-87.

RELNO: E262767

ORIG: OCC/OSG(MATHIAS,37076); AUTH: OCC/OSG (BURGGRAF); COORD: EUR/LGL (COMFORT);; INFO: CHIEF/PCS (MASSENGALE), OGC/OSD (EATINGER), OGC/OFLD (CRAWFORD);; REL: C/EUR/SA (BEVAN) CL BY 0489932.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 95-1758303 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: LA/MCGMXB INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGLA, CIC/LA, LA/MCG, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/P)

95 1758303 ASO PAGE 001

TOT: 221413Z SEP 95 DIRECTOR 456844

~~S E C R E T~~

STAFF 221413Z DIRECTOR 456844

TO: IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY.

FROM: LIMIT LA/MCGMXB INFO C/LA/MCG

SLUGS: WNINTEL KDSOMBRERO KDMARTINI

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE ON MEXICO CITY TELTAPS

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: STATION COMMENTS PER PARA 3.

2. IN 22 SEP 95 ISSUE, WASHINGTON POST PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "CIA BUGGED SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY." THE ARTICLE *IS BASED ON CIA DOCUMENTS DECLASSIFIED UNDER THE<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. MOST OF THE DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ARE EDITED STATION CABLES FROM THE EARLY 1960'S. HQS HAD ATTEMPTED TO BLOCK THE RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENTS; REGRET THAT WE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.

3. THE ARTICLE DISCUSSES SOME AGENCY ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO *CITY IN TIMEFRAME OF THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, FROM A DAMAGE STANDPOINT, THE ARTICLE STATES "...THE CIA HAS TRIED TO KEEP SECRET ITS WIRETAP OPERATION, WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. THE AGENCY HAS ARGUED THAT DISCLOSING SUCH PAST ACTIVITIES MIGHT ENDANGER SIMILAR, ONGOING OPERATIONS, IN MEXICO CITY OR ELSEWHERE." WOULD APPRECIATE STATION'S INPUT ON ANY REACTION BY LIAISON (PARTICULARLY KDSOMBRERO) OR UNILATERAL ASSETS TO THIS FURTHER DISPLAY OF THE INABILITY OF THE USG TO KEEP CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE.

4. THE ARTICLE IS BEING FAXED TO STATION.

5.. FILE: 050-002-037/3, 050-002-033/3 . DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

RELNO: E245787

ORIG: LA/MCGMXB(LUCEMW,39342); REL: C/LA/MCGMXB (LUCE). CL BY 0712052.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: CIC/LA (656) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGLA, CIDORECORD, LA/COGEO, LA/COGRR, LA/COGSA, LA/SAGSC, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/W)

95 1669078 ASR PAGE 001 IN 1669078
TOR: 141221Z SEP 95 SAOP 61999

S E C R E T 141216Z SEP 95 STAFF

CITE SAO PAULO 61999

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BRASILIA.

FOR: LIMIT CIC/LA INFO LA/COGEO, LA/COGSA, LA/SAGSC, LA/COGRR

SLUGS: WNINTEL REAM

SUBJECT: JFK ASSASSINATION SEMINAR

REF: DIRECTOR 429114 95 1531377

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: CONSIDER ALERTING OTHER STATIONS TO CUBAN CA CAMPAIGN AGAINST NWBOLTON.

2. TZKILT/79 ATTENDED REF JFK ASSASSINATION SEMINAR IN RIO, WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY CA 100 PERSONS FIRST DAY, AND BETWEEN 20-30 PERSONS ON FOLLOWING DAYS. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE AUDIENCE WAS COMPOSED OF PERSONS GENERALLY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE THEME, THE ONE-SIDED NATURE OF PARTICIPANTS SHOWED IT TO BE THE PROPAGANDA EFFORT THAT IT WAS, DIMINISHING ANY REAL IMPACT. NEWS COVERAGE WAS SPARSE, WITH ONE ARTICLE REPORTING THAT THE SEMINAR RAISED MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT ANSWERED.

3. K/79 PURCHASED THE BOOK BY CLAUDIA ((FURIATI)) AND THE VIDEO ENTITLED "ZR -THE RIFLE THAT KILLED KENNEDY", BASED ON THE BOOK, AND PRODUCED BY FURIATI'S HUSBAND, NEI ((SROULEVICH)). THE VIDEO, AS OPPOSED TO THE SEMINAR ITSELF, SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN SO LIGHTLY. IT IS A VERY WELL DONE COMPILATION OF FACTS, OBVIOUSLY INTERSPERSED WITH THE CUBAN CA LINE, BUT DONE IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT IS CONVINCING. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE LIVE COPY OF INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER SENIOR NWBOLTON OFFICIALS (OBVIOUSLY DONE FOR LEGITIMATE REASONS), BUT SPLICED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO APPEAR TO BE RESPONDING IN THE POSITIVE TO THEMES PRESENTED JUST PREVIOUSLY. THE CUBANS ALSO USE FOOTAGE OF A FORMER DCI DURING CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, IN WHICH THE FORMER DCI IS MADE TO LOOK LIKE HE IS BEING LESS THAN HONEST. THERE ARE MANY OTHER INTERVIEWS WITH PEOPLE IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT, WITH PEOPLE WHO CLAIMED TO BE INTERMEDIARIES WITH THE MAFIA, AND WITH CUBAN REFUGEES AND OFFICIALS, INCLUDING CASTRO HIMSELF. THE THEME IS

CLEVERLY BUILT THAT FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF THE BAY OF PIGS DUE TO LACK OF RESOLVE OF A "LIBERAL PRESIDENT", THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY (CONVINCED? WAS CONVINCED BY?) NWBOLTON TO GET RID OF THE PRESIDENT, *AND THAT<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>WAS A NWBOLTON TOOL WHO WAS MADE TO LOOK LIKE A COMMUNIST HIT MAN THROUGH CAREFUL STAGING.

4. BASE C/O CARLA B. READY WILL HAND CARRY OUR ONLY COPY OF VIDEO/BOOK TO HQS ON 09 SEP. REQUEST HQS MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO PICK UP VIDEO/BOOK FROM READY AT COFC WHERE SHE WILL BE ATTENDING ECON FUNDAMENTALS COURSE BEGINNING 11 SEP.

5. K/79'S CONTACT WITH CUBAN ATTENDEES WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE MSG.

6. FILE: 010-009-013, TZKILT/79, 201-969899. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CIC/LA INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGLA, CIDORECORD, LA/COGEO, LA/COGRR, LA/SAGAO, LA/SAGSC, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/P)

95 1572375 ASR PAGE 001
TOT: 052050Z SEP 95 DIRECTOR 433207

S E C R E T
STAFF 052052Z DIRECTOR 433207
TO: LIMA INFO HAVANA, SAO PAULO, BRASILIA.

FROM: LIMIT CIC/LA INFO LA/COGEO, LA/SAGAO, LA/SCGBRAB, LA/COGRR

SLUGS: WNINTEL REAM

*SUBJECT: CUBAN 'AFFIRMATION' OF CIA PLOT AGAINST<JFK>

REF: LIMA 36844 95 1542936 (RELAYED HAVANA)

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE BELOW.

2. THANK YOU FOR ALERTING US TO REF ARTICLE. WE BELIEVE YOU ARE SEEING THE FIRST INDICATION OF A POSSIBLY MAJOR CUBAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN. THE CONFERENCE IN QUESTION WAS/IS ATTENDED BY, IN ADDITION TO ESCALANTE, A CUBAN CI OFFICER WHO PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CUBAN SPONSORED CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS CONFERENCES OF 1992-93, AND CLAIMED A PRIMARY ROLE IN DEBRIEFING CIA CUBAN AGENTS IN THE 60'S, SEVERAL US CITIZEN 'INVESTIGATORS' ACTIVE IN PROMOTING VARIOUS CONJECTURES REGARDING CIA'S ROLE IN *THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.>

3. IN VIEW OF THIS, PLEASE FORWARD TEXT OF ARTICLE AND AUTHOR'S BYLINE, AS HE IS POSSIBLY A CUBAN ACTIVE MEASURES ASSET. PLEASE INCLUDE HAVANA ON FURTHER MESSAGES THIS TOPIC.

4. FILE: 010-009-013. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

RELNO: E235319
ORIG: CIC/LA(MAHNCKE,34428); AUTH: CIC/LA (MARQUES); COORD: LA/COG (MERTZ), LA/SAGAO; REL: LA/SAGAO (OSTH). CL BY 187203.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CIC/LA INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGCIU, CIC/CEGLA,
CIDORECORD, LA/COG, LA/COGSA, LA/SAGSC, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA,
DC/LA (3/P)

95 1531377 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 311638Z AUG 95 DIRECTOR 429114

SECRET
STAFF 311638Z DIRECTOR 429114
TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA INFO SAO PAULO.

FROM: LIMIT CIC/LA INFO LA/SAGSC, LA/COGSA, LA/COG, CIC/CEGLA

SLUGS: WNINTEL REAM

*SUBJECT: TZFRESH INFO ON RIO<JFK>CONFERENCE

REF: A. BRASILIA 20490 95 1473908
B. SAO PAULO 61839 95 1447145

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE BELOW

* 2. PLEASE PASS INFORMATION ON RIO<JFK>CONFERENCE INCLUDING THAT FROM TZFRESH (SUITABLY CAVEATED) PROVIDING LISTING OF US AND OTHER ATTENDEES AND CONFERENCE SCHEDULE TO EMBASSY AND CONSULATE WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE INFORMATION BE PASSED TO STATE. THE CONFERENCE AGENDA, COUPLED WITH ESCALANTE'S PARTICIPATION, SUGGESTS A SIGNIFICANT ANTI-NWBOLTON PROPAGANDA EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE CUBANS. WE HAVE PASSED REF INFORMATION TO FOIA, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DETERMINING WHAT NWBOLTON INFORMATION ON THE
*<ASSASSINATION>WILL BE RELEASED. APPRECIATE TZFRESH CONTINUING COVERAGE OF EVENTS. MANY THANKS.

3. FILE: 010-009-013, 201-969899. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>
RELNO: E233485
ORIG: CIC/LA(MAHNCKE,34428); AUTH: CIC/LA (GINSBURG); COORD:
LA/LGL (TELECOORD), LA/COG, LA/SCGSC; INFO: LA/COGSA; REL:
LA/SCGSC (BLEVINS). CL BY 187203.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

ADV: LA/COG (1724Z) STAFF

ACTION: LA/COG (069) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGCIU, CIC/CEGLA, CIC/LA, LA/COGEO, LA/COGRR, LA/SAGSC, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/W)

95 1447145 ASP PAGE 001 IN 1447145
TOR: 231724Z AUG 95 SAOP 61839

S E C R E T 231717Z AUG 95 STAFF

CITE SAO PAULO 61839

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, BRASILIA INFO SANTIAGO, HAVANA.

FOR: LIMIT LA/COG INFO LA/COG/RR, LA/COGEO, LA/SAGSC, CIC/CEGLA

SLUGS: WNINTEL REAM

SUBJECT: TZFRESH INFO ON RIO MEETING OF CUBAN CI OFFICERS AND
* ALLEGED CIA OFFICERS TO REVIEW<JFK>AND LETELIER ASSASSINATIONS

REF: A. SAO PAULO 61631 95 1298402
B. SAO PAULO 61496 95 1181973
C. DIRECTOR 401709 95 1338055

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: BRASILIA: SEE PARA 5.

2. COB ASKED FOR TZFRESH/SAO PAULO FOR INFO ON REF MEETING ON
*<JFK>AND LETELIER ASSASSINATIONS AT A DINNER HOSTED BY TZFRESH/8 EVENING 17 AUG. ON 18 AUG, TZFRESH/17 ADVISED COB THAT SHE HAD CONTACTED TZFRESH/RIO, WHICH WAS SENDING AN AGENDA FOR THE MEETING,AND WHICH WAS LATER PASSED BY F/17 TO COB DURING A LUNCH ON 22 AUG. F/17 ALSO ADVISED THAT TZFRESH/RIO IS SENDING PERSONNEL TO COVER THE MEETING, AND WILL PHOTOGRAPH PARTICIPANTS.

3. FOLLOWING IS FIELD TRANSLATION OF THE LIST OF:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - TEAR LINE - - - - - - - -

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS:

A. JAMES ((LESAR)). LAWYER AND INVESTIGATOR, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION ABOUT ASSASSINATIONS (AARC).

B. WAYNE ((SMITH)). WRITER, PROFESSOR AND DIPLOMAT. WORKED
*FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR 25 YEARS. WAS<EXECUTIVE>SECRETARY OF LATIN AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE KENNEDY GOVERNMENT. WAS CHIEF OF THE DESK OF LATIN AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE KENNEDY GOVERNMENT. WAS CHIEF OF THE DESK OF U.S. INTERESTS IN CUBA. DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY.

C. CIRYL ((WECHT)). MEDICAL DOCTOR AND PROFESSOR. PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN FORUM OF SCIENCES, MEMBER OF THE MEDICAL PANEL WHICH

ANALYZED KENNEDY'S BODY, MEMBER OF THE DIRECTORS' COUNSEL OF THE
COALITION ON POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS (COPA).
D. JOHN ((NEWMAN)). WRITER, HISTORIAN AND PROFESSOR.
TESTIFIED IN U.S. CONGRESS ABOUT THE KENNEDY CASE AND HAS CONNECTIONS
*TO THE CIA. WAS A CONSULTANT FOR OLIVER STONE FOR THE FILM,<JFK">AND
*THE DOCUMENTARIES "KENNEDY AND CUBA," AND "WHO WAS<LEE HARVEY>
*<OSWALD?"> AUTHOR OF THE BOOKS<"JFK>AND VIETNAM" AND "OSWALD AND THE
CIA."
E. ED ((LOPEZ-SOTO)). LAWYER AND INVESTIGATOR ON THE COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS. INTERVIEWED MORE THAT 100
WITNESSES AND ANALYZED MANY SECRET DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE KENNEDY
CASE SUCH AS "PRO-CUBAN" AND "OSWALD IN MEXICO CITY." AUTHOR OF THE
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, "WAS THERE A PRO-CUBAN CONSPIRACY TO
*ASSASSINATE<JFK?">AND<"LEE HARVEY OSWALD,>THE CIA AND MEXICO CITY."
F. GAETON ((FONZI)). REPORTER AND WRITER. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATOR WHO, IN CONSEQUENCE OF HIS DISCOVERIES, WROTE AN
IMPORTANT WORK ABOUT THE KENNEDY CASE WITH RESTRICTED CIRCULATION
ENTITLED, "THE LAST CONSPIRACY." DEEPLY KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT CIA
ACTIVITIES AND ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILES IN FLORIDA.
G. WILLIAM ((TURNER)). INVESTIGATOR AND EX FBI AGENT,
SPECIALIST IN MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY QUESTIONS. AUTHOR OF THE
BOOK, "THE RED HERRING: HISTORY OF THE SECRET WAR AGAINST CASTRO"
AND "HOOVER'S FBI, THE MYTH AND THE MEN."
H. JAMES ((DI EUGENIO)). WRITER AND INVESTIGATOR, AUTHOR OF
THE BOOK, "BETRAYED DESTINY."
I. GORDON ((WINSLOW)). HISTORIAN. PARTICIPATED IN THE
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE MIAMI-BASED EXCLUSIVE COMMITTEE OF
ASSASSINATIONS.
J. SAUL ((LANDAU)). JOURNALIST AND DIRECTOR OF THE WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL STUDIES. AUTHOR OF THE INVESTIGATORY BOOK
WHICH REVEALED ALL OF THE PLOT TO ASSASSINATE CHILEAN ORLANDO
LETELIER.
K. FABIAN ((ESCALANTE)) FONT. DIVISION GENERAL AND CHIEF OF
CUBAN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. SPECIALIST IN THE KENNEDY CASE. DIRECTED
SEVERAL OPERATIONS TO DISRUPT CIA PLANS IN CUBA. DIRECTOR OF THE
CUBAN CENTER OF SECURITY STUDIES.
L. ARTURO ((RODRIGUEZ)). COLONEL IN THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR. RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INVESTIGATIONS ON THE KENNEDY CASE FOR
THE U.S. CONGRESS.
4. FOLLOWING IS A FIELD TRANSLATION OF THE LIST OF THE
SCHEDULED PRESENTATIONS AND PRESENTERS:
29 AUGUST
0900 -- OPENING CEREMONY
0930 -- "PARALLEL POWERS," LESAR
* 1100 -- "A TEST OF LEGAL EVIDENCE, WHY THE<WARREN COMMISSION>
MADE MISTAKES," WECHT AND SMITH
* 1400 -- "CIA, MAFIA AND CUBAN EXILE PAPERS REGARDING THE<JFK>
ASSASSINATION," FONZI, WINSLOW AND ESCALANTE.
30 AUGUST
0900 -- "CONNECTIONS WITH ESPIONAGE SERVICES," NEWMAN AND TURNER
1100 -- "THE MIAMI, NEW ORLEANS AND DALLAS TRIANGLE," DI EUGENIO
1400 -- "THE MEXICAN EPISODE," LOPEZ AND RODRIGUEZ
31 AUGUST
0900 - "PARALLEL OPERATIONS: THE LETELIER AND KENNEDY CASES,"
LANDAU

---

* 1400 -- "THE PLAN TO BLAME CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE<JFK> ASSASSINATION," SMITH, TURNER, AND ESCALANTE.

- 5.

FOR BRASILIA: STATION MAY WISH SHARE ABOVE TEAR LINE WITH AMBASSADOR. PLS ADVISE IF WE SHOULD PASS THROUGH STATE TO CONSUL GENERAL RIO BY SECURE FAX, OR IF AMBASSADOR WOULD PREFER TO DO SO FROM THERE.

6. FILE: TZFRESH; TZKILT/79; 201-969899. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET
MHFNO: 95-1435429 SENSIND: RYBAT

/ / SECRET FRP:

STAFF

CONF: EUR/PLANS INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/CA, EUR/CGT, EUR/RIB, EUR/TECH, LIMITO, MDSX, NR/OPSB, NR/ORG, OCC/CRG, OCC/RB, ODPD, FILE, DC/EURTNO (2/P)

95 1435429 ASR PAGE 001
TOT: 221736Z AUG 95 DIRECTOR 415240

SECRET
STAFF 221736Z DIRECTOR 415240
TO: STAMFORD, NEWARK.

FROM: LIMIT EUR/PLANS INFO EUR/CGT, EUR/CA, EUR/TECH, OCC/CRG, NR/OPSB, NR/ORG

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT FASTTRACK LPAVERT

SUBJECT: LPAVERT PRINCIPAL AS E-MAIL COVER PROVIDER

REF: A. STAMFORD 17619 95 1221202
B. STAMFORD 17640 95 1241611

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI, ONLY.

2. THIS CABLE SUPPLEMENTS INFO CONTAINED IN REFS. IT HAS BEEN DELAYED WHILE HQS WEIGHED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LUNCHEON CONVERSATION REPORTED BELOW AND DECIDED HOW BEST TO USE THE PRESIDENT OF LPAVERT (SUBJ) IN EUR DIVISION'S E-MAIL COVCOM PROGRAM.

3. AFTER THE REF A'S SUCCESSFUL OPS MEETING WITH SUBJ, THE LATTER AND EUR I.C. MACDONALD E. ZAPPLEY HAD A LATE LUNCH TOGETHER AT A LOCAL MAEL RESTAURANT. OVER LUNCH SUBJ VOICED SOME OPINIONS WHICH MERIT RECORDING HERE:

A. AFTER SOME GENERAL CONVERSATION, SUBJ ASKED ZAPPLEY IF HE HAD EVER DONE ANYTHING FOR NWBOLTON THAT LATER HAD GIVEN HIM PAIN OR SHAME. AFTER A MOMENT'S REFLECTION, ZAPPLEY REPLIED, "NO." SUBJ CONTINUED TALKING OF NWBOLTON AND EVENTUALLY SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME FORM OF NWBOLTON INVOLVEMENT IN *THE<ASSASSINATION>OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY.> TO ZAPPLEY'S REJOINDER THAT THIS WAS PURE FANTASY, SUBJ ADMITTED THAT HE COULDN'T POINT TO HARD EVIDENCE FOR HIS BELIEF BUT HELD TO IT NONETHELESS. HE ADDED THAT NWBOLTON'S ROLE IN ALLENDE'S OUSTER AND DEATH WAS ANOTHER BLACK MARK.

B. WHEN ZAPPLEY ASKED WHY HE WOULD COOPERATE WITH AN ORGANIZATION THAT HE FELT WAS SO TAINTED, SUBJ ANSWERED WITHOUT HESITATION; "I BELIEVE YOUR ORGANIZATION MUST EXIST TO HELP US COMBAT CURRENT EVILS. I SIMPLY ALSO BELIEVE THAT NWBOLTON - OR ELEMENTS OF IT, PERHAPS OUT OF CONTROL - HAS ITSELF DONE EVIL

SECRET

THINGS IN THE PAST."

3. THE WARNING FLAGS RAISED BY SUBJ'S CONTRADICTORY FEELINGS ABOUT NWBOLTON, HAVE LED EUR TO CHANGE ITS PLANS FOR HIS USE. INSTEAD OF USING HIS E-MAIL ACCOUNT AND THE SUB-ACCOUNT (IDEN) SPECIFICALLY RESERVED FOR NWBOLTON WITH A SENSITIVE FIELD ASSET AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, HQS WILL RESERVE IT FOR APPLICATIONS OF MUCH LESS SENSITIVITY. IT WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR THE NEXT YEAR, AS OUR CONTRACT WITH SUBJ STIPULATES AND FOR WHICH HE HAS BEEN PAID HIS TAXABLE FEE. BUT AFTER THAT IT MAY BE DROPPED. HIS MOVE TO NEW JERSEY SHOULD NOT BE MUCH OF A BURDEN ON NEWARK STATION SINCE NORMALLY THE ONLY CONTACT NEEDED WOULD BE TO RECEIVE HIS SIX MONTHLY ACCOUNTINGS AND REPLENISH THE REVOLVING FUND FROM WHICH HE PAYS HIS E-MAIL ACCOUNT'S MONTHLY BILLS.

4. DESPITE THE CHANGES EXPLAINED ABOVE, OUR ORIGINAL URGENT REQUEST WAS HANDLED WITH ALACRITY AND SKILL BY OCC/CRG, STAMFORD STATION AND C/O JENSON. EUR DIVISION REPEATS ITS THANKS FOR THIS SUPPORT AND OFFERS IT COMPLIMENTS TO ALL CONCERNED.

5. FILE: CS-6745, 201 PENDING. INDEX: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 1-82.>

RELNO: E228240

ORIG: EUR/CA(MCULGHJ,32684); AUTH: C/EUR/PLANS; COORD: EUR/CGT(WARK), EUR/TECH(BETZER); INFO: OCC/CRG, EUR/CA; REL: NR/OPSB(WALTHER) CL BY 370417

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 95-1374342 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

~~SECRET~~ FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

/ / STAFF

ADV: CE/W/MB (1102Z)

ACTION: CE/W/MB (773) INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, COMPT, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/W, DDO (4/W)

95 1374342 ASP PAGE 001 IN 1374342
TOR: 161102Z AUG 95 MNSK 14144

~~S E C R E T~~ 161059Z AUG 95 STAFF

CITE MINSK 14144 (FALANTZ ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT CODEL

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER AND OSWALD FILES

REF: DIRECTOR 404798 95 1366840

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI OR COMMENT

2. STATION IS FAXING TO HQS A COPY OF BRIEFING PAPER FOR CODEL SHELBY, REVISED IN ACCORD WITH SUGGESTIONS OF REFERENCE. UNLESS ADDITIONAL REVISIONS ARE REQUIRED, THIS IS THE COPY WHICH WE WILL PROVIDE TO CODEL TO READ, BUT NOT TO CARRY AWAY.

3. APPRECIATE SUMMARY INFORMATION REGARDING HISTORICAL CONVERSATION WITH LOCAL SERVICE ABOUT FILES ON *<LEE HARVEY OSWALD.> ACOS BELIEVES HE DID SEE THE CABLE MENTIONED IN REF. AT TIME OF RECEIPT STATION WAS VERY BUSY AND IN ACCORD WITH "READ AND BURN" POLICY A COPY WAS NOT RETAINED. A RETRANSMISSION IS NOT NECESSARY. ALSO, IT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY FOR HQS TO PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER, SINCE SUMMARY INFORMATION WILL PROBABLY SUFFICE. ADDITIONALLY, ACOS HAS LEARNED THAT YESTERDAY THE AMBASSADOR SUBMITTED A DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI SANIKOV WHICH IS AN OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR THE FILES ON OSWALD. STATION JUDGES BY THIS THAT FBI HAS CARRIED THE ACTION TO STATE WITH THIS RESULT. STATION COMMENT: THERE IS BELIEF HERE THAT THE FILES WERE MADE *AVAILABLE TO THE AUTHOR OF A RECENT BOOK ON THE<KENNEDY> *<ASSASSINATION.>

4. STATION WILL ADVISE HQS OF IMPRESSIONS OF CODEL SHELBY AT CONCLUSION OF VISIT. THANKS FOR PROMPT AND THOUGHTFUL SUPPORT IN PREPARATIONS FOR THIS VISIT.

5. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82

~~SECRET~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 95-1366774 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CE/W/MB INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, COMPT, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD,
FILE, CE/W, DDO (4/P)

95 1366774 ASO PAGE 001
TOT: 152211Z AUG 95 DIRECTOR 404768

~~S E C R E T~~
STAFF 152211Z DIRECTOR 404768
TO: IMMEDIATE MINSK.

FROM: LIMIT C/CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT CODEL

SUBJECT: DRAFT BRIEFING PAPER AND OSWALD FILES

REF: A. MINSK 14140 95 1360178
B. DIRECTOR 398108 95 1311426

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE CORRECT DRAFT BRIEFING PAPER TO REFLECT CHANGES REQUESTED IN PARA 3, BELOW.

2. RE PARA 2, REF A: THE BACKGROUND OF THE OFFER TO PROVIDE
*THE<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>FILES WAS TRANSMITTED TO STATION ON 9 AUG
VIA REF B. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THE MATTER WAS TURNED OVER TO
*THE FBI BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY CONNECTED WITH THE<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION.> WE ARE QUERYING THE FBI TO SEE WHERE THE MATTER STANDS. YOU ARE WELCOME TO PASS THIS ALONG TO THE AMBASSADOR. WE WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS THE FBI RESPONDS TO OUR REQUEST.

3. PAGES ONE AND TWO OF YOUR BRIEFING PAPER ARE RIGHT ON THE MARK. PAGE THREE HOWEVER CONTAINS SOME ISSUES THAT WE REQUEST YOU DELETE AND/OR SOFTEN.

A. FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4. DO NOT DISCUSS ANY UNILATERAL OPERATIONS WITH THE SENATOR. WE ARE CONCERNED WITH ANY DISCUSSION OF SOURCES; IN THIS INSTANCE THE CASE IS INACTIVE AND WOULD NOT ADD TO YOUR DISCUSSION.

B. PARAGRAPH 7. PLEASE REDRAFT TO READ AS FOLLOWS: REGARDING EMBASSY SECURITY, OUR CONCERN IS THAT WITHOUT A 24 HOUR PRESENCE WE DO NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY. ELECTRONIC SECURITY DEVICES WILL ONLY TELL US THAT AN ENTRY HAS BEEN MADE, IT WILL NOT STOP AN ENTRY. SECURITY AT EMBASSY MINSK WAS RECENTLY DISCUSSED BY CE OFFICERS WITH THE SSCI, WHO HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN TO THE DEPARTMENT. THE FACT, OF COURSE, IS THAT STATE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO HAVE MARINE GUARDS AT ALL LOCK AND LEAVE EMBASSIES AND NWBOLTON APPRECIATES THAT. (FYI: THIS IS A PARTICULARLY CONTENTIOUS ISSUE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. WE SEE NO POINT IN ALIENATING HIM BY PUTTING

~~SECRET~~

HIM ON THE SPOT WITH THE SENATOR WHEN, IN FACT, THIS MATTER IS BEING SORTED OUT IN WASHINGTON.)

C. PARAGRAPH 8. PLEASE DELETE IT. HQS HAS NOT AGREED TO ALL OF THE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS YOU NOTED SO WE WOULD PREFER THAT THEY NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE SENATOR.

3. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU DID NOT RECEIVE REF B AND WE WILL RETRANSMIT. REGARDS AND GOOD LUCK!

4. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

RELNO: E224938

ORIG: C/CE/W/MB (DOWDON, 73516); AUTH: C/CE/W (WEBER); REL: C/CE/W (WEBER). CL BY 520992.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

SECRET

MHFNO: 95-1338055 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CIC/LA INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGLA, CIDORECORD, LA/COG, LA/COGEO, LA/COGIO, LA/SAGSC, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/P)

95 1338055 ASR PAGE 001
TOT: 120253Z AUG 95 DIRECTOR 401709

SECRET
STAFF 120253Z DIRECTOR 401709
TO: SAO PAULO INFO BRASILIA, HAVANA.

FROM: LIMIT CIC/LA INFO LA/COG, LA/COGEO, LA/COGIO LA/SAGSC, CIC/CEGLAAF

SLUGS: WNINTEL REAM

SUBJECT: RIO MEETING OF CUBAN CI OFFICERS AND ALLEGED CIA OFFICERS

REF: A. SAO PAULO 61631 95 1298402
B. SAO PAULO 61496 95 1181973

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE BELOW. PLEASE FORWARD ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SEMINAR OR ATTENDEES.

2. ADDITIONAL DETAILS PROVIDED REF A WERE MUCH APPRECIATED. CHECKS OF AGENCY INDICES DID NOT TURN UP A JOHN NEWMAN AS A CURRENT STAFFER. HAVING ONLY JOHN NEWMAN'S NAME, AS PROVIDED BY THE NEWSPAPER ARTICLE, WAS INSUFFICIENT TO RUN A MEANINGFUL CHECK OF OTHER INDICES AND PERSONNEL RECORDS.

3. FABIAN ((ESCALANTE)) FONT (201-969899) LAST SURFACED PUBLICALLY AT THE JANUARY 91 (ANTIGUA) AND JANUARY 92 (HAVANA) CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS CONFERENCES. AN NC/WASHINGTON ASSET WHO ATTENDED THE 91 CONFERENCE AND SPOKE WITH ESCALANTE WAS TOLD BY HIM THAT HE (ESCALANTE) BELIEVED THAT 'SOME ELEMENTS OF THE CIA OPERATIONAL ARM' IN COMBINATION WITH THE MAFIA WERE RESPONSIBLE *FOR THE<ASSASSINATION>OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY.> ESCALANTE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE CIA ACTED ON ITS OWN. ESCALANTE'S CURRENT POSITION IS UNCLEAR. HE ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE AS A PCC-CC MEMBER. A DEFECTOR NOTED HIM AS A FORMER CHIEF OF MININT'S POLITICAL SECTION WHO WAS BRIEFLY CHIEF OF THE DCI FOLLOWING ABRANTES' DISMISSAL AND WHO IS NOW WRITING MININT UNIT HISTORIES. ESCALANTE ALSO TOLD THE ASSET THAT HE WAS HEAD OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SECTOR/CHIEF OF COUNTERESPIONAGE FOR THE US AT THE TIME OF THE MISSILE CRISIS, AND THAT HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERROGATING ALL SUSPECT CIA AGENTS DURING THE 1960'S.

SECRET

4. ANY INFORMATION BASE CAN OBTAIN ON THE SEMINAR AGENDA AND ATTENDEES AND WHAT PROMPTED THE HOLDING OF THE SEMINAR BY JOSE LISBOA DA ((GAMA MALCHER)) WOULD BE OF INTEREST IN EVALUATING THE CUBAN HAND AND INTENT. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN LEARNING WHETHER AGEE OR ANY OF HIS ILK PLAN TO ATTEND AND THE MEANING OF SROULEVICH'S STATEMENT REGARDING CUBAN CI OFFICERS' 'PARALLEL CONTACTS' WITH CIA OFFICIALS EXPECTED TO BE IN ATTENDANCE.

5. FILE: 010-009-013, 201-969899. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

ORIG: CIC/LA (MAHNCKE, 34428); AUTH: CIC/LA; COORD: LA/COG, LA/COGEO, LA/SAGSC, CIC/CEG/LAAF (BREWER); INFO: LA/COGIO; REL: C/LA/SAGSC. CL BY 187203.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 95-1311426 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CE/W/MB INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE,
CE/W, CE/W/IS (4/P)

95 1311426 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 092204Z AUG 95 DIRECTOR 398108

~~S E C R E T~~
STAFF 092204Z DIRECTOR 398108
TO: PRIORITY MINSK.

FROM: LIMIT C/CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W/IS, C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT GTDANCER

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE

REF: MINSK 14072 95 1207999

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: INFORMATION BELOW PROVIDED AS BACKGROUND FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMBASSADOR.

2. WE RESEARCHED THE JYVAPOROUS PROMISE TO DELIVER FILES ON
*<LEE HARVEY OSWALD.> WHILE NOT MUCH ON THIS SUBJECT IS REFLECTED IN THE FILES, WE DID COME UP WITH INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES THAT THAT MATTER WAS TURNED OVER TO THE FBI FOR ACTION. THE ORIGINAL OFFER WAS MADE BY JYVAPOROUS/1 (V/1) TO FORMER C/CE IN MAY 92. IN OCTOBER 1992, DC/CETF/W VISITED MINSK FOR FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS WITH V/1 RE THIS AND OTHER SUBJECTS. THE FOLLOWING IS TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM THE TRIP REPORT:

* "WE OPENED THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TOPIC OF THE<LEE HARVEY>
*<OSWALD>FILES, TELLING V/1 THE FBI IS PREPARING A LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER KEBICH, ASKING PERMISSION TO SEE THE FILE. V/1 BECAME IRRITABLE AND DEFENSIVE, SAYING THAT SINCE THE USG DID NOT DEIGN TO MAKE PUBLIC ALL MATERIAL PERTAINING TO ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF
*THE<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION>(THE WARREN REPORT), WHY SHOULD HE BE PRESSURED INTO SURRENDERING HIS FILE. WE SAID NO PRESSURE IS INVOLVED; WE ARE ONLY FOLLOWING UP ON HIS OFFER. STILL DEFENSIVE, HE STATED HE WOULD NOT ALLOW ACCESS TO THE RAW FILE, WHICH WOULD EXPOSE SOURCES AND METHODS USED TO SURVEIL AND INVESTIGATE OSWALD IN MINSK. HE OFFERED INSTEAD SUMMARIES CONTAINING THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION AND SURVEILLANCE, WHICH OSTENSIBLY WERE PREPARED AT THE TIME OF OSWALD'S STAY IN MINSK. HE WOULD ALLOW OUR "EXPERTS" (PRESUMABLY USG) TO EXAMINE THE DOCUMENTS CLOSELY AND TO CONFIRM THEIR AUTHENTICITY AND COMPLETENESS. HE HINTED THAT WE (NWBOLTAN REPRESENTATIVES) MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO LOOK A BIT INTO THE RAW FILE. WE SAID WE WOULD RELAY THIS TO OUR SUPERIORS, BUT EXPLAINED AGAIN THAT, DUE TO THE SENSITIVITY AMONG SOME AMERICANS
*STEMMING FROM THEIR DISTRUST OF NWBOLTAN VIS A VIS THE<KENNEDY>

~~SECRET~~

<ASSASSINATION,>WE COULD NOT UNILATERALLY HANDLE THE FILES -- THOUGH WE COULD HELP FACILITATE THEIR PASSAGE TO THE PROPER USG AUTHORITIES (THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT)."

3. V/1 THEN TOLD OUR C/O THAT THE FBI'S LETTER SHOULD BE SENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET VICE THE PRIME MINISTER AND WE AGREED TO SO INFORM THE FBI. THAT MEMO IS THE LAST INFORMATION WE HAVE ON THE MATTER. THERE IS NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT THE FBI DID INDEED SEND THE LETTER OR, IF IT WAS SENT, THAT THEY RECEIVED A REPLY TO IT. BECAUSE IT WAS PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED THAT THE FBI HAD PRIMACY IN THIS MATTER, IT IS OUR DETERMINATION THAT WE SHOULD NOT REQUERY JYVAPOROUS. WE HAVE ASKED OUR REP AT THE FBI TO CHECK (INFORMALLY) AS TO THE STATUS OF THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE JYVAPOROUS AND WILL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE THE ANSWER. PLEASE ASSURE THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE WOULD LIKE US TO PURSUE THIS MATTER WITH THE FBI THROUGH OUR CHANNELS, WE WILL BE GLAD TO DO SO. REGARDS.

FILE: NONE. INDEX: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

RELNO: E221787

ORIG: C/CE/W/MB(DOWDON,73516); AUTH: CE/W (FREIMANN); REL: CE/W (WEBER). CL BY 520992.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 95-1207999 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: CE/W/IS (513) INFO: CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/W, ~~CE/W/MB (4/W)~~

95 1207999 ASP PAGE 001 IN 1207999
TOR: 311003Z JUL 95 MNSK 14072

~~S E C R E T~~ 311000Z JUL 95 STAFF

CITE MINSK 14072 (OLEAN ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CE/W/IS INFO C/CE/W/MB, C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT GTDANCER

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE ADVISE IF HQS WOULD LIKE PARA 2 QUESTION RAISED WITH JYVAPOROUS.

2. ON 29 JULY, AMBASSADOR SHOWED ACOS STATE CABLE GIVING HIM HEADS-UP ON OFFICIAL DISPLEASURE THAT *JYVAPOROUS, UNCOOPERATIVE IN SHARING ITS FILES ON<LEE> *<HARVEY OSWALD>WITH USG, MADE SOME OF THEM AVAILABLE TO NORMAN MAILER FOR HIS BOOK, AND SUGGESTING THAT IT MAY BE TIME TO ASK AGAIN. WHILE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THIS WAS ONLY A HEADS-UP, AND NO OFFICIAL GUIDANCE HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED, HE PROMISED TO KEEP ACOS INFORMED IF SUCH A REQUEST DOES COME IN. IF HQS BELIEVES SUCH A LINE OF QUESTIONING IS APPROPRIATE, OLEAN CAN FOLLOW UP WITH JYVAPOROUS/3 IN LINE WITH PRIOR DISCUSSIONS ON LACK OF RECIPROCITY IN LIAISON RELATIONSHIP.

3. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

/ /

STAFF

ACTION: LA/COGIO (016) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGLA, CIC/LA, LA/SAGSC, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/W)

95 1181973 ASR PAGE 001 IN 1181973
TOR: 271920Z JUL 95 SAOP 61496

SECRET 271911Z JUL 95 STAFF

CITE SAO PAULO 61496

TO: DIRECTOR INFO HAVANA, BRASILIA.

FOR: LIMIT LA/COGIO INFO LA/COGRR, LA/SAGSC, CIC/LA

SLUGS: WNINTEL REAM

*SUBJECT: RIO CONFERENCE ON<JFK ASSASSINATION>TO BE ATTENDED BY CIA AGENT PER PRESS REPORT

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE

2. WISH DRAW ADDEES ATTENTION TO ARTICLE IN RIO DE JANEIRO'S "O GLOBO" NEWSPAPER ON 25 JULY ADVISING OF AN UPCOMING SEMINAR SPONSORED BY THE RIO DE JANEIRO REGIONAL COURT TO DISCUSS THE KILLING OF
*<PRESIDENT KENNEDY,>WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN RIO IN AUGUST. A U.S.
*PERSON DIRECTOR OF RESARCH AND DOCUMENTATION CENTER ON<ASSASSINATIONS> IN THE U.S. HAS CONFIRMED HIS PRESENCE, "ALONG WITH THE CIA AGENT JOHN NEWMAN." CUBAN COUNTER-ESPIONAGE CHIEF, FABIAN ((ESCALANTE)), WILL ALSO ATTEND THE SEMINAR.

3. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/PCS INFO: C/NR, C/ORMS, LIMITO, MDSX, NR/PGO, ODPD, OGC/LIT, PCDORECORD, FILE (2/P)

95 0938136 ASO PAGE 001
TOT: 031840Z JUL 95 DIRECTOR 346331

SECRET
STAFF 031840Z DIRECTOR 346331
TO: IMMEDIATE ORLANDO.

FROM: LIMIT CHIEF/PCS INFO CHIEF/NR, NR/PGO, OGC/LIT

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST TO CONTACT FORMER NWBOLTON EMPLOYEES

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLS HAVE STATION OFFICER CONTACT TWO FORMER NWBOLTON OFFICERS BY COB 5 JULY AND CONTACT NVTAG/JACKSONVILLE FOR ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING IDEN B PER PARA 3B.

2. AS YOU MAY KNOW, NWBOLTON HAS BEEN COOPERATING WITH *THE<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD, THE PANEL CHARGED WITH *RELEASING DOCUMENTS ON THE<JFK ASSASSINATION,>BY CONDUCTING A DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW AND PASSING APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS. THE PANEL HAS SELECTED ITS FIRST BATCH OF DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED PUBLICLY, WHICH CONTAINS THE TRUE NAMES OF TWO FORMER SVLION OFFICERS WHO RETIRED COVERTLY IN THE 1970S AND, TO HQS KNOWLEDGE, HAVE NOT BROKEN COVER. IN ORDER TO CHALLENGE THE BOARD'S DECISION, WE NEED TO SHOW THAT CERTAIN CONDITIONS EXIST PURSUANT TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE APPLICABLE LAW. THUS, WE NEED THE INPUT OF THE TWO FORMER OFFICERS TO COMPLETE OUR RESEARCH AND WRITTEN RESPONSE. WE REQUEST STATION'S ASSISTANCE IN CONTACTING THEM AND DEMONSTRATING TO THEM THAT THE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IS AUTHORIZED AND LEGITIMATE.

3. SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD LIKE AN OFFICER WHO HAS NWBOLTON ALIAS DOCUMENTS TO CALL THE FORMER EMPLOYEES (IDENS A AND B), IDENTIFY HIMSELF AS A COLLEAGUE FROM THEIR FORMER EMPLOYER AND REQUEST A BRIEF MEETING. IF IDENS ARE AMENABLE, PLEASE EXPLAIN IN PERSON THAT HQS IS FACED WITH THE POSSIBLE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THEIR NWBOLTON AFFILIATION. WE NEED TO KNOW THEIR DATES/PLACES OF ALL OF THEIR TOURS, THE MOST SENSITIVE OPERATIONS IN WHICH THEY WERE INVOLVED AND ANY OTHER NWBOLTON EQUITIES THEY ARE AWARE OF THAT WOULD BE AFFECTED BY REVELATION OF THEIR FORMER EMPLOYMENT. STATION CAN THEN CABLE THE INFORMATION SECURELY TO HQS.

A. IN THE CASE OF IDEN A, HQS ALREADY CONTACTED HIM AND WAS ADVISED HE NEEDED MORE TIME TO EVALUATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF LIFTING HIS COVER. BELIEVE HE WOULD BE MORE COMFORTABLE

DISCUSSING PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA IN PERSON THAN OVER AN OPEN PHONE.

B. IDEN B POSES MORE OF A PROBLEM BECAUSE HQS HAS BEEN UNABLE SO FAR TO GET A CURRENT ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBER FOR HER. THE INFORMATION LISTED IN IDEN CABLE IS HER LAST KNOWN ADDRESS AND CURRENT P.O. BOX NUMBER. NVTAG/HQS LEARNED THAT SHE HAS AN UNPUBLISHED PHONE NUMBER AND THAT HER FLORIDA DRIVERS' LICENSE IS VALID UNTIL 2000. THEY ALERTED NVTAG/JACKSONVILLE THAT STATION WOULD BE CALLING TO COORDINATE LOCAL EFFORTS TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH IDEN B. PLS LET US KNOW SOONEST IF, AFTER CONTACTING NVTAG JACKSONVILLE, STATION IS UNABLE TO LOCATE IDEN B.

4. HQS REGRETS THIS SHORT TIME FUSE DURING THE HOLIDAY AND TRULY APPRECIATES STATION'S ASSISTANCE WITH THIS MATTER. THANKS VERY MUCH.

5. FILE: NONE. INDEX: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

ORIG: DC/PCS/CL/L (COHEN, 43923); AUTH: DC/PCS (); COORD: NR/PGO (); INFO: OGC/LIT (); REL: DC/NR. CL BY 2051283.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

MHFNO: 95-0906823 SECRET
SENSIND: EO RYBAT
PAGE: 1

/ / E-O.
SECRET
FRP: , , , , , , ,
STAFF

CONF: EA/TIB INFO: LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, DDO (2/P)

95 0906823 ASR PAGE 001
TOT: 292123Z JUN 95 DIRECTOR 343286

SECRET
STAFF
292123Z DIRECTOR 343286
TO: BANGKOK, RANGOON, PHNOM PENH, CHIANG MAI.

FROM: LIMIT C/EA/TIB

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - COS - WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: BANGKOK: PLS HOLD FOR COS/HANOI'S PERUSAL THE NEXT TIME HE STOPS AT STATION.

2. DEAR ALL, FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 28 JUN DO MEETING AS PRESENTED BY DCEA/SEA (CEA OCCUPIED FOR PART OF THE TIME WITH ANOTHER MEETING) AT THE 29 JUN EA STAFF MEETING:

- IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT IF YOU HAVE CHILDREN AND WOULD LIKE TO GET THEM REGISTERED IN THE AGENCY'S NURSERY, YOU SHOULD APPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR THE OPENINGS THAT WILL COME AVAILABLE THIS SEPT.

- ADDO MET 30 MEMBERS OF THE PRESS FOR A BACKGROUNDER NEWS CONFERENCE. CNN, ABC, AND ALL THE OTHER BIG MEDIA REPS ATTENDED. PER ADDO, THE BRIEFINGS WENT QUITE WELL. AT ONE POINT, SOMEONE MENTIONED THEY WOULD LIKE TO SAY SOMETHING "OFF THE RECORD," AND THIS CAUSED SOME COMPLAINTS FROM THE PRESS. HOWEVER, ON THE WHOLE, THIS NEW SYSTEM OF HAVING THE DO INTERFACE WITH THE PRESS IS SAID TO HAVE GONE QUITE WELL. THE DCI IS ALSO PREPARING A BACKGROUND FOR THE "NEW YORK TIMES" (NFI).

- THE ADDO MET WITH TOM DONILAN (THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S CHIEF OF STAFF) TO DISCUSS ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE SECRETARY. THIS IS PART OF A NEW SYSTEM INTENDED TO HAVE THE DO GET BRIEFINGS ON WHAT SPECIFIC MATTERS HIGH LEVEL CABINET MEMEBERS ARE INTERESTED.

- THE EXDIR IS STARTING A HUMAN RESOURCES OVERSIGHT COUNSEL TO BE CHAIRED BY BETSY GRAVES. THE COUNSEL WILL HOLD ITS FIRST MEETING NEXT THURSDAY. THE GROUP'S PURPOSE WILL BE TO REVIEW THE AGENCY'S PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL MATTERS (TRAINING, PROMOTIONS, ETC.) FROM CRADLE TO GRAVE, I.E., EOD TO

RETIREMENT, AND THE DIVERSITY ISSUE WILL BE ANOTHER MAJOR CONCERN OF THE GROUP.

- A NEW STRATEGIC BUDGET PLANNING GROUP IS BEING CREATED. IT WILL BE LED BY ERIC QUACKENBUSH AND JOE DETRANI.

- PRESIDENT BUSH'S 27 JUN VISIT TO HQS WENT QUITE WELL, IN THE DCI'S ESTIMATION. THE DCI ADVISED THAT THE BRIEFINGS BY DO PERSONNEL WERE RIGHT ON THE MONEY AND VERY WELL RECEIVED, ESPECIALLY THE CHINA BRIEFING BY ADCEA/CO.

- THE ADDO WILL ATTEND A COVERT ACTION HEARING AT THE SSCI ON 14 JULY. ON THAT SAME DAY, THE PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY WILL VISIT THE AGENCY.

- GEORGE TENET HAS BEEN CONFIRMED AS THE DDCI AND WILL ARRIVE ON MONDAY, 3 JULY. ADMIRAL STUDEMAN WILL REMAIN WITH THE AGENCY FOR A FEW MONTHS OVERLAP.

- A HONDURAN TASK FORCE HAS BEEN CREATED TO FULFILL THE SAME FUNCTION AS THE GUATEMALA TF.

- AN EFFORT IS BEGINNING TO DECLASSIFY ALL *DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> RELEASED DOCUMENTS WILL NOT INCLUDE ANY INFO DEALING WITH THIRD COUNTRY LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS OR ABOUT AGENT ASSETS. HOWEVER, ALL ELSE WILL BE RELEASED.

- THE IG SEMI-ANNUALS ARE ABOUT TO BEGIN (NFI).

- DDA AND DDO WILL BEGIN HAVING BREAKFAST MEETINGS TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS ON "CONNECTIVITY" (E-MAIL AND OTHER COMMUNICATION) BETWEEN HQS AND FIELD STATIONS.

-RE MEALS: EXECUTIVE DINING ROOM #2 WILL SOON CLOSE, AND IT MAY BE RE-ESTABLISHED SOMEWHERE ELSE IN THE HQS BUILDING. DINING ROOM #1 WILL REMAIN FOR USE WITH LIAISON VISITORS.

- FRANK ROCCO (DDA) IS RETIRING. AS PART OF HIS RETIREMENT PROCESS, HE WILL WORK FOR ABOUT TWO MONTHS HELPING ESTABLISH OF THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AGENCY AND THEN SPEND ABOUT ONE MONTH IN THE TRANSITION PROGRAM. AT THE DO STAFF MEETING, ADDO FORMALLY BID ADIEU TO LA DIVISION OFFICER BILL DEVINE, WHO IS ALSO RETIRING.

3. TOWARDS THE END OF THE EA STAFF MEETING, CEA JOINED THE GROUP; AND, AT THE CONCLUSION OF DCEA/SEA'S BRIEFING PRESENTED AN EA PLAQUE TO IDEN REPORTS (AND SOMETIMES FRONT OFFICE) SECRETARY FOR HER SEVERAL YEARS OF OUTSTANDING SERVICE TO THE DIVISION, FIRST AS EA/J SECRETARY AND THEN IN REPORTS. SHE IS MOVING INTO AN AGENCY JOB AT AN OUTLYING OFFICE MUCH CLOSER TO HER RESIDENCE.

4. FYI, THIS WAS YOURS TRULY'S LAST EA STAFF MEETING AS I WILL BE ENTERING THE 90-DAY RETIREMENT TRANSITION PROGRAM,

STARTING 3 JULY AND WITH AN ACTUAL RETIREMENT DATE SET FOR 30 SEP. WINFIELD WILL BE AC/EA/TIB UNTIL THE DIVISION PMAP SOON DECIDES ON THE NEXT BRANCH CHIEF. HE IS A LEADING CANDIDATE FOR THE POSITION. FINAL WORD SHOULD BE OUT TO YOU ALL BY EARLY JULY. IN ANY EVENT, IT HAS BEEN VERY SATISFYING WORKING WITH YOU ALL OUT THERE VICARIOUSLY (UNFORTUNATELY) FOR THE MOST PART THOUGH I DID GET TO MEET AND RENEW ACQUAINTANCES WITH THE COS'S AND SOME OF THE C/O'S DURING YOUR TRIPS BACK HERE. THE WORK YOU ALL ARE DOING IS TERRIFIC AND BEING ACCOMPLISHED UNDER VERY DIFFICULT CONDITIONS. IT WAS GREAT BEING INVOLVED WITH YOUR EFFORTS AND I HOPE OUR SUPPORT HAS BEEN UP TO YOUR EXPECTATIONS. I AM SURE THAT THE VERY SOLID OPERATIONS YOU ALREADY HAVE IN TRAIN WILL CONTINUE TO SUCCEED; AND, BASED ON THE OBVIOUSLY HIGH MOTIVATION BY ALL OF YOU OUT THERE, I AM SURE YOU WILL ALL BE ACCOMPLISHING MANY OTHER GOOD THINGS FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND THE COUNTRY. I WISH YOU THE BEST IN YOUR ENDEAVORS AND YOU CAN COUNT ON THE FACT THAT I WILL STILL BE CHEERING FOR ALL OF YOU AND THE AGENCY FROM THE RETIREMENT SIDE LINES. GOOD LUCK, EMERSON.

5. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

RELNO: E202312
ORIG: EA/TIB(KUSTRRJ,39874); COORD: DC/EA/TIB (AHR); REL: C/EA/TIB (KUSTRA) CL BY 498519
END OF MESSAGE

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: NR/CEDEF (387) INFO: C/ORMS, CE/R/IO, CE/TNI, CIC/CEG, CIC/NR, CIC/OG, CP/NRCBW, LIMITO, MDSX, NRDORECORD, ODPD, FILE, CED/CIC (2/W)

95 0517690 ASR PAGE 001 IN 0517690
TOR: 241217Z MAY 95 BOST 28688

S E C R E T 241210Z MAY 95 STAFF

CITE BOSTON 28688

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT NR/CEDEF INFO CP/NRCBW, CE/R/IO, CIC/NR, CED/CIC

SLUGS: WNINTEL MXBLAZE GTRUFF MXWINDFALL

SUBJECT: A. BRIEFING OF MXWINDFALL/1 FOR TDY TO RUSSIA.
B. TURNOVER OF MXWINDFALL/1 FROM NOC JAGGER TO NOC CORDLE.

REF: DIRECTOR 278086 95 0418438

TEXT:

1. BACKGROUND: EVENING 18 MAY 1995 BOSTON STATION NOC OFFICERS JAGGER AND CORDLE MET WITH MXWINDFALL/1 (W/1) AT HIS RESIDENCE IN RHODE ISLAND. PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO BRIEF W/1 ON HIS UPCOMING TDY TO RUSSIA FOR ATTENDANCE AT THE 3RD INTERNATIONAL MEETING - NUCLEAR PHYSICS FOR PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT (NPPE-95) AT DUBNA, RUSSIA AND TO INTRODUCE NOC CORDLE AS HIS FUTURE C/O. MEETING LASTED FIVE HOURS AND INCLUDED A STRONG DEFENSIVE BRIEFING FOR HIGH RISK TRAVEL AND A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INTEL REQUIREMENTS. EVENING ALSO INCLUDED A CORDIAL DINNER AT A LOCAL CHINESE RESTAURANT AND A HOME MOVIE M/1 INSISTED NOCS WATCH ON HIS NEW HIGH-TECH TV AND SOUND SYSTEM OF WHICH HE IS EXTREMELY PROUD.

3. CI BRIEFING: W/1 WAS GIVEN AN OVERVIEW OF CI AND SECURITY CONCERNS FOR U.S. TRAVELERS TO RUSSIA INVOLVED IN DEFENSE RELATED AND SCIENTIFIC AREAS. W/1 LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AND ASKED THE APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS, BUT WITHOUT APPEARING THREATENED OR FRIGHTENED. PURPOSE WAS TO HEIGHTEN HIS AWARENESS TO POTENTIAL APPROACHES AND TO INSTRUCT HIM IN THE PROPER DEPORTMENT WHILE ATTENDING CONFERENCES AND VISITING SCIENTIFIC FACILITIES. W/1 WAS TOLD TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIATY WHICH WAS DEFINED AS ACTING IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH HIS PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS. HE WAS ENCOURAGED TO MAKE PROFESSIONAL CONTACTS AND ACCEPT INVITATIONS TO FACILITIES CONSISTENT WITH HIS PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS.

4. PLANS: W/1 DEPARTED U.S. ON 21 MAY AND PLANS TO RETURN

4 JUNE. THIS TRIP WILL INCLUDE THE NPPE-95 CONFERENCE FROM 23-28 MAY, A TRIP TO ST. PETERSBURG FOR VISITING SCIENTISTS AT THE CONFERENCE FROM 28 -31 MAY AND ATTENDANCE AT A SMALL *CONFERENCE ON THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>IN EARLY JUNE. W/1 WAS ADVISED TO CONTACT NOC CORDLE ON 5 JUNE UPON RETURN. CORDLE PLANS TENTATIVELY TO MEET WITH W/1 ON 6 JUNE PURSUANT TO W/1'S AVAILABILITY. CORDLE EXPECTS TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY LNLEVY OFFICIAL FOR DEBRIEFING PURPOSES. W/1 WAS ADVANCED $4,500.00 FOR TDY EXPENSES, SIGNED A RECEIPT AND WILL ACCOUNT IN FULL UPON RETURN.

5. FUTURE: W/1 WILL REMAIN IN CONUS UNTIL 18 JUNE AND THEN TRAVEL TO GERMANY WHERE HE IS SCHEDULED TO TEACH A COURSE FOR THREE WEEKS. AFTER THE COURSE HE ANTICIPATES TRAVELING TO RUSSIA FOR ATTENDANCE AT THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL AEROSOL SYMPOSIUM IN MOSCOW ON 9-19 JULY UNLESS ADVISED TO THE CONTRARY (SEE REF). W/1 WAS ADVANCED $3,200.00 FOR TDY TO THE AEROSOL CONFERENCE. HE WILL AGAIN PROVIDE DETAILED ACCOUNTING UPON RETURN. W/1 RETURNS CONUS 20 JULY AND WILL TDY TO BRAZIL IN LATE JULY EARLY AUGUST FOR TWO WEEKS. W/1 HAS NOT RECEIVED FUNDING FOR THE BRAZIL TDY. LNLEVY OFFICER WOULD LIKE W/1 TO TDY TO THIS PERSON'S LOCATION IN LATE AUGUST OR EARLY SEPTEMBER 1995 FOR DEBRIEFING PURPOSES TO INCLUDE VIEWING PHOTOGRAPHY AND TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC RUSSIAN FACILITIES. WELCOME COMMENTS.

6. OTHER: W/1 HAS BECOME AN AMATEUR SLEUTH AND SERIOUS *INVESTIGATOR OF THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> IN THIS REGARD, HE WILL BE GIVING A CREDITED (SIC) COURSE THIS FALL SEMESTER AT THE *UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND ON THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF THE<JFK> INVESTIGATION. W/1 BELIEVES FIRMLY IN THE SOLE GUNMAN THEORY *CONSISTENT WITH RESULTS OF THE<WARREN COMMISSION.> WHILE THIS INTEREST HAS NO DIRECT BEARING ON W/1'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NWBOLTON, IT IS AN ASPECT OF W/1'S PERSONA WHICH IS NOTABLE FOR ITS STRENGTH. C/O'S DEALING WIH W/1 SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR W/1 SURFACING THIS INTEREST IN GREAT DETAIL.

7. FILE: 201-1224541. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: NE/NAOE (125) INFO: DC/NECI, LIMITO, MDSX, NEDORECORD, ODPD, FILE, CIC/NE, NE/SAONIBS (4/W)

95 9691281 ASR PAGE 001 IN 9691281
TOR: 091021Z MAR 95 KTMN 65560

S E C R E T 091013Z MAR 95 STAFF

CITE KATHMANDU 65560

TO: CAIRO, DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT NE/NAOE INFO NE/SAONIBS, CIC/NE

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT FCWAFER

SUBJECT: CONTACT WITH EGYPTIAN FIRST SECRETARY MURTADA ALI MUHAMMAD LASHIN

REF: KATHMANDU 65446 95 9431042

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE, FYI.

2. IN A CONVERSATION AFTER TENNIS ON 8 MARCH 1995, C/O BAECHLER SOUGHT TO DRAW OUT EGYPTIAN FIRST SECRETARY MURTADA ALI MUHAMMAD ((LASHIN)) ON HIS FAMILY SITUATION AND CAREER ASPIRATIONS. IN RECENT DAYS LASHIN'S WIFE HAS HAD ANOTHER ULCER/COLITIS ATTACK, BUT SHE AND LASHIN HAVE NOT YET MADE A FINAL DECISION ON WHETHER TO GO TO TEXAS FOR A COMPLETE PHYSICAL. LASHIN'S WIFE HAS PREVIOUSLY RUN THE MEDICAL GAMUT IN BANGKOK: ENDOSCOPY, BARIUM X-RAYS, EVEN A CAT-SCAN. LASHIN OBSERVED THAT HIS WIFE IS VERY CLOSE TO HER MOTHER AND TO HER BROTHERS AND SISTERS, AND IN CAIRO HER HEALTH TENDS TO BE BETTER BECAUSE HER MENTAL STATE IS BETTER. LASHIN'S CONCERN WITH HER WELL-BEING IS FORCING HIM TO CONSIDER RETURNING TO CAIRO BEFORE THE END OF 1995. HIS THINKING IS ALSO COLORED BY A DISLIKE AND LACK OF RESPECT FOR HIS AMBASSADOR.

3. LASHIN HAS NOT YET DISPLAYED ANY FINANCIAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES. HE NOTED THAT HE OWNS A FLAT IN THE GENERAL NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN CAIRO AND THAT SEVERAL YEARS AGO HE BUILT A VILLA WITH SWIMMING POOL IN A RESIDENTIAL AREA NEAR THE PYRAMIDS. HE NOTED THAT UPON HIS RETURN HE WOULD LIKELY STAY IN THE FLAT DURING THE WEEK, FOR IT IS NOT SUCH A LONG COMMUTE TO HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY. HE WOULD SPEND THE WEEKENDS AND SUMMERS AT THE VILLA. LASHIN ALSO NOTED THAT BECAUSE CAIRO IS NOT A PLEASANT PLACE TO LIVE, HE AND HIS FAMILY WOULD TAKE EVERY

OPPORTUNITY TO TRAVEL TO ALEXANDRIA OR OTHER RESORT AREAS ON THE WEEKENDS. LASHIN'S FAVORITE PASTIME SEEMS TO BE LYING ON THE BEACH. HIS DESCRIPTION OF HIS LIFESTYLE IN EGYPT IS NOT THAT OF A CIVIL SERVANT WHO MUST DEPEND ON HIS SALARY AS THE SOLE SOURCE OF INCOME.

4. C/O RAISED THE TERRORIST KILLING OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL IN KARACHI ON 8 MARCH TO GAUGE LASHIN'S RESPONSE. AFTER LAUNCHING INTO A HOMILY ABOUT HOW THE PROPHET HAD CALLED FOR MERCY AND DECENCY BY WARRIORS IN THE TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS, LASHIN WENT ON TO SPIN A SERIES OF TYPICALLY PARANOID ARAB CONSPIRACY THEORIES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE *<ASSASSINATIONS>OF<JFK>AND ANWAR ((SADAT)) WERE SOMEHOW THE THE WORK OF THE ISRAELIS, WHO ALWAYS SOUGHT TO DISRUPT GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EGYPT. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS LIKED TO "PLAY THE FUNDAMENTALIST CARD" WHENEVER PRESSURES MOUNTED ON THEM TO MAKE CONCESSIONS, AND HE ARGUED THAT THE ISRAELI MOSSAD HAD BEEN BEHIND TERRORIST ACTS IN EGYPT AS FAR BACK AS THE 1950'S.

5. BIOGRAPHIC MISCELLANY: LASHIN'S BROTHER IS THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR IN ECUADOR. FOUR OF HIS BROTHERS-IN-LAW HAVE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME IN THE U.S. TWO REMAINED. TWO RETURNED TO CAIRO, WHERE THEY ARE NOT HAPPY. HOWEVER, THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO RETURN TO THE U.S., WHERE THE PACE WAS TOO STRESSFUL FOR THEM. LASHIN RECALLED THAT HIS BROTHER HAD ADVISED HIM NOT TO JOIN THE FOREIGN SERVICE, FOR IT WAS NOT A PARTICULARLY REWARDING CAREER. LASHIN NOW SEEMS TO REGRET THAT HE FAILED TO TAKE HIS BROTHER'S ADVICE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD THE CHANCE TO PURSUE AN ACADEMIC CAREER AS A PROFESSOR OF PHYSIOLOGY, AFTER HAVING SERVED AS AN ARMY DOCTOR FOR TWO YEARS. HOWEVER, HE DECIDED AGAINST PURSUING MEDICINE, FOR HE FELT AT THE TIME THAT THE MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SYSTEM IN EGYPT WERE TOO BACKWARD. NOW HE BELIEVES THAT IT IS TOO LATE FOR HIM TO RETURN TO MEDICINE. LASHIN IS AN OBSERVANT AND APPARENTLY BELIEVING MUSLIM, AND THIS YEAR HE CONTINUED HIS RAMADAN FAST FOR AN ADDITIONAL SIX DAYS.

6. LASHIN IS HARDLY A RISING STAR. HOWEVER, OTHER THAN A DISLIKE FOR HIS AMBASSADOR, HE HAS NOT DISPLAYED ANY PERCEPTIBLE UNHAPPINESS WITH THE WAY IN WHICH HE HAS BEEN TREATED BY HIS MINISTRY. IN FUTURE SESSIONS WITH LASHIN THE C/O WILL TRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE POSSESSES ANY MANIPULABLE DISGRUNTLEMENT OVER THE MODEST PROGRESS OF HIS CAREER, WHETHER HE HAS ANY WELL-PLACED PATRONS WITHIN HIS MINISTRY, AND WHETHER HE HAS ANY PROSPECTS FOR AN ASSIGNMENT WITH GOOD FI ACCESS UPON HIS RETURN TO CAIRO. THE C/O WILL ALSO SEEK TO DRAW HIM OUT ON HIS CONTACTS WITHIN THE LOCAL DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY AMONG CHINESE, RUSSIANS, INDIANS, AND PAKISTANIS. THE C/O WILL KEEP IN THE BACK OF HIS MIND THE POSSIBILITY THAT LASHIN MAY AT SOME POINT HAVE CROSSED THE SCREEN OF RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.

7. FILE: 144-120-027. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / * SCI *. CONFIDENTIAL FRP: , ,3,4, , , ,

ACTION: OPS/CIB (198) INFO: CAC/TIS, CIC/AG, CIC/NTTB, CTCARCHIVE, MDSX, ODPD, ODPX, OPCTR/TERR, SSSLAN, FILE, C/CTC, CTC/CCB, INTELN (4/W)

95 9158583 NCO PAGE 001
TOR: 200448Z JAN 95 DIRFBI 191918Z

OO YEKADLX
DE YEKOHS #0078 0200335
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO DE SOA DE
O 191918Z JAN 95 ZYH
FM DIRFBI
TO YEKADL/CIA
ZEM
CONFIDENTIAL HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
QQQQ
CITE: //0593//01581/019/0078
PASS: CIA FOR: CIB.
SUBJECT: CERTIFICATION OF CLEARANCE AND ACCESSES.

THIS DOCUMENT IS CLASSIFIED "CONFIDENTIAL" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

THE BELOW LISTED FBI CONSULTANT WILL BE ATTENDING OR INVOLVED IN REVIEWING DOCUMENTS AT CIA WITH POC LISTED AS TIM BOWERS, TELEPHONE NUMBER (703) 482-5620, FROM JANUARY 20, 1995, THROUGH JANUARY 19, 1996. ALL INDIVIDUAL(S) HAVE AN "INTERIM TOP SECRET" SECURITY CLEARANCE BASED UPON A NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK (NAC) PLUS CREDIT WITH "SI/TK/GAMMA/BYEMAN" ACCESSES. A FULL-FIELD BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION IS CURRENTLY BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOU WILL BE NOTIFIED SHOULD CLEARANCE BE TERMINATED PRIOR TO END OF CERTIFICATION. IF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS NEEDED, CONTACT JANICE LAMBERT, FBI PERSONNEL SECURITY UNIT, AT (202) 324-3605.

* THOMAS JEREMY GUNN,<JFK ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD, SSAN 529-74-8907, DOB AUGUST 25, 1952, POB SALT LAKE, VERMONT, CLEARANCE GRANTED BY FBI DECEMBER 5, 1994.

C BY 7585, DECL: OADR.

END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: NR/PRONUCL (731) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/LA, CIC/NR, LA/PROLIF, LIMITO, MDSX, NR/CEDEF, NR/CEDOT, NR/EX, NR/PGO, NR/PROCBW, NRDORECORD, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, CE/CPG, CIC/EA, DC/LA, EA/CONA, EA/CORR (7/W)

94 8939218 ASR PAGE 001 IN 8939218
TOR: 271542Z DEC 94 BONR 26500

S E C R E T 271531Z DEC 94 STAFF

CITE NR/BOSTON 26500

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT NR/PRONUCL INFO CE/CPG, NR/CEDEF, NR/PROCBW, LA/PROLIF, NR/CEDOT, CIC/EA, CIC/NR, EA/CORR, EA/CONA

SLUGS: WNINTEL MXWINDFALL PROFFERCO

SUBJECT: CONTACT REPORT - MXWINDFALL/1 (201-1224541)

REF: A. NR/BOSTON 26498 94 8939086
B. SAO PAULO 58043 94 8581302

TEXT:

1. A. DATE(S) OF MEETING: 30 NOV 94
B. TIME(S) OF MEETING: 1600 TO 2000 HOURS
C. PLACE(S) OF MEETING: MXWINDFALL/1 (W/1'S) HOME AND THEN DINNER AT THE OCEAN VIEW CHINESE RESTAURANT, 140 POINT JUDITH ROAD, MARINER SQUARE, NARRAGANSETT, RHODE ISLAND 02882 (401) 783-9070.
D. C/O AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS: CHRISTOPHER B. JAGGER (IN ZTH ALIAS) AND W/1
E. OPS ALIASES USED: ZACHARY T. HUNTINGTON
F. NEXT MEETING: TO BE SCHEDULED AFTER 03 JANUARY 1994

2. A. MEETING ARRANGEMENTS: C/O WILL CALL W/1 AND ARRANGE THE TIME OF THE MEETING. THE MEETING WILL BE HELD AT W/1'S HOME.
B. INTELLIGENCE: NONE THIS MEETING.
C. OPERATIONAL: SEE REF A FOR INFORMATION ON CHINESE CONTACT ((LI)) MEI. C/O DISCUSSED VARIOUS OPPORTUNITIES FOR W/1 TO TRAVEL TO POTENTIALLY THREE LOCATIONS THIS SUMMER PENDING AUTHORIZATION. THE THREE LOCATIONS WOULD BE RUSSIA, CHINA AND BRAZIL. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B, W/1 WILL DO WHAT IS REQUIRED TO BE IN A POSITION TO ATTEND THE NUCLEAR CONFERENCE IN BRAZIL. C/O EXPLAINED TO W/1 WHAT HE CAN AND CAN NOT DO IN PREPARATION FOR BRAZIL AND WHAT COMMITMENTS HE CAN MAKE. W/1 GAVE C/O COPIES OF E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN W/1 AND TAMARA ((KHODZHER)) DISCUSSING THE INTERNATIONAL AEROSOL SYMPOSIUM THAT WILL TAKE PLACE IN JULY 1995 IN MOSCOW AND ABOUT A VISIT TO IRKUTSK. KHODZHER HAS REQUESTED THAT W/1 ATTEND BOTH. IN

ADDITION W/1 HAS RECEIVED E-MAIL FROM NIKOLAY ((BELOV)) ALSO REQUESTING THAT W/1 ATTEND THE SYMPOSIUM IN MOSCOW AND PRESENT A PAPER. C/O WILL REQUEST AUTHORIZATION AND FUNDING IN SEPARATE CABLES FOR RUSSIA AND CHINA TRIPS.

D. ADMINISTRATIVE: C/O PAID FOR DINNER AT THE RESTAURANT. C/O SUBMITTED A REQUEST FOR MONTHLY PAYMENT OF W/1 AS USUAL ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF THE MONTH. W/1 SHOWED C/O HIS COMPUTER AND IS SHOWING INTEREST IN SEVERAL SOFTWARE PACKAGES. C/O WILL PROBABLY PURCHASE SOMETHING FOR W/1'S COMPUTER AS AN OPS GIFT.

E. PLANS: C/O WILL GATHER AND SUBMIT PLANS FOR W/1 TO ATTEND MEETINGS IN RUSSIA AND CHINA IN SUMMER 1995 FOR AUTHORIZATION AND FUNDING APPROVAL. W/1 HAS MADE IMPRESSIVE CONTACTS IN THE AEROSOL INDUSTRY IN RUSSIA, CHINA AND BRAZIL. HE HAS DEVELOPED THESE CONTACTS OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN GOOD FI AGAINST CBW TARGETS AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TARGETS. C/O WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS W/1'S CONTACTS WITH LI MEI (SEE REF A).

F. SECURITY/CI: C/O NOTED NOTHING UNUSUAL DURING SDR'S TO AND FROM MEETING SITE. W/1 HAS VOWED TO KEEP HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH NWBOLTON A SECRET FROM LI REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME. C/O HAS PREPARED SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE ON LI AND INFORMATION OF A POTENTIAL CI/SECURITY NATURE REGARDING HER AND HER INSTITUTE.

3. THE MEETING WENT VERY WELL AND AFTER THE OPERATIONAL DISCUSSIONS W/1 SHOWED C/O HIS VERY IMPRESSIVE STEREO SYSTEM AND
*TALKED ABOUT HIS AVOCATION/HOBBY, THE<ASSASSINATION>OF FORMER
*PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY.> W/1 IS SPENDING A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TIME, MONEY AND EFFORT TO PROVE HIS THEORY OF HOW THE
*LATE PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY>WAS KILLED BY ONLY ONE PERSON
*FIRING FROM ONE DIRECTION<(LEE HARVEY OSWALD).> W/1 RECENTLY ATTENDED A CONFERENCE IN CHICAGO DEDICATED TO THIS SUBJECT. W/1 HAS PURCHASED DOZENS OF CASSETTE TAPES OF PAST CONFERENCES ON THE SUBJECT, LASER DISC MOVIES AND VIDEO TAPES ALL IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS THEORIES. W/1 APPEARS TO C/O TO BE VERY LONELY AND IS USING THIS HOBBY AND MUSIC TO FILL HIS VOID. W/1'S DAUGHTER BEGAN COLLEGE IN MICHIGAN THIS YEAR AND ALONG WITH THE LOSS OF HIS WIFE A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO, W/1 IS STAYING BUSY WITH WORK AND HOBBIES. C/O COULD ALSO TIE IN W/1'S INTEREST IN LI MEI TO THIS LONELINESS. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED IN SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE ALONG WITH STATION CONCERNS.

4. FILE: 201-1224541. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 94-8695408 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA/MCGMXB (373) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/LA, LA/TERR, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/W)

94 8695408 ASR PAGE 001 IN 8695408
TOR: 022121Z DEC 94 MEXI 53620

~~S E C R E T~~ 022120Z DEC 94 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 53620 (NOWOCIN ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT LA/MCGMXB

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

*SUBJECT: <JFK ASSASSINATION>ISSUES

REF: DIRECTOR 932873 94 8655988

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE.

2. AS HQS IS AWARE, STATION CONTINUES TO CONDUCT JOINT TELTAP OPERATIONS WITH MEXICAN LIAISON AGAINST THE RUSSIAN AND CUBAN EMBASSIES; HOWEVER, THE TAKE ON THE CUBANS IS VERY LIMITED. WE ARE CURRENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF INITIATING A UNILATERAL TELTAP OP AGAINST THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND SEVERAL RESIDENCES. THUS, ANY OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF WHERE TELTAP TAPES ON OSWALD WERE DERIVED WOULD HAVE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON CURRENT LIAISON RELATIONSHIP. THE MEXICAN LIAISON SERVICES AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO BE SENSITIVE RE THE NWBOLTON RELATIONSHIP, AND THERE ARE THOSE WITHIN THESE RANKS WHO QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE MEXICANS SHOULD HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN A FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NWBOLTON. STATION BELIEVES THAT ANY EXPOSURE (WHETHER OLD OR NEW) AT THIS STAGE OF THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP (A NEW REGIME IS COMING TO POWER) WOULD FORCE THE MEXICANS TO REASSESS THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US AS WELL AS QUESTION OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A DISCREET AND PROTECTED RELATIONSHIP. (IT WOULD ALSO GIVE OUR DETRACTORS THE EXCUSE TO FURTHER REDUCE OR COMPLETELY BREAK OFF THE RELATIONSHIP.) GIVEN THE HIGH INTEREST OF POLICYMAKERS IN NARCOTRAFFICKING, TERRORISM, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN MEXICO, THE PRESERVATION OF STATION LIAISON EQUITIES IS PARAMOUNT AT THIS TIME. STATION ENCOURAGES HQS TO CONTINUE TO DO WHATEVER IS POSSIBLE TO KEEP THE LID ON THE BOX RE PREVIOUS JOINT OPS WITH THE MEXICANS.

3. RE THE NOC INVOLVED IN THE TRANSCRIPTION OF THE TAPES,

~~SECRET~~

STATION PLANS TO DISCREETLY CHECK CONSULAR FILES TO DETERMINE IF HE IS STILL RESIDING IN MEXICO. IF NOC IS IN MEXICO WILL QUERY HIM RE HIS REACTION TO FULLER DISCLOSURE OF HIS ROLE WITH THE TAPES. INITIAL STATION REACTION RE DISCLOSURE OF NOC'S INVOLVEMENT WITH OSWALD TAPES AND IMPACT ON STATION OPERATIONS AND EQUITIES IS NEGATIVE SINCE BLOWBACK POTENTIAL COULD BE TWOFOLD: IT COULD DRAW LIAISON ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE STATION USE OF NOCS IN MEXICO, AND LIAISON WOULD PROBABLY SCREEN MUCH CLOSER U.S. BUSINESSMEN TRAVELLING AND OPERATING IN MEXICO.

4. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

MHFNO: 94-8343149 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / ** SOP #132 **. UNCLASSIFIED FRP: ,2, ,4, , , ,

ACTION: OPS/CIB (215) INFO: CAC/TIS, CTC/AIGIS, CTC/COPS, CTC/IFC, CTC/TRGCTB, CTCARCHIVE, FBIIN, MDSX, ODPD, ODPG, ODPX, PCS/CL, SSSLAN, FILE, AGC/DO, C/CTC, C/PCS, CTC/CASB, CTC/CCB, CTC/TRG, PCS/ID (8/W)

94 8343149 MUO PAGE 001 NC 8343149
TOR: 312336Z OCT 94 FBI 312006Z

OO RUEAIIA
DE RUCNFB #0056 3042311
ZNY EEEEE
O 312006Z OCT 94
FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS E F T O
CITE: //0593/01227/304/0056//
PASS: CIA FOR CIB.
SUBJECT: CERTIFICATION OF CLEARANCES.

THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATED WITH THE FBI WILL BE *ATTENDING OR INVOLVED IN MEETINGS CONCERNING<JFK ASSASSINATION>AT CIA, WITH POC LISTED AS TIM BOWDEN, CHIEF OF CLEARANCE DIVISION, TELEPHONE NUMBER (703) 482-5620, FROM OCTOBER 31, 1994, TO OCTOBER 30, 1995. THE LISTED INDIVIDUAL HAS A "TOP SECRET" SECURITY CLEARANCE GRANTED BY THE FBI OCTOBER 14, 1994, BASED UPON A FULL-FIELD BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOU WILL BE NOTIFIED SHOULD CLEARANCE BE TERMINATED PRIOR TO END

PAGE TWO DE RUCNFB 0056 UNCLAS E F T O

OF CERTIFICATION. IF ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS NEEDED, CONTACT JANET FREDERICK, FBI PERSONNEL SECURITY UNIT, AT (202) 324-3605.

* DAVID GEORGE MARWELL,<EXECUTIVE>DIRECTOR<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS REVIEW BOARD, SSAN 080-38-7009, DOB DECEMBER 31, 1951, POB MT. KISCO, NEW YORK.

END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

MHFNO: 93-4634535 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: CE/R/XO (952) INFO: C/ORMS, CE/R/IO, CEDORECORD, CIC/NR, CTC/IFC, CTC/TA, CTCARCHIVE, LA/MCGMXB, LIMITO, MDSX, NR/CEG, NR/EX, ODPD, FILE, C/CTC, C/LA, CIC/EA, CIC/LA, CTC/CENR, CTC/TRG, CTC/TRGBRB, CTC/TRGPSB, DC/LA, EA/ICOG, EA/ICOGIOB (13/W)

---

93 4634535 ASR PAGE 001 IN 4634535
TOR: 232208Z NOV 93 NYFR 81563

S E C R E T 232201Z NOV 93 STAFF

CITE FR NEW YORK 81563

TO: DIRECTOR INFO NC NEW YORK.

FOR: LIMIT CE/R/XO INFO CE/R/IO, C/CE/CIC, NR/CEG, LA/MBOG, EA/ICOG, CIC/LA, CIC/EA

SLUGS: WNINTEL GTDANCER

SUBJECT: OLEG M. NECHIPORENKO

REF: FR NEW YORK 81555 93 4634425

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: TRACES ON SUBJECT.

2. SUMMARY: ON 18 NOVEMBER, NQPIGGIN PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON RETIRED KGB COLONEL, OLEG M. ((NECHIPORENKO)), OF
*<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>FAME, WHO WAS IN THE U.S. TO PROMOTE HIS BOOK,
*"PASSPORT TO<ASSASSINATION."> SUBJECT FLEW TO HOUSTON ON
*18 NOVEMBER TO PARTICIPATE IN A SYMPOSIUM ON THE<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION>AND HOPES TO RETURN TO NEW YORK NEXT WEEK. SUBJECT WILL BE PAID FOR HIS BOOK ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT INCOME EXCEED EXPENSES (INCLUDING HIS CURRENT TRIP). HE IS GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF LONELINESS, AND COULD BE APPROACHED UNDER APPROPRIATE (WRITER/AUTHOR/ACADEMIC) COMMERCIAL COVER. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING THE WEEK OF 8 NOVEMBER, NQP WAS OFFERED A ONE-TIME INTERPRETING JOB BY A COLLEAGUE WHO COULD NOT ACCEPT THE ASSIGNMENT. ON 16 NOVEMBER, NPQ ACCOMPANIED SUBJECT AS INTERPRETER TO A FILMING WITH A PROMINENT AMERICAN T.V. NEWS PERSONALITY. THE ROOM WAS FILLED WITH PRINT AND MEDIA JOURNALISTS AND THE NEWS PERSONALITY MADE A POINT OF STRESSING THAT HIS NETWORK HAS DEVELOPED EXCEPTIONAL EXPERTISE ON THE
*<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION>AND IS DOING A MUCH BETTER JOB THAN THE FBI OR CIA. DURING A 3 1/2 HOUR INTERVIEW, SUBJECT WENT INTO AN EXCRUCIATINGLY DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF HIS MEETINGS WITH OSWALD: WHO STOOD WHERE, WHO WORE WHAT, ETC AND EQUALLY DETAILED ANSWERS TO SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS. SUBJECT RESPONDED TO

SECRET

MOST QUESTIONS IN ENGLISH, BUT WAS OCCASIONALLY CONFUSED BY AN UNEXPECTED QUESTION AND WAS FORCED TO RELY ON NQP. FOLLOWING THE TAPING, NQP INVITED SUBJECT (AT FBI REQUEST) FOR COFFEE AND LATER TO DINNER AT HIS HOME. BOTH WERE GRATEFULLY ACCEPTED AS SUBJECT, WHOSE HOTEL WAS PAID BY THE PUBLISHER, HAD NO WALKING AROUND MONEY. THE DINNER SUBSEQUENTLY DID NOT TAKE PLACE SINCE SUBJECT COULD NOT RESOLVE A SCHEDULING CONFLICT WHICH HAD HIM PARTICIPATING IN AN INTERVIEW AT THE SAME TIME.

4. SUBJECT ENJOYED HIS CIRCA 10 YEARS IN MEXICO AND CUBA. HE CHEERFULLY LAMENTED THAT THE REZIDENTURA IN MEXICO HAD TO USE COMMERCIAL PHONE LINES TO TALK TO THEIR CUBAN COUNTERPARTS: "THE CIA KNEW EVERYTHING WE DID." FOLLOWING HIS EXPULSION FROM MEXICO CITY IN 1971, SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO THE ANALYSIS DIVISION OF THE FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND MADE SEVERAL TRIPS TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA. HE BECAME ELIGIBLE TO RETURN TO MEXICO AGAIN WHEN THE THEN MEXICAN PRESIDENT STATED PRIVATELY DURING A STATE VISIT TO MOSCOW THAT SUBJECT AND APPARENTLY OTHERS WHO WERE EXPELLED WITH HIM COULD RETURN ANYTIME.

5. FOR APPROXIMATELY SEVEN YEARS, CIRCA 1975-1982, SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS. BASED ON THIS EXPERIENCE HE DISAGREED COMPLETELY WITH THE ALLEGATIONS BY KGB GENERAL ((KALUGIN)) THAT AMERICANS POWS WERE HELD IN RUSSIA. ACCORDING TO SUBJECT, KALUGIN IS PARANOID AND TRULY BELIEVES HIS OWN CLAIMS. SUBJECT SAID THE KGB OBTAINED THICK FILES ON POWS FROM THE VIETNAMESE WHICH THE KGB THOUGHT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF SENSITIVE (NFI) EQUIPMENT THAT THE VIETNAMESE WANTED. AFTER REVIEWING THE FILES, HOWEVER, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE FILES WERE USELESS, BECAUSE THERE SEEMED LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO RECRUIT A POW AS AN FI SOURCE. CONTINUING, SUBJECT SUPPORTED HIS COMPLAINT ABOUT THE USELESSNESS OF THE FILES BY COMPLAINING THAT THE VIETNAMESE NEVER INFORMED THE KGB ABOUT THEIR OPERATIONS OR CONTACTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM: "WE SUPPLIED THEM WITH EVERYTHING, INTEL, MATERIAL, WEAPONS, AND THEY WOULDN'T TELL US ANYTHING."

6. CIRCA 1985, AS VIETNAM FADED AS AN ISSUE, SUBJECT GOT A JOB AS AN INSTRUCTOR AT THE KGB SCHOOL, AKA THE RED BANNER INSTITUTE OR ANDROPOV INSTITUTE. THIS ASSIGNMENT WAS REGARDED AS PLUSH DUTY BECAUSE THE COLONELS COULD RELAX AND ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF THEIR RANK IN EXCHANGE FOR TELLING WAR STORIES ABOUT GREAT OPERATIONS THEY RAN.

7. IN 1991, SUBJECT REACHED MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE OF 60. SINCE THEN, HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED WITH AN "INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORIST TRAINING INSTITUTE" IN MOSCOW THAT IS STAFFED WITH OTHER OLD COLD WARRIORS AND WRITING HIS BOOK. ON THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT OF THE LEAD SENATOR ON POW/MIA ISSUES TO MOSCOW, SUBJECT'S KGB SUPERIORS TOLD HIM TO SPEAK FREELY WITH THE SENATOR.

8. UNDER FBI DIRECTION, NQP TRIED TO ELICIT UPDATED CI INFO BY SPECULATING OUT LOUD THAT "YOUR GUYS PROBABLY DON'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO HERE" AND WAS TOLD, "YOU'RE BASICALLY RIGHT.

THEY DO MORE BASIC INFORMATION GATHERING LIKE THE INSTITUTES." NQP (AND THE BUREAU) WERE SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT SUBJECT KNEW NO ONE AT THE RUSSIAN MISSION IN NEW YORK. NQP USED SUBJECT'S PENURY AND DEARTH OF PLANS TO INVITE HIM HOME FOR DINNER THE FOLLOWING EVENING. SUBJECT WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO THE EVENING, NOTING THAT NOT ONLY DID HE KNOW NONE, HE WAS HESITANT TO LEAVE HIS HOTEL ROOM (WHICH HE DESPISED) AT NIGHT. AS IT DEVELOPED, HOWEVER, SUBJECT'S PUBLISHER ARRANGED HIS SOLITARY INTERVIEW FOR THE SAME TIME. THIS, COMBINED WITH THE RAIN, LED SUBJECT TO CANCEL. SUBJECT HOPES TO VISIT NEW YORK ON HIS RETURN TRIP AND WILL CALL NQP IF HE DOES.

9. SUBJECT DOES NOT KNOW IF HE WILL RECEIVE ANY INCOME FROM THE BOOK. HE WILL BE PAID ONLY AFTER ALL THE EXPENSES OF PUBLISHING AND PROMOTION ARE PAID. NQP OBSERVED THAT SUBJECT IS LONELY, AND COULD BE APPROACHED SECURELY UNDER AN APPROPRIATE COMMERCIAL GUISE, SUCH AS THAT OF A WRITER. WHETHER HIS CURRENT ACCESS WOULD JUSTIFY THE EFFORT HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED. STATION WOULD PROPOSE THAT SUBJECT COULD BE AN INTERESTING SPEAKER FOR THE ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.

10. ACCORDING TO HIS CARD, WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN PRINTED IN ONE OF THE LOCAL $5 FOR 50 CARDS MACHINES, SUBJECT'S CURRENT ADDRESS IS:

26/2-269, UL. AK. KAPITSA
117647 MOSCOW
TEL: (095) 429-54-17
FAX: (095) 939-83-67.

HIS TITLE IS "COLONEL KGB (RETIRED) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXPERT".

11. FILE: HQS: ASSIGN/ADVISE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 93-4593421 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

ADV: CE/R/IO (1613Z) STAFF

ACTION: CE/R/IO (479) INFO: C/ORMS, CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/R, DC/CE (4/W)

93 4593421 ASP PAGE 001 IN 4593421
TOR: 191613Z NOV 93 MCOW 62359

S E ~~C R E T~~ 191610Z NOV 93 STAFF

CITE MOSCOW 62359

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ST PETERSBURG.

FOR: LIMIT CE/R/IO INFO C/CE/R, DC/CE

SLUGS: WNINTEL GTDANCER NQHAYWIRE

SUBJECT: 11 NOVEMBER 1993 MEETING WITH THE SVRR

REF: A. MOSCOW 62226 93 4516923
B. MOSCOW 62260 93 4536763
C. MOSCOW 62261 93 4536806

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARAS FOUR AND FIVE. SEPARATE CABLE TRAFFIC CONTAINING SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ACTION WILL BE FORWARDED TO APPROPRIATE HQS ELEMENTS.

2. ON THE MORNING OF 11 NOVEMBER 1993, LEONID ((RYABCHENYA)), DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN LIAISON DEPARTMENT, RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SVRR) TELEPHONED TO ARRANGE AN "URGENT" MEETING WITH COS. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT 1600 HOURS AT KOLPACHNIY PEREULOK. REFS CONTAIN STATION'S TRANSLATIONS OF THE ITEMS RYABCHENYA PASSED DURING THE MEETING (TEXT OF A LETTER TO THE DCI FROM PRIMAKOV CONTAINING HIS THOUGHTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS; A PAPER ON AID TO THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS; AND A PAPER ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA, RESPECTIVELY.)

3. RYABCHENYA ALSO RAISED THE NAME OLEG ((NECHIPORENKO)), RETIRED SENIOR KGB OFFICIAL. AS WE KNOW FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS, NECHIPORENKO'S BOOK, "PASSPORT TO ASSASSINATION" WHICH PROVIDES *NECHIPORENKO'S ACCOUNT OF<LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY IS SCHEDULED TO BE PUBLISHED IN MID-NOVEMBER. RYABCHENYA SAID THAT NECHIPORENKO IS PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. ON BOOK PROMOTION TOUR. RYABCHENYA STATED THAT HE WAS BRINGING THE SUBJECT UP IN ORDER TO PUT ON RECORD THAT THE SVRR HAS NO CONNECTION TO THE BOOK, ITS CONTENTS, OR NECHIPORENKO'S TRAVEL. RYABCHENYA WAS ADAMANT THAT THE ENDEAVOR WAS "100 PERCENT PERSONAL."

---

4. NEXT RYABCHENYA INQUIRED WHETHER ANY DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE WITH REGARD TO THE SCHEDULING OF THE NEXT EXCHANGE ON YUGOSLAVIA. HE RECALLED THE NEXT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WERE TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN DECEMBER 1993 IN WASHINGTON. REQUEST HQS ELEMENTS INVOLVED ADVISE INTENTIONS FOR THE SCHEDULING OF THE NEXT EXCHANGE.

5. RYABCHENYA ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE UNCLASSIFIED PAPER PRESENTING THE FINDINGS OF THE U.S. SCIENTISTS INVOLVED IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL TASK FORCE EFFORT SCHEDULED TO BE PUBLISHED IN OCTOBER 1993. HE REMINDED COS OF OUR PROMISE TO PROVIDE A COPY (A PROMISE MADE FIRST DURING THE VISIT OF THE ETF TEAM IN JULY AND LATER REPEATED BY THE DCI DURING HIS 9 AUGUST MEETING WITH SVRR LEADERSHIP). RYABCHENYA EXPLAINED THAT THE SVRR HAS HELD SOME MEETINGS WITH RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS AND IS WORKING ON A PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN U.S. AND RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS ON THIS SUBJECT. AFTER THEY HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE PAPER, THE SVRR WANTS TO MOVE FORWARD AND SCHEDULE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN U.S. AND RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS. (AN EVENT MOTIVATING THE SVRR'S DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THIS INITIATIVE IS, OF COURSE, THE GORE/CHERNOMYRDIN MEETINGS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW IN THE MIDDLE OF NEXT MONTH.) REQUEST HQS PROVIDE A COPY OF THE UNCLASSIFIED PAPER BY THE MOST EXPEDITIONS MEANS POSSIBLE. LENGTH PERMITTING, SUGGEST USE OF SECURE FAX TO THE STATION.

5. FILE: 74A-002-001. DECL OADR DRV LIA 1-87.
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

/ / SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

ADV: LA/CCGEO (1426Z) STAFF

ACTION: LA/CCGEO (911) INFO: AF/TNB, C/ORMS, CIC/AF, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, AF/SG, CIC/LA (3/W)

93 3909799 ASO PAGE 001 IN 3909799
TOR: 201426Z SEP 93 LUSA 77526

S E C R E T 201432Z SEP 93 STAFF

CITE LUSAKA 77526

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT LA/CCGEO INFO CIC/LA, AF/SG, CIC/AF

SLUGS: WNINTEL VPJAUNTY

SUBJECT: VPJAUNTY/1 CONTINUED CONTACT WITH CUBAN CHARGE

REF: DIRECTOR 277135 93 3844003

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: COMMENTS ON RECENT EVENTS IN VPJAUNTY/1 ASSESSMENT/DEVELOPMENT OF CUBAN CHARGE CARLOS ACEVEDO.

2. AFTERNOON OF 17 SEP 93, C/O BECKNAP MET WITH VPJAUNTY/1 (J/1). J/1 SAID HE HAD HAD DINNER WITH CUBAN CHARGE CARLOS ((ACEVEDO)) AND SPOUSE AT LATTER'S HOME ON 9 SEP 93. DURING THE DINNER, J/1 SAID HE FELT HE WAS BEING TESTED BY ACEVEDO. HE SAID ACEVEDO RAISED THE QUESTION OF HIS PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH PNINFINITE EMPLOYEES. HE SAID HE MET AN EMBOFF IN LAGOS WHOM HE ASSUMED TO BE PNINFINITE. (ACEVEDO DID NOT PROVIDE J/1 WITH THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL). ACEVEDO SAID THAT THIS AMCIT OFFERED TO SELL HIM A CASE OF BEER FOR ONE DOLLAR. WHEN J/1 SAID THAT THE AMERICAN WAS PROBABLY ONLY BEING FRIENDLY, ACEVEDO SAID THAT HE KNEW IT WAS BUSINESS AND NOT FRIENDSHIP WHICH WAS BEHIND THE GENEROUS OFFER. ACEVEDO THEN RAISED THE ISSUE OF A PUBLICATION WHICH LISTED PNINFINITE EMPLOYEES AROUND THE WORLD. ACEVEDO ALSO RAISED THE BAY OF PIGS AND THE *<ASSASSINATION>OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY,>STATING THAT HE KNEW THEM TO BE PNINFINITE OPERATIONS. ACEVEDO COMPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S WAS OBSESSED WITH CASTRO. ACEVEDO STATED THAT CUBA COULD OVERRUN THE AMERICAN BASES IN CUBA IN 5 MINUTES IF THEY WANTED TO DO SO. HE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE TRADE EMBARGO. HE

BRAGGED ABOUT CUBA, PRAISING ITS DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES. ACEVEDO WAS OBVIOUSLY TOUTING THE PARTY LINE VERY CLOSELY DURING THIS SESSION. DURING THE CONVERSATION, ACEVEDO SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT VISIT ANY U.S. OFFICIAL'S HOME, ALTHOUGH HE

MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ANY PROBLEM TALKING TO AMERICANS, AND NAMED C/O'S DERSOOKIAN AND BECKNAP WHOM HE HAD MET THROUGH J/1.

3. DURING THE CONVERSATION, J/1 SAID HE HEARD AN AUDIBLE "CLICK" WHICH HE IS SURE WAS THE SOUND OF A TAPE RECORDER SHUTTING OFF. J/1 SAID HE IGNORED THE SOUND, BUT BOTH HIS HOST AND HOSTESS WERE SHOCKED BY THE NOISE. J/1 SAID THAT ACEVEDO SEEMED TO BE ALL BUSINESS THAT EVENING, ASKING QUESTIONS AND LEADING THE CONVERSATION. WHEN J/1 PHONED HIM ON 13 SEP WITH A PHONE NUMBER HE HAD REQUESTED, ACEVEDO SEEMED TENSE. ON 15 SEP, ACEVEDO CAME BY TO SEE J/1 AT HIS OFFICE, AGAIN REFERRING TO HIM AS HIS BROTHER. ACEVEDO WAS BACK TO HIS PREVIOUSLY FRIENDLY SELF AND ASKED J/1 WHAT HE WAS DOING OVER THE WEEKEND AND J/1 SAID HE WAS VERY BUSY. J/1'S IMPRESSION IS THAT HE WAS BEING TESTED AND THAT HE PASSED THE TEST. C/O SAID SHE WOULD CONSULT THE WASHINGTON EXPERTS AND ADVISE J/1 AT NEXT MEETING WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR 1500 ON 24 SEP. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS COMMENTS PRIOR TO THAT MEETING.

4. DURING THE MEETING, ACEVEDO TOLD J/1 THAT HE WANTED THE BIBLE FOR HIMSELF SINCE HE WAS CATHOLIC. HE SAID THAT PREVIOUSLY, PARTY MEMBERS COULD NOT BE RELIGIOUS AND REMAIN PARTY MEMBERS. HOWEVER, THINGS HAD LIBERALIZED TO THE POINT WHERE HE COULD NOW HAVE A BIBLE. (J/1 DID ADMIT THAT HE FORGOT TO ASK WHY, IF THINGS WERE MORE LIBERAL NOW, ACEVEDO COULD NOT GET HIS OWN BIBLE FROM CUBA.)

5. J/1 SAID THAT BASED ON HIS ASSESSMENT OF ACEVEDO, STATION WOULD NOT GET FAR WITH HIM USING OFFICIAL AMERICANS. HE SAID HOWEVER, THAT A SOUTH AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN INTERESTED IN TRADE IN CUBA (SPECIFICALLY IMPORT/EXPORT) WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO ACEVEDO AS HE HAS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN LEAVING THE GOVERNMENT AND INVOLVING HIMSELF IN BUSINESS DEALINGS. J/1 ASSESSES ACEVEDO AS BEING INTERESTED IN MONEY (HENCE THE INTEREST IN BUSINESS), BUT STILL RETAINING AN INTEREST IN POLITICS. C/O TOLD J/1 THAT STATION AND HQS STILL HAD AN INCOMPLETE PICTURE OF ACEVEDO'S PERSONALITY AND THAT HE SHOULD CONTINUE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT. C/O AGAIN TRIED THE PLOY OF HAVING J/1 WRITE A LETTER TO C/O DESCRIBING ACEVEDO AS IF C/O HAD NEVER MET HIM. J/1 SAID HE WOULD TRY TO DO THAT.

6. STATION ASSESSMENT OF THESE RECENT EVENTS IS TWOFOLD. IT IS LIKELY THAT ACEVEDO HAS REPORTED HIS CONTACT WITH C/O'S DERSOOKIAN AND BECKNAP. IT IS POSSIBLE THEN THAT A SECURITY OFFICIAL INSISTED THAT ACEVEDO CONFIRM HIS VERSION OF THE CONTACT WITH THE SOURCE OF THE CONTACT, J/1. THE EVENTS OF 9 SEP WOULD SUPPORT THIS THEORY, ESPECIALLY THE OBVIOUS AGENDA AND THE SHOCK AT THE MIX-UP WITH THE TAPE RECORDER (THIS IS NOT A TRAINED PROFESSIONAL CONDUCTING A TEST.) ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT THIS WAS A TEST FOR J/1, A SORT OF VETTING EXERCISE. SINCE ACEVEDO CAME BACK TO J/1 AFTER A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT J/1 PASSED THE TEST. THE QUESTION REMAINS AS TO WHO WAS ABLE TO REVIEW THE TAPE IN SUCH A SHORT PERIOD OF

TIME (9-15 SEP). IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IN LUSAKA WAS ABLE TO EVALUATE THE TAPE. OTHERWISE, THE MOST LIKELY PLACE FOR SUCH AN EVALUATION TO TAKE PLACE WOULD BE IN HARARE. STATION'S VPKINGPIN CUBAN FILE DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY INFORMATION ON TRAVEL OF CUBANS DURING THIS TIME PERIOD, MOST RECENT INFORMATION IS FROM LATE AUG 93. WILL ADVISE ANY INFORMATION ON SUCH TRAVEL WHEN KNOWN.

7. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS READOUT OF ABOVE AS WE BELIEVE THIS HAS POTENTIAL CI IMPLICATIONS FOR THIS CASE. PLEASE PROVIDE COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS PRIOR TO HQS COB 23 SEP. REGARDS.

8. FILE: VPJAUNTY/1. INDEX: ((ACEVEDO)). DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 93-3868338 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: EUR/BNBCI INFO: DOOPS, EUDORECORD, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, DC/EURTNO, EUR/BN, EUR/REFS, EUR/TERR (6/P)

93 3868338 ASR PAGE 001
TOT: 160455Z SEP 93 DIRECTOR 283260

SECRET
STAFF 160455Z DIRECTOR 283260
TO: LONDON.

FROM: EUR/BNBCI

SLUGS: WNINTEL

*SUBJECT: <KENNEDY>PAPERS

REF: HQS MEMO 9110, 10 SEP 1993

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE. FOR THE RECORD: HQS PASSED REF MEMO TO SIS ON 14 SEPTEMBER WITH ATTACHED COPIES OF BRITISH DOCUMENTS AND A CIA DOCUMENT (REFERS TO INFORMATION FURNISHED TO THE AGENCY BY BSS) FOUND IN OUR FILES, WHICH CONTAIN REPORTING *PERTAINING TO THE<ASSASSINATION>OF FORMER PRESIDENT JACK *<KENNEDY.>

2. FILE: 011-002-054. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>
ORIG: EUR/BNBCI (LEWIS, 39472); AUTH: DC/EUR/BN (BROWN); COORD: EUR/BNBCI (DILLON); REL: C/EUR/BN (RAHM). CL BY 284781.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA/MCGMXB (930) INFO: C/ORMS, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, (O/W)

93 3747541 ASR PAGE 001 IN 3747541
TOR: 032318Z SEP 93 MEXI 31663

S E C R E T 032317Z SEP 93 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 31663 (SHOLDAR ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT LA/MCGMXB

SLUGS: WNINTEL KDPROTECT

SUBJECT: CONTACT REPORT WITH KDDAGGER/2 AND KDDAGGER/11
201-1458174, 201-1457250

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. A. ASSET: KDDAGGER/2 (D/2)

B. DATE: 02 SEP 93

C. TIME: 1800-1900

D. PLACE: RESTAURANT: MACHO'S ON BARRILACO STREET, NEAR THE CORNER OF PASEO DE LA REFORMA.

E. MAP COORDINATES: 57; 5-F

F. C/O AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS: DENNIS R. BRUEGGE

G. OPS ALIAS USED: NONE

H. NEXT MEETING: THURSDAY, 16 SEPT 93, AT JOHNNY ROCKETS RESTAURANT, POLANCO (58, 5-A).

2. A. MEETING ARRANGEMENTS: SET AT EACH MEETING. CONTACT WITH D/2 AND D/11 IS MAINTAINED, WHEN NECESSARY, VIA CELLULAR TELEPHONE.

B. ATMOSPHERICS: N/A.

C. INTELLIGENCE: DAGGERS NOTED THAT ON 30 AUG 93, A SECOND FORMER RUSSIAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL, ((SHULIPIN)), HAD RETURNED TO THE EMBASSY. DAGGERS BELIEVE SHULIPIN LEFT MEXICO CITY ABOUT MARCH, 1991. HE HAS RETURNED WITH NO APPARENT

DIFFERENCE IN RANK OR DUTIES. DAGGERS COMMENTED THAT THEY FOUND IT STRANGE THAT ANOTHER FORMER RUSSIAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL (A HARD-LINER) HAD RETURNED TO A FORMER POST SO SOON AFTER LEAVING, AND WITH NO APPARENT CHANGE IN DUTIES NOR INCREASE IN RANK.

DAGGERS HAVE NOT SEEN ((ZHILTSOV)) AT THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY SINCE HE LEFT ON HOME LEAVE.

D. OPERATIONAL:

1. COLLECTED PHOTOS AND KDPEEK IN-OUT COMMENTS.
2. ISSUED DAGGERS A BOX CONTAINING AN UNASSEMBLED CD FOR KDPEEK.

3. PAID D/2 THE AUG 93 SALARIES FOR KDHUSTLE/18 (H/18) AND KDHUSTLE/31 (H/31).

4. D/2 ADVISED HE HAD QUESTIONED H/18 AND H31 REGARDING THE CISN'S DECISION TO NO LONGER PROVIDE KDPEEK WITH THE NEGATIVES TAKEN FROM THE OP. D/2 STATED THE HUSTLES HAD INFORMED HIM OF THIS ACTION BY THE CISN ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO. THE HUSTLES, AT D/2'S DIRECTION, MADE SUBTLE INQUIRIES AT CISN HQS REGARDING THE REASON FOR CISN'S ACTION, BUT WERE UNABLE TO LEARN THE REASON, ONLY THAT IT HAD BEEN A DECISION MADE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF VIDEO AND PHOTOGRAPHY AT CISN HQS. THE HUSTLES, HOWEVER, IDENTIFIED THEIR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR AS LICENCIADA ANGELICA CARBAJAL, THE AREA DIRECTOR AS WILFREDO ROBLEDO AND ROBLEDO'S ASSISTANT AS INGENIERO (FNU) FIGUEROA. THE HUSTLES DO NOT BELIEVE ANY OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE INFORMED OF THE DECISION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF VIDEO AND PHOTOGRAPHY.

5. C/O ADVISED DAGGERS TO BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR POSSIBLE PRETEXT KNOCKS AT KDPEEK'S DOOR, THIS DUE TO THE *RECENTLY RELEASED REPORT ON THE<JFK ASSASSINATION,>WHICH INCLUDED INFORMATION ON PHOTOS TAKEN OF AN INDIVIDUAL AT THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY. DAGGERS AGREED THAT IF SUCH PRETEXT CALLS AT THE KDPEEK DOOR OCCUR, D/11 WILL, IF NECESSARY, ANSWER THE DOOR, APPEARING AS A HOUSEWIFE.

6. C/O WILL BE OUT OF TOWN 8 AUG THROUGH 10 AUG 93. ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE TO HAVE NEXT SCHEDULED MEETING ON 16 SEP 93, SINCE IT IS A MEXICAN HOLIDAY, AND A DAY OFF FOR BOTH C/O AND THE DAGGERS, AND SINCE TRAFFIC (BOTH HUMAN AND VEHICULAR) WILL BE DOWN CONSIDERABLY.

F. PLANS: C/O WILL MAKE APPROPRIATE INQUIRIES OF LIAISON BRANCH REGARDING WHAT MAY HAVE CAUSED CISN HQS TO DECIDE TO NO LONGER PROVIDE STATION WITH KDPEEK PHOTO NEGATIVES, SINCE THE WHOLE AFFAIR MAY STEM FROM A MISUNDERSTANDING, RATHER THAN FROM A DELIBERATE DECISION BY SOMEONE AT CISN HQS TO CHANGE THE RULES OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN STATION AND CISN HQS.

G. SECURITY: LEFT EMBASSY AND WALKED TO QPV. DROVE TO TECAMACHALCO AREA VIA EJERCITO NACIONAL TO AVENDIDA CONSCRIPTO. REVERSED COURSE ON CONSCRIPTO, RETURNING TO THE POLANCO AREA. MADE COVER STOP AT LIVERPOOL STORE IN POLANCO. DROVE TO REFORMA VIA JULIO VERNE, THEN TO MACHO'S RESTAURANT, PARKING QPV ON SIERRA NEVADA STREET. AFTER MEETING, DROVE HOME VIA REFORMA, THEN TO PALMAS, AND ULTIMATELY TO AVENIDA DE LAS FUENTES. NO SURVEILLANCE WAS DETECTED.

3. FILE: 201-1458174, 201-1457250. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 93-3246323 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: DC/NRER (547) INFO: LIMITO, MDSX, NROC, ODPD, FILE, CE/RC-2 (4/W)

93 3246323 ASR PAGE 001 IN 3246323
TOR: 202151Z JUL 93 LANR 24682

S E C R E T 202148Z JUL 93 STAFF

CITE NR/LOS ANGELES 24682

TO: NROC INFO DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT DC/NRER INFO CE/RC

SLUGS: WNINTEL MXLETTER GTOPPOSITE VZOPTIC

SUBJECT: YEVGENY RUNGE - NAME APPEARS IN BOOK

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI.

2. ON 16 JULY, SUBJECT WAS MET IN COSTA MESA BY IC FORTAW
(IN PNINFINITE ALIAS D.B.D.) TO PROVIDE SUBJ WITH INFORMATION
CONCERNING THE APPEARANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOK
"THE MAN WHO KNEW TO MUCH", BY DICK RUSSELL (CARROLL GRAF PUBLIS
HERS/RICHARD GELLEN, 260 FIFTH AVE, NY, NY 10001, COPYRIGHT 1992).
THE BOOK IS A "CONSPIRACY THEORY" INVESTIGATION INTO THE
*<ASSASSINATION>OF PRESIDENT<JOHN>F.<KENNEDY>THROUGH INSIGHTS
PROVIDED BY THE ACTIVITIES OF RICHARD CASE NAGELL, ALLEGEDLY A CIA
*(INTERALIA) "AGENT" AND ASSOCIATE OF<LEE HARVEY OSWALD,>WHO CLAIMS
*TO HAVE INFORMED THE US GOV'T OF THE PLAN TO<ASSASSINATE>THE
PRESIDENT. SUBJ HAD BEEN MET ON 29 APR AT HIS REQUEST, AT WHICH
TIME HE ASKED THE RCO TO DETERMINE WHY SUBJ'S NAME HAD APPEARED IN
THE BOOK AND WHAT SIGNIFICANCE IT MIGHT HAVE.

3. RCO OBTAINED A COPY OF THE BOOK AND AFTER REVIEWING IT, PROVIDED SUBJ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON 16 JUL. REQUEST HQS COMMENTS ONLY IF IT IS BELIEVED NECESSARY.

4. THE NAME APPEARS ONCE IN THE BOOK, SPECIFICALLY, IN CHAPTER 29 "NAGELL'S DISAPPEARANCE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN: 1968-70," ON PAGE 657, IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH:

> NAGELL WAS ALSO QUESTIONED IN THE USSR ABOUT A KGB LT COL, YEVGENY RUNGE, WHO HAD SOUGHT ASYLUM FROM THE CIA IN WEST BERLIN IN THE EARLY FALL OF 1967. RUNGE'S DEFECTION WAS SAID TO HAVE EXPOSED THE WIDESPREAD USES OF "ILLEGAL" AGENTS, UNATTACHED TO ANY EMBASSY, BY SOVIET INTELLIGENCE (RUNGE HIMSELF HAD POSED AS A TRAVELING JUKEBOX SALESMAN). (24)

SECRET

FOOTNOTE 24, CHAPTER 29 STATES: NAGELL MENTIONED RUNGE, BRIEFLY AND CRYPTICALLY, IN ONE OF HIS LETTERS TO (ARTHUR) GREENSTEIN. FOR BACKGROUND ON THE RUNGE CASE, SEE DAVID BINDER, "BONN EXPERTS SAY DEFECTOR WAS ONE OF THE SOVIETS' ABLEST AGENTS," NEW YORK TIMES (27 OCT 67); "THE SPIES THAT WERE LEFT BEHIND," TIME (27 OCT 67) P.35; BENJAMIN WELLES, "DEFECTION OF A SOVIET SPY VIEWED IN US AS WINDFALL," THE NY TIMES (10 NOV 67) P.1.

5. CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING UP TO NAGELL'S INTERROGATION BY THE KGB IN MOSCOW: ON 10 JUN 68, WHILE ENROUTE TO WEST BERLIN THROUGH EAST GERMANY, COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES DETAINED AND THEN IMPRISONED NAGELL. HE SUBSEQUENTLY WAS SENT TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR FURTHER INTERROGATION, EVENTUALLY BEING RELEASED AT THE BERLIN BORDER TO AMERICAN AUTHORITIES ON 23 OCT 68.

6. GREENSTEIN, A PERSONAL FRIEND OF NAGELL'S, ORIGINALLY MET NAGELL IN MEXICO CITY IN 1962 WHILE GREENSTEIN WAS A STUDENT AT THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO. GREENSTEIN, WHO EVENTUALLY OPENED AN ADULT BOOKSTORE IN WILLMINGTON,DELAWARE, WAS THE RECIPIENT OF MANY *LETTERS FROM NAGELL CONCERNING THE<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION>BOTH WHILE NAGELL WAS IMPRISONED AT LEAVENWORTH DURING THE PERIOD JUL 67 TO APR 68, AND SUBSEQUENTLY. IT APPEARS THAT AT NO TIME DURING THE COURSE OF GREENSTEIN'S ASSOCIATION WITH NAGELL, THAT GREENSTEIN WAS PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN ANY CLANDESTINE OR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. GREENSTEIN'S MENTIONING OF RUNGE'S NAME WAS SOLELY IN THE CONTEXT OF IT HAVING BEEN MENTIONED BY NAGELL AS ONE OF THE NAMES THAT THE SOVIETS BROUGHT UP IN THE COURSE OF NAGELL'S INTERROGATION. NAGELL HAD NO INFORMATION CONCERNING RUNGE.

7. FILE: 6LG-006-200 (FPF/RMB). DECL OADR DRV DEF 2-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CETF/W/BLO INFO: C/ORMS, CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/CE-3, C/CETF, CETF/W-2 (8/P) .

93 3053154 ASO PAGE 001
TOT: 020005Z JUL 93 DIRECTOR 167476

SECRET
STAFF 020005Z DIRECTOR 167476
TO: IMMEDIATE MINSK.

FROM: LIMIT CETF/W/BLO INFO C/CETF/W, C/CETF, CHIEF/CE

SLUGS: WNINTEL HGDHARMA JYVAPOROUS

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL VISIT OF JYVAPOROUS/1 TO HQS

REF: DIRECTOR 165808 (93 3038825)

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE PROVIDE COS COMMENTS REGARDING PROPOSED TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION DURING JYVAPOROUS/1 VISIT TO HQS; PLEASE ADVISE REGARDING JYVAPOROUS/1'S AVAILABILITY FOR LUNCH/DINNER WITH CHIEF/CE DURING VISIT.

2. FURTHER TO REF, AS ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING FIRMED UP FOR VISIT OF JYVAPOROUS/1 (V/1) TO HQS CIRCA 22 JULY, WE WOULD LIKE TO OFFER THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS REGARDING TOPICS OF DISCUSSION TO BE RAISED BY EITHER C/PNINFINITE OR CHIEF/CE DURING THEIR UPCOMING MEETINGS WITH V/1:

* <--LEE HARVEY OSWALD>FILES. DURING PREVIOUS MEETINGS WITH V/1, HE HAD OFFERED TO PROVIDE SUMMARIES OF JYVAPOROUS FILES ON *<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>AND ALSO ALLOW "EXPERTS" TO EXAMINE DOCUMENTS WITHIN THESE FILES IN ORDER TO CONFIRM THEIR AUTHENTICITY. WHILE WE REALIZE THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE FILES HAS BEEN TURNED OVER TO NVTAG FOR ACTION, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THIS TOPIC TO BE RAISED AT THIS JUNCTURE, GIVEN THE LACK OF ACTIVITY WE HAVE SEEN ON THIS SCORE.

--PRESENCE OF IRAQI AND POSSIBLY IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICERS IN BELARUS. DURING A 16 OCTOBER 1992 MEETING WITH DC/CETF/W, V/1 PROPOSED OPERATIONAL COOPERATION TARGETING THE CIRCA 100 FOREIGN MILITARY OFFICERS PRESENT IN BELARUS. OF THIS PRESENCE, V/1 MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY IRAQI AND ETHIOPIAN OFFICERS AND LEFT SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING A POSSIBLE IRANIAN PRESENCE. V/1 INVITED PNINFINITE TO CONSIDER RECRUITMENT OPERATIONS, OFFERING JYVAPOROUS FILES AND OTHER SUPPORT RESOURCES. WE BELIEVE A POTENTIAL JYVAPOROUS/PNINFINITE JOINT OPERATION TARGETING IRAQI OR IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICERS IN BELARUS POSES SOME EXCITING POSSIBILITIES FOR THIS LIAISON RELATIONSHIP.

3. GIVEN V/1'S INITIAL INSISTENCE THAT HE MEET ONLY WITH C/PNINFINITE DURING THIS VISIT, WE WOULD APPRECIATE COS'S FEEDBACK REGARDING REF PROPOSALS TO ALSO SCHEDULE A MEETING WITH CHIEF/CE. FURTHERMORE, CHIEF/CE WOULD IDEALLY LIKE TO ARRANGE A LUNCHEON/DINNER WITH V/1 DURING THIS VISIT. WE HAVE TENTATIVELY BLOCKED OUT TIME FOR A LUNCHEON BETWEEN V/1 AND CHIEF/CE ON 22 JULY AND REQUEST COS EXTEND CHIEF/CE'S INVITATION, STRESSING HOW MUCH CHIEF/CE WOULD LIKE TO RETURN THE HOSPITALITY DISPLAYED TO HIM DURING HIS MAY 1992 VISIT TO MINSK.

4. FILE: 227-002-001. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>
ORIG: CETF/W/ULO (BOMBERGER, 72506); AUTH: DC/CETF/W/BLO (RACHKO); INFO: CHIEF/CE (); REL: C/CETF/W (NORVILLE). CL BY 2077887.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 93-2030668 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CIC/LA INFO: C/ORMO, CIC/COWB, CICEDC, CIDORECORD, DOOPS, INT/CC, INT/RQ, INT/RR, MDSX, NROC, ODPD, FILE, C/CIC, C/LA/RB5, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEI, CIC/CEX, CIC/ISB, CIC/OO-2, CIC/TA, DC/CIC, DC/LA/RB5, LA/CCG-4, LA/CCGCAR-2, LA/CCGPL, NR/OPS, NR/RB, NR/RMS, NR/SCB-3, NR/WEST (27/P)

93 2030668 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 060138Z APR 93 DIRECTOR 926886

SECRET
STAFF 060137Z DIRECTOR 926886
TO: PRIORITY NR/MIAMI.

FROM: CIC/LA INFO LA/CCG, NR/SCB, LA/CCGCAR

SLUGS: WNINTEL REAM

SUBJECT: REQUIREMENT FOR VZTOUCHDOWN

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. SLANK/1 (, ORIGINALLY ENCRYPTED AMMUG/1, 201-749641) WAS ONE OF OUR EARLIEST CUBAN DEFECTORS. HE WAS A DGI OFFICER WHO DEFECTED 24 APRIL 1964 IN CANADA. FOLLOWING LENGTHY DEBRIEFING, HE WAS USED OPERATIONALLY AND FINALLY TERMINATED IN JULY 1967. WE WOULD LIKE TO RUN HIS NAME AND PHOTO BY VZTOUCHDOWN WHO MAY BE AWARE OF HIS CASE. (A REVIEW OF VZTOUCHDOWN'S REPORTING INDICATES THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN ASKED ABOUT SLANK/1.)

2. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE DGI DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL AFTER SLANK/1'S DEFECTION AND THAT THE DGI NEVER USED DGI OFFICERS AS DOUBLES. NONETHELESS, AS SLANK/1 PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH INDICATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA PLAYED NO *ROLE IN THE<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION,>WE NEED TO TIE UP ALL LOOSE ENDS AS WE APPROACH THE THIRTY YEAR DECLASSIFICATION TIME LIMIT ON FILES COVERING THAT ERA. WE WOULD APPRECIATE, THEREFORE, HAVING YOU ASK VZTOUCHDOWN IF HE RECOGNIZES THE NAME AND PHOTO AND WHAT HE KNOWS ABOUT SLANK/1.

3. FILE: 201-749651, 201-1454012. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>
ORIG: CIC/LA (WEBER, 39380); AUTH: C/CIC/LA (AUSTIN); COORD: C/LA/CCG; INFO: NROC; REL: C/NR/SCB. CL BY 0610917.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

/ / DISSEM PER AIG#4511. CONFIDENTIAL FRP: , , , , , , ,

ACTION: NR/ECC-3 (620) INFO: CIC/NTTB, DONOVA, INTELMIL, MDSX, NRDORECORD, ODPB, ODPD, ODPK, ODPS, FILE, C/CRES, CRES/CTG, CRES/EM, NPIC/CSRD, OSO/SPO, PCS/DPG (7/W)

92 0800754 MCR PAGE 001 NC 0800754
TOR: 240147Z DEC 92 CIA/NR 232045Z

RR RUEAIIA
DE RUEAIIA #3616 3582054
ZNY CCCCC
R 232045Z DEC 92
FM CIA/NR
TO AIG 4511
BT
CONFIDENTIAL WNINTEL NOFORN

CITE CIA/NR 764166

FROM: CIA WASH DC//DDO NR EMIGRE COORDINATION CENTER//
CHAIRMAN, EMIGRE JOINT WORKING GROUP

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

FOR REFERENCE PURPOSES THIS MESSAGE IS JWG NOTICE NUMBER 92/2709.

COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: KNOWLEDGEABILITY BRIEF.

SUMMARY: WASH-32615, A 52-YEAR-OLD ETHNIC JEW, AND FORMER RADIO BROADCASTING ENGINEER WHO WORKED 1966-91 AS A TIMEKEEPER AND ASSEMBLER OF TELEVISIONS IN THE GORIZONT TELEVISION PLANT IN MINSK, BO. SHE CLAIMS TO HAVE INFORMATION ONLY ON UNCLASSIFIED PRODUCTION AT GORIZONT. SHE HAD NO SECURITY CLEARANCE. BELARUS CITIZEN.

TEXT:

1. PERSONAL DATA:
   B. SRCNO: WASH32615
   C. JWG NOTICE: 92/2709
   F. CITIZEN: BO
   G. BIRTCITY: VITEBSK
   H. BIRTCTRY: BO
   I. BIRTHDT: 411209
   J. PCO: CIA/NR
   K. LEFTDT: 920405
   L. INITCTDT: 920919
   M. LASTCTDT: 920919

N. LASTCTRY: US
O. LANGCOMP: RU5; EN1

2. EDUCATION:
A. C; 59-66; RADIO TECHNICAL INSTITUTE, ; MINSK; BO; RADIO BROADCASTING ENGINEER.

3. EMPLOYMENT:
A. 91-92; PRAGMA COOPERATIVE; ; MINSK; BO; WORKER; 0.
B. 66-91; GORIZONT PLANT; ; MINSK; BO; TIMEKEEPER, T.V. SET FINAL TEST TECHNICIAN; 0.

4. MIL SERVICE: NONE.

5. SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGEABILITY:

A. WASH-32615 APPARENTLY HAS LIMITED KNOWLEDGEABILITY ABOUT THE GORIZONT PLANT, WHERE SHE WORKED FOR 25 YEARS, FROM 1966-1991, FIRST AS A TIMEKEEPER AND LATER AS A TELEVISION SET FINAL TEST TECHNICIAN. WHEN SOURCE FIRST WENT TO WORK IN THE GORIZONT PLANT IN 1966, IT WAS STILL KNOWN *AS THE MINSK RADIO PLANT. REPORTEDLY,<LEE HARVEY OSWALD> WORKED AT THE PLANT WHEN HE LIVED IN MINSK DURING 1959-1960. THE PLANT MADE MANY ELECTRICAL SPARE PARTS AND PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS FOR THE MILITARY. BY 1972 THE PLANT HAD EXPANDED ITS FACILITIES TO COVER TWO CITY BLOCKS, AND EMPLOYED ABOUT 10,000 PEOPLE. IN 1972, SOON AFTER IT COMPLETED A NEW SHOP WHICH MADE WOODEN T.V. CABINETS, AN EXPLOSION AND SUBSEQUENT FIRE TOTALLY DESTROYED THE T.V. SHOP. ULTIMATELY, THE 51 CENTIMETER (CM) T.V. SET THE PLANT MADE PROVED TO BE LIKE ONE OF THE BEST QUALITY T.V. SETS IN THE U.S. IN THE EARLY 1970S THE PLANT MADE SOME TYPES OF SECRET MICROELECTRONIC PRINTED CIRCUITS WHICH REPORTEDLY WERE USED IN ROCKETS. WASH-32615 KNEW NO DETAILS OF THIS WORK.

B. WASH-32615 CLAIMS SHE TRIED NOT BE BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY TYPE OF SECRET WORK AT GORIZONT. INDEED, SHE NEVER HAD A SECRET CLEARANCE. BY 1990 ORDERS FOR THE SECRET MICROELECTRONIC ITEMS MADE IN SHOP NO. 6 OF THE PLANT WERE CANCELLED, AND MANY COOPERATIVES WERE STARTED IN THE PLANT. SHE WORKED IN ONE OF THESE COOPERATIVES, IN THE T.V. SHOP, WHERE ABOUT 50 EMPLOYEES REMAINED. THESE 50 EMPLOYEES WORKED SEVERAL DAYS A WEEK, WHENEVER SPARE PARTS FOR THE T.V. SETS WERE AVAILABLE. BY 1991 T.V. SPARE PARTS WHICH NORMALLY CAME FROM MANY PLACES IN THE FSU WERE NO LONGER AVAILABLE. THE COOPERATIVE IN THE T.V. SHOP WAS CALLED "PRAGMA." IT WAS ORGANIZED BY IGOR ((PITKEVICH)), WHO EXPANDED PRAGMA'S WORK BEYOND T.V. SETS, TO DEALING IN COMMODITIES AND RAISING AND SELLING VEGETABLES AND LIVESTOCK. BY EARLY 1991, NO MORE SPARE PARTS WERE LEFT TO MAKE T.V. SETS, AND ALL MILITARY WORK AT THE GORIZONT HAD STOPPED. BY AUGUST 1991, WASH-32615 HAD BEEN FORCIBLY RETIRED. HER RETIREMENT PAY WAS A PALTRY 1,500 RUBLES A MONTH. THE RAPIDLY INCREASING PRICE OF FOOD SOON ATE UP HER PENSION PAYMENTS. HER FAMILY SURVIVED ONLY BECAUSE SHE WAS ABLE TO RAISE SOME FOOD ON THE PLOT OF LAND SHE HAD BOUGHT IN 1989.

C. WASH-32165 WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PROLIFERATION, ON CONTACTS BETWEEN REPUBLICS OF THE FSU AND COUNTRIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN, SOVIET WARTIME MOBILIZATION PLANS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, CLASSIFIED INSTALLATIONS, DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONVERSION, OR LEADERSHIP BIOGRAPHIC DATA.

6. COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS:

A. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSESSING SOURCE'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGEABILITY.

B. SPOUSE DATA: WASH-32615 IS MARRIED AND RESIDES IN THE U.S. WITH HER SPOUSE, WASH-32615A, ON WHOM A SEPARATE KB HAS BEEN PREPARED.

C. RECONTACT AVAILABILITY: SOURCE IS AMENABLE TO RECONTACT.

D. OTHER:

7. GUID: REQUIREMENTS THROUGH SECRET SHOULD BE PROCESSED AS FOLLOWS:

A. HARD COPY REQUIREMENTS TO BE SENT TO NR FOR ACTION WITH INFORMATION COPIES TO CHAIRMAN, EJWG AND TO DIA/DOF-1C, DOF-4. CIA/NR'S MAILING ADDRESS VIA COURIER SYSTEM: CIA/NR/ECC, KEY BUILDING, ROOM 814, ROSSLYN, VA. OR VIA REGISTERED MAIL TO: THOMAS R. WINTERS (ATTN: ECC), POB 1926, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20013. DIA/DOF-1C, DOF-4'S MAILING ADDRESS IS: DIA, WASHINGTON, DC 20340, ATTENTION: DOF-1C, DOF-4.

B. ELECTRICALLY TRANSMITTED REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO NR: RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC//DDO NR EMIGRE COORDINATION CENTER AND INFORMATION COPY TO AIG 7020//.

C. PLEASE FORWARD YOUR REQUIREMENTS NO LATER THAN 30 DAYS FROM DATE OF DISPATCH, OR 30 DAYS FROM DATE OF RECEIPT OF REPORTING, IF REPORTING IS REFERRED TO IN PARA 5 ABOVE AND IF THAT REPORTING IS PRESUMED TO HAVE A BEARING ON THE PREPARATION OF REQUIREMENTS. (NR WILL DETERMINE RECONTACT DATE WITH SOURCE ON THE BASIS OF THE PRIORITY OF THE REQUIREMENTS AND OTHER FACTORS.)

8. FILE: WA32615 . DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

/ / CONFIDENTIAL FRP: , , , , , , ,

CONF: NR/ECC-3 INFO: CIC/NTTB, DONOVA, MDSX, MILOUT, NCREPORT, NRDORECORD, ODPD, ODPR, FILE, C/CRES, CIC/PRB, CRES/EM, PCS/DPG (5/P)

92 0797918 MCR PAGE 001
TOT: 232045Z DEC 92 CIA 764166

CONFIDENTIAL WNINTEL NOFORN
232045Z CIA/NR 764166
TO: AIG 4511.

FROM: CIA WASH DC//DDO NR EMIGRE COORDINATION CENTER//
CHAIRMAN, EMIGRE JOINT WORKING GROUP

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

FOR REFERENCE PURPOSES THIS MESSAGE IS JWG NOTICE NUMBER 92/2709.

SUBJECT: KNOWLEDGEABILITY BRIEF.

SUMMARY: WASH-32615, A 52-YEAR-OLD ETHNIC JEW, AND FORMER RADIO BROADCASTING ENGINEER WHO WORKED 1966-91 AS A TIMEKEEPER AND ASSEMBLER OF TELEVISIONS IN THE GORIZONT TELEVISION PLANT IN MINSK, BO. SHE CLAIMS TO HAVE INFORMATION ONLY ON UNCLASSIFIED PRODUCTION AT GORIZONT. SHE HAD NO SECURITY CLEARANCE. BELARUS CITIZEN.

TEXT:

1. PERSONAL DATA:
   - B. SRCNO: WASH32615
   - C. JWG NOTICE: 92/2709
   - F. CITIZEN: BO
   - G. BIRTCITY: VITEBSK
   - H. BIRTCTRY: BO
   - I. BIRTHDT: 411209
   - J. PCO: CIA/NR
   - K. LEFTDT: 920405
   - L. INITCTDT: 920919
   - M. LASTCTDT: 920919
   - N. LASTCTRY: US
   - O. LANGCOMP: RU5; EN1

2. EDUCATION:
   A. C; 59-66; RADIO TECHNICAL INSTITUTE, ; MINSK; BO; RADIO BROADCASTING ENGINEER.

3. EMPLOYMENT:
   A. 91-92; PRAGMA COOPERATIVE; ; MINSK; BO; WORKER; 0.

B. 66-91; GORIZONT PLANT; ; MINSK; BO; TIMEKEEPER, T.V. SET FINAL TEST TECHNICIAN; 0.

4. MIL SERVICE: NONE.

5. SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGEABILITY:

A. WASH-32615 APPARENTLY HAS LIMITED KNOWLEDGEABILITY ABOUT THE GORIZONT PLANT, WHERE SHE WORKED FOR 25 YEARS, FROM 1966-1991, FIRST AS A TIMEKEEPER AND LATER AS A TELEVISION SET FINAL TEST TECHNICIAN. WHEN SOURCE FIRST WENT TO WORK IN THE GORIZONT PLANT IN 1966, IT WAS STILL KNOWN *AS THE MINSK RADIO PLANT. REPORTEDLY,<LEE HARVEY OSWALD> WORKED AT THE PLANT WHEN HE LIVED IN MINSK DURING 1959-1960. THE PLANT MADE MANY ELECTRICAL SPARE PARTS AND PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS FOR THE MILITARY. BY 1972 THE PLANT HAD EXPANDED ITS FACILITIES TO COVER TWO CITY BLOCKS, AND EMPLOYED ABOUT 10,000 PEOPLE. IN 1972, SOON AFTER IT COMPLETED A NEW SHOP WHICH MADE WOODEN T.V. CABINETS, AN EXPLOSION AND SUBSEQUENT FIRE TOTALLY DESTROYED THE T.V. SHOP. ULTIMATELY, THE 51 CENTIMETER (CM) T.V. SET THE PLANT MADE PROVED TO BE LIKE ONE OF THE BEST QUALITY T.V. SETS IN THE U.S. IN THE EARLY 1970S THE PLANT MADE SOME TYPES OF SECRET MICROELECTRONIC PRINTED CIRCUITS WHICH REPORTEDLY WERE USED IN ROCKETS. WASH-32615 KNEW NO DETAILS OF THIS WORK.

B. WASH-32615 CLAIMS SHE TRIED NOT BE BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY TYPE OF SECRET WORK AT GORIZONT. INDEED, SHE NEVER HAD A SECRET CLEARANCE. BY 1990 ORDERS FOR THE SECRET MICROELECTRONIC ITEMS MADE IN SHOP NO. 6 OF THE PLANT WERE CANCELLED, AND MANY COOPERATIVES WERE STARTED IN THE PLANT. SHE WORKED IN ONE OF THESE COOPERATIVES, IN THE T.V. SHOP, WHERE ABOUT 50 EMPLOYEES REMAINED. THESE 50 EMPLOYEES WORKED SEVERAL DAYS A WEEK, WHENEVER SPARE PARTS FOR THE T.V. SETS WERE AVAILABLE. BY 1991 T.V. SPARE PARTS WHICH NORMALLY CAME FROM MANY PLACES IN THE FSU WERE NO LONGER AVAILABLE. THE COOPERATIVE IN THE T.V. SHOP WAS CALLED "PRAGMA." IT WAS ORGANIZED BY IGOR ((PITKEVICH)), WHO EXPANDED PRAGMA'S WORK BEYOND T.V. SETS, TO DEALING IN COMMODITIES AND RAISING AND SELLING VEGETABLES AND LIVESTOCK. BY EARLY 1991, NO MORE SPARE PARTS WERE LEFT TO MAKE T.V. SETS, AND ALL MILITARY WORK AT THE GORIZONT HAD STOPPED. BY AUGUST 1991, WASH-32615 HAD BEEN FORCIBLY RETIRED. HER RETIREMENT PAY WAS A PALTRY 1,500 RUBLES A MONTH. THE RAPIDLY INCREASING PRICE OF FOOD SOON ATE UP HER PENSION PAYMENTS. HER FAMILY SURVIVED ONLY BECAUSE SHE WAS ABLE TO RAISE SOME FOOD ON THE PLOT OF LAND SHE HAD BOUGHT IN 1989.

C. WASH-32165 WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PROLIFERATION, ON CONTACTS BETWEEN REPUBLICS OF THE FSU AND COUNTRIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN, SOVIET WARTIME MOBILIZATION PLANS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, CLASSIFIED INSTALLATIONS, DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONVERSION, OR LEADERSHIP BIOGRAPHIC DATA.

6. COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS:

A. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSESSING SOURCE'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGEABILITY.

B. SPOUSE DATA: WASH-32615 IS MARRIED AND RESIDES IN THE U.S. WITH HER SPOUSE, WASH-32615A, ON WHOM A SEPARATE KB HAS BEEN PREPARED.

C. RECONTACT AVAILABILITY: SOURCE IS AMENABLE TO RECONTACT.

D. OTHER:

7. GUID: REQUIREMENTS THROUGH SECRET SHOULD BE PROCESSED AS FOLLOWS:

A. HARD COPY REQUIREMENTS TO BE SENT TO NR FOR ACTION WITH INFORMATION COPIES TO CHAIRMAN, EJWG AND TO DIA/DOF-1C, DOF-4. CIA/NR'S MAILING ADDRESS VIA COURIER SYSTEM: CIA/NR/ECC, KEY BUILDING, ROOM 814, ROSSLYN, VA. OR VIA REGISTERED MAIL TO: THOMAS R. WINTERS (ATTN: ECC), POB 1926, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20013. DIA/DOF-1C, DOF-4'S MAILING ADDRESS IS: DIA, WASHINGTON, DC 20340, ATTENTION: DOF-1C, DOF-4.

B. ELECTRICALLY TRANSMITTED REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO NR: RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC//DDO NR EMIGRE COORDINATION CENTER AND INFORMATION COPY TO AIG 7020//.

C. PLEASE FORWARD YOUR REQUIREMENTS NO LATER THAN 30 DAYS FROM DATE OF DISPATCH, OR 30 DAYS FROM DATE OF RECEIPT OF REPORTING, IF REPORTING IS REFERRED TO IN PARA 5 ABOVE AND IF THAT REPORTING IS PRESUMED TO HAVE A BEARING ON THE PREPARATION OF REQUIREMENTS. (NR WILL DETERMINE RECONTACT DATE WITH SOURCE ON THE BASIS OF THE PRIORITY OF THE REQUIREMENTS AND OTHER FACTORS.)

8. FILE: WA32615 . DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>
ORIG: NR/ECC (M. CASEY,31879); AUTH: ; REL: C/NR/ECC/LRB (M. LUC).
CL BY 596796.
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MHFNO: 92-0694935 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / CONFIDENTIAL FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: KNICKER (267) INFO: DOOPS, MDSX, ODPD, ODPM, FILE, PCS/DPG (3/W)

---

92 0694935 ACR PAGE 001 IN 0694935
TOR: 151955Z DEC 92 NYNC 69284

CONFIDENTIAL 151954Z DEC 92 STAFF

CITE NC NEW YORK 69284

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: NR/ECC

SLUGS: WNINTEL NOFORN KNICKER

SUBJECT: KNOWLEDGEABILITY BRIEF (U)

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

SUMMARY: (C/NF) WASH-32615 IS A 52 YEAR OLD ETHNIC JEW AND FORMER SOVIET RADIO BROADCASTING ENGINEER WHO WORKED 1966-91 AS A TIMEKEEPER AND ASSEMBLER OF TELEVISIONS IN THE GORIZONT TELEVISION PLANT IN MINSK, BO. SHE CLAIMS TO HAVE INFORMATION ONLY ON UNCLASSIFIED PRODUCTION AT GORIZONT. SHE HAD NO SECURITY CLEARANCE. BYELARUS CITIZEN.

1. (C/NF) PERSONAL DATA:
1A. NAME:
1B. SRCNO: WASH32615
1F. CITIZEN: BO
1G. BIRTCITY: VITEBSK
1H. BIRTCTRY: UR
1I. BIRTHDT: 411209
1J. PCO: CI
1K. LEFTDT: 920405
1L. INITCTDT: 920919
1M. LASTCTDT: 920919
1N. LASTCTRY: US
1O. LANGCOMP: RU5; EN1

2. (C/NF) EDUCATION:

2A. C; 59-66; RADIO TECHNICAL INSTITUTE, XX; MINSK; UR; RADIO BROADCASTING ENGINEER.

3. (C/NF) EMPLOYMENT:

3A. 91-92 (MARCH); PRAGMA COOPERATIVE; XX; MINSK; BO; WORKER; 0.

3B. 66-91; GORIZONT PLANT; XX; MINSK; UR; TIMEKEEPER, T.V. SET FINAL TEST TECHNICIAN; 0.

4. (C/NF) MIL SERVICE: NONE.

5. (C/NF) SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGEABILITY:

5A. WASH-32165 APPARENTLY HAS LIMITED KNOWLEDGEABILITY ABOUT THE GORIZONT PLANT, WHERE SHE WORKED FOR 25 YEARS, FROM 1966-1991, FIRST AS A TIMEKEEPER AND LATER AS A TELEVISION SET FINAL TEST TECHNICIAN. WHEN SOURCE FIRST WENT TO WORK IN THE GORIZONT PLANT IN 1966 IT WAS STILL KNOWN AS THE MINSK RADIO *PLANT. REPORTEDLY,<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>WORKED AT THE PLANT WHEN HE LIVED IN MINSK DURING 1959-1960. THE PLANT MADE MANY ELECTRICAL SPARE PARTS AND PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS FOR THE MILITARY. BY 1972 THE PLANT HAD EXPANDED IT FACILITIES TO COVER TWO CITY BLOCKS AND EMPLOYED ABOUT 10,000 PEOPLE. IN 1972, SOON AFTER IT COMPLETED A NEW SHOP WHICH MADE WOODEN T.V. CABINETS, AN EXPLOSION AND SUBSEQUENT FIRE TOTALLY DESTROYED THE T.V. SHOP. ULTIMATELY THE 51 CENTIMETER (CM) T.V. SET THE PLANT MADE PROVED TO BE LIKE ONE OF THE BEST QUALITY T.V. SETS IN THE U.S. IN THE EARLY 1970S THE PLANT MADE SOME TYPES OF SECRET MICROELECTRONIC PRINTED CIRCUITS WHICH REPORTEDLY WERE USED IN ROCKETS. WASH-32615 KNEW NO DETAILS OF THIS WORK.

5B. WASH-32615 CLAIMS SHE TRIED NOT BE BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY TYPE OF SECRET WORK AT GORIZONT. INDEED, SHE NEVER HAD A SECRET CLEARANCE. BY 1990 ORDERS FOR THE SECRET MICROELECTRONIC ITEMS MADE IN SHOP NO. 6 OF THE PLANT WERE CANCELLED AND MANY COOPERATIVES WERE STARTED IN THE PLANT. SHE WORKED IN ONE OF THESE COOPERATIVES, IN THE T.V. SHOP, WHERE ABOUT 50 EMPLOYEES REMAINED. THESE 50 EMPLOYEES WORKED SEVERAL DAYS A WEEK, WHENEVER SPARE PARTS FOR THE T.V. SETS WERE AVAILABLE. BY 1991 T.V. SPARE PARTS WHICH NORMALLY CAME FROM MANY PLACES IN THE FSU WERE NO LONGER AVAILABLE. THE COOPERATIVE IN THE T.V. SHOP WAS CALLED "PRAGMA." IT WAS ORGANIZED BY IGOR ((PITKEVICH)), WHO EXPANDED PRAGMA'S WORK BEYOND T.V. SETS, TO DEALING IN COMMODITIES AND RAISING AND SELLING VEGETABLES AND LIVESTOCK. BY EARLY 1991, NO MORE SPARE PARTS WERE LEFT TO MAKE T.V. SETS AND ALL MILITARY WORK AT THE GORIZONT HAD STOPPED. BY AUGUST 1991, WASH-32615 HAD BEEN FORCIBLY RETIRED. HER RETIREMENT PAY WAS A PALTRY 1,500 RUBLES A MONTH. THE RAPIDLY INCREASING PRICE OF FOOD SOON ATE UP PER PENSION PAYMENTS. HER FAMILY SURVIVED ONLY BECAUSE SHE WAS ABLE TO RAISE SOME FOOD ON THE PLOT OF LAND SHE HAD BOUGHT IN 1989.

5C. WASH-32165 WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PROLIFERATION, ON CONTACTS BETWEEN REPUBLICS OF THE FSU AND COUNTRIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN, SOVIET WARTIME MOBILIZATION PLANS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, CLASSIFIED INSTALLATIONS, DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONVERSION, OR LEADERSHIP BIOGRAPHIC DATA.

6. (C/NF) COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS:

6A. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSESSING

SOURCE'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGEABILITY.

6B. SPOUSE DATA: WASH-32615 LIVES WITH HER HUSBAND IN THE UNITED STATES. A SEPARATE KNOWLEDGEABILITY BRIEF WAS PREPARED ON HER SPOUSE.

6C. RECONTACT AVAILABILITY: SOURCE IS AMENABLE TO RECONTACT.

6D. OTHER: SOURCE NEVER HAD ANY KIND OF SECURITY CLEARANCE.

7. (C/NF) GUID: REQUIREMENTS THROUGH SECRET SHOULD BE PROCESSED AS FOLLOWS:

7A. HARD COPY REQUIREMENTS TO BE SENT TO NR FOR ACTION WITH INFORMATION COPIES TO CHAIRMAN, EJWG AND TO DIA/AT-10. CIA/NR'S MAILING ADDRESS VIA COURIER SYSTEM: CIA/NR/ECC, KEY BUILDING, ROOM 200, ROSSLYN, VA. OR VIA REGISTERED MAIL TO: THOMAS R. WINTERS (ATTN: ECC), POB 1926, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20013. DIA/AT-10'S MAILING ADDRESS IS: DIA, WASHINGTON, DC 20301, ATTENTION: AT-10.

7B. ELECTRICALLY TRANSMITTED REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO NR: RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC//DDO NR EMIGRE COORDINATION CENTER AND INFORMATION COPY TO AIG 7020//.

7C. PLEASE FORWARD YOUR REQUIREMENTS NO LATER THAN 30 DAYS FROM DATE OF DISPATCH, OR 30 DAYS FROM DATE OF RECEIPT OF REPORTING, IF REPORTING IS REFERRED TO IN PARA 5 ABOVE AND IF THAT REPORTING IS PRESUMED TO HAVE A BEARING ON THE PREPARATION OF REQUIREMENTS. (NR WILL DETERMINE RECONTACT DATE WITH SOURCE ON THE BASIS OF THE PRIORITY OF THE REQUIREMENTS AND OTHER FACTORS.)

8. DECL OADR.
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 92-7827323 SENSIND:

~~SECRET~~ ERP: / / / / /

/ /

STAFF

CONF: CIC/CEX-3 INFO: C/ORMO, CICEDC, CIDORECORD, DOCHRONO, DOOPS, MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/CI, FILE, C/CIC, CE/RBI, CED/CIC, CETF/W-5, CETF/W/BAL, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEI, CIC/CLFL, CIC/EOB, CIC/ISB, CIC/OG-4, CIC/PRB, CIC/TA, DC/CE, DC/CIC, DDO-2 (28/P)

92 7827323 ASR PAGE 001
TOT: 041754Z APR 92 DIRECTOR 324829

~~S E C R E T~~
STAFF 041754Z DIRECTOR 324829
TO: VILNIUS.

FROM: CIC/CEX INFO CIC/PRB, CETF/W/BAL.

SLUGS: WNINTEL TAZZACEX LWOPUS

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON TIMES ARTICLE RE KGB OFFER TO HOLLYWOOD

REF: A. DIRECTOR 283424 (92 7575137)
B. VILNIUS 10599 (92 7801082)
C. VILNIUS 10578 (92 7735236)

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI.

2. FOLLOWING ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE 27 MARCH EDITION OF THE "WASHINGTON TIMES:"

"THE KGB SPIES WHO CAME IN FOR THE GOLD

"MOSCOW: ON THE 'STREET OF TRUTH,' RETIRED KGB SECRET AGENTS CAME TO TELL ALL.

"WITH NO HINT OF SHAME, THE COLD WAR SPY MASTERS SAID THEIR MEMOIRS CAN BE HAD FOR CASH--ON EVERYTHING
* FROM<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>TO KIM PHILBY AND THE SPY RING THAT STOLE THE SECRETS OF THE ATOM BOMB FROM AMERICA.

"'THE IDEA THAT ALL PEOPLE WHO ENGAGE IN ESPIONAGE ARE VERY RICH IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE,' SAID ANATOLY PRIVALOV, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE ASSOCIATION OF KGB VETERANS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE, OR FIVA, AS THE RUSSIANS CALL IT.

"MR. PRIVALOV AND THREE COLLEAGUES FROM THE ELITE OF KGB ESPIONAGE CAME NOT OUT OF THE COLD BUT OUT OF THE RAIN WEDNESDAY TO THE OFFICES OF KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA ON ULITSA PRAVDA (TRUTH STREET).

"THEY TOLD REPORTS OF THEIR PLANS TO ENTER THE CAPITALIST WORLD THAT THEY TRIED TO VERY HARD TO

~~SECRET~~

UNDERMINE DURING THEIR CLOAK-AND-DAGGER DAYS.

"FEAR OF POVERTY HAD SPURRED THE RETIRED SPIES TO SIGN UP WITH THE HOLLYWOOD FIRM ENTERTAINMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS ASSOCIATION TO PEDDLE THEIR INSIDE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR FOR FILMS, MINISERIES AND DOCUDRAMAS.

"'DUE TO THE PRESENT CONFUSION IN OUR COUNTRY, MANY OF THE VETERANS ARE IN A VERY DIFFICULT (FINANCIAL) SITUATION,' MR. PRIVALOV SAID.

"OLEG NECHIPERENKO, A 25-YEAR KGB VETERAN, SAID HIS FORTHCOMING BOOK WILL GIVE DETAILS OF HIS TWO MEETINGS
* WITH<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>IN MEXICO CITY TWO MONTHS BEFORE
* OSWALD SHOT<PRESIDENT KENNEDY.>

"THE OSWALD MEETINGS TOOK PLACE SEPT. 27-28, 1963, ON THE INITIATIVE OF OSWALD, SAID MR. NECHIPERENKO, THEN KGB STATION CHIEF IN MEXICO CITY.

"'HIS MOOD WAS BAD,' SAID MR. NECHIPERENKO.

"BUT, HE TEASED, 'THE OSWALD HE MET IN MEXICO CITY WAS THE SAME ONE WHO WAS IN DALLAS.

"ANOTHER NECHIPERENKO TIDBIT: TWO OTHER KGB MEN WERE PRESENT AT THE INTERVIEW AND AN OPERATIVE IN MOSCOW WAS KEPT ABREAST OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

"EXHIBITING FAMILIARITY WITH OLIVER STONE'S MOVIE
* <'JFK,'>MR. NECHIPERENKO SAID HE WOULD AGREE WITH 'SOME OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF JAMES GARRISON,' BUT ONLY BASED ON THE FORMER NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S BOOK, NOT ON ANY EVIDENCE.

"IF HE HAD THE DOCUMENTS, MR. NECHIPERENKO SAID, HE COULD GIVE A BETTER VERDICT. OF COURSE, NO TALK OF SUCH
* AN<ASSASSINATION>TOOK PLACE IN MEXICO CITY AND THERE WAS NO ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUCH A DEED, HE SAID.

"MR. NECHIPERENKO HAS BEEN TROTTED OUT BEFORE BY THE KGB ALONG WITH YURI MODIN, THE HANDLER OF KIM PHILBY, THE BRITISH MASTER SPY WHO WORKED FOR THE SOVIETS. PHILBY DIED IN MOSCOW IN 1988.

"THE NEW FACE SHOWN WEDNESDAY WAS ANATOLY YAZKOV, CODE-NAMED 'YAKOVLEV' IN HIS WORLD WAR II YEARS IN AMERICA WHEN HE HELPED RUN THE SPY RING THAT GAVE JOSEF STALIN THE ATOM BOMB. IT WAS ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL ESPIONAGE PENETRATIONS IN HISTORY.

"BUT MR. YAZKOV, BEYOND ADMITTING THAT HE WORKED OUT OF THE RUSSIAN CONSULATE AT 7 E. 61ST ST. IN NEW YORK CITY, ACROSS FROM THE HOTEL PIERRE, WAS SINGULARLY

RETICENT.

"ASKED IF JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG, WHO WERE EXECUTED IN 1953 FOR PASSING ATOMIC SECRETS, WERE INDEED GUILTY, MR. YAZKOV SAID HE PREFERRED 'NOT TO TALK ABOUT PEOPLE WHO TOOK PART IN THIS OR MIGHT HAVE TAKEN PART IN THIS.

"IT WAS NOT THE BEST ADVERTISEMENT FOR HIS FORTHCOMING WORK.

"WHEN ASKED IF HE MISSED THE COLD WAR, MR. YAZKOV REPLIED, 'THANK GOD THAT IT IS OVER.'

"UNCONTRITE, HE INSISTED HE WAS 'NOT SPYING AGAINST AMERICA, BUT IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION IN ORDER TO BALANCE THE TWO POWERS.'

"ABOUT 5,000 FORMER KGB OPERATIVES ARE MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION.

"'WHEN A PERSON LEAVES HIS POST, HE IS LEFT ALL ALONE,' SAID MR. PRIVALOV, A 42-YEAR KGB VETERAN. 'SO IN ORDER THAT PEOPLE WILL NOT FEEL THEMSELVES ABANDONED, WE DECIDED TO UNITE AND TO ORGANIZE A CLUB WHERE VETERANS COULD COME TO RELAX, TO DRINK A BEER OR A WHISKEY, AS THE ASSOCIATION OF THE CIA DOES.

"INSTEAD OF FEELING SORRY FOR THEMSELVES, THE FORMER CLOAK-AND-DAGGER MEN WILL WORK ON A FILM ABOUT THE ATOM BOMB SPY RING; A TV MINISERIES ABOUT U.S. NAVY EMPLOYEE GLENN MICHAEL SOUTHER, A SOVIET SPY WHO COMMITTED SUICIDE IN MOSCOW IN 1989; AND A DOCUMENTARY ON OSWALD'S BIZARRE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KGB.

* "DOCUDRAMAS ON THE<ASSASSINATION>OF LEON TROTSKY AND THE CASE OF NATO OFFICIAL ROBERT LEE JOHNSON, KNOWN AS 'THE AMERICAN KIM PHILBY,' ARE ALSO PLANNED."

3. FOR THE RECORD, WE HAVE NOTED THAT SOME SIMILAR THREADS RUN THROUGH BOTH THIS ARTICLE AND THE LWOPUS CASE.

A. THE TIMING OF THE OFFER BY THE FIVA GROUP ON WEDNESDAY, 25 MARCH, FALLS DIRECTLY INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE WINDOW ESTABLISHED BY LWOPUS (24-26 MARCH). ALSO, LWOPUS NOTED THAT IF THERE WERE ANY DOUBTS ABOUT GETTING THE MANUSCRIPT ACROSS THE LITHUANIAN BORDER, HE WOULD RESORT TO A RESERVE VARIANT BUT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER PARTIES, I.E., HE WOULD APPROACH SOMEONE ELSE.

B. LWOPUS SENT A SAMPLE OF HIS WORK TO US NOT FOR PUBLICATION BUT FOR A CRITICAL READING. HE STATED THAT IF A PUBLISHING HOUSE SHOWED INTEREST IN HIS MANUSCRIPT, AGREEMENT

COULD BE REACHED REGARDING JOINT ACTIONS AND MUTUAL LEGAL COMMITMENTS. ALTHOUGH MONETARY COMPENSATION IS IMPLIED, LWOPUS DOES NOT MENTION ANY SPECIFIC SUM, RATHER HE SUGGESTS THAT HE IS WILLING TO ENTER INTO SOME SORT OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT. THIS IS COMPATIBLE WITH WHAT THE FIVA GROUP APPEARS TO BE ATTEMPTING. THE FIVA GROUP STATES IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT THEY NEED MONEY.

C. IN EACH CASE THERE APPEARS TO BE A LARGE VOLUME OF MATERIAL. LWOPUS STATED THAT UP TO NOW HE HAS PREPARED SEVEN FOLDERS ON FOURTEEN COUNTRIES AND FORESEES WRITING 22-25 SMALL BOOKS OR EPISODES ON DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. THE FIVA GROUP ALSO IMPLIES THAT A LARGE VOLUME OF MATERIAL EXISTS. LWOPUS CLAIMS THAT HIS WRITINGS WERE BASED ONLY ON DOCUMENTARY SOURCES. THE FIVA GROUP MAKES NO SUCH CLAIM, BUT IMPLIES THAT THEIR MATERIAL IS FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.

D. BASED UPON THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY OF THE MATERIAL AND THE TIME SPAN IT ENCOMPASSES, WE SUSPECT THE LWOPUS MANUSCRIPT MIGHT BE A JOINT EFFORT. IF IT IS NOT A JOINT EFFORT, COLLECTION MUST HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR A LONG TIME BY SOMEONE WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS TO ARCHIVAL MATERIAL. THE FIVA GROUP IS A COMMON EFFORT OF AT LEAST FOUR (AND PROBABLY MORE) RETIRED KGB OFFICERS.

E. LWOPUS NOTED THAT HE IS CONCERNED FOR HIS SAFETY AND THAT OF HIS FAMILY. HIS FAILURE TO SHOW AT THE EMBASSY IN VILNIUS DURING THE WINDOW MIGHT BE THE RESULT OF HIS CONCERN. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON STATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY ALERTED THE EMBASSY, INCLUDING THE LITHUANIAN FSN IN HIS OFFICE, THAT THEY SHOULD BE ALERT FOR THE RETURN OF THE LWOPUS MESSENGER. IF LWOPUS BECAME AWARE THAT THE LITHUANIAN EMPLOYEE HAD BEEN TOLD TO WATCH FOR THE MESSENGER, HE MAY HAVE ELECTED NOT TO RETURN. IN SUCH CASE, ASSUMING THAT YURASOV IS CONNECTED WITH THE FIVA GROUP, THEIR OFFER TO THE HOLLYWOOD FIRM MAY BE AN ALTERNATE PLAN.

F. IN EACH CASE, THE MATERIAL PRESENTED WOULD HAVE APPEAL FOR THE GROUP TO WHICH IT IS OFFERED, I.E., THE OFFER TO US OF INTELLIGENCE RELATED SNIPPETS REGARDING IN-PLACE AGENTS VS THE OFFER TO THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY OF THE MORE SPECTACULAR CASES THAT WOULD APPEAL TO A MASS AUDIENCE.

G. THE NAME OF YAZKOV (TRUE NAME ANATOLIY YAKOVLEV) IS SIMILAR TO YURASOV. ALTHOUGH IT IS CERTAINLY NOT TRUE IN EVERY CASE, THE FORMER SOVIETS FREQUENTLY USED COVER NAMES SIMILAR TO OR WHICH HAD THE SAME FIRST LETTER AS THEIR OWN NAME.

H. LWOPUS IS OBVIOUSLY HEDGING HIS BETS. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE HAD MADE TWO PREVIOUS UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS

TO CONTACT US. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM EITHER OF THESE ATTEMPTS, IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE MANUSCRIPT HE PROVIDED TO US WAS A CARBON. BASED ON THE QUALITY, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WAS NOT CARBON NUMBER ONE.

4. WE ARE CURRENTLY CHECKING THE FILES OF THE FOUR FIVA OFFICERS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THEIR BACKGROUNDS MIGHT OFFER THEM ACCESS TO THE SAME INFORMATION THAT LWOPUS PROVIDED. WE ALSO PLAN TO COMPARE THE MATERIAL WE RECEIVED FROM LWOPUS TO SEE IF THE FILES OF THESE FOUR OFFICERS INDICATE THAT THEY HAD CONTACTS SIMILAR TO ANY OF THOSE MENTIONED IN THE LWOPUS MATERIAL. WE WILL ADVISE YOU OF THE RESULTS OF OUR RESEARCH.

5. WELCOME VILNIUS COMMENTS.

6. FILE: 201-1478016. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>
ORIG: C/CIC/CEX (BORGRINK); COORD: C/CIC/CEG (ROBINSON), C/CIC/PRB (BANNERMAN), CETF/W/BAL (MILLER) ; AUTH: C/CIC/CEX (SANDERS); REL: C/CETF/W (MORRIS). CL BY 0710601.
END OF MESSAGE

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: EUR/BNBCI INFO: DOOPS, EUDORECORD, EUR/BN, MDSX, ODPD, PCS/CL, FILE, C/PCS, PCS/ID (3/P)

94 5671109 ASR PAGE 001
TOT: 021535Z MAR 94 DIRECTOR 527588

SECRET
STAFF 021534Z DIRECTOR 527588
TO: LONDON.

FROM: EUR/BNBCI INFO IMS/IRO

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: DOCUMENT RELEASE

REF: MEMO A/900, 11 FEB 94

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE. FOR THE RECORD: HQS RECEIVED REF MEMO ADDRESSED TO IMS/IRO FROM SIS ON 14 FEBRUARY. TEXT OF MEMO AND ATTACHMENT FOLLOWS:

2. WE MET ON 9 SEPTEMBER LAST YEAR TO CONSIDER THE RELEASE OF VARIOUS DOCUMENTS. I ATTACH A PAPER WHICH SETS OUT THE POSITION OF MY SERVICE ON THE ELEVEN DOCUMENTS WE LOOKED AT. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF OTHER SIMILAR DOCUMENTS COME TO YOUR ATTENTION.

ATTACHMENT:

DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO BRITISH GOVERNMENT

A. LETTER FROM BRITISH EMBASSY, MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE DATED 20 JULY 1964

NO SIS OBJECTION TO RELEASE. THE FCO ALSO HAVE NO OBJECTION, BUT HAVE ASKED THAT THE DOCUMENT SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED UNTIL 1 JANUARY 1995, TO COMPLY WITH THE BRITISH 30 YEAR RULE.

*B. <WARREN COMMISSION>LETTER TO CIA DATED 20 AUGUST 1964

WE NOTE THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN RELEASED, BUT THIS CAUSES US NO PROBLEM IN VIEW OF OUR DECISION ON A, ABOVE.

C. ITEM RELATED TO B ABOVE BEARING REFERENCE XAAZ-22429

COMMENT AS FOR B ABOVE.

D. 'TRANSLATION OF SERGIEVSKY'S PENCIL NOTE'

COMMENT AS FOR B ABOVE.

E. LETTER NO 8761 FROM SIS STATION WASHINGTON TO CIA DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1974

WE REQUEST THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED.

F. LETTER NO 8805 FROM SIS STATION WASHINGTON TO CIA DATED 30 DECEMBER 1974

WE REQUEST THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED.

G. LETTER NO 8809 FROM SIS STATION WASHINGTON TO CIA DATED 31 DECEMBER 1974

WE REQUEST THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED.

H. MEMO FROM ANGLETON, CIA TO DIRECTOR FBI OF 26 NOVEMBER 1963

WE NOTE THAT THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN RELEASED. THE BRITISH INFORMATION CONCERNS THE SECURITY SERVICE WHO HAVE BEEN INFORMED.

I. CIA TELEX TO THE WHITE HOUSE DATED 28 NOVEMBER 1963

COMMENT AS FOR H, ABOVE.

J. CIA MEMO DATED 25 MARCH 1970

COMMENT AS FOR H, ABOVE.

K. MEMO FROM ANGLETON TO FBI DATED 27 JANUARY 1964

COMMENT AS FOR H, ABOVE.

3. FILE: 011-002-053. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>
ORIG: EUR/BNBCI (LEWIS, 39472); AUTH: DC/EUR/BN (BROWN); COORD: EUR/BNBCI (INCE); REL: C/EUR/BN (RAHM). CL BY 284781.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

23 Sep 98

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

		ACTION	INFO			ACTION	INFO
1	DCI			11	OPA		
2	DDCI			12	DDA		
3	DDCI/CM			13	DDI		
4	ADCI/MS			14	DDO		X
5	EXDIR/CIA			15	DDS&T		
6	CHMN/NIC			16	D/OIM		X
7	IG			17	HRP	X	
8	GC			18	R. Dunn/ExDir		X
9	COMPT			19			
10	OCA		X	20			

SUSPENSE DATE: N/A

DOCUMENT NO: ER 98-3872

Contact Betsy Quint-Moran (x37929) regarding suspense items.

COORDINATION/ROUTING:

OIM/HRP to prepare and coordinate response as appropriate. We have seven days to appeal these decisions to the President.

SUMMARY:

Additional formal determinations from the Assassination Records Review Board concerning the public disclosure of CIA records on September 9 and September 14, 1998.

Date: 28 September 1998
Received in ER: 28 September 1998
Action Officer: Tracie Matecka x37932

DCI EXEC REG

SECRET

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724–0088 • Fax: (202) 724–0457

September 23, 1998

The Honorable George Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Tenet:

In accordance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, I am writing to inform you that the Assassination Records Review Board has made additional formal determinations concerning the public disclosure of CIA records on September 9, 1998 and September 14, 1998.

Enclosed is a list of the determinations that the Review Board has made. These decisions were premised on several factors, including the historical interest in the documents and the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

You have seven days to appeal these decisions to the President. You are invited to send your representative to the Review Board to examine our copies of the documents for which determinations have been made and to discuss the determinations with my staff.

Sincerely,

Laura Denk

Laura A. Denk
Executive Director

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Edmund Cohen

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

13-00000

Billing Code: 6118-01-P

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

FORMAL DETERMINATIONS, ADDITIONAL RELEASES AND CORRECTIONS

AGENCY: Assassination Records Review Board

ACTION: Notice

SUMMARY: The Assassination Records Review Board (Review Board) met in closed meetings on September 9, 1998 and September 14, 1998, and made formal determinations on the release of records under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act). By issuing this notice, the Review Board complies with the section of the JFK Act that requires the Review Board to publish the results of its decisions on a document-by-document basis in the Federal Register within 14 days of the date of the decision.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Peter Voth, Assassination Records Review Board, Second Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 724-0088, fax (202) 724-0457.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice complies with the requirements of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107.9(c)(4)(A) (1992). On September 9, 1998, the Review Board made formal determinations on records it reviewed under the JFK Act. These determinations are listed below. The assassination records are identified by the record identification number assigned in the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection database maintained by the National Archives.

NOTICE OF FORMAL DETERMINATIONS

For each document, the number of postponements sustained immediately follows the record identification number, followed, where appropriate, by the date the document is scheduled to be released or re-reviewed.

Church Committee Documents: Postponed in Part

157-10002-10102; 2; 10/2017

157-10004-10271; 8; 10/2017

157-10004-10280; 6; 10/2017

157-10005-10158; 5; 10/2017

157-10005-10359; 11; 10/2017

157-10008-10150; 3; 10/2017

157-10011-10002; 2; 10/2017

157-10011-10005; 27; 10/2017

157-10011-10007; 2; 10/2017

157-10011-10011; 31; 10/2017

157-10011-10013; 34; 10/2017

157-10011-10015; 24; 10/2017

157-10011-10017; 74; 10/2017

157-10011-10018; 7; 10/2017

157-10011-10019; 9; 10/2017

157-10011-10024; 9; 10/2017

157-10011-10026; 13; 10/2017

157-10011-10060; 51; 10/2017

157-10011-10061; 4; 10/2017

157-10014-10089; 116; 10/2017

CIA Documents: Postponed in Part

104-10013-10267; 13; 10/2017

104-10052-10083; 4; 10/2017

104-10052-10096; 7; 10/2017

104-10064-10027; 3; 10/2017

104-10065-10361; 3; 10/2017

104-10067-10185; 2; 10/2017

104-10068-10113; 8; 10/2017

104-10070-10009; 52; 10/2017

104-10071-10047; 4; 10/2017

104-10071-10094; 3; 10/2017

104-10071-10096; 5; 10/2017

104-10071-10099; 6; 10/2017

104-10071-10186; 11; 10/2017

104-10071-10354; 2; 10/2017

104-10071-10376; 1; 10/2017

104-10072-10286; 13; 10/2017

104-10074-10221; 2; 05/2001

104-10088-10070; 192; 10/2017

104-10091-10007; 1; 10/2017

104-10091-10008; 1; 10/2017

104-10091-10013; 1; 10/2017

104-10092-10020; 1; 10/2017

104-10092-10052; 1; 10/2017

104-10092-10054; 1; 10/2017

104-10092-10062; 1; 10/2017

104-10092-10446; 1; 10/2017

104-10092-10476; 1; 10/2017

104-10092-10478; 1; 10/2017

104-10092-10480; 2; 10/2017

104-10093-10011; 2; 10/2017

104-10097-10033; 2; 10/2017

104-10097-10045; 4; 10/2017

104-10098-10007; 3; 10/2017

104-10098-10034; 1; 10/2017

104-10098-10046; 1; 10/2017

104-10098-10049; 1; 10/2017

104-10098-10070; 3; 10/2017

104-10098-10143; 5; 10/2017

104-10098-10167; 5; 10/2017

104-10098-10420; 4; 10/2017

104-10098-10421; 4; 10/2017

104-10100-10169; 5; 10/2017

104-10100-10185; 1; 10/2017

104-10102-10016; 3; 10/2017

104-10102-10017; 1; 10/2017

104-10102-10037; 2; 10/2017

104-10102-10066; 2; 10/2017

104-10102-10106; 4; 10/2017

104-10102-10142; 1; 10/2017

104-10103-10158; 2; 10/2017

104-10103-10194; 30; 05/2001

104-10103-10286; 5; 10/2017

104-10104-10412; 14; 10/2017

104-10104-10417; 4; 10/2017

104-10104-10435; 6; 10/2017

104-10105-10103; 6; 10/2017

104-10105-10120; 4; 10/2017

104-10105-10130; 1; 10/2017

104-10105-10133; 2; 10/2017

104-10105-10137; 4; 10/2017

104-10106-10013; 4; 10/2017

104-10106-10025; 3; 10/2017

104-10106-10035; 5; 10/2017

104-10106-10062; 1; 10/2017

104-10106-10143; 12; 10/2017

104-10106-10175; 6; 10/2017

104-10107-10178; 10; 10/2017

104-10107-10180; 3; 10/2017

104-10110-10306; 16; 10/2017

104-10110-10525; 1; 10/2017

104-10110-10527; 6; 10/2017

104-10110-10589; 17; 10/2017

104-10111-10138; 1; 10/2017

104-10111-10158; 1; 05/2001

104-10111-10167; 2; 10/2017

104-10112-10086; 4; 10/2017

104-10112-10090; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10148; 4; 10/2017

104-10112-10168; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10171; 3; 10/2017

104-10112-10172; 2; 10/2017

104-10112-10173; 3; 10/2017

104-10112-10174; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10175; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10179; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10183; 4; 10/2017

104-10112-10189; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10201; 9; 10/2017

104-10112-10203; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10210; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10211; 16; 10/2017

104-10112-10213; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10214; 2; 10/2017

104-10112-10216; 2; 10/2017

104-10112-10237; 2; 10/2017

104-10112-10239; 2; 10/2017

104-10112-10242; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10249; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10250; 15; 10/2017

104-10112-10255; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10259; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10260; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10265; 2; 10/2017

104-10112-10271; 16; 10/2017

104-10112-10275; 2; 10/2017

104-10112-10280; 3; 10/2017

104-10112-10284; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10289; 8; 10/2017

104-10112-10290; 3; 10/2017

104-10112-10291; 2; 10/2017

104-10112-10292; 12; 10/2017

104-10112-10293; 14; 10/2017

104-10112-10327; 2; 10/2017

104-10112-10331; 9; 10/2017

104-10112-10334; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10422; 1; 10/2017

104-10112-10444; 2; 10/2017

104-10112-10450; 3; 10/2017

104-10113-10004; 3; 10/2017

104-10113-10007; 4; 10/2017

104-10113-10011; 1; 10/2017

104-10113-10070; 1; 10/2017

104-10113-10158; 19; 10/2017

104-10113-10241; 1; 10/2017

104-10113-10267; 8; 10/2017

104-10113-10273; 5; 10/2017

104-10113-10274; 4; 10/2017

104-10113-10276; 12; 10/2017

104-10113-10279; 5; 10/2017

104-10114-10158; 1; 10/2017

104-10114-10167; 6; 10/2017

104-10117-10296; 2; 10/2017

104-10119-10202; 3; 10/2017

104-10119-10210; 1; 10/2017

104-10119-10212; 1; 10/2017

104-10119-10217; 1; 10/2017

104-10119-10219; 4; 10/2017

104-10119-10220; 4; 10/2017

104-10119-10225; 7; 10/2017

104-10119-10228; 2; 10/2017

104-10119-10232; 4; 10/2017

104-10120-10276; 5; 10/2017

104-10120-10287; 2; 10/2017

104-10120-10288; 1; 10/2017

104-10120-10298; 1; 10/2017

104-10120-10301; 3; 10/2017

104-10120-10303; 2; 10/2017

104-10120-10304; 2; 10/2017

104-10120-10305; 3; 10/2017

104-10120-10371; 4; 10/2017

104-10120-10372; 3; 10/2017

104-10120-10376; 5; 10/2017

104-10120-10377; 1; 10/2017

104-10120-10378; 7; 10/2017

104-10120-10410; 5; 10/2017

104-10120-10642; 1; 10/2017

104-10120-10645; 10; 10/2017

104-10120-10646; 1; 10/2017

104-10120-10647; 3; 10/2017

104-10120-10649; 1; 10/2017

104-10120-10652; 2; 10/2017

104-10120-10653; 9; 10/2017

104-10120-10655; 3; 10/2017

104-10120-10659; 3; 10/2017

104-10120-10660; 4; 10/2017

104-10120-10662; 3; 10/2017

104-10120-10663; 9; 10/2017

104-10121-10342; 5; 10/2017

104-10121-10343; 3; 10/2017

104-10121-10348; 1; 10/2017

104-10121-10350; 5; 10/2017

104-10121-10351; 13; 10/2017

104-10121-10352; 12; 10/2017

104-10121-10356; 3; 10/2017

104-10121-10366; 2; 10/2017

104-10121-10368; 1; 10/2017

104-10121-10379; 2; 10/2017

104-10121-10400; 19; 10/2017

104-10121-10452; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10039; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10075; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10077; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10082; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10095; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10111; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10116; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10117; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10118; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10120; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10124; 2; 10/2017

104-10122-10127; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10135; 2; 10/2017

104-10122-10279; 5; 10/2017

104-10122-10280; 2; 10/2017

104-10122-10301; 2; 10/2017

104-10122-10344; 4; 10/2017

104-10122-10346; 40; 10/2017

104-10122-10375; 2; 10/2017

104-10122-10399; 3; 10/2017

104-10122-10401; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10405; 14; 10/2017

104-10122-10406; 1; 10/2017

104-10122-10407; 6; 10/2017

104-10122-10411; 4; 10/2017

104-10122-10420; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10010; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10014; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10016; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10030; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10034; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10043; 27; 10/2017

104-10123-10044; 17; 10/2017

104-10123-10046; 13; 10/2017

104-10123-10048; 17; 10/2017

104-10123-10050; 6; 10/2017

104-10123-10053; 9; 10/2017

104-10123-10056; 10; 10/2017

104-10123-10057; 9; 10/2017

104-10123-10059; 6; 10/2017

104-10123-10061; 10; 10/2017

104-10123-10063; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10068; 11; 10/2017

104-10123-10072; 6; 10/2017

104-10123-10075; 15; 10/2017

104-10123-10106; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10134; 3; 10/2017

104-10123-10159; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10160; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10162; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10163; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10190; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10192; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10193; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10208; 18; 10/2017

104-10123-10215; 8; 10/2017

104-10123-10216; 6; 10/2017

104-10123-10217; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10219; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10220; 20; 10/2017

104-10123-10223; 12; 10/2017

104-10123-10227; 3; 10/2017

104-10123-10230; 5; 10/2017

104-10123-10234; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10246; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10251; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10257; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10258; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10259; 3; 10/2017

104-10123-10266; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10281; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10282; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10285; 4; 10/2017

104-10123-10286; 5; 10/2017

104-10123-10288; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10292; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10293; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10294; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10295; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10296; 5; 10/2017

104-10123-10297; 4; 10/2017

104-10123-10299; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10301; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10302; 5; 10/2017

104-10123-10306; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10307; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10314; 8; 10/2017

104-10123-10316; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10320; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10321; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10323; 8; 10/2017

104-10123-10324; 4; 10/2017

104-10123-10328; 3; 10/2017

104-10123-10334; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10344; 3; 10/2017

104-10123-10351; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10355; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10377; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10378; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10379; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10383; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10391; 4; 10/2017

104-10123-10401; 5; 10/2017

104-10123-10404; 25; 10/2017

104-10123-10405; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10409; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10411; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10419; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10421; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10432; 1; 10/2017

104-10123-10435; 2; 10/2017

104-10123-10449; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10000; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10006; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10007; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10008; 3; 10/2017

104-10124-10012; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10013; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10015; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10021; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10022; 2; 10/2017

104-10124-10024; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10033; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10035; 4; 10/2017

104-10124-10036; 3; 10/2017

104-10124-10037; 2; 10/2017

104-10124-10039; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10040; 28; 10/2017

104-10124-10042; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10043; 4; 10/2017

104-10124-10044; 4; 10/2017

104-10124-10047; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10048; 4; 10/2017

104-10124-10054; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10058; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10060; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10064; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10067; 2; 10/2017

104-10124-10075; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10080; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10083; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10086; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10088; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10089; 2; 10/2017

104-10124-10164; 2; 10/2017

104-10124-10167; 2; 10/2017

104-10124-10196; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10198; 5; 10/2017

104-10124-10199; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10200; 1; 10/2017

104-10124-10208; 3; 10/2017

104-10128-10431; 1; 10/2017

104-10129-10012; 6; 10/2017

104-10129-10015; 6; 10/2017

104-10129-10022; 1; 10/2017

104-10129-10026; 2; 10/2017

104-10129-10029; 2; 10/2017

104-10129-10032; 11; 10/2017

104-10129-10034; 7; 10/2017

104-10129-10036; 5; 10/2017

104-10129-10112; 2; 10/2017

104-10129-10414; 6; 10/2017

104-10129-10415; 2; 10/2017

104-10129-10416; 4; 10/2017

104-10130-10481; 3; 10/2017

104-10130-10485; 1; 10/2017

104-10130-10489; 3; 10/2017

104-10130-10501; 1; 10/2017

104-10130-10507; 2; 10/2017

104-10130-10509; 1; 10/2017

104-10130-10510; 2; 10/2017

104-10131-10069; 1; 10/2017

104-10131-10070; 4; 10/2017

104-10131-10071; 1; 10/2017

104-10131-10072; 12; 10/2017

104-10131-10078; 3; 10/2017

104-10131-10111; 3; 10/2017

104-10140-10248; 2; 10/2017

104-10140-10250; 1; 10/2017

104-10140-10431; 2; 10/2017

104-10146-10221; 1; 10/2017

104-10150-10022; 1; 10/2017

104-10150-10038; 10; 10/2017

104-10213-10002; 40; 10/2017

104-10400-10000; 5; 05/2001

104-10400-10012; 56; 10/2017

[redacted]

104-10400-10016; 6; 10/2017

104-10400-10018; 3; 10/2017

104-10400-10019; 1; 10/2017

104-10404-10047; 49; 10/2017

104-10404-10051; 1; 10/2017

104-10406-10001; 3; 10/2017

104-10406-10013; 15; 10/2017

104-10408-10010; 1; 10/2017

104-10408-10011; 2; 10/2017

104-10408-10014; 3; 10/2017

104-10408-10021; 1; 10/2017

104-10408-10023; 4; 10/2017

104-10408-10024; 1; 10/2017

104-10408-10026; 2; 10/2017

104-10412-10000; 5; 10/2017

104-10412-10002; 1; 10/2017

104-10412-10005; 17; 10/2017

104-10412-10006; 4; 10/2017

104-10412-10007; 5; 10/2017

104-10412-10008; 6; 10/2017

104-10412-10009; 2; 10/2017

104-10413-10022; 5; 10/2017

104-10413-10023; 20; 10/2017

104-10413-10024; 6; 10/2017

104-10413-10025; 4; 10/2017

104-10413-10029; 7; 10/2017

104-10413-10032; 2; 10/2017

104-10413-10033; 22; 10/2017

104-10413-10035; 4; 10/2017

104-10413-10036; 1; 10/2017

104-10413-10037; 2; 05/2001

104-10413-10038; 2; 05/2001

DOJ Documents: Open in Full

117-10014-10180; 0; None

117-10014-10181; 0; None

117-10014-10182; 0; None

117-10014-10183; 0; None

117-10014-10184; 0; None

117-10014-10187; 0; None

117-10015-10105; 0; None

DOJ Documents: Postponed in Part

117-10014-10205; 5; 10/2017

FBI Documents: Postponed in Part

124-10096-10232; 1; 10/2017

124-10193-10244; 2; 10/2017

124-10193-10250; 1; 10/2017

124-10193-10351; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10073; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10074; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10086; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10087; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10088; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10090; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10095; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10096; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10097; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10098; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10099; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10100; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10101; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10105; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10106; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10107; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10108; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10109; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10114; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10116; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10117; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10118; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10121; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10122; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10124; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10130; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10131; 1; 10/2017

124-10194-10436; 1; 10/2017

124-10195-10148; 1; 10/2017

124-10195-10153; 1; 10/2017

124-10195-10179; 1; 10/2017

124-10195-10181; 1; 10/2017

124-10195-10184; 1; 10/2017

124-10195-10186; 1; 10/2017

124-10195-10188; 1; 10/2017

124-10195-10209; 1; 10/2017

124-10195-10327; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10060; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10070; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10074; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10088; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10092; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10196; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10197; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10201; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10203; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10235; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10236; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10252; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10253; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10256; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10257; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10258; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10443; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10446; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10447; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10449; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10450; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10451; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10454; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10455; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10456; 1; 10/2017

124-10197-10459; 1; 10/2017

124-10198-10095; 1; 10/2017

124-10198-10265; 1; 10/2017

124-10199-10020; 1; 10/2017

124-10199-10024; 1; 10/2017

124-10199-10027; 1; 10/2017

124-10203-10034; 1; 10/2017

124-10203-10035; 1; 10/2017

124-10203-10036; 1; 10/2017

124-10203-10037; 1; 10/2017

124-10205-10457; 1; 10/2017

124-10205-10479; 6; 10/2017

124-10205-10484; 2; 10/2017

124-10205-10486; 2; 10/2017

124-10205-10488; 1; 10/2017

124-10205-10489; 27; 10/2017

124-10205-10491; 2; 10/2017

124-10205-10492; 3; 10/2017

124-10205-10493; 3; 10/2017

124-10205-10495; 5; 10/2017

124-10215-10378; 1; 10/2017

124-10224-10164; 1; 10/2017

124-10224-10244; 1; 10/2017

124-10224-10269; 1; 10/2017

124-10224-10274; 1; 10/2017

124-10224-10285; 1; 10/2017

124-10225-10318; 1; 10/2017

124-10225-10321; 1; 10/2017

124-10225-10324; 6; 10/2017

124-10277-10155; 1; 10/2017

124-10277-10157; 1; 10/2017

124-10277-10158; 1; 10/2017

124-10277-10159; 1; 10/2017

124-10277-10160; 1; 10/2017

124-10279-10074; 16; 10/2017

124-10280-10003; 12; 10/2017

124-10280-10092; 1; 10/2017

124-10280-10099; 1; 10/2017

124-10280-10100; 1; 10/2017

124-10280-10101; 1; 10/2017

124-10280-10102; 1; 10/2017

124-10288-10367; 1; 10/2017

124-10288-10368; 1; 10/2017

124-10288-10369; 1; 10/2017

124-10288-10371; 1; 10/2017

124-10288-10376; 1; 10/2017

124-10288-10380; 1; 10/2017

124-10290-10084; 1; 10/2017

124-10290-10088; 4; 10/2017

124-10290-10089; 1; 10/2017

124-10290-10309; 1; 10/2017

124-10290-10324; 1; 10/2017

124-10293-10010; 1; 10/2017

124-10293-10022; 1; 10/2017

124-10293-10168; 1; 10/2017

124-10298-10022; 1; 10/2017

124-10305-10021; 148; 10/2017

124-10305-10022; 72; 10/2017

124-10305-10023; 19; 10/2017

124-10305-10026; 5; 10/2017

124-10305-10027; 6; 10/2017

124-10305-10030; 8; 10/2017

124-10305-10033; 1; 10/2017

124-10306-10011; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10003; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10006; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10007; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10009; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10011; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10013; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10014; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10015; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10019; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10023; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10025; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10027; 1; 10/2017

124-10315-10031; 1; 10/2017

124-10320-10444; 1; 10/2017

124-10320-10465; 1; 10/2017

124-10321-10022; 1; 10/2017

124-10329-10004; 6; 10/2017

124-10329-10006; 1; 10/2017

124-10329-10009; 2; 10/2017

124-10329-10012; 3; 10/2017

124-10335-10160; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10162; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10165; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10166; 2; 10/2017

124-10335-10168; 2; 10/2017

124-10335-10170; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10172; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10174; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10175; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10176; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10177; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10178; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10179; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10180; 1; 10/2017

124-10335-10181; 3; 10/2017

124-10335-10216; 4; 10/2017

124-10336-10000; 1; 10/2017

124-90019-10188; 7; 10/2017

124-90019-10292; 1; 10/2017

124-90019-10365; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10001; 3; 10/2017

124-90037-10003; 3; 10/2017

124-90037-10005; 4; 10/2017

124-90037-10007; 5; 10/2017

124-90037-10008; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10010; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10011; 5; 10/2017

124-90037-10012; 3; 10/2017

124-90037-10016; 4; 10/2017

124-90037-10017; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10025; 9; 10/2017

124-90037-10028; 5; 10/2017

124-90037-10042; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10044; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10045; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10046; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10048; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10050; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10056; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10057; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10061; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10068; 5; 10/2017

124-90037-10081; 2; 10/2017

124-90037-10082; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10083; 1; 10/2017

124-90037-10084; 1; 10/2017

124-90058-10051; 1; 10/2017

124-90058-10059; 6; 10/2017

124-90058-10061; 1; 10/2017

124-90058-10062; 1; 10/2017

124-90058-10065; 4; 10/2017

124-90058-10079; 1; 10/2017

124-90058-10086; 12; 10/2017

124-90058-10104; 7; 10/2017

124-90058-10105; 1; 10/2017

124-90058-10136; 5; 10/2017

124-90058-10146; 1; 10/2017

124-90058-10188; 3; 10/2017

124-90058-10244; 1; 10/2017

124-90058-10246; 21; 10/2017

124-90059-10037; 11; 10/2017

124-90059-10039; 4; 10/2017

124-90059-10040; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10042; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10043; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10044; 11; 10/2017

124-90059-10045; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10046; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10048; 3; 10/2017

124-90059-10049; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10050; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10051; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10053; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10054; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10056; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10057; 2; 10/2017

124-90059-10084; 4; 10/2017

124-90059-10088; 2; 10/2017

124-90059-10095; 2; 10/2017

124-90059-10098; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10099; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10104; 1; 10/2017

124-90059-10105; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10003; 23; 10/2017

124-90066-10004; 14; 10/2017

124-90066-10005; 253; 10/2017

124-90066-10007; 28; 10/2017

124-90066-10009; 46; 10/2017

124-90066-10010; 24; 10/2017

124-90066-10012; 25; 10/2017

124-90066-10013; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10014; 10; 10/2017

124-90066-10014; 10; 10/2017

124-90066-10014; 10; 10/2017

124-90066-10015; 8; 10/2017

124-90066-10016; 6; 10/2017

124-90066-10018; 7; 10/2017

124-90066-10019; 2; 10/2017

124-90066-10020; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10022; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10023; 6; 10/2017

124-90066-10025; 4; 10/2017

124-90066-10026; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10030; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10030; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10030; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10032; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10032; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10037; 8; 10/2017

124-90066-10039; 11; 10/2017

124-90066-10041; 20; 10/2017

124-90066-10044; 22; 10/2017

124-90066-10045; 18; 10/2017

124-90066-10047; 8; 10/2017

124-90066-10048; 15; 10/2017

124-90066-10050; 7; 10/2017

124-90066-10051; 7; 10/2017

124-90066-10053; 4; 10/2017

124-90066-10056; 8; 10/2017

124-90066-10071; 12; 10/2017

124-90066-10072; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10074; 2; 10/2017

124-90066-10075; 10; 10/2017

124-90066-10078; 2; 10/2017

124-90066-10081; 4; 10/2017

124-90066-10087; 3; 10/2017

124-90066-10089; 2; 10/2017

124-90066-10090; 10; 10/2017

124-90066-10091; 2; 10/2017

124-90066-10097; 9; 10/2017

124-90066-10100; 5; 10/2017

124-90066-10102; 8; 10/2017

124-90066-10103; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10104; 6; 10/2017

124-90066-10108; 14; 10/2017

124-90066-10109; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10111; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10116; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10118; 5; 10/2017

124-90066-10120; 4; 10/2017

124-90066-10122; 13; 10/2017

124-90066-10124; 3; 10/2017

124-90066-10140; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10142; 9; 10/2017

124-90066-10143; 36; 10/2017

124-90066-10144; 9; 10/2017

124-90066-10145; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10146; 7; 10/2017

124-90066-10147; 6; 10/2017

124-90066-10152; 9; 10/2017

124-90066-10153; 5; 10/2017

124-90066-10154; 3; 10/2017

124-90066-10155; 3; 10/2017

124-90066-10156; 17; 10/2017

124-90066-10157; 3; 10/2017

124-90066-10158; 5; 10/2017

124-90066-10159; 2; 10/2017

124-90066-10171; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10172; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10174; 19; 10/2017

124-90066-10177; 104; 10/2017

124-90066-10181; 7; 10/2017

124-90066-10185; 20; 10/2017

124-90066-10187; 5; 10/2017

124-90066-10188; 1; 10/2017

124-90066-10189; 52; 10/2017

124-90066-10191; 12; 10/2017

124-90066-10197; 19; 10/2017

124-90066-10197; 19; 10/2017

124-90066-10200; 25; 10/2017

124-90066-10201; 5; 10/2017

124-90066-10202; 3; 10/2017

124-90066-10208; 6; 10/2017

124-90066-10209; 17; 10/2017

124-90066-10209; 17; 10/2017

124-90066-10210; 46; 10/2017

124-90066-10211; 95; 10/2017

124-90066-10212; 35; 10/2017

124-90066-10213; 39; 10/2017

124-90066-10214; 5; 10/2017

124-90066-10215; 23; 10/2017

124-90066-10216; 157; 10/2017

124-90066-10217; 16; 10/2017

124-90066-10218; 9; 10/2017

124-90066-10219; 148; 10/2017

124-90066-10220; 10; 10/2017

124-90066-10221; 33; 10/2017

124-90066-10222; 7; 10/2017

124-90066-10223; 6; 10/2017

124-90066-10228; 1; 10/2017

124-90077-10005; 3; 10/2017

124-90084-10002; 7; 10/2017

124-90084-10003; 12; 10/2017

124-90084-10005; 11; 10/2017

124-90084-10007; 9; 10/2017

124-90084-10008; 15; 10/2017

124-90084-10009; 9; 10/2017

124-90084-10010; 4; 10/2017

124-90084-10013; 2; 10/2017

124-90084-10014; 15; 10/2017

124-90084-10016; 7; 10/2017

124-90084-10018; 3; 10/2017

124-90084-10031; 2; 10/2017

124-90084-10033; 2; 10/2017

124-90084-10034; 1; 10/2017

124-90084-10035; 7; 10/2017

124-90084-10039; 3; 10/2017

124-90084-10041; 1; 10/2017

124-90084-10043; 9; 10/2017

124-90084-10044; 1; 10/2017

124-90084-10046; 1; 10/2017

124-90084-10048; 1; 10/2017

124-90084-10052; 2; 10/2017

124-90084-10052; 2; 10/2017

124-90084-10054; 2; 10/2017

124-90084-10055; 3; 10/2017

124-90084-10056; 4; 10/2017

124-90084-10058; 1; 10/2017

124-90084-10060; 2; 10/2017

124-90084-10061; 1; 10/2017

124-90084-10063; 8; 10/2017

124-90084-10076; 1; 10/2017

124-90084-10077; 2; 10/2017

124-90084-10079; 15; 10/2017

124-90084-10081; 1; 10/2017

124-90084-10083; 2; 10/2017

124-90084-10084; 11; 10/2017

124-90089-10006; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10011; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10013; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10030; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10031; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10032; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10033; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10043; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10053; 5; 10/2017

124-90089-10060; 7; 10/2017

124-90089-10061; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10086; 4; 10/2017

124-90089-10091; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10096; 6; 10/2017

124-90089-10104; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10109; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10110; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10111; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10116; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10122; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10125; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10126; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10127; 12; 10/2017

124-90089-10130; 5; 10/2017

124-90089-10183; 15; 10/2017

124-90089-10187; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10188; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10190; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10191; 3; 10/2017

124-90089-10199; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10202; 6; 10/2017

124-90089-10205; 27; 10/2017

124-90089-10207; 11; 10/2017

124-90089-10208; 8; 10/2017

124-90089-10210; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10216; 3; 10/2017

124-90089-10218; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10219; 4; 10/2017

124-90089-10223; 3; 10/2017

124-90089-10224; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10226; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10229; 3; 10/2017

124-90089-10230; 38; 10/2017

124-90089-10231; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10240; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10247; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10248; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10260; 4; 10/2017

124-90089-10270; 3; 10/2017

124-90089-10272; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10273; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10279; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10282; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10285; 9; 10/2017

124-90089-10291; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10292; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10295; 5; 10/2017

124-90089-10295; 5; 10/2017

124-90089-10296; 16; 10/2017

124-90089-10297; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10307; 8; 10/2017

124-90089-10316; 7; 10/2017

124-90089-10319; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10325; 2; 10/2017

124-90089-10326; 3; 10/2017

124-90089-10327; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10328; 4; 10/2017

124-90089-10331; 7; 10/2017

124-90089-10339; 1; 10/2017

124-90089-10357; 3; 10/2017

124-90089-10359; 28; 10/2017

124-90089-10363; 16; 10/2017

124-90096-10001; 19; 10/2017

124-90096-10002; 4; 10/2017

124-90096-10006; 5; 10/2017

124-90096-10010; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10011; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10014; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10015; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10016; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10018; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10020; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10025; 5; 10/2017

124-90096-10026; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10027; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10028; 8; 10/2017

124-90096-10029; 7; 10/2017

124-90096-10030; 7; 10/2017

124-90096-10034; 6; 10/2017

124-90096-10035; 29; 10/2017

124-90096-10036; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10037; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10038; 24; 10/2017

124-90096-10039; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10042; 17; 10/2017

124-90096-10043; 13; 10/2017

124-90096-10048; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10050; 11; 10/2017

124-90096-10055; 5; 10/2017

124-90096-10056; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10064; 4; 10/2017

124-90096-10065; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10067; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10073; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10074; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10076; 4; 10/2017

124-90096-10080; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10081; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10083; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10086; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10087; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10091; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10092; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10093; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10094; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10098; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10099; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10100; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10101; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10102; 4; 10/2017

124-90096-10104; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10107; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10108; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10110; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10111; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10112; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10113; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10114; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10115; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10116; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10117; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10118; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10119; 8; 10/2017

124-90096-10119; 8; 10/2017

124-90096-10120; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10121; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10122; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10123; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10124; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10125; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10127; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10128; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10129; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10130; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10134; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10135; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10136; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10137; 7; 10/2017

124-90096-10168; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10171; 7; 10/2017

124-90096-10172; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10173; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10176; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10177; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10177; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10179; 8; 10/2017

124-90096-10180; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10181; 8; 10/2017

124-90096-10182; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10183; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10184; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10189; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10190; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10191; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10196; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10197; 25; 10/2017

124-90096-10198; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10199; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10200; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10201; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10204; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10205; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10206; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10210; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10211; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10212; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10215; 8; 10/2017

124-90096-10216; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10217; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10218; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10224; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10225; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10227; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10228; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10229; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10230; 22; 10/2017

124-90096-10233; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10234; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10236; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10237; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10238; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10239; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10240; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10241; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10242; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10243; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10244; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10245; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10246; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10247; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10248; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10249; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10252; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10253; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10254; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10255; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10256; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10257; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10258; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10259; 8; 10/2017

124-90096-10261; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10263; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10264; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10265; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10266; 6; 10/2017

124-90096-10267; 6; 10/2017

124-90096-10268; 5; 10/2017

124-90096-10269; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10270; 19; 10/2017

124-90096-10271; 7; 10/2017

124-90096-10272; 2; 10/2017

124-90096-10273; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10274; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10275; 7; 10/2017

[redacted]

124-90096-10276; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10278; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10279; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10280; 3; 10/2017

124-90096-10281; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10282; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10283; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10284; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10284; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10286; 4; 10/2017

124-90096-10287; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10289; 14; 10/2017

124-90096-10293; 18; 10/2017

124-90096-10304; 1; 10/2017

124-90096-10318; 13; 10/2017

124-90096-10323; 14; 10/2017

124-90097-10009; 4; 10/2017

124-90097-10011; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10012; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10013; 6; 10/2017

124-90097-10014; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10018; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10019; 7; 10/2017

124-90097-10020; 4; 10/2017

124-90097-10021; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10023; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10033; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10034; 11; 10/2017

124-90097-10037; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10070; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10073; 3; 10/2017

124-90097-10081; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10082; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10083; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10084; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10085; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10086; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10087; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10088; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10089; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10091; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10092; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10093; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10095; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10096; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10098; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10100; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10103; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10105; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10108; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10109; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10110; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10121; 6; 10/2017

124-90097-10122; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10145; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10164; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10176; 621; 10/2017

124-90097-10195; 23; 10/2017

124-90097-10195; 23; 10/2017

124-90097-10198; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10200; 3; 10/2017

124-90097-10204; 4; 10/2017

124-90097-10207; 4; 10/2017

124-90097-10210; 3; 10/2017

124-90097-10211; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10214; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10215; 3; 10/2017

124-90097-10228; 2; 10/2017

124-90097-10229; 4; 10/2017

124-90097-10234; 12; 10/2017

124-90097-10236; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10243; 4; 10/2017

124-90097-10247; 4; 10/2017

124-90097-10248; 4; 10/2017

124-90097-10249; 11; 10/2017

124-90097-10251; 1; 10/2017

124-90097-10252; 1; 10/2017

124-90113-10019; 15; 10/2017

JCS Documents: Postponed in Part

202-10001-10162; 1; 10/2017

202-10001-10163; 1; 10/2017

202-10001-10166; 16; 10/2017

202-10001-10167; 8; 10/2017

202-10001-10168; 1; 10/2017

202-10001-10169; 8; 10/2017

202-10001-10170; 1; 10/2017

202-10001-10178; 1; 10/2017

202-10001-10179; 2; 10/2017

202-10001-10182; 5; 10/2017

202-10001-10184; 1; 10/2017

202-10001-10185; 9; 10/2017

202-10001-10187; 5; 10/2017

202-10001-10189; 6; 10/2017

202-10001-10190; 3; 10/2017

202-10001-10191; 4; 10/2017

202-10001-10192; 3; 10/2017

202-10001-10193; 1; 10/2017

202-10001-10194; 2; 10/2017

202-10001-10196; 3; 10/2017

202-10001-10197; 1; 10/2017

202-10001-10198; 2; 10/2017

202-10001-10208; 2; 10/2017

202-10001-10210; 10; 10/2017

202-10001-10211; 7; 10/2017

202-10001-10237; 1; 10/2017

202-10001-10238; 2; 10/2017

202-10001-10241; 3; 10/2017

202-10001-10242; 2; 10/2017

JFK Library Documents: Postponed in Full

176-10011-10111; 2; 10/2017

LBJ Library Documents:Postponed in Full

177-10001-10298; 1; 10/2017

NARA Documents: Postponed in Part

179-20001-10330; 5; 10/2017

OSD Documents: Postponed in Part

195-10005-10020; 1; 10/2017

Pike Committee Documents: Postponed in Part

135-10001-10246; 30; 10/2017

US ARMY (Califano) Documents: Open in Full

198-10005-10106; 0; None

198-10005-10107; 0; None

US ARMY (Califano) Documents: Postponed in Part

198-10005-10105; 3; 10/2017

US ARMY (IRR) Documents: Open in Full

194-10001-10360; 0; None

194-10002-10045; 0; None

194-10002-10217; 0; None

194-10002-10218; 0; None

194-10002-10219; 0; None

194-10002-10220; 0; None

194-10002-10221; 0; None

194-10002-10224; 0; None

194-10002-10239; 0; None

194-10002-10240; 0; None

194-10002-10241; 0; None

194-10002-10242; 0; None

194-10002-10243; 0; None

194-10002-10244; 0; None

194-10002-10245; 0; None

194-10002-10246; 0; None

194-10002-10247; 0; None

194-10002-10249; 0; None

194-10002-10250; 0; None

194-10002-10251; 0; None

194-10002-10252; 0; None

194-10002-10255; 0; None

194-10002-10257; 0; None

194-10002-10258; 0; None

194-10002-10259; 0; None

194-10002-10260; 0; None

194-10002-10261; 0; None

194-10002-10262; 0; None

194-10002-10263; 0; None

194-10002-10264; 0; None

194-10002-10265; 0; None

194-10002-10266; 0; None

194-10002-10268; 0; None

194-10002-10269; 0; None

194-10002-10271; 0; None

194-10002-10273; 0; None

194-10002-10274; 0; None

194-10002-10275; 0; None

194-10002-10276; 0; None

194-10002-10277; 0; None

194-10002-10278; 0; None

194-10002-10279; 0; None

194-10002-10280; 0; None

194-10002-10281; 0; None

194-10002-10282; 0; None

194-10002-10283; 0; None

194-10002-10284; 0; None

194-10002-10285; 0; None

194-10002-10286; 0; None

194-10002-10288; 0; None

194-10002-10289; 0; None

194-10002-10290; 0; None

194-10002-10291; 0; None

194-10002-10292; 0; None

194-10002-10293; 0; None

194-10002-10294; 0; None

194-10002-10296; 0; None

194-10002-10297; 0; None

194-10002-10298; 0; None

194-10002-10299; 0; None

194-10002-10300; 0; None

194-10002-10301; 0; None

194-10002-10302; 0; None

194-10002-10303; 0; None

194-10002-10304; 0; None

194-10002-10305; 0; None

194-10002-10308; 0; None

194-10002-10309; 0; None

194-10002-10310; 0; None

194-10002-10311; 0; None

194-10002-10313; 0; None

194-10002-10315; 0; None

194-10002-10317; 0; None

194-10002-10318; 0; None

194-10002-10320; 0; None

194-10002-10321; 0; None

194-10002-10322; 0; None

194-10002-10324; 0; None

194-10002-10329; 0; None

194-10002-10330; 0; None

194-10002-10331; 0; None

194-10003-10013; 0; None

194-10003-10015; 0; None

194-10003-10016; 0; None

194-10003-10017; 0; None

194-10003-10019; 0; None

194-10003-10022; 0; None

194-10003-10023; 0; None

194-10003-10024; 0; None

194-10003-10025; 0; None

194-10003-10026; 0; None

194-10003-10027; 0; None

194-10003-10028; 0; None

194-10003-10029; 0; None

194-10003-10030; 0; None

194-10003-10032; 0; None

194-10003-10033; 0; None

194-10003-10034; 0; None

194-10003-10035; 0; None

194-10003-10036; 0; None

194-10003-10037; 0; None

194-10003-10038; 0; None

194-10003-10039; 0; None

194-10003-10040; 0; None

194-10003-10041; 0; None

194-10003-10042; 0; None

194-10003-10043; 0; None

194-10003-10044; 0; None

194-10003-10045; 0; None

194-10003-10046; 0; None

194-10003-10047; 0; None

194-10003-10048; 0; None

194-10003-10049; 0; None

194-10003-10050; 0; None

194-10003-10091; 0; None

194-10003-10092; 0; None

194-10003-10093; 0; None

194-10003-10094; 0; None

194-10003-10095; 0; None

194-10003-10096; 0; None

194-10003-10097; 0; None

194-10003-10098; 0; None

194-10003-10099; 0; None

194-10003-10100; 0; None

194-10003-10101; 0; None

194-10003-10102; 0; None

194-10003-10103; 0; None

194-10003-10104; 0; None

194-10003-10105; 0; None

194-10003-10106; 0; None

194-10003-10107; 0; None

194-10003-10108; 0; None

194-10003-10109; 0; None

194-10003-10112; 0; None

194-10003-10113; 0; None

194-10003-10114; 0; None

194-10003-10115; 0; None

194-10003-10116; 0; None

194-10003-10117; 0; None

194-10003-10118; 0; None

194-10003-10119; 0; None

194-10003-10120; 0; None

194-10003-10121; 0; None

194-10003-10122; 0; None

194-10003-10124; 0; None

194-10003-10125; 0; None

194-10003-10126; 0; None

194-10003-10127; 0; None

194-10003-10128; 0; None

194-10003-10130; 0; None

194-10003-10131; 0; None

194-10003-10132; 0; None

194-10003-10134; 0; None

194-10003-10135; 0; None

194-10003-10136; 0; None

194-10003-10137; 0; None

194-10003-10139; 0; None

194-10003-10140; 0; None

194-10003-10141; 0; None

194-10003-10142; 0; None

194-10003-10143; 0; None

194-10003-10144; 0; None

194-10003-10145; 0; None

194-10003-10146; 0; None

194-10003-10147; 0; None

194-10003-10148; 0; None

194-10003-10149; 0; None

194-10003-10150; 0; None

194-10003-10151; 0; None

194-10003-10152; 0; None

194-10003-10153; 0; None

194-10003-10154; 0; None

194-10003-10155; 0; None

194-10003-10157; 0; None

194-10003-10158; 0; None

194-10003-10160; 0; None

194-10003-10161; 0; None

194-10003-10169; 0; None

194-10003-10170; 0; None

194-10003-10171; 0; None

194-10003-10172; 0; None

194-10003-10173; 0; None

194-10003-10174; 0; None

194-10003-10175; 0; None

194-10003-10176; 0; None

194-10003-10177; 0; None

194-10003-10179; 0; None

194-10003-10180; 0; None

194-10003-10181; 0; None

194-10003-10183; 0; None

194-10003-10184; 0; None

194-10003-10185; 0; None

194-10003-10186; 0; None

194-10003-10187; 0; None

194-10003-10189; 0; None

194-10003-10190; 0; None

194-10003-10191; 0; None

194-10003-10192; 0; None

194-10003-10193; 0; None

194-10003-10194; 0; None

194-10003-10195; 0; None

194-10003-10197; 0; None

194-10003-10198; 0; None

194-10003-10202; 0; None

194-10003-10203; 0; None

194-10003-10204; 0; None

194-10003-10205; 0; None

194-10003-10209; 0; None

194-10003-10231; 0; None

194-10003-10240; 0; None

194-10003-10248; 0; None

194-10003-10249; 0; None

194-10003-10250; 0; None

194-10003-10253; 0; None

194-10003-10254; 0; None

194-10003-10257; 0; None

194-10003-10270; 0; None

194-10003-10273; 0; None

194-10003-10274; 0; None

194-10003-10305; 0; None

194-10003-10382; 0; None

194-10003-10386; 0; None

194-10013-10325; 0; None

194-10013-10327; 0; None

194-10013-10329; 0; None

194-10013-10430; 0; None

194-10013-10431; 0; None

194-10013-10432; 0; None

US ARMY (IRR) Documents: Postponed in Part

194-10002-10023; 6; 10/2017

194-10002-10024; 5; 10/2017

194-10002-10026; 11; 10/2017

194-10002-10034; 2; 10/2017

194-10002-10035; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10037; 2; 10/2017

194-10002-10042; 2; 10/2017

194-10002-10046; 0; 10/2017

194-10002-10146; 6; 10/2017

194-10002-10147; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10148; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10151; 3; 10/2017

194-10002-10153; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10154; 3; 10/2017

194-10002-10216; 3; 10/2017

194-10002-10222; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10223; 5; 10/2017

194-10002-10228; 2; 10/2017

194-10002-10248; 2; 10/2017

194-10002-10256; 5; 10/2017

194-10002-10267; 3; 10/2017

194-10002-10270; 2; 10/2017

194-10002-10287; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10295; 4; 10/2017

194-10002-10319; 38; 10/2017

194-10002-10328; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10000; 21; 10/2017

194-10003-10012; 28; 10/2017

194-10003-10014; 3; 10/2017

194-10003-10020; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10021; 3; 10/2017

194-10003-10031; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10110; 7; 10/2017

194-10003-10111; 3; 10/2017

194-10003-10138; 179; 10/2017

194-10003-10165; 5; 10/2017

194-10003-10178; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10188; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10196; 11; 10/2017

194-10003-10199; 3; 10/2017

194-10003-10200; 12; 10/2017

194-10003-10201; 15; 10/2017

194-10003-10206; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10207; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10208; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10210; 83; 10/2017

194-10003-10211; 11; 10/2017

194-10003-10229; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10232; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10233; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10234; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10235; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10236; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10237; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10238; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10241; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10243; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10259; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10260; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10261; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10280; 4; 10/2017

194-10003-10281; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10287; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10288; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10292; 3; 10/2017

194-10003-10310; 4; 10/2017

194-10003-10381; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10384; 3; 10/2017

194-10003-10385; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10387; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10388; 3; 10/2017

194-10003-10389; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10390; 4; 10/2017

194-10003-10391; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10392; 4; 10/2017

194-10003-10393; 25; 10/2017

194-10003-10394; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10407; 4; 10/2017

194-10003-10408; 5; 10/2017

194-10003-10409; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10411; 5; 10/2017

194-10003-10413; 6; 10/2017

194-10003-10415; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10416; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10417; 4; 10/2017

194-10003-10419; 4; 10/2017

194-10003-10420; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10421; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10422; 8; 10/2017

194-10003-10423; 5; 10/2017

194-10003-10424; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10425; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10426; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10427; 11; 10/2017

194-10003-10428; 3; 10/2017

194-10003-10429; 2; 10/2017

194-10003-10430; 1; 10/2017

194-10003-10431; 4; 10/2017

194-10003-10433; 6; 10/2017

194-10005-10029; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10030; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10031; 40; 10/2017

194-10005-10033; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10034; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10035; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10037; 5; 10/2017

194-10005-10040; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10041; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10042; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10043; 27; 10/2017

194-10005-10044; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10045; 8; 10/2017

194-10005-10046; 10; 10/2017

194-10005-10047; 9; 10/2017

194-10005-10048; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10049; 4; 10/2017

194-10005-10050; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10051; 4; 10/2017

194-10005-10052; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10053; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10054; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10055; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10056; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10057; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10058; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10059; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10061; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10062; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10063; 13; 10/2017

194-10005-10064; 10; 10/2017

194-10005-10065; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10066; 6; 10/2017

194-10005-10067; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10068; 6; 10/2017

194-10005-10069; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10070; 7; 10/2017

194-10005-10071; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10072; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10073; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10074; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10075; 4; 10/2017

194-10005-10076; 4; 10/2017

194-10005-10077; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10078; 5; 10/2017

194-10005-10112; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10113; 4; 10/2017

194-10005-10114; 6; 10/2017

194-10005-10115; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10116; 1; 10/2017

194-10007-10440; 1; 10/2017

194-10007-10441; 4; 10/2017

194-10007-10442; 8; 10/2017

194-10007-10443; 26; 10/2017

194-10007-10444; 19; 10/2017

194-10007-10446; 2; 10/2017

194-10007-10448; 2; 10/2017

194-10007-10449; 3; 10/2017

194-10007-10451; 3; 10/2017

194-10008-10251; 1; 10/2017

194-10008-10252; 1; 10/2017

194-10008-10253; 34; 10/2017

194-10008-10268; 5; 10/2017

194-10013-10328; 1; 10/2017

194-10013-10357; 2; 10/2017

194-10013-10426; 9; 10/2017

194-10013-10427; 9; 10/2017

The Review Board also determined that the following records are not believed relevant to the JFK assassination:

CIA Documents

104-10079-10281

LBJ Library Documents

177-10001-10277

177-10001-10279

177-10001-10280

US ARMY (IRR) Documents

194-10010-10376

194-10012-10001

194-10012-10002

194-10012-10003

194-10012-10004

194-10012-10005

194-10012-10006

194-10012-10007

194-10012-10009

194-10012-10010

194-10012-10011

194-10012-10040

194-10012-10137

194-10012-10138

194-10012-10139

NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL RELEASES

After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board announces that the following National Security Agency records are now being opened in full: 144-10001-10050; 144-10001-10216

After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board announces that the following Johnson Library record is now being opened in full: 177-10002-10026

After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board announces that the following U.S. Army records (IRR) are now being opened in full: 194-10002-10022; 194-10002-10025; 194-10002-10027; 194-10002-10028; 194-10002-10029; 194-10002-10030; 194-10002-10031; 194-10002-10032; 194-10002-10033; 194-10002-10038; 194-10002-10039; 194-10002-10040; 194-10002-10041; 194-10002-10043; 194-10002-10044; 194-10002-10149; 194-10002-10225; 194-10002-10226; 194-10002-10227; 194-10002-10229; 194-10002-10230; 194-10002-10231; 194-10002-10232; 194-10002-10233; 194-10002-10234; 194-10002-10235; 194-10002-10236; 194-10002-10237; 194-10002-10238; 194-10002-10253; 194-10002-10272; 194-10002-10306; 194-10002-10307; 194-10002-10312; 194-10002-10314; 194-10002-10316; 194-10002-10323; 194-10002-10325; 194-10002-10326; 194-

10002-10327; 194-10002-10332; 194-10002-10333; 194-10002-10334; 194-10002-10335; 194-10002-10336; 194-10002-10337; 194-10003-10001; 194-10003-10002; 194-10003-10003; 194-10003-10004; 194-10003-10005; 194-10003-10006; 194-10003-10007; 194-10003-10008; 194-10003-10009; 194-10003-10010; 194-10003-10011; 194-10003-10123; 194-10003-10129; 194-10003-10133; 194-10003-10156; 194-10003-10159; 194-10003-10162; 194-10003-10163; 194-10003-10163; 194-10003-10164; 194-10003-10166; 194-10003-10167; 194-10003-10168; 194-10003-10182; 194-10003-10228; 194-10003-10230; 194-10003-10239; 194-10003-10242; 194-10003-10244; 194-10003-10245; 194-10003-10246; 194-10003-10247; 194-10003-10251; 194-10003-10252; 194-10003-10255; 194-10003-10256; 194-10003-10258; 194-10003-10262; 194-10003-10264; 194-10003-10265; 194-10003-10266; 194-10003-10267; 194-10003-10268; 194-10003-10269; 194-10003-10271; 194-10003-10272; 194-10003-10275; 194-10003-10276; 194-10003-10277; 194-10003-10278; 194-10003-10279; 194-10003-10282; 194-10003-10283; 194-10003-10284; 194-10003-10285; 194-10003-10286; 194-10003-10290; 194-10003-10291; 194-10003-10293; 194-10003-10294; 194-10003-10295; 194-10003-10296; 194-10003-10297; 194-10003-10298; 194-10003-10299; 194-10003-10301; 194-10003-10303; 194-10003-10304; 194-10003-10306; 194-10003-10307; 194-10003-10308; 194-10003-10309; 194-10003-10311; 194-10003-10312; 194-10003-10313; 194-10003-10314; 194-10003-10315; 194-10003-10316; 194-10003-10317; 194-10003-10318; 194-10003-10319; 194-10003-10320; 194-10003-10321; 194-10003-10322; 194-10003-10323; 194-10003-10324; 194-10003-10325; 194-10003-10326; 194-10003-10327; 194-10003-10328; 194-10003-10329; 194-10003-10330; 194-10003-10331; 194-10003-10383; 194-10003-10395; 194-10003-10397; 194-10003-10398; 194-10003-10399; 194-10003-10400; 194-10003-10401; 194-10003-10402; 194-10003-10403; 194-10003-10404; 194-10003-10404; 194-10003-10405; 194-10003-10406; 194-10003-10410; 194-10003-10412; 194-10003-10414; 194-10003-10418; 194-10003-10432; 194-10005-10038; 194-10005-10039; 194-10005-10133; 194-10005-10134; 194-10005-10135; 194-10005-10136; 194-10005-10137; 194-10005-10138; 194-10005-10139; 194-10007-10445; 194-10007-10447; 194-10007-10450; 194-10013-10322; 194-10013-10355; 194-10013-10356; 194-10013-10358; 194-10013-10399; 194-10013-10400; 194-10013-10401; 194-10013-10402; 194-10013-10403; 194-10013-10404; 194-10013-10405; 194-10013-10406; 194-10013-10407; 194-10013-10408; 194-10013-10409; 194-10013-10410; 194-10013-10411; 194-10013-10412; 194-10013-10413; 194-10013-10414; 194-10013-10415; 194-10013-10416; 194-10013-10417; 194-10013-10418; 194-10013-10419; 194-10013-10420; 194-10013-10421; 194-10013-10422; 194-10013-10423; 194-10013-10424; 194-10013-10425; 194-10013-10425; 194-10013-10428; 194-10013-10429

After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board announces that the following Joint Chiefs of Staff records are now being opened in full:

202-10001-10007; 202-10001-10008; 202-10001-10195; 202-10001-10235; 202-10001-10236; 202-10001-10239; 202-10001-10253

After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board announces that the following JFK Library records are now being opened in full: 176-10010-10143; 176-10010-10144; 176-10011-10138

After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board announces that the following Church Committee records are now being opened in full: 157-10004-10091; 157-10004-10128; 157-10004-10149; 157-10005-10078; 157-10005-10078; 157-10005-10177; 157-10005-10273; 157-10005-10367; 157-10008-10067; 157-10008-10198; 157-10011-10021; 157-10011-10022

On September 14, 1998, the Review Board made formal determinations on records it reviewed under the JFK Act. These determinations are listed below. The assassination records are identified by the record identification number assigned in the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection database maintained by the National Archives.

NOTICE OF FORMAL DETERMINATIONS

For each document, the number of postponements sustained immediately follows the record identification number, followed, where appropriate, by the date the document is scheduled to be released or re-reviewed.

CIA Documents: Postponed in Part

104-10054-10031; 10; 10/1999

104-10059-10238; 23; 10/2017

104-10062-10005; 138; 05/2001

104-10063-10198; 11; 10/2017

104-10065-10102; 68; 10/1999

104-10065-10289; 3; 10/1999

104-10067-10162; 18; 10/1999

104-10067-10441; 4; 10/1999

104-10072-10228; 70; 10/1999

104-10072-10234; 6; 10/1999

104-10079-10096; 10; 05/2001

104-10091-10005; 34; 10/2017

104-10093-10315; 1; 10/1999

104-10096-10337; 1; 10/2017

104-10097-10229; 1; 10/1999

104-10097-10263; 5; 10/1999

104-10097-10305; 15; 10/1999

104-10097-10327; 13; 10/1999

104-10134-10015; 7; 10/2017

104-10175-10179; 118; 10/2017

104-10180-10113; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10114; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10115; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10116; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10117; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10118; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10119; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10120; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10121; 1; 10/2017

104-10180-10122; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10123; 1; 10/2017

104-10180-10124; 13; 10/2017

104-10180-10125; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10126; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10127; 5; 10/2017

104-10180-10128; 5; 10/2017

104-10180-10129; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10130; 9; 10/2017

104-10180-10131; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10132; 10; 10/2017

104-10180-10134; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10135; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10136; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10137; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10138; 70; 10/2017

104-10180-10139; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10140; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10141; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10142; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10143; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10144; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10145; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10146; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10147; 8; 10/2017

104-10180-10148; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10149; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10150; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10151; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10152; 8; 10/2017

104-10180-10153; 1; 10/2017

104-10180-10154; 30; 10/2017

104-10180-10155; 5; 10/2017

104-10180-10156; 41; 10/2017

104-10180-10157; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10158; 5; 10/2017

104-10180-10159; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10160; 14; 10/2017

104-10180-10161; 11; 10/2017

104-10180-10162; 10; 10/2017

104-10180-10163; 8; 10/2017

104-10180-10164; 12; 10/2017

104-10180-10165; 11; 10/2017

104-10180-10166; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10167; 5; 10/2017

104-10180-10168; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10169; 11; 10/2017

104-10180-10170; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10171; 15; 10/2017

104-10180-10172; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10173; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10174; 13; 10/2017

104-10180-10175; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10176; 9; 10/2017

104-10180-10177; 1; 10/2017

104-10180-10178; 19; 10/2017

104-10180-10179; 7; 10/2017

104-10180-10180; 16; 10/2017

104-10180-10181; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10182; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10183; 6; 10/2017

104-10180-10184; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10185; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10186; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10187; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10188; 11; 10/2017

104-10180-10189; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10190; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10191; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10193; 5; 10/2017

104-10180-10194; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10195; 5; 10/2017

104-10180-10196; 5; 10/2017

104-10180-10197; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10198; 12; 10/2017

104-10180-10199; 1; 10/2017

104-10180-10200; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10201; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10202; 6; 10/2017

104-10180-10203; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10204; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10205; 15; 10/2017

104-10180-10206; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10207; 19; 10/2017

104-10180-10212; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10213; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10214; 1; 10/2017

104-10180-10215; 25; 10/2017

104-10180-10217; 1; 10/2017

104-10180-10218; 15; 10/2017

104-10180-10219; 9; 10/2017

104-10180-10220; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10221; 5; 10/2017

104-10180-10222; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10223; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10224; 12; 10/2017

104-10180-10225; 4; 10/2017

104-10180-10226; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10227; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10228; 3; 10/2017

104-10180-10229; 5; 10/2017

104-10180-10230; 5; 10/2017

104-10180-10231; 10; 10/2017

104-10180-10233; 7; 10/2017

104-10180-10234; 2; 10/2017

104-10180-10235; 6; 10/2017

104-10180-10236; 1; 10/2017

104-10413-10039; 4; 10/2017

104-10413-10040; 1; 10/2017

104-10413-10042; 1; 10/2017

104-10413-10044; 7; 10/2017

104-10413-10046; 1; 10/2017

104-10413-10047; 12; 10/2017

104-10413-10048; 3; 10/2017

104-10413-10049; 6; 10/2017

104-10413-10050; 6; 10/2017

104-10413-10051; 2; 10/2017

104-10413-10052; 3; 10/2017

104-10413-10053; 13; 10/2017

104-10413-10054; 10; 10/1999

104-10413-10055; 1; 10/2017

104-10413-10056; 1; 10/2017

104-10413-10057; 1; 10/2017

104-10413-10058; 1; 10/2017

104-10413-10059; 20; 10/2017

104-10413-10060; 3; 10/2017

104-10413-10061; 2; 10/2017

104-10413-10063; 1; 10/2017

104-10413-10064; 25; 10/1999

104-10414-10002; 9; 10/2017

104-10414-10025; 3; 10/2017

104-10414-10026; 1; 10/2017

104-10414-10035; 4; 10/2017

104-10414-10036; 7; 10/2017

104-10414-10040; 2; 10/2017

104-10414-10051; 4; 05/2001

104-10414-10053; 9; 10/2017

104-10414-10054; 19; 10/2017

104-10414-10055; 8; 10/2017

104-10414-10057; 1; 10/2017

104-10414-10058; 3; 10/2017

104-10414-10060; 3; 10/2017

104-10414-10072; 1; 10/2017

104-10414-10075; 9; 10/2017

104-10414-10076; 1; 10/2017

104-10414-10077; 2; 10/2017

104-10414-10078; 7; 10/1999

104-10414-10080; 13; 10/2017

104-10414-10081; 2; 10/2017

104-10414-10083; 1; 10/2017

104-10414-10084; 31; 10/2017

104-10414-10086; 46; 10/2017

104-10414-10087; 5; 10/2017

104-10414-10088; 8; 10/2017

104-10414-10090; 1; 10/2017

104-10414-10092; 1; 10/1999

104-10414-10093; 1; 10/2017

104-10414-10102; 2; 10/2017

104-10414-10103; 36; 10/2017

104-10414-10110; 174; 10/2017

104-10414-10111; 12; 10/2017

104-10414-10113; 1; 10/2017

104-10414-10117; 3; 10/2017

104-10414-10123; 1; 10/2017

104-10418-10002; 1; 10/2017

104-10418-10005; 2; 10/2017

104-10418-10010; 1; 10/2017

104-10418-10015; 2; 10/2017

104-10418-10016; 2; 10/2017

104-10418-10017; 3; 10/2017

104-10418-10019; 2; 10/2017

104-10418-10020; 2; 10/2017

104-10418-10029; 3; 10/2017

104-10418-10030; 4; 10/2017

104-10418-10034; 8; 10/2017

104-10418-10040; 6; 10/2017

104-10418-10041; 22; 10/2017

104-10418-10045; 11; 10/2017

104-10418-10046; 16; 10/2017

104-10418-10048; 7; 10/2017

104-10418-10101; 7; 10/2017

104-10418-10102; 1; 10/2017

104-10418-10103; 8; 10/2017

104-10418-10104; 6; 10/2017

104-10418-10105; 7; 10/2017

104-10419-10000; 3; 05/2001

104-10419-10001; 5; 05/2001

104-10419-10002; 2; 10/2017

104-10419-10003; 1; 10/2017

104-10419-10004; 2; 05/2001

104-10419-10005; 2; 10/2017

104-10419-10006; 2; 10/2017

104-10419-10007; 1; 10/2017

104-10419-10008; 2; 05/2001

104-10419-10009; 3; 10/2017

104-10419-10010; 2; 05/2001

104-10419-10011; 1; 10/2017

104-10422-10006; 4; 10/2017

104-10422-10019; 15; 10/2017

104-10422-10020; 1; 10/2017

104-10422-10022; 4; 10/2017

104-10422-10024; 35; 10/2017

104-10422-10026; 15; 10/2017

104-10422-10040; 2; 10/2017

104-10422-10041; 1; 10/2017

104-10422-10051; 1; 10/2017

104-10422-10052; 1; 10/2017

104-10422-10053; 2; 10/2017

104-10422-10054; 3; 10/2017

104-10422-10055; 21; 10/2017

104-10422-10056; 9; 10/2017

104-10422-10057; 3; 10/2017

104-10422-10058; 2; 05/2001

104-10422-10059; 36; 10/2017

104-10422-10061; 1; 10/2017

104-10423-10000; 1; 10/2017

104-10423-10001; 1; 10/2017

104-10423-10002; 5; 05/2001

104-10423-10003; 7; 10/2017

104-10425-10004; 3; 10/2017

104-10425-10005; 4; 10/2017

104-10425-10006; 1; 10/2017

104-10425-10007; 1; 10/2017

104-10425-10008; 2; 10/2017

104-10428-10010; 1; 10/2017

104-10428-10011; 2; 10/2017

104-10428-10012; 3; 10/2017

104-10428-10013; 1; 10/2017

104-10428-10014; 4; 10/2017

104-10428-10015; 6; 05/2001

104-10428-10016; 1; 05/2001

104-10428-10017; 3; 10/2017

104-10428-10018; 3; 10/2017

104-10428-10019; 12; 10/2017

104-10428-10020; 4; 05/2001

104-10429-10000; 4; 10/2017

104-10429-10001; 3; 10/2017

104-10429-10002; 1; 10/2017

104-10431-10000; 1; 10/2017

104-10431-10002; 18; 10/2017

104-10431-10004; 2; 10/2017

104-10433-10000; 1; 10/2017

104-10433-10001; 2; 10/2017

104-10433-10002; 1; 10/2017

104-10433-10003; 3; 10/2017

104-10433-10006; 8; 05/2001

104-10433-10009; 1; 05/2001

104-10433-10012; 9; 10/2017

104-10433-10013; 3; 05/2001

DOJ Documents: Open in Full

186-10007-10000; 0; 10/2017

186-10007-10006; 0; 10/2017

186-10007-10007; 0; None

186-10007-10008; 0; None

186-10007-10009; 0; None

186-10007-10012; 0; None
186-10008-10000; 0; None
186-10008-10001; 0; None
186-10008-10002; 0; None

DOJ Documents: Postponed in Part

186-10007-10001; 0; 10/2017
186-10007-10002; 0; 10/2017
186-10007-10003; 0; 10/2017
186-10007-10004; 0; 10/2017
186-10007-10005; 1; 10/2017
186-10007-10011; 1; 10/2017
186-10007-10012; 5; 10/2017
186-10008-10003; 1; 10/2017

FBI Documents: Postponed in Part

124-10211-10481; 3; 10/2017
124-10211-10482; 6; 10/2017
124-10212-10221; 5; 10/2017
124-10212-10222; 1; 10/2017
124-10212-10224; 1; 10/2017
124-10225-10480; 23; 10/2017
124-10225-10486; 14; 10/2017
124-10225-10488; 1; 10/2017
124-10225-10490; 12; 10/2017
124-10225-10491; 1; 10/2017
124-10225-10492; 2; 10/2017
124-10225-10493; 1; 10/2017
124-10225-10495; 6; 10/2017
124-10225-10496; 1; 10/2017

124-10225-10497; 1; 10/2017

124-10225-10498; 1; 10/2017

124-10225-10499; 1; 10/2017

124-10277-10453; 24; 10/2017

124-10280-10048; 23; 10/2017

124-10280-10049; 5; 10/2017

124-10280-10050; 2; 10/2017

124-10280-10051; 24; 10/2017

124-10280-10052; 1; 10/2017

124-10280-10053; 4; 10/2017

124-10280-10054; 2; 10/2017

124-10280-10058; 2; 10/2017

124-10280-10059; 11; 10/2017

124-10280-10061; 4; 10/2017

124-10280-10063; 2; 10/2017

124-10280-10064; 1; 10/2017

124-10280-10071; 3; 10/2017

124-10280-10072; 3; 10/2017

124-10280-10073; 1; 10/2017

124-10280-10074; 2; 10/2017

124-10280-10075; 2; 10/2017

124-10280-10076; 2; 10/2017

124-10280-10077; 2; 10/2017

124-10280-10078; 1; 10/2017

124-10280-10080; 4; 10/2017

124-10280-10081; 1; 10/2017

124-10280-10082; 1; 10/2017

124-10280-10083; 2; 10/2017

124-10280-10084; 1; 10/2017
124-10280-10085; 1; 10/2017
124-10282-10290; 10; 10/2017
124-10282-10291; 2; 10/2017
124-10282-10295; 19; 10/2017
124-10282-10297; 19; 10/2017
124-10282-10299; 11; 10/2017
124-10290-10039; 3; 10/2017
124-10290-10040; 5; 10/2017
124-10290-10041; 6; 10/2017
124-10290-10042; 8; 10/2017
124-10290-10043; 5; 10/2017
124-10290-10044; 12; 10/2017
124-10290-10045; 4; 10/2017
124-10290-10046; 5; 10/2017
124-10290-10048; 12; 10/2017
124-10290-10049; 34; 10/2017
124-10290-10050; 63; 10/2017
124-10290-10051; 1; 10/2017
124-10290-10052; 2; 10/2017
124-10290-10057; 1; 10/2017
124-10290-10058; 1; 10/2017
124-10290-10059; 3; 10/2017
124-10290-10142; 27; 10/2017
124-10336-10087; 2; 10/2017
124-10336-10319; 5; 10/2017
124-10336-10326; 3; 10/2017
124-90046-10002; 2; 10/2017

124-90046-10009; 3; 10/2017

124-90046-10012; 3; 10/2017

124-90046-10013; 4; 10/2017

124-90046-10021; 3; 10/2017

124-90046-10023; 7; 10/2017

124-90046-10025; 3; 10/2017

124-90046-10028; 1; 10/2017

124-90046-10030; 9; 10/2017

124-90106-10010; 2; 10/2017

124-90106-10012; 3; 10/2017

124-90106-10014; 3; 10/2017

124-90106-10019; 2; 10/2017

124-90106-10020; 2; 10/2017

124-90106-10029; 4; 10/2017

124-90106-10034; 2; 10/2017

124-90106-10035; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10046; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10048; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10054; 2; 10/2017

124-90106-10060; 2; 10/2017

124-90106-10061; 2; 10/2017

124-90106-10066; 11; 10/2017

124-90106-10082; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10092; 4; 10/2017

124-90106-10100; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10110; 46; 10/2017

124-90106-10111; 13; 10/2017

124-90106-10112; 16; 10/2017

124-90106-10113; 12; 10/2017

124-90106-10114; 9; 10/2017

124-90106-10124; 22; 10/2017

124-90106-10127; 4; 10/2017

124-90106-10131; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10146; 8; 10/2017

124-90106-10151; 4; 10/2017

124-90106-10152; 2; 10/2017

124-90106-10153; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10154; 3; 10/2017

124-90106-10164; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10179; 3; 10/2017

124-90106-10187; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10190; 4; 10/2017

124-90106-10197; 2; 10/2017

124-90106-10201; 5; 10/2017

124-90106-10202; 4; 10/2017

124-90106-10203; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10210; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10217; 1; 10/2017

124-90106-10222; 2; 10/2017

124-90106-10224; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10004; 6; 10/2017

124-90107-10005; 4; 10/2017

124-90107-10020; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10024; 4; 10/2017

124-90107-10035; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10040; 3; 10/2017

124-90107-10042; 2; 10/2017
124-90107-10048; 2; 10/2017
124-90107-10051; 4; 10/2017
124-90107-10053; 2; 10/2017
124-90107-10056; 2; 10/2017
124-90107-10058; 2; 10/2017
124-90107-10060; 3; 10/2017
124-90107-10062; 2; 10/2017
124-90107-10064; 16; 10/2017
124-90107-10065; 15; 10/2017
124-90107-10066; 14; 10/2017
124-90107-10067; 1; 10/2017
124-90107-10069; 2; 10/2017
124-90107-10082; 1; 10/2017
124-90107-10083; 1; 10/2017
124-90107-10087; 2; 10/2017
124-90107-10112; 2; 10/2017
124-90107-10115; 1; 10/2017
124-90107-10120; 1; 10/2017
124-90107-10121; 16; 10/2017
124-90107-10123; 26; 10/2017
124-90107-10124; 36; 10/2017
124-90107-10129; 1; 10/2017
124-90107-10131; 6; 10/2017
124-90107-10131; 6; 10/2017
124-90107-10134; 1; 10/2017
124-90107-10136; 1; 10/2017
124-90107-10138; 7; 10/2017

124-90107-10139; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10140; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10143; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10145; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10154; 9; 10/2017

124-90107-10155; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10184; 12; 10/2017

124-90107-10185; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10190; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10191; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10192; 21; 10/2017

124-90107-10195; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10206; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10207; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10213; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10216; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10217; 6; 10/2017

124-90107-10236; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10246; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10248; 7; 10/2017

124-90107-10260; 3; 10/2017

124-90107-10260; 3; 10/2017

124-90107-10267; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10271; 3; 10/2017

124-90107-10289; 5; 10/2017

124-90107-10291; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10292; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10292; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10294; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10298; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10303; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10312; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10313; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10314; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10315; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10318; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10324; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10335; 6; 10/2017

124-90107-10337; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10340; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10341; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10342; 5; 10/2017

124-90107-10343; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10345; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10349; 4; 10/2017

124-90107-10355; 12; 10/2017

124-90107-10356; 9; 10/2017

124-90107-10368; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10369; 4; 10/2017

124-90107-10376; 13; 10/2017

124-90107-10378; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10382; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10384; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10385; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10387; 4; 10/2017

124-90107-10388; 4; 10/2017

124-90107-10391; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10393; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10395; 5; 10/2017

124-90107-10396; 2; 10/2017

124-90107-10398; 6; 10/2017

124-90107-10399; 4; 10/2017

124-90107-10400; 4; 10/2017

124-90107-10402; 1; 10/2017

124-90107-10403; 3; 10/2017

124-90107-10410; 5; 10/2017

124-90107-10412; 39; 10/2017

124-90107-10413; 5; 10/2017

124-90107-10417; 9; 10/2017

124-90107-10419; 4; 10/2017

HSCA Documents: Open in Full

180-10105-10076; 0; 10/2017

HSCA Documents: Postponed in Part

180-10110-10017; 100; 10/1999

180-10110-10028; 91; 10/2003

180-10113-10119; 35; 10/2003

180-10128-10002; 18; 10/2017

180-10131-10328; 86; 10/2017

180-10142-10250; 3; 10/2017

180-10142-10428; 1; 10/2017

180-10143-10157; 6; 05/2001

180-10143-10297; 28; 10/2017

180-10144-10213; 13; 10/1999

180-10144-10227; 48; 10/1999

180-10144-10240; 7; 10/2017
180-10144-10244; 4; 10/2017
180-10144-10327; 1; 10/2017
180-10145-10078; 1; 10/2017
180-10145-10216; 8; 10/2017
180-10145-10227; 2; 10/2017
180-10145-10234; 2; 10/2017
180-10145-10239; 16; 10/2017
180-10146-10067; 1; 10/2017
180-10147-10190; 1; 10/2017

NSA Documents: Postponed in Part

144-10001-10270; 48; 10/2017
144-10001-10271; 10; 10/2017
144-10001-10272; 10; 10/2017
144-10001-10273; 15; 10/2017
144-10001-10274; 8; 10/2017
144-10001-10275; 19; 10/2017
144-10001-10276; 28; 10/2017
144-10001-10277; 31; 10/2017
144-10001-10279; 38; 10/2017
144-10001-10280; 8; 10/2017
144-10001-10282; 1; 10/2017
144-10001-10283; 34; 10/2017
144-10001-10284; 28; 10/2017
144-10001-10285; 18; 10/2017
144-10001-10286; 28; 10/2017
144-10001-10287; 51; 10/2017
144-10001-10288; 5; 10/2017

144-10001-10289; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10290; 38; 10/2017

144-10001-10292; 26; 10/2017

144-10001-10293; 12; 10/2017

144-10001-10294; 13; 10/2017

144-10001-10295; 10; 10/2017

144-10001-10296; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10297; 13; 10/2017

144-10001-10298; 14; 10/2017

144-10001-10299; 31; 10/2017

144-10001-10300; 9; 10/2017

144-10001-10301; 14; 10/2017

144-10001-10302; 10; 10/2017

144-10001-10303; 8; 10/2017

144-10001-10304; 10; 10/2017

144-10001-10305; 22; 10/2017

144-10001-10306; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10307; 12; 10/2017

144-10001-10308; 8; 10/2017

144-10001-10309; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10310; 24; 10/2017

144-10001-10311; 13; 10/2017

144-10001-10312; 14; 10/2017

144-10001-10313; 9; 10/2017

144-10001-10314; 13; 10/2017

144-10001-10315; 27; 10/2017

144-10001-10316; 13; 10/2017

144-10001-10317; 9; 10/2017

144-10001-10318; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10319; 8; 10/2017

144-10001-10320; 29; 10/2017

144-10001-10321; 8; 10/2017

144-10001-10322; 23; 10/2017

144-10001-10323; 9; 10/2017

144-10001-10324; 12; 10/2017

144-10001-10325; 12; 10/2017

144-10001-10326; 16; 10/2017

144-10001-10327; 12; 10/2017

144-10001-10328; 9; 10/2017

144-10001-10329; 17; 10/2017

144-10001-10330; 16; 10/2017

144-10001-10331; 12; 10/2017

144-10001-10332; 13; 10/2017

144-10001-10333; 12; 10/2017

144-10001-10334; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10335; 13; 10/2017

144-10001-10336; 10; 10/2017

144-10001-10337; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10338; 8; 10/2017

144-10001-10339; 10; 10/2017

144-10001-10340; 13; 10/2017

144-10001-10341; 13; 10/2017

144-10001-10342; 20; 10/2017

144-10001-10343; 9; 10/2017

144-10001-10344; 12; 10/2017

144-10001-10345; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10346; 18; 10/2017

144-10001-10347; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10348; 10; 10/2017

144-10001-10349; 14; 10/2017

144-10001-10350; 13; 10/2017

144-10001-10351; 22; 10/2017

144-10001-10352; 14; 10/2017

144-10001-10353; 8; 10/2017

144-10001-10354; 9; 10/2017

144-10001-10355; 10; 10/2017

144-10001-10356; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10357; 12; 10/2017

144-10001-10358; 16; 10/2017

144-10001-10359; 20; 10/2017

144-10001-10360; 8; 10/2017

144-10001-10361; 9; 10/2017

144-10001-10362; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10363; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10364; 5; 10/2017

144-10001-10365; 26; 10/2017

144-10001-10366; 7; 10/2017

144-10001-10367; 24; 10/2017

144-10001-10368; 10; 10/2017

144-10001-10369; 14; 10/2017

144-10001-10370; 19; 10/2017

144-10001-10371; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10372; 15; 10/2017

144-10001-10373; 11; 10/2017

144-10001-10374; 10; 10/2017

144-10001-10375; 22; 10/2017

144-10001-10376; 49; 10/2017

144-10001-10378; 6; 10/2017

PFIAB Documents: Postponed in Part

206-10001-10000; 25; 10/2017

206-10001-10001; 45; 10/2017

206-10001-10002; 85; 10/2017

206-10001-10003; 35; 10/2017

206-10001-10004; 20; 10/2017

206-10001-10005; 92; 10/2017

206-10001-10006; 11; 10/2017

206-10001-10007; 18; 10/2017

206-10001-10008; 15; 10/2017

206-10001-10009; 16; 10/2017

206-10001-10010; 19; 10/2017

206-10001-10011; 55; 10/2017

206-10001-10012; 106; 10/2017

206-10001-10013; 65; 10/2017

206-10001-10014; 6; 10/2017

206-10001-10015; 12; 10/2017

206-10001-10016; 19; 10/2017

206-10001-10017; 19; 10/2017

US ARMY (IRR) Documents: Open in Full

194-10001-10228; 0; None

194-10001-10372; 0; None

194-10001-10373; 0; None

US ARMY (IRR) Documents: Postponed in Part

194-10001-10378; 2; 10/2017

194-10001-10379; 1; 10/2017

194-10001-10380; 1; 10/2017

194-10001-10381; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10155; 3; 10/2017

194-10002-10156; 2; 10/2017

194-10002-10157; 2; 10/2017

194-10002-10159; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10160; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10161; 6; 10/2017

194-10002-10162; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10163; 5; 10/2017

194-10002-10164; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10182; 3; 10/2017

194-10002-10183; 4; 10/2017

194-10002-10185; 25; 10/2017

194-10002-10187; 41; 10/2017

194-10002-10189; 17; 10/2017

194-10002-10192; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10195; 7; 10/2017

194-10002-10201; 2; 10/2017

194-10002-10203; 59; 10/2017

194-10002-10204; 4; 10/2017

194-10002-10205; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10206; 17; 10/2017

194-10002-10207; 1; 10/2017

194-10002-10208; 34; 10/2017

194-10002-10209; 2; 10/2017

194-10002-10212; 5; 10/2017

194-10002-10213; 2; 10/2017

194-10002-10214; 5; 10/2017

194-10005-10079; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10080; 5; 10/2017

194-10005-10081; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10082; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10083; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10084; 5; 10/2017

194-10005-10085; 4; 10/2017

194-10005-10087; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10088; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10089; 10; 10/2017

194-10005-10090; 4; 10/2017

194-10005-10091; 4; 10/2017

194-10005-10092; 6; 10/2017

194-10005-10093; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10094; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10095; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10096; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10097; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10098; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10099; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10100; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10101; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10102; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10103; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10104; 4; 10/2017

194-10005-10105; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10106; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10107; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10108; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10109; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10110; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10111; 4; 10/2017

194-10005-10117; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10118; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10119; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10120; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10121; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10122; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10123; 1; 10/2017

194-10005-10124; 2; 10/2017

194-10005-10125; 5; 10/2017

194-10005-10126; 4; 10/2017

194-10005-10127; 5; 10/2017

194-10005-10128; 3; 10/2017

194-10005-10140; 7; 10/2017

194-10006-10000; 6; 10/2017

194-10006-10001; 10; 10/2017

194-10006-10002; 4; 10/2017

194-10006-10003; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10005; 4; 10/2017

194-10006-10008; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10009; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10010; 3; 10/2017

194-10006-10011; 3; 10/2017

194-10006-10012; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10013; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10014; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10015; 3; 10/2017

194-10006-10016; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10017; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10018; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10020; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10021; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10022; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10024; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10029; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10032; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10033; 3; 10/2017

194-10006-10036; 3; 10/2017

194-10006-10037; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10038; 4; 10/2017

194-10006-10039; 12; 10/2017

194-10006-10040; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10041; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10042; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10043; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10044; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10045; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10046; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10048; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10051; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10053; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10054; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10055; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10056; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10057; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10058; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10059; 4; 10/2017

194-10006-10060; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10061; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10062; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10177; 1; 10/2017

194-10006-10178; 3; 10/2017

194-10006-10179; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10180; 5; 10/2017

194-10006-10181; 6; 10/2017

194-10006-10183; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10184; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10185; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10186; 3; 10/2017

194-10006-10187; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10188; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10194; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10195; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10196; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10197; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10198; 2; 10/2017

194-10006-10207; 1; 10/2017

NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL RELEASES

After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board announces that the following U.S. Army records (IRR) are now being opened in full:

194-10002-10181; 194-10002-10184; 194-10002-10186; 194-10002-10188; 194-10002-10190; 194-10002-10191; 194-10002-10193; 194-10002-10194; 194-10002-10196; 194-10002-10197; 194-10002-10198; 194-10002-10199; 194-10002-10200; 194-10002-10202; 194-10002-10210; 194-10002-10211; 194-10002-10215; 194-10003-10157; 194-10006-10004; 194-10006-10006; 194-10006-10007; 194-10006-10023; 194-10006-10025; 194-10006-10026; 194-10006-10027; 194-10006-10028; 194-10006-10030; 194-10006-10031; 194-10006-10034; 194-10006-10047; 194-10006-10049; 194-10006-10050; 194-10006-10052; 194-10006-10182; 194-10006-10189; 194-10006-10190; 194-10006-10191; 194-10006-10192; 194-10006-10193

After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board announces that the following Church Committee records are now being opened in full:

157-10011-10079; 157-10014-10076

NOTICE OF CORRECTIONS:

On August 6, 1998 the Review Board made formal determinations that were published in the August 24, 1998 Federal Register (FR 98-22482, 63 FR 12345). The Review Board determined that the following records are not believed relevant to the JFK Assassination:

US ARMY (IRR) Documents

194-10001-10323

194-10001-10415

194-10001-10417

194-10001-10421

On August 25, 1998 the Review Board made formal determinations that were published in the September 15, 1998 Federal Register (FR 98-24741, 63 FR 12345). The following document was mistakenly included in the list of Church Committee documents opened in full: 194-10013-10383

September 22, 1998

Laura Denk

Laura A. Denk

Executive Director

15 May 1995

FOR: David Marwell
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: John Pereira
CIA/Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: Mexico City/Sensitive Information

The Directorate of Operations prepared the attached statement to assist the Assassination Records Review Board. The statement explains the sensitivity of the records related to telephone tap operations in Mexico City. This may help provide a perspective for further discussions on the subject.

John Pereira

Attachment

SUBJECT: Release of Information on Mexico City Teltaps

1. Protection of sources and methods and liaison equities require that references to the Mexico City Station teltap activity be excised from any documents released under the auspices of the JFK Assassination Record Collection Act of 1992. While the teltap activity mentioned in the documents under review occurred some thirty plus years ago, the joint teltap operation with Mexican liaison has never been terminated; it continues to this day in a slightly different form.

2. Release of any information that would constitute official USG acknowledgment of the existence of the joint teltap operation would have a serious adverse impact on current operations. Relations between the Station and the liaison service would be affected, with the likely outcome of discouraging liaison from cooperating in similar ventures in the future with Mexico City Station. Official acknowledgment of the existence of the joint teltap in the 1960's would embarrass the liaison service given Mexico's strong brand of nationalism and sensitivity towards the issue of sovereignty vis a vis the United States. The service probably would terminate its cooperation with the Station on the current joint teltap operation in order to be able to defend itself against domestic critics.

DD/O 3059

-7 NOV 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: David Cohen
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

1. I understand the JFK AARB is presently considering the release of documents which would identify CIA stations to the public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations during a specific window of time if they are substantively relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the documents in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent presence of the station. (S)

2. In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host government and would threaten ongoing sensitive operations and liaison relationships. In a few instances, the damage probably would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and determined the damage to national security which would follow such release. (S)

3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo is now Zaire and the station in the 60's would have been in Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located. Our current relationship with the Zaireans is not a full-blown liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with certain individuals from the services. In the past, we have had close

CL BY 0695930
CL REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM LOC 3-82

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

relationships with the Zaireans because of our need for their cooperation in assisting with a Presidentially-mandated program and will need to improve our relationship over the next several months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We also continue to have a Station in Dakar, Senegal. We have liaison there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing with developmental contacts, there have been recent instances where potential assets have voiced concern about our Agency's ability to keep its relationships clandestine. To expose our station there would further hamper developmental relationships and eventual recruitments. (S)

4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the following comments:

Brussels - Public acknowledgment would force the government and liaison service to pay closer attention to Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S)

Helsinki - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaison; thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison relationships we now enjoy as well as presenting a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S)

Paris - No additional damage. (S)

Bonn - No specific damage. (S)

Berlin - No specific damage. (S)

Luxembourg - Public acknowledgment would embarrass the government and inhibit liaison cooperation; thus endangering ongoing operations. (S)

The Hague - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and create political problems for the government and liaison. This would endanger the continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)

Oslo - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive ongoing joint operations. (S)

Madrid - Public acknowledgment would draw press attention and embarrassing questions for the government and liaison service. This would further damage an already delicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for counterterrorism operations. (S)

Stockholm - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment would be politically embarrassing for the government and liaison services. This would likely endanger any continuation of joint operations. (S)

Geneva - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment would create political problems for the government and liaison service and force greater attention to our operations. This would create an intensive counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to cause a decrease in our operations. (S)

London - No specific damage. (S)

Ottawa - No specific damage. (S)

5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when we consider public exposure. Prague Station is recovering from operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During the last three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin the establishment of good working relations with the host government and internal/external services. As a result, the station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level bilateral operations. These obviously depend upon the good will of the host service. The Czech citizenry came of age in an atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general, and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of our station's previously undisclosed presence and operational activities during the Cold War will necessarily raise questions about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of Prague Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this time without serious damage to national security. (S)

6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua, San Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any release of information about a clandestine service breeds distrust in professionalism and will put future operations at risk. (S)

7. We receive significant national collection systems support from Australia which affects national system collection efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would jeopardize this by releasing the presence of our station to the public. Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in Tokyo. There have been two incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present year. Any further disclosure would exacerbate the tension and create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and personnel. (S)

8. Public acknowledgment of a station in India would be a problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and India foreign relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very sensitive to perceived slights to its national sovereignty, and public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to the Indian Government which in turn could ask that the station be closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized, it would affect a large number of important intelligence collection operations. (S)

9. Public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia would be a problem for Tunisia vis-à-vis its Libyan neighbor. Libya and Tunisia share a border which means the Tunisian Government must act with some prudence regarding its relations with Libya. The Libyan Government would almost certainly respond very negatively

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

to a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should ask that our station be closed, the U.S. Government would lose a capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and Islamic extremism. (S)

10. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a problem for Morocco vis-à-vis its Islamic fundamentalist population. Morocco, like so many countries with a majority Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem, and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.S. in general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist population to react negatively and demand that our station be closed. If the station were closed, the U.S. Government would lose intelligence on the western Sahara conflict, north African stability and Islamic extremism. (S)

11. In those instances where I have indicated damage to operational capability and national security, I would feel compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I must call your attention to the general damage done to us by any disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability to protect source identities and operational methods. Disclosure to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)

David Cohen

OCC-95-149

07 DEC 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review Board

VIA: Associate Deputy Director for Operations
Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human Resources and Programs

FROM: Eric L. Qualkenbush
Chief, Office of Central Cover

SUBJECT: Proposed CIA Name Release

1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or separated employees. As described below, this action would breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work under cover in addition to breaching our obligations to the cover providers.

2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the employee to protect such information from unauthorized disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.

3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency policy to protect the names of former employees who have separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e., Department of State or the "ABC" Corporation, for their entire Agency career as well as into their years after separation from the Agency, jeopardizes:

- the personal safety of former employees;

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL 0489932
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 2-87

- the second careers of former employees;

- the cover and identity of other employees who worked with the covert employee whose name is released as CIA; and,

- the protection of sources and methods (what individual would agree to a clandestine relationship with American intelligence knowing the secret association would become public knowledge?).

4. Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will affect individuals follows:

- Mr. Walter McCabe retired under Department of State cover and is currently working in Russia and several Eastern European countries for a private firm which converts "wartime" factories into peacetime use. Revealing his name would damage his relationship with his current employer, his position with the firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied as a CIA employee and Attachment C is his signed secrecy agreement.

- Attachment D is a signed ackowledgement from Mr. John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which shows that he was aware that he would be denied as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date he entered on duty through the date of his departure. Attachment E is a personal letter received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that his name might be released in connection with declassification of CIA documents. Attachment F is Mr. Whitten's signed secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.

- Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE) written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr. Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in his SAE and understands disclosure of other information would be in violation of his secrecy

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer's signed secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr. Palmer resides in Mexico.

5. Our relationship with cover providers would be jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing cover to CIA employees. The Department of State could very well raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency operations which in turn could severely damage national security. In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities and substantial monetary damages.

6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency's regulation on cover. It states that "cover is required for all Agency operations, activities and installations abroad, including personnel in PCS or TDY status." HR 240-2, the Agency's regulation on cover after separation, states that "the determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon the judgment that separation in an overt status could result in damage to the national security by compromising intelligence sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm to foreign relations. This determination will be made on a case-by-case basis." Please note that all Agency employees who retire abroad must retire under cover.

7. Release of names of former employees who separated under cover will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct sometimes dangerous activities necessary to carry out the Agency's mission. We can accept the purpose of the JFK Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true names of former Agency employees adds no value to the documents in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from our public detractors. We propose and emphatically encourage that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish the impact of the documents.

8. After your review and consideration of the above information, we would appreciate notification of your final decision prior to taking any action.

Eric L Qualkenbush

Eric L. Qualkenbush

Attachments:
As stated above

CONCUR:

Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human Resources and Programs

8 Dec '95

Date

Associate Deputy Director for Operations

8 XII 95

Date

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

DC/OCC/OSG/EMathias:lae/37076 (6 Dec 95)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - JFK Assassination Records Review Board
1 - IMS/HRS
1 - ADDO
1 - ADDO/HRP
2 - DDO Secretariat
1 - DO/IRO
1 - OGC/LD - Linda Cipriani
1 - OCC Chron
1 - OCC/OSG Chron
1 - OCC/OSG File 785-120-034

15 October 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
Australia

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.)

1. (S) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA's position on the review and declassification of foreign government information that appears in the JFK collection. This issue has come to CIA's attention because of the recent review by the JFK Board of Australian liaison documents. The Agency believes it is important to address this issue at this time because this is the first instance that this type of foreign liaison document has been reviewed by the Board and it is possible that such information will appear again in CIA's collection. This memo will, therefore, focus on the larger issue of a United States Government (USG) agency's legal obligations in the dissemination and declassification of foreign government information but will also address the specific issue of the six "Australian documents" (documents: 104-10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012-10080, 104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222, 104-10009-10224).

2. (S) Conclusion: CIA does not object to the release of the information in these six documents, but is only concerned about protecting foreign government information. Therefore, the Agency does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the redacted form proposed by the Board. With regards to the two Australian letters the Agency has no authority to unilaterally agree to their release in any form. Pursuant to its legal obligations, CIA ordinarily seeks the consent of the foreign government prior to declassifying their information. However, for reasons described herein, it is not possible to even seek the consent of the Australians at this time, nor would it be likely that the Australians would give it. Rather than going to the Australians against its better judgment or requesting the

CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(d)
DECL ON: X5
DRV FM: LIA 3-82

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
Australia

President to agree to the unilateral declassification of foreign government information, CIA proposes that the release of the Australian documents be either postponed for a short time or that a substitution be made.

3. (U) Legal Authorities: The procedures governing the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information are set out in Executive Order 12958, as well as Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Executive Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including (1) information provided by a foreign government, or any element thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information and/or the source of the information, are to be held in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign government, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangements, or both, are to be held in confidence. Id., at §1.1(d)

4. (U) Foreign government information is subject to a classification determination under E.O. 12958, section 1.5(c). When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. The E.O. requires that foreign government information shall either retain its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification that shall ensure a degree of protection *at least* equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information. Id., at 1.7(e). Furthermore, agencies are required to safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of protection *at least* equivalent to that required by the originating government. Id., at 4.2(g).

5. (U) Pursuant to his authority as head of the intelligence community to protect all classified information from unauthorized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence has issued Directives (that is, DCIDs) setting out the procedures for the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information. Intelligence obtained from another government or from a combined effort with another government, may not be released or authorized for release without its consent. DCID 5/6 attachment § C.3. Furthermore, the release of intelligence that would be contrary to agreements between the U.S. and foreign countries is expressly prohibited. Id., at § C.5.

6. (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and specifically named foreign countries and government components is classified SECRET unless a different classification is *mutually* agreed upon. DCID 1/10-1. Such information may be declassified only with the *mutual* consent of the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved. DCID 1/10-1.

the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved. DCID 1/10-1.

7. (U) National Security Considerations: The importance of such coordination with foreign governments *prior* to the release of their information cannot be overemphasized. Should CIA, or for that matter any (USG) agency fail to coordinate where required, not only would it be a violation of the aforementioned E.O. and directives, but it would chill relationships it has developed with foreign services over the years. If such lack of coordination became known, foreign services would hesitate to share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed it would be released, in spite of any agreements or U.S. laws to the contrary, without their consent. Furthermore, the U.S. could not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S. government information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives.

8. (S) According to its legal obligations described herein, CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of foreign government information. Its obligation to do so is similar to its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency's documents. For example, CIA could not declassify and release to the public FBI information located in CIA files without coordinating with that agency. Similarly, CIA has no authority to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or information in its files.

9. (S) Coordination with Australia: As two of the documents at issue here are letters from the Australian service (104-10009-10224, 104-10012-10080), CIA is legally obligated by E.O. and agreement with the Australians to seek the consent of the Australians prior to their release, even in redacted form. The issue of coordinating with the Australian service is a timely one. In most cases, CIA would not have an objection to going to the foreign government and seeking their consent for declassification. However, several events that have occurred in the last few months depict just how seriously Australia considers any indication that the U.S. is unable to protect from release their classified information. Based on the incidents described below, it is CIA's position that even asking the Australians for consent to release would threaten the current relationship.

- Within the last year, a demarche was made by the Australian government expressing strong concern that U.S. declassification legislation expressly spell out that no information provided to the USG by the Australian service be declassified without its permission. A copy of this demarche is provided for the Board's review. (See attached.) It is worth noting that this demarche is not between intelligence services but rather between governments -- it was literally delivered by the Australian Ambassador to the National Security Council and to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia. The manner in which the Australians treated the demarche demonstrates that the protection of classified information is receiving top priority in the Australian government and is not just a concern of their intelligence community.

- On two recent but separate occasions the Australian service passed to CIA information indicating that there would be assassination attempts on two non-U.S. citizens. CIA requested that it pass this information on to the targets, but the Australians refused. They argued that the information was not specific enough and would endanger a source. The Australians stated that if they believed the information was useful, they would pass it themselves. The Australians were concerned that CIA had even asked to pass on this information, and questioned what they perceived as CIA's willingness to share their information with third parties. Finally, they stated that the easiest way to protect their information was simply not to pass it to CIA anymore.

- Just this month, a senior official of the Australian service approached the CIA with accusations that a former Agency employee allegedly may have disclosed their classified information. The Australians believe that this disclosure may be related to the loss of all agent reporting sources in a country of particular interest to them. The DDCI promised the head of the Australian service to launch an investigation into the matter.

- The Australian service recently expressed grave concern to CIA about a book published by an American USG official which alludes to a relationship between the CIA and the Australian service. Even though this book was not an official CIA acknowledgment of a liaison relationship, to the Australians, this incident called into question the CIA's ability to protect that relationship.

10. (S) Under the circumstances, it would be an affront to the Australians to be asked for their consent in light of the above events which have all occurred in the last year. The Australians would not only be extremely upset with CIA, but would certainly deny their consent. Should the Australians deny their consent, CIA would have no authority to agree to the release of the information and would be obligated to do all it could to prevent disclosure. It is crucial not only to CIA's mission but

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
Australia

also to the conduct of US foreign relations that the USG is seen as abiding by its agreements with foreign services as well as its own laws on the release of information.

11. (S) Finally, the importance of maintaining good relations with the Australians cannot be overemphasized. As a result of our valuable relationship with our Australian liaison counterparts, the USG receives a large volume of finished intelligence. Due to our shrinking resources, much of this information would not be available to U.S. policy makers were it not provided by the Australians. Additionally, we work together with the Australians around the world on joint collection activities that cover the full spectrum of USG intelligence priorities. Finally, there are several critical collection efforts vital to the USG where we do not have the entrée to collect intelligence independently. In these cases, we rely entirely on the continued good will of the Australian services to provide us with the assistance necessary to meet U.S. policymakers' needs.

12. (S) In light of all the above, CIA submits the following two proposals for the Board's consideration. First, the Board could postpone these two documents from release for a short period (we propose 10 months) at which time CIA can reassess its relationship with the Australians. It is possible that the relationship with CIA and Australia could change so that it would be possible to seek their consent for release in full. However, should we seek the consent of the Australians at a future date and the Australians object to the release of the documents, we would ask that the Board seriously consider any negative reaction from the Australians in its deliberations and abide by their desires. A second option would be for CIA to coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of summary of the Australian documents for immediate release. This summary would hide the fact that the letter came from the Australian service, but would reveal what the subject of the letter was. This would avoid the problem of having to go the Australians to seek their consent, which we would have to do even in the case of redactions.

13. (U) Should the Board reject these proposals, CIA is willing to work with the Board to reach another mutually agreeable solution. We strongly believe, however, that any approach which suggests that the U.S. Government may ignore its obligations and commitments to foreign governments would seriously undermine the vigorous and healthy diplomatic as well as intelligence relationships that we currently enjoy.

14. (S) With regard to the remaining four documents (104-10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222, these are CIA documents and with the redactions proposed by the

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
Australia

government. As such, CIA consents to the release of these documents with the redactions proposed by the Board.

15. (S) Proposal for Future Coordination: With regards to any other foreign government information that may exist in the files, CIA proposes that it approach its liaison services to request their consent in the release of their information when it would be appropriate to do so. Although recent events with Australia make it impossible for CIA to approach them at this time, this may not be so with other services. In cases were CIA believes, because of the nature of the relationship, that it would not be possible to request the consent of the service, CIA proposes that the documents either be postponed from release or that CIA and Board's staff coordinate a summary.

John F Pereira

John F. Pereira

Attachment

13-00000.

Attached is a copy of the Australian Demarche on U.S. legislation on declassification. This was given to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia, Ambassador Perkins, by Philip Flood, then Director of the Office of National Assessments (ONA), in September 1995. This demarche was also given to Sandy Berger at the National Security Council by Australian Ambassador to the United States Don Russell on 4 August 1995.

AUSTRALIAN COMMENTS ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 — CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

- The Australian government wishes to register its concern over the 17 April Executive Order on Classified National Security Information and the apparent omission of any explicit provision to protect foreign-sourced information or documentation from automatic declassification once it is over 25 years old.

- The Australian government understands and supports the democratic principles and commitment to open government which underpin the Executive Order. We too are improving access to government information, but are maintaining provisions to protect foreign-sourced information — including U.S. information.

- We do not agree that these principles can be applied by one foreign government to the information or documentation of another government without prior consultation and clearance. Australian-sourced information was and continues to be passed to the U.S. government on the understanding that it will be protected. We adopt precisely the same approach to information that the U.S. shares with us.

- Omission of such consultation would, in the eyes of the Australian government, not be in keeping with the 1962 U.S.-Australia General Security of Information agreement or the many other bilateral and multilateral intelligence co-operation and information sharing agreements.

- The failure to protect sensitive Australian-sourced information about, for example, our intelligence operations, could have ramifications for our relations with regional countries and compromise intelligence sources and methods (upon which the U.S. depends in part).

- Australian concerns could be addressed if provision for clearance with originators of foreign-sourced material was embodied in the Information Security Oversight Office implementation directive to U.S. agencies.

  — such an approach should not impede or delay the declassification process — Australia is not seeking this. For example, categories of sensitivity for Australia could be identified. A reasonable time limit could be put on Australian response time after which the U.S. could be free to declassify (we have a similar arrangement with the U.K.).

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

13 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.)

1. (U) **Issue**. The purpose of this memorandum is to relate CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the release of the true names of human sources of intelligence which appear in the JFK Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem could be addressed.

I. Factual Background

2. (U) In general, CIA "sources" are foreign nationals, recruited and living in a foreign country, who provide information to the U.S. Government under a promise of confidentiality. Their act of passing information to the U.S. is generally against the national interest of their own country and would be considered espionage, which is a capital offense in most countries. Just as in this country when a spy is caught, should a CIA source be discovered, it would be "headline news," even 30 years after the fact. The Review Board will recall that when former National Security Agency employee Robert Lipka was arrested approximately a year ago for espionage he allegedly committed 30 years earlier, this received a lot of attention in the United States. Lipka is currently awaiting trial in the U.S. for his alleged espionage activities.

3. (U) This month, the Review Board will be considering approximately 50-60 true names of human sources for release. These particular sources range from encrypted

CL BY: 0185904
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FM: HUM 4-82

assets to one-time contacts. It is our understanding that additional source names appear throughout the JFK Collection and will be reviewed in the future. It is important, therefore, that the Review Board and CIA agree on a consistent method of dealing with source names appearing in the JFK Collection at this time so as not to impede the future review of documents.

4. (C) The Review Board has recently developed a policy for releasing the true names of covert CIA employees. Although there are many similarities between covert employees and sources, there is an important difference that should be reflected in the way the Review Board looks at this issue. With CIA covert employees who are mentioned in this collection, it has been possible in some instances to go to them and seek their permission to reveal their names. Some of these former employees have even been made available for interviews and depositions. With most sources, it is not possible to do this. First, CIA has dropped contact with some of these sources and may not be able to locate them. Attempting to find these individuals would create some risk of creating suspicions that they were or are associated with this Agency or the U.S. Government. If CIA were unable to locate a particular source, there would still be some risk in releasing his name. Just because CIA cannot locate him, does not mean that he is not alive and well-known in his own community. Even if we were able to locate a source without risk to his safety, it is probable that he would not want to be visited by the CIA again after so many years. More than likely, sources do not now want their past association revealed when they have undoubtedly moved on in their lives to do other things. Some may be in political or private enterprise positions where CIA affiliation would damage them professionally and/or harm them and their families personally.

5. (U) Another important distinction that needs to be taken into account is the difference between CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) "sources." Perhaps the most significant difference is that many FBI sources provide information with the understanding that the information and the source will be publicly revealed. FBI sources are often used in criminal prosecutions as witnesses. CIA, on the other hand, promises secrecy and confidentiality to its sources. CIA sources rarely appear at public trials. In fact, not only is the identity of CIA sources protected from public acknowledgment, but also it is closely held within the Agency itself. Another difference is the fact that a

foreign national cooperating with CIA is usually committing a unique violation of his own country's laws--espionage. If one gets caught committing espionage, the punishment in many countries is for a capital offense. On the other hand, a foreigner who cooperates with the FBI is not usually committing espionage. Cooperation may be with the full knowledge of his government--such as cooperation in a criminal investigation. Therefore, the risks for cooperation with the FBI are not usually as great as cooperation with CIA. In addition, the FBI has greater means for protecting individuals who provide information to it, for example, the witness protection program, which CIA does not have.

II. Legal Considerations

6. (U) Although Section 11(a) of the JFK Act provides that when the Act requires release of information, it takes precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit the true names of sources. CIA believes that it is important for the Review Board to consider the laws, which have been growing and developing over the years, to protect classified information because they clearly reflect a larger U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.

7. (U) By Executive Order (E.O.)and statute, the President and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) responsible for protecting intelligence sources. In his Directive of 22 January 1946 which established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI responsible for protecting sources. With the establishment of the CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section 103(d)(3), codified at 50 U.S.C. §403(3)(c)(5), ***requires*** the DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure. In addition, §403(3)(d)(2) ***requires*** the DCI to ensure that risks to the United States and those involved in the collection of intelligence through human sources are minimized.

8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working with or for CIA has been of particular concern to U.S. lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. 1949 §403g, Congress specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. Although the purpose of this law is to protect

employees of the CIA, and not assets or contacts, it indicates Congress' intent from early on to protect those working covertly for the U.S. Government.

9. (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving or potentially involving classified information. Working with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has successfully protected intelligence sources from public release even in criminal trials where there are heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to the defendant of all government information relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for *in camera ex parte* hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and relevancy of classified information, including the identity of human sources who may have information pertaining to the defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant or defense counsel, or in open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information and ruled that the harm to national security outweighs the defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other cases, the defense was never notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those cases where the risk to national security is too great.

10 (U) In 1982, Congress acted to protect human intelligence sources by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §421 which criminalizes the revelation of a source's identity. This Act subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a covert agent to prosecution with up to 10 years in prison and $50,000 in fines. A covert agent includes: (a) a U.S. citizen whose intelligence relationship with the U.S. Government is classified and is acting abroad as an agent, informant or source of operational assistance to an intelligence agency; and (b) an individual, other than a U.S. citizen whose past or present intelligence relationship to the U.S. is classified information and who is a present or former agent or informant of, or is of operational assistance to, an intelligence agency.

11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples of a larger government policy to protect human sources from public disclosure.[1] There has also developed over the years a significant amount of case law which further implements this policy. For example, in Sims v. CIA, 10 S.Ct. 1981 (1985), the Supreme Court held that pursuant to the National Security Act, the DCI had the authority to protect from release to Freedom of Information Act requesters the identities of individuals conducting research on projects financed by CIA. The Supreme Court further stated that the DCI's authority to protect sources was broad, and was not limited to only those individuals who were guaranteed confidentiality.

12. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed an Executive Order on classified national security information which came into effect in October 1995. Although it requires that agencies make greater declassification efforts than the prior Executive Order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources extra protection from its declassification provisions. Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and has historical value must be declassified within five years. However, information revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be protected.

13. (U) The above federal statutes and case law show a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who provide intelligence information to the U.S. Government. In carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to this policy and afford the protection of human sources the highest priority.

III. Operational Considerations

14. (U) As the Review Board is well aware, in order for CIA officers to effectively collect intelligence around the world, they cannot acknowledge publicly that they work for CIA and, conversely, CIA cannot acknowledge a particular individual's affiliation with it. This is true even more so with sources. In addition to the risk to a source's personal safety, discovery of a CIA source would also reveal any operations he was conducting and CIA case officers with whom he was meeting or might even cast suspicion on the

---

[1] (U) The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552 is another example of a federal statute that allows for the protection of human sources. Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government documents, exemption b(3) allows for withholding from release information that is exempted from disclosure by statute. The National Security Act has been held by the Supreme Court to be such a withholding statute. Sims v. CIA, 105 S.Ct. 1981 (1985).

affiliation of innocent family and friends. This is no less true with a source who no longer works for the Agency. A source's prior affiliation with CIA is normally still classified in order to protect him, his former contacts at CIA, the CIA facilities at which he may have been meeting with case officers, the cover mechanisms employed to protect his affiliation with CIA, and the operations which he conducted.

15. (U) The public disclosure of an individual's affiliation with CIA could and, in fact, has threatened the safety and lives of not only the source, but also their families, colleagues, officials of foreign governments and other foreign nationals with whom they have had contact. The Review Board will certainly recall the Proenza case (since this was released by the Board in August 1995) in which a number of Cuban officials were falsely believed to be CIA agents. They were arrested, convicted and spent years in prison for their alleged treasonous activities and their professional and personal lives were ruined. The threat of violence to those who are in fact associated with CIA is even more real. These individuals live and work in foreign countries, many of which have a local population hostile to the United States and especially CIA. If one should doubt the risks that those affiliated with CIA face, one only has to recall that, in 1992, two CIA employees were murdered while waiting to turn into CIA Headquarters in Virginia. If this type of attack is possible right at the CIA's front gate, it is not hard to imagine the personal risks that those working with the CIA abroad face. Clearly, the risk is that much greater for those who are sources: for example, as a result of Aldrich Ames' disclosures to the KGB, 10 Soviets who were covert assets of the CIA were executed.

16. (U) Incidents such as these clearly demonstrate that the policy of protecting association with the CIA is an important one. Individuals associated with CIA have been and will continue to be subjected to threats, reprisals and physical injuries from foreign intelligence services, terrorist groups, and other persons or organizations hostile to CIA or the U.S. Government. Individuals choose to undertake these risks for many different reasons, but it is with the condition that the CIA will protect their cooperation with the U.S. Government.

IV. Proposal

17. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA sources in the JFK Collection. The Agency proposes that in

most cases a substitution for the true name be used. In prior releases of these same documents, the Review Board agreed to redact the true name and substitute "source." If the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular sources throughout the records, a particular identifying substitution can be used for an individual source throughout (for example, "Mexican source 1").

18. (S) Among the names that are currently being considered for release by the Review Board, the following are some that the CIA proposes be treated in this manner:

- True name of LIRING/3, an encrypted asset of the CIA and unilateral penetration of the Cuban Embassy. His wife also worked at the Embassy and he was apparently suspected as being CIA though it was never proven. LIRING/3 at some point disappeared and we have no way of knowing what his current situation is.

- True name of ERTHYROID/3, the unilateral penetration of the Nicaraguan Service. The Review Board will recall that it has already been fully briefed on ERTHYROID/3 and had agreed to the protection of the fact that he was a unilateral source.

- Anthony C. M. Devere (1041001210022) was [is] a member of the British Service. As such, he was [is] a liaison source. This raises concerns about protection of our liaison relationships. Moreover, Mr. Devere's identity constitutes "foreign government information" which, as the Board has already been informed, the CIA does not have the authority to release.

19. (S) Another type of name that similarly should be protected from release is the new identity provided to a defector. Although defectors do not face some of the dangers that "assets" overseas face, they are still given new identities for their protection because there is some risk to their personal safety even in the U.S. For example, in this collection the identity of Golitsyn appears in documents being reviewed this month.[2] Since the time of his defection, Golitsyn has utilized successive identities, because they have been unofficially disclosed, that have not

---

[2] (S) Golitsyn's identity had to be changed again. However, there is a risk that revealing this former identity could lead to the identification of Golitsyn's current identity.

been officially released and that are closely held within the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of his family even though they live in the United States. CIA cannot, at this time, agree to the official release of Golitsyn's assumed new identities or for that matter of any defectors that appear to date in the collection.

20. (S) CIA has noted that in some cases a source is identified by only a first name or a code name. Where CIA has been unable to identify any information about that individual or there is no other source revealing information that has been revealed in the JFK Collection, it would be possible to release that name. For example, in a few documents, the name "Tota" appears. To date, CIA has been unable to determine who this person is and there does not appear to be any further source revealing information in the collection. It is probably that "Tota" is just a code name or a street name known to his colleagues. As "Tota" is a common name, such a release would not threaten the particular individual or his family, and as the person can not be identified it would not seriously undermine the U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.

21. (U) The Agency recognizes that some names may be particularly important to the JFK story. In such cases, the CIA is willing to work with the Review Board to come to the appropriate resolution. CIA proposes that it conduct a record search for information on that individual. It may be that in these cases, if the person is deceased and has no living family, that the Review Board and the CIA can agree that the value of revealing the true name outweighs the need to protect that source from disclosure.

22. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review Board can work out a mutually agreeable policy regarding the identity of human sources that will not undermine the important policy of protecting those who work covertly for the U.S. Government. As usual, my staff and I are available to discuss this matter with you.

John F. Pereira

John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

DCI/CSI/J.Pereira: apd/x31805 (13 Dec 96)
G:/CSIFO/SHARED/Pereira.doc

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - CSI/HRP Chrono
1 - D/CSI
1 - C/CSI/HRG
1 - Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRP
1 - Linda Cipiriani, OGC

CLASSIFIED FAX TRANSMISSION

ARRB

202-724-0088

To:	Barry Harrelson	**Date:**	March 31, 1997
Fax #:	703-613-3060	**Pages:**	17, including this cover sheet.
From:	Michelle Combs		
Subject:	DS&T and DO Briefing Questions		

COMMENTS:

Barry,

Attached are the final versions of the DS&T and DO briefing questions. There are no changes in the DS&T questions. Questions have been added to the DO list to reflect our conversation March 19 and 20. You, of course, already have our detailed explanations for the earlier DO questions. If you have any questions or if there are any problems, please give me a call. I should be in all day. See you tomorrow.

Michelle

HTLINGUAL

1. What kinds of records might the DS&T maintain on the HTLINGUAL project? How could these records be queried?

Castro Assassination Plots

1. What kinds of records would TSD or other offices of DS&T have maintained on the various Castro assassination plots? How might a search query be framed to isolate these records?

SKUNK WORKS

A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed

BEN R. RICH AND LEO JANOS

LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY
BOSTON NEW YORK TORONTO LONDON

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
SEP 15 1994
COPY
COPYRIGHT OFFICE

TL565
.R53
1994

Copyright © 1994 by Ben R. Rich

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review.

First Edition

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Rich, Ben R.
Skunk Works : a personal memoir of my years at Lockheed / Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos. — 1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-316-74330-5
1. Lockheed Advanced Development Company — History. 2. Rich, Ben R. — Career in aeronautics. 3. Aeronautics — Research — United States — History. I. Janos, Leo. II. Title. III. Title: Skunk Works.
TL565.R53 1994
338.7'623746'0973 — dc20 94-8732

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

MV-PA

Published simultaneously in Canada
by Little, Brown & Company (Canada) Limited

Printed in the United States of America

The next thing we tried was something called a Salisbury screen, a metallic grid applied to the airplane's undercarriage in the hope of deflecting incoming radar beams, but it worked only at some frequencies and altitudes and not at others.

Kelly thought it was more practical to try special iron ferrite paints that would absorb a radar ping rather than bounce it back to the sender. The paints were moderately effective but inhibited heat dissipation through the airframe's outer skin and we experienced overheating engine problems. But the paint lowered the radar cross section by one order of magnitude, so we decided to give it a try. We called these specially painted airplanes "dirty birds" and shipped the first one out for flight testing in April 1957. Our test pilot, Bob Sieker, took the U-2 up to over seventy thousand feet and suddenly radioed that he was experiencing rapid airframe heat buildup. Moments later his engine blew out and the faceplate blew off Bob's oxygen mask as his pressure suit instantly inflated. The U-2 dove straight down and crashed. It took us three days to locate the wreckage and Bob's body. An autopsy revealed that above seventy thousand feet he had suffered acute hypoxia and lost consciousness in only ten seconds. The culprit that killed him was a defective faceplate clasp that cost fifty cents.

The CIA was so desperate to buy time for these Soviet overflights that Bissell got Kelly to sequester four of our test flight engineers and have them write a bogus flight manual for a U-2 twice as heavy as ours and with a maximum altitude of only fifty thousand feet that carried only scientific weather gear in its bay. The manual included phony instrument panel photos with altered markings for speed, altitude, and load factor limits. Four copies were produced and then artificially aged with grease, coffee stains, and cigarette burns. How or if the agency got them into Soviet hands only Mr. B knew, and he never told.

Questions for Follow-up DO Records Briefing
April 1, 1997

1. At what point did the DDP begin to keep records of destroyed records? For example, in a Cold Warrior footnote, Tom Mangold reports that as any of Angleton's files were destroyed, "a complete record was carefully maintained about what had been done. (George) Kalaris signed off on every file and the DCI's office was notified." (p. 143) Where are these records?

2. Could an archival search be run on specific topics for retired records at the CIA's Record's Center? Perhaps an ARRB staffer could be present during the search to review the abstracts and to suggest other fields or topics to be searched?

3. Could a crypt search for records containing relevant crypts be run through cryptographic reference? How would queries need to be framed and stated?

4. Why is it so difficult to develop a list for all personnel (official, contract, administrative, or TDY) assigned to the post referenced in RIF 104-10065-10199 from 1959-1964?

5. We have been working to identify all technical and surveillance operations in and on the Cuban and Soviet consulates and embassies in Mexico City between September 1 and December 1, 1963. How can we frame a search query to determine if we have a comprehensive and complete list of all operations at that time?

6. How can a search query be framed to document all electronic take produced by the Mexico City Station in the immediate wake of the assassination (the first month) and during the period of Oswald's visit? How can we verify that what exists in the Sequestered Collection represents all records of the technical production that was available at the time of the assassination? If additional records or original production still exists, where would it be stored or filed? What searches could be conducted to retrieve any additional records? If such electronic take has been destroyed, do records exist of the destruction?

7. Could you describe the process by which operational funds are proposed, approved, received, and distributed (circa 1963). What funding and disbursement records exist? How are they organized? How should a request be formulated to institute a reasonable search of these records?

8. We have seen DDP monthly operational reports which contain information on the allocation/distribution of operational funds. Are there other DDP records which would reflect how certain projects utilized their funding? How are these records organized? How should a search query be framed?

9. Various open sources have linked the CIA to various journalists and publishing companies during the 1960's. How should a query be framed to search for connections between the Agency and journalists or publishing companies?

10. Did the Agency have any relationship, projects, or contacts with publishing houses during the time of the assassination and in the aftermath of the Warren Commission? How would a search be formulated to determine whether or not the Agency had a relationship with any of the same publishing houses that were also publishing books about the assassination?

11. How would a query be framed to search for files on any office or person dealing with organized crime and Cuba? How should a request be formulated to institute a reasonable search on this topic?

12. Is there a comprehensive record or list detailing the identities of individuals on the Interagency Source Register? How are these records organized? How can a search query be framed to ascertain whether or not a particular individual appears in the Register.

13. How could a search query be framed to ascertain whether or not a particular individual was given access to classified information by DCD (then OO)? What kind of files are assembled in the process of clearing non-Agency contacts/sources for access to classified information?

14. ARRB's Request for Additional Information and Record No. CIA-13, dated November 1, 1996, contained the following questions:

A. What forms of backchannel communications were there between the Mexico City Station (including the COS), JMWAVE, or Headquarters during 1963? By "backchannel" we mean, *inter alia,* any administrative, senior staff, or restricted access communications, or any written or electronic communications other than regular cables or dispatches (of the type included in the JFK Collection).

B. Were there, in fact, any backchannel communications between the Mexico City Station (including the COS), JMWAVE, or Headquarters during the time periods 27 Sept - 16 Oct 1963 and 22 Nov - 30 Nov 1963?

C. To the extent that there were any backchannel communications for the time periods 27 Sept - 16 Oct 1963 and 22 Nov - 30 Nov 1963 (other than those currently contained in the JFK Collection), please make such records available for review.

Why has it been so difficult to answer these questions?

15. ARRB's Request for Additional Information and Record No. CIA-14, dated December 23, 1996, documented our request for the annual or biannual Station reports for Mexico City Station for 1963 and 1964. Why has it been so difficult to provide these reports?

16. The attached Agency document released in 1996 contains the paragraph:

> 11. A memorandum marked only for file, 16 March 1967, signed M.D. Stevens, says that J. Monroe SULLIVAN, #280207, was granted a covert security approval on 10 December 1962 so that he could be used in Project QKENCHANT. (Clay) Shaw has # 402897-A.

What do these numbers mean? What does the "A" at the ends of Shaw's number signify? Do the files identified by these numbers still exist? Why was Sullivan granted a covert security approval?

17. During the period 1959-1963, what was the purpose or goal of QKENCHANT?

18. Under what circumstances were non-agency employees given covert security clearances for the QKENCHANT project?

19. Did Clay Shaw receive a covert security approval for the QKENCHANT project? Why was one needed? Did Clay Shaw receive covert security clearances for any project other than QKENCHANT

20. What did Clay Shaw do within the QKENCHANT project?

21. Do records exist to account for the disposition of all files on Clay Shaw?

22. Did Howard Hunt have any involvement with the QKENCHANT project prior to 1964?

23. Did J. Monroe Sullivan have any involvement with the QKENCHANT project prior to 1964?

24. The DO telephone directories list an Operational Services/Defector Staff beginning in October 1959? What was the Defector Staff? Did it have an operational component?

25. In the period 1959-1964, were DO officers, selected to serve overseas under State Department cover, legally considered to be "members of the Foreign Service, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate?"

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA SL DATE 2/4/97

a relatively clean, easy-to-read specimen of what we already have.

~~SECRET~~

Note: only redaction is "QK" (what CIA calls a Digraph) from QKENCHANT on page 4 here paragraph #11:

I've included a poor copy of page 4 that contains the "QK".

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
Release As Sanitized
1996

Enclosure 21

SUBJECT: Clay L. SHAW (201-813493)

1. Subject was born on 17 March 1913 in New Orleans, Louisiana.

2. Standard background information on Subject (parents, marital status, records of education and employment, etc.) is lacking because SHAW was a contact of the Domestic Contact Service.

3. Traces on Subject have been run in RID/Main Index, the index of the Office of Security and the Central Cover Staff. The first showed only a 1951 FBI interview with SHAW about a former employee of the New Orleans International Trade Mart. The second showed that OO/Contacts Division had requested a name trace about 1949 and that the check of FBI records then conducted was negative. Central Cover Staff had no record.

4. Some of the OO-B reports based on SHAW's reporting are on hand. They are the following. (It is noted that the source description identifies the source by job title.)

a. OO-B 47958, 26 March 1952, concerns a letter written to the public relations director of the International Trade Mart by one Dr. Jutta SCHALLER, a trade consultant to the Bonn Government. The letter is a follow-up of discussions held in New Orleans during December 1951. The letter said that Soviet production and export trade were being advertised and

CARDED

Document Number 1930-492-Y
for FOIA Review on DEC 1977

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA SK DATE 2/4/97

promoted by West German money. The publication Wer Liefert Was?, published in Leipzig, is now also being published in Hamburg, at a price much lower than competitive volumes.

b. 00-B-9381, 27 December 1948. Information acquired 18 December 1948. SHAW (identified by job title) has agreed to lease to the CSR government 1,000 feet of space for a display of merchandise in New Orleans. The lease is for one year, starting 1 April 1949.

c. 00-B-4933-49, 14 June 1949, information date late April and early May 1949. Results of a trip SHAW made in March through May 1949 in West Indies, Central America, and Northern South America.

d. 00-B-4934-49, 14 June 1949, same general subject and background as above.

e. 00-B-4935-49, 14 June 1949, as above.

f. 00-B-35477, 29 June 1951. Results of a SHAW trip in 1951 in Central and South America and the Caribbean area.

5. On 9 May 1961 General C. P. Cabell, then DDCI, addressed the Foreign Policy Association of New Orleans. It is believed that he was introduced by Clay SHAW.

6. On 3 March 1967 the Washington Star reported that Garrison had arrested SHAW and had made public charges that SHAW, FERRIE, OSWALD, and others had plotted the assassination in the apartment of FERRIE at 3300 Louisiana Parkway, New Orleans. SHAW has said that he never saw OSWALD. He denies having used the name Clay BERTRAND. Jack S. MARTIN said that FERRIE had mentioned

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA SU DATE 2/4/97

SHAW to him. J. Monroe SULLIVAN, executive director of the San Francisco World Trade Center, told the Associated Press that SHAW was in San Francisco and touring the Center with him on the day of the assassination. SHAW, now retired, was formerly the managing director of the International Trade Mart in New Orleans. He is 54 years old. Ramsey Clark, U.S. Attorney General, said that the FBI had investigated SHAW late in 1963. "On the evidence that the FBI has, there was no connection found" with the assassination.

7. Memorandum No. 84-67, 3 March 1967, from Chief, New Orleans Office, to Director, Domestic Contact Service, re SHAW.

a. The first contact of the New Orleans office of the DCS with Clay SHAW occurred in December 1948. A name check request was returned "no info" on 23 March 1949. SHAW was contacted by Mr. Hunter Leake of the New Orleans office seven times in 1949, twice in 1950, five times in 1951, nine times in 1952, once in 1953, twice in 1954, twice in 1955, and twice in 1956. SHAW is the source of eight 00-B reports submitted by the New Orleans office. At one time he had the "Y" number 145.1. The last contact took place on 25 May 1956. On 23 January 1967 Jack S. MARTIN phoned the New Orleans office, said that he was working on an important undercover deal for Garrison and Detective Louis IVON, and was calling at IVON's request. He was calling to ask the head of the CIA office to telephone IVON on his unlisted number. No such call was made. The writer, Lloyd A. Ray, asks that the General Counsel be informed and that he provide advice.

8. Undated and unsigned memorandum (probably produced by CI/R & A). The following additional information was provided by the New Orleans office of DCS.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Since 25 May 1956 Mr. [redacted] had seen SHAW casually, by chance, in various downtown New Orleans restaurants, and greetings were exchanged. The last such casual encounter was just before SHAW's retirement in 1965.

9. On 7 March 1967 Pravda published an article called "Clay Shaw of the CIA" datelined Rome, 6 March 1967, written by V. YERMAKOV. The article charged that CIA made use of the services of Clay SHAW for CIA's own interests in Italy. The Pravda piece notes that the DA in New Orleans is accusing SHAW of participation in the assassination conspiracy. It says SHAW spent "some years" in Rome as a World Trade Center leader. It claims that the Center was a cover for financing anti-Communist activity. CIA gave directives to SHAW. The World Trade Center was a branch of "Permidex" (sic), "which the newspapers in Switzerland openly accused of 'criminal operations'...." (Comment: It appears that all of the Pravda charges are untrue, except that there was a CIA-SHAW relationship. So far as is known, SHAW was never asked to use his relationship with the World Trade Center for clandestine purposes and, in fact, he has not been in Italy.)

10. Memorandum from [redacted] 8 March 1967 subject: Italian Aspects of the Clay SHAW Affair, The Corriere della Sera of 5 March 1967 has an article about SHAW, the assassination, and the World Trade Center. Contains no relevant information.

11. A memorandum marked only for file, 16 March 1967, signed [redacted] Stevens, says that J. Monroe SULLIVAN, #280207, was granted a covert security approval on 10 December 1962 so that he could be used in Project QKENCHANT. SHAW has 0402097-[redacted]

12. Memorandum from [redacted] 24 March 1967, Subject: "Trace Results on Persons Connected with Centro Mondiale Commerciale" (World Trade Center), filed [redacted] folder, Clay SHAW -- working papers.

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA SU DATE 2/4/97

Same page, better copy. QK redacted

~~SECRET~~

Since 25 May 1956 Mr. Hunter Leake had seen SHAW casually, by chance, in various downtown New Orleans restaurants, and greetings were exchanged. The last such casual encounter was just before SHAW's retirement in 1965.

9. On 7 March 1967 Pravda published an article called "Clay Shaw of the CIA" datelined Rome, 6 March 1967, written by V. YERMAKOV. The article charged that CIA made use of the services of Clay SHAW for CIA's own interests in Italy. The Pravda piece notes that the DA in New Orleans is accusing SHAW of participation in the assassination conspiracy. It says SHAW spent "some years" in Rome as a World Trade Center leader. It claims that the Center was a cover for financing anti-Communist activity. CIA gave directives to SHAW. The World Trade Center was a branch of "Permidex" (sic), "which the newspapers in Switzerland openly accused of 'criminal operations'...." (Comment: It appears that all of the Pravda charges are untrue, except that there was a CIA-SHAW relationship. So far as is known, SHAW was never asked to use his relationship with the World Trade Center for clandestine purposes and, in fact, he has not been in Italy.)

10. Memorandum from C/EUR/I to C/CI/R & A, 8 March 1967 subject: Italian Aspects of the Clay Shaw Affair. The Corriere della Sera of 5 March 1967 has an article about SHAW, the assassination, and the World Trade Center. Contains no relevant information.

11. A memorandum marked only for file, 16 March 1967, signed M.D. Stevens, says that J. Monroe SULLIVAN, #280207, was granted a covert security approval on 10 December 1962 so that he could be used in Project []ENCHANT. SHAW has #402897-A.

12. Memorandum from C/EUR/I to C/CI/R & A, 24 March 1967, Subject: "Trace Results on Persons Connected with Centro Mondiale Commerciale" (World Trade Center), filed CI/R & A folder, Clay SHAW - working papers.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA SL DATE 2/4/97

a. The 5 March 1967 issue of Il Messaggero links SHAW with the World Trade Center. Others linked to the center were traced, with results reported in this memorandum. No relationship to the Garrison investigation appears here. A report on "Permidex", a Swiss corporation with principal offices in Rome, is also in the file because the World Trade Center and Permidex are associated. Again, there is no information here which relates significantly to the case Garrison is trying to build in New Orleans.

13. The Washington Post, Outlook, 2 April 1967, "Seeking Truth in New Orleans in the Middle of the Night", George Lardner, Jr.

a. Garrison's men drove RUSSO to SHAW's French Quarter home. RUSSO posed as a Mutual of Omaha salesman. He knocked at door; SHAW answered. RUSSO said that he was Clem BERTRAND.

b. SHAW is a 54-year old bachelor and socialite who pioneered the 33-story International Trade Mart in New Orleans. He was subpoenaed by Garrison's office on 1 March 1967. According to his friends, his questioners did not advise him of his rights. They told him they had evidence of a meeting with FERRIE and OSWALD. There was a fuss and SHAW was arrested and booked on conspiracy to murder JFK. That night Garrison's men raided SHAW's apartment and confiscated whips, chains, a black net cap, a cape and hood. RUSSO told reporters that he did not know Clay SHAW, but he identified the man arrested by Garrison as Clem BERTRAND.

Testimony of Abram Chayes
Legal Advisor, Dept. of State
Warren Commission, Vol. 5 pp 342-343

Mr. CHAYES. No; I think in each case it will depend so much on the situation with the particular person. If a person comes in and he is very agitated or something of that kind, it might dictate a totally different approach than a different kind of thing.

Mr. DULLES. Wouldn't it be useful though to give—I don't want to suggest what the Secretary of State should do in this, but in the light of this experience, would there not be some benefit possibly in giving people in the field the result of the experience gained in this particular case?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, the general approach, and other matters related to it, are touched on in orientation courses for consular officers and so on. I think as I look on Consul Snyder's actions, that he behaved very much like a responsible Foreign Service officer.

That happened long before I was in the Department, so I can say that without any involvement. But it seemed to me that he did just what he should have done, despite the unfortunate aftermath. And it shows to me, at least, that the training and orientation that these people are getting is right, is serviceable, and they are able to handle these situations as they come in.

Mr. DULLES. I realize that you ought not to prescribe hard and fast rules, that there is a broad range of discretion that should be exercised here. But I just raise the question as to whether a good deal of experience hasn't been gained in this case in that very field.

Mr. CHAYES. Well, it may very well be that more attention to that particular aspect should be given in the orientation courses and so on. Those things tend to reflect what is hot at the moment you know, and if you haven't had trouble with something for a pretty long time, it tends maybe not to get mentioned.

Representative FORD. If Oswald had persisted that day, October 31, in demanding the form that is a prerequisite under your definition for renunciation, would Snyder have been required to give it to him and permit him to sign it?

Mr. CHAYES. I think if it had been in ordinary office hours when the consulate was open for business, and if Snyder was satisfied that he was competent, that Oswald was competent, he would have to give him the form, yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Does Snyder have the authority to make a determination of competency?

Mr. CHAYES. No; he doesn't have the authority to make a determination of competence, and I suppose it is possible at some point to get the issue tried in court. But I think a consular officer would probably be acting within his discretion if he saw sombody who was drunk or raving or something and just said, "Well, I am not going to give you this until I am sure that your action is your act." After all, when the consul accepts the oath, he is certifying that it is the act of the person in a meaningful sense, and so if he thought that the person was incompetent, I think he would have discretion not to give the oath. But I put that far aside because in the particular case here, Mr. Snyder made it perfectly clear that he had no reason to doubt that Oswald was fully competent.

And so if Oswald had been there at a time when the office was open, or had returned at a time when the office was open, and had persisted in his demand, I think Snyder would have been under an obligation to give him the form.

Representative FORD. The only technical reason or basis upon which Snyder could have denied Oswald the right that day was the fact that it was on a Saturday, a non-working-hour period of the Embassy.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; I think he had every right to try to dissuade him, or persuade him not to act or persuade him to think it over and come back the next day. But if after all of that Oswald still had said "But I want to do it now" and if the office was open for business, then I think he would have had to do it.

Mr. DULLES. I think it might be useful if it has not been done to introduce at this point as an exhibit the form of oath of renunciation. Here is the formalized oath and I think it would be well to have this in our records unless it is already in our records.

Representative FORD. I agree.

Mr. COLEMAN. No; it isn't. Could we say it will be marked as Commission Exhibit No. 955 and place this sticker on that page, photostat it and then just send it back?

(Commission Exhibit No. 955 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Representative FORD. When Oswald came back on November 3, I believe, which was a regular working day——

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Commissioner, he did not come back on November 3. He merely wrote a letter.

Mr. CHAYES. Wrote a letter. He never came back.

Representative FORD. Are all of the employees, Mr. Snyder, Mr. McVickar, and the others who had any firsthand contact with the Oswald case in this area, were they State Department employees?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir; these two men who were the only ones who did see him directly, I think the secretary, their secretary also saw him, but had nothing to do with him except as a receptionist. These two men were Foreign Service officers and are now Foreign Service officers.

Representative FORD. In the strictest term.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir; members of the Foreign Service, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Representative FORD. Could you tell us in a bit more detail the process that you followed or the procedure that you carried out when you first got into the Oswald case.

You mentioned yesterday you got a call or you were directed by I believe the Secretary of State or by somebody in higher authority to take certain steps. Will you tell us who called you, what you did in the first 3 or 4 days?

Mr. CHAYES. It was the evening of the day, perhaps about 5 o'clock on the day of the assassination. It may have been somewhat earlier, because I think I remember I went home for an hour and then came back to carry out this assignment. Mr. Ball, once it became known that Oswald had some history as a defector—— GEORGE W. Ball

Mr. DULLES. Ball is the Under Secretary of State. D.C.

Mr. CHAYES. He was then the Acting Secretary because the Secretary of State as you recall was on a plane over the Pacific. So he was the Acting Secretary. But even if he had been the Under Secretary he is my client.

Representative FORD. He still had some authority.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; he directed me to gather together the files in the Department on Oswald, and to prepare a report to be available for him the first thing in the morning covering as best we could within that time span the contacts that Oswald had with the Department.

We got the passport file. We got the security office file. We got the special consular services file which covered Mrs. Oswald's visa and the repatriation loan. I think those three files were the ones that we had. It may have been there was a smaller fourth file, but I think those three were the ones.

Representative FORD. What would that smaller fourth file be?

Mr. CHAYES. I can't remember. It was duplicates if it was anything. Oh, that is right, we had a visa file and an SCS file so those were the four. The SCS file, that is Special Consular Services in the office, in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

Representative FORD. You got this order on or about 5 o'clock the 22d of November?

Mr. CHAYES. The 22d; yes, sir.

Representative FORD. And you issued orders to have these files brought in, or did you go and get them yourself?

Mr. CHAYES. No.

Representative FORD. Or what happened? State Dept. employ

Mr. CHAYES. I issued orders to have them brought in. I called—I am trying to think how we got them. [Turning to Mr. Ehrlich.] Did you go down and get them? Mr. Ehrlich and Mr. Lowenfeld, another of my people, we worked through the night on this, the three of us all together and it may be that the two of them went down to get them. I don't think we just called over the telephone and asked them to be brought up.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. CHAYES. It is my recollection that one of these two gentlemen, either Mr. Ehrlich or Mr. Lowenfeld

P 14 D

Vol 5 343

MAR 31 '97 12:10PM

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

15 April 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: David G. Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT: CIA Employees

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.)

1. (U) Issue. The purpose of this memo is to relate CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the release of the true names of CIA employees that appear in the JFK Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem might be addressed.

I. Factual Background

2. (U) To date, approximately 600 true names of CIA employees have been identified in the JFK Collection. Some of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA will continue to work with the Review Board to release as many of these names as possible. Many names, however, appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and appear to add nothing to the historical record.

3. (U) Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence to the Review Board that harm to the national security or to the employee would likely result from such release. Since these guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly clear that the number of names at issue, and, in most cases, their tenuous connection to the JFK story, make this approach unworkable with regard to both CIA's obligation to

CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

protect national security information and the Review Board's duty to inform the public about the JFK assassination in a timely and accurate fashion. The task of locating and informing hundreds of former employees scattered all over the country and the world has been a formidable one. Some employees have contacted us to report their concerns about a "suspicious" letter purporting to be from CIA which they had received. It would not be surprising, therefore, if many former employees ignored the letter for similar reasons, even though they might have legitimate needs to protect their identities.

4. (U) Contacting every named employee and collecting information on each of them to present to the Review Board will clearly take more time and effort than any of us had anticipated. This will have obvious ramifications for how and when the Review Board releases information to the public. More importantly, the decision to publicly acknowledge employees who may have been living for over 30 years under cover is a critical one that should be made not by default, but rather by careful planning and consideration.

5. (U) Relevant to this discussion is the fact that the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy for releasing true names of sources of intelligence information. It was agreed at that time that there would be a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where a source was particularly important to the JFK story and there was no overriding national security interest, the name would be released. Although the CIA recognizes that there are some sensitivities involved with sources that do not apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and operational similarities, which are described herein, that justify similar treatment by the Review Board. As is further detailed in Section IV, CIA, therefore, proposes that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting employee names that appear in the Collection, with exceptions for those individuals whom the Board believes are important to the JFK story.

II. Legal Considerations

6. (U) As both covert CIA employees and clandestine reporting assets are types of "human sources" of intelligence, many of the same laws apply. Although Section 11(a) of the JFK Act provides that, when the Act requires release of information, it takes precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit release, there are strong governmental national security interests in protecting the true names of CIA employees. CIA believes that it is

important for the Review Board to reconsider the laws which protect classified information, because they clearly reflect a larger US Government policy to protect covert CIA employees from disclosure.

7. (U) By Executive order and statute, the President and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for protecting sources of intelligence. In his Directive of 22 January 1946 that established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI responsible for protecting sources. With the establishment of CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section 103(d)(3), codified at 50 USC §403(3)(c)(5), *requires* the DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure. In addition, §403(3)(d)(2) *requires* the DCI to ensure that risks to the United States and those involved in the collection of intelligence through human sources are minimized.

8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working for CIA, not only covertly but overtly as well, has been of particular concern to US lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC §403g, Congress specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency.

9. (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving or potentially involving classified information. Working with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has successfully protected the names of CIA employees from public release even in criminal trials where there are heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to the defendant of all government information relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and relevancy of classified information, including the identity of CIA employees who may have information pertaining to the defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information and ruled that the harm to national security outweighs the

defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other, cases, the defense was never notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case, as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those cases where the risk to national security is too great.

10. (U) In 1982, Congress again acted to protect CIA employees by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 USC §421 that criminalizes the revelation of a covert employee or the identity of a source. This act subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a "covert agent" to prosecution and provides up to 10 years in prison and $50,000 in fines as punishment. This act specifically defines a "covert agent" as including "an officer or employee of an intelligence agency... ."

11. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12958 on classified national security information that became effective in October 1995. Although it requires generally that agencies make greater declassification efforts than under the prior executive order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of intelligence information, which would include employees, extra protection from the declassification provisions. Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and having historical value must be declassified within five years. However, information revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be protected.

12. (U) The above federal laws show a long-standing practice by the US Government to protect CIA employees from disclosure to the public. In carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to this policy and afford the protection of CIA employees a high priority.

III. Operational Considerations

13. (U) For current CIA employees whose names may appear in the JFK Collection, the operational considerations for protecting their identity are similar to those for sources. Many of these employees have worked "under cover" for CIA. Cover is used to disassociate entire installations and offices from open linkage to intelligence activities, to enable intelligence personnel to enter and work effectively in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and authorized clandestine activities from attention by hostile elements and from media exposure, to facilitate access to

certain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in foreign countries.

14. (U) The ability to maintain one's cover is crucial to gathering intelligence. In either a "hostile" or "friendly" country, should the local service become aware of who the CIA employees are, it would increase surveillance and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible. In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local population is not aware of the circumstances. Once it becomes known among the locals that certain US Government officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the government to expel those Americans, disrupting liaison and diplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert employees and their families would face increased risk to their personal safety. Even in "friendly" countries, our employees could face some personal risks as well as risks to ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among an otherwise benign local population. In any of these cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the field; and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in an operationally and physically secure location. Thus, maintaining cover is important to a case officer's effectiveness and to the continuation of a career with CIA.

15. (S) Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is also important to cover providers. The Review Board will recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA employees, both in the United States and overseas, can work under "official" (e.g., State Department) cover or "non-official" (e.g., private company) cover. Disclosure of a covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also negatively affect the governmental or business mission of the cover provider, especially those who provide non-official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in other countries could have a negative impact on the provider's business interests and activities. It would also cast suspicion on that provider's legitimate employees and their families. Further, exposure of cover providers could affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by the Agency and Intelligence Community.

16. (S) Although the majority of names that appear in the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA are

not diminished. Similar to sources, many former employees still do not want their past affiliation with CIA revealed. Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact could negatively affect personal and professional relationships. Some former employees still live overseas where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their personal safety. Other former employees travel overseas on business, where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can threaten their business interests and personal safety. One example of an employee in this category is Robert Fulton, whose name apparently appears only once in the Collection. Fulton retired under Department of State cover; he currently has a consultant business and frequently travels to China. Release of his name would jeopardize not only his business but perhaps even his safety. A similar example is Walter McCabe, who also retired under State cover. He is now working in Russia and several East European countries for a private firm. He does not want his name published, because it could be damaging to his current employer and his professional status.

17. (S) Even if a former employee agrees to the revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, this might not be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing operations on which that employee worked. Foreign nationals recruited by the employee and still providing information to the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public acknowledgment could reveal the location of CIA stations where the employee worked throughout his career, including some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and may have believed they were legitimately providing information to a US corporate representative would be upset to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government.

18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers by their own service would have a chilling effect on prospective assets. Prospective assets would be unlikely to enter into a clandestine relationship with American intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even its own staff employees from public disclosure.

IV. Proposal

19. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions made for those individuals who are important to the story of the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a

substitution for the true name be used. If the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular employees throughout the records, a particular identifying substitution can be used for a particular employee.

20. (S) CIA believes that this approach will not undermine the Review Board's obligations under the JFK Act. A review of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 84 of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection. In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals' identity can add anything of significance to the historical record; yet there may be some security concerns still associated with these individuals. For example, Arthur H. Stimson retired under cover and is currently living in Europe. When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in the JFK Collection and was subject to public release, he told CIA that he was opposed to having his name released and believed such a release could pose personal and security problems. Furthermore, he could not understand why his name even appeared in the Collection, since he had no recollection of being involved in anything related to the assassination.

21. (S) With regard to the approximately 500 names that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast majority of these individuals played almost no role in the JFK story. One example of this is former DO officer Alexander Brasko. His name appears approximately 20-30 times in the Collection simply because he signed off on name trace requests. Mr. Brasko was a covert CIA employee and retired under cover. The public release of his name would provide the public with no additional significant information about JFK. Tom Flores is another example of a covert CIA employee whose name appears in the Collection but has little or no connection to the JFK story. Flores retired under cover, is living in South America, and objects to the release of his name. Mr. Flores' recent letter to CIA is also attached for your convenience.

22. (S) The Agency, of course, recognizes that some names may be particularly important to the JFK story regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in the Collection. One such example is former COS Mexico Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee. In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review Board for an appropriate resolution. The CIA proposes that the Review Board and its staff identify those individuals whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose names should be released to the public. These names would carry a presumption of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm would likely result

from such release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate searches to determine whether release would pose national security concerns for the US Government or personal safety concerns for the individual. In this way, CIA and the Review Board can concentrate their efforts on individuals who are significant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review of the sequestered collection.

23. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review Board can agree on and work out a mutually acceptable policy regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not undermine the important principle of protecting those who work covertly for the US Government. My staff and I are ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.

Michael J. O'Neil
Acting General Counsel

Attachment
A. Tom Flores' letter

Subject: CIA Employees

DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani 76124 (10 Apr 97)

OGC-97-50971

Distribution:
  Original - Addressee
      1 - GC
      1 - Lit File - LDG00021
      1 - LCC Signer
      1 - RDC - FYI
      1 - OGC Registry

17 March 1997

Ms. Beth Mills

Dear Ms. Mills,

Your letter of 4 March was delivered to me on 10 March, and this reply will be sent via the same channel.

I wish to go on record as demanding that my name not be released in ANY document disclosed concerning the Kennedy assassination.

First, I shall describe my present circumstances; and thereafter I will address the legal points in the legislation.

I retired in 1974 in a clandestine status, using a State Department cover, which has worked reasonably well since then. I reside in Caracas, Venezuela. This city (and the entire country) is still populated with Communists and ex-Communists who formed part of the Marxist conspiracy to overthrow the democratically elected Governments in the 1960s and 70s. Many of these persons are now members of Congress and a few are in the President's Cabinet. During my service in Venezuela, as COS, I maintained liaison with civilian and military officers, during which time I worked with these to overcome the guerrilla offensive, and to combat the Communist Party after it accepted "pacification." I left in 1972 and went to Vietnam, from which I returned to Venezuela as a private citizen. Because of my wife's long employment and friendships, we are as closely connected with the Jewish Community as two Christians can be.

Given my somewhat exposed position as COS, my true affiliation was known to a number of important Venezuelan Government officials. In any event, soon after my return, I was informed by the Venezuelan Government that an important Communist leader had learned of my return, and that "I was living in Urbanizacion Miranda (a small and somewhat isolated Caracas suburb) and that I was training right wing paramilitary personnel." They were right about where I lived, but confused Boy Scouts with "right wing paramilitary personnel." I worked as a volunteer leader for the Boy Scouts of America and the Venezuelan Scout Association from 1974 to about 1991.

In any event, the Venezuelan Government was sufficiently concerned about the matter, that it offered me a group of bodyguards. I turned down the offer, and asked them to provide me with an automatic pistol for my protection. I still have that pistol.

The country has changed somewhat since that time. There are still a number of underground radical groups who resisted pacification, and try to foment violence wherever possible. Along the Colombian border they appear to be linked up with the Colombian ELN and FARC. In addition to these, the country has been infiltrated by radical Moslem movements. A Cuban Embassy, with its usual collection of intelligence officers, is located in Caracas. Further Iran, Iraq and Lebanon also maintain diplomatic posts here, and probably support the Muslim extremists.

Under present circumstances, my cover has prevented me from coming to the attention of these people. However, I feel very strongly that if my name is released, I will again become a potential target for these and other persons who wish to embarrass the United States and/or adversely affect U.S./Venezuelan relationships. I was recently decorated by the Venezuelan President for my contributions to good Venezuelan/American relations.

I have no intention of leaving Venezuela under any circumstances.

Any connection I may ever have had with the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination, was highly peripheral. Any documents which may be released, could include my job title (rather than my name) without reducing the value of said documents.

Since I will be quite dead in 25 years, I cannot object to my name being released at that time.

Although not mentioned as an option in your letter, I would like to be permitted to review the documents containing my name which you are being obliged to release. When I retired, I gave up all links with former sources. One of these popped up in the New York Times last week. Some others may still be alive, and in need of protection, although as I recall, none had any useful data concerning the assassination. If the sources are to be exposed, I feel very strongly that they are entitled to all the protection we can afford them. I will be in the Washington D.C. area in November 1997, and would be willing to review these documents.

In terms of the provisions you cite for exceptions in your letter, (A) I consider myself a person (Agent?) whose identity currently requires protection.

The cover I am using, provided by the State Department, is (B) an intelligence method which is currently utilized.

The public disclosure of my name as part of the assassination record (C.3) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. I cannot resist defining the public interest in this matter as "public morbid curiosity."

The public disclosure of my name as part of the assassination record (C.4) would probably compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a government agent and a cooperating individual or foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest. I was COS in Bolivia when the assassination occurred. I was in close touch with the Bolivian Government security chief at that time, and with the Minister of Interior, and we probably interchanged data on the murder, although they could provide nothing useful. Also, the Station was probably tasked to query all of our sources on the matter, again with negative results. The revelation of my name and the identities of liaison contacts and unilateral sources would not only imperil me, but would also embarrass the Bolivian Government, and could endanger current activities of the Agency in that country. I do not recall whether in my subsequent assignment as Chief of the Cuban Task Force, any mention of the assassination came up. However, if it did, revelation of my name could not only imperil those agents of the time who survive, compromise our operational methods, but also, make me a prime target for the Cuban intelligence service.

None of the above should be construed as a waiver of my rights, or those of my heirs, to take legal action to prevent the release of my name and/or to collect damages, both civil and punitive, resulting from the release of my name. There exists an implicit contract between me and the Agency dating from when I accepted the inconveniences of a clandestine retirement. The Agency undertook to provide a LASTING cover for me. It should be noted that this implicit contract predates Public Law 102-526 by some 18 years. Naturally, I am going to inform my legal advisor of this entire matter. I suggest that you pull together a set of all documents pertaining to my retirement, so that these can be made available for his review.

I refrain from comment about a U.S. Congress that would pass such a bill, and a President who would fail to veto it. (You of course, are not to blame.) The New York Times and the Washington Post, will, of course, be drooling to get their hands on your papers. I don't envy you because this is an extremely complicated matter. Unfortunately, the release on a lot of non-pertinent information will go a long way to reveal the scope and role of the Agency in Latin America to any analyst who wants to review the material and piece it together. I believe that this role is not significantly different today than it was when President Kennedy was murdered. Only the targets and the gadgets have changed.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas J. Flores

ER 97-4602

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

October 28, 1997

Mr. David W. Carey
Executive Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Re: Completing the Review of JFK Assassination Records

Dear Mr. Carey:

I would like to congratulate you on your new appointment at the Agency and wish you the very best of success in the difficult challenges that lie ahead.

As you probably are aware, the Assassination Records Review Board has been mandated by Congress and the President to oversee the declassification and transfer to the National Archives of all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. During the past three years we have received excellent cooperation from CIA in regard to the processing of the relevant Agency records. From our perspective, this is due in significant part to the work of John Pereira, Chief of the Historical Review Group, and J. Barry Harrelson, who has shouldered the extremely complicated, burdensome, and frequently thankless task of overseeing the project. Both of them have proved to be superb representatives of the Agency. We also very much appreciated receiving a strong message of support from your predecessor, Nora Slatkin, who advised us in a meeting on October 16, 1996, of her full support for the project and her willingness to commit the necessary Agency resources to complete the project.

Because the Review Board is now in the final twelve months of its statutory tenure, I thought it would be appropriate to advise you of our goals for the upcoming year. It is our wish to be able to state in our Final Report to the President and to Congress that CIA has made all reasonable attempts to locate, review, and declassify all available records on the Kennedy assassination. We would like the Review Board to be able to assure the American people that the Agency has been fully cooperative in this enormous and difficult task, and that the Agency no longer retains any "secret" files on the assassination. In addition, we are obligated to keep Congress informed, on a monthly basis, of the status of our work and any difficulties that would interfere with our ability to achieve our objective.

Although many important strides have been made to further our goals, we nevertheless perceive that the pace of review and declassification of Agency records will need to be

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

accelerated in order for us to succeed. We must keep in mind that the goal includes reviewing, processing, and transferring to the custody of the National Archives ***all*** identified assassination records by September 1, 1998. (We do not perceive that duplicate copies of such records need be transferred by September 1.) Many time-consuming difficulties inherent in this project have been overcome, and we perceive that the pace of review is accelerating. Nevertheless, we wanted to signal to you our concern that, unless the pace of review increases further, we may not be on target to satisfy what I hope to be our common objective.

It is our firm intention to complete our task within the congressionally mandated time limit. If CIA is unable to pre-review and process its records consistent with completion of this task, the Review Board will vote to release-in-full all relevant CIA records and mandate that custody be transferred to the National Archives in a timely way. We sincerely hope that it will not be necessary for the Board to make wholesale decisions on unreviewed records and we will be pleased to work with the Agency to see that such a step is unnecessary. But we are prepared to make such decisions to the extent they are required to fulfill our own responsibilities. Although it is our perception that CIA may wish to devote additional human resources to this project, we of course leave such decisions to the sound judgment of knowledgeable CIA officials.

We therefore strongly urge the Agency to take all appropriate steps to complete its review of records in an orderly and systematic manner. To the extent that the Agency is able to satisfy appropriate deadlines, there will be no need for us to resort to any unfortunate -- but potentially necessary -- measures to complete our own obligations to Congress, the President, and the American people.

If you would find it helpful, the Review Board members and I would be pleased to discuss these issues with you or others at the Agency.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Assassination Records Review Board

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

21 November 1997

CSI 97-536

Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records
  Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
2000

Dear Dr. Gunn:

Thank you for your letter of 28 October in which you outline the Assassination Records Review Board's goals for the coming year. I appreciate the complimentary remarks you made about the "excellent cooperation" that CIA has been providing to the Board.

You raised a concern that the Agency may not be able to increase sufficiently the pace of the review process to meet the 1 September 1998 deadline for completing the transfer of records to the National Archives. You also expressed the view that if any records are not reviewed by the deadline, the Board will vote to release them in full and mandate that custody be transferred to the National Archives.

You can be assured that we are committed to taking all necessary steps to meet our statutory obligation to review all of the Agency's assassination-related materials. It is important that a proper review of all relevant records be done. This will allow us to recommend to the Board what information warrants continued protection.

We appreciate the great responsibility that Congress and the President have given to the Board to inform the American people about the assassination. We share the Board's goal of declassifying and releasing the relevant records to the fullest extent possible.

Please convey my regards to Chairman Tunheim and the other Board members, and assure them of our continued cooperation.

Sincerely,

David W. Carey

David W. Carey

DCI
EXEC
REG

Dave - CSI answers to your questions on JFK project.
I forwarded them to Comptroller, too.
D/Comptroller provided additional background, also attached.

CL BY: 0185904
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COL 1-82

CC: Gina

NOTE FOR: Rebecca V. Strode
FROM: John F. Pereira
OFFICE: CSI/HRG
DATE: 11/06/97 11:38:33 AM
SUBJECT: CSI Resource Request regarding JFK

In Brian Latell's absence, I am providing the following response to the Exdir's questions regarding the request for additional resources for review of JFK documents:

1. What is the size of the JFK declassification problem ? How much work remains to be done ?

- An additional 40-50,000 pages of CIA records remain to be reviewed by 30 September 1998.

- A large volume of documents are being referred to CIA by other agencies for review, including the FBI, State, and Presidential Libraries. The documents are either CIA-originated or contain CIA information. No figures are available, but we estimate at least 40,000 pages.

- The JFK Board has also asked CIA to re-review approximately 130,000 pages of material that we released earlier to the National Archives. The reason is to determine whether information deleted earlier can now be released.

2. How many people do you have working on the JFK project now ?

- Following are dedicated to the JFK project:

  - - One staff officer (Project leader Barry Harrelson)
  - - 13 independent contractors (work 3/4 days per week)

- The DO unit detailed to CSI to coordinate the review of JFK records recently added two contractors and may add more.

3. What difference would X more make ?

- The additional resources requested would allow us to increase the pace of the review of CIA documents and third agency referrals. Unless the pace is increased, it is highly unlikely that the Board's requirement to complete the review and declassification of all JFK-related records by 30 September 1998 could be met.

CC: Brian S. Latell, Patricia F. Duryee, Rodney A. Snyder, Rex H. Latham-C-, Robert E. Leggett, J. Barry Harrelson

Sent on 6 November 1997 at 11:38:33 AM

SECRET

CL BY: 0693020
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: 6 November 2007
DRV FRM: FIN 7-82

TO: Rebecca V. Strode
FROM: Cynthia R. Bower
OFFICE: COMPT
DATE: 11/06/97 12:09:41 PM
SUBJECT: Re: CSI Resource Request regarding JFK

Some background information for you:

(S) First, although Congress authorized and appropriated $5.5 million for classification management, it is unlikely that CSI will receive the full $5.5 million. Why? Congress levied a tax on DoD procurement that will have a significant impact on CIA's program because of the fact that our entire budget is incorporated in DoD's budget as Other Procurement Air Force. As a result of that tax, CIA has to take about a $49 million reduction across all programs (per SAC direction). This will impact on all activities -- including new adds. Each activity can expect to lose about 1% of its resources. We will identify specifically how to take this cut at Friday's offsite.

(C) In addition, CIA has a large FY98 unfunded bill (about $143 million). On Friday, we will determine how to reduce and/or pay that bill. One of the proposals on the table for paying that bill is to use some of the Congressional add money -- obviously, we would have to work this with the Hill, but the bottom line is that some of the declass money may be redirected to other priorities.

(C) Finally, we may decide to use some of the adds to prepay some FY99 shortfalls. We are already aware of a shortfall in FY99 of about $180 million.

(U) So, the bottom line is that no one should count on getting the full amount of their add until we have finalized our decisions on FY98 and FY99 unfundeds.

(C) All that said, if CSI does receive some or all of the money added by Congress, they do have the flexibility to allocate that money to other priorities. However, they should attempt to meet the spirit of the language in the Authorization Act. Specifically, the language reads, "The Senate bill added $5.5 million to enhance declassification efforts, **with a particular emphasis on those documents relating to Guatemala and Honduras.** The House amendment added $8 million for classification management. the conferees agree to provide $5.5 million for declassification and classification management and request that the Director of CSI report to the Congressional Intelligence Committees on progress in declassifying documents of historical significance, the volume of documents involved, the mechanism for review, the anticipated date of completion of this effort, and how the process can be improved."

(U) Hope this helps. CRB

CC: Mary K. Sturtevant

SECRET

AIUO
Classification of Material Transmitted

EXDIR
D/EXDIR
Comptroller
DCI Plans

HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

Phone # 703-613-1806

PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

7 NOV '97 --9:32

****

CLASSIFIED FAX

SUBJECT: JFK

FROM: John Pereira x31805

SENDING FAX NO. 703-613-3060

DELIVER TO: Becky Strode, EXDIR OFFICE

RECEIVING FAX NO. 703-734-1819

DATE TRANSMITTED: 11/7 PAGES TRANSMITTED: 5
(including cover sheet)

TRANSMITTED BY: Barbara

****

MESSAGE:

Becky, this is info you requested on JFK

AIUO
Classification of Material Transmitted

31 October 1997

Request for Additional Funds for the JFK Assassination Records Review Project, through 31 September 1998.

Reference: Ltr. to Executive Director form J. Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director, Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), copy attached.

Background.

1. The ARRB will go out of business on 31 September 1998. Before that date, it has a statutory obligation to complete its review of all records held by the U.S. Government which relate to the assassination of President Kennedy, determine those which are relevant to the assassination story and ensure that the same are transferred to the National Archives. As the board begins its final year, it has become increasingly concerned about the pace of the review and transfer process. Referent letter is the latest of a number of exchanges dealing with that concern.

2. CSI/HRG has carefully reviewed its current position with respect to its ability to meet the deadlines imposed and has concluded that it cannot fully do so without additional resources, at least through 30 September 1998. This conclusion is based in large measure on three changed circumstances:

A. The ARRB has recently exercised its statutory authority and designated additional CIA records to be within the JFK collection (to date approximately twenty cubic feet or 40,000 pages). Additional records may be identified as the ARRB staff continues its review of Agency files.

B. Over the past three months we have received an increase in the number of "Assassination Records" referred from third agencies which include both Agency documents held by another agency or third agency documents which must be reviewed because they contain CIA information; and

C. The ARRB itself has established a deadline which was not anticipated. All agencies had understood that the review process and ARRB action would have to be completed by 30 September, but it was widely assumed that final processing and transfer of the documents to the National Archives could occur after that date. However, the Board has now mandated that all relevant records which are not duplicates must be transferred to custody of the National Archives before it goes out of business.

Additional Resources Requested.

3. The following estimate is based on our understanding of the ARRB requirements at this time.

A. Review of records: equivalent of 2 man-years (3 contractors -- average daily contractor cost $270);

B. Preparation of documents for National Archives: equivalent of 1.5 man-years (2 contractors -- average daily contractor cost $180);

C. Indexing: approximately one-man year of overtime ($25 hourly rate);

D. Reproduction: approximately one-man year of overtime ($25 hourly rate).

Estimated cost FY98: $300,000

Request for Funds for Declassification of Korean Documents

1. Background. In December 1995, the Director of Central Intelligence drafted a Policy Directive calling for the implementation of a community-wide systematic declassification program under the leadership of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). The Community Historical Review Advisory Committee (CHRAC), chaired by the Director of CSI, was formed last year to implement the DCI's directive and to select and prioritize topics for historical declassification review by the Intelligence Community. At the October meeting of the CHRAC, the agency representatives approved the review of materials related to the Korean War as the first topic for historical declassification to be done collectively by the Intelligence Community.

2. The Korean Project. Funds are requested for the Agency to fully participate in this project. With funding, CSI, in cooperation with the Agency's automatic declassification program (OIM/IRG/ADD), will review for possible declassification intelligence records related to the Korean War period (1 January 1950 through 27 July 1953). The review would be done concurrently with the rest of the Intelligence Community. The joint effort will be coordinated by CSI.

3. The Project's Cost. Preliminary research done by CIA's History staff indicates there are approximately 100 boxes, about 150,000 pages, of material that will have to be reviewed from archival material belonging to several Agency directorates. The following costs would be incurred during such a review:

- Document Preparation (select pertinent documents for copying and organize them for reviewers) - One contractor for 50 days ($13,000)[1]

Not J.A contr

- Copying Expenses - One copier, at 75 pages per hour for 2000 hours ($50,000)[2]

- Document Review (contractor document review to make declassification determinations with guidance supplied by staff supervisor) - One contractor doing 2 reviews of each document at a rate of 200 pages per day ($390,000)

---

[1] Contractor is approximately $270 per day.

[2] Copiers are approximately $25 per hour.

- Document Massaging (input of staff supervisor, time for outside coordination, and preparation of final copies for NARA) - Approximately 1/3 of a staff officer's time for 1 year and 2 contractors for a total of 384 days ($135,000)[1]

TOTAL COST	$588,000[3]

---

[3] The total is a conservative estimate that could escalate depending upon the complexity of the project and the need for outside coordination. Costs not included in this total are paper, cost of equipment maintenance, ADP support, document coordination expenses of other directorates, share of cost of CSI support personnel and cost of putting finished declassified documents into MORI.

104-10330-10102
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The Honorable John Raymond Tunheim
Chairman
Assassination Records
  Review Board
600 E. Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Judge Tunheim:

(C) I have just received informal word of the decisions the JFK Board made at its 17 November 1997 meeting. Most of the Board's decisions--those relating to the CIA presence in Warrenton, CIA's involvement in various non-governmental organizations, and the details of CIA funding of the Cuban Revolutionary Council--are very welcome. I must, however, urge the Board to reconsider its decision to release documents in a form that would reveal the Agency's use of State Department cover.

(C) We stand behind the position that we have presented in writing and in discussions with the Board on previous occasions. I would welcome an opportunity to have a senior CIA representative meet with the Board at your convenience to explain why the Agency considers this information so sensitive and to answer any questions you may have. Meanwhile, I offer the following summary of our fundamental concerns.

(S) Effective official cover is necessary to enable our officers to work overseas in often hostile and volatile environments. Official cover also enables the Agency to conduct its business with allied liaison services in countries where host governments would find it politically unacceptable to acknowledge a cooperative relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency. In all such settings, State Department cover is critically important because its use affords our officers the rights and privileges set forth in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Immunity--diplomatic immunity, in particular. Indeed, the effectiveness of the Agency's use of State Department cover

CL BY: 2217297
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 2-87

clearly illustrates the purpose behind the Director's statutory obligation to protect intelligence methods from unnecessary and inappropriate disclosure.

(S) No other cover mechanism can provide our officers the operational utility and personal security that State Department cover does. Achieving effective cover requires that our officers be fully integrated into State Department entities, offices, and functions. Our officers are routinely assigned State Department duties to make it harder for hostile services and others who might try to harm or expose our officers to identify them as Agency employees. Official acknowledgment of even the fact of Agency use of State Department cover would increase dramatically the risks that both Agency officers and our State Department colleagues encounter in serving US interests around the world.

(S) State Department cover continues to be an important intelligence method. Its use is undiminished since the 1960s, and it will remain essential for the foreseeable future. I urge the Board to reconsider its recent decision insofar as it concerns the Agency's use of State Department cover. In this regard, we will be forwarding a more comprehensive memorandum addressing the damage issue prior to the next Board meeting, and we would also like to offer the Board the opportunity for a personal appearance by a senior CIA representative should that be appropriate.

Sincerely,

David W. Carey

David W. Carey

13 May 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Executive Director**
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: **J. Barry Harrelson**
JFK Project Officer

SUBJECT: **CIA Proposal on Alias Documentation and Accommodation Addresses in Assassination Records**

I. (U) Background and Recommendation

1. (C) Alias documentation includes materials carried on the person of any CIA officer or foreign asset traveling and conducting business under a fictitious identity. Aliases are widely used by CIA officers working under both official and non-official cover. They are also used by those on TDY status traveling to or from Headquarters as well as between field stations.

2. (S) This package contains five kinds of information relating to cover methods currently in use in connection with aliases:

A) **Foreign government forgeries** (the Mexican and Panamanian passports used by David Morales under various aliases);

B) **US federal and state documents** (social security cards, drivers licenses, and birth certificates);

C) **Business documents** used with the prior agreement of the company, organization, or association they represent;

D) **Forged business documents**;

E) **Accommodation addresses** ("residences of record" for anyone working under alias).

3. (S) Many of the specific forms of alias documentation represented in this package are identical to those used today by Agency officers and assets using aliases and operating under both official and non-official cover. Moreover, certain aspects of their use in support of non-official cover cause CIA particular concern in the event of disclosure:

- Use of non-official cover is expanding rapidly in response to changes in CIA targets following the collapse of the USSR.

- The use by CIA of non-official cover and the details of how it is employed are less well known than our use of official cover.

- Some of our most uniquely valuable human intelligence comes from this method.

- Non-official cover affords its user no diplomatic immunity. Since some of CIA's most hostile targets necessitate the use of non-official cover, our officers and assets working against these targets run the risk of being arrested, imprisoned, or worse.

4. (S) The likelihood of damage from disclosure of specific information on alias documentation and accommodation addresses runs the gamut from "certain" to "unpredictable." Based on past evidence, public release of references to the forged Mexican and Panamanian passports would be virtually certain to draw a reaction from those governments that would harm US diplomatic relations and deny CIA its use of a currently valuable tool. The probability of litigation from disclosure of business documents is also quite high.

- The damage from release of 25--30 year-old addresses and specifics on seemingly innocuous pocket litter is less predictable. Nonetheless, it has broad implications for both the current use of non-official cover and for the safety of individuals associated with these methods in the past, and therefore CIA can not afford to ignore it. To manage the risk, if denied the option of postponing the release, would require an extremely time consuming review of each piece of information on a case-by-case basis.

5. (U) None of the information being considered for release adds significantly to the historical record on the Kennedy assassination. The minimal added value from its release is small in comparison to the damage, both certain and potential, that would result. Since the cost-benefit ratio is so skewed, we recommend that release of specific information on alias documentation and accommodation addresses be postponed and that generic substitute language be used in its place.

II. (U) Discussion of Potential Damage

6. (C) Disclosure of information relating to the five categories discussed in paragraph 2 above can reasonably be expected to cause the following types of damage:

a) Damage to diplomatic relations with Mexico and Panama;

b) Litigation from private sector firms;

c) Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method;

d) Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets;

e) Potential threats to CIA's agreements with other US government entities.

7. Category by category, the specific kinds of damage most likely to result from disclosure of the five types of information outlined in section 2 above are:

⇒***A) Foreign government forgeries.***

(The Mexican and Panamanian passports carried by David Morales.)

a) (S) Damage to US diplomatic relations with Mexico and Panama would result from release of information on Morales's passport documentation. In the past, CIA's production and use of various countries' passports, birth certificates, and other official documents have been done both with and without specific agreement from those countries. With respect to the documents in this package reflecting our use of Mexican passports, the latter was undoubtedly the case. Moreover, CIA still continues to provide its assets and officers with forged Mexican passports without the agreement of the Mexican government.

- ***The Mexican government has always been extremely sensitive to issues of national sovereignty*** and would almost certainly express official public resentment at CIA's usurping of its unique authority by producing false passports and birth certificates of Mexican citizens.

(S) There are concrete examples of past incidents involving disclosure which have resulted in strong censure and the threat of diplomatic action: In the aftermath of the Iranian takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1978, among the papers the Iranians discovered were forged Belgian and West German identification documents including passports. Upon reading this in the Iranian media, Belgian intelligence officials summoned our people and threatened that if all such documents were not destroyed immediately and the practice ended, there would be exceptionally dire consequences in the spheres of both diplomatic relations and intelligence cooperation.

- Besides the insult to its sovereignty, at least one additional strong factor in the Belgian government's acrimonious representation was ***the desire to avoid any association with CIA, however spurious, of Belgian citizens living, working, or traveling abroad***.

(S) The Germans also registered their ire in strong terms, noting that in using German passports outside the Warsaw Pact theater we had exceeded our negotiated right to reproduce their documentation for use by our officers. During this demarche, similar threats were made to end the liaison relationship with their intelligence service.

- As a result of such flaps, CIA has little recourse but to accede to direct demands that we cease using a given country's documentation, which narrows our range of options for providing officers with operational aliases.

⇒*B)* ***Federal and state documents***

(Social security cards, FAA documentation, driver's licenses, birth certificates)

e) (C) Potential threat to CIA's agreements with other US government entities. At present, sixteen states assist CIA in providing documentation for alias identities, including drivers licenses. There is an unwritten understanding with each that CIA will do all it can to protect the confidentiality of this agreement. Although the immediate damage from release of this would certainly be less severe than the harm done to US diplomatic relations from the release of information on passport forgery, these arrangements could be terminated if they receive too much publicity and state officials or politicians were publicly embarrassed.

- Termination of any of such agreements would curtail CIA's options for providing its officers with solid cover.

⇒*C) and D)* ***Business documents***

(either forged or produced with prior negotiated agreement)

(Rotary club, record and book club membership, AAA, specific bank cards, travel club, Continental Insurance Co.)

b) Litigation from private sector firms;
c) Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method; and
d) Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets.

b) (C) Litigation from private sector firms. The same probability of litigation applies to both forged documents and those produced with the permission of certain companies. Many of these firms conduct business abroad in a variety of political environments that range from friendly to hostile. For reasons relating to loss of revenue and physical threats to their employees and other assets, they cannot afford to have even the public hint of an association with CIA, let alone official disclosure of this fact.

- ***The likelihood of litigation from such disclosure would be high***. CIA's Office of General Counsel has on file a number of letters from private sector firms setting forth their right to take legal action in the event of the disclosure of their relationship with CIA.

- In the past, some firms have taken legal action against CIA for disclosure of an association that adversely affected their business.

c) (S) ***Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method***. Firms which assist CIA by permitting the use of their documentation in support of non-official cover do so voluntarily and without remuneration. In addition, CIA generally requests that the companies sign secrecy agreements. Therefore, the unilateral release by CIA of information about this association would complicate future negotiations by creating the perception that we are an unreliable partner.

- The official disclosure of one such secret arrangement, even at a 30-year remove, would almost certainly be noted in the corporate board rooms of all firms that have an association with CIA.

(S) Release of information on private sector alias documentation would reduce CIA's range of options for supporting its increasing use of non-official cover. The magnitude of the threat this carries is unpredictable. Because of the versatility of non-official cover as well as its unique applicability to certain types of targets, CIA's apprehensions about giving up information that could help adversaries are substantial.

- Non-official cover is the most productive way to gather human intelligence on terrorist organizations, weapons proliferators, narcotics traffickers, members of international organized crime and money launderers, and countries with which we have no diplomatic relations. Almost all of our intelligence on weapons proliferation, for example, comes from NOC officers and assets.

d) (C) ***Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets.*** Adding to an adversary's knowledge of specific forms of alias documentation used in non-official cover could help unmask CIA officers or assets by the profile of typical documentation CIA is known to carry. With the increased availability of sophisticated statistical analysis, the threat from "profiling" would increase exponentially as more information is released. This is of particular concern when working against hostile targets such as terrorists and narco-traffickers.

- Intelligence collection against targets like these requires a watertight alias documentation mechanism that allows our officers to operate as safely and freely as possible.

⇒*E) Accommodation addresses*

c) ***Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method***; and
d) ***Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets***.

(C) Accommodation addresses were and still are used in support of a wide variety of covert operations involving both official and non-official cover. The potential damage from disclosure of specific addresses relates both to present and past users as well as to those individuals who grant, or granted, CIA the right to use their addresses.

- The people who give us the right to use their addresses are in many cases not directly associated with CIA. They may be relatives of CIA employees or simply private citizens. Disclosure of addresses could complicate the search for individuals willing to assist CIA.

- The release of a specific accommodation address, even if it is no longer in use, could enable an adversary to make positive identifications of an entire series of aliases of individuals who used that address in support of their cover package.

- Conversely, an alias that is released can be traced through local postal records to a corresponding accommodation address.

- It is possible to endanger those individuals, including foreign assets, known to have been associated with a given alias, even if the individual who bore the alias is no longer living.

13 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the
Assassination Records Review Board

1. The attached memorandum and attachments are in response to questions raised by ARRB members during the 16 October 1996 briefing. They are provided to the Review Board for background purposes only. We request that the memorandum and its attachments be returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on these issues.

2. Please note that the author of the memorandum is under cover and her name is classified.

John Pereira

John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

This memorandum is unclassified
when separated from attachments

OCC-96-086
19 NOV 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira
Historical Review Group

FROM: Linda A. Jasper
Deputy Chief, Office of Central Cover

SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board

1. During the OCC briefing of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board on 16 October 1996, members of the Board asked three questions to which OCC said it would respond after additional research. Following are the questions and the responses:

a. How many real businesses or contrived facilities in the commercial cover program are connected to the publications industry? Response: A few real businesses are loosely connected with the publications industry, and the names of a few contrived facilities could be perceived as being associated.

b. How many companies participated in the commercial cover program in the 1960s, and how many participate today? Response: Approximately 500 companies participated in the commercial cover program in the 1960s, and circa 1,800 are currently in the program.

ALL PORTIONS OF
THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED SECRET

CL BY 0523550
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1; 12 November 2021
DRV COV 2-87

SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board

c. Could a copy of the secrecy agreement which is signed by company officials participating in the commercial cover program be made available, and has it changed since the 1960s? Response: Attached is a copy of the secrecy agreement used from 1955 to 1988 and a copy of the agreement used from 1988 to the present. The only difference is an addendum on the reverse which was added in 1991 pursuant to the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1991.

2. This memorandum and its attachments are for background information only and must be returned to the Central Intelligence Agency after review by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board.

Linda Jasper
Linda A. Jasper

Attachment:
as stated

cc: Fredrick Wickham, IMS

SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Review Board

DC/OCC(lh/LJasper,32435 18Nov96 file:jfkboard)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DC/OCC (Ljasper)
1 - His. Review Board(BHarrelson)
1 - OCC/EXO (EMathias)
1 - OGC (Ciprinai)

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I acknowledge the fact that because of the confidential relationship between myself and the U.S. Government, I will be the recipient of information which, in itself, or by the implications to be drawn therefrom, will be such that its unlawful disclosure or loose handling may adversely affect the interest and the security of the United States. I realize that the methods of collecting and of using this information, as well as the identity of persons involved, are as secret as the substantive information itself and, therefore, must be treated by me with an equal degree of secrecy.

2. I shall always recognize that the U.S. Government has the sole interest in all information which I or my organization may possess, compile or acquire pursuant to this understanding. No advantage or gain will be sought by me as a result of the added significance or value such information may have, due to the Government's interest in it.

3. I solemnly pledge my word that I will never divulge, publish, nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such information or knowledge, as indicated above, unless specifically authorized to do so, by the U.S. Government.

4. Nothing in this understanding is to be taken as imposing any restriction upon the normal business practices of myself or my organization: i.e., information normally possessed by us or gathered in the regular course of business will continue to be utilized in accordance with our normal practices.

SIGNATURE:

REPRESENTATIVE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

DATE

SIGNATURE:

ORGANIZATION

DATE

FORM NO. 611
1 APR 55

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I acknowledge the fact that because of the confidential relationship between myself and the U.S. Government, I will be the recipient of information which, in itself, or by the implications to be drawn therefrom, will be such that its unlawful disclosure or loose handling may adversely affect the interest and the security of the United States. I realize that the methods of collecting and of using this information, as well as the identity of persons involved, are as secret as the substantive information itself and, therefore, must be treated by me with an equal degree of secrecy.

2. I shall always recognize that the U.S. Government has the sole interest in all information which I or my organization may possess, compile or acquire pursuant to this understanding. No advantage or gain will be sought by me as a result of the added significance or value such information may have, due to the Government's interest in it.

3. I solemnly pledge my word that I will never divulge, publish, nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such information or knowledge, as indicated above, unless specifically authorized to do so, by the U.S. Government.

4. Nothing in this understanding is to be taken as imposing any restriction upon the normal business practices of myself or my organization: i.e., information normally possessed by us or gathered in the regular course of business will continue to be utilized in accordance with our normal practices.

SIGNATURE:	SIGNATURE
REPRESENTATIVE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT	
DATE	ORGANIZATION
	DATE

FORM 9-88 611

(12)

ADDENDUM

Pursuant to the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1991, the following language shall be incorporated into and considered a part of the attached nondisclosure agreement:

"These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12356; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 USC 421 et seq.)(governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including section 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling."

CSI-0042/95
27 June 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Executive Director
General Counsel

FROM: Brian Latell
Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

SUBJECT: JFK Review Board Actions on CIA Records

REFERENCE: Letter to DCI fr Executive Director, ARRB dtd 21 June, 1995, Same Subject

1. Action Requested. That you disapprove the DO recommendation for you to sign the attached letter to the President. The letter recommends that the President postpone the release by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) of the names of two CIA employees who retired under cover. (C)

2. Background. On 7 June 1995, the ARRB made a formal determination to release in full to the National Archives 16 CIA documents from Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file. The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 stipulates that the President has 30 days after written notification of such determinations to either request the disclosure or postponement of disclosure of documents. Appeals procedures also require that the Agency advise the White House Counsel within seven days of notification of Board actions, if we wish to appeal. The Agency was notified on 21 June 1995 (see reference). OGC will unofficially notify White House Counsel within the seven-day period of the DO objection to release. (U)

3. This Center has worked closely with the Board and its staff and has declassified about 220,000 pages of Agency records that have been sent to the National Archives. A large percentage contain redactions, however, and it is those excisions that are now being systematically reviewed by the Board which has full access to the unredacted records. The Board will meet more or less monthly and is likely to press for lifting a significant percentage of CIA's redactions. The pending determination is the first taken by the Board involving Agency records. (U)

CL BY: 195387
DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: JFK Review Board Actions on CIA Records

4. The DO Position: The Acting Deputy Director for Operations reluctantly acquiesces to the release in full of the 16 documents with the exception of two that contain the names of two Agency employees who retired in covert status. The DO argues that acknowledging these officers could expose them to physical danger, possibly threaten past operations and individuals with whom they worked, and abrogate our agreement to protect their identities. The two documents (#104-10015-10052 and #104-1005-10153) and the DO's argument for the continued protection of the two former employees are attached. (S)

5 CSI Position: After consultation with OGC, we do not believe the DO's damage argument would merit Presidential reversal of the Board's decision. The Board's staff has advised that in the absence of "clear and convincing evidence" of a threat to the personal safety of a retired officer if his or her employment were revealed, the Board does not believe the JFK Act permits withholding names. The DO does not cite evidence that the two officers would be in physical danger. Furthermore, OGC advises that the DO's current policy of liberally rolling back cover for career covert officers who ask to be retired overt would seriously undermine the credibility of such an appeal. (S)

6. Recommendation: That you not appeal the JFK Board's decision to the President and thus that you disapprove the DO's recommendation. (U)

Brian Latell

Brian Latell

Attachments:
- A. Documents 104-10015-10052 and 104-1005-10153
- B. DO Document

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence Date

SUBJECT: JFK Review Board Actions on CIA Records

DCI/CSI/BLatell:aw/30214 (27 June 95)

Distribution:
  Original - Addressee (w/atts)
          1 - DDCI (w/atts)
          1 - ExDir (w/atts)
          1 - Executive Registry (w/atts)
          1 - Executive Secretariat (w/atts)
          1 - General Counsel (w/atts)
          1 - ADDO (w/atts)
          1 - D/CSI (w/atts)
          1 - C/HRG/CSI (w/atts)
          1 - C/HS/CSI (w/atts)
          1 - CSI file (w/atts)
          1 - CSI chrono (w/atts)

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Under the "President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992," this agency has been reviewing and forwarding to the National Archives all of its records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. As a part of that process, those records and specific information within records which were determined to require continuing protection were postponed from release under the guidelines of the Act.

The Assassination Records Review Board appointed by you is responsible for reviewing the postponed materials not only of this agency, but all government departments involved in this effort. The Board then makes a determination that a particular postponement was justified under the Act or that it was not. If the latter occurs, the agency then has thirty days in which to present its case to you and ask you to concur in the continued postponement.

We are now at the point where the Board has made a determination to release the names of two former Agency officers who served in a covert status during their Agency careers in a number of overseas posts. The position of the Acting Deputy Director of Operations and one in which I concur, is that release of these two names would do harm to the Agency and its operations and, postponement is proper under the Act. In addition, the revelation of these two names would not add to public understanding of assassination issues in any substantial way. Thus, I recommend that you direct the continued postponement of the two names.

On behalf of the Agency, I thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

John Deutch
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Unclassified When Separated
From Enclosure

SECRET

The President

DCI/CSI/HRG/BHarrelson:pn/x30210 (27 Jun 95)

Distribution:
Original - Addressee (w/enc)
1 - DCI (w/enc)
1 - DDCI (w/enc)
1 - ExDir (w/enc)
1 - Executive Secretariat (w/enc)
1 - Executive Registry (w/enc)
1 - General Counsel (w/enc)
1 - ADDO (w/enc)
1 - D/CSI (w/enc)
1 - C/HRG/CSI (w/enc)
1 - C/HS/CSI (w/enc)
1 - CSI file (w/enc)
1 - CSI chrono (w/enc)

26 June 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: L. Kay Oliver
Brian Latell

FROM: William H. McNair
DO/IRO

SUBJECT: JFK Information Release

Per SA to ADDO, please consider this as the official DDO response and include it in your memo.

The DDO reluctantly acquiesces to release of documents cited in ARRB Memo of 21 June 1995 with the following exceptions:

Document No. 104-10015-10052, CIA Cable, DIR 74673: C. Bustos, originated the cable and testified about it using her pseudo. She retired in a covert status and resides in the United States. Release of her name as a CIA employee will damage cover credibility, expose her to the public as a CIA employee subject to any physical threats which might ensue, and abrogate our agreement with her as to our willingness to protect her identify in return for her willingness to engage in clandestine operations on behalf of the CIA. We would also point out that she was later assigned in several overseas locations including Mexico City and a posting as COS in Trinidad. Exposure of her as a CIA employee would also endanger any operations in which she might have been engaged. Substitution of her pseudo in lieu of true name would allow the identification of a person yet protect the persona itself.

Document No. 104-10015-10153, CIA Cable, DIR 85039: R.W. Herbert was chief of WH Div at the time and signed off on this cable as authenticating officer. He was an "integrated State Officer" who retired in a cover status. His present residence is unknown but his overseas assignments as an U.S. State Department officer would be compromised by exposure of him as a CIA officer. It is believed that exposing him as a CIA officer would not only endanger his operations and those associated with the operations, but would also place him in physical danger in that his field of operations involved anti-Cuban operations.

SECRET
CSI - Internal Use Only

3 January 1996

Note To: D/CSI

Subject: JFK Appeal

1. Attached is an advance copy of the memorandum for the DCI being prepared by DO/IMS (with OGC's help) requesting an appeal of certain ARRB decisions. The memorandum is currently (this a.m.) being redone in DO/IMS for technical reasons (wrong font, distribution, etc.). The DDO is expected to see it this afternoon or tomorrow. After DO approval, the memorandum will pass through OGC (Smith) and CSI for comments before going to the DCI.

2. HRG reviewers are not convinced that the "LICRYPT issue" (Attachment A) should be appealed. While the DO makes a good case on the particular document in question, given the extensive information on liaison with the Mexicans that has been released in documents dated after November 22 1963, HRG reviewers question this as an appeal issue. I discussed the issue with John, but we did not come to a final HRG position.

3. HRG reviewers support the appeal in Attachment B and John agrees.

4. HRG reviewers can support the appeal of the four stations in Attachment C. However, we believe that opening a Nov/Dec 1963 window for Oswald related documents might be a better approach. We are concerned that the State Department has not been part of the discussion--the impact on cover and foreign relations of acknowledging stations. Although the DO is appealing the release of these four stations, it has agreed to acknowledge all of the South and Central American stations plus London, Paris, Ottawa, Bonn and the German bases. I raised the State issue with OGC (Linda Cipriani). She agreed on the need to include State in the discussion; once the decision is made to appeal, she will contact her counterpart at State. I have not had an opportunity to discuss the State issue with John.

Barry

CC: C/HRG

Administrative Internal Use Only
When Separated From Attachment

SECRET
CSI - Internal Use Only

CSI-0353/96
8 October 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

VIA: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: Courtesy Visit of JFK Assassination Records Review Board, 16 October 1996

REFERENCE: Memo for DCI fr C/HRG, dtd 13 June 96, Same Subject

(U) This memorandum provides background information for a meeting between you and the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), which is scheduled for 16 October 1996 in your office between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. The meeting was requested by ARRB Chairman, John Tunheim as a courtesy call.

(U) Background: Mr. Tunheim, recently appointed a federal judge in Minnesota, asked that he and the other four Board members have an opportunity to provide you with a brief description of the Board's purpose and activities. The Board's Executive Director, David Marwell, and General Counsel, Jeremy Gunn will also participate. The ARRB members were appointed by President Clinton in 1993 as required by statute. Their principal responsibility is to ensure public disclosure of all government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy.

(FOUO) Topics the Board May Discuss: The Board probably will discuss their concern about whether they will be able to complete their work by the congressionally-imposed deadline of October 1997. This concern relates to the very time-consuming process that the ARRB and its 30-person staff is obliged to use in reviewing all of the thousands of relevant documents that are redacted, which for CIA comprise the bulk of our documents.

(FOUO) The Board may also seek your personal commitment to continue the Agency's dedication of resources--people and computer capability--to the review of JFK documents. CIA has worked closely with the Board and its staff from the beginning.

CL BY 0185904
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: MET 10-82

SUBJECT: Courtesy Visit of JFK Assassination
Records Review Board, 16 October 1996

We have succeeded thus far in working out cooperative arrangements for resolving differences of opinion as to what information can be released to the public and what should be withheld because of sensitivities.

(U) The Board may also express interest in gaining access to records that are not part of the JFK records (the sequestered collection), but which the Board regards as possibly containing useful background information or leads for further inquiry. We have released some 227,000 pages of relevant Agency records thus far and are continuing to collaborate with the Board to identify additional information that can be released.

(U) Suggested Talking Points: You may want to emphasize the Agency's commitment to continuing the very positive relationship with the Board, including making people and computer expertise available to process relevant documents.

(S) You may want to assure the Board that CIA is determined to give the Board and designated staff full access to all assassination records, as required by the JFK statute. At the same time, it would be helpful to stress that there are certain categories of sensitive information that require continued protection and should not be released. Among the types of information contained in the JFK records that we need to protect are:

- Identities of agents and CIA officers who retired under cover.
- The Agency's relationships with liaison services, and information received from foreign governments.
  - -- A specific example in this category is the Agency's current request to the Board to protect the liaison relationship with Australia, and to withhold documents received from Australia.
- Need to protect non-official cover.
  - -- The Board is planning at its 15-16 October meeting to review documents that identify companies that provided commercial cover. We are arranging to have the DO brief the Board on the potential damage to the non-official cover program and companies involved if such cover is compromised.

SUBJECT: Courtesy Visit of JFK Assassination
Records Review Board

- Locations of certain stations and facilities.

-- In this latter connection, the Board is expected to consider at its 15-16 October meeting our request that the Warrenton Training Center not be disclosed as a CIA facility.

John F. Pereira

John F. Pereira

Attachments:
A. Memo to DCI, 13 June 96
B. List of Board Members
C. Biographies of Board members
Executive Director
General Counsel

SUBJECT: Courtesy Visit of JFK Assassination
Records Review Board, 16 October 1996

DCI/CSI/HRG/JPereira:bas/30373 (8 Oct 96)

Distribution:
Original - Addressee (w/atts)
1 - Executive Registry (w/atts)
1 - Executive Director (w/atts)
1 - D/CSI (w/atts)
1 - C/HRG (w/atts)
1 - CSI/Chrono (w/atts)
1 - HRG file (w/atts)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CSI 0327/96
13 June 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director
Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: Request of JFK Assassination Records Review Board for Courtesy Visit with DCI

1. Action Requested: Paragraph 4 below contains a recommendation for your approval. The Chairman of the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), John Tunheim, has requested that you meet with him and the other four Board members at Headquarters Building some time in the next several months. He asks that the meeting be arranged to coincide with one of their monthly sessions, which are held in Washington. (The schedule of their meetings is attached.) The Board's Executive Director, David Marwell, would also participate.

2. Background: Mr. Tunheim, recently appointed a federal judge in Minnesota, would like to provide you with a brief description of the Board's purpose and activities. The Board has paid similar visits to the FBI, where they met with Director Freeh, and to NSA and the Secret Service. The ARRB members were appointed by President Clinton in 1993 as required by statute. Their principal responsibility is to ensure public disclosure of government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The statute grants the Board full access to all documents that are related to either the assassination or past investigations into the assassination.

3. CIA has worked closely with the Board and its staff from the beginning. The Board's Executive Director and we have worked out cooperative arrangements for resolving differences of opinion as to what information can be released to the public and what should be withheld because of sensitivities. We have released approximately 227,000 pages of relevant Agency records

SUBJECT: Request of JFK Assassination Records
Review Board for Courtesy Visit with DCI

thus far, and are continuing to collaborate with the Board to identify additional information that can be released.

4. Recommendation: That you agree to meet with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board at a date to be determined.

John F. Pereira

Attachments:
- A: ARRB Meeting Schedule
- B: Biographies of Board Members

APPROVED:

_______________________________ Director of Central Intelligence

_______________ Date

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Request for JFK Assassination Records Review Board for Courtesy Visit with DCI

DCI/CSI/HRG/JPereira:bas/30373 (13 June 96)

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - Executive Registry
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - D/CSI
1 - C/HRG

Assassination Records Review Board

Members:

Chair: John R. Tunheim (Federal judge, Minnesota)

Dr. Henry Graff (Professor Emeritus of History, Columbia University)

Dr. Kermit L. Hall (Dean, College of Humanities, Ohio State University)

Dr. William L. Joyce (Associate University Librarian, Princeton University)

Dr. Anna K. Nelson (Adjunct Professor of History, American University)

Dr. David G. Marwell ARRB Executive Director

Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn ARRB General Counsel

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW · 2nd Floor · Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 · Fax: (202) 724-0457

Assassination Records Review Board

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair

Experience

State of Minnesota, Chief Deputy Attorney General, 1986-Present

State of Minnesota, Office of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, 1985-86

State of Minnesota, Office of the Attorney General, Manager, Public Affairs Litigation Division, 1984-85

Law Firm of Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard and Donnelly, Associate Attorney, 1981-84

Senior U.S. District Judge Earl Larson in Minneapolis, Law Clerk, 1980-81

United States Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Staff Assistant, 1975-77

Education

J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1980

B.A., Concordia College, 1975

Dr. Henry F. Graff

Experience

Columbia University, Professor Emeritus of History, 1991- Present

Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, Senior Fellow, 1991-92

Columbia University, Department of History, Instructor to Full Professor, 1946-91, Chairman, 1961-64

Education

Ph.D., Columbia University, 1949

M.A., Columbia University, 1942

B.S., City College, 1941

Dr. Kermit L. Hall

Experience

The Ohio State University, Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law, 1994 - Present

The University of Tulsa, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences and Professor of History and Law, 1992-94

University of Florida, Associate/Full Professor of History and Law, 1981-92

Wayne State University, Assistant/Associate Professor, Department of History, 1976-81

Vanderbilt University, Assistant Professor, Department of History, 1972-76

Education

Master of Study of Law, Yale University Law School, 1980

Ph.D., The University of Minnesota, 1972

M.A., Syracuse University, 1967

B.A., The University of Akron, 1966

Dr. William L. Joyce

Experience

Princeton University, Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections, 1986-Present

The New York Public Library, Assistant Director for Rare Books and Manuscripts, 1981-1985

American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Massachusetts, Curator of Manuscripts, 1972-81, Education Officer, 1988-81

William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan, Manuscripts Librarian, 1968-72

Education

Ph.D., The University of Michigan, 1974

M.A., St John's University (N.Y.), 1966

B.A., Providence College, 1964

Dr. Anna K. Nelson

Experience

The American University, Adjunct Professor of History, 1992-Present, 1986-88

Arizona State University, Distinguished Visiting Professor, 1992

The American University, Associate Professor in History, 1991

Tulane University, Adjunct Associate Professor in History, 1988-90

George Washington University, Instructor to Adjunct Associate Professor, 1972-85

George Washington University, Director, History and Public Policy Program, 1980-82

Education

Ph.D., George Washington University, 1972

M.A., University of Oklahoma, 1956

B.A., University of Oklahoma, 1954

DAVID G. MARWELL

Biographical Information

On July 1, 1994, the Berlin Document Center (BDC) was transferred to the German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv) marking the end of nearly 48 years of American control of this unique organization. With an estimated 25 million Nazi-era personnel-related files, the BDC was once a crucial source of evidence for the Nuremberg Trials and is today an incalculably important source for the study of the Third Reich. The transfer also marked the end of David Marwell's tenure as Director of the BDC.

A well-trained scholar with a PH.D. in History, Marwell came to Berlin in 1988 from the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), U.S. Department of Justice where he held the position of Chief of Investigative Research. At OSI, he was involved in researching and preparing cases against accused Nazi war criminals residing in the United States. In addition, he was selected to participate in the Klaus Barbie Investigation (1983) and played a major role in the Josef Mengele investigation (1985), both of which received international attention.

In connection with the Joseph Mengele and Klaus Barbie investigations, Marwell was in charge of assembling all relevant documentary evidence relating to any possible connection between these individuals and U.S. institutions or personnel. The investigations were two of the most unusual ever undertaken and through them he gained siginificant experiences in the identifying and locating documentary resources. The former Director of OSI, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., in his book *Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America*, described Marwell as "an experienced and careful historian who could find documents in archives when no one else could."

When Marwell arrived at the Document Center, the institution had been rocked by a scandal involving a significant theft of documents. The resulting focus on the Center revealed that it had been neglected in many areas for many years and suffered from an outmoded administrative structure, a disaffected and undertrained staff and a lack of professional guidance. It was Marwell's job to bring the Center up to standard and prepare it for turnover to the German government.

The challenges facing Marwell were not only to manage a complex institution (with an annual budget of eight million deutschmarks) and repair past deficiencies, but also to define a future for an institution in transition. He prepared a "five year plan" for the BDC that set five goals, developed a corresponding program to meet each goal, and designed a system to monitor the progress. In achieving all of the goals, Marwell

- Introduced computer technology (there was not a single computer at the BDC when he arrived) and developed a sophisticated, integrated information retrieval system that has been described as a model for archive administration;

- Created a fully professional document conservation and restoration program;

- Developed a staff (50 Germans and 20

T. Jeremy Gunn
1652 Wild Pine Way
Reston, Virginia 20194
(703) 481-8196

EDUCATION

Ph.D. **Harvard University**, Committee on the Study of Religion, 1991
Field: Religion and Society
Affiliation: Graduate Associate, Center for European Studies
Awards: French Government Grant; Krupp Foundation Fellow, Gilbert Chinard Award, *Institut Français de Washington*; Center for European Studies Grant

J.D. **Boston University School of Law**, 1987, *Magna cum laude*
Awards: Hennessey and Liacos Distinguished Scholar

A.M. **University of Chicago**, General Studies in Humanities, 1978
Award: University Fellowship

B.A. **Brigham Young University**, International Relations and Humanities, 1974, *High Honors with Distinction* (highest 1%)
Awards: several scholarships

EMPLOYMENT

General Counsel and Associate Director for Research and Analysis, JFK Assassination Records Review Board, Washington, D.C., 1994-present

Covington & Burling, Associate Attorney, Washington, D.C., 1988-94
Practice Areas: international law (public and private); civil litigation (including class action and other complex cases); appellate (including Supreme Court) litigation; extensive church-state litigation; and six month full-time work in poverty law for Neighborhood Legal Services Corporation.

United States District Court, Law Clerk to the Honorable Douglas P. Woodlock, Boston, MA, 1987-88

Ropes & Gray, Summer Associate, Boston, MA, 1987

Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Summer Associate, Boston, MA, 1986

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Harvard University, Graduate Teaching Fellow, 1980-84

Ethics and International Relations (Stanley Hoffmann)
Rise of American Power (Ernest May)
Art and Politics (Simon Schama)

Paris and London in the Nineteenth Century (John Clive)
Moral Values in European Thought (James Wilkinson)
French Society and Politics 1715-1815 (Patrice Higonnet)
French Society and Politics 1815-1945 (Patrice Higonnet)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, instructor in History, 1980-81; 1981-82

Brigham Young University, Instructor in History and Humanities on overseas study program in Paris, France 1975

PUBLICATIONS

Book

A Standard for Repair: The Establishment Clause, Equality, and Natural Rights (New York and London, 1992)

Articles

"Freedom of Religion or Belief, Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection," *American Journal of International Law* (1996) (book review) (forthcoming)

"Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights," in *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives* (John Witte and Johan van der Vyver, eds., 1996), 305

"The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American Foreign Policy," 88 *American Journal of International Law* 854 (1994) (book review)

"Neutrality, Expression, and Oppression," 23 *Journal of Law & Education* 391 (1994)

"Applying Coercion: The Latest Element of Establishment," in *Why We Need Public Schools: Church/State Relations and Visions of Democracy* (Art Must, ed., 1992)

RECENT PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Chair, Committee on Human Rights, District of Columbia Bar (1995-present)
Co-Chair, Committee on Public International Law, District of Columbia Bar (1994-95)
General Counsel, National Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty (1990-94)
Member, Board of Directors, Washington Council of Lawyers (1993-present)
International Advisory Board, World Report on Freedom of Conscience and Belief
U.S. Institute of Peace Working Group on Religion, Ideology, and Peace (1994-present)
Who's Who of American Lawyers (8th ed.)

OCC-96-086
19 NOV 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira
Historical Review Group

FROM: Linda A. Jasper
Deputy Chief, Office of Central Cover

SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board

1. During the OCC briefing of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board on 16 October 1996, members of the Board asked three questions to which OCC said it would respond after additional research. Following are the questions and the responses:

a. How many real businesses or contrived facilities in the commercial cover program are connected to the publications industry? Response: A few real businesses are loosely connected with the publications industry, and the names of a few contrived facilities could be perceived as being associated.

b. How many companies participated in the commercial cover program in the 1960s, and how many participate today? Response: Approximately 500 companies participated in the commercial cover program in the 1960s, and circa 1,800 are currently in the program.

ALL PORTIONS OF
THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED SECRET

CL BY 0523550
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1; 12 November 2021
DRV COV 2-87

SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board

c. Could a copy of the secrecy agreement which is signed by company officials participating in the commercial cover program be made available, and has it changed since the 1960s? Response: Attached is a copy of the secrecy agreement used from 1955 to 1988 and a copy of the agreement used from 1988 to the present. The only difference is an addendum on the reverse which was added in 1991 pursuant to the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1991.

2. This memorandum and its attachments are for background information only and must be returned to the Central Intelligence Agency after review by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board.

Linda A. Jasper

Attachment:
as stated

cc: Fredrick Wickham, IMS

SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board

DC/OCC (lh/LJasper, 32435 18Nov96 file:jfkboard)

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Addressee
        1 - DC/OCC (Ljasper)
        1 - His. Review Board (BHarrelson)
        1 - OCC/EXO (EMathias)
        1 - OGC (Ciprinai)

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I acknowledge the fact that because of the confidential relationship between myself and the U.S. Government, I will be the recipient of information which, in itself, or by the implications to be drawn therefrom, will be such that its unlawful disclosure or loose handling may adversely affect the interest and the security of the United States. I realize that the methods of collecting and of using this information, as well as the identity of persons involved, are as secret as the substantive information itself and, therefore, must be treated by me with an equal degree of secrecy.

2. I shall always recognize that the U.S. Government has the sole interest in all information which I or my organization may possess, compile or acquire pursuant to this understanding. No advantage or gain will be sought by me as a result of the added significance or value such information may have, due to the Government's interest in it.

3. I solemnly pledge my word that I will never divulge, publish, nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such information or knowledge, as indicated above, unless specifically authorized to do so, by the U.S. Government.

4. Nothing in this understanding is to be taken as imposing any restriction upon the normal business practices of myself or my organization: i.e., information normally possessed by us or gathered in the regular course of business will continue to be utilized in accordance with our normal practices.

SIGNATURE:	SIGNATURE:
REPRESENTATIVE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT	
DATE	ORGANIZATION
	DATE

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I acknowledge the fact that because of the confidential relationship between myself and the U.S. Government, I will be the recipient of information which, in itself, or by the implications to be drawn therefrom, will be such that its unlawful disclosure or loose handling may adversely affect the interest and the security of the United States. I realize that the methods of collecting and of using this information, as well as the identity of persons involved, are as secret as the substantive information itself and, therefore, must be treated by me with an equal degree of secrecy.

2. I shall always recognize that the U.S. Government has the sole interest in all information which I or my organization may possess, compile or acquire pursuant to this understanding. No advantage or gain will be sought by me as a result of the added significance or value such information may have, due to the Government's interest in it.

3. I solemnly pledge my word that I will never divulge, publish, nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such information or knowledge, as indicated above, unless specifically authorized to do so, by the U.S. Government.

4. Nothing in this understanding is to be taken as imposing any restriction upon the normal business practices of myself or my organization: i.e., information normally possessed by us or gathered in the regular course of business will continue to be utilized in accordance with our normal practices.

SIGNATURE:	SIGNATURE
REPRESENTATIVE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT	
DATE	ORGANIZATION
	DATE

FORM 9-88 611

ADDENDUM

Pursuant to the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1991, the following language shall be incorporated into and considered a part of the attached nondisclosure agreement:

"These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12356; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 USC 421 et seq.)(governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including section. 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling."

SECRET

11 December 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: DO Position on Identification of ERTHYROID/3

1. The DO strongly opposes the release by the ARRB of the phrase "a good KUBARK asset" that was previously withheld in Attachment. The CIA asked the Nicaraguan Service to send ERTHYROID/3 to Mexico City to help in the interrogation of Alvarado. Because this was during the Samoza regime, we have admitted that we had a liaison relationship with the Nicaraguans and we also have released the cryptonym ERTHYROID. ERTHYROID/3 became well known to the Mexicans as the Nicaraguan interrogator and, of course, was known by his own service. The phrase "a good KUBARK asset," however, identifies him as a unilateral source of the Managua Station unbeknownst to the Nicaraguan and Mexican Services.

2. The DO often recruits officers, such as ERTHYROID/3, who are members of intelligence and police services with which it has a liaison relationship. These assets provide us valuable information without the knowledge of the service and in many cases they provide information about the service itself and its activities. To reveal ERTHYROID/3's identity and his special relationship with the CIA would not only personally endanger ERTHYROID/3 but could cast suspicion on other recruited officers of other liaison services and compel them to reevaluate their unilateral relationships with the CIA.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

CL BY 0695930
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1
DRV HUM 2-82

SECRET

SUBJECT: DO Position on Identification of ERTHYROID/3

IMS/ESG/J. Goins/44447/11 Dec 95

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DO/IRO
1 - ESG/HCS
1 - C/ESG

8 January 1997

DRAFT

Memo for the Record

Subject: "Compliance" Meeting with ARRB Staff

Date: 7 January 1997
Location: ARRB offices
Attendees: CIA: Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRG
Eileen Wukitch, DO/IMS/JFK team
ARRB: Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel
Other members of ARRB's CIA team

Purpose: To discuss CIA's response to ARRB's Compliance letter dated 27 November, 1996

1. Gunn stressed that the objective of the ARRB is to assure the American public that every attempt has been made to locate JFK assassination related files/materials and that no "secret" files remained. He realizes that it is not possible for the Agency to say with certainty that all documents had been located. In the ARRB's final report, he wants to be able to say that all reasonable searches were made, and where documents were not found, ARRB staff was given appropriate access to ensure the validity of the respond.

2. Gunn divided records into three categories:

a) Sequestered records and Oswald 201 -- not an issue in terms of identifying records.

b) Additional information/special requests -- official and informal. The responses should include tasking and response memos plus search strategy and files searched if appropriate. In cases of "no records" additional documentation may be required.

[Note: I have already requested the DO, etc., to provide specifics on search strategy/files searched in future responses; in most cases there should not be a problem including this information into responses to ARRB staff.]

c) Records not previously identified -- in addition to releasing HSCA records (sequestered/201 file/etc.), the ARRB seeks to ensure that all relevant files have been searched and that all assassination records (as defined today) have been identified. The ARRB staff has identified Agency components/files that they feel may contain relevant records and should be (or have been) searched. Gunn said he planned to send a formal letter listing these offices/files but wanted to discuss with HRG first.

[Note: Category 3 led to a long discussion on agency records. The focus was on how the ARRB staff could be confident that files were searched.]

3. I explained that the Agency would not be able to say that all records had been located (lack of a central file system). Also it may not be possible to provide documentation that explained the disposition of 1963 records in all cases. I agreed that it would be useful to have additional briefings on the records to address their specific requests and concerns. I asked him not to send a formal request until I had the opportunity to discuss his request with C/HRG and the Directorate focal points. He agreed.

[Note: There were numerous questions on how and where -- do we have a record center in Indiana? -- the Agency stores records. Do inventories of all record at the centers exist? Are there individuals who could address specific office records and what type of records existed in 1963?]

4. Specific Offices/Files mentioned by Gunn as part of Category 3:

- DCI files for the 1958-63 timeframe; specifically chrono or subject files of John McCone
- Richard Helms (chrono/subject files as DCI, DDCI and DDP.
- IG
- OGC
- DO offices (CI, SAS, Cuba, WH/LA)
- DI (OCI, other analysis and finished Intel)
- TSD files on Mexico City; where was TSD in the organization
- DA (what type of pay records would exist 1958-63; Angleton's accounting records; agents' records)
- OS (types of records that existed)
- DS&T (U2 files)
- Specific Stations - explanation of types of records maintained and disposition of those records - Mexico City, Moscow, Helsinki, JMWave, Tokyo
- Commo - types of records maintained in 1963; where are they now
- DCD/00

5. Gunn also included CSI on his list of offices to be searched -- what other relevant records did we have (histories, working files, etc.) I explained that when agency components/review projects located JFK related records they were forwarded directly to HRG JFK team. We had four boxes of LA records (located in Ex Order survey),

individual documents located in other project (example Bay of Pigs) or activities. The current automated declassification effort under the Ex. Order is setup to refer any assassination records to HRG/JFK team. We have not done any work on these materials since the sequestered collection and specific ARRB requests are our first priority. A discussion of the History staff's identification of the Agency's JFK collection followed. He would like more information.

6. Additional questions/issues raised:

Is there a “records” person at the Agency who can address their concerns?

Gunn ask if he can go to WTC and/or other Records Centers and look at shelf lists and the files around a topic of special interest?

What is on the shelf lists? Would they say, for instance, these are the files regarding JFK from Sheffield Edwards?

What are the steps taken in a name trace?

Are records around the specific hit searched?

Is it possible to provide an explanation of the routing indicators in the collection?

SECRET

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

15 January 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Fred Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: ARRB 22 January Meeting -- Agenda

REFERENCE:

1. The following items are on the ARRB meeting agenda for 22 January 1998:

(S) A. **Reconsideration of the State Cover.** The ARRB staff has advised that briefings by senior CIA and/or State officials are not required. However, the Agency and State are welcome to make a presentation if it will add to the information being presented in the "evidence memorandum". The evidence memorandum must be at ARRB no later than Tuesday 20 January. Mr. Gunn has suggested we may want to have individuals standing by for questions. The current plan is for Lee Strickland and me to be available at 600 E. St. NW. to answer any questions.

(AIUO) B. **Office of Personnel Files in the Sequestered Collection** (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recommend to the Board that personnel files be declared NBR (Not Believed Relevant) and their release postponed until 2017. The Agency position is that the privacy of each individual clearly outweighs the public interest, most of the information in these files has no relevance to the assassination story, and any related information exist elsewhere in the collection. At ARRB staff request HRP is preparing five OP files for review by Board members. The ARRB staff will prepare a memorandum for public release describing the files; their memo will be coordinated with the Agency prior to release.

(AIOU) C. **Non-related files/documents in the Sequestered Collection** (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recommend that the files and documents (approximately 35,000 pages) designated non-related by CIA during the 1994 review of the microfilm be declared NBR and released in 2017. If the recommendation is accepted by the Board, the ARRB staff will prepare an unclassified description of the records for public release. This too will be coordinated with the Agency prior to release.

D. Other possible items:

(AIUO) i. ARRB Request # CIA 1 -- The ARRB staff may request that the DO documents at issue in this request be declared Assassination Records to be released in full or sanitized form.

SECRET

(S) ii. Crypt LINLUCK -- ARRB staff did not find our evidence memo on this crypt persuasive. They are expected to recommend that the Board reaffirm its decision to release.

(AIUO) iii. 1967 IG report on "Castro Assassination Plots" -- ARRB has requested that an updated version be released to NARA by the end of January. Any disagreements between the Agency and ARRB staff may be added to the agenda. HRP and DO reviewers are currently re-reviewing the report.

(U) 2. If you have any questions about any of these items please call me.

CC: Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Becky Rant @ DA
Linda Cipriani @ DCI

Sent on 15 January 1998 at 05:24:34 PM

6 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Wickham
DO Focal Point for JFK Board

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG, JFK Project Officer

SUBJECT: ARRB Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-7

REFERENCE: ARRB Memo dtd 8 Nov 95, same subj, sub-para (2), The Mexico City Station (attached)

1. In his review of the history of the Mexico City Station, Jeremy Gunn, ARRB Staff, cited the five footnotes annotated below as possible assassination-related records and requested copies of the source documents. For your assistance in identifying the documents, following the footnote citation is the text (in italics) to which it refers.

Footnote 39. HMMA-17494, 4 Aug 61, sub: Data on Case Officer work and Operational Projects at the Mexico City Station, WH/HO.

pg 38/39, Vol I. *"The Cuban task force and related activities caused an increase in the Mexico City Station (to 76 Americans (40 were located inside the Embassy using official cover, and 36 were outside under nonofficial cover.) Indigenous agents numbered over 200."*

Footnote 55. Ibid. (Ft. 54. ISTHMUS No. 62, 6 Dec 63, WH/HO.)

pg 44, Vol I. *"Later in the year Diaz became the PRI candidate (tantamount to election) which assured LIENVOY of an extended six years under virtually the same management."* (54)

"In 1963 the routine reporting of an operational lead by LIENVOY developed into a long investigation. A man with a US accent, speaking broken Russian, telephoned both the Soviet and Cuban Embasssies on 26 September and 6 October 1963. He identified himself as Lee Oswald and Harvey Oswald.

This information was cabled to Headquarters for traces and identifying data. After the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November 1963 in Dallas, Texas, the Mexico City Station spent several months investigating leads in connection with Oswald's visit to Mexico. (55)"

Footnote 61. I&R Report, Dec 64, 185215 TS.

pg 47/48, Vol I. "*A team from the Inspection and Review (I&R) Staff at Headquarters conducted a thorough review of the Mexico City Station administrative and operational program in July 1964. They wrote: `The Mexico City Station approaches the classic type station in opportunities and in operations.' It had high-level liaison operations, unilateral operations, and joint operations with the host government, as well as Soviet, Satellite, Cuban, and indigenous Communist Party operations. There was local collaborative liaison with other US agencies (the State Department, the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS), and the military attaches). To accomplish this wide range of tasks, the station was organized into Soviet, Cuban, Satellite, Covert Action, Communist Party, and Operational Support Branches. The last branch was an operational catch-all responsible for direction of all technical, surveillance, and liaison operations. In reality, operational support operations were an extension of the chief of station's personal clandestine capabilities, particularly those projects involving Mexican officials. (61)"*

Footnote No. *139.* ISTHMUS No. 29, 8 Mar 61, WH/HO.

pg 229, Vol II. "*During February 1961, the first transmitter was installed in the office of the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico.* (139)"*

*"*Between 1961 and 1968, at least a dozen audio installations were made in Cuban installations and residences, but all of them eventually failed. LI-ROMANCE and LISAMPAN are two projects which provided for short-term multiple audio installations."*

Footnote No. 190. Project LILINK, File Nos. 201-226902 and 50-6-99/1, Job No. 68-494/28, Space 60793.

pg 353 Vol II. "*LILINK*"

2. Mr. Gunn will be at IP the week of 24 February to review additional material related to CIA-7. Please provide the documents, or a status of the search, by 20 February 1997.

J. Barry Harrelson

Att: Ref Document

CSI/HRG/MAQ (3 Feb 97)(BKH-6Feb97)
Distribution:
  Orig - Adse w/att
    1 - HRG w/o att
    1 - JBH w/o att
    1 - DO JFK Team w/att
    1 - ARRB Request File

SECRET
JFK Working Paper - Internal Use Only

3-23-98

Notes from meeting with ARRB staff, 20 March 1998.
re Board Issues (attendees Gunn, Skwirot, Combs)

I. **NEW ISSUE: Covert Actions** -- Document 178-10002-10415 [Rockfeller Commission document]

This document went before the Board in November as part of a group of documents from the Ford Presidential Library. It refers to Agency covert financial support in Peruvian, Greek, Finnish, Italian and Brazilian elections and support to labor union in France and Italy. The ARRB staff viewed the highlighted material (all references to covert action) as not germane to the assassination and had not anticipated a problem. The Board instead questioned the deletions and asked for more evidence before agreeing to protect. The sense of the staff is that the Board is leaning toward release. The DO team prepared a response for the staff in February, however, it is not strong enough to take to the Board.

Given that the next Board meeting is only 3 weeks away, we discussed a two step process:

1. At the 13 April meeting, have a senior official (Ed?) appear before the Board to a) underscore the importance of this issue to Agency and Intelligence Community; b) ask why these covert actions are important to the JFK assassination? They obviously have interest to historians but seem beyond the charter.

[Key points to make: this is not just Agency decision, NSC and/or WH will have to be consulted; the protection / classification has been has up-held by ...... (ISCAP?). If Ed went down, it would also serve as an opportunity to meet the other Board members. We could also make available to ARRB any material previously prepared defending protection of covert actions if appropriate.]

2. If the Board remains inclined to release, prepare full evidence package, etc. for May 12 meeting.

According to Gunn, there is no way to avoid sending this document to the Board. Once the Board has expressed an interest in an issue, they expect to see it again..

ACTION: We need to advise Gunn next week if we are going to have someone address the issue at the April meeting. If not, the document will be scheduled for action at the May meeting and our "evidence package" should be available for the ARRB staff no later than the week of May 4.

SECRET - Internal Use Only

II. Alias documentation and accommodation addresses
[Multiple documents -- I briefed you earlier on this issue].

ARRB staff proposed compromise:

Documentation (driver permits, SSN, membership cards, etc.)-

a. If documentation can be obtained by anyone (pocket litter: National Rife Association card, club memberships cards, etc.), the presumption will be to release.

b. If documentation would be expected to require agreement of another government entity (Federal, State or Local) or private company or organization, the presumption will be to protect.

c. Items that are considered by the ARRB staff to be important to the story, or that do not fall clearly into one of the above categories, will be considered on a case-by-case base. The Agency may be required to provide additional evidence to protect in these cases.

Accommodation Addresses:

Release as much of the address as possible without identifying a specific location or otherwise providing information that could lead to identification of an individual cooperating with the Agency. For example delete house number, release street.

Aliases [when true name is released]

If outside of the JFK timeframes (generally 1960-1964), the presumption is protect.

If within a JFK timeframe, presumption is to release; additional evidence will be required to protect.

Action: The HRP and DO JFK teams will re-review the documents applying the proposed compromise guidelines. If we conclude that the Agency's equities can be protected under this compromise, the ARRB staff will present the guidelines to the Board at the April meeting with the recommendation that the be adopted. The staff will describe the new guidelines as much preferable to the case-be-case approach which requires extensive research by the Agency consume an inordinate amount of staff time.

SECRET

8 April 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee Strickland
Chief, IRG/OIM

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB Issues for EXDIR Info Brief

(S) 1. Covert Actions. Within the Ford Presidential Library referred materials is a document which raises concerns. It is a Helms' MFR on a PIFAB Meeting. Within it there are references to CIA covert financial support to political parties in Peru, Greece, Italy and Brazil and to labor unions in France and Italy.

Status and Issues: The ARRB staff has agreed to recommend to the Board that the information related to those covert actions be considered non-related and the documents designated "Not Believed Related" (NBR). The document will be grouped with similar "NBR" documents and be presented to the Board for action at its 13 April or 12 May meeting.

(AIUO) 2. Alias Documentation and Accommodation Addresses. The security file of former Agency employee, David Morales (deceased -- true name already released), within the sequestered collection contains documentation on five of his alias. We anticipate similar problems as we re-review other security files within the sequestered collection. The ARRB staff has proposed a compromise resolution to this problem as follows:

-- Protect all references to official documents reflecting the alias such as SSN, Drivers Permit, etc.;

-- Release items designated as pocket litter such as club cards, etc.;

-- Protect elements of accommodation addresses to avoid identifying specific locations; and

-- Then make a decision to actually release or protect the alias itself depending on the timeframe and its importance to the JFK story.

CL BY: 0611637
CL REASON: 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: Multiple

SECRET

Status and Issues: The DO JFK Team is currently reviewing this proposal. If they agree with, the Agency and ARRB will spell out the guidelines which will be submitted to the Board at the 13 April meeting accompanied by a staff recommendation to accept. If the DO has problems with the proposed guidelines, I will request that the issue be postponed until the May meeting.

(AIUO) 3. ARRB Request, CIA-1, Organizational Materials. This request asked for organization charts on various Agency directorates/components for the years 1958-1968. All Agency directorates provided material responsive to the request. The ARRB staff has reviewed the material and selected items to be incorporated into the JFK collection. All selected material has been reviewed by appropriate components/IROs and can be released, either in full or in sanitized form except for the DO material. The DO has advised the ARRB staff that all of the DO items selected will be denied in full.

Status and Issues: The ARRB will present the selected material, including a DO JMWAVE chart, to the Board to be declared Assassination Records at the 13 April meeting. They will also propose that a generic DO organization chart be prepared in lieu of the records in contention. The chart would include those components that were involved in the Oswald story and anti-Castro activities. These JMWAVE and DO organization charts have been the subject of several discussions and meetings with the ARRB staff over the past few months. The ARRB staff is clearly leaning toward recommending that the JMWAVE chart be released; an actual vote on these records by the Board will not take place until the May meeting.

(S) 4. ARRB Request, CIA-IR.-15, Mexico City Tapes. This request asked for a thorough search of Agency files and documents for and CIA "surveillance `take' from Cuban and Soviet facilities in Mexico City at the time of the Oswald visit and in the immediate wake of the assassination." Among the items provided by the DO were five boxes containing audio tapes from tel-tap on Cuban and Russian embassies and facilities. A number of the tapes are dated 22 November 1963; many others are dated 23 November 1963 through December 1963.

Status and Issues: The ARRB staff has asked the question, what could possibly be sensitive or classified on the tapes given that we have acknowledge a unilateral tap on the embassies and the existence of the tapes is public knowledge. Barring any additional information from the DO, the ARRB staff plants to present the issue to the Board at the 13 April meeting and request that it declare at least the tapes from 22 and 23 November to be Assassination Records. A vote on releasing the tapes will be delayed until the May meeting.

(S) 5. LITAMIL-9 -- a CIA Penetration of the Cuban Embassy. The identity of LITAMIL-9 was inadvertently released in 1993. He is now identified in true name as a CIA agent in John Newman's book, *Oswald and the CIA*. As of 1993, LITAMIL-9 was still alive, living in Mexico city and he has family in Cuba. Up to now, the ARRB Board has agreed to protect his identity and crypt and delay the release of his 201 file until the Agency could make some judgments about the potential damage created by the release on additional documents with his name/crypt in them.

Status and Issues: The ARRB has requested that we address LI-9 issue at the May meeting. The DO has confirmed that LI-9 is still alive and living in Mexico City. The HRP/DO JFK teams are currently reviewing the 201 and other LI-9 material in the file. It is unlikely that the Board would agree to delay release until 2017, however, there is precedent for delaying release of records on individuals for shorter periods or until death.

(S) 6. Richard Gibson, CIA asset. Gibson, who presently lives in England, is a left wing journalist who was associated with the Fair Play For Cuba Committee (FPFCC), an entity to which Oswald wrote letters and claimed to be a member. Gibson did not become an Agency asset until after the assassination, however, he had been of interest to the FBI when he headed the FPFCC. Unfortunately a combination of previous releases and release by the Board led to press reports in 1994/1995 about his relationship with the CIA. At that time, CIA officers were dispatched to advise him about the possible compromise and promise him the very best attempt at protecting the relationship. ARRB also agreed to delay the release of any additional information until the Agency and FBI had determined the full extend of the files on Gibson and the potential damage.

Status and Issues: The Gibson documents are scheduled for ARRB action at the May meeting. It appears to be possible to release Gibson's role in the JFK assassination story and protect his relationship with the Agency in our JFK assassination records; however, the FBI has a four volumes file which covers both FBI interest and Gibson's relationship with the Agency. The HRP/DO JFK teams are currently reviewing the Gibson material and I will be meeting with the FBI to review what they are releasing on Gibson and the disposition of their file.

(AIUO) 7. ARRB Request, CIA-IR-34, Files of CIA Officials and/or Officers. This is a major request. The board has ask for "the office files of the individual occupying the following positions during the period 1959-1964."

The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
General Charles Cabell 1953-1962
General Marshall Carter 1062-1965
The Office of the Deputy director for Plans
Richard Bissell 1958-1965
Richard Helms 1962-1965
The chronological files of C. Tracy Barnes, 1959-1964
Office of General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, 1959-1964
Operational Diaries of William Harvey 1962-1963.

Status and Issues: This request will by its very breadth require lots of time on behalf of directorate and DCI records officers. And, while it may seem overly broad, HRP has developed a methodology with the ARRB which provides the access required by the Board and guarantees that their review is focused. The request is for access to review the files for possible assassination related material and the Board has no interest in reviewing multiple files which have nothing to do with the assassination story. A meeting is held between the ARRB staff, HRP JFK team and the appropriate IRO to discuss the scope of the request. Usually, the ARRB staff are first provided shelf lists, indexes, records lists, etc. for the purpose of narrowing/selection what they think is important. HRP assist the IRO or component representatives in reviewing the selected files to ensure they deal with appropriate subjects and timeframes. Once access is approved, the appropriate IRO and component sets up a file review session with the ARRB staff. If material requested is particularly sensitive, access can be limited to the ARRB Executive Director or members of the Board. Any records selected as Assassination Records are subject to review under the JFK Act. This process has be used for numerous requests for access including DCI McCone Files, Family Jewels materials, histories and security files

OIM 98-000nn
13 April 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Executive Director

VIA: Director of Information Management

FROM: Lee S. Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group/OIM

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

1. (AIUO) Per your request at our 1 April bi-weekly meeting, we have summarized below the significant issues which are under deliberation and negotiation with the JFK Board. Our approach on protecting Agency equities is multi-step:

- First, with the staff, we argue relevance although the statute and implementing regulations define ''assassination records'' very broadly as including
    - (1) any records related to the assassination or Oswald,
    - (2) any records concerning the various conspiracy theories, and
    - (3) any records within the scope of previous investigations including the Church Committee, Pike Committee, Warren Commission, or House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA),[1]
- Second, with the staff, we argue that release would cause current damage although the exemptions under the JFK statute are much narrower than the corresponding exemptions under the FOIA, and
- Third, if we fail to convince the staff, we must proceed to a more detailed and formal presentation to the Board.

---

[1] (AIUO) It is the materials collected by the HSCA which are the most numerous and often the most troublesome in terms of sensitive equities. They are generally referred to as the ''sequestered collection.''

CL BY: 0219849
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: Multiple

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

ISSUE 1 -- Unacknowledged Covert Actions

2. (S) Within records surfaced by the Ford Library is a document -- a Helms Memorandum for the Record on a PFIAB meeting -- which contains references to CIA covert financial support to political parties in Peru, Greece, Italy and Brazil and to labor unions in France and Italy.[2]

3. (S) After much negotiation, the ARRB staff has agreed to recommend to the Board that the information related to those covert actions be considered non-related and the documents designated ``Not Believed Related'' (NBR). The document will be grouped with similar ``NBR'' documents and be presented to the Board for final action at the 13 April or 12 May meeting.

ISSUE 2 -- Alias Documentation and Accommodation Addresses

4. (S) The security file of former Agency employee, David Morales (deceased -- true name already released), within the sequestered collection contains documentation on five of his alias.[3] We anticipate similar problems as we re-review other security files within the sequestered collection. We are attempting to work a compromise with the following elements but details have yet to be finalized:

- protect all references to official documents reflecting the alias such as social security cards, drivers licenses
- release items designated as pocket litter such as club cards,
- protect elements of accommodation addresses to avoid identifying specific locations, and
- lastly, make a decision to actually release or protect the alias itself depending on the timeframe and its importance to the JFK story.

5. (S) However, disagreements on the actual implementation (*e.g.*, protect house number but release street name of

---

[2] (S) See Attachment 1.

[3] (S) See Attachment 2.

accommodation address) have prevented a final resolution at this time. We are also exploring with the DO senior management whether the blanket release of pocket litter (whether lawfully obtained or forged) might present media or operational issues today. Accordingly, we have requested that the issue be postponed until the May meeting.

ISSUE 3 -- Organizational Materials

6. (S) This request (one of the earliest and known as CIA-1) asked for organization charts on various Agency directorates and/or components for the years 1958-1968. All Agency directorates provided material responsive to the request and the ARRB staff has selected items for inclusion in the JFK collection. Remaining at issue are three DO charts -- a 1961 generic DDP organization, a 1963 generic DDP organization, and a detailed JMWAVE organization.[4] The DO has agreed to release the first two and remain adamantly opposed to the release of the JMWAVE chart given its similarity to current organizational plans. ?

7. (S) This issue will be presented by ARRB staff to the Board at the 13 April meeting where they will recommend that the DDP generic charts be accepted (good for CIA) and that the JMWAVE chart be declared as an assassination record (bad for CIA); an actual vote by the Board will not take place until the May meeting.

ISSUE 4 -- Mexico City Tapes

8. (S) This request asked for a thorough search of Agency files and documents for and CIA ``... *surveillance 'take' from Cuban and Soviet facilities in Mexico City at the time of the Oswald visit and in the immediate wake of the assassination.''* Among the items provided by the DO were five boxes containing audio tapes from telephone taps on the Cuban and Russian embassies and facilities. A number of the tapes are dated 22

---

[4] (S) See Attachment 3.

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

November 1963; many others are dated 23 November 1963 through December 1963.[5]

9. (S) This is one of the most complex requests because of the following facts:

- at one time, there was a tape of Oswald in existence but it has since been lost or erased;
- the relevance of these tapes is argued to be only to prove that no tape in existence today contains the Oswald conversation; ? grammar
- this was not an unilateral operation but rather a joint operation with the Mexican Government;
- there is a confidential request from the ARRB to the Mexican Government for any copies of the actual Oswald conversation they may possess; and,
- quite obviously, the sensitivity is not so much the mere fact that we possess such tapes but our confirmation of the extent and our release of the actual conversations captured. ?

10. (S) The good news, at least at this time, is that the ARRB staff has agreed to postpone Board consideration until May and, in the interim, the Agency will have an opportunity to review (*i.e.*, listen and transcribe) and determine the sensitivity and provide detailed arguments in this regard.

ISSUE 5 -- Protection of LITAMIL-9

11. (S) LITAMIL-9 was a CIA penetration of the Cuban Embassy. Unfortunately, his identity was indirectly and inadvertently released in 1993 and, as a result, he was identified in true name as a CIA agent in John Newman's book, *Oswald and the CIA*. As of 1993, LITAMIL-9 was still alive and living in Mexico City with family in Cuba. To date, the ARRB Board has agreed to protect his identity and crypt and delay the release of his 201 file until the Agency could make some judgments about the potential damage created by the release on

---

[5] (S) The scope of this request is quite significant; it includes five boxes of 185 tapes from operations against both the Cuban and Russian Embassy.

additional documents with his name/crypt in them. That will now occur at the May meeting of the Board. It is, however, unlikely that the Board would agree to delay release until 2017, however, there is precedent for delaying release of records on individuals for shorter periods or until death.

ISSUE 6 -- Richard Gibson (CIA Asset)

12. (S) Richard Gibson, who presently lives in England, is a left wing journalist who was associated with the Fair Play For Cuba Committee (FPFCC), an entity to which Oswald wrote letters and claimed to be a member. Gibson did not become an Agency asset until ***after*** the assassination, however, he had been of interest to the FBI when he headed the FPFCC. Unfortunately, a combination of previous releases led to press reports in 1994/1995 about his relationship with the CIA. At that time, CIA officers were dispatched to advise him about the possible compromise and promise him the very best attempt at protecting the relationship.

Retain $?

13. (S) Since then, the ARRB has agreed to delay the release of any additional information until the Agency and FBI had determined the full extent of the files on Gibson and the potential damage. The issue is scheduled for ARRB action at the May meeting and our objective is to release Gibson's role in the JFK assassination story while protecting his relationship with the Agency; however, the FBI has a four volumes file which covers both FBI interest and Gibson's relationship with the Agency. We will be working in detail with the ARRB staff and the FBI on this approach.

ISSUE 7 -- Certain Files of CIA Officials

14. (S) This is a major request encompassing ``... *the office files of the individual occupying the following positions during the period 1959-1964.''*

- The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- General Charles Cabell 1953-1962
- General Marshall Carter 1062-1965
- The Office of the Deputy director for Plans
- Richard Bissell 1958-1965
- Richard Helms 1962-1965

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

- The chronological files of C. Tracy Barnes, 1959-1964
- Office of General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, 1959-1964
- Operational Diaries of William Harvey 1962-1963.

This request will by its very breadth require significant time on the part of the directorate (and DCI) IROs. While it may appear overly broad, we have developed a methodology with the ARRB staff which provides the access required by the Board but guarantees that their review is focused: In sum, we work from shelf lists ? to narrow the selection and then conduct file review ~~sessions~~ with the ARRB staff; if material requested is particularly sensitive, access can be limited to the ARRB Executive Director or members of the Board. This effort will continue for some time.

Conclusion

part time

15. (AIUO) At the present time, over 40 persons are involved in the JFK records review and we anticipate that this level of effort may increase by 25% in the coming months as we near the statutory end of the Board (30 September 1998). However, even if the Board is not extended (and it has been extended previously), there are statutory tasks for CIA which will extend 12-18 months beyond the end of the Board's existence. Your continued support is critical.

Lee S. Strickland

Secret

5 March 1997

Memorandum For: Fred Wickham, DO Focal Point for JFK
Linda Cipriani, OGC Focal Point for JFK

From: Barry Harrelson BHA
JFK Project Officer

Subject: (U) CIA Employees Names in JFK Records

(AIOU) In meetings on March 4, 1997, I raised with David Marwell and Jeremy Gunn my concerns with the large number of employee names scheduled for review in May 1997 and the potential harm to the Agency if most of these names are released. I found both receptive to our concerns and willing to re-open the issue of the release of CIA employees true names with the Board. Marwell cautioned, however, that they could not predict the Board's response and that we should move expeditiously to provide our "evidence" to the Board.

(U) If you agree with my assessment of the situation (see below), I recommend we move quickly to engage upper management and prepare the necessary material. Please provide your response as soon as possible.

Background

(AIOU) In March 1996, the ARRB agreed to protect the names of all Agency staff employees that appear in JFK documents until May 1997. The agreement reflected the Board's recognition of the need to facilitate the document review, and that it would take time for the Agency to collect evidence to defend individual names.

(AIOU) Jeremy Gunn's memo summarizing the Board's approach to the release of CIA employee names describes a name-by-name approach and sets categories and specific requirements for the release or protection of an individual. Even if the DO is able to complete the research on all employees protected to date (590), it is unlikely that it will be able to develop the type of evidence required by the Board to protect most individuals. Under a name-by-name approach, we can expect a majority of the names to be released.

CL By: 611637
CL Reason: 1.5 (c)
DECL On: X1
DRV From: PER 9-87;COV 1.1-86

Secret

Issue

(AIOU) There is considerable concern among HRG reviewers that the continued release of hundreds of Agency employees' true names has the potential to do unacceptable harm to US national security. The harm from release of a large number of names lies in the fact that the potential damage cannot be measured. This is due to the ripple effect that would occur among assets in many places, with many liaison services and multiple cover entities.

(U) To date, 590 CIA employee names, mostly DO, have been protected and are subject to review by the Board in May 1997. Most of these individuals have little or no connection to the JFK assassination story. This number is much larger than we anticipated when we agreed in March 1996 to the case-by-case approach.

(S) The decisions made by the Board at the May meeting will set a precedent for the potentially hundreds of additional names not yet identified. We have reviewed only the Oswald 201 file and 12 boxes of the JFK sequestered collection. At this point it is impossible to determine the total number of employees mentioned in the JFK collection. For example in Box 48, there is a 155 page Position Control Register listing all employees in Far East Division including the Tokyo station.

Recommendation

(AIOU) That the Agency re-visit the name issue with the ARRB based on the following considerations:

* It should be recognized that there are two separate aspects of the public interest involved in this matter, and that it is necessary to achieve a reasonable balance between them. On the one hand, it is clear that it is now in the public interest to release as much of our JFK collection as is possible. On the other hand, it is equally clear that it is in the public interest for this Agency to maintain its essential security and cover practices in order to be able to serve the nation effectively in accordance with its enabling legislation.

* It is not in the public's interest for one of the fundamental principles of an intelligence agency--protecting the identity of covert employees--to continue to be eroded. While it is not always possible to show harm by the release of any one individual's name, the magnitude of the JFK release

clearly has the potential to do harm to the Agency as an institution and to national security. There is simply no way to measure the possible effect of such a release on past and future employees, agents, liaison relationships and operations.

* Since most of the individuals involved have little or no connection with the JFK assassination, the release of their true names does not add to the assassination story. The substitution of pseudonyms or other identifier would meet the historian's need to track who is saying what to whom, etc.

* However, the Agency does recognizes that there are some employees who are part of the JFK story (many of their names have already been released). We propose that the ARRB staff and HRG work together to establish a list of individuals who fit this category. These are the names that would be released unless the Agency is able to provide the required evidence of current harm.

This approach would serve both the public's and the Agency's interests. It would also allow the Agency to focus its resources on completing the review and responding to the special requests of the Board, instead of spending an inordinate amount of time and money on individuals of marginal or no interest to the JFK story.

(C) [Note: There is also the issue of State Department equities and the impact of officially acknowledging as CIA hundreds of officers who were under official State cover.]

Proposed Action

(AIOU) We have a little over two months to resolve this issue and be ready for the ARRB meeting, May 12-13. Support from top management including a willingness to raise the issue with the acting/new DCI and possibly the White House is critical to success. I envision a memorandum to the Board similar to the one prepared on sources. However, I recommend it be signed by the General Counsel. We should also be prepared to discuss the issue directly with the Board since we are asking them to reconsider a decision in which we initially concurred.

(AIOU) Mr. Marwell recommends that we include examples of documents with names of marginal interest in our package. He also would like to start immediately preparing a list of those names which are “important to the assassination story”. If you concur, HRG and DO JFK reviewers could begin immediately on these two tasks.

(AIOU) The Board has meetings scheduled for 13-14 March, 2-3 April and 23-24 April. I recommend that we begin discussions with ARRB staff as soon as possible with the goal of having the memo ready no later than the 2-3 April meeting. It is important that the DO continue to develop evidence on the individuals who are scheduled for review in May. The worst possible scenario is not succeeding with the new proposal, and then not being ready to defend those individuals who truly need to be protected.

CL BY: 0611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 d
DECL ON: X5
DRV FRM: LIA 4-82

22 July 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI_CSI_JFK_Team

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: OIM/HRP

SUBJECT: ARRB Meeting 20 July - Results

REFERENCE:

Original Text of J. Barry Harrelson
Original Text of J. Barry Harrelson

CL BY: *0611637*
CL REASON: *Section 1.5 d*
DECL ON: *X5*
DRV FRM: *LIA 4-82*

20 July 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: *Lee S. Strickland @ DA*
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
Mary Lou Cummings @ DCI
Barbara T. Blufer @ DI
Teresa Wilcox @ DST
Becky L. Rant @ DA

William H. McNair @ DO
Linda C. Cipriani @ DCI
Eileen M. Wukitch @ DO

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: OIM/HRP

SUBJECT: ARRB Meeting 20 July - Results

REFERENCE:

The ARRB took the following actions on CIA document/issues:

1. Accepted CIA request to consider crypts/project names in Ford Presidential Library Documents (Rockefeller Commission) NBR, not believed relevant, protect until 2017;

2. Accepted CIA request to "retype" the Australian document being released in sanitized form (Board voted to protect the liaison relationship and to delete any identifying information at previous meeting);

3. Accepted CIA approved language for description of 4 pages dealing with the assassination from a sensitive foreign document know as the "Mark Lane" document. [Board member with permission of the foreign government had reviewed the full document on 7 July and agreed that the only the 4 pages should be included in the JFK collection.];

4. Rejected CIA request for reconsideration of previous decision to protect only the digraph of crypt, IJDECANTER [asset, dead, identity and relationship with Agency exposed in Dec 1997 LA Times article];

5. Rejected CIA request to deny in full JMWAVE org chart / Board voted 5-0 to "open in full".

The next Board meeting is 6 August. I need to as soon as possible if the Agency is going to appeal or ask for reconsideration re items 4 and 5.

CC: Edmund Cohen @ DA
James R. Oliver @ DA
Stephen M. White @ DCI
Martin J. Boland @ DA

Sent on 20 July 1998 at 06:24:40 PM

CC:

Sent on 22 July 1998 at 13,06;06

Aquatic

TO: Teresa Wilcox @ DST
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
OFFICE: OIM/HRP
DATE: 08/01/98 07:44:36 AM
SUBJECT: ▨Re: Slug (AQUATIC)

The Agency agreed to release slug lines in 1995 (one of the first battles with the ARRB). Since "Aquatic" was used in the slug line of documents dealing with photo operations in Mexico City it has been released in documents at NARA. We have been advised by the ARRB staff that unless we can show "current harm" to additional releases they will not accept the protection of "Aquatic" in slug lines. If you with to take the issue to the Board at the 6 Aug. meeting, I will need an evidence memo no later than 5 August.

The specific document in question deals with fabrication of Cuban passport. The ARRB staff has agreed to accept our redactions under the previous agreement on alias documentation. If you want a DS&T look, I recommend you have Tony F. review the document. If you want to review other files/document related to "Aquatic", I suggest you come to IP to review.

CC: Eileen M. Wukitch @ DO, James R. Oliver @ DA
Sent on 1 August 1998 at 07:44:36 AM

SECRET

16 May 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Roger Martin

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: Special Clearance for ARRB Staff

REFERENCE: Our phone call, 16 May 1997, a.m.

Request that Kathryn Michelle Combs of the Assassination Records Review Board staff, SSN 229-13-8465, be given a temporary Byeman clearance for access to specific records on the U-2 project. The files to be reviewed are responsive to a special search request from the JFK Board. Marsha Hubbs, DS&T IMO, has reviewed these files and concurs in granting access for background use only to Ms. Combs.

CL BY 611637
CL REASON 1.5(c)
DECL ON X1
DRV FROM: COL 2-82

CC: John Pereira

SECRET

SECRET

CL BY: 2085904
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

TO: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Teresa Wilcox @ DST
OFFICE: ODDS&T/IRO
DATE: 10/23/97 04:33:33 PM
SUBJECT: Re: JFK Board 14 October Meeting -- Results

Original Text of J. Barry Harrelson
Barry:

(S) This follows our telephone conversation of 22 October 1997. I have discussed the decision of the JFK Board to release the true name of Jose Marie Mankel with Linda Cipriani of OGC/Litigation Division. Linda is of the opinion that we have a very weak case were we to pursue an appeal to the President, because we are unable to articulate specific current harm that would ensue when the Board releases Mankel's name. This is because the program with which he was linked, as well as the crypt, already have been officially released to the public via the SSCI hearings in 1975. In addition, I have been advised that the activity with which Mr. Mankel was associated has no link with any current DS&T program. Moreover, Mr. Mankel's name is in the public domain (in Oliver Stone's manuscript for the film "Nixon"), although it has not--up to now--been officially acknowledged. We do not know Mr. Mankel's whereabouts, or even if he is still alive; the last contact the CIA had with him was in 1964, when he was living in Luxembourg.

(S) The chilling effect of publicly releasing the names of persons to whom we have promised confidentiality, thereby harming our ability to recruit in the future, was unsuccessfully argued to the Board at its 14 October meeting. Because we are unable to articulate specific current harm, beyond the general chilling effect, I believe an appeal would be unsuccessful. Therefore, unless we are able to unearth additional information in the seven days allotted to us following formal notification of the Board's decision--which is unlikely--the DS&T will not appeal the release of this name.

CC: Thomas J. Benjamin @ DST, Patricia B. Cameresi @ DST, Joseph P. Hayes-C- @ DST
Sent on 23 October 1997 at 04:33:33 PM

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
(When filled in)

8 October 1997

NAME INFORMATION SHEET

NAME: Mankel, Jose Marie Andre *aka* Mankel, Andre

DOB: 1 Oct 1917

EOD: Contract agent at least by March 1961

PRESENT RESIDENCE:

Unknown

WISHES RE COVER/NO COVER:

Unknown

SENSITIVE ASSIGNMENTS/ACTIVITIES:

Mankel was recruited as a ZRRIFLE agent in late 1960. The objective of the ZRRIFLE project was to procure foreign code and cypher materials and information concerning such matters. Except for a two-month (Nov-Dec 1960) TDY to Africa, Mankel apparently operated in Europe establishing his cover while trying to spot and assess individuals that the CIA could use in safe cracking operations, in line with one of the principal missions of FI/D.

Agency contract terminated in Feb 1964.

CURRENT ACTIVITIES:

Unknown

OTHER NOTES:

First Agency contact with Mankel in 1958 (COS through Chief of Luxembourg Intelligence Service) in connection with illegal narcotics operation into the US. For 18 months, he was contacted sporadically on behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. (The Bureau's files reflect an excellent performance by contact.)

Virtually all data on Mankel -- **except his true name** -- have been released.

BACKGROUND USE ONLY
DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

~~SECRET~~
(When filled in)

CL BY: 0563956
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 2-82

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: LOC 5-82

5 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR:
John Pereira @ DCI
Fred Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
Linda Cipriani @ DCI

FROM:
J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: 17 November JFK Board Meeting-- CIA issues (update)

REFERENCE:

1. The following CIA items are on the agenda for the 17 November ARRB meeting:

- (S) Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton, Va. as the location of the CIA Record Center.

In addition to written evidence being prepared by DA, the Agency has been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

- Chairman Tunheim's proposal to advance the opening date of the Nosenko NBR (Not Believed Relevant) material from the 2017 per the JFK Act to the year 2010.

The ARRB staff disagrees with the Board on this issue and will recommend that the release date remain 2017. However, they are not confident that the Board will accept their recommendation and has requested the Agency's position on the 2010 date. If the Agency opposes the 2010 change in the date, I will need a memo from the DO explaining why. We could offer a compromise--accept the 2010 date provided the Agency has the same right in 2010 as 2017 to review and appeal the release of the records. I have ask OGC for a legal opinion. Please note that this decision affects only those documents designated "NBR" by ARRB. The documents declared to be Assassination Records (AR) will be re-reviewed and released, either sanitized or in full, during the coming year.

- (S) Proposed release of reference to CIA employee being under "integrated State cover".

We have provided written evidence (DO note coordinated with State and copy of MOA between CIA and State). According to the ARRB staff, some Board members consider CIA use of state cover as an "open secret" and are inclined to release. We have been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

- Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) financial records.

ARRB staff plans to recommend to the Board that monthly summaries be considered ARs and the remaining material be designated NBR. Samples of these documents have been provided to DA, DO, and DCI/IRO. If you have any comments or objections, please forward them to me by COB Wednesday.

- Documents containing long lists of names, crypts, companies, etc. These include both Agency documents and notes of HSCA staffers. (FYI - no action required at this time)

The ARRB staff will ask the Board to delay processing of such documents and, in some cases, declare them NBR. The staff considers them marginal to the story and believes that they are not worth the time involved.

(S) 2. We need to advise the ARRB staff no later than COB 12 November (Wednesday), if we plan to brief the Board on Warrenton and/or State Cover. Written evidence is due to ARRB staff by COB 13 November (Thursday). They need at least one day to review the material and prepare their presentations for the Board.

CC: Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Becky Rant @ DA

work copy

SECRET

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

21 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
Linda Cipriani @ DCI

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: ARRB meeting 17 November - Results

REFERENCE:

1. Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton as CIA Records Center:

The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration; postponed until 2017.

2. CIA use of State Cover:

The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive; released.

This determination affects 16 documents (3 duplicates) that were pending Board action. Future documents will be impacted by this decision. Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and OGC for reconsideration/appeal review.

3. Release date of Nosenko NBR records:

The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the right to review and appeal at that time.

4. Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) Financial Records:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that only "General Statement for Month" records for January 1960 and to January 1995 be processed as Assassination Records, and that the approximately 6,000 remaining pages of financial records be declared to have "no believed relevance (NBR)" to the JFK assassination.

5. *Ramparts* Damage Assessment Document:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that the paragraphs on the one relevant organization be processed as a assassination record, and that the remainder of the CIA *Ramparts* Memorandum be declared NBR. The memorandum discusses the truth or fallacy of the allegations in *Ramparts* the Agency used non-governmental organizations for support and funding of worldwide anti-Communist operations. Over one hundred organizations are mentioned in the *Ramparts* article. The relevant organization is the International Rescue Committee; the IRC aided Oswald on his return to the US.

6. Book Cables Dissemination Lists:

The Board accepted the Agency's request that book cable dissemination list be protected in full even if they contain stations that are releasable.

7. Document # 104-10072-10232 :

The Board rejected the Agency's request to protect the full crypt LINLUCK. The document has been sent to the DO for reconsideration/appeal review.

8. Other Documents:

The Board accepted the Agency's and ARRB staff's recommendations on 204 additional documents.

Reconsideration and Appeals:

If the Agency wishes to ask the Board to reconsider a decision or plans to appeal to the President, the ARRB staff has requested that it be notified prior to the letter to the Agency informing the DCI of the Board's decision. We expect the letter on or around Dec. 1st; the Board's determinations will also be published in the Federal Register on that date. As mandated by the White House, the Agency has seven days after notification to appeal a JFK Board decision to the President.

CC: Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
Becky Dyer @ DA

Sent on 21 November 1997 at 05:04:45 PM

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

24 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI_CSI_JFK_Team

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: ARRB meeting 17 November - Results

REFERENCE:

Original Text of J. Barry Harrelson
Original Text of J. Barry Harrelson

CL BY: *611637*
CL REASON: *Section 1.5 C*
DECL ON: *X1*
DRV FRM: *COV 2-87*

21 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: *John Pereira @ DCI*
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
Linda Cipriani @ DCI

FROM: *J. Barry Harrelson*

JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: *CSI/HRG*

SUBJECT: *ARRB meeting 17 November - Results*

REFERENCE:

1. Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton as CIA Records Center:

The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration; postponed until 2017.

2. CIA use of State Cover:

The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive; released.

This determination affects 16 documents (3 duplicates) that were pending Board action. Future documents will be impacted by this decision. Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and OGC for reconsideration/appeal review.

3. Release date of Nosenko NBR records:

The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the right to review and appeal at that time.

4. Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) Financial Records:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that only "General Statement for Month" records for January 1960 and to January 1995 be processed as Assassination Records, and that the approximately 6,000 remaining pages of financial records be declared to have "no believed relevance (NBR)" to the JFK assassination.

5. Ramparts Damage Assessment Document:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that the paragraphs on the one relevant organization be processed as a assassination record, and that the remainder of the CIA Ramparts Memorandum be declared NBR. The memorandum discusses the truth or fallacy of the allegations in Ramparts the Agency used non-governmental organizations for support and funding of worldwide anti-Communist operations. Over one hundred organizations are mentioned in the Ramparts article. The relevant organization is the International Rescue Committee; the IRC aided Oswald on his return to the US.

6. Book Cables Dissemination Lists:

The Board accepted the Agency's request that book cable dissemination list be protected in full even if they contain stations that are releasable.

7. Document # 104-10072-10232 :

The Board rejected the Agency's request to protect the full crypt ***(LINLUCK).*** *The document has been sent to the DO for reconsideration/appeal review.*

8. Other Documents:

The Board accepted the Agency's and ARRB staff's recommendations on 204 additional documents.

Reconsideration and Appeals:

If the Agency wishes to ask the Board to reconsider a decision or plans to appeal to the President, the ARRB staff has requested that it be notified prior to the letter to the Agency informing the DCI of the Board's decision. We expect the letter on or around Dec. 1st; the Board's determinations will also be published in the Federal Register on that date. As mandated by the White House, the Agency has seven days after notification to appeal a JFK Board decision to the President.

CC: *Eileen Wukitch @ DO*
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
Becky Dyer @ DA

Sent on 21 November 1997 at 05:04:45 PM

CC:

Sent on 24 November 1997 at 08:14:49 AM

Secret - Working Paper

Notes from Briefing of ARRB Staff on Stations
(11 October 1995 - ARRB conf. room)

CIA Attendees: Bill McNair
Lee Carle
John Goins
Chuck Briggs
Hal Bean
Barry Harrelson

Bill re Stations:

No problem with release of COS, fact we have overseas locations, CIA representatives in specific countries -- the problem comes with officially acknowledging the stations thereby putting the host government and service in a position of explaining why it is allowing a foreign espionage unit to operate in the country. This may become a serious political issue for the government, especially in countries where the government does not acknowledge its own service. Also can be perceived as "rubbing their nose in it" and can effect the trust between the Agency and the host service (violated agreement of confidentially).

Marwell pointed out that this information was 30 years old and ask what was the impact of acknowledging a station presence in 1963 on current operations or relations.

Bill responded "opened up old sores" and cited Rome and the sensitivity to our involvement in past election. Mentioned the reaction to the announcement on covert actions by DCI.

Gunn ask if stations = liaison relationship; Bill said the other service can not say it did not know the CIA was operation in its own country -- would look incompetent.

Mary ask about changes in government; Bill responded that intell types tend to stay own or its a revolving door where a good will be back in power at some point.

Bill comments on specific stations

It important to the story such as Mexico City and the surrounding stations which were involved in the cable exchanges re Oswald, then will release.

"Don't take it away from us for little or no gain to the story", I. e. if not critical to the story let us protect.

He indicated he could live with opening the stations for short windows if important to story, but also said it created a problem about protecting other activities in that window

Secret

Moscow - opened for Oswald windows

Rome - No, past elections issue and current narcotics projects

Delhi - No, counter narcotics projects

Madrid - Liaison relationships have been up and down; (PNGed five officers) can't afford any more flaps

Rabat - long time relationship w/ head of state; could give anti-government labor unions an issue(however, would not "fall on my sword" for this one

Helsinki and Stockholm -- would go to DCI with request to appeal (governments currently under fire for cooperation with US/very sensitive operation under way

Marwell ask about substitute language: Scandinavia, Northern Europe -- Bill responded with Western Europe/ said southern Europe for Rome, Madrid etc. "ok"

London: do not want to acknowledge but could live with

Australia - very sensitive

Berlin - is open in 1955; 1963 (?) Bill may have been having second thoughts about previous statement "to release", but I think it still stands -- there was a discussion of why Berlin important to story.

Mary ask about other European stations, Bombay and some South American stations

Bill did not have specific on other stations but made a couple of comments

Bonn and Hague - no problem

Brussels - very sensitive to any mention of intelligence service presence

Would get back to them on other stations

[I promised Bill a list of the Stations]

Other issues discussed

Crypts other than LIs and AMs - there was a discussion re deleting digraph and letting rest of crypt; everyone seemed receptive, but no decision.

Bill mentioned Iranian takeover as good example of damage caused by release of documents with crypts, file #s, etc. **Gunn** ask if there was an internal "damage" study prepared. **Bill** said he would check.

Marwell rejected the approach of the Agency having the opportunity to discuss Board actions before official notification. If we have evidence, need to present upfront, not come back with additional evidence after the decision.

The balancing of public interest vs Agency needs came up several times; Marwell commented that even if a document or item is not important to the Oswald story, the Agency must still defend.

Bill stated several timed during the meeting "If important to the story, we can live with release".

Barry
12 October 1995

9 November 1995

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: OCA Job No.80T01614R

Yesterday I had a call from Dee Werbrich (37762) of OCA inquiring about 80T01614R, box 1 & 2, logged out to me in 1992. She has no shelf list for this job and could not advise me of the content of these two boxes. She had notations regarding the History Staff and Russ Holmes relating to this job. I spoke to Norita of the History Staff, and she found a brief reference to the job that included the helpful information that the boxes contained microfilm reels. A return call to Dee added the fact that they were gray boxes.

I next reviewed the History Staff paper of 10 February 1992 sumarizing their survey of the JFK holdings at WTC. Page 2 of that paper refers to JFK box 64: "Box 64 of Job No. 80T01357A contains 72 reels of microfilm (although the box is labeled `CIA/DDO HSCA Records, box 1 of 2,' box 2 has not been found). The History Staff was assured, however, that this was indeed box 64 of Job No. 80T01357A."

I have no recollection of ever receiving any boxes directly from OCA. The JFK boxes were sent to HRG in my name from IMS by Russ Holmes. Apparently he had the OCA records changed to reflect my name in place of his.

Putting all this together I am convinced that the 72 reels in box 64 of 80T01357A came from the two gray boxes of 80T01614R. I called Dee and she accepted this as a likely explanation. She will annotate OCA's records to reflect that CSI/HRG holds the microfim reels formerly of Job No. 80T0164R and now box 64 of 80T01357A.

Frank S. Most
CSI/HRG

13 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Release of Stations and Bases

REFERENCE: Memo DD/095-3059, dated 7 Nov. 95, subject release of JFK documents

1. Per phone conversation with Bill McNair, DO/IRO, on 13 November 1995, the German and Swiss locations not addressed in the referenced memorandum are to be treated the same as the primary station/base that is listed in that memorandum:

Bern and Lausanne - same as Geneva (protect);

Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, and Stuttgart
- same as Berlin and Bonn ("no specific damage",
i.e. release in Oswald 201).

2. The above information was given to ARRB staff via phone message left on J. Gunn's voice mail, 13 November 1995.

Barry Harrelson

CC - HRG files
Ellie Neiman
HRG Reviewers

26 February 1997

Memorandum For: John Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

From: Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

Subject: (U) CIA Employees Names in JFK Records

Background

(AIOU) In March 1996, the ARRB agreed to protect the names of all Agency staff employees that appear in JFK documents until May 1997. The agreement reflected the Board's recognition of the need to facilitate the document review, and that it would take time for the Agency to collect evidence to defend individual names. Attached are Jeremy Gunn's memo summarizing the Board's approach to the release of CIA employee names and the DO's response. Both memos assume a name-by-name approach and set categories and specific requirements for the release or protection of an individual. Also attached is an analysis of the ARRB and DO approaches.

(AIOU) I do not know how prepared the DO is, but I suspect that there is still a significant amount of work to be done prior to the Board's May meeting. I understand that many former employees have not responded to the DO's letter and that most of the responses have been negative. Even if the DO is able to complete the research on all employees protected to date, it is unlikely that they will be able to develop the type of evidence required by the Board to protect most individuals. Under the name-by-name approach, we can expect a majority of the names to be released.

Issue

(AIOU) There is considerable concern among HRG reviewers that the continued release of hundreds of Agency employees' true names has the potential to do unacceptable harm to US national security. The harm from release of a large number of names lies in the fact that it cannot be measured. This is due to the ripple effect that would occur among assets in many places and with many liaison services. It undermines the basic concept of cover for a claudestine service.

CL By: 611637
CL Reason: 1.5 (c)
DECL On: X1
DRV From: PER 9-87;COV 1.1-86

(U) To date over 500 CIA employee names, mostly DO, have been protected and are subject to review by the Board in May 1997. Most of these individuals have little or no connection to the JFK assassination story. This is far more names than had been anticipated when we agreed in March 1996 to the case-by-case approach. [FYI Note: I estimate that approximately 1800 names have been released to date in the JFK review].

(S) In addition, the decisions made by the Board at the May meeting will set a precedent for the potentially hundreds of names to come. We have reviewed only the Oswald 201 file and 12 boxes of the JFK sequestered collection. At this point it is impossible to determine the total number of employees mentioned in the JFK collection. For example in Box 48, there is a Position Control Register (155 pages) listing all employees in Far East Division including the Tokyo station.

Recommendation

(AIOU) That the Agency re-visit the name issue with the ARRB based on the following considerations:

* It should be recognized that there are two separate aspects of the public interest involved in this matter, and that it is necessary to achieve a reasonable balance between them. On the one hand, it is clear that it is now in the public interest to release as much of our JFK collection as is possible. On the other hand, it is equally clear that it is in the public interest for this Agency to maintain its essential security practices in order to be able to serve the Nation effectively in accordance with its enabling legislation.

* It is not in the public's interest for one of the fundamental principles of an intelligence agency--protecting the identity of covert employees--to continue to be eroded. While it is not always possible to show harm by the release of any one individual's name, the magnitude of the JFK release clearly has the potential to do harm to the Agency as an institution and to national security. There is no way to measure the possible effect of these releases on future employees and operations.

* Since most of the individuals involved have little or no connection with the JFK assassination, the release of their true names does not add to the story. The substitution of pseudonyms would meet the historian's need to track who is saying what, etc.

* The Agency recognizes that there are employees who are part of the JFK story (many of their names have already been released). We propose that the ARRB staff and HRG work together to establish a list of individuals who are important to the story. These names would be released unless the Agency is able to provide the required evidence of current harm.

This approach would serve both the public's and the Agency's interests. It would also allow the Agency to focus its resources on completing the review and responding to the special requests of the Board, instead of spending an inordinate amount of time and money on individuals of marginal or no interest to the JFK story.

(C) [Note: There is also the issue of State Department equities and the impact of officially acknowledging as CIA hundreds of officers who were under official State cover.]

Proposed Action

(AIOU) We have a little over two months to resolve this issue and be ready for the ARRB meeting, May 12-13. I propose that I set up a meeting with Fred and Linda this week. If they agree, then I suggest a memo to the DO and the General Counsel presenting the issues. Support from top management including a willingness to raise the issue with the acting/new DCI and possibly the White House is critical to success. I see OGC (Linda) being tasked with preparing a memo for the Board similar to the one prepared on sources.

(AIOU) The Board has meetings scheduled for 13-14 March, 2-3 April and 23-24 April. I recommend that we begin discussions with ARRB staff as soon as possible with the goal of having the memo ready no later than the 2-3 April meeting. We should also be prepared to discuss the issue directly with the Board since we are asking them to reconsider a decision in which we initially concurred.

(AIOU) It is important that the DO continue to develop evidence on the individuals who are scheduled for review in May. The worst possible scenario is not succeeding with the new proposal, and not being ready to defend those individuals who need protection.

Attachments: As stated

John
I ask the JFK reviewers for comments on Gunn's and Wickhams memos (attached); Gary did his as a memo.

Barry

SUBJECT: Analysis of ARRB and DO Memoranda re Treatment of CIA Officer Names in JFK Collection (Prepared by Gary Breneman, 11 Feb 97)

1. **ARRB Memorandum.** The Gunn memorandum sets out the criteria required to meet the burden under several situations.

A. **For officers who are still alive,** Mr. Gunn states that the proofs required to postpone release of a name are three in number and all three must be met:

i. The officer must be living outside of the U.S.

OR,

(R)easonably be expected to travel outside of the U.S. in the foreseeable future;

AND,

ii. The officer is either working ... (presumably a current staff officer, contract employee, or independent contractor) ... or is retired under cover;

AND,

iii. The officer objects to the release of his or her true name.

COMMENTS: Mr. Gunn's criteria are a little confusing and may reach beyond the Board's authority.

a. First, note again that the three elements are joined by an "**AND**" meaning all elements must be met to satisfy a postponement.

b. Second, the first requirement of living or traveling outside of the U.S. is not tied to "cover." Many officers who do not work under cover all of the time are, in fact, provided cover for overseas TDY's. Thus, any officer who might "reasonably" be expected to travel outside of the U.S. would warrant postponement of his/her true name. This would seem to include every CIA employee, contract employee and independent contractor, past and present.

c. With respect to the third element, Mr. Gunn and the Board appear to be in error. To my knowledge, they have no authority to require that an individual be consulted concerning his or her wishes to maintain cover, thus having his or her true name postponed, or to give up cover, thus having the name released. This decision does not lie in the first instance with the individual but is an institutional decision which lies solely within the purview of the Agency and the executive branch of the government. CIA as an executive agency charged with the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of cover mechanisms is the only entity competent to make such a decision. It alone knows if release of an officer's true name will compromise an existing cover mechanism which will, in turn, expose others who share or have shared the same cover. It alone knows if release of an officer's name will expose CIA sponsorship (a cover entity) of a sensitive activity. It alone knows if release of an officer's name will violate a promise of confidentiality to a commercial cover sponsor which could cause both embarrassment and, possibly, financial hardship to the sponsor and, in turn, substantially hinder the Agency's ability to secure subsequent commercial cover sponsors.

d. Turning next to the wishes of a particular officer (either current or retired) vis a vis staying with his or her cover, these thoughts come to mind. For current employees, the decision is again not entirely theirs. If, after careful review, the Agency does not have a strong position on the employee maintaining the cover, the officer should be permitted to decide. He or she should be counseled however, that an action to remove cover could have an adverse impact on future assignments or TDYs. With respect to retirees, if, after careful review, the Agency does not object to the removal from cover, the individual should be permitted to decide. Note, that the responses to this inquiry will be mixed. As a historical note, the Agency over the years has been on an ever-swinging pendulum with respect to "cover into retirement," "cover for life," etc. There will be officers who petitioned hard unsuccessfully to have their cover removed when they retired and will gladly consent to lifting the cover. There will be those officers who do not want their cover lifted under any circumstance.

B. **Former officers, status unknown.** While the heading to this section would seem to suggest the CIA does not know the cover/non-cover status of some of its former officers, the section does not really deal with this issue. Rather, within the section, Mr. Gunn simply recognizes the fact that CIA may not be able to find all of its former officers to ask if they want to be opened up or remain under cover. The test required by Mr. Gunn to satisfy the Board and thus continue postponement until 1 June of this year is a "good faith showing that reasonable attempts" were made to locate the officer and failed.

The section contains the additional provision which advises the Board may continue a postponement beyond 1 June of this year (i.e., until 2010) if the CIA provides the board with evidence which satisfies the criteria of either category 1 or category 3. Such "additional evidence" must be provided by 1 May 1997.

The requirements or tests of this section for the Agency are not onerous but should be set-out as a series of uniform actions or check-off's taken in the attempt to locate each "current status unknown" officer. The record of these actions could then be presented to the ARRB in support of a request for continued postponement. The DO Memorandum mentions the possibility of asking the IRS or the OPM for assistance in this regard and this should probably be done.

C. **Names having effect on current intelligence interests.** The Gunn letter appears to subscribe a higher level of concern to this section and its criteria than the previous two, not recognizing the plain fact that the criteria of all three sections are inextricable. It sets out four separate criteria which, if CIA satisfies its burden; i.e, provides sufficient evidence to prove any one of them, will operate to postpone a true name until the year 2010. Note again, the criteria required are four separate ones, each separated by a comma and between numbers 3 and 4 and **"OR."** They are:

i. The officer must be currently engaged in clandestine activities; **OR,**

ii. The release of the officer's name would compromise ongoing intelligence operations or operations with current intelligence value (presumably, the latter permits a review into the officer's past activities, agent relationships, and cover positions); **OR,**

iii. The release of the officer's true name would reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living person (including family members); (read broadly, this provision would include, the individual, former agents, anyone who shared the same cover or cover position, i.e. a dedicated Department of State slot within an embassy); **OR,**

iv. The release of the officer's name would cause significant harm to the national security or the foreign relations of the U.S. (a criteria which is broad enough to drive the proverbial Mack truck through).

2. In Part II, the Gunn memorandum takes back part of what it gave in the previous section. It sets up a test of "importance to the assassination story vs. evidence of harm." Essentially, it advises that the Board will weigh the CIA's evidence but, if within its view, the true name being considered for postponement is important to the assassination story, the Board will release it. This means for those few individuals who may be viewed as "important to the story," truly substantial evidence must be brought to bear. Absent such evidence, the Board will release, and the only recourse left to the Agency would be an appeal to the President.

3. **The Directorate of Operations Memorandum.** The memorandum basically describes the steps for handling employee names as contained in JFK records. Over 500 names will be subject to ARRB action in May 1997.

Comments:

a. For officers who retired under cover, the first step will be to contact them and ask if they want their true name released. This should be the last step of the review, not the first.

b. The resources and data bases which will be researched for each name should be clearly established and followed in a uniform manner. Deviation from a set, orderly process will open CIA determinations to criticism, objections and dismissal; i.e. release of a name that should be postponed.

c. In addition to the data bases described -- retirement records, annuity pay records, the office of security, insurance lists -- consideration might be given to the Northwest Federal Credit Union and overt data bases such as Phonedec. Like the IRS and OPM, the credit union might not be able from a legal standpoint to provide an address. However, it would probably be prepared to contact an individual and ask that he/she be in touch.

d. The universal release of the true names of overt employees raises concern about current employees. To the extent that any current employee, even an overt employee, may be sent overseas on TDY under light cover, the release of his or her true name via these JFK documents which will receive widespread review could jeopardize his/her overseas mission and possibly place his/her life in danger.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr. DO, Focal Point for ARRB 1D4107 OHB	EXTENSION 44448	NO. DATE 29 July 1996

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Chief, Office of Central Cover 6B4401 OHB			EQ	
2. Chief, Historical Review Group ~~404 Ames~~	22 Aug 96		JP	
3.				
4. B. Harrelson				
5.				
6. File				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

29 July 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

1. Cover mechanisms are an integral part of conducting clandestine operations. We are concerned about individuals that continue to be dependent on particular cover legends and on the organizations that cooperatively work with us to provide those cover legends. The following proposal is offered to streamline the process of handling names and minimize the potential damage an inappropriate release could cause.

A. Incomplete and Unidentifiable names:

a. We will release the occurrence of a name when a common last name appears by itself or in conjunction with a common first name such that it does not tend to specifically identify the individual.

b. We will release the occurrence of a name if it remains unidentified after a reasonable search is conducted.

B. Identifiable names for employees that retired overtly:

In most cases, overt employees' names will be released, but in some cases overt employees may have a portion of their employment remain under cover. Such cases will require the same review as that of an employee who remained under cover into retirement.

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

C. Identifiable names for employees that retired covertly:

a. We will make a reasonable attempt to locate a current address and contact the person. If the person objects to the release of his or her name for reasons associated with current life style issues, we will object to the release of the name. If the person does not have objections based upon personal circumstances we will review the name for organizational issues. (See para C. c.)

b. If reasonable efforts fail to locate the current address, but it can be determined that the individual is still receiving a pension, insurance or other benefit based upon cover legend, we will need to continue to protect the name since source of income or benefits can not be altered without prior notification to the individual. If we fail to identify a pension or other active benefit, we will review the name for organizational issues. (See para C. c.)

c. We will make a reasonable attempt to review the name to look for identifiable harm to the person's safety, family, ongoing operational activities, national security or foreign relations. Assuming that none of the previous concerns are identified, we will review the potential damage to the cover mechanism or cover provider by the specific occurrence of the name if released.

2. Because families of deceased employees could be the beneficiary of pensions or insurance provided under the employees cover legend, we must review them the same as we would the employee. We also have second and third generation officers following in the footsteps of their parents that could be negatively impacted by the revelation.

3. Our efforts to locate current addresses will include all internal record systems maintained by Office of Personnel Security, Retirement Branch and Insurance Branch. We will include a checklist reflecting completion of these searches

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

within the documentation when requesting continued protection of the name.

4. We considered options of contacting IRS or OPM during our attempts to locate current addressing information, but based upon the fact that these offices would be unwitting of the cover arrangement for the individual, it was determined to be an unreasonable risk to the cover of these officers.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

SECRET

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

NOTE FOR: Eileen M. Wukitch @ DO
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
OFFICE: OIM/HRP
DATE: 04/16/98 02:09:10 PM
SUBJECT: Alert: May meeting issue

I will provide follow-up message for distribution -- this is a DO team alert.

I have a meeting with Gunn and staff Monday am to address as many outstanding issues as possible including the following:

1) LINLUCK - Initial response to 12 April memo was "same old stuff". Bob, ARRB, wanted to know what happen to the proposal re letting release stand in issue document and protect where needed in other documents? Did DO agree to letting ARRB staff see detailed message from division?

2) Australia liaison documents - will be scheduled for May meeting. Recommend we re-visit documents and plan to discuss with Bob S. when he comes out next week. I have assigned these to Hal Bean; he will be in contact. If you have a file on these documents that will help Hal come up to speed, please share it with him.

3) State Cover Documents - ARRB member had questions (minor per Bob) on 5 of the documents. In addition, there are two documents from the original 10 that we have a disagreement on. I need to get these document to Lee and lawyers tomorrow (Friday) so that I can address on Monday.

CC:
Sent on 16 April 1998 at 02:09:10 PM

SECRET

104-10331-10370

CONFIDENTIAL

06 January 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

TO: Barry Harrelson
OIM/HRG

FROM: Jerry Owens (C)
OIG/IMO

SUBJECT: (AIUO) Inadvertent Destruction of Records

REF: (U) Telecon dated 06 January 1998

1. (U) Per your request, attached is a memorandum written to the Office of the Inspector Generals (OIG), Deputy and Associate Deputy IG for Investigations. The attached memorandum was also reviewed by OIG/Counsel. It explains in some detail the events we discussed in referenced telephone conversation.

2. (AIUO) It is understood by me, the undersigned, that no further action from the Inspector Generals office is required, and that this matter may be considered closed. The Office of Information Management/Historical Review Group (OIM/HRG) will notify the Assassination Review Board (ARB) and file a copy of this memorandum in HRG files to refer to when writing the compliance letter to the ARB.

3. (AIUO) It is also understood that original documents are not required when material is requested for or being added to the sequestered collection, and that copies of the material which were inadvertently destroyed were previously provided to the HSAC and ARB (or special task force) before their destruction in 1995.

4. (AIUO) With the assistance of HRG, the OIG/IMO has been able to reconstruct the file and will maintain it as a permanent record, also adding a copy of the attached to that file.

CL BY 0680987
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X-1
DRV fm COV 1-82

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: (AIUO) Inadvertent Destruction of Records

5. (AIUO) Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated. If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please call me on secure X77081. Thank you.

Jerry N. Owens (C)

cc: D/IG/INV w/o att
AD/IG/INV w/o att
IG/Counsel w/o att
OIG/IMO w/att
DCI/IMO w/o att

26 November 1997

TO: Rick Cinquegrana, D/IG/INV
Judy Sholes, AD/IG/INV

FROM: Jerry Owens (C), OIG/IMO

SUBJECT: (AIUO) Possible Illegal Destruction of Records

1. (AIUO) The OIG/IMO received a request from the AD/IG/INV to search for records needed to verify certain nominees. During the course of this search, the IMO discovered what appeared to be the inadvertent destruction of permanent OIG records.

2. (AIUO) The records, cases from 1977, were retired in 1980. See exhibit A for a copy of the original records retirement request.

3. (C) When form 140 (exhibit A) was approved by the Agency Archives and Records Center (AARC) and returned with a job number (80-01770R), the records were prepared in folders, placed in boxes, and a shelflist was created (see exhibit B for shelflist).

4. (AIUO) Please take notice of the highlighted portion of the shelflist that claims the records disposition as 'permanent'. This along with the use of the terminology 'case no.', led me to believe these were permanent records.

5. (AIUO) Exhibit C is a completed request (form 141b) from AARC for authority to destroy these records. All of the records except those listed on a handwritten note (exhibit D) attached to form 141b were destroyed.

6. (AIUO) At this point, I referred to the original form 140 (exhibit A) to determine what Records Control Schedule (RCS) and Item Number was used to retire these records in 1980. I ordered a copy of the old RCS 07-76 and checked the disposition of item number '3b' (see highlighted section of exhibit E). The disposition does allow for the lawful destruction of these temporary records.

CL BY 0680987
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X-1
DRV fm COV 1-82

SUBJECT: (AIUO) Possible Illegal Destruction of Records

7. (AIUO) I then noticed that the destruction authorization form 141b (exhibit C) listed the RCS as 10-84 and the Item Number as 29B. Referring to the newer version of the RCS I found that this schedule and item number also allow for the lawful destruction of these temporary records. Please see the highlighted text of exhibit F.

8. (AIUO) At this juncture, I reviewed the material and noticed a note on exhibit D that stated, "IG 37/77 Lonnquist (Kennedy Assassination) destroyed on 5/1/95 by S.K.".

9. (AIUO) Please see the attached JFK Assassination Act (exhibit G), para (a)(1) thru (6). In short, this law was enacted in 1992 and these records were destroyed in 1995. The fact the records were scheduled as temporary and then destroyed according to Agency regulations does not override Public Law 102-526, the JFK Assassination Act.

10. (AIUO) I found three entries in Textware on Lonnquist. Two pertain to nothing of interest in this case; however the third entry states, "allegations regarding the Lee Harvey Oswald file" (see the highlighted text of exhibit H).

11. (AIUO) In May 1997, I told the JFK Assassination Review Board (ARB), in an informal hearing, that OIG had no knowledge or record of any JFK records under OIG's perview being destroyed. This was during discussions at the table, and not one of the listed questions for the OIG/IMO to answer.

12. (AIUO) My plan is to contact the DCI/IMO, enlist his assistance in notifying the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and the ARB that records pertaining to the JFK Assassination were inadvertently destroyed and explain in detail the events surrounding the discovery and what steps have been taken to prevent this from happening again.

13. (AIUO) I personally doubt that there was anything of value to the ARB in the Lonnquist case file, but because LHO is referenced it is considered a JFK ARB file, and by law I have to report its destruction to NARA and the ARB.

SUBJECT: (AIUO) Possible Illegal Destruction of Records

14. (AIUO) Any adjudicative action against me or the Agency will be the decision of the ARB.

Jerry N. Owens (C)

Distribution:

Orig - addressees

1 cy - IMO File

Exhibit A

KMO

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

RECORDS RETIREMENT REQUEST *Submit original and 4 copies to Records Center. Two copies will be returned to the originating office. Additional copies may be prepared as indicated by your RAO.*	JOB NO. ASSIGNED BY RECORDS CENTER 80-01770R *For Reference Service on Records Transferred to Storage Complete Form 490 and Refer to Above Job Number.*

PART I *(TO BE COMPLETED BY THE RECORDS CUSTODIAN)*

TO: CHIEF, AGENCY RECORDS CENTER	FROM: *(Office)* DIV/BRANCH/SECTION DCI/ OIG		DATE 20 November 1980
	ROOM 6E19 BUILDING Hqs	EXTENSION 5733	SIGNATURE OF RECORDS CUSTODIAN Barbara Baskerville

APPLICATION IS MADE FOR RETIREMENT OF THE RECORDS DESCRIBED BELOW

DESCRIPTION OF FILE SERIES *(Use description in Records Control Schedule and inclusive dates.)* IF NECESSARY TO LIST RECORDS. USE FORM NO. 140A. RECORDS SHELF LIST *(Check appropriate box below.)*

Individual Case Files- Consists of documents accumulated in investigating complaints, suggestions, or problems of individuals which are brought to the attention of the IG. Filed numerically by case number. Potential cases filed alphabetically.

(1 Jan77 thru 31 Dec77) Case No. 1/77 thru 167/77

Case No. 81/76 and GG 69/78

☐ SHELF LIST ATTACHED ☐ SHELF LIST INCLUDED IN TRANSFER

SCHEDULE NO. 07-76	ITEM(S) NO. 3 B	CLASSIFICATION/CODEWORD OF RECORDS Through SECRET

PART II *(TO BE COMPLETED BY THE RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICER)*

RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF RECORDS *(If no restrictions write "None")*

IG ONLY

DATE 20 November 1980	SIGNATURE RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICER Barbara Baskerville

PART III A *(TO BE COMPLETED BY RECORDS CENTER)*

INSTRUCTION: *Use Job and Box Numbers for reference until records are processed into archival arrangement.*

DISPOSITION OF THE RECORDS DESCRIBED HEREON HAS BEEN MADE AS FOLLOWS:

AUTHORIZATION:

WHOLE JOB DISPOSITION		PARTIAL JOB DISPOSITION	
☐ DESTROYED		☐ DESTROYED-BOX NOS.	
☐ TRANSFERRED TO:		TRANSFERRED-BOX NOS. TO:	
		☐ SEE ATTACHMENT(S)	☐ SEE REMARKS ON BACK

DATE	DISPOSITION JOB NO.	SIGNATURE CHIEF, DISPOSITION, AGENCY RECORDS CENTER

PART III B *(TO BE COMPLETED BY ARCHIVES)*

UCTION: *Refer to records by subject and date after records have been processed into archival arrangement.*

PROCESSED INTO ARCHIVAL ARRANGEMENT	SIGNATURE *(Chief, Agency Archives)*

140 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED (13-46)

UDCF Rev 10YRS

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY:

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PART III C *(TO BE COMPLETED BY THE RECORDS CENTER) (CONTINUED)*

REFERENCE ACTIVITY

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL

STORAGE LOCATION

JOB NO. IG 80-01770R	AREA IG ONLY	ROW	SPACE

FOLD HERE

DISPOSAL ACTIVITY

OFFICE 80-01770R IG	DIVISION	BRANCH	SECTION	DISPOSAL DATE [redacted]

AUTHORITY FOR DISPOSAL

SCHEDULE NO. *(or List)* 776	PAGE	ITEM 3B

REMARKS

RECEIPT PROCESSING

CUBIC FEET	NO. OF CONTAINERS	TYPE OF CONTAINERS	DATE RECEIVED	RECEIVED BY
6	6	RC	13 Jan 1981	EULIS J. SMITH

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Exhibit B

1

UNCL[illegible]IED

REPORT NO. R20A0601 ARCHIVES RECORDS CENTER SHELF LIST AS OF 810612

JOB NO.	RCS	OPI	DIV	BRANCH	SECTION	[redacted]	CLASS	CLASS-BY	US
[redacted]	07-76	07	DCI	OIG		[redacted]	U		0

BOX	FLD	ITEM	RES	FILE NO.	MED	FOLDER TITLE	ST DTE	END DTE	FS
0001	001	003B	Y			CASE NO. 1/77-23-35/77	010177	311277	0
0002	001	003B	Y			CASE NO. 36/77-41/77; 43-55/77 VOL. I-VOL. III PART 3	010177	311277	0
0003	001	003B	Y			CASE NO. 55/77 VOL. III PART 4-VOL. III PT. 7 THRU 84/77	010177	311277	0
0004	001	003B	Y			CASE NO. 85/77 THRU 121/77 AND CASE NO. 69/78 (9 ENVELOPES)	010177	311277	0
0005	001	003B	Y			CASE NO. 122/77; 123/77; 126/77 THRU 160/77	010177	311277	0
0006	001	003B	Y			CASE NO. 161/77 THRU 167/77, POTENTIAL CASES-A-Z	010177	311277	0

UNCLASSIFIED PAGE NO. 0001

cord Center will only
d back ENTIRE BOX -- Cannot pull by specific case #.

25 JUL 1984 Pls note Box 5 does not contain 126/77 thru 160/77 consecutively.
Following must be filed elsewhere:

141/77

148/77

149/77

151/77

153/77

157/77

158/77

Moore, Edwin G II
Destroyed file
S Kessler 3/1/95

80-1770R

Exhibit C

RETURN ORIGINAL AND 1 COPY TO AARC

REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO DESTROY RECORDS IN AARC

1. DISPOSITION JOB NO. *(Assigned by AARC)* 93-D-26

TO : Archives and Records Center, ISAS/DDA

THRU: Component Records Management Officer

FROM: Archives and Records Center, ISAS/DDA

2. DATE PREPARED 1-28-91

THE RECORDS IDENTIFIED BELOW ARE SCHEDULED FOR IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION. AUTHORIZATION IS REQUESTED TO DESTROY THE RECORDS AS SCHEDULED. IF AUTHORIZATION IS DENIED, REVISED DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE PROVIDED TO RECORDS ADMINISTRATION BRANCH, ISAS.

IDENTIFICATION OF RECORDS

3. OFFICE	4. SCHEDULE NO.	5. ITEM NUMBERS	6. ACCESSION JOB NOS.	7. BOX NUMBERS
DCI/OIG OPI # 7	10-84	29B	80-1770R	Boxes 1-6 6 cu. ft

8. REMARKS

Job Due for Destruction 1 Feb 1991

☐ CONTINUED ON SEPARATE PAGE

AUTHORIZATION TO DESTROY RECORDS

☐ RETAIN ALL [1] ☐ RETAIN PARTIAL [1.2]	9. TYPED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS		EXTENSION	DATE
	Kathy R. Lederer Kathy R. Lederer		75565	12/4/92
☐ QUESTIONABLE [3] ☒ DESTROY ALL	10. TYPED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF COMPONENT RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICER		EXTENSION	DATE
	Kathy R. Lederer Kathy R. Lederer		75565	12/4/92

[1] RMO ATTACH COPY OF FORM 140, RECORDS RETIREMENT REQUEST, AND PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED RETENTION OF RECORDS UNDER SECTION 8 ABOVE. ALSO PROVIDE PROPOSED NEW DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS. FORWARD TO RAB THRU DIRECTORATE RMO.

[2] RMO ATTACH COPY OF FORM 140A, SHELF LIST, ANNOTATED TO SHOW WHICH RECORDS ARE TO BE RETAINED. IF FORM 140A IS NOT AVAILABLE PROVIDE DETAILED DESCRIPTION, BY BOX AND FOLDER NUMBER, OF THE RECORDS TO BE RETAINED. RECORDS NOT INDICATED FOR RETENTION ARE AUTHORIZED FOR IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION.

[3] RMO PREPARE FORM 141C, REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO RETAIN OR DESTROY QUESTIONABLE RECORDS, FOR RECORDS THAT MAY BE SUBJECT TO ACTUAL OR IMPENDING LEGAL OR INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS. FORWARD WITH THIS FORM TO RAB THROUGH DIRECTORATE RMO.

FOR AARC USE ONLY

[✓ DESTROYED]	TRANSFERRED	
PARTIAL JOB *(Box Nos.)*	PARTIAL JOB *(Box Nos.)*	TO: PER 141B CP/JMO
✓ COMPLETE JOB	COMPLETE JOB	

REMARKS

NO BOXES REMAIN AT RECORDS CENTER

CHIEF, DISPOSITION SECTION

DATE 1/5/93

FORM 9-77 141b

Exhibit D

16 Sept 92

Kathy

Job # 80-01770R has been reviewed for destruction of 10 year old + older info. The following cases have been removed + should be noted on the retirement listing as having been pulled from the job + held in OIG until they are removed from the OGC Retention list:

IG 167/77 Box 6 Kovich
IG 50/77 Golitsyn
IG No # Agee (a-c) file
IG No # Destroyed 5/1/95 SK Moore (m-) file
IG 6/77 Destroyed SK 5/1/95 Horne
~~IG~~ 37/77 Destroyed 5/1/95 Lonnquist (Kennedy Assassination)

If you have ~~to~~ any question let me know

Susan Kessler

Exhibit E

RECORDS CONTROL SCHEDULE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	OLD SCHEDULE NO(S). 12.03-75(OIG portion)	REVISED SCHEDULE NO. 07-76
OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH Office of the Inspector General		DATE(S) OF OLD SCHEDULE(S) 16 April 1975	DATE OF CONCURRENCE
TYPE CONCURRENCE OFFICER'S NAME AND TITLE		CONCURRENCE	

OLD SCHEDULE AND ITEM NO(S).	NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION (*TITLE, DESCRIPTION, ARRANGEMENT, AND INCLUSIVE DATES*)	VOLUME (*CU. FT.*)	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
1	1	SUBJECT FILE Program Subjects		
	a.	Record copies of substantive correspondence, reports, memoranda and other papers reflecting policy, procedures and decisions pertaining to the functions assigned to the Inspector General. Filed by subject.		a. Permanent. Cut off annually; hold for one year and then transfer to the Agency Records Center records no longer needed for current reference.
	b.	Transitory material and administrative ~~material~~ subjects. (NonRecord)		b. Temporary. Destroy when one year old.
2	2	SURVEY REPORTS Record copies of reports and related data of inspections conducted by the Staff and recommendations for improvements on proper assignment of functions and missions, methods and procedures of performance by components, or other areas where surveys are deemed necessary. Filed by Agency component. Discontinued in June 1973 and resumed in October 1975.		Permanent. Hold one year then transfer to the Agency Records Center in annual blocks.
3	3	EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCE FOLDERS AND INDEX Record copies of data from employees coming to the IG with grievance regarding nature of grievance, circumstance that caused grievance and how settled. Used to investigate grievance to its conclusion. Also used to refer or provide information in response to or by direction of a court order, or where there is an indication of a violation or potential violation of law whether civil, criminal, or regulatory in nature, to the appropriate agency charged with the		CL BY 0371104 DECL OADR WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED This document is classified Secret in the aggregate.

OLD SCHEDULE AND ITEM NO(S).	NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
		responsibility of investigation or prosecuting such violation or charged with enforcing or implementating a statute or law, regulation or order issued pursuant thereto. Storage: paper. Retrievable: By case number.	SECRET		
	a.	Record copy of closed cases involving litigation or those establishing precedence of policy.			a. Permanent. Transfer closed case file to the Agency Records Center.
	b.	Record copies of close routine cases with no substantive retention value.			b. Temporary. Transfer inactive cases to the Agency Records Center for 10 years and return to custodian for review. Any cases selected for further retention shall be deposited to the Center under Item 3a of this schedule. Destroy those no longer needed.
	c.	Index - Record Copy.			c. Permanent. Destroy index cards when destroying temporary closed case files. Transfer remaining index to Agency Records Center when function is discontinued.
	d.	Log - Record copy for assigning file system case numbers. (1953 through 1967 numbered sequentially. From 1968 to present numbering changed to start over each year with the Number 1/ and the year (1/76). (Published in the Federal Register, Notification of Systems of Records, Privacy Act of 1974. The Federal Register must be amended if this system is changed or discontinued.)			Permanent. Transfer to Agency Records Center when function is discontinued.

SECRET

SECRET

OLD SCHEDULE AND ITEM NO(S).	NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
5	4	SPECIAL STUDIES Record copies of reports and evaluation following investigations and studies of various Agency programs as Career Service, CT Program, etc. Filed by subject.			Permanent. Transfer to the Agency Records Center at end of each year or when no longer needed.
6	5	WORKING FILES Duplicates and working drafts of surveys and material related to investigation or survey. Each staff member maintains own files. (Non-Record)			Temporary. Destroy 6 months after survey completed.
7	6	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL RECORDS			
	a.	Top Secret Log (Form 312)			a. Temporary. Destroy 5 years after documents downgraded, transferred out of control point or destroyed. (GRS 18-6a)
	b.	Log maintained chronologically on Secret and below documents (Form 238)			b. Temporary. Destroy after two years. (GRS 18-5)
	c.	Log used for recording receipt and disposition of official personnel files referred to staff for review.			c. Temporary. Destroy quarterly after folders returned to sender.
	d.	Document Receipts. Retain signed copies of material transmitted outside the office. (Form 615)			d. Temporary. Destroy after 2 years. (GRS 18-3)
	e.	Courier Receipts. Office copy of receipts signed by courier when material picked up for delivery. (Form 240). (OL is the Office of Record.) (Non-Record)			e. Temporary. Destroy when 3 months old.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

OLD SCHEDULE AND ITEM NO(S).	NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
8	7	ADMINISTRATIVE HOUSEKEEPING FILES		
	a.	Duplicates and non-record copies of forms, correspondence and memoranda reflecting administrative support functions within the Office of the IG. File used for administrative purposes and internal housekeeping functions. The Admin Office of the DCI is primarily responsible for administrative support to the IG Office. Filed by Subject. (Non-Record)		a. Temporary. Review file at end of each year and destroy material having no current value.
	b.	Personnel soft files. Duplicate copies of records held by the Admin Office of the DCI and the Official File in OP. Used for internal administrative personnel management of staff members. (This soft file will be screened and incorporated, as appropriate, into the OP Official file or the DCI/Admin Office soft personnel file, either upon reassignment of the individual subject of the file or separation from the Agency. Disposition of each of those files shall be in accordance with the approved Records Control Schedule of those offices.) (DCI/Admin Office is responsible for DCI area personnel soft files as published in the Federal Register.)		b. Temporary. Destroy records that are duplicated in both the OP Official file and the DCI/Admin Office soft file. Transfer immediately pertinent information to the OP file and remaining information to the DCI/Admin soft file.
10	8	IG CORRESPONDENCE FILE Record copies of outgoing correspondence prepared by the IG covering decisions and matters that are not completely duplicated in the permanent Subject Files.		Permanent. Transfer to the Agency Records Center at the end of the current IG's tour of duty.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

OLD SCHEDULE AND ITEM NO(S).	NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
11	9	REGULATIONS FILES Duplicate copies of all Agency Regulations and Notices used for reference. (Regulations Control Branch is the Office of Record.) (Non-Record)		Temporary. Destroy when obsolete, superseded, or no longer needed. Return empty binders to Regulations Control Branch.
NEW	10	INSPECTOR GENERAL RESEARCH RECORDS AND INDEX Record copies on Agency personnel and other individuals whose names appear in documents assembled primarily from other Agency records systems by the IG in relation to an Executive commission and Legislative committee reviews of Agency activities conducted between 1972 and 1976 and CIA documents that are pertinent thereto. Used by Agency officials for reference use in connection with Executive and Legislative reviews of Agency activities. Storage: paper. Retrievability: Name or subject. (Published in the Federal Register, Notification of Systems of Records, Privacy Act of 1974. The Federal Register must be amended if this system changed or discontinued.)		Permanent. Transfer to the Agency Records Center when no longer needed.
NEW	11	FOI RECORD COPIES - SANITIZED VERSION AND JUSTIFICATION(S) Record copies of the final sanitized version and justification(s) for denying portion not released. These are created in reply to FOI requests to disclose information. They are filed with the full text record to provide background for appeals, judicial action, and future requests for the same record. IPS case file copies are only temporary request processing records. (Custodian is the Office of Record.)		Record copies assume the disposition of the full text document. Destroy sanitized version and applicable justification(s) if full text is subsequently disclosed in its entirety or after superseded by new expanded version and justification. (GRS 14-9b)

SECRET

Exhibit F

OLD SCHEDULE AND ITEM NO(S).	NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
	27	b. Emergency planning reports files. Agency reports of operations tests, consisting of consolidated or comprehensive reports reflecting Agency-wide results of tests conducted under emergency plans. (1980 to present)		32/30	PERMANENT. Cut off at end of each calendar year, hold in current files area for 2 years, then transfer to AARC. (Deviates from GRS 18-30)
8-76 Item 3a	28	CIA Legislation Files. Consist of Agency legislation prior to its enactment into law. Proposed amendments to Agency Bills, background information and other related material. Serves as a reference to new and proposed legislation affecting the Agency. Filed numerically by category. (1961 to present)		60/12	PERMANENT. When bill is enacted into law, screen and destroy duplicates and transitory material, then transfer remainder to AARC.
	29	Employee Grievance Files (IG). RECORDS SERIES DISCONTINUED JAN. 1993 SEE RECORDS CONTROL SCHEDULE 00-84, ITEM 9.)			ITEM 29 DISCONTINUED JAN. 93. NEW SYSTEM OF RECORDS ESTABLISHED PER HR 7R 7-6. CHANGE 1, RCS 10-84, APRIL 1993. APPROVED: Charles W. Cooper 7/29/93 (Chief, IMB/PRD) Date

SCHEDULE ITEM NO(S).	NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
NEW		j. Financial Disclosure Reports including Form 2630, for individuals filing according to Executive Order 11222. (OP/SIS maintains and is the office of record for SF 278.)			TEMPORARY. Destroy when 6 years old or no longer needed in an ongoing investigation, whichever is later. (Complies with GRS 1-25a(2)) Item 9j--Approved: Eldon Hatch, 6Oct86 C/IRMD/OIS (DATE)
NEW		k. Time and Attendance Reports including reports from ELECTAS, ETAR, etc. Copies held at component level by T&A clerks.			TEMPORARY. Destroy ~~3~~ 6 years after cutoff. Cut off at end of calendar year, hold for ~~3~~ 6 years, then destroy (Complies with GRS 2, Item 3a). Item 9k added to clarify disposition RCS 00-84, Change 4, June 1991. APPROVED: George D. Darnell 7Jun91 (Chief, IMD/OIT) (DATE)
10-84 Item 29 and New		[redacted] Records [redacted]sed by employees, except EEO complaints. These case files include employee "Grievance Record" which initiates the grievance and states the nature of grievance, statement of witnesses, circumstances that caused grievance, reports of interviews and hearings examiner's findings and recommendations, employee withdrawal, and final resolution of grievance, (may include Forms 4437, 4437a & b, 4438, 4439, and 4440). filed by employee name. (published in the Federal Register, CIA-15, Notification of Systems of Records, Privacy Act of 1974. The Federal Register must be amended if this system is changed or discontinued.			Updated/changed 3/13/97 @ OT: 16.43 per Mike Nicewarner, T+A Records Disposition is 6 yrs now.

ULE NO(S).	NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
		(1) Component files			
		(a) Grievance files closed at component level.			TEMPORARY: Destroy 7 years after case is closed. Cutoff closed cases at end of calendar year, hold 7 years, then destroy.
		(b) Grievances that are not resolved resolved at component level.			TEMPORARY: Transfer complete case file to Directorate Grievance Officer (Item b(1) below).
		(c) Quarterly statistics summary forwarded to Directorate Grievance Officer.			TEMPORARY: Destroy 7 years after closed. Cutoff at end of calendar year, hold 7 years, then destroy.
		(2) Directorate Grievance Officers files.			
		(a) Grievances initiated at Directorate level or files received from components. (Item 1(b) above).			
		(b) Grievances closed at Directorate level.			TEMPORARY: Destroy 7 years case is closed. Cutoff closed cases of claendar year, hold 7 years, then destroy.
		(c) Grievances that are not resolved at Directorate			TEMPORARY: Transfer complete case file to IG (Item 3(a) below).
		(d) Quarterly statistics summary forwarded to IG.			TEMPORARY: Destroy 7 years after closed. Cutoff at end of calendar year, hold 7 years, then destroy.
		(3) Grievance files maintained by IG			
		(a) Grievances initiated at IG level or files received from Directorate Grievance Officer.			

Request this change — 7/11/96

SCHEDULE ITEM NO(S).	NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
		[redacted]			TEMPORARY: Destroy 7 years ~~after case is closed. Cutoff closed cases at end of calendar~~ year, ~~hold 7 years,~~ then destroy. 2 then TRANSFER TO NARC AFTER 2 YRS. FOR REMAINING 5 YRS.
		(2) Closed cases involving litigation.			TEMPORARY: Destroy 7 years after case is closed. Cutoff closed cases at end of calendar year, hold 7 years, then destroy.
		(b) Statistical summaries			TEMPORARY: Destroy 7 years after closed. Cutoff at end of calendar year, hold 7 years, then destroy. Item 91 added new RCS 00-84 Change 5, April 1993 Approved: Charles W. Cooper (Chief/IMB/PRD) (Date)
	10	Training Files. Material on various training programs and courses conducted or sponsored by component, OTE, other Agency components, or external organizations. Course descriptions, outlines or lesson plans, schedules, announcements, applications and authorizations, student rosters, evaluations, correspondence, training aids, and other supporting material, including official individual training records.			
		a. Internal training. Duplicates of information pertaining to internal Agency-sponsored training programs and courses. (Office of Training and Education is the office of record.)			TEMPORARY. Destroy when superseded or obsolete.

Exhibit G

13-00000

JFK Assassination Act

Public Law 102-526
102d Congress

An Act

To provide for the expeditious disclosure of records relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Oct. 26, 1992
[S. 3006]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. 44 USC 2107 note.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992".

44 USC 2107 note.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS, DECLARATIONS, AND PURPOSES.

(a) FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS.—The Congress finds and declares that—

(1) all Government records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy should be preserved for historical and governmental purposes;

(2) all Government records concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy should carry a presumption of immediate disclosure, and all records should be eventually disclosed to enable the public to become fully informed about the history surrounding the assassination;

(3) legislation is necessary to create an enforceable, independent, and accountable process for the public disclosure of such records;

(4) legislation is necessary because congressional records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy would not otherwise be subject to public disclosure until at least the year 2029;

(5) legislation is necessary because the Freedom of Information Act, as implemented by the executive branch, has prevented the timely public disclosure of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy;

(6) legislation is necessary because Executive Order No. 12356, entitled "National Security Information" has eliminated the declassification and downgrading schedules relating to classified information across government and has prevented the timely public disclosure of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; and

(7) most of the records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy are almost 30 years old, and only in the rarest cases is there any legitimate need for continued protection of such records.

(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are—

(1) to provide for the creation of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection at the National Archives and Records Administration; and

(2) to require the expeditious public transmission to the Archivist and public disclosure of such records.

44 USC 2107 note.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) "Archivist" means the Archivist of the United States.

(2) "Assassination record" means a record that is related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, that was created or made available for use by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the possession of—

(A) the Commission to Investigate the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (the "Warren Commission");

(B) the Commission on Central Intelligence Agency Activities Within the United States (the "Rockefeller Commission");

(C) the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the "Church Committee");

(D) the Select Committee on Intelligence (the "Pike Committee") of the House of Representatives;

(E) the Select Committee on Assassinations (the "House Assassinations Committee") of the House of Representatives;

(F) the Library of Congress;

(G) the National Archives and Records Administration;

(H) any Presidential library;

(I) any Executive agency;

(J) any independent agency;

(K) any other office of the Federal Government; and

(L) any State or local law enforcement office that provided support or assistance or performed work in connection with a Federal inquiry into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy,

but does not include the autopsy records donated by the Kennedy family to the National Archives pursuant to a deed of gift regulating access to those records, or copies and reproductions made from such records.

(3) "Collection" means the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection established under section 4.

(4) "Executive agency" means an Executive agency as defined in subsection 552(f) of title 5, United States Code, and includes any Executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government, including the Executive Office of the President, or any independent regulatory agency.

(5) "Government office" means any office of the Federal Government that has possession or control of assassination records, including—

(A) the House Committee on Administration with regard to the Select Committee on Assassinations of the records of the House of Representatives;

(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate with regard to records of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities and other asssassination records;

(C) the Library of Congress;

(D) the National Archives as custodian of assassination records that it has obtained or possesses, including the Commission to Investigate the Assassination of President

John F. Kennedy and the Commission on Central Intelligence Agency Activities in the United States; and

(E) any other executive branch office or agency, and any independent agency.

(6) "Identification aid" means the written description prepared for each record as required in section 4.

(7) "National Archives" means the National Archives and Records Administration and all components thereof, including Presidential archival depositories established under section 2112 of title 44, United States Code.

(8) "Official investigation" means the reviews of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy conducted by any Presidential commission, any authorized congressional committee, and any Government agency either independently, at the request of any Presidential commission or congressional committee, or at the request of any Government official.

(9) "Originating body" means the Executive agency, government commission, congressional committee, or other governmental entity that created a record or particular information within a record.

(10) "Public interest" means the compelling interest in the prompt public disclosure of assassination records for historical and governmental purposes and for the purpose of fully informing the American people about the history surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(11) "Record" includes a book, paper, map, photograph, sound or video recording, machine readable material, computerized, digitized, or electronic information, regardless of the medium on which it is stored, or other documentary material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics.

(12) "Review Board" means the Assassination Records Review Board established by section 7.

(13) "Third agency" means a Government agency that originated an assassination record that is in the possession of another agency.

SEC. 4. PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION.

44 USC 2107 note.

(a) IN GENERAL.—(1) Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the National Archives and Records Administration shall commence establishment of a collection of records to be known as the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection. In so doing, the Archivist shall ensure the physical integrity and original provenance of all records. The Collection shall consist of record copies of all Government records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, which shall be transmitted to the National Archives in accordance with section 2107 of title 44, United States Code. The Archivist shall prepare and publish a subject guidebook and index to the collection.

Printing.

(2) The Collection shall include—

(A) all assassination records—

(i) that have been transmitted to the National Archives or disclosed to the public in an unredacted form prior to the date of enactment of this Act;

(ii) that are required to be transmitted to the National Archives; or

(iii) the disclosure of which is postponed under this Act;

(B) a central directory comprised of identification aids created for each record transmitted to the Archivist under section 5; and

(C) all Review Board records as required by this Act.

(b) DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS.—All assassination records transmitted to the National Archives for disclosure to the public shall be included in the Collection and shall be available to the public for inspection and copying at the National Archives within 30 days after their transmission to the National Archives.

(c) FEES FOR COPYING.—The Archivist shall—

(1) charge fees for copying assassination records; and

(2) grant waivers of such fees pursuant to the standards established by section 552(a)(4) of title 5, United States Code.

Historic preservation.

(d) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.—(1) The Collection shall be preserved, protected, archived, and made available to the public at the National Archives using appropriations authorized, specified, and restricted for use under the terms of this Act.

(2) The National Archives, in consultation with the Information Security Oversight Office, shall ensure the security of the postponed assassination records in the Collection.

(e) OVERSIGHT.—The Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate shall have continuing oversight jurisdiction with respect to the Collection.

SEC. 5. REVIEW, IDENTIFICATION, TRANSMISSION TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ASSASSINATION RECORDS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICES.

44 USC 2107 note.

(a) IN GENERAL.—(1) As soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this Act, each Government office shall identify and organize its records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and prepare them for transmission to the Archivist for inclusion in the Collection.

(2) No assassination record shall be destroyed, altered, or mutilated in any way.

(3) No assassination record made available or disclosed to the public prior to the date of enactment of this Act may be withheld, redacted, postponed for public disclosure, or reclassified.

(4) No assassination record created by a person or entity outside government (excluding names or identities consistent with the requirements of section 6) shall be withheld, redacted, postponed for public disclosure, or reclassified.

(b) CUSTODY OF ASSASSINATION RECORDS PENDING REVIEW.—During the review by Government offices and pending review activity by the Review Board, each Government office shall retain custody of its assassination records for purposes of preservation, security, and efficiency, unless—

(1) the Review Board requires the physical transfer of records for purposes of conducting an independent and impartial review;

(2) transfer is necessary for an administrative hearing or other Review Board function; or

(3) it is a third agency record described in subsection (c)(2)(C).

13-00000

(c) Review.—(1) Not later than 300 days after the date of enactment of this Act, each Government office shall review, identify and organize each assassination record in its custody or possession for disclosure to the public, review by the Review Board, and transmission to the Archivist.

(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), a Government office shall—

(A) determine which of its records are assassination records;

(B) determine which of its assassination records have been officially disclosed or publicly available in a complete and unredacted form;

(C)(i) determine which of its assassination records, or particular information contained in such a record, was created by a third agency or by another Government office; and

(ii) transmit to a third agency or other Government office those records, or particular information contained in those records, or complete and accurate copies thereof;

(D)(i) determine whether its assassination records or particular information in assassination records are covered by the standards for postponement of public disclosure under this Act; and

(ii) specify on the identification aid required by subsection (d) the applicable postponement provision contained in section 6;

(E) organize and make available to the Review Board all assassination records identified under subparagraph (D) the public disclosure of which in whole or in part may be postponed under this Act;

(F) organize and make available to the Review Board any record concerning which the office has any uncertainty as to whether the record is an assassination record governed by this Act;

(G) give priority to—

(i) the identification, review, and transmission of all assassination records publicly available or disclosed as of the date of enactment of this Act in a redacted or edited form; and

(ii) the identification, review, and transmission, under the standards for postponement set forth in this Act, of assassination records that on the date of enactment of this Act are the subject of litigation under section 552 of title 5, United States Code; and

(H) make available to the Review Board any additional information and records that the Review Board has reason to believe it requires for conducting a review under this Act.

(3) The Director of each archival depository established under section 2112 of title 44, United States Code, shall have as a priority the expedited review for public disclosure of assassination records in the possession and custody of the depository, and shall make such records available to the Review Board as required by this Act.

(d) Identification Aids.—(1)(A) Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Archivist, in consultation with the appropriate Government offices, shall prepare and make available to all Government offices a standard form of identification or finding aid for use with each assassination record subject to review under this Act.

(B) The Archivist shall ensure that the identification aid program is established in such a manner as to result in the creation of a uniform system of electronic records by Government offices that are compatible with each other.

(2) Upon completion of an identification aid, a Government office shall—

(A) attach a printed copy to the record it describes;

(B) transmit to the Review Board a printed copy; and

(C) attach a printed copy to each assassination record it describes when it is transmitted to the Archivist.

(3) Assassination records which are in the possession of the National Archives on the date of enactment of this Act, and which have been publicly available in their entirety without redaction, shall be made available in the Collection without any additional review by the Review Board or another authorized office under this Act, and shall not be required to have such an identification aid unless required by the Archivist.

Public information.

(e) Transmission to the National Archives.—Each Government office shall—

(1) transmit to the Archivist, and make immediately available to the public, all assassination records that can be publicly disclosed, including those that are publicly available on the date of enactment of this Act, without any redaction, adjustment, or withholding under the standards of this Act; and

(2) transmit to the Archivist upon approval for postponement by the Review Board or upon completion of other action authorized by this Act, all assassination records the public disclosure of which has been postponed, in whole or in part, under the standards of this Act, to become part of the protected Collection.

(f) Custody of Postponed Assassination Records.—An assassination record the public disclosure of which has been postponed shall, pending transmission to the Archivist, be held for reasons of security and preservation by the originating body until such time as the information security program has been established at the National Archives as required in section 4(e)(2).

(g) Periodic Review of Postponed Assassination Records.—

(1) All postponed or redacted records shall be reviewed periodically by the originating agency and the Archivist consistent with the recommendations of the Review Board under section 9(c)(3)(B).

(2)(A) A periodic review shall address the public disclosure of additional assassination records in the Collection under the standards of this Act.

Federal Register, publication.

(B) All postponed assassination records determined to require continued postponement shall require an unclassified written description of the reason for such continued postponement. Such description shall be provided to the Archivist and published in the Federal Register upon determination.

(C) The periodic review of postponed assassination records shall serve to downgrade and declassify security classified information.

(D) Each assassination record shall be publicly disclosed in full, and available in the Collection no later than the date that is 25 years after the date of enactment of this Act, unless the President certifies, as required by this Act, that—

(i) continued postponement is made necessary by an identifiable harm to the military defense, intelligence operations, law enforcement, or conduct of foreign relations; and

(ii) the identifiable harm is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

(h) FEES FOR COPYING.—Executive branch agencies shall—

(1) charge fees for copying assassination records; and

(2) grant waivers of such fees pursuant to the standards established by section 552(a)(4) of title 5, United States Code.

SEC. 6. GROUNDS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS.

44 USC 2107 note.

Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records to the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if there is clear and convincing evidence that—

(1) the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal—

(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;

(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or

(C) any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States;

(2) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal the name or identity of a living person who provided confidential information to the United States and would pose a substantial risk of harm to that person;

(3) the public disclosure of the assassination record could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest;

(4) the public disclosure of the assassination record would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual or a foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest; or

(5) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal a security or protective procedure currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the Secret Service or another Government agency responsible for protecting Government officials, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest.

SEC. 7. ESTABLISHMENT AND POWERS OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD.

44 USC 2107 note.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established as an independent agency a board to be known as the Assassinations Records Review Board.

President.

(b) APPOINTMENT.—(1) The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint, without regard to political affiliation, 5 citizens to serve as members of the Review Board to ensure and facilitate the review, transmission to the Archivist, and public disclosure of Government records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(2) The President shall make nominations to the Review Board not later than 90 calendar days after the date of enactment of this Act.

(3) If the Senate votes not to confirm a nomination to the Review Board, the President shall make an additional nomination not later than 30 days thereafter.

(4)(A) The President shall make nominations to the Review Board after considering persons recommended by the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, the Society of American Archivists, and the American Bar Association.

(B) If an organization described in subparagraph (A) does not recommend at least 2 nominees meeting the qualifications stated in paragraph (5) by the date that is 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall consider for nomination the persons recommended by the other organizations described in subparagraph (A).

(C) The President may request an organization described in subparagraph (A) to submit additional nominations.

(5) Persons nominated to the Review Board—

(A) shall be impartial private citizens, none of whom is presently employed by any branch of the Government, and none of whom shall have had any previous involvement with any official investigation or inquiry conducted by a Federal, State, or local government, relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy;

(B) shall be distinguished persons of high national professional reputation in their respective fields who are capable of exercising the independent and objective judgment necessary to the fulfillment of their role in ensuring and facilitating the review, transmission to the public, and public disclosure of records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and who possess an appreciation of the value of such material to the public, scholars, and government; and

(C) shall include at least 1 professional historian and 1 attorney.

(c) SECURITY CLEARANCES.—(1) All Review Board nominees shall be granted the necessary security clearances in an accelerated manner subject to the standard procedures for granting such clearances.

(2) All nominees shall qualify for the necessary security clearance prior to being considered for confirmation by the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

(d) CONFIRMATION HEARINGS.—(1) The Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate shall hold confirmation hearings within 30 days in which the Senate is in session after the nomination of 3 Review Board members.

Reports.

(2) The Committee on Governmental Affairs shall vote on the nominations within 14 days in which the Senate is in session after the confirmation hearings, and shall report its results to the full Senate immediately.

(3) The Senate shall vote on each nominee to confirm or reject within 14 days in which the Senate is in session after reported by the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

(e) VACANCY.—A vacancy on the Review Board shall be filled in the same manner as specified for original appointment within 30 days of the occurrence of the vacancy.

(f) CHAIRPERSON.—The Members of the Review Board shall elect one of its members as chairperson at its initial meeting.

(g) REMOVAL OF REVIEW BOARD MEMBER.—(1) No member of the Review Board shall be removed from office, other than—

(A) by impeachment and conviction; or

(B) by the action of the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of the member's duties.

(2)(A) If a member of the Review Board is removed from office, and that removal is by the President, not later than 10 days after the removal the President shall submit to the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report specifying the facts found and the grounds for the removal.

(B) The President shall publish in the Federal Register a report submitted under paragraph (2)(A), except that the President may, if necessary to protect the rights of a person named in the report or to prevent undue interference with any pending prosecution, postpone or refrain from publishing any or all of the report until the completion of such pending cases or pursuant to privacy protection requirements in law.

Federal Register, publication.
President.
Reports.

(3)(A) A member of the Review Board removed from office may obtain judicial review of the removal in a civil action commenced in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

(B) The member may be reinstated or granted other appropriate relief by order of the court.

(h) COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS.—(1) A member of the Review Board shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the performance of the duties of the Review Board.

(2) A member of the Review Board shall be allowed reasonable travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from the member's home or regular place of business in the performance of services for the Review Board.

(i) DUTIES OF THE REVIEW BOARD.—(1) The Review Board shall consider and render decisions on a determination by a Government office to seek to postpone the disclosure of assassination records.

(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Review Board shall consider and render decisions—

(A) whether a record constitutes an assassination record; and

(B) whether an assassination record or particular information in a record qualifies for postponement of disclosure under this Act.

(j) POWERS.—(1) The Review Board shall have the authority to act in a manner prescribed under this Act including authority to—

(A) direct Government offices to complete identification aids and organize assassination records;

(B) direct Government offices to transmit to the Archivist assassination records as required under this Act, including segregable portions of assassination records, and substitutes and summaries of assassination records that can be publicly disclosed to the fullest extent;

(C)(i) obtain access to assassination records that have been identified and organized by a Government office;

(ii) direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board, and if necessary investigate the facts surrounding, additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities under this Act; and

(iii) request the Attorney General to subpoena private persons to compel testimony, records, and other information relevant to its responsibilities under this Act;

(D) require any Government office to account in writing for the destruction of any records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy;

(E) receive information from the public regarding the identification and public disclosure of assassination records; and

(F) hold hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena witnesses and documents.

(2) A subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(C)(iii) may be enforced by any appropriate Federal court acting pursuant to a lawful request of the Review Board.

(k) WITNESS IMMUNITY.—The Review Board shall be considered to be an agency of the United States for purposes of section 6001 of title 18, United States Code.

(l) OVERSIGHT.—(1) The Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate shall have continuing oversight jurisdiction with respect to the official conduct of the Review Board and the disposition of postponed records after termination of the Review Board, and shall have access to any records held or created by the Review Board.

(2) The Review Board shall have the duty to cooperate with the exercise of such oversight jurisdiction.

(m) SUPPORT SERVICES.—The Administrator of the General Services Administration shall provide administrative services for the Review Board on a reimbursable basis.

(n) INTERPRETIVE REGULATIONS.—The Review Board may issue interpretive regulations.

(o) TERMINATION AND WINDING UP.—(1) The Review Board and the terms of its members shall terminate not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, except that the Review Board may, by majority vote, extend its term for an additional 1-year period if it has not completed its work within that 2-year period.

Reports.

(2) Upon its termination, the Review Board shall submit reports to the President and the Congress including a complete and accurate

accounting of expenditures during its existence, and shall complete all other reporting requirements under this Act.

(3) Upon termination and winding up, the Review Board shall transfer all of its records to the Archivist for inclusion in the Collection, and no record of the Review Board shall be destroyed.

44 USC 2107 note.

SEC. 8. ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD PERSONNEL.

(a) EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR.—(1) Not later than 45 days after the initial meeting of the Review Board, the Review Board shall appoint one citizen, without regard to political affiliation, to the position of Executive Director.

(2) The person appointed as Executive Director shall be a private citizen of integrity and impartiality who is a distinguished professional and who is not a present employee of any branch of the Government and has had no previous involvement with any official investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(3)(A) A candidate for Executive Director shall be granted the necessary security clearances in an accelerated manner subject to the standard procedures for granting such clearances.

(B) A candidate shall qualify for the necessary security clearance prior to being approved by the Review Board.

(4) The Executive Director shall—

(A) serve as principal liaison to Government offices;

(B) be responsible for the administration and coordination of the Review Board's review of records;

(C) be responsible for the administration of all official activities conducted by the Review Board; and

(D) have no authority to decide or determine whether any record should be disclosed to the public or postponed for disclosure.

(5) The Executive Director shall not be removed for reasons other than by a majority vote of the Review Board for cause on the grounds of inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of the responsibilities of the Executive Director or the staff of the Review Board.

(b) STAFF.—(1) The Review Board may, in accordance with the civil service laws but without regard to civil service law and regulation for competitive service as defined in subchapter 1, chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, appoint and terminate additional personnel as are necessary to enable the Review Board and its Executive Director to perform its duties.

(2) A person appointed to the staff of the Review Board shall be a private citizen of integrity and impartiality who is not a present employee of any branch of the Government and who has had no previous involvement with any official investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(3)(A) A candidate for staff shall be granted the necessary security clearances in an accelerated manner subject to the standard procedures for granting such clearances.

(B) A candidate for the staff shall qualify for the necessary security clearance prior to being approved by the Review Board.

(c) COMPENSATION.—The Review Board shall fix the compensation of the Executive Director and other personnel in accordance with title 5, United States Code, except that the rate of pay for the Executive Director and other personnel may not exceed the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of that title.

(d) ADVISORY COMMITTEES.—(1) The Review Board shall have the authority to create advisory committees to assist in fulfilling the responsibilities of the Review Board under this Act.

(2) Any advisory committee created by the Review Board shall be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

44 USC 2107 note.

SEC. 9. REVIEW OF RECORDS BY THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD.

(a) CUSTODY OF RECORDS REVIEWED BY BOARD.—Pending the outcome of the Review Board's review activity, a Government office shall retain custody of its assassination records for purposes of preservation, security, and efficiency, unless—

(1) the Review Board requires the physical transfer of records for reasons of conducting an independent and impartial review; or

(2) such transfer is necessary for an administrative hearing or other official Review Board function.

Federal Register, publication.

(b) STARTUP REQUIREMENTS.—The Review Board shall—

(1) not later than 90 days after the date of its appointment, publish a schedule for review of all assassination records in the Federal Register; and

(2) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, begin its review of assassination records under this Act.

(c) DETERMINATIONS OF THE REVIEW BOARD.—(1) The Review Board shall direct that all assassination records be transmitted to the Archivist and disclosed to the public in the Collection in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that—

(A) a Government record is not an assassination record; or

(B) a Government record or particular information within an assassination record qualifies for postponement of public disclosure under this Act.

(2) In approving postponement of public disclosure of an assassination record, the Review Board shall seek to—

(A) provide for the disclosure of segregable parts, substitutes, or summaries of such a record; and

(B) determine, in consultation with the originating body and consistent with the standards for postponement under this Act, which of the following alternative forms of disclosure shall be made by the originating body:

(i) Any reasonably segregable particular information in an assassination record.

(ii) A substitute record for that information which is postponed.

(iii) A summary of an assassination record.

(3) With respect to each assassination record or particular information in assassination records the public disclosure of which is postponed pursuant to section 6, or for which only substitutions or summaries have been disclosed to the public, the Review Board shall create and transmit to the Archivist a report containing—

(A) a description of actions by the Review Board, the originating body, the President, or any Government office (including a justification of any such action to postpone disclosure of any record or part of any record) and of any official proceedings conducted by the Review Board with regard to specific assassination records; and

(B) a statement, based on a review of the proceedings and in conformity with the decisions reflected therein, designating a recommended specified time at which or a specified occurrence following which the material may be appropriately disclosed to the public under this Act.

Federal Register, publication.

(4)(A) Following its review and a determination that an assassination record shall be publicly disclosed in the Collection or postponed for disclosure and held in the protected Collection, the Review Board shall notify the head of the originating body of its determination and publish a copy of the determination in the Federal Register within 14 days after the determination is made.

(B) Contemporaneous notice shall be made to the President for Review Board determinations regarding executive branch assassination records, and to the oversight committees designated in this Act in the case of legislative branch records. Such notice shall contain a written unclassified justification for public disclosure or postponement of disclosure, including an explanation of the application of any standards contained in section 6.

(d) Presidential Authority Over Review Board Determination.—

(1) Public disclosure or postponement of disclosure.—After the Review Board has made a formal determination concerning the public disclosure or postponement of disclosure of an executive branch assassination record or information within such a record, or of any information contained in an assassination record, obtained or developed solely within the executive branch, the President shall have the sole and nondelegable authority to require the disclosure or postponement of such record or information under the standards set forth in section 6, and the President shall provide the Review Board with an unclassified written certification specifying the President's decision within 30 days after the Review Board's determination and notice to the executive branch agency as required under this Act, stating the justification for the President's decision, including the applicable grounds for postponement under section 6, accompanied by a copy of the identification aid required under section 4.

(2) Periodic review.—Any executive branch assassination record postponed by the President shall be subject to the requirements of periodic review, downgrading and declassification of classified information, and public disclosure in the collection set forth in section 4.

Federal Register, publication.

(3) Record of presidential postponement.—The Review Board shall, upon its receipt, publish in the Federal Register a copy of any unclassified written certification, statement, and other materials transmitted by or on behalf of the President with regard to postponement of assassination records.

Federal Register, publication.

(e) Notice to Public.—Every 30 calendar days, beginning on the date that is 60 calendar days after the date on which the Review Board first approves the postponement of disclosure of an assassination record, the Review Board shall publish in the Federal Register a notice that summarizes the postponements approved by the Review Board or initiated by the President, the House of Representatives, or the Senate, including a description

of the subject, originating agency, length or other physical description, and each ground for postponement that is relied upon.

(f) Reports by the Review Board.—(1) The Review Board shall report its activities to the leadership of the Congress, the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the President, the Archivist, and the head of any Government office whose records have been the subject of Review Board activity.

(2) The first report shall be issued on the date that is 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and subsequent reports every 12 months thereafter until termination of the Review Board.

(3) A report under paragraph (1) shall include the following information:

(A) A financial report of the expenses for all official activities and requirements of the Review Board and its personnel.

(B) The progress made on review, transmission to the Archivist, and public disclosure of assassination records.

(C) The estimated time and volume of assassination records involved in the completion of the Review Board's performance under this Act.

(D) Any special problems, including requests and the level of cooperation of Government offices, with regard to the ability of the Review Board to operate as required by this Act.

(E) A record of review activities, including a record of postponement decisions by the Review Board or other related actions authorized by this Act, and a record of the volume of records reviewed and postponed.

(F) Suggestions and requests to Congress for additional legislative authority needs.

(G) An appendix containing copies of reports of postponed records to the Archivist required under section 9(c)(3) made since the date of the preceding report under this subsection.

(4) At least 90 calendar days before completing its work, the Review Board shall provide written notice to the President and Congress of its intention to terminate its operations at a specified date.

44 USC 2107 note.

SEC. 10. DISCLOSURE OF OTHER MATERIALS AND ADDITIONAL STUDY.

(a) Materials Under Seal of Court.—

(1) The Review Board may request the Attorney General to petition any court in the United States or abroad to release any information relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy that is held under seal of the court.

(2)(A) The Review Board may request the Attorney General to petition any court in the United States to release any information relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy that is held under the injunction of secrecy of a grand jury.

(B) A request for disclosure of assassination materials under this Act shall be deemed to constitute a showing of particularized need under Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the Attorney General should assist the Review Board in good faith to unseal any records that the Review Board

determines to be relevant and held under seal by a court or under the injunction of secrecy of a grand jury;

(2) the Secretary of State should contact the Government of the Republic of Russia and seek the disclosure of all records of the government of the former Soviet Union, including the records of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) and the Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye (GRU), relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy, and contact any other foreign government that may hold information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy and seek disclosure of such information; and

(3) all Executive agencies should cooperate in full with the Review Board to seek the disclosure of all information relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy consistent with the public interest.

44 USC 2107 note.

SEC. 11. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

(a) PRECEDENCE OVER OTHER LAW.—When this Act requires transmission of a record to the Archivist or public disclosure, it shall take precedence over any other law (except section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judicial decision construing such law, or common law doctrine that would otherwise prohibit such transmission or disclosure, with the exception of deeds governing access to or transfer or release of gifts and donations of records to the United States Government.

(b) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed to eliminate or limit any right to file requests with any executive agency or seek judicial review of the decisions pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United States Code.

(c) JUDICIAL REVIEW.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed to preclude judicial review, under chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, of final actions taken or required to be taken under this Act.

(d) EXISTING AUTHORITY.—Nothing in this Act revokes or limits the existing authority of the President, any executive agency, the Senate, or the House of Representatives, or any other entity of the Government to publicly disclose records in its possession.

(e) RULES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—To the extent that any provision of this Act establishes a procedure to be followed in the Senate or the House of Representatives, such provision is adopted—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and is deemed to be part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House, and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as they relate to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

44 USC 2107 note.

SEC. 12. TERMINATION OF EFFECT OF ACT.

(a) PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO THE REVIEW BOARD.—The provisions of this Act that pertain to the appointment and operation of the Review Board shall cease to be effective when the Review Board and the terms of its members have terminated pursuant to section 7(o).

(b) OTHER PROVISIONS.—The remaining provisions of this Act shall continue in effect until such time as the Archivist certifies to the President and the Congress that all assassination records have been made available to the public in accordance with this Act.

44 USC 2107 note.

SEC. 13. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this Act, to remain available until expended.

(b) INTERIM FUNDING.—Until such time as funds are appropriated pursuant to subsection (a), the President may use such sums as are available for discretionary use to carry out this Act.

44 USC 2107 note.

SEC. 14. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application of that provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances shall not be affected by the invalidation.

Approved October 26, 1992.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 3006 (H.J. Res. 454):

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 102-625, Pt. 1 (Comm. on Government Operations) and Pt. 2 (Comm. on the Judiciary) both accompanying H.J. Res. 454.
SENATE REPORTS: No. 102-328 (Comm. on Governmental Affairs).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 138 (1992):
July 27, considered and passed Senate.
Aug. 11, 12, H.J. Res. 454 considered and passed House.
Sept. 30, S. 3006 considered and passed House.
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 28 (1992):
Oct. 26, Presidential statement.

○

Exhibit H

Names thru 1986
Name: LONNQUIST, Gary M.
Component: DA OC
Type: 37/77 [redacted]
Complaint: Allegations regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD file.
Referred to IG by: [redacted]
Date Opened: 29 March 1977
Date Opened mm/dd/yy: / /
Date Closed: 31 May 1977
Date Closed mm/dd/yy: / /
Inspectors: Cox
Category:
Spec Cons:
Action:
Was lower resolution possible?:
Was grievant satisfied?:
Case Referred to:
Report Sent to:
Did OGC refer case to DOJ?:

Did DOJ decide to prosecute?:
Record Center Job Number: 80-01770R
Box: 2
Comments:

Names thru 1986
Name: MORRISON Langdon
Component: DS&T OTS, On assignment to DO SE Moscow
Type: IG 21/86
Complaint: Allegation of misconduct. Possible unauthorized outside activity at Moscow Station. Misuse of Station OTS supplies for own financial gain.

Referred to IG by:
Date Opened: 17 October 1986
Date Opened mm/dd/yy: 10/17/86
Date Closed: 12 December 1986
Date Closed mm/dd/yy: 12/12/86
Inspectors: Neal
Category: CRIMINAL & PROHIBITED ACTS, Conflict of Interest, Theft & Misuse
Spec Cons: CROSS REF: *LONNQUIST* Gary OGILVIE Jeff
Action:
Was lower resolution possible?:
Was grievant satisfied?:
Case Referred to:
Report Sent to:
Did OGC refer case to DOJ?:
Did DOJ decide to prosecute?:
Record Center Job Number: 89B01070R
Box: 2
Comments:

Names thru 1986
Name: LONNQUIST Gary
Component:
Type: IG 21/86
Complaint: CROSS REF: MORRISON Langdon OGILVIE Jeff
Referred to IG by:
Date Opened:
Date Opened mm/dd/yy: / /
Date Closed:
Date Closed mm/dd/yy: / /
Inspectors:
Category:
Spec Cons:
Action:
Was lower resolution possible?:
Was grievant satisfied?:
Case Referred to:
Report Sent to:
Did OGC refer case to DOJ?:
Did DOJ decide to prosecute?:
Record Center Job Number:
Box:
Comments:

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

11. (S) LITAMIL-9 was a CIA penetration of the Cuban Embassy. Unfortunately, his identity was indirectly and inadvertently released in 1993 and, as a result, he was identified in true name as a CIA agent in John Newman's book, *Oswald and the CIA.* As of 1993, LITAMIL-9 was still alive and living in Mexico City with family in Cuba. To date, the ARRB Board has agreed to protect his identity and crypt and delay the release of his 201 file until the Agency could make some judgments about the potential damage created by the release on additional documents with his name/crypt in them. That will now occur at the May meeting of the Board. It is, however, unlikely that the Board would agree to delay release until 2017 although there is precedent for delaying release of records on individuals for shorter periods or until death.

ISSUE 6 -- Richard Gibson (CIA Asset)

12. (S) Richard Gibson, who presently lives in England, is a left wing journalist who was associated with the Fair Play For Cuba Committee (FPFCC), an entity to which Oswald wrote letters and claimed to be a member. Gibson did not become an Agency asset until ***after*** the assassination; however, he had been of interest to the FBI when he headed the FPFCC. Unfortunately, a combination of previous releases led to press reports in 1994/1995 about his relationship with the CIA. At that time, CIA officers were dispatched to advise him about the possible compromise and promise him the very best attempt at protecting the relationship.

13. (S) Since then, the ARRB has agreed to delay the release of any additional information until the Agency and FBI had determined the full extent of the files on Gibson and the potential damage. The issue is scheduled for ARRB action at the May meeting and our objective is to release Gibson's role in the JFK assassination story while protecting his relationship with the Agency; however, the FBI has a four volume file which covers both FBI interest and Gibson's relationship with the Agency. We will be working in detail with the ARRB staff and the FBI on this approach.

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

ISSUE 7 -- Certain Files of CIA Officials

14. (S) This is a major request encompassing "... *the office files of the individual occupying the following positions during the period 1959-1964.*"

- The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
  - General Charles Cabell, 1953-1962
  - General Marshall Carter, 1962-1965
- The Office of the Deputy Director for Plans
  - Richard Bissell, 1958-1965
  - Richard Helms, 1962-1965
- The chronological files of C. Tracy Barnes, 1959-1964
- Office of General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, 1959-1964
- Operational Diaries of William Harvey, 1962-1963.

This request will by its very breadth require significant time on the part of the directorate (and DCI) IROs. While it may appear overly broad, we have developed a methodology with the ARRB staff which provides the access required by the Board but guarantees that their review is focused. In sum, we work from shelf lists to narrow the selection and then conduct file review sessions with the ARRB staff; if material requested is particularly sensitive, access can be limited to the ARRB Executive Director or members of the Board. This effort will continue for some time.

Conclusion

15. (AIUO) At the present time, 32 persons are involved in the JFK records review and we anticipate that this level of effort will increase to 37 by May and to 40 thereafter as we near the statutory end of the Board (30 September 1998). However, even if the Board is not extended (and it has been extended previously), there are statutory tasks for CIA which will extend 12-18 months beyond the end of the Board's existence. Your continued support is critical.

Lee S. Strickland

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

Attachment 1

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

Attachment 2

CL BY: 0611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: HUM 4-82

15 May 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee S. Strickland @ DA
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
William H. McNair @ DO
Becky L. Rant @ DA
Teresa Wilcox @ DST
MaryLou Cummings
Barbara T. Blufer

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: OIM/HRP

SUBJECT: ARRB Meeting 13 May 1998 -- Results

REFERENCE: Lotus note dated 8 May -- ARRB Meeting 12-13 May 1998

The JFK Board addressed six Agency issues at the 13 May meeting. The Agency's proposals prevailed in four of the six issues ~~on one~~ and one issue was tabled for further discussion.The Board made the following determinations:

1) **Alias Documentation and Accommodation Addresses:**

accepted our proposal to postpone release of specific information until 2017 and use generic substitute language.

2) **LITAMIL-9** [CIA penetration of Cuban Embassy in Mexico City/considered a "key player" in the Oswald-Mexico City story]:

agreed to continue to protect the full crypt and delay the release of additional documents (201 file) until his death. They set an annual review date on the documents; the Agency will need to advise NARA annually on his status.

3) **Richard Gibson** [member of Fair Play for Cuba Committee during early 60's/considered a "key player in Oswald's story/Agency asset beginning in 1965]:

agreed protect Gibson's relationship with the Agency and designated Agency and FBI files and documents outside the JFK collection window, 1960-64, as NBRs (not believed relevant).

4) **AMTRUNK Assets** [AMTRUNK was an early 1960's anti-Cuban operation; most of the details of the operation including crypts have been previously released]:

agreed to protect true name and 201 file numbers of assets not previously released.

5) **Mark Lane Item** [extract from foreign document]:

postponed until 4 June meeting; board would like have a member or its staff confirm the existence of the document and ensure that it contains no other JFK assassination related information.

6) **Carlos Tepedino** [CIA asset/ key figure in AMLASH-Cubela plot to kill Castro/true name and role in story has been publicly known for years]:

voted to release his name in the 1967 IG Report on Plots Against Castro and other JFK collection documents

The Stone/Golitsyn issue was pulled from the agencd and will be addressed at the next meeting (4 June).

This was a very successful meeting from the Agency's perspective. The loss on Tepedino was not unexpected. Given what is in the public domain, the Agency has not been able to make a persuasive argument to protect his name in the three years Tepedino has been at issue. Thanks to all who assisted in preparing for the meeting, and especially to Steve White and Dick Kinsman who prepared the issue and talking point papers that carried the day.

CC:

June 1975

Report to the President
by the
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

been performed using only Agency personnel and with their full knowledge.

Recommendation (27)

In accordance with its present guidelines, the CIA should not again engage in the testing of drugs on unsuspecting persons.

Recommendation (28)

Testing of equipment for monitoring conservations should not involve unsuspecting persons living within the United States.

B. Other Selected Activities of the Science and Technology Directorate

1. The Manufacture and Use of Documents

The Agency maintains a capability for producing and providing to its agents and operatives a wide range of "alias" credentials. Most such documents purport to be of foreign origin. Some, however, are documents ordinarily issued by other branches of the U.S. government or by private United States businesses and organizations.

Among the United States "alias" documents furnished from time to time to Agency personnel and operatives are Social Security cards, bank cards, professional cards, club cards, alumni association cards and library cards. The Agency has recently stopped producing alias driver's licenses, credit cards and birth certificates, unless needed in a particularly sensitive operation and approved in advance by the Deputy Director of Operations.

While the Agency does not produce false United States passports, it has in the past altered a few by the addition of entries to evidence travel which had not actually occurred.

The purpose of alias documents is to facilitate cover during CIA operations. These documents are not "backstopped," i.e., manufactured with the consent and knowledge of the company or organization whose card is being manufactured. They are useful only as flash identification. Only the Social Security Administration has been told that the Agency is manufacturing its cards.

The Commission found no evidence that any Agency employee has ever used false documentation of this kind to his personal advantage.

Conclusions

Alias credentials are necessary to facilitate CIA covert operations overseas, but the strictest controls and accountability must be main-

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE [illegible]

Alias Documentation, p.i

OIM 98-00044
13 April 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Executive Director

VIA: Director of Information Management

FROM: Lee S. Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group/OIM

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

1. (AIUO) Per your request at our 1 April bi-weekly meeting, we have summarized below the significant issues which are under deliberation and negotiation with the JFK Board. Our approach on protecting Agency equities is multi-step:

- First, with the staff, we argue relevance although the statute and implementing regulations define "assassination records" very broadly as including
  - any records related to the assassination or Oswald,
  - any records concerning the various conspiracy theories, and
  - any records within the scope of previous investigations including the Church Committee, Pike Committee, Warren Commission, or House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA),[1]
- Second, with the staff, we argue that release would cause current damage although the exemptions under the JFK statute are much narrower than the corresponding exemptions under the FOIA, and
- Third, if we fail to convince the staff, we must proceed to a more detailed and formal presentation to the Board.

---

[1] (AIUO) It is the materials collected by the HSCA which are the most numerous and often the most troublesome in terms of sensitive equities. They are generally referred to as the "sequestered collection."

CL BY: 0219849
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: Multiple

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

ISSUE 1 -- Unacknowledged Covert Actions

2. (S) Within records surfaced by the Ford Library is a document -- a Helms Memorandum for the Record on a PFIAB meeting -- which contains references to CIA covert financial support to political parties in Peru, Greece, Italy and Brazil and to labor unions in France and Italy.[2]

3. (S) After much negotiation, the ARRB staff has agreed to recommend to the Board that the information related to those covert actions be considered non-related and the documents designated "Not Believed Related" (NBR). The document will be grouped with similar "NBR" documents and be presented to the Board for final action at the 13 April or 12 May meeting.

ISSUE 2 -- Alias Documentation and Accommodation Addresses

4. (S) The CIA security file of former Agency employee, David Morales (deceased -- true name already released), within the sequestered collection contains documentation on five of his alias.[3] We anticipate similar problems as we re-review other security files within the sequestered collection. We are considering a compromise with the following elements:

- protect all references to official documents reflecting the alias such as social security cards, drivers licenses,
- release items designated as pocket litter such as club cards,
- protect elements of accommodation addresses to avoid identifying specific locations, and
- lastly, make a decision to actually release or protect the alias itself depending on the timeframe and its importance to the JFK story.

5. (S) However, disagreements on the actual implementation (*e.g.*, protect house number but release street name of accommodation address) have prevented a final resolution at this

---

[2] (S) See Attachment 1.

[3] (S) See Attachment 2.

time. ***We are also exploring with the DO senior management whether the blanket release of pocket litter (whether lawfully obtained or forged) might present media or operational issues today.*** Accordingly, we have requested that the issue be postponed until the May meeting.

ISSUE 3 -- Organizational Materials

6. (S) This request (one of the earliest and known as CIA-1) asked for organization charts on various Agency directorates and/or components for the years 1958-1968. All Agency directorates provided material responsive to the request and the ARRB staff has selected items for inclusion in the JFK collection. Remaining at issue are three DO charts -- a 1961 generic DDP organization, a 1963 generic DDP organization, and a detailed JMWAVE organization.[4] The DO has agreed to release the first two and remain adamantly opposed to the release of the JMWAVE chart given its similarity to current organizational plans.

7. (S) This issue will be presented by ARRB staff to the Board at the 13 April meeting where they will recommend that the DDP generic charts be accepted (good for CIA) and that the JMWAVE chart be declared as an assassination record (bad for CIA); an actual vote by the Board will not take place until the May meeting.

ISSUE 4 -- Mexico City Tapes

8. (S) This request asked for a thorough search of Agency files and documents for and CIA "... *surveillance 'take' from Cuban and Soviet facilities in Mexico City at the time of the Oswald visit and in the immediate wake of the assassination.*" Among the items provided by the DO were five boxes containing audio tapes from telephone taps on the Cuban and Russian embassies and facilities. A number of the tapes are dated

---

[4] (S) See Attachment 3.

22 November 1963; many others are dated 23 November 1963 through December 1963.[5]

9. (S) This is one of the most complex requests because of the following facts:

- at one time, there was a tape of Oswald in existence but it has since been lost or erased;
- the relevance of these tapes is argued even though they do not contain the Oswald conversation;[6]
- this was not an unilateral operation but rather a joint operation with the Mexican Government;
- there is a confidential request from the ARRB to the Mexican Government for any copies of the actual Oswald conversation they may possess; and,
- quite obviously, the sensitivity is not so much the mere fact that we possess such tapes but our release of the extent and actual conversations captured.

10. (S) The good news, at least at this time, is that the ARRB staff has agreed to postpone Board consideration until May and, in the interim, the Agency will have an opportunity to review (*i.e.,* listen and transcribe) and determine the sensitivity and provide detailed arguments in this regard.

ISSUE 5 -- Protection of LITAMIL-9

---

[5] (S) The scope of this request is quite significant; it includes five boxes of 185 tapes from operations against both the Cuban and Russian Embassy.

[6] (S) The ARRB staff position on the relevance of the tapes has three forms: There could be conversations about Oswald and/or the assassination on the 22 Nov + tapes which could give clues to Oswald's visit to Mexico City on 25 September - 3 October. The absence of any conversation about Oswald or the assassination would itself be of historical interest. Or, there are transcripts of intercepted telephone conversations that mention the assassination in the collection and, thus, by definition, the tapes are assassination records.

DD/O 93-1586

work copy

25 June 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group
Chief, Information Management Service
Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: John Berg
Special Assistant to the Associate Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Records

REFERENCE: A. Memorandum from DDO dated 9 June 1993: Subject: Release of JFK Assassination Records -- Differences;
B. Memorandum by Dave Gries of 22 June 1993: Subject: JFK Assassination Records-- Proposal for discussion

1. Regarding the items discussed in the referenced memos, it appears that a further interpretation is required.

--On the subject of cryptonyms, we cannot give wholesale approval for their release, but if the crypts have been previously blown or exposed they can be released. There may be cases in which, if the crypt has been retired, does not relate to existing or another project and does not contain a valid digraph, it may also be released. Note, however, that crypts which are related to a series (ZZBOAT/1, ZZBOAT/2 etc.), would, when exposed, link operations or assets to one another or which refer to other operations or projects cannot be released.

--On the subject of pseudonyms, if the pseudonym has been previously blown, there is no objection to its release. Note that release of pseudonyms serves to link officers with assets/operations and this "guilt by association" could lead to futher, undesireable, exposures. Care must also be taken so that the release of pseudonyms is not done in such a manner so as to enable a researcher to accummulate through an inspection of numerous documents the approximate size of a given station. (The sense of this is to mean that only a small number of pseudonyms would be considered for release.)

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Records

On the subject of cable, dispatch and file numbers, there is no objection to the release of this information as it pertains to Mexico City, to include 201 numbers of key players in the JFK story. All hqs cable numbers can be released as can dispatch numbers to Mexico City. The release of cable/dispatch numbers from other Stations can only be done if there has been prior public identification of a Station in that location. The release of file numbers pe se, however, would reveal the methodology by which we file/store and retrieve information-- which is still in practice today and thus we cannot approve it on a blanket basis. Blanket release of 201 numbers reveals similar information as well as targeting/acquistion methodologies which we similarly need to continue to protect.

2. I realize that the above guidelines continue to mean that much information will be "blacked out." As bad as it may appear, none of this information is substantive and its omission does not detract from the "story." Its release, however, could permit detailed analyses of our commo, methodology, contacts and staffing which we cannot accept.

New Subject: Release of William Pawley's name

3. It is agreed that an attempt will be made to locate Pawley's next of kin to request their permission to release information pertaining to his relationship with CIA. If the next of kin cannot be indentified or located, the subject can be revisited. (Note: the information in the Congressional record or in the book "Deadly Secrets" notes that there was contact and even support between Pawley and the CIA but does not identify the full extent of that relationship.)

for Cindy
John Berg

1 November 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Linda Flor
C/MRS/LA/MRS

FROM : Joanne Harris

SUBJECT : JFK Project - Review of Cuban Files

I reviewed 106 files to ascertain the status of Cuban assets which were listed in the attached. Seventeen were found to be former assets, pre-1970, and most of the seventeen were involved in the Bay of Pig Operation. Additionally, the following five appear to be candidates for protection from public disclosure.

a. AMIRE/1 - 201-274049

A Career Agent, AMIRE/1 died of natural causes in October or November 1968. The DCI sent a letter of condolence to his wife.

b. WILDCAT - 201-294213

FBI Double Agent. PNINFINITE assisted in ops in Mexico. He was still active as of March 1982.

c. WKSCARLET/3 - 201-300985

Formally terminated in 1974. Caracas Station had contact with him until circa 1976, at which time he was implicated in bombing of a Cuban plane and was incarcerated in Venezuela. As of March 1993, he was still involved in questionable activities.

d. AMICE-14 - 201-307337

Worked for PNINFINITE through early 1970's.

e. AMMUG/1 - 201-749651

Cuban defector. He was terminated in 1967, but was used through 1971.

7 June 1995

Memo for File

Subject: ARRB request re "slug line" deletions

The policy of deleting **ALL** crypts & designators in the slug line was questioned by ARRB members at the 18 May meeting with CIA. The DO representatives present (Sander & McNair) deferred to the Office of Communications.

Per 6 June 1995 discussion with Don Hatch, DA/IRO, "the slug line is strictly an internal distribution line", and the release of crypts or other designators in the slug line is not a communications issue; slug crypts are not "commo generated". The DA has **no objection to the release of otherwise releasable crypts in the slug line of CIA cables.**

The DA response was provide to J. Gunn, ARRB staff, and Bill McNair, DO/IRO, via phone on 6 June 1995.

Barry Harrelson

CC: HRG reviewers
DO reviewers

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW ▪ 2nd Floor ▪ Washington, DC 20530

June 6, 1995

Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

As you know from our meeting with you on May 18, 1995, as well as from previous meetings with ARRB staff members, CIA's current practice of redacting the sluglines from its cables in the JFK Assassination Collection is of interest to the Assassination Records Review Board. As a result of discussion on this topic at the May 18 meeting, the Board in fact asked those present from CIA to provide it with any additional information available in support of this practice.

If you have any further information in support of redacting otherwise releasable cryptonyms when present in cable sluglines, we would appreciate receiving it by this afternoon, so we can present it to the Board at its meeting tomorrow morning.

With many thanks for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

27 September 1995

Note to: HRG and DO reviewers

Subject: Phone call from Bill McNair, 21 September, 1995, re AM crypts

Bill left the following message on my voice mail:

"I have just talked with Peg Sanders, DC/LA Division, and unless we see a specific incident where giving up an AM crypt will betray an asset, then let it go . I don't believe there is any place we will see that. She is will to give up all AM crypts simply because there are so many iterations going back...and things have been changed."

Barry
HRG Senior Reviewer

JFK

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True Names

During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK collection and by stating our position up front we hope to facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.

> Cryptonyms - Except for cryptonyms related to operational assets or activities involving Mexico or Miami, the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms in this manner will protect the nationalities of individuals and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK investigation and render an easier reading of the written material.
>
> Country File Designators - We will delete the first element of operational activity and operational interest files in those instances when the credibility of the narrative is not affected. The first element of the file number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the country name which is easily discernible, whereas the subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or interest and specific subject.
>
> Action Indicator (Slug) Lines - Generally, we will release the entire action indicator line of a document. Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the

CL BY 0695930
DECL OADR
DRV HUM 4-82

SUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True Names

context identifies a source or a relationship with a specific liaison service.

True Names of Staff Employees - In most instances we will release names of employees who have retired in an overt status and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a document. We will continue to protect the true names of employees cited as serving in a field position. References to field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, since pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between Headquarters and the field.

for Johnny Goins

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

~~SECRET~~

reference copy
(do not file)

8 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy Gunn,
ARRB Staff

FROM: Barry Harrelson,
CIS/CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: Issues re Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True Names (U)

Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point for the ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country designators, action indicators and employee true names. The memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your staff and complements information provided in previous discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues with your staff. (U)

Barry

Attachment

Unclassified When Separated
From Attachment.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review Program
ATTN: JFK Project Officer

Omasta

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS

1. This is further to our memorandum dated 16 June 1998 (attached) wherein the Directorate of Administration (DA) asked to provide a determination with respect to the release of ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC or ISOTROPIC.

2. On 16 June, we advised you that these three terms together with the term MKCOSMOS were reviewed and the DS&T determined that ISOTROPIC and MKCOSMOS must be withheld in their entirety and the DA determined that ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC must be withheld as well. Please be advised that the association to this Agency of the locations referred to by these four crypts is classified in light of the fact that the locations, themselves, are under military cover. Accordingly, any crypts, slugs, or other words associated with the locations and linking them with the CIA must not be released.

3. We hope the information provided above will assist you.

Attachment: As Stated

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: 393504
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: LOC 1-82

30

SECRET

16 June 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review Program
ATTN: JFK Project Officer

FROM: Frieda Omasta Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS

1. This is in response to your request that we review the attached material and provide you with a determination as to whether ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC or ISOTROPIC can be released. We also reviewed the material with respect to MKCOSMOS as well.

2. The Directorate of Administration (DA) has completed its review and we have determined that ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC must continued to be withheld. We forwarded your request to the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) and DS&T has determined that ISOTROPIC and MKCOSMOS must continue to be withheld as well. I have identified below the documents in which these terms are used.

Document No.	Crypts
104-10177-10248	ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC
104-10177-10228	ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC
104-10177-10231	ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC
104-10177-10230	ISOMETRIC and MKCOSMOS

3. Copies of the documents referred to above are returned herewith with these terms highlighted in yellow for deletion. Also returned are three documents that did not contain this information (10197, 10198 and 10199). This concludes DA action on this request. If you have any questions, please call Frieda on 31201 or Becky on 31204.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF ATTACHMENTS

Attachments: As Stated

JFK

OIM-98-0084
06 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

1. (S) This memorandum responds to the Assassination Records Review Board ("ARRB" or "Board") regarding their current deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER). It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the *Los Angeles Times* article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US intelligence interests.

2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (*e.g.*, "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable.

3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations.

4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety. The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided

CL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIM
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
Decl On: X1
Drv From: HUM 4-82

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER). It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his *"... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]."* **It is this final fact which is critical to our request. By having released this substantive information -- *"bona fides ... established"* -- and by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, we must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.**

5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:

- what information was compromised?
- what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?
- what understanding of the information did the service(s) have?
- what information did the intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the United States?

6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.

7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a foreign government fully understands the substance (*i.e.*, the import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a

satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other information they had acquired through signals intelligence, concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e., concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was directly and immediately lost.

8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment of the United States; if they do not, the United States may escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.

9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the *Los Angeles Times* article. The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (*i.e.,* IJDECANTER) defected to the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said; ***they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.*** And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.

10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion, we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed, the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period of time.

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

11. (S) In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including, of course, information on the public record via the media.

12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:

- First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.

- Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.

- And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control; the CIA has pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that it is publicly known at least to some degree. However, because his wife, child and father remain in Russia today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and consider postponement also for this reason. Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release.

Lee S. Strickland

SUBJECT: Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

OIM/IRG/LSS: blo/31287 (6 August 1998)

Distribution:
Orig - Adse

1 - EXDIR
1 - ER
1 - D/OCA
1 - D/OPA
1 - Principal Deputy General Counsel
1 - D/OIM
1 - DA/IRO
1 - DCI/IRO
1 - DO/IRO
1 - DI/IRO
1 - DST/IRO
1 - LSS signer file
1 - OIM/IRG Chrono
1 - Subject File: ARRB

g:/irg_fr'1\general\lss\arrb_ijd.doc

CIA TALKING POINTS

re Protection of "IJDECANTER" Cryptonym Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)

26 AUGUST 1998

- The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of Operations and the CIA.
  - We request the postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER).
  - It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the *Los Angeles Times* article of 29 December 1997, would:
    - provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-intelligence effort,
    - result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence interests, and,
    - have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.

- Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and objectives, we propose however:
  - a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym ***(e.g., "TRUSTED")*** for the actual cryptonym IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable, and/or,

CL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIM
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
Decl On: X1
Drv From: HUM 4-82

- if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source *(e.g.,* ***"a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts."***

- As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety.
  - The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source.
  - It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.
  - It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER).
  - ~~It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has~~ had his "... *bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]."*
  - ***It is this final fact which is critical.***
  - ***By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -- AND by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.***

- I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.

- The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:
    - what information was compromised?
    - what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?
    - what understanding of the information did the receiving intelligence service(s) have?
    - what information did the receiving intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the other party?

- The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.

- Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.

- Question 3 is important (*e.g.,* Boyce Lee case) but is not really an issue here since the US fully understood the information presented.

- Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for exploitation.
    - If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset (*e.g.,* a defector), they act on the information to the detriment of the other service.

  - If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree.
  - This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.

- In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the *Los Angeles Times* article.
  - The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (*i.e.,* IJDECANTER) defected to the United States;
  - they know or suspect what he told the US;
  - they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said;
  - ***they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.***
  - ***And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.***

- In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key.
  - The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document.
  - But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,

of course, information on the public record via the media.

- There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of IJDECANTER.
  - Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence organization.
  - It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets -- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at some future point in time.
  - Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current assets or public statements by inactive ones).
  - Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA. Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly against the harder targets (*e.g.,* terrorism).

- There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in the interests of the Board's time. They are not insignificant, however.
  - ONE, is foreign relations.
    - In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal.
    - This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.

- TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service.
    - This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors.
    - The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.

- THIRD, is an equitable issue.
    - The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control;
    - The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;
    - While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial action the current government might take.
    - Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release.
    - But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.

g:\irg_frontoffice\general\lss\arrbijtp.doc
(last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)

SECRET

CL BY: 031682-1998-DO
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COL 1-82

25 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bob Skwirot

FROM: Charles A. Briggs-Y-

OFFICE: DCI/CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: Mexico City Station History

REFERENCE:

The Mexico City Station History contains at least 99 separate cryptonyms, for the most part concerning projects, but in some cases, individuals, covering the period 1947 to June 1969. In every case, there is identifying information included with the crypt, ranging from a brief parenthetical phrase to several pages of detail. Since the information far exceeds that thought relevant to the JFK story, both in time and substance, an approach designed to provide a maximum amount of information and guidance for historians concerned with the JFK assassination, with a minimum of gratuitously useable leads for curious or hostile FOIA requestors concerning CIA activities generally, was chosen and is reflected in the version the Board has for consideration.

The norm in handling cryptonyms when the entire crypt is not released is to protect the digraph - the location indicator. What I've done here, to avoid unraveling, in effect, the whole history of Station activity for subsequent curiousity seekers, is to reverse the process, releasing the digraph and protecting the root - specifically because the text identifies each crypt. The Board is familiar with the decision to release almost all LI-crypts in full - while protecting identifying information. The major relevant LI projects (LIENVOY, LITEMPO, LICALLA, etc.) have had both the full cryptonym and most of the details released. N4

Station and Operation Directorate division histories are among the most sensitive documents in the Agency. They are very tightly controlled within the area divisions - they are not available to cleared employees in other directorates or, traditionally, outside of the division within the Operations Directorate. Thus concern about the release of the Mexico City History pages that, viewed through the widest of lenses, do not appear to be relevant to the JFK story,is very great.

CC:

document had 47 pg DIF.
so page count is wrong

file

(DO guide names Cuba)

CONFIDENTIAL

7 January 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA

FROM: Bryant Rogers

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH LINDA FLORES

REFERENCE:

On 6 Jan we met with Linda Flores from the DO to discuss HRG concerns with regard to CIA's contacts in the 60's with well known Cubans and Cuban Organizations.

The outcome of this discussion was that the DO agrees that we can release the names of those major players with whom CIA worked with as long as we stay within the 60-63 time frame, with some overlap into 1964 for continuity, when needed. We then discussed our relationships with major anti-Castro organizations. It was agreed that we could release the fact that as a funding vehicle for the US Govt, CIA provided support including funding in general terms. In some cases we may find it necessary to reveal gross ballpark figures for annual budgets. The DO would prefer that we continue to protect specific funding amounts where possible. They were specifically concerned about releasing specific amounts paid to individuals or families of Bay of Pigs members where individuals could claim that one was paid more than another. In supporting these organizations it was acknowledged by the DO that we could release generic operational activities such as publishing journals or financing goodwill tours by prominent exile Cubans to Latin America The DO reminded us that in reviewing these relationships with Cubans and organizations, it was important to protect CIA personnel, agents and assets and any specifics on tradecraft.

When asked about Bay of Pigs training sites, Linda felt that the actual location should still be protected in spite of the fact that they have been mentioned in open literature.

With regard to DO location numbers (19 for Cuba) she thought this was OK for the 60-63 time frame but would check with LA Div. She had no problem with the release of the Bell location in cables since it was no longer used.

CC:
J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
Richard D. Kovar-Y- @ DA
John F. Pereira @ DA

CONFIDENTIAL

8 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy Gunn,
ARRB Staff

FROM: Barry Harrelson,
CIS/CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: Issues re Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True Names (U)

Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point for the ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country designators, action indicators and employee true names. The memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your staff and complements information provided in previous discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues with your staff. (U)

Barry

Attachment

Unclassified When Separated From Attachment.

JFK

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True Names

During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK collection and by stating our position up front we hope to facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.

> Cryptonyms - Except for cryptonyms related to operational assets or activities involving Mexico or Miami, the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms in this manner will protect the nationalities of individuals and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK investigation and render an easier reading of the written material.
>
> Country File Designators - We will delete the first element of operational activity and operational interest files in those instances when the credibility of the narrative is not affected. The first element of the file number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the country name which is easily discernible, whereas the subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or interest and specific subject.
>
> Action Indicator (Slug) Lines - Generally, we will release the entire action indicator line of a document. Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the

CL BY 0695930
DECL OADR
DRV HUM 4-82

context identifies a source or a relationship with a specific liaison service.

True Names of Staff Employees - In most instances we will release names of employees who have retired in an overt status and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a document. We will continue to protect the true names of employees cited as serving in a field position. References to field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, since pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between Headquarters and the field.

for Johnny Goins

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

November 9, 1995

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

HAND DELIVERED

Mr. John Pereira, Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C., 20505

Re: ARRB requests for evidence

Dear John:

I thought that it might be helpful to you if I were to provide you with our current assessment of the status of our review of the Agency's assassination records and point to where we would like to proceed in the future.

I would like to begin by acknowledging the efforts made by the Historical Review Group to facilitate our review of records. It has been, as you know, a difficult and time-consuming process both for the Agency and the Review Board. We very much appreciate the personal cooperation of you and your staff.

We continue to be concerned by the slow progress that has been made. Although we perceive that the task has been more difficult and time-consuming than Congress anticipated, we have found that the careful education process in which we have been involved has helped educate us with respect to your concerns and, we hope, has helped demonstrate to you the Review Board's concerns.

We must, however, begin to pick up the pace. In many circumstances we are reviewing and then re-reviewing the same documents over and over again. We are also frequently put in the position of not being provided with evidence in a timely manner so that we can make our presentations to the Board. While many of these difficulties are understandable -- and perhaps even inherent to the start-up of the process in which we are engaged -- we must expedite the process. Rather than dealing with dozens of records at Board meetings, we need to move towards a schedule where hundreds of records will be reviewed at Board meetings. From our perspective, it seems that it is essential that the Agency be prepared to allocate significant additional resources to the process of reviewing the records and making evidence available to the Board.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

We also believe that the Agency still is not providing the type of evidence that will be the most convincing to the Board. Where issues exist that the Board has not yet addressed, and where the Agency would like to see postponements upheld, *specific* information must be provided to support a postponement. General statements, while useful in identifying the underlying issues involved, do not provide the Board with the complete knowledge and understanding of the issue that is necessary to make an informed judgment regarding release of the information.

The Board is looking forward to receiving the CIA's evidence in support of the postponement of true names. As you know, we have planned for some time to devote the December (12 and 13) meeting to this important issue.

Additionally, you will find enclosed with this letter the next in our series of information requests, covering boxes 7-9 of the Oswald collection. We are submitting these requests now in an attempt to give HRG as much advance notice as possible of which records we will be reviewing for the January 4 meeting. Evidence for records to be reviewed January 4 should be provided no later than December 13, 1995.

We hope that during HRG's review of the January documents, the standards outlined in this letter will be kept in mind. If at any point an issue is deemed so sensitive that a briefing is required, ARRB staff will meet with you at your convenience.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely yours,

David Marwell

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

Enclosures

SECRET

11 December 1995

NOTE FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Briefing of JFK Board Staff: Cover

1. On 1 December, Barry Gibson, Deputy Chief of the Office of Central Cover, briefed the Executive Director of the Assassinations Records Review Board and other Board staff members. Also participating from CIA were John Goins and Eleanor Neiman of IMS; Linda Cipriani, OGC; and Barry Harrelson and I from HRG.

2. The focus of the briefing was on the need to protect the names of former Agency employees that appeared in the JFK records. Gibson discussed the risks involved for people who retired under cover if they were identified in the public record as former CIA employees. He discussed the efforts made by his office to obtain written statements from the more than 100 individuals whose names appear.

3. The purpose of the briefing was to assist the Board in its review of names when it meets on 12-13 December. The Agency was asked in particular to present, in writing, evidence of risk for each of the names that will be discussed at the Board's meeting.

John Pereira

John F. Pereira

CL BY: 0185904
CL REASON: COV 2-82 1.5c
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: AHB 70-9

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

March 20, 1996

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

To: Review Board

cc: David Marwell
CIA Team

From: T. Jeremy Gunn

Subject: Board Guidelines on Release of CIA Officer Names

The Staff understands the Review Board to accept the following general guidelines on the release of true names of CIA officers:

When the true name of a CIA officer (*i.e.* past or present employee of CIA) appears in a document, the Board will bring to its review a presumption that the true name will be released. In order to overcome this presumption of release, CIA must provide evidence demonstrating that release of the name would be harmful. In order to meet its burden of proving harm, CIA must tailor the evidence to satisfy one of the three categories identified in Part I (below). However, when the name of an officer is of such importance that the public interest would not be served in postponing a name, the Board may release the true name consistent with the principles identified in Part II (below).

Part I. Categories of Officers.

1. **Living officers.** For living (present or former) officers, CIA must prove that: (a) the officer is living outside the United States (or reasonably is expected to reside or travel outside the United States in the foreseeable future); (b) the officer is either working or is retired under cover; *and* (c) the officer objects to the release of his or her true name. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board presumptively (see Part II below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the officer's true name until the year 2010.

2. **Where current status of former officer is unknown.** Where CIA has been unable to contact the former officer because his or her location is unknown, CIA must present a good faith showing that reasonable attempts have been made to locate the officer. If the Board is convinced that CIA has made a good faith showing that it was unable to locate the former officer, the Board will postpone the true name until June 1, 1997. However, the Board may postpone the true

name beyond June 1, 1997, if CIA provides to the Board, prior to May 1, 1997, additional evidence that satisfies the criteria of either category 1 (above) or category 3 (below).

3. **Names having effect on current intelligence interests.** If CIA believes that the release of a true name may compromise currently existing intelligence operations or might otherwise cause an identifiable harm, it must provide evidence that: (a) the officer currently is engaged in clandestine activities; (b) the release of the true name would compromise ongoing intelligence operations or would compromise operations with current intelligence value; (c) the release of the true name would reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living person (including family members), *or* (d) the release of the true name would cause a significant harm to the national security or the foreign relations of the United States. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board presumptively (see Part II below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the true name until 2010 or until such other date as CIA reasonably shows to be a date on which the release could be made without causing harm.

Part II. Names of Officers Who Are Important to the Assassination Story.

The Board presumptively will postpone the release of names consistent with categories 1-3 of Part I. However, for certain persons whose names appear in a context that is important to the assassination story, the Board may nevertheless vote to release the true name. In all such instances, the Board will notify CIA of the importance of such a person and provide CIA with the opportunity to provide additional information in support of postponing the release of the names. These names shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with due consideration being given to the importance of the person to the assassination story and such evidence of harm as CIA may provide.

13-00000

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR:	Barry R. Gibson @ DO Elaine S. Mathias @ DO
FROM:	Linda C. Cipriani OGC
DATE:	03/04/96 09:26:53 AM
SUBJECT:	JFK - Central Cover appeal

The General Counsel and I met with the JFK Review Board on Friday and discussed, among other things, how to deal with the potential public release of the identities of former employees retired under cover. The Board clearly wants to do the right thing here, but they feel they are not getting enough information to make that decision.

Jeremy Gunn (JFK Board's General Counsel) will soon provided me with some of the Board's suggestions on how to deal with this which I will pass on to you (including how to deal with Whitten). I would at the very least like to be able suggest that we attempt contact again (either through CIA or the Board) with those retirees who have not yet responded to our letter. Of course, any suggestions you have at this point will be extremely helpful. My sense is that this issue of protecting retirees is something everyone at CIA will want to appeal just on the principal of it, but that we should do everything possible to avoid an appeal. [Until we work out an agreement with the Board, you should continue to prepare that appeal you are drafting]

In the meantime, can you please provided me the following figures:

1. The # of people we sent letters to regarding the potential Board releases. (isn't it 150?) and the following breakdown if available: ,
    - # living abroad
    - # of those retired under cover vs. those whose cover has been rolled back or lifted
    - # of those who still work for us in covert/overt capacity
2. The # of responses we received to date.
3. The # of responses to date requesting that we don't release.
4. The # of responses to date saying that they didn't care.

I realize you are all out of the office these days, but I would appreciate getting this as soon as you can. Thanks.

CC: J. Barry Harrelson
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
Frederick Wickham @ DO

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

8 March 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harellson
John Pereira

FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DCI/OGC/LD

SUBJECT: JFK - March 18 Board Meeting

REFERENCE:

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: Paula A. Sweeney @ DCI
Robert O. Davis @ DCI
Robert D. Caudle @ DCI
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 03/08/96 02:50:39 PM
SUBJECT: JFK - March 18 Board Meeting

I have been informed that Dave Edgers will be attending the next JFK Board meeting. If this is the case, it would seem that Jeff should go as well.

Two issues need to be discussed with the Board: stations and cover employees.

1. Jeff and the Board agreed in principal to a "window" in which all stations would be opened (1960-64). Of course, if there are particular stations which need to be exempted from this the Board will consider it upon the presentation of substantive evidence.

- HRG and the Board think this is a good idea that would enable them to avoid raising potential appeals every month
- Dave Edger needs to be signed onto this idea.
- Jeff, last month, presented additional information on Oslo, Stockholm, and Copenhagen. Jeff and Dave should be prepared to answer questions or provide more information so that the Board will agree to protect these stations.

2. The Board recently released the names of 16 cover employees. An appeal is being prepared (or so I am told). The thirty days runs on March 18. We need to finalize with the Board how to handle this issue. At the last meeting the Board agreed that this was a really important decision, but that they were not getting the information they need to make the right decision. At the last meeting, the Board intimated that they might be willing to delay this release, if CIA and the Board could come to a mutually agreeable way to deal with cover employees. I understood from Jeff that this is an issue that CIA will appeal on just the principal. If this is true, the Board should understand what our ultimate position is on this, but that we are willing to cooperate with them to find a suitable alternative (using pseudos or generic descriptions like "case officer")

3. I will be out all next week but Barry Harellson/HRG (30292) and John Pereira/CSI) (30373) will be happy to fill you in on the details. Barry will be contacting Bob Caudle next week to find out how the March 18 meeting will be handled.

29 July 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

1. Cover mechanisms are an integral part of conducting clandestine operations. We are concerned about individuals that continue to be dependent on particular cover legends and on the organizations that cooperatively work with us to provide those cover legends. The following proposal is offered to streamline the process of handling names and minimize the potential damage an inappropriate release could cause.

A. Incomplete and Unidentifiable names:

a. We will release the occurrence of a name when a common last name appears by itself or in conjunction with a common first name such that it does not tend to specifically identify the individual.

b. We will release the occurrence of a name if it remains unidentified after a reasonable search is conducted.

B. Identifiable names for employees that retired overtly:

In most cases, overt employees' names will be released, but in some cases overt employees may have a portion of their employment remain under cover. Such cases will require the same review as that of an employee who remained under cover into retirement.

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

C. Identifiable names for employees that retired covertly:

a. We will make a reasonable attempt to locate a current address and contact the person. If the person objects to the release of his or her name for reasons associated with current life style issues, we will object to the release of the name. If the person does not have objections based upon personal circumstances we will review the name for organizational issues. (See para C. c.)

b. If reasonable efforts fail to locate the current address, but it can be determined that the individual is still receiving a pension, insurance or other benefit based upon cover legend, we will need to continue to protect the name since source of income or benefits can not be altered without prior notification to the individual. If we fail to identify a pension or other active benefit, we will review the name for organizational issues. (See para C. c.)

c. We will make a reasonable attempt to review the name to look for identifiable harm to the person's safety, family, ongoing operational activities, national security or foreign relations. Assuming that none of the previous concerns are identified, we will review the potential damage to the cover mechanism or cover provider by the specific occurrence of the name if released.

2. Because families of deceased employees could be the beneficiary of pensions or insurance provided under the employees cover legend, we must review them the same as we would the employee. We also have second and third generation officers following in the footsteps of their parents that could be negatively impacted by the revelation.

3. Our efforts to locate current addresses will include all internal record systems maintained by Office of Personnel Security, Retirement Branch and Insurance Branch. We will include a checklist reflecting completion of these searches

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

within the documentation when requesting continued protection of the name.

4. We considered options of contacting IRS or OPM during our attempts to locate current addressing information, but based upon the fact that these offices would be unwitting of the cover arrangement for the individual, it was determined to be an unreasonable risk to the cover of these officers.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

~~ADMINISTRATIVE -- INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

IMS/RPG Fwickham:mjk (29 July 1996)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/OCC
1 - IMS/ESG/ALB
1 - IMS/ESG/IRB
1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
1 - IMS/ESG-OIT/MSG/RDP
1 - ESG Chrono

Doc6 doc.doc

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

11 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC

SUBJECT: Comparison of ARRB and DO Memoranda re Treatment of CIA Officer Names in JFK Collection

1. This memorandum is in response to an assignment to compare a 20 March 1996 ARRB memorandum written by T. Jeremy Gunn and The Directorate of Operations response dated 20 July 1966, authored by Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr. Both deal with the treatment of CIA officer true names which appear in the JFK collection -- when they will be postponed and when they will be released.

2. **First the ARRB Memorandum** Gunn describes in legal terms the Board's position on the postponement or release of CIA officers' true names. He makes a proffer which states that there is a presumption in favor of release akin to a legal evidentuary rule which causes a burden to shift to the other party (CIA) to prove something. In this instance, it is factual evidence/proof sufficient to shift the burden not only back to neutral but to the other side of neutral which permits postponement.

3. The Gunn memorandum then sets out the criteria required to meet the burden under several situations.

A. **For officers who are still alive** he states that the proofs required to postpone release of a name are three in number and all three must be met:

i. The officer must be living outside of the U.S.

OR,

(R)easonably be expected to travel outside of the U.S. in the foreseeable future;

AND,

ii. The officer is either working ... (presumably a current staff officer, contract employee, or independent contractor) ... or is retired under cover;

AND,

iii. The officer objects to the release of his or her true name.

COMMENT: Mr. Gunn's criteria are a little confusing and reach beyond the Board's authority. First, note again that the three elements are joined by an ▒**AND**▒ meaning all elements must be met to satisfy a postponement. Second, the first requirement of living or traveling outside of the U.S. is not tied to ▒cover.▒ Many officers who do not work under cover all of the time are, in fact, provided cover for overseas TDY's. Thus, any officer who might ▒reasonably' be expected to travel outside of the U.S. would warrant postponement of his true name. This would seem to include every CIA employee, contract employee and independent contractor past and present.

With respect to the third element, Mr. Gunn and the Board are simply in error. To my knowledge they have no authority to require that an individual be consulted concerning his or her wishes to maintain cover, thus having his or her true name postponed, or to give up his cover, thus having the name released. This decision does not lie in the first instance with the individual but is an institutional decision which lies solely within the purview of the Agency and the executive branch of the government. CIA as an executive agency charged with the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of cover mechanisms is the only entity competent to make such a decision. It alone knows if release of an officer's true name will compromise an existing cover mechanism which will, in turn, expose others who share or have shared the same cover. It alone knows if release of an officer's name will expose CIA sponsorship (a cover entity) of a sensitive activity. It alone knows if release of an officer's name will violate a promise of confidentiality to a commercial cover sponsor which could cause both embarrassment and possibly, financial hardship to the sponsor and, in turn, substantially hinder the Agency's ability to secure subsequent commercial cover sponsors.

Turning next to the wishes of a particular officer (either current or retired) *vis a vis* staying with his or her cover, these thoughts come to mind. For current employees, the decision is again not entirely theirs. If, after careful review, the Agency does not have a strong position on the employee maintaining the cover, the officer should be permitted to decide. He or she should be counseled however, that an action to remove cover could have an adverse impact on future assignments or TDYs. With respect to retirees, if, after careful review, the Agency does not object to the removal from cover, the individual should be permitted to decide. Note, that the responses to this inquiry will be mixed. As a historical note, the Agency over the years has been on an ever-swinging pendulum with respect to ▒cover into retirement,▒ ▒cover for life,▒ etc. There will be officers who petitioned hard unsuccessfully to have their cover removed when they retired and will gladly consent to lifting the cover. There will be those officers who do not want their cover lifted under any circumstance.

By way of summary, it is CIA not the Board and not the individual officer who makes the initial decision concerning the maintenance or lifting of cover.

B. **Former officers, status unknown.** While the heading to this section would seem to suggest the CIA does not know the cover/non-cover status of some of its former officers, the section does not rally deal with this issue. Rather, within the section, Mr. Gunn simply recognizes the fact the CIA may not be able to find all of its former officers to ask if they want to be opened up or remain under cover. The test required by Mr. Gunn to satisfy the Board and thus continue postponement until 1 June of this year is a ▒good faith showing that reasonable attempts▒ were made to locate the officer and failed.

The section contains the additional provision which advises the Board may continue a postponement beyond 1 June of this year (i.e., until 2010) if the CIA provides the board with evidence which satisfies the criteria of either category 1 or category 3. Such ▒additional evidence▒ must be provided by 1 May 1977.

The requirements or tests of this section for the Agency are not onerous but should be set-out as a series of uniform actions or check-off's taken in the attempt to locate each ▒current status unknown▒ officer. The record of these actions could then be presented to the ARRB in support of a request for continued to postponement. The DO Memorandum mentions of the possibility of asking the IRS or the OPM for assistance in this regard and this should probably be done. I recall however, that the Service will assist, through cleared contacts at the National Office, but only to the extent of determining the whereabouts of the individual and then contacting him and ask that he be in touch with his former employer. I have no current knowledge of cleared contacts at the OPM but they existed in the past and I assume they continue.

C. **Names having effect on current intelligence interests.** The Gunn letter appears to subscribe a higher level of concern to this section and its criteria than the previous two, not recognizing the plain fact that the criteria of all three sections are inextricable. It sets out four separate criteria which, if CIA satisfies its burden, i.e. provides sufficient evidence to prove any one of them, will operate to postpone a true name until the year 2010. Note again, the criteria required are four separate ones, each separated by a comma and between numbers 3 and 4 and " OR." They are:

i. The officer must be currently engaged in clandestine activities; **OR,**

ii. The release of the officer's name would compromise ongoing intelligence operations or operations with current intelligence value (presumably, the latter permits a review into the officer's past activities, agent relationships, and cover positions); **OR,**

iii. The release of the officer's true name would reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living person (including family members); (read broadly, this provision would include, the individual, former agents, anyone who shared the same cover or cover position, i.e. a dedicated Department of State slot within an embassy); **OR,**

iv. The release of the officer's name would cause a significant harm to the national security or the foreign relations of the U.S. (a criteria which is broad enough to drive the proverbial Mack truck through).

4. In Part II, the Gunn memorandum takes back part of what it gave in the previous section. It sets up a test of ▓importance to the assassination story vs. evidence of harm.▓ Essentially, it advises that the Board will weigh the CIA's evidence but, if within its view, the true name being considered for postponement is important to the assassination story, the Board will release it. This means for those few individuals who may be viewed as ▓important to the story,▓ truly substantial evidence must be brought to bear. Absent such evidence, the Board will release, and the only recourse left to the Agency would be an appeal to the President.

5. **The Directorate of Operations Memorandum.** The basic concern with the steps for handling names as contained within the memorandum is as follows. For officers who retired under cover, the **first** step will be to contact them and ask if they want their true name released. Per the comments on page three supra, this should be the last step of the review, not the first.

A. Other Comments. The resources and data bases which will be researched for each name should be clearly established and followed in a uniform manner. Deviation from a set, orderly process will open CIA determinations to criticism, objections and dismissal, i.e. release of a name that should be postponed.

B. In addition to the data bases described -- retirement records, annuity pay records, the office of security, insurance lists -- consideration might be given to the Northwest Federal Credit Union, and overt data bases such as Phonedec. Like the IRS and OPM, the credit union might not be able from a legal standpoint to provide an address. However, it would probably be prepared to contact an individual and ask that he be in touch.

C. A comment must be made about the idea of universally releasing the true names of overt employees. To the extent that any current employee, even overt employee, may be sent overseas on TDY under light cover, the release of his or her true name via these JFK documents which will receive widespread review could jeopardize his overseas mission and possibly, place his life in danger.

6. These thoughts are intended to be talking points as we commence to sort out the manner in which we will deal with the true names. Clearly, we need to begin to quickly identify those names which can be released, those on which there is some question, and those few on which we really need to dig in our heals.

6. I would be glad to discuss with you any of the issues raised herein.

Gary M. Breneman

work file

5 March, 1997

Memorandum For: Chief/HRG

From: Barry Harrelson

Subject: Name Issue / Status of Review

Reference: Meetings with ARRB staff (Marwell & Gunn) 4 March 1997

Name Issue

I met with Gunn and Marwell (separate meetings) to discuss the reopening of the names issue per my memo to you. Both Gunn and Marwell reacted positively. They found the proposal to be reasonable one and they are willing to work with us in approaching the Board. However, both said they could not predict the Boards reaction. Per Marwell, one member of the Board (Anna Nelson) seems to believe that if a person worked for the CIA it should be known.

Apparently our timing is excellent. Marwell is planning to propose to the Board that they change the process from the focus on individual postponements to documents. Under the new approach his staff would have the authority to negotiate with the Agency on the release of documents, and only issues/documents of disagreement would be placed before the Board. Marwell is convinced that even with an additional year they will not finish the project with the current approach. He sees our proposal on the names as an example of how the process would work.

Marwell recommends that we include examples of documents containing names of little or no connection to the story. Bob Skwirot (he was in the meeting with Marwell) said that there were a number of names that appeared in only one document and that the number of names had reached 590. Marwell wants to start immediately on preparing a joint list of important/releasable individuals.

Action: Advise DO, OGC, upper management of our proposal to reopen the name issue (how?). Need to decide what level would sign the memo to the Board, and who would prepare the memo. If you agree I can send a copy of my memo to you to Linda and Fred for background use.

HRG and DO team will collect examples of documents and prepare (with ARRB staff) a list of individuals. The DO should focus on any person on the list that needs protection and prepare the evidence ASAP (i.e. not wait for the issue to be resolved).

New ARRB Review Process

Marwell and I spent some time discussing how a new process would work. He would like to test the process for the April meeting. The following is a rough outline with my comments:

1) HRG reviewers would review the documents the same as they do now (postponements would be blue highlighted). [no change in our procedures]

2) ARRB staff would review the blue highlighted document.

> a) If they agree, they would stamp the document "ARRB approved" and return it to HRG to process for NARA.
>
> b) If they disagree they would highlight in yellow (creating green highlighting). If the two staffs cannot resolve the issue, then the document would go before the Board.

[Major change: ARRB staff would no longer record all the proposed postponements, no DO damage review, no detailed determination letter requiring HRG reviewers to use the "grid" to determine what happen.]

3) Non-issue documents would be sent to the ARRB staff when ready for NARA. At that time the ARRB staff would prepare a simplified final determination notice and letter to the Agencies.

[No action would be required; HRG would file the final determination notice with the document].

4) "Green" highlighted documents that go to the Board would be handled the same as today.

[The expectation is that a lot less documents would require Board action.]

Comments: With some fine tuning, I think this process could work, and we would be able to complete the re-review of documents released in 1993 and 1994 by Oct. 1998. Completing the entire project will depend on how quickly the "non-related" material and the "addition records" are reviewed by the ARRB staff.

Pending Issues

As part of the change in process, Marwell wants the Board to focus on outstanding substantive issues as opposed to micro managing the review. We discussed the following:

1) Nosenko. ARRB staff needs to review the non-related material and make a recommendation to the Board. Marwell leans toward not treating all of Nosenko as assassination related. Could be a hard sell with some Board members. Should we request that Nosenko meet with the Board? Marwell thinks they would react favorably.

2) Personnel Files. Again the first step is to have his staff confirm that only a part of a file is related and that those documents are in the released material.

3) Gibson. FBI file issue; we need to present case to the Board

4) LI 9. Continuing to protect will be a hard sell given that Newman has published identity; we need to present case to the Board.

5) CRC Financial Files. ARRB staff needs to review

Annual Report and Extension

Marwell ask me to draw you attention to the Annual Report and the request for an extension. He would still like a letter from the Agency (could be addressed to him) along these lines: "reviewed Annual Report"
"note that the Board has ask for extension"
"support the request/feel it is in interest of Agency and public /or something along these lines"

Other issues (not discussed with Marwell/Gunn)

Linda (OGC) says CI Staff has ask Gunn to rewrite his notes, and opposes Gunn's suggestion to release pages from the CI histories he reviewed. Gunn indicated in his notes that some of the pages should be released and might be considered assassination records. We are going to run into similar problems with the other histories. Gunn will be in HQ tomorrow to re-do his notes. She will discuss the "pages issue" with the goal of having him drop the request to release. As to the question of designating the pages as assassination records, she will inform him that CI will oppose. If he insist, she will refer back to HRG.

COVER SHEET

FAX

To: J. Barry Harrelson
Fax #: 703-613-3063
Subject: Segregated Collections
Date: April 23, 1997
Pages: 7, including this cover sheet.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Today the Board adopted the attached guidelines.

From the desk of...

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 724-0088
Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Assassination Records Review Board
Guidelines for Review of Postponements in the Segregated Collections
Adopted: April 23, 1997

Background

In order to ensure that the Review Board will be able to complete its task of reviewing all identified assassination records, the Board recently took two significant steps. First, on November 13, 1996, it adopted guidelines with respect to reviewing "Segregated Collections" with regard to information that is "not believed relevant" (NBR) to the assassination. Second, in February 1997, the Review Board requested Congress to extend its tenure for one additional year.

It is the Review Board's judgment that, even with the assumption that our operations may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method of review. In particular, a reasonable modification of current postponement standards would greatly expedite and facilitate the release of additional information and records. Otherwise, the Review Board might cease operations without having reviewed claimed postponements in tens of thousands of pages of FBI and CIA records.

Postponement Criteria for the Segregated Collections

In a further effort to enhance the Review Board's work, the Review Board now issues these revised guidelines for the review of records in the Segregated Collections.[1] (These guidelines do not affect the FBI's Core and Related Files or the CIA's 201 file on Oswald.) The four principal factors that underlie these review guidelines are: first, continuing, to the greatest reasonable extent, the Review Board's established guidelines for postponements that have emerged over the past two years; second, establishing guidelines consistent with the Review Board's decision regarding NBR records; third, establishing reasonable and workable guidelines that will enable the

---

[1] The regulations adopted by the Board on November 13, 1996, define "Segregated Collections" as including *first*, FBI records that were requested by: (a) the House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") in conjunction with its investigation into the Kennedy assassination; (b) the Church Committee in conjunction with its inquiry into issues related to the Kennedy assassination; and (c) by other bodies (*e.g.*, Pike Committee, Abzug Committee, etc.) that relate to the Kennedy assassination; and *second*, CIA records including (a) the CIA's Sequestered Collection of 63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records and the microfilm records (box 64), and (b) several boxes of CIA staff "working files."

Review Board, the ARRB staff, the CIA, and the FBI to complete the significant amount of work that remains; and finally, to provide reasonably consistent standards for the review of postponements that would apply equally to CIA and FBI records.

The following are, in summary form, guidelines for reviewing postponements in the Segregated Collections.[2]

CIA Source and FBI Informant and National Security Asset Postponements

There are, of course, similarities and differences between FBI informants and CIA sources. Like FBI informants and national security assets, CIA sources may or may not be paid for the information that they provide and they may or may not be providers of information over the long-term. When providing information to the Bureau, FBI informants generally are understood to be cooperating with law enforcement officials for a legal and legitimate purpose. It is often the case, although not always, that FBI informants understand that at some point their name might surface in conjunction with a criminal prosecution and that they may need to testify in court. Foreign CIA sources and FBI national security assets, however, are not necessarily deemed to be cooperating with law enforcement officials but may, in fact, be committing the crime of espionage against their native country by cooperating with US authorities. Furthermore, unlike FBI informants, CIA sources and FBI national security assets presume that their names will not be released publicly and they certainly presume (in the ordinary course) that their identities will not surface in criminal trials. As a practical matter, it is generally much easier today for the FBI to locate a former informant who resides in the United States than it is for the CIA and FBI to locate former sources and national security assets.

Despite these differences -- differences which would generally suggest a greater degree of protection being owed to CIA sources and FBI national security assets -- the issues in terms of postponements are fundamentally similar.

---

[2] The existing "NBR" guidelines allow the Review Board to remove from detailed consideration those records or files that truly have no apparent relevance to the assassination. Nevertheless, a significant number of files in the Segregated Collections contain records that shed some light on issues that the HSCA explored as potentially relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. The following criteria would apply to all records in the Segregated Collections, including records containing some NBR redactions.

CIA Sources

The Review Board established guidelines, during its December 1996 meeting, for handling CIA source issues and applied those guidelines at the January 1997 meeting. These guidelines directed the protection of names and identifying information of CIA sources in cases where the identity of the source is of low public interest or is peripheral to the JFK assassination. The Board's decision was based on two factors: the concern that since CIA sources generally live outside the United States, they could risk harm if their identities were revealed. Moreover, many of the sources referenced in CIA records appear infrequently and are of relatively low public interest. Therefore, in records where the identity of the source is of importance for understanding the assassination, the CIA will be required to provide additional evidence to support the protection of the source's identity.[3] In cases where the identify of the source is peripheral to the assassination story, the information will be postponed until 2017.

FBI National Security Assets

FBI national security assets should be treated in the same manner as CIA sources.

FBI Informants

Informant issues represent the largest category of postponements in the FBI's Segregated Collection, as they do in the "core" FBI assassination files. They also provide the greatest opportunity for streamlining the review process. Currently, there are ten members of the Bureau's JFK Task Force who are responsible for researching individual informants in response to evidence requests from the Review Board.[4] They retrieve and review the informants' files and attempt, through DMV, Social Security, and other database searches, to determine if the informant is alive. Under current Review Board standards for "core" files, this work is necessary to provide evidence to support redacting the informant's name, ***regardless*** of whether the informant provided information. Removing the requirement of proving whether informants are alive in the Segregated Collections would free up significant resources that could be deployed to reviewing unprocessed HSCA subject files.

The new approach to HSCA subjects is to protect informant-identifying information, without requiring the Bureau to make a showing that the informant is alive. This protection would extend to individuals characterized as symbol-number informants, "PSIs," "PCIs," "established sources," "panel sources," and the like -- designations that indicate an ongoing relationship with the FBI. It would not extend to individuals who requested that their identity be protected in an isolated contact with the FBI or to local and state law enforcement officers.

---

[3] An example would be the case of John Scelso (pseud.). The Board found that his identity is relevant to the assassination story and CIA offered evidence of a continuing need to protect the identity. In this case, "Scelso" documents would continue to be scheduled for release in five years.

[4] Six work full-time on informant evidence, four devote about half their time to informant evidence.

The "informant-identifying information" to be protected would include the customary (*i.e.*, informant-specific) portions of informant symbol numbers and file numbers, informant names, and -- at least potentially -- descriptions of, and information received from, the informant. How much, if any, of the latter type of information should be redacted would be the principal focus of staff-level discussions with the FBI. The staff's principal goal in this process, with regard to each informant, would be to release as much information that is relevant to understanding the assassination as possible. In discussions with the FBI, the staff would be prepared, if necessary, to concede redaction of informant-identifying information that is unrelated to the assassination in order to ensure that more pertinent information is released.[5]

The presumption will be that an informant's identity will be released if the informant provides "positive" information about an assassination-related issue. To overcome this presumption of release for informants with "positive" information, the FBI would need to make a particularized showing that the identifying information should not be released. To the extent that an informant's identity is protected, it will be postponed until 2017.

CIA Employee Name Postponements

Over the past year the CIA has addressed the employee name issue and has released some names that it had previously asked the Board to postpone. But during that time the list of names has grown to a size that had not been imagined at the time the work began. To date, the Review Board staff has identified in the JFK Collection over 650 names of CIA employees. These names appear in more than 1000 documents already reviewed by the Board and numerous additional records that have not yet been processed. While some of these employee names are important to the assassination story, many appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and seem to add little, if any, important information.

---

[5] In HSCA subjects, there typically will not be information about Ruby, Oswald or the assassination itself. However, in a file on, for example, Sam Giancana, there may be informant reports on Giancana's support of anti-Castro activities, and reports from the same informant on day-to-day numbers operations in the Chicago area. The staff would set a higher priority on release of the former reports than on the latter.

CIA's argument to protect employee names emphasizes a number of points. First, since many employees are "under cover," the maintenance of that cover is critical to gathering intelligence. CIA argues that identification of a name can identify the cover provider and jeopardize operations. Second, although the majority of names are of retired CIA employees, CIA has a confidentiality agreement with them and many do not want their past Agency affiliation released. The argument here is that release may jeopardize business relationships or personal safety. Such arguments have already been presented to the Board. Their merit can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, due to the volume of names in the JFK Collection, the individual review and evaluation of each case would delay significantly the review of documents and ultimately lead to less total information becoming available to the public.

CIA has proposed, and the Review Board agrees, that CIA employee names be treated in a manner similar to that applied to Source names: to postpone until 2017 those employee names that are of low public interest or are of peripheral interest to the assassination. It will be presumed that employee names will be released if their identities are important to the assassination story ***unless*** the CIA is able to provide specific information of a potential harm of release. (CIA acknowledges the presumption of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm to national security or to personal safety would result from the release of the employee name.)

FBI "Foreign Counterintelligence" Postponements

It is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal standards for disclosing "FCI" activities targeting Communist-bloc nations. To the extent that the HSCA subjects reflect "FCI" activities against other nations that have not been addressed by the Review Board in the "core" files, the FBI will be allowed to redact direct discussion of such activities, ***unless*** the information in the proposed redaction meaningfully contributes to the understanding of the assassination.

FBI and CIA Foreign Liaison Postponements

The criteria for these postponements would not, in the abstract, depart significantly from the Review Board's current approach of releasing information received through liaison channels, while protecting direct acknowledgment of the source of the information. In practice, however, the staff would be more flexible in protecting text that implies, although may not unambiguously state, that a foreign government is the source of particular information. Nevertheless, the more significant the information is to any assassination-related issue, the more information would be released under these guidelines.

CIA Stations and Other Issues

Over the past two years the Review Board has established other guidelines that will continue to guide the review process, some of which will be outlined here. For CIA stations, all locations related to the Mexico City story will be released during the period 1960-69. Outside of that window, they will be released on a case-by-case basis should the identity of the station be critical to understanding the assassination. Other stations, except for those identified as particularly sensitive, will be released from the beginning of the Kennedy administration until the publication of the Warren Commission report, (*i.e.,* January 1, 1961 to October 1, 1964). Outside of these windows, stations will be postponed. Cable prefixes, dispatch prefixes, and field report prefixes would be postponed or released according to the same windows as the stations to which they refer. CIA job titles also are redacted or opened along with the station at which the officer served.

Crypts would be released along lines similar to other information. All "LI" crypts, except those considered particularly sensitive would be released through October 1, 1964, as are "AM" crypts and U.S. government crypts. In other areas, only the digraph is protected. Again, the exception is sensitive crypts, which would be protected in their entirety. After October 1, 1964, the presumption shifts towards protection of the crypts, except those that provide meaningful information about the assassination story. (For example, crypts pertinent to Garrison-era documents would likely carry the same presumption of release as those generated during the Warren Commission.)

Surveillance methods will be released if the nature of the surveillance has a material bearing on information related to the assassination ***unless*** CIA provides evidence demonstrating the political or operational sensitivity, in which case the information will be released in 2017.

e:\arrb\regs\eview.wpd

9

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

15 April 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: David G. Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT: CIA Employees

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.)

1. (U) Issue. The purpose of this memo is to relate CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the release of the true names of CIA employees that appear in the JFK Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem might be addressed.

I. Factual Background

2. (U) To date, approximately 600 true names of CIA employees have been identified in the JFK Collection. Some of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA will continue to work with the Review Board to release as many of these names as possible. Many names, however, appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and appear to add nothing to the historical record.

3. (U) Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence to the Review Board that harm to the national security or to the employee would likely result from such release. Since these guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly clear that the number of names at issue, and, in most cases, their tenuous connection to the JFK story, make this approach unworkable with regard to both CIA's obligation to

CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

SECRET

protect national security information and the Review Board's duty to inform the public about the JFK assassination in a timely and accurate fashion. The task of locating and informing hundreds of former employees scattered all over the country and the world has been a formidable one. Some employees have contacted us to report their concerns about a "suspicious" letter purporting to be from CIA which they had received. It would not be surprising, therefore, if many former employees ignored the letter for similar reasons, even though they might have legitimate needs to protect their identities.

4. (U) Contacting every named employee and collecting information on each of them to present to the Review Board will clearly take more time and effort than any of us had anticipated. This will have obvious ramifications for how and when the Review Board releases information to the public. More importantly, the decision to publicly acknowledge employees who may have been living for over 30 years under cover is a critical one that should be made not by default, but rather by careful planning and consideration.

5. (U) Relevant to this discussion is the fact that the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy for releasing true names of sources of intelligence information. It was agreed at that time that there would be a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where a source was particularly important to the JFK story and there was no overriding national security interest, the name would be released. Although the CIA recognizes that there are some sensitivities involved with sources that do not apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and operational similarities, which are described herein, that justify similar treatment by the Review Board. As is further detailed in Section IV, CIA, therefore, proposes that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting employee names that appear in the Collection, with exceptions for those individuals whom the Board believes are important to the JFK story.

II. Legal Considerations

6. (U) As both covert CIA employees and clandestine reporting assets are types of "human sources" of intelligence, many of the same laws apply. Although Section 11(a) of the JFK Act provides that, when the Act requires release of information, it takes precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit release, there are strong governmental national security interests in protecting the true names of CIA employees. CIA believes that it is

important for the Review Board to reconsider the laws which protect classified information, because they clearly reflect a larger US Government policy to protect covert CIA employees from disclosure.

7. (U) By Executive order and statute, the President and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for protecting sources of intelligence. In his Directive of 22 January 1946 that established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI responsible for protecting sources. With the establishment of CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section 103(d)(3), codified at 50 USC §403(3)(c)(5), *requires* the DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure. In addition, §403(3)(d)(2) *requires* the DCI to ensure that risks to the United States and those involved in the collection of intelligence through human sources are minimized.

8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working for CIA, not only covertly but overtly as well, has been of particular concern to US lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC §403g, Congress specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency.

9. (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving or potentially involving classified information. Working with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has successfully protected the names of CIA employees from public release even in criminal trials where there are heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to the defendant of all government information relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and relevancy of classified information, including the identity of CIA employees who may have information pertaining to the defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information and ruled that the harm to national security outweighs the

defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other cases, the defense was never notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case, as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those cases where the risk to national security is too great.

10. (U) In 1982, Congress again acted to protect CIA employees by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 USC §421 that criminalizes the revelation of a covert employee or the identity of a source. This act subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a "covert agent" to prosecution and provides up to 10 years in prison and $50,000 in fines as punishment. This act specifically defines a "covert agent" as including "an officer or employee of an intelligence agency... ."

11. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12958 on classified national security information that became effective in October 1995. Although it requires generally that agencies make greater declassification efforts than under the prior executive order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of intelligence information, which would include employees, extra protection from the declassification provisions. Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and having historical value must be declassified within five years. However, information revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be protected.

12. (U) The above federal laws show a long-standing practice by the US Government to protect CIA employees from disclosure to the public. In carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to this policy and afford the protection of CIA employees a high priority.

III. Operational Considerations

13. (U) For current CIA employees whose names may appear in the JFK Collection, the operational considerations for protecting their identity are similar to those for sources. Many of these employees have worked "under cover" for CIA. Cover is used to disassociate entire installations and offices from open linkage to intelligence activities, to enable intelligence personnel to enter and work effectively in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and authorized clandestine activities from attention by hostile elements and from media exposure, to facilitate access to

certain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in foreign countries.

14. (U) The ability to maintain one's cover is crucial to gathering intelligence. In either a "hostile" or "friendly" country, should the local service become aware of who the CIA employees are, it would increase surveillance and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible. In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local population is not aware of the circumstances. Once it becomes known among the locals that certain US Government officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the government to expel those Americans, disrupting liaison and diplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert employees and their families would face increased risk to their personal safety. Even in "friendly" countries, our employees could face some personal risks as well as risks to ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among an otherwise benign local population. In any of these cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the field; and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in an operationally and physically secure location. Thus, maintaining cover is important to a case officer's effectiveness and to the continuation of a career with CIA.

15. (S) Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is also important to cover providers. The Review Board will recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA employees, both in the United States and overseas, can work under "official" (e.g., State Department) cover or "non-official" (e.g., private company) cover. Disclosure of a covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also negatively affect the governmental or business mission of the cover provider, especially those who provide non-official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in other countries could have a negative impact on the provider's business interests and activities. It would also cast suspicion on that provider's legitimate employees and their families. Further, exposure of cover providers could affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by the Agency and Intelligence Community.

16. (S) Although the majority of names that appear in the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA are

not diminished. Similar to sources, many former employees still do not want their past affiliation with CIA revealed. Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact could negatively affect personal and professional relationships. Some former employees still live overseas where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their personal safety. Other former employees travel overseas on business, where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can threaten their business interests and personal safety. One example of an employee in this category is Robert Fulton, whose name apparently appears only once in the Collection. Fulton retired under Department of State cover; he currently has a consultant business and frequently travels to China. Release of his name would jeopardize not only his business but perhaps even his safety. A similar example is Walter McCabe, who also retired under State cover. He is now working in Russia and several East European countries for a private firm. He does not want his name published, because it could be damaging to his current employer and his professional status.

17. (S) Even if a former employee agrees to the revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, this might not be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing operations on which that employee worked. Foreign nationals recruited by the employee and still providing information to the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public acknowledgment could reveal the location of CIA stations where the employee worked throughout his career, including some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and may have believed they were legitimately providing information to a US corporate representative would be upset to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government.

18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers by their own service would have a chilling effect on prospective assets. Prospective assets would be unlikely to enter into a clandestine relationship with American intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even its own staff employees from public disclosure.

IV. Proposal

19. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions made for those individuals who are important to the story of the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a

substitution for the true name be used. If the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular employees throughout the records, a particular identifying substitution can be used for a particular employee.

20. (S) CIA believes that this approach will not undermine the Review Board's obligations under the JFK Act. A review of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 84 of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection. In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals' identity can add anything of significance to the historical record; yet there may be some security concerns still associated with these individuals. For example, Arthur H. Stimson retired under cover and is currently living in Europe. When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in the JFK Collection and was subject to public release, he told CIA that he was opposed to having his name released and believed such a release could pose personal and security problems. Furthermore, he could not understand why his name even appeared in the Collection, since he had no recollection of being involved in anything related to the assassination.

21. (S) With regard to the approximately 500 names that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast majority of these individuals played almost no role in the JFK story. One example of this is former DO officer Alexander Brasko. His name appears approximately 20-30 times in the Collection simply because he signed off on name trace requests. Mr. Brasko was a covert CIA employee and retired under cover. The public release of his name would provide the public with no additional significant information about JFK. Tom Flores is another example of a covert CIA employee whose name appears in the Collection but has little or no connection to the JFK story. Flores retired under cover, is living in South America, and objects to the release of his name. Mr. Flores' recent letter to CIA is also attached for your convenience.

22. (S) The Agency, of course, recognizes that some names may be particularly important to the JFK story regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in the Collection. One such example is former COS Mexico Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee. In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review Board for an appropriate resolution. The CIA proposes that the Review Board and its staff identify those individuals whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose names should be released to the public. These names would carry a presumption of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm would likely result

from such release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate searches to determine whether release would pose national security concerns for the US Government or personal safety concerns for the individual. In this way, CIA and the Review Board can concentrate their efforts on individuals who are significant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review of the sequestered collection.

23. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review Board can agree on and work out a mutually acceptable policy regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not undermine the important principle of protecting those who work covertly for the US Government. My staff and I are ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.

Michael J. O'Neil
Acting General Counsel

Attachment
A. Tom Flores' letter

Subject: CIA Employees

DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani 76124 (10 Apr 97)

OGC-97-50971

Distribution:
  Original - Addressee
    1 - GC
    1 - Lit File - LDG00021
    1 - LCC Signer
    1 - RDC - FYI
    1 - OGC Registry

26 June 1997

Memorandum to: Jeremy Gunn
ARRB Staff

From: Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Office
CIA/CSI/HRG

Subject: Employee Names Scheduled for ARRB Review

Reference: 201 File and "A" Names Lists

(We request that this memorandum and its attachments be returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the names discussed below.)

1. The above reference lists identify the protected CIA employee names in the Oswald 201 file and on the ARRB staff's key figures list scheduled for action by the ARRB at its 9-10 July 1997 meeting. This memorandum is a partial response to the ARRB's request for evidence and addresses those individuals on the list currently employed by the Agency and the changes in status of names.

201 List

Current employees requiring continued protection (see attached Cover Staff reports):

Walter C. D'Andrade (Andrade, FNU)
Robert J. Austin
Robert F. Litviak

Release:
FNU Coplewood
Joan Field
N. Judkins
FNU Patten
Harrison L Scott
Carl Trettin
W. Walker

Corrections:
Remove Kurt Johansson (source) -- incorrectly identified as an employee
Add Barbara Graham (B. Graham)-- incorrectly dropped from latest list

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

Key Figures (A) List

Release:	FNU Connally FNU Feinglass Daniel Flores Lorna McKay George Misko David Wilsted

2. For the remaining 38 names on the lists, we will provide evidence supporting their cover status and the need for continued protection as available. By 7 July you should have either specific evidence or a status of search statement for each individual.

Barry Harrelson

Attachments:

Cover history printouts (3) [available in CIA SCIF]

8.4

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

#19-297

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Morton Mowbray Palmer III, understand that upon entering on duty with the Central Intelligence Agency I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the Government responsible to the President and the National Security Council for intelligence relating to the security of the United States of America. I understand that in the course of my employment I will acquire information about the Agency and its activities and about intelligence acquired or produced by the Agency.

2. I have read and understand the provisions of the Espionage Act, Title 18, USC, secs. 793 and 794, and I am aware that unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to the national defense may subject me to prosecution for violation of that Act, whether such disclosure be made while I am an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter.

3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have a responsibility to the Central Intelligence Agency not to disclose any classified information relating to the Agency without proper authorization. I undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it such information relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, its activities, or to intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I further understand that this undertaking is a condition of my employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, that its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or other appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally binding upon me after my employment with the Agency as during it.

4. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it, and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized officials of the Agency on these points prior to disclosing information relating to the Agency, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my dismissal.

5. I understand that my unauthorized action or utterance in the nature of a publication or which would reasonably be expected to result in publicity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation of Government and Agency regulations and would be grounds for my dismissal.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

6. I understand that for all grievances and complaints there are established procedures within the Agency permitting appeal by any employee of the Agency and to carry any such grievance or complaint outside the Agency will be considered a violation of the undertaking set forth above in paragraph 3. If the appeal procedures are inadequate in any situation, I am aware that the Inspector General is at all times available to any employee with a legitimate criticism, grievance, or complaint.

7. I further understand and agree that my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with CIA Security Regulations, and the appendices thereto.

8. Inasmuch as employment by the Government is a privilege not a right, in consideration of my employment by CIA I undertake not to publish or participate in the publication of any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of my employment by the Agency without specific prior approval by the Agency.

9. I agree that all information or intelligence acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the Central Intelligence Agency remains the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Agency or upon separation from the Agency, any material relating to such information and intelligence in my possession.

10. I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 9th day of July, 1962.

Morton Mowbray Palmer III (Seal)

Witness:

Doris Shea

9 JUL 1962

Date

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

2. THE UNCLASSIFIED SAE, COORDINATED IN DRAFT WITH CCS/OSB, IS AS FOLLOUS:

Morton M. Palmer

SUMMARY: TRILINGUAL SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE OFFICER (DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962-1990) WITH EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE WORKING WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS, MORE THAN 16 YEARS WORKING AND LIVING IN LATIN AMERICA (ECUADOR, URUGUAY, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, PERU AND MEXICO). ELEVEN OF THOSE YEARS WERE IN SUPERVISORY AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS. RECEIVED A SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AWARD FOR HAVING MADE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS TO OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS HOUSE COMMITTEES CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN POLICY (TO INCLUDE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICE, APPROPRIATIONS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS). THIS WAS COMPLEMENTED BY INDIVIDUAL LETTERS OF COMMENDATION FROM MAJORITY AS WELL AS MINORITY MEMBERS OF THOSE COMMITTEES. IN MEXICO, MAINTAINED FRUITFUL CONTACT WITH CABINET MEMBERS AND WAS A MAJOR PLAYER IN THE DIALOGUE AND POLICY GUIDANCE BUILDING UP TO (INTER ALIA) THE DEBT NEGOTIATIONS AGREEMENT AND ENSUING COMMERCIAL OPENINGS.

DETAILS:

-TOP SECRET AND SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCES.

-DRAFTER AND/OR COORDINATOR ON MYRIAD POLICY, POSITION AND GUIDANCE PAPERS IMPACTING ON US PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS WITH MEXICO. MAJOR PLAYER IN ENSURING THAT HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE EVOLVING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN MEXICO.

-DAILY INTERLOQUTOR WITH MEXICAN CABINET OFFICERS DURING SLIGHTLY LESS THAN FOUR YEARS IN MEXICO CITY.

-IN PREVIOUS WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENT, DEALT EXTENSIVELY WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FOREIGN POLICY ELEMENTS OF THE USG. GAVE IN HOUSE AS WELL AS NUMEROUS INTER AGENCY SPEECHES ON A VARIETY OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

-1980-1984 - FLAGGED THE THEN EMERGING SENDERO LUMINOSO AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO PERUVIAN SECURITY AND WAS THE FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL TO INSIST THAT PERUVIAN COCA PRODUCTION WAS TEN TIMES THE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES. (SADLY, BOTH OBSERVATIONS HAVE TURNED OUT TO BE ALTOGETHER ACCURATE.)

-IN 1978-1980 PERIOD, WORKED FOR THE OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH ALL COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. RECEIVED A SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AWARD AND EFFUSIVE LETTERS OF APPRECIATION FROM MEMBERS OF SIX COMMITTEES.

-IN VARIOUS MANAGEMENT POSITIONS, TWICE WAS IN CHARGE OF UNITS WHICH EXCEEDED TWO HUNDRED PERSONS. HIRED, FIRED, NEGOTIATED, AND PROVIDED ADVICE, GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION AS APPROPRIATE.

I understand that the Summary of Agency Employment (SAE) defines the outer limits of what I may disclose to unauthorized persons concerning my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency. I further understand that disclosure of information about my Agency employment which is not contained in my SAE may constitute a violation of my Secrecy Agreement. I promise that all statements which I make to unauthorized persons concerning my Agency employment will be consistent with my SAE and limited by its content.

11 OCT 1989
Date

Signature

SECRET

OCC-95-149

07 DEC 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review Board

VIA: Associate Deputy Director for Operations
Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human Resources and Programs

FROM: Eric L. Qualkenbush
Chief, Office of Central Cover

SUBJECT: Proposed CIA Name Release

1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or separated employees. As described below, this action would breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work under cover in addition to breaching our obligations to the cover providers.

2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the employee to protect such information from unauthorized disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.

3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency policy to protect the names of former employees who have separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e., Department of State or the "ABC" Corporation, for their entire Agency career as well as into their years after separation from the Agency, jeopardizes:

- the personal safety of former employees;

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL 0489932
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 2-87

SECRET

- the second careers of former employees;
- the cover and identity of other employees who worked with the covert employee whose name is released as CIA; and,
- the protection of sources and methods (what individual would agree to a clandestine relationship with American intelligence knowing the secret association would become public knowledge?).

4. Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will affect individuals follows:

- Mr. Walter McCabe retired under Department of State cover and is currently working in Russia and several Eastern European countries for a private firm which converts "wartime" factories into peacetime use. Revealing his name would damage his relationship with his current employer, his position with the firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied as a CIA employee and Attachment C is his signed secrecy agreement.
- Attachment D is a signed ackowledgement from Mr. John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which shows that he was aware that he would be denied as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date he entered on duty through the date of his departure. Attachment E is a personal letter received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that his name might be released in connection with declassification of CIA documents. Attachment F is Mr. Whitten's signed secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.
- Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE) written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr. Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in his SAE and understands disclosure of other information would be in violation of his secrecy

agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer's signed secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr. Palmer resides in Mexico.

5. Our relationship with cover providers would be jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing cover to CIA employees. The Department of State could very well raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency operations which in turn could severely damage national security. In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities and substantial monetary damages.

6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency's regulation on cover. It states that "cover is required for all Agency operations, activities and installations abroad, including personnel in PCS or TDY status." HR 240-2, the Agency's regulation on cover after separation, states that "the determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon the judgment that separation in an overt status could result in damage to the national security by compromising intelligence sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm to foreign relations. This determination will be made on a case-by-case basis." Please note that all Agency employees who retire abroad must retire under cover.

7. Release of names of former employees who separated under cover will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct sometimes dangerous activities necessary to carry out the Agency's mission. We can accept the purpose of the JFK Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true names of former Agency employees adds no value to the documents in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from our public detractors. We propose and emphatically encourage that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish the impact of the documents.

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

8. After your review and consideration of the above information, we would appreciate notification of your final decision prior to taking any action.

Eric Qualkenbush

Eric L. Qualkenbush

Attachments:
As stated above

CONCUR:

Christine W. Wiley DEC 0 8 1995

Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human Resources and Programs Date

David N. Ec[illegible]

Associate Deputy Director for Operations Date DEC 0 8 1995

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

DC/OCC/OSG/EMathias:lae/37076 (6 Dec 95)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - JFK Assassination Records Review Board
1 - IMS/HRS
1 - ADDO
1 - ADDO/HRP
2 - DDO Secretariat
1 - DO/IRO
1 - OGC/LD - Linda Cipriani
1 - OCC Chron
1 - OCC/OSG Chron
1 - OCC/OSG File 785-120-034

COVER SHEET FAX

To: Mr. Barry Harrelson
Fax #: (703) 351-2114
Subject: December meeting
Date: December 11, 1995
Pages: 3, including this cover sheet.

COMMENTS:

The types of information that the Board needs to know about each of the true names on the attached list for which CIA seeks continued protection are listed below:

1. Is the individual a current or former CIA employee? If so, in what capacity did that individual serve, and did he or she serve overtly or covertly? If currently a retired CIA employee, did the individual retire under cover?

2. If not a CIA officer, did the individual serve CIA as an agent or asset or in any other capacity?

3. Is the individual alive or dead? If alive, where is he or she residing, and what is his or her current activity?

4. What specific and compelling danger would release of this individual's true name pose to him or her at this time?

Of course, you do not need to do anything other than identify those individuals whose true names CIA no longer seeks to protect.

- Secret Attachment -

From the desk of...

Noelle C. Gray
Technical Assistant for Research and Analysis
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, NW, Second Floor
Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 724-0088
Fax (202) 724-0457

W.L. O'Brien	104-10017-10042
F.N.U. Patten	104-10015-10163
Riefe	104-10016-10006
Bonnie Raush	104-10015-10138
Dave Reardon	104-10095-10001
Milly Rodriguez	104-10095-10001
Jane Roman	104-10015-10163
Tom Ryan	104-10018-10096
D.W. Schroeder	104-10017-10042
Forrest Shivers	104-10017-10031
Mr. Snight	104-10015-10143
Mr. Swenson	104-10015-10233
Swider	104-10015-10298
Dr. Stanojevic	104-10017-10001
Boris Tarasoff	104-10095-10001
Pelegrin Tomas	104-10018-10062
R.T. Walsh	104-10015-10386 (Same as Mr. Walsh in 104-10017-10035?)
T. Ward	104-10004-10257
Franklin Anthony Wheelock Garcia	104-10015-10192
Zeitner Rick	104-10017-10056

SECRET

NAMES WHICH CIA CONTINUES TO PROTECT IN DOCUMENTS PREPARED FOR THE DECEMBER 12-13, 1995 ARRB MEETING

Charlotte Aberg	104-10018-10089
Anderson	104-10095-10001
Ray Brewer	104-10015-10001
Peter Baranowski	104-10016-10013
Brogdon	104-10016-10033
Baquero	104-10017-10052
Leona Cotter	104-10018-10099
Dasinti	104-10018-10062
Duncan	104-10015-10043
DeSanti	104-10018-10062
D'Alato	104-10015-10305
P.L. Dillon	104-10017-10042
Charlie Flick	104-10095-10001
Grady	104-10015-10043
Godiner	104-10017-10052
John Harvey	104-10015-10158
Hutchinson	104-10018-10062
William Johnson	104-10015-10396 ("Johnson" released in 104-10015-10375)
Jim Jung	104-10017-10002
Tom Keenan	104-10095-10001
Pam Lee	104-10015-10160
Mallery	104-10015-10110
Manell	104-10015-10339
Anne McDonnell	104-10015-10155

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Proposed CIA Name Release

FROM: Elaine Mathias esm
DC/OCC/OSG
6B4403 OHB

EXTENSION: 37076

NO.

DATE: 7 Dec 95

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Sue Burggraf C/OSG 6B4403 OHB			✓	1. Please call Lisa for hand carry at x32429 (will hand carry to IMS/HRS for delivery to JFK Assassination Records Review Board)
2. Barry R. Gibson DC/OCC 6B4401 OHB		12/7	BRG	
3. Eric L. Qualkenbush C/OCC 6B4401 OHB		12/7	QU	
4.				
5. DDO Secretariat 7F27 OHB	DEC 07 1995			
6. Christine W. Wiley ADDO/HRP 7E17 OHB		8	CW	
7. David N. Edger ADDO 7E30 OHB			✓	
8.				
9.				
10. OCC/OSG 6B4403 OHB				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1-79 610 (EF) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

OCC-95-149
07 DEC 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review Board

VIA: Associate Deputy Director for Operations
Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human Resources and Programs

FROM: Eric L. Qualkenbush
Chief, Office of Central Cover

SUBJECT: Proposed CIA Name Release

1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or separated employees. As described below, this action would breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work under cover in addition to breaching our obligations to the cover providers.

2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the employee to protect such information from unauthorized disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.

3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency policy to protect the names of former employees who have separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e., Department of State or the "ABC" Corporation, for their entire Agency career as well as into their years after separation from the Agency, jeopardizes:

- the personal safety of former employees;

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL 0489932
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 2-87

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

- the second careers of former employees;
- the cover and identity of other employees who worked with the covert employee whose name is released as CIA; and,
- the protection of sources and methods (what individual would agree to a clandestine relationship with American intelligence knowing the secret association would become public knowledge?).

4. Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will affect individuals follows:

- Mr. Walter McCabe retired under Department of State cover and is currently working in Russia and several Eastern European countries for a private firm which converts "wartime" factories into peacetime use. Revealing his name would damage his relationship with his current employer, his position with the firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied as a CIA employee and Attachment C is his signed secrecy agreement.
- Attachment D is a signed ackowledgement from Mr. John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which shows that he was aware that he would be denied as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date he entered on duty through the date of his departure. Attachment E is a personal letter received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that his name might be released in connection with declassification of CIA documents. Attachment F is Mr. Whitten's signed secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.
- Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE) written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr. Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in his SAE and understands disclosure of other information would be in violation of his secrecy

agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer's signed secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr. Palmer resides in Mexico.

5. Our relationship with cover providers would be jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing cover to CIA employees. The Department of State could very well raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency operations which in turn could severely damage national security. In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities and substantial monetary damages.

6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency's regulation on cover. It states that "cover is required for all Agency operations, activities and installations abroad, including personnel in PCS or TDY status." HR 240-2, the Agency's regulation on cover after separation, states that "the determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon the judgment that separation in an overt status could result in damage to the national security by compromising intelligence sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm to foreign relations. This determination will be made on a case-by-case basis." Please note that all Agency employees who retire abroad must retire under cover.

7. Release of names of former employees who separated under cover will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct sometimes dangerous activities necessary to carry out the Agency's mission. We can accept the purpose of the JFK Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true names of former Agency employees adds no value to the documents in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from our public detractors. We propose and emphatically encourage that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish the impact of the documents.

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

8. After your review and consideration of the above information, we would appreciate notification of your final decision prior to taking any action.

Eric L Qualkenbush
Eric L. Qualkenbush

Attachments:
As stated above

CONCUR:

Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human Resources and Programs

8 Dec '95
Date

David Edger
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

8 XII 95
Date

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

DC/OCC/OSG/EMathias:lae/37076 (6 Dec 95)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - JFK Assassination Records Review Board
1 - IMS/HRS
1 - ADDO
1 - ADDO/HRP
2 - DDO Secretariat
1 - DO/IRO
1 - OGC/LD - Linda Cipriani
1 - OCC Chron
1 - OCC/OSG Chron
1 - OCC/OSG File 785-120-034

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECRECY OATH

I, John M. Whitten, am about to terminate my association with the Central Intelligence Agency. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with that Agency, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States of America. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the Espionage Laws (18 USC secs. 793 and 794), and by the National Security Act of 1947 which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods and operations, and specifically Central Intelligence Agency operations, sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or other Government employee or official without the express written consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims which I may have against CIA or the United States Government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of CIA concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to CIA, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as CIA will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Central Intelligence Agency, or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Central Intelligence Agency I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Agency, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information, which it is my duty in the national interest to disclose to the Central Intelligence Agency, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, JOHN M. WHITTEN, understand that by virtue of my duties in the Central Intelligence Group, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to standards set in the State, War, and Navy Departments. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Group, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States.

5. I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Group is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regulations CIG," and the appendices thereto.

6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 22nd day of AUGUST 1947

John M. Whitten (Seal)

Sworn to before me this 22nd day of August 1947
at Washington, D.C.

Rebecca D. Davidson

My Commission Expires March 22, 1951

SECRET

(711)

To Bert Mills:

I object violently to the revelation of my name regardless of the law. Here are some reasons:

1. I emigrated to Austria twice, first in 1971 and again in 1983. Both times I had to fill out and swear to lengthy forms about my background. I used my retired State cover both times, thereby committing perjury twice under Austrian law. My old friends in high places who might have been able to protect me have all retired or, even more, died. Austrian justice is notoriously immutable. Do you want me to go to jail?

2. Living since retirement in Austria from 1971 to 1980 and from 1983 to the present, I have achieved high positions in various musical bodies, Board of Directors of the Johann Strauss Society and Vice President of the Vienna Men's Singing Society, and I am personally known to several recent Austrian Presidents, many reporters and radio figures. I suffered a disabling stroke in December 1993 and my wife and I, both 75, can continue to exist here because our 2000 sq. ft. apartment is within walking distance of 2 post offices, several small supermarkets, my family physician, our dentist, my urologist, and our eye doctor and optician. We are within wheel chair distance of the concert halls and the opera. Where can you duplicate this for me?

3. During my active career in Vienna around 1959 I interrogated and broke an intelligence swindler who had been a Nazi assassin. I promised him secrecy if he confessed, but the US Army put out a "burn notice" on him, forcing him to move to Germany. I am sure he would love to find me and shoot me.

4. Vienna is full of Islamic terrorists. There have

REFERENCE

been several assassinations, even of a city councilman, by them in recent years. Under Austrian law, I, as a foreigner, can not even get a pistol license. You must know about the kidnapping and killing of our colleagues around the world.

4. I have twice testified before House and Senate committees about the Kennedy assassination. Their full reports simply called me the "desk officer" and that has seemed to satisfy everyone. Needless to say, if you do expose my name, I will not even talk to any journalists or so-called historians.

5. If my name is exposed, I will obviously have to leave Vienna, with the whole house full of furniture, pictures, library, clothing, etc. which I packed and paid to have moved over here in 1983. Because of my stroke, I will be unable to do any packing and the move will be very expensive. Where can I resettle in an 2000 sq ft. apt. so conveniently located.

6. My wife and I love living here for many reasons, and leaving would be a cruel and needless fate.

7. I regard this law as dishonorable and unworthy of the United States of America. If you decide against me, I want to appeal before the Board and even the President, whom I happen to admire. I will pay my own way back to do so. I served in WWII and never spared myself; in the outfit I worked hard, was fearless in dealing with my superiors (Cord Meyer and Dick Helms can testify to that) and my adversaries. I wouldn't even think of threatening to expose things to pressure you. I will be employing an attorney or two, familiar with our affairs, to represent me. I will not deny, that I consider you and every one else implementing this law to be engaging in dishonorable conduct, unworthy of our government service.

8 In the late 1960's while serving in Vienna under Tom Karamessines, I was ordered by HQ to reveal to Austrian Military Intelligence that a low-ranking Austrian diplomat serving as their informant in Budapest had also been recruited by us and was reporting to us. I refused to carry out this order and offered my resignation. To me, it was dishonorable to betray a young agent who had accepted our recruitment and put faith in our promise of secrecy. To my mind an agency without principles can not survive and indeed should not survive. Tom Karamessines, perhaps one of the last honorable men to serve with us in high position, fired a stormy cable back and the shameful order was retracted.

9. I have invested about $50,000 in my apartment, in key money and improvements. If I leave, I will lose all or most of this. Our last move to Vienna cost me about $15,000 in sea freight and insurance. I will never get on my knees and ask to be made whole if you expose me, but I may resort to the courts. I am a retired member of the Virginia Bar.

10. Let me regale you with an example of how the historian's mindless drive to know *everything* can lead to a proud country's disgracing itself. During WWII when we were interrogating German POW's, we promised them no one would ever learn they had "spilled their guts," and we all believed we were being honest. But about 25 years after WWII the British declassified all the ADI(K) reports (that's what they were called, and even the "room conversation" transcripts

of the conversations POWs had in their rooms, even including the extremely valuable speeches made by high-ranking Luftwaffe officers to their high-ranking fellow POW's at "Cockfosters" Cockfosters mansion. Newcomers were vetted by the old hands for a month to make sure they weren't stool pigeons, before they were given the privilege of addressing their fellow officers on some important aspect of the war. The excellent British mikes picked it all up.

In recent years, at least one Luftwaffe veteran association, that of J.G. 2, the Richthofen Geschwader, sent people to London to get copies of the interrogation reports of their pilots. They did it chronologically and were so shocked at the vast amount of vital data revealed by their buddies that, in acute revulsion, they stopped looking. I assured them that "everyone" had "talked", which is true

11, I am 75 years old partly paralyzed on my left side from a stroke in Dec. 1993. I was nearly fully rehabilitated when, in May 1994, I was hit by constant muscle spasms all up and down my left side. This rather rare condition, basically a sudden super-human tightening of all the muscles, with after effects lasting until the next spasm, have made it increasingly difficult for me to stand up, walk, or even sit up for very long. In a few days, when all the many medicines are here, will begin a 20-week homeopathic cure for the spasms under Dr. Schramm, a leading specialist here. I can't very well leave for 20 weeks.

You will be contacted momentarily by one of my attorneys. I will also be in touch with my Congressman and Senator.

With bitter resolve,

John M. Whitten

SECRET

RETIREMENT AND RESIGNATION EXIT COVER BRIEFING

NAME *(Last, first, middle)* WHITTEN, John Moss	STAFF OR DIVISION FI/OPS	CCS FILE NO. 3562

GRADE & STEP GS-16/5	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 213-12-1338	☐	VOUCHERED FUNDS	☐	UNVOUCHERED FUNDS

☒ RETIREMENT	FORM	☐	3102	☐	SF-2801	ATTACHED
☐ RESIGNATION	DATE(S) 31 July 1970					
☐ LWOP						

AGENCY EOD 22 aug 1947

LAST WORKING DAY 31 July 70

AGENCY JOB TITLE

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY INCLUDING OVERT PERIODS *(include both domestic and overseas assignments)*

DATE		AREA OF ASSIGNMENT		COVER	NOMINAL	INTEGRATED
FROM	TO	COUNTRY	CITY			
aug 47	may 48	Washington	D.C.	DAC		
May 48	Sept 52	Germany		DAC		
Sept 52	mar 55	Washington	D.C.	DAC		
mar 55	oct 55	austria	Vienna	DAC		
10 oct 55	July 60	austria	Vienna	State		X in Field
July 60	mar 62	Korea	Seoul	State		X
mar 62	18 apl 70	Washington	D.C.	State		X
19 apl 70		Washington	D.C.	State	X	

CIA IS A MATTER OF RECORD AT *(include acknowledgement by OP)*

PLACE	DATE USED	PLACE	DATE USED
No			

FORM 2554 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
5-70

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4 9-12-21)

SECRET

FUTURE EMPLOYMENT PLANS	☐ U.S. ☒ OVERSEAS		☐ GOVERNMENT ☒ NONGOVERNMENT	
RETIREMENT	☐ CIVIL SERVICE	☑ CIA	☐ OTHER (specify)	

FOREIGN TRAVEL PLANS

Plans to reside Vienna, Austria

SENSITIVE, SPECIAL, OR COVERT SITE ASSIGNMENTS

LIST RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY CIA

CIA AWARDS

☐ MEDALLION ☐ CERTIFICATE OF DISTINCTION

☐ INTELLIGENCE MEDAL ☐ LENGTH OF SERVICE CERT.

☐ OTHER (specify)

☐ EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED OR COMPROMISED

☐ EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN ☐ DECLARED ☐ COMPROMISED No record in CCS file

CREDIT BUREAU RECORDS INDICATE	AGENCY	NONAGENCY

COVER BRIEFING

☐ ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT FOR COMPLETE PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT

☒ DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT. USE INSTRUCTIONS AS OUTLINED BELOW

☐ ACKNOWLEDGE PARTIAL AGENCY EMPLOYMENT AS INDICATED BELOW

THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY ON PAGE 1 IS THE ACTUAL DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE. THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BELOW IS THE COVER STORY CONTRIVED FOR USE AFTER DEPARTURE FROM AGENCY EMPLOYMENT.

DATE		AREA OF ASSIGNMENT	TYPE OF COVER	COVER ORGANIZATION	JOB TITLE
FROM	TO				
aug 47	May 48	Washington	DAC		
May 48	Sept 52	Germany	DAC		
Sept 52	Mar 55	Washington	DAC		
Mar 55	Oct 55	Austria	DAC		
10 Oct 55	July 60	Austria	Int	State	Pol Off.
July 60	Mar 62	-Korea	Int	State	att. Pol. Off
Mar 62	18 apr 70	Washington	Int	State	
19 apr 70		Washington	Int	State	Present Office

SECRET

SECRET

TYPE HEALTH INSURANCE CARD ISSUED	✓ AGE		GEHA		NACS		OTHER *(specify)*
LIFE INSURANCE ✓ WILL CONVERT WILL NOT CONVERT	FEGLI		WAEPA		UBLIC		OTHER *(specify)*

DEPARTING EMPLOYEES ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on the date noted below and do understand that I will be Denied as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date I entered on duty through the date of departure in accordance with instructions as outlined above.

I have been informed as to the employment references applicable in my case.

DATE: 15 July 1970

SIGNATURE: John M. Whitten

REMARKS

COORDINATION

CCS/OCM	CCS/OCS	CCS/OCO	CCS/NC

SIGNATURE OF COVER OFFICER

FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY

SECRET

TAX BRIEFING SUMMARY

N.A.

BANKING INSTRUCTIONS

N.A.

FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY COVER OFFICER

I	BLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL	☒	YES	☐	NO	DATE
II	NOTIFY OFFICE OF FINANCE TO HANDLE THE CSC COMPUTATION FORMS IN A COVERT MANNER FOR BLOCKING RECORDS AT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION	☐	YES	☐	NO	DATE
III	OBTAIN REFUND OF CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT FUNDS IN A COVERT MANNER	☐	YES	☐	NO	DATE
IV	RETURN OF CIARD FUNDS FROM CSC	☐	OVERT	☐	COVERT	
V	APPLICATION TO PURCHASE CSC CREDITS	☐	OVERT	☐	COVERT	
VI	CREDIT UNION QUERRIED			☐	YES	☐ NO

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE

FORWARDING ADDRESS	NEW EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS

IDENTITY AND ADDRESS OF EMERGENCY CONTACT

IF SUBJECT HAS APPLIED FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING CCS WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE DID SUBJECT USE?

HAS SUBJECT BEEN QUESTIONED TO ASSURE HE OR SHE DID NOT USE AGENCY PERSONNEL FOR REFERENCE ☐ YES ☐ NO

SUBJECT ☑ HAS ☐ HAS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFY DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED.

IF BACKSTOPPING IS NECESSARY GIVE REASON Was under cover for entire period of employment. Plans to reside abroad after retirement

ANNUITY PAYMENT TO BE CHANNELED BY ☐ GREEN CHECK ☐ BANK TRANSFER ☐ NOC

CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS	1099 MAILING INSTRUCTIONS

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT	DATE RECEIVED	DATE APPROVED

MEDICAL RECORDS	☐ WILL REQUEST	☐ WILL NOT REQUEST	SOCIAL SECURITY CREDITS

SHOULD NOTICE OF RESIGNATION BE RESTRICTED INHOUSE ☐ YES ☐ NO

13-00000

70978

SECURITY REMINDER

1. I, Walter C. McCabe, have been reminded that, by virtue of my duties with the Central Intelligence Agency, I have been the recipient of classified information and information concerning intelligence sources and methods, and that my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement requires me to protect such data. Moreover, I have been given an opportunity to review my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement.

2. I have also been reminded that I am not permitted to retain any documents or other materials which are the property of the CIA or the custodial responsibility of CIA, and I affirm that I do not have in my possession, nor am I taking away from CIA any such documents or materials.

3. Finally, I am aware of my responsibility to notify the CIA promptly in the event I am called upon by properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information that I am pledged not to disclose and I will advise said authority of my secrecy agreement and request that my obligation to testify be established before I am required to do so.

Walter C. McCabe
Signature

February 29th 1980
Date

Witness:

Signature

29 Feb. 1980
Date

FORM 305 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
5-77

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, ______________________________ (print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Central Intelligence Agency"), the obligations contained in this agreement.

2. I understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency I may be given access to information which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12065 as amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive Order, and other information which, if disclosed in an unauthorized manner, would jeopardize foreign intelligence activities of the United States Government. I accept that by being granted access to such information I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become obligated to protect the information from unauthorized disclosure.

3. In consideration for being employed or otherwise retained to provide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby agree that I will never disclose in any form or any manner any of the following categories of information or materials, to any person not authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency to receive them:

a. information which is classified pursuant to Executive Order and which I have obtained during the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency;

b. information, or materials which reveal information, classifiable pursuant to Executive Order and obtained by me in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency but which, because of operational circumstance or oversight, is not formally marked as classified in accordance with such Executive Order and which I know or have reason to know has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency;

c. information obtained by me in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency that identifies any person or organization that presently has or formerly has had a relationship with a United States foreign intelligence organization, which relationship the United States Government has taken affirmative measures to conceal.

4. I understand that the burden will be upon me to learn whether information or materials within my control are considered by the Central Intelligence Agency to fit the descriptions set forth in paragraph 3, and whom the Agency has authorized to receive it.

5. As a further condition of the special confidence and trust reposed in me by the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby agree to submit for review by the Central Intelligence Agency all information or materials including works of fiction which contain any mention of intelligence data or activities, or contain data which may be based upon information classified pursuant to Executive Order, which I contemplate disclosing publicly or which I have actually prepared for public disclosure, either during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter, prior to discussing it with or showing it to anyone who is not authorized to have access to it. I further agree that I will not take any steps toward public disclosure until I have received written permission to do so from the Central Intelligence Agency.

6. I understand that the purpose of the review described in paragraph 5 is to give the Central Intelligence Agency an opportunity to determine whether the information or materials which I contemplate disclosing publicly contain any information which I have agreed not to disclose. I further understand that the Agency will act upon the materials I submit and make a response to me within a reasonable time.

7. I understand that all information or materials which I may acquire in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency which fit the descriptions set out in paragraph 3 of this agreement are and will remain the property of the United States Government. I agree to surrender all materials reflecting such information which may have come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Central Intelligence Agency, or upon the conclusion of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency.

8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event that I am called upon by judicial or congressional authorities to testify about, or provide, information which I have agreed herein not to disclose.

9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligence activities which I consider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President or to any successor body which the President may establish. I recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such matters to the attention of the Agency's Inspector General or to the Director of Central Intelligence. I further understand that any information which I may report to the Intelligence Oversight Board continues to be subject to this agreement for all other purposes and that such reporting does not constitute public disclosure or declassification of that information.

13-00000

RESTRICTED

70978

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, WALTER CASSATT McCABE, understand that by virtue of my duties in the Central Intelligence Agency, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to security standards set by the Central Intelligence Agency. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States.

5. I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regulations CIA", and the appendices thereto.

6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 16th day of February 1953

Walter C. McCabe (Seal)

Witnessed by me this 16th day of Feb. 1953

at WASHINGTON, D. C.

Rebecca D. Vaughan

FORM NO. 38-33
OCT 1950

RESTRICTED

KH

SECRET

RETIREMENT AND RESIGNATION EXIT COVER BRIEFING

ME (Last, First, Middle) R-9274 McCabe, Walter C	X	STAFF	STAFF OR DIVISION IAD DDO/PCS	CCS FILE NO. 6353
		CONTRACT		
B: 20 august 28	EMPLOYEE NO. 061360		OVERT	X	COVERT

ADE & STEP S 15	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 445-20-9032	AGENCY EOD 16 Feb 53	SEPARATION DATE 2/29/80	LAST WORKING DAY 2/29/80

X	RETIREMENT ☒ CIA ☐ CSC	RESIGNATION ☐ CIA ☐ CSC		MATERNITY LEAVE DATE OF RETURN		LWOP DATE OF RETURN

FUTURE EMPLOYMENT PLANS		U.S.	X	GOVERNMENT = contract
		OVERSEAS		NONGOVERNMENT

REIGN TRAVEL PLANS

TDY's to Western Europe -- on contract-

NSITIVE, SPECIAL, OR COVERT SITE ASSIGNMENTS

	EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED OR COMPROMISED				
	EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN		DECLARED		COMPROMISED (specify)

BACKSTOPPING IS NECESSARY GIVE REASON

COVER BRIEFING

	ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT FOR COMPLETE PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT
	DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT, FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS OUTLINED BELOW
	ACKNOWLEDGE PARTIAL AGENCY EMPLOYMENT AS INDICATED BELOW

E EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BELOW IS THE COVER STORY CONTRIVED FOR USE AFTER SEPARATION FROM THE AGENCY.

DATE		AREA OF ASSIGNMENT	TYPE OF COVER	COVER ORGANIZATION	JOB TITLE
FROM	TO				
Feb 53	Aug 64		DAC		
Aug 64	Feb 80		State		

2554 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET WNSISM

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 011180

(4-9-12-21)

SECRET

FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY COVER OFFICER					
BLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL	X	YES		NO	EFFECTIVE DATE EOD / Feb 53
BLOCK CREDIT RECORDS	X	YES		NO	EFFECTIVE DATE EOD
BLOCK TELEPHONE LOCATOR RECORDS	X	YES		NO	EOD

X	PREPARE FORM 1551		ISSUE I.D. CARD TYPE: Returned	X	W-2 FORM TYPE: State	X	HOSPITALIZATION INS. CARD TYPE: AGE

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE

IF EMPLOYEE HAS APPLIED FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING CCS WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE WAS USED?

SUBJECT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER DOCUMENTATION. IDENTIFY DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED.

RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY CIA (*name and relationship*)

None:

DEPARTING EMPLOYEES ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I certify that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on this date and I understand that:

☐ I will be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Cover Briefing Section above.

☒ I will not be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I have been informed of the employment references applicable in my case.

25 February 1980

DATE

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

~~Pull tele strip~~

ID # 189985, 9-11-78, exp 1985-

SAE: 15 Feb 80

Returning on contract
immed. Title: IPC

Retirement address:
~~Local ad~~
2401 "H" ST. NW
Wash, DC

CENCO 3-03-80

COORDINATION

CCS/OCB/M CCS/OCB/S	CCS/DFB —	CCS/CCB	CCS/COB	CCS/CSB

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF COVER OFFICER Kathy Hill	COMPONENT CCS/CT	DATE 2-25-80

SECRET

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, ______________________________ (print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Central Intelligence Agency"), the obligations contained in this agreement.

2. I understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency I may be given access to information or material that is classified or is in the process of a classification determination in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 as amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive order, that if disclosed in an unauthorized manner would jeopardize intelligence activities of the United States Government. I accept that by being granted access to such information or material I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become obligated to protect the information and/or material from unauthorized disclosure.

3. In consideration for being employed or otherwise retained to provide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby agree that I will never disclose in any form or any manner, to any person not authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency to receive it, any information or material in either of the following categories:

a. information or material received or obtained in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency that is marked as classified or that I know is classified;

b. information or material received or obtained in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency that I know is in the process of a classification determination.

4. I understand that it is my responsibility to consult with appropriate management authorities in the component or Directorate that employs me or has retained my services, or with the Central Intelligence Agency's Publications Review Board if I am no longer employed by or associated with the Agency, in order to ensure that I know: 1) whether information or material within my knowledge or control that I have reason to believe might be in either of the categories set forth in paragraph 3 is considered by the Central Intelligence Agency to fit in either of those categories; and 2) whom the Agency has authorized to receive such information or material.

5. As a further condition of the special confidence and trust reposed in me by the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby agree to submit for review by the Central Intelligence Agency any writing or other preparation in any form, including a work of fiction, which contains any mention of intelligence data or activities, or contains any other information or material that might be based upon either of the categories set forth in paragraph 3, that I contemplate disclosing publicly or that I have actually prepared for public disclosure, either during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter, prior to discussing it with or showing it to anyone who is not authorized to have access to the categories set forth in paragraph 3. I further agree that I will not take any steps toward public disclosure until I have received written permission to do so from the Central Intelligence Agency.

6. I understand that the purpose of the review described in paragraph 5 is to give the Central Intelligence Agency an opportunity to determine whether the information or material that I contemplate disclosing publicly contains any information or material that I have agreed not to disclose. I further understand that the Agency will act upon my submission and make a response to me within a reasonable time. I further understand that if I dispute the Agency's initial determination on the basis that the information or material in question derives from public sources, I may be called upon to specifically identify such sources. My failure or refusal to do so may by itself result in denial of permission to publish or otherwise disclose the information or material in dispute.

7. I understand that all information or material that I may acquire in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency that fits either of the categories set forth in paragraph 3 of this agreement are and will remain the property of the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an appropriate official or final ruling of a court of law. I agree to surrender anything constituting, containing or reflecting such information or material upon demand by an appropriate official of the Central Intelligence Agency, or upon the conclusion of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency.

8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event that I am called upon by judicial or congressional authorities, or by specially established investigatory bodies of the executive branch, to testify about, or provide, information or material that I have agreed herein not to disclose. In any communication with any such authority or body, I shall observe all applicable rules or procedures for ensuring that such information and/or material is handled in a secure manner.

9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligence activities that I consider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President, or to any successor body that the President may establish, or to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Senate. I recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such matters to the attention of the Agency's Inspector General or to the Director of Central Intelligence. In making any report referred to in this paragraph, I will observe all applicable rules or procedures for ensuring the secure handling of any information or material that may be involved. I understand that any such information or material continues to be subject to this agreement for all other purposes and that such reporting does not constitute public disclosure or declassification of that information or material.

10. I understand that any breach of this agreement by me may result in the Central Intelligence Agency taking administrative action against me, which can include temporary loss of pay or termination of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency. I also understand that if I violate the terms of this agreement, the United States Government may institute a civil proceeding to seek compensatory damages or other appropriate relief. Further, I understand that the disclosure of information that I have agreed herein not to disclose can, in some circumstances, constitute a criminal offense.

11. I understand that the United States Government may, prior to any unauthorized disclosure that is threatened by me, choose to apply to any appropriate court for an order enforcing this agreement. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a waiver on the part of the United States to institute a civil or criminal proceeding for any breach of this agreement by me. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a wavier on my part of any possible defenses I may have in connection with either civil or criminal proceedings that may be brought against me.

12. In addition to any other remedy to which the United States Government may become entitled, I hereby assign to the United States Government all rights, title, and interest in any and all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted or will result or may result from any divulgence, publication or revelation of information or material by me that is carried out in breach of paragraph 5 of this agreement or that involves information or material prohibited from disclosure by the terms of this agreement.

13. I understand and accept that, unless I am provided a written release from this agreement or any portion of it by the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director's representative, all the conditions and obligations accepted by me in this agreement apply both during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency, and at all times thereafter.

14. I understand that the purpose of this agreement is to implement the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence, particularly the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods, as specified in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

15. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12356; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the Military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C., 421 *et seq.*) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including section 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.

16. I understand that nothing in this agreement limits or otherwise affects any provision of criminal or other law that may be applicable to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including the espionage laws (sections 793, 794 and 798 of Title 18, United States Code) and the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-200; 50 U.S.C., 421 *et seq.*).

17. Each of the numbered paragraphs and lettered subparagraphs of this agreement is severable. If a court should find any of the paragraphs or subparagraphs of this agreement to be unenforceable. I understand that all remaining provisions will continue in full force.

18. I make this agreement in good faith, and with no purpose of evasion.

19. This agreement shall be interpreted under and in conformance with the law of the United States.

Signature

Date

The execution of this agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who accepted it on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency as a prior condition of the employment or other service of the person whose signature appears above.

WITNESS AND ACCEPTANCE:

Signature

Printed Name

Date

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

August 23, 1995

Copy provided to
CIA by FBI

HAND DELIVERED

John A. Hartingh
Inspector-in-Charge
JFK Task Force
Federal Bureau of Investigation
10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

RE: Foreign Government Liaison

Dear John:

This morning, Jack Tunheim, Phil Golrick, and I met with Kenneth Duncan and several State Department representatives regarding how best to implement the JFK Act as to information obtained from foreign governments through liaison channels. We had a very constructive discussion of the affirmative role the State Department could play in encouraging foreign governments, through appropriate diplomatic channels, to agree to the release of such information pursuant to the JFK Act. The Review Board believes that Section 10(b)(2) of the JFK Act contemplates that the State Department play precisely such a role.

As for now, we will hold in abeyance requests for evidence on foreign liaison postponements to which the FBI has not yet responded. This will give us the opportunity in the near future to work with the State Department and the FBI to establish orderly procedures to persuade the foreign governments in question that it is in our countries' mutual interests to release liaison information in assassination records. Until such procedures are in place, we request that the FBI not make further contact with foreign law-enforcement or other government officials regarding the release of liaison information in assassination records.

BOARD MEMBERS: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: *David G. Marwell*

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any question.

Sincerely yours,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Associate Director for Research and Analysis
and Acting General Counsel

cc: Kenneth A. Duncan
Department of State

13-00000

Secret

13 February 1996

Note to: Bob Skwirot,
ARRB Staff

Subject: Liaison related documents

Reference: Phone call between Ellie and Jeremy,
12 February 1996

Attached are a list and documents (13) which show liaison relationships between the CIA and host services. They illustrate the problem of protecting liaison while releasing stations. These Documents were acted on by the Board at the January 5 meeting.

Attachments as stated

OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS

Secret

ATTACHMENT

104-10017-10040: Although the Board continues to protect the liaison cryptonym in both paragraphs, the text shows Station cooperation with the Swedish service.

104-10017-10058: Although the liaison cryptonym remains protected, Paragraph 4 indicates liaison with the Swedish service.

104-10018-10089: Board has made a determination to release "your liaison" in Paragraph 1 in addition to identifying Stockholm Station.

104-10018-10091: With release of Stations (Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Oslo), text reveals liaison with the respective local services.

104-10017-10036: Although the liaison cryptonym is protected, the context of the cable clearly shows Station (if released) has a liaison relationship with the Swedish service.

104-10015-10425: The text of this cable from Rome, responding to a multi-Station message, states that liaison traces will follow. Once the identification of the Station is released, the existence of a liaison relationship with the Italian service in November 1963 is revealed.

104-10015-10420: Cable from Oslo in clear text indicates "no liaison" traces; therefore, if the identification of the Station is released, it will acknowledge the liaison relationship between the Station and the Norwegian service.

104-10015-10159: Paragraph 4 contains information that will show that Oslo Station had a technical operation directed against the Cuban target in Norway in November 1963. Also context of the cable reflects that the following Stations have a relationship with their local liaisons: Paris, Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, the Netherlands, London, and Ottawa.

CL BY 0563956
REASON 1.5(d)
DECL X5; X5
DRV LIA 3-87

104-10015-10225: Paragraph 2 of the cable reflects that Rome Station had a technical operation in conjunction with the Italian liaison. Please note: The Board continues to protect the cryptonyms.

104-10015-10230: Cable reflects that Station had the access to photograph US passports at the Amsterdam Schipol Airport. It can be implied that that capability is due to a liaison relationship with the Dutch service.

104-10015-10255: Cable reflects The Hague Station had a photo operation in the Netherlands. When reviewed with 104-10015-10230, it will be clear that the operation refers to the Schipol Airport operation.

104-10018-10088: Cable clearly shows that both Oslo and Stockholm Stations have a liaison relationship in their respective countries if the Stations are released.

104-10018-10080: At the bottom of Page 2 of the cable is the phrase "assume Stockholm still planned ask its liaison to interrogate." Release of Station and this phrase clearly reflects a liaison relationship with the Swedish service.

CL BY 0563956
REASON 1.5(d)
DECL X5; X5
DRV LIA 3-87

13-00000

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 04/29/96 04:26:36 PM
SUBJECT: Memo re Mexican Liaison (S)

CL BY 2224130
CL REASON 1.5(d)
DECL ON X1
DRV FM LIA 3-82

The following is a draft memo for Jeff. Bob Caudle is looking at it now so there may be more changes. Please let me know if there is anything incorrect here. I have a feeling Jeff will want a meeting with me rather than just the memo. Also, knowing him, he may want to deal with Tunheim on this directly since he was involved in this. I will let you know.

1. Action: That you advise as per paragraph 7.

2. Background: You will recall that you spoke with Chairman Tunheim of the JFK Board about the attached cable and the importance of protecting the phrase "with Mexicans" because it gives away liaison involvement in a tel-tap operation. At its 16 April meeting, at which I was present, the Board reconsidered its initial decision, but determined that the phrase could be released.

3. It had just come to HRG's attention that this same cable was released in full by the Board, with no objection by CIA, in September 1995. CIA probably did not contest this release because an excerpt from this cable, containing the phrase at issue, had been inadvertently released ~~even prior to that~~ to the National Archives in Aug 93. It is, therefore, no longer possible for CIA to argue before the Board for the protection of this phrase in the current cable or to appeal this release to the White House.

4. CIA is now in somewhat of an embarrassing position because it has strenuously argued that the release of this phrase would cause "clear and convincing damage" to the national security only to find that this phrase has been released with CIA acquiescence for at least seven months~~, with no ostensible damage~~. Conceivably, the Board could see this incident as a justification of their second-guessing our damage assessments, and could give us a much more difficult time in the future.

5. On the other hand, CIA could use this situation as a way to highlight the problems HRG has had with the JFK review process - that documents are being reviewed and released to the National Archives in such quantity and speed that it is difficult for CIA to focus on any one document and, more importantly, how seemingly innocuous information in one document can actually be quite significant in relation to prior or subsequent releases. Since September, when this cable was originally released, the issue of protecting Mexican liaison has become increasingly important because of other releases on this subject and because of your appearance before the Board in February.

6. Furthermore, this prior release should not impair our ability to continue to protect the fact of Mexican involvement in this tel-tap operation. Although we have argued to the Board along with other releases that this phrase "with Mexicans" gives that relationship away, the is specific cable does not~~, in fact,~~ directly do so. In fact, the reason for the Board's insistence that this phrase should be released was ~~the very fact that the~~ cable did NOT directly state that the Mexican's were involved in the tel-tap. We should be able to use their arguments to continue to protect the liaison relationship.

7. Our only recourse is to acknowledge to the Board that CIA has no basis to bring an appeal to the President since this cable has already been released in full. We should, however, maintain our position that we believe this information is damaging especially in light of releases to National Archives ~~since September~~, and that we never would have acquiesced to the release in September if we knew then what would be released on this subject in the ensuing months. Although this message does not necessarily need to be conveyed by you to Tunheim and could be handled by John Pereira and David Marwell, given your past dealings with the Board on this issue, you may prefer to do this.

8. In order to avoid problems like this in the future, HRG is immediately dedicating several personnel to the task of reviewing boxes of documents and determining what our releases have been on ~~this~~ sensitive subjects. HRG will also be double checking identify documents going to the Board to ~~make sure that no~~ duplicates of prior releases ~~are being sent~~. You should be aware, however, that there is only a rudimentary CIA computer index listing our releases and that it is impossible to do ~~accurate~~ fool proof computer searches about our releases on specific subjects. Although HRG personnel are extremely knowledgeable on what has been released, with over 220,000 CIA documents currently in the collection, it is suprising that mistakes like this have not happened more often, and no absolute assurances it can't happen again.

CC:

15 October 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
Australia

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.)

1. (S) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA's position on the review and declassification of foreign government information that appears in the JFK collection. This issue has come to CIA's attention because of the recent review by the JFK Board of Australian liaison documents. The Agency believes it is important to address this issue at this time because this is the first instance that this type of foreign liaison document has been reviewed by the Board and it is possible that such information will appear again in CIA's collection. This memo will, therefore, focus on the larger issue of a United States Government (USG) agency's legal obligations in the dissemination and declassification of foreign government information but will also address the specific issue of the six "Australian documents" (documents: 104-10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012-10080, 104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222, 104-10009-10224).

2. (S) Conclusion: CIA does not object to the release of the information in these six documents, but is only concerned about protecting foreign government information. Therefore, the Agency does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the redacted form proposed by the Board. With regards to the two Australian letters, the Agency has no authority to unilaterally agree to their release in any form. Pursuant to its legal obligations, CIA ordinarily seeks the consent of the foreign government prior to declassifying their information. However, for reasons described herein, it is not possible to even seek the consent of the Australians at this time, nor would it be likely that the Australians would give it. Rather than going to the Australians against its better judgment or requesting the

CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(d)
DECL ON: X5
DRV FM: LIA 3-82

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
Australia

President to agree to the unilateral declassification of foreign government information, CIA proposes that the release of the Australian documents be either postponed for a short time or that a substitution be made.

3. (U) Legal Authorities: The procedures governing the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information are set out in Executive Order 12958, as well as Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Executive Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including (1) information provided by a foreign government, or any element thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information and/or the source of the information, are to be held in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign government, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangements, or both, are to be held in confidence. Id., at §1.1(d)

4. (U) Foreign government information is subject to a classification determination under E.O. 12958, section 1.5(c). When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. The E.O. requires that foreign government information shall either retain its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification that shall ensure a degree of protection *at least* equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information. Id., at 1.7(e). Furthermore, agencies are required to safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of protection *at least* equivalent to that required by the originating government. Id., at 4.2(g).

5. (U) Pursuant to his authority as head of the intelligence community to protect all classified information from unauthorized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence has issued Directives (that is, DCIDs) setting out the procedures for the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information. Intelligence obtained from another government or from a combined effort with another government, may not be released or authorized for release without its consent. DCID 5/6 attachment § C.3. Furthermore, the release of intelligence that would be contrary to agreements between the U.S. and foreign countries is expressly prohibited. Id., at § C.5.

6. (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and specifically named foreign countries and government components is classified SECRET unless a different classification is *mutually* agreed upon. DCID 1/10-1. Such information may be declassified only with the *mutual* consent of the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved. DCID 1/10-1.

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
Australia

the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved. DCID 1/10-1.

7. (U) National Security Considerations: The importance of such coordination with foreign governments *prior* to the release of their information cannot be overemphasized. Should CIA, or for that matter any (USG) agency fail to coordinate where required, not only would it be a violation of the aforementioned E.O. and directives, but it would chill relationships it has developed with foreign services over the years. If such lack of coordination became known, foreign services would hesitate to share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed it would be released, in spite of any agreements or U.S. laws to the contrary, without their consent. Furthermore, the U.S. could not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S. government information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives.

8. (S) According to its legal obligations described herein, CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of foreign government information. Its obligation to do so is similar to its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency's documents. For example, CIA could not declassify and release to the public FBI information located in CIA files without coordinating with that agency. Similarly, CIA has no authority to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or information in its files.

9. (S) Coordination with Australia: As two of the documents at issue here are letters from the Australian service (104-10009-10224, 104-10012-10080), CIA is legally obligated by E.O. and agreement with the Australians to seek the consent of the Australians prior to their release, even in redacted form. The issue of coordinating with the Australian service is a timely one. In most cases, CIA would not have an objection to going to the foreign government and seeking their consent for declassification. However, several events that have occurred in the last few months depict just how seriously Australia considers any indication that the U.S. is unable to protect from release their classified information. Based on the incidents described below, it is CIA's position that even asking the Australians for consent to release would threaten the current relationship.

- Within the last year, a demarche was made by the Australian government expressing strong concern that U.S. declassification legislation expressly spell out that no information provided to the USG by the Australian service be declassified without its permission. A copy of this demarche is provided for the Board's review. (See attached.) It is worth noting that this demarche is not between intelligence services but

~~rather between governments -- it was literally delivered by~~ the Australian Ambassador to the National Security Council and to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia. The manner in which the Australians treated the demarche demonstrates that the protection of classified information is receiving top priority in the Australian government and is not just a concern of their intelligence community.

- On two recent but separate occasions the Australian service passed to CIA information indicating that there would be assassination attempts on two non-U.S. citizens. CIA requested that it pass this information on to the targets, but the Australians refused. They argued that the information was not specific enough and would endanger a source. The Australians stated that if they believed the information was useful, they would pass it themselves. The Australians were concerned that CIA had even asked to pass on this information, and questioned what they perceived as CIA's willingness to share their information with third parties. Finally, they stated that the easiest way to protect their information was simply not to pass it to CIA anymore.

- Just this month, a senior official of the Australian service approached the CIA with accusations that a former Agency employee allegedly may have disclosed their classified information. The Australians believe that this disclosure may be related to the loss of all agent reporting sources in a country of particular interest to them. The DDCI promised the head of the Australian service to launch an investigation into the matter.

- The Australian service recently expressed grave concern to CIA about a book published by an American USG official which alludes to a relationship between the CIA and the Australian service. Even though this book was not an official CIA acknowledgment of a liaison relationship, to the Australians, this incident called into question the CIA's ability to protect that relationship.

10. (S) Under the circumstances, it would be an affront to the Australians to be asked for their consent in light of the above events which have all occurred in the last year. The Australians would not only be extremely upset with CIA, but would certainly deny their consent. Should the Australians deny their consent, CIA would have no authority to agree to the release of the information and would be obligated to do all it could to prevent disclosure. ~~It is crucial not only to CIA's mission but~~

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
Australia

~~also to the conduct of US foreign relations that the USG is seen~~ as abiding by its agreements with foreign services as well as its own laws on the release of information.

11. (S) Finally, the importance of maintaining good relations with the Australians cannot be overemphasized. As a result of our valuable relationship with our Australian liaison counterparts, the USG receives a large volume of finished intelligence. Due to our shrinking resources, much of this information would not be available to U.S. policy makers were it not provided by the Australians. Additionally, we work together with the Australians around the world on joint collection activities that cover the full spectrum of USG intelligence priorities. Finally, there are several critical collection efforts vital to the USG where we do not have the entrée to collect intelligence independently. In these cases, we rely entirely on the continued good will of the Australian services to provide us with the assistance necessary to meet U.S. policymakers' needs.

12. (S) In light of all the above, CIA submits the following two proposals for the Board's consideration. First, the Board could postpone these two documents from release for a short period (we propose 10 months) at which time CIA can reassess its relationship with the Australians. It is possible that the relationship with CIA and Australia could change so that it would be possible to seek their consent for release in full. However, should we seek the consent of the Australians at a future date and the Australians object to the release of the documents, we would ask that the Board seriously consider any negative reaction from the Australians in its deliberations and abide by their desires. A second option would be for CIA to coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of summary of the Australian documents for immediate release. This summary would hide the fact that the letter came from the Australian service, but would reveal what the subject of the letter was. This would avoid the problem of having to go the Australians to seek their consent, which we would have to do even in the case of redactions.

13. (U) Should the Board reject these proposals, CIA is willing to work with the Board to reach another mutually agreeable solution. We strongly believe, however, that any approach which suggests that the U.S. Government may ignore its obligations and commitments to foreign governments would seriously undermine the vigorous and healthy diplomatic as well as intelligence relationships that we currently enjoy.

14. (S) With regard to the remaining four documents (104-10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222, ~~these are CIA documents and with the redactions proposed by the~~

government. As such, CIA consents to the release of these documents with the redactions proposed by the Board.

15. (S) Proposal for Future Coordination: With regards to any other foreign government information that may exist in the files, CIA proposes that it approach its liaison services to request their consent in the release of their information when it would be appropriate to do so. Although recent events with Australia make it impossible for CIA to approach them at this time, this may not be so with other services. In cases were CIA believes, because of the nature of the relationship, that it would not be possible to request the consent of the service, CIA proposes that the documents either be postponed from release or that CIA and Board's staff coordinate a summary.

John F. Pereira

John F. Pereira

Attachment

Attached is a copy of the Australian Demarche on U.S. legislation on declassification. This was given to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia, Ambassador Perkins, by Philip Flood, then Director of the Office of National Assessments (ONA), in September 1995. This demarche was also given to Sandy Berger at the National Security Council by Australian Ambassador to the United States Don Russell on 4 August 1995.

AUSTRALIAN COMMENTS ON
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 —
CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

- The Australian government wishes to register its concern over the 17 April Executive Order on Classified National Security Information and the apparent omission of any explicit provision to protect foreign-sourced information or documentation from automatic declassification once it is over 25 years old.

- The Australian government understands and supports the democratic principles and commitment to open government which underpin the Executive Order. We too are improving access to government information, but are maintaining provisions to protect foreign-sourced information — including U.S. information.

- We do not agree that these principles can be applied by one foreign government to the information or documentation of another government without prior consultation and clearance. Australian-sourced information was and continues to be passed to the U.S. government on the understanding that it will be protected. We adopt precisely the same approach to information that the U.S. shares with us.

- Omission of such consultation would, in the eyes of the Australian government, not be in keeping with the 1962 U.S.-Australia General Security of Information agreement or the many other bilateral and multilateral intelligence co- operation and information sharing agreements.

- The failure to protect sensitive Australian-sourced information about, for example, our intelligence operations, could have ramifications for our relations with regional countries and compromise intelligence sources and methods (upon which the U.S. depends in part).

- Australian concerns could be addressed if provision for clearance with originators of foreign-sourced material was embodied in the Information Security Oversight Office implementation directive to U.S. agencies.
  - — such an approach should not impede or delay the declassification process — Australia is not seeking this. For example, categories of sensitivity for Australia could be identified. A reasonable time limit could be put on Australian response time after which the U.S. could be free to declassify (we have a similar arrangement with the U.K.).

Dec

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

28 January 1997

Mr. David G. Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records
  Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Dear David:

This is to acknowledge your letter of 3 January 1997 to the Director of Central Intelligence concerning the Assassination Records Review Board's recent formal determinations with respect to CIA Records.

The appropriate Agency components have again reviewed the documents that the Board has decided to release either totally or with some information postponed. While the Agency does not plan to appeal to the President for additional postponements at this time, we ask that the Board reconsider its decisions with respect to six documents. These documents contain information relating to foreign government provided data, foreign liaison relationships, and intelligence sources--information that we believe merits protection under current standards set by the Board. A list of these six documents, together with Agency comments concerning them, is enclosed.

We plan no further action on these documents pending discussion with your staff and review by the Board.

John Pereira

John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

Enclosure

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

(We request that this enclosure be returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.)

(U) The Central Intelligence Agency requests that the Assassination Records Review Board reconsider its determination on the six documents listed below:

(U) 1. 104-10012-10080 and 104-10009-10224 (substitute--language for a foreign country document).

(S) The foreign government in question has expressed strong concern about USG and CIA's inability to keep secrets, and current relationships are very tense. If we are required to release the date and/or narrow the geographic choices too closely, the foreign government will be able to identify the document as theirs. Because this document is scheduled for another review in July 1997, we request that the ARRB reconsider the inclusion of the date of the document and designation of the country of origin as "Pacific Rim Country", and accept our originally submitted wording.

(U) 2. 104-10051-10106 (release of location)

(S) We request reconsideration of the release of the location identified in the last three words in the eleventh line, paragraph eight. This CIA base currently is undeclared to the host government.

(U) 3. 104-10055-10072 and 104-10054-10007 (foreign government activity/liaison).

(S) Regarding the release of the reference to the passport camera on page 3, it is not the USG's position to confirm that a foreign government undertakes such activity. In addition this is an on-going operation. Further, releasing the words in question would establish a strong inference that the two Agency officers were permitted by foreign officials to inspect the camera, thus

CL BY: 0185904
DECL ON: X1
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DV FM: AHB 70-9 MULTIPLE

tending to confirm the liaison relationship. We request that the last seven words of line four, paragraph "h", be replaced with substitute wording such as "the public security facilities".

(U) 4. 104-10004-10213 (source)

(S) We request that the ARRB reconsider releasing the word "agent" in this context (page 32); suggested substitute, "contact." Nielson was not a paid agent of the REDSKIN project and does not appear to have worked for the Agency in any other capacity. To describe him as a CIA agent could cause danger either to him or his family, especially if they are still in Russia.

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

September 5, 1997

BY COURIER

Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Re: Request to CIA to contact liaison channels regarding LIENVOY intercepts of Oswald telephone calls in Mexico City

Some time ago the Review Board requested informally that CIA contact its liaison channels in Mexico City for information related to Lee Harvey Oswald. During your recent visit here we discussed with you the feasibility of your making such contacts. I am writing in response to your request that we memorialize our request and provide some background information.

The Review Board believes that all reasonable steps should be taken to account for all telephonic intercepts of Oswald during his visit to Mexico City in September-October 1963. There is evidence that CIA intercepted some telephone calls through an operation named LIENVOY conducted jointly with components of the Mexican government. We believe that it would be appropriate for CIA to contact directly Mexico City liaison channels to inquire as to whether the Mexican authorities retained copies of LIENVOY telephonic take, specifically the actual recordings of Oswald's telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy during the period of September 27 through October 3, 1963.

The Review Board previously has sought information from the Mexican Government through appropriate diplomatic channels. For reasons that are obvious to those familiar with Mexico City issues, the Review Board could not raise with Mexican officials nor with the U.S. State Department the possible existence of additional tape recordings that might be in the hands of certain officials. Thus, at the behest of the Review Board, the Department of State requested that the Mexican federal government and local government agencies conduct general searches of their files for records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Mexican government responded

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

by sending copies of the same documentation and correspondence that the GOM had made available to the Warren Commission in 1964.

The basis for our interest in your contacting appropriate Mexican officials is found in CIA document 104-10004-10199, which was reviewed by the Board on September 19, 1995. On page 5 of this document (not including the cover sheet) information that the Board agreed to protect, due to the sensitivity of sources and methods involved, suggests that the Mexican security forces may have had their own copy of the October 1 intercept on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is unclear whether this statement refers to the transcript or to an actual tape containing the phone call. Nevertheless, it provides enough evidence to warrant additional inquiries on this matter.

For your reference we are enclosing copies of the reference documents as well as copies of the correspondence between the DOS and the Mexican government.

We would appreciate your contacting appropriate officials to determine what reasonably can be known about this and related matters, and ask that you provide a response to this request by November 14, 1997. We are fully aware of the sensitivity of this type of request and do not wish to take any action that would compromise existing intelligence operations. If necessary, we would be pleased to discuss with you ways in which we might further elaborate on this request, including person-to-person discussions with appropriate officials either here or in Mexico.

Thank you for your continued assistance and cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

for

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel and Associate Director
for Research and Analysis

cc: J. Barry Harrelson, HRG

Enclosures

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

15 January 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Fred Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: ARRB 22 January Meeting -- Agenda

REFERENCE:

1. The following items are on the ARRB meeting agenda for 22 January 1998:

(S) A. **Reconsideration of the State Cover.** The ARRB staff has advised that briefings by senior CIA and/or State officials are not required. However, the Agency and State are welcome to make a presentation if it will add to the information being presented in the "evidence memorandum". The evidence memorandum must be at ARRB no later than Tuesday 20 January. Mr. Gunn has suggested we may want to have individuals standing by for questions. The current plan is for Lee Strickland and me to be available at 600 E. St. NW. to answer any questions.

(AIUO) B. **Office of Personnel Files in the Sequestered Collection** (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recommend to the Board that personnel files be declared NBR (Not Believed Relevant) and their release postponed until 2017. The Agency position is that the privacy of each individual clearly outweighs the public interest, most of the information in these files has no relevance to the assassination story, and any related information exist elsewhere in the collection. At ARRB staff request HRP is preparing five OP files for review by Board members. The ARRB staff will prepare a memorandum for public release describing the files; their memo will be coordinated with the Agency prior to release.

(AIOU) C. **Non-related files/documents in the Sequestered Collection** (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recommend that the files and documents (approximately 35,000 pages) designated non-related by CIA during the 1994 review of the microfilm be declared NBR and released in 2017. If the recommendation is accepted by the Board, the ARRB staff will prepare an unclassified description of the records for public release. This too will be coordinated with the Agency prior to release.

D. Other possible items:

(AIUO) i. ARRB Request # CIA 1 -- The ARRB staff may request that the DO documents at issue in this request be declared Assassination Records to be released in full or sanitized form.

(S) ii. Crypt LINLUCK -- ARRB staff did not find our evidence memo on this crypt persuasive. They are expected to recommend that the Board reaffirm its decision to release.

(AIUO) iii. 1967 IG report on "Castro Assassination Plots" -- ARRB has requested that an updated version be released to NARA by the end of January. Any disagreements between the Agency and ARRB staff may be added to the agenda. HRP and DO reviewers are currently re-reviewing the report.

(U) 2. If you have any questions about any of these items please call me.

CC: Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Becky Rant @ DA
Linda Cipriani @ DCI

Sent on 15 January 1998 at 05:24:34 PM

not copy

~~SECRET~~ Box 11 Fldr 11

OGC 78-3595
5-31-78

Executive Registry
78-8432/11

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

OLC 78-1012/8
30 May 1978

JUN 5 10 04 AM '78

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : S. D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA
Office of Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

1. Action Requested: That you approve the recommendation at paragraph 14 for limited access of selected House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized version of the Hart Report.

2. Background: As you know, the HSCA Staff Director, Mr. Blakey, has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab A), to provide access to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's handling of the Nosenko case. This request is part of an inquiry into hypotheses arising from Epstein's book *Legend*, in which the view is presented that Nosenko was a dispatched agent with the mission of concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald. Central to HSCA interest is the question of Nosenko's bona fides. Additional to that issue, interest has developed in the manner in which Nosenko was treated during the period that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately below.

I

3. The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nosenko case, addressing the actions and conduct of various officers in the Agency. These matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's bona fides, so there also is considerable review of the methodology employed and the analyses of those handling the matter. Mr. Blakey states in his letter that he has been informed that the report contains no information on the issues of bona fides, being concerned instead only with personnel and internal procedures. This understanding on his part is incorrect, and his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it.

#05948

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

4. The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted in 1967 and 1963 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security in 1968 has also been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the preceding studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and retirees. As a result, much of the information on the case has been revealed to the Committee.

5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study, which prevailed. The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier two studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result, the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart report has the advantage of having been prepared after a ten year period, during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides the basis for an objective re-examination. It is relevant to HSCA interests that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter.

6. Because of the above, the Agency has everything to gain and nothing to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

II

7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided the HSCA with some detail on this. We have made the point that how Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue, not a part of it. When we questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter, HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter extends to the conduct of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which includes this. The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate how concerned CIA was with the man's bona fides, but so far as relating further to the inquiry concerning President Kennedy's assassination, it seems marginal at best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been led to consider that its dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacular this coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public criticism for those staff members who have been acknowledged by Mr. Blakey as hostile to the Agency.

8. If the rationale of the HSCA for pursuing the question of Nosenko's treatment is contrived, and largely peripheral to the real purpose of the Committee, as we believe it to be, it should be faced in those terms. No one would disagree with there being relevant inquiries, but it is hardly proper to take an internal critique and turn it against the Agency on a point irrelevant to the central purpose of the inquiry. The HSCA staff position is tendentious, and reflects on its face a hostile attitude that the Committee may not otherwise want to be so obvious. The Committee has the right to determine what is relevant to its charter, but the Agency should also assert a similar right to defend itself from truly peripheral and hostile fishing expeditions.

9. Therefore, while we believe that the Hart Report should be made available to the HSCA staff, we do not believe that such action should be taken prior to attempting to limit the use made of information contained in the Report not related to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

III

10. There are aspects of the Hart Report that contain information on foreign liaison services that should not be exposed to the HSCA. There is, therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the Report's being made available.

11. A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain modifications in more dramatic rhetorical phrases. That version is in other respects faithful to the original Report. It provides a working basis for further sanitization. Sanitization prior to review is not foreign to the HSCA, as the Directorate of Operations has had a continuing policy of selected sanitization. Extending this practice to the Hart Report would be consistent with the extant working relationship with HSCA. The Report will remain classified.

12. If the paper is made available, classified and sanitized, it should be on a highly restricted basis; the HSCA wants six named persons to have access to it, which is at least three times the number needed for bona fide research purposes.

13. Staff Position: This paper favors making a sanitized version of the paper, in classified form, available to a limited number of the HSCA staff representatives at the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. Any such release should be preceded by appropriate discussions limiting use of the material by the Committee. The General Counsel is of the opinion (Tab B)

that if the paper is withheld, and a court test results, the Agency must expect to fail in withholding the paper. The Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Security, SE Division and CI Staff favor making the paper available under the conditions set forth above.

14. Recommendation: That you approve granting access to a limited number of staff members of the HSCA to a classified, sanitized version of the Hart Report. Such access shall be conditioned on agreement to limit use of materials contained in the Report to those matters relating to the question of Nosenko's bona fides.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments

CONCURRENCE:

SIGNED — 31 MAY 1978
General Counsel — Date

Chief, SE Division — Date

Chief, CI Staff — Date

1 JUN 1978
Director of Security — Date

APPROVAL: /s/ Frank C. Carlucci
Director of Central Intelligence — Date

DISAPPROVAL:
Director of Central Intelligence — Date

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - OGC
1 - C/SE Div
1 - C/CI Staff
1 - SA/DO/O
1 - D/OS
1 - OLC/Subj
1 - OLC/Chrono
OLC/SDB/ksn (30 May 78)

~~CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000~~

C/[illegible]

11 March 1993

Jim

John

For circulation in HRG, J

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Peter Earnest
Chief, Media Relations

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency Specialist on the Kennedy Assassination

The WASHINGTON POST is preparing a series of articles on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Kennedy assassination. ✓

With the help of CIC, we recently arranged for George Lardner and Walter Pincus of the WASHINGTON POST to interview former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko about his knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald during the time Oswald lived in the Soviet Union. To ensure that Nosenko's resettlement identity and location would remain protected, I made the arrangements for Nosenko to come to Washington for the interview. ✓

The POST reimbursed Nosenko for expenses and paid him a $250 consulting fee. The interview was done on Wednesday, 3 March, at the POST offices downtown. I did not remain for it. Lardner and Pincus also hosted a lunch for Nosenko which was attended by Ben Bradlee. Lardner and Pincus were very pleased with their session with Nosenko and appreciative of our making it possible. I also spoke afterwards with Nosenko who said he was satisfied with how the interview was conducted and with the financial arrangements.

Shortly after the interview, Lardner faxed me a list of the questions that he and Pincus had prepared for themselves to use in checking out Nosenko's information. They asked if there was anyone at the Agency they could talk to about the individuals named. I told them that developing information in response to their questions would probably take a good deal of research and that I doubted the Agency would be able to take on such a task at this time for the POST. However, I said I would take it up with the appropriate offices.

Although I told the POST that I do not believe anyone would be willing to undertake research on their questions, I'm wondering if there is anyone around who might be knowledgeable of Nosenko's information who would be willing to talk with Lardner and Pincus on background based on his/her existing knowledge. I think Lardner and Pincus would be grateful for making such a person available even if

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request

all their questions aren't answered. Considering that they are trying to do serious research on the Kennedy assassination, I think any effort on our part to help them would be seen as a gesture of good will.

Peter Earnest

Attachment:
  As stated

______Agree to having a specialist talk to them on background about the Nosenko information if an appropriate person is available.

______No, do not want anyone from the DO talking about the Nosenko information.

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency specialist in the Kennedy Assassination

DCI/PAI/Earnest:ncbx37758 (11 March 1993)

Distribution:

Original	Addressee
1	ADDO
1	SA/DDO
1	DO Registry
1	D/PAI
1	D/DO/CIC
1	C/DO/NROC
1	C/DO/CE
1	C/CSI
1	C/History Staff

Names of Russians we should try to track down about Lee Harvey Oswald, Yuri Nosenko and the JFK assassination:

1. General Oleg M. Gribanov, head of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB in the early 1960s where Nosenko says he worked, primarily against American tourists, as deputy chief of the Seventh Department. Nosenko described himself as sort of favored by Gribanov and he said Gribanov instructed him, after the JFK assassination, to retrieve the Oswald file from the Minsk KGB right away.

2. Anatoliy Koralenko, deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate or one of its departments, at time of JFK assassination. Nosenko said when the file arrived from Minski, he and Koralenko were going over the all-important first volume--and finding KGB had nothing to do with Oswald--when a KGB officer from the First Department came in and picked it up on Gribanov's orders, to review it and write a summary of it.

3. The officer who picked it up was Col. Matveev, deputy chief(I think) of First(or American) Department, Second Chief Directorate. Unhave first name.

4. Chief of this First Department was Col. Sergei M. Fedoseyev or Fedoseev and presumably he would have had a hand in or supervised preparation of the "spravka" or summary.

5. Gribanov and more than 40 other KGB officers were kicked out because of Nosenko's defection, according to Nosenko. That right? What happened?

6. Maj. Georgi Rastrusin. Was in 1959 a senior case officer in KGB responsible for Intourist matters. Nosenko says that it was Rastrusin who told him about Oswald and how he wanted to stay in Soviet Union. Nosenko said Rastrusin said Oswald "doesn't present interest" to KGB and Nosenko checked out with his superiors. Word came back not to bother with Oswald. Nosenko was told to tell Rastrusin to tell Intourist to deal with him.

7. Rastrusin returned next day and said we got a problem. Oswald tried to kill self, etc. KGB washed hands of him, decided to let Intourist deal with him. Intourist then part of Ministry of Foreign Trade. Nosenko said he believes question of what to do with Oswald was run to top of that ministry and beyond, to Khruschev or one of his deputies. In any case, decision was made to let Oswald stay in Minsk. But not, Nosenko says, by KGB.

8. In the fall of 1963, a KGB colleague, M. I. Turalin, Service No. 2(counterintelligence in foreign countries), First Chief Directorate, told Nosenko orally that Mexico City station had just sent a cable about a request by Oswald for a visa to re-enter Soviet Union. What should be done?

Nosenko said he said, 'wait a second. How come he's back in America?' At that point, Nosenko said he hadn't know Oswald had gone back.

9. Nosenko said he said let's go to chief of department who he identified as a Col. Chelnekov or Chelnenko(but later seemed to say his timing might be off and somebody else may have been chief of Nosenko's department at the time). In any case, Nosenko quoted chief as saying, in effect, 'I remember this crazy nut. No. No. No. Tell them we don't have any interest.'

Cable back to Mexico City advising KGB there get rid of Oswald by telling him to go back to his own country and apply for a visa at Soviet Embassy in Washington, etc., etc.

10. Col. Gruzdev, was chief of the KGB department in Minsk that was responsible for foreigners there.

11. Oleg Nechiporenko, one of three KGB officers stationed in Mexico City who reportedly interrogated or dealt with Oswald on his visit to Embassy there. Now living in Moscow area.

Other two Mexico City officers, both still alive in Russia: Valeriy Kostikov and Pavel Yatzkov.

f.6

3 March 1994

Memo to: C/HRG

Subject: Mangold Litigation

Today I alerted OGC (Theresa Wilcox/[redacted]) that the JFK collections contains a significant number of documents on Nosenko (5-6000 pages) which may impact on the Mangold litigation. As I understand it, the Mangold Litigation is over the Angelton files and is several years old. According to JFK reviewers at the FBI, documents on Nosenko's defection and treatment are part of case. I talked with Theresa Wilcox who is the para-legal handling the litigation, however, she was not familiar with the documents involved. She will consult with [redacted], the lawyer on the case, and get back to me.

I consider the ball in OGC's court. I propose that we continue to review the Nosenko files. If there are Mangold or other consideration to address, we can do so after the HRG review is complete.

Barry

13-00000

9 nov 94

Re: NOSENKO

Having Reviewed Box 45 — We note several Reports, not completely identified as to author.

(1) "Conclusions & Comments in the Case of Yuriy I. Nosenko" (dated Oct 68) (The Solie Report) -264 pgs.
(This is in Box 45, Folder 8)
(It has been released in JFK)—JFK 62-F9
(It concludes NOSENKO is good)

(2) "Case of Yuriy I Nosenko" (835 page study)
dated February 1967

(No indication that it has been released)
(Believe it was prepared in SB (perhaps by Bagley — or perhaps with CI/STAFF)
(It concludes NOSENKO is BAD

(3) "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" — TS # 197124
(447 pages) dated FEBRUARY 1968

(This is found in ORIS Box 62 JFK—FLD 9)
(It was released except for ANNEX A which is found in Box 45 F. 23.

(It concludes ~~[illegible]~~ NOSENKO ~~WAS~~ NOT Bona fide.)
(Don't know author).

Jm)

INTERNAL USE ONLY

23 March 1994

Memorandum For: C/HRG

Subject: Nosenko and the Mangold Litigation

I received a call from Kathy Kelly, OGC, this morning concerning the Nosenko files in the JFK files. I described the files again (about 4000+ pages that include transcripts of all his interrogations and numerous studies on his bona fides and treatment by the Agency including the Solie and Hart reports and an 835 page comprehensive study). Since Nosenko is an important figure in the JFK assassination story and the files are part of the sequestered collection, HRG is reviewing the files under the JFK Assassination Records Collections Act. However, we were aware that some of the documents were part of the Mangold litigation and wanted to make sure that they were properly coordinated.

Kathy Kelly said that the Mangold litigation should not be a factor in HRG's review. If the files were subject to the JFK Records Act, they should be processed under that Act. When the review is complete, a list of the documents released should be provide so that OGC can treat them the same in the Mangold case.

I also talked with Kathy Stricker (yesterday) to get some background on the handling of Nosenko files and what were the "secrets" given what we know is publicly available. She said for years the agency "glomared" Nosenko except for the Oswald information: however, once Golitsyn became public that ended. Today, the battle over his bona fides and how he was treated are public knowledge. The Agency up until a couple years ago had not released some of the studies (she mention Solie) but she was not sure that this was still the case or if it was possible to continue to deny them. DO has protected the information provided by Nosenko on other Soviet sources and leads for possible recruitment. This type of information should continue to be protected.

Kathy Stricker's comments are consistent with HRG's handling of the Nosenko files. We are considering all of the files as related; his bona fides is a key element of the story and there was a large amount of information including parts of the studies on him in both the Oswald 201 and the JFK hard copy collection. We have deleted information provided on other sources and operations not related to the JFK story. We are also recommending release of the rest of the studies. Although they contain potentially embarrassing information for the Agency (as did the IG report on the Castro plots), there doesn't appear to be grounds for denying under the JFK Act.

5/94

Restrictions on Declassifying Material on Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

The following should be used as guidelines in declassifying material files pertaining to the career and "bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. CIA Knowledge of Russian intelligence tradecraft. Specific information in the files about KGB targetting of American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence service our knowledge of their tradecraft. Since the Russian services continue to target Americans, this information should continue to be protected.

2. To protect a CIA asset. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO remains an asset of this agency, and is under contract. Moreover, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR) remains interested in NOSENKO's whereabouts and activities. Russian intelligence services since the Second World War have tried to track their defectors. There are indications that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO case.

* o At the time of his arrest, Rick Ames had some NOSENKO files (AESAWDUST) in his possession. The US Counterintelligence Community is unsure if this material was passed to the Russian service.

--Following NOSENKO's brother and mother's visit to the United States, both were questionned by the Russian service about NOSENKO's activity and place and residence.

Legal position
CI.

Mr Robert Pringle
2909 Rock Manor Court
Herndon, Virginia 22071

Dear Bob,

It was very good to meet with you again in Washington on June 12.

I am writing to confirm our recent conversation about the CIA's release of documents about me to the National Archives. As I explained to you at our meeting, I am very displeased that this was done without my knowledge and especially since my photograph was officially released by the Agency for the first time in thirty years.

As you know, it has come to my attention that the CIA released these many hundreds of pages to the public without consulting me or telling me that this was going to be done. I have already seen copies of two of these reports totalling more than 700 pages. One is the October 1968 report supporting me by Bruce Solie; the other was a February 1968 report by the CI Staff which attacked my credibility. (This latter report contains a copy of my photo from the late 1960s. I consider this a breach of my personal security.)

I also consider many of the details in both of these reports to be of a very personal nature. Other pages deal with with some very sensitive cases which I gave the Agency about other people. The information in these reports was given freely and accurately by me to the CIA officers in the 1960s under terms of strict confidentiality. Although it is very difficult for me to say this, I feel that my trust in the Agency has now been seriously damaged.

This release particularly troubles me because for the past thirty years I have remained very loyal to the Agency and considerate of its wishes. For instance, despite many requests, I have only spoken to a few journalists, and only when the Agency advised me to do so. I have never sought

on my own to publish my story in an article or book. But now, the CIA has not returned this courtesy. Instead, it has released sensitive information to the public without speaking to me first.
Under the circumstances, I would like to respectfully request the following:

1. That you show this letter to DDO Ted Price, Director James Woolsey, and the current heads of the CIA's Freedom of Information Office and Historical Review staff -- so that they are aware of what has happened.

2. I would like to receive, in writing, an explanation from those responsible of why this release was done.

3. I would like to receive a list of the major reports about me which have already been released. Aside from the two reports that I already have seen, I would like to receive copies of any other major studies that have been released. (For instance, if there are reports released by Peter Bagley, Newton Miler, James Angleton, the CI Staff and John Hart, then I would like to see them as well.)

4. I would like to be given the Agency's written assurance that further releases will not occur without consulting me first.

Bob, you should know that before I wrote this letter I have spoken about this matter with my good friend George Kalaris. He too was troubled by what I told him, and he advised me that I should ask the Agency for an explanation.
Bob, I apologize for troubling you with this matter, but I have no one else to turn to for assistance.
Please let me know if there is any response as soon as possible.

Respectfully yours,

Secret

Draft letter to Nosenko from the DDO

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Dear ,

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter expressing concern that US Government declassification of material could compromise your privacy and security.

In regard to your question about the documents that have already been released, rest assured that I have directed officers responsible for FOIA requests to take special care in reviewing information concerning you in light of your special circumstances. We will make full use of all possible exemptions exceptions to FOIA-mandated declassification in order to protect your privacy.

As you know, in 1992 Congress passed the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, which required all US Government agencies to release any records related to the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy. As Deputy Director for Operations, I am of course committed to fully supporting the DCI in meeting this requirement, but I also appreciate your concern about the files on you that are related to the assassination. I have therefore directed a senior officer in the DO to meet with the officials in the Agency's Historical Review Group ~~historical staff~~ who are involved in the declassification program. This officer has had extensive discussions with members of the Group ~~staff~~ and has worked closely with them to identify those portions of the files that include personal and operational information.

As a result of this effort, we have taken special care to protect all ~~postponed release of any~~ sensitive information touching on your private life or on operational information pertaining to your debriefings. Under the JFK law, a Presidential Review Board will make the final decision on the disposition of the material. This Agency values the sacrifices you have made for our country, and we will present the Board with the strongest possible case for protecting information that could affect your privacy and security.

Best wishes,

Secret

UNCLASSIFIED

17 April 1997

Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry Harrelson, Historical Review Group, X31825, 2 soft files entitled:

1. "WARREN COMMISSION/OSWALD"
2. "DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/OSWALD"

found by Al Bonner in the vault.

Gary 17-APRIL-97

Received

Gary M. Brenneman

UNCLASSIFIED

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

30 April 1997

Note To: ARRB Staff

Subject: CIC Soft files:
1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

The attached files were located in CIC. They are soft (or working) files containing information on Nosenko, Warren Commission and Oswald. It is not clear if the files date from the Warren Commission period, or were created in 1975/76 (latest date of documents) in response to a request or investigation.

Most of the documents are in the sequestered collection (OGC folders). The other documents may be in the Norsenko material put aside for discussion with the ARRB or in the Microfilm part of the sequestered material (the Microfilm is not indexed document by document).

30 April 1997

Note for the Record

Subject: CIC Oswald/Nosenko related soft files:

1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

1. I advised Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, that most of the documents in the two folders are duplicates of documents in the CIA JFK Collection sequestered by the HSCA. The other documents are related to Nosenko, but do not mention Oswald. These documents are probably duplicated in the Nosenko material set aside for discussion with the ARRB. I recommended that we make the folders available to the ARRB staff. She concurred.

2. Documents will be made available to Michelle Combs, ARRB staff, on her next visit.

Barry

f,76

TO: Eileen M. Wukitch
FROM: James W. Zirkle
DATE: 08/01/97 09:54:03
SUBJECT: ▨Re: The Nosenko Papers

CL BY: 2034442
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

Eileen: Let me introduce myself. I am CIC/Legal. C/CIC asked me to touch base with you concerning any possible ARRB release of privacy information concerning Nosenko. While we are aware that such a decision to release is within the Board's discretion, we do believe that the Agency, when giving this information over to them, should request that the Board protect such information to the maximum extent possible. If I can be of help in that regard just let me know. Jim

From the Desk of Dennis D. Lamb

NOTE FOR: *Ron L. Seckinger*
FROM: *Dennis D. Lamb*
DATE: *07/31/97 10:44:28*
SUBJECT: *The Nosenko Papers*

CL BY: 0790429
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

At about 1020 hrs on Tuesday, 31 July, I received a call from Eileen Wukitch of the Agency's External Support Group/Historical Collection Staff regarding Michelle Combs's interest in reviewing the Nosenko papers for the upcoming meeting of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) on 5 August. Wukitch said Combs, an ARRB staffer, is planning on taking 20 pages of the Nosenko material with her. Wukitch wants to know whether we would like copies of the material Combs is taking. I said yes. Wukitch said Combs appears understanding of our concerns in this case and to this end wanted the following questions answered so she could put a human touch on our concerns in explaining our position to the ARRB.

1. Is Nosenko married? (No one in CIC/AG knows.)

2. What part of the country is he living in? (This is known, but I can't see why she or the ARRB needs to know.)

3. Did the Soviets actually sentence Nosenko to death? Or was this just his claim. (No one in CIC/AG know, but it appears reasonable to assume that the Soviets did sentence him to death.)

4. Nosenko's current age? (No one in CIC/AG knows off hand. Henry's observation was that Combs can find this out from open literature.)

According to Wukitch, Combs also wants to take to the ARRB two letters pertaining to the affair: the letter Nosenko wrote in 1994 objecting to the release of his material without his being consulted or advised, and the letter Ted Price wrote to him in response assuring him that everything possible would be done to prevent further release of his papers. I don't see any problem with this since the papers would support our position--unless the ARRB starts thinking about releasing the letters also.

Wukitch said she told Combs CIC would have Bob Pringle, former Chief of AG/FIOB currently serving as Officer in Residence at the University of Kentucky, flown in to address the ARRB if this appears necessary. Combs will pass this on to the ARRB. Wukitch noted that Combs alluded to the possibility that that ARRB might want to talk with Nosenko himself.

CC:

CC: John B. ENGBERT, Nancy T. BRUNONE, Edgar C. BAUML, Dennis D. Lamb, Curtis L. MACKIAN, Jacqueline Frankfort @ DCI, Ron L. Seckinger

MEMORANDUM

August 5, 1997

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

To: T. Jeremy Gunn

From: Michelle Combs

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

I have prepared this memorandum at your request for the upcoming meeting where the Board will be briefed on issues related to the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko.

Summary and Recommendation

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3500 pages of interviews, transcripts, memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 have been released to the public as open in full or with only minor redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800 contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is our judgment that the remaining 2300 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President Kennedy and we recommend that they be processed as "NBR." These NBR records consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology and operations, and Soviet navy information dating to Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. I suggest that we review carefully these 2300 records to ensure that there is no assassination-related material, and, to the extent this is correct, we should process them as "NBRs."

Background on Nosenko

KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko first secretly contacted the CIA in Geneva in June 1962. One and a half years later on February 4, 1964, he defected to the United States for what he said were ideological reasons. His case became the single most difficult counterintelligence case in the Agency's history to date. Nosenko's information on the assassination of President Kennedy made his bona fides of more importance than simply a means to determine his true identity or whether he was the prototype of a KGB disinformation plot against Western intelligence agencies.

The conflict over Nosenko began two and a half years prior to his actual defection, in

December 1961, when Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB defector, predicted that the KGB would dispatch false defectors after him to discredit him and confuse Western intelligence agencies as part of a massive disinformation campaign. Golitsyn, who had described a darkly intentioned monolithic Russian master deception plan and Soviet intelligence agencies of brutal efficiency, claimed that Nosenko was the most important of these fake defectors and that any Soviet sources who came later and supported Nosenko's bona fides would also be false. Golitsyn was wholly believed by Counterintelligence Chief James Angleton, who shared Golitsyn's world view. Golitsyn argued that any CIA officers who believed Nosenko should be considered as moles themselves.

Nosenko's first four meetings with the CIA in Geneva in June 1962 produced an intelligence bonanza and the two CIA officers (George Kisevalter and Peter Bagley) who met with him believed he had conclusively proved his bona fides. During his debriefings in 1964, Nosenko provided detailed information about Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in the USSR which, he said, had come across his desk routinely as the deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) department responsible for watching American visitors in the USSR.

With Golitsyn arguing against Nosenko's bona fides, plans were made in March 1964, to imprison Nosenko and begin hostile interrogations to find any shifts in his information. On April 2, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms and Soviet Division Chief David Murphy met with the Deputy U.S. Attorney General and obtained legal approval from the Justice Department to imprison Nosenko so that he could not communicate with his supposed KGB controllers. On April 4, he was imprisoned in an attic room in a CIA safe house near Washington. Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement, subjected to physical and mental torture, and submitted to hostile interrogations from April 4, 1964 to October 27, 1967 first at the safe house and then in a specially built cement house in Virginia. Despite over three years of severe treatment, Nosenko's original story remained unchanged, no "confession" was forthcoming, and no evidence was produced indicating he was, as Golitsyn still claimed, a fake defector.

On August 8, 1968, Nosenko was polygraphed for the third time by an Office of Security specialist. During the examination, Nosenko was asked whether he had told the truth about Oswald and the Kennedy assassination; the polygraph operator found only positive responses to the questions. Security Officer Bruce Solie submitted a comprehensive report in October 1968 which evaluated all of Nosenko's information, to date, and concluded that he was what and who he had claimed to be all along. After a review of his case by the Soviet Division, Nosenko was finally released from CIA custody on March 1, 1969 and employed as an independent consultant by the CIA.

File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd

In the 35 years since Nosenko first approached the CIA in Geneva, no prima facie evidence has ever emerged to prove that he was a KGB provocation and subsequent defectors have affirmed him as a bona fide defector. He has identified many hundreds of Soviet intelligence officers, provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization, doctrine and methods of the KGB, and conducted numerous special studies on Soviet subjects. Today, Nosenko is seventy years old, recently retired as a contractor from the CIA, an American citizen, married, and living quietly in the Sunbelt.

File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd

6 October 1997

Note To: DO

From: Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
Historical Review Group

Subject: Nosenko records in JFK Collection

The ARRB (JFK Board) staff has agreed to accept CIA's designation of 25 folders of the Nosenko material in the JFK sequestered collection as “not believed to be relevant” (NBR). The staff plans to present their proposal to the JFK Board at the 14 October meeting. The Board requires a description of all NBRs to be made available to the public. Please review the attached draft prepared by ARRB staff member, Michelle Combs, for classification and public release. The ARRB staff needs a response by COB Thursday if possible. HRG/DO JFK reviewers here have no problem with the draft and recommend release. If you have any questions, call me on 31825. Thanks.

BH
Barry

Per phone call from Denis Lamb 8 Oct 97 1:30+ p.m. CIC has no problem with attached description of Nosenko files.

BH

Folder Summaries of the Nosenko Material Not Believed to be Relevant to the JFK Assassination

Reel 45, Folder 3

During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career and Komsomol experiences.

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and procedures, military personalities and experiences, and his incarceration by CIA.

Reel 45, Folder 5

This folder contains a 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division (C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Reel 45, Folder 8A and B

Folder 8A contains the 263 page "Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" 1 October 1968 report by Bruce Solie, Deputy Chief of the Security Research Staff which concludes that Nosenko is a bona fide defector and should be believed. A sanitized version of the Solie report has been released to the public. The NBR document in folder 8B is a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on inconstancies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" by Peter Bagley. It records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

Reel 45, Folder 17

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to abbreviations in the transcript is also included.

Reel 45, Folder 19

This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko's biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the KGB.

Reel 45, Folder 20

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 21

This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komosol and Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 24

This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

Reel 45, Folder 25

This folder contains pages 85-348, part V of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

Reel 46, Folder 2A

This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

Reel 46, Folder 2B

This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have been released to the public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogations sessions with Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965, an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief, SR/CI on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to Chief, SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.

Reel 46, Folder 3

This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the Clandestine Services' handling of the Nosenko case. The Hart report endorses the conclusions reached in October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide defector.

Reel 46, Folder 5

This folders contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there. Some documents have been released to the public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 "homework assignment" prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces, and a four page memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.

Reel 62, Folder 2

This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.

Reel 62, Folder 3

This folder contains a 75 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress, and a disciplinary problem and its impact on his promotion schedule in the KGB.

Reel 62, Folder 5

This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 6

This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 7

This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 8

This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko says that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.

Reel 62, Folder 9

This folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.

Reel 62, Folder 10

This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Safe." This folder was not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various US Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to day handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for political asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor, and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his handling.

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

October 9, 1997

To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director

From: Michelle Combs MC

Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts, memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800 contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities, and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the Hart Report will also be processed for release.

The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released, which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and identified for processing and review.

13-00000

16 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
DO JFK Board Focal Point

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: Agenda for ARRB meeting 17 November 1997

REFERENCE:

The following issues are tentatively scheduled for action at the next JFK Board meeting:

1. Date of release of Nosenko material; see memo on results of Oct. meeting.

If you or CIC have any comments on the proposal to change the release date (subject of Agency review and appeal) from 2017 to 2010, please provide them to me by 23 October.

2. State cover

This issue originally surfaced in April and was scheduled but not addressed at the September meeting. I recommend that you review the material we sent the ARRB staff for the September meeting to determine if you want to provide additional "evidence". Are there other components that should be consulted on this issue? Sue Burggraf was involved in discussions in April.

3. DRE Monthly Reports. This is a long standing request from the Board staff. Please provide a status of the request by October 21.

CC: John Pereira @ DCI
Eileen Wukitch @ DO

Sent on 16 October 1997 at 04:57:17 PM

FAX Rec'd TODAY 10/31/97 Re NOSENKO

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

SECRET

28 October 1997

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

NB

1. The Board intends to declassify and release for public consumption, approximately 2400 pages of counterintelligence staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews, and bona fides studies on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. These studies contain sensitive personal and operational material completely unrelated and irrelevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. It has been officially stated and documented that the remaining Nosenko records have been carefully reviewed to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of the assassination. Mr. Nosenko has adhered time and time again to the stipulations of his Memorandum of Understanding not to divulge his relationship with this Agency, even in view of the less than satisfactory conditions this Agency forced upon him during his early resettlement. Public disclosure of the remaining documents would constitute an unwarranted invasion of his personal and professional privacy not to mention the breech of trust on the part of this Agency to protect his right of privacy and above all, his security. This trust was reconfirmed in a personal letter from the former DDO, Ted Price, in September 1994, stating that we would take special steps to protect any sensitive information touching on Mr. Nosenko's private life or on operational information pertaining to his debriefings. The letter further states that this Agency valued the sacrifices he made for our country, and every effort would be made to protect information that could affect his privacy and security. The question has been asked before. Should we not show the same integrity that we expect from those who put their lives on the line in defense of our national interests?

2. Furthermore, the recruitment of sources of high intelligence value has always been this Agency's top priority. Public disclosure of this information could do irreparable damage to our ability to attract individuals who admire the US and might be disposed to collaboration. Disclosure of cooperation with the USG would cause any potential source to think twice before placing his life in the hands of an organization who cannot protect his information. For those individuals such as Mr. Nosenko, who placed their trust in this country in the past, entered our resettlement program, and are now US citizens, the indiscriminate release of information, some of it very personal

CL BY 0489514
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1
DRV DEF 2-82

SUBJECT:

and with no real relevance to any national issue, seriously erodes this Agency's credibility and undermines our Resettlement Program.

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: LOC 5-82

5 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Fred Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
Linda Cipriani @ DCI

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: 17 November JFK Board Meeting-- CIA issues (update)

REFERENCE:

1. The following CIA items are on the agenda for the 17 November ARRB meeting:

- (S) Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton, Va. as the location of the CIA Record Center.

In addition to written evidence being prepared by DA, the Agency has been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

- Chairman Tunheim's proposal to advance the opening date of the Nosenko NBR (Not Believed Relevant) material from the 2017 per the JFK Act to the year 2010.

The ARRB staff disagrees with the Board on this issue and will recommend that the release date remain 2017. However, they are not confident that the Board will accept their recommendation and has requested the Agency's position on the 2010 date. If the Agency opposes the 2010 change in the date, I will need a memo from the DO explaining why. We could offer a compromise--accept the 2010 date provided the Agency has the same right in 2010 as 2017 to review and appeal the release of the records. I have ask OGC for a legal opinion. Please note that this decision affects only those documents designated "NBR" by ARRB. The documents declared to be Assassination Records (AR) will be re-reviewed and released, either sanitized or in full, during the coming year.

- (S) Proposed release of reference to CIA employee being under "integrated State cover".

We have provided written evidence (DO note coordinated with State and copy of MOA between CIA and State). According to the ARRB staff, some Board members consider CIA use of state cover as an "open secret" and are inclined to release. We have been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

- Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) financial records.

ARRB staff plans to recommend to the Board that monthly summaries be considered ARs and the remaining material be designated NBR. Samples of these documents have been provided to DA, DO, and DCI/IRO. If you have any comments or objections, please forward them to me by COB Wednesday.

- Documents containing long lists of names, crypts, companies, etc. These include both Agency documents and notes of HSCA staffers. (FYI - no action required at this time)

The ARRB staff will ask the Board to delay processing of such documents and, in some cases, declare them NBR. The staff considers them marginal to the story and believes that they are not worth the time involved.

(S) 2. We need to advise the ARRB staff no later than COB 12 November (Wednesday), if we plan to brief the Board on Warrenton and/or State Cover. Written evidence is due to ARRB staff by COB 13 November (Thursday). They need at least one day to review the material and prepare their presentations for the Board.

CC: Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Becky Rant @ DA

13-00000

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

21 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
Linda Cipriani @ DCI

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: ARRB meeting 17 November - Results

REFERENCE:

1. Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton as CIA Records Center:

The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration; postponed until 2017.

2. CIA use of State Cover:

The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive; released.

This determination affects 16 documents (3 duplicates) that were pending Board action. Future documents will be impacted by this decision. Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and OGC for reconsideration/appeal review.

3. Release date of Nosenko NBR records:

The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the right to review and appeal at that time.

4. Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) Financial Records:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that only "General Statement for Month" records for January 1960 and to January 1995 be processed as Assassination Records, and that the approximately 6,000 remaining pages of financial records be declared to have "no believed relevance (NBR)" to the JFK assassination.

5. *Ramparts* Damage Assessment Document:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that the paragraphs on the one relevant organization be processed as a assassination record, and that the remainder of the CIA *Ramparts* Memorandum be declared NBR. The memorandum discusses the truth or fallacy of the allegations in *Ramparts* the Agency used non-governmental organizations for support and funding of worldwide anti-Communist operations. Over one hundred organizations are mentioned in the *Ramparts* article. The relevant organization is the International Rescue Committee; the IRC aided Oswald on his return to the US.

6. Book Cables Dissemination Lists:

The Board accepted the Agency's request that book cable dissemination list be protected in full even if they contain stations that are releasable.

7. Document # 104-10072-10232:

The Board rejected the Agency's request to protect the full crypt (LINLUCK). The document has been sent to the DO for reconsideration/appeal review.

8. Other Documents:

The Board accepted the Agency's and ARRB staff's recommendations on 204 additional documents.

Reconsideration and Appeals:

If the Agency wishes to ask the Board to reconsider a decision or plans to appeal to the President, the ARRB staff has requested that it be notified prior to the letter to the Agency informing the DCI of the Board's decision. We expect the letter on or around Dec. 1st; the Board's determinations will also be published in the Federal Register on that date. As mandated by the White House, the Agency has seven days after notification to appeal a JFK Board decision to the President.

CC: Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
Becky Dyer @ DA

Sent on 21 November 1997 at 05:04:45 PM

13-00000

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
OFFICE:
DATE: 10/10/97 12:10:24 PM
SUBJECT: Nosenko Records

I have reviewed the descriptions of the folders proposed by the ARRB Staff. While I see this as a success to have them support our position and have some concern about the detail included within the descriptions. We had an occasion in the past to ask for a legal opinion about a former employee's access rights to Nosenko's file and were told he is entitled protection under the Privacy Act. Nosenko has already personally expressed (in a letter to the Agency) his concern and objection about potential release of information about him. I think we should carefully consider the amount of detail included in the public release and whether it violates his rights under the Privacy Act.

I trust the judgment of those that have reviewed these descriptions as to content in relationship to other released material and classification but I just want to raise a mild concern about the detail contained in the descriptions of folder content. I will not object to the these if everyone feels compelled to accept them to protect the success we have achieved as long as they are determined to not be in violation of his privacy rights.

In future efforts to protect NBR information, I would like to see less detail in the description if at all possible.

CC: Eileen M. Wukitch @ DO, Lee E. Carley @ DO
Sent on 10 October 1997 at 12:10:24 PM

Classification of Material Transmitted

HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

Phone # 703-613-1806

PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

****

CLASSIFIED FAX

SUBJECT: Nosenko

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson

SENDING FAX NO. 703-613-3060

DELIVER TO: Dennis Lamb

RECEIVING FAX NO. 893-4346

DATE TRANSMITTED: 10/10 PAGES TRANSMITTED: 7
(including cover sheet)

TRANSMITTED BY: N. Douglas

****

MESSAGE:

Classification of Material Transmitted

MEMORANDUM

October 9, 1997

To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director

From: Michelle Combs MC

Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts, memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800 contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities, and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the Hart Report will also be processed for release.

The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released, which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and identified for processing and review.

NBR Folder Summaries

Each folder also contains an HSCA signature sheet. At least one member of the HSCA reviewed all but the last of the folders listed below.

Reel 45, Folder 3

During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career, and Komsomol experiences.

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and procedures, military personalities and procedures, and his (then current) incarceration by the CIA.

Reel 45, Folder 5

This folder contains one 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division (C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Reel 45, Folder 8B

This folder contains a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on inconsistencies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" written by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Branch (DC/SB) in 1967. The document records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

Reel 45, Folder 17

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to the abbreviations in the transcript is also included in this folder.

Reel 45, Folder 19

This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko's biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the KGB.

Reel 45, Folder 20

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 21

This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komsomol and Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 24

This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 45, Folder 25

This folder contains pages 85-348, part V, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 46, Folder 2A

This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 46, Folder 2B

This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have already been released to the public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogation sessions with Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965; an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief SR/CI on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.

Reel 46, Folder 3

This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the handling of the Nosenko case by the Clandestine Service. The Hart Report endorses the conclusions reached in October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide defector.

Reel 46, Folder 5

This folder contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there. Some documents in this folder have been released to the public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 "homework assignment" prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces and a four page memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.

Reel 62, Folder 2

This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.

Reel 62, Folder 3

This folder contains a 74 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress and a disciplinary problem and its resulting impact on his promotion schedule.

Reel 62, Folder 5

This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 6

This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Perter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 7

This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 8

This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko responds that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.

Reel 62, Folder 9

The folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.

Reel 62, Folder 10

This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Safe." This folder was not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various US Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to day handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for political asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor, and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his handling.

Combs e:\nosenko4.wpd
File 4.20.5, 4.0.2, and 2.4

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

September 22, 1998

To: Laura Denk
Executive Director

cc: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader

From: Michelle Combs Michelle Combs
Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject: Working Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Containing Information Not Believed Relevant to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Previously, the Review Board voted to declare NBR approximately 2400 pages of material on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA sequestered collection microfilm unrelated to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board staff has since examined an additional two boxes of working files on Nosenko produced as a result of the search for records related to the Kennedy assassination. This material either duplicates or is the original copy of the sequestered collection microfilm material previously declared NBR. For example, many of the original tapes from which transcripts were produced are found in the working files. The Board previously declared the transcripts, which are found in the sequestered collection microfilm, to be NBR. The files contain no new material which would add to the understanding of the Nosenko story.

I recommend that the Board declare the contents of the two boxes of working files on Nosenko to be NBR.

e:\combs\nbr\nosenko.wpd
File 2.4, 4.0.2, and 4.20.5

CI-277-94
31 August 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

1. On 3 August I had a series of discussions with the staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) at the Center's office in the Ames Building. Our discussion centered on the disposition of more than 3,200 pages relating to the career of former KGB officer--and current CIA independent contractor--Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. The documents are being reviewed for declassification and release as required by the JFK law.

2. The Declassification Problem: CSI's declassification staff has carefully reviewed the Nosenko material. Ellie Neiman--a career Directorate of Operations officer--is representing the DO in the review process. Ms. Neiman noted that the material can be divided into two parts:

- Approximately 800 pages that deal with Nosenko's information about Lee Harvey Oswald's life in the Soviet Union and his relationship with the KGB.

- A body of counterintelligence staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews, and bona fides studies on Nosenko totaling some 2,400 pages. These studies contain sensitive personal and operational material. For example:

    -- Information on how CIA conducted operations in Moscow ("sticks and bricks"), material on how bona fides analysis is conducted, and details on how we evaluated the KGB's operations.

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DRV HUM 4-82

SUBJECT: Discussions with the Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

-- Extensive personal details on US citizens the KGB assessed and pitched (approximately 100 cases) and on Americans Moscow Station used as assets. One US citizen the KGB developed is now a senior professor of history in California.

3. **Nosenko's Sensitivities:** I discussed with Ms. Neiman Nosenko's concern about the impact of the release of information on his personal life. I informed her of Nosenko's recent letter to the DCI complaining about the release of material related to his association with CIA, and of his concern that future releases would endanger his privacy and security. The bona fides studies dwell in great detail on Nosenko's personal life, including his problems with venereal disease and his relationships with women. Since the bona fides were based on detailed analyses of Nosenko's life, their release would reveal modus operandi of sensitive clandestine operations and further embarrass a man who has served as a CIA employee for more than three decades.

4. Following my discussions with Ms. Neiman, I met with John Pereira, Acting Director of CSI, and Barry Harrelson, a member of his staff. I recommended that CIA move to release the material dealing with Oswald, but--citing the operational costs, embarrassment to prominent American citizens, and threat to Nosenko's privacy--strongly suggested that the other material be held back. Mr. Pereira agreed to take these points into consideration, noting that the law did allow CIA to withhold certain information to protect national security or for reasons of privacy. He told me in closing that later this year the Agency would have to justify to the Congressionally-mandated review board the reasons for withholding. I promised that I would raise the issue with the Chief of the Counterintelligence Center and said I believed we could provide the justification.

Robert Pringle

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

CONCUR:

/s/ 2 Sept 94

John Pereira (AD/CSI) Date

/s/ 2 Sept 94

Barry Harrelson (CSI) Date

/s/ 6 Sept 94

Ellie Neiman Date

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of
Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko

DO/CIC/AG/FIOB/RPringle:ek/76246 (31 Aug 94)

Distribution:
Orig - John Pereira, Barry Harrelson, Ellie Neiman
for Concurrence and Return to CIC/AG
1 - AD/CSI
✓1 - CSI (Harrelson)
1 - Neiman
1 - C/CIC Chrono
1 - CIC/AG Chrono
1 - CIC/AG Defector File

of the factors I had to consider in connection
ed it, and I will continue to accept it until some
idence, not opinion.
gs that Nosenko states is that the KGB never
They didn't interview Oswald when Oswald stat
ey didn't interview Oswald when they decided
d sent him to Minsk.
your knowledge of Nosenko, based on your knowl
d on your knowledge of KGB procedures and tech
credible when he says they never interviewed

what is meant by interview, a formal interview,
KGB headquarters, if that is what is meant—
ring to is a KGB officer speaking face to face with
g himself as a KGB officer, but speaking to him
hooses, Nosenko says that never happened. My
is credible?
best of his knowledge, I will have to—I will

cept that?
ppen.
the KGB didn't have a large book on him.
er done to check out the feasibility of statements
ing to see what the experiences of other defectors
debriefed by KGB officers? Was that ever done,

individual had been interviewed for some other
the Oswald case because the Oswald investigation

some who were in Russia in a proximate period
d, it is very possible. You would almost have to
eriod of time because the international situation
e comparison should be within the approximate

how many lie detector tests, to your knowledge?

y or all of these tests to have been valid?
test to be a completely valid test; that is, the
u be in actual discussion concerning the poly-
se from our office because I am not an operator.
nd I will only confine myself to questions relat-
lie detector information into your report.
onsider them to be valid, is that correct?
ly to not be valid, to be completely invalid.
y that Lee Harvey Oswald was a minor aspect
bona fides?

cterize the Oswald aspect?
rt to be considered.
it received the full consideration and the
Lee Harvey Oswald aspect?
us amount of investigation done in 1964.
en that Nosenko was not truthful in his rela-
rvey Oswald, would that be significant as to
s bona fide?
I would have to consider.
sible that he could be lying about Oswald and

e was lying about Oswald.

he was lying about Oswald, do you think that
whether he was bona fide?

V. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978

INTRODUCTION

Having heard from Nosenko and from an intelligence officer who believed him to be bona fide, the committee spoke to the CIA official who had overall responsibility for the interrogation of Nosenko during the years 1964–67, when Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement. Among other things, he was asked about the reason Nosenko was placed in solitary confinement, about why he questioned Nosenko's credibility, and about Nosenko's charge that his statements to the Agency were inaccurate because he had been drugged by the Agency. Portions of that transcript follow.

EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978

Mr. KLEIN. When Nosenko defected in 1964, when he came to the United States, was he in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't want to be cute by saying I believe so. I am not exactly sure of the legal—I mean what his legal status was. Insofar as physical facts, he was in the custody of the IO.

Mr. KLEIN. What division or unit of the Central Intelligence Agency had primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. The Soviet Russian Division.

Mr. KLEIN. Of which you were the Chief?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. And what year did you leave the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. MURPHY. Beginning in 1968.

Mr. KLEIN. And up until what year did the Soviet Russia Division have primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't recall the exact time but it was certainly up until the spring of 1967.

Mr. KLEIN. The investigation by Bruce Solie began at the end of 1967. At that time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change from the Soviet Russia Division to another division?

Mr. MURPHY. My recollection is that it changed in the spring or early summer of 1967 and the responsibility was turned over to the Office of Security of which Solie was a member.

Mr. KLEIN. As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you have the primary responsibility for what happened to Nosenko? And when I say happened, where he was kept, what he was asked?

Mr. MURPHY. I was responsible for the case.

Mr. KLEIN. OK.

Mr. MURPHY. Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the Division.

Mr. KLEIN. But they would report to you?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

* * * * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. There came a time in 1964, April 4, I believe, when the treatment received by Nosenko greatly changed in that hostile interrogations began, is that correct?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of the question.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, elaborate.

Mr. MURPHY. No; the previous pattern of voluntary discussion of issues under consideration changed and Nosenko was not permitted to evade questions or to decide when he would or would not want to respond.

Mr. KLEIN. Could you describe for us what the pattern was before, as far as conditions and how it was changed?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much permitting Nosenko to call the shots. In other words, we wanted his cooperation and we wanted to discuss these things in a reasonable manner, but his preference was not to sit still for a full day's briefing, to want to go out socially all the time, which made it difficult the next day to continue to work. And the most important aspect, I think, of the change was the decision to confront him with inconsistencies as opposed to taking what he said and passing it on.

Mr. KLEIN. What about the day-to-day living conditions, were they changed?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, he was not permitted to leave. He was not permitted to depart.

Mr. KLEIN. Other than that, his day-to-day treatment, not the actual interrogation sessions, but his food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't think so, not that early. I don't remember that.

* * * * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that Nosenko was interrogated by people from the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Mr. KLEIN. And how were the particular subareas on which he was interrogated chosen?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure. I don't know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is a recollection, but I think the decision was made based on what the CIA people thought offered the best opportunity to get an admission and to break on that. In other words, I think it was based on points that they had collateral on. By that I mean other information which said what this man is saying is not the truth or this man does not know about this and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this. And so it was a fully tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to possession of information in the hands of the interrogators which then offered the best opportunity to get through and get the truth.

One breakthrough it was felt, as is normally the case, gives you other breakthroughs. The decision on what subjects to be interrogated was essentially a factor of the tactics of the debriefing.

Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to say that after April 4 the subject areas were determined by a desire to try to catch him, to break him, as opposed to a desire to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence agency? In other words, knowledge of the operation.

Mr. MURPHY. That is an accurate impression. The answer is yes because by the end of April there was a view that the man was not telling the truth, that parts of what he was saying were known to be untrue and that, therefore, made no sense, and although the reasons for his behavior and his statements were not clear, it made no sense then, it did not appear to make sense to accept as valid any data he might provide unless you could be sure that that data was in fact correct, and there were so many doubts about this, leaving aside the motivation for it, the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that the information was not considered acceptable.

* * * * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko had to say about Oswald?

Mr. MURPHY. From the very first. I mean, when he first said it back in February or March.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall now the substance of it?

Mr. MURPHY. No; not exactly, anything I said would be polluted by so much back and forth. I know that the thrust of the message was that Oswald was never of interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed by them, and I can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the affair. There is more detail, but I can't really pin it down.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you accept this statement by Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. I did not. I did not believe that it would be possible for the Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959 in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an active U–2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It was only later, I think, that as the Nosenko case and its other ramifications began to emerge that it seemed to me that the Oswald story became even more unusual.

I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost to have been tacked on or to have been added as though it didn't seem to be part of the real body of

efore was one of pretty much permitting
words, we wanted his cooperation and we
reasonable manner, but his preference was
ng, to want to go out socially all the time,
o continue to work. And the most important
decision to confront him with inconsisten-
id and passing it on.
lay living conditions, were they changed?
rmitted to leave. He was not permitted to

-to-day treatment, not the actual interroga-
recreation, was that changed at that time?
that early. I don't remember that.

* * * *

is it correct that Nosenko was interrogated
sion?

ular subareas on which he was interrogated

know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is
n was made based on what the CIA people
to get an admission and to break on that.
on points that they had collateral on. By
aid what this man is saying is not the truth
and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this.
ere tactical considerations relating to pos-
f the interrogators which then offered the
et the truth.
normally the case, gives you other break-
ts to be interrogated was essentially a fac-

that after April 4 the subject areas were
him, to break him, as opposed to a desire
use to you in your role as an intelligence
the operation.
impression. The answer is yes because by
t the man was not telling the truth, that
wn to be untrue and that, therefore, made
or his behavior and his statements were
id not appear to make sense to accept as
s you could be sure that that data was in
doubts about this, leaving aside the moti-
e way in which he presented it, that the
able.

* * * *

bstance of what Nosenko had to say about

ean, when he first said it back in February

stance of it?
ing I said would be polluted by so much
st of the message was that Oswald was
nce Services, that he was never debriefed
ecause I was personally involved in the
eally pin it down.
ent by Nosenko?
elieve that it would be possible for the
mained indifferent to the arrival in 1959
perator who had served at what was an
t to be strange. It was only later, I think,
r ramifications began to emerge that it
me even more unusual.
eems to me almost to have been tacked on
dn't seem to be part of the real body of

the other things that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand that Nosenko was—much of what he said was true.

Mr. Klein. You are talking about other areas?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn't have much relationship, and it seemed to be so totally dependent on not just one coincidence but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have been there and all that sort of thing. That is what I mean.

* * * * * * *

Mr. Klein. Do you recall any other specifics about what you could not accept in Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, that they just—this is part of the first one—no contact was ever made, that he went up to Minsk and lived happily and well with no contact. The Soviet Union with foreigners don't do that. I mean, he is the only person. Read the accounts of what happened to this poor gentleman, what happened to Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive debriefing of him on the layout of the American Embassy. It didn't seem to be possible.

Now, again, that does not constitute proof, doesn't constitute any breakthrough. It seemed to me to be strange.

Mr. Klein. Would you distinguish between first the fact that nobody debriefed Oswald when he first came to the Soviet Union, nobody tried to find out what he knew as a marine, as a radar operator, and, second, the fact that once they decided to allow him to stay, nobody debriefed him to find out if he was some kind of a Western security agent or working for CIA?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, they would be two different points. The first point clearly involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply a chap arriving with this background and no one taking the time just from a military intelligence technical point of view, telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000 feet what did the blips look like. I don't think they had many American radar operators handling operational traffic involving U-2's.

Mr. Klein. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko that although the KGB knew Oswald was a marine, they did not bother to question him, and because of that, never knew that he was a radar operator or that he worked at the base from which the U-2's took off and landed?

Mr. Murphy. I think it would be strange.

My other point, going back to your first question, that is, the first aspect of your question, which is the initial arrival and lack of debriefing. There is no indication here that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector, there is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be properly the outfit that would want to be talking to any marine. They will talk to a marine about close order drill. You follow me? It doesn't require that he be known to have been a radar operator or that he be known to have been a—they would talk to him about his military affiliation just as we would.

I realize that there is a body of thought which says that some people think the Soviets are 10-foot tall. I don't believe they are. I think they are very, very, very much the other way. What I find difficult on the part of many Americans is that they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same elemental competence that we have. That is all I ask. And, therefore, we in Germany will talk to a private in the East German Border Guards, period. The GRU would be interested in talking to a private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated to a consul in a consular office, which is manned by the Soviets, Soviet locals and what have you, fully accessible to the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the Embassy, that he wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell all. I guess I found it difficult to believe this is one of the things that made, or many other aspects of the case, but this is one of the things that created an atmosphere of disbelief that there must be something to this case that is important, vitally important to the Soviet Union and we can't understand it.

Yuri may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was very hard to believe.

* * * * * * *

Mr. Klein. And on the basis of your experience and knowledge gained over almost 30 years, is that what is giving you trouble with Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. And other things.

Mr. Klein. Do you know of comparable situations where somebody wasn't questioned like this, was just left alone, as Nosenko says Oswald was?

Mr. MURPHY. I honestly couldn't find anyone, or I am not aware of anyone that the division or the CI Staff, that is, those officers concerned with this case, were handling it directly. I don't know of any former Soviet intelligence officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about this matter who felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it.

Mr. KLEIN. During this interrogation period, beginning in April 1964, would it be fair to say that the questions relating to Oswald and the problems which you have just been discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area for questioning and in interrogating Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. Probaby not.

Mr. KLEIN. Why would that have been?

Mr. MURPHY. Because there were many other areas which posed equally interesting aspects yet about which we knew much more and which had occurred abroad and involved collateral knowledge, which obviously is not easy for us to obtain in the Soviet Union.

Mr. KLEIN. Who in the Soviet Russia division made the decision as to who would question Nosenko, subsequent to April 4?

Mr. MURPHY. [CIA employee], chief of the group.

Mr. KLEIN. And do you know of any criteria that he used to pick his interrogators?

Mr. MURPHY. Some knowledge of Russian, as Nosenko's English was not good, the fact that he had been exposed. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CIA interrogation. You try not to use too many people because you then lose. In the first place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy who is liable to go back to the Soviet Union, or return to the other side, and so you don't want to expose too many officers, plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot of people in. You have to have people who studied the case and became in depth, know it in depth and therefore, so they use the officers that they had available and there were a variety of criteria.

Mr. KLEIN. As I mentioned to you in our conversations about a week ago, it is our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald matter had no background whatsoever in Oswald, he didn't know anything about Oswald's background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason that such a person would be used that you can tell us?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had, he was not a man of a lot of background in the CI debriefings or interrogations. I wasn't sure of the point he didn't know about Oswald. I am not sure very many of us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time.

Mr. KLEIN. Two points——

Mr. MURPHY. The reason that the chap was chosen was because he was levelheaded, extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the long pull. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And his career since then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good officer.

Mr. KLEIN. But wouldn't——

Mr. MURPHY. I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't what you are saying, he knew nothing at all about Oswald's case. I find that difficult to believe. But I don't know.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical situation, where I told you the officer who interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other than what he learned from Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that they would not, if they didn't have somebody already who knew about Oswald, at least given somebody a thorough briefing from A to Z, everything that the CIA knew about Oswald, would you think it was unusual, that they didn't do that?

Mr. MURPHY. I would certainly think so.

Mr. KLEIN. The second part of my question was the other point I made to you a week ago when we spoke, to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the particular officer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is gained from that, it is possible that since I have not seen the typed up deposition that what I say might not be exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is that he also had little or no prior interrogation experience, and my question is would that be——

Mr. MURPHY. That wouldn't surprise me because there were very few people, relatively few people, in the Division or indeed elsewhere who had a lot of interrogation experience. We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA debriefings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad,

one, or I am not aware of anyone
those officers concerned with this
of any former Soviet intelligence
om they spoke about this matter
omeone did, I never heard of it.
od, beginning in April 1964, would
o Oswald and the problems which
Oswald constituted a major area

er areas which posed equally inter-
ich more and which had occurred
hich obviously is not easy for us

sion made the decision as to who
4?
oup.
ria that he used to pick his inter-

is Nosenko's English was not good,
t is one of the aspects of the CIA
ople because you then lose. In the
ly hostile guy who is liable to go
her side, and so you don't want to
t a good idea to simply bring a lot
died the case and became in depth,
he officers that they had available

nversations about a week ago, it is
gated Nosenko about the Oswald
swald, he didn't know anything
swald at all. Is there any reason
an tell us?
thought the point was that he had,
e CI debriefings or interrogations.
bout Oswald. I am not sure very
an was available at the time.

chosen was because he was level-
ing to be with the case for the
hat is why he was used. And his
f many, he is a very good officer.

at he wasn't what you are saying,
find that difficult to believe. But I

a hypothetical situation, where I
knew nothing about Oswald other
you think that was unusual that
lready who knew about Oswald, at
a A to Z, everything that the CIA
unusual, that they didn't do that?

was the other point I made to you
, let me be frank, we spoke to the
r knowledge is gained from that,
ped up deposition that what I say
s, but my recollection of it is that
perience, and my question is would

cause there were very few people,
eed elsewhere who had a lot of
of very many hostile CIA debrief-
probably otherwise, either abroad,

might have had experience, but I know it might sound strange. There just wasn't squads and squads of highly trained fluent Russian speaking CI experienced interrogators.

Mr. **Klein.** One thing I would point out to you is that I have listened to a number of tapes, and all of the ones I have listened to were totally in English, there was no Russian.

Mr. **Murphy.** Yes.

Mr. **Klein.** My question is, was the questioning of Nosenko considered a major operation in the Bureau in 1964?

Mr. **Murphy.** It was an important operation, an important case.

Mr. **Klein.** And yet there was nobody with interrogation experience who could be used to interrogate him?

Mr. **Murphy.** I am sure some of the people had interrogation experience. I mean [CIA employee] himself had a lot of background in this field. I can't explain why the officer who debriefed him on Oswald did not have prior briefing on Oswald except what I mentioned to you the other day, because it was not a thing that we thought we were going to get through on, because we were weak in that area at that time.

* * * * * * *

Mr. **Klein.** Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?

Mr. **Murphy.** Not to my knowledge.

Mr. **Klein.** Were there ever any conversations in which you took part about whether to give him drugs in order to get him to tell the truth?

Mr. **Murphy.** There were many, many conversations all the time about various things that could be done, all the techniques that are known, to get him to talk, but as far as I know and in discussions with the medical officer who handled the case, there was never any decision made or any attempt made to use these, because none of them appeared to be likely to produce results and they all would be very harmful and, therefore, not produce results.

Mr. **Klein.** Between 1964 and 1967 when you lost control over the case, in those years, it is your statement that if any drugs were given to him, to get him to tell the truth, you would have known about it, and no such thing happened?

Mr. **Murphy.** That is correct.

* * * * * * *

Mr. **Klein.** Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie detector test in 1964, in April?

Mr. **Murphy.** Yes, sir.

Mr. **Klein.** Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. **Murphy.** It indicated he was lying on several key points.

Mr. **Klein.** Do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. **Murphy.** No.

Mr. **Klein.** Are you aware that he was given a second lie detector test in 1966?

Mr. **Murphy.** Yes.

Mr. **Klein.** Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. **Murphy.** Same thing.

Mr. **Klein.** And do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. **Murphy.** No; I believe the operator who gave him the test in 1966 was the same operator who gave him the test in 1964.

Mr. **Klein.** That is correct.

V. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES C. MICHAELS AND ALEKSO POPTANICH, AUGUST 11, 1978, BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In a further effort to clear up the facts surrounding Nosenko's claims that his statements to the CIA should not be used to impeach his present testimony, the committee took depositions from FBI and CIA agents who were present during the 1964 interviews. These agents were

13-00000

H/c
E
842.9
U53
vol. 3
copy 2

INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1978

VOLUME III

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-372 O WASHINGTON : 1979

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

I have read the foregoing pages one through sixty-six, inclusive, which contain a correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded. Signature is subject to corrections.

/S/Nicholas Katzenbach

rchigiani , Notary Public in and for the
do hereby certify that I am notarizing
re for the deposition of Mr. Nicholas
th day of February 1979 .

/S/Flora A. Marchigiani
Notary Public in and for the
County of Westchester
State of New York

On September 25, 1978, Mr. Katzenbach mailed to the committee the following letter supplementing his testimony:

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Old Orchard Road, Armonk, New York 10504

September 25, 1978

The Honorable Louis Stokes
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
331 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my testimony before the Committee on Thursday, September 21, I stated that I had absolutely no recollection of meeting with Mr. Helms with respect to the Nosenko case. I understand that Mr. Helms said there was such a meeting, and it took place on April 2, 1964.

On my return to my office this morning I checked on the notes of meetings which were kept by my secretary, and they confirm Mr. Helms' recollection. I am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the calendar. Although it is clear from this page that there was such a meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and therefore cannot tell you what was discussed beyond what is stated in the calendar itself.

It was not my custom to make notes on such meetings, and I doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by me. However it is possible that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such notes. I believe Mr. Foley is now deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now a judge in the District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have some recollection of the meeting.

I had, prior to my testimony, checked my calendar diary for the period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investigation to go as far as April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While this calendar does not refresh my recollection and therefore would not change my testimony, it did seem to me that in fairness to both the Committee and Mr. Helms I should make it available to you.

Respectfully yours,

cc: Mr. Gary Cornwell
Hon. Richard C. Helms
Edward Bennett Williams, Esq.

h my recollection and therefore would not
seem to me that in fairness to both the
hould make it available to you.

Respectfully yours,

s, Esq.

Thursday, April 2, 1964

Harold Reis	)	9:35 a.m.	SAW
Sol Lindenbaum	) Civil	9:35 a.m.	SAW
Joseph Dolan	) Rights	9:35 a.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff	) briefing	9:35 a.m.	SAW
John Douglas	)	9:35 a.m.	SAW
Jack Rosenthal	)	9:35 a.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall	)	9:35 a.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff		11:55 a.m.	SAW
William Foley		12:27 p.m.	SAW
William Orrick		1:50 p.m.	SAW
Marshal McShane		2:37 p.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff		3:10 p.m.	SAW
William Geoghegan		3:25 p.m.	SAW
Edgar Cahn, O.L.C.		3:30 p.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall		3:32 p.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall		4:07 p.m.	SAW
[Lawrence Houston, CIA		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[Richard Helms, CIA		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[David Murphy, CIA		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[J. Walter Yeagley		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[William Foley, Crim. Div.		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[Defector Case]			
Addressed Brandeis Univ. Students (40) in AG's office		4:40 p.m.	SAW
Sol Lindenbaum		6:45 p.m.	SAW
John Douglas		6:56 p.m.	SAW
William Orrick		7:06 p.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff		7:12 p.m.	SAW
Joseph Dolan		7:15 p.m.	SAW

Friday, April 3, 1964

John Duffner (White Motor)		9:15 a.m.	SAW
Sol Lindenbaum	)	9:30 a.m.	SAW
Harold Reis	) Civil	9:30 a.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff	) Rights	9:30 a.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall	) briefing	9:30 a.m	SAW
Jack Rosenthal	)	9:30 a.m.	SAW
Joseph Dolan	)	9:30 a m.	SAW

NdeBK to Puerto Rico 10:15 a.m.

HIC
E
842.
-U53
vol.4
copy 2

INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 22, 25, AND 26, 1978

VOLUME IV

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-373 O WASHINGTON : 1979

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Stock Number 052-070-04906-5

have a say in what happens with respect
ertainly was involved with decisions on
to end, but I was not the controlling

re were three major agency reports that
the Nosenko case; specifically there was
by the Soviet Russia Division, another
l the Office of Security report, and then a
red to as the Hart report.
ether you are familiar with all three of

ll any longer whether I read the first two
riefed on their contents. The Hart report
the agency in early February 1973 and I
onnections with it since.
ing his defection in 1964 and upon his
tes was Yuri Nosenko in the custody of

missed the question.
asking precisely during his defection in
in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko

. That was an accepted procedure under
eragency Defector Committee that defec-
ntry were handled by the CIA, through
esettling period, whatever had to be done

at the legal authority under which he

k that perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you
like to answer that question a little bit
dulge me.
nly.
go, on September 20, 1978, I received a
before this committee in executive ses-
reviewing that transcript I noted that,
er, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko's
between 1964 and 1969 in a number of
is an area of obvious interest to the
take this opportunity to describe my
t greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen-
entral Intelligence Agency was.
a lawyer nor a judge, so I was not
conclusions about Mr. Nosenko's tenure
e Agency. I'm sorry, I am not prepared.
Geneva, Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko re-
ed to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko's
npanied by a claim that he could give a
ee Harvey Oswald's contacts in connec-
Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union be-

e the significance that Yuri Nosenko's
vestigation of President Kennedy's as-
turned out to be a bona fide defector, if

this information were to be believed, then we could conclude that the KGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963 and therefore had nothing to do with President Kennedy's murder.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Nosenko had been programed in advance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information about Oswald's contacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November 1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy.

If it were shown that Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to the United States of America and, indeed, to the world, would have been staggering. Thus, it became a matter of the utmost importance to this Government to determine the bona fides of Mr. Yuri Nosenko. Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end of March it was clear to us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosenko's credibility would not be easy.

On April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of Plans, I, along with David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, and Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, met with Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach, then Deputy Attorney General of the United States; Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department; Mr. William E. Foley, who was then Mr. Yeagley's First Assistant in the Internal Security Division; and Mr. Harold F. Riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department.

The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach's office in the Justice Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosenko's legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency's ongoing custody of Mr. Nosenko.

The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing this meeting on April 2, 1964, and a second memorandum which reflects the substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following day, April 3, 1964. These documents were in part declassified by the Agency on September 18, 1978, and I would like to make them part of the record of these proceedings.

During the meeting of April 2, 1964, the Department of Justice was fully informed of Mr. Nosenko's status with the Agency and the Department's opinion was requested as to the scope of the Agency's ongoing authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko.

As Mr. Houston's memorandums relate, Mr. Nosenko's technical status in the United States was one of "exclusion and parole," which means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States but had also temporarily "paroled him" to the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It is my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that Mr. Nosenko would remain in the custody of the Agency unless it was determined whether Mr. Nosenko should be deported or whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States.

> statement of some employee or something. He was designated by the present Director to come here and present the story because he was supposed to be the most familiar with it since he had reviewed it for the CIA.
>
> He stated in substance, Mr. Nosenko was taken into custody in this country by the CIA after defection or after alleged defection, held in a so-called safe house on a diet of tea and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material. The guards were instructed neither to talk to him or smile to him. He was subjected to 48 hours at a crack interrogation. This being while they built a separate facility somewhere else in the country; namely, a device described by him as a bank vault, and then built a house around the bank vault to put this man in and then kept him there under the equivalent of some 3 years with that kind of thing, 1,277 days to be specific, at which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put him on their payroll and let him go.
>
> And then they gave as their—I questioned on the authority to do a thing like that. Did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Mr. Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK, that this would be legal.
>
> And I just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why—and I don't imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that you would not rather clearly remember the incident if it had occurred.
>
> **Mr. Katzenbach.** If the facts that you have just set forth to me, Congressman, had ever been made known to me, I would recollect it, I am certain; and I would hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that is claimed.
>
> **Mr. Saywer.** It makes me feel better about it. Thank you.
>
> That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Having heard Mr. Katzenbach's testimony of yesterday, can you reconcile his testimony to this committee with your statement just read to this committee?

Mr. Helms. I can only say, Mr. Stokes, that it is very hard to reconcile. I think the basic point at issue here is really whether the meeting with him took place at all. What happened after the meeting is something he was not responsible for as far as I am aware.

Let me read to you the memorandum for the record which Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel of CIA, wrote on April 3, 1964. I have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case.

It reads:

> Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter Yeagley, William E. Foley, and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr. Helms outlined the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opinion of the Justice representatives on what we could do to control the situation. I pointed out that his technical status is one of exclusion and parole—or more technically, deferment and parole.

Paragraph 2:

> After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representatives could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later confirmed this position by telephone.
>
> I in turn, after the meeting, reviewed the parole agreement and provided an interpretation thereof for Director of Security, a copy of which is attached hereto. Also, I informed Mr. Foley of this interpretation. Signed, Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel.

The attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It is signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. It is a memorandum for the director of security. That would be the officer who was the director of the security office of the Central Intelligence Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors:

> On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by INS—

Copyright 1993 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.
All rights reserved
ABC NEWS

SHOW: 20/20 (ABC 9:00 pm ET)

August 27, 1993

Transcript # 1337

TYPE: Show; Show

SECTION: News; Domestic

LENGTH: 8240 words

HEADLINE: Case Closed

GUESTS: MARK LANE, Author/Attorney; GERALD POSNER, Author, "Case Closed"; Dr. PEPPER JENKINS; Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas; URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent; ROBERT OSWALD, Brother

HIGHLIGHT:
Lynn Sherr reports on a new book about the JFK assassination, and interviews author Gerald Posner, who says computer enhancements prove LeeHarvey Oswald acted alone, and was not a Mafia or KGB agent.

BODY:
BARBARA WALTERS, ABC News: Good Evening. I'm Barbara Walters. Hugh Downs is on vacation. This is 20/20.

ANNOUNCER: From ABC News, around the world and into your home, the stories that touch your life, with Hugh Downs and Barbara Walters - this is 20/20.

Tonight, 30 years after the Kennedy assassination, will a powerful new book end the controversy once and for all? Investigative journalist Gerald Posner says he has the answers about Oswald, the magic bullet, and every conspiracy theory to come along. Lynn Sherr's explosive report - 'Case Closed.'

And-

SELMA SCHIMMEL, Breast Cancer Survivor: [sp?] Who is equipped to think of dying in your 20's or 30's?

ANNOUNCER: -if you think it only happens to older women, you're wrong.

KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.

ANNOUNCER: It's happening more and more, and doctors admit the younger you are, the harder it is to detect.

Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: Mammography can have an error rate of up to 40 percent in young women versus a rate of less than 15 percent in older women.

ANNOUNCER: For women in their 20's and 30's, Dr. Timothy Johnson has some shocking news - 'It Could Happen to You.'

Plus, can gay men be made straight? This therapist says he transforms homosexuals. This man once preferred men. Today, he's happy with his wife.

JOHN STOSSEL, ABC News: And now is sexuality an important part of your marriage.

RICHARD COHEN , Nicolosi Patient: Oh, yes. We have good sex, if that's what you're asking.

ANNOUNCER: Others claim treatment is helping them-

'ALEX,' Nicolosi Patient: For the first time in my life, you know, 30 years of my life, I feel alive.

ANNOUNCER: -but in the gay community, backlash.

GAY MAN: This is not a disease. There's no such thing as a cure.

ANNOUNCER: John Stossel brings you the hot debate over gay men. Are they 'Born or Bred?' Those stories tonight, August 27, 1993, after this brief message.

[Commercial break]

Case Closed

BARBARA WALTERS: The Kennedy assassination was back in the headlines all this week when more than 900,000 pages of previously classified government files were finally opened after nearly 30 years. And while close to half the current population wasn't even alive at the time, the controversy surrounding that event continues to haunt us all.

The fact is a majority of Americans don't believe the Warren Commission, and do believe some form of conspiracy was involved. But now, a powerful new book claims to have the last word. Its conclusion? Lee Harvey Oswald did indeed act alone. The book is titled Case Closed, but is it?

[voice-over] Whatever side you're on in this still-raging controversy, you'll want to see Lynn Sherr's report now.

LYNN SHERR, ABC News: [voice-over] No period in an American presidency has been as controversial, as thoroughly analyzed or as frequently written and speculated about as the final six seconds in John F. Kennedy's life.

1st NEWSCASTER: [?] Three shots were fired at the President's motorcade as it passed out of the downtown area of Dallas.

SHERR: [voice-over] No detail about the final moments of the President's life has been spared scrutiny. Every eyewitness account, ballistics test, photograph, medical conclusion and investigative finding has been challenged, reinterpreted or dismissed, then woven into countless theories. For three decades, an already skeptical American public has been left wondering if we would ever learn the truth about what happened in Dealey [sp?] Plaza on November 22, 1963.

MAN: [?] The President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, is dead. Let us pray.

SHERR: The official version of what happened is that from that sixth-floor corner window, acting alone, Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots, the third of which ended the life of America's 35th president. But that's too simple an explanation for a great many Americans, and for conspiracy theorists, far too convenient that one man alone did it. Doubters insist that the shot or shots that killed the President came from behind that fence on the grassy knoll, or from a railroad overpass just beyond.

MARK LANE, Author/Attorney: Shots came from at least two directions. A bullet hit the President in the back. A bullet hit him in the throat. It came from the front. A bullet hit him in the head. It came from the front. That was three shots. At least one bullet hit Governor Connolly [sp?], One bullet missed, struck the curb.

SHERR: [voice-over] Attorney/author Mark Lane, one of the most persistent and prolific of conspiracy theorists, has long insisted that the Warren Commission was wrong, and covered up critical evidence that might make it possible to identify the President's assassins.

Mr. LANE: Today, with hundreds of thousands of documents in the vaults of the CIA, the DI [?], and the FBI and the National Archives - which we can't see - the cover-up is continuing.

SHERR: [voice-over] But another lawyer-turned-author, Gerald Posner, says evidence available to researchers and conspiracy buffs for years led him directly to the only person who could possibly have shot the President.

GERALD POSNER, Author, 'Case Closed': Lee Harvey Oswald killed Jack Kennedy, acting alone.

SHERR: [voice-over] Posner, author of Case Closed, the culmination of a three-year, exhaustive reexamination of the Kennedy assassination, concedes that in identifying a familiar culprit, he's not likely to win over many conspiracy buffs. But he says the evidence didn't allow for any other suspects.

Mr. POSNER: Most people who have written conspiracy books started with their conclusion already done. They knew it was a conspiracy in their heart, and they went around to prove that case.

SHERR: [voice-over] One of the major assassination controversies Posner seeks to resolve is the number of shots fired, where they came from, and which ones struck the President. Using recently-developed computer enhancements of the home movie taken by Abraham Zapruder, Posner explained for 20/20 how he says he was able to count the shots, for which he says Oswald had more time than the Warren Commission believed.

Mr. POSNER: Oswald's first shot, which missed, was fired much earlier than anyone realized - just after the car turned the corner. Evidence of this is overlooked by most experts. It's in the film. In the upper righthand corner of your screen, you'll see a little girl. She's heard that shot and turned. In the car, the President and Mrs. Kennedy and the Governor also heard the shot and turned. After this shot, Oswald, still had over eight seconds, not five, for the next two.

The second shot is fired. This bullet hits both Kennedy and Connolly. After passing through Kennedy, you see it go through the Governor, as his suit lapel flaps forward. A computer technician discovered that crucial detail just last year.

SHERR: [voice-over] This is the so-called 'magic bullet' that seemed to zigzag through the two men.

Mr. POSNER: This computer animation illustrates that the second bullet needed no magic. Because of the way the two men were lined up, this bullet passed directly through them. It turned only after it slowed down and shattered Connolly's wrist - no zigs, no zags.

SHERR: How could that bullet have emerged so clean, with no flaws on it, really, whatsoever?

Mr. POSNER: I was skeptical about that bullet, and I think that was the thing that stops many people from believing Oswald did it alone. It emerged so clean because that it went through Kennedy, it slowed up. When it went through Connolly's chest, it slowed up. By the time it hit the big bone in his wrist, which everybody thinks would damage it, it was traveling at half or a third of its speed - fast enough to crush the bone, but not fast enough to deform the bullet.

SHERR: [voice-over] The sudden backward motion of the President's head as the third and final bullet struck, blowing away part of his skull, has led many to believe that the shot came from the front, but Posner says normal neurological reflexes make the body stiffen when struck, causing it to move back.

And Dr. Pepper Jenkins, one of the physicians attending the President at Parkland Hospital, points to yet another possible factor, the brace President Kennedy wore for his chronic back pain.

Dr. PEPPER JENKINS: He was so tightly wound into a brace that- the metal coming up his back, and he was tied to the metal or strapped to the metal with an Ace bandage.

SHERR: In the Zapruder film and in all the pictures we've seen- well, how do you describe what the body is doing, having seen the brace?

Dr. JENKINS: Well, I would think you couldn't fall forward. I think you'd have to fall backwards or aside.

SHERR: Because?

Dr. JENKINS: Because the brace held him in such a position.

2nd NEWSCASTER: [?] At approximately one o'clock, the President is dead. The doctors were working too frantically to revive him to notice the exact moment.

SHERR: [voice-over] Dr. Jenkins also has a very poignant memory of Mrs. Kennedy sometime standing next to him.

Dr. JENKINS: She had such a drawn look. I really feel like she was in shock, and she was just holding her hands, one above the other. And one of the times, she nudged me with her elbow and handed me something in her hand, which is part of his brain that obviously was in her lap- with his head in her lap as the car came to Parkland. Bad moment.

SHERR: [voice-over] After examining computer animation of the presidential limousine and its passengers, Posner sought to show where in Dealey Plaza, the shots came from.

Mr. POSNER: Kennedy and Connolly are placed into computer animation, and working back from their wounds, the computer determines the only possible location for the assassin, as indicated by the yellow shading. Notice that Oswald's sixth-floor window is right in the center of it.

Mr. LANE: Posner believes the magic-bullet theory. Next, I guess, we're going to hear about the Tooth Fairy. It's just mathematically impossible. No one has ever been able to recreate what it is said that Lee Harvey Oswald did.

SHERR: Well, they've done it- he's done it now with a computer enhancement-

Mr. LANE: I know that.

SHERR: -and he claims the computer shows that it's absolutely the way it happened.

Mr. LANE: Well, he's entitled to his computer. The American people were there, and they testified, and two-thirds of them said they know shots came from the wooden fence.

SHERR: [voice-over] What about that reported fourth shot fired from the grassy knoll? When the House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded in 1978 that there was a 95-percent certainty of such a shot, conspiracy theorists were heartened, but the committee's finding, according to Dallas Sheriff Jim Bowles [sp?], was based on a static-filled Dictabelt recording of a Dallas police motorcycle radio stuck in the on position. The sheriff says the motorcycle wasn't even in Dealey Plaza, but the committee heard four shots. We couldn't hear any.

[interviewing] You have a copy of that tape, right?

Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas: I certainly do.

SHERR: Why don't you play it, and let's take a listen. Is that a shot?

Sheriff BOWLES: No, that's the motorcycle slowing down, see?

SHERR: I didn't hear any shots.

Sheriff BOWLES: Neither has anyone else. They listened to the same belts we listened to, and they claimed to hear four shots.

SHERR: So where do you think the four shots came from on the House Select Committee's tape?

Sheriff BOWLES: You have to ask them.

Mr. POSNER: They clearly went down the wrong path. The National Academy of Sciences reviewed their work later, and pointed out all the flaws in it. They just made an error on that Dictabelt. There is no fourth shot. There's no shot at all, even, to hear.

SHERR: Even if people accepted the physical evidence gathered here in Dealey Plaza, and agreed that it tended to support the Warren Commission's findings, that would not end the speculation. Surveys show that most Americans doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, believing instead that he was either part of or himself became a victim of a conspiracy.

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: I didn't shot anybody, no, sir.

3rd NEWSCASTER: [?] Oswald has been shot!

SHERR: What about the Ruby- the Jack Ruby-organized crime connection? Clearly, there was a connection there.

Mr. POSNER: No question. As a matter of fact, I think the Warren Commission underplayed Jack Ruby's organized crime connections.

SHERR: Isn't there some evidence, then, that he might have been acting on their behalf to wipe out Oswald?

Mr. POSNER: Right. No. If he had a contract from organized crime, why didn't he shoot Oswald when he saw him for the first time two days earlier? On the day Ruby finally killed Oswald, it was only by chance that their paths crossed. He was not acting on behalf of organized crime. He was acting for his own motivation, this desire, as he thought, to be a hero in Dallas, that he would erase the stain and the stigma attached to the city that had been done by the President's murder.

SHERR: You're saying Jack Ruby acted all by himself, a lone-gunman theory once again?

Mr. POSNER: Without any doubt.

SHERR: [voice-over] Posner also explained his views on the many conspiracy theories about the assassination.

ROBERT F. KENNEDY: Did you say, 'That S.O.B., I'll break his back'?

JIMMY HOFFA: Who?

Mr. KENNEDY: You.

Mr. HOFFA: Who's the 'who'?

SHERR: The Mafia wanted the President killed, because that would get rid of Bobby Kennedy, who was going after organized crime.

Mr. POSNER: I would not be surprised if the Mafia, in 1962 or '63, sat at a table with some of its key henchman, and discussed killing President Kennedy. They did hate him. They might have even had a conspiracy afoot. There is no tie between Lee Harvey Oswald and organized crime. There's not opportunity for him to have been their assassin. In essence, he beat the Mafia to Kennedy.

SHERR: How about, as in the Oliver Stone movie, JFK, the military industrial complex?

Mr. POSNER: The movie, JFK, served what I call the kitchen sink. If you can't just have one of them, let's have everybody in the plot, because they all have some reason to knock off Kennedy.

JIM GARRISON: We have the mystery of the assassination of the President solved, and there is no question about it.

SHERR: What about the Garrison investigation?

Mr. POSNER: He had great delusions on the assassination. I think it's a disgrace. It was a travesty of justice, a miscarriage of justice. Garrison knew it. I discovered files of his investigation - documents, affidavits, memos from his investigators - which showed the extent of this scam that was pulled on the American public. Here was a man who knew better. I think his behavior actually crossed the line to being criminal.

SHERR: Is there any evidence- do you believe at all that Lee Harvey Oswald was working on behalf of the CIA to kill the President?

Mr. POSNER: No. I don't believe the CIA had any connection, not only to kill the President, but they had no connection to Oswald at all. And the reason that I can say that so confidently to you is actually an unusual source. It's the KGB files. The KGB files, which had surveillance on Oswald for day in and day out for nearly two years in Russia, came to the conclusion that he was not a sleeper agent, that he had no American intelligence contact.

SHERR: [voice-over] So if Oswald wasn't working for the CIA, how about the KGB? After all, he spoke Russian, defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, married, a Russian, and lived in Minsk for two years.

Mr. POSNER: A popular early theory, popular that we now see in the documents just released this past week in Washington. The KGB was high on the CIA's possible list of targets. The KGB did not want Oswald from day one. They realized Oswald had problems, psychological problems.

URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent: [sp?] I do not think that Oswald will be trusted by any intelligence.

SHERR: [voice-over] Uri Nosenko is someone who might know. Before defecting to the United States in 1963, Nosenko was Oswald's KGB handler, and had access to his file. He insists Oswald never worked for the KGB. Still concerned about his own safety, Nosenko asked 20/20 not to show his face.

Mr. NOSENKO: Lee Harvey Oswald was mentally unstable.

SHERR: [voice-over] But unlike Posner, Nosenko says he doesn't believe Oswald could have shot the President for a very simple reason.

Mr. NOSENKO: In Minsk, he was shooting rabbits with shotgun. Would you believe it? He never shoot a single rabbit. And here we see person shooting rifle on a long distance, and shooting three, four shots in several seconds.

Mr. POSNER: He didn't get a rabbit, and therefore that's used as evidence that he couldn't kill the President? But talk to those who actually knew what Oswald was like with a gun, his brother who used to go out with him.

ROBERT OSWALD, Brother: We have shot cottontail rabbits with .22's on the run, okay? We've shot squirrels in the trees with .22's.

SHERR: [voice-over] Robert Oswald says his younger brother was always interested in guns. He still has the pistol Lee Oswald bought when he was 16.

Mr. OSWALD: My experience with him in the field with a shotgun or a .22 was he usually got his game.

SHERR: [voice-over] And Lee Harvey Oswald used the same rifle that killed the President only weeks earlier in a failed attempt to murder to retired Army general Edwin Walker. In other words, according to author Gerald Posner, Oswald, a loser in life, wanted to accomplish something.

MAN: [?] Lee Harvey Oswald, O, S, W, A, L, D.

REPORTER: Did you fire that rifle?

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: That's the facts that you people have been getting, but I emphatically deny these charges.

SHERR: [voice-over] If, as you say, Lee Harvey Oswald was not working with the mob or with the CIA or with the KGB or with the military industrial complex, why did he kill the President?

Mr. POSNER: I think that Oswald killed the President, because this was to be almost his fulfillment, his moment in the sun. Three days before Kennedy arrives in Dallas, he's given a gift on a silver platter. Jack Kennedy's going to pass in front of the Depository. It's not ideology, it's not because he's Communist, but it's because he has that opportunity to place himself in history. Here we are, 30 years later, talking about him. He was successful. He got his wish.

WALTERS: Well, there's a lot of proof. Is the case closed?

SHERR: Well, certainly, Gerald Posner believes so, but out experience is that people on the other side are so dug in, it's unlikely anything is going to change their mind. You know, even at Dealey Plaza, there are people just walking around, telling you what their theories are. And incidentally, Barbara, Dealey Plaza-

WALTERS: Which is where assassination took place.

SHERR: -which is where it took place-

WALTERS: Yeah.

SHERR: It's so much smaller in real life-

WALTERS: Really?

SHERR: -than it appears-

WALTERS: I think of it as a huge-

SHERR: Right.

WALTERS: -kind of highway.

SHERR: It's quite small, and Posner points out that if all the eyewitnesses who have come forward were in fact there that day, it would have been elbow to elbow. In fact, it was not very crowded that day.

WALTERS: Nine hundred thousand documents released this week- what, 10,000 more to come. Is that going to settle anything?

SHERR: Unlikely. That, however, is the one area where both sides agree - unclassify all those documents. Otherwise- and even so, this is going to be argued for generations to come.

WALTERS: Probably. Probably. Thank you, Lynn.

Next, most people feel that breast cancer only attacks women over the age of 50.

[voice-over] But Dr. Tim Johnson reports that more and more young women are discovering they have a special battle to fight. What should you know? After this.

[Commercial break]

It Could Happen to You

BARBARA WALTERS: The American Cancer Society's meetings on breast cancer are taking place in Boston this week, and from that conference come reports of a disturbing new trend - younger women diagnosed with the disease at a growing rate. Though diagnostic tests have improved over the years, breast cancer in younger women presents a special and quite serious set of problems.

[voice-over] And as Dr. Tim Johnson reports, if you are under 40, much of what you previous learned about the disease may not apply to you.

TERESA ROBERSON, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had lumps before, they were all- they turned out to be cysts. But I knew this was different.

GAYLE RUSSELL, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had no history of any type of cancer in my family, so I was very surprised.

KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.

Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: [voice-over] A disease they thought they were too young to get, but more and more, the woman on the

LEVEL 1 - 15 OF 80 STORIES

Copyright 1993 Chicago Tribune Company
Chicago Tribune

October 3, 1993 Sunday, FINAL EDITION

SECTION: TEMPO; Pg. 1; ZONE: C

LENGTH: 1949 words

HEADLINE: THE CASE AGAINST CONSPIRACY;
GERALD POSNER, ACTING ALONE, HAS WOUNDED THE JFK COVER-UP INDUSTRY

BYLINE: By Paul Galloway, Tribune Staff Writer.

BODY:
The rendezvous was arranged for a weeknight last fall at a Turkish restaurant near CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. The proprietor would be expecting him.

When author Gerald Posner said he was there to meet George and his wife, as he had been instructed to do, the proprietor led Posner and his wife, Trisha, to a private table in the back room.

George was the code name for Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 and now lives under another name in an undisclosed part of the country. Posner was researching a book about the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and Nosenko had agreed to speak for the first time exclusively about the Soviet intelligence agency's surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald during his stay in the Soviet Union from late 1959 until June 1962. Nosenko had suggested that he and Posner bring their wives, Posner said, because the sight of two couples dining together would serve as cover for their interview.

"Yuri supervised the Oswald file in Moscow and was familiar with the KGB files on Oswald's time in Minsk, which I had seen," Posner said. "I knew he could be extremely helpful in reconstructing that period of Oswald's life."

A chapter in Posner's new book, "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK," is devoted to Nosenko and his assessments of Oswald.

As the title suggests, Posner finds Oswald to be Kennedy's assassin, acting alone, just as the Warren Commission said. Further, he was not a CIA agent, not a KGB agent, not an innocent patsy but a sociopath and loser who had grandiose notions of making a mark in history.

Posner is as surprised at the book's conclusion as the conspiracy buffs are riled.

"I'm getting some very personal, vindictive calls from the conspiracy people. If it's any consolation, I never set out to do a book that would say here is the final answer, here is who did it," Posner said during a visit to Chicago.

Posner's intention was to write a primer of sorts about the assassination after examining the welter of conspiracy theories to see what was credible and what wasn't.

Poking in the garbage

"When you read all the conspiracy books, it's apparent they can't all be right because they flatly contradict each other," he said. "I knew there was garbage on the record. I didn't know how much."

After he debunked as many inaccuracies and false leads as he could, he assumed there would be some issues that would require further investigation, perhaps questions about acoustics or ballistics or possible Mafia involvement.

Yet toward the end of his research, Posner notified Bob Loomis, his editor at Random House, that he had taken an unexpected turn.

"I was convinced the Warren Commission had gotten it right. The evidence was overwhelming," he said.

Posner also was aware, of course, that a large majority of the populace thinks the Warren Commission had gotten it wrong, maybe on purpose.

He got a feel for such skepticism when Loomis, vice president and executive editor of Random House, took his own poll at the next meeting of the publishing house's top editors, who periodically gather to report on works in progress.

"Bob told them about what I'd found and asked how many believed the Warren Commission was right," Posner said. "Remember, these are some of the brightest, best-informed, best-educated people in New York City, and no one raised a hand except Bob Loomis."

Posner was not dismayed. "When people cite polls showing 70 or 80 or even 90 percent of the public as believing the assassination was the result of a conspiracy, I say I'm surprised it's not 100 percent when you consider that people have essentially heard only one side for three decades."

'JFK' an 'abomination'

A 1978 congressional investigation estimated that 2,000 books, including those that are self-published, had been written on the subject. All but a handful present a variety of sometimes-elaborate scenarios about plotters, motives, killers and cover-ups, and as a rule, the conspiracy books make bestseller lists, while the others don't.

"Then there are the TV documentaries, which are invariably pro-conspiracy," Posner said. "A recent one was a five-hour British film for Arts & Entertainment called 'The Men Who Killed Kennedy.' "

And most influential of all, he said, is Oliver Stone's $50 million movie, "JFK," released in late 1991.

"Half of our country's present population weren't born (as of) November 1963. Stone's movie is a historical abomination that's filled with demonstrable falsehoods, but to young people, it's a documentary.

"Even if they read articles criticizing it, they say, 'Well, Stone may have exaggerated, but there's got to be something there.' Believe it or not, there's not."

What's especially galling, Posner said, is that Stone based his movie on the investigation of former New Orleans District Atty. Jim Garrison, including his prosecution of businessman Clay Shaw as an alleged conspirator.

"Garrison's prosecution of Clay Shaw was disgraceful, criminal and has been thoroughly discredited. There was coercion of witnesses and changing of testimony," Posner said. "The jury took only 45 minutes to find Shaw not guilty, and one of the jurors said it would have been 20 minutes but that several jurors had to go to the bathroom."

Stone has said "JFK" was a "counter-myth" to the "myth" of the Warren Commission.

The no-longer magic bullet

Among the doctrines of conspiracy literature bolstered by "JFK," Posner noted, is that the so-called magic bullet found on Texas Gov. John Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital was almost pristine, couldn't have struck Kennedy and Connally, as the Warren Commission said it did, without zigzagging in midair, and was probably planted.

"If ballistics tests didn't prove conclusively the bullet struck Kennedy and Connally, which they do, use your common sense," Posner said. "At the time the bullet was found, the conspirators wouldn't know if the bullets fired at Connally and Kennedy were still lodged in their bodies or had been recovered.

"If they wanted to shield the conspiracy, there can only be three shots. More than that, and the single assassin doesn't have time to shoot. So why risk exposing the conspiracy by planting a fourth bullet that wouldn't match ballistically with remnants of the other rounds?"

And what about Jack Ruby, the Chicago native who moved to Dallas to run strip clubs? Did he just happen by the Dallas jail on Nov. 24 and shoot Oswald on the spur of the moment?

"Ruby's murder of Oswald does more to undermine this case in terms of getting the truth out than anything else," Posner said. "First, it prevents the trial of Oswald, where the evidence would have convicted him. It also gives us a second assassin, with ties to organized crime. It's hard for people to believe this was a coincidence, so you're off and running with a conspiracy."

Posner's account of Ruby's life and his actions during the assassination week demolishes any notion he was a conspirator.

According to the trade journal Publishers Weekly, six books by major publishers will appear this fall to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the assassination, with "Case Closed" standing alone in its anti-conspiracy stance.

Posner has been heartened by promising sales and positive reviews. "Many readers are put off by conspiracy books that select only material that's favorable to their position, whether it checks out or not. I think these people are buying the book."

Thumbs up from the critics

Three weeks after its release, it is eighth on The New York Times national best-seller list and seventh on the Tribune's list of Chicago's best sellers.

U.S. News & World Report, which ran excerpts from "Case Closed," writes: "Posner achieves the unprecedented. He sweeps away decades of polemical smoke, layer by layer, and builds an unshakable case against JFK's killer . . . Lee Harvey Oswald." It quotes Stephen Ambrose, biographer of Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon: "The chapter on the (magic) bullet is a tour de force, absolutely brilliant, absolutely convincing."

New York Times book critic Christopher Lehmann-Haupt writes that "Posner effectively refutes hundreds of claims that have added up to conspiracy theories."

In a Tribune review, author Jeffrey Toobin writes that "Case Closed" is "utterly convincing in its thesis, which seems, in light of all that has transpired over the past 30 years, almost revolutionary."

Posner, 39, didn't set out to be a writer, instead complying with the wishes of his father, a union official in San Francisco. "My father dealt with a lot of lawyers. He said, 'Son, these fellows charge fees you can't believe.' "

So Posner attended law school at the University of California at Berkeley, where he was an honor student, then joined a prestigious Wall Street law firm, leaving two years later to form his own firm.

In 1981 he represented Jewish victims of Dr. Josef Mengele, the notorious Nazi war criminal who escaped from Germany after World War II and died in hiding in South America.

"It was a pro bono case, and I sued the Mengele family and the German government," Posner said. "Nothing came of the suit, but I accumulated 25,000 documents about Mengele, so I thought I'd write a book."

"Mengele: The Complete Story," which he co-wrote with John Ware, was published in 1986, prompting Posner to leave the law and write full time.

"Case Closed" is his fifth book. "A weakness of mine is that I tend to underestimate the difficulty of each project I undertake. This was true with this book, but as I kept going I kept finding answers to things I didn't think I could get answers to."

The real cover-ups

Posner agrees with critics of the Warren Commission who say its investigation was flawed.

"There was a cover-up by the FBI and the CIA, but they weren't attempting to conceal their involvement in the murder of the president but rather their own inefficiency and bungling," Posner said. "I go into detail in exposing these cover-ups, but they can't be interpreted as evidence of conspiracy."

The Warren Commission's work also was tarnished by a dubious finding of the 1978 investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Posner said.

"The committee's acoustics experts tested a Dictabelt recording of radio traffic on Dallas police channels and said they were 95 percent certain there had been a fourth shot, therefore a second shooter and a conspiracy."

A retest by the National Academy of Sciences discredited the committee's experts, concluding that the recording was made a minute after the shooting, Posner said.

Half of "Case Closed" is a meticulous examination of Oswald's entire life, culminating in an almost day-by-day chronicle of his movements in the last two months before the assassination. "Many conspiracy books almost ignore Oswald. But he's the key, and it's amazing how much is known about him," Posner said. "It's certainly enough to disprove all the theories that he was a spy or a patsy.

"My technique was to go to original sources. Too many books quote secondary sources, some of which are passing on misinformation, which means the garbage is disseminated again and again, becoming fact.

"Here's an example. 'JFK' opens with Rose Cheramie, a prostitute, warning her doctors that the Kennedy assassination is going to take place in Dallas and naming Ruby as involved. I found her doctor, who said she was psychotic and didn't mention the assassination until the day after it happened or Ruby until the day after he killed Oswald."

Posner paused. "I can go on."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO GRAPHIC
PHOTO (color): Gerald Posner, debunker of conspiracy theorists, at Smyth School on West 13th Street, which Jack Ruby attended. Tribune photo by Charles Cherney.

GRAPHIC: The three shots. From: "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK," by Gerald Posner (Random House, Sept. 1, 1993.)
See microfilm for complete graphic.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: December 7, 1993

SUMMARY OF AUGUST 1996 REVIEW BOARD ACTIONS ON SECURITY CLASSIFIED HSCA TESTIMONY OF JOHN SCELSO

(180-10131-10330)

page; line	Board Action	Modification detail	date/sub.lang.
19; 9, 11, 22	P		Review 05/1997, "CIA Employee."
52; 5-6	M	Protect first four words of line 5; release rest of line.	10/2017, "Operational Details."
52; 11	R (see release on p.141)		
52; 21 & 23	R & R		
53; 6	R		
55; 25	P		10/2017 "Describes technical operation."
56; 4-7	M	Release line 4; protect all of line 5; release lines 6 & 7	10/2017, "Describes intelligence operation in Mexico City."
56; 19-23	M	postpone from 4th word in line 19 through the third word in line 21; release rest of lines 21- 23	10/2017, "Describes intelligence operation in Mexico City."
56; 25	P		10/2017 "Describes technical operation."
57: 2	P		10/2017 "Describes individuals."
57; 4-7	P		10/2017 "Describes technical operation."

page;line	Board Action	Modification detail	date/sub.lang.
57; 10-11	M	Release line 10, postpone 1st, 2nd, and 4th - 6th words on line 11.	10/2017, "Describes intelligence operations " "Describes a group of people."
57; 14	R		
57; 17-19	P		10/2017 "Describes technical operation."
57; 20-23	M	protect last three words on line 20; release lines 21-23.	10/2017, "Describes intelligence operation"
57; 24	P		10/2017, "Describes intelligence operation"
58; 2-3	P		Release 2017, "Describes intelligence operation."
64; 18-21 & 22	R		
68; 13	P		Scelso language and identifier.
83; 14-15	P		10/2017 "Describes individual."
83; 18	P		Release date 08/2006; "Crypt."
83; 22-23	P		10/2017 "Describes meeting."
83; 25	P		Release 2017, "No suitable substitute language"
84; 1-2	P		Release 2017, "No suitable substitute language"

page; line	Board Action	Modification detail	date/sub.lang
84; 7-11	P		Release 2017, "No suitable substitute language"
84; 13-14	R		
84; 17	P		10/2017 "No suitable substitute language."
84; 19	P		10/2017 "Describes technical operation."
85; 10 85; 19	P P		Release date 08/2006. "crypt" "crypt"
86; 12	P		Release date 08/2006. "crypt"
86; 15	P		10/2017. "describes personnel
87; 8 9	P		Scelso language and date.
91; 6-7 8-9 9	P		Release date 08/2006. "description."
106; 11	P		Release date 08/2006. "crypt"
140; 20	R		
140; 23	P		Release date 08/2006, "Operational Detail"
141; 5-6	R		
141; 9	P		Release 2017, "CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 17"
168; 24	R		
171; 19	R		

page; line	Board Action	Modification detail	date/sub.lang.
181; 13	P		Scelso date. Sub.lang. "location".
185; 10-11	R		
185; 20	R		
185; 22-24	R		
notes/ index: p. 1	P		Review 05/1997 "CIA Employee."

CIA team disk 8\ scel_act.wpd

SECRET

27 September 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: John F. Pereira
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso Testimony and Lopez Report

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.)

1. (S) Issue. This memo is to request that the JFK Board reconsider its decision to release certain information contained in the HSCA testimony of John Scelso and in the Lopez Report. Specifically CIA requests that the phrases "political action program" (pg. 64 Scelso Testimony, pg. 177, 178 Lopez Report); "Mexican police" (pg. 85 Scelso Testimony); and "is exposed by Agee in his book" (pg. 141 Scelso Testimony) be postponed from release. We also offer some suggestions for substitute language which we believe will not detract from the JFK assassination story, yet still protect the information at issue.

I. Mexican Political Action Program

"We were running, at that time, a vast ***political action*** program in Mexico City ***to try to swing Mexico around from its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and it succeeded.*** I don't know whether you informed yourself about the magnitude of our ***political action*** program there at the time -- absolutely enormous"
(Scelso, 64; Lopez, pp. 177, 178)

2. (S) From the early 1950's to the mid-1960's, Mexico City Station conducted a political action campaign to minimize leftist influence on and within the Mexican Government. The campaign utilized student groups, a front group of progressive businessmen, and Catholic lay group writers and operatives in political action and media placement efforts. The Station currently does not have a political action program designed to influence Mexican

CL BY 2224130
CL REASON 1.5(c)
DECL ON X1
DRV FM LOC 3-82
LIA 3-82,HUM 4-82

SECRET

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso Testimony and Lopez Report

politics, nor has it undertaken such activity anytime in the recent past. Nevertheless, any public confirmation by the U.S. Government of those activities would risk an adverse reaction. Such adverse reaction would impact on current Mexico City Station operations and be harmful to U.S. interests.

(WH Division officers)

3. (S) As has ~~been~~ described to the Board in previous briefings by the ~~Mexican branch chief~~, Mexicans guard their sovereignty carefully. Nothing will infuriate them more than allegations of CIA meddling in their internal politics. In fact, earlier this year, the Mexican Government postponed a visit to Mexico by the DCI for fear that it might be perceived (and exploited) by the Mexican media and political opposition as the CIA being called in to assist with handling the problem of the Peoples' Revolutionary Army.

title?

4. (S) The fact that the CIA activity to which the Mexicans would object occurred more than 30 years ago will not lessen the reaction. Release of the Scelso comments would risk an adverse reaction from the Mexicans, which would likely include calls for an examination by the Mexican Government of current CIA activities. This could lead to increased scrutiny of Station operations and personnel and could jeopardize our unilateral activities. It could also have a chilling effect on activities conducted jointly with the Mexican services, who will be reluctant to engage in programs that could become subject to public scrutiny and political debate.

(dropped Jap. statement)

5. (S) Furthermore, the fact that these statements were made by Scelso amounts to an official confirmation of the underlying facts, making it very difficult for CIA to protect the same or similar information from further release in the future. Speculation in books, articles, and other publications, or disclosures by Congress are often perceived by the public as evidence that that information is in the public domain and therefore is no longer classified. The CIA has nevertheless been able to legally protect the information from unauthorized disclosure. The courts have held that because there has been no official confirmation, (i.e. declassification by the appropriate CIA official) the CIA may continue to protect from release ~~the~~ the information at issue even when there has been widespread public discussion on the issue in question.

dropped reference to FOIA

6. (S) In this case, should there ~~by~~ be a question raised as to the classification status of documents on the political program referred to by Scelso, it would be difficult to convince a court that such information had not been declassified because of the release by the Board. Scelso was a long-time CIA employee who was in charge of the investigation by the Agency into the assassination of the

(changed from Intel Comm)

President, and his testimony was taken under oath, with the ~~knowledge of the Agency, and in a classified setting.~~ Furthermore, the attached letter to Louis Stokes, Chairman of the Select Committee on Assassination from former Acting DCI Frank Carlucci also indicates that Scelso was acting as an official of the CIA. The DCI states that any classified testimony made by Agency staff before the Committees would be considered "authorized provision" of the information. This was to ensure that "all persons respond fully and truthfully" to the Committee. Carlucci's letter, especially taken together with the first few pages of Scelso's testimony, make it clear that Scelso was speaking as an official of the CIA.

New ¶

7. (S) A court would, therefore, probably find that Scelso's statements were not just merely speculation by a former Agency employee, but in fact, were official confirmation of the political action program. Anything suggesting official confirmation of classified information would lead a judge to the conclusion that the information at issue had been declassified by the CIA. This would make it very difficult for CIA to continue to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure. When confusion arises as to the classification status of information, it could lead to complicated legal proceedings and protracted and unnecessary litigation at great expense to all parties.

II. Liaison with Mexico

"We did not have any source of Cuban employees. We only had ***Mexican police***"...We had a whole reporting set up there with that, two of them, who watched things like that. (Scelso pg. 185).

8. (S) Release by the Board of Scelso's comments about the Mexican police in conjunction with surveillance coverage of the Mexico City airport could similarly have a chilling effect on our current liaison relationship with the Mexicans. The Station has worked, and continues to work, with liaison against compatible targets, including tracking the arrival and departure at the Mexico City airport of targets of interest. Although the targets have obviously changed since the time that Scelso is speaking of, these surveillance operations are ongoing. The success of these current joint operations could be threatened by any revelation today of Mexican cooperation with the CIA in the past.

9. (S) CIA objects to this release on similar grounds as stated in the prior section - disclosure of the Scelso comments would constitute official acknowledgment by CIA of the assistance provided by Mexican liaison to the Agency. Such acknowledgment could affect not only current operations

described above, but also result in reluctance by Mexican liaison to provide similar assistance in the future. The Mexican Government would likely be subject to criticism by groups and individuals opposed on nationalism and sovereignty grounds to such close cooperation with the U.S. Government and, even more so, with the CIA. The continued success of CIA cooperation with the Mexicans, whether it be with ~~the President,~~ the intelligence service, or ~~the police,~~ depends on the fact that those relationships are, and continue to be, secret.

any other Mexican government entity

10. (S) CIA requests that the Board continue to withhold this phrase from release and substitute in "other sources" or something similar to this. Omitting the fact that the airport information was obtained from Mexican counterparts would probably leave the impression that the information was obtained unilaterally. Although this still presents some risk to national security, it does achieve some level of protection to the Station's equities with liaison.

III. Phillip Agee

(S) "That is, the variety and number of telephone taps, surveillance teams, photo operations and other technical operations ***is exposed by Agee in his book.*** That exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world by a lot..." (Scelso, pg. 141)

11. (S) CIA objects to the release of the highlighted phrase because, for reasons described in Section 1, it amounts to official CIA confirmation of the existence of a teltap operation conducted jointly with the Mexicans and with close collaboration with the President of Mexico. As this Board is well aware, CIA has consistently requested, the protection of liaison involvement in this teltap operation. As the Board has agreed with CIA's position on this matter, the only issue is whether this statement reveals what we have agreed meets the criteria for continued protection under the JFK Act.

12. (S) For the Board's convenience, several relevant pages from Agee's book (Inside the Company: CIA Diary) are attached. These pages explain in great detail the teltap operation and the fact that it was conducted jointly between the CIA and the Mexicans. Although such disclosures by former employees are disturbing, they do not amount to official confirmation of the underlying information. Standing by itself, Agee's book can be dismissed by the Agency as speculation, and do not compromise CIA's ability to keep the information classified. Scelso's testimony, however, amounts to official confirmation of Agee's book,

and does effect the Agency's ability to protect the information from further release. Equally troubling is the fact that Scelso's testimony could be read to confirm not only what is accurate in Agee's book, but also what is inaccurate.

12. (S) Furthermore, the language used by Scelso is clear. The use of the phrase "exposed by Agee in his book" does not allow for any other interpretation except that Agee's description of the teltap is accurate. If Scelso had used other language, such as "has been written about elsewhere", the existence of the joint teltap operation would be protected. We request that the Board protect the phrase as it is and use the above substitute language. Such substitute language would not alter the story of the JFK Assassination, yet would still allow for the protection of the joint operation.

13. (S) While the connection between Agee's book and Scelso's testimony may at first seem attenuated, anyone involved in the review process conducted by this Board will know that it is not. Many individuals follow the decisions of this Board closely, and Agee's writings about the CIA are also well known. It is to be expected that those who read the Scelso report would then turn to Agee's book.

John F. Pereira

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 09/26/96 12:22:04 PM
SUBJECT: Agee Memo - New draft

Here it is... with Jeremy's improvements. Please read it carefully as I had to rush through this. Some of Jeremy's comments were slight wording changes so as not to offend "the Board" so you may not notice much change. The biggest substantive change was on my FOIA section (I have skillfully crafted this section to avoid the use of that four letter word!). Please note there is one more paragraph now because I did add a bit about Scelso being an "official". And don't forget to attach to Stokes-DCI letter which I will fax back to you.

Have fun - and let me know if you need help.

AGEEMEMO.DOC

CC:

23 August 1996

Note For: Fred Wickham, DO
Eleanor Neiman, DO
Mike Luce, DO/Mexico
Valerie Patterson, DO/EA
Christine Hegeman, DO/EA
Linda Cipriani, OGC

From: J. Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRG

Subject: Meeting with ARRB Staff

1. Thursday afternoon I met with Dave Marwell, Executive Director for the ARRB, and two of his staff, Jeremy Gunn and Mary McAuliffe. I briefed them on the four releases in the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony that had been identified as potential appeal items, and on the Agency's concerns re the Australian documents. I requested that the Board reconsider the release of the statements on Mexico City political action programs, Scelso's comment on Agee, the reference to the Mexican Police as a source and Warrenton as site of the Agency's Record Center.

2. Marwell agreed to send a "staff recommendation" to the Board recommending that they delay the release of these four items to hear additional evidence from the Agency. The rest of the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony would be released on schedule. If the Board accepts the staff's recommendation, the four items will be addressed at the next Washington meeting (27 September). If the Board rejects the staff's recommendation, then we have the option of appealing to the President. Marwell and Gunn seemed confident that the Board would agree to delay the release.

3. Gunn requested that the Agency's additional evidence on these four items (if provided in writing) be to the ARRB staff by 23 September. The Agency can also brief the Board members at the 27 September meeting. As I understand it, DO/Mexico (Mike L.) will be preparing evidence memos on "political action programs" and "Mexican police" issues and OGC (Linda C.) will take the lead on Agee. I will contact the DA/IRO (Don Hatch) on the Warrenton issue.

4. Concerning the Australian documents, Marwell agreed to delay Board action until the 16 October meeting. The Agency's proposal on these documents should be sent to the ARRB staff as soon as possible.

CL By: 611637 CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1 DRV FM: MULTIPLE

13-00000

Testimony of then Retired DO officer
John SCELSO (pseudonym)
to the HSCA, 16 May 1978

political action program p. 64

largest teltap coverage; 30 lines pp. 52, 53, 56, 57

"is exposed by Agee in his book" p. 141

The phrase, if released, could tie together what we've been trying to protect - primarily a joint teltap with the Mexicans and close collaboration with the President of Mexico. It also gives credence to the many allegations of Agee, which the Agency has neither confirmed nor denied.

coverage of the airport p. 185

in addition to "Mexican Police" being a liaison relationship, it shows our access to airport control items

Please review the attached pages as determined by the Assassinations Records Review Board members

Yellow highlighted passages are as CIA submitted information to the Board, redacted

Bracketed passages FYI as Board upheld deletions

Archives HSCA (RG 233)

been handled in any different manner?

Mr. Scelso. It would have been in the case of dissemination of information about him, but I do not think that any operational action would have been taken to apprehend him or to contact him or to try to force him back to the United States.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about in terms of -- how would the dissemination have been treated differently?

Mr. Scelso. Well, it simply means that we would have disseminated any additional information that we got.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Headquarters ever criticize the Mexico City station for failure to send this information?

Mr. Scelso. No. That was not because we were trying to go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, secretly.

We were running, at that time, a vast political action program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and it succeeded. I do not know whether you informed yourself about the magnitude of our political action program there at the time -- absolutely enormous.

appro

We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of

101845

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Now, why did they not report everything they found out?

Mr. Goldsmith. Answer your own question.

Mr. Scelo. The telephone center envoy was manned by principally Mexican supervision of an American, or Mexican-American. These people were just inundated with information and apparently did not extract this and transmit it back to Washington. ok

The later contacts with the Cuban Embassy, and so on, which only were divulged after the assassination. It is an enormous problem. Mexico had one of the biggest and most active telephone intercept operations in the whole world and the job of processing this material is just impossible.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go through this step by step, although I was not going to do this at this time. I am going to modify the line of inquiry somewhat.

Do you know how many telephone intercepts there were in the Mexico City station?

Mr. Scelo. How many lines were being tapped?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, at the Cuban and then at the Soviet.

Mr. Scelo. I think there are about 30 lines being tapped altogether. That is just the number that sticks in my mind.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thirty meaning a total of thirty from both the Soviet and the Cuban? ok

Mr. Scelo. And various security suspects.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the security suspects to related to the Soviet or Cuban?

Mr. Scelo. Some of them were American Communists living there whom we tapped at the specific request of J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. Goldsmith. Of those thirty lines how many, at your best estimate, would have been for the Soviet and Cubans?

ok

Mr. Scelo. However many outside telephone lines they had.

Mr. Goldsmith. You think just about every outside phone?

Mr. Scelo. I think they tapped all the outside lines.

Mr. Goldsmith. How certain of that are you?

Mr. Scelo. Well, this is just based on my recollection, going back 15 years.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, your earlier comment was that the telephone surveillance operation in Mexico City was one of the most extensive in the world?

Mr. Scelo. Yes. And of course, they taped a great deal which they could not exploit. They could not later listen to it; they did not have time. They used to listen to it sort of spottily, you see, and attempt then to exploit what was the most important.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer to my earlier question as to why the information on Oswald was not sent to the

Archives HSCA (RG 233)

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

(Pause)

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have a few questions to ask you on that. This refers to the envoy operation ~~that was~~ the joint operation conducted by the Mexicans and the Americans and I believe this indicates that there were 30 lines, in fact, connected at one time, so that your early testimony was, in all likelihood, accurate. ok

I am going to have to ask you also to read the section marked number 3, Oswald coverage.

Mr. Scelo. What is that report, if I may ask?

Mr. Goldsmith. This is taken from the 1977 Inspector General Report.

Mr. Scelo. I see.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the section marked Oswald Coverage through to the end of the paragraph on page 162.

(Pause)

On page 161, the section where it says: "Oswald Coverage. In mid-62, the Mexican officer in charge of the envoy, the joint tap operation, asked the American officer at the envoy listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies in anticipation of possible coverage." ok

The question I have for you is as follows. It would seem, from the earlier paragraph, that the liaison operation ok

the National Archives HSCA (RG 233)

was already in effect, so why would it have been necessary for the Mexican officer in charge to ask the American officer for the telephone numbers?

Mr. Scelo. The Mexicans were probably tapping other things at that time, not these targets. They were tapping other Mexicans, and so on. We had our own unilateral tap operations --

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

Mr. Scelo. -- on those important targets.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, are you saying that prior to 1962 the liaison operations with the Mexicans did not cover the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies?

Mr. Scelo. That is what that says. I do not really recall. That would have been in mid-62. That was just about the time I was coming onboard in the Mexico desk. And I do not recall what the previous status was.

I do recall that they certainly did ask -- they suddenly disclosed the intent to tap certain lines which we were tapping unilaterally.

Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates that the liaison operation had taps on 30 lines. If it was not the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have been.

Mr. Scelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects; Mexican Communist Party people. There were three or four or

101838

Reproduced from the holdings of the National Archives HSCA (RG 233)

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Mexico City's station's operations one of the most sensitive of all of the stations at the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. It was then. That is, the variety and number of telephone taps, surveillance teams, photo operations and other technical operations is exposed by Agee in his book. That exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world by a lot. There is no other station in the world that has that good operations.

problem

Then came Caracas. That got to be real good. Nothing like it in Europe.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to draw your attention to a cable which, unfortunately, I do not have with me. The cable is referred to in Book 5 of the Senate report, written by Thomas Karamessinas to the Mexico City station in which he indicated and said the arrest of Sylvia Deran would jeopordize U.S. freedom of action.

Do you remember that cable?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why it was sent?

Mr. Scelso. At that time, we were not sure that Oswald might not have been a Cuban agent, and the arrest of a foreign consular person was quite a serious matter under international law.

Although Sylvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, I believe, nevertheless, I did not think -- Karamessinas may not have

Appendix 1

Alphabetical and numerical listing of CIA employees, agents and collaborators and organizations controlled, financed and influenced by the CIA.

ACOSTA VELASCO, JORGE. Nephew of Ecuadorean President, Jose Maria Velasco. Minister of the Treasury and Minister of Government. Informant and political-action agent of the Quito station.

AGENCIA ORBE LATINOAMERICANO. Feature news service serving most of Latin America. Financed and controlled by the CIA through the Santiago, Chile, station.

AGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT INC. (LAAD). Provided cover for CIA officer Bruce Berckmans, q.v.

AGUERRONDO, MARIO. Uruguayan Army colonel and former Montevideo Chief of Police. Close station liaison collaborator.

AIR AMERICA. CIA-owned airline for paramilitary operations, mainly in the Far East.

ALARCON, ALBERTO. Guayaquil businessman and Liberal Party activist. Principal agent for CIA student operations in Ecuador. Cryptonym: ECLOSE.

ALBORNOZ, ALFREDO. Ecuadorean Minister of Government (internal security). Close collaborator of the Quito station.

ALLEN, JOHN. CIA operations officer at Camp Peary training base, formerly assigned in the Near East.

ALLIANCE FOR ANTI-TOTALITARIAN EDUCATION. Propaganda mechanism of the Montevideo station.

ALMEIDA, WILSON. Publisher and editor of *Voz Universitaria*, q.v., a university student newspaper. Propaganda agent for the Quito station.

ALONZO OLIVE, RAUL. Cuban engineer in sugar industry. Member of commercial delegation to Brazil and Uruguay. Recruited by the CIA in Montevideo before return to Cuba.

AMADOR MARQUEZ, ENRIQUE. Labour and political-action agent of Guayaquil base. Minister of Economy.

AMAYA QUINTANA, ENRIQUE. Leader of the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), recruited in Guayaquil as a penetration agent. Resettled by the CIA in Mexico.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. The US member of the Public Service International

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PETROLEUM AND CHEMICAL WORKERS (IFPCW). The ITS for this industry set up originally by the CIA through the US Oil Workers International Union.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PLANTATION, AGRICULTURAL AND ALLIED WORKERS (IFPAAW). The international trade secretariat for rural workers. Used by the CIA for labour operations.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF WOMEN LAWYERS. Organization used by the CIA for propaganda operations.

INTERNATIONAL POLICE ACADEMY. CIA-controlled police training school under AID cover in Washington DC. Formerly the Inter-American Police Academy founded in Panama by the Panama station.

INTERNATIONAL POLICE SERVICES SCHOOL. CIA training school for police in Washington under commercial cover.

INTERNATIONAL STUDENT CONFERENCE (ISC). *See* COORDINATING SECRETARIAT OF NATIONAL UNIONS OF STUDENTS (COSEC).

INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIATS. A generic description of the international trade-union organizations having as members the national unions of workers in a particular industry. There are 15–20 ITS's most of which have been used by the CIA for labour operations. Some have headquarters in Europe, others in the US but close relations maintained with the ICFTU in Brussels.

INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS FEDERATION (ITF). The international trade secretariat for transport industries. Used by the CIA for labour operations. *See* JOAQUIN (JACK) OTERO.

JACOME, FRANCINE. American married to Ecuadorean. Quito agent who wrote cover letters to Luis Toroella, q.v., and served as transcriber and courier for telephone-tap operation. Cryptonym: ECDOXY.

JARAMILLO, JAIME. Velasquista leader and Quito station penetration agent.

JAUREGUI, ARTURO. Secretary-General of the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT), q.v., in Mexico City. CIA agent.

JAUREGUIZA, —. Montevideo police commissioner in charge of movements of non-domiciled population. Montevideo station liaison collaborator.

JONES, DEREK. Agent of the Montevideo station used in operation to break the code systems of the Embassy of the United Arab Republic (Egypt).

KARAMESSINES, THOMAS. Assistant Deputy Director for Plans and later Deputy Director for Plans.

KAUFMAN, WALTER J. Chief of Mexico branch of Western Hemisphere Division.

KINDSCHI, JACK. CIA operations officer in Stockholm using non-official cover of Washington DC public relations firm Robert Mullen Co. Assigned to Mexico City with same cover.

KING, COLONEL, J. C. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the DDP.

KLADENSKY, OTTO. Quito Oldsmobile dealer and station agent for intelligence on the Czech diplomatic mission. Also the cutout to Reinaldo Varea Donoso, Ecuadorean Vice-President, q.v. Cryptonym: ECTOSOME later DICTOSOME.

LABOR COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION. Propaganda mechanism of the Montevideo station.

LADD, RAYMOND. Quito station administrative officer also in charge of certain operations.

LADENBURG, ARTHUR. CIA operations officer in Mexico City under non-official cover. Later assigned to Santiago, Chile.

LIBIDINAL. Mexico City station postal intercept operation. True cryptonym and true names of agents unknown.

LICALLA. One of three observation posts overlooking the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Names of agents forgotten.

LICOBRA. Cryptonym for operations targeted by Mexico City station against the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Mexican Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Government.

LICOWL-1. Owner of small grocery store near Soviet Embassy, Mexico City. CIA agent. True name forgotten.

LICOZY-1. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the KGB. True name forgotten.

LICOZY-3. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the KGB. True name forgotten.

LICOZY-5. Double-agent of the Mexico City station against the KGB. True name forgotten.

LIDENY. Mexico City station unilateral telephone-tapping operation. True cryptonym and true names of agents unknown.

LIEMBRACE. Mexico City station surveillance team. Names of team members unknown.

LIENVOY. Joint telephone-tapping operation between Mexico City station and Mexican security service. Names of agents unknown.

LIFIRE. Mexico City station travel control and general investigations team. True names unknown.

LILINK. An operation in Mexico City to provide non-official cover for nym: LISAMPAN) is still in the 'interference-complaint-testing' stage.

Another important operation directed against the Cubans is a sophisticated provocation that won the CIA Intelligence Medal for Stan Archenhold,‡ the case officer who conceived it. This operation consisted of a series of letters sent to the Cuban intelligence service in their Mexico City Embassy from a person who purported to be a CIA officer trying to help them. The letters purport to implicate Joaquin Ordoqui, a respected, old-guard leader of the Cuban Communist Party and a high-ranking military leader, as a CIA agent. The letters are based on information from Carlos Manuel Pellecer, the Guatemalan exile and penetration agent, who was closely associated with Ordoqui and Marcos Rodriguez when all three lived in Mexico City during the late 1950s. The letters continue to be sent to Cuban intelligence although Ordoqui was arrested in 1964, and the desired controversy and dissension in the Cuban revolutionary leadership followed.

As the cover of Sherry, the chief of the Cuban operations section, is in the Embassy consular section, he has been able to meet several of the Cuban consular officers directly. However, his main agent for direct assessment of the Cubans is Leander Vourvoulias, Consul of Greece and President of the Consular Corps.

Support Operations

The support operations must also be detailed. The joint operation for telephone tapping, LIENVOY, is effected in cooperation with the Mexican authorities and has a capacity for about forty lines. The station provides the equipment, the technical assistance, couriers and transcribers, while the Mexicans make the connections in the exchanges and maintain the listening posts. In addition to monitoring the lines of the communist diplomatic missions and those of Mexican revolutionary groups, LIENVOY also covers special cases. For years the telephones of ex-President Cárdenas and his daughter have been tapped, and recently tapping has started on that of Luis Quintanilla, a Mexican intellectual who is planning a trip to Hanoi with the publisher of the *Miami News* and with a fellow of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara. Reports on plans for this trip are sent immediately to the White House.

The station also has its own unilateral telephone-tapping operation which is limited to special cases where the involvement of the Mexicans is thought to be undesirable. Connections for this operation are made outside the exchanges by telephone company engineers who work as station agents, as in the case of the bugging of the Cuban Embassy (LISAMPAN). However this is restricted as far as possible in order to avoid damaging relations with the Mexicans in the event of discovery.

Travel control, general investigations and occasional surveillance are the duties of a six-man team called LIFIRE. They obtain flight-travel lists from the airport, which are passed daily to the station and take photographs of passengers to and from communist countries and of their passports as they pass through immigration.

Another eight-man surveillance team, known as LIEMBRACE, has vehicles (including a Volkswagen photo-van) and radio-communications equipment and is mainly concerned with Soviet/satellite and Cuban targets. It is administered by Jim Anderson,‡ who also controls another eight-man team (LIRICE), similarly equipped, which deals with the Mexican revolutionaries and other miscellaneous targets.

Postal interception is mainly directed towards the mail from communist countries, but can occasionally be used to get correspondence from selected Mexican addresses.

As in every station, a variety of agents assists in support tasks which they perform in the course of their ordinary jobs. For processing the immigration papers for station non-official cover personnel, for example, Judd Austin,‡ one of the US lawyers in Goodrich, Dalton, Little and Riquelme (the principal law firm serving American subsidiaries) is used. The Executive Vice-President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City, Al Wichtrich,‡ channels political information to the station that he picks up in his normal work with American and Mexican businessmen. For technical support the station has an officer of TSD under Embassy cover with a workshop and qualifications in audio, flaps and seals, and photography.

533

that they were engaged in political activities. The Chinese had, in fact, been using the NCNA office for propaganda and support to pro-Chinese revolutionary organizations in Mexico and Central America.

Central American Exiles

Mexico has traditionally been a haven for political exiles from Central American countries including communists and other extreme leftists. Several Central American parties, including the Guatemalans, maintain liaison sections in Mexico City in order to keep lines open to the Soviets, Cubans and others. They operate semi-clandestinely for the most part in order to avoid repression from the Mexican government.

Washington DC

20 December 1966

Because of the strategic importance of Mexico to the US, its size and proximity, and the abundance of enemy activities, the Mexico City station is the largest in the hemisphere. Altogether the station has some fifteen operations officers under State Department cover in the Embassy political section, plus about twelve more officers under assorted non-official covers outside the Embassy. In addition, a sizeable support staff of communications officers, technical services, intelligence assistants, records clerks and secretaries bring the overall station personnel total to around fifty.

Liaison Operations

Dominating the station operational programme is the LITEMPO‡ project which is administered by Winston Scott,‡ the Chief of Station in Mexico City since 1956, with the assistance of Annie Goodpasture,‡ a case officer who has also been at the station for some years. This project embraces a complicated series of operational support programmes to the various Mexican civilian security forces for the purpose of intelligence exchange, joint operations and constant upgrading of Mexican internal intelligence collection and public security functions.

At the top of the LITEMPO operation is the Mexican President, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz,‡ who has worked extremely closely with the station since he became Minister of Government in the previous administration of Adolfo Lopez Mateos‡ (1958–64). Scott had also developed a very close working relationship with Lopez Mateos, and, since Diaz Ordaz became President two years ago, Scott has been working closely with the current Minister of Government, Luis Echeverria.‡ Thus the LITEMPO project focuses at the top on the President and the current Minister of Government who will be the second consecutive choice of PRI leaders to pass from internal security to the presidency.

Scott's chummy relationship with Diaz Ordaz none the less has its problems. In 1964 Fulton Freeman went to Mexico City as Ambassador to crown a Foreign Service career that had started in the same Embassy in the 1930s. He is expected to retire after the 1968 Olympic Games. At the time of his assignment to Mexico City Freeman's expectations of meaningful diplomatic relations with Diaz Ordaz collided with the President's preference for dealing with Scott, and Freeman was relegated to protocol contacts with the President while his diplomatic talents focused on the Foreign Minister. The problem of who would deal with the President was confused somewhat by the Ambassador's insistence, not long after arrival, on a detailed briefing about the station operational programme, which Scott refused. Eventually both Scott and the Ambassador visited the White House, where President Johnson settled matters according to the wishes of the Agency and of his friend Diaz Ordaz. Scott continued, of course, to work with the President and the Ambassador never got the full briefing he had demanded. Since then the relations between Scott and the Ambassador have warmed, but the Ambassador forbids any station operations directed against the Mexican Foreign Ministry.

While Scott frequently meets the President and the Minister of Government, two non-official cover case officers handle the day-to-day contact with the chiefs of the security services subordinate to Echeverria. One of these officers is a former FBI agent who worked in the legal attaché's office in the Mexico City Embassy - the legal attaché is usually the FBI office in an American embassy. The FBI officer had left the FBI to come with the station, but pains have been taken to conceal his CIA employment in order to avoid the bad blood that would result from the CIA's 'stealing' of an FBI officer. The two non-official cover officers are the equivalent of an AID Public Safety mission but in Mexico this function is performed secretly by the station in deference to Mexican nationalist sensitivities – as is the case in Argentina. Through the LITEMPO project we are currently providing advice and equipment for a new secret communications network to function between Diaz Ordaz's office and principal cities in the rest of the country. Other joint operations with the Mexican security services include travel control, telephone tapping and repressive action.

The station also prepares a daily intelligence summary for Diaz Ordaz with a section on activities of Mexican revolutionary organizations and communist diplomatic missions and a section on international developments based on information from headquarters. Other reports, often relating to a single subject, are passed to Diaz Ordaz, Echeverria and top security officials. These reports, like the daily round-up, include information from station unilateral penetration agents with due camouflaging to protect the identity of the sources. The station is much better than are the Mexican services, and is thus of great assistance to the authorities in planning for raids, arrests and other repressive action.

Liaison between Scott and the Mexican military intelligence services consists mainly of exchange of information, in order to keep a foot in the door for future eventualities. The US military attachés, moreover, are in constant contact with their Mexican military intelligence counterparts and their reports are received regularly by the station.

Stan Watson,‡ the Mexico City Deputy Chief of Station, has been meeting with a South Korean CIA officer who was recently sent under diplomatic cover to monitor North Korean soundings for establishment of missions in Mexico and Central America.

Communist Party Operations

The station CP section consists of two case officers, Wade Thomas‡ and Ben Ramirez,‡ both under Embassy cover, plus two case officers outside the station under non-official cover: Bob Driscoll,‡ a retired operations officer now working under contract, and Julian Zambianco who was transferred from Guayaquil to Mexico City about a year ago. These officers are in charge of agent and technical penetrations against the revolutionary organizations of importance. The quality of this intelligence is high, although not as high as it was before 1963. In late 1962 Carlos Manuel Pellecer,‡ the station's most important communist party penetration-agent, broke openly with communism by publishing a book. He was a leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) and had been Minister of Labor in the Arbenz government during the 1950s. However, after the Agency-sponsored overthrow of the Arbenz government Pellecer made his way to Mexico City where for years he was the station's best source (cryptonym LINLUCK) on all the revolutionary organizations in Mexico, not just the Guatemalan exiles. His book, of course, was financed by the station and distributed by the Agency all over Latin America. Pellecer is still being used by the Mexico City station as a propaganda agent, as with other former penetration agents who formally break with communism without revealing their years of work as spies – Eudocio Ravines,‡ the well-known Peruvian defector from communism is a parallel case. Another book by Pellecer, also financed by the station, has just appeared. This book is a continuation of CIA exploitation of the Marcos Rodriguez and Joaquin Ordoqui cases in Cuba, and is aimed at denigration of the Cuban revolution.

The station also collects information about communists from the US living in Mexico. Many of them arrived during the McCarthy period and some have subsequently become Mexican citizens. Information about them is mainly of interest to the FBI, which calls them the American Communist Group in Mexico City (ACGMC). Information collected about them includes that obtained through the LIENVOY telephone-tapping operation described below.

The station also receives copies of reports from FBI penetration operations against Mexican revolutionary organizations. Mexico is the only country in Latin America, except Puerto Rico, where the FBI continued operations against the local left when the CIA took over in 1947. The FBI intelligence is of high quality.

13-00000

Soviet/Satellite Operations

The largest section in the station is that covering Soviet/satellite operations. It has four case officers, three intelligence assistants and a secretary, all under Embassy cover, and four case officers under non-official cover. It is headed by Paul Dillon‡ and the other official cover case officers are Donald Vogel,‡ Cynthia Hausman and Robert Steele.‡ A number of sensitive operations are underway.

The station has two observation posts in front of the Soviet Embassy, which cover the entrances, plus a third observation post in the back of the Embassy to provide coverage of the gardens. The LICALLA observation post in the back is the closest of five houses bordering the Embassy property – all five are owned by the station. Several years ago films were made of Soviets conversing in the garden, but attempts by Russian lip-readers to discover their conversations were unsuccessful. From one of the front OP's, radio contact is maintained with the LIEMBRACE surveillance team for signalling when a particular Soviet surveillance target leaves the Embassy, his route and other data. Photos are regularly taken from all the OP's of Soviets and their families and all visitors to the Embassy. When visitors use vehicles, photographs are taken of their licence plates for tracing. Occasionally the LICALLA OP is used for electronic monitoring, since it is close to the Embassy, but so far attempts to pick up radiations from Soviet cryptographic equipment have been unsuccessful.

In addition to the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, several other support operations include coverage of the Soviets. Through the LIENVOY operation, Soviet telephones are constantly monitored, and through the LIFIRE travel-control operation photographs of travel documents are obtained along with data on arrivals and departures. Monitoring of Mexican diplomatic communications reveals requests for Mexican visas by Soviet officials, including the diplomatic couriers. In addition, NSA is also monitoring several communications systems involving 'burst' transmissions from the USSR to as yet unidentified agents believed to be in Mexico – possibly Soviet intelligence officers assigned abroad as 'illegals', with false identity and non-official cover.

The station runs between fifteen and twenty access agents against the Soviets with varying degrees of effectiveness and reliability. Several of these agents are suspected of having been recruited by the Soviets for use as double agents against the station. Two of the most important of the current access-agents are Katherine Manjarrez,‡ Secretary of the Foreign Press Association, and her husband – both of whom are targeted against the Soviet press attaché and the *Tass* correspondent. Others are LICOWL–1‡ and LIOVAL–1.‡

LICOWL–1 is the owner of a tiny grocery store situated in front of the Soviet Embassy where the Soviets buy odds and ends including their soft drinks – TSD is studying ways of bugging a wooden soft-drink case or the bottles themselves. More important, LICOWL–1 is involved at the moment in an operation against the Embassy *zavhoz* (administrative officer), who spends considerable time chatting with the agent. Because Silnikov, the *zavhoz*, has been on the prowl for a lover – or so he said to LICOWL–1 – the station decided to recruit a young Mexican girl as bait. An appropriate girl was obtained through BESABER,‡ an agent who is normally targeted against Polish intelligence officers and who runs a ceramics business specializing in souvenirs. By loitering at LICOWL–1's store the girl attracted Silnikov's attention, and a hot necking session in a back room at the store led to several serious afternoon sessions at the girl's apartment nearby – obtained especially for this operation. Silnikov's virility is astonishing both the girl and the station, which is recording and photographing the sessions without the knowledge of the girl. Although promiscuity among Soviets is not abnormal, relationships with local girls are forbidden. Eventually it will be decided whether to try blackmail against Silnikov or to provoke disruption by sending tapes and photos to the Embassy if the blackmail is refused.

LIOVAL–1‡ is not as interesting a case but is more important. The agent is an American who teaches English in Mexico City and is an ardent fisherman. Through fishing he became acquainted with Pavel Yatskov, the Soviet Consul and a known senior KGB officer – possibly the Mexico City *rezident* (KGB chief). Yatskov and the agent spend one or two week-ends per month off in the mountains fishing and have developed a very close friendship.

When Yatskov is transferred back to Moscow – he has already been in Mexico for some years – we shall decide whether to try to defect him through LIOVAL-1. Recently Peter Deriabin,‡ the well-known KGB defector from the 1950s who is now a US citizen and full-time CIA employee, went to Mexico City to study the voluminous reports on Yatskov written by LIOVAL-1. He concluded that there is a strong possibility that LIOVAL-1 has been recruited by Yatskov and is reporting on Paul Dillon, the station officer in charge of this case. Nevertheless, the operation continues while the counter-intelligence aspects are studied further.

The station double-agent cases against the Soviets, LICOZY-1,‡ LICOZY-3‡ and LICOZY-5,‡ are all being wound up for lack of productivity or problems of control. One of these agents, LICOZY-3, is an American living in Philadelphia who was recruited by the Soviets while a student in Mexico, but who reported the recruitment and worked for the Mexico City station. He worked for the FBI after returning to the US – the Soviet case officer was a UN official at one time – but recently Soviet interest in him has fallen off and the FBI turned the case back over to the Agency for termination.

Against the Czechs and the Poles many of the same types of operation are targeted. Access agents, observation posts, telephone tapping, surveillance and travel control are continuous although with somewhat less intensity than against the Soviets. In the Yugoslav Embassy the code clerk has been recruited by the CIA as has one of the Embassy's secretaries.

Until the *New China News Agency* (NCNA) office was closed last month by the Mexican government, the Soviet/satellite section of the station was responsible for following the movements of the Chinese communists. Telephone intercepts through LIENVOY and occasional surveillance by the LIRICE team were directed against them, but the most important intelligence collected against them was from the bugging of their offices. The audio operation was supported by the Far East Division in headquarters, who sent an operations officer and transcribers to Mexico City. Now that the NCNA offices are closed, the audio equipment will be removed and the station will continue to follow up the many leads coming from the bugging operation.

Cuban Operations

The Cuban operations section consists of two case officers, Francis Sherry and Joe Piccolo, and a secretary under Embassy cover and one case officer under non-official cover. An observation post for photographic coverage and radio contact with the LIEMBRACE surveillance team is functioning, as well as LIENVOY telephone monitoring and LIFIRE airport travel control. Through the LIFIRE team the station obtains regular clandestine access to the *Prensa Latina* pouch from Havana, and copies of correspondence between PL headquarters in Havana and its correspondents throughout the hemisphere are forwarded to the stations concerned.

Through the LITEMPO liaison operation the Mexican immigration service provides special coverage of all travellers to and from Havana on the frequent Cubana flights. Each traveller is photographed and his passport is stamped with arrival or departure cachets indicating Havana travel. The purpose is to frustrate the Cuban practice of issuing visas on separate slips of paper instead of in the passport so as to obscure travel. Prior to each Cubana departure the station is notified of all passengers so that name checks can be made. In the case of US citizens, the Mexican service obliges by preventing departure when requested by the station.

The most important current operation targeted against the Cuban mission is an attempted audio penetration using the telephone system. Telephone company engineers working in the LIDENY tapping operation will eventually install new wall-boxes for the Embassy telephones in which sub-miniature transmitters with switches will have been cast by TSD. At the moment, however, the engineers are causing deliberate interference in Embassy telephones by technical means in the exchange. Each time the Embassy calls the telephone company to complain of interference on the lines, the engineers report back that everything in the exchange is in order. Eventually, as the interference continues, the engineers will check street connections and finally arrive to check the instruments in the Embassy. They will find the wall-boxes 'defective' and will replace them with the bugged boxes cast by TSD. Right now, however, this operation (crypto-

Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean, things like this happened all the time?

Mr. Scelso. Planes were held for travellers who would otherwise miss them, for Cuban officials, and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever actually investigate this particular matter?

Mr. Scelso. It investigated to the extent that there was nothing left to investigate. The plane was gone. The man was on it. He had not identified himself before he left.

We had very complete coverage of the Mexico City Airport and watched the Cuban flights closely, but where it sometimes happened that an important Cuban official would come late, he would go directly to the plane without going through travel controls.

ok

At that time, the man was gone. There was no picture of him. Nobody looked at his passport. Period.

Mr. Goldsmith. You did not bother to ask any Cuban employees in the Airport about the man?

Mr. Scelso. We did not have any source of Cuban employees. We only had Mexican police.

← liaison

Mr. Goldsmith. Were any of them questioned about him?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, this was a routine thing. We had a whole reporting set up there with that, two of them, who watched things like this. But the report from them was that the man had just gone on the plane and they did not know who

Reproduced from the holdings of the National Archives HSCA (RG 233)

The Lopez Report

HSCA Summary of Oswald and the CIA in Mexico City

Warrenton site	p. 44
The installation, under Army cover, is a CIA facility. It is the Archives for CIA holdings	
teltap coverage of 30 lines	p. 54 and others ok
identification of Soviet officials targetted	p. 56, 71 ok
identification of Cuban officials targetted	p. 58 ok
political action program	p. 177, 178

was in operation on only four of those days. This Committee has not been able to establish or disprove the possible inference that LILYRIC covered those days when there was no coverage from LIMITED because the production and logs from the LILYRIC base were not made available for review. That material was requested but has not been made available.141/ An explanation of why this material is missing was requested on 7/25/78.142/ The CIA's explanation stated that the photographs and logs "may have been destroyed in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the folders for the destroyed material were reused to forward more recent photographic material to Headquarters for retention."143/ The folders which once contained the production were located at the National Archives' Warrenton Records Center but, according to the CIA's explanation, the folders contained production material from 1967.144/ Because the CIA has not provided the photographic production and logs from the LILYRIC for examination, no precise determination detailing the effectiveness of the coverage of the Soviet compound can be made.

DOD

DC I

surveillance project.189/ Even though Mr. Scott was the nominal case officer, the "routine case officer functions" were performed by Ms. Ann Goodpasture.190/ An American technician was stationed in the listening post to maintain the equipment and to protect the Station's interests there.191/ Ms. Goodpasture's duties in this operation ranged from meeting with the technician/officer inside the base for the purposes of daily supervision of the operation to handling the collection and distribution of the tapes and transcripts.192/ Ms. Goodpasture worked in this capacity until 1968.193/ With the exception of the technician, the listening post and the transcription room of this base [were staffed by Mexican Army officers]194/ This listening post covered up to thirty lines at one time.195/

O/C

b. Analysis and Reporting of Information Obtained

[Mr. Herbert Manell] was responsible for the analysis, processing, and daily review of the Soviet transcripts.196/ The transcripts were reviewed on a daily basis by [Barbara Manell.] [Mrs. Manell] would

lease of
e names
employees
ho retired
nder cover –
tponed for
lease
ntil
May 1997

It should be noted, though, that an examination of the project files shows that Americans in contact with Communist diplomatic institutions were routinely reported to Headquarters for name traces and dissemination to the intelligence community.203/

3. Telephone Lines Covered

This Committee has made an attempt to determine which telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic compounds were subject to this electronic intercept operation in September and October of 1963. The monthly operational report of this project for the month of September lists the following phones as targets of the operation:204/

14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)

ok

The report notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September 1963.205/ The monthly report for October says that in a chronological file.292/ One copy of the Cuban transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on a weekly basis.293/

(g) Format of Transcripts

The format of the transcripts that Mr. Tarasoff produced was much the same as those of the Spanish language transcripts described above.294/ Mr. Tarasoff's transcripts were from Russian into English.295/ Many of Mr. Tarasoff's transcriptions bear the notation "(previously transcribed)" after the meter number referring to the reel footage location of a conversation.297/ Mr. Tarasoff indicated that this notation meant that the conversation had already been transcribed from a tap on another embassy phone:

> "Previously transcribed" means, for instance, I went to the embassy first and the embassy number was 605055. Now this number 501264 belonged to the film's office. So consequently if that particular call went out of the main building to the films office and it had been transcribed before, that is exactly what I would do, put down "previously transcribed". So there was no question of doing it twice.298/

subject to the intercept operation. It should be noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in the Cuban compound in 1964.212/ They were:

14-42-37	The Ambassador's private telephone
25-07-95	The Chancery
14-13-26	The Chancery
25-09-14	The Commercial Office
11-28-47	The Consulate

One CIA employee who was involved in Cuban operations in Mexico City remembered that there were taps on the telephone of the Cuban Consulate.213/ It is possible that the employee, Mr. Phillips, who was stationed in Mexico City from 1961 to 1966, was incorrect, after a fifteen-year hiatus, in placing this tap in 1963.214/ As the above notes, an examination of the project files fails to support Mr. Phillips' memory, although those files do show that the Consulate telephone was tapped in 1964.

4. Production from Operation

The intercept listening post operated from approximately 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. every day.215/

Classification: TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

Q: Had the information concerning Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa, if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would his case prior to the assassination have been handled in any different manner?

A: It would have been in the case of dissemination of information about him, but I do not think that any operational action would have taken to apprehend him or to contact him or to try to force him back to the United States.

Q: ...how would the dissemination have been treated differently?

A: Well, it simply means that we would have disseminated any additional information that we got. 657/

It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or not this additional information about Oswald was reported to Headquarters. In all likelihood it was not. The Chief of the Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station was ever criticized for this failure to report in the face of a specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters. He said:

> No. That was not because we were trying to go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, secretly.
>
> We were running, at that time, a vast political action program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and it succeeded.

appeal

Classification: TOP SECRET

293

> I do not know whether you informed yourself about the magnitude of our political action program at the time--absolutely enormous.
>
> We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of the Station's effort was to attempt to recruit Russians, Cubans and satellite people. 658/

Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination can best be summed up in Dave Phillips' response when he was asked how he would characterize that handling: "At the very best, it is not professional, at the best." 659/

V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning Oswald After the Assassination

A. Reporting of information concerning the photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man

Even though some people in the Station clearly disassociated the photograph that was described in MEXI 6453 from Oswald after receiving the 10/11 cable, 656/ it is clear that some people still considered it possible for some reason that the photograph was of Oswald. In October, Ann Goodpasture had argued this very point with Winston Scott. 657/ On the day of the assassination, the Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters that it was sending as soon as possible "copies of only visitor to

Whitten

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: John F. Pereira
J. Barry Harrelson
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
Johnny L. Goins @ DO
Fred Crawford @ DO
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 04/24/96 12:15:25 PM
SUBJECT: Interview with John W. (S)

CL By 2224130
CL Reason 1.5(c)
DECL On X1
DRV FM Hum 4-82

Attached is an MFR summarizing my meeting with Mr. Whitten. On a more personal note, Mr. Whitten is an extremely charming and interesting gentleman. The meeting with him went much better than I had hoped, but it was also rather emotionally distressing for both Jeremy and I. Mr. Whitten broke down several times during the meeting and was obviously feeling very scared. Although Jeremy is sure that the Board will do the right thing here, we both agreed that Mr. Whitten is without doubt someone who should be protected even if it means going to the President.

WHITTMFR.DOC

CC:

13-00000

17 May 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600, Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Review Board, and I spoke with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy in Vienna. Gunn conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA. After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten about 1900. (S)

2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on his left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map, he pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where many Middle Easterners would congregate. He then pointed out these places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any attack. (S)

3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a completely different life now in Vienna. He and his wife have lived in Vienna approximately 25 years. He is a member of various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent Vienna Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music (his specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals for his work in the arts in Vienna which we saw when we went to his apartment. (S)

4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that he committed perjury when applying for Austrian residency by stating he worked for the State Department. He believes this

CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FM: HUM 4-82

could subject him to criminal penalties in Austria. He stated on several occasions, should his affiliation become known, he would have to leave Austria. On other occasions, he stated that he would turn himself in to the Viennese authorities and offer his services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service. He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he believed were his options should his name be released by the Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)

5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions, I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and I as his allies in this process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would turn out well. (S)

6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he could to them. The Board will make its decision in it's next meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary for anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)

Linda C. Cipriani
DCI/OGC/LD

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

DCI/OGC/LD/LCipriani:/76124 (17 May 96)

Distribution:
  Original - Original
  1 - Registry
  1 - Lit File

24 April 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600, Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Review Board, and I spoke with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy in Vienna. Gunn conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA. After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten about 1900. (S)

2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on his left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map, he pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where many Middle Easterners would congregate. He then pointed out these places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any attack. (S)

3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a completely different life now in Vienna. He and his wife have lived in Vienna approximately 25 years. He is a member of various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent Vienna Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music (his specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals for his work in the arts in Vienna which we saw when we went to his apartment. (S)

4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that he committed perjury when applying for Austrian residency by stating he worked for the State Department. He believes this

CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FM: HUM 4-82

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

could subject him to criminal penalties in Austria. He stated on several occasions, should his affiliation become known, he would have to leave Austria. On other occasions, he stated that he would turn himself in to the Viennese authorities and offer his services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service. He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he believed were his options should his name be released by the Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)

5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions, I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and I as his allies in this process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would turn out well. (S)

6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he could to them. The Board will make its decision in it's next meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary for anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)

Linda C. Cipriani
DCI/OGC/LD

24 April 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600, Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Review Board, and I spoke with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy in Vienna. Gunn conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA. After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten about 1900. (S)

2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on his left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map, he pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where many Middle Easterners would congregate. He then pointed out these places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any attack. (S)

3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a completely different life now in Vienna. He and his wife have lived in Vienna approximately 25 years. He is a member of various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent Vienna Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music (his specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals for his work in the arts in Vienna which we saw when we went to his apartment. (S)

4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that he committed perjury when applying for Austrian residency by stating he worked for the State Department. He believes this

CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FM: HUM 4-82

could subject him to criminal penalties in Austria. He stated on several occasions, should his affiliation become known, he would have to leave Austria. On other occasions, he stated that he would turn himself in to the Viennese authorities and offer his services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service. He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he believed were his options should his name be released by the Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)

5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions, I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him and Gunn had stated he would argue for ~~his~~ protection to the Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and I as his allies in this process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would turn out well. (S)

6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he could to them. The Board will make its decision in it's next meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary for anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)

Linda C. Cipriani
DCI/OGC/LD

20 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Eleanor Neiman

FROM: Sue A. Burggraf

SUBJECT: Per our telecon, here is a copy of the cable that came in on Friday from Vienna.

REFERENCE:

Document displayed with Header, Body, and Footer zones

Edit cable **Categorize cable** **Print this cable**

CATEGORIES:

ROUTE SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT
ROUTE COMMENTS:

S E C R E T 171648Z NOV 95 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 28456

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, C/EUR/SA, EUR/LGL, OGC/OSD, OGC/OFLD

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT

REF: A. DIRECTOR 493642 95 2040015
B. DIRECTOR 493658 95 2040060

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.

2. ON 14 NOVEMBER 1995, C/O NOBLEHORSE DELIVERED REF TEAR LINE INFORMATION AS REQUESTED. REF IDEN THEN ASKED FOR TIME TO FORMULATE HIS THOUGHTS AND SUBMIT THEM ON PAPER. ALTHOUGH NOBLEHORSE EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD PREFER HE PASS THE RESPONSE DIRECTLY TO C/O, HE WAS APPARENTLY SO ANGERED OVER THE CONTENTS OF REF, THAT HE LATER TRIED TO CONTACT BERT MILLS DIRECTLY AND WITHOUT SUCCESS. ON 15 NOVEMBER, REF IDEN PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE IN WRITING, WHICH IS BEING POUCHED TO HQS VIA TM 902-825:

NOV 14, 1995

TO BERT MILLS:

I OBJECT VIOLENTLY TO THE REVELATION OF MY NAME REGARDLESS OF THE LAW. HERE ARE SOME REASONS:

1. I EMIGRATED TO AUSTRIA TWICE, FIRST IN 1971 AND AGAIN IN 1983. BOTH TIMES I HAD TO FILL OUT AND SWEAR TO LENGTHY FORMS ABOUT MY BACKGROUND. I USED MY RETIRED STATE COVER BOTH TIMES, THEREBY COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE UNDER AUSTRIAN LAW. MY OLD FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROTECT ME HAVE ALL RETIRED OR, EVEN MORE, DIED. AUSTRIAN JUSTICE IS NOTORIOUSLY IMMUTABLE. DO YOU WANT ME TO GO TO JAIL?

2. LIVING SINCE RETIREMENT IN AUSTRIA FROM 1971 TO 1980 AND FROM 1983 TO THE PRESENT, I HAVE ACHIEVED HIGH POSITIONS IN VIENNA'S MUSICAL BODIES, BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE JOHANN STRAUSS SOCIETY AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE VIENNA MEN'S SINGING SOCIETY, AND I AM PERSONALLY KNOWN TO SEVERAL RECENT AUSTRIAN PRESIDENTS, MANY REPORTERS AND RADIO FIGURES. I SUFFERED A DISABLING STROKE IN DECEMBER 1993 AND MY WIFE AND I, BOTH 75, CAN CONTINUE TO EXIST HERE BECAUSE OUR 2000 SQ. FT. APARTMENT IS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF 2 POST OFFICES, SEVERAL SMALL SUPER MARKETS, MY FAMILY PHYSICIAN, OUR DENTIST, MY UROLOGIST, AND AN EYE DOCTOR AND OPTICIAN. WE ARE WITHIN WHEEL CHAIR DISTANCE OF THE CONCERT HALLS AND THE OPERA. WHERE CAN YOU DUPLICATE THIS FOR ME?

3. DURING MY ACTIVE CAREER IN VIENNA AROUND 1959 I INTERROGATED AND BROKE AN INTELLIGENCE SWINDLER WHO HAD BEEN A NAZI ASSASSIN. I PROMISED HIM SECRECY IF HE CONFESSED, BUT THE US ARMY PUT OUT A "BURN NOTICE" ON HIM, FORCING HIM TO MOVE TO GERMANY. I AM SURE HE WOULD LOVE TO FIND ME AND SHOOT ME.

4. VIENNA IS FULL OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL ASSASSINATIONS, EVEN OF A CITY COUNCILMAN, BY THEM IN RECENT YEARS. UNDER AUSTRIAN LAW, I, AS A FOREIGNER, CANNOT EVEN GET A PISTOL LICENSE. YOU MUST KNOW ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING AND KILLING OF OUR COLLEAGUES AROUND THE WORLD.

4. I HAVE TWICE TESTIFIED BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ABOUT THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. THEIR FULL REPORTS SIMPLY CALLED ME THE "DESK OFFICER" AND THAT HAS SEEMED TO SATISFY EVERYONE. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF YOU DO EXPOSE MY NAME, I WILL NOT EVER TALK TO ANY JOURNALISTS OR SO-CALLED HISTORIANS.

5. IF MY NAME IS EXPOSED, I WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LEAVE VIENNA, WITH THE WHOLE HOUSE FULL OF FURNITURE, PICTURES, LIBRARY, CLOTHING, ETC. WHICH I PACKED AND PAID TO HAVE MOVED OVER HERE IN 1983. BECAUSE OF MY STROKE, I WILL BE UNABLE TO DO ANY PACKING AND THE MOVE WILL BE VERY EXPENSIVE. WHERE CAN I RESETTLE IN A 2000 SQ FT. APT. SO CONVENIENTLY LOCATED.

6. MY WIFE AND I LOVE LIVING HERE FOR MANY REASONS, AND LEAVING WOULD BE A CRUEL AND NEEDLESS FATE.

7. I REGARD THIS LAW AS DISHONORABLE AND UNWORTHY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. IF YOU DECIDE AGAINST ME, I WANT TO APPEAR BEFORE THE BOARD AND EVEN THE PRESIDENT, WHOM I HAPPEN TO ADMIRE. I WILL PAY MY OWN WAY BACK TO DO SO. I SERVED IN WWII AND NEVER SPARED MYSELF; IN THE OUTFIT I WORKED HARD, WAS FEARLESS IN DEALING WITH MY SUPERIORS (CORD MEYER AND DICK HELMS CAN TESTIFY TO THAT) AND MY ADVERSARIES. I WOULDN'T EVEN THINK OF THREATENING TO EXPOSE THINGS TO PRESSURE YOU. I WILL BE EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY OR TWO, FAMILIAR WITH OUR AFFAIRS, TO REPRESENT ME. I WILL NOT DENY, THAT I CONSIDER YOU AND EVERYONE ELSE IMPLEMENTING THIS LAW TO BE ENGAGING IN DISHONORABLE CONDUCT, UNWORTHY OF OUR GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

8. IN THE LATE 1960'S WHILE SERVING IN VIENNA UNDER TOM KARAMISSINIS, I WAS ORDERED BY HQ TO REVEAL TO AUSTRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE THAT A LOW-RANKING AUSTRIAN DIPLOMAT SERVING AS THEIR INFORMANT IN BUDAPEST HAD ALSO BEEN RECRUITED BY US AND WAS REPORTING TO US. I REFUSED TO CARRY OUT THIS ORDER AND OFFERED MY RESIGNATION. TO ME, IT WAS DISHONORABLE TO BETRAY A YOUNG AGENT WHO HAD ACCEPTED OUR RECRUITMENT AND PUT FAITH IN OUR PROMISE OF SECRECY. TO MY MIND AN AGENCY WITHOUT PRINCIPLES CANNOT SURVIVE AND INDEED SHOULD NOT SURVIVE. TOM KARAMISSINIS, PERHAPS ONE OF THE LAST HONORABLE MEN TO SERVE WITH US IN HIGH POSITION, FIRED A STRONG CABLE BACK AND THE SHAMEFUL ORDER WAS RETRACTED.

9. I HAVE INVESTED ABOUT $50,000 IN MY APARTMENT, IN KEY MONEY AND IMPROVEMENTS. IF I LEAVE, I WILL LOSE ALL OR MOST OF THIS. OUR LAST MOVE TO VIENNA COST ME ABOUT $15,000 IN SEA FREIGHT AND INSURANCE. I WILL NEVER GET ON MY KNEES AND ASK TO BE MADE WHOLE IF YOU EXPOSE ME, BUT I MAY REPORT TO THE COURTS. I AM A RETIRED MEMBER OF THE VIRGINIA BAR.

10. LET ME REGALE YOU WITH AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE HISTORIANS MINDLESS DRIVE TO KNOW EVERYTHING CAN LEAD TO A PROUD COUNTRY'S DISGRACING ITSELF. DURING WWII WHEN WE WERE INTERROGATING GERMAN POW'S, WE PROMISED THEM NO ONE WOULD EVER LEARN THEY HAD "SPILLED THEIR GUTS," AND WE ALL BELIEVED WE WERE BEING HONEST. BUT ALMOST 25 YEARS AFTER WWII THE BRITISH DECLASSIFIED ALL THE ADI(K) REPORTS (THAT'S WHAT THEY WERE CALLED, AND EVEN THE "ROOM CONVERSATIONS," TRANSCRIPTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS POWS HAD IN THEIR ROOMS, EVEN INCLUDING THE EXTREMELY VALUABLE SPEECHES MADE BY HIGH-RANKING LUFTWAFFE OFFICERS TO THEIR HIGH-RANKING FELLOW POW'S AT "COCKFOSTERS" MANSION. NEWCOMERS WERE VISITED BY THE OLD HANDS FOR A MONTH TO MAKE SURE THEY WEREN'T STOOL PIGEONS, BEFORE THEY WERE GIVEN THE PRIVILEGE OF ADDRESSING THEIR FELLOW OFFICERS ON SOME IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WAR. THE EXCELLENT BRITISH MIKES PICKED IT ALL UP.

IN RECENT YEARS, AT LEAST ONE LUFTWAFFE VETERAN ASSOCIATION, THAT OF J.G.2, THE RICHTHOFEN GESCHWADER, SENT PEOPLE TO LONDON TO GET COPIES OF THE INTERROGATION REPORTS OF THEIR PILOTS. THEY DID IT CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WERE SO SHOCKED AT THE VAST AMOUNT OF VITAL DATA REVEALED BY THEIR BUDDIES THAT, IN ACUTE REVULSION, THEY STOPPED LOOKING. I ASSUMED THEN THAT "EVERYONE" HAD "TALKED," WHICH IS TRUE.

11. I AM 75 YEARS OLD PARTLY PARALYZED ON MY LEFT SIDE FROM A STROKE IN DEC. 1993. I WAS NEARLY FULLY REHABILITATED WHEN, IN MAY 1994, I WAS HIT BY CONSTANT MUSCLE SPASMS ALL UP AND DOWN MY LEFT SIDE. THIS RATHER RARE CONDITION, BASICALLY A SUDDEN SUPER-HUMAN TIGHTENING OF ALL THE MUSCLES, WITH AFTER EFFECTS LASTING UNTIL THE NEXT SPASM, HAVE MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO STAND UP, WALK, OR EVEN SIT UP FOR VERY LONG. IN A FEW DAYS, WHEN ALL THE MANY MEDICINES ARE HERE, WILL BEGIN A 20-WEEK HOMEOPATHIC CURE FOR THE SPASMS UNDER DR. SCHRAMM, A LEADING SPECIALIST HERE. I CAN'T VERY WELL LEAVE FOR 20 WEEKS.

YOU WILL BE CONTACTED MOMENTARILY BY ONE OF MY ATTORNEYS. I WILL ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH MY CONGRESSMAN AND SENATORS.

WITH BITTER RESOLVE,
(SIGNED - REF B IDEN)

3. REF IDEN HAD ALSO ATTEMPTED TO PUT THE ABOVE INTO "CABALESE," BUT BECAME TOO TIRED TO FINISH IT. NONETHELESS, REF IDEN ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE ALSO BE PASSED:

1. SAW SUBJ IN HIS APT NOV 14. CORDIAL

2. REASONS: SUBJ HAS EMIGRATED PRIVATELY TO AUSTRIA TWICE, 1971 AND 1983, USING RETIRED STATE COVER ON SWORN AUSTRIAN FORMS THUS COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE BY AUSTRIAN LAW. HIGH OFFICIAL HERE WHO COVERED FOR HIM NOW DEAD. WOULD FACE SCANDAL TRIAL, JAIL, AND DEPORTATION.

3. SUBJ PROMINENT IN LOCAL MUSIC CIRCLES, RADIO, TV, AND POLITICS AND MILITARY, GREAT SCANDAL POTENTIAL.

4. SUBJ INVESTED 50 THOUSAND DOLLARS IN APT AND WOULD LOSE IT IN HURRIED DEPARTURE, PLUS EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS TO Z1, AND OWN FARES.

5. SUBJ NOW 75 HAD CRIPPLING STROKE DEC 93. WIFE ALSO 75 ABLE TO CARRY ON BECAUSE STORES, DENTIST, DOCTOR, UROLOGIST OF SUBJ, POST OFFICE ALL IN WALKING DISTANCE OF APT. CANNOT DUPLICATE THIS IN Z1.

6. SUBJ WOULD BE ENDANGERED BY ISLAMIC GROUPS HERE WHO HAVE ASSASSINATED SEVERAL INCL ONE CITY COUNCILMAN. EMBASSY GETS THREATENING PHONE CALLS. AS FOREIGNER SUBJ DENIED AUSTRIAN PISTOL PERMIT. SUBJ ALSO ENDANGERED BY FORMER NAZI ASSASSIN AND INTEL SWINDLER HE INTERROGATED AND BROKE 25 YEARS AGO, PROMISING HIM SECRECY; BUT US ARMY PUT OUT BURN NOTICE, FORCING NAZI TO MOVE TO GERMANY.

7. SUBJ HAS TESTIFIED FULLY BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES, TERMED "DESK OFFICER," OWN ROLE MINOR. ALTHO PUT IN CHARGE OF AGENCY INVESTIGATION BY HELMS THEN DDO, HIS WORK WAS SABOTAGED BY ANGLETON WHO WITHHELD HUNDREDS OF BEST FBI REPORTS AND CONFERRED DAILY WITH FBI WITHOUT PRESENCE OF SUBJ, ALL IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF HELMS ORDERS.

8. SUBJ AVERS HE WILL NEVER THREATEN TO EXPOSE AGENCY. EVEN IF SURFACED WILL DENY EVERYTHING.

4. FILE: 785-120-034.
CL BY: 618711
CL REASON: 1.5(C)

DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

CC:

EYES ONLY

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

Nov 14, 1995

CL BY: 618711
CL REASON: 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: Hum 4-82

To Bert Mills:

I object violently to the revelation of my name
regardless of the law, Here are some reasons:
1. I emigrated to Austria twice, first in 1971 and again
in 1983. Both times I had to fill out and swear to lengthy
forms about my background. I used my retired State cover
both times, thereby committing perjury twice under Austrian
law. My old friends in high places who might have been
able to protect me have all retired or, even more, died.
Austrian justice is notoriously immutable. Do you want me to
go to jail?
2. Living since retirement in Austria from 1971 to 1980
and from 1983 to the present, I have achieved high
positions in various musical bodies, Board of Directors
of the Johann Strauss Society and Vice President of
the Vienna Men's Singing Society, and I am personally
known to several recent Austrian Presidents, many
reporter and radio figures. I suffered a disabling stroke
in December 1993 and my wife and I, both 75, can
continue to exist here because our 2000 sq. ft. apartment
is within walking distance of 2 post offices, several small
super markets, my family physician, our dentist, my
urologist, and our eye doctor and optician. We are
within wheel chair distance of the concert halls and
the opera. Where can you duplicate this for me?
3. During my active career in Vienna around 1959
I interrogated and broke an intelligence swindler who
had been a Nazi assassin. I promised him secrecy if he
confessed, but the US Army put out a "burn notice"
him to move to my. I am sure

been several assassinations, even of a city councilman, by them in recent years. Under Austrian law, I, as a foreigner, can not even get a pistol license. You must know about the kidnapping and killing of our colleagues around the world.

4. I have twice testified before House and Senate committees about the Kennedy assassination. Their full report simply called me the "desk officer" and that has seemed to satisfy everyone. Needless to say, if you do expose my name, I will not even talk to any journalists or so-called historians.

5. If my name is exposed, I will obviously have to leave Vienna, with the whole house full of furniture, pictures, library, clothing, etc. which I packed and paid to have moved over here in 1983. Because of my stroke, I will be unable to do any packing and the move will be very expensive. Where can I resettle in an 2000 sq ft. apt. so conveniently located.

6. My wife and I love living here for many reasons and leaving would be a cruel and needless fate.

7. I regard this law as dishonorable and unworthy of the United States of America. If you decide against me, I want to appeal before the Board and even the President, whom I happen to admire. I will pay my own way back to do so. I served in WWII and never spared myself; in the outfit I worked hard, was fearless in dealing with my superiors (Cord Meyer and Dick Helms can testify to that) and my adversaries. I wouldn't even think of threatening to expose things to pressure you. I will be employing an ~~attorney~~ or two, familiar with our affairs, to represent me. I will not deny, that I consider you and everyone else implementing this law to be in dishonorable conduct, unworthy of

8. In the late 1960's while serving in Vienna under Tom Karamessines, I was ordered by HQ to reveal to Austrian Military Intelligence that a low-ranking Austrian diplomat serving as their informant in Budapest had also been recruited by us and was reporting to us. I refused to carry out this order and offered my resignation. To me, it was dishonorable to betray a young agent who had accepted our recruitment and put faith in our promise of secrecy. To my mind an agency without principles can not survive and indeed should not survive. Tom Karamessines, perhaps one of the last honorable men to serve with us in high position, fired a strong cable back and the shameful order was retracted.

9. I have invested about $50,000 in my apartment, in key money and improvements. If I leave, I will lose all or most of this. Our last move to Vienna cost me about $15,000 in sea freight and insurance. I will never get on my knees and ask to be made whole if you expose me, but I may resort to the courts. I am a retired member of the Virginia Bar.

10. Let me regale you with an example of how the historian's mindless drive to know everything can lead to a proud country's disgracing itself. During WWII when we were interrogating German POWs, we promised them no one would ever learn ~~they~~ had "spilled their guts" and we all believed we were being honest. But about 25 years after WWII the British the ADI(K) reports (that's what the

of the conversation POWs had in their rooms
even including the extremely valuable speeches
made by high-ranking Luftwaffe officers to their "Cockfosters"
high-ranking fellow POW's at "Corkfosters
mansion. Newcomers were vetted by the old
hands for a month to make sure they weren't stool
pigeons, before they were given the privilege to
addressing their fellow officers on some important
aspect of the war. The excellent British mikes picked
it all up.
In recent years, at least one Luftwaffe
veteran association, that of J.G. 2, the Richthofen
Geschwader, sent people to London to get
copies of the interrogation reports of their pilots. They
did it chronologically and were so shocked at
the vast amount of vital data revealed by their
buddies that, in acute revulsion, they stopped
looking. I assured them that "everyone" had
"talked," which is true

11. I am 75 years old partly paralyzed
on my left side from a stroke in Dec. 1993.
I was nearly fully rehabilitated when, in May
1994, I was hit by constant muscle spasms all
up and down my left side. This rather rare
condition, basically a sudden super-human tightening
of all the muscles, with after effects lasting until
the next spasm, have made it increasingly
difficult for me to stand up, walk, or even sit
up for very long. In a few days, when all
the many medicines are here, will begin a
20-week homeopathic cure for the spasms
.. by Dr. Schramm, a leading

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

You will be contacted momentarily by one of my attorneys. I will also be in touch with my Congressman and Senator.

With bitter resolve,

John M. Whitten

13-00000

SECRET

CIA
INTERNAL USE ONLY

1. SAW SUBJ IN HIS APT NOV14. CORDIAL

~~2~~ SUBJ HAS ~~PRE~~ WRITTEN PLEA TO REMAIN UNDER COVER,

2. REASONS: SUBJ HAS EMIGRATED PRIVATELY TO AUSTRIA TWICE, 1971 AND 1983, USING RETIRED STATE COVER ON SWORN AUSTRIAN FORMS THUS COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE BY AUSTRIAN LAW; HIGH OFFICIAL HERE WHO COVERED FOR HIM NOW DEAD, WOULD FACE SCANDAL TRIAL, JAIL, AND DEPORTATION.

3. SUBJ PROMINENT IN LOCAL MUSIC CIRCLES, RADIO, TV, AND POLITICS, AND MILITARY, GREAT SCANDAL POTENTIAL.

4. SUBJ INVESTED 50 THOUSAND DOLLARS IN APT AND WOULD LOSE IT IN HURRIED DEPARTURE, PLUS EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS TO ZI, AND OWN FARES.

5. SUBJ NOW 75 HAD CRIPPLING STROKE DEC 93, WIFE ALSO 75 ABLE TO CARRY ON BECAUSE STORES, DENTIST, DOCTOR, UROLOGIST OF SUBJ, POST OFFICE ALL IN WALKING DISTANCE OF APT. CANNOT DUPLICATE THIS IN ZI,

6. SUBJ WOULD BE ENDANGERED BY ISLAMIC GROUPS HERE WHO HAVE ASSASSINATED SEVERAL INCL ONE CITY COUNCILMAN. EMBASSY ~~7.~~ GETS THREATENING PHONE CALLS, AS FOREIGNER SUBJ ~~REFUSED~~ DENIED AUSTRIAN PISTOL PERMIT; SUBJ ALSO ENDANGERED BY FORMER NAZI ASSASSIN AND INTEL SWINDLER HE INTERROGATED AND BROKE 25 YEARS AGO, PROMISING HIM SECRECY; BUT ~~ARMY PU~~ US ARMY PUT OUT BURN NOTICE, FORCING NAZI TO MOVE TO GERMANY

7. SUBJ HAS TESTIFIED FULLY BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES, TERMED "DESK OFFICER," OWN ROLE MINOR. ALTHO PUT IN CHARGE OF AGENCY INVESTIGATION BY HELMS THEN DDO HIS WAR

WITH FBI WITHOUT PESENCE OF SUBS, ALL IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF HELMS ORDERS,

8. SUBJ AVERS HE WILL NEVER THREATEN TO EXPOSE AGENCY; EVEN IF SURFACED WILL DENY EVERYTHING

Subj: On Scelso testimony
Date: Oct12 TueSun 19961995 18:46 EDT
From: 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM
X-From: 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM (ed dolan)
To: dickkovar@aol.com (Dick Kovar)

Dick, this is what Chuck Briggs requested.

Date: 06-Oct-96 02:36 EDT
From: [The name of this person is unimportant]
Subj: Ex-CIA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire

Ex-CIA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire
By Michael Dorman
(c) 1996, Newsday

The chief CIA investigator of President John F. Kennedy's assassination has testified that another high CIA official - noted for seeking conspiracies - disobeyed orders in repeatedly conferring with the Warren Commission shortly after the murder. The witness also said a colleague once told him that the CIA official, the late
James Angleton, ``has ties to the Mafia.''

Almost 33 years after the assassination, the identity of the witness, who held various top-secret CIA jobs, is considered so sensitive that federal authorities insist on withholding his true name. He is known only by the alias ``John Scelso.''

While Scelso testified before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1978, his 192-page testimony was kept secret until now. It has just been sent to the National Archives by the Assassination Records Review Board, a federal agency that screens assassination documents and makes public those that do not endanger national security.

Scelso's testimony, which criticized operations of the CIA, FBI, Secret Service and other agencies, likely will renew debates, especially among conspiracy theorists, on the assassination and how it was investigated.

When Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963, Scelso was chief of a CIA

branch
responsible for operations in Mexico and Central America. Richard Helms, the CIA chief of clandestine services and later the agency's director, placed Scelso in charge of the assassination investigation. Angleton, a counterintelligence official with close ties to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, "immediately went into action to do all the investigating," Scelso testified, criticizing the move sharply.

"Helms called a meeting at which Angleton and a lot of others were present and told everybody that I was in charge and that no one should have any conversations with anyone about the Kennedy case without my being present - which was violated from the word 'go' by Angleton, who dealt with the FBI and the Warren Commission and (Warren Commission member and former CIA Director Allen) Dulles himself. ... Angleton ignored Helms' orders. I tried to get Helms to make him obey and Helms said, 'You go tell him.' "

Angleton, who died in 1987, spent much of his career searching for conspiracies - believing that there was a Communist mole in the CIA - and was presumed by other CIA officers to have tried to press a conspiracy theory on the Warren Commission. The commission found no evidence of a conspiracy. Angleton was fired
in 1975. Years later, a mole was found - Aldrich Ames - but he had entered the CIA after Angleton's dismissal.

At one point in the 1978 House testimony, committee attorney Michael Goldsmith asked, "Do you have any reason to believe that Angleton might have had ties to organized crime?"

"Yes," replied Scelso, who is now retired and lives abroad, government sources said. He said the Justice Department once asked the CIA to determine the true names of people holding numbered bank accounts in Panama because the Mafia was hiding Las Vegas "skim" money there. "We were in an excellent position to do this and told them so - whereupon Angleton vetoed it and said, 'That is the bureau's (FBI's) business.' " Scelso said he discussed the situation with another CIA officer. "And he smiled a foxy smile and said, 'Well, that's Angleton's excuse. The real reason is that Angleton himself has ties to the Mafia and he would not
want to double-cross them.' "

On another subject, Scelso gave Kennedy conspiracy theorists a slight piece of ammunition. A Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, was known to have told investigators that Lee Harvey Oswald - identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's assassin - was not a Soviet agent. But Scelso said: ``I later heard that Nosenko was discovered to have been dissembling, not being on the level. That information was imparted to me by CIA officers."

Based on the information CIA headquarters had on Oswald before the assassination - chiefly that he had been in the Marine Corps and defected to the Soviet Union, then returned - Scelso said he saw no reason to pay him special heed. ``Oswald just seemed to me to be a small-potatoes defector," he said. But he conceded that significant information about Oswald - known to CIA agents in Mexico City, for example - had not reached headquarters before the assassination.

It dealt chiefly with Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico City and his attempts to obtain a Cuban visa two months before the assassination. Scelso said the information failed to reach Washington because of simple overwork and bureaucratic delays in the Mexico City office. He revealed that all the outside telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban embassies were tapped by American agents and that calls Oswald made to them were recorded. After Oswald was arrested, Scelso revealed, agents compared audiotapes made while he was in custody with the wiretaps and determined that he was the same man who had visited the embassies.

Distribution:

To: j. dolan > [74030,3022] Dickford Cohn > [76226,1572]

```
----------------------- Headers -------------------------------
From 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM Tue Oct 8 18:45:41 1996
Return-Path: 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM
Received: from arl-img-4.compuserve.com (arl-img-4.compuserve.com
[149.174.217.134]) by emin09.mail.aol.com (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id
SAA12122 for <dickkovar@aol.com>; Tue, 8 Oct 1996 18:45:40 -0400
Received: by arl-img-4.compuserve.com (8.6.10/5.950515)
```

5:16

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

13 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.)

1. (U) **Issue.** The purpose of this memorandum is to relate CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the release of the true names of human sources of intelligence which appear in the JFK Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem could be addressed.

I. Factual Background

2. (U) In general, CIA "sources" are foreign nationals, recruited and living in a foreign country, who provide information to the U.S. Government under a promise of confidentiality. Their act of passing information to the U.S. is generally against the national interest of their own country and would be considered espionage, which is a capital offense in most countries. Just as in this country when a spy is caught, should a CIA source be discovered, it would be "headline news," even 30 years after the fact. The Review Board will recall that when former National Security Agency employee Robert Lipka was arrested approximately a year ago for espionage he allegedly committed 30 years earlier, this received a lot of attention in the United States. Lipka is currently awaiting trial in the U.S. for his alleged espionage activities.

3. (U) This month, the Review Board will be considering approximately 50-60 true names of human sources for release. These particular sources range from encrypted

CL BY: 0185904
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FM: HUM 4-82

SECRET

assets to one-time contacts. It is our understanding that additional source names appear throughout the JFK Collection and will be reviewed in the future. It is important, therefore, that the Review Board and CIA agree on a consistent method of dealing with source names appearing in the JFK Collection at this time so as not to impede the future review of documents.

4. (C) The Review Board has recently developed a policy for releasing the true names of covert CIA employees. Although there are many similarities between covert employees and sources, there is an important difference that should be reflected in the way the Review Board looks at this issue. With CIA covert employees who are mentioned in this collection, it has been possible in some instances to go to them and seek their permission to reveal their names. Some of these former employees have even been made available for interviews and depositions. With most sources, it is not possible to do this. First, CIA has dropped contact with some of these sources and may not be able to locate them. Attempting to find these individuals would create some risk of creating suspicions that they were or are associated with this Agency or the U.S. Government. If CIA were unable to locate a particular source, there would still be some risk in releasing his name. Just because CIA cannot locate him, does not mean that he is not alive and well-known in his own community. Even if we were able to locate a source without risk to his safety, it is probable that he would not want to be visited by the CIA again after so many years. More than likely, sources do not now want their past association revealed when they have undoubtedly moved on in their lives to do other things. Some may be in political or private enterprise positions where CIA affiliation would damage them professionally and/or harm them and their families personally.

5. (U) Another important distinction that needs to be taken into account is the difference between CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) "sources." Perhaps the most significant difference is that many FBI sources provide information with the understanding that the information and the source will be publicly revealed. FBI sources are often used in criminal prosecutions as witnesses. CIA, on the other hand, promises secrecy and confidentiality to its sources. CIA sources rarely appear at public trials. In fact, not only is the identity of CIA sources protected from public acknowledgment, but also it is closely held within the Agency itself. Another difference is the fact that a

foreign national cooperating with CIA is usually committing a unique violation of his own country's laws--espionage. If one gets caught committing espionage, the punishment in many countries is for a capital offense. On the other hand, a foreigner who cooperates with the FBI is not usually committing espionage. Cooperation may be with the full knowledge of his government--such as cooperation in a criminal investigation. Therefore, the risks for cooperation with the FBI are not usually as great as cooperation with CIA. In addition, the FBI has greater means for protecting individuals who provide information to it, for example, the witness protection program, which CIA does not have.

II. Legal Considerations

6. (U) Although Section 11(a) of the JFK Act provides that when the Act requires release of information, it takes precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit the true names of sources. CIA believes that it is important for the Review Board to consider the laws, which have been growing and developing over the years, to protect classified information because they clearly reflect a larger U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.

7. (U) By Executive Order (E.O.)and statute, the President and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) responsible for protecting intelligence sources. In his Directive of 22 January 1946 which established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI responsible for protecting sources. With the establishment of the CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section 103(d)(3), codified at 50 U.S.C. §403(3)(c)(5), ***requires*** the DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure. In addition, §403(3)(d)(2) ***requires*** the DCI to ensure that risks to the United States and those involved in the collection of intelligence through human sources are minimized.

8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working with or for CIA has been of particular concern to U.S. lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. 1949 §403g, Congress specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. Although the purpose of this law is to protect

employees of the CIA, and not assets or contacts, it indicates Congress' intent from early on to protect those working covertly for the U.S. Government.

9. (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving or potentially involving classified information. Working with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has successfully protected intelligence sources from public release even in criminal trials where there are heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to the defendant of all government information relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for *in camera ex parte* hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and relevancy of classified information, including the identity of human sources who may have information pertaining to the defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant or defense counsel, or in open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information and ruled that the harm to national security outweighs the defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other cases, the defense was never notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those cases where the risk to national security is too great.

10 (U) In 1982, Congress acted to protect human intelligence sources by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §421 which criminalizes the revelation of a source's identity. This Act subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a covert agent to prosecution with up to 10 years in prison and $50,000 in fines. A covert agent includes: (a) a U.S. citizen whose intelligence relationship with the U.S. Government is classified and is acting abroad as an agent, informant or source of operational assistance to an intelligence agency; and (b) an individual, other than a U.S. citizen whose past or present intelligence relationship to the U.S. is classified information and who is a present or former agent or informant of, or is of operational assistance to, an intelligence agency.

11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples of a larger government policy to protect human sources from public disclosure.[1] There has also developed over the years a significant amount of case law which further implements this policy. For example, in Sims v. CIA, 10 S.Ct. 1981 (1985), the Supreme Court held that pursuant to the National Security Act, the DCI had the authority to protect from release to Freedom of Information Act requesters the identities of individuals conducting research on projects financed by CIA. The Supreme Court further stated that the DCI's authority to protect sources was broad, and was not limited to only those individuals who were guaranteed confidentiality.

12. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed an Executive Order on classified national security information which came into effect in October 1995. Although it requires that agencies make greater declassification efforts than the prior Executive Order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources extra protection from its declassification provisions. Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and has historical value must be declassified within five years. However, information revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be protected.

13. (U) The above federal statutes and case law show a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who provide intelligence information to the U.S. Government. In carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to this policy and afford the protection of human sources the highest priority.

III. Operational Considerations

14. (U) As the Review Board is well aware, in order for CIA officers to effectively collect intelligence around the world, they cannot acknowledge publicly that they work for CIA and, conversely, CIA cannot acknowledge a particular individual's affiliation with it. This is true even more so with sources. In addition to the risk to a source's personal safety, discovery of a CIA source would also reveal any operations he was conducting and CIA case officers with whom he was meeting or might even cast suspicion on the

---

[1] (U) The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552 is another example of a federal statute that allows for the protection of human sources. Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government documents, exemption b(3) allows for withholding from release information that is exempted from disclosure by statute. The National Security Act has been held by the Supreme Court to be such a withholding statute. Sims v. CIA, 105 S.Ct. 1981 (1985).

affiliation of innocent family and friends. This is no less true with a source who no longer works for the Agency. A source's prior affiliation with CIA is normally still classified in order to protect him, his former contacts at CIA, the CIA facilities at which he may have been meeting with case officers, the cover mechanisms employed to protect his affiliation with CIA, and the operations which he conducted.

15. (U) The public disclosure of an individual's affiliation with CIA could and, in fact, has threatened the safety and lives of not only the source, but also their families, colleagues, officials of foreign governments and other foreign nationals with whom they have had contact. The Review Board will certainly recall the Proenza case (since this was released by the Board in August 1995) in which a number of Cuban officials were falsely believed to be CIA agents. They were arrested, convicted and spent years in prison for their alleged treasonous activities and their professional and personal lives were ruined. The threat of violence to those who are in fact associated with CIA is even more real. These individuals live and work in foreign countries, many of which have a local population hostile to the United States and especially CIA. If one should doubt the risks that those affiliated with CIA face, one only has to recall that, in 1992, two CIA employees were murdered while waiting to turn into CIA Headquarters in Virginia. If this type of attack is possible right at the CIA's front gate, it is not hard to imagine the personal risks that those working with the CIA abroad face. Clearly, the risk is that much greater for those who are sources: for example, as a result of Aldrich Ames' disclosures to the KGB, 10 Soviets who were covert assets of the CIA were executed.

16. (U) Incidents such as these clearly demonstrate that the policy of protecting association with the CIA is an important one. Individuals associated with CIA have been and will continue to be subjected to threats, reprisals and physical injuries from foreign intelligence services, terrorist groups, and other persons or organizations hostile to CIA or the U.S. Government. Individuals choose to undertake these risks for many different reasons, but it is with the condition that the CIA will protect their cooperation with the U.S. Government.

IV. Proposal

17. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA sources in the JFK Collection. The Agency proposes that in

most cases a substitution for the true name be used. In prior releases of these same documents, the Review Board agreed to redact the true name and substitute "source." If the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular sources throughout the records, a particular identifying substitution can be used for an individual source throughout (for example, "Mexican source 1").

18. (S) Among the names that are currently being considered for release by the Review Board, the following are some that the CIA proposes be treated in this manner:

- True name of LIRING/3, an encrypted asset of the CIA and unilateral penetration of the Cuban Embassy. His wife also worked at the Embassy and he was apparently suspected as being CIA though it was never proven. LIRING/3 at some point disappeared and we have no way of knowing what his current situation is.

- True name of ERTHYROID/3, the unilateral penetration of the Nicaraguan Service. The Review Board will recall that it has already been fully briefed on ERTHYROID/3 and had agreed to the protection of the fact that he was a unilateral source.

- Anthony C. M. Devere (1041001210022) was [is] a member of the British Service. As such, he was [is] a liaison source. This raises concerns about protection of our liaison relationships. Moreover, Mr. Devere's identity constitutes "foreign government information" which, as the Board has already been informed, the CIA does not have the authority to release.

19. (S) Another type of name that similarly should be protected from release is the new identity provided to a defector. Although defectors do not face some of the dangers that "assets" overseas face, they are still given new identities for their protection because there is some risk to their personal safety even in the U.S. For example, in this collection the identity of Golitsyn appears in documents being reviewed this month.[2] Since the time of his defection, Golitsyn has utilized successive identities, because they have been unofficially disclosed, that have not

---

[2] (S) Golitsyn's identity had to be changed again. However, there is a risk that revealing this former identity could lead to the identification of Golitsyn's current identity.

been officially released and that are closely held within the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of his family even though they live in the United States. CIA cannot, at this time, agree to the official release of Golitsyn's assumed new identities or for that matter of any defectors that appear to date in the collection.

20. (S) CIA has noted that in some cases a source is identified by only a first name or a code name. Where CIA has been unable to identify any information about that individual or there is no other source revealing information that has been revealed in the JFK Collection, it would be possible to release that name. For example, in a few documents, the name "Tota" appears. To date, CIA has been unable to determine who this person is and there does not appear to be any further source revealing information in the collection. It is probably that "Tota" is just a code name or a street name known to his colleagues. As "Tota" is a common name, such a release would not threaten the particular individual or his family, and as the person can not be identified it would not seriously undermine the U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.

21. (U) The Agency recognizes that some names may be particularly important to the JFK story. In such cases, the CIA is willing to work with the Review Board to come to the appropriate resolution. CIA proposes that it conduct a record search for information on that individual. It may be that in these cases, if the person is deceased and has no living family, that the Review Board and the CIA can agree that the value of revealing the true name outweighs the need to protect that source from disclosure.

22. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review Board can work out a mutually agreeable policy regarding the identity of human sources that will not undermine the important policy of protecting those who work covertly for the U.S. Government. As usual, my staff and I are available to discuss this matter with you.

John F. Pereira

John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

DCI/CSI/J.Pereira: apd/x31805 (13 Dec 96)
G:/CSIFO/SHARED/Pereira.doc

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - CSI/HRP Chrono
1 - D/CSI
1 - C/CSI/HRG
1 - Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRP
1 - Linda Cipiriani, OGC

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

MEMORANDUM

September 25, 1998

To: Laura Denk
Executive Director

cc: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader

From: Michelle Combs
Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject: No Evidence of Contact Between Lee Harvey Oswald and the CIA's Office of Operations

One of the enigmas that has surrounded Lee Harvey Oswald's defection and re-defection is the question of whether the CIA's Office of Operations (later the Domestic Contacts Division) interviewed or took note of Oswald either before his trip or upon his return from the Soviet Union. The available evidence is somewhat contradictory. The CIA has long claimed that Oswald was never a source, asset, or employee of the CIA. Yet, a November 25, 1963 memorandum discusses the recollections of a CIA staff officer that the Agency considered interviewing Oswald. Further, another former CIA officer, Donald E. Deneselya, has stated that he recalls reading an OO debriefing report in the summer of 1962 from a former Marine re-defector who had worked at the Minsk Radio Factory. The Review Board could not corroborate the recollections of the two former CIA officers with additional records or information.

In an effort to clarify the mystery, the Review Board searched for records that might confirm or deny any contact between Oswald and the CIA before or after his time in the Soviet Union. In the early 1960's, the Office of Operations (OO) was a part of the Directorate of Intelligence. This office, which interviews American citizens who might have come into contact with information or individuals of intelligence interest overseas, later became the Domestic Contacts Division (DCD) of the Directorate of Operations. This office normally only contacts individuals after receiving questions or requirements from intelligence community customers looking for particular types of information.

The Review Board staff examined OO records and operational histories to gain an understanding of OO practices in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The Review Board staff could find no evidence of contact between Oswald and OO either before or after his time in the Soviet Union. Had Oswald departed for his trip to the Soviet Union through New York City, as did most travelers, he possibly might have come to the attention of OO. The Review Board staff did not locate any reference or record to Oswald's departure from New Orleans via freighter that predates the assassination. The Review Board staff also could not locate any information to document an OO interest in Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union. While OO was interested in interviewing tourists to the Soviet Union for general information in the 1950's, by 1962 only travelers with special access, knowledge, or skills were of intelligence interest. OO had no specific policy covering contacts with returning defectors although a local field office could initiate a contact if justified by a particular situation. According to the records located, OO only made contact with three of twenty-three defectors in the 1954-1962 time period. No records or reporting showing any OO contact with Oswald could be located. The Office of Operations did interview re-defector Robert Edward Webster in June 1962 on his work at the Plastics Institute of Leningrad.

While a DCD "A" file on Oswald does exist in the CIA's sequestered collection, most of the documents in the file are from the mid-1970's, none predate the assassination, and the file appears to have been created as DCD personnel attempted to locate any evidence of contacts with Oswald in response to various congressional investigative bodies. This file has been processed for inclusion in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.

~~c:\combs\dcd-wu.wpd~~
File 4.50 (Wrap Up Memos)

9 October 1997

Memorandum to: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

From: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
CIA/CSI/HRG

Subject: October 14 Meeting - Source Names

Reference: "A" Name List of Sources

(CIA requests that this memorandum and its attachments be returned once the Review Board has completed its deliberation on the names discussed below.)

1. Manuel Calvillo, an unwitting source of Alfonso Wichtrich (see below). Calvillo became a figure in the JFK story, when Elena Garro de Paz identified him as the person who sequestered her in a hotel after she protested at the Cuban Embassy. Because of this link to stories related to Oswald's visit to Mexico City, Calvillo is considered a JFK assassination figure. His name and all assassination-related information have been released in collection. However, his crypt when linked to his true name has been deleted. The CIA requests that his crypt not be released when associated with the true name in order to protect Wichtrich and other involved with the LIHUFF project. The linkage of Calvillo's true name with his crypt could lead to his association with and identification of Wichtrich and his assistant.

2. CIA concurs with the release of the following name in the specific documents cited:

Miguel Nazar-Haro in documents 104-10052-10058
and 104-10014-10016.

Because of the relationship of this individual with the CIA, future documents containing his name must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis; there may be situations in which the Agency will request that the name be protected.

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

3. Phillipe Thyyraud De Vosjoli:

Former head of the French Service in Washington (1951-63), De Vosjoli retired and became a CIA/FBI asset. As a USG asset, he had contact with German and Canadian Intelligence Services in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. He became a naturalized US citizen c.1971. Apparently his case was not handled in normal defector channels as the responsible component has no records of De Vosjoli. His 201 file shows that his last substantive contact with the Agency was in 1972 and was initiated by him from Florida. Although De Vosjoli has publicly acknowledged his unilateral relationship with the Agency during his tour in Washington, it is not clear if the extent of his activities following his defection is widely known. Official confirmation of his "defection" could potentially affect the Agency's foreign liaison relationships.

4. The CIA requests that the three names discussed below from the A List be protected. All are, or were, covert assets of the Agency. The Agency has a moral, and possibly a legal, obligation to protect their identities. As a basic tenet of the covert relationship, the Agency agreed to protect the fact of their relationships with the USG; and they, in turn, promised to keep those relationships secret. To our knowledge, the individuals have honored this basic contractual commitment. The Agency believes that the possible harm to the individuals, their families and/or associates, and the potential for damage to sensitive intelligence operations, outweigh the contribution the release of these three names would make to public understanding of the assassination. The Agency is particularly concerned about the erosion of the principle of protecting the identity of sources and the potential chilling effect on future agent operations and recruitment. The Agency is further concerned about the possibility of liability to the individuals and their families for failure to honor its commitments of confidentiality.

A. Franklin Anthony Garcia Wheelock.

The Agency acknowledges that Wheelock is a key figure in the Alavarado story, and it has released all information (including his crypt) except for his name. It is not known if Wheelock is still alive. However, he had five children who may still be living in Nicaragua and are probably unaware of their father's Agency relationship. The release of his name could have negative repercussions for Wheelock and his family. Nicaragua is a small, provincial place, and Wheelock's patronymic name is a prominent one in the country. Revelation of his name and his relationship with CIA would be quickly disseminated within Nicaragua, and his family members would be easily identified. Such identification could result in anything from public humiliation to dangerous retaliation by the thriving leftist Sandinistas. In either case, disclosure would undercut the Agency's ability to recruit sources in small countries such as Nicaragua.

B. Jose Marie Mankel.

Mr. Mankel is a central figure in the Agency project named ZRRIFLE. The Agency has released his crypt and almost all the information related to the project. Mankel's relationship with the Agency commenced in November 1960 and ended in February 1964. Our files do not reflect any contact since that time. It is presumed that, if Mankel is still alive, he is living in Luxembourg.

Mankel had numerous acquaintances in European criminal circles, and, on behalf of Agency/ZRRIFLE interests, he sought out individuals from this element. Acknowledgment that Mankel worked for the USG/CIA could result in personal harm to him, his family, and associates. In addition, his 201 file, which is in the JFK collection, contains a number of references to his support of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Given the potential compromise of individuals and operations totally unrelated to the JFK story, the Agency requests that Mankel's true name continue to be protected. Coordination with DEA may also be required in this case. Mankel's 201 File is available for review in the CIA secure area.

C. Alfonso Rudolph Wichtrich.

A WWII intelligence officer, Wichtrich worked with the Agency in Panama during 1947-49 and in Mexico City from 1954-70 in various capacities (Station contact, field agent, and contract agent). A prominent businessman, he was general manager of the Royal Crown Cola Company in Mexico and later was executive vice president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico. During the JFK time frame, he was primary agent on a CA project (LIHUFF), initially set up to support a conservative front organization. He later became the sole focus of the project. In that role he also served as the cut-out for an unwitting individual, Manuel Calvillo (see above). Wichtrich's only link to the JFK story appears to be his relationship with Calvillo. A review of his files (OP, 201, C, Production) by the ARRB staff did not identify any other connection to the JFK story. A selection of documents from his file are attached.

Given Wichtrich's high profile, the release of his name could impact both past and future intelligence operations and directly affect Mr. Wichtrich and his family. His son had contact with the Panama City Station in 1979; we are trying to determine the extent of that relationship. In this case, the Agency believes that the potential for harm clearly outweighs the contribution the release of Wichtrich's name would make to the JFK assassination story.

J. Barry Harrelson

Attachments: As stated

ESG 95-02
14 July 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination Records

1. At its monthly meeting on 17 July the ARRB will be addressing the issue of the Mexico City Station and its operation in light of any deletions made by the Agency to protect sources and methods. The issues of greatest concern are those surrounding the joint teltap operations run by the Agency and the Mexican Services, official acknowledgment of which could have an impact on liaison and foreign relations. We therefore, wish to maintain protection of this information.

2. We are willing to release information which indicates the existence of operational teltaps against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies as long as they appear unilateral and we can continue to protect the existence of any participation of the Mexican Services. We are willing to release documents which indicate the existence of Mexico City Station during times outside the window which we have acknowledged when they contribute significantly to the historical record. These steps will be useful to the historic record and reveal the extent of coverage employed against these targets. We would want to continue protection of the information which identifies coverage of other countries and individuals other than Lee Harvey Oswald.

3. We also agree to release of the following:

A. Pseudonyms of employees, aliases of employees, and file numbers.

CL BY 524343
DECL OADR
DRV COV 2-87

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination Records

B. Cryptonyms, such as those in the LI series, unless they appear in the context of liaison operational equities (such as LITENSOR and LITEMPO).

C. We need to continue the protection of the cryptonym LIENVOY.
This cryptonym is used extensively throughout the collect to describe the joint activity from different perspectives. Individual occurrences may not seem to reveal anything significant but, when looking at the cryptonym in context over the entire collection it reveals the joint activity which we are trying to protect.

4. Regarding the revelation of names of employees who retired under cover, we request the Board to table its final determination until the individuals have been contacted and informed that their name is being considered for release. This will allow the individual to consider the impact it will have and convey relevant information. The Directorate database is not set up to track individuals who were involved in specific operations. We need the assistance of the employees to know their operational involvement's. Office of Central Cover has prepared and is coordinating a letter to be sent to the employees which will both inform them and solicit their assistance/comments.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

September 11, 1995
WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

ARRB Attendees: Marwell, Gunn, Mary + one
CIA Attendees : Barry, Ellie

Issue: Inconsistency between Mexico City Chrono item #132 and ARRB document #31

Gunn proposed that the Agency release the information in document 31 that was released by mistake in the Mexico City Chrono. Otherwise, the staff would have to take the document back to the ARRB for reconsideration which they felt would undercut the credibility of the CIA and the staff. The Board will not uphold a postponement in a specific document if that information is released by mistake in another copy of the same document.

Ellie's response - because the information deals with Mex. liaison, she will have to take their proposal to a higher level. [response needed by 16 September]

They also requested a "new" highlighted version of the Mexico City Chrono which reflects all information released to NARA in the multiple copies of the Chrono and in the documents referenced in the Chrono.

Issue: The three documents of concern.

GIBSON - Ellie reviewed the Gibson issues--the fact that he had denied in court his affiliation with the CIA, etc. I noted that since the document would not be included in the determination list would the Board be willing to reconsider.

Marwell said that we could make an addition pitch to the Board to reconsider, but he did not think it would have any effect on their decision.

PROENZA - Ellie explained that out goal here was to protect the "asset" not the method and that the deletions could be reduced to those words that could result in the identification of the agent.

Marwell said that the Board may reconsider based on the need to protect a source.

Mary ask who was the asset? Was it LIRING?
Ellie said she did not know (it could have been some "AM" source.

Mary ask for more information on LIRING.

"PRIVATE LINE TAP" - According the Marwell, the Board considered the issue of the "private lines" but since the paragraph dealt with Oswald, voted to release. Mary said is was hard to defend the individual released since she did not have any information on the person.

We pointed out that the this release impacted on other documents which dealt with private line taps plus the Board had not limited its release to the paragraph that mentioned Oswald but released the name in other calls which had nothing to do with Oswald.

Marwell said the Board may re-look at the document as part of looking at similar documents.

The issue of the taps on other Bloc embassies came up. Mary said the Board was inclined to release given the end of the Cold War.

[Note: we will locate as many of the "private line tap" documents we can for special review]

Issue: Removing the Proenza and Private line tap documents form the formal notification list

Marwell clearly prefers not to do it at this time (said they would discuss). Has no problem with asking the Board to reconsider or giving us the opportunity to presence additional evidence since their next meeting was within the 30 days set by the law, but felt that the Board was not inclined to keep tabling documents that they had reached a decision on.

Marwell asked if the Agency plans to "appeal"; he would like a heads-up.

Later, in private, Marwell said that he wanted to build into the process a loop that would handle these types of situations.

Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that **"STATIONS"** would be the focus of the presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico City station window. There are documents from the 50s, references in summaries to the founding of the station and, most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding the Mexico City window into the 70s.

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a good opportunity to address the **Private Line and other Tel Taps** issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation. He said to try a avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico relationship; when possible provide specific/hard evidence (bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories did not go over well and neither did Bill McNair. He emphasized the importance of using the language of the law.

September 12, 1995
WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that "**STATIONS**" would be the focus of the presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations, particularly those in Europe.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico City station window. There are documents from the 50s, references in summaries to the founding of the station and, most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding the Mexico City window into the 70s.

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a good opportunity to address the **Private Line and other Tel Taps** issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation. He said to try to avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico relationship); when possible provide specific/hard evidence (bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories do not go over well. He emphasized the importance of using the language of the law especially when citing harm. He specifically mentioned Sec. 6. (B){copy attached} which sets a standard of "interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities".

[Note: In a previous meeting with Gunn, he stressed similar themes including avoiding what he called "chicken little" arguments. He also raised the question on sensitivity of acknowledging we had a station in Moscow during the 60s. "It would have been logical to have one during the Cold War."]

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

FEB 0 2 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Coordination, Intelligence and Research, Department of State

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

The JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) recently released documents revealing the existence of CIA stations in Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The Hague, a joint tel-tap operation with Mexican liaison, and the identity of a unilateral penetration of a liaison service. It is the CIA's assessment that such releases could seriously damage intelligence operations as well as adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States. CIA is presently preparing an appeal of these rulings by the Board and requests the support of the Department of State should these appeals be brought before the President. (S)

Additionally, the Board has just released the existence of stations in Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Brussels, and Stockholm, and in March-April, it will be reviewing a document that reveals the location of every CIA station in 1965. It is anticipated that CIA will be preparing to appeal those releases and requests State Department's assessment as to the damage to foreign relations should the location of CIA stations be publicly acknowledged. (S)

It remains essential that the U.S. Government stand by assurances to persons and foreign governments that information they provide and activities they undertake based upon expected confidentiality remain protected for as long as necessary. These releases made by the Board seriously undermine the ability of CIA to uphold secrecy obligations it took on in the past and to make those assurances in the future. (C)

CL BY 2103140
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1; X5
DRV LOC 3-82
DRV LIS 3-82

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

We have a critically short deadline in which to address issues concerning the release of Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The Hague stations, the identity of the asset, and Mexican liaison. The release of the identities of the remaining stations must be resolved over the next two weeks. We request your comments and expert opinions regarding the impact such releases would have on the foreign relations of the United States, and hope to cite State Department's support as we finalize our appeal. (S)

David N. Edger
David N. Edger
Acting Deputy Director for Operations

CIR-316/ 00293-96

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

C/IMS/ESG/F.Wickham/tdn/x44448/2Feb96

Distribution:
  Original - Addressee
  1 - DDO/Reg
  1 - AC/DDO
  1 - DCI/CSI/HRG
  1 - OGC
  1 - EUR/LGL
  1 - LA/LGL
  1 - C/IMS
  1 - IMS/IRO
  2 - ESG

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 03/18/96 06:24:14 PM
SUBJECT: JFK Meeting today

After speaking with you tonight about the results of the meeting today, Jeremy Gunn called me and relayed his concerns about the Board's understandings (or misunderstandings) of CIA's position. Bob Caudle and I discussed what happened at the JFK meeting and the following is our impression of what resulted. Basically, Edger did not commit himself on any specifics on these issues, but expressed his willingness to cooperate with the Board:

1. Jerusalem Station Edger was more willing to negotiate this one, but does not agree to its release. CIA wants to present more information. Edger was not under the impression that this station was to be discussed today so he did not come prepared to present new information on it. CIA should do this for the Board at the next possible opportunity.

2. Open Period for Stations Edger agreed that the staffs of the Board and HRG should work out the exact time period. He had no problem with the Sept 63-64 period and opening it up to '61 in the Oswald file. He did not make any firm commitment on the dates to the Board, saying that the staffs should come to an agreement on this.

3. Substitutions for Nordic stations - Although Edger suggested "Scandanavia Station" as a substitution, he clearly prefered something less revealing like "Northern European station 1, 2, etc.)". Using the former term has far less plausible deniability. The latter option basically gives up what we want to protect.

Once HRG hears from Edger as to what his understandings are, then someone needs to speak with Jeremy Gunn ASAP on Tuesday morning before the Board leaves. Jeremy said that unless we correct the Board on its mistaken impression about the above, they will leave assuming we have come to an agreement and will refuse to revisit this at a latter date.

Let me know if you need me to help out in any way on this. FYI, I will be in meetings at 10AM and 2pm (Win Scott settlement discussions!!!) tomorrow.

CC: John F. Pereira
Eleanor Neiman @ DO

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: Fredrick Wickham @ DO
Johnny Goins @ DO
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 03/29/96 11:52:57 AM
SUBJECT: JFK release of Tokyo station(S)

I just spoke with EA legal and informed her about the latest release by the JFK Board of Tokyo station and the fact that we have a letter from the Ambassador objecting to the release. She indicated that Art Brown would be a good candidate to go down to speak with the Board at their next meeting (what are the dates?) to request that they reconsider. It might also be more persuasive if we could arrange for a State Department person (Japan desk) to come to the Board with us and present the Ambassador's letter. (S)

I would appreciate hearing your thoughts on this course of action. If we plan on doing this, we need to arrange it with Marwell and then brief the appropriate people in the DO and State Department as soon as possible. (S)

CL BY 2224130
CL REASON 1.5(c)
DECL ON X1
DRV FM LOC 3-83

CC: Robert D. Caudle
J. Barry Harrelson

Barry H.

~~SECRET~~

21 March 1997

JFK PROJECT WORKING PAPER

SUBJECT: Policy Guidance--"Atsugi" and "U-2"

1. References to "CIA base/Station/representatives at Atsugi, Japan" in the U-2 context is releasable.

2. Information relating to the station, other bases, and Agency representatives elsewhere in Japan will continue to be protected.

3. The issue was coordinated with the DS&T (Teresa Wilcox), DO (Lee Carle), the Air Force (Captain Thomas D. Rock)and the Department of State (Nina Noring); all of whom had no objection to the declassification and/or release of "CIA Base at Atsugi, Japan" and "U-2" project / effort / activities.

J. Barry Harrelson

File: G:\HRG\JAPOL.DOC

~~SECRET~~

DD/O 95-3057

- 7 NOV 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: David Cohen
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

1. I understand the JFK AARB is presently considering the release of documents which would identify CIA stations to the public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations during a specific window of time if they are substantively relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the documents in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent presence of the station. (S)

2. In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host government and would threaten ongoing sensitive operations and liaison relationships. In a few instances, the damage probably would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and determined the damage to national security which would follow such release. (S)

3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo is now Zaire and the station in the 60's would have been in Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located. Our current relationship with the Zaireans is not a full-blown liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with certain individuals from the services. In the past, we have had close

CL BY 0695930
CL REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM LOC 3-82

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

relationships with the Zaireans because of our need for their cooperation in assisting with a Presidentially-mandated program and will need to improve our relationship over the next several months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We also continue to have a Station in Dakar, Senegal. We have liaison there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing with developmental contacts, there have been recent instances where potential assets have voiced concern about our Agency's ability to keep its relationships clandestine. To expose our station there would further hamper developmental relationships and eventual recruitments. (S)

4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the following comments:

Brussels - Public acknowledgment would force the government and liaison service to pay closer attention to Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S)

Helsinki - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaison; thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison relationships we now enjoy as well as presenting a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S)

Paris - No additional damage. (S)

Bonn - No specific damage. (S)

Berlin - No specific damage. (S)

Luxembourg - Public acknowledgment would embarrass the government and inhibit liaison cooperation; thus endangering ongoing operations. (S)

The Hague - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and create political problems for the government and liaison. This would endanger the continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

Oslo - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive ongoing joint operations. (S)

Madrid - Public acknowledgment would draw press attention and embarrassing questions for the government and liaison service. This would further damage an already delicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for counterterrorism operations. (S)

Stockholm - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment would be politically embarrassing for the government and liaison services. This would likely endanger any continuation of joint operations. (S)

Geneva - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment would create political problems for the government and liaison service and force greater attention to our operations. This would create an intensive counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to cause a decrease in our operations. (S)

London - No specific damage. (S)

Ottawa - No specific damage. (S)

5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when we consider public exposure. Prague Station is recovering from operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During the last three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin the establishment of good working relations with the host government and internal/external services. As a result, the station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level bilateral operations. These obviously depend upon the good will of the host service. The Czech citizenry came of age in an atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general, and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of our station's previously undisclosed presence and operational activities during the Cold War will necessarily raise questions about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further

inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of Prague Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this time without serious damage to national security. (S)

6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua, San Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any release of information about a clandestine service breeds distrust in professionalism and will put future operations at risk. (S)

7. We receive significant national collection systems support from Australia which affects national system collection efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would jeopardize this by releasing the presence of our station to the public. Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in Tokyo. There have been two incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present year. Any further disclosure would exacerbate the tension and create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and personnel. (S)

8. Public acknowledgment of a station in India would be a problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and India foreign relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very sensitive to perceived slights to its national sovereignty, and public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to the Indian Government which in turn could ask that the station be closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized, it would affect a large number of important intelligence collection operations. (S)

9. Public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia would be a problem for Tunisia vis-à-vis its Libyan neighbor. Libya and Tunisia share a border which means the Tunisian Government must act with some prudence regarding its relations with Libya. The Libyan Government would almost certainly respond very negatively

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

to a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should ask that our station be closed, the U.S. Government would lose a capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and Islamic extremism. (S)

10. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a problem for Morocco vis-à-vis its Islamic fundamentalist population. Morocco, like so many countries with a majority Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem, and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.S. in general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist population to react negatively and demand that our station be closed. If the station were closed, the U.S. Government would lose intelligence on the western Sahara conflict, north African stability and Islamic extremism. (S)

11. In those instances where I have indicated damage to operational capability and national security, I would feel compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I must call your attention to the general damage done to us by any disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability to protect source identities and operational methods. Disclosure to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)

David Cohen

#1 file

SECRET

26 September 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: John F. Pereira
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Release of
"Warrenton" in the Lopez Report

David,

1. The attached memorandum is provided in support of our request that the JFK board reconsider its decision to release the reference to Warrenton Records Center in the Lopez Report (p. 44).

2. We request that this memorandum and attachment be returned to CIA once the Board has completed its deliberations on this issue.

Attachment

John Pereira

SECRET

OFSS-96-3975
25 September 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Information Review Officer,
Directorate of Administration

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration
Director of Facilities and Security Services
Chief, Facilities Management Group, OFSS

FROM: Chief, Warrenton Training Center, FMG/OFSS

SUBJECT: (S) Warrenton Training Center Cover Considerations

1. (S) This memorandum is written pursuant to yesterday's discussion with regard to the release of JFK-related documents that refer to "Warrenton" and/or derivatives of a Records Center. It documents executive-level "evidence" as to why "Warrenton" cover needs to be protected. In brief, significant damage to mission, people, and the very existence of the Warrenton Training Center (WTC) would occur as a result of the second- and third-order effects of any confirmed affiliation with the Agency.

2. (S) As background, the Central Intelligence Agency has gone to great lengths to protect sensitive missions and prevent identification of covert personnel as Agency employees. The latter is especially profound as the very lives of these employees are often placed in jeopardy at hostile overseas posts. The anonymity provided by cover is essential to their protection. Furthermore, the Warrenton Training Center (WTC) provides the sanctuary whereby Department of State and Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Project Office (DTSPO) personnel can train alongside Agency employees without fear of being "tagged" as working for the Agency.

3. (S) The cover mechanism itself is very fragile. Per mandate of the cover providers, the National Communications System (NCS), and the Department of the Army, the affiliation of WTC and the Agency, is classified SECRET vice CONFIDENTIAL. WTC

CL BY: 2004977
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: LOC 5-82

cover operates solely on the ability to sustain plausible denial. In spite of previous rumors of an Agency affiliation, categorical denial of such has worked to the point that the media currently refers to WTC as a "Top Secret military installation." In addition, the public-at-large truly believes that WTC is a military installation. Given a generally inquisitive media (one radio station, two newspapers -- all with connections to affiliates in the Washington Metropolitan Area) and recent publicity over a WTC ground water contamination issue, the release of references to "Warrenton" in the JFK-related documents would precipitate an unwelcome focus on WTC. This would lead to the real possibility that cover would be compromised.

4. (S) With the closure of Vint Hill, WTC is the sole remaining federal facility in the Warrenton area. As a result, the affiliation of Agency records or "Records Center," under any ruse, will provide a direct link to the Warrenton Training Center. This will pose severe problems for installation activities. While the Agency Archives and Records Center is located at Station "A," the media frequently refers to WTC in its entirety. Activities at the other three WTC Stations that would be compromised are as follows:

a. Station B serves as the principal training site for the Office of Communications, DTSPO, and the Department of State. However, it also is the site of sensitive activities engaged in by personnel from the Directorate of Operations, the Office of Engineering and Development, the Directorate of Intelligence, and the Office of Technical Collections. It is also a training site for covert employees from all Directorates, to include foreign language immersion for officers assigned overseas. In addition, secret Community-wide conferences are held at this low-profile location. Within the past year, conferences have ranged from the Agency's NOC Conference to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to the strategic planning meeting by Community Executives, Ambassadors, and members of the White House Cabinet in preparation for the Bosnian Peace Talks.

b. Station C serves as the Agency's primary transmission site for world-wide communications.

SUBJECT: (S) Warrenton Training Center Cover Considerations

c. Station D serves as the Agency's primary receiving site for world-wide communications. It also handles a significant quantity of message traffic for the White House and member organizations of the Intelligence Community on a 24-hour basis. This message traffic is vital to national security preparedness.

WTC's cover allows it to maintain a very low profile. It is that low profile which protects the personnel and missions as described above. Removal of that protective cover, by act or deed, would provide easy targets of opportunity for counter-intelligence activities, terrorist activities, demonstrations, and emotionally unstable individuals.

5. (S) In summary, any affiliation of WTC and the Agency, no matter how insignificant the individual occurrence or document release may seem, has the very real potential to jeopardize lives, disrupt the Agency mission, disrupt world-wide classified message traffic, and, thereby, do irreparable harm to the national security of the United States.

CL BY: 705641
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 1-82

TO: John F. Pereira
Brian S. Latell
FROM: Rebecca V. Strode
OFFICE: DCI
DATE: 10/20/97 02:21:49 PM
SUBJECT: Re: Release Issue/JFK Board

Thanks. I passed along to D/EXDIR and EXDIR. The D/EXDIR may want Brian Latell to provide some more background on this issue at the meeting tomorrow.
Original Text of John F. Pereira
Original Text of John F. Pereira

Following is in response to questions raised by the EXDIR:

1. Members of JFK Board:

Chairman: Judge John Tunheim (Federal District Court, Minnesota)

Four other members: Henry Graff; History Professor Emeritus, Columbia U.
Kermit Hall; Dean of Humanities, Ohio State
William Joyce; Assoc. Librarian, Princeton U.
Anna Nelson; History Professor, American U.

2. Intermediate steps before appeal to President:

a) We are discussing our concerns with JFK Board Staff, and will ask the Board to reconsider its decision.

b) We'll propose that a senior Agency officer brief the Board on the sensitivity of Warrenton.

3. Who would make the appeal to the President ?

Thus far, the process calls for the Agency's General Counsel to forward the appeal to the White House Counsel, with the approval of the EXDIR and/or DCI.

4. Has there been an appeal to the President before ?

CIA has submitted one appeal, in early 1996. The issues concerned identification of certain European stations and liaison relationships. The White House directed the Board and the Agency to "work it out", which was done. After the ADDO briefed the

Board, a compromise was reached.

The FBI has submitted three appeals, none of which was successful.

5. *Does ISCAP have a role ?*

Thus far, ISCAP has had no role with regard to JFK, as far as we are aware.

CC: Regina A. Genton, Brian S. Latell, Edmund Cohen @ DA, James R. Oliver @ DA, Linda C. Cipriani, J. Barry Harrelson
Sent on 20 October 1997 at 02:21:49 PM

OIM-97-0010
14 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: (U) Deputy Director for Administration
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (S) Required Protection of Warrenton Training Center (WTC) as CIA Facility

1. (S) This memorandum is submitted pursuant to the decision by the Assassination Records Review Board (hereafter "ARRB" or "Board") to release the term *"Warrenton Records Center"* in the context of a CIA facility and the Board's subsequent decision on 17 November 1997 to reconsider this issue. It provides additional information as to why Warrenton Training Center ("WTC") as a CIA facility must be protected from public disclosure and hence the cover of this clandestine facility maintained.[1]

2. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this document, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared,

---

[1] (S) The documents at issue contain the term "Warrenton Records Center" however the actual name of the CIA facility at Warrenton is the "Warrenton Training Center." In point of fact, even CIA personnel tend to use the terms interchangeably.

CL BY: 0700265
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FM: LOC 5-82

and to return this memorandum for retention to Agency representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations.

3. (S) As we advised previously, identifiable and serious damage to the mission, the people and the very existence of WTC could reasonably be expected to occur as a result of any confirmed affiliation with the Agency. Before examining with particularity the damage that would flow from disclosure, I believe that it would be helpful to understand in some detail the activities which currently constitute the WTC mission and what new, costly and critical activities are being developed for WTC.

4. (S) WTC is much more than a records archive for the CIA operating under the relatively fragile cover of the National Communications System (NCS) of the Department of the Army.[2] While it does serve this function, and thus houses at the site known as Station A some of the Agency's most important and sensitive Top Secret Codeword material,[3] it is currently the very heart of the CIA's worldwide communications effort, a critical

---

[2] (S) Pursuant to classification guidelines promulgated by the Director of Central Intelligence, this fact is currently and properly classified at the SECRET level.

[3] (S) Because of the sensitivity of CIA records, the Archivist of the United States has authorized the CIA to maintain this archive for both permanent and temporary records pending ultimate transfer to the National Archives no sooner than 50 years after their origination. This records center currently houses nearly 130,000 cubic feet of records classified up to and including Top Secret codeword and composed of various media ranging from paper to original imagery from our national aerial and satellite surveillance platforms. In addition, the center also houses the CIA's vital records which would provide the only basis for continuity of operations should disaster befall CIA headquarters. In addition and because of the security offered, the Center serves a similar role for the National Security Council and the Office of the Management and Budget.

element in our foreign signals intelligence effort, and a principal location for training and conferencing of officers engaged in highly clandestine technical intelligence collection activities. The facilities at WTC in support of these efforts include:

- Station B serves as the principal communications training site not only for CIA (and thus for CIA communicators who are sent worldwide under official or non-official cover) but also houses the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service (DTS) Program Office which is responsible for various CIA/Department of State communications efforts and the actual Department of State Communications School. This site also supports extensive and very sensitive (a) technical procurement, testing and training, (b) human operational activities, and (c) conferencing; examples in this regard include:
    - covert employees of the Office of Technical Collection[4] which procures, distributes, tests and repairs equipment for our signals intelligence program as well as other technical collection platforms such as the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle which has played and continues to play a critical role in the Bosnian theater;

---

[4] (S) The Office of Technical Collection is a component within the Directorate of Science and Technology which is responsible for the development, deployment and management of the CIA's Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) programs as well as other technical intelligence collection programs. By way of example, our SIGINT program includes unilateral activities directed against foreign communications networks, liaison activities with cooperating foreign governments, and support activities for the DO's human intelligence mission.

  - covert employees of the Office of External Development[5] and the various area divisions of the Directorate of Operations (hereafter "DO") which are responsible for clandestine human intelligence operations overseas;[6]

  - senior officials of the Administration, Ambassadors, and senior executive branch offices in preparation for diplomatic initiatives, such as the Bosnian Peace Talks; and

  - members and staff from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

- Station C serves as the CIA's primary transmit site for high frequency (HF) covert communications (covcom) and thus maintains communications with our most sensitive and secret officers and assets operating overseas largely with non-official cover; and

- Station D serves as the Agency's primary receive site for world-wide classified and encrypted communications with our covert foreign stations and bases, and, also processes a significant volume of highly sensitive message traffic for the White House and the Secretary of State.

---

[5] **(S) The Office of External Development (OED) is one of the most sensitive components within the Directorate of Operations and is responsible for the recruitment and placement of "non-official cover" (NOC) officers overseas who are responsible for the recruitment and management of foreign nationals who provide clandestine services for CIA.**

[6] **(S) The various DO area divisions utilize WTC for immersion language training, covert communications training, and other seminars and studies where such training could not be accomplished through the Department of State or identified CIA facilities because of their pending overseas assignments. Hence, if WTC was associated with CIA, then the presence of a student at WTC would serve to identify that officer as a soon-to-be-assigned espionage officer for American intelligence -- an identification inconsistent with their pending diplomatic or commercial cover and the success of their mission.**

5. (S) As detailed on the attached annotated photographs, WTC and its four constituent stations are a critical support element for the clandestine intelligence collection mission of the CIA and the United States. Whether sending a message to a covert foreign national asset in Havana, or receiving a message from the CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, or supporting military and diplomatic representatives in Bosnia, WTC is a key element in that effort. Moreover, it is extremely vulnerable to physical attack because of the proximity of uncontrolled public roads and spaces. Accordingly, and as considered in more detail in paragraph 6 below, any affiliation of WTC with the CIA, no matter how insignificant the individual occurrence or document release may seem, has the very real potential to jeopardize lives, negatively affect the Agency mission, and thereby do irreparable harm to the national security of the United States.

6. (S) But in addition to this established mission and extant risks, there are new activities at WTC in direct support of the nation's leadership which must be considered -- specifically, the establishment of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Emergency Relocation Site (ERS), and an alternative ERS site for the Secretary of State. WTC has been chosen to be the primary DCI ERS given its location, communications, information services, and life support capabilities. Needless to say, the fact that WTC is not an officially recognized CIA facility adds a dimension of secrecy which will be needed to enable the DCI to continue his work during any emergency situation. Additionally, active consideration is being given to also designating WTC as the

Agency's primary Emergency Communications Center. Given the amount of time, money and resources which will be expended to insure that the facility is maintained in such a way that it will be prepared for any emergency situation, it would certainly be in the best interests of the US Government not to permit any official affiliation, no matter how minor, of WTC and the CIA.

7. (S) The preceding descriptions of ongoing and planned activities at WTC presents, I believe, an intuitive sense of the damage to national security which would follow from a linking of WTC with CIA. In sum, the conduct of covert communications and support activities as well as the presence of officers who will soon be serving overseas under cover in highly sensitive positions can not take place at a facility linked to CIA. But there are some very specific damage issues that I wish to highlight and they include:

- **(S) Serious and Immediate Impairment to Physical and Personnel Security:** Our Department of the Army cover allows us to maintain a relatively low profile in the Warrenton community and a very low profile outside of the immediate area. If WTC became recognized as a CIA facility, the increased visibility and scrutiny would place employees, facilities, and daily operations at greater risk. In sum, WTC would become an easy "target of opportunity" for the media, foreign counter-intelligence agents, terrorist and militia activities, demonstrators, and emotionally unstable individuals. Facts, examples, and specific concerns include:
    - WTC, like most domestic CIA sites, is a very lightly guarded facility in terms of personnel guards and physical fencing. It survives and

maintains security through a low profile.[7] In the past in the United States, identification of CIA facilities have led to a number of surreptitious entries, bombings, and physical disruptions. Simply stated, CIA is a target for both hostile individuals and organizations;[8]

- On the individual level and in the past three years, WTC has experienced an increase in security incidents including a physical breach of Station D compound security, two suspect package incidents, and additional unsolicited contacts and "gate turn-around" incidents;[9]

---

[7] (S) As detailed on the attached annotated photographs, the array of communications equipment and its proximity to public spaces and roads is clear. For example, Station C has two gates: the first is only 50 feet from a public road and the second is approximately 600 feet. There are no electronic intrusion alarms on the fence line and, most often, only one security officer is present at a gate. All facility signs simply state: "Warrenton Training Center / NCS / U.S. Army / Admission By Permit Only"

[8] (S) The current Kasi prosecution provides ample evidence of the risks posed by the public identification of CIA domestic facilities. Any individual intent upon seeking retribution for perceived wrongs quite naturally seeks a target providing the largest possible public notice and while CIA headquarters is an excellent target, a covert facility is even a better target, and a covert facility supporting the foreign espionage activities of the CIA is the best possible target for a political and public statement.

[9] (S) The breach of compound security was by an out-of-state vehicle which followed an employee through a remote gate and the driver had no credible explanation for their actions; the incident is considered suspicious and unexplained. The suspect package incidents include a box which was placed (not dropped) next to our facility which we believe was intended to test and thus observe our response to suspicious packages. Gate turn-arounds number 8-10 per month and include only those vehicles which ignore clear signs that they are entering a classified government facility but proceed in any event to our gate; it is instructive to note that very few of these individuals state

SUBJECT: (S) Required Protection of Warrenton Training Center as CIA Facility

- Moreover, in the past several years, the federal government has had a heightened awareness of the violent domestic organization threat posed by the self-styled "militias" which have a stated intent to destroy government communications capabilities and facilities. We know, from information provided by federal law enforcement authorities, that the target list of such organizations includes federal communications centers and WTC Stations C and D exactly fit this target profile;

- By way of examples in this regard, in June of this year, the Sheriff of Fauquier County reported to WTC information regarding, first, a local militia group, and, second, "unusual" comments from individuals living near Station C that we were communicating with UFO's;

- Any higher profile would realistically and seriously threaten the physical and personnel security of WTC. And, as evidenced by the attached map of WTC, such threats do not need to penetrate the fence line: ***Agency officials are of the opinion that a bomb commensurate with the one which exploded at the Oklahoma City federal building could do substantial damage to the Agency's communications equipment and could kill numerous federal employees at WTC from outside the fence line in circumstances we do not control and could not prevent.***

---

or imply that they know that WTC is a CIA facility and, hence, it would appear that our cover, in fact, is quite good.

- (S) **Likely Future Compromise of Covert Employees in Overseas Assignments**: As discussed above, numerous CIA employees involved in communications, technical intelligence collection, and human intelligence collection train and operate at WTC for the exact reason that it provides a secure environment disassociated from the CIA. We know from ample evidence that foreign intelligence services have as a primary goal the identification of US citizens who appear to be ordinary public servants or private business people but are, in actuality, clandestine intelligence officers.[10] Simply stated, the identification of this facility with CIA will label any and every individual associated as a likely intelligence officer and thus substantially negate their operational ability if not place their lives in jeopardy.

- (S) **Loss of Emergency Relocation Site for DCI**: Emergency relocation sites (ERSs) -- whether they be for the President or Cabinet officials -- have value only as long as their identity is secret. The public disclosure of the fact that WTC would serve as such an ERS site -- which could come from a general compromise of WTC as a CIA facility plus subsequent visual surveillance -- would negate Agency planning in this regard, vitiate expenditures, and leave the Agency with few realistic options for survivability. We must assume that any entity which had the willingness and capability to attack the CIA would be inclined to inflict the maximum damage. Identification of WTC even as a generic CIA facility poses an unacceptable risk to this key aspect to CIA continuity of operations.

---

[10] (S) We know from captured STASI (the former intelligence service of East Germany) and clandestinely-acquired KGB files that substantial resources have been directed at such identifications. Typically, a suspect American will be surveilled for some time in order to identify his or her target and cooperating foreign nationals. To identify a communicator is one of the highest priorities since it provides a possible entrée to cryptographic compromise as well as an opportunity to "roll-up" or identify the numerous human intelligence collection officers who rely on that particular communicator to transmit information back to the United States.

- **(S)** **__Potential Compromise of Classified Communications or Technical Collection Platforms__:** In addition to the foregoing physical threat to our communications facilities (*e.g.*, the potential to destroy towers, satellite dishes and transmitting facilities by terrorist act), the disclosure of WTC as the transmit and receive site for CIA classified communications to foreign embassy sites as well as foreign assets in the field presents a significant opportunity for any number of foreign nations to enhance their signals and communications intelligence efforts at our expense. While the scope and classification level of this memorandum does not permit a detailed discussion, I am convinced that this disclosure would make WTC a target of hostile foreign intelligence services.

- **(S)** **__Loss of Covert, Quick Reaction Procurement Capability__:** In support of OTC and other tenant elements, WTC uses its Army cover to procure items on a non-attributable basis to CIA.[11] These items are acquired in near real time with minimal delay and direct delivery.

---

[11] (S) The official term for such procurements is "SC-1" or "Sterility Code 1" which means that the tangible items purchased cannot be traced to CIA but only to a non-sensitive government agency. For example, if an officer is assigned undercover to a foreign capital and is undeclared to that country, then it would be most imprudent to carry a personal computer and a cellular telephone which could easily be traced to CIA. At a minimum, that officer would be subject to foreign counter-intelligence surveillance and all of his or her contacts compromised (*i.e.*, identified and neutralized).

If the WTC cover is eroded due to affiliation with the Agency, past procurements could be retroactively compromised while subsequent procurement activity would necessitate involving headquarters elements, indirect delivery and forwarding to WTC. The loss of response time would negatively impact on the operational capabilities of WTC tenant organizations.

- **(S) Loss of Secure Training and Conference Capability:** Station B is often used as a conference facility not only by Agency groups, but also by other US Government organizations. For example, Secretary of State Warren Christopher's pre-planning session for the Bosnian Peace Accord Talks was held at WTC based on the need for a discreet location in which Department of State (DoS) officials, to include two ambassadors, and the military could secretly discuss strategic planning without undue attention (media coverage). If CIA affiliation is acknowledged in any way, WTC's value to the entire US Government is greatly diminished. Additionally, its value to the Agency is also diminished in that personnel from OED and other operational elements who use this facility would be running a greater risk of exposure and cover compromise if they visited WTC. Since access roads can be monitored and registration lists and/or luggage tags can be obtained at hotels used to accommodate some of these visitors, their association with the CIA would be much harder to protect.

- **(S) Heightened Scrutiny of Classified Mission:** For more than 40 years, WTC has operated as an Army facility. We have been a good "neighbor" and have developed close working relationships throughout the town. To confirm what many have suspected but could never prove (or what a few "knew" but willingly protected) will have a negative impact on our credibility and will create an "open season" for the local media and others as they quite naturally attempt to learn any and all aspects of our mission -- ***those clandestine officers who could come and go previously with little notice will now be a highly visible target.***[12]

- (S) **Endangerment of Department of State Officers and Loss of WTC as Training Site for DoS:** As the Department of State is an integral part of WTC, their concerns must also be taken into consideration. They have advised of their significant concerns that a loss of WTC cover will lead to the mis-identification of DoS communicators overseas as CIA officers. They have stated that it is the fact of the current WTC cover which permits them to train DoS communicators alongside Agency communicators at a very efficient cost. The only solution to the loss of cover would be to move the DoS communications school to another location, a very costly endeavor in both time and money.

8. (S) In summary, it is my considered judgment that the release of the term "Warrenton Records Center", which will create an affiliation of WTC and the CIA, would cause major disruptions to CIA operations, possible physical harm to CIA facilities and personnel, and hence identifiable and serious damage to the national security of the United States. Accordingly, I respectfully request that the Board defer release of such information. In doing so, I am mindful of the Board's mission

---

[12] (S) It is not unreasonable to believe that the loss of cover for WTC would require a five fold increase in physical security personnel at WTC and even then security could not be ensured given the proximity of the facility to public spaces and roads.

and the necessity for the American public to have the fullest possible disclosure regarding the assassination of President Kennedy, however, I believe that this reference is not relevant to the public's understanding and that disclosure would cause harms significantly disproportionate to any public benefit.

9. (U) If the Board should have any questions with regard to this matter, I have asked Lee Strickland, who serves as Chief of the Agency's Information Review Group, to be available to the Board in order to provide such additional classified or unclassified information as might be required.

Richard D. Calder

(S) Attachment
Annotated View of WTC Station C

SUBJECT: (S) Required Protection of Warrenton Training Center as CIA Facility


Station C
Main Road
Auxillary Tower
Main Towers
Auxillary Tower
Auxillary Tower
Auxillary Tower
Auxillary Tower
Auxillary Tower

SUBJECT: (S) Required Protection of Warrenton Training Center as CIA Facility

(S) Attachment
Annotated View of WTC Station D


Station D
Satellite Dish
Satellite Dish
HF Tower
Satellite Dish
HF Tower
Satellite Dish
Gate
Main Road

SUBJECT: (S) Required Protection of Warrenton Training Center as CIA Facility

OFSS/FMG/WTC/SNAlcivar:kak/49570 (07 Nov 97)
modified OIM/IRG/LSStrickland/31289 (13 Nov 97)

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
2 - DDA
1 - OIM/IRG Chrono
1 - C/OIM/IRG
1 - D/OIM
1 - OIM Legal Advisor
1 - D/OFSS
1 - C/FMG/OFSS
1 - DO/CCO
1 - C/WTC/FMG/OFSS
1 - DC/WTC
1 - OFSS Registry

g:\ipcrdwp\general\lss\arrb_wtc.doc

/04- 22

ER 96-0455/8

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

November 27, 1996

VIA FACSIMILE

The Honorable John M. Deutch
Director of Central Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Re: The Central Intelligence Agency's Compliance with the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Mr. Deutch:

Since 1994, the Assassination Records Review Board ("Review Board") has been working with a number of Federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, to locate and publicly release records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. These actions have been taken pursuant to The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994) ("JFK Act"). We have been working with Mr. John Pereira, Chief, Historical Review Group and Mr. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer, Historical Review Group of CIA and have appreciated the cooperation we have received.

The purpose of this letter is to request your agency's cooperation in assisting the Review Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress and the American people that the goals of the JFK Act have been accomplished to the greatest reasonable extent. We want to assure the American people that the United States Government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. Indeed, one of the paramount purposes of the JFK Act is to certify to the public that the United States Government is not withholding relevant materials related to the assassination. *See, e.g., Assassination Materials Disclosure Act,* H. R. Rep. No. 102-625, Part 1, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992) ("The Federal Government's failure to release official materials has contributed to numerous conspiracy theories and fueled charges of government complicity in the assassination . . . a salutary purpose is served in opening these files [relating to the JFK assassination] to allay the suspicion of government cover-up.").

BOARD MEMBERS: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: *David G. Marwell*

13-00000

The Review Board has recently considered how it, along with the relevant federal agencies, can best demonstrate to the American public that a thorough, good faith, and diligent effort has been made to locate and release all remaining assassination-related records within the control of the United States Government (and that the Government is not hiding any such materials from public disclosure). Pursuant to the Congressional mandate under the JFK Act to "create an enforceable, independent, and accountable process for the public disclosure of such records," 44 U.S.C. § 2107(2)(a)(3), the Review Board seeks to have the relevant federal agencies provide a complete and specific accounting of their efforts to locate and release assassination-related records, including a full explanation for any destruction of such records.

Accordingly, the Review Board requests that each relevant agency adhere to the formal compliance program (hereinafter "JFK Act Compliance Program") outlined below and devised by the Review Board pursuant to its powers under Section 7(j)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), and (F) of the JFK Act. We hereby request that you undertake the following measures by the dates provided (these dates were set in view of the fact that the Review Board's operations currently are scheduled to expire on September 30, 1997):

1. Designation of Agency Compliance Official (or officials) and statement of intent to comply with the JFK Act. We request that by December 9, 1996, your agency designate an Agency Compliance Official who ultimately will be responsible for ensuring that the agency has complied with its obligations under the JFK Act, including the identification, location, and organization of assassination records and the transmission of those records to the National Archives and Records Administration ("National Archives"). Although the Review Board assumes that Mr. John Pereira or Mr. Barry Harrelson will serve in this position, we nevertheless await your formal confirmation. If necessary, your agency may designate additional persons with knowledge of the measures that have been undertaken to locate assassination records.

   We also request that by December 9, 1996, the agency convey its agreement to adhere to the compliance procedures outlined in this letter. To the extent that any compliance procedure described below appears to be unreasonable or to present difficulties that we may not have anticipated, please explain why and make alternate suggestions to us.

2. Initial Statement of Compliance. We request that the Agency Compliance Official prepare, by January 6, 1997, an initial written statement of the

agency's compliance with the JFK Act ("Statement of Compliance"), setting forth the steps that the agency has taken to locate and process assassination records. The Review Board recognizes that many of the relevant federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, have previously written letters to the Review Board apprising it of their progress at various stages of identifying and processing assassination records under the JFK Act. The Statement of Compliance, while it may include information previously reported to the Board, is to be the agency's comprehensive and final report to the American public of what it has done to locate records relating to the assassination. This Statement of Compliance shall include, to the fullest reasonable extent, the following information:

a. A complete description of all steps that your agency took to identify and locate assassination records including, but not limited to, an identification of the major record collections and files that were consulted in the agency's search, any departmental file indices consulted, the names and titles of the persons who were responsible for conducting the searches, the physical locations of the records that were searched, the off-site storage facilities (*e.g.*, Federal Records Centers) searched, the specific steps that were taken to locate and retrieve materials in archives, and any other criteria used by the agency to locate assassination records.

b. A description of the steps that the agency took in direct response to specific requests of the Review Board to locate certain additional records or information relating to the assassination. In particular, we ask that the CIA describe what specific steps it has taken to address the following requests: CIA-9, Publications and Analytical Materials (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated March 6, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); CIA-11, Silvia Duran's Original Statement (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated May 3, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); CIA-12, JMWAVE Materials (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated May 22, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); for HTLINGUAL records (*See* T. Jeremy Gunn Memorandum dated October 1, 1996 to Mr. Barry Harrelson); and for Monthly Operational Reports on Cuban Exile Groups (*See* Manuel E. Legaspi Memorandum dated October 17, 1996 to Mr. Barry Harrelson).

13-00000

c. To the extent that any assassination-related records have been destroyed by the agency or any agency official, a full and specific explanation of the circumstances surrounding the destruction of such records.

d. The status of remaining work that you can now identify that needs to be completed by your agency in order to comply fully with the JFK Act, including an identification of the categories of records that must be processed and transmitted to the National Archives, a description of any additional searches for files that must be done, and the projected date(s) for completion of these tasks.

3. Review Board Interview With Agency Compliance Official (or Officials). Shortly after the submission of the agency's written Statement of Compliance, we ask that the Agency Compliance Official (as well as any persons who helped prepare the agency's initial Statement of Compliance) be made available to the Review Board for an interview regarding the location of agency assassination records. The interview will be used as an opportunity to resolve any outstanding questions regarding the agency's search, including any follow-up tasks to be completed by the agency. The Review Board anticipates that these interviews will be conducted in January 1997.

4. Submission of Final Agency Declaration of Compliance. By July 1, 1997, Federal agencies are expected to complete the process of identification, location, and declassification of its assassination records at which time they should submit to the Review Board a final declaration certifying, under oath, their compliance with the provisions of the JFK Act (the "Final Declaration of Compliance"). Because of the volume of CIA records, such a "final" statement may not be practicable at that time. However, we do expect that CIA will provide a complete status appraisal by July 1, 1997. This final declaration shall set forth all of the information initially set forth in the initial Statement of Compliance and shall also supplement the initial Statement of Compliance by detailing any further steps that were conducted by the agency in identifying and locating assassination records. The agencies' Final Declarations of Compliance will be included in our final report to Congress.

13-00000

5. Compliance Depositions. Starting on or about August 1, 1997, the Review Board, pursuant to its statutory authority, may conduct depositions, under oath, of the Agency Compliance Official along with any other agency officials with responsibility for complying with the JFK Act. The decision to take a compliance deposition of an agency will be made on a case by case basis, taking into account the importance of the agency to the work of the JFK Act and the sufficiency of the agency's efforts to account fully for its compliance with the JFK Act. In the event that the Review Board decides to commence a compliance deposition of an agency, the responsible agency designee(s) will be expected to testify under oath with respect to any and all issues relating to the agency's record search, including the scope of the search, the identity of files searched, the destruction of any relevant records, and any other matters set forth in the Final Declaration of Compliance. Any person obligated to appear for a deposition under oath shall be fully entitled to obtain legal representation.

We look forward to receiving your initial response, by December 9, that designates your Agency Compliance Official and includes your statement regarding your position with respect to the provisions outlined in this letter. To the extent that you have any questions or suggestions regarding the Compliance Program, please do not hesitate to contact our General Counsel, T. Jeremy Gunn, at (202) 724-0088.

Thank you for your cooperation with our work.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

cc: The Honorable Nora Slatkin, Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Michael O'Neil, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency
John Pereira, Chief, Historical Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency
Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer, Historical Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

General Counsel

9 December 1996

David G. Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street N.W., 2nd Floor
Washington D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Marwell:

The Director of Central Intelligence has forwarded to me your 27 November 1996 letter for response. I commend the efforts of the Review Board and its staff in reviewing and releasing hundreds of thousands of United States Government documents for greater public understanding about the assassination of President Kennedy. I also confirm the Central Intelligence Agency's commitment to continue working closely with the Review Board in carrying out its statutory authorities.

With regard to the requests made in your letter, I understand the Review Board's desire to demonstrate to the public that it has carried out its duties thoroughly and diligently. You have requested that CIA appoint an Agency Compliance Official to be responsible for ensuring CIA's compliance with its obligations under the JFK Act. The DCI has full confidence in Mr. John Pereira as Chief of the Historical Review Group (HRG) and has determined that Mr. Pereira will continue to act as the CIA official responsible for ensuring full compliance with the JFK Act and will remain the Agency's focal point with the Review Board.

You have also requested that CIA provide an Initial Statement of Compliance. Mr. Pereira and Mr. Barry Harrelson, the senior review officer for HRG, as well as the rest of the HRG staff, have always been available to you without restriction. The Review Board and your staff have been provided access to any relevant documents or information you have requested. As you know, the Review Board was fully informed as to the steps CIA took to designate Agency records as part of the President Kennedy collection. HRG has also arranged for multiple briefings by senior CIA officials from a wide variety of CIA components so that the Review Board can better understand the information it is reviewing. Given the current effective relationship between HRG and your staff, should you require additional assurances of this Agency's compliance with the JFK Act, I suggest that you contact Messrs. Pereira and

Harrelson directly. As usual, they will provide you with the specific information you need as quickly as possible to continue to record CIA's compliance with the JFK Act.

As to your request for a complete description of the steps CIA has taken to respond to specific requests, I understand that there are several outstanding requests. HRG has assured me that these requests have been discussed with your staff and responses will be provided to you as quickly as possible. Given the number and breadth of the requests that are being made by the Review Board and the limited staff resources available to CIA to process such requests, I ask that the Review Board continue to prioritize all its requests for information or documents. With the Review Board's priorities established in this way, the Agency can immediately work on those requests that are most important to the Review Board. Of course, as CIA responds to these requests, HRG will provide any information the Review Board needs as to how the searches were conducted. I believe that this method will best meet the needs of the Review Board and will allocate CIA's limited resources in the most efficient manner possible.

Finally, as to your requests to interview CIA officials responsible for this Agency's compliance with the JFK Act, Mr. Pereira has always been available to the Review Board for informal discussions as well as for giving sworn testimony including depositions. CIA has never objected to the Review Board deposing or interviewing informally any of its current or former employees and has, in fact, facilitated such interviews. You will also recall that, on 6 August 1996, Messrs. Pereira and Harrelson gave sworn testimony at an open hearing of the Review Board.

I trust that this responds to the concerns raised in your letter. Of course, if you should have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact Linda C. Cipriani, an attorney in the Office of General Counsel, at (703) 874-3124.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

Michael J. O'Neil

David G. Marwell

DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani/76124 (2 Dec 96)

OGC-96-53203

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - DC/LD/OGC
1 - GC
1 - C/HRG
1 - LCC Signer
1 - Lit File - LDG00021
1 - OGC Registry

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

April 16, 1997

Mr. J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: Status of CIA Responses to Assassination Records Review Board's Compliance Program and Requests for Additional Information and Records

Dear Barry:

I am writing to memorialize the Review Board's understanding of the status of CIA's responses to our formal and informal requests for additional information and records that have been requested pursuant to the Review Board's authority under Section 7(j)(1)(C)(ii)of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994) (JFK Act).

It is important that everyone at the Agency who is responsible for providing answers to our requests for additional information and records understand that the answers will need to be incorporated by reference into the Agency's Final Compliance Statement. Essentially, CIA will need to attest, under oath, that it has made all reasonable and diligent searches and that its answers are true and correct to the extent of the best, reasonably available information. In this regard, is important to note that when the Review Board requests, for example, a 201 file, it is ***not*** asking that you identify relevant records within the Sequestered Collection. ***Rather***, it is asking to review the original 201 file in its current and most complete version.[1]

---

[1] The Review Board has no basis for assuming that a 201 file as it appears in the Sequestered Collection today is necessarily complete. It is fully possible that a relevant document was not identified by CIA or the HSCA in 1978-79 and therefore is not included in the Sequestered Collection, or that a relevant document that was initially placed in the Sequestered Collection in 1978-79 may have been misplaced at some point during the subsequent twenty years. Therefore, in response to requests for files, ***it is not sufficient merely to point to places where responsive records appear in the Collection.*** On a case-by-case basis, we are very willing to hear your explanations for the possible burdensomeness of any particular search or your analysis of why a search

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

As we have written in our formal requests and as we have said to you orally, you should interpret our requests in the broadest reasonable sense. However, to the extent that you believe that a request poses an unreasonable burden that we may not have anticipated, or to the extent that you have suggestions to modify or to amend our requests in such a way as to better reach our goals, you should not hesitate to make suggestions or seek clarification. However, unless we specifically hear from you to the contrary, it is our presumption that CIA will respond fully to the requests as posed.

In response to your request, the ARRB staff has now identified six of our outstanding requests as high priority issues. We would appreciate your forwarding to us as much responsive material as you are reasonably able to assemble during the upcoming two weeks with regard to these six issues. We wish to obtain a reasonably complete response to these requests within one month. These six issues are identified in the text by double asterisks (**).[2]

The remainder of this letter is divided into two parts involving first, the formal requests for information and records, and second, the informal requests for information and records. Please let me know if your understanding of any of the following points differs from ours so that we can resolve any potential discrepancies.[3]

I. Formal Requests.

CIA-1 Organizational Material.

CIA has collected information responsive to this request for Review Board action. The ARRB staff has identified records that it believes will enhance the

---

will not be fruitful.

[2] As identified more fully below, the six issues are: CIA-7 (Histories); CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-assassination files); personnel assigned to a designated post; QKENCHANT; the electronic take from the Mexico City Station; and files on George Stanley Brown.

[3] This memorialization follows-up, in large part, on your conversations of March 19 and 20, 1997 with Michelle Combs and on the DO and DS&T briefings to the ARRB staff on April 1, 1997.

historical understanding of the assassination by providing some background on CIA records.

CIA should now review the DO and DS&T organizational material and re-examine some of the proposed redactions. Several documents have been cleared by the directorate IRO's for either release in full or release with minor redactions.[4] The ARRB staff will consult with CIA to determine whether these records should be designated "assassination records" or whether they could be made available publicly in a manner similar to the material from the 1996 Boston trip. HRG would like to discuss this issue before the materials are formally put before the Review Board.

CIA-2 through CIA-5.

These requests have been satisfied and no further action is needed by CIA.

---

[4] These are:

DCI
- –Organization of the Office of the Director 1963
- –Mission Statements for 1959, 1962, 1965 and 1966
- –some Office of the Director notices
- –OGC and IG Mission Statements for 1964, 1966, 1969, 1975, and 1976
- –OLC Mission Statement for 1975 and 1976

DI
- –Organization and Functions of the DI pre-1961
- –Organizational Charts for 1961, 1964, and 1969
- –Mission Statements for 1961, 1963, 1964, 1966, and 1970

DA
- –Mission Statements 1957, 1958, 1960, 1963, and 1974
- –Organizational Chart 1958, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1964, and 1966
- –Office of Security Organizational Charts for 1956, 1958, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1975
- –Office of Security Mission Statements for 1958, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1969, and 1975.

CIA-6 Cables and Dispatches.

The Review Board first made this request on September 11, 1995. On September 11, 1995, CIA agreed to make these materials available by December, 1995. On October 1, 1996, CIA agreed to make these materials available by November, 1996.

We are aware that many of the cables requested are already in the JFK files, but not all are included. Those that we have not been able to locate in the collection include: Mexico City Station to Headquarters (September 26-30, 1963); Headquarters to Mexico City Station (September 26-30, 1963); JMWAVE to Headquarters (September 26-November 21, 1963); Headquarters to JMWAVE (September 26-November 21, 1963); and all traffic between the Mexico City Station and JMWAVE for the periods September 26-October 20, 1963 and November 22-December 30, 1963.

**CIA-7 Histories.

The Review Board first requested access to several internal CIA histories and to indices of histories on November 8, 1995. On August 8, 1996, after reviewing a list of histories that you provided, the ARRB staff designated approximately sixty histories for which further review was sought. To date, the ARRB staff has reviewed the seven histories that CIA has made available and has made suggestions with respect to further processing of those seven histories. CIA should make the remaining sixty-plus histories available.

CIA-8 Intelligence Community Staff records.

The Review Board first requested information on the Intelligence Community Staff on March 1, 1996. On October 1, 1996, CIA agreed to report on the status of this request within two weeks. The Review Board has not yet received any substantive response to this request.

CIA-9 Intelligence Community publications on Cuba or USSR (November 20-30, 1963).

The LBJ Library has already identified several publications for mandatory review.[5] Michelle Combs reviewed the materials and identified some that should probably become available to the public. The DI has been tasked to locate the additional publications that have been requested.

CIA-10 Interagency Source Register.

CIA has provided a full description of the ISR, which should now be submitted as a formal response to the Review Board's request. Once the formal statement is provided, this request will be complete. (Under separate cover, the Review Board is sending to you an additional request for information and records, CIA-17, which provides a list of names that we request you check against the Interagency Source Register.)

CIA-11 Sylvia Duran materials.

CIA reports that it has exhausted its reasonable leads for pursuing additional information. CIA has agreed to provide a formal letter for the record detailing what searches were done and confirming that the responsive document currently in the JFK collection is a true copy of the original letter. Once this formal statement is provided, this request will be complete.

CIA-12 JMWAVE and David Sanchez Morales.

On May 22, 1996, the Review Board requested access to "all 201 files, personnel files, Office of Security files, P-files, or any other files" relating to five persons allegedly connected to JMWAVE. It is our understanding that, in response to this request, several months ago CIA located and made available for our review many records responsive to this request. However, it is also our understanding that all of the records provided were located in the Sequestered Collection.

---

[5] They include:

Intelligence Report (11/22/63; 11/23/63; 11/24/63; 11/26/63; 11/27/63; 12/11/63; 12/13/63; 12/18/63; and 12/20/63).

Intelligence Memorandum (11/23/63; 11/24/63; 11/25/63; 11/25/63; 4/20/64; and 10/16/64).

President's Intelligence Checklist (11/23/63; 11/24/63; 11/25/63; 11/26/63; 11/27/63; 11/28/63; and 11/30/63).

As stated in the second paragraph at the beginning of this letter, we seek to review the original files that we have requested. The DO provided no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-13 Mexico City Backchannel Communications.

This request, dated November 1, 1996, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. The DO provided no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-14 Mexico City Station Annual Reports.

This request, dated December 23, 1996, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. The DO provided no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-15 Win Scott files identified in Russ Holmes Files.

CIA has completed its response and no further action is needed.

**CIA-16 Oswald Pre-Assassination Files.

The HRG reportedly received a lengthy answer from the Office of Security on the LHO files and a formal response to the Review Board's request is in process. Oswald's Office of Security file has been located and will be delivered to HRG for review in April. Access to other files will require a special request from HRG to the Office of Security and should be requested by HRG for ARRB staff review.

II. Informal Requests.

All of the following informal requests have previously been made to CIA. For future reference, they will be referred to by the "Informal Request" (IR) number provided below.

**CIA-IR-01 Personnel assigned to post from 1959-64 (*see* RIF 104-10065-10199).

This request, originally made in November 1996, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. It is our understanding that the DO believes that it is not able to answer this request. The ARRB staff does not find DO's response to be credible. We believe that with all of the resources at the Agency's disposal -- including ready contact with individuals who should be able to answer this question from memory -- this question can be answered.[6] The ARRB staff has provided suggestions as to how this information could be obtained, including suggesting the types of files and cables that could be searched.

CIA-IR-02 Location of cable identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630.

The cable was delivered to the Review Board on March 20, 1997. No further action by CIA is needed.

CIA-IR-03 Full computer search for list of documents in HTLINGUAL file.

CIA should undertake a computer run for all HTLINGUAL documents. All computer searches for these documents should be documented in a formal letter for the record.

CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton's files.

The Review Board seeks to ensure that it has taken all reasonable steps to account for any files that James Jesus Angleton possessed or controlled that related to the assassination and to Lee Harvey Oswald. Because of the perceived controversy surrounding the disposition of Angleton's files, the Review Board believes it prudent to obtain a clear understanding of the types of files that he maintained and their ultimate disposition. (The Review Board does not seek to explore any subjects in Angleton's files beyond those that may have pertained to the assassination.) To date, CIA has made available certain documents provided by the CIC and the case files for *Mangold v. CIA*. The Review Board requests any additional information in the possession of CIA that would explain the disposition of Angleton's files.

---

[6] The ARRB staff has spoken with a retired CIA official who claims to be able to answer this question from memory, but who refused to do so.

CIA-IR-05 Possible foreign source for records on Oswald.

CIA was informally requested, more than two years ago, to use its contacts to pursue certain records related to Oswald that were orally described to CIA. The Review Board believed that, for reasons of security classification of information, it would be appropriate for CIA to make the initial inquiries rather than the Review Board. Under separate cover, we are providing documentation of the action the Review Board has taken to further this request.

**CIA-IR-06 QKENCHANT.

The Review Board seeks information regarding the purpose of QKENCHANT and its connection with Clay Shaw, Howard Hunt, and Monroe Sullivan.

The Review Board was initially provided some information in regard to this request that now appears to be incorrect. CIA is now seeking additional information to correct or to clarify its previous answers. The Review Board seeks an immediate, full, and accurate response to this request.

CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart.

The ARRB staff has reviewed all records that CIA has been able to locate to date. During the course of this review, additional questions were raised that you agreed to pursue. You also agreed to conduct additional searches to determine whether there may be additional retrievable records on Mr. Capehart.

CIA-IR-08 Unredacted copy of the "Family Jewels" memoranda.

HRG will locate this item.

CIA-IR-09 George Bush computer search.

The Review Board provided CIA with a copy of an FBI document, dated November 29, 1963, prepared under the name of John Edgar Hoover, which states: "The substance of the foregoing information [on the assassination of President Kennedy] was orally furnished to Mr. George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency . . . ." We have been informed that the DO has no record of a "George Bush" being in the employ of CIA in 1963 with the exception of Mr. George William Bush who has already given a sworn affidavit that he is not the

"George Bush" in question. CIA is now checking whether the search query included George Herbert Walker Bush prior to 1970. CIA should determine whether George Herbert Walker Bush is the person to whom the memorandum refers and should provide a definitive statement regarding the scope of its search and the basis of its conclusion.

CIA-IR-10 IG Reports.

CIA will determine whether the IG's office maintains an index or inventory of its reports and determine whether the IG's office prepared a report on the handling of Oswald.

CIA-IR-11 Warren Commission critics.

We are asking that CIA determine whether it possesses any files or records on Warren Commission critics Edward J. Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg, or Sylvia Meagher. The Review Board is not requesting information *per se* regarding any FOIA requests by these individuals or any Public Affairs news clippings.[7]

CIA-IR-12 Contacts with journalists or publishing houses.

The Review Board seeks to determine to what extent, if any, CIA might have attempted to influence any journalists or publishers regarding public discussion of the assassination. This request, originally discussed in March 1997, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. The DO had no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-IR-13 Office or person dealing with organized crime and Cuba.

The Review Board requested that CIA make a particular personnel file available. The file was made available by CIA for review. The Review Board will discuss with you whether any further steps need to be taken.

---

[7] To the extent that CIA possesses FOIA files or records on any of these individuals, and to the extent that those records contain information that was not filed with the courts, such records ***are being requested for review by the Review Board.***

CIA-IR-14 Breckinridge files.

CIA (OGC) will determine the disposition of the files of Scott D. Breckinridge.

**CIA-IR-15 Electronic "take" from Mexico City Station.

The Review Board has for some time been attempting to determine whether it has had access to all of CIA's surveillance "take" from the Cuban and Soviet facilities in Mexico City at the time of the Oswald visit and in the immediate wake of the assassination. On numerous occasions, the Review Board has asked whether there was any surveillance take in addition to what is currently in the collection.

On March 18, 1997, the Review Board provided additional leads to CIA to assist it in answering these questions. The DO has agreed to check Headquarters records for the file referenced in HMMW 12454, to search for the crypts cited in this document, and to search for HMMA 20307 and other cables or dispatches cited in this document. The DS&T will query its offices for possible records on Mexico City and Cuba and for the present location of Staff D records. Regardless of the outcome of these particular searches, the Review Board continues to seek a full accounting for all surveillance conducted during the relevant time periods.

CIA-IR-16 U-2 files.

DS&T will provide a folder title print out of U-2 materials for Review Board examination, check for records filed under Richard Bissell's name, and search for OSP files. DS&T has also contacted Lockheed for assistance.

CIA-IR-17 DS&T Records on Castro assassination plots.

HRG will furnish the 1967 IG Report to provide possible search query suggestions for DS&T follow-up.

CIA-IR-18 DO Office.

The Review Board has requested orally information about a particular DO office. We understand that you are collecting the relevant information.

CIA-IR-19 Computer searches.

The Review Board has requested that full computer searches be conducted on all of the following people and organizations. The results of the searches should be documented.

Name	Results/Comments
1. Spas Raikin	ARRB awaits documentation.
2. Leo Cherne	ARRB awaits documentation. OP file starts in 1988. HRG is checking on a 201. No OMS file.
3. Hunter Leake	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG is checking for a DCD file.
4. Marilyn Dutz Murret	ARRB awaits documentation.
5. John McVickar	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file. No OMS file. DO is checking.
6. Andy Anderson	ARRB awaits documentation.
7. Byron B. Morton, Jr.	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file. No OMS file.
8. Marie Cheatham	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file. No OMS file.
9. Paul Garbler	ARRB awaits documentation. OP file. OMS file. HRG has requested personnel file.
10. Verna Deane Brown	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file.
** 11. George Stanley Brown	ARRB awaits documentation.
12. Howard Guebler	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
13. Gordon Duane Novel	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
14. Ed Butler	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
15. INCA (Information Council of the Americas)	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
16. Permindex	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.

Conclusion

Please let me know if you have any supplements or corrections. We would very much like to ensure that these matters are handled expeditiously. As always, we appreciate your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel and
Associate Director for Research and Analysis

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.

Executive Order

8 October 1997

JFK Records Review Project

(U) The following is intended as a guide for those people whose work requires them to review Agency documents and materials that may be subject to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. Some of the records within the Agency's JFK collection are assassination specific, others are ancillary. They deal with individuals and events not directly linked with Oswald or the assassination; but they are thought to have had a relationship to the assassination, or investigation into the assassination.

I. The Agency's JFK Collection.

(U) The Agency's JFK records collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). There were eighty-one (81) Records Center-sized boxes in the original collection. Of these, the first seventeen (17) made up the Oswald 201 file. The next sixty-four (64) are referred to as the "JFK files" or sequestered collection and break down as follows: thirty-four (34) boxes of DO materials; nine (9) boxes of Office of Security files; fifteen (15) boxes of OLC materials; two (2) boxes each of OGC and IG materials; and one (1) box of DDS&T documents. HSCA originated material, including notes by HSCA staff members, are found throughout the collection. Box 64 contains seventy two (72) reels of microfilm.

(U) The microfilm contains copies of complete files to which the HSCA had access during its investigation. In addition to the Oswald 201 file (12 reels), the microfilm includes: 201 files on Cubans, Americans, and Soviets linked to Oswald, the JFK assassination or the various investigations (approximately 26 reels)and the Cuban Revolutionary Council and other exile group activities (approximately 13 reels); the personnel files of CIA staff employees (approximately 5 reels); and operational files on organizations, projects, and other subjects of interest to the HSCA investigation (approximately 16 reels).

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: LOC 3-82

(U) We continue to identify other collections of documents that properly belong within the JFK collection. These include: The Oswald Security File; Agency working files generated by JFK assassination investigations and requests; and CIA documents found by other agencies and Presidential Libraries and referred to CIA for review under the JFK Act.

II. The Time Frame of JFK Assassination Records.

(U) In general, the time frame of JFK records commences when Oswald arrived at the US air base (the U-2) at Atsugi, Japan, in December 1957 and continues through the end of the Garrison investigation in 1968. Note, however, for information which is clearly related to the story of the JFK assassination or its investigations, there is no time frame limitation. Any document or request that deals with the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, or the various conspiracy theories should be referred to the HRG/JFK review project.

III. Key Topics, Etc.

(U) Certain individuals, organizations, places, projects, and subjects are central to the Oswald/JFK story and the ensuing investigations, which causes a number of documents with no mention of Oswald or the assassination to fall within the purview of the JFK Act. Clearly, it is not possible to list every category of document which may have been reviewed and released under the JFK Assassination Records Act. The following categories contain examples of information that are considered to be within the JFK review.

(U) A. JFK Assassination Investigations:

- Warren Commission, 1963-64
- James Garrison, New Orleans DA, 1966-68
- Rockefeller Commission,* 1975;
- Church Committee (Senate),* 1975-76
- House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79

* JFK Assassination, anti-Castro plots and CIA anti-Cuban operations only.

B. Key subjects

(S) -- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, JMWAVE Station, and CIA stations in those cities through which Oswald passed on his way to and from the Soviet Union, as they related to Oswald's activities or to possible conspiracies.

(AIUO) -- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 (Mongoose, etc.) if they involve JFK figures (see comment on Meagher's "index" below); most US anti-Castro activities in 1963 are considered relevant.

(U) -- Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders and organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures.
-- Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts); no limit on time frame.
-- Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans during Oswald time frames (see attached chronology).

(AIUO) C. Key figures
(the following individuals are considered JFK assassination-related, unless the context is clearly unrelated or outside the appropriate time period)

-- AMMUG, Cuban defector;
-- Maurice Bishop, alleged to exist (any reference);
-- Silvia Duran, employee in Cuban Embassy, Mexico City;
-- Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee;
-- Howard Hunt, CIA employee;
-- Priscilla MacMillan Johnson, journalist;
-- Valeriy Kostikov, KGB officer in Mexico city;
-- Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt (all documents)
-- Yuri Nosenko and the dispute over his bona fides;
-- Michael and Ruth Paine, Dallas friends of Oswalds;
-- David Phillips, CIA employee;
-- Richard Snyder, State Department Officer.
-- Winston Scott, COS Mexico City

For a more comprehensive list of subjects and individuals related to the JFK assassination, reviewers should consult Sylvia Meagher's Master Index to the JFK Assassination Investigations, The Scarecrow Press, 1980.

(U) Action Officer: Barry Harrelson (31825)

Attachment: Oswald Chronology

(U) Attachment:

Oswald Chronology, 1956-1963

--Joins Marines	10/26/56
--Arrives Atsugi (U2 Base) Japan	09/12/57
--Returns to US	11/02/58
--Hardship discharge	09/11/59
--Departs New Orleans for Moscow via LeHavre, London, Helsinki	09/20/59
--Arrives Moscow	10/16/59
--Resides in Minsk	01/07/60 - 05/22/62
--Departs Moscow via train	06/02/62
--Departs Rotterdam via ship	06/04/62
--Arrives New York	06/13/62
--Fort Worth/Dallas, Texas	06/14/62 - 04/63
--New Orleans	04/63 - 09/63
--Mexico City	09/25/63 - 10/03/63
--Dallas	10/3/63 - 11/24/63

13-00000

DRAFT

October 16, 1997

HAND-DELIVERED

J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Review Officer
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: Submission of CIA's Initial Statement of Compliance Under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Barry:

In connection with the work of the CIA to locate and release records relating to President Kennedy's assassination pursuant to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ("JFK Act"), please submit to the Review Board the CIA's initial formal report regarding its work.

As you know, the procedures for documenting the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act were set forth in the Review Board's November 27, 1996 letter to the CIA Director. These procedures entailed the submission of an intial report by the CIA, which we referred to as an Initial Statement of Compliance. This past Spring, we informally agreed to extend the time for submission of the Initial Compliance Statement pending ongoing work of the CIA under the JFK Act.

To facilitate the completion of the CIA's work by September 1998, including the submission to Congress of a final report detailing the work accomplished by the CIA and other Federal agencies under the JFK Act, please submit the CIA's Initial Compliance Statement to the Review Board no later than November 6, 1997.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
and General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.

DRAFT

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

October 17, 1997

Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Re: Completion of Review of Assassination Records

Dear John:

The Assassination Records Review Board ("Review Board") has less than one year to complete its statutory responsibility of ensuring that all Federal records related to the assassination of President Kennedy are made publicly available at the National Archives and Records Administration ("NARA"). Because of the importance to the Review Board of completing the review and release of Central Intelligence Agency records, I am taking this opportunity to raise with you some of our concerns and to describe our goals.

Let me first reiterate our deep appreciation for the cooperation that we have received thus far from the Agency. We are very mindful of the enormous amount of work that has been accomplished thus far. We very much hope to be able to report, at the completion of our work, that the Agency has fully complied with the letter and spirit of the JFK Act and that the Review Board is confident that all CIA assassination records have been fully processed and transferred to the National Archives. Unfortunately, it is clear at this point that the pace of review of CIA records will need to increase significantly during this final year so that the Review Board and the CIA will be able to complete our responsibilities and that the Review Board can issue the type of report that we all ideally envision.

It is our goal to have all CIA assassination records reviewed and transferred to NARA by September 1, 1998. By "all" assassination records, I include the unredacted originals as well as copies containing Board-approved postponements. (I am excluding, therefore, duplicates of those records that have been transferred to NARA.) The Review Board is prepared to take all necessary steps within its statutory authority to ensure that this work is accomplished.

BOARD MEMBERS: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: *David G. Marwell*

The Review Board has promised Congress that this work will be completed by September 1998. The Review Board also is obligated to keep Congress informed, on a monthly basis, of the steps it has taken to ensure completion of this goal. We now need to keep Congress informed of any difficulties that we are facing in the course of completing this work.

As you know, the JFK Act in many ways imposed difficult obligations. For example, it required the CIA (and other agencies) to complete its review and transfer of records to NARA within 300 days of the time the statute was enacted in 1993. Although this statutory deadline was not met, we would like to make it as clear as we possibly can that we intend to ensure that the goal to review and transfer all assassination records to NARA is accomplished during the lifetime of the Review Board.

We have raised with you previously our concerns about whether the Agency has allocated sufficient resources to complete its work on its assassination records by September 1, 1998. In a meeting at CIA headquarters on October 16, 1996, CIA Executive Director Nora Slatkin promised members of the Review Board that the CIA would devote whatever resources are necessary to complete the task.

In order to ensure that this work is completed, the Review Board has developed a timetable for review of remaining CIA records. The CIA's Historical Review Group suggests that refinement of the timetable is necessary, but has of yet offered no specific changes.

In order to fulfill our responsibilities under the JFK Act and in order to honor our pledge to Congress, we believe that the following steps are necessary:

> *First*, we need to establish a reasonable but strict schedule for the CIA's review and release of records. The CIA must devote all of the resources necessary to review the records under this schedule. We believe that the only way to ensure that the CIA's work is completed is to adhere to such a schedule.
>
> *Second*, if the CIA has not completed its scheduled review by the proposed deadline, the Review Board will require that all CIA records identified as assassination records under the JFK Act be transferred forthwith to the National Archives regardless of whether they have been reviewed or processed by the CIA pursuant to the Board's authority at 44 U.S.C. § 2107.7(j)(B).

Third, the Board will presumptively vote to open in full all records that have not been reviewed in conformity with the schedule.

We can assure you that we have no desire whatsoever to take steps two and three. However, at this point, we see no other method for satisfying our obligation to ensure that the CIA's assassination-related records are released by September 1998, unless the CIA agrees to schedule the review in a timely, consistent, methodical, and enforceable manner. Although you should not hesitate to contact us regarding any ideas you have for streamlining or improving the accomplishment of this task, there should be no misunderstanding by the Agency regarding what we believe our goal to be and the steps that we are prepared to take to ensure the fulfillment of our statutory obligations and our promises to Congress. It is our perception that if the Agency allocates additional resources to the accomplishment of this project, we all will be able to accomplish the goals of the JFK Act.

We therefore strongly urge the Agency to allocate now whatever resources are necessary to complete its review records in an orderly and systematic manner. To the extent that the Agency is able to meet the necessary deadlines, there will be no need for us to resort to the extreme -- but potentially necessary – measures to complete our obligations to Congress and the American people.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

Skwirot e:\wp-docs\ciastatu.wpd

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

October 30, 1997

VIA FACSIMILE

J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Review Officer
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: Submission of CIA's Initial Statement of Compliance Under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Mr. Harrelson:

I have been asked by Jeremy Gunn to take responsibility, along with Robert Skwirot and Michelle Combs, for handling the Review Board's JFK Act Compliance Program with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Gunn has informed me that you have agreed to provide us with the CIA's initial compliance statement (as it is described in our November 27, 1996 letter to the CIA) by the end of November 1997. Thereafter, we can establish a reasonable time for the CIA to prepare and submit its Final Declaration of Compliance. The CIA's Final Declaration will be submitted to Congress and the President.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
Associate General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

February 11, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE

Mr. J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Review Officer
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: CIA Initial Compliance Statement To Be Submitted Under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Mr. Harrelson:

Thank you for submitting to the Review Board the CIA's December 11, 1997 DRAFT of its initial Statement of Compliance under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act ("JFK Act"). You submitted the draft to obtain the Review Board's initial comments. We have made a preliminary review of the draft and offer the following comments.

The Statement is helpful in providing general background history regarding the measures undertaken by the CIA to assemble files relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Statement also gives a good overview description of those files. At this time, we do not propose that you make any major changes that would delay the formal submission of the initial Compliance Statement to the Review Board.[1]

---

[1] We note that the initial draft statement generally describes the records identified in response to specific Review Board requests. For the initial Compliance Statement, this will be sufficient. To the extent that additional records are later identified or requests completed, these can be included in the Final Declaration of Compliance. We also note that "[t]he status, results and documentation of specific [Review Board] requests" are more specifically being addressed in separate memoranda being submitted to the Review Board, and this process is ongoing. These responses are extremely helpful in articulating what the CIA has done to search for records on the JFK assassination. Therefore, the Review Board will request that these detailed responses ultimately be incorporated by reference into the Final Declaration of Compliance.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

Therefore, please submit the CIA's official initial Statement of Compliance to the Review Board as soon as possible, but no later than March 16, 1998.

After formal submission of the CIA's initial Statement of Compliance, we would schedule an informal interview with you (and perhaps other members of the Historical Review Group) to ask questions regarding the Compliance Statement and regarding the sufficiency of the CIA's record searches. After addressing any outstanding issues, the CIA would thereafter submit its Final Declaration of Compliance.

I recognize that you are extremely busy processing CIA records for inclusion in the JFK Collection. However, it is essential that the CIA devote sufficient time and attention to its Final Declaration of Compliance because, as we have stated before, the Final Declaration will constitute the CIA's representation to the American public, under oath, that the CIA has diligently searched for records relating to the JFK assassination and that the CIA is not withholding any materials regarding the assassination.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
Associate General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.
(By facsimile)

13-00000

2/13/98

BEFORE
THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

DECLARATION OF BRIAN LATELL

I, Brian Latell, do hereby declare and say:

1. I presently serve as the Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (``CSI'') for the United States Central Intelligence Agency (``CIA or ``Agency'') and have held this position since September 1994. I also hold the position of Chairman of the Editorial Board (``Board'') for *Studies in Intelligence* (*Studies*), a publication of CSI. I have served as a foreign intelligence officer for the United States Government for over 36 years and, at CIA, I have held a variety of senior positions of management and analytical responsibility including serving as a member of the National Intelligence Council for 14 years and National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America for four of those years. I hold a doctorate, masters and undergraduate degree from Georgetown University, have served as a Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and presently hold an appointment to Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service as an Adjunct Professor.

2. The purpose of this declaration is to provide the Assassination Records Review Board with my view of the status of *Studies* as a classified publication available within the Intelligence Community and as an unclassified publication available to the public. I make the following statements based upon my personal knowledge, information made available to me in my official capacity, and the conclusions I reached in accordance therewith.

3. *Studies* is an independent, scholastic endeavor with the mission to promote scholarship in intelligence literature. Articles submitted to *Studies* are intended for educational purposes only and present solely the personal, academic views of the individual authors. The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Board. Its criterion for publication is whether the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence. Articles submitted to *Studies* are not required to be coordinated through channels and, indeed, are not vetted through management by either the Board or the author. In addition to senior Agency officers, the Board also has membership representing other agencies of the Intelligence Community.

4. In the beginning of *Studies*, articles were primarily written by CIA authors. In the past decade, however, *Studies* has been enriched by an increasing number of contributions from authors from other components of the Intelligence Community, from members of the academic world in the United States and abroad, and from a few private citizens, most of whom have had some past intelligence connection. The Board welcomes this trend and looks forward to increasing contributions from non-Agency authors.

5. Once an article is submitted for consideration in *Studies* it is circulated to the members of the Board for their review. The Board then decides whether an article meets the criteria for publication and, if it does, begins the publication process. All unclassified submissions are reviewed by the Publications Review Board (PRB)[1] to ensure the unclassified nature of the article. The articles are edited, approved by the Chief of CSI, and published in the classified version of *Studies*. Most of the unclassified articles published in this version are then picked up by the unclassified version of *Studies* and with further slight editing are published. If an article has been deemed to contain classified information by its author, and it is subsequently requested to be released, it will be reviewed

---

[1] PRB is the same body that reviews private writings proposed for publication by current and former Agency employees as required under Agency regulation.

by either the History Staff, the Historical Review Program, or more recently by the Publications Review Board -- pursuant to the personal manuscript standards -- to allow declassification or the creation of an unclassified version. By deeming or marking a given article as classified, we represent only that this personal writing contains some information of a proprietary (hence classified) nature to the US Government; that fact does not alter the nature of this private work or convert it into an official federal record containing official government information.

6. The independence and integrity of the Board, and its historical commitment to academic traditions, has never been questioned by Agency management. I, as well as several of my predecessors, can recall no cases of interference by Agency management with the publication decisions of the Board, no matter how sensitive the subject matter or critical of the Agency. Indeed, it is the antithesis of official information and the embodiment of personal, academic scholarship and work. The very intent is academic in the context of educational mentoring from one individual to those in succeeding generations. The Agency teaches through its institutional and official course materials; individual intelligence officers teach personally through *Studies*.

7. For the foregoing reasons, I believe that, while ``*Studies in Intelligence*'' is published under the auspices of the United States Government, it is neither an expression of official information nor an official release of official Executive Branch information, but rather a forum for the private academic expressions of the authors.

8. Executed this 13th day of February 1998 at Fairfax County, Virginia.

BRIAN LATELL

g:\ipcrdwp\general\lss\arrb_dec.doc

12 february 1998

draft by marty; revisions by lss

13-00000

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT

19 March 1998

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Mr. T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Gunn:

Re: STATEMENT CONCERNING ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992

The following is a listing of the principal measures taken to date by the Agency to fulfill the requirements of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (the Act). Note: it does not include the numerous informal meetings, conversations, and exchanges between ARRB and HRP staff members, many of which covered all of the measures.

INITIAL SEARCHES

a. In early 1992, even before the Act was passed, the Chief of the CIA History Staff reported to the Director that the staff had located all of the so-called "sequestered collection" (those records compiled by the Agency for the House Select Committee On Assassinations investigation) and had surveyed these and other related holdings on the assassination both at Headquarters and at the Agency records center. The sequestered collection contained sixty-four record center-size boxes. In addition, the staff had located sixteen boxes of Lee Oswald's 201 file and a number of loose folders mainly from Mexico Station records that were collected for the Warren Commission.

b. Before the ARRB was appointed by the President, John Pereira, Chief, Historical Review Group/Center for the Study of Intelligence, sent a memorandum dated 25 October 1993 to the Agency directorates requesting a name search on Lee Harvey Oswald, the JFK assassination, and any documents related to the assassination. This effort and discussions with various Agency components and Agency Information Release Officers over the past four years resulted in more than 31 additional boxes of materials being sent for review. Included within this material were 19 boxes of JFK working files based on the sequestered collection, two boxes on Nosenko, seven boxes of LA Division documents and three boxes from the Bay of Pigs period. Not all of this material is related to the JFK story; and in some boxes only a few folders had anything to do with the assassination or events surrounding it. To date, the ARRB staff has designated approximately 22 boxes of this material as assassination records. In addition, about 400 pages of material from an FOIA request for minutes of the DCI's morning meetings which related to JFK were added to the collection. The search for documents is a continuing effort. Guidelines for this effort have been sent to Agency individuals and components which review documents and materials in the course of their work.

REVIEWS

c. Historical Review Group, now the Historical Review Program, reviewed boxes 1 through 63 of the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file and released most of the documents therein either in full or in sanitized form to the National Archives in August 1993. The total number of pages released by CIA prior to or during August 1993 was approximately 123,000. An additional release of approximately 30,000 pages of HSCA material from the sequestered collection was made in 1995.

d. Box 64 of the sequestered collection contained 72 reels of microfilm primarily dealing with Directorate of Operations materials and Office of Security files. In addition there were 22 reels of 201 files on 151 individuals. Following release of the main collection in August 1993, HRG staff members reviewed the microfilm files and released approximately 74,000 pages of material to the National Archives either in full or in sanitized form.

e. The status of HRP's review of additional records and re-review of the sequestered collection will be addressed in regular progress reports to the ARRB staff.

REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS AND INFORMATION

f. The Agency maintains a rather unique and non-integrated files system which precludes a single query on a particular subject and the expected response from the files of all directorates. Following coordination with the ARRB staff, the Agency arranged for the staff to be briefed by a representative of each directorate concerning the nature of the files within the directorate -- how they are organized, maintained, searched, and how they have been searched previously for assassination-related materials. Following this effort, the ARRB staff asked for a number of additional searches by the Agency and they are in various stages of completion.

g. In addition, pursuant to requests both formal and informal from the ARRB staff, HRP has tasked various elements of the Agency to conduct special searches for other materials thought to be relevant to the assassination story. Included in this category was the Oswald security file which was found and has been examined by the ARRB staff. Although a number of the requests are still outstanding, considerable material has been provided for review by the ARRB staff some of which has been found to be relevant. These materials include the History Staff's histories on various CIA operations and Agency components; files on specific individuals involved in either the Warren Commission or HSCA investigations; and the product of CIA internal reviews of programs and operations. Those parts of these materials which are determined by the ARRB staff to have relevancy to the assassination story will be reviewed by HRP and released as completed.

The status, results, and documentation of specific requests are to be addressed in a separate memorandum.

Sincerely,

Barry Harr

J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

July 7, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

HAND DELIVERY

Mr. J. Barry Harrelson
Chief, JFK Project
Historical Review Program
Office of Information Management
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Final Search for all Original CIA Records Related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Dear Barry:

This letter is in follow-up to our meeting of June 26, 1998, where we discussed the comprehensiveness of CIA's search for assassination records. As we expressed in the meeting, the Assassination Records Review Board is extremely concerned as to whether all original records held by the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly those controlled by the Directorate of Operations, have been identified in previous searches for records relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board is aware that the former Chief of the Historical Review Group, John Pereira, ordered a search of all CIA records in 1993. Since that date, however, we have identified at least three examples of records clearly relevant to the assassination that have been identified through the efforts of the Review Board staff and that were subsequently located by CIA. These records were not identified through the 1993 CIA search.

In order to comply with the strictures of the JFK Act and to ensure that all original CIA records relevant to the assassination are identified, the Review Board requests the following:

1. CIA conduct a new search of all Office of Security and Directorate of Operations (including all counterintelligence components), for any documents relevant to the assassination. Particular care should be taken to examine possibly relevant documents dated shortly before and any time after the 1993 search.

BOARD MEMBERS: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • DEPUTY DIRECTOR: *Thomas E. Samoluk*

2. CIA Director George Tenet send a directive to all CIA personnel that explictly requires all offices to search their files and notify the Historical Review Program immediately if they have any records that might possibly be considered relevant to the assassination—including any records created after 1992.

3. CIA arrange for a meeting between the Review Board staff and appropriate CIA officials to discuss CIC and other counterintelligence records.

4. CIA conduct a search for updated or continued records on individuals, from a list of names to be provided by the Review Board, of subjects who were of interest to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. We are particularly interested in any records that CIA acquired on these subjects since the original files were sequestered in 1978. A list will be provided to you shortly.

The Review Board appreciates your cooperation and assistance in resolving these issues. As time is growing short, we would like very much to ensure that these matters are handled expeditiously.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Assassination Records Review Board
Mr. James Oliver
Lee Strickland, Esq.

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

July 15, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Robert M. McNamara, Jr., Esq.
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. McNamara:

I am writing to address the completion of CIA's outstanding obligations under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"), including submission by CIA of a Final Declaration of Compliance certifying, under the Act, its work to identify and release records relating to President Kennedy's assassination. As we have advised CIA previously, the Final Declaration will constitute CIA's representations, under penalty of perjury, regarding disclosure of its records relating to the Kennedy assassination.

Accordingly, set forth below is our understanding of (1) the status for completion of CIA's work under the JFK Act and (2) the form and content of CIA's Final Declaration.

A. Completion of CIA's Work Under the JFK Act

1. Processing of CIA Assassination Records by September 1998

We confirmed with CIA that it intends to place into the JFK Assassination Records Collection ("JFK Collection") at the National Archives and Records Administration ("NARA"), by September 1998, all identified assassination records except certain documents confirmed by the Review Board staff as being duplicates, which may be processed later.[1] Thus, CIA commits to placing the following assassination records into the JFK Collection by September 30, 1998:

---

[1] In addition, some peripheral documents may be processed after September 1998, but only if identified beforehand to, and approved by, the Review Board.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

- Non-duplicate documents within the hardcopy set of the CIA-House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") Sequestered Collection (*i.e*, CIA files that were reviewed by the HSCA for its investigation of the JFK assassination and which were sequestered pursuant to agreement of the CIA and HSCA).[2]

- Non-duplicate documents within the microfilm version of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (the microfilm version is a more expansive set of records than the hardcopy set of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection in that it contains complete underlying files, not just the specific records reviewed by the HSCA).[3]

- Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 File. CIA has placed this file into the JFK Collection.[4] As for the microfilm copy of the Oswald 201 file (which we assume duplicates the original Oswald 201 file processed by the CIA), we request that it be placed in the protected portion of the JFK Collection by September 1998 (after Review Board examination). Certain recently discovered documents relating to Oswald also must be added to the JFK Collection.

- Lee Harvey Oswald's Office of Security File. CIA has placed this file into the JFK Collection.

- Marina Oswald's 201 File. While Marina Oswald's 201 file has been processed for the JFK Collection (as part of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection), we request that the original file be transferred to the protected portion of the JFK

---

[2] As CIA has reported, the hard copy and microfilm versions of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection were first placed into the JFK Collection in 1993 and 1994. *See* CIA Initial Statement of Compliance (dated March 19, 1998), at 2. Documents from those collections are being re-processed, however, to the extent that the Review Board has mandated that such documents be opened up to a greater extent.

[3] NARA reports that it does not have the computerized version of the record identification forms ("RIFs") for documents in the microfilm Sequestered Collection. CIA explained that it must first complete the processing of non-duplicates and update the computer data before that data is transferred to NARA. CIA anticipates that this will be done sometime after October 1998.

[4] However, NARA reports that many documents do not have the proper RIFs attached. CIA will coordinate with NARA to correct this.

Collection by September 1998.

- Non-duplicate documents within Kennedy assassination working files of CIA officer Russ Holmes (19 boxes).
- Non-duplicate documents selected from 7 boxes of Latin American Division working files.
- CIA organizational materials, including the JMWAVE organizational chart specifically designated as an assassination record by the Review Board [CIA-1].[5]
- Excerpts of certain CIA histories designated by the Review Board [CIA-7].
- Excerpts of CIA's "Family Jewels" memorandum [CIA-IR-08].[6]
- Excerpts of a CIA personnel file that relate to organized crime/Cuba [CIA-IR-13].
- Excerpts of the personnel file of Mr. George E. Joannides, the case officer responsible for the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) during a period in the early 1960's [CIA-IR-21].
- CIA "A" files for Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison [CIA-IR-22].
- Designated Watch Committee Reports [CIA-IR-23].
- Oswald-related documents from the a general defector file maintained by the CIA's Office of Security [CIA-IR-24].
- Certain records from the files of former CIA Director John McCone as designated by the Review Board [CIA-IR-28].

---

[5] "CIA-1" reflects that these assassination-related materials were identified by the Review Board from among materials that CIA provided in response to a formal, written request (numbered 1) from the Review Board.

[6] "CIA-IR-08" reflects that these assassination-related materials were identified by the Review Board from among materials that CIA provided in response to an informal request (numbered 8) from the Review Board.

- Designated records from security files of Jack Ruby, Walter Sheridan, Harold Weisberg, Richard Case Nagel, and Gordon Novel [CIA-IR-27].
- Excerpts from the calendar of former CIA Director Allen Dulles [CIA-IR-31].

In addition to the assassination records identified above, the Review Board currently is inspecting additional files CIA has made available in response to Review Board requests. We may designate additional assassination records from these files. They are: intelligence community reports on Cuba/Soviet Union [CIA-9]; files relating to CIA officials stationed at JMWAVE [CIA-12]; and files of various high-level CIA officials (former Deputy CIA Directors Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter, former Deputy Directors for Plans Richard Bissell and Richard Helms, former General Counsel Lawrence Houston, C. Tracy Barnes, and William Harvey) [CIA-IR-34]. Additional assassination records may be identified from other requests for additional information.

2. Mexico City Tapes [CIA-IR-15]

We also have discussed with CIA the potential processing of recordings maintained by CIA and apparently reflecting audio surveillance of certain "Soviet bloc" and Cuban facilities in Mexico City for the period November 22, 1963 through early January 1964, including possible surveillance of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Because CIA has not yet listened to the full tapes, it could not yet confirm the targets or substance of this "electronic take." CIA has committed to listening first to the tapes for the period November 22-23, 1963 (approximately 18 tapes), and thereafter will discuss with the Review Board potential placement of these and later audio recordings into the JFK Collection. CIA said it will complete its review of the November 22-23 tapes in July.

3. Processing of Duplicate Documents under the JFK Act

a. The CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection. Although a version of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (both microfilm and hardcopy) were placed in the JFK Collection in 1993 and 1994, the CIA has since been forwarding more open versions of certain documents in light of Review Board decisions. All such "re-processed" documents will be placed in the JFK Collection by September 1998 except that, to the extent that there are other duplicate copies of these re-processed documents in the Sequestered Collection, such duplicates will be re-processed and placed into the JFK Collection within one year after the Review Board terminates (*i.e.*, by September 1999).

b. Russ Holmes Collection. The CIA currently has not placed the Russ Holmes

Collection (consisting of CIA officer Russ Holmes' working files relating to the Kennedy assassination) into the JFK Collection. The Review Board recognizes that many documents within the Holmes files may be duplicates of CIA documents found in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection or Oswald 201 file. Nonetheless, the Review Board considers placement of the Holmes files into the JFK Collection to be of paramount importance in view of the selection and organization of documents that was made by a CIA officer. Accordingly, the CIA has committed to placing into the JFK Collection, by September 1998, all documents from the Holmes files not found elsewhere in the CIA materials at NARA. Duplicates of documents found elsewhere in the open JFK Collection can be processed after September 1998.

Given the unique organization of the Russ Holmes files, however, the Review Board requests that CIA make every effort to process those files, in their entirety, as soon as possible. Our understanding is that CIA will attempt to place the complete set of Holmes files, including duplicates, into the JFK Collection by December 1998 but absolutely no later than September 1999.

4. Custody of CIA Assassination Records to be Released in 2017

We have discussed with CIA its concerns regarding physical custody of certain records whose release has been postponed, under the JFK Act, until 2017. CIA has indicated that it may want to retain physical custody of certain postponed records pending disclosure in 2017.

The Review Board believes that original, postponed records should presumptively be held by NARA in accordance with the JFK Act. *See* 44 U.S.C. § 2107(5)(e)(2) ("Each Government office shall . . . transmit to the Archivist . . . all assassination records the public disclosure of which has been postponed . . . to become part of [NARA's] protected Collection.") Accordingly, all postponed assassination records of the CIA should presumptively be transferred to the legal and physical custody of NARA by September 30, 1998. The Review Board requests that the originals of any postponed records from the Oswald 201 file, the Oswald Office of Security file, and the Marina Oswald 201 file be placed in the protected portion of the JFK Collection by September 1998. The Review Board understands that originals of postponed records from the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection and the Holmes Collection would be transferred in September 1999 after duplicates have been processed.

To the extent CIA believes that certain other records, particularly those designated as NBR, must remain in CIA's physical custody until 2017, we suggest further discussions to resolve definitively how those record groups will be handled.

5. Completion of CIA Responses to Review Board Requests

We have identified certain Review Board requests for additional information (both formal and informal) for which responses are still due from CIA. We understand that some outstanding responses are in draft form or otherwise nearing completion. CIA's completion of all outstanding responses is an essential aspect of its compliance with the JFK Act. We identified the following responses due from CIA (certain priority items are listed first):

Priority Responses Due

Accounting of Pre-Assassination Files on Oswald (partial response received) [CIA-16]

Accounting of James Angleton Files [CIA-IR-04]

Accounting of Electronic "Take" from Mexico City [CIA-IR-15]

Possible Foreign Source for Oswald Records [CIA-IR-05]

Possible IG reports re Oswald [CIA-IR-10]

Files on Warren Commission Critics [CIA-IR-11]

S. Breckenridge Files [CIA-IR-14]

Other Responses Due

Intelligence Community Staff Records [CIA-8]

Interagency Source Register [CIA-10]

Computer Search for HTLINGUAL Documents [CIA-IR--03]

QKENCHANT [CIA-IR-06]

Contacts with Journalists [CIA-IR-12]

DO Office Information [CIA-IR-18]

Computer Name searches [CIA-IR-19]

Zapruder Film [CIA-IR-25]

AMWORLD [CIA-IR-32]

Search for document mentioned in RIF No. 104-10151-10206 [CIA-IR-35]

William Pawley Files [CIA-IR-37]

6. CIA Review and Declassification of Other Records

Besides CIA records, CIA is continuing to review its equities in other records, including Church Committee records and records from the Presidential libraries. In addition, the Review Board's interviews with former CIA official Ann Goodpasture must be reviewed and declassified by CIA so that the interviews can be sent to Ms. Goodpasture for her corrections and then included with the Review Board's open records.

Finally, the Library of Congress has a set of closed Rockefeller Commission records in its Manuscript Division that may require CIA review and declassification. It is our understanding that these records are closed until 2001 and can be inspected only by permission of the CIA Director. To assess what should be done regarding release of these records, the Review Board first seeks to inspect them. Accordingly, please authorize the Library's Manuscript Division to permit our inspection and let us know when this authorization has been granted.

B. CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance

CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance will constitute its public statement, under penalty of perjury, that (1) CIA has located and disclosed all records relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy that it could identify through a diligent records search and (2) CIA is aware of no other assassination-related records being withheld from the public. We request that CIA submit its Final Declaration to the Review Board absolutely no later than September 1.

To demonstrate that CIA has disclosed all relevant materials, we make the following recommendations for CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance:

1. CIA Should Describe More Specifically its Searches for Assassination Records

We consider it essential that CIA describe with more specificity the searches that it conducted for records relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and to the JFK assassination, including searches done by CIA in the early 1990's. *See* CIA Initial Compl. Stmt., at 1. This is important particularly in light of the fact that CIA record keeping is apparently decentralized among various components of CIA. Therefore, we ask that the Final Declaration confirm that the relevant components of CIA -- the DCI and its offices, the CIA Directorates (Operations, Intelligence, Science & Technology, and Administration), and the CIA office responsible for maintaining CIA's archives -- in some manner inventoried their holdings for the relevant time period for records relating to Oswald or the assassination. To the extent that computer database searches were run by different components of CIA, please confirm that fact and, if possible, identify the names or topics searched.[7]

For its early 1990's searches, the CIA should attach the 1993 search request issued by the Historical Review Group ("HRG") and unclassified versions of memoranda from components of CIA that describe their searches or search results. In addition, we recently requested CIA to re-undertake its searches based on the discovery of certain assassination records that were not identified by CIA's earlier searches.[8] We specifically requested that CIA Director George Tenet issue a directive to all CIA offices requiring them to search their files for assassination records. *See* July 7, 1998 J. Gunn Letter to B. Harrelson. As part of its Final Declaration, we request that CIA document the steps it took in response to our recent request, including attaching the requested search directive from CIA Director Tenet.

---

[7] We understand that most CIA records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy were collected and identified in 1978 for the House Select Committee on Assassinations and, therefore, currently reside within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection being processed under the JFK Act. It is not our intention to have the CIA re-do exhaustive searches done in 1978. However, we want CIA to demonstrate, in the Final Declaration, that it has searched its various components and that the searches were sufficient to identify major records on the assassination not included within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (it is our understanding that the Sequestered Collection does not encompass post-1978 records).

[8] For example, Oswald's Office of Security file was not identified through CIA's early searches. Similarly, we have identified recent documents related to Oswald.

In addition, the Final Declaration should confirm whether or not CIA has saved any 1963-64 files of the Mexico City Station (and certain files from another station). If those files have not been retained, please confirm that fact in the Final Declaration. To the extent those files have been archived, however, then please confirm that they have been examined for the purpose of determining whether they contain assassination records.

2. CIA Should Identify More Specifically the Records It Has Released Relating to Oswald and the Assassination of President Kennedy

We recommend that CIA identify more specifically the CIA files that have been, or will be, placed in the JFK Collection at NARA. Although we leave this to CIA's discretion, we recommend that, to the extent practicable, CIA attach a non-classified listing of the files encompassed within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection. We believe that an identification of the files within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection will demonstrate the breadth and variety of assassination records being made public by the CIA.

3. CIA Should Specifically Account for Certain Important Record Groups, Including Any Destruction of Assassination Records

We request that CIA, in its Final Declaration, account for any important records regarding the assassination that may have been destroyed or that otherwise cannot be located.

For example, CIA has reported that the original surveillance tapes that recorded the Oswald telephone conversations with the Cuban Consulate and Soviet Embassy in Mexico City were destroyed, and that CIA has no copies of these audio recordings. However, CIA apparently has preserved certain recordings from Mexico City that post-date the assassination (*see* ¶ A.2 of this letter). We assume that CIA will provide a complete accounting for these records in its response to Review Board request CIA-IR-15, which relates to CIA's "electronic take" from Mexico City for the relevant time period. That response should be attached to the Final Declaration (CIA may also want to attach any formal explanation of this issue that it previously provided to the HSCA). We want to ensure that CIA explains the circumstances for the destruction of the audio recordings of the Oswald telephone calls in Mexico City, confirms that no copies of this audio surveillance has been retained by CIA, and gives a full accounting of the post-assassination Mexico City tapes.

We also request an accounting of certain records of former CIA Director John McCone. In reviewing his files, we noted that certain documents on the assassination (or dated around the time of the assassination) are identified on an index as missing or destroyed. In the Final Declaration, please explain, as best as possible, the circumstances for this.

We previously requested an accounting for the files of former Counter-Intelligence Chief James Angleton [CIA-IR-04] in view of the fact that no discrete files of Mr. Angleton had been identified under the JFK Act. Since Mr. Angleton was involved in the CIA's assistance to the Warren Commission, we request that CIA's statement regarding Mr. Angleton's files (*i.e.*, CIA's response to CIA-IR-04) be attached to the Final Declaration.

We also ask that CIA verify that all assassination-related materials from the files of Win Scott, former Chief of Station for Mexico City, are in fact in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection. CIA should describe what was done to inventory the Scott files to make certain that no other assassination-related materials exist in addition to those in the Sequestered Collection.

The Final Declaration should identify any other records relating to Oswald or the assassination that CIA knows to have been destroyed or removed from CIA files.

4. The CIA Should Identify, and Incorporate by Reference, Each of Its Written Responses to Review Board Requests for Additional Information

CIA has been cooperative in providing written responses to formal and informal requests submitted by the Review Board regarding CIA records. These responses will collectively demonstrate much of the work that CIA has done under the JFK Act. We request that CIA attach to its Final Declaration a list of CIA's written responses and identify each by subject, date of response, and the Review Board request number. The Final Declaration should state that each response is being incorporated therein by reference.

5. CIA Should State That It Is Aware of No Records on Oswald or the Assassination of President Kennedy Being Withheld from the Public

After describing its records search under the JFK Act, identifying the assassination records that it has located, and accounting for records that were destroyed, CIA should include a representation that it is aware of no other undisclosed files or records relating to Lee Harvey Oswald or the assassination of President Kennedy, including records post-dating the 1978 HSCA investigation. We want the CIA to explicitly confirm, for example, that it is not aware of any undisclosed 1980's or 1990's intelligence or records relating to Oswald or the assassination.

As part of its overall representation, we request that CIA attach to the Final Declaration its complete formal response to the Review Board's request for an accounting of all pre-assassination files that CIA had on Lee Harvey Oswald [CIA-16]. We believe that CIA's response to CIA-16 has been very valuable and therefore should be included as part of CIA's Final Declaration.

Also as part of its certification that no assassination records are being withheld, we request that CIA represent that any remaining assassination records being processed after September 1998 are, in fact, duplicates of records already in the JFK Collection (or are peripheral documents that have been identified to the Review Board for processing after September 1998). CIA should explain, in a general way, its methodology for identifying duplicates so that there is a reasonable level of assurance that unique documents are not being withheld.

6. CIA Should State Its Future Commitments With Respect to the Disclosure of Assassination Records

As we discussed with CIA, CIA will undertake certain actions, after September 1998, to continue release of duplicate records and to release postponed records in 2017. We request that CIA, in the Final Declaration, memorialize its commitment to undertake these tasks and describe what will be done (as contemplated in ¶¶ A.3 and A.4 of this letter). In addition, we ask that CIA confirm in the Final Declaration that it will place any newly discovered or created assassination records into the JFK Collection.

7. CIA Should Execute the Final Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury

CIA's Final Declaration should be made under penalty of perjury.[9] We have made this request of all agencies that have searched for records under the JFK Act. The Review Board considers it essential that CIA's representations regarding its search for, and release of, assassination records be made under penalty of perjury.

Because of the decentralized nature of CIA records, we ask that the responsible individual for certain important components of CIA execute an affidavit on behalf of that component certifying, under penalty of perjury, that a diligent search for assassination records was undertaken. Accordingly, we seek a separate certification from: (1) the DCI area; (2) the Directorate of Operations, including its counterintelligence components; (3) the Directorate of Intelligence; (4) the Directorate of Science & Technology; (4) the Directorate of Administration; and (5) the Office of Information and Management, which we understand to be the office responsible for maintaining CIA's archive records.

---

[9] The Final Declaration(s) would be executed under oath in the form prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Thus, the appropriate CIA official(s) would state at the conclusion of the Final Declaration(s) that "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in _______, Virginia on this __ day of ___ 1998."

Thank you for your continued cooperation in meeting the CIA's obligations under the JFK Act, responding to specific inquiries of the Review Board, and adhering to our compliance program. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director and
General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.,
CIA

J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer,
CIA

Steven D. Tilley, Chief, JFK Assassination Records Collection
NARA

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

In a 15 July 1998 memo to CIA General Counsel, the JFK Assassination Records Review Board outlined what it expects will be contained in CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance, due to be submitted to the Board no later than 1 September 1998. The following is a summary of all points in section B which covers the Declaration:

B. CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance

1. Specific Description of Searches

a.) Confirmation that relevant components inventoried their holdings for the relevant time periods for records on Oswald or the assassination. These relevant components are: DCI area, Directorates (DO, DA, DI, DST), and the AARC

[Input details to be provided by the IROs]

b.) Attach 1993 search request from HRG and "unclassified versions of memos from components that describe searches and results."

[Note: search request is easy; 1993 responses, however, were thin to non-existent]

Attach recent DCI directive, unclassified version of followup memo to CI, LA, CE and results of the searches. If possible, search terms and databases searched should be included.

[Input details to be provided by the above offices]

c.) 1963-64 files of Mexico City Station. If retained, confirm that they have been searched for assassination records. If not, state so.

[DO to provide information]

2. Provide an unclassified index identifying what files are in the JFK Collection at NARA. To the extent possible, attach an unclassified listing of what files are in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection.

[To be done after October 98]

3. Account for Certain Important Record Groups, include. any destruction of Ass. Records

b.) E.g. is from Mexico City tapes. Attach comment on the time and manner of destruction of any records, including information to the effect that destroyed records were first made available to the HSCA (if that is the case)

[DO/IRO to provide input]

c.) Explain missing McCone files relating to the time of the assassination.

[DCI/IRO to provide input]

d.) Attach CIA's statement on James Angleton's files, especially the fact that Angleton was involved in assisting the Warren Commission but no files have been found on this activity.

[DO/IRO to provide input]

e.) Verify that all relevant materials from Win Scott's files are in the HSCA Sequestered Collection. Describe how the Scott files were inventoried to ascertain that all assassination records were included.

[DO/IRO to provide input]

f.) Identify any other records relating to Oswald/assassination that CIA knows to have been destroyed or removed from CIA holdings.

4. Include CIA's Written Responses for ARRB Requests for Additional Information, with Cross References for each.

[HRP files]

5. Statement that CIA is Aware of No Records on Oswald/Assassination Being Withheld from the Public.

b.) Include CIA response to CIA-16

c.) State that all assassination records being processed after Sept 98 are duplicates of records already in the JFK Collection or have been identified by the ARRB as peripheral.

Explain our methodology for identifying duplicates.

[HRP will handle all answers to No 5]

6. CIA's Future Commitments to Disclosure of Newly Discovered Assassination Records

FAX TRANSMISSION

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
600 E STREET, N.W. SECOND FLOOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
202-724-0088
FAX: 202-724-0457

To: Barry Harrelson

Date: July 22, 1998

Fax #: 703-613-3063

Pages: 2 , including this cover sheet.

From: Michelle Combs

Subject: Search Terms

COMMENTS:

Search Terms

Lee Harvey Oswald
Harvey Lee Oswald
Marina Oswald
Jack Ruby
Exaction
Ex Action
Executive Action
Assassination
President Kennedy
John F. Kennedy
Kennedy Assassination
JFK
JFK Assassination
Presidential Threats
Threats to U.S. President
GPFLOOR
GPIDEAL
Assassination Attempts
Warren Commission
HSCA
House Select Committee on Assassinations

HSCA Names

Alvarado, Gilberto
Arcacha-Smith, Sergio
Azcue Lopez, Esuebio
Cabell, Earle
Calderon, Luisa
Cherne, Leo
Cobb, June Viola
Conein, Lucien E.
de Mohrenschildt, George
Diosdado, Cesar
Duran, Silvia Tirado de
Ferrie, David W.
Garrision, James
Garro de Paz, Elena
Gutierrez Menoyo, Eloy
Hall, Loren Eugene
Heming, Gerald Patrick
Johnson, Priscilla Mary Post
Kantor, Marvin
Kostikov, Valeriy Vladimirovich
Martin, Jack
Masferrer y Rojas, Rolando
McMillan, Priscilla Johnson
McVickar, John Anthony
Nagell, Richard Case
Odio, Sylvia
Pawley, William D.
Proenza, Maria Teresa
Raikin, Spas
Ray, Manuel
Ruby, Jack
Salvat Roque, Juan Manuel
Shaw, Clay
Snyder, Richard E.
Sturgis, Frank Anthony (aka Fioriri)
Veciana, Antonio Carlos Blanch
Webster, Robert Edward
Werbell, Mitchell Livingston III

13-00000

file

HSCA NAMES

Alferov, Ivan Gavilovich
Alpizar Perez, Evelio
Alvardo, Gilberto
Alvarez, Ramon Joseph
Alvarez Fernandez, Santiago
Alvarez Rodriguez, Santiago
Amron, Irving
Araujo Bernal, Lepoldo
Arcacha-Smith, Sergio
Artime Buesa, Manuel
Azcue Lopez, Esuebio
Bagley, Tennent H. (Pete)
Bakulin, Valentin Vasilyev
Balbuena, Luis
Barker, Bernard
Barnes, Winifred C.
Bartes Clarins, Francisco Antonio
Bartes, Frank
Bartine, Dominick E.
Batista Falla, laureano
Bentin, Sam
Blanco Fernandez, Juan Francisco
Bloc(k), Morris
Bosch Avila, Orlando
Browder, Edward, Jr.
Buetos-Videla, C.Z. (aka Charlotte L. Zehrung)
Bustamente O'Leary, Jose Angel
Cabell, Earle
Cain, Richard S.
Carballido, Emilio
Cavillo, Manuel
Cellini, Dino Vincent
Charles, Clemard Joseph
Chayes, Abram
Cherne, Leo
Christ, David L.
Cisneros Diaz, Rogelio
Citrynell, Harold

Cobb, June Viola
Coe, Virginius Frank
Conein, Lucien E.
Conte Aguero, Luis
Croizer, Ross L.
Cubela, Rolando
Cuesta Del Valle, Antonio
Dalzell, William
Davidson, Irving
Davis, Rudolph Richard, Jr.
Davis, Thomas E.
Davis, Bruce F.
De Varona, Manuel Antonio
De Torres, Bernardo
de Mohrenschildt, George
Diaz, Lanz Marcos
Diaz-Lanz, Pedro Julio
Diosdado, Cesar
Donovan, John
Du Bois, David (aka Mc Canns, David Graham)
Duque Miyar, Evelio
Duran, Silvia Tirado de
Dutkaniez, Joseph
Echevarria Valdivia, Homer Samuel
Espinosa-Hernandez, Victor
Fernandez, Alberto
Ferre, Luis Albert
Ferrie, David W.
Flick Charles, E
Flores, Jose Jesus Clarck
Frank, Susan Heligman
Galan Ric, Victor
Garanin, Fedor Alexeevich
Garrison, James
Garro de Paz, Elena
Gibson, Richard T.
Godoy y Solis, Joaquin
Golitsyn, Anatoliy
Golub, Grigoriy Y.
Gonzales, Reinol

Guitart Camizano, Agustin
Gutierrez Menoyo, Eloy
Hall, Loren Eugene
Halperin, Maurice Hyman
Hem(m)ing, Gerald Patrick
Hernandez Sanchez, Carlos Eduardo
Hernandez Hechevarria, Alberto
Hoke, John Lindsay
Hunt, Everette Howard, Jr.
Isaacs, Harold
Itkin, Herbert
Johnson, Priscilla Mary Post
Jones, Louis Henry
Kail, Samuel G.
Kantor, Marvin
Kara-Patnitsky, Waldemar boris
Karty, Floryan R.
Keenan, Thoman J.
Koch, Gene John
Korengold, Robert J. (Bud)
Kostikov, Valeriy Vladimirovich
Kutner, Louis
Laborde, Lawrencw J.
Lawson, John Howard
Leonov, Nickolay Sergeyev
Lesnick, Max
Loganov, Valentin Sergeyevich
Lopez, Gilbert Polocarpo
Lorenz, Marita
Luce, Clare Booth
Lynch, Grayson
Maheu, Robert A.
Martin, Willian Hamilton
Martin, Jack
Masferrer y Rojas, Rolando
Mastrocola, Bruce G. (aka Leo Cherne)
Matlak, Dorthe K. (Mrs.)
McCord, James W.
McDonald, Hugh
McLaney, Michael

McLendon, Gordon
McMillan, Prisilla Johnson
McVicker, John A
Merloa, Joseph R.
Meyer, Karl
Miller, Newton
Mirabal-Diaz, Alfredo M.
Mitchell, Bernon
Moore, J. Walton
Morales, David S.
Morales Navarette, Ricardo
Morgan, Eilliam
Morgan, William Alexander
Morua, Martin
Moss, Edward K.
Nagell, Richard Case
Newton, William J.
Nobregas, George
Nunez Portuondo Emilio
Obyedkov, Ivan Dimitriyrvich
Odio, Eunice
Otero, Rolando
O'Sullivan, Fredrick Stephen
Paneque Batista, Victor Manuel
Pawley, William D.
Pedroso Amores, Acelo
Perez Alamo, Duney
Petrulli, Nicholas
Phillips, David Atlee
Pico Ramon, Reinaldo
Pino Machado, Quintin
Pittman, John Orion
Posada, Luis Clemente
Posey, Buford Wallace
Prio Socarras, Carols
Proenza, Maria Teresa
Raikin, Spas
Ramirez Ortiz, Antillio
Randall, Fredrick C.
Rasco, Jose Ignacio

Ray, Manuel
Reggab, Mohammed
Ricciardelli, Libero
Rodriguez, Emilio Americo
Rodriguez y Gonzales, Armesto Napolean
Rodriguez, Tamayo, Francisco
Rodriguez Lopez, Rogelio
Rorke, Alexander
Rothman, Norman
Ruby, Jack
Ruiz, Pedro
Ruiz Perez, Ortestes G.
Salvat Roque, Juan Manuel
Seymour, William Houston
Shaw, Clay
Shaw, Robert Taylor
Sierra, Martinee Paulino
Sloboda, Vladimir
Snyder, Richard E.
Soto Vazquez, Antonio
Stoner, Jessie B.
Sturgis, Frank Anthony (aka Fioriri)
Ulman, Vlastimil
Uzolv, Sergy
Veciana Blanch, Antonio Carlos
Veqa Rerez, Manuel
Wasserman, Jack
Webster, Robert Edward
Werbell, Mitchell Livingston III
Whitehouse Insua, Eduardo Julius
Wichtrich, Alfonso Rudolph
Wickes, Alastar
Wilson Hudson, Carlos Juan
Winston, Henry
Zambernardi, Robert M.
Zarraga Martinez, Carlos

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

OIM

OIM EB No. 02-98
22 July 1998

FINAL DOCUMENT SEARCH TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH "PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992" (JFK ACT)

FROM: George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

1. (U) As you know, the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) is completing its task of overseeing the search and declassification of all Federal government records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy by 30 September 1998. The Board and we want to do everything possible to place before the American people the full story as reflected in government and other records.

2. (U) The Agency has been working on this effort since 1992 and has searched all of the obvious databases. We want to make certain that we have left no stone unturned and that no employee has any records that might possibly be considered relevant to the assassination—including any records created [or received] after 1992. The reference to 1992 is largely intended to encompass documents which may have come into our hands since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

3. (AIUO) In accordance with the provisions of the JFK Act, I hereby direct all CIA personnel to consider documents in their possession or with which they are familiar that might have relevance to the Board's review and that might not have been found in the course of electronic or manual searches over the past six years. Representatives of the Historical Review Program believe that if such documents do exist they would, most likely, be found in files that would not be generally related to the assassination or that would not be "logical" areas for systematic searches. These include working paper files or smaller databases related to countries not normally associated with the assassination. Relevant documents can be in the form of papers, photographs, recordings, tapes, or other media, and can include documents "related to the assassination," such as later investigations, key topics/events within the Oswald/JFK Story, or material related to key figures—such as Nosenko.

4. (AIUO) CIA personnel who believe they have information regarding documents relevant

to the JFK review that may not have been found in previous searches should contact their component or directorate IRO or the JFK Project Coordinator. Directorate IROs and the Agency's JFK Project Coordinator are as follows:

		Secure Phone
DO / IRO	William McNair	44448
DI / IRO	Barbara Blufer	54644
DS&T / IRO	Teresa Wilcox	50104
DA / IRO	Becky Rant	31204
DCI Area / IRO	Mary Lou Cummings	39058
JFK Project Coordinator	Barry Harrelson	31825

/s/
Director of Central Intelligence

lt file

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

General Counsel

29 July 1998

Ronald Haron, Esq.
General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street N.W., 2nd Floor
Washington D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Haron:

Congratulations on your recent appointment as General Counsel to the President John F. Kennedy Records Review Board ("Review Board"). You have my assurances that, as the Review Board enters its final stages of the review and release of records pertaining to President Kennedy's assassination, you will continue to have CIA's full cooperation.

I am in receipt of the 15 July 1998 letter from former General Counsel Jeremy Gunn in which he outlines CIA's outstanding obligations under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"). While I recognize that much work needs to be done over the next few months, I am confident that J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer for CIA's Historical Review Program ("HRP"), together with the rest of the Agency team dedicated to document review under the JFK Act, will complete the outstanding obligations set forth in that letter.

With respect to the Review Board's request that CIA submit a Final Declaration of Compliance under penalty of perjury, we are in the process of identifying the appropriate CIA official to sign such a Declaration. Both HRP and my office will work closely with you to ensure the Declaration contains the recommendations made in Mr. Gunn's letter.

With respect to the suggestion that CIA execute a separate affidavit by an officer from each of the CIA's four Directorates as well as from the DCI area, the Office of Information Management, and the counterintelligence components of the Directorate of Operations, I believe that this is an unnecessarily cumbersome and confusing means by which to attest to Agency-wide record searches. Rather, I propose that the Executive Director of the CIA appoint one senior official as a Records Validation Officer ("RVO"). An RVO has the authority to locate, identify, and preserve records created or maintained by any Agency Directorate or component which are actually or potentially relevant to the subject matter of the search. An RVO also has authority to execute affidavits or to testify under oath with respect to all the record searches done by every Directorate or component of the CIA. For your information, this is the usual method by which CIA attests under oath to record searches done by more than one Directorate in criminal and civil litigation before the federal courts.

I appreciate this opportunity to assure you of CIA's continued cooperation with the Review Board. Should you have any further questions or concerns regarding this matter, you may contact Linda Cipriani of my office at (703) 874-3124.

Sincerely,

Dawn R Ellenberger

for Robert M. McNamara, Jr.

Ronald Haron, Esq.

DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani:nl 76124 (27 Jul 98)

OGC-98-51950

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - GC
1 - LCC
1 - Lit File - LDG00021
1 - RDC FYI
1 - OGC Registry

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

August 10, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Robert M. McNamara, Jr., Esq.
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. McNamara:

Thank you for your July 29 letter regarding CIA's submission of its Final Declaration of Compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"). I am writing to address CIA's desire that one official certify, under oath and on behalf of the entire agency, that CIA has conducted a thorough search for records relating to President Kennedy's assassination. Your letter and concerns were brought directly to the attention of Review Board members for their consideration. We understand that CIA would prefer that each CIA Directorate not be required to certify separately that it has done an adequate search for records on the assassination, as the Review Board had requested.

The Review Board specifically considered your proposal that the certifying official be a records validation officer appointed by the CIA's Executive Director. The Review Board requests, however, that the CIA's certification be made at the highest levels of the CIA. The Review Board believes that certification by a records validation officer would be insufficient to assure, to the fullest extent possible, public confidence in the CIA's representations that it has searched for and released all relevant materials relating to President Kennedy's assassination. In view of the importance of the CIA's formal representations regarding its holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald and President Kennedy's assassination, the Review Board requests that CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance be certified, under oath, both by CIA's Executive Director and its General Counsel.

I ask that CIA confirm that it will agree to this manner of certification.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

Robert M. McNamara, Jr., Esq.
August 10, 1998
Page 2

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.,
CIA

J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer,
CIA

OIM 98-0088
12 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI Area

FROM: Edmund Cohen
Director of Information Management

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

REFERENCE: Memo, "CIA compliance with the JFK Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992," dtd 15 Jul 98, fr the Assassination Records Review Board.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of a requirement to provide to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board a "Final Declaration of Compliance" with the JFK Act. The declaration must include: a description of component searches undertaken in response to Board taskings since 1993; information on any possible destruction of assassination records; and a representation that a diligent search for assassination records was undertaken. We are in need of assistance of your staff in preparing the description of these items for inclusion in the compliance response.

2. The referenced memorandum describes the Board's requirements for the "Final Declaration" in greater detail. Jim Oliver, Chief, Historical Review Program and Barry Harrelson, the Agency's JFK Review Focal Point, are meeting with the Directorate Information Review Officer and, as appropriate, other members of your staff to review the information needed to support the certifications which the Agency will need to make.

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

3. In order to meet the 1 September 1998 deadline prescribed by the Board, we request that the information described in paragraph 1 be sent to Mr. Harrelson by close of business, 21 August 1998.

Edmund Cohen

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

DA/OIM/EdCohen:bkh/31352 (11 Aug 98)
share/oim/ed/oim/irg/pjt/jfk/dd draft 980812.doc

Distribution:
Original - Addressees
1 - DCI IRO
1 - DA IRO
1 - DI IRO
1 - DO IRO
1 - DS&T IRO
1 - D/OIM
1 - C/IRG
1 - C/HRP
1 - OIM/HRP/HRO (Barry Harrelson)
1 - DA Registry
1 - OIM/Subj
1 - OIM/Chrono

~~ADMINISTRATIVE — INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

25 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: (U) Electronic Dissemination of Employee Bulletin

(AIUO) I was requested to send the EB 02-98 (Final Document Search - JFK). The request was distributed to all of the Directorate via Lotus notes on Monday 17 August 1998, the notice was placed in the system on the 18th and received by the Directorate personnel on the 19th. Additionally, we placed it on the morning message that people receive when they first log onto the system.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

SUBJECT: (U) Electronic Dissemination of Employee Bulletin

IMS/ESG/HCS Fwickham x44448:mjk (21 August 1998)

Distribution:
Original - C/HRP/OIM
    1 - C/IMS/ESG
    1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
    1 - ESG Chrono File

UNCLASSIFIED

27 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, JFK Declassification Project/HRP/OIM/DA

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
Chief, Information Management Staff,
External Support Group

SUBJECT: DO Results of New Search for JFK Assassination Records

1. This memorandum is in response to the request from the staff of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). The staff requested that the CIA issue an Agency-wide employee bulletin for a new search for JFK Assassination Records. OIM-98-0081 dated 30 July 1998 was issued.

2. DO/Information Management Staff ran a corporate search of COMET, the DO's electronic message repository. That search generated some 128 hits. Michelle Combs of the ARRB staff reviewed the search results and selected three records for inclusion in the JFK assassination records collection.

3. The three selected documents have been sanitized with Ms. Combs' concurrence. The sanitization is more extensive than JFK guidelines because of the documents' proximity to the present and to current sources and methods.

4. The documents are not herewith attached. They are being provided separately by DO/IMS/ESG/HCS.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: (U) DO Results of New Search for JFK Assassination Records

IMS/ESG/HCS FWickham x44448:mjk (28 August 1998)

Distribution:
Original - C/HRP/OIM
1 - C/IMS/ESG
1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
1 - ESG Chrono File

13-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

D/01/m

SEP 4 1998

Office of General Counsel

31 August 1998

Ronald G. Haron, Esq.
General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Haron:

This letter responds to your 19 August 1998 request that the Central Intelligence Agency confirm, in writing, who will certify its compliance statement. This is to confirm that Edmund Cohen, the CIA's Director of Information Management, will sign.

As Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is responsible for providing oversight and direction to the Agency's records and classification management activities, and information declassification and release programs. He is also responsible for the development and maintenance of automated tools to support these activities. He oversees classification and declassification policies, procedures, and practices. He manages the Agency Archives and Records Center, and serves as the CIA Archivist and the Agency Information Review Officer. He coordinates the conduct of all special searches within the Agency and the release of any information uncovered in such searches. Finally, as Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is responsible to conduct, on behalf of the Agency, liaison with the National Archives and Records Administration and its Office of the Federal Register, and with the Information Security Oversight Office; and with any other entities on any matters within the responsibility or authority of the Director of Information Management.

We believe that Mr. Cohen is clearly the most knowledgeable individual within the Agency, by position and experience, to execute such a certification. Based upon our short telephone discussion, I understand that he is, in addition, at least as senior as the anticipated signatories from other agencies or departments from which the Board has requested certifications. From a practical standpoint, we at CIA make a concerted effort to assure that the most knowledgeable individuals speak on behalf of the Agency on important matters such as this. It is for this reason that we have chosen Mr. Cohen.

If you wish to discuss this matter further, please call me on (703) 874-3123.

Sincerely,

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.
Associate General Counsel

Mr. Ronald G. Haron, Esq.

DCI/OGC/LD/RJEatinger, Jr. 76123 (31 Aug 1998)

OGC-98-52328

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - SA/ExDir (Dunn) (C)
1 - PDGC
1 - D/OIM
1 - ADGC (Burke)
1 - CSI/HRG (Harrelson)
1 - C/LD
1 - RJE Signer
1 - Lit File (LDG00021)
1 - OGC Registry

13-00000

D6 SEP 18 1998

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

		ACTION	INFO			ACTION	INFO
1	DCI		X	11	OPA		
2	DDCI		X	12	DDA		
3	DDCI/CM			13	DDI		
4	ADCI/MS			14	DDO		X
5	EXDIR/CIA	X		15	DDS&T		
6	CHMN/NIC			16	D/OIM		X
7	IG			17	HRP		X
8	GC	X		18			
9	COMPT			19			
10	OCA		X	20			

SUSPENSE DATE: 21 September 1998

DOCUMENT NO: ER 98-4210

Contact Betsy Quint-Moran (x37929) regarding suspense items.

COORDINATION/ROUTING:

EXDIR office to take lead in preparing and coordinating response with OGC.

SUMMARY:

The JFK Assassination Records Review Board has received the Agency's Final Declaration of Compliance. The Board is requesting certifications by the individual directorates, as well as the office of the DCI, or alternatively that the EXDIR and the General Counsel certify that CIA has met its obligations under the JFK Act and certify that no records on the assassination or Lee Harvey Oswald have been knowingly withheld. Absent the requested certifications, the Board considers depositions of senior Agency officials necessary and requests the DDO be made available ASAP, but no later than 21 September, for examination.

Date: 14 September 1998
Received in ER: 14 September 1998
Action Officer: Tracie Matecka x37932

DCI
EXEC
REG

13-00000

FAX TRANSMISSION

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
600 E STREET, N.W. SECOND FLOOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
202-724-0088
FAX: 202-724-0457

To: George Tenet, DCI **Date:** 9/14/98

Fax #: 703-482-3064 **Pages:** 3, including this cover sheet.

From: John R. Tunheim, Chair

Subject: CIA Compliance with the JFK Act

COMMENTS:

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

September 14, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

The Honorable George Tenet
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Tenet:

We have received the CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance (dated September 2, 1998) regarding the completion of CIA's work under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"). On behalf of the Board, I am writing to express the Board's disappointment that CIA has been unwilling to have the most senior officials of your agency attest to CIA's compliance with the JFK Act.

The Board had first asked CIA to submit separate certifications from each directorate, as well as the office of the DCI, attesting to their searches for assassination-related records. We stressed these measures to obtain assurance that all components of the CIA had complied with the JFK Act, as well as to assure the American people that the U.S. Government had left no stone unturned in releasing records on the assassination of President Kennedy. The CIA refused to submit separate certifications, insisting it was their practice for one official to speak on behalf of the entire Agency. The Board then requested that CIA's most senior officials, the Executive Director and General Counsel, certify CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance under the JFK Act. CIA refused.

In 1992, CIA Director Gates testified to Congress that he was "determined personally to make public or to expose to disinterested eyes every relevant scrap of paper in CIA's possession" that related to the Kennedy assassination. *See The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act: Hearing on S.J. Res. 282 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs*, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1992). The Board has merely asked that CIA's highest officials confirm that they are fully confident that this commitment has been fulfilled. While we recognize the substantial documentation provided by CIA to demonstrate its work under the JFK Act, we are disappointed that CIA has been uncooperative in responding

---

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

to this most simple of requests. For me personally and for other members of the Board, this raises significant concerns as to whether CIA's highest officials actually have confidence in the reliability of the results for which the Review Board and CIA have expended considerable effort, energy and resources over the past five years. Such concerns may be noted in our Final Report.

Therefore, the Review Board specifically requests that CIA submit certifications by the individual directorates, as well as the office of the DCI, or, in the alternative, that the Executive Director and the General Counsel certify that CIA has met its obligations under the JFK Act and certify that no records on the assassination or Lee Harvey Oswald have been knowingly withheld. We continue to believe that these more stringent certifications are needed, in part because of CIA's belated discovery of core records relating to the assassination.

Absent certification by the highest levels of CIA, as sought by the Board, the Board considers depositions of senior Agency officials to be absolutely necessary. Accordingly, pursuant to our authority under the JFK Act, the Board requests that CIA make the Deputy Director for Operations immediately available for deposition. The Directorate of Operations has been the primary repository for records directly relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination. In fact, the Directorate of Operations only recently uncovered additional records relating to a KGB source with information relating to Lee and Marina Oswald. We ask that the Deputy Director of Operations be made available for examination as soon as possible, but no later than September 21. He will be expected to testify on behalf of the Directorate of Operations regarding its record systems, and its searches for assassination records, including searches conducted by the Counter-intelligence staff.

Thank you for your cooperation, and please inform us as soon as possible regarding CIA's compliance with this Review Board request.

Sincerely,

John R. Tunheim

John R. Tunheim
Chair

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

September 16, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Robert M. McNamara, Jr., Esq.
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Gary M. Stern
General Counsel
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, Maryland 20740-6001

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Messrs. McNamara and Stern:

The Review Board considers it essential that certain remaining obligations of the CIA under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act") be identified and memorialized before the Board ceases operations on September 30, 1998.

I therefore am enclosing, for your agencies' consideration, a draft Memorandum of Understanding setting forth the outstanding obligations of CIA under the JFK Act. We believe that it is in the interest of the CIA, the National Archives, the Review Board, and ultimately the public to put in writing our collective understanding of the additional work that CIA must undertake and the reasonable time frames within which it should be completed. It is our intent to reduce any future ambiguity or disagreements that may potentially arise as CIA completes its work. We also believe that this MOU will facilitate the ability of the Archivist of the United States to carry out his statutory obligation to certify to the President that all assassination-related records have been released in accordance with the Act (*see* 44 U.S.C. § 2107(12)).

The terms of a Memorandum of Understanding have been discussed among the staffs of the Review Board, the National Archives, and CIA. We believe that the enclosed draft proposal is a fair accommodation of competing interests. Please review the enclosed draft MOU so that we can resolve any outstanding issues and ultimately reach an agreement on an MOU before September 30, 1998.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
General Counsel

cc: J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer,
CIA

Steven D. Tilley, Chief,
JFK Collection, NARA

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS OF THE CIA UNDER THE JFK ACT

WHEREAS the operations of the Assassination Records Review Board ("Review Board") cease on September 30, 1998 in accordance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act");

WHEREAS the JFK Act provides that "the provisions of this Act [as applied to Federal agencies] shall continue in effect until such time as the Archivist certifies to the President and the Congress that all assassination records have been made available to the public in accordance with [the] Act" (JFK Act § 12); and

WHEREAS the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), the Review Board, and the National Archives and Records Administration ("NARA") seek to ensure that the CIA completes its continuing obligations under the JFK Act in a timely fashion;

IT IS HEREBY AGREED by the CIA (including any successor intelligence agency), the Review Board, and NARA that:

1. All CIA records identified as assassination records under the JFK Act will be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection ("JFK Collection") at NARA in College Park, Maryland by September 30, 1998 unless otherwise noted in this Memorandum of Understanding;

2. CIA may transmit the following assassination records to the JFK Collection after September 30, 1998:

    a. Duplicate documents within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (both hardcopy and microfilm sets).[1] The CIA will ensure that, by September 30, 1999, duplicate copies of documents from the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (both hardcopy and microfilm sets) will be placed in the JFK Collection.

    b. Duplicate documents within the working files of CIA officer Russ Holmes. The CIA will ensure that, by December 31, 1998, duplicate copies of documents from the Russ Holmes working files will be placed in the JFK Collection.

---

[1] "Duplicate documents" are exact copies of documents that are already publicly available in the JFK Collection as part of other CIA files or records.

DRAFT

c. The audio tapes, and any transcriptions or summaries made by the CIA, from surveillance of certain Soviet and Cuban diplomatic facilities in Mexico City for the period November 22, 1963 to January 1964. These tapes (approximately 185), and any transcriptions or summaries, shall be placed in the JFK Collection by September 30, 1999. The CIA will submit these tapes to the JFK Collection on a rolling basis, as CIA completes review of individual tapes. Any postponements shall be identified to NARA and postponed information forwarded to the "Protected Collection" (*i.e.*, the classified, postponed records within the JFK Collection) in accordance with Section 5(e) of the JFK Act.

d. Working files from the DCI area, mostly from DCI's Executive Registry, that had been compiled in anticipation of passage of the JFK Act. These working materials, which consist mostly of duplicate documents, shall be placed in the JFK Collection by Decmber 31, 1998.

e. A document containing a list of names and cryptonyms created by the HSCA staff. Given the detailed nature of information in this document (RIF No. 104-10061-10115), the Board agrees that this can be processed by December 31, 1998.

f. Any other non-duplicate assassination-related records created or discovered by the CIA after September 30, 1998.

3. The CIA will review its equities in records that have been referred to it, and the CIA will cooperate with NARA and other Federal agencies to ensure that such records are released under the standards of the JFK Act and placed into the JFK Collection. The CIA will review the following major categories of records:

a. Church Committee records identified by the Review Board in August 1998 as being assassination-related.

b. Records from the files of Robert F. Kennedy, maintained at the JFK Library, that the Library and/or Review Board has identified as either assassination records or as records that would enhance the historical unnderstanding of the assassination.

c. Records of the Rockefeller Commission, maintained by the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, to the extent that the Library of Congress identifies assassination records that are not available as part of the Ford Library set of Rockefeller Commision documents in the JFK Collection.

DRAFT

d. The Army's Investigative Records Repository file on Alfredo Mirabal Diaz.

The CIA will complete its review and and recommendations for release of the major record categories listed above no later than April 30, 1999. To the extent there may be other agency documents requiring CIA review under JFK Act, the CIA will continue to undertake such review.

4. The CIA shall handle the certain original or postponed records in the following manner:

a. By September 30, 1998, CIA shall transmit to the "Protected Collection," in accordance with Section 5(e) of the JFK Act, the originals of all postponed records from Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file, Office of Security file, and "A" file.

b. By September 30, 1998, CIA shall transmit to the "Protected Collection" the hardcopy original of Marina Oswald's 201.

(Protective Conditions.)

c. By September 30, 1998, the CIA will transmit to the "Protected Collection" all of the original microfilm rolls for the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection.

d. By September 30, 1998, the CIA will transmit to the "Protected Collection" all records with postponed information to the extent that such records are not available on the CIA-HSCA microfilm rolls transmitted to NARA.

D. [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] 78 [illegible]

e. By October 30, 1998, the CIA will transmit to the "Protected Collection" the entire Oswald 201 file that was printed from the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection microfilm (this will provide the CIA with time to make its own reference copy).

31,000 pages and [illegible]

D[illegible], But can do

f. By December 31, 1998, CIA shall transmit to the "Protected Collection" the originals of all postponed records from the Russ Holmes working files (this will permit the CIA to process duplicate records in the Holmes Collection by that date).

NBRs?

5. The Review Board and the CIA have determined that certain materials reviewed under the JFK Act are not believed to be relevant to the Kennedy assassination (designated "NBR"), but nonetheless should ultimately be placed in the JFK

DRAFT

Collection. These NBR materials are: certain files contained within the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection; certain CIA work files relating to Yuri Nosenko (but not related to the assassination);[2] certain materials within the Russ Holmes Collection; and the complete version of certain records, portions of which were designated as assassination-related by the Review Board in connection with its requests for additional records and information. These hard copy materials will be physically retained by the CIA and then forwarded to the JFK Collection for public release by October 26, 2017. Within two months of the execution of this agreement, the CIA shall provide to NARA, in writing, a list of the hardcopy files being retained until 2017 and confirm the arrangements for securing this material. NARA shall have the right to inspect and inventory this material for archival and administrative purposes before 2017, and these materials shall be made available for inspection by NARA upon its request.

6. The CIA shall cooperate and coordinate with NARA in carrying out the provisions of the JFK Act, including Section 5(g) of the JFK Act, which provides for the "periodic review" of postponed assassination records. Such review "shall address the public disclosure of additional assassination records in the Collection under the standards of the Act" (§ 5(g)(2) (A)) and "shall serve to downgrade and declassifiy security classified information" (§ 5(g)(2)(C)).

7. The CIA recognizes that, in the year 2017, "[e]ach assassination record shall be publicly disclosed in full . . . ." JFK Act § 5 (g). To the extent that records are postponed but are to be released on a date prior to 2017, NARA shall release the records on the date the Review Board set for release. If the CIA seeks continued postponement of any record in the year 2017 (or an earlier scheduled release date), it will be incumbent upon the CIA to obtain from the President "certification" that continued postponement is necessary. *See* JFK Act § 5(g)(2)(D). Within six months of the scheduled release date, the CIA shall be responsible for notifying NARA of any specifc records, including any records within the microfilm rolls for the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection, for which it will seek Presidential certification of continued postponement.

With respect to the NBR material identified in paragraph 5, these NBR materials shall be physically transferred to NARA by October 26, 2017 for release. In the event CIA seeks further postponement of any NBR material, it shall identify that material to NARA and seek Presidential certification that the material needs to be postponed.

---

[2] The Nosenko materials related to the assassination have been placed in the JFK Collection.

DRAFT

8. With respect to the review of other agency documents referred to CIA, the review of any new assassination records, or the periodic review of postponed assassination records, the CIA shall, in good faith, continue to apply the postponement criteria of the JFK Act as previously interpreted by decisions of the Review Board.

9. This Memorandum of Understanding is intended to clarify the CIA's obligations under the JFK Act in view of the expiration of the Review Board's term on September 30, 1998. This Memorandum of Understanding shall not be interpreted to limit CIA's obligations under the JFK Act.

Date:____________________ Signed:________________________

David W. Carey
Executive Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Date:____________________ Signed:________________________

Laura A. Denk
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

Date:____________________ Signed:________________________

John W. Carlin
Archivist of the United States

SEP 21 1998

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

16 September 1998

Mr. John R. Tunheim
Chair, Assassination Records
Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Tunheim:

This will respond to your 14 September 1998 letter regarding Central Intelligence Agency compliance with the "JFK Act."

I have no doubt whatsoever that the CIA has fully met its obligations to locate, review, and release "assassination records" as defined in the JFK Act. The Agency's 2 September 1998 Declaration of Compliance—signed, as you note, by CIA's Director of Information Management, Edmund Cohen—confirms my judgment. I have full confidence in the scope of the Agency's searches as described in Mr. Cohen's recent declaration.

As Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is directly responsible for CIA's records systems and for ensuring the adequacy of CIA's search, review, and release of documents under the JFK Act. Mr. Cohen signed the Agency's Declaration of Compliance because he was the most senior Agency official with direct personal knowledge that its statements were accurate and complete. There was no more appropriate signatory.

In sum, I understand that the appropriate CIA staff officers have worked diligently to locate and disclose to the JFK Board all relevant records in the Agency's possession and that they do not believe any other relevant records are being withheld from the Board. Mr. Cohen's declaration confirms my understanding.

I trust that this will meet your requirements.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

George J. Tenet

13-00000

REFERENCE

FILE COPY

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2

16 September 1998

Mr. John R. Tunheim
Chair, Assassination Records
  Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Tunheim:

This will respond to your 14 September 1998 letter regarding Central Intelligence Agency compliance with the "JFK Act."

I have no doubt whatsoever that the CIA has fully met its obligations to locate, review, and release "assassination records" as defined in the JFK Act. The Agency's 2 September 1998 Declaration of Compliance—signed, as you note, by CIA's Director of Information Management, Edmund Cohen—confirms my judgment. I have full confidence in the scope of the Agency's searches as described in Mr. Cohen's recent declaration.

As Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is directly responsible for CIA's records systems and for ensuring the adequacy of CIA's search, review, and release of documents under the JFK Act. Mr. Cohen signed the Agency's Declaration of Compliance because he was the most senior Agency official with direct personal knowledge that its statements were accurate and complete. There was no more appropriate signatory.

In sum, I understand that the appropriate CIA staff officers have worked diligently to locate and disclose to the JFK Board all relevant records in the Agency's possession and that they do not believe any other relevant records are being withheld from the Board. Mr. Cohen's declaration confirms my understanding.

I trust that this will meet your requirements.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Special Assistant/EXDIR

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIO
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

[illegible] September 1998

Mr. Cohen,

Jim Oliver called and wanted me to pass on the following message:

Talked Judge Tunheim and he is willing to release the two letters (Cohen & Tenet) and refrain from other derogatory comments if the Carey declaration is substantially like the ones Ed signed.

Michelle

He still would like you to give him a call on 31805.

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

DECLARATION OF DAVID W. CAREY

I, DAVID W. CAREY, hereby declare and say:

1. I presently serve as the Executive Director of the of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency). I have held the position of Executive Director since July of 1997 and have served with the CIA for over 29 years in a variety of operational, staff, and management positions.

2. As the Executive Director I am responsible, on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), for the overall daily management of the Central Intelligence Agency, for strategic planning and coordination, and for the development and execution of the Agency's annual program. In order to carry out these responsibilities, I have been delegated all authorities vested in the DCI and DDCI except as prohibited by law or Agency regulation or policy.

3. The purpose of this declaration is to provide an assurance that the Central Intelligence Agency: (1) has made a diligent records search to locate and disclose to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (the Board) all records in its possession relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy; and (2) is aware of no other assassination-related records in its possession being withheld from the Board. I make these and the following statements (including those in the attachments by reference) based upon my personal knowledge, information made available to me in my official capacity, the advice of CIA's Office of General Counsel, and the conclusions I reached in accordance therewith.

4. With respect to the overall issues of search and review, and as explained in the attachments or otherwise included by reference, the CIA's Directorates of Intelligence (DI), Operations ("DO"), Science and Technology ("DS&T"), and Administration ("DA") and the DCI Area Information Review Officer have certified to me that their respective offices or directorates have properly and fully responded to requests from the Board. Accordingly, I believe that the Central Intelligence Agency has worked diligently with the Board to declassify, consistent with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107) and other statutes,

assassination-related records in its possession, in order to make such records available to the public.

5. There are six attachments to this declaration, which are incorporated by reference. Attachment I addresses the universe and scope of documents that have been the subject of CIA's review. Attachment II describes the methodology and types of the searches conducted. Attachment III describes, in general, the records declassified and released (separate detailed indices will be provided when documents are released to the National Archives and Records Administration). Attachment IV addresses questions raised by the Board regarding perceived gaps in our records, including possible loss or destruction of records. Attachment V discusses specific requests from the Board and incorporates specific CIA responses by reference. And Attachment VI addresses commitments which this Agency makes with regard to provision to the National Archives and Records Administration of assassination related documents, including any documents which may be newly discovered or created subsequent to the tenure of the Board.

6. Based upon the foregoing and the attachments (Attachments I through VI, which are incorporated by reference) I believe that the CIA is in full compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107).

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING AND THE ATTACHMENTS (ATTACHMENTS I THROUGH VI, WHICH ARE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE) ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed this 23rd day of September 1998.

David W. Carey
DAVID W. CAREY

From the Desk of James R. Oliver
Chief, Historical Review Program

NOTE FOR: James R. Oliver@DA
FROM: James R. Oliver
OFFICE: OIM
DATE: 09/24/98 11:12:17 AM
SUBJECT: EXDIR Declaration Signature, 23 September 1998

Memorandum for the Record:

This is to confirm that I replaced the first page of the ExDir's signed JFK Declaration, dated 23 September, with letterhead stationery to assure that the statement was comparable to that signed by Mr. Cohen, as earlier requested by the Board Chairman. The wording of the declaration was unchanged; only the letterhead stationery was changed. I called Michelle in the EXDIR's Officer to confirm that the Executive Director would have no problem with such a change (simply replacing the first page). She called back, saying that she had asked Mr. Carey, and he had no problem with this change.

Mr. Harrelson of this office will be hand carrying the EXDIR's declaration to the Board today. At the same time, and in accordance with my agreement with Chairman Tunheim of yesterday, Mr. Harrelson will be retrieving the earlier declaration signed by Mr. Cohen, the DCI letter of 16 September, both of which are being withdrawn. The Judge Tunheim also agreed yesterday that since the EXDIR had agreed to sign the declaration that there will no longer be a need for the critical language in their report on this issue.

James R. Oliver

CC: Edmund Cohen@DA
R. Bruce Burke@DCI
Sent on 24 September 1998 at 11:12:17 AM

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

Declaration of EDMUND COHEN

I, Edmund Cohen, hereby declare and say:

1. I presently serve as the Director of Information Management for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency). I have held this position since February 1994; I have also held the position of Director of the Office of Information Management since October 1997. I have served with the CIA for over 30 years in a variety of intelligence, legal, staff, and management positions.

2. As Director of Information Management, I am responsible for providing oversight and direction to the Agency's records and classification management activities, and information declassification and release programs. I am also responsible for the development and maintenance of automated tools to support these activities. I oversee classification and declassification policies, procedures, and practices. I manage the Agency Archives and Records Center, and serve as the CIA Archivist and the Agency Information Review Officer. I coordinate the conduct of special searches within the Agency and the release of information uncovered in such searches. I am also the Agency's official liaison with the National Archives and Records Administration and its Office of the Federal Register, with the Information Security Oversight Office, and with any other entities on any matters within the responsibility or authority of the Director of Information Management.

3. I make the following statements based upon my personal knowledge, information made available to me in my official capacity, the advice of CIA's Office of General Counsel, and the conclusions I reached in accordance therewith.

4. The Central Intelligence Agency: (a) has made diligent records searches to locate and disclose to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (the Board) all records in its possession relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy; and (b) is aware of no other assassination-related records in its possession being withheld from the Board.

5. With respect to the overall issues of search and review, and as explained in the attachments or otherwise included by reference, the CIA's Directorates of Intelligence (DI), Operations (DO), Science and Technology (DS&T), and Administration (DA) and the DCI Area Information Review Officer have certified to me that their respective offices or directorates have properly and fully responded to requests from the Board. In addition to these certifications, I have had briefings on the principal searches conducted and have had all of my questions answered to my satisfaction. Accordingly, I believe that the Central Intelligence Agency has worked diligently with the Board to locate and declassify, consistent with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, as amended, reprinted at 44 U.S.C. 2107 note, and other statutes, assassination-related records in its possession, in order to make such records available to the public.

6. There are six attachments, numbered I through VI, to this declaration, which I incorporate herein by reference. Attachment I addresses the universe and scope of documents that have been the subject of CIA's review. Attachment II describes the methodology and types of the searches conducted. Attachment III describes, in general, the records declassified and released. Separate detailed indices will be provided when documents are released to the National Archives and Records Administration. Attachment IV addresses questions raised by the Board regarding perceived gaps in CIA's records, including possible loss or destruction of records. Attachment V discusses specific requests from the Board and incorporates specific CIA responses by reference. Attachment VI addresses commitments which this Agency makes with regard to provision to the National Archives and Records Administration of assassination-related documents, including any documents which may be newly discovered or created subsequent to the tenure of the Board.

7. Based upon the foregoing and Attachments I through VI, I believe that the CIA is in full compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING, INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS I THROUGH VI, ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed this 2 day of September 1998.

Edmund Cohen

Attachment I

Attachment I

Universe and Scope of CIA Documents
Addressed Related to the JFK Assassination

Summary. This Attachment discusses CIA material examined in order to fulfill the requirements of the JFK Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act). It addresses the types of CIA documents found in the records of earlier investigations, including that of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and materials and files recovered in response to searches conducted in 1992 and thereafter. It discusses the process by which documents became "assassination-related records."

Discussion. The Central Intelligence Agency has provided large numbers of documents and materials over the years in support of successive reviews and investigations related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. We estimate that the equivalent of roughly 320,000 pages comprise the "CIA collection" of documents associated with prior assassination reviews, including duplicates. In addition, we estimate that in responses to the JFK Act, CIA has reviewed over 100,000 pages of documents from the National Archives, the Ford, Johnson, and Kennedy Presidential Libraries and miscellaneous papers from the National Security Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, and the Senate Select (Church) Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

The documentation exists in many forms, from original contemporaneous material, such as field reporting from overseas or analytic reports, to material generated specifically as an Agency response to investigation questions. The largest "CIA collection," as such, is associated with the records of the House Select Committee on

Assassinations (HSCA).[1] The HSCA brought together in one place in 1978 the principal documents retrieved over the course of years from earlier investigations, including the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, and the Church Committee.

The Warren Commission in 1963 and 1964 was the first major review of the JFK Assassination. Existing records suggest that CIA provided roughly 4,000 pages of documentation to the Warren Commission review, plus testimony by Richard Helms and John McCone. The Warren Commission pursued matters related primarily to events and actions directly associated with the assassination event, including materials from CIA's Mexico City Station, which were considered relevant because of a visit to Mexico City by Lee Harvey Oswald shortly before the assassination.

The Rockefeller Commission in 1975 and Church Committee investigation in 1975 and 1976 were focused on allegations of wrongdoing by the CIA. Nonetheless, as a part of these investigations they yielded information which, to many, appeared to relate in some way to the assassination, such as an operational capability or willingness to consider assassination as an intelligence method.

From 1976 through 1979 the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) pursued additional leads, generating still further documentation. The HSCA ultimately brought together within its broad scope of investigation many of the documents from the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee. This collection ultimately became the "HSCA sequestered collection," which altogether contains an equivalent of over 300,000 pages, in paper, photographs, tapes, and microfilm media, including duplicates. Because the myriad conspiracy theories included possible Soviet, Cuban, Mafia or right-wing American involvement, the scope of the HSCA investigation included anything or anyone that might appear to support those theories, including historical institutional behavior patterns. Further, although this sequestered collection was considered to be CIA's, it contains documents from other agencies, primarily the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and over 30,000 pages of HSCA originated material.

---

[1] The HSCA sequestered collection reflects the major corpus of CIA material or information reviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (or to which they had access) during the 1976-1979 time frame. The pulling together of this collection was coordinated by the Committee and they defined what it was to include. This Collection has been physically held by CIA since 1979, although CIA was not authorized access until 1992, when permission was given by Congress to review the material in preparation for responding to the JFK Act.

The HSCA sequestered collection is contained in 64 boxes of multimedia material, including paper, photographs, and microfilm which have been loosely organized into major categories of information. Boxes 1 through 34 are mostly material collected by the CIA's Directorate of Operations, the FBI, and other Government agencies, including field reporting and handwritten notes. They also include newspaper articles, name traces performed in response to requests by the HSCA staff, and copies of other documents such as the CIA Inspector General's 1967 report on CIA plots against Castro and Richard Helms' executive session testimony before the HSCA.

Boxes 35 through 63 of this collection are largely records of CIA's Legislative Counsel, Inspector General, General Counsel, Office of Security, and Directorate of Science and Technology, as well as internal records of the HSCA staff. They consist of reports, memoranda, transcripts, cables, letters, newspaper clippings, photographs, and charts. Box 64 contains 72 reels of microfilm—the equivalent of roughly 72 more boxes of paper documents. This material includes the file which the Directorate of Operations maintained on Lee Harvey Oswald (the 201 file) as well as similar files on additional individuals. Many of the microfilm documents duplicate other documents in the other boxes.

While not a part of the sequestered collection, a separate "Oswald 201 File" has served as a CIA repository for JFK assassination-related material over the years and to a large extent material in this file is duplicative of material in the sequestered collection. Only a few documents were in the file at the time of the assassination. The bulk of the approximately 26,000 pages currently in this file consists of documents collected immediately after the assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation. Included are a large number of third agency documents, primarily from the FBI. Other major additions to the Oswald 201 file include relevant Mexico City Station files and material generated by various FOIA requests and investigations, such as that of New Orleans District Attorney, James Garrison.

Assassination-related materials beyond the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file which have been located since 1992 generally fall into three categories. First, there are new documents which have been generated since 1978, such as defector reports that mention rumors or perceptions of conspiracies or newspaper or other open source materials related to an individual associated with the assassination. Second, in a number of cases targeted areas of inquiry or more precise definitions of areas of interest by the JFK Board have yielded more information and added documents to the collection. And third, improved search techniques have provided better access to those files which are searchable electronically. Nonetheless, the material located since 1992 is quite small when compared to the material in the sequestered collection and the overall set of material from CIA which has been designated as "assassination records" by the JFK Board.

In accordance with the law, the Board has the authority to designate records which it considers relevant to the assassination as "Assassination Records." These documents are then subject to review for declassification or, as deemed appropriate by the Board, held for declassification in the year 2017. The Board has designated the entire sequestered collection as Assassination Records as well as selected material generated in the course of searches subsequent to 1992. The entire set of these documents is the equivalent of roughly 320,000 pages, including duplicates.

Attachment II

ATTACHMENT II.

Search Methodology and Types of Searches Conducted

Summary. This Attachment discusses the methodologies used in conducting the searches, including what we know of the searches which were conducted on behalf of the earlier assassination investigations. It includes, in referenced tabs, documentation of selected taskings. It discusses the distributed nature of CIA's paper recordkeeping systems and electronic databases and the custom keyword searches that are used with electronic databases which CIA maintains.

Discussion. The collection of CIA materials contained in the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) "sequestered collection" has existed as a discrete body of records since 1978. This material resulted from highly labor intensive and systematic searches by individuals familiar with the Agency's paper files and records systems in use in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, the sequestered collection comprises the great bulk of CIA-originated documents which can be associated with the JFK Assassination and related investigations.

For most of its history, the Agency has had a system of records which has been shaped by the divergent requirements of the directorates in accordance with the wide variance of focus in their missions. These basic differences in the missions of the directorates, as well as the compartmentalization-of-information procedures (the "need-to-know" concept), have resulted in each directorate keeping its own set of records in accordance with directorate-specific guidelines. This applies equally to paper records as well as to electronic databases.[2]

Since the late 1970s, the Agency has been in the process of converting to electronic databases, which allow for electronic searches for documents using keyword and other indexing tools which provide much more expedited and efficient searches. Because the most significant portion of JFK assassination-related material was generated prior to this conversion to electronic databases, searches of the sequestered collection or other contemporaneous CIA records have had to rely primarily upon labor intensive hand searches.

---

[2] Even within a single database, information may--in accordance with information compartmentalization requirements based on the need-to-know principle--be stored in separate files by several offices or divisions, each with its distinct recordkeeping criteria and access requirements. In order for a search to be thorough, a search for one term or a combination of terms must be conducted across all such files.

Since 1992 and the passage of the JFK Act, CIA has, in responding to the requests of the Board, had to devise search methodologies and techniques to address both the hard copy and electronic versions of our databases. With respect to the hard copy material, Agency efforts have concentrated on those component records most likely to yield assassination-related documents. Short of a complete manual review of all documents in the Agency, the techniques used for searching hard copy materials include expert reviews of file series and folder names, including associations with known related topics, retrieving boxes of files from the Agency's Archives and Records Center, and manually reviewing those files identified as likely to contain the sought after materials.

Electronic files searches can actually be more complex than manual searches, in major part because of the number of different electronic systems in use. The Directorate of Operations' electronic databases, for instance, include most cables since 1978 and they can be searched using single or multiple search terms against the full text of these cables. The Directorate of Intelligence's automated systems include original source material used for analytic assessments as well as the products themselves and can be searched through a variety of electronic techniques. The DCI Area (considered, for this purpose a directorate) maintains the Executive Registry files which are not normally retrievable through full text search, but by index searches. The Directorate of Administration maintains a large and diverse system of databases and files on employees and contractors that includes data on security issues, medical records, training, etc. The Directorate of Science and Technology and its subordinate components maintain other electronic databases unique to individual missions. Each of these systems requires a unique set of access criteria and search commands and must be searched by information management experts of the respective directorates.

Where possible, automated systems were searched using key words such as JFK, Kennedy, assassination, executive action, Oswald, place names, and a large number of names, crypts, or pseudonyms identifying individuals known to have been associated with countries, key installations, organizations, or operations that fell within the period deemed relevant to the history of the assassination.

The following categories are examples of the guidelines for relevancy with which both manual and computerized searches were conducted. They include, but are not limited to, individuals, organizations, places, projects, and subjects which are considered central to the Oswald/JFK assassination history and the ensuing investigations.

A. JFK Assassination Investigations:

- Warren Commission, 1963-64
- James Garrison, New Orleans District Attorney, 1966-68
- Rockefeller Commission, 1975 (JFK assassination & CIA anti-Cuban plots aspects only)
- Church Committee (Senate), 1975-76 (JFK assassination & CIA anti-Cuban plots aspects only)
- House Select Committee On Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79

B. Key Subjects:

- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, and JMWAVE Station, as they related to Oswald's activities or to possible conspiracies.
- KGB interest in Oswald.
- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 if they involve JFK figures or subjects; most US anti-Castro activities in 1963 are considered relevant.
- Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders, and organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures or subjects.
- Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts) without limit on time frame.
- Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans during Oswald time frames.

C. Key Figures: Material with the following terms was considered JFK assassination-relevant unless the context is clearly not related or the information is outside the appropriate time period:

- AMLASH
- AMMUG
- Maurice Bishop (any reference)
- Silvia Duran

- Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee
- Howard Hunt
- Priscilla MacMillan Johnson
- Valeriy Kostikov
- Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt
- Yuri Nosenko
- Michael & Ruth Paine
- David A. Phillips
- Richard Snyder
- Win Scott

Prior to enactment of the JFK Act, in early 1992, the Chief of the CIA History Staff, through various manual searches of shelf lists, located the "sequestered collection" of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (sixty-four record center size boxes). After obtaining the permission of the Congress, his staff surveyed these and other related holdings on the assassination. In addition, the History Staff located sixteen boxes of Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file and a number of loose folders, mainly from Mexico City Station records that had been collected for the Warren Commission.

In October 1993, following enactment of the JFK Act but prior to the President's appointment of the Board, CIA's Historical Review Group (HRG) requested the directorates to conduct a name search on Lee Harvey Oswald, JFK assassination, and any related documents (Tab 1). This request resulted in a series of meetings and discussions with various Agency components and Information Release Officers. More than thirty-one additional boxes of materials were sent to HRG for review. Included in this material were nineteen boxes of JFK working files of Mr. Russ Holmes, a CIA employee who for many years was the Agency's focal point officer with responsibility for responding to questions related to our assassinated-related records. Also included were two boxes on Nosenko, seven boxes of Latin America Division documents, and three boxes from the Bay of Pigs project. Out of these thirty-one additional boxes provided to the Board staff, approximately twenty-two boxes of material were designated by the Board as assassination records. The preponderant volume of these records is duplicative of documents in the sequestered collection.

In April 1995, after the Agency received the Board's first formal request, and in anticipation of "what are likely to be many requests from the Board for information..." the Agency Executive Director asked each directorate and the DCI Administrative Officer to appoint a focal point officer for the JFK Assassination review. (Tab 2)

In the spring and summer of 1997, the Agency arranged for the Board staff to receive a series of briefings by representatives of each directorate on the files kept within the records systems of each directorate. These briefings covered aspects of the records systems, such as how the records are organized, maintained, searched and retrieved, as well as how they had been previously searched for assassination-related materials.

The Board staff requested a number of additional searches, which have now been completed. These requests were both formal and informal and resulted in responses to the Board staff which included a wide range of additional material, some of which was judged relevant to the history of the assassination. This material includes the histories of various CIA operations and Agency components, files on specific individuals involved in either the Warren Commission or in HSCA investigations, and the results of CIA internal reviews of programs and operations. Although many requests from the Board and responses from the Agency were handled informally, the significant initial requests are listed in the table in Attachment V.

Prompted in part by the surfacing of a small number of new relevant documents, the Board staff requested CIA in the summer of 1998 to: (a) perform an additional set of searches on certain specific topics; and (b) issue an Agency-wide notice reminding CIA employees of the requirements of the JFK Act.

Specially tailored tasking was sent to the three Directorate of Operations components deemed most likely to possess records relevant to the JFK assassination of the kind of concern to the Board (See Tab 3). Among other considerations, this special tasking included a list of new or revised search terms, a request for clarification on the disposition of the James Angleton files, and the requirement to focus on potential new information from the debriefing of defectors in which any reference to Oswald or to the Kennedy assassination occurs.

DCI Tenet issued an Agency-wide Employees Bulletin on 22 July 1998 directing all CIA personnel to "consider documents in their possession or with which they are familiar that might have relevance to the Board's review…" (EB OIM 98-02—See Tab 4).

Finally, and in a separate tasking, all directorates were asked to assure that searches undertaken were sufficient to enable a directorate representative to provide a certification of compliance with the JFK Act, and that the DCI's Bulletin had been forwarded to all directorate employees. (See Tab 5).

CSI-0331/93
25 October 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: DO/IRO
DI/IRO
DA/IRO
DS&T/IRO

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group/CSI

SUBJECT: Request to Conduct Search for
JFK Assassination Records

1. In recent testimony before the HPSCI the Director indicated that a continuing search for JFK assassination-related documents was in progress. In order to assure that there are no oversights in this regard, we are requesting the following, by directorate:

> DO & DI: A name search on Lee Harvey Oswald for the period 1980 through 1993; a subject search on JFK assassination (Kennedy assassination, etc.), same period; all appropriate components be asked to forward to us any documents related to the assassination that were not provided earlier.
>
> DA & DS&T: All appropriate components be asked to forward to us any documents related to the assassination that were not provided earlier; a file search when an obvious need is recognized.

2. Information responsive to this request should be forwarded to the Historical Review Group, 404 Ames Building. Questions may be directed to Frank Most, 30146.

John Pereira

John F. Pereira

2

DO/IMS 95-0691

ER 95-8097
6 April 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI

FROM: Executive Director

SUBJECT: Appointment of Directorate Focal Points for JFK Assassination Board Requests

1. I would like each of you to appoint a focal point officer for your Directorate who would be responsible for responding to requests for information from the (President Kennedy) Assassination Records Review Board. (AIUO)

2. The Agency has received the first (attached) of what are likely to be many requests from the Board for information related to the assassination of President Kennedy and to the investigations into the assassination. Up to now, the Board has focused on the "sequestered" records CIA had collected for the House Assassination Committee's investigation and documents that had been part of the Oswald 201 file. It is expected that the new requests will require records searches to be done for additional information. ~~(AIUO)~~

3. The Historical Review Group (HRG) of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), which has been the Agency's principal liaison with the JFK Board, will continue in that role. HRG will receive requests from the Board, and then forward them to the Directorate focal points for action. Responses from the Directorates will be coordinated by HRG, which will make the responses available to the Board. ~~(AIUO)~~

4. Please provide the name of your focal point officer to John Pereira, Chief, HRG [x30373-secure] by 13 April. ~~(AIUO)~~

Leo Hazlewood

Leo Hazlewood

Attachment

3

~~SECRET~~

OIM 98-0081
30 July 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Center, DO
Chief, Latin America Division, DO
Chief, CE Division, DO

FROM: Lee Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group
Office of Information Management

SUBJECT: (U) New Search of CI Files for JFK Assassination Records

REFERENCE: (AIUO) Bulletin OIM-EB No. 02-98, dated 22 July 1998

1. (U) The JFK Board has made a number of recent specific directed requests to assure that the Agency has complied fully with the requirements of the JFK Act. Among these was a request for issuance of the Reference Employee Bulletin, in which the DCI directed that employees leave "no stone unturned" in assuring that relevant documents are provided to the Commission.

2. (U) In part because relevant new documents have surfaced within the past few months, the Board has also requested specific focus on renewed searches of the Agency's "counterintelligence files." The new documents have surfaced due to a variety of reasons, including references to assassination related personalities in recent defector reports, records made available because of the break up of the Soviet Union, and advances in search capabilities due to digitization of older paper files.

CL BY: 644243
CL REASON: 1.5C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: HUM 4-82

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: (U) New Search of CI Files for JFK Assassination Records

3. (~~C~~) In discussions with the Board staff we have attempted to focus any new tasking on those areas in which they have expressed their greatest concern. It is imperative, however, that we satisfy the Board on these issues or the Agency will be subject to a determination by the Board that we are not in compliance with the JFK Act. Because of the impending statutory termination of the Board and their need to issue their report, there is some urgency associated with the conduct and completion of these searches. The searches must be completed by 6 August, 1998.

4. (~~S~~) Databases to be Searched. The addressees to this memorandum are requested to perform new searches—using the search terms in paragraph 5--on ANY of your files which may contain information relating in any way to the JFK assassination, including, in particular, all records systems or files containing information on:

- James J. Angleton and his files
- Debriefings of defectors in which ANY reference to Oswald or the JFK assassination occurs (Example,[IJDECANTER)]

5. (U) Search Terms and Time Periods. These new searches should focus on documents that might be retrievable with the following search terms over the referenced periods:

- The period 1959—1965 using the search terms Executive Action, Exaction, Ex Action.

- Post-1978 information combining the term "assassination" with President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy, Kennedy, JFK, presidential threats, threats to U.S. President, attempt (or attempted), or the crypt GPIDEAL.

- Post-1978 information related to the following terms: Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations, HSCA, Oswald, Lee Harvey Oswald, Marina Oswald, Jack Ruby, or GPFLOOR.

SUBJECT: (U) New Search of CI Files for JFK Assassination Records

6. ~~(S)~~ Information is also sought on:

- The identity and current location of personnel (either the current assignment of employees or any knowledge of current location of retirees) who participated in debriefings or the preparation of reports on debriefings of IJDECANTER.
- The destruction of James J. Angleton's files.

Such information should be brought immediately to the attention of the Historical Review Program, OIM (Barry Harrelson, 31825, Secure).

James R. Olson (for)
Lee S. Strickland

4

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

OIM

OIM EB No. 02-98
22 July 1998

FINAL DOCUMENT SEARCH TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH "PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992" (JFK ACT)

FROM: George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

1. (U) As you know, the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) is completing its task of overseeing the search and declassification of all Federal government records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy by 30 September 1998. The Board and we want to do everything possible to place before the American people the full story as reflected in government and other records.

2. (U) The Agency has been working on this effort since 1992 and has searched all of the obvious databases. We want to make certain that we have left no stone unturned and that no employee has any records that might possibly be considered relevant to the assassination—including any records created [or received] after 1992. The reference to 1992 is largely intended to encompass documents which may have come into our hands since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

3. (AIUO) In accordance with the provisions of the JFK Act, I hereby direct all CIA personnel to consider documents in their possession or with which they are familiar that might have relevance to the Board's review and that might not have been found in the course of electronic or manual searches over the past six years. Representatives of the Historical Review Program believe that if such documents do exist they would, most likely, be found in files that would not be generally related to the assassination or that would not be "logical" areas for systematic searches. These include working paper files or smaller databases related to countries not normally associated with the assassination. Relevant documents can be in the form of papers, photographs, recordings, tapes, or other media, and can include documents "related to the assassination," such as later investigations, key topics/events within the Oswald/JFK Story, or material related to key figures—such as Nosenko.

4. (AIUO) CIA personnel who believe they have information regarding documents relevant to the JFK review that may not have been found in previous searches should contact their component or directorate IRO or the JFK Project Coordinator. Directorate IROs and the Agency's JFK Project Coordinator are as follows:

		Secure Phone
DO / IRO	William McNair	44448
DI / IRO	Barbara Blufer	54644
DS&T / IRO	Teresa Wilcox	50104
DA / IRO	Becky Rant	31204
DCI Area / IRO	Mary Lou Cummings	39058
JFK Project Coordinator	Barry Harrelson	31825

___________/s/
Director of Central Intelligence

5

OIM 98-0088
12 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI Area

FROM: Edmund Cohen
Director of Information Management

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

REFERENCE: Memo, "CIA compliance with the JFK Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992," dtd 15 Jul 98, fr the Assassination Records Review Board.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of a requirement to provide to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board a "Final Declaration of Compliance" with the JFK Act. The declaration must include: a description of component searches undertaken in response to Board taskings since 1993; information on any possible destruction of assassination records; and a representation that a diligent search for assassination records was undertaken. We are in need of assistance of your staff in preparing the description of these items for inclusion in the compliance response.

2. The referenced memorandum describes the Board's requirements for the "Final Declaration" in greater detail. Jim Oliver, Chief, Historical Review Program and Barry Harrelson, the Agency's JFK Review Focal Point, are meeting with the Directorate Information Review Officer and, as appropriate, other members of your staff to review the information needed to support the certifications which the Agency will need to make.

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

3. In order to meet the 1 September 1998 deadline prescribed by the Board, we request that the information described in paragraph 1 be sent to Mr. Harrelson by close of business, 21 August 1998.

Edmund Cohen

14-00000

Attachment III

Attachment III

Records Declassified and Released.

Summary. This Attachment discusses the process used by CIA to declassify JFK assassination-related documents, including interaction with the Board and subsequent re-reviews of materials, as well as the personnel resources engaged in this effort. It discusses the volumes of records reviewed, the volumes of records declassified, and the manner in which the material has or will be made available to the public.

Discussion. In response to the enactment of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 and in anticipation of the appointment of the Review Board, CIA, during 1992 and 1993, reviewed for declassification material which had been sequestered following the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) in 1978. As a result of this effort, CIA released as declassified to the National Archives in August 1993 some 127,000 pages of material from this collection. Since that time, additional releases have been made; approximately 74,000 pages from the microfilm part of the collection were declassified and released in August 1994 and 30,000 pages of HSCA originated material were declassified and released in 1995. We estimate that, since 1992, CIA has devoted over 100 work years to its effort to respond to the JFK Act (including experienced annuitants working as independent contractors).

The development of the declassification review methodology was, from the beginning in 1992, an iterative process that took into account both the requirements of the JFK Act to release to the public information relevant to an understanding of the assassination and the DCI's statutory mandate to protect intelligence sources and methods under the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949.

In the years since 1992, considerable effort has been expended to balancing these two objectives. Interaction with the Board's staff was a significant factor in reaching this proper balance. The net result is that practices over this period evolved to the extent that types of material that had been redacted at the beginning of the process were, by the end, no longer considered necessary to withhold. This has, of course, required a further re-review of the material released during the earlier period to assure that consistent standards were being used for the entire collection.

Each document in the collection was read by an Historical Review Program (HRP) Reviewer -- in every case a retired officer with at least two decades of Agency experience -- who examined every word in the document with an eye toward releasing documents unless such release could be expected to cause damage to:

- Human intelligence assets or their families;
- Intelligence methodology clearly requiring continued protection;
- Intelligence operations or activities warranting continued protection, including relationships with foreign governments.

The reviewed documents were then passed to teams of officers from the components that generated the documents (in most cases the Directorate of Operations), who were responsible for determining current sensitivity. The senior HRP reviewers validated the component groups' actions prior to forwarding the materials to the Board.

Names of CIA employees who served all or most of their careers under cover posed particular problems and, while many names have been redacted, with Board concurrence for release at a later date, the current sensitivity, or lack thereof, of retired individuals' employment by CIA had to be checked in each case. Names of key players in the post-assassination scenario, as stipulated by the Board, were released as true names or with temporary and traceable substitute names. Identification by the Board of those who were considered key players was a complicated and time-consuming task. Significant review and analysis went into the decision to release true names of many Cubans connected with the Bay of Pigs.

Material from the Rockefeller Commission and Church Committee investigations, presidential libraries and PFIAB files which addressed the entire scope of CIA activities raised issues with respect to relevance to the JFK assassination. For example, Project MONGOOSE, a clandestine portion of the publicly acknowledged U.S. anti-Castro policy, was released.

Another major issue was consistency in reviewing duplicate copies of documents. In one case 47 copies of a cable were found by different reviewers in separate files over the six years of our review process. The National Archives ground rules called for release of every copy for inclusion in the NARA collection; therefore, each of these 47 copies is included as part of the total collection. As duplicate copies were found, comparison with the 1993 released version revealed not only inconsistencies but textual phrasing which, in a mosaic of related documents, made likely the identification of a protected individual or action. As a result, much re-review of the files was required and did occur.

Another time-consumer was the question of the identification of overseas station locations, traditionally not revealed--both to protect Agency individuals, activities and sources and to avoid foreign relations difficulties with foreign governments. In these cases, a window of time for acknowledgment of such facilities was negotiated, directly relevant to such actions as Oswald's travels and post-assassination requests for foreign government assistance in the U.S. investigation.

Except for redaction of names of CIA employees, true names of clandestine agents (otherwise identified with traceable cryptonyms), and currently-sensitive cooperation with specific foreign intelligence services, the final collection in the National Archives will contain very limited redactions and, in our opinion, none that would affect an historian's understanding of the Agency's information on, and relevance to, the event.

Attachment IV.

ATTACHMENT IV.

Perceived Gaps in CIA Records

Summary. This Attachment addresses the Board's requested explanation for the apparent absence of files which are known to have existed (or for which there is some evidence that they existed at one time) but cannot now be located. Specifically, the Board asked for such information on the following: Oswald files; certain files of James Angleton; DCI McCone files; William Pawley; and Win Scott. This Attachment also addresses the Board's request that the Agency's Declaration "...identify any other records relating to Oswald or the assassination that CIA knows to have been destroyed or removed from CIA files."

Discussion.

Files on Lee Harvey Oswald

(a) The Office of Security (OS) maintained a pre-assassination subject file on Oswald. This file contained newspaper articles and reports from other government agencies. As would be expected, the number of volumes of the subject file grew following the assassination. The pre-assassination material remained in volume one and subsequent material was filed in volumes numbered II through VI. However, during a February 1997 search, no volume V was found. A second thorough search of the OS file system failed to produce any record of Volume V. A careful page-by-page review of the contents of the existing volumes revealed there is no time gap in the material. Therefore, it is believed the label on Volume VI is simply incorrect; it should have been labeled Volume V.

The OS Oswald subject file was reviewed by the HSCA in 1978; however, it was not stored with the rest of the sequestered material. There is no documentation on why this file was not incorporated into the sequestered collection held by the DO; eight boxes of non-Oswald OS files were in the collection. The Oswald Security File has been reviewed, declassified, and released to NARA.

(b) There has been considerable interest over the years in locating any electronic surveillance tapes that would have been made during the period that Oswald visited Mexico (26 September - 2 October 1963). A thorough search has been conducted of the DO's record system as well as the index to retired records in an attempt to locate any tapes and/or find documentation to resolve their disposition. We have discussed this issue with operational experts and their professional opinion is that most likely such tapes were never returned to Headquarters for retention. It was normal practice to recycle audio tapes after they had been listened to by transcribers and their transcripts made.

Messages between field stations and headquarters used operational jargon and shortened sentence structures that can sometimes allow for misinterpretations. Thus, possible confusion was created when references to what was being sent to headquarters referred to "tapes" but really intend "information" from tapes.

In our search efforts we did locate approximately 185 audio surveillance tapes of the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City that were recorded during the immediate time following the assassination (22 November 1963 to January 1964). The fact that these tapes were retained and returned to Headquarters could account for the fact that some people recall that some tapes existed which were sent to Headquarters.

Based upon the search efforts that were undertaken and the opinions of operational experts consulted, CIA has concluded that the tapes in question do not exist and were almost certainly recycled in the normal course of business before their potential value was identified.

James J. Angleton (Chief, CounterIntelligence Staff, 1954-1974)

As noted in a 24 August 1998 memo to the Board, the files of Mr. Angleton were incorporated within the files of the CI Staff and the Directorate of Operations. Three memoranda, dated 23 November 1976, 5 August 1977, and 29 November 1979, detail the review and incorporation into the DO Central Records System of the Angleton files as well as all the files found in CI Staff following Mr. Angleton's departure. As a result of this review and incorporation of files, there is no identifiable collection of Angleton files. The three memoranda mentioned above have been included in the Agency's JFK collection for processing and release to NARA.

John McCone (Director of Central Intelligence, 1961-1965)

Within the McCone papers are several file folders with notations that indicate documents are missing. However, each folder has an index of the documents that were originally within it. Of all the missing documents only two refer to the Kennedy assassination. One document is described as "Date of Meeting - 26 Nov; Participants - DCI &

Bundy; Subjects Covered - Msg concerning Pres. Kennedy's assassination." The second document is described as "Date of Meeting - 19 May '64; Participants - DCI, J.J. McCloy; Dinner at Residence - Re: Oswald. [The latter is annotated: "Destroyed 1-28-72."]

Both documents were noted as missing when the files were reviewed by the CIA History Staff in November 1986.

William Pawley (Industrialist; friend of DCI Dulles and supporter of Anti-Castro activities)

The JFK collection contains a 201 file on Mr. Pawley that ends in 1962. The Directorate of Operations determined that material through 1965 that should have been in the 201 file was filed in an operational file. Most of the material was already within the JFK collection. The Board staff reviewed all the documents within the operational file and selected additional documents for inclusion in the JFK collection. This material will be processed for release to NARA.

Win Scott (Chief of Station, Mexico City, 1956-1969)

The Agency's Retired Record Table (RRT) shows Mr. Scott's Mexico City files were retired as Job 78-00594R on 11 August 1972. These records were retired to the Agency's Archives and Records Center under Item Number 40-76 in the DO Records Control Schedule in effect at that time. Files under Item Number 40-76 were described as:

"Temporary. Destroy upon completion of a specific job or as they serve their purpose. Return folders and documents on loan and destroy remaining papers."

The RRT shows Job 78-00594R was destroyed on 12 January 1987, based upon reference to Item Number 40-76 of the Records Control Schedule.

The RRT page showing the disposition of Mr. Scott's files and the page of the Records Control Schedule which describes Item Number 40-76 have been incorporated in the Agency's JFK collection and will be processed for release to NARA.

Certain Station Files

Within the Board's guidance for CIA's compliance declaration, the Board asked that the Agency specifically address the existence, non-existence or destruction of files from two stations in its Final Compliance Statement. The two stations in question are Mexico City for the period 1963-1964, and Moscow for the period 1959-1962.

It has been long-standing practice and policy that materials that the DO keeps in the field are for immediate operational needs, and that record materials are to be returned to Headquarters for safekeeping. Limited storage space overseas as well as the risk of physical loss in the event of civil unrest or the need for evacuation are contributing factors to this policy. Once at Headquarters, these materials are normally organized by topic or subject rather than by station because this is the way that work is performed. Particularly with paper records and the passage of significant time, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to reconstruct with any confidence, a full set of documents for any particular station.

We do know that files from Mexico City Station are listed in the documents found in the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file materials. This divergence from normal practice with respect to these files can be explained by the obvious high interest of the Warren Commission in the events in Mexico City surrounding the time of the assassination (as shown by the fact that they are contained in the Warren Commission materials). It would not have been normal practice at the time for the Agency to keep these records in this form. Thus, other than the materials in the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file, we have been unable to identify collections of records which would represent files for the two stations for the periods requested.

HTLINGUAL

The Church and Pike Committees both expressed concern about HTLINGUAL, a mail opening project which held information on American citizens. As a result of these investigations, CIA was directed by court order to destroy all HTLINGUAL material. It is reasonable to believe that an HTLINGUAL file existed on Lee Harvey Oswald; however, along with all other files designated as HTLINGUAL files, it would have been destroyed in accordance with the court order. Within the JFK sequestered collection, there are HTLINGUAL materials on Oswald -- materials which were apparently copied from the HTLINGUAL files before they were destroyed in accordance with the court order. It is not possible, however, to say that everything on Oswald that was held in the HTLINGUAL file wound up in the JFK collection. (See Tab 2 of Attachment V for more details.)

Records Relating to Oswald or the Assassination known to have been destroyed or removed.

In November 1997, the Information Management Officer of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) advised that he had discovered a record which indicated a file that referred to the Kennedy assassination had been destroyed on "5/1/95". A search for information on this document revealed that the document had been created in 1977 and was described as "allegations regarding the Lee Harvey Oswald file." It was included with other documents grouped under the description:

> "Individual Case Files - Consists of documents accumulated in investigating complaints, suggestions, or problems of individuals which are brought to the attention of the IG. Filed numerically by case number. Potential cases filed alphabetically."

It has been confirmed that copies of the documents were made available to the HSCA and are in the sequestered collection. The OIG has reconstructed the file and will maintain it as a permanent record. Documentation is provided at Tab 1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

06 January 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

TO: Barry Harrelson
OIM/HRG

FROM: Jerry Owens(C)
OIG/IMO

SUBJECT: (AIUO) Inadvertent Destruction of Records

REF: (U) Telecon dated 06 January 1998

1. (U) Per your request, attached is a memorandum written to the Office of the Inspector Generals (OIG), Deputy and Associate Deputy IG for Investigations. The attached memorandum was also reviewed by OIG/Counsel. It explains in some detail the events we discussed in referenced telephone conversation.

2. (AIUO) It is understood by me, the undersigned, that no further action from the Inspector Generals office is required, and that this matter may be considered closed. The Office of Information Management/Historical Review Group (OIM/HRG) will notify the Assassination Review Board (ARB) and file a copy of this memorandum in HRG files to refer to when writing the compliance letter to the ARB.

3. (AIUO) It is also understood that original documents are not required when material is requested for or being added to the sequestered collection, and that copies of the material which were inadvertently destroyed were previously provided to the HSAC and ARB (or special task force) before their destruction in 1995.

4. (AIUO) With the assistance of HRG, the OIG/IMO has been able to reconstruct the file and will maintain it as a permanent record, also adding a copy of the attached to that file.

CL BY 0680987
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X-1
DRV fm COV 1-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: (AIUO) Inadvertent Destruction of Records

5. (AIUO) Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated. If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please call me on secure X77081. Thank you.

Jerry N. Owens (C)

cc: D/IG/INV w/o att
AD/IG/INV w/o att
IG/Counsel w/o att
OIG/IMO w/att
DCI/IMO w/o att

14-00000

Names thru 1986
Name: LONNQUIST Gary H.
Component: DA OC
Type: 37/77
Complaint: Allegations [redacted]
Referred to IG by:
Date Opened: 29 March 1977
Date Opened mm/dd/yy: / /
Date Closed: 31 May 1977
Date Closed mm/dd/yy: / /
Inspectors: Cox
Category:
Spec Cons:
Action:
Was lower resolution possible?:
Was grievant satisfied?:
Case Referred to:
Report Sent to:
Did OGC refer case to DOJ?:

Did DOJ decide to prosecute?:
Record Center Job Number: 80-01770R
Box: 2
Comments:

14-00000

Attachment V

Attachment V

Specific Requests From the Board

Summary. The JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 mandates a number of specific actions on behalf of all government departments and agencies. One of these is to:

> "...make available to the Review Board any additional information and records that the Review Board has reason to believe it requires for conducting a review under this Act." (Sec. 5(c)2 H.)

In the exercise of this authority under the Act, the Board made fifty-three specific requests for additional records and information in the form of sixteen (16) requests designated as "formal" and thirty-seven (37) designated as "informal." On each request, the CIA worked closely with the Board and Board staff to provide the information and/or documents requested and a written response which records such actions.

Discussion. As a part of this Final Declaration, the CIA has attached at Tab 1 a list of the fifty-three requests by number and a short description of the subject of each. At the Board's request this attachment includes at Tab 2 the specific response to the request numbered CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination File)

Beyond the fifty-three requests, the Board raised two additional matters which tend to fall within the category of special requests:

1) A request that the Agency review and declassify the Board's interviews of former CIA officer and Mexico City station employee, Anne Goodpasture; the Agency's response to that request is complete.

2) A request for Board staff access to sealed Rockefeller Commission records held by the Library of Congress; these records were given to the Library by Rockefeller via a deed of gift which requires a letter from the DCI before access can be granted. This letter will be completed by 9 September 1998.

Attachment V. Tab 1

JFK Assassinations Records Review Board Requests for Additional Information and Records
As of 1 September 1998

FORMAL REQUESTS	**DESCRIPTION**	**RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT**	**STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES**
CIA - 1	Information on the organization of CIA	All directorates, the Office of the Director and HRP	COMPLETE
CIA - 2	*CIA 2 through 5 were background questions on the JFK collection; these types of questions were handled informally; no written responses prepared*	HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 3		HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 4		HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 5		HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 6	Cables and dispatches	DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 7	Review of 60 CIA histories	HRP, DO, DS&T	**CONTINUING 1 History pending access approval.**
CIA - 8	Intelligence Community Staff Records	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA - 9	Intelligence Community Publications on Cuba or USSR, Nov. 20-30, 1963	DI	**Documents available; being reviewed by Board Staff**
CIA - 10	Interagency Source Register	DO	COMPLETE;
CIA - 11	Sylvia Duran Materials	HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 12	Files on five persons allegedly connected with JMWAVE	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA - 13	Mexico City Back-channel Communications	DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 14	Mexico City Station annual Reports	DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 15	Win Scott files from Russ Holmes files	HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 16	Oswald Pre-Assassination Files	DO, DA	COMPLETE

INFORMAL REQUESTS	**DESCRIPTION**	**RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT**	**STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES**
CIA-IR-01	Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959 to 1964	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-02	Location of Certain Cable	HRP	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-03	Full Computer Search for HTLINGUAL files	DO	**Documents/files available; being reviewed by Board Staff.**
CIA-IR-04	Disposition of Angleton Files	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-05	Possible foreign source for records on Oswald	HRP, DO	**Board chairman has requested a DO Briefing on this matter. To be resolved by 15 September.**
CIA-IR-06	QKENCHANT - Information on purpose and connection with certain individuals	DO	COMPLETE; Classified Response Provided.
CIA-IR-07	Claude Barnes Capehart	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-08	Unredacted copy of the "Family Jewels" memorandum	HRP, DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-09	George Bush computer search	DA, DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-10	Determination if CIA IG maintains an index of reports and determine if one was done on handling of Oswald maters.	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-11	Warren Commission critics (Does CIA maintain files or records on specified critics -other than press clippings?)	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-12	Contacts with journalists or publishing houses	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-13	Office/person dealing with organized crime & Cuba	HRP	**Documents available; being reviewed by Board Staff.**
CIA-IR-14	Breckinridge files (focal point for HSCA investigations)	ODCI/ OCA	COMPLETE

INFORMAL REQUESTS	DESCRIPTION	RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT	STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES
CIA-IR-15	Mexico City Station electronic surveillance and surveillance tapes	DO	COMPLETE. The tapes from 22-23 Nov. '63 have been processed and are available to NARA. Processing the remaining 168 tapes will be done by September '99.
CIA-IR-16	U-2 Files Shelflist	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-17	DS&T records on Castro assassination plots	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-18	Information on one DO Office	DO	COMPLETE.
CIA-IR-19	Computer search on specific individuals and organizations	HRP, DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-20	"Monster Plot"	HRP	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-21	DRE monthly operational reports	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-22	"A" file on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-23	Watch Committee files	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-24	Defector file	DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-25	Zapruder film	DS&T, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-26	Jordan James Pfuntner	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-27	Security files on five individuals	DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-28	McCone files	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-29	Oswald Le Winter	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-30	Cherepanov papers	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-31	Dulles calendar	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-32	AMWORLD—Information on purpose and relation to Cuban exile group	DO	COMPLETE. Classified Response

INFORMAL REQUESTS	DESCRIPTION	RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT	STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES
CIA-IR-33	FBIS-USR-92-112	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-34	Files of CIA officials/offices	DO, ODCI	**DCI Area complete; DO files being reviewed by Board staff.**
CIA-IR-35	Oswald related information provided by Source identified in RIF No 104-10151-10206	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-36	Handling of cables in 1963	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-37	William Pawley	DO	COMPLETE

2

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

24 December 1997

Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E. Street, N.W. (2nd Floor)
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Dr. Gunn:

Re: Request for Additional Information and Records
No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) and
No. CIA-IR-24 (Defector File)

This is a partial response to the ARRB's referent request for pre-assassination files this Agency may have had on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is believed the following comments and two enclosed documents fully respond to the Office of Security questions. The DO response is pending.

1. At Tab A is a 22 December 1997 memorandum containing information from the Agency's Office of Personnel Security which provides details about the files it had on Oswald prior to the assassination plus when and why they were created. These include the Office of Security file on Oswald, a general file on Americans who had defected to another country and information about HTLINGUAL files.

2. Also enclosed at Tab B is a 27 October 1977 memorandum from the Office of Personal Security which explains the numbering of that Office's file on Oswald. In particular, it explains why the "missing" volume V may never have existed.

3. An ARRB staff member has reviewed the Oswald Security file and the file on American defectors.

4. The Oswald Office of Personnel Security file and those pages of the defector file deemed relevant by the ARRB staff member have been forwarded to HRG for review and will be processed according to current release guidelines.

If you have any questions about this response, please advise.

Sincerely,

J. Barry Harrelson

22 December 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. Pursuant to ARRB "Resquet No. CIA-16,the Office of Personnel Security conducted research for and existing pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The following responses are provided to those questions which pertain to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

Question 1: Please identify, as specifically as possible, *each* file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response: At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. One file entitled "Defectors File" (#0341008), contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, and the second file was Office of Security subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

2. Within the ARRB request is specific mention of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files. Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

Question 2: For other than the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

Response: As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

3. HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project involving the opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In the Office of Security this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. The Office of Security actually conducted the opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information being referred to the Directorate of Operations.

4. The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This file contained information was from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960

c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

5. The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors and provided limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of the Office of Security. Efforts to locate this listing or determine its disposition have been unsuccessful.

6. Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. An employee of this Office was, recalls the Defector Machine Listing as being approximately one and one-half inches thick and in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained the limited biographic data on each name.

7. The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959

b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure

r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months

Leaves Soviet 'Home'"

s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

8. In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald

u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963

y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

Response: It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

9. Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

10. The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

11. A representataive of the Office of Personnel Security /Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. He made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

27 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
AIN: 0351164

1. The Office of Personnel Security was tasked on 31 January 1997 by the Historical Review Group/Center for the Study of Intelligence(HRG/CSI), via the Directorate of Administration/Information Review Office, with researching pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The tasking was generated by the John F. Kennedy Board's desire to review and declassify relevant material. The results of this review were forwarded to the HRG/CSI on 27 February 1997.

2. During the Information Management Branch's (IMB)research in response to the above tasking it was noted that Volume V of the Oswald files was not on the shelf where Volumes I-IV and VI-VII were located. A search of the entire area where the volumes had been maintained failed to locate Volume V. The IMB Files Section was subsequently charged with conducting an all out search for the missing volume. The search failed to find Volume V.

3. In July 1997, the Oswald files were reviewed page by page prior to being turned over to HRG/CSI and another attempt was made to locate Volume V or to locate persons who might know what happened to it. Volume V was not located nor were any persons located who were knowledgeable of its status.

4. During the complete review of the Oswald files no time gap was apparent and no one was located who could recall ever seeing Volume V. This would suggest that either Volume V had been consolidated into other volumes or that Volume V never existed, but that a numbering error resulted in what should have been Volume V being labeled as Volume VI. The use of Roman numerals on the cover of the volumes might have caused this error to occur.

DO Response to Board Request CIA - 16
Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201.

Prior to establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedures that upon opening a 201, the documents from an interest file would be transferred to the 201.

Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of material which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection

In sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the information we are aware of that we had prior to the assassination.

Attachment VI

Attachment VI

Disposition of CIA/HSCA Sequestered Collection and other Assassination Records.

Summary. This attachment discusses proposed agreements and understandings between the CIA, the Review Board and National Archives and Records Administration regarding the disposition of JFK Assassination-related records held by CIA which are not already at the National Archives, and the terms under which those records to be declassified will be dealt with.

Discussion.

1. "Processing of CIA Assassination Records by September 1998". Per agreement with the Review Board, the declassification review of all records, unless specifically designated for post-September 1998 processing by the Review Board, in the following categories will be completed and the releasable version of the records ready for transfer to the National Archives by September 30, 1998:

- Non-duplicate documents from the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection, the Russ Holmes files and the LA Division working files;
- Documents designated as assassination records as a result of Review Board specific requests for additional information and records (CIA 1-16, CIA-IR 1-37);
- All documents from Lee Harvey Oswald's "A" file and post-1978 201 file; Oswald's 201 file and security file and Marina Oswald's 201 (microfilm version) have already been transferred to NARA;
- Any non-duplicate documents discovered in the recent searches undertaken to ensure full compliance with the JFK Act; any new documents on Oswald will be added to the post-1978 part of his 201 file.

2. "Processing of Duplicate Documents and Commitments for the Future Treatment of Assassination Records".

- CIA/HSCA sequestered collection duplicates to be completed and transferred to NARA by September 1999.

- Russ Holmes Working Files to be completed and a declassified version transferred to NARA by December 1998.

- Mexico City tapes (186) to be completed and transferred to NARA by September 1999. [CIA-IR-15]

- Post-September 1998 Discovery of Assassination Records.

Diligent searches have been made and we are aware of no assassination records being withheld from the Board. However, given the Agency's decentralized records systems, it is possible that assassination-related documents will be discovered in the future. A guide has been prepared for those officers whose work requires them to review Agency documents and material (Executive Order Review, FOIA, etc.) that may be subject to the JFK Act. Any assassination records that are discovered will be processed according to JFK release standards and forwarded to NARA. A copy of the guide is attached. (TAB 1)

- Referrals not complete by 30 September 1998. The CIA proposes that it complete its review and return to originating agency by April 1999 all unreviewed third agency referral documents which were received prior to 30 September 1998. To date the following referral have been identified for possible post-September 1998 review:

a. Army's Investigative Records Repository (from Review Board):

File on Alfredo Mirabal Diaz -- 151 pages

b. SSCI -- Church Committee Records -- TBD pages
(to be identified by Review Board staff)

c. JFK Presidential Library:

Records from Robert Kennedy files -- 1484 pages

These documents have not been formally designated as Assassination Records. The CIA proposes that these be handled in a manner similar to the John F. Kennedy National Security Files on Cuba that were reviewed in 1996 by a joint CIA-State-DOD-Review Board task force.

3. "Custody of CIA Assassination Records to be Released in 2017."

The CIA proposes that the classified versions of Lee Harvey Oswald's Security File and "A" File along with Marina Oswald's original 201 be transferred to the protected (secure) portion of the JFK Collection At NARA by 30 September 1998. The CIA will need to retain custody of the classified version of the original Oswald 201 and the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection to complete the review of duplicate documents by September 1999.

In September 1999, the classified versions of the Oswald 201 (original and microfilm from the sequestered collection) will be transferred to NARA. Due to the sensitive nature of the information in the remaining sequestered collection, particularly the NBR material, CIA proposes that the Agency and National Archives work out a joint custody arrangement that would allow these record to remain in CIA physical custody until 2017.

14-00000

8 October 1997

JFK Records Review Project

(U) The following is intended as a guide for those people whose work requires them to review Agency documents and materials that may be subject to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. Some of the records within the Agency's JFK collection are assassination specific, others are ancillary. They deal with individuals and events not directly linked with Oswald or the assassination; but they are thought to have had a relationship to the assassination or investigation into the assassination.

I. The Agency's JFK Collection.

(U) The Agency's JFK records collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). There were eighty-one (81) Records Center-sized boxes in the original collection. Of these, the first seventeen (17) made up the Oswald 201 file. The next sixty-four (64) are referred to as the "JFK files" or sequestered collection and break down as follows: thirty-four (34) boxes of DO materials; nine (9) boxes of Office of Security files; fifteen (15) boxes of OLC materials; two (2) boxes each of OGC and IG materials; and one (1) box of DDS&T documents. HSCA originated material, including notes by HSCA staff members, are found throughout the collection. Box 64 contains seventy two (72) reels of microfilm.

(U) The microfilm contains copies of complete files to which the HSCA had access during its investigation. In addition to the Oswald 201 file (12 reels), the microfilm includes: 201 files on Cubans, Americans, and Soviets linked to Oswald, the JFK assassination or the various investigations (approximately 26 reels)and the Cuban Revolutionary Council and other exile group activities (approximately 13 reels); the personnel files of CIA staff employees (approximately 5 reels); and operational files on organizations, projects, and other subjects of interest to the HSCA investigation (approximately 16 reels).

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: LOC 3-82

(U) We continue to identify other collections of documents that properly belong within the JFK collection. These include: The Oswald Security File; Agency working files generated by JFK assassination investigations and requests; and CIA documents found by other agencies and Presidential Libraries and referred to CIA for review under the JFK Act.

II. The Time Frame of JFK Assassination Records.

(U) In general, the time frame of JFK records commences when Oswald arrived at the US air base (the U-2) at Atsugi, Japan, in December 1957 and continues through the end of the Garrison investigation in 1968. Note, however, for information which is clearly related to the story of the JFK assassination or its investigations, there is no time frame limitation. Any document or request that deals with the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, or the various conspiracy theories should be referred to the HRG/JFK review project.

III. Key Topics, Etc.

(U) Certain individuals, organizations, places, projects, and subjects are central to the Oswald/JFK story and the ensuing investigations, which causes a number of documents with no mention of Oswald or the assassination to fall within the purview of the JFK Act. Clearly, it is not possible to list every category of document which may have been reviewed and released under the JFK Assassination Records Act. The following categories contain examples of information that are considered to be within the JFK review.

(U) A. JFK Assassination Investigations:

-- Warren Commission, 1963-64
-- James Garrison, New Orleans DA, 1966-68
-- Rockefeller Commission,* 1975;
-- Church Committee (Senate),* 1975-76
-- House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79
* JFK Assassination, anti-Castro plots and CIA anti-Cuban operations only.

B. Key subjects

(S) -- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, JMWAVE Station, and CIA stations in those cities through which Oswald passed on his way to and from the Soviet Union, as they related to Oswald's activities or to possible conspiracies.

(AIUO)-- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 (Mongoose, etc.) if they involve JFK figures (see comment on Meagher's "index" below); most US anti-Castro activities in 1963 are considered relevant.

(U) -- Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders and organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures.
-- Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts); no limit on time frame.
-- Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans during Oswald time frames (see attached chronology).

(AIUO)C. Key figures
(the following individuals are considered JFK assassination-related, unless the context is clearly unrelated or outside the appropriate time period)

-- AMMUG, Cuban defector;
-- Maurice Bishop, alleged to exist (any reference);
-- Silvia Duran, employee in Cuban Embassy, Mexico City;
-- Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee;
-- Howard Hunt, CIA employee;
-- Priscilla MacMillan Johnson, journalist;
-- Valeriy Kostikov, KGB officer in Mexico city;
-- Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt (all documents)
-- Yuri Nosenko and the dispute over his bona fides;
-- Michael and Ruth Paine, Dallas friends of Oswalds;
-- David Phillips, CIA employee;
-- Richard Snyder, State Department Officer.
-- Winston Scott, COS Mexico City

For a more comprehensive list of subjects and individuals related to the JFK assassination, reviewers should consult Sylvia Meagher's Master Index to the JFK Assassination Investigations, The Scarecrow Press, 1980.

(U) Action Officer: Barry Harrelson (31825)

Attachment: Oswald Chronology

~~SECRET~~

(U) Attachment:

Oswald Chronology, 1956-1963

--Joins Marines	10/26/56
--Arrives Atsugi (U2 Base) Japan	09/12/57
--Returns to US	11/02/58
--Hardship discharge	09/11/59
--Departs New Orleans for Moscow via LeHavre, London, Helsinki	09/20/59
--Arrives Moscow	10/16/59
--Resides in Minsk	01/07/60 - 05/22/62
--Departs Moscow via train	06/02/62
--Departs Rotterdam via ship	06/04/62
--Arrives New York	06/13/62
--Fort Worth/Dallas, Texas	06/14/62 - 04/63
--New Orleans	04/63 - 09/63
--Mexico City	09/25/63 - 10/03/63
--Dallas	10/3/63 - 11/24/63

~~SECRET~~

23 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert M. McNamara@DCI
Robert D. Caudle@DCI
Stephen W. DeVine@DCI

FROM: Edmund Cohen

OFFICE: OIM

SUBJECT: Re: blurb from JFK Board

REFERENCE:

Original Text of Edmund Cohen
Original Text of Edmund Cohen

TO: James R. Oliver@DA

TO: *James R. Oliver@DA*
FROM: *Edmund Cohen*
OFFICE: *OIM*
DATE: *09/23/98 08:04:16 PM*
SUBJECT: *Re: blurb from JFK Board*

After reading the note below, I spoke with the GC, who working with Bob Caudle, was seeking to have included in the Board statement the fact that the DCI had sent a letter endorsing my declaration. I suggested to the GC that even with this addition, the JFK Board comment would be most unfortunate. The whole six year effort was designed to put to rest all of the conspiracy theories and this comment would undercut the effort. In addition, it likely would result in significant additional questions, additional work for OIM, OCA, OGC and PAS, and put the Agency in a bad light. I suggested that I should ask the EXDIR to sign the declaration. The GC interposed no objection. I then spoke with the EXDIR who agreed to sign a declaration if this would satisfy the situation. I informed the GC that the EXDIR was willing to sign and the GC asked me to inform Bob Caudle, which I did. After you spoke with Judge Tunheim and got his agreement to: 1) return the Cohen declaration and the DCI letter and substitute the EXDIR declaration, and 2) eliminate the "blurb," I had the EXDIR sign the declaration.

I subsequently briefed the DDA, ADDA, and ADDA/IS. of the above.

Original Text of Robert D. Caudle
Original Text of Robert D. Caudle

This is what they are going to include in their report, according to fax I just received from Ron Haron:

"The Board has considered release of all CIA assassination records to be critical to successful implementation of the JFK Act. Accordingly, the Board requested each of CIA's directorates to certify,

under penalty of perjury, that they had conducted thorough searches and identified all relevant records. The CIA refused. The Board then, as an alternative, asked the highest officials of the Agency - - the Executive Director and General Counsel - - to certify that CIA had met its obligations under the JFK Act and that no records on Oswald or assassination were withheld. The CIA refused. Instead, the CIA designated its Director of Information Management to sign CIA's Declaration of Compliance. In the Board's view, CIA's highest officials should have been willing to certify, under oath, that the Agency has complied with all the requirements of the JFK Act. The CIA's failure to do so raises serious concerns for the Board that the CIA has in fact fully complied with the JFK Act."

CC: *Lanie P. D'Alessandro@DA, R. Bruce Burke@DCI, Lee S. Strickland@DA, Walter I. Hazlett@DA, J. Barry Harrelson@DCI*
Sent on 23 September 1998 at 08:04:16 PM

CC:

Sent on 23 September 1998 at 08:09:39 PM

I, Barbara Blufer, declare and state based on my personal knowledge and the information made available to me in my official capacity that:

1. I am the Information Review Officer for (IRO) for the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) of the Central Intelligence Agency (Agency). I was appointed to this position on 6 October 1997 and have held various administrative and professional positions within the Agency since (1980). I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DI that may contain JFK Assassination records and may be responsive to Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) requests.

2. Since assuming my present position, I have had limited contact with the ARRB. With respect to matters prior to 6 October 1997, this statement has been prepared with inputs from my predecessor, Richard J. Flynn, who occupied my current position during the DI's principal contact with the Board.

3. Mr. Flynn has reported that, to ensure that the ARRB staff understood the DI records system and search capabilities, the DI/IRO and the DI Information Management Officer, Ms. Diana Hastings, briefed the staff on 13 May 1997. Other DI participants at the meeting were Joyce Jump, Marie Menefee, and Ilse Hartman. These officers were at that time assigned to the DI Office of Information Resources. Ms. Hastings focused on the current DI records keeping system, and, as best we could, the system that existed in the 1960s. DI participants stressed that the DI records keeping system has evolved over time and that the DI is continuously striving to achieve greater consistency in our procedures. DI participants candidly informed the ARRB staff that none of them at the meeting had first hand knowledge of DI records keeping in the 1960s, and b) the system in place at that time was entirely paper-based and therefore could not be considered as accurate as the present system. Members of the ARRB said they understood this limitation.

4. Mr. Flynn further reported that based on his recollection, Mr. Flynn is aware of a limited number of records searches the DI conducted in direct response to ARRB requests. On 11 June 1997, DI personnel met with members of the ARRB. Mr. Flynn had arranged this meeting earlier to give ARRB staffers, Michelle Combs and Bob Skwriot, an even more detailed briefing of DI's document search capabilities. The topics they asked the DI to search are noted in an attached memorandum to Barry Harrelson dated 17 June 1997.. The result of further searches (CIA -9) are summarized a 19 June 1997 memorandum a member of the DI/IRO's staff prepared for Mr. Barry Harrelson, CIA's point of contact on the JFK assassination issue. This memorandum is also attached.

5. On 21 August, Mr. Harrelson contacted me for a further search of DI records, asking specifically that the DI follow up on a previously search by extending the timeframe covered in that original search. According to Mr. Harrelson, the ARRB requested a search for all documents concerning Mexico, Cuba, or the USSR for the period from 20 November 1963 to 6 December 1963. On the basis of this request, a search was conducted 32 documents not belonging to the DI were located. The materials were turned over to Mr. Harrelson.

6. All employees of the Directorate of Intelligence have been furnished with a copy of DCI Tenet's 22 July 1998 directive to all employees requiring them to search records in their possession for information related to the JFK assassination that might not have been found in the course of the searches conducted over the past 6 years.

7. I declare under penalty of perjury that foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 28th day of August 1998.

Barbara Blufer
IRO for the Directorate of Intelligence

Neil Huntley —

4/ — [illegible] 6
Box

October 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Divisions, Staffs, and Groups

SUBJECT : President Kennedy Assassination File Search.

1. We are requested to search our files for any classified material relating to the assassination of President Kennedy, ~~specifically~~ information on Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, Yury Ivanovich Nosenko, and the Warren Commission. Report any documents, etc. on the three individuals regardless of whether the information is related to the assassination or not.

2. The search must be completed as soon as possible. A report (even if only a progress report) must be made to John Michaels, Room 7F36, ext. 7654, no later than 1300, Tuesday, 28 October.

DOUGLAS P. MULHOLLAND
Acting Director
Current Intelligence

[illegible] Cuban [illegible] 11

Post 2 — [illegible] 1

28 Nov '75

File Searach on President Kennedy's Assassination - OCI Front Office

1. Office of D/OCI has a file labeled: "Material regarding President Kennedy's Assassination." It contains:

a. Memo entitled: Rumours About Lee Harvey Oswald, which discusses the rumor-mongering in the world public regarding the presumed assassin. Memo is Secret and dated 23 March 1964.

b. Listing of government leaders expectdd to attend Kennedy funeral

c. Memo entitled: Fidel Castro's Speech, which contained an "objective analysis" of implications of Kennedy's assassination. Memo is Confidential and dated 25 Nov. 1963

d. FBIS study, never disseminated, entitled: The Past Soviet Propaganda Assessment of President Johnson. Study is Confidential and dated 25 November 1963

e. FIBS Daily Report - World Reaction Series - on foreign radio and press reaction of death of Kennedy and accession of Johnson. Official Use Only and dated 26 November 1963

f. Memo entitled: Castro's speech of 27 November on the President's Assassination. Speech says Oswald the innocent dupe of a complex plot. Memo is confidential and dated 29 November 1963.

g. Unclassified copy of Wash. Post article on Castro reaction to Kennedy death - November 29, 1963

h. Three copies of Memo entitled: World Reaction to the Assassination of President Kennedy. Deals with idea of possible coverup in killing of Oswald - to seal his lips and protect the extreme right, whose tool he was. Memos ~~is~~ TOP SECRET DINAR and dated 25 November 1963

are

23, 24, +

Carla Scopeletis

Copy passed to Michael
28 Oct 75

DECLARATION OF MARY LOU CUMMINGS

I, MARY LOU CUMMINGS, hereby declare and say as follows:

1. I am the Information Review Officer ("IRO") for the offices of the Director of Central Intelligence (CIA). I was appointed to this position on 5 January 1998, and have held various administrative and professional positions within the Agency since 1981. I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DCI area (Offices of the Director and Deputy Director(DCI&DDCI), Community Management Staff(CMS), National Intelligence Council(NIC), Office of the Comptroller(COMPT), Office of the General Counsel(OGC), Office of Congressional Affairs(OCA), Office of the Inspector General(OIG), Office of Public Affairs(OPA), Arms Control Intelligence Staff(ACIS), and Center for the Study of Intelligence(CSI)) that may contain JFK Assassination records and may be responsive to ARRB requests.

2. By memo date 6 April 1995, the Executive Director (CIA) requested that focal points for each Directorate be appointed to be responsible for responding to requests for information from the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). Until that time the Historical Review Group (HRG) of the Center for the Studies of Intelligence (CSI) had been the principal liaison with the JFK Board. As of that date, DCI area/IRO was appointed to be the DCI area focal point. HRG would continue to receive requests from the Board forwarding them to the Directorate focal point for action. Responses from the Directorate were coordinated by HRG, which then made the responses available to the Board.

3. In an effort to understand the DCI area records systems and to ensure the conduct of thorough searches and responses, the ARRB staff requested a meeting with the DCI area/IRO and key DCI records management officers. Detailed questions were presented in advance to CIA personnel who then provided complete responses to the ARRB staff during the summer of 1997. At that time HRG instructed my predecessor to wait for formal taskings from ARRB before proceeding with additional searches.
See Attachment 1

4. Based on personal knowledge and information reflected in the records of the DCI area/IRO, I am aware that the following searches and reviews were conducted in response to Board requests for DCI area records.

CIA - 1 ORGANIZATIONAL MATERIAL

The DCI area/IRO made available to the Board the following records:

Organization of the Office of the Director, 1963;

Mission Statements for 1959,1962,1965, and 1966;

Relevant Office of Director Notices;

OGC and OIG Mission Statements for 1964,1966,1969,1975, and 1976;

OLC Mission Statements for 1975 and 1976;

Names of Personnel Responsible for Liaison with the Warren and Rockefeller Commissions, Pike and Church Committees and the HSCA.

See Attachment 2

CIA - 7 HISTORIES

Sixty-one histories were provided to the Board by CSI/HRG. The ARRB staff is continuing to review the histories to determine their relevancy to the JFK assassination.

See Attachment 3

CIA - 8 Intelligence Community Staff Records

Following the Board's request of 1 March 1996, the records systems of CMS were searched for JFK assassination related information with negative results. The Board then asked to examine CMS shelf listings for the relevant time period. A redacted copy of the shelf list was delivered to HRG in April 1998. On 12 August the Board identified 14 CMS records that they believe may be relevant. On 21 August, ARRB Staff examined the responsive folders.

See Attachment 4

CIA-IR-08 Unredacted Copy of "Family Jewels" Memoranda

The Board has identified pages of the Memoranda to be included in the JFK Collection. The Board agreed to the necessary redactions and the request was completed.

See Attachment 5

CIA-IR-09 George Bush Computer Search

The DCI area provided a response of "no record found" of any contact with Bush in the 1960-1967 time frame.

See Attachment 6

CIA-IR-10 IG Reports

On 3 August 1998, the DCI area/IRO informed HRG that OIG does not maintain an index or inventory of IG cases. All reports and material prepared by the IG on the JFK assassination were turned over to the Office of External Affairs (OEXA). There is no indication that a report on the handling of Oswald was ever prepared.

See Attachment 7

CIA-IR-14 Breckinridge Files

The OIG located six documents that may be relevant to the JFK assassination. They have provided a list to HRG. OGC located five documents that they made available to the Board.

See Attachment 8

CIA-IR-23 Watch Committee Files

Following a thorough search and review of CMS files, 12 documents were turned over to the Board.

See Attachment 9

CIA-IR-28 McCone Files

The ARRB staff provided a list of McCone records that they wished to review: The DCI area/IRO, in turn, gave the ARRB staff complete access to the McCone files in March 1998. The records selected by the Board's staff are being processed for release. On 30 April 1998, the DCI area/IRO was notified that the request was complete. The DCI area was then notified on 3 August the there were missing McCone files that remained of interest to the Board. As soon as we receive a list of the missing files, we will begin an in-depth review of Executive Registry records in an effort to locate the missing file

See Attachment 10

CIA-IR-31 Dulles Calendars

The ARRB staff has completed their review of the Dulles calendars and has requested that some pages be processed for release.

See Attachment 11

CIA-IR-34 File of CIA Officials and/or Offices

On 5 March 1998, the Board requested records concerning DDCIs Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter and former General Counsel Lawrence Houston. The DCI area/IRO recalled seven boxes of relevant material from Records Center. The boxes were review by ARRB staff during July 1998 and several records were selected for further processing. OGC is currently reviewing files for pertinent Houston records.

See Attachment 12

5. In addition to the formal requests, the DCI area/IRO completed the declassification review of three NIEs, documents from the Ford and Kennedy libraries, and an IG Report.

See Attachment 13

6. As this declaration demonstrates, the DCI area/IRO including predecessors, to the best of his/her ability has caused thorough searches of the DCI area systems of records for records related to the JFK assassination not included in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection and will place any newly discovered or created assassination records into the JFK collection.

7. I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING AND THE ATTACHMENTS (ATTACHMENTS 1 THROUGH 13, WHICH ARE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE) ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed in Mc Lean, Virginia on this 28 day of August 1998.

Mary Lou Cummings

Mary Lou Cummings

DECLARATION OF BECKY L. RANT

I, Becky L. Rant, declare and say as follows:

1. I am the Information Review Officer (IRO) for the Directorate of Administration (DA) of the Central Intelligence Agency (Agency). I was appointed to this position on 3 February 1997, and have held various administrative and professional positions within the Agency since 1965. I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DA, Office of the Deputy Director of Administration (ODDA), Center for CIA Security (CCS-formerly the Office of Security ((OS)), Office of Human Resource Management (HRM), Office of Medical Services (OMS), Office of Finance and Logistics (OFL), Office of Communications (OC), Office of Training and Education (OTE), Office of Facilities and Security Services (OFSS), Agency Technology Services (ATS), Center for Security Evaluation (CSE), that may contain JFK Assassination records and may be responsive to Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) requests.

2. To ensure that the ARRB staff understood the DA records systems and search capabilities, the DA/IRO and DA Information Management Officer (DA/IMO) briefed the staff on 17 March 1997. The briefing focused on the DA records systems that existed in the 1960s and the current records systems. Questions that were provided by the staff prior to the briefing were discussed and an individual from the Office of Communications (OC) attended to answer questions related to cable processing in the 1960s. In addition to OC participation, the Offices of Finance & Logistics (OFL), Human Resource Management (HRM), and Security (OS) provided written responses to the list of questions submitted by the staff. It was agreed that the additional questions raised by the staff during the briefing would be tasked to the directorate formally by the Agency JFK Focal Point/Historical Review Program (HRP). An outline of the records briefing and a copy of the advance questions and the answers provided appear as **Attachment 1.**

3. Based on personal knowledge and on information reflected in the records of the DA/IRO, I am aware of the following searches that were conducted in response to specific AARB requests for DA records:

CIA 1 - Information on Organization of CIA

The DA provided from the records of the Regulatory Services Group/ODDA copies of Agency regulations and notices pertaining to the organizational structure of the Agency during the time periods specified by the ARRB staff. DA/IRO gave approval for the cleared staff members to review the material. Subsequently the DA/IRO approved release of the following items:

31 mission statements and organization charts for the DDA (DDS) and Office of Security (full release)

2 organization charts and mission statement of the Office of Communications (OC) (sanitized)

16 Agency mission, function and organization charts (full release with concurrence of the other directorates) **(Attachment 2)**

CIA-7-Histories

The DA JFK Focal Point reviewed the index of histories produced by the CIA History Program - for release to the ARRB and approved access with certain restrictions. There is no record in the DA/IRO's office that the staff requested access to the DA histories on the list. **(Attachment 3)**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN REMOVED
FROM SECRET ATTACHMENT

CIA-12-JMWAVE—5 Files

The DA conducted file searches in OS and HRM for records on Theodore Shackley, Ronald Cross, Bart Henry, Doug Gupton, David Morales. We were subsequently advised by HRP that the David Morales OS file was part of the collection so the OS searched for records on the first four names only. OS identified files on Shackley, Cross and Gupton which were reviewed by the ARRB staff. HRM identified files on Morales and Shackley which were provided to HRP. Neither office surfaced records on Bart Henry. **(Attachment 4)**

CIA-16-Oswald Pre-assassination Files

The Office of Security identified a multi-volume file and provided answers to questions posed by the ARRB staff. **(Attachment 5).** The OS file was reviewed and in April 1998 was released to the National Archives. **NOTE:** The attached 17 February 1997 OS memorandum describes records holding related to HTLINGUAL and states that the files were destroyed in April 1994.

CIA-IR-03 HTLINGUAL File

See CIA-16 above and **Attachment 5**

CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart

Capehart's Office of Security file is in the sequestered collection. The DA JFK Focal Point provided input on the question of protecting Capehart's relationship with global marine. **(Attachment 6).** In coordination with the DS&T, HRP responded to the ARRB staff.

CIA-09 George Bush Computer Search

The Offices of Security and Human Resource Management reviewed the files of George Herbert Walker Bush and found no documentation indicating that Mr. Bush had an affiliation with CIA during the 1963 time period. **Attachment 7**

CIA-IR-11 Warren Commission Critics

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management and Information Management were tasked with records searches on Edward Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg and Sylvia Meagher. No records were found on Lane and Thompson. Weisburg and Epstein security files were made available for ARRB staff review. An OS impersonal file was identified but had been destroyed in 1994. HRM found only an OSS service card on Weisberg which has been supplied to HRP. OIM identified a file on Epstein. Several FOIA and PA files also were identified. **Attachment 8.** Contains the DA response and the final HRP response letter coordinated with the DA/IRO.

CIA-IR-13 - Office/Person Dealing with Organized Crime & Cuba

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management and Finance & Logistics provided responses to this request. The Official Personnel File of Charles Ford was given to HRP, OS provided a description of the OS file contents and OFL provided travel and financial records. **Attachment 9**

CIA-IR-19 Computer Search on Specific Individuals and Organizations

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management, Medical Services, Training & Education conducted searches on the following individuals with described results:

Cherne, OPF provided to HRP; OS file made available for staff review
Leake, OPF provided to HRP, OS and OMS files made available for staff review
Garbler, OPF provided to HRP, OS, OTE, OMS files made available for staff review
Verna Deane Brown, OPF provided to HRP
John A. McVickar, OPF provided to HRP
Byron Morton, No records
Marie Cheatham, No Records

The Offices of Security and Human Resource Management conducted searches on the following individuals with results noted:

Spas T. Raikin, OS File described in attachment, No HRM record
Marilyn Murret, Index card only, No HRM record
Andrew Anderson, OS File(may or may no be correct file) made available, No HRM Record
Howard Geubler, No OS or HRM records
Gordon Novel, OS found cross reference to GARRISON file, No HRM Record
Edward S. Butler, OS found cross reference to GARRISON file, NO HRM Record

The Office of Security found no records on INCA (Information Council of the Americas) or Permindex. **Attachment 10**

CIA-IR-21 DRE Monthly Operational Reports

HRP requested and was provided the Official Personnel File of George Joannides

CIA-24 Defector File

The Office of Security provided a description of "Defector Files" maintained by OS in a 17 February 1997 memo **(See attachment 5)**

CIA-IR-25 Zapruder File

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management, Finance & Logistics searched for records on William Green of Kodak Labs. All reported negative results. HRM confirmed that Homer McMahon was an NPIC employee and provided bio information. **Attachment 11**

CIA-IR-26 Jordan James Pfuntner

The Office of Security conducted a search and reported that the OS file had been destroyed in 1980-81. **Attachment 12**

CIA-IR-27 Security Files on 5 Individuals

The Office of Security conducted a records search for files on the following individuals:

Richard C. Nagell
Gordon D. Novel
Jack L. Ruby
Walter J. Sheridan
Harold Weisberg

The Nagell, Novel and Ruby files were designated assassination records and copies were provided to HRP. The Sheridan and Weisberg files were made available and were reviewed by the ARRB Staff. **(Attachment 13)**

CIA-IR-29 Oswald LeWinter

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management, Facilities Security & Services conducted searches for information on Oswald Winter. HRM and OFSS reported negative results. OS found information in an impersonation/crank file. The DA/IRO coordinated with the DO on a statement that was provided to the ARRB staff. **Attachment 14**

CIA-IR-36 Handling of Cables in 1963

The DA/IRO provided coordination approval on a memorandum prepared by HRP describing cable handling procedures **Attachment 15**

List of 38 Names of Interest to the ARRB-Provided by HRP 8/5/98

The Offices of Security and Human Resource Management searched records for information on 38 individuals listed in the attachment. The OS and HRM responses are attached. **Attachment 16**

4. As this declaration demonstrates, I and my predecessors to the best of our ability have caused thorough searches of all relevant DA records systems for records responsive to the JFK ARRB requests for information. In addition, the offices of the Directorate of Administration have certified to me that all employees have been furnished with a copy of DCI Tenet's 22 July 1998 directive to all employees requiring them to search records in their possession for information related to the JFK Assassination that might not have been found in the course of the searches conducted over the past 6 years.

5. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 21 day of August 1998.

Becky L Rant

Becky L. Rant
Information Review Officer
Directorate of Administration

1

Directorate of Administration

Briefing for the JFK Assassination Records Review Board Staff
on
Records Management in the DA

17 March 1997

Carol M. Johnson
DA Information Management Officer
2B17 IP Bldg.
703-613-1205 Secure 31205

Becky Rant
DA Information Review Officer
2B17 IP Bldg.
703-613-1204 Secure 31204

Directorate of Administration

TOPICS

- CIA Information Services Strategic Plan
- Information Management Program Segments
- Information Management Goals
- Organization of Records Management In the Agency
- DA Information Management Officer (IMO)
- DA Information Review Officer (IRO)
- Deputy Director for Support (DDS) - 1965
- Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) - 1997
- DA Records

CIA Information Services Strategic Plan

- "Information and Records Management, including Classification Management, is a fundamental and essential business requirement for the Agency."

- "The CIA's Information Services shall...ensure that each official record is appropriate, accurate, secure and retrievable throughout its life cycle regardless of physical form or media."

Directorate of Administration

Information Management Program Segments

- Records Management
- Classification Management
- Information Disclosure
- Information Automation

~~Administrative-Internal Use Only~~

Directorate of Administration

Information Management Goals

An effective and efficient information management ensures that records are available:

- to meet day-to-day business needs
- to ensure the continuity and consistency of records
- to provide corporate memory and history
- to protect the rights and interests of the organization, the employees and the public
- to meet legal requirements

~~Administrative-Internal Use Only~~

Associate Deputy Director for Administration

Information Services

Organization of Records Management in the Agency

This slide is Administrative Internal Use Only



D/Info Mgt *

Recruitment & Training*

Policy Research & Audit*

OIT

Archive & Preservation*

System Development*

Agency Information & Records Management Panel

* = member

DCI/IMO*

component/imos

DA/IMO*

component/imos

DI/IMO*

component/imos

DO/IMO*

component/imos

DS&T/IMO*

component/imos

DA Information Management Officer (DA/IMO)

- The DA/IMO is the Deputy Director for Administration's representative for issues relating to records and classification management.

- The DA/IMO is responsible for protecting equities consistent with existing statues, EO guidance and internal rules and regulations governing the creation, maintenance and use, and disposition of information.

DA Information Review Officer (DA/IRO)

- The DA/IRO is the Deputy Director for Administration's representative for reviewing all DA relevant information for release to the public under FOIA, PA, EO, and other information release programs.
- The DA/IRO is responsible for protecting equities consistent with existing statutes, EO guidance and internal rules and regulations governing the review and release of classified information, specifically, in response to:
  - FOIA/PA/EO Requests
  - Congressional Inquiries
  - DOJ Inquiries/Litigations
  - IG Investigations
  - Special Searches & Other Release Programs

Directorate of Administration

Deputy Director for Support (DDS) - 1965

- Office of the DDS (ODDS)
- Office of Security (OS)
- Office of Personnel (OP)
- Office of Medical Services (OMS)
- Office of Logistics (OL)
- Office of Finance (OF)
- Office of Communications (OC)
- Office of Training (OTR)

Directorate of Administration

Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) - 1997

- Office of the DDA (ODDA)
- Office of Personnel Security (OPS)
- Office of Facilities & Security Services (OFSS)
- Office of Finance & Logistics (OFL)
- Human Resources Management (HRM)
- Office of Medical Services (OMS)
- Office of Communications (OC)
- Office of Information Technology (OIT)
- Office of Training & Education (OTE)
- Center for Security Evaluation (CSE)

DA Records



- Information Management Officers
- Core functions
  - 1960s
  - 1990s
- Records Life Cycle
  - Creation
  - Maintenance & Use
  - Disposition
- File organization

DA Records



- Records Control Schedules
    - Temporary
    - Permanent
- Records Storage
    - Short term
    - Long term
- Accountability
    - Personal
    - Organization
- Search & Retrieval

DA Records



- Access
- Safeguarding
- Preservation
  - Hardcopy
  - Electronic
- OGC Retention List
- Automation

DRAFT

Types of Questions for DA Records Briefing
March 17, 1997

Budget and Finance

1. In Cold Warrior, (p. 52) Mangold refers to a CI secret slush fund which was tightly controlled by Angleton and never audited by the usual procedures. According to Mangold, it was this fund which allowed Angleton to run his own operations without supervision. Did the fund exist? Was this fund ever audited? Are there any records of CI operational expenses for the period 1959-63?

2. Mangold also refers (p. 53) to an unnamed CI/B&F officer who says he worked for Angleton from 1958-1964 and never dealt with him directly on a single matter. Is there a list of B&F officers assigned to the CI Staff from 1959-63. Do their records still exist?

3. We have seen Directorate of Operations monthly operational reports which contain information on the allocation/distribution of operational funds. Are there other DO or DA records which reflect how a certain project utilized its funding? Can this type of information from the early 1960's still be retrieved?

4. What records are kept on disbursements to sources in the field? If, hypothetically, LHO had received money from the Agency, what records would exist?

Personnel

1. What records are maintained on contract personnel?

Security

1. For the period between 1955-65, what was the universe of files that OS had on individuals or groups?

2. How are Office of Security records indexed?

3. What was the function of the Office of Security/Security Research Staff (OS/SRS)? Why were defector records kept in this component?

These pgs were released in full in 104-10333-10002
JFK-M-18, F3

DRAFT

4. In the OS/SRS memo of Oct. 31, 1960, written by Marguerite D. Stevens, the file numbers of several defectors are listed: "Robert Edward Webster, EE-18854; Lee Harvey Oswald, MS-11165; Libero Ricciardelli, MS-8295; Vladimir Sloboda, MS-10565; and Joseph Dutkanicz, MS-10724." What do the "MS" and "EE" file prefixes designate? How are these designations assigned?

5. Does OS process security clearances for non-employees (e.g. sources) to receive access to classified information? What kinds of files are created by this process? How long are these files maintained. For example, Clay Shaw was given a security clearance and had access to classified information based on his "responsibilities" as a source for the Domestic Contacts Division (DCD).

6. Where are records that would describe liaison (etc.) cooperation or operations between OS and CI located? How are these records organized?

7. Where are records regarding operations that OS participated in or ran located. For example, where are the OS records on the Castro assassination attempts?] more info

8. How many files did OS have on Oswald? Which OS components maintained files on Oswald? Why did OS have any files on Oswald?

nuts & bolts

OC

Do we have anyone who can brief on cable process in 60-64 time period. How came in, decrypted. What happened from the time a cable was sent from a field site until it arrived on a desk at HQS, how disseminated.

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Budget and Finance

Question 1 - In Cold Warrior Mangold refers to a CIA secret slush fund which was tightly controlled by Angleton and not audited by usual procedures. Did the fund exist? Was the fund audited? Are there any records of CI operational expenses for the period 1959-63?

According to C/Financial Service Division (FSD/OFL) who contacted a former finance officer who was a secretary in CI in 1957-60, to the best of their recollection CI did not have their own finance officer. C/FSD also talked to another officer during that era who did not recall that CI was one of the early offices to do their own certification of expenses. It was his feeling that there very well may have been a CI fund that was not handled in the usual way however it is very unlikely to impossible that any fund was not audited/certified in some fashion (i.e. reviewed and certified decentrally and only reported on the books in some aggregate amount). He commented that he has never in discussion with finance officers heard of an account managed by staff officers that wasn't certified by someone in finance.

Question 2 - Mangold also refers to unnamed CI/B&F officer who says he worked for Angleton from 1958-64 and never dealt with him directly on a single matter. Is there a list of B&F officers assigned to the CI staff from 1959-63? Do their records still exist?

OFL - The Career Management Officer stated that we would need the name of the B&F officer in order to identify if he/she was assigned to the CI/Staff. CMO also stated that he does have some old records during that time period pertaining to assignments but the list he has is alphabetical by name. The current procedure is that the soft file maintained in OFL contains the assignment of each officer in the biographical profile.

HRM - Has microfilm staffing complements for the 1959-63 timeframe. These staffing complements were created on a quarterly basis and are broken down by the office (location) level. With the correct directorate/office name we can visually search these microfilm records, find the correct office and produce hardcopy reports listing the employees on the rolls for a given quarter. The hardcopy report could be reviewed to break down the office listing by occupation and create a list of names associated with the occupation (i.e. B&F officers assigned to CI from 1959-63. The employee name could then be used to located current or archived HRM files. CAUTION: 1) If an individual came and left an office during the same quarter they might not appear on the staffing complement, 2) If an individual was TDY to an office they would not appear on the staffing complement of that office. 3) If an individual was being paid by their home office they would not appear on the staffing complement of the outside office they were supporting.

Question 3 - We have seen DO monthly operational reports which contain information on the allocation/distribution of operational funds. Are there other DO or DA records which reflect how a certain project utilized its funding? Can this type of information from the early 1960s still be retrieved?

The DO operational fund records would contain expenditures against a certain project or operation. However, according to C/FSD the system that preceded the General Accounting System (GAS) was RCA 501 (not sure what this contained) but in all probability has been destroyed, would have this type of information also. More information may have been recorded in 201 files similar to today's automated systems.

Question 4 - What records are kept on disbursements in the field? If hypothetically LHO had received money from the Agency what records would exist?

According to the OFL Records Control Schedule station accounting containing indigenous personnel are kept for 56 years, station accounting not containing indigenous personnel are kept 20 years.

Personnel

Question 1 - What records are maintained on contract personnel?

Responsibility for records maintained on independent contract personnel was transferred to OFL o/a 1 October 1996. Staff contract personnel files continue to be maintained by HRM.

Office Contract Personnel Files contain many of the same items found in the staff Official Personnel File (OPF)--application info, actions (Staff contracts only) clearance info, secrecy agreement, etc., and also contract info (agreements, amendments, terminations, etc.) A separate payroll file was also maintained.

IC's - fee for task
Staff Contracts - hired for job--not to exceed 5 years.

Contract files can be opened/maintained/retired in true name, pseudo, alias or crypt depending upon the sensitivity of the contract.

Security

Question 1 - For the period between 1955-65, what was the universe of files that OS had on individuals or groups?

OPS located information which describes the categories of files created during this time frame but it is impossible to state this is all inclusive:

General - Usually unsolicited correspondence of crank variety and junk.

Security Research Staff - possibly material of counterintelligence interest.

DCD contacts - persons who travel abroad and/or have specific information.

Contractor Employees - industrial contractors with collateral and/or SCI accesses

Miscellaneous - Includes publications, organizations, intelligence services, etc.

Alien - Foreign nationals who were of interest

New Building - Persons involved with construction of original Headquarters Building

Regular - Files which included staff employees, contractors, GSA/GSI, etc.

Question 2 - How are Office of Security records indexed?

Prior to 1964 all index records were maintained on 3x5 inch index cards. When the information was known, these cards included names (primary, alias, telecodes), file numbers, kin/relatives, location/residence, DPOB, citizenship, occupation, polygraph number, reference source data, information codes, remarks, SSN, sex, employer, and file retirement data. To locate a file record, the subject of interest was searched in this card system.

During mid-1964 these index cards with the exception of impersonal entities, were under conversion to a keypunch system. The impersonals (companies, publications, intelligence services, organizations, etc.) were maintained on cards until much later, possibly mid-1970s. Aside form the subject name indices, the Office of Security also indexed information of interest within a file record. This information could include associates, companies, publications, other government agency reports information, etc.

TODAY'S INDEXING PARAMETERS ARE VERY LIMITED.

Question 3 - What was the function of the Office of Security/Security Research Staff (OS/SRS)? Why were defector records kept in this component?

The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counter intelligence effort throughout OS. SRS reported directly to the Director of Security.

Question 4 - In the OS/SRS memo of Oct 31, 1960 written by Marguerite D. Stevens, the file numbers of several defectors are listed. What do the MS and EE file prefixed designate? How are these designations assigned.

As noted in question 1, records were categorized according to the type and the older file numbers reflected the file category. "M" designated a miscellaneous record; "S" designated a Security Research Staff record. Therefore "MS" most likely referred to a miscellaneous record of interest to the Security Research Staff. "E" or "EE" designations covered subjects of interest to the Domestic Contacts Division for information/intelligence purposes. It appears that at least some of these alpha designations were converted to numerical values circa 1964.

Question 5 - Does OS process security clearances for non-employees (e.g. sources) to receive access to classified information? What kind of files are created by this process? How long are these files maintained.

Security clearances per se are not processed for non-employees (sources/contacts). The Office of Security conducts appropriate national agency checks to try to determine the reliability of those individuals who are of interest for contact purposes because of their foreign travels, specific scientific information, etc. In a few instances an ad hoc clearance/validation may be requested in the event some classified information would be revealed in the course of acquiring intelligence from these sources. The validation period is normally five years, and any files created are maintained in the individual's name for a period of ten years after the validation period has expired. The DO would most likely have further information on a particular source.

Question 6 - Where are records that would describe liaison (etc) cooperation or operations between OS and CI located? How are these records organized?

With the short turnaround time imposed on responding to this request no information could be readily located to provide an answer to this question. It is believed that if information of this nature does exist, it may be located in archived policy or administrative files of the Office of Security and/or Security Research Staff. Retrieval and review of this information would require an extensive research effort. Officers who may possess knowledge of this type of record were queried and it was suggested that info responsive to this question may possibly be located in DO records.

Question 7 - Where are records regarding operations that OS participated in or ran located? For example, where are the OS records on the Castro assassination attempts?

Records on operations and/or projects in which the Office of Security was involved in the past have most likely been destroyed, unless they are maintained because of congressional directives or the records control schedules. The Office of Personnel Security has the capability of retrieving a listing of any current records with the prefix or "project" or "operation". If the title does not include these words, retrieveal would be more difficult unless an exact name or acronym is known for a particular operation or project.

Question 8 - How many files did OS have on Oswald? Which OS components maintained files on Oswald? Why did OS have any files on Oswald?

OPS answered in CIA-16. Copy attached.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

John:

Thank you for agreeing to participate in briefing the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) to be held on **Monday, 17 March, at 2:00 p.m., in 2C06 IP Bldg.** I regret the short notice. As we discussed, the ARRB has asked for information relating to the creation, transmission, and dissemination of cables and your name instantly came to mind. Their specific questions are:

1- Can you describe the cable process in place in the Agency during the
1960-1964 time period?

Prior to 1962 messages were delivered to the DPD (Development Products Division) at 1717 H Street or to the Communications Center at "L" Street. In addition there also was a Q building that received special traffic. After 1962 messages came into the CIA Headquarters and were processed in different areas depending on the types of traffic.

Imagery traffic would be sent to to a specific floor for the imagery personnel. Intercept and Special Programs would either be passed to a Special Sections Area of the Communications Center or to the Cable Secretariat.

2- How did cables come in?

Messages came in from the field via the Brandy Station State Channels or military channels.

3- How were they decrypted?

Messages were deciphered using a OTT (One Time Tape) or a OTP (One Time Pad) process.

4- What happened from the time a cable was sent from a field site until it arrived
on a desk at Headquarters?

Messages sent from a field site would be passed to a communicator, encrypted and transmitted via High Frequency Radio. The message received from Brandy and relayed to headquarters and then it was decrypted. The analyst of the Cable Secretariat would then read the message and match what they read against customer requirements. They then would have a typist type the dissemination on the message. The message then would be picked up from the message center by the various staffs and or divisions.

5- How were cables disseminated?
See item four.

Please let me or Becky Rant, DA/IRO, know if you have any other questions or concerns prior to the briefing.

CC: Becky L. Rant
Andrea E. Boyce
Sent on 13 March 1997 at 03:17:34 PM

(4) CK JF-24

~~SECRET~~

27 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

REFERENCE: CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997

1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

Question 1: (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response: (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald,

included in 104-10335-10014
JFK-M-19, File
part of 52 pg. doc.

Regraded Confidential
When Separated From
Secret Attachment

CL BY: 0605636
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 1-82

~~SECRET~~

and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

(U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files.

(U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from Lydia Hoffman of the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

Question 2: (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

Response: (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

(U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations.

(U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960

c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

(U) The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS. Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition have been unsuccessful.

(U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. Katie Nakai of this office at one time was assigned to the Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained limited information on each name.

(C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations Division is the current operating component encompassing most of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in OPS. Gail Jewell of this office was queried regarding office holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms. Jewell had no knowledge of the listing and suggested William Gilbert as a resource. Mr. Gilbert, CIC Liaison Officer, could not recall the listing, opined it may have been destroyed, and suggested contacting Zachary Filis of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC).

(C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously conducted by the Security Analysis Group. Mr. Filis was queried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the realignment of duties. Mr. Filis advised the Defector Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations counterparts regarding the listing.

(U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#C351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959

b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure

r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'"

s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

(U) In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald

u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963

y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

Response: (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

(U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

(U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to

detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

(U) Don Staton of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. Mr. Staton made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer Ronda Allen retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame.

4. (U) This review was conducted by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.

Janet A. Ecklund

Attachment

2

~~SECRET~~

DOCS TO ME
MARLENE
30492
GLORIA HAS 6/6/95

1 June 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gloria Boyd, HRG/CSI

FROM: Marlene H. Rives
RSG/CSC/DA

THROUGH: Don Hatch, DDA/IRC AMP
Jack Wright DA Focal Point for JFK ✓

SUBJECT: R AARB Additional Information Request CIA-1

1. Attached per your request is a copy of Regulatory Service Group documents responsive to the subject request for items explaining the organizational structure and division of responsibilities within CIA for the years 1958-68 and 1975-79. Some of the documents are dated outside the time frame specified but were determined to be effective during the years 1958-68 and 1975-79.

2. The Directorate of Operations and the History Staff may have additional documents. See the attached notice dated 13 March 1964.

3. If you have any questions, please call Marlene Rives on 30492 (secure).

Marlene H. Rives
Marlene H. Rives

ATTACHMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM DOCUMENTS

SECRET

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

13 June 1995

CR DA #5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jack Wright @ DA

FROM: Eldon I. Hatch
Information Review Officer, ODDA

SUBJECT: Review of Organizational Structure for the year 1958-68 and 1975-79

REFERENCE: ARRB Additional Information Request CIA-1

1. The attached documents relating to subject have been reviewed for release to the Assassination Records Review Board and are to be handled in accordance with the level of classification security indicated on the documents. The documents have not been reviewed for release to other than properly cleared personnel.

2. If you have any questions, please call me on 30683.

Eldon I. Hatch

Eldon I. Hatch

Attachments: a/s

Handcarried to Jack Wright

CC:

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE~~ ONLY

3

1a

3

2 6 FEB 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group

FROM: Lee S. Strickland
DA Focal Point for JFK Board Requests

SUBJECT: ARRB Request for Access to Indices to CIA Histories

REFERENCE: A. JFK Board Request No. CIA-7, dtd 9 Nov 1995, Item # 6

B. CSI-0307/05, dtd 20 Feb 1996, same subject

1. Per your request, I have reviewed the list provided to me of all histories produced under the CIA History Program for release to the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). Regarding equities that concern the Office of the DA, I reviewed pages 38 through 48 and pages 51-54 and have no problem granting access to the list except for those noted on page 40, 42, 46, and 48. If this list is to be provided unclassified, then the station names as marked would need to be redacted. If this list is to be provided classified, the DA pages may be passed without sanitization.

2. Is the ARRB allowed to request access to any Agency document if unrelated to the JFK Assassination? We could be setting a precedent if we grant the ARRB access to see this entire list. Potentially, the ARRB could request access to any number of Agency documents totally unrelated to the JFK Assassination (i.e. 201 files).

3. If you have questions, I may be reached on extension 30554 secure.

Lee S. Strickland

4

4

CL BY: 0000000
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 1-82

27 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bonnie K. Hunter-Y- @ DCI

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: CIA-12 (Shackley et al)

REFERENCE: Shackley, Cross, Henry, Gupton (CIA-IR-12) DA/IRO No. 12

Bonnie:

This is with respect to your 26 February 1998 note wherein you asked that we check HRM for personnel files on Ron Cross, Bart Henry and William Morris Kent. In an effort to bring the status of this particular tasking (CIA-IR-12) up-to-date, I provide the following:

My records show that on 18 July 1997 Barry requested that we conduct file searches on Ted Shackley, Ron Cross, Bart Henry and Doug Gupton. We were advised by Barry, and as outlined in a 22 May 1996 letter from ARRB to John Pereira, that Cross, Henry and Gupton are pseudonyms used by CIA personnel who testified to the HSCA.

Notwithstanding, we tasked OPS and HRM to conduct searches on these individuals in an effort to locate files. On 22 December 1996, I advised Barry that HRM had located files on Ted Shackley and would provide them to Barry via this office once they arrived from RC. It is my understanding that Becky gave you the OPF yesterday. HRM advsied further that they had attempted to locate files on Cross, Henry and Gupton but failed to locate any files on these individuals in light of the fact that only the pseudos had been provided. We further advised that if in the future you have access to the true names, we will glady search again.

On 23 December 1997, I advised Barry that OPS had located files on Ted Shackley, Ron Cross and Doug Gupton and that the files were in OPS for review. They were unable to locate a record on Bart Henry. It is my understanding that you have not reviewed these files to date but are in the process of making arrangements to do so. Sue-Ann Pierson conducted the search back in July and I am certain that — she will be glad to you in this matter (40000).

And lastly, I have no record of ever having received a request to search on William Morris Kent. Accordingly, I will request OPS and HRM to do so.

Please let me know if I have misinterpreted the status of this request. Thank you. Frieda

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

5

14-00000

④ CR JFK-24

L

~~SECRET~~

27 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

REFERENCE: CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997

1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

Question 1: (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, *each* file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response: (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald,

Regraded Confidential
When Separated From
Secret Attachment.

CL BY: 0605636
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 1-82

~~SECRET~~

and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

(U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files.

(U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from Lydia Hoffman of the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

> Question 2: (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

Response: (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

(U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations.

(U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960

c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

(U) The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS. Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition have been unsuccessful.

(U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. Katie Nakai of this office at one time was assigned to the Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained limited information on each name.

(C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations Division is the current operating component encompassing most of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in OPS. Gail Jewell of this office was queried regarding office holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms. Jewell had no knowledge of the listing and suggested William Gilbert as a resource. Mr. Gilbert, CIC Liaison Officer, could not recall the listing, opined it may have been destroyed, and suggested contacting Zachary Filis of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC).

(C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously conducted by the Security Analysis Group. Mr. Filis was queried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the realignment of duties. Mr. Filis advised the Defector Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations counterparts regarding the listing.

(U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959

b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure

r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'"

s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

(U) In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald

u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963

y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

Response: (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

(U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

(U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to

detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

(U) Don Staton of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. Mr. Staton made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer Ronda Allen retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame.

4. (U) This review was conducted by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.

Janet A. Ecklund

Attachment

6

5

6

27 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Reviewer

SUBJECT: ARRB Request No. CIA-IR-7 For Information On Claude B. Capehart

1. The following is responsive to subject request.

2. The Agency has made a thorough search of its records for information on Claude B. Capehart and can state:

a. Mr. Capehart was never an employee of the Agency;

b. Mr. Capehart was however, an employee of a company with which the Agency had contracts;

c. The Agency has files on Mr. Capehart because of its contractual relationship with his employer.

d. All such files have been made available to and were reviewed by ARRB staff members.

3. If you require anything further in this regard, please advise.

J Barry Harrelson

J. Barry Harrelson

7

14-00000

2

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

9 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
CSI - JFK Project Officer

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-09 - George Bush/ARRB Request

1. This is with reference to your 2 February 1998 memorandum (attached) and our telephone conversation on 6 February wherein you requested that the Directorate of Administration (DA) review "any and all personnel files of George Herbert Walker Bush to determine whether he had any affiliation with CIA during the 1963 period."

2. The Office of Personnel Security and the Office of Human Resource Management have reviewed its files and have been unable to find any documentation to show that George H.W. Bush had any affiliation with CIA during the 1963 period.

3. This concludes DA action on this request.

Attachments

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

8

~~ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

11 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-11 - ARRB Request for Search on Warren Commission Critics (DA/IRO No. 21)

1. This is with reference to your 2 February 1998 memorandum (Tab A) and our subsequent telephone conversation on 6 February wherein you requested that the Directorate of Administration (DA) search for files or records on Warren Commission critics Edward J. Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg, or Sylvia Meagher.

2. Based upon the limited biographic information provided on Subjects, the Office of Personnel Security (OPS), the Office of Human Resource Management (HRM) and the office of the Publication Review Board conducted thorough searches. No records were located on Josiah Thompson or Mark Lane. As you know, OPS located a file on Harold Weisberg as a result of its search in response to CIA-IR-27 (DA/IRO No. 14). At your request, on 6 February 1998 (Tab B) we requested that OPS make arrangements to have this file reviewed by the ARRB to determine which documents are Assassination Records. Accordingly, OPS did not address the Weisberg file in this CIA-IR-11 response.

3. As a result of DA's searches (Tab C) we located the following files and/or information:

Edward J. Epstein - AIN 0 488 768 (found in OPS;
File found in PRB

Harold Weisberg - computer printout (attached,
found in HRM

Sylvia Meagher - OPS advised that there was an impersonal folder regarding Subject and a 1968 Ramparts Magazine article which were destroyed in accordance with the Records Control Schedule on 1 Janaury 1994.

ADMINISTRATIVE - ~~INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

[illegible] Please let me know when you want me to request the [illegible]es on Edward Epstein from OPS and PRS. Meanwhile, this concludes DA action on CIA-IR-11. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me on 31201.

Attachments: As Stated

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

(35)

UNCLASSIFIED

8

E C I R-11
#21

From the Desk of Becky L. Rant
DA/Information Review Office

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson@DCI
Gary M. Breneman-Y-@DCI
FROM: Becky L. Rant
OFFICE: DA/IRO
DATE: 08/14/98 09:10:11 AM
SUBJECT: Response to CIA-IR-11

Barry & Gary:

I have reviewed the draft response to CIA-IR-11 dated 13 August 1998 and following are my comments and requested changes:

Paragraphs 1 and 2 - OK

Para 2a: **EPSTEIN,** Edward J. --The DO found no files identifiable with subject; a file was found on an individual with the same name but; with research, it was determined that the individual was not the Edward J. Epstein who is the subject of this request. DA searches found a Center for CIA Security, formerly the Office of Personnel Security, file and a Publications Review Board file on subject, as well as three "hits" to records destroyed pursuant to normal records destruction schedules. The destroyed records involved three Freedom of Information requests that mention Epstein's name in the subject line. None of the requests were for information on Epstein.

Para 2b: **LANE,** Mark
4th line - Please change Public Affairs to Privacy Act request

Para 2c: **MEAGHER, Sylvia** -- A reference to the fact subject made a Privacy Act request was found. In addition, the Center for CIA Security found that it had, at one time, a folder on subject and a 1968 Ramparts Magazine article. Both subject's Privacy Act request file and the impersonal folder have been destroyed pursuant to normal record control schedules.

Para 2d: defer to DO

Para 2e: **WEISBERG,** Harold

11th line - Please change Office of Security to Center for CIA Security.

In so far as DA equities are concerned, I concur with draft letter once the above changes have been incorporated.

Becky

CC: Frieda P. Omasta@DA
Sent on 14 August 1998 at 09:10:11 AM

UNCLASSIFIED

6

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

9

From the Desk of W. Curtis Chaloner
OPS/CD/IMB (40552) THIS IS A VOICE ACTIVATED COMPUTER. UPPERCASE IS FOR EFFICIENCY & IS NOT MEANT AS A BREACH OF CYBERSPACE ETIQUETTE.

NOTE FOR: Becky L. Rant
Frieda P. Omasta
Janet A. Ecklund
FROM: W. Curtis Chaloner
OFFICE: OPS/CD/IMB
DATE: 06/09/97 04:22:02 PM
SUBJECT: RECORD SEARCH, CHARLES D. FORD, AIN 0038497

DEAR BECKY, I CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF SUBJECT'S SECURITY FILE TO INCLUDE MICROFICHE & HARDCOPY. BELOW ARE MR. FORD'S ACTIVITIES FROM 1959 THROUGH 1964, PER YOUR REQUEST.

MICROFICHE-CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

16 JAN 59-CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE

AUGUST 1959-VACATION IN CANADA FOR 2 DAYS

15 MAR 61-ESTABLISHMENT OF P.O BOX LETTER ADDRESS FOR SUBJECT

30 MAR 62-MFR, SUBJECT WAS PROVIDED AN ALIAS (FISCALINI) FOR TASK FORCE " W" TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK ON 31 MAR 62 TO CONTACT AN ATTORNEY IN THAT CITY. ATTORNEY GENERAL, ROBERT KENNEDY OFFERED HIS SERVICES TO HELP SOME OF THE CUBAN PRISONERS SCHEDULED FOR TRIAL IN CUBA. SUBJECT RECEIVED VERBAL APPROVAL FOR HIS ALIAS.

05 JUN 62-SUBJECT WAS UNAWARE OF REINVESTIGATION & WAS NOTIFIED BY SECURITY.

28 JUN 62-ANOTHER NAME WAS ADDED TO SUBJECT'S LETTER ADDRESS

03 DEC 62-SUBJECT WAS BRIEFED TO A SENSITIVE OPERATION CONDUCTED JOINTLY BY THE CI STAFF & DDS/IOS

20 FEB 63-REQUEST FOR CIA IDENTIFICATION CARD IN ALIAS

06 MAR 63-MFR REGARDING AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT

10 MAY 63-REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE

02 JUL 63-REASSIGNMENT PROCESSING FORM, APPROVED FOR DOMESTIC ASSIGNMENT

08 JUN 63-SUBJECT GRANTED A "Q" CLEARANCE

31 JUL 63-MFR REGARDING AN INDIVIDUAL WHO BROKE INTO SUBJECT'S HOUSE & ATTEMPTED TO ASSAULT HIS 14 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER. THE ASSAILANT WAS ARRESTED, NO HARM TO DAUGHTER

HARDCOPY-CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE~~ ONLY

02 & 10 MAY 62-MEMOS REGARDING BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION FROM U.S. ARMY

27 JUN 62-CIA BRING-UP-TO-DATE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION TWX. FAVORABLE

22 MAY 63-"Q" CLEARANCE REQUIREMENT INFORMATION & 1962 FAVORABLE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION

26 FEB 64 & 25 MAR 63-POLYGRAPH SCHEDULING MEMOS

BECKY, IF WE CAN BE OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE, PLEASE LET US KNOW. THANKS, CURT.

CC:

Sent on 9 June 1997 at 04:22:02 PM

CL BY: 462125
CL REASON: Section 1 5
DECL ON:
DRV FRM:

From the Desk of Becky L. Rant
DA/IRO

NOTE FOR: Barry Harrolson
FROM: Becky L. Rant
OFFICE: DA/IRO
DATE: 09/17/97 10:57:20 AM
SUBJECT: Travel Records

Barry: I am forwarding to you today copies of the microfilmed accounting ledgers re Charles Ford's travel. The OFL IMO worked with RCF and the copies are somewhat better than those you saw previously. This reflects the search after our visit to OFL to define search terms. I am also forwarding for your information the paperwork that approved the destruction of financial accountings after 6 years 3 months. Please call if you have any questions. Becky

CC:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CL BY: 0663879
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X 1
DRV FRM: COV 1-82

[illegible]

TO: Becky L. Rant
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
OFFICE: HRM/MS/INFO COORDINATOR
DATE: 03/26/97 03:14:55 PM
SUBJECT: Re: CSI access to OPFs in Helms Research

Becky - thanks for your note. I'll be sure you and Frieda are kept advised of all file requests that come to me.

I have received the file on Charles D. Ford from Record Center that Barry H. (JFK) requested and I am forwarding the file thru you for your info - I would appreciate it if Pat could handcarry the file to John Pereira as Barry instructed since he (Barry) is off all week.

Have a wonderful Easter - I will be off on Thurs and Fri (my flex). Take care.

Jeanne

CC: Frieda P. Omasta

Sent on 26 March 1997 at 03:14:55 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10

10

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

6 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review Program
ATTN: JFK Project Officer

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: CIA IR-19 (DA/IRO No. 32)

1. This is in response to your 5 August 1998 memorandum (attached) wherein you requested that the Directorate of Administration (DA) conduct searches on the following names identified in CIA-IR-19 of the 27 July 1998 ARRB memorandum (attached). Specifically, upon the DA's review of the 27 July memorandum, we advised your office that we had no record of ever having been tasked to conduct searches on these names.

    Andrew "Andy" Anderson
    Howard Guebler
    Gordon Duane Novel
    Edward Scannel Butler III, Director, Information Council of the Americas (INCA)

2. The Center for CIA Security (CCS) conducted a search (memorandum attached) in the Personnel Security Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database and, based upon the information provided, was able to identify that the names of Gordon Duane NOVEL and Edward Scannel BUTLER are cross-referenced in Volume II of the following security file:

    "GARRISON CASE" AIN 0 601 153, Vols I-III

    No records were located in CCS on Howard Gueoler or Andrew (Andy) Anderson.

3. Please let us know if you need the volume referred to above. Meanwhile, unless you advise us to the contrary, this concludes DA action on CIA IR-19

4. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me on 31201.

Attachments

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28 July 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: Priority Request from JFK Board

1. This is in response to your 3 February 1997 memorandum (copy attached) wherein you requested, on behalf of the ARRB Staff, a comprehensive file search on the individuals listed below. Specifically, the request is for access to records of possible pertinence to the JFK assassination.

A. Leo Cherne
B. Hunter Leake
C. Paul Garbler
D. Byron B. Morton, Jr.
E. Marie Cheatham
F. Verna Deane Brown
G. John A. MMcVickar

2. In response to your 3 February memorandum, the Office of Human Resource Management (HRM), the Office of Medical Services (OMS), the Office of Personnel Security (OPS), and the Office of Training (OTE) conducted thorough searches and attached are copies of their response memoranda.

3. In discussions with Jeanne of HRM, it is my understanding that you still have the files that HRM located on Cherne, Leake, Garbler, Brown and McVickar. HRM was unable to locate records on Morton and Cheatham.

4. As noted in OMS' 10 February memorandum, OMS located medical charts on Leake, Garbler and George Brown which you can review if you make arrangements with OMS as noted in OMS' memorandum. Also note that if a file exists on Verna Brown, it will be included with her husband's chart. OMS was unable to locate records on Cherne, Morton, Cheatham or McVickar.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. As noted in OPS' memorandum, OPS was only able to locate files on Cherne, Leake and Garbler. However, after a careful review, they determined that there is no information contained in the files that links the individuals to or pertains to JFK or to the JFK assassination. They also found reference in Verna Dean Brown husband's file that she was employed by the Department of State.

6. OTE was only able to locate a record on Paul Garbler. However, the record does not pertain to the JFK assassination.

7. This concludes DA action on this request. If you have questions, please feel free to call me on 31201.

Attachments: As Stated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF ATTACHMENTS

From the Desk of Jeanne Kardaras
Human Resource Management/Information Coordinator

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
DATE: 12/23/96 12:25:48 PM
SUBJECT: Priority Requests from JFK Board dated 17 December 1996 (JFK-1K-127

I have completed my search of all Human Resource Management records and have not found any information on the following two individuals listed in your request:

a. Spas T. Raikin - SSN: 085-30-7690, DOB: Oct 26, 1922

b. Marilyn Dorothy Murret - DOB: July 14, 1928

The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive records.
Please advise if I can be of further assistance.

Jeanne

cl by: 0663879, cl reason: 1.5(c), decl on: X1, drv from: cov 1-82.

CC: Gary L. Moore
Frieda P. Omasta
Lee S. Strickland
Mary V. Amoia-Y- @ DCI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
CSI/HRG, JFK Project Officer

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Priority Requests from JFK Board

REFERENCE: Request dated 17 December 1996

1. (C) In response to referenced request for "additional files" searches on Spas T. Raikin and Marilyn Dorothy Murret, the Office of Personnel Security conducted appropriate searches of the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). MDP/PS is the automated database of security records used by the Office of Personnel Security. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to uncover all responsive records.

2. (C) The Office of Personnel Security has a file on Spas T. Raikin (#0134669). This file reflects that in August 1957 Foreign Documents Division/OO requested a clearance on Spas T. Raikin for unclassified contract employment with Project U.S. Joint Publications Research Service in New York City on an unwitting basis. The Office of Security responded there was no information which would preclude use of Mr. Raikin. On 31 January 1967 the Office of Security again granted approval for Mr. Raikin to be used as an unwitting independent contractor with the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service.

3. (C) The Office of Personnel Security does not maintain a security file on Marilyn Dorothy Murret, but there is an index record to an media article dated 1971 from *Computers and Automation*. This article contains the statement that Marylyn Murrett is Lee Harvey Oswald's cousin and that evidence indicates she was involved in espionage activities in Russia and Asia.

4. (U) This review was prepared by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.

CL BY: 0605636
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: SEC 5-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gary Breneman

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: Re: PRIORITY - CIA IR-19 (DA/IRO 32c) JFK/ARRB

REFERENCE: INCA & Permindex

Gary,

As I mentioned in my note of a few minutes ago, noted below is CCS's search response re INCA & Permindex. My records show that all DA action is now complete regarding CIA IR-19 DA/IRO 32a, 32b and 32c). As you were advised in my memoranda dated 6 and 7 August 1998, the Garrison (Volume II refers to Gorder Duane NOVEL and Edward Scannel BUTLER) and the Andrew Clarence Anderson files are available for your review in CCS. Please contact Curt if you wish to see those files. Frieda

Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA

TO: *Frieda P. Omasta@DA*
FROM: *W. Curtis Chaloner*
OFFICE: *CCS/PS/CD/IMB*
DATE: *08/12/98 12:46:19 PM*
SUBJECT: *Re: PRIORITY - CIA IR-19 (DA/IRO 32c) JFK/ARRB*

Frieda, per our telephone conversation CCS has no record for the organizations listed below. Thanks, Curt.

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Curt:

Thank you very much for your status report w/respect to your search on the 38 names and your search re INCA and Permindex.

Pursuant to a call that I received moments ago from Gary Breneman, would it be possible for you to advise as to whether you have located any information on INCA and/or Permindex. Gary is frantically trying to close out IR-19 and your response will assist him greatly. Thanks in advance for addressing these two items separately. Frieda

Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA

32b
done

11 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson, Gary Breneman

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: Re: PRIORITY - Name Traces for JFK/ARRB - Andrew (Andy) Anderson

REFERENCE: CIA IR-19/DA/IRO 32b

Barry:

Below is the HRM response w/respect to its search for files on Anderson, Guebler, Novel and Butler.

CCS is still working on CIA IR-19/DA/IRO 32c w/respect to its search for records on INCA and Permindex.

Frieda

Original Text of Daniel J. Mulqueen-Y-

Original Text of Daniel J. Mulqueen-Y-

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA
FROM: Daniel J. Mulqueen-Y-
OFFICE: HRM
DATE: 08/07/98 01:25:05 PM
SUBJECT: Re: PRIORITY - Name TRaces for JFK/ARRB - Andrew (Andy) Anderson

Frieda,

I have completed searches for Andrew Anderson as Anderson for maximum hits, on Howard Guebler under Guebler, on Gordon Novel under Novel and Edward Butler under Butler, all last names for maximum possible hits. My searchs on these four individuals produced no hits, no records, and no indexed data on one and all.

I note the presumption "Evidently, he (Anderson) was a former employee" because he had a AIN number of 0 800211. An AIN number is an Agency Identification Number, not necessarily suggesting an "employee" relationship. An "EIN" is an Employee Identification Number, but what categories of employment fall under it, I'm not prepared to say.

Dan

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Dan,

Barry Harrelson, the JFK Project Officer, is requesting that you search once again under the name of Andrew (Andy) Anderson in light of the fact that CCS has located a file on one Andrew Clarence Anderson (AIN 0 800211). Evidently, he was a former employee. I regret that we did not have this information prior to tasking you the first time.

11

14-00000

CIA-IR-25

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONL~~Y

6 May 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI

FROM: Becky L. Rant

OFFICE: DA/IRO

SUBJECT: ARRB Special Request - Zapruder Film

REFERENCE:

Barry: HRM's response follows to your request for the address of "Holmer McMann". This sounds like the individual you described--spelling different. As stated, McMahon resigned in 1970 and the Agency has no current address or record of whether or not he is still alive. If you want us to pull the file to determine his address while he was an employee, let me now. That info, of course, is 28 years old. Becky

TO: Becky L. Rant
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
OFFICE: HRM/MS/INFO COORDINATOR
DATE: 05/05/97 04:41:06 PM
SUBJECT: Re: ARRB Request

Becky -

I have located information on a former employee named Homer Albert McMahon, DOB: 6 Jan 1928, who (first) EOD'd 22 Sept 1952 and resigned on 20 March 1953 (GS-03) - his title was photographer. He reEOD'd on 30 Oct 1960 and resigned on 11 Sept 1970 - (GS-11) - his title was photographer and he was assigned to NPIC. HRM would have no address listing for this individual. Mr. McMahon's retired official personnel file is at Record Center.

Please advise if I may be of further assistance.

Jeanne

CC: Frieda P. Omasta
Sent on 5 May 1997 at 04:41:06 PM

CC: Frieda P. Omasta
Teresa Wilcox @ DST

~~ADMINISTRATIVE~~ - INTERNAL USE ONLY

NOTE FOR: Barry Harrolson @ DCI
FROM: Thomas C. Benza
OFFICE: OFL
DATE: 12/24/97 08:37:39 AM
SUBJECT: Search Results - Bill Green and Claude Barnes Capehart

Office of Finance and Logistics has search its files for any information on Mr. William Green at Eastman Kodak. There were no responsive records. We also ran a check on Mr. Claude Barnes Capehart also with negative results.

Any question please call me on extension 58032..

CC: Frieda P. Omasta, Becky L. Rant
Sent on 24 December 1997 at 08:37:39 AM

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

TO: Frieda P. Omasta
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
OFFICE: HRM/MS/INFO COORDINATOR
DATE: 07/23/97 12:55:29 PM
SUBJECT: Re: ARRB Request - Green & Capehart

Frieda -

Based on information provided, I have found no information on the following individual:

Bill (William) Green at the Eastman Kodak lab

The search undertaken was reasonably calculated to uncover all responsive records. Please advise if I may be of further assistance.

Jeanne

CC: Becky L. Rant, J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI, Thomas C. Benza, W. Curtis Chaloner
Sent on 23 July 1997 at 12:55:29 PM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

24 July 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG

VIA: Becky Rant
DDA/IRO

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Assassination Records Review Board Name Trace Request on William Green

REFERENCE: Lotus Note dated 23 July 1967

1. In response to the referenced request, the Office of Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database was searched as requested.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, no security records were located.

3. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
Janet A. Ecklund

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

12

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~~Y

TO: J. Barry Harrelson@DCI
FROM: W. Curtis Chaloner
OFFICE: CCS/PS/CD/IMB
DATE: 08/13/98 12:54:16 PM
SUBJECT: Re: JFK/ARRB Request (PRIORITY) CIA-IR-26 (DA/IRO 34)

Barry, the Center for CIA Security had a file for a PFUNTER, Jordan J., DPOB (?) 07 May 1902, Akron, Ohio. This file was destroyed circa 1980-1981 following the Records Control Schedule. Thanks, Curt.
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Curt,
On behalf of ARRB, please conduct a search for records on Jordan James Pfunter. Please respond directly to J. Barry Harrelson with a copy to Becky and me. Thank you. Frieda

CC: John K. Reilly@DA, Becky L. Rant@DA, Frieda P. Omasta@DA, Gary M. Breneman-Y-@DCI
Sent on 13 August 1998 at 12:54:16 PM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE~~ ONLY

13

14-00000

4,

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE~~ ONLY

13

From the Desk of Frieda P. Omasta

NOTE FOR: W. Curtis Chaloner @ DA
FROM: Frieda P. Omasta
OFFICE: ADA/IRO
DATE: 02/06/98 05:26:24 AM
SUBJECT: PRIORITY - CIA-IR-27 - ARRB Request for Security Files on 5 Individuals (DA/IRO No. 14)

Curt:

In response to CIA-IR-27, on 26 September 1997 OPS advised Barry Harrelson (JFK Project Officer) that security records are available for review by his office on the following individuals:

NAGELL, Richard C.
NOVEL, Gordon D.
RUBY, Jack L.
SHERIDAN, Walter J.
WEISBERG, Harold

Barry has just advised that the files on Nagell, Novel and Ruby have been identified as Assassination Records. Accordingly, they have requested that OPS transfer these files to DCI/CSI/HRG (J. Barry Harrelson) for inclusion in these records. Barry has further advised that a copy of the documents from each file would be acceptable if OPS prefers.

This is with respect to the files on Walter J. SHERIDAN and Harold WEISBERG. Barry has asked that arrangements be made for these files to be reviewed by the ARRB to determine which documents in each of these files are Assassination Records. In light of a short deadline, it is requested that the arrangements be made early in February. Once documents have been selected, Barry will need copies of those documents as well.

Please keep Becky and me posted with respect to these requests. Thanks in advance for your assistance. Frieda

CC: Becky L. Rant @ DA
J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI
Katie Nakai
Sent on 6 February 1998 at 05:26:24 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE ~~INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

26 September 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG

VIA: Becky Rant
DDA/IRO

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Records Search Request for the
Assassination Records Review Board

REFERENCE: Lotus Note dated 26 September 1997

1. In response to the referenced request, the Office of Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database was searched.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, the following security records were located. These security records are available for review by your office after prior written notification.

NAGELL, Richard C.	AIN 0 264 170
NOVEL, Gordon D.	AIN 0 526 113
RUBY, Jack L.	AIN 0 261 219
SHERIDAN, Walter J.	AIN 0 101 572
WEISBERG, Harold	AIN 0 018 281

3. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
Janet A. Ecklund

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

14

17. dr

14

New Memo\Standard

26 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: Assassination Records Review Board Request

REFERENCE: Lewinter aka Lewirter

Barry:

With Curt's response referred to below, this concludes DA action on this request. HRM and OFSS were negative. As you know, OFSS led OPS to the files as summarized by Curt. Frieda

Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

From the Desk of

From the Desk of W. Curtis Chaloner
Information Review (40552)

NOTE FOR: *J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI*
FROM: *W. Curtis Chaloner*
OFFICE: *OPS/CD/IMB/INFORMATION REVIEW*
DATE: *11/26/97 12:24:59 PM*
SUBJECT: *Assassination Records Review Board Request*

Barry, attached is the official OPS response. Thanks, Curt.

DOC1.DOC

CC: *Janet A. Ecklund*
Becky L. Rant
Frieda P. Omasta
Sent on 26 November 1997 at 12:24:59 PM

CC: Becky L. Rant

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

26 November 1997

Memorandum For The Record

Subject: LeWinter, Oswald

Oswald LeWinter came to the attention of the Office of Security in December 1991. CIA/Public Affairs advised LeWinter apparently approached the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) claiming to be a former CIA officer. LeWinter volunteered to provide information about Agency operations overseas. His offer was in conjunction with a six part television series being produced by the BBC based upon the book "The Agency" by John Ranelagh.

LeWinter is a known fabricator and has used the following aliases; Oscar LeWinter, Ibrahimin Razin, Razin LeWinter. LeWinter is indexed to the OS crank file.

LeWinter is also known as a fabricator to the DDC.

N. Curtis Chaloner
DDA/OPS/CD IMB
Information Review

[illegible]

101

~~SECRET~~

December 1997

NOTE TO: ARRB Staff

SUBJECT: Further Clarification

REFERENCE: ARRB Request Regarding Oswald LeWinter

Clarification:

Oswald LeWinter is a naturalized US citizen and a man of at least four other names -- George Mearah, Oscar LeWinter, Razin LeWinter, and Ibrahimin Razin. Although he appeared in the East German *Who's Who in CIA*, the CIA has never had any **official** affiliation with LeWinter. LeWinter was the subject of an Agency "burn notice" in 1990; a burn notice alerts the intelligence community. In this case, the alert advised that LeWinter was an intelligence swindler, peddler, and fabricator. (C)

CIA has a report of an episode involving an intelligence fabricator and convicted drug dealer Oswald LeWinter, AKA George Mearah, born 2 April 1931, in Vienna, Austria. In July 1991, a CIA representative overseas reported that LeWinter, using the name of George Mearah, contacted him and offered to put high-level GDR officials wishing to defect in touch with our representative and in turn the CIA. This contact would be in exchange for help and a presidential pardon that would wipe the slate clean and leave LeWinter (Mearah) without a record as a convicted felon. LeWinter (Mearah) claimed this was important he was married (for the third time) and starting a new life; he was reportedly considering quietly acquiring Israeli citizenship. This contact was not followed up because of the "burn notice." (S)

BACKGROUND USE ONLY
DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

[redacted]

LeWinter also came to the attention of the Office of Security in December 1991. The CIA's Public Affairs advised that LeWinter apparently approached the British Broadcasting corporation (BBC) claiming to be a former CIA officer. LeWinter volunteered to provide information about Agency operations overseas. His offer was in conjunction with a six-part television series being produced by the BBC based on the book "The Agency" by John Ranelagh. (U)

BACKGROUND USE ONLY
DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

[redacted]

15

15

14-00000

26

5

10 March 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Jeremy Gunn, Esq.
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Reviewer, HRP

SUBJECT: ARRB Request No. CIA-IR-36, For Information On Processing of Incoming Cables

1. The following and the attachment are responsive to subject request. The attachment is an extract of the pertinent text from a memorandum provided by the Directorate of Operations.

2. If you have any questions concerning this response, please advise.

J. Barry Harrelson

Att.

FOR YOUR COORDINATION:

Becky Rant *
Becky Rant, DA/IRO

16 March 1998
Date

*Re Para 3 – The Cable Secretariat was part of the Office of the Director until 1972 when it was placed in the Office of Communications. See attached [illegible]

ATTACHMENT TO 10 MARCH 1998 MEMORANDUM RE: CIA-IR-36

1. Per the Review Board staff's request the following is a brief explanation of how the Directorate of Operations (DO) processed cables in the 1963/1964 time-frame. As we are unable to locate any definitive records on the subject, and in all probability none ever existed, the information provided is based solely on the memory of DO officers familiar with procedures in place at the time.

2. Each area division in the DO maintained and staffed its own registry. Although each registry was configured to meet each division's unique requirements, there were common functions performed by all the registries to include: collecting, sorting, and delivering of incoming cables; maintenance of incoming and outgoing cable "chronos"; collecting and delivering of incoming and outgoing pouch material; and the issuance and maintenance of "pseudo and alias" card files.

[illegible] of Director

3. To the specific question regarding processing of cables, on a daily basis, usually six day per week, each registry collected its incoming cable traffic from a central processing point, then called the Cable Secretariate, within the ~~Office of~~ Communications. The incoming cables were then sorted by registry personnel according to pre-defined guidelines. These guidelines were unique to each division and were frequently altered to meet changing operational requirements. Sorted cables were then delivered to specific operational/area desks. A "chrono" copy of each was maintained, on a temporary basis, usually for 90 days and then destroyed.

4. Outgoing cables were created and coordinated by appropriate operational/area desks and usually released by the chief of the division or a designated releasing officer. "Released" cables were then hand delivered or sent by pneumatic tube system (a system long ago dismantled from the original Headquarters building) to Cable Secretariate for processing into the Agency's communication network. "Chrono" copies of outgoing cables were forwarded to the registry for a 90 day hold and then destroyed.

5. It is important to note that the cable scenario outlined here is general in nature and that throughout their existence registries and their procedures were frequently altered until the registry system as described above was eliminated in the mid-1980's.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(This notice is NOT to be filed in Agency manuals. Please destroy after reading.)

ORGANIZATION

HN 1-80
1 February 1972

~~[illegible] COPY~~

TRANSFER OF THE CABLE SECRETARIAT

Effective 1 February 1972, the Cable Secretariat is transferred from the Office of the Director to the Office of Communications, Directorate for Support.

W. E. Colby
W. E. Colby
Executive Director-Comptroller

DISTRIBUTION: AB

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CABLE SEC

16

14-00000

ARRB request re 7 July memo —Advance copy 8/4/98 (16)

HSCA Names

Alvarado, Gilberto
Arcacha-Smith, Sergio
Azcue Lopez, Esuebio
Cabell, Earle
Calderon, Luisa
Cheme, Leo
Cobb, June Viola
Conein, Lucien E.
de Mohrenschildt, George
Diosdado, Cesar
Duran, Silvia Tirado de
Ferrie, David W.
Garrision, James
Garro de Paz, Elena
Gutierrez Menoyo, Eloy
Hall, Loren Eugene
Heming, Gerald Patrick
Johnson, Priscilla Mary Post
Kantor, Marvin
Kostikov, Valeriy Vladimirovich
Martin, Jack
Masferrer y Rojas, Rolando
McMillan, Priscilla Johnson
McVickar, John Anthony
Nagell, Richard Case
Odio, Sylvia
Pawley, William D.
Proenza, Maria Teresa
Raikin, Spas
Ray, Manuel
Ruby, Jack
Salvat Roque, Juan Manuel
Shaw, Clay
Snyder, Richard E.
turgis, Frank Anthony (aka Fioriri)
Veciana, Antonio Carlos Blanch
Webster, Robert Edward
Werbell, Mitchell Livingston III

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA
FROM: W. Curtis Chaloner
OFFICE: CCS/PS/CD/IMB
DATE: 08/14/98 09:07:44 AM
SUBJECT: Re: ARRB - 38 names DA/IRO 33

Frieda, thank you for the kind words, however, I do not deserve them as I was not completely thorough. The oversight was not intentional. Please see attached. Thanks, Curt.

OGCRECD.DOC

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Curt,

Thanks so very much for your most thorough and prompt response this request. However, would you please let us know what, if any, records you may have found on four other names that are identified on the original list? Thanks Frieda

Elena Garro de Paz
Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo
Jack Ruby
Clay Shaw

CC: John K. Reilly@DA, Becky L. Rant@DA, J. Barry Harrelson@DCI, Gary M. Breneman-Y-@DCI

Sent on 14 August 1998 at 09:07:44 AM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

14 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

FROM: John K. Reilly
Chief, Information Management Branch
Center for CIA Security

SUBJECT: Records Search Request
HSCA Names from ARRB

REFERENCE: ADA/IRO MFR dated 13 August 1998

1. In response to the referenced request, Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database and the predecessor to MDP, the Security Automated Name Check Activity (SANCA) were searched.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, the Center for CIA Security has located Security Records which may or may not be identifiable, specific to and/or referenced to, with your request. These records are available for review by your office after prior written notification.

3. RUBY, Jack and SHAW, Clay are cross-referenced to AIN 7 191 689, the Garrison File. IMB has possession of the Garrison File.

4. The Center for CIA Security has no record of a GARRO DE PAZ, Elena or GUTIERREZ MENOYO, Eloy.

5. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
John K. Reilly

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

13 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

FROM: John K. Reilly
Chief, Information Management Branch
Center for CIA Security

SUBJECT: Records Search Request
HSCA Names from ARRB

REFERENCE: ADA/IRO MFR dated 07 August 1998

1. In response to the referenced request, Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database and the predecessor to MDP, the Security Automated Name Check Activity (SANCA) were searched.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, the Center for CIA Security has located Security Records which may or may not be identifiable, specific to and/or referenced to, with your request (attachment A). These records are available for review by your office after prior written notification.

3. Attachment B reflects Security Records which may or may not be identifiable, specific, and/or referenced to your request which were destroyed under the Records Control Schedule.

4. Attachment C reflects those individuals whom the Center for CIA Security has no record.

5. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
John K. Reilly

ATTACHMENT A

The following Security Records are in the possession of Information Management Branch or enroute and are available for your office's review here at CCS/IMB. The Center for CIA Security defers to the Assassinations Records Review

Board regarding documents which could be considered relevant.

		Post 1978 Memoranda
CHERNE, Leo	AIN 0 053 082	UNKNOWN
CONEIN, Lucien E.	AIN 0 005 025	YES
DEMOHRENSCHILDT, George	AIN 0 000 775	NO
DIOSDADO, Cesar	AIN 0 432 469	NO
DURAN, Silvia Tirado de	AIN 0 351 164 = Oswald File	
CCS record reflects listing as Duran, Silvia.		
FERRIE, David W.	AIN 7 191 869 = Garrison File	
Ferrie is also cross-referenced to AIN 0 546 933 (Whelan, John Edward) which was destroyed, according to the Records Control Schedule, on 30 April 1997.		
FIORINI, Frank	AIN 0 353 459 = Sturgis File	
HALL, Loren Eugene	AIN 0 348 627	YES
	AIN 7 191 869 = Garrison File	
CCS record reflects listing and Security File (hardcopy) as Loran not Loren.		
JOHNSON, Priscilla Mary Post		YES
	AIN 0 071 589	
CCS record reflects listing under McMillan, Priscilla J..		
KANTOR, Marvin	AIN 0 539 326	YES
CCS record reflects listing also as Kantor, Melvin.		
KOSTIKOV, Valeriy V.	AIN 0 261 091	NO
MCMILLAN, Priscilla Johnson		YES
	AIN 0 071 589	

CCS record reflects McMillan also cross-referenced to Alliluyeva, Svetlana. The Security File (hardcopy) reflects

ATTACHMENT A CONTINUED

Stalina, Svetlana I.. The McMillan Security File (hardcopy) reflects Macmillan not McMillan.

MARTIN, Jack. CCS records reflect the three following individuals who may or may not be identifiable with your request.

MARTIN, Jack M.	AIN 1 254 357	YES

MARTIN, Jack S. AIN 0 651 268 YES

MARTIN, Lawrence J. AIN 0 634 475 YES

MASFERRER Y ROJAS, Rolando NO
AIN 0 036 859
CCS record reflects listing as Masferrer, Rolando Rojas.
Masferrer is also cross-referenced to AIN 0 780 397
(Montreuil, Raymond A.). NO

MCVICKAR, John Anthony AIN 0 269 351 YES
CCS record reflects listing as McVickar, John **A.**

NAGELL, Richard Case AIN 0 264 170 YES

ODIO, Sylvia AIN 0 351 164 = Oswald File
AIN 0 351 164-6 =-Oswald File

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 078 435 NO

RAIKIN, Spas AIN 0 134 669 YES

SNYDER, Richard E. AIN 0 038 984 YES

STURGIS, Frank Anthony AIN 0 353 459 YES

WEBSTER, Robert Edward AIN 1 258 236 YES
CCS record reflects listing as Webster, Robert.
Webster is also cross-referenced to AIN 0 387 123
(Whittaker, Frederick). YES

WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III YES
AIN 0 027 686
CCS record reflects listing as Werbell, Mitchell L.

ATTACHMENT B

The following Security Records were destroyed in accordance with the Records Control Schedule.

		DESTRUCTION DATE
ARCACHA-SMITH, Sergio	AIN 0 523 948	1994
AZCUE LOPEZ, Esuebio	AIN 0 352 838	25 October 1994
CABELL, Earle	AIN 0 033 554	circa 1980-1981
COBB, June	AIN 0 216 264	1994

GARRISON, James AIN 0 535 449 1994
HSCA list reflects Garrision, James. CCS has no record.

HEMMING, Gerald Patrick AIN 0 592 464 circa 1980-1981
HSCA list reflects Heming or Henning, CCS has no record of either.

HEMMING, Gerald Patrick AIN 0 429 229 04 August 1995
HSCA list reflects Heming or Henning, CCS has no record of either.

MASFERRER Y ROJAS, Rolando
AIN 0 352 772 25 October 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Masferrer Rojas, Rolando Arcadio.

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 350 653 24 October 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Pawley, William.

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 346 416 20 October 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Pawley, William.

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 121 104 circa 1980-1981

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 357 552 circa 1980-1981

PROENZA, Maria Teresa AIN 0 342 000-A circa 1980-1981
CCS record reflects listing as Proenza, Teresa.

PROENZA, Maria Teresa AIN 0 317 003 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Proenza, Teresa.

ATTACHMENT B CONTINUED

SALVAT ROQUE, Juan Manuel
AIN 0 219 999 circa 1980-1981
CCS record reflects listing as Salvat, Juan Manuel.

SNYDER, Richard E. AIN 0 389 179 03 June 1995

STURGIS, Frank Anthony AIN 0 343 309 circa 1980-1981
CCS record reflects listing as Sturgis, Frank.

STURGIS, Frank Anthony AIN 0 349 691 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Sturgis, Frank.

VECIANA, Antonio Carlos Blanch
AIN 0 256 167 1994

WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AIN 0 256 167 1994

CCS record reflects listing as Werbell, Mitchell Livingston.

ATTACHMENT C

The Center for CIA Security has no record of the following individuals.

ALVARADO, Gilberto

CALDERON, Luisa

RAY, Manuel

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Declaration of Teresa F. Wilcox

I, Teresa F. Wilcox, hereby declare and say as follows:

1. (AIUO) I am the Information Review Officer (IRO) for the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T). I was appointed to this position in February 1996, and have held various professional positions within the Central Intelligence Agency since 1985. I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DS&T, to include the Offices of the Deputy Director for Science and Technology and the Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology; the Office of Technical Service (OTS); the Office of Technical Collection (OTC); the Clandestine Information Technology Office (CITO); the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); the Office of Development and Engineering (OD&E); the Office of Advanced Analytic Tools (AAT); the Office of Advanced Projects (OAP); and the Office of Research and Development (ORD). In addition, I am responsible for searching and reviewing certain records of the former National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).

2. (AIUO) I am aware that the DS&T has searched appropriate records systems for information responsive to all requests the DS&T has received. I have obtained this knowledge through my personal experience, as well my conversations with, and my review of the records of, the former DS&T IRO Anthony R. Frasketi, and the DS&T Information Management Officer, Marsha A. Hubbs.

3. (AIUO) The following is a description of DS&T searches and review of documents undertaken in response to Board taskings the DS&T has received.

CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart. The DS&T made deletions to security records located by the Directorate of Administration. The DS&T Searched ODDS&T records for Capehart's medical file. The DS&T forwarded the medical file to the Board for its review.

CIA-IR-08 Family Jewels Memorandum. The DS&T reviewed a package of documents forwarded by Barry Harrelson. The DS&T advised the Board it had no objection to ARRB access.

CIA-IR-15 Electronic 'take' from Mexico City Station. This memorandum addresses the portion of the action, "In addition, the Board is still awaiting a response on the present location of Staff D records. Regardless of the outcome of these particular searches, the Review Board continues to seek a full accounting for all surveillance conducted during the relevant time periods."

In conducting a search for the above information, the DS&T located in OTS records a file with the folder title, "Mexico City, Mexico." We forwarded the entire contents of that folder for the period 24 May 1961 to 10 June 1965, with one exception. Three Operational Monthly Reports were forwarded to the Board. The dates covered were 1-30 September 1963; 1-31 October 1963; and 1-30 November 1963. The attachment to Dispatch HMMA 20307 dated 4 December 1962 was not included. It was a poor-quality audio tape in Spanish, between two individuals talking about office procedures. No substantive information was exchanged during this conversation.

The DS&T also conducted a search of OTC records. This office would have inherited the Division D records of the Directorate of Operations (DO). We reviewed old DO Records Retirement Requests; there are no shelflists (folder-inventory) associated with these Records Retirement Requests since the Division D records were recorded initially in the DO system. We forwarded for the Board's review the six Records Retirement Request whose job numbers reflected the years 1959 to 1962. We advised the Board that Records Center records indicated the records' disposition as follows:

1. 59-S-477: Destroyed September 1977.
2. 60-S-182R: Destroyed May 1980.
3. 60-S-402: Transferred to FI/D(DDO), December 1977.
4. 61-S-157R: Four boxes transferred to FI/D (DDO), March 1972; three boxes destroyed, May 1980.
5. 62-S-885: Destroyed (no date given).
6. 62S000986R: Transferred to the Office of SIGINT Operations (DS&T).

These were the only Records Retirement Requests in the possession of OTC that are in the time frame relevant to the JFK assassination. As their descriptions indicate, they do not appear relevant to the request.

The DS&T also conducted a search of CITO records. This DS&T office inherited some files from OTC when CITO was established. We searched its records in the event some Division D records were held by CITO. These searches identified no responsive records.

Searches of OTS, OTC, and CITO records used the following keywords:

surveil*
Russian
USSR
Cuba*
audio*
electron*
embassy
Mexico*

CIA-IR-16 U-2 Files. The DS&T provided the Board a copy of the U-2 shelflist. We also searched for records filed under Richard Bissell's name. We received no follow-on request from the Board.

CIA-IR-16 FBIS-USR-92-112. The DS&T provided to the Board a translation of articles about a KGB file on Oswald.

CIA-IR-17 DS&T Records on Castro Assassination Plots. Records of the ODDS&T, OTC, and OTS were searched for the following keywords: Castro, Oswalt, Oswald, assas*, and KDBADGER. In addition, we searched OTS records on the following: Project ZRRIFLE, Mollusca, Cubela, Black Leaf, ballpoint pen, hypodermic syringe, Artime, silencer, gambling, aerosol, cigar, depilatory, wiretapping, Phyllis McGuire, skin diving suit, sea shell, and project AMLASH. As a result of these searches, we provided to the Board a document titled, "Handwriting Analysis - AMLASH-1," dated 7 April 1965.

CIA-IR-25 Zapruder Film. A search was conducted on records of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (records of the former National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and Office of Imagery Analysis) using the terms Zapruder, JFK, Commission, and 1963. Hits on year 1963 did not reveal any pertinent information. We located no record of a "William Green" at NPIC in November 1963. We located no log books or indexes regarding the processing or handling of any assassination films. We also reviewed an audiotaped interview with a former NPIC employee, and made minimal deletions to the tape.

CIA-IR-33 Search of FBIS records for any files on Oswald, and request for information on how FBIS-USR92-112 was filed. No past or present files were found. An explanation on how FBIS-USR-92-112 was filed was provided.

Review of three Ford Library Documents (178-10003-10453, 178-10004-10087, 178-10002-10394. Made deletions and deferred to the DO on 178-10002-10394. Made deletions to Summary Report on CIA Investigation of MKNAOMI.

Review of two terms. The DS&T advised that the terms should not be released because of ongoing CIA activity at the location.

Review of Alias Documentation issue (104-10220-10179, -10181, and -10188). Requested that Board postpone release of specific information. A search of OTS records indicated OTS had no records on particular documents in the 1960s and 1970s.

Review of a slug in current use. Requested that the Board postpone its release because the slug is in current use.

Review of Organizational Charts of all Agency directorates for the years 1958-1968 (CIA-1). Requested deletions.

Review of the proposed release of an Agency facility. Provided information about DS&T activities at risk if this facility were acknowledged.

Review of records regarding the release of the name of Jose Marie Mankel. Provided information about the potential chilling effect on current operations.

Review of documents concerning a certain entity in the CIA Sequestered Collection which are Not Believed Relevant (NBR)to the JFK assassination. Four documents had been previously released (one was released in full, and three were sanitized); eight documents had been denied in full. The Board determined that four documents were NBR.

Review of the Board's request to review an index resulting from the CIA's History Staff's review of 61 histories for any connection to the JFK assassination. The DS&T concurred in the Board's review of the index.

4. (U) Based on this information, I have concluded that the DS&T has diligently searched and reviewed all requests for information from the Board that the DS&T has received.

5. (U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in Langley, Virginia on this 21st day of August 1998.

T.F. Wilcox

Teresa F. Wilcox

~~SECRET~~

JFK Declaration of FREDRICK C. WICKHAM, JR.

I, Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr. declare and say as follows:

1. (U) I am the JFK Focal point Officer ("FPO") for the Directorate of Operations ("DO") of the United States Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). I have held technical positions associated with the design and implementation of computer systems, information management positions including the DO IMO, and currently manage the DO information review and release programs. I have been with the CIA since 1967 and have been associated with the JFK records review activity since 1992 and the JFK FPO since 1995.

2. (U) I have obtained the information contained in this declaration based upon my personal knowledge and experience, as well as conversations with the DO Information Review Officer, the DO Information Management Officer and individuals taking action on the specific requests.

3. (U) DO records were predominately paper with a hard copy card index in the 1960's and an electronic index in the 1970's. The indices were based upon names that meet specific collection requirements or projects that were undertaken in the performance of our mission. Searches that exceeded the capability of the indices required manual paper file searches. I am aware that the DO searched the central record system, which includes retired records, and hand searched the convenience files and specialized files located within various offices. Specialized collections are often extremely sensitive and therefore only reside within the components. During our newer searches we have not found any significant documents in the DO files dated 1978 or prior that appear to have been missed by the searches through 1978. We did locate one set of tapes which we know was made available to the Warren Commission but was not included in the HSCA sequestered collection. We also found one file that was only partially included in the HSCA sequestered collection.

CL BY 0524343
REASON 1.5C
DECL X1
DRV MIS 5-82

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

4. (S) Many of the searches performed today are not significantly different than the ones done during the period of the various commissions and committees. The searches performed since 1995 still use the index to the central record system the same as in 1978 but we have a couple of new databases that were not available in 1978. We now capture all cable traffic electronically and are able to perform text searches of that repository. That repository post-dates the HSCA so it is not useful in locating older records. Additionally, we have converted a small amount of very sensitive paper files into computer searchable form. While these specific collections are part of the DO's record system, they were not electronically searchable nor were they included within the indices to the DO's central records system. We have searched all of these records systems for information responsive to requests the DO has received. Some of the specific requests could not be satisfied by the electronic searches and we resorted to manual paper searches in an effort to locate the information.

5. (U) The DO provided several briefings to the Assassination Records Review Board and their staff, starting in 1995, to describe the records created by the DO and the record system that manages that information. We also described what is meant by the need to continue protection of sources and methods, and the impacts the revelation of information would have on the lives of individuals and current operations. The presenters included the Agency's General Counsel, Deputy Director for Operations, Chief of the Information Management Staff, and several other DO managers associated with the conduct of operations and protection of sources and methods. We also provided detailed descriptions of current operations. We provided information about specific individuals whose lives or livelihood would be threatened as examples of harm that would occur if certain information was released. Additionally, we presented a description of the operational environment that existed and the intensity under which searches were performed in the wake of the assassination.

6. (U) The CIA issued an Agency-wide employee bulletin for a new search for JFK Assassination records (OIM 98-0081, dated 30 July 1998). As requested by the ARRB, the DO distributed the employee bulletin via Lotus Notes on 17

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

August and placed it on the morning message that people receive when they first log onto the system.

7. (U) We have received numerous specific requests for additional information. Based on personal knowledge and on information reflected in our records, I am aware of the following efforts that were conducted in responding to specific ARRB requests for DO records. I have abbreviated the questions to save space:

CIA-1 - Information on the organization of CIA

(U) The March 1995 ARRB request called for the availability of "comprehensive organizational charts (or the best available substitutes)." The request contained about three pages of various requirements, including:

A. organizational charts of the Directorate of Plans (DDP); "CIA Stations . . . in Mexico City (1960-68 only), Miami, other stations that we will discuss orally;" any other offices . . . any pro-Castro groups, . . . or anti-Castro groups;

B. names and affiliations of all CIA personnel responsible for liaison with the Warren Commission, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, . . .;

C. all manuals, handbooks, . . . guides explaining: . . . organizational structure, . . . filing systems, . . . for drafting memoranda;

D. copies of the instructions, guidelines, and other materials used by your reviewers;

(U) Over a thousand pages of material were provided in responding to this request.

(U) In May 1997 the ARRB further requested that 35 pages from CSN 5-50, 2 pages of the JMWAVE chart, and

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

13 pages from Regulation No. 1-130 and HR #1 be reviewed for release.

(U) Although the AARB staff had access to all of the requested material, in January 1998 the Agency answered that the various CSN 5-50 pages contained basic information regarding the mission and functions of the Office of Operations (now the Directorate of Operations (DO)) and could not be released. However, in April 1998, we agreed to provide structure charts for the DDP in 1961 and 1963, with Division and Staff titles and a JMWAVE Chart.

CIA-2 - Confirmation of/Queries About Some Information

(U) The ARRB request was dated May 1995 and was six pages of file code numbers, crypts, names, dispatch designators, and cable location designators and requested identification thereof. A variety of methods of responses was utilized, (some dated June and July 1995 and some undated) to answer, including a paired listing (returned to CIA) microfilm file summary sheets, and descriptive sheets.

CIA-3 - Confirmation of/Queries About Some Information

(U) This ARRB request was dated June 1995 and was three more pages of queries similar to CIA-2. A variety of methods of responses was utilized, (some dated June 1995 and some undated) to answer, including a paired listing marked (returned to CIA), microfilm file summary sheets, and handwritten notes.

CIA-4 -- Confirmation of/Queries About Some Information

(U) This four-page ARRB request dated June 1995 was for "descriptions of each crypt, a brief identification of each individual . . . , and indications of whether these crypts, operations, and individuals are presently active or inactive." This request was answered orally and by informal notes.

CIA-5 -- Queries About Some Information

(U) This ARRB request was dated July 1995 and was for identification of some twelve crypts, names, file codes, or acronyms. This was answered by a paired listing dated July 1995 (Returned to CIA).

CIA-6 -- Request for Systematic Review of Traffic

(U) This request was dated September 1995 and was for "the CIA to assemble all of the cable traffic and dispatches for . . . September 26, 1963 through October 20, 1963 and November 22, 1963 through December 30, 1963 between" . . . Mexico City and Headquarters and Mexico City and JMWAVE.

(C) The DO provided a classified response in January 1998. All cable traffic and dispatches for the period September 26, 1963 through October 20, 1963 and November 22, 1963 through December 30, 1963 between: (a) the Mexico city Station and Headquarters, and (B) the Mexico City Station and JMWAVE are not available as a chronological collection. The Office of Communications (OC) only held cables long enough to ensure that they were successfully transmitted to the recipient. Because processes and resources to perform cleanup activity varies, cables were sometimes held for longer periods but not with the intention of becoming a long-term reference collection. The offices of record for the origination of cable traffic and dispatches did not create files in this manner. The desks maintained a temporary paper cable chrono. These were not usually retained for more than 90 days. There is no electronic repository for cables and dispatches from the stations. Cables were printed out and went into specific files dealing with subjects or operations. Accordingly, it is not possible to recreate as a collection all of the requested cables and dispatches.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

CIA - 7 - Review of CIA Histories

(S) ARRB staffers Jeremy Gunn and Michelle Combs have reviewed all of the requested histories except one still under pre-review by the component because of sensitive information -- we expect this to be resolved in the near future. They were granted access to identify any relevance to the assassination of President Kennedy. They selected a number of pages to be included within the materials to be declassified and released to the National Archives. The histories reviewed were as follows:

- *Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba,* written by Colonel J. Hawkins, USMC, on 5 May 1961, and controlled by WH division.
- *Domestic Operations Base,* written by Perry E. Crookham, in May 1967, and controlled by SO Division. We are also aware that relevant parts of pp. 29-31 have been released in the Bay of Pigs declassification project.
- The TS history entitled *Foreign Intelligence Staff/Division D 1948-1965,* written by Fred Griffin, Frank B. Rowlett, and Vyrl E. Leichliter, in April 1974, and controlled by CIA History Staff.
- *The Stockholm Station, Volume I, II, and III, 1942-1967,* written by William D. O'Ryan, in November 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.
- *The Oslo Station, 1943-January 1968.* This history was written by William D. O'Ryan and Elizabeth Hart, in 1967-1968, and controlled by EUR Division.
- *Covert Action Project Funds, FY 1964 and FY 1965 (With Historical Perspective December 1947 - January 1964),* written by CA Staff, in January 1964, and controlled by CA/PEG.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

- *The Helsinki Station, February 1951-February 1964, Volumes I, II, and III,* written by Melvin W. Jokinen and Hank Jarvinen in 1967, and controlled by EUR.

- *Domestic and Areawide Operations (WH/6) August 1963 - 30 June 1967,* written by Maurice Currie, in June 1968, and controlled by WH Division.

- *Soviet Russia Division -- Reports and Requirements 1945 - 1966, Volumes I, II, and III,* written by Mrs. Elizabeth Sanford Peyton and Anthony Arnold, in June 1973, and controlled by SB.

- *Madrid Station -- Spain, Volume I and II, 1942-1966,* written by David Wright and Gardner MacPherson, in April 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *The Ottawa Station, 1953- 1968,* written by William D. O'Ryan, in April 1968, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *CIA Participation in Police Assistance Programs for Developing Countries, 1955 - October 1965,* written by Robert Bowling, Geraldine L. Jelsch, and Lyle T. Shannon, in October 1965, and controlled by CI Staff.

- *History of Lisbon Station, April 1942 - October 1965,* written by Robert Ruth and John C. Bishop, in October 1965, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *The Maritime Branch (MB) at Headquarters, April 1951 - 1966,* written by S. H. Chapman, in June 1968, and controlled by SO Division.

- *History of The Hague Station 1942 - 1966,* written by Marion Linde and William D. O'Ryan in 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *The Alaska Station (Plans for Operations Aimed at Soviet Siberia From Alaska) 1949 - 1964,* written by

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

George N. Belic and John Bogart in January 1971, and controlled by SB.

- *Western Europe Operations Directed at Cuba 1962 - 1964,* written by WE Division Officers in July 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.
- *Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 - 1966,* written by Alfred T. Cox in August 1968, and controlled by SO Division.
- *Iceland - The History of the Reykjavik Station, 1950 - 1966,* written by Rolfe A. Haatvedt in February 1967 and published in February 1968, and controlled by EUR Division.
- *History of Station Port of Spain, August 1949 - November 1967,* written by Stannard K. Short in March 1969 and published in May 1969, and controlled by WH Division.
- *Monrovia Station -- Liberia, December 1958 - August 1969,* written by C. Frank Stone II, Lester C. Houck, and Louis B. Spaeth in October 1969 and published in January 1970, and controlled by AF Division.
- *The Algiers Station, 1947 - 1965,* written by M. S Caver in December 1972, and controlled by AF.
- *History of the Copenhagen Station, 1943 - 1968,* written by William D. O'Ryan in early 1969 and published in October 1969, and controlled by EUR Division.
- The *History of Tunis Station, March 1956 - October 1968,* written by Louis B. Spaeth in October 1968 and published in December 1969, and controlled by AF Division.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

- *History of the Cyprus Station, 1950 - 1968,* written by Dean L. Dodge in June 1968 and published in July 1969, and controlled by NE Division.

- *History of the Brussels Station, 1942 - 1968, Volumes I and II,* written by William D. O'Ryan in Autumn 1968 and published in May 1969, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *History of the Rangoon Station, 1947 - July 1968, Volume II,* written by Carleson C. Ames in September 1968 and published in January 1969, and controlled by FE Division.

- *The Africa Division, 1959 - 1967,* written by W. H. Dunbar in December 1971 and published in June 1972, and controlled by AF.

- *Operations in Angola, 1942 - 1967,* written by Lester C. Houck in May 1970, and controlled by AF.

- *The Conakry Station, February 1959 - June 1968,* written by M. S. Caver in September 1971, and controlled by AF.

- *Operations in Mozambique, 1942 - 1969,* written by Lester C. Houck in September 1971, and controlled by AF.

- *The Bangkok Station, 1945 - 1965, Volume III,* written by Gerard Campagna in May 1971, and controlled by FE.

- *The Phnom Penh Station, 1953 - 1965, Volume II,* written by Allen W. Ginder. in February 1974, and controlled by CIA History Staff and DDO.

- *History of the Bukavu Base, September 1963 - June 1967,* written by Lester C. Houck and Roscoe N. Sandlin, Jr. in August 1969, and controlled by Africa Division.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

- *Lagos Station, 1950 - 1967,* written by William H. Dunbar in March 1971, and controlled by DDP.
- *The Khartoum Station, November 1955 - July 1969,* written by Lawrence R. Devlin in November 1972, and controlled by DDP.
- *The Melbourne Station and Canberra Base, 1954 - 1966,* written by Ruth Hyde in June 1970, and controlled by DDP.
- *Covert Action Operations Soviet Russia Division, 1950-1968,* written by Donald M. Jameson in December 1972, and controlled by CE.
- *History of Guatemala Station, December 1960-March 1965,* written in March 1965 by Paul L. Loeb and controlled by WH.
- *History, Japan - FI/D Operations, 1950-1955*, written in June 1970 by Vyrl E. Leichliter and controlled by the successor component to FI/D.
- *The Illegal Border-Crossing Program, 1946-1959,* written by Anthony Arnold, George N. Belic, Boris Ilyin and John Basarab in July 1971 and controlled by CE.
- *Air Support of Cuban Operations 1960-1962,* written by Andrew Russo in January 1973, and controlled by History Staff.
- *Counterintelligence Operations Soviet Russia Division, 1946 - 1965, Volumes I and II,* written by Frederick Walters in August 1972, and controlled by SB.
- Memorandum for the Record on *HS-Misc 13 (file of CA material)* dated 11 April 1978, written by Eulalie Hammond.

- *The Cuban Invasion -- Maritime Aspects, 1961,* written by Savilion H. Chapman in November 1966, and controlled by Special Operations Division.

- *The Covert Actions Project Funds FY 1964 and FY 1965 (With Historical Perspective), December 1947 - January 1964.* This TOP SECRET history was written by CA Staff in January 1964, and controlled by CA/PEG.

- *Funding Covert Operations, 1960 - 1964.* This TOP SECRET history was written by CA and Cover Staff Officers in September 1964, and is controlled by CA/PEG.

- *Foreign Intelligence Staff/Division D, 1948-1965* This TOP SECRET history was written by Fred Griffin, Frank B. Rowlett, and Vyrl E. Leichliter in April 1974, and is controlled by CIA History Staff.

- *History of the Vietnamese Generals' Coup of 1-2 November 1963, Saigon Station Log and Analysis.* This history's access is controlled by FE/VNC or its successor.

The following were very sensitive and we discussed the collections with ARRB staffers. An agreement was reached to provide access to specific sections that may contain relevant information:

- *Covert Action Project Funds:* pages preceding Tab 1, and pages 1 through 6 under Tab 1.

- *Foreign Intelligence Staff/Division D:* Sections III (1952-1965) (pages 39 through 50) and IV (Division D Contributions to US National Policy) (pages 51 through 57).

CIA-10 -- Interagency Source Register

(U) This request was dated June 1996. The DO provided a classified response to the ARRB together

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

with a copy of DOI 50-46, "The Interagency Source Register," and advised that an unclassified response was not possible.

CIA-11 -- Sylvia Duran Materials

(U) This request was dated May 1996 and was "in particular . . . [for] a 'ten-page statement' she may have given to the Mexican police." IMS/ESG "searched its main index system, its 'names' data base, and hard copy files." The Agency response, dated October 1997, indicated to the ARRB that "no such 'statement' has ever been found and we cannot confirm that it ever existed."

CIA-12 -- Files on five persons allegedly connected with JMWAVE

(U) This ARRB request was dated May 1996 for "all 201 files, personnel files, Office of Security files, P-files, or any other files related to … David Sanchez Morales … Ted Shackley … Ron Cross … Bart Henry and Doug Gupton.

(U) The DO maintains no files on former employees, such as Morales, Shackley, or Gupton (P).

(U) In a response dated August 1998, the DO responded to DA/OIM/HRP/JFK that we were unable to identify Ron Cross and Bart Henry as true names, registered aliases, or pseudonyms and, therefore, could not provide any files.

CIA - 13 - Mexico City Back-channel Communications

(U) The DO provided a classified response explaining that these types of communications are usually administrative matters, e.g., they contain sensitive personnel information and they are not placed in operational files or saved, collectively, in other databases. Unfortunately, there is no way of retrieving these cables through a reasonable search using any generic or specific term, since cables were not captured by any organized filing process.

CIA - 14 - Mexico City Station Annual Reports

(U) The DO was asked for specific annual reports from Mexico City.

(S) We informed the ARRB that we were successful in locating an official DO file which contained station "annual reports" for the years 1957 through 1973. The file included two dispatches which forwarded the RMDs from Mexico Station for the years 1960 and 1961. However, the RMDs, which were sent as separate attachments (sent in a different pouch from the covering dispatch memorandum) were not present in the file. (NOTE: Attachments which contained true names of CIA officers or assets or information that would identify operational sources with CIA were customarily sent in separate transmissions as a security measure if a pouch(es) were compromised). We also note that in a speed letter, dated 1978, written by DDO/LA/STB to OLC, that the RMDs for Mexico City Station, for the years, 1962, 1963, or 1964 could not be located.

(S) Based upon further review, we are providing an updated response to the ARRB as follow: The only report that was annually required of a station was that relating to its ability to meet its mission directives, now called "operational directives". These annual reports called the Station's "Relative Mission Directives" (RMD) were used to compose an overall annual division or staff submission to the Deputy Director for Operations, as an evaluative tool. The RMDs, themselves are a summary of station activities reported to Headquarters in other correspondence during the course of the year, were used to compile a division level evaluation--in a sense, an annual report card--on how it was doing against operational requirements. The station reporting was extracted into the larger division summary, much as it is today. The RMDs from year-to-year could and often did change with the operational requirements the Agency was expected to fulfill. As such, the RMDs for each station had value only as data to the larger examination of how the Agency performed its intelligence mission in a given year and what trends or changes this review would suggest for the ensuing year.

(U) Station reporting of the type described above would be treated as transitory information and as such meet the definition of a temporary record. It is entirely possible and quite probable that these facilitative reports were systematically destroyed. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) authorized the Agency to destroy facilitative reports in 1954 (NARA Reference: II-NNA-1057); the destruction of intelligence collection requirement files in 1962 (NARA Reference: NN-163-1), and operational management objective files at the subcomponent level (which would include reports from Stations and base) in 1977 (NARA Reference: NC1-263-77-10). The 1977 authorization remains in force today.

CIA - 15 - Win Scott files from Russ Holmes files

(U) The Retired Record Table RRT shows Mr. Scott's Mexico City files were retired as Job 78-00594R on 11 August 1972. These records were retired to the Agency's Archives and Records Center under Item Number 40-76 in the Records Control Schedule in effect at the time. Files under Item Number 40-76 were described as:

"Temporary. Destroy on completion of specific job or as they serve their purpose. Return folders and documents on loan and destroy remaining papers."

The RRT shows Job 78-00594R was destroyed on 12 January 1987.

The RRT page showing the disposition of Mr. Scott's files and the page of the Records Control Schedule which describes Item Number 40-76 have been incorporated in the Agency's JFK collection and will be processed for release to NARA.

CIA - 16 - Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

(S) The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201.

(S) Prior to establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational interest file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedure that upon opening a 201, the documents from an operational interest file would be transferred to the 201.

(S) Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of material which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection.

(S) In sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the information we are aware of that we had prior to the assassination.

CIA-IR-01 - Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-1964

(S) The request for a listing of personnel assigned to Moscow 1959-1964 was discussed with Board

Staff. Instead of a listing, the files on individuals who were assigned to Moscow and a history of the Moscow Station were made available. In addition, the staff interviewed a former COS Moscow. The Board staff is satisfied with the response and will prepare its own documentation.

CIA-IR-03 - Full Computer Search for List of HTLINGUAL Files

(C) First, as an outcome of the Pike and Church Committees investigations, all HTLINGUAL files which were identifiable, as such, were destroyed under court order. Copies of materials from these files that may have been made prior to the destruction order and put into other files have, however, surfaced as files are reviewed. This includes material in the HSCA sequestered collection.

(C) The DO ran a search on the term "HTLINGUAL." Some records were identified as destroyed. Some were not so marked but are not locatable under the job number identified; however, given that there is no requirement to record destroyed records under the Federal statutes for disposition programs and given limited resources for noting files destroyed, this is not uncommon. The HTLINGUAL search further identified files because they had been the subject of Freedom of Information Act queries; however, these were not HTLINGUAL files per se, but files which contained the FOIA requester queries for HTLINGUAL information.

(U) ARRB staff member Michelle Combs has reviewed the HTLINGUAL file run and has selected some folders for review. OIM has identified that they have only redacted records for the large FOIA case that is listed. IMS/ESG/HCS is retrieving its records for unredacted copies of the records and will make them available.

CIA-IR-04 - Disposition of Angleton Files

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

(U) The DO provided the following unclassified response about the Angleton Files: The files that Kalaris mentioned in Mangold's book were incorporated with the files of the CI staff. Per memorandum dated 1976-1979, the CI files were reviewed and incorporated into the DO record system. Items that were duplicates or not worthy of retention were destroyed. The memos describe the file collection and the process that was followed. Because the files that were once known as Angleton's have been dispersed within the DO records, they are no longer identifiable as a collection.

CIA-IR-06 -- QKENCHANT

(U) IMS/ESG/HCS initially provided a classified response to DA/OIM/JFK for this request in February 1998. In a follow-up response for declassification of the response, IMS/ESG/HCS worked with the providing office and then approved DA/OIM/JFK's unclassified response.

CIA-IR-07 - Claude Barnes Capehart

(U) The DO provided a classified response, which stated that we found no record when conducting a name trace for records on Capehart. Subsequently, we were advised by the CIA's Project Manager, Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, that this request was primarily being researched by the Directorate for Science & Technology.

CIA-IR-09 -- George Bush

(S) The ARRB requested information about George Bush because of a reference to "George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency" in a certain FBI document dated November 1963.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

(S) IMS/FAB provided a main index search response to IMS/ESG/HCS. A 201 (that dated back only to 1977) and a DCD file were located.

(U) DA/OIM/JFK responded to the ARRB in February 1998 that the "search determined the Agency has no record of any association with George Herbert Walker Bush during the 1963 time period."

CIA-IR-11 - Warren Commission critics (Does CIA maintain files or records on specified critics - other than press clippings?)

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response for "any files or records on Warren Commission critics Edward J. Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg, or Sylvia Meagher below. In addition to these records, our research did surface a reference to a file titled "Garrison Investigation of Kennedy Assassination" which was opened in 1969 and closed in 1996. At the direction of the ARRB staff, no material in response to FOIA requests or news clippings in Public Affairs was included.

A. Edward J. EPSTEIN - The DO has no identifiable information on subject. Our search did surface the name Edward Epstein; however, by using additional biographic data known about subject, we were able to dismiss this name as a false "hit."

B. Josiah THOMPSON - Subject was of operational interest to the DO circa 1962; therefore, a 201 file does exist on this individual. ARRB staff member Combs reviewed this file in August 1998.

C. Mark LANE - Our search produced references to two documents: (1) An Agency dispatch from Germany dated 23 January 1970, and (2) An OGC letter dated 29 March 1977. Both of these documents are available for review. The OGC letter concerns a 1976 FOIA request -- Mark Lane was one of the individuals requesting the FOIA action -- which involves two dispatches dated 1967 and 1968. Because these two documents are the subject of a FOIA request, they are not included in this response.

D. Harold Weisberg - There is a 201 file on subject which contains very limited information. This file can be made available for review by an ARRB staff member. The DO retired records system, CARD, has a reference to an Agency dispatch (EGBA-87605, 1969) which indicates subject was in correspondence with Julius Mader. This document was in the files when it was reviewed by staff member Combs in August 1998.

E. Sylvia Meagher - We found no DO information.

CIA - IR-12 - Contacts with journalists or publishing houses

(U) The DO provided both an unclassified and classified response about contacts with journalists or publishing houses, regarding whether CIA might have attempted to influence any journalists or publishers regarding public discussion of the assassination. Searches with generic terms such as "journalists," "publishers," "publishing houses," and "media" would not produce meaningful responses. This question required the research of crypts mentioned in various documents in the JFK "assassination records." These crypts referred to projects managed under the overall guidance of a staff in the DO and in all instances were projects concerning press and propaganda programs designed to promote anti-communism and to counter Soviet press and propaganda initiatives worldwide. Specifically, the various projects were developed for the following reasons (Corresponding cryptonyms to these projects were provided in a classified document, and are not included below):

A. to counter Soviet activities in international intellectual organizations, in order to unite and promote anti-Communist intellectuals.

B. to be involved in book publishing matters and the international distribution of anti-Communist books.

C. to purchase and distribute books.

D. to cover the international mailing of American books translated into Spanish and French languages.

E. to purchase and mail books to selected addressees in Latin America and Africa.

F. to cover a worldwide news and feature story service.

G. as a Press and Propaganda Developmental and Target of Opportunity project involving Latin America.

CIA-IR-13 -- Organized Crime

(S) As part of DA/OIM/JFK's research, IMS/ESG/HCS was requested to do a trace on "Charles Ford." The trace resulted in no hits.

(S) Later, to answer CIA-IR-03 on HTLINGUAL material, a computer run was made. The list contained a citation to testimony to Congress by Charles Ford in September of 1975. A copy of Ford's testimony to a Senate Committee regarding a Mafia connection to assassination plots against Castro was provided to DA/OIM/JFK in February 1998.

(U) At the request of HRP JFK, several project Crypts were searched and results provided in connection with this request.

CIA - IR-15 - Mexico City Station electronic surveillance and surveillance tapes

(S) The Directorate of Operations has checked Headquarters records for files referenced in HMMW 12454 and for files on the crypts cited in this document and searched for HMMA 20307 and other cables or dispatches cited in this document. As previously explained, the crypts in HMMW 12454 have been researched. The dispatch was apparently written in haste and in truncated language without correct knowledge of the operational crypts for the specific operations in Mexico City. The crypts in the dispatch are the more generic crypts for teltap operations, not for the then-current operations in Mexico City, which are in question.

(U) There has been considerable interest over the years in locating any electronic surveillance tapes that would have been made during the period that Oswald visited Mexico (26 September - 2 October 1963). A thorough search has been conducted of the DO's record system as well as the index to retired records in an attempt to locate any tapes and/or find documentation to resolve their disposition. We have discussed this issue with operational experts and their professional opinion is that most likely tapes such as these were never returned to Headquarters for retention. It was normal practice to recycle audio tapes after they had been listened to by transcribers and their transcripts made.

(U) Messages between field stations and headquarters used operational jargon and shortened sentence structures that can sometimes allow for misinterpretations. Thus, possible confusion was created when references to what was being sent to headquarters referred to "tapes" but really intend "information" from tapes.

(U) In our search efforts we did locate approximately 185 audio surveillance tapes of the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City that were recorded during the immediate time following the assassination (22 November 1963 to January 1964). The fact that these tapes were retained and returned to Headquarters could account for the fact that some people recall that some tapes existed which were sent to Headquarters.

(U) Based upon the search efforts that were undertaken and the opinions of operational experts consulted, CIA has concluded that the tapes in question do not exist and were almost certainly recycled in the normal course of business before their potential value was identified.

CIA-IR-18 - Information on one DO Office

(S) The DO provided an unclassified response on the "Defector Staff" listed in CSN 5-50 revised in October 1959 and the "CIA Defector Coordinator, DDP/CDC," revised in October 1963. The "Defector and Contract Personnel Branch" had the symbol SR/OS/D. Only Soviet Bloc (formerly Warsaw Pact countries) defector cases were handled by this branch. Staffs and branches identified, among other duties, were responsible for identifying, debriefing, and resettling foreign defectors of intelligence interest.

CIA - IR-19 - Computer search on specific individuals and organizations

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response to the ARRB Staffs' request to review Agency files on some 38 names who were the subjects of the HSCA. All files and traces were reviewed by the ARRB staffers on 19 and 20 August.

A. Leo Cherne, (Leopold Chernetsky), a US citizen, was born in 1912, has Office of Security file #53082, has 201 file #07662 (two volumes), has an A-file #048058, and subject does have a pseudo.

B. Hunter Leake has an A-file (#105075) DCD file number, pseudo not found.

C. John McVickar. Trace results only.

D. Andy Anderson. No identifiable traces running variations of "Andy."

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

E. Byron B. Morton Jr. -- Trace resulted one document.

F. Marie Cheatham. -- Trace resulted in one document.

G. Paul A. Garbler. Our records reveal that Garbler had three pseudos assigned to him. Also, Garbler had four aliases on record.

H. Verna Deane Brown. The trace resulted in one document.

I. George Stanley Brown. Results of trace search was an A-File.

J. Howard Guebler. There was one trace result, who may or may not be iden to Subject which is an index card.

K. Gordon Duane Novel. Trace resulted in three index cards. He is the subject of 201-0834822 and has an A file (#A185210); however, the A file has been incorporated into his 201 file. No record of a pseudo on this name.

L. Ed Butler -- Trace resulted in an A file (#121440) on Edward Scannell Butler, III, the Director of INCA.

M. INCA (Information Council of the Americas). AllStar trace search on "INCA" provided the following index card(s) information that may or may not be iden to the "Information Council of the Americas, Inc."

N. Permindex. One trace result was found.

CIA-IR-20 -- Monster Plot NBR

(U) This is a large number of files from the microfilm part of the collection that Michelle Combs reviewed and then crafted a "SECRET" classified memo identifying the reels and folders of the files that were then declared "Not Believed Relevant."

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

CIA-IR-21 -- DRE Monthly operational reports

(U) This request involved "Howard" and some extensive research for the name as a true name, pseudo, or alias for anyone out of JMWAVE and/or connected to the DRE operation.

(U) We also did extensive research for DRE monthly reports. In the JFK collection, there was a gap in the reporting between December 1962 and April 1964.

(U) This also covered the question of George Joannides' Performance Appraisal Reports and their inclusion in the collection with some redactions.

CIA-IR-22 - "A" file on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison

(U) The DO provided this unclassified response:

> "It was the DO's understanding that there were illegible markings on pages of the copy of the "A" file on Clay Shaw. Legible copies were promised and have recently been delivered.
>
> The DO has recently provided a copy of the "A" file on Jim Garrison."

CIA-IR-26 -- Jordan James Pfunter

(U) IMS/ESG/HCS did a records search on subject name. The information is contained in a 201 file and an A file. This information was provided to the ARRB by DA/OIM/JFK in February 1998, and they were advised that other information was available from a Third Agency.

CIA-IR-29 -- Oswald LeWinter

(U) The ARRB provided the name to be traced. Apparently he is/was claiming to be an Agency employee and the Acting Assistant Director of Counter Espionage.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

(S) A name trace was run. The resultant information was included in an IMS/ESG/HCS "clarification memo" for the ARRB. The text, which was classified "Secret," reads as follows:

> "Oswald LeWinter is a naturalized US citizen and a man of at least four other names -- George Mearah, Oscar LeWinter, Razin LeWinter, and Ibrahimin Razin. Although he appeared in the East German *Who's Who in CIA,* the CIA has never had any official affiliation with LeWinter. LeWinter was the subject of an Agency "burn notice" in 1990; a burn notice alerts the intelligence community. In this case, the alert advised that LeWinter was an intelligence swindler, peddler, and fabricator. (C)
>
> CIA has a report of an episode involving an intelligence fabricator and convicted drug dealer Oswald LeWinter, AKA George Mearah, born 2 April 1931, in Vienna, Austria. In July 1990, a CIA representative overseas reported that LeWinter, using the name of George Mearah, contacted him and offered to put high-level GDR officials wishing to defect in touch with our representative and in turn the CIA. This contact would be in exchange for help and a presidential pardon that would wipe the slate clean and leave LeWinter (Mearah) without a record as a convicted felon. LeWinter (Mearah) claimed this was important [because] he was married (for the third time) and starting a new life; he was reportedly considering quietly acquiring Israeli citizenship. This contact was not followed up because of the "burn notice."

CIA-IR-30 -- Cherepanov Papers

(U) This undated and undocumented request from the ARRB was derived from a passage in the book Molehunter (pp. 121-123) regarding the Cherepanov papers.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

IMS/ESG/HCS located a workbook copy in English and provided access to ARRB staffer Michelle Combs. She was further offered access to the original Russian copies. Combs then wrote a memorandum dated April 1997 that identified the collection as papers that "primarily examine the habits, potential vulnerabilities, and KGB approaches made to various members of the American Embassy staff." Combs went on to say that "no information of believed relevance to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy was found in these papers. No pages were designated as assassination records."

CIA-IR-32 -- AMWORLD

(C) The confidential draft of the IMS/ESG/HCS response was shown to ARRB staffer Combs in February 1998. That text follows:

> "(C) **CIA-IR-32 AMWORLD. The Review Board seeks information regarding the purpose of AMWORLD and its connection with the Cuban exile groups. After a thorough search of the DO records system, to include telephonic communications with various DO Latin American Division officers, we formulated the following as a definition of the purpose of the AMWORLD operation. The AMWORLD operation was a covert Agency effort to provide support to several Cuban exile groups. This was an "autonomous" operation designed to bring the exile groups under the direct control of Manuel Artime Buesa. AMWORLD's mission was to cause a popular uprising in Cuba through the use of propaganda and paramilitary forces to ultimately overthrow Fidel Castro.
>
> (C) The Agency provided direct and indirect financial aid and technical advisory support to these groups but did not participate directly in the day-to-day operations. ARTIME was responsible for recruitment of AMWORLD

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

> personnel; he obtained sites for training and deployment, and he had primary responsible for day-to-day operations. AMWORLD was based in three locations. The AMWORLD propaganda efforts were based in Costa Rico. The paramilitary efforts were run out of the Nicaragua base. The third base was located in Miami to service AMWORLD requirements including the collection of operational leads, servicing of dead drops and assisting in the vetting of AMWORLD personnel."

(C) Combs asked two follow up questions: Was part of the program to put in place a government in exile? Was there ever a government in exile? IMS/ESG/HCS put these questions to LA and DO/IRO. The DO/IRO has provided the following additional write up, classified confidential:

> ``(C) Based on file reviews and recollections from officers involved in the Cuban program, there was never a Cuban Government in Exile. During the planning for the Bay of Pigs operation it was envisioned that after the invasion site had been secured, Miro Cardona and the Cuban Revolutionary Council would be flown to the area to establish a new Cuban Government. The invasion site was never secured.
>
> (C) The AMWORLD Project, begun well after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and after the release of Manuel Artime Buesa and other Bay of Pigs veterans from Cuban prisons, was designed to support and unite several Cuban exile groups under the control of Artime in an effort to enhance the cohesion of the exiles and augment Artime's capability to launch propaganda and paramilitary attacks against the Cuban mainland. The overall mission of AMWORLD was to foment a popular uprising in Cuba which could lead to the ultimate overthrow of Fidel Castro. There is no evidence that AMWORLD's mission even remotely came close to fruition and no evidence that a projected government in exile was ever considered as a viable option.''

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

CIA-IR-34 -- Files of CIA officials/offices

(U) IMS/ESG/HCS ran a computer search for 'OPI 40" files. This computer run was then made available to ARRB staff member Michelle Combs for review. Her review encompasses some 42 boxes from a variety of retired DDP files. The identified folders were gathered in an aggregate of seven boxes (including one that is exclusively microfilm and microfiche of so-called Registry logs).

(U) The ARRB staff member's review is about half completed. She has so far selected some 44 records totaling 123 pages to be included in the JFK collection. When the ARRB staff member's review is completed, the selected records will be copied and subjected first to a duplicate check by DA/OIM/JFK reviewers, then reviewed by those reviewers, then reviewed by HCS reviewers.

(U) We have been unable to locate any "operational diaries" by William Harvey.

CIA-IR-35 - Oswald related Information

(S) The surfacing of a report in the continuing Oswald 201 file attributed to IJDECANTER prompted the ARRB to request a review of that defector's 201 file. Certain such reporting records will be included in the JFK collection as records in Oswald's 201. A Board request for an updated search of records for Oswald related material generated some 128 hits, which were reviewed by Ms. Michelle Combs of the ARRB staff. Three records, selected by Ms. Combs and sanitized with her concurrence, were selected for inclusion in the JFK assassination records collection.

CIR-IR-36 - Handling of Cables in 1963

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response to the ARRB staff's request for a brief explanation of how the Directorate of Operations processed cables in the 1963/1964 timeframe. We are unable to locate any Agency-wide definitive records on the subject for this time frame, and the information provided below is based solely on the memory of DO officers familiar with procedures in place at the time and in the specific offices in which they served.

(U) Each area division in the DO maintained and staffed its own registry. Although each registry was configured to meet each division's unique requirements, there were common functions performed by all the registries to include: collecting, sorting, and delivering of incoming cables; maintenance of incoming and outgoing cable "chronos;" collecting and delivering of incoming and outgoing pouch material; and the issuance and maintenance of "pseudo and alias" card files.

(U) On a daily basis, usually six days per week, each registry collected its incoming cable traffic from a central processing point, then called the Cable Secretariat, within the Office of Communications. The incoming cables were then sorted by registry personnel according to predefined guidelines. These guidelines were unique to each division and were frequently altered to meet changing operational requirements. Sorted cables were then delivered to specific operational/area desks. A "chrono" copy of each incoming cable was maintained, on a temporary basis, usually for 90 days, and the receiving office placed a copy into an operational file based upon subject or activity.

(U) Outgoing cables were created and coordinated by appropriate operational/area desks and usually released by the chief of the division or a designated releasing officer. "Released" cables were then hand delivered or sent by pneumatic tube system (a system long ago dismantled from the original Headquarters building) to Cable Secretariat for processing into the Agency's communication network. "Chrono" copies of outgoing cables were forwarded to the registry for a 90 day hold and the sending office placed a copy in the appropriate operational file.

(U) There was a centralized processing section for the directorate that received copies of the cables to review them and update the central index cards.

CIA-IR-37 - William Pawley

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response to the ARRB's request to review all files on William Pawley and any files on his possible connection with Cuban exile groups in the 1962-1963 time frame. The Agency's 201 file on Pawley consists of three volumes, the same as in the JFK sequestered collection, and November 1962 is the date of the last record indexed to his 201. However, the Agency holds operational files for the period 1963 to 1965 which related to Pawley. Those files were made available for review by the ARRB staff and they selected a number of documents for inclusion in the materials being processed for release to NARA.

Unnumbered Request -- Worldwide Query

(U) In March 1998 the ARRB asked "whether a worldwide query was sent out the day after the assassination for all case officers to query their sources for any information on the assassination and Oswald. Are or would all the answers be in the collection?"

(S) The following information has been identified:

A. A "book message," that is a message to all stations and bases, DIR 84608, dated 22 November 1963 (date/time group 222054Z) was sent. This message advised all stations and bases about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The message advised all to be "on alert." This cable is found in Oswald's 201 file, Box 1, Volume 3.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

B. A "book cable," DIR 85133, dated 26 Nov. 1963 (date/time group 262319Z) was sent. This message was sent "routine" but with ten addressees on a "prior-ity basis." The ten "priority" addressees were: Paris, Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa. This cable advised all stations and bases of the identity of the alleged assassin by name of Lee Harvey Oswald. This cable can be found in Oswald's 201 file, Box 1, Volume 4.

C. Neither of these two cables indicates that a "routing" coding was to be used to ensure that all responses, if any, would be classified to Oswald's 201 file.

8. (U) I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed in Langley, Virginia on this 2nd day of September 1998.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
JFK FPO, Directorate of Operations

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration for the Directorate of Operations

DISTRIBUTION:
Original - JFK Official File
1 - D/OIM/DA
1 - C/JFK Declassification Project/HRP/OIM/DA
1 - C/IMS/ESG
1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
1 - ESG/ Chrono

104-10333-10000
JFK-M-18, F2

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW · 2nd Floor · Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 · Fax: (202) 724-0457

CHANGE TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

Assassination Records Review Board

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair
Experience
State of Minnesota, Chief Deputy Attorney General, 1986-Present

State of Minnesota, Office of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, 1985-86

State of Minnesota, Office of the Attorney General, Manager, Public Affairs Litigation Division, 1984-85

Law Firm of Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard and Donnelly, Associate Attorney, 1981-84

Senior U.S. District Judge Earl Larson in Minneapolis, Law Clerk, 1980-81

United States Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Staff Assistant, 1975-77

Education
J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1980

B.A., Concordia College, 1975

Dr. Henry F. Graff
Experience
Columbia University, Professor Emeritus of History, 1991- Present

Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, Senior Fellow, 1991-92

Columbia University, Department of History, Instructor to Full Professor, 1946-91, Chairman, 1961-64

Education
Ph.D., Columbia University, 1949

M.A., Columbia University, 1942

B.S., City College, 1941

Dr. Kermit L. Hall
Experience
The Ohio State University, Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law, 1994 - Present

The University of Tulsa, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences and Professor of History and Law, 1992-94

University of Florida, Associate/Full Professor of History and Law, 1981-92

Wayne State University, Assistant/Associate Professor, Department of History, 1976-81

Vanderbilt University, Assistant Professor, Department of History, 1972-76

Education
Master of Study of Law, Yale University Law School, 1980

Ph.D., The University of Minnesota, 1972

M.A., Syracuse University, 1967

B.A., The University of Akron, 1966

Dr. William L. Joyce
Experience
Princeton University, Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections, 1986-Present

The New York Public Library, Assistant Director for Rare Books and Manuscripts, 1981-1985

American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Massachusetts, Curator of Manuscripts, 1972-81, Education Officer, 1988-81

William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan, Manuscripts Librarian, 1968-72

Education
Ph.D., The University of Michigan, 1974

M.A., St John's University (N.Y.), 1966

B.A., Providence College, 1964

Dr. Anna K. Nelson
Experience
The American University, Adjunct Professor of History, 1992-Present, 1986-88

Arizona State University, Distinguished Visiting Professor, 1992

The American University, Associate Professor in History, 1991

Tulane University, Adjunct Associate Professor in History, 1988-90

George Washington University, Instructor to Adjunct Associate Professor, 1972-85

George Washington University, Director, History and Public Policy Program, 1980-82

Education
Ph.D., George Washington University, 1972

M.A., University of Oklahoma, 1956

B.A., University of Oklahoma, 1954

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

T. Jeremy Gunn
1652 Wild Pine Way
Reston, Virginia 20194
(703) 481-8196

EDUCATION

Ph.D. **Harvard University**, Committee on the Study of Religion, 1991
Field: Religion and Society
Affiliation: Graduate Associate, Center for European Studies
Awards: French Government Grant; Krupp Foundation Fellow; Gilbert Chinard Award, *Institut Français de Washington*; Center for European Studies Grant

J.D. **Boston University School of Law**, 1987, *Magna cum laude*
Awards: Hennessey and Liacos Distinguished Scholar

A.M. **University of Chicago**, General Studies in Humanities, 1978
Award: University Fellowship

B.A. **Brigham Young University**, International Relations and Humanities, 1974, *High Honors with Distinction* (highest 1%)
Awards: several scholarships

EMPLOYMENT

General Counsel and Associate Director for Research and Analysis, JFK Assassination Records Review Board, Washington, D.C., 1994-present

Covington & Burling, Associate Attorney, Washington, D.C., 1988-94
Practice Areas: international law (public and private); civil litigation (including class action and other complex cases); appellate (including Supreme Court) litigation; extensive church-state litigation; and six month full-time work in poverty law for Neighborhood Legal Services Corporation.

United States District Court, Law Clerk to the Honorable Douglas P. Woodlock, Boston, MA, 1987-88

Ropes & Gray, Summer Associate, Boston, MA, 1987

Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Summer Associate, Boston, MA, 1986

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Harvard University, Graduate Teaching Fellow, 1980-84

Ethics and International Relations (Stanley Hoffmann)
Rise of American Power (Ernest May)
Art and Politics (Simon Schama)

Paris and London in the Nineteenth Century (John Clive)
Moral Values in European Thought (James Wilkinson)
French Society and Politics 1715-1815 (Patrice Higonnet)
French Society and Politics 1815-1945 (Patrice Higonnet)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Instructor in History, 1980-81; 1981-82

Brigham Young University, Instructor in History and Humanities on overseas study program in Paris, France 1975

PUBLICATIONS

Book

A Standard for Repair: The Establishment Clause, Equality, and Natural Rights (New York and London, 1992)

Articles

"Freedom of Religion or Belief, Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection," *American Journal of International Law* (1996) (book review) (forthcoming)

"Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights," in *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives* (John Witte and Johan van der Vyver, eds., 1996), 305

"The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American Foreign Policy," 88 *American Journal of International Law* 854 (1994) (book review)

"Neutrality, Expression, and Oppression," 23 *Journal of Law & Education* 391 (1994)

"Applying Coercion: The Latest Element of Establishment," in *Why We Need Public Schools: Church/State Relations and Visions of Democracy* (Art Must, ed., 1992)

RECENT PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Chair, Committee on Human Rights, District of Columbia Bar (1995-present)
Co-Chair, Committee on Public International Law, District of Columbia Bar (1994-95)
General Counsel, National Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty (1990-94)
Member, Board of Directors, Washington Council of Lawyers (1993-present)
International Advisory Board, World Report on Freedom of Conscience and Belief
U.S. Institute of Peace Working Group on Religion, Ideology, and Peace (1994-present)
Who's Who of American Lawyers (8th ed.)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

The Assassination Records Review Board was established by The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act, which was signed into law by President George Bush. The five members of the Board were appointed by President Clinton, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and sworn in on April 11, 1994. The law gives the Review Board the mandate and the authority to identify, secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It is the responsibility of the Board to determine which records are to be made public immediately and which ones will have postponed release dates.

The Review Board consists of the following members:

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair; United States District Court Judge, District of Minnesota.

Dr. Henry F. Graff; Professor Emeritus of History at Columbia University.

Dr. Kermit L. Hall; Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History at The Ohio State University.

Dr. William L. Joyce; Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections at Princeton University.

Dr. Anna K. Nelson; Adjunct Professor of History at American University.

The Review Board has until October 1, 1997 to fulfill its mandate.

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

Chairman:

John R. Tunheim

Board Members:

Henry Franklin Graff
Kermit Hall
William Joyce
Anna Kasten Nelson

Executive Director:

David Marwell

JOHN R. TUNHEIM

Minnesota Chief Deputy Attorney General
102 State Capitol
Saint Paul, MN 55155
612/296-2351

Jack Tunheim is Chief Deputy Attorney General in the Minnesota Attorney General's Office – a position he has held since June, 1986. The senior appointed official in the Attorney General's Office, he is responsible for supervising and directing all operations of the office, with a staff of over 200 lawyers and 400 total employees. Among his duties are the supervision of all legal services, including both criminal and civil litigation, the recruitment and supervision of the office's lawyers, chairing the management team, representing the governor and other top state officials, working with the Legislature, and handling significant constitutional cases.

Prior to 1986, he served as Minnesota Solicitor General and Manager of the Attorney General's Public Affairs Litigation Division. He spent three years in private practice with the St. Paul law firm, Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard and Donnelly and served as Law Clerk to Senior U.S. District Judge Earl Larson in Minneapolis. He is a 1980 *cum laude* graduate of the University of Minnesota Law School where he served as President of the *Minnesota Law Review*. He is a 1975 *summa cum laude* graduate of Concordia College in Moorhead, Minnesota and served from 1975-1978 as a Staff Assistant to U.S. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.

In February, 1994, his nomination by President Clinton to be a member of the U.S. Assassination Records Review Board (AARB) was confirmed by the U.S. Senate. The AARB is responsible for ensuring and facilitating the review and public disclosure of government records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

He currently teaches federal and state constitutional law as an Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. He has served as a visiting lecturer at the University of Minnesota Law School since 1985 on the subject of presenting effective oral arguments. Jack is currently a Mondale Fellow at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota. He serves on the Board of Directors of the Minnesota Institute for Legal Education and is a frequent continuing legal education presenter, with a special focus on the Minnesota Constitution.

He has personally argued three cases before the United States Supreme Court, *Hodgson v. State of Minnesota* (1989), *Perpich v. U.S. Department of Defense* (1990), and *Growe v. Emison* (1992), winning two. He serves the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota as a member of both the Federal Practice Committee and the Advisory Committee on Civil Justice Reform. Jack currently serves on the Executive Committee and as Secretary and immediate past-Treasurer of the American Bar Association Division on Government and Public Sector Lawyers. He was a member of the Special Committee on Lawyers in Government that successfully proposed establishing the new division. He also founded and recently completed a two-year term as Co-Chair of the Public Law Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association. He served as a delegate from the American Council of Young Political Leaders to Russia in December 1991. He was a delegate to the Democratic National Convention both in 1988 and in 1992.

He is the 1991 recipient of the Marvin Award from the National Association of Attorneys General, annually presented to the most outstanding assistant attorneys general in America. He received the 1988 President's Distinguished Service Award from NAAG for his work as an editor of the book *Office of Attorney General: Powers and Duties*. He has lectured at each of NAAG's Management Training Seminars and at numerous NAAG meetings and seminars. He chaired the 1990 and the 1991 Chief Deputies Conferences and has done frequent management consulting for attorneys general and their staffs. He chaired the first NAAG Management Review Team for the Idaho Attorney General's Office in 1991 and served on the NAAG Management Review Team for the Arkansas Attorney General's Office in 1992 and the Ohio Attorney General's Office in 1993. He chaired the Review Team for the Virgin Islands Attorney General's Office in September, 1993.

In 1990, he served as a member of Governor Perpich's Select Committee on the Impact of Drugs on Crime, Education and Social Welfare. From 1987-91, he was a member of the Synod Council of the St. Paul Area Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. In 1985, he co-chaired the Minnesota State Bar Association/Attorney General Task Force on Legal Advice to Farmers; and in 1983, he was a co-founder of the Minnesota Pregnancy and Infant Loss Center. He served as Chair of the Washington County Planning Advisory Commission from 1989-1992. He is currently Chair of the Board of Directors of Family Service St. Croix, Vice-Chair of the Stillwater City Charter Commission and a member of the boards Midsummer: A Minnesota Festival of Music and the Norwegian-American Historical Association.

He lives in Stillwater, Minnesota, with his spouse, Kathryn, who is President of the Twin Cities public relations firm, Tunheim Santrizos, Inc., and their two children, Elizabeth and Samuel.

TUNHJX'

HENRY F. GRAFF
Professor Emeritus of History, Columbia University

Born in New York City on August 11, 1921, he was educated in the public schools, including City College, where he received a B.S.S. degree, *magna cum laude* in 1941, and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. In 1942, he received the M.A. degree from Columbia University, and in 1949 the Ph.D. He, meanwhile, had enlisted in the Army shortly after Pearl Harbor, and rose from private to first lieutenant in the Signal Corps before going on inactive status in the early part of 1946. His principal service was as a Japanese language officer with the Army Security Agency (predecessor of the National Security Agency) which was charged with responsibility for reading foreign codes and ciphers. He received a War Department Citation and the Army Commendation Medal.

Upon returning to civilian life, Graff taught for a semester in the History Department of City College before accepting an appointment as lecturer at Columbia in the fall of 1946. He remained at Columbia thereafter until he retired in 1991, rising through the ranks to Professor and Chairman of the Department of History in 1961. (His term as Chairman ran to 1964.) He has been a visiting professor at Vassar College, and he has lectured on many campuses, including those of the service academies. He has been the Distinguished Speaker at the United States Air Force Academy, and the Sol Feinstone Memorial Lecturer at the Jewish Theological Seminary. In 1992 he was the Dean's Distinguished Lecturer in the Humanities at Columbia's College of Physicians and Surgeons. In 1993 he lectured at the Yale School of Medicine.

Graff's field of specialization is United States history, and within it, the history of the Presidency of the United States and the history of the foreign relations of the United States. He taught courses in both subjects at Columbia where he was a member of the faculties of Columbia College, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and the School of International and Public Affairs.

Graff served for six years on the National Historical Publications Commission (1965-71), to which he had been appointed and then reappointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson. Beginning in 1971 he served for a number of years on the Historical Advisory Committee of the United States Air Force, by appointment of the Secretary of the Air Force. In 1993 he was nominated by President William J. Clinton for membership on the newly-established Assassination Records Review Board.

Graff's books include *Bluejackets with Perry in Japan*, published by the New York Public Library, and *The Modern Researcher* (with Jacques Barzun) first published by Harcourt Brace in 1957 and now in its Fifth Edition (1992), the text edition currently issued by Harcourt and the trade edition by Houghton

Mifflin. Usually described as "the classic work on research and writing," it has been a Book-of-the-Month choice and a selection of the Quality Paperback Book Club. Graff's best-known general work is *The Tuesday Cabinet: Deliberation and Decision on Peace and War under Lyndon B. Johnson* (Prentice-Hall, 1970), which was based on extensive conversations over a period of years with the President and his principal advisors, chiefly on the subject of the Vietnam War.

A well-established standard reference work is Graff's *The Presidents: A Reference History* (Scribner, 1984). On invitation, Graff presented a copy to President Ronald Reagan for placement in the White House Library.

Graff is also the author of widely-used high school and junior high school American history textbooks: *The Adventure of the American People* (with John A. Krout); *The Free and the Brave: The Grand Experiment* (with Paul Bohannan)-- all originally published by Rand McNally & Company, and now by Houghton Mifflin Company; *This Great Nation* (Riverside Publishing Company, 1983); and *America: the Glorious Republic* (Houghton Mifflin Company, revised edition, 1990).

Graff has written extensively for the leading historical and popular journals and magazines. His book reviews have frequently appeared in *The New York Times Book Review*, and his topical articles-- on the Presidency and on international affairs-- in *The New York Times Magazine* and on the op-ed pages of *The New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times*. He has contributed many articles to the *Dictionary of American Biography* and to other encyclopedias and compilations, including the new *Encyclopedia of the American Presidency*.

Among Graff's several current writing projects is a book of essays on selected aspects of presidential history.

For most of the years from 1950 to 1967 Graff was the historical consultant to Time, Incorporated. He was the Consulting Editor on *Life's History of the United States* (twelve volumes). During these same years he was the director of the CBS News and Public Affairs Fellowship Program at Columbia University. In 1976 he was the historical consultant for CBS's bicentennial series, The American Parade. In 1986-7 he was the consultant for ABC's acclaimed series, Our World. In 1987 he was the historical consultant for ABC's The Blessings of Liberty, a television special celebrating the bicentennial of the Constitution. In 1989 and again in 1993 he served as historical commentator during the telecast of the Presidential Inauguration on the ABC network, anchored by Peter Jennings. He has frequently been a discussant on public affairs programs. At present he is a consultant to ABC on its planned series of end-of-the-century documentaries.

In 1966 Graff received City College's coveted Townsend Harris Medal in recognition of distinguished post-graduate achievement in his chosen field. He has been honored with Columbia's Great Teacher Award and with the Mark Van Doren Award, bestowed by the student body of Columbia College for distinguished teaching and scholarship. In 1990 he received the Kidger Award of the New England History Teachers Association for distinction as teacher and author.

Graff was honored with a Senior Fellowship at the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center (formerly the Gannett Foundation Media Center) at Columbia for the academic year 1991-1992, in order to work on his book of essays on the Presidency, tentatively entitled "The Role of the Press in Shaping the Persona of the Presidency."

Graff serves as a member of the Board of Directors of the Rand McNally Company, whose headquarters are in Skokie, Illinois, and has served on the Board of Trustees of the Columbia University Press. He is President of Columbia's Friends of the Library. He is chairman of the editorial board of *Constitution* magazine, and was a member of the editorial advisory board of the *four-volume Encyclopedia of the American Presidency* published by Simon and Schuster in 1994.

Graff's professional societies and affiliations include the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, the Society of the Historians of American Foreign Relations, P.E.N., and the Authors Guild. He is a Fellow of the Society of American Historians. He is also a member of the Century Association and the Council of Foreign Relations.

Graff is married to the former Edith Krantz. They have two daughters, Iris Joan Morse (Mrs. Andrew R. Morse) and Ellen Toby Graff, a partner in the law firm of Wien, Malkin & Bettex. The Graffs reside at 47 Andrea Lane, Scarsdale, New York 10583.

February 6, 1994

Additional details may be found in the current edition of *Who's Who in America.*

WILLIAM L. JOYCE

EXPERIENCE:

Princeton University

Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections, 1986-

This position entails managing the Rare Books and Special Collections Department of the Princeton University Librar including supervising a permanent staff of about 45, overseeing the budget, planning the Department's programs (including acquisitions, cataloging, collection development, conservation, reference and access, exhibitions, and publications) and space needs, and reviewing and revising as necessary policies and procedures for the Department Additional responsibilities include sitting on the Library Council which assists the University Librarian in directing the Princeton University Libraries, and serving as liaison for the Library to the Friends of the Princeton University Library (of which I am also Secretary).

Columbia University School of Library Service

Adjunct Faculty, 1984 -1992

This appointment involved teaching three courses, a lecture course "Curatorship of Rare Books and Special Collections", a seminar, "Problems in Archival Administration," and a seminar on rare books (co-taught with Terry Belanger) until the University closed the school in July, 1992.

The New York Public Library

Assistant Director for Rare Books and Manuscripts, 1981-1986

This position included planning for and managing the Rare Books and Manuscripts and Archives Sections as well as the Arents Collections of Tobacco and Books in Parts. The position emphasized developing the Rare Books and Manuscripts Division's programs and space needs, overseeing the budget, supervising a permanent staff of 15, and reviewing and revising as necessary procedures for the continuing development and management of the Library's rare books, manuscripts and archives holdings. I also participated as a curator in the inaugural exhibition in Gottesmann Gallery, "Censorship: 500 Years."

American Antiquarian Society

Education Officer, 1977-1981

With the assistance of a grant for the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, this position was created to plan and implement seminars, colloquia, lectures, an academic conference, readings, an adult education course, and musical performances that improved scholarly use of AAS holdings and made the Society a more visible cultural resource in the region.

Curator of Manuscripts, 1972-1981

In addition to managing acquisitions and providing reference assistance to readers, this position entailed supervising a six year project, funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, that provided for the systematic arrangement and description of the Society's manuscript collections. (see Publications)

William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan Manuscripts Librarian, 1968-1972

SELECTED PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

- Society of American Archivists
  - Committee on Professional Standards, 1987-1992 (Chairman, 1988-1989)
  - Vice-President then President, 1985-1987
  - Council, 1981-1985
  - Co-chairman, 1981 Program Committee, Annual Meeting, Berkeley, CA
  - Fellow, 1981
  - Member, Committee on Archival Information Exchange, 1982-1984
  - Chairman, Task Force on Institutional Evaluation, 1977-1982, (see Publications)
  - Member, Committee on Education and Professional Development, 1976-1985
- Rare Books and Manuscripts Section, Association of College and Research Libraries (ACA)
  - Vice-chairman then Chairman, 1987-1989
  - Planning Committee, 1991-1993
  - Continuing Education Committee, 1984-1986
  - Publications Committee, 1985-1989
- Conservation Center for Artistic and Historical Artifacts, Philadelphia, PA
  - Board of Directors, 1992-
- Bibliographical Society of America
  - Chairman, Fellowship Committee, 1981-1985
  - Advisory Committee Chairman, Publishing History Sources Project, 1984- 1990
- Research Libraries Committee, co-sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies, The Association of American Universities, and the Council on Library Resources, 1987-1990
- The Grolier Club of New York City, 1983-Council, 1990-
- Research Libraries Group
  - Advisory Task Force on Functional Requirements for the AMC Format, 1980-1981
  - Committee on Archives and Special Collections, 1985-1991
- American Historical Association
  - Member (elected), Professional Division Committee, 1979-1981
- New Jersey State Historical Records Advisory Board, 1987-
- New York State Historical Records Advisory Board, 1984-1986
- New York State Historical Documents Inventory Advisory Committee, 1984-1985
- Massachusetts L.S.C.A. Advisory Council on Libraries, 1975-1977
- National Endowment for the Humanities: Panelist, 1975, 1980, and 1988
- Numerous consulting assignments

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS:

- "Foxes Guarding the Hen House: Archivists in Special Collections,", Provenance: Journal of the Society of Georgia Archivists, v. 7, no. 1 (Spring 1989), 53-60.
- "Archival Education: Two Fables." American Archivist v. 51 (1988), 16-22.
- "The Evolution of the Concept of Special Collections in American Research Libraries," Rare Books and Manuscripts Librarianship, v.3 (1988), 19-30.
- "An Uneasy Balance: Voluntarism and Professionalism", American Archivist, v.50 (1987), 7-12.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS, continued

"Rare Books, Manuscripts, and Other Special Collections Materials: Integration or Separation?" College and Research Libraries, v. 45 (1984). 442-445.

"Archivists and Research Use," American Archivist, v.. 47 (1984), 124-33

"Historical Records Repositories," in Documenting America: Assessing the Condition of Historical Records In the States, Lisa B. Weber, ed. (Washington, D. C.: National Historical Publications and Records Commission, 1984).

with David D. Hall, Richard D. Brown and John B. Hench, eds. Printing and Society in Early America, (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society, 1983).

with Mary Jo Pugh, Evaluation of Archival Institutions: Services, Principles, Guide to Self-Study (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 1982)

"Antiquarians and Archaeologists: The American Antiquarian Society, 1812-1912," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, v. 89 (1979), 123-52.

"Introduction," in Catalogue of the Manuscript Collections of the American Antiquarian Society, 4 vols. (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1979).

with Michael G. Hall, "The Half-Way Covenant of 1661: Some New Evidence," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, v. 87 (1977), 97-110.

Editors and Ethnicity: A History of the Irish-American Press, 1848-1883 (New York: Amo Press, 1976).

EDUCATION:

Ph.D. The University of Michigan, 1974
M.A. St. John's University (N.Y.), 1966
B. A. Providence College, 1964

For more biographical information, see Who's Who in America, 46th ed.

Kermit L. Hall

Dean

Henry Kendall College of Arts & Sciences
Professor of Law and History
The University of Tulsa
Suite 111 Chapman Hall
600 South College Ave.
Tulsa, OK 74104-3189

Tel: 918-631-2473
Fax: 918-631-3721
Internet: AS_KLH@VAX1.UTULSA.EDU

Employment and Education

Kermit L. Hall is Dean of the College of Arts & Sciences and Professor of Law and History at The University of Tulsa, where he teaches undergraduate, graduate, and law courses in American Constitutional and Legal History. Until 1992 he was a Professor of Law and History at the University of Florida, holding appointments in the Colleges of Law and Arts & Sciences. He holds a doctoral degree from the University of Minnesota and a law degree from Yale Law School.

Publications

The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court (Oxford, 1992), which received the American Library Association's award for "An Outstanding Reference Work of 1992," The Texas Bar Association's Award for the "Best Book on the Supreme Court in 1992," The American Bar Association's Gavel Award for 1993, and was a main selection of the History Book Club for September, 1992 and bonus selection of the Book of the Month Club for September, 1993.

By and For the People: Constitutional Rights in American History (Harlan Davidson, 1991).

The Magic Mirror: Law in American History (Oxford, 1990).

The Politics of Justice (Nebraska, 1979).

A Comprehensive Bibliography of American Constitutional and Legal History (7 vols., Kraus, 1984, 1991), which was selected by Choice as an outstanding academic book for 1985.

With Paul Finkelman and William M. Wiecek, American Legal History: Cases and Materials (Oxford, 1992).

With Eric Rise, From Local Courts to National Tribunals (Carlson, 1992).

With James W. Ely, Jr., An Uncertain Tradition: Constitutionalism and the History of the South (Georgia, 1989).

He is completing a case history of New York Times v. Sullivan under the title Heed Their Rising Voices, to be published by McGraw-Hill in 1994, and is supervising the preparation of the Oxford Companion to American Law, to be published by Oxford University Press in 1995. He is also the author of more than 60 scholarly articles and essays in books.

Professional Activities

Professor Hall has been a Fulbright Scholar in Finland and a Visiting Scholar at the American Bar Foundation; he has also held grants and fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Exxon Education Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the U. S. Department of Education, and the Pew Charitable Trusts. He has also lectured and conducted seminars on the American legal system, legal education, and legal history in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Hall has served as a consultant for script preparation and production of several television programs and documentaries, including "The Federal City" (Maryland Public Broadcasting, 1989), "Prayer in the Public Schools" (Maryland Public Broadcasting, 1989), "Prohibition and Constitutional Change" (Maryland Public Broadcasting, 1989), and "Simple Justice" (New Images Productions and WGBH, 1993).

Hall is currently chairperson of the Bill of Rights Education Collaborative, a joint effort of the American Historical Association and the American Political Science Association to promote teaching about the Bill of Rights in primary and secondary schools, a member of the Editorial Board of the Law & Society Review, Associate Editor of the American Journal of Legal History, editor of Bicentennial Essays on the Bill of Rights, a monograph series published by Oxford University Press, co-editor with David O'Brien of Constitutionalism and Democracy, a monograph series published by the University Press of Virginia, a member of the Board of Directors of the Oklahoma School of Science and Mathematics, the ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies Education, and a member of the Board of Advisors, American Bar Association's Commission on College and University Nonprofessional Legal Studies.

Anna Kasten Nelson
3121 Quebec Pl. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

George Washington University   Ph.D. History, 1972

ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Adjunct Professor in History
    The American University, 1986-1988, 1992-
Visiting Professor in History
    Arizona State University, Spring 1992
Associate Professor in History
    The American University, 1991
Adjunct Associate Professor in History
    Tulane University, 1988 -90.
Instructor to Adjunct Associate Professor in History
    George Washington University, 1972 - 1985
Director, History and Public Policy Program,
    George Washington University, 1980-82.

SELECTED CONCURRENT POSITIONS

Consultant, Historical Division, Army Corps of Engineers, 1985-1989.
Project Director, Committee on the Records of Government 1983-1985.
Historical Consultant, National Academy of Public Administration Panel, "The Role of the President in Managing the Federal Government," 1979-80.
Consultant, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1978-1979.
Research Associate, National Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials, 1976-1977.

RECENT AND OTHER SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

"History as a Period Piece?" (Feature Review), Diplomatic History, Winter 1995.

"The Importance of Foreign Policy Process: Eisenhower and the National Security Council," in Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment, LSU Press, 1994 (forthcoming).

"George Aiken: Senator from Vermont," Vermont History (forthcoming).

"Wayne Morse," Robert Cutler," articles for American National Biography. (forthcoming)

"The Ubiquitous Mr. Clifford," (Review Essay), Diplomatic History, Winter 1993.

"The Historian's Dilemma," Understanding Congress: Research Perspectives, GPO, 1991.

"President Kennedy's National Security Policy: A Reassessment," Reviews in American History, March 1991.

"John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress," Political Science Quarterly, Spring, 1987.

"President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council," Journal of American History, September, 1985.

" 'On Top of Policy Hill": President Eisenhower and the National Security Council." Diplomatic History, Fall, 1983.

State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, 1947-1949 (3 vols.), (ed.) Garland Press, 1983

"Destiny and Diplomacy, 1845-1865," Haynes/Walker, eds. American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review, Greenwood Press, 1981.

SELECTED PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

Guest Editor, "Rethinking the Cold War," Organization of American Historians Magazine of History, Winter 1994.

More than three dozen appearances at scholarly meetings on American foreign policy, federal information policy, congressional research and public history.

Articles on access to public records in The Chronicle of Higher Education, 1988 and 1992; OAH Newsletter, 1984; SHAFR Newsletter, (Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations), June -December 1977.

American Historical Association
  Member, Jt. Committee of Historians/Archivists, 1989-91.
  Member (elected), Research Division, 1986-89

Organization of American Historians
  Department of State Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation 1992-1994.
  Committee on Access, 1982-1988 (Chair, 1984-1986)

Consultant and Panel Participant, National Endowment of the Humanities. (1983. 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991).

Testimony before Congressional Committees for AHA and OAH on access to public records and archival policy, (November, 1981; March 1982; June 1983; September 1986; September 17, 1986)

DAVID G. MARWELL

Biographical Information

On July 1, 1994, the Berlin Document Center (BDC) was transferred to the German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv) marking the end of nearly 48 years of American control of this unique organization. With an estimated 25 million Nazi-era personnel-related files, the BDC was once a crucial source of evidence for the Nuremberg Trials and is today an incalculably important source for the study of the Third Reich. The transfer also marked the end of David Marwell's tenure as Director of the BDC.

A well-trained scholar with a PH.D. in History, Marwell came to Berlin in 1988 from the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), U.S. Department of Justice where ~~he~~ held the position of Chief of Investigative Research. At OSI, he was involved in researching and preparing cases against accused Nazi war criminals residing in the United States. In addition, he was selected to participate in the Klaus Barbie Investigation (1983) and played a major role in the Josef Mengele investigation (1985), both of which received international attention.

In connection with the Joseph Mengele and Klaus Barbie investigations, Marwell was in charge of assembling all relevant documentary evidence relating to any possible connection between these individuals and U.S. institutions or personnel. The investigations were two of the most unusual ever undertaken and through them he gained siginificant experiences in the identifying and locating documentary resources. The former Director of OSI, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., in his book *Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America*, described Marwell as "an experienced and careful historian who could find documents in archives when no one else could."

When Marwell arrived at the Document Center, the institution had been rocked by a scandal involving a significant theft of documents. The resulting focus on the Center revealed that it had been neglected in many areas for many years and suffered from an outmoded administrative structure, a disaffected and undertrained staff and a lack of professional guidance. It was Marwell's job to bring the Center up to standard and prepare it for turnover to the German government.

The challenges facing Marwell were not only to manage a complex institution (with an annual budget of eight million deutschmarks) and repair past deficiencies, but also to define a future for an institution in transition. He prepared a "five year plan" for the BDC that set five goals, developed a corresponding program to meet each goal, and designed a system to monitor the progress. In achieving all of the goals, Marwell:

- Introduced computer technology (there was not a single computer at the BDC when he arrived) and developed a sophisticated, integrated information retrieval system that has been described as a model for archive administration;

- Created a fully professional document conservation and restoration program;

- Developed a staff (50 Germans and 20+ Americans) that is better trained and far more responsible, flexible and creative than it had been;

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

NOMINATIONS HEARING
before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
on

Tuesday, February 1, 1994
10:00 a.m.
Room 562 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

MEMBERS, ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

Henry Franklin Graff
Nominee

Kermit L. Hall
Nominee
TO BE INTRODUCED BY:
The Honorable David L. Boren
United States Senator (D-OK)

William L. Joyce
Nominee

Anna Kasten Nelson
Nominee

John R. Tunheim
Nominee
TO BE INTRODUCED BY:
The Honorable Paul Wellstone
United States Senator (D-MN)

* * * * *

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF HENRY FRANKLIN GRAFF

A. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. Name: Henry Franklin Graff

2. Position to which nominated:

   Member, Assassination Records Review Board.

3. Date of nomination: November 5, 1993.

4. Address: 47 Andrea Lane Scarsdale, NY 10583-3115. Office at same address.

5. Date and place of birth: August 11, 1921, New York, NY.

6. Marital status: married, Edith Krantz

7. Names and ages of children: Iris Graff Morse, 45 years old; Ellen Toby Graff, 39 years old.

8. Education:

   George Washington High School, New York, NY 9/33-6/37 academic diploma 6/37
   City College of New York, New York, NY 9/37-6/41 B.S. in S.S, 6/41
   Columbia University, New York, NY 9/41-5/42 M.A. 6/42
   " " 3/46-6/49 Ph.D. 6/49

9. Employment record:

   Fellow, Department of History, City College of New York 9/41-6/42

   Tutor in History, City College of New York 2/46-6/46

   Member, Department of History, Columbia University 9/46-6/91, rising through the ranks from instructor to full professor, serving as Chairman, 1961-64.

   Senior Fellow, Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, NY, 9/91-6/92

10. Military Service:

    6/42-5/44 A.U.S., Private to T-3, honorable discharged
    5/44-3/45 A.U.S., honorable discharge as First Lieutenant, Signal Corps (cryptanalytic and Japanese-language officer)

HENRY FRANKLIN GRAFF, cont'd

11. Government experience:

Member, National Historical Publications Commission, appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, reappointed, 1968.
Member, Historical Committee, United States Air Force, 1972-80.

12. Previous Appointments: No.

13. Business relationships:

Director, Rand McNally & Company, Skokie, IL
Partner, Parkview Realty Company, Yonkers, NY
Secretary-Treasurer, Graff-47 Realty Corp., Scarsdale, NY
Chairman, Friends of the Columbia University Libraries
Former trustee, Columbia University Press

14. Memberships:

Phi Beta Kappa, Phi Beta Kappa Associates, the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, the Society of American Historians, Society of the Historians of American Foreign Relations, Center for the Study of the Presidency, the Authors Guild, PEN, the Century Association, Sunningdale Country Club, the Council on Foreign Relations

15. Political affiliations and activities:

(a) none
(b) none
(c) none

16. Honors and awards:

Fellowship, American Council of Learned Societies, 1942
Army Commendation Medal, 1945
Townsend Harris Medal, the City College of NY, 1966
Mark Van Doren Award, Columbia University, 1981
Great Teacher Award, Columbia University, 1982
Kidger Award of the New England History Teachers Association, 1990
Senior Fellowship, Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, 1991-2

HENRY FRANKLIN GRAFF cont'd

17. Published writings:

BOOKS:

Bluejackets with Perry in Japan (New York, New York Public Library (1952)

The Modern Researcher (with Jacques Barzun) (New York, 1957) Latest edition is the Fifth, published in 1992-- hardcover edition by Houghton Mifflin Co., paperbound edition by Harcourt Brace.

The Adventure of the American People (with John A. Krout) (Chicago, Rand McNally & Co. 1959, second ed., 1968, third ed., 1973)

American Themes: Selected Addresses of John Allen Krout (with Clifford L. Lord) (New York, Columbia University Press, 1963.

cons.ed., The Life History of the United States, 12 vol. (New York, Time, Inc., 1963-64)

The Free and the Brave (Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., 1967, second ed., 1972, third ed., 1977, fourth ed., 1980.)

with the Editors of Silver Burdett, Thomas Jefferson (Morristown, NJ., 1967)

ed., American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1969)

The Tuesday Cabinet: Deliberation and Decision on Peace and War under Lyndon B. Johnson (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1970.

The Call of Freedom (with Paul J. Bohannan) (Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1977)

The Promise of Democracy (with Paul J. Bohannan) (Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1977

This Great Nation: A History of the United States (Chicago, Riverside Publishing Co. 1983)

America: The Glorious Republic (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1985, Second Edition, 1990).

The Presidents: A Reference History (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985)

CHAPTERS OF BOOKS:

"Problem of the Interregnum," in The Dynamics of the American Presidency. Compiled and edited by Donald Burce Johnson and Jack L. Walker, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964, pp. 125-128. Reprinted from The New York Times Magazine, October 2, 1960, pp. 15, 88-89.

"The Charles River Bridge Case," in Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution. Ed. by John A. Garraty, New York: Harper and Row, 1964, pp. 62-76. Colophon edition (Harper paperback), 1966.

Chapter 81, "American Imperialism," in John A. Garraty and Peter Gay, eds., The Columbia History of the World (New York, 1972.

ARTICLES:

"The Early Impact of Japan upon American Agriculture," Agricultural History, 23:2 (April, 1949), pp. 110-16.
"The Lesson of a Japanese Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, 65:3 (September 1950, pp. 431-40).
"Bluejackets with Perry in Japan," New York Public Library Bulletin, 55:3-22, 66-85, 133-47, 162-80, 225-40, 276-87, 449-50 (Jan-Jul).
"Knowledge for Freedom," Baltimore Bulletin of Education, 31-4, April 1954.
"Playing Political Possum Isn't Easy," The New York Times Magazine, June 26, 1960, pp. 13, 40-1.
"Problem of the Interregnum," The New York Times Magazine, October 2, 1960, pp. 88-9.
"Bipartisanship: Only a Dream," The New York Times Magazine, December 25, 1960, pp. 8, 12-3.
"Quipmasters of Politics," The New York Times Magazine, September 17, 1961, pp. 16, 39-41.
"The Kind of Mayor LaGuardia Was," The New York Times Magazine, October 22, 1961, pp. 46, 52-3.
"McGuffey's Lessons--and Un-Lessons," The New York Times Magazine, December 3, 1961, pp. 50-2, 110-15.
"The College Survey Course in American History," Social Education, 25:281-3, October 1961.
"CEEB Advanced Placement Examination: American History -- Commentary by Henry F. Graff," Social Education 26: 251-62, May 1962.
"Decease of the Log-Cabin Legend," The New York Times Magazine, June 30, 1963.
"Life With Father, the President," The New York Times Magazine, July 14, 1963. Reprinted The Milwaukee Journal, November 13, 1963.
"Preserving the Secrets of the White House," The New York Times Magazine, December 29, 1963, p. 9, 30-1.
"From Tippecanoe to Scranton, Too," The New York Times Magazine, July 5, 1964, pp. 11, 16.
"A Heartbeat Away," American Heritage, xv, No. 5 (August, 1974), 81-87.
"The Man Who -- Loses," The New York Times Magazine, November 15, 1964, pp. 36, 132, 134.
"The Presidency,by the Presidents," The New York Times Magazine, April 12, 1964, pp. 18-19, 105.
"Isolationism Again -- with a Difference," The New York Times Magazine, May 16, 1965, pp. 26-27, 98-100. Reprinted in Congressional Record, iii No. 93 Monday, May 24, 1965, 10981-83. Also reprinted in Freedom House Reprint Series, No. 17.

"Decision in Viet Nam: How Johnson Makes Foreign Policy," The New York Times Magazine, July 4, 1965, pp. 4-7, 16-20. Reprinted in Robert A. Divine, ed., American Foreign Policy Since 1945. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969, pp. 215-32. Abridged, The Sunday Times (London), July 4, 1965, pp. 11, 13.

"Teach-in on Vietnam," The New York Times Magazine, March 20, 1966, pp. 25, 128-133.

"The Wealth of Presidents," American Heritage, xvii, No. 6 (October, 1966) pp. 4-5, 106-111.

"Patriotic Values in America: An Historian's View," Perspectives in Defense Management, August, 1968, pp. 1-17.

"Troubled America is Changing," (Bei wa yamitsutsu Kawatte yuku), in Yomiuri Shimbun (TokyoO, September 28,1968. First of series, "This is America" (Zoku Kore ga Amerika da). Subsequent articles were "Trend of the Times, 'Black-White coexistence' " (Toki no nagara 'Kuro-Shiro kyoson'), October 6, 1968; "The Difficult Period of Political Reorganization," (Seiji saihenki no nayami), October 8, 1969. Also, in English, "Americans Aware of Need to Adjust Foreign Policy," November 5, 1968.

"Transition at the White House," The New Leader, LI, No. 25 (December 30, 1968), pp. 3-7.

"Salo W. Baron: Historian of the Jews" (Symposium), Jewish Heritage, xi, No. 4, (Summer, 1969), pp. 45-47.

"Participatory Foreign Policy," The New Leader, liii, No. 5 (March 2, 1970), pp. 10-15. Reprinted in Congressional Record, cxvi, No. 4 (Friday, March 20, 1970), S4131-3.

"The 'Ordinary Many' as President," The New Leader, September 2, 1974, pp. 7-9.

"From Independence to Interdependence," in America at 200, Headline Series, no. 227, pp. 36-60. New York, Foreign Policy Association, Inc. 1975.

"The President and the Press," in Covering the '76 Elections: A Dialogue Between Journalists and Social Scientists (Columbia Journalism Monograph, NO. 2, 1976).

"To Choose a President," published March 7, 1976 (written for Associated Press).

"Do Americans Understand Democracy?" in Perspectives in Defense Management, No. 24, Winter 1975-1976, pp. 69-77.

"Presidents as Penman," in Dora B. Weiner and William B. Keylor, eds., From Parnassus: Essays in Honor of Jacques Barzun, New York, 1977.

"Lyndon B. Johnson: Frustrated Achiever," in Philip C. Dolce and George Skau, eds., Power and the Presidency, (New York, 1977).

"Presidents are Now Mayors," The New York Times, July 18, 1979.
"Electing Civilians," The New York Times, February 22, 1980.
"Threats to Presidency," The New York Times, July 25, 1980.
"The Vexing of the U.S. Presidency: An Interview with Henry F. Graff," by Ceil Cleveland, Columbia, Fall, 1980, pp. 33-7.

MISCELLANEOUS PIECES:

Biographical sketch of Jacob Ruppert in Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement 2, pp. 589-90 (New York, 1958).
Introduction to Margaret Bassett, Profiles and Portraits of American Presidents, (Freeport, Maine, 1964).
Preface to James Warner Bellah, Soldiers' Battle: Gettysburg, New York 1962.

REVIEW ESSAYS AND REVIEWS:

Numerous reviews and review articles for:
American Historical Review
Journal of Modern History
Political Science Quarterly
The New Leader
Columbia Law Review
Saturday Review
The New York Times Book Review

HENRY F. GRAFF cont'd

I have also contributed biographical sketches over the years to the Dictionary of American Biography. These have allowed me to indulge my affection for baseball. I have written the sketches of

Ty Cobb
Lou Gehrig
Rogers Hornsby
Mel Ott
Jacob Ruppert
Honus Wagner
Heine Zimmerman

Yet to be published are those of Casey Stengel and Jackie Robinson, which will appear shortly in the latest Supplement volumes of the DAB.

I contributed the articles on Gerald Ford and Branch Rickey to the Reader's Companion to American History (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1992)

I contributed the articles on Lyndon B. Johnson, the Great Society, Presidential retreats, and Presidential secretaries to be published in the forthcoming four-volume Encyclopedia of the American Presidency (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1993).

I contributed a chapter, "The Campaign of 1928," to Running for President, a two-volume history of presidential campaigning edited by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Fred Israel planned for publication by Simon & Schuster in 1994.

I am at work on a book of essays on the Presidency.

In recent years I have written a number of Op-Ed articles for the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times.

HENRY FRANKLIN GRAFF, cont'd

18. Speeches:

I have no texts of formal speeches delivered in the past 5 years.

19. Congressional Testimony:

I have never testified before a Committee of the Congress.

20. Selection:

(a) Do you know why you were chosen for this nomination by the President? I assume that I was considered to have professional qualifications especially suiting me for the position.

(b) What do you believe in your background or employment experience affirmatively qualifies you for this particular appointment? I have spent a lifetime teaching and writing about the history of the presidency and about American history in general. The work of this appointment is bound to draw on the expertness I believe I have acquired.

B. FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

1. Will you sever all connections with your present employers, business firms, business associations or business organiza tions if you are confirmed by the Senate?

I do not have such connections.

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the government? If so, explain.

No.

3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after completing service to resume employment, affiliation or practice with your previous employer, business firm, associa tion or organization?

No.

4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after you leave government service?

No.

HENRY FRANKLIN GRAFF cont'd

5. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?

Yes.

C. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.

My fees as a Director of Rand McNally & Company are being deferred until such time as I retire from the Board.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

None.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

None.

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public policy.

None.

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide copies of any trust or other agreement.)

None will arise.

6. Do you agree to have written opinions provided to the Committee by the designated agency ethics officer of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this position?

Yes.

D. LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of thics for unprofessional conduct by, or been subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide details.

No.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

No.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.

No.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including pleas of guilty or *nolo contendere*) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense?

No.

5. Please advise the Committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

None.

E. FINANCIAL DATA

(Retained in Committee Files.)

AFFIDAVIT

Henry F. Graff being duly sworn, hereby states that he/she has read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of his/her knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

Henry F. Graff

Subscribed and sworn before me this 16TH day of NOVEMBER, 19 93

Gretchen Barbieri
Notary Public

GRETCHEN BARBIERI
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 4776146
Qualified in Westchester County
Commission Expires Jan. 31, 19 95

PRE-HEARING QUESTIONS FOR
HENRY F. GRAFF
TO BE A MEMBER OF THE
ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

I. NOMINATION PROCESS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS

1. Were any conditions, expressed or implied, attached to your nomination to be a member of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)?

No.

2. Have you made any commitments with respect to policies or programs affected by your role as a member of the ARRB? If so, what are they?

No.

3. Are there any issues involving the ARRB from which you may have to disqualify yourself? If so, please explain.

No.

4. Have you been a party to any legal actions or administrative proceedings pertaining to access to, or disclosure of, federal records on the subject of the assassination of President Kennedy?

No.

II. ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. What particular qualifications and experience do you bring to the role of being a member of the ARRB?

First, I have been a professional historian during most of my adult life, specializing in the history of the presidency and the history of United States diplomatic relations, and attaining national standing and recognition. I believe that I have a well-developed sense of historical objectivity.

Second, I served two terms as a member of the National Historical Publications Commission to which I was appointed and then reappointed by President Johnson. A chief function was to arrange for the evaluation and publication of collections of documents with historical significance. I participated fully in the activities of the NHPC and gained indispensible experience in judging documentary work.

Third, as co-author of The Modern Researcher (which has been described as the "classic guide to research and writing" and which now is in its Fifth Edition and its thirty-sixth year of publication), I have a keen sense of the methods and needs of researchers.

2. What do you consider to be your primary responsibilities and priorities as an ARRB member?

My first responsibility is to help establish the determination of the Board to fulfill the purpose of the legislation creating it.
The second is to help oversee the orderly and complete gathering of the documents from the respective agencies holding them.

The first priority is to help structure the Board so that the work can proceed expeditiously and efficiently.
The second priority is to obtain the services of a knowledgeable and energetic Executive Director as soon as possible.

3. How do you envision your relationship and responsibilities-- as an ARRB member-- to (a) the President, (b) the Congress, and (c) other executive branch agencies?

(a) to the President: I will aim to the best of my ability to meet the high expectations that President Bush enunciated upon signing the Act creating the Board: to help burnish the reputation of the United States Government for trustworthiness. I will be responsive to inquiries and suggestions that may emanate from the White House, while keeping in mind that the Board's own integrity is the highest desideratum.

(b) to the Congress: I will aim to fulfill the purpose of the legislation creating the Board. I will always be acutely aware of the keen interest and concern that the Congress has expressed from the beginning in the assassination itself and in the attendant issues that understanding it has generated both on Capitol Hill and in the country at large. I will be responsive to inquiries and suggestions that may emanate from the Congress, while keeping in mind that the Board's own integrity is the highest desideratum.

(c) to other executive branch agencies: I will be responsive to the special concerns that assembling the pertinent documents may create. Still, I feel obliged to keep firmly in mind that the Board's mission is the highest desideratum.

4. How do you view the job of ARRB Executive Director? What role do you anticipate playing in the selection of ARRB Executive Director and staff?

The Executive Director is central to the success of the Board's mission. He or she must be a person of judgment, The Executive Director is central to the success of the Board's mission. He or she must be a person of judgment, principle, and energy, experienced in dealing with masses of historical material and capable of comfortably delegating work to subordinates. The person must be history-minded as well as capable of administering justly and effectively an enterprise that will be substantial in size and enduring in its impact on the nation's. The Executive Director must be aware from the outset that he or she will have to be in regular contact with the Board on all vital issues arising out of the work.

I would expect to have a part in interviewing prospective nominees for the post, and then in helping to instruct the person selected as to his or her responsibilities. As to the staff, I assume that the Executive Director will have a comparatively free hand in the selection of subordinates in order to guarantee the ultimate responsibility of the Executive Director for the thoroughness of the undertaking. I would expect to be consulted on nominees for staff positions as significant issues arise.

III. POLICY ISSUES

1. Have you made any public statements-- oral or written-- regarding the assassination of President Kennedy or the public availability of government records regarding this assassination? Please explain, and provide copies of any relevant material.

I was interviewed by the Scarsdale Inquirer in the week after President Clinton announced his intention to nominate me to the ARRB. I offered some innocuous remarks to the reporter, which were not set down with complete accuracy. (I know, for example, and so said, that the Kennedy autopsy material will not be made public. Also, I specifically said that George Stephanopoulos was never a student of mine.) The text is attached.

2. Members of the ARRB will be examining security classified records with a view to their declassification and public disclosure, in whole or in part, at some time in the future.

(a) Can you describe what prior experience you have had, if any, with using or examining security classified records of the Federal Government?

During my army service in World War II as an enlisted man and as an officer of the Army Security Agency at Arlington Hall Station in Arlington, Virginia, I was engaged in cryptanalytic and translation work on the most secret Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers. The resulting documents were classified TOP SECRET ULTRA-- the highest classification of that day. I was also privy to the MAGIC SUMMARY, which was issued daily to the White House and to 10 Downing Street by Special Branch in the Pentagon, and was also classified TOP SECRET ULTRA.

(b) What do you think of our current security classification system? For example, would you say it operates well, has integrity, and serves the public interest?

I am not familiar with the intricacies of the classification system at present. I have never requested documents under the Freedom of Information Acts and have no personal experience on which to base an answer to the sub-question.

As a diplomatic historian, I have been concerned that the long time-lag that now obtains in the publication of The Foreign Relations of the United States Series could be considerably shortened without damage to the national interest. Still, a lack of sufficient funds may be partly responsible for this situation.

3. One of the duties of the ARRB will be to determine what constitutes an "assassination record". What criteria do you think should be used to make this determination?

I believe that an "assassination record" would be any document that directly or indirectly materially bears on the assassination. The Board will have to create criteria for what is meant by "materially". It is my further belief that individual documents and classes of documents will have to be evaluated by the Board on a case-by-case basis.

IV. RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

1. Do you agree without reservation to respond to any reasonable summons to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, if confirmed?

Yes.

2. Do you agree without reservation to reply to any reasonable request for information from any duly constituted committee of the Congress, or its duly authorized agent, if conformed?

Yes.

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

A. Biographical Information

1. Name:

Kermit L. Hall

2. Position for Which Nominated:

Member of the Assassination Records Review Board

3. Date of Nomination:

September 9, 1993

4. Address:

Home: 1500 S. Frisco, 2F, Tulsa, OK 74119
Office: College of Arts & Sciences, Suite 111, Chapman Hall, The University of Tulsa, Tulsa, OK 74104-3189

5. Date and place of birth:

31 August 1944, Akron, Ohio, USA

6. Marital status:

Married to Phyllis Anne Moke

7. Names and age of children:

No children

8. Education:

Garfield High School, Akron, Ohio, 1959-1962, Diploma, June, 1962.

The University of Akron, Akron, Ohio, 1962-1966, B.A., June, 1966.

Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, 1966-1967, M.A., August, 1967.

The University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1969-1972, Ph.D., August 1972.

Yale University Law School, New Haven, Connecticut, 1979-1980, Master of Study of Law, August 1980.

Harvard University, Institute for Educational Management, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993, Certificate, July 1993.

9. Employment Record:

Resident Advisor, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, September 1966-August 1967.

Second/First Lieutenant, U. S. Army, Army Security Agency, January 1968-December 1969.

Teaching Assistant, Department of History, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, January 1969-June 1971.

Instructor, Metropolitan Junior College, Minneapolis, Minnesota, September 1971-June 1972.

Assistant Professor, Department of History, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, September 1972-June 1976.

Assistant/Associate Professor, Department of History, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, September 1976-June 1981.

Associate/Full Professor of History and Law, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, September 1981-July 1992.

Dean and Professor of History and Law, The University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma, July 1992-present.

10. Military Service:

Second and First Lieutenant, U. S. Army Security Agency, January 1968-December 1969, Honorable Discharge.

11. Government experience:

Member, Historical Advisory Board, Federal Judicial Center, 1989-present.

Member, Board of Directors, Oklahoma School of Science and Mathematics, 1992-present.

Panel Reviewer, National Endowment for the Humanities, Various Panels involving public programming, secondary and higher education, 1989-present.

Panel Reviewer, National Science Foundation, Law and Social Science Program, 1985-1991.

12. Previous Appointments:

No previous federal nomination.

13. Business relationships:

Member, Board of Advisors, American Bar Association, Commission on College and University Legal Studies, 1993-present.

Member, Board of Trustees, The Tulsa Philharmonic Society, 1993-present.

Member, National Advisory Board, The ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies, 1993-present.

Director and Trustee, American Society for Legal History, 1982-1985, 1986-1989.

Advisory Board, "Road to the War of 1812: A Journey Through Early American History," Pure Magic Productions, El Monte, California.

Advisory Board, "Unlikely Heroes," Peterson Productions, Washington, D. C.

Advisory Board, "Simple Justice," New Images Productions, Berkeley, California.

Advisory Board, "The American Constitution," Maryland Public Television, Maryland.

Co-editor, Constitutionalism and Democracy, The University Press of Virginia, 1991-present.

Co-editor, Southern Legal History, The University of Georgia Press, 1993-present.

Co-editor, Studies in Western Legal History, The University of Nebraska Press, 1987-present.

Editor, Great Cases in American Constitutional History, McGraw-Hill Publishers, 1991-present.

Editor, Bicentennial Essays on the Bill of Rights, Oxford University Press, 1986-present.

14. Memberships:

American Historical Association (Program Committee, Littleton-Griswold Prize Committee, Representative to Project '87, Chairperson, Bill of Rights Education Collaborative)
American Judicature Society
Organization of American Historians (Program Committee, Chair of Ad Hoc Committee on Access to Lawyers' Papers)
Southern Historical Association (Program Committee)

American Society for Legal History (Chair of Program Committee, Member, Board of Trustees, Chair of Committee on Openness)
The Society of Historians of the Early Republic
Social Science History Association
Western History Association (Member, Program Committee, Member, Board of Editors, Western Historical Review)
Ninth Judicial Circuit Historical Society
Phi Alpha Theta (History Honorary)
Omicron Delta Kappa (Leadership Honorary)
Phi Sigma Alpha (Leadership Honorary)
Law & Society Association (Editor, Fifth Issue: Law & Society Review, Member, Editorial Board, Law & Society Review)
American Bar Association (Member, Advisory Committee, on College and University Legal Education)
The National Audobon Society
National Geographic Society
Philbrook Museum
Gilcrease Museum
All Souls Unitarian Church
The Tulsa Philharmonic Society

15. Political affiliations and activities:

Political Affiliations and Activities:

a. List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.

None.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 10 years.

None.

c. Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $50 or more for the past 5 years.

Check-off on income tax return for presidential campaigns.

16. Honors and awards:

"Native Americans and Higher Education," Summer Institute for Native American high school students, The Coca-Cola Foundation, 1994-1997.

"Defining the Core of Citizenship: Reaching Those Who Teach Teachers," Summer Institute for College Teachers, National Endowment for the Humanities, 1993-94.

"Minority Scholars in History," Grant, Pew Charitable Trusts, 1991 - 1994.

Fellow, Center for Great Plains Studies, Lincoln, Nebraska.

American Historical Association Nominee, Charles A. Dana Award of the Association of American Colleges for Pioneering Achievements in Higher Education, 1987.

Comprehensive Bibliography selected by *Choice* as an Outstanding Academic Book in History for 1985.

The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court, selected by the History Book Club as a Main Selection, 1992; Named "An Outstanding Reference Work for 1992," by the American Library Association, and Certificate of Merit, Gavel Award, American Bar Association, 1993.

Fulbright Short Term Lecturer in American Constitutional and Legal History, Universities of Helsinki and Turku, Finland, February 1987.

Visiting Scholar, American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Illinois, 1986-1987.

Grant, "The South and the American Constitutional Tradition," Florida Endowment for the Humanities, 1986-1987.

Grants from Rockefeller, Hewlett, and Exxon Foundations for the History Teaching Alliance, 1984-1987. (Administered through the American Historical Association.)

Fulbright Lecturer in Law and American Studies, Kobe University, Japan, 1985-1986. (declined)

"Collaboratives on Teaching the History of the American Constitution in Secondary Schools," Grant, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, 1984-1987.

Grant, "The Popular Election of Judges and Judicial Behavior," National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Division, 1984-1986.

Grant, "The History of Popular Election of Judges," Albert J. Beveridge Fund, American Historical Association, 1984.

Grant, "The Politics of Nineteenth-Century Judicial Elections," American Association for State and Local History, 1983-1984.

Norman Wilensky Teaching Prize, Department of History, University of Florida, 1983.

"The History of the Popular Election of Judges," National Endowment for the Humanities, Summer Stipend, 1982.

"A Bibliography of American Constitutional and Legal History," American Bar Foundation Legal History Grant, 1982.
Legal History Fellow, American Bar Foundation, 1980-1981.

Post-Doctoral Graduate Fellow, Yale Law School, 1979-1980.

Post-Doctoral Fellowship, Earhart Foundation, 1979-1980.

"The Politics of Federal Judicial Selection," Grant-in-Aid, The American Philosophical Society, Summer, 1976.

"The Politics of Federal Judicial Selection," Grant-in-Aid, The American Council of Learned Societies, Summer, 1975.

17. Published Writings:

Books:

Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Kermit L. Hall and Eric W. Rise, From Local Courts to National Tribunals: The Federal District Courts of Florida, 1821-1990 (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishing Company, 1991).

Kermit L. Hall, The Supreme Court and Judicial Review in American History (Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, 1985). A volume in the American Historical Association's Bicentennial Essays on the Constitution.

Kermit L. Hall, The Politics of Justice: Lower Federal Judicial Selection and the Second American Party System, 1829-1861 (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1979).

Edited Books:

Kermit L. Hall, editor-in-chief, The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). (James W. Ely, Jr., Joel Grossman, and William M. Wiecek associate editors).

Kermit L. Hall, William M. Wiecek, and Paul Finkelman, American Legal History: Cases and the Materials (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

Kermit L. Hall, Major Problems in American Constitutional History, 2 vols. (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1991).

Kermit L. Hall, 'By and For the People': Constitutional Rights in American History (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1991).

Kermit L. Hall and James W. Ely, Jr., An Uncertain Tradition: The South and the American Constitutional Tradition (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989).

Kermit L. Hall, Collected Essays on American Constitutional and Legal History, 21 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing Company, 1986). (not included)

Kermit L. Hall, A Comprehensive Bibliography of American Constitutional and Legal History, 5 vols. (Millwood, NY: Kraus Thomson International, 1985). Supplement, 1980-1987 (Millwood, NY: Kraus Thomson International, 1991). (not included)

Kermit L. Hall, Harold M. Hyman, and Leon V. Sigal, eds., The Constitutional Convention as an Amending Device (Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, 1981).

Herbert Weaver and Kermit L. Hall, eds., The Correspondence of James K. Polk, Volume Four, 1835-1836 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1975). (not included)

Articles and Chapters in Books:

"Of Floors and Ceilings: State Bills of Right and the American Constitutional Tradition," in David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr., eds., New Perspectives on American Liberty (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 213 - 240.

"Of Floors and Ceilings: The New Federalism and State Bills of Rights," Florida Law Review 44 (September 1992, forthcoming).

"If All the World Were Philadelphia: Allen Steinberg's The Transformation of Criminal Justice," Pennsylvania History 27 (Summer 1992): 13-21.

"The Irony of the Federal Constitution's Genius: State Constitutional Development," in Peter Nardulli, ed., The Constitution and American Political Development: An Institutional Perspective (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992): 235-261

"The Legal Culture of the Great Plains," Great Plains Quarterly 12 (Spring 1992): 86-98.

"The Legacy of Nineteenth-Century State Bills of Rights," Perspectives on Intergovernmental Relations 17 (Fall 1991): 15-18.

"'Mostly Anchor and Little Sail': State Constitutions in American History," in Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State Constitutions, in Paul Finkelman and Steven Gottlieb, eds. (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press, 1991), pp. 388-418.

"The Supreme Court, Original Intent, and the Bill of Rights," in Raymond Arsenault, ed., Crucible of Liberty: The Bill of Rights Across Two Centuries (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 3 - 22.

"American Legal History as Science and Applied Politics," Benchmark: A Quarterly Review of the Constitution and Courts 4 (Summer 1990): 227 - 238.

"Justice Brennan and Cultural History: New York Times v. Sullivan and Its Times," California Western Law Review 27 (1990-1991): 339 - 359.

"Framing the Bill of Rights," in 'By and For the People': Constitutional Rights in American History, Kermit L. Hall, ed. (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson Publishers, 1991), pp. 14 - 25.

"The South and the American Constitution," in An Uncertain Tradition, Kermit L. Hall and James W. Ely, Jr., eds. (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1989), pp. 3-16.

"Law Librarians and the New American Legal History," Law Library Journal 81 (Winter 1989): 1-11.

"The American Citizen: The Developing Legal Concept," in Foundations of American Citizenship: New Directions for Education (Washington, D. C.: Council of Chief State School Officers, 1988), pp. 41 - 61.

"Implementing the Constitution as Law: The Origins of Judicial Review," "Implementing the Constitution as Law: The Establishment of Judicial Sovereignty," and "The Amending Process and Constitutional Change," in The American Constitution, ed., Herman Belz (Baltimore: The International University Consortium, 1987), pp. 41 - 61, 62 - 83, and 400 - 30. (not included)

"The 'Magic Mirror' and the Promise of Western Legal History at the Bicentennial of the Constitution," The Western Historical Quarterly, 18 (October 1987): 429 - 36.

"The Magic Mirror: American Constitutional and Legal History," The International Journal of Social Education 1 (Autumn 1986): 22 - 48.

"Dissent on the California Supreme Court, 1850- 1920," Social Science History 10 (Spring 1987): 63 - 83.

"Why We Don't Elect Federal Judges," this Constitution no. 10 (Spring 1986): 20-26.

"Change Within Tradition: Hugh Lennox Bond, the Ku Klux Klan, and Civil Rights," The Maryland Historian 10 (Winter 1986): 110-32, with Lou Williams. (not included)

"Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-72," Emory Law Journal 33 (Fall 1984): 921-51.

"Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920," American Bar Foundation Research Journal (Spring 1984): 345-70. Reprinted in Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials, 2nd ed. (Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company, 1993).

"From Ballot to Bench: Popular Election and the Southern Appellate Judiciary, 1832-1920," in, Ambivalent Legacy: Essays on the Legal History of the South, eds., David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr., (University, Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1984), pp. 229-55. (not included)

"Isham Green Harris: Secessionist Governor of Tennessee," in Buck Yearns, ed., The Confederate Governors (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985), pp. 185-94.

"Constitutional Machinery and Judicial Professionalism: The Careers of Midwestern State Appellate Court Judges, 1861-1899," in The New High Priests: The Legal Profession at the End of the Nineteenth Century ed., Gerard W. Gawalt (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 29-49.

"'Think Things, Not Words': Judicial Review in United States Constitutional History," University of Florida Law Review 135 (1983): 281-95. (not included)

"'Sometimes the Otter and Sometimes the Hound': Political Power and Legal Legitimacy in American History, A Review Essay," American Bar Foundation Research Journal 2 (Spring 1983): 429-39. (not included)

"The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860," The Historian 44 (May 1983): 337-54. Reprinted in Pittsburgh Federalist Society Newsletter, June, 1993.

"For Whom the School Bell Tolls: The Substance and Pedagogy of American Legal History," Northwestern University Law Review 77 (May 1982): 201-16. (not included)

"Hacks and Derelicts Revisited: The American Territorial Judiciary, 1780-1959," Western Historical Quarterly 12 (July 1981): 273-89.

"Mere Party and the Magic Mirror: California's First Lower Federal Judicial Appointments," The Hastings Law Journal 32 (March 1981): 819-37. (not included)

"The Children of the Cabins: The Lower Federal Judiciary, Modernization, and the Political Culture, 1789-1899," Northwestern University Law Review 75 (October 1980), 432-71.

"The Promises and Perils of Prosopography -- Southern Style," Vanderbilt Law Review 32 (January 1979): 331-39.

"240 Men: The Antebellum Lower Federal Judiciary, 1829-1861," Vanderbilt Law Review 29 (October 1976): 1089-1129. (not included)

"101 Men: The Social Composition and Recruitment of the Antebellum Lower Federal Judiciary, 1829-1861," Rutgers-Camden Law Journal 7 (Winter 1976): 199-227. (not included)

"Social Backgrounds and Judicial Recruitment: A Nineteenth-Century Perspective on the Lower Federal Judiciary," The Western Political Quarterly 29 (June 1976): 243-57. (not included)

"Andrew Jackson and the Judiciary: The Michigan Territorial Judiciary as a Test Case, 1828-1832," Michigan History 59 (Fall 1975): 131-51. (not included)

"The Civil War Era as a Crucible for Nationalizing the Lower Federal Courts," Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives 7 (Fall 1975): 177-86. Reprinted in Joel Silbey, ed., The Congress of the United States 1789-1989, vol. 1 (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishing Company, 1991), pp. 127-136. (not included)

"West H. Humphreys and the Crisis of the Union," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 34 (Spring 1975): 48-69. (not included)

"Federal Judicial Reform and Proslavery Constitutional Theory: A Retrospective on the Butler Bill," The American Journal of Legal History 17 (April 1973): 166-84. Reprinted in Joel Silbey, ed., The Congress of the United States 1789-1989, vol. 1 (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishing Company, 1991), pp. 137 - 156.

"New Light on an Old Enigma: Sam Houston and the Grand Saline," The Chronicles of Oklahoma 51 (Fall 1973): 335-43. (not included)

Biographical Directories:

Contributor to Biographical Dictionary of U. S. Supreme Court Justices, Melvin Urofsky, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing Co., forthcoming 1994). Two essays. (not included)

Contributor to The Oxford Encyclopedia of World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 1993). One essay. (not included)

Contributor to The Encyclopedia of Southern Culture, ed. by Charles R. Wilson and William Farris (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). Four essays. (not included)

Contributor to The Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, ed. by Leonard Levy and Kenneth Karst (New York: Macmillan, 1986). Fourteen Essays, from 250 - 2,225 words in length. (not included)

Contributor to Judges of the United States, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984). Over 1,000 biographical entries. (not included)

Contributor to The Encyclopedia of Southern History, ed. by David C. Roller and John Twyman (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979). Two essays. (not included)

Reviews:

Journal of American History (10)
The Historian (7)
The American Journal of Legal History (5)
The American Historical Review (8)
Journal of the Early Republic (4)
Ohio History (5)
Detroit College of Law Review (1)
Reviews in American History (3)
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography (3) Judicature (3)
Vanderbilt Law Review (1)
The Midwest Review (1)
The Western Historical Quarterly (3)
Florida Historical Quarterly (5)
Constitutional Commentary (2)
New York History (1)
Law and History Review (1)
Journal of Southern History (3)
Criminal Justice History (1)
Documentary Editing (1)
Western Legal History (1)
The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society (3)
Georgia Historical Quarterly (3)
The Law and Politics Book Review (1)

18. Speeches:

"The Changing Supreme Court," Public Lecture, University of Kentucky, Louisville, Kentucky, October 18, 1993.

"Time to Reclaim: The Social History of the Lower Federal Courts," Detroit Historical Society, October 13, 1993.

"Civil Rights and the Press," Public Lecture, The Gilman School, Baltimore, Maryland, March 29, 1993

"The Power of Comparison in Teaching About Rights," Public Lecture, The Mershon Center, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

"The Changing Supreme Court," Public Lecture, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D. C., October 1992.

"Public Libel Law and Modern American Morality," Humanities Lecture Series, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, September 1992.

"Sober Second Thoughts: Doing the History of the Federal Courts," Eleventh Federal Circuit Historical Society, Hilton Head, South Carolina, May 2, 1992. (included)

"The Bill of Rights and Original Intent," Keynote Address, University Symposium on the Bill of Rights, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, November 1991.

"What We Know About the Bill of Rights at Two-Hundred Years," Keynote Address, Central Michigan University, November 1991.

"The Problem of Incorporation and the Second Amendment," University of Arizona Law School, Tucson, Arizona, November 1991.

"Is There a Core Body of Knowledge about the Constitution and the Bill of Rights?" Hearing Session Address, The Leon Jaworski Symposium about Teaching the Constitution and the Bill of Rights in the 21st Century, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D. C., August 1991.

"First Things First: The 'Central Meaning' of the Bill of Rights," Session Keynote Address, Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Boston, Massachusetts, August 1991.

"The Bill of Rights in Comparative International Perspective," Session Keynote Address, National Conference of State Legislatures Annual Meeting, Orlando, Florida, August 1991.

"The World We Have Lost: The Bill of Rights Today," Keynote Address, Georgia Bicentennial Commission Symposium on the Bill of Rights, Atlanta, Georgia, July 1991.

"Teaching the Constitution and the Bill of Rights: What to Do and What Not to Do," Symposium on Teaching about Law in Community Colleges, Miami-Dade Community College, Miami, Florida, May 1991.

"The Law of Libel and the First Amendment Revisited," Symposium on the Bill of Rights, University of Minnesota Law School, May 1991.

"The Cultural History of the Law of Libel," Department of History and College of Law, University of Illinois, April 1991.

"The Legal Culture of the Great Plains," Keynote Address, Center for Great Plains Studies' Symposium on the Bill of Rights, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska, March 1991.

"New York Times v. Sullivan and Its Times," Keynote Address, Drake University Law School Symposium on "Values in Conflict: the First Amendment and the Law of Libel," Des Moines, Iowa, March 1990.

"Civil Rights and the Law of Libel, 1950-1964," Syracuse University Law School, October 1989.

"A Little Bad History is Too High A Price for Certainty in the Law," Keynote Address, Symposium on the History of Constitutional Rights, The Ohio State University, Newark, April 1989.

"Heed Their Rising Voices: The Civil Rights Background of New York Times v. Sullivan," Boston University Law School, March 1989.

"State Constitutions in the Political Process," Symposium on Constitutionalism and the Political Process, University of Illinois, November 1987.

"The Imperial Judiciary at the Bicentennial of the Constitution," Keynote Address, Symposium on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, University of Alabama at Huntsville, March 1987.

"Amending the Constitution," Jefferson Foundation National Meeting, Washington, D. C., June 1987.

"The Law Librarian and the New Legal History," American Association of Law Libraries, Chicago, July 1987.

"Original Intent and the Founding Fathers at the Bicentennial of the Constitution," Symposium on the History of Constitutional Rights, Pennsylvania State University, June 1987.

"The Constitution and the Judicial Power at the Bicentennial," Pensacola Naval Air Station Association Bicentennial Celebration, Pensacola, Florida, September 1987.

"The American Legal Tradition," Dinner Address, Dinner in Honor of the Bicentennial of the U. S. Constitution, United States Embassy, Finland, Helsinki, Finland, February 1987.

"The Imperial Judiciary," Loyola College of Law, Chicago, Illinois, April 1987.

"All Anchor and No Sail: The Historical Development of State Constitutions," Mississippi State Bar Association Symposium on Constitutional Reform, Jackson, Mississippi, May 1986.

"The State of Constitutional and Legal History," Department of History, Indiana University at Indianapolis, March 1986.

"The Monster that Almost Ate Washington: Why We Will Not Have a Second Constitutional Convention," Keynote Address, Utah Endowment for the Humanities Conference on Teaching About the Constitution, Ogden, Utah, March 1985.

"Civil Rights and the Federal Courts During Reconstruction," Eleventh Circuit Historical Society, Atlanta, Georgia, October 1984.

"Dissent on the Texas Supreme Court, 1850-1920," Texas Tech University School of Law, Lubbock, Texas, April 1983.

"The Supreme Court in American History," American Studies Research Institute, University of Krakow, Krakow, Poland, June 1980.

"California's First Federal Judicial Appointments," Historical Society of the Northern District of California, San Francisco, California, April 1980.

19. Congressional Testimony:

U.S.House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Census and Population, September 11, 1980, HR 621.9, Bill to Commemorate the Bicentenary Era of the Federal Government.

20. Selection:

a. Do you know why you were chosen for this nomination by the President?

The Organization of American Historians submitted my name to President Bill Clinton and that he wished, on the basis of that recommendation, to appoint persons with appropriate credentials under the statute.

b. What do you believe in your background or employment experience affirmatively qualifies you for this particular appointment?

I believe that as a trained historian who has practiced his craft for over 20 years I am well qualified for the position to which I have been nominated. In addition, I have extensive experience working with documents in the National Archives and, generally, dealing with issues related to the accessibility of legal and governmental documents.

B. Future Employment

1. Will you sever all connections with your present employers, business firms, business associations or business organizations if you are confirmed by the Senate?

No, I see no reason to do so. I will continue as Dean of the Henry Kendall College of Arts and Sciences and Professor of History and Law at The University of Tulsa.

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the government? If so, explain.

Yes, in light of 1 above.

3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or organization?

Yes, in light of 1 above.

4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after you leave government service?

No, although I respond in light of 1 above.

5. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?

Yes.

C. Potential Conflicts of Interest

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.

I will continue to draw my salary as Dean of the Henry Kendall College of Arts and Sciences at The University of Tulsa.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

   I know of no investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which would involve a conflict of interest, real or potential.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

   I know of no business or other relationships, dealings, or financial transactions occurring in the last 10 years that pose any conflict of interest.

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public policy.

   I have no engaged in any activity during the past 10 years that has involved directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification of any legislation.

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide copies of any trust or other agreements.)

   In light of the above, no response is required.

6. Do you agree to have written opinions provided to the Committee by the designated agency ethics officer of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this position?

   Yes, I agree to have written opinions provided by the ethics officer of the appropriate agency and/or by the Office of Government Ethics.

D. Legal Matters

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide details.

   No.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, please provide details.

   No.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.

   No.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including please of guilty or nolo contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense?

   No.

5. Please advise the Committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

   None.

E. FINANCIAL DATA

(Retained in Committee Files.)

Affidavit

Kermit L. Hall, being duly sworn, hereby states that he has read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of his knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

K L Hall
(signed)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 3rd **day of** November**, 1993**

(Notary Public) Exp: Sept 8, 1997.

PRE-HEARING ANSWERS FROM

KERMIT L. HALL

TO BE A MEMBER OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

I. NOMINATION PROCESS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS

1. Were any conditions, expressed or implied, attached to your nomination to be a member of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)?

No.

2. Have you made any commitments with respect to policies or programs affected by your role as a member of the ARRB? If so, what are they?

No.

3. Are there any issues involving the ARRB from which you may have to disqualify yourself? If so, please explain.

No.

4. Have you been a party to any legal actions or administrative proceedings pertaining to access to, or disclosure of, federal records on the subject of the assassination of President Kennedy?

No.

II. ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. What particular qualifications and experiences do you bring to the role of being a member of the ARRB?

I am a practicing historian of 21 years experience with a thorough knowledge of American history and of archival and recording management techniques. I have previously served on committees and task forces charged with improving the retention of both electronic and paper records. My service as a scholar demonstrates, I believe, an even-handed approach to major issues, a willingness to weight evidence impartially and fairly, and to pursue truth with fidelity to the evidence. Moreover, I have successfully brought to press books and articles that have withstood the scrutiny of my peers. I have worked extensively in archival, manuscript, and other governmental materials, both of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. These qualities of professionalism, character, energy, and experience are essential to the effective fulfillment of the duties of a member of the ARRB as required under the statute.

2. What do you consider to be your primary responsibilities and priorities as an ARRB member?

As a member of the Board, I will be asked to consider whether a record constitutes an assassination record and whether an assassination record or particular information in a record qualifies for postponement or disclosure under the statute. In fulfilling these responsibilities I will be required to adhere faithfully to the letter and spirit of the enabling legislation, which carries a presumption of the immediate disclosure of all records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. My responsibility is to serve the public interest in meeting this presumption with the understanding that some materials may pose important issues of national security, identify a living person who provided confidential information and would pose a risk of harm to that person, invade privacy to a degree that outweighs the public interest, and/or compromise a security or protective procedure currently employed. In these cases a decision to postpone the release of a document may be warranted. The burden in these instances is clearly on the agency or other entity holding the record to demonstrate that the presumption of release should be set aside. In every instance the question must be answered whether the release of a document would be so harmful as to outweigh the public interest in releasing it under the terms of the statute.

3. How do you envision your relationship and responsibilities -- as an ARRB member -- to (a) the President, (b) the Congress, and (c) other executive branch agencies?

As a member of the ARRB, I recognize that my official conduct falls under the oversight of the Committee on Governmental Operations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate. Board members have a duty to cooperate with the exercise of such oversight jurisdiction. At the same time, the ARRB has authority to direct Government offices to provide documents and related finding aids for assassination records and, if necessary, to investigate the facts surrounding additional information, records, or testimony from individuals which may reasonably be required for me to perform my duties under the statute. The statute creating the ARRB provides that after it has made a finding with regard to documents obtained or developed solely within the executive branch, the President has the sole and nondelegable authority to require the disclosure or postponement of such record or information under the appropriate provisions of the statute. Throughout, the statue clearly provides that the ARRB engaged in a mutually constructive dialogue with the executive branch and the Congress about the character and disclosure of documents.

4. How do you view the job of ARRB Executive Director? What role do you anticipate playing in the selection of ARRB Executive Director and staff?

Members of the ARRB are charged with appointing an Executive Director, whose responsibilities include serving as a principal liaison to Government offices; administering and coordinating the Board's review of records; and administering the official activities of the Board. The Executive Director will have no authority to decide or determine whether any record should be disclosed to the public or postponed for disclosure. That duty resides with the Board alone. The selection of staff members will be done in keeping with the statutory requirements. Staff members will have no authority to determine whether a record should be disclosed or postponed.

III. POLICY ISSUES

1. Have you made any public statements -- oral or written -- regarding the assassination of President Kennedy or the public availability of government records regarding this assassination? Please explain, and provide copies of any relevant material.

I have made no public statements.

a) Can you describe what prior experience you have had, if any, with using or examining security classified records of the Federal Government?

From 1968 to 1969 I served as an officer in the United States Army, a position that required me to handled many classified documents and other materials. These documents ranged from war plans, to encrypted messages, to memoranda and working papers on various intelligence matters.

b) What do you think of our current security classification system? For example, would you say it operates well, has integrity, and serves the public interest?

Although I have not worked with classified documents for some time, my general sense is that the present system probably leans too heavily toward classification and over-classification of materials that really do not deserve protection. My own experience in years past suggests a tendency to make secret that which is confidential and confidential that which is really not sensitive. Such a practice is perhaps understandable, given the vicissitudes of national security, but openness and the general availability of information about the conduct of government is to be cherished in a democracy.

3. One of the duties of the ARRB will be to determine what constitutes an "assassination record". What criteria do you think should be used to make this decision?

The statute creating the ARRB defines an assassination record as a record that is related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, that was created or made available for use by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the possession of the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Commission, the Pike Commission, the House Assassination Committee, the Library of Congress, the National Archives, Presidential libraries, any Executive agency, any independent agency, any other office of the Federal Government, and any State or local law enforcement office that provided support or assistance or performed work in connection with a Federal inquiry into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I understand that autopsy records donated by the Kennedy family to the National Archives pursuant to a deed of gift regulating access to those records, or copies and reproductions made from such records, are not included.

IV. RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

1. Do you agree without reservation to respond to any reasonable summons to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, if confirmed?

Yes.

2. Do you agree without reservation to reply to any reasonable request for information from any duly constituted committee of the Congress, or its duly authorized agent, if confirmed?

Yes.

K L. Hall
Kermit L. Hall

18 Nov. 1993
Date

United States Senate

Committee on Governmental Affairs

Biographical and Financial Information requested of Nominees

A. Biographical Information

1. Name: William L. Joyce

2. Position to which nominated: Member of the Assassination Records Review Board

3. Date of nomination: Friday, October 22, 1993

4. Address:
99 McCosh Circle
Princeton, N. J. 08540-5626

Princeton University Library
1 Washington Rd.
Princeton, N. J. 08544-2098

5. Date and place of birth: Rockville Centre, N. Y. on March 29, 1942

6. Marital status: Married on August 13, 1967 to Carol Bertani Joyce

7. Names and ages of children: Susan, age 25, and Michael, age 21

8. Education: Freeport (N. Y.) Junior- Senior High School
September, 1954- June, 1960
N. Y. S. Regents High School diploma

Providence (R. I.) College
September, 1960- June, 1964
B. A. degree

St. John's University (N. Y.)
September, 1964- June, 1966
M. A. degree

The University of Michigan at Ann Arbor
September, 1966- August, 1974
Ph. D. degree in American history

9. Employment Record:

William L. Clements Library
The University of Michigan
Manuscripts Librarian: March, 1968- September, 1972

American Antiquarian Society
Worcester, Massachusetts
Curator of Manuscripts: October, 1972- July, 1981
Education Officer: July, 1977- July, 1981

The New York Public Library
New York, N. Y.
Assistant Director for Rare Books and Manuscripts:
August, 1981- December, 1985

Princeton University Library
Princeton, N. J.
Associate Librn. for Rare Books and Special Collections:
January, 1986- present

10. Military Service: None

11. Government experience:
City of Worcester, Mass., Stubbs Drawings Fund Advisory Committee, 1979-80
Massachusetts L.S.C.A. Advisory Board, 1975-77
New York State Historical Records Adv. Board, 1984-86
New Jersey State Historical Records Adv. Board, 1987-
Panelist, National Endowment for the Humanities, 1975, 1980, 1988, and 1990.
Project consultant, "Assessment and Reporting Project," National Historical Publications and Records Commission, 1983-84

12. Previous appointments: I have not previously been nominated for any position requiring Senate confirmation.

13. Business relationships:

Trustee, Conservation Center for Art and Historic Artifacts, 1992- present

Consultant to:
- Essex Institute, Salem, Mass., 1980-81
- New Bedford Whaling Museum, 1980-83
- Dukes County (Mass.) Historical Society, 1979
- The University of Wyoming, 1980
- The New-York Historical Society, 1984-85, 1987-88, and 1990.

14. Memberships:
Society of American Archivists
- Committee on Professional Standards, 1987-1992 (Chairman, 1988-1989)
- Vice-President then President, 1985-1987
- Council, 1981-1985
- Co-chairman, 1981 Program Committee, Annual Meeting, Berkeley, CA
- Fellow, 1981
- Member, Committee on Archival Information Exchange, 1982-1984

Chairman, Task Force on Institutional Evaluation, 1977-1982, (see Publications)
Member, Committee on Education and Professional Development, 1976-1985

Princeton Library in New York
Trustee, 1993-

Rare Books and Manuscripts Section, Association of College and Research Libraries (ALA)
Vice-chairman then Chairman, 1987-1989
Planning Committee, 1991-1993
Continuing Education Committee, 1984-1986
Publications Committee, 1985-1989

Bibliographical Society of America
Chairman, Fellowship Committee, 1981-1985
Advisory Committee Chairman, Publishing History Sources Project, 1984-1990

Research Libraries Committee, co-sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies, The Association of American Universities, and the Council on Library Resources, 1987-1990

The Grolier Club of New York City, 1983-
Council, 1990- 93

Research Libraries Group
Advisory Task Force on Functional Requirements for the AMC Format, 1980-1981
Committee on Archives and Special Collections, 1985-1991

American Historical Association
Member (elected), Professional Division Committee, 1979-1981

Memberships only:
American Antiquarian Society
American Library Association
American Printing History Association
Colonial Society of Massachusetts
Mid- Atlantic Region Archives Conference
New-York Historical Society
Friends of the New York Public Library

Princeton Club of New York
William L. Clements Library Associates, The University of Michigan

15. Political affiliations and activities:

a) I have never held office in a political party or been a candidate for public office.
b) I have not been a member of or held office in a political party or election committee.
c) Though I have made contributions to candidates for public office, I have never contributed as much as $50 to any candidate.

16. Honors and awards:

Graduate assistantship, St. John's University, 1966.
Dissertation research grant, The University of Michigan, 1970
Fellow, Society of American Archivists, 1981

17. Published writings:

"The Scholarly Implications of Documentary Forgeries," in Forged Documents: Proceedings of the 1989 Houston Conference, Pat Bozeman, ed. New Castle, Del.: Oak Knoll Books, 1990.

"Foxes Guarding the Hen House: Archivists in Special Collections,", Provenance: Journal of the Society of Georgia Archivists, v. 7 (1989), 53-60.

"Archival Education: Two Fables," American Archivist, v. 51 (1988), 16-22.

"The Evolution of the Concept of Special Collections in American Research Libraries," Rare Books and Manuscripts Librarianship, v.3 (1988), 19-30.

"An Uneasy Balance: Voluntarism and Professionalism", American Archivist, v.50 (1987), 7-12.

"Rare Books, Manuscripts, and Other Special Collections Materials: Integration or Separation?" College and Research Libraries, v. 45 (1984), 442-45.

"Archivists and Research Use," American Archivist, v.. 47 (1984), 124-33.

"Historical Records Repositories," in Documenting America: Assessing the Condition of Historical Records in the States, Lisa B. Weber, ed. (Washington, D. C.: National Historical Publications and Records Commission, 1984).

with David D. Hall, Richard D. Brown and John B. Hench, eds. Printing and Society in Early America, (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society, 1983).

with Mary Jo Pugh, Evaluation of Archival Institutions: Services, Principles, Guide to Self-Study (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 1982)

"Antiquarians and Archaeologists: The American Antiquarian Society, 1812-1912," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, v. 89 (1979), 123-52.

"Introduction," in Catalogue of the Manuscript Collections of the American Antiquarian Society, 4 vols. (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1979).

with Michael G. Hall, "The Half-Way Covenant of 1661: Some New Evidence," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, v. 87 (1977), 97-110.

Editors and Ethnicity: A History of the Irish-American Press, 1848-1883 (New York: Arno Press, 1976).

18. Speeches: I do not believe that I have made any speeches on topics directly relevant to the position for which I have been nominated.

19. Congressional testimony: On March 10, 1987 I testified briefly as President of the Society of American Archivists before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Interior, in support of the annual appropriation for the National Endowment for the Humanities.

20. Selection:

a) I was selected by the President from among three nominees supplied by the President of the Society of American Archivists, in accordance with the procedure outlined in Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-526).

b) My education as a historian and my background and experience as a professionally active archivist, curator, research library administrator, and archival educator qualifies me for the position for which I have been nominated.

B. Future Employment Relationships

1. Because the position for which I have been nominated is a temporary responsibility as a member of a Federal board, I have not resigned my permanent, full-time position at Princeton University.

2. I have not resigned my permanent position at Princeton University, as I have stated above, and expect to meet my responsibilities at Princeton while also serving the government. I also have a temporary teaching assignment for a twelve week period, from January 10 through March 25, 1994, at the University of California, Los Angeles, though I have arranged my schedule in order to be able to attend meetings of the Assassination Records Review Board. I have also arranged a leave from Princeton for this period.

3. My only commitment during my service with the government is to continue in my permanent position working for Princeton University, as stated above.

4. The only commitment that I have after my government service is concluded is to continue my work in the Princeton University Library. I have received no other offers for commitment of my services after this assignment is concluded.

5. If confirmed, I will continue my service on the Assassination Records Review Board for as long as necessary.

C. Potential Conflicts of Interest

1. The only financial arrangements that I have maintained are those related to the exercise of my duties in the Princeton University Library and as a temporary instructor in the Graduate School of Library and Information Science at UCLA this coming Winter quarter.

2. I do not believe that I have any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position for which I have been nominated.

3. I do not believe that I have had any business relationship, dealing, or financial transaction over the last ten years that could constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the position for which I have been nominated.

4. In the past ten years, the only activity in which I have engaged to influence the passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public policy, has been to write occasional letters on behalf of legislation affecting my chosen professions of research librarianship and archives.

5. Should there be any possible conflicts of interest in connection with my service as a member of the Assassination Records Review Board, I would receive information from all affected parties, and take appropriate steps to eliminate the conflict.

6. I agree without reservation to having written opinions provided to the Committee by the designated agency ethics officer of the agency for which I have been nominated, as well as by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to my serving in the position for which I have been nominated.

D. Legal Matters

1. I have never been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group.

2. I have never been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation, or ordinance.

3. I have not been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation, nor has any business of which I am or was an officer.

4. I have never been convicted (or offered pleas of guilty or nolo contendere) of any criminal violation other than minor traffic offenses.

5. I am not aware of any other information, favorable or unfavorable, which I think should be considered in connection with my nomination.

E. FINANCIAL DATA

(Retained in Committee Files.)

ANSWERS TO PRE-HEARING QUESTIONS

BY WILLIAM L. JOYCE

NOMINATED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

I. NOMINATION PROCESS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS

1. There have been no conditions, expressed or implied, attached to my nomination to be a member of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB).

2. I have made no commitments with respect to policies or programs affected by my role as a member of the ARRB.

3. I am not aware of any issues involving the ARRB from which I would have to disqualify myself.

4. I have not been a party to any legal actions or administrative proceedings pertaining to access to, or disclosure of, federal records on the subject of the assassination of President Kennedy.

II. ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The particular qualifications and experience that I bring to the role of being a member of the ARRB are the training and experience I have acquired as a historian, in addition to my work-related experience as an archivist and research library administrator.

2. My primary responsibilities and priorities as an ARRB member are to establish, in concert with other Board members, clear policies and sound procedures that can guide the work of the staff that the Board is to hire. Once policies and procedures are set and staff is in place, it is the Board's clear responsibility to oversee the training of staff in effective procedures for reviewing classified records, to advise staff in problem areas, and to oversee their work generally.

3. As an ARRB member, I envision my relationship and responsibilities to:
    a) the President to be one of faithfully executing to the best of my ability the provisions contained in the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ;
    b) the Congress to be one of fulfilling the purposes of the same legislation to the best of my ability, and to responding fully to requests for information from appropriate oversight groups concerning our progress;
    c) other executive branch agencies to be one of cooperating to the utmost of my ability to facilitate the review of any of their assassination records and to provide them with full information concerning our activities.

4. I view the job of ARRB Executive Director to be one of organizing staff for the most efficient and effective implementation of the policies and procedures adopted by the Board. Apart from setting policies and procedures, there is no more important task for the Board than hiring the best-qualified Executive Director and overseeing the Executive Director's hiring of staff.

III. POLICY ISSUES

1. I have not made any public statements-- oral or written-- regarding the assassination of President Kennedy or the public availability of government records regarding this assassination.

2. As an ARRB member, I will be examining security classified records with a view to at least partial public disclosure:

a) I have had prior experience with security classified records first in working with the Papers of Senator Arthur Vandenberg at the William L. Clements Library at The University of Michigan, where we had to initiate a declassification review of parts of those papers, and, second, in my current duties at Princeton University where we have had to initiate contact with the State Department concerning the declassification review of hundreds of reels of microfilm of the most important state documents as selected by John Foster Dulles himself.

b) The current security classification system certainly has integrity. I would hope that, in the interest of a fully informed citizenry and accountable public officials, that somewhat more emphasis might be given to disclosure of records after the passage of a specified period of time, allowing for agency initiative to classify records beyond that time when they fall into specific categories that, in order to protect the national interest or privacy interests, must continue to be restricted.

3. The crtiteria to be used to determine what constitutes an assassination record will likely consist of several elements: the proximity of the record either to the time of the assassination or to the related activity of an assassination principal, and/or the content of the record manifestly relating it to the assassination, or an association of the record to the related activity of someone known to have been involved in events plausibly connected to the assassination.

IV. RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

1. If confirmed, I agree without reservation to respond to any reasonable summons to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Congress.

2. If confirmed, I agree without reservation to reply to any reasonable request for information from any duly constituted committee of Congress, or its duly auithorized agent.

PRASRCRVBD/Pre-hearing questions.wn

A. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. Name:
   Anna Kasten Nelson
   (former name used: Anna Louise Kasten)

2. Position to which nominated:
   John F. Kennedy Assassinations Records Review Board

3. Date of nomination:
   October 25, 1993

4. Address:
   Residence: 3121 Quebec Pl.N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008
   Office: Department of History, The American University
   Washington, D.C. 20016

5. Date and place of birth:
   Fort Smith, Arkansas, 12/1/32

6. Marital status:
   Married, Paul Nelson

7. Names and ages of children:
   Eric M., 34.
   Michael S., 31

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.
   Ft. Smith (AR) High School, 1950
   Ft. Smith Junior College (now Westark), 1950-1952, A.A.
   University of Oklahoma, 1952-1954, B.A.
   University of Oklahoma, 1954-1956, M.A.
   Ohio State University, 1961-1964, Ph.D. candidate
   George Washington University, 1965-1972, Ph.D.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   (See attachment A)

10. Military Service: List any military service, including dates, rank, and type of discharge.
    None

11. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those list above.
    a. Department of State Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation (Representing the Organization of American Historians)
    b. Reviewer and/or Panel Participant, National Endowment of the Humanities
12. Previous Appointments: Prior to this appointment, have you ever been nominated for a position requiring confirmation by the Senate?
    No

13. Business relationships: List all positions held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.
    None

14. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, public, charitable and other organizations.
    American Historical Association
    Jt. Committee of Historians & Archivists, 1988-1991
    Member (elected), Research Division, 1986-1988
    Congressional Fellowship Committee, 1984
    Organization of American Historians
    Committee on Access, 1982-1988(Chair, 1984-1986)
    Jt. Committee of Historians & Archivists, 1982-1984 (Chair, 1983)
    Frederick Jackson Turner Prize Committee, 1980
    Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations
    Editorial Board, Diplomatic History, 1991-1993
    Committee on Documentation, 1989-1991 (Chair)
    Government Relations Committee, 1985
    National Council of Public History
    Editorial Board, The Public Historian, 1991-1993
    Publications Committee, 1985-1989 (Chair)
    Executive Committee, 1984-1986
    Society for History in the Federal Government
    Executive Committee, 1980, and 1993-1994.

15. Political affiliations and activities:
    (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
    None

(b)List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 10 years.

None

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $50 or more for the past 5 years.

Records only available for last three years.
1991 - Emily's List $200
1992 - Emily's List $700
1993 - Emily's List $100

16. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

Society for History in the Federal Government, **Franklin D. Roosevelt Prize**, 1988 (For the Advancement of Historical Study of the Federal Government.
Harry S. Truman Library Institute, **Research Grant**, 1987
American Historical Association, **Beveridge Grant**, 1985
George Washington University, **Graduate Fellowship**, 1968
University of Oklahoma, **Tuition Scholarship**, 1953

17. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports or other published materials which you have written. It would be helpful for the Committee to have three copies of each published writing. Please denote any of those for which you are unable to provide copies.

See Attachment B , including list of copies supplied.

18. Speeches: Provide the Committee with three copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

The following is a list of speeches. Some have been reprinted (see publications). Others do not seem relevant to this position but can be made avaible to the Committee if so desired.

"Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson," Smithsonian Associates, October 1993 (notes only).

"Rethinking NSC 68," Seminar on the Cold War, Institute of Policy Studies, October 1991.

"George Aiken: Senator from Vermont," Aiken Lecture Series Conference, October 1991

" Eisenhower and the National Security Process," Lecture, Eisenhower Center, University of New Orleans, October, 1990.

". The Evolution of the American Foreign Policy Process from Roosevelt to Reagan," Lecture, Foreign Relations Association of New Orleans, April 1990. (notes only)

"Kennedy's National Security Policy: A Reassessment." American Historical Association, December 1989.

"Researching Congress: The Paradox of Sources," A Bicentennial Research Conference on the Congress, 1989.

"Before the National Security Adviser: Did the NSC Matter?" Soc. for Historians of American Foreign Relations, June 1988.

"Themes in American Diplomacy," Foreign Service Institute, May 1988. (notes only)

19. Congressional Testimony: Have you ever testified before a Committee of the Congress? If so, please provide details, including date(s).

a. **Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution,** November 12, 1981, in support of Freedom of Information Act,(FOIA). Representing the Organization of American Historians (OAH).

b. **House Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights,** March 10, 1982, in opposition to the draft Executive Order on National Security Information. Representing the American Historical Association (AHA), OAH, and Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR).

c. **Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,** June 28, 1983, on S. 1324, in opposition to the CIA modification of FOIA. Representing OAH and AHA.

d. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, September 9, 1986, in opposition to unqualified nominee for Archivist of U.S. Representing the Society for History in the Federal Government.

e. **House Subcommittee on Rules of the House,** September 17, 1986, in support of H.Res. 114 (preservation and access to House records), Representing the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History.

20. Selection:

(a) Do you know why you were chosen for this nomination by the President?

Name included on list of names provided by the American Historical Association.

(b)What do you believe in your background or employment experience affirmatively qualifies you for this particular appointment.

First, since 1976, when I became a staff member of the Public Documents Commission, I have been engaged in studies of public records and have become knowledgeable about government recordkeeping and archival practices. I also have been a consistent supporter of the preservation of records and timely access for historical research. Between 1980 and 1988, I participated as a speaker on 15-16 programs having to do with public records, archives or government information policy.

Second, as an active researcher in foreign policy records as well as congressional records during the initial stages of the Cold War era, I also have an understanding of the nature of research and the kind of documentation required for such research.

Third, as a member of an advisory committee on documentation in the State Department (which required a security clearance), I have an appreciation of the kinds of documents that government agencies find too sensitive to release.

Finally, I believe that in my work on preservation and access I have illustrated a personal integrity that has allowed me to gain the trust of my professional colleagues.

B. FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

Not Applicable

C. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.

none

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

none

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

none

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public ppolicy.

See item 19, testimony before Congress.

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide copies of any trust or other agreements.)

not applicable

6. Do you agree to have written opinions provided to the Committee by the designated agency ethics officer of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this positionF?

Yes.

D. LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group?

No

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, State or other law enforcement authority for violation of any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic office?

No

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation?

No

4. Have you ever been convicted (including pleas of guilty or nolo contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offence?

No

5. Please advise the Committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

No additional information seems necessary.

E. FINANCIAL DATA

(Retained in Committee Files.)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Academic

Adj. Professor in History
The American University, 1986-1988, 1992-

Distinguished Visiting Professor in History
Arizona State University, January-June, 1992

Assoc. Professor in History
The American University, 1991

Adj. Assoc. Professor in History
Tulane University, 1988 - 1990

Director, Landmarks Program in American History,
The American University, 1987-1988.
Coordinated a biennial conference cosponsored by the Smithsonian's National Museum of American History, "Women and the Constitution: 200 Years.

Adjunct Associate Professor in History
George Washington University, 1977 - 1985

Director, History and Public Policy Program,
George Washington University, 1980-82.
Established a new M.A. program within the history department to prepare historians for professional participation in public agencies and private organizations concerned with public policy.

Visiting Assistant Professor in History,
George Washington University, 1975-1976.
One year appointment in U.S. Diplomatic History.

Instructor, Assistant/Associate Professorial Lecturer in History,
George Washington University, 1970-1975

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Concurrent Non-Academic Positions

Consultant, Historical Division, Army Corps of Engineers,1985-89,
Prepared a book length manuscript on the history of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army/Civil Works. Book based upon research in federal records and manuscript collections as well as oral interviews.

Project Director, Committee on the Records of Government
July 1983-April 1985.
Chief investigator, administrator, and author with Committee Chairman Ernest R. May of the final report of a foundation funded study sponsored by ACLS, SSRC, and CLR. Creation of the Committeee was prompted by a concern for the effect of technological changes (principally computers) on public records and archives.

Historical Consultant, National Academy of Public Administration panel, "The Role of the President in Managing the Federal Government," 1979-80.
Organized and coordinated research in four presidential libraries and the National Archives for a group of political scientists preparing issue papers for panel meetings, and books and articles for publication. Prepared chapter for publication on the President and the National Security Council.

Consultant, Congressional Research Service (National Government Division), Library of Congress, July-August, 1979.
Organized and prepared a report on government historical offices, federal records and the National Archives and Records Service. This report was prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on Government Information, Government Operations Committee, U.S.House of Representatives.

Consultant, Congressional Research Service (Foreign Affairs and National Defense), Library of Congress, September 1978-January, 1979.
Researched material in presidential libraries and private manuscript collections for a report on the role of Congress in the Vietnam War. Also conducted oral interviews with former members of Congress and former members of the Executive.

Staff Consultant, Select Committee on Congressional Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, July - September, 1978.
Organized, researched and prepared a draft report on the records of the House of Representatives and the papers of Members of Congress.

Consultant, Bicentennial Council of the Thirteen Original States, September 1977- February 1978.

Prepared history-related material for a commemorative conference held in York, Pennsylvania, November 1977. Assisted in conducting a conference of educators from museums, libraries, national organizations and adult education groups.

Interim Director, "Project 87," a project co-sponsored by the American Historical Association and the American Political Science Association, June-August, 1977.

Coordinated the activities of the funding groups and sponsoring organizations. Created an administrative framework for the initial stage of the project.

Research Associate, National Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials, June 1976-May 1977.

Initiated and prepared two studies for the Commission; a study of foreign policy records and papers, and a study of government historical offices and public records. Also prepared a study of the federal depository library program, assisted the director in conducting panels and public hearings and assistedin writing and editing the first and subsequent drafts of the Commission report.

PUBLICATIONS

"The Importance of Foreign Policy Process: Eisenhower and the National Security Council," in Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment, LSU Press, (forthcoming).

"The Ubiquitous Mr. Clifford," (Review Essay), Diplomatic History, Winter 1993.

"The Historian's Dilemma," Understanding Congress: Research Perspectives, Government Printing Office, 1991.

"President Kennedy's National Security Policy: A Reassessment," Reviews in American History, March 1991.

"Government-Sponsored Research: A Sanitized Past?" (Roundtable), The Public Historian, Summer 1988.

"John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress," Political Science Quarterly, , Spring, 1987

"The Committee on the Records of Government: An Assessment," overnment Information Quarterly, Spring, 1987).

"Jane Storms Cazneau: Disciple of Manifest Destiny," rologue, (Spring, 1986).

"President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security ouncil," Journal of American History, September, 1985.

" 'On Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the ational Security Council." Diplomatic History, Fall, 1983.

State Department Policy Planning Staff apers, 1947-1949 (3 vols.), (ed.) Garland Press, 1983

"The Public Documents Commission: Politics and Presidential ecords," Government Publications Review, Vol. 9, 1982.

"Challenge of Documenting the Federal Government in the tter 20th Century," Prologue, July, 1982.

"National Security I: Inventing A Process (1947-1960)," clo/Salamon, eds. The Illusion of Presidential Government. stview Press, 1981.

"Destiny and Diplomacy, 1845-1865," Haynes/Walker, eds. erican Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review, Greenwood ess, 1981

"Disorder in the House: The Inaccessible Record," The Public Historian, Summer, 1980.

The Records of Federal Officials, (ed.) Garland Press, 1979.

"Government Historical Offices and Public Records," American Archivist, October, 1978.

"Mission to Mexico: Moses Y. Beach, Secret Agent," New-York Historical Society Quarterly, July, 1975.

"Secret Agents and Security Leaks: James K. Polk and the Mexican War," Journalism Quarterly, Spring, 1975.

Secret Agents: President Polk and the Search for Peace with Mexico, Revised Ph.D. dissertation published in the Modern American History Series, Garland Press, 1988.

Professional Newsletters and Newspapers

"The U.S. Must Declassify Its Cold-War Documents," (with Richard H. Kohn), The Chronicle of Higher Education, (Point of View), September 16, 1992.

"Congress Must Harness NSC," New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 14, 1989.

"Irrational Policies on Access to Government Records Are Undercutting Our Ability to Understand History," The Chronicle of Higher Education, (Point of View), September 28, 1988.

"Classified History," Newsletter, Organization of American Historians, August, 1984.

"In Support of History," Perspectives (American Historical ssociation Newsletter), February, 1984.

"History Without Historians," Newsletter, American Historical ssociation, February, 1978.

"Foreign Policy Records and Papers: A Case Study of One Group f Documents," Newsletter, Society for Historians of American oreign Relations, June-December, 1977.

ook Reviews

American Archivist, (Fall, 1988); Annals of Iowa, (Summer 88); Journal of Southern History, (Summer 1988); The Public storian (Summer 1988); Southwestern Historical Quarterly, anuary, 1989), Technology and Culture, (April, 1989); Political ience Quarterly, (Spring, 1989); Journal of American History, une, 1991); American Historical Review, (April, 1992); Public storian (Summer, 1992); Journal of American History, (December, 92).

Anna K. Nelson

PRE-HEARING QUESTIONS
ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

I. Nomination Process and Potential Conflicts

1. Were any conditions, expressed or implied, attached to your nomination to be a member of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)?

No

2. Have you made any commitments with respect to policies or programs affected by your role as a member of the ARRB?

No

3. Are there any issues involving the ARRB from which you may have to disqualify yourself?

No

4. Have you been a party to any legal actions or administrative proceedings pertaining to access to, or disclosure of, federal records on the subject of the assassination of President Kennedy?

No

II. Role and Responsibilities

1. What particular qualifications and experience do you bring to the role of being a member of the ARRB?

a. Staff member of the Public Documents Commission, created by Congress after the Nixon tape controversy. This Commission held hearings, sponsored studies on public records and wrote a final report. As a staff member, I was introduced to the promises and problems of preserving federal records and providing access to them.

b. Project Director, Committee on Records of Government. This foundation funded project was designed to study the relationship between information management and records management, particularly as it applies to computer generated records. As project director I worked closely with the Chairman of the Committee and its members. I organized hearings, wrote summaries of the hearings to be circulated to the Committee and was responsible for preparation of the final report.

c. As an historian of American Foreign Relations, I have researched documents in the National Archives (including four Presidential Libraries) from the era of the Cold War. I am very familiar with "withdrawal" notices of classified material as well as the kind of material that has been released.

d. I have been elected and/or appointed to several comittees sponsored by various historical organizations that have been concerned with the declassification of historically valuable documents. As a result, I am very familiar with FOIA and the Executive Orders that control declassification.

2. What do you consider to be your primary responsibilities and priorities as an ARRB member?

The primary responsibility of the ARRB is to ensure the review and facilitate the public disclosure of records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. It is important to note that it is not the responsibility of the Board or its members to reach any conclusions about the participants or events of the assassination. Instead, the Board must ensure that the agencies comply with the law and either open or present to the Board ALL documents pertaining to the assassination. The obligation of each member is to carefully study the documents that have not yet been disclosed to weigh the need for public disclosure against the protection of national security. A major priority of the Board should be the preservation of its own integrity in order to ensure the restoration of government credibility regarding the assassination.

3. How do you envision your relationship and responsibilities--as an ARRB member -- to (a) the President, (b) the Congress, and (c) other executive branch agencies?

a and b. My responsibility to the President and Congress is to fulfill the trust and perform the tasks mandated by the legislation to the best of my ability. I would be willing to confer with members of the White House staff and the Congress on the progress of the Board if it is necessary to do so to preserve the integrity of the process.

c. The relationship with other executive branch agencies may prove more problematical. To restore public confidence, the Board must be guaranteed complete compliance with the law by all the agencies with assassination related records. I would try to ensure that agencies have indeed searched for all relevant records, and have either provided public access to them or prepared them for action by the Board.

4. How do you view the job of ARRB Executive Director? What role do you anticipate playing in the selection of ARRB Executive Director and staff?

As described in the statute, the Executive Director should be responsibile for all administrative duties. These will involve serving as a liaison to the agencies, describing the universe of records, organizing hearings (if necessary), etc. The Executive Director will not be responsible for policy and should not be responsible for determining which documents can be opened to the public.

I would anticipate that every Board member would actively seek candidates for the position of Executive Director. However, since five individuals cannot effectively run a Board, the elected Chair of the Board will be the person who will be closely working with the Executive Director. Thus, the Chair should be particularly involved in the selection process.

III. Policy Issues

1. Have you made any public statements -- oral or written -- regarding the assassination of President Kennedy or the public availability of government records regarding this assassination?

No

2. Members of the ARRB will be examining security classified records with a view to their declassification and public disclosure, in whole or in part, at some time in the future.

a) Can you describe what prior experience you have had, if any, with using or examining security classified records of the Federal Government?

As a member of the State Department Advisory Committee on Historical Documentation I have examined documents that have been deemed security classified (including intelligence documents) and have participated in discussions of disclosure of documents in the Foreign Relations of the United States series with desk officers of State who did not wish to see these documents published. I have also participated in meetings with agency personnel whose responsibility included preserving national security related documents.

b) What do you think of our current security classification system? For example, would you say it operates well, has integrity, and serves the public interests?

The current system is extremely expensive, labor intensive and subjective in its implementation. It has resulted in an enormous backlog of documents over 30 years old and has further eroded public trust and government credibility. The current attempt to rewrite the Executive Order governing the security classification system reflects the awareness of the White House and executive agencies that the current system is no longer viable; it does not operate efficiently, sacrifices the integrity of the record and does not, therefore, serve the public interest.

3. One of the duties of the ARRB will be to determine what constitutes an "assassination record". What criteria do you think should be used to make this determination?

This will be one of the most difficult problems facing the Board. First, I think I would seek information from the agencies on what they regarded as an assassination record. Second, since this goes to the heart of public confidence, I think this is a question that probably should be the subject of an open hearing. Currently my sense is that the Board will have to determine parameters for the kinds of records sought, but that these should be as broad as possible.

IV. Relations With Congress

1. Do you agree without reservation to respond to any reasonable summons to appear and testify before any duly consituted committee of the Congress, if confirmed?
yes

2. Do you agree without reservation to reply to any reasonable request for information from any duly consituted committee of the Congress, or its duly authorized agent, if confirmed?
yes.

13-00000

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

A. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. **Name: (Include any former names used.)**

   John Raymond Tunheim (Jack)

2. **Position to which nominated:**

   Assassination Records Review Panel

3. **Date of nomination:**

   September, 1993

4. **Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)**

   Residence: 704 South Third Street, Stillwater, MN 55082
   Office: 102 State Capitol, St. Paul, MN 55155

5. **Date and place of birth:**

   9/30/53 Thief River Falls, MN

6. **Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)**

   Married to Kathryn Hill Tunheim (maiden name: Kathryn J. Hill)

7. **Names and ages of children:**

   Elizabeth Starr Tunheim, age 9; Samuel John Tunheim, age 5.

8. **Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.**

   Marshall County Central High School, Newfolden, MN 1965-1971, June, 1971;
   Concordia College, Moorhead, MN 1971-1975, BA *summa cum laude* with honors, May, 1975;
   University of Minnesota Law School, Minneapolis, MN 1977-1980, J.D. *cum laude*, June 1980.

9. **Employment record: List all jobs held since college, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. (Please use separate attachment, if necessary.)**

   1. United States Senate, Office of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Field Representative, Minneapolis, MN
      7/75 to 10/77

   2. Freeman for Congress, Press and Issues Director, St. Louis Park, MN
      6/78 to 11/78

   3. Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard & Donnelly (law firm), Summer Associate, St. Paul, MN
      6/79 to 9/79

   4. United States District Court, Senior U.S. District Judge Earl R. Larson, Judicial Law Clerk, Minneapolis, MN
      8/80 to 8/81

   5. Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard & Donnelly (law firm), Associate Attorney, St. Paul, MN
      10/81 to 11/84

   6. State of Minnesota, Office of Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General, Manager, Public Affairs Litigation Division, St. Paul, MN
      11/84 to 9/85

   7. State of Minnesota, Office of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, St. Paul, MN
      9/85 to 6/86

   8. State of Minnesota, Office of the Attorney General, Chief Deputy Attorney General, St. Paul, MN
      6/86 to present.

10. **Military Service: List any military service, including dates, rank, and type of discharge.**

    None.

11. **Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.**

- Federal Practice Committee, United States District Court for the District of Minnesota; member (1990 to present)
- Advisory Committee on Reducing Cost & Delay, United States District Court for the District of Minnesota; member (1991 - present); chair, Internal Court Management Subcommittee (1991 - present)
- Stillwater City Charter Commission; member (1989 - present); Vice-chair (1992 - present)
- Washington County Planning Advisory Commission; chair (1989-1992); member (1985-1992)
- Governor's Select Committee on the Impact of Drugs on Crime, Education, and Social Welfare; member (1989-1990)
- Governor's Blue Ribbon Commission on the Crisis in Liability Insurance; member (1987-1988)
- Minnesota State Bar Association/Attorney General Task Force on Legal Advice to Farmers; chair (1985-1986)
- Governor's Superfund Task Force; member (1984-1985)

12. **Previous Appointments: Prior to this appointment, have you ever been nominated for a position requiring confirmation by the Senate? If so, please list each such position, including the date of nomination, Senate confirmation, and Committee hearing, if any.**

No.

13. **Business relationships: List all positions held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.**

Tunheim Lakeshore Partnership, Pelican Rapids, MN (family partnership formed to own a vacation home).

14. **Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civil, public, charitable and other organizations.**

American Bar Association (1981 - present)

- Member, Special Committee on Lawyers in Government (1990-91) (appointed)
- Secretary and Council Member, Government & Public Sector Lawyers Division (1993 - present) (elected)
- Treasurer and Council Member, Government & Public Sector Lawyers Division (1991-1993) (elected)

Minnesota State Bar Association (1981 - present)
- Co-Chair, Task Force on Legal Advice to Farmers (1985-1986)
- Member, Court Rules Committee (1989-1990)
- Co-Chair, Government Lawyers Task Force (1989-1991)
- Co-Chair, Public Law Section (1991-1992)
- Executive Council, Public Law Section (1992 - present)

Member, Board of Directors, Minnesota Institute for Legal Education (1990 - present) (nonprofit)

Member, Board of Directors, Family Service St. Croix (1990 - present) (nonprofit); Vice-Chair (1993 - present)

Member, Board of Directors, Midsummer: A Minnesota Festival of Music (1988 - present) (nonprofit)

Member and Secretary, Board of Directors, Minnesota Pregnancy & Infant Loss Center (1983-85) (nonprofit)

Member, Stillwater Rotary Club (1984 - present)

15. **Political affiliations and activities:**

(a) **List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.**

Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party
- Delegate, Democratic National Convention 1988, 1992
- Associate Chair, Sixth Congressional District (1991 - present)
- Member, Executive Committee (1991 - present)
- Member, Central Committee (1984 - present)
- Chair, Senate District 55 (1986-1990)

(b) **List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 10 years.**

Political party memberships: All listed in 15(a). I have not been an officer for any election committee during the past ten years.

I was elected a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1988 and 1992.

Services rendered to parties and election committees have all been volunteer, sporadic activities such as attending fundraisers and occasional campaign rallies, attending party meetings and conventions, and some doorknocking and telephoning on behalf of local and statewide candidates. Assisted in organization of the endorsement event by Democratic Attorneys General of the Clinton-Gore ticket in Detroit, Michigan, in October, 1992.

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $50 or more for the past 5 years.

These include all contributions which in aggregate total $50.00 or over to any entity over the period 1990-1993. I was unable to locate any records for 1989. I do not believe there were any significant contributions during that year.

Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (all units)
1993: $774.50
1992: $417.00
1991: $133.00
1990: $ 85.00
1989: cannot locate (estimated: $50.00)
Johnston for State Senate, Maple Plain, MN $50.00 (1992)
Friends of Draper for State Representative, Stillwater, MN $80.00 (1992); $60.00 (1990)
Spaeth for Governor, Bismarck, ND $50.00 (1992)
Clinton for President, Little Rock, AR $300.00 (1992)
Citizens for Keith for Chief Justice, St. Paul, MN $50.00 (1992)
Humphrey for Attorney General Volunteer Committee, St. Paul, MN $125.00 (1992); $100.00 (1993); $100.00 (1990)
Evert for Washington County Commissioner, Stillwater, MN $50.00 (1992)
Alan Page for Justice, Minneapolis, MN $100.00 (1992)
Coleman for Mayor, St. Paul, MN $25.00 (1992); $100.00 (1993)
Freeman Volunteer Committee, Richfield, MN (State Senate and Hennepin County Attorney) $50.00 (1993); $50.00 (1991); $300.00 (1990)
Freeman for Governor, Minneapolis, MN $100.00 (1993)
Rice for State Representative Volunteer Committee, Minneapolis, MN $100.00 (1993)
Knutson for DNC, Hutchinson, MN $50.00 (1993)
DNC Federal Account, Washington, DC $1,025.00 (1993)
Democratic National Committee, Washington, DC $25.00 (1993)
Wellstone for U.S. Senate, Minneapolis, MN $25.00 (1991); $150.00 (1990)
DNC Victory Fund, Washington, DC $1,000.00 (1992)
Chandler for State Senate, White Bear Lake, MN $125.00 (1990)
Fuller for State Senate, Oakdale, MN $100.00 (1990)
Friends of Dayton for State Auditor, Minneapolis, MN $100.00 (1990)
Friends of Dooley for State Representative, Stillwater, MN $90.00 (1990)
Perpich for Governor Volunteer Committee, St. Paul, MN $100.00 (1990)
Jan George for State Representative Volunteer Committee, Mahtomedi, MN $80.00 (1990)

16. **Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.**

National Association of Attorneys General, Marvin Award (1991)
(Awarded annually to up to 5 outstanding assistant attorneys general in U.S.)

National Association of Attorneys General, President's Distinguished Service Award (1988)

Mondale Fellow, University of Minnesota, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, Minneapolis (1992-1993)

Rollof Award, University of Minnesota Law School (1980)
Awarded to President/Editor-in-Chief of the Minnesota Law Review

Minnesota Journal of Law & Politics, Selected as "Rising Star Lawyer," (1993)

17. **Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written. It would be helpful for the Committee to have three copies of each published writing. Please denote any of those for which you are unable to provide copies.**

Book: A Scandinavian Saga (Lakes Publishing, 1984)

Article: Parental Involvement in Minor's Abortions: The Aftermath of Hodgson v. Minnesota and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, *Abortion and The States, Political Change and Future Regulation*, Jane B. Wishner, Editor (American Bar Association, Section of Urban, State and Local Government Law) (1993)

Chapter: State Legislative Activities, *State Attorneys General, Powers and Responsibilities,* Lynn Ross, Editor (BNA: Washington, D.C. 1990). I also served as an editor on this book.

Article: Minnesota's Bill of Rights (William Mitchell Law Review)
(In progress, no copy available, scheduled for publication in 1994)

Op. Ed.: Americans Should Lend Russia a Hand on Democratic Journey, *St. Paul Pioneer Press* (January 8, 1992)

18. **Speeches: Provide the Committee with three copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.**

None.

19. Congressional Testimony: Have you ever testified before a Committee of the Congress? If so, please provide details, including date(s).

No.

20. Selection:

(a) Do you know why you were chosen for this nomination by the President?

I was one of six lawyers recommended for nomination to President Bush in December, 1992 by the President of the American Bar Association, J. Michael McWilliams, as required by the statute. The recommendation was unsolicited. I was selected from the recommendations.

(b) What do you believe in your background or employment experience affirmatively qualifies you for this particular appointment?

I have extensive public law experience, including over seven years as the senior managing lawyers in a highly-regarded attorneys general's office with over 425 staff members. I have handled many of the most sensitive legal disputes involving the State of Minnesota over that time, personally arguing three United States Supreme Court cases and winning two. I have served throughout as the chief legal counsel to the Governor of Minnesota. I have considerable experience dealing with Minnesota's open records law and have a reputation of approaching issues in a fair, thoughtful and impartial manner. I have not been involved in any dispute over the assassination records and believe that, although I am a strong believer in openness in government, I will approach the task in a fair manner. I have considerable experience setting up governmental organizations and administrative processes and believe that experience will be helpful in organizing the process by which the Panel will conduct its work. I have played a leadership role within the National Association of Attorneys General, particularly on management-related issues.

B. FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

1. Will you sever all connections with your present employers, business firms, business associations or business organizations if you are confirmed by the Senate?

No. My understanding is that the position is part-time and I have no conflict of interest in my current position. I will take leave time from the State for any days I am working on panel business.

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the government? If so, explain.

Yes. I will continue my employment with the State of Minnesota and a planned position as Adjunct Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Minnesota Law School.

3. **Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or organization?**

   Yes. Continue my current position.

4. **Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after you leave government service?**

   Not in any position other than my current position.

5. **If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?**

   I expect to serve the full term of the Panel which sunsets under current law.

C. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. **Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.**

   None.

2. **Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.**

   None.

3. **Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.**

   None.

4. **Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public policy.**

When employed by Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard & Donnelly, in 1983, I represented business interests on workers compensation legislation before the Minnesota Legislature; and in 1984, I represented a major communications company on tax legislation before the Minnesota Legislature. For both activities, I was registered as a lobbyist with the Minnesota Ethical Practices Board.

Since being employed by the Minnesota Attorney General's Office, I have been involved significantly in the development of legislation in Minnesota, including primary responsibility for the budget of the Attorney General's Office each year from 1986 to present. I have also worked with the Minnesota Legislature on criminal justice issues, environmental issues, farm credit issues, consumer issues, government records issues, labor issues and others. My work has included drafting legislation, testifying before legislative committees, serving on task forces, writing legal opinions, and working with and advising staff, legislators, and governors.

My entire employment experience in the Attorney General's Office has involved the administration and execution of law or public policy. I have been the senior appointed official in the office for over seven years, responsible for the management of the office. None of my activities have involved any records dispute with a federal agency or anything regarding assassination records.

5. **Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide copies of any trust or other agreements.)**

I cannot imagine what conflict might arise, but if there is one I would not take part in any decision of the panel affecting my conflict of interest.

6. **Do you agree to have written opinions provided to the committee by the designated agency ethics officer of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this position?**

Yes.

D. LEGAL MATTERS

1. **Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? if so, provide details.**

No.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

   No.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.

   No.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including pleas of guilty or *nolo contendere* of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense?

   No.

5. Please advise the Committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

   None.

E. FINANCIAL DATA

(Retained in Committee Files.)

AFFIDAVIT

John R. Tunheim being duly sworn, hereby states that he/she has read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of his/her knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

John R. Tunheim

Subscribed and sworn before me
this 4th day of November, 1993.

Notary Public

JRTPERS.AA6

DEBRA M. LANCETTE
NOTARY PUBLIC-MINNESOTA
RAMSEY COUNTY
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES NOVEMBER 25, 1996

Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

JOHN R. TUNHEIM'S ANSWERS TO PRE-HEARING QUESTIONS TO BE A MEMBER OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

1/26/94

I. NOMINATION PROCESS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS

1. Were any conditions, expressed or implied, attached to your nomination to be a member of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)?

No.

2. Have you made any commitments with respect to policies or programs affected by your role as a member of the ARRB? If so, what are they?

No.

3. Are there any issues involving the ARRB from which you may have to disqualify yourself? If so, please explain.

No. I am unaware of any such issue.

4. Have you been a party to any legal actions or administrative proceedings pertaining to access to, or disclosure of, federal records on the subject of the assassination of President Kennedy?

No.

II. ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. What particular qualifications and experience do you bring to the role of being a member of the ARRB?

Primarily, I bring my background and experience as a lawyer and public official. I have twice been elected a section officer in the American Bar Association and was recommended for this nomination by the President of the American Bar Association. My experience as a lawyer includes three years in private practice and nine years as Solicitor General and Chief Deputy Attorney General in Minnesota. For 7 1/2 years I have been the senior appointed official in the Minnesota Attorney General's Office, responsible for the management and direction of an office of over 200 attorneys. I have handled countless sensitive projects and cases, arguing three cases before the United States Supreme Court and serving as legal counsel to two Minnesota Governors and to the Minnesota Legislature. I have played an active role within the National Association of Attorneys General, twice receiving major national awards from NAAG, twice chairing the Conference of Chief Deputies, and directing many of NAAG's management improvement initiatives. I teach Constitutional Law as an Adjunct Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School.

From my experience as Minnesota Chief Deputy Attorney General, I have considerable experience dealing with the kind of processes envisioned by the Act, including establishing new administrative procedures created by new statutes, working with a wide range of governmental agencies, resolving tough legal issues raised by new laws, applying confidentiality rules, administering open records laws, issuing subpoenas, conducting government public hearings, and making difficult public decisions that significantly impact citizens. I understand the separation of powers issues that could be raised in the context of this Act. Furthermore, I have had no prior involvement in any aspect of the Kennedy assassination or the assassination records. I would bring independent, objective judgment to the position.

I also have a strong interest in historical preservation. My primary undergraduate major was History, an area in which I graduated *summa cum laude* with honors. I authored a 220 page local history and study of immigration. My research included reviewing records at the National Archives. I have also provided legal representation to the Minnesota Historical Society and State Archivist for eight years.

I have worked in the Congress for the United States Senate on Senator Hubert Humphrey's staff and have worked in the federal judiciary as a federal law clerk. I have worked closely with the United States Department of Justice on a wide range of projects and cases.

2. **What do you consider to be your primary responsibilities and priorities as an ARRB member?**

I see our primary responsibilities as:

(1) Overseeing and directing the prompt collection from government offices of all Kennedy assassination records that have not yet been transmitted to the National Archives, and directing a prompt public disclosure of all appropriate records.

(2) Gathering input and information from the public to ensure that concerns are addressed and that all appropriate records are requested and received.

(3) Applying in a fair manner the standards set forth in the Act regarding postponement of the release of records, keeping in mind the strong Congressional intent expressed in the Act favoring public disclosure.

(4) Assuring the Congress and the American public that information about the Kennedy assassination is not being hidden by any branch or agency of the federal government.

(5) As the lawyer on the panel, I believe that I have additional responsibilities to help ensure that appropriate and fair processes are established to guide the collection and release of records, that legal questions are addressed promptly and thoroughly, and that any necessary investigations are handled properly.

3. **How do you envision your relationship and responsibilities -- as an ARRB member -- to (a) the President, (b) the Congress, and (c) other executive branch agencies?**

(a) My responsibilities to the President are to provide a regular and detailed accounting of the work of the ARRB, and to provide concise and thorough postponement and release decisions in order to expedite the President's review of ARRB decisions affecting executive branch agencies.

Although ARRB is an independent agency, it is important to have a smooth working relationship with the President in order to ensure that the process established by Congress works well.

(b) My responsibilities to the Congress are to implement the law promptly and in the manner intended by Congress, to provide on a regular basis a detailed accounting of the work of the ARRB, and to respond appropriately to all Congressional inquiries and requests.

(c) My responsibilities toward and relationship with other executive branch agencies are to work cooperatively but firmly in ensuring early transmittal of documents to the National Archives. My responsibility includes working with the agencies to ensure a complete understanding of agencies' responsibilities under the law and fairly and independently reviewing agencies' requests to postpone disclosure of any records.

4. **How do you view the job of ARRB Executive Director? What role do you anticipate playing in the selection of ARRB Executive Director and staff?**

I consider the Executive Director to be the ARRB's chief administrator and coordinator of all functions of the panel. The Executive Director should be the day-to-day administrator of the staff and the administrator of all activities of the ARRB. I envision the Executive Director playing an important coordination role with other federal agencies.

I anticipate playing a role in the selection of the Executive Director. The position is critical to the effectiveness of the ARRB and I would like to use my considerable recruiting and hiring experience to help choose the best available staff.

III. POLICY ISSUES

1. **Have you made any public statements -- oral or written -- regarding the assassination of President Kennedy or the public availability of government records regarding this assassination? Please explain, and provide copies of any relevant material.**

I have made no written or oral public statements regarding the Kennedy assassination or the assassination records.

2. **Members of the ARRB will be examining security classified records with a view to their declassification and public disclosure, in whole or in part, at some time in the future.**

a) **Can you describe what prior experience you have had, if any, with using or examining security classified records of the Federal Government?**

I have no prior experience with using or examining security classified records of the federal government. I have, however, considerable experience handling documents protected by state confidentiality laws.

b) **What do you think of our current security classification system? For example, would you say it operates well, has integrity, and serves the public interest?**

The security classification system has generally well served the public interest throughout the period in which the Cold War placed significant constraints on sharing information. We have entered a new era and my understanding is that a comprehensive review is now underway that will likely result in significant revisions and the development of a less restrictive system of security classification. Such a comprehensive review is a positive development.

3. **One of the duties of the ARRB will be to determine what constitutes an "assassination record." What criteria do you think should be used to make this determination?**

   The definition of "assassination records" will be one of the most important and significant decisions of the ARRB. It is important to understand better the universe of potential records before the difficult decision on how to define "assassination records." Preliminarily, and without such an understanding yet, I would favor a broad definition because (1) a broad definition will help assure the American public that all relevant records are being reviewed and disclosed, and (2) I believe that is the intent of Congress as expressed in the Act.

   It may well be difficult to define "assassination records" in a manner which will cover all relevant documents, and if so, it may be necessary to establish a mechanism by which a case-by-case determination can be made regarding the linkage between the assassination and a particular document.

IV. RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

1. **Do you agree without reservation to respond to any reasonable summons to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, if confirmed?**

   Yes.

2. **Do you agree without reservation to reply to any reasonable request for information from any duly constituted committee of the Congress, or its duly authorized agent, if confirmed?**

   Yes.

JRTPERS.AA7

Office of General Counsel

Kermit Hall Article

FROM: Claudette

Voice: (703) 874-
Fax: (703) 874-3208

DATE: 4/4/97

ADDRESSEE: Barbara
ORGANIZATION:

VOICE NUMBER:
FAX NUMBER: 613-3063

NUMBER OF PAGES WITH COVER:

COMMENTS: 44

NOTICE TO RECIPIENT

This information is property of the United States intended solely for the use of the entity or person named above and also may be attorney-client privileged or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient of this facsimile, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that receipt of this message is not a waiver or release of any applicable privilege or exemption from disclosure, and that review, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this material in error, please notify this office at the above telephone number (collect) for instructions regarding its return or destruction. Thank you.

1ST ITEM of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Copyright (c) 1997 Maryland Law Review, Inc.
University of Maryland School of Law

1997

56 Md. L. Rev. 1

LENGTH: 21305 words

ARTICLE: THE VIRULENCE OF THE NATIONAL APPETITE FOR BOGUS REVELATION

Kermit L. Hall*

* Dean, College of Humanities; Executive Dean, Colleges of Arts and Sciences; and Professor of History and Law, The Ohio State University. Ph.D., University of Minnesota; M.S.L., Yale Law School. This Article was presented as the Judge Simon E. Sobeloff lecture at the University of Maryland School of Law on February 28, 1996. My thanks to Barbara Terzian, Jeff Marquis, and Kenneth Wasserman for their research support and to John Johnson, Donald G. Gifford, and Howard Leichter for their comments and suggestions about earlier versions of this Article. I am especially grateful to Sheryl Walter for her suggestions about sources and her willingness to share her extensive knowledge of the secondary literature on openness of and access to government records.For the title of this Article, I am indebted to one of Baltimore's favorite citizens, H.L. Mencken, who, in another context, commented on "the virulence of the racial appetite for bogus revelation." H.L. Mencken, A Book of Prefaces 23-24 (1917).

TEXT:
[*1]

Introduction

The specter of conspiracy has haunted Americans throughout the second half of the twentieth century. n1 In the 1950s, Senator Joseph [*2] McCarthy's Communist conspiracy theory - the "second Red Scare" - traumatized the nation and destroyed lives. n2 More recently, David Irving's explanation of the Holocaust as an enormous historical fabrication n3 has defied logic and distorted reality. n4 Even Abraham Lincoln rests uneasily in his grave, as theorists of his murder advance plots so tangled that only the exhumation of John Wilkes Booth's bones can unravel them. n5

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n1. This phenomenon is not unique to the modern era. There are many comprehensive historical accounts of the specter of conspiracy in America. See, e.g., Virginia Carmichael, Framing History: The Rosenberg Story and the Cold War (1993) (analyzing and tracing the "politically motivated production of the official Rosenberg story and the historical and cultural critiques performed by its re-presentation in literature, drama and the visual arts"); David Brion Davis, The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style (1969) (discussing the theory that slaveowners conspired against the rest of the country); The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the

Present xxiii (David Brion Davis ed., 1971) ("The main purpose of this book is to use images of conspiracy and subversion as a means of studying American tensions, values, and expectations ...."); Richard Hofstader, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (1965) (examining the popularity of conspiracy theories); George Johnson, Architects of Fear: Conspiracy Theories and Paranoia in American Politics (1983) (demystifying conspiracy theorists and the objects of their theories); Donald J. Lisio, The President and Protest: Hoover, Conspiracy, and the Bonus Riot (1974) (arguing that the proliferation of conspiracy theories causes "gross distortions" in our understanding of the Bonus Riot and Hoover's presidency); Michael Sayers & Albert E. Kahn, The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War Against Soviet Russia (1946) (recounting the history of espionage in the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1945).

n2. David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy 102 (1983) (chronicling the life of Joseph McCarthy and the effects of the "second Red Scare" on the American psyche).

n3. See David Irving, Goebbels (1996); see also Arthur R. Butz, The Hoax of the Twentieth Century: The Case Against the Presumed Extermination of European Jewry 8 (1976) (calling the Holocaust a hoax and a "monstrous lie").

n4. See Deborah E. Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (1993) (examining and discrediting the arguments of Holocaust deniers).

n5. See Edward Colimore, The Search for Lincoln's Assassin, Phila. Inquirer, Apr. 28, 1992, at C1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File; Dentist Examines Lincoln Slaying: Seeks to Exhume Body Buried As Booth's, Compare Teeth with Record, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 18, 1994, (Illinois) at 6, available in 1994 WL 8195597; Hmm, How Do We Really Know Who's Buried in Grant's Tomb?, Wash. Times, Nov. 14, 1992, at C2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File; Our American Corpses, Wash. Times, Mar. 18, 1992, at F2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File; Who's Buried in John Wilkes Booth's Tomb?, U.P.I., Sept. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

These are compelling examples of the American appetite for intrigue, but no other event in twentieth-century American history has generated such persistent notions of conspiracy as the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. More than four hundred books have been published on the subject; n6 a major newsletter provides a continu- [*3] ing flow of new theories about the assassination; n7 and a national organization, the Coalition on Political Assassinations, meets annually to debate the murder. n8 Oliver Stone elevated the idea of conspiracy to epic proportions in the film JFK. n9 That movie claims, among other things, that Lee Harvey Oswald did not act alone; rather, he was part of a plot hatched by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in collaboration with organized crime, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other elements of the American government. n10 Stone's follow-up to JFK, Nixon, n11 echoes this theme, intimating a connection between the Cuban burglars of the Watergate complex and the assassination of President Kennedy. n12

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n6. See, e.g., Robert Sam Anson, "They've Killed the President!": The Search for the Murderers of John F. Kennedy (1975) (calling for a new investigation of JFK's assassination); G. Robert Blakey & Richard Billings, The Plot to Kill the President (1981) (explaining the conclusion of the Select Committee on Assassinations that organized crime was behind the plot to kill JFK); John Davis, Mafia Kingfish: Carlos Marcello and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy (1989) (examining the theory that the New Orleans Mafia was behind JFK's assassination); Edward Jay Epstein, The Assassination Chronicles: Inquest, Counterplot, and Legend (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, Trilogy] (trilogy examining the Warren Commission Report, the investigation conducted by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, and the life of Lee Harvey Oswald); Robert J. Groden & Harrison Edward Livingstone, High Treason: The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: What Really Happened (1989) (claiming that the CIA, organized crime, and right-wing politicians killed JFK); Henry Hurt, Reasonable Doubt (1985) (concluding that Oswald did not act alone); Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment (1966) (arguing that the Warren Commission admitted hearsay and ignored important evidence); David S. Lifton, Best Evidence: Disguise and Deception in the Assassination of John F. Kennedy (1981) (concluding that a second bullet was removed from JFK's head); John Newman, Oswald and the CIA (1995) (arguing that the CIA was interested in Oswald since 1959, and that, "whether witting or not, Oswald became involved in CIA operations"); Gerald L. Posner, Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK (1993) (concluding that Oswald acted alone); Frank Ragano & Selwyn Raab, Mob Lawyer (1994) (identifying Mafia bosses who planned JFK's assassination); Harold Weisberg, Frame-Up: The Martin Luther King/James Earl Ray Case (1971) (drawing a parallel between the JFK conspiracy and the "framing" of James Earl Ray in Dr. King's murder).

n7. See Open Secrets (Coalition on Political Assassinations, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1994.

n8. See John Hanchette, JFK Conspiracy Theorists Announce October Convention, Gannett News Service, Sept. 26, 1994, available in 1994 WL 11247865; Washington Daybook; Today's Headliners, Wash. Times, Oct. 20, 1995, at A11.

n9. JFK (Warner Bros. 1991).

n10. See David Ansen, A Troublemaker for Our Times, Newsweek, Dec. 23, 1991, at 50; Robert Brustein, JFK, New Republic, Jan. 27, 1992, at 26, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazine File; Richard Corliss, Who Killed JFK?, Time, Dec. 23, 1991, at 66, available in 1991 WL 3116696; Stuart Klawans, JFK, Nation, Jan. 20, 1992, at 62, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazine File; John Simon, JFK, Nat'l Rev., Mar. 2, 1992, at 54, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazine File; Jay Carr, Oliver Stone's "JFK' Fights the Right Fight, Boston Globe, Dec. 20, 1991, Arts & Film at 53, available in 1991 WL 7514478; Renee Loth, Oliver Stone's "JFK' Reopens Old Wounds in a Society That Often Views Life Through Pop Culture: Film May Force Reexamination, Boston Globe, Dec. 22, 1991, at A19, available in 1991 WL 7514694; Kenneth Turan, "JFK': Conspiracy in the Cross Hairs, L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 1991, at F2, available in 1001 WL 2190825; Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 23, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript File.

n11. Nixon (Walt Disney 1995).

n12. See Stanley Kauffmann, Cast of Character, New Republic, Jan. 22, 1996, at 26; Christopher Sharrett, Nixon, USA Today, May 1996, Magazine at 49; Jay

Carr, Baring the Heart of Nixon, Boston Globe, Dec. 20, 1995, Arts & Film at 33, available in 1995 WL 5966891; Stephen Hunter, Resurrecting Nixon, Balt. Sun, Dec. 20, 1995, at 1E, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File; Barbara Shulgasser, "Nixon': It Has All the Charm of a Lab Rat, San. Fran. Examiner, Dec. 20, 1995, at C1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File; Kenneth Turan, "Nixon,' the Enigma, L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 1995, at F1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat File; Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 27, 1995), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript File.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[*4]

This Article addresses the Kennedy murder, generally; the work of the Assassination Records Review Board, primarily; n13 and issues of secrecy and openness in government, specifically. In short, the Article considers the competing values of openness and secrecy in government. n14 Gaining access to secret documents is vital, but one must consider the cost of broken confidences to our security. A sense of conflict between these views inspired this Article.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n13. The author sits as a member of the Assassination Records Review Board. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views of the other members of the Board.

The other members of the Board are the Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge, District of Minnesota; Henry Graff, Professor Emeritus, Columbia University; William Joyce, Rare Books Librarian, Firestone Library, Princeton University; and Anna K. Nelson, Adjunct Professor of History, American University.

The Assassination Records Review Board will hereinafter be referred to as the "JFK Board" or the "Board."

Throughout this Article, references are made to the views of the various intelligence agencies. These references are based upon the author's knowledge of these representations made to the Assassination Records Review Board, the context of which remains classified.

n14. See generally Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 579, 583 (1986) (arguing that secrecy issues "present a fundamentally different problem in terms of first amendment theory than those that have been central to the development of first amendment jurisprudence" and that "society is distinctly ambivalent about the benefits of increased knowledge").

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I. The Warren Commission

The Warren Commission and its report stand at the center of almost all Kennedy conspiracy theories. n15 A year after the assassination, the Report was issued by seven sober-minded Americans, headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren. n16 Initially, the Report, which concluded that Oswald was the lone assassin, n17 received strong support. Polling data indicates that prior to the Report's release, only twenty-nine percent of the public believed that Oswald was solely responsible for the assassination of President Kennedy; following its release a year later, in 1964, that number increased to eighty-seven percent. However, two years later, in 1966, only thirty-six percent of Americans indicated they [*5] believed the Report. n18 By the time JFK opened in the movie houses of America, n19 public confidence in the Commission's Report had sunk even further, with about seventy percent of Americans concluding that Oswald did not act alone. n20 The movie, therefore, tapped a deep wellspring of distrust of the Report rather than, as is sometimes implied, n21 fostered it.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n15. See President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (1964) [hereinafter Warren Commission Report].

n16. The members of the Warren Commission were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Senator Richard B. Russell, Senator John Sherman Cooper, Representative Hale Boggs, Representative Gerald R. Ford, Allen W. Dulles, and John J. McCloy. See id. at v.

n17. "On the basis of the evidence before the Commission it concludes that Oswald acted alone." Id. at 22.

n18. These figures are based on CBS and Gallup polling data recapitulated in a poll released a week before the thirtieth anniversary of the assassination. See Nine Out of 10 Americans Doubt Oswald Acted Alone, Reuters, Nov. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; see also Max Holland, The Key to the Warren Report, Am. Heritage, Nov. 1995, at 50, 52 ("Prior to [the Report's] release, a Gallup poll found that only 29 percent of Americans thought Oswald had acted alone, afterward 87 percent believed so.").

n19. See JFK, supra note 9.

n20. See 82% in Poll Say the Truth Wasn't Told in JFK Death: Seven of 10 Suspect There Was a Conspiracy, Buff. News, Nov. 22, 1993, at 1, available in 1993 WL 6126092 ("Seven in 10 Americans suspect a conspiracy, and those who were young on November 22, 1963, are especially likely to be among the 82 percent who believe the truth has not been told. In keeping with many recent polls that show Americans are distrustful toward government, 78 percent think there was an official coverup."). Indeed, there is now a much more conspiracy-minded attitude toward the assassination than there was even 15 years ago. See id.

n21. See, e.g., Brustein, supra note 10 ("Viewers of JFK ... might find themselves shaken in their views of government, society, the media.").

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Events between 1964 and 1992 did much to undermine trust in the Warren Commission Report. An assassination research community quickly appeared, raising troubling questions about the Report and propagating theories of conspiracy. n22 Books entitled Whitewash, n23 Contract on America, n24 Conspiracy, n25 and Rush to Judgment n26 eroded the credibility of the Commission's findings. n27 President Kennedy's murder, moreover, was only one of several prominent political killings. Assassins also gunned down Robert F. Kennedy, Martin

Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X and gravely wounded Governor George C. Wallace. n28 [*6] At the same time, the American government resorted to deception to disguise its policy failures. n29 The nation fought and lost a bloody conflict in Southeast Asia - an undeclared war fostering doctored casualty reports; n30 secret missions into Cambodia and Laos; n31 purported attacks on the destroyers, Maddox and C. Turner Joy; n32 and President Richard Nixon's "secret plan" to end the war. n33 The plan took five years, cost many thousands of additional American and Vietnamese [*7] lives, and left our former allies in the South to the tender mercies of their northern opponents. n34

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n22. See Posner, supra note 6, at 412-19 (describing the "network of amateur sleuths" who checked the accuracy of the Warren Commission Report and challenged its conclusions).

n23. Harold Weisberg, Whitewash (1965) (stating that the Warren Commission did not consider any alternatives to Oswald as sole assassin).

n24. David E. Scheim, Contract on America: The Mafia Murders of John and Robert Kennedy 263 (1983) (concluding that the Mafia killed President Kennedy).

n25. Anthony Summers, Conspiracy 523 (1980) (calling for a new investigation).

n26. Lane, supra note 6.

n27. See Weisberg, supra note 23, at 189 ("In writing this book, the author has had but one purpose. That was to show that the job assigned to and expected of the President's Commission on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy has not been done."); Scheim, supra note 24, at 2-3 (finding that "evidence that established [Jack Ruby's] criminal ties has been repeatedly suppressed or distorted by the Warren Commission"); Summers, supra note 25; Lane, supra note 6, at 378 ("The Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy is less a report than a brief for the prosecution.").

n28. See D'Army Bailey, Mine Eyes Have Seen: Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Final Journey (1993) (providing a pictorial account of King's final journey to Memphis); George Breitman et al., The Assassination of Malcolm X (1976) (arguing that the CIA and FBI participated in the assassination of Malcolm X); Karl Evanzz, The Judas Factor: The Plot to Kill Malcolm X (1992) (concluding that government agencies were involved in the assassination); Gerold Frank, An American Death: The True Story of the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (1972) (concluding that James Earl Ray alone killed King); Michael Friedly, Malcolm X: The Assassination (1992) (concluding that Muslims killed Malcolm X); Robert Blair Kaiser, "R.F.K. Must Die!" (1970) (exploring various conspiracy theories); Three Assassinations: The Deaths of John & Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King (Janet M. Knight ed., 1971) (providing "a factual account of the assassinations" based on "Facts on File, the press, and U.S. government studies"); Stephan Lesher, George Wallace (1994) (describing Arthur Bremer's attempt on Wallace's life); Philip H. Melanson, The Robert F. Kennedy Assassination 13 (1991) (concluding that Sirhan Sirhan was "hypnotically programmed to attack [Robert F.] Kennedy"); Philip Melanson, Who Killed Martin Luther King? (1993) (calling for an investigation of possible CIA and FBI involvement); Dan E. Moldea, The Killing of Robert F. Kennedy 323 (1995) (concluding that Sirhan Sirhan assassinated Robert F. Kennedy to prove "that he still had his nerve"); William W. Turner & John G. Christian, The Assassination of Robert F. Kennedy (1978) (claiming that there was a conspiracy); Weisberg, supra note 6 (concluding that James Earl Ray was framed for the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.).

n29. Regarding the government's use of intelligence materials in the Vietnam War and the bogus nature of much of the reporting about the War, see Sam Adams, War of Numbers (1994); Edward S. Herman & Richard B. DuBoff, America's Vietnam Policy: The Strategy of Deception 79 (1966); John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power 206-22 (1992); John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars 239-325 (1986); L. Fletcher Prouty, JFK: The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy 42-117 (1992); Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy: The Secret Road to the Second Indochina War 51-75 (1972); Neil Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers As Published by the New York Times 241-78 (1971); Sedgewick Tourison, Secret Army, Secret War (1995).

With regard to false "body counts," see Loch K. Johnson, America's Secret Power 60-62 (1989); Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War 195-96 (1985); Newman, supra, at 288-89, 298-99.

n30. See Vance Hartke, The American Crisis in Vietnam 100-02 (1968); Herman & DuBoff, supra note 29, at 122-23; Seymour Hersh, Cover-Up (1972); Kolko, supra note 29, at 195-96; Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War (Robert J. McMahon ed., 2d ed. 1995); Newman, supra note 29, at 229-34.

n31. See Noam Chomsky, At War with Asia 117-258 (1970); Credibility Gap: A Digest of the Pentagon Papers 54-64 (Len Ackland compiler, 1972); Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake 123, 264 (1972); Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War 92, 95-116 (1984).

n32. See Theodore Draper, Abuse of Power 63-65 (1967); George C. Herring, America's Longest War 134 (3d ed. 1996); Robert S. McNamara & Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam 132-34 (1995).

n33. See Herring, supra note 32, at 244-47; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History 582-83 (1983).

n34. See Herring, supra note 32, at 282-83; Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate 9-10, 80 (1990).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The government's penchant for secrecy fueled the public's corrosively cynical view of politics and politicians. During the Watergate investigation, President Nixon proclaimed to the nation that he was "not a crook," n35 but he soon abandoned the Oval Office and joined his disgraced vice president n36 in private life. n37 In one of the great ironies of modern American politics, the instrument of Nixon's downfall was a secret recording system installed in the White House. n38 What was supposed to be a tool to record reliably the President's triumphs became the chief means of exposing the Watergate cover-up. n39

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n35. Question-and-Answer Session at the Annual Convention of the Associated Press Managing Editor's Association, Orlando, Fla., 1973 Pub. Papers 946, 956 (Nov. 17, 1973).

n36. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew resigned on October 10, 1973, after entering a plea of nolo contendre to a federal charge of tax evasion. See Kutler, supra note 34, at 397-98.

n37. See id. at 532, 540, 544-45, 547-50, 620.

n38. See id. at 452.

n39. See id. at 287, 314-15, 324-25, 368-69, 447-49.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Under such circumstances, the Warren Commission's Report would have been subjected to reevaluation even if it had been compiled perfectly. Furthermore, because the Warren Commission labored at the height of the Cold War, n40 the Commissioners adopted a strategy that depended on implicit public trust. The Cold War environment combined with other circumstances to handicap the Warren Commission and eventually to erode that public trust in five significant ways.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n40. See Holland, supra note 18, at 52.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

First, the Commission had access to an enormous amount of information not otherwise accessible to the American press and public. n41 This information was secret, top secret, and beyond, much of it compartmentalized cryptologic and signal intelligence material dealing with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other foreign governments, such as Communist China. n42 Because of the enormous Cold War paranoia, as well as the requirement to maintain tight secrecy around the sources and methods used to collect this information, the Commission could not argue its case fully to the American people. When the research community asserted that the government itself had been im- [*8] plicated in the assassination, n43 the evidence that the Commission had used to discount such a possibility was available only to the government charged with having abetted the crime. The cost of secrecy was uncertainty, an uncertainty that turned to cynicism, much of it based on theories about the assassination that gained legitimacy simply because they could not be tested against the appropriate evidence.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n41. See Hurt, supra note 6, at 432-33.

n42. See Holland, supra note 18, at 64.

n43. See, e.g., Harold Weisberg, Whitewash II: The FBI-Secret Service Coverup 125 (1996) (concluding that "the FBI and the Secret Service are not innocent" in the Warren Commission investigation).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Second, although the Commission had access to some high-quality intelligence information, it did not receive everything. The CIA, FBI, and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy failed to reveal information that would have helped identify a motive for a conspiracy. n44 The failure to disclose all information to the Commission was particularly damaging because of the distinguished character of its seven members. n45 Its chairman was Chief Justice Earl Warren, a person noted for probity and fairness. n46 The Commission was really divided into two subgroups. Four of the members - Warren, Hale Boggs, Gerald Ford, and John Sherman Cooper - had relatively little experience with intelligence matters; however, the other three - Richard Russell, Allen Dulles, and John J. McCloy - were fully conversant with national security issues and the sources and methods used by the intelligence services. n47

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n44. See Warren Hinckle & William W. Turner, Deadly Secrets: The CIA-Mafia War Against Castro and the Assassination of JFK 16-17, 264-71, 403 (1992) [hereinafter Hinckle & Turner, Deadly Secrets]; Warren Hinckle & William W. Turner, The Fish Is Red: The Story of the Secret War Against Castro 228-31, 336 (1981) [hereinafter Hinckle & Turner, The Fish Is Red]; Newman, supra note 6; Prados, supra note 29, at 211-17; Holland, supra note 18, at 62.

n45. See supra note 16.

n46. President Kennedy wrote that Warren had "borne [his] duties and responsibilities with unusual integrity, fairness, good humor and courage." Jim Marrs, Crossfire: The Plot That Killed Kennedy 463 (1989) (quoting letter from President John F. Kennedy to Chief Justice Earl Warren).

n47. See Holland, supra note 18, at 52.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The Commission's success depended, in part, on the ability of the three intelligence-savvy members to raise the right questions. They seem not to have done so. For example, the Commission never discovered the existence of Operation MONGOOSE, n48 a covert scheme concocted by President Kennedy and his brother, Attorney General [*9] Robert F. Kennedy, to assassinate Fidel Castro with the help of organized crime. n49 When these plans reached the public several years later, critics of the Warren Commission had a field day. n50 The Commission's conclusion that a foreign government lacked a sufficient motive to murder the President now crumbled. n51 Indeed, the Commission looked silly and, even worse, to be a part of the plot because its critics could plausibly assert that its distinguished members should have guessed at such a possibility.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n48. See Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rep. No. 94-465, at 139-46 (1975) [hereinafter Church Committee]. Operation MONGOOSE was initiated by the United States government in 1962 as a covert action program to overthrow Castro, the Cuban leader. See id.

n49. See Church Committee, supra note 48, at 139-46; Hinckle & Turner, The Fish Is Red, supra note 44, at 20, 111-26; Holland, supra note 18, at 62.

n50. Even President Johnson expressed his belief that Castro could have planned Kennedy's assassination in retaliation. See Hurt, supra note 6, at 31 (citing interview with Lyndon B. Johnson, The CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 25, 1975)).

n51. See id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Third, in appointing the Commission, President Lyndon Johnson had one goal: to check rumors that the assassination was a Communist plot. n52 Johnson appropriately feared that Kennedy's murder could precipitate World War III. n53 Oswald's time in the Soviet Union and his trip to visit the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City just weeks before the murder pointed to Communist intrigue. n54 Such concerns were amplified because Oswald had identified himself with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, an organization openly supportive of Castro and sharply critical of Kennedy's Cuba policy. n55 Thus, the Commission was under enormous pressure to produce an answer that discounted foreign influence. n56

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n52. See Holland, supra note 18, at 52.

n53. See id. at 56-57.

n54. See id. at 57.

n55. See id. at 56; see also Warren Commission Report, supra note 15, at 290-92 (finding that Oswald purportedly distributed pamphlets on behalf of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, but also finding that Oswald exaggerated the extent of his involvement).

n56. See Holland, supra note 18, at 57.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Fourth, as the science of forensic analysis has progressed over the past three decades, questions have inevitably arisen about the Warren Commission's conclusions involving the President's body, n57 the alleged murder weapon, n58 the number and sequencing of the shots [*10] fired at the President, n59 and the condition of the so-called "magic bullet," which passed through the President and Governor John Connally with a minimum amount of damage. n60 We now know that the autopsy performed on the President was problematic, both in technique and organization. n61 Yet, the Commission relied on it. On other matters, new forms of analysis have been generally supportive of the Commission's findings; although it now appears that the sequencing of the shots fired in Dealey Plaza was somewhat different from that described by the Commission. n62 Ironically, even when the latest techniques corroborate [*11] the Commission's findings, the result has not been greater confidence in those findings, but rather, a belief that the Commission got it wrong instead of almost getting it right. n63

---

n57. See Warren Commission Report, supra note 15, at 19 ("President Kennedy was first struck by a bullet which entered at the back of his neck and exited through the lower front portion of his neck, causing a wound which would not necessarily have been lethal. The President was struck a second time by a bullet which entered the right-rear portion of his head, causing a massive and fatal wound.").

n58. See id. at 81 (stating that the rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository "was identified by the FBI as a 6.5-millimeter model 91/38 Mannlicher-Carcano rifle").

n59. See id. at 111 (finding that "(a) one shot passed through the President's neck and then most probably passed through the Governor's body, (b) a subsequent shot penetrated the President's head, (c) no other shot struck any part of the automobile, and (d) three shots were fired.... The evidence is inconclusive as to whether it was the first, second, or third shot which missed.").

n60. See id. at 79 ("A nearly whole bullet was found on Governor Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital after the assassination.").

n61. See Groden & Livingstone, supra note 6, at 3.

n62. See Charles J. Sanders & Mark S. Zaid, The Declassification of Dealey Plaza: After Thirty Years, a New Disclosure Law at Last May Help to Clarify the Facts of the Kennedy Assassination, 34 S. Tex. L. Rev. 407 (1993).

The so-called "magic bullet" or "single bullet" theory has been the subject of intense debate. See, e.g., Edward Jay Epstein, Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth 115-26 (1966) (criticizing the single bullet theory as based on a "misinterpretation" of ballistics testimony, the "extremely tenuous findings of the wound ballistics test," and the omission of conflicting testimony); Marshall Houts, Where Death Delights: The Story of Dr. Milton Helpern and Forensic Medicine 62-63 (1967) (concluding that a single bullet could not have penetrated seven layers of "tough human skin" in addition to soft tissue and bones); Hurt, supra note 6, at 61-86 (arguing that results of the spectrographic examination and neutron activity analysis did not support the single bullet theory); Michael Kurtz, Crime of the Century 175-76, 180-81 (1982) (criticizing the single bullet theory in light of the condition of the bullet and the deficiencies in the neutron activity analysis tests); Lane, supra note 6, at 69-80 (concluding that the angles of impact and the condition of the bullet found at Parkland Hospital invalidated the single bullet theory); Raymond Marcus, The Bastard Bullet: A Search for Legitimacy for Commission Exhibit 399, 1-77 (1966) (concluding that bullet 399 "was never fired at any human target" and that the bullet was "planted" on the hospital stretcher); Marrs, supra note 46, at 368-71 (concluding that findings from Kennedy's autopsy conflicted with the single bullet theory); Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact: The Warren Commission, the Authorities, and the Report 27-35, 137, 167-70, 461 (1967) (concluding that the single bullet theory is weak because, of the three doctors whose testimony supports the theory, one retracted his original opinion, the second qualified his testimony, and the third was never shown the Zapruder film or the stretcher bullet); Bonar Menninger, Mortal Error: The Shot That Killed JFK 29-43 (1992) (arguing that the single bullet theory is inconsistent with eyewitness accounts and photographic evidence); F. Peter Model & Robert J. Groden, JFK: The Case for Conspiracy 61-77 (1977) (concluding that the angle of impact and the pristine condition of the bullet made the single bullet theory impossible); Posner, supra note 6, at 317, 326-35, 474, 477-79 (relying on "the latest computer and film-enhancement technology" to conclude that a single bullet could cause both Kennedy's and Connally's wounds, and that a single bullet could have been fired from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository); Howard Ruffman, Presumed Guilty 53, 131-48, 226 (1975) (concluding that bullet 399 did not cause Kennedy's injuries); Summers, supra note 25, at 67-71 (concluding that the pristine condition of the bullet invalidated the single bullet theory); Josiah Thompson, Six Seconds in Dallas: A Micro-Study of the Kennedy Assassination 9, 30, 38, 56, 59-71, 75, 77, 196, 201-09, 213-14 (1967) (concluding that the single bullet theory is wrong because none of the shots missed and because the bullet did not go all the way through Kennedy's neck); Luis Alvarez, A Physicist Examines the Kennedy Assassination Film, 44 Am. J. Physics 813-19 (1976) (using motions of Zapruder's camera to determine the number of shots fired); John Nichols, The Wounding of Governor John Connally of Texas: November 22, 1963, Md. St. Med. J., 58, 76-77 (Oct. 1977) (concluding that there was no bullet fragment embedded in Connally's thigh and that, therefore, the single bullet theory is wrong); Nova: Who Shot President Kennedy? (PBS television broadcast, June 19, 1988); The Warren Report (CBS News television broadcast, Part I, June 25, 1967).

. Recent analysis has discounted the acoustical evidence brought forward in the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. See infra note 63; Frontline: Who Was Lee Harvey Oswald? (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 16, 1993); Who Killed JFK: The Final Chapter (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 19, 1993).

n63. See House Select Committee on Assassinations, Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, H.R. Rep. No. 95-1828 pt. 2 (1979). The House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded that the acoustical evidence established that a fourth shot was fired, and, therefore, there was a "high probability" that two gunmen fired at President Kennedy. Id. at 65-79. The Committee relied on analyses of a dictabelt recording of the Dallas police channels. See id. at 66-67. Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc. performed the first analysis and concluded - based on impulse patterns detected from the recording and an acoustical reconstruction of the assassination - that there was a 50% chance of a fourth shot from the Grassy Knoll. See id. at 66-72. Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy performed a follow-up analysis for the Committee and concluded that there was a 95% chance there was a shot fired from the Grassy Knoll. See id. at 72-75. But see Posner, supra note 6, at 240-42 (arguing that the House Select Committee misinterpreted the acoustical evidence, and, therefore, it "failed to establish the number of shots ... scientifically").

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Fifth, the Warren Commission Report - all 888 pages of it - was the work of lawyers, who not only dominated the Commission, but also its staff, the true authors of the Report. n64 The final document reads like a legal brief supporting the argument that Oswald committed the crime. The Report ought to have been a dispassionate analysis of all of the implications surrounding the murder, some of which the Commission itself had no knowledge. n65 Instead, the Report was a mound of facts that obscured the issue of Oswald's motivation and portrayed him as a sullen, dysfunctional, and troubled loner. n66 By generating [*12] such a report, the Commission left open the opportunity for critics to complain that Oswald was a patsy who did not act alone. n67

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n64. See Holland, supra note 18, at 57-58.

n65. See id.

n66. For example, the Report made the following findings with regard to Oswald's character:

> Many factors were undoubtedly involved in Oswald's motivation for the assassination, and the Commission does not believe that it can ascribe to him any one motive or group of motives. It is apparent, however, that Oswald was moved by an overriding hostility to his environment. He does not appear to have been able to establish meaningful relationships with other people. He was perpetually discontented with the world around him.

Warren Commission Report, supra note 15, at 423.

n67. See, e.g., Marrs, supra note 46, at 91-112 (examining Oswald's life and concluding that he was a spy for the United States); Posner, supra note 6, at 410-19 (describing the rash of criticism following the publication of the Warren Commission Report).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The Report began to sink shortly after its release. n68 Researchers used its massive details to challenge the Commission's assumptions and findings. n69 However, the veil of secrecy thrown over the intelligence sources prevented the Commissioners and their defenders from rebutting their detractors. n70 The Commission's Cold War-induced commitment to secrecy inextricably linked its seven members to the intelligence community, and when that community subsequently came under attack, the Commission's reputation suffered as well. n71

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n68. In 1966 a public opinion poll revealed that Americans doubted the findings of the Warren Commission by a margin of three to five. The public's response is recounted in Meagher, supra note 62, at 463.

n69. See, e.g., Lane, supra note 6 (criticizing the Warren Commission's interpretation of objective evidence in the Kennedy assassination); Lifton, supra note 6 (discussing alternative interpretations of the Kennedy assassination evidence); Meagher, supra note 62 (comparing raw evidence of the Kennedy assassination with the presentation of that evidence in the Warren Commission Report).

n70. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.

n71. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

II. Other Investigations of the Assassination

Between 1964 and 1979, the American intelligence services were subjected to unparalleled scrutiny, much of it fueled by the CIA's and FBI's ties to the Watergate debacle and by revelations of domestic political surveillance by both agencies and the military intelligence services. n72 There were three other federal investigations that, in dealing with these issues, also addressed the Kennedy assassination: in the mid-1970s, the Rockefeller Commission, n73 the Pike Committee, n74 and [*13] the Church Committee n75 probed matters that touched on matters relating to the assassination and provided, most spectacularly, information about Operation MONGOOSE. n76 Operation MONGOOSE n77 involved CIA plans to destabilize the Cuban government, murder Castro and other leaders of hostile foreign nations, and relied on organized crime to assist with both. n78

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n72. For an example of the increased scrutiny of the CIA, see Victor Marchetti & John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence 4-12 (1974). See generally Johnson, supra note 29 (discussing the problems of strategic intelligence in a democratic society).

n73. See Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (1975) [hereinafter Rockefeller Commission].

n74. The Pike Committee Report to the House Select Committee on Intelligence was never officially released. However, the Village Voice reprinted a substantial part of the Committee's findings. See The CIA Report the CIA Doesn't Want You to Read, Village Voice, Feb. 16, 1976 (Supp.); The Select Committee's Investigation Record, Village Voice, Feb. 16, 1976, at 72; The Select Committee's Oversight Experience, Village Voice, Feb. 23, 1976, at 60.

n75. See Church Committee, supra note 48.

n76. According to Loch K. Johnson, a series of articles by New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh in December 1974 prompted the creation of all three committees. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 3-4, 207-08. Hersh revealed, among other abuses, that the CIA had compiled files on over 10,000 U.S. citizens as part of Operation CHAOS. See id. at 3.

To investigate Hersh's claims, President Gerald R. Ford created the Rockefeller Commission, named after its chairman, Nelson Rockefeller. See Rockefeller Commission, supra note 73, at ix; see also Exec. Order No. 11,828, 3 C.F.R. 933-34 (1975). The Senate created a special committee chaired by Frank Church. See Church Committee, supra note 48, at 1-3 (stating the Church Committee's mandate and scope of investigation). Otis Pike, the chairman of the House's standing committee on intelligence, investigated for the House. See supra note 74. The Rockefeller Commission was to decide if the CIA had violated 50 U.S.C. 403 (the statute creating the CIA), to determine whether there were adequate safeguards to prevent activities that violated the statute, and to make recommendations to the President and the director of the CIA. See id. at x. The Commission was to issue its final report within three months and to terminate one month after presenting its report. See Exec. Order No. 11,828, 3 C.F.R. 933-34. The Commission found, inter alia, that (1) the CIA's surveillance of mail between the United States and the Soviet Union was illegal; (2) the declared mission of Operation CHAOS to determine foreign influence on domestic dissidence was proper, but some activities exceeded the CIA's authority; (3) the infiltration of dissident groups exceeded its authority. See Rockefeller Commission, supra note 73, at 20-27.

The Church Committee was created by Senate Resolution 21 with a broad mandate to determine if there were any ""illegal, improper or unethical'" governmental intelligence activities. Church Committee, supra note 48, at 1 (quoting S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975)).

In his introduction to the Interim Report, Senator Church explained that the Committee took up the investigation of assassination plots to continue the task of the Rockefeller Commission. See id. at 2. The Church Committee investigated murder plots against Lumumba, Castro, Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider. See id. at 4-5. With regard to Castro, it concluded that "United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro from 1960 to 1965." Id.

n77. See supra note 48.

n78. See Church Committee, supra note 48, at 4-5. The Church Committee investigation revealed evidence that, from 1960 to 1965, the United States government used underworld figures and anti-Castro Cubans in a plot to kill Castro. See id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The most powerful of the post-Warren Commission inquiries was that made by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), which in 1976 reopened the investigation that had been seemingly closed a dozen years earlier. n79 The Committee, chaired by Congressman Louis Stokes of Ohio, explored several controversial areas of John F. Kennedy's assassination, along with those of his brother, Rob- [*14] ert, and Reverend King. n80 The HSCA suffered from its own limitations, which are beyond the scope of this Article. n81 However, the HSCA's conclusions, which now seem to be in question, held that the Committee could not rule out a conspiracy to kill the President. n82 This finding directly challenged the Warren Commission. n83 For example, the HSCA believed that advanced acoustical techniques demonstrated that there had been more than one shooter in Dealey Plaza. n84 That analysis was subsequently repudiated, n85 but it was too late to counter the damage done to the Warren Commission's credibility.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n79. See House Select Committee on Assassinations, Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, H.R. Rep. No. 95-1828, pt. 2, at 9 (1979) (hereinafter House Select Committee).

n80. See id. at 10.

n81. See Hinckle & Turner, Deadly Secrets, supra note 44, at 271 (concluding that the HSCA suffered from lack of funding and that too much time had passed between the assassination and the Committee's investigation).

n82. See House Select Committee, supra note 79, at 95 (stating that the Committee believed "on the basis of the evidence available to it that President John F. Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy").

n83. See id. at 104-09.

n84. See id. at 46-47, 65-79.

n85. See supra note 63.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The HSCA exhausted its funds before it could complete its tasks and left mounds of records behind, including those dealing with organized crime, which the HSCA had subpoenaed, but was unable to process. n86 Today these materials are one of the chief objects of the Assassination Records Review Board.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n86. See Hinckle & Turner, Deadly Secrets, supra note 44, at 271.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

III. The Assassination Records Review Board

The findings of these investigations inspired Oliver Stone's 1991 movie. n87 Without endorsing the movie's sensational conclusions, many members of Congress decided that the government's refusal to release classified information about the assassination promoted an unhealthy level of distrust of government. n88 As a result, Congress passed the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 n89 (the JFK Act or Act), which mandated the creation of a five-person Review Board. n90 The Act orders all federal agencies to assess whether they [*15] possess records relating to the assassination. n91 All records that an agency deems as not suitable for immediate release are subject to the Board's evaluation. n92 All records identified as relating to the assassination must be opened by October 26, 2017, with the exception of records that the President certifies for continued postponement. n93

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n87. See JFK, supra note 9. This 1991 Warner Brothers movie fictionally described the investigations into the John F. Kennedy assassination. See id.

n88. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-625, pt. 1, at 10 (1992) (stating that unjustified secrecy surrounding the assassination increases doubts and speculation and "fuels a growing distrust in the institutions of government").

n89. 44 U.S.C. 2107 (1994).

n90. The legislative history and congressional discussion of the need for the Board can be found in H.R. Rep. No. 102-625, pt. 1, at 6; H.R. Rep. No. 102-625, pt. 2, at 7 (1992); H.R. Rep. No. 103-587, at 2 (1994). The law establishing the Board is at 44 U.S.C. 2107(6) (1994).

n91. 44 U.S.C. 2107(5).

n92. Id. 2107(7)(j).

n93. See Sanders & Zaid, supra note 62, at 419; Harold C. Relyea & Suzanne Cavanaugh, President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Disclosure: An Overview, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 13-17 (1993) (discussing which particular records can be postponed from release).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The Act defines several categories of information for which disclosure may be postponed, including national security, intelligence gathering, personal privacy, and presidential security. n94 However, because the Act declares a "presumption of immediate disclosure," the Board will not postpone the disclosure of material unless it is persuaded that there is "clear and convincing evidence" of some harm that outweighs the public's interest. n95

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n94. 44 U.S.C. 2107(6).

n95. Id. 2107(2)(a).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Congress intended for the Board to oversee the opening to the public of a substantial amount of material - perhaps in the millions of pages. n96 Congress, therefore, clothed the Board with broad subpoena and other powers. n97 The Board is without precedent in American history, with powers that reach far beyond, for example, the Freedom of [*16] Information Act (FOIA). n98 The Board's only task is to make the public record of one epic historical event as complete as possible. n99

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n96. The congressional hearings surrounding the passage of the Act make clear that Congress expected the Review Board to exercise its powers in favor of opening materials. See The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Gov'tal Affairs on S.J. Res. 282, 102d Cong. (1992) [hereinafter Assassination Materials Disclosure Act I]; Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.J. Res. 454, 102d Cong. (1992) [hereinafter Assassination Materials Disclosure Act II]; Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hearings Before the Legislation and Nat'l Sec. Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations on H.J. Res. 454, 102d Cong. (1992) [hereinafter Assassination Materials Disclosure Act III]; The Effectiveness of Public Law 102-526, the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992: Hearing Before the Legislation and Nat'l Sec. Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 103d Cong. (1993)

[hereinafter Effectiveness of Public Law 102-526]. The presumption was always to be in favor of opening a document rather than postponing it, thus making postponement the exception rather than the rule under the law. The Congress could only guess at the scope of materials to be opened.

n97. 44 U.S.C. 2107(7)(j).

n98. 5 U.S.C. 552 (1994). For a discussion of the history and operation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), see generally Patrick J. Carome & Thomas M. Susman, American Bar Association Symposium on FOIA 25th Anniversary, 9 Gov't Info. Q. 223 (1992).

n99. See Sanders & Zaid, supra note 62, at 417-18.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Although the Board's mission is clear, in executing the law it continually confronts the powerful tensions generated by the principled claims of openness and secrecy. To choose is to lead, and the Board, in attempting to break new ground in public disclosure, confronts some profound choices. Those choices have to be informed, moreover, by a shrewd assessment of the public's right to know, the public's need to have secrets vital to its national security protected, and the intelligence services' duty to safeguard those secrets and the sources and methods that produce them. n100

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n100. See DuVal, supra note 14, at 580-91.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The Board's most difficult choices involve the disposition of classified intelligence documents. If a federal agency wants to open materials, it is not the Board's duty to prevent it. Rather, the Board's most important task is to decide what should not be opened immediately, in light of the Act's powerful admonition that there be "clear and convincing evidence" in favor of postponement. n101 In simplest terms, the Board has to decide whether materials, if opened, would reveal:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n101. 44 U.S.C. 2107(6).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;

(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or

(C) any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or the conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States n102

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n102. Id. 2107(6)(1)(A), (B), (C).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The Act provides other grounds for postponement. These include exposure of an informant to a "substantial risk of harm," n103 exposure of a person to an "unwarranted invasion of personal [*17] privacy," n104 the possibility of compromising a relationship between a United States government agent and a confidential source, n105 and the revelation of a security procedure used to protect the President. n106

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n103. Id. 2107(6)(2).

n104. Id. 2107(6)(3).

n105. Id. 2107(6)(4).

n106. Id. 2107(6)(5).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

IV. Openness and Secrecy - OriginalIntentions

History offers uncertain guidance about how the Board should weigh these grounds for postponement against the public's interest in knowing the facts about the assassination. The Framers of the United States Constitution did harbor doubts about government, doubts precipitated by their experience in the English Empire. n107 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, among others, testified eloquently to the proposition that public accountability was an appropriate measure of the success of a republic. n108 Still, the Framers were also sophisticated statesmen who valued secrecy in fostering the public good. n109 For example, the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 conducted its deliberations in secret without any complete record of its debates. n110 The Constitution provides for the maintenance of an executive journal for both Houses of Congress and permits government to publish its accounts and revenues from "time to time," rather than on demand. n111 Even more fundamental was President George Washington's assertion of a broad degree of presidential discretion in dealing with foreign relations, war, and peace. n112 In certain circumstances, secrecy could be justified to attain ends superior to a completely in- [*18] formed public. Indeed, the Constitution's Preamble declares that insuring "domestic Tranquility" and providing for the "common defence" are objectives equal to securing the "Blessings of Liberty." n113

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n107. See generally 9 James Madison, The Writings of James Madison (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (photo. reprint 1971) (discussing how the Framers of the Constitution were affected by their prior experiences with the English).

n108. Madison wrote, "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." Id. at 103. Jefferson stated: "No ground of support of the Executive will ever be so sure as a complete knowledge of their proceedings by the people; and it is only in cases where the public good would be injured, and because it would be injured, that proceedings should be secret." Thomas Jefferson: Word for Word 409 (Maureen Harrison & Steve Gilbert eds., 1993).

n109. See Madison, supra note 107, at 104.

n110. See Thornton Anderson, Creating the Constitution 8-12 (1993); see also William Peters, A More Perfect Union 22-38 (1987) (quoting Thomas Jefferson: "I am sorry they begin their deliberations by so abominable a precedent as that of tying up the tongues of their members.").

n111. U.S. Const. art. I, 5, cl. 3.

n112. See Refusal by President George Washington to Submit Confidential Correspondence with John Jay to the House of Representatives, March 30, 1796, in William M. Goldsmith, The Growth of Presidential Power 418-20 (1984).

n113. U.S. Const. preamble. The Preamble to the Constitution states in full:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

On the question of original intention, the evidence is mixed. Secrets were at once bad and useful, openness was an object to be pursued, but not at all costs. Since 1787, the government has become more rather than less accountable, its secrets more rather than less readily accessible to its citizens. n114

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n114. See generally Daniel N. Hoffman, Governmental Secrecy and the Founding Fathers: A Study in Constitutional Controls (1981) (stating that judicial doctrines and legislative controls on political speech and publication have toughened since 1787).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

V. Openness and Secrecy - FOIA

For more than 190 years, the American public did not have a legal right to gain access to information about its government. n115 All of that changed, however, in 1966 when President Lyndon Johnson signed FOIA n116 and thereby altered the historical relationship between the federal government and the public. n117 FOIA presumes that government information is public information and is implemented by the judicially enforceable requirement that all federal agency records be made available promptly upon request, subject only to nine exemptions, which are to be narrowly construed. n118

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n115. The issue of openness in government has historically been framed in terms of the right of the government to keep secrets, rather than the right of the public to have access to governmental records. See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight Secrets and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1991). The movement towards greater openness in the post-World War II period has been part of a broader movement in the twentieth century to hold government accountable for its actions. See id. As a result, since the progressive era of the early twentieth century, we have seen the institution of public records, open meetings, and "sunshine laws." See id.

n116. 5 U.S.C. 552 (1994).

n117. The Act has come under criticism from both advocates of openness and proponents of secrecy. See, e.g., Carome & Susman, supra note 98, at 223 (criticizing the Act because the cost of implementation outweighs the benefits it is supposed to provide); Non-Denial: How Attitudes and Inertia Combine to Subvert the Freedom of Information Act, Kiplinger Program Rep. 1-32 (Summer 1994) (discussing the success of FOIA in providing Americans with a means of acquiring information about their government).

n118. 5 U.S.C. 552.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Critics of FOIA seldom doubt its good intentions, but they do doubt its effectiveness, complaining that the cost of implementing it [*19] far outweighs its supposed benefits. n119 The argument against FOIA was perhaps best summed up by Justice Antonin Scalia, who described the statute as "the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis ignored." n120 Critics like Justice Scalia charge that FOIA harms the government's and the public's legitimate need for secrecy. n121

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n119. See Carome & Susman, supra note 98, at 223; see also supra note 117.

n120. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, 14 AEI J. on Gov't & Soc'y 1026 (1982).

n121. See id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Many of the most important documents relating to President Kennedy's murder have been unobtainable through FOIA. n122 Nevertheless, FOIA and the Assassination Records Review Board do share a common purpose: to break through government's historical habit of classifying information that otherwise could - and should - be open. n123

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n122. See Sanders & Zaid, supra note 62, at 408 & n.2 (stating that without the implementation of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, the records concerning the assassination would remain classified until the twenty-first century).

n123. See 44 U.S.C. 2107(b)(2) (1994) (stating the purpose of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992); Carome & Susman, supra note 98, at 223 (discussing FOIA and the presumption that government information is public information).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

VI. The Business of Secrecy

Today, keeping information secret has become a massive industry in Washington. n124 According to official estimates, the government took 6.3 million classification actions in 1994, creating an estimated 19 million pages of information that only selected government officials can see. n125 More than 32,000 government workers are employed full-time to determine what should be secret, what level of secrecy the material should have, and whether the documents should be classified. n126 The government holds hundreds of millions of pages of secret documents; indeed, the precise number has gone beyond the government's ability to count. n127

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n124. See Ann Devroy, Clinton Eases Government Secrecy Rules: Most Declassification to Become Automatic, Wash. Post, Apr. 18, 1995, at A1, available in LEXIS, News Library, WPost File.

n125. See id.

n126. See id.

n127. See id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The problem of what to do with classified documents is strangling some government agencies. For example, consider the Department of Energy. n128 American makers of nuclear weapons have been classify- [*20] ing virtually everything for so long that the Energy Department now has more secrets than it can handle. n129 The Department has 100 million pages of documents that it wants to review for possible release, but it does not have the resources to do so. n130 For more than fifty years, the Department followed a scheme of classification that might best be called "classified at birth." n131 Any document generated was presumed secret until proved otherwise. n132 The Department and its civilian contractors have literally lost track of what needs to be kept quiet. n133 Even more fundamental, what is genuinely in need of protection - the design of weapons and such - is lost in an ocean of documents no longer worthy of classified status (if they ever were). n134

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n128. See Matthew L. Wald, Millions of Secrets Burden Energy Agency, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1996, at A15, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.

n129. See id.

n130. See id.

n131. Id.

n132. See id.

n133. See id.

n134. See id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

In April 1995, the Clinton administration attempted to break this classification logjam. n135 The President issued an executive order aimed at opening government's oldest secrets to public view, thereby reducing the number of documents made secret and shortening the number of years they remain classified. n136 The primary element of the order is the automatic declassification without review of most documents that are twenty-five years old or older. n137 Previously, documents had remained classified indefinitely. n138 Now, unless the documents fit into a group of narrow exceptions, they will automatically be open to the public. n139

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n135. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1995), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. 435 (1996).

n136. See id.

n137. See id.

n138. See Devroy, supra note 124.

n139. See id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

How well the new system will work remains to be seen. Presidents come and presidents go, but the security bureaucracy remains. Not only do the intelligence agencies grumble about having to make public that which is most precious to them, but they argue that such declassification is costly and time consuming, especially in an era of diminished resources. n140

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n140. See Tim Weiner, C.I.A. Is Slow to Tell Early Cold War Secrets, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1996, at A6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[*21]

VII. The Board and the Intelligence Services

The JFK Act is an attempt not only to deal with the issue of public confidence in government, n141 but also to forge a model of how we might keep from sinking in our own secrets. Yet, the intelligence community resists the opening of classified materials, even those that are now a third-of-a-century old. This defiance is particularly ironic in the case of the Kennedy assassination, in that the intelligence agencies most troubled by the disclosures are the same ones that most often figure in conspiracy theories. n142 Disclosing materials that the CIA and FBI want postponed might actually affirm that neither a foreign nor domestic conspiracy existed and demonstrate the vital role they played in supporting American interests in the Cold War.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n141. See Assassination Materials Disclosure Act I, supra note 96, at 1 (opening statement of Chairman John Glenn) (observing that "disclosure of information is the only reliable way to maintain the public trust and to dispel distrust").

n142. See, e.g., Exhibit Nine infra p. 54. As early as 1976, the CIA itself acknowledged that "conspiracy theories have frequently thrown suspicion on our organization." Id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Congress never contemplated total disclosure, otherwise it would not have created the JFK Board. n143 Disclosure is an important public interest, but so too is protecting sensitive information. n144 There are many occasions for secrecy. For example, most deliberative bodies make a virtue of secrecy, because it permits compromise by allowing individuals to make concessions without losing face. n145 The Supreme Court has observed: "Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." n146 The Court knows whereof it speaks, as its decisionmaking process in conference remains entirely confidential. n147

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n143. Both the plain reading of the statute and an examination of the legislative history make clear that Congress expected the Board to protect certain secrets from disclosure. See 44 U.S.C. 2107(6) (1994) (identifying the grounds on which the Review Board may postpone release of assassination materials); Sanders & Zaid, supra note 62, at 419 (explaining the Board's obligations when it decides to postpone release of a document).

n144. See DuVal, supra note 14, at 668-71 (identifying 10 justifications for nondisclosure).

n145. See id. at 621-22 (observing that maintaining secrecy of advice, recommendations, and opinions allows officials to "propose, comment, and criticize without concern that their comments may seem foolish or contrary to popular sentiment" and to compromise "without loss of face").

n146. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (footnote omitted).

n147. Secrecy in the High Court is a practice, a matter of the Court's culture and traditions, not of law. See Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren xi (1979) ("The Court has developed certain traditions and rules, largely unwritten, that are designed to preserve the secrecy of its deliberations."). The Justice who tells what took place in conference is indiscreet and is likely to forfeit the respect of other Justices, but he breaks no law and neither do his law clerks. See id. Indeed, one of the arguments raised in the wake of opening the papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall was that his written commentary on his colleagues may have made it more difficult for them to deal with one another now knowing that the public understood the reasons that they held certain positions. See id. at xii (observing that, because Justices are not elected but are appointed for life, they are not disposed to allow their decisionmaking to become public). The matter is posed differently, however, in Great Britain. The Official Secrets Acts make it unlawful for a government employee to make an unauthorized disclosure of official information or for anyone who has received the information in violation of the Act to communicate it to anyone else. Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 ch. 28, 2.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[*22]

The virtues of openness in government, therefore, can be and often are overstated, especially by a self-interested press and media. Openness does mean that bad advice can be challenged, but the consequence may be that good decisions are never reached. Open records and "sunshine laws" n148 may only drive people to less easily documented forms of communication, such as the telephone. n149 Although the costs and benefits of secrecy and openness in government are not easily calculated, we do know that loose lips still sink ships, even in our own thermonuclear age.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n148. See Kreimer, supra note 115.

n149. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 Emory L.J. 649, 664 (1984) (observing that "to some degree creative government officials and bureaucrats will always be able to devise ways to abort FOIA's disclosure requirements").

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

In the case of the Kennedy assassination, how far are we willing to countenance secrecy when a fully illuminated rendition of the events surrounding the President's murder could go a long way to restore trust in government? At what point do the costs of concealing materials become sufficiently high to our government's credibility that they are no longer worth paying? At what point do the costs of disclosure become so great that we compromise our future security? Perhaps nowhere are these issues more acutely felt by the JFK Board than in those matters involving intelligence operations.

The assassination sparked a major intelligence effort. n150 In the days following the murder of President Kennedy,

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n150. See Assassination Materials Disclosure Act II, supra note 96, at 93 (statement of Floyd I. Clarke, Deputy Director, FBI) (noting that "immediately following the assassination, the FBI began a massive and intense investigative effort"); Epstein, Trilogy, supra note 6, at 29 (describing Congress's formation of the Warren Commission less than two weeks after the assassination and the Commission's interaction with the FBI's intelligence efforts).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The entire intelligence community worked to learn everything it could about Oswald and his murky, superficially contradictory activities. New intelligence reports from Mexico City suggested a link between Oswald and the Cuban government. The supersecret National Security Agency and allied eavesdropping agencies went into overdrive to decipher in- [*23] tercepted conversations, cable traffic, radio, and telephone communications at the highest levels of the Soviet and Cuban governments n151

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n151. Holland, supra note 18, at 54.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The FBI literally asked all of its informants whether they could shed light on the murder. In addition, there were efforts to tap the FBI's connection with organized crime to make certain that its members, angry at the President and his brother, had not ordered the murder and that Ruby's killing of Oswald was not a classic mob hit. n152 The resulting cables and other documents laid bare most of the Cold War intelligence capacity of the United States. n153

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n152. See Posner, supra note 6, at 463-64.

n153. See Holland, supra note 18, at 54, 56.

------------------ -End Footnotes- ------------------

Students of the assassination would benefit from opening the mass of information produced by the intelligence community's intense effort to get to the bottom of the President's murder. Yet, protecting America's foreign and domestic intelligence-gathering capabilities is essential to our national defense. n154 Thus, the intelligence agencies regularly assert that the identities of agents and informants must remain perpetually confidential; n155 that nothing should be revealed about the methods and sources used to gather intelligence; n156 that direct reports from United States intelligence agents should not be disclosed; n157 and that intelligence information provided by other nations to the United States, and, indeed, the very existence of such relationships, should not be disclosed.

------------------ -Footnotes- ------------------

n154. See Assassination Materials Disclosure Act III, supra note 96, at 381 (prepared statement of FBI Director William Sessions) (stating that among 250,000 pages requested by the House Assassinations Committee are a large number of FBI documents that "implicate national security interests").

n155. See Assassination Materials Disclosure Act I, supra note 96, at 7 (statement of CIA Director Robert M. Gates) (asserting that "we have an obligation to protect the confidentiality of our sources, regardless of the amount of time that has passed").

n156. See Assassination Materials Disclosure Act III, supra note 96, at 363, 373-74 (statement of CIA Director Robert M. Gates) (stating assumption "that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including ... the exposure of intelligence sources and methods"); Assassination Materials Disclosure Act II, supra note 96, at 109 (statement of Admiral William O. Studeman, Deputy Director, CIA) (echoing Gates's statement).

n157. See supra note 154.

------------------ -End Footnotes- ------------------

VIII. Informants

Informants play a critical role in the world of intelligence operations, both domestic and foreign. For example, the FBI relied heavily on informants to infiltrate the Ku Klux Klan in the 1960s and [*24] 1970s. n158 Today, the FBI recruits informants to help thwart narcotics trafficking and international terrorism. n159 The internal security and general welfare of the United States depends heavily on the role of informants. n160

------------------ -Footnotes- ------------------

n158. See Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and Suggestions for Reform, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 81, 91-92 (1994) (describing the FBI's mishandling of KKK informants).

n159. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Critics "Wrong,' CIA Chief Says, Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 1996, at A21, available in 1996 WL 12392255 (noting CIA Director John M. Deutch's assertion that critics who allege that the CIA has done a poor job recruiting informants knowledgeable about terrorist activities are wrong).

n160. See Ross Parker, Confidential Informants and the Truth Finding Function, 4 Cooley L. Rev. 565, 596 (1987) (citing an informal examination of federal investigations in the Eastern District of Michigan finding that about 50% of drug cases and 40% of public corruption cases involved the use of informants); Timothy A. Raezer, Needed Weapons in the Army's War on Drugs: Electronic Surveillance and Informants, 116 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 39-64 (1987) (extolling the benefits of informants to drug law enforcement); Zimmerman, supra note 158, at 178 (observing that law enforcement "has long reaped and extolled the benefits of informants").

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

What duty does the government owe to persons who agree to serve as informants? There are many reasons why persons serve as informants. Money, revenge, and the sheer thrill explain some of this behavior. Yet, above all else, informants expect that they will be clothed in confidentiality in return for their information. An informant who is identified immediately loses value. All informants in the service of the various domestic and international intelligence operations are recruited with an understanding that they will be granted confidentiality - that they will never be "given-up" in the lingo of the intelligence community. n161 The very nature of what they are asked to do - commit treason on their home government, report on the activities of groups like the American Communist Party, or shed light on the activities of organized crime and terrorist groups - exposes them to tremendous danger; if they are revealed, they and their families may suffer serious personal injury, or even death.

✓

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n161. See Assassination Materials Disclosure Act III, supra note 96, at 53 (statement of CIA Director Robert M. Gates) (observing that the CIA files "contain the names of individuals who provided us information on a promise of confidentiality").

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The Kennedy assassination documents contain thousands of names of informants drawn from every walk of life. The FBI has taken the position that these names must be protected indefinitely and that any disclosure will impair the Bureau's ability to recruit new informants. Yet, all informants are not created equal. Some have greater value than others, both for the story of the Kennedy assassination and for providing information about organized crime and other activities. Moreover, the issue is not simply one of the quality of the information [*25] that is provided. As Exhibit One demonstrates, the vast majority of documents involving informants has been opened in part; infrequently only the names of the informants and other key identifying language has been redacted. n162 These redactions breed a sense of expectation among researchers, because in the climate of conspiracy that surrounds the Kennedy assassination, any material that is covered up is presumed to be an important missing link in the chain of explanation about the murder.

✓

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n162. See Exhibit One infra p. 39.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Exhibit One is perhaps representative of the issues raised about the Review Board's disclosure of informants. The Exhibit contains a message sent by the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in Houston to the SAC in Dallas and to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on November 26, 1963, four days after the murder of President Kennedy. n163 This document was originally reviewed by the FBI, and designated for release under the terms of the JFK Act with certain materials redacted. Those redactions appear in Exhibit One and indicate what material the FBI wanted to keep from the public. n164

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n163. See id.

n164. See id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

As Exhibit Two reveals, the Board decided that much of the redacted material could be released, most notably the name of Mary Ann McCall, a hostess at a Dallas night spot. n165 By the time the informant had interviewed McCall, Jack Ruby had already killed Oswald. The Board decided that the historical record was well served by opening McCall's name, especially given her purported relationship with the Dallas police and organized crime. The Board, however, also accepted the FBI's argument that the name of the person who provided the information about McCall should be protected. Consequently, a document that had many redactions when it was sent from the FBI to the Board went into the public record with only one name redacted. The Board was satisfied that revealing the informant's name would harm the informant, thus outweighing the value of immediate disclosure. The Board used substitute language to make clear to students of the assassination that the redacted portion was the name of a "confidential informant" and ordered that the name be released in the year 2010. n166

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n165. See Exhibit Two infra p. 41.

n166. See id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Should it matter to the Board that many of these informants, when interviewed after the assassination, did not provide positive information about Oswald or Ruby? There are countless examples of [*26] individuals who, when contacted by intelligence services, indicated that they knew nothing about the assassination. The Board has taken the position that intelligence services must demonstrate that harm would come to the individual if her name were released. Agencies must be able to identify the individual, indicate that she is still alive, and establish that some harm will befall her. n167 The threshold issue,

✓

therefore, is whether an agency that seeks to protect an individual, regardless of the quality of the information provided, can substantiate the claim that harm will come to that person as a result of revealing her name. When an agency has failed to do so, the Board has released the name. n168 The record of events surrounding the assassination will never be complete until we know what blind alleys are not worth pursuing. As any good investigator knows, eliminating blind alleys is critical, because the elimination provides additional certainty about who knew nothing, a fact that can be helpful in discerning who knew something. In this context, knowing that an informant knew nothing, at least by her statement, is valuable itself, given the complexity of the conspiracy theories surrounding the assassination.

✓

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n167. See 44 U.S.C. 2107(6)(2) (1994) (permitting postponement of public disclosures when there is clear and convincing evidence that the "name or identity of a living person who provided confidential information to the United States ... would pose a substantial risk of harm to that person"); see also supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.

n168. The McCall document cited above, and found at Exhibits One and Two, infra pp. 39-42, is an example of the Board's release of an individual's name after determining that no harm was likely to come to the individual and that public interest in the disclosure would be high. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

✓

Spying is a feature of modern foreign affairs, and there can be no doubt that, as with informants, we owe some protection to those individuals employed in the clandestine service of the CIA. n169 Understanding how our clandestine services operate and what information they did or did not provide is critical to the assassination story. For example, the CIA sought to protect a considerable amount of information involving the use of double agents to infiltrate the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. As Exhibit Three makes clear, the Agency originally wanted to protect broad sections of a message sent on November 29, 1963, one week after the murder of the President. n170 The CIA believed that releasing the information would compromise the [*27] double agents and reveal the scope of the Agency's efforts against the former Soviet government. Yet, in terms of the story of the assassination, knowing the quality of the effort directed against the Soviets in Mexico City was considered crucial. As Exhibit Four reveals, only weeks before Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested for killing President Kennedy, Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico seeking a visa that would allow him to return to the Soviet Union by way of Cuba. n171 The Board opened most of the information that the Agency previously wanted to postpone, and where the Board determined that disclosure would be harmful, it relied on substitute language, which is handwritten in Exhibit Three. n172

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n169. The JFK Act acknowledges the obligation of protecting the identity of intelligence officers. See 44 U.S.C. 2107(6)(1)(A) (allowing postponement of the release of JFK documents if they involve public disclosure of "an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection"); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.

n170. See Exhibit Three infra p. 43. The CIA originally sought to postpone the information that is in the brackets. See id. In some cases, information was postponed, but substitute language, as provided by the statute, was inserted in its place. See id.

n171. See Exhibit Four infra p. 45.

n172. See Exhibit Three infra p. 43.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The CIA also worries about the status of its former employees and expects that these employees will not reveal the nature of their activities without first seeking the Agency's permission. n173 If an individual retires from the CIA undercover, does it follow that historical researchers must forever be denied access to that person's true name, especially when she is alive and able to answer questions? Does an agent in the clandestine service of the country have a right to be free from the prying questions of researchers and reporters? Does it make any difference, as in the case of informants, that an agent provided only negative information? Should we worry about whether an agent is alive or dead? Or does it follow that significant harm might come to the agent's family and friends through the revelation of her name? Are we willing, in the interest of providing the fullest and richest historical record of the assassination, to subject spouses, children, and parents to potential harassment or worse? ✓

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n173. See Melvin L. Wulf, Introduction to Marchetti & Marks, supra note 72. In 1972, the CIA successfully sued former agent, Victor Marchetti, to require that his manuscript be submitted to the CIA for review prior to publication. See id. at xix.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Weighing the potential harm to such persons against the public's right to know is challenging. We should recall that in 1975, Richard Welch, the CIA station chief in Athens, Greece, was murdered by unidentified gunmen as he returned to his home from a party at the ambassador's residence. n174 Former CIA Director William Colby attributed the death to a magazine account that had named Welch only a [*28] month before. n175 For those agents who are still alive but in retirement, should we take their word that they are at grave risk? Does a lifetime of intrigue have as its cost a retirement filled with uncertainty? ✓

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n174. See Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy 211-12 (1989) (observing that "pro-CIA partisans blamed Welch's death on Agency critics who had irresponsibly released too much information"); Jeremiah O'Leary, Cover Blown, CIA Agent in Athens Killed, Wash. Star, Dec. 24, 1975, at A1 (noting that a United States publication's naming of Welch as the CIA station chief who was slain in Athens will fuel controversy about tragic consequences of public disclosure of CIA personnel).

n175. See O'Leary, supra note 174, at A1.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The value of confidential FBI and CIA sources to the Warren Commission's work is underscored by the documents released thus far by the Board. For example, Exhibit Four is a letter dated June 17, 1964 from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin, then General Counsel to the Warren Commission. n176 The letter details what the FBI knew about Fidel Castro's assessment of the assassination. n177 Originally classified as "Top Secret," this document indicates that the United States had a source sufficiently close to Castro to gauge the Cuban leader's evaluation of Oswald and the circumstances surrounding his visit to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. n178 The FBI wished to redact much of this material. The FBI was concerned that Castro's tests were at variance with the FBI's test results. The Board decided that the information contained in the letter was critical to the assassination story; n179 therefore, the entire document was made available to the American public, illuminating the thinking of Castro and the credibility of the American intelligence community to assess the Cuban leader.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n176. See Exhibit Four infra p. 45.

n177. See id.

n178. See id.

n179. Parts of the document had been declassified in 1976, but the FBI wanted to continue to postpone release of the portions in brackets. See id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

In matters of informants and agents, the JFK statute directs the agencies to provide the Board with "clear and convincing evidence" that disclosure will result in harm, either to an individual or to current operations. n180 If the FBI, for example, is unable to find a former informant, and thus does not know whether she is alive or dead, what is the Board's duty? The Board faces the dilemma of either erring on the side of protecting the individual's identity, even though there is no evidence that the person is alive and living under a current threat, or enriching the historical record by revealing the individual's identity while running the risk of causing unnecessary harm.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n180. 44 U.S.C. 2107(6) (1994).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

There is also the related question of how to treat the names of persons described in the reports of informants as being engaged in some illicit conduct when there is no proof, other than the informant's word, to support the accusation. Is that individual owed a right [*29] to know that he or she was so identified, or is it the Board's duty to redact the person's name? Would disclosing false information be more damaging than retaining it in government records where only government officials have access to such information?

These questions indicate the range of issues associated with deciding whether to postpone releasing the names of informants and agents. Where does the requirement for a full historical record of the Kennedy assassination yield to the prudential uses of secrecy to preserve the nation's ability to gather intelligence?

IX. Sources and Methods

The JFK Act requires the Board to balance the need to protect sources and methods of intelligence collection with the public need for disclosure of information relating to the assassination. n181 The inappropriate release of documents, either in part or in full, dealing with our intelligence agencies' sources and methods could afford hostile nations, organized crime, terrorists, and drug dealers an understanding of our intelligence capabilities. If another nation or a terrorist group knows how we are able to exercise surveillance over them, they are likely to adopt appropriate countermeasures. They also might seek to provide selectively misleading information, knowing that we are listening and how we are listening. Many of the documents already available in the JFK Collection at the National Archives indicate that the United States bugged, tapped, photographed, and otherwise conducted surveillance of persons and places. The question arises whether we should also reveal the precise kind of equipment that was used, how it was employed, and against whom it was targeted. Knowledge about equipment and technique would be important in evaluating the capability of the intelligence community, not only to ply its craft, but to organize a conspiracy on its own. Again, the question arises whether disclosing a source, method, or technique should turn on whether positive or negative information becomes available.

-Footnotes-

n181. See 44 U.S.C. 2107(7) (authorizing postponement of the release of records if the threat of disclosure "is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest"); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.

-End Footnotes-

Exhibit Five provides a good indication of the kinds of issues involved in dealing with sources and methods. n182 This document is a cable sent from the Director of the CIA on November 23, 1963, only hours after the murder of the President, seeking information about a surveillance operation conducted in Mexico City. n183 The message [*30] sought information about what the CIA operatives in Mexico City knew about the existence of tapes and transcripts involving surveillance of the Soviet Embassy there. n184 The CIA originally requested the postponement of much of the information in this document; however, the Board decided that its centrality to understanding the assassination story required its release, with the only redaction being the name of the authenticating office, whose pseudonym was used in its place. n185 Because it helps to clarify the issue of whether the CIA taped Oswald's conversations in the Embassy, this document is one of the most significant released by the Board to date. This document also suggests the CIA's awareness of and interest in Oswald before he purportedly shot the President.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n182. See Exhibit Five infra p. 47.

n183. Id.

n184. Id.

n185. See id. The material enclosed in brackets in Exhibit Five was originally withheld by the CIA. See id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

There is also the question of whether the Board should reveal the identities of those who handled information relating to the investigation of the assassination. America's intelligence machine is a huge bureaucracy that processes information in staggering quantities. n186 How and by whom information relating to the assassination was organized, processed, and distributed is central to evaluating the CIA's role in the assassination. For example, Exhibit Six pertains to the continuing debate about whether the Agency photographed Oswald entering the Soviet Embassy and whether a record of what he had to say there was ever sent to CIA headquarters. n187 Arguably, unraveling the chain of custody of that material is critical. Yet, to do so would require identifying the persons who handled it. In this instance, the Board decided that, on grounds of personal privacy and potential harm, it would not disclose the name of one CIA official involved with the Mexico City operation, although the names of other officials were released in cooperation with the CIA.

✓

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n186. See Assassination Materials Disclosure Act III, supra note 96, at 397 (photograph depicting voluminous JFK assassination files); Wald, supra note 128 (describing the Department of Energy's accumulation of information).

n187. See Exhibit Six infra p. 48.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

X. Foreign Liaison

The American government conducts its intelligence operations in collaboration with the services of other nations. n188 For example, the most secret agreement ever entered into by the English-speaking world is the pact by which the United States, Great Britain, Canada, [*31] Australia, and New Zealand carved the world into spheres of cryptologic influence, assigning each nation targets and agreeing to standardize terminology, code words, and other operations procedures. n189 Revelations of these and other relationships could prove extremely embarrassing to the cooperating governments, especially when those governments profess to be neutral or have publicly stated that they have no connection with the CIA. However, a full understanding of the intelligence base upon which the Warren Commission and the intelligence community as a whole assessed the Kennedy assassination depends on a thorough accounting of such connections. Moreover, perhaps nowhere else is negative information more important than when the intelligence service of another country has access to

✓

unique sources. There is, as well, the related question of how much information was known at the top of the cooperating governments and the extent to which such knowledge would enhance our understanding of the assassination as being the work of foreign conspirators. If we compromise any of those relationships and consequently cause political damage to the cooperating government, we may find a valuable future source of intelligence closed. n190

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n188. See Stafford T. Thomas, The U.S. Intelligence Community 89-94 (1983).

n189. See James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency 309, 315-17 (1982).

n190. Congress acknowledged this concern in the JFK Act by allowing postponement of the release of documents, which clear and convincing evidence establishes will "compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a ... foreign government." 44 U.S.C. 2107(6)(4) (1994).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Exhibit Seven poses some of these liaison issues. n191 The FBI provided the Board with this heavily redacted document, arguing that release of the body of material in the message from the FBI field office in Paris to the Director of the FBI in Washington on October 12, 1960 (three years before the assassination), would damage the ability of the United States to work with the intelligence and police operations of a foreign nation. The cable, however, struck the Board as being particularly important, in that it showed that three years before the murder of the President the FBI was engaged in surveillance of Oswald's activities. n192 The Board was also concerned that concealing so large an amount of material would only heighten speculation about the document's significance.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n191. See Exhibit Seven infra p. 52.

n192. See id.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*32]

As Exhibit Eight demonstrates, the contents of the cable were far more sinister when redacted than when they were disclosed in full. n193 To gain this release, the Board sought the cooperation of the Swiss ambassador to the United States, who consented to the release, only with the proviso that the names of specific Swiss officials not be divulged. As a result of the cable's release, we know that the FBI had knowledge of and interest in Oswald's activities well before the assassination, to the extent of relying on officials of the Swiss Federal Police to learn about his possible attendance at Albert Schweitzer College. n194

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n193. See Exhibit Eight infra p. 53 (observing that Oswald announced his plans to attend Swiss college, but that he never arrived to attend classes).

n194. See id. (documenting FBI's request to Swiss police for information about Oswald).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

XI. Of Times and Theories

How to address the host of issues raised by these intelligence materials depends on answers to two overriding questions. The first is whether the passage of time renders open that which currently requires postponement. The second is whether, by adopting a particular theory about what happened in Dallas, the Board so fundamentally shapes its assumptions about the significance of documents that it may actually fail to open the most critical of them.

More than a third of a century has passed since the murder of President Kennedy. When asked whether the sources, methods, and techniques used then are no longer worthy of protection today, the intelligence and law enforcement agencies appropriately answer no. n195 They argue that disclosure at any time will reduce their capabilities and, hence, our national security. n196 In the world of intelligence operations, all secrets must live forever, lest we be unable to find new secrets in the future.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n195. See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.

n196. See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The passage of time, however, has made a difference, and in some instances dramatically so. There is today no Soviet Union to which Lee Harvey Oswald could return. If he returned to Minsk, he would find it a capital of an independent nation, rather than a satellite of the Communist Empire. The Warsaw Pact has dissolved; the capitals of Eastern Europe now sport trendy shops and capitalist enterprises; Cuba survives by importing tourists from everywhere but the United States; and China has emerged as a major American market. Not only is the Cold War dead, but so too are many of the principal figures in the assassination - President Johnson, Robert F. Kennedy, John Connally, and Jacqueline Kennedy. The U-2 is regularly fea- [*33] tured on television documentaries; photographs from the once super-secret Keyhole surveillance satellites of the 1960s and early 1970s leap from the pages of the current issues of Scientific American. n197 There is no doubt that the CIA, FBI, and military intelligence services snooped on us and other nations, friend and foe. n198 The CIA in particular argues that current intelligence activities must remain plausibly deniable and that the Board's role should be to postpone the disclosure of actions taken a third-of-a-century ago that conceivably could compromise current operations. Yet, we might reasonably ask ourselves, as the Board has, whether, three decades later, we would compromise our security interests around the world by indicating that a CIA station once existed in Moscow. ✓

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n197. See Dino A. Brugioni, The Art and Science of Photo Reconnaissance, Sci. Am., Mar. 1996, at 78. Few secrets were accorded more respect than the techniques associated with photo reconnaissance by spy planes and satellites. See id. (discussing 800,000 reconnaissance photographs taken by the CIA from 1960-72 and kept secret). There is now, however, growing information about the capabilities of the United States during the Cold War. See id.; see also Stuart F. Brown, America's First Eyes in Space, Popular Sci., Feb. 1, 1996, at 42, available in 1996 WL 9275085 (describing the government's declassification of 800,000 photographs); Philip Chien, High Spies: U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites, Popular Mechanics, Feb. 1996, at 47, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mag File (explaining that one of the original reconnaissance satellites of the 1960s will be displayed at the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum).

n198. See generally Michal R. Belknap, Cold War Political Justice (1977) (describing the Department of Justice's nationwide campaign to bring down the Communist party of the United States); Nelson Blackstock, Cointelpro: The FBI's Secret War on Political Freedom (1976) (describing the FBI's counterintelligence operations and violations of constitutional rights); Ward Churchill & Jim Vander Wall, The Cointelpro Papers x (1990) (describing FBI documents that "expose the secret, systematic, and sometimes savage use of force and fraud, by all levels of government to sabotage progressive political activity"); Frank J. Donner, The Age of Surveillance (1980) (describing U.S. domestic intelligence operations); Brian Freemantle, CIA (1983) (attributing CIA excesses to lack of direction or misdirection from the Executive Branch and presidency); Jeffreys-Jones, supra note 174 (describing how allegations of the CIA's failed operations in Bogota, Columbia led to an expansion of intelligence operations); Mark Reibling, Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA (1994) (discussing the CIA's efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro); David Wise, The American Police State: The Government Against the People (1976) (describing U.S. domestic intelligence operations).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

If the passage of time makes no difference, then the American people would never have a right to all of the information used or denied by the Warren Commission. The passage of time neuters secrecy, and eventually, like Douglas MacArthur's old soldiers, secrets just fade away. If there are any secrets that a democratic government has a right to keep permanently from its people, surely the murder of the President would not be one such secret.

Then there is the problem of what theory the Board should adopt to explain events in Dallas. Gerald Posner, for example, has pub- [*34] lished a widely read book on the assassination entitled Case Closed. n199 It concludes that Lee Harvey Oswald murdered President Kennedy, that he did so acting alone, and that there is no evidence of a larger conspiracy, foreign or domestic. n200 That notion of the assassination is countered by a host of critics that insist on just the opposite. n201

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n199. Posner, supra note 6.

n200. See id. at 472.

n201. See, e.g., Harrison E. Livingstone, Killing Kennedy 282-334 (1995) (arguing that Posner's book tricked the public with false scholarship); G. Robert Blakey, Murdered by the Mob?: 30 Years After the Kennedy Assassination, This Case Isn't Closed, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1993, at C1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File (arguing that credible scientific and other evidence points to a conspiracy); Jeffrey A. Frank, Who Shot JFK? The 30-Year Mystery, Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1993, Book World, at X4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File (arguing that Posner "rarely strays from paths staked out by the Warren Commission" and that the "book ultimately becomes an all-too-transparent brief for the prosecution"); Jonathan Kwitny, Bad News: Your Mother Killed JFK, L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat File (contending that Posner "presents only the evidence that supports the case he is trying to build").

Posner related that other reactions to his book included an accusation that he was a CIA agent, a computer network asking its members to discredit his book, and demonstrators in front of his hotel. See Geoffrey C. Ward, The Most Durable Assassination Theory: Oswald Did It Alone, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1993, 7, at 15, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (describing the reactions Posner received from his book).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The general assumptions the Board holds about what happened inform how it assesses the value of a particular document to the public. If the Board assumes that Oswald murdered the President, and consequently looks only for information that speaks to his role, it is likely, on national security grounds, to postpone certain kinds of information. If the Board assumes that the murder was a conspiracy, then much of what seems irrelevant to the Oswald explanation may actually have great currency. n202 The intelligence agencies rely on the [*35] [*36] theory that Oswald did it and that he did it alone. n203 To support such a position, they turn, ironically, to the findings of the Warren Commission, n204 a body that in some ways they attempted to deceive. Perhaps there is no better evidence of the CIA's attitude than its effort to sway public opinion abroad in the wake of the release of the Warren Commission Report. n205 As Exhibit Nine makes clear, the CIA used its substantial resources to just that end. n206

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n202. The Board adopted a broad definition of an "assassination record" with just such issues in mind. See 36 C.F.R. pt. 1400 (1995). The pertinent sections dealing with the scope for interpreting the JFK statute read as follows:

1400.1 Scope of assassination record.

(a) An assassination record includes, but is not limited to, all records, public and private, regardless of how labeled or identified, that document, describe, report on, analyze or interpret activities, persons, or events reasonably related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and investigations of or inquiries into the assassination.

(b) An assassination record further includes, without limitation:

(1) All records as defined in Section 3(2) of the JFK Act;

(2) All records collected by or segregated by all Federal, state, and local government agencies in conjunction with any investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy (for example, any intra-agency investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination; any interagency communication regarding the assassination; any request by the House Select Committee on Assassinations to collect documents and other materials; or any inter- or intra-agency collection or segregation of documents and other materials);

(3) Other records or groups of records listed in the Notice of Assassination Record Designation, as described in 1400.8 of this chapter.

1400.2 Scope of additional records and information.

The term additional records and information includes:

(a) All documents used by government offices and agencies during their declassification review of assassination records as well as all other documents, indices, and other material (including but not limited to those that disclose cryptonyms, code names, or other identifiers that appear in assassination records) that the Assassination Records Review Board (Review Board) has a reasonable basis to believe may constitute an assassination record or would assist in the identification, evaluation or interpretation of an assassination record. The Review Board will identify in writing those records and other materials it intends to seek under this section.

(b) All training manuals, instructional materials, and guidelines created or used by the agencies in furtherance of their review of assassination records.

(c) All records, lists, and documents describing the procedure by which the agencies identified or selected assassination records for review.

(d) Organizational charts of government agencies.

(e) Records necessary and sufficient to describe the agency's:

(1) Records policies and schedules;

(2) Filing systems and organization;

(3) Storage facilities and locations;

(4) Indexing symbols, marks, codes, instructions, guidelines, methods, and procedures;

(5) Search methods and procedures used in the performance of the agencies' duties under the JFK Act; and

(6) Reclassification to a higher level, transfer, destruction, or other information (e.g., theft) regarding the status of assassination records.

(f) Any other record that does not fall within the scope of assassination record as described in 1400.1, but which has the potential to enhance, enrich, and broaden the historical record of the assassination.

1400.3 Sources of assassination records and additional records and information.

Assassination records and additional records and information may be located at, or under the control of, without limitation:

(a) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executing, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government;

(b) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of state and local governments;

(c) Record repositories and archives of Federal, state, and local governments, including presidential libraries;

(d) Record repositories and archives of universities, libraries, historical societies, and other similar organizations;

(e) Individuals who possess such records by virtue of service with a government agency, office, or entity;

(f) Persons, including individuals and corporations, who have obtained such records from sources identified in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section;

(g) Persons, including individuals and corporations, who have themselves created or have obtained such records from sources other than those identified in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section;

(h) Federal, state, and local courts where such records are being held under seal; or

(i) Foreign governments.

1400.4 Types of materials included in scope of assassination record and additional records and information.

The term record in assassination record and additional records and information includes, for purposes of interpreting and implementing the JFK Act:

(a) papers, maps, and other documentary material;

(b) photographs;

(c) motion pictures;

(d) sound and video recordings;

(e) machine readable information in any form; and

(f) artifacts.

n203. See Exhibit Nine infra p. 54 (contending that "Oswald would not have been any sensible person's choice for a co-conspirator").

n204. See id. (advising that in discussing assassination with "politicians and editors," CIA personnel point out that the Warren Commission "made as thorough an investigation as humanly possible").

n205. See id.

n206. See id. (noting that the American public's belief that Oswald did not act alone "is a matter of concern to the U.S. Government, including [the CIA]").

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

There is considerable irony in the CIA's position, both then and now. Much of the speculation about the murder of President Kennedy has centered on the role of that agency. n207 The only way to sustain its innocence in this matter may well be to fully disclose the evidence, including selected sources and methods, that will reveal conclusively that neither it nor some foreign power was behind the murder.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n207. See, e.g., Prouty, supra note 29 (reviewing the history of troubled relations between the CIA and President Kennedy); Alan J. Weberman & Michael Canfield, Coup D'etat in America, The CIA and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy (1992) (asking whether Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent); JFK, supra note 9.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Conclusion

The American public should not rely on the JFK Board to settle the question of what happened in Dallas and why. That is not the [*37] Board's mandate. n208 The Board is not charged with answering the question of who murdered President Kennedy. It is not running an investigation; it is, instead, seeking to disclose documents in an age of open secrets, an age in which we have come to embrace the idea that openness is to be preferred and that accountability is the touchstone for public confidence in government. n209

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n208. See 44 U.S.C. 2107(2)(b) (1994) (identifying the purpose of the JFK Act as establishing the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection of the National Archives and Records Administration and requiring "the expeditious public transmission to the Archivist and public disclosure of such [assassination] records").

n209. See supra note 14.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

We are reminded almost daily by the press and media spokespersons that the maintenance of secrets is bad, that openness is good, and that accountability in all public matters is highly desirable. n210 Full disclosure is to be preferred over partial; the full truth is better than something less, and the more we know about what government has done, is doing, and plans to do, the more secure we will be in our liberties. Yet, the intelligence community charged with making the case for secrecy often does so as a matter of routine rooted in tradition. n211 Secrecy in a democracy deserves better; it cannot be an end in itself, and it certainly cannot be justified simply to obscure the intelligence services that generate much of it in the first place. Such an approach is ultimately self-defeating, both for the intelligence community and for the government it serves.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n210. See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 140 (discussing the CIA's slow release of its files on the most important covert actions of the Cold War). The argument in support of openness and accountability in government is advanced carefully by Norman Dorsen & Stephen Gillers, None of Your Business: Government Secrecy in America (1974).

n211. See Wald, supra note 128 (observing that, at the Department of Energy, "ideas are 'classified at birth,' or presumed secret until proved otherwise"); see also supra notes 124-134 and accompanying text.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

George Bernard Shaw was correct when he argued: "There are no secrets better kept than the secrets that everybody guesses." n212 Shaw's words surely describe the approach of the intelligence agencies to the Kennedy assassination. In the absence of disclosure, the public, goaded by a news-hungry press and an activist research community, will be left to speculate in sensational ways about the assassination. Such speculation will continue to have predictably corrosive consequences.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n212. Christopher Morley & Louella D. Everett, Familiar Quotations: A Collection of Passages, Phrases and Proverbs, Traced to Their Sources in Ancient and Modern Literature by John Bartlett 720 (12th ed. 1948) (quoting George Bernard Shaw).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

We should all be stunned that, with countless documents still hidden in government filing cabinets, researchers, newspaper reporters, [*38] columnists, and movie and TV producers have managed to convey a broadly held view that the Warren Commission failed and that the government knows more than it is telling. n213 We should stand in awe of their capacity to explain the assassination in such breathtaking terms when so much still remains under lock and key. By breaking confidences with former informants and disclosing clandestine CIA and FBI operations, a fuller record will put to the test the most sinister of all conspiracy theories: that the President was murdered by his own government. Such a matter cannot be left to chance explanation because it eats away at the foundation of public confidence in government, which neither well-intentioned secrecy nor covert operations can restore.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n213. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

What Americans require is a greater sense that they can trust their government to protect the secrets that are genuinely important. The government's persistent inability to distinguish between what is vital and what is not n214 lies at the heart of the debate about openness and secrecy in government, the historical verdict on the Kennedy assassination, and the legitimacy of our intelligence services in an admittedly dangerous world.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n214. See Wald, supra note 128 (noting that the Department of Energy is spending $ 3 million on a computer program that will make an initial assessment regarding possible disclosure of 100 million pages of documents to reduce the number of secret documents to a manageable quantity for further human assessment).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Americans have been left guessing about the Kennedy assassination since the Warren Commission issued its report. When everything is secret, everything is secret - and that is how the intelligence business operates. n215 In the case of the Kennedy murder, however, that strategy has taken a heavy toll. Our task is to accept on a principled basis the importance of secrets in a democracy and to protect what is truly valuable and in the public interest to keep secret. Only then will it be possible to assess whether charges of a conspiracy to murder President Kennedy are but another example of the virulence of the national appetite for bogus revelation.

[SEE EXHIBITS IN ORIGINAL]

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n215. See generally Marchetti & Marks, supra note 72, at 370 (concluding that secrecy has become a "way of life" for U.S. intelligence operations).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

COVER SHEET

FAX

To: J. Barry Harrelson
Fax #: 703-613-3063
Subject: Segregated Collections
Date: April 23, 1997
Pages: 7, including this cover sheet.

Today the Board adopted the attached guidelines.

From the desk of...

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 724-0088
Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Assassination Records Review Board
Guidelines for Review of Postponements in the Segregated Collections
Adopted: April 23, 1997

Background

In order to ensure that the Review Board will be able to complete its task of reviewing all identified assassination records, the Board recently took two significant steps. First, on November 13, 1996, it adopted guidelines with respect to reviewing "Segregated Collections" with regard to information that is "not believed relevant" (NBR) to the assassination. Second, in February 1997, the Review Board requested Congress to extend its tenure for one additional year.

It is the Review Board's judgment that, even with the assumption that our operations may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method of review. In particular, a reasonable modification of current postponement standards would greatly expedite and facilitate the release of additional information and records. Otherwise, the Review Board might cease operations without having reviewed claimed postponements in tens of thousands of pages of FBI and CIA records.

Postponement Criteria for the Segregated Collections

In a further effort to enhance the Review Board's work, the Review Board now issues these revised guidelines for the review of records in the Segregated Collections.[1] (These guidelines do not affect the FBI's Core and Related Files or the CIA's 201 file on Oswald.) The four principal factors that underlie these review guidelines are: first, continuing, to the greatest reasonable extent, the Review Board's established guidelines for postponements that have emerged over the past two years; second, establishing guidelines consistent with the Review Board's decision regarding NBR records; third, establishing reasonable and workable guidelines that will enable the

---

[1] The regulations adopted by the Board on November 13, 1996, define "Segregated Collections" as including *first,* FBI records that were requested by: (a) the House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") in conjunction with its investigation into the Kennedy assassination; (b) the Church Committee in conjunction with its inquiry into issues related to the Kennedy assassination; and (c) by other bodies (*e.g.,* Pike Committee, Abzug Committee, etc.) that relate to the Kennedy assassination; and *second,* CIA records including (a) the CIA's Sequestered Collection of 63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records and the microfilm records (box 64), and (b) several boxes of CIA staff "working files."

Review Board, the ARRB staff, the CIA, and the FBI to complete the significant amount of work that remains; and finally, to provide reasonably consistent standards for the review of postponements that would apply equally to CIA and FBI records.

The following are, in summary form, guidelines for reviewing postponements in the Segregated Collections.[2]

CIA Source and FBI Informant and National Security Asset Postponements

There are, of course, similarities and differences between FBI informants and CIA sources. Like FBI informants and national security assets, CIA sources may or may not be paid for the information that they provide and they may or may not be providers of information over the long-term. When providing information to the Bureau, FBI informants generally are understood to be cooperating with law enforcement officials for a legal and legitimate purpose. It is often the case, although not always, that FBI informants understand that at some point their name might surface in conjunction with a criminal prosecution and that they may need to testify in court. Foreign CIA sources and FBI national security assets, however, are not necessarily deemed to be cooperating with law enforcement officials but may, in fact, be committing the crime of espionage against their native country by cooperating with US authorities. Furthermore, unlike FBI informants, CIA sources and FBI national security assets presume that their names will not be released publicly and they certainly presume (in the ordinary course) that their identities will not surface in criminal trials. As a practical matter, it is generally much easier today for the FBI to locate a former informant who resides in the United States than it is for the CIA and FBI to locate former sources and national security assets.

Despite these differences -- differences which would generally suggest a greater degree of protection being owed to CIA sources and FBI national security assets -- the issues in terms of postponements are fundamentally similar.

---

[2] The existing "NBR" guidelines allow the Review Board to remove from detailed consideration those records or files that truly have no apparent relevance to the assassination. Nevertheless, a significant number of files in the Segregated Collections contain records that shed some light on issues that the HSCA explored as potentially relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. The following criteria would apply to all records in the Segregated Collections, including records containing some NBR redactions.

CIA Sources

The Review Board established guidelines, during its December 1996 meeting, for handling CIA source issues and applied those guidelines at the January 1997 meeting. These guidelines directed the protection of names and identifying information of CIA sources in cases where the identity of the source is of low public interest or is peripheral to the JFK assassination. The Board's decision was based on two factors: the concern that since CIA sources generally live outside the United States, they could risk harm if their identities were revealed. Moreover, many of the sources referenced in CIA records appear infrequently and are of relatively low public interest. Therefore, in records where the identity of the source is of importance for understanding the assassination, the CIA will be required to provide additional evidence to support the protection of the source's identity.[3] In cases where the identify of the source is peripheral to the assassination story, the information will be postponed until 2017.

FBI National Security Assets

FBI national security assets should be treated in the same manner as CIA sources.

FBI Informants

Informant issues represent the largest category of postponements in the FBI's Segregated Collection, as they do in the "core" FBI assassination files. They also provide the greatest opportunity for streamlining the review process. Currently, there are ten members of the Bureau's JFK Task Force who are responsible for researching individual informants in response to evidence requests from the Review Board.[4] They retrieve and review the informants' files and attempt, through DMV, Social Security, and other database searches, to determine if the informant is alive. Under current Review Board standards for "core" files, this work is necessary to provide evidence to support redacting the informant's name, ***regardless*** of whether the informant provided information. Removing the requirement of proving whether informants are alive in the Segregated Collections would free up significant resources that could be deployed to reviewing unprocessed HSCA subject files.

The new approach to HSCA subjects is to protect informant-identifying information, without requiring the Bureau to make a showing that the informant is alive. This protection would extend to individuals characterized as symbol-number informants, "PSIs," "PCIs," "established sources," "panel sources," and the like -- designations that indicate an ongoing relationship with the FBI. It would not extend to individuals who requested that their identity be protected in an isolated contact with the FBI or to local and state law enforcement officers.

---

[3] An example would be the case of John Scelso (pseud.). The Board found that his identity is relevant to the assassination story and CIA offered evidence of a continuing need to protect the identity. In this case, "Scelso" documents would continue to be scheduled for release in five years.

[4] Six work full-time on informant evidence, four devote about half their time to informant evidence.

The "informant-identifying information" to be protected would include the customary (*i.e.*, informant-specific) portions of informant symbol numbers and file numbers, informant names, and -- at least potentially -- descriptions of, and information received from, the informant. How much, if any, of the latter type of information should be redacted would be the principal focus of staff-level discussions with the FBI. The staff's principal goal in this process, with regard to each informant, would be to release as much information that is relevant to understanding the assassination as possible. In discussions with the FBI, the staff would be prepared, if necessary, to concede redaction of informant-identifying information that is unrelated to the assassination in order to ensure that more pertinent information is released.[5]

The presumption will be that an informant's identity will be released if the informant provides "positive" information about an assassination-related issue. To overcome this presumption of release for informants with "positive" information, the FBI would need to make a particularized showing that the identifying information should not be released. To the extent that an informant's identity is protected, it will be postponed until 2017.

CIA Employee Name Postponements

Over the past year the CIA has addressed the employee name issue and has released some names that it had previously asked the Board to postpone. But during that time the list of names has grown to a size that had not been imagined at the time the work began. To date, the Review Board staff has identified in the JFK Collection over 650 names of CIA employees. These names appear in more than 1000 documents already reviewed by the Board and numerous additional records that have not yet been processed. While some of these employee names are important to the assassination story, many appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and seem to add little, if any, important information.

---

[5] In HSCA subjects, there typically will not be information about Ruby, Oswald or the assassination itself. However, in a file on, for example, Sam Giancana, there may be informant reports on Giancana's support of anti-Castro activities, and reports from the same informant on day-to-day numbers operations in the Chicago area. The staff would set a higher priority on release of the former reports than on the latter.

CIA's argument to protect employee names emphasizes a number of points. First, since many employees are "under cover," the maintenance of that cover is critical to gathering intelligence. CIA argues that identification of a name can identify the cover provider and jeopardize operations. Second, although the majority of names are of retired CIA employees, CIA has a confidentiality agreement with them and many do not want their past Agency affiliation released. The argument here is that release may jeopardize business relationships or personal safety. Such arguments have already been presented to the Board. Their merit can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, due to the volume of names in the JFK Collection, the individual review and evaluation of each case would delay significantly the review of documents and ultimately lead to less total information becoming available to the public.

CIA has proposed, and the Review Board agrees, that CIA employee names be treated in a manner similar to that applied to Source names: to postpone until 2017 those employee names that are of low public interest or are of peripheral interest to the assassination. It will be presumed that employee names will be released if their identities are important to the assassination story ***unless*** the CIA is able to provide specific information of a potential harm of release. (CIA acknowledges the presumption of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm to national security or to personal safety would result from the release of the employee name.)

FBI "Foreign Counterintelligence" Postponements

It is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal standards for disclosing "FCI" activities targeting Communist-bloc nations. To the extent that the HSCA subjects reflect "FCI" activities against other nations that have not been addressed by the Review Board in the "core" files, the FBI will be allowed to redact direct discussion of such activities, ***unless*** the information in the proposed redaction meaningfully contributes to the understanding of the assassination.

FBI and CIA Foreign Liaison Postponements

The criteria for these postponements would not, in the abstract, depart significantly from the Review Board's current approach of releasing information received through liaison channels, while protecting direct acknowledgment of the source of the information. In practice, however, the staff would be more flexible in protecting text that implies, although may not unambiguously state, that a foreign government is the source of particular information. Nevertheless, the more significant the information is to any assassination-related issue, the more information would be released under these guidelines.

CIA Stations and Other Issues

Over the past two years the Review Board has established other guidelines that will continue to guide the review process, some of which will be outlined here. For CIA stations, all locations related to the Mexico City story will be released during the period 1960-69. Outside of that window, they will be released on a case-by-case basis should the identity of the station be critical to understanding the assassination. Other stations, except for those identified as particularly sensitive, will be released from the beginning of the Kennedy administration until the publication of the Warren Commission report, (*i.e.*, January 1, 1961 to October 1, 1964). Outside of these windows, stations will be postponed. Cable prefixes, dispatch prefixes, and field report prefixes would be postponed or released according to the same windows as the stations to which they refer. CIA job titles also are redacted or opened along with the station at which the officer served.

Crypts would be released along lines similar to other information. All "LI" crypts, except those considered particularly sensitive would be released through October 1, 1964, as are "AM" crypts and U.S. government crypts. In other areas, only the digraph is protected. Again, the exception is sensitive crypts, which would be protected in their entirety. After October 1, 1964, the presumption shifts towards protection of the crypts, except those that provide meaningful information about the assassination story. (For example, crypts pertinent to Garrison-era documents would likely carry the same presumption of release as those generated during the Warren Commission.)

Surveillance methods will be released if the nature of the surveillance has a material bearing on information related to the assassination ***unless*** CIA provides evidence demonstrating the political or operational sensitivity, in which case the information will be released in 2017.

e:\arrb\regs\eview.wpd

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

MEMORANDUM

September 16, 1997

To: Review Board

From: T. Jeremy Gunn

Subject: Proposed ARRB Timetable for Review of CIA Records

I. Background

The CIA Team has developed a preliminary timetable that we hope will provide a reasonable framework for completing our review of CIA's assassination records by August 1, 1998.[1] We are creating this timetable for three purposes:

First, to establish our own working target dates to measure Review Board progress against the mandatory deadline established by the JFK Act.

Second, to provide CIA with our best assessment of the order and scope of our review so that it can make its own internal judgments on the proper allocation of its resources. We provided CIA prior drafts of this memo and solicited its specific advice and suggestions for better ways to accomplish our goals. [We have not asked CIA to "agree" to these deadlines, but we have encouraged it to provide alternative suggestions on how best to meet the August 1 deadline.]

Third, to solicit the Review Board's advice regarding "enforcement" of these (or other) targets. Although we surely hope that both the ARRB staff and CIA will be able to meet the targets, and although we certainly plan to make all reasonable accommodations for problems that no doubt will arise, we nevertheless anticipate that it is possible that CIA might not be able to keep to these timetables. Thus, we anticipate that there may well be times when blocks of records scheduled for Board review will not have been fully processed by CIA. It is our judgment that, in keeping with our commitment to Congress and to the goals of the JFK Act, we may need to have the Board act on groups of records for which CIA has not completed its initial review. At the risk of over-repetition, the ARRB staff seeks to be as reasonable and accommodating as it can on timetables, ***provided that any proposed changes are consistent with our obligation to complete the task.*** We realize that this review may have resource-allocation consequences for CIA and we expect to refine this timetable both to minimize the resource impact and to allow us and the CIA to proceed most efficiently with the review. We also take very seriously our commitment to Congress to complete our work on schedule. Is the Board prepared to make decisions on records if CIA has not completed its review and to enforce those decisions?

---

[1] By establishing this target date, we will provide ourselves with a two-month cushion to handle possible appeals and miscellaneous issues that doubtless will arise.

II. Issues applying to all CIA record groups

Records to be opened-in-full

During the course of CIA's review, it frequently identifies records that is it is prepared to open in full without Board action. Although there is a benefit in promptly forwarding such records to NARA, it is less expensive for CIA to process these records during the summer months. Accordingly, we are prepared to agree with CIA that it may delay processing such records, provided that all such processing of open-in-full records will be completed by August 30, 1998.

Duplicates

CIA will continue to identify duplicates and may process them after all other documents have been reviewed and transferred to NARA. If the ARRB is shown that any given record is a duplicate, CIA need not complete the processing before September 30, 1998.

III. CIA Record Groups

A. Oswald 201 File (17 boxes)

- current status:
  review completed (with a few minor exceptions)

B. CIA Sequestered Collection

1. "The 63 boxes"

- current status:

The ARRB staff has completed a survey of the 63 boxes (on the folder level) and has assigned each folder a relevance priority on a 1 to 4 scale. CIA has completed its declassification review of roughly 66% of the priority 1 folders.

The ARRB Staff has completed its own review of approximately 50% of the priority 1 records and those records have been (or shortly will) be voted on by the Board.

- target dates:
    Completion of final review of 63 boxes by January 31, 1998.

- time line:

9/30/97	box 40 (priority 1)
10/31/97	box 48 (priority 1)
11/30/97	box 56 (priority 1)
12/31/97	box 63 (priority 1)
1/31/98	all priority 2, 3 and 4

2. HSCA Staff notes (originally interfiled in the 63 boxes)
    - status:
        Record Identification Forms prepared for all documents. CIA review is 80% complete. ARRB staff completes its review shortly after receiving records from CIA.

    - target dates:
        Complete Board voting by November 18, 1997.

3. Microfilm (72 boxes)
    - current status:
        CIA identified approximately 33% of these records as NBR. ARRB staff has reviewed all CIA NBR designations, and has identified additional records that should be reviewed by the Board.

        The ARRB Staff will discuss with the CIA the preparation of Record Identification Forms (RIFs or "IDEN aids" in CIA terminology) and develop a plan that will best facilitate review.[2]

    - target dates:
        CIA begins review by November 1, 1997 and completes review by July 1, 1998.

        Complete Board determinations by July 31, 1998.

---

[2] The ARRB staff has no objection to the records being identified entirely on the folder level provided that all records in the folder are open-in-full. If there are records in which the CIA is requesting redactions, those records must be identified individually. The remainder of open-in-full records may still be identified with one RIF as being the contents of the same folder.

- tentative time line:

11/30/97	boxes 1-6
12/31/97	boxes 7-13
1/31/98	boxes 14-19
2/28/98	boxes 20-25
3/31/98	boxes 26-31 & 44-45 (Boxes 32-43 contain LHO's 201 file, which will be treated as a special case.)
4/30/98	boxes 46-51
5/31/98	boxes 52-62
6/30/98	boxes 63-72

4. Microfilm copy of Oswald 201 (approximately 12 boxes)

- issue:

The vast majority (if not all) Oswald Microfilm records are duplicates of records the Board has already reviewed under the JFK Act. To the extent that the records previously have been reviewed, there is little value in re-reviewing the records. The ARRB staff will survey the Microfilm 201 in an effort to identify any additional records that have not already been acted upon by the Board. All records not previously acted upon by the Board will be so designated, a RIF will be prepared, and they will be sent for Board action. The remaining Microfilm 201 will be transferred to the JFK Collection at NARA and opened in full in 2017.

- status:

Staff has completed its initial survey and has thus far identified no records in the 201 Microfilm that are not already in the JFK Collection.

C. "Working Files" (including "Russ Holmes" papers, etc.)

- status:

No Record Identification Forms have been prepared. ARRB staff has conducted a general survey.

- target dates:

Work to commence by CIA on October 1, 1997. CIA should prepare Record Identification Forms for all records by January 1, 1998. Completion of review and Board determinations by March 31, 1998.

-strategy:

The "working files" is a group of records that was assembled at CIA by Russ Holmes. Although he was not asked formally by CIA to create this separate records group, he did so in order to facilitate his work and, perhaps, to satisfy his own curiosity. The group contains many original records (copies of some of which are already in the collection) and it includes some records of which we are aware of no other copies. It is the best-organized collection of assassination records held by CIA. Its value as a reference tool is greatest as a collection. Therefore, though the file contains many duplicates of records found in the JFK collection, the ARRB staff recommends that it be preserved as a single group. Duplicates and open-in-full documents should be treated in the same manner as they are in the rest of the JFK Collection. As with the microfilm from the Sequestered Collection, the ARRB staff has no objection to the records being identified on the folder level provided that all records in the folder are open-in-full. If there are records in which CIA is requesting redactions, those records must be identified individually. The remainder of open in full records may still be identified with one RIF as being the contents of the same folder.

D. Additional Records

- status:

Research, requests, and negotiations continue to identify and include additional CIA records for the JFK collection.

Oswald Office of Security File. As a result of an ARRB staff request for additional information and records, CIA located portions of a previously undisclosed Office of Security file on Lee Harvey Oswald. This seven-volume file, of which six parts have been located, contains two volumes of press clippings, third agency material on Oswald, a copy of Oswald's address book, and Marina Oswald's INS file. In the upcoming months CIA will begin to review and process these materials.

- time line:

Completion by July 31, 1998.

- strategy:

Continue current efforts.

E. Referrals

1. HSCA referrals (Numbered files, Security Classified Testimony, etc.)
   - status:
     most of these records have been reviewed. The database suggests that a percentage of them has slipped through the cracks.
   - target date:
     Complete Congressional records to be reviewed by March 31, 1998.
   - strategy:
     Continue to clarify the status of records. Review any remaining records.
2. Other referrals (FBI, Church Committee, LBJ Library, JFK Library, etc.)
   - status and strategy:
     Records will be coordinated and reviewed on a case by case basis.

TJG e:\...\cia\timetabl.wpd
4.20.7

12 July 1996

Visit for 22 July 1996; 10:00 a.m.

Presidential JFK Assassination Records Review Board

	Date of Birth	SSN
David George Marwell Executive Director	12/31/51	080-38-7009
Michelle Marie Seguin	1/12/69	376-88-5236
Robert John Skwirot	7/28/56	209-50-4324
Manuel Espiritu Legaspi	8/04/68	568-53-8907
Mary Sperling McAuliffe	9/25/43	366-44-4357
Christopher Meade Barger	6/25/68	469-98-3261
Thomas Jeremy Gunn Legal Counsel	8/25/52	529-74-8907

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

15 May 1995

FOR: David Marwell
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: John Pereira
CIA/Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: Mexico City/Sensitive Information

The Directorate of Operations prepared the attached statement to assist the Assassination Records Review Board. The statement explains the sensitivity of the records related to telephone tap operations in Mexico City. This may help provide a perspective for further discussions on the subject.

John Pereira

John Pereira

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Release of Information on Mexico City Teltaps

1. Protection of sources and methods and liaison equities require that references to the Mexico City Station teltap activity be excised from any documents released under the auspices of the JFK Assassination Record Collection Act of 1992. While the teltap activity mentioned in the documents under review occurred some thirty plus years ago, the joint teltap operation with Mexican liaison has never been terminated; it continues to this day in a slightly different form.

2. Release of any information that would constitute official USG acknowledgment of the existence of the joint teltap operation would have a serious adverse impact on current operations. Relations between the Station and the liaison service would be affected, with the likely outcome of discouraging liaison from cooperating in similar ventures in the future with Mexico City Station. Official acknowledgment of the existence of the joint teltap in the 1960's would embarrass the liaison service given Mexico's strong brand of nationalism and sensitivity towards the issue of sovereignty vis a vis the United States. The service probably would terminate its cooperation with the Station on the current joint teltap operation in order to be able to defend itself against domestic critics.

~~SECRET~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

OFFICE PHONE LIST

Ahmed, Sarah	260
Combs, Michelle	262
Denk, Laura	265
DiFrisco, Jessica	258
Fagnant, Marie	230
Fletcher, Carrie	247
Goslee, Jim	259
Gunn, Jeremy	226/267
Haron, Ron	239
Horne, Doug	245
Legaspi, Manuel	261
Marr, Irene	243
Mays, Christina	255
Olson, Jerrie	254
Reddy, Sydney	246
Rhodes, Chet	240
Rockwell, Benjamin	242
Rodriguez, Cathy	238
Samoluk, Tom	227 V-mail
Shycoff, Tracy	233
Skwirot, Robert	268
Spells, Janice	221
Sullivan, Eileen	253
Tiernan, Kevin	264
Voth, Peter	256
Zimmerman, Joan	263
Kitchen	223
Board Room	236
SCIF	241
Guest Phone	225
Juelich, Rochelle (Intern)	224

ARRB staff

Barger, Christopher Meade	469-98-3261
Combs, Kathryn Michelle	229-13-8465
Golrick, Philip David	225-21-0020
Gunn, Thomas Jeremy	529-74-8907
Legaspi, Manuel Espiritu	568-53-8907
Marr, Irene Frances	013-54-5987
Marwell, David George	080-38-7009
Rosen, Brian Eliot	473-58-1973
Skwirot, Robert John	209-50-4324
Trzaska-Sails, Valerie Marie	589-40-1874

Assassination Records Review Board Staff
October 1, 1997


Gunn
Executive Director
Samoluk
Deputy Director
Shycoff
Associate Director
Administration
Haron
Associate
General Counsel
Administration
Rhodes,
Olson, Rodriguez,
Mays, Spells
Herd
Senior Attorney
(pending)
Presidential Libraries
NARA
Sullivan
Press and Public
Affairs Officer
Horne
Military Team Leader
Combs
Special Assistant
Research and Review
Skwirot
CIA Coordinator
Denk
FBI Team Leader
Tieman
Senior Analyst
Goslee
NSA
Legaspi
USSS
Zimmerman
Senior Analyst
DiFrisco, Legaspi,
Marr, Rockwell,
Voth
Ahmed, Fagnant,
Fletcher, Reddy
State
Marr
WC/HSCA
Zimmerman
Senior Analyst
Church, SSCI,
PFIAB, NSC,
Congressional,
Postal Service
Solid line equals reporting relationship.
Dotted line equals concurring relationship.

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

"All Government records concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy should carry a presumption of immediate disclosure."
The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
Public Law 102-526, October 26, 1992

Introduction to the Assassination Records Review Board

The Assassination Records Review Board is an independent federal agency created to oversee the identification and release of records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board was established by The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526), and was signed into law by President George Bush. The five members of the Board were appointed by President Clinton, confirmed by the United States Senate, and sworn in on April 11, 1994.

The law gives the Assassination Records Review Board the mandate and the authority to identify, secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy.

The Board has until September 30, 1998 to fulfill its mandate.

The Review Board Members

The Review Board consists of the following members:

1. The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair; United States District Court Judge, District of Minnesota.

2. Dr. Henry F. Graff; Professor Emeritus of History at Columbia University.

3. Dr. Kermit L. Hall; Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law at The Ohio State University.

4. Dr. William L. Joyce; Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections at Princeton University.

5. Dr. Anna K. Nelson; Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence at The American University.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

The Law

The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act was enacted by the Congress and signed into law by President George Bush on October 26, 1992. The law states "All Government records concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy should carry a presumption of immediate disclosure."

The law mandates that all assassination-related materials be housed in a single collection in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

The Act defines five categories of information for which disclosure may be postponed, including national security, intelligence gathering, and privacy -- provided there is "clear and convincing evidence" of some harm which outweighs public disclosure.

The law requires all federal agencies to make an initial assessment of whether they possess records relating to the assassination. The agencies themselves will conduct an initial review to determine whether their records may be disclosed immediately or whether disclosure should be postponed. The agencies must then give all records that are not disclosed to the Review Board. The Review Board will then evaluate all agency decisions to postpone the release of records. Once the Board completes its review of an agency's recommendation for postponement, all records, including those that have a postponed release date, will be transferred to NARA. The Act requires that all assassination records must be opened by 2017, with the exception of records certified for continued postponement by the President.

Authority of the Assassination Records Review Board

The Senate report of The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 stated that " the underlying principles guiding the legislation are independence, public confidence, efficiency and cost effectiveness." In order to achieve these objectives, the Act gave the Board the specific powers to:

* direct government offices to provide identification aids and organize assassination records;

* direct government offices to transmit assassination records to the National Archives;

* obtain assassination records that have been identified and organized by a Government office;

* direct government offices to investigate the facts, additional information, records, or testimony from individuals which the Board has reason to believe is required;

* request the Attorney General to subpoena private persons to compel testimony, records, and other relevant information;

* require any Government office to account in writing for the destruction of any records relating

to the assassination of President Kennedy;

- receive information from the public regarding the identification and public disclosure of assassination records; and

- hold hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena witnesses and documents.

Background and Need for the Law

On November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated while traveling in a motorcade in Dallas, Texas. His tragic death, and the subsequent murder of Lee Harvey Oswald, the President's alleged assassin, led to the creation of The Warren Commission, seven days after the assassination.

Amid continuing public doubts that all of the facts surrounding the assassination had not come to light, the House of Representatives established the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1976 to reopen the investigation.

In addition to these two major federal investigations devoted to the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, three other federal investigatory bodies have dealt with the assassination to some degree. President Ford created The Rockefeller Commission in 1975 to investigate Central Intelligence Agency activities within the United States. Part of the Commission's efforts related to the Kennedy assassination. Also in 1975, Congress created the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee) and the House Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee). Some of the work of these committees was related to the assassination.

Despite these official investigations and with private researchers continuing their efforts, the public was not satisfied that all of their questions about the assassination of President Kennedy had been answered. The result was the passage of The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, which included the creation of the Assassination Records Review Board.

Contacting the Assassination Records Review Board

The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 provides that the Review Board has the authority to "receive information from the public regarding the identification and public disclosure of assassination records."

If you have relevant information regarding records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, or would like to learn more about the Board, please contact us at:

The Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, N.W., Second Floor
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: (202) 724-0088; Fax: (202) 724-0457

AGENDA

Meeting with JFK ARRB Staff

Monday, 17 March 1997
2C06 IP Building
1:00 p.m.

1. Records Management Briefing

    Becky Rant, DA/IRO
    Carol Johnson, DA/IMO

2. Cable Process

    John Rovito, Agency Network Mgt. Center, OIT

3. Questions & Answers

John -

Thank you for agreeing to participate in briefing the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) to be held on **Monday, 17 March, at 2:00 p.m., in 2C06 IP Bldg.** I regret the short notice. As we discussed, the ARRB has asked for information relating to the creation, transmission, and dissemination of cables and your name instantly came to mind. Their specific questions are:

1- Can you describe the cable process in place in the Agency during the
1960-1964 time period?

Prior to 1962 messages were delivered to the DPD - handled U-2 & Bay of Pigs **(Development Products Division) at 1717 H Street or to the Communications Center at "L"** Building **~~Street~~. In addition there also was a Q building that received special traffic. After 1962 messages came into the CIA Headquarters and were processed in different areas depending on the types of traffic.**

Imagery traffic would be sent to to a specific floor for the imagery personnel. Intercept and Special Programs would either be passed to a Special Sections Area of the Communications Center or to the Cable Secretariat.

2- How did cables come in?

Messages came in from the field via the Brandy Station State Channels or military channels.

3- How were they decrypted?

Messages were deciphered using a OTT (One Time Tape) or a OTP (One Time Pad) process.

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4- What happened from the time a cable was sent from a field site until it arrived on a desk at Headquarters?

Messages sent from a field site decyphered or processed would be passed to a communicator, messages going out encrypted and transmitted via High Frequency Radio. The message received from Brandy and relayed to headquarters and then it was decrypted. The analyst of the Cable Secretariat would then read the message and match what they read against customer requirements. They then would have a typist type the dissemination on the message. The message then would be picked up from the message center by the various staffs and or divisions.

5- How were cables disseminated?
See item four.

Please let me or Becky Rant, DA/IRO, know if you have any other questions or concerns prior to the briefing.

CC: Becky L. Rant
Andrea E. Boyce
Sent on 13 March 1997 at 03:17:34 PM

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Briefing for the JFK Assassination Records Review Board Staff

on

Records Management in the DA

17 March 1997

Carol M. Johnson
DA Information Management Officer
2B17 IP Bldg.
703-613-1205 Secure 31205

Becky Rant
DA Information Review Officer
2B17 IP Bldg.
703-613-1204 Secure 31204

Directorate of Administration

TOPICS

- CIA Information Services Strategic Plan
- Information Management Program Segments
- Information Management Goals
- Organization of Records Management In the Agency
- DA Information Management Officer (IMO)
- DA Information Review Officer (IRO)
- Deputy Director for Support (DDS) - 1965
- Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) - 1997
- DA Records

Directorate of Administration

CIA Information Services Strategic Plan

- "Information and Records Management, including Classification Management, is a fundamental and essential business requirement for the Agency."
- "The CIA's Information Services shall...ensure that each official record is appropriate, accurate, secure and retrievable throughout its life cycle regardless of physical form or media."

legal obligation

Directorate of Administration

Information Management Program Segments

- Records Management - identification, storage
- Classification Management - Executive Orders
- Information Disclosure - search, retrieval, review for disclosure
- Information Automation - electronic format

Information Management Goals

An effective and efficient information management ensures that records are available:

- **to meet day-to-day business needs**
- **to ensure the continuity and consistency of records**
- **to provide corporate memory and history**
- **to protect the rights and interests of the organization, the employees and the public**
- **to meet legal requirements**

Associate Deputy Director for Administration

Information Services

Organization of Records Management in the Agency

This slide is Administrative Internal Use Only



D/Info Mgt *

OIT

Recruitment & Training*

Policy Research & Audit*

Archive & Preservation*

System Development*

Agency Information & Records Management Panel

* = member

DCI/IMO*

component/imos

DA/IMO*

component/imos

DI/IMO*

component/imos

DO/IMO*

component/imos

DS&T/IMO*

component/imos

DA Information Management Officer (DA/IMO)

- The DA/IMO is the Deputy Director for Administration's representative for issues relating to records and classification management.

- The DA/IMO is responsible for protecting equities consistent with existing statues, EO guidance and internal rules and regulations governing the creation, maintenance and use, and disposition of information.

DA Information Review Officer (DA/IRO)

- **The DA/IRO is the Deputy Director for Administration's representative for reviewing all DA relevant information for release to the public under FOIA, PA, EO, and other information release programs.**
- **The DA/IRO is responsible for protecting equities consistent with existing statutes, EO guidance and internal rules and regulations governing the review and release of classified information, specifically, in response to:**
  - **FOIA/PA/EO Requests**
  - **Congressional Inquiries**
  - **DOJ Inquiries/Litigations**
  - **IG Investigations**
  - **Special Searches & Other Release Programs**

Deputy Director for Support (DDS) - 1965

- Office of the DDS (ODDS)
- Office of Security (OS)
- Office of Personnel (OP)
- Office of Medical Services (OMS)
- Office of Logistics (OL)
- Office of Finance (OF)
- Office of Communications (OC)
- Office of Training (OTR)

Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) - 1997

- Office of the DDA (ODDA)
- Office of Personnel Security (OPS)
- Office of Facilities & Security Services (OFSS)
- Office of Finance & Logistics (OFL)
- Human Resources Management (HRM)
- Office of Medical Services (OMS)
- Office of Communications (OC)
- Office of Information Technology (OIT)
- Office of Training & Education (OTE)
- Center for Security Evaluation (CSE)

DA Records



- **Information Management Officers**
- **Core functions**
  - 1960s } basically the same
  - 1990s
- **Records Life Cycle** - general system used by records management
  - Creation
  - Maintenance & Use } most records done by personal identifier — a name medical files kept by code number
  - Disposition
- **File organization** office takes with them relevant records with a reorganization — Nothing is left out or behind

ie OGC records moved from DA to DCI's office

Directorate of Administration

DA Records

- Records Control Schedules Records Managers Bible
  - Temporary
  - Permanent

L all categories of files in Agency are documented
L new records series = new schedule
L old records still reflected in current schedule



soft files on + financial records for overseas stations kept 56 years.
L sources
L contacts
L staff
+ other non personnel/payroll finances are kept 20 yrs

- Records Storage - Archive + Records Center
  - Short term
  - Long term
- Accountability
  - Personal - each person is responsible for create + retain information
  - Organization
- Search & Retrieval

DA Records



- **Access**
- **Safeguarding**
- **Preservation**
  - Hardcopy
  - Electronic
- **OGC Retention List**
- **Automation**

Combs 1/7

DA Briefing 3/17/97

~~Info Mess~~

Info Management chart 11
DO more centralized file management
DA more decentralized w/ 10 components w/ special jobs
each office manages their own programs

DA/IMO works w/ all 10 offices in DA
records management, policy, guidance

DA/IRO 5 in agency each Directorate + DCI
- tasks 10 DA components
- component finds info, + IRO reviews for possible release

IMOs in components do the records search for both DA/IMO + DA/IRO.

Archive + Records Ctr
DA/OIT manages
47,440 cu ft of records for DA
131,000 cu ft of records total

most DA records are "temporary"
personnel 75 yrs
financial/payroll 56 yrs

archive began early 50's
WF55
pre 55 in Rosly

2/7

Warehouse w/ shelving
Program ongoing to deal w/ expired records / purges

Records Management / Storage
- system that tells us what boxes are expiring
- OGC retention list - not destroyed until OGC says so

accountability —

Search & Retrieval - goes to file level / not document level - file folder title query.
ARSENS(?) automated query for archive information
can search for docs into early 50's
Old ~~[illegible]~~ shelf lists ~~[illegible]~~ inputed in mid 70's

proper search (hand search) of file is
not considered "reasonable" for FOIA

offices have indexes & file card

✓ Records on destruction of records of the
file center are kept only a short
section of time. (kept longer than legal
requirement) (2-3 yrs?)

Office of Personnel Security enters records
destruction info in their index. Some do,
some don't.

SECRET
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

3/7

Cable Process – John Rovito -EOD 1963

1963 moved pito

Stations can send messages laterally w/o HQS knowledge

Special projects like U-2

[illegible]

Landline, CW, morse code, teletype
One time tape + one time pad.

L Street were wire operators, cable secretariat

comm ctr → cable secretariat → dissemination
typed by typist based on requirements listed in books for divisions/staffs/directorates/based on slugs in message.

Later cable secretariat would suspend info to other directorates

"Special traffic" elint/comint/RH project

In '63 shift to KW-26 mechanical crypto.

decrypted using a like process – 3 types

Question Mexico City 63 – is there more than 1 channel of comms?

SCI > 2 channels
Non SCI

different Router for each area, L St, Q St, etc then you can send messages independently.

SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4/7

State + CI A over same links - charges are routers + encryption
SCI + Non SCI = different Networks

Privacy traffic is slugged for individual
Slug tells who it is destined for - tells
Cable Secretariat

P + L prescribed - limited - CI had that

Cable # put on as they are logged in
+ can tell if #s from Station are sequential
as well (if ~~not~~, cables are missing)
need to retransmit

DA/IMS will do) Are log schedules kept?

Chrono records kept?
any cable records kept?

Now cable maintenance is responsibility of the
office responsible for the information
not the COMMO CTR.

In 59-64 Cable Secretariat was under DCI
but records we kept for only a relatively
short period of time (microfilm?)
maybe up to 76.

Computer system put in 1977

prior to 77 - VR's vital records were microfilmed
all messages ~~were~~ - VR's every stuffable
no RH's, P&L, Privacy → microfilmed

SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

5/7

post 64 - Comm picks up "special traffic"

Q Building - did it handle RH?
P&L? prescribed & limited

officers running a project determine the channels used.

* were special & regular traffic given sequential #'s or where they numbered on parallel tracks?

SCI - compartmented   All in effect from 1952 on
special designee
Military
State
NSA
Intel channel

SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

6/7

DA Questions

B&F

1. Financial Accounting vouchered, certified, + audited
Finance + Accounting Date, location, time period
indexing or kept by office in U.S.

2. HRM has microfilm of staffing complements
for that time period

3. C/Financial Services – doesn't think it was
maintained that way, if it was, it was
maintained in a 201, 301 or project file.
OF records were not organized by project
but by accounting practices

4. Station accounting on indigenous personnel
kept 56 yrs. Non natives kept only 20 yrs.

Personnel

1 Contract personnel
independent Contractor – office of Finance + Logistics
post 1996

OP kept them before '96
Filed by name, separate ~~separate~~ security file, medical file,
payroll file

SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

7/7

Security

1. get Wed from Barry

3 SRS - collected, developed, evaluated
incl. CI nature

5 Security clearance like activities for non-employees
but "clearances" per se are not given
across the board staff like clearances.
They do national agency checks on contactors

6.

SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

13-00000

Types of Questions for DA Records Briefing
March 17, 1997

Budget and Finance

1. In Cold Warrior, (p. 52) Mangold refers to a CI secret slush fund which was tightly controlled by Angleton and never audited by the usual procedures. According to Mangold, it was this fund which allowed Angleton to run his own operations without supervision. Did the fund exist? Was this fund ever audited? Are there any records of CI operational expenses for the period 1959-63?

2. Mangold also refers (p. 53) to an unnamed CI/B&F officer who says he worked for Angleton from 1958-1964 and never dealt with him directly on a single matter. Is there a list of B&F officers assigned to the CI Staff from 1959-63. Do their records still exist?

3. We have seen Directorate of Operations monthly operational reports which contain information on the allocation/distribution of operational funds. Are there other DO or DA records which reflect how a certain project utilized its funding? Can this type of information from the early 1960's still be retrieved?

4. What records are kept on disbursements to sources in the field? If, hypothetically, LHO had received money from the Agency, what records would exist?

Personnel

1. What records are maintained on contract personnel? → OP payroll file
→ OS
→ OMS

Security

1. For the period between 1955-65, what was the universe of files that OS had on individuals ~~or~~ groups? ✓

2. How are Office of Security records indexed? card to keypunch

(SAG)

3. What was the function of the Office of Security/Security Research Staff (OS/SRS)? Why were defector records kept in this component? designated point — "CI function"

4. In the OS/SRS memo of Oct. 31, 1960, written by Marguerite D. Stevens, the file numbers of several defectors are listed: "Robert Edward Webster, EE-18854; Lee Harvey Oswald, MS-1116~~5~~4; Libero Ricciardelli, MS-8295; Vladimir Sloboda, MS-10565; and Joseph Dutkanicz, MS-10724." What do the "MS" and "EE" file prefixes designate? How are these designations assigned?

5. Does OS process security clearances for non-employees (e.g. sources) to receive access to classified information? What kinds of files are created by this process? How long are these files maintained. For example, Clay Shaw was given a security clearance and had access to classified information based on his "responsibilities" as a source for the Domestic Contacts Division (DCD).

6. Where are records that would describe liaison (etc.) cooperation or operations between OS and CI located? How are these records organized?

7. Where are records regarding operations that OS participated in or ran located. For example, where are the OS records on the Castro assassination attempts?

8. How many files did OS have on Oswald? Which OS components maintained files on Oswald? Why did OS have any files on Oswald?

CLASSIFIED FAX TRANSMISSION

ARRB

202-724-0088

To:	Barry Harrelson	**Date:**	March 31, 1997
Fax #:	703-613-3060	**Pages:**	17, including this cover sheet.
From:	Michelle Combs		
Subject:	DS&T and DO Briefing Questions		

COMMENTS:

Barry,

Attached are the final versions of the DS&T and DO briefing questions. There are no changes in the DS&T questions. Questions have been added to the DO list to reflect our conversation March 19 and 20. You, of course, already have our detailed explanations for the earlier DO questions. If you have any questions or if there are any problems, please give me a call. I should be in all day. See you tomorrow.

Michelle

Questions for Follow-up DO Records Briefing
April 1, 1997

1. At what point did the DDP begin to keep records of destroyed records? For example, in a Cold Warrior footnote, Tom Mangold reports that as any of Angleton's files were destroyed, "a complete record was carefully maintained about what had been done. (George) Kalaris signed off on every file and the DCI's office was notified." (p. 143) Where are these records?

2. Could an archival search be run on specific topics for retired records at the CIA's Record's Center? Perhaps an ARRB staffer could be present during the search to review the abstracts and to suggest other fields or topics to be searched?

3. Could a crypt search for records containing relevant crypts be run through cryptographic reference? How would queries need to be framed and stated?

4. Why is it so difficult to develop a list for all personnel (official, contract, administrative, or TDY) assigned to the post referenced in RIF 104-10065-10199 from 1959-1964?

5. We have been working to identify all technical and surveillance operations in and on the Cuban and Soviet consulates and embassies in Mexico City between September 1 and December 1, 1963. How can we frame a search query to determine if we have a comprehensive and complete list of all operations at that time?

6. How can a search query be framed to document all electronic take produced by the Mexico City Station in the immediate wake of the assassination (the first month) and during the period of Oswald's visit? How can we verify that what exists in the Sequestered Collection represents all records of the technical production that was available at the time of the assassination? If additional records or original production still exists, where would it be stored or filed? What searches could be conducted to retrieve any additional records? If such electronic take has been destroyed, do records exist of the destruction?

7. Could you describe the process by which operational funds are proposed, approved, received, and distributed (circa 1963). What funding and disbursement records exist? How are they organized? How should a request be formulated to institute a reasonable search of these records?

8. We have seen DDP monthly operational reports which contain information on the allocation/distribution of operational funds. Are there other DDP records which would reflect how certain projects utilized their funding? How are these records organized? How should a search query be framed?

9. Various open sources have linked the CIA to various journalists and publishing companies during the 1960's. How should a query be framed to search for connections between the Agency and journalists or publishing companies?

10. Did the Agency have any relationship, projects, or contacts with publishing houses during the time of the assassination and in the aftermath of the Warren Commission? How would a search be formulated to determine whether or not the Agency had a relationship with any of the same publishing houses that were also publishing books about the assassination?

11. How would a query be framed to search for files on any office or person dealing with organized crime and Cuba? How should a request be formulated to institute a reasonable search on this topic?

12. Is there a comprehensive record or list detailing the identities of individuals on the Interagency Source Register? How are these records organized? How can a search query be framed to ascertain whether or not a particular individual appears in the Register?

13. How could a search query be framed to ascertain whether or not a particular individual was given access to classified information by DCD (then OO)? What kind of files are assembled in the process of clearing non-Agency contacts/sources for access to classified information?

14. ARRB's Request for Additional Information and Record No. CIA-13, dated November 1, 1996, contained the following questions:

A. What forms of backchannel communications were there between the Mexico City Station (including the COS), JMWAVE, or Headquarters during 1963? By "backchannel" we mean, *inter alia*, any administrative, senior staff, or restricted access communications, or any written or electronic communications other than regular cables or dispatches (of the type included in the JFK Collection).

B. Were there, in fact, any backchannel communications between the Mexico City Station (including the COS), JMWAVE, or Headquarters during the time periods 27 Sept - 16 Oct 1963 and 22 Nov - 30 Nov 1963?

C. To the extent that there were any backchannel communications for the time periods 27 Sept - 16 Oct 1963 and 22 Nov - 30 Nov 1963 (other than those currently contained in the JFK Collection), please make such records available for review.

Why has it been so difficult to answer these questions?

15. ARRB's Request for Additional Information and Record No. CIA-14, dated December 23, 1996, documented our request for the annual or biannual Station reports for Mexico City Station for 1963 and 1964. Why has it been so difficult to provide these reports?

16. The attached Agency document released in 1996 contains the paragraph:

> 11. A memorandum marked only for file, 16 March 1967, signed M.D. Stevens, says that J. Monroe SULLIVAN, #280207, was granted a covert security approval on 10 December 1962 so that he could be used in Project QKENCHANT. (Clay) Shaw has # 402897-A.

What do these numbers mean? What does the "A" at the ends of Shaw's number signify? Do the files identified by these numbers still exist? Why was Sullivan granted a covert security approval?

17. During the period 1959-1963, what was the purpose or goal of QKENCHANT?

18. Under what circumstances were non-agency employees given covert security clearances for the QKENCHANT project?

19. Did Clay Shaw receive a covert security approval for the QKENCHANT project? Why was one needed? Did Clay Shaw receive covert security clearances for any project other than QKENCHANT

20. What did Clay Shaw do within the QKENCHANT project?

21. Do records exist to account for the disposition of all files on Clay Shaw?

22. Did Howard Hunt have any involvement with the QKENCHANT project prior to 1964?

23. Did J. Monroe Sullivan have any involvement with the QKENCHANT project prior to 1964?

24. The DO telephone directories list an Operational Services/Defector Staff beginning in October 1959? What was the Defector Staff? Did it have an operational component?

25. In the period 1959-1964, were DO officers, selected to serve overseas under State Department cover, legally considered to be "members of the Foreign Service, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate?"

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA SV DATE 2/4/97

a relatively clean, easy-to-read specimen of what we already have.

~~SECRET~~

Note: only redaction is "QK" (what CIA calls a Digraph) from QKENCHANT on page 4 here paragraph #11.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
Release As Sanitized
1998

Enclosure 21

I've included a poor copy of page 4 that contains the "QK".

SUBJECT: Clay L. SHAW (201-813493)

1. Subject was born on 17 March 1913 in New Orleans, Louisiana.

2. Standard background information on Subject (parents, marital status, records of education and employment, etc.) is lacking because SHAW was a contact of the Domestic Contact Service.

3. Traces on Subject have been run in RID/Main Index, the index of the Office of Security and the Central Cover Staff. The first showed only a 1951 FBI interview with SHAW about a former employee of the New Orleans International Trade Mart. The second showed that OO/Contacts Division had requested a name trace about 1949 and that the check of FBI records then conducted was negative. Central Cover Staff had no record.

4. Some of the OO-B reports based on SHAW's reporting are on hand. They are the following. (It is noted that the source description identifies the source by job title.)

a. OO-B 47958, 26 March 1952, concerns a letter written to the public relations director of the International Trade Mart by one Dr. Jutta SCHALLER, a trade consultant to the Bonn Government. The letter is a follow-up of discussions held in New Orleans during December 1951. The letter said that Soviet production and export trade were being advertised and

CARDED

Document Number 1930-492-Y

for FOIA Review on DEC 1977

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA SK DATE 2/4/97

~~SECRET~~

promoted by West German money. The publication Wer Liefert Was?, published in Leipzig, is now also being published in Hamburg, at a price much lower than competitive volumes.

b. 00-B-9381, 27 December 1948. Information acquired 18 December 1948. SHAW (identified by job title) has agreed to lease to the CSR government 1,000 feet of space for a display of merchandise in New Orleans. The lease is for one year, starting 1 April 1949.

c. 00-B-4933-49, 14 June 1949, information date late April and early May 1949. Results of a trip SHAW made in March through May 1949 in West Indies, Central America, and Northern South America.

d. 00-B-4934-49, 14 June 1949, same general subject and background as above.

e. 00-B-4935-49, 14 June 1949, as above.

f. 00-B-35477, 29 June 1951. Results of a SHAW trip in 1951 in Central and South America and the Caribbean area.

5. On 9 May 1961 General C. P. Cabell, then DDCI, addressed the Foreign Policy Association of New Orleans. It is believed that he was introduced by Clay SHAW.

6. On 3 March 1967 the Washington Star reported that Garrison had arrested SHAW and had made public charges that SHAW, FERRIE, OSWALD, and others had plotted the assassination in the apartment of FERRIE at 3300 Louisiana Parkway, New Orleans. SHAW has said that he never saw OSWALD. He denies having used the name Clay BERTRAND. Jack S. MARTIN said that FERRIE had mentioned

~~SECRET~~

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA SL DATE 2/4/97

SHAW to him. J. Monroe SULLIVAN, executive director of the San Francisco World Trade Center, told the Associated Press that SHAW was in San Francisco and touring the Center with him on the day of the assassination. SHAW, now retired, was formerly the managing director of the International Trade Mart in New Orleans. He is 54 years old. Ramsey Clark, U.S. Attorney General, said that the FBI had investigated SHAW late in 1963. "On the evidence that the FBI has, there was no connection found" with the assassination.

7. Memorandum No. 84-67, 3 March 1967, from Chief, New Orleans Office, to Director, Domestic Contact Service, re SHAW.

a. The first contact of the New Orleans office of the DCS with Clay SHAW occurred in December 1948. A name check request was returned "no info" on 23 March 1949. SHAW was contacted by Mr. Hunter Leake of the New Orleans office seven times in 1949, twice in 1950, five times in 1951, nine times in 1952, once in 1953, twice in 1954, twice in 1955, and twice in 1956. SHAW is the source of eight 00-B reports submitted by the New Orleans office. At one time he had the "Y" number 145.1. The last contact took place on 25 May 1956. On 23 January 1967 Jack S. MARTIN phoned the New Orleans office, said that he was working on an important undercover deal for Garrison and Detective Louis IVON, and was calling at IVON's request. He was calling to ask the head of the CIA office to telephone IVON on his unlisted number. No such call was made. The writer, Lloyd A. Ray, asks that the General Counsel be informed and that he provide advice.

8. Undated and unsigned memorandum (probably produced by CI/R & A). The following additional information was provided by the New Orleans office of DCS.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Since 25 May 1956 Mr. [redacted] had seen SHAW casually, by chance, in various downtown New Orleans restaurants, and greetings were exchanged. The last such casual encounter was just before SHAW's retirement in 1965.

9. On 7 March 1967 Pravda published an article called "Clay Shaw of the CIA" datelined Rome, 6 March 1967, written by V. YERMAKOV. The article charged that CIA made use of the services of Clay SHAW for CIA's own interests in Italy. The Pravda piece notes that the DA in New Orleans is accusing SHAW of participation in the assassination conspiracy. It says SHAW spent "some years" in Rome as a World Trade Center leader. It claims that the Center was a cover for financing anti-Communist activity. CIA gave directives to SHAW. The World Trade Center was a branch of "Permidex" (sic), "which the newspapers in Switzerland openly accused of 'criminal operations'...." (Comment: It appears that all of the Pravda charges are untrue, except that there was a CIA-SHAW relationship. So far as is known, SHAW was never asked to use his relationship with the World Trade Center for clandestine purposes and, in fact, he has not been in Italy.)

10. Memorandum from [redacted] 2 March 1967 subject: Italian Aspects of the Clay Shaw Affair. The Corriere della Sera of 5 March 1967 has an article about SHAW, the assassination, and the World Trade Center. Contains no relevant information.

11. A memorandum marked only for file, 16 March 1967, signed [redacted] Stevens, says that J. Monroe SULLIVAN, #280207, was granted a covert security approval on 10 December 1962 so that he could be used in Project QKENCHANT. SHAW has 0402097-[redacted]

12. Memorandum from [redacted] 24 March 1967, Subject: "Trace Results on Persons Connected with Centro Mondiale Commerciale" (World Trade Center), filed [redacted] folder, Clay SHAW - working papers.

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA SU DATE 2/4/97

Same page, better copy. QK redacted

SECRET

Since 25 May 1956 Mr. Hunter Leake had seen SHAW casually, by chance, in various downtown New Orleans restaurants, and greetings were exchanged. The last such casual encounter was just before SHAW's retirement in 1965.

9. On 7 March 1967 Pravda published an article called "Clay Shaw of the CIA" datelined Rome, 6 March 1967, written by V. YERMAKOV. The article charged that CIA made use of the services of Clay SHAW for CIA's own interests in Italy. The Pravda piece notes that the DA in New Orleans is accusing SHAW of participation in the assassination conspiracy. It says SHAW spent "some years" in Rome as a World Trade Center leader. It claims that the Center was a cover for financing anti-Communist activity. CIA gave directives to SHAW. The World Trade Center was a branch of "Permidex" (sic), "which the newspapers in Switzerland openly accused of 'criminal operations'...." (Comment: It appears that all of the Pravda charges are untrue, except that there was a CIA-SHAW relationship. So far as is known, SHAW was never asked to use his relationship with the World Trade Center for clandestine purposes and, in fact, he has not been in Italy.)

10. Memorandum from C/EUR/I to C/CI/R & A, 8 March 1967 subject: Italian Aspects of the Clay Shaw Affair. The Corriere della Sera of 5 March 1967 has an article about SHAW, the assassination, and the World Trade Center. Contains no relevant information.

11. A memorandum marked only for file, 16 March 1967, signed M.D. Stevens, says that J. Monroe SULLIVAN, #280207, was granted a covert security approval on 10 December 1962 so that he could be used in Project [JENCHANT. SHAW has #402897-A.

12. Memorandum from C/EUR/I to C/CI/R & A, 24 March 1967, Subject: "Trace Results on Persons Connected with Centro Mondiale Commerciale" (World Trade Center), filed CI/R & A folder, Clay SHAW - working papers.

SECRET

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA SU DATE 2/4/97

SECRET

a. The 5 March 1967 issue of Il Messaggero links SHAW with the World Trade Center. Others linked to the center were traced, with results reported in this memorandum. No relationship to the Garrison investigation appears here. A report on "Permidex", a Swiss corporation with principal offices in Rome, is also in the file because the World Trade Center and Permidex are associated. Again, there is no information here which relates significantly to the case Garrison is trying to build in New Orleans.

13. The Washington Post, Outlook, 2 April 1967, "Seeking Truth in New Orleans In the Middle of the Night", George Lardner, Jr.

a. Garrison's men drove RUSSO to SHAW's French Quarter home. RUSSO posed as a Mutual of Omaha salesman. He knocked at door; SHAW answered. RUSSO said that he was Clem BERTRAND.

b. SHAW is a 54-year old bachelor and socialite who pioneered the 33-story International Trade Mart in New Orleans. He was subpoenaed by Garrison's office on 1 March 1967. According to his friends, his questioners did not advise him of his rights. They told him they had evidence of a meeting with FERRIE and OSWALD. There was a fuss and SHAW was arrested and booked on conspiracy to murder JFK. That night Garrison's men raided SHAW's apartment and confiscated whips, chains, a black net cap, a cape and hood. RUSSO told reporters that he did not know Clay SHAW, but he identified the man arrested by Garrison as Clem BERTRAND.

SECRET

Testimony of Abram Chayes
Legal Advisor, Dept. of State
Warren Commission, Vol 5 pp 342-343

Mr. Chayes. No; I think in each case it will depend so much on the situation with the particular person. If a person comes in and he is very agitated or something of that kind, it might dictate a totally different approach than a different kind of thing.

Mr. Dulles. Wouldn't it be useful though to give—I don't want to suggest what the Secretary of State should do in this, but in the light of this experience, would there not be some benefit possibly in giving people in the field the result of the experience gained in this particular case?

Mr. Chayes. Well, the general approach, and other matters related to it, are touched on in orientation courses for consular officers and so on. I think as I look on Consul Snyder's actions, that he behaved very much like a responsible Foreign Service officer.

That happened long before I was in the Department, so I can say that without any involvement. But it seemed to me that he did just what he should have done, despite the unfortunate aftermath. And it shows to me, at least, that the training and orientation that these people are getting is right, is serviceable, and they are able to handle these situations as they come in.

Mr. Dulles. I realize that you ought not to prescribe hard and fast rules, that there is a broad range of discretion that should be exercised here. But I just raise the question as to whether a good deal of experience hasn't been gained in this case in that very field.

Mr. Chayes. Well, it may very well be that more attention to that particular aspect should be given in the orientation courses and so on. Those things tend to reflect what is hot at the moment you know, and if you haven't had trouble with something for a pretty long time, it tends maybe not to get mentioned.

Representative Ford. If Oswald had persisted that day, October 31, in demanding the form that is a prerequisite under your definition for renunciation, would Snyder have been required to give it to him and permit him to sign it?

Mr. Chayes. I think if it had been in ordinary office hours when the consulate was open for business, and if Snyder was satisfied that he was competent, that Oswald was competent, he would have to give him the form, yes, sir.

Representative Ford. Does Snyder have the authority to make a determination of competency?

Mr. Chayes. No; he doesn't have the authority to make a determination of competence, and I suppose it is possible at some point to get the issue tried in court. But I think a consular officer would probably be acting within his discretion if he saw sombody who was drunk or raving or something and just said, "Well, I am not going to give you this until I am sure that your action is your act." After all, when the consul accepts the oath, he is certifying that it is the act of the person in a meaningful sense, and so if he thought that the person was incompetent, I think he would have discretion not to give the oath. But I put that far aside because in the particular case here, Mr. Snyder made it perfectly clear that he had no reason to doubt that Oswald was fully competent.

And so if Oswald had been there at a time when the office was open, or had returned at a time when the office was open, and had persisted in his demand, I think Snyder would have been under an obligation to give him the form.

Representative Ford. The only technical reason or basis upon which Snyder could have denied Oswald the right that day was the fact that it was on a Saturday, a non-working-hour period of the Embassy.

Mr. Chayes. Yes; I think he had every right to try to dissuade him, or persuade him not to act or persuade him to think it over and come back the next day. But if after all of that Oswald still had said "But I want to do it now" and if the office was open for business, then I think he would have had to do it.

Mr. Dulles. I think it might be useful if it has not been done to introduce at this point as an exhibit the form of oath of renunciation. Here is the formalized oath and I think it would be well to have this in our records unless it is already in our records.

Representative Ford. I agree.

Mr. Coleman. No; it isn't. Could we say it will be marked as Commission Exhibit No. 955 and place this sticker on that page, photostat it and then just send it back?

(Commission Exhibit No. 955 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Representative Ford. When Oswald came back on November 3, I believe, which was a regular working day——

Mr. Coleman. Mr. Commissioner, he did not come back on November 3. He merely wrote a letter.

Mr. Chayes. Wrote a letter. He never came back.

Representative Ford. Are all of the employees, Mr. Snyder, Mr. McVickar, and the others who had any firsthand contact with the Oswald case in this area, were they State Department employees?

Mr. Chayes. Yes, sir; these two men who were the only ones who did see him directly, I think the secretary, their secretary also saw him, but had nothing to do with him except as a receptionist. These two men were Foreign Service officers and are now Foreign Service officers.

Representative Ford. In the strictest term.

Mr. Chayes. Yes, sir; members of the Foreign Service, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Representative Ford. Could you tell us in a bit more detail the process that you followed or the procedure that you carried out when you first got into the Oswald case.

You mentioned yesterday you got a call or you were directed by I believe the Secretary of State or by somebody in higher authority to take certain steps. Will you tell us who called you, what you did in the first 3 or 4 days?

Mr. Chayes. It was the evening of the day, perhaps about 5 o'clock on the day of the assassination. It may have been somewhat earlier, because I think I remember I went home for an hour and then came back to carry out this assignment. Mr. Ball, once it became known that Oswald had some history as a defector—— GEORGE W. Ball

Mr. Dulles. Ball is the Under Secretary of State. D.C.

Mr. Chayes. He was then the Acting Secretary because the Secretary of State as you recall was on a plane over the Pacific. So he was the Acting Secretary. But even if he had been the Under Secretary he is my client.

Representative Ford. He still had some authority.

Mr. Chayes. Yes; he directed me to gather together the files in the Department on Oswald, and to prepare a report to be available for him the first thing in the morning covering as best we could within that time span the contacts that Oswald had with the Department.

We got the passport file. We got the security office file. We got the special consular services file which covered Mrs. Oswald's visa and the repatriation loan. I think those three files were the ones that we had. It may have been there was a smaller fourth file, but I think those three were the ones.

Representative Ford. What would that smaller fourth file be?

Mr. Chayes. I can't remember. It was duplicates if it was anything. Oh, that is right, we had a visa file and an SCS file so those were the four. The SCS file, that is Special Consular Services in the office, in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

Representative Ford. You got this order on or about 5 o'clock the 22d of November?

Mr. Chayes. The 22d; yes, sir.

Representative Ford. And you issued orders to have these files brought in, or did you go and get them yourself?

Mr. Chayes. No.

Representative Ford. Or what happened? State Dept. emplou

Mr. Chayes. I issued orders to have them brought in. I called—I am trying to think how we got them. [Turning to Mr. Ehrlich.] Did you go down and get them? Mr. Ehrlich and Mr. Lowenfeld, another of my people, we worked through the night on this, the three of us all together and it may be that the two of them went down to get them. I don't think we just called over the telephone and asked them to be brought up.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Chayes. It is my recollection that one of these two gentlemen, either

p 14
D.
vol 5
343

MAR 31 '97 12:10PM

3/14/97

Barry

My reaction is that several questions are much too broad e.g., 5, 6, 9, 10, 12. Need to be specific.

For No. 2, we should not agree to having an ARRB staffer present.

For No. 7, they should explain the purpose of the question.

FAX TRANSMISSION

ARRB

202-724-0088
FAX:

To:	Barry Harrelson	**Date:**	March 14, 1997
Fax #:	703-613-3060	**Pages:**	3, including this cover sheet.
From:	Michelle Combs		
Subject:	DO Briefing Questions		

COMMENTS:

We may add additional questions but this should give you an idea of the topics. Have a good weekend.

John/
What is your reaction
to these questions? Has
Gunn crossed the line?

Return

Barry

DRAFT

Types of Questions for Follow-up DO Records Briefing
March 17, 1997

1. At what point did the DDP begin to keep records of destroyed records? For example, in a Cold Warrior footnote, Tom Mangold reports that as any of Angleton's files were destroyed, "a complete record was carefully maintained about what had been done. (George) Kalaris signed off on every file and the DCI's office was notified." (p. 143) Where are these records?

2. Could an archival search be run on specific topics for retired records at the CIA's Record's Center? Perhaps an ARRB staffer could be present during the search to review the abstracts and to suggest other fields or topics to be searched?

3. Could a crypt search for records containing relevant crypts be run through cryptographic reference? How would queries need to be framed and stated?

4. Why is it so difficult to develop a list for all personnel (official, contract, administrative, or TDY) assigned to the post referenced in RIF 104-10065-10199?

5. We have been working to identify all technical and surveillance operations in and on the Cuban and Soviet consulates and embassies in Mexico City between September 1 and December 1, 1963. How can we frame a search query to determine if we have a comprehensive and complete list of all operations at that time?

6. How can a search query be framed to document all electronic take produced by the Mexico City Station in the immediate wake of the assassination (the fist month) and during the period of Oswald's visit? How can we verify that what exists in the Sequestered Collection represents all records of the technical production that was available at the time of the assassination? If additional records or original production still exists, where would it be stored or filed? What searches could be conducted to retrieve any additional records? If such electronic take has been destroyed, do records exist of the destruction?

7. Could you describe the process by which operational funds are proposed, approved, received, and distributed (circa 1963). What funding and disbursement records exist? How are they organized? How should a request be formulated to institute a reasonable search of these records?

DRAFT

DRAFT

8. We have seen DDP monthly operational reports which contain information on the allocation/distribution of operational funds. Are there other DDP records which would reflect how certain projects utilized their funding? How are these records organized? How should a search query be framed?

9. Various open sources have linked the CIA to various journalists and publishing companies during the 1960's. How should a query be framed to search for connections between the Agency and journalists or publishing companies?

10. Did the Agency have any relationship, projects, or contacts with publishing houses during the time of the assassination and in the aftermath of the Warren Commission? How would a search be formulated to determine whether or not the Agency had a relationship with any of the same publishing houses that were also publishing books about the assassination?

11. How would a query be framed to search for files on any office or person dealing with organized crime and Cuba? How should a request be formulated to institute a reasonable search on this topic?

12. Is there a comprehensive record or list detailing the identities of individuals on the Interagency Source Register? How are these records organized? How can a search query be framed to ascertain whether or not a particular individual appears in the Register.

13. How could a search query be framed to ascertain whether or not a particular individual was given access to classified information by DCD (then OO)? What kind of files are assembled in the process of clearing non-Agency contacts/sources for access to classified information?

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

March 18, 1997

TO: John Pereira and Barry Harrelson

FROM: Jeremy Gunn

SUBJECT: ARRB Questions Submitted for DO Briefing

I would like to address some of the concerns that you expressed at our meeting yesterday, where we briefly discussed the Review Board's Proposed Questions for the March 17 briefing regarding DO records. We understand that you have some concerns about the scope of the topics raised. We very much appreciate your recognition of the importance that we attach to the ARRB's independence and we again wish to emphasize the fact that we fully understand your proper concern for the protection of information that is unrelated to the Kennedy assassination.

I would like to emphasize that the questions that we sent to you were not intended as in depth research queries, but rather as topical talking points for discussion. We prepared the questions, at your request, in order to give the persons conducting the briefing an understanding of the types of issues in which we were interested. They represent issues that we wish to explore in our quest for additional information and records to facilitate the completion of the ARRB's responsibilities under the JFK Act.

We appreciate your acknowledgment that the ARRB is not necessarily obligated to justify to CIA the questions it deems relevant to the assassination. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate and coordinate our efforts, we are very willing to offer the following additional explication of those questions that we understand may have been considered by the Agency to be excessively broad.

SECRET

Question # 5:

We have been working to identify all technical and surveillance operations in and on the Cuban and Soviet consulates and embassies in Mexico City between September 1 and December 1, 1963. How can we frame a search query to determine if we have a comprehensive and complete list of all operations at that time?

Until very recently, we had seen no evidence that CIA had microphone surveillance of the Cuban compound. However, Dispatch HMMW 12454 (no IDEN number attached) found in Box 23, Folder 9 of the Sequestered Collection, makes reference to LICOOLs (concealed microphones inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City). Though the dispatch reports that the last LICOOL ceased functioning in 1961--before the period in question--the prior existence of this capability and the fact that the dispatch discusses the possibility of reactivation prompts the question of whether all technical and surveillance operations against the Cuban and Soviet Consulates have been identified to the ARRB. In addition, the dispatch refers to MKTRAP, a telephone hot mike operation which was re-actuated from a basehouse in November 1963. The specific hot mike telephone PBIMPULSE appears to have been in operation during 1963. Are there records from this operation? Are there any other operations that may have picked up Oswald's visit?

Question # 6:

How can a search query be framed to document all electronic take produced by the Mexico City Station in the immediate wake of the assassination (the first month) and during the period of Oswald's visit? How can we verify that what exists in the Sequestered Collection represents all records of technical production that were available at the time of the assassination? If additional records or original production still exists, where would it be stored or filed? What searches could be conducted to retrieve any additional records? If such electronic take has been destroyed, do records exist of the destruction?

This question is a follow up to question # 5. If MKTRAP was in operation from September 1-December 1, 1963, where are the records or transcripts describing the take? Was the take ever retained or reviewed? Do any original tapes or transcripts still exist? Where might these records be found? Were any other technical operations in progress? The various project files for the technical operations known to exist during this period are spotty and incomplete. How can the ARRB know if it has reviewed records of all the technical operation take for the relevant time period?

Question # 9:

Various open sources have linked the CIA to various journalists and publishing companies during the 1960's. How could a query be framed to search for connections between the Agency and journalists or publishing companies?

The two 1967 Ramparts articles mention connections between the Agency and journalists worldwide. The primary focus of this question is on any connection between the Agency and any journalist who might have covered the assassination domestically. Additionally, we would be interested in any publishing company involved in publishing books about the assassination. HSCA staff notes (RIF 180-10142-10087) summarize several files dealing with contacts between the Agency, publishing houses, and authors. For example, the file identified as QKOPERA/Liaison ZRBLESS outlines a memo by Gunnar W. Beckman CA/PROP on the status of negotiations between Praeger Publishing and Milovan Djilas. ZRBLESS is identified as a subproject of WUBONBON. Further, the staff notes mention a project involving "Praeger and publication" [sic], a separate project involving "the Freedom Fund and distribution" [sic], and a third project to provide news service to the foreign press through Continental Press. Each of these projects appears to have been in operation in 1963-64.

Question # 10:

Did the Agency have any relationship, projects or contacts with publishing houses during the time of the assassination and in the aftermath of the Warren Commission? How would a search be formulated to determine whether or not the Agency had a relationship with any of the same publishing houses that were also publishing books about the assassination?

This question is a follow up to question # 9. One record that is already in the collection (RIF 180-10142-10087) summarizes the Project File of WUPUNDIT and notes two 'one time only' operations in 1963--WURAISIN and WUTRANSIT which were responsible for publishing two books each. In addition, WUSENDER is reported to be a 'one time only' operation responsible for three books in 1964. If these books have domestic implications or are on subjects related to the assassination, they would be relevant documents.

We hope that this additional explication may help you and the DO understand our approach to the issues raised in our questions. Should any of our requests impose on you or your staff a burden that we may not have anticipated -- or which would entail work of dubious value or benefit -- please advise us so that we can work with you to modify or amend the requests accordingly.

SECRET

Please also remember that, when we request accesses to these materials, we are not designating them "assassination records" and we are not, at this time, requesting that copies of documents be given to the Review Board.

We appreciate your continuing cooperation and helpfulness.

Sincerely yours,

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel and Associate Director
for Research and Analysis

SECRET

13-00000

MAR 18 '97 06:54PM

Sequestered Collection Box 23, Folder 9

P.6

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
KAPOK
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
COS, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN LIFEAT/LIERODE, Confusion in Use of Cryptonyms

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The Station's use of certain cryptonyms identifying technical operations against PBRUMEN TPELIDE in Mexico has caused confusion in Headquarters elements responsible for sourcing and dissemination of information produced, and for supporting the entire complex of operations itself. The cryptonyms in question are (a) LIFEAT (b) LIERODE (c) MKTRAP (d) LICOOL/11 and (e) PBIMPULSE. The original meaning of these cryptonyms is being forwarded under separate cover.

2. The purpose of this dispatch is to submit for Station comment a review of the technical operational effort against PBRUMEN TPELIDE since its inception. The objectives are (1) to complete Headquarters records which lack considerable detail concerning the intricacies of the operation, (2) to urge a more precise use of cryptonyms in reporting this activity which would benefit Headquarters personnel responsible for monitoring and supporting those operations and (3) to suggest a few administrative adjustments which would dispel the present confusion mentioned in this dispatch.

3. The initial effort against the target was PBIMPULSE. It was introduced into the target using LIFEAT assets and was actuated from the LIFEAT VI basehouse. This is mentioned only to complete the record and does not pertain to the intent of this discussion. Properly speaking the initial effort begins with the activation of LIFEAT/LIERODE in February 1959, as indicated in HMMA 12358. Subsequently eight (8) LICOOL attempts were made during 1960-1961 against the same target. The LICOOLs were monitored from a mobile LP (not LIFIRE), Basehouse ABLE and Basehouse BAKER, and the latter came to be referred to as the LIERODE base. The most productive operation of this sort seems to have been LICOOL/11, activated on 9 May 1959, according to MEXI 3884, dated 15 May 1959. According to our records the last LICOOL ceased functioning during late 1961. Please confirm.

Attachment - u/s/c

Distribution
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City w/att

CS COPY

50-6-32/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW 12454

DATE
1 April 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/6

1 - RI
1 - Chrono
1 - TSD/ASB
1 - TSD/Photo

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	L Sanchez	rg	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/FI	21 Mar 64	
TSD/ASB	6 April 64	
TSD/Photo	3 April 64	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	18	J. C. King

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION KAPOK SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW 12454

4. At that time a different technique was planned. The following briefly outlines the development of the operations which the Station habitually refers to as "MKTRAP":

5 February 1962: Request for operation received at MKCHARITY by Harvey C. MULFORD.

8 Feb.-Mar.1962: Design and construction of MKTRAP.

9 March 1962 : MKTRAP delivered to LIFEAT CO for placement in target area.

10 March 1962 : MKTRAP installed by LIFEAT assets and initial LP tests performed from LIFEAT VI basehouse with negative results.

14 March 1962 : LP tests conducted with revised series line connections with positive results.

6-13 April 1962: Design and construction of LP equipment.

16 April 1962 : Installaction of LP equipment in LIFEAT VI basehouse.

MKTRAP, although moved from room to room, remained in place within the target area, though inactive most of the time. During November 1963 MKTRAP was re-actuated from a second LIFEAT basehouse known as Basehouse CHARLIE.

5. The photo surveillance of PBRUMEN TPELIDE was put into effect, using basehouse BAKER (LIERODE Base) at the same time that MKTRAP was actuated. This photo coverage, the basehouse, PBRUMEN TPELIDE and the activity for which the cryptonym was first authorized have all been identified as LIERODE which has created considerable confusion here at Headquarters.

6. According to scanty Headquarter's records the following operations have utilized these bases against the target:

a.	PBIMPULSE	LIFEAT VI
b.	LICOOLS	Basehouses ABLE and BAKER
c.	LIFEAT/LIERODE	LIFEAT VI
d.	"MKTRAP"	LIFEAT VI, Basehouse BAKER, Basehouse CHARLIE
e.	PHOTO	Basehouse BAKER

Headquarters has the impression that the principal factors that contributed to the suspension of MKTRAP activity from LIFEAT VI, were the physical deterioration of the house itself and the divorce of the basehouse keepers. The current LIFEAT Project Outline indicates that LIFEUD 14 and LIFEUD 17 were obtaining a divorce and were terminated as of 30 September 1962. Headquarters assumes they were the occupants of LIFEAT VI, yet the project outline does not show that the base was closed. LIFEAT VI was listed on page 20 of the outline as an active unit. On the other hand, page 15 of the outline states that LIFEUD 22 and LIFEUD 23 are occupying the "LIERODE photo basehouse", but that they have never been involved in LIFEAT work. This indicates that LIFEAT/LIERODE and the photo work against the PBRUMEN target are now being conducted from two different basehouses. The project outline also indicates that while it had been planned to have this base serve

FORM 5-63 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION KAPOK SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION KAPOK SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW 12454

"LIFEAT/MKTRAP", technical difficulties made this impossible, therefore these two agents were not being included under LIFEAT Project. When MKTRAP was re-actuated in November 1963 and as stated above, the Station utilized another LIFEAT basehouse, also called basehouse CHARLIE, situated approximately six miles from target. Please confirm the accuracy of the foregoing and supplement it by informing Headquarters the basehouses and keepers involved and the operations they are currently monitoring.

7. Headquarters requests Station's comments on the following suggestions:

a. Photographic coverage. That a separate project be prepared to include LIFEUD 22 and 23. The project should cover their salaries, basehouse rent, and equipment expenses, an arrangement similar to LITABBY and LIDOGTROT. This activity, identified with a new cryptonym would eliminate further confusion when discussing photographic coverage of PBRUMEN TPELIDE.

b. LICOOL. Headquarters is not aware of any LICOOLs presently operative. If any are contemplated, CSI-52-6, 27 February 1958, requires special Headquarters approval prior to any action taken. If successful, a decision can be made at that time whether a new project is necessary or whether it can adequately be covered under LIFEAT, depending on the assets being utilized in the operation.

c. LIERODE. The original intent of this cryptonym is discussed in the separate cover attachment and the activity has been assigned file number 50-6-32/6. If the operation utilizes LIFEAT assets, it is suggested that it remain under LIFEAT Project and be identified as LIFEAT/LIERODE in all correspondence. Please inform Headquarters of the assets presently used for LIFEAT/LIERODE coverage.

d. MKTRAP. KURIOT would prefer the Station not use this cryptonym in reporting this particular type of coverage. It is suggested that a new cryptonym, in the LI series, be utilized to reference this activity. The present cryptonym refers to a technique which hasprogressed from the developmental into the operational stage and should more appropriately be identified with a regular Station cryptonym. If this operation is being worked by LIFEAT assets, then it might be identified with a dual cryptonym LIFEAT/LI. A separate file number, within the LIFEAT series, can be assigned to cover "MKTRAP" if the Station requests it, but it does not seem necessary since other LIFEAT targets do not have separate file numbers either.

e. Consolidated Project. If the Station prefers, all technical operations - LIERODE, MKTRAP, LICOOL, PHOTO - directed against PBRUMEN TPELIDE can be funded and administered under one project.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

50-6-32/

CS COPY

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a · USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

ATTACHMENT TO
HMMW 12454

CRYPTONYM A -	Used to identify Station's unilateral telephone taps.
CRYPTONYM B -	Assigned on 21 February 1959, to identify the Station's unilateral telephone tap of the PBRUMEN TPELIDE in Mexico City. (See MEXI 3382, February 21, 1959)
CRYPTONYM C -	Identifies the technical nomenclature of a hot mike telephone A/S installation. Details of the system are contained in HMMA 20307.
CRYPTONYM D -	Concealed microphones.
CRYPTONYM E -	Hot mike telephone.

50-6-32/6

[illegible] - 12454

CS COPY

v09-16-96ccr

JFK RECORDS

Cross Reference: None

Status in System:

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10142-10087
RECORD SERIES : CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 23-06-03
Other Agency Equity: None

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : CIA
TO :
TITLE : THE WARREN COMMISSION AND MEXICO
DATE : 00/00/78
PAGES : 62
DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
SUBJECT(S) : MEXICO; WC; CIA, FILES;
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN PART
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/07/95
COMMENTS : Box 12

Date in: 01/26/96

T T F F F F F F
F F F F F F F F

The Warren Commission and Mexico.

I Info from cable chrono, Oswald's Mexi file and WX-7241.

A December 21, 1963.

1. DIR 90466 (420-757)

orig: [Whitten]

RO "by auth of Helms: "Our present plan is to eliminate mention of [telephone taps], in order protect your continuing ops." They plan on relying instead on Duran and Sov. file given to the State Department. Asks that [penetration agents] be questioned for possible collaboration of Duran's story. (NO. R.S.)

IN-PASSING INFO TO WARREN COMMISSION

B January 30, 1964

1. DIR 97829 (498-204) – NOTE: The communication chrono was only examined up to 1 Jan. Therefore I have not determined the Originator, AO or RO of DIRS after this date)

This cable reports that Helms appeared before the Warren Commission on 28 January re what the Commission expected from the CIA: "On Saturday 1 Feb we will give Commission a report on Lee Oswald's activities in Mexico, presented so as to protect your sources and techniques. Pls review your reporting to us on this subject and cable in anything additional you may have in time for us to include in report." (RS indicates Scott, White, Phillips, [[redacted]] ~~and~~ Goodpasture + ["Dottie"])

2. MEXI 8008
response to DIR 97829
Orig + RO: Scott
reports that station has reported all info available & also notes that all the info, including that from the Soviet Embassy [taps] was reported to

3

the FBI's Mexi rep't
Ambassador Mann. Scott
points out that this
information may have
been included in Mexican
FBI reports ~~(RS indicates~~ and
that the CIA would have
been cited as the source.
(RS indicates Scott, [White,]
Phillips, [Mannell], ~~Anne~~
Goodpasture.) (503-210)

C. April 7, 1964

1. State Department Cable
# 1775 (Control 133) -
informs Embassy that
[Coleman], Slawson +
Willens plan travel
to Mexi on 8 April.
purpose:
a determine nature + extent
of effort of U.S. investigating
agencies abroad
b. investigative effort of
Mexican authorities
c. Consult US + Mexi author-
ities re: further investi-
gation if any is determined
necessary.

4/3/78
HARDWAY

Summary of ["QKOPERA/LIAISON" ZRBLESS"] file 6/1/61 – 8/28/64

1. The Company concerned is [Praeger Publishing]

2. A memo by [Gunnar W. Beckman] "CA/PROP" dated 8/21/61 deals w the publication and royalty problems of [Milovan Djilas's] books. ?

3. A blind memo dated 2/11/64 deals w the status of negotiations with ["Draper"] author of ["Castro's Cuba"] ~~The Agency wants~~ He is unwilling to update the book but is open to the possibility of doing another volume. He has introduced the author of the memo to two other Cubans who were writing books: Justo Carrillo Hernandez and Ernesto Betancourt. ?

4. [Susan Watkins says ZRBLESS] was subproject of [WUBONBON.]

4/3/78
HARDWAY

Summary of ["W.U. Sandy.]
Development and Plans"
file.

1. "Subject + Project File Request and Field Notification of Action" dated 6/26/63 describes the project as "a Developmental and Target Opportunity project based in the U.S. Sub-projects are to be targeted abroad...."

2. Project Action form dated 8/28/63 signed by Karamessines approves a $65,000 budget for [WUTARY] for the fiscal year 1963 (July) to 1964 (June).

4. Memo dated 3/17/64 to DDP from Tracy Barnes requests that [[redacted]s] budget be increased to $80,000.
"The requested increase is needed to (a) cover an unanticipated developmental charge in connection with an individual doing SPECIAL work involving a Latin American

business advisory group;
(b) covers the production
costs of propaganda material
targeted at foreign visitors
to [the World's Fair."]

HUNT SUMMARY

Hardway
4/7/78

files reviewed:

1. [ECPOEM-WURABBIT] Correspondence folder 7, Box 2,

2. [WURABBIT] Termination Folder 1, Box 1

3. MPS Project file [WUPUNDIT]

ops. included in '64

[Praeger
Freedom Fund, Inc (conduit)
Seaman's Service Institute
A Praeger Spanish Affiliate
Continental Press, Inc.]

There were 2 "one time only" operations in 1963 - [WURAISIN] and [WUTRANSIT] - which were responsible for publishing two books each.

There was one "one time only" operation in 1964 - [WUSENDER] which was responsible for publishing three books. There is a proposal for [WUSENDER] but it was evidently not approved.

SECRET

Operational structure. There was one operation that was primarily a development project. There was a project involving [Praeger] and publication. There was a project involving the [Freedom Fund] and distribution. There was a project to provide news service to foreign press through [Continental Press]. Prior to 1963 the development project funds were used for books procurement. In FY63-64 book procurement was made a seperate project. Funds for this project were channeled to [Praeger] through the [Freedom Fund.]

4. MPS Project File [WUBONBON]

5 " " " [WUHUSTLER]
PART I of 3.

6. [WUBONBON] Accountings Folder 24

7 [WUBONBON] Operations FY 64
folder 25

Contains two memos for the Records by Hunt re 8/8/63 meetings

8. [WUPUNDIT] Support folder 27

9 [WUPUNDIT (WUBONBON)] folder 26

10 [WUBONBON] Development + Plans F 19

11 [WUBONBON] Policy Papers F 20

12 [WUPUNDIT] CIA Book Publishing
F-28+29.

13 [WUBONBON] FY 65 Support
F.21

14 [WUPUNDIT / WUBONBON] SUPPORT
F 23+22

104-10333-10008

59 p.p.

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
Gloria M. Boyd @ DA
Barbara A. Standley @ DA
FROM: John F. Pereira
DATE: 12/07/94 05:00:07 PM
SUBJECT: Meeting with JFK Board Staff

I've confirmed with David Marwell that we will meet with him and several of his staff in Ames at 10:00, tuesday, 20 December.

For D/CSI: Marwell asked us to provide background on our JFK review process to him and the four or five members of his staff who will be on board. Among them will be Sheryl Walter, their General Counsel. I've invited Bob Eatinger, OGC to participate.

CC: Brian S. Latell @ DA

4/94

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(draft)

BRIEFING OUTLINE (For JFK Board)

1. Background on CIA's approach to review of JFK records
    - Organization of the effort
    - The review process
2. Description of records under review
    - Condition of records
    - Sequestered documents
    - Oswald 201 file
    - Microfilm (printouts)
    - Other records
        - HSCA
        - SSCI
        - HPSCI
        - FBI, other third agency
        - Warren Commission, Rockefeller Commission
        - Presidential libraries -Ford, Kennedy, Johnson
3. Status report on processing of documents
    - Records released to NARA (in full, sanitized)
    - Records remaining to be completed
    - Records withheld (examples)
    - Types of information sanitized
4. Issues/Problems
    - Degree of sanitization
    - Relevancy

- Privacy
- Duplicates
- Office of Personnel files
  Office of Security files
- Identification aids (examples)
  Indexing
- Jim Lesar litigation
- Inadvertent release of agent's identity

5. Review of records by the Board

   - Summaries (examples- financial records)

4-00000

CIA JFK Collections

1) Oswald 201 file: 17 boxes (Aug 93/Jan 94 Release)

1) JFK hard copy, 63 boxes (Aug 93/Feb 94 Release)

2) JFK microfilm, 72 reels (currently under review)

The Microfilm Reels contain the files that the HSCA staff either requested or had access to. A great deal of the material is duplicative of that found in the 63 hard copy boxes including the complete Oswald 201 file. There are also files not related to the assassination story and files not reviewed by the HSCA.

HGR has reviewed all the microfilm material (page by page) with the exception of the Oswald 201 file. The Microfilm collection has been divided into to two parts:

1) documents reviewed for release and being prepare for NARA (records related to the assassination, the investigations, or the various conspiracy theories),

2) documents reviewed but being held pending discussion with the board (see attachment).

Microfilm Material Not Processed for Release (Pending Discussion with the Board):.

Oswald 201 File - this appears to be a duplicate of the hard copy 201 file reviewed in 1993. 12+ Reels/approximately 30,600 pages

CIA Staff Employees' Personnel Files - Approximately 10,800 pages located on 7 different reels. Request that these file not be considered part of the JFK collection as a matter of privacy. Only a small portions of these files have any relevance to the JFK investigations and we believe that the documents related to their roles in the JFK story were released in the JFK hard copy collection. We have reviewed each of the OP files and prepared a classified summary for the Board.

Non-Related Material - Most of these documents fall into three major categories:

Individual 201 files : These files cover the entire period of agency interest or contact with a person. For individuals who are not "key figures" in the JFK story, those sections of the file that are outside relevant time frames or can not be linked to Oswald, the assassination, the various investigations, or any of the conspiracy theories have been treated as non-related.

Project/Operational Files: Many of these cover the complete life of a project. Sections of these file deals with operations which have no connection with the assassination or fall in only part of a relevant time frame. For example there are over 3000 pages on the Mexico City Photo operation covering the 1960's and 1970's. The only related material is that falling in the time frame of Oswald's visit to Mexico City and the investigation following the assassination.

Cuban Exile Groups/Operations: The anti-Castro activities of the Cuban exiles in the US during 1960 - 1963 are considered relevant to the assassination. However, some of the organizations and individuals members continued to run operations against Castro into the 1970's. The exile activities after the assassination are generally not considered related unless they involve plots to assassinate Castro, the continuation of pre-assassination projects or the Garrison Investigation.

Notes:

I did not address the financial records of the CRC that we are replacing with a summary (need to review again); we will probably have to wait until we meet with the full board to get their thinking on summaries.

There are other categories/types of documents that are non-related but do not fit in the above categories. For example, the HSCA requested files on 29 on defectors; they chose only 11 for their defector sample to be compared with Oswald. We treated the 11 as related and the rest as non-related. However, the number of pages involved is small compared to the above three categories.

14-00000

→ Barry

J

753

facsimile
TRANSMITTAL

to: John Pereira
fax #: 703-243-8343
re: Upcoming Visit
date: December 19, 1994
pages: 1, including cover sheet.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

The following ARRB Staff will be coming:

David G. Marwell
Gene Burpoe (Starting 27 December)
Jeremy Gunn (Interim TS)
Sheryl Walter (Interim TS)
Tom Samoluk (Clearance Pending)

From the desk of...

David G. Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • Room 208
Washington, DC 20004

(202) 724-0088
Fax. (202) 724-0457

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

20 Dec 94

BRIEFING OUTLINE (For JFK Board Staff)

INTRODUCTIONS

AGENDA: Discuss review process for JFK records
Status of document review
Discuss indexing (Gloria)
Walk-through/see documents

1. Overview of CIA's approach to review of JFK records

    a. Process of review began in April 1992

    b. How the original "core' file was organized
        - Sequestered file
        - Oswald 201

    c. How CIA identified additional records

        - Oswald 201 file

        - Search request in 1993

2. Organization of the effort

    - Staffing

    - Steps in the review process:

        -- Reviewers
        -- Senior reviewers provided guidance
        -- Coordinated with directorates
        -- Coordinated with third agencies

    - Guidance (JFK Law, specific)

3. Description of records under review

    - Condition of records
        -- poor quality
        -- not organized
        -- lots of duplicates
        -- large number of press items

    - Sequestered documents (64 boxes, 127,000 pages)

    - Oswald 201 file (17 boxes, 35,000 pages)

        - Gates released a pre-assassination file on Oswald to Congress in 1992

- Microfilm (1 of 64 boxes, 72 reels, 164,000 pages) (printouts)

- Other records

    - DCI Morning meeting minutes (400 pages)

    - HSCA - 14,000 pp referrals [1,000 to do]

    - SSCI - complete

    - HPSCI/- "

    - FBI, other third agency ~~- 10,000 pp~~

    - Warren Commission, Rockefeller Commission

    - Presidential libraries -Ford, Kennedy, Johnson

        - Ford Library documents reviewed ✓

4. Status report on processing of documents

    - Records released to NARA (in full, sanitized) (attachment)

    - Records remaining to be completed

      5,000 HSCA, Working files, Presidential libraries

    - Records withheld (examples)

    - Types of information sanitized

        -- identity of agents
        -- sensitive sources and methods
        -- relations with foreign government
        -- unwarranted invasion of privacy

    - Summaries (examples--financial records)

5. Issues/Problems (examples of postponed information)

    - Degree of sanitization

    - Relevancy e.g., chrono cables from Mexico City (Chinese ops items)

    - Privacy

    - Duplicates (Oswald 201 in microfilm)

- Office of Personnel files
  Office of Security files
- Hand- written notes prepared by HSCA staffers
  - -- 5x8 cards, note pads, sensitive operational information, some of it innaccurate
- Identification aids (examples)
  Indexing
- Jim Lesar litigation--receives copies of docs, i.a.
- Inadvertent release of agent's identity
  (attachment)

6. Discuss arrangements for review of records by the Staff

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Assassination Review Board

Second Public Meeting, 12 July 1994
Room 105, NARA

Official Attendees: Members of the Board, Steve Tilly, NARA.

Public: 25/30 in attendance including four from FBI (Terry & Grant), Lesar, and Newman. Also one network (ABC?) rep.

Purpose: Transact official business, briefing form Tilly on recent releases; discuss future board activities

Selected items of HRG Interest:

I spoke with Jack after the meeting. Ex. Director MARWELL will be on board 8 Augusts; they expect to be in new offices by 15 August and have a core staff in September. Jack said (after meeting) he would like to meet us last part of August/early September.

Tilly said that the CIA would be releaseing 70,000 pages later this summer (he ask me before the meeting if July was still a good date -- I said "no"). He also mentioned the 20,000 pages of HSCA material in our files that we would be reviewing this summer.

FBI received praise from the board; not much discussion of CIA. DOD agencies are now the "bad boys". Hall ask several pointed questions about the "small" DOD releases then Newman blasted NSA and DIA during the question period.

Items/Issues addressed by the Board during the meeting:

Announced appointment of Executive Director David G. MARWELL (see bio sheet). Will be on board 8 August.

Passed resolution extending the Board to October 1995

MOA signed with the White House - funds through Sept. 1994

Discussed status of items before Congress (extending the Board to October 1996 and funding). Funds included in House version of appropriation bill/deleted from Senate. They assume that the funds will be restored in Conference; however, could be reduced which would impact on number of public meeting to held outside of Washington.

Expects to move into new office space by mid-August and have a core staff in place in September. The bulk of the staff would come on board in October.

Plans to begin public hearing on defining an assassination record in Sept. Anna Nelson commented on the importance of identifying what is a record before beginning to address specific issues/documents.

William Joyce reported that he had sent letters to 55 agencies asking about the quaintly of records still held by the agency and had received 20 responses several which had identified additional sources for documents (no specifics)

Steve Tilley gave a briefing on status of releases. Releases since last meeting include tapes of telephone calls from the Johnson Library, the FBI files, Church Committee (7 boxes), and DOJ's FOIA litigation files. This month an additional 10 boxes of Church Committee and some Pike Committee Files (only a small part deals with JFK). Expects a release from the CIA of approximately 70,000 pages later this summer (mentioned the 73 Reels).

Tilley also described the 20,000 pages of HSCA material in CIA files and that NARA would be acting as House agent on these record.

Questions (to Tilly) by the Board:

Size of the NARA collection? - 1200 Cubic Feet (2500 pages per foot)

(Jack) what was the number of documents with redactions? -- Steve said he could not give a figure, would guess less than 50%

(Graff) any problems with agencies' willingness to release documents -- None, considers the work be the various agencies as a remarkable effort to turn over records. The problem was the volume of material and the time it takes to review.

A question about Senate and House Committee reviews procedures led to a discussion where it was clear that neither the Board nor Tilly had a good fix on that part of the review. The point was made that CIA information in those documents (and in our HSCA material) would be reviewed by CIA reviewers; the originator of the information was the key reviewer).

(Jack) how were the agencies doing in defining "assassination records? -- Tilly described some of his discussions about assassination records within NARA and with other agencies. He mentioned that the "major agencies" had records that they felt fell outside the scope which they planned to discuss with the board.

(Hall) how was the cooperation of the DOD intelligence agencies including NSA / how much had they withheld ? -- Tilly said he found them cooperative but that the release was small. Did not know off hand how much was withheld. Hall considered so few record as "suspect" and ask if NARA had followed up. Tilly said no. NARA did not have the authority to question the agencies about their searches. He indicated that the Army among others had not responded to NARA's initial request. (During the public comments part of the meeting Newman and Lesar returned to the question of DOD compliance.)

Several members of the Board had questions about the Presidential Libraries; Tilly described his role and the process.

When Jack open the meeting for public comments, Newman returned to the question about DOD releases. He clamied that NSA had release only one true document and that most of the DIA files was administrative or news clipping. He said he had seen at least 30 DOD documents in CIA and FBI files that did not appear in the DIA release.

Newman then ask if the agencies could withhold documents from the Board; Jack responded that under the law thar only Board had the power to withold a document.

Lesar ask if the Board had given consideration to his letter concerning the definition of an assassination record. Jack thanked him for the letters but the Board would not be able to address the issues Lesar raised until they had a staff to do the research.

A third "expert" named Mark Zaid ask a question about Post Office files that had been released before and how they compared with recent Post Office files found by NARA. Anna responded that such questions require a staff.

Sep 23 '94 15:58 P.02

Barry

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
600 E Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004

MEMORANDUM

via facsimile: 1 *pages*

TO: **JOHN PEREIRA**

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

DATE: September 23, 1994

FR: **JOHN R. TUNHEIM**
Chair

PHONE: (612) 296-2351

RE: **PEREIRA LETTERS**

Please disregard the letter faxed to you on the issues the Review Board would like to review on Wednesday, as that was a preliminary draft of the issues. On Monday you will be faxed a letter which will be in final form of the issues the Reivew Board would like to discuss. I apologize for any confusion this may have caused. Thank you.

ADDRESS FOR REVIEW BOARD CHAIR
102 State Capitol • St. Paul, Minnesota 55155-1002
612 296-2351 • TDD 612-297-7206 • Fax 612-297-4193

14-00000

Sep 23 '94 15:38 P.01

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
600 E STREET N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20004
202-724-0088 • Fax 202-724-0457

September 23, 1994
via facsimile: 703/243-8343

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

John Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group
Room 404 Ames Building
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Pereira:

This is to confirm our discussion in which we agreed to meet on Wednesday, September 28, 1994 at 10:00 a.m. in your offices to discuss the agency's review of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. I expect all of the Board members, Kermit Hall, Henry Graff, Anna Nelson, and William Joyce to join me, as well as the Board's Executive Director, David Marwell. As I indicated, Mr. Marwell now has a "temporary top secret" security classification. I expect to fax to you on Monday a list of the questions that the Board would like to review with you and your staff, questions along the lines we discussed on Wednesday.

We look forward to meeting with you and beginning our understanding of the issues and the process that the CIA is following with respect to the records that fall within the Review Board's jurisdiction. Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

John R. Tunheim

John R. Tunheim
Chair

cc: Board Members
David Marwell

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

600 E STREET N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20004
202-724-0088 • Fax 202-724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

September 26, 1994
via facsimile: 703/243-8343

John Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group
Room 404 Ames Building
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Pereira:

In our briefing meeting on Wednesday, the Review Board would like to address the following issues, along with whatever issues you may wish to raise.

1. Overview of the JFK Assassination Record review process followed by the CIA, including:
    a. Formation of the original core file that was organized in response to previous congressional investigations;
    b. The process by which the CIA identified additional assassination records in order to fulfill the mandate of the current legislation.
2. Overview of the process by which the CIA has identified assassination records, including relevant discussion of the filing system;
3. Discussion of the files which include assassination records, including:
    a. Briefing on the filing system(s), content of CIA archives, effect of reorganization of CIA since 1960s on filing systems, etc.
4. The CIA's view as to how the term "assassination records" should be defined;

ADDRESS FOR REVIEW BOARD CHAIR
102 State Capitol • St. Paul, MN 55155
612-296-2351 • TDD 612-297-7206 • Fax 612-297-4193

5. Discussion of postponement issues from the CIA's view, including reviewing examples of postponed information and categories of postponed information;

6. Discussion about relevant files at the Ford Library;

7. Review issue of operational files as it relates to assassination records.

We look forward to seeing you on Wednesday. Please contact me or Dave Marwell if there is any matter that we should discuss prior to Wednesday. We are planning a 4-5 hour meeting. Thanks very much.

Sincerely,

John R. Tunheim
Chair

cc: Board Members
David Marwell

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Barry

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

28 Sep 94

BRIEFING OUTLINE (For JFK Board)

INTRODUCTION: Discuss review process for JFK records
Walk-through look at documents
Possible demonstration of indexing (Gloria)

1. Overview of CIA's approach to review of JFK records

   a. How the original "core' file was organized

   b. How CIA identified additional records

      - Oswald 201 file

      - Search request in 1993

2. Overview of CIA filing system(which include JFK records)

   _ Issue of operational files

3a Organization of the effort

   - Staff (from attached data sheet)

   - Steps in the review process:

     -- Reviewers
     -- Senior reviewers provided guidance
     -- Coordinated with directorates
     -- Coordinated with third agencies

3b Description of records under review

   - Condition of records
     -- poor quality
     -- not organized
     -- lots of duplicates
     -- large number of press items

   - Sequestered documents (64 boxes, 127,000 pages + microfilm

   - Oswald 201 file (17 boxes, 35,000 pages)

     - Gates released a pre-assassination file
       on Oswald to Congress in 1992

   - Microfilm (1 of 64 boxes, 72 reels, 164,000 pages)

(printouts)

- Other records
    - DCI Morning meeting minutes (400 pages)
    - HSCA - 20,000 pp
    - SSCI
    - HPSCI
    - FBI, other third agency - 10,000 pp
    - Warren Commission, Rockefeller Commission
    - Presidential libraries -Ford, Kennedy, Johnson

4. How assassination record should be defined ?

5. Status report on processing of documents

- Records released to NARA (in full, sanitized)
  (attachment)
- Records remaining to be completed

  HSCA, Working files, Presidential libraries
- Records withheld (examples)
- Types of information sanitized

  -- identity of agents
  -- sensitive sources and methods
  -- relations with foreign government
  -- unwarranted invasion of privacy
- Summaries (examples--financial records)

6. Issues/Problems (examples of postponed information)

- Degree of sanitization
- Relevancy e.g., chrono cables from Mexico City
  (Chinese ops items)
- Privacy
- Duplicates (Oswald 201 in microfilm)
- Office of Personnel files
  Office of Security files

- Hand- written notes prepared by HSCA staffers
    - -- 5x8 cards, note pads, sensitive operational information, some of it innaccurate
- Identification aids (examples)
  Indexing
- Jim Lesar litigation--receives copies of docs, i.a.
- Inadvertent release of agent's identity
  (attachment)

7. Ford Library--relevant files.

8. Question: Arrangements for review of records by the Board ?

The following Agency members will attend the meeting with the ARRB on Wednesday, 2 August 1995:

Eleanor Neiman
Directorate of Operations

Michael Luce
Directorate of Operations

John Kambourian
Directorate of Operations

Fred Wickham
Directorate of Operations

William McNair
Directorate of Operations

Robert Eatinger
Office of General Counsel

Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group

18 May 95

The following Agency members will attend the meeting with the ARRB on Thursday, 18 May 1995:

Eleanor Neiman
Senior Coordinator, Directorate of Operations

Margaret Sanders (Reg)
Latin America Division, Directorate of Operations

Robert Eatinger
Office of General Counsel

William McNair
Information Review Officer, Directorate of Operations

Michael Luce
Latin America Division, Directorate of Operations

John Pereira
Historical Review Group

Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group

6 March 95

1. Mr. Devine will discuss the perspective of the Directorate of Operations with respect to sensitive information that may appear in the assassination records. This includes information related to protection of sources and liaison relationships.

2. The following Agency members will attend the meeting with the ARRB on Monday, 6 March 1995:

John Devine
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

Donald Cryer
Deputy Chief, Information Management Staff

Eleanor Neiman
Senior Coordinator, Directorate of Operations

Margaret Sanders
Latin America Division, Directorate of Operations

Robert Eatinger
Office of General Counsel

Frederick Wickham
Chief of External Support, Information Management

John Pereira
Historical Review Group

Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group

To Mr. David Marwell:

The following Agency members will attend the meeting with the ARRB on Monday, 6 March 1995:

John Devine

Donald Cryer

Eleanor Neiman

Margaret Sanders

Robert Eatinger

Frederick Wickham

John Pereira

Barry Harrelson

CERTIFICATION FOR 6 MARCH 1995 SI/TK/G&B

David Marwell	080-30-7709
Thomas J. Gunn	529-74-8907
Thomas E. Samoluk	030-50-1292
Sheryl Walter	506-80-0934

SECRET

11 December 1995

NOTE FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Briefing of JFK Board Staff: Cover

1. On 1 December, Barry Gibson, Deputy Chief of the Office of Central Cover, briefed the Executive Director of the Assassinations Records Review Board and other Board staff members. Also participating from CIA were John Goins and Eleanor Neiman of IMS; Linda Cipriani, OGC; and Barry Harrelson and I from HRG.

2. The focus of the briefing was on the need to protect the names of former Agency employees that appeared in the JFK records. Gibson discussed the risks involved for people who retired under cover if they were identified in the public record as former CIA employees. He discussed the efforts made by his office to obtain written statements from the more than 100 individuals whose names appear.

3. The purpose of the briefing was to assist the Board in its review of names when it meets on 12-13 December. The Agency was asked in particular to present, in writing, evidence of risk for each of the names that will be discussed at the Board's meeting.

John Pereira

John F. Pereira

CL BY: 0185904
CL REASON: COV 2-82 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: AHB 70-9

SECRET

ARRB OPEN MEETING
6 August 1996

HANDOUTS

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Select Committee on Assassinations

Office of Legislative Counsel Memorandum (OLC 79-2477) dtd August 1979; Subject: HSCA Records

Request of Records Disposition Authority

CIA's HSCA JFK Sequestered Records - I [Boxes 1-63]

CIA's HSCA JFK Sequestered Records - II [Box 64]

[illegible]

AGENCY COPY

ST FOR RECORDS DISPOSITION AUTHORITY
(See Instructions on reverse)

TO: GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE, WASHINGTON, DC 20408

1. FROM (AGENCY OR ESTABLISHMENT)
Central Intelligence Agency

2. MAJOR SUBDIVISION
Office of Legislative Counsel - (08-76)

3. MINOR SUBDIVISION

4. NAME OF PERSON WITH WHOM TO CONFER
Elizabeth S. Lancer, Jon E. Wolfe
David W. Landram

5. TEL. EXT.
351-7776

LEAVE BLANK

JOB
NC1-263-80-1

DATE RECEIVED
June 3, 1980

NOTIFICATION TO AGENCY

In accordance with the provisions of 44 U.S.C. 3303a the disposal request, including amendments, is approved except for items that may be [illegible] in column 10.

SIGNATURE OF THE ARCHIVIST IS
NOT REQUIRED FOR APPROVAL OF
PERMANENT RETENTION OF RECORDS

Date — Archivist of the United States

6. CERTIFICATE OF AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE:

I hereby certify that I am authorized to act for this agency in matters pertaining to the disposal of the agency's records; that the records proposed for disposal in this Request of 2 page(s) are not now needed for the business of this agency or will not be needed after the retention periods specified.

☐ A Request for immediate disposal.

☑ B Request for disposal after a specified period of time or request for permanent retention.

C. DATE	D. SIGNATURE OF AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE	E. TITLE
5/23/80	Edgar T. McHenry	Associate Records Management Officer

7. ITEM NO.	8. DESCRIPTION OF ITEM (With Inclusive Dates or Retention Periods)	9. SAMPLE OR JOB NO.	10. ACTION TAKEN
1.	MATERIAL HELD BY CIA RELATING TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS INVESTIGATIONS Consists of all substantive documents and other materials created or reviewed as the result of inquiries made of the CIA by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) during its investigations into the deaths of President Kennedy and Martin Luther King. The collection includes all CIA files requested for review, documents generated by the HSCA as the result of its reviews, correspondence exchanged between the CIA and the HSCA, and pertinent supporting documentation. The bulk of the collection consists of CIA files reviewed by the Committee and is primarily in the form of 16mm roll film produced, stored, and inspected in accordance with Federal standards for archival microfilm. The microfilming was done in those instances when it was necessary to return the paper files to their original locations. (Each paper file microfilmed will be maintained or disposed of in accordance with approved records control schedules covering the record series of which the file is a part.) a. Silver original 16mm microfilm produced, stored, and inspected in accordance with F [illegible]		

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

est for Records Disposition Authority—Continuation

JOB NO. NC1-263-80-1

PAGE 2 OF 2

7. ITEM NO.	8. DESCRIPTION OF ITEM (With Inclusive Dates or Retention Periods)	9. SAMPLE OR JOB NO.	10. ACTION TAKEN

b. Textual records not contained in "a" above.

Permanent. Records to be retained in the Agency Archives and Records Center. Not to be opened without the concurrence of the Legislative and General Counsels.

Records will be offered for transfer to the National Archives and Records Service when national security considerations permit.

Initial inspection of item 1a microfilm will be conducted as required by 41CFR 101-11.507-2, at 2 year intervals from the approval date of this records disposition request.

Amendments to this schedule concurred in by
Jon E. Wolfe/CIA, and R C Tagge/NARS-NCD, 6/04-05/80.

-203

Four copies, including original, to be submitted to the National Archives

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

STANDARD FORM 115-A
Revised July 1974
Prescribed by General Services
Administration
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.4

OLC 79-2477

10 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. George Frates
AC/Records Management Division
ISS/DDA

FROM : Rodger S. Gabrielson
Office of Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT : HSCA Records

1. During the course of the HSCA investigations, much classified information was assembled in response to HSCA requests. Three categories of information must now be disposed of under terms of the HSCA/DCI Memorandum of Understanding.

Category 1a: Classified material from Agency holdings, requested by the HSCA, which HSCA staff members reviewed.

Category 1b: Classified material from Agency holdings, requested by the HSCA, but which HSCA staff members did not review.

Category 2: Material generated by the HSCA from Agency classified holdings made available to the HSCA in response to the latter's request. (Note: This HSCA material is considered by the HSCA as its property and, therefore, not releasable to the public under the Freedom of Information Act. An inventory of this material received from HSCA has been completed.)

Category 3: Classified correspondence and certain unclassified correspondence exchanged between this Agency and the HSCA.

2. The HSCA has indicated its desire that copies of these three categories of material be held in sealed and segregated storage to ensure the preservation of all relevant records pertaining to the phase of the investigation involving this Agency. In order to accommodate the HSCA, but also leave our own records accessible for routine purposes, a photographic copy should be made of each official Agency document made available in response to a specific request by the HSCA (Category 1a and 1b).

3. Upon completion of the task of photographing the Category 1a and 1b documents, those photographic copies (Category 1), the HSCA-generated materials based upon Agency material (Category 2), and the designated Agency-HSCA correspondence (Category 3), will be sealed and held in segregated storage by the Agency, in accordance with schedules established by the Archivist of the United States.

4. Documents are now in the individual custodies of members of the Agency HSCA Task Force. These individuals are listed by attachment.

5. Please advise on your recommended procedures for photographing these documents and procedures for entering these copies into sealed storage.

/S/

Rodger S. Gabrielson

Attachment

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

19 August 1977 ✓

I. Preparation of Materials

A. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will cooperate fully in the investigations conducted by the Select Committee on Assassinations (Committee) by providing access, as requested, to classified information within the releasing authority of the CIA, and held by the CIA, that bears upon the study and investigation authorized by H. Res. 222. CIA will notify the Committee of any requested information held by CIA not within the releasing authority of the CIA, and notify the Committee of the proper authority to contact to obtain the information. No document or a portion of the document in the possession of CIA will be withheld without written notice of that action to the Committee. Access to all classified information designated for protection from unauthorized disclosure by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and currently held by any federal agency or department shall be governed by this memorandum.

B. Documentary material will be made available as expeditiously and completely as feasible, subject to the responsibility of the DCI to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods. The Committee and CIA will periodically agree upon a list of identities that will not be excised from materials turned over to the Committee. Subject to the list of identities that will not be deleted, CIA will appropriately sanitize, including excising if necessary, information to assure protection of information identifying sensitive sources and methods. When an excision is made, CIA will indicate the nature of the source or method excised, including the functional intelligence discipline which was the source of the intelligence.

C. The Chief Counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations and a designated representative of the DCI shall meet monthly to discuss a random sample of the complete and unsanitized materials selected by the Chief Counsel for the purpose of verifying the appropriateness of the sanitizing done by the CIA. Those matters on which they do not agree shall be referred to the Chairman, Ranking Minority Member, and the DCI for resolution.

D. In making any excisions or other alterations of requested materials, CIA shall be bound by 18 U. S. C. Subsection 1505 and all other applicable statutes.

II. Request Procedure

A. The CIA element responsible for dealing with the Committee is the Coordination and Review Staff of the Office of Legislative Counsel (C&RS/OLC). All Committee requests for information will be conveyed to CIA only via the Coordination and Review Staff. Absent extraordinary circumstances, appointments with CIA employees and former employees will be arranged through the Coordination and Review Staff.

B. All Committee requests for information will be in writing. In the interest of timely response, C&RS/OLC will accept preliminary telephone or other oral requests, but no information can be made available until a request is received in writing from the Chief Counsel or one of the Deputy Chief Counsels.

III. Staff Clearance

Prior to access by Committee personnel to any material which has been designated for protection from unauthorized disclosure by the DCI, such Committee personnel will be granted security clearance by the Committee after consultation with the CIA. Committee personnel requiring access to such material will be required to execute, in advance, the attached Select Committee on Assassinations Nondisclosure Agreement.

IV. Transcripts of Statements Under Oath

A steno-typist from either the Committee or the CIA will make a verbatim record of all statements of current CIA personnel taken under oath. One copy of the record will be made available to the Committee and the other to the CIA in accordance with the Rules of the Committee.

V. Examination of Material

Materials to which access has been granted by CIA will be reviewed in a CIA reading room set aside for this purpose or in a designated area within the Committee's offices.

VI. Storage of Materials

A. Committee procedures for control and storage of any documents or materials provided by the CIA which require protection will follow security standards and procedures established in consultation with, and approved by, the CIA.

B. Upon the termination of the Committee, all materials provided by CIA and examined by the Committee will be kept and preserved within a segregated and secure area within CIA for at least 30 years unless the DCI and the House of Representatives agree to a shorter period of time. All persons having access to such materials must sign an access sheet indicating the date, the name of the person receiving access, the specific documents or materials to which access was granted, and the person who authorized the access.

VII. Disclosure of Information

A. The Committee will notify the DCI in writing of its desire to disclose, in any manner, including under the Select Committee on Assassinations Nondisclosure Agreement, any information that is designated for protection from unauthorized disclosure by the DCI. If within five days the Committee does not receive a letter from the DCI objecting to the proposed disclosure and stating the reasons for the objection, the Committee may disclose the information.

B. If the DCI notifies the Committee within five days that he objects to the proposed disclosure and states the reasons for his objections, the Chairman of the Committee and the DCI, or their designated representatives, shall meet to attempt to resolve any differences over the information to be disclosed. If the Chairman of the Committee considers that the negotiations have reached an impasse, he will give the DCI a written notice to that effect, and the Committee will take no steps until at least 14 days thereafter to disclose the information in dispute.

C. Any differences left unresolved by negotiation may become the subject of litigation. In any such action each party will be free to assert all its constitutional, statutory, or other legal rights, and the parties agree to be bound by the final outcome of any such action. If such an action is commenced by the Executive Branch but is disposed of without a judicial decision on the merits of the disclosure issue, the Committee agrees that it will not on that basis, or on the basis of its 14-day notice letter, disclose the information in dispute. This Agreement, however, is without prejudice to any of the Committee's other rights, privileges and responsibilities concerning the production by legal compulsion and disclosure of information, and the DCI's rights, privileges and responsibilities concerning the protection from disclosure of the information.

Director of Central Intelligence

19 AUG 1977
Date

Chairman

August 29, 1977
Date

5 August 1996

CIA's HSCA JFK SEQUESTERED RECORDS - I

BOXES 1-63 HARDCOPY MATERIAL

The 63 boxes contain copies of material collected or prepared in response to over a thousand individual requests from HSCA. Boxes are grouped by responsible component. With the exception of the security files, there is no general subject grouping or order to the boxes. Individual boxes usually contain a mix of topics and types of documents, and there is much duplication through out the collection.

Boxes 1-34 (Directorate of Operations): contains a mix of CIA, third agency (primarily FBI) and Warren Commission documents plus a significant amount of HSCA originated material*. These records cover a wide range of topics but focus on anti-Cuba/Castro activities and Oswald in USSR, Mexico City and New Orleans. Also included are responses to the large number of names traces requested by the HSCA staff, numerous copies of documents from the Oswald 201, the 1967 IG report, testimony of Richard Helms before HSCA, Nosenko material, CIA cable traffic.

Boxes 35-36 (Inspector General): HSCA reports, Senate Select Committee reports, reports on Cuban operations, Book V of Church Committee final report.

Boxes 37-38 (Office of the General Counsel): Cuban exile activities, Garrison investigation, name files.

Box 39 (Directorate of Science & Technology): Photo comparisons of Hunt, Sturgis and the Dallas tramps; chart of frames from Zapruder film.

Boxes 40-48 (Office of Security): name files.

Boxes 49-63 (Office of Legislative Liaison): HSCA requests, notes, memos, correspondence and final report, plots against Castro, photos of unknown man, defector study, Nosenko, name files, Mexico City station files, FBI reports, Warren Commission reports.

*approximately 30,000 pages of HSCA originated material has been removed from the files and transferred to the National Archives.

5 August 1996

CIA's HSCA JFK SEQUESTERED RECORDS -- II

BOX 64 MICROFILMED MATERIAL

Box 64 contains 72 reels of microfilm. All but a small percentage of the materials are CIA-originated, and include cables, dispatches, memoranda, reports, and correspondence. Many of the reels contain a mix of subjects and types of material:

Reels 1-20	Individual 201 files, mainly Cubans, some Americans and Soviets
Reels 21-22	Cuban Defector AMMUG-1
Reels 23-25	DO Project Files, Garrison investigation
Reels 25-28	Cuban exile organizations
Reels 28-30	Office of Personnel Files; Mexico City records
Reels 31-44	Oswald files; 201 file is duplicate of hardcopy file
Reels 45-47	Nosenko; Mexico City records
Reels 48-49	CIA-HSCA Correspondence, 1967 IG Report, Cuban Mug Book, miscellaneous
Reels 50-56	Individual 201 Files (includes Cubela)
Reels 57-60	Office of Personnel Files
Reels 61-62	Nosenko, Golitsyn, anti-Castro activities
Reels 62-71	Cuban Revolutionary Council and other Cuban exile organizations.
Reel 71-72	Project Files

(Gunn presentation)

Outline of Presentation to the Board
August 6, 1996

I. Where we are in the process of CIA records

- We have almost completed the Oswald 201 file.
  - Size 17 boxes
  - Postponements have been reviewed word by word

- We are now turning to new areas for CIA records
  - HSCA collection now housed physically just a few yards from here
    - To be reviewed word by word
      - Scelso
      - Oswald in Mexico City by Hardaway and Lopez
  - JFK Library
    - Release this fall of many records related to Cuba

I am pleased to say -- and I offer this as my personal opinion -- that I have seen no example where the Board has postponed any information that bears directly on the assassination. I believe that the story is coming out with the records that are being released.

II. Issue immediately before us is the CIA's sequestered collection.

Mr. Pereira has described it from the perspective of the agency.

The Review Board staff has been reviewing the record and has given the Board its own assessment of the status of the records.

There are a great number of records in the sequestered collection that are highly relevant:

Lee Harvey Oswald
Georges de Mohrenschildt
Elena Garro de Paz
Antonio de Varona (Frente RD)
Silvia Duran
Rolando Cubela
CRC
Bay of Pigs
Castro assassination attempts
Warren Commission
HSCA
Garrison investigation

These types of records need to be reviewed on the same word-to-word basis as the board has reviewed records thus far.

But we have a new problem: how should the Board review records from the sequestered collections where the relevance to the assassination is not clear.

III. Examples where the staff has difficulty finding a nexus to the assassination in certain records.

I will offer a few examples to provide you with a flavor of some of the issues we are confronting. The examples below are hypothetical and are loosely based upon our review of the files in order to illustrate the issues.

A. The "false hit" category

The HSCA requested files from CIA on a great number of persons. In many instances the agency did not know why the files were requested, and accordingly it made available files that it had on the name that had been requested. Because names are not always unique, the agency sometimes made available files on individuals who were of no interest to the HSCA and who had no identifiable relation to the assassination.

1. A very common name --- I will use as an example the name Robert Smith. The HSCA requested Robert Smith files because of an alleged connection between a "Robert Smith" and Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963. The Smith whose file was made available, however, was a CIA officer who died in 1956. The ARRB staff has reviewed the file and has discovered no relevance to the assassination.

B. CIA operational files or 201 files.

2. Cuban now living in the United States. CIA unsuccessfully attempted to recruit her to collect information on Cuba through her family and friends, but ultimately abandoned the effort. Neither she nor any of her hoped for contacts had any identifiable connection to the Oswald story or to the JFK assassination.

3. Cuban cultivated for operational work against Castro in whom CIA lost interest when he was not able to meet operation standards.

4. Soviet official at the Mexico City embassy during Oswald's visit, although he never had any personal contact with him. The Mexico City portion of his file ha been reviewed and released in part to NARA. The remainder of

his file covers his subsequent career in a European country, where CIA monitored him closely. This portion of his career - by far the largest part of his file - has no bearing on Oswald or the JFK assassination.

C. CIA officials

There are many personnel files of CIA officers. The files often contain medical records evaluations, recommendations, and postings. They generally do not contain any operational details.

5. CIA employee who was a Headquarters secretary for a major figure in the case. Her file consists of personnel records, medical records, and a polygraph, none of which has any identifiable bearing on the Oswald story of the JFK assassination.

As anyone knowledgeable about the Kennedy assassination can testify, there is a bewildering number of allegations regarding CIA officials who have alleged connections to the assassination. The HSCA investigated some of these leads. Not all leads are successful.

6. A CIA officer was allegedly in Dallas on November 22. An examination of the file suggests that the individual was not in Dallas, but was in Vietnam. There is nothing in the file that contains any apparent connection to the assassination.

7. CIA official in Mexico City who was directly involved in matters related to Oswald's visit. Prior to and subsequent to the Mexico City tour, the officer was stationed at headquarters and at other locations in the world. With the exception of the portion related to Mexico City, the staff can identify no other documents that illuminate the assassination.

D. Summary of problems

First, establishing criteria for relevance

Second, handling different types of records

ex. 1: entire file has no identifiable relevance

ex. 2: some documents in a file have relevance, but others do not

ex. 3: portion of a document has identifiable relevance, but others do not

IV. Selected Statutory Provisions in The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994)

Definition of Assassination Record

> "'Assassination record' means a record that is related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, that was created or made available for use by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the possession of [the HSCA]." Sect. 3(2).

Interpretation 1: All records in segregated collection are assassination records.

> Argument: the segregated collection are "assassination records" because a government agency examined them in the course of their investigation of the assassination.

Interpretation 2: Only segregated collection records that actually relate to the assassination of President Kennedy come within the scope of the JFK Act.

> Argument: In order for a record to be an "assassination record" it must: (a) relate to the assassination of President Kennedy, ***and*** (b) have been used by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the possession of a government agency.

Selected CFR Provisions:

> "All records collected by or segregated by all Federal, state, and local government agencies in conjunction with any investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy . . . ." 36 CFR 1400.1(b)(2)

> "An assassination record shall be released in its entirety except for portions specifically postponed pursuant to the grounds for postponement of public disclosure of records established in . . . the JFK Act, and no portion of any assassination record shall be withheld from public disclosure solely on grounds of non-relevance unless, in the Review Board's sole discretion, release of part of a record is sufficient to comply with the intent and purposes of the JFK Act." 36 CFR 1400.5.

V. Staff Preliminary Suggestions to Board

A. Factors suggesting possible relevance to assassination:

Unfortunately, there is no simple, clear, obvious method for determining relevance. Accordingly, rule of thumb guidelines need to be followed. The obvious rules of thumb to assist staff in identifying relevant documents would include:

-- documents that obviously are related to assassination
  - CIA internal investigations
  - Oswald records
  - Garrison investigation
  - Castro assassination attempts

-- documents falling within certain dates (relevance of dates depends on issue under consideration
  - dates associated with Oswald
  - dates immediately around assassination
  - dates of Warren Commission
  - dates of Church Committee, HSCA investigations

-- individuals of importance
  - CIA officials in Mexico City
    - David Atlee Phillips
    - Win Scott
  - CIA officials in HQ involved in investigation
    - John Scelso
    - JJ Angleton

-- geographical relevance (USSR; Cuba; Mexico)

B. Handling of records in sequestered collection

First, ARRB staff reviews all records and files in sequestered collection.

Second, all documents that are found to be relevant will be subjected to word by word review of postponements by the Board. The staff will, over time, work with the Board to establish guiding criteria for identifying relevance. The focus will be on individuals and groups that have been identified as playing a role in the larger story of the assassination. Examples of individuals who have been identified as being a part of the greater story surrounding the assassination include David Atlee Phillips, Win Scott, James Angleton, etc. Groups include Cuban exile groups

(DRE, Alpha 66, etc.), Minutemen, etc.

Third, for a file where no relevance can be found, the staff will write a memorandum identifying the file, describing the review process, and explaining the basis of finding no relevance. The staff memorandum will then be sent to the JFK Collection and be made fully available to the public.

Fourth, for a file containing some relevant records, the relevant records will be subjected to the word by word review. Records for which the staff has been able to identify no relevance, a memorandum will be written to describe generally the type of records and explain the basis for finding no relevance.

Fifth, with regard to the microfilm copy of the Oswald 201 file, the staff will review the entire file in order to determine whether there are any records in the file that are not included in the released version of the 201 file. If such records are identified, they will be subjected to the same word by word review as other records -- but the remainder of the 201 file will not be reviewed again.

Sixth, in rare cases, portions of a document that genuinely have no identifiable relevance to the assassination, may be redacted consistent with the 1400.5.

I recommend that the Board, in the near future, deliberate on the guidance that it wishes to give to the staff regarding these matters.

TESTIMONY BEFORE JFK BOARD, 6 AUGUST 1996

INTRODUCTION

Introduce CIA participants

We are pleased to provide information to the Assassination Records Review Board that might assist the Board in fulfilling its responsibilities under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act. CIA is committed to full cooperation with the Board.

Before addressing the subject of the sequestered collection directly, I would like to provide some background to help put the sequestered collection into some sort of context.

In the spring of 1992, prior to the enactment of the JFK Assassination Records Act, then Director of Central Intelligence, Bob Gates issued instructions to begin reviewing for declassification all records related to the assassination.

The CIA History Staff was charged with identifying the relevant records. Once this was done, the Historical Review Group took custody of these records and immediately began reviewing them for declassification for release to the National Archives.

Once the Kennedy Assassination Records Act was passed, our goal became to release as many of the records as possible by the 22 August 1993 deadline established by the Act. Approximately 125,000 pages were transferred to the National Archives by that date.

With subsequent releases, CIA has now declassified and transferred some 227,000 pages of material to the National Archives. Based on discussions with the Board, we are continuing to release additional information that had been redacted earlier.

The remaining records are in various stages of review. Some require review by other agencies. Some is congressional material. Final decisions on other records are awaiting discussion with the Review Board.

THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS

In identifying relevant records, we have followed the definitions in the 1992 Act and the related rules which were published in the Federal Register.

The Kennedy assassination records in CIA consist of two major groups of files. One group consists of the documents in the Lee Harvey Oswald file--sometimes referred to as the "Oswald 201 file". These consist mainly of documents collected after the assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation.

There are about 26,000 pages of material in the Oswald file. All but a handful have been declassified and sent to the National Archives.

The second group is comprised of the "sequestered collection". These are the records that were made available to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and which the Committee asked CIA to hold in safekeeping upon the completion of the Committee's investigation.

Certain additional records, including 400 excerpts from minutes of the Director's morning meetings, and some working files, have been added to the overall collection since 1992.

SEQUESTERED COLLECTION

First of all, every document in the sequestered collection is available to the Board for review. The documents are available in full, without redactions.

The record shows that the sequestered collection consists of documents compiled in connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA).

A portion of the documents were created specifically in response to requests from the HSCA. Other records were already in existence prior to the creation of the Committee. Still other documents were created by the Committee itself. For example, notes of interviews conducted by the Committee's staff.

Within the sequestered collection there are two major categories of records. One category consists of approximately 129,000 pages of hard copy. The second category consists of 72 reels of microfilm, or the equivalent of 163,000 pages of hard copy.

The reason why the documents were sequestered is explained in a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Chairman Louis Stokes of the HSCA and DCI Stansfield Turner in August 1977. The Memorandum provides as follows:

"Upon termination of the Committee, all materials provided by CIA and examined by the Committee will be kept and preserved within a segregated and secure area within CIA for at least 30 years unless the DCI and the House of Representatives agree to a shorter period of time."

In April 1979, Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the HSCA visited CIA Headquarters to complete the process of designating what materials were to be sequestered. All the documents made available to the Committee were included in the sequestered collection.

REVIEW AND DECLASSIFICATION OF THE SEQUESTERED FILES

In 1992, CIA wrote to Speaker of the House Thomas Foley requesting approval to begin declassifying and releasing the records. In October of that year, Mr. Foley wrote a letter to the DCI granting CIA the authority to do so. The Speaker's decision was made in anticipation of passage of the Assassination Records Collection Act.

THE HARDCOPY MATERIAL

The hardcopy part of the sequestered collection includes copies of most of the CIA documents in the Oswald 201 file. Also included are 201 files, personnel files, and security files on persons who are mentioned in documents relevant to the assassination, or who figure in one of the conspiracy theories.

The collection also includes about 30,000 pages of documents, memos, and notes (many handwritten) that were created by the Committee staff during their investigation.

THE MICROFILM PORTION OF THE SEQUESTERED COLLECTION

As I noted earlier, there are approximately 72 reels of microfilm in the sequestered collection. (Incidentally, we have arranged to have all of the microfilm records printed in hard copy.)

The decision to microfilm a portion of the sequestered collection was apparently based on two major considerations:

First, the integrity of the sequestered records had to be maintained.

Second, a number of the files requested by the HSCA were active and had to be available to allow people to continue conducting their normal activities.

The solution was to replace certain records with microfilm versions. These records were microfilmed during 1979-80 with the approval of the Assassinations Committee.

THE CONTENT OF THE MICROFILM

A sizeable portion of the microfilm--approximately 50 percent--duplicates the hard copy files. For example, there are 12 reels of material from the Oswald 201 file.

The bulk of the reels consists of files on individuals and organizations, including personnel files of CIA employees. There are also a number of files on anti-Castro organizations. All but a small percentage of the materials are CIA-originated cables, dispatches, memoranda, reports, and correspondence.

There are questions of privacy that we believe the Board may want to consider in determining what information is to be released to the public. Some of the records contain, for example, medical information on an individual.

There are also questions of relevancy that we suggest the Board consider. For example, many of the documents cover sensitive activities that go far beyond the timeframe of the assassination or investigations into the assassination.

SUMMARY

--We hope that the Board has found this discussion of the sequestered documents useful.

--We look forward to continuing cooperation with the Board as we all work towards releasing as much information as possible to the American public.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

24 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Flynn @ DI
Teresa Wilcox @ DST
Kathryn Dyer

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
CSI/HRG, JFK Project Officer

SUBJECT: Records Briefing for ARRB Staff

REFERENCE: ARRB letter to DCI, dtd. 27 November, 1997, RE CIA Compliance with the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act.

1. The JFK Board (ARRB) staff has requested briefings by records "specialists" on the Agency's records systems as part of the compliance with the JFK Act process (see reference). The first DO briefing took place on 12 February. The DA briefing and a follow-up DO briefing is planned for early March. I would like to set up the remaining briefings as soon as possible.

2. The ARRB staffers are very familiar with agency documents and have had several general briefings on Agency records; one member of the staff is a former Agency employee (CTC). These "compliance" briefings should focus on what files would have existed in the 1958-63 time period and how we search, or account for, those records today. The ARRB requests you have been working on give you some sense of the type of information they are interested in. In addition I am faxing a copy of the "talking points" prepared for the DO briefing. I have also ask Jeremy Gunn, ARRB General Counsel, to provide a list of directorate specific topics.

3. The briefing can take place at HQ or at IP. The ARRB attendees will include Mr. Gunn and 4 or 5 members of the Board's CIA team; all are fully cleared (SCI). I have asked Mr. Gunn to provide a list of dates when he and his staff would be available. I will forward the list to you as soon as I receive it. Thank you for your assistance in setting up these briefings. If you have any questions, please give me a call on extension 31825.

CC: John Pereira

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

24 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee Strickland @ DA
DA Focal Point for JFK Board

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
CSI/HRG, JFK Project Officer

SUBJECT: Records Briefing for ARRB Staff

REFERENCE: 1. Meeting with you, 21 February, 1997, same subject;
2. ARRB letter to DCI, dtd 27 November 27, 1997, RE CIA Compliance with the JFK Assassination Records Collection ACT.

1. As we discussed in our meeting of 21 February, the ARRB staff has asked for briefings on the Agency's records systems. These briefings are the first steps in the compliance with the JFK ACT process describe in reference #2. At the meeting we set the first two weeks in March as the timeframe for the DA briefing. Mr. Gunn has requested that the briefing take place prior to 12 March if possible. The Board is meeting on the 13-14 March and he will be reporting on the status of the compliance process. Let me know as soon as possible if this is feasible.

2. Your proposal to include representatives of offices of Security and Personnel is excellent. The briefing should focus on what records would have existed in 1963 and how we search, or account for, those records today. The talking points paper for the DO briefing, which I left with you, will give you a good sense of the type of information the ARRB staff is interested in. If you have any questions, please give me a call on extension 31825.

CC: Becky L. Rant @ DA
John Pereira

- Judge Tunheim
- Jeremy Gunn
- Cohen
- Lee Strickland
- John Pereira
- Martin Boland
- Barry Harrelson

Talking Points - 2/18/98 Judge John R. Tunheim, Chair
Assassination Records Review Board

1. OIM - New Office -

   a. Bringing all of release programs into alignment.

   b. Realize there are problems - let me read two short sections from a briefing I have prepared for the DDA and the EXDIR

   Pgs 13, and 19

   c. This office is not knee-jerk or Neanderthal in its approach. We care a great deal about what makes sense practically and legally

   d. In fact we have a significant legal bent in this office.

   Lee is a former OGC attorney.
   His FOIA coordinator is an attorney.

   I am a former DGC on rotation from OGC

   And I have three attorneys assigned to this office

   Bruce Burke - Assoc DGC for Information

   And two staff level attorneys:

   Vicky Pepper a GS-15 attorney and

   Martin Boland a junior attorney.

2. Cover Issue:

   a. Appreciate your consideration of our concerns on state cover.

   b. As I explained when I met with Dr. Gunn on 3 February. There are subjects that seem like open secrets, if they could be called secrets at all. And certainly, this is different from a secret like x is a CIA spy in y country.

   c. But as the State Department and our station chiefs have indicated, this is more important that it would seem at first blush. There are repercussions from official acknowledgment of certain ``open secrets.''

   d. Which brings me to perhaps a final point:

e. Intelligence information often looks sensitive to the layman or generalist when the expert will tell you it is innocuous. And conversely, what seems innocuous to the layman can be quite sensitive. Our job is to help you distinguish the one from the other.

f. we rely on you to help us figure out ways to ensure your job is done and the American people are informed without doing damage to intelligence equities.

g. We want to be as forward leaning as possible, and work out compromises so it is a win-win solution for our respective organizations and for the American people.

h. We will strive very hard for a cooperative, harmonious relationship and we are committed to providing whatever resources are needed, from a very slender resource base to ensuring that we have met all of your taskings.

[shifted 7 additional contractor/reviewers to bring the total to 20]



Office of OIM Information Management

Challenges

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Process

- Directorate Search & Review Is Cumbersome
- Coordination Is Resource Intensive & Inefficient
- IRO Task Not Perceived As Important
  - --Limits Experience & Sophistication We Can Bring to the Task
- The IRO Has Little Clout or Resources

Policies

- Saying "No" Is Easier Than Justifying Damage
- Past Practices Are Not Examined Until Forced

13

s/addais/ed/briefing/982Gina8.ppt

Process: First, process - the components own the information and the IRO is the gatekeeper who controls what will be done, what will be searched, and what will be released. This makes coordination complex, but the larger issue is that the IRO usually does not have either the clout or the resources to do the job and we find cases bottle-necked.

Policies: What also makes coordination difficult, is an institutional bias to withhold until forced to release. Thus, we adopt silly positions. When pressed, we often concede in the end, but we lose credibility in the process.

There is no stomach, and perhaps no time to:

- Question the questionable,
- Revalidate the counter intuitive,
- or even overturn the nonsensical.



Office of OIM Information Management

OIM Corrective Actions

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

- **Expedite Automation Efforts**
  - Assure All Released Agency Material Contained in a Compatible and Easily Accessible Database
- **Conduct a Top Level Review of Current Classification Policy**
  - Confirm What is Sensitive and What is Not

19

s/addais/ed/briefing/982Gina8 ppt

Sixth, Capture of Previously Released Information: We are trying to complete the job of populating a data base of previously declassified and released information.

It is not acceptable that those outside the Agency know better than we do, what we have released. Our MORI database, once fully populated will allow us to:

Satisfy many requesters from information we already have declassified.

Speed up our declassification by knowing what decisions have already been made.

Increase the consistency of our decisions.

And most importantly, avoid wasting resources and embarrassing ourselves fighting to protect what already has been released.

And seventh, Classification Policy: The world is changing.

The overall budget figure was never released, but now it is.

It was forbidden to mention the existence of the NRO; that has changed.

All NRO contractors were under cover; now a two page listing of those contractors has been published in the media.

We tightly protected all overhead imagery program, but we now are declassifying product from early systems.

On the other hand, we still have policies that are outdated and may no longer make sense - [Farm, defectors, psychoanalysis, bios, World War II liaison information.]

A small effort can inject fresh thinking, and can staff issues for periodic and systematic validation by senior management.

This can pay dividends by keeping us from wasting time and resources protecting and defending what senior managers believe can and should be released.

17 August 1998

Talking Points for meeting with ARRB Executive Director,
Laura Denk -- 4:00 p.m., 17 Aug. 1998

Meeting is primary a “Meet and Greet”

Laura will be looking for reaffirming of commitment to complete the tasks still outstanding and to meet the deadline for the Final Declaration. She may also bring up the subject of a “Memo of Understanding” on what is to be done after the Board goes out of business.

Current Status:

Sequestered Collection

The re-review is virtually complete-- the remaining material (approximate two boxes) is mostly security files)

[Note: In the review controversial, complicated or Denied in Full documents were white-banded for later processing; I currently have a team of 3 reviewers going through the collection handling these problem documents. A number of these could lead to potential appeal issues. It will take 2-3 weeks to complete the white band review.]

Russ Holmes' file

Review -- approximately 2/3 completed
Indexing -- approximately 1/2 completed

Special Requests

Complete -- 22
Continuing -- 10 (searches complete; material being collected or available for review)
Outstanding -- 5 All DO

[Note: Two of the outstanding requests (CIA 16 and CIA-IR-04) are long-overdue priorities that the ARRB staff requested by completed by 7 August. Laura may raise this issue. Several of the “Continuing” requests are close to completion.]

Preparation of Records for NARA
(Board Determination Documents and Release in Fulls)

The pace will pick as I move reviewers from the sequestered collection to assisting with preparation.

[Note: Will probably need additional resources in September to complete the task]

Post Board Tasks (some examples)

Duplicates from the Sequestered Collection, Russ Holmes, and other working files.

Referrals received in last two months of project (We will try to review as many as possible by end of September)

Other documents/material that it is not feasible to review by 30 Sept. or extremely time-consuming for both staffs and marginal to the story (examples: Mexico City tapes, card files that duplicate information in the file)

Other Topics for Discussion

Final Declaration -- "Who signs" may come up.

Transfer of Oswald classified files to NARA by 30 Sept.

Transfer of all Release In Full documents to NARA by 30 Sept.
[Laura changed procedures -- we no longer have to send through ARRB staff; send directly to NARA.]

Next Meeting - 25 Aug.- Possible Issues

Mexico City Tapes (200+)

Board leaving toward declaring as Assassination Records; DO's initial response is to object. I have advised DO that we will need a "defense" for Aug. 25 meeting.

IFDECANTER

Although the release of DECANTER was delayed at last meeting, I understand the Board still leans toward release.

Notes from Briefing of ARRB Staff on Stations
(11 October 1995 - ARRB conf. room)

CIA Attendees: Bill McNair
Lee Carle
John Goins
Chuck Briggs
Hal Bean
Barry Harrelson

Bill re Stations:

No problem with release of CAS (Controlled American Source), fact we have overseas locations, CIA representatives in specific countries -- the problem comes with officially acknowledging the stations thereby putting the host government and service in a position of explaining why it is allowing a foreign espionage unit to operate in the country. This may become a serious political issue for the government, especially in countries where the government does not acknowledge its own service. Also can be perceived as "rubbing their nose in it" and can affect the trust between the Agency and the host service (violated agreement of confidentially).

Marwell pointed out that this information was 30 years old and asked what was the impact of acknowledging a station presence in 1963 on current operations or relations.

Bill responded "opened up old sores" and cited Rome and the sensitivity to our involvement in past election. Mentioned the reaction to the announcement on covert actions by DCI.

Gunn asked if stations = liaison relationship; Bill said the other service can not say it did not know the CIA was operating in its own country -- would look incompetent.

Mary asked about changes in government; Bill responded that intell types tend to stay own or its revolving door where the group that leaves when a neww government comes into power will be back in power at some point.

Bill comments on specific stations

If important to the story such as Mexico City and the surrounding stations which were involved in the cable exchanges re Oswald, then will release.

"Don't take it away from us for little or no gain to the story", I. e. if not critical to the story let us protect.

He indicated he could live with opening the stations for short windows if important to story, but also said it created a problem about protecting other activities in that window

Moscow - opened for Oswald windows

Rome - No, past elections issue and current narcotics projects

Delhi - No, counter narcotics projects

Madrid - Liaison relationships have been up and down; (PNGed five officers) can't afford any more flaps

Rabat - long time relationship w/ head of state; could give anti-government labor unions an issue(however, would not "fall on my sword" for this one

Helsinki and Stockholm -- would go to DCI with request to appeal (governments currently under fire for cooperation with US/very sensitive operation under way

Marwell asked about substitute language: Scandinavia, Northern Europe -- Bill responded with Western Europe/ said southern Europe for Rome, Madrid etc. "ok"

London: do not want to acknowledge but could live with

Australia - very sensitive

Berlin - is open in 1955; 1963 (?) Bill may have been having second thoughts about previous statement "to release", but I think it still stands -- there was a discussion of why Berlin important to story.

Mary asked about other European stations, Bombay and some South American stations

Bill did not have specific on other stations but made a couple of comments

Bonn and Hague - no problem

Brussels - very sensitive to any mention of intelligence service presence

Would get back to them on other stations

[I promised Bill a list of the Stations]

Other issues discussed

Crypts other than LIs and AMs - there was a discussion re deleting digraph and letting rest of crypt; everyone seemed receptive, but no decision.

Bill mentioned Iranian takeover as good example of damage caused by release of documents with crypts, file #s, etc. **Gunn** ask if there was an internal "damage" study prepared. **Bill** said he would check.

Marwell rejected the approach of the Agency having the opportunity to discuss Board actions before official notification. If we have evidence, need to present upfront, not come back with additional evidence after the decision.

The balancing of public interest vs Agency needs came up several times; Marwell commented that even if a document or item is not important to the Oswald story, the Agency must still defend.

Bill stated several timed during the meeting "If important to the story, we can live with release".

Barry
12 October 1995

OGC-94-52916
19 September 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: David P. Holmes
Deputy General Counsel

FROM: Robert J. Eatinger. Jr.
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC

SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records

1. Per your request, I have attached a copy of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (ARCA), Pub. L. 102-526, 106 Stat. 3443-3458, reprinted at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note. For your convenience, I have highlighted the pertinent provisions that will aid in responding to an inquiry regarding the statute's effect on the DCI's statutory authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.

2. The clear language and intent of the law is to supersede statutes that prohibit disclosure of information, except for some irrelevant subject areas, such as tax records. The statute provides that "it shall take precedence over any other law (except section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judicial decision construing such law, or common law doctrine that would otherwise prohibit" the disclosure of information subject to the Act. ARCA § 11(a). This language, taken with the provisions discussed below which limit the intelligence sources and methods that may be protected and set a strict procedural scheme by which information is to be reviewed under the ARCA, effectively supersedes the DCI's National Security Act authority with respect to intelligence sources and methods information subject to the ARCA.

3. Section 6 of the ARCA provides the grounds for which the release of information may be "postponed." The statute contemplates that all information will eventually be released. Indeed, it specifies that all information will be made available to the public no later than 25 years after the passage of the ARCA (which occurred in October 1992) unless the president certifies that continued postponement is necessary. ARCA § 4(g)(2)(D). With respect to intelligence-related information, ARCA allows postponement if:

> "(1) the threat to ... intelligence operations ... is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal--

> (A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;
>
> (B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or
>
> (C) any other matter currently relating to ... intelligence operations ... the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States."

ARCA § 6(1) (Emphasis added.)

4. The originating agency is to make the first review to identify information that meets the standards for postponement. ARCA § 4(c)(2)(D)(i). For CIA, this effort is being undertaken by the Historical Review Group, in consultation with the Directorate of Operations and other appropriate Agency components. Information the originating agencies identify for postponement must be transmitted to the Review Board. ARCA § 4(c)(2)(E). The Review Board "shall consider and render decisions on a determination by a Government office to seek to postpone the disclosure of assassination records." ARCA § 7(i)(1). Specifically, the "Review Board shall consider and render decisions on ... whether an assassination record or particular information in a record qualifies for postponement of disclosure under the Act." ARCA § 7(i)(2)(B).

5. If the Review Board determines to order the disclosure of information that the originating agency felt met the criteria for postponement, it "shall notify the head of the originating body of its determination and publish a copy of the determination in the Federal Register within 14 days after the determination is made." ARCA § 9(c)(4)(A). If the information contained in an assassination record is "obtained or developed solely within the executive branch, the President shall have the sole and nondelegable authority to require the disclosure or postponement of ... the information under the standards set forth in Section 6." ARCA § 9(d)(1) (emphasis added). The President's decision must be certified to the Review Board within 30 days of the Review Boards determination. Id. Records postponed by the President must be re-reviewed every 5 years. ARCA § 9(d)(2).

6. I would be happy to discuss this further if you so desire. You might also want to contact John Pereira (x30373) since he has met with some or all of the Review Board members.

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.

Attachment

SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority w/Respect
to JFK Assassination Records

OGC-94-52916

DCI/OGC/RJEatinger:76105 (19 Sept 94)

Original - Addressee (w/attach)(hand delivered)
1 - OGC Registry (~~w/attach~~)
1 - Lit File ________
1 - RBB (OGC/ILD)
1 - C/HRG (J.Pereira-404 Ames)
1 - RJE - Soft File (w/attach)
1 - RJE - Signer
1 - PDP
1 - KK -fyi
1 - PAS-fyi

14-00000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

DRAFT

CHAPTER XIV – ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

Part 1400 – GUIDANCE FOR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992" (ARCA)

Sec.

1400.1 Scope of assassination record.

1400.2 Scope of additional records and information.

1400.3 Sources of assassination records and additional records and information.

DRAFT

1400.4 Types of materials included in scope of assassination record and additional records and information.

1400.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety.

1400.6 Originals and copies.

1400.7 Additional guidance.

1400.8 Implementing the ARCA – Notice of Assassination Record Designation.

Authority: 44 U.S.C. 2107 note.

§ 1400.1 Scope of assassination record.

(a) An assassination record includes, but is not limited to, all records, public and private, regardless of how labeled or identified, that document, describe, report on, analyze, or interpret activities, persons, or events reasonably related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and investigations of or inquiries into the assassination.

(b) An assassination record further includes, without limitation:

(1) All records as defined in Sec. 3(2) of the ARCA;

(2) All records collected by or segregated by all federal, state, and local government agencies in conjunction with any investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy (for example, any intra-agency investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination; any inter-agency communication regarding the assassination; any request by the House Select Committee on Assassinations to collect documents and other materials; or

any inter- or intra-agency collection or segregation of documents and other materials);

(3) Other records or groups of records listed in the Notice of Assassination Record Designation, as described in §1400.8 of this chapter.

§1400.2 Scope of additional records and information.

The term additional records and information includes:

(a) All documents used by government offices and agencies during their declassification review of assassination records as well as all other documents, indices, and other material (including but not limited to those that disclose cryptonyms, code names, or other identifiers that appear in assassination records) that the Assassination Records Review Board has a reasonable basis to believe may constitute an assassination record or would assist in the identification, evaluation or interpretation of an assassination record. The Assassination Records Review Board will identify in writing those records and other materials it intends to seek under this section.

(b) All training manuals, instructional materials, and guidelines created or used by the agencies in furtherance of their review of assassination records.

(c) All records, lists, and documents describing the procedure by which the agencies identified or selected assassination records for review.

(d) Organizational charts of government agencies.

(e) Records necessary and sufficient to describe the agency's:

DRAFT

(1) Records policies and schedules;

(2) Filing systems and organization;

(3) Storage facilities and locations;

(4) Indexing symbols, marks, codes, instructions, guidelines, methods and procedures;

(5) Search methods and procedures used in the performance of the agencies' duties under the ARCA; and

(6) Reclassification to a higher level, transfer, destruction, or other information (e.g., theft) regarding the status of assassination records.

(f) Any other record that does not fall within the scope of assassination record as described in §1400.1, but which has the potential to enhance, enrich, and broaden the historical record of the assassination.

§1400.3 Sources of assassination records and additional records and information.

Assassination records and additional records and information may be located at, or under the control of, without limitation:

(a) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government;

(b) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of state and local governments;

(c) Record repositories and archives of federal, state, and local governments, including presidential libraries;

(d) Record repositories and archives of universities, libraries, historical societies, and other similar organizations;

(e) Individuals who possess such records by virtue of service with a government agency, office, or entity;

(f) Persons, including individuals and corporations, who have obtained such records from sources identified in subparagraphs (a) through (e) of this section;

(g) Persons, including individuals or corporations, who have themselves created or have obtained such records from sources other than those identified in subparagraphs (a) through (e) of this section;

(h) Federal, state, and local courts where such records are being held under seal; or

(i) Foreign governments.

§1400.4 Types of materials included in scope of assassination record and additional records and information.

The term record in assassination record and additional records and information includes, for purposes of interpreting and implementing the ARCA:

(a) papers, maps, and other documentary material;

(b) photographs;

(c) motion pictures;

DRAFT

(d) sound and video recordings;

(e) machine readable information in any form; and

(f) artifacts.

§1400.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety.

An assassination record shall be disclosed in its entirety except for portions specifically postponed pursuant to the grounds for postponement of public disclosure of records established in Sec. 6 of the ARCA, and no portion of any assassination record shall be withheld from public disclosure solely on grounds of non-relevance unless, in the Assassination Records Review Board's sole discretion, release of part of a record is sufficient to comply with the intent and purposes of the ARCA.

§1400.6 Originals and copies.

(a) For purposes of determining whether originals or copies of assassination records will be made part of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (the JFK Assassination Records Collection) established under the ARCA, the following shall apply:

(1) In the case of papers, maps, and other documentary materials, the Assassination Records Review Board may determine that record copies of Government records, either the signed original, original production or a reproduction that has been treated as the official record maintained to chronicle

government functions or activities, may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

(2) In the case of other papers, maps, and other documentary material, the Assassination Records Review Board may determine that a true and accurate copy in lieu of the original may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

(3) In the case of photographs, the original negative, whenever available (otherwise, the earliest generation print that is a true and accurate copy) may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

(4) In the case of motion pictures, the camera original, whenever available (otherwise, the earliest generation print that is a true and accurate copy), may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

(5) In the case of sound and video recordings, the original recording, whenever available (otherwise, the earliest generation copy that is a true and accurate copy), may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

(6) In the case of machine-readable information, a true and accurate copy of the original (duplicating all information contained in the original and in a format that permits retrieval of the information) may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection; and

(7) In the case of artifacts, the original objects themselves may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection.

(b) To the extent records from foreign governments are included in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, copies of the original records shall be sufficient for inclusion in the collection.

(c) In cases where a copy, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section above, is authorized by the Assassination Records Review Board to be included in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, the Assassination Records Review Board may, at its discretion if it determines it to be necessary to ensure the integrity of the JFK Assassination Records Collection, require a certified copy. In cases where an original, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, is required for inclusion in the JFK Assassination Records Collection the Assassination Records Review Board may, at its discretion, accept the best available copy. In such cases that records included in the collection, whether originals or copies, contain illegible portions, such records shall have attached thereto a certified transcription of the illegible language to the extent practicable.

(d) For purposes of implementing the ARCA, the term copy means a true and accurate photocopy duplication by a means appropriate to the medium of the original record that preserves and displays the integrity of the record and the information contained in it.

(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to suggest that additional copies of any assassination records contained in the JFK Assassination Records Collection are not also assassination records that, at the Assassination Records

DRAFT

Review Board's discretion, may also be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection.

(f) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to prevent or preclude copies of any assassination records, and particularly assassination records in audiovisual or machine readable formats, from being made from time to time in the professional judgment of and at the discretion of the National Archives and Records Administration for purposes of preservation or reformatting to conform to different hardware and/or software requirements.

§1400.7 Additional guidance.

(a) A government agency, office, or entity includes, for purposes of interpreting and implementing the ARCA, all current, past, and former departments, agencies, offices, divisions, foreign offices, bureaus, and deliberative bodies of any federal, state, or local government and includes all inter- or intra-agency working groups, committees, and meetings that possess or created records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(b) The inclusion of artifacts in the scope of the term assassination record is understood to apply solely for purposes of establishing the JFK Assassination Records Collection and for fully implementing the terms of the ARCA and has no direct or indirect bearing on the interpretation or implementation of any other statute or regulation.

© In the case of artifacts deemed to be assassination records and included in

DRAFT

the JFK Assassination Records Collection, the provision to the public of photographs, drawings, or similar materials depicting the artifacts shall be sufficient to comply with the ARCA's requirement that copies of assassination records be provided to the public upon request. Additional display of or examination by the public of artifacts in the JFK Assassination Records Collection shall occur under the terms and conditions established by the National Archives and Records Administration to ensure their preservation and protection for posterity.

(d) The terms and, or, any, all, and the plural and singular forms of nouns shall be understood in their broadest and most inclusive sense and shall not be understood to be terms of limitation.

(e) Unless the Assassination Records Review Board in its sole discretion directs otherwise, records that are identified with respect to a particular person shall include all records relating to that person that use or reflect their true name or any other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol, number, cryptonym or alias used to identify that person.

(f) Unless the Assassination Records Review Board in its sole discretion directs otherwise, records that are identified by the Assassination Records Review Board with respect to a particular operation or program shall include all records pertaining to that program by any other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol, number or cryptonym.

DRAFT

§1400.8 Implementing the ARCA -- Notice of Assassination Record Designation.

(a) A Notice of Assassination Record Designation shall be the mechanism for the Assassination Records Review Board to announce publicly its determination that a record or group of records meets the definition of assassination records.

(b) Notice of all designations will be published in the Federal Register within 30 days of the decision to designate such records as assassination records.

In determining that a record or group of records meets the definition of assassination records, the Assassination Records Review Board must determine that the record or group of records will more likely than not enhance, enrich, and broaden the historical record of the assassination.

Calendar No. 552

102d Congress
2d Session

SENATE

Report
102-328

THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 3006

TO PROVIDE FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS RELEVANT TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

July 22 (legislative day, July 20), 1992.—Ordered to be printed

---

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
★ 59-010 WASHINGTON : 1992

tion, it is important to emphasize and clarify the legislative intent and importance of particular provisions of the Act.

Defining assassination records

"Assassination records" are defined in Section 3. The definition of "assassination records" is a threshold consideration for the successful implementation of the Act. Its scope will be the barometer of public confidence in the release of assassination records. While the records of past presidential commissions and congressional committees established to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy are included as assassination records under this Act, it is intended and emphasized that the search and disclosure of records under this Act must go beyond those records. While such records are valuable, they reflect the views, theories, political constraints, and prejudices of past inquiries. Proper implementation of this Act and providing the American public with the opportunity to judge the surrounding history of the assassination for themselves, requires including not only, but going beyond, the records of the Warren and Rockefeller Commissions, and the Church and House Select Assassination Committees.

The term "assassination record" was not more specifically defined by the Committee because to do so before more is known about the universe of records would have been premature, and would have further injected the government between the records and the American public. There is a sufficient volume of known assassination records to organize and review at the outset. However, it is intended that the Review Board issue guidance to assist in articulating the scope or universe of assassination records as government offices and the Review Board undertakes their responsibilities. Such guidance will be valuable notwithstanding the fact that government offices will begin to organize and review their records before the Review Board is established. Government offices are required to begin the review and disclosure of records upon enactment to expedite public access to the many records which do not require additional review or postponement. However, the ultimate work of the Review Board will involve not only the review of records recommended for postponement, but requiring government offices to provide additional information and records, where appropriate. Guidance, especially that developed in consultation with the public, scholars, and affected government offices, will prove valuable to ensure the fullest possible disclosure and create public confidence in a working definition that was developed in an independent and open manner.

Autopsy Records

The Act specifically excludes from the definition of "assassination records" the autopsy records and copies or reproductions made from such records donated by the Kennedy family pursuant to a deed of gift executed on October 29, 1966. These records include the autopsy photographs and X-rays of President Kennedy. The Committee believes that this exclusion is a sound policy. The Committee believes that there is a compelling justification for protecting the privacy of the Kennedy family from the unwarranted the date of enactment unless, in the case of executive branch records, the President demonstrates that public disclosure will result in an identifiable harm to the national security, intelligence operations, or foreign relations of the United States.

The Assassination Records Review Board is an independent agency within the executive branch. The five-member Review Board will be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the United States Senate. The confirmation hearings will be conducted by the Committee on Governmental Affairs. The Act requires that the Review Board include at least one historian and one attorney, and that each member is a national recognized professional in his or her field. The legislation requires that prior to making the appointments, the President is required to consider recommendations from the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, the Society of American Archivists, and the American Bar Association.

To ensure a comprehensive search and disclosure of assassination records, particularly to enable the public to obtain information and records beyond the scope of previous official inquiries, the Review Board has the authority to direct any government office to produce additional information and records which it believes are related to the assassination. It has the authority to subpoena private persons and to enforce the subpoenas through the courts.

The Review Board is authorized for a two-year period and it may be extended by a majority vote of the Review Board for up to an additional year. The Review Board could decide to extend it existence to less than one year if that is the time determined as necessary to complete its work. Annual financial reports and other periodic reports are required to be provided to the Congress. The reports must include statements of progress, the level of cooperation of government offices and agencies, and the possible need for additional time or authority from Congress.

IV. BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

On November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated. It was a tragic and defining moment in American history. The desire by the American public to understand who assassinated President Kennedy, and why, has resulted in several official investigations and a broad spectrum of private inquiries and scholarship. Unfortunately, in the eyes of the public, each investigation and inquiry served to raise additional questions, and did so while increasing the volume of secret government records about the assassination. In 1992, the public demand, fostered by increased media attention, the opening of secret files by changing governments around the world, and other factors, culminated in the recognition by the Congress and the Executive Branch that the records related to the assassination of President Kennedy should be fully disclosed.

In addition to the legislation considered by the Committee, and its counterpart considered by the House Committee on Government Operations, four other related, though more limited, measures were introduced in the House of Representatives in 1992. Two bills mandating the release of all Kennedy assassination investigation

(B) For dependents of active duty members in pay grades of E–5 and above, $25; and,

(C) For retirees and their dependents, $25.

(vi) The copayment for prescription drugs per prescription, for a maximum 30-day supply, is as follows:

(A) For dependents of active duty members in pay grades E–1 through E–4, $5;

(B) For dependents of active duty members in pay grades of E–5 and above, $5; and,

(C) For retirees and their dependents, $9.

(vii) The copayment for ambulance services is as follows:

(A) For dependents of active duty members in pay grades of E–1 through E–4, $10;

(B) For dependents of active duty members in pay grades of E–5 and above, $15; and,

(C) For retirees and their dependents, $20.

(e) *Inpatient cost sharing requirements under the Uniform HMO Benefit.*—(1) *In general.* In lieu of usual CHAMPUS cost sharing requirements (see § 199.4(f)), special cost sharing amounts are required. The specific requirements shall be uniform and shall be published as a notice annually by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

(2) *Structure of cost sharing.* For services other than mental illness or substance use treatment, there is a nominal copayment for active duty dependents and for retired members, dependents of retired members, and survivors. For inpatient mental health and substance use treatment, a separate per day charge is established.

(3) *Amount of inpatient cost sharing requirements.* Beginning in fiscal year 1995, the inpatient cost sharing requirements are as follows:

(i) For acute care admissions and other non-mental health/substance use treatment admissions, the per diem charge is as follows, with a minimum charge of $25 per admission:

(A) For dependents of active duty members in pay grades E–1 through E–4, $11;

(B) For dependents of active duty members in pay grades of E–5 and above, $11; and,

(C) For retirees and their dependents, $11.

(ii) For mental health/substance use treatment admissions, and for partial hospitalization services, the per diem charge is as follows, with a minimum charge of $25 per admission:

(A) For dependents of active duty members in pay grades E–1 through E–4, $20;

(B) For dependents of active duty members in pay grades of E–5 and above, $20; and,

(C) For retirees and their dependents, $40.

(f) *Updates.* The enrollment fees for fiscal year 1995 set under paragraph (c) of this section and the per services specific dollar amounts for fiscal year 1995 set under paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section may be updated for subsequent years to the extent necessary to maintain compliance with statutory requirements pertaining to government costs. This updating does not apply to cost sharing that is expressed as a percentage of allowable charges; these percentages will remain unchanged.

(g) *Applicability of the Uniform HMO Benefit to Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities Managed Care Program.* The provisions of this section concerning the Uniform HMO Benefit shall apply to the Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities Managed Care Program, effective October 1, 1995. Under that program, non-CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries have the same payment responsibilities as CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries.

Dated. February 2, 1995.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 95–3028 Filed 2-7-95, 8 45 am]

BILLING CODE 5000-04-M

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

36 CFR Part 1400

Guidance on Interpreting and Implementing the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

AGENCY: Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB).

ACTION: Proposed interpretive regulation.

SUMMARY: The ARRB proposes to issue regulations providing guidance on the interpretation of certain terms defined in and the implementation of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

DATES: To be considered, comments must be received on or before March 10, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Comments should be mailed to the Assassination Records Review Board at 600 E Street, NW, Second floor, Washington, D.C. 20530 or delivered in person to that address between the hours of 9:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday (except legal holidays). Comments may also be faxed to the Board at (202) 724–0457. Comments received may be inspected in the Board's public reading room, located at the address shown above, between 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Monday through Friday (except legal holidays). Persons wishing to inspect comments in the Board's public reading room should call the Board's office beforehand at (202) 724–0088 for further information.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sheryl L. Walter (General Counsel), (202) 724–0088.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. 2107 note (as amended) (ARCA), established the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (the JFK Collection) at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). In establishing the process for public disclosure of all records relating to the assassination, Congress created an independent agency within the executive branch, the Assassination Records Review Board (the Board), which consists of five citizens appointed by the President. Under the statute, the Board is empowered to decide "whether a record constitutes an assassination record." 44 U.S.C. 2107 note, Sec. 7(i)(2)(A). Congress further made clear its intent that the Board "issue guidance to assist in articulating the scope or universe of assassination records." President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, S.Rep. 102–328, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) at 21.

In constructing the proposed guidance set out here, the Board seeks to implement congressional intent that the JFK Collection contain "the most comprehensive disclosure of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy." *Id.* at 18. The Board is also mindful of Congress's instruction that the Board apply a "broad and encompassing" working definition of "assassination record" in order to achieve the goal of assembling the fullest historical record on this tragic event in American history and on the investigations that were undertaken in the assassination's aftermath. The Board recognizes that many agencies have already begun to organize and review records responsive to the ARCA even before the Board was appointed and began its work. Nevertheless, the Board's aim is that this guidance will aid in the ultimate assembly and public disclosure of the fullest possible historical record on this tragedy and on subsequent investigations and inquires into it.

The Board's proposed guidance is designed to help government agencies and the Board identify and make available to the public all documents that will enhance, enrich, and broaden the historical record of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The Board seeks through this guidance to fulfill Congress's "inten[t] and emphasis that the search and disclosure of records under this Act must go beyond" the records of previous commissions and committees established to investigate President Kennedy's assassination. *Id.* at 21. The Board also seeks to provide notice of the scope of its intended exercise of authority to seek additional information or records in order to fulfill its functions and responsibilities under the ARCA.

In addition, the Board proposes to create a mechanism to facilitate the Board's ongoing work and to further ensure future public access to the broadest possible historical record. This mechanism will be known as the "Catalog of Assassination Records" (COAR). The COAR is intended to be an official listing of all records determined by the Board to meet the definition of "assassination record" and included in the JFK Collection.

Request for Comments

The Board seeks public comment on its proposed interpretive regulations intended to provide guidance on the interpretation of the term assassination record, the intended scope of its exercise of authority to seek additional information or records, and its additional proposals for implementation of the ARCA.

List of Subjects in 36 CFR Part 1400

Administrative practice and procedure, Archives and records.

Accordingly, the Assassination Records Review Board hereby proposes to establish a new chapter XIV in title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations to read as follows:

CHAPTER XIV—ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

PART 1400—GUIDANCE FOR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992 (ARCA)

Sec.
1400.1 Interpretation of assassination record.
1400.2 Interpretation of additional records and information.
1400.3 Sources of assassination records and additional records and information.
1400.4 Types of materials included in scope of assassination record and additional records and information.
1400.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety
1400.6 Originals and copies.
1400.7 Additional guidance
1400.8 Implementing the ARCA—Catalog of Assassination Records

Authority: 44 U.S.C. 2107 note.

§ 1400.1 Interpretation of assassination record.

(a) An *assassination record* includes, but is not limited to, all records, public and private, regardless of how labeled or identified, that document, describe, report, analyze, or interpret activities and events that may have led to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; the assassination itself; and investigations of or inquiries into the assassination.

(b) An *assassination record* further includes, without limitation:

(1) All records as defined in Sec. 3(2) of the ARCA;

(2) All records called by or segregated by all federal, state, and local government agencies in conjunction with any investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy (for example, any intra-agency investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination; any inter-agency communication regarding the assassination; any request by the House Select Committee on Assassinations to collect documents and other materials; or any inter- or intra-agency collection or segregation of documents and other materials);

(3) Other records or groups of records listed in the Catalog of Assassination Records, as described in § 1400.8 of this chapter.

§ 1400.2 Interpretation of additional records and information.

The term *additional information and records* includes:

(a) All documents used by government offices and agencies during their declassification review of assassination records as well as all other documents, indices, records, and other material that disclose cryptonyms, code names, or other identification material in assassination records.

(b) All training manuals, instructional materials, and guidelines created or used by the agencies in furtherance of their review of assassination records.

(c) All records, lists, and documents describing the procedure by which the agencies identified or selected assassination records for review.

(d) Organizational charts of government agencies.

(e) Records necessary and sufficient to describe the agency's:

(1) Records policies and schedules;

(2) Filing systems and organization; and

(3) Storage facilities and locations.

§ 1400.3 Sources of assassination records and additional records and information.

Assassination records and additional records and information may be located at, or under the control of, without limitation:

(a) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government;

(b) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of state and local governments;

(c) Record repositories and archives of federal, state, and local governments, including presidential libraries;

(d) Record repositories and archives of universities, libraries, historical societies, and other similar organizations;

(e) Individuals who possess such records by virtue of service with a government agency, office, or entity;

(f) Persons, including individuals and corporations, who have obtained such records from sources identified in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section;

(g) Federal, state, and local courts where such records are being held under seal; or

(h) Foreign governments.

§ 1400.4 Types of materials included in scope of assassination record and additional records and information.

The term *record* in assassination record and additional records and information includes, for purposes of interpreting and implementing the ARCA:

(a) Papers, maps, and other documentary material;

(b) Photographs;

(c) Motion pictures;

(d) Sound and video recordings;

(e) Machine readable information in any form; and

(f) Artifacts.

§ 1400.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety.

An assassination record shall be disclosed in its entirety except for portions specifically postponed pursuant to the grounds for postponement of public disclosure of records established in section 6 of the ARCA, and no portions of any assassination records shall be withheld from public disclosure solely on grounds of non-relevance.

§ 1400.6 Originals and copies.

(a) For purposes of determining whether originals or copies of assassination records may be made part of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (the JFK Records Collection) to be established under the ARCA:

(1) In the case of papers, maps, and other documentary material, the Assassination Records Review Board (the Board) may determine that a true and accurate copy of the original is sufficient;

(2) In the case of photographs, the term record means the original negative if available, otherwise, the earliest generation print;

(3) In the case of motion pictures, the term record means the camera original if available, otherwise, the earliest generation print,

(4) In the case of sound and video recordings, the term record means the original recording, if available, otherwise, the earliest generation copy;

(5) In the case of machine-readable information, the Board may determine that a true and accurate copy of the original is sufficient; and

(6) Artifacts means the original object itself.

(b) In cases where a copy, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section is authorized by the Board to be included in the JFK Records Collection the Board may, at its discretion, require a certified copy. In cases where an original, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, is required for inclusion in the JFK Records Collection the Board may, at its discretion, accept the best available copy.

§ 1400.7 Additional guidance.

(a) A government *agency, office,* or *entity* includes, for purposes of interpreting and implementing the ARCA, all departments, agencies, offices, divisions, foreign offices, bureaus, and deliberative bodies of any federal, state, or local government and includes all inter- or intra-agency working groups, committees, and meetings that possess or created records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(b) The inclusion of artifacts in the scope of the term assassination record is understood to apply solely for purposes of establishing the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection and for fully implementing the terms of the ARCA and has no direct or indirect bearing on the interpretation or implementation of any other statute or regulation.

(c) In the case of artifacts deemed to be assassination records and included in the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, provision to the public of photographs, drawings, or similar materials depicting the artifacts shall be sufficient to comply with the ARCA's requirement that copies of assassination records be provided to the public upon request. Other display to or examination by the public of artifacts in the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection shall occur under terms and conditions established by the National Archives and Records Administration that are adequate to preserve and protect the artifacts for posterity.

(d) The terms *and, or, any, all,* and the plural and singular forms of nouns shall be understood in their broadcast and most inclusive sense and shall not be understood to be terms of limitation. Any records identified with respect to a particular person also includes any records for that person by any other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol, number, cryptonym or alias. Any record described with respect to an operation or program includes any record pertaining to that program by any other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol, number or cryptonym.

§ 1400.8 Implementing the ARCA—Catalog of Assassination Records.

(a) A Catalog of Assassination Records (COAR) shall be created as the official listing of all records determined by the Board to meet the definition of assassination record.

(b) Notice of all decisions to include records in the COAR will be published in the Federal Register within 30 days of the decision.

(c) In listing records or groups of records in the COAR, the Board must determine that the record or group of records will more likely than not enhance, enrich, and broaden the historical record of the assassination.

Dated: February 3, 1995.

David G. Marwell,

Executive Director, Assassination Records Review Board.

[FR Doc. 95-3112 Filed 2-7-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6820-TD-M

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Parts 51 and 93

[FRL-5149-9]

Transportation Conformity Rule Amendments: Transition to the Control Strategy Period

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY: This action proposes to permanently align the timing of certain transportation conformity consequences with the imposition of Clean Air Act highway sanctions. For ozone nonattainment areas with an incomplete 15% emissions-reduction state implementation plan with a protective finding; incomplete ozone attainment/3% rate-of-progress plan; or finding of failure to submit an ozone attainment/3% rate-of-progress plan, and areas whose control strategy implementation plan for ozone, carbon monoxide, particulate matter, or nitrogen dioxide is disapproved with a protective finding, the conformity status of the transportation plan and program would not lapse as a result of such failure until highway sanctions for such failure are effective under other Clean Air Act sections.

This action would delay the lapse in conformity status, which would otherwise prevent approval of new highway and transit projects, and allow States more time to prevent the lapse by submitting complete ozone implementation plans.

EPA has published in the final rule section of this Federal Register a similar interim final rule which takes effect immediately and applies for six months. This proposal would apply the provisions of the interim final rule permanently.

DATES: Comments on this action must be received by March 10, 1995. A public hearing will be held at 10:30 a.m. on February 22, 1995 in Washington, DC.

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may submit written comments (in duplicate, if possible) to: Air and Radiation Docket and Information Center, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Attention: Docket No. A-95-02, 401 M Street, SW., Washington, DC 20460.

CSI-0316/95
16 February 1995

NOTE FOR: D/IM/ADDA/IS
DCI/IRO
DA/IRO
DI/IRO
DO/IRO
DS&T/IRO
OGC (Bob Eatinger)
DD/OCA
C/IP&CRD
C/RDP/MSG/OIT

FROM: John Pereira
Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: JFK Assassination Records
Proposed Regulations

1. Attached for your review and comment is a copy of proposed regulations prepared by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board. The regulations focus on the definition of "assassination record", which is very broad. The possibility of requiring additional records searches is raised.

2. The Board plans to discuss the regulations at its next meeting on 6-7 March, so it would be helpful to give the Board our input in advance of that meeting. Please provide Barry Harrelson (x30292) or me (x30373) with your comments by 1 March.

John Pereira

John F. Pereira

Attachment

facsimile
TRANSMITTAL

to: John Pereira, CIA Historical Review Program
fax #: (703) 243-8343
re: ARRB proposed interpretive regulations
date: February 9, 1995
pages: 4, including cover sheet.

Dear John:

Following this cover sheet is a courtesy copy of the Assassination Records Review Board's proposed interpretive regulations, published yesterday in the Federal Register. The proposed regulations include guidance on interpretation of the scope of certain provisions of the Assassination Records Collection Act, including the terms "assassination record" and "additional records and information." The Board is soliciting comment from all interested parties and would welcome any comments that the CIA may have. (The comment period is 30 days; the deadline is March 10.)

If you have any questions or need any additional information, please don't hesitate to give me a call on my direct line or at our main number, 724-0088.

Sincerely,

Sheryl

Sheryl L. Walter
General Counsel

From the desk of

Sheryl L. Walter
General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, NW, Second Floor
Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 724-0815
Fax (202) 724-0457

27 February 1995

To: C/HRG

Subj: Review Board's Proposed Regulations

1400.2(e)(3), Storage facilities and locations, presents a possible conflict with our continuing protection of WTC.

1400.5, Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety...and no portion withheld solely on grounds of non-relevance. For that portion of the documents we have declared non-relevant that is operational and is clearly non-relevant we should argue strongly with the Board. The Director's statutory responsibility for the protection of sources and methods must be defended; and we can be sure that it was not anticipated that a KGB officer in Mexico City would be transferred to another country and go on generating much operational information. Furthermore, we saw it as the Board's responsibility to review the records we identified as non-relevant and to support publicly those of our decisions that they felt were justified!

1400.6, Originals and copies, could cause problems if the Board gets fussy about it. Originals of memos sent outside the agency would be gone(to the addressee). Originals of cables and despatches are virtually non-existant.

1400.8(c),"...the Board must determine that the record or group of records will more likely than not enhance, enrich, and broaden the historical record.." Like some of this stuff might be non-relevant?

Frank

New Note

NOTE FOR: Edward P. Maguire@ DCI
FROM: John N. Greer
DATE: 02/27/95 06:02:46 PM
SUBJECT: JFK Records

This is in response to your request that I review ASAP the proposed regulations by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board.

I see Sheryl Walters hand very much in evidence here I see from the attachment that she is the Board's GC.

Like you, I am very concerned about the breadth of the reg's definitions The key to keep in mind is the statutory authority for the Board. I would argue that the definition of "assassination record" in the statute (44 U.S.C. section 2107 note, section 3(2) of the Act) is more limited than the reg. The statute defines an assassination record as one "related" to the assassination of JFK. Thus, when section 1400.2 (d) and (e) of the reg authorize Board access to organizational charts of governmental agencies and records necessary and sufficient to describe the agency's records policies and schedules, filing systems and organization, and storage facilities and locations, I would argue that such information is way too far afield. There is no way we can allow the Board to have access to this information, which in any event is prohibited by section 403g from disclosure notwithstanding any other law

The same issue arises with respect to section 1400.7(d) of the reg that proposes to include in the definition of record any records for a person by another name or personal identifier. This would appear to authorize Board access to all information about an agent who may have only been tangentially involved in the assassination but whose crypt is given in many other unrelated documents about unrelated operations. Talk about your camel's nose under the tent!

Finally, section 1400.5 of the reg raises an old dog of an issue. The National Security Archive (Sheryl's old employer) has been fighting for a long time in FOIA litigation that the FOIA refers to records and that therefore all information in a responsive record must be released unless otherwise exempt. There is no FOIA exemption, they argue, for non-responsive material in a record. This is a big problem for multi-topic documents, such as the NID. We, of course, argue that agencies are only required to process that which is asked for and delete non-responsive material as unrequested. The proposed reg would mean that the Board would have access to all information in a document about several unrelated operations or events if that document even mentioned the assassination or anything related to it. Again, the camel's nose

CC: Thomas J. Benjamin@ DCI

From the Desk of Robert J. Eatinger

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
FROM: Robert J. Eatinger
DATE: 03/01/95 01:46:44 PM
SUBJECT: Comments on proposed JFK reg

Here is advance copy:

OGC-95-50522
1 March 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC

SUBJECT: Comments on JFK Assassination Records Proposed Regulation

1. The following are my comments on the Assassination Records Review Boards proposed interpretive regulations published in the Federal Register on 8 February 1995.

2. The term assassination record is defined in the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, Pub.L. 102-525, 106 Stat. 3443, Oct. 26, 1992, reprinted at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note (the Act). Any interpretive definition by the Board cannot exceed that in the Act. The Acts definition is found in Section 3(2) and provides:

> (a) Assassination record means a record that is related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, that was created or made available for use by, obtained by, or otherwise came into possession of

various Federal, State, or local government bodies.

3. The proposed regulation is broader than that in the Act. The proposed regulation includes as assassination records:

> records, public and private, regardless of how labeled or identified, that document, describe, report, analyze, or interpret activities and events that may have led to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy; the assassination itself; and investigations of or inquiries into the assassination.

§ 1400.1(a). This language in overbroad in two respects. First, the phrase events that may have led to is both broader than relates to as in the Act and provides no articulable standard. For instance, the theme in the Oliver Stone movie JFK appears to be that President Kennedy was assassinated as a result of a conspiracy to keep the war in Vietnam from winding down. Under the proposed regulation, the Board might consider all records concerning the war in Vietnam during the Kennedy Administration as being assassination records. Without a standard, the phrase is permits arbitrary and inconsistent application. Third, it includes information about investigations and inquiries other than those conducted by those entities identified in the Act. Although the Board states that it is following the intent of Congress in seeking the most comprehensive disclosure of records related to the assassination, it appears the Board may be exceeding its authority.

4. The definition further states that assassination record includes, without limitation ... all records as defined in Sec. 3(2) of the ARCA. See § 1400.1(b)(1). Thus, by its terms it exceeds the statutory definition. Further, it is unhelpful because by refusing to limit itself to any articulable class of records it remains unlimited and subject to constant re-interpretation by the Board.

5. The proposed definition of additional information and records under proposed § 1400.2 is objectionable because the regulation does not provide the intended use of the definition. The Board may be attempting to provide a definition useful in interpreting the Boards authority under §7(j)(1)(C)(ii) of the Act:

> The Review Board shall have the authority to act in a manner prescribed under this Act including authority to ... direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board, and if necessary investigate the facts surrounding, additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities under this Act....

(Emphasis added.) If this is the case, the Board should expressly so state and provide opportunity for informed comment on that application. For instance, proposed § 1400.2(a) includes all documents used by the agency during its declassification review. This definition could include requests for legal advice on particular matters. Such advice would be protected within the particular agency by attorney-client privilege and should not be provided to an extra-agency body.

6. Please call me with any questions or suggestions.

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.

CC:

TO: John N. Greer @ DCI
FROM: John F. Pereira
DATE: 03/02/95 05:07:45 PM
SUBJECT: Re: Proposed Regs by JFK Assassination Records Review Board

A number of us have concerns about the broad approach in the proposed regs. Among others, Bob Eatinger has written a memo on the subject. We are preparing a formal response for the Board, which will be sent around for comment

In the meantime, I have had an informal discussion with the Board's Executive Director, David Marwell, advising him of our concerns. He has invited us to propose specific textual changes.
The Board's deadline is 10 March.

Any additional thoughts would be welcome

CC: Edmund Cohen @ DA @ DCI, J. Edwin Dietel @ DA @ DCI, Edward P. Moffett @ DCI, Thomas J. Benjamin @ DCI

From the Desk of John N. Greer
OCA

NOTE FOR: Edmund Cohen @ DA
J. Edwin Dietel @ DA
John F. Pereira @ DA
FROM: John N. Greer
DATE: 03/02/95 04:22:48 PM
SUBJECT: Proposed Regs by JFK Assassination Records Review Board

Page and I are very concerned about the overly broad reach of the proposed regulations of the JFK Board. I have prepared specific comments that I will send by separate cover. In essence, we are concerned that the regs reach too far into Agency records and stray too far from the definition of an "assassination record" in the law. What input does CIA have into this process and what are the time constraints? It looks like a power grab. It seems to us that Cohen should engage immediately in his role as Chair of the Agency Release Panel. The full ARP might wish to address these issues at it 9 March meeting. Please advise.

CC: Edward P. Moffett @ DCI
Thomas J. Benjamin @ DCI

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
FROM: Gloria M. Boyd
DATE: 03/02/95 09:25:33 AM
SUBJECT: Response to the JFK Proposed Regulation

This vehicle seemed to be the best one available to pass my "bullets" to you. Perhaps you can dump them in a Word file and ammend them with your thoughts.

1400.1 Interpretation of Assassination Record

a.) non-limiting descriptor "may have led to the assassination" makes us vulnerable for capricious search demands

FYI p 31 of report says R.B should act on a "reasonable basis" in requesting additional info/record.

1400.2 Interpretation of Additional Records

a.) and b.) This relates to Agency classified resources that refer to the total Agency mission. - well beyond the "assassination" subject.

Identification of all such resources will require a separate effort requiring substantial resources. In addition it may be impossible to identify all such specific resources as the review effort involved many people having experience throughout the Agency.

These resources are classified and most probably would be recommended for "indefinite" postponement.

d.) and e.) Information described in these sections has been and is protected by the National Security Act

As a time period for this information is not stated it is thus implied to be open ended and that all such information would be made available.

1400.5 Requirement That Assassintion Records Be Released In Their Entirety

- Nonrelevance issue will most likely result in marked increase in postponed records.

1400.6 Originals and Copies

a.) Large portion of CIA's JFK collection is comprised of copies. A search for originals will require a massive resource commitment. There are additionally a substantial number of previously sanitized documents in the collections.

1400.7 Additional Guidance

d.) Application of this requirement may well jeopardize current postponements aimed at protecting Agency personnel and sources

This requirement also implies a new generation of searches to "round-out" or to verify previous searches and retrieved material..

Major Concern
201 & OP files
If an individual's minor involvement in the JFK story or in anti Cuban activities make his complete file (or all files on the individual) we will have a major source protection & privacy problem

CC:

7 March 1995

NOTE FOR: Bob Eatinger, OGC

SUBJECT: JFK Proposed Regulations

As we discussed, I would appreciate your view as to whether OGC should send a separate paper to the JFK Board on the proposed regulations.

The attached is what we in HRG propose to coordinate in the Agency today, 7 March, depending on your view. I'll hold off circulating the attached draft for comment until I've heard from you.

(The Board asks for comments by 10 March.)

John P.

John Pereira

9 March 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA

FROM: Jane C. Heishman

SUBJECT: JFK Assassination Records Proposed Regulations

REFERENCE:

Per your request, Anthony Frasketi concurs with the proposed regulation.

CC:
James J. Boney @ DST
Anthony R. Frasketi @ DST

CSI-0319/95
8 March 1995

NOTE FOR: D/IM/ADDA/IS
DCI/IRO
DA/IRO
DI/IRO
DO/IRO
DS&T/IRO
OGC (Bob Eatinger)
DD/OCA
C/IP&CRD
C/RDP/MSG/OIT

FROM: John Pereira
Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: JFK Assassination Records
Proposed Regulations

Please review attached draft comments on the proposed regulations prepared by the JFK Assassination Review Board. Our deadline for comments to the Board is 10 March, so please send me or Barry Harrelson your suggestions by cob 9 March

John Pereira

John Pereira

Attachments

14-00000

8 Mar

Mr. David Marwell

Dear David,

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Assassination Records Review Board's proposed interpretive regulations as published in the Federal Register, February 8, 1995. We recognize the value of providing guidance for those who are responsible for implementing the Assassination Records Collection Act.

Our general view is that the regulations are comprehensive in identifying the range of records that would potentially be relevant to the JFK assassination or the scope of the investigations into the assassination.

In a few sections of the regulations the wording seems somewhat overly broad or the meaning is not clear. Attached for the Board's consideration are comments on these sections. In some parts of the text we suggest possible changes in wording for purposes of clarification.

We would be pleased to discuss these comments at the Board's convenience. It is our intention to continue cooperating fully with the Board and to make every effort to release assassination records held by the Agency.

John F. Pereira
Historical Review Group, CIA

Following are CIA's comments on specific sections of the Assassination Records Review Board's interpretive regulations, as published in the Federal Register, February 8, 1995.

1. Section 1400.1 Interpretation of Assassination Record

In paragraph (a) the reference to "activities and events that may have led to the assassination--" seems overly broad, and appears to go beyond the limits established in the Assassination Records Collection Act. We believe that it would be helpful to include an articulable standard in this section. The present text would permit inconsistent application of the regulations, which might encourage massive and expensive, additional records searches that are of doubtful value.

The following change is suggested in paragraph (a):

"activities and events that may reasonably be considered to have led to the assassination--" (This would be consistent with the Act.)

2. Section 1400.2 Interpretation of additional records and information

Paragraph (a) raises a question as to the purpose and definition of "additional records and information." The meaning of the phrase "all documents used--during declassification review of assassination records as well as all other documents--"seems unclear. Is it the intention to include any document, book, index, record system, etc. regardless of relevance to the assassination or investigations, including for example, legal opinions ? We assume that the purpose is to enable the Board to request and review additional records.

We suggest that the section be made more specific, including a clearer statement of the intent. For example, with respect to cryptonyms, codewords, guides, etc. a more precise link to events related to the assassination or to a timeframe could be helpful.

3. Section 1400.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety

The introductory paragraph specifies that "no portions of any assassination record shall be withheld--solely on grounds of non-relevance." This appears to open the door for access to entire documents that contain information on sensitive activities even when the documents contain information that is only incidental to the assassination, such as a passing reference to a name. There is a potential risk that sensitive, non-relevant sources and methods would be compromised.

We suggest that the Board consider adding wording to this section that accommodates those instances when there is a need to release ample information from a document to disclose assassination-related material, while still protecting obviously unrelated, sensitive information. The Board, of course, would continue to have access to the entire record.

4. Section 1400.7 Additional guidance

Paragraph (d) states "any records identified with respect to a particular person also includes any records for that person by any other name, pseudonym, codeword," etc. This appears to require that all records on any individuals who are merely mentioned in an assassination record be made available. Is the objective really to assure that all files on an individual or activity be made available regardless of the labels on the files ? If so, we suggest that the text be modified to reflect this.

In the letter to David, I would add at the end of the third paragraph:

“Our Office of General Counsel provided some legal comments on the scope of the definition that we've included in the attached.”

In the attachment under the comments to Section 1400.1:

After the first sentence, ending with “beyond the limits established by the [ARCA]”, I suggest adding the following sentences:

“The Act authorized the Board to issue interpretive regulations. Interpretive regulations, while entitled to great deference, cannot be inconsistent with the congressional intent to cover only certain specific activities. Rather, they should stay within the clearly articulated definitions provided by Congress. This is particularly important with respect to the definition of “assassination records” since the ARCA has a overriding effect on other statutory grants of power found necessary in the interests of national security, such as the National Security Act's direction that the Director of Central Intelligence protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The ARCA provides a statutory standard for protecting or “postponing” intelligence sources and methods” that applies only to “assassination records.” The standard in the ARCA restricts those sources and methods that can be protected in assassination records. The Review Board is given the ultimate authority to apply that standard, subject to being overridden only by the President. Thus, the ARCA reflects a congressional desire to limit the DCI's authority to protect sources and methods, but only for “assassination records” as ARCA defined it. An interpretive definition by the Board that would sweep in records not covered by the Act, we believe, would exceed the Board's limited rulemaking authority. Thus, the proposed definition should be limited more clearly to those records identified by Congress as “assassination records. To do this, we believe ....”

2. General comment

This page is
From Eatragee
3/10/95

In the letter to David, I would add at the end of the third paragraph:

"Our Office of General Counsel provided some legal comments on the scope of the definition that we've included in the attached."

In the attachment under the comments to Section 1400.1:

After the first sentence, ending with "beyond the limits established by the [ARCA]", I suggest adding the following sentences:

"The Act authorized the Board to issue interpretive regulations. Interpretive regulations, while entitled to great deference, cannot be inconsistent with the congressional intent to cover only certain specific activities. Rather, they should stay within the clearly articulated definitions provided by Congress. This is particularly important with respect to the definition of "assassination records" since the ARCA has a overriding effect on other statutory grants of power found necessary in the interests of national security, such as the National Security Act's direction that the Director of Central Intelligence protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The ARCA provides a statutory standard for protecting or "postponing" intelligence sources and methods" that applies only to "assassination records." The standard in the ARCA restricts those sources and methods that can be protected in assassination records. The Review Board is given the ultimate authority to apply that standard, subject to being overridden only by the President. Thus, the ARCA reflects a congressional desire to limit the DCI's authority to protect sources and methods, but only for "assassination records" as ARCA defined it. An interpretive definition by the Board that would sweep in records not covered by the Act, we believe, would exceed the Board's limited rulemaking authority. Thus, the proposed definition should be limited more clearly to those records identified by Congress as "assassination records. To do this, we believe ...."

2. Following are comments on specific sections of the Assassination Records Review Board's interpretive regulations, as published in the Federal Register, February 8, 1995.

a. Section 1400.1 Interpretation of Assassination Record

In paragraph (a) the reference to "activities and events that may have led to the assassination--" seems overly broad, and appears to go beyond the limits established in the Assassination Records Collection Act. We believe that it would be helpful to include an articuable standard in this section. The present text would permit inconsistent application of the regulations, which might encourage massive and expensive, additional records searches that are of doubtful value.

The following change is suggested in paragraph (a):

"activities and events that may reasonably be considered to have led to the assassination--" (This would be consistent with the Act.)

b. Section 1400.2 Interpretation of additional records and information

Paragraph (a) raises a question as to the purpose and definition of "additional records and information." The meaning of the phrase "all documents used--during declassification review of assassination records as well as all other documents--"seems overly broad and unclear. As presently worded, this section would appear to include any document, book, index, record system, etc. regardless of relevance to the assassination or investigations, including for example, legal opinions. We assume that the purpose is to enable the Board to request and review additional records.

We suggest that the section be made more specific, including a clearer statement of the intent. For example, with respect to cryptonyms, codewords, guides, etc. a more precise link to events related to the assassination or to a timeframe could be helpful.

c. Section 1400.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety

The introductory paragraph specifies that "no portions of any assassination record shall be withheld--solely on grounds of non-relevance." This appears to open the door for access to entire documents that contain information on sensitive activities even when the documents contain information that is only incidental to the assassination, such as a passing reference to a name. There is a potential risk that sensitive, non-relevant sources and methods would be compromised.

We suggest that the Board consider adding wording to this section that accommodates those instances when there is a need to release ample information from a document to disclose assassination-related material, while still protecting obviously unrelated, sensitive information. The Board, of course, would continue to have access to the entire record.

d. Section 1400.7 Additional guidance

Paragraph (d) states "any records identified with respect to a particular person also includes any records for that person by any other name, pseudonym, codeword," etc. This appears to require that all records on any individuals who are merely mentioned in an assassination record be made available. We assume that the purpose is more specific i.e., to assure that all files on an individual or activity be made available regardless of the labels on the files. We suggest that the text be modified to reflect this.

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

1 March 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira
Barry Harrelson
CSI/HRG

FROM: Kathryn I. Dyer
DI/IRO

SUBJECT: Comments--ARRB Proposed Interpretive Regulations

1. I have reviewed the proposed interpretive regulations drafted by the Assassination Records Review Board, particularly the sections addressing the ARRB's interpretation of the scope of certain provisions of the Assassination Records Collection Act. While I have comments on a number of sections, there is one section in particular which raises serious concerns--principally 1400.2 regarding additional information and records.

2. As presently worded, this section opens up significant records which have nothing to do per se with the assassination, and which are currently protected by various laws, including the National Security Act of 1947, and, moreover, are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

For example, (d) Organizational charts of government agencies.
(e) Records necessary and sufficient to describe the the Agency's:
(1) Records policies and schedules;
(2) Filing systems and organization; and
(3) Storage facilities and location.

Items (a) and (b) of this section (1400.2) also pose similar problems in that (a) includes all documents used by agencies during their declassification review...This includes all materials including omnibus classification guides or other materials (i.e. not merely those prepared for use in the JFK review) which would identify sensitive material across the board. Similarly, item (b) includes materials "created or used by agencies in furtherance of their review...." This entire section should at a minimum be restricted to items created by agencies for use in the assassination reviews. For example, if the DO has a master list of cryptonyms, some of which appear in JFK documents, only the subset should be included. Generic categories of information which stand alone on their own merits should be omitted.

Recommend: Delete items (d) and (e). Subpart (a) should be confined to documents created by agencies (vice used) during their declassification review.

The inclusion of generic categories of information, i.e., those created independent of the assassination investigation(s) and review effort, appears to be a calculated effort to gain access to significant areas of information that are protected by other laws (i.e., circumvention of the FOIA.)

If provisions (d) and (e) are not deleted and a and b not limited to materials created by or created solely for use in the assassination review, an additional section should be added that applies to section 1400.2 in its entirety. This should state that information created independent of the assassination review will be released unless protected by other laws, Executive Orders, and/or regulations.

3. Other Comments:

1400.1 (a)

Recommend: Insert the word "reasonably" between "may have [reasonably] led to the assassination..."

The mere allegation that foreign events or international developments may have led to the assassination at this point in time (after all the investigations) should not bring records not related to the assassination on their face within the scope of this act. There should be an objective standard, i.e., reasonable person threshold. Otherwise agencies could be subjected to massive records searches on little more than whim. The JFK assassination is the epitome of conspiracy theories. Without a threshold standard, the door would be opened to additional searches (without merit), the potential costs of which could be significant.

1400.6 Originals and copies.

Recommend: (2) and (3) Add the word "available" after "the earliest generation print [available]."

Otherwise no provision to cover situation when earliest generation print can't be located.

1400.8	Implementing the ARCA - Catalog of Assassination Records. (COAR) Sections (a) and (c) appear to be inconsistent. As presently worded, former specifies all records will be listed in COAR; latter section implies not all records will be listed, i.e., requirement that in listing one must determine that the record will more likely than not enhance, enrich....

4. If any questions, please call 54644 (secure).

Kathryn I. Dyer

Kathryn I. Dyer

NOTE FOR: John F. Pereira @ DCI
FROM: Eldon I. Hatch @ DA @ DCI
DATE: 02/21/95 02:15:20 PM
SUBJECT: Comments re the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

1. In general there is not much in the regulation to cause the DA undo concern except for Sec. 1400.2 Interpretation of additional records and information; specifically (e), (1), (2), & (3). The schedules are classified in the agregate, filing systems and organization structures are classified in toto, and the storage facility is an Agency Records Center at a classified location. I know this may not be a lot of help, but I have little or no argument/comment concerning the other sections.

2. If you have any questions/comments, please call me on 30683 or note.

CC:

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

22 February 1995

Executive Secretariat
Information Review Officer

John F. Pereira
Historical REview Group

Attn: Barry Harrelson

Barry,

Do not agree with "no portions of any assassination records shall be withheld from public disclosure solely on grounds of non-relevance." See Section 1400.5. Non-relevant material should not have to be reviewed for declassification & release. This could be a never-ending project.

Thanks for the opportunity to comment.

Eunice M. Evans
DCI/IRO

1 March 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Periera

FROM: Gary Breneman

SUBJECT: Comments on Proposed Rules, 36 CFR Part 1400, Concerning JFK Records Collection Act of 1992

1. You asked that I review subject proposed rules and provide my thoughts and concerns. This is in response to that request.

2. As a general statement, the proposed rules are not well written and seem to try to cast the biggest net possible. With reference to poor draftsmanship, note that at Sec.1400.2, they introduce a term "additional information and records," and describe what the term includes. Compare sections 1400.3 relating to "sources" and 1400.4 relating to "(t)ypes of materials." In the latter, they have reversed the term and used "additional records and information." While the intent is fairly clear, it causes one to wonder what they had in mind.

3. With reference to the big net approach, it is a basic rule of statutory and regulatory drafting to not write laws and regulations which cannot be enforced. In this regard, I know of no authority in U.S. law, including the JFK Act, which would give the Board jurisdiction over records which "may be located at, or under the control of,"..."(f)oreign governments." See 1400.4 (b). I have a similar concern with respect to "private" records. Cf. Sec. 1400.1 (a).

4. On the nonsensical side of the big net approach is every book, magazine and newspaper article and which has ever been written that may "report, analyze, or interpret" the assassination. See 1400.1 (a). If read literally, the Agency would have to give up all of its collections of private books, etc. which fall within this definition. This is particularly true of those books we referred to here within HRG for information and understanding as we conducted the review. See 1400.2 (a) -- (a)ll documents used by government offices and agencies during their declassification review of assassination records..."

5. With specific reference to the requirement of 1400.2 (a), the Agency should be concerned about its records within the DO which tie crypts to true names of projects and alias' and pseudos to the true names of individuals. Because we regularly called the DO office responsible for these matters for assistance in identifying the projects and names behind the crypts and alias,' this subsection would seem to place those document holdings within the reach of the Board. This needs to be addressed.

5. Turning to 1400.7 (d), the Agency should be very careful here. In HRG's review and release of documents, we have often given out an alias but protected the true name. In others, we have given out the true name but protected the alias or pseudo. This section seems to vitiate that effort and needs to be addressed.

6. I have several thoughts on the non-relevant issue which would take several more paragraphs. Suffice it to say, carried to its extreme, if the Board can in any way make the case a document is an assassination record, then they are entitled to access to it and may direct its release.

7. I would be pleased to discuss any of these items with you if you wish.

Gary M. Breneman

2 March 1995

Assassination Record Definition: Comments

Background Section:

[the statement *"search and disclosure of records...must go beyond the records of previous commissions..."* is based on a similar statements on pages 19 & 21 of the Report to accompany S. 3000]

Section 1400.1 - Interpretation of Assassination Record
*(a)"An assassination record includes,...,all records...that **may** have led to the assassination..."*

[S.3006 states that the "Board should act on a reasonable basis in requesting additional records. Recommend we insert "**reasonably**" into statement after "have" (or change may to reasonably could)]

(b)(2)"All records...or segregated by all Federal...agencies in conjunction with any investigation..."

[means all "microfilm" documents are assassination records, and will have to be reviewed and accounted for even if we are successful in "postponing" most of these records]

1400.2 Interpretation of additional records and information.
*(a) "All documents **used** by government offices and agencies during their declassification review of assassination records as well as **all other documents, indices, records, and other material that disclose cryptonyms, code names, or other identification material in assassination records.**"*

[Section (a) is too inclusive; as written would include ANY document, book, index, record system or other material consulted or "used" during the review, regardless of relevance to JFK assassination. In fact, most of the material "used" in the review was used to determine if information/names/etc. had been previously released and had nothing to do with the assassination or investigations.

Also the part of the statement following "as well as" needs clarification. Are they asking for all records that contain information on individuals mentioned in assassination records or are they asking for the records/indices/etc. that were used to identify individuals mentioned by crypt or code name in assassination records.

[the amendment recommended by FBI covers CIA concerns; ideally the word "used" should be changed to "created"]

1400.2 (continued)

(b) & (c) [ok]

(d) & (e) [add wording to identify time period for these records such as "**at the time of the assassination and investigations**".]

1400.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety.

An assassination record shall be disclosed in its entirety except for portions specifically postponed...,and ***no portions** of **any** assassination **records** shall be **withheld from public disclosure solely on grounds of non-relevance.***

[If this applies to an "individual" assassination record then there is no problem. However, if it applies, as I suspect, to files and groups of records then we have a major problem of privacy and source protection with the OP and 201 files. It may be possible to "postpone" the 201 and OP files under the Privacy exemption and National Security Act, however, the FBI approach to amending the regulation to deal with "**incidental appearance of assassination material**" seems a better approach. Our proposed amendment should include "**files**" as well as "records".

1400.6 Originals and Copies

(a)(2) add "available" after *"the earliest generation print"*

(b) in cases where a copy, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section is authorized...the board may...require a certified copy.

[In some cases our file copy or original is a previously sanitized copy of the document; we may have to "certify" theses copies as the "original" file copy.]

1400.7 Additional guidance

(d)...Any records identified with respect to a particular person also includes any records for that person by any other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol, number or cryptonym...

[This needs clarification. It the goal of this section is to ensure that all files on an individual/project are provided regardless of how filed (under name, crypt, etc.) then I do not see a problem. However, with out clarifying language, this section could lead to the type of situation described by Gloria. FBI also requested clarification.]

Issues:

Non-related (36,000+ pages) and OP (10,000 pages) material in microfilm collection

The “segregated” records statement negates our claim that material in the Microfilm is “non-related”. We can point out that the HSCA requested, but did not review a lot of these records and that access was given to complete files even thought the request dealt with specific events or timeframes. However, given their objective of going “beyond” previous investigations, I not sure this would have any impact.

A different approach would be to deny or postpone personnel type files including 201s that are not related to the assassination (guidelines to be established in consultation with the Board) as unwarranted invasion of privacy and/or protection of sources. Approximately 25,000 pages of the Non-related material are from 201 files; the remaining 10,000+ pages are from organization and project files.

10 March

To: C/HRG

Subject: OGC's comments on proposed JFK regulations.

Bob's comments should be included in our response to the Board, however, not as he has recommended. The language and tone is very different and does not inserted well into existing text; I think his comments will work better as a separate paragraph or as an addendum.

Barry

10 March 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA

FROM: John F. Pereira

SUBJECT: JFK Assassination Records Proposed Regulations

REFERENCE:

10 March 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: John F. Pereira @ DA

FROM: William H. McNair
DO/IRO

SUBJECT: JFK Assassination Records Proposed Regulations

REFERENCE: CSI-0319/95, subject as above, dtd 8 March 1995

1. The DO concurs in ref comments and would add the following:

A. Comment Par 2 re Section 1400.2 - para d and e(3) call for "Organizational charts of government agencies" and "Records necessary and sufficient to describe and agency's storage facilities and locations".

Organizational charts of detail are classified and release would have to be balanced against DCI mandate to protect such details.

Description and location of agency's storage facilities are classified and release of such information would have to be balanced against security concerns and DCI mandate to protect such information.

B. Comment 4 re Section 1400.7 - Consideration should be given to protect records and files of different time frame not related to JFK where the subject is but a passing name or reference. To reveal full records could endanger national security without adding to body of information relating to JFK.

2. Believe these two comments should be considered for inclusion into official CIA remarks.

CC:

CC:

NOTE FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Barry Harrelson @ DCI
FROM: Kathryn I. Dyer @ DI @ DCI
DATE: 03/10/95 08:13:32 AM
SUBJECT: Comments re Assassination Records Review Board's Interpretive Regulations

1. I have reviewed the draft comments prepared for the Agency regarding the AARB's proposed interpretive regulations and believe some modifications are in order.

2. First and foremost, the comments regarding Section 1400.2 do not adequately address the concerns previously raised regarding the unbridled inclusion of categories of records that have nothing to do with JFK's assassination, e.g., organization charts, records schedules, filing systems, etc. This section should be limited to items created by agencies for use in the assassination review. Generic categories of information which stand alone on their merits should be included. This section is overly broad and inclusive. (Please see the discussion in my 1 March memorandum.) Contrary to the proposed comment that the intent of this section is "unclear", I think it is eminently clear, and that's the problem. I think our concerns would be better served by raising in terms of scope rather than intent. Also recommend against asking questions such as "Is it the intent...?" Heck, yes! Would suggest wording along the lines--"As presently worded, this section would appear to include...."

3. The proposed comment on Section 1400.7 opens the door to all records on a person vice those relevant to the assassination inquiries. Do we really want to set ourselves up for the obvious response to the question we are asking? There are a number of different points here that need to be clarified, all dealing with scope. The board's legitimate concern that all records on an individual records be addressed (regardless of how filed, e.g.under another name, pseudonym, etc.). And an equally legitimate Agency concern that
1.) records on an individual when the records themselves are not relevant to the assassination inquiry, (i.e. other records on the individual may be), or 2.) that all records on individuals who merely happen to be mentioned in a document falling within the scope of the assassination inquiry (but the individuals themselves are not the subject of investigation) should not be subsumed within the scope of these regulations.

CC:

To: C/HRG

Subject: OGC's comments on proposed JFK regulations.

1) OGC submission

Bob's comments should be included in our response to the Board, however, not as he has recommended. The language and tone is very different and does not inserted well into existing text; I think his comments will work better as a separate paragraph or as an addendum.

2) DI IRO

Kathy's comments on section 1400.2 are on target, but a little strong. I don't think the board will buy changed "used" to "created". Our proposed response, as written, does question the scope but not directly. (note: The FBI proposed wording, if accepted by the board, would satisfactorily limit the scope of this section). She does have a point in changing "intent" to "as presently worded".

On section 1400.7, Kathy's reaction is the same as Gloria's. I think our response adequately address the concerns here, but could be strengthen without changing the tone of the response. (Note - OGC comments will also address "scope" which clearly is Kathy's primary concern.

Barry

Mr. David Marwell

Dear David,

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Assassination Records Review Board's proposed interpretive regulations as published in the Federal Register, February 8, 1995. We recognize the value of providing guidance for those who are responsible for implementing the Assassination Records Collection Act.

Our general view is that the regulations are comprehensive in identifying the range of records that would potentially be relevant to the JFK assassination or the scope of the investigations into the assassination.

In a few sections of the regulations the wording seems somewhat overly broad or the meaning is not clear. Attached for the Board's consideration are comments on these sections. In some parts of the text we suggest possible changes in wording for purposes of clarification.

We would be pleased to discuss these comments at the Board's convenience. It is our intention to continue cooperating fully with the Board and to make every effort to release assassination records held by the Agency.

John F. Pereira
Historical Review Group, CIA

Following are CIA's comments on specific sections of the Assassination Records Review Board's interpretive regulations, as published in the Federal Register, February 8, 1995.

1. Section 1400.1 Interpretation of Assassination Record

In paragraph (a) the reference to "activities and events that may have led to the assassination--" seems overly broad, and appears to go beyond the limits established in the Assassination Records Collection Act. We believe that it would be helpful to include an articuable standard in this section. The present text would permit inconsistent application of the regulations, which might encourage massive and expensive, additional records searches that are of doubtful value.

The following change is suggested in paragraph (a):

"activities and events that may reasonably be considered to have led to the assassination--" (This would be consistent with the Act.)

2. Section 1400.2 Interpretation of additional records and information

Paragraph (a) raises a question as to the purpose and definition of "additional records and information." The meaning of the phrase "all documents used--during declassification review of assassination records as well as all other documents--"seems unclear. Is it the intention to include any document, book, index, record system, etc. regardless of relevance to the assassination or investigations, including for example, legal opinions ? We assume that the purpose is to enable the Board to request and review additional records.

We suggest that the section be made more specific, including a clearer statement of the intent. For example, with respect to cryptonyms, codewords, guides, etc. a more precise link to events related to the assassination or to a timeframe could be helpful.

3. Section 1400.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety

The introductory paragraph specifies that "no portions of any assassination record shall be withheld--solely on grounds of non-relevance." This appears to open the door for access to entire documents that contain information on sensitive activities even when the documents contain information that is only incidental to the assassination, such as a passing reference to a name. There is a potential risk that sensitive, non-relevant sources and methods would be compromised.

We suggest that the Board consider adding wording to this section that accommodates those instances when there is a need to release ample information from a document to disclose assassination-related material, while still protecting obviously unrelated, sensitive information. The Board, of course, would continue to have access to the entire record.

4. Section 1400.7 Additional guidance

Paragraph (d) states "any records identified with respect to a particular person also includes any records for that person by any other name, pseudonym, codeword," etc. This appears to require that all records on any individuals who are merely mentioned in an assassination record be made available. Is the objective really to assure that all files on an individual or activity be made available regardless of the labels on the files ? If so, we suggest that the text be modified to reflect this.

(o) of this section shall be completed by October 1, 1995.

* * * * *

PART 1926—SAFETY AND HEALTH REGULATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION

5. The authority citation of subpart Z of 29 CFR Part 1926 is revised to read as follows.

Authority: Sections 6 and 8, Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 655, 657, Secretary of Labor's Orders Nos. 12–71 (36 FR 8754), 8–76 (41 FR 25059), 9–83 (48 FR 35736) or 1–90 (55 FR 9003) as applicable, and 29 CFR part 1911

Section 1926.1101 also issued under 5 U.S.C. 553

Section 1926.1102 not issued under 29 U.S.C. 655 or 29 CFR part 1911, also issued under 5 U.S.C. 553

Section 1926.1103 through 1926.1118 also issued under 29 U.S.C. 653

Section 1926.1128 also issued under 29 U.S.C. 653.

Section 1926.1145 and 1926.1147 also issued under 29 U.S.C. 653

Section 1926.1148 also issued under 29 U.S.C. 653.

6. Section 1926.1101 is amended by revising paragraph (q) to read as follows:

§ 1926.1101 Asbestos.

* * * * *

(q) *Dates.* (1) This standard shall become effective October 11, 1994.

(2) The provisions of 29 CFR 1926.58 remain in effect until the start-up dates of the equivalent provisions of this standard.

(3) *Start up dates.* All obligations of this standard commence on the effective date except as follows

(i) *Methods of compliance.* The engineering and work practice controls required by paragraph (g) of this section shall be implemented by October 1, 1995.

(ii) *Respiratory protection.* Respiratory protection required by paragraph (h) of this section shall be provided by October 1, 1995.

(iii) *Hygiene facilities and practices for employees.* Hygiene facilities and practices required by paragraph (j) of this section shall be provided by October 1, 1995.

(iv) *Communication of hazards.* Identification, notification, labeling and sign posting, and training required by paragraph (k) of this section shall be provided by October 1, 1995.

(v) *Housekeeping.* Housekeeping practices and controls required by paragraph (l) of this section shall be provided by October 1, 1995.

(vi) Medical surveillance required by paragraph (m) of this section shall be provided by October 1, 1995

(vii) The designation and training of competent persons required by paragraph (o) of this section shall be completed by October 1, 1995.

* * * * *

[FR Doc. 95–15790 Filed 6–27–95, 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510–26–M

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

34 CFR Part 685

RIN 1840–AC05

William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program

AGENCY: Department of Education.

ACTION: Final regulations

SUMMARY: The Secretary amends the regulations governing the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program to add the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number to certain sections of the regulations. Those sections contain information collection requirements approved by OMB. The Secretary takes this action to inform the public that these requirements have been approved, and therefore affected parties must comply with them.

EFFECTIVE DATE: Information collection requirements in the final regulations are effective on July 1, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rachel Edelstein, Policy Development Division, Office of Postsecondary Education, U.S. Department of Education, 600 Independence Avenue, SW., (Room 3053, ROB-3), Washington, DC 20202–5400. Telephone (202) 708–9406. Individuals who use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) may call the Federal Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877–8339 between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. Eastern time, Monday through Friday.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Final regulations for the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program were published on December 1, 1994 (59 FR 61664). Compliance with information collection requirements in these regulations was delayed until those requirements were approved by OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980. OMB approved the information collection requirements on December 7, 1994. Those requirements will therefore become effective with the other provisions of the regulations on July 1, 1995.

Waiver of Proposed Rulemaking

It is the practice of the Secretary to offer interested parties the opportunity to comment on proposed regulations. However, the publication of OMB control numbers is purely technical and does not establish substantive policy. Therefore, the Secretary has determined under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), that public comment on the regulations is unnecessary and contrary to the public interest.

List of Subjects in 34 CFR Part 685

Administrative practice and procedure, Colleges and universities, Education, Loan programs—education, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Student aid, Vocational education

Dated: June 23, 1995.

David A. Longanecker,

Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education.

The Secretary amends Part 685 of Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 685—WILLIAM D. FORD FEDERAL DIRECT LOAN PROGRAM

1. The authority citation for part 685 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1087a *et seq.*, unless otherwise noted.

2. Sections 685.204, 685.206, 685.209, 685.213, 685.214, 685.215, 685.301, 685.302, 685.303, 685.309, and 685.401 are amended by adding the OMB control number following the section to read as follows:

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 1840–0672)

[FR Doc. 95–15844 Filed 6–27–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4000–01–P

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

36 CFR Chapter XIV

Guidance on Interpreting and Implementing the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

AGENCY: Assassination Records Review Board.

ACTION: Final regulations.

SUMMARY: These final interpretive regulations provide guidance on the interpretation of certain terms included in the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 and on implementation of certain of the statute's provisions. The final interpretive regulations make effective the proposed interpretive regulations previously published by the Assassination Records Review Board (Review Board). The Review Board revised the proposed interpretive

regulations after considering public comment received in writing and through testimony at public hearings convened by the Review Board.

EFFECTIVE DATE: These interpretative regulations are effective June 28, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: T. Jeremy Gunn, Acting General Counsel, Assassination Records Review Board, 600 E Street, N.W., 2nd Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 724-0088, fax (202) 724-0457.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background and Statutory Authority

The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. 2107 (as amended) (JFK Act), established the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Assassination Records Collection) at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). In establishing a process for public disclosure of all records relating to the assassination, Congress created an independent Federal agency, the Assassination Records Review Board, that consists of five citizens appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in 1994. Under the JFK Act, the Review Board is empowered to decide "whether a record constitutes an assassination record." 44 U.S.C. 2107.7(i)(2)(A). Congress intended that the Review Board "issue guidance to assist in articulating the scope or universe of assassination records." President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, S. Rep. 102-328, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) at 21. These final interpretive regulations, a proposed version of which were published at 60 FR 7506-7508 (Feb. 8, 1995), comply with that mandate.

The Review Board's goal in issuing this guidance is to implement congressional intent that the JFK Collection contain "the most comprehensive disclosure of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy." S. Rep. 102-328, *supra* at 18. The Board is also mindful of Congress's instruction that the Board apply a "broad and encompassing" working definition of "assassination record" in order to achieve the goal of assembling the fullest historical record on this tragic event in American history and on the investigations that were undertaken in the assassination's aftermath. The Board recognizes that many agencies began to organize and review records responsive to the JFK Act even before the Board was appointed and began its work. Nevertheless, the Board's aim is that this guidance will aid in the ultimate assembly and public disclosure of the fullest possible historical record on this tragedy and on subsequent investigations and inquiries into it.

The final interpretive regulations are intended to identify comprehensively the range of records reasonably related to the assassination of President Kennedy and investigations undertaken in its aftermath. The final interpretive regulations are also intended to aid in the consistent, effective, and efficient implementation of the JFK Act and to establish procedures for including assassination records in the JFK Assassination Records Collection established by Congress and housed at NARA's facility in College Park, Maryland.

Notice and Comment Process

The Review Board sought public comment on its proposed interpretive regulations and set a thirty-day period, which ended on March 10, 1995, for the purpose of receiving written comments. The Review Board also heard testimony at public hearings on aspects of the proposed interpretive regulations. In addition, the Review Board sent copies of the proposed interpretive regulations to agencies known to have an interest in and to be affected by the Review Board's work, particularly those that either created or now hold assassination records, and to the appropriate oversight committees in Congress. The Review Board also sent notices of the proposed interpretive regulations and request for comments to many organizations and individuals who have demonstrated an interest in the release of materials under the JFK Act or who have engaged in research into the assassination of President Kennedy.

The Review Board received written comments on the proposed interpretive regulations from four Federal agencies, three state and local government entities, and twenty-one private individuals and organizations with an interest in the Review Board's work. Federal agencies providing written comments include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), NARA, and the Department of State. State or local government entities providing written comments include the Dallas (Texas) County Commissioner's Court, the Dallas County Historical Foundation, and the City of Dallas Records Management Division of the Office of the City Secretary.

Prior to publication of the proposed interpretive regulations, the Review Board heard testimony at a public hearing held at the Review Board's offices on December 14, 1994, from representatives of NARA on the question of including artifacts in the scope of the term "assassination record." After publication of the proposed interpretive regulations and before expiration of the comment period, the Review Board heard testimony at a public hearing on March 7, 1995, from the FBI and from several individuals and representatives of private organizations on their views regarding the text of the proposed interpretive regulations. Copies of all written comments received and transcripts of public testimony on the proposed interpretive regulations were placed in the public reading room at the Review Board's offices and made available for inspection and copying by the public upon request.

At a public meeting held on May 3, 1995, for which notice was timely published in the Federal Register pursuant to the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, the Review Board considered a final draft of these interpretive regulations. That discussion draft incorporated many of the comments received by the Review Board on the proposed interpretive regulations. The Review Board unanimously voted to adopt the text of the discussion draft as its final interpretive regulations. The approved text is, with a few minor corrections that do not change the substance, published here.

Response to Comments

The Review Board found very helpful the thoughtful and, in many cases, very detailed comments submitted on the proposed interpretive regulations. Nearly all of the commentators expressed support for what they characterized as the proposed interpretive regulations' comprehensiveness and flexibility. All comments submitted were carefully studied and considered by the Review Board. Submitters made both substantive and technical suggestions, many of which were incorporated into the interpretive regulations as issued here in final form. The summary below includes the principal substantive comments received and the Review Board's responses thereto.

Comment. The proposed language of § 1400.1(a) is unduly restrictive because the phrase "may have led to the assassination" requires at least a potential causal link to the assassination. Moreover, determining whether there is a causal link would require the Review Board to evaluate the validity of competing accounts of what led to the assassination of President Kennedy

Response A number of commentators put forward criticisms along these lines. Some of these commentators suggested that some form of a "reasonably related" standard be substituted for the "may have led to" language, while others suggested alternative formulations (*e g.* "that may shed light on the assassination"). In adopting and eventually applying a "reasonably related" standard, the Review Board does not seek to endorse or reject any particular theory of the assassination of President Kennedy, although such theories may inform the Review Board's search for records reasonably related to the assassination and investigations into it. The Review Board believes that § 1400.1(a), as now worded, advances that effort and will promote a consistent broad interpretation and implementation of the JFK Act.

Comment: The proposed language of § 1400.1(a) is too broad and open-ended. A more specific nexus to the assassination of President Kennedy should be required.

Response. As its text and legislative history make clear, the JFK Act contemplates that the Review Board extend its search for relevant records beyond what has been compiled or reviewed by previous investigations It is inevitable, therefore, that the Review Board must exercise judgment in determining whether such records constitute "assassination records." The Review Board regards its "reasonably related" standard as sufficient to ensure that agencies are not overburdened with identifying and reviewing records that, if added to the JFK Assassination Records Collection, would not advance the purposes of the JFK Act

Comment Section 1400 1 should specifically include as assassination records any records pertaining to particularly identified individuals, organizations, events, etc.

Response: The Review Board determined that, in almost every case, the types of records commentators sought to add were already adequately covered by § 1400.1 as proposed. Accordingly, the Review Board declined to include records or record groups at the level of specificity urged by these commentators because doing so might limit the scope of the interpretive regulations as applied initially by other agencies, or otherwise might prove duplicative or confusing However, the Review Board welcomes and encourages suggestions from the public as to specific records or record groups that may constitute assassination records, and intends to pursue such leads, including those provided in the written comments to the proposed interpretive regulations

Comment: Section 1400 2(a) is vague and overly broad in describing the scope of additional records and information

Response: The Review Board has added language to clarify that the purpose of requesting additional records and information under § 1400.2(a) is to identify, evaluate, or interpret assassination records, including assassination records that may not initially have been identified as such by an agency The Review Board also has added language to indicate that it intends to implement this section through written requests signed by its Executive Director. The Review Board contemplates that, with regard to such requests, its staff will work closely with entities to which such requests are addressed to implement the JFK Act effectively and efficiently.

Comment. The scope of additional records and information should specifically include records and information that:

—describe agencies' methods of searching for records:
—describe reclassification, transfer, destruction, or other disposition of records; or
—do not constitute assassination records, but have the potential to enhance, enrich, and broaden the historical record of the assassination.

Response. To the extent that the inclusion of records and information of the types described would assist the Review Board in meeting its responsibilities under the JFK Act, the Review Board has adopted the suggested language

Comment. The scope of "assassination records" under § 1400 1 and "additional records and information" under § 1400.2 should not extend to state and local government or to private records that are not in the possession of the Federal government.

Response The Review Board considered such comments carefully, but concluded that the terms of the JFK Act preclude the narrower reading of the Review Board's responsibilities urged by such comments. Section 1400.6 allows the Review Board, in its discretion, to accept copies in lieu of originals The Review Board believes that this flexibility addresses the concerns of some commentators about the removal of original records already housed, for example, in state or local archives

Comment: Section 1400.3 should include as sources of assassination records and additional records and information individuals and corporations that possess such material even if not obtained from sources identified in paragraphs (a) through (e) thereof, and should specifically include individuals and corporations that contracted to provide goods or services to the government.

Response: The Review Board has added paragraph (f) to this section in response to these comments. The Review Board has concluded that, in view of paragraph (f), specifically identifying government contractors or other private persons would be unnecessary and redundant.

Comment. NARA contended that § 1400.4 should not include artifacts among the types of materials included in the term "record." Treating artifacts as "records" would be contrary to NARA's accustomed practice and the usage of the term "records" in other areas of Federal records law and would result in substantial practical difficulties.

Response: The Review Board has carefully considered NARA's objections to the inclusion of artifacts as "records," but decided that this inclusion is necessary to achieve the purposes of the JFK Act. The Review Board notes that artifacts that became exhibits to the proceedings of the Warren Commission have long been in the custody of NARA, and decided that those artifacts should remain in the JFK Assassination Records Collection. The Review Board further believes that the unique issues of public trust and credibility of government processes that prompted enactment of the JFK Act require that artifacts be included within the JFK Assassination Records Collection. The strong support that commenting members of the public gave to this position reinforces this conclusion. The Review Board included in its proposed regulations, and retained in § 1400.7(b)–(c) of the final interpretive regulations, language intended to address NARA's concerns about potential copying requirements and preservation issues unique to artifacts.

Comment: Section 1400.5 should be modified to allow agencies to withhold from the JFK Assassination Records Collection material that is not related to the assassination of President Kennedy, even though it appears in a record that contains other material that is related to the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response: It remains the intent of this section to make clear to agencies that, as a rule, entire records, and not parts thereof, are to become part of the JFK Assassination Records Collection. The purpose of requiring that records be produced in their entirety is to ensure that the context and integrity of the records be preserved. Only in rare instances will the Review Board assent to withholding particular information within an assassination record on the ground that such information is not relevant to the assassination. Section 1400.5 has been modified to clarify that, although the Review Board may allow this practice in extraordinary circumstances, this determination is within the sole direction of the Review Board.

Comment: The discussion of originals and copies in § 1400.6 is, in various respects, unclear and confusing.

Response: The Review Board made extensive changes to this section to address these concerns and to achieve greater internal consistency. The Review Board's intent in this section is to express its strong preference for including original records in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, but also its understanding that, for a variety of reasons, there may be situations where a copy instead of the original of an assassination record may be more appropriate for inclusion in the Collection.

Comment: Section 1400.6 should be clarified as to whether "record copies" of Federal agency may be included in the JFK Assassination Records Collection.

Response: The Review Board has modified § 1400.6(a)(1) to clarify that the Review Board may determine that record copies may be included in the Collection.

Comment: The Catalog of Assassination Records (COAR) described in § 1400.8 should consist of, or be replaced by, the database and finding aids prepared by the Federal agencies in possession of assassination records.

Response: This and other comments received regarding the proposed § 1400.8 indicated some confusion as to the intent and operation of the mechanism established in this section. For this reason, the Review Board decided to replace the term "Catalog of Assassination Records" with the term "Notice of Assassination Record Determination" (NARD), and to redraft this section to clarify the Review Board's intent to use the NARD mechanism simply to document the Review Board's ongoing determinations that, in addition to records explicitly enumerated in the JFK Act as assassination records (e.g., records reviewed by the HSCA) or identified by Federal agencies in their own searches, certain other records also are assassination records to be included in the JFK Assassination Records Collection.

Section by Section Analysis

Scope of Assassination Record

As discussed above with regard to the public comments, subparagraph (a) of § 1400.1 has been modified to adopt a "reasonably related" standard and the term "Catalog of Assassination Records" has been replaced with "Notice of Assassination Record Determination" in subparagraph (b)(3). The final interpretive regulations also incorporate suggested technical changes, including edits for clarification and revision of this section's title to make it more precise.

Scope of Additional Records and Information

The title of § 1400.2 was revised to conform to the new title of § 1400.1. Additional editing changes were made for clarity. A new subpart (G) was added to subparagraph (e) and a new subparagraph (f) was added after consideration of comments that noted the potential exclusion of certain categories from the scope of this section in the proposed interpretive regulations. The Review Board has added language in the final interpretive regulations to clarify that the purpose of this section is to aid in identifying, evaluating or interpreting assassination records, including assassination records that may not initially have been identified by an agency. The Review Board also has added language to suggest that it intends to implement this section through written requests signed by the Review Board's Executive Director.

Sources of Assassination Records and Additional Records and Information

A new subparagraph (g) was added to § 1400.3 after consideration of comments noting the potential exclusion of records created by individuals or corporations or obtained from sources other than those already identified in the previous subparagraphs.

Types of Materials Included in Scope of Assassination Record and Additional Records and Information

No substantive change has been made to § 1400.4 as it appeared in the proposed interpretive regulations.

Requirement That Assassination Records be Released in Their Entirety

Language has been added to § 1400.5 to permit the Review Board, in its sole discretion, to allow release of only part of an assassination record where such partial release is sufficient to comply with the intent and purposes of the JFK Act.

Originals and Copies

Extensive changes were made to § 1400.6 for reasons of clarity and internal consistency. The Review Board also incorporated in the final interpretive regulations language clarifying that "record copies" of Federal agency records may be included in the JFK Assassination Records Collection and addressing the important issue of preservation requirements. In this respect, the Review Board sought to treat records in various media in a means appropriate to the unique characteristics of each medium.

Additional Guidance

In the light of comments received, the Review Board extensively revised § 1400.7. Subparagraph (d), as it appeared in the proposed interpretive regulations, has been broken into three subparagraphs—new subparagraphs (d), (e), and (f)—to avoid potential confusion and to add clarity. The intent of these subparagraphs is to make clear that all files on an individual, event, organization or activity are to be made available to the Review Board regardless of the labels on the files, where the records may be found, or whether they reflect the true name or identifier of the individual, event organization, or activity.

Subparagraphs (b) and (c) § 1400.7 were included in the proposed interpretive regulations and retained in the final interpretive regulations in order to address concerns expressed by NARA regarding the inclusion of artifacts in the scope of the material deemed "assassination records." By including these subparagraphs, the Review Board wishes to make it clear that it believes the JFK Act establishes unique standards as to the records to be included in the JFK Assassination Records Collection. By including artifacts as a type of "assassination record," the Review Board seeks to fulfill its mandate from Congress to assemble all materials reasonably related to the assassination in the JFK Assassination Records Collection. It is not intended that the inclusion here of artifacts for purposes of implementing the JFK Act should be construed to affect the implementation of other records laws. Subparagraph (c) is intended to ensure that all artifacts in the collection are preserved for posterity and that public access be provided to those artifacts in a manner consistent with their preservation. The Review Board encourages NARA to set out in writing the terms and conditions under which access to such materials shall be allowed.

Implementing the JFK Act—Notice of Assassination Records Determination

The Review Board has replaced the term "Catalog of Assassination Records" that appeared in the proposed interpretive regulations and redrafted § 1400.8 to clarify the Review Board's intent. In the final interpretive regulations, the Review Board substitutes the term NARD for prior references to a "catalog."

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.

The regulation is not subject to the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 *et seq.*) because it does to contain any information collection requirements within the meaning of 44 U.S.C. 3502(4).

Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601–612), the Board certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities and that, therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis need not be prepared. 5 U.S.C. 605(b). The proposed rule would not impose any obligations, including any obligations on "small entities," as set forth in 5 U S C 601(3) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or within the definition of "small business," as found in 15 U S C 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration and codified in 13 CFR part 121.

Review by OMB

This regulation has been reviewed by OMB under Executive Order 12866.

List of Subjects in 36 CFR Part 1400

Administrative practice and procedure, Archives and records

Accordingly, the review Board hereby establishes a new chapter XIV in title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations to read as follows.

CHAPTER XIV—ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

PART 1400—GUIDANCE FOR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992 (JFK ACT)

Sec.
1400.1 Scope of assassination record.
1400.2 Scope of additional records and information.
1400.3 Sources of assassination records and additional records and information.
1400.4 Types of materials included in scope of assassination record and additional records and information.
1400.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety.
1400.6 Originals and copies.
1400.7 Additional guidance.
1400.8 Implementing the JFK Act—Notice of Assassination Record Designation

Authority. 44 U.S.C. 2107.

§ 1400.1 Scope of assassination record.

(a) An *assassination record* includes, but is not limited to, all records, public and private, regardless of how labeled or identified, that document, describe, report on, analyze or interpret activities, persons, or events reasonably related to the assassination of President John F Kennedy and investigations of or inquiries into the assassination.

(b) An *assassination record* further includes, without limitation:

(1) All records as defined in Section 3(2) of the JFK Act.

(2) All records collected by or segregated by all Federal, state, and local government agencies in conjunction with any investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy (for example, any intra-agency investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination, any interagency communication regarding the assassination, any request by the House Select Committee on Assassinations to collect documents and other materials; or any inter- or intra-agency collection or segregation of documents and other materials).

(3) Other records or groups of records listed in the Notice of Assassination Record Designation, as described in § 1400.8 of this chapter.

§ 1400.2 Scope of additional records and information

The term *additional records and information* includes

(a) All documents used by government offices and agencies during their declassification review of assassination records as well as all other documents, indices, and other material (including but not limited to those that disclose cryptonyms, code names, or other identifiers that appear in assassination records) that the Assassination Records Review Board (Review Board) has a reasonable basis to believe may constitute an assassination record or would assist in the identification, evaluation or interpretation of an assassination record. The Review Board will identify in writing those records and other materials it intends to seek under this section

(b) All training manuals, instructional materials, and guidelines created or used by the agencies in furtherance of their review of assassination records.

(c) All records, lists, and documents describing the procedure by which the agencies identified or selected assassination records for review.

(d) Organizational charts of government agencies.

(e) Records necessary and sufficient to describe the agency's:

(1) Records policies and schedules;

(2) Filing systems and organization;

(3) Storage facilities and locations;

(4) Indexing symbols, marks, codes, instructions, guidelines, methods, and procedures;

(5) Search methods and procedures used in the performance of the agencies' duties under the JFK Act; and

(6) Reclassification to a higher level, transfer, destruction, or other information (*e.g.*, theft) regarding the status of assassination records.

(f) Any other record that does not fall within the scope of assassination record as described in § 1400 1, but which has the potential to enhance, enrich, and broaden the historical record of the assassination.

§ 1400.3 Sources of assassination records and additional records and information.

Assassination records and additional records and information may be located at, or under the control of, without limitation:

(a) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government;

(b) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of state and local governments;

(c) Record repositories and archives of Federal, state, and local governments, including presidential libraries;

(d) Record repositories and archives of universities, libraries, historical societies, and other similar organizations,

(e) Individuals who possess such records by virtue of service with a government agency, office, or entity;

(f) Persons, including individuals and corporations, who have obtained such records from sources identified in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section.

(g) Persons, including individuals and corporations, who have themselves created or have obtained such records from sources other than those identified in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section;

(h) Federal, state, and local courts where such records are being held under seal; or

(i) Foreign governments.

§ 1400.4 Types of materials included in scope of assassination record and additional records and information.

The term *record* in *assassination record* and *additional records and information* includes, for purposes of interpreting and implementing the JFK Act:

(a) papers, maps, and other documentary material;

(b) photographs;

(c) motion pictures;

(d) sound and video recordings;

(e) machine readable information in any form; and

(f) artifacts

§ 1440.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety.

An assassination record shall be released in its entirety except for portions specifically postponed pursuant to the grounds for postponement of public disclosure of records established in § 2107.6 of the JFK Act, and no portion of any assassination record shall be withheld from public disclosure solely on grounds of non-relevance unless, in the Review Board's sole discretion, release of part of a record is sufficient to comply with the intent and purposes of the JFK Act

§ 1400.6 Originals and copies.

(a) For purposes of determining whether originals or copies of assassination records will be made part of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Assassination Records Collection) established under the JFK Act, the following shall apply:

(1) In the case of papers, maps, and other documentary materials, the Review Board may determine that record copies of government records, either the signed original, original production or a reproduction that has been treated as the official record maintained to chronicle government functions or activities, may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

(2) In the case of other papers, maps, and other documentary material, the Review Board may determine that a true and accurate copy of a record in lieu of the original may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

(3) In the case of photographs, the original negative, whenever available (otherwise, the earliest generation print that is a true and accurate copy), may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

(4) In the case of motion pictures, the camera original, whenever available (otherwise, the earliest generation print that is a true and accurate copy), may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

(5) In the case of sound and video recordings, the original recording, whenever available (otherwise, the earliest generation copy that is a true and accurate copy), may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

(6) In the case of machine-readable information, a true and accurate copy of the original (duplicating all information contained in the original and in a format that permits retrieval of the information), may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, and

(7) In the case of artifacts, the original objects themselves may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection.

(b) To the extent records from foreign governments are included in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, copies of the original records shall be sufficient for inclusion in the collection.

(c) In cases where a copy, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, is authorized by the Review Board to be included in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, the Review Board may require that a copy be certified if, in its discretion, it determines a certification to be necessary to ensure the integrity of the JFK Assassination Records Collection. In cases where an original, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, is required for inclusion in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, the Review Board may, at its discretion, accept the best available copy. In such cases that records included in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, whether originals or copies, contain illegible portions, such records shall have attached thereto a certified transcription of the illegible language to the extent practicable.

(d) For purposes of implementing the JFK Act, the term *copy* means a true and accurate photocopy duplication by a means appropriate to the medium of the original record that preserves and displays the integrity of the record and the information contained in it.

(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to suggest that additional copies of any assassination records contained in the JFK Assassination Records Collection are not also assassination records that, at the Review Board's discretion, may also be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection.

(f) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to prevent or to preclude copies of any electronic assassination records from being reformatted electronically in order to conform to different hardward and/or software requirements of audiovisual or machine readable formats if such is the professional judgment of the National Archives and Records Administration.

§ 1400.7 Additional guidance.

(a) A government agency, office, or entity includes, for purposes of interpreting and implementing the JFK Act, all current, past, and former departments, agencies, offices, divisions, foreign offices, bureaus, and deliberative bodies of any Federal, state, or local government and includes all inter- or intra-agency working groups, committees, and meetings that possess or created records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(b) The inclusion of artifacts in the scope of the term assassination record is understood to apply solely to the JFK Assassination Records Collection and to implement fully the terms of the JFK Act and has no direct or indirect bearing on the interpretation or implementation of any other statute or regulation.

(c) Whenever artifacts are included in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, it shall be sufficient to comply with the JFK Act if the public is provided access to photographs, drawings, or similar materials depicting the artifacts. Additional display of or examination by the public of artifacts in the JFK Assassination Records Collection shall occur under the terms and conditions established by the National Archives and Records Administration to ensure their preservation and protection for posterity.

(d) The terms and, or, any, all, and the plural and singular forms of nouns shall be understood in their broadest and most inclusive sense and shall not be understood to be terms of limitation.

(e) Unless the Review Board in its sole discretion directs otherwise, records that are identified with respect to a particular person shall include all records relating to that person that use or reflect the true name or any other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol number, cryptonym, or alias used to identify that person

(f) Unless the Review Board in its sole discretion directs otherwise, records that are identified by the Review Board with respect to a particular operation or program shall include all records, pertaining to that program by any other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol, number, or cryptonym

§ 1400.8 Implementing the JFK Act—Notice of Assassination Record Designation.

(a) A Notice of Assassination Record Designation (NARD) shall be the mechanism for the Review Board to announce publicly its determination that a record or group of records meets the definition of assassination records.

(b) Notice of all NARDs will be published in the Federal Register within 30 days of the decision to designate such records as assassination records.

(c) In determining to designate such records as assassination records, the Review Board must determine that the record or group of record will more likely than not enhance, enrich, and broaden the historical record of the assassination.

Dated: June 22, 1995

David G Maxwell,

Executive Director Assassination Records Review Board.

[FR Doc 95-15819 Filed 6-27-95; 8 45 am]

BILLING CODE 6820-TD-M

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

National Park Service

36 CFR Part 7

RIN 1024-AC14

National Capital Region Parks; Special Regulations; Correction

AGENCY: National Park Service, Interior.

ACTION: Correction to final regulations

SUMMARY: This document contains a correction to the final regulations which were published Friday, April 7, 1995 (60 FR 17639). The regulations limit the sales on Federal park land to books, newspapers, leaflets, pamphlets, buttons and bumper stickers and set standards for sites, stands and structures used in such sales within National Capital Region Parks.

EFFECTIVE DATE: May 8, 1995

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sandra Alley, Associate Regional Director, Public Affairs and Tourism, National Capital Region, National Park Service, 1100 Ohio Drive SW., Washington, D.C. (202) 619-7223

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Need for Correction

As published, the final rule contains one error which may prove to be misleading and is in need of correction.

Correction of Publication

Accordingly, the publication on Friday, April 7, 1995 (60 FR 17639) of the final regulation, FR Doc. 95-8599, for National Capital Region, is corrected as follows.

In the FR Doc. 95-8599, appearing on page 17649 in the issue of Friday, April 7, 1995, the words "the introductory text of" need to be added after the word "revising" that appears in the first column, beginning on the ninth line, which now reads "2. Section 7.96 is amended by revising paragraph (k)(2) to read as follows:" is corrected to read "2. Section 7.96 is amended by revising the introductory text of paragraph (k)(2) to read as follows:"

Dated: June 22, 1995

Rick Gale,

Acting Chief, Ranger Activities Division

[FR Doc. 95-15741 Filed 6-27-95, 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4310-70-P

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Parts 52 and 81

[A-1-FRL-5248-6]

Clean Air Act Promulgation of Extension of Attainment Date for Ozone Nonattainment Area; Maine

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Final rule

SUMMARY: EPA is extending the attainment date for the Hancock and Waldo Counties, a marginal ozone nonattainment area in Maine to November 15, 1994. This extension is based in part on monitored air quality readings for the national ambient air quality standard for ozone during 1993. This notice also updates tables in 40 CFR 52.1024 and 40 CFR 81.320 concerning attainment dates in the State of Maine

EFFECTIVE DATE: This extension becomes effective July 28, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard P. Burkhart, Air, Pesticides and Toxics Management Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I, JFK Federal Bldg., Boston, MA 02203. Phone. 617-565-3244

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Feb 22, 1995 (60 FR 9813), EPA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR) for the State of Maine. The NPR proposed extending the attainment deadline for ozone for Hancock and Waldo Counties, and asked for public comment. No comments were received.

CAA Requirements and EPA Actions Concerning Designation and Classification

Section 107(d)(4) of the Clean Air Act as amended in 1990 (CAA) required the States and EPA to designate areas as attainment, nonattainment, or unclassifiable for ozone as well as other pollutants for which national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) have been set. Section 181(a)(1) (table 1) required that ozone nonattainment areas be classified as marginal, moderate, serious, severe, or extreme, depending on their air quality.

In a series of Federal Register notices, EPA completed this process by designating and classifying all areas of the country for ozone. See, e.g., 56 FR 58694 (Nov. 6, 1991); 57 FR 56762 (Nov. 30, 1992); 59 FR 18967 (April 21, 1994)

Areas designated nonattainment for ozone are required to meet attainment dates specified under the Act For areas classified marginal through extreme, the attainment dates range from November 15, 1993 through November 15, 2010. A discussion of the attainment dates is found in 57 FR 13498 (April 16, 1992) (the General Preamble).

The Hancock and Waldo Counties, Maine area was designated nonattainment and classified marginal for ozone pursuant to 56 FR 58694 (Nov. 6, 1991). By this classification, its attainment date became November 15, 1993.

CAA Requirements and EPA Actions Concerning Meeting the Attainment Date

Section 181(b)(2)(A) requires the Administrator, within six months of the attainment date, to determine whether ozone nonattainment areas attained the NAAQS For ozone, EPA determines attainment status on the basis of the expected number of exceedances of the NAAQS over the three-year period up to, and including, the attainment date. See General Preamble, 57 FR 13506 In the case of ozone marginal nonattainment areas, the three year period is 1991-93. CAA section 181(b)(2)(A) further states that, for areas classified as marginal, moderate, or serious, if the Administrator determines that the area did not attain the standard by its attainment date, the area must be reclassified upwards.

However, CAA section 181(a)(5) provides an exemption from these bump

11 May 1994

NOTE FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: JFK Board Clearances

From Ed Howell, OS:

All board members but Graff cleared. Graff may be cleared by end of today.

Briefing of board members:

- CIA merely says yes or no
- clearances are SI/TIK/GAMMA
- office of Craig Livingston, White House could brief the board.
- Chuck Easley in Livingston's office could do briefing. He is OPM staffer assigned to White House.

CIT VISIT CERTIFICATION REQUEST
COLLATERAL CLEARANCES AND/OR SCI ACCESSES

Requester Tracy Phone 202-724-0088 Org Assassination Review Bd

PERSON(S) TO BE CERTIFIED:
(Provide * for collateral requests only. Dates = Yr/Mo/Day)

Name Scheinkopf, ERIC SSN 070-54-7711 Org ______

*Date of birth 22-OCT-51 *Place of birth ______

*Clnc date/Org 06-Jun-95/______ *DOBI/Org By DOD ___-___-___/______

Name ______ SSN ______ Org ______

*Date of birth ___-___-___ *Place of birth ______

*Clnc date/Org ___-___-___/______ *DOBI/Org ___-___-___/______

Name ______ SSN ______ Org ______

*Date of birth ___-___-___ *Place of birth ______

*Clnc date/Org ___-___-___/______ *DOBI/Org ___-___-___/______

CLNCS/ACCESSES REQUIRED: ____, ____, ____, ____, ____, ____

Site of visit Historical Review Grp.

Date(s) of visit (From) 06Jun95 (To) 5Jun96

Point of contact John Pereira Phone ( )351-2802

Purpose of visit ______

COTR ______ Agency business? Y N

Received at CIT by ______ Date ______

16 May 1994

NOTE FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: JFK Board Clearances

OS/Clearance Division (Edward) advised us today (16 May) that Board member Henry Graff has been cleared. This completes the clearances for Board members.

John P.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

27 October 1994

NOTE FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: JFK Board/Security Clearances

1. On 27 October, I called Terry O'Connor, FBI to provide him with the following information that he had requested.

The CIA contact person for receiving clearances on staff members of the JFK Board is:

~~Tim Bower~~, Chief/Clearance Division, OS
Jeanette Moore → ~~Dale [illegible]~~, Clearance Division x40620
Tel: 703-482-5620

Sec Fax: 703-893-5235

Uncl Fax: 703-356-6452

2. Bower's secure phone no: x4019~~9~~7 (not passed to FBI).

3. O'Connor said that the FBI is processing clearances for four members of the Board'staff. He also said that David Marwell's clearances have been completed.

JP
John Pereira

cc: File
Harrelson
Boyd
C/HRG

13-00000

10 February 1995

To: C/HRG

Subject: PC Support for Assassination Record Review Board (ARRB) Reviewers

Attached is Scott Nann's note on INFOSEC procedures. It appears that the ARRB reviewers will be able to take laptops in and out of the building as long as security requirement for handling classified diskettes and **Classified PCs** are met. HRG will have to maintain the proper logs and forms.

I propose we implement Situation #3 (board reviewers can carry their own SECRET Laptops daily in & out of the building). Establishing procedures for a LOG and the Form 4261 should not be a problem. We will need 2 or 3 HRG staffers with media badges to fill out the form 4261 or to escort the Board reviewers out of the building.

CERTIFICATION FOR 6 MARCH 1995 SI/TK/G&B

David Marwell	080-30-7709
Thomas J. Gunn	529-74-8907
Thomas E. Samoluk	030-50-1292
Sheryl Walter	506-80-0934

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW ▪ 2nd Floor ▪ Washington, DC 20530

MEMORANDUM

April 6, 1995

TO: Barry Harrelson, CIA Historical Review Group

FROM: Tracy Shycoff, Administrative Officer

SUBJECT: Clearances Passed to CIA

Clearances were passed to the CIA Security Office, on Thursday, April 6, 1995 for the following ARRB employees:

Mary McAuliffe, Supervisor Analyst	SSN 366-44-4357
Michelle Seguin, Analyst	SSN 376-88-5236

The clearances are at the Top Secret level and have been passed for a period of 1 year.

Additionally, Jeremy Gunn (SSN 529-74-8907) previously had his clearance passed to the CIA on January 18, 1995. If you need further information, please call me at the number listed below.

11 April 1995

NOTE FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: JFK Board/Security

1. On 11 April, I received a call from the Chief, Domestic Programs Division, Office of Security Operations (Bob McCants) on the status of the Board's request for security certification of their facility at 600 "E" Street.

2. Room 2617 in the Board's office is approved for storing classified materials. The entire space controlled by the Board will be approved once all of the Board's staff receives SCI clearances. Requests for SCI clearances should be sent by the Board to HRG for forwarding to Director, Office of Personnel Security.

3. Andrew Smith from Bob's office did the security survey at 600 "E" Street on 9 March 1995. Smith can be reached through the Division's front office (x43437 secure, 703-506-7437 open).

John P

John Pereira

cc: File
Harrelson
Boyd
C/HRG

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
Gloria M. Boyd @ DA
Barbara A. Standley @ DA
FROM: John F. Pereira
DATE: 05/01/95 04:33:53 PM
SUBJECT: . JFK Board Staffer's Clearance

Office of Personnel Security, CIB called to pass clearance of following JFK Board Staffer:

Manuel Legaspi (need to check spelling)

SS# 568-53-8907

CC:

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW ▪ 2nd Floor ▪ Washington, DC 20530

June 14, 1995

Mr. John Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group
CIA
1820 North Fort Myers Drive
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear ~~Mr. Pereira~~ John:

I have attached a list of ARRB employees who have been granted Top Secret clearances based on SBIs conducted by the OPM/OFI. The ARRB received guidance from the Department of Justice on the adjudication of the cases.

As we have discussed, I would like to request that the CIA take the necessary action to grant appropriate SCI clearances to these employees.

If you require further information, please contact either me or Tracy Shycoff, our Deputy Security Officer, at the number listed below. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

Telephone: (202) 724-0088 ▪ Facsimile: (202) 724-0457

Employee	SSN	Date of Adjudication
Laura A. Denk	509-82-4982	5/2/95
Philip D. Golrick	225-21-0020	4/6/95
Manuel E. Legaspi	568-53-8907	5/2/95
Mary S. McAuliffe	366-44-4357	4/6/95
Eric N. Scheinkopf	070-54-7711	6/6/95
Michelle M. Seguin	376-88-5236	4/6/95
Robert J. Skwirot	209-50-4324	5/23/95
Eileen A. Sullivan	091-66-0890	4/6/95
Kevin G. Tiernan	230-08-5833	4/6/95
Joan G. Zimmerman	469-62-8398	4/6/95

13-00000

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW ▪ 2nd Floor ▪ Washington, DC 20530

June 30, 1995

Mr. John Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group
CIA
1820 North Fort Myers Drive
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Per~~iera~~eira:

I have attached the second list of ARRB employees who have been granted Top Secret clearances based on SBIs conducted by the OPM/OFI. As with the others, the ARRB received guidance from the Department of Justice on the adjudication of the cases.

As we have discussed, I would like to request that the CIA take the necessary action to grant appropriate SCI clearances to these employees.

If you require further information, please contact either me or Tracy Shycoff, our Deputy Security Officer, at the number listed below. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

Telephone: (202) 724-0088 ▪ Facsimile: (202) 724-0457

Mr. John Pereira
June 29, 1995
Page two

Employee	SSN	Date of Adjudication
Christopher M. Barger	469-98-3261	6/20/95
Joseph P. Freeman	186-48-3000	6/20/95
Noelle C. Gray	217-88-4242	6/20/95
Tammi S. Long	249-21-0975	6/20/95
Charles C. Rhodes	575-94-4810	6/20/95
Dennis J. Quinn	146-68-1454	6/20/95
Valerie M. Sails	589-40-1874	6/20/95

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724–0088 • Fax: (202) 724–0457

September 19, 1995

Mr. John Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group
CIA
1820 North Fort Myers Drive
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. ~~Pereira~~: John

As we previously discussed, please initiate the necessary action to grant the appropriate SCI clearances for Carolyn Carpenter, SSN 538-46-7574. Ms. Carpenter's file was reviewed by the Department of Justice Personnel Security Office. The DoJ recommended granting a Top Secret clearance and postponing a decision on SCI pending a CIA review for special exception to DCI Directive 114, paragraph 5C, due to foreign in-laws.

As you may recall from our conversation, Ms. Carpenter is a former CIA employee. I would like to request that the investigation for her SCI clearance be given careful consideration. It is extremely important to the Review Board that our clearances meet the highest standards of the agencies with which we have dealings.

The Review Board has informed Ms. Carpenter that her employment is contingent upon receiving the appropriate clearances. Therefore, I respectfully request that her case be given top priority. If you need further information, please contact either me or Tracy Shycoff, our Deputy Security Officer. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

SECURE FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL FORM

CSI/HRG
Room 404
Ames Bldg.

DATE: 9/20

ENDING SECURE/FAX TELEPHONE NUMBER: (703)-351-2114

ECEIVING SECURE/FAX TELEPHONE NUMBER: 703-827-2264

UMBER OF PAGES (Including Transmittal Form and Coversheet, if applicable) 3

ROM: John Pereira, C/HRG/CSI
(Name / Office / Extension)

UBJECT: Clearance

O: (ADDRESSEE / ORGANIZATION / OFFICE / EXTENSION)

	Jeanette Moore, C/Clearance x 40197
3.	
4.	
5.	
6.	
7.	
8.	
9.	
10.	

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Any questions?? Please call Barbara x 30335. Thank you.

RELEASING OFFICIAL: Barbara Standley (PRINTED NAME) Barbara Standley (SIGNATURE)

RECEIVING STATION USE ONLY

Please receipt for material by entering time of receipt/signature and transmit back to sending station.

DATE / TIME:

SIGNATURE:

FOUO
(CLASSIFICATION OF MATERIAL TRANSMITTED)

FORM
10-92 4383A

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

20 September 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Clearance Division

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: Request from JFK Assassination
Records Review Board

1. The JFK Assassination Records Review Board has requested that CIA grant an SCI clearance to a former Agency employee, Carolyn Carpenter. She is being considered for employment with the Board. The request is attached.

2. The Board's request notes that the Justice Department raised a question about the existence of foreign in-laws in Ms. Carpenter's case.

3. David Marwell, the Board's Executive Director, is interested in knowing when a determination is likely to be made on this request. Please let me know what response we should give to Mr. Marwell.

John F.Pereira

26 October 1995

As of now the person who is handling clearances for the JFK Board is:

W. Curtis (Curt) Chaloner
x40335

Curt talked with Marwell and set up procedures for sending clearances requests directly to Curt.

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

MEMORANDUM

November 29, 1995

TO: Barry Harrelson, CIA Historical Review Group

FROM: Tracy Shycoff
Associate Director for Administration
and Deputy Security Officer

SUBJECT: Passing Clearance

I passed the clearance to the CIA Security Office on November 29, 1995, for the following ARRB employee for the purpose of reviewing documents related to the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act held by the CIA:

Joseph P. Freeman SSN 186-48-3000 DOB 2/2/56
Place of Birth Pittsburgh, PA
Clearance Granted 6/20/95

The clearance is at the Top Secret level and has been passed for a period of 1 year. If you need further information, please call me at the number listed above or contact Mark in the CIA Security Office at 703-482-7330.

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

6 March 1996

Roger Martin, DCI/Security, called today and stated that clearances were passed for Dennis Quinn, 146-68-1454--he is from the ARRB. He was granted TS clearance.

Barry

18 July 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief/VAB/OS

FROM: Karen Gilbert
Public Communication Branch, Public Affairs Staff

SUBJECT: Headquarters Visitors - Presidential JFK Assassination Records Review Board

1. On Monday July 22, 1996, seven members of the Presidential JFK Assassination Records Review Board (see attached sheet) will be visiting the Agency from 10:00 am-12:00pm along with two members of the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

2. They will arrive in three personal cars. They have been directed to arrive at the VCC at 09:45 for badging and parking directions. They will be met at the OHB lobby by Karen Gilbert, Public Liaison Officer, Public Communications Office. They will be given a tour of the first floor of the OHB and the Exhibit Center and then taken to the EAA Store. Following this they will depart.

3. FOR SECURITY/ACCESS. Please notify the Headquarters Receptionists and the Security Officers at the Main Gate of the date and time of arrival. Please badge our visitors with a Visitor Escort Required badges at the Visitor Control Center and direct them to the Old Headquarters Building lobby entrance and to VIP parking.

4. FOR OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES. Please add them to your visitors list for 22 July 1996.

5. FOR PROTECTIVE PROGRAMS GROUP. Please inform the Security Officers at the 123 Entrance that the cars will be dropping off the group at the OHB lobby entrance and to direct them to parking in the VIP lot.

6. If you have any further questions prior to the day of the visit, please contact Karen Gilbert on x51744. On the date of the visit, please direct any questions or problems to the Public Communications Branch on 482-0623.

Karen Gilbert

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

MEMORANDUM

June 10, 1997

To: CIA Security Office

From: Tracy Shycoff
Deputy Security Officer

Subject: Passing Clearances

I am passing the clearance for the following ARRB employee for the purpose of reviewing documents related to the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act held by the CIA:

Douglas Horne **SSN 285-54-3352** **DOB 5/19/52**
Place of Birth Oceanside, CA
Clearance Granted 8/22/1995

The clearance is at the Top Secret level and is to be passed through September 20, 1997 to Mr. John Pereira, Chief of the CIA Historical Review Group at 703-613-1805. If you need further information, please call me at the number listed above.

cc: Barbara Standley, CIA Historical Review Group

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

25 July 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson

FROM: John F. Pereira

OFFICE: DCI/CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: 4 Assassination Records Review Board Visitors

REFERENCE: We alerted Eileen, Frank

---

25 July 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: John F. Pereira

FROM: Roger L. Martin

OFFICE: DCI/AREA SECURITY OFFICER

SUBJECT: 4 Assassination Records Review Board Visitors

REFERENCE: FYI/Retention.

CIB
Compartmented Information Branch

NOTE FOR: Roger L. Martin
DATE: 07/24/97 03:50:32 PM
SUBJECT: 4 Assassination Records Review Board Visitors

The following ARRB employees will be meeting John Pereira (703)613-1805 on 28 Jul 97 and until 01 Aug 97.

Tracy Shycoff	SSN: 033 42 2144	TS
Thomas Samoluk	SSN: 030 50 1292	TS
David Marwell	SSN: 080 38 700	TS, SI, TK, GAMMA and BYE
Thomas Gunn	SSN: 529 74 8907	TS, SI, TK, and BYE

13-00000

file

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

MEMORANDUM

December 3, 1997

To: CIA Security Office

From: Tracy Shycoff
Deputy Security Officer

Subject: Passing Clearances

I am passing the clearance for the following ARRB employee for the purpose of reviewing documents related to the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act held by the CIA:

Charles C. Rhodes **SSN** 575-94-4810 **DOB** 6/3/61
Place of Birth Schenectady, NY
Clearance Granted 6/20/1995

The clearance is at the Top Secret level and is to be passed through September 30, 1998 to Mr. John Pereira, Chief of the CIA Historical Review Group at 703-613-1805. Please note that the CIA holds Mr. Rhodes' SCI clearance if it is needed by Mr. Pereira. If you need further information, please call me at the number listed above.

cc: Barbara Standley, CIA Historical Review Group

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

13-00000

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ASSASSINATION BOARD

Address: 633 Indiana Ave., N.W.

Contacts

Space: GSA: Calvin Snowden (202) 708-5702
CIA: Patti Postel, OS x 43446
(703) 506-7446 (open)

Security White House Office of General Counsel
Marvin Crisloff

Clearances CIA: Ed Howell, OS X40206

Board Chairman - Jack Tunheim (612) 296-2351

11 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jim Oliver
C/HRG

FROM: Martha Lutz
Chief/Research/PRD

SUBJECT: Secrecy Agreements with Commission Members

1. At your request, PRD searched its files to find information on how secrecy agreements have been handled vis a vis members of commissions dealing with intelligence-related matters. There have been three instances of PRD interface with such commissions. The first was in 1994 when the Joint Security Commission requested a PRB review on its report on Counterintelligence and Security Policies, Procedures and Practices in the CIA in the aftermath of the Ames affair. There is no mention of Commission membership or secrecy agreements in our files, and, in fact, the Commission report was finally and properly re-reviewed by a different entity for official declassification.

2. PRB was also asked to review the final report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Commission (Brown Commission) in 1996. Again there is no record of secrecy agreements with Board members in our files.

3. Finally and most recently, the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States was established in 1998, and its members signed secrecy agreements. John Hedley, PRB Chair, spoke with the members in March, explained pre-publication requirements and emphasized the Board's and staff's willingness to provide guidance and prompt responses to Board members. Since that time, four of the nine Commission members have submitted a total of 12 manuscripts for review.

CL BY: 2115436
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: HUM 4-82

TO: James R. Oliver@DA
FROM: Ramona G. Dunn-C- @ DCI
OFFICE: EXDIR STAFF
DATE: 09/14/98 10:59:51 AM
SUBJECT: Re: Status of JFK Issues/ARRB Meetings

Jim:
Thanks for the update which I will pass on to the EXDIR. Which Agency staffers are the Board considering deposing? Are they considering deposing officials at other agencies?

On a related issue: On Friday, Marty Boland told me that we (White House, FBI, OIM) can't find the Board's secrecy agreements. Were they located over the weekend?. If not, the EXDIR requests that OIM obtain new signed agreements as soon as possible.

Thanks.
Ramona

Original Text of James R. Oliver
Original Text of James R. Oliver

Dawn: Per our discussion this morning, attached is Barry's status report on the JFK Board actions. Jim O.

Original Text of J. Barry Harrelson
Original Text of J. Barry Harrelson

CL BY: *0611637*
CL REASON: *Section 1.5 C*
DECL ON: *X1*
DRV FRM: *HUM 4-82*

14 September 1998

From the Desk of R. Bruce Burke
Associate Deputy General Counsel

NOTE FOR: Marne Jensen-Kendrick @ DA
FROM: R. Bruce Burke
OFFICE: OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
DATE: 09/17/98 08:59:36 PM
SUBJECT: JFK Board Prepublication Review

Marne:

My comments in bold (although my computer quit bolding in paragraph 5).

Bruce

ATTORNEY/CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS

Ramona,

The following represents a summary of where we currently stand regarding the issue of whether secrecy agreements were ever signed by the Assassination Records Review Board ("the Board"), and offers options to address that issue. Thus far, CIA security officials have conducted diligent searches, both internally and externally (FBI, White House), to locate any secrecy agreements that members of the Board may have signed. Those searches have been unsuccessful - to date, no secrecy agreements have been found. We now intend to search selected Agency records systems to see if there exists any reference to, or indication of, particular secrecy agreements that the Board members may have signed. We also will attempt to locate any secrecy agreements the Board staff signed to see if that leads us to any secrecy agreements the members may have signed. At this point, however, the likelihood that these actions will bear fruit are not good.

Our primary goal in this situation is to preserve our prepublication review rights with respect to future writings of the Board members, in order to prevent the inadvertent release of classified information (since it is unlikely that any member of the Board would knowingly reveal classified information). Before considering the options set forth below, it is worth noting that whatever approach we take with the Board, we may encounter some hostility and resistance due to the Board's unhappiness with our position concerning the final statement of compliance that we submitted to the Board. With that in mind, our options are:

1. Do and say nothing, and hope that the Board members will voluntarily submit any future writings for prepublication review.

2. Provide a generic security exit briefing for the Board which mentions their continuing obligation not to reveal classified information in any way, without specifically mentioning prepublication review, and again hope that they will voluntarily submit any future writings for prepublication review.

3. Provide a specific security exit briefing for the Board which expressly mentions that they have an obligation to submit for prepublication review any future writings they plan to publish (related to their work as Board members) as part of their obligation to protect classified information,

and hope the Board members do not ask for the source of this obligation (since we cannot provide them with any signed secrecy agreements). In essence we bluff the Board. (**A variation of this approach would be to have the Board execute an SCI debriefing statement, which includes a prepublication clause, although it is limited to SCI material**)

4. Have the Board members sign secrecy agreements on the way out. This option would be difficult to implement as there would be no incentive for a Board member to sign it (there exist no sanctions for not signing), and it would be legally unenforceable (since the agreement would provide a benefit to the Agency, but not to the Board members, and therefore would not contain the legal consideration necessary to establish a binding contract). We would have to hope that the question of enforceability issue is not raised - essentially, amounting to another bluff.

5. We can rely on language in the Snepp case, as interpreted by the Department of Justice in the mid-1980's, that appears to permit the Agency to write a regulation that requires prepublication review of the possibly classified writings of non-CIA personnel given access to CIA information, to allow the DCI to protect intelligence sources and methods. The regulation would be signed by the DCI, and then the Board would be briefed on their responsibilities and obligations under the regulation.

CC: Martin J. Boland @ DA
Sent on 17 September 1998 at 08:59:36 PM

NOTE FOR: *Ramona G. Dunn-C-/@ DCI*
FROM: *R. Bruce Burke*
OFFICE: *OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL*
DATE: *09/18/98 02:32:25 PM*
SUBJECT: *READ IMMEDIATELY: JFK Board Secrecy Agreements Issue*

ATTORNEY/CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS

Ramona,

The following represents a summary of where we currently stand regarding the issue of whether secrecy agreements were ever signed by the Assassination Records Review Board ("the Board"), and offers options to address that issue. Thus far, CIA security officials have conducted diligent searches, both internally and externally (FBI, White House), to locate any secrecy agreements that members of the Board may have signed. Those searches have been unsuccessful - to date, no secrecy agreements have been found. We are also searching selected Agency records systems to see if there exists any reference to, or indication of, particular secrecy agreements that the Board members may have signed. In addition, we are attempting to locate any secrecy agreements the Board staff signed to see if that leads us to any secrecy agreements the members may have signed. At this point, however, the likelihood that these actions will bear fruit are not good. Moreover, this effort has been complicated by the fact that, at the outset, the FBI was given responsibility for the security clearance process relating to the Board.

Our primary goal in this situation is to preserve our prepublication review rights with respect to future writings of the Board members and staffers, in order to prevent the inadvertent release of classified information (since it is unlikely that any member of the Board or its staff would knowingly reveal classified information). The last meeting of the Board will take place on 23 September, and the Board will be out of business as of 1 October. If we wish to address the Board on this issue as a group, the 23 September meeting will be our last opportunity to do so. Otherwise we will have to deal with each Board member and staffer individually, if at all. Before considering the options set forth below, it is worth noting that whatever approach we take with the Board, we may encounter some hostility and resistance due to the Board's unhappiness with our position concerning the final statement of compliance that we submitted to the Board. With that in mind, our options are:

1. Do and say nothing, and hope that Board members and staffers will voluntarily submit any future writings for prepublication review.

2. Provide a generic security exit briefing for the Board which mentions their continuing obligation not to reveal classified information in any way, without specifically mentioning prepublication review, and again hope that they will voluntarily submit any future writings for prepublication review. Board members and staffers sign nothing.

3. Provide a generic security exit briefing for the Board which mentions their continuing obligation not to reveal classified information in any way, and also makes available our prepublication review services to assist them in this regard, if requested, with respect to any future writings (related to their work as Board members or staffers). Board members and staffers sign nothing. The success of this option depends upon the willingness of Board members and staffers to voluntarily submit any future writings for prepublication review.

4. Provide a specific security exit briefing for the Board which expressly mentions that they have an obligation to submit for prepublication review any future writings they plan to publish (related to their work as Board members or staffers) as part of their obligation to protect classified information, and hope the Board does not ask for the source of this obligation (since we cannot provide them with any signed secrecy agreements). In essence, we bluff the Board. Board members and staffers sign nothing.

5. In lieu of a security exit briefing, send each Board member and staffer a letter which expressly mentions that they have an obligation to submit for prepublication review any future writings they plan to publish (related to their work as Board members or staffers) as part of their obligation to protect classified information. This approach would make it more inconvenient for the Board to probe for the source of this obligation (which we would be unable to produce since we have not found any signed secrecy agreements). Again, we bluff the Board. Board members and staffers sign nothing.

6. Ask Board members and staffers to sign secrecy agreements on their way out. This option could be difficult to implement as there would be no incentive for a Board member to sign it (there exist no sanctions for not signing), although Board staffers have indicated they would support this approach. Generally speaking, a secrecy agreement signed on the eve of separation from government service would be legally unenforceable (since the agreement would provide a benefit to the Agency, but not to Board members or staffers, and therefore would not contain the legal consideration necessary to establish a binding contract). However, in this case, if the agreement was modified to indicate that it merely reduced to writing understandings which had been previously agreed to by the Board, we would have a strong argument the agreement was legally binding. Of course, this option would alert the Board to the fact that we do not have any secrecy agreements previously signed by the Board. Even if the Board agrees to sign new secrecy agreements before they disband, nothing would preclude them from disputing the enforceability of the agreements at a later date.

6. We can rely on language in the Snepp case, as interpreted by the Department of Justice in the mid-1980's, that appears to permit the DCI to write a regulation to protect intelligence sources and methods by requiring prepublication review of the possibly classified writings of non-CIA personnel who have served in positions of special trust and have been given access to CIA information. The regulation would be signed by the DCI, and promulgated immediately. Then the Board would be briefed on their responsibilities and obligations under the regulation. Of course, nothing would preclude the Board from disputing the validity of such a regulation at a later date.

None of the above options guarantee success. However, I have discussed these options with Dawn Eilenberger, and we believe that Option #__ is the best approach to take. OIM concurs. Please let me know how we should proceed, since our last chance to deal with the Board as a group will be at their 23 September meeting.

Bruce

CC:

CC:

Sent on 18 September 1998 at 04:31:51 PM

CL BY: 0681401
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 1-82

18 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: James R. Oliver@DA

FROM: R. Bruce Burke @ DCI
Associate Deputy General Counsel

OFFICE: OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: READ IMMEDIATELY: JFK Board Secrecy Agreements Issue

REFERENCE: Note Appended Below

Jim:

Please read and let me know which option you prefer in light of my rewrite.

Bruce

Original Text of R. Bruce Burke

Original Text of R. Bruce Burke

CL BY: *0681401*
CL REASON: *Section 1.5 C*
DECL ON: *X1*
DRV FRM: *COV 1-82*

From the Desk of R. Bruce Burke
Associate Deputy General Counsel

CL BY: 2115436
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

TO: R. Bruce Burke@DCI
FROM: Ramona G. Dunn-C- @ DCI
OFFICE: EXDIR STAFF
DATE: 09/21/98 05:44:25 PM
SUBJECT: JFK Board Secrecy Agreements Issue

Bruce:
The EXDIR concurs with the OGC recommended option (#5) , provided that the letter is low-key and stresses that the pre-publication review "obligation" is standard operating procedure. Additionally, he requests the opportunity to view the letter in draft. Thanks.

Ramona

(Option 5. In lieu of a security exit briefing, send each Board member and staffer a letter which expressly mentions that they have an obligation to submit for prepublication review any future writings they plan to publish (related to their work as Board members or staffers) as part of their obligation to protect classified information. This approach would make it more inconvenient for the Board to probe for the source of this obligation (which we would be unable to produce since we have not found any signed secrecy agreements). Again, we bluff the Board. Board members and staffers sign nothing.)

CC: Dawn R. Eilenberger@DCI, Valerie O. Patterson@DCI, Robert J. Eatinger@DCI, James E. Archibald@DCI, Paul F. Morris@DA, Edmund Cohen@DA, Lanie P. D'Alessandro@DA, Lee S. Strickland@DA, James R. Oliver@DA, J. Barry Harrelson@DCI, Martin J. Boland@DA, Marne Jensen-Kendrick@DA
Sent on 21 September 1998 at 05:44:25 PM

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, ______________________________ (print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Central Intelligence Agency"), the obligations contained in this agreement.

2. I understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency I may be given access to information or material that is classified or is in the process of a classification determination in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958 as amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive order, that if disclosed in an unauthorized manner would jeopardize intelligence activities of the United States Government. I accept that by being granted access to such information or material I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become obligated to protect the information and/or material from unauthorized disclosure.

3. In consideration for being employed or otherwise retained to provide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby agree that I will never disclose in any form or any manner, to any person not authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency to receive it, any information or material in either of the following categories:

a. information or material received or obtained in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency that is marked as classified or that I know is classified;

b. information or material received or obtained in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency that I know is in the process of a classification determination.

4. I understand that it is my responsibility to consult with appropriate management authorities in the component or Directorate that employs me or has retained my services, or with the Central Intelligence Agency's Publications Review Board if I am no longer employed by or associated with the Agency, in order to ensure that I know: 1) whether information or material within my knowledge or control that I have reason to believe might be in either of the categories set forth in paragraph 3 is considered by the Central Intelligence Agency to fit in either of those categories; and, 2) whom the Agency has authorized to receive such information or material.

5. As a further condition of the special confidence and trust reposed in me by the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby agree to submit for review by the Central Intelligence Agency any writing or other preparation in any form, including a work of fiction, which contains any mention of intelligence data or activities, or contains any other information or material that might be based upon either of the categories set forth in paragraph 3, that I contemplate disclosing publicly or that I have actually prepared for public disclosure, either during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter, prior to discussing it with or showing it to anyone who is not authorized to have access to the categories set forth in paragraph 3. I further agree that I will not take any steps toward public disclosure until I have received written permission to do so from the Central Intelligence Agency.

6. I understand that the purpose of the review described in paragraph 5 is to give the Central Intelligence Agency an opportunity to determine whether the information or material that I contemplate disclosing publicly contains any information or material that I have agreed not to disclose. I further understand that the Agency will act upon my submission and make a response to me within a reasonable time. I further understand that if I dispute the Agency's initial determination on the basis that the information or material in question derives from public sources, I may be called upon to specifically identify such sources. My failure or refusal to do so may by itself result in denial of permission to publish or otherwise disclose the information or material in dispute.

7. I understand that all information or material that I may acquire in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency that fits either of the categories set forth in paragraph 3 of this agreement are and will remain the property of the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an appropriate official or final ruling of a court of law. I agree to surrender anything constituting, containing or reflecting such information or material upon demand by an appropriate official of the Central Intelligence Agency, or upon the conclusion of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency.

8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event that I am called upon by judicial or congressional authorities, or by specially established investigatory bodies of the executive branch, to testify about, or provide, information or material that I have agreed herein not to disclose. In any communication with any such authority or body, I shall observe all applicable rules or procedures for ensuring that such information and/or material is handled in a secure manner.

9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligence activities that I consider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President, or to any successor body that the President may establish, or to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Senate. I recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such matters to the attention of the Agency's Inspector General or to the Director of Central Intelligence. In making any report referred to in this paragraph, I will observe all applicable rules or procedures for ensuring the secure handling of any information or material that may be involved. I understand that any such information or material continues to be subject to this agreement for all other purposes and that such reporting does not constitute public disclosure or declassification of that information or material.

10. I understand that any breach of this agreement by me may result in the Central Intelligence Agency taking administrative action against me, which can include temporary loss of pay or termination of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency. I also understand that if I violate the terms of this agreement, the United States Government may institute a civil proceeding to seek compensatory damages or other appropriate relief. Further, I understand that the disclosure of information that I have agreed herein not to disclose can, in some circumstances, constitute a criminal offense.

11. I understand that the United States Government may, prior to any unauthorized disclosure that is threatened by me, choose to apply to any appropriate court for an order enforcing this agreement. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a waiver on the part of the United States to institute a civil or criminal proceeding for any breach of this agreement by me. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a wavier on my part of any possible defenses I may have in connection with either civil or criminal proceedings that may be brought against me.

12. In addition to any other remedy to which the United States Government may become entitled, I hereby assign to the United States Government all rights, title, and interest in any and all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted or will result or may result from any divulgence, publication or revelation of information or material by me that is carried out in breach of paragraph 5 of this agreement or that involves information or material prohibited from disclosure by the terms of this agreement.

13. I understand and accept that, unless I am provided a written release from this agreement or any portion of it by the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director's representative, all the conditions and obligations accepted by me in this agreement apply both during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency, and at all times thereafter.

14. I understand that the purpose of this agreement is to implement the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence, particularly the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods, as specified in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

15. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12958; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the Military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C., 421 *et seq.*) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including section 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.

16. I understand that nothing in this agreement limits or otherwise affects any provision of criminal or other law that may be applicable to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including the espionage laws (sections 793, 794 and 798 of Title 18, United States Code) and the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-200; 50 U.S.C., 421 *et seq.*).

17. Each of the numbered paragraphs and lettered subparagraphs of this agreement is severable. If a court should find any of the paragraphs or subparagraphs of this agreement to be unenforceable, I understand that all remaining provisions will continue in full force.

18. I make this agreement in good faith, and with no purpose of evasion.

19. This agreement shall be interpreted under and in conformance with the law of the United States.

____
Signature

____
Date

The execution of this agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who accepted it on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency as a prior condition of the employment or other service of the person whose signature appears above.

WITNESS AND ACCEPTANCE:

____
Signature

____
Printed Name

____
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

JFK ACT RELEASE

June 9, 1997

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Stewart F. Aly
Associate Deputy General Counsel
Office of General Counsel
Department of Defense
1600 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1600

Colonel James R. Moore, Jr., U.S.A.
Information Management Officer,
DCSPER (DAPA-ZXI)
300 Army Pentagon, Room 2D749
Washington, DC 20310-0300

Re: Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Joseph Califano's Army Papers under the JFK Act

Gentlemen:

The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to declassify six boxes of Army records from the files of Joseph Califano. The files date principally from the period 1962-63, during which Mr. Califano served as Army General Counsel and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The records had been deposited at the National Archives and Records Administration, where they were recently located. A description of the records, which primarily pertain to U.S. activities related to Cuba, is attached hereto. We have identified what appears to us to be equities of numerous military entities in the Califano papers as well as equities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the United States Information Agency, and others.

Deadlines

Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board's current sunset date of September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the records.[1] *We have slated the Califano papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997 meeting.* The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a prompt and efficient review of the Califano papers.

---

[1] The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may be able to revisit the schedule proposed below.

BOARD MEMBERS: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: *David G. Marwell*

Preliminary Review of Califano Papers

The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has tentatively reached the following conclusions: *first*, the records are very similar in subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection; *second*, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the information in other contexts; and *third*, the Califano papers contain equities of numerous military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard referral process, would be very difficult and time-consuming.[2] Thus, the logistical problem in declassifying the records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number of agencies that will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason, and for the short time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an urgent need to make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.

Proposal

In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of the Califano papers. We would like to schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23, 1997, where all agencies with equities in the Califano papers be concurrently present for a declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with each other and quickly to resolve questions.

Because the Califano papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6 meeting, we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all agencies with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Army and the

---

[2] Ms. Toni Bowie, of the Army Declassification Activity, spent three days reviewing some of the records and making recommendations for referrals to other agencies both within and outside of the military. Although Ms. Bowie worked energetically for three days, it was our sense afterwards that, if we continue at the same pace, the agencies with equities will likely not be able to complete their reviews before the August deadline arrives.

Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the records while Army and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military entities to be present.

We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a plan that will provide all agencies with equities in the Califano papers to have an opportunity to review and declassify their equities.

I look forward to discussing this issue with you.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel

Attachment

cc: Steven D. Tilley, NARA
J. Barry Harrelson, CIA
Nina Noring, State
Richard S. Werksman, USIA
William Leary, NSC
Carol Keeley, FBI

JOSEPH CALIFANO PAPERS (6 boxes)

Identified by Steve Tilley at NARA, these 6 boxes of papers, almost exclusively from 1962-63, were either generated by, or addressed to Joseph Califano, who at this time was Department of the Army General Counsel and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. Most of the documents are short summaries of proposed policy positions, or letters of transmittal, with voluminous appendices attached. Each of the 6 boxes contains approximately 1500-2000 pages of material.

Representative Topics:

(1) ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs--the "Cottrell Committee") meetings on future U.S. policy toward Cuba. These documents are generally background papers prepared prior to meetings, minutes of meetings, or follow-on discussion of action items assigned at meetings of the ICCCA.

(2) Contingency plans for Cuban invasion by the U.S. military in the event of a Cuban uprising.

(3) Psychological warfare against Cuba.

(4) Diplomatic initiatives intended to increase isolation of Cuba.

(5) Biographies, and evaluations of Cuban exile leaders.

(6) Intelligence reports and estimates on reported events inside Cuba.

(7) Summaries of clandestine paramilitary actions taken against Cuba, and suggestions for possible future actions.

Apparent Equities:

Ninety-five per cent of the documents appear to have multiple-agency equities, usually 4 to 6 agencies per document. Based upon staff review, it is estimated that 80% of the documents have State equities, 60% Joint Staff or OSD, 60% NSC, 60% CIA, 15% Army, Navy or Air Force, perhaps 10% DIA, and a small percentage of USIA, Justice, Treasury and FBI.

Horne e:\wp-docs\Califano.wpd
File: 4.0.4

JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)

Using broad topic guidelines provided previously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for 1962 and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe may be relevant to the assassination.

Topics:

(1) ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs) meetings regarding future U.S. policy toward Cuba.

(2) Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert paramilitary operations against Cuba.

(3) Cuban coup planning.

(4) Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.

(5) OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam).

(6) U.S. military strength levels in Vietnam.

Apparent Equities:

Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document--usually State, OSD and/or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared to expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboration with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection; upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence declassification review.

Home e:\wp-docs\Jointstaff.wpd
File: 4.0.4

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

June 9, 1997

Stewart F. Aly
Associate Deputy General Counsel
Office of General Counsel
Department of Defense
1600 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1600

Mr. Edmund McBride
Chief, Information Management
Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Staff
The Pentagon, Room 2B917
Washington, DC 20318-0400

Re: Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Selected Papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler, and Selected JCS Central Files under the JFK Act

Gentlemen:

The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to declassify approximately 147 records previously flagged by the Joint Staff from both the JCS Central Files, and the papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler. The files date principally from the period 1961-64. The records were flagged during searches directed by Mr. Edmund McBride (Chief, Information Management Division, Joint Staff) at the request of the ARRB staff. With one exception, ARRB staff feels that all records flagged by Mr. McBride's working group are relevant to the historical understanding or context of the assassination of President Kennedy. A description of the records, which primarily pertain to U.S. activities related to Cuba, or to Vietnam policy, is attached hereto. We have identified what appear to us to be equities of numerous military entities in these papers, as well as equities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the National Security Council, and others.

Deadlines

Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board's current sunset date of September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the records.[1] *We have slated these papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997 meeting.*

---

[1] The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a prompt and efficient review of these selected papers of Joint Chiefs Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler, and the Joint Staff Central Files.[2]

Preliminary Review of Papers of JCS Chairmen and Joint Staff Central Files

The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has tentatively reached the following conclusions: *first*, the records are very similar in subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection; *second*, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the information in other contexts; and *third*, these papers contain equities of numerous military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard referral process, would be very difficult and time-consuming. Thus, the logistical problem in declassifying the records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number of agencies that will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason, and for the short time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an urgent need to make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.

Proposal

In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of these papers of the three aforementioned JCS Chairmen and the JCS Central Files. We would like to schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23, 1997, where all agencies with equities in these JCS/Joint Staff papers be concurrently present for a declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own

---

be able to revisit the schedule proposed below.

[2] The Joint Staff's Initial Statement of Compliance to the Review Board, dated February 6, 1997, identified in detail the process by which these records were located—namely, which files were searched, and who participated in the searches. Mr. Edmund McBride, Chief of the Joint Staff Information Management Division, indicated in this statement that the Joint Staff was standing by to expeditiously process these records for declassification in collaboration with other agencies when the ARRB was ready. ARRB staff has only recently completed its initial review of these records, which constitute selectively flagged folders within 40 boxes of JCS and Joint Staff records.

equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with each other and quickly to resolve questions.

Because these papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6 meeting, we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all agencies with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Joint Staff and the Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the records while the Joint Staff and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military entities to be present.

We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a plan that will provide all agencies with equities in these Joint Staff/JCS papers to have an opportunity to review and declassify their equities.

I look forward to discussing this issue with you.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel

Attachment

cc: Steven D. Tilley, NARA
J. Barry Harrelson, CIA
Nina Noring, State
William Leary, NSC

JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)

Using broad topic guidelines provided previously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for 1962 and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe may be relevant to the assassination.

Topics:

(1) ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs) meetings regarding future U.S. policy toward Cuba.

(2) Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert paramilitary operations against Cuba.

(3) Cuban coup planning.

(4) Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.

(5) OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam).

(6) U.S. military strength levels in Vietnam.

Apparent Equities:

Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document--usually State, OSD and/or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared to expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboration with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection; upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence declassification review.

Home e:\wp-docs\Jointstaff.wpd
File: 4.0.4

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Via Facsimile

July 2, 1997

TO: Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG

FROM: Doug Horne, Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT: Declassification Session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS Records

1. The joint declassification session mentioned in our letters to the Army (re: the Joseph Califano Papers) and to the Joint Secretariat (re: Selected Papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler, and selected JCS Central Files) of June 9, 1997 is scheduled to take place during the four-day window Monday, July 21-Thursday, July 24, inclusive. The first session will commence at 9:00 A.M. Monday morning, July 21, at the ARRB offices in room 207 of the Bicentennial Building, located at 600 E Street, NW (at the corner of E Street NW and 6th Street).

2. Our offices are located equidistant from the following three Metro stations: Archives/Navy Memorial (Yellow Line); Judiciary Square (Red Line); and Gallery Place (Red Line). Parking Garages are located in the basement of the Bicentennial Building, and also across the street from us in the basement of the ARRP building.

3. Please fax the names, SSNs, and clearance information for CIA attendees to Tracy Shycoff on our staff at fax number (202) 724-0457 prior to close-of-business on Wednesday, July 16, 1997. Please indicate on your visit request that the period of the visit is through the end of calendar year 1997, since it is anticipated that our efforts to expedite declassification of these documents will take more than one session to accomplish.

4. We look forward to working cooperatively with all of our partners in this enterprise.

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

Confidential

18 July 1997

Memorandum For: David G Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

Subject: CIA Reviewers - Clearance Certifications

1. The CIA review team for the joint declassification session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS records scheduled for July 21-24 is composed of the following individuals:

Charles A. Briggs IC/DCI/CSI/HRG	SSN 161-22-9115
Kathleen Puchnick IC/DCI/CSI/HRG	SSN 161-26-1452
Richard D. Kovar IC/DCI/CSI/HRG	SSN 194-22-0138
Eileen M. Wukitch S/DO/IMS	SSN 178-36-7636
Mary V. Amoia IC/DO/IMS	SSN 579-42-8195
William Perkins IC/DO/IMS.	SSN 082-30-4664

2. The Agency reviewers listed above have the appropriate clearances to review Joseph Califano's Army Papers and the selected JCS records and files. Official certification of the individuals' clearances will follow. If you have any questions concerning clearances in my absence, please contact Barbara Standley, 703-613-1806.

J. Barry Harrelson
Project Officer,
CIA JFK Review

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 2-82

FAX'd by Barbara
AM - 21 July 97

Confidential

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Via Facsimile

August 5, 1997

TO: Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG

FROM: Doug Horne, Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT: Invitation to Next Declassification Session for Califano Papers and JCS Records

1. I am writing to notify you that the next working session for joint declassification review of subject records in accordance with the standards of the JFK Act is scheduled for Tuesday, October 7 through Thursday, October 9, inclusive, in the ARRB conference room in our second floor offices at 600 E Street, N.W.

2. Our goals for this second session are to complete joint review of the JCS papers, and to open up for review two more boxes in the Califano collection. This session will also allow selected agencies (which were not able to complete review of documents available at the first session) an opportunity to catch up.

3. We see a need for representatives of the CIA to continue to attend these sessions until they are completed.

4. Names and clearances need to be faxed to us only if the CIA attendees for this October session are different from those clearances passed to ARRB in July. Our point-of-contact and fax number for clearances is Tracy Shycoff, at (202) 724-0457.

5. For planning purposes, following this October session, our plans are to host one session per month, of 2 to 3 days duration each time, until the declassification review of the selected JCS papers and the Califano collection is completed. Agencies which require more time are welcome to make individual appointments to review these documents in-between the monthly, group sessions.

BOARD MEMBERS: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: *David G. Marwell*

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

NEWS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 18, 1997

CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN
(202) 724-0088, EXT. 253

JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD RELEASES MILITARY RECORDS RELATED TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA FROM 1962-64

The Assassination Records Review Board, an independent federal agency overseeing the identification, review, and release of records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, today released approximately 1,500 pages of previously classified military records from 1962-64 that relate to U.S. policy toward Cuba.

"These documents further expand the historical record by illustrating the United States government's deep interest in developing a policy that would force Castro from power during the early 1960's," said Dr. Anna Nelson, a member of the Review Board. "We now have a new window into the policy options toward Cuba that were being considered and debated at the highest levels of the military services."

The mandate of the Review Board is to make the record surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy as complete as possible. The Board has aggressively sought to uncover records on U.S. foreign policy that put the assassination into its historical context.

The Review Board worked cooperatively with representatives from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to locate records stored at NARA that met the definition of being "assassination related." The documents are from the fi[redacted]ho served as General Counsel to the Secretary of the Army, the files of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler, and the central files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The records have been transferred to NARA for inclusion in the JFK Collection, which is housed at the NARA facility in College Park, Maryland. These documents are now available to researchers.

Copies of selected documents are available from the Assassination Records Review Board, 600 E Street, NW, Second Floor, Washington, DC 20530; telephone number: (202) 724-0088.

-more-

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

The Assassination Records Review Board was established by the JFK Act, which was signed into law by President George Bush. The five members of the Board were appointed by President Clinton, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and sworn in on April 11, 1994. The law gives the Review Board the mandate and the authority to identify, secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It is the responsibility of the Board to determine which records are to be made public immediately and which ones will have postponed release dates.

The Review Board consists of the following members:

Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair; U.S. District Court Judge, District of Minnesota.

Dr. Henry F. Graff; Professor Emeritus of History at Columbia University.

Dr. Kermit L. Hall; Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History at The Ohio State University.

Dr. William L. Joyce; Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections at Princeton University.

Dr. Anna K. Nelson; Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence at The American University.

-30-

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD RECORDS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE	CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN
NOVEMBER 18, 1997	(202) 724-0088, EXT. 253

SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM MILITARY RECORDS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA FROM 1962-64

Attached are six selected documents from approximately 1,500 pages of military records that relate to U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-64. The records are being released today by the Assassination Records Review Board. Sections of the documents that may be of particular interest to the reader are marked by arrows in the margin on the right side of the relevant pages.

List of Selected Documents

1. Excerpts from 198-10004-10020
   Note: The Record Information Form (document cover sheet) for the compilation of documents in this group is dated 3/1/63, but the excerpted documents are from February 1962.
   "Possible Actions To Provoke, Harass, Or Disrupt Cuba"

2. Excerpts from 202-10002-10104
   February 7, 1962, March 9, 1962, March 12, 1962, March 13, 1962, April 10, 1962
   "Northwoods" documents

3. Excerpts from 202-10002-10018
   May 1, 1963
   "Courses of Action Related to Cuba"

4. Excerpts from 198-10004-10011
   December 11, 1963
   Memo to Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Secretary of the Army - "Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua"

5. Excerpts from 202-10002-10010
   December 19, 1963
   "Meeting with President on Cuba"

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

6. Excerpts from 202-10002-10117
January 31, 1964
"A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba"

Cuba Selected Documents
#1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10020
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : MULTIPLE
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 03/01/63
PAGES : 135
SUBJECTS : PLANNING AND POLICY, CUBA

POLICY OBJECTIVES, CUBA

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

LATIN AMERICA SECURITY

ACTIONS TO IMPEDE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES

CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION, CUBA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

BLOCKADE OF CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
TE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 7. Package of proposed actions to be used against Cuba, including operations to apply pressure to the Cuban regime to oust Castro and potential reaction to US involvement.

[R] - ~~ITEM IS RESTRICTED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PROVOKE, HARRASS, OR DISRUPT

-CUBA-

1. Operation SMASHER:

a. Objective: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and commercial communications facilities in Cuba.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the clandestine introduction of a "special" vacuum tube into selected communications equipment. The tube, which is available, is virtually undetectable inasmuch as its effectiveness is due to the insertion of a chemical compound in the base of the tube. The chemical, when heated becomes a conductor, when cool a non-conductor.

2. Operation FREE RIDE:

a. Objective: The objective is to create unrest and dissension amongst the Cuban people.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by airdropping valid Pan American or KLM one-way airline tickets good for passage to Mexico City, Caracas, etc. (none to the U.S.). Tickets could be intermixed with other leaflets planned to be dropped. The number of tickets dropped could be increased. The validity of the tickets would have to be restricted to a time period.

3. Operation TURN ABOUT:

a. Objective: The objective is to create indications to Fidel Castro that his value to the revolutionary cause has diminished to the point where plans are being made for his "removal".

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of intelligence means the crecendo increasing until it culminates in Castro's discovery of the mechanism or hardware.

UNCLASSIFIED

Special Handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties.

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with permission of the issuing office.

Incl 5/1

~~TOP SECRET~~ This document consists of ______ pages.
Copy # 1 of 3 copys.

4. **Operation DEFECTOR:**

a. Objective: To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban military to defect with equipment.

b. Concept: This activity when properly planned and implemented has the effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian system the immediate reaction is increased security accompanied by decreased activity. It also creates havoc in security and intelligence agencies. Could be accomplished by intelligence means and promise of rewards.

5. **Operation BREAK-UP:**

a. Objective: To clandestinely introduce corrosive materials to cause aircraft, vehicle or boat accidents.

b. Concept: This activity, if possible should be aimed primarily toward the Sov Soviet-provided aircraft. If properly accomplished it would degrade confidence in the equipment, increase supply and maintenance problems and seriously affect combat capability.

6. **Operation COVER-UP:**

a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Communist government of Cuba that Naval Forces ostensibly assigned to the MERCURY project is merely a cover.

b. Concept: It should not be revealed as to what the cover is--this should be left to conjecture. This could tie in with Operation DIRTY TRICK.

7. **Operation DIRTY TRICK:**

a. Objective: The objective is to provide irrevocable proof that, should the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists et al Cuba.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the Cubans.

8. **Operation FULL-UP:**

a. Objective: The objective is to destroy confidence in fuel supplied by the Soviet Bloc by indicating it is contaminated.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by introducing a known biological agent into jet fuel storage facilities. This agent flourishes in jet fuel and grows until it consumes all the space inside the tank.

9. **Operation PHANTOM:**

a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Castro Government that clandestine penetration and resupply of agents is being regularly conducted.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by use of BJ, UDT, AND JJ capabilities to create the impression that landings have been made on beaches and air drops have been made in other areas.

10. **Operation BINGO:**

a. Objective: The objective is to create an incident which has the appearance of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing the excuse for use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of SNAKES outside the confines of the Guantanamo Base. SNAKES simulate an actual fire-fight and upon hearing such a sound it is entirely feasible that the immediate reaction on G'Mo would be that the base is being attacked. This would, with proper preparation, be followed by a counterattack and with adequate planning the base at G'Mo could disgorge military force in sufficient number to sustain itself until other forces, which had been previously alerted, could attack in other areas. It is envisaged that a schedule of operations similar to the following would overwhelm the Cuban military and cause its defeat:

(1) Simulated attack on Guantanamo.
(2) Word flashed to the President.
(3) President orders counterattack to include:
  (a) Immediate launch of alerted aircraft whose targets are Cuban airfields.
  (b) Immediate launch of counterattack down strategic lines in communication in Cuba.
  (c) Fleet force standing by on alert would make way toward pre-selected targets/landing areas.
  (d) Immediate embarkation of airborne troops previously alerted to pre-selected targets.
  (e) Launch of additional combat aircraft to clear drop areas and further interdict lines of communication.
  (f) Ships and aircraft would land/airdrop troops and secure airfields, road/rail terminals, etc.

Incl 5/3

UNCLASSIFIED

(g) Resupply and replacement activities.

Properly executed, the above could overthrow the Cuban Government in a matter of hours, providing the plan is implemented within the next six months.

11. Operation GOOD TIMES:

a. Objective: To disillusion the Cuban population with Castro image by distribution of fake photographic material.

b. Concept: Prepare a desired photograph, such as an obese Castro with two beauties in any situation desired, ostensibly within a room in the Castro residence, lavishly furnished, and a table briming over with the most delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption (appropriately Cuban) such as "My ration is different." Make as many prints as desired on sterile paper and then distribute over the countryside by air drops or agents. This should put even a Commie Dictator in the proper perspective with the underprivileged masses.

12. Operation HEAT IS ON:

a. Objective: To create the impression with Castro Government that certain dyed-in-the-wool Red pilots are planning to defect, thus causing a detrimental tightening of security.

b. Concept: It is known that many Cuban refugee pilots are personally acquainted with many of the present CRAF pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated Castro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the Castro intelligence system the fact that these pre-designated Reds are planning to defect for monetary and/or ideological reasons. Security crackdown should help destroy Castro image and also impose unacceptable restrictions on routine training activities.

UNCLASSIFIED

Incl 5/4

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATION: Invisible Bomb

OBJECTIVE:

1. To create the impression that isolated bombings are taking place in Cuba thus maximizing harrassment and confusion of the Castro government.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

2. The Air Force can utilize the operational characteristics of F-101 or other Century series aircraft to create the impression that anti-Castro opposition is continuing. The aircraft operational characteristic to be exploited is the "sonic-boom."

3. The "sonic-boom" can be employed in several different ways such as an individual boom at selected spots or a continuous boom and performed at either high or low altitudes. It will cause not only apprehension but varying degrees of malicious damage as well, i.e. break all the windows on a street in Havana.

4. The "sonic-hoom" effect can be maximized by planning missions for execution during the early morning hours when the populace is sleeping. The Cuban people are generally unfamiliar with this phenomenon, therefore it is felt that the impact for a time would be most beneficial.

5. The directional aspects of the "sonic-boom" also make it feasible for use in simulating U.S. Naval gun-fire in the immediate vicinity of the Cuban land mass.

6. This operation is considered relatively safe and leaves no tangible evidence. It can be planned and executed with a minimum of effort and expense.

UNCLASSIFIED

Special Handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties.

eproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with permission of the issuing office.

This document consists of 1 pages.
Copy # 1 of 3 copys.

~~SECRET~~

Incl 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Operation "HORN SWOGGLE"

Objective:

1. To crash or force down Cuban MIG aircraft with an all weather intercept capability by communications intrusion.

Concept of Operations:

2. Closely monitor MIG air/ground communications for the purpose of determining frequency and terminology usage for practice or real GCI operations.

3. By use of overriding transmitters and either a decoy aircraft or solid weather conditions, override Cuban controller and have Cuban refugee pilot issue instructions which run MIG out of fuel or towards Florida, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, a carrier, etc.

UNCLASSIFIED

Special Handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties.

eproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with permission of the issuing office.

~~TOP SECRET~~ This document consists of 1 pages.
Copy # 1 of 3 copys.

Incl 3

13-00000

[illegible] ~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Operation TRUE BLUE

1. **Objective:** To degrade Castro and his government in the eyes of the Cuban people by communications intrusion.

Concept of Operations:

2. By utilizing high powered transmitters in the vicinity of Cuba (Florida, Inagwa, Jamaica, aboard Naval ship) which have the capability of overriding commercial Cuban radio and TV stations, periodically degrade Castro and other government figures in the minds of the Cuban people.

3. The technique of communications intrusion could be exploited by pre-taping or live broadcasts of anti-communist and anti-Castro propaganda at station breaks, Castro speeches, etc. This idea envisions the use of a Cuban refugee to make such broadcasts and naturally would require close monitoring of stations to be worked. Any number of thoughts could be injected such as:

a. "Cuba Si, Russia No."
b. Communism exploits the masses.
c. Communism is ruthless totalitarianism.
d. Castro and henchment feast off the land while we are rationed.
e. Castro and his reign of terror.
f. Castro is a lunatic and should be put away.
g. Castro is the cause of all our troubles.
h. Rise up against the pig Castro, etc. etc.

4. If approved this operation could become a continuous project, perhaps under control of USIA.

UNCLASSIFIED

Special Handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties.

production of this document in whole
r in part is prohibited except with
permission of the issuing office.

[illegible] ~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 1 pages.
Copy # 1 of 3 copys.

Incl 2

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

2 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Subject: Ideas in Support of Project

The enclosed ideas are submitted for your consideration and possible use in furtherance of the objectives of the Cuba Project. I think some of them have promise and should you desire our group to develop any of them in more detail, we will do so.

William H. Craig
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brigadier General, USA
DOD Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

6 encls
1. Operation Smasher(2Pages) (TS)
2. Operation True Blue(1Page) (TS)
3. Operation "Horn Swoggle"(1Page)(TS)
4. Operation "No Love Lost" (1Page) (TS)
5. Possible Actions to Provide, Harrass, or disrupt (4Pages)(TS)
6. Operation Invisible Bomb (1Page) (TS)

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

CSGWG 0#19

UNCLASSIFIED

Operation "NO LOVE LOST"

1. **Objective:** To confuse and harrass Castro Cuban Pilots by use of radio conversations.

2. **Concept of Operations:** Fly Cuban refugee pilot in sterile aircraft in proximity of Cuba at periodic intervals while communication monitoring Cuban air/ground frequencies utilized for airdrome control. Cuban refugee pilot in sterile aircraft would personally know many of the pilots still flying for Castro. Refugee pilot would get into argument with Castro pilots over radio thus distracting confusing, etc. Would be real trouble for Castro pilots in actual weather conditions. Argument could go, "I'll get you you Red son-of-a-gun," and call by name if appropriate.

UNCLASSIFIED

Special Handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties.

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with permission of the issuing office.

This document consists of 1 pages.
Copy # 1 of 3 copies.

Incl 4

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

I. Operation SMASHER.

1. Objective: Disrupt or disable military and commercial communications facilities in Cuba.

2. Technical Requirements:

a. Detailed information on both commercial and military communications facilities and capabilities, to include inside and outside plant construction, system networks, equipment details (i.e. circuitry, tubes, etc.) location and type of repeator stations. This information is required to construct a refined device.

b. A vacuum tube modified in such a manner as to cause a short circuit. This is possible by inducing silicon carbide (?) into the base of the tube. When the tube becomes hot the silicon carbide liquifies and becomes a conductor; when the tube cools the matter returns to a solid non-conductive state. Such a device (vacuum tube) is available.

3. Targets:

a. Cuban Telephone Company. The company provides local and long distance telephone service throughout Cuba and also international telephone service.

b. Radio Corporation of Cuba Avenida Carlos. The company provides radiotelephone service to American and European countries. It also provides radiotelegraph service and includes leased teleprinter channels. In conjunction with AT&T the company inaugurated over-the-horizon microwave radio service between Cuba and Florida in 1957. This latter made available two-way TV channels.

c. Cuban American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Founded by IT&T and AT&T, providing six (6) submarine cables linking Havana and Key West. Facility operates in conjunction with microwave link.

d. Commercial Radio and Television Stations.

e. Military Radio and Land-line Facilities. These include point-to-point command and administrative systems, air/ground facilities, navigational aids. Obviously certain commercial facilities provide service to the military therefore disrupting or disabling commercial facilities will affect military communications capabilities.

production of this document in whole
r in part is prohibited except with
permission of the issuing office.

Special Handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties.

Incl #1/1

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 2 pages.
Copy # 1 of 3 copies.

4. Concept of Operation:

a. The tube must be introduced clandestinely into appropriate equipments.

b. Introduction can be accomplished through the use of known assets either directly or by contact with an employee of a company who would have access and who would receive proper remuneration.

Incl 1/2

[redacted]

Cuba Selected Documents
#2

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : NORTHWOODS
DATE : 00/00/62
PAGES : 197
SUBJECTS : U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

UPRISINGS IN CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

SOVIET BASE IN CUBA

CARIBBEAN SECURITY

PATROL POSTS

INVASION OF CUBA

JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
ATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to JCS recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify US military intervention.

[R] - ~~ITEM IS RESTRICTED~~

~~SECRET~~
JCS 1969/303
7 February 1962
Page 2144

UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 1
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

---

* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat

~~SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL E. G. LANSDALE,
Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

Subject: Cuba Project

Reference: Memorandum from Your Office for
BrigGen W. H. Craig, USA, subj:
"Special Project", dated 17 Jan 62

1. As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has been determined based upon the following factors:

a. National Security Policy, determined by the NSC during the meeting of 9 May 1961.

b. Current intelligence estimates of the situation in Cuba.

c. Operations against the Castro regime will be covert, at least initially.

d. Time favors the Castro government.

2. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist government are as follows:

a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.

b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in:

(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability.

(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

3. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba.

b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.

4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is recognized, it is believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:

a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the Cuban people.

b. If it is announced incident to the overt military action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further assistance from the OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.

5. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 1969/321
12 March 1962
Page 2165

UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 1
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

---

* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

UNCLASSIFIED

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 May 84
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

L. L. Lemnitzer

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1 Enclosure
Memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~~TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Re 1969/333

~~TOP SECRET-NOFORN~~
~~SPECIAL~~ HANDLING

JCSM-272-62
10 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuba

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must be solved in the near future. Further, they see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present communist regime either as a result of internal uprisings or external political, economic or psychological pressures. Accordingly they believe that military intervention by the United States will be required to overthrow the present communist regime.

2. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this communist government increases the probability that one or more other nations in Latin America will become communist or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the problems currently facing the United States and the Organization of American States. While considered unlikely, it is possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.

3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc. They are provided with the opportunity to continue with their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing internal security measures by police state methods decrease

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~~TOP SECRET-NOFORN~~
SPECIAL HANDLING

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 May 84
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

~~TOP SECRET NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING~~

UNCLASSIFIED

the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure control of the government and the island. The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for a communist underground after the elimination of the present government. This creates a problem for the future which is steadily increasing in magnitude.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of general war. They also believe that the intervention can be accomplished rapidly enough to minimize communist opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces available would assure rapid essential military control of Cuba. Continued police action would be required.

5. In view of the increasing military and subversive threat to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They also recommend that such intervention be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces presently on active duty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING~~

UNCLASSIFIED

9 March 1962

COPY OF COPIES
~~SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION~~

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBA PROJECT (TS)

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter by 13 March 1962.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN~~

JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretexts which they consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action.

3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area.

4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere.

6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is

---

* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months.

CONCLUSION

7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).

M

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):

(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.

(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.

(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.

(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).

UNCLASSIFIED

(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.

(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).

(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.

(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.

(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.

(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.

7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio

stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.

ENCLOSURE B

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows:

> " - - - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive US military action."

3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

---

* JCS 1969/303
** JCS 1969/313

[redacted]

Cuba Selected Documents
#3

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10018
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCS 2304/189

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM : J-5
TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TITLE : COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II)
DATE : 05/01/63
PAGES : 36
SUBJECTS : POLICY, CUBA

REVOLT IN CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

OPLAN 312

OPLAN 316

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
TE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Report to Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff discussing courses of action toward Cuba.

[R] - ~~ITEM IS RESTRICTED~~

13-00000

COPY NO. ____

DISTRIBUTION [illegible]

JCS 2304/188

[illegible] May 1963

Pages 1102 - 1126, incl.

REPORT BY THE J-5

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II) (U)

References: a. JCS [illegible]
b. JCS [illegible]
c. JCS 2304/[illegible]
d. JCS [illegible]
e. JCS [illegible]
f. JCS 2304/[illegible]

The Commandant has expressed the direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter.

COORDINATION

This paper has been processed in accordance with paragraphs 3 c and 4 (2) of Policy Memorandum 132.

DISTRIBUTION:

Gen. Taylor (C/JCS)	
Gen. Wheeler (CSA)	Gen. Reynolds (VD/JS)
Adm. Anderson (CNO)	Adm. [illegible]
Gen. LeMay (CSAF)	Gen. [illegible] (J-5)
Gen. Shoup (CMC)	Gen. [illegible]
Gen. Parker (DC/S, OPS)	Gen. [illegible]
Adm. Sharp (DCNO-P&P)	Gen. [illegible]
Gen. Burchinal (DC/S, P&O)	Gen. [illegible]
Gen. Bowser (DC/S-P, MC)	Gen. Ingelido (S/JCS)
Adm. Riley (D/JS)	Capt. [illegible] (DS/JCS)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

JCS 2304/188 1102

(Page revised by 3rd Corrigendum - 13 May 1963)

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

TOP SECRET

COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II) (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. In response to a request* from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide comment and recommendation concerning the requirements for and the desirability of fomenting a revolt in Cuba, giving consideration to the advantage of engineering an incident as an alternate cause for invasion.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by CM-437-63, dated 25 March 1963*, requested that a study be made of the requirements to plan and incite a revolt in Cuba. He stated, in part therein, "In view of past difficulties in infiltrating agents into Cuba and of obtaining reliable information out of Cuba, it will always be extremely difficult to contrive a timed uprising in proper relation to US preparations to exploit it." Hence, "consideration should be given to the advantages of engineering an incident as a cause for invasion rather than trying to generate and coordinate action from the inside involving many Cubans of doubtful reliability."

3. CINCLANT has forwarded a proposed concept** for a "Cuban revolt well conceived, timely executed, and supported overtly by US military forces" and a related letter*** on the use of Cuban nationals.

DISCUSSION

4. For discussion, see Enclosure B.

---

* Enclosure to JCS 2304/176
** Attachment to JCS 2304/171
*** Attachment to JCS 2304/168

UNCLASSIFIED

CONCLUSIONS

5. Unless the United States intervenes militarily, the Castro government will become more firmly entrenched as its efforts and ability to spread international communism will increase.

6. The United States should intervene militarily in Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly perpetrated by the Castro regime or (b) foment a revolt in Cuba.

7. Engineered provocations would provide greater advantages in control, timing, simplicity and security than would a fomented revolt. It would be most difficult to generate a widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of a local uprising as a contrived incident should not be precluded.

8. The United States should:

a. Initiate a coordinated program to create a pretext for overt US military intervention in Cuba.

b. In support of the above, undertake a flexibly phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, commencing with the intensification of intelligence collection and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a framework for guerrilla activity.

c. At a propitious time, launch appropriate military action to remove the Castro communist government.

9. It would appear necessary that one governmental organization be given the primary responsibility for developing a national plan.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan.

11. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group (5412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of NSAM 57.*

---

* Enclosure to JCS 1969/217

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in Enclosure A, which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded on a "Special Handling Required - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" basis, to the Secretary of Defense.

b. The memorandum in Enclosure B, together with its Appendix, be forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for his use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Department of Defense for Policy toward Cuba.

c. Copies of this paper be forwarded to CINCARIB, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

e. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Action Officer: Colonel D. C. Pollock, J-5, Ext. 77556
Western Hemisphere Branch

ENCLOSURE B

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subject: Courses of Action Related to Cuba (U)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the courses of action that might be taken by the United States to contrive a pretext for US military intervention in Cuba. They are of the opinion that the discussion in the Appendix hereto would be useful to you in your capacity as Executive Agent of the Department of Defense for Policy toward Cuba.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

APPENDIX

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This report is in response to a request from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider the desirability and requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba. It includes an examination of engineering an incident or a series of incidents as a cause for invasion and consideration of pertinent comments received from CINCLANT.

2. Summary. Study of the desirability and the requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba and of the advantages of engineering an incident or a series of incidents rather than trying to generate and coordinate action from inside involving many Cubans of doubtful reliability leads to the conclusions that:

a. It is unlikely that an effective spontaneous revolt will occur in the near future.

b. Any uprising without US overt support is likely to be short-lived because of the improved Cuban/Soviet military capabilities presently in Cuba and Castro's increasingly efficient internal security operations.

c. There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro communist regime will risk a direct provocation that could be used as a pretext for US intervention.

d. Unless the United States intervenes militarily, the Castro government will become more firmly entrenched and its efforts and ability to spread international communism will increase.

e. The United States should intervene militarily in Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly perpetrated by the Castro regime to serve as the cause of invasion or (b) foment a revolt within Cuba which would call for US military intervention.

f. Engineered provocation would provide greater advantages in control, timing, simplicity, and security than would a fomented revolt. It would be most difficult to generate a widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of a local uprising as a contrived incident should not be precluded.

g. The United States should:

(1) Initiate a coordinated program to create a pretext for US military intervention in Cuba.

(2) In support of the above, undertake a flexibly phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, commencing with the intensification of intelligence collection and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a framework for guerrilla activity.

(3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military action to remove the Castro communist government.

h. Implementation of the above would involve many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary that one governmental organization should be given the primary responsibility for developing such a national plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan.

i. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group (5412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of NSAM 57.

j. CINCLANT's concept for fomenting a revolt in Cuba while containing much merit, should be re-examined both for its timing and for the large-scale guerrilla activity it envisages.

b. Conduct physical and psychological military harassment of the Cuban regime and covert and clandestine operations as directed.

c. Undertake military action in Cuba in accordance with contingency plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and directed by the President. The primary purpose of the US military intervention would be to assure the overthrow of the Castro communist government and to assist in the establishment of a new, non-communist government acceptable to the United States.

20. The implementation of any of the suggested courses of action in this study would involve many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary, therefore, that one single governmental organization be given the primary responsibility for developing a national plan.

21. Because of the extensive military operations involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan. In addition, for a contrived revolt, they should be assigned the specific responsibility for developing the military and paramilitary aspects of the plan. This would require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek a determination under NSAM 57 when a revolt contrived by the United States were an operation large enough to warrant control of covert forces by the Department of Defense and that CINCLANT be designated as the DOD agent. In this connection, CINCLANT has developed a specific concept for political and military action in Cuba.

CINCLANT CONCEPT

22. The CINCLANT concept provides for inciting a revolt in Cuba, followed by overt, large-scale US military operations. The proposed timing of operations permits completion in 15-18 months. Supporting operations by CIA, State, and USIA will be required.

23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for the development of intelligence, the organization by State of a Free Cuban Government (FCG), the development of a propaganda plan by USIA, and the development of a suitable cover plan.

24. Actual operations would commence with the execution by CINCLANT of OPLAN 380-63 about 15 January 1964. This plan calls for infiltrating of UW forces into Cuba for area assessment, establishing guerrilla bases, developing military units, establishing escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion. On about 15 June 1964, UW forces would be augmented and would accelerate subversive operations to create conditions favorable for establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for employment of conventional forces.

25. CINCLANT then proposed that on about 15 July mobilization of forces for US conventional operations would begin. Execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312 would commence on 26 July 1964 followed by D-Day OPLAN 316, about 3 August 1964.

26. Although the foregoing schedule is approximate, it should be noted that the Free Cuban Government would be required to exist at least for 18 days in the face of the Castro government's excellent counterguerrilla ability. This time requirement appears to be excessive, but it could be shortened. The criteria for United States recognition of a new government could be met in this period. The Free Cuban Government could claim it:

a. Was in actual possession of the governmental machinery.

b. Was administering it with general acceptance by the population; and,

c. Was prepared to honor international obligations.

27. The UW forces required for CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 are approximately:

(1) Headquarters, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic (JUWTFA)	-	6 Off	42 EM
(2) UW Operating Base	-	36 Off	482 EM
(3) Support Units	-	15 Off	331 EM
(4) Special Forces	-	1 Group Headquarter (reinf.) 2 Companies (reinf.	
(5) Submarines	-	2	
(6) APD	-	1	
(7) SEAL Teams	-	1	
(8) Air Commandos	-	150 Personnel 20 Aircraft 4 Air Control Teams	
(9) CIA Forces	-	Internal and External assets as required by CINCLANT.	

28. CINCLANT does not have UW forces assigned at this time, however, a nucleus JUWTFA staff is included within the CINCLANT staff and has the capability for preparing UW plans for normal contingencies. Planning or conducting UW operations of the magnitude envisaged in CINCLANT's concept in this plan is beyond current capabilities.

29. At an appropriate time in preliminary operations the activation of the JUWTFA as a separate organization and the assignment to it of full wartime headquarters complement of 48 officers, 56 enlisted men, and five civilians would be required. Approval of any concept in principle or for planning purposes, however, would not necessitate the

activation of a separate headquarters. In this case, CINCLANT would re-evaluate his staff capabilities and submit appropriate recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

30. CINCLANT in a related outline concept recommended, concerning the use of Cuban nationals in UW operations, that "As practical, the Military Services should initially form their Cuban nationals into integral, all Cuban units . . .". It is considered that the creation of a "Cuban Expeditionary Force" in anticipation of its employment in the execution of OPLAN 316 is a risk which cannot be justified and should not be undertaken. There appears to be no reason, however, why Cubans could not be formed into small teams for use in UW activities. It is estimated that from two to four hundred carefully selected Cubans could be used in this role. It would be appropriate for the CIA in a supporting role to select and train the individuals forming them into teams of appropriate size to be made available for joint use by CINCLANT or by CIA, as necessary.

31. For other details of training Cuban nationals, see JCSM-360-63.

32. The force levels in CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 are adequate to cope with the improved Cuban military capability and the presence of Soviet troops on the island.

33. The experience of the JUWTFA during the Cuban crisis in October 1962, indicates that the present military supply system in the CONUS will be unable immediately to provide equipment and supplies in the required configuration for projected UW operations in Cuba. The Army is currently studying prestockage of UW equipment and will submit proposals for approval and financing.

UNCLASSIFIED

34. The conceptual outline submitted by CINCLANT does not provide an exact plan in detail for contriving a revolt in Cuba. However, his general concept would provide for:

"a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist dominated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion, unconventional warfare, limited conventional actions and finally full-scale invasion in that order, if necessary.

b. The capability of US to withdraw at any point in the process if unfavorable international reactions or pressures require it; or if the Cuban people themselves, in a successful revolt, overthrow the present regime and form a government favorable to US interests.

c. An ambiguous atmosphere during the critical phases in its development which would not present the Soviets with a direct confrontation of power until events would preclude timely action on their part to prevent our intended result in Cuba.

d. Utilization of the OAS Forum and support without being dependent upon OAS approval or disapproval for the necessary intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban Government in exile and the final, decisive military action.

e. Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements in the US for political and military support without depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success of the plan.

f. No maldeployment of US forces, affecting the over-all US military posture, until the final decisive stages of the plan are ready for execution, thus reducing maldeployment time.

g. The most economical use of US resources to accomplish the defeat of Castro communism.

h. A definite time scale of events culminating in the defeat of Castro's communist government and establishing the groundwork for the installation of a government compatible with the aims of the OAS and friendly to the US by 1 October 1964."

Cuba Selected Documents
#4

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10011
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY
FROM : R. D. ALBRO
TO : OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
TITLE : TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES IN NICARAGUA
DATE : 12/11/63
PAGES : 11
SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS

ARTIME, MANUEL

CUBAN BRIGADE

KENNEDY, ROBERT

CUBAN EXILE TRAINING IN NICARAGUA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
TE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 10. Memo regarding training of Cubans in Nicaragua, recriutment efforts of Manuel Artime, meeting between Artime and Robert Kennedy, and Cubans in US Army.

[R] - ~~ITEM IS RESTRICTED~~

~~SECRET~~

20310

ACSI-CX

11 DEC 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

ATTN: MR. JOSEPH CALIFANO, GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua (S)

1. (U) References:

a. ACSI-CX Memorandum 19 Nov 63, above subject, to Office, Secretary of the Army

b. Intelligence Report #2870006563, 9 Aug 63, Subject: Prominent Cuban Exiled Leaders visit Nicaragua (U), from USARMA, Nicaragua

c. Intelligence Report #2870009363, 31 Oct 63, Subject: Puerto Cabezas and Cuban Exiles (U), from USARMA, Nicaragua

d. Summary of Information, 1 Nov 63, 112th INTC Gp, Subject: Cuban Officer Training Program (U)

e. Memorandum for Record, ACSI-CX, 19 Nov 63, Subject: Cuban Brigade Member (U)

2. (S) Reference 1a, prepared at the request of your office, advised that query by USARMA, Managua within the U. S. Embassy there, revealed no indication that Colonel Thomas D. McPhail, 0-30613, USA Retired, the former Chief of US Army Mission, was in anyway involved in the training of Cuban refugees in Nicaragua.

3. (C) During the above inquiry, the USARMA, Managua called attention to two intelligence reports he had furnished (references 1b. and 1c above) reporting Nicaraguan press comment on the visit of exiled Cuban refugee leaders Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, Dr. Carlos PRIO Socarras, Dr. Manuel Antonio DE VARONA, Dr. Francisco FERNANDEZ Pla, Dr. Laureano BATISTA, Dr. Orlando PUENTES, Dr. Miguel DE LEON, and Roberto RODRIGUEZ to Nicaragua during July and August 1963. The USARMA's comment on the newspaper speculation and rumors concerning this visit was that he "does not have any firm information or indicators that anti-Castro forces are being trained in Nicaragua."

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 28713B

~~WARNING NOTICE~~
~~SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

DECLASSIFIED BY ARMY

FILE

ASC

DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 7 oct 77 978-490-63

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS:
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

ACSI-CX
SUBJECT: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua (S)

11 DEC 1963

4. (C) Reference 1d. from the A. C. of S, G-2, Fourth Army reports alleged efforts by Mr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, to get some of his former associates in the Bay of Pigs invasion to resign their U. S. Army commissions and go with him to a revolutionary camp in Nicaragua. A copy of this reference is inclosed for your information. CONARC, Fourth Army and 3rd Army have been directed to continue to report on the alleged recruiting activity by ARTIME.

5. (C) Reference 1e. reports information received from Ft. Holabird, Md., that a former Cuban Brigade member, 2nd Lt Jose Raul VARONA Gonzales, O-2312303, had been invited by 2nd Lt. Eneido OLIVA (former second in command at the Bay of Pigs) to visit Washington, D. C. on 18 Nov 63 to meet with Mr. Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General. VARONA is a student at Ft. Holabird and reportedly was the G-2 of Brigade 2506 in the Cuban invasion. When VARONA returned from Washington he did not mention seeing Mr. Kennedy, but did say that he had met with Lt. OLIVA. The actual purpose of the meeting is not known. A copy of reference 1e. is inclosed for your information. Mr. Robert Kennedy did confer on 17 Nov 63 with Manuel ARTIME Buesa, Roberto SAN ROMAN aka Roberto Perez SAN ROMAN, Jose SAN ROMAN aka Jose Perez SAN ROMAN, and Enrique Jose RUIZ William Alfert. They were also scheduled to meet with Mr. Robert Kennedy on either 21 or 22 November 1963. There is no indication that Ft. Holabird student VARONA was present.

6. (C) This office has no information whether Mr. Kennedy is aware of ARTIME's alleged recruiting activity. The information in paragraphs 3 through 5 above, and the inclosures hereto, are furnished in the event that they may be of some pertinence to your inquiry regarding Colonel McPhail, reference 1a. above.

2 Incl
as

[Sgd] R. D. Albro, Col, GS
R. D. ALBRO
Colonel, GS
Director of Foreign Intelligence

OFF CHIEF OF STAFF
DEC 11 2 55 PM '63
MAIL & REC SEC
RECEIVED

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
DEC 15 1 51 PM '63
COORDINATION OFFICE

~~WARNING NOTICE~~
~~SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

~~SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

Cuba Selected Documents
#5

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10010
RECORDS SERIES : TAYLOR PAPERS
GENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM : EARLE G. WHEELER
TO :
TITLE : MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ON CUBA, 1100 HRS, 19 DEC 1963
DATE : 12/19/63
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA

OPERATIONS, CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
E OF LAST REVIEW : 07/31/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Wheeler, Box 193. Memorandum reporting meeting with President on Cuba. 1 Document.

[R] - ~~ITEM IS RESTRICTED~~

JUL 23 1997

~~SECRET: SENSITIVE~~

19 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with President on Cuba, 1100 hrs, 19 Dec 1963

1. The following persons were present at the meeting:

White House:	The President
	Mr. McGeorge Bundy
	Mr. Smith
State:	Mr. Thompson
	Mr. Ball
	Mr. Johnson
	Mr. Martin
	Mr. Crimmins
Defense:	Mr. Gilpatric
	Mr. Vance
	General Wheeler
CIA:	General Carter
	Mr. FitzGerald
	Mr. Helms
Treasury:	Mr. Dillon
USIA:	Mr. Wilson

2. Mr. FitzGerald briefed the President on Agency operations covering the following areas:

a. Collection of intelligence.

b. Propaganda activities.

c. Economic denial actions.

d. Exploitation of Cuban military disaffection.

e. Sabotage and harrassment activities.

f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

3. a. The President was most interested in economic denial actions. He was informed that talks would be undertaken in the immediate future with representatives of the Canadian and British governments relative to the supply of spare parts and critical materials by Canadian and British firms to Cuba. It was stated that Spanish firms are likewise active in this area, as well as a number of essentially fly-by-night firms located in a number of foreign countries. No reputable American firms are engaged in supplying Cuba and, in fact, have been helpful in preventing their foreign affiliates from engaging in this traffic. Apparently, State regards the Canadian, the British and the Spanish efforts as being the real trouble spots. The President directed that State undertake talks, as appropriate, with the governments of firms concerned to dissuade them from this practice.

b. Under questioning, Mr. FitzGerald stated that exploitation of Cuban military disaffection is a long term undertaking. While there are disaffected Cuban military men in important posts, they have not, to date, made any contacts with each other nor formed any sort of group. However, Mr. FitzGerald considers that any successful operation to overthrow Castro emanating from within Cuba will have to be supported by the Cuban military if it is to have any real likelihood of success.

c. During the discussion on sabotage and harrassment, the President expressed his reluctance to undertake high risk actions at this time for two reasons:

(1) Current attempts to get OAS agreement to various actions directed against Cuba might be jeopardized; and

(2) The Soviets seem to be watching closely the new administration's policies toward Cuba, and it might influence unfavorably the success of our efforts to achieve further reductions in Soviet military personnel in Cuba.

4. Mr. Helms briefed on the significance of the arms cache discovered in Venezuela. Mr. Martin briefed upon the activities of the OAS survey group now in Venezuela and the results, to date, of their survey. He stated that the group apparently had accepted that the arms had been introduced for subversive purposes, but that the survey group was asking of the Venezuelan government further information regarding propaganda activities directed against the Venezuelan government, etc. He does not expect that the commission will report

to the OAS prior to 10 January 1964. In the meantime, our effort is devoted to ascertaining the maximum that the OAS is prepared to do as a result of the Venezuela affair. They are hopeful that the OAS will support an increased surveillance system. He thinks it is too early to expect a complete break in economic and travel relations between OAS countries and Cuba.

5. There was some discussion of further actions we might take to increase pressures and harrassments at an appropriate time. Among other items mentioned were the effect of low level reconnaissance flights from time to time and the desirability of executing such flights at intervals to maintain the viability of our "right" to do so. While the President did not express disapprobation, neither did he express approval. In fact, no real decisions were taken at this meeting which must be regarded, I think, as being an important orientation session.

Signed - Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

COPIES TO:
- Chairman, JCS #1
- CSAF #3
- CNO #4
- CMC #5
- Director Jt Staff (Attn: SACSA) #6
- Army General Counsel #7
- cy #8 OCS TSU
- cy #9 OCS TSC
- cy #2 OCS TSU

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SE~~ SEN~~SITIVE~~

Cuba Selected Documents
#6

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10117
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCSM-77-64

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO : SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TITLE : A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA
DATE : 01/31/64
PAGES : 58
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA

COUP IN CUBA

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Memo for Chairman, JCS regarding contingency plans in the event of a coup in Cuba.

[R] - ~~ITEM IS RESTRICTED~~

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

UNCLASSIFIED

SM-161-64
31 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC

Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

1. Transmitted herewith is a conceptual proposal, subject as above, which has been developed jointly by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. This concept envisions a coup occurring in Cuba which may, if supported by the United States, achieve US national objectives by the elimination of the communist regime and establishment of a Cuban government acceptable to the United States.

3. The proposal provides for US military intervention in a flexible manner covering a spectrum ranging from provision of logistic support to full execution of OPLANS 312, and 316. Conditions under which military intervention at a level LESS than that of OPLAN 316 might be undertaken are generally in consonance with those described in JCS Message 8970, DTG 070155Z March 1963.

4. It is desired that CINCLANT prepare a separate contingency plan to support a coup in Cuba within the context of conditions described in the attachment hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

M J Ingelido
M. J. INGELIDO
Brig Gen, USAF
Secretary

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

Copy 11 of 22 copies, each of 1 page, Series A

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
to carry out their [illegible] duties.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 19 OCT 1989
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

IN REPLY REFER TO:

UNCLASSIFIED

DEC 30 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

Reference: JCSM 809-63,* Subject as above, dated October 21, 1963

Enclosed** herewith are three copies of the plan on the above subject which has been prepared jointly on a restricted basis by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency. The plan, which has been revised to reflect generally the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in reference, provides a conceptual basis for US response to a Cuban military coup and has been approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency as a basis for appropriate detailed planning. Mr. McGeorge Bundy has been advised of the foregoing and requested to inform the President of the existence of the plan on a suitable occasion. It is anticipated that the Secretaries of State and Defense may subsequently be requested to brief the President on its outline.

In accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraph 8c, page 22 of the plan, it is requested that current CINCLANT plans be revised as necessary to reflect the concept of military operations described in the plan and that you advise me when this has been accomplished.

In accordance with paragraph 8b, page 22 of the plan, representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency in coordination with representatives of the Departments of State and Defense will develop a plan for the introduction of the "Special Team" into Cuba which will subsequently be circulated for appropriate action and further detailed planning by agencies concerned.

Cyrus Vance
Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of the Army

---

* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/205-1
** Appendix to Enclosure B to JCS 2304/205-2

Enclosure (3 cys)
As Stated

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 19 OCT 1989
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

Control No. T/S 0354 ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD [illegible] T APPLY

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

UNCLASSIFIED

A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA

1. Problem. To provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in Cuba in order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United States.

2. Assumptions.

a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, from previous contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d. below), their revolt will be supported by the US if a US "special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1) below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met. Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: The leaders, in secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence and establish a Provisional Government in full expectation of forthcoming US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet probable criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Government, hoping that the US will intervene.

b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain information to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents; if the US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required.

ND

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 19 OCT 1989
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

This document contains 22 pages.
Copy No. __ of __ copies.
Series __.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

OSA, ASC Control No T/S 0354

Re 2304/205-3

UNCLASSIFIED

c. US intervention would be based on:

(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action would not await formal OAS approval), or

(2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had started without prior US concurrence, if the US determined that the insurgents met generally the criteria for support, or

(3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.

d. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable, recognizing that specific criteria will depend upon the situation existent at the time:

(1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order to survive.

(2) Be prepared to establish a Provisional Government, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).

(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.

(4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably including Havana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.

e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.

(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the reintroduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation

which could be used as a pretext for such action.

(2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage unorganized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelihood of any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, a planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban military forces.

(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces, either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installations, would result in immediate implementation of OPLANS 312 and 316.

3. Sequence of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this paper is based on the following general sequence of events:

a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time. (In the event that a coup were initiated without prior US knowledge, the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering information made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to commit forces needed to sustain it.)

b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on a pre-arranged basis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the US would:

(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents. This team, composed of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA, would make contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if not. The report of the findings should be received by CIA within twenty-four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents' plans. In any event, reliable reports from trained American observers in Cuba would be of great value to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and expand it. (The special team, augmented as appropriate by CINCLANT, would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Government if the US intervened and would be directed to report immediately to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made to intervene.)

(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the blockade; commence generating and positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

c. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source intelligence assessment including the special team's report, would be made to the President. This would be the critical decision because, once made, certain actions would ensue immediately and, henceforth, the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These actions would include:

(1) The assumption by CINCLANT of command of all military and para-military operations in Cuba.

(2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel for the purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine. In the event that the US delayed public announcement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would be provided in such a manner as to minimize public knowledge of active US involvement in Cuba.

(3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government, if one has not already been established, and request US and OAS assistance in order to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS. As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade to become effective at (time, date). The justification for this unilateral, interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta del Esta meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/OC established a collective basis for the blockade, as well as to insure that support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually, the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph 7.a. below).

(4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the Presidential announcement of the blockade and public announcement of the other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and reconnaissance units, thereby providing visible evidence to the insurgents that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-intervention while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support. At the same time, the US would be generating and positioning forces required for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announcing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be sufficient to bring down the Castro regime, if the coup carried with it a significant element of the Cuban armed forces. However, it is probable that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, as required.

4. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea

SPECIAL HANDLING

[illegible]

SPECIAL HANDLING

CSOWG
CONTROL # 0-132

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~ ~~S~~PECIAL HANDLING ~~NOFORN~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 March 1962

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.

4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommeded that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

William H. Craig

WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

Enclosure
Pretexts to Justify
Military Intervention
in Cuba

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.

4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure
  Pretexts to Justify Military Intervention
  in Cuba

ENCLOSURE

PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):

(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.

(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.

(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.

(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).

(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.

(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).

(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.

(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.

(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.

(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.

[illegible]

7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio

stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.

9 March 1962

COPY ____ OF ____ COPIES
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBA PROJECT(TS)

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter by 13 March 1962.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretexts which they consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action.

3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area.

4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievences. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere.

6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is

---

* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months.

CONCLUSION

7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

MC

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. D

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

---

* Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in Gen Craig's office

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. X w/D

3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.

4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

X w/ Add

ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).

Mc

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

   a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):

      (1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.

      (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.

      (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.

      (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).

(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.

(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).

(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.

(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.

(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.

(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.

7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio

stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.

ENCLOSURE B

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows:

> " - - - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive US military action."

3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

---

* JCS 1969/303
** JCS 1969/313

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/321

12 March 1962

Page 2165

COPY NO. 1

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

---

* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Helen -
Put these all as
under one tab as used
draft material of DOD
in preparation in connection
comments for report
w/ Thurston 20-24 Feb 63
prepared
Thanks.
Col

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Helen -

There are a lot of undated drafts here - They are all about 20-25 Feb.

Please do the best you can with them.

Mr. Vance

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMBATTING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

1. Introduction

While there is not total agreement on the magnitude of the Communist effort to export subversion to Latin America, from and through Cuba, there is agreement, at the least, that the program embodies grave potential hazards for the tranquility of the Hemisphere. Beyond this, there is also general acknowledgement that the subversion problem is not a new one, that the Communist bridgeheads in Montevideo and Mexico City have been sources of infection to much of Latin America for two decades or more. Finally, there is evidence that the U.S. appreciates these realities, as exhibited in the depth of on-going U.S. programs in all of Latin America, aimed at blunting the Communist subversive thrusts into the continent.

The question created by the President's underscoring of the problem is whether or not our efforts in this area are adequate -- as to scope, as to coordination, and as to intensity. It is the view of the Committee that they are not. Further, it is the view of the Committee that steps aimed solely at impeding the flow of students and subversives to and from Cuba will not, of themselves, greatly abate the problem. There must be companion efforts designed both to degrade the basic capability for Cuban-based subversion, as well as efforts to develop a more effective resistance capacity among the Latin American states. The sections to follow are designed with these two requirements in mind.

~~TOP SECRET~~

First, with respect to preventing the export of Communist subversion by or through Cuba, there is a summary of what we are doing now, and what we can do in the future.

Second, with respect to assisting the Latin American nations to resist the impact of Communist subversion, there is a summary of our current programs and a listing of specific additional things which we can do; in other words, a treatment of the subversive question from two points of view -- therapy as regards Cuba; prophylaxis as regards Latin America at large.

II. Measures to Impede the Export of Communist Subversion By and Through Cuba.

1. Programs Now in Motion.

The following existing programs are all having some adverse effect on the basic capabilities of the Communists to organize, train, teach, equip, underwrite and export subversive strength into Latin America from Cuba:

a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance activities, which unite to provide information and to represent a continuing deterrent to subversive movement:

(1) Picket ship patrol of the Windward Passage.

This action contributes to the restriction of illicit Cuban sea traffic to Haiti and Dominican Republic area.

(2) Aircraft patrol flights out of Guantanamo.

These flights, augmenting surface surveillance, keep watch for small craft, fishing and merchant shipping operating in the Caribbean south of Cuba, and waters adjacent to and north of Jamaica.

(3) U. S. Military execution of specific counter-subversive tasks.

This involves action taken in response to specific needs, as during the 1962 attempts to export Cuban revolutionaries to Central America. These were countered, and probably aborted, by the presence of U. S. Navy destroyers patrolling the coastal areas of Costa Rica at the request of the government of that country.

(4) Overflight.

Although primarily designed to observe and to document changes in Cuban military capabilities, these flights serve as a reminder of U. S. vigilance and determination.

(5) Communications Intelligence.

All of the above are supported by and given a sense of direction from the great volume of material provided through the facilities of the Communications Intelligence system.

b. Propaganda - Radio and Television.

(1) The Voice of America now conducts 2-3/4 hours of short wave broadcasts to Cuba daily. These serve, in some degree, to expose to the Cuban people the subversive activities of the Castro regime.

(2) Armed Forces radio and television broadcasts from the Guantanamo Naval Base seek daily to combat the spread of Communism by the orientation of their programs.

(3) Et seq., (additions on this subject should be provided by USIA).

c. Intelligence Collection.

(1) There is continuous intelligence collection on subversive activities, from workers employed in the Guantanamo Naval Base.

(2) Et seq., (should be supplied by CIA).

d. The Forum of World Opinion.

(1) Elimination of Cuba from Hemisphere organizations exhibites the penalty for conducting subversive activity in her neighboring states.

(2) U.S.-Soviet talks regarding removal of Soviet combat forces from Cuba are productive in that they continue the pressure on the USSR and the Cubans, and keep the subject of subversion before the world.

e. Current Political Actions Aimed at Impeding Travel into and out of Cuba.

(This is to be provided by State)

2. Programs Which May be Undertaken.

It is clear that those activities which relate to the denial of agent movement and the suppression of propaganda serve directly to diminish the Communist capability to export subversion from Cuba. It is necessary, however, to contemplate other actions which, while less directly related to subversion, still serve to weaken Cuba and its Communist dictatorship, and thus to eliminate the problem at its source. It is for this reason that there is presented herein a spectrum of actions related directly to Cuba. While it is clear that some actions listed may exceed the horizons of feasibility, in terms of scope, vigor, or the requirements of international relations, it is nevertheless considered necessary that they be set forth in their entirety, in order that [illegible] options.

a. Extend Surveillance of Cuba and the Caribbean.

(1) Intensively monitor, observe and report upon air and sea transportation -- both scheduled and non-scheduled, both Free World and Communist -- in the Caribbean area contiguous to [illegible] multi-national politico-military program providing [illegible] cooperative Latin American state of suspected [illegible] its territorial waters.

(2) Exploit fully the intelligence opportunities [illegible] system passing through Havana, while reviewing [illegible] of interrupting the system for security reasons.

b. Intensify Psychological Actions.

(1) Create problems for the Castro [illegible] programs by an intensified psychological effort [illegible] and airborne TV emphasizing the hardships and [illegible] by the Campesinos while subversive trainees are [illegible]

(2) Publicize the contrast between [illegible] instructors and those of the Cuban peasants.

(3) Increase greatly the amount of [illegible] to Cuba, and intensify emphasis on the [illegible] on the Cuban people by the Castro subversive [illegible]

(4) Conduct airborne television [illegible] people and Latin American students in Cuba [illegible] Castro-ssubversive efforts are designed [illegible] Hemisphere.

TOP SECRET

c. Intensify Physical Intelligence Gathering Efforts.

(1) By non-attributable means -- Cubans and third country nationals -- endeavor to acquire much more hard intelligence on the nature and scope of subversive training conducted in Cuba andmethods of exportation.

d. Movement of Personnel.

Through multilateral and bilateral political arrangements with Latin American states, seek to impede the movement of persons into and out of Cuba. (This is to be expanded by State).

e. Diminish the Physical and Economic Capability of Castro Cuba to Train and Export Subversives.

It is evident that ready funds, in considerable quantity, are required to conduct a subversive training program, not to speak of other costly factors -- arms, demolitions, fuel, food, propaganda, etc. Specific actions aimed at reducing the Cuban's resources will thus have a direct effect upon their ability to pursue their program of subversion, will cause them to turn to their own internal problems and will give the Russians pause as to the wisdom of pursuing a program which is costly and marginally productive. Likewise, every action which contributes to instability, unrest, apprehension and dissension between Russian and Cuban will reduce correspondingly both their ability and their opportunity to drive forward on a program of subversive training and exportation. The following actions will contribute to this end:

(1) Attrit Cuban resources

(a) Purchase the defection of personnel, aircraft, ships, boats and other valuable items.

(b) Conduct non-attributable actions against petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends. These actions should extend all the way from direct destruction to sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers and storage.

(c) By means of intelligence indications (aircraft flights, agents, clear radio transmission, beach jumpers) cause Cuban military forces to stand continually at high alert level and thus to consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive training.

(2) Diminish Cuban financial resources.

(a) Consider introduction of counterfeit currency in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, and to undermine confidence.

(3) Create suspicion and dissension between Cubans and Russians.

1. Programs now in being:

In appraising the programs which are now in progress it is necessary to reflect that, extensive though they are, many have not yet accelerated to their full thrust and, taken all together, they have certainly not fortified our allies to the point where subversion can be said to be under full control.

a. US Military Efforts.

United States military forces are now participating in a broad spectrum of military and extra-military functions in Latin America, all of which contribute to strengthening the ability of the countries to expose and put down subversive activity. Of these, the principal are:

(1) Counterinsurgency, anti-subversion and psychological operations training through the medium of military missions and mobile training teams.

(2) Provision of equipment and material on short notice for use in the face of subversion or subversive threats.

(3) The conduct of emergency training programs in mob and riot control.

(4) Provision of formal counterinsurgency education for Latin American officers and enlisted men in United States Service schools and academies.

(5) Provision of civic action training and assistance.

(6) Ancillary military efforts aimed at strengthening the ability of Latin American countries to resist subversion:

(a) United States provision of maintenance support and assistance for Latin American naval and air units.

(b) Officer exchange programs.

(c) Language training for Latin American military students.

(d) International Army, Navy and Air Force Defense Conferences.

(e) Cooperative mapping operations.

(7) Troop information:

The United States military is embarked on a program aimed at ma the Latin American military aware of the realities of Communism and Communist subversion. This includes:

(a) Translation into Spanish and printing of 50,000 sets of the series of ten pamphlets entitled, "Democracy versus Communism."

(b) Development of an audio/visual film strip based on the "Democracy versus Communism pamphlets for the illiterate Latin American enlisted men. One Hundred and eighty of these films and records have been sent to CINCARIB for further distribution to the Latin American services.

(c) Thirteen-hundred copies of the USIA pamphlet "Tacticas y Directivas Contra La Farsa Communista: are being procured for distribution among the Latin American military.

b. The Politico-Economic Effort (to be supplied by State).

c. The Propaganda Effort (to be supplied by USIA).

d. The Intelligence and Non-attributable Efforts (to be supplied by CIA).

2. Programs Which May Be Initiated:

As in the case of Section II, the programs outlined below are within reasonable technical and practical competences. However, as they cross the complete spectrum of actions, it is realized that some may be found unsuitable, on political or other grounds:

a. Surveillance:

(1) Establish a Caribbean sea and coastal surveillance program which provides for multilateral exchange of information and multilateral participation in an alerting system; each country to be responsible for patrolling its own coast.

(2) Require a US intelligence input into the Caribbean alerting system and provide selective exchange of intelligence between subscriber nations.

(3) Continue the improvement of US communications in Latin America, at high priority, to contribute to the effectiveness of the alerting system.

b. Multinational Counterinsurgency Force.

Explore the feasibility of organizing an OAS Counterinsurgency Brigade for employment throughout Latin America to combat the effects of subversion. Such a proposal, made at this time, would exhibit the serious determination of the U. S. to support vigorously an anti-subversion program.

c. Training and Orientation.

Provide for a greatly expanded out-of-country training and orientation program for key segments of each Latin American country's population such as:

(1) Enlisted and officer military personnel to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States.

(2) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama or the United States.

(3) Newspaper personnel to be schooled within the United States.

(4) Nurses (male and female) to be trained in the United States.

(5) Civilian technicians to be trained in United States training schools.

The thrust of such an expanded training program, taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance the skill and education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the Latins to US influence, to show them our country, to persuade them by close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their resolve to combat subversion in any form.

d. Troop Information Program

Expand greatly the current Latin American troop information program in order to educate the Latin American servicemen (and their civilian contemporaries) to the subversive danger they face.

e. News and Propaganda

(1) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct an information program within each country in Latin America using these themes:

(a) An exposition of facts on subversive training, movement of subversives and general subversive programs.

(b) Objectives of the Communists within each country.

(c) Communist methods of operation.

(d) Facts on the decrease in living standards within Cuba since the rise of Castro.

(e) Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.

(2) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist Press

Many Latin American papers, even the anti-communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their columnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match this financial investment in news control in order to convey the truth to the Latin who, like the America believes what he reads.

(3) Distribute Anti-Communist Literature

Books and pamphlets, in large numbers, exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.

f. Travel Controls (to be furnished by State).

g. Improve Our Counterinsurgency Programs

We should accelerate and broaden counterinsurgency programs in each country of Latin America, driving for a realistic "Internal Defense Plan" for every country and urging Latin American countries to ask for US counter-insurgency training assistance, for military, paramilitary and police forces. Beyond this we should place specific emphasis upon developing civic action programs in the areas of greatest need.

j. Non-attributable actions

(1) Instigate and stage selected terrorist incidents in Latin American countries, designed to implicate Castro.

(2) Arrange for caches of Soviet-Czech arms to be "discovered" in selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba.

IV. Conclusion.

It is the belief of the Committee that the actions outlined in the preceding sections comprise a series of steps which in some areas will stem and in others attack the program of Cuba-based Communist subversion in Latin America. Each individual action embodies some element of usefulness in itself, and any combination of actions may generate correspondingly favorable results. There is no profound relationship which demands the combining of any specific set of actions.

It is recommended, therefore, that an early selection be made of those actions listed above whose execution is compatible with national obligations and dedications in other areas and which are within U.S. capabilities, and that they be put quickly into effect since the longer the subversive influences in the Hemisphere are permitted to mature, the more difficult will be their ultimate elimination.

And finally, recognizing the diverse nature of the Cold War activities involved, it is strongly recommended that a single point in the Government be designated and assigned responsibility for supervising execution of the total program.

While we generally concur with the paper prepared by the Department of State, we do not believe that the proposals contained therein present a sufficiently wide spectrum of options or activities to impede and stop Castro/Communist subversion in Latin America.

Specifically, we recommend the following additional actions:

(1) Measures to attrit Cuban resources:

(a) Purchase the defection of personnel, aircraft, ships, boats and other valuable items.

(b) Conduct non-attributable actions against petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends. These actions should extend all the way from direct destruction to sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers and storage.

(c) By means of intelligence indications (aircraft flights, agents, clear radio transmission, beach jumpers) cause Cuban military forces to stand continually at high alert level and thus to consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive training.

(d) Consider introduction of counterfeit currency in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, and to undermine confidence.

(2) The designation of a single point in the Government to be held responsible for supervising the execution of the total program.

(3) An intensified and broadened news and propaganda program, including the following:

(a) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct an information program within each country in Latin America using these themes:

1. An exposition of acts on subversive training, movement of subversives and general subversive programs.

2. Objectives of the Communists within each country.

3. Communist methods of operation.

4. Facts on the decrease in living standards within Cuba since the rise of Castro.

5. Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.

(b) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist Press

Many Latin American papers, even the anti-communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their columnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match this financial investment in news control in order to convey the truth to the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reads:

(c) Distribute Anti-Communist Literature

Books and pamphlets, in large numbers, exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.

(4) Greatly expanded training and orientation in the United States for key segments of each Latin American country's population, such as:

(a) Enlisted as well as officer military personnel to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States.

(b) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama or in the United States.

(c) Newspaper personnel to be schooled within the United States.

(d) Nurses (male and female) to be trained in the United States.

(e) Civilian technicians to be trained in United States training schools.

The thrust of such an expanded training program, taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance the skill and education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the Latins to US influence, to show them our country, to persuade them by close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their resolve to combat subversion in any form.

~~TOP SECRET~~

AN ACTION PROGRAM

COMBATTING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

1. Introduction

While there is not total agreement on the magnitude of the Communist effort to export subversion to Latin America, from and through Cuba, there is agreement, at the least, that the program embodies grave potential hazards for the tranquility of the Hemisphere. Beyond this, there is also general acknowledgement that the subversion problem is not a new one, that the Communist bridgeheads in Montevideo and Mexico City have been sources of infection to much of Latin America for two decades or more. Finally, there is evidence that the U.S. appreciates these realities, as exhibited in the depth of on-going U.S. programs in all of Latin America, aimed at blunting the Communist subversive thrusts into the continent.

The question created by the President's underscoring of the problem is whether or not our efforts in this area are adequate -- as to scope, as to coordination, and as to intensity. It is the view of this Committee that they are not. Further, it is the view of the Committee that steps aimed solely at impeding the flow of students and subversives to and from Cuba will not, of themselves, greatly abate the problem. There must be companion efforts designed both to degrade the basic capability for Cuban-based subversion, as well as efforts to develop a more effective resistance capacity among the Latin American states. The sections to follow are designed with these two requirements in mind.

First, with respect to preventing the export of Communist subversion by or through Cuba, there is a summary of what we are doing now, and what we can do in the future.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Second, with respect to assisting the Latin American nations to resist the impact of Communist subversion, there is a summary of our current programs and a listing of specific additional things which we can do; in other words, a treatment of the subversive question from two points of view - therapy as regards Cuba; prophylaxis as regards Latin America at large.

II. Measures to Impede the Export of Communist Subversion By and Through Cuba

1. Programs Now in Motion.

The following existing programs are all having some adverse effect on the basic capabilities of the Communists to organize, train, teach, equip, underwrite and export subversive strength into Latin America from Cuba:

a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance activities, which unite to provide information and to represent a continuing deterrent to subversive movement:

(1) Picket ship patrol of the Windward Passage.

This action contributes to the restriction of illicit Cuban sea traffic to Haiti and Dominican Republic area.

(2) Aircraft patrol flights out of Guantanamo.

These flights, augmenting surface surveillance, keep watch for small craft, fishing and merchant shipping operating in the Caribbean south of Cuba, and waters adjacent to and north of Jamaica.

(3) U.S. Military execution of specific counter-subversive tasks.

This involves action taken in response to specific needs, as during the 1962 attempts to export Cuban revolutionaries to Central America. These were countered, and probably aborted, by the presence of U.S. Navy destroyers patrolling the coastal areas of Costa Rica at the request of the government of that country.

(4) Overflight.

Although primarily designed to observe and to document changes in Cuban military capabilities, these flights serve as a reminder of U.S. vigilance and determination.

(5) Communications Intelligence.

All of the above are supported by and given a sense of direction from the great volume of material provided through the facilities of the Communications Intelligence system.

b. Propaganda - Radio and Television.

(1) The Voice of America now conducts 2-3/4 hours of short-wave broadcasts to Cuba daily. These serve, in some degree, to expose to the Cuban people the subversive activities of the Castro regime.

(2) Armed Forces radio and television broadcasts from the Guantanamo Naval Base seek daily to combat the spread of Communism by the orientation of their programs.

(3) Et seq., (additions on this subject should be provided by USIA).

c. Intelligence Collection.

(1) There is continuous intelligence collection on subversive activities, from workers employed in the Guantanamo Naval Base.

(2) Et seq., (should be supplied by CIA.)

d. The Forum of World Opinion.

(1) Elimination of Cuba from Hemisphere organizations exhibits the penalty for conductive subversive activitiy in her neighboring states.

(2) U.S.-Soviet talks regarding removal of Soviet combat forces from Cuba are productive in that they continue the pressure on the USSR and the Cubans, and keep the subject of subversion before the world.

e. Current Political Actions Aimed at Impeding Travel into and out of Cuba.

(This to be provided by State)

2. Programs Which May be Undertaken.

It is clear that those activities which relate to the denial of agent movement and the suppression of propaganda serve directly to diminish the Communist capability to export subversion from Cuba. It is necessary, however, to contemplate other actions which, while less directly related to subversion, still serve to weaken Cuba and its Communist dictatorship, and thus to eliminate the problem at its source. It is for this reason that there is presented herein a ~~full~~ spectrum of actions related directly to Cuba. While it is clear that some actions listed may exceed the horizons of feasibility, in terms of scope, vigor, or the requirements of international relations, it is nevertheless considered necessary that they be set forth in their entirety, in order that the President may contemplate ~~the~~ an ~~full~~ array of options.

a. Extend Surveillance of Cuba and the Caribbean.

(1) Intensively Monitor, observe and report upon ~~all~~ air and sea transportation - both scheduled and non-scheduled, both Free World and Communist - in the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba. Develop an agreed multinational politico-military program providing for inspection by each cooperative Latin American state of suspected carriers within its territory or its territorial waters.

~~(2) Consider, at a time when the criticality of the situation dictates, re-instituting the quarantine of Cuba giving as a reason evidence of the export of agents and materials of subversion by and through Cuba.~~

b. Intensify Psychological Actions.

how? (1) Create problems for the Castro regime and its subversive programs by an intensified psychological effort emphasizing the hardships and sufferings being endured by the Campesinos while subversive trainees are given favored treatment.

(2) Publicize the contrast between living conditions of USSR instructors and those of the Cuban peasants.

(3) Increase greatly the amount of VOA broadcast time tailored to Cuba, and intensify emphasis on the degradation and suffering brought on the Cuban people by the Castro subversive effort.

(4) Conduct airborne television broadcasts aimed at the Cuban people and Latin American students in Cuba, dwelling on the theme that Castro's subversive efforts are designed to destroy the tranquility of the Hemisphere.

c. Intensify Physical Intelligence Gathering Efforts.

(1) By non-attributable means - Cubans and third country nationals - endeavor to acquire much more hard intelligence on the nature and scope of subversive training conducted in Cuba and methods of exportation.

d. Movement of Personnel.

Through multilateral and bilateral political arrangements with Latin American states, seek to impede the movement of persons into and out of Cuba. (This to be expanded by State.)

e. Diminish the Physical and Economic Capability of Castro Cuba to Train and Export Subversives.

It is evident that ready funds, in considerable quantity, are required to conduct a subversive training program, not to speak of other costly factors - arms, demolitions, fuel, food, propaganda, etc. Specific actions aimed at reducing the Cubans' resources will thus have a direct effect upon their ability to pursue their program of subversion, will cause them to turn to their own internal problems and will give the Russians pause as to the wisdom of pursuing a program which is costly and marginally productive. Likewise, every action which contributes to instability, unrest, apprehension and dissension between Russian and Cuban will reduce correspondingly both their ability and their opportunity to drive forward on a program of subversive training and exportation. The following actions will contribute to this end:

~~(1) Cause unrest, fear and suspicion in the Castro regime.~~

~~(a) Introduce many small inexpensive sabotage kits into the country. Even if utilized by only a small number of malcontents, in the aggregate they would waste valuable resources, take Communist lives and divert the attention of the regime from its dynamic programs.~~

~~(b) Introduce very large numbers of small inexpensive fire arms and ammunition into the country. Such action would cause grave unrest in the Castro regime and among the Russians, and would result, inevitably, in costly search operations.~~

(2) Attrit Cuban resources.

(a) Purchase the defection of personnel, aircraft, ships, boats and other valuable items.

(b) Conduct non-attributable actions against petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends. These actions should extend all the way from direct destruction to sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers and storage.

(c) By means of intelligence indications cause Cuban military forces to stand continually at a high alert level and thus to consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive training.

Specific
planes
[illegible] agents
beach jumping

(3) Diminish Cuban financial resources.

(a) Consider Term of Introduce counterfeit currency in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, and to undermine confidence.

~~(b) Create rumors of bank failures.~~

(4) Create suspicion and dissension between Cubans and Russians.

~~Since the Russians are doubtless a major factor in training programs conducted in Cuba, any action which will interfere with their inter-relationships will diminish directly the subversive training capability:~~

~~(a) Initiate a Russian language program beamed to Cuba and designed to attract Russian listeners. Once an audience is established, undertake to cause the Russians to question the purpose of, wisdom in, and personal risk involved by their presence in Cuba.~~

~~(b) Exploit the presence of the Red Army in Cuba by driving a wedge between the Soviet soldier instructors and the Cuban population. Efforts to attain this objective would include the use of live double agents, planted rumors, incidents created by guerrilla insurgents, and propaganda designed to identify the hardship of the peasant with the Soviet intrusion.~~

~~(c) Develop action plans for Cubans to kidnap, harass and destroy Russian technicians. Offer bounty, through clandestine sources, for destruction of Russian personnel.~~

~~(Additional actions, aimed directly at the subversive training and distribution potential in Cuba, should be added by other agencies, in their areas of competence).~~

III. Measures Designed to Enhance the Capabilities of the Latin American States to Resist Communist Subversion

1. Programs now in being:

In appraising the programs which are now in progress it is necessary to reflect that, extensive though they are, many have not yet accelerated to their full thrust and, taken all together, they have certainly not fortified our allies to the point where subversion can be said to be under full control.

a. US Military Efforts.

United States military forces are now participating in a broad spectrum of military and extra-military functions in Latin America, all of which contribute to strengthening the ability of the countries to expose and put down subversive activity. Of these, the principal are:

(1) Counterinsurgency, anti-subversion and psychological operations training, through the medium of military missions and mobile training teams.

(2) Provision of equipment and material on short notice for use in the face of subversion or subversive threats.

(3) The conduct of emergency training programs in mob and riot control.

(4) Provision of formal counterinsurgency education for Latin American officers and enlisted men in United States Service schools and academies.

(5) Provision of civic action training and assistance.

(6) Ancillary military efforts aimed at strengthening the ability of Latin American countries to resist subversion:

(a) United States provision of maintenance support and assistance for Latin American naval and air units.

(b) Officer exchange programs.

(c) Language training for Latin American military students.

(d) International Army, Navy and Air Force Defense Conferences.

(e) Cooperative mapping operations.

(7) Troop information:

The United States military is embarked on a program aimed at making the Latin American military aware of the realities of Communism and Communist subversion. This includes:

(a) Translation into Spanish and printing of 50,000 sets of the series of ten pamphlets entitled, "Democracy versus Communism".

(b) Development of an audio/visual film strip based on the "Democracy versus Communism" pamphlets for the illiterate Latin American enlisted men. One-hundred and eighty of these films and records have been sent to CINCARIB for further distribution to the Latin American services.

(c) Thirteen-hundred copies of the USIA pamphlet "Tacticas y Directivas Contra La Farsa Communista" are being procured for distribution among the Latin American military.

b. The Politico-Economic Effort (to be supplied by State).

c. The Propaganda Effort (to be supplied by USIA).

d. The Intelligence and Non-attributable Efforts (to be supplied by CIA).

2. Programs Which May Be Initiated.

As in the case of Section II, the programs outlined below are within reasonable technical and practical competence. However, as they cross the complete spectrum of actions, it is realized that some may be found unsuitable, on political or other grounds:

a. Surveillance:

(1) Establish a Caribbean sea and coastal surveillance program which provides for multilateral exchange of information and multilateral participation in an alerting system; each country to be responsible for patrolling its own coast.

(2) Require a US Intelligence input into the Caribbean alerting system and provide for exchanging intelligence between subscriber nations.

(3) Continue the improvement of US communications in Latin America, at high priority, to contribute to the effectiveness of the alerting system.

b. Multinational Counterinsurgency Force.

Explore the feasibility of organizing an OAS Counterinsurgency Brigade for employment throughout Latin America to combat the effects of subversion. Such a proposal, made at this time, would exhibit the serious determination of the U.S. to support vigorously an anti-subversion program.

c. Training and Orientation.

Provide for a greatly expanded out-of-country training and orientation program for key segments of each Latin American country's population such as:

(1) Enlisted and officer military personnel to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States.

(2) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama or the United States.

(3) Newspaper personnel to be schooled within the United States.

(4) Nurses (male and female) to be trained in the United States.

(5) Civilian technicians to be trained in United States training schools.

The thrust of such an expanded training program, taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance the skill and education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the Latins to US influence, to show them our country, to persuade them by close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their resolve to combat subversion in any form.

d. Troop Information Program

Expand greatly the current Latin American troop information program in order to educate the Latin American servicemen (and their civilian contemporaries) to the subversive danger they face.

e. News and Propaganda

(1) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct an information program within each country in Latin America using these themes:

(a) An exposition of facts on subversive training, movement of subversives, and general subversive programs.

(b) Objectives of the Communists within each country.

(c) Communist methods of operation.

(d) Facts on the decrease in living standards within Cuba since the rise of Castro.

(e) Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.

(2) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist Press

Many Latin American papers, even the anti-communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their columnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match this financial investment in news control in order to convey the truth to the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reads.

(3) Distribute Anti-Communist Literature

Books and pamphlets, in large numbers, exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.

f. Travel controls To be formulated by State

~~(1) We should strive for an OAS embargo on travel to and from Cuba. If unable to achieve a majority decision in the OAS we should pursue the matter on a bilateral basis, outside of the framework of the OAS, and inject these Cuban isolationist criteria into acceptance requirements of the "Alliance for Progress".~~

[illegible] specific

~~(2) We should initiate measures against Cuba directed at preventing Latin Americans from entering Cuba or returning to their own countries and prevent the travel of Cuban personnel and goods to other Latin American countries. The "Alliance for Progress" should be used as a lever, adding these requirements to the acceptability criteria.~~

~~(3) We should promote arrangements which permit extradition of individuals who are charged with subversive activities.~~

g. Improve Our Counterinsurgency Programs

We should accelerate and broaden counterinsurgency programs in each country of Latin America, driving for a realistic "Internal Defense Plan" for every country and urging Latin American countries to ask for US counterinsurgency training assistance, for military, paramilitary and police forces.

h. Sponsor Land and Political Reform

~~Intensify action through OAS channels to bring about land and political reform in Latin America in order to reduce the susceptibilities of the "have-nots" to communist subversion.~~

i. Support Labor and Youth Reforms

~~Encourage reforms to ameliorate the frustrations of labor and youth. With labor, it is a matter of economics; with youth, it is a matter of orientation.~~

~~Unless sufficient reform is made to satisfy the aspirations of the laborer; and unless sufficient evidence is presented to embryonic intellectuals that Castroism is the greater of the political/economic evils facing them, Castro will continue to find a fertile bed for his seeds.~~

j. Non-attributable actions

~~(1) Through third parties, seek and destroy the communist agents, fund resources, and subversive capability wherever it exists.~~

~~(2) Penetrate communist party labor and youth groups in the Latin American target countries. Objectives would include:~~

~~(a) Publicized exposure of the apparatus.~~

~~(b) Frustration of subversive plans and apprehension of leaders by government authority.~~

~~(c) Counterespionage against future subversive planning.~~

(3) Instigate and stage selected terrorist incidents in Latin American countries, designed to implicate Castro.

(4) Arrange for caches of Soviet-Czech arms to be "discovered" in selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba.

in some areas will stem ~~[illegible]~~ and in other attack the program

IV. Conclusion

It is the ~~conviction~~ belief of the Committee that the actions outlined in the preceding sections comprise a series of actions ~~program which offers promise of meeting and ultimately reversing the pro-~~ cess of Cuba-based Communist subversion in Latin America. Each individual action embodies some element of usefulness in itself, and any combination of actions ~~should~~ may generate correspondingly favorable results. There is no profound relationship which demands the combining of any specific set of actions.

It is recommended, therefore, that an early selection be made of those actions listed above whose execution is compatible with national obligations and dedications in other areas, and which are within US capabilities and that they be put quickly into effect since the longer the subversive influences in the Hemisphere are permitted to mature, the more difficult will be their ultimate elimination.

And finally, recognizing the diverse nature of the Cold War activities involved, it is recommended that a single point in the Government be designated and assigned responsibility for supervising execution of the total program.

most important

13-00000

Originating Agency: DoD [redacted]

Subject: Cuba/Contingency Planning

Date: 3/11/63

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

DIA		**USAF**			
Navy	X	**NSC**			
ONI		**State Dept.**	X		
OSD	[redacted]	~~**CIA**~~		CIA	
Joint Staff		**Other** (Please specify below)			

The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)
Reviewed on 7/24/97, Boyle

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

Captain Zumwalt/DRAFT # 2
March 11, 1963

OSD/ISA

IX.A.3.d. General Pressures to Create a Contingency

In order to accomplish the overthrow or reorientation of the Cuban regime without harming the United States image and with minimum distortion of bilateral US-USSR relationships, there must be careful coordination and phasing of our future actions and demeanor. There must be a plan capable of getting us from where we are now to where we want to go, by gradually increasing pressures until the objective is achieved. These pressures should be designed to create opportunities and contingency situations for further exploitation, along the way.

The optimum orchestration of such a Cuban program must obviously be developed as the future unfolds. But in order to provide overall guidance within this Government, a plan tracing the mainstreams of effort is required. This plan is divided into eight headings with a gradually increasing level of effort described under each of these headings. The progress through the various phases is visualized as taking place in a coordinated but not necessarily symmetrical manner. In other words, we may be in the most vigorous phase of propaganda while not yet having reached the final phase with regard to subversion but nonetheless the decision to proceed to the respective phase in either category would be coordinated as part of an overall governmental orchestration.

A program scenario capable of producing a decisive change or exploitable contingency over an 18-month period follows.

US Posture - - Initially the US image should be that of willingness to do all that is necessary to keep Castro's military threat nil and his subversive threat to the Western Hemisphere at an acceptably low level. It should be characterized as one during which the USG, having been

~~SECRET~~

extremely reasonable despite Castro's intransigence, is waiting for signs of more favorable change in Cuba.

Later the US image should change to one in which the US is being "led" by the majority of the OAS into OAS initiated and sponsored pressures against Cuba. These would consist of measures less than those certain to overthrow Castro but going beyond the earlier measures, in the expectation that resulting internal pressures might eliminate Castro or provide an occasion for decisive action. Pressures would be applied in such fashion as to represent both a carrot to the Cuban people to get rid of Castro regime and a stick toward the present regime. Still later the US stance should become publicly, "at last" to join the OAS majority in seeking vigorous pressures on the Castro regime without yet irrevocably committing US prestige to decisive action.

Finally, if and when the orchestration and circumstances have brought the US position to such a point that decisive action is possible, and if earlier pressures have not eliminated Castro or do not give promise of eliminating him, some decisive action might be considered. This need not be an invasion by US forces and could be re-imposition of total blockade or a disarming airstrike, dependent on the circumstances.

OAS Action - - The USG will need to devote major attention to the strengthening of the solidarity of the OAS as a source of regional opposition to the Castro regime. These efforts should go forward openly along several lines, quite apart from the covert effort to organize the majority on specific issues. This effort to achieve solidarity should consist of frequent briefings of the OAS nations through all appropriate channels, Consultative Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, efforts to set up an OAS military organization with occasional commitment of troops for training, and all other feasible developments of regional themes, such as intensive efforts to build up the counterinsurgency capabilities of the region. It is very necessary, in view of the general LA situation to continue all measures necessary to isolate Castro.

Initial OAS action should be the enlargement of the bases for the invocation of the Rio Treaty. This broadening should be against the continued presence of Soviet troops (unless negotiations with the USSR indicate that this aspect should be deferred) and/or against Castro's continued subversive activity. Concomitantly, the recent study of the Special Consultative Committee on Security should be given wide publicity and the US should press for implementation of its recommendations.

The OAS, in the near future, probably after publication of the results of the foregoing study and enlargement of the basis for invoking the Rio Treaty to include subversion, should again formally warn Cuba against promotion of any more subversive activities. The OAS should formally state that should Cuban subversive activities rise above some (unspecified) level, a "new condition" would exist which would justify decisive action against Cuba. All episodes of subversion or sabotage which could be attributed to Castro should be highly publicized. The majority OAS support should be organized to neutralize the Brazilian co-existence theme. Bilateral approaches and economic quid pro quos should be used to win Brazil to the U.S. view within OAS.

Still later, at an appropriate time, the OAS should make an official finding, from its studies initiated earlier, that the Castro regime has continued, despite warnings, to conduct aggressive and subversive actions in Latin America. A summary publication of subversive activities or

White Paper should be promulgated through the OAS. Later a "new condition" should be found formally to exist, following which the US would state that the earlier US-USSR modus vivendi regarding Cuba has come to an end. Following the above, an OAS vote should call for the remaining LA nations to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and for all members to restrict their nationals from travel to Cuba. Castro should be officially labeled as a major threat to the hemisphere and to the objective of the Alliance for Progress.

The OAS might then declare that Castro's subversive activity constitutes warlike activity and proclaim a prohibition against any warlike activity being conducted by Cuba within an ocean and land area around the entire LA continental and Caribbean area. Intervention of aircraft and ships carrying arms, subversive agents, propaganda materials, etc. could be authorized.

Free World Activity

Still later at an appropriate time the OAS should vote, under the Rio Pact, to punish Castro's aggression. This action could take the form of a resolution for all members to take such action including the use of force as individually considered appropriate or to endorse any specific decisive action to which the members had agreed.

The USG should brief its Allies on the views of the OAS and warn that the situation may get worse. Later, as a result of "OAS insistence" the Free World should be urged to extend or re-affirm trade embargos to all items except food stuffs, medicines, and medical supplies; to apply shipping restrictions; NATO should be persuaded to include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited; free world industrial nations should be dissuaded from shipping to Cuba crucial spare parts and equipment which are not on the COCOM list.

Still later the US should increase the vigor with which she seeks, through briefings, pressures, etc., to increase the effectiveness of all economic measures and should seek to persuade all non-bloc nations to limit their airline services to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to Soviet aircraft serving Cuba. At an appropriate point in the orchestration, food stuffs should be added to the prohibited trade list, with US using its influence to extend this embargo throughout the Free World.

The ultimate extension of economic actions, would be the application of a blockade to Cuba. This could be a phased weapon consisting of a blockade on POL, with the prospect of total blockade to follow.

Surveillance over Cuba -- Until it becomes apparent that the Soviet Union has no intention of removing any additional military personnel, aerial surveillance should be limited to appropriate high altitude coverage with low level surveillance avoided except for thoroughly suspicious indications.

Later, at a suitable point in the orchestration, occasional low altitude surveillance of "suspicious" areas should be undertaken in such fashion as to be clearly visible to the Cuban people, while avoiding AA defenses.

Still later, suitably timed, the United States/OAS should initiate very frequent low altitude surveillance. This should be increased in intensity to the point at which our aircraft would literally seek out AA defense sites in search of provocative acts or, in the absence of Cuban reaction, to deflate Castro's image.

In any decisive action at the end of the road, surveillance should be at saturation levels.

~~SECRET~~

Regional Surveillance -- The OAS or the Caribbean nations should take the initiative in organizing, as a part of a Caribbean security arrangement, a surface ship and aerial surveillance of the coastal and offshore waters of the Caribbean nations. These patrols should be progressively moved out from the shores of the nations being protected into the Caribbean approaches to Cuba, tying in with an OAS proclaimed zone in which movement of subversive agents, materials, forces, or arms is prohibited. Toward the end of the crescendo, they should operate close to the shores of Cuba. There should be increasing surveillance and control of land boundaries. There should be improved systematic exchange of intelligence on subversive activity.

Propaganda -- There should be established immediately a radio station (Radio Free Cuba), probably in Florida, using covert funds, with regularly scheduled Cuban broadcasts available to all Cuban political groups. Its content should be the middle course between VOA and Radio Swan.

Initially, through public statements, VOA, etc., maintain the theme of the U.S. "watchful waiting" for change in the Castro regime. Maintain the currently enhanced VOA wave facility beamed to Cuba. Highlight positive results in Latin America of the Alliance for Progress. We should warn Cuba unofficially through the suggested Radio Free Cuba of the consequences of continued subversion and of Castro's present track. Still later, prior to any decisive action, if taken, this theme should go out officially over VOA and in announcements of public officials.

Initiate and organize clandestine newspapers and leaflet operations. Infiltrate Cuban exile publications. Play up, on all media, the threat of Castro to the regimes of the Western Hemisphere and the objectives of Alliance for Progress. Remind the Cuban people that Castro came to power on a pledge to provide political freedom. Remind them of the social goals he held up while he destroyed that freedom. Contrast their present economic chaos with those economic goals of land and housing reform. Remind them that he preached nationalism while delivering their country to the Soviet military occupation. Point out how each shift of goal was accompanied by the destruction of earlier ones. Ask what Castro has left to offer. Conclude that only the mutual fear of retribution among his elite remains to hold them in power. Use slogans such as "L 64" (Liberty in '64), etc.

Still later initiate through public broadcast, training in the rudiments of seditions activity.

Still later urge the many small revolutionary-cells to make contact with neighboring groups. Warn and threaten the Castro regime through all media; exhort the people to organize to join enlarged resistance groups; seek to build up resistance heroes. Endeavor to deflate Castro through these broadcasts. Stress the freedom of the Cuban people, post-Castro, to choose their own political and social structure.

Subversion -- There should be an initial period of no increase in subversive efforts by the U.S., until the bilateral phase of the Cuban affair is completed and it is clear that the Soviet Union will remove no additional military personnel.

After that time minimal covert contacts should be established within Cuba for the distribution of newspapers and leaflets. Minimal acts of defiance and sabotage should be initiated. For example, exhort groups of 3 or 4 friends, without establishing external rebel affiliation, to paint L'64, etc., on walls or to commit isolated acts of sabotage. The purpose would be to establish rebel connotation and to generate leadership. This would lead to the establishment of rudimentary cellular training in seditious activity. Minimal supply of critical items should be initiated to subversive groups within Cuba on a case-by-case basis. Potential leaders should be identified. Contingency planning, covert and unilateral, should continue. The number of Cuban exiles taken into the United States Armed Forces for training and formation of reserve units should be significantly increased. A similar program for "freedom fighters for Cuba" should be undertaken for volunteers from other LA nations. At a later point in the crescendo, departures from the Cuban armed forces in organized units should be encouraged. All covert effort should be exerted toward coordinating the cells, pockets, and groups resisting Castro, inside and outside Cuba. This would be a transition period from sporadic acts in isolation into organized subversion. Fuel and food supplies should be sabotaged. An organized supply system should be put into effect with large numbers of fishing craft situated around the island to make both scheduled supply of deliveries and deliveries of opportunity. As various groups are identified in revolt, they should be worked into the supply system. New LA and Cuban fighters training outside Cuba, should be introduced in the same way into these organized movements within Cuba. There should be frequent leaks of planned US invasion and appropriate denials to frustrate the suspicious Castro. Fleet and air "training" demonstrations should be scheduled off Cuba. At the same time it should be made clear to rebel leaders that an externally launched invasion is not to be expected until a revolution has come from within, with external logistic assistance.

It should be emphasized to the rebel leaders that the U.S. does not expect the clock to be turned back with regard to social conditions.

Still later a complete orchestration should be woven together, coming to a crescendo through the optimal exploitation of all the mainstreams discussed in the categories above. Propaganda should reach the maximum denunciation of the regime, exhorting to revolt, holding up the prospect of peace and a better life should the Cuban people join their resistance leaders. Subversion should be stepped up by introduction of all available externally trained resistance fighters, provision of maximum logistic support, etc. At the appropriate time, if this resistance movement needs the assistance of external forces there should be an OAS structured air strike, related to an appropriate Castro mis-step, to disarm Cuban offensive and defensive power and to destroy all POL storage. This attack should be coordinated with all-out sabotage.

An invasion force should be kept in readiness for use, if required to save the resistance, once the all-out internal resistance efforts has been initiated.

Criteria -- The pressures discussed in all categories above should be appropriately coordinated. The period of moderation should end after one or two months when it is apparent that no further Soviet military personnel are to be removed. Moderate pressures should then commence, lasting for a period of two to three months, until some episode of escalation by Castro or other appropriate event, makes further pressures feasible. If such an event is not forthcoming, OAS major insistance should lead to escalation of pressures. After another short period, again preferable triggered by an appropriate Castro episode or alternatively by a majority OAS vote still more vigorous pressures should be initiated.

If Castro has initiated a suitable war-like act, such as firing on surveillance aircraft, pressures should be escalated to the maximum immediately rather than gradually.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

IN REPLY REFER TO
Op-613C/sg
Ser 000950P61
MAR 1 1963

[redacted] ~~Secret~~

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~ — Downgraded to CONF upon removal of enclosures

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. A. CALIFANO, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion (U)

Ref: (a) Your Memo No. 13 of 28 FEB 1963

Encl: (1) through (8) Proposed actions (TS)

1. As requested by reference (a), specific and direct actions designed to resolve problems of Cuban subversion are submitted herewith as enclosures (1) through (8).

W.F.A. Wendt

W. F. A. WENDT
Director, Strategic Plans Division

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

PAGE NO. 1 OF 1 PAGES
COPY NO. 1 OF 10 COPIES

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with permission of the issuing office or higher authority.

[redacted] ~~Secret~~
[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

Top Secret

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN UNILATERALLY BY THE US, BILATERALLY, OR THROUGH THE OAS, TO IMPEDE THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES TO AND FROM CUBA

A. Institute effective procedures to insure that U.S. citizens do not travel to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).

B. Continue U.S. restriction against U.S. airline service to Cuba. (This is important to avoid giving other airlines an excuse to reestablish air service) (unilateral U.S. action).

C. Thoroughly examine Latin American constitutions and laws to determine the legal capability or impediment to control of travel of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).

D. Arrange for adverse publicity on individuals who are known to have undergone subversive training in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).

E. Spread rumors of epidemics in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).

F. Sabotage aircraft proceeding to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).

G. Increase U.S. efforts to establish identity of all Latin Americans travelling to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).

H. Encourage Latin American countries to pass new legislation, or enforce existing legislation, restricting the travel of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).

I. Persuade Latin American governments to prevent re-entry to their country of persons suspected to have been trained in subversion in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).

J. Persuade LA countries to tighten border security measures by appropriate authority (unilateral U.S. action). Supply equipment and POL for patrol and surveillance. See enclosure (6).

K. Cubana's Britannia aircraft are in disrepair (2 or 3 of 5 are operational). Under existing agreements, Cuba must

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with permission of the issuing office or higher authority.

ENCLOSURE (1) to CNO Ser/Memo 000950P61

~~SECRET~~

Top Secret

seek Mexican concurrence in using new equipment (IL-18) on the Havana-Mexico City route. We should persuade Mexico to refuse the new aircraft on grounds of safety, facilities, or other reasons. We should also encourage Great Britain or other sources to cut off spare parts (unilateral U.S. action).

L. Encourage hemispheric countries to deny unscheduled traffic stops to Cubana airlines (unilateral U.S. action).

M. Persuade friendly governments in LA and elsewhere to harass ships and aircraft traveling to Cuba with administrative delays (minute examination of air worthiness certificates, customs, documents, etc.) (unilateral U.S. action).

N. Seek arrangement whereby other Latin American countries would cooperate with Mexican efforts to deny travel their nationals to and from Cuba via Mexico (see Mexico City Tel 2221) (bilateral U.S. action).

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lt. Col. J. K. Patchell - X75727
18 April 1963

U. S. POLICY CONCERNING CLANDESTINE AND COVERT ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST CUBA

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to provide, within security limitations, a useful guide for the consideration of clandestine and covert actions as a part of a future projection of U. S. actions toward Cuba.

11A

The paper is designed to be as objective as possible without compromising many details of highly sensitive information. For this reason, the paper focusses on general principles. The study is not intended to be critical. It is not designed to justify the past nor to predict the future.

The discussion of the factors conditioning U. S. policy in the realm of the clandestine and covert may seem elementary and somewhat philosophical; however, these factors provide the general parameters within which future actions can be considered. Any attempt to determine the proportionate influence of any particular conditioner would be speculative.

2. MAJOR CONDITIONING FACTORS

Following are listed a number of the major conditioning factors which probably have influenced past U. S. policy in the clandestine and covert areas. This is not an exhaustive list, but it describes briefly a few of the elements which must be considered in the process of making valid and conclusive determinations:

a. **Objective.**

It is most desirable to determine the U. S. objective in precise terms. When the objective is clarified and understood, actions can be developed to achieve that objective. The extent of the U. S. commitment, as reflected by the determination of the objective, is an important factor in the determination of the commitment of U. S. resources and has great significance in the motivation of recruited Cuban participants.

It must be understood that the creation of a resistance under the situation currently obtaining in Cuba probably envisages an ultimate U. S. commitment to direct military action. There can be no advanced guarantee of the success or the security of such an operation, nor is there any realistic brake upon the ultimate outcome which may be susceptible to rapid escalation. Current intelligence estimates indicate little likelihood of the success of a Cuban inspired revolt without significant external support.

While U. S. clandestine or covert actions can be taken in support of (or as a prelude to) overt U. S. or multilateral actions, there are general misconceptions and certain grave risks inherent in (a) seeking a solution to the Cuba dilemma wholly by clandestine or covert means, (b) placing disproportionate reliance on clandestine and covert activity, (c) developing clandestine or covert actions in isolation of or significantly in advance of U. S. policy, and (d) developing actions for the sake of action alone or in order to capitalize on some intriguing gimmickery.

Obviously, the determination of U. S. objectives is beyond the realm of the clandestine and covert and cannot be considered in the context of Cuba alone. Serious judgments must be made in relation to the broad world environment. Actions against Cuba may be detrimental to U. S. aims by causing intensified security measures in Cuba, counteractions elsewhere, or the unnecessary exposure and compromise of pro-U. S. suspects, potential agents or trained U. S. assets.

b. Risks.

A good "rule of thumb" with respect to clandestine or covert actions is that the risks entailed are in direct proportion to the usefulness of the operations.

c. Attribution and Deniability.

U. S. leadership will always be concerned with clandestine or covert actions which may be attributed to the U. S.

It is reasonable to assume that Cuba will attribute to the U. S. (at the time of Cuba's choosing) any actions, real or manufactured, which they desire. Assuming that the U. S. will receive the blame (regardless of the nationalities of those involved), attribution (per se) is not a relevant measure except as it may limit the overall flexibility for action.

Deniability, while quite relevant, is a relative factor. Every effort can be made to disassociate participants, to utilize sanitized materiel, and to operate from covert bases. Such efforts, when carried to an extreme, tend to jeopardize the security of the operation. Generally, an attempt is made to strike a reasonable balance to achieve "plausible deniability," a term obviously subject to widely varying judgments.

In summary, the determination of deniability is subjected to judgments at all levels of those who have access, including the curious and those who develop personal emotional involvements. Theoretically, the solution appears to be to seek a reasonable balance between almost complete deniability (an example in which few actions can be taken and the associated administrative or security precautions outweigh or jeopardize the operation itself) and reasonable safeguards to insure that the proof of U. S. implication cannot be developed.

In this connection there is a mandatory requirement for unanimity of denial on the part of U. S. officials. This unanimity must obtain despite the magnitude, persistence, or accuracy of the Castro/Communist propaganda machine. The stated denials of U. S. officials generally are not contested. Official statements which indicate or hint at U. S. implication or internal U. S. governmental dissension may be all that is required to compromise an otherwise secure operation.

It should be pointed out that as a result of U. S. accepted complicity in U-2 flights and the Bay of Pigs operation, the U. S. is in a significantly more sensitive position with respect to clandestine and covert actions. U. S. admissions tend to give greater credibility to the accusations of the Castro or Sino/Soviet Bloc and alert our enemies to the possibility that the U. S. may undertake actions of a less conventional nature.

d. Visibility.

It may be desirable to undertake actions which achieve little press coverage (visibility or noise level). It is difficult to determine with any accuracy beforehand the extent of the publicity to be achieved. The Castro Regime generally can control the timing and magnitude of public release. The world press for the most part is not subject to U. S. control except as the U. S. may achieve success through counter-propaganda.

It is reasonable to conclude that a progressively increasing or static noise level is the most acceptable. A dramatically increased noise level may be acceptable when accompanied by significant (headline) overt items which serve to distract the attention of the public.

e. Morality and Selectivity.

There is a natural reluctance to undertake clandestine or covert actions which result in the death or serious injury to innocent Cubans. Meaningful actions will certainly cause harm to certain elements, but some of the destructive actions which could be undertaken may be counterproductive in that they strike at the wrong targets. Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve the desired degree of selectivity in uncontrolled operations, implemented in secrecy.

The creation of food, clothing and medical shortages and the sabotage of storage or distribution facilities undoubtedly may hurt the economy but those committed to the Castro Regime may suffer relatively little. Such actions may do little but weaken an inactive or apathetic populace while increasing the internal security mechanism.

There are obvious moral judgments attached to many of the proposals for actions directed against Cuba. When the judgments of various individuals differ, the resulting U. S. position probably reflects the least common denominator. Many proposals may be unacceptable because the deniability factor is too low or the proposals may be of a nature that premature commitment and subsequent disclosure would not be desirable since the weapon may be worthy of a more far reaching impact. There is an understandable frustration in the U. S. resorting to the application of sophisticated clandestine weapons against a small state which theoretically could be brought to its knees in a relatively short period of time through the application of conventional weapons.

There is an imposing array of intriguing or amusing "tricks" which are of no real or lasting consequence. These could subject the U. S. to adverse criticism on moral grounds or extend the parameters of warfare to new dimensions.

4. Recruitment and Exile Politics.

The recruiting problem deserves consideration in any paper considering clandestine and covert actions. Obviously, the recruitment of a sole individual involves a system of screening which theoretically must not be compromised either in the process of sorting or during the subsequent utilization and post-utilization periods. There is a marked tendency for Cubans to talk, to brag, or to infer participation in secret operations. Individuals personally and scores of exile organizations are quick to capitalize on the real or imaginary activities of their members. These Cuban exile organizations compete for recognition, prestige and material support which they hope will stem from their participation in clandestine or covert activities. There is a constant flow of proposals for action and requests for assistance or official recognition. Some individuals and organizations merely desire to publicize their affiliations with some member of the U. S. Government.

It is not feasible to investigate in details all of the proposals for action submitted by individuals and groups. Experience has indicated that generally the exile claims are without foundation and the preponderance of their proposals are not feasible. As a matter of practice such individuals or groups are not satisfied with a single rebuff, but make their offers to individuals in CIA, the Departments of State, Defense and Justice or with members of Congress, the press, and other non-governmental individuals or agencies. A specific action or proposal may have had merit at one point, but from a security standpoint, the persistence of the proposer may have negated the potential of his proposal and could have compromised an otherwise workable scheme.

In order to minimize affiliation with exile groups, the most apparent solution which is suggested frequently envisages the recruitment of Cubans who have no political affiliations. While this may be possible, experience has indicated that it is not probable. Those Cubans in the U. S. who have associated with U. S. personnel and those who speak English are generally marked. Those whose language capabilities and economic stature combine to limit their social mobility are more likely to turn to, accept and become involved in the social, political or cultural cloisters of Cubans in the U. S.

There are additional political and psychological problems in seeking recruits from among Cubans who have fled and generally desire to remain united with families and friends. Their motivation to participate in activities against Castro generally can be measured in terms of their assimilation and economic success in the U. S. Experience has shown that internal oppositionists may resent external Cuban leadership. As the exile groups compete for political prestige and material support, so do the representatives of the internal resistance groups.

The problems of exiles attempting to determine the extent of U. S. commitment and associated security implications are discussed elsewhere in this paper.

g. Timing.

Obviously, the successful execution of well-planned clandestine or covert operations is time consuming. Recruitment, isolation and training cannot be accomplished in a matter of days. There is no standby reservoir of multi-purpose agents. The operations themselves call for split second timing and are subject both to nature's elements (weather, tides, moon, season) and other unanticipated and unpredictable circumstances (Cuban alerts, contact with patrols, compromise of internal contacts, actions of anti-Castro groups, or other world events).

Timing problems are compounded by the increased security requirements and the requirements for synchronized actions.

More effective operations can be undertaken when there is some general continuity in the program and there is an opportunity to plan in greatest detail. From a practical standpoint, it is extremely difficult to maintain individual or group motivation and aggressiveness when operations are delayed, aborted, canalled or subjected to continual modification.

3. ASSETS

In considering U. S. assets for covert and clandestine operations against Cuba, it is well to review briefly in an historical context, the situation which faces the U. S.

Prior to Castro's assumption of power, U. S. efforts in the field of intelligence and clandestine operations in Latin America lagged behind efforts in other more immediate problem areas of the world. At the time Castro assumed control in Cuba, there was much open controversy on the question of Castro's subservience to communism, but generally it was assumed that the change of government in Cuba was in the well-known Latin tradition. Later, it was realized that the change of government was not just a change in personalities, but a revolutionary change in governmental system. At this point, early in 1960, plans were developed to assist the people of Cuba in overthrowing their government. This plan culminated in the abortive Bay of Pigs Operation in late April 1961. It has been conceded that the Bay of Pigs Operation caused many dissidents and potential resistance groups to expose themselves and be "rolled up" in the Cuban security operations which came in the wake of this fateful operation.

During the six month period which followed the events of April 1961, the U. S. was not in a position to expose itself further to any suggestion of clandestine actions against Cuba. The experts involved in that operation were reassigned and little or no effort was made to further endanger any residual assets in Cuba which may have survived the Cuban security operations of the spring and summer of 1961.

By late 1961, another effort was organized to determine what assets were available for operations in Cuba. It suffices to state that an inventory revealed that the few reliable assets in the target area were essentially intelligence agents and could not be spared for conversion to clandestine operations. Castro had consolidated his security mechanism to the point that by early 1962 it was quite clear that insertions of agents in useful areas would be most precarious. The large reservoir of motivated Cubans who had participated in the Bay of Pigs Operation were either imprisoned or had lost their cover. They were no longer an available source for clandestine operations. During the first nine months of 1962, the emphasis was placed on intelligence gathering rather than clandestine operations or political action in the target area.

Because of certain operational difficulties most of the operational missions undertaken during the spring and summer of 1962 were aborted or compromised. Castro's accusation, coupled with the public appearance and "confessions" of "U. S. agents" caused the operational program to be periodically discontinued. No attempt was made during or immediately after the missile crisis to continue the program.

4. ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The role of the Department of Defense in clandestine and covert areas has been the subject of much controversy both within the Department of Defense and within the Central Intelligence Agency.

By charter the Department of Defense does not play the principle role in the fields of clandestine or covert operations. The Department of Defense is not specifically precluded from assuming a principle role and, in fact, there is specific authority for the Department of Defense to assume such a role when the scope of a particular operation exceeds the capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency. From U. S. lessons learned in Laos and Cuba (during the Bay of Pigs Operation) the size of these operations were considered beyond the capabilities of the CIA. (At least the resources of men, money and materiel available to CIA were strained severely). In such circumstances when DoD assets far exceed those of CIA, it may be preferable to give DoD the primary role and responsibility and have CIA render required support. Again security becomes a major factor when an operation reaches such a magnitude that DoD is forced to assume the responsibility. Many argue, with some justification, that when the operation is of a magnitude that the DoD must assume the responsibility, it is at the point of losing its cover or clandestine wrappings and DoD may suffer the consequences.

Except for participation during World War II, few individuals in the Department of Defense were concerned with clandestine operations prior to 1960. Experiences of the military in Germany, Laos, Cuba and Vietnam served to underline many of the capabilities and limitations of the military in these fields. There are many emotional organizational conflict of interest aspects involved in a consideration of the role the military should assume. One view is that the military can and should assume a greater role immediately. Supporters of this view base their arguments on some demonstrated inefficiencies committed under CIA management in the past, the planning experience of DoD, and the breadth and depth of resources in men, money and materiel available to the Department of Defense. Some of the more emotional support of this view stems from the military's frustration of CIA's apparent inability to take bold actions (probably combined with some inborn jingoism).

The proponents in DoD of a more cautious approach are sensitive to the commitment of U. S. military resources in the unconventional field at the expense of implicit responsibilities in the conventional area. There is some opposition on moralistic grounds and there is concern that the inability to maintain security in any sizeable covert or clandestine operation could subsequently reflect adversely on the military establishment or the professional military as a group. Other objections include a reluctance to assume the responsibilities and risks entailed in operations of this nature and a preference to play a supporting role to the "professionalism" of CIA. Some bureaucratic or organizational lethargy may also influence military views.

In the past, the military has played an essential role in three major categories -- money, men and materiel. From the fiscal standpoint, the Department of Defense can provide vast expenditures with relatively great flexibility.

The vast resources in manpower of the DoD (with military technical and linguistic skills, overseas experience, physical conditioning and personal dedication and aggressiveness) provides a very lucrative potential for DoD participation in clandestine and covert actions. The major problem in this connection is the separation of the individual from the military Service. The mechanics of individual cover, dummy records, and the administrative processing is essentially no great problem. The difficulties appear in the consideration of family and military associations. It is relatively easy to quickly isolate and "sheep dip" an air crew or a small boat crew for one short mission; however, this process is not easily extended for any protracted period. There is usually a requirement to consider carefully the pay and allowances of military personnel operating independently or in conjunction with CIA personnel on clandestine and covert operations.

The material assets of the Department of Defense can play a major role in CIA's overall operation. DoD can provide cover for many of CIA's training, supply and storage installations. DoD is involved in surveillance activities. The DoD inventory of aircraft and ships with trained crews are adaptable to infiltration and exfiltration missions. DoD stocks of arms, foodstuffs and equipment along with DoD's ability to sanitize, package and ship for aerial or surface delivery quantities of supplies is a significant asset.

There is a general misunderstanding concerning the use of Army Special Forces units, Navy SEAL teams, Air Force Jungle Jim organizations or Marine Corps special units in covert and clandestine operations. While it is entirely possible and feasible to convert individuals or units for clandestine or covert operations, the basic mission of Special Forces originally was oriented toward the organization of resistance forces in support of overt military operations. Subsequently, the charter of Special Forces was expanded to incorporate counter-insurgency operations in friendly territory. Both of these missions are essentially overt in nature and there is a lack of experience and doctrine for the commitment of Special Forces in clandestine or covert operations. This generally applies to units of the other military Services. Any major reorientation of the mission of these units will detract from their current requirements and could jeopardize, for example, the ability of our Special Forces to assist in the organization of a resistance in Cuba in support of a conventional military operation there.

5. INTELLIGENCE

It is essential to an understanding of the problem to realize that since late 1961, all U. S. intelligence estimates have indicated that there is little likelihood of an internally sparked Cuban resistance to be of any significance. According to CIA there is little possibility of getting advanced information of any uprising without this information also reaching officials of the Castro Regime. It is also estimated that there is little likelihood that any resistance groups would be able to "hold out" in any organized form for more than a week or two. Castro personally is quite aware of the potential of a guerrilla resistance and moves ruthlessly, committing disproportionate forces to ensure that the spark does not mature.

There has been a lack of useful intelligence on Cuba. This has caused the U. S. to place primary importance on clandestine intelligence operations with a corresponding lack of emphasis on other clandestine operations. In order to undertake operations, vast amounts of current operational intelligence are needed. The priority for this operational type intelligence has been relegated to a relatively unimportant station in the spectrum of our intelligence requirements for Cuba. This is particularly true when there are limited assets and so much pressure to obtain reliable information or confirmation on sophisticated conventional weapons or Soviet activities. Normally, different methods of operation are employed in a different physical environment for those seeking operational intelligence.

It should be pointed out that the lack of intelligence has been used as a crutch in not pressing for more clandestine operations actions. This view can be justified, but no commander who commits forces on the battlefield ever knows all he wants to know about his enemy. Somewhere in between lies the answer. There must be an acceptance of certain gaps in operational intelligence and consequently some additional operational risks; otherwise, no meaningful actions will ever be taken.

6. PARAMETERS OF FUTURE ACTION

This portion of the paper is designed to indicate in general terms the latitude of clandestine and covert actions based upon past experience and those pertinent factors which might serve to limit or modify U. S. action in these areas. This should not be interpreted to indicate the limits of future actions.

Clandestine and covert activities prior to and during the Bay of Pigs operation can be characterized as bold and far reaching. The future orientation of U. S. activity in this field is conditioned largely by the failure of that operation. Clandestine and covert actions since April 1961 can be summarized as being cautious, intermittent, and low level. The current attention directed towards "things Cuban" places even more stringent requirements on U. S. activities in the clandestine and covert environment.

Following are examples of the types of activities which could be undertaken. This is not an exhaustive list, but is presented to illustrate the types of activity which might be considered.

a. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

(1) Interrogation of refugees.

(2) Counterintelligence in U. S.

(3) Legal travellers.

(4) Clandestine intelligence agents.

(5) Air and naval surveillance.

(6) Communications surveillance.

(7) External sources (where Cuba is represented officially or quasi-officially or where refugees and travellers can be reached).

(8) Intelligence provided by third countries.

(9) Defectors (inside or outside Cuba). It is important to note that the security mechanism in Cuba renders suspected potential defectors relatively inaccessible. The development of a defector program requires vast amounts of operational intelligence which has not been available. There are additional problems in seeking defections from among those who have families. The Cuban security apparatus combines with geography to further restrict attempts on the part of many who might defect if there was any reason to believe they could leave Cuba. Those who have sought asylum in other embassies in Havana have been refused exit visas for such prolonged periods that their information, when finally released, is practically useless.

(10) Penetrations (inside or outside Cuba). Extreme caution must be used to prevent the compromise of any penetrations which can be made. Penetrations in the communist apparatus outside of Cuba may be of little utility or Cuban requirements of such low priority as to limit the scope of such attempts.

b. Propaganda and Psychological Operations

(1) Radio and television directed at Cuba (black, white or grey).

(2) Printed material (mail, airdrop, or packed with other material destined for Cuba). Airdrop is severely limited by Cuba's air defense capability.

(3) Radio and television and printed material to Latin America.

(4) Counterpropaganda.

(5) Rumor, threat, or other campaigns using all available communication assets, to include telephone. Propaganda should reach the proper target, should be consistent (Cuba versus other parts of Latin America). Psychological actions could include air dropping of foodstuffs and medicine, Russian language broadcasts, large scale military actions near Cuba of a deception nature, rumors and "plants" of information, etc.

c. Political Actions

(1) Inside Cuba to instigate demonstrations, establish a resistance net, or to take a particular action.

(2) External to instigate demonstrations against Cubans.

(3) Tours of Cuban exiles to Latin America and elsewhere (educators, jurists, labor leaders, women, youth, entertainers, religious and cultural groups, etc.). NOTE: Many of the above actions can be accomplished overtly.

d. Economic Actions

(1) Sabotage of agriculture, power, industry, internal or external transport, communications, administration, or storage facilities.

(2) Covert operations to prevent sale of purchase of items destined for Cuba or coming from Cuba. (Sugar, tropicals, etc.) NOTE: Since the Sino-Soviet commitment to Cuba is preponderant, a large portion is not susceptible to U. S. action; however, the remaining trade with the Free World, although relatively minor, is critical to Cuba and provides the U. S. with a lucrative target.

(3) Counterfeiting. Because Cuba has essentially a barter market and mass distribution is difficult, this may not represent a useful activity. There are other very far reaching implications which must be considered against a relatively meager and short lived gain.

e. Sabotage and Harrassing Actions

(1) Sabotage of leaders homes, offices and military installations. (Economic sabotage included in paragraph d above).

(2) Actions designed to withdraw people from harvest or to overwork military elements. (To include actions from rumors to major military exercises).

(3) Radio or television intrusion or jamming.

(4) Bribing, embarrassing, blackmailing, assassinating, coercing and kidnapping leaders.

(5) Attack, seizure, search or harrassment and sabotage of air and naval traffic.

(6) Attack, intimidation and harrassment of Cuban representatives abroad.

f. Paramilitary Operations

(1) Raids.

(2) Prison breaks.

(3) Weapons caches.

(4) Reconnaissance in force.

g. Provocations or auto provocations. Contrived operations can be undertaken; however, it appears preferable to capitalize on real provocations which occur almost daily in some form. Through political and psychological handling many of these real provocations can be developed into provocative acts.

7. FUTURE OPTIONS

A discussion of future options should be related specifically to the overall objective and should consider the factors indicated in paragraph 2 above.

There may be advantages to taking clandestine actions for actions sake alone in order to (a) demonstrate and publicize continued Cuban resistance, (b) keep the resistance potential alive, (c) accede to demands for a spectacular action, (d) indicate a reprisal for actions by the Cuban Regime, (e) test, probe, deceive or harrass the internal security mechanism in Cuba and (f) establish a psychological climate for other overt actions.

So long as Castro remains the "David" and the U. S. remains the "Goliath," the U. S. will have a major problem of image making in Cuba, Latin America and the world. Since April 1962, there are indications that the fascination for "Fidelismo" has waned significantly but to the Cubans, the Latin Americans and many other new-born states, Castro is still the "David" and the only Latin who has successfully challenged the North American giant. The recognition and support of a resistance leader (real or imaginary) in Cuba would only provide a partial solution to this problem.

As the economic situation in Cuba becomes more intolerable, the U. S. may expect greater dissension and more manifestations of unrest, to include outbreaks of violence. At some point, the U. S. could be called upon to support openly such an effort. Obviously, it would be extremely embarrassing to the U. S. to be unable to respond before the resistance is crushed completely. In any event, it would be extremely difficult for the U. S. to support such a resistance in a clandestine or covert manner for more than a few days. Such support could serve to alert Cuba to U. S. intentions.

Theoretically, the most desirable event which could take place would envisage a major split of Cuban leadership involving relatively proportionate military and internal security forces. It is difficult under present circumstances to visualize a Cuban leader of such stature even considering such a move, since he has no real assurance of immediate U. S. military, economic and political support so vital to his tenure and so necessary to prevent a counter coup from those deriving strength from the heavy Sino-Soviet economic orientation of the present regime.

The U. S. continues to be extremely vulnerable to acts of auto provocation by the Cuban Regime. It is not beyond the realm of possibility to have Cuban directed attacks of Cuban military elements (disguised as exiles or U. S. personnel) on soft and emotional targets in Cuba. Such an action could serve to help Castro consolidate internally and to seriously embarrass the U. S. internationally.

8. SUMMARY

The U. S. finds itself in an uncomfortable position of waiting for the breaks in Cuba and not knowing precisely when or how the breaks will occur. As time goes on the changes for an internally inspired revolt become increasingly more remote. Barring a major political schism in which major elements of the security forces are split, there is little promise of an internally sparked revolt of sufficient magnitude to permit the U. S. to muster multilateral representation or support and intervene on behalf of this resistance.

According to authoritative sources, the U. S. will receive little or not advance notice of such an uprising and according to intelligence estimates there is little likelihood of such an uprising surviving for more than a few days. Also, it has been indicated that there is little likelihood of such a resistance could gain control of a radio station to request outside assistance. (It is recognized, however, that this probably would be one of the principle aims of any such action group.)

So long as the Sino-Soviet Bloc continues to subsidize Cuba, the internal economic situation will probably not become intolerable for those committed to the Castro Regime. The Sino-Soviet Bloc would stand to suffer severely if they undertook any major reduction in their support of Cuba.

Castro has cautiously avoided provocative actions of sufficient magnitude to incur the wholesale wrath of the U. S. or to provide a juridical basis for overt intervention. To Castro's liking, U. S. options have been narrowed to U. S. instigated open conflict economic pressures or to a time-consuming and frustrating multilateral approach utilizing the OAS mechanism.

The U. S. may again be afforded the opportunity to take increased overt actions (such as blockade or other stringent measures). Unless preplanning on this or other actions is accomplished beforehand, covert actions in support of these overt measures will be limited to only those opportunities upon which the U. S. can capitalize with the means at its disposal at the time.

From the standpoint of the Cuban Regime, there appears to be little likelihood that any clandestine actions will be taken directly against the U. S. However, the recent aircraft attacks or warnings against U. S. boats indicates the possibility of uncontrolled action on the part of individuals of the Castro Regime.

DRAFT

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of ________, February _, 1963, 4 P.M.)

FROM: Coordinator of Cuba Affairs

SUBJECT: Psychological Program in Support of U.S. Policy on Cuba

Objectives

The basic program adopted by the Executive Committee on January 25, 1963 sets forth major objectives for our policy toward Cuba. It al commits us to "be prepared to increase the political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created."

This memorandum outlines a program that will meet the psychologica requirements of our overall policy.

Role of Psychological Operations

A successful psychological campaign cannot be viewed solely as a propaganda exercise or an informational program. It should cover actio and statements--all that is said or done solely or primarily for psycho- logical effect. This definition sets off psychological activities from those actions undertaken primarily for their direct value--whether in t fields of intelligence, military, political, or economic action.

One of the tasks of psychological operations is to exploit other activities to maximum advantage, or to seek to minimize any negative aspects of such activities. In designing and carrying out action program directed at Cuba, it shall be the task of the Coordinator and his Group

[illegible] TS 0051

[redacted] SECRET

to balance possibly conflicting interests and to determine which, in any given circumstance, shall have priority.

Strategy and Tactics

We must keep in mind constantly the relationship between what happens in Cuba and the overall struggle between ourselves and the Communists. We should seek to insure that the Cuban situation will develop in a way that will:

a) lead to the collapse or overthrow of the Castro regime;

b) demonstrate to the Cuban people and to the world at large that communism is not a solution for the problems of a developing country;

c) discredit Castro and his associates and their methods of operation throughout the Americas;

d) insure that the burden imposed by Cuba on the Soviet Union and the satellites adds substantially to the mounting evidence that efforts to export communist revolution are unsuccessful and excessively costly.

Our focus should always be on the first of these objectives--the end of the communist regime in Cuba. But pending achievement of this, we can move toward the other objectives. And they, after all, are of major importance to our overall strategic purposes.

We have the possibility of insuring that so long as Cuba remains Communist it will serve as an open, bleeding wound that will weaken the Communist cause generally. This strategic concept is one which the Communists have tried to use against us.

Our tactical approach should be designed to fit this overall concept. It calls for the utilization of every available weapon in our aresenal and engagement, day-in and day-out, in a multi-faceted struggle at all levels.

Our initial aim should be to weaken steadily the capability, confidence and will of the enemy (inside and outside Cuba) and, correspondingly, to strengthen our side. We need not, indeed ought not, stake everything on one great effort. Nor should we concentrate on simply building up our forces and husbanding them "until the right time comes" for a final showdown.

Instead, our effort should be directed toward achieving an unbroken series of small successes, encompassing gains on the part of anti-Castro elements and failures on the part of the regime itself. Our aim should be that the end of each day would see the position and prospects of the Castro regime and little worse than they had been at sunrise.

A factory breakdown because of a shortage of spare parts or sabotage, an increase in absenteeism, lengthened queues at the food stores, failure to get a field planted--whether because of neglect or lack of seed, a resort to terrorist methods against the populace, an unexplained fire, creation of suspicion in a minor but key official, the sudden appearance of antiregime slogans on walls, a defection from the armed forces--these and similar things, whether major or minor, and over and over again on a mounting scale, will have a cumulative impact. In the long run, they can be equivalent to a major victory.

The important thing is to keep the pressure on, to never give the regime a respite, to see that the series of small defeats and setbacks is unbroken and unending. Our purpose is to create a situation in which the regime and its supporters steadily lose hope and heart, in which they come to accept the certainty of eventual defeat.

Meanwhile, repercussions would be felt throughout the Communist world. Assistance to the regime would increasingly be regarded as a "rat hole" operation. The "example of Cuba" would become the reverse of expectations; fidelismo would become a term of opprobrium.

In short, the goal is to bring about the elimination of the Castro regime without resort to direct and massive force. We cannot rule our the possibility that some reliance on force may become necessary to insu final victory for anti-Castro forces. But the greater and more effective is the effort herein outlined, the more we are likely to insure tha overt force requirements will be minimal.

Specific programs to carry out this kind of approach to the Cuban problem are submitted in Annexes A and B.

Audiences and Targets

The psychological program should be directed at the following primary audiences or target groups:

1) the Cuba people. Our goal should be to encourage dissatisfaction with the present and hope for the future once Castroism is eliminated. It should be made clear that the next chapter of Cuba's history must be written by the Cubans. But they should know that they will have friendly support from others.

2) the Castro regime. Our goal should be to create dissension, doub and hopelessness inside the ruling clique.

3) Latin America. In programs directed at the peoples and governments of the hemisphere, our goal should be to weaken the influence of the Cuban regime and its propaganda, to encourage solidarity within the OAS family, to counter Cuban influence in key groups (youth, labor, intellectuals), to encourage actions that counteract Cuban programs of subversion and insurrection.

4) the Soviet Union and other Communist states. To picture Cuba as a steady drain on already limited resources, to insure that i is such a drain, to encourage the Soviets to limit and eventuall eliminate their involvement in Cuba.

5) Other countries. To insure understanding of what is involved in the Cuban situation, to use Cuba to disprove that communism provides useful answers to the needs of developing countries, to expose the continuing danger of communist efforts to export revolution.

6) the Home Base. To provide the American people and the Congress with the full facts of the Cuban situation within the limits of legitimate security considerations.

Assets

The psychological program toward Cuba should utilize the full range of the Government's capabilities for action and information. These include, among others:

a) public statements by the President and other officials;
b) informational assets such as the public affairs and Congressional relations agencies of State, Defense and other agencies;
c) the Government's research and analysis facilities;
d) overseas information programs in all media, especially the facilities of the U.S. Information Agency;
e) the diplomatic mechanism for both formal and informal contacts;
f) capabilities for unattributed programs of action and information.

Coordination and Guidance

In carrying out the kind of many-sided offensive described herein, it will be necessary to provide for coordinating various programs. We must be sure that what we do in one area reinforces what we do elsewhere. It will be necessary to provide careful and regular policy guidance to those responsible for action. This task is assigned to the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs. He should establish the necessary machinery on an inter-departmental basis.

U.S. Posture toward Cuba

The picture we should seek to create is one of a confident and decisive United States moving forward in cooperation with its other friends, dealing with the Cuban situation but not exclusively preoccupied with Castro. We should not appear to be in doubt or confusion. We should take note of developments in Cuba promptly and react to them quickly. Our answer to claims, charges or attacks should be swift. Our machinery must be geared to permit answers to Castro and his henchmen immediately and effectively. If he makes a speech tonight, our reply should be on the airwaves tomorrow at the latest.

Our approach should not be defensive. We should not confine ourselve to answering Castro but as much as possible force him onto the defensive. We should insure that he is required to do the answering, the explaining, the disagreeing as much as possible.

Attachments: Annex A - Guidelines for Attributable Programs
Annex B - Guidelines for Unattributable Programs

FEB 11 1963

[illegible]

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX A

Guidelines for Attributable Programs

Current Requirements

1. There should be a statement, preferably by the President, explaining overall U.S. policy toward the Cuban question. It would provide clarification of where we stand on Cuba and how we hope to see the future develop. It would provide the basis for statements, private and public, for all other officials concerned. It would inform the Cubans how we regard their future; tell Latin Americans how we see the problem and our view of their role; underline to the Soviet bloc our determination to oppose communism in this hemisphere; further clarify for our own people the seriousness of the problem and our determination to support the cause of freedom in Cuba with all feasible means.

The Coordinator should arrange for preparation of such a statement and submit a draft to the White House.

2. It is our policy to seek elimination, or at least material reduction, of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. Efforts now underway to achieve this end should be given a reasonable chance. If they fail to produce the desired result within a reasonable time, we should be prepared to move forward along other lines. The Coordinator should develop a program to meet this contingency. Meanwhile, the continuing presence of Soviet forces should be described as an exacerbating influence in East-West relations and a symbol of foreign domination and control in Cuba.

TS 0051

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. Clarification of our position on "non-invasion" would be desirable. This could be covered in 1 above. It should be clear that we do not regard invasion of Cuba by the United States as a desirable or useful course. But the possibility of such action in given circumstances cannot be eliminated. The door should be left open for any action that we and our allies in the hemisphere may regard as necessary in the future to counter aggressive moves by the Cuban regime.

4. We need to have clearly in mind our position regarding a possible internal revolt. This, too, could be covered in 1 above. We should avoid statements for the present which could reasonably be expected to encourage an open revolt. We should avoid for the present anything that could be read as a firm pledge to come to the aid of anyone who moves against Castro. We should make clear, however, that we are prepared to support and cooperate with any elements who succeed in ending communist dominance in Cuba and who are committed to establishing in Cuba a free and democratic government responsive to the desires of its own people.

5. We should exploit by available means all evidence of internal discontent and opposition. Defections from the Cuban regime should be exploited extensively and quickly as soon as security considerations are met.

6. The Coordinator should arrange for up-to-date surveys of the following:

a) programs now underway in the psychological field;

b) U.S. capabilities in this field with a view to exposing any obvious remediable gaps in our resources for conducting a significant psychological effort against Cuba;

c) Castro's propaganda machine--how does it work? how much effort goes into it? how can we weaken it?

d) major lines of the Cuban propaganda offensive--favorite themes, techniques, principal targets, etc.;

e) current position of Castro and his regime in Latin America--main areas of influence, by country and by groups.

f) the past record on leaflet drops--how effective, advantages of plane vs. balloon drops, comparison of delivery by other means, possibilities of such a program being used to attack us in the UN or among the Cuban people.

Themes for Information Programs

Information media should exploit the following themes to the maximum extent practicable. Hard data supporting these themes should be spotted on a day-to-day basis and used. Commentaries and discussions should be tailored to take full advantage of these attitudes.

(To Cuban audiences)

1. Castroism is doomed; it is on the slippery slope to oblivion.

2. Cuba is an unwilling instrument of Soviet policy, subject to the whims and moods of a foreign power.
3. Moscow will use Cuba as it sees fit and for its own purposes, giving help and withdrawing it to suit the Kremlin's desires.
4. Castro has isolated his country from its traditional friends, from the hemisphere in which its roots of history, culture, religion, and well-being are sunk.
5. Communism has failed to solve the problems of Cuba--has lowered rather than raised its standard of living. ?
6. The Cuban revolution has been perverted and betrayed.
7. Freedom, independence and diversity are the "wave of the future."

(To Latin American audiences)

1. Use the above as appropriate.
2. Castro and the Russians are using Cuba as a base for subversion, espionage and sabotage against neighboring states.
3. Castroism promises bloodshed, terror and economic stagnation.
4. The Hemisphere's most promising course is vigorous efforts to achieve the goals of the Alliance for Progress. ?

(To Soviet and Bloc audiences)

1. The above as appropriate.

2. Cuba represents a steady drain on already limited Soviet and bloc resources; every shipment to Cuba means things do not appear on Soviet shelves.
3. Castro really supports the Chinese, not Moscow; he is using Soviet help to promote Castroism not Moscow's policy.

The above lists do not pretend to be exhaustive. They are but the beginning of a catalog of themes we can exploit in our information and propaganda offensive.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX B

It is the judgement of the Coordinator that this annex covering intelligence and covert actions should be submitted separately after the Executive Committee reaches a conclusion on the overall psychological program and the attributable activities set forth in Annex A.

See par. 4 para 2 Annex A above

TS 0051

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ **DOCUMENT RECORD** *(AR 380-5)*	DATE RECEIVED 2-11-63	DATE OF DOCUMENT	NUMBER OF COPIES	COPY NUMBER(S) none
	LOCAL TS CONTROL NUMBER *(If applicable)*	TS 0051		

OFFICE OR HEADQUARTERS OF ORIGINATOR Mr. Califano	TYPE OF DOCUMENT AND ADDRESSEE(S) Draft Memo for NSC Exec. Comte

UNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT OR SHORT TITLE

Psychological Program in Support of U.S. Policy on Cuba

NUMBER AND DESCRIPTION OF INCLOSURES TO DOCUMENT *(Indicate addition and/or deletion of inclosures with dates)*

Annex A (5 pgs) and Annex B (1 pg)

DISTRIBUTION DATA DATE OF DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO.	ADDRESSEE *(Print or type)*	COPY NO.	ADDRESSEE *(Print or type)*

INTRA-OFFICE ROUTING DATA

FOR: ☐ ACTION ☐ INFORMATION SUSPENSE DATE

CHECK	TO	CHECK	TO
X	~~Mr. Califano~~		

NAMES OF ALL PERSONS HANDLING ATTACHED DOCUMENT OR WHO HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF ITS CONTENT WILL BE LISTED BELOW

NAME *(Print or type)*	DATE	NAME *(Print or type)*	DATE
~~A. Carter~~	~~2-11-63~~		

DA FORM 1 MAY 60 **969** EDITION OF 1 JAN 58 IS OBSOLETE.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

~~TOP SECRET Sensitive~~

Pos [illegible]

13 May 1963

SUBJECT: Future Cuban Leadership

INTRODUCTION

Following is a proposal for the creation of an imaginary Cuban leader. This proposal is presented primarily to fill gaps existing in the present policy study. It will become obvious that this proposal can be utilized in conjunction with current programs as well as many of those programs proposed for the future. It may be necessary to address this proposal or a similar proposal separately and in advance of the policy study; however, in the event no pressing requirement exists, it is suggested that this proposal be considered in conjunction with the policy study and handled on a closely held basis.

REASON FOR PROPOSAL

Following are listed a number of indications that the leadership question will be addressed in the near future:

a. With the termination of U.S. support to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) a vacuum has been created. Various exile groups in the U.S. and elsewhere will be vying for recognition and support in an attempt to fill this void.

b. There has been constant pressure on the U.S. and on other Latin American countries to recognize a government in exile. This proposal could serve to lessen or eliminate much of this political and psychological pressure.

c. This proposal could serve to reduce the bickering among exile groups and may serve to resolve some of the problems of Cuban exile unification.

~~TOP SECRET~~ Sensitive

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

d. The proposal could emphasize the development of a native "David" in opposition to Castro, the Cuban "Goliath." This could serve the U.S. image by making Castro the "Goliath" rather than the "David" who opposes the "North American Giant."

e. This proposal could serve to prevent the U.S. from making premature commitments to a leader or a particular exile group and could be used as a device to test exile response.

f. This proposal could retain for the U.S. the ability to control future selections of leaders or groups (timing and political ideologies).

g. This proposal could permit the U.S. on a progressive basis to influence the idealogies of the resistance and thus to influence the platform of a future Cuban Government.

h. The publicity associated with the prolonged existence of a resistance in Cuba can serve to delay the furtherance of the de facto recognition of the present Cuban Regime.

OBJECTIVE

To create an imaginary leader or image of resistance in Cuba. This image would serve as a focal point for resistance directed against Castro by Cubans or Latin Americans.

DEVELOPMENT

An imaginary name of a resistance leader could be developed utilizing a popular name from Cuban history, a name associated with resistance in Cuba or a newly devised name. The name selected should typify a person who is friendly to the Cuban people, is anti-communist, is willing to fight against the Regime, and is little-but tough. There is no requirement for a detailed staff study in order to determine this name. "The Little Bull," "The Little Worm," "The Friendly Worm," "The Fighting Friend," "The Tough Peasant," or any such name which is acceptable and meaningful in Spanish could suffice. Over a period of several months the name could be "dropped" or leaked through U.S. officialdom, in diplomatic channels, in intelligence channels or within the Cuban exile community. Specific acts against the Regime could be credited to this individual or members of his group. Communications could be arranged between this individual and his subordinates to be picked up either by Castro's censors or by radio intercept in Cuba or in the U.S.

After a period of time, all unexplained incidents and actions for which credit has not been seized by some other exile group would automatically be ascribed to our imaginary friend. At some point in time it could be leaked that the U.S. is, in fact, supporting this imaginary person. Similarly, other Latin American countries may, without inducement, publicly follow the U.S. pattern.

During the course of this operation it is quite possible that the Castro Regime could indicate that the activities of this individual were terminated, that the individual was captured, that he was being pursued, or that he was an imaginary faker or fraud. Such action would only serve to further publicize the actions of the individual and so long as resistance in general continued the fame of our "Cuban Kilroy" would spread. Humorous antics could be credited to our imaginary friend and rumors of his exploits of bravery (ala Zoro) could be circulated.

At some point in time it may be wise to indicate what this individual stands for. (It will become obvious that he is opposed to the Regime in Cuba.) It could be possible to indicate little-by-little his political platform in very general terms -- realizing that the mistique and the "generalness" connected with his operation is, in fact, the power behind the operation. Ultimately, Cubans and others may demand that he proclaim his complete political views or even that he present himself physically. Since this is not desirable, arrangements could be made to have selected individuals meet with his appointed representative. His instructions and words could be relayed to the public by many means.

As his political platform becomes more apparent within the exile groups, it may be possible to determine those willing to follow his leadership (to gain Cuban independence under his terms) or those who are unwilling to accept his leadership. The lines of controversy among exiles can be drawn more clearly. Undesirable leaders and exile groups can be eliminated from the competition through his disavowals.

Eventually, a member of the resistance in Cuba may gain sufficient stature to assume or to be given the title of this imaginary leader. This, of course, will depend in large measure on individual leadership ability and the ability to "fill the boots" of this anti-Castro image.

While this scheme is replete with gimmickery, its implementation could be undertaken in a relatively short period of time. Sensitivity of this scheme is such that the knowledge should be held on the tightest basis and if implemented, those proposing should not be informed. In the event the scheme is compromised, (unless knowledge is widespread) there is little need for plausible deniability; however, once used and compromised the scheme can hardly be reinstated. A major advantage is that this image can be created over a long period of time or developed rapidly without a political or economic commitment on the part of the U.S. There may be a point at which the U.S. could no longer disavow collaboration with this imaginary person. This point, however, is so distant that during any point in the intervening period it would be possible for the U.S. to disengage easily without suffering embarrassment or loss of prestige.

CONCLUSION

Based on a consideration of factors indicated above, it appears that the U.S. should immediately undertake to implement this proposal, determining at 30 to 60 day future intervals what additional action should be taken to improve, reduce, or change the image during the subsequent 30 or 60 day period.

James K. Patchell
James K. Patchell
Lt Colonel, USA

SECRET

22 May 1962

~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Colonel Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Following is a brief "run-down" of meeting on psychological operations at State, 21 May 1962. The meetings are normally held each Monday at 1430. Attendees include: Bob Smith or Kermit Brown (USIA); Seymour Bolton (CIA); Colonel Wade Robert (DOD); Harvey Summ (Cuba Desk Officer - State); Bob Hurwitch, Dick Phillips (Public Affairs Advisor of Martin's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs - State) and Leon Curtis (Bureau of Intelligence and Research - State).

Subjects discussed included:

(1) Priorities of work - Cuba, Western Hemisphere, U.S. in that order.

(2) Publication of document on conditions in Cuban Universities received from Cuban exile group (DRE) - CIA to check authenticity and whether document is outdated.

(3) Radio SWAN - CIA studying proposed changes.

(4) USIA reported three commentaries put out on Cuban Independence Day.

(5) On the Armstrong Circle Theater, USIA states this "hung up" for $15,000 cost of translation. It was decided in meeting to push on to get it translated - and in the meanwhile to get Miro Cardona's speech into wide circulation.

(6) State suggested that speeches in Cuba (Rodriguez, Castro, and others) within past week indicated moves away from collectivization to free enterprise and mentioned antipathy of people to idea and name of cooperatives. USIA to push on this and to prepare releases on it.

~~SENSITIVE~~

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

(7) CIA to declassify the Soviet nickel contract with Cuba which exposes Soviet colonialism - for wide distribution in Latin America through Embassies and USIA and for use by CIA in Cuba.

(8) CIA wants more stuff in the vein of ridicule, satire, humor - to get away from invective and hit the regime and individuals - low key stuff to develop ridicule.

(9) CIA to find out from refugees what appeals best, what they read, what they listen to, etc.

(10) USIA and CIA to play up the March USIA survey which shows Castro's popularity in Latim America on the decline.

(11) On 26th of July, State suggested cave be used to avoid discussing 26th of July movement as Commy - to clearly differentiate between original 26th of July movement and its principles - and the betrayal. CIA requested State's guidance on policy and State's help on providing material. State provided the attached and indicated that its use is within policy (I have noted some particularly hard hitting stuff - if used properly).

(12) A number of important events and dates in June and July were discussed to include Caribbean Games, Peace Festival, Khrushchev Rocket statement, and Castro's "Cordillera of the Andes" statement. USIA and CIA to prepare information on these.

(13) State asked CIA to prepare a catalogue of admission of failures of the Castro Regime, a list of production promises, and a report of bloc people in key positions. All were asked to bring ideas into next week's meeting to be used to exploit 26th of July to our advantage.

(14) This office will be placed on distribution of minutes of the meetings.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 June 1962

~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Col. Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held at 1430 hours on 28 May 62 with Mr. Hurwitch and Mr. Simm of State, Bolton of CIA, Smith of USIA, and myself attending. Following is a summary of subjects discussed:

(1) CIA asked State to provide a clarification of personalities and groups to be supported - this came up in connection with a discussion of CRC and newspaper stories on its change in leadership.

(2) The Armstrong Circle Theater movie has been okayed for Spanish language publication and distribution.

(3) On the "Eyewitness to History" program of 25 May 62 - because of the type of movie - USIA to look at carefully and determine whether useful for replay (I will be invited to attend).

(4) CIA using theme for farmers not to produce - okayed.

(5) On declassification of Cuba - Soviet trade agreement - CIA has been unable to obtain, but should produce soon.

(6) CIA guidance now being prepared for psych war to list priorities as follows: (a) Cuba, (b) Latin America, (c) rest of world. Draft copies will be brought to next meeting for informal review.

(7) On the DRE publication "White Book on University Problems in Cuba" - 2,000 copies each are being printed in Chile in English, French, and Spanish. CIA to take action to make available in summary form for Latin newspapers and student publications.

(8) On the CRC publication "Cuba Nueva" - presently going only to exile community. CIA to look into getting it into Latin America and Cuba - money appears to be no problem.

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(9) State suggested exploitation by USIA and CIA of items appearing in the FBIS daily summary. (Housing and labor -- made arrangements to put us on distribution.)

(10) CIA brought up the unhappy impact of Moscoso's speech inferring that Cuba should be forgotten and that we should get on with the Alliance For Progress. State indicated that a correction was being made to show that Moscoso was misquoted.

(11) State suggested that Castro's 11 April speech (which was not released until May) had many exploitable points -- corruption - failure to suggest unity - labor -- State sent to CIA for research people to work on.

(12) Item appearing in Cuban paper concerning people who "transgress the norm" being sent to training camps - USIA to take action.

(13) CIA after looking at symbols etc. has about decided that the "worm" is preferable to the "fish" and that it has been popularized by Castro and we should take advantage of it. Both CIA and USIA will develop further the worm idea. Lt. Col. Patchell suggested relating it to such expressions as "the worm will turn" - if applicable in Cuba and associating it will biblical quotations such as "Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched" -- Isa 6624 or "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood, so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart" - Prov. 25. 20. USIA to take action.

COMMENT:

In the two previous meetings I have developed sufficient rapport so that I can now get actions taken without too much question. This next meeting I propose to introduce a system of suspense dates so that the "we are looking into" or "we are considering" are replaced by "we will meet the suspense" -- this may be difficult at first, but feel it can be managed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

6 June 1962

~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Colonel Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held 1430-1450 on 4 June 1962. Attended by Mr. Hurwitch, Mr. Phillips, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Curtis (State), Mr. Bolton (CIA), Mr. Smith (USIA), and myself. Following is a summary of discussion items:

(1) USIA will provide advance notice of TV programs scheduled re Cuba.

(2) Free Cuban Group (DRE) has arranged for strong representation at African International Student Meeting in Canada 27-28 June. They will surface copies of report on student conditions in Cuba. They asked for no advance publicity - then big "follow up" - - State and CIA coordinating to include preparation of releases to U.S. press.

(3) CIA has looked at CRC's mailing lists for various types of info, to include the publication "Cuba Nueva." They find lists most elaborate, complete and well organized for each purpose.

(4) USIA reports they are on top of stories pointing out loss of rights by workers in Cuba. USIA provided sample copies of their daily wire output and of weekly mail output for me to look at in greater detail. (I will report separately on this.)

(5) Much exploitable info in Castro's speech on housing -- corruption, unavailability etc. USIA and CIA to exploit.

(6) CIA reported that the Latin American edition of Time Magazine was in English -- that Time Magazine in spanish was a Latin publication (Bogota) using same format, but not useful for purpose of exploiting Blas Roca story.

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(7) Reports of hunger strikes etc. at Isle of Pines prison to be played up by USIA. (Berne's cable 527).

(8) Copies of cartoon books and other publications were requested by Lt. Col. Patchell.

(9) USIA requested to provide info on the public opinion poll conducted and schedules for future polls.

Seymour Bolton privately asked me to inform you that subject to any comment from you, he was using the approach on psy war that the means of delivery would not be tied to attribution. Although it might be more convenient to work completely through the CRC, he believed that we should reserve flexibility by organizing the "pipelines" and then putting stuff in from CRC, or other Cuban organisations, as well as stuff created by the U.S., with or without signatures or attribution. He feels that such control would best insure that we sent in just what was needed and no more or no less.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

12 June 1962

~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Col. Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held 1430-1600 on 11 June 1962. Attended by Mr. Hurwitch, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Wells (substituting for Mr. Curtis from R&I-State); Mr. Bolton (CIA); Mr. Smith (USIA); and Lt. Col. Patchell. Following is a summary of discussion items.

(1) CIA has translated and declassified Soviet-Cuban Trade Agreement and passed to Mr. Hurwitch for publication and use.

(2) Lt. Col. Patchell pointed out that the Cuban increase of delegates to 330 to Helsinki Eighth World Youth and Student Festival "for reasons of an imperative nature" should be acted upon and full use made of report on student conditions which will be surfaced at the Canadian regional meeting. Bolton assured me that action was being taken. NOTE: After the meeting Bolton said the same group of people were working on both and that "extensive" work was being done on Helsinki. I asked him to be sure it was on Cubans in Helsinki -- not just Helsinki.

(3) USIA agreed to look at clippings on Cuba with view to broader distribution in Latin America -- as requested by Lt. Col. Patchell.

(4) CIA will present a document next week on guidance with respect to Cuba. and when do we see?

(5) State (Mr. Summ) indicated a Cuban report indicated that Havana was going back to horse-drawn trolleys because of motor transport shortages. Mr. Wells added that previously horse-drawn transport was not permitted in Havana. All to look into this for possible exploitation.

~~SENSITIVE~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

(6) Lt. Col. Patchell brought up comparison between Hitler's speech after the unsuccessful Beer Hall Pustch and Castro's "History Will Absolve Me Speech" following his abortive attempt. CIA will look into this -- both for research and whether suitable for propaganda purposes.

(7) Since the title "Doctor" adds some respect to Castro's name -- all agencies will push toward referring to him primarily as the Prime Minister or secondarily as Fidel Castro. ← Not according to F.A. specialists gf

a name of more respect!

(8) A USIA report indicated that Cuba had increased its radio propaganda output by 60% over the past few months. USIA stated that FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) has added Cuba to the list of Bloc Countries, which -- subjects Cuba to periodic research and analysis reports and broadcast trends. (See FBIS Report, "Operational Developments in Foreign Broadcasting" Number 355, dated 6 June 1962.)

(9) CIA reported additional people had been placed in their research department to make content analyses on Cuba.

(10) State has received two articles from New Delhi written by an Indian reporter who visited Cuba in the early months of 1959 and recently revisited Cuba. These reports are good for the "before" and "after" content and will be publicized. State asked USIA to look for others who visited in the early days of the Castro Regime -- who might be encouraged on a selective basis to return and make a comparison.

Is Craig aware?

Does Navy have complaints? What are they?

(11) State indicated that Cuba had presented a series of complaints against U.S. actions at Guantanamo and it looked as though Cuba was building up a case against the U.S. for future use in the U.N. or world opinion medias. State has asked Navy to provide similar information for use by State and will present information to the group for possible exploitation.

Gen Craig made aware 12 Jun 62 gf

(12) USIA unable to report on Miro Cardona's speech in Costa Rica. CIA reported that it had been carried in papers in Costa Rica and had been broadcast by the Voice of America and several Miami Spanish language stations.

Any mention of keeping alive by quoting others than Miro?

(13) State suggested the next meeting be held at USIA for the purpose of briefing the group on the functioning of USIA -- in handling a select number of items.

Gen L answered on this 12 June gf

~~SENSITIVE~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted] ~~SECRET-NOFORN~~
~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

18 June 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Col. Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

The meeting held 1430-1600 on 18 June was attended by Mr. Hurwitch, Mr. Bart Wells, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Phillips (State), Mr. Bolton (CIA), Mr. Bob Smith (USIA), and Lt. Col Patchell. Following are items of interest.

(1.) CIA distributed copies of a student booklet (English and French versions attached). Thirty-thousand copies were printed in Spanish, French, English, and Portuguese in Chile -- sponsored by a Latin American student organization, and primarily for Latin audiences. The booklets will be used on tour of Latins in Afrika and were distributed throughout Latin America and at international youth and student meetings in Quebec and Helsinki. Some copies will be mailed into Cuba.

(2.) CIA presented draft guidelines for overseas posts re Cuba. The group made some minor changes. The guidelines are PRIMARILY FOR USE [illegible] 26 July.

(3.) State will put out a similar circular to its posts, and USIA will consider doing the same.

(4.) Roundup reports of overseas stations on actions are due within 7 days after 26 July. They are to cable significant actions immediately.

(5.) Hurwitch distributed copies of a draft cable intended to exploit Cardenas incident (copy attached).

(6.) Lt. Col. Patchell asked full exploitation of Mexican defector -- suggesting appearance before OAS Committee, trip through Latin America, etc.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

SENSITIVE

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~-NOFORN
~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~

This document contains 2 pages.
Copy No. 2 of 2 copies. Series ____

(7.) The Group was informed that Mr. Grant (St. Louis Post-Dispatch), Tad Szulc, and a number of other newsmen were attempting to get into Havana for the 26 July celebration. Depending on the individual situation, these people will be briefed and debriefed by State and, in some cases, by CIA.

(8.) State will obtain copies of reports from the British, Italian, West German and other Allied Embassies in Havana for distribution to members of this group.

(9.) CIA asked to have Cuban Embassy representatives in other Latin American states confronted with Castro promises and asked for comment for publication -- refusals and "no comments" to be publicized.

(10.) USIA reported that Cardenas incident played two times Saturday evening and four times Sunday over VOA.

(11.) USIA provided film on Carpenter flight for use on TV at Guantanamo.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

26 June 1962

~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Col. Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held at 1430 on 25 June 1962 was attended by Mr. Hurwitch (State), Mr. Robert Follestad (substituting for Harvey Summ-State), Bob Smith (USIA), John Tilton (substituting for Seymour Bolten-CIA), and Lt. Col. Patchell. Following items discussed:

a. State to seek anti-Castro press clippings from other Latin American countries for replay.

b. USIA is distributing confidential memorandum, "The Impact of Castro on Mexican Public Opinion and Some Indications of Attitudes Toward the U.S. and the USSR" (LA-3, Feb 62). This report, although dated Feb 62, is just now coming out - it reportedly shows a significant decrease of Castro popularity in Mexico.

c. CIA was asked whether the reports of Cuban communist interference with other Latin communist parties could be exploited.

d. Decided to direct propaganda into Cuba which is designed to destroy the image of Cuban success throughout the hemisphere. Also to direct propaganda designed to stress that Cuba is being "used" by the USSR.

e. State pointed out the value of President's trip to Mexico this week end to point up US-Mexico solidarity. (Noted that Hurwitch withdrew considerably from his initial position - Cuba not mentioned as a point of solidarity).

f. CIA is translating Theodore Draper's book into Spanish for dissemination as a paper-back in Latin America.

g. Decided to play back into Cuba administrative "goofs" by Cubans on transportation arrangements for youths of other Latin countries to celebrations. (Some left penniless and stranded in Caribbean).

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

h. The Cultural people in State are seized with problem of Jamaican Games. I suggested other athletes for free Cuba or other personalities. -- That we should at least make an inventory to see what we have available. It is noted that Cubans are "out to win" -- What is now being accomplished is not good enough.

i. CIA working with Navy on declassification of USSR-Cuba Trade Agreement.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

3 July 1962

~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE (has seen)

From: Lt. Col. Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held from 1100 to 1300 on 3 July 1962 with the following in attendance: Bob Smith (USIA), Seymour Bolten (CIA), Bob Hurwitch, Bob Fallestad, Al Carter, and Bart Wells (State) and Lt. Col. Patchell. Following are highlights of discussion.

a. State is providing copies of report from British Ambassador to Cuba MARCHAND. Report made after absence of 3 months from his post in Cuba. Copy attached - see redlined portions

b. State has received letters explaining details of Cardenas incident - passed to CIA and USIA for action.

c. CIA to obtain more information on outbreak in ALCANO which is being suppressed by Cuba.

d. CIA provided copies of study on promises and failures of Castro regime - it has been distributed to CIA stations overseas. State and USIA to look at with view to providing copies to international organizations and State and USIA representatives overseas. Copy attached

e. In view of uncertainty expressed in messages from Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and UAR about stability of Cuban economy and attempts to collect funds to assist Cuba - CIA to play on theme of Cuba as poor investment etc. behind iron curtain.

f. Defector who was formerly Cuban economic attache in Moscow being debriefed - he was held for 16 months in Argentine Embassy in Havana and for this reason much of his information is dated. CIA to expedite his assessment.

g. On Cuban economic defector from Mexico - still being interrogated and assessed with view to looking at his ability to stand

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

up to cross-examination under OAS. State stressed need to expedite in order to gain impact. CIA can provide no estimate of time when assessment will be completed. In Miami, his press conference indicated Castro control of the Mexican provincial police.

h. On question of intervention - Mexican papers stating this is Mexican victory on Cuban issue - this is being replayed by U. S. papers - leaves a poor impression. State said this is being discussed with President and will be covered by Lincoln White at press conference today. CIA and USIA agreed that more should be done. State could not answer on Cuban talks - unknown how deeply Cuba was covered and whether the question of diversion of U. S. good or movement of people were discussed. Any hint of Mexican victory will be demoralizing to people in Cuba - exile community - and Latin America in general.

i. Following the meeting Mr. Hurwitch indicated that State and CIA representatives would meet with CAB officials concerning PAA flights to Havana.

~~TOP SECRET-NOFORN~~
~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~

Mr Hand first
Lt Col Patchell —
EL

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

11 July 1962

~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Col. Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Following is brief of meeting held from 1430-1530 on 9 July 62 with the following in attendance: Robert Hurwitch, Harvey Summ, Juan Gurrell, and Al Carter (State), Bob Smith (USIA), John Tilton (CIA), and Lt. Col. Patchell.

Swiss article. A Swiss publication has a very fine article in detail on Cuba - by Swiss reporter who spent several months in Cuba - USIA to replay.

Clipping service. Good immediate reaction to clipping service being provided.

26th of July. Group agreed to "jack up" machinery for information on activities and L. A. reaction to 26th of July.

CRC Political Platform. State provided members with copies of a CRC political platform (attached). Little publicity has been attached to document. CIA will check to see if it is a document for internal or external distribution. (Note: Following the meeting, I asked Mr. Hurwitch to consider this in connection with his guidelines paper, depending upon its validity and usefulness. He stated he believed the two were in consonance, but would check.)

Cuban Protests. Discussion of Cuban protests. Believed that the publication of protests may be leading up to justification for receipt of defensive weapons. (Note: This fits in with Mr. Bill Harvey's earlier remarks on the same general subject.) State is responding to protests and queries in low key.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~~TOP SECRET-NOFORN~~
~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~

This document contains ____ pages.
Copy No. ______ of ______ copies. Series _____

British Newsman. Will meet with State representatives at 1430 on 11 July. Others invited. This individual was formerly a Communist.

Chinese Opium Technicians. On report of Chinese technicians to assist Cubans in opium growing. Lt. Col. Patchell suggested CIA get declassified and publicized as quickly as possible.

Overall Evaluation. All to take a look at orientation of group - its purpose, missions, methods of carrying out tasks to see what changes are required for period starting 1 August 1962, or after new NIE is published.

Note: From the time that I joined the group on 21 May, the group's orientation has changed from a general Latin American psychological operations group to one focused on Cuba. My own personal objective is now to get the output extended beyond Latin America - into NATO, the uncommitted areas, eastern Europe, Japan, etc.

Visit of James B. Donovan.x Following the meeting, Mr. Hurwitch gave me the attached memorandum of conversation with Mr. Donovan.

x Copy sent to W Harvey 16 July 62

CIA-2

facsimile
TRANSMITTAL

to: John Pereira, Director, Historical Review Group, CIA
fax #: (703) 351-2114
from: David Marwell, Executive Director, ARRB
date: 5/30/95
pages: 8 , including cover sheet.

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • Room 208
Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088
Fax: (202) 724-0457

13-00000

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW ▪ 2nd Floor ▪ Washington, DC 20530

May 30, 1995

Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

RE: ARRB Additional Information Request No.CIA-2

Dear John:

As you know, the ARRB Board at its May 19, 1995 meeting concluded that it required additional specific information before it could review the CIA records under discussion at this meeting. Based upon my discussions with you and with Barry Harrelson, I understand that the Historical Review Group can respond only to questions that draw upon information already on hand, and that any questions requiring further research will go to the components for a response.

Since I understand from you and Barry that it will be faster if we divide those of our questions directed to the Historical Review Group from those directed to the components, we are submitting two separate lists for CIA's response. List 1, which we are submitting to the Historical Review Group, asks basic questions about documents, including the Mexico chronology, which HRG has not previously addressed. List 2 asks for the answers to questions about names, pseudonyms, and crypts that go beyond what we understand is HRG's current available information.

Since the ARRB Board will consider these documents at its June 7, 1995 meeting, we hope to have this information by then. Thank you for your continued cooperation, and we look forward to your response. Please do not hesitate to contact me or Jeremy Gunn for any clarification regarding these requests.

Sincerely yours,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

ARRB Request for the Central Intelligence Agency, May 30, 1995

1. Please confirm the information we have for the following portions of file numbers, and provide information for those portions still in question:

19-9-8	Cuba Country Indicator-?-?
19-4-128	Cuba-Communist Infiltration of Government-?
65-6-38/4	Spain Country Indicator-?-?
33-126-22/4	Greece Country Indicator-?-Restricted File, Still Active
50-2-4-1	Mexico Country Indicator, Liaison File-? (Communist Activities?)

2. Please tell us which of the following crypts are still in use. (We understand that most of these pertain to surveillance operations in Mexico City):

LICALLA
LIEMBRACE
LIENVOY
LIERODE
LITEMPO (or LITEMPOS)
LCIMPROVE
REDWOOD
LIMITED
LILYRIC
LIFEAT
LIFIRE
MKCHARITY

3. Please confirm the information we have for the following crypts and provide additional information, including whether these crypts are still in use. For agent crypts, please give us some background for the individuals in question (janitor or president of country?), and tell us where these individuals are now, as well as what they are doing. (It is possible that providing the Board with the 201 file for that individual would be helpful).

LIELEGANT	Liaison Official
LITENSOR	High Mexican Official (Source)
LIERGO	Liaison Official
LIRING-3	Mexican Agent With Access to Cuban Target (cultural type)
LIJENNET-1	Access Agent Operating Against Soviet Target in Mexico
LINILE-1	Access Agent Operating Against Soviet Target in Mexico
LITEASE-1	Access Agent Operating Against Soviet Target in Mexico

ARRB request, page 2

LISTEED-2	Access Agent Operating Against Soviet Target in Mexico
LINEB-1	Access Agent Operating Against Soviet Target in Mexico
LICRAVE-1	Access Agent Operating Against Soviet Target in Mexico
LICUFF-1	Access Agent Operating Against Soviet Target in Mexico
LICANNY-1	Access Agent Operating Against Soviet Target in Mexico
LIMERICK	?
LIENTRAP	Photo Operation Against Prominent Mexican Communist
LIFEUD-22	Mexican Operating Photo Surveillance Basehouse (LIERODE) Against Cuban Target
AMKIRK-1	Cuban Access Agent (friend of LICOOKY-1)
AMROD	Sensitive Cuban Operation in Mexico City-(Explain?)
ERTHYROID-3	Nicarguan Liaison Official

4. Please confirm the information we have on the following individuals and provide additional information, including what these individuals were doing for CIA in 1963-64, as well as what they are doing now and where they are presently located:

Munro, George Frederick (Jeremy K. Benadum)
    NOC; former FBI agent in Mexico
Manell, Herbert (Gerald F. Gestetner)
    Transcriber/translator (Spanish), Mexico City station
Manell, Barbara (Lucy A. Dillinger)
    Transcriber/translator (Spanish), Mexico City station
Tarasoff, Boris (Douglas J. Feinglass)
    Transcriber/translator (Russian), Mexico City station
Shaw, Robert T. (Lawrence F. Barker)
    Officer, Mexico City station
White, Allen P. (Robert Easby)
    DCOS, Mexico City Station
Bustos, Charlotte (alias Elsie Scalletti)
    WH-3/Mexico
Horton, John (Roger Kingman)
Diamond, Robert
    Deceased
Langan, Joseph
    Staffer in WH/Sec officer
Langdon, Joseph
    Office of Security staffer

- Zambernardi, Robert (Gregory D. Parmuth)
  - Liaison between photo basehouses and station, Mexico City?
- Whitten, John (alias John Scelso)
  - C/WH-3
  - Retired under cover to Vienna, Austria?
- Herbert, Radford W. (TN)
- Gallery, L.N. (TN)
  - C/WH/REPTS
- (Scantling, Oliver G.)
  - American Support Asset in Mexico
  - True name?
- (Kasnicka, Lewis F.)
  - Staff Commo. Also used in photo support operations
  - True name?
- (Gerende, Raymond H.)
  - Mexican support asset
  - True name?
- (Mulford, ________)
  - Staff Photo Techician
  - True name?
- Flick, Charles F. (Arnold F. Arehart)
  - Support Staffer
- (Urquhart, Thomas G.)
  - True name?
- (Rowton, Wallace B.)
  - Case Officer for LIRING-3
  - True name?
- King, Joseph C. (Oliver G. Galbond)
  - C/WH
  - Deceased?
- Wolf, Wesley F. (Orville R. Horsfall)
  - Technical officer in Mexico

SECRET

ARRB Request for the Historical Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency, May 30, 1995

Please provide us with information on the following :

PACY
MRID
MNTY
HMYA
EGGA

Peter K. Woodhead
Rescigno
Jentons
Salvador Diaz Verson
Joaquin Nassim
Robert Florstedt (CIA)
Burnell Goodrich
________ Tessarolo
Wilfred Clower
________ Tichborn
Stan Watson
Jonathan Weening
Wallace B. Rowton
Richard Welch (COS/Georgetown)/
_______ Lund
_______ Poscher

AMPALM-26
AMPALM-4
LIHUFF-1
D ~~O~~TDORIC TPRANSACK
AMRAZOR-1
AMBUCKLE-1
ODEARL
ZRMETAL
LITEMPO-8
KUDESK
PBPRIME

SECRET

SECRET

ARRB request, page 2

LITEMPO-4
HBFINCH
LITEMPO-1
LIOVAL-1
KUJUMP
AMTHUG-1
LIKAYAK-2
LIMUD
ASCHAM
LICOWL-1
LIMESA
LIONION
PBSWING
LITAINT-2
LICHANT-1
WOFACT
WOVIEW
LIRAMA
LICOMET-2
LNERGO
LNPURE
LIRING-3
LICOAXES
LITEMPO-12
LIQUIFIER
LIROBBIN-1
LNGOLD
WOFIRM
AMOT-2
LITAMIL-7
LITAMIL-9
ERTHYROID-1
KMULCER
ZRERASE
KUCLUB
AEGENERATE
LICASA-1
LITAINTS

SECRET

SECRET

ARRB request, page 3

NIEXIT-3
NIETO
STGANG
UNSTAR

SECRET

ARRB Request for the Historical Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency, May 30, 1995

SYMBOLS

PACY	Panama City
MRID	Merida Base, Mexico
MNTY	Monterrey Base, Mexico
HMYA	Monterrey Base dispatch symbol
EGGA	Hamburg, Germany dispatch symbol

IDENTITIES

1. Calvin E. Davis (T)
2. Donald Velasquez (T)
3. J. Deering Danielson (deceased)
4. (REQUIRES RESEARCH)
5. (REQUIRES RESEARCH)
6. Walter G. MARCHMAN (P)
7. (REQUIRES RESEARCH)
8. Judd Allen Austin (T); alias Raphael G. Leminger (T) (201-0220680)
9. Joseph G. Sancho (T)
10. (See Secret bio summary attached)
11. DCOS/Mexico City under Scott (deceased)
12. Cynthia J. Hausman (T)
13. Staffer who was case officer for LIRING/3
14. Deceased; assassinated in Athens, Greece (1976)
15. Jack Kaufman (T)
16. (REQUIRES RESEARCH)

CRYPTONYMS

17. Media Asset
18. Sensitive media Asset
19. See attached secret file summary
20. Covert Action/International Federation of Journalists
21. Cuban Asset
22. Cuban Asset
23. Department of Defense (DoD)
24. Washington, D.C.
25. Mexican liaison official
26. CI Staff
27. United States

28. Mexican liaison officer
29. U.S. Embassy
30. Mexican liaison officer
31. Mexican asset
32. Was Office of Operations (OO); later Domestic Contact Service (DCS)
33. Fidel Castro
34. Mexican asset
35. Postal Intercept Program
36. Allen W. Dulles
37. Double agent against Soviet target in Mexico City
38. Technical surveillance operation against Soviet Embassy in Mexico City
39. Fixed photo coverage of Cuban Embassy (unilateral operation)
40. U.S. Embassy/Consulate/Consul General
41. Mexican asset
42. Manuel Calvillo (Mexican Social Security Institute Consultant)
43. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
44. Covert Action Staff
45. Mexican asset
46. Mexican asset
47. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
48. U.S. Embassy/Consulate/Consul General
49. Carlos Juredo Delmar (access agent against Cuban target)
50. (REQUIRES RESEARCH)
51. Mexican liaison officer
52. (REQUIRES RESEARCH)
53. Asset
54. Department of State (DOS)
55. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
56. Cuban support asset
57. Consuelo Esperon) **Cuban Embassy penetration**
58. Luis Alberue-Suoto) **agents**
59. Nicaraguan Security Service Officer
60. Italy/Italian
61. (REQUIRES RESEARCH)
62. Office of Communications (OC)
63. Access agent to Soviet target
64. Mexican asset
65. Surveillance support group

SECRET

66. Foreign embassy FI assets;)
67. both used contacts of J. Deering Danielson)
68. ChiCom audio operation
69. Contact of J. Deering Danielson; foreign embassy FI asset.

SECRET

file

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

October 7, 1996

HAND DELIVERY

Mr. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Status of Assassination Records Review Board Requests to CIA for Additional Information and Records

Dear Barry:

I am writing to memorialize our conversation of October 1 regarding the status of Assassination Records Review Board requests for information and records from the CIA.

We discussed the following formal requests:

CIA-1 (Organization materials)

CIA has made records available to the Review Board. The Review Board staff will continue its review and make recommendations to the Board and will request further information, if necessary, from CIA. CIA needs to do nothing further at this time.

CIA-2-5 Complete

CIA-6 (Cables and dispatches)

CIA originally informed the Review Board staff that these materials could be made available by December, 1995. CIA now agrees to make the records available (or to have a response) by the first of November, 1996.

CIA-7 (Histories)

Mexico City. CIA has shown the Mexico City history to Gunn. CIA will compile the portion of the history that was shown to G. Robert Blakey,

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

which will be processed as an assassination record. Gunn will then determine whether there are any additional portions of the history that should be added to the Blakey version. CIA will compile the "Blakey version" as soon as possible and Gunn will promptly thereafter review the documents.

Index. CIA has made an index available to Review Board staff and the staff has identified certain histories that may be appropriate for review. CIA will make available those histories that are of obvious relevance, and will raise with Review Board staff any questions regarding the requests where the basis for the request is unclear. CIA will begin to make histories available on a rolling basis. Review Board has agreed to review histories promptly once they are made available. Although it was not discussed at our meeting, we would very much appreciate it if you would, within the next two weeks, identify which histories you are prepared to make available and those that CIA believes should be subject to further discussions.

Cram's multi-volume counterintelligence history. Although Cram's history was not specifically discussed at our meeting, the Review Board staff understands that the history has been located and the Review Board staff awaits its being made available.

CIA-8 (Intelligence community staff)

CIA will provide a report to the Review Board staff within two weeks.

CIA-9 (Publications and analytical materials)

The Review Board staff provided CIA with a list of certain publications as they appear in an LBJ Library finding aid. CIA will report back on recommended action to the Review Board promptly.

CIA-10 (Interagency source register)

CIA has compiled information responsive to the request. CIA will make records available within two weeks.

CIA-11 (Duran's original statement)

CIA has been unable to identify to date Duran's original statement. CIA will make some further attempts to locate it.

CIA-12 (JMWAVE materials)

CIA will begin to make materials available on a rolling basis.

With respect to the informal requests, it is our understanding that:

CIA is inquiring into matters related to Spas Raikin. The Review Board staff will discuss issues with CIA once the pending research is completed.

CIA is locating a cable number IN 24738 (7 July 62), which is identified in record number 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630 (Box 34, F 22), p. 2.

CIA is inquiring into matters related to Marilyn D. Murrett. The Review Board staff will discuss issues with CIA once the pending research is completed.

CIA is continuing to search for HTLINGUAL records, particularly those identified in Church Committee index that was provided to CIA by Review Board staff. CIA is prepared to provide oral briefing on HTLINGUAL.

Please let me know if you have any supplements or corrections. We would very much like to ensure that these matters are handled expeditiously.

As always, thanks for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel and Associate Director for Research

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

March 6, 1996

Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

Re: Assassination Records Review Board Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-9 (Publications and analytical materials)

Dear John:

We would once again appreciate your assistance in obtaining access to CIA records of possible pertinence to the John F. Kennedy assassination. We request that you locate CIA or Intelligence Community serial publications for the dates immediately before and after the assassination (November 20-30, 1963), including such publications as the President's Daily Brief, the President's Checklist, or any serial publications related specifically to Cuba or the Soviet Union. In addition to intelligence reports, we also request that a search be undertaken for any analytical materials bearing upon the assassination.

As with our previous requests, we would be pleased to discuss with you ways in which we might better refine this request.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

13-00000

f.6

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

November 27, 1996

VIA FACSIMILE

The Honorable John M. Deutch
Director of Central Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: The Central Intelligence Agency's Compliance with the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Mr. Deutch:

Since 1994, the Assassination Records Review Board ("Review Board") has been working with a number of Federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, to locate and publicly release records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. These actions have been taken pursuant to The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994) ("JFK Act"). We have been working with Mr. John Pereira, Chief, Historical Review Group and Mr. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer, Historical Review Group of CIA and have appreciated the cooperation we have received.

The purpose of this letter is to request your agency's cooperation in assisting the Review Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress and the American people that the goals of the JFK Act have been accomplished to the greatest reasonable extent. We want to assure the American people that the United States Government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. Indeed, one of the paramount purposes of the JFK Act is to certify to the public that the United States Government is not withholding relevant materials related to the assassination. *See, e.g., Assassination Materials Disclosure Act*, H. R. Rep. No. 102-625, Part 1, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992) ("The Federal Government's failure to release official materials has contributed to numerous conspiracy theories and fueled charges of government complicity in the assassination . . . a salutary purpose is served in opening these files [relating to the JFK assassination] to allay the suspicion of government cover-up.").

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

The Review Board has recently considered how it, along with the relevant federal agencies, can best demonstrate to the American public that a thorough, good faith, and diligent effort has been made to locate and release all remaining assassination-related records within the control of the United States Government (and that the Government is not hiding any such materials from public disclosure). Pursuant to the Congressional mandate under the JFK Act to "create an enforceable, independent, and accountable process for the public disclosure of such records," 44 U.S.C. § 2107(2)(a)(3), the Review Board seeks to have the relevant federal agencies provide a complete and specific accounting of their efforts to locate and release assassination-related records, including a full explanation for any destruction of such records.

Accordingly, the Review Board requests that each relevant agency adhere to the formal compliance program (hereinafter "JFK Act Compliance Program") outlined below and devised by the Review Board pursuant to its powers under Section 7(j)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), and (F) of the JFK Act. We hereby request that you undertake the following measures by the dates provided (these dates were set in view of the fact that the Review Board's operations currently are scheduled to expire on September 30, 1997):

1. Designation of Agency Compliance Official (or officials) and statement of intent to comply with the JFK Act. We request that by December 9, 1996, your agency designate an Agency Compliance Official who ultimately will be responsible for ensuring that the agency has complied with its obligations under the JFK Act, including the identification, location, and organization of assassination records and the transmission of those records to the National Archives and Records Administration ("National Archives"). Although the Review Board assumes that Mr. John Pereira or Mr. Barry Harrelson will serve in this position, we nevertheless await your formal confirmation. If necessary, your agency may designate additional persons with knowledge of the measures that have been undertaken to locate assassination records.

   We also request that by December 9, 1996, the agency convey its agreement to adhere to the compliance procedures outlined in this letter. To the extent that any compliance procedure described below appears to be unreasonable or to present difficulties that we may not have anticipated, please explain why and make alternate suggestions to us.

2. Initial Statement of Compliance. We request that the Agency Compliance Official prepare, by January 6, 1997, an initial written statement of the

agency's compliance with the JFK Act ("Statement of Compliance"), setting forth the steps that the agency has taken to locate and process assassination records. The Review Board recognizes that many of the relevant federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, have previously written letters to the Review Board apprising it of their progress at various stages of identifying and processing assassination records under the JFK Act. The Statement of Compliance, while it may include information previously reported to the Board, is to be the agency's comprehensive and final report to the American public of what it has done to locate records relating to the assassination. This Statement of Compliance shall include, to the fullest reasonable extent, the following information:

a. A complete description of all steps that your agency took to identify and locate assassination records including, but not limited to, an identification of the major record collections and files that were consulted in the agency's search, any departmental file indices consulted, the names and titles of the persons who were responsible for conducting the searches, the physical locations of the records that were searched, the off-site storage facilities (*e.g.*, Federal Records Centers) searched, the specific steps that were taken to locate and retrieve materials in archives, and any other criteria used by the agency to locate assassination records.

b. A description of the steps that the agency took in direct response to specific requests of the Review Board to locate certain additional records or information relating to the assassination. In particular, we ask that the CIA describe what specific steps it has taken to address the following requests: CIA-9, Publications and Analytical Materials (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated March 6, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); CIA-11, Silvia Duran's Original Statement (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated May 3, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); CIA-12, JMWAVE Materials (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated May 22, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); for HTLINGUAL records (*See* T. Jeremy Gunn Memorandum dated October 1, 1996 to Mr. Barry Harrelson); and for Monthly Operational Reports on Cuban Exile Groups (*See* Manuel E. Legaspi Memorandum dated October 17, 1996 to Mr. Barry Harrelson).

c. To the extent that any assassination-related records have been destroyed by the agency or any agency official, a full and specific explanation of the circumstances surrounding the destruction of such records.

d. The status of remaining work that you can now identify that needs to be completed by your agency in order to comply fully with the JFK Act, including an identification of the categories of records that must be processed and transmitted to the National Archives, a description of any additional searches for files that must be done, and the projected date(s) for completion of these tasks.

3. Review Board Interview With Agency Compliance Official (or Officials). Shortly after the submission of the agency's written Statement of Compliance, we ask that the Agency Compliance Official (as well as any persons who helped prepare the agency's initial Statement of Compliance) be made available to the Review Board for an interview regarding the location of agency assassination records. The interview will be used as an opportunity to resolve any outstanding questions regarding the agency's search, including any follow-up tasks to be completed by the agency. The Review Board anticipates that these interviews will be conducted in January 1997.

4. Submission of Final Agency Declaration of Compliance. By July 1, 1997, Federal agencies are expected to complete the process of identification, location, and declassification of its assassination records at which time they should submit to the Review Board a final declaration certifying, under oath, their compliance with the provisions of the JFK Act (the "Final Declaration of Compliance"). Because of the volume of CIA records, such a "final" statement may not be practicable at that time. However, we do expect that CIA will provide a complete status appraisal by July 1, 1997. This final declaration shall set forth all of the information initially set forth in the initial Statement of Compliance and shall also supplement the initial Statement of Compliance by detailing any further steps that were conducted by the agency in identifying and locating assassination records. The agencies' Final Declarations of Compliance will be included in our final report to Congress.

5. Compliance Depositions. Starting on or about August 1, 1997, the Review Board, pursuant to its statutory authority, may conduct depositions, under oath, of the Agency Compliance Official along with any other agency officials with responsibility for complying with the JFK Act. The decision to take a compliance deposition of an agency will be made on a case by case basis, taking into account the importance of the agency to the work of the JFK Act and the sufficiency of the agency's efforts to account fully for its compliance with the JFK Act. In the event that the Review Board decides to commence a compliance deposition of an agency, the responsible agency designee(s) will be expected to testify under oath with respect to any and all issues relating to the agency's record search, including the scope of the search, the identity of files searched, the destruction of any relevant records, and any other matters set forth in the Final Declaration of Compliance. Any person obligated to appear for a deposition under oath shall be fully entitled to obtain legal representation.

We look forward to receiving your initial response, by December 9, that designates your Agency Compliance Official and includes your statement regarding your position with respect to the provisions outlined in this letter. To the extent that you have any questions or suggestions regarding the Compliance Program, please do not hesitate to contact our General Counsel, T. Jeremy Gunn, at (202) 724-0088.

Thank you for your cooperation with our work.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

cc: The Honorable Nora Slatkin, Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Michael O'Neil, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency
John Pereira, Chief, Historical Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency
Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer, Historical Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency

Jim

SECRET

10 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dick Flynn
DI Focal Point for JFK Board

FROM: Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG
JFK Project Officer

SUBJECT: ARRB Request No. CIA-9

REFERENCE: "Compliance Letter" to DCI, fr. ARRB ExDir, dtd. 27 Nov 1996, (attached)

1. The attached request was received from the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) in March 1996. It appears from our records that a copy was not sent to you. (Our normal procedure is to provide the appropriate Directorate Focal Point a copy of the request as soon as received.) This is one of several requests placed on hold while we worked on other ARRB priorities.

2. In the Agency's response to the 27 November "Compliance" letter (see reference), we asked the ARRB to prioritize their requests. The ARRB staff has identified CIA-9 as a "priority" request.

3. The initial request is for access not release. We usually limit access to sensitive material to Jeremy Gunn, ARRB General Counsel, and one or two of his staff. If the material is particularly sensitive, access is restricted to Mr. Gunn and/or the Executive Director of the Board, Mr. David Marwell. Gunn, Marwell and all members of the ARRB Staff's CIA team are fully cleared (TS/SCI).

4. HRG reviewer Jim Hanrahan (31809) is the focal point for this request. Many of the documents described in CIA-9 were part of eight Executive Order Mandatory Review requests (see attachments) from 1994 and 1995. Jim has obtained from IP&CRD full-text copies of the documents. He will be in touch with you concerning access to these specific documents.

5. Mr. Gunn will be at IP the week of February 24 to review documents. Please advise HRG as soon as possible of

SECRET
THIS MEMORANDUM IS ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT

any concerns or restrictions on access to the mandatory review documents. Also please provide any additional documents responsive to CIA-9 as soon as possible, and advise us of the status of the search by COB 21 February 1997.

/s/

Barry Harrelson

Attachments:
as stated

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee w/attachment
   1 - C/HRG w/o att
   1 - JFK Request File w/attachments
   ~~1~~ - Jim w/o att
   1 - Barry w/o att

SECRET

CIA-#9

23 April 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jim Hanrahan
CSI

FROM: John Loverro
DI/IRO Staff

SUBJECT: Documents Related to President Kennedy Assassination

1. Per your request, OIR searched for the documents related to the time period around the Kennedy assassination.We are still searching for the PICL and the World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination series. Enclosed are the CIB's and the CIWR's for the dates you requested. I will be in touch to let you know the results of our ongoing search.

John Loverro

CL BY:
CL REASON:
DECL ON:
DRV FROM:

SECRET

14 May 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jim Hanrahan
CSI/HRG

FROM: John Loverro
DI/IRO Staff

SUBJECT: ARRB Request No. CIA-9

1. The DI/IMO has located the PICL's which you requested as part of the above request. Copies for 20, 21 and 23 November 1963 are attached. Please call if you need additional material.

John Loverro

ADMIN-INTERNAL USE ONLY
when separated from attachments

13-00000

file CIA-9

17 June 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Barry Harrelson
Senior Review Officer
CSI/HRG

FROM: Richard J. Flynn
DI/IRO

SUBJECT: JFK Assassination Review Board Request

1. On 11 June 1997 members of the DI/IRO staff, OSS personnel, and Bonnie Hunter of your staff met with Michelle Combs and Bob Skwriot of the JFK Assassination Review Board to discuss DI document retrieval methods. The meeting was requested by the Board to provide them with a clearer understanding of DI document searches.

2. Ilse Hartman and Joyce Jump of OSS provided a detailed overview of the document retrieval process. Ilse walked the board members through a typical request, document search, and retrieval. The Board members were satisfied with the thorough nature of the process and appreciated the time spent to provide a detailed overview.

3. During our discussions the Board members asked for five additional topics which they felt might be appropriate to research on the JFK assassination. These were:

- USSR,Cuba,and Mexico combined with the term assassination for the period 20-30 November 1963.

- Minsk radio factories(where Oswald was employed) and possible Cuban training bases in the Minsk region for the period October 1959 to January 1963.

- Helsinki and visas to try to capture information on Oswald's visa application. The Board also asked for information on hotels in Moscow and Minsk where Oswald may have stayed.

- Information on the freighter "Marion Lykes" plus a passenger manifest covering the period 19 September to 8 October 1959.

SUBJECT: JFK Assasination Review Board Request

- Information on anti-Castro activity by Cuban exile groups operating in the US for the period January 1961 to January 1964.

4. Ilse did a search of these topics and was able to find three documents related to activities of Cuban exile groups in Miami for the time period specified.These documents are attached. There were no hits on the other requests.

Richard J. Flynn

Richard J. Flynn

19 June 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Barry Harrelson
CSI/HRG

FROM: John Loverro
DI/IRO Staff

SUBJECT: JFK Assassination Board Request

1. Dick Flynn asked me to forward the attached to you. Documents included are the President's Intelligence Checklist for 22, 24, and 29 November 1963, the Daily Summary for 25 and 29 November 1963 and 2,3,4,5,6,9,10,11,12 and 13 December 1963,the Weekly Summary for 22 and 29 November 1963,the President's Intelligence Briefing Book for 26 November 1963, the Current Intelligence Digest for 26 November 1963 and 2 December 1963, Current Intelligence Memorandums for 25 and 29 November 1963,CIA Memorandums for 23,24,25 November 1963(World Reaction to the Assassination of Presidet Kennedy), a memorandum on the Analysis of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination (13 December 1963),FBIS World Reaction Series No. 8-1963,Government Leaders Expected to Attend President Kennedy's Funeral, 25 November 1963,FBID 25 November 1963 entitled "The Past Soviet Propaganda Assessment of President Johnson",two undated memoranda from Job#79T01762, Box 5, Folder 3,several rough drafts of various papers,and a memorandum entitled "Rumors About Lee Harvey Oswald" dated 23 March 1964.

2. Please let us know if the DI/IRO can be of additional assistance.

John Loverro

HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE-COMINT
CHANNELS JOINTLY

19 June 1997

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Documents Included in Memo to Barry Harrelson, 19 June 1963

1. The President's Intelligence Checklist, 23(TS Dinar),and 24, 29 November 1963(TS).
2. Daily Summary 25 and 29 November 1963 and 2,3,4,5,6,9,10,11,12,13 December 1963.(TS Dinar)
3. Weekly Summary 22 and 29 November 1963.(S/NF)
4. The President's Intelligence Briefing Book 26 November 1963.(TS Dinar)
5. Current Intelligence Digest 26 November and 2 December 1963.(S/NF)
6. Current Intelligence Memorandum 25 November 1963.(C)
7. Current Intelligence Memorandum OCI No. 2477/63 29 November 1963.(C)
8. Current Intelligence Memorandum SC No.06504/63 5 November 1963.(TS Dinar/NF)
9. CIA Memorandum "World Reaction to the Assassination of President Kennedy" 23,24,and 25 November 1963.(TS Dinar)
10. Memorandum "Analysis of World Reaction to President Kennedy's assassination" 13 December 1963.(S/Limited Distribution)
11. FBIS World Reaction Series No. 8 -1963 26 November 1963.(Official Use Only)
12. "Government Leaders Expected to Attend President Kennedy's Funeral" 25 November 1963.(Not Classified)
13. FBID Special Memorandum "The Past Soviet Propaganda Assessment of President Johnson" 25 November 1963.(C)
14. Various undated, unattributed memos from Job 3 79To1762, Box 5, Folder 3.(Some pages labeled TS)
15. Various long hand versions of undated, unattributed drafts. No Job number identified.(One page noted as TS in longhand; later pages labeled TS Umbra/Sensitive/Chess/Ruff)
16. Memorandum "Rumors About Lee Harvey Oswald" dated 23 March 1963.(S)
17. Two documents on file search requests for material on President Kennedy's Assassination(No Classification)

HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE-COMINT
CHANNELS JOINTLY

SUBJECT: Documents Included in Memo to Barry Harrelson, 19 June 1963

Distribution:

HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE-COMINT CHANNELS JOINTLY

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

December 10, 1997

Barry,

Welcome back! Here are the two letters we received from the LBJ Library with the listed materials attached. We can process these documents as assassination records by designating only the sections of the reports/checklist/memoranda that are assassination related and declaring the rest NBR. We could include a short memorandum which explains that these documents are compilations of lots of issues, and the NBR redactions are unrelated to the assassination. If these materials are about to be released under the Executive Order and there are no redactions in the assassination related parts, the Board will probably not need to see them.

As long as you are talking to the Executive Order folks, there were additional materials (beyond the ones specified in these letters) which the LBJ Library sent to CIA and I reviewed early last spring. Some of those items also could be designated as assassination records. I can give you a copy of the list if you don't have it. It would be nice to know what has happened to these materials too.

Thanks for checking on this issue. It is part of CIA-9. If this issue is settled, CIA-9 may be close to completion.

Michelle

TOP SECRET

~~CODEWORD MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

2313 Red River Street Austin, Texas 78705

June 23, 1995

In reply refer to:
NLJ 95-263

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. John Wright
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Wright:

Under the mandate of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act and the provisions of Section 3.4, Executive Order 12356, Harry J. Middleton, the Director of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, has requested the mandatory declassification review of the enclosed CIA document from our holdings.

The enclosed document list identifies the Library file which contains the document. This request is from donated historical material; therefore, Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act exemptions may not be cited.

Would CIA please coordinate declassification review of the document, including any necessary concurrences from other agencies, and inform the Library of its determination for each document. Should CIA excise information from any documents, please provide the Library with appropriately marked copies. **Please determine, where applicable, if information may be downgraded.**

Because of the heightened interest in this material, we ask that you please expedite review of these documents and respond as soon as possible with the results of your review.

If there is any question concerning this request, please do not hesitate to contact me. I can be reached at 512-482-5137, extension 255.

Sincerely,

Regina Greenwell

REGINA GREENWELL
Senior Archivist

Enclosures

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

~~CODEWORD MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

TOP SECRET

LBJ LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW SUBMISSION LIST

2. #7

MR Case Number: NLJ 95-26

Page 1 of 1

Name (Last, First, M.I.): MIDDLETON, HARRY J.

Address: 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705

Consulting Agency: CIA

File Location: NSF, Intelligence Briefings, President's Intelligence Checklist, 11/23-12/15/63, Box 1

Date Completed: 6/13/95

Comments:

Doc. No.	Doc. Type	Document Description	Doc. Date	Classification	No. pp.	Comments	Action Taken
1	report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/23/63	TS/ Codeword	15 ✓	[SC-NLJ-063/95 B/1]	

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

2313 Red River Street Austin, Texas 78705

August 4, 1994

[illegible] OBJECTION TO
[illegible] AND/OR
[illegible] INFORMATION
[illegible]

In reply refer to:
NLJ 94-484

Mr. John Wright
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Wright:

Under the mandate of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act and the provisions of Section 3.4, Executive Order 12356, **Harry J. Middleton, the Director of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library**, has requested the mandatory declassification review of the enclosed CIA document(s) from our holdings.

The enclosed document list identifies the Library file which contains the document(s). This request is from donated historical material; therefore, Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act exemptions may not be cited.

Would CIA please coordinate declassification review of the document(s), including any necessary concurrences from other agencies, and inform the Library of its determination for each document. Should CIA excise information from any documents, please provide the Library with appropriately marked copies.

Because of the heightened interest in this material, I ask that you please expedite review of these documents and respond as soon as possible with the results of your review.

If there is any question concerning this request, please do not hesitate to contact me. I can be reached at 512-482-5137.

Sincerely,

Regina Greenwell

REGINA GREENWELL
Senior Archivist

Enclosures

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS

[illegible] CODEWORD MATERIAL ATTACHED

LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW SUBMISSION LIST

#1 (have)

MR Case Number: NLJ 94-484

e (Last, First, M.I.): MIDDLETON, HARRY J.

Page 1 of 2

ress: LBJ Library, 2313 Red River Street, Austin, TX 78705

Consulting Agency: CIA

Location: See Below

Date Completed: 8/4/94

ments:

Doc. Type	Document Description	Doc. Date	Classification	No. pp.	Comments	Action Taken
', Intelligence File, "Codeword Material, Vol. 1," Box 6						
report	Intelligence Report	11/26/63	TS/ Codeword	5 4	[SC-NLJ-082/93 B/1]	7✓
memo	Intelligence Memorandum	11/25/63	TS/ Codeword	9 8	SC No. 12420/63 B/1	✓
memo	Intelligence Memorandum	11/24/63	TS/ Codeword	10 9	SC No. 12149/63 B/1	✓
memo	Intelligence Memorandum	11/23/63	TS/ Codeword	11 10	SC No. 06509/63 B/1	✓
?, Intelligence Briefings, "President's Intelligence Checklist, 11/23/63-12/5/63," Box 1						
report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/25/63	TS/ Codeword	11 ✓	[SC-NLJ-083/93 B/1]	✓
report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/26/63	TS/ Codeword	11 ✓	[SC-NLJ-084/93 B/1]	✓
report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/27/63	TS/ Codeword	16 ✓	[SC-NLJ-085/93 B/1]	✓
report	Intelligence Report	undated	S/ Codeword	4 ✓	[SC-NLJ-086/93 B/1]	✓ DIF

111\106

LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW SUBMISSION LIST

MR Case Number: NLJ 94-484

ne (Last, First, M.I.): MIDDLETON, HARRY J.

Page 2 of 2

lress: LBJ Library, 2313 Red River Street, Austin, TX 78705

Consulting Agency: CIA

Location: See Below

Date Completed: 8/4/94

nments:

Doc. Type	Document Description	Doc. Date	Classification	No. pp.	Comments	Action Taken
F, Intelligence Briefings, "President's Intelligence Checklist, 11/23/63-12/5/63," Box 1						
cable	Intelligence Report	11/22/63	TS/ Codeword	4 ✓	[SC-NLJ-087/93 B/1]	✓ DIF
report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/28/63	TS/ Codeword	14 ✓	[SC-NLJ-088/93 B/1]	✓
report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/30/63	TS/ Codeword	11 ✓	[SC-NLJ-089/93 B/1]	✓

COVER SHEET

FAX

To: Barry Harrelson
Fax #: (703) 613-3063
Subject: LBJ Library documents outstanding
Date: May 28, 1998
Pages: 9, including this cover sheet.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

COMMENTS

The following is a list of some of the LBJ Library documents that have not reached us in the review process. As I understand it, these were submitted to you by the library and marked as assassination records by Michelle. They are related to request CIA-9. As we discussed these are not the balance of the LBJ library records awaiting review, only the most easily identified.

From the desk of...

Robert J. Skwirot

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street,NW
Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 724-0088
Fax: (202) 724-0457

LBJ LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW SUBMISSION LIST

MR Case Number: NLJ 94-484

Name (Last, First, M.I.): MIDDLETON, HARRY J.

Page 1 of 2

Address: LBJ Library, 2313 Red River Street, Austin, TX 78705

Consulting Agency: CIA

File Location: See Below

Date Completed: 8/4/94

Comments:

Doc. No.	Doc. Type	Document Description	Doc. Date	Classification	No. pp.	Comments	Action Taken
NSF, Intelligence File, "Codeword Material, Vol. 1," Box 6							
28	report	Intelligence Report	11/26/63	TS/ Codeword	5	[SC-NLJ-082/93 B/1]	
29	memo	Intelligence Memorandum	11/25/63	TS/ Codeword	9	SC No. 12420/63 B/1	
0	memo	Intelligence Memorandum	11/24/63	TS/ Codeword	10	SC No. 12149/63 B/1	
1	memo	Intelligence Memorandum	11/23/63	TS/ Codeword	11	SC No. 06509/63 B/1	
ISF, Intelligence Briefings, "President's Intelligence Checklist, 11/23/63-12/5/63," Box 1							
	report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/25/63	TS/ Codeword	11	[SC-NLJ-083/93 B/1]	
	report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/26/63	TS/ Codeword	11	[SC-NLJ-084/93 B/1]	
	report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/27/63	TS/ Codeword	16	[SC-NLJ-085/93 B/1]	
1	report	Intelligence Report	undated	S/ Codeword	4	[SC-NLJ-086/93 B/1]	

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

LBJ LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW SUBMISSION LIST

MR Case Number: NLJ 94-484

Name (Last, First, M.I.): MIDDLETON, HARRY J.

Page 2 of 2

Address: LBJ Library, 2313 Red River Street, Austin, TX 78705

Consulting Agency: CIA

File Location: See Below

Date Completed: 8/4/94

Comments:

oc. o.	Doc. Type	Document Description	Doc. Date	Classification	No. pp.	Comments	Action Taken
NSF, Intelligence Briefings, "President's Intelligence Checklist, 11/23/63-12/5/63," Box 1							
b	cable	Intelligence Report	11/22/63	TS/ Codeword	4	[SC-NLJ-087/93 B/1]	
	report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/28/63	TS/ Codeword	14	[SC-NLJ-088/93 B/1]	
	report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/30/63	TS/ Codeword	11	[SC-NLJ-089/93 B/1]	

LBJ LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW SUBMISSION LIST

MR Case Number: NLJ 95-211

Name (Last, First, M.I.): MIDDLETON, HARRY J.

Page 1 of 1

Address: LBJ Library, 2313 Red River Street, Austin, TX 78705

Consulting Agency: CIA

File Location: See Below

Date Completed: 5/24/95

Comments:

Doc. No.	Doc. Type	Document Description	Doc. Date	Classification	No. pp.	Comments	Action Taken
NSF, Intelligence Briefings, President's Intelligence Checklist, 11/23-12/5/63, Box 1							
2	report	Intelligence Checklist	11/24/63	TS	11		
NSF, Country File, Cuba, Castro's Speeches, Vol. 1, Box 20							
44	memo	Intelligence Memorandum	11/25/63	C	2		
NSF, Country File, Cuba, TDCS's, Vol. 1, Box 32							
152	report	Intelligence Report	12/20/63	S	1		
158	report	Intelligence Report	12/18/63	S	2		
170	report	Intelligence Report	12/13/63	S	2		
183	report	Intelligence Report	11/27/63	S	2		
188	report	Intelligence Report	11/24/63	S	2		
190	report	Intelligence Report	11/23/63	S	2		
NSF, Country File, USSR, Cables, Vol. 1, Box 217							
36	report	Intelligence Report	12/11/63	S	5		
NSF, Agency File, CIA, Helms Memorandum, Box 10							
14	memo	Intelligence Memorandum	4/20/64	S	3	[Sanitized 1990/copy enclosed]	

LBJ LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW SUBMISSION LIST

MR Case Number: NLJ 95-270

Name (Last, First, M.I.): MIDDLETON, HARRY J.

Page 1 of 1

Address: 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705

Consulting Agency: CIA/WH

File Location: NSF, Situation Room File, 11/22/63-12/31/63, Box 58

Date Completed: 6/13/95

Comments: PCI = Possible Classified Information

oc. lo.	Doc. Type	Document Description	Doc. Date	Classification	No. pp.	Comments	Action Taken
	report	"Classified Log"	11/22/63- 12/31/63	PCI	71		

LBJ LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW SUBMISSION LIST

MR Case Number: NLJ 95-378

Name (Last, First, M.I.): MIDDLETON, HARRY J.

Page 1 of 1

Address: LBJ Library, 2313 Red River Street, Austin, TX 78705

Consulting Agency: CIA/WH

File Location: See Below

Date Completed: 8/30/95

Comments:

Doc. No.	Doc. Type	Document Description	Doc. Date	Classification	No. pp.	Comments	Action Taken
NSF, Committee File, President's Committee on the Warren Report, Meetings, Vol. 1, Box 14							
2a	memcon	"Meeting on 10/19/64, of President's..."	10/21/64	S	5	[Exempted 1976]	
2b-2	report	"Background Paper on Security of..."	[10/64]	S	5	[Exempted 1976]	
11	memcon	"Meeting on 10/13/64 of President's..."	10/15/64	S	5	[Exempted 1976]	
14	memo	Chase to Bundy	10/13/64	C	2	[Exempted 1976]	
16	draft	From the President	10/12/64	C	1	[Exempted 1976]	
NSF, Committee File, President's Committee on the Warren Report; Meetings, Vol. 1, Box 14							
9	memo	Chase to Bundy	10/16/64	S	1	[Exempted 1976]	
9a	memo	Osborn and Kallen to Carey	10/16/64	S	6	[Exempted 1976]	
NSF, Committee File, President's Committee on the Warren Report, General, Vol. 2, Box 13							
25	memo	Ash to Smith	11/17/64	C	1	[Sanitized 1976/copy enclosed]	
32	memo	Bundy to President	11/6/64	S	1	[Exempted 1977]	
32a-1	report	"Procedure for Conducting..."	11/5/64	S	4		

BJ LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW SUBMISSION LIST

MR Case Number: NLJ 95-380

ame (Last, First, M.I.): MIDDLETON, HARRY J.

Page 1 of 1

ddress: LBJ Library, 2313 Red River Street, Austin, TX 78705

Consulting Agency: CIA

ile Location: NSF, Committee File, President's Committee on the Warren Report, Meetings, Vol. 1, Box 14

Date Completed: 8/30/95

omments:

c. .	Doc. Type	Document Description	Doc. Date	Classification	No. pp.	Comments	Action Taken
5	memo	Intelligence Memorandum	10/16/64	S	8	[Exempted 1976]	

LBJ LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW SUBMISSION LIST

MR Case Number: NLJ 95-212

Name (Last, First, M.I.): MIDDLETON, HARRY J.

Page 1 of 1

Address: LBJ Library, 2313 Red River Street, Austin, TX 78705

Consulting Agency: STATE

File Location: See Below

Date Completed: 5/24/95

Comments: PCI= Possible Classified Information

Doc. No.	Doc. Type	Document Description	Doc. Date	Classification	No. pp.	Comments	Action Taken
NSF, Country File, USSR, Memos, Vol. 1, Box 217							
61	memo	Harriman to Bundy	12/31/63	C	1	declass	
61a	notes	Walton's "Visit to Moscow"	12/63	C	5	"	
NSF, Country File, USSR, Mikoyan Conversations, Vol. 1, Box 228							
a ✓	memcon	"Soviet press reaction to President..."	11/25/63	C	1	declass [#9a ✓]	
b ✓	memcon	"Mikoyan conversation with Mrs. Kennedy"	11/25/63	C	1	" [#17 ✓]	
NSF, Country File, Cuba, Vol. 1, Box 16							
31 ✓	airgram	La Paz A-477	1/2/64	C	5	" [Sanitized 1991/~~copy enclosed]~~	
59 ✓	airgram	Madrid A-442	12/16/63	PCI	2	"	
61 ✓	airgram	Madrid A-437	12/13/63	PCI	2	"	
78	cable	Madrid 1155	12/7/63	C	1	to CIA ← This one only	

13-00000

LBJ LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW SUBMISSION LIST

MR Case Number: NLJ 95-26.

Name (Last, First, M.I.): MIDDLETON, HARRY J.

Page 1 of 1

Address: 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705

Consulting Agency: CIA

File Location: NSF, Intelligence Briefings, President's Intelligence Checklist, 11/23-12/15/63, Box 1

Date Completed: 6/13/95

Comments:

Doc. No.	Doc. Type	Document Description	Doc. Date	Classification	No. pp.	Comments	Action Taken
1	report	President's Intelligence Checklist	11/23/63	TS/ Codeword	15	[SC-NLJ-063/95 B/1]	

6 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Barbara T. Blufer @ DI

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: OIM/HRP

SUBJECT: ARRB Request CIA-9: President's Intelligence Checklists

REFERENCE:

Barbara,

Could you take a few minutes before the ARP to look at how we are handling the Checklists. ARRB has requested 11 (Nov. 20-30); Jim Hanrahan is reviewing.

Have you finished your review of the 24 documents sent previously? If so could you bring them with you.

The two items you gave me to review last week are not considered "assassination records"; you can close the book on them.

The ARRB staff will not complete its review of DI documents until the end of this week. Hopefully they will not select many as assassination records (AR). If possible, I would like to set up coordination session at IP. I will call you as soon as I know how many assassination records we have.

Thanks for you help.

Barry

CC: James R. Oliver @ DA (bcc: Bonnie K. Hunter-Y-)

Sent on 6 September 1998 at 03:23:55 PM

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

September 12, 1998

To: Laura Denk
Executive Director

cc: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader

From: Michelle Combs Michelle Combs
Associate Director for Research and Review

Ben Rockwell
Analyst

Subject: CIA-9 Publications and Analytical Materials

The Review Board's Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-9 asked the CIA to locate CIA or Intelligence Community serial publications for the dates immediately before and after the assassination (November 20-30, 1963), including such publications as the President's Daily Brief, the President's Checklist, and any serial publications related specifically to Cuba or the Soviet Union. Review Board also requested that a search be undertaken for any analytical materials bearing upon the assassination.

In response to the Review Board's request, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) searched for serial publications which might contain information of relevance to the assassination, special or ad hoc reports pertaining to the assassination, and raw intelligence reports on topics which might pertain to the assassination. All the materials supplied by the Directorate of Intelligence have been reviewed by the Review Board staff. Material within these publications, relevant to the assassination of President John Kennedy, was designated as assassination records. Due to the sensitive and worldwide nature of the information contained in most of these Directorate of Intelligence publications, only material relevant to the assassination was designated as an assassination record. These designated records will be processed and sent to the JFK Collection at the National Archives.

The Directorate of Intelligence supplied copies of the following serial publications for the period November 20-30, 1963 or containing information which from the period November 20-30, 1963.

> *The President's Intelligence Checklist,* the predecessor of *The President's Daily Brief,* an all-source daily summary of intelligence information designed for the President and a small number of high level officials.
>
> *The Daily Brief of the Central Intelligence Bulletin,* a larger and more detailed all-source publication with a wider distribution.
>
> *The Weekly Review - Office of Current Intelligence,* an all-source weekly compendium of events available on Fridays.
>
> *The Weekly Summary - Office of Current Intelligence,* a more limited version of *The Weekly Review* mentioned above. *The Weekly Summary* only contained material up to the SECRET level.

According to the Directorate of Intelligence, only one analytical report on Cuba or the Soviet Union, dated November 15, 1963, was issued near the relevant period. The Review Board staff read this report but did not designate it as an assassination record.

The Review Board staff also examined *The President's Intelligence Briefing Book,* dated November 26, 1963, a compendium of information on major intelligence issues affecting the national security of the United States, which was prepared for President Lyndon Johnson. This briefing book was not designated as an assassination record.

In addition, the DI was asked to search for intelligence reporting on anti-Castro activity by Cuban exile groups in the United States from January 1961 - January 1964. The *Weekly Review - Office of Current Intelligence* for April 5, April 12, and April 19, 1963 were found to contain relevant information on exile raids on Cuban targets. The relevant portions of these documents were designated as assassination records.

Finally, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) searched for records based on subjects supplied by the Review Board staff. The DI database is searchable only by general subject headings assigned from a master list and coded to particular documents. This database is not searchable by keyword. In response to the Review Board's request, the DI supplied raw intelligence reports (not finished analytical intelligence documents) for the period November 20 - November 30, 1963 for the USSR, Cuba, and Mexico. Documents relevant to the assassination of President John Kennedy were designated as assassination records.

The DI reported that there were no DI intelligence reports on the following subjects searched at the request of the Review Board staff:

- USSR and assassination
- Cuba and assassination
- Mexico and assassination
- Minsk radio factories
- Cuban training bases in Minsk
- Helsinki and visas
- Hotels and Moscow
- Hotels and Minsk
- Freighter "Marion Lykes"

e:\combs\cia-9wu.wpd
File 4.20.1 and 4.20.4

14 September 1998

FOR DI REVIEW: CIA #9, LBJ Library Material

NOTE: Review only the material outside of the blue highlighting. Inside the blue highlighting is declared non-relevant.

Attachments:

I. THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
(11 items, see below)

1. 20 November 1963, 8 pages
2. 21 November 1963, 8 pages
3. 22 November 1963, 7 pages
4. 23 November 1963, 14 pages
5. 24 November 1963, 11 pages
6. 25 November 1963, 11 pages
7. 26 November 1963, 10 pages
8. 27 November 1963, 16 pages
9. 28 November 1963, 14 pages
10. 29 November 1963, 10 pages
11. 30 November 1963, 10 pages

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL

II. McCone Files: Two items: White House Briefing for the DCI, 7 April 1964, 6 pages; and Khanh's Data on "Population Control," 5 May 1964, 3 pages

III. McCone Files: Two items: re South Vietnam, 11 September 1963, 3 pages; NSC ExCom Meetong on Vietnam, 18 September 1963, 4 pages

IV. McCone Files: Two Items: The Diem Regime, 8 October 1963, 4 pages; Special OCI Memoranda on Coup Plotting in South Vietnam, 7 October 1963.

~~ADMINISTRATIVE — INTERNAL USE ONLY WHEN SEPARATED FROM TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

13-00000

file copy

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

14 September 1998

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Ms. Laura Denk, Esquire
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Reference: CIA-9, Intelligence Community Publications on Cuba or USSR (November 20-30, 1963)

Dear Ms. Denk:

This is in response to referent request.

Searches were made for information responsive to the request and materials were provided for examination by ARRB staff. From that examination, staff members selected a number of documents to be included within the JFK Collection. Those documents have now been included with the JFK Collection and are being processed for released to NARA.

This concludes the Agency's action on this request. If you have any question, please advise.

Sincerely,

J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

Ms. Laura Denk, Esquire

HRP/OIM: apd/(14 Sep 98)

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - Subject File

21 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson@DCI

FROM: Barbara T. Blufer
DI/IRO

OFFICE: DI/IRO

SUBJECT: Disposition of the DI/IRO on the release of Country Names in the 11 PICLs Reviewed by
Me for the ARRB

REFERENCE:

1. In light of the additional details, laying out the background of negotiations on the PICLs conducted by Linda Cipriani in OGC and articulated in a note to George last week--not sent to me, I concur with the inclusion of country names of even the non-relevant titles in the text of the reviewed PICLs. It's always easier to make appropriate decisions when one is armed with the full knowledge of the background. In light of my very short tenure in dealing with this issue, I would appreciate in the future receiving any background or additional information on prior negotiations that ha~~s~~ve bearing on decisions I must make. Additionally, having that background information ahead of any review or disposition saves time and effort, and result in the best decision not only for the DI but also for the Agency. BB

2. This concludes the DI action on this matter. A signed copy of this memorandum will be sent to Barry for his records.

Barbara T. Blufer

CC:
Robert J. Eatinger@DCI
Linda C. Cipriani@DCI
W. George Jameson@DI
Kathleen K. Boster@DI
James R. Oliver@DA
Michael D. Smith@DI

Sent on 21 September 1998 at 11:34:13 AM

104-10335-10014

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS [illegible]
DECLAS [illegible]
RELEASE [illegible]
IN THIS DOCUMENT

January 28, 1997

Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Re: Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16
(Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)

Dear John:

Under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994), the Review Board has the authority to "direct a Government office to . . . investigate the facts surrounding, additional information [and] records . . . ." Section 7(J)(1)(C)(ii). Pursuant to this authority, the Review Board is seeking to resolve in a complete and comprehensive manner certain questions related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that CIA may have held prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. Accordingly, we request that CIA provide complete and comprehensive answers to the questions identified below.

On May 12, 1992, Director Robert M. Gates testified to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs regarding CIA's records on Oswald prior to the assassination. Mr. Gates testified that "[p]rior to President Kennedy's assassination, *CIA held only a small file* on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages . . . . ." (*The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1972: Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs*, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1992) (emphasis added) (copy enclosed). It is the Review Board's current understanding, however, that at the time of the assassination, CIA held at least three separate files (including soft files) on Lee Harvey Oswald: a 201 file (201-289248), an HTLINGUAL file, and an Office of

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

Security file.[1] We have identified references to one or more other possible Oswald files including possible soft files designated as follows: CI/SI, CI/SIG, CI/LSN, and CS/LSN.

1. Please identify, as specifically as possible, ***each*** file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

2. Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

3. For the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please identify which records (and the total number that) were in the file at the time of the assassination.

4. To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

For each question, please explain the basis for the answer and the sources (records or persons) whom you consulted to answer the question. To the extent that you are not able to answer a question completely, please so indicate and provide the best reasonable answer. If, during the course of your research, you learn that any record relating to a pre-assassination file or record has been destroyed, please provide us with all available information related to the destruction of the records or files.

These queries should be interpreted in their broadest reasonable sense. To the extent that you question whether certain responses may be within the scope of our request, please let us know and we can advise you whether we would wish to include it. We anticipate that the responses to these questions will be referenced in CIA's Final Compliance Statement.

---

[1] One Office of Security file on Oswald (or relating to Oswald) may have been numbered 351-164. In addition, Margaret Stevens may have held an Office of Security "MS-" file on Oswald.

We request that you make this information available to us by February 24, 1997. If this does not provide you with sufficient time, please let us know, in writing, by what date you believe you will be able to answer the questions fully.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

Enclosure

13-00000

S. Hrg. [illegible]

THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. J. RES. 282

TO PROVIDE FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS RELEVANT TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

MAY 12, 1992

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-233
WASHINGTON : 1992

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-039035-4

denied, you say postponed. I am curious as to how long the postponement will be. Will it be until the national security or privacy are no longer threatened? Do we want to require a mandatory review every two years?

Going along, some of the language is fairly broad. We had the exchange here a few moments ago about an intelligence agent. Then there is another section that gives us an exception—"an intelligence method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized."

The one that troubles me most, although I know there is a reason for it, but I just am concerned about the doors it may open, is ". . . an invasion of privacy of a living person, whether that person is identified in the material or not." I am concerned about that being used as a ground for requesting postponement of disclosure.

So I think, consistent with all that you have said here, I hope that you will give us the benefit of your second look at that Section 6 of this proposed Act.

Chairman GLENN. Thank you.

Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. No further questions.

Chairman GLENN. Good. Thank you very much. We may have additional questions. It has been a long session this morning here, and we have additional questions from other members or questions after we review. We would appreciate an early reply so it could be included in the record. Thank you very much. We appreciate.

Mr. STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much.

Chairman GLENN. The next panel is the Honorable Robert Gates, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Honorable William Sessions, Director of the FBI. Gentlemen, you have been very patient here this morning. I know we had told you you would be on by about 10:00 here. We are about an hour late on that, or a little over. We appreciate your forbearance this morning. We look forward to your testimony this morning.

Mr. Gates, if you would lead off, we would appreciate it very much.

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. ROBERT M. GATES, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on S. J. Res. 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and to describe the nature of the documents held by the Central Intelligence Agency that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Senator SASSER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Director could pull the mike just a little bit closer? Thank you.

Mr. GATES. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution, that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the assassination of

President Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

Even before the introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older.

In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the history staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.

This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we hold, but it is an earnest of my commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. Indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved a new CIA declassification guideline for our historical review program which specifically directs a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward-leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency today will make publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000 to 300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.

Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized, all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages, some of which originated with the FBI, the State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see firsthand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and we are providing them to the National Archives.

The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald, some 33,000 pages, most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

The Committee has asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI and about 20 percent originated from the State Department or elsewhere.

Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms, in part, overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 percent originated with a variety of other U.S. Government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Although our documents do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require considerable effort to review, and as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway.

A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act which protect the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure, the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA.

However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of the material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give an example of this type of material.

During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of CIA employees. These files contain fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping the information confidential.

Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip and rumor. Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of Government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program and I am committed to making it work. Even in a time of diminishing resources within the intelligence community, I have allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the history staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to getting these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside non-governmental review. It is against this background that in response to the Committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only intelligence community concerns. I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the assassination materials review board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the executive director of the assassination materials review board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the executive director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth, and finally, Section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed.

These are the technical problems that I believe can be solved and that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

Mr. Chairman, let me close with a comment on why I am personally committed to getting these documents out. Like all Americans old enough to remember that terrible day in 1963, and as several members of the Committee have alluded to, I also remember where I was and what I was doing.

I was a college student at William and Mary, and I can remember how the word spread like wild fire between classes of that horrible event. I made my way to Washington that weekend and stood at the intersection of Constitution and Pennsylvania Avenues, where I waited for hours to watch the President's funeral cortege. I will never forget it.

I entered public service less than three years later, heeding President Kennedy's inaugural call, a call I think many in my generation heard. He said then, "Now, the trumpet summons us again, not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need, not as a call to battle, though in battle we are, but as a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation, a struggle against the common enemies of man—tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself."

Mr. Chairman, the only thing more horrifying to me than the assassination itself is the insidious, perverse notion that elements of the American Government, that my own Agency, had some part in it. I am determined personally to make public or to expose to disinterested eyes every relevant scrap of paper in CIA's possession, in the hope of helping to dispel this corrosive suspicion. With or without legislation, I intend to proceed. I believe I owe that to his memory.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gates follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GATES

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on S. J. Res. 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution—that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment to begin review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved a new CIA declassification guideline for our Historical Review Program which specifically directs a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000–300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized—all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 33 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 documents originated with the CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald—some 33,000 pages—most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20 percent originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 72 reels of microfilm. The microfilms, in part, overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 percent of the documents originated with a variety of other U.S. Government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Although our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require considerable effort to review, and as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of the material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports, (performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping the information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip and rumor. Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of Government to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in a time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, I cite our technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth, and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed.

These are the technical problems that I believe can be solved and that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

Chairman Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Gates.
Mr. Sessions.

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. WILLIAM S. SESSIONS, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID G. LEITCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Sessions. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I have a complete statement which I will file, and there are some diagrams which I will also make available for the record, and a photograph of the files themselves.

Chairman Glenn. Without objection, your entire statement will be included in the record.

Mr. Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to appear before you to testify about FBI investigative records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I applaud this process and your efforts. It is fundamental that Government exist to meet the needs of its citizens. An examination of these issues is directly related to satisfying the intense interest and concern of our citizens about the circumstances surrounding that tragic event some 29 years ago.

From the outset, I would like to state emphatically that I favor maximum disclosure, consistent with the law and the legitimate need to protect certain small but highly sensitive categories of information. I can assure you that the FBI will work cooperatively through the Department of Justice with both the Senate and the House to develop a comprehensive approach to these important issues.

As you know, the Government has conducted a number of reviews of the assassination. The Warren Commission, the House Assassinations Committee, and the Church Committee all conducted reviews that I believe can be best categorized as exhaustive. It is my understanding that the FBI provided massive amounts of information to those entities to help ensure that they accomplished their missions. Once again, we desire to be as helpful as we are able.

Immediately following the shooting of President Kennedy, the FBI began a massive investigation. An intense effort was made. Related investigations were conducted and much information was exchanged, as Director Gates has noted, between the various agencies. As is the case with all major investigations, thousands of pages of documents were created to record the results of these efforts and to facilitate the investigations.

Many different kinds of information were recorded in the FBI files. The results of thousands of interviews of witnesses, other individuals with possible helpful knowledge, and contacts with confidential informants were memorialized. Communications between the FBI headquarters and our field offices, and vice versa, were included, as were communications between the FBI and other agencies. Forensic reports were recorded. In all, FBI files relating to the assassination contained over 499,000 pages of documents, with a few more pages added every time the FBI follows up on a new allegation or a new issue arises.

After Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act in 1974, the FBI began receiving requests for information relating to the assassination. By 1978, four years later, over 200,000 pages of material had been processed and made available to the public through the FBI's public reading room. Many authors, journalists, historians, and others have visited and revisited these materials, which remain available today as a valuable source of historic information.

I would like to briefly describe to the Committee a breakdown of FBI records relating in some way to the assassination. The FBI has four core files that relate directly to the investigation of the assassination. Our cooperation with the Warren Commission and the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby—those are the four core files. There are approximately 499,000 pages in these files, 263,000 of which are duplicate pages that were cross-filed, third agency records, and some FBI records that have not been processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.

Approximately 223,000 pages, or 94 percent of the records we have processed, have already been released to the public. In addition, the FBI has several other much smaller files as a result of other directly related investigations, such as the investigation of Marina Oswald, and these files comprise approximately 22,000 pages, 13,000 of which are duplicate, third agency, or unprocessed pages. Fifty-eight percent of these pages processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act have been released to the public.

Of the pages available in the FBI reading room on the main floor at FBI headquarters, approximately 189,000 pages, or 94 percent, are available in their entirety. The remaining 12,000 pages in the reading room reflect some degree of redaction. The information that has not been disclosed or that has been redacted to some degree falls within the exemptions that are enumerated in the Freedom of Information Act and the protections of the Privacy Act.

This includes information that, one, is classified on the basis of national security; two, would disclose the identities of individuals who specifically requested confidentiality; three, would disclose the identities of confidential informants or sources; four, is highly personal information about individuals; or, five, originated with other Government agencies and those agencies specifically requested that the information not be released based upon exemptions applicable to those particular agencies.

While I strongly favor maximum disclosure under the law, there are certain types of information that are particularly critical to successful law enforcement investigations and national security; for example, information that is properly and appropriately classified, information that would identify confidential sources, and information that would disclose sensitive investigative techniques or the types of information the disclosure of which could negatively impact upon our ability to fulfill our mission. Information in FBI files that has not been disclosed publicly falls largely within these descriptions of information.

In any case, I believe it is extremely healthy for the country to have these issues aired and to be resolved. The public interest dic-

file

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CSI 97-062
31 January 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Wickham
DO Focal Point
for JFK Board

Lee Strickland
DA Focal Point
for JFK Board

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical
Review Group

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16
from JFK Board

1. Attached is "Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)", which was received from the Assassination Records Review Board on 29 January 1997. The request is for additional details related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that may have existed in the Office of Security and in the DO.

2. Please advise how you would like us to respond to this request. We are asked to make the information available to the Board by 24 February 1997.

John Pereira

John Pereira

Attachment

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

27 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

REFERENCE: CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997

1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

> **Question 1:** (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, *each* file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response: (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald,

Regraded Confidential
When Separated From
Secret Attachment

CL BY: 0605636
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 1-82

and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

(U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files.

(U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from Lydia Hoffman of the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

Question 2: (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

Response: (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

(U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations.

(U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960

c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

(U) The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS. Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition have been unsuccessful.

(U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. Katie Nakai of this office at one time was assigned to the Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained limited information on each name.

(C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations Division is the current operating component encompassing most of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in OPS. Gail Jewell of this office was queried regarding office holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms. Jewell had no knowledge of the listing and suggested William Gilbert as a resource. Mr. Gilbert, CIC Liaison Officer, could not recall the listing, opined it may have been destroyed, and suggested contacting Zachary Filis of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC).

(C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously conducted by the Security Analysis Group. Mr. Filis was queried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the realignment of duties. Mr. Filis advised the Defector Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations counterparts regarding the listing.

(U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959

b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure

r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'"

s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

(U) In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald

u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963

y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

Response: (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

(U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

(U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to

detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

(U) Don Staton of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. Mr. Staton made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer Ronda Allen retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame.

4. (U) This review was conducted by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.

Janet A. Ecklund

Janet A. Ecklund

Attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

On 8 April 1994, the complete set of SRPOINTER and HTLINGUAL security support files and indexes held by the Office of Security were destroyed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the approved Records Control Schedules 31-76 and 31-83 and by the Office of General Counsel.

OGC-94-51066
6 April 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: Terri Eagal
Information Review Team
Office of Security

VIA: Robert J. Eatinger
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division

FROM: Stephen K. DiRubio
Information Management Officer
Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction

1. This responds to your memo of 9 February 1994 requesting confirmation that the security support files of the HTLINGUAL project are not the subject of a current litigation, investigation, or other inquiry that would preclude their destruction pursuant to normal guidelines for records of this type. A review of OGC files located no currently active cases involving the HTLINGUAL project. Therefore, OGC poses no objection to destruction of the files if authorized by your approved records disposition schedule.

2. For your information I have attached a copy of a March 1990 memorandum in which OGC provided guidance to the DO regarding destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL project files. According to that memorandum, files pertaining to HTLINGUAL may be destroyed only if: (1) they meet the criteria for destruction on the applicable NARA approved records disposition schedule; (2) are not responsive to a FOIA or Privacy Act request currently being processed by the office concerned; and (3) do not document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the projects, or constitute files on U.S. persons of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency is required to maintain. As the attachment indicates, NARA's requirement that the SSCI concur in any proposed destruction has already been met.

CL BY 2171358
DECL OADR
DRV FM SEC 13-87

SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction

3. I apologize for the delay in responding to your request. Please let me know if I may be of further assistance.

Stephen K. DiRubio

Attachment:
As Stated

SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction

DCI/OGC/REG/SKDiRubio:skd/76195 (6 Apr 94)

Distribution:
  Original - Addressee
    1 - OGC Registry

OGC-90-50611
19 March 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/OIT/IMS

FROM: W. George Jameson
Chief, Litigation Division, OGC

SUBJECT: Destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Project Files

REFERENCE: Request for Authorization to Retain or Destroy Questionable Records: 141C's for MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Projects, from IMS/MPG/IRMB, dated 18 December 1989

1. The referenced request seeks concurrence for the destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL files in accordance with routine records destruction schedules approved by the National Archivist. Subject to the qualifications set forth below, the proposed destruction can proceed without legal objection.

2. On several occasions over the past 12 years, DO/IMS has proposed that the Agency identify and destroy MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL records in accordance with routine records destruction schedules. The major reason not to do so has been the existence of litigation that has necessitated retention of those records. With the settlement of the National Lawyers' Guild litigation, a major obstacle to routine records destruction appears to have been eliminated.

3. That case alone, however, does not govern the records retention or destruction of MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files. In addition, destruction may proceed only in accordance with the records disposition authorization provided by the Archivist on 17 March 1978. (Job Nos. NC1-263-77-18 and NC1-263-78-1). The approval given by the Archivist is subject to essentially the following conditions: (1) files and documents that are the objects of FOIA and Privacy Act requests, or those involved in any other litigation, are not to be destroyed; (2) files that document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the projects, and other files on U.S. persons of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency is required to maintain, are not to be destroyed; (3) no disposal will occur prior to review and concurrence of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

4. In reviewing the materials you have provided, I have been able to conclude that then SSCI Chairman, Birch Bayh, in several separate letters dated 6 April 1978, informed the DCI that the Committee had no objection to the implementation of the records disposal lists approved by the Archivist. In my

view, therefore, condition number (3) has been satisfied. Accordingly, with the exception of the case of Hurwitz v. United States, there appear to be no ongoing court cases relating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files that necessitate the retention of those materials. All HTLINGUAL materials relating to Leo T. Hurwitz, therefore, should be retained. In addition, any records pertaining to Dr. Sidney M. Peck (Peck v. CIA) should be retained. I am not aware of any other matters that would require retention of the files at the present time, but you should contact the Agency's FOIA Coordinator to determine if there are any outstanding FOIA or Privacy Act requests relating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL that should not be destroyed. If so, materials should be retained in accordance with the requirements of the Records Disposal List. Finally, of course, information that the Agency must maintain that is of foreign intelligence value also should not be destroyed.

4. I would also point out that the terms of the National Lawyers Guild settlement require that all agencies of the Federal Government, including the CIA, shall not use, release or disclose, within or outside the Government, certain information relating to the National Lawyers Guild and its subunits. Accordingly, if there is CIA information derived from the FBI's investigation relating to the National Lawyers' Guild, Agency records, files or indices must be appropriately marked so as to permit implementation of the settlement agreement. This means that, to the extent MHCHAOS records are not isolated but are contained in other Agency files, some means of ensuring that the information is not disseminated must be made.

5. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.

Wm George Jameson
W. George Jameson

cc: C/ALD/OGC

9 February 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: OGC/Litigation STEVE

FROM: Terri Eagal
Information Review Team

SUBJECT: Files Scheduled For Destruction

1. On 7 February 1994, this office was given direction by Mr. Archibald, Legal Advisor for the Office of Security, to deal directly with your office in reference to the attached.

2. If you have any questions about the attached, please feel free to call on 40615. Your prompt assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

3. Thank you for your coordination and cooperation in assisting the Records Control Schedule Analysts; Terri Eagal 40615 and Lydia Hoffman 40616.

Terri Eagal
Information Review Team

SECRET

9 December 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: James Archibald
Office of Security, Legal Advisor

FROM: Terri Eagal
Information Review Team

SUBJECT: HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER Files

1. On 7 December 1993, this office coordinated with Barry Zeeman of DO/IMS, on 47411, in reference to the HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER Files. I asked Mr. Zeeman if his office had any problems with our office destroying these files as they were within our guidelines for destruction. He responded by saying that they had retired their files in 1991 and would have to look into it further. On 8 December 1993, Mr. Zeeman called to say that his office, DO/IMS, had no problem with us destroying our support files to their HT LINGUAL project as they destroyed their files in the late 1980's. The few files they retired in 1991 were on the Administrative and Policy issues of HT LINGUAL.

2. Since the DO no longer has a need for the information in these files (list is attached) and has essentially approved their destruction, we have supplied to you copies of our own Security Records Control Schedule which verifies that these files meet destruction criteria. As you can see though, by the comment on the SR POINTER Files, we need to be sure there is no litigation open before we destroy.

3. In light of paragraph 2, our office now awaits OGC approval. Your coordination with OGC in this effort is greatly appreciated. Please note, destruction of these files include the SR POINTER name index which is currently utilized by this office for the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act (PA) cases. Destruction of this index will aid in decreasing unnecessary review and research on part of FOIA and PA.

4. Thank you. If we can be of any assistance to you, please call either Barbara Deavers on 40268, Terri Eagal on 40615 or Lydia Hoffman on 40615.

Terri Eagal
Information Review Team

Distribution:
Original - Jim Archibald
cc - Len Kaplan

CL BY 2039256
DECL OADR
DRV FM SEC 13-87

SECRET

RCS
31-83

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
28	**Security File Review Log.**		
	Lists of security files received by External Activities Branch personnel in connection with external activities, requests, and cover and documentation matters.		TEMPORARY. Destroy when 6 months old.
29	**Security Duty Office Reporting Files.**		
	Security Duty Office events reports. Duplicate copies of reports prepared by Security Duty Officers concerning individuals who contact the Agency. (Published in the *Federal Register*, CIA-51, Notification of Systems of Records, Privacy Act of 1974. The *Federal Register* must be amended if this system is changed or discontinued.)		TEMPORARY. Destroy 5 years after cutoff. Cut off at end of each calendar year, hold in current files area for 2 years, transfer to AARC for 3 years, then destroy.
30	**Security Duty Office Operational and Instruction Files.**		
	a. Copies of survey reports, guard post instructions and duty officer rosters.		TEMPORARY. Destroy when superseded obsolete, or no longer needed.
	b. Record copies of requests for telephone backstopping [illegible]		TEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after cutoff. Cut off when backstop arrangement is terminated, hold in current files area for 3 years, then destroy.
31	**Security Support Files.**		
	Record copies of correspondence and reports on operational activities in connection with Office of Security projects.		TEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after cutoff. Cut off at termination of project, hold in current files area for 1 year, transfer to AARC for 2 years, then destroy.

RCS
31-76

SECRET

D SCHEDULE ITEM NO(S).	NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
1		SPECIAL PROJECT MATERIAL Record copies of reports pertaining to the SRPOINTER Project. (Discontinued).			Temporary. Hold in current file area until litigation concluded then destroy.

Security Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files

David G. Ellis
Mail Intercept Program
McAuley, Peter F. SFN 156003
McAuley, Peter F.
99358 PROJECT CHAPERON
OS-PROJECT POINTER
PROJECT SETTER SFN 159144
PROJECT SETTER
SRINDIAN SFN 507356
PROJECT SRINDIAN
SR POINTER/REDSKIN
SR POINTER
PROJECT SR POINTER
PROJECT SR POINTER Cuban Watch List
SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL Material Duplicated from CI Staff.
Report JAN 29 75
Draft Memorandum on Background of SR POINTER Prepared 23DEC74
OS Personnel Directly and Indirectly Involved with SR POINTER
WESTPOINTER SFN 583870
PROJECT WESTPOINTER
SSD Mail Cover
U.S. Post Office Liaison
File with no name related to Mail
SR POINTER INDEX
VOL 1 SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL
VOL 2 SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL
VOL 3 Record of BANJOES Received
VOL 4 PROJECT HT LINGUAL Clearance #90079 29NOV56-29NOV63
VOL 5 SR POINTER General Admin and Policy April 63
VOL 6 Original SR POINTER Documents
VOL 7 Documents Reviewed by George Clark OGC
VOL 8 SR POINTER SFN 119144 Informant BANJO
VOL 9 PROJECT SR POINTER Admin 11JUN52-5FEB58 #77826
VOL 10 HT LINGUAL Statistics SFN 119144
VOL 11 SR POINTER GENERAL SFN 93466
VOL 12 PROJECT Outline and Cronology #77826
VOL 13 Record of BANJOES Received (VOL 6)
VOL 14 SR POINTER Statistics JAN68-MAR70
VOL 15 SR POINTER
VOL 16 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Policy 18JAN62-29MAR63
VOL 17 SR POINTER 13MAR70 #90079
VOL 18 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Ploicy 27JUL54-19DEC61
VOL 19 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 1FEB56-2SEP58 Memos to CI Staff
VOL 20 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 9SEP58-15AUG60 Memos to CI Staff

Security Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files

VOL 21 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 26AUG60-6JUN62 Memos to CI Staff
VOL 22 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 25JUN62-25MAR64 Memos to CI Staff
VOL 23 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 2JUL53-27DEC57
VOL 24 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 8JAN58-22DEC58
VOL 25 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 7JAN59-22DEC60
VOL 26 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 3JAN61-27DEC61
VOL 27 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 23JAN63-2MAR64
VOL 28 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 25MAR64-23DEC64
VOL 29 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 4JAN66-29MAR67
VOL 30 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 30MAR67
VOL 31 FANFOLD Coding System #90079
VOL 32 Watch List JAN66
VOL 33 #90079 DC Survey
VOL 34 #94866 Radio Moscow
VOL 35 SFN 77826 PROJECT SR POINTER Post Office Department, Relations With
VOL 36 PROJECT DAYLIGHT SFN 243550
VOL 37 Review of HT LINGUAL Project Outline 10AUG59
VOL 38 POINTER

13-00000

SR POINTER Information

HT LINGUAL- A DO project. Opening U.S. citizen's mail going to other countries (mostly Soviet Union) & mail incoming from other countries (1950's). Most mail was opened in NY. Actual opening & monitoring of mail assigned to OS with info turned over to the DO.

SR POINTER- OS name for HT LINGUAL

WESTPOINTER- Opening mail in San Fransico (also known as MK SOURDOUGH). Targeted the Chinese.

PROJECT INDIAN- Targeted mail to/from Pakistan.

BANJO- Actual letters (copies) intercepted.

PROJECT SETTER- Mail opened in New Orleans, targeting South America.

Project was exposed in Rockefellar Commission report. Project names release with JFK info.

06 December 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Phil Boycan
Services Team Leader

FROM: William Marshall
Services Team

SUBJECT: Transfer of POINTER and related files

REFERENCE: Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993 from Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT) to Jim Archibald (OGC)

Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993, from Jim Archibald (OGC) to Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT)

1. On 30 November 1993, Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB) received a copy of an Office of General Counsel (OGC) memorandum, dated 23 November 1993, wherein Jim Archibald advised that it would be prudent for I&SB to transfer the below list of files to the Information Review Team (IRT).

2. In accordance with this memorandum, I&SB (3S04 Stafford) transferred the below list of files, on 06 December 1993, to Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT) via Barbara Deavers (G20 Stafford).

3. Therefore, as of 06 December 1993, I&SB considers itself absolved of the responsibility as custodian of the files. Conversely, as of 06 December, IRT assumes the responsibility as custodian of the files.

FILES TRANSFERRED FROM OS/I&SB TO OS/IRT:

1.	HT LINGUAL (BANJO)	0119144
2.	WESTPOINTER	0583870
3.	SR POINTER	No case number visible
4.	DAVID G. ELLIS FILE	No case number visible
5.	PROJECT INDIAN	No case number visible

(Continued on next page)

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY 0701140
DECL OADR
DERV FRM COV 1-82

(Continued)

6.	HT LINGUAL	0090079
7.	SR POINTER/OS PERSONNEL	No case number visible
8.	HT LINGUAL	0090079
9.	PROJECT HT LINGUAL	0090079
10.	HT LINGUAL	0090079
11.	SR POINTER	0077826
12.	SR POINTER	0093466
13.	SR POINTER (BANJO)	0119144
14.	SR POINTER (BANJO)	0119144
15.	WATCH LIST	No case number visible
16.	HT LINGUAL	0119144
17.	DC SURVEY	0090079
18.	PROJECT DAYLIGHT	0243550
19.	SR POINTER (CUBAN WATCHLIST)	No case number visible
20.	HT LINGUAL (BANJO)	0119144
21.	HT LINGUAL	No case number visible
22.	SR POINTER (BANJO)	0119144
23.	RADIO AMATEURS IN USSR	No case number visible
24.	FANFOLD CODING SYSTEM	0090079
25.	SR POINTER (MAPS)	No case number visible
26.	RADIO MOSCOW	0094866
27.	PROJECT CHAPERON	0099358
28.	SR POINTER	No case number visible
29.	MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAM	No case number visible
30.	SR POINTER	0090079
31.	PROJECT OUTLINE CHRONO/SR POINTER	0077826
32.	PETER MEAULEY	0156003
33.	US POST OFFICE LIAISON	No case number visible
34.	SSD MAIL COVER	No case number visible
35.	PROJECT SETTER	0159144
36.	SR POINTER/REDSKIN	No case number visible
37.	SR POINTER	No case number visible
38.	OS PROJECT POINTER	No case number visible
39.	RECORD OF BANJOES	No case number visible
40.	SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL	No case number visible
41.	SR POINTER	No case number visible
42.	HT LINGUAL	No case number visible
43.	SR POINTER	0090079
44.	ORIGINAL SR POINTER	No case number visible
45.	SR POINTER/BANJO	0119144
46.	SR POINTER/BANJO	0119144
47.	SR POINTER/BANJO	0119144
48.	HT LINGUAL	0119144
49.	SR POINTER	No case number visible

(Continued)

50.	PROJECT HT LINGUAL	0090079
51.	PROJECT SR POINTER	0077826
52.	SR POINTER	0093466
53.	SR POINTER	0093466
54.	SR POINTER	No case number visible
55.	BANJO	No case number visible
56.	CLAUDETTE BOUFFARD	No case number visible
57.	CLARE LENK	No case number visible
58.	STOLEN AGENCY CREDENTIAL	No case number visible
59.	SR POINTER	0090079

William Marshall (C)
OS/I&SB

Barbara Deavers (C)
OS/IRT

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
REMOVAL OF SRPOINTER FILES FROM 3S04 STAFFORD TO G20 STAFFORD

FROM: Leonard M. Kaplan C/IRT G20 Stafford	EXTENSION 40285	NO. DATE 23 Nov 93

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OS/Legal Advisor	11-24	11-27		Len - I have been informed that the SRPOINTER files are a subgroup of the HTLINGUAL files. I recently recommended to OS that it coordinate with the DO's IMOs and the Agency's FOIA Office to determine the ultimate disposition of these files. In the interim, I agree that it would be prudent to allow your office to retain these files. Please call me if you'd like to discuss this matter further.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. Please call when signed. Thank you.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

23 November 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: James Archibald, OS Legal Advisor
6N20 Stafford Building

FROM: Leonard M. Kaplan
Chief, Information Review Team
Office of Security

SUBJECT: Removal of SRPOINTER Files from 3S04 Stafford (I&SB) to G20 Stafford (IRT)

1. Per a telephonic conversation with Will Marshall of the OS/Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB), this memo will formally request a transfer/relocation of the noted SRPOINTER files to OS/Information Review Team (IRT).

2. I&SB is currently holding the SRPOINTER files as Mr. John Daley, formerly an I&SB Security Officer, served as the OS referent, as well as for his historical perspectives of the files. Mr. Daley has since retired and it has been informally agreed that IRT will serve as the focal point holder of the files.

3. A formal transfer will serve to alleviate I&SB's role as an "intermediary" in the occasional to frequent use of the SRPOINTER files for IRT's formal responses to Freedom of Information and Privacy Act requests. Additionally, as IRT serves as the focal point for other public and Agency requests, it is necessary to reference these files.

4. Your concurrence is required per C/I&SB instructions for a formal move of the SRPOINTER files from 3S04 Stafford to G20 Stafford.

Leonard M. Kaplan

Leonard M. Kaplan

Concurrence: * See note on router

James Archibald

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY 2129112
DECL OADR
DERV FRM COV 1-82

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL
USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)
Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

FROM
J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group/CSI
2E20 IPB

Extension
31825

NO.
CSI 97-210

DATE
9 May 1997

TO (Officer designation, room, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICIAL'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. John Pereira, C/HRG 2E20 IPB	9May97		JP	
2.				
3. Janet A. Ecklund C/IMB, OPS 1S12 Stafford				
4.				
5. J. Barry Harrelson CSI/HRG 2E20 IPB				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				

FORM 1-92 610 (EF) USE EDITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL
USE ONLY

CSI 97-210
9 May 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

VIA: Chief, Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

REFERENCE: A. Memo for C/IMB, dtd 27 Feb. 97, Same Subject
B. Memo for DA/DO IROs (CSI 97-062), dtd 31 Jan 97

The following actions need to be taken to complete the Agency's response to the JFK Board's Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files):

a. Response to Request: CIA has to provide an official response that will become a part of the public record. The response should be a releasable version of your memorandum of 27 February 1997; according to the classification markings, most of the text is unclassified. I recommend that you send me an annotated copy indicating what can be released. I will prepare the response and coordinate it with you. Also please review the attachments to the memorandum for **possible** release. The JFK Board **may** consider documentation of the destruction of potentially relevant files as assassination records. HRG will handle any additional coordination (OGC, DO, etc.) required.

b. Transfer of Oswald's OS File(#0351164): The original Office of Security subject file on Oswald currently held by the Office of Personnel Security should be transferred to the Historical Review Group. The file will be incorporated into the Agency's JFK Assassination Collection and reviewed for release under the JFK Act of 1992. Most documents in this file will probably be duplicates of documents in the HSCA sequestered material held by HRG, however, under the JFK law all "Oswald" files are considered assassination records. The ARRB staff has asked for access to the file when practical.

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

c. Defectors File (#0341008): The ARRB staff has requested access to the parts of the Defector File that contain the Oswald documents, items a-f, listed in your 27 February memorandum. (We were unable to locate documents "e" and "f" in the HSCA sequestered collection.) Assassination- and Oswald-related documents in this file will most likely be declared assassination records. HRG will handle any third Agency coordination required.

Please let me know when it will be possible to give the ARRB staff access to the files. The access is considered for background purposes only, and any notes taken will be reviewed by your staff and HRG. If a file is considered sensitive, access can be restricted to one ARRB staff member and monitored by your staff. The review can take place either at your office or in HRG. If you any questions, please give me a call, secure 31825.

J. Barry Harrelson

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

DCI/CSI/HRG/JBHarrelson:bas/x31806 (9 May 97)
g:hrg/req#16OS.doc

Distribution:

Original - Addressee
1 C/IP&CRD
1 Linda Cipriani, OGC
1 - C/HRG
1 - B. Harrelson
1 - HRG File

13-00000

5 June 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of OS Records on LHO and Defectors

FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC

1. Over the course of three half days, 29 May, 2 and 4 June, 1997 ARRB Staff member Michelle Combs reviewed the Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald and a multi-volume file collection entitled "Defectors." These were made available by Ms. Janet Ecklund in OS offices in Stafford Building.

2. At the request of OS, the undersigned was present during the review. Mrs. Combs took notes of items of interest and put yellow stickies on a number of documents. She advised Ms. Ecklund that she (Mrs. Combs) would write a memorandum on what she had done and pass it to Mr. Gunn. Further, she advised that Mr. Gunn might want review the files personally.

3. Ms. Ecklund stated she would keep these files segregated within her office for quick retrieval if we wanted to see them again.

Gary Breneman

27 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
AIN: 0351164

1. The Office of Personnel Security was tasked on 31 January 1997 by the Historical Review Group/Center for the Study of Intelligence(HRG/CSI), via the Directorate of Administration/Information Review Office, with researching pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The tasking was generated by the John F. Kennedy Board's desire to review and declassify relevant material. The results of this review were forwarded to the HRG/CSI on 27 February 1997.

2. During the Information Management Branch's (IMB)research in response to the above tasking it was noted that Volume V of the Oswald files was not on the shelf where Volumes I-IV and VI-VII were located. A search of the entire area where the volumes had been maintained failed to locate Volume V. The IMB Files Section was subsequently charged with conducting an all out search for the missing volume. The search failed to find Volume V.

3. In July 1997, the Oswald files were reviewed page by page prior to being turned over to HRG/CSI and another attempt was made to locate Volume V or to locate persons who might know what happened to it. Volume V was not located nor were any persons located who were knowledgeable of its status.

4. During the complete review of the Oswald files no time gap was apparent and no one was located who could recall ever seeing Volume V. This would suggest that either Volume V had been consolidated into other volumes or that Volume V never existed, but that a numbering error resulted in what should have been Volume V being labeled as Volume VI. The use of Roman numerals on the cover of the volumes might have caused this error to occur.

13-00000

file cy

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

24 December 1997

Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E. Street, N.W. (2nd Floor)
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Dr. Gunn:

Re: Request for Additional Information and Records
No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) and
No. CIA-IR-24 (Defector File)

This is a partial response to the ARRB's referent request for pre-assassination files this Agency may have had on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is believed the following comments and two enclosed documents fully respond to the Office of Security questions. The DO response is pending.

1. At Tab A is a 22 December 1997 memorandum containing information from the Agency's Office of Personnel Security which provides details about the files it had on Oswald prior to the assassination plus when and why they were created. These include the Office of Security file on Oswald, a general file on Americans who had defected to another country and information about HTLINGUAL files.

2. Also enclosed at Tab B is a 27 October 1977 memorandum from the Office of Personal Security which explains the numbering of that Office's file on Oswald. In particular, it explains why the "missing" volume V may never have existed.

3. An ARRB staff member has reviewed the Oswald Security file and the file on American defectors.

4. The Oswald Office of Personnel Security file and those pages of the defector file deemed relevant by the ARRB staff member have been forwarded to HRG for review and will be processed according to current release guidelines.

If you have any questions about this response, please advise.

Sincerely,

J. Barry Harrelson

22 December 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. Pursuant to ARRB "Resquet No. CIA-16,the Office of Personnel Security conducted research for and existing pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The following responses are provided to those questions which pertain to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

> **Question 1:** Please identify, as specifically as possible, *each* file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response: At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. One file entitled "Defectors File" (#0341008), contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, and the second file was Office of Security subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

2. Within the ARRB request is specific mention of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files. Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

Question 2: For other than the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

Response: As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

3. HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project involving the opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In the Office of Security this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. The Office of Security actually conducted the opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information being referred to the Directorate of Operations.

4. The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This file contained information was from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960

c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

5. The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors and provided limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of the Office of Security. Efforts to locate this listing or determine its disposition have been unsuccessful.

6. Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. An employee of this Office was, recalls the Defector Machine Listing as being approximately one and one-half inches thick and in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained the limited biographic data on each name.

7. The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959

b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure

r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months

Leaves Soviet 'Home'"

s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

8. In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald

u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963

y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

Response: It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

9. Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

10. The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

11. A representataive of the Office of Personnel Security /Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. He made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

file cy

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

16 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM

SUBJECT: CIA-16, Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

1. This is further to my letter of 24 December 1997 in response to referent request.

2. That letter, was a partial response which provided the Office of Personnel Security's information. The Directorate of Operations' (DO) response was still pending. The DO response was provided on 2 September 1998 and it is attached.

3. Please note that both responses are contained in the Agency's Compliance Declaration dated 2 September 1998 at Attachment V(2).

4. This completes the Agency's action on CIA-16. If you have any questions about this matter, please advise.

Sincerely,

J. Barry Harrelson

Encl. A/S

DO Response to Board Request CIA - 16
Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201.

Prior to establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedures that upon opening a 201, the documents from an interest file would be transferred to the 201.

Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of material which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection

In sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the information we are aware of that we had prior to the assassination.

5 DEC 96

file
(see notes, on attached)

5 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
DO JFK Focal Point

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
CSI/HRG
JFK Project Officer

SUBJECT: Priority Requests from ARRB Staff

REFERENCE:

REQUESTS:

1. **The ARRB Staff is planning to interview Russ Holmes about his JFK Ancillary (working) Files. Dave Marwell has requested that Holmes be given on one day clearance** so that he can look to the files. How do you want to handle?

2. **Has David Vance Vanek (SSN 482-36-5577)** ever worked for the Agency (DO)? Vanek is an army officer who served in Thailand and Vietnam; could have been detailed to Agency. He figures in one of the conspiracy theories that the ARRB staff is currently taking depositions on. Can DO check or is this an OP issue -- we have not had a lot of luck with OP. Initially the ARRB staff was going to make this a formal request, but agreed to hold off for the moment. The theory involves counter-terrorism training and the death of an American with knowledge of JFK assassination.

3. **Agency Officers in Moscow:** The ARRB staff is researching Oswald's contacts in Moscow. The records shows that he came into contact with other Americans besides Snyder (the Consular Officer). Gunn requested a list of the CIA officers in Moscow a few weeks ago. Based on discussions with Ellie, etc., I told him a list did not exist and would be considered very sensitive if we did prepare one. I ask him to be more specific; if he had names, we would check against Agency records. Since then his staff has located a list of senior officers in Moscow prepared for the HSCA (Eileen has copy). He has now resurrected his requests. Let discuss the next step.

4. **Did Mrs. G. Stanley Brown (Verna Deane Stebbens Brown, born 12 August 1928) work for the Agency; what was her status when she was in Moscow as Embassy receptionist/secretary?** She is the wife of George Stanley Brown, an Agency employee from 1952-1962. According to the ARRB staff, she had contact with Oswald (see item #3).

I will give you a call on Friday to discuss our responses to the above request..

CC:

13-00000

27 Oct 96
work copy

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

October 27, 1996

Mr. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: Status of Assassination Records Review Board Requests to CIA for Additional Information and Records

Dear Barry:

I am writing to follow-up on our letter of October 7, 1996, regarding the status of Assassination Records Review Board requests for information and records from the CIA.

Formal Requests:

CIA-1

Review Board staff review continues. No CIA action needed at this time.

CIA-6 (Cables and dispatches)

CIA has agreed to make records available (or to have a response) by November 1, 1996.

CIA-7 (Histories)

Counterintelligence. CIA has made material available and Review Board staff examination is ongoing.

Mexico City. The Review Board awaits CIA's compilation of the portion of the Mexico Station history that was shown to G. Robert Blakey.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

Other Histories. No response has been received to our agreement that CIA identify within two weeks the histories that can be made available and those that should be subject to further discussions.

CIA-8 (Intelligence community staff)

CIA had promised to provide a report to the Review Board within two weeks. Nothing has been made available.

CIA-9 (Publications and analytical materials)

We have received no materials responsive to this request. Additionally, no response has be received from CIA regarding the list of publications that are identified in an LBJ Library finding aid that the Review Board staff provided.

CIA-10 (Interagency source register)

CIA has not yet made available the records that it had agreed to provide within two weeks. (was Oswald on)

CIA-11 (Duran's original statement)

CIA has agreed to make some further attempts to locate Duran's original statement.

CIA-12 (JMWAVE materials)

CIA has agreed to make materials available on a rolling basis.

Informal requests:

Spas Rankin. CIA has made the Spas Rankin file available to the Review Board. Review Board staff research continues. When research is complete, staff will discuss issues with CIA. files from collection pulled / waiting ARRB staff review

IN 23738. CIA is searching for cable number IN 23738 (7 July 1962). - copy sent

Marilyn Murrett. CIA has made the Marilyn Murrett file available to the Review Board. Review Board staff research continues. When research is complete, staff will discuss issues with CIA.

HTLINGUAL. It is the Review Board staff's understanding that CIA continues its search for HTLINGUAL records and will provide an oral briefing on the subject. It is also our understanding that some HTLINGUAL records have been located, but that they have not yet been made available to the Review Board.

Recent and additional informal requests that we have discussed with you:

Operational Reports for Cuban Exile Groups. The Review Board staff has been unable to locate in the collection monthly operational reports for the DRE, CRC, or MRR for the period between March 1963 and March 1964. Please advise us whether these records exist and when we may review them.

Moscow. CIA has been asked to search for additional information regarding Mosco as discussed with Michelle Combs on October 24, 1996.

Tape. CIA has been asked to search for additional information regarding a tape as discussed with Irene Marr on October 24, 1996.

Please let me know of any inaccuracies in this letter or any suggestions that you have. Thank you for your help and cooperation.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel and Associate Director for Research

9 JAN 97

SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

MEMORANDUM

To: Barry Harrelson

From: T. Jeremy Gunn

Subject: Requests to CIA for Records-Related Information- UPDATE

Date: January 9, 1997

The following is a list of our current requests for information. These should be considered informal requests for which we await your response. If you have any additional questions or responses, you should call either Bob Skwirot or the analysts identified below. We are willing to formalize any of the requests into our numbered series if you would so prefer.

[illegible]	Date of Request	Subject	[illegible]
partial response 10/96	9/6/96	Spas Raikin files. Are all files in collection? If CIA has any additional files (e.g., personnel, 201, etc.), we would like to request them.	Combs
pending	9/6/96	Spas Raikin file in Box 15 folder 34. Who is the person signing the DCD messages? Did Raikin work for CIA? Did he work for DCD/OO? What is relationship between documents in file and Raikin?	Combs
pending	9/6/96	Location of cable identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630 (Box 34, F 22) p. 2. Cable number (IN 24738) 7 July 62. We can send fax if helpful.	Legaspi
partial response 10/96	9/6/96	Marilyn D. Murret files. Are all files in collection? If CIA has any additional files (e.g., personnel, 201, etc.), we would like to request them.	Combs
pending	9/96	Information on HTLINGUAL	Combs
complete 10/96	9/96	Information on Angleton's filing system at CI	Combs
pending	10/17/96	Location of DRE, CRC, MRR(?) monthly operational reports	Legaspi
pending	10/24/96	Tapes	Marr
pending	10/24/96	Moscow	Combs
pending	11/06/96	Tapes of Alvarado Interrogation	Marr
pending	12/10/96	New Orleans, Hunter Leake, Clay Shaw, QKENCHANT, and ZRCLIFF	Legaspi
pending	12/10/96	Claude Barnes Capehart	Skwirot
pending	01/07/97	Howard Guebler	Gunn

re CIA-IR-01

18 DEC 97

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

December 18, 1997

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Mr. John Pereira
Chief
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: Status of CIA Responses to Assassination Records Review Board's Requests for Additional Information and Records

Dear John:

I am writing to follow-up on our telephone call earlier today and to convey my serious concern about the status of CIA's responses to the Review Board's requests for additional information and records. Although CIA has completed its responses to several requests, and many others have been answered in part, a significant number of requests have not been answered — including some that were made more than two years ago. On many occasions we have been assured that responses would be forthcoming, only to have promised dates come and go without answers. It is now extremely important that these requests be answered promptly so that we may conduct a proper follow-up if necessary. The issues that we can now identify as being of the highest priority are identified in the text below by double asterisks (**)[1] and we request that they be answered within the next month. We request that the remaining requests be answered by April 1, 1998.

The remainder of this letter is divided into two parts: first, a listing of the formal requests for information and records, and second, a listing of the informal requests for information and records. Please let me know if your understanding of any of the following points differs from ours so that we can resolve any potential discrepancies.

---

[1] As identified more fully below, the issues are: CIA-1 Organizational Material, CIA-6 Cables and Dispatches, CIA-13 Backchannel Communications, CIA-IR-03 HTLINGUAL Documents, CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton Files, CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart, CIA-IR-15 Electronic "take" from Mexico City, CIA-IR-21 DRE Monthly Operational Reports, CIA-IR-22 "A" Files on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*

Informal Requests

Each of the following informal requests was previously made to CIA. For future reference, they will be referred to by the "Informal Request" (IR) number provided below.

CIA-IR-01 Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-64 (*see* RIF 104-10065-10199).

This request is complete.

CIA-IR-02 Location of Cable Identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630.

This request is complete.

**CIA-IR-03 Full Computer Search for List of Documents in HTLINGUAL File.

CIA agreed to undertake a computer run for all HTLINGUAL documents in April 1997. To date, no response has been received by ARRB. All computer searches for these documents should be documented in a formal letter for the record.

**CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton's Files.

The Review Board seeks to ensure that it has taken all reasonable steps to account for any files that James Jesus Angleton possessed or controlled that related to the assassination and to Lee Harvey Oswald. Because of the perceived controversy surrounding the disposition of Angleton's files, the Review Board believes it prudent to obtain a clear understanding of the types of files that he maintained and their ultimate disposition. (The Review Board does not seek to explore any subjects in Angleton's files beyond those that may have pertained to the assassination.) To date, CIA has made available certain documents provided by the CIC and the case files for *Mangold v. CIA*. The Review Board requests any additional information in the possession of CIA that would explain the disposition of Angleton's files.

In addition, the ARRB staff's review of the *Mangold v. CIA* files designated additional documents from those files as assassination records. These documents are: Tab D, documents Nos. 95, 109-116, 120, and 121; and from the Denied

MEMORANDUM

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

July 20, 1998

To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader

From: Michelle Combs Michelle Combs
Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject: CIA-IR-01 Personnel Assigned to Post in 104-10065-10199 from 1959-1964

In response to ARRB's first informal request, CIA provided several documents from the Directorate of Operations which contained lists of the CIA employees assigned to the country post found in record number 104-10065-10199. These lists of CIA employees were not designated as assassination records.

e:\combs\cia-ir01.wpd
File 4.20.1 and 4.20.4

12 Sep 98

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

12 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Laura Denk
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-1, CIA Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-64

1. This is in response to referent request.

2. Searches were made for information responsive to the request and materials were provided for examination by ARRB staff. No documents were selected for the JFK Collection.

3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request. If you have any question, please advise.

J. Barry Harrelson

file cy

17 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-35, Source Identified in RIF Number
104-10151-1-206

1. The following is in response to subject request.

2. Searches were made for information responsive to subject request and materials were provided for examination by the ARRB staff. From that examination, staff members selected a number of documents. Those documents have now been included within the Lee Harvey Oswald 201 file to be processed and released to NARA.

3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request. If you have any questions, please advise.

J. Barry Harrelson

13-00000

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO [illegible]
DECLAS[illegible]
[illegible]

September 12, 1998

To: Laura Denk
Executive Director

cc: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader

From: Michelle Combs Michelle Combs
Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject: CIA-IR-35 Source Identified in RIF 104-10151-10206

In CIA Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-35, the Review Board requested additional information on a source identified in RIF number 104-10151-10206 as having given the CIA additional information on Lee and Marina Oswald and their time in the Soviet Union. At the request of the Review Board, the CIA searched its compartmented files and databases for additional information on this source and the raw intelligence information given by this source to the CIA. CIA provided the source's 201 file which was examined by the Review Board staff. No assassination records were designated from this 201 file. CIA also provided sections of briefing reports, an audiotape, and portions of transcripts of conversations between the source and interviewers on Lee Harvey Oswald. A final memorandum from this source was also found to be located in the post-1978 volume of Oswald's 201 file. All of these materials were designated as assassination records and will be included in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.

Given the recentness of the information and the sensitivity of the source, the Review Board agreed to protect the source's true name and cryptonym. Documents from this source are identified as the product of "a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts."

e:\combs\cia-ir35.wpd
File 4.20.1 and 4.20.4

OIM-98-0084
06 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

1. (S) The CIA Deputy Executive Director has asked that I respond to the Assassination Records Review Board ("ARRB" or "Board") regarding their current deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER). It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the *Los Angeles Times* article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US intelligence interests.

2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (*e.g.*, "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable.

3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations.

4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety. The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided

CL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIM
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
Decl On: X1
Drv From: HUM 4-82

information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER). It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... *bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]*." **It is this final fact which is critical to our request. By having released this substantive information -- *"bona fides ... established"* -- and by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, we must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.**

5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:

- what information was compromised?
- what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?
- what understanding of the information did the service(s) have?
- what information did the intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the United States?

6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.

7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a foreign government fully understands the substance (*i.e.*, the import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a

satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other information they had acquired through signals intelligence, concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e., concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was directly and immediately lost.

8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment of the United States; if they do not, the United States may escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.

9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the *Los Angeles Times* article. The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (*i.e.*, IJDECANTER) defected to the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said; ***they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.*** And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.

10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion, we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed, the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period of time.

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

11. (S) In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including, of course, information on the public record via the media.

12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:

- First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the Russians ~~are~~ fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.
- Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.
- And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control; the CIA has pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that it is publicly known at least to some degree. However, because his wife, child and father remain in Russia today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and consider postponement also for this reason. Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release.

Lee S. Strickland

CIA TALKING POINTS

re Protection of "IJDECANTER" Cryptonym Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)

26 AUGUST 1998

- The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of Operations and the CIA.
  - We request the postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER).
  - It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the *Los Angeles Times* article of 29 December 1997, would:
    - provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-intelligence effort,
    - result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence interests, and,
    - have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.

- Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and objectives, we propose however:
  - a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym ***(e.g., "TRUSTED")*** for the actual cryptonym IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable, and/or,

CL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIM
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
Decl On: X1
Drv From: HUM 4-82

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

  - if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source ***(e.g., "a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts."*** "U"

- As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety.
  - The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source.
  - It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.
  - It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER).
  - It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... *bona fides* ... *fully established [by CIA]*."
  - ***It is this final fact which is critical.***
  - ***By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -- AND by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.***

- I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.

- The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:

  - what information was compromised?

  - what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?

  - what understanding of the information did the receiving intelligence service(s) have?

  - what information did the receiving intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the other party?

- The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.

- Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.

- Question 3 is important (*e.g.,* Boyce Lee case) but is not really an issue here since the US fully understood the information presented.

- Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for exploitation.

  - If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset (*e.g.,* a defector), they act on the information to the detriment of the other service.

  - If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree.
  - This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.

- In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the *Los Angeles Times* article.
  - The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (*i.e.*, IJDECANTER) defected to the United States;
  - they know or suspect what he told the US;
  - they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said;
  - ***they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.***
  - ***And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.***

- In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key.
  - The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document.
  - But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,

of course, information on the public record via the media.

- There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of IJDECANTER.
    - Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence organization.
    - It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets -- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at some future point in time.
    - Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current assets or public statements by inactive ones).
    - Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA. Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly against the harder targets (*e.g.*, terrorism).
- There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in the interests of the Board's time. They are not insignificant, however.
    - ONE, is foreign relations.
        - In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal.
        - This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.

- TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service.
    - This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors.
    - The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.

- THIRD, is an equitable issue.
    - The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control;
    - The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;
    - While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial action the current government might take.
    - Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release.
    - But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.

g:\irg_frontoffice\general\lss\arrbijtp.doc
(last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

April 1992

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of April 6, 1992 requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolution 454 were enacted into law.

I should also point out that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently embarking on its own review of assassination records. I would expect that this review will result in the public release of a significant body of information.

To help the committee understand the nature and number of CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing the answers to the specific questions you raised in your letter.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

SUBJECT: Agency Records on the JFK Assassination

OCA/LEG/DMPearline:rw 23 April 1992 (OCA 1123-92)
(OCA 1123-92/1)
(OCA 1123-92/2)

Original - Addressee (w/enclos)
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ExDir
1 - ER
1 - D/OCA (w/enclos)
1 - DMPearline Signer (w/enclos)
1 - OCA/LEG Subject File (w/enclos)
1 - OCA Record (w/enclos)
1 - D/Center for the Study of Intelligence (w/enclos)

13-00000

OCA 1123-92

1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of these records?

Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000 pages of such records which include microfilm of CIA's Oswald file (originally collected in response to the Warren Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records collected in response to specific requests from the HSCA. Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. The vast majority of documents pertaining to Oswald were created in response to specific inquiries from the Warren Commission and HSCA. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the civil rights movement.

2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to the HSCA that may be considered relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and the approximate number of pages.

[illegible]

The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission and the HSCA (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. If the Agency were asked to explore newly advanced theories, the search for documents could be a rather large undertaking involving the review of thousands of additional documents. To conduct any further search, CIA would require specific guidelines describing the kinds of records sought.

no.

not our business — [illegible]

3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originate with the FBI? If so, approximately how many?

about 30

We believe that between 40 percent ~~and 50 percent~~ of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the FBI.

4. Did any of these records originate with any other Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.

A small number of CIA's records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.

5. How many of these records have been reviewed for release under the Freedom of Information Act(FOIA)? How many of these records have been released pursuant to such requests?

CIA has released 7,432 pages of records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, representing 1,969 documents, under the FOIA. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.

50,240,67
1,567
14,763)
250
6,012
15,1

6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many records would be released under the standards contained in House Joint Resolution 454?

It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed because consideration for protection of classified information and other sensitive categories of information would be required on a document by document basis. We would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods and with privacy interests of individuals involved.

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DCI History Staff
316 Ames Building
Washington, D.C. 20505
Phone (703) 351-2621

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

TRANSMITTED DATE: 4/21/92

PAGES TRANSMITTED 8
(cover sheet included)

TRANSMITTED TO:

NAME: JOHN PEREIRA

ORGANIZATION: OGC

BLDG, ROOM

TELE/EXT: 76160 (FAX 874 3208)

SUBJECT: OCA LETTER (W/ENCL) & INR MEMO (W/O ATT.) & CIA HS DRAFT MOU WITH STATE

TRANSMITTED FROM:

NAME: KEN McDONALD

BLDG, ROOM: 316 AMES

TELE/EXT: 30147 (FAX 522 9280)

MESSAGE:

John – The OCA letter (which David Pearline sent us yesterday) has my suggested changes on it. I think I sent you an earlier draft of our proposed access memo of understanding with State, to which the Wilcox memo refers.

Ken

UNCLASSIFIED

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of 6 April requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolutin 454 were enacted into law.

I should also point out that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently embarking on its own review of assassination records. I would expect that this review will result in the public release of a significant body of information.

To help the committee understand the nature and number of CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing the answers to the specific questions you raised in your letter.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of these records?

Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000 pages of such records which ~~consist~~ include microfilm of CIA's Oswald file (originally collected in response to the Warren Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records collected in response to specific requests from the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of names traces requested by the HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the civil rights movement.

2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to the House Assassinations Committee that may be considered relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and the approximate number of pages.

The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. To conduct any further search, CIA would require specific guidelines of the kinds of records sought.

3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation? If so, approximately how many?

We believe that between 40% and 50% of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

4. Did any of these records originate with any other Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.

A small number of CIA's JFK assassination records, probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.

5. How many of these records have been reviewed for release under the Freedom of Information Act? How many of these records have been released pursuant to such requests?

CIA has released 7,432 pages of JFK assassination records, representing 1,969 documents, under the Freedom of Information Act. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.

6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many records would he released under the standards contained in House Joint Resolution 454?

It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed. We would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

13-00000

APR 22 '92 08:48

JOHN GLENN, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

SAM NUNN, GEORGIA
CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
JIM SASSER, TENNESSEE
DAVID PRYOR, ARKANSAS
HERBERT KOHL, WISCONSIN
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT
DANIEL K. AKAKA, HAWAII

WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DELAWARE
TED STEVENS, ALASKA
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
WARREN B. RUDMAN, NEW HAMPSHIRE
JOHN SEYMOUR, CALIFORNIA

LEONARD WEISS, STAFF DIRECTOR
FRANKLIN C. POLK, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL

20 APR 1992
ER 92-2346

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

April 14, 1992

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Dear Director Gates:

I am please to learn that you will be testifying before the Committee on Governmental Affairs on Tuesday, May 12, 1992. The hearing will begin at 9:00 a.m. and be held in Room 342 of the Dirksen Senate Building. The subject of the hearing will be the "Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992." The legislation proposes to create an independent review board to govern and coordinate the release of government information relevant to the assassination of former President John F. Kennedy. As required by Commmittee rules, please have 100 copies of your written testimony delivered to the Committee by close of business, Friday, May 8, 1992. While your written testimony may be as long as you wish, please plan to limit your spoken testimony to five to seven minutes in length.

Your testimony will be extremely helpful to the Committee and to the Congress as it considers this important legislation. While you may discuss whatever aspects of the legislation you desire, particularly how it relates to the records and resources of your agency, the Committee would appreciate learning your views on several specific subjects:

> What are the reasons which the Central Intelligence Agency has records related to the assassination of President Kennedy?
>
> What have the methods been to date for the identification and definition of Central Intelligence Agency records as material related to the assassination of President Kennedy?
>
> What steps has the Central Intelligence Agency made to assess the scope of relevant documents outside of materials requested by earlier investigative or other official committees or commissions, or through the Freedom of Information Act?
>
> What is the volume of material which you might recommend be released to the public without concern for further postponement?

Would you be opposed to a provision requesting agencies, whenever possible, to self-certify materials which may released without agency objection?

What recommendations can you make with regard to the need for interagency working groups to identify third-agency records in agency files, to avoid duplication, and to assist in the efficient disclosure of information to the public?

What are the logistical, manpower, and resource concerns that you have with regard to the review and release of assassination material?

Thank you for your assistance and consideration. I look forward to seeing you on May 12th. In the event that you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Your staff has already been very helpful to the Committee in its preparation for the hearing. They may also contact Dr. Leonard Weiss, Staff Director, or Steven Katz, Counsel, at 202-224-4751.

Sincerely,

John Glenn

John Glenn
Chairman

JHG/sk

13-00000

HEARING
before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
on
S.J. Res. 282:
THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

Tuesday, May 12, 1992
9:00 a.m.
Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

* * * *

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Panel 1:

The Honorable David L. Boren
United States Senator (D-OK)

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senator (R-PA)

The Honorable Louis Stokes
United States Representative (D-OH)

* * * *

Panel 2:

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable Williams Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

* * * *

Panel 3:

James Lesar
President
Assassination Archives and Research Center
Washington, D. C.

Professor Ernest May
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

* * * *

HEARING
before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
on
S.J. Res. 282:
THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

Tuesday, May 12, 1992
9:00 a.m.
Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

* * * *

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Panel 1:

The Honorable David L. Boren
United States Senator (D-OK)

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senator (R-PA)

The Honorable Louis Stokes
United States Representative (D-OH)

* * * *

Panel 2:

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable Williams Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

* * * *

Panel 3:

James Lesar
President
Assassination Archives and Research Center
Washington, D. C.

Professor Ernest May
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

* * * *

4/22/92

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

OUTLINE OF TESTIMONY ON JFK RESOLUTION

A. Agreement with Principles of Legislation.

1. Favor disclosure of as much material on JFK as is consistent with protection of intelligence sources and methods.

2. Established own declassification program. Presumption will be in favor of disclosure.

3. Pledge to cooperate with any reasonable mechanism to declassify documents.

B. Describe Nature and Amount of Records.

1. Reasons for having records.

2. Volume of existing material and who it belongs to.

3. How we have identified material related to JFK assassination.

C. How Much Material Can be Released?

1. Give estimate of amount of material to be released under CIA program or resolution.

2. Describe material that could not be disclosed.

    a. Example of Intelligence Sources and Methods that would require withholding.

    b. Example of material the release of which would invade privacy.

3. Describe resources--manpower and funds-- to achieve results.

D. Concerns with Resolutions.

1. Address only Intelligence Community Concerns. Will defer to DoJ on Constitutional objections.

2. CIA or other agencies that originate documents should conduct initial review of material to determine whether it can be released. Material withheld from public release could then be made available to Review Board.

3. Agencies that originate information should be allowed to review it for release even if that information is contained in a document prepared by another agency or Congress. Suggest interagency working group to handle coordination issues likely to arise with disclosure of third agency documents.

4. Will cooperate with any request by the Board for additional material that has a reasonable relationship to the assassination.

5. Would hope that the Board will consult with DCI before using subpoena power to compel production of material that involves sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

5. Exemptions need to be clarified so as to ensure that deliberative process information and identities of covert employees are protected.

E. **Conclusion:** Pledge to cooperate with whatever mechanism is established to declassify material. Hope that this effort will help to dispel myths regarding JFK assassination.

OCA 2034-92
1 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

1. On 28 April, the undersigned attended a public hearing on the proposed Assassination Materials Disclosure Act conducted by the House Government Operations Legislation and National Security Subcommittee. Majority Committee/Subcommittee Chairman Conyers and Ranking Minority Member Horton were present for the entire hearing; majority Subcommittee members English, Neal, Peterson, and Thornton and minority members Shays and Schiff and full Committee member Martinez attended at least part of the hearing. The Committee's Press release, which criticizes the government and particularly CIA as releasing JFK-related documents "at a snail's pace", and witness statements are attached.

2. The hearing was well attended by the public and attracted much media coverage. Eight witnesses testified in four groups: Congressmen Louis Stokes (assisted by Robert Blakey, former counsel to the House Select Committee on Assassinations) and former HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton testified first. The congressmen were followed by the movie "JFK"'s director Oliver Stone, who was followed by Howard Willens, Counsel to the Warren Commission, and James Johnston, Counsel to the Church Committee. The session closed with a panel comprised of Ms. Leslie Harris, Chief Legislative Counsel for the Washington office of the ACLU; Dr. Herbert Parmet, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College and Graduate School of the City University of New York, and Dr. Harold Rellyea, American National Government Specialist at the Congressional Research Service.

3. Chairman Conyers advised in his opening remarks that the Committee wanted to hear from the Executive branch and thus would hold another hearing session. He noted that "after much negotiation," the Director of Central Intelligence would be testifying in mid-May. He further noted that the Committee also hoped to hear from the Attorney General, but negotiations with the Justice Department were still ongoing. Conyers was criticized of the DoJ at the outset, noting that the Committee had

received a long, single-spaced letter from Justice detailing numerous "legalistic" objections to the resolution, which he characterized as not reflecting a real willingness to work together to release the documents to the American people.

4. The general tone of the session was strongly in favor of the resolution and disclosure of the vast majority of the material. Most witnesses conceded that there might be some materials that required postponement of disclosure, but the bias was clearly toward disclosure. Even Oliver Stone, in response to a comment from Congressman Shays that he (Shays) found it hard to imagine what national security or privacy issues would persist after 30 years, conceded that there might be some exceptions, but Stone thought 98 percent of the material could be released. Several witnesses, including Congressman Stokes and Church Committee counsel, suggested that most national security information should be released under the resolution, but that privacy interests posed greater concerns. Congressman Hamilton warned that the Congress should be careful that nondisclosure "loopholes" do not "swallow up the bill," which is why he said that review by an independent board was so important.

5. Stone's testimony had quite an impact on the hearing. Several congressman and witnesses credited his movie "JFK" as "the reason we are all here today." Chairman Conyers appeared particularly impressed with Stone, describing his testimony in exchanges with later witnesses as "persuasive" and "compelling." A few potentially tough questions were thrown at Stone--did he not over-lionize Garrison; how much research did he do for the movie and did he seek to talk to or obtain information from the government as part of his research process? However, there was no aggressive follow-up to Stone's answers. Discerning observers may have picked up on the fact that Stone's "research" seemed tailored to and limited by pre-conceived conspiracy theories. (For example, when asked if he had talked to President Ford, a member of the Warren Commission and advocate of disclosure of the JFK documents, Stone answered no--that it was pretty obvious where Ford stood as a proponent of the lone gunman theory.)

6. When asked about his personal views, Stone said he believed that there were two conspiracies. The murder conspiracy was small and covert--perhaps involving no more that five to ten people--and was led by the "intelligence agencies." Stone did not mention CIA by name at this point.

He mentioned Oswald's alleged ties to naval intelligence, and also said that a closer look should be taken at an operation "MONGOOSE" and a Colonel Landsdale. He also posited a bigger "cover-up" conspiracy after the fact, spearheaded by President Johnson (who Stone alleged told Earl Warren he would be responsible for World War III if the Commission tied the Cubans into a conspiracy). Stone theorized that a much broader "Establishment", while not directly involved in the assassination, was not sorry to see Kennedy go because he was an agent of profound change embarking upon several courses that disturbed that "Establishment", including pulling out of Vietnam. In response to a later question about various theories, Stone called the Mafia theory a "red-herring." Stone said "as you know, the CIA has always used the Mafia for plausible deniability" and that it was important to look behind the Mafia at "who pulls the strings."

7. Other matters of Agency interest discussed include that both the Warren Commission attorney and particularly the Church Committee attorney castigated CIA for "lying" to the Warren Commission. The particular example offered had to do with "AMLASH." This individual came up in connection with traces the Agency apparently conducted for the Warren Commission. CIA purportedly had a relationship with AMLASH in connection with a Castro assassination plot, but did not make this fact known to the Warren Commission. The witnesses characterized this as pertinent information CIA consciously withheld from the Warren Commission. Also, when the final panel engaged in a broader discussion of government disclosure and FOIA with the subcommittee, the ACLU held up the CIA Openness Task Force report as an example of why FOIA was a "dismal failure" as the mechanism to "vindicate t public's right to know." (On 18 March Conyers rigorously questioned Gary Foster on the task force report when his subcommittee held a hearing on "Government Secrecy After the Cold War.")

8. A major recurring theme was concern that, despite the need to make the documents publicly available, the Administration would not support the resolution and it could be vetoed. Congressman Hamilton stated that, if the resolution were vetoed, he hoped that at minimum the House would pass a resolution to release its own records. (Such an action would be problematic for the Administration, because much Executive branch information is contained in House records, and the House also probably considers documents obtained from Executive agencies as part of its

records.) Most witnesses thought the Congress should try to avoid a constitutional confrontation with the Administration, however, and a few practical suggestions to help work around problems were made. For example, the ACLU suggested that the Review Board might be modeled after the Advisory Committee established in connection with the State Department's preparation of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, with which CIA's historical staff is familiar. This body was established by a provision included in last year's Foreign Relations Authorization Act.

9. In conclusion, the hearing did not get into much detail on provisions of the resolution. Much time was spent on general propositions like the fact that the documents ought to be released and why, and matters tangential to core issues raised by H.R. 454.

Victoria L. Pepper
Assistant General Counsel
Office of Congressional Affairs

13-00000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
~~SECRET~~
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

4 May 1992

TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE OSWALD PRE-ASSASSINATION FILE:

NOT A PART

ADDED LATER

Pages	Date	Description
1	6 Mar 64	Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA
4	30 Jan 76	CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15 Jan 75 on deleting #s.
1	6 Mar 64	DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding.
4	6 Mar 64	Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.
5	6 Mar 64	Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.
1	31 Oct 59	State Cable from Moscow to SecState.
1	"	Redacted copy of same.
1	1 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	2 & 4 Nov	Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query
3	2 Nov 59	Fon Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept
1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Moscow to SecState
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Tokyo to SecState
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	16 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	26 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	25 May 60	Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms
7	12 May 60	Attachment to above
2	12 May 60	FBI report, fr Dallas
2	25 Oct 60	State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors
2	"	Redacted copy of same
1	3 Nov 60	DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	18 Nov 60	Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany draft reply to Cumming
1	undated	Handwritten descrip of letter cited above
2	21 Nov 60	Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US defectors
1	"	Declassified version of Oswald info from ff
7	"	List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter
1	18 Nov 60	Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell
9	21 Nov 60	Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above
2	9 Dec 60	2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald 201
3	11 Jul 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
4	26 May 61	2 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
1	13 Apr 61	DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship and passport (signed Rusk)
1	26 Jan 61	State MemCon re Oswald
1	"	Redacted copy of same
14	13 Jul 61	Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several FBI reports, much of which is illegible
1	28 Sep 61	Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion in Oswald 201
4	13 Oct 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow
1	7 Dec 61	Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info on Oswald

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

1	3 Mar 62	Note saying Navy message of this date is missing from CD 692 sent from Archives
5	26 Apr 62	Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus Navy, USMC, and press items
9	7 Sep 62	Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas
2	"	Redacted pages from above
7	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas
3	24 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans
3	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas (apparently different from above)
2	8 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans report
20	7 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff
20	25 Oct 63	FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material above
14	31 Jan 64	Report, not really contemprary with this file, entitled: "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..," 28 Sep--3 Oct 63
14	"	Redacted copy of same

DUPLICED & ADDED LATER

~~SECRET~~

OCA 2050-92
6 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: JFK Testimony

1. Attached is a copy of your opening statement for the 12 May hearing before Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on the JFK Joint Resolution. Because we are commenting on legislation, Executive Branch guidelines require us to submit the testimony in advance to OMB for Administration clearance. We also intend to provide your opening statement in advance to the DoJ and FBI. As you know, Director Sessions will be joining you for a panel presentation before the Committee.

2. Please let me know whether you have any objections to release of your statement to OMB, DoJ, and the FBI. The Committee has requested that an advance copy of your statement be provided to them by 8 May.

Stanley M. Moskowitz

Attachment:
as stated

Draft 5/6/92

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

12 MAY 1992

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger ~~even~~ over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that ~~the~~ CIA had anything to do with ~~participated in~~ the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year- old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records. ~~As we speak this Group has~~ already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, ~~which includes~~ including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation for other agencies to start declassifying ~~these~~ documents ~~papers which are CIA's~~ belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction,

Can we give some idea of #?

Is it limited only to the 37 documents cited on the next page? If so, that's not good enough. I thought Ken said there were several "easy" boxes that could be processed quickly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, we will use a presumption in favor of releasing as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which ~~have~~ specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to ~~do~~ be so.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consist of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of (copies ~~of~~ and originals of) information provided to the (Warren Commission and the) House Select Committee on Assassinations ~~between 1977 and 1979~~, and ~~over~~ 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald, accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.

add part.

how + where? What kind of documents.

rewrite

~~At first blush, you might think that this is an enormous amount of material for the CIA to have on the assassination. It is important to recognize, however, that~~ Virtually all of these are ~~essentially "secondary"~~ documents were ~~accumulated~~ originated or came to CIA from other agencies ~~collected~~ after the assassination as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. ~~There were~~ Some documents relevant to the investigations ~~that did~~ existed before the assassination, but they were only brought together in response to investigations of the event. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this very point.

not clear

What's this mean? Spell out

Where's the chart?

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination The documents CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of ~~37~~ 33 documents (~~less than 150~~ approximately 160 pages)~~, of which 28 documents consisted of material originated by the State Department, the Navy, the FBI, and newspaper clippings.~~ I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first hand how slender it was at the time. As I have

Only 11 of were CIA documents

11 - CIA

(need pages.

What's that mean? Sounds like a dodge.

~~with minimal deletions of Site numbers, personal names~~

already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file ~~and intelligence methods~~ ~~and provided them~~ to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities ~~in the U.S.~~ after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated ~~collected all~~ the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages in total. ~~most of which~~ ~~originated from other agencies~~

from where?

You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, ~~I should emphasize that~~ much of the material held by CIA originated from other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% percent of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our ~~My~~ staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee ~~on Assassinations~~, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 72 reels of microfilm. The microfilms ~~which~~ in part overlap material in ~~the 63 boxes~~. other parts of the collection ~~However,~~ we estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately = 27 ~~10~~ % originated from the ~~FBI, and a smaller number of records, less than 1 %, originated from the State Department or elsewhere~~ ~~and the Justice Department~~ a variety of other agenc and 24 % originated from a variety of other U.S. government agencies, ~~and~~ private organizations, and foreign and American press.

24%?

Although our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review. And, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey ~~review~~ of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet

Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation, and Cuban exile activities. ~~copies of FBI reports about Oswald, and even information about Watergate~~

The CIA cannot ~~simply act to declassify or~~ release ~~some~~ a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to proceed ~~to review for declassification~~ those documents it has sequestered.

Release the results of the declassification on the sequestered documents?

The House will let us declassify and release these sequestered documents?

While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested ~~on~~ a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers.

Meaning? Although ~~largely~~ irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of living individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose ~~this information~~ their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will ~~be willing~~ to make redactions, and ~~substitute generic information~~ or summarize ~~the~~ that information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

Meaning?

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of ~~15~~ stet full-time positions to expand the History Staff, and to form the Historical Review Group that will undertake the review of the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

15 is correct

~~Should~~ If legislation is not passed ~~[illegible]~~ by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and ~~assurance~~ that CIA ~~[illegible]~~ has not held back any ~~relevant~~ information on the assassination, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans to examine ~~whatever~~ documents we have redacted or kept classified. ~~and~~ They would then review and declassify and public report their ~~[illegible]~~ findings.

intent to get these papers ~~[illegible]~~ declassified and released, and to ~~[illegible]~~ open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, I cite our

~~While we are in complete agreement on the need~~ to ~~declassify documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, I do have certain~~ technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

~~My primary concern with the joint resolution, as currently drafted, is that it directs the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board to make the initial~~ the determination as to whether CIA materials ~~related to the assassination held by all Executive Branch agencies, including CIA,~~ can be released to the public. First ~~Vesting~~ vesting ~~this review authority~~ in an outside body is ~~inconsistent with~~ my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. ~~In addition, I am concerned that placing responsibility for classification determinations in a Review Board that has no particular expertise in making~~ intelligence ~~classification determinations and is unfamiliar with the assassination material is bound to result in delays in releasing the material. It will also result in a duplication of effort since originating agencies will have to review the decision of the Executive Director to release particular documents.~~

~~I share your belief that the review of documents be done in an expeditious and efficient manner. To that end, I propose that the initial review of assassination materials be made by the~~

~~originating agencies and completed within a reasonable period of time. As I have indicated, the CIA has already begun this process. Documents that an agency determines cannot be released to the public~~ or redactions ~~would then be reviewed by members of the Review Board, who could operate with a lean staff. Any dispute between an agency and the Review Board over the release of a document could then be resolved by the President or his designee. This arrangement would ensure that the initial review of documents is accomplished quickly by individuals who are in place and have the necessary substantive experience to declassify documents while at the same time providing an independent review of all decisions made to withhold information. It presumably would expedite the process because the amount of material still classified~~ ~~would~~ ~~to be reviewed would be only a fraction of the whole.~~

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff. ~~As Director of Central Intelligence, I have an obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods, and to uphold that obligation I could not make classified information available to the Board until it took the necessary steps to safeguard that information.~~

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review

Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies. ~~Once again, this provision conflicts with my statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods; that duty should not be delegated to an outside body. I believe that the joint resolution should provide that an agency that originated information found in another's document should have the opportunity to review the information and raise necessary objections prior to its release to the public. An interagency working group should be established to coordinate the review and release of this "third agency" information in a timely fashion.~~

~~Fourth, the joint resolution defines "assassination material" broadly to include any records that relate "in any manner or degree to the assassination." I believe we have already identified these documents as a result of previous inquiries from investigative bodies, such as the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations. These investigations were thorough, and any additional requests for information should bear some reasonable relationship to the JFK assassination. Perhaps a panel of distinguished historians could be formed to provide advice to the Review Board as to what, if any, additional material should be reviewed.~~

Fourth ~~Fifth,~~ the joint resolution provision for ~~provides only~~ a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information~~. This~~ may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be large volume~~s~~ of material at one time. ~~If the initial review of documents is done by the Executive Director, the joint resolution should be amended to provide that an agency may request a reasonable extension of time to determine whether documents may be released.~~

Fifth and ~~F~~finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, ~~may~~ makes ~~not be adequate to protect Agency interests in certain respects. For example, there is~~ no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed. ~~I also believe that "intelligence agent" under section 6(1)(A) of the joint resolution should be defined to include covert employees of an intelligence agency, or former employees who retired undercover from an intelligence agency.~~

There are technical problems that I believe can be solved in ~~a~~ ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

~~While I believe that the joint resolution can be improved, I want you to know, Mr. Chairman, that the CIA will cooperate with whatever reasonable mechanism is established to declassify the assassination material. As Director of Central Intelligence and as ~~Robert Gates~~ a private citizen, I am committed to making this process work. It is my hope that the declassification of this~~

But, again, ~~if the~~ whatever the future course of the legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review ~~and~~ for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate with any ~~the~~ mechanism established by the Congress and the

13-00000

1) a number questions?
2) Check my fixes with Gries, McDonald OGC & OCA
3) ~~Then~~ Go ahead & circulate to OMB, DoJ & FBI.

6 May 1992

NOTE FOR: DCI

FROM: Neal Wolin, SA/DCI

Re: JFK Testimony

Attached is the draft JFK testimony, as prepared by OCA. The draft has been coordinated with OGC, the Center for the Study of Intelligence (both Dave Gries and Ken McDonald), and the DO. The handwritten edits are mine and Dave Gries'. A briefing book with Q's and A's will be ready by COB Friday. As Stan's cover note suggests, the testimony must be coordinated with others in the Executive; OCA's preference is to send it out tomorrow.

Dave and I agree that the section of the draft testimony commenting on the proposed legislation (pp. 7 et seq.) is too long and runs the risk of overwhelming the positive message you relay in the first part of the statement. It seems to me that while you should lay down your objections to the legislation's scheme clearly (and even forcefully), you should do so in language that will leave the impression (which is consistent with the reality) that (1) you are in agreement with their basic objectives relating to the material in question and (2) that you are doing, and will continue to do, all that you can to accommodate the release of material consistent with your statutory obligations.

In particular I think it unnecessary to reiterate your "statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods" more than a couple of times. Moreover, I think the paragraph on the definition of "assassination material" (middle of p.9) unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. One of the impetuses for the JFK resolution, after all, is the notion (crazy or not) that previous inquiries were insufficient in scope; this paragraph feeds right into that criticism. Some of the other "technical" criticisms (i.e., paragraphs on pp. 9-10) seem important to make (especially if the basic model of the legislation is adopted) but might be better included in a post-hearing letter to the committee or something. Again, otherwise I fear you run the risk of leaving the perception of trying to nitpick the concept of JFK material declassification to death.

Neal

Neal

OCA 2149-92
19 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence
Chief, Administrative Law Division, OGC

FROM: David M. Pearline
Deputy Director for Legislation, OCA

SUBJECT: Follow-up to DCI's 15 May JFK Testimony

1. We have reviewed a transcript of the Director's 15 May testimony on the JFK Assassination Materials Resolution to identify those questions with respect to which CIA committed to provide answers for the record. A copy of the transcript with relevant portions marked is attached.

2. The following specific questions require follow-up action:

a. How much material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about? (p. 5)
b. Why was the Oswald file opened at the CIA 14 months after his defection? (p. 5)
c. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? (p. 5)
d. Was that picture in his [Oswald's] file that was thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there something involved in that you can shed some light on? (p. 5)
e. [W]hat consisted of new information [in the Oswald file] that the public had not already had in its published files somewhere? (p. 14)
f. [W]ould the establishment of such a panel of outside experts [by DCI, to review redactions in the absence of legislation] . . .violate the Privacy Act? (p. 16)

3. I assume CSI, in coordination with appropriate components, will take the lead on all questions except for the last. I understand OGC will take the lead on the Privacy Act question. (Note: OGC advises that the issue of why Oswald's file was not opened for 14 months after his defection is addressed in the Findings and Recommendations volume of the HSCA Report at pp. 200-202.) I appreciate your assistance in preparing proposed responses for the record.

David M. Pearline

Attachment

Draft: 14 May 1992

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

15 MAY 1992

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on **House Joint Resolution 454,** "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter, **just as I did before your Senate counterparts last Tuesday.**

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

FIRST PRIORITY - JFK documents

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be declassified released shortly.

were relea...

change to over the coming week

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. **In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.**

In connection with these historical review guidelines, I have recently commissioned a task force to review Agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). I have instructed this task force to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described for historical declassification. Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed into the historical review program, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and release of Agency records.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing the **JFK** papers for declassification, it is important to

Chart

place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized--all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents (**amounting to 124** pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. **(Although I reported slightly smaller numbers to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs earlier this week, a subsequent count by my staff revealed these exact numbers.)** Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. I brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

There has been some comment on this pre-assassination Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this is but the first installment--an example of our intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer [illegible] **the declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded.**

The committee has asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by

CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Mr. Chairman, you have also asked about assassination materials that may be held by other Intelligence Community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research report, after a preliminary search, that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be

minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.

Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review, and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of

Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to the committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.

These are technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

Statement of Admiral William O. Studeman, USN
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law
Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. House of Representatives
20 May 1992

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide our views on House Joint Resolution 454, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin, as the Director did last week in testifying on this subject, by emphasizing that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, we believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, the Director recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, he announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, the Director has directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, we are not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is but a small fraction of what we have, but it is an indication of our commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and we anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, the Director recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. The Director believes that we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and he has instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.

In connection with these historical review guidelines, the Director has recently commissioned a task force to review Agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The mission of this task force is to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described for historical declassification. Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed into the historical review program, our intention is to bring to the

FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and release of Agency records.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized--all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents (amounting to 124 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

There has been some comment on this pre-assassination Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all the material that we will review--an example of our intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded.

We have been asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

We have also been asked about assassination materials that may be held by other Intelligence Community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research report, after a preliminary search, that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.

Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review, and, as I said earlier, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, we will ask the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. We hope to work with you, Mr. Chairman, to remove any obstacles that might arise in releasing the sequestered documents.

While we expect that a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, the Director has stated that he would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and both the Director and I are personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, the Director has allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to the committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with the Director's statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, we are concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, we are concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.

These are technical problems that we believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2157-92
22 May 1992

The Honorable John Glenn
Chairman
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to correct for the record two statements I made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.

I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee on Government Operations.

In addition, I was asked at your hearing by Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State Department might have requested those files, but I was not certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January 1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective."

CL BY 2196777
DECL OADR
DRV FM LIA 3-87

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable John Glenn

To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of correcting the public record, I suggest the following unclassified statement:

> In response to a request from the US embassy in Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file holdings on Oswald. They have advised us that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective."

I enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful. A similar letter is being sent to Ranking Minority Member Roth.

Sincerely,

Robert M Gates

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Senator Cohen
Senator Boren
Senator Murkowski

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2157-92/1
22 May 1992

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Roth:

I am writing to correct for the record two statements I made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.

I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee on Government Operations.

In addition, I was asked at your hearing by Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State Department might have requested those files, but I was not certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January 1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective."

CL BY 2196777
DECL OADR
DRV FM LIA 3-87

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of correcting the public record, I suggest the following unclassified statement:

> In response to a request from the US. embassy in Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file holdings on Oswald. They have advised us that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective."

I enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful. A similar letter is being sent to Chairman Glenn.

Sincerely,

Robert M Gates

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Senator Cohen
Senator Boren
Senator Murkowski

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable John Glenn
The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

SUBJECT: Corrections on DCI Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs

OCA/LEG/SMDunne:me/37916 (21 May 1992) OCA 2157-92

Distribution:
Original - Addressees
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ExDir
1 - DDO
1 - D/OCA
1 - D/CSI
1 - C/DCI History Staff
1 - ER
1 - OCA Records
1 - Leg Subj File
1 - SMD Signer File
1 - SMD Soft File

Senator John Glenn

News Release

IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Contact: Jack Sparks (202) 224-5635
May 12, 1992 Leonard Weiss (202) 224-4751

Statement of Senator John Glenn
Chairman, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Hearing on
S. J. Res. 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act"
May 12, 1992

The bill before us today, S.J. Res. 282, is the "Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992." The legislation was introduced by Senator David Boren and Senator Arlen Specter. An identical bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by our colleague, Representative Louis Stokes.

The legislation would require the government to release records to the American public which are "relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy." The bill would establish an independent review board within 90 days of enactment, and this board would work as quickly as possible to release the records to the public through the National Archives and the Government Printing Office.

The bill creates a strong presumption on releasing documents. The onus will be on those who would withhold documents to prove to the Review Board and the American people why those documents must be shielded from public scrutiny.

It is also important to stress that the legislation does not authorize any official investigation of the assassination. Its only purpose is to create a process by which the American public may be given the most complete access to review relevant records, and make their own observations and assessments. The Committee's work and the hearing today is likewise limited to this purpose.

This bill is the result of a climate of suspicion and distrust that has grown over the years regarding the official explanation of the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a climate nurtured by many books, articles, television programs, and the recent movie "JFK." Disclosure of information is the only reliable way to maintain the public trust, and dispel distrust. Those of us who knew President Kennedy personally and remember where we were when we learned of President Kennedy's assassination must exercise our responsibility to the next generation of Americans, whose historical knowledge of the assassination of President Kennedy will be significantly improved by the release of these records.

Ironically, it was President John F. Kennedy who first required scheduled declassification in the release of Executive Branch national security information. Declassification schedules remained in effect until President Reagan eliminated the requirement in 1981, and President Bush persists in this same practice. It is likely that more government documents related to the Kennedy assassination could have been released over the past 12 years if declassification was still a priority. It is also fair to say that the 1986 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, including broad law enforcement exemptions, have narrowed the release of Kennedy assassination records by the FBI.

The public interest in the history of the assassination of President Kennedy has been insatiable. In one noted bibliography, a total of 5,134 books, articles, reports, films, or television programs were produced on the subject between the years 1963 and 1979. The Library of Congress has over 250 holdings on the subject. The FBI continues to receive reports, allegations, and requests for further investigation. Indeed, as Director Sessions may testify today, the FBI has recently located and interviewed two of the three "hobos" who were identified as witnesses of the shooting, as well as seven Dallas police officers who were not previously interviewed by government investigators.

The speculation about the assassination of President Kennedy may be more cruel than the truth itself. It is arguable whether the disclosure of new information will dampen the speculation, but I hope that the breadth of information made available will answer many questions and provide many history lessons.

I view the Committee's mandate as determining whether the process for review and release of the records is fair and appropriate; and that exemptions, when needed, must be kept to a minimum. The Department of Justice has told the Committee that it will recommend a presidential veto of the bill as written. I hope we can find a way to construct a process for release of assassination related records that will be efficient and effective, will gain the confidence of the public, and will address concerns of the Justice Department that are legitimate.

The authors of the bill are to be congratulated for working quickly to propose an independent and accountable mechanism to release records related to the assassination. However, we must carefully consider the parameters of the bill.

I believe that the major issues include:

First, how will agencies and others who hold records define the universe of "relevant" Kennedy assassination materials? It is important to be able to go beyond the frame of reference of previous inquiries of commissions and committees, but the question must be asked: Where will the search for documents end?

Second, the definition and search for "relevant assassination material" also raises important questions of human resources and costs to organize and make material available to the Review Board. How much will this cost?

Third, what is the best mechanism to govern the review and release of records in an independent, accountable, and credible manner. The tension between management and public confidence in the process cannot be overlooked. However, it may be important to simplify the process. The bill proposes a five-member Review Board, with an Executive Director and staff. Are we creating a Rube Goldberg machine, or are these layers necessary?

Fourth, we must ask why the bill, which acts in the name of openness in government, also exempts the Review Board from the Government in the Sunshine Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and judicial review?

Fifth, is the issue of standards for postponement of disclosure. I strongly believe that the government should practice disclosure of information as the rule, unless there are demonstrable reasons for protecting the information. It is important to emphasize that while hundreds of thousands of pages of material will be released, the bill contains national security and privacy exemptions, and withholds personnel and administrative records relating to past official inquiries.

I personally believe that the agencies and the Congress, which hold Kennedy assassination records should not wait for the passage of legislation, and the resolution of all issues in the bill, before releasing documents. It is my intention to move legislation through the Committee as quickly as possible, but regardless it will take time for whatever authority is created in statute to become assembled, establish procedures, and begin its work. We will hear today how ready key agencies and congressional officials are to release their records. If even some of the material can go out the door without further adjustments, then let's give the public access now. The review board or whatever authority is created will certainly have the opportunity to face the more difficult issues shortly thereafter.

Today we are fortunate to have several experts and authorities to discuss these issues. These include the authors of the legislation, as well as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. We are grateful to have our other witnesses as well. Among them is attorney James Lesar, President of the Assassination Archives and Research Center. Mr. Lesar's work represents the track record on public access to Kennedy assassination material under the Freedom of Information Act. He will speak to the nature and limitations of current access arrangements. We also have two prominent twentieth century historians, Professor Ernest May of Harvard University and Professor Athan Theoharis from Marquette University. Each possess extensive experience regarding the federal records of the intelligence and federal law enforcement communities. We welcome all of you to the Committee.

13-00000

CIHRG #
If you have any oral comments,
Vicki Pepper is the one to call.
Dave

DRAFT

6/5/92

SUGGESTED AREAS TO BE ADDRESSED IN REPORT LANGUAGE
(IF NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION)

1. Initial Review of assassination materials. It should be made clear that section 5 of H.J.Res. 454, which requires that records not provided to the Archivist for public disclosure be made available to the Review Board within 60 days of enactment, is not intended to preclude agencies from conducting their own reviews and making as much information available as possible before the Review Board conducts its review of assassination materials. Suggested clarifying report language:

> The Committee notes that some agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, have already begun to review and release assassination materials. Section 5(a)(2), which requires that all records of an official investigation for which an agency is custodian be made available to the Review Board within 60 days of enactment of the Joint Resolution, is not intended to preclude agencies from continuing any reviews that they have ongoing and transferring documents to the Archives for public release wherever possible. In, fact the Committee encourages such reviews to continue inasmuch as they can provide for more expeditious release of assassination materials to the public.

2. "Third agency rule" adhered to in review of documents. The legislation on its face does not necessarily provide that the agency or department that originated the information will have any input into a decision to disclose the record, or will even be apprised of such a decision after the fact. Suggested clarifying report language:

> The Committee understands that existing regulations within the Executive Branch require that classified information originated in one agency may not be disseminated outside another agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating agency. The Committee expects that agencies that are custodians of records will follow this practice before providing information to the Archivist under section 5(a)(1) for public release pursuant to section 4.
>
> Section 5(a)(2) requires agencies that are custodians of records of official investigations to make such records available to the Review Board. The Board will then make a determination of whether the material qualifies for postponement under the criteria set forth

DRAFT

in Section 7 and shall inform the custodian of records and the originating body of the record of its determination. The Committee expects that the Review Board also will consult with the agency or department that originated the information in reaching its determination as to whether public disclosure of the material must be postponed to ensure that it is apprised of relevant sensitivities presented by that information. For example, the Review Board should consult with the relevant Executive Branch agency that provided information incorporated into a Congressional document before making a decision to release that document and shall inform the originating agency of a decision to release that information.

3. Identities of covert employees qualify for postponement. "Intelligence agent" is something of a term of art that, left undefined, might not be construed to protect information that would reveal the identity of covert employees of intelligence organizations. Suggested clarifying report language:

> The term "intelligence agent" as used in section 7(a)(1)(A) is intended to permit postponement of release of information that would reveal the identity of a domestic or foreign intelligence or counterintelligence asset, collaborator, foreign liaison contact, or covert employee of a United States intelligence organization, where the identity of any of these currently requires protection.

4. Board access to "any record" of an Executive agency. In addition to adding language to section 10(1)(1) to clarify that requests for additional records must be made by the Review Board itself, report language should make clear that the Committee does not intend the Board's discretion in this regard to be unbounded. Suggested report language:

> Section 10(1)(1) provides that the Review Board may request "any record" from an Executive agency. The Committee intends to give the Review Board wide latitude to determine what additional records may be held by agencies that are relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. Rather than the Committee attempting to define what records should be requested, the Committee believes that this judgment is best left to the Board, which will develop expertise in assassination-related issues and documents as its work

DRAFT

proceeds. However, the Committee does not intend to vest unfettered discretion in the Review Board to request any and all records of agencies without regard to their relationship to the assassination. The Committee expects that the Board will request only documents that may bear some reasonable relationship to the assassination, and that the Board will be guided by the principle that unreasonable risk of exposure of sensitive intelligence or law enforcement sources or methods is to be avoided.

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

HPSCI BRIEFING - JFK DECLASSIFICATION 10 April 1996

1. Nature of the records--Oswald 201, Sequestered
   - Other records: Minutes of DCI morning meetings; working files
   - Third Agency documents: FBI, SSCI, Presidential libraries
2. Pages released (227,000)
   - Percentage of pages redacted; 70 %
3. Process of declassification
   - Former senior officers in HRG review
   - Coordination with OGC, DO (DO team detailed to HRG)
4. Standards for review in JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 1992
   - Records related to the assassination or investigation into the assassination
   - Law provides grounds for postponement of disclosure of records
     - -- "Clear and convincing evidence" must be presented to the Board

       E.g., Identity of agent currently requiring protection
       - Source or method currently utilized
       - Foreign government relationship currently requiring protection
5. Board has authority to release records unless it agrees there is "clear and convincing evidence" to support a postponement
   - Board then has to justify on the record each redaction with which it agrees
   - Once a determination is made, Board must publish it in Federal Register within 14 days

- Options available: substitute language e.g., "Northern European station"
  - Also, summary of a record
- Board has access to every document in full

6. Issues raised by Board's decisions:

- Problem: Board has difficulty in linking disclosure of information that is 30 years old with damage to current intelligence operations
- Identification of stations e.g., Helsinki
- Names of former Agency employees who retired under cover
  - Board guidelines: Protect person if retired under cover and now residing overseas, but not if in US
- Liaison, joint operations in Mexico
- Briefing of the Board by Dave Edger, Jeff Smith, Central Cover, DO desk officers, others
- Problem of accumulative effect of releases--eroding cover, ability to conduct operations

7. Provision for appeal to the White House if we disagree with Board's determination

- President has sole authority to require postponement of a record or information
  - --President required to advise the Board within 30 days of the Board's determination
    - -- This is published in the Federal Register

Barry + Linda

8. Current appeal (now resolved)

- Issues: identification of Agency asset
  liaison relationship
  identification of station
- Potential appeal: Tokyo station

9. Additional requests of Board to review other records e.g., history of Mexico City station, Intelligence Community Staff records

13-00000

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~ Barry's file

CSI 1997-552
10 December 1997

NOTE FOR: Director, Center for the Study
of Intelligence
Deputy Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

FROM: John Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: JFK/Possible Letter from
Congressman Burton to EXDIR

Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director of the JFK Board, told HRG yesterday that Congressman Dan Burton may well write a letter to the EXDIR expressing concern about whether CIA will be able to meet the deadline for declassification of assassination-related records. Burton chairs the Government Reform and Oversight Committee which has cognizance over the JFK Board.

Gunn said that he briefed members of Burton's staff last week and told them he was concerned that the Agency may not have enough resources dedicated to JFK to finish the review of documents by 1 September 1998. Gunn showed the staffers the recent exchange of letters between the Board and the EXDIR on the same issue. According to the staffers, Burton has a strong personal interest in the release of the assassination records. The staffers gave Gunn the impression that Burton's strong interest will prompt him to write to the Agency.

During our discussion with Gunn, we reviewed with him the Agency's clear commitment to declassifying all assassination records. We also explained that we have shifted four additional contractors to the JFK project, and will shift more if necessary, even at the cost of slowing down or stopping other declassification efforts.

John Pereira

John Pereira

1- Eileen.
1- Fax'd Wickham
12/10
1 circulated JFK

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

DAN BURTON, INDIANA
CHAIRMAN

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, NEW YORK
J. DENNIS HASTERT, ILLINOIS
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, MARYLAND
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, CONNECTICUT
STEVEN SCHIFF, NEW MEXICO
CHRISTOPHER COX, CALIFORNIA
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, FLORIDA
JOHN M. McHUGH, NEW YORK
STEPHEN HORN, CALIFORNIA
JOHN L. MICA, FLORIDA
THOMAS M. DAVIS III, VIRGINIA
DAVID M. McINTOSH, INDIANA
MARK E. SOUDER, INDIANA
JOE SCARBOROUGH, FLORIDA
JOHN SHADEGG, ARIZONA
STEVE C. LaTOURETTE, OHIO
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, SOUTH CAROLINA
JOHN E. SUNUNU, NEW HAMPSHIRE
PETE SESSIONS, TEXAS
MIKE PAPPAS, NEW JERSEY
VINCE SNOWBARGER, KANSAS
BOB BARR, GEORGIA
ROB PORTMAN, OHIO

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

Congreſs of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143

MAJORITY (202) 225-5074
MINORITY (202) 225-5051
TTY (202) 225-6852

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

TOM LANTOS, CALIFORNIA
BOB WISE, WEST VIRGINIA
MAJOR R. OWENS, NEW YORK
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, NEW YORK
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, PENNSYLVANIA
GARY A. CONDIT, CALIFORNIA
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, NEW YORK
THOMAS M. BARRETT, WISCONSIN
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHAKA FATTAH, PENNSYLVANIA
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, MARYLAND
DENNIS KUCINICH, OHIO
ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, ILLINOIS
DANNY K. DAVIS, ILLINOIS
JOHN F. TIERNEY, MASSACHUSETTS
JIM TURNER, TEXAS
THOMAS H. ALLEN, MAINE
HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., TENNESSEE

BERNARD SANDERS, VERMONT
INDEPENDENT

December 16, 1997

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

The Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Tenet:

As Chairman of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, I have a great interest in ensuring that the Assassination Records Review Board, which is under the jurisdiction of the Committee, completes its work by its scheduled termination date of September 30, 1998. Earlier this year I introduced H.R. 1553, now Public Law 105-25, which extended the authorization of the Review Board for one additional year, until September 30, 1998. This one-year extension of authorization for the Review Board was included in President Clinton's fiscal year 1998 budget, and received bipartisan support in Congress.

During consideration of H.R. 1553, I stated my firm intention for this to be the final extension of authorization for the Review Board. Accordingly, I believe that it is of utmost importance that all federal agencies holding assassination records fully cooperate with the Review Board, in a timely manner, in order that documents may be processed and transferred to the National Archives, in compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-526).

The Review Board has advised me that while it perceives that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) generally has been cooperative and helpful, the Board nevertheless believes that the CIA is not transferring records to the Board at a pace consistent with the need to complete the work on time. The Board similarly has advised that, unless it receives processed records in a more expeditious manner, it is prepared to use its legal powers to order a transfer of records to the Board which would then vote to open the records without benefit of a pre-review by the CIA. The Board has informed me that it does not wish to take this step, but that it is fully prepared to do so if necessary to complete its work by its September 30, 1998, termination date.

I urge you to take all appropriate steps to ensure that the CIA promptly fulfills its obligations under the law by expeditiously reviewing and transferring the relevant records to the Review Board.

Sincerely,

Dan Burton

Dan Burton
Chairman

DB:jts

13-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

OCA 97-1969
8 January 1998

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of December 16, 1997 in which you expressed interest in the status of Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) processing of records related to President John F. Kennedy's assassination.

You referred to the Assassination Records Review Board's concern that CIA may not be processing records at a pace sufficient to complete the work on time. I want to assure you, as I did to the Review Board's Executive Director in the enclosed November 21, 1997 letter, that the Agency is committed to taking all necessary steps to meet the statutory deadline of September 30, 1998 for reviewing all of the Agency's assassination-related materials. As the Review Board has noted, we are cooperating fully with the Board and its staff in this effort.

We share the Review Board's goal of declassifying and releasing the relevant records to the fullest extent possible. As you are aware, it is important that there be a proper review of all the records so that still sensitive information that might warrant continued protection can be identified to the Board. For the past several years a team of experienced reviewers has been dedicated to the task of declassifying the assassination records. Recently we shifted several additional personnel to the team in order to accelerate the processing of documents and assure the prompt transfer to the Review Board and ultimately to the National Archives.

The Honorable Dan Burton

I understand the importance that the Congress and the President have placed on disclosing to the American people all available information about the assassination. To this end, we have released more than 200,000 pages of material and are working diligently to complete our review of the remaining records.

If you or your staff require any further information or would like a briefing on our declassification program, please have your staff contact Mr. Jim Meehan, Office of Congressional Affairs, at (703) 482-8796.

Sincerely,

David W. Carey

David W. Carey

Enclosure

The Honorable Dan Burton

DCI/OCA/Liaison Grp/JPMeehan:dms/37976 (29 Dec 97 **INTERIM**)
OCA 97-1969 (FN:wdata/action/liaison/burton.doc)
Revised from INTERIM LTR (never sent) to FINAL LTR (6 Jan 97)

Distribution:
Original - The Honorable Dan Burton, HGR&OC
1 - EXDIR/CIA **(Follow-up to SCI 97-536)**
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER **(ACTION ITEM: ER 97-5851)**
1 - DCI/OGC
1 - DCI/CSI
1 - DDO
1 - DO/IMS
1 - DA/OIM
1 - DA/OIM/IRG
1 - DA/MS
1 - D/OCA
1 - AO/OCA
1 - OCA Records **(ACTION ITEM: A/97-05697)**
1 - JPMeehan Chrono

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment to begin review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart.

Make public today the guidelines

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized--all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 33 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 documents originated with the CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains (73) 72 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% of the documents originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Although our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House

Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

perhaps
including
former
distinguished
jurists

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by

Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.

These are the technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of the legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

Added comment on personal reaction at the time.
Determined personally to make available every scrap of paper

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
~~SECRET~~
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

4 May 1992

TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE OSWALD PRE-ASSASSINATION FILE:

	Pages	Date	Description
NOT A PART	1	6 Mar 64	Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA
	4	30 Jan 76	CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15 Jan 75 on deleting #s.
ADDED LATER	1	6 Mar 64	DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding.
	4	6 Mar 64	Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.
	5	6 Mar 64	Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.
	1	31 Oct 59	State Cable from Moscow to SecState.
	1	"	Redacted copy of same.
	1	1 Nov 59	Press clipping
	1	2 & 4 Nov	Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query
	3	2 Nov 59	Fon Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept
	1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Moscow to SecState
	1	"	Redacted copy of same
	1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Tokyo to SecState
	1	"	Redacted copy of same
	1	16 Nov 59	Press clipping
	1	26 Nov 59	Press clipping
	1	25 May 60	Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms
	7	12 May 60	Attachment to above
	2	12 May 60	FBI report, fr Dallas
	2	25 Oct 60	State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors
	2	"	Redacted copy of same
	1	3 Nov 60	DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)
	1	"	Redacted copy of same
	1	18 Nov 60	Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany draft reply to Cumming
	1	undated	Handwritten descrip of letter cited above
	2	21 Nov 60	Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US defectors
	1	"	Declassified version of Oswald info from ff
	7	"	List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter
	1	18 Nov 60	Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell
	9	21 Nov 60	Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above
	2	9 Dec 60	2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald 201
	3	11 Jul 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
	4	26 May 61	2 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
	1	13 Apr 61	DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship and passport (signed Rusk)
	1	26 Jan 61	State MemCon re Oswald
	1	"	Redacted copy of same
	14	13 Jul 61	Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several FBI reports, much of which is illegible
	1	28 Sep 61	Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion in Oswald 201
	4	13 Oct 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow
	1	7 Dec 61	Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info on Oswald

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

1	3 Mar 62	Note saying Navy message of this date is missing from CD 692 sent from Archives
5	26 Apr 62	Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus Navy, USMC, and press items
9	7 Sep 62	Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas
2	"	Redacted pages from above
7	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas
3	24 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans
3	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas (apparently different from above)
2	8 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans report
20	7 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff
20	25 Oct 63	FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material above
14	31 Jan 64	Report, not really contemprary with this file, entitled: "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..," 28 Sep--3 Oct 63
14	"	Redacted copy of same

DUPLICED & ADDED LATER

~~SECRET~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Wick
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

June 14, 1966

MR. TOLSON:

Justice Fortas returned my call of midday, 6/13/66, late last night. I told him that I wanted to see him about a matter which he might consider bordered on a violation of judicial ethics. He was told that I had been able to discuss matters in confidence with him on several other occasions, i.e., the Jenkins case, [redacted] boyfriend, and other items which Mr. Hoover had me handle with him, and that I therefore felt that he wouldn't mind if this matter was brought to his attention.

(b)(6)

The Black case was then brought up and he was told that although he had disqualified himself, he might not desire to discuss this matter. Justice Fortas replied that he would be glad to not only discuss this matter but any other matter with me on a confidential basis at any time. He then asked me to have breakfast with him at 7:45 a.m. this morning.

Upon seeing the Justice in his home for breakfast, we preliminarily engaged in small talk and eventually got down to the meat of the problem. I gave him a complete rundown on the exchange of correspondence that the Director had had with Katzenbach. He was told specifically of Katzenbach's evasive tactics in attempting to defend Bobby Kennedy. I then mentioned the Black case and told him that while the Director planned to furnish the Attorney General specific, honest, hardhitting answers to the Supreme Court's questions, we nevertheless knew that Katzenbach would throw our answers out the window and present his own slanted version to the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas agreed.

Justice Fortas stated that the entire matter boiled down to a continuing fight for the Presidency. He stated that Kennedy was of course out to capture that segment of voters which in the past had belonged to Vice President Humphrey. He mentioned that Kennedy, to a certain extent, had succeeded in capturing this left-wing group. He added that of course if facts, as possessed by the FBI, concerning Kennedy's approval of wiretapping were made known to the general public that it would serve to completely destroy Kennedy.

CDD:amr
(2)

CONTINUED.....OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Justice Fortas spoke of the Black case. He stated that after Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall had ineptly and inadequately presented the matter of electronic devices to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court had held a confidential meeting among themselves. Although Justice Fortas and Justice White disqualified themselves, they still attended the meeting. At the meeting it was decided among the Justices that rather than remand the Black case to a lower court, the Supreme Court would set itself up as a tribunal to gather further information concerning the usage of electronic devices and afterwards make a decision. The Justices, with the exception of Byron White, felt that if the case was immediately remanded to a lower court Attorney General Katzenbach would, in order to win the case, pick his own Judge and thereby attain victory. Justice Fortas stated that some of the Justices in the Supreme Court were somewhat belligerent in their attitude towards Kennedy and Katzenbach. He stated these men would not be "pushed around" regardless of the politics involved.

Justice Fortas stated that the problem at hand was to determine how the FBI's irrefutable evidence exposing Kennedy and the Department in their clear-cut authorization for usage of microphones could be gotten to the Supreme Court and to the people. I showed him at this point several memoranda taken from the file, including the New York telephone memorandum which Kennedy had signed. He stated that there was no doubt in his mind but what the FBI acted in a complete, above-board and honest manner at the specific urging of Kennedy and the Department. He then stated that he fully recognized that Katzenbach would only slant any reply the FBI gave him in answer to the questions posed by the Supreme Court.

After some deliberation, Justice Fortas stated that he thought the best thing to do would be for him to slip in the back door and see the President. He stated he would tell the President all of the above facts. As an aside, Justice Fortas asked me if the President had been aware of the exchange of correspondence pertaining to the Director and the Attorney General. I replied that the Director in all fairness and in order to protect the FBI, had definitely advised Watson and the President. The Justice replied that this was good, however, he felt that the President would want to know his opinion as a result of seeing it from the Supreme Court.

He then stated that his plan of action would serve to protect the President and the FBI and could spell "back seat" for Katzenbach and Kennedy. He mentioned that he would recommend to the President that the President should immediately call Katzenbach in his office and tell him that

CONTINUED. . . . . OVER

he was very greatly concerned about this entire matter and that, in order for honesty and justice to prevail, an arbitrator should be set up who would listen to all of the evidence and then furnish a complete report to the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas added that naturally the arbitrator would be someone whom the President could trust to furnish the absolute true facts.

He stated the next problem would be to find this particular man. He said he had in mind somebody like Ken Royall, former Secretary of the Army. He asked me what I thought of him. I told him I naturally had heard Mr. Royal's name, however, Mr. Hoover would have far better judgment on this matter than I would. He next stated that perhaps someone like Ross Malone, former President of the American Bar Association, would be good in this regard. I told him that we had enjoyed very favorable relations with Mr. Malone. Justice Fortas then mentioned that there was an immediate past President of the American Bar Association from the State of Virginia. I told him he probably was thinking of Lewis Powell. He stated this was correct. He asked me what I thought of Powell. I told him that Mr. Powell had generally concurred with Mr. Hoover's beliefs concerning crime, however, on occasions he had been somewhat naive and a little weak. Justice Fortas stated that he thought Royal or Malone would be the best man.

Justice Fortas told me that he would take the above action immediately. He stated he was going to Jacksonville, Florida, today; however, he would try to talk to the President prior to his departure---if not, he would discuss this matter with the President Thursday morning, 6/16/66. I told him that time was growing short inasmuch as the Supreme Court wanted an answer almost immediately. He stated this was true and that, as a matter of fact, once the arbitrator was appointed all of his facts would have to be gathered and furnished to the Supreme Court within two weeks. He stated he thought this could be done.

Justice Fortas told me that he wanted to mention another subject. He stated that he had already taken steps to disqualify himself in the Hoffa case. He mentioned that the Black, Baker and Hoffa cases would be continuing cases which would go on for many years. He asked me if I knew of any irregularities on the part of Bobby Kennedy in connection with the Hoffa case. I replied in the affirmative, stating that Kennedy on one occasion had specifically asked an FBI representative to place a microphone on an attorney by the name of Haggerty. I stated this action had been taken despite the fact that the FBI had not wanted to do this. Justice Fortas replied that he had felt that such might be the case and that under the circumstances

CONTINUED.....OVER

he would sit with the rest of the Supreme Court on the Hoffa case and would make certain that Kennedy was exposed. He stated that he felt that the Supreme Court would definitely confirm the decision of the lower court in the Hoffa case. He mentioned that this opinion had been expressed to him by the other Justices.

Justice Fortas next inquired if I had known a former Bureau employee by the name of Courtney Evans. I told him that I did know Evans. He asked if I knew of Evans' association with Kennedy. I told him that we were well aware of this relationship. I then briefed Justice Fortas completely concerning Evans. I told him of the statements made by Edward Bennett Williams with respect to the fact that Kennedy planned to use Evans as his "ace in the hole." I told Justice Fortas that Mr. Hoover had instructed me to call Evans in and to show him approximately eight memoranda which had previously been prepared by Evans. Justice Fortas was advised that Evans had been told that he had not only prepared but approved such memoranda and that we demanded to know if the facts as he had given them at the time of preparation were as true now as they were then. I told Justice Fortas that Evans had affirmed the truthfulness of these facts and had sadly indicated, "Facts are facts and can't be changed." I also told Justice Fortas that we had specifically asked Evans if Bobby Kennedy had been furnished information from microphone coverage in the Black case. The Justice was advised that Evans had admitted that he had frequently briefed Kennedy in this regard. The Justice was told that we next inquired of Evans whether or not Kennedy knew that such information came from microphone coverage and that Evans had replied that there was one specific occasion in which Kennedy specifically could have inferred that the information could only have come from microphone coverage.

Justice Fortas asked if the President knew of Evans' background. I told him that apparently the President did not know this. It was further mentioned that Evans was currently employed by Katzenbach, obviously at the urging of Kennedy. Justice Fortas replied that this was the worst news he had received since Bobby Kennedy's urging that the Viet Cong be allowed to sit down at the conference table. He stated that the President should definitely be told of this fact. He then mentioned that several members of the Supreme Court are well aware of the background of Evans as well as the background of such characters as Sheridan, Bellino, and other henchmen of Kennedy's.

CONTINUED.....OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At this point, I told Justice Fortas of the memoranda in which the Director in 1963, at the specific request of the President, had furnished the President concerning Bellino, et al., and that the President had the following day dismissed these individuals from employment at the White House. I mentioned that Kenny O'Donnell had immediately advised Bobby Kennedy, and Bobby Kennedy had had Ed Guthman issue a direct threat to us in connection with this matter. Justice Fortas stated this was typical of Kennedy.

Justice Fortas next made reference to the decision handed down by the Supreme Court yesterday in connection with confessions. He stated that he sincerely hoped that the Director and the personnel of the FBI would pay close attention to the conclusion of the statement by Chief Justice Warren wherein the Chief Justice clearly implied that the FBI was a model agency for all law enforcement to follow. Justice Fortas told me that he wanted the Director to know that following Thurgood Marshall's inept and stupid presentation to the Supreme Court regarding the general matter of confessions, he, Justice Fortas, had been instrumental in instructing Thurgood Marshall to specifically return to the Department and ascertain exactly how the FBI handled the matters of questioning of subjects, arraignment of subjects, confessions, etc. He stated that Marshall therefore, as a result of such action, had found it necessary to submit such procedures to the Supreme Court. He stated on this basis, Chief Justice Warren had no alternative but to pat the FBI on the back.

Justice Fortas inquired as to the Director's opinion concerning Ramsey Clark. I told him that the Director of course had enjoyed a very favorable friendly relationship with Justice Tom Clark for many years and that the Director had also enjoyed a fairly favorable relationship with Ramsey Clark, however, not anywhere near as close as the friendship with his father. I told the Justice that the Director had received information pointing out that despite the fact Ramsey Clark was known as a "Johnson man," he nevertheless could see no wrong in Bobby Kennedy. Justice Fortas stated that he felt Ramsey was a good man but young, naive and one that constantly looked down into the deep waters and could see no wrong in anyone. He stated that Ramsey Clark was a "dreamer." Justice Fortas then inquired as to whether or not there are any loyal Johnson supporters in the Department. I stated that the Director had mentioned on a number of occasions that perhaps the only one who could be declared a loyal supporter of the President's was Ed Weisl, Jr. The Justice expressed no surprise. He stated he thought this to be the case.

CONTINUED.....OVER

V

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator." He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters.

ACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions I will advise Marvin Watson today of the background and current employment of Courtney Evans.

(2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best man to serve as an "arbitrator."

RESPECTFULLY,

C. D. DE LOACH

OK. Certainly Royall would be impossible. I had enough of him when he was counsel for the saboteurs & later when as Secretary of War he was instrumental in throwing us out of S.I.S. [Special Intelligence Service] & setting up C.I.A. [Central Intelligence Agency] The practicality of the "arbitrator" I have some doubts. It can be another "Warren Commission" & end in a fiasco. H [Hoover]

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

4-750 (Rev. 12-14-88)

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

28 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

☐ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552		Section 552a
☐ (b)(1)	☐ (b)(7)(A)	☐ (d)(5)
☐ (b)(2)	☐ (b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
______	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
______	☐ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
______	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☐ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
☐ (b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)

☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your request.

☐ Information pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only.

☒ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

______ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

______ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): ______

☐ For your information: ______

☒ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:
65-6165-25, 26

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X DELETED PAGE(S) X
X NO DUPLICATION FEE X
X FOR THIS PAGE X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX

MAR 1 1953

Theoharis -- Appendix C

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

March 16, 1953

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
ON 12-27-79 [illegible]

In connection with a possible unauthorized leak of official Government information, it is believed desirable to institute a technical surveillance of Henry William Grunewald, a prominent figure in Washington, D. C.

I therefore recommend that you grant authority to place a technical surveillance on the residence of Grunewald, Apartment 625B, The Westchester, 4000 Cathedral Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C., telephone: Woodley 7-5700, or any other residence or office space which he might occupy in the future.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

RECORDED - 9 | 65-[illegible]-119
MAR 18 1953
24

RECEIVED [illegible]
MAR 16 5 03 PM '53

The Attorney General on February 13, 1953, requested that we cover the activities of Grunewald and asked that a technical surveillance be instituted on his residence. This memorandum is being submitted in accordance with the Attorney General's suggestion. (EHW/rh)

10⁰⁰ am
3/17/53

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

~~56 APR 1 1953~~

13-00000

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson ✓

DATE: April 28, 1953

FROM : L. B. Nichols

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE [illegible] BY [illegible]

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY OF HENRY GRUNEWALD
KEAN COMMITTEE

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

Executive Session testimony

I saw John E. Tobin, the General Counsel of the Kean Committee, on Monday evening, April 27th. Tobin pointed out that on the first day Grunewald testified in Executive session, [redacted] Tobin then outlined the following particulars:

1. [redacted] Tobin stated he had ascertained this was probably [redacted]

b7C

2. [redacted] This was the point which Tobin stated caused him the most concern because there was such a reference in the report of Special Agent [redacted] dated at New York on July 20, 1951, in the investigation on [redacted]

b7C

3. [redacted] Tobin outlined this was [redacted]

b7C

4. Tobin stated that Grunewald had the habit of passing out ties at Christmas and that as late as 1951 Grunewald had sent ties to the Director, Clyde Tolson and Guy Hottel. I told Tobin if he was inferring that because Grunewald sent ties to these three individuals they might have furnished him the information, that he ought to be pretty cautious because I knew pretty well what the feeling was. I told him in the first place the Director had not seen Grunewald to my certain knowledge for a long period of time; the Director was not intimate with Grunewald; the Director has not appreciated the manner in which Grunewald has thrown the Director's

cc: Mr. Ladd
Mr. Rosen

RECORDED - 58
INDEXED - 58

65-6165-147

name around and I had my serious doubts whether the Director had ever seen the ties and I was certain the Director never reviewed the file on [redacted] With reference to Mr. Tolson, I told Tobin that Mr. Tolson was one of the most conscientious individuals in Washington and that certainly Mr. Tolson would not engage in any such activity. Thirdly, all he had to do was look at the record so far as Hottel was concerned; that a few years ago, Hottel was primarily responsible for leading to Grunewald's downfall when he was hiding out from the Senate District Committee.

Tobin was making quite a point about how Grunewald could have gotten the information. I told Tobin categorically I had reviewed the files on the five individuals he had mentioned and that I was absolutely certain Grunewald did not get any information from the Bureau. I further told him that with reference to the information on [redacted] Grunewald was a fairly good investigator and it would have been a simple matter for him to find out [redacted] that with reference to the information on [redacted] I told him it was my understanding [redacted] that this itself was a matter of public record; that one of the first things an investigator would do in the investigation of a lawyer would be to check on his admission to the Bar and with the Grievance Committee; that anybody could have gotten this. Further, I inquired whether he had any information to the effect that [redacted] assisted Grunewald in the investigation. He stated Grunewald stated [redacted] assisted him. I told him [redacted] undoubtedly knew [redacted] personally; that [redacted] was in the Department for many years himself and no doubt had friends in the Department. I asked whether he had any information indicating [redacted] was close to McInerney.

[redacted]

b7c

The matter boiled down to the fact he was primarily concerned about [redacted] I told him the investigative reports on [redacted] went to the Attorney General and Vanech on November 9, 1951; Congressman King on August 9, 1951; photostatic copies were given to G-2 on December 26, 1951, and that the Attorney General requested a summary of our files on February 28th; that a summary memo was furnished the AG under date of February 29th on [redacted] and [redacted] He then inquired as to why G-2 would want the information. I told him I could not answer this, but would endeavor to ascertain the answer.

I asked him if he had any indication as to when Grunewald made his investigation. He stated it was shortly after the time when the committee first started checking on Grunewald, which would be in November or December, 1951.

I further told Tobin a reputable news source had inquired regarding [redacted] and [redacted] stating he had heard there were a couple of Communists on the staff and that the evidence was supposed to be on the Director's desk. I told him obviously that was not the case and it would appear that the newspaper source was merely calling us to let us know what was being circulated around town, but obviously we furnished no information; that there was some indication from the source that [redacted] had been helping Grunewald and [redacted] might be in contact with McInerney.

[redacted] I told him he was at liberty to do so.

I told him I would check for the reason why G-2 wanted the information and let him know, which is being done.

b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

In my conversation with Tobin, he advised that there was information over in the Senate similar to that furnished by Grunewald. I asked him where in the Senate and he said it came out of Senator McCarran's Office. Inasmuch as [redacted] told me that a member of the King Committee had told the Senator about [redacted] and [redacted] I think it might be well the next time I see [redacted] to confidentially inquire as to whether she recalled what member of the Committee furnished them this information.

I, of course, see no point in talking to [redacted] any further about this matter.

b7C b7D

cc Mr. Ladd
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Malley
Mr. Pennington

b7C [redacted]

The Attorney General

May 13, 1953

orig ret to file
See 65-6165-192
Conc 11/22/57 TIK

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

JUNE

①
HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DECLASSIFIED BY
ON 12-27-89

The following information concerning Henry William Grunewald was obtained by a confidential source of known reliability on May 11, 1953.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy

MAILED 11
MAY 14 1953
COMM-FBI

b7C

EXED - 75
163

RECORDED

MAY 18 1953

The Attorney General

b7C

[redacted]

Complete details concerning the information developed in connection with the request of Deputy Attorney General Rogers will, of course, be furnished to him upon the completion of the investigation of these matters.

NOTE:

This is a condensed version of information received from the Washington Field Office which has been set forth in as readable form as possible for the information of the Attorney General. It is to be noted an attempt has been made to furnish the Attorney General with only pertinent information which appears would be of interest to him.

b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(5) Bureau file 67-322 also reflects that, in April 1929, the Bureau conducted an investigation entitled, "William H. Vander Poel, Henry W. Grunewald, Application for Commission in Officer's Reserve Corps." It is noted that Vander Poel had served as an Agent of the Bureau of Investigation during World War I. At the time of the investigation, both were seeking to obtain a commission in the United States Army. The Bureau's investigation reflected that Grunewald was not trustworthy, possessed a bad reputation and had been indicted for violation of the National Prohibition Act, although he was not convicted of this offense. This information was furnished to the Military Intelligence Service by memoranda to the Department dated May 6, 1929, and September 10, 1929.

(6) Bureau file 65-6165 reflects that at the request of Mr. Stephen T. Early, Secretary to the President, the Bureau conducted an investigation in June and July, 1940, entitled, "Harry H. Woodring; Henry William Grunewald, also known as Henry Gruenwald, Frederich Wilhelm Grunewald, and Henri Grunewald; Misconduct in Office, Espionage." Mr. Early's request was based on allegations received from [redacted] to the effect that Grunewald was believed to be "in cahoots" with Senator Gerald P. Nye and that [redacted] had told [redacted] that Grunewald, on two occasions, had given the secretary a check in the sum of $4000 for Senator Nye. It was alleged that Grunewald had intimated this money came from Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring and that the money was paid in connection with War Department negotiations. On June 25, 1940, the Bureau received a memorandum from the Military Intelligence Service reflecting that Mr. Smith W. Brookhart had informed that Service that he had learned through [redacted] an alleged employee of the French-English Intelligence Service in 1917-1918 that the head of Nazi espionage in Washington, D. C., was Frederich Wilhelm Grunewald, also known as Henry William Grunewald, Westchester Apartments, Washington, D. C. It is noted that McDonald at that time was also residing in the Westchester Apartments and during 1937 and a portion of 1938, Grunewald shared offices with McDonald and former Senator Arthur R. Robinson, in the Munsey Building, Washington, D. C. (1)

b7C
b7D

b7D
per
Bsuing

(1) 65-6165-3

87.2755 287

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator." He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters.

ACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions I will advise Marvin Watson today of the background and current employment of Courtney Evans.

(2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best man to serve as an "arbitrator."

RESPECTFULLY,

C. D. DE LOACH

OK. Certainly Royall
would be impossible.
I had enough of him
when he was counsel
for the saboteurs & later
when as Secretary of War
he was instrumental in
throwing us out of SIS [Special Intelligence Service,
& setting up the C.I.A. Central Intelligence Agency "
practicability of the "arbitrator"
I have some doubts. It can be
another "Warren Commission" & end
in a fiasco. H (Hoover)

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

May 23, 1941

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. [illegible]
Tele. Room
[illegible]
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

[redacted] b7c - 51018

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

With further reference to Henry William Grunewald, in whom we are presently interested, I am attaching a memorandum for Mr. Carson fro [redacted]

b3 b7C per IRS

[redacted]

b3 per IRS

For your approval there is attached hereto a letter for the Attorney General's signature, to the Secretary of the Treasury [redacted]

Respectfully, [illegible]

P. E. Foxworth

T-4 SNIT
9-11-40

65-5165-25

[illegible] 1941

The investigation in this matter, which was closed July 8, 1940, revealed that the original allegations were apparently based on surmise and suspicion and not on any definite knowledge of the complainants. Neither the conditions alleged nor any irregularity on the part of Grunewald or former Secretary of War Woodring were discovered. There was no evidence developed that Grunewald was engaged in any activity for the German government. The result of the investigation in memorandum form were furnished to Mr. Early on July 9, 1940. (1)

(7) Bureau file 65-6165 also reflects that in May, 1941, the Military Intelligence Service advised the Bureau that information had been received by one of its informants that Grunewald was the pay-off man for German agents in the United States and was also contact man for various American peace and subversive organizations. Subsequently, the Bureau ascertained that the informant of the Military Intelligence Service was [redacted] and it was felt that the Military Intelligence Service was merely resurrecting old information in view of the fact that the Bureau had previously investigated the same allegations made by [redacted] However, on May 13, 1941, a technical surveillance of Grunewald was authorized and from June 4, 1941 through August 1, 1941, such surveillance was maintained on his apartment in the Westchester Apartments. No definite information was developed, indicating that Grunewald had violated any specific Federal Statute. (2)

b7D per Army

(8) Bureau file 65-6165 reflects that on September 15, 1942, the Omaha Office of the Bureau received a complaint from the Military Intelligence Service that Henry William Grunewald had, on the previous evening, given $110.00 in currency to two Army Privates attached to Headquarters, Seventh Service Command, while Grunewald, [redacted] were drinking at a bar in the Fontenelle Hotel in Omaha. The two Privates were then engaged in studying intelligence work, and becoming suspicious of Grunewald's apparent generosity with his money, reported the matter to the Omaha Office. They indicated that [redacted] had approximately $16,000 in her purse. This money was observed when she opened her purse in order to furnish currency to Grunewald to pass out to the crowd.

b7C b7D

Grunewald was interviewed by two Agents of the Omaha Office on September 15, 1942, regarding the matter and he identified himself as being connected with the Alien Property Custodian's office in Washington, D. C., by exhibiting travel authority 55G, signed by James E. Markham, of the Alien Property Custodians Office in Washington, D. C. Grunewald claimed to receive $8000 per year as salary from the Alien Property Custodian's Office. He admitted passing out money promiscuously in the bar and stated that he did not wish the matter reported to his superiors in Washington although he was willing to furnish information about the incident confidentially to the Bureau. He stated

(1) 65-6165-8
(2) 65-6165-22; 65-6165 Sub 1, Serial 1 to 122

Serial Removal Charge Out- [redacted]
4-674 (Rev. 7-18-73)

b7E

Subject HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD

This serial, the original memorandum from the FBI to the Attorney General dated 3/16/53, which was returned to the Bureau signed by the Attorney General authorizing FBI to conduct electronic surveillance, has been permanently removed for retention in the [redacted] per memorandum [redacted] to [redacted] dated 7-13-73. See 62-115687-1 for details and where maintained.

b7E

b7C

Removed By 343 Date 1/21/74

Complete File and Serial Number 65-6165-124

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/10/82 BY sp2[illegible]

12-27-89 SPSA [illegible]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERN

WPR:MJH:eo

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr. Tr
Mr. Gea
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Win
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Sizoo
Miss Gandy

TO : J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: April 13, 195

FROM : William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

SUBJECT: Request of Kean Committee for Henry W. Grunewald Files

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated April 7, 1953, from the Chief Counsel of the House Subcommittee on Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws, requesting permission to inspect the Immigration and Naturalization Service files and the personnel files relating to Henry W. Grunewald including his service with the Office of Alien Property and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service files and the Alien Property files have been obtained and will be made available, minus any FBI reports, in accordance with policy.

Advise would be appreciated whether the Bureau has a personnel file on Grunewald, and, if so, whether the Bureau would have any objection to making it available, minus any investigative reports, for examination by a Subcommittee representative. If the Bureau has such a file and no objection to its examination, please advise whether the Bureau would prefer to make it available for examination in one of the Bureau's offices or in this office.

1 Enc.

cc Grunewald to Mr. Nichols

23

Ack [redacted] 8/14 bx

RECORDED - 23

~~EXPEDITE PROCESSING~~

COPIES DESTROYED
268 AUG 27 1970

65-6165-141

APR 23 1953

50 MAY 4 1953

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14 May 1992

Note For: David Pearline, OCA

Subject: Suggested Qs & As for Hearing on JFK Assassination Documents

(Dave Gries suggests additional Qs and As along the following lines)

Q. Many of the Oswald documents transferred to the National Archives earlier this week were said to have been in the Archives previously . Is this correct ?

Ans. Yes, but most of the documents were originated by other agencies, and we were not aware of what those agencies had previously released.

Q. There appears to be little information of interest in the Oswald file that was released. Is this true ?

Ans. Yes this is essentially accurate. But the objective in transferring the file was to demonstrate our good faith commitment to release as many documents related to the assassination as possible, and as expeditiously as possible

John Pereira
x 76160

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

rtt-rw TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-M
a0639
11:22 05-15

BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-MULTITAKES
THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
Location: Rayburn Building, Room 2154
Time: 10 a.m.
May 15, 1992

*****

The editor of the report is Steve Ginsburg. Tim Ahmann, Eric Beech, Peter Ramjug and Paul Schomer also are available to help you. If you have questions, please call 202-898-8345. For service problems inside the District of Columbia, call 202-898-8355; outside D.C., call 1-800-537-9755.

*****

*****

This transcript is provided by News Transcripts, Inc. If questions of content arise, call 682-9050

*****

ROBERT GATES (director, CIA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm here to provide my views on House Resolution 454, the assassination materials disclosure act of 1992. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee, just as I did before your colleagues in the Senate last Tuesday.

I can summarize my statement, I think. It is largely the same as the one I did earlier. Let me just say, as I have said, that I'm in complete agreement with the effort to underline the joint resolution, that is, the effort to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy.

Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with his murder.

I have undertaken a number of efforts at CIA to accelerate the declassification of historical materials, creating a new organization to do that. It will be classified, or review for declassification, all documents over 30 years old, and Soviet estimates up to 10 years ago.

I've asked them to take as their first priority the review for declassification a review of the documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. And we have proceeded with that, without waiting for legislation.

And I've indicated earlier this week, we've declassified the first set of these records, the pre-assassination Oswald file. And these have now been transferred to the National Archives for release.

It's a small fraction of what we have, but I want to do it right away as an earnest of our intention to move on, to declassify these documents and to get them before the public as quickly as possible.

I've also made publicly available this week the agency's new guidelines for historical review and declassification.

~~In connection with these guidelines~~ I have recently commissioned a task force to review agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act. I've instructed this task force to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I've described for historical declassification.

Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents and those that are often requested under FOIA, and 30-year-old documents placed under historical review programs, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and the release of government or CIA records.

The chart that I've brought along with me describes the nature of CIA's collection of documents, about 250,000 to 300,000 pages of material. And I don't need I think to go into any further detail on that.

As I indicated, only about 11 of the pre-assassination documents belong to CIA, and we have released those, and as I did earlier in the week, brought along that file simply to show how thin it was before that time.

It was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated most of the documents that it had; 33,000 pages on Oswald alone.

There has been some comment on the pre-assassination Oswald file, and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all the material we will review; merely an earnest of our intentions.

All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the archives as they are completed without waiting for work on the entirety to be completed.

Mr. Chairman, you have asked about assassination materials that may be held by other intelligence community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records.

The National Security Agency and the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research report after a preliminary search that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be minimal, because its mission at the time of the assassination focused on foreign military order of battle.

I've indicated in my statement for the record that CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally, because of limits in the privacy act, which protects the names of Americans against unauthorized disclosure; the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations; and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA.

However, we've already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification.

As I indicated earlier in the week, if necessary, and in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of ~~Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the~~ results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. And I hope that we can work together, Mr. Chairman, to remove any obstacles that might arise in releasing the sequestered documents.

I also have indicated in my statement for the record that I assume there will be some materials that cannot be released, for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns, or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods.

And let me again take a moment to give an example of this type of material.

During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that a number of security and personnel files of CIA employees were requested. These files contained fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers.

Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended ~~up~~ in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of the disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping it confidential.

Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals, where the information is based on gossip or rumor.

Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality, and we would not release their names in breach of such a promise.

Where we cannot disclosure such information to the public, the agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent, or the privacy of an individual.

As I told your Senate colleagues earlier in the week, if legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the president regarding these papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back information relative to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified.

And they would then issue an unclassified report on their findings.

I believe that these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these documents declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside nongovernmental review.

It is against this background that I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this result.

First, vesting in a body outside--in an outside body the determination whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the assassination materials review board or its staff.

Third, I'm concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by the Congress or the Warren Commission.

Under the joint resolution documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the executive director of the assassination materials review board, without any review by the president or the executive branch.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies and departments to appeal decisions of the executive director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, Section 6 of the Joint Resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of a public release of the documents, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain executive privilege, or deliberative process, attorney-client or attorney-work product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest, and in fact are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly relating to the assassination, they would be unavailable in the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed.

These are technical problems, and I believe they can be solved in ways that can expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. And further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the president to declassify this material.

That concludes my summary of my statement, Mr. Chairman.

*****

*****

The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing
May 15, 1992
MORE

LLLEnglish

rtt-rw TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-1
a0829
13:50 05-15

BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-1STADD
THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992
(First Add)

*****

x x x Mr. Chairman.

REP. JOHN CONYERS JR. (D-MI): Thank you very much, Mr. Gates. We appreciate your statement. And I only have a couple of observations.

Putting them altogether, I'm interested in how much material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about? Why the Lee Oswald file was opened at the ~~CIA 14 mon~~ths after his defection. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? And was that picture in his file that was thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there something involved in that that you can shed some light on?

Q's

GATES: Well, at the risk of appearing appallingly ignorant, Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answers to any of those questions. But I will take them for the record and respond quickly to the committee.

A

REP. CONYERS: Well, thank you so much.

We're here against the background of history and the fact that this is the murder of the century. A president of the United States, sitting president. And I thought it was exemplary of the CIA--I never thought I'd be saying this this morning, either--to find out that you had permitted your representatives to discuss the subject matter with various think tanks around the city, one of which was included was the Institute for Policy Studies, whose cofounder is Marcus Raskin.

And I was told that there was a very candid exchange about this subject matter which was the purpose of the meeting. Some dozen or more of your representatives were meeting with them.

And I think that that is a very healthy sign of the times. I never thought it would happen, so I never thought I'd say what I am saying today. But one of the parts of that discussion was that Oliver Stone, the producer of the movie, has been parading around the country saying that you will not meet with him.

And as a conciliatory member of this Congress, could I facilitate such an arrangement so that it would help relieve the confusions and the disturbances of a lot of people, since he has, as a result of this movie, become apparently an expert on this subject?

GATES: Mr. Chairman, I would characterize him as a self-styled expert on this subject. I am no expert at all. I think I have moved very far in the direction of releasing these documents, as you indicated at the outset of the hearing. I think that the agency has in many ways set a standard in terms of its willingness to release these documents, and our determination to do so whether or not there is legislation.

Frankly, I find that the allegations contained in the--that I have been told about in the movie; I have not seen it--are offensive to the agency, and to the American government, and to a number of people who were in office at that time from the President of the United States on down, President Johnson on down.

It is not entirely clear to me what particular purpose would be served by a meeting between myself and Mr. Stone.

REP. CONYERS: Can you tell me about the sympathy and understanding that you may have for the American people's confusion and differences of view about whether Lee Harvey Oswald was alone the sole assassin of the president?

GATES: Well, my view, and it's a very personal view, Mr. Chairman, is that--and I have never made a study of the assassination; I have not read the many books that have been written about it--but my personal view is that the enormity of the event and the sense of tragedy that the American people felt, and still feel, over that event, is so great that the idea of a single individual, a single irrational individual, committing an act of such enormous historical consequence is enormously difficult to--for them to accept at face value.

And in many respects, it is similar to the continuing controversy over the assassination of President Lincoln, as more than 100 years later we still read books about conspiracies and so on in that respect.

And by the same token, and with all due respect to his memory, there doesn't seem to any similar kind of controversy about the assassination of President McKinley.

And so I think it is the inability of a lot of people to accept such an irrational act with such enormous consequences that has contributed to this. And I think that the--one of the concerns that grows out of this film is not that people accept it at face value but rather than particularly young people who may not read much history and may not read the reviews and may not read what historians have to say that is critical about the movie, but come out of it with the sense that there is some fire in all that smoke; that he may not have it right, but there must have been some sort of conspiracy.

And I've had, as I indicated to you the other day, I had a conversation about this with a distinguished United States Senator who had sent some of his smartest young staff out to see the ~~money~~ movie, and they came back and the reaction was not that they accepted what the movie said, but their concern that their government had in some way been involved. And frankly it was that more than anything else that prompted me to decide that it was imperative to get these documents out and try to dispel the suspicions that had been created.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. Mr. Schiff.

REP. STEVEN SCHIFF (R-NM): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Director Gates; I want to thank you for appearing personally here. I know that you have a heavy schedule, and I'm sure all the members of the committee do appreciate that.

I have just a few questions, but I do have a couple of observations on your statement. The first is, I do not know personally whether Mr. Oliver Stone who testified before us at the last hearing is a real expert on the assassination of President Kennedy, or as you suggested a self-styled expert.

I do know this, though. I do know that it's because of his movie that members of the Congress of the United States are discussing this matter publicly with the director of the CIA. And I'm quite positive that his movie has caused all of that to happen today, and I personally give him the credit for that.

Second of all, I note your observation that there is not a lingering conspiracy theory involving the assassination of President McKinley. To your knowledge, anywhere in the government, your agency or elsewhere, are there any documents or information which for any reason are not being released with respect to the assassination of President McKinley?

GATES: Well, I can't speak to that from direct knowledge, Mr. Schiff. But I will say that since it predated CIA's formation by 47 years, I imagine not.

REP. SCHIFF: Well, you see, I think that's the central point here, is that there is--I'm not sure we'll ever resolve all the questions about the assassination of President Kennedy. You are correct that we have not resolved all the questions about the assassination of President Lincoln. On national TV I saw a program recently suggesting that John Wilkes Booth did not actually die as suggested, and gave reasons for that.

But the difference between the assassination of President Kennedy and these prior terrible assassinations in our country's history is, this is the one situation where the government, for whatever reason, and for whatever circumstances, still holds information which it considers to be confidential.

And that's the root of this controversy now, and that's the root of this hearing, I think.

And I made a note of items that you as director of the CIA would consider to be still--to still warrant confidentiality today. And I made notes of three. If there were more, I apologize that I missed them. I'm not talking about the procedures, which you made observations about, and which I think you'll find the committee willing to discuss with the executive branch.

But three classifications of records. The first is personnel records involving, I gather, government agents, perhaps CIA agents, fitness reports and credit reports, first of all.

Second of all, the privacy issue because government files often accrue totally unsubstantiated information which can be fairly characterized as gossip, but which do get into the files when a total investigation is done; and third, where we've made a specific promise of confidentiality to a particular informant.

Before I ask you about those three, can I just ask, are there any other areas of documents that you as director of the CIA believe should not be released in terms of a generic category like these?

GATES: No, I would only include in the protection of sources also the protection of intelligence methods. But I think you've captured it.

REP. SCHIFF: Let me just go back on each of these briefly.

On protection of personnel records, why would those have gotten--I understand what you're talking about. I think we all do matters where there is internal monitoring of your own agents, which I understand is a necessity at times, why would those records have gotten into the assassination records on President Kennedy? Why are they mixed in there, do you know?

GATES: I don't really know, Mr. Schiff. I think, as I understand it, from the materials that were prepared for me, a great deal of documents were swept up in the material that is kept, and as my statement indicates, I don't think I read this part of it: These files contain everything from the most mundane newspaper articles, which are obviously not classified, or shouldn't be, to the most sensitive intelligence sources.

And so I think it's just a hodgepodge. As I also indicated, part of the problem that we have in going through these documents is that they are not indexed; they are not catalogued; and they really have no organization to them.

So when I started asking some months ago what was in the documents, what did we have, it actually took quite some time even to perform a survey to get some kind of idea of what kinds of records were in there.

But I assume that these kinds of things were just swept up with a lot of other material.

*****

*****

The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing (first add)
May 15, 1992
MORE

LLLEnglish

rtt-rw TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-2
a0831
13:52 05-15

BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-2NDADD
THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992
(Second Add)

*****

x x x other material.

REP. SCHIFF: Well, let me go on to one of the other categories, and that is, where the government has given a promise of confidentiality, the government ought to keep that. Can't the information be released without revealing the informant? Because I think it's the information that is desired here, not necessarily the identity of who provided it.

GATES: My own view, Mr. Schiff, is that that should be the case in almost every instance.

REP. SCHIFF: Finally with respect to intelligence methods, I understand that there's a national security point there. But we are also talking about 30 years ago, approximately.

Are our intelligence-gathering methods so unchanged in 30 years that you believe that revealing how agencies gather and collect and evaluation information would present a national security risk today if revealed?

GATES: Well, first of all, if an intelligence method is no longer in use, then I think it no longer--and there's little prospect of it ever being used again, I see no reason to protect it.

I think here again, though, that the focus should be on the information provided by these sources and methods, rather than the identification of the sources and methods themselves.

The only reason I would seek to protect them is in those instances in which those techniques are still being used, or we think there is a good chance they will be used again.

With respect to sources, I think that we have a much longer standing commitment to protect them. But again, I'm prepared, either under the legislation, through the board that would be established, or in the absence of legislation, through an outside panel, to let people who are not in the intelligence business review any of that material that we had held back to see that we had justifiable reasons for doing so.

REP. SCHIFF: So your overall position, Director

Gates, is that everything that can be released should be released?

GATES: Absolutely, Mr. Schiff.

REP. SCHIFF: Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you, Mr. Schiff.
The chair recognizes Mr. Thornton.

REP. RAY THORNTON (D-AR): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Director Gates, for a very forthcoming and positive testimony before this committee. I think that it is important to emphasize that we share an interest in disclosing all of the information related to the substance of this without jeopardizing the capacity of your agency to conduct its business.

And in fact, Section 6 of the proposed resolution says that disclosure to the general public of assassination material or particular information in assassination material may be postponed if its release would--and there's a whole list--but among that list is, if an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the United States government is involved.

And Director Gates, I believe that you're telling us, and I want to ask you directly, that if the standards that are contained in this resolution were adopted, and the CIA's records as you have suggested they should be, were released, with those safeguards, do you believe that any sensitive sources or methods would be revealed or compromise by the information which is released?

GATES: I think that the provisions that provide for the protection of sources and methods and that allow us ultimately the president to have the final say would provide adequate safeguards.

REP. THORNTON: The protections in the bill for intelligence-related information then are sufficient?

GATES: Yes, sir. I've indicated in my testimony we would ask the Congress to consider I think two additional categories of information. I mentioned executive privilege, or deliberative process. Attorney-client kinds of information.

Again, we think that there would be very little information that would be withheld under those circumstances, but without mentioning it, that recourse would be denied.

The second is, I think it would be useful to pick up on the same protection that the Congress has granted in separate legislation in terms of not revealing the names of covert employees of U.S. intelligence agencies.

REP. THORNTON: I appreciate those suggestions. But in summary the release of the CIA records in accordance with the general outline contained in this resolution would not damage any current CIA operations; is that correct?

GATES: No, sir, not in keeping with those safeguards.

REP. THORNTON: I know, Director Gates, that you've recently released, as you told us, some materials regarding Oswald. Can you make a commitment here to promptly release all of the files about the CIA's operations against Fidel Castro in the late '50s and early '60s?

GATES: We certainly--the files concerning Operation Mongoose, AMLash (phonetic), and so on, are included in the documents that will be reviewed in the--

REP. THORNTON: That was my specific followup question as to whether those files would be included in the material.

GATES: Yes, sir.

REP. THORNTON: I want to thank you again for your testimony. Like you I have not seen the movie, and that is not the basis of my concern. The basis of my concern is to make sure that all of the information that is in government possession relating to this assassination be released. Because in addition to the movie, I believe there are some inferences drawn by the House committee on investigations, and by the Garrison jury, that while no showing of a government conspiracy, that there were allusions to the possibility of an external conspiracy, and whatever may have existed needs to be dispelled by having the light of full disclosure shown upon the events of that time.

Would you agree with that, sir?

GATES: I agree with that totally, Mr. Thornton.

REP. THORNTON: Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Thornton. The chair recognizes Ms. Mink.

REP. PATSY T. MINK (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I too want to commend the forthright position that you've taken as the head of the CIA in initiating steps to release important documents that will contribute to the better understanding of the public at large as to what exactly happened.

I also agree with my colleagues that while the conclusions and inferences that were part of Oliver Stone's movie are under question, and perhaps totally negated by your agency, they are nevertheless, the basis for the renewed attention and concern as to exactly what happened on that day.

And therefore, it seems to me appropriate that the chair of this committee asked you to direct your attention to the content of that movie, because what we need now is an informed basis upon which to look at it.

I happen to have seen it, unlike some of my colleagues. And there are a number of very troublesome questions that the movie raises, and I am in no position to evaluate it, as most of the people in the country. And therefore, the disclosure of these documents are extremely important.

Looking at your testimony, Mr. Gates, I notice that you indicate that some of the documents which are relevant to this inquiry cannot be released by the CIA because they are in fact documents which belong to other agencies.

Would you comment on that and clarify that particular statement in your testimony?

GATES: Yes, ma'am. In the course of the post assassination investigations, a great deal of information was shared among the agencies. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records that we have, approximately 40 percent of those documents originated with the FBI, and were simply made available for information to CIA.

About 20 percent originated with the State Department or other agencies, immigration and naturalization and so on.

Under the third-agency rule, it is our obligation to leave it to those agencies to declassify their own documents. We cannot do that, and by the same token, they exercise the same practice with us.

REP. MINK: Now, would the legislation that we are considering now make it possible for your agency, as the custodian of records that you have been given by other agencies, be included in your own disclosure? Can we make that possible?

GATES: I don't think the legislation would do that, Mrs. Mink. I think that it would simply require those other agencies to undertake the same steps that we are in terms of reviewing for declassification the documents that they originated.

We don't hold the record copies of those documents. We simply have copies of them.

REP. MINK Now, in the materials that you have volunteered for disclosure, with reference to Oswald, how much of the materials in your possession, therefore, had to be excluded because they were documents that your agency had been provided by other governmental agencies?

GATES: Let me answer, and then check with my colleagues to make sure I got it right, in this very thin file, of the 34 documents, I think only 11 were originated by CIA. My impression is that the others had all--belong to other agencies had all already been declassified. That's correct.

REP. MINK: So that we have the total file with reference to Oswald now in the public domain?

GATES: The total file that CIA had in its possession.

REP. MINK: But you just said that all the other agencies have also already declassified, meaning that they are part of the public domain, and cannot be obtained, if not necessarily voluntarily released by those agencies, are now available public documents?

GATES: I don't know whether that's the case or not. Only the documents that we had from them have been released as part of the file we released. They may have other documents pre-November 22nd, 1963 that we didn't have.

REP. MINK: In other words, in reference to Oswald everything that you had in your possession, regardless of whether it belonged to other agencies, because you found them to be declassified, have all been released?

GATES: That's my understanding, yes, ma'am.

REP. MINK: Now, there is a Washington Post article of May 14th which suggests that the materials that have been disclosed with reference to Lee Harvey Oswald contain nothing new. Is that your understanding also of the documents that you released to the archives?

GATES: As I indicated earlier, I am certainly no student of this material. I do not know the answer to that question.

*****

*****

The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing (second add)
May 15, 1992
MORE

LLLEnglish

rtt-rw TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-3
a0835
13:54 05-15

BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-3RDADD
THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992
(Third Add)

*****

x x x that question.

REP. MINK: Does anyone in the room here from your agency have an answer to that question?

GATES: Some of the documents had not previously been released, so would have represented new information.

REP. MINK: Might we know today what exactly were new items that had not been released previously?

GATES: This is David Grease (phonetic). He is the director of our center for the study of intelligence.

DAVID GREASE (director, center for the study of intelligence): Mrs. Mink, some of these documents had been previously released. About half of those that are--originated at the CIA.

Among the documents of other agencies that were in our files, it's my understanding, but this would have to be verified, that almost all of them, if not all of them, had been previously released.

REP. MINK: So what consisted of new information that the public had not already had in its published files somewhere? } Q.

GREASE: Yes, I understand. We would have to respond to you separately from that. I cannot from memory tell you precisely which documents were new. } A.

I do know that the new ones are not of much consequence. They do not contain any information that is particularly enlightening. But we can tell you after the hearing what those are.

REP. MINK: Can you explain a second, if the CIA had been alerted by the State Department by a cable dated October 31st, 1959, with respect to Oswald's defection, why the CIA did not open a file until 14 months alter?

GATES: I don't think we have the faintest idea, Mrs.

Mink.

REP. MINK: There was no policy in effect in 1959 with reference to persons who publicly announced defection to the Soviet Union?

GATES: I just don't know.

REP. MINK: Has there been any inquiry made within the agency to determine that 14-month lapse?

GATES: I don't believe so.

GREASE: We did attempt to contact people who might have been involved at the time, and that largely failed, and in addition, we gained no information. We don't know.

REP. MINK: Now, I don't know the basis of this conclusion in the news article, but it indicates that the materials that were turned over to the National Archives, did not indicate that they were originals, unexpurgated originals, as the article says, that the materials turned over had been altered, revised, in some way by the CIA before they were released to the archives. Is that a true statement?

GREASE: It is not correct to say that they were altered or revised. Our effort was to furnish the file that we had. That file contained copies of original documents. Therefore we thought it appropriate to furnish precisely what we had.

What might be characterized as alterations by some by us are redactions of the kind of material that Director Gates has described to you, meaning some numbers, some names, but I can assure you, nothing of any consequence.

These are Privacy Act considerations and things of that nature.

REP. MINK: Mr. Gates, one final question: In your testimony you indicated that you did not support vesting in an outside body the determination of whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public, and to agree to that would be inconsistent with your statutory responsibility.

I take it, then, that you oppose the provisions in this bill which call for such vesting in an outside body?

GREASE: Frankly, my own view is that the provisions that provide that the president can have the final say, normally I would not shift to the president my burden for protecting sources and methods. But it seems to me that, given the unique circumstances of this case, it seems to me that that is one part of the bill that we could find a way to work around.

REP. MINK: Then is it not somewhat inconsistent in your testimony in saying that if this bill didn't pass and didn't become law, you would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside the government to do the exact same function for your agency?

GATES: No, ma'am, what I would appoint that panel to do is examine all the redactions that we had made, and to examine all of the documents that we decided could not be declassified, and then provide a report to the American people on whether or not any of those redactions or those withheld documents had a bearing on the assassination.

They would not make the decision to declassify.

REP. MINK: Now, would the establishment of such a panel of outside experts in effect also under your definition violate the Privacy Act? } Q.

GATES: I don't know the answer to that. I would have to have--I would have to have our attorneys look at it.] A.

REP. MINK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mrs. Mink. You've touched on some very important areas.

There are just two related considerations that I'd like to bring to your attention, Director Gates. One is in the Freedom of Information Act, where electronic data is a discretionary matter with the agency, and we would like you to review the problem with the release of CIA electronic data of previously released requests. It's a technical point, but I bring it to your attention for your future consideration.

And finally, with regard to the Castro records, and AMLash and Gilverto Lopez (phonetic), it is my hope that you will elevate those as high up on your agenda for reconsideration for release as soon as appropriate. There are a number of members in the Congress that have asked me to bring this matter to your attention as well.] HRG Note

GATES: I think we can do that, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. And on behalf of the committee, we deeply appreciate your appearance before us today.

GATES: Thank you, sir.

END GATES TESTIMONY
*****
*****
The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing (third and final add)
May 15, 1992
REUTER

LLLEnglish

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

January 30, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
2185 Rayburn House Office Building
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is the Assassination Records Review Board's sixth monthly progress report, as required by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight report on H.R. 1553 (now P.L. 105-25), that extended the authorization of the Review Board until September 30, 1998.

At the January 22 closed meeting, the Board processed for public release approximately 3,600 FBI records, 1,000 CIA records, and 350 records from other agencies. The nearly 5,000 records processed by the Board is its highest total for a single meeting. In addition, the Review Board recently released approximately 600 pages of military records regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-63. Additional military records related to U.S. policy toward Cuba in the early 1960's will be ready for public release in the coming months.

The 710 records that the CIA made available for Review Board action at the January meeting is the highest monthly number of records released to date. In addition, a total of 289 HSCA documents with CIA equities were opened in full pursuant to discussions with the CIA. Although the Review Board believes that the pace must continue to increase, the momentum is unquestionably in the right direction. The CIA also has advised us that it has added additional reviewers and indexers, which we believe should help it process more records during the upcoming months. We now are conducting weekly meetings with CIA for the purpose of evaluating the pace of the review process. The CIA also has increased its progress in responding to our requests for additional information and records. The requests that we had identified as priorities have now been answered either in whole or in part and the CIA has shown an increased

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

willingness to respond to follow-up requests more quickly. While there are a significant number of requests outstanding, the increased responsiveness of the CIA bodes well for the completion of these requests in a timely manner.

Since our December report, the Board's FBI team has reviewed an additional 20,000 pages of records from the FBI's HSCA files. Included in these files are the names of individuals who have a prominent role in the history surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. Although this page count is higher than last month, we have advised the FBI that the volume must return to earlier levels to ensure that the review is completed in a timely manner.

As I reported in my January 16, 1998 letter to you, all of the agencies and offices to which you addressed letters in December have now contacted us and pledged to complete their work in a timely manner. In particular, recent meetings and communications with the Internal Revenue Service have been fruitful and provide reason to believe that the IRS will fulfill its obligations under the law.

I would also like to take this opportunity to provide you with an update on the Board's federal compliance program. The State Department has submitted a draft final compliance statement and we expect that its obligations under the JFK Act will be completed and appropriately documented by early March. The Joints Chiefs of Staff has submitted its final compliance statement, and the Board has agreed that its compliance statement is complete. The Social Security Administration also has submitted its final compliance statement and has now received notification that its obligations under the law are fulfilled. We continue to work with the other federal agencies that have obligations under the JFK Act and the compliance program is proving to be an effective mechanism to document their progress.

Again, thank you for your continuing interest in the work of the Review Board and the support that you have provided in working with various federal agencies. Please do not hesitate to have a member of your staff contact me if you have any comments or questions. I can be reached at 724-0088, ext 226.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

file

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director and General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board

Prepared Statement for
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Hearing on S. 712

March 25, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee -- I appreciate the opportunity to testify on S. 712 from the perspective of a person who has labored in the declassification trenches for the past three and one-half years. Although I serve as the Executive Director of the Assassination Records Review Board, I wish to emphasize that I am testifying here today not as a spokesman for the Review Board, but as an individual who has been involved in day-to-day interactions with numerous Federal agencies on issues related to declassification. The Review Board members, who were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, are Judge John R. Tunheim, Professor Henry F. Graff, Dean Kermit L. Hall, Dr. William L. Joyce, and Professor Anna Kasten Nelson. The Board members have provided the American people unparalleled access to information that has been held secret for more than a third of a century. The Review Board's official positions on matters related to declassification will be set forth in its Final Report to Congress and the President later this year.

I applaud the efforts of Senator Moynihan, Senator Helms, and this Committee to reduce government secrecy. One of the tragic consequences of government secrecy has been the widely held belief that the government has known much more about the assassination than it has been willing to reveal to the public. Many of the assassination records that we have seen could have been opened to the public years ago without any harm to the national security. The efforts of this Committee could go a long way to help alleviate the suspicion of government -- some of it being justifiable suspicion -- that has festered since the assassination of President Kennedy.

Because my experience comes principally from the field of declassification, I will focus my remarks on that area rather than discuss the very important issue of initial classification.

I. Background

Although the word "unique" is over-used, it can fairly be applied to the work and accomplishments of the Review Board. The Board was created by Congress in an effort to release the government's still-secret files related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In accordance with the declassification standards articulated in Section 6 of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107, Pub.L. 102-526 (as amended) ("JFK Act"), the Review Board has opened up previously classified records from numerous agencies and departments, including the CIA, NSA, FBI, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice, as well as the Military Services, Secret Service, Senate and House Committees, and the National Security Council.

Under the JFK Act, agencies are required either to open assassination records in full, or to present to the Review Board proposed redactions and evidence in support of their proposed redactions. After receiving the agencies' evidence, the Review Board deliberates and makes "formal determinations" as to whether the records should be opened. The Board's determinations have been overwhelmingly in favor of opening records. If an agency disagrees with the formal determination of the Review Board, its sole recourse is to appeal the Board's decisions to the President. Thus far, only one agency, the FBI, has appealed Board decisions. (The appeals ultimately involved approximately 90 records and four different issues.) After extensive briefings had been submitted to the President -- with each side arguing why the records should or should not be released -- the FBI ultimately withdrew its appeals and negotiated with the Review Board for resolution of the issues. Without exception, every formal determination ultimately made by the Review Board has prevailed and records have been released in accordance with Board decisions. It has now been almost two years since an agency has appealed a decision to the President. Thus, the Board's work has been a success. Although I do not consider the JFK Act to be the precise model for future government-wide declassification efforts, it nevertheless has provided valuable lessons that may be of use to you as you consider S. 712.

II. The "Four Noble Truths" of Declassification

In my opinion, any legislation that would attempt to have a significant impact on the culture of secrecy must do more than articulate worthy goals and establish bureaucratic entities to reiterate those goals. Effective legislation must address the significant institutional impediments to declassification. Any conscientious effort to change the secrecy system should take into account what I will call the "Four Noble Truths" of declassification:

first, an independent entity, not the classifying agency, should be the final decision maker on declassification;

second, the independent declassification entity should be informed, committed, and skeptical;

third, in order for declassification to be successful, there must be internal institutional incentives to declassify information; and

fourth, the key to successful declassification is *not* the articulation of the

List of Exhibits
Statement of T. Jeremy Gunn

Exhibit A.
Cable to the Mexico City Station from CIA Headquarters, November 27, 1963.

This document was released in full after a Board vote in 1995. The second line of typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) "RYBAT" and "GPFLOOR." These crypts appear in the "slug line" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. "GPFLOOR" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of the second paragraph of text. CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable.

Exhibit B.
Letter to the Legal Attaché in Paris from the Director of the FBI, October 12, 1960. Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald - Internal Security.

This document was one of several records exempted by the FBI because it contained foreign government information. The stamps on the page suggest that the document was reviewed in 1977 and stamped exempt from declassification. This document was re-reviewed in 1992 and severely redacted. The Review Board, with the assistance of the Department of State, approached the Swiss Government and requested that it consent to the release of the information. In December 1995, the document was released in full after a Board vote and with the concurrence of the Swiss Government.

Exhibit C.
Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31, 1964. Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba.

The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. This exhibit contains one page from a 58-page document formerly classified Top Secret--Sensitive. The document was excluded from automatic declassification and was unavailable to the public in any form. It was systematically reviewed in October 1989 and the classification was continued. This document and many similar documents were opened in full at a declassification session in July 1997 after review by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, the National Security Council, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Exhibit D.
(a) *Vietnam January-August 1963*, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 3. pp. 265-270.

(b) Memorandum for the Record of the Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference on Vietnam, May 6, 1963, Honolulu, Hawaii.

In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam in Honolulu, Hawaii. Part (a) of this exhibit includes all of the material that had been publicly released on the conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in *Foreign Relations of the United States)* and part (b) includes the title pages of the full 213-page *Record [of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference* from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been excluded from automatic regrading and declassification and could presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989, and the classification of Top Secret was continued. The document was opened in full at an ARRB declassification session in July 1997.

Exhibit E.
Monthly Operational Report 1-30 September from the Chief of Station, Mexico City to Chief KURIOT, October 18, 1963.

The CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance. This document is a CIA monthly operational report for Mexico City for September 1963, a period that includes Lee Harvey Oswald's arrival in the Mexican capital. The attached form discloses that this document was reviewed in 1993 and postponed in its entirety. It was opened in full in 1995 after a Board vote.

Exhibit F.
NSA SIGINT product report, November 26, 1963.

The Review Board has had some success in releasing NSA records. This document discloses NSA's intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from automatic declassification. This document was released with sanitizations by Board vote.

Exhibit G.
Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from Gordon Chase, June 15, 1964. Subject: Assassination of Castro.

This document from the files of the National Security Council was originally classified "Secret" and was exempted from declassification in 1976. The NSC agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Review Board in 1998.

categories of information exempt from release (although the clear articulation of such categories is important), but the allocation of the burden of proof to the party that seeks to exempt information from release.

Because these four points are inextricably interconnected, I will discuss them in reference to our work and to a series of documents that are attached as exhibits to this testimony.

During the past four years, I have spent hundreds of hours talking with officials from more than a dozen agencies and reviewing memoranda that argue against the release of certain types of classified information. It has been my general impression that the officials making such arguments are intelligent, conscientious, competent, and hardworking. (I also have had the general impression that they have sought to be cooperative with the Review Board and that they have made good-faith efforts to comply with the JFK Act.) One nevertheless cannot help but observe a deep-seated, institutional reluctance to release information -- particularly on the part of those institutions that were created for the purposes of collecting secret information and preserving secrets.

In order to facilitate declassification, S. 712 requires agencies to articulate their reasons for initial classifications and for exemptions from declassification. For example, Section 4(c)(2)(A) would require the agency to "provide in writing a detailed justification for [an initial classification] decision." Similarly, with regard to the 30-year review, agencies would "certi[fy] to the President at the end of such 30-year period that continued protection of the information from unauthorized disclosure is essential to the national security of the United States . . . ." (Sect. 4(d)(2)). The talented officials who are hired by the agencies will be able to provide such explanations and such justifications. The issue from my perspective is not whether agencies are able to articulate such justifications, but to what extent their justifications can withstand scrutiny. Let me provide some examples where initial justifications for withholding information did not withstand scrutiny.

Illustration 1. See Exhibit A. The first illustration is a CIA cable dated November 27, 1963, that has now been released in full. As you can see, the second line of typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) "RYBAT" and "GPFLOOR." These crypts appear in what is called the "slug line" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. "GPFLOOR" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of the second paragraph of text. The CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable. I had several discussions with agency officials as they tried to explain why GPFLOOR could be released in one place but not in the other. I could not understand their explanations. At that time I was new to the work and I did not know whether I was simply not bright enough or experienced enough to understand the explanation being offered. I again raised the question in a later meeting with several agency officials that covered other topics. Finally, an official said: "I don't see why it can't be released. This is an issue for COMMO [COMMO is the Communications Office.] Someone ask COMMO whether it cares." COMMO was subsequently asked -- and it had no objection to the release. I now infer that protecting crypts in slug lines was an ingrained agency habit rather than a considered judgment. The disclosure came only after incessant questioning by a skeptical interlocutor.

Illustration 2. During the course of our review of records from the Secret Service, the Board identified for the Secret Service a record it intended to open in full and the agency objected. The Board then advised that a copy of the record had actually been published in full in 1964 as an exhibit to the Warren Commission Report. The agency continued to object, arguing that even a subsequent release of an open document would again disclose matters that should be kept secret. The Board subsequently voted to open the record.

Illustration 3. In several FBI documents that were subject to appeal to the President, the FBI argued that certain types of its electronic surveillance had not previously been disclosed. In our opposing memoranda, we showed that Director J. Edgar Hoover, in open testimony to Congress, had effectively disclosed the existence of the electronic surveillance. Those records are now open.

Illustration 4. See Exhibit B. The Review Board was presented with a heavily redacted but provocative document pertaining to an FBI "Internal Security" inquiry into Lee Harvey Oswald in October 1960. The FBI declined to release the information, arguing that it contained the equities of a foreign government and that the government had refused to release the information. The Review Board, with the assistance of the Department of State, thereupon approached the Swiss Government and requested that it consent to the release of information about the assistance that the Swiss Federal Police provided to the FBI to track down Oswald. The Swiss government agreed and the record is now open in full.

Illustration 5. See Exhibit C. The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. Exhibit C contains one page from a 58-page document from this group that had been "excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification." The Review Board staff arranged for a group of declassifiers from several military and other national-security entities to meet at the Review Board offices in a joint-declassification session. The 58 pages of this document, and many other records from this group, have gone from being completely closed to completely open.

Illustration 6. See Exhibit D. In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam. Exhibit D includes all of the material that had been publicly released on the conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in *Foreign*

Relations of the United States, 1961-63 Vol. 3) and the title page of a 213-page *Record [of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference* from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification and could presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989 and the classification of Top Secret was continued. The document was opened in full at a declassification session in July 1997.

Illustration 7. See Exhibit E. Like the FBI, the CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance. Exhibit E is a monthly operational report from Mexico City from September 1-30, 1963, a period that includes Oswald's arrival in the Mexican capital. In 1993, the document was postponed in its entirety. The Review Board voted to open the record in its entirety.

Illustration 8. See Exhibit F. The Review Board has also had some success in releasing NSA records. Exhibit F is dated November 26, 1963, and discloses NSA's intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination. It was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from declassification. After Board action, the important information has been released.

Illustration 9. See Exhibit G. Exhibit G is a National Security Council document that pertains to an alleged plot to assassinate Castro. Although it was originally classified "Secret" and was deemed to be exempt from declassification, the NSC agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Board.

I trust that these examples show that agencies are initially inclined to protect information that can and should be released. But the examples also show that, with a little prodding by an independent entity, agencies can and will participate in a cooperative spirit to declassify secrets. Under the current regime, outside of the JFK Act, agencies have little internal or external incentive to take an energetic approach to declassifying records. Agencies do not send the message to agency personnel that a fast track to career advancement lies with the release of more information than is absolutely necessary. Agencies have the natural disinclination to release information that has been painstakingly acquired. Ultimately, secrecy becomes a habit and declassification is mired in lack of attention and inertia. There is, however, an important and encouraging message that comes out of the Board's experience: *once agencies come to the understanding that they must declassify records and that there is a presumption that records should be opened, the agencies will cooperate in good faith with the requirements established by Congress.*

III. The Mechanics of Declassification

Declassification involves more than appropriate standards for the release of information. It also calls for the establishment of effective mechanisms to move records through the bureaucracy. Once again, the experience of the Review Board provides valuable lessons that should be of use to this Committee in considering legislation. I would like to draw attention to four important points involving the mechanics of declassification.

First, the "referral process" is one of the most significant, government-wide bottlenecks to the declassification of records. Before an agency can release information in its records that was obtained from another agency, it must refer the record to the agency from which it derived that information. Although this procedure is a sensible arrangement that promotes the valuable goal of sharing information among agencies, it becomes a costly and time-consuming obstacle to declassification. Very frequently, records become trapped in the morass of the referral process.

The Review Board developed essentially three procedures to help expedite the referral process: (a) establishing joint-declassification sessions where several agencies convened at the Review Board offices (or sometimes at another site) and declassified records; (b) hand-carrying records from one agency to another and having them declassified on-site; and (c) giving agencies notice that unless records were reviewed by a certain date, the Board would simply vote to open the records without receiving the benefit of their input. In my opinion, any legislation designed to improve the declassification process must take into account this referral bottleneck by giving to the independent, supervising agency, the authority to set enforceable timetables.

The ability to bring agencies together, such as in the joint-declassification sessions, has important beneficial effects that extend beyond expediting the referral process. In our experience, agencies tended to lose some of their institutional inhibitions as they sat at a table with each other and discussed records openly. Surprisingly, agencies typically *assumed* that another agency would not release information when the other agency was in fact willing to do so. Frequently, it is the suspicion that one agency does not want to release information that inhibits other agencies from releasing information. Like the COMMO example from Illustration 1 above, the perception of unwillingness to open records is sometimes greater than the need to keep records closed.

Second, the Review Board profitted from the power, authorized by Congress, to "direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board . . . additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities . . . ." JFK Act, § 7(j)(1)(C)(ii). This power enabled the Review Board to obtain information about the basis for classifications, the existence of records relevant to completing its mandate, and the circumstances surrounding the creation of records. It is important that an agency with supervisory responsibility over declassification have the authority to obtain the information it needs to accomplish its work.

Third, as with the referral process, a frequent bottleneck in the declassification process is the final transfer of records from the declassifying agency to the National Archives. An independent entity responsible for supervising this process should have the authority and responsibility of guaranteeing that once the declassification process is complete, the final step of making records available to the public is taken.

Fourth, although the start-up process is very time-consuming, it is a necessary prelude to more efficient and productive work. The start-up time for the Review Board, as I understand is also the case for Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), required education not only of the Board and staff, but also of the agencies. It is important that any future planning of an endeavor of this nature take into account the initial costs and, importantly, take advantages of the lessons learned by the Review Board. The initial cost can be recuperated in the long run.

When an independent agency, such as the Review Board, has the authority to set the agenda (by establishing timetables), sponsor joint declassification sessions, require the production of evidence, and ensure the prompt transfer of declassified records from the agencies to the National Archives, declassification can be a success. I strongly urge this Committee to take advantage of the momentum created by the JFK Act and by ISCAP, and create an authority that will be able to bring independence, consistency, and energy to the process of making the government more open and accountable to the people who have paid for it.

IV. Recommendations for Making S. 712 More Effective

With regard to S. 712, I wish to summarize the following recommendations that have been offered either explicitly or implicitly in the testimony above:

First, the entity responsible for overseeing the declassification process (which, in the current version of the S. 712, is the National Declassification Center), must be genuinely independent of the agencies whose records it oversees. The Center should be staffed by persons who are both sensitive to the genuine secrets of the agencies, but who also are skeptical and demanding of proof.

Second, the independent entity should have the power to set reasonable timetables by which an agency must complete the declassification review (or referral review). The independent entity should be empowered to release information on its own authority if agencies do not comply with reasonable timetables. The independent agency should additionally be empowered to obtain information from the agencies that is essential for completing its work.

Third, the legislation should incorporate a statutory provision that, at a certain point in time, records will presumptively be opened unless the agencies are able to articulate specific and persuasive reasons for continued redactions. Although it would be sensible to provide agencies with the benefit of the doubt regarding declassification for an initial period (*e.g.*, between 10 and 25 years), once this period has passed the presumption should shift decisively in favor of releasing the information.

Fourth, agencies should be required to do more than provide mere "detailed justifications" (*see, e.g.*, S. 712 § 4(c)(2)(A)) for classifying and refusing to declassify records. The written explanations must be *more than* "justifications," they must be able to convince a skeptical reader who has sufficient information to evaluate the merits of the writing.

Fifth, it would be highly advisable to provide the declassification entity (the National Declassification Center), with the authority to make binding requests to agencies to search out records that may have been misplaced or misfiled.

Finally, there is one additional recommendation that I would make that presumably goes beyond the scope of today's hearing and so I will raise it only in passing. I believe it would be advisable for future Executive Orders to break down the "sources and methods" exemption, inasmuch as it is used too casually and it covers a multitude of very distinct issues. To the extent that the Committee is interested, I would be willing to submit additional comments at a later point to develop this issue.

* * * *

I would like once again to thank the Committee for taking seriously the right of the American people to better understand how their government functions. I would be pleased to answer your questions.

13-00000

STATEMENT OF STEVEN GARFINKEL
DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE*
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

before the

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

March 25, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am very pleased to appear before you today to report on our progress in implementing the recently established system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information. On April 17, 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12958, entitled "Classified National Security Information." This Order took effect on October 14, 1995, only two and one-half years ago. While still in its early stages of implementation, the Order clearly attempts to strike an appropriate balance.

---

*The Information Security Oversight Office, or ISOO, is responsible for overseeing Government-wide implementation of the security programs under Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information," and Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program." ISOO is also responsible for reporting annually to the President on the status of those programs. Created in 1978, ISOO became a component of the National Archives and Records Administration in November 1995. In addition to reporting to the Archivist of the United States, the Director of ISOO receives policy guidance from the National Security Council.

Among its functions, ISOO: (1) develops implementing directives and instructions; (2) maintains liaison with all agencies that create or handle classified information; (3) inspects agency programs and reviews their classified records; (4) receives and responds to public complaints, appeals and suggestions; (5) collects and reports to the President and Congress relevant statistical data about the security classification program, including data about its costs; (6) serves as a spokesperson for information about the security classification program; (7) provides program and administrative support for the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel and the Information Security Policy Advisory Council; and (8) recommends policy changes to the President through the National Security Council.

On the one hand, it seeks to reduce the permitted level of secrecy within our Government, and to make available to the American people hundreds of millions of pages of historically valuable documents that no longer require protection in the interest of national security. On the other hand, the Order enables us to safeguard the information that we must in order to protect our nation and our citizens.

Already, this new system has achieved some rather remarkable results:

- In the last two years, the agencies of the executive branch have declassified more than 400 million pages of permanently valuable government records.

- Of the more than 650 million pages that the executive branch has declassified since 1980, more than 70% of that total took place in the past three years.

- Agencies that never previously contemplated large-scale declassification, like the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, now have in place productive declassification units.

- The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, a new six member panel representing the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has declassified in their entirety more than 70% of the documents that have come before it on appeal from agency decisions to keep those same documents classified.

- Original classification decisions, the actions most akin to new secrets, have decreased to historic lows.

- Anecdotally, those of us who are exposed to a wide variety of classified information are noting more and more situations in which information that would have been routinely classified in the past is now routinely unclassified, without any increased threat to our national security.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I can state with total confidence that the United States Government stands far in the forefront among nations in the manner, timing and extent to which it makes available to its citizens and the general public its records of governance, including its formerly classified records. In conversation after conversation that I have had over the years with foreign government officials, and with foreign students, researchers, and journalists, one visitor after another has expressed great admiration for the degree of openness offered by our freedom of information laws, and our security classification system, with its limitations on classification and its emphasis on declassifying information as soon as it is prudent to do so.

These indicators of progress do not mean that we have all the answers about our security classification system or that there aren't tremendous hurdles to clear. For example, the implementation of the new system has been uneven among the major classifying agencies, and a few are only now just getting started; the costs of implementing the system at some agencies are higher than we anticipated; and resource limitations are having a clear impact on agency compliance and oversight. To be sure, the standards and goals established within the new Executive Order are unparalleled. We are not yet certain that every agency, or perhaps any agency, can achieve them. However, only if the targets are difficult can reaching them be noteworthy.

I recognize that the focus of today's hearing is the legislation before the Committee. I will try to answer any questions you may have concerning the similarities and differences between the security classification system that currently exists and the system that S. 712, as currently drafted, would impose. The Administration has serious objections to certain provisions of S. 712, particularly as they could impinge upon the President's authority and flexibility to manage the classification and declassification programs. Legislating in this area can be perilous, given the great deference traditionally given to the President in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs.

However, the Administration is prepared to work with the Congress to address these concerns and to establish an effective National Declassification Center. The Administration will identify the revisions that would be required to enable the Administration to support S. 712.

Board of Sponsors
(Partial List)
- * Sidney Altman
- Bruce Ames
- * Philip W. Anderson
- * Kenneth J. Arrow
- * Julius Axelrod
- * David Baltimore
- * Baruj Benacerraf
- * Hans A. Bethe
- * J. Michael Bishop
- * Konrad Bloch
- * Nicolaas Bloembergen
- * Norman E. Borlaug
- * Owen Chamberlain
- Abram Chayes
- * Stanley Cohen
- * Leon N. Cooper
- * E. J. Corey
- Paul B. Cornely
- * Johann Deisenhofer
- * Renato Dulbecco
- John T. Edsall
- Paul R. Ehrlich
- * Gertrude B. Elion
- George Field
- Jerome D. Frank
- * Jerome I. Friedman
- * D. Carleton Gajdusek
- John Kenneth Galbraith
- * Walter Gilbert
- Edward L. Ginzton
- * Donald Glaser
- * Sheldon L. Glashow
- Marvin L. Goldberger
- * Joseph L. Goldstein
- * Roger C.L. Guillemin
- * Herbert A. Hauptman
- * Dudley R. Herschbach
- Frank von Hippel
- * Roald Hoffmann
- John P. Holdren
- * David H. Hubel
- * Jerome Karle
- Nathan Keyfitz
- * H. Gobind Khorana
- * Arthur Kornberg
- * Edwin G. Krebs
- * Willis E. Lamb, Jr.
- * Leon Lederman
- * Wassily W. Leontief
- * William N. Lipscomb
- Jessica T. Mathews
- Matthew S. Meselson
- Neal E. Miller
- * Franco Modigliani
- Philip Morrison
- Stephen S. Morse
- * Joseph E. Murray
- * Daniel Nathans
- * Marshall Nirenberg
- * Douglas D. Osheroff
- * Arno A. Penzias
- * Martin L. Perl
- Gerard Piel
- Paul Portney
- Mark Ptashne
- George Rathjens
- * Frederick Reines
- * Burton Richter
- * Richard J. Roberts
- Vernon Ruttan
- Jeffrey Sachs
- * Arthur Schawlow
- * J. Robert Schrieffer
- * Glenn T. Seaborg
- * Phillip A. Sharp
- * Herbert A. Simon
- * Richard E. Smalley
- Neil Smelser
- * Jack Steinberger
- * Henry Taube
- * James Tobin
- * Charles H. Townes
- Robert A. Weinberg
- Victor F. Weisskopf
- * Torsten N. Wiesel
- C. S. Wu
- Herbert F. York

* Nobel laureates

F.A.S.

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS
307 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone (202) 546-3300
E-Mail fas@fas.org
Web http://www.fas.org/
Facsimile (202) 675-1010

Carl Kaysen *Chairman* | Robert M. Adams *Vice-Chairman* | Ann Druyan *Secretary* | Charles C. Price *Treasurer* | Jeremy J. Stone *President*

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Statement
of
Steven Aftergood
Director, Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists

before the
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

Hearing on
S. 712, The Government Secrecy Act

March 25, 1998

National Council Members

Eric Hall Arnett
Rosemary Chalk
Steve Fetter
* Val L. Fitch
Linda Gottfredson
David Hafemeister
Morton H. Halperin
Daniel Kammen
Priscilla J. McMillan
Arthur H. Rosenfeld
Robert Socolow
Burns H. Weston

*ex officio: *Robert M. Solow, Andrew Sessler*

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to address your Committee on the subject of government secrecy.

I believe that this subject is as important as any on the Committee's agenda because it goes directly to the heart of our political system. Government controls on information define the limits of American democracy. Limits on information mean limits on informed debate, limits on the ability of citizens to meaningfully communicate with their representatives, and on their ability to hold elected officials accountable.

At the same time, it is self-evident that some degree of secrecy is necessary in certain matters of national security, including the protection of advanced military technologies and the conduct of diplomatic and intelligence activities.

A sound government information policy is therefore one that strikes a responsible and appropriate **balance** between the imperatives of open, accountable government and the requirements of national security secrecy.

Such a balance is precisely what has been lacking throughout the modern era of cold war secrecy, leaving us today with a grotesquely distended secrecy system that improperly withholds unimaginable quantities of records from public access while often failing to protect genuine secrets.

My hope is that Congress and this Committee will take steps towards a new balance that corrects the failings of the past, and will enact a government information policy that better serves the national interest.

In the following remarks, I will first present several assertions about secrecy policy by way of background, and I will then draw some specific conclusions concerning the Government Secrecy Act.

BACKGROUND

I would like to emphasize several points that I believe should form the foundation for congressional deliberation on the future of the government secrecy system.

1. Most Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive.

One might well suppose that public concern about official secrecy is limited to those who are most immediately affected by it, such as journalists and historians, as well as a small cadre of advocates and activists. But that is not the case.

Public surveys conducted for the Department of Defense in 1994 and 1996 consistently found that a majority (55%) of Americans believe that "the government protects too many documents by classifying them as SECRET and TOP SECRET."[1]

In other words, concern about excessive government secrecy is not simply the province of "special interest" groups; it is shared throughout the general public. Reducing government secrecy truly is a matter of "public interest."

Much of this public concern is latent and diffuse, but it crystallizes time and again around specific issues-- the JFK assassination, POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia, UFOs, Nazi war crimes, human rights violations in Latin America, and so forth.

2. Excessive classification is a fact. But independent review can overcome it.

Even if the majority of Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive, they could conceivably be mistaken. But they are not mistaken. It is demonstrably true that government agencies classify too much and fail to declassify information that no longer warrants protection.

This problem is illustrated with particular clarity by the fact that agency refusals to declassify records are frequently overturned-- within the executive branch itself-- by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), which receives appeals from members of the public for documents that agencies have refused to declassify

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roslyn A. Mazer, who was appointed by President Clinton to chair the ISCAP, reported recently on the latest activities of her Panel, which includes representatives of the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, CIA, NSC and the National Archives:

> We have taken final votes on appeals for declassification of more than 70 documents on a wide variety of subjects. Of these, we have voted to declassify more than 70 percent of them in their entirety, while declassifying significant segments of most of the remainder. This is significant in my view because, *in each instance, we are voting to overturn an agency's decision reached at its highest level of appeal....*[2]

---

[1] Not inconsistently, a majority of those surveyed also favor "a high level of secrecy" for technology with military applications. *"Public Attitudes Towards Security and Counter-Espionage Matters in 1994 and 1996"* by Tom W. Smith, National Opinion Research Center, prepared for the Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, November 1996. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/perssur2.html>.

[2] Remarks by Roslyn A. Mazer, Chair, Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, before the DoD Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel, March 6, 1998, emphasis added. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/iscap0398.html>.

The fact that agency classification policies often cannot withstand scrutiny even within the executive branch points to the root of the problem. The problem is not that classifiers are dishonest or acting in bad faith; in general, they are doing a thankless job the best they can.

The problem rather is the natural and often unconscious tendency of all bureaucracies to limit the flow of information to outsiders. As Sen. Moynihan observed, "The problem is that organizations within a culture of secrecy will opt for classifying as much as possible, and for as long as possible."[3] If they go unchecked, agencies will hoard information beyond all reason, which is how we got to where we are today.

Fortunately, Ms. Mazer's remarks also reveal a solution to this unavoidable problem, and that is independent review of agency classification decisions. The record of the ISCAP demonstrates that unnecessary classification can be reduced or eliminated when contested classification actions are reviewed by "outsiders" who share the agency's commitment to national security, but who do not share its Weberian tendencies toward bureaucratic secrecy.

Only such independent reviewers are capable of separating the national security wheat from the bureaucratic chaff. I believe that this is a crucial principle which should inform Congressional action in this area.

3. Congress is free to legislate on secrecy policy.

The Justice Department "strongly opposes a statutory framework for the safeguarding of national security information," arguing in effect not only that the President has the authority to set and implement classification policies, but that he has *exclusive* authority to do so.[4]

The Committee should recognize that this is a natural and predictable response from the executive branch, which seeks to preserve its prerogatives and to maximize its own freedom of action. But I believe the Justice Department overstates its case.

---

[3] Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy ("Commission Report"), 1997, Chairman's Foreword, page xxxix. Available in searchable "html" format at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html>.

[4] "Subjecting the protection of national security information to statutorily-required standards or procedures would raise constitutional concerns to the extent that it would limit the President's ability to discharge a core constitutional responsibility as he sees fit." Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General on the Government Secrecy Act of 1997, September 15, 1997.

There is no question that Congress has the right and, I would say, the obligation to legislate in this area, particularly since the executive branch has failed to manage the secrecy system in a way that best serves the national interest. As Harold Relyea of the Congressional Research Service has pointed out:

> Pursuant to its constitutional authority "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces" (Article I, Section 8, clause 14), as well as the "necessary and proper" clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 18), Congress has long established rules, regulations, and procedures of general effect for the government and the armed services.... These clauses would appear to empower Congress with authority to legislate policy and procedure comparable to that prescribed by presidential executive order to effect security classification.[5]

The right of Congress to enact secrecy-related legislation has also been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court. Prior to the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, the Court held in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) that Congress had not intended for the courts to examine the propriety of classification decisions or procedures. But, as Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies has noted, the Court also found that:

> Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established its own procedures-- subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such congressional ordering.[6]

And of course Congress has enacted legislation dictating classification policy on numerous occasions, including the statutory classification framework of the Atomic Energy Act and the National Security Act, in which Congress (not the President) assigned the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

Furthermore, Congress has also successfully enacted statutes requiring

---

[5] Statement by Harold C. Relyea, Congressional Research Service, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information," March 16, 1994, page 48ff.

[6] 410 U.S. at 83 (1973). See Testimony of Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information," March 16, 1994, page 66ff, for further elaboration of related Court rulings, and her conclusion that "the only possible constitutional limitation would be that the Congress could not order disclosure of advice given to the President that would constitute a state secret."

disclosure of certain classified information, including the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act (P.L. 102-526) and legislation concerning the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series (P.L. 102-138). In addition, Congress has granted itself the authority to declassify any information in its possession.[7]

Today, several more bills mandating declassification are pending before Congress, including: S. 1220, "The Human Rights Information Act"[8]; S. 1232, a bill to declassify the private journal of Dr. Glenn Seaborg[9]; and S. 1379, "The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act."[10] Each of these bills was introduced because the public had no choice but to turn to Congress in order to correct the failings of executive branch classification and declassification policies. If the Justice Department position were to be taken at face value, all of these bills-- as well as the Freedom of Information Act itself-- would be unconstitutional, and executive branch officials would have completely unchecked power to withhold whatever information they chose.

In short, while the executive branch is entitled to *advise* Congress to stay out of national security information policy, Congress must be guided by the larger national interest and has every right to reject that advice, as it has in the past.

4. The secrecy system is not as bad as it could be.

A statutory secrecy system should be conceived as a means, not an end in itself. In considering legislative changes to secrecy policy, Congress should aim to fix what needs fixing, but also to preserve what warrants preserving.

In particular, the Committee should recognize the changes that were inaugurated with President Clinton's executive order 12958, and which have already produced some impressive results.

Most important, from my point of view, is the order's automatic declassification provision (section 3.4) which requires the declassification of most historically valuable 25 year old documents by April 2000. This provision has generated an unprecedented surge in declassification, reported at nearly 200 million pages in FY 1996 alone.[11]

---

[7] See Senate Resolution 400, section 8.

[8] <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1220.html>.

[9] <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1232.html>.

[10] <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1379.html>.

[11] 1996 ISOO Report to the President <http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/isoo96.html>.

So Congress need not and should not consider classification policy in a vacuum. It must start with the reality of classification policy as it is today and "first, do no harm." Legislative changes to the classification system should begin by affirming what is positive in current policy-- and then building on it.

THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY ACT OF 1997

The Government Secrecy Act contains a number of important provisions which are derived from the two-year investigation of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. The Act's two most positive innovations-- a "balancing test" and a National Declassification Center-- are also the ones that have elicited the strongest opposition from the executive branch. I will comment briefly on each of these, and suggest one other area for Committee consideration.

1. The balancing test and judicial review.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Act would require officials to weigh or "balance" the potential benefit from disclosure against the need for protection in making classification and declassification decisions, and further dictates that if there is significant doubt about the need to classify the information, it shall not be classified.

From the perspective of a non-governmental consumer of government information, this is the Act's single most important provision.

In the abstract, the idea of "balancing" is unexceptionable and is almost built into the practice of classification. Executive order 12958 includes a discretionary balancing test for declassification (sect. 3.2b) as well as a "significant doubt" standard (sect. 1.2b) for classification. (Interestingly, the CIA promulgated a balancing test during the Carter Administration which remains in effect today [32 C.F.R. 1902.13(c)].)

This provision of the Act has drawn agency opposition not because of its balancing requirement *per se*, but because it would allow judicial review of agency balancing decisions under the Freedom of Information Act. The idea that courts would presume to "second guess" agency classification decisions is profoundly unwelcome to classifiers, who warn of disastrous consequences if their judgment is questioned.

This warning is self-serving and needs to be taken with large grains of salt. Similar concerns contributed to President Ford's decision to veto the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, which allowed judges to determine whether information had been "properly" classified.[12] Fortunately, Congress overrode that veto and it turned out that the opponents' fears were not realized.

---

[12] See President Ford's veto message at 120 Congressional Record H36243-4.

To the contrary, judicial review has been a potent factor in making the FOIA as useful a tool of democracy as it is. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that the courts are not *sufficiently* diligent in reviewing agency classification decisions.[13]

The CIA has warned of "costly legal challenges that risk second-guessing of DCI/CIA judgments." This is a considerable exaggeration since in practice, no judge would reject a sworn affidavit from the DCI that certain information must be withheld. But at the same time, CIA classification judgments are *in need of* the checks and balances that judicial review would provide, particularly when it comes to the invocation of "sources and methods." Thus, the Secrecy Commission last year found that:

> the sources and methods rationale has become a vehicle for agencies to automatically keep information secret without engaging in the type of harm analysis required by executive orders as a prerequisite to keeping other kinds of information secret. The statutory requirement that sources and methods be protected thus appears at times to have been applied *not in a thoughtful way but almost by rote.*[14]

Federal court judges will never reject a "thoughtful" or even a merely plausible argument about the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. But the possibility of judicial review will serve to discourage indefensible "rote" classification.

Dire warnings of the consequences of judicial review of classification have not been borne out by the last 24 years of judicial review under the FOIA, and there is no reason to believe that courts would suddenly become reckless now when confronted with a balancing test.

I would add that any suggestions of a "flood" of lawsuits resulting from this provision are certain to be exaggerated. For the typical FOIA requester, there are huge "barriers to entry" to the judicial system. Legal representation is absurdly expensive, and *pro bono* assistance is generally available only in cases of considerable national importance or when victory is all but assured. In the last twenty years I must have filed hundreds of FOIA requests, but have brought suit under the FOIA only once.

The absence of effective "checks and balances" on executive branch classification actions has helped to produce today's bloated and highly arbitrary classification system. A balancing test that is subject to judicial review is the most appropriate solution.[15]

---

[13] "National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for Effective Judicial Enforcement," Boston College Law Review **25**: 611-643 (1984).

[14] Commission Report, Chapter III, page 70, emphasis added.

2. A National Declassification Center

The proposed National Declassification Center is a response to the fragmented quality of declassification policy, and to the inadequacy of executive branch oversight, which the Secrecy Commission described as "the critical missing link."[16]

As currently conceived, however, the Center risks becoming an extraneous bureaucracy that agencies are free to utilize or not, as they wish, and that has little or no independent authority. In order to fulfill its intended purpose, the Center should be assigned specific tasks and authorities. For example:

- The Center could be assigned to perform independent review and approval of all agency declassification guides, so as to ensure their consistency and compliance with the provisions of the Act and the executive order.

- The Center could be assigned to perform or to coordinate the declassification of all documents involving multiple agency "equities," in order to optimize the efficiency of the declassification process.

Perhaps most important, the Center could undertake in an expanded form many of the oversight responsibilities now assigned to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).

ISOO, under Steven Garfinkel's leadership, has a profound understanding of the intricacies and shortcomings of secrecy policy and, in my opinion, has generally demonstrated good judgment about what is appropriate and achievable and what is not. But ISOO's staffing and resource levels are laughably low when compared to its nominal responsibilities. This disparity between resources and responsibilities sends a message throughout the executive branch that "we're not going to take secrecy oversight seriously."

---

[15] The characteristic risks and benefits of information disclosure, and the mechanics of actually balancing them in practice are elucidated by Arvin S. Quist in *Security Classification of Information*, Vol. 2: Principles for Classification of Information, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN, Report No. K/CG-1077/V2, April 1993, Chaps. 5, 6. Of particular interest, Quist discusses how legal standards for weighing evidence that are already part of the judicial process-- such as "beyond a reasonable doubt," "clear and convincing evidence," and "preponderance of the evidence"-- could be used in balancing and in any subsequent review (pp. 61-69).

[16] Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 42.

The ISCAP, meanwhile, is doing a fine job, but on a tiny scale. And it is already operating at full capacity, although its tasks are expected to escalate sharply in coming years. As ISCAP Chair Roslyn Mazer has noted,

> When I consider what the next few years may hold for ISCAP, I fear that to a considerable extent we may become victims of our own successes-- and the caseloads that these successes may engender. Unfortunately, ISOO [which also supports the ISCAP] is a very small organization that faces ever-increasing demands on its resources from the dramatic changes in the classification and declassification systems now underway.... the onus on the ISCAP's staffing structure may very well prove too much to bear.[17]

Therefore, one straightforward "fix" that Congress might consider, at least in the interim, would be to significantly increase the stature and resources available to these two organizations so as to help fill in the "missing link" of executive branch oversight.

But whether Congress chooses to invigorate the existing oversight entities or to establish a new National Declassification Center, the goal should be one that has been clearly formulated by the Secrecy Commission:

> Oversight should be the responsibility of a strong and active organization, independent of the agencies that classify, perhaps modeled after agency inspector general offices. To be truly effective, such an organization should also possess the means to compel agency compliance with established policies.... Equally critical is that such a body have adequate resources, whether through a budget line item or the reallocation of resources from the principal classifying agencies.[18]

3. What About the "Other" Classification System?

If the Government Secrecy Act became law, we would not just have a statutory secrecy system-- we would have two statutory secrecy systems: one for national security information and one for atomic energy information, prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This may be too much of a good thing.

The existence of two parallel classification systems has proven to be a significant obstacle to efficiency in secrecy policy, as numerous records must undergo separate declassification reviews under each system.

---

[17] Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above.

[18] Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 44.

Even the high-level executive branch officials who are members of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel have been flummoxed by the difficulties in coordinating the declassification of information controlled under the Atomic Energy Act. This is particularly absurd because, according to Ms. Mazer,

> information that is similar or identical to much of what we have seen designated as FRD [i.e. classified under the Atomic Energy Act] has been in the public domain for many years, often as a result of a prior Department of Energy declassification review. Moreover, *there appears to be no system in place to get this information declassified*, even though the Departments involved-- Energy, Defense, and State-- acknowledge that it is innocuous.[19]

The perpetuation of two distinct classification systems would represent a significant compromise of the Government Secrecy Act's goal of "a more stable and cost-effective set of policies and a more consistent application of rules and procedures."

Therefore, I would suggest that the Committee consider the feasibility of consolidating both classification systems into one.

CONCLUSION

Although the Cold War has officially been over for several years now, we still face the challenges of adapting the inherited structures of that era to the present day. Fixing the classification system is foremost among those challenges.

It is only natural that any significant changes to the status quo will be resisted by the bureaucratic systems that are now in place. But the Committee should have confidence in the traditional American mechanism of "checks and balances."

By installing new checks and balances into a classification system that has long been allowed to function unilaterally, Congress can induce prudent changes that will advance the national interest in open and accountable government, while more efficiently protecting genuine national security information.

---

[19] Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above, emphasis added.

THIS SEARCH	THIS DOCUMENT	THIS CR ISSUE	GO TO
Next Hit	Forward	Next Document	New Search
Prev Hit	Back	Prev Document	HomePage
Hit List	Best Sections	Daily Digest	Help
	Doc Contents	Extens Contents	CR Issues by Date

Congressional Record entry 1 of 100

H.R. 1553, 1-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

[Page: E876]

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

HON. DAN BURTON

in the House of Representatives

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1997

- Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing H.R. 1553, which amends the President John F. Kennedy **Assassination Records** Collection Act of 1992--Public Law 102-526--to provide 1 additional year for the **Assassination Records Review Board** to complete its work. This legislation would extend the **Review Board** 's September 30, 1997, termination date under current law to September 30, 1998. H.R. 1553 authorizes $1.6 million in fiscal year 1998 for this purpose. I am pleased that the Honorable **Henry Waxman,** the ranking minority member on the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and the Honorable **Louis Stokes,** who sponsored the 1992 Act and who chaired the House Select Committee on **Assassinations** that was established in 1976, are original cosponsors of H.R. 1553.

- The purpose of the 1992 legislation was to publicly release **records** relating to the Kennedy **assassination** at the earliest possible date. The **Assassination Records Review Board** was set up to **review** and release the voluminous amounts of information in the Government's possession. The FBI, the Secret Service, the CIA, the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee in the Senate, and the House Select Committee on **Assassinations** have all held **assassination records** , and **records** have also been in the possession of certain State and local authorities as well as private citizens. When this legislation was considered, nearly 1 million pages of **records** compiled by official investigations of the **assassination** had not been made available to the public, some 30 years after the tragedy. Congress believed that simply making all relevant information available to the public was the best way to respond to the continuing high level of interest in the Kennedy **assassination** , and was preferable to undertaking a new congressional investigation. The 1992 law requires the **Review Board** to presume that documents relating to the **assassination** should be made public unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. I believe that the release of this information is important to ensure accountability in the Government and to clearly demonstrate to Americans that the Government has nothing to hide.

- As a result of the **Review Board** 's efforts, over 10,000 documents have been transferred to the national archives and **Records** Administration for inclusion in the JFK collection. At the end of 1996, that collection totaled approximately 3.1 million pages and was used extensively by researchers from all over the United States. The **Review Board** was in the news last month when it voted to make public the Abraham Zapruder film of the Kennedy **assassination** .

- The President John F. Kennedy **Assassination Records** Collection Act of 1992 originally provided a 3-year timetable for the **Assassination Records Review Board** to complete its work. Unfortunately, there were lengthy delays in the appointment of **Board** members, and as a consequence the **Review Board** was scheduled to cease operations before it even began its work. As a result, in 1994 Congress restarted the clock by extending the 1992 law's termination date for 1 year, until September 30, 1996. The **Review Board** subsequently exercised its authority to continue operating for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1997. Because the **review** process proved to be more complex and time-consuming than anticipated, the President included in his fiscal year 1998 budget a request for a 1-year extension of the **Review Board** 's authorization.

- I support the **Assassination Records Review Board** 's request for a 1-year extension of its authorization so that it can complete its mission in a professional and thorough manner. I have always believed very strongly that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding for Federal entities that were clearly intended to be temporary in nature. The **Review Board** has informed me that it is confident that it will be able to finish its work and complete its final report if Congress will extend its life for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1998.

THIS SEARCH	*THIS DOCUMENT*	*THIS CR ISSUE*	*GO TO*
Next Hit	Forward	Next Document	New Search
Prev Hit	Back	Prev Document	HomePage
Hit List	Best Sections	Daily Digest	Help
	Doc Contents	Extens. Contents	CR Issues by Date

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

TESTIMONY OF ATHAN G. THEOHARIS

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

on

S.J. Res. 282

"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act"

Before the

SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

MAY 12, 1992

STATEMENT OF ATHAN G. THEOHARIS

I am a professor of history at Marquette University, specializing in U.S. intelligence and surveillance policy, and have published extensively on matters relating to the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As a consultant in 1975 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (the so-called Church Committee), I researched classified and nonclassified records deposited at the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidential libraries and since 1978 have filed numerous Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for FBI records.

I welcome this opportunity to testify on S.J. Res. 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and the question it raises: Should Congress create a special Review Board and authorize it to release or postpone the release of relevant Government records?

There are precedents for legislating procedures governing the release of "Government records relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy," most notably the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, as amended in 1974, mandating the release of and stipulating the exemptions for withholding agency records. The congressional response to the so-called Nixon-Sampson agreement of 1974 offers a further precedent. Rejecting former President Richard Nixon's claimed right to retain exclusive control over the records pertaining to his presidency, including the right to destroy the so-called Oval Office tapes, Congress rescinded this agreement, created the Brownell Commission, and enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978. Presidential records were public records, and not a president's personal property, Congress affirmed when defining the criteria to govern the disposition and release of all presidential records.

As in the case of the Nixon presidential records, there exists widespread public suspicion about the Government's disposition of the Kennedy assassination records stemming from the beliefs that federal officials (1) have not made available all Government assassination records (even to the Warren Commission, Church Committee, House Assassination Committee) and (2) have heavily redacted the records released under FOIA in order to cover up sinister conspiracies. S.J. Res. 282 effectively addresses these concerns first by creating an impartial body, the proposed Executive Director and Review Board, with the authority to review and if necessary subpoena all relevant records and then by establishing the criterion of full disclosure except in cases where "clear and convincing justification exists for postponing" the release of specified documents.

There is reason to believe that all relevant Government records pertaining to the Kennedy assassination have not been released and cannot be precisely identified by persons outside the executive branch. It might not be the case that all such records were filed under specific names and programs (Oswald, Ruby, Ferrie, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Warren Commission). The federal intelligence agencies, for example, had in the recent past instituted separate records procedures to safeguard their most sensitive documents. CIA files, for one, are compartmentalized to limit access on the "need to know" principle. As one result, when responding in 1975 to the Church Committee inquiry into the Agency's drug testing program, CIA officials advised that the relevant program file had been destroyed in 1973. In 1978, however, CIA officials admitted to having discovered among the Agency's financial records extant documents which provided additional information about the scope of this program. During the Iran-contra hearings of 1987, moreover, CIA officials, at times, distinguished between official and informal records while NSC official Oliver North admitted to having employed a "do not log" procedure to ensure that his communications to his superior, John Poindexter, were not indexed in the NSC's central records system. Although the FBI maintains a central records system, FBI officials dating from 1940 had authorized a series of special records procedures to ensure that sensitive records were not serialized or filed in the Bureau's central records system or that sensitive information could be withheld if a FBI report was circulated outside the Bureau. These included: the Do Not File procedure for memos requesting and authorizing "black bag jobs;" blue/pink/informal memos for "administrative" matters in which case was "to be destroyed after action is taken and not sent to files section;" JUNE Mail for reported information received from "sources illegal in nature" or from "most secretive" sources such as "Governors, secretaries to high officials who may be discussing such officials and their attitude;" and administrative pages/cover letters for reporting "facts and information " which could "cause embarrassment to the Bureau, if distributed." Do Not File and blue/pink/informal memos were to be maintained in "office files" of senior FBI officials (and were to be destroyed every six months), JUNE Mail was to be maintained "under lock and key" in FBI field offices or in the Special File Room at FBI headquarters, while administrative pages/cover letters were to be detached whenever the report to which they were appended was "distributed to any agency outside the Bureau."

S.J. Res. 282 addresses the inability of requestors to identify all relevant Kennedy assassination records and how and where they might have been filed. Executive agencies are mandated to make available to the Review Board "all assassination materials" even if "uncertain if a record is assassination material" and the Executive Director is authorized to "inquire as to the existence of further records" and then recommend that the Review Board "subpoena such records in the event of denial." Properly placing the burden of ensuring the accessioning of all Kennedy assassination materials on agency officials who are most knowledgable about their agency's records practices, S.J. Res. 282 further enables the Executive Director and staff to identify additional records learned through a close reading of cross references in the "available" documents.

Section 6, moreover, addresses the companion obstacle to full disclosure, the discretion which the FOIA allows federal agency officials to withhold categories of information when releasing FOIA-requested documents. Particularly during the 1980s agency officials have withheld information clearly relevant to an understanding of the relationship of the agencies to individuals identified directly or indirectly with the Kennedy assassination. Administrative and legislative changes encouraged such non-disclosure--notably President Ronald Reagan's 1982 classification order, legislation of 1984 totally exempting CIA "operational" files from disclosure, and legislation of 1986 authorizing the FBI to withhold and deny the existence of FBI informant files. Section 6 dovetails FOIA's exemptive provisions but, at the same time, introduces a stricter non-disclosure standard to require release unless "the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweighs any public interest in its disclosure."

My skepticism about agency practices in withholding documents, moreover, is based on my experiences as a frequent user of the FOIA. I recognize that this is not the proper forum for reviewing how federal agencies have processed FOIA requests but think the following examples shed light on whether the FOIA, and its provisions accepting agency discretion, can be expected to ensure full and reasonable disclosure.

In 1980, I filed an FOIA request for the Official and Confidential File of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and in 1983 received approximately 6,000 heavily redacted pages of this 17,700 page file. Exercising my right to appeal these withholdings, I eventually (in 1985) received approximately 2,000 additional documents. Granted the right of a second appeal, at this time I offered a detailed folder by folder challenge, arguing that much of the withheld information was already in the public domain and further that since the former FBI director had maintained in his office derogatory information on presidents, members of Congress, and other prominent personalities the question of what use had been made of this information required its release. These arguments proved somewhat convincing and in 1989 the FBI released approximately 15,000 pages including information formerly redacted in the earlier processed releases.

The enclosed Fortas document (see Appendix A) was one of the documents released to me in 1989, but withheld entirely both in 1983 and 1985. When withholding this document (and five others pertaining to the same matter), the FBI had originally claimed that its release would reveal FBI sources and methods and violate personal privacy rights. Yet, Fortas had not been acting as a FBI Criminal Informant or Security Informant when concerting with FBI Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach in 1966 and the withheld information records Fortas's willingness to service the political and bureaucratic interests of President Lyndon Johnson and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

This example, because the FBI had evaluated the same document three times, offers insights into the criteria employed to deny the release of records. And while the agency ultimately decided to disclose, this decision indirectly supports S.J. Res. 282's "clear and convincing" standard. For, my original 1980 request and receipt in 1983 of the heavily redacted Hoover file had become known to U.S. News and World Report which devoted its "1984" issue of December 1983 to summarizing the contents of the released Hoover file. The resulting publicity heightened public and media interest in the heavily redacted Hoover file. By 1989, if not 1985, FBI officials were no longer williug to risk FOIA litigation challenging their claimed interpretation of the FOIA's exemptive provisions.

My second example bears indirectly on how the FBI would process a FOIA request for still-unreleased wiretap records first diclosed by the House Assassination Committee. The House report had disclosed that FBI wiretap intercepts recorded critical comments of organized crime leaders, notably Carlos Marcello, regarding the Kennedys. Did the Mafia put a "contract" out on John Kennedy? Did FBI officials purposefully withhold this information from the Justice Department and the Secret Service in 1963 and then from the Warren Commission in 1964? The answers to these questions would require the release of the wiretap transcripts as well as other FBI memos recording how the FBI dealt with these transcripts. My experience involving how the FBI has processed my requests for other FBI wiretaps suggests that any FOIA-released Kennedy documents will be so redacted as to preclude answers to these questions. In describing one of my FBI wiretap requests, let me also outline for the Committee the considerably broader "records universe" sought by scholars and which distinguish our approach from those of journalists, congressional staff, and lawyers.

This case of FBI wiretapping involved Henry Grunewald, a Washington, D.C.-based investigator with close ties to New York insurance executive Henry Marsh, isolationist Republican congressmen, former New Dealer Thomas Corcoran, and Washington bureaucrats. FBI officials were keenly interested in Grunewald's activities, confirmed by the inclusion in Hoover's office file of two folders containing the transcripts of two FBI wiretaps of Grunewald in 1941 and 1945. As in the case of the Fortas document, these two folders had originally been withheld in entirety on sources and methods and personal privacy grounds. The released 1941 wiretap transcript particularly interested me as I had learned from documents contained in former FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd's still extant office file that Grunewald, as other conservative critics of the Roosevelt Administration, became the subject of FBI "espionage" investigative interest during the early 1940s. The Ladd file, however, did not resolve whether this 1941 wiretap had been known or authorized by the Attorney General or the White House. Accordingly, I filed a further FOIA request for the FBI's headquarters files on Grunewald. The released, redacted records confirmed the Roosevelt Administration's interest in Grunewald's activities in 1940 but (see Appendix B) either because of redactions or the Justice and Treasury Departments' failure to have processed as yet documents which they originated the wiretap authorization question cannot be resolved.

The heavily redacted Grunewald files further disclosed that Grunewald became the subject in 1953 of a third FBI wiretap. In 1952, a House Committee held public hearings on the subject of influence peddling that centered on Grunewald's activities, among others. This inquiry proved embarrassing to the Truman Administration and was exploited by the Republicans during the 1952 presidential and congressional campaigns. In 1953, the new Republican-controlled House revisited this issue. Particularly interested in Grunewald, the so-called Kean Committee sought assistance from the Justice Department. The heavily redacted records (see Appendix C), however, preclude answers to the questions as to why concurrent with this congressional inquiry Attorney General Herbert Brownell had requested and authorized this wiretap and whether the Justice Department's assistance to the Committee included information learned from this wiretap. (I have only appended a summary of one FBI report to the Attorney General, based on this wiretap. The released transcripts of this 1953 wiretap, in contrast to those released to me involving the 1941 and 1945 taps, were heavily redacted--the FBI withheld on personal privacy grounds the names and intercepted conversations of Grunewald's telephone partners, rendering the released transcripts virtually incomprehensible and of minimal research value.)

I have gone into detail on the Fortas and Grunewald matters as I think they offer insights into the processing of FOIA requests, an issue central to these hearings. It has been my experience that the "culture" of the intelligence agencies encourages agency officials to interpret the FOIA exemptive provisions broadly but also that more senior agency officials will release even embarrassing information in those instances when their decisions are potentially subject to critical scrutiny. The Review Board procedure promotes this needed accountability. At the same time, the Board's independence can undercut public suspicions that claimed national security or privacy justifications are a mask to preclude full disclosure. Surely now, thirty years after President Kennedy's assassination and with the end of the Cold War, we should be able to assure the public that relevant Kennedy assassination records are neither secreted nor withheld for bureaucratic reasons.

While I doubt that the rlease of the Kennedy assassination records will conclusively resolve the question "who killed Kennedy," I am convinced that the procedures outlined in S.J. Res. 282 will undercut suspicions that records documenting a government conspiracy are being purposefully withheld. Release of the Kennedy assassination records, moreover, will service other significant research interests of the scholarly community. Let me conclude by briefly list some of these non-assassination-related questions: (1) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the CIA before and after the assassination; (2) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the Secret

Service and the background to the FBI's revised delimitation agreement of 1964 with the Secret Service; (3) the politics of presidential commissions (the purpose for creation, the level of agency cooperation, and the responses of federal agencies, Congress, the White House, and the public to the Warren Commission's findings); (4) the paradox of the FBI's apparent disinterest in Oswald (Soviet defector and Fair Play for Cuba Committee activist) in contrast to the intensity of FBI interest in more respectable national leaders (Eleanor Roosevelt, Adlai Stevenson, Joseph Alsop, Ernest Hemingway, even John Kennedy); and (5) the FBI's and the CIA's relationships with and uses of informants and sources recruited to provide foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal, and "subversive activities" information.

13-00000

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

CIA HAS [illegible] TO
DECL[illegible]
RELEASE [illegible] INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR DAVID L. BOREN

BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

ON THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

May 12, 1992

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss with you Senate Joint Resolution 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992.

The purpose of this legislation is to provide for a comprehensive process ultimately leading to the release of all materials held by the United States Government regarding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Congressman Louis Stokes, the distinguished former Chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, has introduced identical legislation in the House of Representatives. I am particularly pleased, Mr. Chairman, to have you as an original cosponsor of this legislation.

We have had at least four substantial federal government investigations into the Kennedy assassination: the first conducted by the Warren Commission appointed by President Johnson in 1963; the second, by the President's Commission on CIA

Activities -- the Rockefeller commission -- in 1975; the third by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence -- the Church Committee -- in 1975 and 1976 as part of its investigation of CIA assassination plots against foreign leaders; and finally, the extensive investigation of the House Assassinations Committee in 1978 and 1979.

Each of these investigations, particularly the Warren Commission and House Assassinations Committee investigation, produced long, detailed public reports concerning the Kennedy assassination. In addition, literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on the subject.

Yet still, almost 30 years later, the questions remain.

The recent release of the controversial film "JFK" has raised them anew, suggesting that answers may well lie in the assassination records and other materials that remain sealed by our Government. Even prior to the release of "JFK," in fact, there were diligent efforts made by researchers as well as concerned legislators to open these files for public review.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know what all of these files contain. Specifically, I do not know whether they contain information that would call into question or undermine the findings of the previous investigations or not.

But it seems to me the time has come to open these files to the public and let them speak for themselves. Let historians and journalists and the people read them, and draw the appropriate conclusions.

As a general principle, the Intelligence Community should make available its records after the passage of a reasonable amount of time when current sources and methods would no longer be compromised. The American people have a right to assure themselves to the greatest degree possible of the accuracy of the historical record of our government. The timely release of all documents of historic value and importance helps to assure that even the most secret programs of our government will be operated in accordance with basic American values. Current intelligence operations will be even more carefully conducted when it is recognized that they will be scrutinized by the public during the lifetime of many of those who administered the programs.

This is not to say that all of the files should simply be pulled from the vaults, turned upside down and dumped onto Pennsylvania Avenue for general consumption. Careful review is required to ensure responsible public policy and fundamental fairness. Even after almost thirty years, there remain governmental interests, as well as individual privacy interests, that we must consider. But these concerns must not stand in the way of disclosure unless they are shown in a given case to be especially compelling.

What this Resolution proposes is a comprehensive, government-wide review of the Kennedy assassination records conducted under the auspices of an impartial, independent board.

It may be useful to state precisely what these records are. First, they encompass all of the records of the FBI, the CIA, Secret Service, military intelligence, and other Executive branch agencies which may pertain to the Kennedy assassination. They also include the records of the Warren commission, the Rockefeller commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Many of these records are now stored under seal at the National Archives, while many others remain in agency files. The Rockefeller Commission files were claimed by President Ford as part of his personal papers and then deeded by him to the Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. There may be other relevant records at the Kennedy and Johnson presidential libraries. These presidential library records are administered by the National Archives, and thus we envision that they would be subject to this Joint Resolution.

I can report to you briefly on the status of one group of these records -- the Church committee files, which are now in the custody of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All of the Church committee files are housed in some 500 boxes in a single small room at the National Archives. There is a rudimentary index, but it is not always sufficiently descriptive, and a file-by-file review is probably necessary. My staff has examined some of these files, and we believe the process of separating out J.F.K. assassination materials -- once that term is more precisely defined (as I will discuss in a moment) -- will not prove especially cumbersome or time-consuming. The Kennedy assassination investigation was only a small component of the Church committee's work and the investigation conducted concerned only the role of the intelligence community in investigating the assassination; it did not seek to determine who killed President Kennedy. In addition, many of the Church records are in fact copies of records originated by other agencies. However, the Church staff did interview numerous witnesses, both inside and outside of government, and the transcripts and notes of those interviews, among other materials originated by the Church committee, are an important part of the J.F.K. files.

Although many government records on the J.F.K. assassination have previously been released by the Archives and as a result of Freedom of Information Act litigation, a great deal remains shielded from public view. Approximately twenty boxes of the internal files generated by the Warren Commission are still sealed. Experts estimate that a much greater volume of FBI and CIA files remain sealed. Many pages of documents that have been released have been so extensively redacted that their informational value is minimal. The extensive files of the House Assassinations Committee, some 848 boxes of materials on both the Kennedy and King assassinations, currently are sealed until the year 2029.

To date, these records have been withheld from the public due to a variety of concerns: the fear of damaging foreign relations and military defense, the concern for disclosing the identities of confidential sources or informants, and the desire to protect the privacy of individuals. While these concerns may yet retain some validity in a very few isolated cases, it seems to me that with the passage of time, there should remain very few objections to full disclosure. I believe it is time to review these records, not in terms of the old assumptions, but rather in light of the need for openness and to encourage confidence in the Government. We need to assure ourselves of the facts, that there is not information lurking somewhere in the Government that would shed new light on what remains perhaps the most heinous and enigmatic crime of this century.

The Joint Resolution would make it much harder to justify the continued shielding of a document from public view. It would also create a process by which many records could be promptly released. Any arguments made for withholding any document or portions of it must be weighed against the strong public interest in disclosure. The resolution establishes this kind of balancing test -- with a strong presumption in favor of disclosure.

In addition, to address the problem of heavily redacted and therefore meaningless documents, the Joint Resolution borrows a page from the Classified Information Procedures Act, the law that covers the handling of secret information in criminal trials. Under that law, federal judges have discretion to permit introduction in evidence of summaries or substitutes in place of classified information. The Joint Resolution provides for creation of such summaries or substitutes where appropriate, so that the public can learn essential facts about the Kennedy assassination from a document even where references to private matters or crucial national security secrets would render the document itself mostly unreleasable at present.

In all cases, the Joint Resolution requires that the presumption be in favor of release. All records will be released unless there is clear and convincing evidence that postponing release is essential to a vital interest.

Now let me briefly discuss the process established by the Joint Resolution for applying these disclosure standards.

The Joint Resolution creates a five-member panel called the Assassination Material Review Board. The members of this Review Board would be distinguished private citizens outside of government who have had no prior involvement with previous inquiries into the Kennedy assassination. This Review Board, aided by an executive director and staff, would play the central role in the release of the assassination materials. The Board would be required to complete its work within two years of its first meeting, although it is certainly expected that it could be completed much more quickly. The point is to proceed expeditiously, while still doing a careful job.

We faced a difficult choice in deciding who should appoint the Review Board, and I am aware your Committee is looking at other alternatives. I am certainly amenable to this, but let me give you some idea of why we came out as we did. Given the allegations of government cover-up and the potential for perceived conflict of interest, allowing the President or Congress to appoint the Board did not seem appropriate. We settled instead on the special three-judge federal court division that appoints independent counsels for criminal investigations.

The Justice Department, in an April 27, 1992, letter to Chairman Glenn, worries that "it is not clear" that our approach to appointing the Review Board is constitutional. In addition, some may feel that a judicial panel is ill-suited to make appointments for this task. The judges themselves, who have very small staffs and other concerns, might well prefer to avoid this assignment. In short, we recognized that this approach would raise possible constitutional objections, as well as practical ones, but, on balance, we felt the appointment authority should rest with an impartial source without no interest or stake in the outcome. I believe a strong argument can be made that the appointment process is constitutional under the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654

(1988), which upheld the power of the same court division to appoint independent counsels to investigate executive branch misconduct.

If the Committee nevertheless concludes that this approach is undesirable, I would offer two alternatives for consideration, conceding that both are also susceptible to possible constitutional objection. The first would be for the President and the leadership of the House and Senate each to appoint a given number of Board members. Each body has interests in, and responsibility for, certain of the records at issue. I would not make these appointments subject to Senate confirmation, since they are not policy positions, and confirmation would only delay the task at hand. A second alternative would be the approach suggested by the ACLU: adopt some variant of the formula used last year by Congress in establishing the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation in the State Department, namely to have the President appoint based on specific criteria, i.e. background in particular disciplines, with most of the members coming from lists submitted by designated professional associations.

Once the Review Board, however it is appointed, is constituted, it would appoint an executive director, and the first step in the process would be to make available to the Executive Director all Government assassination materials. Where the Executive Director suspects that the agencies have failed to submit some of the relevant records, he or she has authority to question the agencies and to use the subpoena power of the Review Board to obtain any additional records.

The Executive Director, assisted by employees of the Review Board and, if deemed necessary, detailed from elsewhere in the Government, would undertake the initial screening of these records. If the Executive Director concluded that a particular record was appropriate for release, the record would automatically be released, unless the record implicated personal privacy or the Executive agency or congressional committee with responsibility for that record filed an appeal with the Review Board. In this manner, many records could be promptly released without formal Review Board deliberations.

If the Executive Director determined that a particular record was not appropriate for release under present circumstances or that the record implicated personal privacy concerns, he or she would automatically be required to refer that decision to the Review Board.

The Executive Director would also be permitted to refer particularly difficult decisions, or decisions requiring further investigation, to the Review Board.

In deciding on appeals and referrals from the Executive Director, the Review Board would have authority to conduct hearings and subpoena records and witnesses.

The Review Board would have final say as to the release or non-release of all materials, except that in the case of Executive branch materials, the President would have the authority to supersede the Board's determination and postpone release. But each time the President did so, he would be required to explain his reasons, both in a notice to the public and to the Congress. Decisions by the Review Board itself to postpone release of records would also have to be explained to the public and Congress.

Finally, under the Joint Resolution, no item would remain permanently sealed. The Review Board, before finishing its work, would designate as to every item still withheld a specified time or a specified occurrence following which the item could be released. The files would then be transferred to the Archives, where the Archivist would have a continuing duty to reconsider them for release under the standards set by the Joint Resolution.

Materials released by the Archivist or the Review Board would be available in the Archives for public review and copying.

Our Joint Resolution makes clear that an Executive branch agency or congressional committee retains its existing powers under the law to release a particular record even if the Joint Resolution does not require it to do so, and that the members of the public can continue to use the Freedom of Information Act to request from the agencies documents related to the assassination.

Mr. Chairman, this Resolution may appear complicated, but the matter of disclosure is itself complicated. It cannot be accomplished arbitrarily or summarily. The process established by the Resolution, in my view, is logical and takes account of all the interests and equities in the disclosure of these documents. In the end, I think it will result in all of the pertinent information pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy being made public in a prompt and orderly way, and, in doing so, will help restore confidence among the public in our Government.

Since the Joint Resolution was introduced, comments have been received from the Justice Department as well as others suggesting the need for change.

With regard to the reaction of the Justice Department, I must say I found it very unfortunate that the Department chose to take what I found to be an extreme, hard-line position in opposing many of the key provisions of the Resolution. Rather than showing the flexibility needed in this unique circumstance to deal cooperatively with the Congress on a matter that is a serious concern for many Americans, the Justice Department chose to reassert familiar claims of Executive privilege and all of the other reasons asserted over the years to block the release of government information.

The whole point of this legislation was to create new criteria and new procedures to maximize the release of information hitherto withheld by the Government. The old laws and old procedures have been tried for the last 30 years, and have not produced the type of disclosure needed to restore the confidence of the American people.

It seems to me that just this once, where the public policy interest in full disclosure of these records is so apparent, the Justice Department could dispense with its usual "to-the-last-man" defense of Executive branch prerogatives, and help us deal with solving the problem.

I feel obliged to take special note of one point in the Justice Department letter, and that is their claim that the Executive branch must have not only increased safeguards over its own material -- but also have the ability to veto release of any congressionally-created assassination record. This strikes me as preposterous, particularly coming from a department that is ostensibly so concerned to preserve a separation of powers. If Congress wants to release information it has developed, the President should not be able to stand in the way.

Hopefully, the Committee will yet be able to obtain executive branch cooperation and move forward with this process. The public expects action on this matter, as the many letters, postcards, and telephone calls to congressional offices demonstrate.

Having said this, there are, in fact, several points raised by the Justice Department's letter, and by private citizens in touch with me, which I believe merit further consideration by the Committee.

1. Perhaps the most important matter involves setting the boundaries of "assassination material." The Joint Resolution defines "assassination material" as "a record that relates in any manner or degree to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy...." But given the wide range of theories that have developed as to who killed President Kennedy and why, many types of records arguably relate in some manner to the assassination. What records regarding, for example, Cuba, Vietnam, and organized crime should be covered? This matter requires careful consideration.

The Justice Department urges a substantial narrowing of the definition of "assassination material," apparently to only those records that on their face directly concern the assassination. I am concerned that this formulation may be too narrow. There is widespread public suspicion that some sort of conspiracy led to the murder of President Kennedy. If we go out of our way to avoid records that might shed light on activities linked to such an alleged conspiracy, we make little progress toward assuring the public that it has the full story. If we err on the side of inclusiveness, and as a result learn a bit more about the operations of our government and our foreign policy in the early 1960's, I think we will benefit. My only concern would be that the search becomes so broad that it delays action of the release of documents clearly germane to the assassination. But where records have already been segregated, such as the executive branch materials obtained by the House Assassinations Committee, full review is probably appropriate.

I do, however, suggest that the Committee, either in the Joint Resolution itself or in report language, set more precise parameters defining "assassination material," or else direct the Review Board to do so promptly after it is established. Otherwise, we may end with widely varying interpretations by the various records agencies and committees as to what documents should be forwarded to the Review Board executive director.

2. As the Justice Department's letter to Chairman Glenn noted, the Joint Resolution, as drafted, would give an agency or committee control over release of a record it originated even if that record contained information obtained from another agency or committee. I agree that this provision should be changed to give agencies authority over release of their own information. However, the change suggested in the Justice Department letter may not by itself do the trick, because a record, for example a lengthy congressional report, may contain both information

developed by the body that created the record and information originated by an executive agency. Instead of letting either of these two "originating bodies" have veto power over the release of an entire document, we should work out language that give an agency or committee control over release of that portion of a document for which it was responsible even if other information in the document was originated elsewhere.

3. On reflection, I think it would be best to amend the Joint Resolution to make the records of the Review Board itself subject to the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, and to make the Board's proceedings subject to the Sunshine Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. A law mandating increased government openness should not itself establish an exception from general standards for accountability. I still strongly believe, however, that we should avoid subjecting the Board to extensive court litigation over the release of the J.F.K. files themselves either under the standards set by the Joint Resolution or under the Freedom of Information Act.

4. Section 11(a) should probably be amended to make clear that the Joint Resolution's provisions take precedence not only over other laws, but also over executive orders and regulations.

5. A sentence might be added to Section 8(f) to ensure that the public is clearly informed when summaries or substitutes are released instead of actual records or information: "Any such

summary or substitution shall be clearly labeled as such when released to the public."

6. The Joint Resolution should probably be amended to recognize the records of the Rockefeller commission as a component of this effort. The Archives would be the appropriate custodian of Rockefeller commission materials for purposes of the Joint Resolution.

I thank the Committee for this opportunity to express my views on this measure.

Statement for the Senate Committee on Government Affairs,

May 12, 1992

Ernest R. May

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

It is an honor to be invited to testify on this bill. I am a professor of history at Harvard University, where I teach both in the history department and in the John F. Kennedy School of Government. While I have done research on the history of intelligence agencies and have served in Washington from time to time as a consultant, I do not speak as an expert on the matter before the committee. My comments are merely those of a historian looking at legislation designed to unearth historical source material.

The bill now under consideration seeks to clear doubts about President Kennedy's murder. The Warren Commission had the same aim. Its make-up was supposed to reassure the public. It failed. The Commission reported in 1964. Almost within months, books challenging its findings hit best-seller lists.

Over time, other theories multiplied. Now, it takes whole books just to list books about the murder. Some of these books picture the CIA or FBI as plotters. This is not new. A number appeared in the 1970s. Recently, this particular set of theories has found new life. Two books of this genre reached best-seller lists in the spring of 1992, and Oliver Stone's film, "JFK," became a box office hit.

The bill now under consideration would open records so that the public can be reassured that these theories are fantasies. The stated aim is to "contribute to the trust of the people in their government."

To achieve this, the bill proposes to create a five-person Review Board. As reassurance against a cover-up in behalf of the President or Congress, the District of Columbia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals would appoint the Board. (The Supreme Court presumably is thought too partisan; besides, it might bring to mind Chief Justice Warren.)

The bill says that members of the Board are to be "distinguished and impartial." Otherwise, it demands only that they not be currently in government employ and that they never have been involved in any investigation of the Kennedy murder.

The Board and its Executive Director would have wide powers. They would look at all materials relating to the murder. If they suspect any agency of withholding material, they would have a right to conduct a hunt. The bill gives the Board power to subpoena records and persons, to take testimony under oath, to grant immunity to witnesses, and to punish defiance.

The Board's decisions are to be final unless the President himself intervenes to insist that some piece of information not be released. The bill giving the Board its powers is to "take precedence over any other law, judicial decision ..., or common law doctrine" that might be in conflict.

My comments on this bill are mostly cautionary. I question whether any legislation can achieve all that this bill seeks to achieve. I question giving to a court-appointed Review Board such broad responsibilities and powers. I believe that a Review Board differently selected, with a more limited mandate, could do a better job.

The first cautionary point concerns the aim of clearing doubts about the Kennedy murder. Even if every bit of relevant documentation becomes public, it will not yield a story that all Americans will accept. Why should it? Though we now know just about everything about the Pearl Harbor attack, new conspiracy theories continue to be woven. One of the latest has Winston Churchill as the villain!

Despite more than a century of research, new theories still appear about conspirators helping John Wilkes Booth kill Lincoln. The chances are that the same will always be true for Oswald and Kennedy. After another decade or so, however, Kennedy's murder will probably become, like Lincoln's, more an interest of buffs than of the public at large.

The chances of clearing away all doubts are lessened by the fact that every bit of relevant documentation will not be released. This bill itself speaks of protecting secret agents and intelligence sources and methods. It speaks also of privacy rights. CIA and FBI reports and National Security Agency intercepts contain much material that, by these criteria, would have to remain secret.

In fact, still more material may be kept from the public. This bill refers only to protecting the privacy of living persons. If the Review Board yields to human feelings, it may extend protection to families and friends. Suppose, for example, that it sees raw FBI files recording old accusations against some Cuban-American. Even if the person is dead, anyone ever connected with that person could suffer should the accusations become public. If the Review Board suspects that the accusations were malicious and false, will it not choose to leave the files secret?

Also, it has to be assumed that some files will turn out to have been lost or destroyed. The proposed Review Board would thus have to confess not only that it chose to leave some material under wraps but that other material was simply missing. Would spinners of conspiracy theories take the Board's word? Would they not instead accuse it of colluding in concealment of "smoking guns"?

The Review Board would meanwhile be under pressure not to let privacy rights or other considerations inhibit release of documents. Investigative reporters, writers, and docudrama producers would hammer at it. So would scholars, including many interested in subjects other than the Kennedy murder. So would others with axes to grind.

Some material sought might have only a remote relationship to the murder. The clamor would be no less ferocious. How much of the central files of the FBI and CIA would have to be opened, for example, to persuade disciples of Mark North or Mark Lane or Oliver Stone that neither FBI nor CIA officers participated in a murder plot?

The Review Board would surely be urged to pursue data on the possible involvement of right-wing extremists. Obvious items would include not only FBI files but also tax returns. Imagine the scope of possible documentation if, in fairness, the Review Board also sought data on financial transactions by individuals associated with Vice President Lyndon Johnson!

I forecast, in other words, that new evidence will not dispel conspiracy theories. At most, it will curb some of the more adventurous theorizing.

I also forecast that, if release of the evidence is managed as this bill proposes, one of two results will follow.

If the Review Board yields to outside pressures, it will conduct a fishing expedition. Much embarrassing and possibly harmful information will be made public. Alternatively, the Review Board will resist pressure. It will define its mandate narrowly. It will be prudent in what it reveals. It will then be accused of a "whitewash." The latter result could make matters worse rather than better. Suspicion could be fed, not allayed.

There may, however, be better means of doing what needs doing. The current bill would have the Review Board and its Executive Director examine all materials to be released. They would be charged with ferreting out undisclosed material, and they would have effective responsibility for deciding what would and would not be released.

An alternative would be a bill simply enjoining holders of records to identify and locate materials that, in the language of the current bill, "relates in any manner or degree" to the murder of President Kennedy. The injunction would apply to all congressional committees and all executive agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the National Archives. The bill could direct these record-holders to make the materials public. It could specify that the only materials to be held back would be those itemized in the current bill -- agents, intelligence sources and methods, etc.

Where legislative writ does not run or is disputable, a statute could urge voluntary action. The current bill asks such cooperation from state and local agencies and foreign governments. A statute that sought to avoid constitutional disputes could ask the same of the President regarding records of the White House and Executive Office.

This alternative bill could require or request public reports describing materials withheld from release — their characteristics and quantities, the general reasons for nondisclosure, and plans for eventual release.

A Review Board could be created with a limited — and more workable — mandate.

Its first duty could be to review record-holders' guidelines. These might well differ from agency to agency. Procedures for searching National Security Agency files of communications intercepts might not be the same as those for searching the much less voluminous files of CIA stations and headquarters divisions. The Board could try, however, to ensure comparative uniformity in the diligence of searches.

The Board could try also to ensure comparative uniformity in definitions of what is to be withheld. It might urge, for example, that the intelligence sources and methods criterion apply only to sources and methods in current use, not just to any ever used.

The Board's second duty could be to scan materials that record-holders proposed actually to withhold. The Board might question record-holders' decisions. If so, it could ask that the agency or committee think again. If differences continued, the Board could appeal to the President or, for Congressional documents, to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House.

In a final public report, the Board could describe any still unresolved differences. While the description would be in generalities, the issues would become publicly known. The broad purpose of the Board's report would be to validate the record-holders' non-disclosure decisions.

Such a Review Board could be selected by comparatively traditional methods. Nominations could be asked of the

American Bar Association, the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, or kindred bodies. Appointments could be made by the President, with advice and consent of the Senate.

Unless the quantity of material withheld proved to be much larger than I would expect, the Review Board could be kept small. It could probably manage with minimal staff.

I believe that this alternative statute would accomplish all that can be accomplished. It would leave the onus for release or non-release of records on those already familiar with these records. Committees of Congress would make rules for their files. The President, the heads of departments, the Directors of Central Intelligence and the FBI, and the Archivist of the United States would make rules for theirs.

This alternative statute would limit the powers and responsibilities to be thrust on an untried and potentially vulnerable Review Board. It would create a Board with the assignment only of checking the coherence and consistency of criteria for disclosure and non-disclosure.

Since the invitation to testify included questions reaching beyond the current bill, I take the opportunity to respond to that concerning general declassification policies. I believe the procedure just outlined could be applied much more widely. A statute could declare that all government records more than thirty years old would become public unless the originating agency showed specific cause for continued non-disclosure. A Board or Commission appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate could have authority to review all such materials and to question or appeal the non-disclosure. This approximates practice in the United Kingdom.

In conclusion, I repeat a warning against expecting any legislation to create consensus and thereby "contribute to the trust of the people in their government." Inventors of conspiracy theories will always be more ingenious than assemblers of evidence. The immediate result of releasing records will be, moreover, to provide grist for the theorists' mills. Even if everything were released tomorrow, it would take at least a decade for researchers to sort the newly released materials. In the meantime, conspiracy builders would be picking out those bits and pices of evidence that suited them. In the long run, release of documents will get us closer to truth; but, as Keynes observed, that long run probably stretches beyond any of our lifetimes.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. LESAR

PRESIDENT

ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES AND RESEARCH CENTER

ON

S.J. RES. 282

"THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992"

BEFORE

THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

May 12, 1992

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I am honored to have this opportunity to testify before you on the legislation to require the government to release its records pertaining to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I appear on behalf of the Assassination Archives and Research Center ("the AARC"), of which I am President. The AARC is a private, non-profit organization which collects, preserves and disseminates information and materials on political assassinations. The AARC is funded by membership dues and donations from the public. I am an attorney specializing in Freedom of Information Act litigation, and have litigated well over 100 such lawsuits. Over the past twenty years I have represented nearly all of the major authors and researchers who have litigated their Freedom of Information Act requests for records pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy. To date, I have handled over fifty such lawsuits.

I have carefully studied the proposed legislation. I have also read the letter which you received from the Department of Justice. I have heard that the Administration may seek to achieve its goals, particularly that of using more restrictive standards for release of Executive Branch records, by issuing an executive order rather than awaiting action by Congress. In my mind the only thing worse than seeing the Justice Department's wishes granted in legislation would be to see them set forth in a stand-alone executive order which goes unchallenged by Congress. Legislation is needed to bring each branch of government which holds records on to the same playing field, and to create a process which is accountable, independent and credible. Incorporating the Justice Department's restrictive standards in an executive order would duplicate the devastating damage to the ideal of full disclosure which occurred when the Reagan Administration successfully sabotaged the 1974 amendments to Exemption 1 by drastically altering the standards for classifying information in the interests of national security.

The difficulty which researchers have had gaining access to Kennedy assassination materials amply demonstrates the need to alter the standards employed by the FOIA and the current executive order on national security classification. If you support release of the Kennedy assassination records, you cannot favor the Justice Department's recipe of simply mixing one part political will to three parts of existing standards and stir. You must substantially liberalize the existing standards and make it stick.

A few illustrations from my practice will show the inadequacies of the FOIA and the enormous frustration which accrues to those who attempt to use it to obtain information about the Kennedy assassination. These examples reveal a pattern of delay, costly litigation, and untrue representations by the government. Cases brought in the 1980's also show that massive withholding of information, with little significant information being released.

Case 1: In 1969 Harold Weisberg, a leading Warren Commission critic, made a simple request to the FBI. He wanted to see the results of the spectrographic tests which had been conducted on bullet(s), bullet fragments and items of evidence allegedly struck by bullets during the assassination of President Kennedy. Denied access by the FBI and the Attorney General, in 1970 he brought suit. A four-year legal battle ensued. First, the district court, relying on the Justice Department's representation that it was not in the national interest to release the results of these scientific tests, denied his request. A court of Appeals panel reversed, but the dissenting judge wrote a scathing opinion in which he referred to FOIA requesters as "rummaging writers" and characterized Weisberg as "some party off the street." Stating that the FOIA "forfend(ed) against" Weisberg's proposed further inquiry into the Kennedy assassination, he concluded his dissent with a Latin phrase in capital letters, "REQUIESCAT IN PACE." "Rest in Peace." But the case did not rest in peace. The Justice Department sought a rehearing before the full court, which was granted. On rehearing en banc, the full court ruled that the files of the FBI were exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements. That case set a precedent so bad that when Congress first amended the FOIA in 1974, it specifically overturned the Weisberg case, requiring that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies demonstrate that allegedly exempt records fall within one or more of six enumerated harms.

In 1975, when the new amendments took effect, Weisberg again brought suit on his request for the spectrographic analyses, this time adding a request for neutron activation testing on the same evidentiary items. This new phase of the battle lasted eight years and involved three trips to the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, Weisberg obtained important records on these scientific tests, including records that the FBI had first said did not exist, then claimed were missing or destroyed. Other records were never located or were meaningless. From the date of the first request, the legal battles lasted fourteen years.

Case 2: In 1980 another requester asked the CIA to release all of the records it had made available to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The CIA refused and the requester brought suit. In court the CIA stated that there were approximately 300,000 pages of records responsive to the request. I spent the first three years of this lawsuit litigating four threshold issues raised by the Government. Had my client lost any one of these four threshold issues, the CIA would not have had to release a single page from its 300,000 page collection.

By 1984 the CIA had begun to release a trickle of documents. Although the CIA told the court that it had assigned seven people to work on the request, it processed the documents at an incredibly slow pace. When it became evident that it would take the CIA several decades to process all of the documents, the requester had no choice but to drastically limit the scope of his request. Thus, he entered into a stipulation which restricted his request to some of the subjects discussed in the report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations and its supporting volumes. Although the CIA's job of reviewing documents was reduced by more than one-half, it took several more years for it to complete processing of the remaining documents. Moreover, the CIA continued to withhold virtually everything. Only a few thousand pages were released, and most of them consisted of newspaper clippings, records that previously had been released, or documents that were heavily redacted.

Case 3: In 1976, Dr. Paul Hoch requested two batches of CIA documents which had remained to be processed after the CIA had made its initial releases of Kennedy assassination documents. Many of the records responsive to this request related to the 1966-1969 investigation and trial of Clay Shaw by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, who charged that Shaw, David Ferrie and others had plotted to kill the President. The CIA repeatedly told Hoch that his request was being processed and that if he would only be patient the documents would be released in "a few months," "in six to eight weeks," "in the near future." Indeed, Hoch received such assurances on no less than 11 different occasions over a six-year period. After having been strung-out for six years, Hoch retained counsel and filed suit. After the suit was filed, evidence was developed which indicated that all the CIA had done over the previous six years was to number the documents. It had numbered several documents one month, a few more another month, a couple more the next month. Then, in one month, it engaged in a veritable orgy of numeration, numbering, as I recall, nearly a hundred documents that month.

A few months after Hoch filed his complaint in district court, the CIA produced 808 pages. It also continued to withhold a considerable volume of materials, mostly on grounds of national security or because disclosure allegedly would identify intelligence sources and methods. The district court upheld all of the CIA's exemption claims save one. This one was an 11-page memorandum which the CIA swore must be withheld in its entirety under Exemption 5's deliberative process privilege. The judge ordered this anonymous, undated memorandum disclosed. Then things got really interesting. The CIA moved the judge to reconsider his order on this memorandum, asserting that it had claimed, albeit obscurely, that this document was also withheld in its entirety under Exemptions 1 and 3 in order to protect national security and intelligence sources and methods. But before the court could act on the motion for reconsideration, the CIA rushed to court with a new revelation: the eleven-page memo, which dealt with the CIA/Mafia plots to kill Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, matters exposed by the Church Committee in 1975, had been released nearly in full almost a decade earlier, by the CIA itself.

Case 4: In 1969, Harold Weisberg made a request for FBI records on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. J. Edgar Hoover himself ordered that no response be made to this request. In 1975, when the amended FOIA became effective, Weisberg submitted a new request for King assassination records. He specifically included a request for crime scene photographs. After he filed suit, the FBI claimed that it did not have any crime scene photographs. This statement was false. Ultimately, the FBI released more than 150 crime scene photographs to Weisberg.

During the same case, Weisberg picked up indications that an

FBI supervisor named Long had kept a tickler on the King assassination. A tickler is a file containing extra copies of documents kept at hand so it can be immediately retrieved. The FBI first denied that such a tickler file had been kept. Then it claimed that it could not locate it. After a long period of resistance, the Justice Department finally located the Long tickler exactly where Weisberg had suggested they look for it. When finally located, most of the file had been gutted.

Weisberg's suit for the King assassination documents lasted 15 years. He obtained approximately 60,000 pages. If the same suit were filed today, I believe that he would get about one-fourth of what he obtained in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

These stories that I have related are unusual only because the requesters actually went to court to fight the CIA and FBI. Most requesters cannot afford the time or the money of litigating their FOIA requests against these agencies. You might be tempted to conclude from the absence of litigation that the FOIA is working just fine. The opposite is true. The FOIA has been severely damaged by the 1984 amendments eliminating access to CIA operational files and by the 1986 amendments to Exemption 7, which applies to law enforcement records, as well as by a string of decisions in the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which have greatly expanded the amount of material which can be withheld from the public.

Let me add that while it is important to have obtained the public pledges from CIA Director Gates and FBI Director Sessions which you heard today, if you support release of the records, you must also ensure that you have the support of other agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Treasury Department, the State Department, and such divisions as the Secret Service and the National Security Agency.

I wish to caution that while I think that this legislation will result in greatly enriching our fund of knowledge about the Kennedy assassination and the official investigations of it, at least if modified along the lines I suggest in the attachment to this statement, I do not believe that there is likely to be any "smoking gun," which will "solve the case." Rather, this legislation must be defended on the ground that the American people have a right to the fullest possible disclosure so they can make of it what they will. It will take much time to read, analyze, and understand the information released. Whether it will lead to the resolution of any controversies which beset this subject remains to be seen, but it is a course which cannot be avoided. The American people want to know the details of their history, however painful and puzzling it may be, and that is their right.

The proposed legislation has both strengths and weaknesses. I am attaching to this statement a detailed discussion of the joint resolution which includes a number of recommendations for changes. To briefly summarize, the major provisions of the bill include: a definition of "assassination materials," the composition of the Review Board, and the standards for the postponement of the release of information. The standards for postponement are critical because they determine the amount of material which may be withheld.

Before discussing the limitations on the term "assassination material" as related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, I note that this section excludes records on the assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") conducted an extensive investigation on Dr. King's assassination and concluded that his murder probably involved a conspiracy. Public belief that Dr. King was killed as a result of a conspiracy and that this crime remains unsolved is widespread. The alleged assassin, James Earl Ray, denies that he shot Dr. King. Unless the importance of historical issues is to be determined by whether a movie has been made about them, there is no justification for excluding the King assassination records from this legislation.

The assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy is equally the subject of profound controversy. Recently, a group of distinguished citizens have submitted a lengthy petition to the Los Angeles County Grand Jury to investigate evidence that the Los Angeles Police Department engaged in "willful and corrupt misconduct" in its investigation of Senator Kennedy's assassination. In support of these charges, the group submitted more than 800 pages of exhibits, mainly derived from the Los Angeles Police Department's own files, which document its charges that L.A.P.D. destroyed crucial items of evidence, ignored material evidentiary leads, cannot account for important missing evidence, engaged in a cover-up of its failures, and failed to conduct a thorough investigation of the crime. The records of federal agencies and congressional committees relevant to Senator Kennedy's assassination should also be included in this legislation.

The term "assassination material" is broadly defined, but it falls short of ensuring that scholars will have all of the documents which they need in order to properly study the subject. It should include policy documents which provide the context of decisions in the Kennedy Administration which may shed light on the assassination. It should include, as it presently does, all documents obtained or created by any previous official investigation. It should include materials on those persons who have figured in previous official investigations: state, Federal or local. Because no one can predict in advance where new avenues of study may lead, or what they may produce, the definition should be flexible enough to provide scholars with those materials reasonable calculated to shed light on the assassination or its investigations. Finally, it should also include information records on agency operations and functions which may be relevant to the study of the assassination.

The current provision defining assassination materials contains an exemption for "personnel matters or other administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of Government." I strongly oppose this exclusion. The Warren Commission records on this subject have been publicly available through the National Archives for many years and should not now be made secret. The work of prior commissions and committees is a perfectly legitimate subject, but it has been the subject of some secrecy which has impeded the public's right to know. In particular, the staff of the House Assassinations Committee, with the exception of its General Counsel and Staff Director, G. Robert Blakey, pledged an oath of secrecy about their work. Blakey has published a commercial book about the committee's work, and is quite public and outspoken about it. Because of the secrecy oath, others who are quite knowledgeable about the Committee's work have been silenced. The public has been denied their views and their information. In this regard, I would urge the insertion of an additional provision in this legislation which would rescind any secrecy oaths taken by the staffs of any previous congressional or executive branch commission or committee.

This provision would also be used to prohibit release of information regarding a very troubling incident in which the House Select Committee discovered that its most sensitive files on the Kennedy assassination had been rifled by a CIA liaison officer assigned to assist the committee. According to published accounts in the Washington Post, this officer, Regis T. Blahut, surreptitiously entered the safe reserved for physical evidence of President Kennedy's assassination, including autopsy photos, X-rays, and other articles, including the so-called "magic bullet" that wounded both Kennedy and Texas Governor John Connally. According to the Post, Blahut was given several polygraph examinations. He was asked whether he did it, and according to one source, he flunked that. He was asked whether anyone had ordered him to do it, and he is said to have flunked that question too. Materials regarding incidents of this kind should be fully available to the public.

A second problem with this legislation is that is proposes to exclude from the Review Board anyone who has had "previous involvement with the investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy." I believe this is too broad and should be limited to involvement in prior "official" investigations. Having a panel of Kennedy assassination agnostics might have some idealistic allure, but the public is unlikely to be persuaded that the government intends to disclose all pertinent materials if the panel does not include experienced and knowledgeable Kennedy researchers.

A third and critically important area that needs refinement is the standards for postponement of disclosure. Particularly significant is the need to narrow the definition of the term "intelligence source" and the term "intelligence method." Virtually all information an intelligence agency document can be withheld under these terms. "Intelligence source" must be defined to make clear that it does not include dead sources who have been the subject of widespread publicity that is tantamount to official acknowledgement, and sources who are willing to have their identities disclosed, and sources who cannot reasonably be expected to suffer death or serious bodily harm if their identities are disclosed. Similar restrictions must be put on the term "confidential source." With respect to intelligence methods, it must be made clear that this term does not include outmoded methods, methods which are known to the public or methods which may be commonly deduced. Nor should it include methods that are known to other hostile intelligence services.

New legislation is needed. Half measures will not do. If this legislation does succeed in substantially clearing the air, it does not convince the public that nothing of critical importance to our understanding has been withheld but for the very best of reasons, then public cynicism about government will continue to increase.

I ask that additional comments be placed in the record.

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS

on S. J. Res. 282

Sec. 3. Definitions

(2) "Assassination material" is broadly defined but still may fall far short of the documents which scholars need in order to properly study the Kennedy assassination. In essence, the present definition limits "assassination materials" to those records which have figured in previous inquiries by Congressional committees or Executive Branch agencies or commissions. Since these entities may not have asked for all of the relevant records, and may in fact not have asked for records on some relevant subject areas, the definition of "assassination material" needs further refinement. It should be modified to indicate that "assassination material" includes any material which any member of the Assassination Materials Review Board ("AMRB") or any individual seeking release under the Freedom of Information Act ("the FOIA"), can plausibly contend may shed light on the assassination or any of its investigations.

The definition also contains two explicit exclusions. The first of these excludes material to the extent that it pertains "to personnel matters or other administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of the Government. . . . " This language could be used to prohibit release of materials pertaining to Regis Blahut, the CIA employee suspected of tampering with autopsy materials pertaining to the Kennedy assassination.

The second exclusion relates to the autopsy materials donated by the Kennedy family to the National Archives. This assumes that the autopsy materials were those of the Kennedy family to give to the Archives. This legitimizes a bad precedent. The autopsy materials ought to be subject to public, not private, control. The remedy for abuse of autopsy materials should be a newly created right of legal action by family members rather than denial or public access.

Sec. 5. Assassination Materials Review Board

(b) Court of Appeals division shall appoint "5 distinguished and impartial private citizens, none of whom are presently employees of any branch of the Government and none of whom shall have had any previous involvement with any investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, to serve as members of the Review Board."

Query: Is this language designed to exclude private citizens who have written or spoken critically of the official investigations of President Kennedy's assassinations? Or only those persons who participated in official investigations or inquiries? If it excludes the former, then it will be difficult to find individuals who are sufficiently knowledgeable about Kennedy assassination matters to make the judgments called for by the Joint Resolution (i.e., defining what materials are related to the assassination and whether the public interest in disclosure outweigh other concerns). Additionally, without such persons on the Review Board, it may be difficult to persuade the public that all pertinent materials will be disclosed, thus undercutting the objective of restoring trust in government. A committee of distinguished citizens who know nothing about the subject is not likely to inspire trust.

Sec. 6. Grounds for Postponement of Disclosure

Subsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would (A) reveal "an intelligence asset."

This must be qualified. It should only apply to living, covert intelligence agents. Furthermore, if material in the public domain identifies or suggests the identity of an intelligence agent, the presumption should be that such material shall be disclosed unless the agency which employed the agent can show by clear and convincing evidence that serious damage to the agent can reasonably be expected to result from disclosure.

Subsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would (B) reveal "an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government. . . ."

This provision also must be modified. The first problem is that there is no limiting definition of "intelligence source of method." Under this proviso, it would be possible to withhold such "intelligence sources" as newspapers, libraries, law enforcement agencies, etc., as well as the personnel affiliated with them. Research in a public library is an "intelligence method," and it, too, is no doubt currently utilized. A fortiori would this definition include the surveillance techniques employed at the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.

The "intelligence source" definition should be limited to living sources in circumstances where disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in actual serious personal damage to the source. Where disclosure of the identity of the source will not cause serious actual damage to the current national defense or foreign policy interests of the United States or where the identity of the source has become publicly known or is likely to have become known to any hostile or formerly hostile foreign power or an agency thereof, it should be released.

"Intelligence methods" must also be modified so that it applies only to methods that are unknown to the public or to foreign intelligence agencies.

Subsection 1 states that disclosure maybe postponed if its release would (C) reveal "any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States; and the threat to the military defense or conduct of foreign relations of the Unites States posed by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweigh any public interest in its disclosure.

The chief problem with this provision is that there is no standard for what constitutes a "public interest" of sufficient moment to outweigh any of the putative threats. Is the general interest in the fullest possible disclosure a public interest which may be considered, or must a showing of public interest in the substantive content of the material at issue be shown?

Subsection 2 provides that invasion of the privacy of a living person is a grounds for postponement of disclosure "if that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweigh any public interest in its disclosure."

This exemption contains a phrase stating that it applies "whether the person is identified in the material or not." This phrase should be stricken. With this phrase included this provision is significantly less liberal than current FOIA exemption 6, which covers only those invasions which result from the actual production of the materials themselves. Additionally, some content needs to be given to the invasion of privacy concept. One limitation would be that it must cause an actual as opposed to a theoretical invasion of privacy. A second that it relates only to intimate personal matters the disclosure of which would be likely to have profound adverse impact on an individual.

Subsection 3 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would constitute "a substantial and unjustified violation of an understanding of confidentiality between a Government agent and a witness or a foreign government. . . ."

This provision needs to be amended to include only those promises of confidentiality--either to a witness or a foreign government--made in writing. Among the reasons for this are the fact that (1) if the promise of confidentiality is not required to have been made in writing, then there is seldom any effective means to counter the agency's claim of confidentiality and the agency wins by default; and (2) the agency's claim of confidentiality frequently reflects not the desire of the witness but its own desire for secrecy.

This provision needs to be amended to make it clear that it does not authorize withholding of the identify of, or information provided by, a deceased witness. Secondly, there should also be some time limitation on any understanding of confidentiality made with a foreign government. And perhaps there should be a requirement that the foreign government officially object to each such disclosure in writing.

Additionally, it should be made clear, either in the text or in the legislative history, that it is not a "substantial and unjustified violation of a promise of confidentiality to disclose information supplied by a witness if the identity of the witness can be concealed.

Section 8. Determinations by the Review Board

Subsection (g) provides that any decision of the AMRB that a record is not assassination material or that disclosure should be postponed "shall not be subject to judicial review."

Why not? Likely to pose less of a burden and expense than litigation under the FOIA.

Subsection (h)(2) provides that the President may certify that material "qualifies for postponement of disclosure pursuant to section 6, in which case release of the material shall be postponed, and this decision shall not be subject to judicial review."

There is no limitation on the duration of postponement by the President. Suggest that the maximum period of time be that portion of the President's term which remains.

Section 11. Rules of Construction

Subsection (b) provides that nothing in the Joint Resolution shall be construed to eliminate any right to file requests with any Executive agency other than the Review Board or seek judicial review of the decisions of such agencies under the FOIA.

One problem here is that transferring all agency records to the Review Board may mean that they are no longer "agency records" within the meaning of the FOIA."

A second problem is that this provision eliminates the AMBR from FOIA coverage. This sets a bad precedent and sets up circumstances of highest irony in which an agency whose overriding mission is openness will itself operate in secrecy.

A provision should be added here stating that in any FOIA action involving assassination materials the court is to apply the standards for postponement set forth in the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act in lieu of the exemptions provided in the FOIA.

Additional Notes

It may be a good idea to expressly mention the Rockefeller Commission as subject to the Act.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Judge John R. Tunheim
Chairman
Assassination Records Review Board

Prepared Testimony In Support of H.R. 1553, To amend the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 to extend the authorization of the Assassination Records Review Board until September 30, 1998.

Before the
National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee,
House Government Reform and Oversight Committee

June 4, 1997

I. Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Assassination Records Review Board in support of H.R. 1553, which would extend the authorization of the Review Board for one final year. The Board acknowledges that all of the issues surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy will likely never be fully resolved, however, this additional time will allow us to complete our work, including the review and public release of critical FBI and CIA records, submit a comprehensive and complete final report to the Congress and the President, and make available to the American public as much information as possible on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Burton for introducing H.R. 1553, and Congressmen Waxman and Stokes for cosponsoring this bill. These Members have exhibited an admirable bipartisan spirit and an understanding that we as a government, and as a nation, must bring closure to a sad chapter of our history, and that we must seize this opportunity to do it now. In addition, we would like to express our appreciation to Chairman Hastert for chairing this hearing today. It provides an opportunity to explain what the Review Board has accomplished to date and discuss how we could finish our work in Fiscal Year 1998, if given the opportunity.

Please allow me to introduce the other members of the Review Board with whom I have had the professional honor and personal pleasure to work: Dr. Henry F. Graff, Professor Emeritus of History, Columbia University; Dr. Kermit L. Hall, Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law, The Ohio State University; Dr. William L. Joyce, Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University; and Dr. Anna K. Nelson, Distinguished Adjunct Historian in

Residence, The American University. We have been honored to engage in this important effort to make the history of the Kennedy assassination available to the American public and I am pleased to be here today to testify before this Subcommittee and answer any of your questions.

I would also like to describe briefly the professional staff that we are fortunate to have hired. The Executive Director is Dr. David G. Marwell, a professional historian who gained vast experience dealing with large numbers of important historical documents with the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice and later as the Director of the Berlin Document Center. He leads a staff of 28 full-time employees, who have varied backgrounds as historians, lawyers, analysts, investigators, and administrators. The members of the staff have approached their unique task with seriousness of purpose, creativity, professionalism, and competence, and have assisted us in shedding new light on the assassination through the release of thousands of Federal Government records, and the acquisition of records in private hands and local governments that were not previously available to the American public. I believe that we assembled exactly the type of professional and diversified staff that Congress envisioned would be necessary to accomplish this difficult assignment.

II. Accomplishments to Date

As I know you are aware, the Review Board was created by The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) as an independent Federal agency to oversee the identification and release of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. I know that certain members of this subcommittee played a role in crafting and passing the JFK Act—a unique piece of legislation designed to remove doubt and speculation about the content of government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. As a result of these lingering suspicions, Congress determined that an independent board was the most effective and efficient vehicle to make all assassination records available to the public.

The Review Board has accomplished much since we began releasing previously secret records in June of 1995. The Board has acted to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) at the National Archives and Records Administration. We would not have been successful in our efforts without the significant assistance of the National Archives. The JFK Collection currently totals approximately 3.7 million pages and is used extensively by researchers from all over the United States.

By the end of Fiscal Year 1997, the Review Board will have reviewed and processed nearly all of the assassination records that have been identified by the more than 30 different government offices believed to be in possession of relevant records, with the important exception of the FBI and the CIA. I will elaborate on the status of records held by these two agencies later. The overwhelming majority of previously redacted information will have been made public by the Review Board.

III. Release of Government Records Related to the Assassination

Before discussing what we will accomplish with one final year, I would like to highlight for the Members of the Subcommittee some of the important records that the Board has made public. They include:

* Thousands of CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy that made up the CIA's Oswald File and detail the agency's investigative activities following the assassination;

* Thousands of once-secret records from the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, including the controversial Staff Report on Oswald's trip to Mexico City;

* Thousands of records from the FBI's core and related assassination files that document the FBI's interest in Oswald from 1959-63, after he had defected to the Soviet Union, three years before the assassination; and

* The extensive FBI files on its investigation of the assassination.

The important work in which the Review Board has been engaged can be best and most graphically demonstrated by showing you the "before" and "after" versions of one of the pre-assassination FBI documents to which I just referred and that the Board has released to the public. Prior to the Review Board's review, this FBI document (JFK Collection Record Number: 124-10023-10236, Attachment Number 1) was available to the public as you see it on the left. As you can see, it is heavily redacted. The only information that was not secret was the date of the memorandum, "October 12, 1960," that it was to the "Director, FBI," from "Legat, Paris" (the FBI representative in Paris), that the subject was "Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security," and that it had to do with a "Paris letter 9/27/60." The rest of the text was blacked out. Obviously, this version of the document left room for a great deal of speculation among historians and researchers regarding what was underneath the black ink on this document with the provocative subject title.

The Review Board aggressively pursued the release of the redacted information in this document and several others that relate to the FBI's interest in Oswald before the assassination. After protracted negotiations with the FBI, an initial FBI appeal to the White House in an effort to keep the document secret, and a direct appeal to the Swiss government, we were able to release the information. The unredacted memorandum shows that the Swiss Federal Police had been enlisted by the FBI to try to locate Oswald and to determine whether or not he had enrolled at a school in Switzerland. Now the public is able to see the document in full and judge its importance. In its redacted state, the document could have meant anything that a researcher's imagination and speculation could invent. In its released form, it must be analyzed for what it says.

IV. Identification and Location of Additional Assassination Records

One of the most important, most difficult, and most time-consuming responsibilities of the Review Board is to identify and locate additional records that are relevant to the assassination. This is a task that to some degree must logically come later in the process, after the Review Board has gained a full understanding of the records that have already been identified. Although the Review Board has made a significant number of requests for additional records and information, some of which I would like to outline, much remains to be done before it can be confident that it has completed this responsibility.

I would like to highlight some of our efforts to identify and locate additional assassination records. Some examples:

* Medical Records Inquiry. The Review Board has several ongoing efforts to identify and locate assassination records involving medical issues. As with any homicide, the medical records are among the most important pieces of evidence. As part of its attempt to ensure that the medical records are as complete as possible, the Review Board staff has deposed the principal pathologists involved in President Kennedy's autopsy, as well as other individuals who had knowledge of the autopsy and related photographic records.

* Identification and Location of Additional FBI Records and Information. The Review Board has continued its efforts to locate additional FBI assassination records by making several requests for records and information. The FBI has assisted in this effort by giving the Review Board members access to requested files. The JFK Task Force at the FBI has, on the whole, been extremely cooperative and helpful to the Board and has provided the requested information.

* Identification and Location of Additional CIA Records and Information. The Review Board has initiated a number of requests to the CIA for additional information and records. The Review Board expects that these requests will be promptly and fully satisfied during the upcoming year.

- Identification and Location of Additional Secret Service Records and Information. Time consuming and careful review of Secret Service activities by the Review Board produced a series of requests for additional records and information that, in turn, led to the identification of additional relevant assassination records. For example, in response to the Review Board's first eight requests for additional information, the Secret Service has submitted more than 1,500 pages of material.

- Identification and Location of Additional Military Records and Information. The Department of Defense (including its many components and the military services) (collectively "DOD"), identified few assassination records on its own initiative. DOD has nevertheless been cooperative with the efforts of the Review Board to locate assassination records. When such records have been located, DOD has been willing to release the records with few redactions.

  Additional work would be required in our last year to ensure that all assassination records in the military archives have been made a part of the JFK Collection. Fortunately, the diligent efforts of the ARRB staff have set the stage for accomplishing this task.

V. Release of Private and Local Records

In addition to the release of records in the Federal Government's vast files, and consistent with the Board's mandate to make the historical record of the assassination as complete as possible, we have been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant assassination-related records in the possession of private citizens and local governments, including:

- The original personal papers of Warren Commission Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin that give further insight into the operations of the Commission;

- Copies of the official records of New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the assassination;

- The original papers of New Orleans attorney Edward Wegmann, from his work as a member of the legal team that successfully defended Clay Shaw in 1969 against a charge of conspiracy to kill President Kennedy.

- Copies of records from the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans, including records on District Attorney Garrison's investigation and prosecution of Clay Shaw and records regarding New Orleans organized crime figures;

- Long-lost films taken in Dallas on November 22, 1963, that the public had never seen and that shed new light on the events of that day; and

- Private collections of records from individuals including Warren Commission attorney Wesley Liebler, author David Lifton, FBI Special Agent Hosty, Attorney Frank Ragano, as well as others.

I am also pleased to announce today that the Review Board has just acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw, the late New Orleans businessman who is the only person ever tried in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. Shaw was acquitted by a jury in 1969 after being charged as part of District Attorney Garrison's investigation. The Shaw papers will surely add another dimension to this particular chapter of the assassination story.

All of these records will enrich the historical record of the assassination for future generations of Americans. Once these records are processed and described by the National Archives, they will be available for research.

VI. The Need For Additional Time

Despite our best efforts and significant accomplishments, some of which I have outlined, the Review Board will not be able to complete its work within the original three-year timetable set by Congress for the following reasons:

- First, the authors of the original legislation believed that our task would take three years. That estimate was based on the best available information at the time, but the legislation established an unprecedented process. There was no way of knowing the problems of scale and complexity that the Board would encounter, nor was there any way to factor in the comprehensive approach we have taken in fulfilling our mandate.

- Second, the Board was not appointed until 18 months after the legislation was signed into law. As a result, without the guidance of the Board, Federal agencies initially defined for themselves the universe of records that should be processed under The Act and to speculate about the kind of evidence that would be needed to sustain the redaction of assassination-related information. Once the Board was in place, agencies needed to redo a considerable amount of work. In fact, many agencies have yet to complete their review and the Board is still seeking their compliance.

- Third, our enabling legislation imposed several restrictions on the manner in which the Board could operate. Unlike other temporary agencies, the Board could not hire or detail experienced federal employees, but rather had to hire new employees who had to undergo background investigations and be cleared at the Top Secret level. Locating and renovating space that was suitable for the storage of classified materials was required. As a result, the Board could not begin an effective review of records until the third quarter of our first year.

We are pleased and proud that the Review Board and staff have been able to overcome these obstacles, and that we have developed an efficient and effective process for the review of records. All involved in this process want to see that the job is done, and do not want to cease now with a reasonable conclusion in sight. We want to finish the job we began, and with one additional year we can.

VII. The Job Ahead

The additional year of operations will permit the Review Board to finish its task by completing several major areas of our work. Please be assured that these are identifiable projects that are critical to ensuring that the JFK Collection is as complete as possible, that relevant Federal agencies have been held accountable, and that all that we have done is documented in our final report. The Board would focus in our final year on the following:

* CIA Sequestered Collection. The Review Board has completed its review of the Oswald "201 file," the file created and maintained by the CIA on Oswald and the assassination. The Review Board is now faced with the task of reviewing the agency's "Sequestered Collection," the large collection of files that was assembled by the CIA in response to requests made by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, in the late 1970's. These records find their relevance to the assassination defined in part by the course of the HSCA investigation. The Sequestered Collection originally consisted of 63 boxes of CIA- and HSCA-originated records as well as 72 reels of microfilm. Unfortunately, these records are in a confused order, poorly described, and are replete with duplicates. Some of these records are clearly of great significance, some are of only marginal interest, and the relevance of others cannot be identified.

* FBI Sequestered Collection. The FBI divides its assassination records into two general categories. The first is the "Core and Related Files," consisting of nearly 600,000 pages of files collected in the course of the massive FBI investigation into the assassination. The Review Board will complete its review of this significant collection by the end of FY 1997. The second, which the FBI refers to as its "HSCA records," is a large collection of records that were identified as being of interest to the HSCA and which remain to be reviewed by the Board. Like the

CIA's Sequestered Collection, this voluminous body of records (approximately 280,000 pages) ranges widely in relevance to the assassination.

* The Records of Some Federal Agencies and Congressional Committees. Additional time will allow the Board to finish its work with several agencies, including the Secret Service, the National Security Agency, and Congressional Committees, including the Senate Intelligence Committee.

* Search for Additional Records. With one more year of operations, the Board's search for additional records held by Federal agencies, private individuals, and local governments would be concluded with greater confidence. Some of these records have been identified, but not yet acquired by the Board.

* Federal Agency Compliance. In November 1996, the Review Board initiated a compliance program to ensure that Federal agencies have fully cooperated with the Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress and the American public that the goals of the JFK Act have been accomplished to the greatest possible extent. The requests to document compliance with the JFK Act were sent to 27 U.S. government agencies and departments to confirm that the U.S. government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The agencies' statements of compliance will be included in the Review Board's final report to the Congress. The one-year extension will ensure that the compliance program is completed and fully documented in the final report.

It is important for the Review Board to complete these major projects. The Board believes that the completion of the task outlined above, the inclusion of these important records in the JFK Collection, and the documentation of Federal agency compliance as part of the final report will mark an appropriate point at which to conclude the Board's work. We are confident that all that remains for the Board can be accomplished in an additional year.

VIII. An Approach to the Review of the Remaining CIA and FBI Records

It is clear to the members of the Review Board that there is much work to be done. The review of the remaining CIA and FBI records is a cumbersome and complicated task. However, the Board and staff have the benefit of our experience to date that sets the stage for an efficient and effective review of the remaining records. I would like to briefly describe our early experiences reviewing records and how the past two years set a firm foundation for the future and would work to our advantage in our last year.

Our review of records in the early months was slowed by the complexities of the issues raised in the records. The unprecedented new standards of the JFK Act, which go far beyond those established under the Freedom of Information Act, required a time-consuming early phase.

At first, the review process proceeded slowly and the agencies were afforded ample opportunity to present their evidence. Over time, the Review Board began to standardize its interpretation of the relevant section of the JFK Act and the issues raised in the various documents. Now that the Review Board and the agencies are familiar with the rigorous demands of the JFK Act, the process has accelerated. In a progressively increasing number of cases, records that initially contained proposed postponements can be released through a "consent" process. In this consent process, the ARRB staff notifies an agency that its proposed postponements are not likely to be approved by the Review Board and the agency thereupon voluntarily consents to the release of the information.

In our review of the FBI's "Core and Related Files" and the CIA's "Oswald 201 File," the records that have been the focus of our attention to date, we subjected every requested redaction to a rigorous test: did the evidence of the harm that would result from the release of the information outweigh the public interest in the information?

In considering our review of the CIA and FBI "Sequestered Collections," the Board recognized that it needed to develop a different approach, one that would take into account the varied degree of relevance of individual records to the assassination. Only in this way could the Board ensure that it would appropriately expend its resources in its last year. As a first step, the Board carefully analyzed each collection in order to determine what priority should be assigned to the category of records. In addition, the Board developed a set of guidelines for the review of these records which recognized that some categories of records did not require the intensive word-by-word review that had been the rule for the core collections that have been the subject of the Board's attention to date. The development of these guidelines began with the August 6, 1996 Board public hearing and culminated in their adoption at the October 16, 1996 Board meeting. The ARRB staff will distinguish between records whose relevance to the assassination is clear and those not believed to be relevant (or "NBR"). Applying these new standards will permit the ARRB staff to identify and review the most significant remaining records in order of priority.

These detailed guidelines will reduce the loss of valuable Review Board and ARRB staff time expended to review, on a word-by-word basis, those documents that have a remote relationship, at best, to the Kennedy assassination. Those documents that are identified as relevant to the assassination will continue to be reviewed word-by-word. These standards of relevance are designed to ensure that the greatest number of true assassination records is properly identified, reviewed, and made public in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.

The fruits of our labor from the first three years would be realized in our last year, one in which we would be reviewing some of the most difficult records, and potentially most important records, but with the benefit of our invaluable experience. I am happy to report that we have received assurances from the FBI and CIA that they will work with us in a final year to make sure that the necessary resources are applied so that our task can be completed.

IX. Conclusion

In making our recommendation for a one-year extension, we, the members of the Review Board, are fully cognizant of the difficulties inherent in extending a temporary commission. We are aware of the concern that temporary bodies may have a self-preserving and self-perpetuating instinct, and want to assure you in the clearest and most unambiguous manner that our recommendation is motivated strictly by our desire to complete the job. My colleagues and I were appointed as private citizens and have many competing claims on our time and energy. It is our collective conviction that the additional time is necessary and our sincerest commitment that we will complete our task by the end of Fiscal Year 1998, if given the means.

I would like to note that, as you may be aware, the Administration is supportive of the one-year extension for the Review Board and has submitted an FY 1998 budget amendment to allow us to complete our work, close out our operation, and submit our final report.

Since the Review Board began this effort three years ago, we have witnessed the widespread and passionate interest that the American public has in the assassination of President Kennedy. We have received thousands of letters, telephone calls, faxes and e-mail messages from individuals who care deeply about our history. They come from all walks of life, from all over the country, and are of all ages. Their interest is of varying degrees and they do not all agree on what happened in Dallas on November 22, 1963. However, they do agree that the public has the right to see the files on the assassination.

I believe that what the Review Board is all about can be summed up in a letter we received from a man from California just last week. The author is not a professional historian, not a student working on a paper for a history class, but simply a private citizen interested in learning about this tragic historical event. He wrote the following:

> "In my humble opinion, it appears that the ARRB is having a healing effect

> upon the American public, who may be coming to realize that there may be closure in sight (in our lifetimes) with regard to the JFK assassination."

These words capture why the Review Board was created by the Congress and why we hope that the Review Board will have the additional year to complete our task.

The Assassination Records Review Board was conceived as a means of eliminating uncertainty and speculation about the contents of government files relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. We, the members of the Board, believe that a premature termination of the Review Board would surely generate intensified doubts within the general public about the commitment of Congress to release all information that relates to the assassination of President Kennedy, as well as renewed speculation about the conduct of our government and its institutions and personnel. If appropriate closure is not reached now, the identical issues will likely have to be addressed again in the future—at even greater cost. The additional year that we recommend will allow for a confident conclusion of this important task.

sion of this important task.

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the members of the Assassination Records Review Board, I thank you for allowing us this opportunity to discuss our work and our future. We urge you to favorably report H.R. 1553. I would be happy to answer any questions that the members of the Subcommittee may have for me. The Board and staff stand ready to provide the Subcommittee with any additional information that may be required. Thank you.

file

Copyright 1997 Federal Information Systems Corporation

Federal News Service

JUNE 4, 1997, WEDNESDAY

SECTION: IN THE NEWS

LENGTH: 12335 words

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATIONS RECORDS REVIEW BOARD REAUTHORIZATION
CHAIRED BY REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS HASTERT (R-IL)
2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC

BODY:

REP. HASTERT: The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice will come to order. This hearing will focus on a very important piece of legislation, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. This bill was introduced by Chairman Dan Burton on May 8, 1997 and included in original cosponsors ranking minority member Henry Waxman and Congressman Louis Stokes, our first witness for today, also who chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

In 1992, 30 years after the assassination, nearly one million pages of records compiled by official investigations still had been not made public. Congress decided to set up a process for reviewing and releasing to the public the records surrounding the Kennedy assassination. The result was that on October 26, 1992, President Bush signed into law Public Law 102-526, the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

The original act provided a three-year timetable for the review board to complete its work. Unfortunately, extensive delays in the appointment of board members delayed the review board's work from the very beginning. In 1994, the Congress extended the 1992 law's termination date for one year, until September 30th, 1996. The review board subsequently exercised its authority into the statute to continue operating for one additional year.

The review process has proved to be more complex and time- consuming than anticipated. And although we believe that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding federal entities that were intended to be temporary, Chairman Burton and this subcommittee support the request for a one-year extension of the board's reauthorization. I believe that by releasing these documents to the public we serve an important public right to know and advance the cause of total accountability to the people of this country.

At this time I would like to recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

REP. THOMAS M. BARRETT (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to welcome
my esteemed colleague, Representative Louis Stokes, to testify before this subcommittee. We are fortunate to be able to draw on your experience in this area.

Over 30 years ago this country was shocked by the assassination of President Kennedy in a way that it had not been shocked since the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the bombing or Hiroshima. Yet today we are still prying papers out of the government about that assassination.

The legislation that created the Assassination Review Board broke new ground by establishing the principle that there should be a presumption of public access to government information. That legislation was necessary because administration after administration had failed to release documents. That should not be. The Assassination Review Board has released millions of pages that could have otherwise remained locked in government file drawers. We are here today to extend the authorization of this board because the process of making government information public has been more complex and time-consuming than anticipated. I am not criticizing the work of the board or the dedication of its members. I am, however, critical of the fact that we are still fighting with our government to allow public access to government documents. Congress has passed laws and resolutions reiterating the principles of public access that were laid down when this country was founded. Administration after administration has worked to thwart that access. I applaud President Clinton for his efforts to declassify xdocuments, but we need to do much more.

I hope that every employee at the Office of Management and Budget, and every agency in the government will pay attention to what this board has accomplished. It is the refusal to allow public access that breeds suspicion of the government. It is the thwarting of public access that causes the public to mistrust government officials. If we are to turn the tide of mistrust and suspicion, it will be done by opening the doors of access. Today is one step in that process, but there is much more work to be done.

Thank you.

REP. HASTERT: Are there any other members wishing to make an opening statement? If not, our first witness this morning is fellow Congressman Lou Stokes, who served as the chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations from 1976 to 1979, and is a cosponsor of this important bill.

And, Mr. Stokes, we want to say welcome, and thank you for your fine work in this area. And please proceed with your opening statement.

REP. LOUIS STOKES (D-OH): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Barrett, Mr. Turner, Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my written testimony for the record, and if I may, I'd like to just summarize my testimony.

REP. HASTERT: Without objection.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

It seems, Mr. Chairman, it was not as long as it is, but actually it's been 20 years; it was in 1977 when I was appointed as chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. We were authorized at that time and directed to complete an investigation surrounding the assassination and the death of President John F. Kennedy. We completed, as you've already stated, our investigation in 1979. And on March 28th of that year, we filed our final report. In addition to it, 12 volumes of evidentiary material, printed by the Government Printing Office, was made available to the American public. In addition to this, we conducted 18 days of public hearings and an additional two days of public policy hearings.

Prior to the committee running out of both time and money, we had released everything that we had the time and resources to release. All of our other records were placed in the National Archives, under a House of Representatives rule which existed at that time, Rule 36, requiring such unpublished records routinely to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The records of our committee relative to this investigation consisted of 935 boxes, which we turned over to the National Archives. Then, over the years, a considerable public debate about these records has ensued, including accusations that these records, if released, would contain evidence of a government cover-up, or complicity of government agencies in the assassination of President Kennedy.

A great deal of this was fueled in 1992 by a movie entitled "JFK." That movie contained many distortions of the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of our president. As a result of that movie, my office was deluged with thousands of letters and telegrams by Americans calling for the release of these sealed files.

As a member of Congress, and a former chairman of that committee, I deemed it important not to have the good work of our committee impugned by such baseless accusations. Our committee had attempted to conduct its investigation into the assassination of the president, and to present the results of that investigation to the Congress and to the American people in a thorough and dignified manner in keeping with the memory of this great president.

Consequently, in 1992, I introduced, and the House and Senate passed, PL 102-526, a bill entitled The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. That law created the Assassination Records Review Board, which mandated and authorized that board to identify, secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It was our intention, Mr. Chairman, that everything that could be released from every agency, every court record, anywhere they existed -- that those records be released to the American people.

Under the law, the board had until October 1, 1996, to fulfill its mandate, plus an additional year, at the board's discretion.

We were very fortunate to have a very distinguished panel appointed. This panel was appointed by President Clinton 18 months after the law was enacted here by the Congress -- a considerable delay in the appointment of this panel. But we were very fortunate to have persons such as Chairman Tunheim, Dr. Henry Graff, Dr. Kermit Hall, Dr. William Joyce, Dr. Anna Nelson, and an outstanding executive director, David Marwell.

Under this panel, they have now released more than 10,000 previously secret government documents.

They have released a report, which I would urge all the members of the committee to read, if they have an opportunity, because I think you will see the extensive amount of work in which they have been involved.

They now need one additional final year in order to complete their work. Their work during this period of time will be primarily to secure the release of documents from the CIA and the FBI. Those are the two main agencies left from which they still have a considerable number of documents to be released.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I think that it's important that we complete this work in an orderly manner with full and complete disclosure to the American people, that they will feel that they know everything that their government knows about the assassination of their president. And I would urge the support and passage of this legislation sponsored by Chairman Burton, of which I am one of the original co-sponsors.

I'd be pleased to answer any questions.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Chairman -- or, Mr. Stokes. And I really appreciate the work that you've done here. I have just two brief questions. Actually, three. Do you believe that the Ford Review Board is up and running smoothly now?

REP. STOKES: Absolutely. In spite of the delay of 18 months they have done just a yeoman's amount of work. It's just been almost incomparable to realize how much they have done. And to their credit, they feel that if given just this one additional year that they will complete the work.

REP. HASTERT: And do you believe that this process is consistent with the goals of your original legislation in 1992?

REP. STOKES: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: And then you are confident, as you said before, that the review board can finish its task by September 30th, 1998.
REP. STOKES: I am just very confident that -- in projecting the fact that they can do this work with one year. And when they say themselves as they will say to you when they appear, this'll be one final year.
REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much, and thank you for your testimony.
REP. STOKES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. HASTERT: The gentleman from Wisconsin.
REP. BARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't have a lot of questions, either. I just want to compliment you, Congressman Stokes, for the fine job that you have done.
REP. STOKES: Thank you.
REP. BARRETT: And just one question. Do you think in the unfortunate and hopefully unlikely scenario that there are future assassinations in the future that this was a good way to approach this problem, the panel that you served? Do you think that you have accomplished what you intended to accomplish?
REP. STOKES: Mr. Barrett, at the time that we undertook this panel and Congress passed the act to create this panel, 85 percent of the American people believed that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald had participated in the assassination of President Kennedy. A national poll had told us that. There were boundless rumors and myths. People were writing numerous books and things of that sort. And as a consequence of it, I think that putting this panel together and permitting this type of investigation I think was very helpful. I think it allayed many of the rumors and myths that grew up and abounded around the assassination of our president.
However, I don't think that it put to bed everything. We uncovered many things. For instance, we pointed up many of the things that the Warren Commission had not done properly. And we were able to destroy many of the myths, such as the umbrella man theory and things of that sort. But we couldn't put everything to bed. We had begun that investigation 15 years after the assassination of the president. I think had we been given this type of investigation immediately after it had occurred, it would have been a different result. But many of the witnesses had died. Evidence had disappeared. As you can see now, there were materials which we were not able to get even within that two-year period before we went out of existence.
And so as a consequence of it, I think we did an outstanding job. No one has ever been able to refute any of the work that we did. No one has been able thus far to say anything was ever covered up from the American people. And so to that degree, I think that it performed a good service for the American people.

REP. HASTERT: Okay, thank you very much.

The gentleman from Ohio.

REP. STEVEN LATOURETTE (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for having this hearing today and for also expediting the markup on 1553, and give praise to the co- sponsors, our chairman, Mr. Burton, Mr. Waxman, and also to Congressman Stokes.

The editorial comment I would make is I'm always amazed each succeeding day that I serve in Congress at the rich history that a number of our colleagues have, and to now have our fine colleague from Ohio, Congressman Stokes from Cleveland, here and talk about his previous work on the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Although many members in the House remember his service, I would venture to say there are a number of people back home that don't know all of the things that you've done during your many years of service to this Congress and this country.

Just as an example, the other day I found out -- and I don't know if you're a lawyer or not, Mr. Chairman, but I found out that Congressman Stokes -- well, you're lucky you're not a lawyer, but I am, and I'm proud to be a lawyer.

I found out that Congressman Stokes was responsible for a ruling called Terry versus Ohio, and you might have heard of a "Terry Frisk and Search," and I didn't know that till the other day, that Congressman Stokes had a hand in that, and so, again, we find Congressman Stokes showing up again, sharing his expertise with the country.

Lou, the one question I would have, deals with, in both your written testimony, and then also your observations to Congressman Baird's question. You talked about the "JFK" movie, and all of the rumors and innuendoes and the public polls. And you still run into people -- as I'm sure -- I still run into people that aren't convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone on that November day in Dallas.

And part of it has to do, I think, with, after your commission met, and now the legislation in '92, and a little delay in getting everybody in place in the review board. Do you think it was necessary, after you've reviewed the documents in this case, that we waited, as a government, 34 years to make these documents available? Was there something impinging upon the national security that you found or discovered that made it necessary for the government to wait 34 full years before releasing this information, and hopefully dispelling some of those rumors?

REP. STOKES: Thank you very much, Mr. LaTourette, firstly for your nice remarks. But it's a good question, because not many people realize that this was not -- when we sealed these records for the period 30 to 50 years, this was not done because of anything relative to this particular investigation. That was a House rule in existence at that time, that applied to any committee that, when it completed its work and filed its final report, if they had documents which had not been released publicly, under that House rule, they had to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The same applied to the other part of that investigation which we conducted, which was to investigate the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., which was a companion part of our investigation. So that applied to that one also.

But as a result of it, in compliance with the House rule, it just sort of sat there until things were stirred up by that "JFK" movie and it sort of brought things to the head.

REP. LATOURETTE: Okay. The principles behind your '92 legislation, the Assassination Records Collection Act -- obviously, now we collect records differently than we did before. A lot of them are electronically stored. Do you think that we can use that act as a vehicle, should another tragedy -- God forbid we should ever have such another tragedy in this country, but should another tragedy such as this occur, could we use the lessons learned in the model of this review board to prevent the significant time lag between the date of event and the eventual release of documents for public review?

REP. STOKES: I would hope, Mr. LaTourette, that we have learned some lessons. Firstly, here in the Congress we'd no longer have such a rule in effect, and that will help us, I think, tremendously.

But also, I think, by the agencies now working with a review panel of this sort and realizing that many of the type of documents which they will cite to you in their testimony -- for instance, there's a very interesting document that they will talk about, where the whole page, with the exception of just the date and the name of a country -- everything was redacted. And under their work, that whole page has been released, and everyone can read that.

What you do by that is that you're to allay all the suspicion as to what really has been redacted and people can really see. And then you can't have the kind of rumors and myths that grow up around it.

And I think and hope that in the event of such an occurrence in the future -- which all of us hope would never occur -- that our agencies will realize that this has been a good example of how we could allay some of the fears and suspicions that the American people have around the manner in which we conduct this type of thing.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you very much, Congressman Stokes, for your expertise --

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. LATOURETTE: -- and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you.

And at this time I recognize the gentleman from Texas.

REP. JIM TURNER (D-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And all I would add is to also compliment you, Mr. Stokes, for your many years of work on this effort. I too stand somewhat in awe at the number of years of service and your contributions to this body.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. TURNER: And I know the Congress and the American people are grateful for the years of service you've provided not only on this issue, but on many other issues to which you've contributed.

And I also want to thank those who've served on this panel, because I'm sure it is a time-consuming endeavor to carry out this task.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Mr. Turner.

Thank you, Mr. Stokes.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. HASTERT: The second panel, come forward, please.

Our distinguished second panel includes four witnesses: Mr. John Tunheim, the chair of the Assassination Records Review Board; Mr. Steven Tilley, the chief of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection at the National Archives. We also have Mr. Max Holland, the author and contributing editor of the Wilson Quarterly; and Mr. Bruce Hitchcock, an historian and teacher at Noblesville High School in Indiana, our distinguished chairman's home state.

And I also would say that, at this time, Mr. Burton would have wanted to be here to make a few comments. He is not here yet. We may entertain that at any time. So, if you gentlemen would please stand, and -- (witnesses are sworn in). Thank you. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

And we start with you, Mr. Tunheim.

JOHN TUNHEIM (Chair, Assassination Records Review Board): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to submit my written testimony for the record and just give a brief summary to members of the subcommittee today.

I'd like to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify today in favor of House bill 1553. And I'd also like to note our thanks to Congressman Stokes for his leadership on this issue and his guidance in the important effort to release the records relating to the tragic assassination of President Kennedy.

The review board is confident that the additional time requested and provided by Congressman Burton's bill will allow us to complete our work and submit a truly complete final report to the Congress, to the president and to the American public. I'd like to thank Chairman Burton for introducing the bill and Congressman Waxman and Stokes for co-sponsoring the bill that is before the subcommittee today. And I also appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your role in chairing this hearing today and assisting in this effort.

One of the other members of the review board is present with us today -- I'd like to introduce her -- Dr. Anna Nelson, who is the distinguished adjunct historian in residence at the American University and is seated in the row directly behind me. Dr. David Marwell, the executive director of the review board, is also here, as are a number of staff members who are very professional and very dedicated and have done their work for us very well.

The review board, Mr. Chairman, began releasing records in July of 1995, pursuant to the act passed by Congress. And thus far, the board has acted specifically to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the JFK collection at the National Archives. That collection, as Mr. Tilley will tell the subcommittee shortly, now contains more than 3.7 million pages' worth of material.

I'd like to show one brief and rather dramatic example of the work that the review board is doing. Congressman Stokes mentioned this issue in his testimony. This involves one particular record. This is the "before" version, the record that was available to the public up until several years ago. You probably cannot see it from here, but it is a document that was sent from the FBI's representative in Paris to Director Hoover on October 12, 1960. That is indicated at the top of the memorandum. The subject, as indicated, is Lee Harvey Oswald: Internal Security. And then it says Re: Paris Letter 9-27- 60. And the remainder of the entire document is blacked out. And not surprisingly, a document like this dated three years prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, a document sent to J. Edgar Hoover attracted a great deal of interest among researchers who saw it because everything was blacked out underneath. The speculation that individuals had about this was great.

Well, the board aggressively pursued the release of this information, initially ordering its release. The FBI appealed that decision to the president. Subsequently we worked out with them, including an aggressive effort to contact Swiss authorities who were the subject of this particular document. I met personally with the Swiss ambassador to the United States to ask for his assistance in obtaining Swiss approval to release it.

And here is the record that is now released to the American public at the National Archives. All of the material is released. And what it indicates was the FBI was interested in whether Oswald was indeed attending a college in Switzerland during that period of time. And the document tells about the investigation that Swiss authorities did to determine whether Oswald was, indeed, enrolled. He was someone who the FBI was following because of his interest in defecting to the Soviet Union. That's a good example of the type of work that the review board is doing: pursuing individual releases of information that has long been redacted from the public.

The board has worked closely with federal agencies. The vast majority of the records are at the CIA and the FBI. We have completed the review of the core collections in both of those agencies and significant numbers of materials have

been released.
The board has also been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant assassination-related records that have been in the hands of private citizens and local governments. Just a couple of examples:
The papers of J. Lee Rankin, who was the chief counsel to the Warren Commission, have now been released through the efforts of the review board. Virtually all of the records of the prosecution in New Orleans of Clay Shaw was also released.
And I'm announcing for the first time today that the review board has just acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw. He was the individual prosecuted in New Orleans in 1969, the only individual prosecuted for the assassination of President Kennedy. That will add another dimension to this story. This is an example of his diary, which the board has just obtained, and will be released as soon as we can process the materials. It's very interesting. It's his diary from the day that he was arrested, on March 1st, 1967 and his feelings about Oswald on that particular day.

Despite the best estimate, Mr. Chairman, that this job could be done in three years, we cannot finish our work by the end of this fiscal year. We're confident that in the additional year we will be able to get through the records, which will largely involve the sequestered collections at the CIA and at the FBI -- records sequestered by the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I'd be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman, that you and the members have.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you. We'll hold all the questions until the end of the testimony.

MR. TUNHEIM: Very well.

REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tilley?

STEVEN TILLEY (Chief, Access and Freedom of Information Staff, National Archives and Records Administration): Mr. Chairman, I am Steven Tilley, and I'm the chief of the Access and Freedom of Information Staff at the National Archives and Records Administration. And I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf -- for the National Archives in support of HR 1553.

I'm appearing today in my capacity of NARA's chief of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection. In that role, I am charged with implementing NARA's responsibilities under the act, and I serve as NARA's liaison to the Assassination Records Review Board. And it's my understanding that my written statement will be made part of the record, therefore, I'll be brief in my remarks.

Mr. Chairman, this month marks the 20th anniversary of the closing of the office of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. I oversaw the closing of that office and supervised the transfer of those records to the National Archives. Most of my career at the National Archives since then has been involved with working with sensitive records. And in 1993, I became the chief of the JFK Collection, and I've served in that capacity ever since.

When the review board members were confirmed by the Senate in April of 1994, my staff and I began to work with the board, and later with the board staff, to provide information on the records in the JFK Collection, the development and use of NARA's data base, our contacts and discussions with other agencies involved in searches for assassination records, and the existence of assassination records in the custody of private repositories or individuals.

The review board and NARA have maintained an excellent working relationship through the three years of the board's existence, and I'd like to think that this close relationship has in some way contributed to the success of the review board.

NARA enthusiastically supports passage of HR 1553 to extend the review board's authorization.

The board needs the time designated in this bill to complete its important work in making available as complete a historical record as possible concerning the assassination of President Kennedy.

I would like to briefly offer for your consideration some statistics and facts to demonstrate the success of the board. The JFK Assassination Records Collection has grown to more than 1,600 cubic feet of records, or approximately 3.75 million pages from more than 30 different government offices. These numbers are a testament to the work of the board in obtaining the cooperation of the entire federal government as well as private donors in this important task.

For the information of the committee, Mr. Chairman, I've attached to my testimony a copy of the register of the collection, which lists the major groups of federal records and private papers along with a supplemental listing of FBI records.

Not only has the collection increased dramatically in size; the significance of the records in the collection cannot be underestimated. In addition to the records of numerous executive branch agencies and offices, the records of relevant congressional committees, related court cases, and records donated by private entities are also available in the collection.

This rich documentation is searchable electronically, giving researchers the ability to seek out documents concerning a topic, person or event, or even individual documents, not only at NARA's College Park facility but from their own personal computer through the Internet.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, public demand for these records is the ultimate evidence of the value of this collection. Reference requests have risen in number every year since the collection opened with new records in August of 1993. This year we have already received over 600 written inquiries, an increase of over 30 percent from this period of time last year. The number of inquiries on our computer Web site is also steadily increasing. Since March 1996, when the assassination records database was made available through the Internet, it has been accessed over 100,000 times by the public.

Due to the exceptional work of the Assassination Records Review Board, great progress has been made on making available as complete a record as possible in the history of the assassination of John Kennedy. Without the focus, integrity and expertise of the review board, the collection would not have the size, quality or public demand witnessed today.

However, there is still much to do. NARA supports passage of HR 1553 so this important work can be completed.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I'll be glad to answer any questions.

REP. HASTERT: Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Holland?

MAX HOLLAND (Author, contributing editor of Wilson Quarterly): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to make a brief statement summarizing my testimony.

Nearly 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination, a chemist-turned-author named Otto Eisenschiml provoked a national furor with his 1937 book, "Why Was Lincoln Murdered?" Eisenschiml claimed one of the most important events in American history was still a mystery. And Eisenschiml claimed to have uncovered the truth: President Lincoln was the victim of a conspiracy organized by his secretary of war, Edwin Stanton, who was allegedly opposed to the president's program for a charitable post-war reconstruction of the South.

When pressed, Otto Eisenschiml openly admitted that he had no evidence to support his case. At the same time, it was precisely the documentary record that enabled critics to prove that Eisenschiml's book was just another in a long line of lunatic theories about the first assassination of an American president.

Here lies, I submit, the long-term importance of the work being carried out by the AARB. The meaning of the raw data being unearthed by the review board will probably not be appreciated any time soon by the generations sentient when President Kennedy was murdered in Dallas, but if these generations cannot come to terms with history as it happened in their lifetimes, then at the very least, they have an obligation to hand over, insofar as possible, a complete and thorough documentary record. Citizens will need that record to rebut the Otto Eisenschimls of the next century, not that there is any dearth of them now.
I strongly support without qualification extension of the review board for another year and full funding of its operations. Bringing its work to an abrupt end would not only diminish the investment of time and resources already made; in all likelihood, it would throw the whole initiative into chaos. Not least of all, gutting the effort now would surely create ineradicable suspicion about the federal government's intentions in the first place. I'd like to spend the balance of my time describing the three areas where I thank the review board

had made its greatest contributions. The first has to do with the Warren Commission. The review board's labors have resulted in many new documents that I believe will eventually remove the stigma that has been attached to the commission, which is probably the most unfairly reviled and/or ridiculed entity ever created by the federal government.

These records paint a sobering portrait of our federal government during a very traumatic time. It's not the idealized versions depicted in civics text books nor the demonized version featured on talk radio. It's the real federal government: imperfect, plodding, riven by ambition, distrust, rivalries, compartmentalized by secrecy, working at cross-purposes or in ignorance, simultaneously guided by the most banal bureaucratic instincts and the most elevated national concerns. Somehow, through all of that, it does struggle and manage to do the right thing.

Besides the Warren Commission, I think the work of the review board has made a very substantial contribution towards understanding the operations of the intelligence community. The assassination necessarily caused what could only be termed a mobilization of the U.S. intelligence community's far-flung resources. The government had to determine that weekend who was responsible and whether the assassin or assassins had any co-conspirators either foreign or domestic. Consequently the records being released now constitute a gold mine of information about domestic and foreign intelligence operations at the midpoint of the cold war. These records not only shed new light on what the government knew 34 years ago; the release is an object lesson in why they were kept secret for all those years. They do not contradict the federal government's official conclusion at stated in the Warren report. Rather, the documents were kept secret because they disclosed or tended to disclose ongoing intelligence sources and methods.

With the release of these documents, the intelligence community's record in the wake of the assassination can finally be assessed with some fairness and thoroughness. The fact is that the information provided by the FBI, CIA and other agencies was instrumental to preventing the United States government from overreacting when the circumstantial public evidence was highly suggestive of a link between Lee Harvey Oswald and a foreign power.

The last area in which the review board has made a -- perhaps its greatest contribution has to do with whole issue of secrecy and disclosure. The balance between secrecy and disclosure has always been in favor of secrecy, especially since World War II, controlled by laws highly deferential to the equities of the interested government agencies. The five citizens who serve on the review board decided that if their mandate was to have any meaning it was imperative to pierce this veil. They had to get at categories that had been classified here before, including information derived from intelligence sources and methods. While some historians have been critical of the resources devoted to this particular effort, I like to believe that a breakthrough had to be achieved somewhere, and in fact, the records pertaining to President Kennedy's assassination make an excellent demonstration project of what can now be released. The lines drawn by the review board should prove helpful as the government undertakes to declassify the vast body of records generated during the Cold War.

Finally, I'd like to say the entire history of the federal government's efforts in the wake of the assassination, including the experience of the review board, serves as a cautionary tale. Perhaps it will enable the government to strike a better balance between secrecy and disclosure in the future, for there exists no better example of the heavy wages of doubt, suspicion and public cynicism exacted by secrecy than the Kennedy assassination experience.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: I thank the gentleman.

And now, Mr. Hitchcock, I'd like to welcome you especially. A gentleman from Ohio asked me a little while ago if I was an attorney. Indeed, I was not an attorney, I happened to be a history teacher for 16 years before I ever got into politics. So it's certainly a noble trade, and happy that you're here. I know the chairman wanted to introduce you personally, but he couldn't make it this afternoon.

You have contributed students, I understand, a clerk for this commission, and have been involved in it at a very high degree. So we welcome you and listen to your testimony.

BRUCE HITCHCOCK (Teacher, Noblesville High School, Indiana): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, would ask that my written statement be entered into the record and I will briefly summarize.

REP. HASTERT: Without objection, all written statements will be entered into the record.

MR. HITCHCOCK: Thank you.

My name is Bruce Hitchcock and I am a teacher at Noblesville High School located in Noblesville, Indiana, which is a community approximately 20 miles north of Indianapolis. I am currently completing my 28th year in secondary education. My teaching assignment has primarily been in the areas of United States history, American government, and international relations.

And I want to express my appreciation to the committee for affording me the honor and privilege of being here today and permitting me to make some brief remarks concerning an issue about which I have very strong convictions not only as a citizen, but as an educator.

In the spring of 1994, I assigned my Honors United States history class a project studying the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. This project culminated in the students placing the Warren Commission Report on trial. Half of the class represented the prosecution and half the class defended the Warren Commission Report. The class became quite interested in, and many would say obsessed with this subject. The project resulted in a trial which became quite intense and divisive, so much so that the class had to have a party at the end of the semester to rekindle friendships. They became so fascinated with the subject of the assassination that they requested an opportunity to travel to Washington, DC during the summer following their graduation to do additional research.

From that modest class assignment developed an internship opportunity with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board. To date, four student groups from believe the government did conceal, continues to conceal, and will continue to conceal the truth. If the review board is permitted time to complete its work, it will assist in defusing the last two charges. We cannot prevent the speculation that someone did conceal the truth. But the argument that a cover-up continues, and will continue, can at least be defused, or discouraged. What has been lost cannot be replaced. However, what still exists can be made public. We should have access, and our students should have access to the information and documents still in existence. This is an opportunity for the United States government to provide a credible response to public interest. The review board established by the Congress, is actually a group of citizens telling the government what to do, and what to release. An opportunity exists, in this era of skepticism, to restore some credibility and trust in the government.

In his recent book, "The Approaching Fury," author Stephen B. Oates quotes John Furling as saying, "Events by themselves are unimportant. It is the perception of events that is crucial."

Perhaps in 1997, the most important aspect concerning the assassination of President Kennedy, is the perception, shared by many, of a conspiracy involving individuals and agencies of the United States government. Do we not owe our young people the opportunity to form the most accurate perception possible? Do we not owe them the chance to see as much of the truth intact as can be assembled?

It seems to me that we owe this generation, and all succeeding generations, the opportunity to question, to study, and to form opinions on the basis of information they can view independently, without solely relying on the opinions of others. Oftentimes, while I'm in the classroom, I observe students who have opinions, but little to substantiate them. Congress has a chance before it in some small way -- or maybe in some large way -- to at least provide them with more information, so that they may have their turn in determining what the JFK assassination means.

We have been affected by this event. For 34 years we have been affected. The 56 students from Noblesville High School have, as have countless others, been affected by the events of November 22nd, 1963.

The study of this event has the public interest. It is an event to which the public and students can relate. It touches people.

As an aside, last week an article was published in the Indianapolis Star. I have a copy with me today. Regarding our school's ongoing JFK assassination project. Within a day of its publication I received phone calls from a gentleman offering 500 pages of documents for our use. And from a former teacher calling me with information regarding some scholarship opportunities. I also received a call from ABC News Nightline. And yesterday before leaving Noblesville High School received a call from Atlanta, Georgia offering information.

The subject of the call from Nightline was seeking information as to what Noblesville High School students were doing with regard to the study of the assassination. Together I think these calls reflect continued local and national interest in continuing the probe into what happened in Dallas. Congress has the opportunity to lay the facts before the American public and permit a more reasoned, rational and fact-based account and discussion of the assassination.
I would hope that the committee would take into consideration the fact that the review board had a one-year delay before truly becoming operational, that it is making a one-time request for an extension, that the review board has been on task and on budget, that the review board has conducted its business in a professional and non-partisan manner, and in 1992, when the act was passed by this Congress and signed by President Bush, the enormity of the task was not

Noblesville High School have interned with the review board, with the fifth scheduled for the week of June 16th of this year. When this group completes its work, a total of 56 of our students will have participated in this unique and truly educational opportunity.

I might add that except for the first group, succeeding student groups have studied, researched and prepared for their internship on their own time, outside normal class meetings. The most recent group to participate did so over spring break. The fact that students wanted to spend their vacation working with government records reflects the interest that the JFK assassination has for students.

In my 28 years of teaching, I have never had a topic create as much interest as the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a mystery, and it provides an excellent research opportunity, as well as a chance for students to be actively involved in learning.

Since November 22nd, 1963, there have been many who have believed, and still and could not be fully appreciated.

An opportunity exists to complete a task which I believe is overwhelmingly supported by the American public, and it is important that this mission and mandate authorized by Congress be completed. I would like to end with just a couple of quotes, one from former Senator Bob Dole, who said in a different context, this is not about only who we are. It is about have we made a difference. This is a chance to make a difference. And as former President Reagan often said, if not us, who, and if not now, when?

After 34 years it is time to let the public know the facts that remain. To do less would be a tragedy and a travesty. As an educator I believe that our most important task is to provide our young people the most complete story of who we are and why we are who we are. We have an opportunity to work towards the accomplishment of that goal. It is an opportunity, I believe, we cannot afford to miss.

In his last speech in Fort Worth on November 22nd, 1963, President Kennedy said, we would like to live as we once lived, but history will not permit it. History can only be served by permitting the public to see the evidence.

Mr. Chairman, as a further aside, if I might just have a few seconds. Reflective of our students' interest in this event, I have my honors government classes perform a project for the model Congress. One of the students this year -- they could write a bill on whatever subject they wished, and one student who worked with the review board last year introduced House concurrent resolution 1 in support of the review board, and concludes, after all the whereas's, the Congress of the United States firmly supports the assassination records review board in all endeavors leading to the collection, review and release of the documents regarding the assassination of President Kennedy and supports the extension of the life of the ARRB for an additional fiscal year.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: We thank the gentleman and thank the panel. Now, I recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

REP. BARRETT: Mr. Hitchcock, can you give us the name of that student so we can make him or her an honorary co-sponsor? Might as well get the name in the record.

MR. HITCHCOCK: Abigail Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.

REP. BARRETT: Judge Tunheim, you mentioned that you were releasing some materials from Clay Shaw's diary and perhaps other things. Is there any information in here that you find particularly interesting?

MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Barrett, I've not had a chance to go through it. We've just gotten these materials in the last week through some aggressive efforts on our staff. The page that I cited to you is interesting in that he made the notation in there and it's a portion of it in his own handwriting that it was perhaps unfortunate that he had never met Oswald because then he might have possibly been a tiny footnote in history, an ironic statement given the role that he played in the trial.

We've not had a chance to analyze it thoroughly yet. It does contain his reactions to events as they were going on around him during the course of the prosecution and certainly supports his view that he was not involved whatsoever in the assassination, which ultimately was the view of the jury that acquitted him.

REP. BARRETT: For my benefit, as a person who has not been immersed in this issue at all. You just mentioned it took some aggressive work from your staff to get this released. Can you tell me what that entailed, where it was, why it was so difficult to get this information?

MR. TUNHEIM: Certainly. Part of this, this is an investigation into where records are. The bulk of our work has been with federal agencies that hold assassination records. But we've also, at the direction of Congress in the bill that was passed, entertained a search for records wherever they might be. Records that are in private hands are not records that we can subpoena and take from people, so we have to find where they are.

Staff members go out, talk to people, encourage them to donate those records to the American public, to the National Archives. That was done in this case. We received a tip that an individual had records that were left over from Mr. Shaw, and staff went and talked to the person, spent time with the person, encouraged them to share those records with the American public, and that's how it was developed.

REP. BARRETT: How do you determine which assassination records you can disclose now and which just have to wait?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, there's a standard that's set up by the act. There's first of all a presumption that all records should be public. That presumption has governed what the board has done throughout the process. But then there's a standard where the board has to weigh the public interest in a particular record or information with the potential harm that might be caused by release of the material.

The standards that we look at are, are there national security interests such as disclosure of an intelligence agent whose name hasn't been disclosed and whether that person perhaps may be in some danger if that name was released publicly. Does it disclose a method of protecting the president that is not generally known today, so therefore it might be a threat to the president. Are there personal privacy considerations that are involved.

I will tell you that when all is said and done, a very, very tiny percentage of information gets redacted under the standards that we are applying, and the process of going through the records has led the board to arrive at a number of policy decisions which the agencies by and large are now following in their own review of records, and therefore decisions that we had to make two years ago now we don't have to make because the agency is following the advice of the board made on earlier records.

REP. BARRETT: As long as there are some records that are not being released, do you think that we will inevitably face criticism from some people in the American public that there is still some sort of cover-up? I make reference to Mr. Holland's comments about a book being written 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination.

Will the time ever come, do you think, when all records will be released?

MR. TUNHEIM: I think it will, Mr. Barrett. The board is releasing every record. The question is whether certain information on these records gets redacted or not. For every redaction we are attaching a specific release date. Some of the dates are five years in the future. The law that was passed which established the review board provided that all records that are redacted, all information redacted will be released in 2017 unless whoever is president at that time makes a specifics determination that the record cannot be released because of some continuing national security concern.

So we expect that virtually all of the information by 2017 will be released but a very high percentage, in the 99.999 range is being released right now.

REP. BARRETT: Mr. Tilley, in your written statement you indicate that the collections currently consist of 3.75 million pages. What's your estimate of how many more records need to be reviewed?

MR. TILLEY: Well, it's hard to say because there is still a good deal of material that's being reviewed by agencies at this time. But we have located some records at the National Archives that are still under review, such as the Secretary of Army's records dealing with Operation Mongoose, the campaign to destabilize the Cuban government in the period after the Bay of Pigs.

Other records have been located at other agencies. I received a call from the Customs Bureau today and they will be turning over their assassination records to me hopefully this afternoon. After this hearing is over I'll be picking up the records they've located.

So it's tough to say how much is still out there but I think there's still going to be another considerable amount of material, probably will be added to the collection before this process is finished.

REP. BARRETT: Millions of pages?

MR. TILLEY: Oh, no. I would say probably, if we had another half a million pages, that might be the extent of it. But what's interesting and fascinating about this process is that we continue to turn up records where we did not know there were records before. As agencies are aware of this effort, they have come to the board. And the board is responsible for a lot of this by their aggressive work with federal agencies. But I don't see us ever doubling the collection again, but I think we will add a significant amount of material in the weeks and years ahead.

REP. BARRETT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tunheim, I have just a very short question. You mentioned the movie that came out, JFK, and Mr. Oliver Stone's work in there. Did Mr. Stone ever have any questions of your work at all, or did he do research?

MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Stone has been very supportive of the work of the review board. He testified before the Congress when this bill was passed initially, encouraging broad release of the records. He sent a representative to one of our public hearings who testified and spoke very favorably about the work of the board. So he's been strongly supportive and we've appreciated that support.

REP. HASTERT: Why have you waited to this point in the process to begin reviewing the CIA and FBI records?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we've been reviewing CIA records and FBI records from the very beginning, Mr. Chairman. The volume of records in those agencies is really significant. We have completed the entire review of the core collections of those agencies and those are numbers, between the two agencies, it's more than a million pages of records.

What we are doing right now are delving into what's called the sequestered collection in both of these agencies. Within the CIA these are records that the House Select Committee on Assassinations asked to be sequestered, taken away from their files and kept in a secure place for future review. The House Select Committee did not have time to review these records carefully. Some of them are highly relevant to the assassination, others are not. Within the CIA there are about 62 boxes of material and 72 reels of microfilm.

In the FBI in the same kind of sequestered collection is about 280,000 pages of records. Those records are the focus of the review board's work over the next year, if we get the extension.

REP. HASTERT: Let me ask the same question I asked the previous panel. Do you think that you can finish your work by the end of the fiscal year 1998?

MR. TILLEY: Mr. Chairman, I'm confident that the board can complete its work. Members of the review board are confident. We will make every effort to ensure that it gets done. In fact, we intend to provide to your staff a timeline which sets out our anticipation of how we will review these records over the next year.

We have set up a review process that we're working on right now that's moving quickly and we are confident that the work can be done. We were set up to be a temporary board and no one on the board wishes this effort to take a long

time. We need to get the information to the American public.
REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much. Mr. Hitchcock, I want to ask you, bringing students into the real realm of research and learning in that respect, how important is it that records like this be made available to the public so that folks like yourself can have the availability for students?
MR. HITCHCOCK: I think, Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important for not only teachers of history and historians but also for future students and future generations. One of the things so special about our relationship with the review board has not only been an opportunity for students to travel to Washington, and they pay their own way and they do their own research on their on time. But it has helped change opinions in many cases by students about not only the assassination but about government, politics, agencies and people who work for the government.
I cannot overstate the importance this has had for the 43 thus far, and soon to be 56, students from Noblesville High School who have had this research opportunity, that have been able actually to see, handle original documents, to work with documents, to see firsthand the evidence that exists. To have that opportunity is something that no teacher, no classroom, no film, no laser disk, nothing in the classroom can simulate such interest and focus as this trip to Washington DC, the review of documents, the working with people that we've had the opportunity to be with at the review board on a firsthand basis.
It is just something that cannot be duplicated, or as I said, simulated in any classroom anywhere in the country. It's just been a fantastic opportunity and will provide students in the future with a place to go to find those records, to look at the records, to look at the documents, and be at least assured that as much as is available and is in existence can now be made available to them as ordinary citizens of this country, whether they be students at a university, students at a high school, or in their just curiosity and interest as American citizens.
I don't think it can be overstated the impact that this will have in helping bridge that gap of skepticism, if this is the correct way to say it, that exists. I just cannot imagine what the many conspiracy theorists out there would think if the review board has to finish its stay without completing its work.
REP. HASTERT: Thank you. The gentleman from Ohio.
REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Chairman, I would begin by indicating that my earlier query about your legal training was not meant to be an affront, and I should have recognized that your learned demeanor was that of a --
REP. HASTERT: Not at all.

REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Howe, I don't have a question but I'm glad you told the story of Otto Eisenschiml because somewhere in the back of my mind I remember a book or movie called the Lincoln conspiracy and I was certain that Secretary Stanton had something to do with the demise of our sixteenth president, so I'm glad you brought that up.
Mr. Tunheim, I do want to ask you a follow-up question to what we were talking to Congressmen Stokes about and I was fascinated by the document that you held up. When I was in the prosecution business and we had a public records law in Ohio which was new on the books, we found that law enforcement agencies always wanted to take a big black magic marker and redact everything. It was my view that that led to more conjecture, rumor, suspicion than not, and I think this document that you brought forward, knowing that it came from the Swiss federal police, that would give, I think, some cause to believe that Mr. Oswald had some Swiss bank account and was squirreling away money from foreign nationals as part of a conspiracy.

When you un-redact it, if that's really a word, you find out like so many other people he apparently registered for the Albert Schweitzer College for the fall semester of 1960 and didn't show up. Nothing sinister or unusual in that at all. The question I have is, when you were testifying you indicated that the FBI originally appealed the decision to not--or to withdraw the redaction of this particular document. You also indicated that the vast majority of documents that you have left to review during this renewal period are located at the CIA and the FBI in the sequestered section, I assume.

Are you any unusual difficulties with either of those agencies in terms of cooperation as you attempt to get to a public release of what should be appropriately publicly released?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, Mr. LaTourette, the answer -- the question is, no, we're not receiving any degree of difficulty with those agencies right now. They are committed to this process. They are supportive of the effort to keep the process going for one additional year.

The CIA has not appealed decisions that the review board has made. We've got a good working relationship with the people within that agency who are doing their work. The FBI appealed a significant number of our decisions, but now all of those appeals have been withdrawn. And we've got a working relationship with the FBI that I think has been constructive and professional and is working quite well.

The FBI initially opposed release of the document that I held up and appealed the decision because they had contacted, in a general way, the Swiss federal police and asked whether this record could be released, and the answer was no. Our follow-up through the ambassador is showing what really this document was all about, led to some wiser approach to the particular issue. And sometimes it takes additional work like that to accomplish the release of important materials.

REP. LATOURETTE: And the last question I would have is Congressman Stokes expressed the view that perhaps the fine work of this review board -- should another review board setting be required in the future to review another situation similar to this, that you may be breaking down some of the barriers in terms of suspicions that the intelligence community may have about do we need to, you know, stick to the script and have a page that has all black magic marker on it? Do you find that the lessons learned in this review board will be instructive to us as we move forward and think of ways of dealing with the release of documents in the future?

MR. TUNHEIM: I think that's a very good question. And we have found through this effort, being the first group, an independent group outside of an agency, to have this degree of control over the declassification process. The process

at first was rough and difficult and fraught with suspicion. That has changed. There's been a sea change as these agencies have realized that release of this information is not going to harm our national security, that perhaps it's time simply to trust the American people with access to important information about their government. And I think everyone has learned important lessons from this process. It's a process that, while time- consuming, has worked very well for this set of records.
REP. LATOURETTE: And in that regard and in that vein, have you at the review board put together sort of an instruction or an operating manual to be left behind for future such endeavors?
MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we certainly will. We have -- virtually all of our work has been computerized so that we have an extensive record of exactly how we've approached all these issues. We do intend, in our final report, to make recommendations on how this effort can be extended in the future to other areas if the Congress so wishes.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you for answering my questions. Thank you for your fine work. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. : Thank you. I had a couple of questions. I read your testimony as I was listening to the other two. I'm sorry I was late. I wanted to ask Mr. Holland; were there credible historians who at this point were still questioning the assassination in the Warren Commission and the information that came out before this commission existed, before these documents came out?

MR. HOLLAND: Basically, most historians have stayed away from it because they regard it as a tar baby. So there are actually surprisingly few. By historians, you mean professors at universities. Surprisingly few have written about it, because they just see it as a morass, and how are you going to possibly figure out what happened? So my answer would be -- and, you know, credible is in the eye of the beholder.

But there's actually remarkably few, and that's one of my arguments is that you have to -- it is time to insert it back into history. It did happen during the Cold War, and that exerted a tremendous influence over what the government did. Right after the assassination, it was a precipitating element of the formation of the Warren Commission that the Cold War was ongoing, and they worried about -- to be frank, they worried about congressional committees holding hearings and disclosure of sources and methods, such as the fact that Oswald had gone to Mexico City and been observed by photographic surveillance, and how was that going to be handled by a congressional committee? So I do believe it has to be inserted into historical context. That's probably been the element that's been missing all this time.

REP. : So you believe one of the elements of this commission is it'll bring out of pulp -- pop culture -- pulp culture was a bad choice of words -- pop culture and in more mainstream because more documents are there, less questions. It can now be analyzed. And also, you seem to hint that we'll gain as much, not necessarily that there's a lot of new information on the assassination, but that we're going to learn a lot about how our government worked and a lot of the interrelationships, and that may be, in fact, more use to the historians than any questions they had remaining about the assassination.

MR. HOLLAND: I think -- my own particular view is that besides, you know, being an investigation of three crimes -- the murder of President Kennedy, the assault on Governor Connally and the murder of Officer Tippett (sp), and then the murder of Oswald, so four crimes -- the Warren Commission is a fantastic lens to view the operation of the government circa 1963-64, because they had an overriding mandate.

But yet they were going up against agencies such as the FBI and CIA with entrenched interests, and especially Hoover's FBI was sort of a wonder to behold. You dealt with it very gingerly. So it's a great -- and the FBI had not been second-guessed since Hoover became director. This was the first time. And you can't underestimate what that meant in terms of the difficulties it posed for the commission. Now, I maintain they still came to the right conclusion, but the fact is that they had a lot of trouble with the FBI.

REP. : One of the questions here is it took so many years to get to this point. In looking at what future commissions might do, how much of that, do you think, can be overcome? In other words, how much of this was the Hoover FBI, say, and how much of this is institutional that in the first 10 years you'd have so many agents active in the field, ongoing operations, in the first 20 years there's still some -- can we accelerate the process?

What have we learned from this as to -- obviously this is one that particularly anybody in the '60s era was a defining event, so it's an extraordinary assassination. But what have we learned for investigations in the future? Do you believe the CIA and FBI will release information sooner? And if so, presumably they'll still be redacted, which still could lead to Oliver Stone movies and Lincoln conspiracy books and all sorts of things.

MR. HOLLAND: Mr. Chairman, I think that the fact that these records are 30 years old has helped in obtaining their release. It's not information about the assassination per se that agencies have objected to releasing. It's more who said what to who, who's an intelligence agent and who's an informant for the FBI, those kinds of issues. And there will still be institutional reluctance to release any of that information.

I hope that through this process we can demonstrate to the public and to these agencies that this information can be released to the public, that the public can be trusted with information like this. There will still be a need for secrecy to a certain extent, but certainly not with the broad brush/black pen approach of the past.

REP. : We first learned -- I was elected in '94, and our first experience in this committee was with Waco, where we had similar questions and still had some information that wasn't able to be released. We're certainly having that ongoing debate with the administration right now, because it gets far beyond the initial investigation. In the course of Travelgate we discovered the data bank. And, of course, with the data bank you discover the code, and then you find out that the code leads to this. Pretty soon you're off into other investigations. That's going to be an ongoing problem. Do you believe, in the end, that this will have silenced most critics?

MR. HOLLAND: In my view, Mr. Chairman, it will silence some. It will perhaps provoke others.

We're many years after an event that was investigated in a different era. There were many mistakes made at the time that cannot be corrected at this stage in time. But I think when the review board is done with its work, one thing we should be able to prove to the American people is that the federal government is no longer keeping secrets from them relative to the Kennedy assassination. I think that will be a very significant development.

Whether all the questions will be resolved or not, that's a question for historians in the future who will review these materials and will make their determinations. This is like a gigantic puzzle with a lot of pieces missing. We are putting some of those pieces in, small pieces and large pieces. But there's a lot of pieces of the puzzle that will never be found.

REP. : I want to ask one last question, and that's options of dealing with acquiring the Zapruder film. Is that going to be a cost additional to what you're requesting? Do you have options on how to pay for that? What's the status of that?

MR. HOLLAND: Well, the Zapruder film, as the chairman is aware, the review board designated that as an assassination record about a month or so ago. We felt that that decision was determined by the Congress in the passage of the JFK Records Collection Act when it said that all records in the possession of the National Archives are assassination records and should be included in this collection.

Recognizing the potential cost of a film like this, we did set forth a 16-month period before the taking would take place, so that the Congress could address this issue and make appropriate determinations that the Congress wished to make those determinations. The board did feel that that decision had been made for it by the Congress in the earlier act and that it is the most significant piece of evidence of one of the most significant crimes in our nation's history. So, therefore, the original has an intrinsic value, and it should belong forever to the American public.

We are hopeful that the Zapruder family will agree eventually to donate that film to the American public. We have no assurances of that at this point. But we did set the time frame far out in the future so that the Congress can review this issue and make its own determinations if it so wishes. REP. : Do you have any additional questions? With that, I thank you all for --
REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Chairman, if I could beg your indulgence and just ask one more question, if I may.
Mr. Tunheim, if I might, my previous question about difficulty with the CIA and FBI. Sometimes I don't make things broad enough. And I guess my query would be, it's been brought to my attention that perhaps there's been some difficulty in obtaining records from the other body. Is there any agency within the federal government that you're having difficulty in terms of cooperation that would impede your ability to complete your work in a timely fashion, as envisioned by this legislation?
MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. LaTourette, I have not seen any evidence currently that anyone is deliberately stonewalling us, so that when we go away, they will put the records back into the files. We had some significant problems early in the process, just really because agencies didn't understand what this was all about and didn't understand what the law really provided for. So it took some time. It's taken some time, for example, with the Secret Service to get them to the point of realizing their obligations under the act. They do now, and they've been very cooperative and easy to work with. But this has been a learning process for all of the agencies, and I feel at the current time there are no impediments among any of the agency partners that we're dealing with to completing the review of the records on a timely basis.
REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you. I thank the chair for your indulgence.
REP. : I thank you all for your testimony and appreciate your coming today. For procedural purposes, I'll now close this hearing -- the hearing is adjourned -- and open a subcommittee markup on HR 1553, markup of the John F. Kennedy Record Review Board Reauthorization Act. The hearing is now open.
If there are no opening statements, the subcommittee will now proceed to the consideration of the bill as amended. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with and the bill will be considered for amendment at any point. Do any members wish to be recognized to offer an amendment? Hearing none, the question is on favorable reporting of the bill, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. All those in favor say "Aye."
MEMBERS: Aye.
REP. : Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. It goes fast. The question now comes, will the subcommittee report the bill to the full

committee? All those in favor, say "Aye." MEMBERS: Aye.
REP. : Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. The bill moves forward to the full committee. There is no other business before the subcommittee. We now stand adjourned. Thank you all for your hard work.
~END~

25 August 1993

NOTE FOR: All HRG Members

SUBJECT: Briefing of HPSCI on Denied JFK Documents

This is to let everyone know that HRG has been asked to brief the HPSCI staff on the 10,000 pages of JFK materials that we have denied in full (so far).

The request came from HPSCI Chairman Dan Glickman, who apparently anticipates questions from others in Congress about the denied documents.

Among the questions we are asked to address in the briefing are the following:

- How many documents are involved (as opposed to pages)?
- What specific types of sources and methods are we protecting?
- What is the review process?
- Who made the judgments to deny the documents?
- Are there provisions for continuing review of the denied documents?

We've asked that the briefing not take place until the week of 30 August, but HPSCI may want it sooner.

John P.

John F. Pereira

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

26 August 1993

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

HPSCI BRIEFING OUTLINE

JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS

I. Overview: CIA declassification program for JFK records

- Sequestered files and Oswald 201 file
- Total JFK records:
    Hardcopy documents: 162,000 pages (HSCA material / & related items)
    Microfilm: 73 reels, 150,000 pages

II. Resources devoted to JFK

Number of people: 15 HRG (9 staffers, 6 retirees)
25 indexers (overtime, weekends)
10 DO for coordination

III. Documents Released:

Oswald	35,000 pages ✓
Sequestered files	90,000 pages ✓
Total	125,000 pages ✓

Indexing and identification forms for each document
Show example of iden form

Withheld temporarily:

HSCA-originated:	20,000 pages
Third Agency	7,000 pages

Denied-in-full

- Continuing review of the DIF documents by HRG
- Likelihood CIA will release a number (many ?) of DIF
- Review Board's determination on DIF items

SAN - review for Panel

IV. Identification forms provided to NARA for each DIF Document

V. Types of information protected in DIF items

- Grounds for postponement of information under JFK Law

VI. Who made judgments on withholding documents

- 15 reviewers
- Followed procedures
- Senior Reviewers provided guidance
- Directorates coordinated
- Third agency coordination

VII. Issues for Review Board

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

1 September 1993

HPSCI BRIEFING OUTLINE

JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS

Introduction: Discuss how CIA fulfilled requirements of the JFK Act.

.Discuss the withheld documents

General Remarks

1. Every JFK record will be seen by the Review Board.

2. We have followed the JFK Assassination Records Act in determining which records will be postponed. (Section 6)

   - Our presumption was that a record would be released.

3. We made every effort to meet the 22 August deadline established by the JFK Act. The Director was committed to this.

4. This called for a major effort--additional people, lot of overtime and weekend shifts.

5. We are continuing to review the postponed documents, and expect to release a high percentage of them.

23 January 1996

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Memo for Record

Subject: - Status of JFK Records Review

References: Letter from Marwell to Pereira, dtd 15 Dec 96, (same subject);
Letter from Pereira to Marwell, dtd 19 Jan 96, (response to above letter);
Phone Conversation with Marwell, 22 Jan 96, (same subject).

1. Marwell requested a figure for the number of records in the sequestered files that contained postponements. I explained that our review figures were based on pages and that there was no record count for the microfilm part of the collection. However, based on the HRG index unaudited record count (see below) of the Oswald 201 file and the JFK hardcopy boxes, I was able to give him an estimate of 28,000 records.

2. Unaudited HRG Index statistics:

	Total Records	Records w/Postponements
Oswald	4,349	1,871
JFK (63 boxes)	28,532	12,132
	32,881 (154,724 pages)	14,003

The page count for the hardcopy part of the collection is within 10,000 pages of the Microfilm (163,500). Given that the microfilm contains many duplicates and similar records as the hardcopy, the percentage of sanitized documents should be close to the same. I estimate the total number of records with postponements to be approximately 28,000.

NOTE FOR: Richard E. Schroeder
FROM: John F. Pereira
DATE: 03/27/96 05:54:53 PM
SUBJECT: Phone Conversation with Susan Oullette, HPSCI

As you requested, I called Susan Oullette, HPSCI Staff today to respond to her questions about JFK Assassination records. She said that the Committee was interested in the process used for declassifying the records, the status of our review, and what criteria we use for declassification.

Following are among the main topics we covered during a discussion of about 10 minutes on the STU-III:

- A description of the JFK records held by CIA
- Process of declassification (review by retired senior officers, coordination with DO, OGC, others)
- Criteria for redaction
- Coordination with FBI, other agencies on third agency documents.
- Presidentially-appointed JFK Assassination Records Review Board
    - Differences with the Board on release of certain information e.g., names of former employees, identification of stations
    - Current appeal to the White House of decision by Board to release certain information we redacted.
    - Efforts of the Board to identify additional records, including in other countries

Susan said that she may have enough information for now, but she would let me know if more would be needed. I invited her to visit us if she wanted more details or to look at the records.

CC: Brian S. Latell, J. Barry Harrelson, Fred Wickham @ DO

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

EVENT: QUICK COM DATE: 03/27/96 TIME: 1500
PLACE: 7BOO HQS STATUS: X - KEY: C/96-05672
FOR: HPSCI
SUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS

RESPONSIBLE OFFICER: RICHARD SCHROEDER - SECURE: 3-9940

---> (PARTICIPANTS) <---

ASSOC	NAME	ROLE
STAFF	OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY (HPSCI)	
CIA	PEREIRA, JOHN (DCI/CSI)	BRFR

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

In response to a request from HPSCI staffer Susan Ouellettee, John Pereira, Chief of the Center for the Study of Intelligence's Historical Review Group, called her to discuss staff questions. Attached is his memo of that telecon.
QUOTE:
I called Susan Ouellette, HPSCI Staff today to respond to her questions about JFK Assassination records. She said that the Committee was interested in the process used for declassifying the records, the status of our review, and what criteria we use for declassification.

Following are among the main topics we covered during a discussion of about 10 minutes on the STU-III:

- A description of the JFK records held by CIA
- Process of declassification (review by retired senior officers, coordination with DO, OGC, others)
- Criteria for redaction
- Coordination with FBI, other agencies on third agency documents.
- Presidentially-appointed JFK Assassination Records Review Board
  - Differences with the Board on release of certain information e.g., names of former employees, identification of stations
  - Current appeal to the White House of decision by Board to release certain information we redacted.

- - Efforts of the Board to identify additional records, including
in other countries

Susan said that she may have enough information for now, but she would let me know if more would be needed. I invited her to visit us if she wanted more details or to look at the records.
END QUOTE

SUPPORTING TEXT:

---

no further text in this document (U)

Richard E. Schroeder
DCI/OCA/CLG
28 March 1996

Distribution: DCI/CSI
DO/ORMS
DDI
OGC
OCA
RES chrono

CL BY 620119
CL REASON 1.5C
DECL ON X1
DRV FM HUM 4-82
CONFIDENTIAL

From the Desk of Richard E. Schroeder C-

NOTE FOR: John Pereira
Laurie Goodwin @ DO
FROM: Richard E. Schroeder C-
DATE: 03/28/96 01:19:41 PM
SUBJECT: HPSCI Request for staff brief on JFK assassination

HPSCI staffer Susan Ouellette liked John Pereira's 27 Mar 96 telecon on the JFK assassination issue (see attached note) so much that she'd like to schedule a staff brief for sometime in the next two weeks. She'd like the brief to concentrate on two issues mentioned by John in the telecon:

--Differences with the Board on release of certain info (names of former employees, identification of stations),
and --Current appeal to the White House of decesion of Board to release certain info we redacted.

Defer to John and DO addees to work out who'll brief (see separate note from DO/ORMS Laurie Goodwin re Bill McNair.)

Ouellette suggests c. 1000 either Apr 2, 3, or 4, or Apr 9, 10, 11 since HPSCI recess schedule is pretty open.
John, pls advise your timing preference. Thanks.

C9605672.DOC

CC: Brian Latell
Barry Harrelson
Fred Wickham @ DO
William McNair @ DO
Virginia B. OKUM @ DO
Montgomery Rogers
Charles Boykin
Joyce Woodburn
Jacqueline Mitchell

13-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Attendees at the meeting with HPSI Members on Wed:

Mike Sheehy

Christine Healey

Steve Nelson

Doug Bowman

Bill Lieser

Date 4/96

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

*U.S. GPO: 1989-253-195/00416

TO: John Pereira
Laurie Goodwin @ DO
FROM: Richard E. Schroeder-C-
DATE: 04/03/96 12:57:18 PM
SUBJECT: Re: HPSCI Request for staff brief on JFK assassination

HPSCI staffer Susan Ouellette liked John Pereira's 27 Mar 96 telecon on the JFK assassination issue (see attached note) so much that she'd like to schedule a staff brief for sometime in the next two weeks. She'd like the brief to concentrate on two issues mentioned by John in the telecon:

--Differences with the Board on release of certain info (names of former employees, identification of stations),

and --Current appeal to the White House of decesion of Board to release certain info we redacted.

Defer to John and DO addees to work out who'll brief (see separate note from DO/ORMS Laurie Goodwin re Bill McNair.)

Ouellette suggests c. 1000 either Apr 2, 3, or 4, or Apr 9, 10, 11 since HPSCI recess schedule is pretty open.
John, pls advise your timing preference. Thanks.

C9605672.DOC

I've now confirmed our briefing for HPSCI at 1030 Weds 10 April. Pls let me know who will attend for CSI and the DO. Thanks. OCA van will depart from OHB Main Entrance at 1000. RES 1255/3Apr96.

CC: Brian Latell, Barry Harrelson, Fred Wickham @ DO, William McNair @ DO, Virginia B. OKUM @ DO, Montgomery Rogers, Charles Boykin, Joyce Woodburn, Jacqueline Mitchell

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

SECRET

NOTE FOR: John F. Pereira
J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 04/09/96 01:51:24 PM
SUBJECT: HPSCI talking points

Thought you may be interested in seeing in advance an outline of what I plan to say at the HPSCI briefing. Of course, I will be ready to alter this according to the circumstances of the meeting!

Talking Points

I. Statutory Authorities of the JFK Board

1. The JFK Act states that all government records relating to the JFK assassination should carry a presumption of immediate disclosure and that all records will eventually be disclosed. Although the Act allows for the postponement of release of certain information, all records will be disclosed in full by 2017 unless the President certifies that protection is still necessary.

2. Under the JFK Act, the JFK Board determines what is an "assassination record" and whether an assassination record qualifies for postponement. The Board has the power to direct a government agency to make available to it, not only assassination records, but additional information which it believes is necessary to fullfill its duties under the Act. It has has the power to request the Attorney General to subpoena private persons, records and other information relevant to its responsibilities under the Act.

II. Appeal Procedures set out in JFK Act

1. Once Board has determined whether a record shall be released or postponed, it must send a "Notification Letter" to the head of the agency (DCI)

2. Only recourse for an agency that disagrees with Board determination is to appeal to the President.

3. The President has 30 days from the date of the Notification Letter to reply to appeal

a. White House asks that agencies submit any appeals within 7 days of receiving Notification Letter

4. CIA has never before presented an appeal to the President; FBI presented an appeal last year but the White House told the parties to work out their difficulties.

III. February 8th Appeal

1. In November and December of 1995, the JFK Board notified DCI of the release of documents that would:

- implicate high-ranking Mexican officials in a joint tel-tap operation against foreign embassies - Mexican liaison (December 7)
- reveal station in Helsinki (December 27)
- identify sensitive unilateral source in the Nicaraguan service (November 28)

2. On February 8, DCI submitted an appeal to the President on these issues.

a. Admittedly, CIA did have problems getting appeal out on time. The JFK staff was very understanding of our time problems and arranged to give us more time. They too have recognized that the time periods set out in the Act are too short to bring an appeal.

b. The reason for CIA's delay was simply because the decision to appeal a Board determination to the President of the US is very difficult one to make, both on a procedural and a substantive level. As CIA never did an appeal before, it did not have an efficient system worked out.

c. Today, the procedure is as follows: Once HRG is notified of Board decisions, they immediately pass this on to OGC and the DO. The appropriate components within DO are asked whether the release would cause current damage to the national security or intelligence operations or sources. If so, they are tasked to provide a written assessment of that damage.

d. An appeal package is then prepared by OGC and the DO. This package must then be approved by GC, DDO, EXDIR, DDCI and DCI.

e. Although CIA's turn around time is improving, it can take several weeks to task the appropriate people, have them gather the information needed to prepare an appeal and then get this up to the DCI.

3. Despite our time problems, the JFK Staff was cooperative in the process of bringing this appeal to the President:

a. Before submitting appeal to the President, I faxed copy of appeal to JFK Board's General Counsel with the idea that if it presented new and convincing evidence, he would present it to the Board during its session.

b. Shortly after submitting the appeal to the President, I spoke with White House Counsel and Counsel to JFK Board. We agreed to put the appeal on hold until the Board could review CIA's submission to the White House and possibly reconsider its determinations in light of additional information presented in the appeal.

c. I talked with JFK Board's Counsel and Executive Director regularly about the best way to handle the appeal. I arranged with them to have the General Counsel of CIA to come to the Board's February meeting and present new information regarding the issues on appeal.

d. On February 29, the General Counsel of CIA and I met with the JFK Board and their staff. We discussed issues on appeal as well as 3 other stations recently released (Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen).

e. Based on the information presented by CIA at this meeting, the Board reconsidered and agreed to protect all of the issues on appeal as well as 3 other stations.

IV. Future appeal procedures

1. Both JFK Board and CIA agree that we should never have to appeal something to the President and we should try to work out difficult issues on our own.

2. In the last 2 months, when CIA believed that a release would damage the national security, the Board has invited us to their meetings to present additional evidence on the issue. In some cases, they have reconsidered their decision and protected the information.

3. The Board also recently released Tokyo station - we are arranging to meet with them at the end of this month to present stronger arguments for protecting this station.

4. The Board is now considering the release of names of CIA employees who retired under cover. It is very important for CIA's mission that the names of its employees, especially those who remain covert, be protected even after retirement. In the spirit of cooperation and in the hopes of getting the Board to understand this, CIA helped arrange a meeting between the JFK Board's General Counsel and a retired CIA covert employee

SECRET

currently living in Europe. CIA hopes that after hearing from the employee about his objections to having his name released and the harm that may come to him, the Board will agree to protect his name, and others like him, from release.

CC:

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

HPSCI BRIEFING - JFK DECLASSIFICATION 10 April 1996

1. Nature of the records--Oswald 201, Sequestered (hard copy/microfilm
17 (63 + 72)

   - Other records: Minutes of DCI morning meetings; working files

   - Third Agency documents: FBI, SSCI, Presidential libraries

-> 2. Pages released (227,000)

   - Percentage of ~~pages~~ redacted; 70 %

3. Process of declassification

   - Former senior officers in HRG review

   - Coordination with OGC, DO (DO team detailed to HRG)

4. Standards for review in JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 1992

need summary of types of records

   - Records related to the assassination or investigation into the assassination [Cuban exile activities]

   - Law provides grounds for postponement of disclosure of records

      -- "Clear and convincing evidence" must be presented to the Board

      E.g., Identity of agent currently requiring protection

         - Source or method currently utilized

         - Foreign government relationship currently requiring protection

5. Board has authority to release records unless it agrees there is "clear and convincing evidence" to support a postponement

   - Board then has to justify on the record each redaction with which it agrees

   - Once a determination is made, Board must publish it in Federal Register within 14 days

- Options available: substitute language e.g., "Northern European station"
    - Also, summary of a record
- Board has access to every document in full

6. Issues raised by Board's decisions:

- Problem: Board has difficulty in linking disclosure of information that is 30 years old with damage to current intelligence operations
- Identification of stations e.g., Helsinki Jan 1961 - Sept 1964 window exceptions
- Names of former Agency employees who retired under cover
    - Board guidelines: Protect person if retired under cover and now residing overseas, but not if in US * (1 year to provide addition evidence) *
- Liaison, joint operations in Mexico
- Briefing of the Board by Dave Edger, Jeff Smith, Central Cover, DO desk officers, others
- Problem of accumulative effect of releases--eroding cover, ability to conduct operations

7. Provision for appeal to the White House if we disagree with Board's determination

- President has sole authority to require postponement of a record or information
    - --President required to advise the Board within 30 days of the Board's determination
        - -- This is published in the Federal Register

8. Current appeal (now resolved)

- Issues: identification of Agency asset
  liaison relationship
  identification of station
  } document examples
- Potential appeal: Tokyo station

9. Additional requests of Board to review other records e.g., history of Mexico City station, Intelligence Community Staff records

Notes:
- Board does n't accept "principle" as justification for postponement — requires evidence
- Even if agreement to protect (liaison mex) disagreements over specific / sub language at times
- precedent set by JFK → re FOIA etc

WTC/Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/96-05677

EVENT: STAFF BRIEFING
DATE: 04/10/96 TIME: 1030
STATUS: COMPLETE
PLACE: H-405 CAPITOL
FOR: HPSCI
SUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS

(PARTICIPANTS)

ASSOC	NAME	ROLE
STAFF	BARTON, CHRISTOPHER (HPSCI)	
STAFF	DUPART, LOUIS H. (HPSCI)	
STAFF	EBERWEIN, CATHERINE D. (HPSCI)	
STAFF	HEALEY, LOUISE CHRISTINE (HPSCI)	
STAFF	LOWENTHAL, MARK M. (HPSCI)	
STAFF	OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY (HPSCI)	
STAFF	SHEEHY, MICHAEL WILLIAM (HPSCI)	
CIA	CIPRIANI, LINDA (DCI/OGC)	BRFR
CIA	HARRELSON, BARRY (DCI/CSI)	BRFR
CIA	PEREIRA, JOHN (DCI/CSI)	BRFR
CIA	SCHROEDER, RICHARD (DCI/OCA)	SPRT
CIA	WICKHAM, FRED (DO/IMS)	BRFR

(EXECUTIVE SUMMARY)

Following a telephone conversation with HPSCI staff in which HRG/CSI noted a number of JFK assassination declassification issues (see OCA C/96-05672 of 27 Mar 96,) CSI, DO, and OGC briefed staff on the status of the JFK declassification effort, the 1992 law which established the JFK Assassination Records Review Board and the scope of the Board's authority, and the details of some current declassification issues we have been addressing with the Board. We noted the close working relationship between the Agency and the Board, and said that the Board staff is trying to understand the Agency's equities and perspectives. Some staff expressed concern about the Board's broad powers and authorities under the 1992 law, particularly regarding declassification of intelligence material bearing on identities, sources, and methods. (S)

(ADDITIONAL INFORMATION)

1. C/CSI/Historical Review Group Pereira opened by briefly describing the nature of the CIA JFK material. The open-ended "Oswald 201" also includes material gathered after the assassination, and the "sequestered file" is that material that was assembled for the JFK assassination investigations. The material was originally sanitized and released to the National Archives in 1993. We are now reviewing the 227,000 pages and attempting to justify the material we withheld. Some seventy percent of the released material contains redactions, although later in the briefing we noted that as our experience has grown the redaction standards have evolved and now most material (up to eighty percent) is being released whole. Some 25 senior annuitants, working closely with a DO team led by Wickham, have been performing the initial review. Pereira pointed out that we are not only reviewing the assassination records, but those records bearing on the House Assassinations Committee's investigation of the assassination. Pereira identified the five academic historians who make up the Board, and said they are supported by 30 full-time Board staffers headed by former Berlin Documentation Center chief David Marwell.

CL BY 620119
CL REASON 1.5C
DECL ON X1
DRV FM HUM 4-82

Pereira said that the 1992 Act specifies that the Board must have "clear and convincing evidence" if we want to postpone release, and said that the Board requires "current justification" if we want to protect agent identities, sources and methods, or liaison identities. Under the law, the Board has the authority to release all information, and must justify in the Federal Register within 14 days any redactions. The Board sees the full text of all documents. Pereira said that we negotiate with the Board the use of summaries or generic descriptions (such as substituting "a northern European station" for Helsinki) and that the Board is making an "honest effort" to see the connection between 30 year old information and current damage to Agency equities. Dupart asked rhetorically whether the Board understood the concept of ongoing liaison, with Wickham saying that the Board clearly had a different perspective from the DO, and that the ADDO, General Counsel, Cover Staff and others have briefed the Board in detail to address this "problem." Harrelson pointed out that our joint teltaps had recorded Oswald himself, although we assured the clearly unhappy Dupart that we are trying to protect the fact that liaison cooperated in the teltaps. We also noted our effort to protect the identities of covert Agency employees, although we are working particularly hard in cases where the Agency employees now reside overseas. Pereira said we are concerned about the cumulative erosive effect on our cover and our ability to conduct operations. He noted that the Board tends to focus on individual specific cases without always focusing on the broader cumulative impact of their discrete decisions. (S)

2. Cipriani described the appeals process specified in the 1992 JFK Act. She also lent Sheehy a copy of the act, which he studied carefully during the briefing. Under the 1992 act, documents related to JFK carry the "presumption of release," with the Board defining which records fall under the act. We have to justify any redactions or postponements, and Board decisions can only be appealed to the President himself (which, as Cipriani dryly noted, tends to inhibit appeals.) The act also specifics very short deadlines, with only 30 days for the President to make his decision. (This means we have only about seven days to get our appeals out of Hqs and to the White House--a practical impossibility.) Our only appeal to date involved three issues: (i) a cable implicating senior Mexican officials in our joint teltaps, (ii) the identification of the very sensitive Helsinki Station, and (iii) the identity of a Nicaraguan source. In fact our appeal took several months, with the Board being very accommodating about the delay, and we finally were able to give the Board enough justification and explanation that they changed their position and spared the White House the decision. Healey noted that the Agency declassification team includes a DO team (as noted above,) and asked why we hadn't been able to head off the problem. Cipriani responded that new information arises for the Board to consider in making its determination, and Wickham elaborated by noting that the DO is reluctant to reveal sensitive current information to protect old material. He characterized this as a problem of "DO culture." At the same time, he cited the specific example of the Mexicans declining to meet the DCI on his recent Latin American trip as illustrative of Mexican sensitivity to the liaison issue. We later noted that the only other appeal thus far involves the FBI, and the White House has told the Bureau to resolve the matter with the Board. (S)

3. Pereira noted to the staffers that we're dealing with very short deadlines involving enormous volumes of material, and illustrated by showing the staff a bulky recent Board declassification notification which we must review to confirm we have no problem with the material involved. In response to a Sheehy question, Harrelson reminded staff that the original redaction and submission to the Board took place in 1992-3, and as noted above, our redaction standards and judgements have evolved since then. Further, we have to double-check each release to confirm we concur, and in some cases compare substitute language. Sheehy asked why we would object to such a thing as the acknowledgment of Tokyo Station, and seemed impressed and persuaded when Wickham patiently explained that both the Japanese and Ambassador Mondale have strongly recommended against confirming the existence of the Station. The Japanese are very sensitive to any public acknowledgment of our liaison relationship. Wickham noted that the Board is trying to document Oswald's travels, and wants to identify stations reporting such travel. Pereira said that we recognize the need to report the facts, but want to protect details

that do not add to the story but harm our equities. In response to a Healey question, Pereira said we are making progress in giving the Board staff the context and framework necessary to appreciate and support our concerns. He said the staff tries very hard to give the Board necessary background, and Wickham seconded Pereira's assessment that we have a very good working relationship with the staff. Under the provisions of the Act, the Board will be working until October 1997, dealing with CIA, FBI, DepState, as well as private individuals and even foreign governments. They are interviewing people, and as Pereira noted, "getting theories." (S)

4. Staff, even those who asked pointed questions like Healey and Sheehy, seemed satisfied. Majority Staffer Eberwein, perhaps reflecting concerns voiced by Deputy Majority Director Dupart about protecting Agency sources and methods, however, expressed concern later about possibly amending the '92 act to moderate the act's bias toward release. Indeed, she contacted OCA lawyer Cindy Ellis and asked her to draft language amending the act. It had not been my impression during the briefing that staff had been especially concerned about the act to the point of intending to modify it, and its also unclear whether Eberwein was acting on behalf of senior majority staff or the membership in asking OCA to suggest modifications to the act. (S)

Richard E. Schroeder (C)
CIA Liaison Group
Office of Congressional Affairs

DCI/OCA/CLG/RESchroeder:dms/39940 (15 Apr 96)

Distribution:
Original - OCA Records
1 - D/OCA
1 - DCI/CSI
1 - DO/IMS
1 - DO/ORMS/CAG
1 - DCI/OGC
1 - REschroeder Chrono

---- (FOLLOW-UP ACTION ITEMS) ----

There were no Action Items on file for this event.

SECRET

EVENT: STAFF BRIEFING DATE: 04/10/96 TIME: 1030
PLACE: H-405 CAPITOL STATUS: X - KEY: C/96-05677
FOR: HPSCI
SUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS

RESPONSIBLE OFFICER: RICHARD SCHROEDER - SECURE: 3-9940

---> (PARTICIPANTS) <---

ASSOC	NAME	ROLE
STAFF	BARTON, CHRISTOPHER (HPSCI)	
STAFF	DUPART, LOUIS H. (HPSCI)	
STAFF	EBERWEIN, CATHERINE D. (HPSCI)	
STAFF	HEALEY, LOUISE CHRISTINE (HPSCI)	
STAFF	LOWENTHAL, MARK M. (HPSCI)	
STAFF	OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY (HPSCI)	
STAFF	SHEEHY, MICHAEL WILLIAM (HPSCI)	
CIA	CIPRIANI, LINDA (DCI/OGC)	BRFR
CIA	HARRELSON, BARRY (DCI/CSI)	BRFR
CIA	PEREIRA, JOHN (DCI/CSI)	BRFR
CIA	SCHROEDER, RICHARD (DCI/OCA)	SPRT
CIA	WICKHAM, FRED (DO/IMS)	BRFR

SECRET

EVENT: STAFF BRIEFING　DATE: 04/10/96　TIME: 1030
PLACE: H-405 CAPITOL　STATUS: X - KEY: C/96-05677
FOR: HPSCI
SUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS

RESPONSIBLE OFFICER: RICHARD SCHROEDER - SECURE: 3-9940

---> (PARTICIPANTS) <---

ASSOC	NAME	ROLE
STAFF	BARTON, CHRISTOPHER (HPSCI)	
STAFF	DUPART, LOUIS H. (HPSCI)	
STAFF	EBERWEIN, CATHERINE D. (HPSCI)	
STAFF	HEALEY, LOUISE CHRISTINE (HPSCI)	
STAFF	LOWENTHAL, MARK M. (HPSCI)	
STAFF	OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY (HPSCI)	
STAFF	SHEEHY, MICHAEL WILLIAM (HPSCI)	
CIA	CIPRIANI, LINDA (DCI/OGC)	BRFR
CIA	HARRELSON, BARRY (DCI/CSI)	BRFR
CIA	PEREIRA, JOHN (DCI/CSI)	BRFR
CIA	SCHROEDER, RICHARD (DCI/OCA)	SPRT
CIA	WICKHAM, FRED (DO/IMS)	BRFR

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Following a telephone conversation with HPSCI staff in which HRG/CSI noted a number of JFK assassination declassification issues (see OCA C/96-05672 of 27 Mar 96,) CSI, DO, and OGC briefed staff on the status of the JFK declassification effort, the 1992 law which established the JFK Assassination Records Review Board and the scope of the Board's authority, and the details of some current declassification issues we have been addressing with the Board. We noted the close working relationship between the Agency and the Board, and said that the Board staff is trying to understand the Agency's equities and perspectives. Some staff expressed concern about the Board's broad powers and authorities under the 1992 law, particularly regarding declassification of intelligence material bearing on identities, sources, and methods. (S)

SUPPORTING TEXT:

1. C/CSI/Historical Review Group Pereira opened by briefly describing the nature of the CIA JFK material. The open-ended "Oswald 201" also includes material gathered later, and the "sequestered file" is that material that was

assembled for the JFK assassination investigations. All is being processed for declassification, with some 227,000 pages already released. Some seventy percent of the released material contains redactions, although later in the briefing we noted that as our experience has grown the redaction standards have evolved and now most material (up to eighty percent) is being released whole. Some 25 senior annuitants, working closely with a DO team led by Wickham, have been performing the initial review. Pereira pointed out that we are not only reviewing the assassination records, but those records bearinmg on our own investigation of the assassination. Pereira identified the five academic historians who make up the Board, and said they are supported by thirty full-time Board staffers headed by former Berlin Documentation Center chief David Marwell. Pereira said that the 1992 Act specifies that the Board must have "clear and convincing evidence" if we want to postpone release, and said that the Board requires "current justification" if we want to protect agent identities, sources and methods, or liaison identities. Under the law, the Board has the authority to release all information, and must justify in the Federal Register within fourteen days any redactions. The Board sees the full text of all documents. Pereira said that we negotiate with the Board the use of summaries or generic descriptions (such as substituting "a northern European station" for Helsinki) and that the Board is making an "honest effort" to see the connection between thirty year old information and current damage to Agency equities. Dupart asked rhetorically whether the Board understood the concept of ongoing liaison, with Wickham saying that the Board clearly had a different perspective from the DO, and that the ADDO, General Counsel, Cover Staff and others have briefed the Board in detail to address this "problem." Harrelson pointed out that our joint teltaps had recorded Oswald himself, although we assured the clearly unhappy Dupart that we are trying to protect the fact that liaison cooperated in the teltaps. We also noted our effort to protect the identities of covert Agency employees, although we are working particularly hard in cases where the Agency employees now reside overseas. Pereira said we are concerned about the cumulative erosive effect on our cover and our ability to conduct operations. He noted that the Boards tends to focus on individual specific cases without recognizing the broader cumulative impact of their discrete decisions. (S)

2. Cipriani described the appeals process specified in the 1992 JKF Act. She also lent Sheehy a copy of the act, which he studied carefully during the briefing. Under the 1992 act, documents related to JFK carry the "presumption of release," with the Board defining which records fall under the act. We have to justify any redactions or postponements, and Board decisions can only be appealed to

the President himself (which, as Cipriani dryly noted, tends to inhibit appeals.) The act also specifics very short deadlines, with only 30 days for the President to make his decision. (This means we have only about seven days to get our appeals out of Hqs and to the White House--a practical impossibility.) Our only appeal to date involved three issues: (i) a cable implicating senior Mexican officials in our joint teltaps, (ii) the identification of the very sensitive Helsinki Station, and (iii) the identity of a Nicaraguan source. In fact our appeal took several months, with the Board being very accommodating about the delay, and we finally were able to give the Board enough justification and explanation that they changed their position and spared the White House the decision. Healey noted that the Agency declassification team includes a DO team (as noted above,) and asked why we hadn't been able to head off the problem. Cipriani responded that new information arises for the Board to consider in making its determination, and Wickham elaborated by noting that the DO is reluctant to reveal sensitive current information to protect old material. He characterized this as a problem of "DO culture." At the same time, he cited the specific example of the Mexicans declining to meet the DCI on his recent Latin American trip as illustrative of Mexican sensitivity to the liaison issue. We later noted that the only other appeal thus far involves the FBI, and the White House has told the Bureau to resolve the matter with the Board. (S)

3. Pereira noted to the staffers that we're dealing with very short deadlines involving enormous volumes of material, and illustrated by showing the staff a bulky recent Board declassification notification which we must review to confirm we have no problem with the material involved. In response to a Sheehy question, Harrelson reminded staff that the original redaction and submission to the Board took place in 1992-3, and as noted above, our redaction standards and judgements have evolved since then. Further, we have to double-check each release to confirm we concur, and in some cases compare substitute language. Sheehy asked why we would object to such a thing as the acknowledgement of Tokyo station, and seemed impressed and persuaded when Wickham patiently explained that both the Japanese and Ambassador Mondale have strongly recommended against confirming the existence of the station. The Japanese are very sensitive to any public acknowledgement of our liaison relationship. Wickham noted that the Board is trying to document Oswald's travels, and wants to identify stations reporting such travel. Pereira said that we recognize the need to report the facts, but want to protect details that do not add to the story but harm our equities. In response to a Healey question, Pereira said we are making progress in giving the Board staff the context and framework necessary to appreciate and support our concerns. He said the staff tries very hard to give the Board necessary background, and

Wickham seconded Pereira's assessment that we have a very good working relationship with the staff. Under the provisions of the act, the Board will be working until October 1997, dealing with CIA, FBI, DepState, as well as private individuals and even foreign governments. They are interviewing people, and as Pereira noted, "getting theories." (S)

4. Staff, even those who asked pointed questions like Healey and Sheehy, seemed satisfied. Majority staffer Eberwein, perhaps reflecting concerns voiced by deputy majority director Dupart about protecting Agency sources and methods, however, expressed concern later about possibly amending the '92 act to moderate the act's bias toward release. Indeed, she contacted OCA lawyer Cindy Ellis and asked her to draft language amending the act. It had not been my impression during the briefing that staff had been especially concerned about the act to the point of intending to modify it, and its also unclear whether Eberwein was acting on behalf of senior majority staff or the membership in asking OCA to suggest modifications to the act. (S)

Richard E. Schroeder
DCI/OCA/CLG
15 April 1996

Distribution: DCI/CSI
DO/ORMS
DO/IMS
OCA
OGC
RES chrono

CL BY 620119
CL REASON 1.5C
DECL ON X1
DRV FM HUM 4-82
SECRET

TO: Richard E. Schroeder
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 04/15/96 05:30:04 PM
SUBJECT: Re: DRAFT--OCA MFR on 10 Apr 96 HPSCI JFK Docs Brief

Looks OK to me - I was especially pleased to read that the staff was concerned about the the presumption for release in the Act and asked Cindy Ellis to draft language modifying the act. If Cindy needs any help, I would be very happy to give her some suggestions!!

I would greatly appreciate being kept informed as this progresses.

Thanks Linda

CC: John Pereira, J. Barry Harrelson, Fred Wickham @ DO, Linda Cipriani

TO: Richard E. Schroeder-C-
FROM: John F. Pereira
DATE: 04/16/96 02:40:06 PM
SUBJECT: Re: DRAFT--OCA MFR on 10 Apr 96 HPSCI JFK Docs Brief

The MFR looks basically fine.

Two minor suggestions:

Par 1. - change "our own investigation" to the House Assassinations Committee's investigation

Par 1, last sent. - change last part of sent to read without always focusing on the broader cumulative impact of their discrete decisions.

CC: J. Barry Harrelson

RELEASE IN FULL
2000

24 November, 1998

Memo for the Record

Subject: JFK Records Review - Lessons Learned

The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps. Release standards were liberal; basically only source identities and information, names of agents, employees under cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.

I. The JFK Act

Mandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed unrealistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program.

Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs (searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-page review and sanitization of classified documents. For example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of that database took several thousand man-hours and continues today.

Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the Board. For example:

a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the collection was considered a “unique” assassination record. The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication.

13-00000

For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in the collection.

b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion) be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording and coding of every deletion within each document required processing resources well beyond what would be considered reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600 deletions and many over 100).

Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required by the Board to postpone what was generally considered protectable information was extremely high and usually required docmentation of "current harm". Defenses based on general principles such as official cover or sources and methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to support recommended postponements. Again, much time was spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For example, several major evidence packages involving several offices and presentations by senior agency officers and officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect Agency physical locations and names of employees and other persons not related to the JFK story.

Three times during the six years of the project, including most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had to borrow additional resources from other offices and review projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to require a significant portion of HRP's resources through FY99.

II. The Process

There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects:

* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive.

* We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of "official release" in the context of each project.

* Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be

released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information.

* On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project.

* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion.

* Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A "declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project.

* In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above).

* Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.

* If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index.

III The Requests

(being drafted)

Attachment I. [incomplete draft attached]

Description of the JFK Collection

Attachment II. [being drafted]

[statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFs, SANs, DIFs, NBR, etc.)]

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

DRAFT

12 December, 1998

Memo for the Record

Subject: JFK Records Review Project and Lessons Learned

The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps. Release standards were liberal; basically only source identities and information, names of agents, employees under cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.

I. Background (1992-1995)

The setting up of the Historical Review Program by DCI Gates in early 1992 coincided with growing interest in Congress to require federal agencies to declassify records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. DCI Gates decided to start declassification process before Congress passed legislation:

* testified before Congress on 12 May 1992 about CIA`s new openness policy and announced the declassification of the first folder of Oswald's 201 (also known as the pre-assassination file).

* six boxes of the Oswald's 201 were reviewed and transferred to NARA by Oct. 1992.

The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) was signed 26 October 1992:

* it called for Presidential-appointed Assassination Records Review Board composed of non-government individuals;

* established "a presumption of immediate disclosure" for records relating to the assassination.

For first two years of its existence, the Historical Review Program focused primarily on the review of JFK assassination records:

- there were two major releases of Agency records (August 1993 and August 1994)of approximately 227,000 pages;

- joint HRG/DO teams reviewed additional assassination related collections at National Archives (Warren Commission), the SSCI (Church Committee and the Ford Presidential Library (Rockefellow Commission) plus numerous referrals from other federal agencies (FBI, State, Army, etc.).

Due to delays in the appointment of its members and the time required to hire and clear a staff, the ARRB did not actually begin reviewing documents until May 1995. It became clear in immediately that the ARRB would require the release of far more information than the Agency had released in the 1992-94 review. In mid-1995 HRG began a re-review of the previously released sanitized documents:

- approximately 80% of the 227, 000 pages release in 1993-94 contained deletions

- resources were taken from other projects and added to JFK project to meet Board's monthly deadlines.

II. The JFK Act and the ARRB

Mandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed unrealistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program.

Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs (searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-page review and sanitization of classified documents. For example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of that database took several thousand man-hours and continues today.

Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the Board. For example:

a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the collection was considered a “unique” assassination record. The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication. For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in the collection.

b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion) be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording and coding of every deletion within each document required processing resources well beyond what would be considered reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600 deletions and many over 100).

Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required by the Board to postpone what was generally considered protectable information was extremely high and usually required documentation of “current harm”. Defenses based on general principles such as official cover or sources and methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to support recommended postponements. Again, much time was spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For example, several major evidence packages involving several offices and presentations by senior agency officers and officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect Agency physical locations and names of employees and other persons not related to the JFK story.

Three times during the six years of the project, including most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had to borrow additional resources from other offices and review projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to require a significant portion of HRP's resources through FY99.

III. The Process and Lessons Learned

There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects:

* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive.

- We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of "official release" in the context of each project.

- Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information.

- On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project.

- Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion.

- Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A "declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project.

- In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above).

- Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.

- If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index.

IV ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records

(see attached draft)

Attachment I. Description of the JFK Collection

Attachment II. [being drafted-will be available 17 Dec a.m.]

[statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFs, SANs, DIFs, NBR, etc.)]

9: lrg - hrp
"reg. doc"

DRAFT: Section IV ~~III~~, ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records

1. Unlike most declassification projects, the Agency's involvement in the JFK Project was governed by the dictates of a Federal statute, the JFK Act, and the powers it vested in the Board it established -- the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). In particular, under Section 7, the Act armed the ARRB with the authority to dig for records and information, specifically:

> ...(1) The Review Board shall have the authority to act in a manner prescribed under this Act, including authority to --
>
> * * *
>
> (C)(ii) direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board, and if necessary investigate the facts surrounding, additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities;
>
> * * *
>
> (F) hold hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena witnesses and documents.

This substantial authority provided the ARRB and its staff with almost unlimited access to Agency records and personnel. It also was the basis for a number of specific requests from the Board to the Agency for additional information, document searches and explanatory papers. HRP designated this ARRB activity, "Special Requests." During its existence the ARRB sent to the Agency fifty-three special requests, CIA 1-16 and CIA-IR 1-37.

2. Categories of Requests:

Although each request had unique characteristics, all began as a request by the Board or an ARRB staff member on behalf of the board for information. The requests fell generally into five broad categories as follows:

a. Requests for **access** to basic information which would help the board understand the CIA, its organizational structure and how it operated around the time of the assassination which included: Requests for organizational charts, briefings, mission statements, etc.; review of over ___ histories of CIA offices and projects; a review of the so-called "Breckinridge files;" and, a search for an IG index of Oswald reports.

b. Requests about **methodologies** which included: How cable traffic was handled at HQ during the relevant time period; the existence and use of the inter-agency source registry; and, the assignment and use of alias's pseudonyms, crypts, etc.

c. Requests for **subject specific** matters which included: The Mexico City Station annual reports; the existence of DRE monthly reports; Oswald's pre assassination files; and, a search for any documents or information detailing the Agency's involvement in transporting and processing the Zapruder film.

d. Requests for **project specific** information and files, which included: Requests for information and files on AMWORLD, QKENCHANT, an index to the HTLINGUAL materials, and the Mexico City electronic surveillance tapes.

e. Requests for **individual specific** information and files, which included both CIA and CIA associated individuals and non-CIA individuals: Information on individuals with JMWORLD; detailed information on Sylvia Duran; a determination of the identify of a particular "George Bush;" and, the files on William Pawley.

3. How a Request was Worked Following receipt of a request and HRP tasking the responsible Agency component(s) to conduct a search, the materials found were first reviewed by HRP staff members before access was provided to the ARRB staff. ARRB staff then reviewed the documents and materials and identified those which it believed were relevant to their inquiry and these materials were placed in the normal queue to be reviewed and processed for release. However, the mere identification of materials did not equate to automatic release. Rather, if particularly sensitive information was involved, negotiations took place and, on occasion, a written statement about the materials was provided for release vice the actual document(s).

4~~3~~. The Agency's written responses to each request - either a letter or memoranda - included, of course, the fact the materials designated were to be processed for release according to then current guidelines. The ARRB staff then wrote its own version of the request, search, and response. Both of these are a part of the public record on this project.

5~~4~~. Lessons learned: A number of things surfaced as HRP worked to complete these requests which required considerable explanation, negotiation, and resolution.

a. First among these was the fact there existed an outside Board which asked for information and carefully monitored the responses (a very powerful external Board with subpoena authority), without doubt caused documents and information to be found and made available that would not have been provided to an internal declassification project.

b. Second, for any large project such as JFK to be successful, there is an absolute requirement that each directorate and independent office identify two responsible persons -- a senior management official who can ensure that deadlines (particularly deadlines established by an external authority) are met; and, a senior focal point officer, who has the substantive knowledge and background to both locate all relevant material and make decisions on its sensitivity.

c. Third, the individuals identified and appointed in sub-paragraph "b" next above must be fully versed in the guidelines which pertain to each specific project. They cannot rely on FOIA or other guidelines as to the depth of their searches or the conditions governing release/ redaction/denial of materials.

ATTACHMENT #1

CIA'S JFK ASSASSINATION RECORD COLLECTION

Oswald Files

Pre-assassination "201" file --approximately 40 documents that existed at the time of the assassination. Released in 1992 with minimal deletions.

DO 201 File (Approximately 26,000 pages): Agency's primary file for documents dealing with the assassination or mentioning Oswald; the file is still active. Contains pre-assassination documents; materials collected after the assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation; Mexico City files, Garrison investigation materials plus other documents related to the assassination or Oswald received over the years. A microfilm copy of file, as it existed in 1978, was sequestered by the House Select Committee on Assassination (HSCA).

The DO's original (record copy) 201 was transferred to HRG in early 1992; a declassified version was released in August 1993; it was re-released with fewer deletions in 1996 under the authority of the ARRB . Additional documents, filed into the 201 after the its transfer to HRG, were released in September 1998.

Office of Security File (2041 pages): Contained key Oswald documents, FBI investigative reports, newspaper clippings. This file, primarily duplicative of the 201, was reviewed by the HSCA, but a copy was not sequestered with the rest of the Agency's "JFK" collection. The file surfaced as a result of an ARRB request in 1997. A declassified version of the file was released in 1998.

DCD "A" File (41 pages): A microfilm copy of this Oswald file was in the sequestered collection. The ARRB requested that the original file by reviewed for release.

Marina Oswald's 201 file. A copy of this file from the sequestered microfilm collection was reviewed and released in 1994. The ARRB requested that the original file be reviewed for release by September 1999.

The ARRB directed that the classified originals of all documents from the Oswald files be transferred to NARA for secure storage. These documents were transferred to NARA in October 1998.

The Sequestered Collection

At the end of its investigation, the HSCA directed that all materials (files, documents, memos, notes, tapes, etc.) collected or prepared in response to its investigation be sequestered. This included files made available for review, but not reviewed by the HSCA staff.

JFK boxes 1-63 (hardcopy): These boxes are the core of the Agency's JFK collection. They are the working files/materials of the HSCA staff and reflects the wide range of issues pursued by the Committee. In addition to Agency documents, they include approximately 30,000 pages of notes, letters and memos created by the HSCA or its staff. The boxes are a combination of files on subjects and persons of interest to HSCA including documents prepared by the Agency as a result of the investigation, eight boxes of security files and Mexico City cable chrono files. The boxes contain a significant amount of duplication (most of the Oswald 201 documents appear multiple times in this part of the collection). A declassified version was released in August 1993, then re-released under ARRB in 1997.

JFK Microfilm (72 reels): These reels are copies of Agency files that were made available to HSCA staff. Although the HSCA interest usually focused on a small portion of a file, the Committee sequestered the complete file. The microfilm includes approximately 25 reels of 201 files, 6 reels of Office of Personnel files, 14 reels of Anti/Castro - Cuban exile material, extensive files on Nosenko and operational and production files from Mexico City. The microfilm also contains copies of all the Oswald files except for the security file.

DCI Morning Meeting Minutes

This file contain 442 excerpts from the minutes of the DCI's Morning Meetings that refer to JFK assassination and related issues and investigations. The initial search for the minutes was in response to an FOIA. The material was turned over to HRG in 1993 for review and inclusion into the Collection.

Russ Holmes' Working Files (19 boxes)

Russ Holmes was a DO officer initially assigned to work on JFK assassination records in the mid-70s. He was one of the Agency's liaison officers with the HSCA during its investigation and subsequently became custodian of HSCA sequestered collection . He continued in this role until 1992.

As the focal point for JFK related requests, Russ Holmes created a JFK reference file know as the "Ancillary Collection" (13 boxes). The contents are primarily duplicative (approximately 80%) of material found in Oswald's 201 and in the sequestered collection, but organized by subjects and requests. The collection contains some non-related material reflecting Holmes' involvement in other FOIA, etc. requests. There were an additional six boxes of unorganized reference material and files from his office transferred to HRG when he retired. These 19 boxes became know as the "Russ Holmes Working Files" and were declared assassination records as a collection by the ARRB. Non-duplicative records from this collection were released in September 1998. The duplicative material is currently being reviewed and will be transferred to NARA in early January 1999.

LA Division JFK Task Force Files

The survey undertaken in response to Executive Order ##### located seven boxes of DO Latin American Division continuing JFK Task Force files and related Cuban material. The ARRB staff reviewed the boxes; the non-duplicative JFK Task Force documents and selected documents from the Cuban material were designated as assassination records. 1637 pages from these boxes were transferred to NARA in October 1998.

New assassination Records -- "M" [Miscellaneous] Series

The ARRB submitted 53 numbered "Requests for Additional Information and Records" (CIA-# and CIA-IR-# series) plus many informal requests on individuals and subjects in their search for additional assassination records. Theses requests generated several 100 additional assassination records including 185 audio tapes from the Mexico City telephone taps. Additional material related to the JFK Act including DO cables to the field and working files of the HRP project officer were declared assassination records in the final actions of the Board. Over 4500 pages and 17 tapes have been reviewed and prepared for transfer to NARA. The remaining records and tapes are scheduled for completion by September 1999,.



JFK Assassination Records Collection Act

- Five year Effort; Estimated 100 person years expended
- Extraordinary Authorities/ Access/ "non Precedent Setting Releases"
- Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action.
- Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection.
- Prepared a Declaration of Compliance with the Act, with a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Board's requests.
- Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review.
- "The Review Board considered the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act....to be one of [the Board's] highest priorities." It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency's Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency's activities in response to the Board.

During FY 1998, compliance with the legal requirements of the JFK Act absorbed the preponderant portion of HRP resources. HRP completed necessary coordination with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board on behalf of the Agency, an ongoing process since FY 1994. HRP provided a central Agency focus for a process which:

Coordinated with Board Staff on relevancy and classification on roughly 250,000 pages (many duplicates)

Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action.

Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection.

Prepared CIA's Declaration of Compliance with the Act, a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Boards requests.

Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review.

The Board's report of 30 September 1998 states that "The Review Board considered the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act....to be one of [the Board's] highest priorities." It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency's Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency's activities in response to the Board.

JFK Act -- Process

- Scope/Deadlines/Decisions defined by law and outside Board.
- Focal Point (HRP) Serves Primarily as: (1) Moderator between Board and Components, (2) Bookkeeper, (3) Consistency Keeper.
- Everything reviewed by Focal Point (HRP) and the appropriate component (Often many times).
- Components often take strong initial position but recede in face of strong arguments.
- Senior Agency Managers unaware of intricacies of the Process unless problems come up.
- Exceptions: Issues Taken to Board by senior management: Cover, Employee Names, Facilities Stations.

Without making a value judgment on the merits of the JFK Act, it is possible to characterize the process which the Act dictated for CIA.

The scope/deadlines and decisons were defined in the law and by the Assassination Records Review Board, an outside body. Over the course of the history of this effort (5 years), CIA, as did other agencies, developed (and redeveloped) processes and responses to the Board. For the most part the detailed work by the Staff was at a level which did not involve senior managers unless a major problem arose.

When problems did arise, Senior Agency officials were asked to make presentations to the Board and, in all cases, consensus was achieved. No issues from CIA had to be appealed to the President, the formal procedure in the Act for resolving differences between Agencies and the Board.



JFK Lessons Learned

- Statutory Mandates are Not Efficient
  - Requirements to declassify All drives out focus on important
  - Standards for Declassification are Invariably Different
  - Projects of equal merit without a statute are orphaned
- Structure and Planning
  - Good Communications with Oversight Body
  - Expertise in Subject matter and Information Management
  - Strategy, Concepts and Policy known and Understood:
    - Guidelines (flexible),
    - Deadlines (reasonable),
    - Responsibilities
  - Understanding of Final Product Desired:
    - Media, Databases, indexes, etc.
- Support of Senior Management

8

- Our experience is that statutory mandates such as the JFK Act are very inefficient. The specific requirements of the act, including Board administrative decisions, required us to :
  - Address all possibly related documents, no matter how insignificant.
  - Engage in lengthy negotiation processes over an almost endless number of documents.
  - Establish databases for management of the documents and workflow
  - Treat documents in ways different from all other release programs.
  - Postpone plans for systematic declassification on other programs ~~for which we had no~~ that did not have the benefit of a legal mandate.
- Our expectation is that there will be more of such mandates, including the recently enacted Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. Similar proposals are under consideration for human rights violations in central america. What we have learned from our JFK experience is that:
  - We need to remain in very close coordination with the Oversight body to assure that we are not going down the wrong street and will have to repeat efforts.
  - We have found that annuitants "who know the territory" can be extremely valuable as a resource for finding and understanding the senstitivity of material.
  - We know that we have to organize within the Agency and to gain agreement early on with regard to strategies for managing the effort, including agreement on what the final product is to be and how we are to get there.
  - We also need to keep senior management attention on what we are doing so that they are not surprised at the end, which not only causes delays in an orderly process but can lead to significant misunderstandings between senior participants.
- We are trying to apply these lessons learned to our planning for the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.

OIM 99-0281
29 October 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM

FROM: Charles A. Briggs
JFK Declassification Project, OIM

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

1. My assumption in preparing the attached is that I was asked because: a) for seven-plus years I've been involved in the project; and b) my past Agency assignments, including being the first DO Information Review Officer, gave me the opportunity to see declassification from many vantage points: from a legalistic directorate-oriented, either-or standpoint (taking full advantage of allowed exemptions), to a "corporate" Agency-wide strategy to foster credibility while protecting secrets that should remain secret. My comments and conclusions reflect that experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of HRP management.

2. Historically, the Deputy Directors have not paid much attention to information management - unless there's a problem. Then the approach has been: what went wrong; who's to blame; how can we ensure that this doesn't happen again; what lessons have we learned? What this JFK experience reiterates is the need for a proactive, not just reactive, flexible strategy, with corporate Agency direction through the Deputies to their Information Review Officers. And the IROs, who, in essence, determine credibility and resource impact, should be supergrades, with experience in at least two directorates. Because information release has become a major management issue, the Executive Director is the obvious officer to ensure consistent and informed implementation of release policy.

AIUO When Separated
from Attachments

CL BY: 0611637
CL REASON: 1.5(d)
DECL ON: X5
DRV FRM: LIA 2-82

SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE

3. Considerable skepticism in the public, the media, and, unfortunately, the Congress results from the in-house conclusion that denial is justifiable in the absence of "official acknowledgment" of Executive Branch information, even though such information is already in the public domain, from senior Agency officials' publications, Congressional investigations, books by former Cabinet-level NSC members, even Presidents. This inflexible legal strategy may win the battle and lose the war. Lawsuits are a lot more expensive than negotiation.

4. The Agency Task Force that in 1992 considered some of the aspects of DCI Gates' "openness" philosophy did not have the benefit of the JFK experience. I suggest that a senior-level panel be established to consider an objective look at the need for continued classification of generic versus specific sources and methods information, particularly that already in the public domain and when dealing with matters of high public or historic interest. HR 70-14, referring as it does in paragraph e.(4) to "Guidelines for Declassification" in Executive Order 12356, does not promote the tactical approach which is suggested in the Comments section on page eight of the attached.

Charles A Briggs

Charles A. Briggs

SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE

DA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:bkh/31835 (29 Oct 99)
s:/oim/fo/jim/hrp/jfk/C.B. JFK Declass Exp.doc

Distribution:
  Original - Addressee, w/atts
  1 - C/IRG/SCD, w/atts
  1 - IRG/SCD/HRO, w/atts (Harrelson)
  1 - SCD Chrono, w/atts
  1 - SCD Subj, w/atts

OIM 99-0282
29 October 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM

FROM: Charles A. Briggs
JFK Declassification Project, OIM

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

1. (AIUO) BACKGROUND: The impact of the JFK declassification law on Agency resources and information release decisions was dramatic and to the DO, traumatic. The resource trauma stemmed from the unanticipated number of years required to complete the project. In a memorandum for the DCI dated 11 June 1993, the then-Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence outlined a plan for implementing the "openness philosophy" espoused by both DCIs Gates and Woolsey through a series of "Cold War Declassification" projects. He noted that priority, by virtue of a Congressionally-mandated deadline of 22 August 1993, had been given to declassification of the JFK collection; however, he said, "with the end of the JFK activity in sight," resources could be applied to the other projects. Six years later (actually seven since the project got underway), we are almost finished.

2. (AIUO) The substantive, versus administrative, trauma stemmed from the fact that the JFK Act superseded all other existing laws, including FOIA, the Privacy Act, the DCI's authorities, as well as Executive Orders and Regulations.[1] The Act presumed release. It did allow for appeal but only to the President from the DCI. It allowed "postponements" but only if clear and convincing evidence was presented for each requested postponement and that release would demonstrably impair the national security. The net effect was the release of names, crypts, pseudos, methods, station locations (within specified dates), file identifier numbers, and tradecraft generally, which are protectable under the other laws - and which the Agency had

---

[1] See OGC-92-5325, 14 Dec 92 and OGC-94-52916, 19 Sep 94 (Attachment B)

AIUO When Separated
from Attachments

CL BY: 0611637
CL REASON: 1.5(d)
DECL ON: X5
DRV FRM: LIA 2-82

learned to live with (See Appendix A for the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) "Standards For Review" and "Key Distinctions Between Those Under FOIA, Executive Order 12356 and the JFK Act," with examples).

3. (U) Finally, a Presidentially-appointed assassination review board (the ARRB) had the final say both on postponement and on relevance, subject only to a successful DCI appeal to the President. Although a few appeals were considered, particularly in the early period, none was made.

4. (U) The JFK Act called for each agency to review and transfer its relevant material to NARA by 22 August 1993. Thus, a significant set of materials was transferred from CIA to NARA in 1993, reflecting CIA's then-current judgment on the redactions permitted. Subsequent Board reviews and ARRB staff inquiries resulted in the addition of material to that original set of documents, as well as adjustments to the original set, to reflect Board actions - generally to release more information. Although many documents have been adjusted or added to the collection, requiring substantive HRG and DO reviews as well as administrative actions, the net number of pages in CIA's JFK Collection at NARA is about 260,000.

SIZE AND NATURE OF THE COLLECTION

5. (U) The material requiring line-by-line review included 17 boxes called the Oswald 201 File; 64 boxes called the "Segregated Collection" File, containing those documents made available to the House SubCommittee on Assassinations (HSCA) during its 1978 investigation; 23 boxes of HSCA referrals - staff notes in longhand and type, draft sections of the HSCA final report, correspondence on HSCA letterhead, trip reports - anything referred to us by the National Archives (NARA) for review of possible Agency equities; 19 boxes called "The Holmes Collection" - a reference collection used by the then-DO focal point for FOIA and other JFK queries, Russell Holmes; Presidential libraries material, Church Committee and Rockefeller Commission testimonies, National Security Council papers, PFIAB Minutes and other Community papers made available through the ARRB staff; and 13 boxes called "Miscellaneous," including follow-on questions from the ARRB, a previously overlooked Latin American Division working file, DCI calendars, some DI/OCI

"Dailies." Box 64 of the "Segregated Collection" consisted of 72 reels of microfilm of complete files from which the material reviewed by the HSCA staffers was drawn: CIA staff personnel and security files; a duplicate Oswald 201 file; 26 reels of 201 files on Cubans, Russians, and Americans linked with Oswald, the JFK assassination, and the several investigations; DO project history files, and so on.

6. (AIUO) Included were printed text, almost illegible Thermofax, photographs, computer listings, typed 3X5 cards, buckslips, routing sheets, handwritten scraps - every imaginable form of documentation, with a tremendous amount of duplication, in one instance, 54 copies of a Mexico City cable. Every one of these pieces of paper had to be handled according to NARA instructions, as a unique document for inclusion in the NARA collection for public access and with an Identification Aid for research assistance and retrieval. Among other things, the collection reflected little attention to procedures propounded by NARA itself for Records Management, including destruction of duplicate copies.

7. (AIUO) The pressure to meet an initial Congressionally-mandated release date of 22 August, 1993 with the NARA-required Research Identification Forms, resulted in a crash effort at indexing done, mainly, by individuals on loan from the directorates on an overtime basis and generally unfamiliar with the collection and the subject matter. Thus, a major factor in inconsistent redacting of multiple copies of the same document in different boxes was a function of the quality of the indexing and the effort of the reviewers to cope with constantly changing guidelines. Inadvertent release was inevitable.

THE REVIEW PROCESS

8. (AIUO) The majority of the reviewers were independent contractors with many years of experience, in some cases senior management experience in at least two directorates. Two HRG reviewers had been Information Review Officers themselves as supergrades, one in the DO, the other in the DA. After the HRG review with suggestions for release in full or with redactions, the documents went to a DO review team. The DO agreement or disagreement was reflected on each document, and the package was returned for a senior-level HRP review prior to forwarding to the ARRB.

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

9. (AIUO) As complicated and frustrating as the process was, it wouldn't have worked at all without the on-site presence of the DO team with their link to DO/IMS and the area divisions in Headquarters. Not surprisingly, the DO Headquarters tended to use the familiar FOIA standards, under which much more information could be withheld than was defendable under the JFK law. A major part of the JFK story was Oswald's trip to Mexico City; it took several months for the DO to agree to allow acknowledgment of the existence of a station in Mexico City and many more months to release the name, pseudo, and tenure of the chief of station - information, except for the pseudo, long since in the public domain.

10. (AIUO) Another long time debate concerned acknowledgment of teltap and photo surveillance by the Mexico City Station on the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates - both discussed in open literature but disguised as unidentified sensitive source materials in the Warren Commission report, along with a cropped photo and transcripts of telephone conversations that came to the station from somewhere. One issue, for a long time, was acknowledging that the teltaps were station activities. The ARRB insisted on nearly total release of Mexico City Station traffic, history, personnel, and project approvals because Oswald's trip to Mexico City remained one of the most controversial conspiracy theory aspects of the JFK story. Proof of Oswald's presence there, of his contact with the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates, and the reasons therefore, of the station's unfamiliarity with him prior to the assassination became evident through release of the detailed information on the teltap and photo operations.

11. (AIUO) After the ARRB staff received the Agency reviewed material, discussion of the validity of the deletions (the "postponements") occurred. In the early stages there was a tendency for the Agency Information Review Officers in the directorates to deny rather than release, to test using FOIA standards until challenged, then back off. In a couple of instances, assertions were made that the information that the ARRB said should be released was so sensitive that an appeal to the President would be made - but it wasn't. The net result of the deny-until-pushed approach was an absence of credibility, leading the ARRB to include the following statement in its Final Report to the President on 30 September 1998:

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

> "A small number of CIA staff officers, almost exclusively in the Directorate of Operations, unnecessarily impeded the process and damaged the Agency's interests by resisting compromise with all-or-nothing positions."

12. (AIUO) As time passed and both Agency and ARRB staffers became better educated in attempting the balance between the public interest and the legitimate need for secrecy, credibility improved, the ARRB members delegated the negotiation process to the staff. Previously, every postponed word, phrase, or paragraph had to the approved by the Board. Toward the end, only remaining disagreements were passed by the staff to the Board.

THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE

13. (AIUO) The ARRB, under the law, determined relevance of file material - the Agency could not do so although it could and did, eventually quite successfully, negotiate. Because of the impact of the Oliver Stone movie "JFK," reflecting a 70-80% public view that the Warren Commission conclusion that Oswald acted on his own was wrong, the ARRB pursued all the major conspiracy theories. Thus, Agency files on the USSR's handling of American defectors, entry and departure controls on foreigners, alien employment and marriage with Soviet citizens, and, particularly, KGB interest in Oswald, and Nosenko's claim to have reviewed Oswald's KGB file in Moscow were declared relevant - as was the whole Nosenko bona fides issue. Agency contact with the Mafia to arrange for Castro's assassination, not known to the Warren Commission, were obviously relevant and, by extension, assassination as an Agency activity was considered relevant - hence, all such testimony before the Church Committee had to be reviewed. Of particular interest was the plot against Lumumba because of the involvement of the former Chief of the Technical Services Division, which division was also involved in the Castro assassination planning.

14. (U) The major conspiracy theory of interest to the Board concerned Cubans: either alleged Castro involvement because of his awareness of plotting against himself or Cuban exiles, furious with JFK for the Bay of Pigs failure. Thus, all files on Agency support to the many Cuban

exile groups and CIA involvement in Project MONGOOSE were declared relevant. Hundreds of JMWAVE cables, Mexico City Station documents, and Cuban names, and many with their crypts, were released.

15. (U) Those records that the Board concluded "truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination" were designated "not believed relevant" (NBR). Cooperative negotiation resulted in about 50,000 pages being declared NBR.

INADVERTENT RELEASES/FOREIGN LIAISON CONCERNS

16. (AIUO) As noted above, inadvertent releases were inevitable. The contributing factors included: guidelines that changed almost continuously as negotiations with the ARRB reduced the claims of current sensitivity; inaccurate and incomplete records on the cover status of retirees; an initial tendency, consistent with FOIA practices, to deny crypts but to release true names- the crypt implying an Agency relationship- if the text did not imply same. (Later: duplicate copies plus mosaic pattern analysis made linkage of some crypts and true name quite easy.); and a surge of inexperienced reviewers loaned during the closing days to meet the agreed NARA deadline for the remaining files.

17. (S) The inadvertent releases of former employees names resulted in a few individual complaints but no known foreign government or liaison service complaints. Four foreign governments opposed release of their information when queried, but no inadvertent releases were involved. (See Appendix C.) The worst slip appears to have been the name of a former NOC, living abroad, who, upon being informed, demanded and received compensation for the violation of his confidential relationship with CIA and the FBI. The other outraged former employee, also living abroad, threatened to contact the President if it became known in his adopted country that he had been CIA. His true name, on a great many documents, is the only redaction; he was of considerable interest to the Board as a key player in the HSCA investigation because he was the Mexico Branch chief and was initially appointed by the DDO to be the focal point for JFK assassination information and briefings. The HSCA allowed him to testify in alias, and the ARRB allowed the substitution of his alias wherever his true name appeared; however, the Board ruled that his true name should be

released in May 2001 or on his death if before that date. Given the volume of the documents in which his name appeared, there were inadvertent releases of his true name.

IMPACT OF THE JFK RELEASES ON FUTURE DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAMS

18. (AIUO) Whether the JFK Act is, or should be considered, precedent-establishing has been argued since its passage. It addresses a unique, highly emotional event, of obvious interest to the public; and it should serve as a catalyst for future declassification policy discussion. But it should not be considered to have set a legal precedent. What should result is what the ARRB directed in the case of exact duplicate documents: that they all be handled consistently, with the same, or no, redactions. Other documents concerning the same or a similar event, not exact duplicates but relevant to the issue, and not subject to the tight legal demands of the JFK legislation, could be reviewed in accordance with the exemptions allowed under the FOIA or the Executive Order. However, the basic factor in deciding on release or denial should not be the avoidance of embarrassment through inconsistent or inadvertent release. It should be the current need for protection of sources and methods.

19. (U) The JFK experience did demonstrate that a traditional generic sources and methods denial is not always necessary, defendable, or smart. Instead of being negatively reactive, it may well be tactically smarter to be proactive to better ensure protection of important secrets. More on that below.

20. (AIUO) LESSONS LEARNED:

- Don't cut costs on indexing. Use experienced indexers. Aim for indexing all materials before review and processing begins. A key focus should be identification of duplicate documents.

- Use retirees with broad Agency experience under staff supervision. Because the most common release problems usually involve DO material, seriously consider an on site-DO team.

- Develop and keep updating written guidelines, including those for coordinating third-agency documents

- Establish early what is already in the public domain. Take a fresh look at the "official release" philosophy, particularly as concerns former DCIs, Cabinet Officers, Presidents, and Congressional investigations.

- Develop better information on the cover status of retired employees.

- Avoid confrontation on marginal or non-relevant information. Avoid stonewalling on relevant information.

- Because the Information Review Officers are the key implementers of information release policy, ensure that the guidance given them by their Deputy Directors has Agency corporate equity.

21. (AIUO) COMMENTS: Information Management, Information Warfare, Information Handling, Information Declassification: at least three of these terms have elicited groans from senior Agency management and a preference to have someone else, some staffer, deal with the subject, keeping the boss out of trouble and minimally informed. But inflexible insistence on continued classification of dated information, particularly that known to the public, ignorance of what has already been declassified and released, and counterproductive stonewalling - these factors have caused trouble and will cause more trouble as the "Information Age" matures.

22. (C) In 1976, then DDI Ed Proctor wrote to the DCI, citing "the need to rationalize the classification process." A 1977 memorandum for the Agency's Executive Committee by two of the current HRG contract reviewers urged the development of an O/DDCI level (the Executive Director position having been abolished) policy review of flap potential in information release and a computer-supported index to released documents. At various times in the 1970s, consideration was given to establishing a fifth Directorate of Information Handling. After a good bit of internal agonizing, DCI Gates in April 1992 signed off on HR 70-14 to make "significant historical information available without

damage to national security." Subsequently, a central management focal point was established in the Office of Information Management and a system that addresses part of the indexing goal and, with its mandatory declassification "metrics" (millions of pages of released documents), modulates some of the outside criticism alleging that CIA is reneging on "openness."

23. (AIUO) What is missing is a Year 2000 look at secrecy. When the FOIA law was passed and the Agency was traumatized by receipt of 150 public requests a day for information, we were able to make case law in the courts and protect sensitive sources and methods by non-arbitrary and non-capricious use of allowed exemptions. It is obvious today that a more forward-thinking strategy than the "no comment" of the 1950s and the "answer the question only as asked" of the 1970s is needed - the JFK experience demonstrated both the counterproductive result of an all-or-nothing defense and that credibility and compromise can be gained without current sensitivity loss. And the fact that Chairman Porter Goss has joined with Senator Moynihan in proposing the existence of an outside group on the model of the JFK Assassination Review Board as arbiter in the government declassification arena is a very clear signal.

24. (AIUO) In my view (and as was the case, briefly, in the past), this extremely complicated, frustrating, and ubiquitous topic requires the personal attention of the Executive Director with "corporate" Agency focused guidance to the Deputies for their personal attention and policy guidance to the IROs. And because the IROs, as the implementors of their Deputies' policies, determine the credibility and resource impact levels, they should be supergrades and experienced in at least two directorates.

25. (AIUO) The eventual development of a credible association with the JFK ARRB was a function of: (1) the patience and diplomacy of the HRP/JFK Project Officer, Barry Harrelson and (2) the presence, on site, of the DO team, without whom this exercise could not have been completed. Ironically, as is so often the case when an individual or group is between a rock and a hard place, as the DO team was between the DO desk officers, the DO/IRO, and the HRP reviewers, there were allegations of their having

been co-opted. Both the DO team and HRG were seen, at times, as "the enemy." That kind of in-house idiocy needed instant quashing.

26. (AIUO) CONCLUSIONS: The JFK Project cost far too much, took far too long, produced no information to change the conclusion that Oswald acted alone. But it did make available to the public previously withheld operational material to negate what DCI Gates had called the most heinous of the conspiracy theories: that CIA was involved in the assassination of the President of the United States. The resource impact was a function of: the unique requirements of the law; the crash nature of the initial release; the National Archives decision that every duplicate must be reviewed and indexed as a unique document; less than satisfactory indexing, contributing to inadvertent releases and time wasted in checking for consistency in the handling of duplicates; problems in determining the cover status of retired employees; and stonewalling.

27. (AIUO) Although there was inconsistency and inadvertent release and some resultant retiree anger, we know of no significant national security breech. Previously withheld information from the Church Committee hearings and from the Presidential libraries declared relevant by the ARRB will be titillating and may stimulate FOIA requests, but the variance from FOIA rules was not a legal justification for withholding under the JFK law.

28. (U) If this experience leads to a serious objective look at the theory and practice of secrecy in this changed world, perhaps the cost will have been worth it.

Charles A Briggs

Charles A. Briggs

Attachments:
- A. Excerpt from Final Report of the ARRB (Standards)
- B. OGC Memorandum
- C. Foreign Government Information

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

DA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:bkh/31835 (29 Oct 99)
s:/oim/fo/jim/hrp/jfk/C.B. Memo The JFK Declass Exp.doc

Distribution:
Original - Addressee, w/atts
1 - C/IRG/SCD, w/atts
1 - IRG/SCD/HRO, w/atts (Harrelson)
1 - SCD Chrono, w/atts
1 - SCD Subj, w/atts

A

closure-oriented than President Reagan's order. The current Executive Order applies to all Executive branch records and, unlike the JFK Act, requires agencies to engage in a systematic declassification of all records more than 25 years old. The Executive Order gives agencies five years—until April 2000—to declassify all *classified* information that is (1) more than 25 years old, and (2) is of permanent historical value unless the "agency head" determines that release of the information would cause one of the nine enumerated harms. The Executive Order provides for continuing protection for sources and methods where disclosure would damage the national security. It also protects, *inter alia,* information that involves diplomatic relations, U.S. cryptologic systems, war plans that are still in effect, and protection of the President.[8]

We need to separate sources from methods. This could be the most lasting effect of the Board.
—Steven Garfinkle,
April 14, 1998

The JFK Act guidelines that governed the disclosure of records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy were detailed in section 6 of the JFK Act.[9] The JFK Act allowed the Review Board to postpone the release of assassination records only where the agencies provided clear and convincing evidence that one of five enumerated harms would occur if the Review Board released the record *and* that the harm outweighed the public interest in disclosure. The statute allowed protection of intelligence agents and intelligence sources and methods if the agency could show that the agent, source, or method currently required protection. The statute further allowed the Board to protect the identity of living persons who provided confidential information to the government if the agency could show that disclosure of the person's identity would pose a substantial risk of harm to the person. The JFK Act allowed the Review Board to postpone release of information if release would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or if release would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality between a government agent and a cooperating individual or foreign government. Finally, the JFK Act allowed the Review Board to protect current information concerning protection of government officials.

2. Key Distinctions Between Standards of Release Under the FOIA, the Executive Order, and the JFK Act

In considering whether the JFK Act was necessary to guarantee public access to assassination records, Congress evaluated the effectiveness of both the FOIA and the then-current Executive Order 12356. Both the House and the Senate concluded that the FOIA and the Executive Order, as administered by the executive branch, had failed to guarantee adequate public disclosure of assassination records.

At the time that the JFK Act became law, the largest collections of records concerning the assassination were under the control of the FBI, the CIA, and the Congressional Committees who investigated the assassination. The FOIA provides special protections for each of these entities, and thus could not serve as the mechanism for maximum disclosure of assassination records. *First,* the FOIA exempts CIA operational files from disclosure.[10] *Second,* the FOIA provides broad-based protection for law enforcement files and therefore allows the FBI to protect a substantial amount of its information from disclosure.[11] *Third,* the FOIA does not apply to unpublished Congressional records.[12] Congress found that the FOIA did not require adequate disclosure in those records that it *did* cover. Thus, Congress believed that the FOIA was not a satisfactory mechanism for guaranteeing disclosure of assassination records.[13]

President Clinton did not sign Executive Order 12958 until April 17, 1995—over two years after Congress passed the JFK Act. Clearly, the terms of the Executive Order applied to most assassination records since they were of permanent historical value *and* were over 25 years old. Even if President Clinton's Executive Order had been in effect prior to 1992, it could not have achieved the maximum disclosure accomplished by the JFK Act. The problem with the Executive Order is that it allowed "agency heads" to make the decision to exempt records from automatic declassification provided that the "agency head" expected that disclosure of the records would result in one of the nine enumerated categories of harm. As many sections of this Report explain, the Review

Board found that "agency heads" tended to be quite reluctant to release their agencies' secrets. The Executive Order, while well-intentioned, failed to provide for any independent review of "agency heads'" decisions on declassification. Thus, although the Executive Order's standards for declassification appeared to be disclosure-oriented, the Executive Order failed to hold agency heads accountable for their decisionmaking.

The JFK Act did require agencies to account for their decisions. To ensure such accountability, Congress included four essential provisions in the JFK Act: *first,* the JFK Act presumed that assassination records may be released; *second,* the JFK Act stated that an agency could rebut the presumption of disclosure only by proving, *with clear and convincing evidence,* that disclosure would result in harm and that the expected harm would outweigh any public benefit in the disclosure; *third,* the JFK Act created an *independent* agency—the Review Board—whose mandate was to ensure that agencies respected the presumption of disclosure and honestly presented clear and convincing evidence of the need to protect information; and *fourth,* the JFK Act required agencies to provide the Review Board with *access* to government records, even when those records would not become part of the JFK Collection. Without these accountability provisions, the JFK Act would not have accomplished its objective of maximum release of assassination records to the public. So, while the FOIA and the Executive Order each expressed the goal of obtaining maximum disclosure, the JFK Act ensured that the goal would be met. The two accountability provisions that relate directly to the Section 6 grounds for postponement—the presumption of release and the standard of proof—are discussed in detail below. The third provision discussed below is the Review Board's obligation to balance the weight of the evidence in favor of postponement against the public interest in release.

a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of assassination records.

The most pertinent language of the JFK Act was the standard for release of information. According to the statute, "all Government records concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy should carry a *presumption of immediate disclosure.*"[14] The statute further declared that *"only in the rarest cases is there any legitimate need for continued protection of such records."*[15]

b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence.

If agencies wished to withhold information in a document, the JFK Act required the agency to submit clear and convincing evidence that the information fell within one of the narrow postponement criteria.[16]

Congress selected the clear and convincing evidence standard because "less exacting standards, such as substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence, were not consistent with the legislation's stated goal" of prompt and full release.[17] The legislative history of the JFK Act emphasized the statutory requirement that agencies provide clear and convincing evidence.

The bill creates a strong presumption on releasing documents. The onus will be on those who would withhold documents to prove to the Review Board and the American people why those documents must be shielded from public scrutiny.
—Senator John Glenn,
May 12, 1992

> There is no justification for perpetual secrecy for any class of records. ***Nor can the withholding of any individual record be justified on the basis of general confidentiality concerns applicable to an entire class.*** Every record must be judged on its own merits, and every record will ultimately be made available for public disclosure.[18]

When agencies did present to the Review Board evidence of harm that would result from disclosure, it had to consist of more than speculation.

> The [Review] Board cannot postpone release because it might cause some *conceivable or speculative harm* to national security. Rather in a democracy the *demonstrable harm* from disclosure must be weighed against the benefits of release of the information to the public.[19]

The Review Board's application of the clear and convincing evidence standard is covered in more detail in Section B of this chapter.

Section B includes a discussion of the "Rule of Reason" that the Review Board ultimately adopted with regard to receiving evidence from the agencies.

c. *JFK Act requires the Review Board to balance evidence for postponement against public interest in release.*

Assuming that agencies did provide clear and convincing evidence that information should be protected from disclosure, the terms of section 6 required that information not be postponed unless the threat of harm outweighs the public interest in disclosure. As used in the JFK Act, "public interest" means "the compelling interest in the prompt public disclosure of assassination records for historical and governmental purposes and for the purpose of fully informing the American people about the history surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy."[20] The Review Board interpreted the balancing requirement to mean that agencies had to provide the Review Board with clear and convincing evidence of the threat of harm that would result from disclosure. However, to the extent that the JFK Act left room for discretion in evaluating the historical significance, or public interest, of particular assassination records, it was the Review Board—not the agency that originated the document—that was to exercise this discretion. The burden was on the agencies to make the case for postponement, not to judge the level of public interest in a particular document. The JFK Act established the Review Board as a panel of independent citizens with expertise as historians and archivists precisely in order to secure public confidence in such determinations.[21]

d. *Segregability and substitute language.*

When the Review Board determined that the risk of harm *did* outweigh the public interest in disclosure, it then had to take two additional steps: (1) ensure that the agency redacted the least amount of information possible to avoid the stated harm, or "segregate" the postponed information, and (2) provide substitute language to take the place of the redaction.

3. Federal Agency Record Groups and the Standards Applied to Them.

The JFK Act defines "assassination records" to include records related to the assassination of President Kennedy that were "created or made available for use by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the possession of" the following groups: the Warren Commission, the four congressional committees that investigated the assassination, any office of the federal government, and any state or local law enforcement office that assisted in a federal investigation of the assassination.[22]

When it passed the JFK Act, Congress intended for the JFK Collection to include the record groups that it identified in section 3(2), but it also intended for the Review Board to consider carefully the scope of the term "assassination record" and to issue an interpretive regulation defining this crucial term.[23] The Act requires government agencies to identify, organize, and process those assassination records that are defined as assassination records in section 3(2). Chapter 6 of this report explains how the Review Board interpreted its responsibility to define and seek out "additional records and information." Set forth below is a description of some of the core government holdings on the assassination which were released under the standards of the Review Board.

a. *The FBI's "core and related" files.*

The FBI's "core and related" files consist of those records that the FBI gathered in response to FOIA requests that it received in the 1970s for records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The "core" files include the FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby, as well as the FBI's Warren Commission files and the JFK assassination investigation file. The "related" files include FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald's wife Marina and mother Marguerite, Oswald's friend George DeMohrenschildt, and the Oswalds' Dallas friends Ruth and Michael Paine. The FBI began its processing of the core and related files in 1993. The Review Board applied strict standards to its review of postponements in the core and related files.

b. CIA's Lee Harvey Oswald "201" file.

CIA opens a 201 file on an individual when it has an "operational interest" in that person. The CIA opened its 201 file on Lee Harvey Oswald in December 1960 when it received a request from the Department of State on defectors. After President Kennedy's assassination, the Oswald 201 file served as a depository for records CIA gathered and created during CIA's wide-ranging investigation of the assassination. Thus, the file provides the most complete record of the CIA's inquiry in the months and years immediately following the assassination.

c. The FBI's "House Select Committee on Assassinations"(HSCA) Subject Files.

During the HSCA's tenure, the Committee made a number of requests to the FBI for records that the Committee believed might be relevant to their investigation of the Kennedy assassination. In response to the HSCA's requests, the FBI made available to the HSCA staff approximately 200,000 pages of FBI files. The FBI began its processing of the "HSCA Subject" files in 1993. The Review Board applied its "Segregated Collection" guidelines (explained below) to the HSCA subject files.

d. The CIA's "Segregated Collection" files.

HSCA investigators gained access to CIA files. Upon completion of the HSCA's work, the CIA kept separate the files that it had made available to the HSCA and retained them as a segregated collection. This collection is divided into two parts: paper records and microfilm. CIA made 63 boxes of paper records available to the HSCA staff. The paper records consist, in many cases, of particular records that CIA culled from various files. The 64th box of the CIA's segregated collection contains 72 reels of microfilm and represents the entire set of files from which records were made available to the HSCA. Thus, in many cases, the microfilmed files contain material well beyond the scope of the HSCA investigation and may, for example, cover an agent's entire career when only a small portion of it intersected with the assassination story.

e. FBI records on the congressional committees that investigated the assassination.

The JFK Act defined "assassination record" to include records relating to the Kennedy assassination that were used by the congressional committees who investigated events surrounding the assassination.[24]

Before President Clinton appointed the Review Board, the FBI collected and began to process its administrative files relating to its involvement with each of these committees. In large part, the records contained in the Bureau's administrative files related to topics other than the Kennedy assassination. To the extent that the Review Board found records in these files that concerned topics other than the Kennedy assassination, it designated the records not believed relevant (or "NBR" as that acronym is defined *infra*) and removed them from further consideration.

f. Requests for Additional Information.

Congress included in the JFK Act a provision that allowed the Review Board to obtain additional information and records beyond those that were reviewed by previous investigations. Chapter 6 of this report explains the requests that the Review Board made and the assassination records designated as a result of those requests.

B. DECLASSIFICATION STANDARDS

The Review Board's primary purpose, as outlined in section 7(b) of the JFK Act, was to determine whether an agency's request for postponement of disclosure of an assassination record met the criteria for postponement set forth in section 6. Section 6 consisted of an introductory clause, which established the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, and five subsections that set forth the criteria under which the Review Board could agree to postpone public disclosure of assassination-related information.

1. Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence

Text of Section 6

Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records

> *to the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if [agencies provide] clear and convincing evidence that [the harm from disclosure outweighs the public interest in release.]*

a. Review Board guidelines. For each recommended postponement, the JFK Act requires an agency to submit "clear and convincing evidence" that one of the specified grounds for postponement exists.[25] The Review Board required agencies to submit specific facts in support of each postponement, according to the Review Board's guidelines for each postponement type.

b. Commentary. Although the agencies argued that the clear and convincing evidence standard could be satisfied by a general explanation of those agencies' positions in support of postponements, the Review Board determined that the clear and convincing evidence requirement was a document-specific one. Thus, the Board required agencies to present evidence that was tailored to individual postponements within individual documents.

> *I think today a great gulf exists between people and their elected officials. Doubts about this particular matter are a symptom of that, and so I think the purpose of this hearing is to ask some questions. Why does information need to be withheld? At this moment in time, what compelling interests are there for the holding back of information? Are there legitimate needs in this respect? Who and what is being protected? Which individuals, which agencies, which institutions are in the need of protection, and what national security interests still remain?*
> *—Senator William S. Cohen, May 12, 1992*

The JFK Act clearly required agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence in support of their postponements, but it did not establish a mechanism for when and how such evidence should be presented. The legislative history provides a clue as to Congress' intent: "[T]o the extent possible, consultation with the government offices creates an understanding on each side as to the basis and reasons for their respective recommendations and determinations."[26] The Review Board did consult with government offices to determine fair, efficient, and reasonable procedures for presenting evidence.

The Review Board began its review of assassination records by considering pre- assassination records on Lee Harvey Oswald. In an attempt to arrive at consistent decisions, the Board asked the staff to present the records on an issue-by-issue basis. For example, with FBI records, the Review Board first scheduled a group of FBI records for review and notified the FBI of the meeting date at which it intended to vote on the records. The Review Board invited the FBI to present its evidence. Second, the FBI requested that it be allowed to brief the members of the Review Board. At the briefing, the FBI presented its position to the Board—both in an oral presentation and in a "position paper." The FBI's "position papers" summarized the FBI's general policy preferences for continued classification of certain categories of information. Third, the Review Board staff researched existing law on each of the FBI's "positions" and determined that the arguments that the FBI put forth in support of its JFK Act postponements were essentially the same arguments that the FBI offers to courts for FOIA cases. Of course, in legislating the declassification standards of the JFK Act, Congress intended for the JFK Act standards—and not the FOIA standards—to apply. Aware of congressional intent, the Review Board rejected the FBI's general policy preferences on the basis that the arguments did not constitute the clear and convincing evidence necessary to support a request for a postponement under section 6. The FBI did appeal the Review Board's decisions to the President, but the Review Board's document-specific interpretation of the clear and convincing evidence standard ultimately prevailed when the vote was withdrawn.

i. "Rule of Reason." Of course, some assassination records are of greater interest than others. With regard to records that had a close nexus to the assassination, the Review Board strictly applied the law. For example, the Review Board voted to release in full nearly all of the information in the FBI's pre-assassination Lee Harvey Oswald file and the bulk of the information in the HSCA's report on CIA activities in Mexico City—the "Lopez" report—because of the high public interest in that material. With regard to the FBI files, the FBI believed that its arguments were compelling enough to merit appeals to the President on nearly all of the Review Board's decisions on the pre-assassination Lee Harvey Oswald records. The FBI, the Review Board, the White House Counsel's

Office, and ultimately the Department of State spent a substantial amount of time resolving the issues that arose in the appeal process, and for those important records that were at issue, the Review Board considered its time well-spent. The Review Board similarly dealt with other key records and spent as much time as was necessary to deliberate and decide upon those records.

The postponement-by-postponement review at each early Review Board meeting proved to be a slow and careful process. The postponement-by-postponement review proved to be a necessary educational process for the Board members. The Board members were a group of five citizens who were selected not for their familiarity with the subject of the assassination, but for their professional competence in history and law. Thus, through reviewing individual documents at its early meetings, the Board essentially educated itself about the assassination.

While the Review Board did need time to educate itself and to develop its policies, the Board's pace eventually increased. In an effort to streamline its work, the Review Board consulted with federal agencies such as the CIA and FBI to work out an approach for review of records that would allow the Review Board to make informed decisions, but not require agencies to spend hundreds of hours locating evidence for and providing briefings on each postponement within an assassination record.

The first step to developing a reasonable approach was for the Review Board to formulate general rules for sustaining and denying postponements. The Review Board's "guidance" to its staff and the agencies became a body of rules—a Review Board "common law." Once the Review Board notified an agency of its approach on a particular type of postponement, the agency learned to present only those facts that the Review Board would need to make a decision. For example, with regard to FBI informants, the Review Board notified the FBI of what it considered to be the relevant factors in its decisionmaking. In other words, it defined for the Bureau what it considered to be "clear and convincing" evidence. Then, the Review Board worked with the FBI to create a one-page form titled an "Informant Postponement Evidence Form" that the FBI could use to provide evidence on an informant. (See illustration.) The form allowed the FBI to simply fill in the answers to a series of questions about the informant in question, which in turn allowed the Review Board to focus on those facts that it deemed to be dispositive in a particular document. This approach had the added benefit of providing consistency to the Review Board's decisionmaking.

A large number of records that the JFK Act defined as "assassination records" proved to be of very low public interest. The JFK Act required the Review Board to process all records that were "made available" to the Warren Commission and the Congressional Committees that investigated the assassination, whether or not the records were used by the Commission or the committees. Many of these records, while interesting from a historian's perspective, are not closely related to the assassination. For those documents that were of little or no public interest, the Review Board modified its standards in the two ways described below.

A. "NBR" Guidelines: Records that Review Board judged were "not believed relevant" to the assassination. For those records that truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination, the Review Board designated the records "not believed relevant" (NBR). The "NBR" Guidelines allowed the Review Board to remove irrelevant records from further consideration. Records that the Review Board designated "NBR" were virtually the only groups of records that the Review Board agreed to postpone in full. Thus, the Review Board was always extremely reluctant to designate records "NBR" and rarely did so.

B. Segregated Collection Guidelines. For those records that were not immediately relevant, but shed at least some light on issues that the congressional committees that investigated the assassination explored as potentially relevant to the assassination, the Review Board created the "Segregated Collection Guidelines." The segregated collections records, although marginally relevant, were not appropriate for "NBR" designation, as the "NBR" Guidelines would have resulted in withholding records in full. Instead, the Board passed the "Segregated Collection" Guidelines, which ensured that the Review Board staff would review every page of the marginally relevant records, but would not require agencies to present the same amount of evidence in support of postponements. The regulations that the Review Board adopted on November 13, 1996, define "Segregated Collections" to include the following: (1) FBI records that were requested by the HSCA in conjunction with its investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy, the Church Committee in conjunction with its inquiry into issues relating to the Kennedy assassination, and the Pike Committee and Rockefeller Commission that investigated issues related to the assassination; (2) CIA records including the CIA's segregated collection of 63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records (box 64) and several boxes of CIA staff "working files." The Review Board adopted revised guidelines on April 23, 1997 in an attempt to streamline the review process of postponements in the segregated collections, and ensure a page-by-page review of all documents in the segregated collections. The guidelines state, "...even with the assumption that our operations may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method of review." Where the Review Board's standards differed between core files and segregated collection files, the guidelines set forth below note the distinction.

Thus, throughout its tenure, the Review Board sought to be vigorous in applying the law, but, in order to complete its work, found it necessary to employ a "rule of reason."

2. Intelligence Agents

Text of Section 6(1)(A)

> *...clear and convincing evidence that the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal—*
>
> *(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection...*

a. CIA officers.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board usually protected the names of CIA officers who are still active or who retired under cover and are now living in potentially risky circumstances. The Review Board usually released names of deceased CIA officers and the names of CIA officers whose connection to the CIA was public knowledge. When the Review Board postponed names, it usually substituted the phrase, "CIA Employee."

ii. Commentary. Names of numerous CIA officers appeared in the CIA's assassination records. The Review Board and the CIA had to confront the challenge presented by the statute, which requires name-specific evidence, but gathering such evidence proved to be time-consuming and burdensome for the CIA and the names of CIA officers in the records were not always relevant to the assassination. The statute, of course, states that the only way that the Review Board could protect names of intelligence agents was if the CIA provided clear and convincing evidence that the CIA officer's identity "currently" required protection.

The CIA initially believed that the solution to the above-referenced challenge was for the Review Board to agree with CIA that the names of all CIA officers within the JFK Collection should be postponed until the year 2017. The CIA supported its request for blanket postponements with two arguments: *first,* since many CIA employees are "under cover," CIA argued that its intelligence gathering capability depended on employees maintaining cover, and, *second,* even though the majority of CIA officer names in the Collection are names of retired CIA employees, CIA is bound by a confidentiality agreement to protect the relationship. Many of these former employees objected to release of their former Agency affiliation, complaining that it violates this agreement and suggesting that such release might jeopardize business relationships or threaten personal safety.

Mindful of the JFK Act's requirement that agencies provide name-specific evidence, the Review Board would not agree to CIA's request for blanket postponements of CIA names. Instead, the Review Board requested CIA to provide evidence for each name.

The CIA, however, was reluctant to produce name-specific evidence and, on occasion, CIA failed to furnish evidence when it promised to do so. CIA's initial refusal to supply evidence on individual names was met, not with the wholesale release of names by the Board, but with a firm insistence that the Agency meet the requirements of the Act. The Review Board released the names of a few individuals who were of central importance to the assassination story early in the process, but gave the Agency a number of additional opportunities to provide specific evidence on other names.

For example, in December 1995, the Review Board designated one day of their meeting "name day," and invited CIA to provide evidence for names the Review Board had encountered in CIA records during the previous six to seven months. On that day, CIA again requested the Review Board to sustain the postponement of all CIA names. The Review Board did not want to jeopardize the personal safety of individuals and gave CIA more time to provide evidence. The Board set other "name days" in May 1996 and May 1997. As deadlines for submission of evidence approached, CIA agreed to release some names, but in most cases, continued to offer less than satisfactory evidence on those they wished to protect. Gradually, the CIA did begin to provide supporting evidence of the postponement of individual names.

By May 1996, the Review Board had decided what evidence would meet the clear and convincing evidence standard. If the CIA provided evidence that the individual retired under cover or abroad, or evidence that the individual objected to the release of his or her name when contacted (CIA agreed to attempt to contact former employees), the Review Board would protect the CIA officer's name. Moreover, where the CIA specifically identified an ongoing operation in which the individual was involved or CIA could demonstrate that the person was still active with CIA, the Review Board would protect the name. Because the JFK Act required the Review Board to balance the potential harm from disclosure against the public interest in release, there were cases in which the Review Board determined that, even though the CIA had provided the required evidence, the Review Board believed that the individual was of sufficiently high public interest that it would require the CIA to provide additional evidence before it would consider protecting the name. In these cases, the Review Board asked CIA to provide information on the employee's current status, his or her location, and the nature of the work he or she did for the CIA.

The Review Board determined that names were of high public interest when the CIA officer at issue had a substantive connection to the assassination story or where the CIA officer's name appeared in CIA's Oswald 201 file. By July 1997, the Review Board had determined that where CIA officer names did not fit within one of the "high public interest" categories, it would require CIA to provide significantly less evidence in support of its requests for postponement. Given the large number of CIA officer names in the CIA records, the Review Board determined that it had to adopt the practical high public interest/low public interest approach, particularly since it had limited time and resources available to complete its own review of CIA records. The Review Board would have preferred to review each name at the same high level of scrutiny that it used to review names of high public interest. Nevertheless, the Board's approach compelled the CIA to release many more names than it would have desired.

b. "John Scelso" (pseudonym).

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board protected the true name of the individual known by the pseudonym of John Scelso until May 1, 2001 or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever comes first.

ii. Commentary. The CIA employee who was head of CIA's division "Western Hemisphere 3" during the period immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy testified before the HSCA and the Church Committee under the "throw-away" alias John Scelso. His true name appears on hundreds of documents in the JFK collection, many of which were the product of the Agency's extensive post-assassination investigation that spanned the globe. In reviewing this particular name, the Review Board's desire to satisfy the public's interest in release clashed with the CIA's strong evidence in support of postponement. Initially, the Board was inclined to release Scelso's true name, but the Agency argued convincingly against release. CIA provided evidence on the current status of the individual, shared correspondence sent by him, and even arranged an interview between him and a Review Board staff member. As an interim step, the Review Board inserted his prior alias "Scelso" as substitute language. (See illustration.) Then, at its May 1996 meeting, Board members determined to release "Scelso's" true name in five years or upon his death.



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : BIRCH O'NEAL
UNIT : C/CI/SIG
EXT : 5367
DATE : 23 NOV 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

57 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

23 NOV 63 17 18z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CI/SI
INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SR 7, WH 7, OS 2, VR

CS COPY

C/LEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
IMMEDIATE

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1995

84886

REF: MEXI 6453 (IN 36017)*

1. IMPORTANT YOU REVIEW ALL [LIENVOY TAPES AND TRANSCRIPTS] SINCE 27 SEPTEMBER TO LOCATE ALL MATERIAL POSSIBLY PERTINENT TO SUBJECT REF.

2. DISPATCH SOONEST BY SPECIAL COURIER, STAFFER IF NECESSARY, [FULL TRANSCRIPTS AND ORIGINAL TAPES IF AVAILABLE] ALL PERTINENT MATERIAL.

3. [ARE ORIGINAL TAPES AVAILABLE?]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 16 APR 1976
E2 IMPDET CL BY 012108

END OF MESSAGE

CS Comment: *Reported that on 1 October 63, an American male who said his name was Lee Oswald was at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Document Number 40-541
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

201-289248
~~200-5-41~~
23 Nov 63

D:200-5-41

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH

COORDINATING OFFICERS
~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[SCELSO]
WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

c. *Information that identifies CIA officers.*

i. Review Board guidelines. For specific information that, if released, would reveal the identity of an individual CIA officer that the Board had voted to protect, the Review Board protected the information.

ii. Commentary. Whenever the Review Board voted to protect the identity of an individual throughout federal agency assassination records, it had to be realistic enough to realize that some information about individuals is so specific that release of the information would reveal the individual's identity. Examples of specific identifying information include home addresses, birth dates, job titles, names of family members, and other less obvious, but equally revealing pieces of information.

d. *Names of National Security Agency employees.*

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board protected the names of all National Security Agency employees that it encountered. The Review Board would have considered releasing names of National Security Agency employees if it determined that a particular name was extremely relevant to the assassination.

ii. Commentary. Due to the nature of NSA information, few NSA employee names appeared in NSA's assassination records. Even though the Review Board did not often encounter NSA employee names, it did have to vote on those names that it did confront. NSA's policy of not releasing the names of its employees conflicted with section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act that presumed release of such information unless NSA could prove that individual NSA employee names required protection. NSA argued that the release of any names, other than those of publicly acknowledged senior officials, jeopardized the potential security of U.S. cryptographic systems and those individuals. As it did with the names of other intelligence agents and officers, the Review Board considered the names of NSA officers on a document-by-document basis. Given the nature of NSA information, the Review Board members agreed that none of the few names which appear in the documents, and for which NSA requested protection, was of high enough public interest or central to an understanding of the assassination story. Thus, it protected the names.

3. Intelligence Sources and Methods, and Other Matters Relating to the National Security of the United States

Text of Section 6(1)(B) and (C)

> *...clear and convincing evidence that the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal—*
>
> *(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or*
>
> *(C) any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States;*

a. CIA sources.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board handled CIA sources, assets, informants, and specific identifying information under standards similar to the Board's decisions for CIA officers. Where the Review Board believed names held a high level of public interest, either because the name was central to the story or because assassination researchers expressed interest in the name, the Review Board subjected them to close scrutiny. The Board generally protected the identity of foreign nationals unless they were of high public interest and then the Review Board required CIA to provide specific evidence in support of its claimed postponements. The Review Board protected domestic sources, assets and informants where CIA demonstrated that release would jeopardize ongoing operations or harm individuals. If CIA did not provide evidence of one of the two above-referenced harms, the Review Board released the name at issue. In addition, where the public already knew the names of individuals who were connected to the CIA, especially if the government had previously released the information, the Review Board released the information.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board addressed the issue of whether to postpone or release source names at the same time that it considered CIA employee names, and encountered the same problems as it had in the review of CIA employee names. As with CIA employee names, CIA was reluctant to provide name-specific evidence to the Review Board, opting instead to offer general principles supporting CIA's request that the Review Board redact all names.

The Review Board ultimately decided to protect the names of sources, assets, and informants in cases where the identity of the source is of reduced public interest because CIA sources live in countries other than the U.S. and were more likely to face harm if the Board disclosed their relationship with CIA. In those records where the source's identity was of possible public interest in relation to the assassination story or was important to understanding information related to the assassination, the Review Board required the CIA to provide additional evidence to support the protection of the source's identity.

The Review Board should consider a variety of factors related to the need to postpone disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, including the age of the record, whether the use of a particular source or method is already well known by the public (e.g. that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was bugged during the alleged visit of Lee Harvey Oswald), and whether the source or method is inherently secret, or whether was the information it collected which was secret.
—Senate Report on JFK Act
July 22, 1992

When the Review Board postponed release of source names, it did so for ten years except in cases where a foreign government might accuse the source of committing treason for assisting the CIA. In those cases, the Review Board protected the source's name and identifying information until 2017.

b. CIA pseudonyms.

i. Review Board guidelines. With only a few exceptions, the Review Board released the pseudonyms of individuals. In some instances, the Review Board used pseudonyms as substitute language for the individual's true name.

ii. Commentary. Very early in the review process, the Review Board determined that, since pseudonyms were a sort of "throw away" identity for individuals who were under cover, the Review Board could release the pseudonym without harming the individual. The CIA did not object to the Review Board's policy to release pseudonyms. The CIA did identify several pseudonyms that it believed to be particularly sensitive, and demonstrated to the Review Board with clear and convincing evidence that release of those pseudonyms would do irreparable harm.

c. CIA crypts.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board released some CIA "crypts"—code words for operations and individuals. The Review Board also generally released CIA "digraphs"—the first two letters of a crypt that link a particular crypt to a particular location. CIA often created crypts to refer to other U.S. government agencies; for example, the FBI was "ODENVY." The Review Board made a blanket decision to release all U.S. government crypts. The Review Board nearly always released CIA crypts where those crypts denoted operations or individuals relating to Mexico City or Cuba. (The digraph for Mexico City was "LI," and for Cuba, it was "AM.") For all other crypts, the Review Board protected the digraph and released the remainder of the crypt. The Review Board established a few exceptions, and where exceptions applied, the Board required CIA to provide crypt-specific evidence of the need to protect.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board had to determine whether it believed that release of CIA crypts would harm CIA operations and individuals. Section 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement of CIA crypts. The Review Board required the CIA to provide crypt-specific clear and convincing evidence that CIA currently used, or expected to use the crypt and that CIA had not previously released the crypt. Thus, in order to convince the Review Board to sustain postponements, the Board required CIA to research each crypt to determine whether CIA still used the individual or the operation and provide that evidence to the Review Board.

As it did with CIA agent names, CIA initially requested the Review Board to sustain postponements of all CIA crypts—even "ODENVY"—the CIA's old crypt for the FBI that CIA had already released in other CIA records. CIA argued that its use of crypts was an operational method that should remain secret, even though CIA had replaced most of the crypts at issue years earlier. CIA believed that if the Review Board released the crypts, researchers would be able to piece together the records and determine the identity of operations and individuals. CIA further argued that the burden of locating evidence on each crypt was too heavy.

The Review Board, conversely, believed that CIA conceived crypts as a code to hide the identity of an operation or an individual, and so the Review Board could release the crypts and not compromise the operation or the individual. As with CIA agent names, the Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to locate evidence on each crypt. Finally, the Review Board released a group of CIA crypts from Mexico City with the "LI" digraph. CIA eventually agreed to release its crypts and digraphs in assassination records, and the Review Board eventually agreed to protect certain sensitive crypts.

The Review Board recognized that it could not conduct a crypt-by-crypt review for every CIA record that it encountered. CIA records contain hundreds of thousands of crypts. Given the need to finish its work, the Review Board decided that, for all crypts *except* the "LI," "AM," and "OD" series crypts, it would agree to postpone the location-specific digraph and release the actual crypts. Thus, the Review Board released most crypts in the collection and the most relevant digraphs. The Review Board did make three exceptions to its general rule: it protected the digraph in non-core files when (a) the crypt appeared next to a true name that had been released, (b) when the crypt appeared next to specific identifying information, and (c) when CIA provided clear and convincing evidence that the Review Board should protect the digraph.

d. CIA sluglines.

i. Review Board guidelines. "Sluglines" are CIA routing indicators, consisting of two or more crypts, that appear above the text in CIA cables. (See illustration.) The Review Board released CIA sluglines according to the same criteria it applied to crypts and digraphs.

13-00000

ii. Commentary. The Review Board released CIA sluglines because the Agency never offered the Review Board any evidence to explain why the Board should not release them. An example of a CIA slugline is "RYBAT GPFLOOR." "RYBAT" is a CIA crypt that meant "secret," and GPFLOOR was the crypt that CIA gave Lee Harvey Oswald during its post-assassination investigation. CIA initially asked the Review Board to postpone the CIA slugline even where CIA had released the individual crypts that made up the slugline elsewhere. For example, in the case of "RYBAT GPFLOOR," the CIA agreed to release the crypt "RYBAT" in two places elsewhere in the document at issue, and the CIA agreed to release the crypt GPFLOOR when it appeared in the text. CIA told the Review Board that it could not, however, release the slugline "RYBAT GPFLOOR." CIA offered no substantive arguments to support its request for postponement of the slugline. Given the statute's demand that CIA provide clear and convincing evidence in support of its requests for postponement, the Review Board voted to release CIA sluglines.

e. CIA surveillance methods.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board generally released CIA surveillance methods, the details of their implementation, and the product produced by them where the Review Board believed the methods were relevant to the assassination. The Review Board sustained postponements of CIA surveillance methods where CIA provided convincing evidence that the method still merited protection. Where the Review Board sustained the CIA's requests for postponement of surveillance methods, it substituted the language "surveillance method," "operational details," or "sensitive operation."

ii. Commentary. As with all its sources and methods, CIA initially requested the Review Board to postpone all of its surveillance methods since, CIA argued, CIA currently conducts surveillance operations. The Review Board, on the other hand, believed that it was not a secret that CIA currently conducts surveillance operations. Moreover, the Review Board did not believe that its votes to release CIA surveillance methods in Mexico City in 1963 would jeopardize current CIA surveillance operations. Finally, the Review Board recognized that certain CIA surveillance operations in Mexico City in 1963 were already well-known to the public because the U.S. government had disclosed details about those operations. CIA surveillance, particularly telephone taps and photo operations, was a major element in the story of Oswald's 1963 trip to Mexico City. (See illustration.)

The Board, therefore, concluded that the public interest in disclosure far outweighed any risk to national security and directed release of the information. However, in records that CIA proved did contain information about current operations, the Review Board voted to postpone the information.



DISTR:
ACTION:
INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 29 NOV 63
FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS JPC	2900227	6796

TO INFO CITE ~~DIR 85660~~

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1995

IMMEDIATE MEXI MANA

Slugline ⇩

RYBAT GPFLOOR

REF MANA 4617

⇧
Cable Prefix

Crypt
⇩

DUP OF
230-650

1. FEEL ERTKYROID 3 SHOULD GO MEXI EVEN THOUGH ALVARADO MAY BE IN MEXICAN HANDS. ASSUME HE CAN BE USED AS CONSULTANT AT LEAST, THAT HE WILL KNOW WHETHER HE CAN AND SHOULD CONTACT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES, AND THAT MEXI WILL CLEAR ANY ACTIVE USE WE MAKE OF HIM WITH THE ODENVY REP. ODENVY HERE KNOWS HE IS COMING TO MEXI TO HELP.

2. AT 1830 WASHINGTON TIME, WHICH IS ABOUT 1630 YOUR TIME, WE HAVE NO FURTHER NEWS OR REQUESTS. WE ARE GOING HOME BUT CAN BE BACK ON THE WIRE ON SHORT NOTICE.

Orig sent to
Gilberto ALVARADO
CP

29/0105Z

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

File: P-8593

f. CIA installations.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board used date "windows" within which it released the locations of CIA installations where the location was relevant to the assassination. Specifically, the Review Board released the location of CIA installations relating to Mexico City during the time period 1960-1969. Likewise, the Review



Record reviewed unilaterally by CIA in 1992.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

SUBJECT: Delay in sending the first cable about OSWALD

1. Much has been written about the delay (by the Mexico Station) in sending the first cable requesting traces on the name Lee OSWALD. It was discussed in Dave Phillips book as a case of laziness on the part of the Soviet case officer (which in my view was unjust and unnecessary and indicates that Dave didn't know what he was talking about).

[redacted]

4. A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way [redacted] ran that Station. [redacted]. It was also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced.

000151

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

SECRET

A1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

D 01075

Same record after Review Board action in 1995.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1995

SUBJECT: Delay in sending the first cable about OSWALD

1. Much has been written about the delay (by the Mexico Station) in sending the first cable requesting traces on the name Lee OSWALD. It was discussed in Dave Phillips book as a case of laziness on the part of the Soviet case officer (which in my view was unjust and unnecessary and indicates that Dave didn't know what he was talking about).

2. Normally, the Spanish transcript for the 1 October conversation would have been picked up on the morning of the 2nd of October. The Russian language portion would have gone to the Russian/English transcriber on the 3rd of October. The translation would have been returned the following day (4th) at which time, the Soviet case officer would have asked for the photographic coverage. That coverage would not have been in the station before the 7th since the film was still in the camera on the 3rd of October and would be picked up probably on the 4th, processed and passed to the station on the next work day which would have been Monday 7 October.

3. Later the film was taken out of the camera every day but at that time, the film stayed in the camera until a full roll was completed which might take three or four days.

4. A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way Win Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage—sometimes there was a U.S. automobile license number. It was also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced.

000151

[redacted]

SECRET

A1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

D 01075

Board generally released the location of *all* CIA installations that were relevant to the assassination during the time period between the date of the assassination—November 22, 1963—and the date that the Warren Commission issued its report in September 1964. Finally, the Review Board generally released the location of *all* CIA installations that appeared in Oswald's 201 file during the time period January 1, 1961 through October 1, 1964. The Review Board did grant CIA a few exceptions to its general rule, and except for the specific time windows described above, the Review Board protected all information that identified CIA installation locations.

The Review Board created substitute language for its postponement of CIA installations to enable researchers to track a particular CIA installation through the JFK collection without revealing the city or country in which it is located. To accomplish this, the Review Board divided the world into five regions: Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, Northern Europe, East Asia/ Pacific, and Africa/ Near East/ South Asia. Then the Board added a number to refer to each different location in the region. Thus, "CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 1" serves as a place holder for a particular installation in all CIA assassination records.

ii. Commentary. Initially, the Review Board released CIA installation locations in CIA documents relevant to Oswald's visit to Mexico City. CIA did not raise significant objections to the Review Board's release of its installations in these records.

When the Review Board began to vote to release the location of additional CIA installation locations, the CIA did object, but did not offer evidence of the harm to national security that it believed would result from disclosure of the information. The CIA threatened to appeal to the President to overturn the Review Board's votes, but the Review Board's position was that the JFK Act required release of information where CIA did not provide convincing evidence to support their postponements. The Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to gather and present its evidence to support its requests for postponements as both the CIA and the Review Board hoped to avoid a CIA appeal to the President.

Ultimately, the CIA determined that it would trust Review Board members with the information that the Review Board required to postpone the release of the location of a small number of CIA installations. In an effort to balance high public interest in the location of CIA installations and the need to protect certain installations, the Review Board decided to establish date "windows" within which it would release CIA installation locations.

The CIA never appealed a Review Board vote to the President.

g. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report).

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA cable, dispatch, and field report "prefixes" are identifiers that CIA uses on its communications to indicate the installation that generates a particular message. Where the Review Board had voted to release the location of a particular CIA installation, the Review Board also voted to release CIA cable, dispatch, and field report prefixes that the installation generated. Likewise, the Review Board protected cable, dispatch, and field report prefixes where it voted to protect the location of the CIA installation.

The Review Board replaced the prefixes that it protected with substitute language similar to that used for CIA installations. An example of substitute language for CIA prefixes is: "Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 1."

ii. Commentary. Once the Review Board voted to release the location of a particular CIA installation, the Review Board and CIA did not disagree that the Board should release cable, dispatch and field report prefixes.

h. CIA job titles.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board voted to release CIA employees' job titles except when the Board's disclosure of the title might reveal the identity of an individual or CIA installation requiring protection.

ii. Commentary. Although the Review Board did not believe that it should vote to protect CIA job titles, standing alone, it sometimes voted to protect titles if they revealed other information that the Review Board had voted to protect.

i. CIA file numbers.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA organizes many of its files by country and assigns "country identifiers" within particular file numbers. The Review Board released nearly all CIA file numbers that referred to Mexico City. The Review Board protected the "country identifiers" in CIA file numbers for all other countries with the exception of country identifiers "15" and "19." The Review Board generally released all CIA "201" or "personality" file numbers where the files related to the assassination.

ii. Commentary. The CIA rarely objected to the Review Board's release of its file numbers.

j. CIA domestic facilities.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board released references to domestic CIA facilities where the CIA has previously officially disclosed the existence of the facility. The Review Board did not release information that would reveal the location of domestic CIA facilities where the CIA provided evidence that the facility was still in use.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board rarely encountered the issue of whether to release the location of CIA domestic facilities in assassination records, as CIA officially acknowledges most of its domestic facilities. When the Review Board did vote to postpone the location of CIA domestic facilities, it required the CIA to provide extensive evidence as to why the CIA had to keep the location of those facilities secret.

k. CIA official cover.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA "official cover" is a means by which a CIA officer can operate overseas in the guise of an employee of another government agency. In *congressional documents*, the Review Board released general information about official cover but protected specific details. With regard to *executive branch documents*, the CIA convinced the Review Board that, while Congress might reveal information about official cover, the executive branch does not generally reveal information about official cover because to do so would damage the national security. Thus, the Review Board sustained CIA's postponements regarding official cover in executive branch documents unless the U.S. government had previously officially disclosed the information at issue.

The Review Board inserted the phrase "official cover" as substitute language when it postponed such information.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board initially considered the issue of official cover to be an "open secret" that was well-known to the public. Thus, they were loathe to withhold such obvious information. The CIA, however, supported its strong objections in briefings and negotiations with the Board, and eventually convinced the Review Board that the harm in releasing information about official cover outweighed any additional information that assassination researchers might gain from knowing details about official cover.

l. Alias documentation.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA employees and agents use aliases and the CIA creates documentation to support its employees' and agents' aliases. The Review Board released information that revealed that CIA employees and agents used aliases. The Board protected specific details about how CIA documents particular aliases.

ii. Commentary. The CIA argued that it currently uses alias documentation and that aliases are vital to CIA's performance of its intelligence operations. The CIA also argued that the Review Board's release of specific information about alias documentation would not be useful to assassination researchers. The Review Board members accepted CIA's arguments, primarily because they agreed that the public interest in the specific details about alias documentation was low. The Review Board determined that it did not want the CIA to spend a large amount of time gathering evidence in support of postponements that were of low public interest and, thus, it did not require the CIA to provide evidence in support of every postponement relating to alias documentation.

m. Foreign intelligence cooperation.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board postponed references to foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board vigorously debated the issue of foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA and demanded extensive evidence and multiple briefings from the CIA on the subject. Though in some instances Board members judged that the information might add to the historical understanding of the assassination, the Review Board, with some dissent, determined that the evidence to postpone the information outweighed this potential value.

n. Human sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence (assets).

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board evaluated the need to postpone the identity of human sources in foreign counterintelligence operations on a case-by-case basis. Where the human source was a *foreign national*, the Review Board generally agreed to protect the individual's identity *unless* the individual's connection with the FBI was already known to the foreign government at issue. Where the human source was a *United States citizen interacting with foreign government officials*, the Review Board sometimes released the identity of the individual if the public interest in the name of the asset was high. Where the human source was a *United States citizen interacting with other United States citizens*, the Review Board tended to evaluate the release of the source's name more like other domestic informants.

ii. Commentary. In its position paper, the FBI defined "intelligence source" as "any individual who has provided or is currently providing information pertaining to national security matters, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in damage to the FBI's intelligence and counterintelligence-gathering capabilities."

The FBI offered the following arguments in support of its request to keep intelligence sources' identities secret: (1) Review Board disclosure of intelligence sources would harm the FBI's ability to develop and maintain new and existing sources, because sources would reasonably believe that the government would reveal their identities, and (2) disclosure of intelligence sources may subject the sources, their friends, and their families to physical harm, ridicule, or ostracism.

The Review Board's interpretation of the "clear and convincing" evidence standard required it to reject the FBI's general policy arguments, and instead required the FBI to present asset-specific evidence that explained the particular harm that the FBI expected the asset to face if the Review Board voted to disclose his or her identity. As a general rule, the Review Board usually protected the identities of foreign nationals who could be prosecuted in their home countries for espionage. Likewise, where the asset was a United States citizen interacting with foreign government officials, the Review Board considered whether the individual was in a position of trust with the foreign government and whether he or she might be in danger if the Review Board disclosed his or her relationship with the FBI. Unlike the above-referenced scenarios, the source who was a *United States citizen interacting with other United States citizens* was generally evaluated according to the Board's domestic informant standards.

a. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities.

i. Review Board guidelines. As a general rule, the Review Board believed that most aspects of the FBI's foreign counterintelligence activities against Communist Bloc countries during the cold war period were well-known, were of high public interest, and were not eligible for postponement pursuant to § 6(1)(B)-(C) of the JFK Act.

ii. Commentary and overview of foreign counterintelligence appeals. The FBI's assassination records contain information that reveal many of the FBI's foreign counterintelligence activities during the cold war period. Beginning in late 1995, the Review Board considered how it could release as much information as possible in the records without jeopardizing operations that still require protection.

In spring 1996, the Review Board considered and voted on a group of FBI records relating to the FBI's foreign counterintelligence activities. In response to the Review Board's requests for evidence on the foreign counterintelligence records, the FBI had provided its "position paper" on foreign counterintelligence activities. In its paper, the FBI defined "intelligence activities" as "intelligence gathering action or techniques utilized by the FBI against a targeted individual or organization that has been determined to be of national security interest." The FBI's primary argument in support of its request for continued secrecy of intelligence activities was that disclosure of specific information describing intelligence activities would reveal to hostile entities the FBI's targets and priorities, thereby allowing hostile entities to develop countermeasures.

> ***In all cases where the Review Board is considering postponement, it should keep the withheld information to an absolute minimum, and ensure that the postponement is narrowly drawn for the shortest possible duration. In so doing, the Review Board should release as much information from the records as is possible.***
> ***—Senate Report on JFK Act, July 22, 1992***

Sections 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement. In addition, the JFK Act's legislative history instructed the Review Board to consider a variety of factors related to the need to postpone disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, including the age of the record, whether the use of a particular source or method is already well-known by the public, whether the source or method is inherently secret, or whether the information collected was secret.[27]

The Review Board considered the FBI's evidence and weighed it against public interest in the records. After careful consideration, the Review Board decided to release some foreign counterintelligence information. The Board's primary reason for releasing such records was its belief that the FBI's evidence did not enumerate specific harms that would result from disclosure.

A. The FBI's May 1996 Appeals to the President. On May 10 and 28, 1996, the FBI appealed to the President to overturn the Board's vote on 17 records relating to the FBI's surveillance of officials and establishments of four Communist countries—the Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Poland—during the 1960s. The FBI's overarching arguments were that disclosure of the information would reveal sensitive sources and methods that would compromise the national security of the United States, and that disclosure of the targets of the surveillance—the four Communist countries—would harm the foreign relations of the United States.

The FBI sought to postpone five types of source and method capabilities: tracing of funds, physical surveillance (lookout logs), mail cover, electronic surveillance, and typewriter and fingerprint identification. The Review Board's response briefs to the President dealt with each source or method in turn. Specific details regarding the appeal of each issue are discussed below.

In response to the FBI's overarching argument that disclosure of the information would reveal sensitive sources and methods and compromise the *national security*, the Review Board responded that if the national security would be harmed by release of this information, the harm would have already occurred, since the FBI had already released both the identities of the target countries *and* the sources and methods that the FBI used in its operations.

In response to the FBI's arguments that disclosure of the targets of the surveillance would harm the *foreign relations* of the United States, the Review Board responded in three parts. *First,* the information that the FBI sought to protect is widely available in the public domain, from both official government sources and secondary sources, so if foreign relations are harmed by disclosure of the information, then the harm has already occurred. *Second,* the FBI simply did not prove its argument that it may have violated international law or "diplomatic standards" by employing the sources or methods at issue since the FBI did not cite the laws or treaties to which it referred and the Review Board could not locate any laws or treaties that were in effect at the time that the records were created. *Third,* despite the FBI's assertion to the contrary, the Review Board had evidence that other governments *do* acknowledge that, in past years, they conducted foreign counterintelligence operations against other countries.

The Review Board believed that the FBI had not provided evidence of a "significant, demonstrable harm" to current foreign relations or intelligence work. Thus, the Board asked the President to deny the FBI's requests for postponement. The White House did not expressly rule on the appeals. Instead, after several meetings involving representatives from the Review Board, the FBI, and the White House, the White House directed the FBI to provide the Review Board with specific evidence in support of its postponements. The White House requested the Review Board to reconsider the Bureau's specific evidence. The FBI, in turn, withdrew the first two of its pending appeals, including some records in which the Review Board voted to release information obtained from a technical source.

B. Post-appeal decisionmaking. After further negotiations, the Review Board and the FBI agreed to release most information regarding its foreign counterintelligence activities against Communist Bloc countries as "consent releases." In those few cases where the Bureau believed that foreign counterintelligence activity against Communist Bloc countries still required protection, the Bureau submitted for the Board's determination postponement-specific evidence.

To the extent that the information in the FBI's proposed redaction did not meaningfully contribute to the understanding of the assassination, the Review Board allowed the FBI to postpone direct discussions of foreign counterintelligence activities against *non*-Communist Bloc countries. With regard to the FBI's "segregated collections," the Review Board stated in its segreated collection guidelines,

> It is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal stan-

13-00000

B

OGC-92-53256

14 December 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

VIA: W. George Jameson
Associate General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC

FROM: Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC

SUBJECT: Declassification Guidelines Established by the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

1. The enactment of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ("the Act") has created declassification guidelines that are to some extent different from the Historical Review Program guidelines established by the Director of Central Intelligence. In the continuing review of material related to the assassination of President Kennedy, the guidelines established by the Act must be used.

2. The Act's most fundamental changes are the burden it creates on agencies to justify continued classification of information, and a requirement that agencies balance the national security concerns against the public interest. Under the Act, information must be declassified unless a showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that release of the information would demonstrably impair the national security.

3. The Act's guidelines for declassification are found in its Section 6 and are as follows:

> **Sec 6. GROUND FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS.**
>
> Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records to the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if there is clear and convincing evidence that--
>
> (1) the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination is of such gravity that

it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal--

(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;

(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or

(C) Any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States;

(2) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal the name or identity of a living person who provided confidential information to the United States and would pose a substantial risk to that person;

(3) the public disclosure of the assassination record could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest;

(4) the public disclosure of the assassination record would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual or a foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest; or

(5) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal a security or protective procedure currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the Secret service or another Government agency responsible for protecting Government officials, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest.

4. The Act therefore superseded the guidelines established for the Historical Review Program to the extent the Historical Review Group (HRG) is processing information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The specific changes are as follows.

a. The most basic change is that you must apply a balancing test before maintaining the classification of any information. You must balance continued classification against the public interest in the information. Therefore, the greater light disclosure of the information would shed on the assassination of the President, or on the government's investigation into that assassination, the more serious must be the need to continue to withhold the information for classification to be maintained.

b. HR 70-14.e(2) states the reviewers of information advocating continued classification of information will bear the burden identifying any damage that disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to the national security. The Act defines that burden as one of "clear and convincing evidence." Further, the Act changes "reasonably could be expected to cause" to "demonstrably." Therefore, unless a showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that release of the information would demonstrably impair the national security, the information must be declassified.

c. HR 70-14.e(4) addresses the standards for maintaining the classification of foreign government information, the identity of a foreign source, and intelligence sources and methods. It notes that Executive Order 12,356 presumes that this information is classified. Under the Act, with respect to these categories of classified information found with records related to the assassination of President Kennedy, you must still find demonstrable damage by clear and convincing evidence regardless of the presumption in the Executive Order. Further, with respect to intelligence sources and methods, the Act requires that they--

(1) be either currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the U.S. Government; and

(2) that they not have been officially disclosed; and

(3) that their disclosure would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities.

All of these factors must be met by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.

d. HR 70-14.e(4) also discusses CIA personnel and organizational information. The Act only permits the continued withholding of the identity of an "intelligence agent" if, by clear and convincing evidence, it can be shown the person's identity requires protection. Further, the Act does not permit the withholding of organizational information unless, by clear and convincing evidence, it can be shown the disclosure of the organizational data would demonstrably impair the national security.

e. HR 70-14.e(7) states that the HRG will determine whether information warrants continued protection pursuant to statutory or other requirements. The Act supersedes all other statutory authority for withholding information except for a provision of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with tax return information. This means the Act takes precedence over 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) and § 403g, as well as the Privacy Act, when determining whether to release records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Act also makes no provision for protecting information on the basis of executive privilege, such as deliberative process and attorney-client communications.

5. Certain categories of information may fall into more than one of the grounds set forth in Section 6 of the Act. We recommend that you review all of the grounds when determining whether to release or withhold specific information. For example, a human intelligence source may fall into grounds (1)(A) ("intelligence agent"), (1)(B) ("intelligence source"), (2) ("living person who provided confidential information to the United States"), and/or (4) ("understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual"). At this point, we do not know how the Assassination Records Review Board will interpret each of these grounds. Therefore, if you determine the standards of the Act are met to permit withholding of certain information, you should assert as many grounds as may arguably apply as authority for that withholding.

cf NARA software per Haney: won't accept author. for [illegible] redaction

6. Although the Act severely limits what information may be withheld from disclosure, it may be possible to protect information not expressly covered by the Act. However, such information may be withheld only with the personal authorization of the President. When the President signed the Act, he issued a statement that included the following:

> My authority to protect [executive branch deliberations, law enforcement information of the executive branch, and national security information] comes from the Constitution and cannot be limited by statute. Although only the most extraordinary circumstances would require postponement of the disclosure of documents for reasons other than those recognized in the bill, I cannot abdicate my constitutional responsibility to take such action when necessary.

7. The Act provides individuals the ability under the Administrative Procedures Act to challenge in court final decisions of the Assassination Records Board. We can expect, then, court challenges to the Board's decisions to uphold any of our determinations that certain information meets the criteria for postponement of release. Additionally, as you know, there are FOIA litigations for this same material. Plaintiff's counsel has indicated in court pleadings and orally that he wants the court to review our redactions not under FOIA standards, but under the standards of the Act. Thus, you should apply the Act's standards knowing your judgments may be questioned by the Board,

subsequent court challenges to the Board's action, and the FOIA cases.

8. If you have any questions concerning the application of the Act to your review of the assassination records, please call me on secure extension 76105.

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.

DCI/OGC/RJE:ig 76105/ 15 Dec 1992

OGC-92-53256

Distribution:

1 - Addressee
1 - DO/IRO
1 - DI/IRO
1 - DS&T/IRO
1 - DA/IRO
1 - DCI/IRO
1 - PCS/PGG
1 - ERR
1 - DPH
1 - Lit file
1 - EC
1 - WGJ
1 - RJE Soft file
1 - OGC Chrono
1 - RJE Signer

1

OGC-94-52916
19 September 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: David P. Holmes
Deputy General Counsel

FROM: Robert J. Eatinger. Jr.
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC

SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records

1. Per your request, I have attached a copy of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (ARCA), Pub. L. 102-526, 106 Stat. 3443-3458, reprinted at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note. For your convenience, I have highlighted the pertinent provisions that will aid in responding to an inquiry regarding the statute's effect on the DCI's statutory authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.

2. The clear language and intent of the law is to supersede statutes that prohibit disclosure of information, except for some irrelevant subject areas, such as tax records. The statute provides that "it shall take precedence over any other law (except section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judicial decision construing such law, or common law doctrine that would otherwise prohibit" the disclosure of information subject to the Act. ARCA § 11(a). This language, taken with the provisions discussed below which limit the intelligence sources and methods that may be protected and set a strict procedural scheme by which information is to be reviewed under the ARCA, effectively supersedes the DCI's National Security Act authority with respect to intelligence sources and methods information subject to the ARCA.

3. Section 6 of the ARCA provides the grounds for which the release of information may be "postponed." The statute contemplates that all information will eventually be released. Indeed, it specifies that all information will be made available to the public no later than 25 years after the passage of the ARCA (which occurred in October 1992) unless the president certifies that continued postponement is necessary. ARCA § 4(g)(2)(D). With respect to intelligence-related information, ARCA allows postponement if:

> "(1) the threat to ... intelligence operations ... is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal--

> (A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;
>
> (B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or
>
> (C) any other matter currently relating to ... intelligence operations ... the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States."

ARCA § 6(1) (Emphasis added.)

4. The originating agency is to make the first review to identify information that meets the standards for postponement. ARCA § 4(c)(2)(D)(i). For CIA, this effort is being undertaken by the Historical Review Group, in consultation with the Directorate of Operations and other appropriate Agency components. Information the originating agencies identify for postponement must be transmitted to the Review Board. ARCA § 4(c)(2)(E). The Review Board "shall consider and render decisions on a determination by a Government office to seek to postpone the disclosure of assassination records." ARCA § 7(i)(1). Specifically, the "Review Board shall consider and render decisions on ... whether an assassination record or particular information in a record qualifies for postponement of disclosure under the Act." ARCA § 7(i)(2)(B).

5. If the Review Board determines to order the disclosure of information that the originating agency felt met the criteria for postponement, it "shall notify the head of the originating body of its determination and publish a copy of the determination in the Federal Register within 14 days after the determination is made." ARCA § 9(c)(4)(A). If the information contained in an assassination record is "obtained or developed solely within the executive branch, the President shall have the sole and nondelegable authority to require the disclosure or postponement of ... the information under the standards set forth in Section 6." ARCA § 9(d)(1) (emphasis added). The President's decision must be certified to the Review Board within 30 days of the Review Boards determination. Id. Records postponed by the President must be re-reviewed every 5 years. ARCA § 9(d)(2). ✓

SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records

6. I would be happy to discuss this further if you so desire. You might also want to contact John Pereira (x30373) since he has met with some or all of the Review Board members.

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.

Attachment

SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority w/Respect to JFK Assassination Records

OGC-94-52916

DCI/OGC/RJEatinger:76105 (19 Sept 94)

Original - Addressee (w/attach)(hand delivered)
1 - OGC Registry (~~w/attach~~)
1 - Lit File ________
1 - RBB (OGC/ILD)
1 - C/HRG (J.Pereira-404 Ames)
1 - RJE - Soft File (w/attach)
1 - RJE - Signer
1 - PDP
1 - KK -fyi
1 - PAS-fyi

C

Attachment C

Friday, October 29, 1999

Foreign Government Information Contained in JFK Collection

CIA's JFK Collection includes Foreign Government Information (FGI) in a number of forms:

First, some CIA documents in the collection contained FGI but, by general agreement with the Assassination Records Review Board, the source could be protected by redaction even when CIA and the Board agreed that substantive information could be released.

Second, documents were provided by foreign governments in the aftermath of the assassination in response to requests from the US Government for information about the assassination or individuals whose names may have been associated with it. Such documents subsequently became a part of CIA's "sequestered collection" and thus were automatically designated by the JFK Board as "Assassination Records," subject to declassification review. A number of such documents were released in full in the early years of the project (1992-1994), with the concurrence of the DO/IRO, but OIM has no documentation regarding coordination with liaison.

Third, in a number of documented cases, the DO consulted with liaison services regarding documents that were clearly identifiable as from a liaison service, and handling of both the substance and the sources was discussed with the liaison services and their views obtained. In all such documented cases, the BOARD agreed to protect the foreign government source and, as appropriate, to postpone the release of redacted portions or entire documents until the year 2017, reflecting the language of the JFK Act.

The information below reflects those instances of coordination with liaison services that are reflected in OIM records:

Australian

1. (S) A 1968 letter from Charles C. F. Spry, on Australian Security Intelligence Organisation letterhead, to DCI Richard Helms objected to the proposed release of a Warren Commission document in which reference is made to the 'Australian security service.' [The Warren Commission document (CD #97) was a memorandum to Mr. J. Lee Rankin from DDP Helms dated 22 May 1964 reporting an anonymous caller -- who described himself as a Polish chauffeur for the Soviet Embassy in Canberra -- to the US Embassy there. That memo was sanitized to delete the 'Australian security service.'] The Board did not accept the Agency's initial action to "deny in full" Sir Spry's letter and the Board's acceptance of substitute text provided only additional time to pursue the possibility of full release. Consultations between and among EA/PAMSI, OGC, and others and queries to the Australian desk, and, in turn, the Station and the Australian Government brought an acceptable compromise. ASIO authorized the release of a redacted and retyped version of Sir Spry's letter that did not reveal Sir Spry as the writer and that did not reveal an ASIO/CIA relationship, and ASIO further stated "this . . . should not be seen as setting any precedent in releasing ASIO documents." The Board postponed release of the original until 2017.

2. (S) Helms' response to Sir Spry and two related CIA documents were released in sanitized form that protected the liaison relationship. The release of the redacted portions are postponed until 2017.

3. (S) Cables exchanged between Headquarters and Canberra over the issue in Item 1 were declared assassination records, but release of the cables was postponed until 2017.

LIA 2-82
X5
1.5d

British

1. (S) The BOARD wanted to release the 1963 British Security Service's (BSS) interview of the spouse of a West-East defector (Sloboda). The BSS advised the Station that release would be a violation of *privacy rights in the UK.* The BOARD agreed that the document was "not intrinsic to assassination story" and that the document could be postponed until 2017.

2. (S) Another British document in the collection provided information that as of 1982 "KOSTIKOV . . . was posted in Beirut in 1978 . . . and may still be there." (The author EPSTEIN in *Legend* claims KOSTIKOV was Lee Harvey Oswald's KGB case officer in Mexico City.) The British desk accepted the release of the one pertinent paragraph (one of five paragraphs in the document), and the Board agreed to postpone until 2017 the release of all other text and source originating information.

3. (S) The BOARD learned of the existence of a British document that the CIA possessed from the BOARD's examination of FBI files. One member of the BOARD reviewed the entire document and declared one portion of the document as relevant to the JFK assassination. The four-page section of the document regarding KGB Active Measures was released in full and further noted that it was from a foreign government that specifically requested not to be identified.

Canadian

(S) A report received through Canadian liaison channels on West-East defectors (Martin and Mitchell) is in the collection. As consultations with the Canadian desk were underway, the BOARD determined the document as not believed relevant and postponed its release until 2017.

Dutch

(S) The BOARD wanted to release two attachments (teltap transcripts) to a dispatch from the Dutch Station. The matter was coordinated with the Dutch desk, the Dutch Station, and the Director General of the Dutch National Security Service. As a result, translation substitutions provide the information from intercepted conversations on the topics of "Mr. Lee (sic)" and Richard Gibson, but redactions obscure the source of the transcripts, according to guidelines in a letter from the service. Release of the redacted portions is postponed until 2017.

LIA 2-82
X5
1.5d

file copy

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Coordination: JFK Assassination Document (FBI referral)

FROM: Barry Harrelson, Reviewer CSI/HRG 402 Ames	EXTENSION 30171	NO. DATE 3-25-93

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICIAL'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DCI/FIO 7E12 OHB		3/29/93		Becky, For your review, FBI memorandum dated 12/23/63 (Brennan to Sullivan) containing CIA information. We are proposing "Release-in-Full" for this document. Barry
2.				
3.				
4. Barry Harrelson CSI/HRG				
5. 402 Ames				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				No objection to full release of this document. Becky Rau
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1-92 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan WCS ~~SECRET~~ DATE: 12/23/63

FROM : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Lee Oswald

Reference is made to memorandum dated 12/19/63, from Mr. Brennan to Mr. Sullivan. Pursuant to instructions, Agent Papich met with John McCone, Director, CIA, on 12/23/63, (to confront the CIA Director with false statements attributed to him by Mr. DeLoach's sources.) (S) The Liaison Agent is reporting this meeting in some detail so that you may have full appreciation of all aspects.

Agent Papich advised McCone that he had a piece of business which needed ironing out before the end of the year. The Agent explained that since the assassination of President Kennedy, there have been various types of stories circulated concerning the case and the evidence collected; that some of these stories could immediately be discounted; and that there was certain information received by the Bureau which very directly affected relations between the Bureau and CIA. The Agent stated that certain information had reached such proportion to be most alarming and that the Agent had requested permission from Mr. Hoover to discuss the matter with the CIA Director. (S)

McCone was then told that he was charged with being the source of information conveyed to a high Government official and to Drew Pearson in that he, McCone, had stated that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received $6,500 to assassinate President Kennedy. The Agent elaborated by stating that if this were true, McCone had endeavored to leave the impression with certain people that CIA had developed information not known to the Bureau and, in essence, made the Bureau look ridiculous. The Agent advised that if McCone had made such statements, we could only assume that he was employing vicious and underhanded tactics since he and officials of his agency fully well knew that the story concerning the $6,500 had been proved to be absolutely false. McCone's attention was directed to the Alvarado interrogation, Alvarado's admission that he had fabricated the information and the subsequent (S)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
SJP:chs
(7)

NOT RECORDED
199 JAN 2 1964

22 DEC 31 1963

Classified by SP6-[illegible]
Declassify on: OADR 11/2/88
Per CIA letter 9/23/88. #64

JAN 3 1964

~~SECRET~~

corroboration of the polygraph. (S)

McCone was very visibly incensed and left the impression that he might at any moment ask the Agent to leave. After pausing a few moments, he made the following statements: (S)

(1) He stated that he has never talked to Drew Pearson in his life; that he has never sent any kind of message to Pearson directly or indirectly and that he does not have any intention of communicating with Pearson. He briefly referred to the fact that he has been the target of attacks by Pearson, one of these occurring within the last two weeks. (S)

(2) With regard to the "$6,500 story," McCone advised that as soon as the original report was received from his people in Mexico City, he contacted President Johnson and informed him of the development. He explained to the President that this was a matter which required intensive interrogation of Alvarado and that CIA had coordinated very closely with the FBI. He told the President that Alvarado would be kept in a safe house by CIA until the FBI was satisfied that all necessary investigative action had taken place. (S)

(3) McCone advised that he has not been critical of the Bureau; that if he had any criticism he would confer directly with the Bureau and not get involved in malicious gossip. He commented that in connection with the Oswald case, he has encountered people who have been critical of the Bureau and the Secret Service and he, McCone, has gone to the defense of both agencies. (S)

(S) McCone was left in an angry mood but he did retain his composure throughout. Before the Agent left, McCone inquired about the status of FBI - CIA relations in general and the Agent replied that they were satisfactory. He also asked about the Director's health to which the Agent answered that the Director was in excellent health.

That news probably didn't please him. H

As indicated above, no statement was made which in any way might jeopardize the security of Mr. DeLoach's sources.

ACTION:

For information.

WCS

Barry - his cy

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

10 April 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Grant P. Harmon
Unit Chief, JFK Taskforce
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Barry Harrelson, Senior Reviewer
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Authenticity of Document

1. This is in response to your request to this office to review the attached document and advise if it is a valid Agency document or something made up using an Agency reports format and information either entirely made up or from other sources. The 3 August 1962 document purports to tie Dorothy Kilgallen, Marilyn Monroe and former Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, together with knowledge of an number of matters, including the plot to kill Castro.

2. Those Agency officers who have reviewed the document consider it to be fradulent. While the format resembles a "reports" form used in the 1960's, the substantive information and presentation is foreign to normal presentaion or collection efforts. Also, the control stamps and other administrative items are not typical of CIA reports written during the 1960's.

3. If you have any further questions in this regard, please call me directly at (703) 351-2909.

Barry Harrelson

BH:gb

FOR ~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Rel on Fradulent

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[illegible]

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOT FOR PUBLICATI

COUNTRY New York, US

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT Marilyn Monroe

DATE DISTR 3 August 1962

NO PAGES [redacted]

REFERENCES MOON DUST Project

54

DATE OF INFO 3 August 1962

PLACE ACQ. [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO.

EVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE [illegible] ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS

SOURCE: Wiretap of telephone conversation between reporter Dorothy Kilgallen and he close friend, Howard Rothberg (A); from wiretap of telephone conversation of Marilyn Monroe and Attorney General Robert Kennedy (B). Appraisal of Content: [redacted]

1. Rothberg discussed the apparent comeback of subject with Kilgallen and the break up with the Kennedys. Rothberg told Kilgallen that she was attending Hollywood parties hosted by the "inner circle" among Hollywood's elite and was becoming the talk of the town again. Rothberg indicated in so many words, that she had secrets to tell, no doubt arising from her trists with the President and the Attorney General. One such "secret" mentions the visit by the President at a secret air base for [illegible] purpose of inspecting things from outer space. Kilgallen replied that she knew what might be the source of visit. In the mid-fifties Kilgallen learned of secret effort by US and UK governments to identify the origins of crashed spacecraft and dead bodies, from a British government official. Kilgallen believed the story may have come from the New [illegible] in the late forties. Kilgall- said that if the story is true, it would cause terrible embarra[illegible] Jack and his plans to have NASA put men on the moon.

2. Subject repeatedly called the Attorney General and complained about the way she was being ignored by the President and his brother.

3. Subject threatened to hold a press conference and would tell all.

4. Subject made reference to "bases" in Cuba and knew of the President's plan to kill Castro.

5. Subject made ref[illegible] to her "diary of secrets" and what the newspapers would do with such disclosures.

MSH--FILES

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

13-00000

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

15 May 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Ellie Neiman
DO JFK Review Team

FROM: Barry Harrelson
Senior Reviewer, CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: FBI Request For CIA's Opinion On Proposed FBI Release Of Agent Specific Data

1. The FBI has asked for an Agency response on the following matter.

2. HRG counterparts at the FBI are engaged in serious discussions with representatives of the Review Board concerning withholding the identities of FBI confidential informants. In the course of those negotiations, FBI officers advise they are increasingly concerned about being able to withhold the crypts and, possible even the true names, of three former Soviet agents. Given that view, they believe it would assist their overall efforts and negotiating position if they could release additional information on one or more of the three Soviet agents.

3. The three former Soviet agents are:

a. "TOPHAT" also encrpyted as BOURBON;" true name is provided on separate attachment.

b. ["SHAMROCK]" (s) true name on attachment. 1B FBI

c. "FEDORA" also encrpyted or known as "IRONCLAD" "SCOTCH" AND "JADE;" true name on attachment.

4. Attached are seven documents that the FBI is considering for release. Two of them are CIA documents found in the FBI JFK file. HRG has been unable to locate these documents in the CIA JFK collection.

5. Please provide DO views on the FBI proposal.

Barry Harrelson

Atts: A/S

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

IDEN ATTACHMENT TO 10 MAY 1995 MEMORANDUM

The following names and descriptions are keyed to paragraph 3 of the 10 May memornadum:

a. Dmitriy Fedorovich POLYAKOV; reportedly died as a result of Ames disclosure.

b. Nikolay Romanovich MAKAREVICH; (s) whether he is dead or alive is not known. 1B FBI

c. Aleksiy Isadorovich KULAK (Kulyak ?); reportedly died of natural causes.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

FBI filing
26.7.95

Passed this excised portion of DO's 7 June 95 memo to the FBI.

GWS

NOTE: GOT LEE CARLE'S concurrence to do so beforehand.

(s)

a. SHAMROCK's real name, Nikolay Romanovich MAKAREVICH (s) may not be released. His identity has remained a secret for 30 years. We do not know if MAKAREVICH is alive or dead, and believe that exposure could damage him and his family. 1B FBI 1B FBI

b. Tom RYAN's name should be deleted from the front cover of the SHAMROCK debriefing. Mr. RYAN retired under cover, and is employed as an intelligence contractor on a sensitive project. 1B FBI

c. The name and cover name of NARKULYANI ("Greta") should be deleted. 1B FBI

CI

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

OCI No. 1586/64

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
4 June 1964

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America Since July 1963

1. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America are continuing at a steady pace, despite recent major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed the inevitability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however, Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to violence and have emphasized other policy priorities. Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in Latin America remains high.

2. In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro recaptured much of the militant tone of his speeches in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin America. He claimed that what has been done in Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many Latin American countries." The hemisphere's militants, he said, must take advantage of conditions presently favoring revolution and "open the breach." On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperialists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution," the Cubans believe that before that could be accomplished "many other revolutions like ours will appear on the continent." On 24 November, Che Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is part of our daily preoccupation."

3. What emerged from these and other Cuban pronouncements was the apparent conviction of Castro and his aides that further Communist revolutions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be initiated wherever possible and as soon as possible. It is logical to assume that despite recent official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders continue to believe that the very presence of their regime will inspire other Latin American revolutionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue to give assistance to these efforts.

4. Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemisphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example, OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending; despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign, constitutional government in Venezuela was successfully transferred following President Leoni's dramatic election victory last December; and the outbreaks of violence in Panama last January failed to upset constitutional processes there. The April revolt in which President Goulart of Brazil was overthrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that a breathing spell is necessary. In addition, Castro may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionary tactics when he visited the USSR last January. This year has been designated "the year of the economy." This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed commercial and industrial goods from West also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its public expressions of support for revolution. Moreover, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy on revolution now may pay dividends after the US elections in November. He probably assumes that conditions for a US-Cuban modus vivendi--on his terms--will be more favorable then.

5. Nevertheless, evidence presented in the accompanying country-by-country index shows that Cuba has continued since the first of the year to promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (before the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British

Guiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In an interview published in an Italian newspaper in March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to violence. He emphasized that violence would be "necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries, for "there is no other way." In an April interview in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very, very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin America by employing peaceful means."

6. A number of reliable clandestine sources have provided information on the many facets of Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America. The most serious form of subversion from Havana is its training of other Latin Americans in the practical arts of guerrilla warfare. As many as 1,500 received such training in 1962. It is estimated that several hundred [redacted] who traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such training. It has been learned that "scholarship students" who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" receive guerrilla warfare training. This instruction encompasses the use and management of communications equipment; the techniques of military intelligence, including methods of establishing intelligence networks to obtain information from peasants; training in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small arms, which are readily available in most Latin American countries; training in explosives, and training in guerrilla tactics, including instruction on how to operate independently in the countryside for extended periods of time. A separate training school reportedly trains Communist youth from other Latin American countries. The school's one-year course is divided between the study of Communist theory and practical training in political agitation and subversive activities. Reports from returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are developing extensive files on most Latin American countries on subjects pertinent to the planning and development of further subversive activity. Detailed questionnaires submitted to [redacted] trainees requested comments on possible air drop zones, weather conditions, locations of military bases, competence of local authorities, border and frontier controls, and a long list of similar questions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic knowledge [redacted].

7. Latin Americans returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba often take a round-about route to conceal the fact that they have been in Cuba. [redacted]. They then go through Europe to some other Latin American country, from which they enter their own. Cuba gives these travelers documents which show no indication that they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments and are given special training in clandestine communications, which permits them to maintain a contact with Cuba after they have returned home.

8. In addition, Latin Americans who receive guerrilla warfare and other types of training in Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are known to have been conducting such training in Costa Rica, Panama, British Guiana, Peru, and elsewhere. Thus, the Castro-oriented revolutionary effort in Latin America has a potential for steady growth even if there should be a lessening in the actual training program in Cuba.

9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central and South American-based extremist groups. Only in the case of the arms cache discovered in Venezuela on 1 November, however, has there been incontrovertible proof of Cuban complicity in such efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the hemisphere is basically a continuation of long-established patterns of arms smuggling between nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo planes which are well-suited to gun-running or air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have always stressed the importance of Latin American revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from local sources. Moreover, some financing from Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms.

10. Another important aspect of Havana's efforts in Latin America is centered on supporting and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide

labor organization which could serve as a platform for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its constituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's support for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now is attempting to organize another hemisphere "solidarity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in July. This proposed congress--which, however, is being officially discouraged by the Canadian government--would be modeled on a similar effort staged in Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963.

ANNEX

Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion

1. Argentina

Clandestine reporting for the past year confirms that the Cubans are cooperating with small extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to establish a coordinated subversive effort in Argentina. Extreme-left wing Peronists [redacted] have been in close liaison with Cuban agents [redacted], and elsewhere. [redacted] appears to be the principal support agent of a group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peronists believed to be directed and supported [redacted].

Last January, [redacted] traveled to the provinces of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla camps in March. Some guerrillas who were arrested in that raid are known to have had guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items found at these camps was a book written by Jorge Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be "Commandante Segundo" and is probably in charge of the small guerrilla bands discovered in northern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas possessed the same specifications as those found in the 1 November Venezuelan arms cache. It is believed to be of Cuban origen.

[redacted]

2. Bolivia

Cuban subversive activity in Bolivia has been centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice

President Juan Lechin. Through its embassy in La Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his supporters some arms and money to aid his bitter struggle with President Paz Estenssoro for political domination of the country. [redacted] Cuban Charge Roberto Lassale said the Cuban government believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups. He said Havana was prepared to supply the required arms.

[redacted] gave him two boxes of arms to be distrubuted among the volatile Bolivian tin miners who at that time were in revolt against his government. [redacted] that the Cuban government was willing to provide financial and material support to Lechin for his campaign to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban agents in early April to discuss his financial needs and to determine what he was prepared to offer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance.

In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which aspires to establish a terrorist organization on the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation, was organized last year with the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force and near the residence of the US Ambassador.

The Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia as a staging area from which to send trained subversives into neighboring countires. It is possible that some Cuban support for guerrillas in northern Argentina may have come across the border from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has long been a favorite transit area for terrorists returning to Peru after having received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led police to an arms cache which was to be used to support guerrilla operations in Peru. Bolivian authorities have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro-Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year.

[redacted]

3. Brazil

Before the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda support to Communist and pro-Communist groups. Operating primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother-in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately described Brizola as having the best prospects for starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil. The ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao from late 1963 until the April overthrow.

[redacted] to finance his expanding press and radio activities and to "buy some arms" from his Popular Mobilization Front. [redacted] to buy arms. In addition, a usually reliable [redacted] reports that about 10 days before the beginning of Goulart's overthrow, Havana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster the Brizola forces. Four Cuban couriers reportedly took the money to Brazil [redacted].

Cuba also maintained a substantial propaganda operation in Brazil, primarily through the local office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba. The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues had increased to the point where they covered all major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar organizations existed at the national level, such as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. Cuba also broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.

Brazil under Goulart also afforded Cuba an excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL)--which is planned to replace the moribund Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL)--was held in Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delegation to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on 9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew, who brought a letter from the President warmly supporting the conference. Brazil was also used as a transit area for some Latin American subversives returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba.

In late April, the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line, was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them direct support.

[redacted]

4. British Guiana

The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in British Guiana, in contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to bring down the existing regime.

Clinton Adlum, the Cuban trade representative in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP). Cuban ships call frequently at British Guiana ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.

Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these ships also transport arms to British Guiana which allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America.

The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Communist countries, as well as for Cuban funding of Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Export (GIMPEX). Havana ordered payment [redacted] of GIMPEX [redacted], ostensibly for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable source. It is unclear, however, whether the money was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds in the past both to the government and to the PPP publishing house. Another source reports that the publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan for PPP salaries and expenses.

Georgetown [redacted] officials believe Cuban-trained terrorists are behind much of the sporadic violence which has occurred during the months-long strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is attempting to gain an official endorsement by the Guianese sugar industry. A senior [redacted] official has told the US Consul General that six or eight Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support for this group's growing terrorist efforts in Georgetown. Another source reports some Guianese were receiving guerrilla training in the interior of the country in November 1963, presumably for the newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army.

[redacted]

5. Chile

The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on support for the presidential campaign of Salvadore Allende. Allende is the candidate of the Communist-dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP), and he has a chance of being elected in the September presidential elections. Allende has visited Cuba on several occasions; his campaign manager was in Havana in January. While there, he was promised financial support for Allende's campaign. A usually reliable source reports that Che Guevara recently said: "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin American country to enter our camp."

A clandestine source [redacted] reported in February that [redacted] said some 40 Chileans would soon be leaving Cuba to return to Chile. The source said these Chileans had received political training in Cuba and were returning with funds from the Cuban government for Allende's presidential campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identified 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the past three years as "subversives," but we have no evidence of any organized guerrilla training of Chilean groups in Cuba.

[redacted]

6. Colombia

Cuba has been providing funds to subversives in Colombia since 1960. The pro-Castro, Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)--whose members are building up the newly activated National Liberation Front (FLN), and the recently organized National Liberation Movement have been the principal recipients of Cuban funds. A fairly reliable source reported [redacted] to evaluate the FLN and its prospects and to pass funds for further activity.

Cuba has established some contact with bandit gangs infesting the Colombian countryside. Army troops who are fighting the bandits have found Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits. Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had substantial success so far in directing bandit activity for political ends.

[redacted]

7. Costa Rica

The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) continues to send members for subversive training in Cuba. Some of these militant returnees have begun training small groups of party members, but they appear to have no immediate plans for anti-government action. Much of the pro-Castro activity in Costa Rica appears to have been directed against neighboring Nicaragua. Cuba-trained revolutionaries based in Costa Rica have on occasion crossed into Nicaragua. The police inspector at a town in the Pacific banana zone reported in early February that two unidentified Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica attempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in support of Panamanian charges against the US.

The Costa Rican Society for Friendship with Peoples, a small Communist-front group designed to propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other Latin American countries, is an important Havana asset in San Jose.

[redacted]

8. Dominican Republic

The country's two militant pro-Communist organizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faithful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence of Cuban material support for this effort. The quick response from Radio Havana suggests, however, the existence of a communications link with one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country. Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican Republic also was reflected during the transit workers strike in early May.

One Dominican who has received guerrilla training in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new organization is to promote urban terrorism. A terrorist captured by police in mid-March is said to have told police that this group is receiving arms and guidance from Castro.

[redacted]

9. Ecuador

Since the 11 July 1963 military coup, the Ecuadorean government's careful monitoring of anti-government activities has hampered Cuban efforts there. When the junta began to exile Communists and pro-Castro extremists last fall, several took up residence in Havana. [redacted] told a clandestine source in late March that exiles in Cuba were receiving guerrilla warfare training before returning to Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities. Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard-line faction of the Ecuadorean Communist Party (PCE), is reportedly planning a trip to Havana in late May to confer with Castro. Echeverria expects to have laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by then so that he can "prove his good faith" to the Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid.

Other clandestine sources report Cuban aid has been offered to supporters of former president Velasco Ibarra and that aid is being offered to followers of former president Arosemena.

[redacted]

10. El Salvador

There has been little evidence of direct Cuban-supported subversion in El Salvador during the past 10 months. The Castro government probably helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCES) and its front groups to get to Cuba for guidance and training. Havana radio, heard clearly in El Salvador, provides a propaganda line which can be echoed in locally published Communist publications.

Havana has at least one well-trained Salvadoran intelligence agent, who provides intelligence on selected targets. He was trained in Cuba for a year and a half, not only in guerrilla warfare but in clandestine communications. Like many other Cuban agents, he is not actually working in Salvador but in a neighboring country, from which he deals with Salvadoran operations across the border on direct instructions from a Cuban intelligence officer.

[redacted]

11. Guatemala

Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for over two years. While we have no firm evidence of substantial Cuban assistance in 1963, two clandestine sources reported [redacted] In addition, another source reports [redacted] Mexican Marxist journalist Victor Rico Galan, often used by Castro as an agent in Central America, saw Yon Sosa in October and is said to have urged him to work more closely with the Guatemalan Communists.

Strong anti-subversive measures by the Peralta Government have curtailed, but have by no means eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala. The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guerrillas are still at large in the mountainous areas of the country. They maintain reliable communications and contacts and have the capability to stage damaging raids on carefully chosen targets.

At least 64 Guatemalans are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963. On the basis of clandestine reporting, it is estimated that another 50 traveled secretly and that these received training in guerrilla tactics or political indoctrination.

12. Haiti

Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio.

A French-language transmission is aimed at the educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed to the masses. The speaker has been identified as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist exile in Cuba. The content of Depestre's broadcasts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier. Some Haitians may have received guerrilla training in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any such trainees have returned to Haiti. The long-time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so desire.

[redacted]

13. Honduras

Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras appears to be directed toward support of similar activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala. The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an effective internal security force, and the presence of long-established routes for smuggling into neighboring countries make Honduras well suited for such a role.

Two recent clandestine sources report the Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of the Honduran Communist Party to establish an effective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are said to favor the establishment of a new organization with no direct ties to orthodox Communist groups. The Cubans are said to have selected Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to investigate their readiness for armed action against Honduras' military government.

[redacted]

14. Mexico

The Castro regime has been careful in the past to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico. The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico City as well as individual Mexican nationals and exiled Central American residents there to support subversive activities elsewhere in Central America. The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan are a case in point.

Havana may find it difficult, however, to avoid exploiting the endemic peasant unrest which is increasing in northern Mexico. A clandestine source [redacted] reported [redacted]--which has been behind much of the peasant unrest. The US consul general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban consul there was openly preaching revolution and distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he had stepped up the tempo of his activities considerably in recent months.

[redacted] Mexicans traveled to Cuba in 1963; [redacted] to Cuba from January through April of [redacted].

15. Nicaragua

Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua have been channeled principally through the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revolutionary organization. Most of this group's guerrilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along with members of various other Nicaraguan revolutionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the form of financial support, training, and guidance, but details are lacking regarding its current size or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organization some of its key personnel. Since then, the FLN has been the object of harassment by both Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has shown no capability to make another move soon.

[redacted]

16. Panama

Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11 January incidents, Havana had been increasing its pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as the threatened banana workers' strike in October 1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government campaign. Planning quickened after the early November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly other Castro agents. Some of the approximately 100 Panamanians believed to have received training in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare courses in December and again in May.

Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May 1963 national elections. Havana is reliably reported to have provided some funds for campaign assistance to selected deputorial candidates of the Radical Action Party (PAR).

[redacted] Four of these were VAN members. Another group of recently-returned trainees was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama and to launch revolutionary activities in the near future.

[redacted] to Cuba in 1963.

17. Paraguay

Cuban subversive efforts directed against Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and training Paraguayan exiles based for the most part [redacted] The Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and attention, ~~which is given through the Cuban embassy in Montevideo~~. Some FULNA members have received guerrilla training in Cuba.

A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be keeping two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani.

~~Only six Paraguayans traveled to Cuba in 1963~~. However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled to Havana.

18. Peru

The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for armed revolution against the Belaunde government is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a militant pro-Castro organization composed of some 1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers. Between 450 and 500 MIR members have received guerrilla training abroad, most of them in Cuba. Police raids in January and May probably upset the MIR's timetable for initiating anti-government action, but the movement is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized. It has the potential for carrying out a subversive campaign of considerable disruptiveness. Luis de la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro.

Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of lesser importance, but such assistance has been limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN) is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba for subversive training. Principal FLN leader Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September.

Castro-inspired extremists have exploited recurring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past several months and they have been behind much of the illegal peasant land incursions which have occurred there.

[redacted] known to have [redacted] 16 traveled to Cuba [redacted].

19. Uruguay

We have no evidence of Cuban support for revolutionary activity directed at subverting the Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on subversive contacts with dissidents from neighboring countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans, and Brazilians. The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been particularly useful as a transit point for air travel to Cuba of travelers wishing to conceal their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban propaganda for neighboring countries. Cuban propaganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals.

[redacted] traveled to Cuba [redacted].

20. Venezuela

The current level of Cuban activity in Venezuela is considered fairly low. International reprecussions stemming fron the unprecedented discovery of the huge Cuban arms cache in Venezuela on 1 November 1963, the failure of the terrorist campaign to disrupt the December national elections, and the presently increased capabilities of the Venezuelan military and security forces will probably dampen Cuban activities in Venezuela in the short run. There is no reason to believe, however, that these setbacks will alter Venezuela's high priority on Cuba's target list for subversion. Cuban support for the militantly pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) doubtlessly will continue, and may even increase.

The FALN gives signs of stepping up its activities, but on a lesser scale than at the end of 1963. The decision in late April of the central committee of the Communist party to continue using violence as a political instrument probably presages a gradual increase of terrorist incidents. Riots in mid-May led by Communist-dominated students took place in Caracas, San Cristobal, and Merida. At the same time, one successful student-led robbery of a post office occurred, as well as an attempted robbery of the university payroll.

Robberies have been the FALN's favorite means in the past to obtain money to finance its terrorist activities.

[redacted]

SECRET

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA DURING 1963

~~SECRET~~

NATIONALITY	January		February		March		April		May		June		July		August		September		October		November		December		1963	
	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From
ARGENTINA	18	27	47	34	12	21	13	14	57	12	4	5	6	0	4	0	37	0	4	9	5	3	15	1	222	126
BOLIVIA	1	7	4	3	3	5	6	0	2	5	3	2	14	0	5	3	21	5	1	17	2	1	7	0	69	48
BRAZIL	11	19	22	13	9	6	18	7	10	5	1	6	25	0	0	24	121	0	2	162	0	0	0	0	219	242
BR. GUIANA	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	1	0	0	7	10	0	0	1	0	0	10	0	26	25	51
CHILE	31	44	26	20	13	42	20	8	9	14	3	8	20	1	22	47	175	1	9	70	9	54	18	7	355	316
COLOMBIA	54	39	7	12	13	9	23	5	7	15	3	7	29	1	6	14	17	1	8	14	5	1	10	4	182	122
COSTA RICA	9	0	0	29	1	0	11	1	0	8	0	3	12	0	0	8	0	5	0	1	4	1	10	0	47	56
DOM. REPUBLIC	0	2	0	0	0	6	2	1	1	2	0	2	37	0	1	8	19	0	11	0	0	0	3	3	74	24
ECUADOR	20	0	20	5	10	1	31	1	24	1	4	6	2	0	0	2	7	0	3	4	4	0	1	0	121	20
EL SALVADOR	7	2	0	0	0	0	5	4	0	0	0	4	4	1	1	0	3	0	6	0	0	1	0	0	26	12
GUATEMALA	30	18	0	5	15	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	6	0	3	0	2	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	64	23
HAITI	0	0	4	4	0	0	18	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	23	22
HONDURAS	11	12	20	0	0	0	11	0	1	8	0	11	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	50	39
JAMAICA	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	33	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	38	6
MEXICO	100	81	22	0	26	38	37	18	34	54	14	42	65	28	34	63	84	36	24	71	23	27	49	72	512	530
NICARAGUA	4	7	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	12	9
PANAMA	4	1	20	0	2	1	2	3	2	0	3	0	15	0	6	0	6	13	1	3	0	0	0	3	61	24
PARAGUAY	2	3	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	9
PERU	6	2	2	4	3	1	5	8	5	3	3	5	4	0	2	9	1	2	0	0	1	2	1	2	33	38
URUGUAY	19	19	16	14	8	8	8	0	5	12	9	0	17	15	10	16	56	6	3	27	1	0	6	13	158	130
VENEZUELA	26	9	2	3	9	9	8	0	4	4	8	0	22	0	3	0	37	0	11	10	6	0	3	0	139	35
MONTHLY TOTALS	354	296	212	150	124	149	223	88	163	144	73	103	319	47	104	214	587	64	76	380	69	99	126	132	2430	1863

The peaks in January, July, and September reflect travel of delegations to the anniversaries of the overthrow of Batista and of the "26 July" movement, and to the international architects' congress in October.

640219 3

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JANUARY 1964

NATIONALITY	JANUARY TO	JANUARY FROM	PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
ARGENTINA	9	3	1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.
BOLIVIA	3	1	1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Communist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school.
BRAZIL	0	0	
BR. GUIANA	1	0	29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown.
CHILE	14	15	Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution.
COLOMBIA	4	0	An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations.
COSTA RICA	11	13	3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration.
DOM. REP.	0	1	1 attended Architects Congress
ECUADOR	8	0	5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico.
EL SALVADOR	0	0	
GUATEMALA	0	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	1	
JAMAICA	0	0	
MEXICO	87	45	
NICARAGUA	0	1	
PANAMA	1	1	
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	5	3	
SURINAM	0	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	0	7	
VENEZUELA	5	0	
TOTALS	148	91	

SECRET

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JANUARY 1964

NATIONALITY	JANUARY TO	JANUARY FROM	PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
ARGENTINA	9	3	1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.
BOLIVIA	3	1	1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Communist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school.
BRAZIL	0	0	
BR. GUIANA	1	0	29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown.
CHILE	14	15	Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution.
COLOMBIA	4	0	An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations.
COSTA RICA	11	13	3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration.
DOM. REP.	0	1	1 attended Architects Congress
ECUADOR	8	0	5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico.
EL SALVADOR	0	0	
GUATEMALA	0	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	1	
JAMAICA	0	0	
MEXICO	87	45	
NICARAGUA	0	1	
PANAMA	1	1	
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	5	3	
SURINAM	0	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	0	7	
VENEZUELA	5	0	
TOTALS	148	91	

SECRET

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - MARCH-APRIL 1964

NATIONALITY	MARCH-APRIL		PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
	TO	FROM	
ARGENTINA	11	10	1- Going to Cuba is an Argentine Communist Party leader in Buenos Aires Province. 1 - UNESCO delegate. 1-Returning is employee of Cuban Construction Ministry.
BOLIVIA	8	2	3- Attending May Day Celebration.
BRAZIL	0	0	
BR. GUIANA	2	2	
CHILE	14	37	4- Labor leaders attending May Day Celebration. 16-Returning are members of delegation from School of Economy of University of Chile.
COLOMBIA	7	0	
COSTA RICA	3	3	1- En route to East Germany. 2- In attempt to obtain release of Teodoro Picado Lara.
DOM. REP.	1	7	4- Returning from 26th July Celebration.
ECUADOR	5	2	
EL SALVADOR	3	8	2- Attending May Day Celebrations. 8-Returning from military training in Cuba.
GUATEMALA	0	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	0	
JAMAICA	0	0	
MEXICO	32	24	3- Attending May Day Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	2	1	
PANAMA	2	14	3- Returnees members of Vanguard of National Action
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	9	0	
SURINAM	0	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	14	11	
VENEZUELA	17	0	
TOTALS	130	121	

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

2 (circled)

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY T PER EUR 30 TOTAL COPIES 6 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/EUR3

INFO RF FILE VR DDO

ACTION #

"EYES ONLY"

1		4
2		5
3		6

1 604753 EIA836 PAGE 01 IN 795558

TOR:151902Z JAN 76 LOND 68796

S E C R E T 151705Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE LONDON 68796

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLKMBALL

NELSON FROM MEYER

REF: ROGER CHANNEL 09548 *

1. REFERENCE FROM DEPARTMENT INFORMS EMBASSY THAT SENATOR HART OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WILL BE ATTENDING CONFERENCE AT DITCHLEY 30 JANUARY TO 1 FEBRUARY. HE HAS REQUESTED THAT EMBASSY ARRANGE WITH DEREK TONKIN FOR BRIEFINGS ON SERIES OF SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO HIM AND SELECT COMMITTEE. THEY ARE THE DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN A. SECURITY AND THE SECRET SERVICE AND B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. HE GOES ON TO REQUEST BRIEFINGS ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COVERT OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. IN ADDITION HE WANTS BRIEFINGS ON INTELLIGENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND COORDINATION AND SYSTEM FOR APPROVAL OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS. SENATOR HART ALSO WANTS A BRIEFING ON THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW IT WORKS.

2. TONKIN HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY EMBASSY OFFICER AND TONKIN HAS

C/EUR W
D/EUR
DC/EUR
DC/EUR

ACIGBL

CT
BG

4086

Did a copy go to the [illegible] staff? [illegible] Which Hart?

SECRET

* Not Received

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR.	1		4	
			2		5	
ACTION #			3		6	

T 604753 EIA836 PAGE 02-02 IN 795558

TOR:151902Z JAN 76 LOND 68796

ADVISED THAT BRITS WILL DO THEIR BEST TO PROVIDE INFORMATION SENATOR HART WANTS BUT THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION COULD NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE. HE IS PROPOSING A JOINT MEETING WITH SIR LEONARD HOOPER AND RICHARD SYKES FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND WITH MR. ROBERT ARMSTRONG AT THE HOME OFFICE ON THE WORKINGS OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN THE SCHEDULE AND EMBASSY WILL BE ADVISED BY MR. TONKIN AT A LATER DATE.

3. THERE IS NO INDICATION IN THE DEPARTMENT TRAFFIC THAT CIA HAS BEEN INFORMED BUT WE PRESUME THAT OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY HAVE OR WILL BE CONTACTED BY SENATOR HART OF HIS STAFF ON THE MATTER.

4. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 27 PER SOP #112 TOTAL COPIES 10-3 RUN BY walker

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/EA 3

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF
DDO, SA/DDO, D/OLC

T 602263 EIA422 PAGE 01 IN 794546

TOR:150052Z JAN 76 CNBR 21033

Senate [illegible]

S E C R E T 142302Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 21033

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT TAPPER PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

1. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE CODEL ON THE EVENING OF THE 12TH GEORGE CARY CONTACTED COS AND ARRANGED FOR STATION BRIEFING AT 0830/13TH (THE CONTRY TEAM BRIEFING WAS SCHEDULED FOR 0930). CARY MENTIONED THAT THE INTEL BRIEFS HAD BEEN GIVEN "TAIL END" TREATMENT AT PREVIOUS STOPS, AND CONGRESSMAN ADDABBO HAD INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO BE SURE AND REMEDY THAT ON THE CANBERRA STOPOVER.

2. CONGRESSMEN ADDABBO, ROBINSON AND EDWARDS, ACCOMPANIED BY STAFFERS SNODGRASS, PRESTON AND GEORGE CARY ARRIVED AT THE EMBASSY AT 0830. WITH CUNNEELY PRESENT, COS GAVE THEM DETAILED BRIEFING AS OUTLINED BY HEADQUARTERS. DISCUSSION COVERED THE MAKE-UP OF THE STATION AND BASES, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN AUSTRALIA, THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT SCHEME USED BY HQS IN MANAGEMENT OF STATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES, OUR USE OF LIAISON, STRESSING OUR USE OF THEM TO SUPPLEMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES, OUR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FROM VALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE . VR .

ACTION #

T 602263 EIA422 PAGE 02 IN 794546

TOR:150052Z JAN 76 CNBR 21033

PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE, SPECIFIC DETAILS OF HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OPS TASKING- SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT, DIRECT CONTACT WITH TARGETS AND USE OF LIAISON - STATION BUDGET, ETC., ACTUAL EXAMPLES WERE USED WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE POINT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PDWHIZ CASE WAS USED TO SHOW HOW THE STATION FOCUSES ON AN INDIVIDUAL, PRIMARY TARGET. IT WAS A LIVELY SESSION, WITH CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON AND SNODGRASS: THE "LIVE WIRES" OF THE GROUP. QUESTIONS WERE OF A ROUTINE NATURE PRIMARILY RELATED TO INCIDENTAL OPS DETAILS. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON NOTED THAT HE FELT IT RATHER EASY TO IDENTIFY THE SENIOR AGENCY OFFICERS OF A MISSION BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY HAPPEN TO BE INTERFACED ADMINISTRATIVELY WITHIN AN EMBASSY COS RESPONSE WAS THAT SUCH IS OFTEN TRUE, BUT THAT STATIONS AND HQS MANAGEMENT ARE FOCUSING ON THAT SPECIFIC PROBLEM, AND THAT THE WELCH INCIDENT HAS CERTAINLY ACCELERATED OUR EFFORTS IN THAT REGARD.

3. ALL BUT A FEW MINUTES OF THE ENTIRE HOUR WAS SPENT IN DISCUSSING STATION OPS. GEORGE CARY CERTIFIED THAT THE GROUP WAS "WITTING" AND A FEW QUESTIONS AND ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 602263 EIA422 PAGE 03 IN 794546

TOR:150052Z JAN 76 CNBR 21033

SNODGRASS WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF THAT EXCHANGE, AND IT IS REPORTED IN SEPARATE CABLE (CANBERRA 21027). (IN 793209) AT SNODGRASS' REQUEST STATION HAD ARRANGED A SPECIAL MEETING WITH A SELECT GROUP OF GOA OFFICIALS. THE DETAILS OF THAT MEETING AND AN ADDITIONAL ONE EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE 13TH WITH DEFENSE ARE ALSO DETAILED IN CANBERRA 21029. (IN)* BECAUSE OF SOME RATHER UNUSUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ~~THOSE~~ MEETINGS, SUGGEST CEA AND C/EA/PMI REVIEW REFERENCED CABLE. THE CABLE WAS GIVEN RESTRICTED HANDLING BY STATION BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF ITS CONTENT.

4. THE MEETING LASTED THE FULL HOUR AND THE CONGRESSMEN INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WELL-SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN COVERED. COS STRESSED THAT WE WERE AVAILABLE TO CONTINUE ON THE SUBJECT AFTER THE FORMAL AGENDA OF THE DAY WAS COMPLETED, BUT THEY INDICATED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN ADEQUATELY COVERED. THERE WAS NO FURTHER STATION CONTACT WITH THE CONGRESSMEN DURING THEIR VISIT. THE STAFFERS DEPARTED ON THEIR "VISIT" IN THE EMBASSY CONVAIR ON SCHEDULE, AND WILL RETURN DIRECT TO SYDNEY BY CONVAIR ON THE 14TH, ARRIVING AT ABOUT 2300. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

~~WALLER~~
~~WALKER~~
MARGE

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER Sop117 TOTAL COPIES 10 / RUN BY (24)

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT
C/EA 3
ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF, DDO ~~SA/DDO~~ / OLC,

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 595025 EIA412 PAGE 01-01 IN 791659
TOR:122154Z JAN 76 CNBR 21007

S E C R E T 122040Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 21007

TO: JAKARTA INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDABBO

REFS: A. JAKARTA 35606 (IW787635)
B. JAKARTA 35661 (IW790579)

CANBERRA STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED REPORTING ON CODELS. WAS HELPFUL WITH THE RANDALL GROUP, AND AM SURE WILL BE VALUABLE WITH ADDABBO GROUP AS WELL. REGARDS. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER SOP 112 TOTAL COPIES 10 - 2 RUN BY 4/

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/EA3

INFO RF FILE VR DCI(REVIEW STAFF)
DDO, CS/RF, SA/DDO, D/OLC

ACTION #

T 593616 EIA024 PAGE 01 IN 791004

TOR:121111Z JAN 76 JKRT 35674

S E C R E T 120939Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE JAKARTA 35674

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCUNGA CODEL ADDABBO

REF: JAKARTA 35661 (790579)

1. AT RECEPTION AT HOME OF CHARGE NIGHT OF 11 JANUARY, REPRESENTATIVE ADDABBO MADE POINT OF TELLING COS THAT STATION BRIEFING AS PER REF WAS "DAMN GOOD" AND THAT HE APPRECIATED THE FRANK ANSWERS TO THE DELEGATION'S QUESTIONS.

2. MR. SNODGRASS ALSO VOLUNTERRED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD IMPACTED FAVORABLY ON THE DELEGATION AND THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED AND PLEASED TO GET SUCH STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS. HE ADDED THAT WHAT OFTEN GAVE HIM TROUBLE WAS STATEMENTS BY AGENCY OFFICERS THAT THEY HAD BEEN PURSUING SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR TEN YEARS OR MORE AND HAD NOT YET RECRUITED ONE. HE ALLUDED TO THIS AS THE BUREAUCRAT'S DREAM, BEING PERPETUALLY PAID FOR SEEKING THE HOLY GRAIL WITHOUT EVER FINDING IT. COS POINTED OUT TO MR. SNODGRASS THAT SOVIETS WERE BEING RECRUITED AND THAT THE WORK OF ONE STATION WHICH MIGHT NOT RESULT IN RECRUITMENT WOULD BE THE VERY BASIS ON WHICH ANOTHER STATION IS ABLE TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL

S E C R E T

7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	I N F O	RF. FILE VR.	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 593616 EIA024 PAGE 02 IN 791004

TOR:121111Z JAN 76 JKRT 35674

RECRUITMENT APPROACH, IN COST EFFECTIVENESS TERMS, ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF A SINGLE SOVIET COULD AND DOES RESULT IN A MORE ACCURATE APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THUS A MORE REALISTIC ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO MEET IT. MR. SNODGRASS ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS SO BUT ADDED HIS OPINION THAT MORE RATHER THAN LESS CONGRESSIONAL CONTACT WITH CIA FIELD PERSONNEL AS IN JAKARTA WOULD BE A PLUS FOR THE AGENCY AND GIVE THE CONGRESS A BETTER FEEL FOR OUR ENDEAVORS AND PROBLEMS.

3. MR. CAREY ALSO SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALKS WITH MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IT APPEARED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD GONE DOWN WELL AND THAT THEY FELT THEY WERE BEING GIVEN AN ACCURATE AND INTERESTING INSIGHT.

4. THUS IT SEEMS THAT STATION DID GET THROUGH TO THE DELEGATION DESPITE THE INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE GENERALLY LETHARGIC ABOUT IT.

5. NEW SUBJECT: DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING OF CODEL DIGGS? E2, IMPDET

S E C R E T

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

File

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER SOP 11 2 TOTAL COPIES 10 -1 RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT
C/EA 3
ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DCI/REVIEW STAFF
CS/RF, DDO, SA/DDO, D/OLC

T 592728 EIA152 PAGE 01 IN 790651

TOR:112233Z JAN 76 CNBR 21000

SECRET 112220Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 21000

TO: IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: WELLINGTON 15837 (IN 787572)

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DESIRES REFERENCED MEETING AT 0800 AND WILL EXPECT CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON HIS ARRIVAL.

2. HE IS VERY EASY TO TALK TO AND AM SURE YOU WILL ENJOY THE MEETING. HE MET HERE WITH HEADS OF LIAISON SERVICES, ABOUT 45 MINUTES WITH EACH. HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARE WHAT THEY THINK OF THE CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS, WHAT IMPACT HAVE THEY HAD ON FOREIGN INTEL RELATIONS, ETC.

3. HE HAS A MINOR HEARING PROBLEM, SO SHOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE HIM SEATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO BRIGADIER GILBERT.

4. BEST REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER SOP11Z TOTAL COPIES 10-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/EA3

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. DCI/REVIEW STAFF

CS/RF. DDO. SADDO. D/OLC.

0

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 592741 EIA165 PAGE 01 IN 790652

TOR:112313Z JAN 76 CNBR 21001

SECRET 112305Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 21001

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA RTBUSHEL (DUCKETT)

SUBJECT: MILFORD VISIT

1. COS SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ON 10 JANUARY, AND BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED HIS OBJECTIVES HERE. HE MET WITH SQUASH DIRECTOR GENERAL, D/JIO AND SOTERN/44, EACH FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES AND ALL MEETINGS WENT WELL. ALSO WORKED THE MEETING IN WITH THE NASA REP AND THAT ALSO APPEARED TO GO WELL, AS DID THE MEETING ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.

2. INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS HELD WITH WILSON AND DICKINSON, DEALING WITH TERRORISM QUESTION. ENTIRE DELEGATION WAS VERY FRIENDLY AND A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITH. JACK MAURY'S PRESENCE WAS AN ASSET.

3. DETAILED SUMMARY OF DAY'S ACTIVITY BEING FORWARDED THIS DATE. E2 IMPDET.

-- SECRET

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 47 PER SOP 112 TOTAL COPIES 10-2 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/EA3

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DCI (REVIEW STAFF)
ODO CS/RF SA/DDO OLC

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 592369 EIA799 PAGE 01 IN 790579

TOR:110137Z JAN 76 JKRT 35661

SECRET 110937Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE JAKARTA 35661.

TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA, SYDNEY.

NIACT CANBERRA

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

1. COS BRIEFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 11 JAN IN COS OFFICE. ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD CONCERNING TARGETS, OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET, ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO COMMUNIST TARGETS VS INTERNAL TARGETS, RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT. STABILITY AND INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET INFORMATION, MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF COVER WORK PERFORMED BY OFFICIALLY COVERED OFFICERS, MALAYSIAN INSURGENCY, INDONESIAN REASONS FOR NOT PROVIDING BASES, DIA ROLE IN INDONESIA, AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING.

2. QUESTIONS WERE NOT PERSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR AND GROUP SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO SATISFY. EXCEPTION WAS SNODGRASS, A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE IN MORE DETAIL BUT WAS RESTRAINED BY TIME LIMITATIONS (THE

SECRET

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 592369 EIA799 PAGE 02-02 IN 790579

TOR:110132 JAN 76 JKRT 35661

CONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCH).

3. THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL. NONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF REPS WILSON/DICKENSON. MR. CARY WAS QUITE HELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THEIR OUTLOOK.

4. OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY PROBABLY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THEIR TRIP.

E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

13-00000

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER SOP#1, 2 TOTAL COPIES 10-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT CI/EA 3	INFO	RF FILE ~~VR~~ DCI/Review STAFF, CSRF, DDO, SA/DDO, D/OLC
ACTION #		

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 588800 EIA313 PAGE 01-01 IN 789314

TOR:091229Z JAN 76 CNBR 20992

SECRET 090033Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 20992

TO: WELLINGTON INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: WELLINGTON 15837 787572)

1. COS WILL TAKE MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASAP ARRIVAL CANBERRA AND ADVISE.

2. REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

OUTGOING 'ESSAGE 15-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		

OMF

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 082336Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 789926

CONF: C/EA 8 INFO: FILE DCI Review Staff, CS/RF, DDO, ~~SA/DDO~~, D/OLC,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 22
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SOP
0 IP FILES # 112

Mr. Waller copy

TO: PRIORITY JAKARTA INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF: JAKARTA 35600 (IN 787573*) Y

1. STATION APPEARS TO HAVE HANDLED VISIT OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IN FINE FASHION. REF WILL BE HELPFUL IN FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS HERE.Y

2. PARAGRAPH NINE, REFERENCE GIVES US SOME PROBLEMS. OBVIOUSLY, EVEN FACT THAT HE WAS BRIEFED BY CIA STATION CHIEF IN JAKARTA SENSITIVE SINCE THAT FACT IF PUBLISHED WILL CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT WITH INDONESIAN LIAISON AND WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT PLUS CALLING UNWANTED ATTENTION TO STATION. FURTHER, STATION ACTIVITIES IN INTERNAL OPS FIELD AND FOCUS ON ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN INDONESIA WILL, IF PUBLISHED, CAUSE US DAMAGE IN INDONESIA. ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT WE HAVE PLEDGED TO LIAISON THAT WE WILL PROTECT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM. MEETING WITH YOGA, IF PUBLISHED, WILL BE INTERPRETED BY YOGA AS A BREACH OF FAITH.Y

3. THEREFORE REQUEST STATION FORWARD "NON-CLASSIFIED" VERSION OF BRIEFING AND YOGA MEETING BY CABLE. HEADQUARTERS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058913

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	OCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C RE T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

789926

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

WILL HANDLE HERE WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SO THAT STATION OPERATIONS INCLUDING LIAISON EQUITIES ARE PROTECTED.Y

4. FOR CANBERRA, WELLINGTON: IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAKES REQUEST FOR UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF MEETING AND BRIEFINGS WITH/ BY STATION AND LIAISON STATION SHOULD AGREE FORWARD TO HEADQUARTERS AND WE WILL HANDLE IN SIMILAR FASHION AS JAKARTA MATERIAL. E2, IMPDET.

д

OLC MR. WHITE {DRAFT}
SA/DDO MR. WALLER {TELECOORD}
CEA/PMI UNFOD R. P.

DATE: 8 JAN 76
ORIG: B.J.HOUSTON
UNIT: DCEA
EXT: 9373

William E. Nelson

WILLIAM E. NELSON DDO
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

T. Shackley

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058913

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 47 PER SOP 112 TOTAL COPIES 12-5 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT EA3

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DCI(REVIEW STAFF) CSRF
DDO (SA/DDO D/OLC DCI D/DCI

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 584782 EIA351 PAGE 01 IN 787635

TOR:080559Z JAN 76 JKRT 35606

file in Senator/Congressmen travel

S E C R E T 080352Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE JAKARTA 35606

TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA ROUTINE WELLINGTON.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: JAKARTA 035600 (IN 787573)*

1. CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON BRIEFED AT COS RESIDENCE NIGHT 7 JANUARY FOLLOWING A RECEPTION AT CHARGE'S RESIDENCE. THEIR INTERESTS LAY PRIMARILY IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF SITUATION IN INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ROLE OF INDONESIAN MILITARY. THEY ASKED NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION, TARGETS, PERSONNEL OR BUDGET OF STATION. THEY WERE OPENLY CRITICAL OF YOGA BRIEFING, WHICH THEY HAD ATTENDED EARLIER IN THE DAY AS PER REF, AND FELT THAT YOGA HAD BEEN EVASIVE AND GENERALLY UNRESPONSIVE. THEY ASKED COS TO SUM UP WHAT YOGA HAD SAID. COS'S ANSWER WAS THAT YOGA HAD APPEALED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUT HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THE TOTAL INDONESIAN "NATIONAL RESILIENCE" PLAN, WHICH INCLUDED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNIST ENCROACHMENT. THE CONGRESSMEN AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BASIC MESSAGE, SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN CONVEYED IN FIVE MINUTES

S E C R E T

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TI
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE . VR .	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 584782 EIA351 PAGE 02 IN 787635

TOR:080559Z JAN 76 JKRT 35606

RATHER THAN ONE HOUR PLUS.

2. THE TWO WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND WHAT WAS BEING DONE ABOUT IT IN INDONESIA. THEY APPEARED HIGHLY INTERESTED WHEN COS REPORTED THAT THE STATION HAD PENETRATED WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUP WHICH APPARENTLY HAD CONNECTIONS WITH THE JAPANESE RED ARMY. NEITHER HAD EVER HEARD OF THE JRA AND WERE INTERESTED IN A SHORT BRIEFING ON IT. BOTH MADE MENTION OF INDONESIA'S CO-SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION CONDEMNING U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GUAM. ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IS REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO WONPAT, WHO IS THE REPRESENTATIVE FROM GUAM. THEY SAID MR. WONPAT HAD AGREED FOR THE SAKE OF DIPLOMACY NOT TO BRING UP THIS MATTER DURING THE VISIT, BUT THAT HE HAD CONFESSED TO SOME DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING HIMSELF IN THIS MATTER. COS REPLIED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION HE SOMEWHAT REGRETTED THAT MR. WONPAT DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF ON THIS ISSUE SINCE WE HAD TAKEN SOME PAINS TO LET OUR INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS KNOW THAT WE WERE NOT HAPPY AT THIS GRATUITOUS REBUFF. IT WAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STATION HAD MADE SURE THIS ISSUE WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO, WHO HAD REACTED BY INSTRUCTING THE INDONESIAN U.N. DELEGATION TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM JAKARTA

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO: RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 584782 EIA351 PAGE 03 IN 787635

TOR: 080559Z JAN 76 JKRT 35606

BEFORE ACTING ON ANY SUCH ISSUE AGAIN. WE ALSO NOTED THAT PRESIDENT SUHARTO HAD BEEN DEEPLY UPSET AT THE INDONESIAN UN. DELEGATION VOTE ON THIS ISSUE AND HAD MADE HIS DISPLEASURE KNOWN TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

3. DURING THE COURSE OF THE YOGA BRIEFING, SEVERAL OF THE CONGRESSMEN HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC STUTEMENTS OF PRESIDENT MARCOS AND "THE KING OF THAILAND" DEMANDING THE REMOVAL OF U.S. MILITARY BASES FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. YOGA HAD RESPONDED THAT THESE STATEMENTS WERE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSUMPTION AND DID NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF THE THAI AND PHILIPPINE LEADERSHIP. AS YOGA PUT IT, THESE WERE POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND NOT STATEMENTS OF POLICY. BOTH CONGRESSMEN FELT THAT THIS ANSWER REPRESENTED HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL NAIVETE SINCE SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE HEADLINED IN THE U.S, AND NATURALLY AFFECTED CONGRESS. CONGRESSMAN WILSON COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIGHT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THESE COUNTRIES WHEN THEY WERE TELLING THE WORLD THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT IT. HE ADDED THAT THAT GOES FOR THE GUAM RESOLUTION ALSO. HE ASKED FOR COS'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHETHER TO KEEP QUIET ON THIS OR LET HIS FEELINGS BE KNOWN. COS SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER _______ TOTAL COPIES _______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 584782 EIA351 PAGE 04 IN 787635

TOR:080559Z JAN 76 JKRT 35606

DISCUSS THIS WITH THE CHARGE, BUT OFFERED AS A PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT WOULD DO NO HARM AND MIGHT DO SOME VERY REAL GOOD FOR CONGRESSMEN TO LET THEIR FEELINGS BE KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT. COS ADDED THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY TOLD HIS INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS THAT IT DID NO GOOD FOR ASIAN LEADERS TO SAY PRIVATELY THAT THEY DIDN'T REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY DID SAY PUBLICLY SINCE THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE ON THE RECORD AND THE PRIVATE ONES WERE NOT.

4. THESE GENTLEMEN ARE HARD BITTEN, PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS. GENERALLY THEY APPEARED TO FAVOR A CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE U.S. IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING CONTINUING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ASIAN LEADERS, THEIR WILL AND ABILITY TO SURVIVE AGAINST DETERMINED COMMUNIST SUBVERSION, AND THEIR PERSONAL INTEGRITY. CONGRESSMAN WILSON RECOUNTED THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN SUKARNO ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS AND WAS HAILED AS A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER. HE ADDED, "LOOK AT WHAT THAT (EXPLETIVE DELETED) DID TO US!" THEY EXPRESSED VERY LITTLE OF THEIR OPINIONS CONCERNING THE AGENCY, ALTHOUGH BOTH SEEMED TO ATTEMPT TO ELICIT STATEMENTS FROM COS CRITICAL OF MR. HELMS. IN THIS, OF COURSE, THEY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. BOTH EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE CONDOR OF MR. COLBY.

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 584782 EIA351 PAGE 05-05 IN 787635

TOR:080559Z JAN 76 JKRT 35606

5, GENERALLY IT APPEARED THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR CONVERSATION WITH COS, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF THEIR VISIT UP TO THAT TIME, SINCE THEY SAID THEY HAD NOT FOUND OUT MUCH FROM THE INDONESIANS THAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW BEFORE. STRONGLY ENDORSE HEADQUARTERS ADVICE TO TREAT WITH THESE GENTLEMEN SEPARATLEY FROM CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, WHOSE INTERESTS SEEM QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THEIRS', E2, IMPDET.

*Advised of contact with Congressmen Milford, Wilson and Dickinson to arrange briefings, and forwarded a report of the separate 3 hour briefing of Milford on 7 January.

S E C R E T

FORM 3020D
7-71 MFG. 12/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER Sop112 TOTAL COPIES 15-6 RUN BY 24

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/EA 9

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF, DDO SA/DDO D/OLC

T 584283 EIA894 PAGE 01 IN 787573

TOR:080007Z JAN 76 JKRT 35600

S E C R E T 070944Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE JAKARTA 35600

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: A. DIRECTOR 788143

B. DIRECTOR 788139

C. DIRECTOR 788390

D. DIRECTOR 785722

1. MADE CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AND ARRANGED TO BRIEF HIM ON MORNING 7 JANUARY. ALSO CONTACTED CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON AND LATER MR. TED LUNGER, AND WILL BRIEF WILSON AND DICKINSON NIGHT 7 JANUARY.

2. MILFORD BRIEFING COMPRISED THREE FULL HOURS AND GENERALLY FOLLOWED FORMAT OUTLINED REF D. THIS WAS LIBERALLY INTERSPERSED WITH THEORETICAL EXAMPLES WHICH WERE VERY CLOSE TO ACTUAL CASES.

3. MILFORD WAS SERIOUS, ATTENTIVE AND INTERESTED LISTENER. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CHECKS AND BALANCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL, FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SECURITY AND MORALE OF STATION PERSONNEL. HE DID NOT ASK NUMBERS OF STATION PERSONNEL, OVERALL BUDGET, OR OTHER SENSITIVE DETAIL. HE WAS VERY INTERESTED

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO: RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 584283 EIA894 PAGE 02 IN 787573

TOR:080007Z JAN 76 JKRT 35600

IN STATION'S LIAISON PROGRAM AND AN EVALUATION OF THE STABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. HIS ATTITUDE WAS POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HIGH ADMIRATION FOR THE AGENCY AND BELIEVED THAT NEGATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES WERE LARGELY BASED ON IGNORANCE. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE CONGRESS SO FAR HAD BEEN LOOKING AT THE AGENCY'S "OLD CATS" AND THAT EVEN SOME OF THE "RAVING LIBERALS" WOULD TAKE ANOTHER VIEW OF THE AGENCY IF THEY TOOK THE TIME TO INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE MANY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE AGENCY, AND PARTICULARLY BY THE DDO. HE ALSO EVIDENCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE, SAYING THAT HE FELT THIS TO BE AN IMPORTANT MISSION OF THE AGENCY AND NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. COS OUTLINED A FEW STATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS FIELD THAT SEEMED TO PLEASE HIM.

~~PAGNS2 JAKARTA 35600 S E C R E T~~

4. OFF THE RECORD, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SAID HE HAD IN MIND PREPARING A MINORITY REPORT AND SPONSORING A BILL WHEREBY A SINGLE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY OVERSIGHT WOULD BE FORMED. THIS COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE MEMBERSHIP FROM THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, TREASURY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND ?

S E C R E T

7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR.	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 364283 EIA894 PAGE 03 IN 787573

TOR:080007Z JAN 76 JKRT 35600

THE PRESENT SELECT COMMITTEE. UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS, ITS MEETINGS WOULD ALWAYS BE CLOSED AND ONLY OPEN AS A SPECIFIC VARIATION FROM THE NORM AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. ALSO, UNLIKE OTH~~BC~~ER COMMITTEES, COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT ON A STRICT BIGOTED BASIS AND ~~MCWD NRLNYE~~ COULD NOT BE DECLASSIFIED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE AND ~~0 Q~~ THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. HE ADMITTED THAT THIS BILL MIGHT HAVE SOME ROUGH GOING IN THE P~~00~~RESENT CONGRESS. HE POOH-POOHED THE IDEA OF A JOINT COMMITTEE SA~~EE~~YING THAT IT WOULD HAVE ~~MRO~~ NO LEGISLATION AUT~~TO~~HORITY AND WOULD THUS SIMPLY BE ANOTHER DOG BITING AT OUR HEELS.

5. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED FOR COS' VIEWS ON THIS LEGISLATION AS WELL AS ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH COS WOULD CARE TO MAKE ON OR OFF THE RECORD. COS MERELY COMMENTED THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PLANNED LEGISLATION SEEMED EXCELLENT AND NOTED THAT THE AGENCY WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO AVOID RESPONSIBLE OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRESS, BUT ADDED THAT A SECRET SERVICE MUST HAVE ~~SVE~~ SOME SECRETS, AND WITHOUT THIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT WE WOULD BE OUT OF BUSINESS. COS OFFERED NO RECOMMEND~~OFR~~ATIONS ON THE BASIS THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNEXPECTED AND DID NOT GIVE HIM SUFFICIENT

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 584283 EIA894 PAGE 04 IN 787573

TOR:080007Z JAN 76 JKRT 35600

TIME TO THINK THROUGH A RESPONSIBLE RECOMMENDATION.

6. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ON STATION ACTIVITIES. COS POINTED OUT CERTAIN OBVIOUS SECURITY AND BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

7. FOLLOWING STATION BRIEFING, COS ACCOMPANIED CONGRESSMAN MILDORD, TOGETHER WITH CHARGE RIVES AND THE ENTIRE DELEGATION, TO A MEETING WITH GENERAL YOGA IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE. IN THE COURSE OF THIS MEETING CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED GENERAL YOGA IF YOGA FELT HE WAS RECEIVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND IF HE HAD ANY CRITICISM OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INTERFERENCE IN INDONESIAN AFFAIRS. GENERAL YOGA REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THE NEED TO DEVELOP BAKIN SOMEWHAT FURTHER, THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF BAKIN ARE CLOSE TO SUFFICIENT. IN CERTAIN CASES IT IS POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, BUT THIS WAS ALWAYS DONE WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN EITHER SIDE. YOGA CONTINUED THAT BAKIN AND CIA COOPERATIVE IN CASES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, SUCH AS THE SOVIETS. THIS IS A LIMITED COOPERATION DIRECTED TO A SPECIFIC GOAL. YOGA ADMITTED ALSO THAT HE HAD OTHER LIAISON

13-00000

FORM 3020D
7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR.	STAFF 1 4 2 5 3 6
ACTION #			

T 584283 EIA894 PAGE 05 IN 787573

TOR:080007Z JAN 76 JKRT 35600

RELATIONSHIPS ITH THE BRITISH, THE AUSTRALIANS, THE JALANESE, WEST GERMANS, AND ALL OF THE ASEAN NATIONS. HE SAID SPECIFICALLY THAT HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH RIA WERE EXCELLENT. HE DID NOT ADDRESS HIMSELF TO ANY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAS AN ACTIVE, VIVACIOUS WIFE NAMED MARY WHO WAS WELL TAGEN CARE OF BY EMBASSY ESCORT FSO EMILY PERREAULT. SHE EVIDENCED INTEREST IN THE CASINOS, SAILING SHIPS AND SHOPPING FOR NATIVE HANDICRAFTS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS AN AVID PHOTOGRAPHER AND ASKED TO BE TAKEN ON A MINI-TOUR OF THE CITY FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE WEARS A HEARING AID AND IS SLIGHTLY HARD OF HEARING, AND IT IS WELL TO SPEAK DISTINCTLY AND DIRECTLY AT HIM.

9. MILFORD ASKD FOR A NON-CLASSIFIED VERSION OF STATION BRIEFING AND OF MEETING WITH ZOGA TO BE SENT TO AGENCY AND PSSED ON TO HIM. THIS WILL BE A LITTLE DIFFICULT BUT HE INSISTED IT HAVE NO CLASSIFICATION SINCE IT WOULD GO INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD. WILL PREPARE AND FORWARD SOONEST.

10. OVERALL BELIVE THIS WAS A PLUS. MILDORD EXPRESSED COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH HIS BRIEFING AND AGAIN REPEATED THAT IF OTHERS OF THE CONGRESS WOULD ONLY INFORM THEMSELVES THEY TOO WOLLD BE IMPRESSED.

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER ________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 584283 EIA894 PAGE 06-06 IN 787573

TOR:080007Z JAN 76 JKRT 35600

11. WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON WILSON/DICKINSON BRIEFING WHEN IT IS COMPLETED LATER TONIGHT. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

13-00000

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY O PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 10-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY d AT 0010 Z

ACTION UNIT [illegible]

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR DCI (Review Staff) a/dgf [illegible] o/OLC

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 583972 EIA590 PAGE 01-01 IN 787506

TOR:072129Z JAN 76 CNBR 20980

SECRET 072100Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 20980

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: DIRECTOR 787555

1. APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY ARRANGED. CONG. MILFORD WILL MEET WITH SQTERN REP (PROBABLY SQTERN/44, D/JIO AND SQUASH/D-G.

2. COS AND BONHAM DISCUSSIONS TENTATIVELY SET FOR 0830-1000. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATE 30 MINUTES MEETING WITH EACH LIAISON OFFICER, SO SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN AMPLE TIME FOR MILFORD TO REJOIN GROUP FOR AFTERNOON ACTIVITIES. CAN EXTEND DURATION OF MEETINGS IF HE DESIRES. E2, IMPDET.

--

SECRET

13-00000

7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 44/40 PER SOP# 112 TOTAL COPIES 10-1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/EA3

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR. DCI (REVIEW STAFF), DDO, CS/RF, SA/DDO, D/OLC

T 584270 EIA882 PAGE 01 IN 787572

TOR:080001Z JAN 76 WELL 15837

S E C R E T 070240Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE WELLINGTON 15837

TO: CANBERRA INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 787959

B. DIRECTOR 787555

file Senator travel

PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT COS WELLINGTON CAN ARRANGE 15 JANUARY 0800 HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING WITH NZ SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR, BRIGADIER H. E. GILBERT, AT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S HOTEL. ALTHOUGH EMBASSY WELLINGTON BRIEFINGS ON OPERATION DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15 JAN, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY PREFER TO MEET WITH COS AND BRIGADIER GILBERT. AMBASSADOR SELDEN CONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT. TRANSPORTATION TO AIRPORT FOR FLIGHT TO MT. COOK WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH GILBERT. PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PREFERENCE SO COS CAN CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT WITH BRIGADIER GILBERT. E2IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

10-1

ROUTING

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 0223482
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 787954

CONF: C/EA 3 INFO: FILE DCI (REVIEW STAFF) DDO, CS/RF, SA/DDO DDO/DO D/OLC

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 27
PER 500
112

TO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: DIRECTOR 787555 |*|

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES DESIRE MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS. REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH LIAISON. E2, IMPDET.

*TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE.

OLC Rch
CEA/PMI [illegible] telecoord

DATE: 2 JAN 76
ORIG: B.J. HOUSTON
UNIT: DCEA
EXT: 9373

Houston
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY CEA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Houston
BILL J. HOUSTON DCEA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 059913

13-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

10-3

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP 032120Z
CITE DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 788139

CONF: D/OLC INFO: FILE DCI/Review Staff, DDO, CS/RF DDO/DO, SA/DDO, C/EA3

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SOP
0 IP FILES # 112
DISSEM BY: 22

TO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON INFO TOKYO.Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGAY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 785722 (NOT NEEDED TOKYO) |*|

B. DIRECTOR 787555 (NOT NEEDED TOKYO) |**|Y

1. BASED 3 JANUARY DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, HE EXPECTS MEETINGS WITH ACTION ADDEES AS FOLLOWS:Y

JAKARTA - MORNING 7 JANUARY

CANBERRA - 10 JANUARY

WELLINGTON - EVENING 14 JANUARY Y

2. AT 3 JANUARY MEETING, MILFORD REAFFIRMED HE, AS MEMBER HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (PIKE COMMITTEE), HAS BEEN MOST INTERESTED IN OUTCOME OF COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATIONS AND IS CONCERNED ABOUT DIRECTION IN WHICH COMMITTEE HEARINGS HAVE GONE. FYI, ONLY MILFORD PLANS FILE SEPARATE VIEWS OR MINORITY REPORT WHEN COMMITTEE DRAWS UP ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE HAS VISITED HQS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY VARIOUS AGENCY OFFICIALS. HE RECENTLY VISITED SEOUL WHERE HE SPENT DAY IN COS HOSPITAL ROOM JUST TALKING. MILFORD ANXIOUS SOAK UP AS MUCH KNOWLEDGE AGENCY ACTIVITIES

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058085

13-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	OCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF		DIRECTOR	

CONF: INFO: FILE

788139

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #
DISSEM BY:

AS POSSIBLE TO ASSIST HIM WRITE MINORITY REPORT. ACCORDINGLY, HE WANTS MEET OUR FOREIGN LIAISON COUNTERPARTS TO GET FEEL FOR IMPORTANCE THIS SOURCE AND NEED PROTECT IT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURES. RECOGNIZE SHORT NOTICE, BUT REQUEST ACTION ADDEES MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT ARRANGE LIAISON CONTACTS.Y

3. FOR JAKARTA: PLS HANDLE MILFORD AND WILSON/DICKINSON CONTACTS SEPARATELY AND AVOID OBVIOUS SITUATION OF SINGLING MILFORD OUT FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT.Y

Mr. Lou BonHAM

4. FOR CANBERRA: MILFORD DOES EXPECT MEET AND DISCUSS HIS
(BONHAM'S)
ACTIVITY WITH MR. [redacted] BONHAM IN CANBERRA. HE WILL DEVOTE DAY OF 10 JANUARY TO STATION AND NASA. REQUEST STATION COORDINATE WITH NASA REP WHO PLANS TAKE MILFORD VISIT FACILITY AT TIPENBILO. IF SO, SUGGEST STATION ARRANGE HAVE MRS. MILFORD TOUR NEARBY ZOO. IF ANY CONFLICT SCHEDULING WITH NASA, MILFORD SAYS HE WANTS AGENCY TO TAKE PRIORITY.Y

5. FOR WELLINGTON: MILFORD UNDERSTANDS HIS STAY WELLINGTON SHORT AND WILLING DEVOTE EVENING TO STATION.Y

6. FOR TOKYO: TOKYO IS RESTSTOP AND MILFORD EXPECTS NO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUC I BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR BITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058086

OUTGOII , MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3		3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF:
INFO: FILE

788139

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES
DISSEM BY:
#

CONTACT.Y

7. REQUEST ACTION ADDEES COORDINATE STATION PLANS WITH EMBASSY SCHEDULING FOR GROUP TO GIVE MILFORD OPPORTUNITY MEET SENIOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IF CONFLICT CAN BE AVOIDED. MILFORD HAS STRESSED, HOWEVER, AGENCY BUSINESS HAS PRIORITY. HQS HAS PROVIDED MILFORD NAMES COS'S IN JAKARTA, CANBERRA, AND WELLINGTON. REQUEST STATIONS CONTACT MILFORD AS SOON AFTER ARRIVAL AS POSSIBLE SO MILFORD CAN PLAN NON-AGENCY PART OF SCHEDULE. SUGGEST STATION OFFICER ASSIST MRS. MILFORD SINCE SHE MAY NOT WISH TO TAG ALONG WITH LARGER GROUP WITHOUT HER HUSBAND. E2 IMPDET.H

*GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.
**CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REVISED SCHEDULE.

DEP. DIR/DDS&T - C. DUCKETT (DRAFT)
OLC - R. CHIN (DRAFT)

DATE: 3 JANUARY 76
ORIG: R. CHIN
UNIT: OLC
EXT: 9010

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058088

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER SOP 112 TOTAL COPIES 10-2 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/EA3

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR DCI/REVIEW STAFF, DDO, CS/RF SA/DDO, O/OLC

T 572990 EIA882 PAGE 01 IN 782959

TOR:020840Z JAN 76 JKRT 35549

SECRET 020756Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE JAKARTA 35549 (SHIMA ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 787555

B. DIRECTOR 785722

1. CHARGE MIKE RIVES HAS BEEN ADVISED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST FOR STATION BRIEFING PER REF A. WILL ARRANGE BRIEFING AFTER CONGRESSMAN'S ARRIVAL.

2. ON 2 JANUARY HAFAWN/1 TELEPHONED STATION TO SAY THAT CABLE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY BAKIN FROM HACLAUSE/1. WE PROPOSED MEETINGS WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT AND CALL ON PRESIDENT SUHARTO. HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT GENERAL MURDANI BRIEF THE GROUP ON GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION. BAKIN HAS SENT CABLE TO MURDANI TO RETURN TO JAKARTA EARLY NEXT WEEK TO PARTICIPATE IN BRIEFINGS. BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR STAFF MEMBERS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD AT BAKIN HQS ON 7 JANUARY. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS BRIEFING. STATION ARRANGED BAKIN BRIEFINGS BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHARGE,

E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MBO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 312338Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 787555

CONF: C/EA3 INFO: FILE DCI (REVIEW STAFF) CS/AF DDO SA/DDO DDO/DO D/OLC

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SP
0 IP FILES # 112
DISSEM BY:

TO: PRIORITY JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y

REF: DIRECTOR 785722 |*| Y

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REVISED SCHEDULE:Y

ETD JAKARTA	1200	8 JAN	FOR BALI Y
ETD BALI	0800	9 JAN	FOR CANBERRA Y
ETA CANBERRA	1740	9 JAN	Y
ETA WELLINGTON	1515	14 JAN	Y
ETD WELLINGTON	1000	15 JAN	FOR MT. COOK Y
ETD MT. COOK	1400	15 JAN	FOR CHRIST CHURCH Y
ETA CHRIST CHURCH	1500	15 JAN	Y
ETD CHRIST CHURCH	~~21~~09 30	~~15~~16 JAN	FOR HAWAII Y

NOTE: THIS SEPARATE TRIP TO THAT OF SNODGRASS, PRESTON, CARY MENTIONED DIRECTOR 778574.Y

2. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAD PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED MEETING WITH COS, JAKARTA 10 JANUARY, COS, CANBERRA 13 JANUARY AND WITH COS, WELLINGTON, 15 JANUARY. REVISED SCHEDULE WILL ALTER HIS DESIRES THIS CASE. MEETING WITH HIM ON 3 JANUARY AND WILL FORWARD NEW

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 056913

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DATE-TIME GROUP
CITE
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

DIRECTOR

CONF:
INFO: FILE

787555

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

SCHEDULE FOR MEETINGS WITH COS' AT THAT TIME.Y

3. FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS CEA AND OLC (MR. ROBERT CHIN) BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD 19 DECEMBER 1975:Y

A. NINETEEN DECEMBER MEETING LAID ON IN ORDER THAT REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD COULD BE GIVEN A BRIEFING IN OVERVIEW TERMS ON WHAT THE CIA STATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND INDONESIA WERE DOING IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS.Y

B. AUSTRALIA: THERE WAS CIA PRESENCE IN CANBERRA, MELBOURNE AND SYDNEY. THIS REPRESENTATION CONSISTED OF ABOUT SIX OFFICERS CHARGED WITH BASIC MISSION OF PURSUING SOVIET, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN TARGETS AVAILABLE IN AUSTRALIA. IT WAS STRESSED THAT THESE DENIED AREA TARGETS WERE PURSUED BOTH UNILATERALLY AND IN JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE AUSTRALIAN LIAISON SERVICE. THERE WERE 53 SOVIETS IN AUSTRALIA, 66 CHINESE, 8 HUNGARIANS, 22 CZECHS, 3 BULGARIANS, 59 YUGOSLAVS, 9 RUMANIANS AND 17 NORTH KOREAN STUDENTS. IT WAS STRESSED THROUGHOUT BRIEFING THAT PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN BOTH UNILATERAL AND JOINT OPERATIONS WAS THE RECRUITMENT OF SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DATE-TIME GROUP
CITE DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF:
INFO: FILE

787555

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #
DISSEM BY:

EUROPEAN TARGETS AS IN-PLACE AGENTS WHO WOULD WORK FOR US NOT ONLY IN AUSTRALIA BUT UPON THEIR RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. ALSO STRESSED CIA'S INTEREST IN OBTAINING NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE FROM RECRUITED PENETRATIONS OF THE SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN AUSTRALIA. HE WAS INFORMED OF OUR DESIRE TO RUN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR ARRANGE THE DEFECTION OF KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES. OUR INTEREST IN BUILDING UP PERSONNEL INDICES ON THOSE INDIVIDUALS FROM TARGET COUNTRIES WHO WERE IN AUSTRALIA BUT WHO WERE NOT RECRUITABLE IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT ALSO WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS UNDERSCORED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO NOT RECRUITABLE TODAY MIGHT BE RECRUITABLE IN FUTURE IF WE CAN LEARN TO UNDERSTAND WHAT MOTIVATES THE TARGET AND WHAT MAKES THEM TICK AS HUMAN BEINGS. THE BRIEFING OF REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD ON AUSTRALIA ALSO TOUCHED LIGHTLY ON THE BROAD ASPECTS OF CIA'S LIAISON WITH ASIO, ASIS AND JIO.Y

C. NEW ZEALAND: HE WAS ADVISED THAT CIA HAD THREE PEOPLE IN WELLINGTON WHO WERE FOCUSED ON RUNNING JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE NEW ZEALAND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AGAINST THE SOVIET, PRC

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 058917

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DOI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DATE-TIME GROUP
CITE
DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
787555

CONF:
INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #
DISSEM BY:

AND EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN NEW ZEALAND. HE WAS GIVEN RUNDOWN ON NUMBERS OF SOVIETS, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN WHO WERE CURRENTLY IN NEW ZEALAND. THE SCOPE OF OUR OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS WAS ALSO DISCUSSED IN TERMS SIMILAR TO WHAT WAS OUTLINED IN PARA 3B ON AUSTRALIA.Y

D. INDONESIA: CIA MAINTAINED A PRESENCE IN JAKARTA, MEDAN AND SURABAYA. CIA HAD APPROXIMATELY 28 PEOPLE IN INDONESIA. THESE FIGURES WERE COMPARED AGAINST THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE IN INDONESIA. A DISCUSSION OF THE PRC TARGET AS SEEN FROM PERSPECTIVE OF INDONESIA FOCUSED ON LEGAL TRAVEL OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINA AS WELL AS SCREENING OF INTERCEPTED MAIL FROM CHINA TO INDONESIA. THERE WAS ALSO BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NORTH KOREAN AND VIETNAMESE TARGETS IN INDONESIA. THE BRIEFING ALSO FOCUSED ON INDONESIA AS AN INTELLIGENCE TARGET IN TERMS OF HOST COUNTRY ACTIVITIES, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS TRAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF INDONESIA. A BRIEF COMMENT WAS ALSO MADE ON TOPIC OF CIA LIAISON WITH BAKIN, THE INDONESIAN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE TOTALITY OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 053773

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DATE-TIME GROUP
CITE DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

787555

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

STATION'S EFFORTS IN INDONESIA WAS DESCRIBED IN BROAD MANAGEMENT TERMS AND SOME EXAMPLES WERE CITED OF TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM CIA ACTIVITIES IN INDONESIA. CEA ALSO FOCUSED BRIEFLY ON OUR ABILITY TO USE AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO PURSUE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN INDONESIA.Y

E. COMMENT: REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD TOOK NOTE OF ABOVE BRIEFINGS, ASKED LIMITED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THE TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS PRODUCED BY THE VARIOUS STATIONS AND INDICATED THAT BRIEFINGS HAD COVERED ALL OF THE ISSUES THAT HE HAD WANTED TO DISCUSS.Y

F. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD EXPRESSED GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ASKED THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN AUSTRALIA, HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH MEMBERS OF AUSTRALIAN LIAISON SERVICES. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD MADE POINT THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL TO HIM IN CONTEXT OF HIS PIKE COMMITTEE DUTIES BECAUSE HE COULD THEN COMMENT ON LIAISON SERVICES' REACTIONS TO CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES INTO CIA. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD WAS ADVISED THAT ATTEMPTS WOULD BE MADE TO ARRANGE MEETINGS,

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058913

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — DATE-TIME GROUP — CITE: DIRECTOR — MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

792555

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

PARTICULARLY IN AUSTRALIA, WITH ONE OR TWO SENIOR LIAISON PERSONALITIES.Y

4. REGARDING REFERENCE PARA THREE F, SINCE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SPECIFICALLY WISHES DEAL WITH LIAISON SERVICES ATTITUDES IN HIS MINORITY REPORT, HAVE NO OBJECTION GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF OUR DEALINGS WITH LIAISON SERVICES. STATIONS CAN ALSO ARRANGE MEETING WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS ON DISCREET BASIS IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REQUESTS. E2, IMPDET.H

* GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.

DATE: 31 DEC 75
ORIG: B.HOUSTON
UNIT: DCEA
EXT: 9373

OLC RChin
DDS&T
SA/DDO
EA/PMI

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: -58913

OUTGOING MESSAGE

10- G

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

~~WALKER~~

Travel

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 242143Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 785722

CONF: C/EA 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/LF, DDO, SA/DDO, DDO/PO, D/OLC

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SOP
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 29
1'2

TO: PRIORITY CANBERRA, JAKARTA, WELLINGTON. Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REFS: A. CANBERRA 20866 |IN 774560*| (RELAYING JAKARTA, WELLINGTON)

B. DIRECTOR 784159 |**| (RELAYING JAKARTA, WELLINGTON) Y

LARGE NUMBER
1. ~~THIRTEEN~~ MEMBERS OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, ACCOMPANIED BY WIVES, WILL BE MAKING TRIP TO JAKARTA, CANBERRA, SYDNEY, AND WELLINGTON. GROUP WILL USE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AIRCRAFT. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRIP. THEREFORE, NO NEED FOR STATION TO MAKE HOTEL OR RELATED TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS. TWO REPRESENTATIVES, PRICE AND

the only
WILSON, ARE MEMBERS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE who ~~NONE~~
ARE GOING AT THIS TIME. NONE FRANK SLATINSHEK
OF ABOVE HAVE ASKED TO MEET WITH STATIONS. ~~IF LATER REQUESTED~~
Chief counsel of committee fully cleared AND travelling
~~BY HEADQUARTERS TO MEET WITH GROUP CONTACT CAN BE MADE THROUGH~~
with group AND expect he may contact you if
~~COMMITTEE STAFF ASSISTANT SLATINSHEK WHO TRAVELLING WITH GROUP. Y~~
INTEREST DEVELOPS.

2. HOWEVER, CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (DEMOCRAT, TEXAS) WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE (HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE) WILL ACCOMPANY THIS GROUP AND DOES DESIRE BRIEFINGS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WIFE WILL TRAVEL WITH HIM. CONGRESSMAN

DATE: 24 DEC 75
ORIG: B.J.HOUSTON
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058913

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
0MF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE DIRECTOR 785722

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY:
PER
#

MILFORD'S INTEREST AS STATED BY HIM WILL BE IN SEEING HOW THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS WORKS FROM THE GROUND UP. HE WANTS TO ACQUIRE BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ON THIS PROCESS SO THAT WHEN THE FINAL COMMITTEE REPORT IS MADE HE CAN USE HIS INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT IT IS A BALANCED ONE. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES NOT LIKE FORMAL BRIEFINGS AND DOES NOT WANT CHARTS.Y

3. SINCE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IS VERY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW THE AGENCY FUNCTIONS, IT IS LIKELY THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL FOCUS ON THIS ASPECT OF STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT.

A. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES: STATIONS PROBABLY CAN DEAL WITH THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS FROM THE GROUND UP BY BRIEFING HIM ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES FUNCTIONS. STATION CAN OUTLINE OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., HOW STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HEADQUARTERS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVES IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058913

13-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	OCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
ONF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3		

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY:

PER

#

CONF: INFO: FILE

785722

DOWN TO AG'S OF SPECIFIC INTEREST. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING OF FAN'S, ETC.Y

B. AGENT ACQUISITION: STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ARE CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS.Y

C. AGENT AUTHENTICATION: DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHENTICATED ~~AUTHORIZED~~ ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC.Y

EJ

D. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. [redacted]

5.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058913

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 4 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
785722

CONF:

INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: #

FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: SHOULD MAKE POINT THAT COLLECTION ON INTERNAL TARGET IS BY PRODUCT ACQUIRED THROUGH ELICITATION FROM LIAISON, FOREIGNERS AND AMERICANS. (FYI: OBJECTIVE K HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM CANBERRA OD AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED IN THIS BRIEFING.) THRUST OF PROGRAM IS RECRUITMENT OF SOVS AND CHINESE, USING LIAISON AS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOQ	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	X5

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR   DATE-TIME GROUP   CITE   MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

DIRECTOR

785722

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO   PER
0 IP FILES   #

EXTENSION OF CIA, FOR COLLECTION OF INFO ON PRC AND USSR. POINT OUT DO NOT RECRUIT AUSTRALIANS OR NEW ZEALANDERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF GOVTS CONCERNED.Y

E. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM: STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRQ PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEED BACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON.Y

F. CASE HISTORY: IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES OR LIAISON SERVICES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR STATIONS.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058913

13-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	OCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	X6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DATE-TIME GROUP
CITE DIRECTOR 785722
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF:
INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #
DISSEM BY:

4. WHERE APPLICABLE (SUCH AS JAKARTA) BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH STATION COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCIDS FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS.Y

5. FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: IT PROBABLY WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WITH ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. HE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN STATION'S ESTIMATE OF HOW NEW GOVERNMENTS WILL CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICIES, VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES.Y

6. FOR JAKARTA: IN ADDITION TO STABILITY OF SUHARTO REGIME THE CONGRESSMAN MIGHT APPRECIATE A REVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE TIMOR SITUATION AND HOW THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE STABILITY OF THE REGION.Y

7. THIS VISIT IS SEPARATE FROM TRIP OF PRESTON, SNODGRASS, CALLOWAY AND CARY DISCUSSED IN DIRECTOR 778574.Y

8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.Y

9. SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS TO CANBERRA ON SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF VISIT. [redacted] [redacted] ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS: Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058913

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRQ	OCI
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

PAGE OF PAGES X7

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE DIRECTOR 785722

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

JAKARTA 6 JAN, ETD 9 JAN Y

CANBERRA 9 JAN , ETD 11 JAN Y

SYDNEY 11 JAN, ETD 14 JAN Y

WELLINGTON 14 JAN, ETD 16 JAN E2, IMPDET.H

* INQUIRY CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION.

** HQS CONTACT WITH D. MILFORD ON TRIP TO AUSTRALIA.

DDS&T/OEL

OLC

SA/DDO

[redacted]

EA/PMI

DATE: 24 DEC 75
ORIG: B.J.HOUSTON
UNIT: ACEA
EXT: 9373

David H. Blee

DAVID BLEE, A/DDO
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Houston

BILL J. HOUSTON, ACEA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058913

13-00000

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 48 PER CSRF #112 TOTAL COPIES 10 - 6 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF PRECEDENC

ACTION UNIT C/EA 3

ACTION #

INFO: ~~RF~~ FILE VR DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF, DDO, ~~SA~~/DDO, D/OLC,

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 494891 EIA755 PAGE 01 IN 754484

TOR:280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948

S E C R E T 280348Z NOV 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25948

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: SEOUL 25761 (736898)

file in Congressmans travel folder

1. FOLLOWING LETTER WAS PREPARED BY GENERAL RICHARD G. STILWELL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, AND FORWARDED TO DOD CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON FOR REVIEW AND PASSAGE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. THE LETTER WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST TO BOTH GENERAL STILWELL AND LT. GENERAL JAMES HOLLINGSWORTH, COMMANDER, I CORPS, CAMP RED CLOUD, FOR LETTERS SIMILAR TO HIS REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR SNEIDER. GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH PREPARED A LETTER WHICH WAS REWORKED INTO THE FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH WAS SENT BY GENERAL STILWELL AS REFLECTING BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND HIS OWN VIEWS. THE LETTER WAS FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON AS AN SSO BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE AND HAS SINCE BEEN CLEARED BY DOD FOR RELEASE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER WAS GIVEN TO COS BY GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH.

2. QUOTE " DEAR MR. MILFORD:

S E C R E T

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO

RF. FILE VR.

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 494891 EIA755 PAGE 02 IN 754484

TOR:280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948

GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED AT THE INTEREST YOU SHOWED IN THE PROBLEMS WE FACE HERE IN KOREA. I AM ONLY SORRY THAT OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US TO EXPLORE THE CHALLENGES WE FACE HERE AND OUR CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH THEM IN GREATER DETAIL. THIS LETTER INCORPORATES BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND MY VIEWS.

AS FIELD COMMANDERS, WE ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE AREA OF INTELLIGENCE - AND FOR GOOD REASONS. A COMMANDER HAS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN PROTECTING HIS COMMAND AND ASSURING THAT, SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR, HIS COMBAT RECOURSES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER POSSIBLE.

ORGANIZATIONALLY, THE US INTELLIGENCE SETUP IN KOREA IS VIABLE. THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, I.E., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA), AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) WORK EFFECTIVELY IN CONCERT WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND THOSE COLLECTION ELEMENTS WHICH ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED AND EFFICIENT FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE. WE HAVE BEEN MOST IMPRESSED WITH THE DEDICATION AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THOSE NATIONAL AGENCIES; AND WE HAVE EQUALLY HIGH RESPECT FOR OUR

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 494891 EIA755 PAGE 03 IN 754484

TOR:280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948

OWN PEOPLE. THIS TEAM IS RESPONSIVE AND GIVES US A GREAT DEAL OF QUALITY INTELLIGENCE.

LIKE ALL COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE PRIMARY NEED IS FOR RELIABLE WARNING INTELLIGENCE. BECAUSE OF OUR PROXIMITY TO THE ENEMY'S AIRFIELDS, AND THE FACT THAT MANY OF OUR TROOPS LIVE WITHIN THE RANGE FANS OF HIS EMPLACED WEAPONS SYSTEMS, WE MUST CONSTANTLY BE ALERT FOR THOSE ANOMALIES IN HIS BEHAVIOR WHICH WOULD TIP US OFF TO IMPENDING ATTACK. UNFORTUNATELY, BECAUSE OF HIS READINESS AND THE FORWARD DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES, INCLUDING FORWARD POSITIONING OF SUPPLIES, WE DO NOT HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE THAT WE WILL HAVE MUCH WARNING. WHILE WE MIGHT HAVE DAYS OR WEEKS, IT IS MORE PROBABLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE ONLY HOURS. TO PARTIALLY OFFSET THIS, US AND ROK FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERT, PREPARED TO QUICKLY ENGAGE THE FORCES OF THE NORTH SHOULD THEY INITIATE AN ATTACK. CONCURRENTLY, WE AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ARE SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR SYSTEMS AND METHODOLOGIES TO INCREASE OUR ASSURANCE OF TIMELY WARNING.

NATIONALLY MANAGED COLLECTION PROGRAMS GIVE US INVALUABLE INTELLIGENCE ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE POTENTIAL ENEMY. YET WE

SECRET

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR.	1		4
			2		5
ACTION #			3		6

T 494891 EIA755 PAGE 04 IN 754484

TOR:280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948

STILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN OUR HOLDINGS ON THE ACTUAL LOCATIONS AND IDENTITIES OF HIS UNITS, HIS COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE AND HIS WAR PLANS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE THE EXCELLENT TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN PHOTOGRAPHY AND ELECTRONIC
ENCE SU
INTELLIGFMZ CUUPPLY A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES, WE ARE STILL LACKING INTELLIGENCE ON HIS INTENTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT HE IS THINKING AND PLANNING WOULD COME LARGELY FROM HUMAN SOURCES, AND GIVEN THE CLOSED NATURE OF HIS SOCIETY AND HIS STRICT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COLLECT THIS KIND OF INFORMATION.

THE PREPONDERANCE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR HUMAN SOURCE CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE FALL WITHIN THE PROPER PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND THAT AGENCY IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A NEED FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED, LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ON STRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THIS NATURE IS THE TUNNEL NETWORK THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN DETECTED CONSTRUCTING UNDER THE DMZ. THIS IS A LABOR INTENSIVE EFFORT, AND EXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINE TECHNIQUES WOULD BE A MEANS OF

FORM 2020b
7-71 MFD. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY ________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE . VR .

ACTION #

T 494891 EIA755 PAGE 05 IN 754484

TOR:280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948

DISCOVERING THE TUNNELS BEFORE THEY ARE USED AGAINST US.

IN THE AREA OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE REQUESTED A HIGH ALTITUDE PLATFORM TO BE OPERATED OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN LAND MASS TO GIVE US A DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE LOOK INTO THE ENEMY'S ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. THE REQUESTED SYSTEM INCLUDES A DOWN LINK CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD GIVE US A NEAR REAL TIME READ OUT OF DATA COLLECTED. OUR PROPOSAL HAS RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM DIA AND NSA. WE ALSO HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN INSURING THAT WE WILL HAVE DOWN LINK ACCESS TO NATIONALLY MANAGED OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY SYSTEMS, WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL.

WE ARE AWARE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN FIELDING MODERN COLLECTION SYSTEMS AND THE UPGRADING OF CURRENT ONES, NONETHELESS, GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN OUR MISSION AND OUR PROXIMITY TO POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT, WE MUST HAVE THE BEST INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR TRIP TO KOREA GAVE YOU A FEEL FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY THAT WE LIVE WITH HERE, AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE CONGRESS WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AND HELP TO INSURE THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT NEEDED TO DO THE JOB TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.

S E C R E T

13-00000

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______	TOTAL COPIES	RUN BY	REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______	SECRET		
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED	BY	AT	Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6
ACTION #			

T 494891 EIA755 PAGE 06-06 IN 754484

TOR:280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948

SINCERELY YOURS, "UNQUOTE

E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 49 PER SoP 112 TOTAL COPIES 11-1 RUN BY R

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

cEA 3

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CSRF, DDO, SA/DDO, D/OLC

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 448045 EIA080 PAGE 01-01 IN 736898

TOR:100349Z NOV 75 SEOU 25761

S E C R E T 100322Z NOV 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25761

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: SEOUL 25730 (IN 732789)

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATE 264382 (ROGER CHANNEL) 10 NOVEMBER 1975: QUOTE SUBJECT: LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. REF: SEOUL 8531.* 1. LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO MILFORD AS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSED PARA 5 REFTER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE, OWING TO SENSITIVITY OF REFERENCE TO "CLANDESTINE OPERATION" IN LETTER LIKELY TO BECOME PART OF PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTE.

file under Travelling Senators & Congressmen

SA/DDO

10 NOV 75 13 48

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC.

SECRET

13-00000

FORM 3020D
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4A PER 58112 TOTAL COPIES 13-2 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT CIA 3 ACTION #	INFO	RF. FILE. VR. DCI, D/DCI, DCI (REVIEW STAFF) DDO, CSRF, SA/DDO, D/OLC	1 2 3	4 5 6

T 424247 EIA337 PAGE 01 IN 728294

TOR:310345Z OCT 75 SEOU 25687

Senate congressional travel file

S E C R E T 310314Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25687

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: SEOUL 25649 (724591) *

31 OCT 75 08 39

1. REGRET DELAY IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. DCOS BROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSED HIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NEDZI (SEOUL 25657).

2. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE DEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. * R SPROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION WITH COS EMPHASIZING THE AEZFCY COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES.

3. COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN TO READ A STERILIZED COPY OF SEOUL 25388 LESS THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT AROUND THIS TYPE *AGE OR WE 41 I-83 94 23 78B REVIEW

SECRET

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 424247 EIA337 PAGE 02-02 IN 728294

TOR:310345Z OCT 75 SEOU 25687

STUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE. THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HIS DESIRE TO NOW FOLLOW UP HIS KOREA INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AND SOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HE REINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH GENERAL WALTERS. COMMENDED MR. SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS ON THIS AREA.

4. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL. HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE.

E2, IMPDET.

CS COMMENT:*COS forwards a resume of points covered during more than six hours of off the record discussions with Congressman Dale Milford (D-Texas) on 25 October 1975.

* Borus SVC'D

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER SOP 112 TOTAL COPIES 12-21 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/EA 3

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF,~~ FILE . VR . DCI/Review Staff, DCI D/DCI, DDO, D/OLC, CSRF, SA/DDO

T 414520 EIA827 PAGE 01 IN 724591

TOR:280440Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

S E C R E T 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 1 OF 4 Sec 1-4 of 4

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: A. SEOUL 25646 (723138)

B. DIRECTOR 759641

FOLLOWING IS A RESUME OF POINTS COVERED DURING MORE THAN SIX HOURS OF OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSIONS WITH CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (D-TEXAS) ON 25 OCTOBER 1975. BECAUSE OF FEVER COS HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL AND DISCUSSIONS WERE THEREFORE HELD AT THE HOSPITAL SITTING ROOM.

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY REITERATING CONCERNS SURFACED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON. IN ADDITION TO HIS REFERENT A ASSESSMENT, HE STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE COMMITTEE REPORT WILL STATE THAT:

A. DUPLICATION OF INTEL MISSIONS RESULTED IN MULTICHANNEL FORWARDING OF INFORMATION.

B. BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTED IN DELAYS

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

IN FORWARDING OF INTELLIGENCE.

C. NEW LEGISLATION AND NEW PERMANENT, PREFERABLE JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ARE REQUIRED.

2. THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT THE COMMITTEE INQUIRIES ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND IN HIS OPINION THERE IS NO PRETENSE OF OBJECTIVITY. TIME FACTORS DID NOT PERMIT HIM OR OTHER MEMBERS TO PERSONALLY OR SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED SO THAT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, MOST MEMBERS WERE "PRISONERS OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF". HE HAS NOT BEEN HAPPY WITH THIS SITUATION AND HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THAT EACH COMMITTEE MEMBER BE PERMITTED TO PERSONALLY SELECT ONE STAFF MEMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE. HE HAD LINED UP A TOTAL OF SIX MEMBERS TO BACK THIS APPROACH. WHEN THE CHAIRMAN AGREED TO LET HIM SELECT ONE STAFF MEMBER IF HE IN TURN WOULD DROP HIS SPONSORSHIP OF THIS PROPOSAL. HE AGREED, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD AS YET BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AN APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE. HE DISMISSED THE CURRENT COMMITTEE STAFF AS STARRY-EYED LIBERALS OUT TO MAKE A NAME FOR THEMSELVES. HE IS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______PER	TOTAL COPIES	RUN BY	REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED	
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	SECRET		STAFF	
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED	BY AT Z			
ACTION UNIT	INFO RF. FILE VR.		1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 414520 EIA827 PAGE 03 IN 724591

TOR:280440Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

ACTIVELY SEEKING A CANDIDATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AS HIS STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE COMMITTEE, BUT DID NOT APPEAR SANGUINE THAT HE WOULD COME UP WITH THE RIGHT MAN.

3. COS NOTED THAT DIRECTOR COLBY WOULD BE THOROUGHLY DELIGHTED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SINCE HE WAS NOW OBLIGED TO REPORT TO SIX SEPARATE COMMITTEES. COS EVIDENCED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT A JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC IN THE SHORT TERM BUT BELIEVED THAT A JOINT COMMITTEE WILL EVENTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED. HE SAID THAT RIGHT NOW THE AGENCY IS ESSENTIALLY IN AN UNDERDOG POSITION AND IS GOOD COPY. HOWEVER, OVER THE LONGER TERM, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP SCORES NO POINTS WITH THE FOLKS BACK IN HOMETOWN USA SO THAT IN TIME CONGRESSMEN WILL NAMEUVER TO AVOID THE ASSIGNMENT.

4. THE REAL PROBLEM AS HE SEES IT IS TO FORM A COMMITTEE THAT WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF THE HOUSE AND HAVE PROCEDURES THAT WOULD PERMIT EFFECTIVE

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE . VR .

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION #

T 414520 EIA827 PAGE 04 IN 724591

TOR:280440Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

OVERSIGHT FUNCTION TO BE EXERCISED AND IN A SECURE MANNER. THE CONGRESSMAN IS PUSHING A PROPOSAL THAT THE HOUSE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP BE COMPOSED OF ONE MEMBER NOMINATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE, ONE FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ONE APPOINTED BY THE SPEAKER, WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE COMMITTEE TO BE NOMINATED BY THE SPEAKER WITH CONCURRENCE BY THE HOUSE MEMBERS.

5. THE PRESENT HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) IS TO BE PHASED OUT AS OF 31 JANUARY. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS OF TWO MINDS AS TO WETHER THE COMMITTEE'S LIFE SHOULD BE EXTENDED. IF TERMINATED ON SCHEDULE, THE SPOTLIGHT WOULD FADE AWAY BUT THE RESULT WOULD BE VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "BAD" LEGISLATION. IF CONTINUED, THE POLITICALLY INSPIRED MANIPULATION OF THE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SENSATIONAL HEADLINES. HE SAID THAT HE FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW WHICH WAS WORSE.

6. THE CONGRESSMAN'S STATED INTENT, WHICH HE SHARES WITH CONGRESSMAN DAVID C. TREEN IS TO FILE

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER
TOTAL COPIES
RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE VR,

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 414520 EIA827 PAGE 05 IN 724591

TOR:280440Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

A DISSENTING MINORITY REPORT FOCUSING IN A POSITIVE MANNER ON THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION RATHER THAN THE HISTORICAL ISSUES THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS FOCUSED IN A NON-OBJECTIVE MANNER, HOWEVER, SINCE DECEMBER IS FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES NOT A WORKING MONTH, THIS GIVES HIM ONLY THIRTY DAYS TO PUT TOGETHER A REPORT. SINCE HE IS A MEMBER OF THREE HOUSE COMMITTEES AND CHAIRMAN OF ONE SUB-COMMITTEE WITH NOT EVEN ONE STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE SELECT COMMITTEE HE IS FINDING IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT. HE TURNED ASIDE THE SUGGESTION THAT FAVORABLE WITNESSES BE CALLED AS IMPRACTICAL. HE SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IF HE ASKED GENERAL WALTERS OR PRESTIGIOUS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONALITIES WITH INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUNDS TO APPEAR, THEY WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MAKE AN OBJECTIVE AND BALANCED PRESENTATION, THE COMMITTEE'S LINE OF QUESTIONING WOULD BE CONFINED TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE "DEAD CATS" OF TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS AGO. HE ALSO FORESAW NO POSSIBILITY OF MODIFYING THE MAJORITY VIEWS OR THE MAJORITY REPORT, HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT SAM ADAMS'

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 414520 EIA827 PAGE 06-06 IN 724591

TOR:280440Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

ALLEGATIONS ARE BEING ACCEPTED AS FACT WITHOUT REBUTTAL PERMITTED. HE WAS PUSHING FOR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALL INDIVIDUALS CITED BY ADAMS BUT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE COULD OBTAIN COMMITTEE AGREEMENT. IF NOT, HE INTENDED TO EMPHASIZE THIS POINT IN THE PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.

7. THE CONGRESSMAN IS TENTATIVELY CONSIDERING A MINORITY REPORT THE THRUST OF WHICH WOULD BE THAT HE

SECRET

13-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER__________ TOTAL COPIES __________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED __________ BY __________ AT __________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 414531   EIA838   PAGE 7 ~~0~~1   IN 72459~~4~~ 1

TOR:280502Z OCT 75   SEOU 25649

S E C R E T 280300Z UCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 2 OF 4

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

HAD TAKEN A CURRENT LOOK AT THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN A CRITICAL AREA (KOREA) AND FOUND IT ALIVE AND WELL, AND HAD FOLLOWED THE INTEL FLOW THROUGH THE CYCLE "ALL THE WAY TO THE FORTY COMMITTEE". HE STATED THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS SOME "VEHICLE" TO TIE THIS ALL TOGETHER FOR PURPOSES OF HIS REPORT. COS NOTED THAT USIB IN WASHINGTON HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A COMPREHENSIVE ALBEIT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE KOREAN TARGET IN A EFFORT TO IDENTIFY ANY PROBLEM AREAS AND TO TAKE PROPER REMEDIAL ACTIONS. COS NOTED THAT HAVING ONLY RECENTLY ARRIVED HERE HE HAD OF COURSE UNDERTAKEN A THOROUGH IN-COUNTRY REVIEW IN ORDER TO ASSURE HIMSELF OF THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS. THE CONGRESSMAN SEIZED ON THESE REVIEWS AS THE POSSIBLE BASIS OF HIS REPORT, HOWEVER, HE WANTED TO DEAL

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

8 1

T 414531 EIA838 PAGE ~~02~~ IN 724594

TOR:280502Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

WITH "UNCLASSIFIED ASPECTS" OF THE REVIEW. (HOW ONE RECONCILES THIS CANNOT BE SUGGESTED FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, IT MERELY EMPHASIZES THE LACK OF FOCUS AND THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT HIS INABILITY TO FIND A "HANDLE".)

8. THE CONGRESSMAN COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'S HANDS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM, THE HSC RULES STATE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL MUST NOT BE RELEASED BUT THESE RESTRICTIONS DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE HOUSE REGULATIONS ON THIS POINT AND WOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED IF CHALLENGED. HOWEVER, SINCE THE HARRINGTON EPISODE HE DOUBTED THAT THE HSC'S SPECIAL RULE WOULD BE CHALLGNGED (ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT HOUSE RULES ANY MEMBER CAN ASK FOR A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF ANY CLOSED COMMITTEE HEARING AND USE IT ALMOST WITH IMPUNITY).

9. COS WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF REFERENT B GUIDANCE IF WE SENSED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN WOULD BE RECPTIVE TO THIS LINE OF PRESENTATION. GIVEN THE UNORTHODOX MANNER IN WHICH THIS HAD

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY_________PER_______ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE . VR .	1	4	
			2	5	
ACTION #			3	6	

T 414531 EIA838 PAGE ~~03~~ 9 IN 724594

TOR:280502Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

DEVELOPED, AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS BELIEVED BEST TO GIVE THE CONGRESSMAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHART THE COURSE. IN SO DOING IT BECAME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT HIS INTEREST LAY IN THE AGENCY'S ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW COORDINATION AND CONTROL WAS EXERCISED IN THE FIELD. COS EXPLAINED THE CHIEF OF STATION'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY IN THE COORDINATION OF CLANDESTINE COLLECTION PORGRAMS. IN DISCUSSING COORDINATION OF MILITARY COLLECTION AGENCIES COS IN DUE COURSE SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY REPRESENTATIONS MIGHT PROFITABLY BE INVITED TO JOIN IN THE DISCUSSION. TELEPHONE CALLS BROUGHT THE 8TH ARMY J-2, CAPTAIN ALBERT M. HUNT, THE DEPUTY J-2 COLONEL ARTHUR W. LONG AND THE SENIOR NSA REPRESENTATIVE MR. DELMAR C. LANG INTO THE DISCUSSION. THE COMMAND AND COORDINATION CHANNELS WERE OUTLINED, AND THE STATION'S ROLE WAS ENDORSED BY THE MILITARY REPS TO ALMOST AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE. COS EXPLAINED THE DCID'S, AND IN THIS INSTANCE DCID 5/1, EXPLAINED HOW THE FIELD CLEARANCE,

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE . VR .

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION #

T 414531 EIA838 PAGE ~~04~~ 10 IN 72459~~4~~ 1

TOR:280502Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

REGISTRATION, APPROVAL AND IF NECESSARY, RECLAIMOR PROCESS WORKS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN OBTAIN COPIES OF THE DCID'S UPON HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON. NOT SURPRISING, THE CONGRESSMAN HAD NEVER HEARD OF THE DCID'S, HE NOTED THE SUGGESTION AND WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY FOLLOW UP UPON HIS RETURN.

10. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE WAS A DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND INTENTLY QUESTIONED THE MULTICHANNEL NATURE OF REPORTING WHEN ONLY ONE DICISION COULD BE TAKEN. COL. LONG, THE DEPUTY J-2, WAS PARTICULARLY ELOQUENT IN DEFENSE OF MULTIPLE REPORTING CHANNELS, POINTING OUT THE SPEED AND ASSURANCE OF COVERAGE WHEN SUCH WERE EMPLOYED. HE ADDED THAT PLACING A UNIFYING LAYER OF BUREAUCRACY ON TOP WOULD TEND: TO DELAY THE MORE RAPID TRANSMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE; TO STIFLE DISSENTING VIEWS; AND TO CREATE A MONSTROUS SIZED SUPER-AGENCY WHICH MIGHT PROVE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO CONTROL AND REVIEW. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS PARTICULARLY

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY_________PER_______ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED_________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 414531 EIA838 PAGE ~~05~~ 11 IN 724594

TOR:280502Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

STRUCK WITH THIS LATER POINT WHICH HE CONSIDERED A PARTICULARLY PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR MULTICHANNEL REPORTING. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE PERSUASIVE ON HIS "WILD-EYED" LIBERAL PEERS.

11. COS REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER SYSTEM AS A DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND DEVELOPED BY THE DCI TO FURTHER REFINE THE COMMUNITY EVALUATION SYSTEM AS WELL AS TO ENSURE EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AND UNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE NIO FOR NORTH ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, MRS. EVELYN COLBERT, IS A SENIOR CAREER STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICER, WHILE COL. LONG'S PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN AS THE DEPUTY NIO FOR LATIN AMERICA. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE SYSTEM PERMITS THE DCI TO ESTABLISH AN ORDER OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND TO EXAMINE THE PRODUCT OF AN ENTIRE MISSION, AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, OR A SERVICE COMPONENT TO SEE HOW WELL IT IS ADDRESSING THE KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS. THE EVALUATIONS OF THE NIO SYSTEM REPRESENTS

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

1		4
2		5
3		6

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE . VR .

ACTION #

T 414531 EIA838 PAGE 12 ~~06-06~~ IN 72459~~4~~6

TOR:280502Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

A MAJOR ADDITIONAL STEP IN MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY. COS ALSO NOTED THAT PERHAPS AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT STEP TAKEN BY THE DCI IN EFFECTING COMMUNITY CONTROL WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-AGENCY RESOURCES ALLOCATION COMMITTEE (IRAC) WHICH PERMITS THE DCI TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BUDGETS OF THE RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUICK TO PERCEIVE THE USEFULNESS OF IRAC.

12. COS REVIEWED THE AGENCY SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND THE FIELD INTEL PROCESS IN SOME DETAIL NOTING THE AUTOMATIC SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE TO CUSTOMERS IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS THE FIELD. LOCAL COORDINATION WAS EXPLAINED AND THE ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY OF STATION'S REPORTING WAS STRESSED. COS STATED THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF A SINGLE INCIDENT DURING HIS CAREER IN WHICH AN AMBASSADOR OR GENERAL OR ANY OFFICER HAD PREVENTED THE DISSEMINATION OF A SINGLE REPORT FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER REASONS. LOCALLY, COS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	1		4	
			2		5	
ACTION #			3		6	

T 414508 EIA815 PAGE ~~01~~ 13 IN 724~~581~~ 591

TOR:280423Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

SECRET 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 3 OF 4

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

NOTED THAT WE DO NOT PRECLUDE REQUESTING THE AMBASSADOR'S OR THE CINCUNC'S OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIST OPINION OR COMMENTS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THE SUBJECT MATTER IS OF A NATURE THAT THEIR COMMENTS WOULD PLACE THE INFORMATION IN CONTEXT AND THEREBY MATERIALLY ADD TO THE VALUE OF THE REPORT. IT WAS NOTED THAT SUCH COMMENTS ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH IN THE REPORT AND SUCH REVIEW IS NOT PERMITTED TO DELAY ITS TIMELY DISSEMINATION, E.G., THE OFFICE OF THE CINCUNC IS PERMITTED 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO COMMENT ON CERTAIN MILITARY REPORTS IF THE SUBJECT MATTER IS OF A MILITARY NATURE AND THE TIMELINESS OF THE INFORMATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY A 24-HOUR DELAY. COS EMPHASIZED THAT NO ONE REPEAT NO ONE IN THE FIELD CAN PRECLUDE A CHIEF OF STATION FROM EXERCISING HIS RESPONSIBILITY AND PREROGATIVE TO DISSEMINATE SUCH

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	STAFF	
ACTION #			1	4
			2	5
			3	6

T 414508 EIA815 PAGE ~~02~~ 14 IN 7245~~81~~ 9

TOR:280423Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

INTELLIGENCE AS HE, IN HIS CONSIDERED JUDGMENT, CONSIDERS WORTHY OF DISSEMINATION INTO THE NATIONAL LEVEL SYSTEM.

13. THE COS'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR COORDINATION OF MILITARY CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS WERE ALSO REVIEWED IN DETAIL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEPUTY J-2. COLONEL LONG, WHILE DEFENDING THE SERVICES SEPARATE NEED FOR A COLLECTION CAPABILITY, STRONGLY ENDORSED THE NEED FOR THE COORDINATION PROCESS UNDER DCID 5/1.

14. THE CONGRESSMAN NOTED THAT ONE PROBLEM THAT HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION AND WHICH HAD SURFACED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS THAT FOUR DIFFERENT INTEL ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN USING THE SAME SOURCE IN VIETNAM. COS NOTED THAT IF TRUE THE INCIDENT WAS THE EXCEPTION NOT THE RULE AND EXPLAINED THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTER AGENCY SOURCE REGISTRY AND HOW IT SERVES THE NEEDS OF THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY. THE PROBLEM OF FABRICATION WAS DISCUSSED AND THE COMMUNITY'S USE OF BURN NOTICES

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER

TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 414508 EIA815 PAGE ~~03~~ 15 IN 7245~~81~~ 91

TOR:280423Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

TO IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE SUCH PEOPLE WAS EXPLAINED.

15. ALTHOUGH COS HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, SUSLAK DELMAR LANG BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN ON THE STATUS OF COMINT COVERAGE OF THE NORTH KOREAN TARGET. HE ALSO STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED U-2R DEPLOYMENT, PROPOSED MARKHAM AND SWAMP COVERAGE AND ADDING A DF CAPABILITY TO THE AUTOMATED VHF/HF ADVENTURER COLLECTION SITES. LANG ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING OF DSA, THE KOREAN COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION. THE CONGRESSMAN AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT HE SAW NO REASON FOR THE SEPARATION OF NSA AND CIA. COS ADDRESSED TO THIS AND THE NSA REPRESENTATIVE LATER STATED HIS VIEWS WHICH WERE GENERALLY IN ACCORD. COS EXPLAINED NSA TASKING RESPONSIBILITY AND FIRST AND THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS NOTING THAT ON THE SURFACE HE COULD NOT PERCEIVE ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF GREATER

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 414508 EIA815 PAGE ~~04~~ 16 IN 7245~~81~~ 91

TOR:280423Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

EFFICIENCY OF COST EFFECTIVENESS BY COMBINING THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS. INDEED THE UNIQUE NATURE OF NSA RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND SOMEWHAT ESOTERIC ARGUED AGAINST FUNCTIONAL MERGER OF THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE RESULTANT SPAN OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL COULD IN FACT RESULT IN A LESS COST EFFECTIVE OPERATION. BOTH COS AND MR. LANG NOTED THAT PRESENT PROCEDURES PRECLUDE UNDESIRED DUPLICATIVE TASKING AND ENSURED MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY EXPLOITATION IRRESPECTIVE OF WHICH AGENCY HAD THE LOCAL COMINT RESPONSIBILITY. MR. LANG COMMENTED THAT HE HAD WORKED CLOSELY WITH CIA IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, AND SAW NEITHER MAJOR PROBLEMS NOR ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD NECESSARILY ACCRUE IF THE AGENCIES WERE COMBINED.

16. DCOS BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON THE EVENING OF 25 OCTOBER ON THE NATURE OF THE CONGRESSMAN'S INTERESTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DAY'S DISCUSSIONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THESE CONCERNS WITH THE CONGRESSMAN ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY. THE AMBASSADOR SAW CONGRESSMAN

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

T 414508 EIA815 PAGE ~~05~~ 17 IN 7245~~81~~ 9

TOR:280423Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

MILFORD THAT NIGHT AT DINNER AND INVITED HIM TO THE RESIDENCE AT 1100 HOURS ON THE 26TH. THE CONGRESSMAN LATER STATED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE QUITE HELPFUL AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREED TO FORWARD A LETTER ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT WHICH WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIS PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.

17. IN A STATION-ARRANGED ONE HOUR MEETING WITH LT. GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH ON 26 OCTOBER IN WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, THE CONGRESSMAN RESTATED THE NATURE OF HIS CONCERNS IN SEEKING POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO A MINORITY REPORT. HE THEN ASKED GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH WHAT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT HE NEEDED AS A FIELD ARMY COMMANDER AND HOW HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE SUPPORT HE WAS CURRENTLY OBTAINING FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. HOLLINGSWORTH RESPONDED WITH A CRUSTY BUT IMPASSIONED LECTURE ON THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO CIA AND NSA. HOLLINGSWORTH TOLD THE CONGRESSMAN THAT HE NEEDED MORE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND HE NEEDED IT IN A TIMELY FASHION, WHICH WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD RECENTLY TOLD SECRETARY

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA[N]
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE[D]

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________ BY________ AT________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE . VR .

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 414508 EIA815 PAGE ~~06-06~~ 18 IN 7245~~81~~ 84

TOR:280423Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

SCHLESINGER WHO HAD POSED THE SAME QUESTION. THE GENERAL STATED THAT HE WANTED MORE NORTH KOREAN TACTICAL, PHOTO, AND EVEN ECONOMIC COVERAGE AND HE DEPENDED ON NSA AND CIA TO GET IT FOR HIM. HE COMPLETELY DISCOUNTED U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS SAYING THE ARMY DID NOT PUT HIGH CALIBER MEN INTO INTELLIGENCE AND DID NOT DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS. HE NOTED THAT HIS SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER HAD JUST BEEN TRANSFERRED TO DIA IN AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT. HE SAID HE WAS A GOOD SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER BUT NO INTEL OFFICER, WHEREAS HIS FORMER G-2 HAD BEEN REASSIGNED TO HONOLULU IN A PERSONNEL SLOT, AND THEN THE ARMY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED COLONEL AS A REPLACEMENT. HE SAID THAT IN CONTRAST CIA AND NSA HAVE CAREER PROFESSIONALS WITH WHOM THE FIELD COMMANDER CAN WORK, AS HE FORMERLY DID IN VIETNAM AND AS HE IS NOW DOING IN KOREA. HOLLINGSWORTH ALSO ADDED KUDOS FOR STATION MILITARY REPORTING, NOTING THAT KOREA IS A MILITARY-ORIENTED SOCIETY

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE . VR .	1	4	
			2	5	
ACTION #			3	6	

T 414512   EIA819   PAGE ~~01~~ 19   IN 7245~~65~~ 9

TOR:280427Z OCT 75   SEOU 25649

SECRET 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 FINAL SECTION OF 4

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

AND THAT HE HAD FOUND OUR MILITARY/POLITICAL REPORTING QUITE HELPFUL. THE GENERAL DECLINED TO BE SPECIFIC AS TO THE NATURE OF ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT HE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY REGARDING ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, BUT HE VOLUNTEERED TO PUT HIS REQUIREMENTS AND COMMENTS IN A LETTER TO THE CONGRESSMAN WHICH HE WOULD FORWARD VIA STATION CHANNELS AND "THEN LET THE PEOPLE BACK HOME WORK OUT THE CLASSIFICATION PROBLEM"; CONGRESSMAN SAID THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL AND WOULD REPRESENT A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO HIS REPORT.

18. IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH DCOS, THE CONGRESSMAN REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DDCI BY NAME IN DRAFTING HIS MINORITY REPORT AS WELL AS IN REVIEWING THE USIB STUDY ON KOREA

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 414512 EIA819 PAGE ~~02~~ 20 IN 7245~~85~~ 91

TOR:280427Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

REQUIREMENTS. HE STATED THAT HE PROPOSED TO BASE HIS REPORT ON THE USIB AND COS REVIEWS OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM AND TO INCLUDE EXTRACTS OF THE LETTERS FROM THE AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH. ALTHOUGH STILL UNCERTAIN AS TO METHODOLOGY, HIS INTENT IS TO DEVELOP A POSITIVE REPORT REFLECTING THE HIGH DEGREE OF LOCAL COOPERATION THAT HE HAS PERSONALLY OBSERVED BUT STRESSED THAT THE REPORT MUST BE UNCLASSIFIED BECAUSE THE REPORT MUST BE DESIGNED FOR PRESENTATION ON THE HOUSE FLOOR. HE BELIEVED THE DDCI WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR ASSISTANCE IN PULLING TOGETHER A REPORT OF THIS NATURE.

19. THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT HE AND REPRESENTATIVE DAVID C. TREEN WERE IN THE VANGUARD ON THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AND THEY HAVE THE SUPPORT OF REPRESENTATIVES MCCLARY AND JOHNSON ON THE COMMITTEE. HE SAID THE BIPARTISAN NATURE OF THIS MINORITY, ALBEIT THREE REPUBLICANS TO ONE DEMOCRAT, WOULD ASSIST ITS ACCEPTANCE. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE MUST NOW MOVE RAPIDLY TO RECRUIT HIS OWN STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE

13-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________

TOTAL COPIES

RUN BY

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1	4
2	5
3	6

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 414512 EIA819 PAGE ~~03-03~~ 21-21 IN 7245~~85~~ 9

TOR:280427Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

COMMITTEE STAFF.

20. ADDITION DISCUSSION IS SCHEDULED WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD FOR 28 OCTOBER. WILL ADVISE.

E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

9-1

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 220018Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 760703

CONF: C/LA3 INFO: FILE DCI (REVIEW STAFF), CS/RF, DDO, DDC/DD, SA/DDO

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES
DISSEM BY: 45
PER SOP
112

TO: PANAMA CITY.Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF: PANAMA CITY 34339 (IN 723135)Y

1. HQS AWARE OF AND HANDLING REF CASE. NO NEED FORWARD WALKER LETTER AND OTHER THAN POUCHING COPIES OF MEMOS, NO FURTHER STATION ACTION NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE IF ANY FURTHER INFO THIS MATTER COMES TO STATION ATTENTION.Y

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET.H

OCT 29 8 57 AM '75

LA COMMENT: REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE ON 1972 CASE OF MAIL INTERCEPTS INADVERTENTLY SENT TO PANAMA.

SA/DDO - NORM SHEPANEK (TELECOORD)

DATE: 28 OCT 75
ORIG: BARBARA GRAHAM:EME
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/PA
EXT: 1805

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAM
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

OUTGOING MESSAGE

9-1

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 242332Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 759842

CONF: C/EA 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF, DDO, DDO/OO, SA/DDO

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 9
PER Sop
112

TO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI, KOBE, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA, SYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN.

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA

REF: DIRECTOR 759843

1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST BEAR THE SENSITIVITY INDICATOR RYBAT AND THE CRYPTONYM [redacted] PLMHCONGA.

2. FOR UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE CASES, CHIEFS OF STATION MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION USE THE DIVISIONS (PLMPTACT) PRIVACY CHANNEL.

3. ALL INFORMATION RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST REPEAT MUST BE SENT TO HQS VIA CABLE REPEAT CABLE. E2, IMPDET.

CEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL (IN DRAFT)
EA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS (TELECOORD)

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG: CEA/ESEC
UNIT: S.M. LABAR
EXT: 1709

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 005088

OUTGOING MESSAGE

91

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 242332Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 759843

CONF: C/EA 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF, DDO, DDO/DO, SA/DDO

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: J
PER SOP
112

TO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI, KOBE, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA, SYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN. Y

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA Y

REF: DIRECTOR 759842 Y

1. IDENTITY IS: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE AGENCY.

2. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.H

CEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL (IN DRAFT)
EA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS (TELECOORD)

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG: CEA/ESEC
UNIT: S.M. LABAR
EXT: 1709

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 005088

OUTGOING MESSAGE

10-4

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	—	4

N

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	241922Z	DIRECTOR	759641

CONF: C/EA 3   INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF, DDO, DDO/DO, SA/DDO, D/OLC

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY: 0
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO   PER SD
0 IP FILES   # 112

IMMEDIATE SEOUL. Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF: A. SEOUL 25645 |IN 722803|

B. SEOUL 25646 |IN 723138| Y

1. IN VIEW OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S INTENTION AS EXPRESSED IN REF A TO SPEND ONE IF NOT SEVERAL DAYS IN DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES, BELIEVE SEOUL STATION SHOULD APPROACH THIS TASK WITH FOLLOWING DATA IN MIND: Y

A. BACKGROUND. HOUSE COMMITTEE IN ITS ENTIRETY IS KEENLY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW CIA FUNCTIONS. IT MOST LIKELY CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WILL BE FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT TO SEOUL. Y 28

B. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE. BELIEVE MUCH OF WHAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD CALLS "START OF THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROCESS IN THE FIELD" CAN BE DEALT WITH IF STATION STARTS ITS BRIEFING WITH PRESENTATION ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS. SUGGEST STATION OUTLINE

DATE: 24 OCT 75
ORIG: TGSHACKLEY:DCM
UNIT: C/EA
EXT: 1428

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION   REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED   E 2 IMPDET
S E C R E T   CL BY: 061991

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR 759641
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES
DISSEM BY: #

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HQS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL, IN KOREAN CONTEXT, TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION DOWN TO AG-4 OR AG-7. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING BY FAN'S, ETC. Y

C. AGENT ACQUISITION. WITH FOCUS OF BRIEFING BEING ON AG-4 OR AG-7, STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ~~IS~~ ARE CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS. Y

D. AGENT AUTHENTICATION. DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHENTICATED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPROD ION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS HIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061991

13-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR 759641
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

E. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. Y

F. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM. STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRQ PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON ~~[illegible]~~ FEED BACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. Y 2P

G. CASE HISTORY. IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW

OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061991

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP:

CITE: DIRECTOR 759641

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: #

PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR SEOUL. Y

2. BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS. ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF BRIEFING CONCENTRATE ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH ROK'S. THIS MIGHT WELL SHOW COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN MEASURING INTEL SUCCESS OR FAILURES. Y

3. HQS HAS HAD LIMITED EXPOSURE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THUS UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON QUESTION POSED IN REF B PARA 2. BASIC GUIDELINE FOR THIS BRIEFING MUST BE FULL CANDOR WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS. Y

4. PLEASE USE ABOVE INDICATORS ON FUTURE TRAFFIC DEALING WITH BRIEFINGS OR TRAVELS OF CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS WHO INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION OF INTEL COMMUNITY. E-2, IMPDET.H

AC/EA/JK
DC/EA
C/EA/COPS
A/DDO
C/REVIEW STAFF
C/OLC

DATE: 24 OCT 75
ORIG: TGSHACKLEY:DCM
UNIT: C/EA
EXT: 1428

DDO
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REPRO[DUC]TION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS [PR]OHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061991

Senator's Travel File

LE SEC DISSEM BY 19 PER SoP TOTAL COPIES 10-2 RUN

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ON UNIT NOTIFIED

ANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

ON UNIT EA3

ION #

INFO RF FILE VR DCI (REVIEW STAFF), CSRF, DDO, SADDO, D/OLC

STAFF PRECEDENCE			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 408492 EIA951 PAGE 01 IN 722803

TOR:240650Z OCT 75 SEOU 25645

SECRET 240620Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25645

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

NIACT DIRECTOR

RYBAT CODEL

REF: A. DIRECTOR 758492

B. DIRECTOR 758427

1. CODEL MURPHY ARRIVED SEOUL EVENING 23 OCTOBER AT ROKG INVITATION. DUE HOSPITALIZATION OF COS, DCOS CONTACTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AND OFFERED SEPARATE BRIEFING IF DESIRED. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION AFTER COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING ON MORNING OF 24 OCTOBER IN WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD REITERATED POINTS COVERED IN REFERENT A MESSAGE AND STATED HE HAD BEEN CHARGED BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO MAKE A DETAILED STUDY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS IN THE FIELD. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BREAK OFF FROM DELEGATION SCHEDULE AS OF 0900 OCTOBER 25 TO COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS. WHILE PARAMETERS OF HIS INTERESTS NOT FULLY COVERED IN INITIAL CONVERSATION, HE ANTICIPATES DEVOTING ONE/F NOT

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 408492 EIA951 PAGE 02-02 IN 722803

TOR:240650Z OCT 75 SEOU 25645

SEVERAL DAYS TO DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES.

2. REP. LUCIEN NEDZI WAS ALSO CONTACTED WITH OFFER OF STATION BRIEFING WHICH WAS RECEIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION. REP. NEDZI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH LATER DURING THEIR FIVE DAY STAY.

3. COS MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER. WHETHER HE IS OR NOT, COS PREPARED TO TALK WITH REP. MILFORD EITHER AT HOSPITAL OR AT RESIDENCE WHERE HE WILL NEED BE CONFINED FOR ONE WEEK RECUPERATION. THIS OFFER BEING CONVEYED TO CONGRESSMAN, AND IF AGREEABLE TO HIM, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR HIM TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH COS.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BY 0800 LOCAL 25 OCTOBER AS REP. MILFORD'S INTERESTS OBVIOUSLY EXTEND TO DETAILED PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEYOND NORMAL SCOPE OF FIELD BRIEFINGS.

E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

9-1

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	NRO	DCI	PAGE	OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 231741Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 758926

CONF: C/NE - 3 INFO: FILE DCI/Review Staff, cs/RF, DDO, DDO/DO, SA/DDO

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 0
PER 50
112

TO: TEHRAN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA.

ADMIN

1. ALL SIGNIFICANT CABLE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA SHOULD CARRY IDEN SLUG.

2. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY ADDRESSEES MAY USE PLARGYLE RATHER THAN IDEN SLUG. IN SUCH INSTANCES, NE DIVISION WILL ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE HQS COMPONENTS ARE APPRISED OF PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THOSE MESSAGES. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG: SAMUEL H. RICKARD
UNIT: NE/COPS
EXT: R-1562

C/NE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NE/COPS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 056382

OUTGOING MESSAGE

9-1

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	231741Z	DIRECTOR	758927

CONF: C/NE-3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF DDO, DDO/DO, SA/DDO

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY 0
PER
112

TO: TEHRAN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA.Y

ADMIN Y.

REF: DIRECTOR 758926

IDEN: PLMHCONGA. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG: SAMUEL H. RICKARD
UNIT: NE/COPS
EXT: R-1562

C/NE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NE/COPS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 056382

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY 10 - 1

ACF	COI	ACP	TOG	TIME	MRO	DDI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 212348Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 758109

CONF: C/EUR 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF, DDO DDO/DO SA/DDO

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: PER Sop # 112

TO: ROME.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

FOR ACOS AND OZGA

1. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE PLANS HOLD HEARINGS ON DESTRY PROJECT 29 OCTOBER. REQUEST MR. OZGA PLAN REVIEW PLDEFINE MATERIAL WITH CHIEF EUROPE ON 27 OCTOBER AND ARRANGE BE HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN AFTERNOON 28 OCTOBER.

2. PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2, IMPDET.

File

DATE: 21 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG: PHILIP F. FENDIG
UNIT: DC/EUR
EXT: 1283

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

SA/DDO (IN DRAFT)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DC/EUR (IN DRAFT)
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

6

SIGNAL CENTER USE

AGE	COI	ACP	JG	TPE	MRO	DCI		PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1		

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	211745Z	DIRECTOR	757742

DISSEM BY: 38

CONF: C/EUR INFO: FILE DCI (REVIEW STAFF), CS/RF, DDO, SA/DDO.

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER DDO
0 IP FILES # MEMO

TO: LONDON, BONN.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR REPORTING ON VISIT MR. DAVID AARON. PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 21 OCTOBER 75
ORIG: PHILIP F. FENDIG
UNIT: DC/EUR
EXT: 1283

Philip F. Fendig
for C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Philip F. Fendig
DC/EUR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012860

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

ROUTING SHEET

TO:

	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIALS
1 DDO				
2 ADDO				
3 C/PLANS				
4 C/OPS				
5 C/SS				
6 C/CCS				
7 C/CI				
8 C/AF				
9 C/DCD				
10 C/DIVD				
11 C/EA				
12 C/EUR				
13 C/FR				
14 C/NE				
15 C/SE				
16 C/LA				
⑰ SA/DDO CT-5				

SUSPENSE DATE 10 NOV 1975

REMARKS:

file

Senator Church?

17 OCT 75 13 49

SIGNATURE SA/ADDO

DATE 17 OCT 1975

FORM 3671 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
4-75 (40)

17 OCT 1975

DD/O 75-5707

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT : The Director's Greeting Card List

1. It is requested that you provide recommendations as to whom the Director should send holiday greetings. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO in Room 7E22 by the close of business 10 November 1975.

2. Your list should be prepared on a very selected basis. You may include the names of chiefs of foreign security and intelligence services and the names of non-intelligence personnel abroad who are of special interest or significance to the Agency mission. In most cases, these names should be those of persons whom the Director has met here or abroad.

3. After the Director has reviewed the lists of recommended names, the greeting cards will be prepared and sent to the appropriate Division or Staff for pouching or mailing.

Peter V. Raudenbush
SA/ADDO

Distribution:
C/AF
C/EA
C/EUR
C/DCD
C/DIVD
C/FR
C/LA/
C/NE
C/SE
C/CCS
C/CI
C/OPS
C/PS
C/SS
SA/DDO
SPG/DDO

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 037796

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

17 OCT 1975

DDO 75-[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT : DDCI's Greeting Card List

Addressees are requested to prepare a Christmas card list for the DDCI. It should include, where security permits, all significant contacts hosted by him at Headquarters or visited in the field. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO by close of business 10 November 1975.

Peter V. Raudenbush

Peter V. Raudenbush
SA/ADDO

Distribution:
C/AF
C/EA
C/EUR
C/DCD
C/DIVD
C/FR
C/LA
C/NE
C/SE
C/CCS
C/CI
C/OPS
C/PS
C/SS
SA/DDO
SPG/DDO

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 037796

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Philip F. Fendig DC/EUR	EXTENSION	NO.
		DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. SA/DDO			✓	FYI
2. Joan				file in "Senatorial trip file in my safe.
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				17 Oct 75
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY PER EUR TOTAL COPIES 6 - 5 RUN BY

ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

DVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

CTION UNIT RF FILE VR OCT 17 DDO M '75

EUR 3

CTION #

INFO

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION COPY

EYES ONLY

T 389706 EIA620 PAGE 01 IN 716119

TOR:161931Z OCT 75 LOND 66194

C/EUR

DC/E/NW

C/E/BC

Add [illegible]

& send copy t SA/DDO.

S E C R E T 161650Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 66194

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLKMBALL

REF A. DIRECTOR 752556

B. DIRECTOR 754586

1. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION AND OUR RELATIONSSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL FIGURES.

2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING, AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING:

A. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. COS REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION I
ISSUING OFFICE

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO: RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 389706 EIA620 PAGE 02 IN 71611

TOR:161931Z OCT 75 LOND 661

IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR. COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK CONSIDERABLY.

B. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINAATED WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH SITUATION.

C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A PROGRAM. COS REPLED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD . COS REPLIED THAT ACTION OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF				
1		4		
2		5		
3		6		

ACTION UNIT

I N F O RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 389706 EIA620 PAGE 03 IN 716119

TOR:1619312 OCT 75 LOND 66194

COLLECTION OPERATION. AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS. COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN THE U.K.

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER______ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY ISSUING OFFICE IS

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR.		
			1	4
ACTION #			2	5
			3	6

T 389706 EIA620 PAGE 04 IN 716119

TOR:161931Z OCT 75 LOND 6619

CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION OF THHE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE US. AARON SAID HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.

B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY EFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH REPRESENTATIVES SERVCING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY. AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS PROBLEM.

C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH

He asked? [illegible]

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE, VR,

ACTION #

T 389706 EIA620 PAGE 05-05 IN 716119

TOR:161931Z OCT 75 LOND 66194

COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.

4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET

UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROUTING SHEET

TO:	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIALS
1 DDO				
2 ADDO				
3 C/PLANS				
4 C/OPS				
5 C/SS				
6 C/CCS				
7 C/CI				
8 C/AF				
9 C/DCD				
10 C/DIVD				
11 C/EA				
12 C/EUR				
13 C/FR				
14 C/NE				
15 C/SE				
16 C/LA				
(17) SA/DDO Mr. Waller GT-5				

SUSPENSE DATE

REMARKS:

17 OCT 75 16 16

File in my Senatorial travel File

SIGNATURE EA/DDO

DATE 17 Oct. 75

FORM 3671 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
4-75

(40)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

ROUTING SHEET

TO:

	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIALS
1 DDO				
2 ADDO				
3 C/PLANS				
4 C/OPS				
5 C/SS				
6 C/CCS				
7 C/CI				
8 C/AF				
9 C/DCD				
10 C/DIVD				
11 C/EA				
12 C/EUR				
13 C/FR				
14 C/NE				
15 C/SE				
16 C/LA				
⑰ SA/DDO Mr. Walker CT-5				

SUSPENSE DATE

REMARKS:

17 OCT 75 16 16

File in my Senator's travel file

SIGNATURE SA/DDO

DATE 17 Oct. 75

FORM 4-75 3671 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(40)

S E C R E T 161726Z OCT 75 STAFF

IN-716059

CITE BONN 43387

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 752556

1. MR. DAVID AARON OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BRIEFED BY STIGGINS, HIBBERT AND DEUTINGER FOR TWO HOURS MORNING 15 OCTOBER. AARON HAD LUNCH WITH HIBBERT AND NEWLY ARRIVED ARMY ATTACHE COLONEL OLIVER RAY. HE MET FOR OVER HOUR WITH AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND AFTERNOON 15 OCTOBER BEFORE DEPARTING FOR LONDON.

2. LARGE PART OF MORNING BRIEFING DEVOTED TO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS IN GERMANY. AARON ASKED FOR DEFINITION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT COS SUPERVISED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT WHICH EXPLAINED TO HIM IN SOME DETAIL. AARON ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT COORDINATION PROCESS AND HOW THIS IMPLEMENTED. HE WANTED KNOW IF THE COORDINATION PROCESS EXTENDED TO A REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS AND OF THE VALUE OF MILITARY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AS REFLECTED IN ITS PRODUCT AND TOLD THAT OUR COORDINATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES GENERALLY CONFINED TO INSURING THAT MILITARY TRADECRAFT MET OUR STANDARDS, AND THAT POLITICAL RISKS ACCEPTABLE. IN PRACTICE, WE DID NOT REVIEW PRODUCTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. WE MENTIONED THAT MILITARY COLLECTION IN RECENT YEARS WAS ON RELATIVELY MODEST SCALE AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FLAPS IN RECENT YEARS.

3. MR. AARON SAID THAT THE SENATORS ON HIS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO FIND THAT MILITARY WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COLLECTION ACTIVITY SINCE THIS NOT COVERED IN ANY LEGISLATION, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY AUTHORIZED IN NONSKIDS. STIGGINS MADE POINT THAT MILITARY IN GERMANY STRUCTURED ALONG COMBAT INTELLIGENCE LINES AND IN EFFECT ENGAGED IN MILITARY COLLECTION OF TACTICAL NATURE AS TRAINING EXERCISE APPROPRIATE TO THEIR POTENTIAL WARTIME MISSION. MR. AARON SEVERAL TIMES SUGGESTED MILITARY OBS AND PERSONNEL COULD BE ASSIGNED TO CIA OPERATIONAL

CONTROL IN FIELD. WE OPINED THIS IS TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTION IN WHICH COORDINATION HAS TRENDED OVER THE YEARS BUT LOCAL COMMANDERS PROBABLY FEEL HIS CONTROL UNDERMINED THEREBY.

4. TURNING TO BKHERALD OPS, MR. AARON SAID HE RECALLED FROM WASHINGTON BRIEFING THAT GERMAN STATION HAD SIZEABLE ALLOTMENT FOR OFFICER ENGAGED IN POLITICAL COVERT ACTION ON REGIONAL BASIS. WE EXPLAINED THAT MONIES IN THIS PROJECT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR SALARY AND EXTENSIVE TRAVEL OF OFFICER (HERZFANZ NOT MENTIONED BY NAME) AND NOT USED FOR AGENT PAYMENT OR OTHER PURPOSES. THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY AARON.

5. HE ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT "FANCY" POLITICAL SOURCES, ALONG LINE THAT THESE COULD PERHAPS BE HANDLED AS NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AND ASKED WHETHER THESE CONTACTS DID NOT REPRESENT HIGH RISK IF EXPOSED. STIGGINS EXPLAIND AT SOME LENGTH THAT THESE SOURCES VERY FEW IN NUMBER, AND WERE PRODUCT OF SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING MANY YEARS' CONTACT WITH SPECIFIC CIA OFFICERS, MAKING POINT THAT AGENTS' CONFIDENCE IN CIA BASED ON MANY YEARS ASSOCIATION. WE ESTIMATED FLAP POTENTIAL SLIGHT THESE LONG-STANDING CONTACTS, WHICH COULD BE EXPLAINED AS OLD FRIENDSHIPS. FOR REASON THAT THEY WERE, IN FACT SUCH, THESE RELATIONSHIPS COULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS. WE MENTIONED THAT SOME OF THE LOWER-LEVEL DEVELOPMENTAL OPERATIONS ACTUALLY REPRESENTED HIGHER RISK AND CITED GENERAL OUTLINE OF "HILTON AFFAIR" (WITHOUT NAMES) AS EXAMPLE HOW DEVELOPMENTAL CASE COULD BE TROUBLESOME. EMPHASIZED THERE HAD BEEN FEW OF THESE OVER YEARS.

6. AARON ASKED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT FEDREP REACTION IN EVENT OUR INCOMPATIBLE SOURCES EXPOSED. WE RESPONDED THAT IN GENERAL GERMANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN EMBARRASSING US AND THAT THIS KEY ELEMENT, PLUS FACTOR THAT WE HANDLED ALL INCOMPATIBLE ACTIVITY VERY CAREFULLY, LED US TO CONCLUSION THAT WE WERE NOT RUNNING RISK MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT BY CONDUCTING LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS. POINTED OUT THAT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE COVERAGE THOSE AREAS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND SOME ECONOMIC FIELDS WHERE GERMANS NOT COMPLETELY CANDID WITH US EMBASSY RE THEIR ACTIVITIES.

7. MR. AARON ASKED ABOUT EXTENT WE KEPT AMBASSADOR INFORMED ON OUR ACTIVITIES IN WEST GERMAN FIELD. WE REPLIED THAT AMBASSADOR SAW VIRTUALLY ALL REPORTING AND THEREFORE KNEW WHERE SOURCES LOCATED BUT THAT AS RULE WE DID NOT CLEAR WITH HIM ON INDIVIDUAL CONTACTS, MAKING REFERENCE TO "SOURCES AND METHODS" PROVISION OF OUR REGULATION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. POINTED OUT THAT EACH CASE TREATED SEPARATELY BUT THAT AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY/CONSULATES HAVE NOT HAD INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTAL CONTACT WITH YOUNGER POLITICAL FIGURES OUTSIDE BONN AREA. ON OTHER HAND HE CLEARLY QUITE CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH RESULT THAT WE GENERALLY ASSUMED HANDS-OFF ATTITUDE ON FONMIN.

8. MR. AARON INQUIRED RE STATION CASE OFFICER STRENGTH AND GIVEN FIGURES CITED IN POSITION REPORT DATED OCTOBER 74 (FORWARDED HQS BY TM DATED 25 SEPT 74.) WE EXPLAINED THAT BREAKDOWN SOMEWHAT ARBITRARY AND SAID THAT FOR NUMBER OFFICERS (THOSE ENGAGED IN LIAISON, SUPPORT, ANALYSIS, FOR INSTANCE) IT NOT ALWAYS EASY TO CATEGORIZE THEIR EFFORTS.

9. HE PROBED IN SOME DETAIL ON OUR NOC STRENGTH AND WE ANSWERED CANDIDLY. MR. AARON SEEMED SURPRISED AT SMALL NUMBERS NOC OFFICERS IN STATION AND SAID HAD HEARD OPINION FROM SOME CIA OFFICERS THAT NOC PREFERABLE TO OFFICIAL COVER. WE SAID FELT THIS DEPENDENT ON LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT HERE IN GERMANY ARMY COVER READILY AVAILABLE, GENERALLY QUITE SATISFACTORY AND COST CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN NOC COVER. AARON ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS RE REASONS WE WOULD PUT OFFICER IN GERMANY UNDER NOC. WE EXPLAINED NOC PRIMARILY USED FOR PERSONNEL WE PLANNED KEEP ASSIGNED GERMANY SEVERAL YEARS AND WHERE NOC PROBABLY MORE SECURE AND FOR INSTANCES WHERE IT PROVIDED BETTER ACCESS. WHEN HE PUSHED FOR FURTHER EXAMPLES WE MENTIONED HAD RECENTLY CONSIDERED PUTTING OFFICER UNDER STUDENT COVER IN HEIDELBERG WHERE OFFICIAL CHINESE STUDENTS SIGNIFICANT TARGET REPRESENTED BUT THAT THIS PLAN DROPPED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS. WE MADE NO MENTION USE JOURNALIST COVER AND DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY COVER FIRMS BY NAME.

10. AARON ASKED STIGGINS WHICH OF WHAT AARONS ENVISAGED AS THREE PRINCIPAL DUTIES TOOK MOST TIME. AARON OUTLINED COS DUTIES AS MANAGEMENT OF STATION, EMBASSY RESPONSIBILITIES AND COORDINATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. STIGGINS SAID MANAGEMENT OF

STATION CLEARLY REQUIRED MOST TIME AND FURTHER THAT WITHIN STATION, THE EFFORT AGAINST THE HARD TARGETS CONSUMED THE MAJOR PART OF HIS TIME AND EFFORT.

11. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH AARON PRIOR TO HIS SESSION WITH HIM. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED S E C R E T

...TION BY OTHER TH
...FFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/EUR6

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR CS/RF, DCI (REVIEW STAFF)
C/[illegible], DDO, OLC, ICS

T 389723 EIA645 PAGE 01 IN 716124

TOR:161937Z OCT 75 BONN 43389

S E C R E T 161856Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE BONN 43389

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF BONN 43387 (IN 716059)

WEN
DHB
Para 5

1. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED COS AFTERNOON 16 OCT ON HIS HOUR AND ONE-HALF SESSION WITH MR. AARON ON 15 OCT. DISCUSSION COVERED THREE MAIN TOPICS: (A) RISKS AND NEED FOR "FANCY POLITICAL SOURCES" IN BONN; (B) COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS; AND (C) DEGREE TO WHICH AMBASSADOR COGNIZANT OF STATION ACTIVITIES.

R 2. ON POINT ~~ON~~ 1. A. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT MOST STATION POLITICAL SOURCES WERE OF LONG-STANDING AND COMMENCED IN THE EARLY POSTWAR/OCCUPATION ERA. THEY WERE BASED ON PERSONAL FRIENDSHIPS AND UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE EARLY POSTWAR YEARS AND WERE IN HIS BELIEF LIKELY TO PROVE IRREPLACEABLE. THAT IS, AMBASSADOR OPINED THAT SIMILAR CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED BY STATION IN TODAY'S POLITICAL CLIMATE AND IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED COVERAGE TO GRADUALLY WITHER AWAY. BECAUSE OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIPS, AMBASSADOR BELIEVED RISK WAS VERY LOW AND STATED THAT

MFG. 2/75

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY _________ PER _________ TOTAL COPIES

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 389723 EIA645 PAGE 02 IN 716124

TOR:161937Z OCT 75 BONN 43389

THE COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THESE SOURCES WAS OF DEFINITE VALUE SINCE THE INFORMATION WAS NOT OBTAINED BY OFFICIAL EMBASSY CONTACTS.

3. REGARDING PARA 1.B., AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED TO AARON THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT STATION WAS NO LONGER INVOLVED IN LARGE-SCALE COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND THAT HE ASSUMED EXPLANATION PER PARA 4 REF WAS IN ACCORD WITH FACTS. COS EMPHATICALLY ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WERE NO COVERT ACTION FUNDING OPERATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY THE STATION, AND THAT WE HAD BEEN MYSTIFIED BY MR. AARON'S REFERENCE TO THE LARGE BUDGET FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES BUT HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT MUST APPLY TO SALARY AND EXPENSES OF HERZFANZ WITH WHICH AARON SEEMED TO AGREE.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFICS OF STATION ACTIVITY, THE AMBASSADOR STATED FIRST THAT HE OF COURSE "HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA" ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF SOME OF OUR SOURCES BUT HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVISED OF THE IDENTITIES OF ANY OF THEM. HE FOUND THE SITUATION ACCEPTABLE HOWEVER, FIRST BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH COS PERSONALLY FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THAT

SECRET

ˌLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR	STAFF		
			1	4	
			2	5	
ACTION #			3	6	

T 389723 EIA645 PAGE 03 IN 716124

TOR:161937Z OCT 75 BONN 43389

COS WOULD ADVISE HIM OF ANYTHING HE OUGHT TO KNOW. LOOKING BACK ON THE RECORD OF THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE CONCLUDES THAT IN FACT THE AMBASSADORS IN BONN HAD BEEN KEPT APPROPRIATELY ADVISED AND THE ABSENCE OF FLAPS WOULD SUBSTANTIATE THE JUDGMENT EXERCISED BY THE RESPECTIVE STATION CHIEFS OVER THE YEARS.

5. MR. AARON DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WITH THE AMBASSADOR THE FEASIBILITY OF CHARGING THE AMBASSADOR WITH GREATER DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF THE CLANDESTINE EFFORT. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT IF IT WERE ASSIGNED TO HIM AS A MISSION HE WOULD MANIFESTLY HAVE TO DISCHARGE IT AND WOULD AS HE SAW IT PROBABLY NEED A STAFF OF AT LEAST TWO COMPETENT OFFICERS TO CARRY OUT THE PRACTICAL STAFF WORK ON HIS BEHALF. MR. AARON THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM ABOUT WHICH THE AMBASSADOR MADE THE PERTINENT OBSERVATION THAT IT WAS A QUESTION FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. IF IT WAS DECIDED TO SUBORDINATE CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD DIRECTLY TO THE AMBASSADOR, THEN APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENT COULD AND WOULD BE MADE. THE AMBASSADOR WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION BY MR. AARON THAT AT LEAST A NUMBER OF THE MEMBERS [illegible] THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ARE

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

RF. FILE. VR.

INFO

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 389723 EIA645 PAGE 04-04 IN 716124

TOR:161937Z OCT 75 BONN 43389

GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE BRITISH SYSTEM AS A MEANS OF INVESTING AMBASSADORS WITH DIRECT AUTHORITY OVER CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

FILE

"EYES ONLY"

365963 EIA898 PAGE 01 IN 715761

TOR:161514Z OCT 75 BONN 43369

S E C R E T 161302Z OCT 75 STAFF

*Recommend dissemination to D/OLC + DCI (Review

CITE BONN 43369

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLKMBALL

1. MR. AARON MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON ~~15 OCTOBER~~. SAID HE WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE OF SENATOR MONSDALE AND WAS HEAD OF SELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORCE. MR. AARON SAID HE FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED.

2. AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS CIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT. HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING DIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS TO FBI WHO WERE "GOING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED." SAID FBI HAD GONE 50 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF WRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION.

3. ALSO OF INTEREST, COLONEL SMITH, DEPUTY TO DCSI USAREUR GENERAL DILLARD, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMY

S E C R E T

BLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

VANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR

TION #

T 388983 EIA898 PAGE 02-02 IN 715761

TOR:161514Z OCT 75 BONN 43369

COMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ON TALKS WITH MR. AARON, LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE OVER POSITIVE COLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE 66TH MIG. MR. AARON MADE SIMILAR COMMENTS TO US, AS WE REPORTING SEPARATELY. E2 IMPDET.

13-00000

PER EUK 3 TOTAL COPIES 6 - 5

SECRET

UNIT NOTIFIED

COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF
1
2
3

ACTION UNIT EUR3
INFO RF FILE VR DDO

EYES ONLY

T 389706 EIA620 PAGE 01 IN 716119

TOR:161931Z OCT 75 LOND 66194

SECRET 161650Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 66194

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLKMBALL

REF A. DIRECTOR 752556

B. DIRECTOR 754586

Copy to W

WEN

1. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION AND OUR RELATIONSSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL FIGURES.

2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING, AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING:

A. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. COS REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY

SECRET

RUN BY

STAFF

1

2

3

INFO

ACTION

IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR. COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK CONSIDERABLY.

B. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINAATED WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH SITUATION.

C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A PROGRAM. COS REPLED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD . COS REPLIED THAT ACTION OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE . VR .	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

COLLECTION OPERATION; AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS. COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN THE U.K.

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND

TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY ISSUING OFFICE

STAFF

BY AT Z

FILE VR

ACTION

1		4
2		5
3		6

T 369706 EIA620 PAGE 04 IN 716119

TOR:161931Z OCT 75 LOND 6619

CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION OF THHE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE US. AARON SAID HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.

B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY EFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH REPRESENTATIVES SERVCING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY. AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS PROBLEM.

C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR

ACTION #

T 389706 EIA620 PAGE 05-05 IN 716119

TOR:161931Z OCT 75 LOND 66194

COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.

4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET

6 Oct 75 1658

Review Staff: 75/3149/a

Date 6 October 1975

Marge: File

TO : CIA Task Force

FROM : The Review Staff, Walter Elder

SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request

RECEIVED: Date 3 October Time 1905

The attached letter requests an orientation briefing for David Aaron who is travelling again, this time to Switzerland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Comments: 1st Meeting - Briefing on 8 Oct 1975 by DC/EUR & Fendig
2nd Briefing - 10 Oct 75 by Fendig

	Action	Info
SC/DCI		X
A/DDA		X
A/DDI		X
✓ A/DDO	[illegible]	
A/DDS&T		X
OGC		X
OLC		X
IG		X
B.Evans		X
SA/DDO	✓	

13-00000

REVIEW STAFF

75-3149

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 5, 1975

Mr. Seymour Bolten
Assistant to the Director
Room 6D0120
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.

Although plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military commanders.. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.

Sincerely,

Bob

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

OCT 3 7 05 PM '75

13-00000

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

REVIEW STAFF
75-3150

October 3, 1975

Mr. William G. Hyland
Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Hyland:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.

Although the plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military commanders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Bolten, CIA

OCT 3 7 05 PH '75

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: John Waller 2B-1415	EXTENSION 9135 ~~9018~~	NO. DATE 26 September 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. ~~Mr. Rogovin~~	10/6		MR	Mitch: Attached is worth reading: A report on a trip of Daniel Aaron and Bill Trueheart (both SSC) to Latin America. Note para 18, BRIL 24723. Thanks! M
2. John Waller				
3. File				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

7 OCT 75 14 50

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

SEC DISSEM BY J PER LA 8 (EJ0) TOTAL COPIES 6-9 RUN BY 24

UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

UNIT LA 3

RF FILE VR DDO

INFO

EYES ONLY

T 333576 EIA022 PAGE 01 IN 695650

TOR:242029Z SEP 75 MONT 21403

S E C R E T 241945Z SEP 75 STAFF

&2

CITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 SECTION 1 OF 2

#1

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

NACT BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT PLVWCADET

1. COS HAD TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH TRUEHART AND AARON LATE MORNING 24 SEPTEMBER. GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT BOTH WERE BUSINESS-LIKE; QUESTIONS WERE INCISIVE AND DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN HOW A STATION FUNCTIONS IN AN EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS THE AMBASSADOR, RATHER THAN HOW MONTEVIDEO STATION IS FUNCTIONING IN URUGUAY. HENCE MANY QUESTIONS WERE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL. MOST IMPORTANT IMPRESSION WAS THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR TRUEHART (WHOM COS HAD MET IN NIGERIA YEARS AGO) FEELS THAT AN AMBASSADOR SHOULD BE FAR MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALL REPEAT ALL STATION OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO JUDGE POSSIBLE "FLAP POTENTIAL".

2. COS DID NOT SHOW OD TO VISITORS SINCE THEY DID NOT ASK TO READ IT BUT INSTEAD READ PORTIONS OF IT TO THEM AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THEM.

3. THEY ASKED INITIALLY WHAT THE AMBASSADORS INJUNCTIONS WERE WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITED OPERATIONS. COS SAID

SECRET

AMBASSADOR DOES NOT WANT COVERT OPERATIONS OF A POLICTICAL NATURE IN URUGUAY WITHOUT HIS PRIOR APPROVAL NOR DOES HE WANT US TO MOUNT "ELECTRONIC" OPERATIONS WITHOUT APPROVAL. COS OPINED THIS LATTER INJUNCTION MEANT UNILATERAL EFFORTS. AARON ASKED IF WE HAD ON-GOING PRESS PLACEMENT MEDIA OPERATIONS. COS SAID WE DID HAVE SOME BUT THESE WERE OF ROUTINE NATURE. AARON PURSUED MATTER. ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WAS FULL Y AWARE OF THIS TO WHICH COS RESPONDED THAT HE PRESUMED SO. COS ADDED HE HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED THIS POINT WITH THE AMBASSADOR SINCE COS ARRIVAL HERE LESS THAN ONE MONTH AGO.

4. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART QUESTIONED AT LENGTH WHAT KIND OF THINGS WE COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND IN WHAT DEPTH PRIOR TO INITIATION OF AN OPERATION. WHAT KIND OF AGENTS WOULD WE IDENTIFY BY NAME TO THE AMBASSADOR? COS SAID HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO REVEAL TO THE AMBASSADOR THE NAME OF ANY SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM THE AMBASSADOR WAS DEALING OFFICIALLY AND INTIMATELY, BUT THIS WOULD IN LARGE PART DEPEND ON THE AMBASSADORS WISHES HIMSELF. WOULD WE INFORM THE POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF OF THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF OUR AGENTS WHOM THE POLITICAL OFFICER WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP?

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES RUN

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION #

T 333576 EIA022 PAGE 03 IN 695650

TOR:242029Z SEP 75 MONT 21403

COS ANSWERED WE WOULD FIRST INSTRUCT THE AGENT HOW TO HANDLE HIS OVERT CONTACT BUT, DEPENDING UPON RELATIONS, MIGHT ALSO DISCUSS THE MATTER FRANKLY WITH POLITICAL OFFICER. WHAT ABOUT DEFENSE ATTACHE? ANSWER: THE SAME.

5. THIS LED TO DISCUSSION OF INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER. HAVING JUST FINISHED WITH DEFENSE ATTACHE, AMBASSADOR TRUEHART SAID DEFATT INDICATED HE HAD MANY SOURCES REGISTERED AND THEREFORE WE WERE PROSCRIBED FROM RECUITING THEM. COS POINTED OUT SOURCE REGISTER IS FOR COVERT AGENTS ONLY AND SINCE DEFATT HERE IS PROCSCRIBED FROM RUNNING COVERT AGENTS, NONE OF HIS SOURCES ARE IN INTER-AGENCY SURCE REGISTER. COS ADDED THAT MANY DEFENSE ATTACHES MISCONSTRUE THEIR REGISTERING OF THEIR AGENTS IN PENTAGON SERIES AS SYNONOMOUS WITH REGISTRATION IN THE INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER.

6. TRUEHART ASKED IF WE EXERTED "REAL CONTROL" OVER DEA'S OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED BY DCID. COS SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY WE EXERTED NO CONTROL OVER DEA NOR ARE WE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO TRY TO DO SO, WE DO COORDINATE CLOSELY, REGISTER THEIR SOURCES, PROVIDE TRACES AND ASSITANCE, ENCOURAGE LIAISON TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THEM, ETC. IN ADDITION, WHEN A DEA OPERATIN IS

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 333576 EIA022 PAGE 04 IN 695650

TOR:242029Z SEP 75 MONT 21403

BEING MOUNTED TO UNDERTAKE A DRUG BUY WE ARE REQUIRED TO KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE CASE IN ADVANCE TO ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR AS TO THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVED, IF THERE ARE ANY.

7. TRUEHART ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT WE WORK WITH LIAISON ON TH E OSOVIET TARGET AND WHETHER WE HAVE TELTAPS. HE WAS ADVISED LIAISON SHARES WITH US THE PRODUCT OF THEIR TELTAPS AND THAT LIAISON IS PREPARED TO MOUNT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH US AGAINST SOVIET TARGET, THAT WE ARE NOW INTENDING TO APPROACH THIS MATTER WITH LIAISON IN A MORE PLANNED WAY. AARON ASKED HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WOULD WE ADVISE AMBASSADOR IN ADVANCE OF MOUNTING JOINT OPERATION WITH LIAISON TO BUG RESIDENCEE OF A SOVIET OFFICIAL, WE SAID PROBALBLY NOT SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO FLAP POTENTIAL, AARON WANTED TO PURSUE THIS BUT STRANGELY ENOUGH TRUEHART AGREED FULLY AND EXPLAINED THAT IF SOME ELEMENT WENT AWRY THE LIAISON SERVICE WOULD BE THERE TO SET IT RIGHT.

8. AARON AND TRUEHART SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ANALYZING OD NON-COMMUNIST WORLD COVERT ACTION OBJECTIVE K-2 INVOLVING AGENTS OF INFLUENCEM, THIS PARAGRAPH WAS READ SEVERAL TIMES TO THEM ON THEIR REQUEXT, THEY WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IN LATIN AMERICA (ANSWER: TWO OR

SECRET

BLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER ________ TOTAL COPIES RU

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

DVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

TION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

TION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 333576 EIA022 PAGE 05 IN 695650

TOR:242029Z SEP 75 MONT 21403

THREE YEARS IN ITS PRESENT FORM THOUGH WE HAVE BEEN DOING THIS KIND OF THING FOR YEARS.) WE STRESSED THAT THIS PARAGRAPH IN TWO PLACES CONTAINED THE PHRASE "SUBJECT TO POLICY APPROVAL" WHICH MEANT THE AMBASSADOR AND WASHINGTON. WHILE THEY UNDERSOTOOD THIS POINT THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WOULD COORDINATE IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR OR THE DEFENSE ATTACHE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF A SENIOR URUGUAYAN GENERAL AS A POSSIBLE AGENT OF INFLUENCE. ANSWER: NO. DO WE HAVE ANY RECRUITED AGENTS OF INFLUENCE IN URUGUAY. ANSWER: NO. ARE WE WORKING ON THIS? ANSWER: YES. THEN AARON ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME WE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY THROUGH COVERT AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY COULD THREATEN PRIORITY U.S. INTERESTS IN URUGUAY. ANSWER: TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIME; WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO RURN TO OTHER AGENTS POSSIBLY INCLUDING LIAISON SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PRIOR TO OUR ACQUISITION OF AGENTS OF INFLUENCE, AARON ASKED WHY THAT PARAGRAPH IN OD SPOKE OF MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN THE STABILITY OF URUGUAY SINCE THERE IS LITTLE U.S. COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN URUGUAY. WE ANSEWEREED THAT URUGUAY IS

MLG. 2/76

BLE SEC DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES RUN

RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

VANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

CTION #

T 333576 EIA022 PAGE 06-[illegible] IN 695650

TOR:242029Z SEP 75 MONT 21403

CLEARLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, VOETES ANTI-COMMUNIST IN INTERNATIONAL FORUM AND IS CONSIDERED A FIRIEND OF THE U.S. AARON ASKED IF SIMILAR PROVISIONS WERE WRITTEN INTO THE OD'S OF OTHER STATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, I.E. TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY. WE SAID WE DID NOT KNOW. CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY, TRUEHART POSED HYPOTHETICAL CASE ABOUT RECRUITMENT FOR FI PURPOSES OF A PRIVATE SECRETARY TO A MINISTER, WOULD WE COORDINATE THIS [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ P BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT ______ INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION # ______

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

50

T 333589 EIA034 PAGE ~~01~~ 07 IN 695658

TOR:242034Z SEP 75 MONT 21403

S E C R E T 241945Z SEPT 75 STAFF

CITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 FINAL SECTION OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

NIACT BUENOS AIRES

RECRUITMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. ANSWER: NO. TRUEHART THEN POSTULATED CASE WHERE RECRUITED SECRETARY CONFESSES TO MINISTER THAT SHE HAD BEEN FURNISHING US WITH COPIES OF THE MINISTERS CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE. WOULD THIS NOT HAVE FLAP POTENTIAL HE ASKED? ANSWER: YES. TRUEHART THEN MUSED THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO KNOW PRIOR TO OUR RECRUITMENT OF THE SECRETARY. HE DID NOT SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT WE ARE THE OPERATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO WOULD JUDGE THE RISK PRIOR TO RECRUITMENT AND WOULD BE MONITORING THE CASE THROUGHOUT. WE PRESUME, THEREFORE, BY EXTRAPOLATION TRUEHART WOULD WANT THE AMBASSADOR TO BE THE SUPER-CASE OFFICER MONITORING ALL OUR OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP POTENTIAL.

9. SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN POWER (ABOUT TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET, HOPE PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER

S E C R E T

IBLE SEC DISSEM BY .... PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUI

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

HSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

CTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR.

CTION #

08

50

T 333589 EIA034 PAGE ~~02~~ IN 695658

TOR:242034Z SEP 75 MONT 21403

OBJECTIVES). HOW IS OVER-ALL BUDGET ARRIVED AT (DIALOGUE WITH HEADQUARTERS, SYSTEM STILL IN FLUX) AND IS BUDGET BOVIDED BY OBJECTIVES (YES) WITH SUBORDINATE LINE ITEMS CALLED WHAT (PROJECT ACTIVITIES). WAS THERE ANY FLEXIBILITY DURING THE COURSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR? ANSWER: SOME WITHIN PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES BUT NOT BETWEEN OBJECTIVES WITHOUT HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL. DO WE HAVE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF BRIEFING REGULAR EMBASSY OFFICERS ON OUR ACTIVITIES SO THEY UNDERSTAND BETTER? ANSWER: NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE. AARON IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BETTER AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.

10. IN DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, WE POINTED OUR MOST OF OUR TARGETS ARE IN BUENOS AIRES. COULD WE RUN AGENTS FROM HERE AGAINST THOSE TARGETS IN ARGENTINA? ANSWER: YES, BUT ONLY IF COORDINATED WITH AND APPROVED BY HQS AND BUENOS AIRES STATION. CONCERNING MANPOWER, WE SAID WE ARE AT PRESENT UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF BOTH TERRORIST AND NARCOTICS TARGET TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEN THE MANPOWER REQUIRED SO THESE EFFORTS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX. WE SAID WE WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT BUENOS AIRES MAY NOT HAVE NARCOTICS IN ITS OD BUT THAT THEY HAVE A VERY FULL PLATE

SECRET

13-00000

BLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

VANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

TION #

9-9

50

T 333589 EIA034 PAGE ~~03-03~~ IN 695658

TOR:242034Z SEP 75 MONT 21403

OF OTHER THINGS TO DO.

11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON NOCS WE ADVISED WE H NONE IN URUGUAY. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 6 PER LA, E.O. TOTAL COPIES 6-11

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED LA E.O. BY C AT 1510 23 2 05 PM '75

STAFF PRECEDENCE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT LA3

INFO RF FILE VR ODD ACTION

ACTION # 1

EYES ONLY

T 329488 EIA040 PAGE 01 IN 694147

TOR:231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

S E C R E T 231409Z SEP 75 STAFF 2

1 - SA/DDO J. WALLER

CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

#2

1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S ACTIVITIES.

2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.

3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS OPERATIONS--E.G. LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES--CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ R Y

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCUIATED IN THE OD. PERIODIC REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISED AGAINST THESE PRIORITIES. A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS (RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O. THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE. HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE. AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES R BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________ BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.

4. THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS (SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN CONTACTING NOCS (NO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER SCRUPULOURS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).

5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A CO/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/OS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL). WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ R BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF LIAISON AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELETAPS, SURVEILLANCE, ETC.--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME. DESPITE HQS BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP. MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR POLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO THAT ACTIVITY. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN POL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FOR SUCH ACTION, THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO

~~PAGE 3 BRASILIA 24723 S E C E~~

UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL AS AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE CHILEAN VARIETY.

6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY

HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL COS SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY, COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE, PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.) (AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND ASKED FOR PARTICULARS.)

7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO STATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ______ BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED _____ BY _____ AT _____ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

T 329488 EIA040 PAGE 06-06 IN 69414 7

TOR:231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJOR ITEMS-SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO SUBMISSION, STATION MADE IT A PRACTIVE TO CHECK INTEL OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN SENSITIVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED. THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN

SECRET

13-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

67

T 329420 EIA971 PAGE 01 IN 694101

TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

S E C R E T 231409Z SEPT 75 STAFF

CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.

8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY).

9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE

SECRET

13-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ R... BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 329420 EIA971 PAGE 02 8 IN 694101 47

TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES.

10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.

11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIQS AND THE CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY. THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN SAY, STATE.

12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)

13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RI

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 329420 EIA971 PAGE ~~03~~ 4 IN 6941~~01~~47

TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT, ETC.

14. AARON EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS, THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST 50PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WORK DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.

15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER

SECRET

13-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ R IY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)

16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH OT THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.

17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, IS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________

TOTAL COPIES ________ R

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 329420 EIA971 PAGE 05-05 IN 694101 47

TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL PRODUCT.

18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

13-00000

WALLER

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER LA 8 EV TOTAL COPIES 9 — RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED C/LA BY 1 AT 1636Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/LA3

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR DCI, D/DCI, DDO CSRF

"EYES ONLY"

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 344592 EIA750 PAGE 01 IN 699594

TOR:291627Z SEP 75 BUEN 34519

S E C R E T 291547Z SEP 75 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 34519

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

REF BUENOS AIRES 34511 (IN 698265)*

1. VISITORS MET WITH AMBASSADOR HILL FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF EVENING 27 SEP AT HIS RESIDENCE AND THEN WENT DIRECTLY TO AIRPORT. AFTER INTRODUCING VISITORS TO AMB, COS WITHDREW AND WAITED IN ANOTHER ROOM. (UPON DEPARTING COS HEARD AMB ASK VISITORS FOR THEIR CREDENTIALS.) AMB LATER TOLD COS HE SUGGESTED TO VISITORS THAT COS BE PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION BUT THEY PREFERRED TO TALK WITH HIM PRIVATELY. COS WAS CALLED IN, HOWEVER, TO PARTICIPATE IN LAST FEW MINUTES OF DISCUSSION. IN COS PRESENCE, MR. AARON ASKED AMB WHETHER ~~HE THOUGH~~ HE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL INFORMATION PRODUCED WITHIN HIS MISSION, TO WHICH AMB REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. AARON THEN ASKED AMB WHETHER HE IN FACT SAW ALL INFO. AMB REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HAD CONFIDENCE IN COS IN THIS REGARD. AARON THEN ASKED COS WHETHER HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SHOW AMB ALL STATION REPORTING. ANSWER: OPERATIONAL REPORTING IDENTIFYING AGENTS OR CLANDESTINE METHODS OF OPERATION COULD NOT BE SHOWN TO AMB WITHOUT

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	1 2 3 4 5 6
ACTION #			

T 344592 EIA750 PAGE 02 IN 699594

TOR:291627Z SEP 75 BUEN 34519

HQS APPROVAL. OTHER INFO COULD BE SHOWN AT DESCRETION OF COS. SUBJ OF ROGERS LETTER RE SHOWING INTEL REPORTS TO AMB PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION WAS THEN RAISED BY AMB. AMB SAID HE TOOK POSITION THIS WAS POLICY MATTER WHICH HAD TO BE SOLVED IN WASHINGTON AND HAD SO INFORMED ROGERS. (COS SAW DRAFT OF LETTER TO ROGERS TO THIS EFFECT.) AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING AMB HANDED COS A NEWS ITEM (HAVANA MERIDIANO 80 IN SPANISH 1-15 JUL 75 PP 5-6, ARTICLE BY CARLOS MARIA GUTIERREZ ENTITLED AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HILL SEEN AS CIA AGENT IN ARGENTINA) AND ASKED THAT ARTICLE BE SHOWN TO VISITORS IN CAR. AMB TRUEHEART READ ARTICLE AND COMMENTED SOMETHING TO EFFECT THAT ARTICLE DID NOT SEEM TO HIM TO BE ANYTHING TO BE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT. MR. AARON DID NOT READ IT. POUCHING COPY. (AMB SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD COS ARTICLE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HIM IN WASHINGTON BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT RYAN.)

2. ON WAY TO AIRPORT AFTER MEETING WITH AMB, TRUEHEART MENTIONED AMB'S REQUEST TO SEE THEIR CREDENTIALS. SINCE THEY HAD NONE, THEY SHOWED THEIR PASSPORTS. (AMB LATER TOLD COS HE HAD ASKED TO SEE CREDENTIALS SINCE HE WANTED TO SEE FOR HIMSELF EXACTLY WHAT THE LIMITS OF THEIR AUTHORITY WERE.) COS INFERRED THAT VISITORS WERE TAKEN ABACK BY AMB'S REQUEST BUT MEETING WITH AMB

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF, FILE, VR	1		4
			2		5
ACTION #			3		6

T 344592 EIA750 PAGE 03 IN 699594

TOR:291627Z SEP 75 BUEN 34519

WAS NONETHELESS HARMONIOUS. (AMB LATER CONFIRMED THIS IMPRESSION.)

3. AMB TELEPHONED COS MORNING 28 SEP AND GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSION WITH VISITORS. FULLER ACCOUNT GIVEN IN HIS OFFICE EARLY MORNING 29 SEP. AMB CHARACTERIZED VISITORS AS INTELLIGENT AND BUSINESSLIKE. AMB HAD IMPRESSION THEY SATISFIED WITH VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES AND WITH COOPERATION THEY RECEIVED FROM EVERYONE. HE SPECULATED THAT THEIR REPORT WOULD BE WRITTEN IN MANNER WHICH SERVES INTERESTS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE. AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS HE SATISFIED WITH BKHER/ALD OPERATION IN ARGENTINA. ONLY AREA WHERE HE HAD A QUARREL WITH BKHER/ALD IS THAT OF COMMUNICATIONS: AMB BELIEVES STATE DEPT SHOULD CONTROL ITS OWN COMMUNICATIONS; HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO BKHER/ALD HAVING ITS OWN COMMO, ALSO. REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF BKHER/ALD ACTIVITY, AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS THAT BECAUSE OF TERRORIST PROBLEM HE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT BKHER/ALD ACTIVITIES IN DETAIL AND TRUSTS COS TO TELL HIM WHATEVER HE NEEDS TO KNOW. VISITORS SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS VIEWPOINT. AMB SAID HE HAD HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONLY ONE STATION CHIEF WHO NOW DECEASED, WIN SCOTT, AND WITH ONE FORMER DIRECTOR, RICHARD HELMS. AMB EXPLAINED THAT BEFORE HE WENT TO SPAIN AS AMB, DIRECTOR HELMS HAD TOLD HIM SIXTY PERCENT OF MADRID STATION'S EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION #

T 344592 EIA750 PAGE 04 IN 699594

TOR:291627Z SEP 75 BUEN 34519

2

CUBANS. ONLY LATER DID AMB FIND OUT BY CHANCE ABOUT SPORLON EFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH AFRICA. AMB SAID MR. HELMS AWARE OF HIS SENTIMENTS AS IS GENERAL WALTERS. EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT BY VISITORS, AMB TOLD COS THAT AMB CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

4. CURIOUSLY, AARON ASKED DCOS' SECRETARY FOR DATE EVENING 26 SEP. ALTHOUGH IT TURNED OUT BE PRIMARILY SOCIAL EVENT AND HE DID NOT ATTEMPT ELICIT INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY, AARON DID MAKE FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST:

(A) HE SAID HE HAD BEGUN TRIP WITH CERTAIN AMOUNT ANTI-BKHERALD BIAS BUT THIS HAD BEEN MUTED SOMEWHAT BY FAVORABLE IMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED OF VARIOUS BKHERALD OFFICERS IN THE FIELD WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN.

(B) HE SAID HE THOUGH BUENOS AIRES' EMBASSY POLITICAL SECTION WAS "JEALOUS" OF BKHERALD.

(C) HE IMPLIED HIS EGO HAD BEEN BRUISED ON TRIP BECAUSE PEOPLE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED AMBASSADOR TRUEHEART, NOT HE, WAS SENIOR OFFICER. HE SAID HE NEXT PLANS TRIPS TO EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE. HEADQUARTERS, THEREFORE, MIGHT WISH ALERT FUTURE STATIONS HE WILL VISIT OF PECKING ORDER.

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF, FILE VR,

ACTION #

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 344592 EIA750 PAGE 05-05 IN 699594

TOR:291627Z SEP 75 BUEN 34519

5. VISITORS DEPARTED BUENOS AIRES 27 SEP AT 2130 HOURS ON SCHEDULE.

6. AMB SAID HE HAD A GOOD TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. RICHARD SAMPSON IN WASHINGTON, MENTIONING ESSENTIALLY SAME POINTS REPORTED DIRECTOR 744995.

7. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

CS Comment: *Aaron and Trueheart's 26 September conversations with COS and DCOS.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY Q PER 8 TOTAL COPIES 6-8 N BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TI
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF PRECEDENC

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED C/LA BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/LA-3

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR

DDO

EYES ONLY

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 337339 EIA706 PAGE 01 IN 697014

TOR:252337Z SEP 75 BUEN 34503

S E C R E T 252234Z SEP 75 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

REF DIRECTOR 745626

1. COS AND DCOS HELD TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR WILLIAM TRUEHEART AND MR. DAVID AARON MORNING 25 SEP AND THEN ATTENDED LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOSEPH MONTLLOR, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAYNE SMITH, AND FBI REP ROBERT SCHERRER ALSO PRESENT. EARLIER IN MORNING TTHE TWO VISITORS MET PRIVATELY WITH CHARGE MONTLLOR AND IN AFTERNOON TRUEHEART TALKED PRIVATELY WITH SMITH. (AARON BECAME ILL AND REMAINED IN HOTEL.) COS AND DCOS ALSO HAD DINNER ALONE WITH VISITORS EVENING 24 SEP.

2. AARON CLEARLY IN CHARGE. (AT LUNCHEON TRUEHEART EXPLAINED THAT AARON IS HEAD OF THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL WORKING GROUP, ONE OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE, AND TRUEHEART IS SERVING AS CONSULTANT.) AARON ASKED MOST OF QUESTIONS. BY NATURE AND TONE OF SOME OF AARON'S QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAD PREFORMED NOTIONS WHICH ANTI-BKHERALD. (E.G., ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROGRAM DISCUSSED BELOW.)

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

1 2 3 4 5 6

ACTION #

T 337339 EIA706 PAGE 02 IN 697014

TOR:252337Z SEP 75 BUEN 34503

3. IN DISCUSSING BKHEARALD APPROACH TO SOVIET TARGET, AARON ASKED IF IT REALLY MADE SENSE TRY RECRUIT SOVIET IN "OUT OF WAY PLACES" WHERE SOVIET, EVEN IF RECRUITED, WOULD NOT LIKELY HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO USG. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR INTERESTS NOT PRIMARILY IN LOCAL SOVIET ACTIVITIES BUT IN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTERS, POINTED OUT ACCESS SOVIETS HAVE TO THIS INFO EVEN WHILE ABROAD, SAID SOME SOVIETS RECRUITED ABROAD SELECTED FOR INTERNAL HANDLING, ALSO POINTED OUT CI VALUE OF CERTAIN TYPES INFO PROVIDED BY RECRUITED RIS OFFICERS. NONE OF THIS SEEMED IMPRESS AARON, WHO CONTINUED QUESTION VALUE OF BKHERALD SOVIET OPS IN MANY (BUT UNDEFINED) AREAS, SAID HE HAD WORKED IN WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE SAW ALL INTEL, FOUND IT HARD JUSTIFY BKHERALD SOVIET PROGRAM INPUT ON BASIS INTEL PRODUCTION. WE ARGUED THIS IS ONE PROGRAM WHERE LARGE AMOUNT CASE OFFICER TIME REQUIRED ON WORLD-WIDE BASIS IN ORDER ACQUIRE THE FEW GOOD SOURCES WHO CAN BE PICKED UP AND WHO ARE PICKED UP. TRUEHEART ASKED FOR EXAMPLES, AND WE REFERRED THEM TO HQS FOR DETAILS. TRUEHEART SAID IT HIS IMPRESSION THAT BKHERALD NOW IN A "SOVIET PHASE", WHEREAS IN EARLIER YEARS IT HAD BEEN IN COVERT ACTION OR OTHER PHASES. WE SAID SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MAJOR TARGET, AND OUR APPROACH TO THEM HAS BEEN REFINED OVER THE YEARS.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES ______ BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	1		4
			2		5
ACTION #			3		6

4. KEEN INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN STATION RELATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR AND DEGREE TO WHICH STATION ALLOWED AMBASSADOR EXERCISE CONTROL OVER, OR AT LEAST HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, ITS OPERATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, DEGREE TO WHICH WE WOULD COORDINATE RECRUITMENT PROPOSAL OF GOVT OFFICIAL PRIOR TO MAKING PITCH. ANSWER: AMB WOULD BE INFORMED IF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY OR HIGH RISK INVOLVED, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE HERE THUS FAR. ASKED WHO DETERMINES IF AMB SHOULD BE INFORMED. ANSWER: COS. ASKED WHETHER AMB HAD PLACED CERTAIN POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS OFF LIMITS. ANSWER: HE HAD NOT. THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF SUCH INJUCTION EXISTED, WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT OR TRY TO CIRCUMVENT IT. ANSWER: WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT. ASKED WHETHER AMB SATISFIED WITH WORK OF STATION AND ITS MISSION. ANSWER: WE BELIEVE SO, BUT DEFER TO AMB (WHO WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES MORNING 26 SEP AND WILL TALK WITH TRUEHEART.)

5. BOTH WANTED KNOW HOW STATIONS'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE WERE GENERATED (I.E., PRIMARILY BY HQS OR THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH AMB AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS). IT CLEAR THAT THRUST OF QUESTION WAS TO DETERMINE DEGREE TO WHICH STATION COOPERATED/COORDINATED WITH AMB AND OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS.

ANSWER: WE RECEIVED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FROM HQS ON CONTINUING BASIS, AND THESE FORM GOOD DEAL BUT NOT ALL OF GUIDANCE WE FOLLOW ON INTERNAL TARGET. WE ASSURED VISITORS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REPORTING FROM OTHER EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR NEEDS. VISITORS PROBED DEEPLY INTO MANNER IN WHICH STATION COORDINATES ITS REPORTING AND FORUMS THROUGH WHICH IT RECEIVES THIS GUIDANCE. WE MENTIONED TWICE WEEKLY POLITICAL MEETING PLUS COUNTRY TEAM MEETING AND FREQUENT INFORMAL CHATS WITH AMB AND OTHER OFFICERS. WE ALSO POINTED TO OUR PROCESS OF SHOWING REPORTS PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION TO POL SECTION AND OTHER INTERESTED COMPONENTS. REGARDING VOLUME OF REPORTS, WE SAID AVERAGE IS OVER 20 PER MONTH. REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF HQS DISSEMINATED REPORTS, WE SAID AMB RECEIVES ALL REPORTS AND, EXCEPT FOR EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEMS (WHICH ARE RARE), OTHER INTERESTED OFFICERS DO ALSO.

6. IN RESPONSE THEIR QUERIES, WE ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCTIVE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL INTEL SERVICE (WHICH NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME) BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. SAID COS AND DCOS ONLY STATION OFFICERS DECLARED TO LIAISON. ASKED WHETHER WE IN TOUCH WITH BRITISH INTEL REP, ANSWER: YES, BUT THIS NOT SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THEY WANTED KNOW HOW WE HAD MET HIM, AND WE SAID RELATION-

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________N BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	1		4
			2		5
ACTION #			3		6

T 337339 EIA706 PAGE 05 IN 697014

TOR:252337Z SEP 75 BUEN 34503

SHIP HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS, AND CONTACT IS PASSED FROM ONE PERSON TO ANOTHER. ASKED WHETHER THERE SDECE REP IN BUENOS AIRES. ANSWER: WE NOT AWARE OF ANY. NO MENTION MADE OF ANY OTHER LIAISON CONTACTS AND SUBJECT OF LOCAL POLICE NOT RAISED.

7. SUBJECT OF NOCS NOT RAISED.

8. ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. ANSWER: NONE OTHER THAN A FEW CONTACTS UNDER AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM. WE STRESSED INFO COLLECTION ROLE OF THESE AGENTS AND CONTINGENCY NATURE OF CONTACT IN COVERT ACTION CONTEST. ASKED WHETHER WE RECRUITING NEW AGENTS. ANSWER: WE CONSTANTLY STRICE TO UPGRADE CALIBER OF OUR REPORTING SOURCES AND THEREFORE ARE RECRUITING NEW ONES AND AT SAME TIME WEEDING OUR LESS PRODUCTIVE ONES. WE EXPLAINED HOW ACCESS OF GIVEN AGENT CAN CHANGE FROM ONE TIME TO ANOTHER DUE TO CHANGES IN POLITICAL SCENE.

9. FEW QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING STATION STAFFING. WE EXPLAINED IN RESPONSE QUESTING WHETHER STAFFING ADEQUATE THAT STATION CUT BY OVER 30 PERCENT OVER LAST 18 MONTHS OR SO, INCLUDING CASE OFFICERS. WE ADMITTED THIS RESULTED IN CUTTING OF SOME LESS IMPORTANT CONTACTS BUT NO LET UP IN EFFORTS AGAINST HARD TARGETS. WE EXPLAINED FUNCTIONS OF EACH CASE OFFICER AND STRESSED TEAM

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED________ BY________ AT________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION #

T 337339 EIA706 PAGE 06-06 IN 697014

TOR:252337Z SEP 75 BUEN 34503

CONCEPT IN WORKING AGAINST HARD TARGETS. OD OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES WERE IDENTIFIED BY OD INSELF NOT PROVIDED.

SECRET

13-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY .... PER .... TOTAL COPIES .... R... BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF FILE VR	STAFF	
			1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

14

T 337290 EIA660 PAGE ~~01~~ 07 IN 6970[illegible]

TOR:252301Z SEP 75 BUEN 34503

S E C R E T 252234Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 FINAL SECTION OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

10. CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SHOWN IN SUBJECT OF TERRORISM. WE DESCRIBED TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS (MONTONEROS AND ERP) AND STRESSED DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THESE GROUPS. AARON SAID THAT CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THE CASE OF SOURCE FROM ANOTHER AREA WHO HAD PROVIDED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA. (AMB AWARE OF COVERAGE BY PJTENNIS-3 FROM TIME OF HIS FIRST VISIT AND HAD MENTIONED IT TO MONTLLOR.) WE EXPLAINED HOW SOURCE SUCH AS THIS CAN ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AT HIGHER LEVEL AND PROVIDE GOOD INFO. WE STRESSED THAT OUR INTEREST WAS IN COLLECTING INFO BEARING ON SECURITY OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. AARON ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD PROVIDE TO LIAISON INFO FROM OUR AGENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CAPTURE TERRORISTS DURING MEETING WITH OUR AGENT. ANSWER: NO, FOR SEVERSL (OBVIOUS) REASONS, WHICH WE SPELLED OUT.

11. EVENING 25 SEP AARON APPEARED TO HAVE RECOVERED FROM ILLNESS, WENT SHOPPING WITH TRUEHEART. BECAUSE BUENOS AIRES STORES WILL BE CLOSED 26 SEPT AND BECAUSE AARON NOT LEAVING

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE . VR .

ACTION #

08-08 14

T 337290 EIA660 PAGE ~~02 02~~ IN 6970[redacted]

TOR:252301Z SEP 75 BUEN 34503

UNTIL NIGHT 26 SEP AND TRUEHEART NIGHT 27 SEP, WE ANTICIPATE WE WILL HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. THESE WILL BE COVERED IN NEXT CABLE.

12. WISH THANK INFO ADDEES FOR THEIR PROMPT AND USEFUL WRAP-UPS.

E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER LA8 (GO) TOTAL COPIES 61/ RUN BY 8

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/LA3

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR DDO

EYES ONLY

T 345167 EIA304 PAGE 01-01 IN 699882

TOR:291957Z SEP 75 BRIL 24777

S E C R E T 291925Z SEPT 75 STAFF

CITE BRASILIA 24777

TO: BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

REF: BUENOS AIRES 34519 (IN 699594)

REF PARA 3 SENTENCE "EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT BY VISITORS, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE." FYI, AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS ON HOME LEAVE AND RICHARD JOHNSON, DCM, WAS CHARGE AT TIME OF AARON'S AND TRUEHEART'S VISIT TO BRASILIA. IN THE SHORT TIME COS HAS BEEN IN BRASILIA, CRIMMINS HAS BEEN MORE THAN COOPERATIVE AND APPEARED TO BE MORE APPRECIATIVE OF BKHERALD'S EFFORTS THAN MOST STATE OFFICERS. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD GET ELABORATION ON HILL'S REMARKS ON LOW KEY BASIS. E2, IMPDET.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 6 PER LA 8E,0, TOTAL COPIES 6-11 RUN BY 2

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED C/LA E.O. BY C AT 1510 Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/LA 3

ACTION # 1

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR 000

EYES ONLY

T 329488 EIA040 PAGE 01 IN 694147

TOR:231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

SECRET 231409Z SEP 75 STAFF 2

CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S ACTIVITIES.

2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.

3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS OPERATIONS--E.G. LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 329488 EIA040 PAGE 02 IN 694147

TOR:231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCUIATED IN THE OD. PERIODIC REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISED AGAINST THESE PRIORITIES. A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS (RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O. THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE. HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE. AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____ PER ____	TOTAL COPIES	RUN BY	REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____	SECRET		STAFF
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED	BY AT Z		
ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	1 4 2 5 3 6
ACTION #			

T 329488 EIA040 PAGE 03 IN 694147

TOR:231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.

4. THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS (SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN CONTACTING NOCS (NO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER SCRUPULOURS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).

5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A CO/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/OS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL). WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 329488 EIA040 PAGE 04 IN 694147

TOR:2315232 SEP 75 BRIL 24723

DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF LIAISON AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELETAPS, SURVEILLANCE, ETC.--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME. DESPITE HQS BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP. MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR POLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO THAT ACTIVITY. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN POL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE F N SUCH ACTION, THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO

~~PAGE 3 BRASILIA 24723 S E C E~~

UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL AS AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE CHILEAN VARIETY.

6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY_________PER

TOTAL COPIES

RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 329488 EIA040 PAGE 05 IN 694147

TOR:231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL COS SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY, COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE, PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.) (AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND ASKED FOR PARTICULARS.)

7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO STATION (YES; ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 329488 EIA040 PAGE 06-06 IN 694147

TOR:231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJOR ITEMS-SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO SUBMISSION. STATION MADE IT A PRACTIVE TO CHECK INTEL OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN SENSITVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED. THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 329420 EIA971 PAGE 01 7 IN 694101 67

TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

SECRET 231409Z SEPT 75 STAFF

CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.

8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY).

9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 329420 EIA971 PAGE 02 8 IN 694101 47

TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES.

10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.

11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIQS AND THE CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY. THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN SAY, STATE.

12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)

13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________PER________ TOTAL COPIES RL BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 329420 EIA971 PAGE 03 IN 694101

TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT, ETC.

14. AARON EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS, THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST 50PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WORK DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.

15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY ________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 329420 EIA971 PAGE 04 IN 694101 47

TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)

16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH OT THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.

17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, IS

S E C R E T

13-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RU Y

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 329420 EIA971 PAGE 05-05 IN 694101 47

TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL PRODUCT.

18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.

--

SECRET

file under SSC travel

SECRET

20 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA Division

SUBJECT : Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing the Intention of SSC Staffers to Visit Latin America

1. Attached is a xerox of a letter from the SSC Staff Director (Review Staff 75-2399) describing travel plans to Latin America on the part of SSC Staffers. This is for your information. You will be alerted when this becomes firm and an itinerary is established.

2. Also attached is an agreed upon memo giving guidelines of such trips. Supplementing this should be a briefing of the travelling of SSC Staffers before they go and a notification of the stations involved as to what the guidelines are.

John H. Waller
SA/DDO

Attachment
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att
2 - SA/DDO

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055636

SECRET

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

1. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions

6/25/75

that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.

HURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
ER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
A.
E, MINN.
LESTON, KY.
AN, N.C.
COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

File

REVIEW STAFF
75-2399

August 12, 1975

Mr. Seymour Bolten
Assistant to the Director
Room 6D0120
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

Done: C/LA + 3 LA officers completed briefing on 17 Sept 1975. MEY

Dear Mr. Bolten:
Seymour

This letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been asked to make next month.

Although plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September. It is proposed that they visit Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and Montevideo. If time permits, they might also visit another consular post in Brazil and/or Buenos Aires.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA relations in the field with Embassy and Station officers. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed.

Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

OUTGOING MESSAGE

15-2

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MHO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	022049Z	DIRECTOR	714410

CONF: EUR 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN DDO DDO/DO OLC ICS PS/PG

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 55
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY LONDON.

REF: STATE 137637, 30 JUNE 1975

DH3

1. SENATOR TOWER, MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA, IS TRAVELING IN EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. STATE HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR TOWER WILL BE IN LONDON 3-7 JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON MINISTER HEALEY ON 4 JULY AND CINCUSNAVEUR ON 7 JULY.

R

2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY IN U.K. IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE BRITISH BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND BRITISH SERVICE CONTACTS.

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IN THE EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDLINES FOR

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAGE 2 OF 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR 71410
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY AND LOCAL MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY, AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 2 JULY 1975
ORIG: GEORGE B. HOLMES
UNIT: EURBC
EXT: 14[illegible]3

George B Holmes
EURBC
RELEASING OFFICER

(TELECOORD)
SA/DDO - WALLER IN SUBSTANCE
OLC - ~~MILLER~~ R. CHIN
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL. BY: 012591

19-2

MHO DEI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	011756Z	DIRECTOR	713701

CONF: EUR 8 INFO: FILE, IP/AN, OLC, C1/OP 2, PS/EG 2, ~~DDO~~, DDO/DO, SA/DDO, ICS, PS/PG

☐ INDEX DISSEM BY: 7

☐ NO INDEX

☐ RETURN TO PER

☐ IP FILES #

TO: IMMEDIATE BONN, MUNICH. Y
NIACT BONN MUNICH

LIAISON Y

DAS -

REF: MUNICH 30382 |IN 621567| Y

1. AS YOU AWARE, IN ADDITION TO BEING A MEMBER OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE {ASC} SENATOR TOWER IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE {SSC} INVESTIGATING CIA. SENATOR TOWER IS TRAVELLING TO EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED HIS DETAILED ITINERARY BUT WILL ADVISE YOU AS APPROPRIATE WHEN WE DO. Y

2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELLING ON ASC BUSINESS SENATOR TOWER MAY WELL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY IN THE FRG. SHOULD HE DO SO, THIS ASPECT OF HIS VISIT SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED, BUT, IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, THE STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL LIAISON EXCHANGE WITH THE BND, OMITTING THE DETAILS INVOLVED WITH OUR INTEL EXCHANGE AND JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. THE STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER TO ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND ITS FRG LIAISON CONTACTS.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

713701

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

THE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST. Y

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IN THE EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY (CONSULATE) AND LOCAL MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 1 JULY 1975 G Peary
ORIG: GALEN PEARY/HP Select Knoche
UNIT: E/G/CIL Review Staff in draft
EXT: 1582 SA/DDO Waller

DC/E
RELEASING OFFICER

LYLE MILLER

C/E/

CLASSIFICATION
SEC

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHE

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/SS/CAG 3D0004	EXTENSION R9125	NO.	
		DATE 28 July 1975	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. John Waller SA/DDO 2B1415	29 JUL 1975			Orig shown to [illegible] for Director
2.				
3. Mr. Seymour Bolten Review Staff 6 D 0120				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

28 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten
Review Staff

VIA: Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to the DDO

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at Right-Wing Governments

1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee.

2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other disclosures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those operations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if absolutely necessary.

3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was provided to you directly by LA Division.

4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055377

5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision of this material to the Select Committee.

Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Group
Services Staff

Attachments, a/s

SECRET
SENSITIVE

28 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten
Review Staff

VIA: Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to the DDO

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at Right-Wing Governments

1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee.

2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other disclosures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those operations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if absolutely necessary.

3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was provided to you directly by LA Division.

4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055377

SECRET
SENSITIVE

5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision of this material to the Select Committee.

/s/ Donald J. Purcell

Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Group
Services Staff

Attachments, a/s

Covert Action Operations Concerning Right-Wing Regimes

CATEGORY I

1. ETHIOPIA: A project for covert support of the Ethiopian labor movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support was to encourage the development of the labor movement as a democratic force and as one of the few mass representative organizations in Ethiopia. The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973. The total approved budget for this project from its inception in CY 1964 to its termination in CY 1973 was $291,006. Covert support to the Ethiopian labor movement was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970, on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972.

2. SOUTH VIETNAM: From 1955 to 1975, a series of projects was begun designed to build up grass social institutions as a means of strengthening the democratic foundations of the country. One of the most long-lasting of these was aimed at supporting the soundly democratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and tenant farmers.

3. GUATEMALA: In 1972-73, the Guatemala City Station with access to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military action against Belize.

4. HAITI: As early as 1963, the Special Group discussed ways and means of influencing the Duvalier dictatorship. In 1967, a modest project was approved for the support of Haitian exile radio broadcasts for the purpose of offsetting "the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to Haiti from Radio Habana."

5. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the successful efforts to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of General Elias Wessin y Wessin and forestall his leadership of a right-wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections.

6. GERMANY: From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo-Nazi political movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement and its European counterparts.

CATEGORY II

1. SOUTH AFRICA: In 1959, after consultation with the Special Group, the DCI approved an overall expenditure of $165,000 to a leading South African political figure designed to encourage the creation of a new political party. This party was established in 1960. The objective was to influence the liberalization of the South African Government by having a legally constituted party in opposition to apartheid. The activity was terminated in 1962.

2. SOUTH AFRICA: A project was initiated in 1962 to encourage the development of a multiracial trade union organization which opposed apartheid. It was funded through a European philanthropic organization. State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total of $311,705 was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968.

3. KOREA: In 1963, the Special Group approved a covert action project designed to encourage "emerging civilian government" vis-a-vis the military leadership following President Rhee's resignation and in anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group of National Assembly members.

4. KOREA: The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed to support a private, rural self-help organization to encourage more participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase their influence on the Government of the Republic of Korea; it involved the creation of agricultural training centers in rural villages, a newsletter and student rural services. It was terminated in 1970 as a project, but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government.

5. ARGENTINA: Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were directed at countering Peron's program to obtain wide support in Latin America for his Movement of Latin American Trade Unionists (ATLAS) which was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in the area. Partially as the result of CIA's efforts, the movement never caught on and it was abandoned with Peron's ouster from power.

6. BRAZIL: From the early 1960's through the ouster of Goulart and the assumption of power by the conservative Brazilian military, to 1972, CIA supported a rural cooperative movement in the impoverished Northeast. This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to the movement first by the Goulart government and then by Brazilian military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972.

7. NICARAGUA: During the period 1962 to 1966, CIA participated in efforts to interdict moves by General Somoza to purchase arms for military actions against his neighbors.

8. SPAIN: In 1963, the Special Group approved a program to train 15-20 Spanish democratic labor leaders a year outside of Spain to build an effective cadre of Spanish labor leadership. In 1966, the Special Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen the Christian Democratic movement in Spain through supportive efforts with youth, political and labor elements.

SECRET

22 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to DDO

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Against Right-Wing Governments

REFERENCE: SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975, Same Subject

We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the following comments on those paragraphs which concern European Division.

13. GERMANY. While this case is somewhat bizarre and does not represent a productive operation, we pose no objection to its being presented to the Senate Select Committee.

14. SPAIN. We have no objection to the presentation of these programs to the Senate Select Committee for review although we share concern expressed by SS/CAG that a leak of this information would be detrimental to the base negotiations.

signed/William W. Wells

William W. Wells
Chief, European Division

DDO/DC/E/NW:MFBuell:tj (22 July 75)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - SS/CAG
1 - C/EUR
1 - DC/E/NW
1 - E/G
1 - E/IB

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 061414

SECRET

25 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services Staff

SUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against Right Wing Regimes

C

1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the three covert action operations in Africa, cited in your memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated 18 July 1975.

2. In the case of Ethiopia, we understand from your discussions with Mr. Clifton Strathern that the labor project has not been eliminated from your list but that the Director will request that discussion of it be limited to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee. The Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing procedural errors in the presentation and review of this project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure to two former assets who have been jailed by the new Ethiopian regime.

3. The Ethiopian labor program was undertaken without 303 Committee knowledge or approval. Subsequently, the project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August 1967 and Mr. Walt Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council, asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before. He was told that for projects costing $20,000 or less, it had been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it before the committee. Mr. Rostow directed that the 303 Committee should examine all political action projects. Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973.

4. In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest in 1974 and continued detention of two Ethiopian labor leaders who are former assets under this project, and accusations in

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904

the Ethiopian press that the trade union organization received support from the U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIA interest in the labor organization potentially dangerous to our former assets. Neither of the former assets was arrested because of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assets nor the labor organization have been accused of CIA involvement. An admission now of CIA support to Ethiopian labor or to the two Ethiopian labor leaders in jail could be a sentence of death for them.

5. In the case of South Africa, CIA support to a leading South African political figure to encourage the creation of a new political party remains a very sensitive matter. The principal agent is still a leading and respected spokesman for the opposition party in South Africa and is a leading member of the South African parliament. Exposure of the operation could lead to his identification which would be extremely damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our government's relations in South Africa. For these reasons, we believe it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this operation to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee only.

6. The European philanthropic organization which was used to fund the development of a multiracial trade union organization in South Africa was the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), located in Germany. The South African labor officials and organizations which received funds from FES were not aware that the actual origin of the funds was the United States Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government or CIA involvement. Aside from exposing a U.S. Government involvement where none is known to have existed, FES was used to support a number of other covert action operations in Africa and elsewhere and exposure of the foundation would have ramifications other than in South Africa. The Director should be briefed on FES and its range of activities on behalf of CIA if he has not already been informed.

Clifton R. Strathern

Clifton R. Strathern
Deputy Chief, Africa Division

Attachments:
As Stated Above

SECRET

21 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to the DDO

SUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against Right Wing Governments

REFERENCE : Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated 18 July 1975
Subject: "Summary of Covert Action Operations Against Right Wing Governments"

1. EA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our concern centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to Reference as "were mounted against" "right wing governments". None of the EA operations -- DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which took place in Korea) and TUMIX (which took place in Vietnam) -- were or should be so described as being mounted against the government then in power. In fact, just the opposite is true. All of these operations, while covert in the sense that the U.S. Government hand was never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing advice and support to "grass root elements" in an attempt to get these elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking participation in the governmental process.

2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the DNSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with opposition elements in South Korea. As noted above, the purpose of this contact was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its effort to establish a two-party system in South Korea. The Agency today

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014848

SECRET

maintains contact with the major opposition leaders in South Korea and this contact is well known to and approved by the U.S. Ambassador in Korea as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Department of State.

3. We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations were to be raised with the Senate Select Committee.

Robert D. Brown, Jr.
Acting Chief, East Asia Division

cc: DC/Operations Staff
C/SS/CAG

July 20.

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distastefull to a host government.

In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 15 PER

TOTAL COPIES

RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/EUR 6

ACTION #

INFO FILE VR C/IP/AN, DDO, D/OLC

ICS, C/OPS, C/PS/EG2, C/PS/PG

CY-SA/DDO

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 126005 EIA165 PAGE 01 IN 620738

TOR:301301Z JUN 75 LOND 628897

S E C R E T 301128Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 628897

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF DIRECTOR 712872

WE N

1. IN MEETING WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION OF BKHERALD BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. AMBASSADOR FOUND SENATOR MONDALE ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPROACH AND FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTY OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1960'S BY STANDARDS OF 1975.

2. AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT HE HAD MADE SOME EFFORT TO CONTACT BRITISH ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT SUCCESS. IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE. IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC, REPORTED THAT BRITISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE TO MEET WITH BRITISH ON 38 JUNE. SINCE SYKES HAD TO BE IN PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND HOOPER HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION #

T 126005 EIA165 PAGE 02-02 IN 620738

TOR:301301Z JUN 75 LOND 628897

TRIP, U.K. EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO INFORM MONDALE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. THIS IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HQS. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ✓ PER

TOTAL COPIES 17 RUN BY

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT C/EUR 6

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR C/IPLAN1, DDO
C/LEGL. D/OLC. D/ICS
d/al/p3.

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 121509 EIA815 PAGE 01 IN 619528

TOR1271651Z JUN 75 BONN 41001

S E C R E T 271217Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE BONN 41001

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

FROM GRAVER

REF DIRECTOR 708791

1. IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER WITH SOME INDICATION OF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS BONN VISIT. IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF BERLIN, I AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE BERLIN AND MUNICH PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN BONN.

2. WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE "SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH THE BND" SINCE, AS HQS AWARE, THE BND IS LOCATED IN MUNICH. WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7 ABOUT 'SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY' WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST RESURGENCE OF LONG-STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT WESTPORT IS A

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 121509 EIA815 PAGE 02-02 IN 619528

TOR:271651Z JUN 75 BONN 41001

PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING AND PROCESSING DEFECTORS. THERE IS NO WESTPORT FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS IN FRANKFURT, AND I PLAN TO BRIEF THE SENATOR ON WESTPORT ACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE BONN PRESENTATION. IF THE SENATOR PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LOCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN ADDITION TO BONN WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF.

3. ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES, REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES, BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD, IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.

4. WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA OF SENATOR AND PARTY BONN AS SOON AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

13-00000

7-71 MFG. 2 75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER TOTAL COPIES 19 - 1 RUN B

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF PRECEDENC

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED 9EUR BY A AT 1145 Z

ACTION UNIT 9EUR6	INFO	RF. FILE VR 9IAAN, DDO, OLC, ICS, 9KIOP3, 9OPS, 9PS/EG2	1 2 3		4 5 6
ACTION #					

T 120565 EIA892 PAGE 01 IN 619109

TOR:271119Z JUN 75 LOND 62823

S E C R E T 271112Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62823

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF A. DIRECTOR 708791

B. STATE 146723 DTD 21 JUNE (NC*

C. STATE 150884 DTD 26 JUNE (NC*

R

1. WE NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP.

2. REFS B & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING ~~[illegible]~~ LONDON 28 JUNE DEPARTING 29TH, TRAVELLING NORWAY THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON VIA LONDON ON 7 JULY. NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY EXCEPT MRS. MONDALE. REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION. DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS LONDON ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND 1 JULY?

3. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMPDET

*NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT

D1+3

OUTGOING MESSAGE 14-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

ROUTING: 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	252225Z	DIRECTOR	711716

CONF: C/EUR6 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, ~~DDO~~, DDO/AO, OLC, C/SS3; C/PS/EG2, C/CI/OP3

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 22
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DHB ✓
JW ~~copy~~ sent

TO: LONDON.

RYBAT

REFS: A. LONDON 62701 (IN 616087)

B. LONDON 62615 (IN 613590)

AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT NOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CODEL. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, WE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED TO LONDON BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEARANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE, BUT KNOW OF NO SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN HIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECT ARISE, WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY. RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING SOURCE NAMES, YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT ACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E2, IMPDET.

DATE: 25 JUNE 1975
ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS
UNIT: C/EUR
EXT: 1012

W. W. Wells

WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

John Waller

JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 1 PER

TOTAL COPIES 17-1 RUN BY 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT C/EUR 6

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR O/IP/AN DDO C/PS/EG-2 D/OLC C/CI/OP-3 4/OPS

T 112809 EIA332 PAGE 01 IN 616087

TOR:241622Z JUN 75 LOND 62701

SECRET 241451Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62701

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

WEN

DHB

JW

REF A, DIRECTOR 708791

B, LONDON 62615 (IN 613590)

1, RE PARA 5 REF A, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC, INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE VIA MURRAY SIMONS, SYKES AND SIR LEONARD HOOPER ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTROL IS EXERCISED OVER BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND HOW BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT WORKS.

2, SYKES MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE AND HOOPER WERE THE ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT SENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH GNGRAPH OR JAGUAR REPS.

3, WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY TO GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF B.

E2 IMPDET

SECRET

Review Staff: 75/1009
24 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk to QJWIN While Traveling in Europe

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator is traveling in Europe.

The agent is QJWIN. He was first approached in 1958 through the head of the Luxembourg intelligence service. At first he was used mainly to spot potential agents in various European countries. Later he became the major asset under ZRRIFLE. In this capacity he made a brief visit to the Congo, but took no actions.

On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others. QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read. So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have not contacted him since.

We have heard that David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill Miller.

It is difficult to imagine how a U.S. senator could talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of the local intelligence service (probably Luxembourg) and of the host government who might wonder about the propriety of investigations being conducted on their territory and involving one of their citizens.

In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest to the Department of State, and the senator might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding.

Walt Elder
Walter Elder

CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET

Talking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His Proposed Contact With QJWYN

1. Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the risk of his exposure to his local government and the press. Because of his former activities and relationships he might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible prosecution for espionage at home from his local government and harassment from the media.

2. Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have further cause to believe that the American intelligence service is incapable of protecting its informants from disclosure. Contacting an agent under the insecure conditions involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship.

3. Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with the CIA.

4. It is possible that the local government involved might lodge a formal protest to the US mission protesting the unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty without requesting formal permission.

6/24/75

Classified by 014359
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

SECRET

Executive Registry
75-6905

Review Staff: 75/868
20 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent of ours while traveling in Europe.

You should know that we have been told that the Senate Select Committee staff has already been in touch with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already advised David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff of a potential problem area in connection with such a proposed meeting. The agent in question is, of course, a subject of interest to the local intelligence service and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence service would agree that a United States senator, especially a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately conduct such investigations within its territory without clearance to do so.

In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest and indeed of concern to the Department of State and the senator might be well advised to consult with them before proceeding.

For your information, the agent referred to is QJWIN and we have not been in touch with him since about 1961.

/s/

Walter Elder

Elder handcarried
orig to DCI.

CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET

SECRET

13-00000

6/25 DDO
ADDO
SA/DDO

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

More facts, per your request, on the QJWIN matter.

Talking points for your use with Sen. Gary Hart are included.

H. Knoche 6-24-75
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47

PROPOSED DOD CHANGES SHOWN HERE, PP 2 and 5, WITHIN THE HEAVY BRACKETS,

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND THEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. Ther mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that

25 June — latest version, incorporating proposed changes by DoD.

could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. [Several foreign governments or entities thereof now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence agreements-exchanges maintain strongly neutral or anti-U.S. foreign policies; continuation of such agreements-exchanges is therefore dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. In many cases termination of such agreements would result in the loss of unique strategic intelligence, and alternate collection methods are either not available or are prohibitively expensive.] To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

Approved

~~HH~~ - Baron

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

[Senate Select Committee principals and staff should understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence installations or foreign intelligence installations supported by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government involved.]

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuiously and will be easily recognized.

FORM [illegible]
7-71 MFG. 2/75

I

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 38 PER ____ TOTAL COPIES 17-2 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ____

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ____ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT c/eur6

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~. FILE VR c/iplan, c/ectops2, c/ops, c/pslea2, OLC, DDO,

T 105747 EIA405 PAGE 01 IN 613590

TOR:201921Z JUN 75 LOND 62615

S E C R E T 201745Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62615

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REF A. DIRECTOR 707518

B. DIRECTOR 708791

1. THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR MONDALE'S PROPOSED VISIT, AND AMBASSADOR AND MINISTER HAVE BOTH BEEN ALERTED.

2. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 6 REF A, COS PLANS TO BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE NATURE OF OUR INTERFACE WITH IT WITH PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE GROUND RULES GOVERNING OUR RELATIONSHIP. COS WILL ALSO COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TO US: A. WHAT CLEARANCES DO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS TWO STAFF ASSISTANTS ~~[illegible]~~ HAVE? B. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE SENATOR BEEN INFORMED ABOUT AGEE CASE, AND IN WHAT DETAIL SHOULD THIS CASE BE COVERED WITH HIM AND HIS TWO ASSISTANCTS? C. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD

13-00000

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 105747 EIA405 PAGE 02-02 IN 613590

TOR:201921Z JUN 75 LOND 62615

SPECIFIC CA PROJECTS BE DESCRIBED. ASSUME THERE IS NOT OBJECTIONS TO POINTING OUT THE DAMAGE DONE BY LEAKAGE IN WASHINGTON TO TOHAWKBIT, AS A WAY OF DRAMATIZING THE NEED FOR SECURITY IN THE COURSE OF THE SENATE INVESTIGATION. D. IF THE STATION IS TO BE RESPONSBIBLE FOR THE SENATOR'S HOTEL AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING SO INFORMED. E2 IMPDET

Clearances
Mondale –
Cannon –
Baker –
SI TKH
Clearances & [illegible] appeal
Atty clearances

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

7-2

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO OCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 181733Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 708791

CONF: C/EUR6 INFO: FILE C/PLAN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/PSLEG2, D/OLC, D/ICS, C/CI/OP3,

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: 2

TO: LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS INFO OSLO, HELSINKI. Y

RYBAT Y

WFN

REF: DIRECTOR 707518 {NOT NEEDED OSLO, HELSINKI} Y

1. {REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES.} Y

2. SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS HE WILL ARRIVE LONDON ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO VIENNA 7 JULY FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN TO PARIS {1 DAY} AND BONN {2 DAYS}. NO DECISION YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED ~~[illegible]~~ (DIRECTLY FROM) VIENNA. Y

3. MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS' PRIORITIES AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN, BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING SPECIFICS. Y

4. MR. AARON STATES THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OUTGOING			
2	5	8
3	6	9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

708790

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

AIRCRAFT.

5. FOR LONDON. MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MURRAY SYMONDS BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT. SENATOR MONDALE HAS ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE (AND PROBABLY MI-6) ON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW THE BRITISH COMMAND AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES RUN WITHIN THE BRITISH SERVICE. WE ARE NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR.

6. FOR BONN. SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH THE [redacted] GERMAN EMBASSY AND THE BND.

7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR. AARON SAID THAT IN VIENNA THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. IN BONN THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS AND MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY. IN PARIS THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM.

8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN INFORMED. E2, IMPDET.

DATE: 17 JUNE 1975
ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS
UNIT: C/EUR
EXT: 1012

E.H. KNOCHE EHKnoche

W. W. Wells

WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE AND PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100
Room 2E-45

SUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed Trip to Europe

1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary, while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:

a. 30 June - 1 July: London

b. Monday, 7 June: Vienna, for one day

c. Paris and Bonn. Although the order has not yet been determined, the Bonn stop would be two days and the Paris stop, one day.

In the period between London and Vienna, the party intends to visit Oslo and Helsinki. The purpose of this part of the trip, however, has nothing to do with the SSC and the party does not want or need Station contact.

2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the party should not get into specific operational cases. They want to discuss "more generic" subjects: operational priorities, relations with the Embassy, problems, scope of liaison, operating conditions, etc. Their basic interests are related to "command and control". It had occurred to Aaron that Vienna would be a good example of a Station which concentrates on "East - West" operations (read third country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations). He recognized London was a liaison station. Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to Cord Meyer.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055636

Paris, he felt, would provide some understanding of "third world" operations. Bonn, he felt, would be a good example of the interrelations of a CIA Station with the Military and the Foreign Service.

3. Mr. Aaron stated that he had already sought out Mr. Simon of the British Embassy, requesting that contacts be arranged in London with the appropriate Foreign Office or Intelligence Offices in order to discuss the British experiences in "command and control". Aaron is also interested in how the British Official Secrets Act works. He had heard that it was proving inadequate. Mr. Aaron stated that Simon had not been enthusiastic about the idea but promised to look into it. Aaron felt that it had been better to work directly with Simon, whom he claimed to know,than to involve the Agency's go-between.

4. Mr. Aaron intended to make a similar approach to the German Embassy.

5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason, we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned that he would want to bring this to the attention of others.

6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was connected with Select Committee investigations.

7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He also suggested that they might get in touch with military intelligence services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference to "Naval Intelligence".

8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still tentative and subject to change.

9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal. Mr. Waller replied negatively.

10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader would be a member of the Senator's party.

Distribution:
1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - Mr. Wells
1 - Miss Page
1 - Mr. Leader

7-71

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER

TOTAL COPIES 18-1 RUN BY

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT 9EUR 6	INFO	~~RF~~ FILE VR 9IPAN, DDO, OLC, ICS, 9CIOPS, 9OPS, 9PSIEG2	1		4	
ACTION #			2		5	
			3		6	

T 092461 EIA462 PAGE 01 IN 608574

TOR:160921Z JUN 75 VIEN 26077

S E C R E T 160853Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 26077

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 707518

D

OMB
JW

1. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STATION'S POSITION WITHIN EMBASSY, PRIMARY TARGETS, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HQS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 8 REF.

2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF AIDE, MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF SAEM NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENNANT COMMANDER.

3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGS	COI	ACP	TOO	TPS	MRO	DCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

81-9

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	141651Z	DIRECTOR	707518

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 38
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

CONF: C/EUR 6 INFO: FILE DCI, D/DCI, DDO, CS/RF, OLC, C/IP/AN, DDO/DO, C/CI/OPS, C/OPS, C/LSN/ID, C/PS/EG2,

TO: PRIORITY LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS.

RYBAT

SUBJECT: THE VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE AT THE END OF THE MONTH.

1. THE SENATORIAL PARTY WISHES TO VISIT CIA FIELD STATIONS TO EXAMINE AGENCY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE FIELD. SENATOR MONDALE WILL WISH TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT HOW STATIONS OPERATE AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATION AND THE EMBASSY. PRESUMABLY THE SENATOR WILL ALSO WISH TO EXAMINE OUR [redacted] COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS.

2. SENATOR MONDALE WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL AIDE, MR. DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. WILLIAM BADER, A SECOND STAFF MEMBER, MAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR.

3. HEADQUARTERS WILL ~~SUGGEST TO~~ REQUEST OF SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE OTHER REASONS THAN THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR HIS TRAVEL IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS. WE DO NOT YET KNOW, HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012866

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPS	MRO	DCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF

DIRECTOR 707518

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

4. YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR OF THE SENATOR'S INTENTIONS TO VISIT HIS MISSION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT. PLEASE ASK THE AMBASSADOR TO RESTRICT HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THIS TRIP TO EITHER CIA CHANNELS OR THE ROGER CHANNEL. LATER RESTRICTIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING, DEPENDING ON HOW SENATOR MONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. Y

5. THE CODEL'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART 30 JUNE VIA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT, ARRIVING LONDON 1 JULY; 2 JULY - VIENNA; 3-4 JULY - BONN; 5-6 JULY - PARIS; 7-8 JULY - LONDON; 9 JULY - RETURN TO THE U.S. Y

6. REQUEST EACH COS ADVISE HEADQUARTERS OF HIS PLANS FOR BRIEFING THE SENATOR. Y

7. FOR BONN. SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER A VISIT TO WESTPORT. Y

8. HEADQUARTERS WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. E2, IMPDET

9. MORE specific guidance on operational discussions to follow.

E.H. KNOCHE EHKnoche

LC

SA/DDO

DATE: 13 JUNE 1975

ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS

UNIT: C/EUR

EXT: 1012

DCI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

William E. Nelson

DDO

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY:

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distastefull to a host government.

In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distastefull to a host government.

In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

6/18/75

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THE INVESTIGATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. Some reason other than SSC business should be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff to help maintain the discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of, or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distastefull to a host government.

In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

SECRET

SECURITY FOR COMMITTEES

11 March 1977

Karen, please make copy for Shep

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James M. Potts
Chief, Africa Division

Mr. Richard S. Sampson
Chief, Europe Division

Mr. Alan D. Wolfe
Chief, Near East Division

Mr. Richard F. Stolz
Chief, Soviet/East European Division

FROM : John D. Walker
O/SA/DO/O

SUBJECT : Guidelines for Providing Information to the House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Security Services

1. Since members of the S&I Staff will be talking with your Divisions in the near future, it may be worthwhile to review the guidelines as to what may be said concerning relationships with foreign liaison services. In the broad sense, liaison services constitute both a source and a method.

2. We are prepared to discuss the following:

a. The identification and responsibilities of the liaison services in a particular area to the extent that we can draw on sources other than information derived through the established liaison relationship, i.e. overt information or information from penetrations which will not endanger the source.

b. In further describing the liaison services, we can provide information on the objectives, key personnel, strength, budget

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012860

SECRET

and methods of operations of services provided that such data will be drawn from open sources or penetrations and not from details of liaison arrangements with the services themselves.

c. Agency manhours and funds devoted to liaison with the foreign services.

d. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further details on such arrangements, including the scope of funds and equipment provided to such foreign services.

d. We are prepared to provide general comments on the degree of operational cooperation with the Station. If technical support, for example, provides a useful input, we can state that the liaison service provides technical support, using a qualifying adjective to define, such as excellent, limited, etc.

3. We have no objection to the provision of foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with such services. Source descriptions should be those used in the disseminated report.

4. We will not make available details on liaison arrangements, information on sources and methods of such services which have been obtained through liaison or jointly controlled sources or other information which would reveal Agency sources and methods or violate the trust on which the official liaison relationship is based.

5. The S&I Staff approves close liaison relationships and believes that these relationships are cost effective.

John D. Walker

O/SA/DO/O:JDWalker:kaw (1542)

Distribution
Original - C/AF
1 - C/EUR
1 - C/NE
1 - C/SE
2 - SA/DO/O

Guidelines for Providing Information to Congressional Oversight Committees on Foreign Intelligence and Security Services

These guidelines take into account the fact that foreign intelligence and security services, when acting in connection with the Agency's official liaison with them, constitute both a source and a method and thus require the statutory protection accorded any other intelligence source or method. The guidelines also recognize that the duly constituted oversight bodies of the Congress have expressed an interest in such services and in the general scope, nature and extent of the Agency's relationships with them. The purpose of these guidelines is to provide a formula for dealing with these two sometimes conflicting objectives.

The Agency is prepared to provide, upon specific request, appropriately classified and sanitized information to oversight committees on the following aspects of foreign intelligence and security services:

a. The identification of the governments with whose services CIA has liaison arrangements;

b. Agency man hours and funds devoted to liaison with foreign services;

c. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further details on such arrangements, including the scope of funds and equipment provided to such foreign services;

d. Information on the objectives, key personnel, strength, budget and methods of operation of such services, provided that such data will be drawn from open sources or penetrations and not from the details of liaison arrangements with the services themselves;

e. Where relevant, foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with such services.

The Agency will not make available to the oversight committees the details of liaison arrangements with foreign services, information on sources and methods of such services obtained through liaison or jointly controlled sources, or other information which would reveal Agency sources or methods or violate the trust on which these official liaison relationships is necessarily based.

In the event of substantial allegations of improper activities conducted by foreign intelligence or security services with which the Agency is presumed to maintain liaison, every effort will be made to provide all relevant facts which bear on such allegations. Where this would involve departure from the above guidelines, the Director will be prepared to meet with the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the committee to seek a satisfactory resolution of such problems.

HSC MAT FOR

REVIEW STAFF
75-2014

24 July 1975

SECURITY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Mr. Colby, Mitch Rogovin and Mr. Knoche met with Chairman Otis Pike at 9:30, 7/24 in Chairman Pike's office to discuss groundrules, etc. for the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. Colby left the following material with Pike:

1. 16 June 1975 Letter to the Honorable Elmer B. Staats Comptroller General of the United States, Signed by Mr. Colby. The letter deals with the GAO's audit of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Attached)

2. Guide to Central Intelligence Agency Statutes and Law dated September 1970 (without the Ryan Amendment on Foreign Intelligence). (Filed in 6D0120)

3. Three Groudrules papers: (Attached)
   --Agreements To Be Sought By the DCI With Chairmen of the Select Committees

   --Secrecy Agreement

   --Guides for Protection of Classified Information And Documents Furnished The Select Committee

4. 11 March 1975 Letter from Colby to Senator Church. (Attached)

Rosemarie R. Hesterberg

SECRET

Checklist for DCI Discussion with HSC

1. Your intent to be cooperative and forthcoming.

2. Your responsibility to protect S&M. Will need HSC understanding of particularly sensitive matters:

   --names of agents and sources.

   --names of cooperating American organizations and contacts to whom we have pledged confidentiality.

   --material from foreign liaison.

   --sensitive intelligence methods and techniques of collection.

3. Will need to work out security groundrules.

   --Chairman of USIB Security Committee and CIA Director of Security available to help work out custodial arrangements, compartmented clearances, etc.

4. Importance of secrecy agreements. Your willingness to suspend them to permit testimony by current and ex-employees.

5. Will confirm with a letter and an employee bulletin which can be used by HSC in dealing with Agency witnesses and interviews.

24 July 1975

Classified by 014359
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on Date Impossible to Determine

SECRET

AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES

1. It would be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees, as has been customary in other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, that:

(a) Departments and agencies shall have the right to request that testimony be given only in executive session, that in some instances testimony be "off-the-record" and that certain testimony be heard only by members and in some cases only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(b) Witnesses be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony prior to any publication of it.

(c) When questioned about intelligence matters that come under the purview of another organization, witnesses should be permitted to state that a response to the question is not properly within their authority and to respectfully suggest that the appropriate party be called to testify on such matters.

2. It would also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies furnishing documents to the committees be authorized to excise from those documents, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel under cover or whose personal safety might be jeopardized as well as those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy may be jeopardized by disclosure. Also excised should be names of sources, operations, specific details of technical devices and systems maintained in compartmented channels and names of organizations cooperating on a highly confidential basis.

3. In view of their susceptibility to foreign countermeasures, it would be desirable if the DCI could obtain agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees not to require presentation of details

of the technology of the technical collection programs. It would also be desirable if the Select Committees adopted the use of Compartmented Control Systems to protect documents on these programs and cleared only those staff personnel with an absolute need-to-know. The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area.

4. Further, it would be desirable if the DCI attempt to secure an agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that they will entertain and consider security principles and guidelines which will be provided.

SECRECY AGREEMENT

I, ________________________________, in accepting employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure.

I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Select Committee.

It is my understanding that in the course of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to information from departments and agencies of the Government which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the property of the United States of America and I further agree to surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee, any classified material which has come into my possession as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.

I hereby agree that the burden is on me to determine if information is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative.

I hereby agree that any information learned during my employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is related to intelligence and prepared for publication by me will be submitted to the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative prior to discussing with or showing to any publisher, editor or literary agent for the purpose of determining whether said material contains any classified information as defined in Executive Order 11652. I agree that the Chairman of the Select Committee, President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has the authority to make the final determination as to whether information is classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted.

I have been informed of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 793, 794, 798 and 952; and 50 U.S.C. 783 (b); and 42 U.S.C. 2274; and Executive Order 11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified information, and understand their meaning.

Further, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as the Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified material. I understand that any breach of any part of the obligations in this agreement could subject me to legal and/or administrative action.

I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed on me with respect to the protection of classified information by this agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated.

I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

Signature

Date

WITNESS:

Signature

Date

GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES

1. Personnel Security Clearances

(a) Background Investigation

It would be desirable for the Select Committees to stipulate that no staff personnel is to be given access to any classified material, testimony or information received or generated by the committees without prior receipt of a security clearance based on a full field investigation.

(b) Secrecy Agreement

It would be desirable for the Select Committees to require a signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to the committees' staffs. The agreement should include provisions:

1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations is a condition precedent of employment or assignment;

2) Recognizing US Government property rights to classified information;

3) Requiring prior written consent before divulgence of classified information;

4) For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules and obligations contained in the agreement could subject the signer to administrative and/or legal action under appropriate statutes;

5) That there is no time limit on the terms of the agreement.

2. Physical and Document Security

The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure that the secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be preserved. These rules should be made known to the individuals and agencies who will be called upon to present testimony or materials. Among these should be rules on physical security and document security.

(a) Physical Security

It would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following rules related to physical security:

1) All classified material will be stored in safes for safekeeping in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with the regulations of this registry for classified material.

2). Twenty-four-hour guard protection, supplemented by anti-intrusion alarms, should be required on the storage area.

3) Areas selected for use in closed session should be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons.

4) The committees should arrange for the conduct of audio countermeasures to preclude the possibility of unauthorized use of transmitters and/or recording devices. It should be noted that a foreign clandestine transmitter was located in the Rayburn House Office Building on 12 February 1973.

5) At the end of each session of the Select Committees, the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff officer who will secure any misplaced classified material or waste.

6) Areas should be designated in which classified material can be reviewed. These areas should be secure against access by unauthorized personnel. Material should not be removed from these areas for the sake of convenience except when necessary for the work of the committees and should ~~not be transported~~ overnight to the office or residence of personnel of the committees.

(b) Document Security

1) Committees should select and identify a single location and specific personnel authorized to sign acknowledgement of receipt of classified materials provided to the committees.

2) A system of document control should be established to permit control of classified documents to provide for accountability.

3) Duplication of documents should be controlled so as to require a record of the document reproduced, the number of copies reproduced and the custodian or receiving personnel. Reproduced classified documents should be subject to the same controls as the original.

4) Appropriate arrangements should be made for the destruction of classified waste.

5) Transcripts. The committees should give consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate security in the transcription of testimony by committee transcribers. The committees may desire to charge each agency presenting testimony with this responsibility. In some, if not all cases, this might include escort of materials to the place of transcription, the securing of carbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance with committee rules.

6) Early agreement should be reached on the disposition of classified materials such as storage under seal in the National Archives. The question of access should be determined by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House.

3. Compartmented Information

There is some extremely sensitive information in the intelligence community which is disseminated only to those who have a very strict "need to know" in order to build, perfect, operate or handle the material produced by extremely sensitive foreign intelligence collection programs. The sensitivity of these programs rests upon the vulnerability to countermeasures which a foreign government could easily institute if details of the means of collection became known. Thus, even individuals cleared for Top Secret information do not have access to compartmented information unless they are required to have such knowledge in the performance of their duties. This information is handled in Compartmented Control Systems. It would be desirable if the Chairmen would adopt the Compartmented Control Systems on these extremely sensitive collection efforts and clear only those staff personnel with an absolute "need to know" about such systems, and that documents related to such systems be handled in a compartmented fashion by the Select Committee. The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area.

4. Security Officer

It would be desirable if the committees appointed a security officer with the responsibility of discharging the security rules adopted by the committee and of serving as a point of contact with the departments and agencies of interest to the committee. It would also be desirable if the committee rules required each agency of interest to identify a single point of contact to facilitate provisions of security support required by the committee.

13-00000

ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN
ASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry
75-2289/A

16 JUN 1975

Honorable Elmer B. Staats
Comptroller General of the United States
General Accounting Office
441 G Street
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Staats:

My attention has been directed to a letter from Mr. Keller, General Accounting Office, to the Honorable William Proxmire dated May 10, 1974, which was placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Proxmire on February 11, 1975. The letter deals with the intelligence community and reviews the General Accounting Office's right to audit and obtain information from the Central Intelligence Agency.

Inasmuch as Mr. Keller has treated a subject basic to this Agency's capability to carry out work mandated by Congress, I believe it would serve a useful purpose to review some of the background concerning the use of confidential funds and their relationship to the audit of CIA over the years.

Mr. Keller notes in his letter that there are "a fairly substantial number of instances where expenditures are accounted for solely upon a certification by the head of the department or establishment involved." The need is clear in the case of this Agency. The necessity to safeguard certain truly vital foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by the Congress in its direction to the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This responsibility was complemented by authorizing certain expenditures "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature," to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director of Central Intelligence. Such expenditures would apply, for example, to a secret agent operating abroad in a hostile climate whose identity must be protected not only so that he can continue supplying the intelligence involved, but also because his freedom--and on occasion his life--weighs in the balance.

Other intelligence activities do not have such obvious security requirements, but are, nonetheless, within the sources and methods concept. Liaison with foreign intelligence and security agencies is extremely important in fields of both positive intelligence and counterintelligence. Such liaisons to be effective depend on the confidence of each service that the other will protect not only the mere fact of the relationships, but also its sources and methods and sensitive information. Compromise of any of these brings not only protests from the foreign liaison service, but in some cases a lessening or even cessation of its cooperation.

EXECUTIVE [illegible]

Even overt activities have their own security problems. Thus, many U. S. citizens and others are willing to provide sensitive information to overt intelligence units only on condition that their cooperation in this respect be absolutely protected.

This need for the special protection of intelligence sources and methods has been well recognized by officials in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of our Government. Mr. Lindsay C. Warren, then Comptroller General of the United States, in a letter dated March 12, 1948, to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, addressed the provision granting the Director of Central Intelligence the power to certify the expenditure of confidential funds by stating that while it provided "for the granting of much wider authority than I would ordinarily recommend for Government agencies, generally, the purposes sought to be obtained in the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency are believed to be of such paramount importance as to justify the extraordinary measures proposed therein." He went on to say that the "necessity for secrecy in such matters is apparent and the Congress apparently recognized this fully in that it provided in section 102(d)(3) of Public Law 253, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Under these conditions, he stated, "I do not feel called upon to object to the proposals advanced... "

It has been and it remains the policy of CIA to rely upon vouchered funds wherever possible. (Vouchered funds are those which can be accounted for and audited in conformance with the laws that apply to other Government agencies and with standard Government regulations and procedures.) Currently more than half of the Agency's appropriations are disbursed as vouchered funds. The confidential funds certification authority referred to by Mr. Warren in his March 12, 1948 letter is reserved for "objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature."

From the beginning of CIA records for all vouchered fund expenditures were made available to and were subject to a voucher audit by the GAO. Use of the voucher audit procedure allowed the GAO to examine expenditure and collection vouchers and related documents to determine whether expenditures were made legally and solely for the objects for which appropriations were made. Use of the voucher audit procedure also allowed CIA to protect those activities of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, i.e., intelligence sources and methods.

Subsequent to the enactment of the CIA legislation, GAO adopted a "comprehensive audit approach," and raised with the CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee the desirability of an expanded audit of Agency activities. The Comptroller General stated by letter dated May 29, 1959 to Subcommittee Chairman Kilday that he did "not recommend any change in section 10 (now section 8) of the Central Intelligence Act" and that "any broadening of our audit activities should not include an evaluation of the intelligence activities of the Agency."

Mr. Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, agreed that GAO should expand its current audit activities in a letter to the Comptroller dated October 16, 1959, cautioning, however, that the comprehensive audit would have to be limited so as to remain outside the area of sensitive security operations for which by law the Director's certificate must be deemed a sufficient voucher.

The results of the trial period of comprehensive audit from 1959 to 1961 were made known to the CIA Subcommittee in a letter of May 16, 1961 from the Comptroller General in which he said the GAO planned to discontinue the audit of CIA activities. He acknowledged that various steps were taken by the CIA "to place the General Accounting Office in a position to make a comprehensive audit of the overt activities of CIA." Nevertheless, he stated that GAO "cannot effectively review and evaluate activities of the Support Component because the confidential and overt activities of this component are integrated to such an extent that we cannot make reasonably comprehensive audits." He further stated "we have been given sufficient access to make reasonably comprehensive reviews of the overt activities of the Intelligence Component, but such reviews, in our opinion, will not be productive of significant evaluations because we cannot feasibly evaluate the extent to which needed overt information is available for collection or determine the need for the intelligence information selected for collation and use in the production of intelligence reports." In short, the Comptroller General was recognizing the conflict between the philosophy underlying a "comprehensive audit approach" and the Director's statutory responsibility and authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Both the Director and Chairman Vinson, of the House Committee on Armed Services, requested that the Comptroller General continue to audit Agency affairs on a limited basis, but after another trial period the Comptroller General reiterated his earlier view. In a letter to Chairman Vinson dated June 21, 1962, the Comptroller General stated his belief that for maximum effectiveness "it would be necessary for our GAO audit staff to have nearly complete access to CIA activities," and that even to perform reasonably comprehensive reviews would require "complete access to the administrative activities ... that are performed in support of both sensitive and nonsensitive operations of CIA."

Chairman Vinson replied to the Comptroller General on July 18, 1962, stating that, "the restrictions you met within the Central Intelligence Agency are necessary, I believe, for the proper protection of its intelligence activities and should be maintained." The Chairman agreed, however, that in view of the Comptroller General's opinion that a continued audit was not a worthwhile effort, GAO might withdraw from further audit activities in the Central Intelligence Agency.

In summary, I believe that several points are deserving of emphasis in assessing the nature and history of GAO's audit activities with respect to this Agency:

(a) CIA coope ed fully in all respects in exten ng administrative support and in granting security clearances and access to information related to vouchered fund activities.

(b) The Chairman of the interested oversight committee in the House of Representatives was fully informed of the nature and status of the activity.

(c) This Agency encouraged GAO to conduct and to continue to conduct its activities consistent with the operational and statutory requirements imposed upon this Agency.

(d) The decision to discontinue the audit activities was made solely by GAO and was approved by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - OGC
1 - DDA
1 - Compt
1 - OF
1 - OS
1 - OLC Subject (GAO) w/basic
1 - OLC Proxmire file
1 - OLC Chrono
OLC: WPY: cg (13 Jun 75)

JUN 17 11 09 AM '75
ER
JUN 16 11 54 AM '75
ER

75-3465

~~DCI~~

REVIEW STAFF

75-2051

E DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 JUL 1975

HSC Mat Jun

Security

The Honorable Otis G. Pike, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In our conversation on Friday you asked for the statutory basis for the compartmentation principle. I wish first to respond to your inquiry and then suggest a manner in which your staff can receive access to the sensitive material protected by special compartmentation systems.

The current basis for the U.S. Government security classification system is Executive Order 11652, promulgated on 8 March 1972. Historically, foreign intelligence has been treated as one category of classified national security information. There are numerous statutory recognitions of the importance of national security information, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act. Consequently, much foreign intelligence is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET according to specifications set forth in the Order. Not all foreign intelligence, however, is classified national security information under the provisions of the Executive Order (e.g., an American source providing foreign information or assistance). Also, the potential risks attendant with the compromise of a foreign intelligence source or method differ substantially from the risks attendant with much classified defense information.

Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides: "That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." In recognition of this responsibility, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (17 February 1972) instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to, "...develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

Since the National Security Act did not provide for an authority corresponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area, the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S. Intelligence Board are responsible for: "The supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material." The Director of Central Intelligence, acting with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence Board, has promulgated a number of directives, regulations and security manuals, related to the protection of foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and methods, and applicable to the overall U.S. intelligence community.

The fundamental security principle involved in the protection of foreign intelligence and of its sources and methods is a strict application of "need to know" --a principle referred to in Executive Order 11652, Section 6(A). This applies the simple mathematical premise that the fewer the number of individuals made privy to a secret, the less likely that it will be disclosed. The security principle of "compartmentation" involving special access and information dissemination controls is designed to ensure that only those individuals whose "need to know" has been specifically approved by some higher authority, who have been specially indoctrinated, and who undertake special commitments to protect it are provided access to a particularly sensitive category of foreign intelligence sources and methods. Compartmentation assists in the application of the "need-to-know" principle by ensuring that individuals are provided access to only that information clearly essential to the performance of their duties.

Compartmentation was undoubtedly a major contributing factor involved in the nation's secret development of the atomic bomb during World War II, and the principle is still implicit in security procedures related to ERDA's "RESTRICTED DATA" as reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In the field of U.S. foreign intelligence activities, compartmentation was practiced throughout the development and operation of the U-2 reconnaissance program. One of the major foreign intelligence categories of activities using formalized compartmentation procedures today involves the matter of foreign signals intercept for intelligence purposes, i.e., communications intelligence. Title 18 of the U.S. Code Section 798 recognizes the special character of this material by providing specifically for prosecution for the unauthorized disclosure of information concerning any communications activities of the United States without the necessity to show intent to harm the United States. The reason for the application of strict compartmentation procedures to communications intelligence and other foreign intelligence activities reflects the extreme vulnerability of the sources. Once an opposition becomes aware of which of its communications we are intercepting, it can take swift remedial action, and the source can be forever lost.

On Friday afternoon, copies of the secrecy oath used by the executive branch with respect to three compartmented access control systems were made available to you along with the revised forms developed for and executed by certain members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence Activities. I would hope that the enclosed agreement modified for the House Select Committee, combining all three compartments into one document, would meet your particular concerns.

For your information, in addition to the Senate Select Committee's use of the modified secrecy oath dealing with compartmented access, the following House and Senate committees have obtained compartmented access for their staffs, which was granted after the normal briefings and signing of the secrecy oath:

Armed Services Committee
Appropriations Committee
Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee

May I reiterate the points I made on Friday:

a. No material is being withheld from members of the Committee.

b. We are prepared to and did brief the staff of the Committee on noncompartmented matters, based upon your certification of their security clearance and the fact that they entered into an appropriate secrecy agreement with you, a copy of which you provided.

c. The compartmentation procedures of the Intelligence Community have been established pursuant to statute and National Security Council Intelligence Directives. The simplest way for the staff to obtain access to this compartmented material would be to accept the normal secrecy arrangements as modified in the enclosed. This would ensure against difficulties in access to such compartmented material throughout the

Intelligence Community. It is clear that the obligations assumed here would run between the staff member and the Committee and in no way would provide any control or influence over them by me or any element of the Intelligence Community.

d. It would undoubtedly be feasible to develop another procedure to ensure special protection of the sensitive matters currently included in the compartmented systems, but this would involve review and discussions with various interested parties which would undoubtedly take some time and delay your investigations.

I hope you will agree that this is the simplest and easiest manner of solving a practical matter so that we can proceed with the substance of your investigations.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

Distribution:

1-DCI
1-DDCI
1-IG
1-OLC
1-E.H.Knocke
1-SC/DCI

White House Distribution:
1-Rod Hills
1-Phil Buchen
1-Jay French

CONFIDENTIAL

COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE INDOCTRINATION

I have been informed that pursuant to law (Sections 792, 793, 794, 795, 797 and 798 of Title 18, United States Code) I am not to discuss with or disclose to any person any information relating directly or indirectly to the below identified compartmented Programs, unless such person is currently authorized to discuss or receive such information or material of the particular category involved. I am aware that the responsibility of ascertaining that such an authorization for another person is valid and current, rests with me.

I acknowledge that it is my responsibility to inform myself of the contents of the above mentioned sections of Title 18, U.S. Code, as they pertain to performance of my duties. I am aware further that if a change in my status renders it no longer necessary for me to receive compartmented intelligence, my name will be removed from the list of persons authorized to receive such material.

News media reports concerning any of these compartmented materials does not relieve me of my obligation under the oath signed below.

I acknowledge that I have been briefed on the following compartmented systems or programs:

____________	____________
____________	____________
____________	____________

OATH OF SECRECY

I do solemnly swear that I will not discuss with or disclose to any person, regardless of his official position or status, any information relating directly or indirectly to Compartmented Intelligence, any information derived therefrom, or the nature of the sources of such intelligence, until I have ascertained that such person has been authorized to discuss

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY ____________

and handle this material, and that his authorization has not been revoked, except in the performance of my official duties on the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and in accordance with the requirements set forth in the rules of such Committee.

~~Social Security Number~~

Signature

Witness

Date

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

HSC MAT. FURN.
Review Staff: 75/2563
20 August 1975

HSC SECURITY
Dir O/S approval

Mr. A. Searle Field
Staff Director
Select Committee on Intelligence
Room 232
Cannon House Office Building
Washington D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Field:

Around the end of July, Mr. Roeder, obviously impressed by your admonitions about the need for security, asked if I could work up a package of guidance on how to handle classified documents. Our Office of Security put this together, and while I think Mr. Roeder had in mind something more applicable to an individual than to an office, I thought I would pass this on to you for whatever use you care to make of it.

Incidentally, we have not yet carried out the physical survey of your quarters which you requested on 29 July. I have been in touch with Ms. Hess, and our Office of Security will conduct one as soon as she is ready. We may have some other recommendations for your consideration when that is done.

Sincerely,

Jerry Brown

Jerrold B. Brown
Assistant to the Director

Attachment: a/s

cc: D/OS

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions.

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 003717
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of E.O. 11652, Exemption
Category: 5B (1), (2), (3) or (4)
Declassified only on approval of the
Director of Central Intelligence

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL
1776-1976

14 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Jerrold B. Brown

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence - Protection of Classified Materials

REFERENCE : Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold B. Brown, subject: Request for Security Aids

In accordance with the request in the referenced memorandum for a "package" to be used by the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified material, the attached suggestions are provided for your assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive physical security survey of the area which will be used to store the Committee's classified material, specific recommendations must be deferred. In this connection, we plan to have Mr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate representatives of the Committee for the specific purpose of conducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field, Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the results of this survey and its recommendations, the attached general physical security measures are recommended in an effort to provide the requisite protection for the Committee's classified material.

Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

Atts.

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Adse
1 - ADD/A

E3 IMPDET
CL BY 056966

OS 5 12 065

13-00000

ATTACHMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL SUGGESTIONS
FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

1. Designate a Committee member as the Security Officer responsible for the overall control handling and protection of the classified material.

2. Establish and maintain a register of all Committee personnel who are authorized to review classified material and insure that no unauthorized personnel will have access to the material.

3. Establish a central document control system whereby all classified documents are properly logged upon receipt and annotated as to disposition.

4. Designate a Document Control Clerk who will be specifically responsible for the logging and control of all classified material. Appropriate records should be established to reflect that all classified material is properly logged in and out, by date and time, to authorized members of the Committee.

5. In the event material is designated as being of a codeword or compartmented nature, special physical security features as enunciated by the Ad Hoc Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board and later adopted as policy should be adhered to. (Specifics regarding these requirements will be provided in the course of the pending survey.)

6. All guards assigned to the physical security control over the Committee's storage area should be U. S. citizens and possess appropriate security clearances.

7. If feasible, a reading room should be established within the designated storage area

CONFIDENTIAL

for the Committee's classified material, and all research and review activities of the material should be restricted to this area.

8. In those instances where the Committee meets in Executive session, every effort should be made to insure that the site being used has been subjected to a technical security inspection to negate the possibility of unauthorized transmitting or recording devices. This area of concern could pose serious security deficiencies in the event the same area would be used initially in public session and then closed for the Executive session without such an inspection being made.

9. Adequate safeguards should be utilized in the transmission of classified material under the cognizance of the Committee from one area to another.

10. Reproduction of any portion of the Committee's classified material should be prohibited without the express approval of the Staff Director. In this instance, notes, extracts, summaries, etc., made from classified material must also be provided the same degree of protection as that provided to the source material.

11. Access controls to the storage and retention area should be established to insure that only authorized personnel are allowed entrance.

12. Storage of all classified material should be within the designated area as opposed to any areas or outside offices.

13. Security protection should be provided to all Committee transcripts during the transcription process as well as during the periods while they are in transit.

14. A security check procedure should be established to inspect the areas where the Committee meets at the termination of each session to insure that no classified material

or notes, etc., are inadvertently left unsecured. (Attached are examples of Security Check Sheets.)

15. Arrangements should be made to insure that there are adequate facilities for the destruction of classified waste material. In this instance, such waste material should be provided protection until its final destruction.

16. Only approved classified material destruction methods should be utilized. (Details regarding this can be obtained in the course of the pending survey.)

17. All Committee personnel granted access to classified material by the Staff Director should be briefed on their obligations and responsibilities regarding the unauthorized disclosure of such material.

18. Specific physical security recommendations applicable to the proposed storage area for the Committee's classified material, consistent with sound security principles, must be deferred until the completion of the survey. This would also include recommendations relative to the type of storage containers which the Committee proposes to use.

19. Pending the completion of a security survey at the new storage site, it is suggested that the protective measures currently in effect at the temporary storage facility in Room 232, Cannon Building, not be changed.

ATTACHMENT

SECURITY CHECK SHEET

TO : Office of Security
THRU: Component Security Officer

TO LOCK

ROTATE DIAL FOUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION

TO CHECK

SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL DRAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON "HERRING-HALL-MARVIN" SAFES TURN DRAWER HANDLE TO RIGHT *(on new type, raise latch)* AND PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD.
VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD.
ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO "NIGHT" POSITION

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT I HAVE OPENED OR PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM.

MONTH(S)

DATE	OPENED BY		CLOSED BY		CHECKED BY		GUARD CHECK	
	INITIALS	TIME	INITIALS	TIME	INITIALS	TIME	INITIALS	TIME

FOLD HERE -- REVERSE FOLD FOR FULL USE OF BOTH SIDES -- FOLD HERE

SECURITY CHECK SHEET

FROM:	ROOM NO.	BUILDING	SAFE NO.

TO LOCK

ROTATE DIAL FOUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION

TO CHECK

SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL DRAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON "HERRING-HALL-MARVIN" SAFES TURN DRAWER HANDLE TO RIGHT *(on new type, raise latch)* AND PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD.
VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD.
ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO "NIGHT" POSITION

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT I HAVE OPENED OR PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM.

MONTH(S)

DATE	OPENED BY		CLOSED BY		CHECKED BY		GUARD CHECK	
	INITIALS	TIME	INITIALS	TIME	INITIALS	TIME	INITIALS	TIME

FORM 1-65 108 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(9)

Area Security Check Sheet

Items to be Checked	Checker
Desks (Including Drawers)	________________
Tables (Including Drawers)	________________
Chairs	________________
Floor	________________
Window Ledges	________________
Typewriters	________________
Stenotype Machines	________________
Reproduction Equipment	________________
Trash Receptacles	________________
Charts, Exhibits, Chalkboards	________________
Notebooks, Paper Pads, etc. (Check to insure that imprints of classified notes not present)	________________

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) House Select Committee on Intelligence - Protection of Classified Materials

FROM: Director of Security	EXTENSION 6777	NO. File with 75-2563 20 AUG 75 DATE 14 AUG 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Edward Ryan DD/A Coordinator 4E-27, Hqs.	14 AUGUST 75		ER	
2. ADD/A 7D-26, Hqs.	14 [illegible]			
3.				
4. The Review Staff 6D-0120			WE Seymour	
5. Attn: Mr. Jerrold B. Brown				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

14 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Jerrold B. Brown

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence - Protection of Classified Materials

REFERENCE : Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold B. Brown, subject: Request for Security Aids

In accordance with the request in the referenced memorandum for a "package" to be used by the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified material, the attached suggestions are provided for your assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive physical security survey of the area which will be used to store the Committee's classified material, specific recommendations must be deferred. In this connection, we plan to have Mr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate representatives of the Committee for the specific purpose of conducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field, Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the results of this survey and its recommendations, the attached general physical security measures are recommended in an effort to provide the requisite protection for the Committee's classified material.

Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

Atts.

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Adse
1 - ADD/A

E3 IMPDET
CL BY 056966

OS 5 12 065

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Jerold Brown

REVIEW STAFF

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2620
2 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence

Attached is a paper from the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, outlining security arrangements made by the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

Jack E Thomas
Jack E. Thomas
Major General, USAF (Ret.)
Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS

Attachment

This Document May Be Downgraded
to Unclassified When Removed From
Attachment

CLASSIFIED BY 356793
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Date Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

SECRET

SECRET

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-105
2 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence

On 29 August 1975, Mr. Robert Gambino, Director of Security/CIA; Mr. William H. Standiford, Deputy Chief, Physical Security Division, Office of Security/CIA; and I viewed the permanent space of the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence at the invitation of Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director of the Committee. We believe the security arrangements made and being made are satisfactory for the storage of compartmented information. Attached is a memorandum outlining the security arrangements.

Donald E. Moore
Donald E. Moore
Chairman

Attachment

This Document May Be Downgraded
to Unclassified When Removed From
Attachment

CLASSIFIED BY 356793
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Date Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

2 September 1975

House Select Committee on Intelligence

1. The House Select Committee staff is now located in its permanent space, B-316, Rayburn Building. Ms. Jacqueline Hess is the Security Officer, telephone number 225-9696.

2. The only entrance is through B-316 and the space consists of several adjoining offices all served by an inner walkway. A member of the Capitol Police is stationed at a guard desk inside the door and admits only authorized individuals. Visitors must sign in with the guard, who calls the appropriate staff employee and visitors are allowed access to the space only in the company of staff employees. Interview rooms are located in the staff area but separated from the work area. During non-work hours two guards are on duty in the space.

3. All classified material is kept in a secure area at the rear of the space with one entrance to the secure room. This room is to be locked at all times when specified employees are not on duty in the room. At the present time, Ms. Hess is the only one who will be able to open the secure area and unless circumstances change this arrangement will continue.

4. All classified material is kept in this secure area, and stored in approved safes with three-way combination locks. At present, Ms. Hess is the only person who possesses the combination to these safes.

5. Reading of classified documents is to be in a reading area, consisting of several tables, in the secure area. A staff employee desiring access to a classified document must make a request for it, Ms. Hess then obtains it, the employee reads it in the secure area and it is then returned to Ms. Hess for return to the safe cabinet. Staff employees have been advised that notes taken from classified documents and material prepared from such notes or the documents must respect the original classification and receive corresponding security. Copying of classified documents is to be strictly controlled, is to be done only on a copying device located in staff space, and copies are to receive the same security protection as the original.

CLASSIFIED BY 356793
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Date Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

SECRET

6. The entire space has been swept and plans call for additional periodic sweeping. There is a motion detector in the secure area which rings at the guard desk in the staff area and also at the main office of the Capitol Police in the Rayburn Building. Tests have been made of this device and the response by the Capitol Police was immediate. Two doors which normally serve as access to the secure area from space occupied by other House Committees have been secured from the inside and alarms are to be installed on these doors.

7. Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director, and Ms. Hess advised that staff employees have been alerted to telephone security and this will be continually stressed. Also they have tried to instill strong security consciousness among all the staff. Mr. Field indicated that at present it is not expected the staff will total more than 35.

ADMI. STRATIVE INTERNAL USE O Y

House Armed Services
Subcommittee on
Intelligence
and Military Application of Nuclear Energy

The Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy is newly established and the successor to the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence Chaired by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi. The new Subcommittee has picked up the responsibility of the soon to be abolished Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and is expanding its staff accordingly. Representative Melvin Price's Chairmanship is due to his long years of membership on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. There will be an ever-increasing involvement by the Subcommittee in military application of nuclear energy and we undoubtedly will be called upon to provide required foreign intelligence.

Members of the Subcommittee are as follows:

Melvin Price (D., Ill.), Chairman
Charles H. Wilson (D., Calif.)
Jack Brinkley (D., Ga.)
Dan Daniel (D., Va.)
G. V. Montgomery (D., Miss.)
Ronald V. Dellums (D., Calif.)
Bob Carr (D., Mich.)
Charles E. Bennett (D., Fla.)
Samuel S. Stratton (D., N.Y.)
Bob Wilson (R., Calif.)
William L. Dickinson (R., Ala.)
Marjorie S. Holt (R., Md.)
Robert W. Daniel, Jr. (R., Va.)

Staff of the Subcommittee are as follows:

John Ford, Staff Director
William H. Hogan, Counsel
Adam J. Klein, Professional

Mr. Ford is Staff Director of the full Committee and replaced Mr. Frank Slatinshek, former Chief Counsel, who retired. Mr. Hogan is Counsel of the Subcommittee and will be the principal staff man on Agency matters. Adam Klein is a specialist in atomic energy matters.

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

PROBLEMS

A. House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy

Former Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi fully exercised his perogatives as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and we could look to him for support in any problems developing with other committees and other members of the House not on the Subcommittee. Based on the reactions of Chairman Melvin Price in the few instances that we have approached him in this Congress for assistance, it is quite evident that he is not the dominant personality as was Chairman Nedzi and will not stick his neck out to defend the Agency. Nor does it appear that the new staff director will be of the forceful personality as was Frank Slatinshek who was very helpful in a number of problems. A few weeks ago former Chairman Nedzi suggested that we resolve a problem involving Representative Donald M. Fraser by going to Speaker O'Neill. This may have been his indication to us that we may have to look to House leadership to resolve problems. Mr. Nedzi also suggested that we contact someone in the White House on a problem. We may be faced with needed White House support on a problem before we approach the leadership.

B. House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control

The extent of Chairman Lester L. Wolff's oversight of the Agency in its narcotics collection activities still remains a looming problem. As indicated by the request for the seal, Mr. Wolff intends to extend the Agency's activities to where there is maximum effective collection of foreign intelligence on narcotics trafficking leading to arrest and conviction without regard to the Agency's statutory prohibitions. The only solution rests with the Attorney General and the White House giving the Agency clear and precise guidelines to operate in this area which the Agency can then point to in any disputes that may arise with the Select Committee as to what the Agency's role should be.

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
House of Representatives
(95th Congress, 1st Session)

GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, *Chairman*

Democrats

- JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi
- ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida
- EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts
- WILLIAM H. NATCHER, Kentucky
- DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania
- TOM STEED, Oklahoma
- GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, Illinois
- JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia
- JOHN J. FLYNT, Jr., Georgia
- NEAL SMITH, Iowa
- ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut
- JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York
- JOHN J. McFALL, California
- EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey
- CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland
- SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois
- FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado
- DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
- EDWARD R. ROYBAL, California
- LOUIS STOKES, Ohio
- GUNN McKAY, Utah
- TOM BEVILL, Alabama
- BILL CHAPPELL, Florida
- BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri
- BILL ALEXANDER, Arkansas
- EDWARD I. KOCH, New York
- YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California
- JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
- BOB TRAXLER, Michigan
- ROBERT DUNCAN, Oregon
- JOSEPH D. EARLY, Massachusetts
- MAX BAUCUS, Montana
- CHARLES WILSON, Texas
- LINDY (MRS. HALE) BOGGS, Louisiana
- ADAM BENJAMIN, Jr., Indiana
- NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington

Republicans

- ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan
- ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois
- SILVIO O. CONTE, Massachusetts
- JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania
- MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota
- JACK EDWARDS, Alabama
- ROBERT C. McEWEN, New York
- JOHN T. MYERS, Indiana
- J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia
- CLARENCE E. MILLER, Ohio
- LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, Pennsylvania
- C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
- JACK F. KEMP, New York
- WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado
- RALPH S. REGULA, Ohio
- CLAIR W. BURGENER, California
- GEORGE M. O'BRIEN, Illinois
- VIRGINIA SMITH, Nebraska

KEITH F. MAINLAND
Clerk and Staff Director

Subcommittees

AGRICULTURE & RELATED AGENCIES	Whitten, Evans, Burlison, Baucus, Traxler, Alexander, Sikes, Natcher Andrews, Robinson, Myers
DEFENSE	Mahon, Sikes, Flood, Addabbo, McFall, Flynt, Giaimo, Chappell, Burlison Edwards, Robinson, Kemp
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	Natcher, Giaimo, Wilson, McKay, Burke, Benjamin Burgener, Kemp
FOREIGN OPERATIONS	Long, Obey, Koch, Wilson, Yates, Burke, Roybal, Stokes Young, Conte, Smith
HUD—INDEPENDENT AGENCIES	Boland, Traxler, Baucus, Stokes, Bevill, Boggs, Burlison, Alexander Coughlin, McDade, Young
INTERIOR	Yates, McKay, Long, Evans, Murtha, Duncan, Dicks, Whitten McDade, Regula, Armstrong
LABOR—HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE	Flood, Natcher, Smith, Patten, Obey, Roybal, Stokes, Early Michel, Conte, O'Brien
LEGISLATIVE	Shipley, Benjamin, Giaimo, McFall, Murtha, Traxler Armstrong, Coughlin, Cederberg
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION	McKay, Sikes, Murtha, Steed, Long, Chappell McEwen, Regula
PUBLIC WORKS	Bevill, Boland, Whitten, Slack, Boggs, Dicks, Shipley, Chappell Myers, Burgener, Smith
STATE, JUSTICE, COMMERCE & JUDICIARY	Slack, Smith, Flynt, Alexander, Burke, Early Cederberg, Andrews, Miller
TRANSPORTATION	McFall, Steed, Koch, Duncan, Benjamin, Smith, Addabbo, Evans Conte, Edwards, O'Brien
TREASURY-POSTAL SERVICE—GENERAL GOVERNMENT	Steed, Addabbo, Roybal, Patten, Boland, Flynt Miller, McEwen

NOTE: Mr. Mahon, as Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Cederberg, as Ranking Minority Member, are ex officio members of all subcommittees of which they are not regular members.

GPO 86-238-b

January 26, 1977.

Surveys & Investigations Staff

House Appropriations Committee team:

Room 2 D 0117. Telephones: 5848, 5849 (B) and 1570 (R) 8801 (gray)

Leonard M. (Bucky) WALTERS
Badge: blue House Committee
Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM

G.
Charles [illegible]. (Chuck) HAYNES
Badge: green no-escort
Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM

~~Eugene B. WILHELM~~
~~Badge: blue House Committee~~
~~Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM~~

George C. BAIRD (Carter)
Badge: blue House Committee
Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM

Leon F. (Frank) SCHWARTZ
Badge: blue House Committee

John LAYTON

Supervisory officials of HAC Surveys & Investigations Staff (not to be stationed at Hqs bldg, but may visit from time to time):

Cornelius R. (Lefty) ANDERSON, Chief
Badge: green no-escort

Marion S. RAMEY, Deputy Chief
Badge: blue House Committee
OX 7-9371

James Brian HYLAND
Badge: ~~none~~ blue House Committee

SECRET

Shep

2 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Initial Meeting with House Appropriations Committee Survey Group

1. An initial session was held on 30 July 1976 of about one and a half hours with six persons from the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations Committee, to discuss the purpose of their survey of the Directorate of Operations and to propose some arrangements to govern their access to Agency personnel and documents. The following attended:

Mr. Cornelius (Lefty) Anderson, Chief of Surveys and Investigations Staff
Mr. Marion Ramey, Deputy
Mr. Leonard (Bucky) Walters, who will head the team inspecting the Directorate of Operations
Mr. Charles (Chuck) Haynes, team member
Mr. Eugene Wilhelm, team member (former Agency employee)
Mr. George C. Baird, team member

Attending for the Agency were:

Mr. Theodore Shackley, who chaired the meeting
Mr. Robert Gambino
Mr. Lyle Miller
Mr. Thomas B. Abernathy
Mr. Richard Point
Mr. Philip F. Fendig

2. The meeting followed reasonably well the attached agenda, which was made available to all at the beginning of the meeting. The following paragraphs summarize the important points covered.

3. Scope: Mr. Shackley asked the group to define its mission, noting some of the topics mentioned in recent conversations with Mr. Snodgrass suggested particular interests whereas the Committee's report on the FY 77 budget

SECRET

had suggested a different orientation. Mr. Anderson, characterizing the enterprise as a survey rather than an investigation, stated that his instructions were from the Chairman of the Committee: they called for a detailed review of the operation of the Directorate in its entirety. Mr. Walters would mention certain particular interests, noted below, but that did not set limits to the ultimate scope of the survey. Mr. Walters then took over:

a. He expects to do a complete review, from the managerial and substantive standpoint, of the Directorate. His initial interests indicated an auditor's approach to these questions - how budgets are compiled, examination of accounting procedures for regular and special funds, cost systems and the like.

b. He went on, however, to the management aspects which they would also pursue to determine the results of the Directorate's operations - the value of intelligence produced versus the costs involved in procuring it, and areas of possible overlap in collection with the military and with NSA.

c. Specific areas which would be explored, given, as examples, included contingency reserves, the "special retirement fund" (presumably referring to MHMUTUAL), the procedures for reimbursing the State Department for cover and support, proprietaries (how created, their justification, value and effectiveness), safehouses and "CA cadres."

Mr. Anderson reluctantly agreed to Mr. Shackley's request for a memorandum spelling out these objectives in sufficient detail so that we could take the managerial steps necessary to resolve any conflicts in the priority of the time of our managers and senior operations officers who would be involved in current operations as well as overlapping inquiries from other groups concurrently overseeing the Directorate. Mr. Anderson also asked for any ongoing studies which the Directorate might have which would aid the team in its work.

4. Duration: The team's first objective will be to render an interim report to the Committee by 1 January 1977, in order to meet the mandate that the survey be used in considering the Agency's FY 1978 budget. The team wishes to start work immediately and will consist of either six or seven members who will occupy space in Headquarters building and presumably do most of their work here; it was brought out, however, that the team would also interview users of our intelligence and other collectors. There was ambiguity in the projection of the total length of the survey; I interpreted Mr. Anderson's remarks to indicate that he expected the team to be with us for most of calendar year 1977.

5. Security: Mr. Anderson explained the arrangement by which the Committee limits access by even the members of the Subcommittee to the reports of his group; they must be reviewed in a specified area and they are stored, in very limited numbers, in the tower of the Capitol in the special facilities there for the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress. Mr. Gambino explained the arrangements for badges, certification of clearances, and provided for the team's consideration a copy of the "non-disclosure agreement" which we would like members to sign. There was considerable discussion, and some objection, to the issuance of blue badges which will provide access to virtually all parts of the building but which must be turned in and picked up at the entrance each day. This arrangement was reluctantly accepted but it was made clear at lunch and in later discussion with the team and with Mr. Anderson they are unhappy with this slight infringement on their convenience and physical access to the building.

6. Access: Of more concern was the Agency position that the SA/DO/O would serve as a control point for the team's further access to individuals and documents in the Directorate. The requirement was explained in terms of the need to record, against later requirements such as in fact now in progress stemming from another investigation, the names, subject matter and general content of matters discussed by Agency officers with team members. The requirement to "monitor" was explained as an effort to keep this type of record, rather than to impose a third party from the office of SA/DO/O on all interviews; the latter was clearly considered by the team to be an unreasonable intrusion. It was agreed after some discussion that we would proceed with

system outlined in the attached agenda, and that we would reconsider procedures later if they seemed clearly to be unwieldy. We anticipated, however, that once the team splits into smaller groups as is planned, and pursues particular areas of inquiry, it will be possible to evolve a workable system which meets the objectives of both parties.

7. Other: There appears to be no difficulty in protecting identities of sources, providing documents in sanitized form, maintaining notes only in this building and at the appropriate security level and introducing some officers under cover in alias where necessary; all these points were noted and none was objected to. Space and other facilities may be cramped but it appears to be possible to provide adequate space adjacent to the SA/DO/O offices. Mr. Anderson began by noting the outstanding cooperation on the Angola and COMINT surveys done in the building (in which relatively free access to personnel and files had been afforded his team), and ended by stating that the coming survey was not a witch hunt nor an investigation of abuses and that therefore he believed that such access could have very beneficial results for the Agency. It was agreed to begin the survey formally with a briefing by the DDO or ADDO on 3 or 4 August 1976. Mr. Walters with several team members will, however, set up shop on 2 August to review such general briefing papers as Mr. Fendig can make available to them at that time.

(signed)
Philip F. Fendig

Philip F. Fendig

SA/DO/O:PFFendig:jl (7368/1398)

Distribution: (all w/att)
Orig & 1 - DDO
1 - ADDO
1 - OLC (Mr. Miller)
1 - D/SEC (Mr. Gambino)
1 - COMPT (Mr. Point)
1 - SSA/DDO
1 - SA/DDCI (Mr. Bolten)
4 - SA/DO/O

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012860

SECRET

[redacted]

AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF
30 JULY 1976

12 months

A. Request statement from Committee representatives of scope, duration and proposed procedure to be followed by Committee investigators.

B. Discussion of arrangements for investigation:

1. Facilities: DDO will provide office space, telephones and secure storage facilities for investigators. Parking spaces and cafeteria priveleges will also be provided.

2. Security:

    a. Badges allowing unescorted access to Headquarters building will be issued, to be picked up and left with receptionist. Agreement to be signed when badge issued, per current procedures governing all Congressional staffs.

    b. Clearances through necessary level to be obtained prior to commencement of briefings or interviews, level to be determined on basis of first meeting.

3. Access:

    a. Orientation briefings on Directorate and its subdivisions to be offered.

    b. Access to personnel and documents within Agency to be controlled by office of SA/DO/O, which will maintain record of all interviews and of documents provided. [redacted]

    c. Documents to be provided upon specific request for study within building. They will be sanitized to protect sources and methods using guidelines previously established for HSC and SSC.

d. Documents to be examined by the investigation team within Headquarters building. If copies of documents are desired, investigators will request them from SA/DO/O who will see that they are provided promptly in appropriate classified and sanitized form. If required by the Committee (outside Headquarters building), same procedure will be followed but will be subject to review by SA/DO/O. [redacted]

e. Formal questions are to be put in writing in order to provide proper and full context so that most complete and pertinent answers can be provided.

f. SA/DO/O to monitor all interviews. [redacted]

g. Discussion of note-taking and reports:

    (1) Maintenance of proper security and classification

    (2) Notes to retain same level of security classification as documents or interviews on which they based.

This notice expires 31 January 1978

DON 5-218

DDO NOTICE
NO. 5-218

GENERAL
4 August 1976

SURVEY BY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF

1. GENERAL

Members of the staff of the House Appropriations Committee began an extensive examination of the Directorate of Operations beginning the week of 2 August 1976. They expect that it will take approximately 17 months to complete this study. They state their activities are necessary to better understand the appropriations process. They emphasize that their objective is not to dig out evidence of wrongdoing or improper activities. The staff members' activities will be coordinated through SA/DO/O. The following paragraphs attempt to anticipate the procedures necessary to exercise orderly control over the staff's activities. These procedures may be subject to modification as future experience may dictate.

2. LOCATION

Members of this Congressional staff have been issued blue badges bearing the words "House Committee" which permit unescorted access to all non-specially controlled areas of the building, including the main cafeteria. The staff will be provided suitable private office space in Room 2 D 0117, adjacent to the office of the SA/DO/O, which will be relocated in Room 2 D 0109 as of 6 August 1976. It is expected that they will initially have a greater interest in interviews than they do in documents. Since they will have adequate office space, interviews should be conducted within their premises.

3. CONTROL OF DOCUMENTS

a. The staff is expected to make any requests for documentation to the SA/DO/O. Individual officers who receive requests from staff members for documents should ask that the request be put to the SA/DO/O. All documents provided to the SA/DO/O for transmittal to the staff will be logged in by the SA/DO/O and logged back to the component after the staff has completed its study. The SA/DO/O will not, as a matter of routine procedure, retain a copy of the document concerned.

b. All documents will be properly sanitized to protect sources and methods. The staff has indicated that it does not anticipate any need for such detail and accepts the principle of sanitization. Any questions concerning the degree of sanitization should be referred to the SA/DO/O. Ground rules for sanitization are similar to those applied during the activities of the Select Committees. General guidelines will be provided separately.

c. On receipt of a document back from the SA/DO/O the recipient should indicate the date received, and that it had been made available to the staff. The document should be retained by the recipient in the form in which it was provided to the staff for possible further reference; the record copy of the document should also reflect the fact that a sanitized copy was provided to the staff. Any further copies of documents requested by the staff will be made only by the office of the SA/DO/O.

4. INTERVIEWS

a. A representative from the office of the SA/DO/O will not necessarily be present during interviews. All interviews should be requested by the staff through the SA/DO/O. The SA/DO/O will maintain a record of the date of interview; the name of the person interviewed, and by whom; the alias if one is used; and the subjects discussed. A form will be provided to the interviewee to record

DON 5-218

DDO NOTICE
NO. 5-218

GENERAL
4 August 1976

the essential facts. He should retain one copy for possible future reference and one copy should be forwarded to the SA/DO/O.

b. It is recognized that the badge access and the length of the stay in the building by the staff members may lead to unscheduled contacts. If such contacts are connected with the official duties of the staff, then appropriate comments should be forwarded to SA/DO/O on the form cited above. Officers should be careful not to allow conversations to drift to areas of interest not covered by official interviews. If this does take place, however, we shall rely on the officer concerned to inform the SA/DO/O of these developments.

5. SECURITY

The blue badge should be sufficient to indicate that staff members should be treated as visitors in the presence of persons not connected with their official duties. Persons introduced under alias should be careful that the alias is protected if a chance meeting takes place in the presence of other colleagues. In this connection, persons interviewed should be careful not to expose associates who have not been interviewed.

William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

cy: A/DDCI (Mr. Bolten) 18 Aug 76

27 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Divisions and Staffs

FROM : Philip F. Fendig
SA/DO/O

SUBJECT : Guidance for Interviews with House Appropriations Committee Staff

REFERENCE : DON 5-218, 4 August 1976

1. You have been scheduled at the time indicated on the cover sheet of this memorandum for a briefing to be given to the five members of the Surveys and Investigations Staff team from the House Appropriations Committee. The subjects which the team would like you to cover are contained in the memorandum distributed prior to the DDO staff meeting on 25 August 1976 and discussed at that meeting. I have explained to the Surveys and Investigations team that topic e (personnel policy and practices) will be discussed at a separate briefing to be given by the Chief, Career Management Group. You should touch on the other topics suggested in the memorandum mentioned above.

2. General guidelines are contained in reference notice. The following may be helpful, however, in preparing your briefing. Our general intention is to be as forthcoming as possible while drawing the line clearly at any information which would lead to the identification of a specific source, intelligence method, cooperating person or group with which the Agency has a relationship of confidence, or confidential matter involving a cooperating foreign intelligence service. The fact of liaison with foreign services can in most cases be acknowledged, but details of the relationship and the subject matter of joint or shared operations should not be disclosed.

3. In the briefing contemplated on management policies and practices, most of the above sensitive areas would not appear to arise, but you may find that questions will tend to bring out some more sensitive areas and these should be deferred with an agreement of looking into the possibility of providing further information later. The staff has already had access to basic budgetary material, including funds and

personnel strengths broken down by component, and a listing by cryptonyms and funding levels of all OPACTS. They have been given a briefing on the current organization of the Directorate of Operations and are aware that its staff elements will shortly be reorganized. They have a listing of all overseas stations and bases. If you have further questions on material already provided to the Committee, please check with this office.

4. Most of the briefings are scheduled to take place in room 2 D 0117; if possible, a member of my staff will be present. We would appreciate, however, a short Memorandum for the Record, using the attached "Interview Form" as a general guide. Space is somewhat limited, but you should bring any supporting personnel you desire to have participate in your briefing. The Surveys and Investigations team is aware that aliases may be used by those with solid cover status; please advise this office if any persons intend to use an alias during these briefing sessions.

5. We will be happy to assist in any way, including follow-up matters which may be developed in the course of these briefings.

Philip F. Fendig

att

August 18, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Philip F. Fendig
SA/DO/O

FROM L. M. Walters, Staff Member
House Appropriations Committee
Surveys and Investigations Staff

Request arrangement for comprehensive briefings with appropriate officials regarding the subjects outlined below be provided to HAC S&I Staff members George C. Baird and Leon F. Schwartz.

1. Paramilitary Covert Action Cadre

Provide in this briefing data relating to the organization, utilization and cost data for this activity for the periods FY 74, 75, 76 and projected data for FY 77 and FY 78. Organizational data should include manning and equipment levels for the aforementioned periods.

2. Reorganization of the Directorate of Operations

Briefing should include rationale behind the proposed reorganization and manpower and dollar savings to be effected by such a change. If additional expenditures in either dollars or manpower positions are involved, justification should accompany the presentation. Explain in detail how the Directorate of Operations plans to absorb the FY 77 loss of 100 manpower positions, if imposed in the pending Appropriations Bill.

3. The Special Projects Group

Explain the rationale behind the transfer of Israel from the Near East Division and providing it with special status by placing it directly under DDO. Additional manpower and dollar costs accompanying this change should be addressed.

4. Coordination Within the Intelligence Community

Briefing should show the identity and purposes of the various task groups established (both within CIA and community-wide) which have been specifically established to deal with the collection vs. analysis problem. Impacts and changes brought about or anticipated within DO as a result of these groups' actions should be covered.

5. Management Policies and Practices of Each DO Staff and Division, (a separate briefing by each) including but not limited to:

a. Overview of role of staff or division

b. Decision-making processes and how coordinated in DO, CIA and intelligence community

c. Organizational structure

d. Program development, and execution from initiation to budgeting to implementation, including development of annual plans, their flexibility, and degree of autonomy of case officers, chiefs of stations, desk officers and division or staff directors.

e. Personnel policies and practices including recruitment, training promotion, position classification, establishment of station complements and rotational policies.

f. Management and accounting controls to assure compliance with laws, executive orders, policies and regulations and assurance that funds and other assets are properly used, expended and receipted for.

While the order of arranging the presentations is not critical, it is suggested that, if possible, item (1.) be presented earliest and that item (5.) be instituted the week of August 30. Please coordinate with either Mr. Baird or myself for prompt scheduling of these sessions. Also, it would be appreciated if a copy of charts or other documentary material used in the presentations could be provided to the attendees during each briefing session.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICA N TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	MR FENDIG		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks: Copies: To Shepanek, Sovern

For your info I have attached pages 6 and 7 of DD/O 76-3259 of 26 May 1976, covering the A/DDO's position with Mr SNODGRASS on MBO.

Also attached is a page from the DCI's statement to the Committee on the same subject (no date)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WALKER	10 Sept 76

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

in attempting to be both forthcoming and helpful to him and the Committee in understanding the DDO's problems. At the same time Mr. Snodgrass pointed out that while he had no quarrel with Mr. Shackley, he continued to be irritated with the totality of the Agency's attitude toward providing him with data. Mr. Snodgrass then launched into a long litany on how the Agency had not been responsive in terms of his needs as he perceived them in the time frame February to May 1976. With that as a backdrop Mr. Snodgrass then launched into his inquiry as to why the Agency was not willing to give him full access to Management by Objective documents. The dialogue which followed on this topic had a natural ebb and flow to it, but the key point that emerged from this is that Mr. Snodgrass continues to feel that unless he can see the Management by Objective documents he will not be able to have a firm understanding of DDO manpower allocation procedures. Secondly, Mr. Snodgrass claims that CIA's position that it will show Management by Objective documents to members of the Committee and not the Staff is an obstructionist tactic. His point being that the members of the Committee do not have the time to look at such documents and they thus depend on the Committee Staff for this type of substantive review. According to Mr. Snodgrass this means that if the Agency will not provide data to the Staff, it is in fact denying information to the Committee members. Attempts were made by Mr. Shackley to show how men of good will on both sides of this question could have an honest difference of opinion on the issue. In this framework Mr. Shackley reiterated the DDO position that access to Management by Objective documents by Mr. Snodgrass would impact adversely on the whole question of sources and methods as well as the integrity of the reporting system. As a followup to this position an effort was made to find out exactly what it was about the DDO manpower allocation system that Mr. Snodgrass did not understand and which he thought he might find out about from an examination of the Management by Objective documents. It was hoped that through this line of inquiry an alternate approach could be discovered which would enable us to deal with Mr. Snodgrass' problems. Our probes in this direction were unsuccessful in clarifying the issue. One can only conclude that Mr. Snodgrass is committed to finding some sort of a formula or equation which will enable him to test our manpower allocation system. We have repeatedly outlined to him the variable factors that go into making judgments on operational deployment of manpower such as what targets are in a country, what are the great power interests in a particular country, what is the operational environment in the country i. e., permissive or not, what are the cover possibilities, what are our liaison equities, and what are our needs for regional support from a particular country. These explanations are taken aboard by Mr. Snodgrass, but he is looking for something else which has less variables in it when, in fact, there is no magic formula for determining how one gets people to commit treason. This portion of the meeting ultimately ended on a friendly note but left unresolved the question of what was it that Mr. Snodgrass really wanted on the issue of manpower allocations and what could CIA tell him that we haven't already told him. (ACTION REQUIRED: Mr. Snodgrass is currently preoccupied with drafting his report on the House Appropriations Committee Mark-up of the DDO FY 77 budget. Once this task is completed Mr. Chin, OLC, will return to see Mr. Snodgrass and will try to obtain an elaboration of what specifically are the manpower issues that trouble Mr. Snodgrass. In this context Mr. Chin has been asked to try to determine if a review, position-by-position, of two or three typical Stations within the DDO might give Mr. Snodgrass the insight into manpower allocations that he is currently seeking.)

9. Comment. In net assessment terms one would have to conclude that the 25 May meeting achieved the optimum that could be expected from this kind of an encounter. On the one hand the attached briefing book which was examined by Mr. Snodgrass was accepted by the latter as a first rate product. For this the Agency gets high marks. On the other hand, the Management by Objective system, because he can't see the documents, leaves Mr. Snodgrass frustrated and irritated. This evokes acrimonious complaints from Mr. Snodgrass with the end result being that the burden for seeking a solution to a problem created by Mr. Snodgrass is placed on the Agency. In short, we have ended up where we expected to be. Put another way, there appears to be no prospect for establishing the type of dialogue with Mr. Snodgrass which satisfies the interests of both parties. We are inevitably doomed to being in an adversary relationship with him, although it is incumbent on us to continue to minimize, to the extent that

13-00

Dick, File per JH

MBO

Mr. Mahon. Would you please provide the Committee staff with some samples of these performance reports, sanitized as you think appropriate?

Mr. Bush. I would be willing to bring some down and discuss them with the Committee off the record, Mr. Chairman. But I am reluctant to do that, and I am even more reluctant to provide the documents themselves or to have their contents described to the Committee by anyone who is not intimately familiar with espionage, counterintelligence and covert action operations and with the entire management system used by the Operations Directorate.

There are a number of reasons for my position. One serious concern revolves around the effects on our internal processes of the sort of inquiry you propose. One of the primary reasons that our internal management system is effective is that participation is strictly limited to those immediately concerned. Given that we are all human beings, there is no escaping the fact that knowledge that the reports in question are being read, or may at some future time be read, by outsiders will lead to their being written with a view to their possible impact on an extended readership. There will be a tendency for the managers in the field to slant their discussions of problems and to exaggerate accomplishments. Inevitably, the net effect will be to reduce the usefulness of the system.

Another difficulty involves security. To be useful for judging performance, the reports must be very detailed. Thus they discuss recruitments in terms of numbers, the specific access of agents to information, recruitment techniques, and so forth. By the time all this sensitive material on sources and methods is removed, any samples are going to consist primarily of disconnected bits and pieces or of unenlightening generalizations.

And I have a third problem with this request. The reports themselves are but one part of a very complex and thorough process we use for internal management. It takes a detailed familiarity with the process to appreciate its effectiveness. Thus, I feel strongly that someone from the Agency who has that intimate knowledge should be present if and when you want to consider the reports.

DCI BUSH
TESTIMONY
House appropriations
Committee

3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*

Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*

Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*

Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):

(a) Members and trainees of ACTION;

(b) Fulbright grantees;

DOI 50-10

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

- **(c)** **Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom;**
- **(d)** **Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations;**
- **(e)** **Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies.**

(2) ***Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence*** **(see paragraph 6):** AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.

- **(a)** Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
- **(b)** DDO agents or assets in the United States;
- **(c)** Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;
- **(d)** Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand;
- **(e)** Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
- **(f)** Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) ***Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO*** **(see paragraph 7):**

- **(a)** Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;
- **(b)** CARE employees;
- **(c)** Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
- **(d)** Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;
- **(e)** Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned;
- **(f)** Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
- **(g)** Officials of the Vatican State;
- **(h)** U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
- **(i)** Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
- **(j)** Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
- **(k)** Volunteers to America.

(4) ***Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division*** **(see paragraph 8):**

- **(a)** Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
- **(b)** Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.;
- **(c)** Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION*

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION.

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. *Fulbright Grantees*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

e. *Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations.

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies*
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions.

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI.

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*

The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

For Germans [illegible] only by

e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.

b. *CARE Employees*

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.

d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United ~~States~~* NATIONS
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations*

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute*

Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America*

Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)

The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.*

The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community.

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is

operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad.

DDO Approval

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph S.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

SECRET

15 November 1974



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                         201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26        POB GERM, BERLIN      TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                   OCC PHARMACIST        OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53  OCC CODE CHEM         RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                           30 NOV 70         00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

SECRET

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISC. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-______________. ☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier) ☐ Non-Restricted Dossier For Split Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to ________ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ________ (date) retained at ____________ desk.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

CL BY: 007622

FORM 8-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REG. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A

RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______

RESTRICTED BY: ______________________ (name)

COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________

SECTION B

REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______________ R.O. No. ________

COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

13-00000

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will 7 destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

15 November 1974

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



FUL 4 CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0230859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1109/0038		90	CHIN, AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU-MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0238629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CNAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CNAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0925340			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CNAT	0832855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130615			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1134/455		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091833			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040289			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-GAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2885/5930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CNAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,YUAN TANG TS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2885/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CNAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2885/2797	A	C1DC22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0488577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3185/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2575/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0044757			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2885/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0073195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2885/9133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179622			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2885/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CNAT	0239156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0647/009		C1AC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0221162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2551/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2873/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0958643			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CNAT	0095967			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/		15APR30	CHIN,SHANGHAI	CMND	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAN /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2885/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0095119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2495/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU TEN /2975/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013731			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TING /7115/0647/6639		C1PC75	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2885/2717/		18MAR17	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	[illegible]			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0317/	A	02FEB05				[illegible]			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAN /7115/2885/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	[illegible]			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2885/5391/		15JUN05	CHIN,FANG CHEN KW		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		[illegible]	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CNAT	[illegible]			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB39	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	[illegible]			CHIN	DENK	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3942/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	TAIW	

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
E2 IMPDET CL BY 056979

PAGE [illegible]

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location
(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
(3) Citizenship
(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname
(b) Given name
(c) Date of birth
(d) Country of birth
(e) Citizenship
(f) OI code
(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

   All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Rscn by
Annex B to Chpt III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dtd
1 [illegible] 62

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

DD/P 1-1220

27 JAN 61

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Related Mission Directive for Mexico

1. Attached is the revised Related Mission Directive for Mexico.

2. Your approval is requested.

J. C. King
Chief, WH Division

CONCUR:

(Signed) S. M. HINES
Chief, DDP/PG

Lloyd George
Chief, FI

Chief, CA

Chief, CI

APPROVED:

Richard Helms
A/Deputy Director (Plans)

3 JUN 1961
Date Approved

24 January 1961
Distribution:
Orig & 2 - WHD
1 - PG
1 - CA
1 - CI
1 - SR
1 - FI/Plans
1 - FI/INT
1 - RI

COPY

RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. National Policy. The long-range national policy objectives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce to an ineffectual level the influence of international Communism, to encourage democratic government, and to keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably inclined toward U. S. policies. Further guidance is given in the current OCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America.

B. Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis will continue to be placed on clandestine collection 24 24 operations and covert action operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico.

C. Changes in the RMD. This basic policy instruction for activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capabilities and direction. In view of the importance and threat presented by Communist Cuba to U. S. interests in Latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The former task for production of motion pictures and their distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid requirement; two former tasks pertaining to the possible use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to develop young potential political leaders (ZREAGER) has 01 been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelli- 29 gence service, and the Station regularly reports on activities of the security services. 29 Coverage of Chinese Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with the elimination of the former Priority C section.

D. Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy Intelligence

S/R

Guides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected that these requirements be satisfied utilizing existing assets. Of particular interest on a continuing basis is information on: (a) any indications that Mexico may be used as a base for clandestine activity directed against the U. S. (CI Book Messages 88 and 115); (b) activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially those that are potentially harmful to U. S. interests; (c) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to their current importance in attempts to overthrow the regimes of their respective Latin American countries; (d) the current alignment and activities of political 24 forces with the potential for assuming control of the Mexican Government; (e) U. S. Communists residing in Mexico; and (f) the Spanish Communist group.

OK

It will be noted that certain previous contingency reporting requirements have been amended as follows: The former levy for reporting on the stability of the Mexican Government has been changed to a more realistic and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above. This modification is appropriate, as political changes in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework of constitutionality. The previous charge for reporting on secret shipments of strategic materials from Mexico 24 to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and has been deleted.

II. OBJECTIVES

PRIORITY A

1. Obtain information on Sino-Soviet bloc plans and activities in Mexico, including those of bloc intelligence services.

   a. Continue and, where possible, increase physical and technical surveillance of bloc installations and residences.

   b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitor the activities of bloc personnel; if conditions warrant, attempt recruitment or defection of bloc personnel.

3/RS

c. Continue CI operations against bloc intelligence personnel.

2. Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Communist and leftist control or influence in key governmental and non-governmental organizations, political parties, mass media outlets, and other elements that influence public or official opinion and policies. 24 24

a. Develop political action penetration agents in key functional groups, such as students, teachers and organized labor, in order to disrupt and reduce their capacity for carrying out action harmful to U. S. objectives and interests. 24

b. Expose and discredit illegal or subversive Sino-Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico, as well as the activities and personnel of international and local Communist front organizations. 08

c. Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminate Communists and pro-Communists from strategic positions in government, educational institutions, state-controlled industrial and agricultural enterprises, labor unions, and student organizations. 24

d. Provide support and give guidance to individuals and organizations that can be induced to produce and disseminate anti-Communist, pro-Free World propaganda via radio, television, newspapers, or other media, and carry out political action operations against Communist or other anti-U. S. elements. 24

e. Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communist political, business or civic leaders to carry out propaganda, economic or political actions against Communist influence and induce them to support views coinciding with U. S. Government policy interests. 24 24

f. Continue to support and guide anti-Communist youth and student organizations, publications or agents, and when necessary, develop additional assets in key schools in Mexico City and selected provinces. 24 24

10/Rs

24

g. Develop and support covert press assets on the staffs of influential newspapers. 24

h. Develop access to individuals and organizations 24 in the labor field and support non-Communist leaders and groups in key unions. 24

3. Obtain information on the organizational structure, key personnel, financing, covert plans and activities of the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM), Communist front organizations and groups, especially the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), and non-Communist and/or anti-U. S. groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by International Communism. 24

a. Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the PCM and the PPS. 24

b. Maintain penetrations of the PCM and seek to penetrate the anti-ENCINA wing of the PCM. 24

c. Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key source in the Workers' University capable of monitoring cultural contacts between the University and bloc diplomatic installations. 24

d. Continue to monitor the activities of selected Communist-influenced labor unions and front groups through the penetration in the PPS; if conditions warrant, make selected recruitments in the unions or groups. 24 24

4. Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U. S. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime.

a. Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats.

24

b. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in Cuba.

c. Secure support of high Mexican Government officials for the conduct of operations against Cuba. 24

d. Continue to provide operational support for activities

1/4/RJ

directed against the CASTRO regime in Cuba.

e. Utilize propaganda media, political action assets, 24 and other covert means to combat the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico.

PRIORITY B

1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U. S. activities in 24 Mexico, and propagandize the dangers of Communism.

   a. Utilize existing media and political action 24 assets to combat anti-U. S. propaganda or activities.

   b. Utilize existing media and political action 24 assets to prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalis and Communists. 24

   c. Utilize media and political action 24 assets to prevent or negate the socio-economic and cultural penetration plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

   d. Spot and develop 24 for future covert collaboration 24 young local figures who show potential for political leadership and who may be influenced to become generally favorable to U. S. interests.

2. Obtain information on the secret intentions 24 and activities of the Mexican Government in foreign affairs, particularly toward the U. S., the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba.

   a. Continue to develop and influence 24 high level contacts in the Mexican Government, particularly the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry. 24

3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc.

   a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers. 24

   b. Recruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected travellers to bloc countries, especially those who will remain in bloc countries for an extended period and who may be on scientific missions.

12/RS

c. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries.

d. Obtain [communications] 24 intelligence on bloc diplomatic [traffic.] 24

4. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico.

a. Spot, assess and recruit or develop sources in the Chinese community.

b. Exploit [the Gobernacion files on] 24 Chinese living in Mexico and effect penetration of the [SNACP.] 24

4/R

78-0070/B

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible]VINE, OHIO
STEWAR[illegible] MC KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES T[illegible]ONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

FEB 21 1978

Mr. Patrick Carpentier
Office of the Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Carpentier:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of President John F. Kennedy, I am writing to request that by March 1, 1978, the Central Intelligence Agency provide a statement explaining in detail the reasons for which a 201 file may be opened. This statement should address the following possible criteria, individually or in any combination, as well as any other possible criteria not specifically listed:

1. Possible and actual sources of intelligence information;
2. Possible and actual intelligence agents, assets, or contract employees;
3. Travelers, particularly travelers to communist or unfriendly countries;
4. Individuals who defect or have attempted to defect to communist or unfriendly countries;
5. U. S. servicemen or former U. S. servicemen who pose counterintelligence dangers by revealing, offering to reveal, or threatening to reveal military or intelligence secrets to communist or unfriendly countries;
6. Individuals whose suspected counterintelligence activities precipitate changes in United States military or intelligence codes, methods, sources or procedures;

7. Individuals who have been contacted by communist or unfriendly intelligence organizations or instrumentalities thereof;

8. Individuals who have received money or other items of value from communist or unfriendly governments or instrumentalities thereof; and

9. Possible and actual foreign intelligence agents or employees.

Please address this statement to the time period 1958-1964 in particular, and indicate whether there were any changes in such criteria during these years. Finally, would you please specify in your response under which criteria, or combination of criteria, if any, the opening of a 201 file was considered to be mandatory during this period.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mgj

SECRET

OLC #78-0070/[illegible]

DO/ISS 78-098

28 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O
Attention: Mr. Shepanek

FROM: William F. Donnelly
Chief, Information Services Staff

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S)

REFERENCE: OLC 78-0070/19, 23 February 1978

1. (S) With reference to the conversation of 27 February between Mr. Shepanek and Mr. Cleffi of ISS, attached are copies of DOHB 70-1-1, 15 November 1974, and an earlier version, CSHB 43-1-1 dated 15 February 1960. A close study of the list of questions submitted by the HSCA Staff has led us to conclude that the most complete and effective way to respond would be by inviting the Staff to review our regulation governing the criteria for opening, maintaining, controlling and closing 201 files by the Operations Directorate. A careful reading of the regulation provides an answer to every question posed by the Staff.

2. (S) The earlier version of the regulation is included to reflect the situation as it existed in the period of their primary concern (1958-1964). The later version provides an expansion, clarification and refinement of the earlier versions.

William F. Donnelly
William F. Donnelly

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 015866

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                          201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26        POB GERM, BERLIN       TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                   OCC PHARMACIST         OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53  OCC CODE CHEM          RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                                30 NOV 70        00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

15 November 1974

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

7

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records systêm and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

13-00000

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of ____ volume(s) of 201-__________.
4.				
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ________ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ________ (date)
14.				retained at __________ desk.
15.				

FORM 3-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

15 November 1974

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ____ BADGE ____ COMPONENT ____ EXT. ____

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REQ. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021):



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______________________ (name)
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________________

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______________________ R.O. No. ____________
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________________

FORM 8-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CONFIDENTIAL E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



FUL A CHINA SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/9030/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0163401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0230859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0086		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, PANCIUPIA, PORT ARTH		CHAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CHAT	0069796			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7119/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CHAT	0812855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/495		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091803			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040288			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-HAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2295/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CHAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHIANG /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,HUAN TANG IS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7119/2995/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CHAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHIN /7119/2985/2797	A	C1DC22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0908577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAN /7115/2985/3185/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/76		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0044759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2985/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0073195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2295/8133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179422			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2985/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CHAT	0239156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2895/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179673			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0647/009		C1DC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0854440			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CHAT	0096947			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7119/2885/0589/		15APR30	CHIN,SHANGHAI	CRMO	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2809/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0083119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103289			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2495/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763816			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TEH /M75/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013991			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639		C1DC75	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2995/2737/		18MAR17	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0767442			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0317/	A	02FEB06				0191329			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAU /7115/2695/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093196			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2899/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN,FANG CHEN KW		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/8992/		07OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CHAT	0343624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB19	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0313610			CHIN	DENK	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0454010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY PAGE 150
E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*
   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.
   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.
   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).
   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*
   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.
   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).
   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.
   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*
   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*
   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.
   b. Military attaches.
   c. Assistant military attaches.
   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

   All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

~~SECRET~~

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Resc by
Annex B to Chapt III
to CSHB 70-1-1 c
, [illegible] -

~~SECRET~~

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                            201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26        POB GERM, BERLIN         TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                   OCC PHARMACIST           OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53  OCC CODE CHEM            RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                          30 NOV 70        00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

7

15 November 1974

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) #____ of ____ volume(s) of 201-__________. ☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier) ☐ Non-Restricted Dossier For Split Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to ______ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ______ (date) retained at ________ desk.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ________ BADGE ________ COMPONENT ________ EXT. ________

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REG. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS   CONFIDENTIAL   CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE BT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______________________
(SIGN)
COMPONENT: ______________ Date: ______________

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______________ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______________ Date: ______________

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CONFIDENTIAL E2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622 1131

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

7

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



```
FUL & CHINA                                   SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
     201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
     03 OCT 1973

            NAME                 TYPE   DOB       BIRTHPLACE                   OCC.  CIT.    201      OI-1  OI-2  ACT.  LOC.  INT.
                                 NAME   DA/MO/YR  CTRY  CITY                                                  CTRY  CTRY  CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/          17JUL14   CHIN,KWANGTUNG                     CHIN?   0165401              CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/                                                  DIPT          0239859              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/     A    24JAN11                                              0178653              CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038          90        CHIN,AMOY                    BUSP  CCOM?   0043751              CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU WEI                          04JAN19   CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.                CHIN?   0234629              CHIN  CUBA
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690          21OCT08   CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH         CHAT    0179620              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001     A    12NOV22   CHIN, HUNAN                        CHAT    0069796              CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-TAO                          18MAR45   CHIN                         DIPT  CCOM    0905390              CHIN  MALT
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1           C41       CHIN, CANTON                 ENGR  CHAT    0837855              CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807          02SEP26   CHIN, LIAONING PRO                 CHIN?   0130415              CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/455           12JAN18   CHIN, FUKIEN                       CCOM?   0091803              CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-YI                           09JUN99   CHIN, CANTON                 PROF  CHIN?   0040289              CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU-SAN                      A    19DEC19   CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV               CHAT?   0052638              CHIN  HWAI
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2595/6930          02JUL30   CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.        ARMY  CHAT    0328328              CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122          19        CHIN,HUAN TANG IS                  CHIN?   0124438              CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2935/2            NOV30     UK                           TSEA  CHAT    0797335              CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2995/2797     A    C1AC22    CHIN,PEILIU                        CHIN?   0200223              CHIN
CHEN, SHU FEN                      R                                                         0988577              CHIN  ETHI
CHEN, SHU HAN /7115/2885/3185/          08JUL16   CHIN,KWANGTUNG                     CHIN?   0179621              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74          10        CHIN,FUKIEN                        CHIN?   0054759              CHIN
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2985/7           23FEB07   CHIN, KWANGTUNG                    CCOM?   0073195              CHIN
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2855/8133          05MAY18   CHIN,FOOCHOW                       CHIN?   0179622              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-HUA                           30MAR26                                DIPT  CCOM.   0223161              CHIN  CEY
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2975/5030/       A    06FEB16   CHIN, HOPEI                  DIPT  CHAT    0839156              CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710          27NOV23   CHIN,FANG CHENG              PROF  CHIN?   0179623              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LAN                      R              CHIN                               CCOM    0221972              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0547/009          C1BC21    CHIN                         DIPT  CHIN?   0223162              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/          25NOV20   CHIN,FENGSHUN                      CHIN?   0179624              CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010           01JUL29   CHIN, KIANGSU                MILA  CCOM    0854440              CHIN  LAOS
CHEN, SHU-MIN                      A    20SEP20   CHIN, HSIAN-HSIEN, KIANGSU         CHAT    0096967              CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/          15APR30   CHIN,CHENGHAI                CHMO  CHIN?   0179625              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/          19DEC19   CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.              CHAT?   0052638              CHIN  HWAI
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2895/2773/     A    10DEC26   CHIN,KWANGTUNG                     CHIN?   0085119              CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091           27JAN25   CHIN, FUKIEN PROV                  CHIN?   0103249              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2495/1795/           21DEC37   CHIN, SHANGHAI               GEOL  CHIN?   0763816              CHIN  BURM
CHEN, SHU TEH /MTS/                V    27MAR20   CHIN, CHANG SHU                            0013951              CHIN
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639          C1BC75    CHIN,HANG CHOW                     CHIN?   0153929              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2995/2737/     -    18MAR17   CHIN                         FIN   CCOM    0747442              CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0337/     A    02FEB06                                              0151320              CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YAU /7115/2655/1031           11NOV06   CHIN, KWANGTUNG                    CCOM?   0093196              CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YIN                      V    05APR17   CHIN,PEIPING                       CHIN?   0107306              CHIN  CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2895/5391/          15JUN06   CHIN,FANG CHEN KU                  CHIN?   0179626              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/          07OCT30   CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN   ARMY  CHAT    0340628              CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-YU                            17FEB38   CHIN, CHEKIANG               INT   CCOM    0313810              CHIN  DENK
CHEN, SHU-YU                            21APR21   CHIN, SHANGHAI                     CHIN?   0144010              CHIN
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/      V    04SEP28   CHIN, SZECHWAN                     CHIN?   0144758              CHIN  TAIW

                                              SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY                                      PAGE  150
                                              E2 IMPDET CL BY 056979
```

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

SECRET

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

SECRET

Resc by
Annex B to Chp III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dat
1 Oct 62 -

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: DE SENSITIZE

Signed: R. Hartman

R.O. #1 - Unit C/I/R+A

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

DIRECTOR

MELBOURNE

C/WH 4

DCI, D/DCI, DDP, C/CI, C/CI/SI, VR

CS COPY

S E C R E T 020422Z

DIR INFO CNBR CITE MELB 2517 (ROLLOFIER ACTING)

GPFLOOR

REF DIR 85690 +

2 DEC 63 IN 71187

1. SQUARE PRELIMINARY CHECKS ON RECORDED CONVERSATIONS REVEAL FOLL:

A NO TRACE 1952 DARK BLUE BUICK BELONGING SOVIET OR BLOC INSTALLATION CNBR OR SYDNEY.

B NO LICENSE PLATE IDENTICAL TO ONE MENTIONED BUT FOLL L.S.W. VARIANTS CHECKED: CCC 012, 1960 VAUXHALL, TWO-TONED BLUE, ERHAR SATRAPINSKY, 149 WENTWORTH AVE, WENTWORTHVILLE; CCC 122, 949 STANDARD, FAUN, WILLIAM JOHN SIMS, BINALONG; CCO 122, 1960 OLDEN, BIEGE, KEITH BETHKE, 28 HEWITT AVE, WAHROONGA. NO SQUARE EROG ON ABOVE.

C NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON AUSSIE MENTIONED CNBR 0591. (IN 68838)

D FRASERS MENTIONED SAME REF ARE ALP MPS.

E INDON FIRST SECY POSSIBLY IDW R. WILLY SASTRANEGARA HAS MOUSTACHE; RUSSIAN CAPABILITY NOT KNOWN TO SQUARE; NOT NOTICEABLY CLOSE TO SOVS CNBR.

Document Number 270-676 for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1976 E IMPDET CL BY 012208

201-289248

D: 200-5-41

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

2. SQUARE 2 HAS ARRANGED WITH PMG LIAISON OFFICER TED YOUNG SE ANY FURTHER CALLS MADE. EMBASSY IN CLOSE CONTACT SQUARE 2 CNBR.

3. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

CRET

/S COMMENT: Hqs requested information on the Polish driver connected with e Russian diplomatic establishment in Australia.

Document Number ---------- for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

SECRET

P4635

Executive Registry
68-5160/1

20 NOV 1968

XAAZ-
35926

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Letter for Director from Sir Charles Spry (ASIO)

1. Attached is a sealed letter from Sir Charles Spry, Director General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (who provided a copy of the letter to the Chief of Station, Melbourne), and a suggested reply for your signature.

2. Sir Charles' letter to you recommends against declassification of the Warren Commission document CD-971, which refers to our investigation of anonymous telephone calls to the Canberra Embassy before and after the assassination of President Kennedy.

3. I consider the points made by Sir Charles in his letter to be valid and accordingly recommend against the declassification of CD-971 in the foreseeable future. CI Staff concurs with this recommendation.

Document Number 1128-988

for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

W. E. Nelson

William E. Nelson
Chief, Far East Division

Attachments, 5
- A. Letter from Sir Charles Spry
- B. Letter Replying to Sir Charles Spry
- C. FAMA 5808, subject: Declassification of Warren Commission Document CD-971
- D. Copy of CD-971
- E. FAMA-5886, subject: Request for Release of Warren Commission Document

cc: DDCI

RI/FILES
FOR FILING

DDP/FE/PMI/AN:Amos Taylor, Jr.:arc (19 November 1968)
Distribution
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
2 - DDP
1 - ADDP
1 - C/CI Staff
1 - CFE
1 - CFE/PMI
1 - CFE/PMI/AN

RECORD COPY

26 Nov 68

201-289248

SECRET

SECRET

Executive Registry
68-5160/a

EDDP 8-4635/1

26 NOV 1968

FILE

Sir Charles C. F. Spry
Director General
Australian Security Intelligence Organization
G. P. O. Box 5105BB
Melbourne

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 15 October recommending against the declassification of Warren Commission document CD-971. I might mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968) was in anticipation of further pressure for the release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is not, at the present time, any intention to release CD-971.

Should the question be raised at some future time, the points made by you in your letter provide every reason to keep the document out of the public domain.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
Orig - Addee
2 - DCI
1 - DDCI
2 - DDP

cc: DDCI

1 - ADDP
1 - CFE
1 - PMI
1 - PMI/AN

Signature Recommended:

Deputy Director for Plans

Date

DDP/FE/PMI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X-5502):aib (25 November 1968)
5681

201-289248

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

6-L

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: DEFERRED TELEPOUCH
DATE-TIME GROUP: 170106Z
CITE: WASHINGTON
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 914708

CONF: IPDP5 INFO: FILE

☐ INDEX DISSEM BY:
☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO PER
☐ IP FILES #

15-5

TO: BRUSSELS.Y

24

FROM: SE/BIO INFO SE/CI/X, SE/X/EU, E/BNL/BH

02 01 OTP

SUBJECT: WNINTEL CKTOP PDGRAVE NIGALE - TRACE ON VLADIMIR KUZNETSOV {ASSIGNED 201-0943610}Y

20-5

REFERENCE: BRUSSELS 41919 |IN 025302| |*|Y

ACTION: FOR LIAISON LESS 201 AND FYIY

IP/EDI		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	☒	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/CR/V		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/MB		FPDE NO. (2, 3)
		REST. CODE
		(11)
		(8)
IP/CRU		FOR FILING

24

1. VLADIMIR KUZNETSOV {ASSIGNED 201-0943610} IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV, A GRU STAFF OFFICER {FYI: 02 PDSATISFY, DOI: 67}.Y

2. FYI: ACCORDING TO 02 PDSTORAGE, AS OF OCT 67, VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV HELD THE RANK OF ENGINEER-MAJOR AND WAS ASSIGNED TO THE THIRD {ANGLO-AMERICAN} DIRECTORATE AT THE GRU HEADQUARTERS IN MOSCOW. SOMETIME EARLIER IN 1967, KUZNETSOV ATTENDED THE MILITARY DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY. END FYI.Y

3. FYI: SUBJECT OF 02 PDSTORAGE AND 02 PDSATISFY INFORMATION IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV {201-0900259} WHO SERVED AS COUNSELOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN JAKARTA FROM 72 TO 75. END FYI.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

B 201-900259

RECORD COPY

17 Sept 76

201-943610

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

10/W

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	AGE	COI	ACP	TOO	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE OF PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DATE-TIME GROUP
CITE
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

914708

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO PER
☐ IP FILES

DISSEM BY: #

4. AS KUZNETSOV IS A COMMON SOVIET SURNAME, HEADQUARTERS WILL RETRACE SUBJECT REF UPON RECEIPT OF PATRONYMIC AND ADDITIONAL PERTINENT BIO DATA.Y

5. FILE: 201-0943610 AND 201-0900259. E-2 IMPDET.H

*REQUESTED TRACES ON PCS SOV

MD40617

DATE: 13 SEPT 76
ORIG: SE/BIO
UNIT: DOREEN PETERSON/KN
EXT: X1551

03

SE/CI/X P.W. JONSSON/L. SULLIVAN [IN DRAFT]

03 03

SE/X/EU M. NOSTER [IN DRAFT]

03

P Champlain
DC/E/BNL
RELEASING OFFICER

E/BNL/B
COORDINATING OFFICERS

03

DC/SE/BI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0590471

7IIN

[illegible]

SECRET

6 June 1960

—PROJECT LINOG COVERS HIM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF DAVID M. WILSTED (ps)

03

1. 03 On 1 June 1960 Mr. (John G. Heyn) and Mr. John Kennedy of WHD, Mr. (Robert Brown) of CI/OPS, Mr. (Robert Bryant) of FI/OPS and Mr. (Charles 03 Bray) of FI/D met with David M. WILSTED (ps). 03

2. WILSTED emphasized that the whole telephone system in Mexico City is undergoing a reformation. The company Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., has sub-contracted this work of cleaning up and reorganizing the phone system to the independent firm, Intel. They are cleaning up unused and old lines, putting in new and spare lines, redefining exchange areas, laying underground cables, etc. Eventually we should be better off because there should be more surplus lines. The renovation work has hampered much of the LIFEAT work, principally because many of the lines now are underground and we cannot get access to them before they enter the central. This is particularly true with respect to the Czech Embassy, to whose telephone lines we cannot obtain access from the vantage point we now occupy.

3. WILSTED said that we try to keep track of the activities of "Intel" but since they seem to attack "Colonias" at random, we have no prior warning of their presence in a certain area.

4. In the recent past, Mexico has been using houses for listing posts for security reasons. We have more control over the access of phone company inspectors or repairman to houses. However, under new regulations, all new apartment buildings must have telephone lines installed in the building by the phone company during the construction phase. This means that the lines and their destination are concealed. WILSTED proposed that this will mean we can again use apartments since we can siphon off a line destined for use by another tenant in such a way that the phone company cannot trace its destination without tearing the building apart and we can then install a separate line to the building and hook up the subscriber to this line which, if checked, will belong to a legitimate subscriber.

5. One system which has been used effectively is to take one-half of two separate pairs which have one faulty line each. These two half pairs then form one good pair which we can use.

6. WILSTED explained that it cost about 3000 pesos to get a regular telephone. This entails the purchase of a telephone company bond, which later can be sold.

4|PV

SECRET

7. Personnel involved in the tapping of the lines are:

06
(Rene)- who has access to the [centrals]. He contacts the following men:
Two brothers
(Jose)- does exchange connections.
06

8. The take from each basehouse is collected early in the morning before office hours by RAFANELLI. He only enters one basehouse which is occupied by an elderly couple. All other contacts are in automobiles made at different spots each day of the week. RAFANELLI then takes the material to a meeting between him, WILSTED and SECHEN where RAFANELLI turns the material over to SECHEN and they all discuss the problems and plans for the day.

9. According to WILSTED there is no live monitoring done by any of the basehouse keepers.

10. There follows a list of the basehouses and the lines covered at each base:

DO! JUNE '61

[redacted]
CHANGED BY '63 ? YES!

a) (Calero 39) 24 - formerly covered American commies, now no lines. Being held for future use.

b) (Juanacatlan 179) 24 - Cuban residence
Russian Commercial
E. T. (Nicaraguan)

c) (Atlixco 47) 24 - 2 Polish
Seborer
Tropete
Bekier

d) (Tenanzingo) 24 - Cuban military office
Cuban Ambassador's office
Campos (travel agency)
1 spare

e) (Aristoteles 80) 24 -UAR
Ejercito Nacional 540 (name of person unknown)

f) (Suderman & Horacio) 24 - facilities for three lines. Formerly processed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open.

g) (Cuautla 131) 24 - 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the [Central])
1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)

9/17

SECRET

ALN-72-77
11 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Miami Field Office

FROM : Chief, Domestic Collection Division, Operations Services Group, Alien Branch

SUBJECT : Case 57845

1. Please show the attached photographs of an unidentified man to Subject. A photograph of this man was published in the Warren Commission report on the assassination of President Kennedy. Copies have also been widely distributed in news media by journalists critical of the Warren Commission investigation. The unidentified man visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City during October 1963. As of October 1963, he was described as approximately 35, athletic build, about 6 feet tall, blond receding hairline with balding top, and wore khakis and sport shirt.

2. We would appreciate any information Subject is able to provide on this man.

3. Should you obtain any OIR reports, please use referent CPLA-006877.

JACKSON R. HORTON

Attachments:
As stated

FJNiemiec/ltg

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
[illegible]

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 006875

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL 181600Z MAR 77 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13919

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

WNINTEL/WOMACE INTERNAL USE ONLY

MIAMI OIR-06870-77

SUBJECT: UNIDENTIFIED KGB OFFICER

REF : DCD CASE 57845
CFLA-006877

1. ON 17 MARCH 1977, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE CUBAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) WAS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER IDENTIFIED THE MAN AS YURI (LNU), A KGB OFFICER, WHOM HE MET IN MOSCOW IN 1964 WHILE ATTENDING AN INTELLIGENCE COURSE IN THAT CITY. HE SAID THAT YURI, A FLUENT ENGLISH AND SPANISH SPEAKER, WAS ACTING AS A TROUBLESHOOTER FOR THE CUBAN GROUP, ABOUT 15, ATTENDING THE COURSE.

2. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER SAID THAT THE CUBAN GROUP, ALONG WITH THE BULGARIANS, WERE QUARTERED IN THE SAME BUILDING IN MOSCOW AND THAT YURI LIVED WITH THEM. ANYTIME THAT THE CUBANS HAD A PROBLEM YURI WOULD SOLVE IT FOR THEM. HE ALSO SAID THAT YURI WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF JUAN (PSEUDO), A KGB OFFICER WHO TAUGHT THE CUBANS ABOUT THE AGENCY AND THE WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS. JUAN TOLD THE FORMER DGI MEMBER ONE DAY THAT HE HAD SERVED IN MEXICO FOR ABOUT 20 YEARS AND IN THE US CLANDESTINELY FOR ABOUT 10 YEARS. AT THE TIME JUAN WAS ABOUT 55 YEARS OLD. YURI DID NOT ATTEND CLASSES WITH THE CUBAN GROUP. HE WAS ONLY ENTRUSTED WITH THEIR WELFARE.
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668
CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000

1/12

3C 2019

05

Source - (Ramiro Perez Rodriguez)

Page count wrong. 86 pages

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Latin America Division	EXTENSION 1431	NO.	DATE 13 July 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. Russell Holmes O/EXO/CI				
2.				
3.				
4. Mr. Scott Breckinridge Principal Coordinator/HSCA				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

13 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Scott Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator/HSCA

VIA : Mr. Russell Holmes
O/EXO/CI

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

1. Attached is a file folder titled "Yuri" which contains informal and preliminary research based on a theory that Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV might be identifiable with the "unidentified man" observed entering and departing the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, in October 1963. Ms. Christine Hopkins undertook to research the theory that MOSKALEV might be the unidentified man as a result of the indepth study she conducted as the Task Force Leader of this Division's efforts to determine if there could have been Cuban complicity in the John F. Kennedy assassination.

2. Although the material contained in the attached folder is entirely theoretical and does not constitute an official file or position of this Division or Agency it may be of interest to Mr. Blakey and Mr. Cornwell of the HSCA.

3. It is requested that you review the material contained in the file folder and, if you consider it appropriate, make the material available for Messrs. Blakey and Cornwell to review with the understanding that it is a theoretical unofficial research undertaking.

Raymond A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren

1 Attachment as stated

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 12180

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Latin America Division	EXTENSION 1431	NO. DATE 13 July 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. O/EXO/CI				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Dup

SECRET

[illegible] JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Scott Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator/HSCA

VIA : Mr. Russell Holmes
O/EXO/CI

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

1. Attached is a file folder titled "Yuri" which contains informal and preliminary research based on a theory that Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV might be identifiable with the "unidentified man" observed entering and departing the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, in October 1963. Ms. Christine Hopkins undertook to research the theory that MOSKALEV might be the unidentified man as a result of the indepth study she conducted as the Task Force Leader of this Division's efforts to determine if there could have been Cuban complicity in the John F. Kennedy assassination.

2. Although the material contained in the attached folder is entirely theoretical and does not constitute an official file or position of this Division or Agency it may be of interest to Mr. Blakey and Mr. Cornwell of the HSCA.

3. It is requested that you review the material contained in the file folder and, if you consider it appropriate, make the material available for Messrs. Blakey and Cornwell to review with the understanding that it is a theoretical unofficial research undertaking.

Raymond A. Warren

1 Attachment as stated
DDO/C/LA/STB/WSturbitts:esm (X9127) (13 Jul 78)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/att
1 - O/EXO/CI w/o att
1 - C/LA w/o att
1 - C/LA/STB w/o att
1 - LA/CO/CIOS w/o att

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 12180

SECRET

SECRET

April 1977

SUBJECT: Theory re MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich and
Unidentified Man

That Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV might be identifiable with the "unidentified man" going into and coming out of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in October 1963. The "unidentified man" was recently identified by SLIPSTREAM as a KGB type by name of "Yuri" whom he knew in Moscow in 1964.

- According to travel records MOSKALEV was in the USSR in 1964.; in the U.S. in October 1963 .
- MOSKALEV functions officially as a Soviet scientist and often attends international conferences. He has been in contact with known GRU Soviet diplomat in the U.S.

MOSKALEV bears a striking resemblance to composite of "Saul" in book Appointment in Dallas who claims he was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. "Saul" claims:

- he crossed border into U.S. illegally and was in Dallas on 20 November.
- That he had been to Mexico City, had a contact in Soviet Embassy there, in 1963, and that he knew the identity of OSWALD because he (OSWALD) had been fingered to him in Mexico City.

- that OSWALD was involved in the Kennedy assassination plot, but that he, "Saul", fired shots that killed Kennedy.

- that two hours after the assassination he, "Saul", was out of the U.S. That he used limp as a disguise.

QUESTIONS

1. Could MOSKALEV be "Saul"?
2. Could MOSKALEV, therefore, be mystery man who boarded plane in Mexico City for Havana on 22 November 1963?
3. Was assassination a Soviet comspiracy without Cuban knowledge?

RECOMMENDATION

1. Can we obtain voice tape of MOSKALEV, since he has delivered speeches at scientific conferences in U.S. and abroad?
2. If so, could we arrange to have McDonald (unwittingly) hear it, to see if he recognizes it as that of "Saul"

Chris Hopkins
LAD/JFK Task Force

1. Can we find photo that PENKOVSKY identified of MOSKALEVSKIY.

2. May I see PENKOVSKIY's 201 file for period 61-63?

3. Get photos and check out MOISEEV and BABKOV.

4. Via CI Staff, find out if we can show photo to DERYABIN and ROSTVOROFF?

5. Could MOSKALEV be Dept 13? Could OSWALD have met with him in Mexico City clandestinely in 1963?

SECRET

26 March 1977

SUBJECT: Juriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

DOB: 23 July 1920

POB: Iguamnovo, USSR

HGT: 172 Centimeters

Hair: Brown (medium light)

Eyes: Gray

Wife: Married to Vera Nikolayevna STRELTSOVA

Children:

Education: Unknown

Misc:. Became a Communist Party member in 1951

Was allegedly imprisoned during war because of his German descent or for black market dealings.

Occ: As of May 1973 was with Institute of Biophysics of the Soviet Ministry of Health. (Dr. of Medical Sciences.) Prof.

1922 - Family moved to Leningrad.

48-70- Lived in Moscow

1958 - Became head of Division of Institute of Biophysics, Soviet Ministry of Public Health

1951-53 Head of Patho physiology Lab, Inst. of Biophysics.

1952 - Last half of year, had a month's TDY at Biophysical Lab. in Moscow.

1953 - When source (Dr. Wilhelm MENKE)STIB, left as Chief of Pathphysiological Lab. at Sungol in Oct. 53, MOSKALEV took that position. He reportedly was not well qualified.

Personal Misc.

1. Very adept diplomat - finds it easy to adopt conversation to group he is with.

2. Excellent chess player, patient with both adults and children.

3. Has dasha near Moscow.

4. Reads, writes, and conprehends English well, but speaks it with less proficiency. Reportedly speaks it much better after few drinks. (He is careful about drinking, if he drinks at all, in relation to attending conferences.)

26 Dec 62 - CIA=A-3.246.539

Re International Conference on Diagnosis and Treatment of Radioactive Poisoning, Vienna, Aust. 15-18 Oct 62. "Most interesting aspect of meeting was conduct and contributions of Prof. MOSKALEV of USSR Academy of Sciences. His subject was listed as "Uptake and Retention of Plutonium in Man"; no abstract was presented. When he spoke he changed the title to "Problems of Kenetics of Uptake and Retention of Radioisotopes." His paper presented nothing new and can be described as elementary. He apparently spoke no English.

19 Jan 63 - OOB 3,248,156.

Information from another source on the above conference. Dr. D. J. SEMENOV and Dr. I.T. TRUGUBENKO ? were invited to attend. The Soviets sent instead, Prof. MOSKALEV. He was bright, but not individual who should have been sent representing the USSR at this meeting. Was said to be his first time out of the USSR. /̲ CDH comment - not so.7̲

9 July 63 - DF-440

(PENKOVSKY)

Source: AEDAZZLE-1 (doi 1961) identified photo(not by name, nor was name supplied) as that of Col. Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY Air Force Col. and GRU officer in Information Directorate of GRU who attended a meeting in London in May or June 1961.

21 Aug 63 - OOB 3,271,609

MOSKALEV participated at meeting of IAEA panel on Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, Austria 4-8 June 63.

18 Oct 63 - OOB 3,278,069

Re Symposium in Vienna, Austria from 26-31 August 63. The Soviets sent a small three or four member delegation headed by MOSKALEV "a very personable and diplomatic gentleman." At the end of the conference MOSKALEV voiced his dismay that the Soviets had misunderstood the exact point of the meeting and had presented very minor papers.

3 Dec 63 - OOB 3,283,411

Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining & Milling, Vienna, Austria late Aug 63. "Due to misunderstanding in USSR, topics covered by symposium were not known sufficiently in advance for Soviet scientists to contribute papers on other than nuclear toxicology." All papers were given by Dr. L. N. BURYKINA in the absence of MOSKALEV et al.

10 Dec 63 -

30 Dec 63 - OOB 3,286,351

MOSKALEV atttended Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63.

23 Jan 64 - OOB 3,288,475

IAEA Symposium on Neutron Irradiation, Brookhaven, Long Island, N.Y. Oct 63. MOSKALEV, one of the Soviet delegates, was frequent commentator on other people's work and made a practice of denigrating their reports with respect to radiation lethality.
Sources (3 U.S. scientists) were asked if they thought MOSKALEV's objectives were motivated from anything more than genuine scientific position. They responded - "Who can say?" MOSKALEV, both from papers he gave and his questions and comments in discussion, indicated he was very sharp. The paper he gave presented no new data. His paper said nothing specific.

24 Oct 66 - OOB 321,15482-66

About one third of the Soviets expected at the Third Int'l Congress of Radiation Research put in appearance. The papers were disappointing. A paper written by MOSKALEV and V.A. STRELTSOVA was not impressive.

16 Oct 67 - OOB 321,30340-67

MOSKALEV attended the Second Int'l Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, 12-14 Sept 67. He presented an interesting paper. He was not expected at the meeting and came alone, arriving two days early. He had furnished no brief and it was a surprise tohear his paper. He understands English reasonably well, but speaks it less well. Therefore, his appearance alone at the conference was even more unusual. He became very interestdd in visiting a certain U.S. facility and pursued arrangements to visit it. U.S. Gov't clearance and permission to visit were obtained, but he "backed-out" (after all had been arranged) saying it was too much trouble for U.S. persons and authorities concerned.

16 Oct 67 - OOB 321,27474-67

MOSKALEV participated in Second Int'l Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, arriving two days early. He had travelled alone to Sun Valley and apparently was able to use his knowledge of English language to get along on his own. However, he complained to Chairman of conference that he did not know enough English to read his paper which also required condensation because it was too long for the time allowed. A colleague who had known MOSKALEV from previous meet-
N.B. ings said MOSKALEV's knowledge of English improved greatly after a few drinks. However, he did not drink at all during this conference. He did mention that he had written the English version of the paper he presented himself. A respected U.S. scientist with more experience than MOSKALEV said he frankly did not believe MOSKALEV's findings. (Said this in private.) MOSKALEV attempted to make propaganda of a report by a West German. MOSKALEV left the conference a
N.B. little upset. He took copious notes on all papers, which indicated he understood what was going on. He also took many pictures with a 35 mm camera. From questions he asked in private, it was obvious he understood English quite well. Considerable time was spent in arranging visit to a U.S. lab. in route to his home. He took a different route, without telling anyone of plans, and did not visit the lab.

1 Feb 70 -

BV

1 Jul 70 - OOB 321/17309-70

Fnu MOSKALEV and P.V. RAMZAYEV were scheduled to attend the Biology & Ecology of Polonium and Radiolead Conf. Sutton, U.K. 30 Apr to 1 May 70, but apparently were not permitted by the USSR to attend.

24 Aug 70 - OOB 321/20573-70

MOSKALEV was among Soviet delegation to Second Int'l Congress on Radiation Protection, Brighton, U.K. 3-8 May 70. MOSKALEV personally attended virtually every session and was very busy asking many questions. He asked all questions through an interpreter, but when answers were given, in English, he always seemed to understand without benefit of his interpreter.

13 Nov 70 - OOA(S) 322/33488-70

Sept 70 MOSKALEV visited a U.S. facility devoted to research in field of nuclear medicine. "It is obvious that he is a careful and trustworthy worker." Visited Brookhaven in Oct 63; Sun Valley in 67; and Hanford Biology Symposium 69.

24 Aug 71 - U.S. Embassy Moscow Airgram

26 Sept 71 - Science Berkeley Lab. 600254

Four Soviet scientists, MOSKALEV, MOISEEV, NENOT and MASSE, participated at the same Transuranium Biology Symposium at Hanford during week of Sept 26. They were in San Francisco by chance at the same time and desired to visit Berkeley on the same day. They did not travel to the conference together. It all seemed to be coincidental. Drs. MOSKALEV and MASSE reportedly understood more English than they could speak. Dr. MOSKALEV was the USSR's rep. on ICRP internal dose committee.

23 Dec 71 - OOE 324/37776-71

Dr. Yuriy I. MOSKALEV, Inst. of Biophysics, Min. of Public Health, visited several U.S. biological and biophysical research facilities. During that time it was learned that he was chairman of the USSR equivalent to the U.S. National Council on Radiation Protection. In this position Dr. Aleksey A. MOISEEV (Central Advanced Institute for Training of Physicians, Moscow) was MOSKALEV's secretary.

25 Oct 71 - Letter to U.S. Atomic Energy Commission from

BATTELLE Pacific Northwest Laboratories

12 May 73 - U.S. Embassy Moscow files

Y

Chris Hopkins

SUBJECT: Passports Used by MOSKALEV, Yuriy
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich

	PP#
1957	Unknown
1962	S-012960
1963	S-022766 S-012960
1964	S-022766
1965	S-022766
1967	O-113459
1968	T-286915
1970	O-286915 S-201222
1971	S-201222
1972	O-068765 S-201222
1974	Unknown

MOSKALEV has following birthdates:

23 July 1920

17 January 1920

21 July 1920

1930

TRAVEL

NAME	DPOB	OCC	PP#	DATE	FROM-TO	
MOSKALEV, Juriy Ivanovich	-	Chem	-	Sept 57	USSR	France
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	S-012960	Oct 62	Aust.	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	-	Oct 62	USSR	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	23/7/20	Biol.	S-012960	Oct 62	USSR	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	23/7/20	Phys.	S-022766	May 63	USSR	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	S-022766	30/6/63	Poland	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	S-022766	8/6/63	Aust	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie.	S-012960	Oct 63	USSR	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie	S-012960	Oct 63	USA	Denmark
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie	S-012960	Oct 63	USSR	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie	S-012960	Oct 63	USA	Denmark
MOSLAKEV , YuriyIvanovich	23/7/20	Scie.	S---------	Oct 63	USSR	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich	23/7/20	--	S-012960	Oct 63	USA	Denmark
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich	23/7/20	--	S-012960	Oct 63	Denmark	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	23/7/20	Medl.	S-022766	9/11/64	--	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	S-022766	14/11/64	USSR	Aust.

NAME	DPOB	OCC	PP#	DATE	FROM-TO	
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	S-022766	15/4/65	Aust	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	S-022766	10/5/65	Czech	Aust
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	0-113459	8/9/67	USSR	Can
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	0-113459	8/9/67	Can	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	0-113459	8/9/67	Can	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Prof.	--	8/9/67	USSR	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Stu	0-113459	8/9/67	Can	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Chem.	T-286915	4/4/68	-	UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Chem.	T-286915	11/4/68	UK	-
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	-	-	-	1/2/70	--	UNNY
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	0-286915	2/5/70	--	UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	0-286915	16/5/70	UK	-
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	S-201222	11/70	USA	Suis
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	S-201222	15/4/71	USSR	UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	S-201222	25/4/71	UK	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	1930	--	--	26/9/71	USSR XXXX	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	S-201222	10/71	USSR XXXXX	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20		S-201222	17/10/71	USA	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	S-201222	25/4/71	UK	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	1930	--	--	26/9/71	USSR	USA
MOSKALVE, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	S-201222	10/71	USSR	USA

NAME	DPOB	OCC	PP#	DATE	FROM	TO
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	S-201222	17/10/71	USA	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Prof	O-068765	11/11/72	-	UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol	S-201222	15/11/72	UK	==
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	--	9/ 3/74	-	Suis



USSR CONFIDENTIAL CIA-P-312403
MOSKALEV, YURIY IVANOVICH. 1971.
INSTITUTE OF BIOPHYSICS,
MOSCOW.

CRS PHOTO

SECRET

April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Identity of the "Unidentified Man" Photographed in Mexico City in October 1963

REFERENCES: A. Photos Taken in Mexico City by Mexico City Station

B. Paperback Book "Appointment in Dallas"

C. Soft File, Headquarters Information on Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV, Possible "Unidentified Man"

1. Photographs of the unidentified man were taken by our Mexico City Station on 2,3,4, and 15 October 1963, going into or coming out of both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City. Copies were provided to the FBI in Dallas, Texas on 22 November 1963. Although cropped copies have appeared in various works, including Volume XX, page 691, of the Warren Commission Report, and the book "Appointment in Dallas", to our knowledge the individual has never beeni identified.

2. On 17 March 1977, a former member of the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) recognized photographs of the unidentifid man as Yuri LNU, a KGB officer, whom he met in Moscow in 1964 while attending an intelligence course there. He said that Yuri, a fluent English and Spanish speaker, was acting as a trouble shooter for the Cuban group, about 15, attending the course. Yuri lived with

the Cuban and Bulgarian groups quartered in the same building in Moscow. Any time the Cubans had a problem, Yuri would solve it for them. Yuri was a good friend of Juan (pseudo) a KGB officer who taught the Cubans about the Agency (CIA) and the West German intelligence apparatus. Juan told the DGI member that he had served in Mexico for about 20 years and in the U.S. clandestinely for about 10 years (specific dates unknown). Yuri was entrusted with their welfare only, and did not attend classes with the Cuban group.

3. SE/X travel records were reviewed in search of an individual by the name of Yuri who possibly fit the description of the unidentified man. This lead to an individual by the name of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV, a Soviet, reportedly a Doctor of Medical Sciences, who has participated in international scientific conferences for the USSR since 1962 or earlier. Although there is no official 201 file on MOSKALEV, there is a sizable dossier on him in the Central Reference Service. Many of the documents in his dossier are OO reports from U.S. scientists concerning MOSKALEV's attendance and behavior at scientific meetings. It is obvious that he has a much greater knowledge of the English language than he admits. His capability is said to improve greatly after a few drinks; however, it is noted that he rarely, if ever, drank at the scientific meetings. It is also noted that on occasions he reportedly was not qualified to represent the Soviets at a particular conference. His papers rarely, if ever, were specific, or presented new data.

Following are items of interest from selected documents in MOSKALEV's CRS dossier:

a. In 1961 PENKOVSKY identified a photo (with no name provided) as that of Col. Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY, Air Force Col. and GRU officer in the Information Directorate of the GRU.

b. [In December 1963 the FBI reported

FBI

c. In October 1963 MOSKALEV was a delegate to the IAEA Symposium on Neutron Irradiation, Brookhaven, Long Island, New York. Described by U.S. scientists as very sharp, MOSKALEV was a frequent commentator on other people's work and made a practice of denigrating their reports with respect to radiation lethality.

d. In October 1967 MOSKALEV participated in the Second International Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, arriving two days early. He travelled al[illegible] to Sun Valley and appar[illegible] was able to use his knowledge of the English language to get along on his own. Although he complained about not knowing much English, he admitted writing the English version of the paper he presented. MOSKALEV attempted to make propaganda of a paper by a West German scientist. A respected U.S. scientist said he frankly did not believe MOSKALEV's findings. MOSKALEV took copious notes on all papers, which indicated he understood what was going on. He also took many pictures with a 35 mm camera. From questions MOSKALEV asked, it was obvious that he knew English quite well. Although considerable time was spent arranging for MOSKALEV to visit a U.S. laboratory en route to his home, he took a different route, without telling anyone of his plans, and did not visit the lab.

FBI

FBI

STATE DEPT

STATE

4. On 23 March 1977 several identification experts of the Disguise and Identification Section of OTS/GAD compared photos of the unidentified man with photos of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV from the FBI, British Liaison, and CRS. It was their opinion that MOSKALEV could very likely be identifiable with the unidentified man.

5. Page 59 of the book "Appointment in Dallas," shows an Identi-Kit Model composite of an individual who told the author in London in 1972 that he was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. The composite of that individual (code name "Saul"), whose real name is unknown to the author, bears a striking resemblance to the photos of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV. According to the author "Saul"identified the picture shown in the Warren Commission Exhibit #237 as having been taken at the Russian Embassy in Mexico City, either in the foyer or just outside.

6. The author of the aforementioned book, Hugh C. McDonald, is the inventor of the Identi-Kit and at one time was under contract to CIA in regard to the Identi-Kit. McDonald claims in his book that he met "Saul" at an office in CIA Headquarters sometime after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and that a colleague of McDonald told him that "Saul" was an assassin.

7. There are striking parallels between the backgrounds of "Saul" as given in McDonald's book, and MOSKALEV. For example:

"Saul"	AGENCY INFO. MOSKALEV
Pg. 7 - CIA allegedly knew of Saul. McDonald said he first met Saul in CIA Hqs. CIA took picture of Saul that started McDonald's investigation.	According to Office of Security, McDonald has been in touch with CIA in relation to his Identi-Kit. His FILE [redacted] states he was a cleared source of LAFO/DCS - doi September 1969. (contract agent) It is true that Mexico City Station took photos of "Saul" that McDonald claimed started his investigation.
Pg. 59 - See Identi-Kit composite of "Saul".	CDH comment: See photos of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV. He bears striking resemblance to "Saul."
Pg. 60/61 - McDonald states it was obvious that FBI and CIA were compromised at the very top since both Agencies denied knowledge of "Saul". No one wanted to hear anymore about him.	Helms, the DDP testified under oath that he didn't know "Saul."

Pg. 69 - McDonald began his search of "Saul" in 1970. It began, he said, with a call from an unidentified woman who arranged a meeting in London and told him she believed the Russians had a germ warfare installation in Vozrozdenya, in the Aral Sea. McDonald obtained CIA approval to make contact.	Note MOSKALEV's scientific background and travel. He was in the U.K. in 68,70, 71 and 72. Background is biophysics. MOSKALEV's (GRU) contact BUBNOV/"specialized in chemical warfare".
Pg. 70 - In Germany in 1945 McDonald knew of 12 people (Poles, Czechs, Rumanians, Germans, Scandinavians, 2 Russians) who feared and hated Russia. They formed org. to observe, analyze, and report all future activities within Russia and Russia sphere of control. Most had legitimate jobs.	MOSKALEV was allegedly imprisoned during war because of his German descent or for black market dealings. Could he be a double agent?
Pg. 71 - 24 Sept 70 McDonald left for London with "Saul's" picture. McDonald said both he and Saul were contract men for CIA. Saul did dangerous jobs for private interests.	McDonald met Saul in London July 72. MOSKALEV travel shows him in London Nov 72.
Pg. 73 - McDonald learned that on Island of Vozrozdenya, Aral Sea, germ warfare was being planned against U.S. (Russians transmit germs in jet streams).	

Pg. 75 - McDonald showed photo of Saul to man. Man asked if McDonald's interest had to do with murder of Pres. in 1963. McDonald said no, he wanted to talk to him (Saul) on business.	
Pg. 76 - By now McDonald was sure that "Saul" was reasonably well-known in highly specialized circles on the European continent.	MOSKALEV is known in international circles as scientist.
Pg. 81 - McDonald says that co-relation between activity on Vozrozdenya and new types of influenza in U.S. is disturbingly exact.	
Pg. 92. - Man told McDonald in summer of 1970 on outskirts of Gormisch, that he was dying from radiation sickness. He was flown to Vozrozdenya where he was lead to believe there was hospital that specialized in cases of radiation sickness and he would be looked after by famous doctors. Was interviewed by 3 Russian specialists: Emile KROPTATE Peter GORSACH Marion LENTZEN	MOSKALEV was delegate to 2nd International Congress on Radiation Protection, Brighton, U.K. 3-8 May 70.

Pg. 95 - At hospital ~~he~~ was orderly by name of Ivan. There were other young interns, orderlies, etc., there.	MOSKALEV's middle name is Ivanovich; so is BUBNOV's .
Pg. 99 - Some momths before Kennedy was killed, an inquiry was being circulated, about this man (Saul). Someone wanted to contact him. Word went out that someone needed his services.	
Pg. 109 - An alleged former Agency employee/(McDonald called Kimsey) said the scheme which "Saul" described [to kill the president] could not possibly have been activated without help from very high places in this country. (U.S.)	
Pg. 117 - Saul did not know he was being called Saul.	
Pg. 119 - Saul told Kimsey that he often used limp as part of his disguises.	
Pg. 120 - In Zurick in 1972 McDonald saw four men. Three Arabic and one who had a blunt, Slavic fact with a broad-typed nose, about 40.	Could this have been MOSKALEV?

Pg. 121 - Kimsey felt that Saul was a middle-European, so probably grew up with German as second language. "Saul" spoke English like an American.	MOSKALEV has much greater knowledge of English than he pretends or admits.
Pg. 143 - "Saul" said he came back to the U.S. for a short period one time, lived in Southern Calif. for about a month, or six weeks, then moved to Mexico. Said business was good in Mexico, and that made it easy, or easier, to try to make contact with whoever was trying to make contact with him.	
Pg. 164 - "Saul" said a contact he knew/ namedTroit would have OSWALD in Mexico City 26 Sept to 3 Oct. and that OSWALD would call on both the Cuban Consul and Soviet Consul. "Saul" said he did not have a photo of OSWALD but had a contact in the Soviet Embassy would do the job (identify OSWALD) for him. Saul said OSWALD did show up in Mexico City and was fingered to him. He sat close to him in restauratns and cafeterias.	According to our records, OSWALD was in Mexico City between those dates, and was in contact with the Cuban and Soviet Consuls.

Page 167: "Saul" said he left for the U.S. in Nov 1963 but would not say how or where he crossed the border. On evening of the 20th of Nov he was in Dallas.	McDonald said that as a professional assassin with international clientel, "Saul" had to master the art of crossing borders illegally, so that no record is kept. False passports are easiest methods.
Page 177: "Saul" desccibed how he shot President Kennedy from 2nd story window of County Records Bldg.,	
Page 178: "Saul" said that he used "limp" disguise" out of bldg., and in 2 hours was out of the U.S.	Could "Saul" be mystery man who boarded plane for Havana? See DIRECTOR 36054. Flight from Mexico City reportedly delayed from 1700 to 2200 hours for passenger who arrived at 2130.
Page 182: McDonald remembers "Saul's" statement that long before the Warren Commission even existed he had been told that there was a possibility that such a bullet would be planted to tie in OSWALD's rifle positively to the shooting. It therefore appears that the mere existence of CE No. 399 tends to prove the accuracy of "Saul"s statement and the presence of a conspiracy.	

Page 185: McDonald [illegible] he believes "Saul" was telling true story.	CDH - I do too.
Page 94: McDonald finds buck passing so pervasive that he cannot escape suspicion of a continued and officially backed cover-up.	
Page 199: McDonald said he thinks Herman KIMSEY (what was true name?) was the mentor or contact for "Saul" wherever Saul worked with the Agency.	Can we identify KIMSEY? Was he really working for Agency?
Page 203: "Saul" moves from country to country, avoiding the U.S. except in extremis but keeping in touch with his contacts in Guatemala and Mexico. He calls THEM. Spends much time in Europe. Has no wife, children, or friends. Is voracious reader.	
Page 204: "Saul" went into Westbury Hotel without a tie.	
Page 205: "Saul" had recently given up smoking (1972?) but still had nicotine stains on fingers.	Does MOSKALEV smoke?

Chris Hopkins
LAD/JFK Task Force

27 September 63: OSWALD went to Cuban Embassy, Mexico City and made appoint for visa to Cuba on way to USSR. OSWALD to Soviet Embassy to get letter of recommendation. They wouldn't give it to him because they didn't know who he was.

OSWALD went to Soviet Embassy on 27 Sept.

" then went back to Cuban Emb. on 27 Sept.

Valery KOSTIKOV talked with Sylvia Duran and said Soviet had never heard of OSWALD.

SUBJECT: Unidentified Man Seen Going into Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City in Oct 1963. Photos Taken by Mexico City Station











Subject: Unidentified Man

1. A photograph of this unidentified man was published in the Warren Commission report on the assassination of President Kennedy. Copies have also been widely distributed in news media by journalists critical of the Warren Commission investigation. The subject visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City during October 1963.

2. As of October 1963, he was described as:

Apparent age: 35

Athletic build

About 6 feet tall

Blond, receding hairline with balding top

Wore khakis and sport shirt.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Case 53034

FROM:
DCD/OSG/Alien Branch
[redacted]
203 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2775

NO.:

DATE: 6 Apr 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. LA/COG/NY Attn: [redacted] 3D 5325				REF: LA/COG-068-77, dated 3 Mar 77 Attached copy of memo SF-137-77, dated 29 March is in response to reference. Attached also are related photographs. [redacted]ltg
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				E 2 IMPDET CL BY 006875
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SF-137-77

TO : Chief, Domestic Collection Division DATE: 29 March 1977

ATTN : OSG/Alien [redacted]

FROM : Chief, San Francisco Office

SUBJECT: Case 53,034 - Resettlement Case

REF : ALN-71-77

1. Subject examined the photographs of the unidentified man very carefully but was unable to provide any information. We did not mention the fact that a photograph of the man had been published in the Warren Commission report until Subject said that he was unable to identify the man. Subject still could not make any comment about the identity of the man.

2. We are returning the photographs of the man as requested. We regret that Subject was unable to be of greater assistance on this matter.

for E. S. Ratenburg
CHARLES R. CARLSEN

EBAmes:mm

Enc: Photographs

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 031686

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ [illegible]RNAL [illegible]NLY ☐ CONF[illegible]NTIAL SECRET SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: AM OTS/GAD/A/OPS 227 Central Bldg	EXTENSION 2444	NO. AB MEMO NO. 194 DATE 29 MARCH 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DC/OTS/GAB/A	29 Mar	77	✓	
2.				
3. C/OTS/GAD	✓	✓	✓	
4.				
5. Deputy Chief, Latin America Div 3C2019 HQS			CH	
6.				
7. LAD/TASK FORCE				
8. C. Hopkins				for files MOSKALEV.
9.				
10.				
11.				2 photos - 1 from FBI (State) 1 " Bus. liaison
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

SECRET

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AB MEMO NO. 194
29 MARCH 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Latin America Division

ATTN : Chris Hopkins

FROM : Graphics and Authentication Division/Senior Operations Officer

SUBJECT : Photo Comparison

REFERENCE : DDO/LA Division Memo, dated 25 March 1977

1. On 23 March, Chris Hopkins of Latin America Division handcarried photographs to OTS/GAD for identification comparison. These photos were examined by the undersigned and two identification experts of the Disguise and Identification Section.

2. The results of the comparison is as follows:

A. Facial Shape - Close similarities, although there are slight differences which are probably due to subject's age differences.

B. Chin - Fair similarities-the loss of muscletone due to ageing is most apparent here.

C. Hair Line - Again good similarity with the natural ravages of time factored in.

D. Set and Proportion of Eyes and Eyebrows - Close similarities. (Comparison of eye detail is not possible due to poor photo quality)

E. Nose and Caliper Lines - Close similarities in the nose but the younger man has no sign of the distinctive caliper lines which extend from the nose to either side of the mouth on the known Soviet. This could be explained by loss of muscletone and/or differences in lighting.

F. Mouth - The shape, proportion and expression of the mouth and the whole area from the tip of the nose to the tip of the chin is perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of both subjects. Here the similarities are very close.

SUBJECT: Photo Comaprison
PAGE -2-

G. The proportions of the head, check bones and the body style of the younger man tend to indicate he is of slavic origin.

3. The results of this type comparison are rarely absolute and are usually limited by poor photo quality or differences in viewing angle. With that understood it is our opinion the two subjects of the forementioned photo comparison could very likely be the same person. If additional photographs of the subjects, particularly if they are of better quality, are obtained, we would be happy to examine those as well.

Antonio J. Mendez
Senior Operations Officer,
OTS/Graphics and Authentication Division

14-00000

NSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: Chris Hopkins, LAD/Task Force

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

FROM:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

SECRET

25 MAR 77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OTS/GAB

ATTENTION : Acting Chief, OTS/GAB/DIS

FROM : George V. Lauder
Deputy Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Photo Comparison

This is the official follow-up, requested by you, of the visit to your office by Chris Hopkins on 23 March 1977 for the purpose of photo comparison. Although a preliminary analysis was given Ms. Hopkins at that time, it was understood that you would provide a written analysis for the record. Your assistance is much appreciated.

/s/ George V. Lauder
George V. Lauder

DDO/LAD Task Force/CHopkins:rp(25 Mar 77) 1839

Based on: Photos of unknown man taken in front of Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City in October 1963; Photos of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV.

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addee
1 - LAD/Task Force Chrono
1 - Chris Hopkins
1 - DC/LA

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 056852

[illegible]
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

3C 2019

Source - Ramiro Perez Rodriguez

SECRET

ALN-72-77
11 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Miami Field Office

FROM : Chief, Domestic Collection Division,
Operations Services Group, Alien Branch

SUBJECT : Case 57845

1. Please show the attached photographs of an unidentified man to Subject. A photograph of this man was published in the Warren Commission report on the assassination of President Kennedy. Copies have also been widely distributed in news media by journalists critical of the Warren Commission investigation. The unidentified man visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City during October 1963. As of October 1963, he was described as approximately 35, athletic build, about 6 feet tall, blond receding hairline with balding top, and wore khakis and sport shirt.

2. We would appreciate any information Subject is able to provide on this man.

3. Should you obtain any OIR reports, please use referent CPLA-006877.

JACKSON R. HORTON

Attachments:
As stated

FJNiemiec/ltg

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 006875

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

C O N F I D E N T I A L 181600Z MAR 77 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13919

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

WNINTEL/WOMACE INTERNAL USE ONLY

MIAMI OIR-06870-77

SUBJECT: UNIDENTIFIED KGB OFFICER

REF : DCD CASE 57845
CFLA-006877

1. ON 17 MARCH 1977, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE CUBAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) WAS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER IDENTIFIED THE MAN AS YURI (LNU), A KGB OFFICER, WHOM HE MET IN MOSCOW IN 1964 WHILE ATTENDING AN INTELLIGENCE COURSE IN THAT CITY. HE SAID THAT YURI, A FLUENT ENGLISH AND SPANISH SPEAKER, WAS ACTING AS A TROUBLESHOOTER FOR THE CUBAN GROUP, ABOUT 15, ATTENDING THE COURSE.

2. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER SAID THAT THE CUBAN GROUP, ALONG WITH THE BULGARIANS, WERE QUARTERED IN THE SAME BUILDING IN MOSCOW AND THAT YURI LIVED WITH THEM. ANYTIME THAT THE CUBANS HAD A PROBLEM YURI WOULD SOLVE IT FOR THEM. HE ALSO SAID THAT YURI WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF JUAN (PSEUDO), A KGB OFFICER WHO TAUGHT THE CUBANS ABOUT THE AGENCY AND THE WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS. JUAN TOLD THE FORMER DGI MEMBER ONE DAY THAT HE HAD SERVED IN MEXICO FOR ABOUT 20 YEARS AND IN THE US CLANDESTINELY FOR ABOUT 10 YEARS. AT THE TIME JUAN WAS ABOUT 55 YEARS OLD. YURI DID NOT ATTEND CLASSES WITH THE CUBAN GROUP. HE WAS ONLY ENTRUSTED WITH THEIR WELFARE.
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668
C O N F I D E N T I A L

14-00000

TI SMITTAL SLIP

DA 2 March

TO: Chris Hopkins

ROOM NO. 3D57

BUILDING

REMARKS:

BU-4

Amber

[illegible]

[illegible]

FROM: Mailey LY/INFO

ROOM NO. 1E41

BUILDING

EXTENSION 1479

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

14-00000

National Library of Medicine

PROG:

1
~~AU - Moskalov YI~~
AU - Levdik TI
AU - Lyubchanskii ER
AU - Nifatov AP
AU - Erokhin RA
AU - Buldakov LA
AU - Lemberg VK
AU - Koshurnikova NA
AU - Filippova LG
AU - Ternovskii IA
TI - Metabolism and biological effects in rodents of plutonium and other actinide elements. pp. 1214-32.
SO - In: Nygaard OF, et al., ed. Radiation research: biomedical, chemical, and physical perspectives. New York, Academic Press, 1975. W3 IN558 197r. :

SS 2 /C?
USER:
NOS

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	**DATE** 25 Mar 7.
TO: Chris Hopkins	
ROOM NO. 3D57	**BUILDING**

REMARKS:

BU-4

amber

FROM: Hailey LY/INFO		
ROOM NO. 1E41	**BUILDING**	**EXTENSION** 1479

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

Soviet Personalities in Biomedicine 2 (new publication)
1974

NAME: MOSKALENKO N P

SPECIALIZATION: INTERNAL MEDICINE

CAREER POSITIONS: INST OF CARDIOLOGY IM A L MYASNIKOV, AMS USSR, M

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES:
"CHANGES OF THE TOTAL AND RENAL HEMODYNAMICS IN ORTHOSTATICS IN HEALTHY PERSONS AND IN ORTHOSTATIC HYPOTENSION" (CO-AU)
"COMPENSATORY CHANGES IN THE KIDNEYS IN UNILATERAL AFFECTIONS AND NEPHRECTOMY" (CO-AU)
"THE DIURETIC AND HYPOTENSIVE EFFECT OF UREGIT (ETHACRINIC ACID)" (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKALENKO YU D

SPECIALIZATION: CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY

CAREER POSITIONS: DIV OF VASCULAR SURGERY, INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY IM A N BAKULEV, AMS USSR, M

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES:
"THE CLINICAL PICTURE, DIAGNOSIS AND SURGICAL TREATMENT OF CONGENITAL ARTERIOVENOUS FISTULAS OF PERIPHERAL VESSELS" (CO-AU)
"HEMODYNAMICS WITH ARTERIOVENOUS FISTULAS (ON DATA OF CARDIOGRAPHY AND SCANNING OF THE HEART CAVITIES)" (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKALENKO, YURIY YEVGEN'YEVICH

SPECIALIZATION: PHYSIOLOGY

CAREER POSITIONS: HEAD, LAB OF REGULATION OF BLOOD CIRCULATION IN THE BRAIN, INST OF EVOLUTIONARY PHYSIOLOGY AND BIOCHEMISTRY IM I M SECHENOV, AS USSR, M

PUBLICATIONS, BOOKS:
INTRACRANIAL BLOOD CIRCULATION UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF STRESS AND WEIGHTLESSNESS, M, 1971 (CO-AU)
DYNAMICS OF BLOOD FILLING OF THE BRAIN UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS AND DURING GRAVITATIONAL LOADS, L, 1967

NAME: MOSKALEV, YURIY IVANOVICH

SPECIALIZATION: ROENTGENOLOGY AND MEDICAL RADIOLOGY

CAREER POSITIONS: INST OF BIOPHYSICS, M

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES:
"CHANGES IN LENS OF RATS AFTER TOTAL EXTERNAL BETA-IRRADIATION" (CO-AU)
"THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF EUROPIUM-152 AND CURIUM-244" (CO-AU)
"THE DISTRIBUTION AND BIOLOGICAL EFFECT OF CALIFORNIUM-252" (CO-AU)
"THE EFFECT OF SUB-ACUTE 241AM DOSES ON RABBITS" (CO-AU)
"EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS ON RADIOBIOLOGY IN THE USA"
"WAYS AND PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED IN APPLYING ANIMAL EXPERIMENTAL DATA TO MAN"

PUBLICATIONS, BOOKS:
THE RADIOBIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENT AND MAN, M, 1969
PROBLEMS OF THE DISTRIBUTION AND EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF PERMISSIBLE LEVELS, M, 1968 (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKALIK K G

SPECIALIZATION: ONCOLOGY; ROENTGENOLOGY AND MEDICAL RADIOLOGY

CAREER POSITIONS: RESEARCH INST OF ONCOLOGY IM N N PETROV, L

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES:
"EFFECT OF ENERGY MAGNITUDE OF IMPULSE AND RHYTHM OF IRRADIATION ON THE ANTITUMOR EFFECT OF LASER RADIATION" (CO-AU)
"QUESTIONS ON THE USE OF LASERS IN ONCOLOGY" (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKOVICH E G

SPECIALIZATION: INTERNAL MEDICINE

CAREER POSITIONS: CLINICAL HOSPITAL IM S P BOTKIN, M

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES:
"DEVELOPMENT OF A GRAVE FORM OF DIABETES MELLITUS AND OF HYPERGLYCEMIA IN TWO PATIENTS AFTER TAKING HYPOTHIAZIDE" (CO-AU)
"TWO CASES OF HYPEROSMOLLARY COMA DURING DIABETUS MELLITUS" (CO-AU)

PUBLICATIONS, BOOKS: DIABETES MELLITUS AND DISEASES OF THE EYES, M, 1966 (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKOVKINA O YA

SPECIALIZATION: ONCOLOGY; VIROLOGY

CAREER POSITIONS: EXPERIMENTAL TUMOR THERAPY LAB, RESEARCH INST OF ONCOLOGY IM P A GERTSEN, M

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES:
"THE EFFECT OF A COMBINED THERAPY OF VIRAL LEUKEMIA OF MICE WITH CYCLOPHOSPHANE AND COMPLETE FREUND ADJUVANT" (CO-AU)
"STIMULATION OF CC57BR-BV VIRAL RETICULOSARCOMATOSIS BY COMPLETE FREUND'S ADJUVANT IN MICE" (CO-AU)
"STIMULATION OF RAUSCHER-VIRUS-INDUCED LEUKEMOGENESIS BY COMPLETE FREUND'S ADJUVANT" (CO-AU)

EDUCATION: DR MED SCI (1967)

SPECIALIZATION: PEDIATRICS; ORTHOPEDICS AND TRAUMATOLOGY

CAREER POSITIONS: HEAD, CHAIR OF PEDIATRIC SURGERY AND ORTHOPEDICS, STATE MEDICAL INST, TOMSK, RSFSR for Chris M.

Intelligence Informat. ı Report

~~6602547~~

Dupe.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.	OO-E-324/37776-71
SUBJECT	Visit to US by Yu I Moskalev and Alex Moiseev/Current Positions/Moskalev's Research Program/Personality Data	DATE DISTR.	23 DEC 71
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	

DATE OF INFO. October 1971

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE US/October 1971

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US biophysicist who had conversations with Yu I Moskalev and Alex Moiseev during the visit of the two Soviets to the US in October 1971.

1. In October 1971 Dr Yu I Moskalev, Institute of Biophysics, Ministry of Public Health, ~~Moscow~~ and Dr Alex Moiseev, Central Advanced Institute for Training of Physicians, Moscow, visited several US biological and biophysical research facilities. During one of these visits it was learned from Moskalev that he is the Chairman of the USSR equivalent to the US National Council on Radiation Protection. In this position, Moiseev is Moskalev's secretary.

2. Moiseev was a difficult individual to figure out. He stated that his training is in health physics and that his job in the USSR is to be informed at all times of the status of US health physics and radiation protection programs. He said that he reads the US journal "Health Physics" regularly as well as other Western radiation research journals. Although in discussions with Moiseev he appeared to be technically competent, he kept very close to Moskalev and rarely let him out of his sight. If Moiseev is Moskalev's "guardian" (as he appeared to be) he let his own guard down during a cocktail party hosted by Dr David M Taylor, Department of Biophysics, Institute of Cancer Research, Belmont, UK. During the course of the evening Moiseev consumed countless gin and tonics until he could barely articulate. Moskalev, on the other hand, sipped one or two drinks all evening.

3. Moskalev was a very adept diplomat. He finds it easy and convenient to adopt his conversation to whatever kind of group he is with. He talked at considerable length about the role of women in the Soviet economy and mentioned that his own wife is a pathologist. He was always much freer in his conversation when Moiseev was out of hearing.

4. In terms of his professional work, Moskalev stated that he has a program in the USSR of exposing dogs to various doses of radiation to learn the biomedical effects of radiation. It is a program quite similar to that at the Lovelace Foundation in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The major difference being that whereas the Lovelace inhilation experiments involve only the beagle dog, the Soviets do not use a controlled breed, but rather use mongrels. Moskalev's budget, which

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM **NO DISSEM ABROAD**

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to ·nizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

he implied was sufficient, comes from the Soviet Ministry of Health. The actual Soviet work with the dogs is virtually parallel that in the US. It involves studying the low level effects of radiation from inhaled or injected materials.

5. Moskalev's work appears to be very good as far as it has gone. But he has only worked with nitrates and chlorides of plutonium, not with plutonium oxide. Oxides (solid components) should be of interest to anyone working in this field because the chemical forms of plutonium are quite useful to know about when doing accident type studies — to understand plutonium metals it is essential to know about plutonium oxide. Whether the Soviets are working only with solutions rather than oxides is not known. It is always possible, of course, that Soviet work with plutonium oxides is classified.

- end -

(600254

Battelle
Pacific Northwest Laboratories
Battelle Boulevard
Richland, Washington 99352
Telephone (509) 946-2121
or 942-1111
Telex 36921

October 25, 1971

Mr. D. G. Williams
Manager
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Richland, Washington 99352

Dear Mr. Williams:

Report on Visit of USSR Citizens to Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Visitors

Professor Yuriy I. Moskalev, Institute of Biophysics, Ministry of Public Health, Zhivopisnaya 46, Moscow D-182, USSR.

Professor Aleksey A. Moiseev, Central Institute for Advanced Medical Studies, 2 Botkinsky proezd 7, Moscow A-284, USSR.

Date

Visitors arrived in Richland at 12:35 p.m., September 27, 1971 and departed early on October 2, 1971. They stayed at the Rivershore Motor Inn.

Schedule of Visit

September 27, 1971 - 2:30 p.m. Attended Dedication ceremonies for new Life Sciences Laboratory in 300 Area.

6:30 p.m. Symposium banquet at Rivershore Motor Inn.

September 28, 29, 1971 - Attended Biology Symposium on The Biological Implications of the Transuranium Elements at the Rivershore Motor Inn. The symposium was sponsored by the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine and Battelle-Northwest.

September 30, 1971 - Attended meeting on Transplutonium Registry organized by the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine and Hanford Environmental Health Foundation.

October 1, 1971 - Visited Biology Department staff in Life Sciences Laboratory, 331 Building, 300 Area.

Participation in Symposium and Transuranium Registry Meeting

Five contributed papers and one invited paper by USSR scientists were included on the symposium program and were presented by Drs. Moskalev and Moiseev. These included:

1. Yu. I. Moskalov. Plutonium-239: Problems of Its Biological Effect (Invited).

2. L. A. Buldakov, Z. I. Kalmykova, A. P. Nifatov, V. N. Doshchenko, I. A. Tseveleva, G. S. Mushkacheva, N. P. Kudasheva, V. M. Pesternikov, V. I. Matveev, A. G. Surina, and V. N. Karpova. Metabolism and Biological Effects of Inhaled ^{241}Am and ^{239}Pu in Dogs.

3. N. A. Koshurnikova, V. P. Aristov, V. K. Lemberg, G. S. Mushkacheva, M. G. Poplyko, and I. A. Tseveleva. As to Mechanism of Development of Plutonium Pneumosclerosis.

4. T. I. Levdik, V. K. Lemberg, L. A. Buldakov, E. R. Lyubchanskii, and V. M. Pesternikov. As to Biological Effectiveness of Neptunium-237.

5. A. P. Nifatov, L. A. Buldakov, and V. I. Matveev. Some Late Effects After a Single Inhalation of ^{239}Pu and ^{241}Am in Dogs.

6. E. P. Ovcharenko. An Experimental Evaluation of the Effects of Transuranic Elements on Reproductive Ability.

The two visitors presented the Soviet papers in English (Dr. Moiseev speaks English quite well) and participated in the discussions of other papers. The visitors were already acquainted with many attending the Symposium so informal discussions were very common and apparently productive. Representatives from all major U. S. laboratories working on the transuranium elements and from the Atomic Energy Commission were able to meet with the Soviet visitors. The visitors related current status of their studies on biological effects of plutonium in their formal presentations and in their discussions. Their manuscripts have been received and will be published in the Symposium proceedings. During the week, they met with Dr. R. C. Thompson, Symposium Co-chairman to discuss editing of their manuscripts.

Visit to Life Sciences Laboratory

On October 1, Drs. Moskalev and Moiseev were escorted to the 331 Building by W. J. Bair. Discussions with the staff occurred during the day in the conference room with visits to various laboratory facilities occurring as necessary.

Dr. J. F. Park - Past, present, and future experiments on the biological effects of inhaled plutonium in laboratory animals; therapeutic removal of inhaled plutonium, and USSR recommendations to the ICRP to lower plutonium MPC's were discussed. These Soviet scientists have completed more work on the biological effects of inhaled plutonium in animals than any other research group except our own laboratory. The interchange of experimental methods, results, and concepts was valuable for planning our future research and evaluating the results of past and present research. Since they have reported biological effects of inhaled plutonium in experimental animals at extremely low exposure levels and recommended to the ICRP that limits of exposure should be lowered, the opportunity to understand and evaluate their experimental results, interpretation, and logic in making their recommendations was very useful.

Dr. V. H. Smith - Drs. Moiseev and Moskalev were reasonably well acquainted with the field of therapy for plutonium poisoning but not intimately in terms of details or recent Soviet literature; the former because his field was more on the ecological side, and the latter because he has concentrated on radiation effects and ceased active work on removal about ten years ago. Dr. Moskalev was interested in our plans to test phosphorothioic acids as removal agents and mentioned his own work on the removal of ^{144}Ce with DTPA as an example of the timing of treatment. He stated DTPA was given i.v. to humans in the USSR, not by inhalation, and that Zn-DTPA was not used or being experimented with. The latter is difficult to believe due to his former close relationship with Dr. Catsch. He was not satisfied with the lack of side effects of multiple DTPA treatments and said that some problems with bone in long-term experiments could be due to DTPA but he wasn't aware of the details. Answers to questions about other treatments than DTPA, experience in treating humans, or future plans were not obtained because presumably this was not a primary research concern of Dr. Moskalev, although he did state there was considerable research effort in this field.

Dr. C. L. Sanders discussed our low-level inhaled $^{238}PuO_2$ studies (life-span), metabolism of plutonium and cellular interaction with PuO_2 particles. The Russians were particularly informative in describing their low-level life span studies with ^{239}Pu. It was learned that Dr. Moiseev is primarily a radioecologist who worked in Siberia and is familiar with oil pipe lines and associated ecological problems such as arctic and lake pollution problems.

Dr. J. E. Ballou discussed their studies with soluble plutonium compounds, comparative metabolism and effects of DTPA, and our americium, plutonium, and cerium work. Dr. Moskalev had tried inhaled EDTA therapy many years ago to no avail. He was interested in our work with age effects on gut absorption and wanted to know why the very young absorb more plutonium. He agreed there is prolonged gut transit time and different intestinal morphology in

17. Sikov, M. R., D. D. Mahlum, T. D. Mahony, and M. F. Sullivan. 1966. Particle Size and Animal Age as Factors in Evaluating Hazards from Ingested Radionuclides. In: Gastrointestinal Radiation Injury, M. F. Sullivan, Ed., pp. 524-535.

18. Mahlum, D. D. and M. R. Sikov. 1969. Physicochemical State as a Determinant of Plutonium-238 Toxicity in the Rat. Health Physics 17, 346-347.

19. Mahlum, D. D. and M. R. Sikov. 1968. Effect of Environmental Temperature and Potassium Consumption on Cesium-137 Metabolism in the Rat. Health Physics 15, 541-543.

20. Mahlum, D. D. and M. R. Sikov. 1968. Distribution of Cerium-144 in the Fetal and Newborn Rat. Health Physics 14, 127-129.

21. Mahlum, D. D. 1971. Modification of the Hepatotoxic Action of Neptunium-237 in the Rat. Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 18, 696-702.

Other Activities

During the week, in addition to participating in the Symposium social functions, they were guests in the homes of Dr. W. [illegible] Lotz, Director, Health and Safety Division, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Richland, Drs. W. J. Bair and C. L. Sanders. These occasions were enjoyable for the hosts and, apparently, for the visitors. Dr. Moskalev is an excellent chess player and very patiently played chess with both adults and children. Dr. Moiseev was interested in current fashions and consumer products. Mrs. Bair gave him the current Sears and Roebuck Christmas catalog as an example of consumer products. He was familiar with the mail order concept but we could not determine for certain that it is common in the USSR. Both Drs. Moskalev and Moiseev have dachas near Moscow which indicate they are well up the status ladder in USSR science, but it was also obvious that Dr. Moskalev's dacha is a level above Dr. Moiseev's.

The visitors also expressed interest in our standard of living. The visits to our homes seemed to dispel some doubts they might have had about our standard of living. They seemed particularly to enjoy the opportunity to meet our children.

Comment

All those having an opportunity to meet with our Soviet guests were impressed by their congeniality, willingness to discuss their research, interest in our family life, and the spirit of good will

14-00000

RENCE BERKELEY

REPORT ON VISIT OF FOREIGN SCIENTISTS, OCTOBER 4, 1971 331

There were four guests in the group:

Dr.(Prof) Yuri I. Moskalev; Inst. of Biophysics, Ministry of Public Health, Moscow. 6002547

Dr. Alexei A. Moiseev; Central Inst. for Advanced Medical Studies, Moscow

Dr. Jean-Claude Nénot; CEA, Centre D'Etudes Nuclaires, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France.

Dr. R. Masse,; CEA as above.

The four visitors were not traveling together, but by coincidence were participants at the same Transuranium Biology Symposium at Hanford during the week of Sept. 26. They were in San Francisco by chance at the same time and desired to visit Berkeley on the same day.

Mrs. Anne Low-Beer picked up the four guests in San Francisco and brought them to the Donner Laboratory where they were greeted by Dr. John Lawrence. Drs. Donald Van Dyke, James McRae, and Howard Parker took them on a short tour of the Anger camera facility and whole-body counting and scanning equipment. The current uses and potential in medical diagnosis were discussed. Major questions concerned the use of these instruments in monitoring and assessing the extent of persons contaminated with radionuclides in industrial accidents.

Lunch was attended by Dr. Hardin Jones, the four guests, Drs. Van Dyke and Parker, and Dr. Patricia Durbin, who acted as hostess and guide through the day. Topics discussed at lunch were centered about the Transuranium symposium. The efficacy of two new techniques to remove lung contamination by alpha-emitting isotopes was considered. The two techniques are lung lavage and aerosolized chelating agents, particularly DTPA.

A tour of Bldg. 74 followed lunch. Three of the visitors are biologists-- Drs. Moskalev and Nénot are physicians, and Dr. Masse is a veterinarian -- and all deal with animal experiments or the interpretation of the results of animal experiments. They were much interested in how one achieved and managed a "biologically clean" rodent colony, in the minimum maintenance rabbit rooms, and the cage-washing facilities. There was some discussion about the 90-Sr-injected monkeys, their exposure levels, years of follow-up, and the essential absence of biological effects at the dose levels in the study.

A two-hour general discussion between and among the four guests and Dr. Durbin followed the building tour. The chief topics discussed were how to explain the observed differences in the metabolism of the transuranic elements among species. The usefulness and verifiability of models of human Pu metabolism were considered at great length. New areas of research in internal emitters problems were considered including the influence of age on local dose and ultimate biological end-points; the usefulness of common experiments with various species particularly those with known variations in iron metabolism, bone formation rates and liver function.

Dr. Durbin proposed a collaborative effort with two of Dr. Moskalev's colleagues. They have collected data on human skeleton weights, but now do not have the time or interest to write up their material. Dr. Durbin has collected all of the 19th century and early 20th century human bone weight data and would like to add the modern Russian material to the set. Dr. Moskalev agreed to propose a joint article with his colleagues looking towards publication in an international journal. He suggested that the original data would be forwarded in any case as soon as it could be copied.

In the late afternoon the visitors toured (briefly) the Bevatron guided by Ralph Thomas; the californium separation facility guided by Francis McCarty; and the Hi-lac guided by Al Ghiorso. Dr. Moiseev, who is a physicist, was very much intrigued by the proposal to make an advanced scientific instrument by joining the Bevatron and the Hi-lac. Dr. Moskalev was not interested in how the machines worked,"physics was not his field"he said, but asked what he as a biologist might do in the nature of radiobiology experiments with such machines.

Dr. Moskalev regretted that it had not been possible to visit with Dr. Tobias. (We could probably have fit in a few minutes or made arrangements for the following day, but I had run them ragged with sight-seeing the day before, Monday was very full, and frankly they were exhausted and needed rest. pwd). They would also have liked to visit the Medical Services group. Mrs. Low-Beer tried to fill them in on the duties and routine of that group.

Comments on money, budgets, problems of communication, demands on time such as committees, etc. ran thoough all of the conversations. Dr. Nenot and Dr. Moiseev spoke English and understood it well. Dr. Moskalev and Dr. Masse understood more English than they could speak. All four are chiefly occupied with radiation protection and especially with problems raised by internal emitters. Dr. Moskalev is his country's representative on the ICRP internal dose committee. They all forsee the development of nuclear power in their countries at a fast pace. This obviously includes, as they were careful to point out, Pu fast breeders, hence the overriding interest in Pu and its transplutonium contaminants.

The Russian visitors will be guests of the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine in Washington. (I feel certain we will receive good marks as hosts and as scientists. pwd).

One further point needs to be added. Although nuclear medicine is not a cuurent specialty in either country, and the use of nuclear medical techniques, especially as diagnostic tools, is very limited, the two physicians indicated thay they personally were much interested, and there was a definite trend in both countries towards more and more use of such tools. "It is coming", they said.

Patricia W. Durbin

FROM DCS/LSD/SBD 25 Nov 70

COUNTRY: USSR

DCHI 00-A(S) 322/33488-70

SUBJECT: Dr. Y. I. Moskalev, Institute of Biophysics, Moscow/Professional Interests/Personal Characteristics/Foreign Travel

13 Nov 70

1. In September 1970, Dr. Yuri Ivanovich Moskalev visited a US facility devoted to research in the field of nuclear medicine. Dr. Moskalev was born on 23 July 1920 in Igumnobo, USSR, which is near Kalinin. In 1922 his family moved to Leningrad. He has lived in Moscow since 1948. In 1958 he became the head of a division comprised of approximately 30 people at the Institute of Biophysics, Soviet Ministry of Public Health, Moscow. He is the best known investigator of the metabolism and toxicity of radioelements in the Soviet Union and has published a number of papers and reviews on this subject. During his visit, he outlined his as yet unpublished experiment on skin carcinogenesis in rats (dosage administered to the body surface by Sr^{90} -Y^{90} plaques on the sides of the cage) and reported two percent tumors of the skin and some mammary tumors after a 245 rad exposure. It is obvious that he is a careful and trustworthy worker.

2. Moskalev is conversant with English but not fluent and has some difficulty in finding the correct English words; however, with a little patience, scientific communication is very satisfactory. He is genial, frank, and possesses a good sense of humor. He prefers Leningrad to Moscow, considering the former to be a more traditional and cultured city. His chief recreational diversion is his dacha, near Moscow, to which he sometimes travels by skis in winter (a distance of approximately 20 kilometers).

3. Dr. Moskalev has visited the United States on two previous occasions; once attending the Sun Valley Symposium in 1967 and again for the Annual Hanford Biology Symposium in 1969. He has traveled to other places outside the Soviet Union and was present at a meeting sponsored by the IAEA in Vienna in 1964.

- end -

Also in Oct. 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

USSR

Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CURRENT POSITION:	Institute Biophysics, Moscow since 1953.
BIRTHDATE AND BIRTHPLACE :	23 July 1920; Igumnovo, RSFSR.
EDUCATION :	Doctor Medical Sciences.
PARTY MEMBERSHIP:	Member CPSU since 1951.
CAREER :	Member, Radiobiology Department, Nuclear Research Institute, Sungul 1951-53 (Head, Pathophysiology Laboratory 1953).
SCIENTIFIC SPECIALTIES :	Biological effect of fast neutrons and protons of high energy; blastomogenic effect of ionizing radiation; distribution of yttrium-91, zirconium-95, and niobium-95 in rats after inhalation; distribution of radium isotope thorium-X, antimony-124, tellurium-127, tin-113, cerium-144, and strontium-89, 90; distribution of lead (thorium B) after intra-arterial and intravenous injection; dynamics of white blood cell reaction to irradiation; kinetics of excretion of Nb^{95} from organism; blastomogenic effect of 120-Mev protons; primary blood relations induced by ionizing radiation; behavior of cesium-137 in mammals; distribution and biological effect of americium-241; (1963-68).
TRAVEL :	International Conference on Diagnosis and Treatment of Radioactive Poisoning, Vienna, October 1962; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Panel on Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, June 1963; Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, August 1963; visit, Poland, June 1963; Symposium on Biological Effects of Neutron Irradiations, Brookhaven, New York, October 1963; visit, Austria, November 1964; visit, Czechoslovakia, May 1965; Third International Conference on Radiation Research, Cortina d'Ampezzo, Italy, June-July 1966;

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV (cont.)

TRAVEL : Second International Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone-Seeking Radionuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, September 1967; visit, Salt Lake City, Utah, September 1967; visit, Montreal, September 1967; visit, UK, April 1968.

PERSONAL : About five feet, eight inches tall; graying, dark blond hair, with receding hairline; gregarious; reads, writes, and comprehends English well, but speaks it with less proficiency; wife, Vera Nikolayevna Streltsova, also works at Institute Biophysics.

HONORS : Order Lenin.

mr 21 January 1968

REMARKS : No major changes in Moskalev's career since publication of above report; a recent document refers to him as head of a laboratory at Institute Biophysics; applied for visa June 1970 for four month's stay in US for meetings of United Nations Working Group on Effects of Atomic Radiation. During 1969 published several papers (with coauthors Yu. M. Shtukkenberg, V. F. Zhuravlev, V. N. Strel'tsova, L. A. Buldakov, L. A. Kalmykova, L. A. Yerokhin, V. K. Lemberg): "Recommendations as to the Maximum Permissible Concentrations of Tritium Oxide in Industrial Environment," "Late Effects of Radionuclide Damage," "Role of the Time Factor in Separate and Combined Injury by Cerium-144 and Plutonium-239", "Accumulation-Removal Patterns of Cesium-137 in Adult Dogs; Long-Range Experiment", "Remote After-Effects of Radiation Injury".

ees 9 September 1970

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY USSR/France/Italy

REPORT NO. OO- B-321/20573-70

SUBJECT Second International Congress on Radiation Protection/Unimpressive Soviet Contribution/Lafuma's Work With DTPA at Fontenay-aux-Roses/ General Interest in Plutonium Protection

DATE DISTR. 24 Aug 70

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case 54123
NAVINTCOM NIP-10-70
USAFAC/OTSG

DATE OF INFO. May 1970

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Brighton/Fontenay-aux-Roses - May 1970

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, radiation physicist who attended the Second International Congress on Radiation Protection, Brighton, UK, 3-8 May 70.

1. The Soviet delegation to the Second International Congress on Radiation Protection arrived several days late. As a consequence, the only presentation from the USSR personally attended was a paper entitled, "Disorders in Embryonal Development of Rats after Injection of 131_I," by A M Lyaginskaya, Y D Parev and S N Sinitsyana. Since this same experiment has been conducted on the human embryo, there was really nothing new or even interesting in Lyaginskaya's presentation.

2. A Soviet delegate who was very busy asking many questions at virtually every session personally attended, was Yuriy I Moskalev. Moskalev is a well known scientist in the fields of radiobiology and radiotoxicity. He asked all of his questions through an interpreter, but when answers were given in English he always seemed to understand without benefit of his interpreter. Moskalev indicated to a US attendee that the USSR was finally planning to request membership in the International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA).

3. The most interesting work presented at the meeting from a personal point of view was that of Professor J Lafuma, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France. He is charged with the responsibility of setting the plutonium protection standards and removal techniques after exposure to plutonium for all of France. Lafuma's most impressive work involves the success he has had in removing copious amounts of plutonium and other transuranium products from humans using DTPA.

4. Lafuma explained that from his point of view he was concerned with only two primary aspects of human contact with plutonium, inhalation and wounds. His studies have shown, of course, that the earlier treatment is begun the better the results; but also he has found it easier to decontaminate an area of the body exposed to plutonium through contact or a wound than to remove it from the lungs. Lafuma has used intravenous injection exclusively for the treatment of wounds and finds that a very significant amount of the transuranium particles are discharged from the body in urine. For the treatment of inhaled particles, Lafuma has used both DTPA aerosols and injection. He find his results from injection are better than the use of aerosols, even in lung decontamination.

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1 [illegible]

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABRC

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence componen the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically trolled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Govern directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be dissemina organizations or personnel; including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the origi

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report 600257 /

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY International/USSR

REPORT NO. OO-B-321/17309-70

SUBJECT Second Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association, Brighton, UK, 3-8 May 1970/Biology and Ecology of Polonium and Radiolead Conference, Sutton, UK, 30 April - 1 May 1970/Current Research and Findings

DATE DISTR. 1 Jul 70

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case 54,123
NAVINTCOM NIP-10-70

DATE OF INFO. May 70

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Sutton/Brighton: May 70

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen; a professor and researcher in radiation biology at a US university.

[This report was prepared for submission to the US Atomic Energy Commission and is disseminated in accordance with DCID 2/3.]

1. A US radiation biology researcher attended both the Biology and Ecology of Polonium and Radiolead Conference, Sutton, UK, 30 April - 1 May 1970, and the Second Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association, Brighton, UK, 3-8 May 1970.

2. The nature of the Sutton meeting was such that few significant scientific positions were taken: however, in general, the quality of the papers was very high. The scheduled Soviet participants, P V Ramzayev and FNU Moskalev, were presumably not permitted by the USSR to attend; D Panov (Yugoslavia) was in the US, and D Djuric (Yugoslavia) did not attend for unknown reasons. The countries represented were UK (26), Italy (5), France (1), Sweden (2), Poland (1), South Africa (1), and the US (7).

3. To the extent that the proper "half-life for lead in man" was discussed, the consensus appeared to be that (a) the loss rate can not be represented as a single exponential; (b) the presently available data on baboons and beagle dogs does not extend for a sufficient period of time to provide a measure of the "last slow rate loss constant"; (c) it is likely that lead and radium loss rates will differ because of the selective reutilization of Pb in bone. D Barltrop (UK) and US researchers have been performing experiments which indicate that lead is not bound by red cell membranes, but at sites in the cell interior.

4. C R Hill (UK) provided a useful summary of the contribution of polonium to human radiation dose. He stipulated that the distribution of polonium will depend on whether it is administered as polonium per se or is allowed to grow in an animal as the daughter of an ingested parent. This is a significant consideration to biological researchers engaged in dose calculation work.

5. Twenty-nine countries and five international bodies were represented at the Second Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association. W G Marley (UK) was the congress president and H J Dunster (UK) was the secretary of the scientific program committee. The congress shared the common problems and advantages of similar large meetings. Concurrent sessions inevitably brought about some conflicts in important papers, discussion was generally absent or quite limited, and there was the usual number of papers given in "broken" English by foreign scientists.

U NO

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/ [illegible]

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Sec to E/BC/UK

PHOTOS RETAINED BY SB/BIO

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SB/O/F4			[illegible]	[illegible]
2.				
3.				
4. SB/BIO		[illegible]	19 July	[illegible]
5.				
6.				
7. RID/INFD/REC				WJ
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

BULKY

CALL RID/FILES, EXT. 6867
FOR ATTACHMENTS. RECORDS
CENTER JOB NO. 68-974
BOX NO. 8

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT ? X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
11-8-28

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
[illegible] 67

DOCUMENT NUMBER
[illegible]

14-00000

Chief, SB	INDEXING REQUIRED
Chief, EUR	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
Chief of Station, London	MICROFILM

JECT REDTOP/AEUPWARD
Transmittal of Immigration Cards

TION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: For Richard J. ULLMAN

Transmitted herewith is the latest group of photostats of Immigration Cards.

Nelson C. CHIRUCK

PHOTOS RETAINED BY SB/BIO

Attachment:
As stated Herewith

Distribution:
~~2~~ - C/SB h/w att.
3 - C/EUR w/o att.

CS COPY

JUN 1968

11-8-28

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OELA - 49339	DATE 7 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 74-120-158

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY	USSR/West Germany/France/Poland	REPORT NO.	00-B-321/27474-67
SUBJECT	Y I Moskalev's Paper on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides Disappointing/Personality Notes/Attempt to Propagandize at West German Scientist's Expense/France and Poland Fail to Participate	DATE DISTR.	16 OCT 67
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	DCS Case 49,991
DATE OF INFO.	Sep 67 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	-- Sep 67 and earlier		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, an active researcher in the field of long-range effects of radio nuclides.

1. I was quite surprised when I arrived in Sun Valley, Idaho, to participate in the International Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides to find that Dr Yuriy I Moskalev of the Institute of Physics, Moscow, had arrived two days earlier. Moskalev had traveled alone to Sun Valley and apparently was able to use his knowledge of the English language to get along on his own. However, he complained to the chairman of the conference that he did not know enough English to read his paper which also required condensation because it was too long for the time allowed. A colleague who had known Moskalev from earlier meetings said Moskalev's knowledge of English improved greatly after a few drinks. However, during this conference, he did not drink at all. He did mention, however, that he had written the English version of the paper he presented himself and said he could read and write English quite well but was deficient in the spoken language.

2. Moskalev's paper concerned the results of a series of experiments utilizing an unusually large number of rats and mice. The numbers he used were far in excess of those that would be used in a western laboratory. These figures were undoubtedly meant to impress his western associates. The data he presented was primarily on Strontium 90. His findings indicated that Strontium 90 was much more toxic than had been reported anywhere in western literature and that it was more carcinogenic than has been previously reported. His technique was almost exclusively injections of radio nuclides. The control he had on his animals was not explained, but very likely was very poor. He claims to have been able to induce cancer in laboratory animals at permissible exposure levels for atomic workers in the US. The animals were not examined for radioactivity, only for the existence of cancer. A respected US scientist with much more experience than Moskalev flatly stated, in private, that he did not believe Moskalev's findings. Moskalev did not ask questions during the question periods. However, he did talk privately to several scientific reporters after their presentations.

3. Dr Heinz Spiess West Germany reported on the results of injections of Radium 224 made during World War II in a wide section of the population in Germany. At that time, there was a mistaken belief that Radium 224 had a very beneficial effect on a person's health. He reported on 242 cases in which all types of cancer were appearing. The results of his observations in human population exposures were very similar to experiments

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U	YES	C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L	GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	S	YES

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

on dog populations in this country. Moskalev made an attempt to make some propaganda of this report by asking in a small group, "Why did you do this?" almost accusing Spiez of doing it himself.

4. Moskalev left the conference a little upset. It was suggested that he might visit a US laboratory en route home, and considerable time was expended to arrange this visit. However, he apparently took a different route and made no effort to tell anyone of his plans, and he did not visit the laboratory. He took copious notes on all papers, which indicated he was understanding what was going on. He took many pictures with a 35mm camera. From the questions he did ask in private, it was obvious that he understood English well.

5. I understand a Polish scientist had been invited to the conference. However, when his paper was submitted, the reviewer criticized it quite severely and suggested changes. As a result, the Polish scientist apparently decided not to attend the conference.

6. Three French scientists asked to be invited when the symposium was first announced. They even gave titles to their papers and the papers were put on the program. However, they later withdrew and no French scientists attended the meeting.

/Headquarters Comment: The analysis of Moskalev's paper in this report conflicts with the analysis in report 00-B-321/30340-67/

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY USSR

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/30340-67

SUBJECT Second International Symposium, "Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radionuclides", Sun Valley, Idaho/ Interesting Paper Presented by Soviet Yu I Moskalev, an Unscheduled Participant

DATE DISTR. 16 OCT 67

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case 49,991
(351)

DATE OF INFO. Sept 67

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---; Sept 67

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen; research scientist.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I attended the Second International Symposium on "Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radionuclides", Sun Valley, Idaho, 12-14 Sept 67.

2. An interesting paper was presented by Yuri I Moskalev, USSR on "Some Late Effects of Radionuclide Damage". Dr. Moskalev was not expected at the meeting and he came alone, arriving two days early. He had furnished no brief and it was a surprise to hear his paper.

3. I was unaware that research such as he presented was being done in the USSR. His demonstration was a good piece of scientific work, that is, his procedures and results in pathological consequences of radioisotopes fit reasonably well with our procedures and results in the US. He did not present anything new in his paper, and it must certainly reveal that they are a few years behind the US in biology and radioisotope studies and applications. They are apparently still testing the toxicity of radio elements, which we have already established and accept, knowing the effects and using them accordingly. In other words, we are through with his reported work, feeling that it is completed; apparently they are not. Else, they don't yet know the toxicity boundaries, are still experimenting along these lines, or are experimenting to see how much more they can learn. But his paper reveals remarkable research.

4. Dr. Moskalev understands English reasonably well, but speaks it less well. Therefore, his appearance alone at the conference was even more unusual.

5. I understand that Dr. Moskalev became very interested in visiting a certain US facility researching in his field of interest and pursued arrangements to visit there. His time schedule permitted the visit and permission to visit the facility was obtained for him from the facility and the US governmental clearances were also obtained. However, after all this was done, he "backed out", going to great extent to give the

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U Yes | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | S Yes

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

reason that the itinerary change was too much trouble for the US persons and authorities concerned, notwithstanding the fact that all change arrangements had already been completed, which facts he well knew. From the USSR viewpoint, he stated that no objections would exist, but I doubt that this was true. He was in Sun Valley four days; immediately after the conference he went to Salt Lake City, and then on to Montreal, Canada. His schedule allowed for several days in Canada, but he stated that he was leaving Montreal immediately for Moscow.

/Headquarters Comment: The analysis of Moskalev's paper in this report conflicts with the analysis reported in 00-B-321/27474-67/

-end-

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

AC

CONTROLLED DISSEM C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY	USSR/Yugoslavia/Poland	REPORT NO.	00-B-321/15482-66
SUBJECT	Soviets at the Third International Congress of Radiation Research/Emphasis on Study of Radiation Effects on Large Animals/David Shugar of Poland/Planning for 1967 International Symposium on Photobiology in Yugoslavia.	DATE DISTR.	24 OCT 66
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	DCS Case 47146 Responsive to: C-SI6-52537 Related to: FTD-5901-N
DATE OF INFO.	Up to 3 Jul 66		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Cortina d' Ampezzo, Italy 26 June - 3 Jul 66		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: SOURCE A. US citizen, radiologist at US university.

SOURCE B. US citizen, biologist at US university.

[illegible] 6002545

SOURCE A.

1. About one third of the Soviets expected at the Third International Congress of Radiation Research put in an appearance. The papers I heard were disappointing. In my opinion the Soviets are confining themselves to a narrow range of interests in their radiation research. In Session 32, which was concerned with ingested or injected radioisotopes, a paper written by Yu I Moskalev and V N Streltsova of the Institute of Biophysics of the Ministry of Public Health, USSR, did not impress me. A very poor reading marked the presentation of the paper prepared by A Tumanyan of the Gamaleya Institute for Epidemiology and Microbiology, Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR. The paper was given in a hurried and garbled fashion by a person who obviously was not a scientist. After the session ended, I talked to Tumanyan regarding her radiation experiments with monkeys. A woman about 45 years of age, Tumanyan had no English but spoke excellent French. She was quite enthusiastic about her work which I in turn considered commonplace.

6002547

6008566 [illegible]

2. It appears to me that the Soviets have a strong tendency toward experiments that enable them to study radiation effects on large animals. They do not seem interested in radiation response — the effect on tissue; on the other hand, they concern themselves with metabolic effects, which are important because they are related to the ability to suppress immunity mechanisms. They stress immunology and transplants.

Yu Ya Kerkis 6000332

SOURCE B.

3. Session 8, which was devoted to the discussion of radiation effects on cells, had but one Soviet paper. This was presented by J J Kerkis of the Institute of Cytology and Genetics, Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Novosibirsk. It was a poor paper.

S - NO U - NO

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7., it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

4. The meeting gave me an opportunity to renew my acquaintance with David Shugar of the Warsaw Institute of Biochemistry and Biophysics, Academy of Sciences of Poland. Though a highly competent scientist and a dedicated Communist, Shugar seems to be short of funds. The organizing committee of the Congress sent him money to insure his presence at Cortina d'Ampezzo. He and his wife drove by automobile from Poland to Italy. Shugar introduced me to one of his students - K L Wierzchowski. In performing the introduction Shugar declared the young man was highly capable and had a brilliant future.

5. The International Committee of Photobiology had an executive committee meeting at Cortina d'Ampezzo. It was decided to hold a photobiology symposium in the late summer of 1967 on the Island of Hvar, Yugoslavia. The symposium will emphasize photosynthesis. The general plan calls for participation by about 100 scientists, with emphasis being placed on invitations to the younger scientists in the Sov Bloc. The chief organizer of the forthcoming symposium is Maria Drakulic, Laboratory of Cellular Biochemistry, Institute "Rudjer Boskovic", Belgrade.

- end -

U. R. S. S.

The following contains photos and bio information about the delegates to the XI International Congress of Radiology, held in Rome Italy 22-28 Sep 65.

SO: 00-E-324/18669-65 Case 46424, UNCL.

GORISONTOV, Petr D.; Prof. M.D.
Member of the Academy of Medical Science of the USSR;
Two Orders of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner of Labour;
National Delegate;
Institute of Biophysics Academy of Medical Science,
14 Solyanka, Moscow.



IVANITSKAYA

IWANITSKAYA, Maria A.; M.D.Sc.
Head of the Roentgenological Department,
Institute of Cardio-Vascular Surgery;
National Delegate;
8 Leninskij prospect, Moscow.

KOROGODIN, Vladimir I.; Ph. D.
Institute of Medical Radiology, Obninsk;
National Delegate
Kaluga Region.



KOZLOVA, Anna; M.D.
Professor;
National Delegate;
7 Solanka, Moscow.



LAGUNOVA, Irina G.; Prof. M.D.
National Delegate;
7 Solianka, Moscow.



MOSKALEV, Yuri I.; Prof. M.D.
~~Order of Lenin;~~
Institute of Biophysics Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, 14 Solyanka, Moscow.



REINBERG, Sam A.; M.D.Sc.
Professor, Director of the First Chair of Medical Radiology;
Postgraduate Institute (Central) in Moscow;
Honorary President and Member of 22 Societies of Radiology;
President of the Moscow Society of Radiologists;
National Delegate;
Moscow A-55, Novoslobodskaja 57/65, K U 37.



Candidate of Medical Sciences; Chief of Division of Med. Radiology, Deputy Chief of General Department for Medical and Prophylactic Service, Ministry of Health;
National Delegate;
3 Rachmanovski pereulok, Moscow.
SEMENOV, VIKENTY A

6002597



UGRYUMOV V M

UGRJUMOV, Benjamin; Prof. M.D.
Director of Neurosurgical Institute;
National Delegate;
12 Majakovskaja Stard, Leningrad.

min health RSFSR



ZEDGUENIDZE, Georgii; Prof.
Académicien,
Membre de l'Académie des Sciences Médicales de l'URSS;
Président de l'Association Scientifique des Radiologistes de l'URSS;
Délégué National;
14 Solianka, ASM de l'URSS, Moscow.

9xerox

URUGUAY



GORLERO ARMAS, Agustín A.; Méd. Cir. Rad.
Universidad, Facultad de Medicina de Montevideo;
Jefe de Servicio de Radiodiagnóstico;
Jefe del Servicio de Radiología del Hospital Italiano Umberto I;
1480 Calle Yí, Montevideo.

ISRAEL CRESPO, Davi; Dr. en Med. y Cir.
Universidad de la República Oriental del Uruguay;
Jefe de Sección de Radiodiagnóstico;
2971 Calle J. Vazquez Ledesma, Ap. 301,
Montevideo.



KASDORF, Helmut; Dr. en Med.
Profesor Agregado de Radiología de la Facultad de Medicina de Montevideo;
Jefe del Departemento de Rad. del Hospital Universitario;
1171 Calle Soriano,
Casilla Correo 930, Montevideo.

Moskalev Yu. I.

6UU2011

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY USSR/International

REPORT NO. 00- B-3,288,475

SUBJECT IAEA Symposium on Neutron Irradiations, Brookhaven, Long Island, NY, Oct 63: Neutron Irradiations Compared to X- and Gamma Radiations in Large Animals; the Problem of Neutron Depth-Dose Relationships in Large Animals; Problems with the term "Relative Biological Effectiveness"; Soviet Proposal for Supplanting "Rad" with Some Other Radiation Unit

DATE DISTR. 23 Jan 64

NO. PAGES 10

REFERENCES CD/00 Case 41357
FTD-5462-N

DATE OF INFO. Oct 63

PLACE & DATE ACQ. --- Oct 63

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Three US citizens. Radiobiologists at a major US radiobiological research center.

Sources participated in IAEA Symposoium on Neutron Irradiations, Brookhaven, Long Island, New York.

Source 1

1. Q. Did Symposium contributions include significant advancements in research on controlled thermonuclear reactions that may be useful in determining the feasibility of initiating uncontrolled thermonuclear reactions solely without the use of fissionable materials which would produce large amounts of energy, on the order of one kiloton or greater?

A. To the best of my knowledge there was no formal discussion of any nuclear reactions, as such. The great majority of the material presented had to do with biological effects, and the physicists at the Symposium were using high energy machines largely to produce the radiation that would be comparable to solar flare radiation.

2. Q. Was anything presented on effects of space radiation on the human body?

A. I can recall no Soviet references to the Vostok flights. The two Soviet speakers confined their references to purely laboratory observations. There was a number of US papers, and as I recall one from France, oriented to space flight conditions, however.

3. Q. Were there results in the use of drugs in radiation protection?

A. I do not recall anyone's discussing drugs--Soviet or other. And I think that although research in drugs is continuing many radiobiologists are not very optimistic about their value. This is something many of us have reservations about.

4. Q. Was anything presented on the characteristics of a bio-element used for space radiation detection including the number required for an extended space probe and the method of transmitting information.

A. I do not recall any discussion of this by anybody. Practically everyone was talking about physical measurements

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-YES

U-YES

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CONTROLLED

NO DISSEM ABROAD

DISSEM: The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence compone of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically contro in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government direc

14-00000

Q. Was there anything on biological indicators at low ranges of radiation doses?

A. This is something on which I can speak somewhat as an expert. Although other people may claim to have this, I do not think anyone has it, including the Soviets. One can find biological criteria at low doses, and whether they have meaning beyond the limited experiment is the big question, you see.

Were results presented on cosmic and Van Allen belt radiation effects on test organisms in such areas as lethal, metabolic, developmental and genetic?

A. Nothing.

Q. Were conclusions presented on determining the relative biologic effectiveness factor of biologic material when exposed to radiation from nuclear testing?

A. Again, I can speak with some certitude. There is no conclusion about the relative biological effect of this factor. People will argue about it, but there is no conclusion. The Soviets had some things to say about it, but I was thoroughly confused about their position. There are two ways of thinking about the RBE factor. One is from the viewpoint of theoretical biology which is interested in the why of differences of biological effectiveness, and this becomes one of the parameters of experiment. The other is the question of an empirical number that one can use in handling questions of judgment about radiation exposure in man. With regard to the questions of judgment, I think that most biologists would agree that we do not have any reliable and valuable RBE factors. We have numbers that represent what we might be afraid of, more than anything else.

Q Did the Soviets say anything bearing on physical measurements of radiation in space in terms of relative biological effectiveness factor and implications for future manned space flights?

A. One of the Soviet delegates, [Yu.I] Moskalev, was a frequent commentator on other people's work and he made a practice of denigrating the reports of these people with respect to radiation lethality. His comment was to the effect that the studies of radiation lethality done usually in small animals were not to the point, were not germane to problems in the human case, and that to be useful these studies should be done in animals closer to man.

Q. What is your critique of his argument?

A. Well, a mass of work has been done with the smaller animals in variuos laboratories and we are beginning to get certain generalities about the nature of radiation injury, or at least certain kinds of radiation injury, and therefore I think it is worthwhile to pursue it. As you might imagine, I presented a paper on radiation lethality and was among those to whose work Moskalev objected.

Q Do you think Moskalev's objections were motivated from anything more than a genuine scientific position?

A. Who can say? In their published work the Soviets show a lot of attention to effects in the central nervous system--they are very interested in this and US people have tended to ignore this area. So conceivably Moskalev is oriented to CNS work and physiological functions, I do not know. But quite a lot of the Soviet work has a different orientation from western work--at least their published stuff.

24. Moskalev, both from the papers he gave and his questions and comments in discussion, indicated that he was very sharp, very advanced in his knowledge of the biological effects of radiation, particularly with respect to distinguishing among the effects of various energies of neutrons and the techniques for measuring these energies. I think it may be safely assumed that the Russians are using very advanced methods for detecting and measuring the various energies of neutrons--the dosimetry of neutrons. In the biological effect, I think they are way behind us. But they are much involved in the potentials of neutron irradiation and their objectives are, I am sure, the effects of space radiation on human beings.

25. Actually, [V P] Afanas'yev, who is a physicist, was even more sophisticated than Moskalev. Afanas'yev's paper was entitled "Production and Investigation of Dose Fields for Irradiation of Experimental Animals with Protons of High Energy". His paper showed that both their production of high energy protons in the laboratory and the measurements of these protons with respect to animal work is sophisticated. They are advanced in this. I think this is the distinction to be made: they are more advanced in the technology of producing high energy radiations and the measurement of these than they are in biological effects of radiation.

26. Q. Was anything reported on effects of radiation on non-regenerative tissues such as the brain?

A. The Russians are very much involved in CNS effects of radiation, but they presented no data at the Symposium. The paper that Moskalev gave was a survey of Russian research work on biological action of neutrons and isotopes. It covered maybe twenty different pieces of work with only a few sentences for each. It presented no new data and nothing on the CNS as I recall. Afanas'yev's paper, on the other hand, presented new data on the production of dose fields with high energy protons.

27. One gets the impression that whereas Russians physics is mechanistic and quite indistinguishable from ours in that respect, Russian biology is impregnated with philosophy. Moskalev, for example, spoke of how the body "adapts" to radiation in the sense that a single animal adapts. Most biologists will reserve this word to changes in a species over a very long period. I suppose you could consider wound healing as adaptation in a sense. But western biology sees certain events occuring in an organism as the consequence of a wound which can be described without resort to notions of teleological adaptation. This philosophical tendency has been a damaging element in Russian biology, I believe.

28. Q. Were there results in the use of drugs in radiation protection?

A. I can recall nothing on protective drugs from anybody. There was here and there a reporting of drugs used to enhance the effect of radiation with respect to tumor treatment.

29. Q. Was anything presented on the characteristics of a bio-element used for space radiation detection including the number required for an extended space probe and the method of transmitting information?

A. I am afraid I do not understand the question.

30. Q. Was there anything on biological indicators at low ranges of radiation doses?

A. There is a tremendous amount of interest in such indicators everywhere. Moskalev's presentations did not say anything specific except that the Russians are working on long-term effects of small doses of radiation mostly as regards tumors. So they are interested in carcinogenesis and in fact Moskalev asked me a question following my paper on carcinogenesis. He said nothing on acute, short-term effects of low doses of radiation, so presumably they are not concerned with these.

31. People from other countries, and particularly the US, reported work having to do with low dose effects and reliable biological indicators for low ranges of dose using the chromosome aberration methods in human cells. But the Russians had nothing to say about this particular thing and seem not to be working on it as yet.

32. Q. In your opinion, what is the level of accomplishment, worldwide, in this matter of getting reliable indicators of biological damage?

A. Insofar as I know, the most sensitive and reliable biological index for damage at low dose rates involves the study of chromosome abnormalities. The approach was developed in the US and is being used extensively here and in England, and other countries are taking it up. Moreover, I think that in radiobiology in general, in almost any question you could ask, the west and particularly the US and England are very much in the forefront. From what I know of Russian radiobiology from translations and hearsay, the Russians are years behind us, but I exclude their related physical work from this judgment.

33. Q. Was there reporting from the Soviets on types of radiation detection equipment used in the Vostok flights? Did they report findings on the relative biological effectiveness factor values for neutrons, protons and cosmic ray attenuations?

A. Well, again, there was no specific mention of this, but the interest in the relative biological effectiveness factor for neutrons and cosmic radiation was a major concern of the whole Symposium: the attempt to elucidate the RBE factor and particularly the problem with respect to large animals, like humans, where in the case of neutrons you have a change in the type of radiation in the interior of the animal. You do not have this change with x- gamma rays, but you do have it with fast neutrons.

34. Q. How is this neutron change manifested in large animals?

A. The neutrons become moderated. As they proceed through the tissue, the hydrogen in the tissue reacts with the neutrons and there is a change in the energies taken up. At some point you have gammas. So, the first few layers of hydrogenous material on the outside of the animal tend to change the dose, and in the interior, where the important effects occur, you do not know what the dose is. We talk about mid-line doses, average doses, but the actual dose in the cells of the bone marrow or the gut, we do not know yet. This is one of the problems of the RBE and a very big one.

35. [A G] Searle of Harwell reported genetic effects of low dose rate neutrons in mice finding that there were as many if not more mutations with low dose rate neutrons than with high dose rate neutrons. His work is the first direct evidence of the cumulative effect of a prolonged, or fractionated, low dose of neutrons. You do not have such an effect with x- or gamma rays. If you prolong the dose with these, the effect will be very much less than it would be if you gave the same total dose in a single fast pulse.

36. Q. The neutron dose given gradually might have an even more damaging effect than if given all at once, is that it?

A. Yes. At least. But the matter is still delicate, for Searle's experiment was with mice and the question remains whether neutrons, as such, will get into cells in the interior of a large animal, such as a human being, or will be moderated and changed into gamma rays. The neutron RBE for mortality in dogs, as reported from my laboratory and Brookhaven, is around 1. For small animals like mice it is more like three or four. So there is this discrepancy, and it may be promising for large animal research. Harwell, my laboratory, and the Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago are now setting up to apply low dose rate neutrons in sheep. This will be new work and should have important results.

37. Q. Were results presented on cosmic and Van Allen belt radiation effects on test organisms in such areas as lethal, metabolic, developmental and genetic?

A. There was nothing on this as far as I know, except for a paper from the Donner Laboratory people at the University of California, Berkeley entitled "Some Biological Effects of 730 Mev Protons". This may simulate the kind of radiation that occurs in space and this is why they are playing around with it, you see.

38. Q. Were conclusions presented on determining the relative biologic effectiveness factor of biologic material when exposed to radiation from nuclear testing?

A. Well, this kind of interest is implied in work with neutrons. With neutrons there is this question of RBE and it was one of the major points of discussion at the Symposium.

39. Q. Did the Soviets say anything bearing on physical measurements of radiation in space in terms of relative biological effectiveness factor and implications for future manned space flights?

A. All I can say is that it is logical to suppose that this is what they are after: good physical measurements of radiation of a type that might be anticipated in space.

40. Q. Was there anything said on mapping and profiles for space radiation?

A. There was nothing on this.

41. Q. What interest have the Soviets shown in development and testing of nuclear power sources for thermionic power generators? Are the Soviets now applying such generators?

A. There was nothing on this.

42. Q. Did the Soviets report progress in radiation resistant materials and components for application to long space flight electronic equipment?

A. This Symposium was all biological, so there was nothing on this.

43. Q. Was there anything from the Soviets on methods of radiation shielding?

A. It was there by implication. The fact that they were talking about the investigation of dose fields, the radiation of experimental animals with protons of high energy, implies that they would be using some kind of shielding to get the animal exposed.

44. Q. This contribution would have been in Afanas'yev's paper "Production and Investigation of Dose Fields for Irradiation of Experimental Animals with Protons of High Energy"?

A. Yes.

6002547

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	International	REPORT NO.	00-B-3,286,351
SUBJECT	Assessment of Attendees and Research at Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63	DATE DISTR.	30 Dec 63
		NO. PAGES	3
		REFERENCES	Case--40178 Guide-316 C-SI3-81,081 CSI/ABCD MIIA FSTC/CCIA
DATE OF INFO.	August 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Vienna, August 1963		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE. US citizen, professor of industrial medicine at a large western medical school.

Source, a medical doctor, attended the conference under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission. This was his first experience at a conference of this kind and first meeting with foreign colleagues in this field.

[This report was prepared for submission to the US Atomic Energy Commission and is disseminated in accordance with paragraph 4 of DCI/D 2/3.]

1. The Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling in Vienna, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63, brought together the professional multi-discipline groups concerned with the health and safety of people exposed to nuclear materials in mining and milling and the potential problem of public health from the waste materials in these industries. To me, it pointed up the necessity of understanding the work within each of these disciplines in order to better define the exposures, dosimetry, metabolism and biological reactions in people exposed to the nuclear and chemical materials encountered in these industries.

2. Except for the historical review of the pulmonary malignancies found in the workers of the Schneeberg and St Joachimsthal mines and the epidemiological review of the Colorado Plateau with the suggestion of possible increase in pulmonary emphysema, fibrosis and cor pulmonale as well as malignancies and some dyscrasia of hair roots in these people, the meeting was devoid of any specific information with regard to health effects on humans.

3. We did not make detailed notes of the meeting and are not prepared to summarize the papers, however, there were a few points of interest to us that we will mention in the following paragraphs.

4. V A [illegible] of the USSR stated that uranium tetrafluoride was less toxic than uranyl nitrate in the same dose in animals. A P Novikova [illegible] of the USSR reported a decrease in blood cellular elements and an

get better copy

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		[illegible]		FBI		AEC				

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

observation of an unstable non-protei[illegible] [illegible] with albumin and glycosuria as the result of moderately [illegible] [illegible]latory doses of mixtures of the oxides of Uranium 238 and 235. [illegible] also reported from such exposures what appeared to be a [illegible] [illegible]ential or [illegible] type of urinary uranium excretion function and high retention of the uranium oxides in the lungs and concomitant lymph areas. These exposures also allegedly caused a deterioration of conditioned reflexes in their dogs but no pathological changes were found in the nervous system at autopsy. They did find sclerotic damage in the pulmonary perivascular, peribronchial and mediastinal lymph areas. This damage was more prominent in the dogs inhaling mixtures of oxides containing the highest per cent of Uranium [illegible]. One dog, [illegible] [illegible] ten so studied, [illegible] with a carcinoma of the lung and another had atypical hyperplastic changes in the lung. V S [illegible] of the USSR reported that silica dust plus radon exposures in animals caused more clinical and pathological pulmonary damage than either silica or radon alone. Yu I Moskalev of the USSR reported on the body distribution and biological effects of numerous inhaled radioisotopes with acute, subacute and chronic pathological changes in the lungs, bone marrow and liver. We personally know so little about the effects of the radioisotopes of which he spoke that we don't know whether this was new knowledge or not.

5. J Lafuma from France reported finding no radon daughters in a slave dog attached by a cross blood circulation experiment with a master dog inhaling radon. Radon daughters were found in the lung of the master dog. The Yugoslavians reported confirmatory information on finding the immediate radon daughter attached to dust particles and they stressed the importance of determining radon daughters in the environment in order to calculate alpha lung doses. The [illegible]ian, E Pohl, reported studies of people and animals exposed to radon in their spas and found a high lung retention of radon daughters and that the bismuth daughters of radon were more readily excreted by the kidneys than the lead daughters. Dr [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] gave a fine paper on the function of mass mean diameter and chemical composition of Plutonium dust with relation to lung retention. [illegible] of Sweden gave an interesting theoretical discussion on the effects of the thickness and physiologic activity of the bronchial mucous on alpha lung doses. Cember of the US gave a theoretical discussion of the expected neighborhood alpha dose from a point source. [illegible] of Poland unfortunately was not present to give or discuss his paper on the finding of radiolead in the hair and nails of uranium miners and his hypothetical evaluation of Lead 210 body burden therefrom.

6. J C Cililand of the US [illegible] on the secular disequilibrium of uranium daughters in uranium mill [illegible] and methods for determining a man's time-weighted exposure to [illegible] in mills [illegible] a frequency of sampling for 95% confidence exceeding or not a maximum allowable concentration. We detected no new ideas in most of the papers on environmental exposure and internal and external contamination from Japan, France and Canada.

7. E C Hyatt of the US, in a paper describing the techniques for measuring and sizing radioactive dusts, reiterated again that the particle sizing and density of radioactive dusts are extremely important in evaluating biological effects. It was generally agreed in the section on "Radiological Protection" that ventilation is most important in controlling radon and radon-daughter products in mining atmospheres and that masks have only a special limited use in temporarily uncontrolled areas of exposure. The USSR scientists, however, paid unusual attention to Mr Hyatt's paper on respirators and seemed quite concerned about the acceptability by workmen of the described respirators. The Russians apparently are using disposable masks.

8. Management of wastes appears to be a unique problem for the areas in which wastes occur. No general management of wastes was promoted.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Austria/USSR/International/Belgium/Sweden

REPORT NO. OO-B-3,2[illegible],411

SUBJECT Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling Held in Vienna 26-31 Aug 63 Under Auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Labor Organization, and the World Health Organization (IAEA-ILO-WHO)/USSR Research and Practice in These Subjects As Disclosed at the Symposium/Visits to Related Laboratories in Belgium and Sweden: (1) Laboratories Du Centre D'Etudie De L'Energie Nucleaire, Mol, Belgium; (2) Division of Radiobiology, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden, and (3) Forsvarets Forskningsanstalt, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden

DATE DISTR. 3 Dec 63

NO. PAGES 7

REFERENCES Case 40170 0-SI3-[illegible]

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ~~Vienna, Mol, Stockholm, Au-Sep 63 DATE OF INFO: Aug-Sep 63~~

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US nuclear biologist.

He is head of the pharmacology operation of a major US atomic laboratory.

1. In late August 1963 I attended the Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling held in Vienna, Austria. The symposium was under auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Labor Office, and the World Health Organization. In early September 1963 I visited related laboratories as follows: (1) Laboratories Du Centre D'Etudie Nucleaire, Mol, Belgium; (2) Division of Radiobiology, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden, and (3) Forsvarets Forskningsanstalt, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden.

2. Due to a misunderstanding in the USSR, the topics covered by the symposium were not known sufficiently in advance for Soviet scientists to contribute papers on other than nuclear toxicology. Therefore, Soviet Delegate N Tschesnokow briefly discussed USSR uranium mine health practices which included three areas of activity: (1) Maximum efforts are taken to suppress dust at the source, and mines are well ventilated; (2) Personnel protective devices, such as respiratory masks and filters, are used, and (3) Preventive health or prophylactic procedures include assignment of mine workers to a sanitarium for one month each year. No kidney damage or other pathology apparently has been seen as a result of uranium mining activities in the USSR. There was no mention of cancer due to this activity. Four papers from the USSR dealt with laboratory studies on the toxicology of internal emitters. Most Soviet studies involved intratracheal administration of the isotopes -- although it was brought out that the importance of inhalation as a route of entry is being recognized. The symposium brought together a world cross section of scientific disciplines for discussion of uranium mining and milling hazards. Details of all of this are given in my trip report which follows:

3. IAEA, ILO, and WHO Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, Austria, August 26-31, 1963. Visits were also made to the following laboratories:

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT

CONTROLLED NO DISSEM ABROAD NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISSEM: The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence compo of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically contr in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government dir participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to orga tions or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

This is apparently due to the high acceptance of data published by the University of Rochester. It was pointed out that the possible contribution of radioactive dust composed of other than radon daughters was not actually evaluated in the case of the Schneeburg lung cancers because dust samples were not collected. Although radon is released by crushing of ores, radon and radon daughters were not considered to be a problem in uranium mills of France because of large work areas and high ventilation rates.

e. Four papers from the USSR dealt with laboratory studies on the toxicology of internal emitters in general, particularly Cs^{137}, Sr^{89}, Sr^{90}, Y^{91}, Ce^{144}, Zr^{95}, Ni^{95}, Ru^{106}, and uranium and radon. Most studies involved intratracheal administration of the isotopes, although a few inhalation studies were described. These papers were all given by Dr L N Burykina in the absence of Drs Moskalev, Sanotsky, Novikova and Kushneva. They report that 10 to 18 per cent of the inhaled radioactivity was found in the lungs of rats and dogs after exposure, and that five per cent was cleared by ciliary activity. These data are difficult to evaluate since the particle sizes of the aerosols were broadly described as being between 1 and 4 μ. Translocation of the inhaled radioisotopes was similar to that reported by others.

f. Biological effects were reported only for intratracheal administration of Ce^{144} and Ru^{106}. They report degenerative inflammation of the lung and aplastic changes in the bone marrow accompanied by leukopenia in acute stages. In longer term studies they find chronic pneumonia and degenerative and proliferative changes of the bronchial epithelium and connective tissue. They also reported reduction of bone marrow hematopoiesis and degenerative changes in the liver, kidney, etc. These occurred after deposition of 1 to 19 μc Ce^{144} in rats, 0.6 to 2.6 μc Ce^{144}/gram of dog, and 0.4 μc Ru^{106}/gram of rat. No cardiovascular changes were noted, but were not specifically studied. The results of studies with uranium were similar to those reported many times, with the exception of central nervous system injury which consisted of changes in conditioned reflexes and in hibitory and excitatory processes. Due to this and relatively high burdens found in skeleton (3 to 4 per cent) they conclude that uranium toxicity is not necessarily confined to kidney damage. Kushneva's paper on synergistic effects of silica and radon reported previously published data. Silicotic rats were exposed to 8 μc radon. The radon treated silicotic rats showed more serious clinical symptoms, drop in circulating blood cells, and more extensive lung pathology than rats treated with radon or silica alone.

g. An excellent paper describing experimental work on the inhalation of Rn^{222} and its decay products was presented by Dr E Pohl from the University of Innsbruck, Austria. When Rn was inhaled in equilibrium with RaA, RaB, and RaC the concentration of daughters in lungs and other tissues were higher than when the concentrations of RaA, RaB, and RaC in the inhaled air were less than the equilibrium values. However, in the latter case the concentrations of daughter products in the lungs and other tissues were higher than would be predicted from the concentrations in the inhaled air. Further experiments are in progress to confirm and explain these results. Similar, but less extensive, studies were reported in a paper co-authored by Dr LaFuma of France and Medjidovic of Yugoslavia.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

600 2547

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	International	REPORT NO.	00- B-3,278,069
SUBJECT	Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63	DATE DISTR.	18 Oct 63
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	August 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Vienna—August 1963		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizens; professors of industrial medicine at a large western medical school.

Sources, one of whom is a medical doctor, attended the conference under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission. This was their first experience at a conference of this kind and first meeting with foreign colleagues in this field.

[Sources are generally available for reinterview, should any further questions be generated by this report.]

[On file in CIA Library is the official program of the Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling under the sponsorship of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Labor Organization and the World Health Organization, held in Vienna on 26-31 Aug 63. Also on file is the Provisional List of Participants as of 19 Aug 63 and the Provisional Volume of Abstracts in the language submitted by the author.] [FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY].

1. The Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling in Vienna, 26-31 Aug 63, did not provide much new information mainly because the US is so far ahead of the other countries represented at the symposium in its studies of these subjects. The US was actually the only country which presented original material at the conference. The Soviets sent a small three or four-member delegation headed by Yuriy Ivanovich Moskalev, a very personable and diplomatic gentleman. At the end of the conference, he voiced his dismay in all apparent sincerity, that the Soviets had misunderstood the exact point of the meeting and had presented very minor papers.

...2547

1.5

2. All the Soviet papers were read by V S Kusneva, a woman physician who delivered them very dramatically. The most interesting Soviet claims, which we do not believe directly applicable to the causes claimed and which were not fully documented were:

    a. that uranium effects the central nervous system, i e, causes certain changes in the Pavlovian reflexes;

111V

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

[redacted]

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

CE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C002547

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY USSR/International

SUBJECT Meeting of IAEA Panel on the Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, 4-8 Jun 63

REPORT NO. OO- B-3,271,609

DATE DISTR. 21 Aug 63

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Jun 63

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Vienna; Jun 63

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen. Medical doctor.

Source, who does cancer research at a large US institute devoted to nuclear studies, attended subject meeting.

1. I attended the meeting of the IAEA Panel on the Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, 4 - 8 Jun 63. The purpose of the panel was to advise the IAEA on research programs in this field. The meeting was organized by Evgeniy I. Komarov (USSR) of the IAEA Division of Isotopes.

2. The following named scientists participated in the panel:

Dr. M. H. Faes, Chief
Medical Service
Nuclear Energy Center
Mol-Donk, Belgium

Dr. A. R. Gopal-Ayengar
Atomic Energy Establishment
Richardson-Cruddas Building
Byculla, Bombay, India

Dr. Arne G. A. Nelson
Research Institute of
National Defence, Dept. 1
Sudbyberg, Sweden

Yuri I
C002547
Professor C. Moskalev
Academy of Medical Science
Moscow, USSR

Dr. Krista Kostial
Institute of Medical Research
Yugoslav Academy of Science
Zagreb, Yugoslavia

Dr. Julian Liniecki
Institute of Occupational Medicine
Narutowicza 96
Lodz, Poland

Dr. P. Brinkman
Radiopathology Laboratory
University of Groningen
Groningen, Netherlands

Dr. Jan Muller
Radiation Safety Division
Institute of Labor Hygiene
and Occupational Disease
Prague, Czechoslovakia

Dr. Pierre Wenger
Institute of Radium
Geneva, Switzerland

Dr. Otto Hug
University of Munich
Munich, Germany

5
4
3
2
1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	AEC				

NO DISSEM ABROAD

[illegible] is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled [illegible] may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly [illegible] IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organiza- [illegible] a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

14-00000

12

DF - 440

9 July 1963

INFORMATION REPORT

SUBJECT : Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY

SOURCE : AEDAZZLE-1

DOI : 1961

1. Source identified a photograph of MOSKALEVSKIY /not by name, nor was the name supplied/ as that of an Air Force Colonel and GRU officer in the Information Directorate of the GRU who attended a meeting in London in May or June 1961.

Comment:

2. No SR/6/Bio traces.

3. Informal [redacted] traces report that Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY, born 17 January 1920, a radio engineer, attended a Conference on Electronics in London from 12 to 17 June 1961.

DISTRIBUTION:

Orig - 74-5-112 File
1 - SR/CI/G/Chrono
1 - 74-6-439/4
1 - SR/CI/G/Targets

SR/CI/G:STull:st

INDEX

9 July 1963

N.B. Birthdate also recorded as 23 July 1920.

CENTRAL [illegible]

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Moscalev

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

6002547

COUNTRY USSR/Czechoslovakia/West Germany/India/France

REPORT NO. 00- B-3,248,[illegible]

SUBJECT WHO/IAEA Scientific Meeting on the Diagnosis and Treatment of Radio-Active Poisoning--Assessment of Participants and Their Presentations/Biographical Information

DATE DISTR. 15 Jan 63

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES Guide 383

DATE OF INFO. 15-18 Oct 62

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Vienna 15-18 Oct 62

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, doctor of medicine.

Source conducts research in the treatment of radioactive metal poisoning and is also a clinician when such cases arise at the medical center. Source speaks German and keeps abreast of all literature on the subject of radioactive poisoning. [This report was prepared by an ARMY representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I participated in the World Health Organization's International Atomic Energy Agency's scientific meeting on the diagnosis and treatment of radioactive poisoning, held at Vienna, Austria, 15-18 Oct 62. There were only 20 participants at this meeting; therefore each individual is considered highly qualified in this particular field otherwise he would not have been invited as a participant.

2. The two USSR doctors who were invited were Dr D J Semenov and Dr I T [illegible], a female doctor. They are both from Sverdlovsk Center. When the secretary had not heard from them, he contacted the permanent USSR representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who called Moscow to find out whether or not these two representatives would attend. He was informed that they could not come due to unforeseen circumstances. They sent instead, Prof 6002547 Moscalev. He speaks only Russian. He is bright but not current on the effects of radiation, that is, the effects of radioactive metals. He was therefore not the individual that should have been representing the USSR at this meeting. This was his first time out of the USSR. He is about 5'-8" tall, weighs about 175 pounds, is around 45 years of age and has graying hair. He is generally an outgoing individual. He became very warm and friendly during the meeting and toasted my son saying that he hoped that his son and my son could climb mountains together. He was rather gay at parties but only a social drinker. He smoked an average amount. He has a family, the size of which I do not know, and is a professor in the Institute of Medicine.

3. Professor V Volf, Department Ionizing Radiation, Institute of Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Diseases, [illegible] 24, Prague 7, Czechoslovakia, is a well-known scientist. He is tall, slender, and athletic, in his late 30's, about 6 feet tall, speaks perfect English. He has one boy aged 5 and a girl aged 9. He lives in Prague. He publishes an annual report on the proceedings at his institute, which I receive. He is a top-notch scientist. He is an MD and sees patients in addition to conducting research. He stated

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CONTROLLED NO DISSEM ABROAD NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISSEM: The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically [illegible] in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

Moskalev

6002547

Int'ntl Conf on Diagnosis and Treatment of Radioactive Poisoning
Vienna 15-18 Oct 62

Source US national; physicist on staff of US institution of higher learning.

The most interesting aspect of meeting was conduct and contributions of Prof Yu I Moskalev of USSR Acad Sci. His subject was listed as "Uptake and Retention of Plutonium in Man"; no abstract was presented. When Prof Moskalev spoke, however, he changed the title to "Problems of Kinetics of Uptake and Retention of Radioisotopes." During his presentation, it was suggested that the retention of multiple dosis of Sr90 in the rat could not be predicted on the basis of single injection studies. After continual questioning via translation service (he apparently spoke no English), we concluded he meant by this that the rat is a continually changing animal. In any event, his paper presented nothing new and could be described as being rather elementary.

In contrast, Prof Moskalev's questions throughout the four day meeting covered a wide range of topics, and left one with the impression that he was a competent individual. In response to questions, however, his answers were far from satisfactory. He have no specific answers to questions regarding Soviet experience with radioisotopes in man.

SO: CIA-A-3.246.539 CONFIDENTIAL Controlled/NDA/NFD
26 Dec 62

SECRET

1. **NAME** MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich

CASE NO. 5656719

2. **VARIANTS**
3. **POSITION** Sci Worker, Radiobiological Installation, Nuc Res Inst, Sungul, Chelyabinsk Oblast, c 53; I/w Inst. of Biophysics, AS USSR, Moscow, 51
4. **LOCATION** @ Sungul, Chelyabinsk Obl, C 53; Msocw, 51
5. **OCCUPATION** Nuclear Research-Radiobiology
6. **FIELDS** Distribution of Isotopes in Various Animal Species.
7. **BIRTHDATE** c1921 ✓
8. **BIRTHPLACE**
9. **NATIONALITY** USSR
10. **EDUCATION**

585-2750

6002547

11. **HONORS**
12. **POL. AFFIL.** CP Mbr., 51 ✓
13. **CTRY. WORK. FOR**

Retain

CHECKED

INDEXED

9.	SOUNDEX	TO 1	LOCATION	4.	ORGANIZATION	7.	5.	6.	13.
600	24125	0	617-5310		60120	-21	X290750	X 030000	
					(601)			X [illegible]	
W			6011 3005		X 408 90000				

FORM NO. 214B 1 OCT. 54 REPLACES FORM 60-58B WHICH MAY BE USED

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION CARD

SECRET

In 1953 tests were begun by MOSCALEV concerning the distribution of isotopes in various animal species. Work of the radiobiological installation at Sungul

SO: CIA, CS-G-EG-14 64, 25 Oct. 55, Secret. jab

MOSKALEV -- assistant to Timofeyev, Head of Biological Dept, Sungul Institute. Moskalev, a nerve physiologist and party man, worked with Catsch (and subsequently succeeded him) on research on curing or preventing radiation damage. (Source is Dr Wilhelm Menke (STIB), a returned German scientist who gave information on Soviet personalities at the Nuclear Research Institutes at Sukhumi, between 1945 and 1955.) SOURCE: CIA, CS-G-82811, 1 Mar 56, SECRET/NOFORN RELEASABLE TO U.K./CONTINUED CONTROL

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich - worked as a sci. asst. in source's lab. at Sungul. Took the position of chief of the pathophysiological lab. when source left in Oct. 53. Not well qualified. Was supposedly imprisoned during the war because of his German descent or for black market dealings. Became a Party member in 1951. Had one month's TDY at t the Biophysical Inst., Moscow during the last half of 52. Upon his return, he informed source that the inst. was doing intensive work on the hematological effects on dogs of radiation exposure. The inst. was also working on radiation effects on the nervous systems of dogs, similar to the conditioned reflex experiments of Pavlov. He also stated that the inst. was doing parallel work to Sungul on increasing the excretion of incorporated radioactive isotopes, using diuretic substances & hormones, particularly the parathyreotrope hormone. No special results were achieved. He was married to Vera Nikolayevna Streltsova. Age 35. Medium height. Dark blond.

SO: CIA, CS-G-EG-1550, 24 Apr. 56, Secret joe

SRI, Consol, Biblio, lme, Ju 1956

```
                                        15-10
A 76A01 M   TRADE REPRESENTATION
A 76A01 N   SUIS                       (BERN)              CA SEP 76          OPEN          102
A 76A01 U   PCS REPORTS          20-10 (BERN) 7821                            09 SEP 76
F 76A02 U   NO TRACE                   WASH-914630         TELEPOUCH          14 SEP 76
*************************************************************************************
  00A00 A 404617                       201-0943610
  00A00 B  KUZNETSOV                   VLADIMIR                               T
  00A00 C   USSR                       MOSCOW              20 SEP 26          M
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE GALINA B 25 MAY 41 MOSCOW NEE GULIYUTKINA
A 76A01 B  KUZNETSOV                   VLADIMIR                               T
A 76A01 C   USSR                       MOSCOW              20 SEP 26          M
A 76A01 D   USSR
A 76A01 E  WIFE GALINA B 25 MAY 41 MOSCOW NEE GULIYUTKINA
A 76A01 G  EMPLOYEE                          15-5
A 76A01 M   TRADE REPRESENTATION
A 76A01 N   BELG                       (BRUSSELS)          CA SEP 76          OPEN
A 76A01 U   PCS REPORTS           20-5 (BRUS) 41919                           31 AUG 76
F 76A02 U   POSS TRACE                 WASH-914708         TELEPOUCH          13 SEP 76
*************************************************************************************
  00A00 A 404618                       201-0933047
  00A00 B  BELOKON                     VALENTIN            ANATOLEYEVICH      T
  00A00 C   USSR                                           CA 30              M
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE OLGA
B 76A01 B  BELOKON                     VALENTIN            ANATOLEYEVICH      T
B 76A01 C   USSR                                           CA 30              M
B 76A01 D   USSR
B 76A01 E  WIFE OLGA
B 76A01 G  STUDENT                               15-5
B 76A01 M   UNIVERSITY OF BRUSSEL
B 76A01 N   BELG                       (BRUSSEL)           CA SEP 76          OPEN
B 76A01 Q   FOR 1976-1977 ACADEMIC YEAR
B 76A01 U   PRESENCE REPORTS      20-5 (BRUS) 41938                           02 SEP 76
F 76A02 U   TRACE REPLY                WASH-914699         TELEPOUCH          14 SEP 76
*************************************************************************************
  00A00 A 404619
  00A00 B  TRUBETSKY                   ANDREY              GERASIMOVICH       T
  00A00 C   USSR                       KRASHINO            04 MAR 48          M
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE FAINA GRIGORYEVNA B 27 FEB 49 LARINOVKA

10/03/77   PAGE    26618                              404619
                          SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE   E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877
```

```
                          SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
404619                           CONT.

B 76A01 B  TRUBETSKY                   ANDREY              GERASIMOVICH       T
B 76A01 C   USSR                       KRASHINO            04 MAR 48          M
B 76A01 D   USSR
B 76A01 E  WIFE FAINA GRIGORYEVNA B 27 FEB 49 LARINOVKA
B 76A01 G  ELECTRICAL ASSEMBLER
B 76A01 H   ORSHANSKY TOOLS-BUILDING PLANT
B 76A01 M   STANKO-CANADA LTD            16-43
B 76A01 N   CAN                        (TORONTO)           30 SEP 76          OPEN
B 76A01 U   PRESENCE REPORTS      21-6 (OTTA) 27783                           09 SEP 76
F 76A02 U   NO TRACE                   WASH-915518         TELEPOUCH          15 SEP 76
*************************************************************************************
  00A00 A 404620                       CLOSED SEE 208433   09/03/77
*************************************************************************************
  00A00 A 404621
  00A00 B  KASSINOV                    ERIK                                   T
  00A00 C   USSR                                                              M
  00A00 D   USSR
F 76A01 B  KASSINOV                    ERIK                                   T
F 76A01 C   USSR                                                              M
F 76A01 D   USSR
F 76A01 G  EMPLOYEE
F 76A01 H   SORICE INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
F 76A01 M   STANKO-FRANCE                      15-4
F 76A01 N   FRAN                       (PARIS)             PR JUL 76
F 76A01 U                              SX-29811                               03 JUL 76
*************************************************************************************
  00A00 A 404622                       201-0943860
```

9 HW

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE 6 Dec 76

SUBJECT George S. de MOHRENSCHILDT

FILE NUMBER

1. The Interagency Source Register has no record of Subject (including the 1960s).

2. CI/OA has no record of Subject.

3. Check (Phil) WUBRINY (CCS) -

4 Check (Phil) LA/Haiti (Vivian + Sturbitz)

5. DCD file - copies attached)

8 Dec 76

Re separate request on FRIGAUD, Jean (traveling on Belgian passport in 1960's) - IPS has no record.

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

FORM 7-62 1954

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

13-00000

Need letter
Need policy for [illegible]
before DDO material
released.



6 de M

1. Don Massey got another call from Moore & [illegible] — official request.

2. OSec has material — Contact Reardon to see file. If only references for DODS + FR, not problem.

3. DCD material can be made available — no higher level authority, for him to see here.

4. Al Brodie (IG) has letter to Bush + reply which we haven't seen. Should go in 201. Anything else? Massey can get from IG, but if it from DDO we would have to review it.

5. Vivian Gardella (Haiti) has 201 file. To identify problem re mail intercept (prob. can't protect that — c/o US Emb + we got it), segregating this + FBI material, all else, sanitize it.

6. Check ISR and all others on list to see what they have.

7. Bolton says IG (memo?) article re Post article by Kessler.

8. Find out from Vivian re what story was.

9. Is it the same if c/o Emb + Emb opened it as domestic US mail?

Check following -
George de Mohrenschildt,

CI/OC - Norman Ott
✓ CI Staff (Russ Holmes)
JMWAVE (then Stubbits)
✓ LA/Haiti (Vivian Gardella)
ISR 03
✓ CCS - (Erich Isenstead)
IG - (Al Brodie)

WUBRINY/1 file
April '63 - introduced
by Clemard Joseph Charles, financier
15 May '63 - [illegible] w/ DDI
21 May '63

Bonn & track ↑

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	**DATE** 26 Nov
TO: Eric	
ROOM NO.	**BUILDING**

REMARKS:
These are my notes on the G. de M. matter. I'd like to go over them with you on Monday to see if you could pick up some of the pieces. I probably should do an M/R on my meeting with Tom Moore - reminded me!

FROM:

ROOM NO.	**BUILDING**	**EXTENSION**

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

'1DV

13-00000

PRIVACY ACT- to the extent it within jurisdiction of the Committee

OSS applicant in 1942 (DI re Nazi connection)

CI Staff

57-58 — Yugoslavia - debriefed by DCD
[illegible] - recontacted until [illegible] 9'61

23 & 24 Nov. 63 - DCD/Dallas [illegible] the [illegible] re Oswald in Dallas [illegible]

Testified before Warren Commission

Moscow FBI investigative reporting

Dec 63 — Haiti - some reporting

We passed to Warren Commission

also summary of [illegible]

Also passed to Bureau in 1965

info [illegible] in Haiti

also ONI
ACSI
~~State~~
CSE

Commercial Ops part of DO Division

Transferred to 1963

Gale Allen 04

WUBRINY/1 = (John Pell Carter Train) still a contract agent

WUSALINE = [Cover office in which] John Barkley of CCS 24

John Leader
2E24

2/17

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible] Russ Holmes 1750

per Don M.

Tom Moore (de Mohrenschildt) will be here on Friday at 0930 (in OLC office) to review material. Don feels Secur has so little info that they should be done away with first. Thinks Moore should be ready to review DDO material @ 10-1030.

Date 8 Dec 76 Jane

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CMF	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

15-4

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	102353Z	DIRECTOR	851765

CONF: C/EA-3 INFO: FILE DDO, DDO/DO, OC-C, EYES ONLY, C/SS, C/EUR 3, C/EA-3

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 4A
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER C1
0 IP FILES # 3 (E0)

TO: (LONDON) INFO (JAKARTA), (THE HAGUE), (PARIS).Y
151 13-20 15-6 15-4

RYBAT (PLMH)BLANKET Y
02

REF: (LONDON) 72167 |IN 906466|Y
20-1

1. FOLLOWING ARE HQS TRACES ON WILLEM LEONARD OLTMANS (201-155221). (SUBJECT). DPOB: 10 JUNE 25, HUIZEN, NETHERLANDS. OLTMANS IS 6'1" TALL.Y

2. FYI: OLTMANS STUDIED AT YALE IN 1950 AND WAS EXPELLED FOR MISBEHAVIOR. FOR A SHORT TIME HE WORKED FOR U.P. AND "DE TELEGRAAF" A DUTCH NEWSPAPER, HOWEVER, HE WAS FIRED FROM BOTH. IN 1956 OR 57 HE MARRIED AN AMERICAN GROUND STEWARDESS. IN 1960 HE DIVORCED HER AND IN NOV 61 WAS LIVING WITH A FILIPINO MALE. OLTMANS WAS ADMITTED TO THE U.S. IN NEW YORK CITY AS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ON 10 JUNE 58. END FYI Y

3. NUMEROUS FIELD REPORTS INDICATE THAT IN 1956 SUBJECT ARRANGED AN INTRODUCTION FOR HIMSELF TO PRESIDENT SUKARNO. HE THEN TRAVELED WITH SUKARNO DURING THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP THRU EUROPE IN 1956 AS THE PRESIDENT'S GUEST. SUBJ'S TRIP FROM INDONESIA TO THE US IN FEB 57 WAS PAID BY THE INDONESIAN GOVT. INDICATIONS ARE THAT SUBJ WAS BEING USED AS A TOOL BY THE INDONESIAN GOVT TO CARRY ON PROPAGANDA IN THE US AND AT THE UN. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

[illegible]

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

6|pw

OUTGOING MESSAGE

18

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

AGE COI ACP TOO TPE MRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:

0 NO INDEX

851765

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

~~(SUBJ'S WIFE SAID THAT DURING THEIR MARRIAGE OLTMANS WROTE SUKARNO AT LEAST ONCE A WEEK.3)~~

4. F/I: IN MAR 1960 SUBJ DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS ANTI-COMMUNIST./ HE STATED HIS VIEWS ARE AT BEST THOSE OF A GREAT ADMIRER OF COMMUNISM AND WHAT THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM REPRESENTS. HE WAS DESCRIBED AS HAVING EXCELLENT CONTACTS WITH ALL THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CUBA. END FYI 4

5. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, ON 18 DEC 62 SUBJECT ANNOUNCED HE INTENDED TO TAKE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER J. M. A. H. LUNS. SUBJ ALLEGED THAT HE HAD BEEN REFUSED "ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM LUNS" A DECLARATION BY THE DUTCH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. THAT HE WAS A BONA FIDE JOURNALIST WORKING FOR BONA FIDE NEWSPAPERS. AN EARLY 1972 REPORT ([redacted]) 24 STATED OLTMANS WAS ATTEMPTING TO HAVE THE GOVT PROSECUTE LUNS FOR "LYING AND MISLEADING THE GOVERNMENT" ON INDONESIA DURING HIS TENURE AS FOREIGN MINISTER. THE 19 AND 20 JAN 72 ISSUES OF DUTCH PAPER "DE TELEGRAAF" CARRY ARTICLES EXPOSING ACTIVITIES SUBJ WHO ENGAGED IN DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST LUNS. STORIES ACCUSE SOVIETS OF COLLUSION WITH SUBJ AND OF INTERFERENCE IN DUTCH

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 851765

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY: #

INTERNAL AFFAIRS. (S)

6. IN 1963 SUBJECT WAS A JOURNALIST AT THE UN CONNECTED WITH AN OBSCURE DUTCH NEWSPAPER. THE OTHER JOURNALISTS CLAIMED TO NEVER HAVE SEEN ANYTHING OF SUBJ'S IN PRINT. WHILE AT THE UN OLTMANS APPLIED FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN CORRESPONDENCE ASSOCIATION. HOWEVER, HE COULD NOT PRODUCE A SINGLE CLIPPING TO DEMONSTRATE HIS JOURNALISTIC ACTIVITIES. DURING THIS TIME, SUBJ GAVE LECTURES, EARNING ABOUT $6000 PER SEASON, ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, TOUCHING ON ASIA IN GENERAL AND INDONESIA SPECIFICALLY. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE GROWN UP IN INDONESIA AND THEREFORE KNOWS THE CONDITIONS THERE.Y

7. IN NOV 63 A (LIASON) REPORT 24 ([redacted]) 24 DESCRIBED SUBJECT AS "OUTSPOKEN ANTI-AMERICAN, OUTSPOKEN PRO-INDONESIAN, AND PERSONA NON-GRATA WITH THE DUTCH."Y

8. IN APRIL 1967 SUBJ CLAIMED TO HAVE SOLD AN ARTICLE TO "RAMPARTS" MAGAZINE ABOUT THE CIA IN INDONESIA. HOWEVER, THE ARTICLE WAS NEVER PRINTED.Y

9. IN FEB 68, SUBJECT INTERVIEWED JIM GARRISON ON DUTCH TV ABOUT THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION.Y

10. IN FEB 72 A LIASON REPORT [[redacted]] 24 DESCRIBED SUBJECT AS AN EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

3|pv

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	ACE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MPO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4		4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
851765

CONF:

INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

PUBLICITY SEEKER WHO DOESN'T SEEM TO CARE WHAT TYPE PUBLICITY HE RECEIVES.

11. IN 72 OLTMANS WAS PLANNING TO MAKE A FILM IN THE USSR ON ECOLOGY. HE VISITED THE USSR 23-26 JAN 72 TO MAKE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FILM. AT THIS TIME, [DUTCH SERVICE [redacted]] 24 CLAIMED SUBJ HAD A 5-YR RETAINER FROM SOVIETS AS OVERT PR MAN. (NO INDICATION IN FILE IF FILM EVER MADE.)

12. SUBJ'S TRAVEL: 1956 - MET AND ACCOMPANIED PRESIDENT SUKARNO ON EUROPEAN TRIP. DEC 56 - VISTED INDONESIA. FEB 57 - USA. 1960 - CONGO. 1961 - E. GERMANY, CZECHSLOVAKIA, POLAND, HUNGARY. 1962 - CUBA. JAN 72 - USSR. FEB-MAR 72 - USA. MAR 72 - USSR.

13. NO LATER INFORMATION IN THE FILE. ABOVE WITH EXCEPTION PARAS 2 AND 4 MAY BE GISTED FOR 01 (JAGUAR).

14. FILE: 73-6/46/3. E2 IMPDET.

~~AC~~/DDO]03
AC/CI/OG]03
EA/PIA]03
EUR/BNL/~~N~~]03
EUR/F]03
EUR/BC]03
EUR/FP/FC]03
DC/EAW
]03
03

DATE: 6 MAY 76 03
ORIG: PATSY
UNIT: CI/OG
EXT: 1117

C/EUR
ADDO
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

12/PN

FORM 3020b
7-71 M/B. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ______ PER c/f # ✓ TOTAL COPIES 14 — ✓ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT							
c/CI-3	I N F O	RF. FILE. VR. DDO OGC c/SS c/EUR-3 c/EA 3	1		4	
ACTION #			2		5	
			3		6	

T 889585 EIA165 PAGE 01 IN 908916
20-6
TOR:041017Z MAY 76 (HAGU) 29003

EYES ONLY

S E C R E T 040921Z MAY 76 STAFF
20-6
CITE (THE HAGUE) 29003 (BALILES ACTING)
15-1 15-4
TO: (LONDON), DIRECTOR, (JAKARTA) INFO (PARIS).
02 13-20
RYBAT, (PLMH)BLANKET
REF: (LONDON) 72167 (IN 906466)
20-1

1. STATION RECORDS REFLECT THAT WILLIAM L. OLTMANS (201-155221) IS DUTCH FREE LANCE JOURNALIST WHO HAS LONG HISTORY OF SENSATIONAL JOURNALISM AND HOMOSEXUAL ACTIVITY. ALTHOUGH NOT A COMMUNIST, HE ESPOUSES EXTREMELY LEFTIST VIEWS AND FANATICALLY BELIEVES THAT COMMUNISM OFFERS BEST FUTURE FOR INDONESIA. ALLEGEDLY HIS GOOD ACCESS TO PROMINENT INDONESIANS IS DUE TO PAST INITMATE RELATIONS WITH NUMBER OF INDONESIANS, INCLUDING SUKARNO. HE HAS MAINTAINED A RUNNING BATTLE WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL JOSEF LUNS, WHOM HE ACCUSES OF MISLEADING FORMER DUTCH PRIME MINISTER WILLEM DRIES ON POLICY TOWARD THE FORMER WEST NEW GUINEA. OLTMANS HAS TRAVELED TO THE USSR AND THE BLOC ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS

P&L DISSEM
RYBAT
RECORD COPY
5 MAY 1976

Form 547a Processed

S E C R E T

7/17

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 889585 EIA165 PAGE 02-02 IN 908916

TOR:041017Z MAY 76 20-6 (HAGU) 29003

MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH A NUMBER OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN THE HAGUE WHO WERE KGB SUSPECTS. HE IS AN INVETERATE NAME DROPPER AND CLAIMS TO KNOW, AMONG OTHERS, COLUMNIST JACK ANDERSON AND HOWARD JONES, FORMER US AMBASSADOR TO INDONESIA.

2. ABOVE FOR PASSAGE TO (JAGUAR) 01. IF (JAGUAR) 01 HAS NOT ALREADY REQUESTED TRACES ON OLTMANS FROM (SYMPATHIZER) 01 SUGGEST THAT THEY DO SO.

3. FILE: 73-6-46/3 X-REF 201-155221.

E2 IMPDET

4|IN

SECRET

104-10418-10046

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER 1# 2 (E.O.) TOTAL COPIES 14-? RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT C/CI3

ACTION #

INFO: ~~RF~~. FILE. VR. DDO, C/SS, ~~OGC~~, C/EUR3, C/CI3

EYES ONLY

T 882004 EIA762 PAGE 01 IN 906466

TOR:301935Z APR 76 LOND 72167

S E C R E T 301657Z APR 76 STAFF

20-1

CITE (LONDON) 72167

13-20 15-6 15-4

TO: DIRECTOR, (JAKARTA) INFO (THE HAGUE) (PARIS)

02

RYBAT (PLMH) BLANKET

REF: (LONDON) 72122 (SENT ONLY DIRECTOR) (904898)

20-1 13-20 15-6 15-4

1. FOR (JAKARTA), (THE HAGUE), (PARIS): REF ADVISED THAT DURING 23 APR CONTACT BETWEEN PHILIP AGEE AND STEPHEN M. WEISSMAN, WEISSMAN (WHO IN CALIFORNIA) SAID HE HAD FOUND AN ARCHIVES ON AGENCY MATERIAL WITH A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION. HE MENTIONED INDONESIA AND SAID THAT PAUKER WAS PERSONALLY IDENTIFIED AS "OUR" MAN BY CIA. AGEE THEN TOLD WEISSMAN THAT HE COULD ARRANGE AN INTRODUCTION TO DEWI SUKARNO AT ANY TIME FOR WEISSMAN, AS WELL AS A JOURNALIST WHO KNEW SUKARNO PERSONALLY.

01

2. (JAGUAR) WAS SOURCE OF ABOVE INFO. AFTER CHECKING THEIR RECORDS, ON 29 APR (JAGUAR) ADVISED THAT THEY BELIEVE THE JOURNALIST IN QUESTION TO BE ONE WILLIAM L. OLTMANS OF AMERBOS 205, AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS. THEY SHOWED TO US THREE LETTERS WHICH HAD BEEN MAILED TOGETHER IN ONE ENVELOPE POSTMARKED IN THE U.K. ON 9 OCT 75. THE ENVELOPE WAS ADDRESSED "PHIL AND ANGELA" AND GAVE THEIR CAMBRIDGE ADDRESS. THE LETTERS

SECRET

no station traces
(Jakarta) 38302
(905532)

12/PJ 18-20

Form 847a Processed

P&L DISSEM

RECORD COPY

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TI
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ____ AT ____ Z

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF . FILE . VR .

ACTION #

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 882004 EIA762 PAGE 02 IN 906466

TOR:301935Z APR 76 20-1 LOND 72167

WERE DATED JUL 75, ONE HAVING BEEN SIGNED BY OLTMANS AND THE OTHER TWO BY DEWI SUKARNO. OLTMANS' LETTER WAS AN EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN THE SENATE INVESTIGATIONS AND PARTICULARLY IN ANY ASPECT REGARDING INDONESIA. OLTMANS CLAIMED TO HAVE KNOWN SUKARNO QUITE WELL, AND SAID THAT HE HAD HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SUKARNO ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CIA AND HOW THE CIA WAS TRYING TO OUST SUKARNO. DEWI SUKARNO'S TWO LETTERS WERE REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON THE RESULTS OF THE SENATE INVESTIGATION AND HOPED THAT THE INQUIRIES WOULD SERVE TO CLEAR HER HUSBAND'S NAME.

3. SINCE THE LETTERS WERE ACTUALLY WRITTEN TO SENATOR FRANK CHURCH AS HEAD OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, JAGUAR 01 FOUND IT INTERESTING THAT AGEE WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN COPIES OF LETTERS WRITTEN TO A U.S. SENATOR IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS HEAD OF SUCH A COMMITTEE. JAGUAR 01 WONDERED IF SOMEONE ON THE SENATE COMMITTEE HAD SENT THE LETTERS TO AGEE, BUT WE FEEL IT POSSIBLE THAT OLTMANS/SUKARNO GAVE COPIES OF THEIR LETTERS TO PEOPLE IN PARIS WHO GOT THEM TO AGEE.

4. REQUEST ADDEES TRACES OLTMANS WITH INDICATION OF WHAT MAY BE PASSED JAGUAR 01

5. FILE: 73-6-46/3. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

4/PV

12-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI	PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH	152046Z	WASHINGTON	125435

CONF: /ADP// INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: /

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

15-6

TO: (THE HAGUE).Y

FROM: E/BNL/N INFO CI/OG, SA/DO/O, LA/C/EU[redacted]Y

~~REVIEW~~ 01

SUBJECT: WNINTEL RYBAT REAM (SYMPATHIZER) MHCOLOR Y

20-6

REF: (THE HAGUE) 33077 |IN 459495| Y

1. FYI: INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REFERENCE IS BEING PROVIDED [redacted] {WITH SOURCE PROTECTION} TO FBI, INS AND TO BOTH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE AND HOUSE ASSASSINATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE. QUERY WHETHER STATION HAS ADVISED CONSULATE.Y

2. FILE: 201-0155221. E2 IMPDET.H

03

ORIG: E/BNL/N {(B. RATHJEN), 9004}; COORD: CI/OG {R. HOLMS - TC}, SA/DO/O {E. VIDAL - INFO}, LA/C/EU {(B. BRAMSON) - TC}; REL: AC/[redacted]E/BNL {(D. KRUMVIEDE)}.

03

DATE: 15 NOV 77

ORIG: (RATHJEN) JMG

UNIT: E/BNL/N 03

EXT: 9004

CI/OG - R. HOLMS {TELECOORD}

SA/DO/O - E. VIDAL {FOR INFO}

LA/C/EU - (B. BRAMSON) {TELECOORD}

03

AC/E/BNL

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 034537

8/PV

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C1/OG		
2	Room 2D-39		
3			
4	attn Mr. Russ Holmes		
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

per our telecon

on Willem Oltmans

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. 03	DATE
E/BNL/N (Carol Saunders) x9004	

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67

7-71 MFG. 7/76

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER

TOTAL COPIES 13 - 1 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT P/DP 11

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR.

T 348531 EIA195 PAGE 01 IN 468074

TOR:170925Z NOV 77 20-6 (HAGU) 33140

S E C R E T 170900Z NOV 77 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE 20-6 (THE HAGUE) 33140

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: EUR/BNL/N INFO: CI/OG, SA/DO/O, LA/C/EU

SUBJECT: WNINTEL RNMUM RYBAT REAM 01 (SYMPATHIZER) MHCOLOR

REFS: A. 20-6 (THE HAGUE) 33077 (459495)

B. WASHINGTON 125435

1. WE DID NOT DISCUSS INFO CONTAINED REF A WITH CONSULATE FOR TWO REASONS: INFO RECEIVED FROM 01 (SYMPATHIZERS) WELL AFTER SUBJECT'S INTENDED DEPARTURE DATE, AND IF SUBJECT NEEDED VISIT CONSULATE FOR VISA HE ALREADY WOULD HAVE DONE SO. SECOND, DUE TO SENSITIVITY OF SOURCE OF INFO, WE PREFERRED NOT PROVIDE IT AFTER THE FACT TO ROTTERDAM CONSULATE, WHICH LACKS CLASSIFIED COMMO AND STORAGE FACILITIES.

2. WILL BE INTERESTED IN ANY CONGRESSIONAL REACTIONS TO, OR DOMESTIC COVERAGE OF, OLTMANS VISIT. NOTHING NOTED HERE IN LOCAL PRESS.

3. FILE: 201-0155221. E2 IMPDET.

-- S E C R E T

5IN

ORIGINAL

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER

TOTAL COPIES 37-2 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT c/IAS

ACTION #

INFO 6 RF. FILE. VR. c/ciPloms, c/CA3, DDO4, c/SES, c/EUR6, c/SIA/IC, c/SIA/FL, c/SIA, c/CI4, c/EPS/EG2, SA/DDO

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 325447 EIA549 PAGE 01 IN 459495

TOR:091001Z NOV 77 HAGU 33077

S E C R E T 090945Z NOV 77 STAFF

CITE THE HAGUE 33077

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT REAM SYMPATHIZER MHCOLOR

REF: ONHA-40410, 4 MAY 1977

1. SENSITIVE SYMPATHIZER SOURCE INDICATES THAT ON 3 OCTOBER WILLEM OLTMANS MADE APPOINTMENT MEET WITH CUBAN AMBASSADOR, THE HAGUE. OLTMANS STATED HE GOING "TO AMERICA ON 18TH" AND THAT HE " IS INDEED PREPARED TO GO AT THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER AS ARRANGED".

2. DURING DISCUSSION, OLTMANS SAID HE ALSO HAD VISIT SCHEDULED WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ROMANOV FOR 3 OCTOBER AND WANTED COMBINE TWO VISITS FOR SAME DAY. OLTMANS WAS TOLD AN ATTEMPT BY CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO SCHEUDLE MEET WITH HIM DURING SEEK 25 SEPTEMBER HAD BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OLTMANS COULD NOT BE REACHED. OLTMANS STATED HE HAD BEEN IN SOVIET UNION THEN.

3. ABOVE EVIDENCE OF OLTMAN'S CONTINUI~~N~~G CLOSE CONTACT WITH CUBAN AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS AND HIS RECENT TRAVEL TO THE USSR AND APPARENT CURRENT TRAVEL TO CUBA

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY ________

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ Z

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION UNIT

I N F O — RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 325447 EIA549 PAGE 02-02 IN 459495

TOR:091001Z NOV 77 HAGU 33077

IS OF INTEREST IN VIEW HIS NOTORIOUS ROLE AT THE TIME OF THE DEATH OF GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILD. LATTER WAS OF INTEREST BOTH TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGNECE AND HOUSE ASSASSINATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE. IF HQS DEEMS IT APPROPRIATE, NO STATION OBJECTION TO CONVEYING ABOVE, WITH ADEQUATE SOURCE PROTECTION, TO PROPER CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITIES.

4. FILE: 201-155221. E2, IMPDET.

* C/S SUGGESTS ADD. DISSEM TO: OLC

SECRET

SECRET

Filed & indexed in CI/SIG files

File SO memos

Files 29 January 1964

M. D. Stevens

THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

([illegible])

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, née: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

SECRET

Dup

1271-4029

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. [The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.]

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project RJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizens Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

FIELD DISTRIBUTION - BD #5847

AF DIVISION

Johannesburg
Lagos
Nairobi
Pretoria
Rabat
Salisbury

EUR DIVISION

Barcelona
Berlin
Bern
Bonn
Brussels
Copenhagen
Geneva
The Hague
Hamburg
Helsinki
Lisbon
London
Madrid
Milan
Munich Liaison Base
Munich Ops. Base (Laurion)
Oslo
Ottawa
Paris
LCPIPIT
Rome
Salzburg
Stockholm
Vienna
Zurich

NE DIVISION

Ankara
Athens
Beirut
Calcutta
Colombo
Istanbul
New Delhi
Rawalpindi
Teheran

FE DIVISION

Bangkok
Djakarta
Hong Kong
Honolulu
Kuala Lumpur
Kuching
Manila
Medan
Melbourne
Okinawa
Rangoon
Saigon
Seoul
Singapore
Taipei
Tokyo
Vientiane
Surabaya
Wellington

WH DIVISION

Asuncion
Bogota
Brasilia
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Georgetown
Guatemala City
Guayaquil
JMWAVE
Kingston
La Paz
Lima
Managua
Mexico City
Monterrey
Montevideo
Norfolk (REPLANT)
Panama City
Port au Prince
Porto Alegre
Quito
Recife
Rio de Janerio
San Jose
San Salvador
Santiago
Santiago de los Caballeros
Santo Domingo
Sao Paulo
Tegucigalpa

SECRET

HQS DISTRIBUTION - BD #5847

CA STAFF

DC/CA
CA/COPS
CA/PROP
CA/LO
CA/B1
CA/B2
CA/B3
CA/B4
CA/B5

AF/COPS/CA
AF/1
AF/2
AF/3
AF/4
AF/5
AF/6

FE/CA 14
C/CO/CA

SB/CA

DO/CA 3

CI/R&A 10

EUR DIVISION

E/CA
E/SC
E/BNL
E/F
E/I
E/IB
E/G
E/AS
E/BC

NE DIVISION

NE/COPS
NE/GTI/G
NE/GTI/T
NE/GTI/I
NEAA/I
NEAA/AP
NEAA/S&L
NESA/RE
NESA/C&N
NESA/I
NESA/P

WH DIVISION

WH/CA
WH/C
WH/C/CA
WH/1
WH/1/Mexico
WH/2
WH/2/G
WH/2/P
WH/H/S
WH/2/CR/N
WH/3
WH/3/B
WH/3/CO
WH/3/E
WH/3/P
WH/3/V
WH/4
WH/4/AR
WH/4/CH
WH/4/P/U
WH/5
WH/5/Brazil
WH/6
WH/7
WH/7/HT
WH/7/GU
WH/7/DR
WH/7/JTS

11/4

O'Reilly says getting pressure
re Weisenburg request on Nosenko.
Wants to know when we will finish
on him. Said wk & half. I said
would try to [illegible].

Jean said this was done. Will
try get from Lee Wigren. She did it.
Results showed we don't have Rocco's
material. Lloyd^{03} is supposed to be getting

Points for Dan.

✓ T&A — O.T.

Better leave nothing there off.

Eleanor on Wed. & Sub[illegible] Thur.

Third man on same team.

✓ Other office open D-Day. Jim Pier pursuing

They will bring all notes.

13-00000

11/1

Query Hartman 8/5/51 on memo for Rankin of 23 Mar. 64 in Vol 31 which refers to Agency cable to Navy (Doc 74673).

~~10~~/
11/4

Mr. Wall:

Mr. Voorhis believes that the drafts ~~sh~~ can be withheld for the FOIA requests. Unless – they present a significant change from the final copy – . (If we ever see a final copy!)

Shall I mark this att. for no release?

Also – what about other drafts – shall we

11/3

Betsy's point on the resettlement point for defectors being exposed by referring to the location of the resident agent who interviewed, i.e. New Haven.

10/31

AM

Gene Wilson said he would not provide a rep for FOIA over the weekend as he is behind on 2000 requests + one more isn't going to matter.

He called in response to my request to Ed Kaletski

Want Dan in charge for 3 days next week.

Weekend schedule. 10 people each day

Have 48 volumes for Senate

FOIA not working over weekends.

I would like

Points for G.K.

2. Weekend Pairs. — Sat - Sun - Mon.
5 6 & 3 11 & 1
Dan Tony Bob

1. ✓ FBI & State – ok with escape clauses.

3. ✓ Deletions for Senate & FOIA – One standard

4.

For final spot check of FOIA material. 14-1

x check all [Helsinki] traffic

x check all [Dutch tel taps] info.

24

2/72

11 November 1975

Bob,

There are, in my mind, two distinct problems which have to be addressed by the Task Force. These are (a) a final proofing of the sterile copy of the file, and (b) ensuring that the machine run accurately reflects what actions were taken with regard to full and partial declassification.

In the case of the final proofing only one person review the entire sanitzed file to ensure consistancy in the released product, eliminate duplicate materials and pick up any errors which may have slipped past, i.e. crypts etc. This should not take long, perhaps a day and should probably done by a person with a fresh view, i.e. not having done the declassific

The second problem may take more time. It would be the reviewing of each of the documents indicating what declassification , if any was done and accurately reflecting the action on the machine run. The would be a two man job. An attendent problem would be indicating on the machine run whenever duplicates bearing other numbers appear in the file. (In some cases we have found two, three or more copies of the same document, bearing a different number, larded throughout the files.) A tertiary problem is the marking on the machine run cases of drafts, research notes etc. My recommendation for this phase would be for a person from the Task Force, familiar with files and the entire excercise work jointly with a person from C/CI/EKO's office.

22 Oct thru 20 Nov 75

Total Time : 1,939.5 hours

Regular : 1,324.5 × 8.30

O.T. : 615.0

1,939.5

10 – 11 and below

7 – 12 to 15

$6580.00

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/CI	24 [illegible]	
2			
3	Bob Wall	[illegible] OCT [illegible]	
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

File

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
EXO	24

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

TO: Chief, CI

Re your remarks on a report to DDO for DCI and other DD's on the declassification exercise, it will include the following:

Number of documents reviewed.

✓ Number of documents declassified entirely (including those with minor sanitization, such as removal of crypts, slugs, true names, etc.).

✓ Number of documents partially declassified (portions of text removed which cannot be released because of substantive content).

Number of documents remaining classified.
Number of documents referred to other agencies.
Number of manhours spent on the exercise, with professional and clerical breakdown (for possible cost estimates in future).

Number of pages of documents copied.

Are there any additional items you wish included?

JOR

13-00000

Points for 12 Nov.

Start Betsy + George on final proof

Conclude Computer check for DC or NR.

~~Finish ops cat + parts ops.~~

Have first proofing continue. (Jean)

1/2 Day Sat

✓ Betsy —

○ Ken —

✓ George —

✓ Dan — Rocca.

✓ Judy —

+ ✓ Ann —

⊗ Jean —

✓ John —

✓ Martha

✓ Bob F.

✓ Jen. 0900 on

○ Tony

(Betsy
Ken
Bill
George)

Jean
John

Martha
Judy

Points for final review

1. [Helsinki penetration]
2. Echevarria 24
3. Things which could be embarrassing

Make 2 jobs of final preparation

1/17V

Ad/10

LEE HARVEY OSWALD DECLASSIFICATION EXERCISE

Jim Peters 8 | 8

	①		②		③		④		⑤		⑥ Sat		⑦ Sun		⑧ Mon		⑨ Tues		⑩ Wed	
NAMES	3 Nov		4 Nov		5 Nov		6 Nov		7 Nov		8 Nov		9 Nov		10 Nov		11 Nov 75		12 Nov 75	
	R	O	R	O	R	O	R	O	R	O	R	O	R	O	R	O				
✓(Bill Wallauer) 03	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0			0	0
John Carroll	6	0	8	1	8	1	8	1	8	1		8	0	0	8	.5	0	0	8	0
03 (Dan Niesciur)	8	0	8	1	8		8	1/2	8	1/2		4		~~3/4~~ 2	8		2	0	0	0
Bill Perkins	8	1½	8	1	8		0		0	0					0		0	0	0	0
03 ✓(Ann Ward)	0	0	0	0					0	0	0	0	0	0	0		5	1/2	5	0
03 ✓(Ken Jasper)	8	0	8	0	8	1	8	1	8	0	0	0	0	6	8	0	8	1/2	8	0
03 (Bob Litviak)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	4	0		0	0	0	6
03 ✓(Len Breijo)	0	1	0	0					0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
03 ✓(Martha Tribby)	2	0	1	0					8	0	0	8	0	0	0		0	0	2	0
Tony Sileo	0	0	0	0					0	0		0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0
03 ✓(E. J. McElfresh)	8	1/2	8	1	8	3/4	8	2	8	2		8	0	0	0	0	8	1	8	0
Jean Mansuri	8	0	8	0	8	0	8	0	8			2		6	8		8	0	8	0
03 (Judy Cline)	8	1/2	8	1	7½	0	8	0	8	1	0	5	0	3½	8	.5	8	1	8	0
Robert Wall	6½	0	8	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0				
03 ✓(Eleanor Ausum)	6	0	0	0					0	0	0	8	0	0	0		0	0	0	0
G. Bradley	8	1	8	0	8	1	8	1	8	1		8	0	0	6	0	8	1		

Reg 408
OT8 115¼

13-00000

LEE HARVEY OSWALD DECLASSIFICATION EXERCISE

414¾

	NAMES	22 oct R	23 Oct R	23 Oct O	24 Oct R	24 Oct O	25 Oct R	25 Oct O	26 Oct R	26 Oct O	27 Oct R	27 Oct O	28 Oct R	28 Oct O	29 Oct R	29 Oct O	30 Oct R	30 Oct O	31 Oct R	31 Oct O	1 NOV R	1 NOV O	2 Nov
			①		②		③		S ④		M ⑤		T ⑥		W ⑦		Th ⑧		F ⑨		Sat ⑩		S
	(Bill Wallauer) 03		0	2	1	0	0	4	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
✓	John Carroll	8	8	[illegible]	8	3	0	8½	0	7	0	8	8	2½	8	1	8	1½	8	1	0	[illegible]	6
✓	(Dan Niesciur) 03		4		8	0	0	4	0	8	0	8	8	0	8	0	8	0	8	0	0	0	8
✓	Bill Perkins		4	2.5	8	.5	0	0	0	7.5	0	8	8	2¾	8	2	8	2	8	1	0	0	8
	(Ann Ward) 03		6.5	2.5	4	3.5	0	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	2½	8	½		0	0	0	0	8	
	(Ken Jasper) 03		4	2½	8	2½	0	0	0	5	0	8	8	0	8	1	8	2	8	1	0	0	8
	(Bob Litviak) 03		1.5	0	8	0	0	0	0	8½	0	8	8	3½	8	0	8	1	8	0	0	2	
	(Len Breijo) 03		1.5	2	8	3	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	2¾	8	2	8	2	8	1	0	8	8
	(Martha Tribby) 03				8	0	0		0		0	8	8	0	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	8	
✓	Tony Sileo		4	2½	8	2½	0		0	5½	0	8	8	0	8	½	8	2	8	1	0	0	8
✓	(E. J. McElfresh) 03		6.5	2.5	8	3.5	0	4	0	7½	0	6¾	8	3½	2	0	7	1½	8	2		8	3½
	Jean Mansuri	8	8		8	0	0	0	0		0	8	8	0	8	0	8	0	8	½	0	4½	4½
	(Judy Cline) 03		8	2	8	–	0	8½	0	8½	0	8	8	2¾	8	½	8	2	8	1	0	7½	3½
✓	Robert Wall		3	2	8	3	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	2½	8	2	8	2	8	1	0	4	4
	(E. Ausume) 03														5	0	8	0	8	0	0	7	
✓	G. Bradley														5	0	8	0	8	1	0	7½	
		16	[illegible]	20.5	101	21.5		36.5		57.5		45	96	23¾	108	8½	111	16	104	10½		71½	61½

CONFIDENTIAL

30 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Chief, CI Meeting with Mr. Paul Wallach, Chief Counsel of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

This meeting occurred on Wednesday, 29 October 1975 as a result of concern on the part of Senate Select Committee officers that the Agency was not forthcoming with file material related to the Lee Harvey Oswald case, i.e., the assassination of President Kennedy. The following points were made by the principals as indicated.

Chief, CI - To open the meeting Mr. Kalaris made it clear that the Agency is anxious to demonstrate that we have nothing to hide and that all pertinent material was made available to the Warren Commission. He added that the procedure for making material available to the Senate Staff posed certain problems with regard to sources, methods and liaison, which were delaying the turnover of material. He then presented several examples of the sanitization process in which cables taken directly from the 201 file were edited so that all evidence of source, method and liaison information was removed.

Chief Counsel - As an opening reply Mr. Wallach stated that his position was that he considered that the Senate Committee should have the same access as the Rockefeller Commission. He added that in his discussions with several senators on his committee they had mentioned reports that a Rockefeller reviewing official by the name of Belin who had had access to the original file, had appeared on several talk shows and was going to write a book based on his review of Agency holdings on the Oswald case.

Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then pointed out that there were certain particularly sensitive aspects of the material which could not be released for use outside of the building.

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 064737

He gave two examples of this. 24 One was the fact that the Mexican Government security liaison contact on the case was the current President of Mexico. He said, and Mr. Wallach agreed; 24 this was obviously a matter which had to be protected. The second case was the Mexican Government penetration of the Cuban Embassy. Again Mr. Wallach 24 agreed.

Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then suggested that the answer might very well be for the Senate Committee review officers to work with the original file with the exception of those particularly sensitive items which would either be sterilized or summarized. Mr. Kalaris added that to establish the sensitivity of these items he would be willing for the sterilizations/summarizations to be spot checked against the originals by the Senate reviewers.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach conferred with his colleagues and then agreed that this would be acceptable. He did inquire as to approximately how many such items there would be. He was informed by Mr. Kalaris that it was somewhat difficult to access but that there should not be more than 100 such items.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that it would be necessary for his people to take notes, but he would agree that these notes not be taken from the building. The purpose of the notes is simply to allow the reviewers to keep track of where they have been and what they have seen. It was agreed at a minimum that their notes would be checked with us.

Chief, CI - At this point Mr. Kalaris called Mr. Blee and requested approval of the above procedure. Mr. Blee concurred.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that his people would tab those sterilized or summarized items which they wanted to discuss and we would confer with them on those points.

3|pJ

Comment

Mr. Wallach mentioned that Mr. Proctor (DDI) is a family friend and he wanted to make contact by phone.

At the end of the day the reviewers returned the three files of other agency documents and offered their notes for review. It was agreed they would return on Monday to start reviewing files and that we would have at least 15 volumes ready for them. Mr. Wallach was to call on Friday to confirm our readiness.

R. Wall
Robert G. Wall
Deputy Chief, CI/OG

cc: Chief, CI
ADDO
SA/DDO
Review Staff - Walt Elder

TAL Commission File

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chiefs of all Stations

INFO.

FROM
Chief, KUDOVE

SUBJECT
Warren Commission Testimony - Selected Excerpts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

1. The Warren Commission's Report on the assassination of President Kennedy focused attention on the magnitude of the problem involved in the protection of the Chief Executive. As you know, it is our responsibility, overseas and in headquarters, to render every support possible to the Secret Service in the conduct of its statutory responsibilities in the United States, and especially when the President travels abroad.

2. The circumstances confronting the Warren Commission produced discussion and testimony on various aspects of the problem of Presidential protection and on interagency operational cooperation, which normally do not find their way into the public domain. These include the acquisition and dissemination of information, consultation, coordination, and operational interchanges. I believe you will be interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren Commission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pertinent portions have been side lined. I commend these materials for reading by all officers in positions of senior responsibility in headquarters and overseas.

FLETCHER M. KNIGHT

DATE TYPED 23 Dec. 1964	DATE DISPATCHED 2 FEB 19[illegible]
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER Book Dispatch No. 4726	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 100-300-12	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

AF Division

Abidjan
Accra
Addis Ababa
Algiers
Bamako
Brazzaville
Bujumbura
Conakry
Dakar
Dar-es-Salaam
Freetown
Kampala
Khartoum
Lagos
Leopoldville
Lome
Lusaka
Mogadiscio
Monrovia
Nairobi
Pretoria
Rabat
Salisbury
Tananarive
Tripoli
Tunis
Yaounde

The above listing has been
reviewed in the AF Division.

(Initials)

EE Division

Athens
Bern
Frankfurt
Nicosia
Vienna

The above listing has been
reviewed in the EE Division.

(Initials)

FE Division

Bangkok
Djakarta
Hong Kong
Honolulu
Kuala Lumpur
Manila
Melbourne
Okinawa
~~Phnom Penh~~
Rangoon
Saigon
Seoul
Taipei
Tokyo
Vientiane
Wellington

The above listing has been
reviewed in the FE Division.

(Initials)

Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

NE Division

- Aden
- Amman
- Ankara
- Baghdad
- Beirut
- Cairo
- Colombo
- Damascus
- Jidda
- Kabul
- Karachi
- Kathmandu
- Kuwait
- New Delhi
- Tehran

The above listing has been reviewed in the NE Division.

(Initials)

WE Division

- Brussels
- Copenhagen
- The Hague
- Helsinki
- Lisbon
- London
- ~~Luxembourg~~
- Madrid
- Oslo
- Ottawa
- Paris
- Paris/ LCPIPIT
- Reykjavik
- Rome
- Stockholm

The above listing has been reviewed in the WE Division.

(Initials)

S-E-C-R-E-T

Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

WH Division

Asuncion
Bogota
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Georgetown
Guatemala City
Kingston
La Paz
Lima
Managua
Mexico City
Montevideo
Panama City
Paramaribo
Port-au-Prince
Port of Spain
Quito
Rio de Janeiro
San Jose
~~San Juan~~
San Salvador
Santiago
Santo Domingo
Tegucigalpa

The above listing has been
reviewed in the WH Division.

(Initials)

Headquarters Distribution for
Book Dispatch No. 4726

2	DDP
1	ADDP
1	C/OPSER
1	C/TSD
1	C/CA
1	C/CCS
1	C/SOD
1	C/CI
1	C/FI
2	C/AF
1	C/AF/1
1	C/AF/2
1	C/AF/3
1	C/AF/4
1	C/AF/5
1	C/AF/6
2	C/EE
1	C/EE/G
1	C/EE/K
1	C/EE/SA
2	C/FE
1	C/FE/CH
1	C/FE/HULA
1	C/FE/JKO
1	C/FE/PMI
1	C/FE/TBL
1	C/FE/VNC
2	C/NE
1	C/NE/1
1	DC/NE/AA
1	C/NE/4
1	C/NE/5
1	C/NE/6
2	C/WE
1	C/WE/1
1	C/WE/2
1	C/WE/3
1	C/WE/4
1	C/WE/5
1	C/WE/BC
2	C/WH
1	C/WH/1
1	C/WH/2
1	C/WH/3
1	C/WH/4
1	C/WH/5
1	WH/COPS
1	WH/POA
1	WH/POB
1	WH/Plans
2	CI/R&A
1	CI/LIA
1	CI/OPS/AF
1	CI/OPS/EE
1	CI/OPS/FE
1	CI/OPS/NE
1	CI/OPS/SS
1	CI/OPS/WE
1	CI/OPS/WH
1	RID

Originated by: Chief, CI/R&A, Ext. 7468/23 December 1964
and Mr. A.E. Dooley, Ext. 6748

ALAN H. BELMONT, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI
MAY 6, 1964

Mr. STERN. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have the exact answer on the record, and I thought it might——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I would think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to paraphrase that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem to me to be abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see what it would prove. If you have anything in addition that you want to ask him, if you want to ask him if there is anything in addition he has not put in there, that is all right. But to just ask him to paraphrase answers that have been done with great care would seem to me to be confusing the record, and serve no purpose.

Mr. STERN. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you would like to add or amplify in these questions?

Mr. BELMONT. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in view of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very happy to make clear our approach to this matter. For example, the fact that our interest in defectors, in this case, is shown by the fact that in early November 1959 we opened a file on Oswald based on the newspaper publicity as to his defection. And the fact that he had applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our files then to see was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a fingerprint record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines.

We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice in our fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back into the country unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble we would be immediately notified. That is our opening interest in the case with the thought in mind that should he come back to the country we would want to know from him whether he had been enlisted by Soviet intelligence in some manner.

That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have happened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue whenever we can.

Mr. STERN. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a stop in the files that you just referred to?

Mr. BELMONT. We merely notify our identification division to place what we call a flash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that should he be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the appropriate division, in this case the domestic intelligence division, would be notified that the man had been arrested, for what and where he was arrested, thus enabling us to center our attention on him.

Our next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his mother had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in April 1960 and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had told her that he would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.

So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed that while they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he did not show up at the college.

Mr. STERN. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the answer to the first question.

Mr. DULLES. I have one question I would like to put to you on the first question and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833—the Bureau's letter of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the first news you got about Oswald was from a news service item, and then later on at the bottom of the second full paragraph you state, "A file concerning Oswald was prepared and as communications were received from other U.S. Government agencies those communications were placed in his file."

The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State Department as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that might have known about it?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. We received a number of communications from other agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the State Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or his dealings with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we were sure we had all information in the State Department file.

We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies.

Mr. **Dulles**. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans abroad who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come back you can take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established SOP?

Mr. **Belmont**. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or otherwise, we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have any information and establish an interest there so that if they have not voluntarily furnished us the information they will do so upon our request.

Mr. **Dulles**. Thank you.

Mr. **Stern**. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview Oswald after he had established residence and why it was not preferable to interview him upon his arrival in New York?

Mr. **Belmont**. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when an individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the press is there, there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and Naturalization Service has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless there is a matter of urgency, to let the individual become settled in residence. It is a much better atmosphere to conduct the interview, and to get the information that we seek. If it is a matter of urgency, we will interview him immediately upon arrival.

Mr. **Stern**. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6, was it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon after his first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything unusual about that?

Mr. **Belmont**. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain interviewed Oswald on June 26, 1963—1962, I believe it was, was it not?

The **Chairman**. Yes; 1962.

Mr. **Belmont**. And was not satisfied that he had received all the information he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at that time.

Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an appropriate period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within the prerogative of the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not satisfied with the first interview it was his duty and responsibility to pursue the matter until he was satisfied.

Mr. **Stern**. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of Oswald to the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the returned defector, or unusual?

Mr. **Belmont**. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is an individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background of the individual, and the circumstances surrounding it.

Mr. **Stern**. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if he got a contact? Are they generally that cooperative?

Mr. **Belmont**. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of our interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited by the Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us if he was contacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether he meant it is a question. However, you must bear in mind that this man, I believe it was when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the American Embassy, the interviewing official there said it was apparent that he had learned his lesson the hard way, and that he had a new concept of the American way of life, and apparently had decided that Russia was not for him.

When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his stay in the Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is customary for us in such a case as this, to ask the man if he will report a contact, and it is customary for him to say yes, because frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather bad light if he didn't say yes.

Mr. **Stern**. Turning to——

Mr. **Dulles**. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your report and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no evidence that there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United States?

Mr. **Belmont**. No evidence whatsoever.

in view of the fact that we have practically—we have all the reports, he says we have all the reports that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing old straw to go over it and over it again.

Mr. McCloy. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here from the Embassy?

Mr. Belmont. You are looking at——

Mr. McCloy. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that? We don't have these in our files, for example.

Mr. Belmont. This is subsequent to the assassination. You see your area of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior to the assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that started to come in subsequent to the assassination, you see.

Mr. McCloy. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should examine that file. I can't come to any other conclusion after reading it all, because I don't know what is in it, what is in our record, and what is in that file. There is a good bit of material there that is narrative, which I think would be relevant. Certainly, I don't believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not producing a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking of. We are just as interested in protecting the security of your investigative processes as you are. But I don't think that when it is on the record that we have this file, that may contain material that was not in our files, and we are given the opportunity to examine it, without disclosing these confidential matters that we ought not to have somebody go through it.

Mr. Dulles. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we checked off first what we have already and that would cut out about half of that file probably.

Mr. McCloy. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about half of it.

The Chairman. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see. All right, proceed, Mr. Stern.

Mr. Stern. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the file then until we can give you the information.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. Stern. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at this time, Mr. Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834?

The Chairman. Yes. There are no security matters in this?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir.

The Chairman. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6 with an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 835?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. Yes; this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. Stern. What is the subject?

Mr. Belmont. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI.

Mr. Dulles. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews. I mean for the record, would you just define what you mean by an informant in this sense?

Mr. Belmont. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed to cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either for or without payment.

Mr. Stern. Thank you.

Mr. Belmont. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen to whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information in his possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or seeks out information at the direction and instance of the FBI relative to subversive or criminal matters. In other words, I want to make it clear we do not regard patriotic citizens as informants.

Mr. Stern. I take it you also would not have regarded Lee Oswald as an informant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and the other agents have told us about?

Mr. Belmont. Indeed not; in no way could he be considered an informant; in no way.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation of the information contained here?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. And you are familiar with it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; I am.

Mr. Stern. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely state the Bureau's practice in recruiting a prospective informant?

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. Is there anything you would like to add to the information covered in there with respect to your practices regarding informants?

Mr. Belmont. No; only in my personal knowledge this is a correct statement and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI.

Mr. Stern. Did you ever use the term "agent" to apply to anyone other than an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI?

Mr. Belmont. No; we do not.

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain's separation from the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in his handling of the Oswald case?

Mr. Belmont. No; indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and decided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retired and is presently working in Texas and very happy, I understand.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you.

Mr. Belmont. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the FBI is concerned.

The Chairman. And a year before the assassination.

Mr. Belmont. Frankly, I don't recall.

The Chairman. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified.

Mr. Stern. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that the record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever an agent of the FBI?

Mr. Belmont. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI.

Mr. Stern. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to testimony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you subsequently been advised that Mr. Wade had not testified before the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; we received a letter from the Commission advising us that the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than actual testimony before the Commission.

Mr. Stern. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that Mr. Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald as an informant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. The Commission's letter so advised us.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835?

The Chairman. It may be admitted under that number.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated February 12, 1964, a number of affidavits by special agents, attached to it. It was identified yesterday, parts of it were identified yesterday and it therefore carries the number for identification 825. Can you identify this letter for us?

Mr. Belmont. In order to be sure—I beg your pardon. This is a letter dated February 12, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI, to which is attached affidavits of FBI personnel who had reason to contact Lee Harvey Oswald and who were in a supervisory capacity over the agents who contacted Oswald.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise the preparation of this material?

Mr. Belmont. These affidavits were prepared, of course, by the men themselves.

I have read the affidavits, and they were compiled as an enclosure and sent over with this letter.

Mr. Stern. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony before the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. To your knowledge, are they accurate?

Mr. Belmont. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes.

Mr. Stern. Are they complete?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. They do not omit any significant fact you know of?

Mr. Belmont. No.

Mr. Stern. In connection with the material they cover?

Mr. Belmont. No.

Mr. Stern. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I suggest we admit this document.

The Chairman. It may be admitted as No. 825.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission, with a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been marked for identification as No. 836. Can you identify this for the Commission?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. This is a letter dated March 31, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our manuals as to the type of information which should be disseminated to Secret Service and our relations or liaison with Secret Service.

Mr. Stern. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation?

Mr. Belmont. I did.

Mr. Stern. Have you reviewed it recently?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; it is.

Mr. Stern. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect to the matters covered?

Mr. Belmont. Well——

Mr. Dulles. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry directed to the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this is complete as of the time of the assassination? I think we have two questions there to consider.

Mr. Belmont. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret Service and the material that is attached covers both the instructions to our agents prior to the assassination and the current instructions.

Mr. Dulles. Subsequent to the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Stern. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your agents to employ before the assassination in determining what information should be reported to the Secret Service regarding threats against the President, members of his family, the President-elect, and the Vice President?

Mr. Belmont. These are contained in detail in the attachments which represent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to all of our personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government, and also in the FBI handbook which is in possession of the individual agent in the field. These instructions require that any information indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the persons mentioned by you must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communications to the nearest office of the Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Washington must be advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has been furnished to Secret Service.

Mr. **Stern**. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested in, that is before the assassination?

Mr. **Belmont**. Yes. Specifically the kind?

Mr. **Stern**. Yes.

Mr. **Belmont**. Any information indicating the possibility of a threat against the President and Vice President and members of the family.

Mr. **Stern**. Have you broadened——

Mr. **Belmont**. I may say, sir——

Mr. **Stern**. Yes.

Mr. **Belmont**. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will find that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information over the years that we have furnished them. That was a practice religiously followed and a practice voluntarily followed without request. In other words, we do not have a written request for this type of information but rather considered it our responsibility and duty to furnish this information.

Mr. **Stern**. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion with the Secret Service before the assassination regarding the kind of information they were interested in?

Mr. **Belmont**. We had close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no doubt that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn't present but I would assume it has come up, particularly as we were constantly furnishing information. We have no written criteria, you might say, as to what should be furnished.

Mr. **Stern**. That is, established by the Secret Service.

Mr. **Belmont**. That is correct.

Mr. **Stern**. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of——

Mr. **Belmont**. No; I did not.

Mr. **Stern**. This liaison function.

Mr. **Belmont**. This is something we have done for years on the basis that we consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President goes. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy relative to other high officials when it appears desirable.

Mr. **Stern**. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your instructions to special agents in this respect?

Mr. **Belmont**. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional instructions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President.

The **Chairman**. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. **Belmont**. They appear as an attachment—working from the back, I think, Mr. Chairman, I can help you most.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Mr. **Belmont**. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of Instructions Section 83."

The **Chairman**. Yes; I have it.

Mr. **Belmont**. The first page is the same information that we previously furnished to Secret Service involving threats.

The **Chairman**. The first page is intact, as it was before.

Mr. **Belmont**. There may be some slight changes in wording but essentially it is the same dealing with possible threats.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Mr. **Dulles**. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the Commission's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a certain date. It is quite difficult going through it now without referring to the letter in each case to determine whether the instructions are as of the date of the assassination or as of the present date?

Mr. **Belmont**. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to do it with the staff, or can I help you here?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would be useful when this goes into the record for our later reference in studying this to have those dates available to us on each one of the attachments.

Mr. **Belmont**. Very good.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you.

Mr. Belmont. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir, the other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President is set forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion in our manual, and it extends the dissemination to "subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (*a*) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (*b*) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local government or officials of a foreign government, (*c*) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (*d*) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional, and a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information that might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November 22, 1963.

Mr. Stern. This did not come about, this change did not come about, through any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the Secret Service?

Mr. Belmont. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to provide any additional information in the light of what happened that might be of assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting the President.

Mr. Dulles. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly changing in section (*d*) the word "and" to "or" whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads "and hatred against organized government". There have been cases, I believe, where the propensity for violence had not been previously noted but the hatred of organized government has.

Mr. Belmont. We will be happy to change that.

Mr. Dulles. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to rewrite it.

Mr. Belmont. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles.

Mr. Stern. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr Belmont, should that "and" before (*d*) be "and" or "or"? Do you mean these——

Mr. Belmont. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled together if that is your thought.

Mr. Stern. That is right.

Mr. Belmont. We will be happy to change the "and" before (*d*) to an "or".

Mr. Stern. This means any of the broad classifications of people, subversives, ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these four tests.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in volume which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By volume, I mean the volume of your references to the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that more than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under these criteria.

The Chairman. In what period of time?

Mr. Belmont. Since we put them out.

The Chairman. I see.

Mr. Belmont. Which was December 26.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. McCloy. Have you included defectors in this list?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; we do include defectors.

Mr. Stern. You mean as of December 26, 1963?

Mr. Belmont. Correct.

Mr. Stern. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or difficulty for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem or difficulty under the expanded criteria?

Mr. Belmont. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance security against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws and a government of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the increase in security means an increase in the control of the individual and a diminishment, therefore, of his individual liberties. It is a simple matter to increase security. But every time you increase security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much difficulty.

Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous are immediately rounded up and detained while the individual is in the country. The authorities have no problem because in those countries there is not a free society such as we enjoy, and the people who are detained have no redress. The FBI approaches this whole field of security—I am not boring you with this, am I?

The CHAIRMAN. No, indeed. This is tremendously important.

Mr. BELMONT. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its tremendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the country as a sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our work in the security field, we do it in such a manner under the law that we strengthen rather than weaken the free society that we enjoy. It is for that reason that our men are trained carefully, thoroughly, and supervised carefully, to insure that their approach to the entire security field, which inevitably touches on control of thought, is handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the country, but to meet it under the law. We feel that to place security as such above the rights of the individual or to increase these controls beyond what is absolutely essential is the first step toward the destruction of this free society that we enjoy.

We have been asked many times why we don't pick up and jail all Communists. The very people who ask those questions don't realize that if action, unrestrained action, is taken against a particular group of people, a precedent is set which can be seized on in the future by power-hungry or unscrupulous authorities as a precedent, and which inevitably will gnaw away at this free society we have, and sooner or later will be applied to the very individuals who are seeking this action. Up until the time of the assassination we religiously and carefully and expeditiously furnished to Secret Service immediately on a local basis as well as on a national basis, headquarters basis, any and all information that in any way was indicated to be a possible threat against the President. This permitted Secret Service to take such action as was required against these individuals who had by their action set the stage for appropriate restraint or observation based on something they did. Therefore, they were not in a position to complain legitimately because they had by some word or deed set in motion a threat against the President of the United States. Since the assassination, as I have testified, we have broadened the area of dissemination in an effort to be helpful. It stands without question that we could have said, "No; we won't go any further." But we felt that it was our responsibility to do whatever we could do and, hence, we have broadened these criteria, and we have distributed thousands of pieces of information on individuals to Secret Service.

(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford enters the hearing room.)

We are not entirely comfortable about this, because under these broadened criteria after all we are furnishing names of people who have not made a threat against the President, people who have expressed beliefs, who have belonged or do belong to organizations which believe in violent revolution or taking things into their own hands. Unless such information is handled with judgment and care, it can be dangerous.

For example, we know that in one city when the President recently visited, the police went to these people and told them, "You stay in the house while the President is here or if you go out, we will go with you." We know that these people have threatened to consult attorneys, have threatened to make a public issue of the matter on the theory that this is restraint that is not justified as they have made no threats against the President. Now, when you examine this a bit further, we give these names to Secret Service. Secret Service must do something with those names, and Secret Service solicits the assistance of the police, quite properly. But I don't need, I think, to paint this picture any further, that when you get away from a specific act or deed of threats against the President, and you go into the broader area of what, perhaps, a man is thinking and, therefore, he may be a threat, and you take action against the man on the basis of that, there is a danger.

That is why, despite the fact that we have given this additional information and will continue to do so, we are uneasy. Again, if I may be permitted to continue, this is inherent in the entire approach of the FBI to the security field.

We go as far in our investigations as is necessary. But we go no further. We do not harass people. We do not conduct an investigation of a man for what he may be thinking. We attempt to the very best of our ability to carry out this responsibility for internal security without adopting tactics of harassment or unwarranted investigation, and we will not pursue a security matter beyond that which is essential to carry out our responsibilities. Now, I say that because that is the broad field of our policy, and I say it with complete sincerity, because I know. I have been in this work with the FBI both in the actual investigative field and in the policymaking and supervisory field for 27 years, and I know the policies and the procedures that are followed, and the care with which this problem is approached, and I agree with it fully.

Mr. McCLOY. You are going to impose a pretty heavy burden on the Secret Service when you dump them with the 5,000 more names than they have been used to having.

Mr. BELMONT. It will be more than 5,000, sir. This will continue.

Mr. McCLOY. From your knowledge of the situation, do you feel that the Secret Service is equipped to cope with this added burden? Is it something that you feel——

Mr. BELMONT. The Secret Service, as it has in the past, is required to call on the police for assistance in this field when the President visits a city. I do not know the exact complement of personnel of Secret Service, but they are a relatively small organization.

Mr. McCLOY. It may be they will have to reorganize some of their procedures to cope with this, won't they?

Mr. BELMONT. I do not know.

Mr. McCLOY. You have got a pretty broad classification here. "All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (*a*) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior." That may include a good many people in the United States and maybe some members of this Commission—I am speaking for myself. There is irrational behavior that I have been guilty of many times. [Laughter.] This doesn't mean you are going to send everybody over there, but the names that—all those under your classification, all of those in your opinion come under that classification unless you feel they have some, there is some, reason behind it. In other words, you are selective in this list. You purport to be selective in the numbers that you are going to convey to, the names you are going to convey to, the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. We endeavor to use good judgment, sir. Now, as you indicate there are what, 190 million people in this country, and who knows when someone may adopt abnormal behavior.

You cannot tell tomorrow who will pose a risk. This is an effort to be as helpful as possible and, as we have in the past, we will use our best judgment. But this will broaden considerably the type of people and the number of people who go to the Secret Service.

Mr. McCLOY. That is what I am getting at really, Mr. Belmont. You are not saying that all those people that you characterize here under this paragraph 2 will ipso facto be sent over to the Secret Service every time the President makes a move. This simply says that all investigative personnel should be alert in that situation; am I right in that?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir. If you will follow in the next paragraph, we say, "If cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly furnish Secret Service locally a letterhead memorandum" with the information.

Mr. McCLOY. So without any further ado all the people in your list who are in that category will be transferred over to the Secret Service when there is an occasion, when the President travels?

Mr. BELMONT. No. This is a continuing procedure. In other words, during our investigations we come across someone who is in this area or category, and this is a requirement that that man's name go to Secret Service with a brief description of him, and Secret Service then has that filed and is in a position to know that that individual has been referred to them.

Mr. McCLOY. Well, that brings up again the comment that I originally made.

This does put a big burden of investigation and judgment on the Secret Service, one which they have not heretofore presumably had placed on their shoulders.

Mr. BELMONT. I think you are correct.

Mr. MCCLOY. The reason I am asking these questions is because by implication, at least, one of our directives is to look into this situation for the future protection of the President, and we want to see that we have got something that is practical as well as cautious.

Mr. DULLES. Do the memoranda attached, Mr. Belmont, to this exhibit indicate what classes were so identified for investigation under the procedures existing at the time of the assassination and what change has been made, how it has been extended?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir. If you——

Mr. DULLES. By the definitions under paragraph 2 of the Manual of Instructions.

Mr. BELMONT. The previous page and the paragraph right above No. 2 sets forth the same information that we acted on prior to the assassination.

Mr. DULLES. That is paragraph 1?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. The Manual of Instructions, section 83.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. What are the various categories given now at the top of page 2 of this exhibit which have been added?

Mr. BELMONT. At the top of page 2, sir, that is the information that should be included in the notification to headquarters as to who the individual is and the background information that was furnished to Secret Service so that we, too, can disseminate to Secret Service here.

Representative FORD. Under the new criteria would Oswald's name have gone to the Secret Service automatically?

Mr. BELMONT. Well, Congressman, right now we are including all defectors automatically.

Now, the question whether Oswald meets these criteria here as set forth is a question of judgment. As I say, right now we do furnish all defectors.

Representative FORD. Defectors are for the time being at least a special category other than what is set forth here unless for some other reason they would fall into one of these categories.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. MCCLOY. Do you under that category send forward all Communists?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. MCCLOY. All Communists, yes.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether or not it would be wise for the record at this point to read into the record, in view of the importance of this, this paragraph which we are now discussing and which, as I understand it, contains the new definition of investigative cases?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we can put it into the record.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, as I understand it, the new criteria are set forth in paragraph 2 on page 2 of the Manual of Instructions, section 83; is that correct?

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. MCCLOY. Which, as I counted, is the 12th page of the Commission's Exhibit No. 836; is that right, Mr. Stern?

Mr. STERN. That is right number of the exhibit.

Mr. MCCLOY. 836, and I think it is the 12th page.

Mr. DULLES. For convenient reference I suggest that when this be included that we add the dates and the page numbers.

Mr. STERN. I think the witness can do this immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give a copy of it to the reporter and he may copy it and incorporate it later in the record.

(Paragraph 2 reads as follows:)

"Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the President. All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (*a*) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (*b*) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They find themselves in a mousetrap then.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir; that is right.

Mr. MCCLOY. In other words, you would expect your agents to exert some selection before they would send these names over to the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. Our agents use judgment in the pursuance of this work, and they would continue to use judgment in the selection of people who meet this criterion. Otherwise if you carried this to the extreme you would get out of hand completely. So that there is judgment applied here and our agents are capable of applying the judgment.

Representative FORD. What has been the reaction of the Secret Service to this greater flow of information that they have received?

Mr. BELMONT. They have taken it. There has been no official reaction, to my knowledge.

Representative FORD. Have they objected to the greater burden?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I would like to say, I don't know whether you are going to cover this, Mr. Stern, that our relations with the Secret Service are excellent. We work closely together.

As a matter of fact, since the assassination, at the request of Mr. Rowley, we have furnished agents to assist on occasion in the protection of the President, which is primarily a function of Secret Service, but as a cooperative gesture we have on a number of occasions made agents available at the request of Mr. Rowley. I think the figure runs to something like 139 agents—yes, 139 agents that we have made available.

We do have a very close liaison with Secret Service both at the seat of Government and in our field offices. We have a supervisor here at the seat of Government whose duty it is to stay directly in touch with Secret Service, to cut redtape and produce results both for Secret Service and for the FBI; to see that the problems are handled immediately. He has direct access to Mr. Rowley, and we have on a number of occasions at the request of Secret Service, sent one of our agents with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad, particularly where we have a representative in the countries being visited, because our relations with the law enforcement officials in those countries have been built up over the years, and we are thus in a position to assist Secret Service in establishing the necessary security measures and the flow of information to serve their purpose.

In addition, when the President travels abroad we alert all of our offices to advise us of any information which may pertain to the travel of the President, and we set up a supervisor back here to receive that information and cable it or get it immediately to our man who is accompanying the President when he makes this trip.

This is done, this agent going with Secret Service is done, at the invitation and request of Secret Service.

Representative FORD. 169 agents of the FBI who have assisted since the assassination. Did Secret Service make a specific request for their help in these instances?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; Mr. Rowley advised that he needed help, it was offered to him by Mr. Hoover, and when the President is going to visit a city and Secret Service does not have sufficient personnel in that particular city to cover what they consider is necessary, they need specialized help from us, they will make the request to us and we will authorize our local agent in charge to make those men, the designated number, available to the Secret Service representative, who then uses their services while the President is there.

Representative FORD. I gather that prior to the assassination such requests, specific requests, had not come from Secret Service to the Bureau.

Mr. BELMONT. No. There were never any such requests before.

Mr. STERN. At the level at which the requests have been made so far, have they proved to be a difficult burden for the FBI?

Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Stern, any time that we have a pending caseload of something like 115,000 investigative matters, which is what we have, and our agents are assigned about 20 to 25 cases apiece across the country, ranging from matters of immediate urgency to matters which can be handled in due time, and whenever our agents are putting in an average of over 2 hours overtime a day voluntarily, the loan of 139 men will be felt.

Representative **Ford**. 169.

Mr. **Belmont**. I believe it was 139, sir. I think the letter says 139.

Mr. **Stern**. 139 on 16 separate occasions.

Mr. **Belmont**. Yes. I do not wish to overplay this. We are not complaining. We do feel that at such time as Secret Service is able to increase its personnel or meet this problem within the organization that it is properly their problem. But meanwhile we are following this procedure and we are not complaining.

Mr. **Dulles**. I had hoped, Mr. Chairman, that at some time while Mr. Belmont was here, we could ask him to just briefly define for us, going back to the assassination day, a clear definition of the respective functions of the FBI and the Secret Service prior to and immediately after the assassination. There seemed to have been at one time a little confusion there. Naturally in a situation of this kind it always happens, but I am not absolutely clear in my mind as to——

Mr. **Belmont**. At the time of the assassination?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes. Just before, I mean what your responsibilities were just before the assassination, and just after as contrasted with the functions of the Secret Service.

Mr. **Belmont**. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the President and his family, and the Vice President and so on. That is a basic responsibility.

Mr. **Dulles**. And you have no auxiliary function to that——

Mr. **Belmont**. No, sir.

Mr. **Dulles**. Except to furnish names and suspects, as you have indicated.

Mr. **Belmont**. That is correct. We have no function there. That is a primary responsibility and function of Secret Service.

Now, we do have what we have considered our responsibility, to furnish to Secret Service any indication of a threat to the President, and that we have done religiously.

After the assassination the President ordered us into an investigation of the assassination which changed the picture as far as this particular case was concerned.

Mr. **Dulles**. You mean President Johnson, immediately after the assassination?

Mr. **Belmont**. Yes, sir.

Mr. **Dulles**. And there was a period there, there was a period though, after the assassination and before President Johnson took the oath of office—did this order come to you during that period or after he had taken the oath of office?

Mr. **Belmont**. It was very rapid, probably within a day.

Mr. **Dulles**. I see. It wasn't immediately after.

Mr. **Belmont**. No.

Mr. **Dulles**. It wasn't this period I am speaking of.

Mr. **Belmont**. You see, Mr. Dulles, the Federal Government still has no jurisdiction over the assassination of the President. That was a murder and was within the province of the local police who immediately took hold of it and started the investigation.

Mr. **Dulles**. I realize that.

Mr. **Belmont**. And started the investigation and it was theirs.

Mr. **Dulles**. You were only in there by courtesy. What you did was by courtesy of the local authorities.

Mr. **Belmont**. Yes, sir; we went to the Dallas Police Department and immediately went into action because of what had happened, and there was no time for us to stand on priorities. But we felt we should be of the utmost assistance, and we sent men to the police department to assist in the interview and do anything else we could. This wasn't a time, of course, to sit back and say, "This isn't our job."

Mr. **Dulles**. I understand.

Mr. **Belmont**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Belmont, just one question. Do you know of any legislation in recent years that might have been introduced in the Congress to make an attack upon the President a Federal offense?

Mr. Belmont. I do know that there is legislation presently pending.

The Chairman. Since the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. Since the assassination.

The Chairman. Yes. But had it been considered in recent years? I know it had at the time of other assassinations, but so far as you know were there any recent legislation to that effect?

Mr. Belmont. Mr. Chairman, I must plead ignorance. I haven't done research on it, and I just don't know.

The Chairman. Yes. Well, we can find that out very easily.

Representative Ford. Mr. Chairman, just the other day in the House of Representatives a bill was approved giving Federal officials the right to take certain action when a chief of state from a foreign country was within the United States; a broadening of their authority when they had a suspicion or they had some reason to believe that an attack was being made on a foreign dignitary.

At the time it went through the House I thought of the same question you just raised, and I wondered whether there were any specific legislative matters pending before any committee on this particular point.

Mr. Belmont. I am sure there is a pending bill because my recollection is that it was called to our attention—I cannot pinpoint it for you—but I think there is pending legislation now in this matter.

Mr. McCloy. I noticed in some Law Review article recently reference to the fact that previous bills had been introduced but had gone into the wastebasket.

The Chairman. That is true.

Mr. McCloy. In respect of other incidents.

The Chairman. When the emotion died down.

Mr. McCloy. When the emotion died down, that is true.

I have some further questions.

The Chairman. Have you finished, Mr. Stern?

Mr. Stern. I want to get one thing established that came up yesterday. Mr. Belmont, yesterday the Commission was interested in determining, if possible, when Agent Hosty recorded the interviews that he had taken on October 29, November 1, and November 5. He wasn't certain, except that he thought it had been done after the assassination. Have you caused a check to be made on that?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; we checked with our Dallas office, and they do not have a specific record of when that information was recorded.

Mr. Stern. Was it recorded in substantially the same form in some contemporaneous communication?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; within a day or two, I think on November 4, if I recall correctly, the fact that Hosty had talked to the neighbor of Mrs. Paine and had located Marina Oswald, was sent in by AIRTEL.

Mr. Stern. You might refer to Commission Exhibit 834, page 9, items 64 and 67, just so the record is straight.

Mr. Belmont. Item 64 is an AIRTEL from the Dallas office to the headquarters dated October 30, wherein Hosty reported this interview that he had had with the neighbor of Mrs. Paine.

On November 4 the Dallas office reported by AIRTEL the results of his contact with Mrs. Paine on November 1, so that the results of his interviews were incorporated at that time, October 30, November 4, but the actual insert for the report was not prepared until some time later. To the best of Hosty's recollection it was after the 22d and prior to December 2, but he was already on record by these AIRTELs.

Mr. Stern. Thank you, Mr. Belmont.

I have no further questions.

The Chairman. Mr. McCloy.

Mr. McCloy. I have one or two questions.

Mr. Belmont, you do know the charge has been made by some that Oswald was what is called a secret agent. Do you have any information whatever that would cause you to believe that Oswald was or could have been an agent or an informant of the FBI?

Mr. Belmont. I have covered that in some considerable detail, Mr. McCloy, and I will make a positive statement that Oswald was not, never was, an agent or an informant of the FBI.

Mr. McCloy. In the course of your investigation do you have any reason to make you believe that he was an agent of any other country?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; we have no reason to believe that he was an agent of any other country.

Mr. McCloy. Or any other agency of the United States?

Mr. Belmont. Or any other agency of the United States.

Mr. McCloy. You said this morning, I believe, or at least I guess Mr. Hosty said, that the assassination of the President and any leads in connection with it are still of constant concern to the FBI.

Do you feel there are any areas as of the present time that you feel at the present time require or justify further investigation other than routine check-ups that have not already been undertaken?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; frankly, I don't. I will say that from the requests we have received from the Commission, you have explored this most thoroughly. We do not have any unexplored areas in this investigation that should be explored. There are some pending requests that you have made, and we are running them out as rapidly as we can.

Mr. McCloy. Maybe this isn't a fair question to ask you, but, after all, you have had a long record of criminal investigation, and you have had a long exposure to investigation in this case.

As a result of your investigation do you feel that there is any credible evidence thus far which would support a conclusion or an opinion that the death of the President was the result of a conspiracy or anything other than the act of a single individual?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; we have no evidence, and I could support no conclusion that this was other than an act of Oswald.

Mr. McCloy. Now, the investigation does lead you to the conclusion that he was the President's assassin?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCloy. Did you ever at any time have any connection whatever—you or the agency—have anything to do with the Walker, General Walker, case?

Mr. Belmont No, sir; that was a matter handled by the Dallas police. I am drawing on my recollection of it now, but, as I recall it, after the incident, we offered to examine the bullets that were recovered——

Mr. McCloy. Bullets.

Mr. Belmont. And the police apparently wanted to retain them, so that we did not conduct the examination of the bullets until subsequent to the assassination itself.

Mr. McCloy. Until recently.

Mr. Belmont. No; we had no connection with it, with that investigation.

Mr. McCloy. In your investigation of the President's assassination, did you have occasion, after the event, to make an investigation of Ruby's background or Ruby's relationship to Oswald?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; we went into that very thoroughly.

Mr. McCloy. Have we got all your reports on that?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCloy. Have you come to any conclusions or opinions in regard to Ruby and his connection with Oswald, if any?

Mr. Belmont. The reports, of course, speak for themselves. But in summation, we did not come up with anything of a solid nature, that is anything that would stand up to indicate that there was any association between Ruby and Oswald. We had numerous allegations which we ran out extensively and carefully, but there is nothing, no information, that would stand up to show there was an association between them.

Mr. McCloy. Maybe this is in the record, but do you—by reason of your very close association with this investigation, I venture to ask this question—do you, from your knowledge of the investigation find—was there any evidence in

Mr. DULLES. Do you have some more?

Mr. McCLOY. I think I have got all the questions I wanted to ask.

(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford leaves the hearing room.)

Mr. DULLES. I have two or three questions.

As you know, Mr. Belmont, there have been a wide variety of rumors that have been spread abroad very particularly with regard to the assassination.

I have before me, just received last night, a book just being published in England, it is coming out in the next day or 2, called "Who Killed Kennedy," by Thomas G. Buchanan, published in London by Secker and Warburg. I have not had an opportunity yet to read the book. I have read a good deal of the background material on which it is based.

I would like to ask though when this book is available to you, and we will make a copy available to you and see that you get one promptly, whether you would have the Bureau read this, an appropriate person in the Bureau familiar with the case or yourself, and possibly give us your views with regard to certain of the allegations here within your particular competence.

Mr. BELMONT. As I understand it, Mr. Dulles, this is probably a compilation of the articles that he wrote in the French press.

Mr. DULLES. Express; yes.

Mr. BELMONT. Which, I believe, we sent over to the Commission as we received them.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Mr. BELMONT. And from my recollection of perusing those articles, they are filled with false statements, innuendoes, incorrect conclusions, misinformation, and certainly what I would term false journalism. In other words, he has stated as fact or as a correct conclusion many things which the Commission's investigation has disproved completely.

We will be glad to read the book and to furnish you with a general comment on it. But to take down each statement in there and go into it would probably result in a critique of 500 pages.

Mr. DULLES. We do not want that. I don't think we need that.

Mr. BELMONT. Where actually many of these allegations have already been resolved by the Commission, I am sure. We will be glad to read it and give you a——

Mr. DULLES. I think that would be useful for the Commission to have, Mr. Chairman. Do you agree?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; yes. If you find any factual matters in there that contradict your findings, we would expect you to call it to our attention.

Mr. BELMONT. Most certainly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But otherwise I don't think we want a review of the book. That is your idea, is it?

Mr. DULLES. Not a review of the book, but if there are allegations there, any evidence you can factually deny, that would be helpful to have it.

Mr. McCLOY. Do you have any record of Buchanan? Do you know anything about Buchanan's background?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I do not recall.

Mr. DULLES. I wish you would check.

Mr. BELMONT. We can send you a letter.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the record.

Mr. McCLOY. He seems to be very much Ivy League, Lawrenceville School and Yale.

Mr. DULLES. He was at one time, I believe, he admitted to being a Communist at one time. He was at one time employed by the Washington Star, I am advised, and I believe, according to the information I have, that he was terminated by the Star some years ago.

Mr. BELMONT. I thought he had been in touch with the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. He came in, he did come in here, and made a statement which we have recorded. His testimony wasn't taken. He just walked in off the street.

Mr. DULLES. I have one or two more questions, Mr. Chairman.

J. EDGAR HOOVER
MAY 14, 1964

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. **Hoover**. I do.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Rankin will carry on the examination, Mr. Director.

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. Chief Justice, do you want to tell him briefly what our purpose is?

The **Chairman**. Oh, yes; it is our practice to make a brief statement before the testimony of each witness, and I will do it now.

Mr. Hoover will be asked to testify in regard to whether Lee H. Oswald was ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in any capacity at any time, and whether he knows of any credible evidence of any conspiracy, either domestic or foreign, involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.

What he has to say about an article in the National Enquirer, Commission Exhibit No. 837, and concerning the failure to include the name and information concerning special agent Hosty in the initial report of the Oswald address book and any suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning improvements or changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the United States. Now, Mr. Rankin, you may proceed.

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. Hoover, will you state for the record your name and position?

Mr. **Hoover**. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice.

Mr. **Rankin**. Where do you live, Mr. Hoover?

Mr. **Hoover**. I live at 4936 30th Place, Northwest, Washington, D.C.

Mr. **Rankin**. And you have been Director of the Bureau for some 40 years according to the newspapers?

Mr. **Hoover**. That is correct; since 1924.

Mr. **Rankin**. You have furnished us a considerable amount of information, Mr. Hoover, about whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was ever an agent or acting for the Bureau in any capacity as informer or otherwise at any time. Are those statements correct?

Mr. **Hoover**. They are correct. I can most emphatically say that at no time was he ever an employee of the Bureau in any capacity, either as an agent or as a special employee, or as an informant.

Mr. **Rankin**. I call your particular attention to Exhibit 835, and suggest that you will find that that is your letter, together with your affidavit about this subject matter, and other matters that you furnished to us concerning this particular subject.

Mr. **Hoover**. That is correct.

Mr. **Rankin**. Do you wish to add anything?

Mr. **Hoover**. No; there is nothing that I desire to add to what appears in this letter and my affidavit which accompanied it to the Commission.

Mr. **Rankin**. You have provided many things to us in assisting the Commission in connection with this investigation and I assume, at least in a general way, you are familiar with the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, is that correct?

Mr. **Hoover**. That is correct. When President Johnson returned to Washington he communicated with me within the first 24 hours, and asked the Bureau to pick up the investigation of the assassination because as you are aware, there is no Federal jurisdiction for such an investigation. It is not a Federal crime to kill or attack the President or the Vice President or any of the continuity of officers who would succeed to the Presidency.

However, the President has a right to request the Bureau to make special investigations, and in this instance he asked that this investigation be made. I immediately assigned a special force headed by the special agent in charge at Dallas, Tex., to initiate the investigation, and to get all details and facts concerning it, which we obtained, and then prepared a report which we submitted to the Attorney General for transmission to the President.

Mr. **Rankin**. From your study of this entire matter of the assassination and work in connection with it, do you know of any credible evidence that has ever come to your attention that there was a conspiracy either foreign or domestic involved in the assassination?

Mr. HOOVER. I know of no substantial evidence of any type that would support any contention of that character. I have read all of the requests that have come to the Bureau from this Commission, and I have read and signed all the replies that have come to the Commission.

In addition, I have read many of the reports that our agents have made and I have been unable to find any scintilla of evidence showing any foreign conspiracy or any domestic conspiracy that culminated in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Representative FORD. May I ask this, Mr. Hoover. As I understand your testimony, it is based on the evidence that has been accumulated thus far?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct, sir.

Representative FORD. Is the Federal Bureau of Investigation continuing its investigation of all possible ramifications of this assassination?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. We are receiving and we, I expect, will continue to receive for days or weeks to come, letters from individuals that normally would probably be in the category of what we would call crank letters in which various weird allegations are made or in which people have reported psychic vibrations. We are still running out letters of that character and in turn making a report to this Commission upon it, notwithstanding the fact that on the face of it the allegation is without any foundation. Individuals who could not have known any of the facts have made, some very strange statements. There have been publications and books written, the contents of which have been absurd and without a scintilla of foundation of fact. I feel, from my experience in the Bureau, where we are in constant receipt over the years of these so-called crank letters, that such allegations will be going on possibly for some years to come.

I, personally, feel that any finding of the Commission will not be accepted by everybody, because there are bound to be some extremists who have very pronounced views, without any foundation for them, who will disagree violently with whatever findings the Commission makes. But I think it is essential that the FBI investigate the allegations that are received in the future so it can't be said that we had ignored them or that the case is closed and forgotten.

Representative FORD. Could you give us some idea of how many agents are currently working to one degree or another on any aspects of this case?

Mr. HOOVER. I would estimate, Congressman Ford, that there are at the present time at least 50 or 60 men giving their entire time to various aspects of the investigation, because while Dallas is the office of origin, investigation is required in auxiliary offices such as Los Angeles or San Francisco, and even in some foreign countries like Mexico. We have representatives in Mexico City.

At the outset of the investigation, following the assassination, it was the desire of the President to have this report completed by the Bureau just as quickly as possible, and as thoroughly as possible, and I would say we had about 150 men at that time working on the report in the field, and at Washington, D.C.

Now, all the reports that come in from the field are, of course, reviewed at Washington by the supervisor in charge of the case, and then in turn by the assistant director of the division, and then in turn by Mr. Belmont, who is the assistant to the Director.

Reports in which there is a controversial issue or where statements have been made of the existence of some particular thing that we have never heard of before, I myself, go over these to see that we haven't missed anything or haven't had any gap in the investigation so it can be tied down.

Recently the National Enquirer had a fantastic article in it as to the existence of a letter that had been written or a request that had been made by the Department of Justice to Chief Curry of the Dallas Police Department, to withhold arresting Rubinstein, or Ruby, and Oswald after the Oswald attempt on General Walker's life.

First, I had the agent in charge at Dallas interview Chief Curry and I have sent to the Commission a letter as to what Chief Curry had to say. He branded it as an entire lie—that he had never received any request of that kind. I had our files searched to be certain we had not written any such letter as that and found we had not. I requested the Department of Justice to advise me whether they had written any such letter and Mr. Katzenbach advises there is no reference in the Department files to the alleged letter from any Department of Justice official to Chief Curry nor any reference that an FBI official was asked to request the Dallas police not to arrest Oswald or Ruby. A letter is being sent to the Commission today setting forth this information.

Representative FORD. The point that I think ought to be made is that despite the magnitude of the effort that has been made by the FBI and by other agencies, and despite the tremendous effort that has been made, I believe, by the Commission to help and assist and to consolidate all of the evidence that we possibly could, that there is always the possibility at some future date that some evidence might come to the surface.

Mr. HOOVER. That is, of course, possible; yes.

Representative FORD. I want just to be sure that no leads, no evidence regardless of its credibility will be ignored, that it will be pursued by the Bureau or any other agency to make certain that it is good, bad or of no value.

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned, the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to either prove or disprove the allegation. We found in the course of our investigations that individuals have made statements. Yet, when we investigate they will frankly admit that the statement is an entire falsehood, or that they don't know why they wrote the letter or why they made the statement. But, nevertheless, we have the record and generally in those instances we try to get a signed statement from that individual so it can be made a part of the record.

Representative FORD. Under your authority from the President, the authority which gave you the FBI, the responsibility to conduct this investigation it is not an authority with a terminal point. It is an authority that goes on indefinitely?

Mr. HOOVER. Very definitely so. The President wanted a full and thorough investigation made of this matter, and we have tried to do so. As I have stated, I think we will continue to receive allegations. I think this will be a matter of controversy for years to come, just like the Lincoln assassination. There will be questions raised by individuals, either for publicity purposes or otherwise, that will raise some new angle or new aspect of it. I think we must, and certainly we intend in the FBI to continue to run down any such allegations or reports of that kind.

Representative BOGGS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Boggs.

Representative BOGGS. Mr. Hoover, I don't want any cover—to cover any ground which has been covered but I just have one or two questions. First, let me say that you and the Bureau have been very cooperative with this Commission.

Mr. HOOVER. Thank you.

Representative BOGGS. And tremendously helpful. I have been concerned about some of these wild press reports and concerned about what impact it may have ultimately on the history of this thing. For instance there is a man named Buchanan who has written a series of articles.

Mr. DULLES. A book now. A book is out; yes.

Representative BOGGS. A book now. I understand they have been widely circulated in the European press, and this man came here and was, as I got it from some other sources, he took in some people here, some American journalists, and I am told that this man has a Communist background, and in addition to that is a most unreliable person. He has made these allegations that the Dallas police force was involved in the assassination and so on.

Would you have any suggestions on how this Commission should deal with this sort of thing?

Mr. HOOVER. We have received a request from the Commission to review that book and to make a report upon any portions of it that can be contradicted or substantiated by actual facts or documents. I know Buchanan's background. He worked on the Washington Star and he was dismissed from the Washington Star because he was a member of the Communist Party. He spent much of his time in recent years in France writing for French newspapers. I have followed the articles that he has written about this matter and they are what I would call "journalistic garbage." There is not a scintilla of truth to most of the things he has written in these articles and in his book which I have had a chance to scan but haven't actually reviewed yet. It is being reviewed by my research section. Some of the allegations are utterly fantastic. I often wonder where some of these individuals get such ideas and why they make such statements without foundation.

Now, he makes many wild charges there, and to read it, a person not knowing him, or his views, or his background, would be inclined to wonder. I think you are going to have that problem, as I say, for years to come. I don't know how you can handle individuals like him other than to have the record clear upon the facts of the case, and either substantiate or disprove his statements. I don't think too much time should be given to these individuals who have such unsavory backgrounds as Buchanan has and who makes statements that have been proved to be untrue. But, at the same time I think when a book like that comes out or an article of that type comes out that deals with the assassination of the late President, I think it should be gone into from an investigative point of view. We should then submit to this Commission, even after it has concluded its hearings, for record purposes, what we have found in each particular instance.

Representative BOGGS. Now, on the other side of the fence——

Mr. DULLES. May I add one other thing just to interrupt. I wish you would add to your list a book called "The Red Roses of Dallas" by a man named Gun. He is a more reliable correspondent.

Mr. HOOVER. He is a Philadelphia correspondent.

Mr. DULLES. He has been living in this country since 1946. I have met him over here. Let's see, he was at Dallas at the time. He was then reporting, I think, for the Italian newspaper Epoca.

Mr. HOOVER. That is not the same one.

Mr. DULLES. He might have been lying. This book is full of lies. But I think it is a book that ought to be added, too, and I will see that a copy is sent to the Bureau.

Mr. HOOVER. I would appreciate that.

Representative BOGGS. On the other side of the spectrum some professor out at the University of Illinois wrote a piece in which he alleged the President was a Communist agent, President Kennedy, and Buchanan's allegations are that the extreme right assassinated the President and this fellow's allegations are that the Communists assassinated the President. Would you care to comment? Have you read that piece?

Mr. HOOVER. I have read that piece. My comment on it is this in general: I think the extreme right is just as much a danger to the freedom of this country as the extreme left. There are groups, organizations, and individuals on the extreme right who make these very violent statements, allegations that General Eisenhower was a Communist, disparaging references to the Chief Justice and at the other end of the spectrum you have these leftists who make wild statements charging almost anybody with being a Fascist or belonging to some of these so-called extreme right societies. Now, I have felt, and I have said publicly in speeches, that they are just as much a danger, at either end of the spectrum. They don't deal with facts. Anybody who will allege that General Eisenhower was a Communist agent, has something wrong with him.

A lot of people read such allegations because I get some of the weirdest letters wanting to know whether we have inquired to find out whether that is true. I have known General Eisenhower quite well myself and I have found him to be a sound, level-headed man.

In New York City there is a woman by the name of Kraus who must be mentally deranged as she stands on a Broadway corner there handing out leaflets in which she charges me with being in the conspiracy with the Communists to overthrow this Government and so forth.

Well now, if any person has fought communism, I certainly have fought it. We have tried to fight it and expose it in democratic ways I think that is the thing we have to very definitely keep in mind in this whole problem in the security of the President and the successor to office. Just how far you are going to go for his protection and his security. I don't think you can get absolute security without almost establishing a police state, and we don't want that. You can't put security in a black groove or a white groove. It is in a gray groove, and certain chances have to be taken. You are dealing with a human being when you are dealing with the President of the United States. President Johnson is a very down to earth human being, and it makes the security problem all the more difficult, but you can't bar him from the people.

There are certain things that can be done, and I submitted a memorandum to the Secret Service, and to the White House on certain security steps that might be taken and tightened up. But you are dealing with the general public and that is what has given me great concern in the recent expansion, of the criteria for dissemination that we adopted after the assassination.

Prior to that time we reported to the Secret Service all information that dealt with individuals who were potential killers or by whom acts of violence might be anticipated. The Secret Service would take that information and would do with it as they saw fit. I gave great consideration to it because I am not very happy with the criteria expansion, but I felt we had to include subversives of various character, and extremists. We have, in turn, furnished their names to the Secret Service. I think 5,000 names up to the present time already have been submitted and there are at least three or four thousand more that will be submitted within the next few months.

Then you come to the problem of what you are going to do when the Secret Service gets those names. They have to call upon the local authorities. Just recently, in the city of Chicago, when the President was there, the local authorities were asked to give assistance as they usually do to the Secret Service and they went to the homes of some of these people, and it resulted really almost in a house arrest.

Now, I don't think there is any place in this country for that kind of thing, but these people who belonged to extreme subversive organizations or organizations that advocated the overthrow of government by force and violence were told that they couldn't leave their house or if they did they would be accompanied by a police officer. That gives me great concern because in New York City alone, you run into maybe three or four thousand such individuals who would be members of subversive organizations, and then you get into the twilight zone of subversive fronts.

Now, there again, merely because a man belongs to a subversive front organization, in my estimation doesn't mean that he is blacklisted and is a menace to the country for life. If he belongs to 20 of them, it certainly shows either one of two things, he is either very gullible and dumb or he is a menace. That has been my attitude in regard to Government service where you find a Government employee who belonged to one or two, maybe in his early days. I don't believe this necessarily makes him a security risk. Rather, this would be dependent on the degree of his activity in the front group and his purpose and intent in associating himself with it. But where he has belonged to 15, 18, 20 of them, I don't think he has enough good judgment to be in the Government.

Some ministers get drawn into organizations, some of which are under the domination of the Communist Party. Now, those ministers don't know that. They are just as loyal and patriotic as you and I are, but they happen to belong. Now, that is where the question of human judgment has to be used. We try to use it in selecting these names. But I was startled when I learned of the incident in Chicago because there you come pretty close to a house arrest and we don't want that. We don't want a gestapo. We have to, I think, maintain an even balance.

I think it was very well expressed—

Mr. Dulles. May I ask you, Mr. Hoover, was this house arrest based on names you had furnished the Secret Service and they furnished the local authorities?

Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.

Representative Boggs. That brings me back to the question I think I heard

Congressman Ford ask you as I came into the room, because I think this is the crux of our investigation.

I read the FBI report very carefully and the whole implication of the report is that, number one, Oswald shot the President; number two, that he was not connected with any conspiracy of any kind, nature or description.

Mr. HOOVER. Correct.

Representative BOGGS. Do you still subscribe to that?

Mr. HOOVER. I subscribe to it even more strongly today than I did at the time that the report was written. You see, the original idea was that there would be an investigation by the FBI and a report would be prepared in such form that it could be released to the public.

Representative BOGGS. Surely.

Mr. HOOVER. Then a few days later, after further consideration, the President decided to form a commission, which I think was very wise, because I feel that the report of any agency of Government investigating what might be some shortcomings on the part of other agencies of Government ought to be reviewed by an impartial group such as this Commission. And the more I have read these reports, the more I am convinced that Oswald was the man who fired the gun; and he fired three times, killed the President, and wounded Governor Connally.

And I also am further convinced that there is absolutely no association between Oswald or Ruby. There was no such evidence ever established.

Mr. DULLES. Or Oswald and anybody else? Would you go that far?

Mr. HOOVER. Anybody else who might be——

Mr. DULLES. In connection with the assassination?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; I would certainly go that far. There was suspicion at first this might be a Castro act.

Representative BOGGS. Right.

Mr. HOOVER. We had information that had been obtained in Mexico City by another intelligence agency indicating there was a man who had seen a certain amount of money passed to Oswald at the Cuban Consulate. I think it was $6,000 that was passed. We went into that very thoroughly. The man later retracted his statement and stated it was not true. He was asked whether he would take a lie detector test, and he did. The lie detector test showed that he was telling a lie.

As to the lie detector, I do want to make this comment on it. I have always held to the opinion that it is not a perfect piece of machinery. It is an interpretation made by human beings of what the machine, the polygraph, shows. I would never want to convict or to send to the penitentiary any person solely on the evidence of the lie detector. It is a contribution in an investigation, a more or less psychological contribution.

But I have seen individuals who have failed the lie detector test and who were just as innocent as they could be. That particular lead in Mexico City was completely disproved; there was no foundation for it.

We found no associations between Oswald and Ruby. There has been a story printed that Ruby and Oswald worked together and were close friends.

There was no evidence, there was never any indication that we could find that Oswald had ever been in Ruby's nightclub or had had any association with him.

Ruby comes from Chicago, he was on the fringe of what you might call the elements of the underworld there. He came to Dallas, opened up the nightclub and it was a place where, certainly not the better class of people went, but it wasn't any so-called "joint," to use the vernacular. It was just another nightclub. So far as we have been able to establish there was no relationship or contact between Oswald and Ruby or anyone else allegedly involved in this assassination.

Representative BOGGS. The FBI interviewed practically everybody who ever associated with Oswald?

Mr. HOOVER. It did.

Representative BOGGS. You didn't find any indication of why anyone should even suspect that Oswald would do this, did you?

slowly. It wasn't going at a high rate of speed, so that he had perfect opportunity to do it.

Now, some people have raised the question: Why didn't he shoot the President as the car came toward the storehouse where he was working?

The reason for that is, I think, the fact there were some trees between his window on the sixth floor and the cars as they turned and went through the park. So he waited until the car got out from under the trees, and the limbs, and then he had a perfectly clear view of the occupants of the car, and I think he took aim, either on the President or Connally, and I personally believe it was the President in view of the twisted mentality the man had.

But he had given no indication of that—we had interviewed him, I think, three times. Of course, our interviews were predicated to find out whether he had been recruited by the Russian intelligence service, because they frequently do that.

Representative BOGGS. And had he been?

Mr. HOOVER. He had not been, so he said, and we have no proof that he was. He had been over there long enough but they never gave him citizenship in Russia at all. I think they probably looked upon him more as a kind of a queer sort of individual and they didn't trust him too strongly.

But just the day before yesterday information came to me indicating that there is an espionage training school outside of Minsk—I don't know whether it is true—and that he was trained at that school to come back to this country to become what they call a "sleeper," that is a man who will remain dormant for 3 or 4 years and in case of international hostilities rise up and be used.

I don't know of any espionage school at Minsk or near Minsk, and I don't know how you could find out if there ever was one because the Russians won't tell you if you asked them.

They do have espionage and sabotage schools in Russia and they do have an assassination squad that is used by them but there is no indication he had any association with anything of that kind.

Representative BOGGS. Now we have some people, including this man's mother, talk about Oswald having been an agent of the Government of the United States. I think his mother mentioned the CIA; she has made these statements publicly for money, apparently.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; she has.

Representative BOGGS. Just for the purpose of the record, I think it would be well if you would comment on that, Mr. Director.

Mr. HOOVER. Of course, we have interviewed his mother and his wife, and all his relatives, and everybody that he is known to have associated with. His mother I would put in a category of being emotionally unstable. She has been around the country making speeches, and the first indication of her emotional instability was the retaining of a lawyer that anyone would not have retained if they really were serious in trying to get down to the facts. But she has been in New York City; she has been in Chicago; I think other parts of the country, always speaking for money.

Now, that kind of an individual is the type we have seen over the years, who will say almost anything to draw a crowd. Just to be able to say something sensational. Many times we have gone out to such people and asked them specifically, "Now, what is your basis for this?" And they will say, "Well, I just had a feeling that that was true, so I said it."

She has never made that statement to us, but we have many other instances where that kind of statement is made. They don't have the legal evidence that you must have if you are going to take any positive action. I would put very little credence in anything that his mother said.

I think his wife was a far more reliable person in statements that she made, so far as we were able to ascertain, than his mother. I think the mother had in mind, naturally, the fact she wanted to clear her son's name, which was a natural instinct, but more importantly she was going to see how much money she could make, and I believe she has made a substantial sum.

Representative BOGGS. And the allegations she has made about this man being an agent either of the CIA or the FBI are false?

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I can certainly speak for the FBI that it is false, and I have discussed the matter, naturally, with Mr. McCone, the Director of CIA, and he, of course, will no doubt appear himself, but there is no indication at all that he was employed by them. We frequently get that kind of a story from individuals who, when they get into some kind of difficulty, will claim they were working for the CIA or they were working for the FBI.

Representative BOGGS. Surely.

Mr. HOOVER. Now, no one can work for the FBI without the approval being given at Washington and a record kept of it, even of the confidential informants. That is very tightly controlled. We have no so-called lump sum that we can use to hire people. So there has to be a voucher and specific details of payment. And I know at no time was he an informant or agent or a special employee or working in any capacity for the FBI.

As to the interviews we had with him in which he gave us some information, some of it was not the truth, but this was not particularly significant. The interviews we had with him I would not term as talking with an informant. He was interviewed while under arrest by the New Orleans police, and then after he had committed this act of assassination we interviewed him in police headquarters in Dallas. But they were the only contacts we had, I think four contacts altogether, and he received no money of any kind, no promise of any kind, and there was no indication that he was rendering assistance to the U.S. Government. We looked upon him as a criminal after the assassination, of course, and prior to that time we looked upon him as an individual who we suspected might become an agent of the Soviet government. There was no proof of that, and we checked him carefully.

We knew of his contact with the Soviet Embassy here at Washington, his contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, and his contact with the Worker publication in New York. And none of those contacts gave any indication of any tendency to commit violence.

There are many people who read the Daily Worker, or what is now the Worker, and you certainly can't brand them as hazards to the security of the country or as potential assassins. It is in that area that I am particularly concerned that we don't become hysterical and go too far in restricting the citizens of our country from exercising their civil and constitutional rights. The mere fact a person disagrees with you in a matter on communism doesn't mean he should be arrested. Many Communists make very violent speeches, and we know them, but I don't feel that the time has come that they should be arrested. If they have violated the laws of the United States, we will, then, proceed with prosecution, and the cases can then go through the courts. Such cases last for years before they get to the Supreme Court, and even then such cases often start over on some legal angle. But, all in all, I think that the enforcement of security and the enforcement of laws dealing with subversion ought to be handled in the American manner.

I am criticized by the extreme right for that. They put me in the category, I guess, along with General Eisenhower. But the extreme left criticizes me, saying I believe that any person who has on a red necktie may be addicted to communism, and, therefore, is a great danger. That is why I say the extremists at both ends are bad, and I have repeated that several times publicly.

Representative BOGGS. No doubt about the problem being a difficult one. I remember some years back when these fanatics started shooting up the House of Representatives.

Mr. HOOVER. I recall that.

Representative BOGGS. I happened to be there on the occasion and there were many suggestions that we build a bulletproof glass enclosure around the Members of Congress and so on. Of course, all of us rejected those ideas because it would be totally incompatible with our democratic institutions and this, obviously, becomes a problem in the security of the President; that is what you are telling us, isn't it?

Mr. HOOVER. That is the great problem. We have participated in the protection of the President since the assassination. The Secret Service indicates how many agents it needs when the President is traveling somewhere or going somewhere in Washington, and then I assign that number of agents to the Secret Service. They are not under my direction. They are under the direction of the Secret Service because under law they are charged with the protection of the President. We have never done that before, but I felt that it was something we must do if the Secret Service desired it. Sometimes, such as at the funeral of the late President Kennedy, the procession walked up Connecticut Avenue, which created a very, very grave security problem because they were walking with these tall building on either side. As I recall, we had the responsibility for the Cathedral, and we had 43 agents in the Cathedral during the services. I was more concerned about these tall buildings, because all the small buildings have been torn down along Connecticut Avenue, and there were about six or seven blocks to walk. Not only the high officials of this Government, including the President, but the Queen of Greece, General de Gaulle, Emperor Haile Selassie, and many Prime Ministers were present. They were a perfect target for someone in some window.

Now, you can't empty these buildings. It is impossible to do that, because you can't go to the Mayflower Hotel and say all front rooms must be vacated. Other office buildings are there, even taller than the Mayflower, and you can't make them keep everybody out of the front offices because then you get into a police state.

The Secret Service does try to check to find out who have these various offices. We also check so if there is anything in our files on those individuals the Secret Service is at once advised. When the President goes to a banquet or a social occasion, all of the employees in the hotel, the cooks, waiters, and busboys, and so forth, are all checked by Secret Service to be certain there is no one with a background that would indicate a hazard to the President. But that is as far as I think you can go. You can't put in a whole new staff of waiters and you can't make people move out. People going to a Presidential function are generally invited by card or by list and that is very carefully checked at the entrance by the Secret Service.

We suggested a few more things that possibly could be done, and some of which I have doubts about. You speak about this matter of glass around the galleries in the House. One of the suggestions that we made was that there be bulletproof glass in front of the President's lectern. In my own mind, I question whether that is wise. Knowing this President as this President is, he wants to get close to the audience; he wants to reach over and shake hands with people. That concerns me because you never know when an emotionally unstable person may be in that crowd. As you noted, he has frequently brought groups into the White House gardens and walked around with people he didn't know. I know the Secret Service people are concerned about it. I am concerned about it.

President Truman last week expressed his concern that the President was taking unnecessary chances.

But the governmental agency having the responsibility for guarding him, the Secret Service, has a natural hesitancy to say, "You can't do this."

Representative Boggs. Of course, for the record, President Kennedy had the same difficulty.

Mr. Hoover. That is right. It was best expressed at Parkland Hospital. One of President Kennedy's staff made the statement that the whole fault in this matter was that, in the choice between politics and security, politics was chosen. That is exactly what happened. It was an open car. I am thoroughly opposed to the President riding in an open car.

They did not have any armored car in the Secret Service at that time. I have now sent one of our armored cars over for the President, but it is a closed limousine. But on occasion, such as at Gettysburg and Atlanta the other day, the President got out of the armored car which had been flown there for his use, and commandeered the car of the Secret Service which is wide open, so he could wave and see the people. Now, that is a great hazard. I think he should always be in an armored car that is closed, that can't have the top put down. But as you recall, President Kennedy had the bubble top off of the car that he was in. It was not armored and the bubble top was made of plastic so a bullet could have gone through it very easily.

Representative Ford. Mr. Hoover, you have categorically testified that the

FBI never at any time had Oswald as an agent, as an informant, or in any other way.

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. I couldn't make it more emphatic.

Representative FORD. And Mr. Belmont testified to the same last week when he was before us.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Both you and he would be fully familiar with all of the records of the FBI in this regard?

Mr. HOOVER. We would, and we would not only be fully familiar with it because while Mr. Belmont is in charge of the Investigative Branch of the Bureau—we have two assistants to the Director, one in charge of administrative work and the other in charge of investigative work—we have also checked the administrative records where vouchers or payments would have been made and there is no indication that any money was ever paid to Oswald. We have obtained, and they are on file with the Commission, the affidavits of the agents, who at various times were in contact with Oswald, to the effect that he was not an informant; that they had never paid him anything; that he was being questioned as to possible recruitment by the Soviet intelligence; so there was no evidence at any time indicating employment by the FBI.

Representative FORD. And you were not under any limitation or restriction from any other authority in this regard?

Mr. HOOVER. Absolutely not. I have the entire control of whether a man shall be an informant or shall not be an informant. That comes under my chain of command from the local office which has the matter at hand. They can't just put on an informant without our approval. The recommendation on security informants comes to the Bureau; it goes through the Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division, and, in significant cases, goes to Mr. Belmont, and then to my desk for my specific approval. So I, or my seat-of-government staff, have to approve every one of those who are used as informants in all classes of cases, not only in intelligence cases but in white-slave cases, automobile thefts, and all of these cases.

Representative FORD. There is no limitation on what you can tell us about this situation?

Mr. HOOVER. None whatsoever.

Representative FORD. No limitation; no restrictions?

Mr. HOOVER. No restriction. So far as the record of vouchers in the Bureau are concerned, they are open to the inspection of this Commission at any time going back as far as you may want to go.

Senator COOPER. May I ask just one question there? I think you have answered it, but in your examination of this aspect as to whether or not Oswald was an informer or employee or held any relationship to the FBI, you, yourself, have looked into all of the means you have of determining that fact when you make the statement to us?

Mr. HOOVER. I have personally looked into that for two reasons: Because the President asked me personally to take charge of this investigation and to direct it, and I knew that the report ultimately would be made to him. For that reason I became familiar with every step and every action that was taken. Then when the allegation was made by someone—I think it was the mother of Oswald first, if I recall correctly—that he was employed by some Government agency, the CIA, or FBI, and maybe both, I insisted upon a check being made and any record showing any indication of that being brought to me. When they could find none, I then asked for affidavits from the field force that had dealt with Oswald as to whether they had hired him or paid him anything or given him anything, and the affidavits are on file here that they had not.

Senator COOPER. I think you have said there is no sum available to the FBI which would enable these men, these agents, to employ him out of any funds that are made available to them.

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, no; it must be done by voucher, and those vouchers are examined by the General Accounting Office every year or so. We have no lump sum in the field offices for employment of informants as such which is not supported by vouchers.

Senator COOPER. I have just about two questions, I may have to go in a few minutes to the Senate. I would like to direct your attention to that period of time when Oswald was a defector, beginning when he left the United States and when he returned.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. During that period, did the FBI have any jurisdiction over intelligence regarding him, or any capacity to know?

Mr. HOOVER. While he was in Russia?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. HOOVER. No; we did not. We were interested in knowing what he might say in Russia that appeared in the press. That was our first intimation that this man had defected, when we read it in a newspaper article. We were, of course, interested in knowing when he would return or if he would return. We had no jurisdiction as to what he was doing in Russia after he had gone there.

Senator COOPER. As I understand it, you had no capacity at that time to follow his activities?

Mr. HOOVER. That is true. We have no agents in Russia. Foreign intelligence is handled by the Central Intelligence Agency, and our responsibility is domestic. We work very closely together.

Senator COOPER. Have you had the jurisdiction since the assassination or the occasion to examine persons connected with the State Department concerning the activities of Oswald in Russia?

Mr. HOOVER. Well——

Senator COOPER. Would that be a matter for some other agency?

Mr. HOOVER. That could be a matter for CIA or for us after Oswald had returned here.

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. HOOVER. Then he becomes a civilian in the country here. Now, there is what we call a delimitation agreement among the Government intelligence agencies. For instance, the military branches of the Government have their own intelligence services and they handle all military deviations in regard to espionage or things of that kind. If they want our assistance and ask for it we, of course, will always cooperate. In regard to CIA, there are many cases which CIA and the FBI work jointly on, of individuals that may have been recruited over in Europe by the CIA, not by us, because we don't have authority to do that abroad, but when that man comes to this country, the best ends of intelligence are served by having the two agencies work very closely together, conduct joint interviews, and exchange information very, very freely. That has been going on ever since I can recall CIA being existence.

Mr. DULLES. I would like to testify to the fact that that cooperation existed during the whole period I was Director, and I am sure it has continued now with great cooperation on both sides.

Mr. HOOVER. It is a very necessary thing, because the intelligence agency of many of these foreign countries will cover the whole world and the country itself. Whereas in this country you have separate agencies covering espionage activities. CIA covers the foreign activity, and the FBI the domestic activities, and they must be interlocking. An espionage agent of the Soviet Government can arrive in New York today by plane from Paris and he can be in Mexico City tomorrow. Then, CIA would pick him up there. We would not pick him up there. We would watch him while in this country, but as soon as he takes that plane and leaves the United States CIA moves in on him. If he comes back to the United States, we move in on him. Therefore, we have a very close liaison.

As a matter of fact, what we have done in government agencies is to have a liaison agent in our Bureau assigned to contact CIA, the Pentagon, State Department, and various other agencies to cut out the red tape of writing letters back and forth. In order to orally relay information which has come to his attention, our representative can immediately phone it over to the FBI, and if there is need, for instance, to meet a plane coming in to New York or a boat that is docking at New York, it is all accomplished within a matter of 45 minutes or an hour.

If you went through this letter-writing process and the paper war that goes on so often in the Government it might take a week or 10 days.

The FBI does have 10 legal attaches attached to 10 embassies abroad. Their purpose is not operational. They don't investigate in those countries any matters that have to be investigated. That, if it is to be done, is handled by CIA. Our purpose in being there is to maintain liaison with our opposite number such as the Surete Nationale in France and with the national police in the Philippines, to exchange information that is vital to our internal security, and also vital to the internal security of the other country.

Senator COOPER. May I ask one other question?

Is there any, considering the number of defectors in the United States to Communist countries, which cannot be large, I would assume——

Mr. HOOVER. I think there are about 36.

Senator COOPER. Which would indicate, I would think either a lack of reliability on their part and stability or beyond that a dedicated purpose to become Communists, then upon their return, wouldn't it seem to you they should be given some special attention?

Mr. HOOVER. We have now———

Senator COOPER. To determine whether they are a risk to become Soviet or Communist espionage agents or in fact become dangerous?

Mr. HOOVER. We have taken steps to plug that gap.

Prior to the assassination of the President, a defector, before he came back was always cleared for return by a representative of the State Department or the military abroad. When he came back we immediately interviewed him if he was a civilian. It had to be done promptly to determine whether he could be a potential intelligence agent.

Now, in December of last year, following the assassination, we expanded the criteria of what should be furnished to the Secret Service, and all defectors automatically go on the list to be furnished to the Secret Service.

There are 36 defectors that we know of in this country who have been under investigation. Some of those men may have changed their views sincerely. Some of them may not have. But as a matter of general precaution, as a result of the Oswald situation, we are seeing that all go to the Secret Service.

Mr. DULLES. That includes military defectors, does it not?

Mr. HOOVER. Military defectors and defectors from any private agency, after they return to the U.S. and become civilians. Some have defected to China, to the satellite nations and to Russia.

Senator COOPER. Just one other question, because I have to go.

In the course of this investigation, as you know so well, there have been a number identified who were very close, at least to Mrs. Oswald, and a few, I can't say that were close to Oswald yet they had association with him, such as the man who drove him back and forth, Mrs. Paine, with whom Mrs. Oswald lived, and others, has there been any credible, I won't say credible because if you had you would have presented it to us in your report, has there been any claims by persons that these people are in any way related to the Communist Party?

Mr. HOOVER. We have had no credible evidence that they have been related to the Communist Party in this country.

Now, as to Mrs. Oswald, the wife of Oswald, there is no way of knowing whether she belonged to the Russian Communist Party in Russia. She is a rather intelligent woman, and notwithstanding that you have to talk with her through an interpreter, we have had no indication of her association with Communists in this country, nor have any of her close friends or relatives.

As to his mother, we found no indication she is associated or closely associated with the Communists. She is the only one of the group that we have come in contact with that I would say is somewhat emotionally unstable. Our agents have interviewed her. She sometimes gets very angry and she won't answer questions. As to the rest of the group who had been friends of his, or worked with him in the Texas School Book Depository, none of them have indicated any Communist associations of any kind.

Senator COOPER. Thank you.

Mr. Hoover. Thank you.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, I hand you Exhibit 863 and ask you to examine that and state whether or not that is the letter that you referred to in which you answered questions of the Commission concerning the National Enquirer magazine or newspaper?

Mr. Hoover. This letter of May 8 addressed to the Commission is the letter that dealt with our interview with Chief Curry and was predicated upon the article which appeared in the National Enquirer of May 17, 1964.

Mr. Rankin. I ask you if you would care to add anything to that letter except what you have already testified to?

Mr. Hoover. No; I have nothing to add to that. Chief Curry was very specific, I am told by my agent in charge at Dallas, that this article is an absolute lie; that none of these things set forth in the article occurred; that he received no phone call or any request of any kind oral or by phone or in writing from the Department of Justice or from the FBI. As I stated earlier, the report from the Department of Justice indicated that they made no request.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit 863, being the letter just referred to.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 863 for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, is Exhibit 837 the article that you referred to in the National Enquirer?

Mr. Hoover. Yes; that is the one.

Mr. Rankin. I call your attention to Exhibit 836 and ask you if that is the letter that you referred to which describes the criteria in the handling of the security of the President that you have described in your testimony.

Mr. Hoover. This is the letter. It sets forth the criteria which were adopted, originally about 1942 and later incorporated in the manual of instructions in 1954. It also includes the amended instructions to our field offices, prepared in December of 1963, which extended the criteria.

Mr. Rankin. Does that Exhibit correctly set forth the information you had in regard to those matters?

Mr. Hoover. It does.

Mr. Rankin. Do you care to add anything to it?

Mr. Hoover. No; I have nothing to add to it at all.

Mr. Rankin. Now, in light of what happened. Mr. Hoover, I think the Commission would desire to have your comments or whatever you care to tell them, concerning the reasons why you did not furnish the information you had concerning Lee Harvey Oswald to the Secret Service prior to the time of the President's assassination.

Mr. Hoover. Well, I have gone into that very thoroughly because that was obviously one of the questions that I had in my mind when the tragedy occurred in Dallas.

In going back over the record, and I have read each one of the reports dealing with that and the reports of Mr. Hosty who had dealt with the Oswald situation largely in Dallas, we had the matter that I have previously referred to, the report of the State Department that indicated this man was a thoroughly safe risk, he had changed his views, he was a loyal man now and had seen the light of day, so to speak.

How intensive or how extensive that interview in Moscow was, I don't know. But, nevertheless, it was in a State Department document that was furnished to us.

Now, we interviewed Oswald a few days after he arrived. We did not interview him on arrival at the port of entry because that is always undesirable by reason of the fact it is heavily covered by press, and any relatives generally are there, so we prefer to do it after the man has settled down for two or three days and become composed. We do it in the privacy of our office or wherever he may be, or in his own home or apartment. We interviewed him twice in regard to that angle that we were looking for. We had no indication at this time of anything other than his so-called Marxist leanings, Marxist beliefs.

We wanted to know whether he had been recruited by the Soviet government as an intelligence agent, which is a frequent and constant practice. There is not a year goes by but that individuals and groups of individuals, sometimes on these cultural exchanges, go through Russia and recruits are enlisted by the Russian intelligence, usually through blackmail. The individual is threatened that if he doesn't come back to this country and work for them they will expose the fact that he is a homosexual or a degenerate or has been indiscrete.

Pictures are usually taken of individuals who become implicated in that sort of thing, so the individual is really desperate. Such blackmail has occurred year after year for some time.

In Oswald's case we had no suspicion that any pressure like that had been brought to bear on him because he had gone voluntarily and had obviously wanted to live in Russia and had married a Russian woman.

After those interviews had been completed, the next incident was the difficulty he had at New Orleans. We were concerned there as to whether he was functioning officially for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee which was financed and supported by Castro and Castro's government, and if he was, where he obtained money and with whom he had dealt.

He apparently had the leaflets printed himself on plain ordinary paper. There was no reason for us, then, to have any suspicion that he had any element of danger in him.

However, we did not ignore or forget the fact that he was still in the country. We kept track of him when he went from New Orleans to Dallas, and that was one of the reasons why Hosty went to the home of Mrs. Paine. She told us where Oswald was working, at the Texas book house. Hosty gave her his telephone number and his name so that if there was any information or any contact she wanted to make she could phone him at the Dallas office.

Mrs. Oswald, the wife, took down the license number of Hosty's car which was incorrect only in one digit. The name, the telephone number, and the automobile license were later found in Oswald's memorandum book.

However, that in itself was not significant because many times we will go to see a person and tell him now, "If you think of anything you want to tell us or you have any information you want to give us, here are my name and address, telephone number, and call me," and that is what was done with Mrs. Paine because Hosty wasn't there at the time. He was at work.

Incidentally, those items in Oswald's notebook requiring investigative attention were first set out in an investigative report of our Dallas Office dated December 23, 1963. This report was not prepared for this Commission but rather for investigative purposes of the FBI and, therefore, the information concerning Hosty's name, telephone number and license number was not included in the report as the circumstances under which Hosty's name, et cetera, appeared in Oswald's notebook were fully known to the FBI.

After our investigative report of December 23, 1963, was furnished to the Commission, we noted that Agent Hosty's name did not appear in the report. In order that there would be a complete reporting of all items in Oswald's notebook, this information was incorporated in another investigative report of our Dallas Office, dated February 11, 1964. Both of the above-mentioned reports were furnished to the Commission prior to any inquiry concerning this matter by the President's Commission.

There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to the President or to the Vice President. Up to that time, as has been indicated.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, may I interrupt, you said Hosty was not there at the time, he was at work—did you mean Mr. Oswald?

Mr. HOOVER. That was my mistake. I meant Mr. Oswald. Hosty talked with Mrs. Paine and Mrs. Oswald. Mrs. Paine speaks Russian and she could interpret for her.

Oswald was at the Texas Book Co., and then, as I say, Hosty left his telephone number and name, and Mrs. Oswald for some reason took down the license number. I don't know whether she was convinced this was an agent of the FBI, or why she did it.

But, anyway, that was in the book that was later found, and which contained many other things that Oswald had entered in the book.

Now, as I say, up to that time, there had been no information that would have warranted our reporting him as a potential danger or hazard to the security or the safety of the President or the Vice President, so his name was not furnished at the time to Secret Service.

Under the new criteria which we have now put into force and effect, it would have been furnished because we now include all defectors. As to the original criteria, which we felt were sound and sufficient and which we felt no one, not even the most extreme civil rights proponent could take exception to, we limited the furnishing of names to S.S. to persons potentially dangerous to the physical well being of the President. We included emotionally unstable people who had threatened the President or Vice President.

At my office during the course of a week there are sometimes three or four callers who have to be taken to a Hospital because of their mental condition. They claim they are being persecuted by radio beams and they want to see me or the President to have those beams stopped. Now you never know what tangent they are going to take. If such a person is living in some part of the country where the President may be going his name would be furnished to the Secret Service.

One car last year, I think, crashed through the gates of the White House; the person driving wanted to see the President. The guard wouldn't let him in and so the car crashed through and got within 20 feet of the first door. The guards, by that time, had their revolvers out and took him into custody.

Last year a gentleman drove all the way from Arizona to see me. He drove up the marble steps of the Department of Justice, and by that time the guards had come out and took him into custody. I think he was incarcerated in Arizona.

People of this type are among those we would have furnished to the Secret Service. They have the potential to harm somebody.

We get names from members of Congress, of people who come to the Capitol and try to threaten them or harass them. They let us know about it, and we make the investigation or advise the police. If we can get the family to have the person put into an institution, we try to do so. If they don't, we may take steps to have him incarcerated through other legal means.

Mr. **Dulles**. How many names, Mr. Director, in general, could the Secret Service process? Aren't their facilities limited as to dealing with vast numbers of names because of their limited personnel?

Mr. **Hoover**. I think they are extremely limited. The Secret Service is a very small organization and that is why we are fortifying them, so to speak, or supplementing them by assigning agents of our Bureau which is, of course, quite a burden on us. Our agents are assigned about 24 to 25 cases per agent and cover such involved matters as bankruptcy and antitrust cases.

Now, the Secret Service has a very small group and I would estimate that the names we have sent over number some 5,000. I would guess there are about another 4,000 that will go over in the next month to them. Frankly, I don't see how they can go out and recheck those names. We keep the records up to date; if additional information comes in on these names we furnish it to the Secret Service. They will have to call upon the local authorities, unless the Secret Service force is enlarged considerably so that they can handle it entirely on their own. I think the Secret Service is entirely too small a force today to handle the duties that they are handling. The great crowds that are at the White House all the time, around the gates, that go to church where the President goes, all of those things, of course, have to be checked over by them. They always check in advance and just recently, a few Sundays ago, they found some individuals in the basement of St. Mark's church in Washington, where he was going to attend on Sunday morning. His arrival was held up until they could ascertain who they were. They were deaf mutes whose identity had not been cleared with the Secret Service.

Now, the Presidential party was delayed about 5 or 10 minutes in reaching the church by reason of the radio call to the White House to hold it up.

We are giving to Secret Service more and more names. The total, in addition to the names they already had, will reach 10,000. I don't see how they are going to be able to handle the situation as they would want to handle it. They have to depend upon local police organizations. Many local police departments are capable and efficient; some are not. Many have good judgment and some have not. Wherever you have a police department of 10,000, 15,000, 20,000 men you are bound to find a few who will just barge in and do something which better judgment would dictate should not be done, as in the incident which occurred in the Midwest where they placed people practically under house arrest. I think it was very bad judgment and should not have been done but the Secret Service, of course, turned the names over to the local authorities, and the local authorities do what they think is right.

Now, I guess their attitude with all justice to them is, "Well, we will resolve the risk in our favor. If we keep these people under surveillance and keep them in the house until the President gets out of town nothing can happen from them." That is what you would call totalitarian security. I don't think you can have that kind of security in this country without having a great wave of criticism against it. There is a great tendency for people to expect the intelligence forces and the law enforcement agencies to be able to go out and arrest people and bring them in and hold them endlessly and talk to them. We can't arrest a person, without probable cause, or unless he commits a crime in our presence. We have to arraign him promptly and if not done promptly, the confession that he may have made generally cannot be used against him.

Just as a collateral matter we faced that problem in California in the case of the kidnapping of Frank Sinatra, Jr. One of the kidnappers we arrested near San Diego confessed but we didn't arraign him because the other kidnappers would have left California and it would have been difficult to find them. However, the next day after arraignment he made changes in the confession and signed it so the court held that it was admissible.

The Secret Service, of course, is faced with the same problem. They just can't arrest people because they may not like their looks. They have to have facts justifying detention but the public conception is that you have a full right to go out and do these things. We have stressed in the FBI that there must be full compliance with the laws of this country and with the decisions of the Supreme Court. That is the law of the country. Now, whether a person likes it or not and there are some groups that are very violent against the decisions of the court while others are very much in favor of them, it is not for the FBI to take sides. We have a job to do and we do it under the rulings of the courts and we have been able to do it effectively.

I know when the ruling came down on the prompt arraignment, there was great shouting and some strong editorials claiming that it was going to wreck law enforcement. It hasn't wrecked us. It has made it more difficult but I think we have to face up to the fact that law enforcement in a free country must abide by the laws of that country irrespective of how difficult it is. Some persons talk about putting handcuffs on the law enforcement officers and taking them off the criminals. That is a nice catch phrase to use in a speech or article but operating within the law has not interfered with our work.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, I ask you about Exhibit 825 which is first a letter and then encloses certain affidavits of your agents.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. You are familiar with that?

Mr. HOOVER. I am familiar with that. I read all of that and signed it.

Mr. RANKIN. You know those are the affidavits in regard to whether Lee Harvey Oswald was an agent or connected in anyway with the Bureau that you have just testified to?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct; and the affidavits of all agents, who had any contact with him.

Mr. RANKIN. I call your attention to Exhibits 864 and 865, and ask you if you have seen those before or, you have seen the original of 864 and 865 is a photostatic copy of your letter to us in answer to 864, is that correct?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct; yes. I recall very distinctly.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you recall those letters involved an inquiry as to any connections of Lee Harvey Oswald with Communists or any criminal groups or others that might be conspiratorial?

refrained from further comment but of course by that time the identification of the gun was known, the caliber of the gun, where it had come from, where it had been bought and the information we had run down in Chicago and had furnished to the Dallas Police Department.

If the case had been in the hands of the FBI none of that information would have been given out: Because of the publicity you had to face the charge that the prejudice of the community would require a change of venue. With the publicity, I don't know where you could have changed the venue to, since newspapers all over the State covered it. I think a Houston reporter was the first one who wrote that Oswald was an informant of the FBI. We went to the newspaper reporter. He refused to tell us his source. He said he had also heard it from other persons. We asked him the names of these persons and we interviewed them but none of them would provide the source. In other words, I was trying to nail down where this lie started. That, of course, is always the result where you are daily giving out press interviews because the press wants stories desperately. We have always adopted the policy in the Bureau of no comment until we have the warrant and make the arrest. Then a release is prepared briefly stating what the facts are, what the written complaint says, the fact. The complaint was filed with the Commissioner, and that ends it. We don't try to run it out for a week or 10 days, It is up to the U.S. attorney thereafter and the court to try the case.

I was concerned about the demand for change of venue, because all the evidence was being given out. At that time, of course, we didn't know that Oswald was going to be killed, and there was a possibility that he might be confronted with some of this evidence. If it had been kept secret and used in the interrogation of him, just confronting him with what was found, such as his picture with the gun might have been helpful.

A small thing can often make a man break and come forward with a full confession. If he knows in advance that you have certain evidence he will be on guard against answering questions. Of course, he is always advised of his rights and that he can have an attorney. We always make a point of this. We generally have a reputable physician of the community present in our office while the prisoner is there, to administer to him and be able to testify that he has not been subjected to third degree methods. He is examined when he comes in and he is examined before we take him to the commissioner. Taking him before the commissioner in a case like Oswald's would probably have been done within 4 or 5 hours. Generally we try to arraign a prisoner within an hour.

That makes it more difficult; you have to work faster. But again I say I am in favor of having the procedures of law enforcement officers as tightly bound down as we can, with due respect for the interests of society.

Of course, there must be an equal balance. For years we have had a rule against third degree methods, but years ago many police departments used the third degree. I think very few of them use it now because if they use it they violate the civil rights statutes and we investigate them for having brutally handled a prisoner. Many allegations are made unfairly against police officers that they have used third degree methods and we are able to prove they haven't in our investigations. That is particularly true where civil rights matters are involved. We have such cases in many areas where civil rights agitation is going on.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, to remind you of my question, any suggestions that you may have concerning the protection of the President, and the information that the Commission has that you have a special appropriation in that connection for the Bureau?

Mr. HOOVER. We do not have a special appropriation for the protection of the President. The Secret Service, of course, has that responsibility. On December 2, I prepared this memorandum for the President, and for the chief of the Secret Service at the request of the President, outlining suggestions that I felt should be considered to tighten up on the security of the President. If the Commission desires I will be glad to leave this or I will be glad to read it to the Commission.

Representative BOGGS. Why don't you ask the Director just to summarize it.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you summarize it?

Mr. Dulles. Can we have a copy of it?

Mr. Hoover. Oh, yes.

Representative Ford. Could the copy be put in the record as an exhibit?

Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir; that is all right with me. I have no objection to it.

Regarding travel, first, advise the Secret Service as far in advance as possible of the President's travel plans and proposed itinerary. The reason for that is there have been Presidents who suddenly decide they are going somewhere and the Secret Service does not have the chance always to cover the area and check the neighborhood and check the hotel or place where it may be.

Representative Boggs. You have one like that right now, Mr. Director.

Mr. Hoover. I know from experience.

Second, avoid publicizing exact routes of travel as long as possible. Again, it has been the practice in the past to announce the President is going along a certain route and, therefore, great crowds will gather along that route. And, therefore, I thought that was something that should not be given out and the President should be taken along some routes which are not announced. At the present time, he goes to cities and he wants to see people and the crowd wants to see him. In Dallas, the route was publicized at least 24 hours before so everybody knew where he would be driving.

Third, use a specially armored car with bulletproof glass and have such cars readily available in locations frequently visited. The President, as I observed earlier in my testimony, had no armored car. He has one now which I supplied to Secret Service and they will have one made no doubt in due time for the President's use. But if it had been armored, I believe President Kennedy would be alive today.

Fourth, avoid setting a specific pattern of travel or other activity such as visiting the same church at the same time each Sunday.

Regarding public appearances. First, use maximum feasible screening of persons in attendance including use of detection devices sensitive to the amount of metal required in a firearm or grenade.

Second, use a bulletproof shield in front of the entire rostrum in public appearances such as the swearing in ceremony at the Capitol on inauguration day, the presidential reviewing stand in front of the White House on the same day and on the rear of trains.

Third, keep to a minimum the President's movements within crowds, remain on the rostrum after the public addresses rather than mingling with the audience. Again, there is great difficulty in that field.

Fourth, in appearances at public sporting events such as football games, remain in one place rather than changing sides during half-time ceremonies.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Dulles. About the armored car you said if Kennedy had an armored car that might have saved him. Would the back of the armored car have some protection to protect his head?

Mr. Hoover. Oh, yes.

Mr. Dulles. Because if the armored car had been open——

Mr. Hoover. He must never ride in an open car; that has been my recommendation.

Mr. Dulles. The back never comes down?

Mr. Hoover. The back never comes down, and it is bulletproof. The top, sides, and underpart are all of bulletproof construction. So that except by opening a window and waving through the window the occupant is safe. A person can shoot through the window if the glass window is lowered.

Fifth, limit public appearances by use of television whenever possible.

Sixth, avoid walking in public except when absolutely necessary.

Now, on legislation. First, I recommended that the President and the Vice President be added to the list of Federal officers set out in section 1114, title 18 of the U.S. Code which deals with assaults which are punishable under Federal law.

Mr. Rankin. You would add to that I understood from your prior remarks, the Speaker and the President Pro Tempore?

Mr. Hoover. In view of the situation which prevails at the present time the

Speaker and President pro tempore, in other words, the line of succession under the Constitution but not below that.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HOOVER. Second, furnish the Secret Service authority to request assistance and cooperation from other U.S. agencies including the military, particularly in connection with foreign travel.

Now, my reason for that is that sometimes requests for assistance have to clear through red-tape channels here at Washington through some high official of Government. If an emergency arises abroad, or even in this country, it may be of such character that you do not have time to telephone back to Washington or to telephone back to the Pentagon. Aid ought to be immediately available by calling on the local authorities and the nearest military authority.

Third, improve control of the sale of firearms requiring as a minimum registration of every firearm sold together with adequate identification of the purchaser. The problem of firearms control is under extensive debate, in both the House and Senate at the present time.

The gun that Oswald used was bought by mail order from a mail-order house in Chicago, no license for it, no permit for it, no checkup on it. The only way we were able to trace it was to find out where in this country that Italian-made gun was sold. We found the company in Chicago and later the mail-order slip that had been sent by Oswald to Chicago to get the gun. Now, there are arguments, of course——

Mr. DULLES. In a false name.

Mr. HOOVER. In a false name.

There is argument, of course, that by passing firearms legislation you are going to take the privilege of hunting away from the sportsmen of the country. I don't share that view with any great degree of sympathy because you have to get a license to drive an automobile and you have to get a license to have a dog, and I see no reason why a man shouldn't be willing, if he is a law-abiding citizen, to have a license to get a firearm whether it be a rifle or revolver or other firearm.

It is not going to curtail his exercise of shooting for sport because the police make a check of his background. If he is a man who is entitled to a gun, a law-abiding citizen, a permit will be granted.

Of course, today firearms control is practically negligible, and I think some steps should be taken along that line.

Fourth, a ban on picketing within the vicinity of the White House as is now done at the U.S. Capitol and Supreme Court. Some of these pickets are well-meaning and law-abiding individuals, some are for peace and some are more or less dedicated Communists.

Representative BOGGS. It is illegal to picket a Federal court now, Mr. Director, I happen to be the author of that law.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; I am glad you had that law passed. Of course, they picket public buildings, they march around the Department of Justice Building, now and then, but the principal places they prefer to go are the Supreme Court Building, the Capitol and its grounds and the White House.

I think such picketing at the White House, of large or small groups, should be forbidden. I think at the White House they tried to get the pickets to walk across the street along Lafayette Park. That at least takes them away from being close to the gates at the White House. I think there ought to be some control. Picketing, of course, is legitimate if it is orderly. Many times it doesn't continue to be orderly, and sometimes pickets, as in this city, have thrown themselves on the pavement and the police have to come and pick them up or drag them away. Then, of course, the charge is made of brutality right away.

Delegations of colored groups have visited me and asked why I don't arrest a police officer for hitting some Negro whom he is arresting in a sit-in strike, lay-in strike or demonstration in some southern cities.

We have no authority to make an arrest of that kind. Under the authority the Bureau has we have to submit those complaints to the Department of Justice and if they authorize us to make an arrest we will do it.

have the number 866 assigned to the memo that Mr. Hoover is going to send about protection of the President, and have it admitted to this record under that number.

The **Chairman**. Yes; it may be.

Representative **Ford**. Also a number for this letter Mr. Hoover is going to submit.

Mr. **Rankin**. May I assign 867?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

(Commission Exhibit Nos. 866 and 867 were marked for identification and received in evidence.)

TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. McCONE AND RICHARD M. HELMS

MAY 14, 1964

The **Chairman**. The Commission will be in order.

Director McCone, it is customary for the Chairman to make a short statement to the witness as to the testimony that is expected to be given. I will read it at this time.

Mr. McCone will be asked to testify on whether Lee Harvey Oswald was ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency in any capacity at any time, and whether he knows of any credible evidence or of any conspiracy either domestic or foreign involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, also with regard to any suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning improvements or changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the United States.

Would you please rise and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. **McCone**. I do.

The **Chairman**. Will you be seated, please? Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. McCone, will you state your name?

Mr. **McCone**. My name is John Alex McCone.

Mr. **Rankin**. Do you have an official position with the U.S. Government?

Mr. **McCone**. Yes, sir; I am Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. **Rankin**. Have you been Director for some time?

Mr. **McCone**. Yes; a little over 2½ years.

Mr. **Rankin**. Where do you live, Mr. McCone?

Mr. **McCone**. I live at 3025 Whitehaven Street in Washington.

Mr. **Rankin**. Are you familiar with the records and how they are kept by the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether a man is acting as an informer, agent, employee, or in any other capacity for that Agency?

Mr. **McCone**. Yes; I am generally familiar with the procedures and the records that are maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency. Quite naturally, I am not familiar with all of the records because they are very extensive.

Mr. **Rankin**. Have you determined whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald, the suspect in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy, had any connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, informer or indirectly as an employee, or any other capacity?

Mr. **McCone**. Yes; I have determined to my satisfaction that he had no such connection, and I would like to read for the record——

Mr. **Rankin**. Will you tell us briefly the extent of your inquiry?

Mr. **McCone**. In a form of affidavit, I have gone into the matter in considerable detail personally, in my inquiry with the appropriate people within the Agency, examined all records in our files relating to Lee Harvey Oswald. We had knowledge of him, of course, because of his having gone to the Soviet Union, as he did, putting him in a situation where his name would appear in our name file. However, my examination has resulted in the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or received or solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him directly or in any other manner. The Agency never furnished him with any funds or money or compensated him directly or indirectly in any fashion, and Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected directly or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency. When I use the term "Agency," I mean the Central Intelligence Agency, of course.

Representative **Ford**. Does that include whether or not he was in the United States, in the Soviet Union, or anyplace?

Mr. **McCone**. Anyplace; the United States, Soviet Union, or anyplace.

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. McCone, is that the affidavit you are going to supply the Commission in connection with our request for it?

Mr. **McCone**. Yes; this is the substance of the affidavit which I will supply to you.

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to mark that Exhibit 870 and have it introduced in evidence as soon as we receive it from Mr. McCone as a part of this record.

The **Chairman**. It may be admitted.

(Commission Exhibit No. 870 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. **Rankin**. Would you tell us about your procedures in regard to having an agent or informer or any person acting in that type of capacity? Does that have to pass through your hands or come to your attention in the Agency?

Mr. **McCone**. No; it does not have to come through my personal hands.

Mr. **Rankin**. Without disclosing something that might be a security matter, could you tell us how that is handled in a general way in the Agency?

Mr. **McCone**. Mr. Helms, who is directly responsible for that division of the Agency's activities as a Deputy Director, might explain. Would that be permissible?

Mr. **Rankin**. Could we have him sworn then?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. **Helms**. I do.

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. Helms, you heard the inquiry just directed to Mr. McCone. Could you answer the question directly?

Mr. **Helms**. Yes; we have a specific procedure which we follow in all cases where the Agency is in contact, for the purposes of acquiring intelligence or whatever the case may be, with an individual. We not only have a record of the individual's name, but we also usually get information of a biographical nature. We then check this individual's name against our record. At that point we make a determination as to whether we desire to use this man or not to use him. It varies from case to case as to how many officers may be involved in approving a specific recruitment. May I go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. Helms, did you have anything to do on behalf of your Agency with determining whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was acting in any of the capacities I have described in my questions to Mr. McCone?

Mr. **Helms**. Yes; I did.

Mr. **Rankin**. Will you tell us what you did in that regard?

Mr. **Helms**. On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all of our records searched to see if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our card files and our personnel files and all our records.

Now, this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch with those officers who were in positions of responsibility at the times in question to see if anybody had any recollection of any contact having even been suggested with this man. This also turned out to be negative, so there is no material in the Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the mind of any of the individuals, that there was any contact had or even contemplated with him.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms——

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there? Do you recall or do you know at what time the name of Lee Harvey Oswald was carded, first came to your attention so it became a matter of record, in the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I would want to consult the record to be absolutely accurate, but it is my impression that the first time that his name showed up on any Agency records was when he went to the Soviet Union.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, in connection with your work you have supplied information to the Commission and we have requested many things from your Agency. Can you tell the Commission as to whether or not you have supplied us all the information the Agency has, at least in substance, in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. We have; all.

Representative FORD. Has a member of the Commission staff had full access to your files on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. He has, sir.

Representative FORD. They have had the opportunity to personally look at the entire file?

Mr. HELMS. We invited them to come out to our building in Langley and actually put the file on the table so that they could examine it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was personally out there, too, and was offered the same opportunity. I did not avail myself of it because of the time element, but I was offered the same opportunity.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, can you explain, according to the limitations of security, the reasons why we examined materials but did not always take them, in a general way?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I can.

In our communications between individuals working overseas and in Washington, we for security reasons have a method of hiding the identities of individuals in telegrams and dispatches by the use of pseudonyms and cryptonyms. For this reason, we never allow the original documents to leave our premises. However, on the occasion when the representatives of the Commission staff looked at these files, we sat there and identified these pseudonyms and cryptonyms and related them to the proper names of the individuals concerned, so that they would know exactly what the correspondence said.

Mr. RANKIN. By that you mean the representatives of the Commission were able to satisfy themselves that they had all of the information for the benefit of the Commission without disclosing matters that would be a threat to security; is that right?

Mr. HELMS. It is my understanding that they were satisfied.

Representative FORD. Mr. McCone, do you have full authority from higher authority to make full disclosure to this Commission of any information in the files of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. McCONE. That is right. It is my understanding that it is the desire of higher authority that this Commission shall have access to all information of every nature in our files or in the minds of employees of Central Intelligence Agency.

Representative FORD. On the basis of that authority, you or the Agency have made a full disclosure?

Mr. McCONE. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, I have handed you Exhibits 868 and 869 directed to you acting for the Agency, the first one being from the Commission to you and the second one, 869, being your answer in regard to your full and complete disclosure in regard to your records; isn't that correct?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct. May I say, Mr. Rankin, that any information, though, subsequent to this correspondence which we may obtain we will certainly continue to forward to the Commission.

Mr. RANKIN. Thank you. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask leave to have those two exhibits, 868 and 869, received in evidence at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted under those numbers.

(Commission Exhibits Nos. 868 and 869 were marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, if I may return to you, I will now ask you if you have any credible information that you know of or evidence causing you to believe that there is any or was any conspiracy either domestic or foreign in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. MCCONE. No; I have no information, Mr. Rankin, that would lead me to believe or conclude that a conspiracy existed.

Representative FORD. Did the CIA make an investigation of this aspect of the assassination?

Mr. MCCONE. We made an investigation of all developments after the assassination which came to our attention which might possibly have indicated a conspiracy, and we determined after these investigations, which were made promptly and immediately, that we had no evidence to support such an assumption.

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any contact with Oswald during the period of his life in the Soviet Union?

Mr. MCCONE. No; not to my knowledge, nor to the knowledge of those who would have been in a position to have made such contact, nor according to any record we have.

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any personal contact with Oswald subsequent to his return to the United States?

Mr. MCCONE. No.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, your Agency made a particular investigation in connection with any allegations about a conspiracy involving the Soviet Union or people connected with Cuba, did you not?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, we did. We made a thorough, a very thorough, investigation of information that came to us concerning an alleged trip that Oswald made to Mexico City during which time he made contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt to gain transit privileges from Mexico City to the Soviet Union via Havana. We investigated that thoroughly.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you also include in your statement that you found no evidence of conspiracy in all of that investigation?

Mr. MCCONE. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. And also the investigation you made of the period that Lee Harvey Oswald was in the Soviet Union?

Mr. MCCONE. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone——

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there? Does your answer, Mr. McCone, include a negation of any belief that Oswald was working for or on behalf of the Soviet Union at any time when you were in contact with him or knew about his activities?

Mr. MCCONE. As I have already stated, we were never in contact with Oswald. We have no evidence that he was working for or on behalf of the Soviet Union at any time. According to his diary, Oswald did receive a subsidy from the Soviet Red Cross which we assume had the approval of the authorities. Such a payment does not indicate to us that he even worked for the Soviet intelligence services. Furthermore, we have no other evidence that he ever worked for Soviet intelligence.

Representative FORD. Is the Central Intelligence Agency continuing any investigation into this area?

Mr. MCCONE. No, because, at the present time, we have no information in our files that we have not exhaustively investigated and disposed of to our satisfaction. Naturally, any new information that might come into our hands would be investigated promptly.

Mr. HELMS. I simply wanted to add that we obviously are interested in anything we can pick up applying to this case, and anything we get will be immediately sent to the Commission, so that we haven't stopped our inquiries or the picking up of any information we can from people who might have it. This is on a continuing basis.

Representative FORD. In other words, the case isn't closed.

Mr. HELMS. It is not closed as far as we are concerned.

Mr. Rankin. Would that be true, Mr. Helms, even after the Commission completed its report, you would keep the matter open if there was anything new that developed in the future that could be properly presented to the authorities?

Mr. Helms. Yes. I would assume the case will never be closed.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, do you have any ideas about improving the security provisions for the President that you would like to relate to the Commission?

Mr. McCone. Well, this is, in my opinion, a very important question which I am sure this Commission will—has and will—devote a considerable amount of thought to, and undoubtedly have some recommendations as part of its report.

Mr. Rankin. Your Agency does have an important function in some aspects.

Mr. McCone. We have a very important function in connection with the foreign travels of the President, and I would like to inform the Commission as to how we discharge that responsibility by quickly reviewing the chronology of the Central Intelligence Agency's support of President Kennedy's visit to Mexico City from the 29th of June to the 2d of July 1962.

Mr. Rankin. Will you please do that.

The Chairman. Director, is that a security matter?

Mr. McCone. No. I think I can handle this for the record.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. McCone. If I have to make a remark or two off the record I will ask that privilege.

That visit, as I said, started on the 29th of June. On the 28th of April, in anticipation of the visit, instructions were transmitted to Mexico for the Ambassador to coordinate planning and informational guidance for the advance party of the Secret Service.

We asked that the Secret Service be given information on local groups and persons who would cause disturbances, embarrassments or physical harm, an estimate of the determination and ability of the Mexican government to prevent incidents, and preparation for special briefings to the Embassy officials and the Secret Service, and such additional support and communications personnel that might be required.

These instructions were given two months before the trip.

On the 15th of May, we received confirmed information that the President would visit Mexico on the specific dates. On the 1st of June the Secret Service was supplied by the Agency with the detailed survey of Mexican security forces that would be called upon to protect the President.

Friendly and allied governments were informed of the visit and their cooperation and pertinent informational support was solicited. From this date through the 2d of July daily information reports were furnished to the State Department, the Secret Service, the FBI and the military services.

That is from the 1st of June to the 2d of July, a period of 31, 32 days. On the 8th of June the Secret Service advance party was briefed in detail by a group of officers of the Agency on the Mexican government's plans for the protection of the President, including current information on the size, strength and capabilities of potential troublemakers.

Hazardous locations and times in the planned itinerary were identified, political and economic issues that might be invoked by hostile elements for demonstrations were specified.

On the 11th of June, the Secret Service advance party left for Mexico supported by additional security personnel to assist in coordinating an informational report and the followup activity required.

Especially prepared national intelligence estimates on the current security conditions in Mexico was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on the 13th of June.

On the 15th of June arrangements were completed to reenforce communications facilities. On the 24th of June a conference at the State Department was held at the request of the President for reviewing security measures, and this meeting I attended personally, and reported to the State Department on the essence of all that had gone before.

Emergency contingency plans were discussed and a consensus was reached that the President should make the visit as scheduled.

On the 27th of June, a final updated special national intelligence estimate was prepared, and this indicated no basic changes in the security assessment that Mexican government was prepared to cope with foreseeable security contingencies.

On the 28th of June, a final briefing report was prepared for the Director's use which indicated the security precautions of the Mexican government had effectively forestalled major organized incidents, and our informed estimate was that the President would receive a great welcome.

The report was presented to the President personally by the Director at noon in a final meeting prior to departure on this trip.

From the 29th of June to the 2d of July in Washington headquarters, headquarters components remained on a 24-hour alert for close support of the embassy and the Secret Service.

So, not only was the Central Intelligence Agency and its various components involved in this for a period of 2 months in close collaboration with the Secret Service, but by bringing in the United States Intelligence Board we brought in all of the intelligence assets of the United States Government in connection with this particular trip. I thought this procedure which is followed regularly on all trips that the President makes out of the country would be of interest to the Commission.

The **Chairman**. That is the normal format of your procedures?

Mr. **McCone**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. When the President goes abroad?

Mr. **McCone**. Yes, I selected this one. The same was true of his trip to Caracas or Paris or elsewhere.

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. McCone, in your investigation of the Oswald matter did you use the same approach or a comparable approach to a liaison with the other intelligence agencies of government to try to discover anything that might involve your jurisdiction.

Mr. **McCone**. Yes. We were in very close touch with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and with the Secret Service on a 24-hour basis at all points, both domestic and foreign, where information had been received which might have a bearing on this problem.

Mr. **Rankin**. Assassination?

Mr. **McCone**. Assassination.

Mr. **Rankin**. Do you have an opinion, Mr. McCone, as to whether or not the liaison between the intelligence agencies of the United States Government might be improved if they had better mechanical, computer or other facilities of that type, and also some other ideas or methods of dealing with each other?

Mr. **McCone**. There is a great deal of improvement of information that might be of importance in a matter of this kind through the use of computers and mechanical means of handling files, and you, Mr. Chief Justice, saw some of our installations and that was only a beginning of what really can be done.

The **Chairman**. Yes; I did.

Mr. **McCone**. I would certainly urge that all departments of government that are involved in this area adopt the most modern methods of automatic data processing with respect to the personnel files and other files relating to individuals. This would be helpful.

But I emphasize that a computer will not replace the man, and therefore, we must have at all levels a complete exchange of information and cooperation between agencies where they share this responsibility, and in going through this chronology, it points out the type of exchange and cooperation that the Central Intelligence Agency tries to afford both the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in matters where we have a common responsibility.

I would like to emphasize the very great importance of this exchange, which is not always easily accomplished because it is cumbersome.

Sometimes it becomes involved in distracting people from other duties, and so on and so forth.

I have given a good deal of thought to the matter of some incentives to bring out informers, thinking about the old informer statutes in which some of them are still on the books, in which people were rewarded for informing when others conducted themselves in a damaging way.

Mr. **Dulles**. Smuggling cases?

Mr. **McCone**. Smuggling cases. But I believe that something could be done. I call to the attention of this Commission one of the laws relating to atomic energy, namely the Atomic Weapons Reward Act of 15 July 1955 wherein a substantial reward is offered for the apprehension of persons responsible for the clandestine introduction or manufacture in the United States of such nuclear material or atomic weapons. It is suggested that the Commission may wish to recommend that original but similar legislation be enacted which would induce individuals to furnish information bearing on Presidential security by offering a substantial reward and preferential treatment. Substantial reward could represent a significant inducement even to staff officers and personnel of secret associations and state security organs abroad who are charged with assassination and sabotage. We have information that such personnel and police state apparatuses have expressed and, in certain cases, acted upon their repugnance for such work and for the political system which requires such duties to be performed.

Mr. **Rankin**. Is it your belief, Mr. McCone, that the methods for exchange of information between intelligence agencies of the Government could be materially improved.

Mr. **McCone**. I think the exchange between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Secret Service is quite adequate. I am not informed as to whether the exchanges between the Secret Service and the FBI are equally adequate. I have not gone into that. I would have no means to know. Certainly it is most important that it be done.

Mr. **Dulles**. Looking back now that you have the full record, do you feel that you received from the State Department adequate information at the time that they were aware of Oswald's defection and later activities in the Soviet Union, did you get at the time full information from the State Department on those particular subjects?

Mr. **McCone**. Well, I am not sure that we got full information, Mr. Dulles. The fact is we had very little information in our files.

Mr. **Helms**. It was probably minimal.

Representative **Ford**. Why did that happen?

Mr. **Helms**. I am not sure, Mr. Ford. I can only assume that the State Department had a limited amount. Interestingly enough, it is far enough back now so that it's very hard to find people who were in the Moscow Embassy at the time familiar with the case, so in trying to run this down one comes to a lot of dead ends and I, therefore, would not like to hazard any guess.

Representative **Ford**. Whose responsibility is it; is it CIA's responsibility to obtain the information, or State Department's responsibility to supply it to Central Intelligence and to others.

Mr. **McCone**. With respect to a U.S. citizen who goes abroad, it is the responsibility of the State Department through its various echelons, consular service and embassies and so forth.

For a foreigner coming into the United States, who might be of suspicious character, coming here for espionage, subversion, assassination and other acts of violence, we would, and we do exchange this information immediately with the FBI.

Representative **Ford**. But in this particular case, Oswald in the Soviet Union, whose responsibility was it to transmit the information, whatever it was, to the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. **McCone**. Well, it would be the State Department's responsibility to do that. Whether there really exists an order or orders that information on an American citizen returning from a foreign country be transmitted to CIA, I don't believe there are such regulations which exist.

Mr. **Helms**. I don't believe they do, either.

Mr. **McCone**. I am not sure they should.

Representative **Ford**. It wouldn't be your recommendation that you, the head of Central Intelligence Agency, should have that information?

Mr. **Dulles**. In a case of an American defecting to a Communist country, shouldn't you have it?

Mr. **McCone**. Certainly certain types of information. What we ought to be careful of here, would be to rather clearly define the type of information which should be transmitted, because after all, there are hundreds of thousands or millions of Americans going back and forth every year, and those records are the records of the Immigration Service, the Passport Division.

Mr. DULLES. I was thinking of a person who having defected might, of course, have become an agent and then reinserted into the United States and if you were informed of the first steps to that you might help to prevent the second step.

Mr. MCCONE. Well, certainly information on defectors or possible recruitments should be, and I have no question is being, transmitted.

Representative FORD. What I was getting at was whether the procedures were adequate or inadequate, whether the administration was proper or improper in this particular case, and if some files you have that started when he attempted to defect are inadequate why we ought to know, and we ought to know whether the basic regulations were right or wrong, whether the administration was proper or improper, that is what I am trying to find out.

I would like your comment on it.

Mr. MCCONE. Well, I think the basic regulations should be examined very carefully to be sure that they are copper-riveted down and absolutely tight. What I am saying, however, is because of the vast number of Americans who go abroad and stay in foreign countries for indefinite periods of time, it would be an impossible task to transmit all information available in the State Department and Immigration Service as files to the Central Intelligence Agency. It would not be a productive exercise. What must be transmitted and is being transmitted, while I cannot recite the exact regulations is information that is, becomes, known to the various embassies of suspicious Americans that might have been recruited and defected, and then returned so that they would be agents in place.

Representative FORD. In this case, Oswald attempted to defect, he did not, he subsequently sought the right to return to the United States, he had contact with the Embassy. Was the Central Intelligence Agency informed of these steps, step by step, by the Department of State?

Mr. MCCONE. You might answer that.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Ford, in order to answer this question precisely I would have to have the file in front of me. I have not looked at it in some time so I don't have it all that clearly in mind. But it is my impression that we were not informed step by step. When I say that there is no requirement that I am aware of that the State Department should inform us and when I said a moment ago that we had minimal information from them, this was not in any sense a critical comment but a statement of fact.

But an American going to the American Embassy would be handled by the Embassy officials, either consular or otherwise. This would be a matter well within the purview of the State Department to keep all the way through, because we do not have responsibility in the Central Intelligence Agency for the conduct or behavior or anything else of American citizens when they are abroad unless there is some special consideration applying to an individual, or someone in higher authority requests assistance from us. So that the State Department, I think, quite properly would regard this matter as well within their purview to handle themselves within the Embassy or from the Embassy back to the Department of State without involving the Agency in it while these events were occurring.

Representative FORD. I think it could be argued, however, that the uniqueness of this individual case was such that the Department of State might well have contacted the Central Intelligence Agency to keep them abreast of the developments as they transpired. This is not—and when I say this, I mean the Oswald case—is not an ordinary run-of-the-mill-type of case. It is far from it. Even back in the time, well, from the time he went, and particularly as time progressed, and he made application to return, there is nothing ordinary about the whole situation.

Mr. MCCONE. That is quite correct; there is no question about that.

Representative FORD. And I am only suggesting that if the regulations were not adequate at the time and are not now, maybe something ought to be done about it.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, when you said that supplying all of the information about U.S. citizens who went abroad and came back to the country would not be a profitable exercise, did that comment include the thought that such an intrusion upon all citizens would be questionable?

Mr. McCone. Such an intrusion?

Mr. Rankin. Upon their right to travel.

Mr. McCone. Well, I think this would have a bearing on it. I did not have that particular matter in mind when I made that statement, however. I was just thinking of the——

Mr. Rankin. Burden?

Mr. McCone. Of the burden of vast numbers involved.

Mr. Rankin. Do you have any thought in regard to whether it would be an intrusion upon their rights?

Mr. McCone. Well, that would be a matter of how it was handled. Certainly, if it was handled in a way that the counterpart of providing the information was to impose restrictions on them, then it would be an intrusion on their rights.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Senator Cooper. May I inquire?

The Chairman. Senator Cooper.

Senator Cooper. I missed the first part of Mr. McCone's testimony; I went to answer a quorum call. Perhaps the question has been asked.

It has been brought into evidence that a number of people in the Embassy talked to Oswald when he first defected, and the various communications with the Embassy and, of course, when he left to come back to the United States. Have we been able to ascertain the names of officials in the Embassy or employees with whom Oswald talked on these various occasions?

Mr. McCone. I am not familiar with them; no.

Mr. Helms. Neither am I, sir.

Mr. McCone. I presume that the Department's inquiries have covered it.

Senator Cooper. Is it possible to ascertain the names of those employees?

Mr. Rankin. Senator Cooper, I can answer that. We have inquired of the State Department for that information, and are in the process of obtaining it all.

Senator Cooper. Taking into consideration your answers to the previous question, would it have been possible in your judgment to have secured more comprehensive information about the activities of Oswald in Russia?

Mr. McCone. It would not have been possible for the Central Intelligence Agency to have secured such information because we do not have the resources to gain such information.

The Chairman. Anything more? Congressman Ford?

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency investigate any aspects of Oswald's trip to Mexico?

Mr. McCone. Yes; we did.

Representative Ford. Can you give us any information on that?

Mr. McCone. Yes; we were aware that Oswald did make a trip to Mexico City and it was our judgment that he was there in the interest of insuring transit privileges and that he made contact with the Cuban Embassy while he was there.

We do not know the precise results of his effort, but we assumed, because he returned to the United States, he was unsuccessful. We have examined to every extent we can, and using all resources available to us every aspect of his activity and we could not verify that he was there for any other purpose or that his trip to Mexico was in any way related to his later action in assassinating President Kennedy.

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency make any investigation of any alleged connection between Oswald and the Castro government?

Mr. McCone. Yes; we investigated that in considerable detail, because information came to us through a third party that he had carried on a rather odd discussion with Cuban officials in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The allegation was that he had received under rather odd circumstances a substantial amount of money in the Cuban Embassy, and the statement was made by one who claimed to have seen this transaction take place. After a very thorough and detailed examination of the informer, it finally turned out by the informer's own admission that the information was entirely erroneous, and was made for the purpose of advancing the informer's own standing with the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Government and it was subsequently retracted by the informer in its entirety.

Representative **Ford**. Was there any other evidence or alleged evidence——

Mr. **McCone**. Parenthetically, I might add a word for the record that the date that the informer gave as to the date in time of this alleged transaction was impossible because through other, from other, information we determined that Oswald was in the United States at that particular time.

Representative **Ford**. Did the Central Intelligence Agency ever make an investigation or did it ever check on Mr. Ruby's trip to Cuba or any connections he might have had with the Castro government?

Mr. **McCone**. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. **Helms**. We had no information.

Mr. **McCone**. We had no information.

Representative **Ford**. Central Intelligence Agency has no information of any connections of Ruby to the Castro government?

Mr. **McCone**. That is right.

Representative **Ford**. Did you ever make a check of that?

Mr. **Helms**. We checked our records to see if we had information and found we did not.

Representative **Ford**. What would that indicate, the fact that you checked your records?

Mr. **Helms**. That would indicate that if we had received information from our own resources, that the Cubans were involved with Mr. Ruby in something which would be regarded as subversive, we would then have it in our files. But we received no such information, and I don't, by saying this, mean that he did not. I simply say we don't have any record of this.

Representative **Ford**. That is all.

The **Chairman**. Director, thank you very much, sir, for coming and being with us and we appreciate the help your department has given to us.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)

Thursday, June 4, 1964

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY, LEO J. GAUTHIER, LYNDAL L. SHANEYFELT, AND ROBERT A. FRAZIER

The President's Commission met at 2:10 p.m., on June 4, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman Cooper, Representative Gerald R. Ford, Allen W. Dulles, and John J. McCloy, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant counsel; Arlen Specter, assistant counsel; Waggoner Carr, attorney general of Texas; and Charles Murray, observer.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY

(Members present at this point: The Chairman, Representative Ford, Mr. Dulles, and Mr. McCloy.)

Mr. **Specter**. Mr. Chief Justice, we have witnesses today who are Thomas J. Kelley of the Secret Service; Leo J. Gauthier, Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, and Robert A. Frazier of the FBI. They are going to testify concerning certain

JAMES J. ROWLEY, CHIEF, SECRET SERVICE
JUNE 18, 1964

Mr. ROWLEY. I think there are certain things that you have to allow the man who is operating as a politician, and not as head of state. I mean this makes a difference in your operation.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report of the activities in protecting the President at and around Parkland Hospital?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And is that Commission Exhibit No. 1026?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1026 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1026.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1026, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any additions or corrections you care to make in that exhibit?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report about protective activity subsequent to Dallas on behalf of the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1027 and ask you if that is the report that you have just referred to.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1027 for identification.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I ask you, are there any problems with regard to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 concerning security, and whether that should be—that document should be made public? You just take your time if you want to glance over it.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; as I read it, it is general enough, sir, that it can be included.

(At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1027.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1027, was received in evidence.)

(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Are there any of the various answers that you give in the answers to the questions attached to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 that you care to elaborate on at this time?

I am not asking you or urging you to do it, because I assume that you anwered them with care at the time. I just wanted to give you that opportunity.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; not at this time.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask a question there?

You consider that the criteria as now furnished by you to the FBI and other investigative agencies would cover a case like Oswald's?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You think they would?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You think they understand that?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, as we stated in the covering letter when we sent this out—we haven't gotten any reaction—we asked for their cooperation and suggestions in connection with such guidelines.

Mr. DULLES. Defectors are not specifically covered, are they, by your criteria?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, they are given to us now. We are being furnished the names of defectors, and they are being investigated, so that their background and history will be furnished to us, and we will be in a position now to determine whether they represent a risk or not.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley——

Representative BOGGS. May I ask a question there?

Would you have any notion as to why names of defectors were not provided to you prior to November 22?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; under the broad picture, Mr. Congressman, there was no indication that they had made any threat toward the President or members of his family. Whenever there was a threat made, we were furnished promptly by the different agencies the information on the individual's name. And this was done in voluminous reports by the FBI, and the other agencies. When they got any information, they would notify the local office, notify their liaison, who notified us by telephone, and confirmed by memorandum. The same obtained with respect to the CIA.

Representative Boggs. This fellow was interviewed by the FBI several times—he was interviewed in New Orleans when he allegedly had his Fair Play Committee. If my memory serves me correctly, Mrs. Paine was interviewed about him shortly before the visit of the President, after he had gone to work at the Texas School Book Depository. I agree that there had been no indication of a threat on the President's life. But, obviously he was a person in the FBI files who was under some degree of surveillance. It would seem to me strange that the FBI did not transmit this information to the Secret Service.

Mr. Rowley. The FBI, Mr. Congressman, are concerned with internal security. And I think their approach was internal security as it related to this individual, whether or not he was a potential recruit for espionage, intelligence, or something like that.

Their concern was talking to him in this vein, in the course of which there was no indication that he bore any malice toward anyone, and particularly to the President of the United States. If someone said that Henry Smith didn't like the President, and we got his file, we would get to the point where you have 3 million names in the file. How effective are you going to be then?

Representative Boggs. Well, that is right.

Mr. Rowley. And then you get in the area of civil rights and all, if you start going into individuals——

Representative Boggs. And if I remember correctly, there has never been—we have had no testimony from anyone that Oswald ever threatened the President of the United States. Is that correct?

Mr. Rankin. That is correct.

Representative Boggs. That was the only question I had.

Mr. Dulles. Along that line, I just raise the question as to whether maybe too much emphasis is not put on the threat angle, because a clever fellow, if he is going to assassinate the President, the last thing he is going to do is go around and talk about it and threaten it.

Mr. Rowley. That is right. Well, this has been so with loners, too.

As you say, you read the assassinations. Some of them just kept to themselves, and traveled, and the next thing you know they confronted their victim. Sometimes they were successful, other times they were not.

Mr. Dulles. I recognize the difficulty of working out adequate criteria. But I just think you ought to do some more seeking, and there is more work to be done on that.

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Senator Cooper. May I ask this question: It hasn't been clear to me. Is it correct that now a defector does come within the scope of your Service?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir; we are furnished the names of defectors by the FBI. And they investigate these people. And then in their report, if it shows that the individual has emotional instability or propensity for violence, we pick it up from there. But all the reports on the known defectors in this country are submitted to us, and then we evaluate from the case history of the report whether or not he would be a risk for us subject to investigation.

Senator Cooper. I understood that was the procedure before. But my question is now, is the defector per se classed as one of those against whom you would take protective measures?

Mr. Rowley. No, no, sir; not unless we had——

Senator Cooper. Since the assassination?

Mr. Rowley. Not unless we had these three categories of factors we just enunciated.

Senator Cooper. I would suggest—first, I understand there are not many defectors who have returned to the United States.

Secondly, it seems to me a man who has defected from the United States to go to Russia or a Communist country indicates that he has pretty strong convictions against the United States, or else there is something questionable about his mental processes.

I would think that fact alone would make it important to watch his activities when he came back.

Mr. Rowley. It would. And I think the FBI properly conducts the investigations, from the standpoint of internal security, and furnishes us a report. And then if there is something in the report that indicates he could be a risk to the President or the Vice President, we could take it from there.

Representative Boggs. Mr. Rankin, I have to go to a meeting in 2 or 3 minutes. There is just one question I would like to ask before leaving.

Is it not a fact that probably the greatest deterrent that you have is the very fact that the public knows that there is a Secret Service?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Representative Boggs. That you do guard the life of the President. And that the chances of an assassin escaping with his own life are pretty remote. So this psychological weapon is one of the things you rely on?

Mr. Rowley. That is correct.

Representative Boggs. And you must necessarily keep a degree of secrecy about the methods you employ.

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir; otherwise they could develop countermethods, to thwart anything we might set up.

Representative Boggs. Exactly. Thank you very much.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, do you in the Secret Service obtain the benefit of cooperation with other governmental agencies in the protection of the President?

Mr. Rowley. We receive cooperation from every agency. If I may name a few—we were scheduled to visit Puerto Rico in 1948 or 1947—I am not quite certain—with President Truman, who was then vacationing at Key West. We had no office in Puerto Rico at the time. We did not know the situation other than that it could be sticky because of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.

(At this point, Representative Boggs withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. Rowley. Our advance man called me and asked me if I would not talk to Mr. Hoover to see whether or not we could have the assistance of some of their agents who were down there in an office established there. And I communicated then with the Assistant Director, who said, "I will get back to you" and got the approval. That was an example of the beginning of the cooperation, when I was at the White House, with the FBI.

Now, in the years subsequent to World War II, anytime we were abroad, I made personal contact with Mr. Dulles, and I think for national security we should go off the record on this, because this is something that pertains today.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Back on the record.

Mr. Rankin. Now, Chief Rowley, are you familiar with the provisions in the appropriation act with regard to the FBI concerning their protection of the person of the President?

Mr. Rowley. Yes.

Mr. Rankin. You know of that, do you?

Mr. Rowley. Yes; I do. Historically, that was first passed in 1910. It stated that because of the limited number of Secret Service men at that time, that appropriation—a certain given figure—was to be used by the U.S. marshals to assist the Secret Service.

Mr. Rankin. Was the Secret Service opposed to that provision in the appropriation act for the FBI?

Mr. Rowley. No; it has never opposed that provision over the years. I started to say, Mr. Rankin—subsequently, after the founding of the FBI, this was transferred, apparently, from the marshals to the FBI, and it has been in the appropriations as long as I can remember. We have never objected to that appropriation.

Mr. Rankin. Now, there is some language in H.R. 4158, I understand, which deals with the permanent organization of the Government that you are objecting to; is that right?

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Declassification of Warren Commission Documents

1. In accordance with existing arrangements, we have been asked by the National Archives to review four Warren Commission documents for possible declassification. One of the documents is classified in its entirety, whereas only certain segments of the others remain in classified status. Copies of the affected materials are attached.

2. We see no reason to continue the restriction on document B. Similarly, document A would normally require no further withholding from the public domain, but we checked with Mr. David Murphy, an Agency official under (Department of State cover) and he requested that his true affiliation 32 not be revealed at this time. He 32 is still under cover and uncoordinated revelation of his true status could become an embarrassment to the (Department.)

3. Documents C and D would go beyond what we want to release now about our dealings with defectors and the determination of their legitimacy.

4. A suggested reply to National Archives is attached. We recommend your signature.

/s/
Raymond G. Rocca
Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Operations

Attachments

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 006593

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DC/CIOPS/Chrono
1 - Warren Commission File
1 - CIRA/RS/Chrono

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Marion Johnson
National Archives

SUBJECT : Mandatory Review of Four Warren Commission Documents

1. Pursuant to your request we have reviewed the attached four documents in order to determine whether the classifications ascribed to them need to be retained. Our conclusions are detailed below.

2. Top Secret Document, Subject: Conference with the CIA on March 12, 1964 (List No. 1, Item 19).

There are only two segments of this document which have continued to be classified at our request, specifically the name of one person in paragraph one and the entire second paragraph. We should now like to remove all restrictions concerning paragraph two, but we want to continue to withhold the person's name in paragraph one.

3. Top Secret Document, dated 24 June 1964, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko (List No. 1, Item 27)

We have no objection to the declassification of this document in its entirety.

4. Top Secret Document, Pages 63-73 from Transcript of the Executive Session of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, January 21, 1964 (List No. 2A, Item 1)

We wish to continue the classification of this segment of the transcript.

5. Top Secret Document Entitled Report of Proceedings Held at Washington, D.C., June 23, 1964 (List 2A, Item 18)

We wish to continue the classification of this document.

13-00000

A
T
T
A
C
H
M
E
N
T
S

SECRET

ALN-72-77
11 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Miami Field Office

FROM : Chief, Domestic Collection Division,
Operations Services Group, Alien Branch

SUBJECT : Case 57845

1. Please show the attached photographs of an unidentified man to Subject. A photograph of this man was published in the Warren Commission report on the assassination of President Kennedy. Copies have also been widely distributed in news media by journalists critical of the Warren Commission investigation. The unidentified man visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City during October 1963. As of October 1963, he was described as approximately 35, athletic build, about 6 feet tall, blond receding hairline with balding top, and wore khakis and sport shirt.

2. We would appreciate any information Subject is able to provide on this man.

3. Should you obtain any OIR reports, please use referent CPLA-006877.

03

JACKSON R. HORTON

Attachments:
As stated

FJNiemiec/ltg

03

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 006875

SECRET

2|FN

SC 2019

05

Source - (Ramiro Perez Rodriguez)

dpJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L 181600Z MAR 77 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13919

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

WNINTEL/WOMACE INTERNAL USE ONLY

MIAMI OIR-06870-77

SUBJECT: UNIDENTIFIED KGB OFFICER

REF : DCD CASE 57845
CFLA-006877

1. ON 17 MARCH 1977, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE CUBAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) WAS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER IDENTIFIED THE MAN AS YURI (LNU), A KGB OFFICER, WHOM HE MET IN MOSCOW IN 1964 WHILE ATTENDING AN INTELLIGENCE COURSE IN THAT CITY. HE SAID THAT YURI, A FLUENT ENGLISH AND SPANISH SPEAKER, WAS ACTING AS A TROUBLESHOOTER FOR THE CUBAN GROUP, ABOUT 15, ATTENDING THE COURSE.

2. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER SAID THAT THE CUBAN GROUP, ALONG WITH THE BULGARIANS, WERE QUARTERED IN THE SAME BUILDING IN MOSCOW AND THAT YURI LIVED WITH THEM. ANYTIME THAT THE CUBANS HAD A PROBLEM YURI WOULD SOLVE IT FOR THEM. HE ALSO SAID THAT YURI WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF JUAN (PSEUDO), A KGB OFFICER WHO TAUGHT THE CUBANS ABOUT THE AGENCY AND THE WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS. JUAN TOLD THE FORMER DGI MEMBER ONE DAY THAT HE HAD SERVED IN MEXICO FOR ABOUT 20 YEARS AND IN THE US CLANDESTINELY FOR ABOUT 10 YEARS. AT THE TIME JUAN WAS ABOUT 55 YEARS OLD. YURI DID NOT ATTEND CLASSES WITH THE CUBAN GROUP. HE WAS ONLY ENTRUSTED WITH THEIR WELFARE.
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668
C O N F I D E N T I A L

handcarried to Percy's
office 1 Feb 75

SECRET/SENSITIVE

31 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense
James R. Schlesinger

SUBJECT : Analysis of Soviet Policy towards the United States by an ex-Member of the KGB

1. Several weeks ago I talked to Bill Nelson, DDO,* regarding a more thoughtful use of our Soviet KGB Source's knowledge of fundamental Soviet Bloc policy. The information relates to the clandestine programs of the KGB sponsored by the Central Committee in its reorientation in May of 1959 against the United States as the "main enemy." My suggestion was to submit a number of your speeches and solicit Source's critique as seen through the eyes of an ex-KGB officer. Mr. Nelson stated that he had no objection as long as there was a description of the Source with a statement that his study did not necessarily represent the views of CIA. I should add that the FBI and other services are on record to the effect that they have never been able to disprove Source's factual information although they do not necessarily agree with his hypotheses (see Attachment A).

2. Attachment B sets forth the highlights and chronology of his professional career in the KGB. This alone does not convey the true significance of his defection to the Agency in December 1961. From 1953 until 1961 various circumstances and events led to his disaffection with the system and hardened his determination to defect should his family be reunited. His concern was for his

---

*Bill has taken sick leave for the next ten days and has not seen this letter.

054519

O

Impossible to Determine

SECRET/SENSITIVE

03034

young daughter who lived with her grandparents in Russia. In 1961 she was permitted to visit Source and his wife abroad, and this triggered his defection. Overall, the case is one where we unwittingly had an agent in place in the KGB who was breaking down Soviet compartmentation of the KGB, both in the First and in the Second Chief Directorate. His purpose was to obtain information of great value to the West should he have the opportunity to defect.

3. By way of special talents, he is essentially an analyst and historian. He was frequently called upon by senior members of the service to study and make recommendations where there were conflicts over cases affecting more than one department. In his drive to gain more knowledge outside of his particular sphere, he managed on one occasion to be appointed to the Inspector General's team which gave him access to the logs of KGB production indicating the overall espionage production obtained by the KGB. The investigation was initiated by the Politburo who complained of the delay in receiving the product derived from espionage, such as British Admiralty, Cables and Plans, NATO documents, etc. This gave Source freedom to inspect the processing of secret information and to trace its handling from the moment it arrived in Moscow, the translation of the product and its preparation for the Politburo. Unfortunately, the names of agents were not indicated, but it enabled Source, after his defection, to identify the actual documents which were identified by Western services on the basis of his description. This, in turn, led to investigative action and important counterintelligence successes in the West.

4. Source has cooperated with some nine intelligence and security services under our aegis. He has imparted first-hand knowledge of major covert political programs from the days of LENIN to 1961. This knowledge was acquired from reading deeply into the archives and records of the activities of Soviet intelligence services beginning with the Revolution. Equally important was his long tenure in the Higher Counterintelligence School where he was able to milk KGB officers from many departments of the Service abroad who were brought back for short periods of retraining.

5. Because the Administration, the State Department and the Agency, in part, appear to be firmly entrenched in their views regarding the policy of Detente, I believe that a preliminary unofficial reading of these materials by an expert in your Department might generate an interest in the Source and his views.

This could lead to a symposium in which he would be invited to participate and respond to adversary views. His reaction to such a proposal is unknown. He has always resisted control in the sense of being an agent of any given country. Further, he does make demands for classified information and position papers including the nature of the sources before addressing himself to any particular problem. Nevertheless, his paper on your speeches were obtained from him using only unclassified information.

6. His production has run into several thousands of pages of transcripts of interviews including meetings which he had with other foreign intelligence and security services. The range of his information is so vast and detailed that we are hard put to use it as an overlay for interpreting current Soviet events. We have learned from experience that if we give him a problem with an adequate data base, he will computerize and rearrange his basic information to support his analysis of any new subject. This approach has been fruitful because in supporting his thesis, he often reveals new information of value.

7. Attachment C is a sensitive report received from our Israeli liaison; Attachment D is an assessment regarding the activities, role, modus operandi and reason for Ambassador DOBRYNIN's success vis-a-vis the United States (which is incomplete wherever an asterisk is indicated); and Attachment E is a rough draft of his review of the following books - SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY and CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM - A SOVIET VIEW - submitted to us during your tenure in the Agency by Mr. Don Cotter. We intend to follow up on this at some future date. This, and other attachments, are partly drawn from a draft manuscript which he has in his possession. The manuscript runs to over two thousand pages. He guards it jealously and is reluctant to publish it at this time. He has permitted me to read several chapters, and they are of unique interest because of the classified information (based on documents) which he read in Moscow.

8. By way of digression, a bird's eye view is set forth below of Source's theme.

9. The major reorganization (which produced the KGB Department of Disinformation) and the gradual reorientation of the KGB and GRU was completed at the end of 1958 when SHELEPIN succeeded General SEROV as the chairman of the KGB. (General SEROV, who worked with KHRUSHCHEV in the Ukraine, was downgraded to head the GRU). This development climaxed two years of inspection by a

special committee headed by SHELEPIN who worked under the Central Committee to investigate activities and policies of the KGB and GRU. They concluded that the Intelligence Services had not carried out deStalinization which required that the services follow the Leninist concepts of intelligence and its role in political action. By way of explanation, the OGPU and Cheka were credited under LENIN with having saved the Revolution. This was accomplished by suppressing enemies at home, mounting successful penetration operations into Western governments, the manipulation of agents of influence and conducting massive disinformation programs by feeding deception to the West through their intelligence services. Under STALIN the services degenerated into instruments of personal terror to preserve his cult of personality and lost sight of the overall political, economic, and military objectives of the Soviets.

10. Before STALIN's death, there were anti-Stalinist elements who were uncovered and repressed, but their cause to find a Leninist solution to post-war problems continued after his death. For example, MALENKOV began serious investigations into the KGB and other police organizations by enlisting the talents of the Leninist/Marxist Institute. It was his objective to have the investigation culminate in open revelations regarding the crimes of STALIN and the activities of the police state. The course which was set would have ultimately led to the trials of KHRUSHCHEV and many members in the leadership who were prominent in advancing the Stalinist regime as syncophants and "bootlickers."

11. MALENKOV was unfortunately outmaneuverd by the collective which voted against him on issues, particularly regarding Germany. Even in victory, KHRUSHCHEV could not stem the tide let loose by MALENKOV; therefore, in order to survive, he had to "steal" the process of de-Stalinization and shape it to his own ends and the survival of himself and his friends. This led eventually to the "secret speech" regarding STALIN's crimes in which he twisted the facts to exonerate himself and his followers. This led to unrest in the Bloc and the Hungarian Revolution which forced KHRUSHCHEV and his cohorts to initiate plans and programs which represented a return to LENIN.

12. In May 1959, a secret, six-day series of meetings was held for Government bureaucrats possessing a COMINT security clearance. It was attended by approximately two thousand members from different parts of the Government. The purpose was to hand down and explain in Leninist terms the decisions of the Central Committee relating to the deStalinization of the intelligence services and to set forth policies which would result in their reorganization and reorientation.

13. The principal speaker was SHELEPIN who was supported by General GRIBANOV of the Second Chief Directorate as well as many other senior officials of the Government and Services. SHELEPIN gave a broad analysis of the world situation stressing that the USSR and the USA had reached an atomic stalemate. Accepting this to be a fact, he stated that all plans for war such as stay-behind net-workers should be abandoned. He outlined programs and reforms for the Intelligence Services which were accomplished under LENIN and which required the intelligence potential to be in harness with all other departments of the Government. He stressed that each intelligence operation should be designed to help achieve broad political objectives. Noting that the letter "P" (Politika) had been obliterated from OGPU by STALIN, SHELEPIN announced the creation of the Department of Disinformation within the KGB but subject to the control and direction of the Central Committee. The Department's task was to use all organs of Government to implement strategic disinformation in accordance with directives. This was meant to include all channels to the West; namely, diplomatic, press, military, cultural and economic. This was in addition to the use of double agents and provocateurs.

14. In discussing the various objectives, SHELEPIN expounded on the wisdom of pursuing peaceful coexistence in the developed countries and wars of national liberation in the underdeveloped countries, noting that these courses of action were not contradictory.

15. Shortly thereafter, the Central Committee charged the KGB with the recruitment of two thousand additional S&T staff officers in order to exploit on a broad basis the opening to the West. The purpose for this increase was to gain Western technology as well as to effect the recruitment of agents and agents of influence in the Western scientific world. It should be noted that one of the more efficient and productive elements of the KGB and GRU had always been their successful acquisition of scientific secrets and R&D from the West. SHELEPIN noted that the change of balance of military power could only be achieved through this additional strength of acquiring the technological and strategic secrets of the West. This would also strike at the USA and hasten its isolation.

16. According to the Source, he learned in 1961 that the KGB had acquired approximately one thousand new staff officers for S&T in accordance with the Central Committee directive and that about one thousand slots remained to be filled. In 1961 he and some six hundred KGB officers attended an important lecture given by a senior general of the Defense Ministry. The lecture was to outline the S&T tasks which the KGB would be expected to undertake.

He stressed that the objective of the Soviet and the Bloc was not only to achieve parity with the West but to overtake the United States and swing the balance of military power to the Soviets.

17. The general stated that the USSR was fourteen years behind the United States in electronic technology but that the gap would be remedied by coordinated action in the following fields:

a. A greatly increased espionage effort because of the addition of one thousand staff officers to the S&T of the KGB and the Academy of Sciences;

b. Disinformation, i.e., programs to mislead the United States and the West regarding Soviet technology which would lead the Western scientific community into expensive and time-wasting blind alleys of R&D;

c. To acquire new technology through trade agreements; and

d. To make treaties and other diplomatic arrangements by which the Soviets and Bloc would acquire information and which would permit Soviet scientists to gain access to the United States scientific community for the purpose of spotting potentials for the KGB and GRU. Most important, he said, was that treaties could be used to block the natural technological growth of the Western powers, in particular, the United States.

18. As noted above, the lecture on shortcomings of Soviet technology in electronics was delivered in 1961. Attachment F is a National Intelligence Bulletin (TOP SECRET UMBRA) dated 16 July 1974, which has a direct bearing on Source's information regarding the aforementioned lecture. The National Intelligence Bulletin begins with the following:

> "Leading officials of the Soviet electronics industry have told visiting US experts that the Soviet Union is four or five years behind the United States in integrated circuit technology. The US experts, who tested Soviet equipment in this field, have confirmed the Soviet judgment.

> Integrated circuits are needed to meet the size, weight, power, and reliability of modern military equipment as well as the needs of many civil electronic systems."

Admittedly, the question of electronics covers only one phase of the question of military power, and we have not been able to pursue this question of technology further, given our ever-shrinking assets.

19. Since my days are numbered here, I do feel an obligation to dispatch these papers for analysis and comment by your expert before my time runs out.

20. As previously noted, this package represents a unique dissemination, unofficial in character. It is requested that this exercise be tightly held and that we consider modalities for the future exploitation and/or discussions of the product and the Source. We and our allies regard Source to be the most valuable Soviet defector since World War II.

21. At your convenience I would appreciate a short acknowledgement of the above and a reaction from your reader. In the event that these papers do not stimulate any worthwhile interest, I would appreciate their return for the use of my successor.

Kindest personal regards from,

Jim Angleton

James Angleton

Attachments: as stated

[redacted]

U.S.S.R.

Report No.: 1-6444

Subject: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Source: Born 1938 in RIGA, has an academic education and is a sociologist by profession. He acquired his academic training in Moscow and Baku. In 1962 he worked for about six months with the M.V.D. in Baku and after that, until 1963, he worked as a lecturer in philosophy in Baku. In 1966-1967 he did his doctoral work at the University of Moscow. From 1967 until December 1973 when he left the U.S.S.R., he worked in Yaroslavl and in Baku. He was a member of the Sociology Association of the U.S.S.R. From 1964 he was an active member of the Communist Party in Azerbaydzhan and was a member of its Central Committee. He was closely associated with the First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhani Party. He cooperated willingly and made the impression of being a highly intelligent and educated man with analytical ability, good perception and excellent memory.

Validity of Information: November 1973

Reliability: B/2-3

[redacted]

U.S.S.R.

Subject: THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA

1. On this subject, Source can report on the opinions of people like KHALIPOV, ALIYEV, SUKHODEYEV, GVISHYANI (KOSYGIN's son-in-law), OSIPOV and Polkovnik-General BYCHENKO (FNU) (Commander of the P.V.O. in the BAKU Area). The following is a gist of the main ideas:

a. The danger of war with China is not taken seriously in official circles of the U.S.S.R. and particularly in military circles. General KHALIPOV said more than once that common interests outweigh the differences between the two Communist countries. The majority in those circles are of the opinion that the spreading of warnings about war with China is a deliberate piece of dis-information by the Soviet authorities in order to justify the keeping of a large mobilized force. It was often said that neither China nor the Soviet Union fear an attack by the other side. China needs anti-Soviet propaganda for her own internal purposes and the U.S.S.R., in order to keep millions of mobilized soldiers.

b. In those circles it is thought that war with China is impossible for the following reasons:

(1) Even given the use of nuclear weapons, it would take a tremendous effort to destroy just the military potential of China. KHALIPOV mentioned a figure: 200 atomic bombs.

../...

[redacted]

(2) War with China would in fact be a war of mutual attrition and even in the case of a formal Soviet victory and a change-over in Chinese leadership - the U.S.S.R. will be unable to feed the hungry masses of China. According to GVISHYANI, there are a hundred million hungry people in China, and in the U.S.S.R. there is not enough food for the population. A Soviet victory would thus double the needs of the Soviet Union in this respect and would put too great a strain on her economy.

2. From some conversations mainly with KHALIPOV, Source concluded that the Soviet Union is preparing for war with Western Europe rather than with China; here are his reasons:

a. The substitution of old weapons for new ones takes place first and foremost in the western parts of the Soviet Union, and not on the border with China, except in the VLADIVOSTOK area, and this not because it is near to China, but, mainly, because it is near to the U.S.A.

b. According to KHALIPOV, two or three days will be enough for the Soviet Army to conquer Western Europe and he elaborated:
England has about 920 tanks and 1500 planes;
France - about 900 tanks and about 1500 planes;
Germany - about 500 tanks and about 1000 planes;
All this put together is but about a sixth of what the U.S.S.R. can put in the field against the West within 2 or 3 days; and until the West decides on counter-measures it will be too late.

3. According to Source, who bases his opinion on his conversations with the s/n people, not only is the Soviet Union in no fear of a war with China, but she even thinks China will join her in a war against the West

[redacted]

U.S.S.R.

Subject: ANDROPOV, GRECHKO AND GROMYKO AS MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO

1. Many Soviet personalities, close to Government circles, are of the opinion that ANDROPOV's, GRECHKO's and GROMYKO's inclusion in the Politburo should be examined against the backgroun of two tendencies current within Soviet ruling circles with regard to U.S.S.R. policy towards China and the U.S.A.

a. A policy of detente with China is supported, according to these personalities, by SUSLOV and SHELEPIN. These two think that the Soviet Union should strive for closer relations with China by adopting a tough policy towards the capitalist countries; a policy of detente with the West weakens the Soviet position in the International Communist Movement and at the same time strengthens the ideological attitudes of China.

b. A policy of detente with the West
BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, GROMYKO, GRECHKO, ANDROPOV and particularly KIRILENKO - on the other hand - support a policy of detente with the West in general and with the U.S.A. in particular. This group stresses the need for the modernization of Soviet production processes. After this vital objective is achieved, the U.S.S.R. should adopt an even tougher policy towards the West than in the past.

2. Thus the membership of the three in the Politburo is designed to strengthen BREZHNEV's position. It should be remembered that these three owe a personal debt to BREZHNEV: it was BREZHNEV who made them what they are now. It should also be kept in mind that the membership in the

../...

[redacted]

Politburo of the Minister of War, the Head of the K.G.B. and of the Foreign Minister, has a special significance; it is an indication that BREZHNEV is about to make most important decisions and needs the support of the Armed forces, the K.G.B. and of the Foreign Office.

The general opinion in circles of the intelligentzia, and particularly in scientific circles, is that a war against the West is being planned. According to this opinion, BREZHNEV's admission of these three Ministers to the Politburo is a very unusual act in the history of the Soviet Union. A similar step was taken only once before, when STALIN admitted VOROSHILOV, MOLOTOV and BERIA to the Politburo - about two months before the outbreak of war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany.

Potocki
Kazak

DEVELOPMENTAL AND RECRUITMENT APPROACHES TO AMERICANS
--
THE SOVIET SECURITY THREAT IN THE DETENTE PERIOD

1. The aura of detente in the Soviet and Bloc relations during the last year and a half, we believe, has created a favorable climate for recruitment and penetration in the West. This paper deals with the problems as we see them. There are related counterintelligence issues which involve internal security: the leakage and exchange of economic, scientific and political information; the sale of technological information; and the impact of disinformation and agents of influence on American policy. As has been noted in our previous forums, since 1961 when KAGO brought us documentary evidence* that Soviet intelligence had launched a full-scale penetration effort against the "Main Enemy," we have seen a steady and continuing Soviet effort to effect penetrations of the U.S. Government. Detente has done nothing to blunt this effort. Soviet intelligence has worked steadily on the American target and has been quick to seize upon the openings to the West which KRUSHCHEV was the first to label "Detente." BREZHNEV has made the word the cliche of the moment. It has been clear to Soviet intelligence, as it has been apparent to Western counterintelligence, that Soviet policy designed to exploit Western technology and, hopefully, change the balance of military power has created new opportunities for Soviet espionage.

2. These new opportunities may be characterized as a plethora of choices: a harvest almost unprecedented since the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) period and the 1958 Central Committee decision to assign to the KGB a new vital role in the policy to exploit the West by returning to the principles of LENIN. Soviet intelligence now finds more Americans, both official and unofficial:

a. Anxious to exchange all types of information;

b. Willing to discuss virtually any subject;

c. Inclined to believe there is truly a latent and potentially viable dissident movement in the USSR which can be influenced if only the American people-to-people concept could prevail;

---

*Referred to and quoted in Attachment A.

02926

d. Convinced that there is a bonanza for the American businessman in the USSR and that "business" can alter the Soviet lifestyle and reduce governmental, i.e., CP control;

e. Believing that the Cold War was a myth created by America;

f. Anxious to atone for the "sins" of Vietnam and interventionist policies;

g. Anxious about China and nuclear weapons;

h. Believing there is more merit to direct USSR-USA negotiation if America attempts to negotiate in tandem with its Western allies or other nations;

i. Ready to believe there are many, if not legions, of Soviet citizens, particularly the young "intellectuals," who are willing to cooperate with the West to advance freedom for the Russians;

j. Ignorant about Soviet ideological consistency and purpose.

3. Addressing ourselves only to manifestations of the Soviet security threat outside the U.S., we are concerned that the climate for penetration, particularly for the recruitment of Americans, has become too permissive. The attitudes outlined have not only made America more vulnerable but have made the counterintelligence job more difficult. Not only has Soviet-American contact increased in geometric proportions, but there is also increasing evidence that the always relatively loose security check rein on official Americans has lengthened even more. As discussed elsewhere, it is apparent the Soviet-inspired attacks on Western intelligence, when coupled with domestic attacks of whatever origin against American intelligence and security organs, have had a direct bearing on opportunities for Soviet intelligence to attempt to develop and recruit Americans.

4. In an attempt to cope with the problem of Soviet and Bloc recruitments and penetrations, we have - since August 1965 - collected statistics and case data on a government-wide basis of recruitment attempts made against American personnel abroad and foreign employees of the United States Government. Our objective has been to collect, record, collate and analyze such information in order to:

a. Identify officers and agents of Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and Chinese Communist services;

b. Identify U.S. Government employees who are being targetted by these adversary services;

c. Determine the scope of activity of these adversary services by area, date and modus operandi;

d. Determine the scope of targetting against any specific U.S. Government agency;

e. Help us understand the extent of foreign intelligence efforts against the U.S. Government and to obtain other perspectives about possible disinformation and deception operations;

f. Facilitate management of double agent cases;

g. Furnish counterintelligence and operational guidance to our field stations in their efforts to mount aggressive operations against the adversary;

h. Provide the Agency and other U.S. Government agencies, as appropriate, information about the scope and type of penetration efforts being made against U.S. Government installations abroad.

5. Our evaluated cases* of penetration and recruitment attempts over the last nine years by the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and Chinese Communist services are as follows:

1965	-	117
1966	-	131
1967	-	72
1968	-	97
1969	-	86
1970	-	60
1971	-	56
1972	-	78
1973	-	45
Total		742

= 2 solid penetrations and recruitment attempts per week.

---

*The unit in these and the other statistics in this review is the single case of penetration or the recruitment incident as established by evaluation of confirmed reports, unconfirmed or circumstantial information, and other specific reporting and information.

6. Over the whole period the penetration and recruitment efforts have been fairly stably distributed by service as follows:

Soviet	-	58% of the cases
Bloc	-	37% "
Cuban	-	4% "
Chicom	-	1% "

7. Over the range of cases, recruitment and penetration efforts have been directed at U.S. officer personnel in 30% of the cases, other staff in 5%, communications personnel in 5%, enlisted ranks in 9%, local employees in 30%;** others in 22% of the cases.

8. Looking more particularly at our information on Soviet and associated recruitment and penetration efforts for the Detente period--the past four years--there is the following distribution of adversary service case effort:

	Soviet	Bloc	Cuban	CPP	Yearly Totals
1970	41	29	-	-	60
1971	32	21	3	-	56
1972	47	28	3	-	78
1973	31	12	1	1	45

9. It is clear that Soviet penetration and recruitment operations, up to and including the last year, against U.S. Government installations and representatives abroad have not been materially affected or inhibited by "Detente." Some representative cases since 1968 are cited in Attachment B. The cases have been sanitized to protect the innocent. They are included solely to suggest the range, precision and persistence of the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and Chinese Communist penetrations effort.

10. This is not the end of the problem. Our data consists essentially of information on approaches and pitches voluntarily reported by American personnel. The 1973 case figures (and those for 1974, thus far) hold up very well as valid indicators of the persistence of Soviet and Bloc penetration efforts in spite of, or because of, Detente permissiveness. However we acknowledge that we have no way yet of judging exactly the impact of Detente on the reporting mood of the official Americans who are being targetted.

---

*This covers only local employees outside of Iron Curtain installations. Local employees in U.S. installations behind the Iron Curtain are regarded as actually or potentially under the control of their respective security services and are therefore not considered in this calculation.

11. Soviet Bloc _modus operandi_--the operational techniques used against Americans--include all the known gambits and have changed little over the past decade. There have been slight tactical shifts both abroad and in the Soviet Bloc to take advantage of the "spirit of Detente," for example, but the basic M/O remains what it was in the 1920's and 1930's.

12. In addition to diplomatic and official access to U.S. officials, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers frequent the places--bars, restaurants, clubs and other international, national and local organizations--that provide them with opportunities to meet American personnel or U.S. Government employees. In their recruitment efforts, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers have utilized the theme of peace, friendship, and mutual cooperation and they have offered the bait of exchanging information to develop "common" interests and cooperation to obtain information. They have utilized the ploy of professional advancement or business interests for one or both parties when attempting to gain cooperation or buy information to try to remove the stigma of espionage in their development negotiations as well as in some recruitment attempts. They continue in their efforts to obtain access to both American and indigenous female employees throughout the world by using officers or local indigenous male and female agents to cultivate these target personalities. Recently they have used the language lesson gambit--even with CIA personnel. Local personnel, ranging from servants to higher officials, have been recruited and targetted either to obtain employment with Americans or to develop personal as well as official access to American officials. They have attempted to recruit foreign local employees to report about the interests and activities of their American employers. They employ sex and financial remuneration as bait, use personal compromise as a threat, seek out personal weaknesses to utilize as operational opportunities, make direct recruitment approaches based on compassionate or nationalistic grounds, utilize audio and other technical mechanisms, etc.

13. This summary examination of the recent case evidence of the essentially unchanged Soviet and Bloc recruitment effort against official Americans abroad is not the whole Detente story. There is also a great interest by the Soviets in recruiting U.S. students abroad. The primary objective of that recruitment effort is to guide the student eventually to obtain employment with the U.S. Government. Such efforts are only indicative of the fact that the Soviets view their penetration of the U.S. Government, via students, as a continuing and long-range program.

14. A recent additional dimension to the problem of Soviet and Bloc recruitment of Americans has been the access the Soviets have developed to American businessmen--many of whom are privy to

U.S. Government secrets through defense-related contracts--who travel to the USSR and entertain Soviet trade delegations in the U.S. The concern we have previously expressed about the role of Lt. General Yevgeniy N. PITOVRANOV and the Soviet intelligence officers in the foreign trade business was well founded and, in fact, we believe was somewhat understated. It is now evident that PITOVRANOV controls most if not all of the activities going on where American business encounters Soviet trade officials, in the International Trade Center to be built in Moscow, in exhibits in the USSR and abroad, in the patents and licensing agreements, in the supervision of the travel of trade delegations to the U.S. and the like.

15. Reports which reveal that the KGB is active among American businessmen are beginning to surface. Not too surprisingly, these reports indicate that their techniques are both subtle and blatant. One of the most blatant approaches to American business involves Igor ARTEMYEV, who is attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. ARTEMYEV claims to be a student in the U.S. to study relationships between U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries and licensing agreements between U.S. and foreign companies. In the course of his research, ARTEMYEV sends detailed questionnaires to U.S. companies. The questionnaires are the kind required by our Securities and Exchange Commission. While some companies do not respond, there are those that do. ARTEMYEV also visits various companies to talk with officials. On one occasion he replied to a question about the level of classification of the meeting by saying it was "confidential." With that kind of access, who needs to recruit in the classic sense.

16. PITOVRANOV's people are very evident in various trade delegations under their Chamber of Commerce cover, and they are applying what appear to be classic assessment techniques. It has been our experience to date that they are thinking long-range and are themselves not interested in the cheap shot or quick pitch, although these devices are being employed against some American businessmen who visit Moscow. There are also strong indications that the Soviets are using recruited agents among the rapidly expanding demi-monde of fixers, many Russian-speaking, who gain employment as the in-house experts who "know how to deal with the Russians" and who find employment with American firms as guides and advisors accompanying U.S. delegations to Moscow.

Attachments

The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's) professional career:

September 1944:	**Subject was mobilized and sent to the Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where he remained until July 1945. At that time Subject left the Artillery School before completion of the course and enrolled in a Counterintelligence School.**
1945-1946:	**Student at the one year course, Military Counterintelligence School, GUKR/"SMERSH," Moscow.**
1946-1948:	**Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section (otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony - security of Soviet officials abroad) Department (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. Headquarters in Moscow. During the period November 1947 to September 1948 Subject held the title of Referent and his office was designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI (Committee for Information), but his functions were unchanged.**
1948-1950:	**Student at the two-year course, Higher Intelligence School of the KI. Subject studied general subjects and the English language; he was one of 30 students who specialized in counterintelligence during the second year of the course.**

1950-1951: Desk officer, Operational Case Officer, supervising SK activities in China, assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Department, First Directorate of the MGB Headquarters in Moscow, the SK functions having reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.

September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section, Counterintelligence Department of the First Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.

November 1951: Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational Case Officer."

December 1951: The KI was dissolved and former state security elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's functions continued the same, but, in the reorganization, he was assigned to the CI Section of the American Department of the Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the First Chief Directorate of the MGB.

March 1952: Subject and an unidentified young colleague wrote a joint letter through the Central Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of Soviet foreign intelligence and counterintelligence work.

September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour meeting, with his friend, with STALIN, MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two officers for their suggestions, discussed intelligence matters in detail and asked them to send him a letter with specific proposals

for necessary reorganizations, together with the names of recommended chiefs. In a subsequent letter they recommended Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR. STALIN met Subject and his friend a second time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and appointed Chief of the First Chief Directorate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy. A Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence Department with an Emigre desk and seven geographical desks. Subject was appointed by OGOLTSOV as chief of the American Desk, supervising approximately 15 staff persons.

March 1953: When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control of the State Security apparatus, which he combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees. Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of the Second (new designation for foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject supervised activities against emigres in Austria and Germany.

October 1953: Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in Vienna, Austria, as an operational case officer in the Emigre Operations Group.

August 1954: Subject was transferred to the British Sub-Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned with penetration of foreign intelligence services.

1955-1959: One of 170 students attending the four year internal security-counterintelligence course, the KGB Higher School Juridical Institute. He presented and successfully defended his thesis on the subject of SK activities among Soviet delegations and tourist groups traveling abroad. He received his diploma in August 1959. During his school tour Subject also spent several weeks in on-the-job training as a student assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate, with access to operational files on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow who were KGB targets.

September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational Case Officer responsible for NATO information within the Treaty Organizations Direction, Information (Reports) Department, First (Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters, Moscow. His function was to translate, edit and summarize information reports obtained by KGB agents abroad and to disseminate the pertinent information to the Central Committee of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the Minister of Defense. At one time, during a CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about the delays in translation and processing and Subject was assigned to study the situation. Thus he examined registry logs showing the titles of agent information reports, the place acquired, the date received and the date of dissemination of the finished Russian intelligence reports to the government.

April 1960: Subject was transferred to the American Section

of the CI Department of the First Chief Directorate, KGB, to prepare for assignment to the KGB residency under Soviet Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as the CI officer working against foreign intelligence services.

August 1960: Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true name was compromised through the 1954 defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and with the cover title of Third Secretary.

15 December 1961: Subject, with his wife and young daughter defected to the U.S. Government which granted them political asylum.

28 December 1961: Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.

1962: Subject was debriefed by CIA Officers, officials from other US Agencies and teams of Intelligence Officers from Free World nations. Subject provided much valuable information on the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations, aims and efforts against the Free World. Subject, however, proved to be a difficult handling problem, especially as a result of his personality and his constant demands for regular meetings with high-level US officials such as the President, the Attorney-General, the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a policy role in the US Intelligence Community.

16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with the Attorney-General.

2 July 1962: Subject met again with the Attorney-General and Mr. HELMS.

9 July 1962: Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.

22 August 1962: Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW, Director of USIA.

15 Nov. 1962: An FBI source reported that the KGB was aware of Subject's presence in the U.S.A. and ordered all Soviet IS personnel to report immediately any information which they may obtain regarding Subject.

27 Nov. 1962: Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested

treatment by the Agency.

14 December 1962: Subject met again with the DCI.

21 Feb. 1963 : Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on SS Sylvania for England.

Spring 1963: Subject worked with the British.

8 August 1963: Subject returned to the U.S.A.

22 August 1963: Subject met the Attorney-General again.

23 August 1963: Subject met the DCI again.

4 Sept. 1963: Subject met the DCI again and stated that he wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and the Intelligence Community.

October 1963-
April 1964: Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative to some extent.

1964/1965: Subject, according to a Dutch official, visited The Netherlands.

June 1965: Subject interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP) in the N.Y.C. area.

August 1968: Subject in contact with the British regarding possible publication of his book.

October 1968: An FBI source indicated that he had no current information concerning the KGB attitude regarding Subject but the source stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location it might undertake to eliminate him.

July 1970 . Subject was in contact with Agency personnel and visited Florida.

March 1972: A KGB defector, LYALIN, reported that he knew

that Subject had been sentenced to death by the KGB. An article regarding this sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after 1964.

April 1972: Subject was in touch with CIA officials.

September 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors, Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of Punitive Units and Other Criminals under Search Warrants. In this List the KGB listed Subject and his wife as under the sentence of death for revealing Soviet State secrets.

The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's) professional career:

September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where he remained until July 1945. At that time Subject left the Artillery School before completion of the course and enrolled in a Counterintelligence School.

1945-1946: Student at the one year course, Military Counterintelligence School, GUKR/"SMERSH," Moscow.

1946-1948: Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section (otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony - security of Soviet officials abroad) Department (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. Headquarters in Moscow. During the period November 1947 to September 1948 Subject held the title of Referent and his office was designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI (Committee for Information), but his functions were unchanged.

1948-1950: Student at the two-year course, Higher Intelligence School of the KI. Subject studied general subjects and the English language; he was one of 30 students who specialized in counterintelligence during the second year of the course.

1950-1951: Desk officer, Operational Case Officer, supervising SK activities in China, assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Department, First Directorate of the MGB Headquarters in Moscow, the SK functions having reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.

September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section, Counterintelligence Department of the First Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.

November 1951: Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational Case Officer."

December 1951: The KI, was dissolved and former state security elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's functions continued the same, but, in the reorganization, he was assigned to the CI Section of the American Department of the Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the First Chief Directorate of the MGB.

March 1952: Subject and an unidentified young colleague wrote a joint letter through the Central Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of Soviet foreign intelligence and counterintelligence work.

September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour meeting, with his friend, with STALIN, MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two officers for their suggestions, discussed intelligence matters in detail and asked them to send him a letter with specific proposals

for necessary reorganizations, together with the names of recommended chiefs. In a subsequent letter they recommended Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR. STALIN met Subject and his friend a second time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and appointed Chief of the First Chief Directorate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy. A Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence Department with an Emigre desk and seven geographical desks. Subject was appointed by OGOLTSOV as chief of the American Desk, supervising approximately 15 staff persons.

March 1953: When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control of the State Security apparatus, which he combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees. Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of the Second (new designation for foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject supervised activities against emigres in Austria and Germany.

October 1953: Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in Vienna, Austria, as an operational case officer in the Emigre Operations Group.

August 1954: Subject was transferred to the British Sub-Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned with penetration of foreign intelligence services.

1955-1959: One of 170 students attending the four year internal security-counterintelligence course, the KGB Higher School Juridical Institute. He presented and successfully defended his thesis on the subject of SK activities among Soviet delegations and tourist groups traveling abroad. He received his diploma in August 1959. During his school tour Subject also spent several weeks in on-the-job training as a student assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate, with access to operational files on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow who were KGB targets.

September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational Case Officer responsible for NATO information within the Treaty Organizations Direction, Information (Reports) Department, First (Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters, Moscow. His function was to translate, edit and summarize information reports obtained by KGB agents abroad and to disseminate the pertinent information to the Central Committee of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the Minister of Defense. At one time, during a CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about the delays in translation and processing and Subject was assigned to study the situation. Thus he examined registry logs showing the titles of agent information reports, the place acquired, the date received and the date of dissemination of the finished Russian intelligence reports to the government.

April 1960: Subject was transferred to the American Section

Directorate, KGB, to prepare for assignment to the KGB residency under Soviet Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as the CI officer working against foreign intelligence services.

August 1960: Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true name was compromised through the 1954 defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and with the cover title of Third Secretary.

15 December 1961: Subject, with his wife and young daughter defected to the U.S. Government which granted them political asylum.

28 December 1961: Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.

1962: Subject was debriefed by CIA Officers, officials from other US Agencies and teams of Intelligence Officers from Free World nations. Subject provided much valuable information on the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations, aims and efforts against the Free World. Subject, however, proved to be a difficult handling problem, especially as a result of his personality and his constant demands for regular meetings with high-level US officials such as the President, the Attorney-General, the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a policy role in the US Intelligence Community.

16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with the Attorney-General.

2 July 1962: Subject met again with the Attorney-General and Mr. HELMS.

9 July 1962: Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.

22 August 1962: Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW, Director of USIA.

15 Nov. 1962:	An FBI source reported that the KGB was aware of Subject's presence in the U.S.A. and ordered all Soviet IS personnel to report immediately any information which they may obtain regarding Subject.
27 Nov. 1962:	Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested treatment by the Agency.
14 December 1962:	Subject met again with the DCI.
21 Feb. 1963 :	Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on SS Sylvania for England.
Spring 1963:	Subject worked with the British.
8 August 1963:	Subject returned to the U.S.A.
22 August 1963:	Subject met the Attorney-General again.
23 August 1963:	Subject met the DCI again.
4 Sept. 1963:	Subject met the DCI again and stated that he wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and the Intelligence Community.
October 1963-April 1964:	Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative to some extent.
1964/1965:	Subject, according to a Dutch official, visited The Netherlands.
June 1965:	Subject interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP) in the N.Y.C. area.
August 1968:	Subject in contact with the British regarding possible publication of his book.
October 1968:	An FBI source indicated that he had no current information concerning the KGB attitude regarding Subject but the source stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location it might undertake to eliminate him.
July 1970	Subject was in contact with Agency personnel and visited Florida.

that Subject had been sentenced to death by the KGB. An article regarding this sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after 1964.

April 1972: Subject was in touch with CIA officials.

September 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors, Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of Punitive Units and Other Criminals under Search Warrants. In this List the KGB listed Subject and his wife as under the sentence of death for revealing Soviet State secrets.

The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's) professional career:

September 1944:	Subject was mobilized and sent to the Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where he remained until July 1945. At that time Subject left the Artillery School before completion of the course and enrolled in a Counterintelligence School.
1945-1946:	Student at the one year course, Military Counterintelligence School, GUKR/"SMERSH," Moscow.
1946-1948:	Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section (otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony - security of Soviet officials abroad) Department (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. Headquarters in Moscow. During the period November 1947 to September 1948 Subject held the title of Referent and his office was designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI (Committee for Information), but his functions were unchanged.
1948-1950:	Student at the two-year course, Higher Intelligence School of the KI. Subject studied general subjects and the English language; he was one of 30 students who specialized in counterintelligence during the second year of the course.

1950-1951: Desk officer, Operational Case Officer, supervising SK activities in China, assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Department, First Directorate of the MGB Headquarters in Moscow, the SK functions having reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.

September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section, Counterintelligence Department of the First Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.

November 1951: Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational Case Officer."

December 1951: The KI, was dissolved and former state security elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's functions continued the same, but, in the reorganization, he was assigned to the CI Section of the American Department of the Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the First Chief Directorate of the MGB.

March 1952: Subject and an unidentified young colleague wrote a joint letter through the Central Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of Soviet foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence work.

September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour meeting, with his friend, with STALIN, MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two officers for their suggestions, discussed intelligence matters in detail and asked them to send him a letter with specific proposals

for necessary reorganizations, together with the names of recommended chiefs. In a subsequent letter they recommended Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR. STALIN met Subject and his friend a second time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and appointed Chief of the First Chief Directorate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy. A Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence Department with an Emigre desk and seven geographical desks. Subject was appointed by OGOLTSOV as chief of the American Desk, supervising approximately 15 staff persons.

March 1953: When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control of the State Security apparatus, which he combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees. Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of the Second (new designation for foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject supervised activities against emigres in Austria and Germany.

October 1953: Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in Vienna, Austria, as an operational case officer in the Emigre Operations Group.

August 1954: Subject was transferred to the British Sub-Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned with penetration of foreign intelligence services.

1955-1959: One of 170 students attending the four year internal security-counterintelligence course, the KGB Higher School Juridical Institute. He presented and successfully defended his thesis on the subject of SK activities among Soviet delegations and tourist groups traveling abroad. He received his diploma in August 1959. During his school tour Subject also spent several weeks in on-the-job training as a student assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate, with access to operational files on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow who were KGB targets.

September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational Case Officer responsible for NATO information within the Treaty Organizations Direction, Information (Reports) Department, First (Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters, Moscow. His function was to translate, edit and summarize information reports obtained by KGB agents abroad and to disseminate the pertinent information to the Central Committee of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the Minister of Defense. At one time, during a CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about the delays in translation and processing and Subject was assigned to study the situation. Thus he examined registry logs showing the titles of agent information reports, the place acquired, the date received and the date of dissemination of the finished Russian intelligence reports to the government.

April 1960: Subject was transferred to the American Section

	of the CI Department of the First Chief Directorate, KGB, to prepare for assignment to the KGB residency under Soviet Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as the CI officer working against foreign intelligence services.
August 1960:	Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true name was compromised through the 1954 defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and with the cover title of Third Secretary.
15 December 1961:	Subject, with his wife and young daughter defected to the U.S. Government which granted them political asylum.
28 December 1961:	Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.
1962:	Subject was debriefed by CIA Officers, officials from other US Agencies and teams of Intelligence Officers from Free World nations. Subject provided much valuable information on the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations, aims and efforts against the Free World. Subject, however, proved to be a difficult handling problem, especially as a result of his personality and his constant demands for regular meetings with high-level US officials such as the President, the Attorney-General, the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a policy role in the US Intelligence Community.
16 February 1962:	Subject had another meeting with the Attorney-General.
2 July 1962:	Subject met again with the Attorney-General and Mr. HELMS.
9 July 1962:	Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.
22 August 1962:	Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW, Director of USIA.

15 Nov. 1962:	An FBI source reported that the KGB was aware of Subject's presence in the U.S.A. and ordered all Soviet IS personnel to report immediately any information which they may obtain regarding Subject.
27 Nov. 1962:	Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested treatment by the Agency.
14 December 1962:	Subject met again with the DCI.
21 Feb. 1963 :	Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on SS Sylvania for England.
Spring 1963:	Subject worked with the British.
8 August 1963:	Subject returned to the U.S.A.
22 August 1963:	Subject met the Attorney-General again.
23 August 1963:	Subject met the DCI again.
4 Sept. 1963:	Subject met the DCI again and stated that he wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and the Intelligence Community.
October 1963- April 1964:	Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative to some extent.
1964/1965:	Subject, according to a Dutch official, visited The Netherlands.
June 1965:	Subject interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP) in the N.Y.C. area.
August 1968:	Subject in contact with the British regarding possible publication of his book.
October 1968:	An FBI source indicated that he had no current information concerning the KGB attitude regarding Subject but the source stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location it might undertake to eliminate him.
July 1970	Subject was in contact with Agency personnel and visited Florida.

March 1972: A KGB defector, LYALIN, reported that he knew that Subject had been sentenced to death by the KGB. An article regarding this sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after 1964.

April 1972: Subject was in touch with CIA officials.

September 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors, Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of Punitive Units and Other Criminals under Search Warrants. In this List the KGB listed Subject and his wife as under the sentence of death for revealing Soviet State secrets.

~~SECRET~~

21 MAY 1982

US/82/71

Dear [Anthony],

Regarding your letter [6/705] of 10 May 1982, our records indicate that Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov traveled to Mexico, France, Spain, the U.S. and Cuba during the period 1959-61. In 1961, he was assigned permanently to Mexico City as a consular officer and served there until August 1965. He was variously described as a translator, vice-consul, and attache. During this tour he attempted to cultivate a U.S. Government employee assigned to our embassy in Mexico City.

201-289248

In September/October 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald approached the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt to get a visa allowing him to return to the USSR. Kostikov, as a consular officer, handled this visa request. We have no information which indicates any relationship between these individuals other than for the purpose of Oswald's making his visa request.

Kostikov returned to Mexico City for a second tour of duty in July 1968. During this tour he was again assigned to the consular section and was a second secretary. It appeared that he was tasked with following the activities of the Central American communist parties and left-wing groups, and he met often with members of these groups, reportedly providing them with funds and technical guidance. In July/August 1969, Kostikov made an unusual TDY trip to Moscow lasting three weeks. (His family remained in Mexico.) In July 1970 he made a four-day trip to Havana.

Kostikov's tour in Mexico ended unexpectedly in September 1971. Our information indicated that he was not due to leave for another three to four months, and at the time of his departure, there was some speculation that the suddenness of his departure was due to the fact that he was known to [Lyalin].

100-2-85

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-289248
DO NOT DESTROY

Form 547a Processed

RECORD COPY

D050-005-003
~~D201-289248~~

XAF-09222
21MAY82

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

While in Mexico he was considered by some to be the most effective and dangerous of intelligence officers in Mexico. He has been described as being without morals, education, and manners. Shortly after his arrival in Mexico in 1968, he was arrested in front of a house of prostitution after becoming involved in a fist fight with some locals. It appears this incident did not affect his position in Mexico City, despite the fact that it received a good deal of press coverage.

We are aware only that Kostikov arrived in Beirut in June 1978. We are unable to confirm his presence there now.

Although our file indicates that Kostikov may have been a member of Department 13 (Executive Action) (Department V's predecessor), we have been unable to confirm this. Also, to the best of our knowledge the KGB has not engaged in such executive action since 1959.

Sincerely,

/s/ David

David H. Blee

Mr. Anthony C. M. DeVere

PHOTO ATTACHED



DDO/CI/RA/Joan Paxson (21 May 1982)

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - Adse
1 - CI/RA Chrono
1 - 100-2-95 ✓
1 - Reading Board
1 - Paxson

~~SECRET~~

100-2-95

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: E/BC 4C 20 Hqs WHF	EXTENSION 1413 7220	NO. DATE 3 APR 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI/R+A			
2. Hausman	4 APR 1978		R
3. Russ Holmes			
4. 3D 57			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

This is the ACTION/INFO copy of a communication received on ______ from MI-5 in Washington.

Another copy is being held in E/BC.

Any reply should be directed to E/BC for forwarding to Liaison.

Processing by IP is to be determined by__________.

Coordination with E/BC is required prior to any dissemination of this information outside the DDO.

NB: Richard A. SPRAGUE, Chief Counsel and Director of HSCA, saw a copy of attached document. See his attached letter to Sergyj CZORNONOH, 04 December 1976.

RBH

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OP-187

13-00000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Our ref: GEN 1

Dear Art,

30 March 1978

Please find attached correspondence received from one Sergyj CZORNONOH who claims that he provided information about Lee Harvey OSWALD to the American Vice Consul (presumably Tom Blackshear) in Sofia, Bulgaria, in August 1963.

2. I have sent copies of these letters to the FBI and to my Head Office in London.

D H Jones
for G M L Blackburne-Kane

Mr A H Stimson

Enc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERGYJ CZORNONOH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA
95814

USA 9c

EUGENE O'NEILL PLAYWRIGHTS

SACRAMENTO STATE CAPITOL
MAR 15 1978

M. Waller

TO BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

REGISTERED
NO. 257254

SERGYJ CZORNONOH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, 95814

MARCH 15, 1978

TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR
BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR SIR,

i WROTE LETTER ON FEBRUARY 15, 1978 TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN PRIME MINISTER i ENCLOSED REGISTERED MAIL NO. 251067.

ON JULY 18, 1963 i WAS iN LONDON ENGLAND AT THE AIRPORT iMMiGRATiON OFFiCER NO. 175 i HAD NO ViSA iMMiGRATiON PLACE ME UNDER HOUSE ARREST, MR. SMiTH iN POLiCE UNiFORM SECRET SERViCE BROUGHT ME STEAK DiNNER AND POLiCE OFFiCER iNTERROGATED ME, HE ASKED ME WHAT THE EMBASSY OF U.S.S.R. SAY WHAT DiD YOU HEARD iN ViENNA, AUSTRiA, i SAiD i HAVE HEARD THAT ONE AMERiCAN DEFECTOR (MR. LEE HARVEY OSWALD) TO RUSSiA AND HE RETURNED TO UNiTED STATES OF AMERiCA THiS MAN HE PREPARiNG TO KiLL TO ASSASSiNATE PRESiDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY,

MR. SMiTH POLiCE OFFiCER ASKED ME DO YOU KNOW HiS NAME, i SAiD HiS NAME START ON "O" HiS NAME WAS PUBLiSHED ONE TiME iN NEWS PAPER iN WASHiNGTON POST, MR. SMiTH POLiCE OFFiCER SAiD iT EASY TO FiND.

I DO SEARCHING FOR THIS FILE IN B
POLICE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND
IMMIGRATION, ASKING YOUR EMBASS
HELP TO FIND THE TRUTH AND I AS
GOVERNMENT TO FORWARD MY RECOR
JULY 18, 1963 TO PRESIDENT JIMMY C
AND SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE CH
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IN
GENCE I ENCLOSE HIS COPY LETTER TO
ALSO I ENCLOSE YOU COPY LETTER I
ON FEBRUARY 17, 1978 TO RUSSIAN A
YOUR JUSTICE ALWAYS WILL BE AP
MY INCOMING MAIL IS CONTROL BY
F.B.I. AGENTS SOME OF THE MAIL
GET NOT FORWARD TO ME F.B.I. SUP
MY INFORMATION AND TORTURE ME

RESPECTFULLY
Sergyj Czorn

U.S. PASSPORT NO. D027000

[illegible]

CITY MANAGERS
ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
BRITISH EMBASSY

Sergyj Czornonoh
Regis Hotel
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

February 6, 1978

Mr. John M. Price
District Attorney
Sacramento, California

Dear Mr. Price:

This is a retyped letter. I visited Mr. Ferry , Deputy District Attorney, on August 16, 1977. I told in the office that F.B.I. agents and Secret Service use police department to harass me. Police department do supply pencil of anesthesia gas to the manager of the building I live. The manager do or use certain people to freeze me by anesthesia gas - then push drugs, poison in my mouth to torture me - to take my sleep away - or bleed by rectal and they use many other chemicals to brainwash me to use me in political assassination which I refused. On January 20, 1976 in Sacramento on 8th and I Streets, man came to me from police or post office, U.S. Department of Justice and freeze me by gas and told me to take gun, pistol and we will tell you where to go to shoot - to kill - Mr. Sargent Shriver. I refused. Manager, Mr. Sisel, of Marshall Hotel, call on the man to tell me this on the street. In February 1976, police intelligence told me that assassination will not happen here. How about to move to Maryland state.

In this letter I ask you to get report from Dr. Frederick S. Baker, M.D. - colon and rectal surgery on January 31, 1978. His phone - 452-4095. I do bleed today very much and I am weak, In this letter I ask you to give restrain order or respond to me what could be done. The right wing in America made record to use me in assassination. I refuse. I am human and I like to be treated as human. Police put frame up on me - just to take advantages on me. Police use lie, police use mental case to take advantages on me and tell me that right wing do use such people like me. To prove I enclose copy midnight June 14, 1976. Also I enclose copy letter I sent to Mr. Ted Sheedy, Supervisor, on January 26, 1978 and copy of his reply to me.

Please respond to me. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Sergyj Czornonoh
Sergyj Czornonoh

Mr. Sargent Shriver was run for President in 1976.

Sergyj Czornon

Legal Center For The Disabled

1722 J STREET, SUITE 19 • SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
Telephone: 446-4851

March 3, 1978

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Mr. Czornonoh:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter regarding difficulties you have encountered with the police and the FBI.

In the event that there is legal action taken by the police or the FBI to institutionalize you this office will provide you with legal representation.

If you have any further legal problems please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Leslie Kay
LESLIE KAY
Paralegal

CATHERINE HUGHES
Staff Attorney

LK:ab



REGISTERED NO. 25067
Value $ NO
Reg. Fee $ 2.10
Handling Charge $
Postage $ .93
Special Delivery $
Return Receipt $ .32
Restricted Delivery $
☒ AIRMAIL
POSTMASTER (By)
POSTMARK OF U.S. SACRAMENTO STATE CAPITOL STA. FEB 15 1978
MAILING OFFICE
FROM Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th 95814
TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN
Mr. James Callaghan
London England
OFFICE OF MINISTRY
LONDON ENGLAND

13-00000

D027000

Extensions, amendments, limitations, and restrictions

SOFIA BULGARIA

American LEGATION
SOFIA, BULGARIA
Amended to AUG. 15 1963
THIS PASSPORT VALID
FOR DIRECT TRAVEL
TO THE UNITED STATES
ONLY

VICE CONSUL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

IMM. & NATZ. SERVICE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 14
ADMITTED
AUG 17 [illegible] 1963
CLASS
TO
CO-2-34, 897

Mr. Sergyj Czornonoh

5

February 17, 1978

Copy 10
BRITISH AMBASSADOR

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 - 11th Street
Sacramento, California 95814

To Russian Ambassador
Embassy of U.S.S.R.
1125 - 16th Street
Washington, D. C.

This is retyped letter from hand written

Dear Sir:

Mr. Wasilev Consul gave me order to transmit this information to U. S. Government, on August 9, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria. Mr. Wasilev, Consul of Embassy of U.S.S.R., gave me this information about Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald on August 14, 1963. Mrs. Besera Asenova, girl friend of Russian Consul came to my room and repeated that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assassin. He will kill President Kennedy.

On August 15, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria, at the airport in embassy car, I told to Mr. Blackshire, American Vice Consul, that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assissin. He has a weapon or has ordered one. Mr. Blackshire said it seems like he will kill someone. I said that Mr. Lee H. Oswald is preparing to kill President of the United States, John F. Kennedy. Mr. Blackshire said where will it happen. I said they (right wing) will invite President, criticize him in the newspaper, then kill him. Mr. Blackshire told me he will give the telegram to Department of State and he gave me the address where to report.

At 9 a.m. on August 19, 1963 in Washington, D. C., I went to see (Mr. Kippingan) Director of Special Counselor Service Department of State at 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue-11th floor. I told the Director that I have information about President Kennedy. The Director said do not mention name of President Kennedy, only respond to the questions. The Director said tell us what will happen to Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald then. I said Mr. Lee H. Oswald will be killed after kill Kennedy. I said I will take the truth drug to tell the truth. Director tell us who else get killed in this country. I said as I heard, that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. will be killed. Who will kill Dr. King, Jr. Negro leader? I said a man who is in prison at this time. (Mr. James Earl Ray was in prison at that time.) Director asked where assassination will happen. I said in Dallas, Texas. Director said if someone gave this information here I would expel the man. Director did call on F.B.I. agents after F.B.I. use anesthesia gas to freeze me to drub me to keep amnesia.

I told Director Department of State that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald have a weapon. Go see him. Director told me you too can have weapon--so what if Oswald got weapon.

Sincerely,

Sergyj Czornonoh
Sergyj Csornonoh
U.S. Passport D027000

U.S House of Representatives
Select Committee on Assassinations told me to write letter to Embassy in early 1977.

Sergyj Czornon
3/15/78

13-00000

Holmes 5 of 6,

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Registered letter No. 251254
March 15, 1978
Retyped letter from handwritten
of March 15, 1978, which I sent

To British Ambassador
British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Phone 462-1340

Dear Sir:

I wrote letter on February 15, 1978, to Mr. James Callaghan, Prime Minister. I enclosed registerd mail No. 251067.

On July 18, 1963, I was in London, England at the airport. Immigration officer No. 175 - I had no visa - immigration place me under house arrest. Mr. Smith in police uniform, secret service, bought me steak dinner and police officer interrogated me. He asked me what the Embassy of U.S.S.R. say. What did you heard in Vienna, Austria. I said I have heard that one American Defector (Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald) to Russia and he returned to United States of America. This man he preparing to kill - to assassinate President John F. Kennedy.

Mr. Smith, police officer, asked me do you know his name. I said his name start on "O". His name was published one time in newspaper in Washington Post. Mr. Smith, police officer, said it easy to find.

I do searching for this file in British police, British intelligence and British immigration. I asking your Embassy to help to find the truth and I ask your government to forward my record of July 18, 1963, to President Jimmy Carter and Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I enclose his copy letter to me. Also I enclose you copy letter I sent on February 17, 1978 to Russian Ambassador.

Your justice always will be appreciated. My incoming mail is control by the F.B.I. agents. Some of the mail I don't get. Not forward to me. F.B.I. suppress me my information and torture me by drugs. 27 years anesthesia gas and freeze me - push drug in my mouth.

My U.S. passport No. D027000.

Respectfully yours,

Sergyj Czornonoh

Sergyj Czornonoh

MARCH 20, 1978

REGISTERED NO 251254

Value	$ 1.0	Special Delivery	$
R[illegible]	$ 2.10	Return Receipt	$ 25
Handling Charge	$	Restricted Delivery	$
Postage	$ 24	☐ AIRMAIL	
POSTMASTER (By)			

POSTMARK OF MAILING OFFICE

SACRAMENTO, CALIF.
MAR 15 1978
STATE CAPITOL STA.

FROM S. Czornonoh
1106 11 st 95814

237-902

13-00000

Room 316
1106-11 TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
95814

SACRAMENTO CA
PM
2 MAR
1975


UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON 5c
PROCLAIM LIBERTY THROUGHOUT ALL THE LAND
USA 13c

TO BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE.
N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

United States Senate
650 CAPITOL MALL
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

316

PM
1978

S.I. Hayakawa
U.S.S.

Mr. Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 - 11th Street, Room 316
Sacramento, CA 95814

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief [redacted]

INFO. Chief [redacted]

FROM Chief [redacted]

SUBJECT 0 Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache [redacted]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

[redacted]

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr.

201-760966

Distribution:
2 - [redacted]
2 - Chief, [redacted]

COPY

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 9 May 1978

[redacted]

[redacted]

1 att

~~201-760466~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [redacted]

DATE 30 March 1966

59

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a rally in [redacted] to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge of a future visit of KING to [redacted].

Any future information which becomes available will be forwarded to you. We have also taken due note of your desire that the [redacted] authorities not know of your interest in Subject's activities.

[redacted] COPY

59

[redacted]

att A/ to [redacted]

~~201-760166~~

att 2 [redacted]

13-00000

COORDINATE ~~LAST~~ SENTENCE OF ATTACHMENT WITH FBI

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

INFO.

FROM

SUBJECT

Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache,

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr.

Distribution:

DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO FBI

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

30 March 1966

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

59

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a rally in Oslo to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge of a future visit of KING to Norway.

Any future information which becomes available will be forwarded to you. [We have also taken due note of your desire that the Norwegian authorities not know of your interest in Subject's activities.]

att #1 to

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, London

INFO.
Chief, WE

FROM
Chief of Station, Oslo

SUBJECT
1) Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache, London

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

Leon S. TOZALL

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr. 201-760966

Distribution:
2 - COS, London w/att
2 - Chief, WE w/att

CS COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 001829
date 28 Feb 1978

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 001829

100-003-018
~~201-760466~~

1att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

COPY 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OWOA-19623

DATE
30 March 1966 (59)

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

HQS FILE NUMBER

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a rally in Oslo to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge of a future visit of KING to Norway.

Any future information which becomes available will be forwarded to you. We have also taken due note of your desire that the Norwegian authorities not know of your interest in Subject's activities.

CS COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

[illegible]

100-002-018

~~201-260466~~

MESSAGE FORM TOTAL COPIES: 16

SECRET

ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CI/OP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 22 April 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 32 PER DRIK

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/CI 3 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF, C/EUR, C/WH, C/FE, C/NE, CSDO,

SECRET 22 23 47 Z CITE DIRECTOR 93538

TO BOOK CABLE

PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, HELSINKI, HONG KONG, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO, NEW ~~K~~DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE, RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH

99

RYBAT WOMUSE

REF: DIRECTOR 93162*

DESENSITIZED
PER DOI 70-17

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

14-00000

14 00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 93538

TO

1. LNERGO FINGERPRINT FORMULA FOR JAMES EARL RAY: 16, M OVER M, 9 OVER 4, U OVER W, O OVER I, O OVER O, O OVER I, 12 RPT 16, M OVER M, 9 OVER 4, U OVER W, O OVER I, O OVER O, O OVER I, 12.

2. PLEASE PASS TO LIAISON.

*LNERGO (1) has positively identified accused ~~assassin as James Earl~~ Ray.

DC/CI

C/WH

C/EUR

C/FE 03

for C/NE

DDP

Richard Ober
CI/OP/DO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

VBR

#1 JCt D

JCt D
Doc #1

4/11/68

CODE

TELETYPE URGENT

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Griffith
1 - Mr. Atkinson

VIA TELETYPE
1232PM
APR 11 1968
ENCIPHERED

TO LEGAT SANTO DOMINGO

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

Murkin

ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

REURTELS NUMBERS TWO AND FOUR DATED APRIL EIGHT LAST.

PERTINENT DATA IN RETELS WAS INCORPORATED INTO LHM AND FURNISHED WHITE HOUSE, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND INTERESTED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES BY LETTER APRIL TEN INSTANT.

IN VIEW OF NATURE AND ENORMITY OF ALLEGATIONS MADE BY HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA CONCERNING THIS MATTER, LEGAT MUST ENDEAVOR TO VERIFY OR DISPROVE SUCH ALLEGATIONS.

PHOTOGRAPH OF ONE HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA, ALSO KNOWN AS HERNAN HENRIQUEZ URENA LORA, BORN OCTOBER TWENTY FOUR, FIFTEEN, AT SAN DIEGO, CUBA, OR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

REC-4 44-38861-4498

BUREAU FILES REVEAL ABOVE INDIVIDUAL IS DOMINICAN CITIZEN AND HIS PARENTS WERE MAX AND GUARINA HENRIQUEZ.

10 APR 12 1968

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-167197

[redacted]

[redacted]

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review)

1 - 105-168197 (H. Rap Brown)
1 - 100-446080 (S. Carmichael)
1 - [illegible] (Hernan Henriquez Lora)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

TELETYPE TO LEGAT SANTO DOMINGO
RE: ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

b)(1)
b)(3)
b)(6)

[redacted]

THIS INFORMATION WAS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" BY CIA.

CIA ON AUGUST NINE, SIXTY SIX, ADVISED IT HAD NOT HAD ANY OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN [redacted] AND ITS FILES INDICATED HE HAS "VERY UNSAVORY REPUTATION." b)(6)

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION CONCERNING HENRIQUEZ LORA WILL BE FORWARDED BY AIRTEL.

NOTE:

Legat in retels reported Henriquez Lora had volunteered a third party had over heard a conversation in Santo Domingo between two Dominican communists in which it was alleged that Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown advocated the death of Martin Luther King and King's assassination would benefit the cause of black violence.

13-00000

#1
Jct D

Jct D
Doc #1

4/11/68

CODE

TELETYPE **URGENT**

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Griffith
1 - Mr. Atkinson

VIA TELETYPE
1232PM
APR 11 1968
ENCIPHERED

TO LEGAT SANTO DOMINGO

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

MURKIN

ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

REURTELS NUMBERS TWO AND FOUR DATED APRIL EIGHT LAST.

PERTINENT DATA IN RETELS WAS INCORPORATED INTO LHM AND FURNISHED WHITE HOUSE, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND INTERESTED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES BY LETTER APRIL TEN INSTANT.

IN VIEW OF NATURE AND ENORMITY OF ALLEGATIONS MADE BY HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA CONCERNING THIS MATTER, LEGAT MUST ENDEAVOR TO VERIFY OR DISPROVE SUCH ALLEGATIONS.

PHOTOGRAPH OF ONE HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA, ALSO KNOWN AS HERNAN HENRIQUEZ URENA LORA, BORN OCTOBER TWENTY FOUR, FIFTEEN, AT SAN DIEGO, CUBA, OR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

REC-4 44-38861-498

18 APR 12 1968

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-168197

BUREAU FILES REVEAL ABOVE INDIVIDUAL IS DOMINICAN CITIZEN AND HIS PARENTS WERE MAX AND GUARINA HENRIQUEZ.

CIA ON APRIL SEVENTEEN, SIXTY TWO, ADVISED ABOVE HENRIQUEZ LORA WAS CITIZEN OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WHO HAD BEEN TRAVELING ON CUBAN PASSPORT NUMBER ONE ONE TWO SEVEN DATED JANUARY TWENTY FIVE, FIFTY NINE. IN ONE NINE SIX TWO HE RESIDED AT ANTONIO MAURA TEN

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review)

1 - 105-168197 (H. Rap Brown)
1 - 100-446080 (S. Carmichael)
1 - [illegible] ([illegible]nan Henriquez Lora)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELE ☑

WRW

MADRID, SPAIN. ACCORDING TO CIA, HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN BOTH PRO-CASTRO AND ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN MADRID DURING PRECEDING TWO YEARS AND WAS SUSPECTED OF BEING A MEMBER OF CUBAN G-TWO. THIS INFORMATION WAS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" BY CIA.

CIA ON AUGUST NINE, SIXTY SIX, ADVISED IT HAD NOT HAD ANY OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA AND ITS FILES INDICATED HE HAS "VERY UNSAVORY REPUTATION."

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION CONCERNING HENRIQUEZ LORA WILL BE FORWARDED BY AIRTEL.

NOTE:

Legat in retels reported Henriquez Lora had volunteered a third party had over heard a conversation in Santo Domingo between two Dominican communists in which it was alleged that Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown advocated the death of Martin Luther King and King's assassination would benefit the cause of black violence.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Doc #2
Jot D

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.   DATE: April 17, 1968

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: MURKIN

b)(3) [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), furnished the following to the Liaison Agent on April 17, 1968:

(b)(1))(3). (6) A CIA source, characterized as being very reliable, advised that on or about April 15, 1968, an individual identifying himself as [redacted] a [redacted] called at the [redacted] office of the [redacted] and asked to be [redacted] as soon as possible. (It should be noted that reference is being made to the office of the [redacted]) He was asked to furnish his local address in [redacted] and he refused to do so. He became very agitated and then left. So far he has not returned to the aforementioned office. CIA's source stated that [redacted] answers the general description of the suspect in the instant case as reported in newspapers.

(3) (6) [redacted] volunteered information indicating that he applied for [redacted] in [redacted] California, on June 16, 1964, and that he registered as a member of the [redacted] in [redacted] on February 21, 1968. He has [redacted] and [redacted] He was born April 8, 1937, in Missouri (town not given). CIA's source described him as 5'10"; 155 pounds; brown hair, receding hairline on both sides; a scar, not prominent, about two and one half inches long across the center of his forehead. His most outstanding characteristic was his grin, described as "disconcerting and resembling a grimace."

REC 3 44-38861-2404

(b)(1) (3) (6) [redacted] advised that this same information has been given to our Legat, [redacted] CIA is checking through available sources in Tokyo to establish the whereabouts of [redacted] If this lead washes out, CIA would like to be advised.

ACTION: The above information is being directed to the attention of the Civil Rights Section of the General Investigative Division.

SJP:clb (4)

1 - Mr. McGowan (Long)
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Doc #2

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

ro : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: April 17, 1968

ROM : S. J. Papich

UBJECT: MURKIN

Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), furnished the following to the Liaison Agent on April 17, 1968:

A CIA source, characterized as being very reliable, advised that on or about April 15, 1968, an individual identifying himself as Gerald Lee Richards, a U. S. seaman, called at the Tokyo, Japan, office of the National Maritime Union and asked to be signed on a ship as soon as possible. (It should be noted that reference is being made to the office of the U.S. National Maritime Union.) He was asked to furnish his local address in Tokyo, and he refused to do so. He became very agitated and then left. So far he has not returned to the aforementioned office. CIA's source stated that Richards answers the general description of the suspect in the instant case as reported in newspapers.

Richards volunteered information indicating that he applied for seaman's papers in San Pedro, California, on June 16, 1964, and that he registered as a member of the National Maritime Union in San Pedro on February 21, 1968. He has Social Security number 562-46-5078 and U. S. Coast Guard identifying document Z2711-782. He was born April 8, 1937, in Missouri (town not given). CIA's source described him as 5'10"; 155 pounds; brown hair, receding hairline on both sides; a scar, not prominent, about two and one half inches long across the center of his forehead. His most outstanding characteristic was his grin, described as "disconcerting and resembling a grimace."

REC 3 44-[illegible]-2404

Ober advised that this same information has been given to our Legat, Tokyo. CIA is checking through available sources in Tokyo to establish the whereabouts of Richards. If this lead washes out, CIA would like to be advised.

ACTION: The above information is being directed to the attention of the Civil Rights Section of the General Investigative Division.

SJP:clb (4)

1 - Mr. McGowan (Long)
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

#13
164

Tolson	
DeLoach	
Mohr	
Bishop	
Casper	
Callahan	
Conrad	
Felt	
Gale	
Rosen	✓
Sullivan	
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Holmes	
Gandy	

McGuire

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan WCS

DATE: April 22, 1968

FROM : Mr. J. A. Sizoo

SUBJECT: MURKIN

(b)(3) At 6:35 pm 4/22/68, [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), furnished the following information to Night Supervisor James F. McGuire by telephone:

(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(6) [redacted]

(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(6) [redacted]

(b)(3) (b)(6) [redacted]. Further, he does not know of any factual connection of these individuals with the King case. He said CIA sources were trying to develop this matter further. He also advised that CIA would send the FBI a written communication concerning this matter on 4/23/68.

(b)(1) (b)(3) At 9:10 pm 4/22/68, [redacted] orally advised that a check had been made with the [redacted] determined that [redacted]

JFM:chs (7)

REC-48 CONTINUED - OVER

44-38861-1685

1 - Mr. Sullivan	1 - Mr. J.A.Sizoo
1 - Mr. Rosen	1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. Helgeson	1 - Mr. J.F.McGuire

APR 24 1968

66 APR 30 1968

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: MURKIN

(b)(3) [redacted] the assassination of Martin Luther King. [redacted] indicated that the entire information may be a complete hoax; however, CIA will advise FBI if any additional data comes to their attention.

ACTION:

The above information was orally furnished to Mr. Helgeson, General Investigative Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 22, 1968

FROM : Mr. J. A. Sizoo

SUBJECT: MURKIN

At 6:35 pm 4/22/68, John Mapother, Clandestine Service, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), furnished the following information to Night Supervisor James F. McGuire by telephone:

CIA sources in Panama have reported two American citizens are being detained in Panama City, Panama, at the request of the Costa Rican authorities. Allegedly, they are being detained in connection with the assassination of Martin Luther King. These individuals are identified as Tom Wolman, born 7/17/44 in New York. Wolman has Passport Number J085474, issued 1/29/68, and his permanent residence is shown as 30 Larrys Lane, Pleasantville, New York. The other individual is identified as Douglas Harry Hulbard, Passport Number 330926. Hulbard is described as a former soldier who has returned to Panama to be married. CIA did not have any further descriptive data regarding Hulbard.

These two individuals were traveling in a Chevrolet, License Number 23GH19, Motor Number 13 387 13 113711. The vehicle and license plates could not be further described by CIA. According to CIA, Wolman's passport indicates he had entered and departed El Salvador and Honduras on 4/17/68; Nicaragua on 4/18/68.

Mr. Mapother advised he has no indication why the Costa Rican authorities have requested the detention of the above-described individuals. Further, he does not know of any factual connection of these individuals with the King case. He said CIA sources were trying to develop this matter further. He also advised that CIA would send the FBI a written communication concerning this matter on 4/23/68.

At 9:10 pm 4/22/68, Norman Poulin, CIA, orally advised that a check had been made with the Costa Rican authorities and determined that Costa Rica has no information regarding the above-mentioned individuals; that Costa Rica did not request Panamanian authorities to hold these individuals, that they have no request from any American authorities to detain them; and that they have

44-38861-1685

REC-48

JFM:chs (7)

CONTINUED ~~OVER~~

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Helgeson
1 - Mr. J.A.Sizoo
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. J.F.McGuire

APR 24 1968

66 APR 26 1968

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: MURKIN

no knowledge of any connection between these individuals and the assassination of Martin Luther King. Poulin indicated that the entire information may be a complete hoax; however, CIA will advise FBI if any additional data comes to their attention.

ACTION:

The above information was orally furnished to Mr. Helgeson, General Investigative Division.

M

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Doc 4 Jot D

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 4/28/68

: J. A. Sizoo

T: MURKIN

[redacted], Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised this date that a [redacted] Germany, had advised the American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that he believed he had seen an individual whom he thought to be Eric Starvo Galt at the [redacted] on the afternoon of 4/23/68. Because he thought the individual looked like Galt he made an effort to get some information concerning him. He found he was registered at the hotel as [redacted] The [redacted] did not know if [redacted] had registered at the hotel as an American. In conversation with [redacted] he [redacted] learned that [redacted] was employed by the [redacted] (adress unknown) and was en route to [redacted].

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(A)

Bufiles contain no references to [redacted] or the [redacted].

(b)(6)

[redacted] CIA, was advised that Bufiles contain no references to [redacted] or [redacted].

(b) B
(b)(6)

ACTION:

None. For information. This is being referred to the General Investigative Division.

JHK:brr (8)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sizoo
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. McDonough
1 - Mr. Kavanagh

REC- 31

-2461

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Doc 4
Jot D

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 4/28/68

: J. A. Sizoo

T: MURKIN

Norman Pulin, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised this date that a german doctor, Klaus Steer, German Director, Scientific Department, Africa, E. Merck Aktiengesellschast, Karmstady, Germany, had advised the American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that he believed he had seen an individual whom he thought to be Eric Starvo Galt at the Bristol Hotel, Lagos, Nigeria, on the afternoon of 4/23/68. Because he thought the individual looked like Galt he made an effort to get some information concerning him. He found he was registered at the hotel as Joe Musgaque, Room 403, receipt number D52138, account number 08325. The doctor did not know if Musgaque had registered at the hotel as an American. In conversation with Musgaque the doctor learned that Musgaque was employed by the Wilder Oil Company (adress unknown) and was en route to Warri Oil Field, Nigeria.

Bufiles contain no references to Joe Musgaque or the Wilder Oil Company.

Mr. Pulin, CIA, was advised that Bufiles contain no references to Joe Musgaque or Wilder Oil Company.

ACTION:

None. For information. This is being referred to the General Investigative Division.

JHK:brr (8)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sizoo
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. McDonough
1 - Mr. Kavanagh

REC- 31

-2461

13-00000

Doc #5
168 D

4-29-68

Airtel

1 - Mr. Hudson

To: SAC, Washington Field

From: Director, FBI

MURKIN

b)(1)
)(3)
)(6)

On 4-28-68, a representative of CIA advised the Bureau that a [redacted] had advised the American Embassy, [redacted], that he believed he had seen an individual whom he thought to be Eric Starvo Galt at the [redacted] on the afternoon of 4-23-68. The individual was identified as [redacted] who is reportedly an employee of the [redacted] (address unknown).

C

b)(1)
(3)
)(6)

Washington Field, check passport records for any identifying data concerning [redacted] and also attempt to determine through the Department of State any information concerning the [redacted] which reportedly is operating in [redacted] If no information available in State Department records regarding the [redacted] determine whether State Department can obtain this information from the [redacted] Embassy.

Handle immediately.

1 - Memphis (info)

EX-110 REC 5

1-2440

4 APR 30 1968

FJH:jlh
(5)

NOTE: See memorandum from J. A. Sizoo to W. C. Sullivan dated 4-28-68, captioned "Murkin" JHK:brr.

MAY 3 1968

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Doc #5
1st D

4-29-68

Airtel

To: SAC, Washington Field

1 - Mr. Hudson

From: Director, FBI

MURKIN

On 4-28-68, a representative of CIA advised the Bureau that a German doctor, Klaus Steer, German Director, Scientific Department, Africa, E. Merck Aktiengesellschast, Karmstady, Germany, had advised the American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that he believed he had seen an individual whom he thought to be Eric Starvo Galt at the Bristol Hotel, Lagos, Nigeria, on the afternoon of 4-23-68. The individual was identified as Joe Musgaque, who is reportedly an employee of the Wilder Oil Company (address unknown).

E

Washington Field, check passport records for any identifying data concerning Musgaque; and also attempt to determine through the Department of State any information concerning the Wilder Oil Company, which reportedly is operating in Nigeria. If no information available in State Department records regarding the Wilder Oil Company, determine whether State Department can obtain this information from the Nigerian Embassy.

Handle immediately.

1 - Memphis (info)

EX-110 REC 5 [illegible] 1-2440

4 APR 30 1968

FJH:jlh
(5)

NOTE: See memorandum from J. A. Sizoo to W. C. Sullivan dated 4-28-68, captioned "Murkin" JHK:brr.

AY 3 1968

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Doc #6
tot D

Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. May 22, 1968

S. J. Papich

COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA
INTERNAL SECURITY - COLOMBIA

[illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ACTION:

This information will be checked out by the Soviet Section for any significant indicators relating to the movement of funds through Soviet intelligence channels.

This information and enclosure are also being directed to the attention of the General Investigative Division in the event we desire to check any identified currency utilized by James Earl Ray against the attached listing.

Enclosure

SJP:clb
(7)

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Murkin File
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

[illegible]
NOT RECORDED
87 DEC 4 1968

ORIGINAL FILED IN

54 DEC 31 1968

Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. May 23, 1968

S. J. Papich

COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA
INTERNAL SECURITY - COLOMBIA

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) previously has furnished information concerning the arrest of two individuals in Colombia who clandestinely brought into the country a large sum of U. S. currency slated to be delivered to the Communist Party of Colombia.

On May 21, 1968, Thomas Karamessines, Deputy Director of Plans, CIA, made available the enclosed list of serial numbers of the currency recovered by Colombian officials. It should be noted that the first digit in each listed number designates the particular denomination (1-$1; 2-$5; 3-$10; 4-$20; 5-$50; 6-$100).

ACTION:

This information will be checked out by the Soviet Section for any significant indicators relating to the movement of funds through Soviet intelligence channels.

This information and enclosure are also being directed to the attention of the General Investigative Division in the event we desire to check any identified currency utilized by James Earl Ray against the attached listing.

Enclosure

SJP:elb
(7)

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Murkin File
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

NOT RECORDED
87 DEC 4 1968

ORIGINAL FILED IN

54 DEC 31 1968

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc.
Asst. D
Admin
Comp
Ext.
Files
Gen.
Ident.
Inspe
Intell
Labo
Plan.
Spec.
Train
Legal
Teleph
Direct

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller DATE: November 29, 1973

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

(b)(3) On November 21, 1973, Mr. [redacted] of the Central Intelligence Agency personally delivered the attached press release noting that the captioned committee was sponsoring a two-day conference at Georgetown University on November 23 and 24 in commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of President John F. Kennedy's death. Mr. [redacted] particularly noted that former Special Agent William Turner was scheduled to be the moderator of a panel dealing with unique investigative techniques. In the program Turner is identified as a former FBI Agent, author of numerous books on investigative techniques. Among others appearing on the program are Fred Cook, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg all of whom who have been outspoken critics of the FBI.

(b)(3) The Central Intelligence Agency, according to Mr. [redacted] was concerned over the appearance of their ex-employees - Victor Marchetti and George O'Toole.

(b)(3) Mr. [redacted] advised that his Agency would have coverage of the conference and that he would be happy to pass along any data developed by their coverage.

ACTION:

(b) 3 For information. Anything of pertinence received from Mr. [redacted] will be made a matter of record. A copy of this memorandum has been designated for the personnel file of ex-Agent Turner.

WAB:hke
(5)

62-112697
Enclosure
1 - Personnel File of William Turner
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

REC-89
62-112697-3
EX-112
NPC/GIM
DEC 3 1973
ENCLOSURE
3

XEROX
1973
55 DEC 13 1973

XEROX
DEC 1 1980

PERS. FILE
(See Fred Cook)

13-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Asst. Dir.: ___
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: November 29, 1973

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

On November 21, 1973, Mr. Raymond Rocca of the Central Intelligence Agency personally delivered the attached press release noting that the captioned committee was sponsoring a two-day conference at Georgetown University on November 23 and 24 in commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of President John F. Kennedy's death. Mr. Rocca particularly noted that former Special Agent William Turner was scheduled to be the moderator of a panel dealing with unique investigative techniques. In the program Turner is identified as a former FBI Agent, author of numerous books on investigative techniques. Among others appearing on the program are Fred Cook, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg, all of whom who have been outspoken critics of the FBI.

The Central Intelligence Agency, according to Mr. Rocca, was concerned over the appearance of their ex-employees - Victor Marchetti and George O'Toole.

Mr. Rocca advised that his Agency would have coverage of the conference and that he would be happy to pass along any data developed by their coverage.

ACTION:

For information. Anything of pertinence received from Mr. Rocca will be made a matter of record. A copy of this memorandum has been designated for the personnel file of ex-Agent Turner.

WAB:hke
(5)

62-112697
Enclosure
1 - Personnel File of William Turner
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

REC-89
62-112697-3
EX-112
NPC/GIM
DEC 3 1973

3 ENCLOSURE

XEROX
1973

55 DEC 13 1973

XEROX
DEC 12 1973

(see Fred Cook)

13-00000

BERNARD FENSTERWALD, JR.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
ASSASSINATIONS
1520 16TH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 232-1152

ROBERT SMITH
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH

JAMES LESAR
COUNSEL

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:

In observance of the tenth anniversary of President Kennedy's death, the Committee to Investigate Assassinations is sponsoring a two-day Conference at Georgetown University on November 23rd and 24th. A brochure describing the Conference and its program is attached. As you will note, several of the Nation's prominent writers and investigators of the assassinations of the past decade will speak.

While a number of different points of view on the subject will be represented, there is general consensus that the Executive Branch has failed to make known all the relevant facts of the assassinations.. We believe that the Congress must ultimately take the initiative if the public is to learn all of the facts, and that Watergate has shown us that Congress' action depends largely on disclosures by an informed press and other news media.

A press pass will be available for you at the Conference registration desk. For further information, please contact:

Ms. Andrea Wyatt
Conference Coordinator
(202) 232-1152

memo W.A. Branigan
to Mr. E. S. Miller,
11/29/73
WAB ENCLOSUR

21

13-00000

THE LAST THREE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY BULLETS:

1964 — result decided by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy

1968 — result decided by the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy

1972 — result decided by the near-assassination of Governor George Wallace

WHAT is the evidence?

WHO fire the fatal shots?

WHY has there been such a concerted effort to withhold the facts?

WHO was really behind the assassinations?

COME SHARE THE FINDINGS
OF THE NATION'S EXPERTS

AT A TWO DAY CONFERENCE

SPONSORED BY THE COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

TO BE HELD AT:

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

GASTON HALL

Nov. 23-24, 1973

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
1520 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. • (202) 232-1152

DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS

1963 - 1973

JOHN F. KENNEDY • SYLVANUS OLYMPIO • ABDUL KARIM KASSEM • MEDGAR EVERS • "NGO" DINH DIEM • JIGME DORJI • ADIB AL SHISHAKLI • PIERRE NGENDANDUMWE • HASSAN ALI MANSOUR • MALCOLM X • VIOLA LIUZZO • MARIO MENDEZ MONTENEGRO • SIR ABUBAKAR BALEWA • J.T.V. IRONSI AGUIYI • HENDRIK VERWOERD • TRAN VAN VAN • GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL • CHE GUEVARA • MARTIN LUTHER KING • ROBERT F. KENNEDY • EDUARDO MONDLANE • TOM MBOYA • A.A. SHERMARKE • GEORGE WALLACE • SALVADORE ALLENDE •

1963 – 1973

PROGRAM

FRIDAY – NOVEMBER 23

9:00 LATE REGISTRATION –
Early Registrants pick up passes.

9:50 WELCOME:
Mr. Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Executive Director, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
Mr. Norman Mailer, Author and Forwarder of *The Fifth Estate*

10:00 CURRENT STATUS OF PROMINENT ASSASSINATION CASES:
JFK CASE – Mr. Robert P. Smith, Director of Research, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
RFK CASE – Mr. Robert Hanson, Attorney, present counsel for Sirhan Sirhan
KING CASE – Mr. James Lesar, Attorney, present counsel for James Earl Ray
WALLACE CASE – Mr. Ronald Van Doren, Newsman, Author, researcher into the background of Arthur Bremer
ROCKWELL CASE – Ms. Meredith Rode, Professor at Federal City College, Authority in killing of George Lincoln Rockwell

11:30 UNIQUE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES:
Mr. William Turner, Moderator – Former FBI Agent, Author of numerous books on investigative techniques
Mr. George O'Toole – Former CIA Agent, Free-Lance Writer, expert on the PSE (Psychological Stress Evaluator)
Mr. Robert Saltzman – Computer Engineer, lecturer on the Warren Commission Report

FRIDAY – Continued

12:30 BREAK FOR LUNCH

2:00 MEDICAL AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE:
Mr. Josiah Thompson, Moderator – Professor at Haverford College, author of *Six Seconds In Dallas*
Dr. Cyril Wecht – Professor of Law and Forensic Medicine at Duquesne University; Coroner of Pittsburgh, Pa.
Ms. Sylvia Meagher – Attorney, UN Official, author of *Accessories After The Fact*
Mr. Roger Hanson – Attorney, counsel to Sirhan Sirhan
Mr. Herbert MacDonnell – Professor of Criminalistics, Corning University; expert in case of Fred Hampton
Mr. Mark Lane – Attorney, author of *Rush To Judgment* and *Executive Action*

6:00 BREAK FOR DINNER

8:30 WARREN COMMISSION REPORT: FACT OR FICTION –
A slide show and lecture by Mr. Robert Saltzman

SATURDAY – NOVEMBER 24

9:30 ASSASSINATIONS AND THE MEDIA:
Mr. John Henry Faulk, Moderator – Humorist and Author of *Fear On Trial*
Mr. Robert Kaiser – Author of *RFK Must Die*
Mr. Donald Freed – Co-Author of *Executive Action*
Mr. Harold Weisberg – Author of *Frame Up*
Mr. Ted Charach – Author of *Second Gun*
Mr. Peter Noyes – Author of *Legacy Of Doubt*
Mr. Fred Cook -- Author of numerous books and articles

12:30 BREAK FOR LUNCH

2:00 THEORIES OF CONSPIRACY:
Mr. Richard Sprague, Moderator – Computer expert and author
Dr. Richard Popkin, Professor at Washington University; author of *The Second Oswald*
Col. Fletcher Prouty -- Former Liaison Officer between Pentagon and CIA; author of *The Secret Team*
Mr. Robert K. Brown -- Former Special Services Officer; expert in attempts on life of Castro
Mr. Earl Golz – Reporter for Dallas Morning News, expert on Organized Crimes
Mr. Victor Marchetti -- Former CIA Agent; author
Mr. Peter Dale Scott – Professor at Berkeley; Author of *The War Conspiracy*

5:00 INDIVIDUAL WORKSHOPS WITH THE SPEAKERS –
Question and Answer Sessions

6:00 FINI

FBI documents
forwarded to CIA
for review

D

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Lou Dube, DDO/PIAG		
2	1-D-4127-Hqs.		
3	HT-1		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

The first time the Bureau sent these, they combined King-Ray docs with Kennedy assassination docs. After discussion with you, they were sent back to the Bureau asking them to segregate King-Ray docs. Here they are.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Karen W. 5765	11/3

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

(40)

☒ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

JUN 18 2 00 PM '76

REQUEST NUMBER 76- 382

FROM: ~~A. B. Swider~~ Mary
O/DDO/FIO

EXTENSION OPS/ITG 9415

DATE SENT 18 June

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. OPS/ITG Converse ATTN: Mary ~~Moran~~ Tube ES-2	18 JUN 1976		mc
2. BK		21 Jun	B
3.			H
4. PH		27/7	H
5.			
6. C/OPS/ITG	27 JUL 1976		JR
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/FIO att: Annette tube: CT-5 , 2B1415			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Att

JFK—
need to
copy some 1/2
slips that
are in here as
1st pgs for some

☐ No record of subject

☐ No info identifiable with subject

☒ See attached memorandum

Part I & II

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749
1-75 OP-12

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLA

27 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Officer, DDO

SUBJECT: Weisberg Request (Martin Luther King, Jr.) Part I

REFERENCE: 76-F-382

1. This office maintains a three volume sensitive (unofficial) file on the Subject. We no longer maintain 201 file (201-760966); Dr. King's files and documents were closed out on 6 November 1974 and forwarded to IP files on 25 May 1976. A further check of other records in this office revealed the following information relevant to the Subject. While a large number of documents are available which mention King, the majority are dated after his death and in some way are related to world reaction to his assassination which was on 4 April 1968, prior to the implementation of the MHCHAOS program, 4 July 1968.

a. The following overt items (excerpts from books published) are considered releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. Black Power/White Resistance, (EX-3283) by Fred Powledge; The Negro Revolt, (EX-3267) by Louis E. Lomax; Ghetto Rebellion to Black Liberation, (EX-3212) by Claude M. Lightfoot; Is Anybody Listening to Black America, (EX-3573) by C. Eric Lincoln; Martin Luther King, Jr., (EX-3670) by William Robert Miller; SNCC - The New Abolitionists, (EX-2108) by Howard Zinn; The Black Muslims in America, (EX-2109) by C. Eric Lincoln; Negro and Jew, (EX-3573) by Shloma Katz; Chronicles of Black Protest, (EX-3439) by Dr. C. Eric Lincoln; The Black Messiah, (EX-3669), by Albert B. Cleage, Jr.; Black Power and White Protestants, (EX-3211), by Joseph C. Hough, Jr.; The Negro Mood, (EX-2127) by Lerome Bennett, Jr.; Black Man's Burden, (EX-3571) by John Oliver Killens; When Negros March, (EX-3577) by

Doc's 1-23

E2 IMPDET CL BY 058723

Herbert Garfinkel; Black Man's America, (EX-3208) by Simeon Booker; Staff Study by The Committee on Internal Security, (EX-4866) dated 1970; Testimony of Gerald Wayne Kirk, Hearings of the Committee on the Judiciary, (EX-7044) 1970; Hearings Before the Committee on Un-American Activities, (EX-2131) 1968; Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Investigations, (EX-2169) June 20 and 21, 1968; The New Left, Memorandum prepared for the Committee on the Judiciary, (EX-3535), 9 October 1968; National Review, 3 May 1967; The Rebel (published in Exile), May-June 1967; The New World of Negro Americans, (EX-3571) by Harold R. Isaacs.

b. The following overt items which mention the Subject and/or his activities are not available in this office.

Washington Star, dated 14 August 1968
Washington Star, dated 4 February 1969
Washington Star, dated 8 May 1968
Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968
Washington Star, dated 20 January 1969
Washington Star, dated 10 November 1968
Washington Star, dated 29 March 1969
Soul Newspaper (EX-3653), 1 December 1969
New York Times, dated 13 April 1967
New York Times, dated 18 August 1968
New York Times, dated 5 October 1969
Time, dated 12 April 1968
Liberation News, dated November 1967
Committee Newsletter, dated May 1967
D.C. Catholic Standard, dated 18 July 1968
Militant (pg. 5), dated 22 November 1968
Ottawa Citizen, dated 17 December 1968
Sepia (pg. 66) (EX-3592), December 1969-destroyed
Jet Magazine (pg. 17) (EX-3594), 7 August 1967-destroyed
The Black Panther (pg. 10) dated 1969
Washington Post, dated 1 September 1967
Washington Post, dated 15 November 1968
Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968
Washington Post, dated 26 May 1968
Washington Post, dated 24 December 1968

~~Washington Post, dated 14 December 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 19 November 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 22 September 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 17 August 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 29 March 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 20 March 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 24 May 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 17 November 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 5 April 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 12 May 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 1 April 1968~~
Washington Post, dated 14 March 1969

c. The following overt items pertaining to the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. are releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. Look, 15 April 1969; Washington Star, 24 April 1968; 12 March 1969; 13 March 1969; 17 March 1969; 20 March 1969; 23 March 1969; 24 March 1969; 1 April 1969; 2 April 1969; 4 April 1969; 13 April 1969; 24 April 1969; 27 May 1969; 16 July 1969; 31 May 1969; New York Times, 10 March 1969; 7 March 1969; 8 March 1969; 14 March 1969; 16 April 1969; 23 May 1969; 24 May 1969; 26 May 1969; 1 June 1969; UPI-108, 3 January 1969; Washington Post, 3 January 1969; 18 January 1969; 28 January 1969; 31 January 1969; 8 February 1969; 8 March 1969; 11 March 1969; Tass International Service, 11 March 1969; Daily World, 12 March 1969; Washington Post, 12 March 1969; 13 March 1969; 17 March 1969; 18 March 1969; 20 March 1969; 22 March 1969; 23 March 1969; 26 March 1969; 8 April 1969; 12 April 1969; Item from News Dispatches, 1969; The Sunday Star, 16 March 1969; Item from Associated Press, 8 April 1969; Associated Press, 14 June 1969; Associated Press item, 13 May 1969; Associated Press item, 14 May 1969; Washington Post, 21 May 1969; 23 May 1969; 24 May 1969; 27 May 1969; 26 May 1969; 25 May 1969; 16 July 1969; 30 May 1969; 16 March 1969; 27 June 1969; 20 June 1969; 26 June 1969; Washington Star; 4 May 1968; Washington Star, 29 May 1968; Time, 13 September 1968; Washington Post, 19 September 1968; Chicago Daily News Service, undated; Washington Star, 18 September 1968; Washington Star, 23 September 1968; Los Angeles Times, 7 August 1968;

125-347 Docs ~~24-151~~
See separate list from OPS/ITG - above is not accurate

Washington Post, 16 August 1968; Washington Star, 6 July 1968; Reuters, London, 6 July 1968; Washington Post, 22 July 1968; Time, 26 July 1968; Washington Star, 12 April 1968; Washington Star, 13 April 1968; Washington Post, 13 April 1968; Washington Star, 14 April 1968; Washington Post, 14 April 1968; Washington Post, 16 April 1968; Delta Democrat Times, 16 April 1968; Washington Star, 17 April 1968; Washington Star, 18 April 1968; Washington Star, 19 April 1968; undated item; undated item; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Star, 24 April 1968; Washington Post, 6 May 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, undated; Reuters, 16 July 1968; Associated Press, 9 July 1968; 16 July 1968; Reuters, 16 July 1968; Reuters, 9 July 1968; UPI-122, 9 July 1968; UPI-48, 10 July 1968; UPI-129, 15 July 1968; UPI-48, 12 July 1968; Associated Press, 17 July 1968; Reuters, 2 July 1968; Associated Press, 2 July 1968; Reuters, undated; London, 2 July 1968; UPI-30, 2 July 1968; Reuters, 8 July 1968; UPI-21A, 2 July 1968; UPI-125, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; Associated Press, 2 July 1968; UPI-8, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; Reuters, undated; Reuters, undated, Reuters, 2 July 1968; Associated Press, 18 July 1968; London, 18 July 1968; Reuters, 18 July 1968; Associated Press, 18 July 1968; Associated Press, 18 July 1968; Reuters, 17 July 1968; Reuters, 17 July 1968; London, 17 July 1968; Associated Press, 17 July 1968; Reuters, undated; London, undated; Associated Press, July 1968; Reuters, 17 July 1968; Associated Press, 17 July 1968.

d. The following documents are releasable in sanitized form to the requestor under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Excised portions are exempt as noted. OIRT-06733, 23 September 1964, exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(3)(b); OIRT-06733, 16 October 1964, exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(3)(b); CSCI-315/02051-64, exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(3)(b); S-19, 5 October 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); S-20, 5 October 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); UWCA-3510, 11 October 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); EX-01655, 5 November 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); JMWAVE-1417, 26 February 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Georgetown-5024,

OS referral also

26 February 1968, exempt under (b)(6); EX-895, 7
March 1968; exempt under (b)(6); Kingston-4004,
6 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b),
(b)(1)5(B)(1); Mexico City-5143, 7 April 1968,
exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Tokyo-9443,
10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b);
~~Dir-90530, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a),~~ Ray
~~(b)(3)(b),~~ (b)(6); ~~Mexico-5188, 10 April 1968, exempt~~
~~under (b)(3)(b)~~; JMWAVE-2022, 12 April 1968; exempt
under (b)(3)(b); Berlin-2149, 15 April 1968, exempt
under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); ~~Dir-92664, 18 April 1968,~~ Ray
~~exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6)~~; Memo draft, dated
26 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a) (if USIB concurs);
not records ~~FHHT-6444, 7 May 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6);~~
~~Stockholm-9024, 7 June 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a),~~
~~(b)(3)(b), (b)(6);~~ B-173, 19 September 1968, exempt not record
under (b)(3)(b); ~~RL-188, 13 November 1968, (b)(3)(a)~~;
B-2628, 21 May 1971, (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6);
Budapest-017, 19 May 1971, (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); ~~EX-8726,~~ — not a record
~~27 September 1971, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6)~~;
Memorandum, 28 November 1975, exempt under (b)(3)(b).

e. The following Top Secret (SI) documents which mention either Dr. or Mrs. King are held in OPS/ITG (SI) vault:

~~3/0/QOY/T-68-68~~
3/0/QOF/T151-67
3/0/QOY/T-58-68
~~3/0/GOUT/T269-68~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T88-69~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T92-69~~
3/0/QOY/T57-67
~~3/0/GOUT/T415-69~~
3/0/QOF/T95-67
3/0/QOF/T106-67
~~3/0/GOUT/T177-69~~

Refer

2. The following documents are exempt from release; exemptions are as cited.

Cables:

(a) Kingston-4005, dated 8 April 1968; according to (RUABBE/1) a Jamaican service four groups are trying to get demonstrations going against the Amembassy, but without success; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1). 63

(b) Bogota-0654, dated 10 April 1968; (GISOY/GIJAY) unit intercepted propaganda items from Cuban mail pouch. Disclosure to the requestor would identify a clandestine method of the station for obtaining information; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6). 64

(c) Mexico City-5210, dated 15 April 1968; Para. 3 of this cable mentions an intercepted letter addressed to President Johnson protesting the King assassination. (LITEMPO/12) a member of a Mexican service provided the information; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1). 65

(d) Mexico City-5249, dated 17 April 1968; the Legal Attache provided composite photos of suspect in connection with King assassination and asked for check of visitors to Soviet and Cuban embassies; exempt under (b)(3)(a). 66

(e) Bogota-0703, dated 20 April 1968 (GISOY) surveillance team followed an American National with a striking resemblance to Galt; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6). 370

(f) Paris-9506, dated 22 April 1968; concerns Forman's arrival in Paris, incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(g) Nairobi-3000, dated 14 June 1968; source (TGFLER/1) stated he had an interview with Robert F. Williams. Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(h) Director-48988, dated 7 November 1968; concerns a Richard George Perrin, incidental reference to the Subject in a record pertaining to another subject and should not be considered a document responsive to the requestor; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(i) Addis Ababa-1027, dated 18 August 1971; source (JEPYX-1) entertained Hosea Williams in his home during latter's visit to Ethiopia. Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

62 Dispatches: UFGT-16828, 15 Jul 66 - OS Referral b1 (OGA) b3

(a) OELA-48626, dated 19 January 1968; forwards a memorandum prepared by (Rufus F. Rodigast) which deals with MHALPHA-related individuals; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

67 (b) FJTA-53902, dated 29 January 1968; forwards a pamphlet (which also contains an article mentioning Dr. King's name) from BEHEIREN Hqs. in Tokyo, obtained by (POFRAGRANCE) a unilateral source still active and sensitive; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(c) OEPA-982, dated 15 March 1968; forwards a copy of recent correspondence between (QRPHONE/1) and (QRPEONY/1). Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(d) OEPA-1058, dated 17 April 1968; contains operational information submitted by the Station concerning (RODIGAST); contains an incidental mention of the name Dr. Martin Luther King; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

?, 68 (e) OEPA-1097, dated 29 April 1968; is a report by (RODIGAST) on SNCC activities in Paris in the aftermath of the Dr. King assassination; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

69 (f) HMMA-34688, dated 20 May 1968; contains items from (LIBIGHT/LIMUD) a sensitive teletap and mail intercept operation coverage; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(g) FJTA-54934, dated 31 July 1968; Americans Invited to Leftist Conference in Japan. (POFRAGRANCE/1) a unilateral source still active and sensitive provided the information; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6). Note: An extensive search has failed to locate the attachment for this document. The covering dispatch makes no mention of Dr. King or his assassination.

(h) OCOA-13493, dated 27 September 1968; is a report forwarded by (SMABOVE) a Canadian service; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1). 70

(i) OELA-51949, dated 10 February 1970; (JAGUAR) a British service forwarded press clippings (they contained an incidental mention of the name Dr. King) by or about a Jonathan Power; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(j) FZWA-2412, dated 8 September 1970; Subject: Activities of Andrew Pulley in New Zealand; contain an incidental mention of the name Dr. King; (MLDUST) a New Zealand servvice provided the information; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(k) ANLA-4097, dated 16 December 1970; concerns a memorandum passed to (KRHOLLY) a Nigerian security service requesting information on and watchlisting of the MHCHAOS group who were destined for Africa; contain an incidental mention of the name Dr. King; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

71 (l) OCOA-17031, dated 27 June 1972; (SMABOVE) a Canadian service provided a report on the Day of African Solidarity; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

Memoranda:

(a) EX-1239, dated 22 August 1967; is a Biographic Summary on Kunstler, William Moses, incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(b) Memorandum S-13, dated 5 October 1967; Subject: Views of the Reverend Daniel Mallette on the Black Militant Situation in Chicago; incidental reference to the Subject; the information was obtained by QRPHONE/1, a sensitive unilateral source in a personal interview with Father Mallette; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(c) B-35, dated 8 February 1968; Black Nationalist Writers in Paris; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

72 (d) B-75, dated 9 April 1968; Subject: Attempted Anti U.S.-Demonstrations in Kingston, according to the Special Branch of the Jamaican security service; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(e) Memorandum, dated 16 April 1968; Subject: Tentative Plans of Senator Robert Kennedy to Visit West Berlin on 1 May. Incidental referenc to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(f) EX-1623, (rewritten) dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Biographic Summary on Hayden, Thomas Emmett, incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

73 (g) B-88, dated 18 April 1968; FBI provided our representative in Mexico with composite photos of suspected killer; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(h) B-89, dated 22 April 1968; Subject: Radio Messages for Stokely Carmichael during April 1968 riots in Washington, D.C. Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(i) B-92, dated 23 April 1968; Subject: Arrival of James Rufus Forman in Paris; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

74 (j) B-97, dated 25 April 1968; Subject: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Jr.; concerns a subject who did not appear to be identical with FBI's suspect; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(k) EX-1183 (rewrite of 19 July 1967), dated 26 April 1968; is a Biographic Sketch of Howard Zinn; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(1) EX-1490, dated 14 June 1968; is a Biographic Summary on Mark William Rudd; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(m) EX-2148, dated 4 September 1968; is a Biographic Summary on Szymanski, Albert John Jr; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

75 (n) B-191, dated 9 October 1968; Subject: Jamaican Special Branch Report - Jamaica/ United States Black Power Ties; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

76 (o) B-308, dated 17 February 1969; Subject: Bahamas/United States Black Power Ties; report of a British service; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

77 SL-134-69, 19 Feb 69 - OS referral b1, 2, 3, 6

78 Memo 28 May 69 OS referral b1, 2, 3, 6

(p) 79 B-618, dated 8 September 1969; Subject: World Council of Peace planned delegates to Paris; a sensitive reliable source revealed a Clarence Fielden Jones as being in contact with Martin Luther King; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(q) EX-9272, dated 21 November 1972; is a summary about Ralph Henry; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(r) EX-10198, dated 29 May 1972, concerns VB#5 and miscellaneous comments by (MHRUPEE); incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

378 (s) CSCI-1763, dated 14 May 1968 (201-760966); this file has been closed. – Record on Ray

3. Thirty FBI reports which mention the Subject and/or his activities. Excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment I.

4. The cited documents are available in this office if needed.

John Reagan

John J. Reagan
Chief, Internationl Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Attachment: a/s

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: OPS/ITG

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS

Pls note which of the SI docs. mention Mrs. King only.

[illegible]

Is NSA the orginating agency for all of these? Yes

*On Dr. King

FROM: MFelton DDO/PIC HT-1

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION 1644

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

February 1968, exempt under (b)(6); EX-895, 7 March 1968; exempt under (b)(6); Kingston-4004, 6 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(1)5(B)(1); Mexico City-5143, 7 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Tokyo-9443, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Dir-90530, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Mexico-5188, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b); JMWAVE-2022, 12 April 1968; exempt under (b)(3)(b); Berlin-2149, 15 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Dir-92664, 18 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Memo draft, dated 26 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a) (if USIB concurs); FHHT-6444, 7 May 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); Stockholm-9024, 7 June 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); B-173, 19 September 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b); RL-188, 13 November 1968, (b)(3)(a); B-2628, 21 May 1971, (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Budapest-017, 19 May 1971, (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); ~~EX-8726, 27 September 1971, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6)~~; Memorandum, 28 November 1975, exempt under (b)(3)(b).

[illegible] — not a record

e. The following Top Secret (SI) documents which mention either Dr. or Mrs. King are held in OPS/ITG (SI) vault:

~~3/0/QOY/T-68-68~~
3/0/QOF/T151-67*
3/0/QOY/T-58-68*
~~3/0/GOUT/T269-68~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T88-69~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T92-69~~
3/0/QOY/T57-67*
~~3/0/GOUT/T413-69~~
3/0/QOF/T95-67*
3/0/QOF/T106-67*
~~3/0/GOUT/T177-69~~

Refer

2. The following documents are exempt from release; exemptions are as cited.

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRT - 6733, 20 Oct 64		b1, b2, b3
DIRT - 6733, 7 Nov 64		b1, b2, b3
CSCI - 316/02051-64, 30 Nov 64		b1, b2, b3
Memo, 5 Oct 67		b1, b3, b6
Memo, 5 Oct 67		" " "
UWCA-3510, 11 Oct 67		b1, b2, b3, b6
Memo, 5 Nov 67		b1, b3, b6
WAVE, 26 Feb 68		b1, b3
Georget. 5024, 26 Feb 68		b1, b3, b6
Memo - 895, 7 Mar 68		? b1 (OGA), b3, b6
Kngs, 6 Apr 68		b1 liaison, b3
Mexi 7 Apr 68		b1, b3
Tokyo 10 Apr 68		b1, b3
DIR 10 Apr 68		b1, b3, b6
Mexi, 10 Apr 68		b1, b3
HDCA 10 Apr 68		b1, b2, b3
UFGA, 11 Apr 68		b1, b2, b3
UFGA, 11 Apr 68		b1, b2, b3
WAVE, 2 Apr 68		b1, b3
Berlin 15 Apr 68		b1, b3, b6
DIR, 18 Apr 68		b1, b3, b6
~~Memo Draft, 26 Apr 68~~		
~~EA-1020~~ ~~FHHT - 7 May 68~~	not record	b1, b3, b6
~~referred~~ ~~Srce 9024, 7 June 68~~	"	b1, b3, b6
Memo 19 Sep 68		b1, b3
~~Memo 13 Nov 68~~	~~" "~~	~~b1, b3~~
~~Mem~~ Buda, 19 May 71		b1, b3, b6
Memo, 21 May 71		b1, b3, b6
Memo, 28 Nov 75		b1, b3

Deny - 201

CSCI-316/01703-68, 2 May 68	b1 (liaison) b3, b6
PANA 6180	" " "

Release - 201

UFGA-29884 - 11 Apr 68	b1, b2, b3
UFGA-29877, 11 Apr 68	" "
HDCA 7012, 18 Apr 68	b1, b2, b3
Coord w/FBI — OUOA-19623, 30 Mar 66	b1, b2, b3
CSCI-316/02051-64, 30 Nov 64	b1, b2, b3
OIRT- 6783, 17 Nov 64	b1, b2, b3
OIRT- 6733, 20 Oct 64	b1, b2, b3

4 Aug

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

Para C:

I cannot match the documents with the list you provided. Please arrange the articles chronologically and number them lightly in pencil to correspond with numbers in a memo (see attached Memo from the DDA, 26 March 76, para b). It would be useful if you would use that format for all your memos, as the way you have done it is very hard to follow without making errors.) Also clipped documents have parts cut off of them or are almost unreadable. Can you provide better copies?

Para D:

1 First document is a report whose number should be left in. Pls provide another resanitized copy.

2 Please delete dissemination controls in your sanitizations; otherwise we just have to do them over. Also classification was left on one doucment. See XXXXX clips.

3 Please provide sanitized 1st x page of EX-895, 7 Mar X 68.

4 Please delete cite numbers from incoming cables.

Many thanks.

Mary Felton
X1644 DDO/PIC

PART II

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

JUN 18 2 00 PM '73

REQUEST NUMBER 76- 382.

FROM: ~~A.B. S[illegible]der~~ MARY
O/DDO/FIO

EXTENSION OPS ITG ~~9415~~

DATE SENT 18 JUNE

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OPS/ITG — Converse ATTN: Mary ~~Moran~~ Tube ES-2	18 JUN 1976		MC	
2. BK		21 Jun	B	Att
3.			H	
4. PH				
5.				
6. C/OPS/ITG	27 JUL 1976			
7.				
8.				
9. DDO/FIO att: Annette tube: CT-5 , 2B1415				
10.				

/_/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/X/ See attached memorandum

Part I & II

Y HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

13-00000

1976

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

REQUEST NUMBER 76-382

FROM: ~~A.B. Swider~~ Mari
O/DDO/FIO CT-5

EXTENSION 9415

DATE SENT 18 June

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. ~~CI Staff~~ ~~Attn: John Bender~~ 2C29	22 JUN 1976	22 JUL 1976	
2.			
3. CI/EXO	22 JUL 1976		
4.			
5. CI/PA (Graves)	23 JUL 1976		
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/FIO Attn: Annette Tube: CT-5, 2B1415			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

22 July 1976

DDO/PIC:

Please see attached comments.

Not a Record

/_/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/✓/ See attached ~~memorandum~~ Comments

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 OP-11 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

22 July 1976

DDO/PIC

Re: Martin Luther King (Request #F-76-382)

In response to this request, CI Staff has no records with the exception of one document, prepared in the Office of Security:

> Memorandum for the Record, dated 1 July 1968,
> Subject: King, Coretta Scott (#541 487).

A copy is attached for referral.

Dan Roche
Daniel L. Roche, Jr.
CI/PA

Attachment:
Referral Document,
As Above

Mrs F age

Sen
15.7.68

1 July 1968

Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Record

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT : KING, Coretta Scott
#541 487
AKA: Mrs. Martin Luther KING
nee: Coretta SCOTT

1. Subject, without question, is the Coretta SCOTT referred to in an FBI report on Alfreda ABELL, #355 109, dated 10/29/54, which indicates that on 7 September 1951 ABELL, the Subject of a "Security Matter-C" type investigation, communicated with C. SCOTT, Route 1, Box 158, Heiberger, Alabama, which address was identified as the residence of Coretta SCOTT. According to the postmaster at Heiberger, (in 1954?), Coretta SCOTT was then attending the New England Conservatory of Music. (See attachment A) Mrs. Coretta Scott KING is said to have attended this Conservatory and while there to have met her future husband. (See attachment B)

2. Alfreda ABELL, who was a clerk in the UN Secretariat from 1947 until 6/30/52 when her employment was terminated for security reasons, was said in the New York Times on 2 January 1953 to be one of 25 former employees of the UN ousted as one believed to be a communist or under communist discipline. While employed in the UN, ABELL was reportedly active on behalf of the Pro-Communist group of the UN Staff Committee and was friendly with, and actively participated in giving a party in October 1951 to honor, four persons who had been dismissed by the UN for security reasons. (ie: Jeanne PICOU, identified as a member of the French Communist Party; Mary Jane KEENEY, a CP member active in the Communist Party underground during the late 30's-early 40's; Benedict Soloman ALPER, also reported to be a CP member; and Rajah HOWRANI, who was reportedly a Communist Party member and had received training in the Soviet Union. The individual said to be responsible for ABELL's employment in the UN, and to have been her supervisor there at one time, was Adam TARN, a Polish citizen said to be a Communist Party member. According to the FBI report on ABELL, she registered with the American Labor Party when voting in 1949 and 1952; subscribed to the National Guardian; and attended a W.E.B. DuBois testimonial dinner in February 1951, to which she took Helen KAGAN as her guest.

9.3.1c

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SIG/Misc
3401

cy to Mr. R. OBER, 19.7.67
with Caveat not to be used w/o check with Sig

3. ABELL and Helen KAGAN, who also was terminated at the UN Secretariat for security reasons, were reported in October 1952 to frequently return to the UN premises where they were said to often be seen in its corridors conversing with certain Russians and alleged Communists. According to a confidential FBI informant, ABELL in March 1952 made a check payable to KAGAN in the amount of $150, and KAGAN had made checks payable to ABELL on a number of occasions. Helen KAGAN is Helen KAGAN-POZNER, AKA: Elena Aleksandrovna Wilga, etc., #348 486, who is suspected of having long engaged in Soviet intelligence activities. Her brother, Vladimir A. POZNER, is an identified KGB officer and her cousin, Vladimir Wolf POZNER, is a known member of the French Communist Party and is suspected of involvement in Soviet intelligence. Her long-time consort, Peter WILGA, a leading figure in the CPUSA, was also suspected of Soviet intelligence connections. Helen KAGAN-POZNER WILGA is of continuing interest to the FBI and to SRS.

4. At a Senate Internal Security Subcommittee hearing in New York City in late 1952, Alfreda ABELL refused on grounds of self-incrimination to say whether she was then or ever had been a communist, whether she tried to organize UN workers, or whether since leaving the UN in the Summer of 1952 she had revisited UN headquarters in the role of a communist organizer. The FBI continued to have an interest in ABELL until at least December 1961, the date of an FBI report in her file.

5. The postmaster at Heiberger, Alabama in advising regarding Coretta SCOTT, as stated above, commented that she had in the past sung on the same program with Paul ROBESON at ROBESON's personal invitation. (Louis BUDENZ has stated that prior to his, (BUDENZ), defection from the Communist Party in 1945, he knew Paul ROBESON as a secret member of the Communist Party.)

M. D. Stevens

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Re Martin Luther King, Jr. — Harold Weisberg	REQUEST NUMBER F-76-382

FROM: IPS Vorhis	EXTENSION 7486	DATE SENT 17 June 76	SUSPENSE DATE 24 June 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDO/PIC F. C. Randall HT-1 Amber; GX-2 pls relay				Action
2.				
3. OS/IRG E. R. Duffy ~~TY 1~~				Action
4.				
5. CRS/FIO C. W. Rice ~~2B-60~~				Action
6. FELTON MARY HR-580 DDO/PIC 1D4127 EXT. 1644 TUBE HT1				
7. SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108				FYI
8. Batch F6-161				OPS/IRG
9. AI/DDA H. G. Bean ~~BX 1~~				FYI 7/8 - 52 hrs. per. P. Cochran. 3 Aug 76
10.				
11. DDI/FIO T. C. Lawler 2E-6104				FYI
12.				

RETURN TO: IPS Vorhis 2E-50

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

JBP

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) B-1965 B-1966
Re Martin Luther King, Jr. — Harold Weisberg
re James Earl Ray ~~B69-127 B-70 HK~~

REQUEST NUMBER F-76-382

FROM: IPS Vorhis

EXTENSION 7486

DATE SENT 17 June 76

SUSPENSE DATE 24 June 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DDO/PIC F. C. Randall HT-1 Amber; GX-2 pls relay			
2. DCD			
3. OS/IRG E. R. Duffy ~~EX-1~~			
4. 6-21-76 p.M.			
5. CRS/FIO C. W. Rice ~~2E-60~~			
6. FELTON MARY HR-580 DDO/PIC 1D4127 EXT. 1644 TUBE HT1			
7. SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108			
8. Batch F6-161			
9. AI/DDA H. G. Bean ~~BX 4~~			
10.	PM		
11. DDI/FIO T. C. Lawler ~~2E-6104~~	6-25-76		
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Action Attached is a copy of the only document we have which is pertinent

Action to the request. It is denied pursuant to the provisions of

Action exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)(a+b).

FYI HS

LANG 87 29 Sep

FYI Document 61

FYI

RETURN TO: IPS Vorhis 2E-50

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

REQUEST NUMBER 76-382

FROM: ~~A. B. Swider~~ Mary
O/DDO/FIO Ext. 9415

EXTENSION

DATE SENT 18 June

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. OSG/OC Attn: P. Marine	18/6/76	18/6/76	
2. 2B16			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/FIO Attn: Annette tube: CT-5, 2B1415			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

/✓/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/_/ See attached memorandum

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 OP-10 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

REQUEST NUMBER 76-382

FROM: ~~A.B. Swi~~der Marr
O/DDO/FIO CT-5

EXTENSION 9415

DATE SENT 18 June

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. FR PLANS Attn: Bob Baker	22 JUN 1976		
2. BU-6			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/FIO Attn: Annette Tube: CT-5, 2B1415			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

☑ No record of subject

☐ No info identifiable with subject

☐ See attached memorandum

RETURN TO:

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 OP-9 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King, Jr.

REQUEST NUMBER F 76-382

FROM: DCD/FIO/PAO
Helen Spilman
Rm 915 - Key Bldg

EXTENSION 2271

DATE SENT 25 Jun 76

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDO/PIC attn: Mary Felton				
2. Rm 1D 4125 - Hqs.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

RETURN TO:

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING – FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) FOI Request - Martin Luther King, Jr. (Harold Weisberg - Requester)

REQUEST NUMBER: F 76-382

FROM:
Donald G. Vorhis 7486 R 9271
Sally Weller 6400 R 9581
IPS/DDA 2E42 Hqs DX-2

EXTENSION:

DATE SENT: 26 July 1976

SUSPENSE DATE: 31 July 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DDO/PIC Mr. Randall GX-2 Pls relay to HT-1 Amber			
2.			
3. OPS/ITG		30/7	H
4. ES-2			
5.			
6. C/OPS/ITG			
7.			
8.			
9.			
DDO/PIC HT-1			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

The attached 7 documents were surfaced by OS/IRG in its search on Subject. The documents originated in your component or predecessor component.

Please review the documents to determine if they can be released to Subject in full, in sanitized form, or they are to be denied.

If the documents are releasable in full, please have them declassified by an authorized officer of your component.

If deletions are to be made, please make them and forward the sanitized version to this Staff to send to the requester. Cite the FOIA subsection which applies to the deleted portions.

If the document is denied please cite the appropriate subsection(s) of the FOIA.

In both of the above instances please name the denying official.

PRIORITY HANDLING – FOIA REQUEST
☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. x requested by Weisberg

REQUEST NUMBER
F76-382

FROM:
DDO/PIC
M. Felton
1D4125

EXTENSION
1644

DATE SENT
5 Aug 76

SUSPENSE DATE
XXXX 9 Aug 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. W. Strubitts SA/LA/EICO ET-3	5 AUG 1976		8
2. JOE		6 Aug	JL
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8. DDO/PIC M. FElton HT-1			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Pls review the attached for release to Weisberg per his FOIA request. Pls cite exemptions for denials and partial denials.

Thanks.
MFelton

2 to 8:

Have sanitized the attached documents for release to Weisberg.

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,requested by Weisberg	REQUEST NUMBER F76-382

FROM: M. Felton DDO/PIC 1D4125	EXTENSION 1644	DATE SENT 5 Aug 76 SUSPENSE DATE 9 Aug 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. H. Thompson EA/OEM/FOI BU-2	6/8	6/8	
2. AC/PIA/			W
3.			
4. EA/OEM/OS			
5. C/OEM		10/8	
6.			
7.			
8. M. Felton DDO/PIC HT_1			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

OPS/ITG proposes we pass the attached document to Weisberg in response to his FOIA request. Do you agree with this and with their sanitization? In particular, do you agree with leaving the address at the top of the attachment to the dispatch?

Thank you.
MFelton

1-2 -
I don't think we should agree. Reference to King is incidental. All other names would have to be removed.

2-4: Agree; we do not want the "O.J. Martin" address released. Attachment of little use to requestor anyway.

Document FHHT-6444
7 May 1968 - Hawaii Foundations for American Freedoms, Inc.

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King, Jr., requested by Weisberg

REQUEST NUMBER F76-382

FROM: DDO/PIC
M. Felton
1D4125

EXTENSION 1644

DATE SENT 5 Aug 76

SUSPENSE DATE 9 Aug

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. C. LaClair EUR/EXO GS-6	5 AUG 1976		cl	Pls review the attached documents for release to Weisberg per his FOIA request. Thanks. MFelton
2.				
3. E/I	9/8			
4.				3-5+8: documents with exception of owoA-19623 (which has no Italian connection) can be passed after excising ~~[illegible]~~ portions that have been bracketed (for source protection)
5. EXO	9 AUG 1976		a	
6. EUR/EXO GS-6	9 AUG 1976		cl	
7.				
8. DDO/PIC ATTN: Mary HT_1				8-6 - Pls review last document.
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				6 to 8: P[illegible] last sentence of the attach[illegible] doc owoA-19623 [illegible]

RETURN TO:

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Martin Luther King, Jr requested by Weisberg

REQUEST NUMBER
F76-382

FROM:
M. Felton
DDO/PIC
1D4125

EXTENSION
1644

DATE SENT
17 ~~16~~ Aug 76

SUSPENSE DATE
19 Aug 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. LA ET-3		9 Aug	Jh
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8. DDO/PIC HT-1 ATTN: Mary			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Pls review the attached document for release to Weisberg per his request. Cite exemptions for deletions or denial. Thank you.
MDFelton

1 TO 8:
Document sanitized for release.

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
FOI Request - Martin Luther King, Jr.
(Harold Weisberg - Requester)

REQUEST NUMBER
F 76-382

FROM:
Donald G. Vorhis 7486 R 9271
Sally Weiler 6400 R 9581
IPS/DDA 2E42 Hqs DX-2

EXTENSION

DATE SENT
26 July 1976

SUSPENSE DATE
31 July 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DDO/PIC Mr. Randall GX-2 Pls relay to HT-1 Amber	~~29 Jul 76~~		
2.			
3. OCD	29 Jul 76	30 Jul 76	
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/PIC			
10. 1D4127			
11. attn: Mary			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

The attached 7 documents were surfaced by OS/IRG in its search on Subject. The documents originated in your component or predecessor component.

Please review the documents to determine if they can be released to Subject in full, in sanitized form, or they are to be denied.

If the documents are releasable in full, please have them declassified by an authorized officer of your component.

If deletions are to be made, please make them and forward the sanitized version to this Staff to send to the requester. Cite the FOIA subsection which applies to the deleted portions.

If the document is denied please cite the appropriate subsection(s) of the FOIA.

In both of the above instances please name the denying official.

3 to 9: We do not know anything more about this incident. Inasmuch as it apparently did not appear in the press, I am afraid that the information in these memoranda, if put into the public domain, could jeopardize our relationship with the person who provided it to us. Therefore both documents are ebing denied pursuant to exemptions (b)(1),(b)(2),(b)(3)(a)&(b) and (b)(6).

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

3745 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

LISTING OF ATTACHED DOCUMENTS

(1) Memorandum from DCS, dated 28 May 1969. # 256

(2) Memorandum to Director, DCS, dated 19 February 1969. # 255

(3) DDO cable, dated 8 June 1968, IN 27362. — 252

(4) DDO cable, dated 8 June 1968, IN 27366. — 253

(5) DDO cable, dated 8 June 1968, IN 27367. -254

(6) DDO dispatch, UFGT-16828, dated 15 July 1966. — A-62

(7) DDO biographic data on Martin Luther King, dated 5 November 1967.

13-00000

3 Aug 76

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Request for copy of CIA Cable from CIA Reference File

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Cable Secretariat/Reference File Mr. Garnett U. Tate Chief, Cable Archives 1A-53 Hqs. Tube CT-7	6159	DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4. LA/SA			
5.			
6.			
7. DDO/PIC ATTN: MARY FALTON			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

The attached Form 1604, "Archives Cable Service", requests a copy of a CIA cable for which the dissemination is restricted. Would you please:

(a) Forward the attached copy to the requester (shown on Form 1604 or;

(b) Return the attached copy to Cable Archives with guidance in order that we may notify the requester of the disposition of his request.

Deny release based on liaison & sensitive sources & methods.

JL

2 cables denied

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC
CABLE REFERENCE SECTION
IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7

FROM: NAME OF REQUESTER: Felton, Mary D.
DIVISION/BRANCH: HT-1 DDO/PIC
DATE: 3 Aug 76
EXTENSION: 1644

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ____________ (IN/DIR NUMBER) ____________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

☐ ADD: ________ ________ ________ FOIA

☐ Recall copies from: ________ ________ ________ ________ ________

☐ Change action from: ________ To: ________

Authorized by: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ________ (EXT.)

In coordination with: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ________ (EXT.)

☐ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☑ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE '68	SUBJECT
[illegible]	PARA 6181	April	[illegible]

SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 1604 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

(47)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC
CABLE REFERENCE SECTION
IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7

FROM: NAME OF REQUESTER: M D Felton
DIVISION/BRANCH: HT-1 DDO/PIC

DATE: 9 Aug 76
EXTENSION: 1644

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ____________ (IN/DIR NUMBER)

____________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

☐ ADD: ________ ________ ________ FOIA

☐ Recall copies from: ________ ________ ________ ________ ________

☐ Change action from: ________ To: ________

Authorized by: ____________ NAME (type or print) ______ EXT.

In coordination with: ____________ NAME (type or print) ______ EXT.

AUG 9 10 15 AM '76

☒ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☒ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

38

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
IN 03635 2740	Rome 5861	May 68	RAY

Mary D. Felton
SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC CABLE REFERENCE SECTION IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7	FROM: NAME OF REQUESTER M.D. [illegible]	DATE 1[illegible] Aug 71
	DIVISION/BRANCH DDO/PIC (HT-[illegible])	EXTENSION 1604

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ______________ (IN/DIR NUMBER)

______________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

Follow

☐ ADD: ______ ______ ______

☐ Recall copies from: ______ ______ ______ ______ ______

☐ Change action from: ______ To: ______

Authorized by: ______________ (NAME (type or print)) ______ (EXT.)

In coordination with: ______________ (NAME (type or print)) ______ (EXT.)

☐ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☐ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
		[illegible]	

SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 **1604** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

(47)

3-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC
CABLE REFERENCE SECTION
IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7

FROM: NAME OF REQUESTER: Mary D. Felton
DIVISION/BRANCH: (HT-1) DDO/PIC
DATE: 13 Aug 76
EXTENSION: 1644

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ____________ (IN/DIR NUMBER)
____________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

☐ ADD: ________ ________ ________

FOIA

AUG 13 2 30 PM '76

☐ Recall copies from: ________ ________ ________ ________ ________

☐ Change action from: ________ To: ________

Authorized by: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ________ (EXT.)

In coordination with: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ________ (EXT.)

☑ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☒ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
IN 25866 2746	COPE 7485	June 68 (94)	MHPASHA
	5525		
	20		
	5535		

Mary D. Felton
SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 1604 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (47)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC
CABLE REFERENCE SECTION
IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7

FROM: NAME OF REQUESTER: Mary D. Felton
DIVISION/BRANCH: HT-1 155/RCG
DATE: 28 Mar 7
EXTENSION: 1644

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ________ (IN/DIR NUMBER) ________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

☐ ADD: ________ ________ ________

☐ Recall copies from: ________ ________ ________ ________ ________

☐ Change action from: ________ To: ________

Authorized by: ________ NAME (type or print) ________ EXT.

In coordination with: ________ NAME (type or print) ________ EXT.

☐ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☐ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
99685	ADDIS 2200	Apr 68	J. E. Ray

Sent to C/AF Reg for clearance

Mary D. Felton
SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 1604 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

(47)

1976

SECRET

FELTON MARY HR-580
DDO/PIC 1D4127
EXT. 1644 TUBE HT1

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE:

IP/FI CONTROL NO. 784

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	18	6	
REQUESTER					
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52			3m
REQUESTER					
IP/RMS	DW-6	GA-20			

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED: 4

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO *(Doc. Ref.)*:

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(TO IP/IN)*

F

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME: KING

GIVEN NAMES: Martin Luther Jr.

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED:

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 201-

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*:

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

☐ NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT

☐ SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES

☑ INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED

☐ THERE ARE ____ RECORDS OF WHICH ____ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME: 181148

1976 JUN 18 PM 1:11

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 3-74 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-8-38)

SECRET

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS (See DOI 70-20)

1. IF SUBJECT HAS A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH THE INDEX RECORDS MARKED IN GREEN TO REFLECT THE CONSOLIDATION ACTION TAKEN. **(Documents should then be placed in the 201, by the Researcher).**

2. WHEN SUBJECT HAS NO 201 FILE, BUT MEETS THE REQUIREMENT FOR OPENING A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH:

   A. A COMPLETED FORM 831.

   B. ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS, EXTRACTS, AND PROPERLY EDITED RECORDS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF THE FILE BY IP/RMS.

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

DATE

CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES: REQUESTER SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER TRACING THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WHICH ARE NOT SEARCHED BY IP/INDEX *(SEE NAME TRACE HANDBOOK)*.

SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED	SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED
DO AREA DESKS			CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE		
IP/ARCHIVES			CIA LIBRARY		
COMINT NAME CHECK			OFFICE OF SECURITY		
SB BIOGRAPHICS BRANCH			OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES		
TRAVEL PROGRAMS			DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION		
NAME OF BEARER FILE/OTS					
CIA APPLICANTS FILE/OFFICE OF PERSONNEL			DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE		
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP-SS/IL *(WFTU)*			DEFENSE CENTRAL INDEX		
COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF			CENTRAL REGISTRY - EUROPE		
OPERATIONS STAFF RESERVE OFFICERS FILE			FBI		
INTERAGENCY SOURCE REG.			I & NS		
CI OPERATIONS: CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
E/G PROGRAM			SECRET SERVICE		
WH SUBVERSIVES PROGRAM			DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY		

REMARKS

JUN 23 2 43 PM '76

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE 181148 034

REQ NO: 181148A01 REQUESTER: HR580 FELTON MARY DDO/PIC 1D4127 1644 HT1

NAME: KING,MARTIN LUTHER YOB: SEX: CIT:
ORIGIN:A DUR: PURPOSE:FDS PRTY:R OTPT:D300 FNU: SPELL: MASK: MAT:

CONTROL CODE 034-MHS-760618-142118-00015 142103

784

0001 KING, MARTIN LUTHER 201-0024907
SEX M DBA-0[redacted] APERTURE CAR
CIT USA 23APR62
TO BE INTERVIEWED BY PAUL KRASSNER CONTACT OF SUBJ ~~FBI~~
OF 201-24907. P9
FORMERLY: SS NO SOUR
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
APERTURE CARDS AVAILABL
DBA-07422 20 JUL 62 06186240

ACA
1458
ORIGIN: Miami, Fla
Date: 23 Apr 62
Subj: William Worthy, Jr.
Bufile: 105-20110
Fild: MM-105-4750

RECORD COPY AT...
PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY

0002 KING, MARTIN LUTHER 100-004-[illegible]
SEX M DFB-80124
MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH 16TH NATIONAL CON- P 732-0
VENTION OF CP, USA. PAGE NO. 316.
FORMERLY: DD NO DATE, SS NO SOUR
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
DFB-80124 20 SEP 72 03527255

28/03/57
mu
Sec - 11

ORIGIN: New York, NY
Date: 6 March 57
Subj: Communist Party USA
Bufile: 100-3
Field: NY-100-4931

PAGE 0001
---CONTINUED--- HR580 181148 034

S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

13-00000

```
                             S-E-C-R-E-T

0003 KING, MARTIN LUTHER /REV./                      200-009-004
                                                     DFB-82024
                                                     SER-27
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARDS AVAILABL
     DFB-82024                     01 JAN 58  08311751



0004 KING, M. L. /REV./                              074-006-040
                                                     RAKA-00708
                                                     25MAY56
                                                     SER-64
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARDS AVAILABL
     RAKA-00708                    01 JAN 58  08049094



0005 KING, MARTIN                                    201-0170954*
     SEX M DOB 14APR24          POB USA, NJER, HOBOKEN  TYPE NAME R
     CIT USA                                         RCD DATE 75
     RES USA. HUSB OF KING, EVA /201-0170954/
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
                                   23 APR 75  09272198



                     END OF REPLY - 0005 RECORDS LISTED




                                                                  PAGE 0002
               HR580                                    END OF  181143     034
                             S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

ORIGIN: New York, NY
Date: 19 Apr 57
Subj. Johnson Forest Group
Bufile: 100-347390.
Field: none given

ACA 15 07

25/04/57 Apr

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

ACR 15.07

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

SECRET

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM: FELTON MARY
DDO/PIC
BRANCH: EXT. 1644

BADGE NO.: HR-580
104127
TUBE HT1

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

DATE: 13 AUG 76

IP/FI CONTROL NO.: 590

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	28/7/76	
REQUESTER				
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52		
REQUESTER				
IP/RMS	DW-6	GA-20		

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED: 1

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO *(Doc. Ref.)*:

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(TO IP/IN)*

P

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME: RAY

GIVEN NAMES: JAMES EARL

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED:

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 201-

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*: ASSASSIN OF DR. KING.

SEX:

DATE OF BIRTH: 1928 (?)

PLACE OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP: USA

RESIDENCE:

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

	NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT
	SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES
✓	INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED
	THERE ARE ______ RECORDS OF WHICH ______ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS: no Fnu S

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME: 1976 JUL 28 PM 3:22 281224

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 3-74 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-8-38)

SECRET

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS (See DOI 70-20)

1. IF SUBJECT HAS A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH THE INDEX RECORDS MARKED IN GREEN TO REFLECT THE CONSOLIDATION ACTION TAKEN. **(Documents should then be placed in the 201, by the Researcher).**

2. WHEN SUBJECT HAS NO 201 FILE, BUT MEETS THE REQUIREMENT FOR OPENING A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH:

   A. A COMPLETED FORM 831.

   B. ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS, EXTRACTS, AND PROPERLY EDITED RECORDS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF THE FILE BY IP/RMS.

ꟷIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER	DATE

CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES: REQUESTER SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER TRACING THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WHICH ARE NOT SEARCHED BY IP/INDEX *(SEE NAME TRACE HANDBOOK)*.

SOURCE		DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED	SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED
O AREA DESKS				CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE		
P/ARCHIVES				CIA LIBRARY		
OMINT NAME CHECK				OFFICE OF SECURITY		
B BIOGRAPHICS BRANCH				OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES		
RAVEL PROGRAMS				DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION		
AME OF BEARER FILE/OTS						
IA APPLICANTS FILE/OFFICE OF PERSONNEL				DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE		
PECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP·SS/IL *(WFTU)*				DEFENSE CENTRAL INDEX		
OVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF				CENTRAL REGISTRY - EUROPE		
PERA-TIONS STAFF	RESERVE OFFICERS FILE			FBI		
	INTERAGENCY SOURCE REG.			I & NS		
I OPERATIONS: CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS				DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
/G PROGRAM				SECRET SERVICE		
H SUBVERSIVES PROGRAM				DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY		

EMARKS

AUG 13 1 06 PM '76

SECRET

```
                              S-E-C-R-E-T

                         NAME INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE
RQ# 28122482    REQUESTOR: HR500  FELTON, MARY   DDO/PIC  1D112T  1644  ITT

1 RAY,JAMES EARL                             YOB:        SEX:   CIT:
SIT:   DOB:    PURPOSE:PDS   PRTY:1   STRT:0500  F:04   SPELL:   HASH:   RPT:

RQL CODE 055- -S-750720-152345-00020    152515
----------------------------------------------------------------------

 RAY, JAMES EARL                                       201-0332732*
 SEX M DOB 10MAR28            POB USA, ILLINOIS        TYPE NAME T
 CIT USA                                               RCD DATE 68
 RES USA @ GALT, ERIC STARVO @ GALT, ERIC STAVO @
 WILLARD, JOHN @ WILLIARD, JOHN @ LOWMYER, HARVEY @
 OCONNOR, JAMES @ RAYNS, J.L. @ WALTON, JAMES @
 MCBRIDE, JAMES @ SNEYD, RAMON GEORGE @ SNEYA, RAMON
 GEORGE
 ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO DPD/ITG, 080704 , 1758, 19704/08
                                   23 JUL 68  00211859


 RAY, JAMES EARL                                       050-300
 SEX M DOB C28                POB USA                  HMMW-16558
 CIT USA                                               25APR68
 AKA GALT, ERIC STARVO, AKA LOWMYER, HARVEY, AKA
 WILLARD, JOHN SUBJ REPORTEDLY SHOT AND KILLED MARTIN
 LUTHER KING SUPPOSEDLY VISITED MEXICO
 ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - DC-52
                  APERTURE CARDS AVAILABLE
 HMMW-16558                        01 MAY 68  02723573
```

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

ACA
14,04
See Ops ITG
memo

```
CONTINUED---     HR500                                        PAGE 0001
                                                      281224       033
                     S-E-C-R-E-T   E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

S-E-C-R-E-T

```
RAY, JAMES                                                  100-002-002
SEX M DOB 00MAR26                                           316-0170368
CIT ITAL                                                    14MAY68
< USA PDD LOS ANGELES TRACE REPLY TO FBI
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - OC-92
316-0170368                  23 MAY 68  02131003
```

OLD/176 memo
[illegible]

```
RAY, JAMES                                                  049-007-025
SEX M                                                       PIR-05119
OCC DIRECTOR OF COHEN RONABECK TRAINING CO, THE             10NOV49
LATTER BEING AN AIR TRANSPORT FIRM WHICH CARRIES OUT        SER-15
ILLEGAL CONTRABAND OPS.
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - OC-92
PIR-05119                    23 NOV 72  02357421
```

END OF REPLY - 0004 RECORDS LISTED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

IP CONTROL NO. (Filled in by IP/FILES) H R 580	**DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST**
FROM: (Requester's name) OR AFFIX REQUESTER GUMMED LABEL Mary Felton	DATE OF REQUEST 27 Aug 76 dB 9:00

BRANCH	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.
DDO/PIC	1D4125	1644

TO:	DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1 IP/FILES DT-6			
2 REQUESTER			
3 IP/FILES DT-6			
4			
5			

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge.

☒ Temporary ☐ Permanent

4. Indicate source of reference:

☐ Document reference from IP/Index.

☐ Document reference from source other than IP/Index.

SUBJECT (must be furnished)
KING

#564

Q

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE	DISPOSITION OF REQUEST (To be completed by IP/Files)
201-1277	DBC 29138	13 Sep 68	RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY

Pg 8 Incidental
Reference
Not a Record

FORM 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
2-74

~~SECRET~~

CL. BY: 007622 (38)

SECRET
(*When Filled In*)

IP CONTROL NO. (*Filled in by IP/FILES*)

FELTON MARY
DDO/PIC
EXT. 1644
HR-580
1D4127
TUBE HT1
SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST

DATE OF REQUEST

BRANCH	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.
/		

TO:		DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	IP/FILES **DT-6**			
2	REQUESTER			
3	IP/FILES **DT-6**	9055 Mimi Allen		
4				
5				

SUBJECT (*must be furnished*)
King / Martin

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)

2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.

3. Indicate type of charge:

☑ *Temporary* ☐ *Permanent*

4. Indicate source of reference:

☐ *Document reference from IP/Index.*

☐ *Document reference from source other than IP/Index.*

REC'D IN FILES
16.00
OUT

#701

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE	DISPOSITION OF REQUEST (*To be completed by IP/Files*)
	PANA 6180 W 97566	Apr 68	[illegible]
201-811911	DBC 9770D	4 Feb 68	SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED FEH 8.70
~~19-5-52~~	~~DBC-23402~~	~~23 Jul 68~~	THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD
~~100-300-26~~	~~DBC-25546~~	~~19 Aug 68~~	RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
~~100-120-21~~	~~DBC-41496~~	~~30 Jan 69~~	THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD
201-1277	DBC-29138	13 Sep 68	Temp Charge See back
100-4-113	~~DBB-47898~~	~~13 May 68~~	LOST ~~Extensive Search Throughout~~ DDO Has Failed To Locate
~~100-4-44~~	~~DBC-23644~~ THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD	~~12 Jul 68~~	RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
~~96-300-1~~	~~DBC-63847~~	~~30 Sep 69~~	
~~201-805119~~	~~DBC-64858~~	~~13 Oct 69~~	RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
	~~DBC-3~~	ync 10 3 rd bk.	

FORM 2-74 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CL. BY: 007622 (38)

13-00000

IP/DMS

TEMPORARY CHARGE TO:

Dibenedetto

Name VINCE Ext x1552

Micrographics

Div. Subj

Rm

AUG 10 3 45 PM '76

13-00000

1976

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	OPS/ITG - Mr. Haefner	20/8	H
2	ES-2		
3	P.C. - FOR ACTION	23/8	
4			
5	DDO/PIC M. Felton HT-1		
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Pls fill out the attached form so we can report costs to IPS. Note we can only claim the actual search time for the records and not the time involved in reviewing and sanitizing them. Thank you.

(I talked to P. Cochran about this on the phone, but I'd like to get it in writing. Thanks)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
M. Felton	

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

FOIA REQUEST MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

DATE

TITLE OF DOCUMENT(S) AND/OR SUBJECT

F[illegible]76-382

WEISBERG request on Martin LUther King and James Earl Ray

SEARCH		COST *(To be completed by IRS)*	CLASSIFICATION REVIEW		COST *(To be completed by IRS)*
GRADE/STEP LEVEL	MANHOURS		GRADE/STEP LEVEL	MANHOURS	
8.7.	47 manhours		8.7	[redacted]	
				5 hrs. writeup	
TOTAL COST			TOTAL COST		

DO NOT DETACH THIS SLIP
RETURN TO ➡

CHIEF, INFORMATION REVIEW STAFF
7 C 28 Headquarters

FORM 1-75 3533 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (13-47)

13-00000

WEISBERG REQUES

	NR	NAI	INFO
IP/IN			X
CCS	X		
CI/OPS			X
DCD			X
FR	X		
OPS/ITG			X
OSG/OC	X		

13-00000

July 1976

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/DDO/PIC		✓
2	C/SS EW-7		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

If you've no objection, would like to pry out some sort of criteria.

Andy

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
A. F. Addona, C/DDO/PIC/AL HT-1	15 July

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 (40)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Request For Opinion--FOIA (b)(6) & Privacy Act

FROM: Charles A. Briggs Chief, Services Staff EW-7	EXTENSION 1596	NO. DATE 15 July 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OGC/FOIA FU-2				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Request For Opinion--FOIA (b)(6) & Privacy Act

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Charles A. Briggs Chief, Services Staff EW-7	1596	DATE 15 July 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/OPS/ITG ES-2 Attn: P. Haefner				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

C/SS
to
OGC

C/SS memo to OGC
(15 Jul 76)
requesting
criteria to
release info
under FOIA as
regards family
privacy rights.

Administrative - Internal Use Only

15 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : C/FOIA/PA

SUBJECT : Request For Opinion--FOIA (b)(6) & Privacy Act

REFERENCE : FOIA Request 76-382, copy attached

1. Mr. Weisberg has requested under the FOIA information on:

a. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

b. Earl Ray

c. Other individuals involved with the assassination of Dr. King.

2. To ensure consistency in making determinations for release under both the FOIA exemptions (b)(6) and the Privacy Act, of requests such as Mr. Weisberg's, would you please state the current legal criteria to apply to these type cases. Specifically, it would be helpful to the DDO to have a clearly enunciated legal opinion regarding what, if any, privacy rights the family of a deceased individual might have vis-a-vis the deceased individual. Further, what, if any, privacy rights does a convicted felon have.

3. We are aware that each case must be judged on its own facts. Hence, we would be grateful for your opinion regarding the criteria to apply to Mr. Weisberg's request. However, a general rule applicable to the type of request also would be very useful, would expedite the processing of such requests, and would apply some consistency in the decision-making process.

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

Attachment: Reference

cc: Paul Haefner, OPS/ITG

Administrative - Internal Use Only

CONFIDENTIAL

30 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Coordinator, DDO

SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

REFERENCE: F-76-382

This office recommends following action concerning the documents referred by OS/IRG:

Ray London-5061, dated 8 June 1968 and London-5062, dated 8 June 1968; concerns Ray traveling in London; source of this information was the FBI, some of the information was received from Scotland Yard; excluded under 1900.3(g)(4) and exempt under (b)(1)5(B)(1).

Ray Ottawa-5446, dated 8 June 1968; concerns travel of Galt; (SMABOVE/9) a Canadian service provided the information; exempt under (b)(1)5(B)(1).

King UFGT-16828, dated 15 July 1966; concerns surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by the Dade County/Florida police (Criminal Intelligence); excluded under 1900.3(g)(4).

John J. Reagan
Chief, International Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Ray LOND 5062 OGA1
8 June 68 liaison

CONFIDENTIAL

E.2 IMPDET CL BY 058223

13-00000

1976

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)

HAROLD WEISBERG FOR MARTIN LUGHTER KING AND JAMES EARL RAY DOCUMENTS

REQUEST NUMBER

FROM:

EXTENSION

DATE SENT

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. Owen	4 May	4	Ao
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7. Helen 1D 3125			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

These are the documents on Ray only. Please review them and let me know if there are any changes you want made on them.

OGC is currently reviewing them and writing the affadavit. Court date is 22 May.

We will have to incorporate ~~m~~ your changes into the affadavit.

Thanks

Helen X1313

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

27 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Officer, DDO

SUBJECT: Weisberg Request (James Earl Ray)
Part II

REFERENCE: 76-F-382

1. This office maintains a two volume 201 file (201-832732) on the Subject. These files and other records in this office revealed the following:

a. The following overt items are releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. Life, dated 3 May 1968; New York Times, dated 26 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 8 May 1968; Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; Ray's Odd Odyssey, undated; UPI, dated 17 May 1968; Reuters, Lisbon, dated 9 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, Lisbon, 9 June 1968; Los Vegas Sun, dated 3 June 1968; The Evening Star, dated 1 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; United Press International (UPI-16), dated 27 June 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, London, undated, UPI-16, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, Memphis, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, Washington, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; Ramparts, 29 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, Memphis, 27 June 1968; The Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Washington Post Foreign service, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Washington Post, 28 June 1968; Reuters, London,

Not accurate

E2 IMPDET CL BY 058123

dated 18 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 17 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 21 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, London, dated 28 June 1968; Reuters, undated; Reuters, Washington, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, undated; The Washington Post, 9 June 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 18 April 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 17 April 1968; The Washington Post, dated 8 April 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 16 April 1968; St. Louis Missouri, Post-Dispatch, dated 5 April 1968; Chicago Illinois News, dated 8 April 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, undated; London, dated 27 June 1968; Washington Star, 27 June 1968; New York Times, 18 April 1968; New York Times, dated 18 April 1968; New York Times, dated 19 April 1968; New York Times, dated 23 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 5 July 1968; Los Angeles Free Press, dated 19 April 1968; Washington Star, 26 April 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 25 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 27 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 4 July 1968; Washington Star, dated 30 December 1969; Reuters, dated 9 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968; EX-3438, dated 1969; The Strange Case of James Earl Ray; dated 1969; London, undated; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; UPI-7, London, 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, 11 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; London, 11 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, Washington, dated 10 June 1968; London, 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Moscow, (Gevorgyan Report), dated 22 November 1968; Moscow Trud (Gevorgyan Report) dated 22 November 1968; Evening Star, dated 9 May 1968; Washington Post, 8 May 1968; Washington Post, dated 2 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 11 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto,

Not accurate

refer to DDI/FBIS

dated 10 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, dated 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, undated; London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 30 June 1968; UPI-33, London, undated; Associated Press, London, dated 18 June 1968; UPI-26, London, dated 17 June 1968; UPI-13, dated 18 June 1968; London, dated 18 June 1968; UPI-30, London, dated 14 June 1968; London, dated 13 June 1968; London, dated 6 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 5 July 1968; Washington Examiner, dated 26-27, April 1968; Associated Press, dated 8 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 3 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 3 July 1968; London, dated 5 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 30 December 1969; Los Vegas Sun, 10 May 1968; Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968; Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968; Associated Press, London, undated; Reuters, London, 18 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, 13 June 1968; London, UPI-20, dated 13 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 12 June 1968; Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968; London, dated 13 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 12 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 12 June 1968; UPI-58, Lisbon, dated 12 June 1968; UPI-39, London, dated 12 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 20 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 13 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 13 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, London, dated 13 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968; UPI-9, London, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968; Associated Press, Washington, 11 June 1968; UPI-126, Washington, 11 June 1968; UPI-54, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 20 June 1968; Reuters, undated; Associated Press, London, dated 20 June 1968; UPI-61, 17 July 1968.

Not accurate

b. The following overt items make mention of the Subject but are not attached. Some cannot be reproduced and others are not available in this office. The Ottawa Citizen, dated 10 June 1968; The Ottawa Journal, dated 10 June 1968; The Gazette, dated 10 June 1968; Montreal Gazette, dated 11 June 1968; The Washington Post, dated 9 June 1968; The Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 17 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 20 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; Time, 21 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 May 1968; Washington Star, dated 18 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 21 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 6 May 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 June 1968; New York Times, dated 18 November 1968; Time, dated 13 September 1968; The Militant, dated 6 December 1968; Washington Star, dated 13 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 8 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 3 July 1968; Washington Post, 12 November 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 March 1969; Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 April 1969; Washington Star, dated 17 March 1969; Washington Post, dated 9 January 1970; Washington Star, dated 12 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 April 1968; Washington Post, 26 January 1969; Washington Post, dated 19 September 1968; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 13 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 14 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 11 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 19 April 1968; Associated Press, London, 27 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Time, dated 26 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 18 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 20 January 1968; Washington Star, dated 25 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 2 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 1 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 30 May 1969.

348-DIR 90530, 10 Apr 68 b1, b3, Mexi 5188, 349 10 Apr 68 b1, b3

c. The following agency documents are considered releasable to the requestor in segregated form under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Excised portions are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6). Cables: Director-92664, dated 18 April 1968; Director-93163, dated 19 April 1968; Sao Paulo-8372 (IN-94694), dated 19 April 1968; Director-93162, dated 19 April

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

1968; Director-93261, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93260, dated 20 April 1968; Tokyo-9600 (IN-94797), dated 20 April 1968; Director-93236, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93538, dated 22 April 1968; Bogota-0707 (IN-9556), dated 22 April 1968; Director-93603, dated 23 April 1968; La Paz-4254 (IN-96327), dated 23 April 1968; Guatemala City-8934 (IN-99192), dated 26 April 1968. Dispatches: ONHA-3982, dated 22 April 1968; HMMW-16358, dated 22 April 1968. Memoranda: Official Routing Slip, dated 22 October 1975; Official Routing Slip, dated 23 October 1975; Memoranda, dated 23 April 1968.

HMMW-16358 22 Apr 68

2. The following agency documents are exempt from release. Exemptions are as cited:

370 (a) Bogota-0703 (IN-95025), dated 20 April 1968; this cable concerns an American National with a striking resemblance to Eric Starvo Galt; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

371 ④ (b) Bangkok-9432 (IN-00056), dated 29 April 1968; Airforce Intelligence advised that a person formerly in Bangkok knew James Earl Ray; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

373 ⑥ (c) Rome-5861, dated 3 May 1968; concerns a James Ray, DPOB 8 March 1928, information provided by Siena police to (DEPARK/DEGOTIST); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

368 ① (d) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

Cindy

372 ⑤ (e) Memorandum, dated 1 May 1968 is a request for preparation of a transmittal to the FBI that deals with King Assassination; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

374 ⑦ (f) Memorandum, dated 14 May 1968; Subject: Assassination of Martin Luther King. Subject in this memorandum is a James Ray, born 8 March 1928 in Los Angeles. (CSCI-316/01763-68); the information was provided by an Italian intelligence service; exempt under (b)(1)5B(1).

375 (g) Memorandum, dated 16 May 1968; Subject: Investigation in Japan of Report of Suspicious Action of Another Subject who was Originally Described as Resembling Suspected Assassin; contains information provided by the Japanese National Police Agency; exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6), and (b)(1)5B(1). ~~Disp, 15 Jul 68 b1, b3~~ b6, King

From 30 Jul 71 Memo to DDO/PIC from OPS/ITG OS Referrals → 3 Cables, 8 June 68 b1 (liaison),

(h) Memorandum for the Record, dated 19 April 1968; Subject: Unknown Subject, possibly identifiable with Eric Starvo Galt; the information was based on clandestine photography of the Cuban embassy in Mexico City; exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(6) and (b)(1)(5)B(1). 369 ②

Memo, 19 Feb 69; Memo, 28 May 69, b1, b2, b3, b6 (OS referrals - DCD)
379 380

376-378 3. the following documents concern the James Earl Ray case but do not mention the Subject by name. All are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

381-388 (a) Eight biographic sketches on individuals thought to be associated with the Ray case.

389 (b) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards.

390 (c) The Hague-4137 (IN-94424), dated 19 April 1968; station and liaison traces provided no evidence that Subject had ever been in the Netherlands; exemptions (b)(1)5B(1) also applies.

391 (d) La Paz-4228 (IN-94482), dated 19 April 1968; La Paz morning papers carried photos of FBI Wanted Posters.

392 (e) Caracas-9414 (IN-94487), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

393 (f) San Jose-0157 (IN-94496), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

394 (g) Director-93306, dated 19 April 1968; states that two copies of photo sent 19 April.

395 (h) Director-92897, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

396 (i) Director-92895, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

397 (j) Director-93264, dated 20 April 1968; concerns one Edwin Mason.

398 (k) Panama City-6150 (IN-95853), dated 22 April 1968; concerns the detention of two Americans who were suspect.

399 (l) San Jose-0162 (IN-95902), dated 23 April 1968; queries fail to reveal any knowledge of Wolman or Hubbard (subjects of Panama City-6150, above).

400 ✓ (m) Panama City-6180 (IN-97560), dated 24 April 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, Panamanian National, who voluntarily signed a deposition that when his ship docked in Mobile Ala. in October 1962 he was approached with a job offer that might have had something to do with Dr. King. liaison

401 (n) Panama City-6193 (IN-98420), dated 25 April 1968, concerns material being pouched to the Station (ie the deposition of R. Brown cited above).

402 (o) Director-94343, dated 25 April 1968; Station sent a request to pouch copy of deposition and letter.

403 (p) HZPT-10075, dated 26 April 1968; transmits a copy of deposition material as requested.

404 (q) Lagos-9878, dated 28 April 1968; requests that the Embassy inquire of Wilder Company concerning one J. B. Musgrave.

405 (r) Lagos-9888 (IN-00793), dated 30 April 1968; reveals subject of Addis Ababa-2200 is not the man we seek.

406 (s) Director-95641, dated 30 April 1968; is a request that future traffic be sent in Air Force Channels.

407 ✓ (t) Memorandum, dated 2 May 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, a Panamanian National; forwarded to the FBI Brown's deposition. liaison

(u) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 6 May 1968;
408 Subject: Joe Bailey Musgrave.

(v) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 13 May 1968;
409 Subject: Joe Bailey Musgrave; forwarded passport photos of Musgrave.

(w) Frankfurt-5732 (IN-18095), dated 24 May 1968;
410 records of the Federal Criminal Police provided a negative reply (re Galt); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

4. Seven FBI reports which mention the Subject and/or his activities; excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment I.

a. Undated Memo, sanitized for release if the
411 FBI concurs; exemptions (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

b. Cactus-001, dated 22 January 1973; concerns
412 proposed hijacking of an unidentified aircraft.

c. Photos of Eric Starvo Galt, aka Harvey
413 Lawmyer and John Willard.

414 d. Photo of an unidentified individual.

415 e. Photo of an unidentified individual.

416 f. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G.

417 g. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G, Identification order 4132, 20 April 1968.

418 5. Department of State telegram, Ottawa-1813, dated 8 June 1968. Reports of the apprehension in London of James Earl Ray. Excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment II.

80 6. AB Memo, number 9605, dated 24 April 1968 which forwarded information on the Subject is attached for your contact with C/TSD/AB/PDS concerning the releasibility of this information. See Attachment III.

6. The cited documents are available in this office if needed.

John Reagan

John J. Reagan
Chief, International Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Attachment: a/s

27 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Officer, DDO

SUBJECT: Weisberg Request (James Earl Ray) Part II

REFERENCE: 76-F-382

1. This office maintains a two volume 201 file (201-832732) on the Subject. These files and other records in this office revealed the following:

a. The following overt items are releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. 1 Life, dated 3 May 1968; 2 New York Times, dated 26 April 1968; 3 Washington Star, dated 8 May 1968; 4 Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; 5 Ray's Odd Odyssey, undated; 6 ~~UPI~~ Reuters, dated 17 May 1968; 7 Reuters, Lisbon, dated 9 June 1968; 8 Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968; 9 Reuters, London, undated; 10 Reuters, Lisbon, 9 June 1968; 11 Los Vegas Sun, dated 3 June 1968; 12 The Evening Star, dated 2 July 1968; 13 Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; 14 ~~Reuters~~ AP, London, dated 27 June 1968; 15 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 16 Reuters, London, 27 June 1968; 17 Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; 18 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 19 Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; 20 Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; 21 United Press International (UPI-16), dated 27 June 1968; 22 London, dated 27 June 1968; 23 London, dated 27 June 1968; 24 Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; 25 Reuters, London, undated; 26 Reuters, London, undated; 27 UPI-16, dated 27 June 1968; 28 Associated Press, Memphis, dated 27 June 1968; 29 Associated Press, Washington, dated 27 June 1968; 30 Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; 31 Ramparts, 29 June 1968; 32 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 33 Reuters, London, undated; 34 Reuters, Memphis, 27 June 1968; 35 The Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; 36 Washington Post Foreign service, dated 8 June 1968; 37 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 38 Washington Post, 28 June 1968; 39 Reuters, London,

E2 IMPDET CL BY 058723

dated 18 June 1968;[40]Associated Press, dated 17 June 1968;[41]Reuters, London, dated 21 June 1968;[42]Reuters, London, undated;[43]Reuters, London, dated 28 June 1968;[44]Reuters, undated;[45]Reuters, Washington, dated 8 June 1968;[46]Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968;[47]Reuters, undated;[48]The Washington Post, 9 June 1968;[49]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 18 April 1968;[50]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 17 April 1968;[51]The Washington Post, dated 8 April 1968;[52]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 16 April 1968;[53]St. Louis Missouri, Post-Dispatch, dated 5 April 1968;[54]Chicago Illinois News, dated 8 April 1968;[55]London, dated 27 June 1968;[56]London, dated 27 June 1968;[57]Associated Press, London, undated;[58]London, dated 27 June 1968;[59]Washington Star, 27 June 1968;[60]New York Times, 18 April 1968;[61]New York Times, dated 18 April 1968;[62]New York Times, dated 19 April 1968;[63]New York Times, dated 23 April 1968;[64]Washington Post, dated 5 July 1968;[65]Los Angeles Free Press, dated 19 April 1968;[66]Washington Star, 26 April 1968;[67]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 25 April 1968;[68]Washington Post, dated 27 April 1968;[69]Washington Post, dated 4 July 1968;[70]Washington Star, dated 30 December 1969;[71]Reuters, dated 9 June 1968;[72]Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968;[73]EX-3438, dated 1969;[74]The Strange Case of James Earl Ray;[75]dated 1969;[76]London, undated;[77]Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968;[78]London, dated 10 June 1968;[79]London, dated 10 June 1968;[80]UPI-7, London, 10 June 1968;[81]Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968;[82]London, dated 10 June 1968;[83]London, dated 10 June 1968;[84]Reuters, London, 11 June 1968;[85]Reuters, London, undated;[86]London, 11 June 1968;[87]Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968;[88]London, dated 10 June 1968;[89]Reuters, Washington, dated 10 June 1968;[90]London, 10 June 1968;[91]London, dated 10 June 1968;[92]Reuters, London, 10 June 1968;[93]Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968;[94]London, dated 11 June 1968;[95]Reuters, London, undated;[96]Moscow, (Gevorgyan Report), dated 22 November 1968;[97]Moscow Trud (Gevorgyan Report) dated 22 November 1968;[98]Evening Star, dated 9 May 1968;[99]Washington Post, 8 May 1968;[100]Washington Post, dated 2 July 1968;[101]Reuters, London, dated 11 June 1968;[102]Associated Press, dated 10 June 1968;[103]Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968;[104]Associated Press, Toronto,

dated 10 June 1968;[105]Associated Press, Toronto, dated
10 June 1968;[106]Associated Press, London, undated;[107]London,
dated 27 June 1968;[108]Associated Press, London, dated
30 June 1968;[109]UPI-33, London, undated;[110]Associated Press,
London, dated 18 June 1968;[111]UPI-26, London, dated 17
June 1968;[112]UPI-13, dated 18 June 1968;[113]London, dated
18 June 1968;[114]UPI-30, London, dated 14 June 1968;
115 London, dated 13 June 1968;[116]London, dated 6 July 1968;
117 Reuters, London, dated 5 July 1968;[118]Washington Examiner,
dated 26-27, April 1968;[119]Associated Press, dated 8 July
1968;[120]Reuters, London, dated 3 July 1968;[121]Reuters,
London, dated 3 July 1968;[122]London, dated 5 July 1968;
123 Washington Post, dated 30 December 1969;[124]Los Vegas
Sun, 10 May 1968;[125]Associated Press, London, 18 June
1968;[126]Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968;[127]Associated
Press, London, undated;[128]Reuters, London, 18 June 1968;
129 Associated Press, Toronto, 13 June 1968;[130]London, UPI-20,
dated 13 June 1968;[131]Reuters, London, dated 12 June 1968;
132 Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968;[133]London, dated
13 June 1968;[134]Associated Press, London, dated 12 June
1968;[135]Associated Press, London, dated 12 June 1968;
136 UPI-58, Lisbon, dated 12 June 1968;[137]UPI-39, London,
dated 12 June 1968;[138]Associated Press, London, dated
20 June 1968;[139]Associated Press, London, dated 13 June
1968;[140]Associated Press, London, dated 13 June 1968;
141 Reuters, London, undated;[142]Reuters, London, dated 13
June 1968;[143]Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968;
144 UPI-9, London, dated 11 June 1968;[145]Reuters, Nashville,
dated 11 June 1968;[146]Associated Press, Toronto, dated
11 June 1968;[147]Reuters, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968;
148 Associated Press, Washington, 11 June 1968;[149]UPI-126,
Washington, 11 June 1968;[150]UPI-54, Nashville, dated
11 June 1968;[151]Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968;
152 Reuters, London, dated 20 June 1968;[153]Reuters, undated;
154 Associated Press, London, dated 20 June 1968;[155]UPI-61,
17 July 1968.

b. The following overt items make mention of the Subject but are not attached. Some cannot be reproduced and others are not available in this office. The Ottawa Citizen, dated 10 June 1968; The Ottawa Journal, dated 10 June 1968; The Gazette, dated 10 June 1968; Montreal Gazette, dated 11 June 1968; The Washington Post, dated 9 June 1968; The Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 17 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 20 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; Time, 21 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 May 1968; Washington Star, dated 18 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 21 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 6 May 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 June 1968; New York Times, dated 18 November 1968; Time, dated 13 September 1968; The Militant, dated 6 December 1968; Washington Star, dated 13 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 8 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 3 July 1968; Washington Post, 12 November 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 March 1969; Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 April 1969; Washington Star, dated 17 March 1969; Washington Post, dated 9 January 1970; Washington Star, dated 12 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 April 1968; Washington Post, 26 January 1969; Washington Post, dated 19 September 1968; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 13 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 14 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 11 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 19 April 1968; Associated Press, London, 27 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Time, dated 26 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 18 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 20 January 1968; Washington Star, dated 25 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 2 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 1 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 30 May 1969.

c. The following agency documents are considered releasable to the requestor in segregated form under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Excised portions are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6). Cables: Director-92664, dated 18 April 1968; Director-93163, dated 19 April 1968; Sao Paulo-8372 (IN-94694), dated 19 April 1968; Director-93162, dated 19 April

1968; Director-93261, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93260, dated 20 April 1968; Tokyo-9660 (IN-94797), dated 20 April 1968; Director-93236, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93538, dated 22 April 1968; Bogota-0707 (IN-9556), dated 22 April 1968; Director-93603, dated 23 April 1968; La Paz-4254 (IN-96327), dated 23 April 1968; Guatemala City-8934 (IN-99192), dated 26 April 1968. Dispatches: ONHA-3982, dated 22 April 1968; HMMW-16353, dated 22 April 1968. Memoranda: Official Routing Slip, dated 22 October 1975; Official Routing Slip, dated 23 October 1975; Memoranda, dated 23 April 1968.

2. The following agency documents are exempt from release. Exemptions are as cited:

(a) Bogota-0703 (IN-95025), dated 20 April 1968; this cable concerns an American National with a striking resemblance to Eric Starvo Galt; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(b) Bangkok-9432 (IN-00056), dated 29 April 1968; Airforce Intelligence advised that a person formerly in Bangkok knew James Earl Ray; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(c) Rome-5861, dated 3 May 1968; concerns a James Ray, DPOB 8 March 1928, information provided by Siena police to (DEPARK/DEGOTIST); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(d) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(e) Memorandum, dated 1 May 1968 is a request for preparation of a transmittal to the FBI that deals with King Assassination; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(f) Memorandum, dated 14 May 1968; Subject: Assassination of Martin Luther King. Subject in this memorandum is a James Ray, born 8 March 1928 in Los Angeles. (CSCI-316/01763-68); the information was provided by an Italian intelligence service; exempt under (b)(1)5B(1).

(g) Memorandum, dated 16 May 1968; Subject: Investigation in Japan of Report of Suspicious Action of Another Subject who was Originally Described as Resembling Suspected Assassin; contains information provided by the Japanese National Police Agency; exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6), and (b)(1)5B(1).

(h) Memorandum for the Record, dated 19 April 1968; Subject: Unknown Subject, possibly identifiable with Eric Starvo Galt; the information was based on clandestine photography of the Cuban embassy in Mexico City; exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(6) and (b)(1)(5)B(1).

3. the following documents concern the James Earl Ray case but do not mention the Subject by name. All are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(a) Eight biographic sketches on individuals thought to be associated with the Ray case.

(b) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards.

(c) The Hague-4137 (IN-94424), dated 19 April 1968; station and liaison traces provided no evidence that Subject had ever been in the Netherlands; exemptions (b)(1)5B(1) also applies.

(d) La Paz-4228 (IN-94482), dated 19 April 1968; La Paz morning papers carried photos of FBI Wanted Posters.

(e) Caracas-9414 (IN-94487), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

(f) San Jose-0157 (IN-94496), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

(g) Director-93306, dated 19 April 1968; states that two copies of photo sent 19 April.

(h) Director-92897, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

(i) Director-92895, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

(j) Director-93264, dated 20 April 1968; concerns one Edwin Mason.

(k) Panama City-6150 (IN-95853), dated 22 April 1968; concerns the detention of two Americans who were suspect.

(l) San Jose-0162 (IN-95902), dated 23 April 1968; queries fail to reveal any knowledge of Wolman or Hubbard (subjects of Panama City-6150, above).

(m) Panama City-6180 (IN-97560), dated 24 April 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, Panamanian National, who voluntarily signed a deposition that when his ship docked in Mobile Ala. in October 1962 he was approached with a job offer that might have had something to do with Dr. King.

(n) Panama City-6193 (IN-98420), dated 25 April 1968, concerns material being pouched to the Station (ie the deposition of R. Brown cited above).

(o) Director-94343, dated 25 April 1968; Station sent a request to pouch copy of deposition and letter.

(p) HZPT-10075, dated 26 April 1968; transmits a copy of deposition material as requested.

(q) Lagos-9878, dated 28 April 1968; requests that the Embassy inquire of Wilder Company concerning one J. B. Musgrave.

(r) Lagos-9888 (IN-00793), dated 30 April 1968; reveals subject of Addis Ababa-2200 is not the man we seek.

(s) Director-95641, dated 30 April 1968; is a request that future traffic be sent in Air Force Channels.

(t) Memorandum, dated 2 May 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, a Panamanian National; forwarded to the FBI Brown's deposition.

(u) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 6 May 1968; Subject: JJoe Bailey Musgrave.

(v) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 13 May 1968; Subject: Joe Bailey Musgrave; forwarded passport photos of Musgrave.

(w) Frankfurt-5732 (IN-18095), dated 24 May 1968; records of the Federal Criminal Police provided a negative reply (re Galt); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

4. Seven FBI reports which mention the Subject and/or his activities; excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment I.

a. Undated Memo, sanitized for release if the FBI concurs; exemptions (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

b. Cactus-001, dated 22 January 1973; concerns proposed hijacking of an unidentified aircraft.

c. Photos of Eric Starvo Galt, aka Harvey Lawmyer and John Willard.

d. Photo of an unidentified individual.

e. Photo of an unidentified individual.

f. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G.

g. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G, Identification order 4132, 20 April 1968.

5. Department of State telegram, Ottawa-1813, dated 8 June 1968. Reports of the apprehension in London of James Earl Ray. Excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment II.

6. AB Memo, number 9605, dated 24 April 1968 which forwarded information on the Subject is attached for your contact with C/TSD/AB/PDS concerning the releasibility of this information. See Attachment III.

6. The cited documents are available in this office if needed.

John J. Reagan

John J. Reagan
Chief, International Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Attachment: a/s

OGC
memo
(4 Oct
197
to ADDO
re.
FBI
contact
w/CIA
regard.
KING

OGC 76-5403 [illegible]
4 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR : Associate Deputy Director for Administration
Attn: Chief, Security Analysis Group, OS
Director of Personnel
Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology
✓Associate Deputy Director for Operations
Attn: ISS/IP/EIS
D/DCI/Intelligence Community
D/DCI/for National Intelligence Officers
Legislative Counsel
Inspector General
Executive Secretary

FROM : Richard H. Lansdale
Associate General Counsel

SUBJECT : Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. At the Attorney General's direction, a task force was established in May 1976 by the Office of Professional Responsibility of the Justice Department to review the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in relation to the late Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., his assassination and the Bureau's investigation of that murder.

2. Pursuant to the Attorney General's directive, Justice is canvassing those investigative agencies of the Government which might have been contacted by the FBI to secure or deliver information for intelligence, for investigative assistance (before or after the assassination), or for any form of counterintelligence action in relation to Dr. King.

3. It is requested that a check be made of your records to determine the extent and nature of any contacts with CIA by the FBI in regard to the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

4. DoJ has expressed some urgency in responding to their request. Therefore, please advise this Office of the results of your search at your earliest convenience, but no later than close of business, 21 October 1976.

Richard H. Lansdale
Richard H. Lansdale

13-00000

IPS

resp.
to
WEISBERG

~~3~~ 2 copies

2 left
1 copy
1 Betty

((

26 APR 1977

James H. Lesar, Esq.
Attorney at Law
1231 Fourth Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

This is in partial response to your request, dated 11 June 1976, made on behalf of your client, Mr. Harold Weisberg. Please refer also to our letters, dated 21 June 1976, 30 November 1976 and 13 January 1977. Per our recent telephone conversation this partial response addresses itself to that part of your letter requesting records pertaining to James Earl Ray.

The materials located thus far have been reviewed carefully, and our determinations are as follows:

Enclosed, Tab A, are copies of the following items which are being released to you in their entirety:

1. One book excerpt.

2-109. One hundred and eight (108) press items.

110-134. Twenty-five (25) UPI wire items.

135-171. Thirty-seven (37) Reuters wire items.

172-223. Fifty-two (52) AP wire items.

Enclosed also, Tab B, are segregable portions of the documents listed below. Deletions in the originals were made under the exemption provisions of the Freedom of Information Act subsections which are given with each document cited.

The applicability of these exemptions has been explained to you in our earlier correspondence.

	Documents	Exemptions
224-225.	Two cables, dated 10 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
226.	Cable, dated 10 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
227-229.	Three cables, dated 19 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
230-233.	Four cables, dated 20 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
234-235.	Two cables, dated 22 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
236-237.	Two dispatches, dated 22 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
238-239.	Two cables, dated 23 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
240.	Memorandum, dated 23 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
241.	Cable, dated 26 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
242.	Routing slip, dated 22 October 1975.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
243.	Routing slip, dated 23 October 1975.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

The documents listed below are being withheld in their entirety under the exemption provisions of the Freedom of Informaton Act subsections given with each document.

	Documents	Exemptions
244.	Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
245.	Memorandum, dated 19 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
246.	Cable, dated 20 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

371 247.	Cable, dated 29 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
248.	Memorandum, dated 1 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
249.	Cable, dated 3 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
250.	Memorandum, dated 14 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
251.	Memorandum, dated 16 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
252-254.	Three cables, dated 8 June 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
255.	Memorandum, dated 19 February 1969.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
256.	Memorandum, dated 28 May 1969.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
257-264.	Eight biographic sketches.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
265.	Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
266-272.	Seven Cables, dated 19 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
273.	Cable, dated 20 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
274.	Cable, dated 22 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
275.	Cable, dated 23 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
276.	Cable, dated 24 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
277-278.	Two Cables, dated 25 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
279.	Dispatch, dated 26 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

280. Cable, dated 28 April 1963. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

281-282. Two Cables, dated 30 April 1963. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

283. Memorandum, dated 2 May 1963. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

284. Memorandum, dated 6 May 1963. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

285. Memorandum, dated 13 May 1963. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

286. Cable, dated 24 May 1963. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

The decisions cited above were made by Mr. Charles A. Briggs, DDO Information Review Officer.

As specified in the Freedom of Information Act, I am advising you of your right to appeal the above decisions, but it would seem to be more reasonable to await the complete results of our processing before you actually determine whether to do so.

We thank you for your patience and consideration.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Savige

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures
IPS/EK/cb/20 Apr 77
Orig. - Adse.
1 - DDO
1 - IPS Chrono
1 - IPS F-76-382 w/cy Tab B
1 - OLC
1 - OGC
1 - Pub Aff/Hetu

13-00000

7ICG

CONFIDENTIAL

27 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

FROM : Charles A. Briggs
DDO Information Review Officer

SUBJECT : FBI Referral re Harold Weisberg Request on Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Earl Ray

REFERENCES : A. Request No. F 76-382

B. Referral, Dated 25 March 1977

C. Briggs' Memorandum to IPS dated 26 October 1976

The documents forwarded under Reference B have been reviewed by the responsible DDO components and the following determinations have been made:

a. One CIA originated document may be released in sanitized form (Tab A).

b. Five CIA originated documents are denied; they are listed with appropriate exemptions under Tab B.

c. Five FBI documents containing CIA information should be denied; they are listed with appropriate exemptions under Tab C.

d. Two FBI documents and one CIA document should be referred to other CIA components for determinations (see Tab D).

/s/ Charles A. Briggs
Charles A. Briggs

Attachments: a/s

cc: IPG/SCB
SA/C/LA
EUR/EXO
AF/Plans

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

CIA · Originated
Release - Sanitized

TAB A
(PICG 15)
155 [illegible]

FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	EXEMPTIONS
	[✓ Cable], Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date : 11 Apr 68	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:

13-00000

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

[illegible] TELETYPE
[illegible] 1968
ENCIPHERED

C.I.A.
RELEASE

RR ESV

DE ESC 050 1022137

ZNY SSSSS

R 111603Z APR 68

FM DIRECTOR CIA

TO DIRECTOR FBI

BT

SECRET

CIA NBR 90520

McGowan

marking

SUBJECT: CLAUDE CHESTER MCLAREN, JR.

1. A SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT SUBJECT, BORN 12 SEPT 1936 IN TEXAS, U.S. PASSPORT Z 155489, ARRIVED MEXICO CITY FROM HONDURAS ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT ON 8 APRIL. SOURCE NOTED SUBJECT HAD AMAZING RESEMBLANCE TO "PHOTOGRAPHS" OF ALLEGED ASSASSIN OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

REC-9 44-38861-860

EX-116

APR 16 1968

2. ANOTHER SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT MCLAREN DEPARTED MEXICO CITY FOR HOUSTON ON PANAM FLIGHT EVENING 8 APRIL OCCUPYING SEAT NO. 41. SOURCE SAW PLANE

76

59APR 22 1968

TAXI OFF WITH SUBJECT ABOARD. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, CAPTAIN OF THE PANAM FLIGHT (WHO RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 9 APRIL) REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SUBJECT ARRIVED IN HOUSTON.

3. THIS OFFICE HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT.

4. THE INFORMATION IN PARA ONE HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO YOUR BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY

GP-1

BT

NNNN

INT QSL PLS GA

EFH FBI REC NBR 50

TOR 11/2155Z KK

C.I.A.
RELEASE

cc: Mr. Papich

13-00000

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. G
Mr. R
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TELETYPE
APR 11 1968
ENCIPHERED

C.I.A.
RELEASE

~~RR ESV~~

~~DE ESC 050 1022137~~

~~ZNY SSSSS~~

R 111603Z APR 68

FM DIRECTOR CIA

TO DIRECTOR FBI

BT

~~S E C R E T~~

CIA NBR 90520

Markin

McGowan
4/23/69

SUBJECT: ~~CLAUDE CHESTER MCLAREN, JR.~~

1. ~~A SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT SUBJECT, BORN 12 SEPT 1936 IN TEXAS, U.S. PASSPORT Z 155489,~~ ~~ARRIVED MEXICO CITY FROM HONDURAS ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT ON 8 APRIL. SOURCE NOTED~~ SUBJECT HAD AMAZING RESEMBLANCE TO "PHOTOGRAPHS" OF ALLEGED ASSASSIN OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

REC-9 44-38861-860

EX-116

16 APR 16 1968

2. ~~ANOTHER SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT MCLAREN~~ DEPARTED ~~MEXICO CITY~~ FOR HOUSTON ON PANAM FLIGHT EVENING 8 APRIL ~~OCCUPYING SEAT NO. 41. SOURCE SAW PLANE~~

76

59 APR 22 1968

~~TAXI OFF WITH SUBJECT ABOARD. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, CAPTAIN OF THE PANAM FLIGHT (WHO RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 9 APRIL)~~ REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SUBJECT ARRIVED IN HOUSTON.

3. THIS OFFICE HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT.

4. THE INFORMATION IN PARA ONE HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO YOUR BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE ~~IN MEXICO CITY~~

GP-1

BT

NNNN

~~INT QSL PLS GA~~
~~EFH FBI REG NBR 50~~
~~TOR 11/2155Z KK~~

C.I.A.
RELEASE

cc: Mr. Papich

13-00000

C.I.A. Documents
Denied

TAB B
(PICG's)
FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER | **DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION** | **EXEMPTIONS**

Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch
Other:
Date :
(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
(j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1)
Other:

Doc # A-73
King
h/w
Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch
Other:
Date : 18 Apr 68
Doc. ⑧③ of Briggs Memo to IPS, 26 Oct 76
[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ ~~(b)(3)~~], (b)(6)
(j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1)
Other:

Treated in Initial Review
[✓ Cable], Memorandum, Dispatch
Other:
Date : 25 Apr 68
~~Based~~ on Doc. 407 #(283) of Briggs memo to IPS
based on
[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)]
(j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1)
Other:

Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch
Other:
Date : 25 Apr 68
KING
Doc. ⑦④ of Briggs Memo to IPS
[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], (b)(6)
(j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1)
Other:

✓
Treated in Initial Review
Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch
Other:
Date : 2 May 68
Doc. 407 of Briggs memo to IPS
(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
(j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1)
Other:

Treated in Initial Review
date: 6 May 68
Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch
Other:
Date : ⑦ May 68
Doc. 408 of Briggs Memo to IPS
(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
(j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1)
Other:

Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch
Other:
Date :
(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
(j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1)
Other:

Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch
Other:
Date :
(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
(j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1)
Other:

Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch
Other:
Date :
(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
(j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1)
Other:

SECRET

[illegible] Release CIA 4/11/68 [illegible]

18 Apr 68

McGhee Flory

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Junior

1. Your Bureau representative in Mexico City provided our representative with composite photographs of the suspected killer of Martin Luther King, Jr, and asked for a check against visitors to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City during the recent months.

2. Checks for persons appearing to resemble the composite photographs were negative at both Embassies. On 30 January 1968 an unidentified white male visited the Soviet Embassy but the description did not fit either the composite photograph or the description provided by your Bureau representative. However, our representative passed copies of the photographs to your Bureau representative with the notation that he did not appear to be identical with the Bureau suspect. Our representative further stipulated that any use of the photographs in an investigation should not reveal that the photographs were made in Mexico or by this Office.

B-88! 17 April
Dec 73
Denied
6/63

EX-103

REC 11 44-38861-1371

APR 23 1968

248

GROUP 1

SECRET

13-00000

CIA info in FBI Documents
Deny per 27 Apr 77
ISS response to IPS

TAB C
(PICG'S)

FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	EXEMPTIONS
KING	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Teletype Date : 4/11/68	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY Doc #A	Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : 17 Apr 68	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Based on Doc. 389 of Biggs' Memo to IPS, 26 Oct 76	
RAY Doc A	Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : 22 Apr 68	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Based on Doc. 398 of Biggs Memo to IPS	
RAY	Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : 4/28/68	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY	Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : 4/29/68	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:

( ) UNCLASSIFIED ( ) CONFIDENTIAL ( ) SECRET ( ) TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

Document Description: FBI Teletype

Dated: 4/11/68

Document Located By : ____________ (Office Designation)

Document referred to DDO for review by: FBI

RECOMMEND:

- ____ Release in full-text
- X Release in sanitized form
- ____ Deny in toto
- ____ Defer decision to ____
- X Coordination with LA/DR prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
( )	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
(X)	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(X)	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
(X)	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
* ( )	Other, specify:		

* For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

Deny — All CIA info denied. b1, b3, b2

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

D. Kostegard, E/IB Mary C Hogg SA/C/LA

Signature of Reviewing Officer & Office

Document No. ____________

(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

13-00000

4/11/68

CODE

TELETYPE URGENT

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Griffith
1 - Mr. Atkinson

VIA TELETYPE
1232 PM
APR 11 1968
ENCIPHERED

TO LEGAT SANTO DOMINGO

FROM DIRECTOR FBI [illegible]

ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

REURTELS NUMBERS TWO AND FOUR DATED APRIL EIGHT LAST.

PERTINENT DATA IN RETELS WAS INCORPORATED INTO LHM AND FURNISHED WHITE HOUSE, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND INTERESTED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES BY LETTER APRIL TEN INSTANT.

IN VIEW OF NATURE AND ENORMITY OF ALLEGATIONS MADE BY HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA CONCERNING THIS MATTER, LEGAT MUST ENDEAVOR TO VERIFY OR DISPROVE SUCH ALLEGATIONS.

PHOTOGRAPH OF ONE HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA, ALSO KNOWN AS HERNAN HENRIQUEZ URENA LORA, BORN OCTOBER TWENTY FOUR, FIFTEEN, AT SAN DIEGO, CUBA, OR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-4 44-38861-498

BUREAU FILES REVEAL ABOVE INDIVIDUAL IS DOMINICAN CITIZEN AND HIS PARENTS WERE MAX AND GUARINA HENRIQUEZ.

19 APR 12 1968

Delete ~~CIA ON APRIL SEVENTEEN, SIXTY TWO, ADVISED ABOVE HENRIQUEZ LORA WAS CITIZEN OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WHO HAD BEEN TRAVELING ON CUBAN PASSPORT NUMBER ONE ONE TWO SEVEN DATED JANUARY TWENTY FIVE, FIFTY NINE. IN ONE NINE SIX TWO HE RESIDED AT ANTONIO MAURA, TEN~~

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review)

1 - 105-168197 (H. Rap Brown)
1 - 100-446080 (S. Carmichael)
1 - 105437088 (Hernan Henriquez Lora)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WHA:lam (10)

TELETYPE TO LEGAT SANTO DOMINGO
RE: ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

~~MADRID, SPAIN. ACCORDING TO CIA, HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN BOTH PRO-CASTRO AND ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN MADRID DURING PRECEDING TWO YEARS AND WAS SUSPECTED OF BEING A MEMBER OF CUBAN G-TWO. THIS INFORMATION WAS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" BY CIA.~~

~~CIA ON AUGUST NINE, SIXTY SIX, ADVISED IT HAD NOT HAD ANY OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA AND ITS FILES INDICATED HE HAS "VERY UNSAVORY REPUTATION."~~ delete

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION CONCERNING HENRIQUEZ LORA WILL BE FORWARDED BY AIRTEL.

NOTE:

Legat in retels reported Henriquez Lora had volunteered a third party had over heard a conversation in Santo Domingo between two Dominican communists in which it was alleged that Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown advocated the death of Martin Luther King and King's assassination would benefit the cause of black violence.

MAR 11 12 17 PM '68
CODING UNIT

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. ________

Document Description: Memo

Dated: 4/29/68

Document Located By : FBI
(Office Designation)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ________

RECOMMEND:

- ________ Release in full-text
- ________ Release in sanitized form
- ✓ Deny in toto
- ________ Defer decision to ________
- ________ Coordination with ________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(X)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(X)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(X)	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
~~( )~~	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
* (X)	Other, specify: This name is subject of investigation by other USG entities.		

* For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Signature of Reviewing Officer & Office

Document No. ________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

4-29-68

Airtel

1 - Mr. Hudson

To: SAC, Washington Field

From: Director, FBI

MURKIN

On 4-28-68, a representative of CIA advised the Bureau that a German doctor, Klaus Steer, German Director, Scientific Department, Africa, E. Merck Aktiengesellschast, Karmstady, Germany, had advised the American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that he believed he had seen an individual whom he thought to be Eric Starvo Galt at the Bristol Hotel, Lagos, Nigeria, on the afternoon of 4-23-68. The individual was identified as Joe Musgaque, who is reportedly an employee of the Wilder Oil Company (address unknown).

Washington Field, check passport records for any identifying data concerning Musgaque; and also attempt to determine through the Department of State any information concerning the Wilder Oil Company, which reportedly is operating in Nigeria. If no information available in State Department records regarding the Wilder Oil Company, determine whether State Department can obtain this information from the Nigerian Embassy.

Handle immediately.

1 - Memphis (info)

APR 30 1968

EX-110 REC 5

1-2440

APR 30 1968

FJH:jlh
(5)

NOTE: See memorandum from J. A. Sizoo to W. C. Sullivan dated 4-28-68, captioned "Murkin" JHK:brr.

3 1968

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. ____________

Document Description: Memo

Dated: 4/28/68

Document Located By: FBI
(Office Designation)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

- ____ Release in full-text
- ____ Release in sanitized form
- ✓ Deny in toto
- ____ Defer decision to ____________
- ____ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(X)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(X)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(X)	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( )	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
* (X)	Other, specify: This memo is addressed in distribution to other USG entities.		

* For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: ~~This~~

Signature of Reviewing Officer & Office

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

13-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan wcs

DATE: 4/28/68

: J. A. Sizoo

T: MURKIN

Norman Pulin, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised this date that a german doctor, Klaus Steer, German Director, Scientific Department, Africa, E. Merck Aktiengesellschast, Karmstady, Germany, had advised the American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that he believed he had seen an individual whom he thought to be Eric Starvo Galt at the Bristol Hotel, Lagos, Nigeria, on the afternoon of 4/23/68. Because he thought the individual looked like Galt he made an effort to get some information concerning him. He found he was registered at the hotel as Joe Musgaque, Room 403, receipt number D52138, account number 08325. The doctor did not know if Musgaque had registered at the hotel as an American. In conversation with Musgaque the doctor learned that Musgaque was employed by the Wilder Oil Company (adress unknown) and was en route to Warri Oil Field, Nigeria.

Bufiles contain no references to Joe Musgaque or the Wilder Oil Company.

Mr. Pulin, CIA, was advised that Bufiles contain no references to Joe Musgaque or Wilder Oil Company.

ACTION:

None. For information. This is being referred to the General Investigative Division.

JHK:brr (8)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sizoo
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. McDonough
1 - Mr. Kavanagh

REC- 31

-2461

MAY 6 — 1968

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

McGuire

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 22, 1968

FROM : Mr. J. A. Sizoo

SUBJECT: MURKIN

At 6:35 pm 4/22/68, John Mapother, Clandestine Service, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), furnished the following information to Night Supervisor James F. McGuire by telephone:

CIA sources in Panama have reported two American citizens are being detained in Panama City, Panama, at the request of the Costa Rican authorities. Allegedly, they are being detained in connection with the assassination of Martin Luther King. These individuals are identified as Tom Wolman, born 7/17/44 in New York. Wolman has Passport Number J085474, issued 1/29/68, and his permanent residence is shown as 30 Larrys Lane, Pleasantville, New York. The other individual is identified as Douglas Harry Hulbard, Passport Number 330926. Hulbard is described as a former soldier who has returned to Panama to be married. CIA did not have any further descriptive data regarding Hulbard.

These two individuals were traveling in a Chevrolet, License Number 23GH19, Motor Number 13 387 13 113711. The vehicle and license plates could not be further described by CIA. According to CIA, Wolman's passport indicates he had entered and departed El Salvador and Honduras on 4/17/68; Nicaragua on 4/18/68.

Mr. Mapother advised he has no indication why the Costa Rican authorities have requested the detention of the above-described individuals. Further, he does not know of any factual connection of these individuals with the King case. He said CIA sources were trying to develop this matter further. He also advised that CIA would send the FBI a written communication concerning this matter on 4/23/68.

At 9:10 pm 4/22/68, Norman Poulin, CIA, orally advised that a check had been made with the Costa Rican authorities and determined that Costa Rica has no information regarding the above-mentioned individuals; that Costa Rica did not request Panamanian authorities to hold these individuals, that they have no request from any American authorities to detain them; and that they have

44-38861-1685

REC-48 CONTINUED — OVER

JFM:chs (7)
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Helgeson
1 - Mr. J.A.Sizoo
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. J.F.McGuire

APR 24 1968

66 APR 30 1968

DIR 95853

no knowledge of any connection between these individuals and the assassination of Martin Luther King. Poulin indicated that the entire information may be a complete hoax; however, CIA will advise FBI if any additional data comes to their attention.

ACTION:

The above information was orally furnished to Mr. Helgeson, General Investigative Division.

M

WCS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: April 17, 1968

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: MURKIN

Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), furnished the following to the Liaison Agent on April 17, 1968:

A CIA source, characterized as being very reliable, advised that on or about April 15, 1968, an individual identifying himself as Gerald Lee Richards, a U. S. seaman, called at the Tokyo, Japan, office of the National Maritime Union and asked to be signed on a ship as soon as possible. (It should be noted that reference is being made to the office of the U.S. National Maritime Union.) He was asked to furnish his local address in Tokyo, and he refused to do so. He became very agitated and then left. So far he has not returned to the aforementioned office. CIA's source stated that Richards answers the general description of the suspect in the instant case as reported in newspapers.

Richards volunteered information indicating that he applied for seaman's papers in San Pedro, California, on June 16, 1964, and that he registered as a member of the National Maritime Union in San Pedro on February 21, 1968. He has Social Security number 562-46-5078 and U. S. Coast Guard identifying document Z2711-782. He was born April 8, 1937, in Missouri (town not given). CIA's source described him as 5'10"; 155 pounds; brown hair, receding hairline on both sides; a scar, not prominent, about two and one half inches long across the center of his forehead. His most outstanding characteristic was his grin, described as "disconcerting and resembling a grimace."

REC 3 4[illegible]-2404

Ober advised that this same information has been given to our Legat, Tokyo. CIA is checking through available sources in Tokyo to establish the whereabouts of Richards. If this lead washes out, CIA would like to be advised.

ACTION: The above information is being directed to the attention of the Civil Rights Section of the General Investigative Division.

SJP:clb (4)

1 - Mr. McGowan (Long)
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

Based info
contained [illegible]
in [illegible] CI Staff

CIA info in FBI Documents
Refer to other components

TAB D
(PICG 15) ?
(FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77)

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	EXEMPTIONS
KING	Cable, [✓ Memorandum,] Dispatch Other: Date : 9 Apr 68 Refer to OS or A/DCI	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
KING	Cable, [✓ Memorandum,] Dispatch Other: Date : 10 Apr 68 Refer to OS or A/DCI	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY	Cable, [✓ Memorandum,] Dispatch Other: Date : 4/17/68 Refer to OS.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: April 9, 1968

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: MURKIN

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. McDonough
1 - Mr. Long
1 - Mr. Martindale
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Sullivan

This is the case involving the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., 4/4/68.

One of the most promising leads developed so far is the laundry tags appearing on a T-shirt and a pair of shorts apparently abandoned by the subject with the rifle that is believed to be the murder weapon. It has been determined that these laundry marks were made by a Thermo Seal marking machine manufactured by the Textile Marking Machine Company, Syracuse, New York. The manufacturer of this machine has advised that the laundry marks in question are unusual in that they consist of five characters whereas the usual code contains six characters.

These markings are also unusual because the first two characters are in smaller type while the remaining three characters are in larger type. The normal arrangement is for the first three characters to be in smaller type and for the following characters to be in larger type. The Textile Marking Machine Company has stated only a limited number of machines have been manufactured which print laundry marks in this manner. Investigation is proceeding on an expedited basis to locate these machines for the purpose of identifying the laundry marks.

EX-115 REC 64- 38861-1174

16 APR 12 1968

Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has furnished the Central Intelligence Agency file on Robert Ervin Kramer, M. D., Berkeley, California, whom Helms considers a suspect because of his resemblance to an artist's conception of the subject and because of the Central Intelligence Agency's experience with Kramer. The Central Intelligence Agency file states Kramer has a long arrest record and contains a Berkeley Police Department photograph, dated 1/27/66, number 22805.

Enclosure sent 4-9-68

54 APR 24 1968

WLH: yea

CONTINUED - OVER

He has been a chronic letter writer to the Central Intelligence Agency criticizing them and the Government. By letter of 12/29/67 Kramer requested the Central Intelligence Agency to pay him $100,000 monthly for six months for a paper on geopolitical economy he had previously submitted. He concluded his letter with the statement, "In the event that you fail to acknowledge my request, I can accept no responsibility for any future efforts necessary to gain the combined ends of ideal government and financial recompense."

The only record of Kramer found in Bureau files is a memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency, 1/18/68, advising us of his letters to the Central Intelligence Agency. No record can be located in the Identification Division but Kramer's fingerprints are being obtained from the Berkeley police.

A. C. Hayden, Intra-Division Information Unit of the Department, advised on the evening of 4/8/68 that Beatrice Rosenberg, a secretary in the Attorney General's office, had received a telephone call from a man identifying himself as Frederick Dunstan who said he resided at Route 350, Whitefield, North Carolina. Dunstan said he was calling the Attorney General to report that a white man was in his house, was drunk, had a gun and said he had killed Martin Luther King, Jr.

There is no Whitefield, North Carolina. There is a Whiteville, North Carolina. Investigation by the Charlotte Division has failed to locate a Route 350, Box 350, or Highway 350 in the Whiteville area and no record of a Frederick Dunstan has been located. No record of Dunstan could be found in Bureau files.

A pair of duckbill pliers was found among the personal effects believed to have been abandoned by the subject. These pliers bear a trademark of the Rompage Hardware Company, Los Angeles. Employees at the hardware company believe this is one of twelve pliers purchased in October, 1966. Employees have no recollection of the sale of these pliers but an exhaustive search is being made of charge sale records.

It is noted that the rifle believed to be the murder weapon was purchased in Birmingham, Alabama, 3/30/68. Binoculars found with the rifle were purchased in Memphis, 4/4/68. A latent fingerprint found on the rifle is identical with a latent fingerprint found on the binoculars. This presents a strong probability that these fingerprints are those of the subject.

CONTINUED PAGE THREE

Other major avenues of investigation include checking out white Mustang automobiles, since one was seen leaving at a high rate of speed after the shot was fired; efforts to trace a bedspread or blanket found with the gun, and the immediate processing of all suspects as soon as they are developed.

ACTION:

1. Attached is a memorandum for the White House, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General and the Civil Rights Division.

2. Investigation is continuing on an all-out basis.

OK-
H

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: April 10, 1968

FROM : C. L. McGowan

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Long

SUBJECT: MURKIN

This is the matter involving the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.

Liaison advised of the receipt of information from Richard Helms, Director of CIA, that one Robert Kramer was a possible suspect. According to information furnished by Howard Osborn, Director of Security of CIA, Kramer, who is a doctor, has been a source of trouble to CIA for some time. Only recently Mr. Helms received a very cryptic telegram from Kramer. In reviewing Kramer's file, they noted a photograph which bears a very strong resemblance to recent pictures of artist drawings of the killer which have appeared in local papers. The likeness was so striking that Mr. Helms thought it should be brought to the attention of the FBI immediately.

ACTION:

Senior Resident Agent Jesse Hall, Alexandria, Virginia, was telephonically contacted and instructed to obtain full details from the files of CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia, together with all background information on Kramer, as well as a photograph, so that this matter could be thoroughly checked out.

CRM:mcs
(5)

101

REC- 31 44-38861-638

12 APR 16 1968

70 APR 1 [illegible]

Referred PCS/TC 29 Mar [illegible] Dec [illegible]

Rec'd from Robt. Maroney 4/17/68 wcb

SUBJECT: STAAR, Richard Felix - PHOTOGRAPH
aka: GWIAZDOWSKI, Richard Felix

DPOB : 10 January 1923, Warsaw, Poland

Subject of FBI investigations in 1954 (Voice of America) and 1956 (USIA) - Bureau File 123-15026.

Of possible interest is similarity between his name and that of "Eric Starvo GALT." In that Richard STAAR is similar. GWIAZDA is "star" in Polish. Among STAAR's references on a 1949 PHS is Professor Stanley AULT, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana.

From 1959 to 1962 (latest information available) STAAR was a Professor of Political Science at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia. His local residence addresses during that period are shown as 303 Vickers Drive, N. E., Atlanta, 7, and 879 Clifton Rd., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia.

X-115 EX-114

REC-19 44-38861-1549

10 APR 23 1968

ENCLOSURE

REC-31

ENCLOSURE

SCB (1AP) due 6

79 MAY 7 - 1968




RICHARD F STAAR
JUNE 49

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: April 10, 1968

FROM : C. L. McGowan

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Long

SUBJECT: MURKIN

This is the matter involving the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.

Liaison advised of the receipt of information from Richard Helms, Director of CIA, that one Robert Kramer was a possible suspect. According to information furnished by Howard Osborn, Director of Security of CIA, Kramer, who is a doctor, has been a source of trouble to CIA for some time. Only recently Mr. Helms received a very cryptic telegram from Kramer. In reviewing Kramer's file, they noted a photograph which bears a very strong resemblance to recent pictures of artist drawings of the killer which have appeared in local papers. The likeness was so striking that Mr. Helms thought it should be brought to the attention of the FBI immediately.

ACTION:

Senior Resident Agent Jesse Hall, Alexandria, Virginia, was telephonically contacted and instructed to obtain full details from the files of CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia, together with all background information on Kramer, as well as a photograph, so that this matter could be thoroughly checked out.

CRM:mcs
(5)

101

REC-31 44-38861-638

12 APR 16 1968

70 APR 19 1968

Referred

? ✗

LOG AS APPEAL (F-76-382)

Doesn't he owe us money?

Appeal F-76-382

Mr. Gene Wilson, FOIA/PA Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Rt. 12, Frederick, Md. 21701
7/21/77

(Tom O., or successor

Dear Mr. Wilson,

LOG THIS AS A NEW REQUEST

The news account of your coming release of an additional 4,000 pages on what might be called mind-bending reminds me that my requests seem to me to cover this and that you have not notified me of this release. I do want these. If you interpret my prior requests as not covering them then consider this a new request. My recollection is that my initial requests cover anything and verything directly or indirectly related to this subject. That you have interpreted my requests as I have is evidence from prior correspondence notifying me of releases.

Under the Act there is authority for the remission of all costs and fees. I believe I meet the requirements for this remission and I make the request formally. My work is restricted exclusively to what is now regarded as important historical cases, In one on which I have paid the CIA large sums without compliance, the King assassination, the previous Attorney General so held, formally, confirmed by a federal judge. I have already arranged to give all my records, not just these, to a university system. I believe at an earlier date I reserved the right to recover these fees. I have delayed a formal appeal~~s~~ pending a determination of a judge that there be a ruling by the Department of Justice with regard to me and on this.. The Department provided a bargain-basement response, a 60% remission that I have appealed and will if necessary litigate. I hope the CIA will act favorably on this.

quest for
iver.
ue to
live
ving
is.

adly,
adding
fees
ady
be
sed!!

It has been a very long time since I have heard from you about a multitude of requests all long overdue by your own backlog claims. One of these is on the King assassination, In that you may recall you estimated a $1,000 search fee and asked for and received a $500 deposit. What you have sent is ludicrous. In the long time in which I have heard and received nothing further I think you have in effect refused the request after charging fees so this is also an appeal on the King/Ray records.

peal

I am asking again when I may expect to hear from you on all the other requests, including my PA request for the records on me. The appeal is several years old now. My recollection is that your last reference to this stated the processing of the appeal had not been completed. I have rights under the Act to more than copies. I want to exercise those rights. This is impossible without obtaining all copies first. As I have told you repeatedly I would prefer not to have to litigate this. What I am thus really asking you is doe s the CIA want me to suit it on a request that goes back to 1971 and on which it is not in compliance? Not even processed tye appeal?

Among the factors making it difficult to keep track of these non-compliances is your failure to respond as well as to comply. I believe I have asked this before. If I have then what follows is an appeal from a refusal. If I have not it is a new request. I would like all records relating to my requests and appeals, including their sequential relationships to other requests, under both Acts and particularly as this relates to compliance with other requests.

EI K

does
it
to
a
sensible
scription!"

Sincerely,

Harold

Harold Weisberg

JUL 25 2 55 PM '77

?

LOG AS APPEAL (F-76-382)

Doesn't he owe us money?

Appeal F-76-382

Mr. Gene Wilson, FOIA/PA Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Rt. 12, Frederick, Md. 21701
7/21/77

(Tom O., or successor)

Dear Mr. Wilson,

LOG THIS AS A NEW REQUEST

The news account of your coming release of an additional 4,000 pages on what might be called mind-bending reminds me that my requests seem to me to cover this and that you have not notified me of this release. I do want these. If you interpret my prior requests as not covering them then consider this a new request. My recollection is that my initial requests cover anything and verything directly or indirectly related to this subject. That you have interpreted my requests as I have is evidence from prior correspondence notifying me of releases.

Under the Act there is authority for the remission of all costs and fees. I believe I meet the requirements for this remission and I make the request formally. My work is restricted exclusively to what is now regarded as important historical cases. In one on which I have paid the CIA large sums without compliance, the King assassination, the previous Attorney General so held, formally, confirmed by a federal judge. I have already arranged to give all my records, not just these, to a university system. I believe at an earlier date I reserved the right to recover these fees. I have delayed a formal appeal pending a determination of a judge that there be a ruling by the Department of Justice with regard to me and on this.. The Department provided a bargain-basement response, a 60% remission that I have appealed and will if necessary litigate. I hope the CIA will act favorably on this.

It has been a very long time since I have heard from you about a multitude of requests all long overdue by your own backlog claims. One of these is on the King assassination. In that you may recall you estimated a $1,000 search fee and asked for and received a $500 deposit. What you have sent is ludicrous. In the long time in which I have heard and received nothing further I think you have in effect refused the request after charging fees so this is also an appeal on the King/Ray records.

I am asking again when I may expect to hear from you on all the other requests, including my PA request for the records on me. The appeal is several years old now. My recollection is that your last reference to this stated the processing of the appeal had not been completed. I have rights under the Act to more than copies. I want to exercise those rights. This is impossible without obtaining all copies first. As I have told you repeatedly I would prefer not to have to litigate this. What I am thus really asking you is doe s the CIA want me to suit it on a request that goes back to 1971 and on which it is not in compliance? Not even processed tye appeal?

Among the factors making it difficult to keep track of these non-compliances is your failure to respond as well as to comply. I believe I have asked this before. If I have then what follows is an appeal from a refusal. If I have not it is a new request. I would like all records relating to my requests and appeals, including their sequential relationships to other requests, under both Acts and particularly as this relates to compliance with other requests.

El K.

Sincerely,

Harold Weisberg

JUL 25 2 55 PM '77

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
FOIA Appeal - Harold Weisberg, for information about Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Earl Ray

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS F 76-382

FROM:
H.G. Bean
Assistant for Information, DDA
7 D 02 HQ

EXTENSION
5117

DATE SENT
15 AUG 1977

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. Wells, DDO THRU: Mr. Addona, DDO/PICG 1 D 4125 HQ HT-1			
2.	DDO/PIC 16 AUG 1977		
3. Mr. Dirks, DDS&T THRU: Mr. Redmond, DDS&T/FIO 6 E 56 HQ BY-1			
4.			
5. Mr. Stevens, DDI THRU: Mr. Lawler, DDI/FIO 2 E 6104 HQ FX-4			
6.			
7. Mr. Blake, DDA 7 D 26 HQ BX-4			
8.			
9. Mr. Ziebell, OGC 6-D-0120 - Hqs. BX-5			
10.			
11. Mr. Biddiscombe, OS/IRG GE 31 HQ FX-1			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached is an FOIA Appeal with a due date of 19 Aug 77.

In accordance with IPS procedures, the Chairman has assigned action for this appeal as follows:

Mr. Wells, Mr. Dirks,
Mr. Stevens and Mr. Blake

Designated Action Member(s) should contact me within 48 hours should there be any objection to the case assignment.

The OGC attorney assigned to advise you or your Appeals Officer regarding this case is:

Mr. Ziebell

The Action Member or Appeals Officer is requested to ensure that staff work is completed and the case is ready for presentation (should such be required) at the 11 Aug 77 meeting.

H.G. Bean

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

LOG (F)

[Acknowledgement drafted]

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024

TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

F 76-382

June 11, 1976

OS
DDO
CRS ?
OGC ?

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Freedom of Information Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Wilson:

On behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg of Frederick, Maryland, I request access to the following:

1. All records pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. All records pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

3. All records pertaining to James Earl Ray, under whatever name or alias.

4. All records on any alleged or suspected accomplice or associate in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. All collections of published materials on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

6. All analyses, commentaries, reports, or investigations on or in any way pertaining to any published materials on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. or the authors of said materials.

7. All records, letters, cables, memorandums, routing slips, photographs, tape recordings, receipts, sketches, computer printouts or any other form of data pertaining to or in any way relevant to the foregoing requests for information, regardless of source or origin.

This request is made under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, as amended by Public Law 93-502.

JUN 16 8 11 AM '76

Sincerely yours,

James H. Lesar

James H. Lesar

21 JUN 1976

James H. Lesar, Esquire
1231 Fourth Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

This acknowledges receipt of your letter of 11 June 1976 on behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg requesting, under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, access to any CIA records dealing with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or James Earl Ray and any of his alleged or suspected accomplices in Dr. King's assassination.

I shall arrange for a search of CIA files and shall be in further communication with you once the search has been completed and any records found reviewed for releasability under the Act.

As you may know, the heavy volume of Freedom of Information requests received by the Agency has resulted in processing backlogs. If we do not respond within the 10 working days stipulated by the Act, it is your right to construe this as a denial, subject to appeal to the CIA Information Review Committee. It would seem more reasonable, however, for us to continue processing your request and to respond as soon as feasible. Any denials of records could be appealed at that time. Unless we hear from you otherwise, we will assume that this is agreeable to you and proceed on this basis.

For your information, I am enclosing a copy of our fee schedule. If the charges seem likely to be considerable, I shall provide you with an estimate and perhaps require a partial payment in advance of processing.

Sincerely,

/s/GFW

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure: as stated
IPS/CES/cb/21 Jun 76Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - ✓IPS Chrono
1 ✓ IPS (F-76-382)

30 NOV 1976

IPS/DGV/cr/29 Nov 76
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - OGC (Strickland)
1 - DDO/PICG
1 - OS/IRG
1 - AI/DDA
① - IPS (Weisberg,F-76-382) SPR
1 - IPS (Weisberg Correspondence)
1 - IPS Chrono

James H. Lesar, Esquire
1231 Fourth Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

You will recall that our letter of 21 June 1976 acknowledged receipt of your letter on behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg requesting, under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, access to any CIA records dealing with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and to those dealing with James Earl Ray and any of his alleged or suspected accomplices in Dr. King's assassination.

We find that we are unable to respond to your request as it now stands due to legal and regulatory restrictions on the release of personal information from official records. In that light, please be advised that we can proceed no further with your request unless and until we are in receipt of notarized statements of release from Mrs. Coretta King and James Earl Ray, respectively. These statements should be quite specific as to what areas of personal information are and are not authorized for release by this Agency to you and your client. If all information in our records is releasable, that should be so stated; if only such information as relates to specific incidents or to specific periods of time is releasable, those caveats should be clearly stated.

Finally, we must ask that you provide a statement of willingness to pay search and duplication fees as required by this request and in line with the fee schedule enclosed. It has been estimated that such charges could approach $1000. Along with the notarized statements above, and the statement of willingness to pay all search and copying charges (or those up to an established limit), we would require a down payment of half the anticipated charges. Payment should be made to this office in the form of a check or money order payable to Treasurer of the United States.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

13-00000

F-76-382
EK

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024
TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

December 3, 1976

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Wilson:

In response to your letter of November 30, 1976, Mr. Harold Weisberg has authorized me to state his willingess to pay search and copying charges up to the amount of $1,000 if such charges are required by his Freedom of Information Act request for records pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his assassination. Because you require a down payment of half the anticipated charges, I enclose a check for $500.00.

This payment of $500.00 and any subsequent payments made in connection with this request are tendered with the express reservation that Mr. Weisberg does not waive his right to recover them.

DEC 9 11 PM '76

C.I.A. regulations provide:

> Records shall be furnished without charge or at a reduced rate whenever the Coordinator determines that waiver or reduction of the charge is in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public. The Coordinator also may waive or reduce the charge whenever he determines that the interest of the government would be served thereby. 32 C.F.R. §1900.25(a).

In accordance with this regulation, I call upon you to determine that it is in the public and governmental interest to waive search and copying charges incurred in connection with Mr. Weisberg's request. Enclosed herein is a copy of a letter to Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler, Jr. which makes a similar request of the Department of Justice. The reasons expressed in that letter for granting a waiver are incorporated in my request that you grant a waiver.

Should you require it, I will provide you with affidavits by myself, Mr. Weisberg, and others in support of this request for a waiver of the search and copying charges for these records. If you do wish supporting affidavits, I would appreciate it if you would inform me of this as soon as possible. I would also request that you indicate what standards, if any, you have established for determining whether or not a request for waiver should be granted.

You state that you can proceed no further with Mr. Weisberg's request "unless and until we are in receipt of notarized statements of release from Mrs. Coretta King and James Earl Ray, respectively." Because Mr. Weisberg's request undoubtedly comprises records which do not involve any proper claim of privacy, this cannot be true. I do enclose, however, a copy of a notarized waiver by James Earl Ray. I will immediately contact Mrs. King about a waiver by her. In the meantime, I request that you proceed to make available those records responsive to Mr. Weisberg's request which do not involve any proper claim of invasion of privacy.

Sincerely yours,

James H. Lesar

James H. Lesar

13 JAN 1977

James H. Lesar, Esquire
1231 Fourth St., NW
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

Thank you for your letter of 27 December. This will acknowledge receipt of the sworn waiver executed by Mr. James Earl Ray, and to advise that processing of this portion of your request has been initiated. Upon receipt of the sworn waiver from Mrs. King, as mentioned in your letter of 3 December, we will then be able to proceed with all aspects of your FOIA request. We also wish to acknowledge receipt of your check for $500.

Thank you for your assistance and continued cooperation.

This request has been assigned the case number F-76-382.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

IPS/EK/cb/12 Jan 77
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - IPS Chrono
1 ✓IPS F-76-382
1 - OGC

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING - FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
FOIA Appeal - Harold Weisberg, for information about Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Earl Ray

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS F 76-382

Copy of IPS respon To WEISBE

FROM:
H.G. Bean
Assistant for Information, DDA
7 D 02 HQ

EXTENSION
5117

DATE SENT
15 AUG 1977

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. Wells, DDO THRU: Mr. Addona, DDO/PICG ~~1 D 4125 HQ HT-1~~			
2.			
3. Mr. Dirks, DDS&T THRU: Mr. Redmond, DDS&T/FIO ~~6 E 56 HQ BY-1~~			
4.			
5. Mr. Stevens, DDI THRU: Mr. Lawler, DDI/FIO ~~2 E 6104 HQ FX-4~~			
6.			
7. Mr. Blake, DDA 7 D 26 HQ BX-4			
8.			
9. Mr. Ziebell, OGC 6-D-0120 - Hqs. BX-5			
10.			
11. Mr. Biddiscombe, OS/IRG GE 31 HQ FX-1			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached is an FOIA Appeal with a due date of 19 Aug 77.

In accordance with IPS procedures, the Chairman has assigned action for this appeal as follows:

Mr. Wells, Mr. Dirks, Mr. Stevens and Mr. Blake

Designated Action Member(s) should contact me within 48 hours should there be any objection to the case assignment.

The OGC attorney assigned to advise you or your Appeals Officer regarding this case is:

Mr. Ziebell

The Action Member or Appeals Officer is requested to ensure that staff work is completed and the case is ready for presentation (should such be required) at the 11 Aug 77 meeting.

H.G. Bean

H.G. Bean

RETURN TO:

PRIORITY HANDLING - FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

FBI Referral to CIA

28 Sept. 77 - deleted Kennedy assass. doc's

5 doc's originated w/CIA

2 FBI doc's for CIA coordination

F 382

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(There [illegible] the [illegible] unless [illegible]

TIPS REGISTRY
F77-0854

Date: September 28, 1977 BY COURIER

To: Freedom of Information Act Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Gene F. Wilson
Room 2E 42

From: Clarence M. Kelley, Director

Subject: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST OF HAROLD WEISBERG

This is in reference to our referral of documents to your Agency dated August 18, 1977, and your response to that referral dated September 9, 1977.

F77-564 closed 9/9/77

We have segregated from this referral those documents which are not responsive to Mr. Weisberg's FOIA request. The remaining documents which are being forwarded to your Agency are construed to be within the scope of Mr. Weisberg's request. Should you reach a determination that some of these documents are not responsive to Mr. Weisberg's request, please return those documents which you so consider to the FBI. We would appreciate your processing all those documents which you consider to be within the scope of Mr. Weisberg's request as it is necessary that we resolve the disposition of these documents and so inform the requester without further delay.

Attached are five documents from our files which originated with your Agency. Please examine these documents and if classified, determine if classification is to be maintained. If continued classification is not warranted, or if the documents are unclassified and otherwise releasable, please delete any portion to be withheld under the FOIA and cite the applicable exemptions.

LL, [illegible] 100

Central Intelligence Agency

Also attached are two FBI documents which contain information received from your agency. The information is being referred for a current classification determination and releasability under the provisions of the FOIA.

If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact Ralph Harp, FOIPA Branch, at telephone number 324-5566.

Enclosures (8)

13-00000

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
3231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024

TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

December 23, 1975

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
DEC 29 11 08 AM '75
DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

Mr. Harold Tyler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.   20530

Dear Mr. Tyler:

On behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg, I am requesting that you grant him access to the following records pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.:

1. All receipts for any letters, cables, documents, reports, memorandums, or other communications in any form whatsoever.

2. All receipts for any items of physical evidence.

3. All reports or memorandums on the results of any tests performed on any item of evidence, including any comparisons normally made in the investigation of a crime.

4. All reports or memorandums on any fingerprints found at the scene of the crime or on any item allegedly related to the crime. This is meant to include, for example, any fingerprints found in or on the white Mustang abandoned in Atlanta, in any room allegedly used or rented by James Earl Ray, and on any registration card. It should also include all fingerprints found on any item considered as evidence in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. Any taxicab log or manifest of Memphis cab driver James McCraw or the cab company for which he worked.

6. Any tape or transcript of the radio logs of the Memphis Police Department or the Shelby County Sheriff's Office for April 4, 1968.

7. All correspondence and records of other communications exchanged between the Department of Justice or any division thereof and:

R. A. Ashley, Jr.
Harry S. Avery

James G. Beasley
Clay Blair
David Calcutt
Phil M. Canale
John Carlisle
Robert K. Dwyer
Gov. Buford Ellington
Michael Eugene
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Roger Frisby
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
W. Henry Haile
William J. Haynes, Jr.
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
George McMillan
William N. Morris
Jeremiah O'Leary
David M. Pack
Lloyd A. Rhodes
J. B. Stoner
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ stanton Jr.
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ stanton Sr.

8. All correspondence or records of other communications pertaining to the guilty plea of James Earl Ray exchanged between the Department of Justice or any division thereof and:

Rev. Ralph Abernathy
Rev. James Bevel
Rev. Jesse Jackson
Mrs. Coretta King
Rev. Samuel B. Kyles
Rev. Andrew Young
Harry Wachtel

9. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any letter, cable, or other written communication from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

10. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any telephonic or verbal communications from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

11. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever of the following persons:

Judge Preston Battle
Wayne Chastain
Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
Renfro Hays
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Robert I. Livingston
George McMillan
Judge Robert McRae, Jr.
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
Richard J. Ryan
J. B. Stoner
Russell X. Thompson
Harold Weisberg

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

12. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever on the Committee to Investigate Assassinations (CTIA) or any person associated with it in any way.

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

13. All records pertaining to any alleged or contemplated witness, including any statements, transcripts, reports, or memorandums from any source whatsoever.

14. All correspondence of the following persons, regardless of origin or however obtained:

Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Robert W. Hill.
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
J. B. Stoner
Harold Weisberg

15. All letters, cables, reports, memorandums, or any other form of communication concerning the proposed guilty plea of James Earl Ray.

16. All records of any information request or inquiry from, or any contact by, any member or representative of the news media pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. since April 15, 1975.

17. All notes, memoranda, correspondence or investigative reports constituting or pertaining to any re-investigation or attempted re-investigation of the assassination of Dr. King undertaken in 1969 or anytime thereafter, and all documents setting forth the reasons or guidelines for any such re-investigation.

18. Any and all records pertaining to the New Rebel Motel and the DeSoto Motel.

19. Any records pertaining to James Earl Ray's eyesight.

20. Any records made available to any writer or news reporter which have not been made available to Mr. Harold Weisberg.

21. Any index or table of contents to the 96 volumes of evidence on the assassination of Dr. King.

22. A list of all evidence conveyed to or from the FBI by any legal authority, whether state, local, or federal.

23. All reports, notes, correspondence, or memorandums pertaining to any effort by the Department of Justice to expedite the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held in October, 1974, on James Earl Ray's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

24. All reports, notes, or memorandums on information contained in any tape recording delivered or made available to the FBI or the District Attorney General of Shelby County by anyone whomsoever. All correspondence engaged in with respect to any investigation which was made of the information contained in any of the foregoing.

25. All records of any contact, direct or indirect, by the FBI, any other police or law enforcement officials, or their informants, with the Memphis group of young black radicals known as The Invaders.

26. All records of any surveillance of any kind of The Invaders or any member or associate of that organization. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

27. All records of any surveillance of any kind of any of the unions involved in or associated with the garbage strike in Memphis or any employees or officials of said unions. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

28. All records containing information which exculpates or tends to exculpate James Earl Ray of the crime which he allegedly committed.

This request for disclosure is made under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, as amended by Public Law 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.

Sincerely yours,

Jim Lesar

Jim Lesar

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
FBI Referral re Martin Luther King, et al

REQUEST NUMBER
75-
77-322

FROM: [redacted] [redacted]
M. Felton ISS/PICG HT-1

EXTENSION 9532

DATE SENT 8 Aug 77

SUSPENSE DATE 15 Aug

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [redacted]			
2. [redacted]			
3. Mr. C. LaClair EUR/EXO GS-6	8 AUG 1977		
4. E/G	18 Aug 77		G
5.			
6. EUR/EXO			
7.			
8.			
9. [redacted]			
10. M. Felton ISS/PICG HT-1			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Pls review the attached for release to the requester.
Thanks.
MDF

~~/_/ No record of subject~~
~~/_/ No info identifiable with subject~~
~~/_/ See attached memorandum~~

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749
1-75 OP-10

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REFER ~~TO USAF~~
(our copy)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Extracts from Monthly Counterintelligence Report,
OSI, AAC

SOURCE: DIR OSI, AAC

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 - 30 April 1956

DATE OF REPORT: 14 May 1956

Extracts of interest taken from the OSI Monthly Counterintelligence Report are as follows:

SYNOPSIS

Former CP member arrives in Alaska. CP member confined in Federal Jail at Anchorage for non-support. Activities of possible subversives set forth. Alaskan Labor Defender starts publication again.

1. An aircraft passenger list from the Juneau Daily Empire revealed ART [illegible] arrived in that city from Seattle, Washington on 3 March 1956 and departed for Anchorage on 5 March 1956. A later list in the same newspaper revealed [illegible] again flew to Anchorage on 29 March 1956. When interviewed by the FBI in 1951, [illegible] admitted being a member of the Ketchikan branch of the Communist Party from 19[illegible] to 1950.

2. Another passenger list in the Juneau Empire revealed a [illegible] D. [illegible] departed Juneau for Anchorage on 17 March 1956. Information at this office indicated [illegible] D. [illegible], a known Communist, was due to return to Alaska from the ZI during the latter part of March 1956. Further inquiry by this office has disclosed [illegible] D. [illegible] was confined in the Federal Jail in Anchorage and charged with non-support of his former wife. [illegible] was released on 13 April 1956 when he agreed to pay the stipulated amount and is reportedly planning on working as a self-employed contractor in the Anchorage area.

3. [illegible] [illegible] ([illegible]) was recently reported as attorney for Anchorage Mayor, [illegible], in the latter's dispute with the City Council over a paving contract. As an indication of [illegible]'s activities, he has recently represented the following companies and/or individuals in highly controversial issues: Chugach Electrical Association, [illegible] Bus Lines, Matanuska Electric Association, Fairview Inn, Copper Valley Electric Association, and the [illegible] tax case. In connection with the [illegible] case, a local newspaper reported that a [illegible] started a fund raising activity which was termed the "[illegible] Defense Fund."

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

REPRODUCTI
FROM APERT

CONFIDENTIAL

DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO USAF

A-82

(82)

OSI COMMENT: The CHARLES PARKER mentioned above is believed to be the same individual as CHARLES LINCOLN PARKER, who resigned a commission in the U.S. Naval Reserve because of admitted pro-Russian sympathies. BOYKO's continual agitation, past association with Communists, and apparent association with PARKER, certainly places both individuals in a category which is, at least, highly questionable.

4. Further inquiry concerning ESTHER H. BUCKLEWSKI revealed she recently divorced WILFORD SAVOY and reportedly returned to the Homer, Alaska area.

OSI COMMENT: Liaison has been effected with another government agency in the Ninolchik area in an effort to determine the present whereabouts of SUBJECT.

5. The Alaskan Labor Defender, a monthly news publication, has recently reappeared in the Fairbanks area with its first publication dated May 1956. Previous editions of this newspaper appeared in the Fairbanks area in early 1955, but it was discontinued after publication of two editions due to the refusal of a local printing firm to print subsequent copies. Among editorials appearing in the Alaskan Labor Defender are several articles condensed from the "MILITANT," a publication of the Socialist Workers Party, which is cited by the U. S. Attorney General as subversive. One article quoted a speech made by a (Mr) DU BOIS at a rally held at Carnegie Hall in New York on 29 March 1956 which relates, in referring to the Montgomery, Alabama bus protest, * * * "Led by clear thinking, they (the Negroes) have discovered that the race problem was at bottom an economic problem. Unwittingly they have discovered Earl Marx." * * * (In referring to EARL MARX, they were probably referring to KARL MARX, co-author of the Communist Manifesto)

Quoted below are portions of another article under the caption "It's Time to Think" written by ERNEST GRIFFIN, Independent Candidate from Fairbanks, Alaska, for the House of Representatives:

* * * * "Today there seems to be little or no attention paid to the examples made by the founders of this new nation, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, or the Negro people as citizens of these United States." * * * * (In reference to the Constitution of the United States) * * * "Although this Constitution ranks above every other written Constitution for excellence of its scheme, its simplicity, the precision of its language, and its judicious mixture of definiteness in principle, it has become a neglected Constitution." * * *

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

* * *"But we can be destroyed when we lose faith or hope and when life itself seems like a story told by a mad man, as it must seem to the members and supporters of the White Citizens Council.....

The Negro people of the South have been marking time, making excuses and accepting conditions that exist in the South. Until a few brave men in Alabama turned what seemed to be a tragedy into an opportunity by having courage enough to challenge the Jim Crow laws." * * *

Quoted below is a portion of an editorial under the caption "The Longest Picket Line in the World", also appearing in the May 1956 publication of the Alaskan Labor Defender:

* * *" 'Every union local, every worker in office, factory or workshop, must make it a personal obligation to take action now! This is no time for passing the buck! This is the time to collect it and send it to the Montgomery Improvement Association, care of the Rev. M. L. King, Dexter Ave. Baptist Church, Montgomery, Alabama.'

The above statement was issued by Farrell Dobbs, presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers Party, and refers to the 50,000 Negroes in Montgomery, Alabama who are in a struggle against Jim Crow on the buses of that city." * * *

* * *"Actually the struggle goes deeper and wider than that. The present wave of race terror and hatred in the South is being fanned by the White Citizens Council. What is not generally known is that this terror is directed against any white workers who dare to solidarize with Negroes. The murderous White Citizens Council are not only rabidly Jim Crow but Anti-Semitic and Anti-Labor. Their aim is to preserve the system of color segregation and discrimination as the foundation upon which rests the open shop structure of the "Right to Work" South". * * *

Also appearing in this issue is an article relating that the Catholic Worker has protested the padlocking of the Daily Worker as a violation of the freedom of the press.

An article appearing under the caption "Auto Workers Take Home Pay Declines" reflects the "demand for a 30 hour week at 40 hours pay" by the UAW, Ford Local 600, and the AFL-CIO. Another article under the caption "Employment Falling Off; Productivity is Increasing", quotes JOHN CLARK, president of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, as stating that his union "intends to do something" about declining employment in the metals industry. Also set forth in this issue of the Alaskan Labor Defender is the "platform" of DONALD W. BOLTON, Independent Candidate for the Senate, ERNEST GRIFFIN, MIKE DOLLINTER, and NIILO KAPONEN, Independent Candidates for the House of Representatives. Two of the issues listed on the "platform" are "Stop the governments thought-control witch hunt which is pushing America

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

down the road to dictatorship", and "Eliminate the government's blacklist which has placed 18 million Americans, through 70 government agencies, on Security Suspect Lists. Restore Freedom of Speech to all".

The Editorial Staff of the Alaskan Labor Defender is listed as DON HOLTON, ERNEST GRIFFIN, MIKE COLLINTER, CARTER PAGE and EMIL HYYTUNEN. Mailing address for this newspaper is P. O. Box 1915, Fairbanks, Alaska.

> OSI COMMENT: Although there is no evidence that this newspaper is associated with the Communist Party or its front organizations, it is interesting to note that in many articles, the paper has quoted publications or officials of organizations which have been cited by the U. S. Attorney General as either subversive or Communist infiltrated and controlled. It is further interesting to note that MIKE COLLINTER, an editor of this newspaper, and ROY BATISTE, owner of the Fairbanks Recreation Center and Cafe, the only advertiser in this edition are both listed as Category I, Alaskan Command Surveillance List.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

74-6-40-2-64

Refer USAF

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. RAKA-709

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR

DATE 25 May 1956

FROM : Chief of Station, Anchorage

SUBJECT GENERAL REDWOOD/Operational

SPECIFIC Transmittal of Extracts taken from AAC Counterintelligence Report - April 1956

Submitted herewith for your information and retention are Extracts taken from the AAC Monthly Counterintelligence Report covering the period 1 - 30 April 1956. The information submitted is only that which deals with CE Activities in the Alaskan Theatre.

Russel T. Arne

Approved: Herbert M. Cavell

Attachment:
Extracts from Report, in dup.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

FULL TEXT COPY — DO NOT RELEASE

Distribution:
3-Headquarters w/attach as noted.

COPY	ROUTING
1	7 w/att
2	7 file
3	8/7 6 w/att
4	
5	

1 Encl.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A

RI COPY

74-6-402-64

Full text

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Extracts from Monthly Counterintelligence Report, OSI, AAC

SOURCE: DIR OSI, AAC

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 - 30 April 1956

DATE OF REPORT: 14 May 1956

Extracts of interest taken from the OSI Monthly Counterintelligence Report are as follows:

SYNOPSIS:

Former CP member arrives in Alaska. CP member confined in Federal Jail at Anchorage for non-support. Activities of possible subversives set forth. Alaskan Labor Defender starts publication again.

1. An aircraft passenger list from the Juneau Daily Empire revealed ART OLIN arrived in that city from Seattle, Washington on 3 March 1956 and departed for Anchorage on 5 March 1956. A later list in the same newspaper revealed OLIN again flew to Anchorage on 23 March 1956. When interviewed by the FBI in 1951, OLIN admitted being a member of the Ketchikan branch of the Communist Party from 1946 to 1950.

2. Another passenger list in the Juneau Empire revealed a NORMAN B. NELSON departed Juneau for Anchorage on 27 March 1956. Information at this office indicated NORMAN B. NELSON, a known Communist, was due to return to Alaska from the ZI during the latter part of March 1956. Further inquiry by this office has disclosed NORMAN B. NELSON was confined in the Federal Jail in Anchorage and charged with non-support of his former wife. NELSON was released on 24 April 1956 when he agreed to pay the stipulated amount and is reportedly planning on working as a self-employed contractor in the Anchorage area.

3. EDGAR PAUL BOYKO was recently reported as attorney for Anchorage Mayor, KEN HINCHEY, in the latter's dispute with the City Council over a paving contract. As an indication of BOYKO's activities, he has recently represented the following companies and/or individuals in highly controversial issues: Chugach Electrical Association, Matanuska Bus Lines, Matanuska Electric Association, Fairview PUD, Copper Valley Electric Association, and the JACK MARLER tax case. In connection with the MARLER case, a local newspaper reported that a CHARLES [illegible] started a fund raising activity which was termed the "MARLER Defense Fund."

CONFIDENTIAL

74.6.11-2- 64

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

OSI COMMENT: The CHARLES PARKER mentioned above is believed to be the same individual as CHARLES LINCOLN PARKER, who resigned a commission in the U.S. Naval Reserve because of admitted pro-Russian sympathies. BOYKO's continual agitation, past association with Communists, and apparent association with PARKER, certainly places both individuals in a category which is, at least, highly questionable.

4. Further inquiry concerning ESTHER M. ENCHLEWSKI revealed she recently divorced WILFORD SAVOY and reportedly returned to the Homer, Alaska area.

OSI COMMENT: Liaison has been effected with another government agency in the Ninelchik area in an effort to determine the present whereabouts of SUBJECT.

5. The Alaskan Labor Defender, a monthly news publication, has recently reappeared in the Fairbanks area with its first publication dated May 1956. Previous editions of this newspaper appeared in the Fairbanks area in early 1955, but it was discontinued after publication of two editions due to the refusal of a local printing firm to print subsequent copies. Among editorials appearing in the Alaskan Labor Defender are several articles condensed from the "MILITANT," a publication of the Socialist Workers Party, which is cited by the U. S. Attorney General as subversive. One article quoted a speech made by a Mr. DU BOIS at a rally held at Carnegie Hall in New York on 29 March 1956 which relates, in referring to the Montgomery, Alabama bus protest, * * * "Led by clear thinking, they (the Negros) have discovered that the race problem was at bottom an economic problem. Unwittingly they have discovered Earl Marx." * * * (In referring to EARL MARX, they were probably referring to KARL MARX, co-author of the Communist Manifesto)

Quoted below are portions of another article under the caption "It's Time to Think" written by ERNEST GRIFFIN, Independent Candidate from Fairbanks, Alaska, for the House of Representatives:

* * * * "Today there seems to be little or no attention paid to the examples made by the founders of this new nation, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, or the Negro people as citizens of these United States." * * * * (In reference to the Constitution of the United States) * * * "Although this Constitution ranks above every other written Constitution for excellence of its scheme, its simplicity, the precision of its language, and its judicious mixture of definiteness in principle, it has become a neglected Constitution." * * *

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

* * *"But we can be destroyed when we lose faith or hope and when life itself seems like a story told by a mad man, as it must seem to the members and supporters of the White Citizens Council......

The Negro people of the South have been marking time, making excuses and accepting conditions that exist in the South. Until a few brave men in Alabama turned what seemed to be a tragedy into an opportunity by having courage enough to challenge the Jim Crow laws."* * *

Quoted below is a portion of an editorial under the caption "The Longest Picket Line in the World", also appearing in the May 1956 publication of the Alaskan Labor Defender:

* * *" 'Every union local, every worker in office, factory or workshop, must make it a personal obligation to take action now! This is no time for passing the buck! This is the time to collect it and send it to the Montgomery Improvement Association, care of the Rev. M. L. King, Dexter Ave. Baptist Church, Montgomery, Alabama.'

The above statement was issued by Farrell Dobbs, presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers Party, and refers to the 50,000 Negroes in Montgomery, Alabama who are in a struggle against Jim Crow on the buses of that city." * * *

* * *"Actually the struggle goes deeper and wider than that. The present wave of race terror and hatred in the South is being fanned by the White Citizens Council. What is not generally known is that this terror is directed against any white workers who dare to solidarize with Negroes. The murderous White Citizens Council are not only rabidly Jim Crow but Anti-Semitic and Anti-Labor. Their aim is to preserve the system of color segregation and discrimination as the foundation upon which rests the open shop structure of the "Right to Work" South". * * *

Also appearing in this issue is an article relating that the Catholic Worker has protested the padlocking of the Daily Worker as a violation of the freedom of the press.

An article appearing under the caption "Auto Workers Take Home Pay Declines" reflects the "demand for a 30 hour week at 40 hours pay" by the UAW, Ford Local 600, and the AFL-CIO. Another article under the caption "Employment Falling Off; Productivity is Increasing", quotes JOHN CLARK, president of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, as stating that his union "Intends to do something" about declining employment in the metals industry. Also set forth in this issue of the Alaskan Labor Defender is the "platform" of DONALD W. HOLTON, Independent Candidate for the Senate, ERNEST GRIFFIN, MIKE DOLLINTER, and NIILO KAPONEN, Independent Candidates for the House of Representatives. Two of the issues listed on the "platform" are "Stop the governments thought-control witch hunt which is pushing America

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

down the road to dictatorship", and "Eliminate the government's blacklist which has placed 18 million Americans, through 70 government agencies, on Security Suspect Lists. Restore Freedom of Speech to all".

The Editorial Staff of the Alaskan Labor Defender is listed as DON HOLTON, ERNEST GRIFFIN, MIKE COLLINTER, CARTER PAGE and EMIL HYYTUNEN. Mailing address for this newspaper is P. O. Box 1915, Fairbanks, Alaska.

> OSI COMMENT: Although there is no evidence that this newspaper is associated with the Communist Party or its front organisations, it is interesting to note that in many articles, the paper has quoted publications or officials of organisations which have been cited by the U. S. Attorney General as either subversive or Communist infiltrated and controlled. It is further interesting to note that MIKE COLLINTER, an editor of this newspaper, and ROY BATISTE, owner of the Fairbanks Recreation Center and Cafe, the only advertiser in this edition are both listed as Category I, Alaskan Command Surveillance List.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

74-6-40-2-64

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. ________

Document Description: ____________________ Dated: ____________________

Document Located By : ____________________
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

- ______ Release in full-text
- __✓__ Release in sanitized form
- ______ Deny in toto
- ______ Defer decision to ____________
- ______ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
( )	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( )	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: No objection to release of pages unmarked - but those marked X should be withheld.

____
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ____________

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

FORM 1-77 3966

(20)

13-00000

75-004
75-4927
75-4785
75-6669
76-143

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

F 77-322
EK:CT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION F

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

Assign to Ed K.

Date: May 10, 1977 BY COURIER

To: Freedom of Information Act Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

DDO
L. Ziebell

Attention: Gene F. Wilson
Room 2E 42

CMK

From: Clarence M. Kelley, Director

Subject: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
REQUEST OF MR. HAROLD WEISBERG CONCERNING
THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

Enclosed herewith are a copy of correspondence from captioned individual and two copies of each document which originated with your Agency.

Please examine these documents and if classified determine if classification is to be maintained. If continued classification is not warranted or if the documents are unclassified and otherwise releasable, please indicate any portions to be withheld under the FOIA and cite the applicable exemptions.

Two copies of each document are enclosed. One copy is to be returned in the same condition as received while the other should be used to indicate deletions directly thereon and returned to us.

While it is recognized that disposition of these documents could be made directly by you to the requester, we request their return so direct response to the requester may be made by the FBI. We have found, from past experience with requests of this magnitude, that such procedure affords a more easily managed system of accounting for released material.

To assist in accounting for this referral, it is requested that you direct your reply to Linda Morcock, FOIA Branch, telephone number 324-5550.

Enclosures (9)

MAY 24 1 00 PM '77

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024

TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

December 23, 1975

DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL
[illegible] 1975

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

Mr. Harold Tyler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Tyler:

On behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg, I am requesting that you grant him access to the following records pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.:

1. All receipts for any letters, cables, documents, reports, memorandums, or other communications in any form whatsoever.

2. All receipts for any items of physical evidence.

3. All reports or memorandums on the results of any tests performed on any item of evidence, including any comparisons normally made in the investigation of a crime.

4. All reports or memorandums on any fingerprints found at the scene of the crime or on any item allegedly related to the crime. This is meant to include, for example, any fingerprints found in or on the white Mustang abandoned in Atlanta, in any room allegedly used or rented by James Earl Ray, and on any registration card. It should also include all fingerprints found on any item considered as evidence in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. Any taxicab log or manifest of Memphis cab driver James McCraw or the cab company for which he worked.

6. Any tape or transcript of the radio logs of the Memphis Police Department or the Shelby County Sheriff's Office for April 4, 1968.

7. All correspondence and records of other communications exchanged between the Department of Justice or any division thereof and:

R. A. Ashley, Jr.
Harry S. Avery

James G. Beasley
Clay Blair
David Calcutt
Phil M. Canale
John Carlisle
Robert K. Dwyer
Gov. Buford Ellington
Michael Eugene
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Roger Frisby
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
W. Henry Haile
William J. Haynes, Jr.
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
George McMillan
William N. Morris
Jeremiah O'Leary
David M. Pack
Lloyd A. Rhodes
J. B. Stoner
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ stanton Jr.
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ stanton Sr.

8. All correspondence or records of other communications pertaining to the guilty plea of James Earl Ray exchanged between the Department of Justice or any division thereof and:

Rev. Ralph Abernathy
Rev. James Bevel
Rev. Jesse Jackson
Mrs. Coretta King
Rev. Samuel B. Kyles
Rev. Andrew Young
Harry Wachtel

9. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any letter, cable, or other written communication from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

10. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any telephonic or verbal communications from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

11. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever of the following persons:

Judge Preston Battle
Wayne Chastain
Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
Renfro Hays
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Robert I. Livingston
George McMillan
Judge Robert McRae, Jr.
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
Richard J. Ryan
J. B. Stoner
Russell X. Thompson
Harold Weisberg

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

12. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever on the Committee to Investigate Assassinations (CTIA) or any person associated with it in any way.

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

13. All records pertaining to any alleged or contemplated witness, including any statements, transcripts, reports, or memorandums from any source whatsoever.

14. All correspondence of the following persons, regardless of origin or however obtained:

Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Robert W. Hill
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
J. B. Stoner
Harold Weisberg

15. All letters, cables, reports, memorandums, or any other form of communication concerning the proposed guilty plea of James Earl Ray.

16. All records of any information request or inquiry from, or any contact by, any member or representative of the news media pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. since April 15, 1975.

17. All notes, memoranda, correspondence or investigative reports constituting or pertaining to any re-investigation or attempted re-investigation of the assassination of Dr. King undertaken in 1969 or anytime thereafter, and all documents setting forth the reasons or guidelines for any such re-investigation.

18. Any and all records pertaining to the New Rebel Motel and the DeSoto Motel.

19. Any records pertaining to James Earl Ray's eyesight.

20. Any records made available to any writer or news reporter which have not been made available to Mr. Harold Weisberg.

21. Any index or table of contents to the 96 volumes of evidence on the assassination of Dr. King.

22. A list of all evidence conveyed to or from the FBI by any legal authority, whether state, local, or federal.

23. All reports, notes, correspondence, or memorandums pertaining to any effort by the Department of Justice to expedite the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held in October, 1974, on James Earl Ray's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

24. All reports, notes, or memorandums on information contained in any tape recording delivered or made available to the FBI or the District Attorney General of Shelby County by anyone whomsoever. All correspondence engaged in with respect to any investigation which was made of the information contained in any of the foregoing.

25. All records of any contact, direct or indirect, by the FBI, any other police or law enforcement officials, or their informants, with the Memphis group of young black radicals known as The Invaders.

26. All records of any surveillance of any kind of The Invaders or any member or associate of that organization. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

27. All records of any surveillance of any kind of any of the unions involved in or associated with the garbage strike in Memphis or any employees or officials of said unions. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

28. All records containing information which exculpates or tends to exculpate James Earl Ray of the crime which he allegedly committed.

This request for disclosure is made under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, as amended by Public Law 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.

Sincerely yours,

Jim Lesar

Jim Lesar

BON-2 (Rev. 3-1-71)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Acting Director, FBI ( ) DATE: 11/13/72

FROM : Legal Attache, Bonn (105-7501-1779) (RUC)

SUBJECT: BERNARD FENSTERWALD, JR.
IS-EG
(OO:WFO)

Re in file 62-11

Enclosed is one copy each of one item(s) pertaining to subject received from Bureau Source 300. For details and reporting procedures see Form BON-6 attached to enclosed.

Request enclosure(s) ______________ be translated ☐ in summary ☐ verbatim and enclosure(s) and translation sent to interested field division.

FROM
BERNARD FENSTERWALD, JR.
Law Offices
Fensterwald & Ohlhausen
905 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

TO
DR. JULIUS MADER
Mauerstrasse 69
1066 Berlin W 66

REMARKS:

The enclosed is a form letter directed by JULIUS MADER (Bufile 100-169674), Mauerstrasse 69, East Berlin, to subject soliciting the latter to buy MADER's book, "Yellow List: Where is the CIA?" and furnishing an order blank for this purpose.

Subject encloses the order blank, indicating he wants one copy in English of the above book, and his personal check in the amount of $2 which shows the designation "Committee to Investigate Assassination."

ENCLOSURE ~~ST-102~~ ~~REC-73~~

62-112677-

NOT RECORDED
145 DEC 15 1972

4

ORIGINAL FILED IN

3 X - Bureau (Enc. 1)
1 - XXX Foreign Liaison Desk
2 - Bonn
1 - 105-7501-1779
1 - 105-4658
ALC/jms.
(5)

58 DEC 18 1972

ESP

A check of Bonn's indices reflected a reference to the "Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Inc.," 927 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C., which came to attention in connection with Bonn's destroyed file regarding "Committee for 'The Investigation of the Three Assassinations': Information Concerning - Miscellaneous (FPC)" (Bufile 163-26234). Bonn indices are negative concerning subject.

[illegible] (Rev. 8-15-72)

CONFIDENTIAL

Attached is one copy of a communication being sent to an East German address. This item was obtained from Bureau Source 300, which is to be described in communications prepared for dissemination as "another government agency which conducts intelligence investigations." The item is classified CONFIDENTIAL by the originating agency and bears the special marking "Warning Notice - Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved."

Permission has been received from the source to disseminate this information to United States and foreign agencies provided the information is appropriately classified and paraphrased in a manner which will fully protect the nature of the source. Verbatim quotation from the attached material and use of complete, exact, foreign addresses set out in attached material tend to indicate the nature of the source and are to be avoided when preparing communications for dissemination. Permission has been received from the source to withhold the special marking "Warning Notice - Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved" from Bureau communications containing properly paraphrased versions of Bureau Source 300 information.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY another government agency
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY II
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON indefinite

ENCLOSURE
62-115177

13-00000

ffices
OHLHAUSEN
EET, N. W.
D. C. 2

A.M.F. WASHINGTON, D.C.
5 PM
21 SEP
1972

ALW
YOUR CODE

Dr. Julius Mader
Mauerstrasse 69
1066 Berlin w 66

[illegible]
WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Identification includes
all data in this block

SEP.
1972

HQ-1043-H
VAN

13

13-00000

AMERICAN POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS:

A BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF WORKS PUBLISHED
1963-1970
RELATED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF
JOHN F. KENNEDY
MARTIN LUTHER KING
ROBERT F. KENNEDY

Compiled by

THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

WASHINGTON, D. C.
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
1973

13-00000

I. JOHN F. KENNEDY

A. GENERAL

ns of Bourgeois Democracy: The Right to Deny Rights." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1 January 1964, p. 25.
Tragedy." Tablet, 30 November 1963, pp. 1181-1182.
Assassination." Newsweek, 15 August 1966, pp. 30-33.
ived; second installment of the death of a President." Time, 27 January 1967, p. 38.
and J. Tamney. "Some Functions of Religious Ritual in Catastrophe: Kennedy Assassination." Sociological Analysis, 25(1964), 212-230.
onina. "That Day In Washington." Philippines Herald Magazine, 25 January 1964, pp. 23-25.
"When Night Fall on the U.S." Philippines Herald Magazine, 7 December 1963, p. 12.
"Johnson Takes Over." Saturday Evening Post, 15 February 1964, pp. 17-23.
Long Vigil." TV Guide, 25 January 1964, pp. 19-22.
ld's yellow flowers." Newsweek, 2 December 1963, pp. 36-37.
it was November 22 again." Newsweek, 30 November 1964, pp. 25-28.
ry of an Assassination." Reconstructionist, 27 November 1964, p. 6.
Brother. "Death has Pounced: Excerpt from Tongs of Jeopardy." Dominicana, September 1965, pp. 9-12.
e and after." Christian Century, 80(1963), 1487.
a, L. "Reflections sur une Tragedie." Relations, January 1964, p. 27.
Stephen A. "The Kennedy Assassination." Psychoanalytic Review, 53, no. 3(1966), 69-80.
S. The Death of a President. Passaic, N.J.: Minority of One, 1964.
ation Gives Impetus to Dodd's Gun Bill." Advertising Age, 2 December 1963, pp. 1-2.
ion of a President, reprinted from New York Times with intro. by Anthony Lewis. New York, 1963.
sination of President John F. Kennedy." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 11 December 1963, pp. 3-15.
sination of President Kennedy." East Europe, January 1964, pp. 25-26.
ination of President Kennedy. (N.P.) Look, 1963. ("Memorial Edition")
sination: Scene of the Crime." Newsweek, 4 December 1967, pp. 31B-32.
sination: the Reporter's Story; What was Seen and Read: Television, Newspapers, Magazines; Journalism's Role: Unresolved Issues." Columbia Journalism Review, Winter 1964.
ation: the trial to a verdict; with report by G.R. Ford." Life, 2 October 1964, pp. 40-50B.
ney." Time, 27 December 1963, p. 18.
terval." Newsweek, 6 January 1964, pp. 19-20.
Ida. "President Johnsons Mordkommission." Frit Danmark, 23, no. 2(1964-65), 4-6.
the secrecy in the assassination probe." U.S. News and World Report, 24 February 1964, pp. 52+.
Dallas: Theories of J. Thompson and J. Connally." Time, 24 November 1967, pp. 54-55.
ad to the Kennedy Film." Film Comment Magazine, Fall/Winter 1967, pp. 39-44.
, B.H. "Assassin." Saturday Evening Post, 4 December 1963, pp. 22-27.
on C. The Assassination of President Kennedy: A Study of the Press Coverage. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Dept. of Journalism, 1965.
Franc. "Dva Atentata." Vjesnik, 24 November 1963.
, Leo. "The Kennedy Assassination." Views, Autumn 1964, pp. 90-93.
orris A. Guns of the regressive right; the only reconstruction of the Kennedy Assassination that makes sense. Washington: Columbia Pub. Co., 1964.
Stephen B. "Cerf Says Assassination Book to Widen Kennedy-LBJ Rift." Yale Daily News, 15 December 1966, pp. 1-3.
Anna. Elnökgyilkosságtól elnökválasztásig. Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1964.
vid. "Truth was my only goal." Texas Observer, 13 August 1971, pp. 13-15.
Howell Camera Used for Assassination Film Now in National Archives." Image Magazine, January 1967.
, V. "More Light on the Kennedy Assassination (book review of Die Wahrheit über den Kennedy-Mord: wie und warum der Warren-report lügt, by Joachim Joesten)." New Times, 26 October 1966, pp. 28-32.
. Luc. Le Jour où Kennedy fut assassiné. Paris: Editions du Cerfaut, 1963.

Bickel, A.M. "Return to Dallas." New Republic, 23 December 1967, p. 34.
Bishop, Jim. The Day Kennedy Was Shot. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968.
"Black Friday, five years later." Newsweek, 25 November 1968, pp. 22-23.
"B'nai Brith, Overseas Mourn JFK; BBYO's 40th Anniversary Service dedicated to JFK; Hillel Directors place Wreath at Tomb of President." National Jewish Monthly, January 1964, pp. 24-26.
Bonner, Judy Whitson. Investigation of a Homicide: the Murder of John F. Kennedy. Anderson, S.C.: Droke House, 1969.
Booker, Simeon. "How JFK Surpassed Abraham Lincoln." Ebony, Febryart 1964, pp. 25-28, 30, 32-34.
Boonstra, Jan. Zes seconen in Dallas: 22 November 1963. De moord op John F. Kennedy: 1917-1963, President van de Verenigde States van Amerika. Amsterdam: Bibliotheek en-documentatie school, 1968.
Bowser, Hallowell. "The Perils of Hasty History." Saturday Reveiw, 31 December 1966, p. 14.
Brand, Sergiu. "Si Totusi Cine?" Cronica, 17 December 1966, p. 12.
Bravo, Francisco. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, el mártir de la esperanza: discurso. Cuenca, 1963.
Breig, J. "Assassination of a People." Ave Maria, 14 December 1963, p. 10.
———. "President Kennedy's Death: Why?" Ave Maria, 11 January 1964, p. 9.
———. "Death in Emergency No. One: Parkland Memorial Hospital." Saturday Evening Post, 14 December 1963, pp. 30-31.
Brienberg, Mordecai. "The Riddle of Dallas." Spectator, 212(1964), 305-306.
Bringuier, Carlos. Red Friday. Chicago: Charles Hallberg & Co. n.d.
Brodie, Israel. Tribute to the late President John Fitzgerald Kennedy...at the Marble Arch Synagogue, London...1963. London: Office of the Chief Rabbi, 1964.
Buchanan, Thomas C. "Pravo Porocilo o Umoru v Dallasu." Delo, 27-29 February 1964, pp. 56-58.
Budimac, Budimir. "Zlocin u Teksasu." Dnevnik, 22(1963), 6124.
Bugialli, Paolo, et al. Chi ha ucciso i Kennedy. Roma: Trapani editore, 1968.
"Business Pledges its Support." Business Week, 30 November 1963, p. 34.
Butler, Ed. "The Great Assassin Puzzle." The Westwood Village Square, 1, no. 2(1968), pp. 21-28; 2, no. 1(1969), pp. 26-27, 37-41.
Cameron, J. "Humane and Sane." Commonweal, 13 December 1963, pp. 338-339.
Caplan, Gerald and Vivian Cadden. "Lessons in Bravery." McCalls, September 1968, pp. 12, 85, 115.
Carney, Frederick S. "Crisis of Conscience in Dallas: Soul-searching vs. 'New Faith in Dallas.' Thought on the day of the funeral of Tom F. Driver." Christianity and Crisis, 23 December 1963, pp. 235-241.
Carr, Waggoner. Texas Supplemental Report on the Assassination of President Kennedy and the Serious Wounding of Governor John B. Connally, November 22, 1963. Austin, Texas. 19
Castro, Fidel. Comparecencia del Comandante Fidel Castro, ante el pueblo de Cuba sobre los sucesos relacionados conel asesinato del Presidente Kennedy. Havana: Comision de Orientacion Revolucionaria, Direcion Nacional del PURSC, 1963.
A Child's Eyes: November 22, 1963 (motion picture). Group VI Productions (released by Pathe Contemporary Films), 1968.
"A Chronology of Tragedy." Time and Tide, 28 November 1963, pp. 7-9.
Ciardi, John. "November 22, 1963." Saturday Review, 7 December 1963, pp. 16+.
———. "Of chaos and courage." Saturday Review, 28 December 1963, p. 25.
Clifford, G. "Warren Report: A New Boost for the Kennedy Memorabilia Industry." Maclean's Magazine, 2 November 1964, p. 3.
Cole, Alwyn. "Assassin Forger." Journal of Forensic Sciences, July 1966, pp. 272-288.
"Compendium of Curious Coincidences: Parallels in the Lives and Deaths of A. Lincoln and J.F. Kennedy." Time, 21 August 1964, p. 19.
The Complete Kennedy Saga: Four Dark Days. 4 vols. Hollywood: Associated Professional Services, 1967.
Condon, R. "Manchurian Candidate in Dallas." Nation, 28 December 1963, pp. 449-451.
Connally, John B. "Why Kennedy Went to Dallas." Life, 24 November 1967, pp. 86A-86B.
Connally, Mrs. John B. "Since That Day in Dallas." McCalls, August 1964, pp. 78-79+.
Cook, Fred J. "Assassination Investigations. The Irregulars Take the Field." Nation, 19 July 1971, pp. 40-46.
Cooke, Alistair. "After the President's Assassination." Listener, 5 December 1963, pp. 907-908.
———. "Death of the Young Warrior." Listener, 28 November 1963, pp. 863-864.
———. "Man at Large: the Evidence on the Assassination of President Kennedy." Manchester Guardian, 22 September 1966, p. 8.
Cottrell, John. Assassination: The World Stood Still. London: New English Library, 1964.
Cousins, Norman. "The Legacy of John F. Kennedy." Saturday Review, 7 December 1963, pp. 21-22

mes T. The Kennedy Literature: A Bibliographical Essay on John F. Kennedy. New York: New York University Press, 1968.

. "RM and JFK: Twins of Fate." Philippines Herald Magazine, 14 March 1964, pp. 42, 44, 67, 72.

ane. JFK Assassination File. Dallas: American Poster and Printing Co., 1969.

, Hans U., ed. In memoriam John F. Kennedy. Aus dem Leben eines grosses Staatsmannes. Zurich: Romerhof-Verlag, 1964.

Late Casualty." Newsweek, 28 February 1966, pp. 31-32.

ejoinder." Nation, 25 May 1964, p. 519.

evisited." Time, 21 February 1969, pp. 18-19.

Detektivhistoria." Elöre, 10 April 1964, p. 319.

d Tragedia." Magyar Szovjet Közgazdasági szemle, 14 October 1964, pp. 273-285.

. "When Castro Heard the News." New Republic, 7 December 1963, pp. 7-9.

. "Assessing the Blame in the President's Death: Excerpts from Addresses." U.S. News and World Report, 14 December 1963, p. 73.

r, W.J. Review of Deed by G. Frank. Commentary, July 1963, pp. 90-92.

Review of Deed by G. Frank. Discussion, January 1964, pp. 6+.

died; excerpts from The Day Kennedy Was Shot by Jim Bishop." Ladies Home Journal, November 1968, pp. 151-157.

edy Died." Newsweek, 2 December 1963, pp. 20-26.

Dallas." Reader's Digest, January 1964, pp. 39-44.

a modern." Spectator, 29 November 1963, p. 681.

the President." Commonweal, 6 December 1963, p. 299-301.

h of a President." Women's Wear Daily, 28 March 1967.

a President: The Established Facts." Atlantic, March 1965, pp. 112-118.

h of a President: Told in Direct Testimony, Excerpts." U.S. News and World Report, 7 December 1964, pp. 68-70.

President Kennedy: Statements by Sir Robert Menzies and Sir Garfield Barwick on 23rd November." Current Notes on International Affairs, November 1963, pp. 38-39.

h of the President." Illustrated London News, 30 November 1963, pp. 889-899.

n "Who Killed John Kennedy?" Comments by critics and defenders of the Warren Report." Senior Scholastic, 18 November 1966, pp. 21-22+.

S. Destiny in Dallas: on the scene story in pictures. Dallas: The author, 1964.

Meeting in Dallas. Dallas: Denco Corporation, 1964.

tin. "Assassination and the Aftermath." American Opinion, March 1964, pp. 1-10. April 1964, pp. 33-40.

t look at Dallas." U.S. News and World Report, 3 February 1964, pp. 42-46.

"Why was JFK Shot?" Atlas, May 1967, pp. 10-13.

. "Commentary of an eyewitness." New Republic, 21 December 1963, p. 18.

Marven. Les quatre jours du Dallas. Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1966.

. "Sad Day in Texas." Singent, 14(1964), 26-27.

Martin S. "The Kennedy Film Discussed at the Warrenton Seminar." Film Comment, Fall/Winter 1967, pp. 33-34.

s: A Shock, Then Recovery." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 92-93.

Shop Talk." Antioch Review, Winter 1963-64, pp. 403-404.

"Winter, 1963: A Time for Quiet Voices." America, 21 December 1963, pp. 787.

a Beginning." Newsweek, 9 December 1963, pp. 19-20.

so. "Washington 25 November 1963." Ravu, 11 March 1967, pp. 18-20.

as: Memorial Boom." Newsweek, 30 December 1963, pp. 49-50.

Edward J. "Der Tod Kam bei Bild 313: eine neue Untersuchung des Kennedy-Mordes." Der Spiegel, 20, no. 29(1966), 63-67.

"Final Chapter in the Assassination Controversy." New York Times Magazine, 20 April 1969, pp. 30-31.

hat window." Newsweek, 22 June 1964, p. 32.

two hours without a president: excerpts from testimonies." U.S. News and World Report, 14 November 1966, pp. 68-78.

Harold. Fifty-One Witnesses: The Grassy Knoll. San Francisco: Idlewild Pubs., 1965.

evidence connected with the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (N.P.) 1963-64.

evidence connected with the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. 21 vols. in 2 reels microfilm. (Washington) Microcard Editions, 1967.

lliam M., ed. That Day with God. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.

Power: Same Goals, Sterner Style." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 31-32.

s." Television, January 1964, pp. 27-33.

: The Historical Record of the Death of President Kennedy. New York: American

Fox, Sylvan. "Unanswered Questions About President Kennedy's Assassination." National Review, 11 January 1966, pp. 36-37.

"Funeral of John Fitzgerald Kennedy." Illustrated London News, 30 November 1963, pp. 890-893.

Gales, Robert Robinson. "Notes. The Assassination of the President: Jurisdictional Problems." Syracuse Law Review, Fall 1964, pp.69-81.

Gans, H.J. "Why did Kennedy Die?" Trans-Action, July 1968, pp. 5-6.

Gardos, Miklos. A Kennedy Dosszie. Budapest, 1968.

Garson, Barbara. MacBird. New York: Grove Press, 1967.

Gellner, J. "Who Killed John Kennedy?" Saturday Night, July 1964, pp. 11-14.

Gershenson, Alvin. Kennedy and Big Business. (N.p.) Book Company of America (n.d.)

Gilliatt, Penelope. "The Current Cinema." New Yorker, 17 June 1967, p. 95.

Gilman, R. "Facts of Morality." Commonweal, 17 December 1963, pp. 337-338.

Glikes, Edwin A., ed. Of Poetry and Power: poems occasioned by the Presidency and death of John Kennedy. New York: Basic Books, 1964.

Goodhart, A.L. "The Mysteries of the Kennedy Assassination and the English Press." Law Quarterly Review, January 1967.

Gordon, Bruce. One and One Make Two Some Times: the Kennedy Assassination. Fullerton, California, 1968.

Gordon, William E. "The Assassination of President Kennedy." Contemporary Review, January 1964, pp. 8-13.

Gotte, Fritz. "Nach John F. Kennedys Tod." Die drei, 1964, pp. 143-145.

"The Government Still Lives." Time, 29 November 1963, pp. 21-32.

Graham, Fred P. "Doctors Inspect Kennedy X-rays." New York Times, 9 January 1972.

Greenberg, Bradley S. "Diffusion of News of the Kennedy Assassination." Public Opinion Quarterly, 28(1964), 225-232.

Grosvenor, Melville Bell. "The last Full Measure." National Geographic, March 1964, pp. 307-355.

Gun, Nerin E. Red Roses From Texas. London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1964.

Gurgo, Ottorino. Perche i Kennedy muoiono. Roma: Trevi, 1968.

Habe, Hans. "Die Hälfte der Wahrheit; der Mörder Gefundender Mord Ungeklärt." Weltwoche, 32(1964), 1614.

———. The Wounded Land: Journey through a Divided America. New York: Coward-McCann, 1964.

Hanson, William H. The Shooting of John F. Kennedy. San Antonio, Texas: The Naylor Company, 1969.

Harris, T.G. "Memo About a Dallas Citize." Look, 11 August 1964, pp. 64+.

Hart, L. "The Death of President Kennedy." Columbia, December 1963, p. 3.

———. "A Year of Progress with a Sorrowful Close." Columbia, January 1964, p. 16.

"Hatred knows no logic." Saturday Evening Post, 4 January 1964, p. 80.

"Have We Learned Our Lessons?" Christian Century, 80(1963), 1567-1568.

He Gave His Life. Nashville, Tenn.: The Nashville Tennessean, 1965.

Hegyi, Karoly. "A Dallasi Itelethirdetes Utan." Elöre, 17 March 1964, p.3.

Henderson, Bruce. 1:33. New York: Cowles, 1968.

Herchar, W.W. "Thousand well wishers and one assassin." U.S. News and World Report, 2 December 1968, pp. 34-35.

Hessel, D. "To heal the wounds." Christian Century, 81(1964), 15.

"Die Hintergrunde des Kennedy- Mords." Das andere Deutschland, 1963.

"History's Jury." Newsweek, 16 December 1963, pp. 25-27.

Holmes, W.A. " One thing worse than this: Sermon delivered at Northhaven Methodist Church, Dallas, November 24, 1963." Christian Century, 80 (1963), 1555-1556.

Homage to a friend, a memorial tribute by the United Nations for President John F. Kennedy. New York: United States Committee for the United Nations, 1964.

Horowitz, Irving L. "Kennedy's Death, Myths, and Realities." Trans-Action, July 1968, pp. 3-5.

Houts, Marshall. "President Kennedy's Autopsy was Botched." Medical Economics, 4 March 1968, p. 249.

———. Where Death Delights: Adventures in Courtroom Medicine. New York: Coward-McCann, 1967.

"How JFK Died." Newsweek, 30 December 1963, p.55.

Howard, Anthony. "Logistics of the Funeral." Esquire, November 1968, pp. 119-122.

Howe, Irving. "On the death of John F. Kennedy." In his Steady Work: Essays in the Politics of Democratic Radicalism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966.

Hughes, Emmet John. "An Echo in the Silence." Newsweek, 2 December 1963, p. 52.

"Hvem Myrdede Hven og Hvorfor?" Frit Danmark, 22 (1963-64), 3-5.

"Hyannis Port Revisited." Look (17 November 1964: The JFK Memorial Issue), pp. 37-45.

"Hypothetical Case: Letters." National Review, 17 December 1963, pp. 515-516; 24 January

: post-Kennedy assassination threats of magnicide." Newsweek, 23 December 1963,). 27.
): John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 1917-1963, President of the United States of America: memorial convocation at the University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, November the twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and sixty three. Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1964.
: Survived." Christian Century, 80 (1963), 1599-1601.
low of Dallas. San Francisco: Ramparts Magazine, 1966.
: Dallas: The Right to Bear Arms." Tablet, 3 October 1964, pp. 1101-1102.
mal Outlook." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 83-84.
Archives, X-rays and photographs of body of JFK." Time, 11 November 1966. p. 33.
:am. Kuda vedut sledy. Moscow, 1964.
:ia. "The Dallas Investigation." New Times, 11 December 1963, pp. 10-12.
'Echo of Dallas." New Times, 21 December 1966, pp. 29-31.
arl- Heinz. "Var Ermordete Kennedy? Fakten und Phantome: Suche Nach dem Zweiten Attentäter." Die Zeit, 21, no. 48 (1966), 7.
leans. "Why Vietnam is Kennedy's War." National Review, 23 April 1968, pp. 396-397.
ohn B. Neither the Fanatics nor the Fainthearted. The Tour Leading to the President's Death and the Two Speeches He Could Not Give. Austin, Texas: Pemberton Press, 1963.
sination." New Republic, 1 February 1969, pp. 9-10.
red?" Newsweek, 3 October 1966, pp. 65-66.
lone." Look, 17 December 1963, pp. 94+.
: a new investigation but..." U.S. News and World Report, 13 March 1967, p. 16.
ng: New Findings." U.S. News and World Report, 27 January 1969, p. 4.
death and the doubt." Newsweek, 5 December 1966, pp. 25-26.
Murder and the Myth." Time, 12 June 1964, pp. 44+.
lers: Swarm of Doubt." Newsweek, 6 April 1964, pp. 22-24.
ick. "An American Tragedy." Philippines Free Press, 7 December 1963, pp. 2-3, 75.
oachim. The Biggest Lie Ever Told. The Kennedy Fraud and How I helped Expose It. 4 vols. The author, 1968.
low Kennedy Was Killed. The Full Appalling Story. London: Peter Dawney, 1968.
Der Kennedy-Mord als 'Politische Warheit'." Frankfurte Hefte, Zeitschrift für Kultur und Politik, 21 (1966), 8.
nedy, 22 November 1963, Samlet og odsendt af Denmark-Amerika Fondets stipendiatsektion. Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1965.
gerald Kennedy." Look (17 November 1964: The JFK Memorial Issue), pp. 33-36.
ames Commission to Probe Assassination." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 6 December 1963, pp. 2122-2123.
a. "Mysterious Deaths in the Long Aftermath of Dallas." The Times, 25 February 1967, p. 11.
"November in Dallas." Library Journal, 1 January 1964, p. 72.
ménez Ricardo. Dos viernes tragicos: Asesinato del doctor Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, 9 de abril de 1948; asesinato de presidente John F. Kennedy, 22 noviembre, de 1963. Bogata: Editorial Horizontes, 1968.
Ursula Von. Diary of a Nightmare. London, 1965.
J. "A Visit to the Grave." Catholic Digest, July 1964, pp. 8-11.
urrey. "Looking Back on the Anniversary." Spectator, 1964, pp. 778-779.
"Rage Greater than Grief." Atlantic, May 1967, pp. 98-100.
live in hospital." Science News Letter, 10 October 1964, p. 229.
ssassination - Communist Version." Communist Affairs, November-December 1963, pp. 3-6.
ssassination; question of a second investigaton." New Republic, 12 November 1966, p. 8.
ssassination: something rotten..." Saturday Evening Post, 2 December 1967, p. 88.
dy Book." Commonweal, 6 January 1967, pp. 361-362.
acqueline L. "Mrs. Kennedy says thank you to 800,000 friends." Life, 24 January 1964, pp. 32B-32C.
ohn F. The Unspoken Speech of John Kennedy at Dallas, November 22, 1963. El Paso: Privately printed, 1964.
dys: A New Life." Newsweek, 16 December 1963, pp. 24-25.
Death: How the Controversy was Reborn." The Times, 21 August 1966, p. 6.
till Mystery." Science News Letter, 10 October 1964, p. 230.
in Luther. Die rede bei d. Gedenkfeier für John F. Kennedy anlassl. d. Eroffnung d. Berliner Festwochen. 1964. Vienna: USIS, 1964.
Kopkind, Andrew. "The Kennedy Mystery Reopened." New Statesman, 29 July 1966, p. 163.
Korolovsky, Lajos. "Fanatizmus és Vallásosság. Gondolatok a Kennedy Gyilkosság Hatterérol." Világosság, 5, no. 2 (1964), 80-87.
Kristl, Zvonimir, et al. Kennedy: Drama u Dallasu. Zagreb: Izdavačka Kuća "Stvarnost", 1963.
Kroeger, Albert R. "The Four Days." Television, January 1964, pp. 27+.
Krupp, G.R. "Day the President died; its meaning and impact." Redbook, March 1964, pp. 49+
Kurnoth, Rudolf. "Gedanken um den Tod John F. Kennedy." Frankenstein-Munsterberger Heimatblatt, 10, no. 12 (1963).
"Labor: Union Rally to Johnson." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 46, 48.
Lane, Mark. A Citizen's Dissent: Mark Lane Replies. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winsto 1968.
———. Kennedy, o crime e a farsa. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Saga, 1967.
———. "The Man in the Doorway." Film Comment, Fall/Winter 1967.
———. Rush to Judgment. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.
———. Rush to Judgment. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1967.
———. "Who Killed Kennedy? CBS is Wrong." True Magazine, December 1967.
"Lane says JFK death is still unsolved murder." Publishers Weekly, 22 August 1966, p. 38.
Langer, E. "Kennedy's Assassination: Study Organized by Social Scientists." Science, December 1963, pp. 1446-1447.
The Last Two Days (motion picture). Naval Photo Center 1211-69. National Archives and Records Service WHN: 17.
Lattimer, Dr. John K. "Factors in the Death of President Kennedy." JAMA, 24 October 1966.
Lauzon, A. "Au Banc Accusée, une Ville: Dallas." Le Magazine Macleans, March 1964, pp. 13-15, 56-58.
Lawrence, D. "Incredible Tragedy." U.S. News and World Report, 2 December 1963, p. 104.
Lawrence, Lincoln (pseud) Were We Controlled. New Hyde Park, New York: University Books, 1967.
Lefever, Ernest W. Uncertain Mandate. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967, 1968.
Lerner, Max. "The World Impact." Illustrated London News, 66, no. 1707 (1963).
———. "The World Impact." New Statesman, 29 November 1963, p. 769.
Leslie, Warren. Dallas City Limit. [N.p.] Grossman (n.d.)
"Letters to the Editor." National Review, 31 December 1963.
"Letters to the Editor; with editorial comment." Senior Scholastic, 10 January 1964, p. 18.
Levin, Bernard. "The Bell Tolls in Dallas." Listener, 5 December 1963, p. 914.
Levy, A. "Day JFK died; what people remember now." Good Housekeeping, November 1965, pp. 84-87.
Life. John F. Kennedy memorial edition: all of Life's pictures and text on the most shocking event of our time, including his biography and his most enduring words. Chicago: Time, Inc., 1963.
Life-Itek Kennedy Assassination Film Analysis. Lexington, Mass.: Itek Corporation, 1967.
"A Lonely Summer for Jacqueline." Look (17 November 1964: The JFK Memorial Issue), p. 45.
Love, Ruth. "Television and the Kennedy Assassination." New Society, 13 October 1966, pp. 567-571.
Lützkendorf, Felix. Dallas 22. November. Einaszenischer Bericht. [Basel] Desch [1965]
Makai, György. A Kennedy-gyilkosság Kulisszai mögött. Budapest: Kossuth Konyokiado, 1964.
"Man Who Killed Kennedy." Time, 6 December 1963, pp. 33A-34.
Manchester, William R. The Death of a President, November 20 - November 25, 1963. New York: Harpers, 1967.
———. "The Death of a President." Look, 24 January, 7 February, 21 February, 7 March, 1967.
———. "Dood Van een President." Revu Magazine, 1967 (seven serialized parts):
———. "John F. Kennedy: Portrait of a President." Holiday Magazine, April, May, June 1962.
———. "Mort d'un President." Paris Match, 1967 (eight serialized parts).
———. Portrait of a President. Boston: Little, Brown, 1962.
———. "Der Tod Des Präsidenten." Stern Magazine, 1967 (eight serialized parts).
———. Der Tod des Präsidenten. 20-25. November. 1963. Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1967.
———. "Wie Die Kennedys Mein Buch Bekampfen." Stern Magazine, 26 March 1967.
———. "William Manchester's Own Story." Look, 4 April 1967.
Mandel, P. "End to nagging rumors; the six critical seconds." Life, 6 December 1963, p. 52F.
Mannes, M. "Long Vigil." Reporter, 19 December 1963.
Mansfield, Michael J. Eulogies to the late President John Fitzgerald Kennedy delivered in the rotunda of the United States Capitol, November 24, 1963. New Britain, Conn.: J.L. Kapica, 1964.
———et al. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, eulogies to the late President delivered in the rotunda of the United States Capitol

ley J. Murder most foul! The Conspiracy that murdered President Kennedy: 975 uestions and answers. Los Angeles: Bureau of International Relations, 1967.

resident and Nation's Journey." Reconstructionist, 13 December 1963, p. 3.

hard. The Kennedy Curse. New York: Belmont Books, 1969.

reasonable doubt." Life, 25 November 1966, pp. 38-48B+.

. Four Dark Days in History: November 22-25, 1963. Los Angeles: The author, 963.

on. "November 22, 1963." Progressive Magazine, December 1964.

ley. "What They are Saying." Listener, 28 November 1963, p. 868.

B. Bulletin from Dallas: the President is Dead. New York: Exposition Press, 967.

mas M. "The Assassination Industry: A Tentative Checklist of Publications on he Murder of President John F. Kennedy." American Book Collector, Summer 1968.

ry. "After great pain; a formal feeling." America, 14 December 1963, p. 764.

n memoriam: John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Washington: Evenign Star Newspaper Co., 963.

, M. "Paris, November 22nd, 1963." Immaculate Heart Crusader, November-December 964, pp. 8-9.

.J. "Après la Mort de Kennedy: L'Amérique devant Elle-Même." Etudes: Revue atholique d'intérêt général, 1964.

lvia. "The Curious Testimony of Mr. Given." Texas Observer, 13 August 1971, p. 11-12.

otes for new investigation." Esquire, December 1966, pp. 211+.

'On Closing the Doors, Not opening Them; or the Limit of the Warren Investigation." he Minority of One, July-August 1966, pp. 29-32.

'Post Assassination Credibility Chasm." The Minority of One, March 1967, pp. 21-22.

'A Psychiatrist's Retroactive Clairvoyance." The Minority of One, June 1966, pp. 25-27.

"Wheels with Deals: How the Kennedy Investigation Was Organized." The Minority of One, July-August 1968, pp. 23-27.

pinion." Science Digest, February 1967, pp. 35-36.

ollection of newspaper microfilm chronicling events of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, November 22-26, 1963. Cleveland: Bell and Howell Co., Micro Photo Division, 1964.

, Harold. "Broadcast vs. Sources of Information in Emergent Public Crises: the Presidential Assassinaton." Journal of Broadcasting, Spring 1964, pp. 147-156.

l E. "Echoes of Dallas." Illustrated London News, 66, no. 1709 (1963), 868-870.

"History as Tragedy." Illustrated London News, 66, no. 1707 (1963), 766-768.

, Ive. "Snapjperski Metak na Savijest Amerike." Vjesnik u srijedu, 27 November 1963, p. 604.

Tko je ubio Kennedija. Zagreb: "Starnost,/ 1967.

ko. "Amerika je Povela Istragu nad Samom Sobom." Borba, 1 December 1963, pp. 29-30.

"Stravicna Hronika 22. Novembra." Borba, 24 November 1963.

"Ubijen Predsednik SAD Dzon Kenedi." Borba, 23 November 1963.

and S. Lynd. "Seeds of Doubt: Some Questions About the Assassination." New Republic, 21 December 1963, pp. 14-17.

Fail. "Enigma de la Dallas di Semnele ei di Întrevare." Pentru Ăpararea Păcii, ecember 1966, pp. 19-22.

ink: photos and X-rays of autopsy." Newsweek, 14 November 1966, pp. 30-31.

l. "New Inquiry needed: questions concerning the assassination." New York Times Magazine, 25 December 1966; 8 Jnauray 1967.

Tragedy." U.S. News and World Report, 2 December 1963, p. 6.

, R. "Crystal Ball: Condensation from Gift of Prophecy." Reader's Digest, July 1965, pp. 235-242.

ld stories concerning the Death of a President by W. Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 30 January 1967, p. 36.

man. Assassination: The Death of President John F. Kennedy. New York: New American Library, 1963.

ight. One Day: This Being the Day in November the word from Dallas was Heard in Escondido. New York: Atheneum, 1965.

, Malcolm. "A New Kennedy Theory." New Statesman, 18 November 1966, p. 735.

"Report from Mexico on Reaction to John Kennedy's Tragic Death." Catholic Messenger, 5 December 1963, p. 12.

National Broadcasting Company. There Was A President. New York: Random House, 1966.

"The Nations: How Sorrowful Bad." Time, 29 November 1963, pp. 38-39.

Nelson, Harry. "If Kennedy had Survived: Life in Respirator Might Have Been His Fate." Angeles Times, 7 June 1968, pp. 1. 19.

"New Assassination theory: theory of J. Thompson." Newsweek, 27 November 1967, pp. 29-

"New conflict over assassinaton." U.S. News and World Report, 5 December 1966, pp. 6+.

"New Light on the Assassination: a secret agent's story." U.S. News and World Report, June 1964, pp. 38-39.

Newmann, Alfred. The Assassination of John F. Kennedy. The Reason Why. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1970.

Nichols, Dr. John. "President Kennedy's Adrenals." JAMA, 10 July 1967, pp. 129-130.

"Notes and comment." New Yorker, 7 December 1963, p. 45.

"November 22, 1963, Dallas: Photos by Nine Bystanders." Life, 25 November 1967, pp. 87-

"Now the Trumpet Summons Again..." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 21-23.

"Now the U.S. gets JFK autopsy." U.S. News and World Report, 14 November 1966, p. 81.

O'Brien, Conor C. "The Life and Death of Kennedy." New Statesman, 71, no. 1818 (1966). 50-51.

———. "No one Else but him." New Statesman, 30 September 1966, pp. 479-481.

O'Toole, Dr. James K. "Mourning a President." Psychiatric Quarterly, 40 (1966), 737-755.

"On the Far Right: The Assassination." Commonweal, 27 December 1963, pp. 384-385.

"On the Writing of Contemporary History." Atlantic, March 1967, pp. 69-74.

"Oswald's Historic Diary." Life, 10 July 1964, pp. 26-31.

"Other Guns." Newsweek, 30 December 1963, p. 15.

Pacis, Vicente A. "Hate Campaign did it." Weekly Graphic, 25 December 1963, pp. 2, 3, 98.

Panter-Downes, Mollie. "Letter from London." New Yorker, 7 December 1963, pp. 196-198.

"Paris: le Coup de Dallas." New Statesman, 6 December 1963, p. 817.

Parlach, Alexander Von. "Jacqueline Kennedy: das Leben einer Witwe." Stern Magazine, 5 1967, pp. 90+.

"Pathologist Sleuth Reopens Kennedy Controversy; Suggests JFK suffered from Addison's Disease." Science News, 22 July 1967.

"A Permanent Record of What We Watched from November 22-25, 1963." TV Guide, 25 January 1964, pp. 23-43.

Phelan, J. "Plot to Kill Kennedy? Rush to Judgment in New Orleans." Saturday Evening Pc 6 May 1967, pp. 21-25.

"Pilgrimages to Grave of President Kennedy: Shadow Still Cast Over White House." The Tim 23 November 1966, p. 8,

"Piety of it." Jewish Frontier, December 1963, p. 3.

Pomerantz, Charlotte, comp. The Mood of the Nation. New York: Marzini and Munsell, 1964.

"Portrait of a Psychopath." Newsweek, 16 December 1963, pp. 82-84.

Possony, S.T. "Clearing the air." National Reveiw, 9 February 1965, pp. 113-114.

Poznanska, A. "Procès à Dallas." Cite libre, April 1964, pp. 26-28.

"President Assassinated by a Gunman at Dallas." Illustrated London News, 30 November 1963, pp. 887+.

"President Kennedy Assassinated." The Times, 23 November 1963, p. 8.

President Kennedy's Last Hour (motion picture). Wolper Production, Dallas Cinema Associate

"The Press: Covering the Tragedy." Time, 29 November 1963, p. 84.

"Priceless Role." Newsweek, 16 December 1963, p. 56.

"Primer of Assassination Theories." Esquire, December 1966, pp. 205-210.

Puche, Ignacio, comp. Asesinato: el asesinato de Kennedy en todos sus detalles. Madrid: Grafica Ruán, 1963.

"A Quiet and Sad Day." Newsweek, 30 December 1963, p. 34.

Rand, Michael et al., comps. The Assassination of President Kennedy. London: Cape, 1967.

Rankin, Marcus. "Rush to Judgment." Yale Law Reveiw, January 1967, pp. 581-597.

"Reaction in the South." Newsweek, 16 December 1963, p. 27.

"Reaction to killings." Science News Letter, 7 December 1963, p. 358.

"Reaction to the Assassination; excerpts from reports to Christian Century's news correspondents." Christian Century, 80 (1963), 1618-1619.

"Report from the FBI." Newsweek, 23 December 1963, pp. 19-20.

Reyes Monroy, Jose Luis. Ramo de orquídeas; la bella flor nacional de Guatemala, a la memo del gran presidente de los Estados Unidos de America, senor John F. Kennedy. Gua mala: Tip. Nacional, 1965.

Roberts, C. "Eyewitness in Dallas." Newsweek, 5 December 1966, pp. 26-29.

Roberts, Charles W. The Truth About the Assassination. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1967.

Robertson, A. "Murder most foul."

ır, V. "No time for collective guilt." U.S. News and World Report, 9 December 1963, p. 72.

to buy the report on Kennedy Assassination." U.S. News and World Report, 12 October 1964, p. 20.

to Judgment: A Conversation with Mark Lane and Emile de Antonio." Film Comment, Fall/Winter 1967, pp. 2-18.

ıl, Bertrand. 16 Questions on the Assassination. Passaic, N.J. n.d.

ı, F. "Doubts about Dallas." National Review, 6 September 1966, pp. 887-888+.

, Martin H. Bio-bibliography of the Kennedy Family. New York: Scarecrow, 1969.

ılyan, Mikhail. "Dallas. Who? How? Why?" Sputnik Monthly Digest, June, August, 1971.

er, Pierre E.G. "With Kennedy." Good Housekeeping, August 1966, pp. 57-67, 158, 160-168, 170, 172, 174.

– and Sander Vanocur, eds. A Tribute to John F. Kennedy. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Press, 1964.

ury, Harrison E. "Who Killed Kennedy?" Progressive Magazine, November 1966, pp. 36-39.

E. and J. Wickey. "Resolutions of the Liberal Dilemma in the Assassination of President Kennedy." Journal of Personality, December 1965, pp. 636-648+.

Atsuyuki. "New Light on the Assassination: A Secret Agent's Story." U.S. News and World Report, 8 June 1964, pp. 38-39.

e, Leo. "As I was Saying." New Leader, 9 November 1964, pp. 8-13.

Sirimongkom. Rüanglang khāttakam prathānāthiphōdī Kennedi. Bangkok, 1964.

inger, Arthur M., Jr. "A Eulogy: John Fitzgerald Kennedy." Saturday Evening Post, 14 December 1963, pp. 32-32A.

t, Sister M. Bernadette, comp. The Trumpet summons us...John F. Kennedy. New York: Vantage Press, 1964.

ber, F.R. and M. Herman. "November 22, 1963, a Psychiatric Evaluation." Science Digest, July 1965, pp. 39-41.

r, Alfred. "Im 'Carousel' Sitzen FBI-Agenten. Dallas nach dem Kennedy-Mord." Der Spiegel, 17 (1963), 76.

len, Joachim. "Der Mord von Dallas." Die Zeit, 19 (1964), p. 3.

; Primer of Assassination Theories." Esquire, May 1967, pp. 104-107.

less Tragedy." Saturday Evening Post, 14 December 1963, p. 19.

Naci. Kennedy, suikasti. Istanbul: Bilgin Yayinlari, 1967.

Ido. Or ya'ur naged rotshe Kenedi. Tel Aviv: N. Twersky, 1964.

Hours and What They Can Teach Us." Life, 6 December 1963, p. 4.

on a Grassy Knoll: Photographic-Analysis shows no New Evidence." Time, 26 May 1967, p. 21.

in Dallas" Saturday Review, 28 December 1963, p. 26.

, Robert Lewis. "The Relevant Question." Saturday Review, 14 December 1963, p. 23.

J.M., Jr. "Memo from a Dallas citizen." Look, 24 March 1964, pp. 88+.

ot That Changed our Future." Time and Tide, 28 November 1963, p. 4.

L. "Dealey Plaza." Holiday, November 1969, pp. 78-79+.

Merriman. The Murder of the Young President. United Press International (n.d.)

William R. Assassination by Consensus: the story behind the Kennedy assassination. Washington: L'Avant Garde, 1966.

–. A Hoe Story: from the aftermath of the Kennedy Assassination. Washington: L'Avant Garde, 1968.

, George W. Why Did They Assassinate President Kennedy? The author (n.d.)

: Mystery of the Missing Frames." Newsweek, 6 February 1967, p. 17.

ommission Untersucht Kennedy-Attendat." Polizei-Polizei-praxie, 55 (1964), pp. 159-160.

n, Theodore C. "Kennedy." Look, 10 August, pp. 40-50; 24 August, pp. 37-50; 7 September, pp. 42-46, 51-54; 21 September, 48-52, 57-60; 19 October, pp. 50-53.

Press Comment Following Kennedy's Death." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 18 December 1963, pp. 3-7.

, S.P. and N.K. Denzin. "Levels of Knowledge in an Emergent Crisis." Social Forces, December 1965, pp. 234-237.

, Richard E. "The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: The Application of Computers to the Photographic Evidence." Computers and Automation, May 1970, pp. 29-60.

n, Adlai E. "Tributes to John F. Kennedy." In Baird, A.C., ed. Representative American Speeches, 1963-1964. New York: Wilson, 1964.

, Charles J. and Bruce Kendall, eds. A man named John F. Kennedy: sermons on his assassination. Glen Rocks, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1964.

"We all had a finger on that trigger." Outlook, February 1964, pp. 8-9.

"Das Teuflische Spiel um den Kennedy-Mord. Der Trick des Weltkommunismus Durchschaut und Missglückt." Schlesische rundschau, 15, no. 49 (1963), 1, 3.

"This is a Great Nation." Economist, 30 November 1963, pp. 901-902.

"This nation, under God: Statement by the editors." Reader's Digest, January 1964, pp. 37-39.

Thomas, J. "Le Monde Libre et le Crime de Dallas." La nouvelle revue internationale, 7 (

Thompson, Josiah. Six Seconds in Dallas. New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 1967.

Thompson, Thomas. "In Texas a Policeman and an Assassin are Laid to Rest, Too." Look, 6 December 1963, pp. 52B-52E.

Thompson, W.C. A Bibliography of Literature relating to the Assassination of President Joh F. Kennedy. San Antonio, Texas (n.d.)

"A Thousand Days." Life, 16 July, 23 July, 30 July, 5 November, 12 November, 19 November 1965.

A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

"Three patients at Parkland." Texas State Journal of Medicine, January 1964, pp. 60-74.

Thruston, Wesley S. The Trumpets of November. New York: Bernard Geis Associates n.d.

"Time between. Reporter, 5 December 1963, p. 14.

"The Times Investigates the Assassination." Newsweek, 12 December 1966, p. 20.

Tobin, Richard L. "If You Can Keep Your Head When All About You: Television and News Coverage of the Kennedy Assassination Story." Saturday Review, 14 December 1963, pp. 53-54.

The Torch Is Passed: the Associated Press Story of the Death of a President. New York: Associated Press, 1964.

"A Tragedy and a Challenge." Business Week, 30 November 1963, p. 124.

"Tragic Day in Texas." Senior Scholastic, 18 November 1966, p. 7.

"Tragic end of John F. Kennedy." U.S. News and World Report, 2 December 1963, pp. 31-32.

Trevor-Roper, Hugh. "Ki Ölte meg Kennedy-t?" Korunk, 25 (1966), 1601-1609.

Troelstrup, Glenn. "New Light on the Assassination: A Secret Agent's Story." U.S. News and World Report, 8 June 1964, pp. 38-39.

Tupa, Stefan. "Dallas: Declaratii si Ipoteze." Lumea, 12 March 1964, pp. 9-10.

Turnbull, J.W. "Notes from Texas." Commonweal, 13 December 1963, p. 337.

Turner, W.W. "Some disturbing parallels; assassination of M.L. King and J.F. Kennedy." Ramparts Magazine, 29 June 1968, pp. 33-36.

"Two Mrs. Kennedys." National Review, 4 April 1967, pp. 335-336.

United Press International. Brochure of front pages of 91 American newspapers, November 22 to 25, 1963. New York: KMR Publications n.d.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Preserving evidence pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy: report to accompany H.R. 9545. Washington: G.P.O., 1965.

———. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Preserving evidence pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy: report to accompany H.R. 9545. Washington: G.P.O., 1965.

U.S. 88th Congress. House Report 1913, authorizing subpoena power for Commission on Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Report from Committee on Judiciary to accompany H.J. Resolution 852. December 10, 1963. Washington: House Documents Room, 1964.

———. Public Law 202. S.J. Res 137, joint resolution authorizing Commission established to report upon assassination of President John F. Kennedy to compel attendance and testimony of witnesses and production of evidence. Approved 13 December 1963. Washington: G.P.O., 1964.

———. 2nd Session, 1964. Memorial addresses in the Congress of the United States and tributes in eulogy of John F. Kennedy, late President of the United States. Washington: G.P.O., 1964.

"Unraveling the mystery of the assassination of John F. Kennedy; the official story." U.S. News and World Report, 5 October 1964, pp. 35-42+.

"Untold Stories: Aftermath of the Assassination." U.S. News and World Report, 12 October 1964, pp. 58-62.

Uruguay. Biblioteca del Poder Legislativo. John F. Kennedy: 1917-1963: noticia biográfica o ocasión de su fallecimiento. Montevideo, 1963.

"USA-Attentat-Aufklarung: Weisser Mann Gesucht." Der Spiegel, 17, no. 49 (1963), 83-86.

"USA-Kennedy-Attentat: Mord in der Sonne." Der Spiegel, 17, no. 49 (1963), 77-83.

"USA Präsidentenschutz: Fenster zu." Der Spiegel, 17, no. 49 (1963) 86-87.

"Use and Abuse of Stock Footage." Film Comment, Fall/Winter 1967, pp. 47-53.

Ushakov, G. "Dallas Merry-go-Round." New Times, 18 March 1964, pp. 27-29.

Van Der Karr, Richard K. Crisis in Dallas: an historical study of the activities of television broadcasters during

Street Revives Fast After the Crisis." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 28-31.
r, Dale. Who Killed the President? New York: American Press, 1964.
r, Ken. "Big Bargain in Rifles." Mechanix Illustrated, 60, no. 437 (1964), 89-91+.
This Man Sane?" Life, 21 February 1964, pp. 26-29.
ington Outlook." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 41-42, 109-110.
erg, Harold. Photographic Whitewash. (suppressed Kennedy Assassination pictures). Hyattstown, Md: The author n.d.
—. Post Mortem; suppressed Kennedy Autopsy. Frederick, Md., 1969.
—. Post Mortem III, secrets of the Kennedy Autopsy. Frederick, Md., 1969.
—. Whitewash II, the FBI-Secret Service coverup. Hyattsville, Md., 1966.
D, and W. Turner. "In the Shadows of Dallas." Ramparts, 25 January 1969, pp. 61-71.
, R.J. "Kennedy assassination; with editorial comment." Saturday Evening Post, 14 January 1967, pp. 19-25, 74.
they saw that Dreadful Day in Dallas: Testimony and Evidence Published." Newsweek, 7 December 1964, pp. 28-30.
r, Keith. "The Rifle that Killed Kennedy." Life, 27 August 1965, pp. 62-63.
Kennedy Died." Newsweek, 14 September 1964, p. 61.
the shots come from." New Republic, 28 December 1963, p. 7.
Theodore H. "Assassination inquiry: slow, careful." U.S. News and World Report, 27 January 1964, p. 49.
. "For President Kennedy: An Epilogue." Look, 6 December 1963, pp. 158-159.
. "One wished for a Cry, a Sob...Any Human Sound." Look (17 November 1964: JFK Memorial Edition).
lled Kennedy?" National Review, 2 July 1968, p. 642.
lled Kennedy? The Crucial Evidence." The Times, 9 October 1966, pp. 7-21.
lled President Kennedy: Soviet Condolences." New Times, 4 December 1963, pp. 5-7.
s to Blame?" Economist, 7 December 1963, p. 1022.
Gary. "Dallas: Out There." National Catholic Reporter, 4 January 1967, p. 10.
Richard. "What Happened to the Kennedy Program." Look (17 November 1964: JFK memorial Edition), pp. 117-118+.
vid. "It Will Be Many Years..." Good Housekeeping, February 1964, pp. 90-91+.
"Secret Evidence on the Kennedy Assassination." Saturday Evening Post, 6 April 1968, pp. 70-73.
and Thomas B. Ross. The Day Kennedy Died. San Antonio: The Naylor Co., 1964.
r, L. "Que s'est-il Passe a Dallas?" Macleans, September 1966, pp. 2-3.
fter New Year's America: Minds in Ferment." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 8 January 1964, pp. 18-19.
ld and the White House." New Statesman, 29 November 1963, pp. 56-58.
istened and Watched: Radio-TV Meets Greatest Challenge in Wake of JFK Tragedy..." Broadcasting, 2 December 1963, pp. 36-61.
ourns in doubt, fear, and hope." Newsweek, 9 December 1963, pp. 56-58.
the Spot." Newsweek, 16 December 1963, pp. 27-28.
;h, Ralph. "Sensory Perception." Newsweek, 16 January 1967, p. 6.
' Lightning: Day of Drums." Film Comment, Fall/Winter 1967, pp. 22-23.

B. WORLD OPINION AND EFFECTS

joe, Guillermo. The World Before a Tomb. Barcelona, 1964.
mne J. "The Kennedy Assassination: Early thoughts and Emotions." Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1964, pp. 216-224.
Norman H. and Jacob J. Feldman. Public Apathy and Public Grief. Chicago: National Opinion Center, University of Chicago, 1964.
l. "Questions from abroad." Saturday Review, 9 May 1964.
obert. "Russia: No, No, This Cannot be True." Look, 6 December 1963, pp. 129-130.
Guilt." Christian Century, 81 (1964), 37-38.
e Guilt in the U.S.? Take a Look at the World: with Excerpts from Address by Thruston B. Morton." U.S. News and World Report, 23 December 1963, pp. 72-74.
e or individual guilt." U.S. News and World Report, 16 December 1963, p. 10.
.K. "Reaction of Pre-school Children to the Assassination of President Kennedy." Young Children, November 1964, pp. 100-105.
gic, Livingston. La eterna antorcha de Arlington: reportajes de un periodista mexicano desde Washington, a la muerte de John F. Kennedy. Mexico: Editorial Academia Lietraria, 1964.
of "Burden of guilt." Christian Century, 81 (1964), 243.
Jan L. "The Kennedy Assassination as Viewed by Communist Media." Journalism
(Flanner, Janet) ("Genet," pseud.) "Letters from Paris." New Yorker, 7 December 1963, pp. 133-134+.
"From friend and foe in America: sense of shock and dismay at the despicable act, statemen U.S. News and World Report, 2 December 1963, p. 49.
Frontek, T. "An American View." Tablet, 8 April 1967, pp. 382-383.
Greenberg, Bradley S. and Edwin B. Parker, eds. The Kennedy Assassination and the America public: social communication in crisis. Stanford University Press, 1965.
Greenstein, Fred I. "Popular Images of the President." American Journal of Psychiatry, 122, no. 5 (1965), 523-529.
Habe, Hans. Anatomy of Hatred: the wounded land. London: Harrap, 1964.
Harris, T. George. "Competent American: Eight Views of JFK." Look, 17 November 1964, pp. 54, 56, 61, 64.
Hepburn, James. Farewell America. Belgium; Frontier Company, 1968. (Also in German and French texts).
"How America Felt." Newsweek, 16 March 1964, p. 33.
"How sorrowful bad; world reactions." Time, 29 November 1963, pp. 38-39.
"In Jural Procesului de la Dallas. Răsfoind Presa Straină." Scinteia, 9 March 1964, p.
"In the Nation's interest; commission to investigate the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy." America, 21 December 1963.
"Kennedy legacy, the people's task." Commonweal, 13 December 1963, pp. 335-336.
Lineberry, William. "The Lingering 'plot'. Foreign Opinion and the Assassination." New Leader, 27 April 1964, pp. 21-22.
"Lingering doubts; survey of public opinion." Newsweek, 6 January 1964, p. 19.
McGill, R.E. "Speaking out: hate knows no direction." Saturday Evening Post, 14 December 1963, pp. 8+.
"Der Mord von Dallas Mahnt die Welt." Begegnung, Berlin, 12 (1963), no. 3, pp. 1-2.
"L'Occidente e la Morte di Kennedy." Rivista di studi politici internazionali, Florence, 30 (1963), p. 3.
Radojčič, Miroslav. "Kako je Amerika Primila Vest a Zlocinu u Teksasu." Politika, 23 November 1963, p. 18010.
———. "Zasto je Amerika Cutala?" Politika, 2 December 1963, p. 18017.
Rains, Rohn R., comp. Editorials U.S.A. Different opinions on different subjects. John F. Kennedy assassination. November 22, 1963. Dallas, Texas: The author (n.d.)
Rajski, Raymond B., ed. A nation Grieves: The Kennedy Assassination In Editorial Cartoons Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1967.
Sheatsley, Paul B. and Norman Bradburn. "Assassination! How the American Public responded American Psychological Asso. Los Angeles, September 1964, pp. 1-19. (paper)
Sheatsley, Paul B. and Jacob J. Feldman. "The assassination of President Kennedy. A Preliminary Report on Public Reactions and Behavior." Public Opinion Quarterly, 28 (1964), p. 2.
"Soviet Press Comment Following Kennedy's Death." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 18 December 1963, pp. 3-7.
Tamama, T. Reply to H. Brandon's "Questions from abroad." Saturday Review, 27 June 1964.
"Tragedy in Dallas: letters to the editor." Christian Century, 80 (1963), 1588-1590.
Wolfenstein, Martha and Gilbert W. Kliman, eds. Children and the Death of a President; multidisciplinary studies. New York: Doubleday, 1966.
Wilson, J.J. Mood of the Nation. New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1964.
"The World Resounds: Reactions to the President's Murder, a Symposium: New York, by W. We: Tokyo, by J. Blewett, Rome, by D. Campion, Washington, by S. Quinlan. Bogota, by Andrade. Milwaukee, by Q.Quade. Toulouse, by F. Bechesu. London, by A. Boyle." America, 14 December 1963.
"World Weeps and Waits." Business World, 30 November 1963, pp. 30-31.

C. WARREN COMMISSION

"As Warren Inquiry starts; latest on the assassination." U.S. News and World Report, 30 December 1963, pp. 28-30.
"The assassination: The Warren Report." Newsweek, 5 October 1964, pp. 32-40, 45-52, 57-60, 63-64.
"Autopsy on the Warren Commission: Time Essay." Time, 16 September 1966, pp. 54-55.
"Between two fires: Mrs. Oswald's testimony to Warren Commission." Time, 14 February 1964, pp. 16-20.
Bickel, Alexander M. "Failure of the Warren Report." Commentary, April 1967, pp. 7-8.
———. "Reexamining the Warren Report." New Republic, 7 January 1967
"Brave little woman

all, A. "What happened in Dallas? Concerning H. Weisberg and E.J. Epstein's theories on the Warren Report." New Republic, 25 June 1966, pp. 23-25.
Case Against Mr. X." New Leader, 3 January 1966, pp. 13-18.
, R.A. "Postscript to Warren." Spectator, 27 January 1967, p. 99.
—. "Warren in the Dock Who killed Kennedy." Spectator, 23 September 1966, pp. 371-372.
, Jacob. "The Warren Commission report and its Critics." Frontier, November 1966, pp. 5-20.
—. "What the Warren report omits: vital documents." Nation, 11 July 1966, pp. 43-49.
dium on Warren Commission. Mundelein, Ill.: Callaghan & Co. (n.d.) (Journal of the Forensic Sciences)
Fred J. "Warren Commission report; some unanswered questions" Nation, 13 June 1966, pp. 705-715.
—. "Warren Commission report: testimony of the eyewitnesses." Nation, 20 June 1966, pp. 737-746.
—. "Warren Report and the Irreconcilables: Theories of Josiah Thompson and Sylvia Meagher." Nation, 26 February 1968, pp. 277-281.
rd, Curtis et al. Critical Reactions to the Warren Report. New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1964.
rd, K. "Warren impeachers." Newsweek, 19 October 1964, p. 40
n, Robert F. "Why the Warren Commission?" New York University Law Review, May 1965, pp. 477-533.
Jay. The Weight of the Evidence: The Warren Report and its Critics. New York: Meredith Press, 1968.
Marc and Jim Matthews, eds. Highlights of the Warren Report. Covina, Calif.: Collectors Publications, 1967.
—. Highlights of the Warren Report. Los Angeles: Associated Professional Service, 1964.
nd growing doubts questioning the verdict of the Warren Commission." Newsweek, 10 October 1966, pp. 36+.
er, David. "The Warren Report: The Death of a President." Liberation, January 1965, pp. 11-12.
, "Editorial: The Warren Report...?" Liberation, March 1965, pp. 3-5.
A. "Allan Dulles answers Warren Report Critics; excerpts from statements, December 4, 1966." U.S. News and World Report, 19 December 1966, p. 20.
W. "The Warren Report." Jubilee, December 1964, pp. 24-27.
, Edward J. Inquest: the Warren Commission and the establishment of truth. New York: Viking Press, 1956.
, O relatório de Médo: A Comissão Warren e a busca da verdade. Trad. do Renato Fernandes. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Inova, 1967.
"Who is afraid of the Warren Report?" Esquire, December 1966, pp. 204+.
rnold L. "JFK in Dallas: The Warren Report and its Critics." Saturday Review, 21 January 1967, p. 36.
blishers issue Warren panel's report." Publishers' Weekly, 5 October 1964, pp. 43-44.
F. "As others see us; concerning Warren Commission Report." Saturday Review, 7 November 1964, pp. 35-37.
aetano. "Loose Ends." Greater Philadelphia Magazine, January 1967.
"The Warren Commission: The Truth and Arlen Specter." Greater Philadelphia Magazine. (Page proofs, 1966?)
rald F. and John R. Stiles. Portraits of an Assassin. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.
Paul L. "The Warren Commission and the Fourth Shot: A Reflection on the Fundamentals of Forensic Fact Finding." New York University Law Review, May 1965.
Charles. An Examination of the Contradictions and Omissions of the Warren Report. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1966.
R. "The Warren Commission." Ave Maria, 17 September 1966, pp. 16-17.
K. and A.L. Goodhart. "Warren Commission: the critics and the law; theories of E.J. Epstein and M. Lane." Reporter, 15 December 1966, pp. 44-48.
A.L. "The Warren Commission from a Procedural Standpoint." New York University Law Review, May 1965, pp. 404-423.
. "The Mysteries of the Kennedy Assassination and the English Press." Law Quarterly Review, January 1967, pp. 23-63.
D. "Warren Commission." Atlantic, August 1966, pp. 117-118.
ed That Consumes... Address by Chief Justice E.G. Warren on the Assassination of the President." Hadassah Magazine, December 1963, p. 32.
at the Warren report will show." U.S. News and World Report, 14 September 1964, pp. 42-43.
"Warren Commission One-Bullet

Jacobson, Dan. "Mean Street: Warren Commission Report." New Statesman, 15 January 1965 pp. 76-77.
Jaffe, Louis L. "Trial by Newspaper." New York University Law Review, May 1965, pp. 504
Joesten, Joachim. Die Wahrheit über den Kennedy-Mord: wie und warum der Warren-Report lü Zurich: Schweizer Verlagshaus, 1966.
———. The Gaps in the Warren Report. New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1965.
Johnson, Marion M., comp. Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the President's Commis on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Washington: National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1970.
Jones, Penn. Forgive My Grief; a critical review of the Warren Commission report on the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Midlothian, Texas: Midlothian Mirror, 1966.
———. Forgive My Grief, Volume Two. Midlothian, Texas; Midlothian Mirror, 1967.
Kempton, M. "Warren report: a case for the prosecution." New Republic, 10 October 1964 pp. 13-17.
"Latest on murder of Kennedy: a preview of the Warren Report." U.S. News and World Repor 1 June 1964, pp. 43-44.
Lewis, Richard W. The Scavengers and critics of the Warren Report; the endless paradox. New York: Delacorte Press, 1967.
Lifton, David S., comp. Document Addendum to the Warren Report. Los Angeles: Sighttext Publications Inc., 1968.
Lynd, Staughton. "Comment by Staughton Lynd." Liberation Magazine, 9, no. 10 (1965), 18.
MacDonald, Dwight. "A Critique of the Warren Report." Esquire, March 1965, p. 39.
———. "A Ctitique of the Warren Report." In Walker, Gerald, ed. Best Magazine Artic 1966. New York: Crown, 1966, p. 19-53.
———. Ghost of Conspiracy. A Critique of the Warren Commission Report. Englewood Cli N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965. (publication withdrawn)
Malow, Richard. The Kennedy Assassination and the Warren Report. Washington: G.P.O., 196
Marcus, Raymond. The Bastard Bullet; a search for legitimacy for Commission Exhibit 399. Los Angeles: Rendall Publications, 1966.
Meagher, Sylvia. Accessories after the fact; the Warren Commission, the authorities, and the report. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1967.
———. Subject index to the Warren report and hearings and exhibits. New York: Scare Press, 1966.
Meyer, Karl E. and N. MacKenzie. "Spotlight on Warren." London, New Statesman, 2 Octobe 1964, pp. 474-476.
———. "The Warren Report: the Triumph of Caliban." New Leader, 12 October 1964, pp.
Michel, Armand. L'assassinat de John Kennedy, le Rapport Warren et ses critiques. N.P. Trinckvel, 1968.
Mills, Andrew. "Who killed Kennedy? The Warren Report is Right." True Magazine, Decemb 1967, pp. 32, 72, 75-77.
Montagu, Ivor. "The Warren Report." Labour Monthly, November 1964, pp. 449-503.
Mosk, Richard M. "The Warren Commission and the Legal Process." Case and Comment Magazi May-June 1967, pp. 13-20.
Muhlen, Norbert. "Mord und Legende. Die Kritiker des Warren-Reports." Frankfurt am Mai Der Monat, 17 (1965), 14-28.
"Mystery makers; J. Sparrow's evaluation of the Warren Commission report and its critics. Time, 22 December 1967, p. 21.
Nash, George and Patricia. "The Other Witnesses." The New Leader, 12 October 1964, pp.
New York Times. The Witnesses: The Highlights of Hearings before the Warren Commission the Assassination of President Kennedy. New York: Bantam Books, 1964.
"New York Times Runs 48 Pages of Report." Editor & Publisher, 3 October 1964, p. 61.
"Nightmare revisited; reenactment for Warren Commission." Newsweek, 8 June 1964, p. 48.
O'Brien, Conor Cruise. "Veto by Assassination?" Minority of One, December 1967, pp. 16-
Osterburg, James W. "The Warren Commission: Report and Hearing." Journal of the Forens Sciences, July 1966, pp. 261-271.
Oswald, Frank. "Kan man Stole pa Warren?" Verdens Gang, 1964, pp. 274-279.
Packer, Herbert L. "The Warren Report: A Measure of Achievement." Nation, 2 November 1 pp. 295-299.
Podhoretz, Norman. "The Warren Commission. An Editorial." Commentary, January 1964, p. 24.
Popkin, Richard H. "The Second Oswald; The Case for the Conspiracy Tehory." New York Review of Books, 28 July 1966, pp. 11-12.
"Porocilo Warrenove Komisije." Ljubljjanski dnevnik, 8 October 1964, pp. 268-275.
"Reaction to Warren Commission Report." Senior Scholastic, 14 October 1964, p. 17.
"Recommendation." JAMA, 11 January 1965, p. 143.

and Solemn duty; commission to investigate the assassination of J. Kennedy." Time,
13 December 1963, pp. 26-27.
udria, Vincent J. "The Warren Report? A Philadelphia Lawyer Analyzes the President's
Back and Neck Wounds..." Liberation, March 1965, pp. 14-32.
unmann, Ralph. "Ist der Warren-Bericht uber den Tod President Kennedys Glaubwurdig?"
Frankfurter Hefte, 20, no.1(1965), 15-24.
irtz, Jay. "A Legal Demurrer to the Report of the Warren Commission." Journal of
Forensic Sciences, July 1966, pp. 318-329.
y, Alfredda. "A Lawyer's Notes on the Warren Commission Report..." American Bar
Association Journal, January 1965, pp. 39-43.
m, Robert L. "Persistent Devils: CBS News Inquiry; the Warren Report." Saturday
Review, 22 July 1967, p. 46.
ou, W. David. "The Warren Report: Letters from Readers." Commentary, April 1967,
pp. 12, 14, 16.
, R.H. "Thinking the unthinkable: the Warren Commission books." Publishers Weekly,
10 October 1966, p. 55.
w, John H.A. After the Assassination: a Positive appraisal of the Warren report.
New York: Chilmark Press, 1968.
sium on the Warren Commission Report." New York University Law Review, May 1965,
pp. 404-524.
of the Warren Commission." Nation, 27 January 1964, p. 81.
of Summary of Warren Commission Report." Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 2 October
1964, pp. 2332-2340.
s, George C. The Quest for Truth: A quizzical look at the Warren Report: or, How
President Kennedy was really assassinated. Glendale, California: C.C. Thomson
Engineering Co., 1964.
mioning exhibits; photographs and X-rays turned over to the National Archives."
Nation, 14 November 1966, p. 500.
Anthony. "The Assassination, the Warren Commission and the public interest."
Motive, February 1967, pp. 6-14.
Roper, Hugh R. "Slovenly Warren Report." Atlas, February 1965, pp. 115-118.
about Kennedy Assassination; was the Warren report written in haste to prove a
theory? With interview of A. Specter." U.S. News and World Report, 10 October
1966, pp. 44-50.
esident's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. A Concise Compendium
of the Warren Commission Report on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy. New York:
Popular Library, 1964.
Hearings. 26 vols. Washington: G.O.P. 1964.
Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings before
the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Washington,
D.C., 1964.
The Official Warren Report on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy,
with Nizer and Catton. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964.
Report of the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.
With added material prepared by the New York Times exclusively for this edition.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.
Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John
F. Kennedy. Washington: G.O.P., 1964.
The Warren Report: Report of the Commission. New York: Associated press,
1964.
The Witnesses - selected and edited from the Warren Commission hearings by
the New York Times. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.
en Commission. Warren Report über die Ermordung des Praesidenten John F. Kennedy.
und kommentiert von Robert M.W. Kempner. Koln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1964.
t, L. "Book for all to read: Warren Report." Life, 16 October 1964, p. 35.
"Warren Report is not enough; voices speaking in contradiction of report;
call for investigation." Life, 7 October 1966, p. 38.
ommission." Nation, 28 December 1963, p. 445.
New Republic, 29 February 1964, p. 4.
ommission and the death of JFK." Senior Scholastic, 18 November 1964, pp.
.14-20.
ommission Report." Time, 2 October 1964, pp. 45-50.
n Commission Report on the role of the press in the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy." In Gross, Gerald, ed. The Responsibility of the Press, New
York: Fleet Pub., 1956.
ommission report; Paraffin test unreliable; killing still a mystery." Science
News Letter, 10 October 1964, p. 227.

"Warren Commission Report: Verdict, One Man Alone." World Week Magazine, 7 October 1964,
pp. 9-10.
"Warren Commission: Testimony and evidence." Time, 4 December 1964, pp. 25-27.
"Warren fingdings: some new facts." U.S. News and World Report, 6 July 1964, p. 44.
"Warren Report: A Measure of the Achievement; with editorial comment." Nation, 2
November 1964, 290-295.
"Warren report; comment." Commonweal, 9 October 1964, p. 59.
"The Warren Report: How to Murder the Medical Evidence." Current Medicine for Attorneys,
November 1965, pp. 1-28.
"The Warren Report: Letters from Readers." Commentary Magazine, April 1967, pp. 7-12.
"Warren Report Wrong, College Teacher Says." Los Angeles Times, 17 November 1967, p. 18.
"Warren's Secret." National Review, 7 April 1964, pp. 265-266.
"Washington News: Kennedy Shot Twice in the Back." JAMA: 4 January 1964, p. 15.
Weaver, John D. Warren: The Man, The Court, The Eara. Boston: Little Brown (n.d)
Weisberg, Harold. The Report on the Warren Report: or The Six Wise Men of Industan. 1965.
———. Whitewash, the report on the Warren Report. Hyattstown, Md., 1965.
West, John R. Death of the President. The Warren Commission on Trial. Covina, California:
Collectors Pub., 1967.
White, Stephen. Should we Believe the Warren Report?" New York: MacMillan, 1968.

D. LEE HARVEY OSWALD

Amâlric, J. Review of L'affaire Oswald, by Leo Sauvage. Atlas, October 1965, pp. 249-250.
Ansbacher, Heinz and Rowena R., David and Kathleen Shiverick. "Lee Harvey Oswald: An
Adlerian Interpretation." Psycholanalytic Review, 53, no. 3 (1966), 55-68.
"Assassination, as the plot unfolds: case against Oswald: How the President was shot."
U.S. News and World Report, 9 December 1963, pp. 68-71.
"Attorney for Oswald." Time, 6 March 1964, p. 47.
Bachmann, Ida. "Hvem Myrdede Praesident Kennedy? Et Defensorat for Oswald Indleveret."
Frit Danmark, 22, no. 10 (1963-64), 1-3.
"Boy, Don't You Know I'm on Camera?" New Republic, 29 February 1964, p. 7.
Chapman, Gil and Ann. Was Oswald Alone? San Diego: Publishers Export Company, 1967.
Cooke, Alistair. "Oswald had Psychopathic Personality: no evidence of conspiracy."
Manchester Guardian, 27 November 1963, p. 11.
"Counsel for Oswald." U.S. News and World Report, 9 March 1964, p. 16.
Ducovny, Amram and Leon Friedman. "The Trial of Lee Harvey Oswald (A Play)." Playbill
Magazine, 4, no. 11, 12.
Feldman, Harold. "Oswald and the FBI." The Nation, 27 January 1964, pp. 86-89.
Graham, J.J. "Acquittal for Oswald; Concerning the movie 'Rush to Judgment'."
Commonweal, 21 April 1967, pp. 149-151.
Grove, L. "Did press pressure kill Oswald?" U.S. News and World Report, 6 April 1964,
pp. 78-79.
Hastings Michael. Lee Harvey Oswald: A Far Streak of Independence Brought on by Neglect.
Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966.
"He was my brother: excerpts form Lee (R.L. Oswald and others)." Look, 17 October 1967,
pp. 62-66+.
Hewes, Henry. "The Theatre: Sensing History." Saturday Review, 4 May 1968, p. 40.
Holmes, John Clellon. "The Silence of Oswald." Playboy, November 1965, pp. 101-102,
222, 224.
"If Oswald had lived, could Impartial Jury Have Been Found to Try Him." Broadcasting,
6 January 1964, pp. 52-53.
Jackson, Donald. "The Evolution of an Assassin." Life, 21 February 1964, pp. 68A-80.
Joesten, Joachim. "Lasni Oswald." Oslobodenje, 21 (1964), 5297-5938.
———. Marina Oswald. London: Dawnay, 1967.
———. Oswald: Assassin or Fall Guy?" New York: Marzani and Munsell, Inc., 1964.
———. Oswald: The Truth. London: Dawnay, 1967.
Johnson, Priscilla. "Oswald in Moscow." Harper's, April 1964, pp. 46-50.
Kempton, M. "Oswald, May We Have Some Facts, Please." New Republic, 13 June 1964, pp. 13-1
Lane, Mark. "Oswald Innocent? A Lawyer's Brief." National Guardian Weekly, 19 December 19
"Lee Oswald's Widow tells her story; summary of testimony by Marina Oswald." U.S. News and
World Report, 17 February 1964, p. 19.
La Manna, Roger and Gene Ringgold. Assassin. The Lee Harvey Oswald Biography. Hollywood:
Associated Professional Services, 1964.

and the weight of evidence." Newsweek, 9 December 1963, pp. 36+.

Diary Publication Stirs Furor." Editor and Publisher, 4 July 1964, p. 14.

Killing Discussed." Science News Letter, 7 December 1963, p. 355.

mystery grows deeper and deeper." U.S. News and World Report, 30 March 1964, p. 45.

's Case Against the Warren Commission." New Leader, 20 December 1965, pp. 5-10.

k, Stanley. "The Oswald Case Should be Reopened!" Dissent 13, no. 5 (1966), 469-470.

o Clear Lee Oswald." National Review, 7 April 1964, p. 265.

Richard H. The Second Oswald. New York: Avon Books, 1966.

r, Ruth. "The Oswald Riddle." Coronet, March 1967, pp. 122-127.

, Leo. "Afera Oswald." Vjesnik u srijedu, 25 August 1965, pp. 694-695.

L'Affaire Oswald: Response au Rapport Warren. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1965.

Gesucht: Kennedys Morder Die Affäre Oswald Wien. München: Molden, 1967.

"The Oswald Affair." Commentary, March 1964, pp. 55-56.

The Oswald Affair: an examination of the contradictions and omissions of the Warren Report. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1966.

"Oswald in Dallas: a Few Loose Ends." Reporter, 2 January 1964, pp. 24-26.

cond Oswald: An Exchange of Letters." New York Review of Books, 6 October 1966, pp. 29-34.

aul. Lee Harvey Oswald and the American Dream. New York: Pageant Press, 1967.

L. "Lee Oswald's Guilt: How Science Nailed Kennedy's Killer." Popular Science, April 1965, pp. 68-73.

John H.A. "Making Mysteries About Oswald." Atlas, March 1965, pp. 173-174.

, Jean. A Mother in History. London: Chatto & Windus, 1966.

"The Strange World of Marguerite Oswald." McCall's, October 1965, pp. 112-113.

World of Lee Oswald: More Light on the Assassination." U.S. News and World Report, 16 December 1963, pp. 60-62.

, Joe H. Why Lee Harvey Oswald would have been acquitted for the murder of John F. Kennedy. (N.P., 1967)

, Kerry W. Oswald. Chicago: New Classics House, 1965.

Commission." New Republic, 29 February 1964, pp. 4-5.

ren Commission's Case Against Oswald." New Leader, 22 November 1965, pp. 16-21.

ald Guilty? A Judicial Summing up of the Warren Report." New Statesman, 12 March 1965, pp. 399-403.

the Sun; Marguerite Oswald's Testimony." Newsweek, 7 December 1964, pp. 28-30+.

asmyn. "Marina Oswald Porter: Seven Years After Dallas." Redbook, August 1970, pp. 57-59, 129-132, 134-135.

ivella, Manuel. ¿Quien dio el fusil a Oswald? Bogotá: Editorial Revista Columbiana, 1967.

E. JACK RUBY

ssination: A Nonentity for History." Time, 13 January 1967, pp. 16-17.

Subilla. "Verdict on Jack Ruby." Life, 27 March 1963, pp. 32-34, 34B, 70A-71, 74.

lvin M. and M.C. Carroll. Dallas Justice. The Real Story of Jack Ruby and His Trial. New York: David McKay, 1964.

"Tells his Public Relations Role in Ruby Case." Editor and Publisher, 1 February 1964, p. 58.

Dr. John W. "Did Jack Ruby Kill the Wrong Man?" Argosy, September 1967, pp. 29, 96-101.

Tell?" Sunday Times, 9 October 1966, p. 8.

, Sanford. "Who Killed Jack Ruby?" Real Magazine, April 1967, pp. 40-42.

mais. "The Last Madness of Jack Ruby." The New Republic, 11 February 1967, pp. 19-25.

rd leak; testimony of Jack Ruby to the Warren Commission." Time, 28 August 1964, p. 40.

er. Moment of Madness: People vs. Jack Ruby. Chicago and New York: Follett, 1968.

er and Wayne B. Giampietro. "The Trial of 'State Cases': A Postscript on the Ruby Trial." DePaul Law Review, 16, no. 2 (Spring-Summer 1967), 285-308.

Ernest. "Defendant Ruby Will Meet the Ghost of a Long Dead Scott." Life, 21 February 1964, pp. 30-31.

onchia. The Truth About the Case of Jack Ruby. La Vérité Sur LeCas de Jack Ruby. Paris: Editions Casterman, 1967.

e gun; premature disclosures." Newsweek, 13 July 1964, p. 50.

Kempton, Murray. "Boy, Don't You Know I'm on Camera?" New Republic, 29 February 1964, p

———. "The Disposable Jack Ruby." Spectator, 13 January 1967, p. 35.

———. "Ruby, Oswald, and the State." Spectator, 21 October 1966, pp. 506-507.

Lewis, Richard Warren. "A Flashy Lawyer for Oswald's Killer." Saturday Evening Post, 8 February 1964, pp. 28-30.

Linn, Edward. "Appointment in Dallas: The Untold Story of Jack Ruby." Saturday Evening Post, 25 July 1964, pp. 24-26, 28, 33, 36-37, 40, 48-49.

Popa, Stefan. "Dallas 'Pasiti'l Bine pe Ruby." Lumea, 26 March 1964, pp. 10-11.

———. "Dallas: Procesul Ruby." Lumea, 27 February 1964, pp. 8-9.

"Public Relations Firm Sets Press Rules for Ruby's Trial." Editor and Publisher, 28 December 1963, p. 9.

"Radio-TV Barred from Ruby Trial." Broadcasting, 23 December 1963, p. 56.

"Radio-TV Newsmen Testify in Ruby Trial." Broadcasting, 16 March 1964, p. 74.

Revere, Guy. "Jack Ruby: The Mafia's Man in Dallas." Saga, March 1967, pp. 28-31, 86-8 90.

"Ruby and the King of Torts." Times Literary Supplement, 17 March 1966, p. 221.

"Ruby Death Verdict: A TV Spectacular." Editor and Publisher, 21 March 1964, p. 11.

"Screen Test." Newsweek, 10 February 1964, p. 48.

Stern, R. Le Proces Ruby-Dallas. Kapellan, Belgium: Beckers, 1967.

"What's your source?"; premature publication by Journal-American of Ruby's Testimony before Warren." Newsweek, 31 August 1964, pp. 68-69.

Wills, Gary and Ovid Demaris. "The Disposal of Jack Ruby." Esquire, June 1967.

Wills, Gary and Ovid Demaris. Jack Ruby. New York: New American Library, 1968.

Worthington, Peter. "The Limelight: Why Jack Ruby's First Trial Couldn't Happen Here." Maclean's, 18 April 1964, pp. 3-4.

"You All Know Me! I'm Jack Ruby." Esquire, May 1967, pp. 79-87, 153-164.

F. QUESTION OF CONSPIRACY

"Any number can play: question of whether the assassination was the work of one man." Newsweek, 7 November 1966, pp. 37-38.

Berendt, John. "If They've Found Another Assassin, let them Name Names and Produce their Evidence." Esquire, August 1967, pp. 80-82.

Besson, Waldemar. "Die Schusse von Dallas. War eine Verschwörung des Hasses am werk?" Die Zeit, 19, no. 33 (1964), 6.

Buchanan, Thomas G. Who killed Kennedy? New York: Putnam's, 1964.

Carlos, Newton. A Conspiracao. Rio de Janeiro: J. Alvaro, 1964.

Cutler, Robert B. The Flight of CE399: Evidence of Conspiracy. Beverly, Mass.: Omni-Print, 1969.

———. Two Flightpaths: Evidence of Conspiracy. Danvers, Mass.: Mirror Press, 1971.

Davis, Nord, Jr. Dallas Conspiracy. Hollis, N.H.: The author. (n.d.)

Epstein, Edward J. Counterplot. New York: Viking Press, 1969.

Fairlie, H. "No conspiracy but perhaps two assassins?" New York Times Magazine, 11 September 1966, pp. 52-55+.

Goldberg, Arthur. Conspiracy Interpretations of the Assassination of President Kennedy: International and Domestic. University of California Security Studies Project Paper Number 16. Los Angeles: University of California, 1968.

Gonset, P. and R. L'homme qui crut tuer Kennedy. Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1967.

Hartogs, Renatus and Lucy Freeman. The Two Assassins. New York: Crowell, 1965.

Hermson, Kai. "Wer war Kennedys Mörder?" Die Zeit, 19, no. 15 (1964), 7.

Hill, Richard J and Charles M. Bonjean. "News Diffusion: a Test of the Regularity Hypothesis." Journalism Quarterly, 41, no. 3 (1964), 7.

Karp, Irwin. "Debate over Dallas: Theories of John Sparrow and Sylvia Meagher." Saturday Review, 9 March 1968, pp. 113-114.

Lauzon, A. "Oswald a-t-il tué Kennedy?" Maclean's, March 1964, pp. 1-2.

"A Matter of Reasonable Doubt." Ravu Magazine, 28 January 1967, pp. 18-26.

"More than one man." America, 7 December 1963, p. 722.

"Mythmakers; mysterious deaths of people involved in case." Time, 11 November 1966, pp. 33-34.

"New Light on Second Assassin Theory." U.S. News and World Report, 29 May 1967, p. 14.

"New Orleans and the Cubans: Who was ready to Help Oswald." The Times, 20 February 1967, p. 12.

"Phantasmagoria; who murdered Kennedy?" Time, 25 November 1966, pp. 34-35.

"Policaj Ubil Kennedija?" Vecernji Sarajevski list, 24 December 1964, pp. 298-300.

Rice, John R. What Was Back of Kennedy's Murder. Murfreesboro, Tenn.: Sword of the

ne, Harford. "Chance or design?" Manchester Guardian, 28 September 1964, p. 18.
son, Josiah. "The Cross Fire that Killed President Kennedy: Excerpts from Six Seconds in Dallas." Saturday Evening Post, 2 December 1967, pp. 27-31.
Bremulon, J.M. "Did Lee Harvey Oswald Act without Help?" New York University Law Review, 40, no. 3 (1965), 466-467.
dict: One man alone." Senior Scholastic, 7 October 1964, pp. 9-10.
n, David M. The Plot to Kill JFK. Chicago: Novel Books, 1965.
berg, Harold. "Kennedy Murder: Buried Proof of a Conspiracy!" Saga, April 1967, pp. 20-31, 89-90, 92, 94-96.
——. Oswald in New Orleans: Case of Conspiracy with the CIA. New York: Canyon Books, 1967.
, David and David Lifton. "The Case for Three Assassins." January 1967, pp. 77-100.
a plot was feared when Kennedy was Shot." U.S. News and World Report, 6 January 1964, p. 7.

G. JIM GARRISON

the elements." Newsweek, 10 March 1969, pp. 36+.
ac of Jim Garrison's investigation into the assassination of John F. Kennedy: the crime of silence. Austin: Research Publications, 1968.
, M.S. "Garrison and Warren, Anything in Common?" Minority of One, October 1967, pp. 11-12.
Assassination: Bourbon Street Rococo." Time, 3 March 1969, p. 26.
ssination: History or Headlines." Newsweek, 13 March 1967, pp. 44+.
, James. "The Garrison Investigation: How and Why it Began." New Orleans, April 1967, pp. 8-9.
orth, R. "J. Garrison's investigation of a plot to kill JFK." Newsweek, 15 May 1967, pp. 36+.
, Milton E. The Garrison Case. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1969.
val in New Orleans: Jim Garrison's Investigation." Newsweek, 6 March 1967, p. 32.
ase for Garrison." New York Review of Books, 14 September 1967, pp. 19-29.
e of Conspiracy." Newsweek, 3 April 1967, pp. 36-37.
ng In; Garrison's unofficial chief investigator quits." Time, 7 July 1967, p. 17.
J. and N.C. Chriss. "New Orleans: Act One." Reporter, 6 April 1967, pp. 17-20.
ing Big Jim." Newsweek, 17 March 1969, p. 105.
ins for the DA; physicians examine photographs and X-rays." Newsweek, 27 January 1969, p. 27.
Wins a Round: Jim Garrison's Investigation." Time, 24 March 1967, pp. 17-18.
y Iteration." Time, 7 March 1969, pp. 22-23.
at Defendant." Newsweek, 24 February 1969, p. 33.
William F. Jr. "The Press: Its Actions and Reactions." New Orleans, April 1967, pp. 12-13, 52-53.
, Edward Jay. "Garrison." New Yorker, 13 July 1968, pp. 35-40, 42, 49-52, 54-56, 58-60, 62-76, 79-81.
the Hurricane." Newsweek, 3 March 1969, pp. 24+.
de, Paris. The Kennedy Conspiracy: An uncommissioned report on the Jim Garrison investigation. New York: Meredith Press, 1969.
n, Jim. A Heritage of Stone. New York: Putnam, 1970.
. "New Orleans Evidence; excerpts from statements." Reporter, 8 February 1968, p. 10.
on Under Fire." The Economist, 25 February 1967, p. 730.
on vs. the People." Time, 14 March 1969, p. 29.
, Alex. "Clay Shaw Tells His Story." Transcript of TV Interview, Station WVUE, Channel 12, New Orleans, 11 March 1969.
. "Jim Garrison Tells His Story." Transcript of TV Interview, Station WVUE, Channel 12, New Orleans, 13 March 1969.
ivable connivance." Time, 12 January 1968, p. 14.
velyn. "'Several Plots' Claims District Attorney." Sunday Times, 26 February 1967.
osemary and Jack D. Wardlaw. Plot or Politics? The Garrision Case and its cast. New Orleans: Pelican Publications, 1967.
Joachim. The Garrison Inquiry, Truth and Consequences. London: Peter Dawnay, 1967.
ears Shaw." Senior Scholastic, 21 March 1969, p. 16.
James. American Grotesque. An Account of the Clay Shaw-Jim Garrison Affair in the City of New Orleans. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.
isparitie dia Scena a lui Jim Garrison." Lumea, 22 June 1967, pp. 97-100.
Who Loved Kennedy." Time, 21 February 1969, p. 18.
ree Season."

"More than a Man in the Dock." Time, 14 February 1969, pp. 26-29.
"New Orleans Plot." Senior Scholastic, 14 April 1967, pp. 18-19.
Norden, Eric. "Jim Garrison: A candid conversation with the Embattled District Attorney of New Orleans." Playboy, October 1967, pp. 59+.
"Odd Company." Time, 10 March 1967, p. 24.
Phelan, James. "To Old New Orleans: The Vice Man Cometh." Saturday Evening Post, 8 June 1963, pp. 67-71.
Powledge, F. "Is Garrison Faking?" New Republic, 17 June 1967, pp. 13-18.
Roberts, C. "The Case of Jim Garrison and Lee Oswald." New York Times Magazine, 21 May 1967, pp. 32-35.
Rogers, W. "Persecution of Clay Shaw." Look, 26 August 1969, pp. 53-56+.
"Round One." Newsweek, 3 February 1969, p. 33.
"Shutting Up Big Mouth." Time, 25 August 1967, pp. 48-51.
"Sideshows in New Orleans." Time, 31 January 1969, p. 40.
"Sifting Fact From Fantasy: Use of Truth Drugs in Jim Garrison's Investigation." Time, 31 March 1967, p. 41.
"Sleight of Hand: Jim Garrison's Assassination Investigation Extends to FBI and CIA." Newsweek, 22 May 1967, p. 40.
"Smiling through." Newsweek, 27 January 1969, pp. 27-28.
Smith, Merriman. "Jim Garrison and His Sources of Evidence." Manchester Guardian, 18 Mar 1967, p. 7.
"Tales of Garrison." The Economist, 25 March 1967, p. 1145.
"A Taste for Conspiracy." Newsweek, 20 March 1967, p. 76.
"Thickening the Plot: Judges support Jim Garrison's plot Theory." Newsweek, 27 March 1967 p. 37.
Turner, William W. "Garrison Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy..." Ramparts, January 1968, p. 43.
"Two For the Seesaw." Newsweek, 3 July 1967, p. 82.
"What Conspiracy? Testimony of Perry Russo." Newsweek, 24 February 1969, p. 33.
"What Garrison Proved." New Republic, 15 March 1969, p. 9.
Young, Roger.. "The Investigation: Where It Stands Today." New Orleans, July 1967, pp. 1

H. WILLIAM MANCHESTER

"L'Affaire Manchester." Triumph, January 1967, p. 7.
"As the book appears: a close look at the facts; concerning The Death of a President, by William Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 23 January 1967, pp. 50-52.
"The Assassination. The Book." Newsweek, 10 April 1967, pp. 34-35.
"The Assassination: Who Can Understand It?" Newsweek, 16 January 1967, pp. 28-29.
"Battle of the Book; Manchester's The Death of a President." Time, 23 December 1966, pp. 15-18.
Bennett, Arnold. Jackie, Bobby and Manchester: The Story Behind the Headlines. New York Bee Line Books, 1967.
"Book that backfired; concerning Death of a President by William Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 26 December 1966, p. 36.
Cafiero, L.H. "Manchester Book Alledges Com Lag Day JFK Killed." Electronic News, 3 Apri 1967, p. 22.
Cannon, James M. and Edward Kosner. "Manchester's Own Story." Newsweek, 30 January 1967, pp. 21-24.
Churchill, Randolph S. "The Manchester Book." The Times, 13 February 1967, p. 13, 14 February 1967, p. 11.
Coit, Margaret L. "November 22, 1963." Saturday Review, 15 April 1967, pp. 30-31.
Collins, R.S. "Kennedy vs. Look, Manchester, Harper & Row; an Informal Glossary of Press Relations Techniques." Public Relations Journal, April 1967, pp. 13-15.
Cooke, Alistair. "Fresh Shots in Kennedy Book Battle." Manchester Guardian, 24 January 1967, p. 9.
———. "Mrs. Kennedy Suffers Grief She Sought to Avoid." Manchester Guardian, 21 December 1966, p. 7.
Cory, J. "Manchester Affair." Saturday Review, 9 September 1967, p. 61.
Cunliffe, Marcus. "A courtier's obsequies." (Review of Death of a President). New Society, 20 April 1967, pp. 580-581.
"Death of a President; Excerpts from the Introduction to the Annual Report of the Librarian of Congress for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1964." Library Journal, August

Featherstone, Joseph. "Last Flight from Dallas." New Republic, 22 April 1967, pp. 20-22.

Fein, Arnold L. "The Legal Right of Privacy." Saturday Review, 21 January 1967, pp. 26-27.

"Feud Over Death of a President Intensifies as Manchester Attacks Kennedy Family and Aids." Publishers Weekly, 30 January 1967, pp. 88-89.

Galbraith, John Kenneth. "Was Mrs. Kennedy Justified in Bringing Suit?" Saturday Review, 21 January 1967, pp. 18-21.

Hardwick, Elizabeth. "Blow Up." New York Review of Books, 20 April 1967, pp. 11-12.

Hughes, E.J. "Trials of Government in Exile: Graceless Battle between the Kennedy Family and W. Manchester." Newsweek, 6 February 1967, p. 20.

"The Holiday Spirit." Newsweek, 9 January 1967, p. 25.

"How to Lose a war: Long running row over Manchester's Book." Newsweek, 6 February 1967, pp. 34-35.

"In the Hours After Dallas: the Book and the Testimony: Concerning The Death of a President, by Wm. Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 20 February 1967, pp. 51-52.

"Jacqueline Kennedy's Victory." Newsweek, 2 January 1967, pp. 16-19.

oesten, Joachim. The Case Against the Kennedy Clan. Munich: The author (n.d.)

arp, Irvin. "The Author's Right to Write." Saturday Review, 21 January 1967, pp. 28-29.

The Kennedys: Temporary Cease Fire." Newsweek, 9 January 1967, pp. 20-21.

opkind, Andrew. "The Kennedy Book Battle." New Statesman, 30 December 1966, p. 956.

osner, Edward. "Jacqueline B. Kennedy, Plaintiff..." Newsweek, 26 December 1966, pp. 39-43.

rassner, Paul. "The Parts That Were Left Out of the Kennedy Book." Realist, May 1967, pp. 1, 18.

isagor, Peter. "A Brilliant Mosaic of Events." Panorama Magazine, 8 April 1967, p. 3.

ittle, Stuart W. "Birth Pains of a Book." Saturday Review, 9 September 1967, p. 61.

ogan, A. "JFK: the Stained Glass Image." American Heritage, August 1967, pp. 4-7.

———. "Outdoor Life and the Death of a President: William Manchester Charges Outdoor Life with Hard Boiled Callousness Toward a National Tragedy." Outdoor Life, October 1967.

nchester, William. "William Manchester's Own Story." Look, 4 April 1967, pp. 62-66.

anchester Book: Despite Flaws and Error, a Story That is Larger than Life or Death." Time, 7 April 1967, pp. 22-23.

agher, Sylvia. "After the Battle, The Book." The Minority of One, June 1967, pp. 25, 27.

rs. Kennedy Reaches Accord with Harper & Row and William Manchester." Publishers Weekly, 23 January 1967, p. 222.

vins, Allan. "Gargantuan, Honest and Useful, but so exasperating." Panorama Magazine, 8 April 1967, pp. 2-3.

umb, J.H. "The Private Grief of Public Figures." Saturday Review, 21 January 1967, pp. 24-25.

aquela: Spreading Controversy." Time, 6 January 1967, pp. 16-17.

erman, George. "The Book of the Century." This Week Magazine, 7 January 1967, pp. 6-7.

inn, Richard M. "Note: Guilt and Depth Reaction to the Death of a President." Psychoanalytic Review, Fall 1966, pp. 81-82.

lese, Gay. "The Corry Papers." Esquire, June 1967, pp. 24+.

o Help You Keep the Record Straight About that Book; Concerning The Death of a President, by Wm. Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 6 February 1967, pp. 66-67.

alin, Nicholas. "Just Read the News, Mr. Manchester." New Statesman, 21 April 1967, pp. 547-548.

hmann, Barbara W. "The Historian's Opportunity." Saturday Review, 25 February 1967, pp. 27, 31, 71.

Gelder, Lawrence. The Untold Story: why the Kennedys lost the Book Battle. New York: Award Books, 1967.

ere was O'Donnell?" Time, 17 February 1967, p. 78.

dow vs. author; concerning W. Manchester's Death of a President." Senior Scholastic, 6 January 1967, p. 16.

is, Gary. "Manchester's Upheaval." National Catholic Reporter, 29 March 1967, p. 10.

hem, Francis. "Manchester and the Kennedys." Sunday Times, 15 January 1967, p. 10.

I. LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON

wing Rift of LBJ and Kennedy: Behind the Furor over a Book, Concerning the Death of a President, by Wm. Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 2 January 1967, pp. 22-27.

y, J. Evetts. A Texan Looks at Lyndon: A Study in Illegitimate Power. Canyon, Texas: Palo Duro Press, 1964.

ten, Joachim. The Case Against Lyndon B. Johnson in the Assassination of President Kennedy. (N.p.) The author, 1967. 2 vols.

———. The Dark Side of Lyndon B. Johnson. London: Peter Dawnay, 1968.

nson, L.B. Messages to the Congress: address

Johnson, L.B. "President's Proclamation, June 6, 1968." Vital Speeches, 15 June 1968, p

"Johnson takes oath as nation mourns Kennedy." Senior Scholastic, 6 December 1963, p. 1

Knebel, F Letcher. "After the Shots: The ordeal of Lyndon Johnson." Look, 10 March 196 pp. 26-28+.

"LBJ on the Assassination." Newsweek, 11 May 1970, p. 41.

Lincoln, Evelyn. Kennedy and Johnson. New York: Rinehart & Winston n.d.

McReynolds, D. "New York Letter: Macbeth in the White House." Saturday Night, December 1966, pp. 22-23.

II. MARTIN LUTHER KING

"Accused killer, a clumsy man with closed eyes." Life, 26 April 1968, p. 42B.

Adams, S.J. "Measuring up the Catholic Press and Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr." America, 4 May 1968, p. 624.

"As 150,000 said farewell to Dr. King." U.S. News and World Report, 22 April 1968, pp. 38-39.

"Assassination." Time, 12 April 1968, pp. 18-21.

"Assassination according to Capote." Time, 10 May 1968, p. 65.

"Assassination shocks nation; with quotations." Senior Scholastic, 25 April 1968, pp. 18-19.

Bennett, Lerone, Jr. "Martyrdom of M.L. King." Ebony, May 1968, p. 174.

———. What Manner of Man: A Biography of MLK. Chicago: Johnson Pub. Co., 1968.

"Big Hunt for mystery killer." U.S. News and World Report, 29 April 1968, pp. 84.

Blair, Clay. The Strange Case of James Earl Ray. New York: Bantam Books, 1969.

Boutelle, P. et al. Murder in Memphis. (N.p.) Merit Publications, 1968.

Brown, Mrs. Julia. Please Don't Help Glorify Martin Luther King. TACT Committee. (n.d.)

Cameron, J.M. "British view on Martin Luther King." Commonweal, 26 April 1968, p. 164.

Clarke, J.W. and J.W. Soule. "How Southern Children felt about King's Death." Trans-Act October 1968, pp. 35-40.

"Deepening mystery of Dr. King's Assassination." U.S. News and World Report, 27 May 1968, p. 10.

"Did Ray Kill King?" National Review, 23 April 1968, pp. 376+.

"Doctor King." National Review, 23 April 1968, pp. 376+.

"Doctor King's murder: nagging questions remain." U.S. News and World Report, 24 March 1 p. 13.

Halberstam, M. "Are you guilty of murdering Martin Luther King?" New York Times Magazin 9 June 1968, pp. 27-29+.

Huie, W.B. "Story of James Earl Ray and the plot to assassinate Martin Luther King." Lo 26 November 1968, pp. 96-97+.

Huie, W. B. et al. "Why James Earl Ray Murdered Dr. King." Look, 15 April 1969, pp. 102-104.

"James Ray: manhunt ends but mysteries remain." U.S. News and World Report, 24 June 1968 pp. 34-36.

"King is the man, oh, Lord." Newsweek, 15 April 1968, pp. 34-38.

Lomax, Louis. To Kill a Black Man. Los Angeles: Holloway House, 1968.

"Man in Room 5." Time, 12 April 1968, p. 21.

"Martin Luther King and the right to know." America, 22 March 1969, p. 323.

"Notes and Comment." New Yorker, 13 April 1968, pp. 35-37.

O'Leary, J. "Greatest manhunt in law enforcement history." Reader's Digest, August, 196 pp. 63-69.

"Raising a whirlwind; Ray's plea of guilty." Time, 21 March 1969, pp. 16-17.

"Reactions to the slaying of Martin Luther King; symposium." America, April 1968, pp. 534-536.

Turner, W. "Some disturbing parallels." Ramparts, 25 January 1969.

Watters, P. et al. "Beale Street and points North." Nation, 22 April 1968, pp. 529-535.

"Where is James Earl Ray?" Newsweek, 29 April 1968, p. 21.

"Who killed King?" Newsweek, 22 April 1968, pp. 31-33.

"Who Killed King?" Time, 26 April 1968, pp. 20-21.

"Widening Search." Time, 19 April 1968, p. 20.

"Willard, Galt, Ray?" National Review, 7 May 1968, p. 432.

Woodbury, R. "Murder clues: hand prints, a car chase and a silly smile." Life, 19 April 1968, pp. 40-40A

"Year later: honors for Dr. King; violence, too." U.S. News and World Report, 14 April 1969, p. 8.

III. ROBERT F. KENNEDY

"The Accused: Ray and Sirhan." Life, 21 June 1968, pp. 24-34.
'Aftermath of a tragedy; boy's deep hate, a senator slain." U.S. News and World Report, 17 June 1968, pp. 25-28.
merican Heritage, Editors of. RFK: His Life and Death. New York: Dell, 1968.
Bobby Kennedy Record." U.S. News and World Report, 6 May 1968, pp. 50-54.
Bobby: To be or Not To Be." Newsweek, 29 January 1968, pp. 18-19.
uckley, W.F., Jr. "Reflections on the Sirahn trial." National Review, 11 March 1969, P. 247.
ameron, J.M. "From England: the death of Kennedy." Commonweal, 28 June 1968, pp. 429-30.
iardi, John. "Manner of Speaking: TV coverage and radio coverage." Saturday Review, 29 June 1968, p. 37.
Clashing symbols." Newsweek, 14 July 1969, pp. 36+.
The Conscience of RFK." Reporter, 22 February 1963, p. 12.
ooke, Terence J. "Eulogy to Robert F. Kennedy, Delivered at the Funeral." Vital Speeches, 1 July 1968, pp. 547-548.
Death of a Democrat." America, 19 July 1969, p. 22.
Toledano, Ralph. RFK, The Man Who Would Be President. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1967.
amond, B.L. "Sirhan through the looking glass; testimony of psychiatrist." Time, 4 April 1969, p. 28.
oes Bobby Kennedy Have a Chance?" Saturday Evening Post, 20 April 1968, p. 88.
ougherty, Richard. "New Yorkers Weep as Family, Friends Return with Body." Los Angeles Times, 7 June 1968, pp. 1, 12.
nstoss, Wm. "First Court Appearance; Suspect Gives Impression of Cocky, arrogant Confidence." Los Angeles Times, 9 June 1968, pp. 1, 15.
iendly prone on the way to a Rostrum; with reports by L. Wainwright and T. H. White." Life, 14 June 1968, pp. 32-42D.
, John J. "Brother Delivers Eulogy for 'Good and Decent Man'." Los Angeles Times, 9 June 1968, pp. 1, 22.
in, R. H. "Day in June." McCalls, June 1970, pp. 38+.
erstein, David. "Travels with Bobby Kennedy." Harper's, July 1968, pp. 51-61.
es, Hal. "Indiana: A Test for Bobby." New York Times Magazine, 5 May 1968, pp. 32-33.
l, Gladwin. "Kennedy State 'Extremely Critical'; Suspect, Arab Immigrant, Arraigned; President puts Guard on Candidates." New York Times, 6 June 1968, pp. 1, 20.
sman, Roger. "RFK on Cuba: an Insider's Analysis." Commonweal, 22 November 1968, pp. 273-275.
ghton, Robert A. Special Unit Senator: RFK Assassination. New York: Random House 1970.
Many Conspiracies?" Minority of One, September 1968, pp. 9, 16.
Nixon vs. Kennedy: the Odds." U.S. News and World Report, 29 April 1968, pp. 28-30.
ncredible Year of '68: Year of Shock." Life, 10 January 1969, pp. 30-37.
ide story of the latest Bobby-LBJ break." U.S. News and World Report, 1 April 1968, pp. 30-32.
o, Godfrey. Why Robert Kennedy was Killed. New York: Third Press, 1970.
e 5, 1968" (a poem). See, October 1968, pp. 12-13.
y vs. Sirhan." Newsweek, 5 May 1969, pp. 34+.
er, Robert Blair. "Conversations in jail with Sirhan, a name Meaning Wolf." Life, 17 January 1969, pp. 20-25.
——. RFK Must Die. New York: Grove Press, 1970.
ell, John. "Kennedy Made Each of his 42 years count." Los Angeles Times, 7 June 1968, pp. 2, 16.
y, Thomas B. "The Fire of your Love (June 5, 1968)." America, 15 June 1968, back cover.
edy Assassination: religious overtones." Christian Today, 21 June 1968, p. 39.
edy Candidacy." Christian Century, 27 March 1968, pp. 380+.

ennedy Cause." New Republic, 15 June 1968, pp. 3-4.
edys Thank Nation for Providing them With Strength and Hope." New York Times, 16 June 1968, pp. 1, 34.
, Peter. "Suspect called calm and lucid...Sirhan describes himself as Jordanian born in Jerusalem." New York Times, 6 June 1968, pp. 1, 21.
ing a father." Time, 21 March 1969, p. 17.
, Tom. "President sets Sunday as day for mourning." Los Angeles Times, 7 June 1968
en, D. "Missing word: [illegible]

"Letter and the Law." Newsweek, 2 June 1969, p. 33.
"Letters to the editor." Ebony, June 1968, pp. 14+.
Lowell, Robert. "RFK; Poem." New Republic, 22 June 1968, p. 27.
Lyons, Louis M. "America Bereft: RFK." Massachusetts Review, Summer 1968, pp. 578-580
Martin, Dean. "Dean Martin talks about his drinking, the Mafia, Frank Sinatra, Women, Bobby Kennedy. Interview edited by Oriana Fallaci." Look, 26 December 1967, pp. 78-85.
Mahdi, M.T. Kennedy and Sirhan: Why? New York: New World Press, 1968.
Moore, T. "A Bit of the Way with RFK." Ave Maria, 28 October 1967, pp. 6-9.
"Mother and son." Newsweek, 17 February 1969, p. 33.
Muggeridge, Malcolm. "Elevation of Senator R.F. Kennedy." Esquire, November 1968, pp. 118+.
Navasky, Victor. "Robert F. Kennedy, Martin L. King, J.E. Hoover – who did it to whom?" Atlantic, November 1970.
"New clues in RFK death: was there a plot?" U.S. News and World Report, 24 June 1968, p. 36.
Newfield, Jack. "Kennedy Lays Out a Gut Campaign." Life, 29 March 1968, pp. 28-31.
"Notes and Comment." New Yorker, 15 June 1968, pp. 21-23.
———. New Yorker, 22 June 1968, p. 19.
O'Leeskar, Karl. "Down the Primary Stretch, from Indiana to Oregon." Nation, 27 May 1968, pp. 682.
"Once Again, Once Again." Newsweek, 17 June 1968, pp. 20-40.
Osborne, John. "Nebraska Primary, the ifs, ands, and buts." New Republic, 18 May 1968, pp. 7-9.
"Other Sirhan; testimony of prosecution's psychiatrist." Newsweek, 14 April 1969, pp. 44-45.
"Psychiatry on trial." National Review, 6 May 1969, pp. 427-428.
Reeves, Richard. "The Making of a Candidate 1968." New York Times Magazine, 31 March 1968, pp. 25-27.
Reich, Ken. "McCarthy Suspends Political Activities; Asks Prayer Vigil." Los Angeles Times, 6 June 1968, p.8 18.
Reichley, A.J. "He's Running Himself Out of the Race." Fortune, March 1968, pp. 112-11
"RFK." Christian Century, 85 (1968), 807-808.
"RFK: The Bob Kennedy we knew." Look, June 1968, entire issue.
"RFK: the man, the dream, the tragedy." U.S. News and World Report, 17 June 1968, pp. 16-18.
Riesman, David. "McCarthy and Kennedy." New Republic, 13 April 1968, pp. 22-23.
"Robert F. Kennedy and the Negro." Ebony, July 1968, pp. 29-32.
Roberts, S.V. "Sirhan B. Sirhan literary negotiations." Esquire, November 1970, pp. 131-134+.
Rogers, Warren. "Bobby's Decision." Look, 16 April 1968, pp. 72-80.
Rogers, Warren and Stanley Tretick. "The Bob Kennedy we Knew." Look, 9 July 1968, pp. 31-36.
Rovere, Richard H. "Letters from Washington." New Yorker, 15 June 1968, pp. 90-96.
Scheer, Robert. "The Night Bobby Died." Ramparts, 10 August 1968, pp. 56-58.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. "Why I am for Kennedy." New Republic, 18 May 1968, pp. 39-40.
"Second thoughts on Bobby." Time, 21 June 1968, p. 48.
"Selectivity in Los Angeles." Time, 3 January 1969, p. 40.
Shihab, Aziz. Sirhan. San Antonio: Naylor Co., 1969.
"Shock of violence hits the campaign." Business Week, 8 June 1968, pp. 38-42.
"Sirhan guilty." Senior Scholastic, 2 May 1969, p. 19.
"Sirhan takes the stand." Newsweek, 17 March 1969, p. 37.
"Sirhan; tragedy of the absurd." Newsweek, 24 March 1969, p. 324.
"Sirhan's trance; testimony of psychiatrist." Newsweek, 7 April 1969, p. 37.
"Sirhan's Verdict." Time, 25 April 1969, pp. 21-22.
"Socking it to 'em: Travels with Bobby." Time, 5 April 1968, pp. 22-23.
Sorensen, Theodore C. "RFK: a Personal Memoir." Saturday Review, 22 June 1968, p. 19.
Steinbecker, John. RFK: The Man, the Mysticism, the Murder. Los Angeles: Import Publishers, 1969.
"T.R.B. from Washington; who's guilty." New Republic, 15 June 1968, p. 2.
"Taking the oath." Newsweek, 25 August 1969, p. 42.
"Test case; responses to psychological tests." Newsweek, 7 April 1969, pp. 94-95.
"Three Assassinations." Minority of One, 10, no. 9 (1968), 13-16.
"Toward the Gas Chamber." Time, 2 May 1969, p. 19.
Townsend, Dorothy. "Witness Reports Girl said 'We Shot Him'." Los Angeles Times, 6 June

"Verdict on Sirhan." *Newsweek*, 28 April 1969, pp. 41+.

Weiss, P. and M. Mannes. "Reflections on a tragedy." *Seventeen*, August 1968, pp. 194-195.

"What was in Sirhan's mind?" *Time*, 24 January 1969, p. 54.

Weick, Paul R. "The Oregon Primary." *New Republic*, 8 June 1968, pp. 14-15.

"Win or lose, the Primary Players." *Life*, 7 June 1968, pp. 35-41.

Wise, David. "How Bobby Plans to Win It." *Saturday Evening Post*, 1 June 1968, pp. 23-27.

"Witnesses speak." *Newsweek*, 24 June 1968, pp. 26-27.

Yoakum, Robert. "Kennedy and McCarthy: 1965-1967 Voting Record." *New Republic*, 11 May 1968, pp. 23-27.

“It's the first lie detector that can be used on a dead man. It works on tapes and other voice recordings”

by George O'Toole

Assassination Tapes

The rulers of the state are the only ones who should have the privilege of lying, either at home or abroad; they may be allowed to lie for the good of the state.
—Plato: *The Republic*, Book Three

It's a little frightening. The machine can listen to what you're saying and tell, with a high degree of reliability, whether or not you are lying. It's called the Psychological Stress Evaluator, and it is, in effect, a lie detector. Unlike the polygraph, it needs no physical connection to the subject; therefore it can be used without his knowledge. It works from recordings of his voice, so anything on tape, sound track or phonograph record is fair game for the machine. It is the first lie detector that can be used on a dead man.

Early this year, one of these instruments came into my hands. I resolved to use it to probe one of the darkest mysteries of recent history, the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I set about collecting every recording I could lay my hands on of anyone who had any direct knowledge of the affair. Soon I had compiled the tape-recorded testimony of twenty-two persons—eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, the pathologist who conducted the autopsy, members and staff of the Warren Commission, Jim Garrison, Clay Shaw, and even Earl Warren.

I ran the tapes through the PSE systematically, taking each controversial point in turn. Did the rifle which belonged to Lee Harvey Oswald kill President Kennedy? Was Oswald the killer? Were others involved? What of those mysterious autopsy photographs which the Warren Commission never saw—do they support the Commission's lone-gunman, single-bullet theory? And what about the Warren Commission itself? Did its members conspire to cover up the truth?

Slowly a picture emerged. It is blurred, and it is not the picture I expected. Not all the details are there, but I guarantee this: you may believe the lone-gunman theory of the Warren Report, or you may believe the government-conspiracy theory of Mark Lane, Jim Garrison and others, but either way you are wrong.

The PSE is not a crystal ball. It was invented as an interrogation aid, a function it performs well. To my knowledge, this was the first instance of its use as a tool for historical research. To understand what I did with the PSE, one should know something about the device itself.

I first heard of the Psychological Stress Evaluator last year, when I met two of its inventors, Allan D. Bell, Jr., and Charles R. McQuiston. Bell and McQuiston, both former lieutenant colonels, retired from Army Intelligence several years ago to form a company called Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Inc. It was a logical second career for the two men. Both are experts in the technology of espionage. Either one could pick the lock on your front door in less time than it takes you to find your key. Colonel Bell wears a Black Belt in karate, is an accomplished swordsman and small-arms expert, and has a dozen inventions to his credit, from anti-bugging devices to a miniaturized microdot camera. Colonel McQuiston is one of the foremost polygraph experts in the U.S., a specialist in radio and audio surveillance, and a qualified locksmith.

polygraph. Standard polygraphs
ure four variables: pulse, blood pres-
respiration and perspiration. Some
neasure additional physiological vari-
The more variables measured, the
reliable the polygraph.
i and McQuiston discovered that the
encies composing the human voice
ot fixed; they shift very slightly from
to fourteen times every second. But
the speaker is under stress, this nor-
requency modulation disappears.
remains are the pure component fre-
cies of the voice. And a strong indica-
at the speaker is lying.
e two men developed a device to
t this phenomenon and planned to use
an additional "channel" on the poly-
. Then they discovered that the new
ole was so reliable and accurate a
ure of psychological stress there was
no need to measure the other poly-
variables.
ed from the necessity of strapping the
ct into a chair, stretching a pneumo-
ic tube across his chest, gluing elec-
s to his palms, and clamping his arm
blood-pressure cuff, the PSE proved
much more versatile than the poly-
. Because it can work from a tele-
or tape recorder, the PSE can be
without the knowledge or even the
cal presence of the subject.

ked Colonel Bell to tell me about some
things the PSE was being used for,
ially cases in which a conventional
raph couldn't be used. He mentioned
e police in Howard County, Maryland,
been using the PSE for two years; they
had great success in establishing the
ence of suspects who were afraid to
t to a polygraph examination because
machine's forbidding aspect.
l went on to describe some of his
ion's other uses, actual or potential.
and the Federal government are ex-
g its use as a defense against skyjack-
d telephoned bomb threats, and as
ns of speeding up customs inspec-
Some doctors and psychiatrists are
PSEs to study patients' physical and
l stress. The National Committee to
igate Aerial Phenomena, a private
that investigates UFO reports, is
sing the PSE to interview witnesses
) sightings.
ked Bell if he would lend me a PSE
eriment with, in order to write a piece
he device. He agreed, with two con-
. First, I must take Dektor's three-day
in operating the instrument; second,
using the PSE, I must review my
etation of its output with his staff, in
erest of accuracy. This seemed rea-
e, so I agreed.
course was held in the meeting room
oliday Inn in Falls Church, Virginia.
ght other ~~students were~~ employees
tomers who had purchased the
. These included a private detective
in Pennsylvania, a New York chain

African country. The instructor was Mike Kradz, a criminologist and retired police officer. Kradz projects the tough-cop image, but he is a living rebuttal to the Polish joke. There is nothing about forensic science, from fingerprints to polygraphy, on which the man is not an expert.

The first morning of the course was devoted to the physical operation of the PSE. The device is used in conjunction with a Uher tape recorder, which has four speeds and can be manually wound back to locate a particular point on the tape. The testimony to be evaluated is recorded at a tape speed of 7½ inches per second, then played back and stopped at the beginning of the utterance in question. The recorder is slowed to 15/16 inches per second and played. The sound, no longer recognizable as a human voice, is a long, low rumble.

The PSE itself is built into an attaché case. The case opens to reveal a chart drive, similar to an electrocardiograph, and a number of buttons and knobs. A single cable connects the PSE to the tape recorder.

As the tape recorder reels slowly turn, and a rumble issues from its speaker, the PSE stylus dances back and forth across the moving chart paper, leaving behind a ragged trail. Then the recorder is stopped, the chart paper is stopped, and that's all there is to it. The result is a strip of paper with a squiggly line. The rest is up to the human eye and brain.

On the afternoon of the first day, Kradz showed us what to look for. The unstressed voice looks like an untrimmed hedge, with stalks of different heights sticking up (and down) at irregular intervals. But add some stress, and that hedge begins to look trimmed. The greater the stress, the smoother the shape. If the subject was experiencing the hard stress which accompanies deception, the over-all outline of the figure tends to take on a rectangular shape, a concertina as seen by the player. Kradz showed slide after slide of charts made during actual police interrogations. He told us the background of each case and pointed out the tell-tale signs of deception, whenever they were present.

> “The more I read,
> the more I doubted
> the official account of
> what happened
> that day in Dallas”

That night each student took a PSE back to his room to practice operating it. Some coordination must be learned to become facile in handling the recorder and the PSE, but clearly the difficult part of the course would be learning how to read and interpret the charts.

The next day we learned the theory of

the PSE. There is, first of all, the matter of the "outside issue."

Most people, Kradz pointed out, have some sort of deep secret they don't want known. When faced with a polygraph examination, a person may be more concerned that this outside issue may come to light than he is about the actual substance of the interrogation. This can produce irrelevant stress in some of his answers, and mislead the examiner. Therefore it is is necessary for the examiner to interview the subject before the examination, go over all of the questions he intends to ask, and assure the subject he will ask only these questions.

I had reason to remember this later, when I ran my first real interrogation tape.

The interrogation always includes the question, "Are you afraid that I will ask you about something we have not discussed?" A negative answer with no sign of stress eliminates the outside-issue problem. Also, the examiner always asks some innocuous questions, such as, "Do you like the color blue?" in order to observe the subject's general state of tension. And there is always one "red-herring" question.

The red herring is used to identify the "guilt complex responder." Such a person shows stress when he responds to any accusatory question. The examiner may ask, "Did you steal the watch?" when it is money, not a watch, that is missing. A stressed denial will alert the examiner, who carefully compares this response to the stress produced by questions about the missing money.

That night the class was given tapes of real police interrogations. In most cases, Kradz was the examiner; and in every case, he knew the background and resolution of the matter. One case I was assigned concerned a young man accused of stealing money from his father's store. Kradz started by asking the "outside-issue" question. No, the young man replied, he was not afraid Kradz would ask him a question they hadn't discussed. Then the following exchange took place:

"Do you live in Howard County?"

"Yes."

"Do you suspect someone of having taken the money?"

"No."

"Are you wearing a white shirt?"

"Yes."

"Do you know who took the money?"

"No."

"Are you wearing a ring?"

"Yes."

"Did you take the money?"

"No."

There were a few red-herring questions to check for the guilt complex response. The questions about wearing a white shirt and a ring and living in Howard County had been included to measure the background stress elicited by irrelevant issues.

I ran the tape and charted it on the PSE. All but two of his responses were unstressed. The question about suspecting

vearing a ring?" In fact, his yes to that
accompanied by such stress as I had
only once or twice in the class slides.
e next morning Kradz called on me.
he suspect take the money, he asked.
I didn't think so. Kradz nodded. Did
spect who took the money? Yes, I
ht he did. Very good, said Kradz. Did
ce anything else about the interroga-
Well, yes, there was this business
t the ring. Perhaps the suspect had
it. Kradz smiled. No, the kid hadn't
the ring, but he was gay. He had
anged rings with another guy. Nobody
about it. The kid didn't really expect
asked about it, because Kradz had
over all the questions with him. Still,
he ring was mentioned, he panicked.
e third day of the course, I had begun
e some thought to what I might do
e PSE. I was particularly interested
fact that the device works from a tape
ing. Sound-recording technology is
a century old (Edison invented the
graph in 1877), and an enormous
t of history is stored on phonograph
s, sound tracks, and tape and wire
ings. I thought how many press con-
es, interviews and public pronounce-
are stored away in the film and tape
es of the world, and how many ques-
ould be settled if we knew for certain

situation, I wondered if it could be used the way I had hoped, as a tool for historical research.

During the lunch break I took Kradz aside and asked him. Could the PSE be used outside interrogations, where the speaker was telling what may or may not have happened? Yes, he said, the PSE could be used for that. Where there was no stress, I could be confident that the speaker was telling the truth. However, when I did find stress, I had to be very careful about reaching conclusions about its cause; it could result from something other than deception. But if I found a stress pattern in the testimony of several witnesses to the same event, I would very probably have uncovered deception.

Encouraged, I reviewed the list of recent mysteries. Watergate was, of course, the first to come to mind. The ITT affair was also of recent interest. The Kent State incident had never been fully cleared up. But one subject seemed to loom above all the rest—the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Like many others, I have found it difficult to believe the Warren Report. When Mark Lane's book came out, I read it carefully. I read much of the other criticism of the Warren Commission's findings. The more I read, the more I doubted the official account of what happened that day in Dallas. I waited for the real story to emerge. It didn't. details of the controversy dimmed in my mind, leaving only a dull residue of doubt. I had despaired of ever learning the truth. Now I knew what to do with the PSE.

It was all there: the statements made before television cameras by eyewitnesses, policemen, medical examiners, members of the Warren Commission. Somewhere in a network-television vault were the sound tracks, with the tiny, inaudible variations in voice frequency that could settle once and for all the question, "Did Oswald, acting alone, shoot and kill John F. Kennedy?"

My immediate problem was getting access to the recordings. I was certain the television networks would have them, but I wasn't sure exactly what to ask for. There must be thousands of hours of sound recordings relating to the assassination. Where, among all this talk, was the critical testimony?

I started digging and soon discovered the existence of a group called the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, located in Washington, D.C. I called the number listed in the telephone directory and was soon speaking to Bob Smith, the Committee's Research Director. I told Smith that I was a writer and wanted to do a piece on the John F. Kennedy assassination. I asked him for an interview, and he agreed.

We met in the offices of Bernard Fenster-



Voice prints by the Psychological Stress Evaluator of former chief justice Earl Warren in May, 1972 indicating hard stress on the words "no evidence."

sassination Tapes

UED FROM PAGE 47

a successful criminal lawyer and tor of the Committee, in a modern building a few blocks from the White e. Fensterwald is a small, dapper man thin beard. Smith is a lean, intense smoker. Both men appeared to be ir forties.

fore we begin," I said. "I think I should on that I used to work for the CIA." ive run across it often, the theory that IA killed Kennedy. It seems absurd . and I don't believe it. I worked there ee years and never saw or heard any- suggesting the Agency was involved assassination. I never met anyone I thought capable of doing it. Still, learned through bitter experience of uspicion which attaches to former in- ence officers. Epidemics of paranoia o accompany us through life. I thought tter get that issue out of the way.

ith and Fensterwald exchanged es and smiled. Fensterwald told me ey did not necessarily believe the CIA sin theory, and they certainly didn't talking to a former Agency employee. ieved. I began to outline my project. d if they had heard of the PSE. Both were dimly aware of it. I described evice and started to detail the way it be used as a research tool. They im- ately understood what I was proposing vere tremendously enthusiastic. Yes, aid, there were many key statements e somewhere, and they would be glad mpile specific references for me. ermore, they could, in some cases, de me with the tape. They said they be in contact when they had some- for me.

ile I was waiting, I experimented with SE. I telephoned a friend and told him the device. I asked if he was willing y a little game to test it out, and he d. He picked a number between one en. I asked him, "Is the number one?" e number two?" and so on, and he ered no each time. I recorded his nses, ran them through the PSE and him back. The number he picked, him, was five.

was dumbfounded. He had not heard PSE and had thought I might be con- g some elaborate joke at his expense. hen I called back and correctly iden- the number he had picked, he realized serious. And he was shocked.

layed the same game several times thers and did not always have similar ess. With Bernard Fensterwald, I was only to narrow the answer down to two ers, one of which turned out to be cor- problem with this game is that the player knows that it is just that. He knows that I know he is lying, it is a socially acceptable situation, and there is nothing at stake. The stress which accompanies real deception is not always present.

I obtained a tape recording from CBS News of a portion of a *Sixty Minutes* program in which Mike Wallace interviewed Clifford Irving. The interview took place during the height of the controversy, while Irving was still claiming to have gotten Howard Hughes' life story through a series of interviews with the billionaire. It was a consummate job of lying, embellished with such convincing details as Irving's disagreement with his colleague Susskind about whether Hughes kept his organic prunes in a paper or a plastic bag. *Sixty Minutes* re-ran the segment after Irving's confession because the man's sheer virtuosity as a prevaricator was amazing. I was interested in the interview for a different reason: at the height of the controversy, Irving had been given a polygraph examination and had passed it. I wanted to see if the man who had beaten the conventional lie detector could also beat the PSE.

I selected a point in the interview at which Mike Wallace suggested that Irving had not interviewed Howard Hughes, but had happened on some transcripts of Hughes' statements. Irving asked how he could have happened on them. Wallace rejoined, "Where *did* you happen on those transcripts?" Irving replied, "I got the transcripts from Howard Hughes." I charted this statement on the PSE.

It was a perfect example of total stress, horizontally blocked, with the smooth, "trimmed-hedge" wave form. Clifford Irving was a master liar, and he had beaten the polygraph, but he would have been caught by the PSE.

A few days after our first meeting, I received a call from Bob Smith. He had turned up a few things for me. I visited him at the Committee's office in downtown Washington. He gave me a tape recording and a typewritten transcript. The recording was the Louis Lomax television program of Sunday, October 16, 1966. Wesley Liebler, a member of the Warren Commission's staff, was the guest. The transcript was of a CBS News television program entitled *The Warren Report*, which had been broadcast in four one-hour segments on June 25, 26, 27 and 28, 1967.

I examined the transcript. The programs had been narrated by Walter Cronkite and other CBS newsmen. They reviewed every major point of controversy that had been raised by the critics of the Warren Report, interviewing eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, medical examiners, ballistic specialists and many others who had some inside knowledge of the assassination of John F. Kennedy. For what I had in mind, it was a gold mine. I telephoned CBS and learned that I could get a copy of the program's

Next I played the Lomax-Liebler tape. Apparently Mark Lane had been on an earlier Lomax program, and now Liebler was on to rebut him. I didn't need the PSE to know that Liebler was stressed. He seemed very agitated, and his breathing audibly indicated his tension. He was angry about the things Lane had said, the questions Lomax was asking him, and the reaction of the studio audience. Given his highly emotional state, he did not seem a very promising subject for the PSE. Nonetheless, I decided to give it a try.

Charting a tape with the PSE is a long and tedious process, and it was impractical to chart the entire program. I ran some of Liebler's statements which were not in dispute and discovered, as I had expected, a great deal of stress. He was pretty charged up.

Most of the exchange between Liebler, Lomax and the audience was argumentative and did not deal with specific factual points. I found two key statements by Liebler, though, and I charted them.

The first statement, in response to a question by Lomax, was, "I have no doubt about the conclusions of the [Warren] Report." Plenty of stress was evident, but not much more than in other statements.

The second statement related to those Warren Commission documents which were not included in the Report—they were locked up in the National Archives. Lomax asked Liebler if there was anything in the documents which would alter Liebler's opinion. Taken literally, it was a strange question, since Liebler had seen the documents and, if they would alter his opinion, they would already have done so. Lomax probably meant to ask if the documents would conflict with the conclusions of the Warren Report. Whatever Liebler thought the question meant, he answered quickly, "Oh, none, none at all." The PSE showed much more stress here than during any of Liebler's other statements.

It was all pretty confused and fuzzy, and it didn't tell me more than I'd already known: Wesley Liebler was pretty upset when he appeared on the Louis Lomax program. I hoped that the CBS tapes would yield more enlightening results.

I finally received a call from CBS's Washington office saying the tapes had arrived. I broke a few traffic laws getting there to pick up the tapes and returning to my apartment. I had already selected the points I wanted to check from the transcript of the program. I mounted the first tape on the recorder, ran it down to the first point of interest, and turned on the PSE.

For the next three days and nights, I ran charts. When I finished, I had a splitting headache, my kitchen floor was ankle deep in chart paper, but I had a much clearer idea of what did and did not happen that day in Dallas.

Before I describe my results, I feel that I must offer the reader a few comments and ation aid, it has not been validated for historical research. Even though familiar with the machine believe an be used in this way, my project first attempt to do so.

easier to demonstrate with the PSE peaker is telling the truth than to is lying. Stress can be caused by other than deception; but the absence of stress is an extremely reliable on of truthfulness. Of course, the e of stress does not prove that a nt is true, only that the speaker it to be true.

hough I found a great deal of stress stimony of the assassination tapes. ngle instance can I say that the in- was lying. I point this out not only ct myself from libel suits but be- am not morally certain any one indi- /as not telling the truth.

netheless, stress in the testimony witnesses to the same event makes ematical probability overwhelming east some of them were lying.

points could not be better illus- han they were by the Jim Gar- lay Shaw Affair.

son, it may be recalled, was the New s District Attorney who, in 1967, l to have solved the Kennedy assas- . He presented an elaborate case a local businessman, Clay Shaw, ers, as members of an assassination acy. In one of the hour-long pro- CBS interviewed Garrison, Shaw, other people involved in Garrison's ons.

interview, Garrison was hostile and make many firm, factual statements test with the PSE. However, he did here's no question about it [that he ow the assassination had been car-] . . . we know the key individuals d . . . there is no question about the conspirators] were there [in Dealy " The PSE showed good to hard n each of these statements. I also oncontroversial statement of Gar- as a control: "Oswald was not killed t the movie theater where he was l]," and found no stress. Garrison's nts about his case against Clay rongly indicated deception.

ran some statements by Clay Shaw his involvement in such a conspir- d denying ever knowing or meeting rvey Oswald. I also ran a control nt. Shaw turned out to be heavily d throughout.

vas not particularly surprising. The d been accused of conspiring to the President of the United States s being interviewed about it before n cameras. He would have to have pretty cool customer not to show stress, even if he were telling the e truth.

ng that both Garrison and Shaw stress was not an encouraging valid evidence linking Shaw to the assassination and then, in the time-honored tradition of prosecutors, invented the rest of his case. But Shaw's stress could easily be the result of his predicament, and Garrison's might also be the result of some outside issue. The situation was ambiguous.

I ran the testimony of Lee Odom. Odom, a Dallas businessman, was attempting to explain the mysterious coincidence of the post office box numbers. It seems that the Dallas post office box number 11906 appeared in the notebooks of both Clay Shaw and Lee Harvey Oswald. In his testimony, Odom stated that he could not account for the number appearing in Oswald's notebook, he knew how it got into Shaw's. It was Odom's box number, and he had given it to Shaw, whom he'd met by chance on a business trip to New Orleans. The PSE showed hard stress during his statement. No unrelated control statement was available for me to run for comparison.

This didn't really clear things up. There were several obvious alternative explanations for Odom's stress. For example, there had been a number of rather unsavory allegations in the press about Clay Shaw, unrelated to the Garrison charges. Odom may have felt extremely uncomfortable about linking himself to this man in any way. The coincidence of the box numbers seemed very suspicious, but Bob Smith of the Committee had pointed out to me that both Shaw's and Oswald's notebooks were filled with numbers, so the chance of such a coincidence was not that remote.

> Deception is not proved by stress, but given enough witnesses' testimony, the PSE is able to arrive at the truth

At this point I began to wonder if the television camera was the "outside issue" in every case. Perhaps just being on television will so thoroughly rattle the average person that, lying or not, he is going to show stress on the PSE. I checked this out by recording and charting a number of people on television programs—public officials, men in the street, even witnesses to a particularly gruesome accident. There was occasional stress, but it never reached the high level I was finding in the assassination tapes.

I also recalled something else which put my mind to rest on this point: the PSE had been used to analyze the statements of con- and-so" with an accuracy of better than 94 percent. The problem obviously was not the television camera.

I ran the testimony of William Gurvich on the PSE. Gurvich had been Garrison's chief aide in the investigation of Clay Shaw until he resigned, charging Garrison with wrongdoing. He said, "The truth as I see it is that Mr. Shaw should never have been arrested." He was asked if Garrison had known of certain illegal and unethical methods Gurvich had alleged were being used by Garrison's staff. He answered, "Yeah, of course he did. He ordered it." There was no stress in Mr. Gurvich's statements. The PSE showed that he believed what he was saying.

Obviously I did not have enough testimony from a large enough number of witnesses to create a detailed picture of the Garrison–Shaw affair, but it seems probable that, at the very least, Garrison did not have much of a case against Shaw (a view later held by a New Orleans jury) and likely that Shaw was completely innocent of complicity in the assassination. The lesson of this episode is twofold. First, stress in any one person's testimony does not prove deception. Second, given enough testimony by different witnesses, the PSE can arrive at the truth.

The first person I ran on the PSE who had any direct knowledge of the assassination was Oswald's widow, Marina. Unfortunately, only one of her statements was on the CBS tapes—that Oswald had owned a rifle. The PSE said she was telling the truth.

The rifle had been one of the major points of controversy raised by critics of the Warren Report. The debate centered on two points: whether the Mannlicher–Carcano alleged to have belonged to Oswald was the rifle found by the Dallas police in the Texas School Book Depository, and whether that particular gun could have been the murder weapon.

On the tapes, Darrell C. Tomlinson, an employee of Parkland Hospital, testified that he had found a rifle bullet on a stretcher which he believed had carried Governor Connally. There was no stress in his statement. The PSE said he was telling the truth.

Dr. Joseph D. Nicol, Superintendent of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation for the State of Illinois, ran ballistic tests on bullet fragments found in the presidential limousine, and on the intact bullet found by Tomlinson. Nicol testified that both the intact bullet and the bullet fragments had been fired by the Mannlicher–Carcano. He, too, was apparently telling the truth.

Deputy Constable Seymour Weitzman of the Dallas police claimed that he found Oswald's Mannlicher–Carcano on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. However, on the day of the assassination, he had told the press that the rifle he'd found was a German Mauser. The following day he signed an affidavit to that effect. But on the CBS tapes he testified that he had been mistaken about that point, that it had really erable stress in his statements.

atrolman Gerald L. Hill testified that he nd three spent bullet hulls on the floor eath the window from which the fatal ts allegedly were fired. The PSE showed d stress in his statements.

he rifle was one of the principal points d by the Warren Commission to link vald to the assassination. The PSE sub- ntiated the testimony that Oswald owned fle and that the evidence supplied to allistics expert indicated this rifle was murder weapon. However, the PSE did substantiate the controversial claims of las police regarding the discovery of evidence.

he hospital employee was apparently ng the truth when he recounted finding bullet on a stretcher at Parkland Hospi- but many critics have charged that the et had been deliberately planted there. s is the famous "single bullet" which the rren Report says passed through the lies of both the President and Governor nnally, and then lodged in Connally's st. Several researchers have tried to eat this, firing the same type of bullet the wrist of a cadaver. The bullets never ained perfectly intact, as the one found he stretcher; they became twisted lumps ead and copper.

he second link between Oswald and the assination is the charge that he killed cer Tippitt. a Dallas policeman, while ing from the scene of the first shooting. umber of eyewitnesses have testified they saw Oswald shoot Tippitt, and one hem, Domingo Benavides, was inter- ved on the CBS tapes. He was asked nere was any doubt in his mind that vald was the man he saw shoot Tippitt. replied, "No, sir, there was no doubt ill." There was absolutely no stress in statement. He was telling the truth.

he killing of Officer Tippitt by Oswald fueled the fires of controversy over the rren Report. Tippitt was far from his usual it when he was shot. Some witnesses e alleged that Tippitt and Oswald were n together in Jack Ruby's nightclub. y theorize that the three men were part n assassination conspiracy, and that pitt had been sent to silence Oswald, had been beaten to the draw.

he Dallas police radio dispatcher, cer Murray Jackson, was asked if he ught Tippitt knew Oswald. "No," he lied, "I don't think he knew Oswald." Did kson know Oswald? "No," answered kson, "I didn't either." The PSE showed vy stress in both statements.

erhaps the greatest source of con- ersy over the Warren Report is it's claim all the shots were fired by one gunman. ne eyewitnesses claim to have heard ts and seen gunsmoke in the area of w hillock ahead and to the right of the sidential motorcade. This hillock has ne to be known as "the grassy knoll." e of these witnesses was a railroad ker named S.M. Holland, who observed The PSE confirmed that he thought he had seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, but it could not support his claim that he had heard a shot from that direction.

Another witness, Charles Brehm, was quoted by Mark Lane as having said that he had seen a portion of the President's skull flying back over the left rear end of the limousine. Lane offered this as evidence of a shot from the grassy knoll. On the CBS tapes, Brehm stated heatedly that he had been quoted out of context, and emphatically denied that any shots had come from the knoll. Despite his emotional state, there was almost no stress in this statement.

Officer Jacks of the Dallas police, who was riding in the limousine of Vice-President Johnson, denied that any of the shots had come from the direction of the grassy knoll. The PSE turned up a fair degree of stress.

Three witnesses, Mrs. Caroline Walther, Arnold Rowland and Howard Brennan, claimed to have seen gunmen in the windows of the Texas School Book Depository building. Mrs. Walther said she saw two men, one armed with a rifle, the second with a shorter gun. Rowland told the Warren Commission he had seen two men, one an elderly Negro, in the window Oswald is alleged to have fired from, but on the CBS tapes he claimed he had seen an armed man at a different window. The Commission relied heavily on the testimony of Brennan, who claimed to have seen a gunman in the "Oswald window" actually firing the last of the shots. The PSE showed hard stress in the testimony of all three witnesses.

> "
> Chief Justice Warren:
> "We explored both these theories and found no evidence that either group was involved"
> "

The PSE analysis of the eyewitnesses' testimony regarding the source of the shots is ambiguous. It supports Holland's claim to have seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, and Brehm's denial that any shots came from that direction, and it raises serious doubts about all other claims and counterclaims. This contradiction seems to result from the notorious unreliability of eyewitnesses, perhaps compounded by a fair amount of fabrication. Deception, if it is present here, may have been motivated merely by a desire for attention. Or there may have been darker reasons.

There is, however, other evidence and testimony that could shed some light on the existence, number and location of assassins other than Oswald. This brings us to perhaps the most dubious and controversial element in the Warren Commission's version of the event—the autopsy.

nedy had been rushed to the emergency room at Parkland Hospital, where Dr. Malcolm Perry tried to save his life. The physician saw that the President had suffered a massive head wound and a smaller wound in the throat. Perry performed a tracheostomy, cutting through the throat wound in an attempt to open a breathing passage. Afterward, when hope for the President had been abandoned, Perry met with the press and declared that the wound in the front of the neck had been an entry wound.

The President's body was flown to Washington, D.C. There, approximately eight hours after the shooting, an autopsy was performed at Bethesda Naval Hospital. Because of the tracheostomy, the nature of the neck wound could no longer be observed and was, at first, overlooked. Later, after consulting the Dallas doctors, the Bethesda pathologists concluded that it was an exit wound. The autopsy report stated that there were two entry wounds, one low in the rear scalp and one at the right base of the neck; and two exit wounds, the throat wound and a large irregular wound on the right side of the head.

The confusion was compounded when two FBI agents present at the autopsy reported that a wound had been found in the President's back, and that no corresponding exit wound had been located. Diagrams made during the autopsy seemed to confirm this, showing the lower of the two entry wounds to be below the shoulders, not at the base of the neck. What became of the bullet? The agents reported that Bethesda doctors thought the bullet had dropped from the wound when the Dallas doctors attempted external heart massage. But this was the shot that the Commission claimed had passed through Kennedy and struck Governor Connally.

X-rays and color photographs of the autopsy were made. The brain was removed from the body. Brain and skin tissue slides were prepared for microscopic examination. Remarkably, the Warren Commission never asked to see any of this evidence, relying instead solely on the testimony of Captain James J. Humes, one of the pathologists who conducted the autopsy. Even more incredible is the disappearance of the brain, the slides, and some of the photographs, which were alleged to have been turned over to the National Archives by the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

Both Dr. Perry and Captain Humes were interviewed on the CBS tapes. Perry was asked about the throat wound he'd seen when the President was brought to Parkland Hospital. His answer seemed evasive. He neither confirmed nor denied that he had thought it was an entry wound, talking instead about the difficulty of making such a determination and the fact that his attention had been devoted to saving the President's life. Then the interviewer asked him directly whether he had thought at the time that it was an entry wound. "Actually, I didn't really give it much thought," he replied. He

sassination Tapes

ED FROM PAGE 114

ed hard stress on the PSE. Unfortu- he made no other definite statement the nature of the wound.

interview with Captain Humes was nformative. Just before the interview, 7, Humes had re-examined the autop- otographs and X-rays, and he dis- d them at length on the CBS tapes. grams drawn during the autopsy, d. had not been intended to precisely ent the location of the wounds. How- le now produced a sketch which, he did represent these locations accu-

The interviewer asked, "Your re- nation of the photographs verify that unds were as shown here?"

s, sir," he replied. No stress.

e there any wounds other than one base of the neck and one up in the "No, sir, there were not." Moderate not enough to suggest deception.

there any doubt that the wound at ck of the President's head was an ound? "There is absolutely no doubt, gain stress but again moderate.

gether, how many wounds were "There were two wounds of entrance o of exit." At this point the stress be- hard.

where were the entry wounds lo- "Posteriorly, one low in the right or scalp, and one in the base of the n the right." Hard stress again.

d he be absolutely certain that what d was an entry wound was, in fact, 'es, indeed we can." Hard stress.

nterview with Humes was one of the st and most detailed on the CBS and I charted most of it with the PSE. clear to me that he believed much he was saying, but the frequent flick- of moderate stress and the occasion- es of hard stress suggested that he nearly as confident of his testimony claimed to be. As Dr. Perry had l out, sometimes it's not easy to tell y wound from an exit wound.

nterviewer asked him one good "bot- e" question:

you have any different conclusion, ferent ideas, any different thoughts er seeing [the autopsy photographs] than you had at that time?"

replied Captain Humes, "we think ar up very well, and very closely, imony before the Warren Commis-

tress was hard.

Specter, one of the Warren Commis- rincipal investigators, also spoke on tapes. He said that the case against fitted together very well, and that could one find among actual crim-

the charge that the Commission had been formed to whitewash the facts.

The PSE said he was telling the truth.

John McCloy, a member of the Warren Commission, said much the same thing, and added that he had seen no credible evidence to contradict the findings of the Commission. The PSE backed him up on this, but it failed to do so when, speaking of the Warren Report, he said, "There was nothing fraudulent about it." Here the PSE showed hard stress.

If Specter and McCloy were as confident as the PSE shows them to be in the truthfulness of the Warren Report, what could be fraudulent about it? Perhaps the snipping off of a few loose ends, the suppression of a few pieces of inconvenient evidence which conflicted with a version of events they believed to be essentially true.

The one man who could be expected to have the most informed opinion regarding the work of the Warren Commission is former Chief Justice Earl Warren himself. He had declined to be interviewed on the CBS program in 1967, but he did appear on television in May, 1972, in an interview which was part of a series called *The Brandeis Television Recollections*. Bob Smith of the Committee provided me with the tape.

"...we found no evidence of any kind that there was any conspiracy." There was very hard stress on "no evidence"

The interview was an hour long, but the Kennedy assassination and the Warren Commission came up only once. The interviewer, Abram Sachar, Chancellor of Brandeis University, was friendly and deferential. I charted some of Warren's remarks unrelated to the assassination and found that he was generally unstressed. Sachar raised the subject of the Commission obliquely, and Warren volunteered several rather lengthy statements about it

Warren said that immediately after the assassination there were two theories, one that Khrushchev and Castro were behind the killing, the other that a group of right-wing Texas oilmen were responsible. He said:

"We explored both of those theories for ten months and found no evidence that either of them was involved in it."

The PSE showed hard stress.

He continued:

"... we found no evidence of any kind that there was any conspiracy."

Again there was stress, and particularly hard stress on the words "no evidence."

"I have read everything," said Justice Warren, "that has come to my notice in the that have criticized the Commission very severely, but I have never found that they have discovered any evidence of any kind that we didn't discover and use in determining the case as we did."

Hard stress once again. The word "never" was a perfectly "trimmed hedge."

"I have found nothing since that time," he continued, "to change my view, nor have I heard of anything that has changed the view of any member of the commission since that time."

The stress was hard. As I had now come to expect, the word "nothing" seemed a particularly beautiful example of stress. Another word seemed to show even more stress: "member." Could he have been thinking of someone in particular? On January 19, 1970, Senator Richard B. Russell, a member of the Warren Commission, revealed that he had never believed that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone.

I had charted the last of the assassination tapes. Of course, these few thousand feet of recording tape are only a small fraction of the relevant testimony recorded and stored away in the archives of television news departments. There is, for example, Lee Harvey Oswald, as he was led through the Dallas police station, denying that he had killed the President. There are statements by Marina Oswald, Jack Ruby and by others.

I have no doubt that with these tapes, a Psychological Stress Evaluator, and time to work on them, a very detailed picture of the assassination of John F. Kennedy could be reconstructed, a picture that might even reveal the identities of the assassins and their co-conspirators. I hope that sooner or later someone does this. I have gone as far as the private resources of a free-lance writer permit.

What, given the sample of testimony I have processed with the PSE, can I say about the assassination?

We should first examine the testimony in which *no* stress was found, since it is almost certain that these people were telling the truth as they saw it. This strongly suggests the following:

1. Oswald owned a rifle.
2. A bullet fired from that rifle was found on Governor Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital.
3. Bullet fragments *alleged* to have been found in the presidential limousine also came from Oswald's rifle.
4. At least one eyewitness believes he saw gunsmoke on the grassy knoll, but another is equally certain no shots came from that direction.
5. Oswald shot and killed Officer Tippitt.
6. At least one member of the Warren Commission and one member of the Commission's staff really believe in the validity of the Warren Report.
7. Jim Garrison had little or no case against Clay Shaw.

Almost all of this tends to support, in one way or another, the Warren Report. But now by the PSE.

The claim that Oswald's rifle was
l in the Texas School Book Depository.

The claim that bullet hulls matching
ld's-rifle were found in the same place.

The claim that one gunman was seen
"Oswald window" of the Dallas Book
sitory.

The claim that two gunmen were seen
s window.

The claim that a gunman was seen
lifferent window of that building.

Another claim that no shots came from
assy knoll, and a claim by the witness
saw the gunsmoke on the knoll that
so *heard* a shot from that direction.

A claim by a Dallas policeman that
r he nor Officer Tippitt knew Oswald.

The claim by the pathologist—the
n Commission's only source of infor-
n about the autopsy—that the X-rays
utopsy photographs support his tes-
before the Commission.

he claim by a member of the Warren
ission that there was nothing fraudu-
bout the Warren Report.

The claim by Earl Warren that the
ission found no evidence of a con-
y; that none of the Warren Report's
ever found anything the Commission
issed; that he had found nothing since
blication of the Report to change his
and that he knew of no Commission
er who had ever changed his mind
their conclusions.

indicates deception, an interesting and unexpected possibility emerges:

Oswald was involved in some way in the assassination, if only as a fall guy. Some of the Dallas police force may have been involved, planted the evidence that implicated Oswald, and covered up the fact that there was a conspiracy. The medical examiner believed his own testimony to the Warren Commission, but later had doubts. The Commission found evidence of a conspiracy but didn't believe it, so they covered it up in order to present a tidy package to the public. Later, at least one member of the Commission changed his mind, but since he didn't know what really did happen, he decided to say nothing. So there was conspiracy in Dallas, and in Washington nothing worse than blundering.

I could say all this with certainty if I knew that stress always equals deception. Unfortunately, I do not know that. But the PSE analysis of the assassination tapes has generated a staggering amount of fresh doubt regarding the Warren Report. This doubt rises not only from specific points the PSE has called into question, but from the very sinister implications of the very existence of deception among policemen, government officials and Commission members. The question remains: did such deception exist or was the stress found by the PSE the result, in every case, of an outside issue?

the PSE and cannot be cross-checked by a structured interrogation, some probability must be accepted that this stress is caused by an outside issue. No study has yet been conducted to establish what this probability might be, but let us pick, for the sake of discussion, a figure that may seem ridiculously high—70 percent. In other words, we are assuming that 70 percent of the times the PSE finds stress in testimony, it results from something other than lying.

Now, let's ignore the deception indicated in the testimony of the eyewitnesses; even if present, it might have resulted from mere desire for attention. That leaves eight "insiders" who have demonstrated stress when making statements supporting the Warren Report: the Dallas policemen Hill, Jacks, Jackson and Weitzman; the medical examiner, Captain Humes; Commission staffer Wesley Liebler; Commission member John McCloy; former Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Assuming that there is a 70 percent chance that any *single* instance of stress is "outside issue," what is the probability that all eight instances are due to factors other than deception? Elementary probability theory tells us that it is seven-tenths raised to the eighth power, or approximately 6 percent.

In other words, even making some fairly conservative assumptions, there is a 94 percent chance that at least one of these eight men is lying.

My own personal opinion? I don't know. I remember the young man with the ring. He said he was wearing it, and he was, but he stressed. He stressed not because he was lying, but because there was something about that ring that really bothered him, something he didn't want the world to know. Perhaps that is also true of these men who, in one way or another, learned some part of the truth about the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

I suppose I'm not absolutely sure even of that. When I first met Bob Smith of the Committee, I asked him if there was any one thing the government could do to clear up the mystery. Yes, he replied, the one thing that would help more than anything else would be to make available the physical evidence — the detailed FBI lab reports, the X-rays and autopsy photographs, the microscopic slides, the bloodstained clothing, yes, even the President's brain, wherever it has been hidden. These things, he said, would go far toward answering the questions about what actually happened that day in Dallas. Maybe they would even confirm the Warren Report.

So when I say I'm not absolutely certain these men are concealing something, I mean I can think of something that could conceivably change my mind. That is, if the government would open all its files on this matter to us and prove that we are wrong —we, the people who ten years later still believe we haven't yet heard the full account of the events of November 22, 1963.

13-00000

E LAST THREE PRESIDENTIAL CTIONS HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY BULLETS:

64 – result decided by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy

68 – result decided by the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy

72 – result decided by the near-assassination of Governor George Wallace

is the evidence?

ire the fatal shots?

has there been such a concerted effort ithhold the facts?

as really behind the assassinations?

62.11697-33

COME SHARE THE FINDINGS OF THE NATION'S EXPERTS

AT A TWO DAY CONFERENCE

SPONSORED BY THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

TO BE HELD AT

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

GASTON HALL

Nov. 23-24, 1973

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
1520 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. • (202) 232-1152

DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS

1963 - 1973

JOHN F. KENNEDY • SYLVANUS OLYMPIO • ABDUL KARIM KASSEM • MEDGAR EVERS • "NGO" DINH DIEM • JIGME DORJI • ADIB AL SHISHAKLI • PIERRE NGENDANDUMWE • HASSAN ALI MANSOUR • MALCOLM X • VIOLA LIUZZO • MARIO MENDEZ MONTENEGRO • SIR ABUBAKAR BALEWA • J.T.V. IRONSI AGUIYI • HENDRIK VERWOERD • TRAN VAN VAN • GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL • CHE GUEVARA • MARTIN LUTHER KING • ROBERT F. KENNEDY • EDUARDO MONDLANE • TOM MBOYA • A.A. SHERMARKE • GEORGE WALLACE • SALVADORE ALLENDE •

DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS
1963 – 1973

PROGRAM

FRIDAY – NOVEMBER 23

:00 **LATE REGISTRATION –**
Early Registrants pick up passes.

:30 **WELCOME:**
Mr. Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Executive Director, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
Mr. Norman Mailer, Author and Forwarder of *The Fifth Estate*

0:00 **CURRENT STATUS OF PROMINENT ASSASSINATION CASES:**
JFK CASE – Mr. Robert P. Smith, Director of Research, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
RFK CASE – Mr. Robert Hanson, Attorney, present counsel for Sirhan Sirhan
KING CASE – Mr. James Lesar, Attorney, present counsel for James Earl Ray
WALLACE CASE – Mr. Ronald Van Doren, Newsman, Author, researcher into the background of Arthur Bremer
ROCKWELL CASE – Ms. Meredith Rode, Professor at Federal City College, Authority in killing of George Lincoln Rockwell

11:30 **UNIQUE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES:**
Mr. William Turner, Moderator – Former FBI Agent, Author of numerous books on investigative techniques
Mr. George O'Toole – Former CIA Agent, Free-Lance Writer, expert on the PSE (Psychological Stress Evaluator)
Mr. Robert Saltzman – Computer Engineer, lecturer on the Warren Commission

FRIDAY – Continued

12:30 **BREAK FOR LUNCH**

2:00 **MEDICAL AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE:**
Mr. Josiah Thompson, Moderator – Professor at Haverford College, author of *Six Seconds In Dallas*
Dr. Cyril Wecht – Professor of Law and Forensic Medicine at Duquesne University; Coroner of Pittsburgh, Pa.
Ms. Sylvia Meagher – Attorney, UN Official, author of *Accessories After The Fact*
Mr. Roger Hanson – Attorney, counsel to Sirhan Sirhan
Mr. Herbert MacDonnell – Professor of Criminalistics, Corning University; expert in case of Fred Hampton
Mr. Mark Lane – Attorney, author of *Rush To Judgment* and *Executive Action*

6:00 **BREAK FOR DINNER**

8:30 **WARREN COMMISSION REPORT: FACT OR FICTION –**
A slide show and lecture by Mr. Robert Saltzman

SATURDAY – NOVEMBER 24

9:30 **ASSASSINATIONS AND THE MEDIA:**
Mr. John Henry Faulk, Moderator – Humorist and Author of *Fear On Trial*
Mr. Robert Kaiser – Author of *RFK Must Die*
Mr. Donald Freed – Co-Author of *Executive Action*
Mr. Harold Weisberg – Author of *Frame Up*
Mr. Ted Charach – Author of *Second Gun*
Mr. Peter Noyes – Author of *Legacy Of Doubt*
Mr. Fred Cook – Author of numerous books and articles

12:30 **BREAK FOR LUNCH**

2:00 **THEORIES OF CONSPIRACY:**
Mr. Richard Sprague, Moderator – Computer expert and author
Dr. Richard Popkin, Professor at Washington University; author of *The Second Oswald*
Col. Fletcher Prouty – Former Liaison Officer between Pentagon and CIA; author of *The Secret Teams*
Mr. Robert K. Brown – Former Special Services Officer; expert in attempts on life of Castro
Mr. Earl Golz – Reporter for Dallas Morning News; expert on Organized Crimes
Mr. Victor Marchetti – Former CIA Agent; author
Mr. Peter Dale Scott – Professor at Berkeley; Author of *The War Conspiracy*

5:00 **INDIVIDUAL WORKSHOPS WITH THE SPEAKERS –**
Question and Answer Sessions

OURCES AND METHODS INV VED

SEP. 1972

Dr. Julius Mader
Author and editor
Editor of "Who's Who in CIA"

Mauerstrasse 69
1066 Berlin W 66

Dear Sirs:

I take this opportunity of offering you:

"Yellow List: Where Is the CIA?"

("Gelbe Liste: Wo ist die CIA")

This book presents for the first time anywhere in the world a documentation in alphabetical order of more than 400 disguised or subsidised organisations and institutions of the US civilian and military intelligence network in North, Central and South America, Europe, Africa and Asia.

The "Yellow List" is available either in the English or German language.

The price per copy, inclusive of air mail postal costs, is $2.00 (or the corresponding amount in other currencies at present exchange rates). The book will be sent to you immediately upon receipt of your order blank and check.

I would be grateful if you would mention this publication of topical interest to others as well.

Yours very sincerely,

Mader

Dr. Julius Mader

SEP.
1972

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATION

NUMB 4

DATE Sept 2 1972 15-511

PAY TO THE ORDER OF [illegible] $2.00

[illegible] 00/100 DOLLA

The RIGGS NATIONAL BANK
of WASHINGTON, D.C.
FEDERAL OFFICE
1730 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N. W.

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIO

AUTH. S

⑆0511⑈0003⑆ 11⑈07098549⑈

ORDER BLANK

I wish ....1.......... copies of the "Yellow List: Where Is the CIA?" in the ....language. (German [✓ or English])

I enclose a check for ....2.00.......(sum and currency)
Name or Company ....Bo FENSTERWALD............
Address ...905 16th ST NW.........................
Country ...Washington D.C. 20006.............

CONFIDENTIAL

X



Eric Starvo Galt, aka Harvey Lowmyer and John Willard (Eyes drawn in by FBI artist)

DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO FBI

~~411~~A 413





DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO FBI

~~412~~ A41

13-00000

I. O. 4132
4-20-68

CIVIL RIGHTS - CONSPIRACY
INTERSTATE FLIGHT - ROBBERY

WANTED BY FBI

JAMES EARL RAY

FBI No. 405,942 G
16 M 9 U 000 12
M 4 W 101

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

ALIASES: Eric Starvo Galt, W. C. Herron, Harvey Lowmyer, James McBride, James O'Conner, James Walton, James Walyon, John Willard, "Jim"



Photographs taken 1960



Photograph taken 1963
(eyes drawn by artist)



James Ray

DESCRIPTION

AGE: 40, born March 10, 1928, Alton Illinois
HEIGHT: 5'10" EYES: blue
WEIGHT: 163 to 174 pounds COMPLEXION: medium
BUILD: medium RACE: white
HAIR: brown, possibly cut short NATIONALITY: American
OCCUPATIONS: baker, color matcher, laborer
SCARS AND MARKS: small scar on center of forehead and small scar on palm of right hand
REMARKS: noticeably protruding left ear; reportedly is a lone wolf; allegedly attended dance instruction school; has reportedly completed course in bartending

CRIMINAL RECORD

Ray has been convicted of burglary, robbery, forging U. S. Postal Money Orders, armed robbery, and operating motor vehicle without owner's consent.

CAUTION

RAY IS SOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH A MURDER WHEREIN THE VICTIM WAS SHOT. CONSIDER ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

A Federal warrant was issued on April 17, 1968, at Birmingham, Alabama, charging Ray as Eric Starvo Galt with conspiring to interfere with a Constitutional Right of a citizen (Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 241). A Federal warrant was also issued on July 20, 1967, at Jefferson City, Missouri, charging Ray with Interstate Flight to Avoid Confinement for the crime of Robbery (Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1073).

IF YOU HAVE INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS PERSON, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI OFFICE. TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND ADDRESSES OF ALL FBI OFFICES LISTED ON BACK.

Identification Order 4132
April 20, 1968

J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20535

415A417 DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO FBI



DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO

~~43~~ A415

WANTED BY THE FBI

CIVIL RIGHTS - CONSPIRACY

ERIC STARVO GALT

FBI No. 405,942 G

DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO FBI

44A446



Photograph taken 1968
(eyes drawn by artist)



Photograph taken 1968

DESCRIPTION

Age:	36, born July 20, 1931 (not supported by birth records)		
Height:	5'8" to 5'11"	**Eyes:**	Blue or hazel
Weight:	160 to 175 pounds	**Complexion:**	Medium
Build:	Medium	**Race:**	White
Hair:	Brown, possibly cut short		
Occupation:	Has claimed employment as seaman		
Remarks:	Noticeably protruding left ear; reportedly is a lone wolf; allegedly attended dance instruction school; has reportedly completed course in bartending.		

CAUTION

GALT IS SOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH A MURDER WHEREIN THE VICTIM WAS SHOT. CONSIDER ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

A Federal warrant was issued on April 17, 1968, at Birmingham, Alabama, charging Galt with conspiring to interfere with a Constitutional Right of a citizen (Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 241).

IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS PERSON, PLEASE NOTIFY ME OR CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI OFFICE. TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND ADDRESSES OF ALL FBI OFFICES LISTED ON BACK.

J. Edgar Hoover

DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
TELEPHONE, NATIONAL 8-7117

Wanted Flyer 442
April 17, 1968

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Mr. William A. Branigan

SUBJECT : Conference of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Report on Proceedings 23 November 1973 Inc.

1. Herewith a report containing partial coverage on the events during the first session of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, together with material (which is overt) made available on the floor of the conference.

2. We would be interested in anything you develop on any of the other sessions of the conference.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

REC-64 62-112697-33

J. Angleton
James Angleton

EX-104

14 JAN 3 1974

Enclosure:
Report w/atts

CIR-316/03107-73

7-

ENC. BEHIND FILE

CLASSIFIED BY 055431
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
impossible to determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

Letter to CIA Remijo 12/20/73

SECRET

Attachment to CIR-316/03107-73

SUBJECT: Conference of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Report on Proceedings 23 November 1973

1. The Committee to Investigate Assassinations claims to have been established in 1969. The headquarters are in Washington, D. C. (at 1520 16th Street, N. W.). In the four years of its existence the Committee has done research and has become a kind of clearing house for the study of assassinations. It maintains contact with other groups engaged in similar activity, of which there seem to be at least two, one of which is located in the Boston area.

2. In addition to research, the Committee acts to help individuals interested in the investigation of assassinations. It thus files suits for private persons demanding access to classified information. It sponsors the publication of books and articles relating to the field of its interest, and sponsors the production of movies. It publishes a newsletter.

3. The conference of November 23-24, 1973, is the first of its type to be held by the Committee. The Georgetown University was helpful by placing Gaston Hall at the disposal of the Committee free of charge. By agreement with the University, the Committee will also be able to use the services of the University Library as a repository and research center.

4. The Conference opened on November 23, 1973, with a delay of about half an hour. The delay may have been due to the installation of recording equipment which literally covered the premises with a tangle of wires of every kind. The Washington Post reports an attendance exceeding 300. This is a generous estimate. After deducting official speakers, recording personnel, and press representatives, the audience probably numbered no more than 150, if that many.

CLASSIFIED BY 006593
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1) [illegible] more
AUTOMATICALLY [illegible]
impossible to determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

5. Beards and long hair prevailed, and others stood out like a sore thumb. There was not a single Negro in the audience, nor, that morning, on the platform. Even the speaker who spoke on the case of Martin Luther King was white.

6. Not all the speakers preannounced were present. The chairman announced the absence of Richard Sprague. Another speaker, a lawyer from Los Angeles whose name was drowned out in the noise, was also absent. They were replaced by Dr. Robert Forman and someone whose name sounded like "Ed Kirkley".

7. The chairman announced that all the speeches would be tape recorded for subsequent publication. He further invited the audience to attend movies to be shown that night. One of these, "Burn", was to be shown at the University. Others by prearrangement would be shown at local movie theaters. The latter were connected with the Kennedy assassination. The case of the President's murder was in the center of the conference and, as noted by one of the organizers (Smith), one half of the speakers were to center their attention upon the Oswald case.

8. The chairman adhered strictly to the program and every speaker mentioned in the program for the morning session of November 23 spoke as specified. Of those who spoke, Norman Mailer, Robert P. Smith and Ronald Van Doren deserve particular attention. Their speeches in summary are reviewed below.

9. A table at the back of the audience presented recommended literature. The books included H. Weissberg's Whitewash and Peter Noyes' Legacy of Doubt. For some reason there was a copy of one paper only, that of George O'Toole's "Assassination Tapes". There was also a bibliography of political assassination; the foreword to which lists the persons most actively collaborating with the Committee.

10. A publication circulated during the conference was the November, 1973 issue of Computers and Automation which is to be renamed, starting January 1, 1974, Computers and People. The publication of articles such as "Nixon and the Mafia" which concludes that Richard M. Nixon seems to be the embodiment of a prediction that organized crime would someday put its own man in the White House, seems somewhat curious in a magazine devoted to the profession of data processing and the use of computers. The magazine was established in 1951 by Berkeley Enterprises in Massachusetts. Alger Hiss is among its contributors and an abundance of articles by Richard Sprague on the subject of Watergate published in the past year.

11. Another organization which received publicity at the Conference was The Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC).

12. A representative of Computers and Automation handed out this publication free of charge to members of the audience. He took notes with fantastic speed and apparent accuracy of everything said during the proceedings.

13. The lights gave out at one point and did not come on again during the morning session. The absence of current may have affected the tape recording.

14. The morning session, due to close at 12:30, ended after 1:30 p.m. By this time the audience was impatient to have lunch, and the resumption of the proceedings was therefore postponed to a later hour.

15. No document of any kind was issued to the persons who paid $15.00 to enter. Instead their hand was stamped with the name of the organization which gave them access to all further meetings that day and the next (the members of the audience were apparently not supposed to wash their hands during this time). Names were taken down, but no questions asked other than one's initial. No information on address, occupation, etc. was required.

16. Speech by Norman Mailer. This was beyond a doubt, the most striking presentation during the Friday morning session. Mailer spoke briefly and left the conference shortly after the speech.

17. Mailer said that political intelligence as a subject was as powerful as "peace". Interest in assassination is obsessive. The obsession arises from the fact that a solution to the problem is not found, and attention is constantly drawn back to the unanswerable question.

18. He said that we have here the most powerful nation in the world which cannot come to grips with a question which seems as amazingly simple as the Kennedy assassination. The result has been that this nation has decided to shut down investigation and has thus alienated itself from its own history. This alienation has brought apathy, a trait noticeable in the reaction to investigations which bring no wide response.

19. A nation which rejects its own history is on the path to a totalitarian regime. Facts, meanwhile, have a peculiar ability to change when they are investigated, and investigators must therefore rely upon hypothesis. The history of the last ten years has been made unendurable by the abundance of hypotheses. They range from the opinion that an assassination is an accident lacking any particular sequence to the hypothesis that secret police forces are engaging in a world conspiracy.

20. The present conference must help us to learn whether there are possibilities, and what possibilities exist, to solve these questions.

21. Speech by Robert P. Smith. Mr. Smith was described as the director of research of the Committee, but he seems to be one of the major motive forces in this organization.

22. Mr. Smith pointed out that he had spent the last three years studying the Kennedy case. Much research had been done, but nothing had changed, so far as practical action was concerned, in the last nine years.

27. Speech by Ronald Van Doren. Mr. Van Doren seems to be a follower of Governor Wallace. He began by commenting on the sad situation in a country with a judiciary where individuals have to make conjectures regarding a case as obvious as that of Bremer. There is no doubt that Bremer pulled the trigger. But one should examine the political situation at the time of his action. Wallace was by far the leading candidate in the election campaign, a threat to other candidates, and he was winning the nomination. He represented a challenge to both parties. Nothing he said could be interpreted as racist, and in the economic sense he carried wide appeal. The question which faced the other candidates was how he could be stopped from disrupting the two parties and from preventing the re-election of the President. History will show how he was stopped and why this occurred.

28. The case in defense of Wallace's civil rights was quietly dropped. No proper investigation was conducted. As usual in assassination cases there was a diary. It showed that Bremer was acting alone and was deranged. Read as a piece of literature, the diary presents Bremer as a non-person, an illiterate unable to spell. There is nothing regarding the people he worked with. Meanwhile, if one examines Bremer's background, he appears an entirely different person. Why did he travel repeatedly to Ottawa? How did he manage to carry guns on planes? What was he doing in New York? Why was he in Washington? And where did he get his funds? The apartment he rented exceeds his annual income. His mother could not afford to visit him in prison, yet he dressed well. With whom was he involved?

29. All this should be looked into. Watergate brought the electoral campaign to the fore. Why has discussion of the Bremer shooting been excluded from the investigation? Bremer was a part of the 1972 campaign, yet there is no mention of Wallace or of Bremer. Two years from now Wallace will be back.

30. Speech by Ms. Meredith Rode. Ms. Rode was very brief. She said she became interested in the killing of George Lincoln Rockwell in 1970, and that the case was built on circumstantial evidence exclusively. The case is still open, for the police believe that there was an accomplice. No funds are available for defense.

23. Although the National Archives are the repository for the Kennedy assassination documents, the FBI and the CIA are responsible for restricting research. Much of the 300 cubic feet of documents have been printed, a reclassification in 1971 has released 3,000 pages, and the CIA later released more, but none of the material released has created any sensation. The Freedom of Information Act is not as liberal on assassination material as on other matters. Some material was not even turned over to the Warren Commission. The FBI and the Justice Department are alone in knowing the results of some tests.

24. In the non-governmental area, much has been published, and the book by Peter Noyes must be singled out particularly.

25. Speech by Mr. Robert Hanson. Mr. Hanson has become the counsel for Sirhan Sirhan. He studied to become an engineer and then shifted to law. (To judge from the number of cases which he says he has lost, he should have remained an engineer instead of becoming an attorney.)

Mr. Hanson said that the Sirhan case is pretty hopeless. The trial was based on a 100 per cent belief in Sirhan's guilt. Therefore important witnesses were not called, and no attention was paid to ballistics. Scientific study, however, indicates that Sirhan Sirhan may not even have been the person who committed the crime. But even if it is proved that his gun did not kill Robert Kennedy, this discovery may have no influence upon Sirhan's case. California officials have no desire to reopen the case and funds to handle the proceedings are lacking. A book by Tiger on the case is worthy of note. Tiger claims that Sirhan Sirhan was acting under hypnotic influence.

26. Speech by James Lesar. Mr. Lesar, who spoke on the Martin Luther King assassination, declared that Ray was innocent, and that the FBI and the Justice Department were responsible for wrongly solving the crime. Ray was framed by conspirators. The persons presently involved in Watergate played a role in the Ray case investigation. No private agency - only a government agency - can solve the Ray case. All depends on whether the judiciary acts honestly or with political consideration in mind. As it stands today, we see Ray's rights having been abominably violated; we see lawyers who did not do their job; and we see nothing approaching an open hearing.

31. There was also a speech by Robert Salzman who was long-winded and technical. No useful coverage available.

32. Copies of materials which were available at the Conference are attached.

A. American Political Assassinations: A Bibliography of Works Published 1963-1970 Related to the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Robert F. Kennedy. Compiled by The Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Washington, D. C., 1973.

B. "Decade of Assassinations -- 1963-1973". Committee to Investigate Assassinations, 1973.

C. "Don't Read This Out Loud!" Intelligence Report. The Committee for Action Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC).

D. Announcement. The announcement states that Senator John Stennis will begin hearings on his Bill to amend the National Security Act, in regard to the clarification of the authority of the CIA.

E. Assassination Tapes by George O'Toole. Published by Penthouse International Ltd., 1973.

F. Computers and Automation (Computers and People), November, 1973, Volume 22, No 11.

ANNOUNCEMENT

Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, will begin hearings early in the New Year on his Bill No. S.2597 -- to amend the National Security Act -- in regard to clarification of the authority of the CIA.

The bill recently introduced by Senator Stennis resulted in part from correspondence with Senator Edmund Muskie, Chairman of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee. To some degree, these hearings were inspired by the Watergate developments.

People with knowledge in the areas which might be fruitful for investigation should be in touch with Senator Stennis' Committee. For further information, contact the Task Force For A Nuclear Test Ban, Betty Lall and Jo Pomerance, Co-Chairmen, care of the Project on Budget Priorities, 1620 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

• PUBLICATIONS

CARIC publishes a bi-weekly INTELLIGENCE REPORT and a uarterly named *COUNTER-SPY* featuring various articles examining the structures and operations of U.S. Intelligence. In addition, CARIC publishes occasional pamphlets on various concepts in the craft of intelligence. CARIC also provides reprints of selected articles on intelligence which have appeared in other publications.

CARIC is preparing a guide to U.S. Intelligence which will serve as a citizen access device to the hidden world of government operations. We hope that any controversy raised by this guide or any other CARIC publication will lead to public debate and resolution of the issues involved. Our analysis is based in a firm belief that no human being should be denied life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness by our government or its agents. CARIC publications aid the public effort to insure the veneration of this concept by those in our government.

• IN-FROM-THE-COLD HEARINGS

CARIC will sponsor In-From-The-Cold Hearings featuring public testimony by individuals intimately involved with U.S. Intelligence. The hearings will focus on American intervention abroad, domestic repression in this country and the effects of secrecy on the individuals' personality. Former intelligence workers and those who have been victimized by the intelligence community will publicly relate their participation in activities of our government which can no longer be ignored by good citizens.



JOIN THE COUNTER-SPY

TEAM

Join with us in our effort to end "illegal, unconstitutional and gross acts" by our government. CARIC is entirely supported by donations from American citizens. Donate and become a sponsoring member of the Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community. Sponsoring members receive our bi-weekly *INTELLIGENCE REPORT* and our quarterly *COUNTER-SPY* as well as additional information on government operations. CARIC actively seeks the advice and viewpoints of all sponsoring members in our activities. Write to CARIC, Box 647, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044, or call (202) 785-8330.

With your support we can prevent the visions of George Orwell in *1984* from becoming an American reality.

STOP THE SPYING

STOP TECHNOFASCISM

CARIC A
Box 647
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044

I wish to sponsor the efforts of CARIC.
Please find enclosed my donation of $______

I wish only to subscribe to the INTELLIGENCE REPORT's and to COUNTER-SPY ($6/individual, $10/organization)

NAME______________________________
ADDRESS___________________________
____
__________________________ZIP______

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Don't Read This Out Loud!

The Committee for Action Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC)

The headlines in American newspapers have for years told of Army surveillance of civilians, U.S. spy planes being shot down over other countries, attempted coups and intrigue initiated by the CIA and unrestrained FBI wiretapping. We all know that Big Brother is watching, but no one in our government has taken the time to explain who is being spied upon, and *why* we are being watched. Too often, we American citizens don't even know who Big Brother *is*.

In 1955, President Eisenhower accepted the report of the Hoover Commission on U.S. Intelligence. Among other recommendations, the Commission emphasized the need for two "watchdog" committees on intelligence within the executive and legislative branches of government. Although a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB) was established to serve the President, Congress by an overwhelming majority has refused to establish a committee within the legislative branch. Now, in the midst of the Watergate scandals, there is some movement within Congress to establish committees on the separate intelligence agencies. The result will be divided oversight with no assurance that Congress will be able to stop illegal and unjustified spying. With Congress abrogating its responsibilities, there is no agency of government, directly responsible to the public, monitoring the United States Intelligence Community.

Now former intelligence workers and concerned citizens have formed a national association to provide the vital information an aware public needs to know about government operations. The Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC) is an independent "watchdog" on the government spy apparatus. CARIC, sponsored entirely by donations from American citizens, serves as an alternative source of analysis and information on the practices, organization and objectives of U.S. Intelligence. What clandestine operations are being carried out in the name of America? Is the CIA preparing to entangle us in another war similar to the Indochina War? What information is going into Federal, State, local and private data banks on innocent American citizens? Is the FBI becoming a "secret police force?" Whose phones are tapped in America? These are some of the questions CARIC is answering.

CARIC knows that all conscientious Americans are closely watching the events that have unfolded since the arrests made at the Watergate building. We share the hope of most Americans that the illegal espionage practices that have now been exposed will no longer be a part of American political life. However, the dismantling of one espionage network loyal to one group of politicians does not insure that this abuse of power will not be repeated by future politicians.

Who knows what future political espionage will occur under the guise of so-called "national security" or loyalty to an administration? Only time will tell, but through diligence and your help CARIC will anticipate and bring to your attention situations within the government that are likely to produce a new "Watergate."

Although CARIC does believe that a massive government spy apparatus is at work in the world, we hope to dispel some of the paranoia citizens naturally feel when there is talk of spies and wiretaps. We know that the FBI does not have agents behind every tree, but there are agents in every major community in this country who have spied on innocent private and public citizens. Only a full and undisguised look into this hidden world can displace unwarranted fears, and guide the public effort to end this illegal and unjustified espionage. ***The secrecy with which the government surrounds itself must end.***

CARIC knows that tens of thousands of American citizens from all walks of life were mobilized over the past decade to help bring an end to the government's war in Indochina – a war that has taken new forms under the direction of U.S. Intelligence agencies. CARIC hopes that these same concerned citizens will continue to oppose the policies of our government which bring this new form of *covert war* and the Watergate scandals. It is now time for thousands of Americans to mobilize to stop the spying as we stopped the dying. ***Please join us in our effort.***

THE COMMITTEE FOR ACTION/RESEARCH ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (CARIC)

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

• CARIC ORGANIZATION

CARIC is organized to reflect the operating procedures of a typical intelligence organization. Our research process involves collecting information from a wide variety of sources both public and private. Our analysis is the collective product of CARIC participants and eliminates any compartmentalization of knowledge. The information and our analysis is then disseminated through CARIC publications and separate works by CARIC participants. In addition, CARIC provides information to other journalists and qualified researchers.

• INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTATION CENTER (IDC)

CARIC is continuously collecting information on intelligence from a variety of sources including official government publications and documents, previous investigations, public accounts and interviews conducted with hundreds of former intelligence and police agents. The information forms the data-base of the Intelligence Documentation Center maintained by CARIC. The IDC is a library of information on U.S. Intelligence available upon request to journalists, qualified researchers and members of CARIC.

• SPEAKERS BUREAU AND WORKSHOPS

CARIC maintains a listing of members available to speak before groups on a variety of subjects ranging from the foreign intelligence programs of our government to the problems of criminal justice in this country. Our speakers include former intelligence workers, police agents and informers and others familiar with American intelligence.

CARIC will periodically conduct workshops for church, labor, school or community organizations. Workshop topics include:

- OPERATION PHOENIX – CIA assassination in Vietnam
- SALEM HOUSE – Preparation for the coup in Cambodia
- The CIA in Laos
- OPERATION BOULDER – An introduction to the next American war
- Right-wing terrorism in America
- Federal Planning for civil disturbances: Riots and demonstrations
- The Internal Security apparatus and Watergate

• MULTI-MEDIA BRIEFING

CARIC will soon augment our workshops with a multi-media briefing on U.S. intelligence featuring films, video tapes, displays and recorded interviews. The exhibit will dramatically illustrate Intelligence as practiced by our government. Our hope is to creat a super-conscious realization by our audience of the concepts presented in the display.

The first element of the multi-media briefing is a slide show tracing the growth of the internal security apparatus of our government and demonstrating how this apparatus influenced the Watergate scandals. The slide show terminates with suggestions for limiting future growth of the internal security apparatus.

13-00000

November, 1973

Vol. 22, No. 11

UNTIL DECEMBER 31, 1973

computers and automation

STARTING JANUARY 1, 1974

computers and people

WORKING TOGETHER

Cooperative Facilities to Obtain the Advantages of Computers — *M. J. Cerullo*
Control in Time-Sharing Systems — *F. C. Castillo*
Computer Art: The Search Beyond Manipulation — *G. C. Hertlein*
Computers in Science Fiction — *M. Ascher*
Strategy and Action on World Trade — *J. H. Binger*
Virtue, in Spite of Erroneous Conceptions — *J. P. Frankel*
Nixon and the Mafia — Conclusion — *J. Gerth*

Here is the start of the most famous article that we ever published — excerpted from the May, 1970, issue of *Computers and Automation.* If you would like to read this article, and look at the eleven photographs it contains, send us $2 (prepayment is necessary). This issue is RETURNABLE IN 7 DAYS FOR FULL REFUND (IF IN SALABLE CONDITION). How can you lose?

Computers and Automation, 815 Washington St., Newtonville, Mass. 02160

THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE APPLICATION OF COMPUTERS TO THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

by
Richard E. Sprague
Hartsdale, New York

Part 1. Introduction

Who Assassinated President Kennedy?

On November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, President John F. Kennedy, while riding in an open limousine through Dealey Plaza and waving to the surrounding crowds, was shot to death. Lee Harvey Oswald, an ex-Marine, and former visitor to the Soviet Union, was arrested that afternoon in a movie theatre in another section of Dallas; that night he was charged with shooting President Kennedy from the sixth floor easternmost window of the Texas School Book Depository Building overlooking Dealey Plaza. This act Oswald denied steadily through two days of questioning (no record of questions and answers was ever preserved). Two days later while Oswald was being transferred from one jail to another, he was shot by Jack Ruby, a Dallas night-club owner, in the basement of the Dallas police station, while millions of Americans watched on television. The commission of investigation, appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, and headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren of the U. S. Supreme Court, published its report in September 1964, and concluded that Oswald was the sole assassin and that there was no conspiracy.

In view of the authority of the Warren Commission, that conclusion was accepted by many Americans for a long time. But the conclusion cannot be considered true by any person who carefully considers the crucial evidence — such as the physics of the shooting, the timing of a number of events, and other important and undeniable facts. In other words, Oswald was not the sole assassin, and there was a conspiracy.

This article will develop that thesis, prove it to be true on the basis of substantial, conclusive evidence, and in particular some analysis of the photographic evidence.

There was in fact a conspiracy. Oswald played a role in the conspiracy, although there is conclusive evidence that on November 22, 1963, he did no shooting at President Kennedy, and that, just as he claimed when he was in the Dallas jail, he was a "patsy." At least three gunmen (and probably four) — none of whom were in the sixth floor easternmost window of the Texas School Book Depository building where the Warren Commission placed Oswald — fired a total of six shots at President Kennedy.

One of these shots missed entirely; one hit Governor John B. Connally, Jr. of Texas, riding with Kennedy; and four hit President Kennedy, one in his throat, one in his back, and two in his head. (The bulk of the undeniable evidence for these statements about the shots consists of: (a) the physics of the motions of Kennedy and Connally shown in some 60 frames of the famous film by Abraham Zapruder; (b) the locations of the injuries in Kennedy and in Connally; and (c) more than 100 pictures, consisting of more than 30 still photographs and more than 70 frames of movies.)

More than 50 persons were involved in the conspiracy at the time of firing the shots. These persons included members of the Dallas police force (but not all of the Dallas police — and that ac-

(continued in the May 1970 issue of Computers and Automation)

Contents

Page

Parts

1 Introduction 30
2 The Photographic Evidence 34
3 The Application of Computers to the Photographic Evidence 56
4 Appendices:
Acknowledgements and Notices 58
Epilogue 59
Bibliography 60

Figures

1 Helicopter View of Dealey Plaza 37
2 Policemen and "Tramps" 38
3 "Tramps" 39
4 Policemen and "Tramps" 40
5 Policemen and "Tramps" 41
6, 7 6th Floor Easternmost Window of the Texas School Book Depository Building 42
8, 9 Kennedy About the Time of the First Shot 43
10 Kennedy After the First Three Shots and Before the Fatal Shot 44, 45
11 The Radio Communicator 33

Charts

1 Spatial Chart 48, 49
2 Schematic Timing Chart 51

Tables

1 Index to Spatial Chart 46
2 Photographs Acquired by FBI and Unavailable 50
3 Main List of Photographs 52
4 Preliminary List of Computer Codes 57
5 Preliminary Coding Sheet for Computer-Assisted Analysis 58

THE PURSUIT OF IMPORTANT TRUTH

The magazine *Computers and Automation* has for more than three years followed an unusual publication policy:

- The pursuit of truth in input, output, and processing, for the benefit of people,

and an unusual belief:

- That computers are too important to be left to computer experts and must be integrated into a socially responsible profession of information engineering.

Where this policy has operated most is in publishing information, articles, and reports on subjects which a great many liberal and progressive newspapers and periodicals have left unexplored or unmentioned:

- The political conspiracies which have led to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and others – and their coverups
- The conspiracies, coverups, and lies in connection with the pursuit of war in Indochina and dictatorship by the Saigon regime
- The connections of President Richard M. Nixon with organized crime and the Mafia
- The Watergate crimes

If you believe in the value of truthful, frank reporting on the most important topics for the welfare of the people of the United States today, we urge you to subscribe to our magazine, and buy our back copies (almost every one is in print). Please help us pursue the important truth and report on it, by buying our products.

Edmund C. Berkeley

Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor

Unsettling, Disturbing, Critical . . .

Computers and Automation, established 1951 and therefore the oldest magazine in the field of computers and data processing, believes that the profession of information engineer includes not only competence in handling information using computers and other means, but also a broad responsibility, in a professional and engineering sense, for:

- The reliability and social significance of pertinent input data;
- The social value and truth of the output results.

In the same way, a bridge engineer takes a professional responsibility for the reliability and significance of the data he uses, and the safety and efficiency of the bridge he builds, for human beings to risk their lives on.

Accordingly, Computers and Automation publishes from time to time articles and other information related to socially useful input and output of data systems in a broad sense. To this end we seek to publish what is unsettling, disturbing, critical — but productive of thought and an improved and safer "house" for all humanity, an earth in which our children and later generations may have a future, instead of facing extinction.

The professional information engineer needs to relate his engineering to the most important and most serious problems in the world today: war, nuclear weapons, pollution, the population explosion, and many more.

– (may be copied on any piece of paper) –

TO: *Computers and Automation (Computers and People,* starting January 1, 1974)
815 Washington St., Newtonville, Mass. 02160, U.S.A.

( ) YES, please start my subscription to your magazine –

( ) Without the "Computer Directory": I enclose ( ) U.S.A., $11.50 ( ) Canada, $12.50 ( ) Foreign, $17.50
( ) With the "Computer Directory": I enclose ( ) U.S.A., $23.50 ( ) Canada, $24.50 ( ) Foreign, $32.50

( ) Please bill my organization.

( ) Please send me information about the important articles in back copies (usual cost, $2 each)

Name: ______________________________ Title ______________

Organization: ______________________________

Address: ______________________________

____

Signature: ______________________ Purchase Order No. ______________

UNTIL DECEMBER 31, 1973

computers and automation

STARTING JANUARY 1, 1974

computers and people

Vol. 22, No. 11
November, 1973

Editor **Edmund C. Berkeley**

Assistant Editors **Barbara L. Chaffee**
Linda Ladd Lovett
Neil D. Macdonald

Software Editor **Stewart B. Nelson**

Advertising Director **Edmund C. Berkeley**

Contributing Editors **John Bennett**
Moses M. Berlin
Andrew D. Booth
John W. Carr III
Ned Chapin
Leslie Mezei
Bernhard W. Romberg
Ted Schoeters
Richard E. Sprague

Advisory Committee **Ed Burnett**
James J. Cryan
Bernard Quint

Editorial Offices
Berkeley Enterprises, Inc.
815 Washington St.
Newtonville, Mass. 02160
617-332-5453

Advertising Contact
The Publisher
Berkeley Enterprises, Inc.
815 Washington St.
Newtonville, Mass. 02160
617-332-5453

"Computers and Automation" is published monthly, 12 issues per year, at 815 Washington St., Newtonville, Mass. 02160, by Berkeley Enterprises, Inc. Printed in U.S.A. Second Class Postage paid at Boston, Mass., and additional mailing points.

Subscription rates: United States, $11.50 for one year, $22.00 for two years. Canada: add $1 a year; foreign, add $6 a year.

NOTE: The above rates do not include our publication "The Computer Directory and Buyers' Guide". If you elect to receive "The Computer Directory and Buyers' Guide", please add $12.00 per year to your subscription rate in U.S. and Canada, and $15.00 per year elsewhere.

Please address all mail to: Berkeley Enterprises, Inc., 815 Washington St., Newtonville, Mass. 02160.

Postmaster: Please send all forms 3579 to Berkeley Enterprises, Inc., 815 Washington St., Newtonville, Mass. 02160.

© Copyright 1973, by Berkeley Enterprises, Inc.

Change of address: If your address changes, please send us both your new address and your old address (as it appears on the magazine address imprint), and allow three weeks for the change to be

The Computer Industry

8 Cooperative Facilities to Obtain the Advantages of Computers [T A]
by Michael J. Cerullo, State University of New York, Albany, N.Y.
How to plan, before operations begin, a cooperative service bureau that will provide its sponsors with all the advantages of electronic data processing, plus the advantages of greatly reduced expenses.

10 Control in Time-Sharing Systems [T A]
by Fermin Caro del Castillo, Fort Worth, Texas
How time-shared computer systems should be controlled, made secure, and protected against incursions and hazards.

14 Alienation and the Systems Analyst [T A]
by Alan E. Brill, The Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, N.Y.
How systems analysts are often looked upon as in a "computer department" and outside of the firm – and what might be done to correct this practice.

Computers and Art

18 Computer Art: The Search Beyond Manipulation [T A]
by Grace C. Hertlein, California State University-Chico, Chico, Calif.
How computer art is ranging through variation in patterns, variations in design, and varying philosophies of art – and where it may go.

Computers and the Future

20 Computers in Science Fiction – II [NT A]
by Marcia Ascher, Professor of Mathematics, Ithaca College, Ithaca, N.Y.
A survey of some two dozen themes of importance in the real world that are reflected in science fiction when astute writers explore the significance of computers to human beings.

6 The Understanding of Natural Language by Computers [NT E]
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
Some rather convincing evidence suggests that before long some large areas of ordinary natural language will be understood by computers.

World Affairs and Social Policy

15 Strategy and Action on World Trade [NT A]
by James H. Binger, Chairman, Honeywell Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.
Why it is important for the well-being of the people of the United States to aid the international division of labor and production: – a discussion by the head of a

The magazine of the design, applications, and implications of information processing systems – and the pursuit of truth in input, output, and processing, for the benefit of people.

World Affairs and Social Policy (continued)

33 Virtue, in Spite of Erroneous Conceptions [NT A]
by J. P. Frankel, Dean of the Faculty, Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, Calif.
Which projects and problems should scientists work on? and which projects and problems should receive support by the government and which from other sources?

The Profession of Information Engineer and the Pursuit of Truth

3 Unsettling, Disturbing, Critical [NT F]
Statement of policy by *Computers and Automation*

3 The Pursuit of Important Truth [NT F]
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor
Four kinds of truth that are regularly unexplored and unmentioned.

36 Nixon and the Mafia – Conclusion [NT A]
by Jeff Gerth, *SunDance Magazine,* San Francisco, Calif.
The many connections of President Richard M. Nixon with organized crime, scandal, etc.

26 Burying Facts and Rewriting History – II [NT A]
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
Taken together the information published May 1970 to November 1973 in *Computers and Automation* effectively destroys a large segment of the beliefs, the rewritten history, that the establishment in the United States has arranged for the people in the United States to believe.

28 Political Assassinations in the United States [NT R]
Inventory of 41 articles published in *Computers and Automation* May 1970 to October 1973 on the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, Reverend Martin Luther King, and other politically important persons in the United States: titles, authors, and summaries.

27 The Watergate Crimes [NT R]
Inventory of 12 articles published in *Computers and Automation* August 1972 to September 1973 on the burglarizing of the Democratic National Committee offices in the Watergate Building, Washington, D.C., June 17, 1972, and the ramifications: titles, authors, and summaries.

Computers, Puzzles, and Games

35 Numbles [T C]
by Neil Macdonald

Corrections

For changes in "The Path to Championship Chess by Computer" by Professor Donald Michie published in the January 1973 issue of *Computers and Automation,* see page 23 of this issue, or page 24 of the July issue.

For changes in the reprinting and the indexing of "Communication – Three Way: Chimpanzee, Man, Computer" published in the July issue.

Front Cover Picture

Three eighth graders - each from a different continent - are working together to solve complex mathematics problems. They are at the new United Nations International School, and are Laurence Ling May, a Chinese-Thai American; Catharina Nilson of Stockholm, Sweden; and Arun Alagappan of India. The minicomputer system is a gift from Digital Equipment Corp. For more information, see page 43 of the July 1973 issue.

Departments

42 Across the Editor's Desk – Computing and Data Processing Newsletter
50 Advertising Index
50 Calendar of Coming Events
32 Classified Advertisement
48 Monthly Computer Census
46 New Contracts
47 New Installations
23 Statement of Ownership

Key

[A] – Article
[C] – Monthly Column
[E] – Editorial
[F] – Forum
[NT] – Not Technical
[R] – Reference
[T] – Technical

NOTICE

*D ON YOUR ADDRESS IMPRINT MEANS THAT YOUR SUBSCRIPTION INCLUDES THE COMPUTER DIRECTORY. *N MEANS THAT YOUR PRESENT SUBSCRIPTION DOES NOT INCLUDE THE COMPUTER DIRECTORY.

EDITORIAL

The Understanding of Natural Language by Computers

Proposition: Computers are making long strides towards understanding natural language as used by human beings, and will eventually understand such language as well as many human beings do.

What do we mean by: computers? understanding language? natural language? And what is the evidence for this proposition?

The word "computers" here refers to powerful computers that have appropriate programs written by human beings plus the programmed capacity to improve their programs by using experience. An example of such improvement is Dr. A. L. Samuels' famous checker-playing program, which can learn from experience, and which plays far better checkers than Dr. Samuels himself can play.

The experience may consist of the following at least:

Answers from human beings to questions posed by the computer;

Differences between computed results and *a priori* specified results;

Signals from the environment, such as instrument readings;

Information obtained by "looks" at the environment, as for example recognition of the character A, as in optical character recognition;

The interpretation of words, as with FORTRAN expressions.

Probably there are even more categories of experience which a powerful computer program can use to modify itself to become even a better program.

In regard to "understanding language", there are over 500 languages which computers have been programmed to understand, when written precisely according to stated rules: among them, BASIC, FORTRAN, COBOL, many kinds of machine language, etc.

"Natural language" is the ordinary language used by human beings, subject to the requirement that for a computer implicit understandings must be stated. For example, when a speaker exclaims "Ouch!", a great deal of the meaning comes from the listener's observations of the speaker. But a computer, like a blind man, cannot "see" the situation, and must be told more than the ordinary listener.

With some definitions taken care of, let us consider evidence for the main proposition stated above. This evidence includes the information published in several recent articles in *Computers and Automation.*

The article "'Do What I Mean' – The Programmer's Assistant", by Warren Teitelman, in the April 1972 issue, described a "programmer's assistant", called "DWIM"; this was a "front end" or preprocessor to an interactive program for operating with LISP expressions. The front end was tolerant of the programmer's mistakes in typing, in low-mistake occurred, it would inquire of the human programmer what he meant, suggesting the correctly spelled alternative, and so on. In this way the human programmer was relieved of much of the burden of expressing himself exactly and correctly the first time, and his efficiency in using the LISP interactive program greatly increased.

The three articles "Computer Programming Using Natural Language" by Edmund C. Berkeley, Andy Langer, and Casper Otten, in the June, July, and August 1973 issues, demonstrated the understanding by a computer program called GENIE of at least some sets of instructions in ordinary natural language. The vocabulary though small was free, and there was unlimited freedom in putting the words together, with about a 90% chance of complete understanding. The computer program that did this could be called 15% GENIE, because, as the authors emphasized, it was still in an early stage of development.

The article "Latest Computers See, Hear, Speak, and Sing – and May Outthink Man" by David Brand, in the October 1973 issue, enumerated many instances of computers (and robots equipped with computers) which could deal with concepts expressed in natural language. One of the programs mentioned could for example decipher natural language commands dealing with the stacking of blocks of various shapes, sizes, and colors.

The main tasks for understanding natural language appear to be the following:

Recognition of the framework of a sentence;

Recognition of the common meaning of groups of synonyms, the collection of words that "say the same thing";

Knowledge of context: the context is regularly specified to the computer, so that it does not have to deduce the context from "what is being said";

Knowledge of a limited vocabulary consisting of perhaps 300 to 500 words – knowledge in the sense that the computer program can attach meaning to the words either by themselves or in phrases, as for example it may attach the meaning of doing something three times to the numeral 3;

Capacity to accept variation in the way something is stated by a human programmer.

The three articles referred to above show instances of the achievement of all of these tasks separately. Combining all the achievements should not be too hard, especially since children as young as four years old show complete capacities to listen to many kinds of natural language, understand, and respond.

Edmund C. Berkeley

The Notebook on
COMMON SENSE, ELEMENTARY AND ADVANCED

is devoted to development, exposition, and illustration of what may be the most important of all fields of knowledge:

WHAT IS GENERALLY TRUE AND IMPORTANT =

COMMON SENSE + WISDOM + JUDGEMENT AND MATURITY + SCIENCE IN GENERAL + TECHNIQUES FOR SOLVING PROBLEMS + TECHNIQUES FOR AVOIDING MISTAKES + SOME PARTS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH + SOME PARTS OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS + AVOIDANCE OF LOGICAL FALLACIES + ...

PURPOSES:

- to help you avoid pitfalls
- to prevent mistakes before they happen
- to display new paths around old obstacles
- to point out new solutions to old problems
- to stimulate your resourcefulness
- to increase your accomplishments
- to improve your capacities
- to help you solve problems
- to give you more tools to think with
- . . . . .

8 REASONS TO BE INTERESTED IN THE FIELD OF COMMON SENSE, WISDOM, AND GENERAL SCIENCE

COMPUTERS are important –
But the computer field is over 25 years old. Here is a new field where you can get in on the ground floor to make your mark.

MATHEMATICS is important –
But this field is more important than mathematics, because common sense, wisdom, and general science have more applications.

WISDOM is important –
This field can be reasonably called "the engineering of wisdom".

COMMON SENSE is important –
This field includes the systematic study and development of common sense.

SCIENCE is important –
This field includes what is common to all the sciences, what is generally true and important in the sciences.

MISTAKES are costly and to be AVOIDED –
This field includes the systematic study of the prevention of mistakes.

MONEY is important –
The systematic prevention of mistakes in your organization might save 10 to 20% of its expenses per year.

OPPORTUNITY is important –
If you enter or renew your subscription to both *Computers and Automation* and the *Notebook on Common Sense* at the same time, direct to us, – you may take off $2.00 per year from the total cost.

Topic:
THE SYSTEMATIC PREVENTION OF MISTAKES

Already Published

Preventing Mistakes from:
- Failure to Understand
- Forgetting
- Unforeseen Hazards
- Placidity

To Come

Preventing Mistakes from:
- Bias
- Camouflage
- Interpretation
- Distraction
- Gullibility
- Failure to Observe
- Failure to Inspect
- Prejudice
- . . . .

Topic:
SYSTEMATIC EXAMINATION OF GENERAL CONCEPTS

Already Published

The Concept of:
- Expert
- Rationalizing
- Feedback
- Model
- Black Box
- Evolution
- Niche

To Come
- Strategy
- Understanding
- Teachable Moment
- Indeterminacy
- System
- Operational Definition
- . . . .

.... (may be copied on any piece of paper) ....

To: Computers and Automation
815 Washington St., Newtonville, Mass. 02160

( ) Yes, please enter my subscription to *The Notebook on Common Sense, Elementary and Advanced* at $12 a year (24 issues), plus extras. I understand that you always begin at the beginning and so I shall not miss any issues.

( ) Please send me as free premiums for subscribing:
1. Right Answers – A Short Guide to Obtaining Them
2. The Empty Column
3. The Golden Trumpets of Yap Yap
4. Strategy in Chess
5. The Barrels and the Elephant
6. The Argument of the Beard

( ) I enclose $________ ( ) Please bill my organization

RETURNABLE IN 7 DAYS FOR FULL REFUND IF NOT SATISFACTORY
HOW CAN YOU LOSE?

Name________________________ Title________________

Organization____

Address (including zip)______________________________

Signature____________________ Purchase Order No.________

Cooperative Facilities to Obtain the Advantages of Computers

Michael J. Cerullo
Asst. Professor of Accounting
State Univ. of New York at Albany
1400 Washington Ave.
Albany, N.Y. 12222

> *"Because of general dissatisfaction, 30% of the surveyed service bureau clients planned to discontinue using service bureaus."*

Computer Use

A recent study of 2,500 companies conducted by the Research Institute of America, revealed that 55% of the firms regularly use computers in conducting their business. Further breakdown of the study shows that an average of 32% own or lease their own computers, and 23% use an outside service bureau for processing data.[1]

While a majority of the companies surveyed do use computers in some form, a significant 45% of the respondents do not use any type of computerized data processing service. Those companies cited the following reasons for not using computers:[2]

	Per Cent
Operation too small	50
Too costly	35
Looked into and tabled for the present	31
Present methods satisfactory	21
Plan to install a computer within a year	8
Plan to begin using a service bureau within a year	8
Other	13
Total (multiple answers)	166%

Service Bureau Use

In addition to the non-users, another recent study revealed that most service bureau clients are not effectively using their service bureau and, as a result, are receiving few, if any, of the advantages of electronic data processing (EDP). Most of the surveyed service bureau clients were:[3]

1. Receiving routine services which do not save them money.
2. Not planning to expand into more sophisticated, higher-payoff applications.
3. Not receiving indirect benefits and savings, such as improved information for decision making.
4. Not satisfied with current services.

The study also disclosed that because of the general dissatisfaction, 30% of the surveyed service bureau clients planned to discontinue using service bureaus and purchase in-house computers.[4]

Cooperative Service Bureaus

Both non-users and dissatisfied service bureau clients, therefore, offer a ready market for a newer approach to obtaining the advantages of EDP — the formation of a cooperative service bureau. A cooperative service bureau consists of several sponsoring firms who jointly own a computer and share in its operating costs at a much lower expense than individual ownership of a computer. If carefully planned before operations begin, a cooperative service bureau will provide its sponsors with all the advantages of EDP plus many other advantages unique to jointly-shared facilities and personnel.

Among these additional advantages are:

1. The sponsors would purchase a computer tailored to their specific needs.
2. They would have exclusive use of the computer.
3. Their computer would be available for use at any time.
4. They could share the costs of any computer programs developed.
5. They could share the costs of any package or canned computer programs purchased.
6. They would have available for their exclusive use a staff of data processing experts and a computer — at a fraction of the cost of individual ownership.

Factors Insuring the Success of the Cooperative

The first step in forming a successful cooperative service bureau is to enroll an appropriate number of comapnies. Ideally the cooperative should be limited to five or six sponsoring firms. A larger number may create unmanageable problems involving operations, communications, control, scheduling of computer time, and so forth. A smaller number may make the venture economically unfeasible.

Lack of Interest

At the present time, widespread lack of interest in joining a cooperative is more of a problem to potential organizers than too much demand. The author contacted a number of public accounting firms about the feasibility of forming cooperatives and found that three firms who had already made such an attempt could not interest enough firms to join. Their comments were:

— We tried to organize one several years ago; the firms contacted were not interested.

— We would like to explore this possibility but we can't get anyone else interested.

— At present there appears to be a tragic lack of interest locally by other CPA firms.

Unquestionably, one reason for the lack of interest is a misunderstanding of the true nature of a cooperative. Interested companies must therefore be prepared to sell the idea to others. As more published material becomes available in the field, this problem should be alleviated.

Confidential Information

A second major reason for lack of interest is that companies fear for the control and security of their confidential or sensitive information. Such a concern is certainly legitimate and underscores the need for a cooperative that is to be successful, to devise an adequate system for quality control and security. A committee responsible for such a system should be established at the outset by the sponsoring firms.

Protection

One of its duties should be to adequately safeguard the sponsors' records and documents against fire, theft, water, and other hazards and disasters. Statistics compiled by the Safe Manufacturers National Association show that about one-half of companies whose important records and documents were destroyed through some catastrophe never resumed business or were permanently closed down within six months; an additional 13% suffered serious economic impairment and were able to remain in business only under severe operating handicaps.[5] For this reason the quality control and security committee must see that the cooperative service bureau maintains:

protective devices
fireproof vaults
a method of reconstructing any destroyed records
adequate insurance to cover loss of important client records or documents

The committee must also take measures to prevent one client's records from becoming commingled with another client's records — a not-unlikely occurrence in such an environment.

Preventing Disclosure

Finally, the committee should determine how to prevent disclosure of confidential information. For example, no member of any sponsoring company should be allowed in certain strategic parts of the computer center. Likewise, each company's records should be coded and the code number known only to key computer center personnel. In cases requiring utmost security, the actual processing of data should be monitored by a key employee of the computer center or possibly by a representative of a disinterested third party, such as a firm of independent public accountants.

Sharing of Expenses: Startup Costs

With an adequate number of sponsoring firms lined up and a sound security system worked out, the third necessity in establishing a successful cooperative is to determine methods of sharing the expenses. There are two categories of costs to consider:

1. Startup costs. These include all costs incurred prior to the time that the cooperative commences operations. Startup costs are either directly traceable to a particular firm or are joint or common to all firms. An example of a direct cost would be that of analyzing, modifying, and redesigning of systems prior to conversion to the computer. An example of a joint or common cost would be the cost of computer housing, including air conditioning, engineering supervision, false floors, ducts and pipes, tranformers or motor generators, cabling and wiring, and overhead racks and supports.

Each sponsoring firm should pay for its own direct costs. Joint costs should be shared equally or apportioned among the firms according to some equitable formula.

Operating Costs

2. Operating costs. These include the monthly hardware and software costs to operate the cooperative. Hardware costs refer to the periodic rental or purchase charge for the computer equipment. As a minimum the computer equipment consists of an input unit, a central processing unit, and an output unit. Software costs include personnel costs, programming costs, testing and debugging costs, magnetic tapes, disc packs, punched cards, paper, paper tapes, repair parts, power, telecommunication lines, and so on.

Operating costs that are directly traceable should be paid by the using firm. Joint or common costs can be shared equally or can be allocated to each firm based on the number of transactions processed or the actual computer processing time used during the period. In addition, if so desired, a sponsor could be required to pay a minimum or maximum monthly charge.

Management

Fourthly, the sponsoring companies should decide how to manage the venture. It is advisable to form a committee to oversee the management and operation of the cooperative. A decision must be made whether each member regardless of size should have one vote or whether another basis of voting should be used. This decision should assure participants that no one firm will dominate or control the cooperative.

Common Line of Business

A factor not to be overlooked when forming a cooperative, one which will avoid frustrations, complications, and extra expenses, is to see that each member is in the same industry or business category. Thus all sponsoring firms will have similar operating problems that can be simultaneously solved by the computer personnel, resulting in the allocation of smaller costs to each firm for each problem solved. Also computer programs developed or packaged programs purchased can be shared by all sponsors with minimum modifications, thus resulting in considerable programming cost savings.

(please turn to page 13)

Control in Time-Sharing Systems

Fermin Caro del Castillo
6043 Westridge Lane
Fort Worth, Texas 76116

> *"A time-sharing installation (like every computer environment) is exposed to the seven major dangers: fire, water, theft, fraud, sabotage, equipment malfunctions, and human errors."*

Introduction

This article has as its main objective to furnish and define some methods and provisions for control and security in a computer time-sharing environment.

It is evident that computer time-sharing has become very popular during recent years. More and more confidential information is being handled by these systems, creating an urgent need for strong measures of control and security.

Description of the System

The service provided by a single computer to many telecommunications terminals has been called "computer time-sharing". With this type of service each user shares simultaneously in the processing capabilities of the central processor. This new computer facility makes this service available to small companies and/or other users who have little need for their own computer.

Computing services that may go under the heading of time-sharing include:

> Commercial computing; text editing; databank information retrieval services; application services such as colleges' records, inventory control, payrolls of small companies, and account receivables; administrative messages; switching and collection services; and more.

Among the great number of time-sharing users are hospitals (Welch Hospital, one of the biggest in Europe, has acquired the large ICL 1904S computer with 7020 terminals), banks (Gosbank, the national bank of the USSR, has ordered two large-scale Honeywell series 600 with 100 terminals), schools and colleges (British schools and colleges have started using terminals), airlines (Continental Airlines uses the Sonic 360 reservation system with 550 on-line terminals).

Trends

The growth in computer time-sharing has been phenomenal in recent years in spite of a short business recession between 1970 and 1972. Time sharing was a broker's dream in the '60s; many companies realized its potential, entered the market, and failed because of: one, strong competitive pressure, and two, because of the countless thefts and violations suffered. The highly competitive situation benefited the user in regard to pricing, but the offsetting consequence of lower profits caused a high casualty rate among these companies. As a result, the number of time-sharing firms dropped from 150 to 50 between 1969 and 1972.

A few of the companies which survived and which account for most of today's time-sharing business are Rapidata Corporation, Teletype Corporation (a subsidiary of AT&T), Tymeshare Incorporated (the largest independent firm and second only in size to IBM and Honeywell time-sharing operations), and IBM

Jerry Dreyer, executive president of ADAPSO, an association of data processing service organizations estimates that one time-sharing company out of three was profitable in 1971, two out of five in 1972, and probably three out of six in 1973. Nowadays, this computer facility is coming back to its original trend, and it is expected that the number of computers with terminals will grow from 32% at the end of 1971 to 45% at the end of 1975, with the average central processing unit driving 15 to 20 terminals.

One consultant, Creative Strategies of Palo Alto, California, predicts that time-sharing sales by 1976 will increase to 2 billion from 331 million last year. By 1975, says ADAPSO's Dreyer, time-sharing will account for 1/3 of the $4.5 billion computer services industry.

Technological Advances

Most important technological advances have been achieved recently on on-line terminals linked to central processors. Some of the improvements made include solid state keyboards, which have greater reliability and lower cost; visual display methods, which incorporate more capacity, economy, and aesthetic appeal; non-impact printing techniques, which provide faster, quieter and more reliable operations; improved lower cost memories; more powerful logic capability; and faster and more accurate modern techniques and improvements in central processor software.

This is only the beginning. It is foreseen that in the future the equipment itself will change in nature and will probably not be recognizable as terminals per se. Rather, terminals will be modular systems consisting of the required input/output functions for specific jobs, built around basic controller and communication interfaces; in many instances, terminals will become special purpose devices.

Hazards

A time-sharing installation, like every computer environment, is exposed to the seven major dangers of fire, water, theft, fraud, sabotage, EDP equipment malfunctions, and human errors. Fire is considered to be the greatest threat to magnetic tapes. Water does not constitute an important hazard to magnetic tapes, but it does to computer installations. Theft, fraud, sabotage, EDP equipment malfunctions, and human errors are considered the most common dangers.

On-line terminals connected to central processors from remote points are more exposed to violations and thefts. The increasing popularity of time-sharing systems among large corporations and service bureaus has given rise to even more potential security breaches. Data transmitted over a communication line could be subject to wire tapping and a number of other hazards such as piggyback entry, whereby the intruder intercepts and compromises communication between a terminal and the processor while a legitimate user is inactive but still holding the line open. The intruder can even cancel the user's sign-off signal and continue operating in his name. A knowledgeable person could enter program changes from a terminal and play havoc with the system.

Need for Protection

Due to the increasing popularity of computing services, the issue of control and security protection has become more important. It is evident that time-sharing systems present few obstacles to unauthorized parties. The security problem has been made much more critical by the growing number of people trained in computers and by the fading of the computer mystique. In addition, communication by means of time-sharing systems has no more protection than telephone conversations or Morse-coded methods, since the technological skills necessary to interpret computerized data are widespread. More and more companies are appointing security monitors from their EDP staffs to centralize security matters. Trade organizations such as the American Management Association and the Bank Administration Institute, computer firms, and research firms such as Advancement Management Research, Inc. find their seminars on computer security overcrowded by data processing managers and security officers from business and government.

Target of Attacks

Computers have become an important source of information and, as a result, the target of many attacks. Some of the general information targets for industrial espionage are sales and service information, market analysis strategies, bid prices, corporate finance, stockholder information, legal negotiations, planned policy changes, expansion plans, product developments, personnel changes, payroll data, general administrative matters; and the list could be expanded even more.

Threats

The case of an 18 year-old Cincinnati youth who used long distance telephone to tap the lines of a time-sharing system firm in Louisville, Kentucky, and extracted data from its ledgers, as well as records of its customers, is representative of the type of risk to which computer installations are exposed.

Accidents can have serious consequences such as the incident in which income tax return records for [illegible] were erased by energy emitted from the radar of a nearby airport in Austin, Texas.

Safeguards

It is important to consider that too much control and too many security safeguards can become bothersome and costly. The measures to protect data from unauthorized access vary from one system to another. According to Richard F. Cross, Security Office for the Bank of New York, security systems should include each of the following segments: physical security; personnel security; procedural security; audit control; insurance; and any needed interfacing.

The quality and level of protection required depends on the sensitivity of the data handled. Nevertheless, control and security in a time-sharing environment should encompass the whole system, since it is well known that even the strongest control measures can be violated at the weakest point. These measures should be taken in the central processing unit, software, personnel, communication lines, the terminal, and its users.

Methods and Provisions — Central Processing Unit

The central processor is threatened mostly by sabotage, fire, water, theft, EDP equipment malfunctions, human accidental errors and environmental problems.

The computer center of any company is the heart of the organization, and protection of the equipment against these threats can be provided by a carefully planned computer room. Luis Scoma, President of Data Processing Security, Inc., recommends that the computer center be located out of the main traffic areas. It must be fireproof, dustfree, and waterproof and provided with temperature and humidity control and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers. Water lines should not run through the computer room. A separate, fireproof storage area should be provided for data files, documentation, and operating supplies. It should also have alarm devices sensitive to magnetism, humidity, heat, pressure, dust, theft, power blackout, etc. There should be strong access control including armed guards, fenced areas, TV monitors, personnel identification (visual, voice print, fingerprint, badge, passwords, etc.), well-performed maintenance service, and a number of extra provisions for protection.

Data Processing Security, Inc. has developed, for high security necessities, an electronically operated double door entry system for access control into the computer room. When a person enters the buffer zone, the door locks behind him while he is subjected to electronic search. If something is detected, the system freezes and automatically alerts the security guard. The second door can be opened only with a special badge key.

A carbon dioxide (CO_2) fire extinguishing system, such as the one installed at the Chase Manhattan Bank's New York City headquarters, has proved useful. Engineered by Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., this system uses a battery of remotely located cylinders containing the liquid gas. When activated by smoke detectors, the gas discharges and builds up an inert atmosphere in the immediately surrounding area, extinguishing the fire without damaging equipment or data files. Employees can go back to work within five minutes after the fire has been put out and the ventilation systems restarted.

Another fire-fighting system which has been developed by the Ansul Company uses Halon extinguishing agents which are discharged in the form of a colorless, odorless, and non-toxic gas. 'Since Halon agents do not work by diluting oxygen, they are well-suited for areas where humans are present.

The Guaranty Bank and Trust Co. of Worcester, Mass., has adopted another approach to fire-fighting, a system installed by Security Control Systems which detects fire, smoke and excessive temperatures and humidity fluctuations and causes a monitoring and reporting device to alert four pre-selected phone numbers for help.

Software

Protection of data files, whether in the form of punch cards, magnetic tapes, or discs, is the key element in any computer facility.

Some specific examples of software security control measures are audit trails, access regulations, strong supervision of computer operators, the use and control of programs utilizing program documentation methods, the use of a log for all significant events (such as user identification, file use and attempts of unauthorized use), regulations to prevent unauthorized personnel from browsing through the files, and the use of a semi-automatic data inventory control system.

Personnel

Physical control as to who is allowed near the computer and the files is advisable. Note that this does not mean "employees only"; it implies a careful screening of employees, repairmen, and visitors to determine which of them should be allowed this proximity to the system. Intimately involved with time-sharing installations are three types of personnel: operators, programmers, and maintenance engineers.

According to Dennis Van Tassel, mathematician and head programmer at San Jose State College, all operators must understand that there exists a protection philosophy. If personnel are expected to help enforce and to comply with this protection philosophy, it must be clearly defined and specified.

It is advisable to use the following provisions for personnel control: control of logs and monitor, division of responsibilities, rotation of duties, adequate supervision to reduce the risk of losses caused by accident or error, careful handling of data files, cleanliness regulations, control access to private files, and appropriate instruction in case of disasters.

Terminals

Some of the most common pitfalls encountered when using terminals are frequent communication interruptions, risk of communication interception, difficult access control, and noisy lines.

Among the greatest disadvantages of time-sharing services are those in connection with the communication lines which link the terminals to the central processing unit. Telephone lines are designed for voice communication rather than data communication, and the results have been that such lines are too noisy and have too many interruptions for appropriate handling of data communication.

There have been some recent developments in the improvement of data transmissions. Bell System has developed its Digital Data Service (DDS), a data transmission system which has been introduced early this year in five cities (New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, and Chicago); and, by the end of 1974, twenty-four cities are expected to have it. Bell further plans to provide continuous monitoring of their DDS channels. When errors of transmission are detected, DDS will notify the customer. Decision on retransmission will be the customer's responsibility. Another development in data communication is DUV (data under voice). By late 1973 this technique will be in service between New York and Chicago; consequently, communication problems should become virtually nonexistent within the near future, and this system will become even more popular.

Telephone lines are vulnerable to three types of security problems: wire tapping, piggyback, and user's sign-off signal cancellation. These common threats may be avoided by the use of a privacy transformation method (also called scramblers or cryptographic techniques). This is a non-singular (reversible) operation which conceals the original message either by the substitution of new characters, rearrangement of the characters, or by the adding of strings of digits to the original message.

Some new techniques for encrypting data have evolved, such as high speed transmission and signal scrambling. In spite of all of these new techniques, it is still possible to intercept and tap the information. According to Tuckerman, unauthorized users (intruders) who possess only limited material and information with which to work, can readily extract the original text of enciphered messages by making use of the speed, capacity, and computational abilities of the computer.

The greater the efficiency of the privacy transformation, the more difficult it becomes for unauthorized copying of files.

Access Control

Access to the system throughout the communication lines should be controlled by the central processing unit and by the user's own procedures. This is possible by cryptographic and scramble techniques, personnel regulations, user identification, appropriate terminal location, or by ciphering and deciphering hardware.

Computer software packages have been written to cipher data transmissions. Ciphering software is an attractive technique because it can be done automatically by the program which creates the data and at a very low cost. Only programs using the matching deciphering technique are able to use this data. These special hardware cipher devices can be located at the terminal and at the computer to protect transmitted data.

Scramblers or voice privacy devices are currently being used by people who readily acknowledge the insecurity of transmitted information. Scramblers are used by large corporations such as the oil industry as well as by union representatives during contract negotiation time. (Scramble phones are currently a 20 to 30 million-dollar business, excluding law enforcement and military purchases). Scramble devices are now being built for time-sharing operations. These devices offer protection similar to encryption. Scramblers convert data into something resembling channel noise or a malfunctioning circuit.

Other features for terminals include print inhibit, security keylock, operator identification card reader, and the use of a terminal identifier. With print inhibit the terminal operator can enter data, such as security passwords, without its being physically displayed. A physical keylock can be attached to the terminal which will not allow the entry of data. The operator identification card reader reads magnetically encoded information on a magnetic strip card. The card can be used to supply the user's password and/or name.

Direct access device security features include file mask, volume detection, and write-exhibit switch. The file mask controls or allows read-only of read-write access to data sets. The volume detection switch alerts the control program when the volume is increased; this protects data from being written upon. This switch provides additional protection for read-only volumes.

Insurance

If data security measures fail, the use of EDP insurance can back-up or soften the blow. Every business or person who now has an in-house computer, operates or is a user of a service bureau, or transmits data to a data center should be computer-security conscious. Insurance is one of the back-up measures if prevention fails. However, not all business can afford or even need an elaborate and expensive security system; thus, evaluation of the information becomes necessary to determine those sections of the system which require this protection.

The subject matter of ordinary insurance coverage is physical damage to tangible property. In this case, software and data are not covered. Business interruption insurance protects you in the event of fire or other interruptions to normal business but does not cover the consequences. Boiler explosion policies which also insure other heating mishaps do not cover computer operations. Theft and employee dishonesty are also insured in terms of general risk. Valuable papers and records' coverage provides protection in the event of destruction of such intangibles as notes and account receivable records but does not include such computer media as valuable papers. Public liability insures the company for its acts or omission of acts which give rise to claims by outsiders against the company.

Insurance can prevent an unfortunate event from becoming a catastrophe. When a person buys an insurance policy, he knows that he will be indemnified if a loss does occur.

Some of the insurance companies which write EDP policies are the Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Insurance Company of North America, The Home Insurance Co., and Royal Assurance of America.

Insurance premiums generally correspond to the regular fire policy rates plus an added loading factor for the additional EDP perils.

Undoubtedly any computer installation, regardless of the quality and level of its security system, cannot approach the state of no risk of loss. Security is based on a "cost-benefit" concept; in other words the cost of violating the system should be greater than the gain derived therefrom.

References

"All About Time-Sharing Services." Data Processing Digest. Vol. 18, No. 3, March, 1972.
Bairstow, Jeffrey N. "The Terminal that Thinks for Itself." Computer Decisions. Vol. 5, No. 1, January, 1973.
Bertram, Peter. "Software Security." Data Processing Digest. Vol. 18, No. 4, April, 1972.
Branstad, Dennis K. "Privacy and Protection in Operating Systems." Computer. Vol. 6, No. 1, January, 1973.
Bray, Melvyn. "How Safe is Your System?" Data Processing Digest. Vol. 18, No. 4, April, 1972.
Chesson, Frederik W. "Computers and Cryptology." Datamation. Vol. 19, No. 1, January, 1973.
Computer News. Vol. 16, No. 6, June, 1972.
Computer News. Vol. 16, No. 10, October, 1972.
"Developments in Data Transmission." EDP Analyzer. Vol. 11, No. 3, March, 1973.
Dickey, C. Lewis. "Securing the Computer." Journal of Systems Management. Vol. 23, No. 2, February, 1972.
"Distributed Intelligence in Data Communication." EDP Analyzer. Vol. 11, No. 2, February, 1973.
"The Emerging Computer Networks." EDP Analyzer. Vol. 11, No. 1, January, 1973.
Girsdansky, M. B. "Cryptology, the Computer, and Data Privacy." Computers and Automation. Vol. 21, No. 4, April, 1972.
Goldstein, Seth. "A New Life for Time-Sharing." Dun's. Vol. 101, No. 1, January, 1973.
Hebditch, D. L. "A Simple Terminal Language for a Database." Computer Bulletin. Vol. 16, No. 1, January, 1972.
Koehn, Hank E. "Are Companies Bugged about Bugging?" Journal of Systems Management. Vol. 24, No. 1, January, 1973.
Murphey, Wayne E. and Daniel V. Olson. "Controlling Access to Large Tape Files." Data Processing Magazine. Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring, 1972.
Salzman, Roy M. and Arthur D. Little. "An Outlook for the Terminal Industry in the United States." Data Processing Digest. Vol. 18, No. 1, January, 1972.
"Security in Data Processing." Data Processor. Vol. 16, No. 1, February, 1973.
Simis, T. L. "Telephone Service: The Rules of the Game When the Game is Changing." Computers and Automation. Vol. 21, No. 12, December, 1972.
"Toward Distributed Computing." EDP Industry Report. Vol. 7, No. 6, January 17, 1972.
Van Tassel, Dennis. Computer Security Management. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1972.
Zaiden, Dennis J. "Special EDP Insurance: Who Needs It?" Data Processing Magazine. Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring, 1972. ☐

Cerullo — *Continued from page 9*

Procedure for Withdrawal

Sixth, a procedure should be established for withdrawal from the cooperative. If the withdrawing firm has not been a member for a predetermined time, perhaps one or two years, a sliding scale penalty fee for withdrawal should be established.

Procedure for Admission

Finally, procedures must be determined to govern the admission of new members into the cooperative. Perhaps a unanimous affirmative vote by current members should be required to admit a new member. The current members should also decide if a newly admitted member should be required to pay a predetermined portion of the cooperative's startup costs and if the cooperative should limit membership to firms of the same approximate size as current members.

Conclusion

With due care taken in following the above steps, establishing a successful cooperative service bureau should be relatively easy. Companies would be well advised to consider the idea seriously, for cooperative service bureaus offer a viable and in many ways superior alternative to the more costly inhouse computer and the less satisfactory outside service bureau.

Foothotes

1. Computers in Business: An RIA Survey of Users and Nonusers (New York: Research Institute of America, 1969), p. 4.
2. Ibid., p. 17.
3. Michael J. Cerullo. "Service Bureaus: User Appraisal." Datamation, Vol. 18, May 1972, p. 86.
4. Ibid., p. 89.
5. ADAPSO Eighth Management Symposium. "How to Operate a Service Bureau for Profits." 1963, p. 49.

Alienation and the Systems Analyst

Alan E. Brill
Supervising Systems Analyst
The Chase Manhattan Bank N.A.
New York, N.Y. 10005

"Systems analysts ... must be seen as full-fledged members of the firm."

A Wall of Managerial Attitudes

In most large organizations, the systems and data processing departments are separated from the rest of the firm by a wall of managerial attitudes. While employees in most jobs are encouraged to gain a wide variety of experience in various departments as they rise through various management levels, it is rare that a systems analyst or a programmer is given an equal opportunity. The general attitude is "He's a computer man, not a manager (or a businessman, or a banker). He wouldn't fit in. Besides, he's doing a good job where he is."

As a result, the analyst has exactly no motivation to think of himself as an insurance man or a businessman, or a banker, or an accountant. He is made to feel like a consultant. He can serve the organization, but he isn't free to move within it. To make matters worse, some firms rotate the people in their management development programs through a stint in the systems department. It is little wonder that there is a high turnover in systems analysts. The company does very little to make him feel like a member of the family.

Potential Source of Talent

But beyond the problems brought about by the personnel turbulence, the firm is ignoring a potential source of fine managerial talent. Many analysts joining major corporations hold degrees as Master, Business Administration. Their educational backgrounds, when combined with their ability to objectively define problems and see solutions, and the detailed working knowledge of the company gained in the system design process, should put them in the management spotlight. Instead, the system analyst finds that he has been given the indelible label of "computer person" and that his upward mobility is limited to the systems department. As a result, systems analysts leave the firm, and often leave the systems profession.

If companies hope to attract and hold talented personnel for their systems activities, they need to offer them an equal chance to develop to their full potential. They must be seen as full-fledged members of the firm — not as consultants who are here today, but who could move on tomorrow.

Experience in Systems

As businesses come more and more to depend upon data processing to support their operations, it will be desirable for a significant number of management team members to have experience in systems. Yet, by their actions, managements have forced many talented people to avoid beginning their careers in data processing for fear of becoming stereotyped.

So it would seem that a number of the problems that businesses face in their systems activities are a result of a regrettable but widespread management attitude.

Only when systems analysts are regarded as having a potential for advancement to positions in general management, and are given an equal chance to rise in the organization, will the systems man lose his alienation and see himself as a member of the company team.

Strategy and Action on World Trade

James H. Binger, Chairman
Honeywell Inc.
2701 Fourth Ave. S.
Minneapolis, Minn. 55408

> *"What we [the United States] have is a little corner of the world, and we must find a way to live in it harmoniously with our neighbors, many of whom are every bit as good as we are at almost everything we do."*

The theme of my remarks is the intensifying controversy over the conditions that influence our well-being here in the United States — particularly the threat of another unfortunate experience with protectionism.

I am well aware that I cannot go deeply into this subject in a short space. This I know because I was privileged to serve on the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy. For over a year we studied every way in which this and other countries are affected by international trade and investment policies.

Protectionist Attitude

Let there be no doubt where I stand on the principal issue. I believe that the threat of the protectionist attitude in America is far more than an issue involving business and jobs. I sincerely believe that this issue embraces many powerful forces that will have an important bearing on whether or not all the peoples of the world make the most of their opportunities in the years to come.

I recognize that there are strong and honest differences of opinion on the proper direction of our nation's foreign trade policies. There are many persons and suppliers who have been adversely affected by foreign competition. It would be unrealistic not to acknowledge this fact of life.

Complexity

These differences of opinion, and these dislocations of people's lives, point up the complexities of the problem. Who among us can honestly say he understands all of the ramifications involved in the balance of trade? Where is there an unchallenged expert on monetary policy? What type of restraints, if any, could or should be made on the world-wide transfer of technology? What is the proper level of East-West trade relations, and are the national defense implications of yesterday still appropriate today? Should the United States government be supporting broad research and development to match the funds that foreign countries are investing in their industry? Can we preserve the rise in productivity that underlies the American miracle — which is the production of goods at low cost while wages, taxes and dividends all rise steadily?

These are just some of the questions which must be asked in the discussion now developing, particularly in the halls of Congress, but also at various other governmental and community levels.

Facing these and still other complexities, we know that Congressional hearings soon to begin could result in new laws and regulations which could be detrimental.

Action

Because this is so, it will not do for anyone with a qualified viewpoint backed by experience, to be simply an observer. I am convinced that this present controversy can be resolved positively, but it will require action.

What kind of action will be most effective? the kind of action which is in the public interest? — not special pleadings based on the experience of a single company, or a single industry, or even a single community.

It is, of course, important to gather this supporting information and be aware of all the facts that bear on our needs, our experience and the options that governments can take to effect them. But going beyond this, we must be prepared to discuss with everyone who will exert influence on our elected lawmakers the more important question — what do all these statistics and contentions mean to me?

The Concerns of U.S. Citizens

The concerns of the great body of United States citizens are how to assure and enhance their jobs and living conditions and be involved in what was once unashamedly described as "the pursuit of happiness".

Based on a talk before the Board of Governors of the Electronic Industries Association, Phoenix, Ariz., January, 1973.

Let's look at just one major concern: about 1.3 million new American families are formed every year. Approximately eight million people change their jobs every year. About 3.7 million people join the labor force and 2.1 million leave it. By 1980 full employment in the United States will require jobs for 100 million people, 18 million more than were employed at the end of 1972. These, quite clearly, are the priority considerations in the minds of millions who do not clearly understand how the enterprise system meets their needs.

If they and the representatives of large numbers of voters do not understand, how can we expect their support?

I would like to review the arguments for their support in as familiar terms as I can muster.

The Days of U.S. Preeminence are Gone

First, let's examine one portion of the real economic world we inhabit.

Of primary importance is the fact that the days of almost total U.S. preeminence since the close of World War II are gone.

We must learn to live and work in a world where forevermore we will be dependent on other portions of the globe for some of our more basic needs — and some portions will be dependent on us. The U.S. is not self-sufficient in materials, nor does it have a corner on the world's technology, the world's innovative ability, the world's marketing savvy, the world's production know-how. What we have is a little corner of the world, and we must find a way to live in it harmoniously with our neighbors, many of whom are every bit as good as we are at almost everything we do.

The Energy Crisis

I hesitate, somewhat, to use the energy crisis as an example of this dependency, because I recognize that there are those who question whether the crisis really exists, or who maintain that new technology will solve the problem before it reaches crisis stage. I can say at this point that there is an energy shortage, if not a crisis; for example, the fuel oil allotment for our Minneapolis operations has been cut by 25 per cent for January and February, and similar cutbacks have been imposed on other companies, our schools, our common carriers.

Let's look at the dependency which is developing in the oil industry. In the past, the repatriated earnings of oil companies have exceeded the value of imported oil and were a favorable factor in our international balance of payments. By 1985, however, our needs for oil and natural gas could create for us a trade deficit approaching twenty billion dollars a year.

As no doubt you know, we currently import 10 to 15 per cent of both crude oil and copper, 30 per cent of our iron ore, and more than 80 per cent of our bauxite needs. We must import all or most of our tin, natural rubber, nickel and chrome.

Trade with the World

We cannot go it alone. We must trade with the world — and to trade, you give something to get something, with the hope that both traders get what they want and need. Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to fully realize this goal, and much of the controversy over this nation's foreign-trade policies revolves around the best way to achieve it.

There is a strong and vocal body of opinion which believes that protectionist measures will achieve what is best for American workers and companies in the arena of world trade. One of their principal targets are companies like Honeywell — multinational companies with substantial investments, employees and sales outside the United States.

"Exporting Jobs"?

It is claimed that U.S. multinational corporations are "exporting jobs" overseas; that U.S. companies invest overseas to take advantage of lower wages; that imports from the overseas subsidiaries of U.S. companies cause unemployment here at home; that if U.S. companies were prevented from investing and manufacturing abroad these companies would be forced to expand their operations in the United States, creating more jobs here; that multinational companies invest abroad in order to avoid paying taxes; that American corporations are exporting U.S. technology and therefore are helping non-U.S. companies compete in our own and other countries.

The Burke-Hartke bill has been proposed as the solution to these problems; and protectionist sentiment also underlies other proposals which may emerge for the consideration of Congress.

At this point, there may be those who will accuse me of making a tactical blunder by even mentioning the allegations of our critics. But I'll go one step further. If someone could prove to me that these allegations are factual, I'd be one of the major supporters of moves to inhibit the growth of multinational companies.

The Opposite is True: Making Jobs

Thanks to various companies, government agencies and trade associations who have accumulated the facts and published them, I know otherwise.

I am convinced, thanks to these studies, and my experience with Honeywell, that multinational companies do not export jobs, but create jobs in the United States faster than other U.S. companies. I am convinced that U.S. companies invest abroad to gain participation in markets in other countries, not to take advantage of lower wages or so-called tax loopholes. I am convinced by these studies that imports from the overseas subsidiaries of U.S. companies have not been a major factor in U.S. unemployment.

To be more specific, I'd like to give you some information taken from a survey conducted by the Emergency Committee on American Trade, of which I am a member. This committee researched the domestic and international operations of 74 U.S. corporations representing a broad group of large multinational corporations. This survey reveals that in the years between 1960 and 1970, when these companies were increasing their overseas operations, they also provided 900,000 new jobs in the United States. They also increased their sales from American facilities — work performed in this country — from $58 billion to $113 billion — nearly doubled, in fact. Their exports from the United States nearly tripled in this period, rising from $4.3 billion to $12.2 billion. In the all-important balance of payments category, they increased their net surplus of exports over imports from $3.2 billion to $6.6 billion — more than doubled.

International Investment Activities of Multinational Companies

These figures, and other results of the survey, lead to one major conclusion: That the international investment activities of these representative multinational companies played an important role in their rapid export growth and consequently made a major positive contribution to their domestic — and I emphasize the word domestic — sales, investment and employment growth.

Double Taxation

I have tried to speak in familiar language; so I have some misgivings about discussing the issue of taxes. But the tax issue is an important one, and I'd like to cover some specific areas which are coming more and more into public discussion.

At issue is the section of U.S. tax law which allows American corporations a tax credit for the income taxes they pay to foreign countries on income earned in such countries. The purpose of this tax credit is to avoid taxing the foreign earnings of U.S. corporations twice — once in a foreign country and again when the earnings are remitted to the United States.

Opponents of this tax credit argue that since domestic firms are not allowed a federal tax credit for the state taxes they pay, the current method of taxing income from foreign sources is inconsistent with the way domestic income is taxed.

Taxation by U.S. States

A major fallacy in this argument is that it is based on the incorrect assumption that the taxation of domestic income by city, state and the federal government is analogous to the United States taxing the foreign earnings of American subsidiaries which have already been taxed by the host country.

The proper analogy is between the way states treat corporate income earned in two or more states and the way the U.S. government treats income earned in two or more countries. Every state which has a state income tax provides a method of allocating the income of a multi-state company among the various states in order to avoid duplicate taxation of the same income. As a matter of fact, the constitution requires this. Thus the current methods of taxing foreign and domestic income are consistent.

Further, where one domestic corporation in the United States has an ownership position in another domestic corporation, the federal income tax law quite properly prevents duplication of corporate income taxes. The parent company is taxed on earnings of the owned company only when such earnings are distributed as a dividend — and then at no more than a nominal rate. What logic can there be in the Burke-Hartke proposal that earnings of an overseas subsidiary — in most cases earnings already taxed in the foreign country at rates comparable to or higher than U.S. rates — should be immediately re-taxed at full U.S. income tax rates?

International Competition by American Industry

Another fundamental element of the issue is the tax credit's relationship to the ability of American industry to compete internationally. According to a recent survey by the National Association of Manufacturers, if the United States were to repeal the tax credit for foreign taxes paid and tax all foreign subsidiary income before it is paid out in dividends to the parent company, U.S. firms with foreign operations would be forced to pay an average effective tax on their foreign earnings of over 70 per cent.

Given this added tax handicap, few American firms could continue to compete with foreign-controlled companies for world markets.

You can appreciate how useful it is to have these facts for presentation where contradictory allegations are being made. Let's keep the record straight!

Also useful to the undertaking on which we must all embark is the factual story of what imports and exports do, beneficially to create jobs.

Imports Produce One Million U.S. Jobs

Labor Department figures document the finding that one million jobs in the United States are dependent on imports — jobs for food processors, ship and dock workers, truck drivers and railroaders, warehouse employees and retail clerks. And it's equally impressive to consider that every billion dollars worth of exports creates 60-to-80,000 jobs in the United States.

As we assess the situation, let us not forget the dilemma our government faced in August 1971. As Mr. Peter Peterson wrote, the New Economic Policy announced that month was not, and I quote, "a one-shot reaction to a one-time crisis. It marked the beginning of a new era of more flexible, enduring, and viable economic relationships among nations. The years behind us were by and large an era of success, but an era based upon a system which had become outgrown, outworn — and increasingly crisis-prone."

Tariffs and Free Trade

Mr. Peterson was referring to the tremendous impact that international trade and monetary factors were having on our people. We have since come to learn the difficulty of achieving universally approved corrective action. And now we must reckon with this reality: U.S. negotiators are preparing to enter economic talks next fall that could shape future international relationships for many years to come. Our government can and should strive in these talks to put an end to present attitudes and trends that point ominously to another "balkanization" of world trade.

It can and should seek agreement to reduce, and if possible end, all tariffs on industrial trade by the end of this century.

It can and should try to create far freer trade conditions for farm products.

It can and should seek the harmonization among nations of the present hodgepodge of non-tariff trade barriers and preferences.

But these objectives will remain forlorn hopes unless our negotiators can go into these hard bargaining sessions with the clear backing of the American people and their Congress. We must give them that.

Spurring Internal Transition to Successful Competitive Enterprise

Meanwhile, we face and must do something about the undeniable tolls and grievances resulting from

(please turn to page 23)

Computer Art: The Search Beyond Manipulation

Grace C. Hertlein
California State University—Chico
Chico, Calif. 95926

"Computer arts are still in the highly experimental stage of emergence."

In present computer art, the naive onlooker could readily misconstrue that mathematical processing of data and manipulation of design represent the total modus operandi of this new form, rather than just the initial phases of exploration. A review of the varied computer arts reveals diverse input of patterns and subsequent manipulation or transformation, creating a series of new, perceptual audio or visual images. There appears a similarity of approaches and some variation of the techniques utilized by practitioners of the cybernetic arts: graphics, sculpture, film, dance, music, textile design, weaving, poetry, and architecture.

There is a tendency to forget that the computer arts are still in the highly experimental stages of emergence, and although some attractive and very pleasing works have been accomplished, this new medium has generally not progressed much beyond its mathematical and scientific origins. At times, in viewing or hearing the output of the computer arts, one would relegate the resultant art form to the category of interesting sound or visual patterns, experimental/initial exercises, or mathematical and scientific visualization, rather than as works of art per se. (This latter statement is equally true of contemporary manual experimental art.) There is, at the present time, a tendency for the computer arts to relate to an elite coterie, made up of scientists and intellectuals, rather than the public at large. However, as this new art medium is given greater space in the mass media, this audience should enlarge greatly, as exposure acquaints the general audience with the potential of this new art form.

This article is reprinted by permission from the *Proceedings of the Invitational International Exhibit of Computer Arts,* T-5, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, June-July 1973. Grace C. Hertlein is Assistant Professor in the Computer Science Department at California State University—Chico, Chico, Calif. 95926. Her computer art has been published for many years in *Computers and Automation* and currently some of her computer art is being exhibited at an art exhibition in Bordeaux, France.

Pattern Manipulation

Manipulation of design by the computer may be deliberate, (or at times highly experimental) as change or transformation of the original pattern is achieved via a host of techniques developed within the past twelve years. However, in attempting to see precedent in manipulation of design, one observes ample evidence of a growing interest by artists and critics in combining (manually) mathematics and art. Since the turn of the century, such techniques and philosophy have been practiced and even more verbally expressed by electronic and concrete musicians. Further, the concept of pattern manipulation is as old as man's art, and one finds ample evidence of this concept throughout art history. A few such examples are: Offset X/Y patterns in Persian sculptural reliefs; repetitions of design in serial imagery from early Greek vases; reversals of pattern in the compositions of Bach; mirror images and mathematical progressions of design in the Foundation Course exercises of the Bauhaus School; juxtaposition and superposition of musical patterns throughout musical history; and randomization of musical variations via throwing of dice, as practiced by Mozart. The world was quite ready philosophically and mathematically for further explorations in such transformation of pattern, yet it was not until the speed of the computer afforded this electronic manipulation, that it became feasible to such a degree. (Alteration, change, and transformation of pattern is revealed in other technological systems that may or may not use the computer as an aid in creation: synthesized video, sound, and the film.) In other words, science and technology now afford further exploration of ideas and techniques that have been practiced by experimental artists for years.

The philosophy and practice of twentieth century music shows a very great similarity between the manipulative techniques used by musicians since the early 1900's and the present-day computer procedures. Examination of the philosophy of the Bauhaus and study of the works emanating from this revolutionary school, also reveals great similarities in the approaches to creation, and in the final works of art of this school and present-day computer arts.

The computer artist is manipulating patterns, because this is an inherent potential of the computer medium. The manual artist (or scholar), by contrast, is bound to laborious manual processing of data and pattern, and thus generally discovers to a lesser degree, further sources of innovative and perceptual changes, i.e., manipulation as practiced in the computer arts is not feasible manually. When perceptual change is accomplished manually (many of the works in Graphis afford excellent examples), such change is not only excessively time-consuming, but represents a manual tour de force. It could be more readily accomplished via the computer.

The manual artist is generally not concerned with perceptual change or alteration of the original image. On the other hand, since the computer readily affords such changes, the cybernetic artist may literally exploit component designs, taking them through what may appear to be unlimited design changes. The more abstract the component design, the more readily it lends itself to mathematical variation and processing, termed design state variation.

Design State Variation

This is a term devised by the writer, adapted from given "state" variations used in printmaking, in which one may revise a plate or stone, and alter it by additions and/or changes of pattern, resulting in a series of new works. The term denotes known variations of pattern that are possible, which may be used as sub-routines or stored on the computer library and merely called by the user, who defines the values of the given parameters of the specific algorithms being utilized. One of the most provocative concepts emerging in computer art is that of being to literally predict innumerable design state variations, in which a basal component will be visually or auditorially pleasing. The artist may use only those design states that reflect personal expression of design. (One might compare design state variations to the many kinds of chisels the sculptor may use in execution of a work of art, each giving unique effects.) Further, this library of manipulative design state variations is constantly being enlarged by experimenters in the computer arts. A brief listing follows:

- Offsets of pattern on the X, Y, X/Y (progressions in music)
- Mirror images or reversals on the X, Y, X/Y
- Scalar variations or duration of pattern in superposition of form
- Rotation, in open or closed forms
- Irregular radiation of images and forms with growing scalar values
- Redundant serial imagery in closed form
- Polygon serial imagery, with circular, square, or varied final form
- Positive and negative variations of repeated or design-related patterns
- Disintegrating variants of images and sounds in redundant or transform pattern
- Metamorphic variations of images or sounds in predetermined sequences
- Transformations of pattern, in which one design becomes another
- Alterations of design by mathematical algorithms
- Pseudo-randomizations of patterns with artist-imposed parameters
- Overlays of images and sounds in dimensional forms
- Combinations of related patterns, using any of the above design states
- Multi-media combinations, using any of the aforementioned

Prior to design state variation, the artistic idea is stated in coherent, sequential steps. It may be flow-charted before translation into a computer program. Thus the art idea is transformed into analyzed data, using synthetic machine languages, and is then subject to processing and manipulation via the computer using design state variations, revealing innumerable new, final works. Examples include:

- The warp and weft patterns in weaving
- Classical ballet positions, with designations of the head, arms, and feet
- Structural modules in sculpture and architecture
- Derivations of design from art or musical history, including the archaic, the classical, or the contemporary
- Formulae and transformations from science or mathematics
- Stylistic analysis of a given artist's style, with designation and statement of a specific set of definitions describing the style
- Artistic composition of a given musical era, with parameters of such rules

Thus the art idea is initially expressed in the manner of science, but it does not end there. The choice of the art idea or problem should express the personal philosophy of the originator, whether it is mathematical formulae, natural derivations from the environment, or analyses of prior styles of artists. The personal focus of the original idea, ensuing variation and execution cannot be too strongly stressed! The design state variations allow the artist to choose the given direction of psychic expression. Further, selection of specific computer systems and art materials affords a highly individual element within cybernetic creation. And lastly, the varying techniques of execution, which may be preplanned or participant, add a unique and personal opportunity to spontaneously participate within the formation of the work of art, or to maximize the capacities of the computer in artistic execution, using preplanned or heuristic modes.

Diverse Philosophies of Computer Art

Stylistic analysis and resultant design derivation are highly visible in the computer arts and possess decided benefits: these techniques allow one to analyze more thoroughly the subject under study, and in addition, they allow the artist to gain perceptual variations and permutations of the original source not obtainable by manual methods. (The writer and many others have often found these new departures from the design source to be as or more aesthetic than the original input source.) There is, however, a great tendency among humanists to concern themselves with past styles and subject matter, as being more "pure" aesthetically than the present. On the other hand, there is an equal tendency among scientists to exploit mathematical manipulation, disregard art totally, and to have the computer and its peripheral devices accomplish the work of art, without intervention by man. Here one finds two extremes, with beginning dogmatic statements by artists of varying capacities and philosophies. The insightful computer artist, however, seeks to unite personal philosophy and expression with the highest level of computer usage.in a statement of artistic unity. However, one is conscious of new visions emerging throughout history, which are subsequently categorized and "cast in bronze," as "the way." Computer art appears to be no exception to this great

(please turn to page 31)

Computers in Science Fiction — II

Marcia Ascher
Professor of Mathematics
Ithaca College
Ithaca, N.Y. 14850

> *"In science fiction writing, non-specialists attempt to involve other non-specialists in the human questions arising from computer use."*

In "The Computer and the Poet," Norman Cousins emphasizes that the role of poets, "those who have respect for and speak to the human spirit," becomes even more important as computer usage increases (32). Science fiction writers should indeed be included as poets in our technological age. All too often in our society, problems arising from technology are left to technologists because others are too unsure of their own knowledge to question or criticize. The science fiction writings directly involving computers are one of the few places where non-specialists attempt to involve other non-specialists in the human questions arising from computer use.

Emphasis on Man

Perhaps the most recurrent science fiction theme is the difference between computers and man. These raise the question of the proper role for machines versus the proper role for humans or emphasize the aspects that make man unique. In one story (Asimov, "Someday") children in a society where reading and writing are no longer needed form a secret society to learn just for the joy of it; in another (Weir, "What Happened to the Teaching Machine") where all learning is by machine, only uneducated children still know how to pose questions. A super-computer is defeated by a human because he can bluff or "lose to win" and it cannot (Caiden, The God Machine); another super-computer is robbed of its control because of a group of humans whose main desire is freedom (Pohl, Starchild); and to others (Dick, "The Variable Man"; Sheckley, "Fool's Mate") human unpredictability continues to be a problem. This distinctive aspect of man is very directly stated by the computer builder in a French science fiction story (Boulie, "The Perfect Robot"). In trying to make the computer more like man, he progressively adds to its ability to deal with data, the ability to play chess, language, concepts of love, the ability to engender new machines, concepts of good and evil, and finally what he considers to be the crucial missing element — "I have unhinged them". Mike, a super-computer capable of running an entire revolution (Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress), cannot understand why a joke is funny, and the computer AM (Ellison, "I Have No Mouth and I Must Scream") hates people because unlike them "he could not wander, he could not wonder, he could not belong, he could merely be".

Science fiction writers persist in confronting their readers with a question that receives little direct discussion but is of current concern. As expressed by the historian Bruce Mazelish (33), just as continuities were established with the material universe, the animal kingdom, and our subconscious, we are faced with transcending the 4th discontinuity — of harmonizing our existence and those of machines in a technological society. Or, as expressed by Weizenbaum ("On the Impact of the Computer on Society") the insights of science such as those provided earlier by the work of Galileo, Darwin, and Freud, and now provoked by the advent of the computer, shake man's self-esteem because, when viewed superficially, they seem to diminish man.

Mechanistic View of Man

We diminish man and in our anxiety grow more disdainful of ourselves and ambivalent towards computers if computer usage is predicated on a mechanistic view of man and this mechanistic view becomes our self-image. Too many statements made by systems analysts or computer scientists display that a computer-usable view of man is being substituted for the whole man. Keep in mind the above list of human attributes contrasted to computers by science-fiction writers as you read the following statement from the widely read and much discussed book Limits of Growth written by well-motivated systems analysts:

> Some considered the model too 'technocratic' observing that it did not include critical social factors, such as the effects of adoption of different value systems. The chairman of the Moscow meeting summed up this point when he said, 'Man is no mere biocybernetic device'. This criticism is readily admitted. The present model considers man only in his material system because valid social elements simply

> could not be devised and introduced in this first effort. Yet, despite the model's material orientation, the conclusions of the study point to the need for fundamental changes in the values of society. (34, p. 191)

Admission that the world model has a minor flaw of omitting "critical social factors" followed so blithely by conclusions about fundamental value changes surely conveys to the reader that the factors that have been dealt with are the more essential and more significant.

Again recall the human attributes as you read:

> By the same token since the thinking human being is also an information processor, it should be possible to study his processes and their organization independently of the details of the biological mechanisms — the 'hardware' that implement them. (Simon and Newell, "Information-Processing in Computers and Man", p. 256)

That the theories

> . . . are mechanistic — that they postulate only the processes capable of being effected by mechanism — is guaranteed by simulating the behavior predicated by ordinary digital computers. (ibid. p. 258)

To reemphasize the contribution of science fiction, let us trace through one well-written and popular book, Stand on Zanzibar (Brunner). In the 21st century over-populated world, there is a very advanced computer Shalmaneser owned by General Technic, a company large enough to be contemplating the subsidization, modernization, and management of a small underdeveloped country Beninia. Beninia is unique since it alone has retained peacefulness and trust and humane behavior. Computer analysis is undertaken of the feasibility of the G.T. project and for alternative plans of carrying it out. With regard to the possibility of computer analysis of what makes Beninia attractive, one sensitive character in the book says " ... when they get love down to a bunch of factors you can analyze with a computer, there'll be nothing left of whatever makes it worth being human". Shalmaneser eventually rejects the data on Beninia because it is inconsistant with reality. Mulligan, a cynical sociologist, gets the computer to process the data by adding the additional assumption that an unknown force is active in that population. Mulligan points out that the scientists who have been working toward consciousness for the super-computer have been successful because the rejection of the data was a display of its first human characteristic — "orneriness" or "bloody-mindedness". When faced with something different, it chose to reject it instead of broadening its view of the possible. Mulligan sets out to find what makes Beninia different and traces it to a genetic mutation which produces a body odour that surpresses in others the territorial-aggression reaction. Mulligan's hope is that a world-renowned biologist who is working on modification of human genetic maps can use this to better mankind. His hope is shattered when he learns that this biologist has been murdered for political reasons. The decision is that the machine will work on finding an external synthetic spray. Mulligan is led away crying for lost humanity " ... what in God's name is it worth to be human, if we have to be saved from ourselves by a machine?" The now conscious machine has the last word and the last sentence of the book "Christ, what an imagination I've got". The irony of the book is that Mulligan, who represents and speaks for those characteristics which are human, falls into another part of the prevalent mechanistic trap — aggression is in our genes; the solution to our problems will be via a specific scientific breakthrough.

Superstates and Sypersystems

A concern for the use of computers in politics and government is seen in numerous stories. Opinion polling in a political campaign is involved in The 480 (Burdick), and the writing of campaign literature in The Novel Computer (Escarpit). The prediction of elections is carried to an extreme in "Franchise" (Asimov) where only one vote is needed to determine the election, and Counterfeit World (Galouye) describes an entire synthetic society (an "electromathematical model") made up for purposes of opinion surveying. Of greater concern, however, are the super-states dependent on or replaced by super-computer systems. Many of these stories describe the process by which men gradually gave away self-determination in exchange for material well-being, or in the belief that a larger something was needed to protect them from each other (Anderson, "Sam Hall"; Cole, The Funco File; Dick, Vulcan's Hammer; Fairman, I, the Machine; Mason, Matrix; Pohl, Starchild). Often, no one really understands any longer how the system works (Cameron, Cybernia; Cole, The Funco File; Delany, The Fall of the Towers; Dick, Vulcan's Hammer; Fairman, I, the Machine; Mason, Matrix). In most cases, the vast destructive power of the system is realized when, for some reason, it is no longer serving human ends. One computer overemphasizes the goal of protecting itself (Dick, Vulcan's Hammer), one gets carried away by its goal of avoiding thermo-nuclear war (Cardin, The God Machine), two become lonely and hence mad (Fairman, I, the Machine; Pohl, Starchild), another becomes psychotic because of what it learns from men's minds (Delany, The Fall of the Towers), others are under the control of selfish people (Cameron, Cybernia; Sladek, The Reproductive System). Most of these systems are destroyed by man's more flexible intelligence. However, in one story (Miller, "Dumb Waiter"), the system goes on even after there are no more people, and in another (Dick, "Autofac"), without the knowledge of the people.

Loss of Control

Some ten years ago when discussing views of computers in science fiction, I pointed out that few contemporary stories could be viewed simply as man's worries about his machines getting beyond his control. I noted that most of the stories focused on extensions of specific current uses and emphasized man's responsibilities as technology advanced (30, 31). While there are some stories in which computers turn on their makers (Dnieprov, "Siema"), the stories just cited have two significantly different characteristics. The stories do not begin with the construction of a machine motivated by curiosity or scientific naivetée, but instead, they begin with the populace agreeing to control by the machine. We read, for example, that in 1993 after a large world war, all nations agree to "subordinate themselves in a realistic manner ... to a common supranational authority ..." which is a machine so that it won't put "interest over reason, emotion over logic" (Dick, Vulcan's Hammer p. 19); or that another machine is built to control the world because with stone axes men could be free as they could do only limited damage before they were stopped but with advanced technology men could do damage so much more quickly they cannot be free to start (Pohl, Starchild). In A Tale of the Big Computer (Johannesson), a history of life until the "computer age," we learn that man is a part of the evolution leading up to computers and that the basic cause of his failure was the inability to organize a complex society. In the very enjoyable Funco File (Cole), when the question is raised, "Has it become your ruler, your god ..."?, the response is, "Well, no. Not exactly. It's more like where our technology triumphs have finally got us to. I guess you might say our real ruler was always an idea of what's normal or not. Conformity, I guess you'd call it ... I suppose the Machine — plus the F.D.I. — working together — have sort of externalized it once and for all." In the stories where there is a struggle between man and the computer, it is not a struggle to retain control but to get it back once it has knowingly been given away or unwillingly allowed to slip away.

Consequences of Bigness

The persistent theme in these stories is that of Bigness — big states and big computer systems — and its consequences. This bigness is well described in an article by Weizenbaum. This article is important because it is one of the few expository statements of this serious theme.

> These often gigantic systems are put together by teams of programmers, often working over a time span of many years. By the time the systems come into use, most of the original programmers have left or turned their attention to other pursuits. It is precisely when gigantic systems begin to be used that their inner workings can no longer be understood by any single person or by a small team of individuals. ... This situation, which is now upon us, has two consequences: first that decisions are made on the basis of rules and criteria no one knows explicitly, and second that the system of rules and criteria becomes immune to change. ("On the Impact of the Computer on Society," pp. 612-613).

What is the effect of this situation on individuals and on society? Two side effects are discussed by Weizenbaum.

> First of course, there is the psychological impact on individuals living in a society in which anonymous, hence irresponsible, forces formulate the large questions of the day and circumscribe the range of possible answers. ... But even worse, since computer-based knowledge systems become essentially unmodifiable except in that they can grow, and since they induce dependence and cannot, after a certain threshold is crossed, be abandoned, there is an enormous risk that they will be passed from one generation to another, always growing. (Ibid., p. 613)

Computers Are Not Gadgets

The reader may argue the degree to which these side effects are already present in our society, but, if he reads sicence-fiction, he cannot ignore them. While the first theme of the differences of man and machines may be the most repeated, this second theme is probably the most important. The science-fiction writers maintain their importance as poets of the "computer revolution" by redirecting our attention from the computer as "gadget" to the computer as an integral part of the modern configuration of government-academe-industry-management which shares skills, resources, techniques, personnel, and goals. Just as our image of the scientist has changed from the man standing lonely vigil over a bubbling retort to prove his scorned hypothesis, the isolated computer with a programmed quirk, asked the wrong question or fed the wrong data, is no longer hero. Frankenstein's monster, or the more recent, Karl, Emmy, and Siema, for example, are very limited creations with identifiable creators, circumscribed environments, and restricted effects. We now have instead Shalmaneser, Project 79, Vulcan 3, Allied Mastercomputer, or simply, The Machine. The new computer-hero has remote access, varied input and output devices, processes large amounts of data supplied by different agencies, works in real-time, makes policy decisions based on quasi-mathematics, commands vast resources, and affects large numbers of people.

Bibliography

Fiction

1. Anderson, Poul. "Sam Hall". Astounding Science Fiction, September 1953, as reprinted in (10).
2. Asimov, Isaac. "Franchise". If, Vol. 5, No. 5, August 1955.
3. __________. "Someday". 1956, as reprinted in (23).
4. Boulle, Pierre. "The Perfect Robot". Time Out of Mind, Vanguard Press, 1966 (quote p. 75, Signet edition, 1969).
5. Brunner, John. Stand on Zanzibar. Ballantine Books, 1968, (quotes pp. 101, 645, 649).
6. Burdick, Eugene. The 480. Dell Publishing Co., 1964.
7. Caidin, Martin. The God Machine. E.P. Dutton & Co., 1968.
8. Cameron, Lou. Cybernia. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1972.
9. Cole, Burt. The Funco File. Doubleday, 1969, (quote p. 187, Avon edition, 1970).
10. Conklin, Groff, ed. Selections from Science-Fiction Thinking Machines. Vanguard, 1954.
11. Delany, Samuel R. The Fall of the Towers. Sphere Books, Great Britain, 1971 (originally published as Bk. I — Out of the Dead City; Bk. II — The Towers of Toron; Bk. III — City of a Thousand Suns).
12. Dick, Philip K. "Autofac". Galaxy Publishing Corp., 1955, as reprinted in (14).
13. __________. "The Variable Man". Space Publications Inc., 1953, as reprinted in (14).
14. __________. The Variable Man and Other Stories. Ace Books, 1957.
15. __________. Vulcan's Hammer. Ace Books, 1960.
16. Dnieprov, Anatoly. "Siema". More Soviet Science Fiction, Collier Books, 1962.
17. Ellison, Harlan. "I Have No Mouth and I Must Scream". If, 1967, as reprinted in I Have No Mouth and I Must Scream, Pyramid Books, 1967, (quote p. 34).
18. Escarpit, Robert. The Novel Computer. Flammarion, 1964, (English translation Martin Secker and Warburg, Ltd., England, 1966).
19. Fairman, Paul W. I, the Machine. Lancer Books, 1968.
20. Galouye, Dan. Counterfeit World. Victor Gollanz, Great Britain, 1964.
21. Heinlein, Robert A. The Moon is a Harsh Mistress. Putnam-Berkley Medallion Books, 1966.
22. Johannesson, Olof. A Tale of the Big Computer (English translation). Coward-McCann, Inc., 1968.
23. Knight, Damon, ed. The Metal Smile. Belmont Production, 1968.
24. Mason, Douglas R. Matrix. Ballentine Books, 1970.
25. Miller, Walter M., Jr. "Dumb Waiter". Astounding Science Fiction. April 1952, as reprinted in (10).

26. Pohl, Frederick and Jack Williamson. Starchild. Penguin Books, 1970.
27. Sheckley, Robert. "Fool's Mate". 1953, as reprinted in (23).
28. Sladek, John. The Reproductive System. Mayflower Paperbacks, England, 1970.
29. Weir, E. C. "What Happened to the Teaching Machine". Teaching Machines: Industry Survey and Buyer's Guide. Center for Programmed Instruction, 1962, as reprinted in Of Men and Machines, A.O. Lewis, Jr., ed., Dutton, 1963.

Non-Fiction

30. Ascher, Marcia. "Computers in Science Fiction". Harvard Business Review, November-December 1963.
31. ___________. "Fictional Computers and Their Themes". Computers and Automation. Vol. 11, No. 12, December 1962.
32. Cousins, Norman. "The Computer and the Poet". Saturday Review, July 1966, as reprinted in (35), (quote p. 500).
33. Mazlish, Bruce. "The Fourth Discontinuity". Technology and Culture. January 1967, as reprinted in (35).
34. Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows, Jergen, Randers, and William W. Behrens III. The Limits to Growth. Potomac Associates, 1972 (New American Library Signet edition, 1972).
35. Pylyshyn, Zenon W., ed. Perspectives on the Computer Revolution. Prentice-Hall, 1970.
36. Simon, Herbert A., and Allen Newell. "Information-Processing in Computers and Man". American Scientist. Vol. 52, No. 3, 1964, as reprinted in (35).
37. Weizenbaum, Joseph. "On the Impact of the Computer on Society". Science. Vol. 176, May 1972. ☐

Binger — *Continued from page 17*

our world trade. These weights must be removed and this need must be attended to by Congress and ourselves. We must endorse, broaden and actively support the steps that adjustment assistance can take to alleviate human distress, cushion the impact of change and spur internal transition to successful competitive enterprise.

When we become more familiar with the great influence wielded by exports and the creative capabilities of companies that operate in many lands, we will do a lot more to overcome, where they exist, the penalties we pay for the benefits we enjoy. I firmly believe this.

If I have reminded you of both the pluses and minuses that world trade produces, ask yourself how much of this your family knows and understands. See how skillful you can be in finding ways to make this vital topic really interesting to your family, your neighbors, your associates and the other thinkers, teachers and decision-makers in your community.

This we will do, wherever we have Honeywell people who have built their careers on unraveling knotty problems in research, production, distribution, legislation and public affairs.

We mean to do the things which will make the ordering of a sound world trade policy in the United States the logical and popular response to a broad and informed public petition.

We intend to urge businessmen, labor leaders, and government officials to work for a system of world business that will create jobs all over the world — not in one country to the disadvantage of another. ☐

CORRECTION

In the article "The Path to Championship Chess by Computer" by Professor Donald Michie published in the January 1973 issue of "Computers and Automation," the following corrections should be made:

Page 7, second column, third paragraph, lines 1 and 2: replace "the Rand Corporation mathematician" by "the professional philosopher".

Page 8, the chess position for Figure 1B should be:

1b



Page 9, the graph in Figure 2 should be as follows (containing one more connecting link):





Page 1

U S POSTAL SERVICE

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON PAGE 2 (REVERSE)

1. TITLE OF PUBLICATION: Computers and Automation
2. DATE OF FILING: September 30, 1973
3. FREQUENCY OF ISSUE: monthly
4. LOCATION OF KNOWN OFFICE OF PUBLICATION: 815 Washington St., Newtonville, Middlesex County, Mass. 02160
5. LOCATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS OR GENERAL BUSINESS OFFICES OF THE PUBLISHERS: Berkeley Enterprises, Inc., same address
6. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF PUBLISHER, EDITOR, AND MANAGING EDITOR

PUBLISHER: Edmund C. Berkeley, 815 Washington St., Newtonville, Mass. 02160

EDITOR: same

MANAGING EDITOR: same

7. OWNER

NAME	ADDRESS
Berkeley Enterprises, Inc.	815 Washington St., Newtonville, Mass. 02160
Edmund C. Berkeley	" " "
James J. Cryan	33 Sandra Lane, Wayne, N.J. 07470
Ed Burnett	40 East 10 St., New York, N.Y. 10003

8. KNOWN BONDHOLDERS, MORTGAGEES AND OTHER SECURITY HOLDERS OWNING OR HOLDING 1 PERCENT OR MORE OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF BONDS, MORTGAGES OR OTHER SECURITIES

NAME	ADDRESS

9. FOR OPTIONAL COMPLETION BY PUBLISHERS MAILING AT THE REGULAR RATES

10. FOR COMPLETION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AUTHORIZED TO MAIL AT SPECIAL RATES

☐ ☐

11. EXTENT AND NATURE OF CIRCULATION	AVERAGE NO. COPIES EACH ISSUE DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS	ACTUAL NUMBER OF COPIES OF SINGLE ISSUE PUBLISHED NEAREST TO FILING DATE
A. TOTAL NO. COPIES PRINTED (Net Press Run)	9008	8300
B. PAID CIRCULATION 1. SALES THROUGH DEALERS AND CARRIERS, STREET VENDORS AND COUNTER SALES	0	0
2. MAIL SUBSCRIPTIONS	7611	7175
C. TOTAL PAID CIRCULATION	7611	7175
D. FREE DISTRIBUTION BY MAIL, CARRIER OR OTHER MEANS 1. SAMPLES, COMPLIMENTARY, AND OTHER FREE COPIES	100	100
2. COPIES DISTRIBUTED TO NEWS AGENTS, BUT NOT SOLD	0	0
E. TOTAL DISTRIBUTION (Sum of C and D)	7711	7275
F. OFFICE USE, LEFT-OVER, UNACCOUNTED, SPOILED AFTER PRINTING	1297	1025
G. TOTAL (Sum of E & F—should equal net press run shown in A)	9008	8300

Edmund C. Berkeley

A fabulous gift for Christmas:

"RIDE THE EAST WIND: Parables of Yesterday and Today"

by Edmund C. Berkeley, Author and Anthologist

Over fifty parables (including anecdotes, allegories, and fables) by Berkeley and many other authors, modern and ancient, dealing with famous problems, modern, classic, or ageless. Many parables are decorated by a bouquet of proverbs and quotations — for readers who like to choose which variety of lesson appeals to them. A short guide to some patches of common sense and wisdom. An ideal gift. Illustrated. Hard cover. 224 pages.

The eagle in the great forest flew swiftly, but the Eastwind flew more swiftly still

Do you remember the story of the fox and the grapes? illustrating a principle of such timeless value that the phrase "sour grapes" has been used and understood by millions of people for 2000 years?

Well, why not make a collection of ideas and principles of common sense and wisdom — and why not illustrate them with fables, allegories, and anecdotes of enormous impact?

That was the plan of this book.

It comes right out of our work on the "Notebook on Common Sense and Wisdom, Elementary and Advanced" — which we have been talking about for two years to anyone who would listen.

Some of the issues of the Notebook roused the interest of the president of Quadrangle Books — and this book is one of the results.

You can't lose by taking a look at this book:

- You might enjoy it.
- You might find much of it humorous and imaginative — as did Aesop's listeners.
- You might find it instructive, philosophical, worth thinking about, and more besides.

You can see it, read it, keep it for 7 days, return it, and back comes the full price of the book.

How can you lose?

We want only satisfied customers.

"RIDE THE EAST WIND:
Parables of Yesterday and Today"

Table of Contents

Part 1. *The Condition of Man*

Pandora and the Mysterious Box / H. A. Guerber
The Garden of Paradise* / Hans Christian Andersen
*to which the King's son was transported by the East Wind
The History of the Doasyoulikes / Charles Kingsley
The Locksmith and the Stranger / Edmund C. Berkeley (B)
The Elephant and the Donkey / James Reston
Where that Superhighway Runs, There Used to be a Cornfield / Robert Redfield
The Fire Squirrels / B

Part 2. *On Flattery and Persuasion*

The Crow and the Fox / Jean de La Fontaine
The Visitor who Got a Lot for Three Dollars / George Ade
The Cuckoo and the Eagle / Ivan A. Kriloff
The Wind and the Sun / Aesop
The Lion in Love / Aesop
The Crow and the Mussel / Aesop, B
The Two Raccoons and the Button / B

Part 3. *On Perseverance and Resourcefulness*

The Crow and the Pitcher / Aesop
Robert Bruce and the Spider / Sir Walter Scott
Hannibal Mouse and the Other End of the World / B
The Fly, the Spider, and the Hornet / B

Part 4. *Behavior — Moral and Otherwise*

A Small Wharf of Stones / Benjamin Franklin
The Three Bricklayers / B
The Good Samaritan / St. Luke
Much Obliged, Dear Lord / Fulton Oursler
The Fisherman, the Farmer, and the Peddler / B

Part 5. *The Problem of Truth*

On Being a Reasonable Creature / Benjamin Franklin
The Monkey and the Spectacles / Ivan A. Kriloff
The Golden Trumpets of Yap Yap / Mike Quin
The Barrels and the Pittsburgh Manufacturer / B
The Empty Column / William J. Wiswesser
The Differences in Two Strains of Corn / Edgar Anderson
The Six Blind Men of Nepal / B
The Sighting of a Whale / B
The Stars and the Young Rabbit / B
The Ocean of Truth / Sir Isaac Newton

Part 6. *On Common Sense*

The Lark and her Young Ones / Aesop
The Bear and the Young Dog / B
The Bear and the Young Calf / B
The Bear and the Young Beaver / B
The Wasps and the Honey Pot / Sir Roger l'Estrange
The Six-Day War and the Gulf of Dong / B
The Deceived Eagle / James Northcote
Missile Alarm from Grunelandt / B
The National Security of Adularia / B
Doomsday in St. Pierre, Martinique / B

Part 7. *Problem Solving*

The Wolf and the Dog of Sherwood / Aesop, B
The Three Earthworms / B
The Hippopotamus and the Bricks / B
The Cricket that Made Music / Jean de La Fontaine, B
The Fox of Mt. Etna and the Grapes / B
The Mice of Cambridge in Council / Aesop, B
Brer Badger's Old Motor Car that Wouldn't Go / B
The First Climbing of the Highest Mountain in the World / Sir John Hunt, B
The Evening Star and the Princess / B

Notes
Some Collections of Parables and Fables

The Fox of Mt. Etna and the Grapes

Once there was a Fox who lived on the lower slopes of Mt. Etna, the great volcano in Sicily. These slopes are extremely fertile; the grapes that grow there may well be the most delicious in the world; and of all the farmers there, Farmer Mario was probably the best. And this Fox longed and longed for some of Farmer Mario's grapes. But they grew very high on arbors, and all the arbors were inside a vineyard with high walls, and the Fox had a problem. Of course, the Fox of Mt Etna had utterly no use for his famous ancestor, who leaping for grapes that he could not reach, called them sour, and went away.

The Fox decided that what he needed was Engineering Technology. So he went to a retired Engineer who lived on the slopes of Mt. Etna, because he liked the balmy climate and the view of the Mediterranean Sea and the excitement of watching his instruments that measured the degree of sleeping or waking of Mt. Etna. The Fox put his problem before the Engineer. . . .

To be published in November 1973 by Quadrangle / The New York Times Book Co., hard cover, $6.95

RETURNABLE IN 7 DAYS IF NOT SATISFACTORY
(You can read it all in 7 days — and keep it only if you think it is worth keeping.)

(may be copied on any piece of paper)

To: Computers and Automation
815 Washington St., Dept. CA11, Newtonville, Mass. 02160

( ) Please send me when published (November publication expected) ______copy(ies) of *Ride the East Wind: Parables of Yesterday and Today* by Edmund C. Berkeley, Author and Anthologist. I enclose $7.25 (Publication price + Postage and Handling) per copy.

Total enclosed ________ (Prepayment is necessary)

RETURNABLE IN 7 DAYS FOR FULL REFUND IF NOT SATISFACTORY

My name and address are attached

EDITORIAL

(an updated version of an editorial first printed May 1973)

Burying Facts and Rewriting History - II

One of the efforts of this magazine is to pursue truth.

One of the ways in which truth is pursued is not to let statements of the utmost importance be buried and forgotten in the pages of daily newspapers, nor unreported and lost because they are no longer well covered in national news magazines.

Among those statements are two of permanent interest in connection with the Watergate Caper (this phrase is establishmentese for "the Watergate Crime").

- The statement by Bernard L. Barker, one of the convicted operatives, which explains his motivation and background (see November 1972, *Computers and Automation*).
- The statement by Alfred Baldwin, 3rd, ex-FBI agent, an employee of the Republican Committee to Re-elect the President, telling what he did and saw while five men burglarized the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee on June 17, 1972, about 2:30 a.m. (see December 1972, *C&A*).

In addition, we have published seven installments of reports on the Watergate Crime by our contributing editor, Richard E. Sprague (a computer professional of 25 years standing) who as an avocation has studied for many years dirty political operations in the United States, including the assassinations by conspiracies (not "lone assassins") of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, and Reverend Martin Luther King.

Three years ago in May 1970, when we began to publish this type of article, we could not have spoken confidently of "the assassination by conspiracies" of two Kennedys and one King. But the articles we have published – which are listed and characterized on the following pages – have together a remarkable impact.

Taken together, the information published May 1970 to October 1973 in *Computers and Automation* effectively destroys a large segment of the beliefs, the rewritten history, that the establishment in the United States has arranged for people in the United States to believe. I do not assert that the establishment is a conscious organism or organization; perhaps the best description is this: a loose confederation of overt conspiracies, silent conspiracies, and biased wealthy persons, with very intelligent orchestration stemming from the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Presidency, and with assists from organized crime and the Mafia.

We challenge any fairminded person to read this column (may be ordered from us), and after reading them, to still believe that the assassinations are actually the actions of "lone psychopaths," instead of fitting together into a plan to install a certain kind of autocracy in the United States.

This kind of autocracy claims to be democratic, to stand up for "national security," "executive privilege," "separation of Constitutional powers," etc. It offers appearances of democracy, but it seizes the realities of money and power. It cuts programs of social benefit; but it allocates $80 billion a year to be paid to the military-industrial-Pentagon complex.

In the 1940's there was a name for this kind of autocracy. Its name was "fascism," effectively a dictatorship in the interests of big business. What is now appearing in the U.S. is "fascism" in the form of a dictatorship by the military-industrial complex.

Here in a nutshell is an example of the present uneven contest: it takes the form of two sentences in a report by E. Drake Lundell, Jr., in *Computerworld* for April 22, 1973:

> ● The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department is "outmanned and outgunned" when it comes to prosecuting cases like the current action against IBM, Senate investigators were told last week.
>
> ● In addition, witnesses before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee stated that often the division cannot do its job properly because of political pressure from the White House. ...

These two statements contain a world of implications.

Essentially, the Department of the United States Government which is charged with enforcing certain U.S. laws against monopoly, can no longer properly function because of (1) the enormous power of just one business, IBM, and (2) political pressure from the White House (this phrase is establishmentese for "President Richard M. Nixon").

We must dig up facts, remember them, and write history the way it is.

We must take action to compel the persons who deceive us and lie to us to leave the government of the United States, such as Spiro Agnew, former Vice President.

Edmund C. Berkeley

The Watergate Crime

Articles Published in *Computers and Automation* August 1972 to September 1973

Inventory of Titles, Authors, and Summaries

August 1972

33 **The June 1972 Raid on Democratic Party Headquarters — Part 1**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
A report on five men who have numerous connections with the Republican Party, the White House, the Central Intelligence Agency, anti-Castro Cubans, and plans for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and who were arrested seeking to bug Democratic National Headquarters at 2:30 a.m., June 17, 1972.

October 1972

18 **The Raid on Democratic Party Headquarters (The Watergate Incident) — Part 2**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
A report on further developments in the June 1972 raid by James McCord, Bernard Barker, and others, on National Democratic Party Headquarters, and implications affecting a number of Republican leaders and President Richard M. Nixon.

November 1972

26 **Bernard L. Barker: Portrait of a Watergate Burglar**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
How a cloak and dagger operative and right-wing activist, who was caught as a burglar in the Watergate Hotel offices of the Democratic National Headquarters, looks at himself and his line of work.

29 **Walter Sheridan — Democrats' Investigator? or Republicans' Countermeasure?**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
Walter Sheridan, recently employed by the Democratic National Committee to investigate the Watergate Incident, may actually be a "countermeasure" by the Republicans to defeat the Democratic investigation.

December 1972

24 **The Raid on Democratic Party Headquarters (The Watergate Incident) — Part 3**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
A report on further developments in the June 1972 raid by James McCord, Bernard Barker, and others, on National Democratic Party Headquarters, and implications affecting a number of Republican leaders and President Richard M. Nixon.

26 **Martha Mitchell and the Watergate Incident**
by Martha Mitchell, the magazine *Parade*, and Richard E. Sprague
How Martha Mitchell (wife of former Attorney General John Mitchell) was molested and kept incommunicado and a prisoner — reported on by Mrs. Mitchell and the editor of *Parade* magazine.

27 **The Watergate Crime: An Eye-Witness Account**
by Alfred Baldwin, 3rd
A round-by-round account by an ex-FBI agent, an employee of the Republican Committee to Re-elect the President, of what went on while five men burglarized the Watergate offices, June 17, 2:30 a.m. Baldwin's main assignment was listening to bugged calls to the Democratic National Committee.

January 1973

33 **President Richard M. Nixon, the Bay of Pigs, and the Watergate Incident — Part 4**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
How President Nixon lied in 1960 about the plans for the Bay of Pigs Invasion, and is suppressing in 1972 the investigations of the Watergate Incident.

March 1973

26 **The Watergate Crime and the Cover-Up Strategy — Part 5**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
A report on the trial of E. Howard Hunt, James McCord, Bernard Barker, and four other persons for their raid on Democratic National Committee Headquarters in June 1972 using funds of the Republican Committee for the Re-Election of the President; and the strategies of cover-up that have been employed.

June 1973

26 **Watergate: What More is There to Hide? — Part 6**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
How investigation into the Watergate Crime is leading to ramifications and implications, and what are some more of the now hidden connections that may be revealed.

August 1973

36 **Lessons of Watergate — Part 7**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
The collection of Watergate Crimes; the anatomy of a "Really Big American Cover-Up"; other cases of "Really Big American Cover-Ups"; and the implications and ramifications.

September 1973

37 **Six Parallels of 25 Years Ago**
by Alger Hiss
How an establishment attacked Alger Hiss —

Political Assassinations in the United States

Articles Published in *Computers and Automation* May 1970 to October 1973

Inventory of Titles, Authors, and Summaries

May 1970

30 **The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: The Application of Computers to the Photographic Evidence**
by Richard E. Sprague
A reexamination of some of the evidence relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy – with emphasis on the possibilities and problems of computerized analysis of the photographic evidence.

July 1970

29 **The May Article, "The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: The Application of Computers to the Photographic Evidence" – Report No. 2:**
32 More About Jim Hicks
32 Confirmation of FBI Knowledge 12 Days Before Dallas of a Plot to Kill President Kennedy
35 The Second Conspiracy About the Assassination of President Kennedy

August 1970

48 **The Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy:**
48 Preface, by Edmund C. Berkeley
50 Two Men With Guns Drawn at Senator Kennedy's Assassination: Statement to the Press, by Theodore Charach
50 Map of the Scene of the Assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy
51 The Pantry Where Senator Robert Kennedy was Assassinated
52 Bullet Hole in the Frame of a Door
53 Two Bullet Holes in the Center Divider of the Pantry Door

September 1970

39 **Patterns of Political Assassination: How Many Coincidences Make a Plot?**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
How the science of probability and statistics can be used as an instrument of decision to determine if a rare event is: (1) within a reasonable range; (2) unusual or strange or suspicious; or (3) the result of correlation or cause or conspiracy.

48 **Computer-Assisted Analysis of Evidence Regarding**

Progress Report
by Richard E. Sprague

October 1970

52 **The Conspiracy to Assassinate Senator Robert F. Kennedy and the Second Conspiracy to Cover It Up**
by Richard E. Sprague
A summary of what researchers are uncovering in their investigation of what appears to be not one but two conspiracies relating to the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

56 **Index to "Special Unit Senator: The Investigation of the Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy"**
An index is supplied for the Random House book written by Robert A. Houghton, of the Los Angeles Police Department, about the investigation of the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

November 1970

44 **Confidential and Secret Documents of the Warren Commission Deposited in the U.S. Archives**
by Neil Macdonald, Assistant Editor
A list of the subjects of over 200 documents of the Warren Commission which were classified confidential, secret, and top secret.

December 1970

39 **The Assassination of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., The Role of James Earl Ray, and the Question of Conspiracy**
by Richard E. Sprague
James Earl Ray says he was coerced into entering a plea of guilty to killing Martin Luther King . . . and contrary evidence (plus other evidence) have led to filing of legal petitions for relief.

January 1971

45 **The Death of Walter Reuther: Accidental or Planned?**
by Edmund C. Berkeley and Leonard Walden
Some significant questions about the plane crash in May 1970 in which Walter Reuther was killed.

February 1971

48 **The Report of the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations**
by Bernard Fensterwald, James Lesar, and Robert

What the National Committee in Washington, D.C. is doing about computerizing files of evidence, initiating lawsuits to obtain information, etc.; and comments on two new books by District Attorney Jim Garrison and Robert Blair Kaiser.

March 1971

35 **"The Assassination of President Kennedy: The Application of Computers to the Photographic Evidence" — Comment**

35 I. Another View, by Benjamin L. Schwartz, Ph.D.
A polemical attack on "The Assassination of President Kennedy: the Application of Computers to the Photographic Evidence" by Richard E. Sprague published May 1970.

40 II. Response, by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor

45 **District Attorney Jim Garrison on the Assassination of President Kennedy: A Review of *Heritage of Stone***
by Neil Macdonald, Assistant Editor

April 1971

32 **The Right of Equal Access to Government Information**
by the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Washington, D.C.

May 1971

27 **The Assassination of President Kennedy: The Spatial Chart of Events in Dealey Plaza**
by Robert B. Cutler, Architect
The chart, first published in May 1970, is revised and brought up to date.

June 1971

41 **The Case of Secret Service Agent Abraham W. Bolden**
by Bernard Fensterwald, Attorney, Executive Director, National Committee to Investigate Assassinations
Bolden wanted to tell the Warren Commission about a Chicago plot to kill President Kennedy, and was jailed six years on a framed-up charge for trying to do so.

July 1971

51 **The Central Intelligence Agency and *The New York Times***
by Samuel F. Thurston, Newton, Mass.
The issue of systematic suppression of questions about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and a hypothesis.

August 1971

37 **Jim Garrison, District Attorney, Orleans Parish, vs. the Federal Government**
by Bernard Fensterwald, Attorney, Executive Director, National Committee to Investigate Assassinations
How District Attorney Jim Garrison of New Orleans became interested in the New Orleans phase of the assassination of President Kennedy; and how the Federal government frustrated and blocked his investigation in more than a dozen ways.

September 1971

26 **The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Assassination of President Kennedy**
by Bernard Fensterwald, Attorney
How J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI withheld much pertinent information from the Warren Commission, flooded them with irrelevant information, and altered some important evidence, thus concealing Oswald's connections with the FBI.

October 1971

41 **The Assassination of President Kennedy — Declassification of Relevant Documents from the National Archives**
by Richard E. Sprague
The titles of the documents and other evidence indicate convincingly that Lee Harvey Oswald was trained in spy work by the CIA before his visit to Russia; etc. Like the Pentagon Papers, these documents should be declassified.

November 1971

24 **The Assassination of President Kennedy: The Pattern of Coup d'Etat and Public Deception**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
Five significant, eye-opening events from May 1970 to October 1971, showing patterns of coup d'etat, assassination, and concealment; and some predictions.

December 1971

32 **The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: A Model for Explanation**
by Vincent J. Salandria, Attorney, Philadelphia, Pa.
A study of the reasons why a great deal of the Federal government's own evidence in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy declared "conspiracy" — and a hypothesis, supported by considerable evidence, about why the President was assassinated and how the implications of that action were to be signaled to those who could read the signals.

6 **The Strategy of Truth-Telling**
by Edmund C. Berkeley
Editorial

January 1972

57 **Spotlight on McGeorge Bundy and the White House Situation Room**
by Robert B. Cutler, Manchester, Mass.
An argument that the "lone assassin — no conspiracy" announcement from the White House Situation Room could have resulted from information available in Dallas and Washington prior to the announcement — and thus does not actually demonstrate that someone there had a guilty foreknowledge of the shooting.

February 1972

43 **Who Shot President Kennedy? — Or Fact and Fable in History**
by Gareth Jenkins, Weston, Mass.
How the physical evidence actually published by the Warren Commission relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy shows conclusively that more than one man was responsible for the shooting — contrary to the Commission's own report.

March, April, May, June 1972

28 **Dallas: Who, How, Why? (in four parts)**
by Mikhail Sagatelyan, Moscow, USSR
A long report published in Leningrad, USSR, by an ace Soviet reporter about the circumstances of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and their significance from a Soviet point of view.

July 1972

32 **The Shooting of Presidential Candidate George C. Wallace: A Systems-Analysis Discussion**
by Thomas Stamm, Bronx, N.Y., and Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor
An analysis of the shooting of Governor Wallace of Alabama; and a discussion of systematic methods for protecting American leaders from violent attacks.

10 **The Shooting of Governor George C. Wallace, Candidate for President**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor
Editorial

September 1972

24 **The Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy: Proofs of Conspiracy and of Two Persons Firing**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
A review and summary of the evidence showing conclusively the fact of conspiracy and the presence of two guns firing, at the time of the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

November 1972

32 **The Central Intelligence Agency: A Short History to Mid-1963 — Part 1**
by James Hepburn, author of *Farewell America*
The unverified, but probably largely true, secret history of the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S. — as a preliminary to its involvement in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

December 1972

34 **The Central Intelligence Agency: A Short History to Mid-1963 — Part 2**

38 **Le Francais Qui Devait Tuer Kennedy (The Frenchman Who Was To Kill Kennedy)**

January 1973

37 **The Frenchman Who Was To Kill Kennedy**
by Philippe Bernert and Camille Gilles, *L'Aurore*, Paris, France; translated by Ann K. Bradley
English translation of the French newspaper report on José Luis Romero, which was reprinted in French in the December issue.

40 **Why I Distrust the Romero Story**
by Robert P. Smith, Director of Research, Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Washington, D.C.
The Romero report reprinted from *L'Aurore* has many earmarks indicating that it is very difficult to believe.

February 1973

26 **Analysis of the Autopsy on President John F. Kennedy, and the Impossibility of the Warren Commission's "Lone Assassin" Conclusion**
by Cyril H. Wecht, M.D., Institute of Forensic Sciences, Pittsburgh, Pa.
The coroner of Allegheny County, Pa., reports on his examination of the evidence that still remains (some of it is missing) locked up in the National Archives of the United States, not accessible to ordinary investigators.

30 **U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir — Part 1**
by *Ramparts*, Berkeley, Calif.
How the U.S. National Security Agency intercepts, decodes, and understands almost all secret and top secret electronic communications and signals of all nations all over the world.

March 1973

31 **U. S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir — Part 2**
by *Ramparts*, Berkeley, Calif.
How the National Security Agency intercepted and decoded enemy messages in order to direct bombing strikes in Viet Nam, and often failed; and how the hideousness of what the American military forces were doing in Southeast Asia finally led this interviewee to resigning and terminating.

April, May 1973

34 **The New Orleans Portion of the Conspiracy to Assassinate President John F. Kennedy — Four Articles:**
(1) by Edmund C. Berkeley, in the April issue; (2) by Jim Garrison, in the April issue; (3) by F. Irving Dymond, in the May issue; (4) by Jim Garrison, in the May issue
On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States refused to permit Jim Garrison, District Attorney, New Orleans, to prosecute Clay Shaw for perjury. On November 21, Jim Garrison issued a statement commenting on this refusal, which is Article 4 of this set; Article 1 is an introduction; Articles 2 and 3 are opening statements

F. Irving Dymond, attorney for the defendant, in the February 1969 trial of Clay Shaw in New Orleans; Clay Shaw was charged by the grand jury with "having conspired with David W. Ferrie and Lee Harvey Oswald to murder President John F. Kennedy" — in regard to which the trial jury found Clay Shaw "not guilty".

May 1973

6 **Burying Facts and Rewriting History**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
Taken together, the information published May 1970 to May 1973 in *Computers and Automation* effectively destroys a large segment of the beliefs, the rewritten history, that the establishment in the United States has arranged for the people in the United States to believe.

June, July 1973

36 **The American News Media and the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Accessories After the Fact** (in two parts)
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
An examination of what happened in many important American news organizations, to cover up and hide the facts about how President John F. Kennedy was actually assassinated in Dallas.

September 1973

6 **Establishments and Truth**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
The nature of an establishment as a system

38 **A Parallel of 1963**
by Marguerite C. Oswald, Ft. Worth, Texas
The ignoring of evidence of conspiracy regarding Lee Harvey Oswald — a parallel to the Watergate cover-up.

October 1973

21 **The Framing of Lee Harvey Oswald**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
When Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested, Nov. 22, 1963, for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, he said to his captors in the Dallas jail cell, "I'm a patsy". A review of the evidence (including 18 photographs) proves that Oswald was a patsy, and that he was "framed" for the murder of President Kennedy — although "establishmentese" American history denies it.

Hertlein — *Continued from page 19*

human failing. Even the most broad-minded practitioner is bound by his or her capacities and philosophy, and it requires a deliberate and concerted effort to remain open-minded, and to appreciate varied approaches that are not in accord with one's own temporary aesthetic parameters. One discerns computer artists who prefer natural or man-made patterns and sounds, vs. those who desire only mathematics, electronic and computer sounds, sans the human touch. There are those who exploit two or three-dimensional static images, vs. the creators who prefer moving permutations in flux, declaiming that the computer is a perceptual medium, and therefore should not be imprisoned in static form, i.e., cybernetic art is "pure idea," ad infinitum. Ironically, even the newest of the arts appears destined to hardening within specific schools of thought, with separatist camps warring in "vs." expression and debate.

Summary

It is obvious that the concept of manipulation and processing via the computer is merely the first stage of cybernetic creation. Even now, far beyond the statements of the artistic problem and aesthetic, personal variation, is a vast, open territory that is being explored by questioning, hardy intellectual pioneers, as they seek to perceive the inner anatomy of art and philosophy:

What is style?
What constitutes the aesthetic? How may this be accomplished?
What is art? Music? Sculpture? Dance? Poetry?
What is science? Mathematics?
Is art purely the man-made: The sound of the human voice, or playing music upon man-made instruments? The painting and sculpting of man with hand-held tools?
Is art a part of life, embracing: The ordinary, the animal and natural sounds? The patterns carved by the winds, sands, and the water?
Is art perceptual, a mere fleeting moment or experience in time, or is it permanent, enduring?
What is the optimum role of man in a cybernetic society?
What is the role of art in a technology-oriented world?
What is the symbiosis of man-and-the-machine?
What is thinking?
What is creativity?
Is man the measure of all things?

When man uses the computer as an aid in creation, or when he attempts to create heuristic art, his mind finds new questions to explore and to answer. It appears highly possible that a renewed perception of life and the arts awaits present and future generations of man, and that this may be partially accomplished by eliminating the boundaries of compartmentalized disciplines, and by walking freely between art and science, by combining interdisciplinary practices and materials, to hopefully bring forth the ideal of an open, growing, and dimensional perception of art/life for the human race. ☐

Editor's Note: This paper is published in accordance with a new editorial policy of allowing writers freer expression, with no editing by the editors, in the hope that greater variety of expression and ideas will result for the benefit of readers.

Classified Advertisement

THE COLLEGE OF PETROLEUM & MINERALS

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

This major technical university, serving the petroleum and minerals industry, is seeking candidates for instructional faculty in a new College of Industrial Management, Department of DATA PROCESSING and INFORMATION SCIENCES.

Program will closely follow ACM curriculum committee recommendations on Computer Education for Management. Sophisticated configuration IBM 370/155 available. All instruction in English. Appointments will be at appropriate Academic Ranks for which candidates qualify, and be effective 1 September 1974. Personal interviews will be arranged after submission of documentation.

PROFESSOR (all Ranks)
Ph.D. in Information Science, Engineering or related fields; 3 to 5 years teaching experience; extensive experience with commercial systems and management information systems; broad knowledge of data processing/information system education; detailed knowledge of languages, methods, hardware and software evaluation used in commercial data processing application.

LECTURER/INSTRUCTOR PROGRAMMING and COMPUTER SYSTEMS (all Ranks)
M.B.A. or M.Sc. in Business Administration or similar academic qualifications; two to three years experience in government, business or industry in area of computer systems, programming, and systems analysis; previous teaching experience highly desirable but not essential; specific instructional capability: Programming (COBOL); Information Structures; Storage and Management; Sorting and Searching; Hardware/Software Configuration and Evaluation; File Systems; Data Management Systems; Communication System Organization; Data Base Development.

LECTURER/INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS (all Ranks)
M.B.A. or M.Sc. in Business Administration or Management; two to three years experience in Business Systems and Management Information with work in both systems analysis and design; previous teaching experience highly desirable but not essential. Specific instructional capabilities: Systems Organization or Management; Basic Analysis tools; Systems Implementation; Management Systems; Systems Life Cycle; Long-Range Planning; Systems Development; Scheduling and Allocation; Queuing Models; Inventory Models; Simulation Models.

Please send detailed professional resume and address all inquiries to:

College of Petroleum & Minerals
c/o Saudi Arabian Educational Mission
880 Third Avenue — 17th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10022

CORRECTION

In the July 1973 issue of Computers and Automation, a single article entitled "Communication — Three-Way: Chimpanzee, Man, Computer" was published. Part 1 was authored by Larry B. Dendy of the Public Relations Office of the University of Georgia and Part 2 was authored by Ernst von Glasersfeld et al of the University of Georgia and the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center of Emory University.

In compliance with the authors' wishes, the two parts of that article have been reprinted as two separate articles. The first article is authored solely by Larry B. Dendy and is titled, "Communication — Three Way: Chimpanzee, Man, Computer." The second article is authored by Ernst von Glasersfeld and his colleagues from the Yerkes Primate Research Center and Georgia State University and is titled, "A Computer Mediates Communication with a Chimpanzee." Also, and in compliance with the authors' wishes, all figures and tables of the article as published in the July 1973 issue have been included in the second of these articles.

In the 1973 annual index Computers and Automation will enter the two articles in this manner, which serves to separate a regular article from a formal scientific and technical report.

DID YOU ENJOY THIS ISSUE OF *COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION*

Would you like to send it at no cost to some friends of yours, with a message?

We'll join you half-way — you send us his name and address (with zip) and the message, and we will send the issue and your message to him TOGETHER WITH a gentle "soft-sell" invitation to subscribe to *Computers and Automation.*

We have set aside a hundred copies of this issue for this purpose. So long as they last, we can carry out your request.

Just fill in the following and send it to us:

(may be copied on any piece of paper)

To: Computers and Automation and People
815 Washington St., Newtonville, MA 02160

( ) I request that you send a copy of the __________ issue of *Computers and Automation and People* to

1. Name ____________________ My message ____________________
Address ____________________ ____________________
____________________ ____________________

2. Name ____________________ My message ____________________
Address ____________________ ____________________
____________________ ____________________

3. Name ____________________ My message ____________________
Address ____________________ ____________________
____________________ ____________________

My name and address (and zip) are attached. I am a subscriber to *Computers and Automation and People.*

Virtue, in Spite of Erroneous Conceptions

J. P. Frankel
Dean of the Faculty
Harvey Mudd College
Claremont, Calif. 91711

> *"We think of knowledge as knowing how-to-do-it, wisdom as knowing whether-to-do-it, and virtue (if the answer is yes) as doing-it."*

In this article, I mean virtue in a much narrower sense than the theologians, and I mean erroneous conceptions in a much broader sense than planners of parenthood.

Let me first speak of virtue.

We think of knowledge as knowing how-to-do-it, wisdom as knowing whether-to-do-it, and virtue as doing it. In this sense, at least in the universities, we think of scientists as knowing, the humanists as wise, and the engineers and other technicians (doctors, nurses, social workers and the like) as virtuous, that is, the do-ers.

The World is Full of Problems

Now the world is full of problems where we need to know how to do it, whether to do it, and (if the answer is yes) to do it. Each of us can make his own list of pressing social problems: pollution, arms limitation, or population growth. Fortunately we are reasonably well supplied with scientists, humanists, and technicians. To understand why we still have these urgent problems, let us turn to erroneous conceptions.

The erroneous conceptions I wish to deal with here are:

That it is within the power of scientists and engineers to choose to work only on projects "in the public interest," and
That the market place is where one discovers the public interest.

Choice of Projects to Work on

Critics seem to assume that scientists and engineers are free to choose their projects, and complain that they fail to consider the real public interest. Scientists may be free to choose their work, but they have no more to say about how their discoveries are used than Christopher Columbus did.

As for the engineers, they have more to say about the uses of science, since they are the ones who choose which of science's ideas will be applied, but they in turn have almost no way, at present, of identifying the public interest, and even less in determining which products or processes should be produced to serve it.

A Moratorium on Science?

We will return to this matter of choice, but first let's eliminate from the list of reasonable alternatives facing society, the silly and dangerous notion of a moratorium on science.

The key notion in the moratorium idea is that if you can't control it, you shouldn't do it. Therefore, we are urged, don't do any more science until (presumably) the humanists devise suitable controls. The trouble with this kind of conceptual contraception is two-fold. In the first place, as Paul Saltman has pointed out eloquently, you can't forbid knowing any more than you can forbid writing poetry. Science can be slowed down, of course, by driving it underground, but even if we slowed it way down, there is no evidence that we have either knowledge or wisdom enough to control its application, unless we change some of our habits.

Ignorance and Fear Lead to Irrationality

One habit that needs correction has to do with the thinking and feeling processes of the humanists — the philosophers, if you will — who presumably are to show us how to behave. Too often they are ignorant or fearful of science and engineering. What one is ignorant or fearful of, he cannot deal with in a rational way. There is no possibility that we can learn to control what we do by some non-rational process, such as satori, using mystically-fashioned playing cards, etc. Control over what we do will

---

Based on remarks delivered on Joseph C. Wilson Day, November 10, 1972, at the University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y.

have to be done rationally. I also believe that it will have to be done by humanists, and that before they can do it, we have somehow to lower, or at least make more permeable, the barrier that separates the Two Cultures. We will come back to this point later. Before that, let us return to the notion that engineers choose what they will work on.

The Choices of Engineers

Most engineers do not make cosmic choices. They do not decide that this product will be built and that one won't be. Practically all engineers, I suspect, work for other engineers, who work for others, who work in companies where the products are determined not by science or philosophy, but by market analysis. Now market analysis has come a long way since the days of the Edsel, and it often guesses accurately, although not always so, what the public is interested in buying. But what the public buys is not necessarily what it needs.

The Market-Place Guessing Game

We buy those things that are offered for sale that are better (in some vague way) than the alternatives available to us. Except for advertising or other ways of influencing public opinion, the basic mechanism of the market-place is a guessing game. Try this product, see if it sells. If it does, figure out what it was about it that sold, and push a little harder. If this one does not sell, retrench a little, or gamble on another change — and so on. Advertising and public opinion do play important roles — how else explain so many different labels on the same bar of soap, the same automobile? — but the decision as to how the engineers' skills will be used has, in the past, been largely determined by the instantaneous outcome of the market game.

Major Civil Problems

Now please do not misunderstand me. The market-place mechanisms are important for determining soap or automobile styles. I believe that criteria of risk-and-return of investment are elements of our decision-making processes that we could discard only at great peril to our society. What I am saying is that the major civil problems: pollution, poverty, and population density, for examples, are not likely to be defined by market analysis.

These problems, for which acceptable solutions are needed, share these characteristics:

First, they cross product classification lines, and involve more than one sector of the economy. They are not just problems of the auto industry, or the mining companies, or manufacturing-but-not-service-industries — they involve all of these. All the skills that all these sectors employ may have to be applied to these problems. The cement plants in the country and the transport companies in the city have pollution problems that differ only in detail. To expect them to do the necessary research and development separately, each with his eye on his own segment of the market, is to postpone until much too late, if not forever, solving even the smaller parts of our problems. The problems, so to speak, are too big.

These Problems are Hardly Separable

In the same way, the major civil problems are not readily separable. One can reduce the amount of air pollution caused by internal combustion engines by using electric autos, for example. If so, we may replace polluted air in the cities with polluted streams out in the country where the new massive power plants are. Or we can replace with solar energy the fissionable materials or fossil fuels we now use for power; however, at least in the near future, we would then have either much less energy or much more costly energy, and fewer jobs and more poverty. (Some among us tend to paint even blacker pictures. They point out that our society gave up slavery only when our technology developed to the point where machines were cheaper than slaves. Is it possible that we could deliberately reverse this process and end up with clean air, but with slaves?)

This characteristic of tight linkage, or inseparability of the big problems, also suggests that we cannot rely upon the ordinary market-place mechanisms to determine how we employ our technology to solve our problems.

Very Difficult Problems

The third characteristic of our problems that forces us to reconsider the mechanisms of choice, is that our problems are so very difficult. The technical solutions do not exist outside of social considerations. The social costs outweigh such usual factor costs as materials, labor, and capital. Our cities present much tougher problems than putting man on the moon. As someone smarter than but unknown to me, has said, "We couldn't have put a man on the moon if the moon had been inhabited".

World-wide and Nation-wide Problems

All these characteristics, and others that I've left out, such as geographical diversity — some problems are not local, nor even regional or national, but world-wide — suggest that the organizations needed for these new problem-solving teams differ considerably from those of even our biggest, most diversified companies, or else that we need some super-industrial team of coordinators, who are to be responsive not to the elements of the market-place, but rather to the public interest. Whether that public is regional, or national or world-wide, someone who has thought this problem further through must tell. My own thoughts, tempered by a certain sourly pragmatic view of the interactions of various national governments, suggests that the approach most likely to succeed in the near future is the national one.

The National Science Policy and Priorities Act

The essentials of a first step in a national plan are contained in the National Science Policy and Priorities Act, which, among other things, sets up procedures for contracting out to universities, companies and other organizations, the research and development necessary for solution of the major civil problems, including the design of civil science systems. Whether an agency like NASA should be set up, as the Act says, or whether an existing agency should supervise new programs, is a matter of debate. The importance to our discussion is that some federal funding agency, not the various product market-places, should establish the priorities and fund the solutions to our civil problems.

As you see, this bill or Act or plan makes a first approach to nationalizing the solution to national problems. At the same time it utilizes local collections of scientific, humanistic and engineering talent, that either already exist in the aerospace companies, universities and think tanks, or can be collected there. In essence, this bill solves one aspect of the problem. It replaces small or local or single-commodity market-places with a national market-place based on national needs. I suspect that the new agency will find that big aerospace companies usually do not have the necessary mix of talents, although they probably do have the necessary organization. The universities, on the other hand, probably do have the necessary mix of talents, but probably do not have the proper organization. It seems, however, to be a logical first step, and the sooner the bill becomes law, the sooner we can begin to solve our problems.

International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis

An example of the international approach is the recently established International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna as a joint venture of our National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy, among others. Since they will operate on about three-and-a-half million dollars a year (the Civil Science part of the National Science Policy and Priorities Act allots an average of 270 million per year for three years) it is unreasonable to expect anything more than papers for publication to come out of Vienna. The international effort will result in more knowledge and wisdom; on the proposed national budget we could become virtuous as well.

In Order to be Virtuous One Must be Wise and Knowing

One final caution. I hope you have not heard me suggest that only scientists and engineers are capable of leading us out of the thicket of difficulties we are in. I am not advocating technocracy, that totalitarian philosophy which says that only engineers can lead us. I do not believe that for one moment, nor does anyone who knows enough engineers and scientists. There is no reason to believe that they, as a class, are any more capable of leading our people than, say, the lawyers.

I would rather that you heard me say that no longer is it virtue merely to do it, but rather that in order to be virtuous one must also be wise and also knowing.

Our Leaders Must Be Part Scientist, Part Humanist, and Part Engineer

We will need new kinds of agencies and organizations to define "the public interest" and to find ways of organizing the talents that may solve some of our problems. But organizations — universities and corporations and public agencies — are built by people, led by other people. So our leaders must be part scientist, part humanist, and part engineer, and they must use what they have, not in response to some particular market-place, but in the true public interest. Not nearly enough people will be born with these characteristics. They will have to be educated.

If this sounds like a very tall order to put to an education system — it is.

But we should be encouraged to redesign our education systems to help produce such people, not only because we have to (God knows we do) if mankind is too survive — but also because we know it is possible. □

NUMBLES

Neil Macdonald
Assistant Editor
Computers and Automation

A "numble" is an arithmetical problem in which: digits have been replaced by capital letters; and there are two messages, one which can be read right away and a second one in the digit cipher. The problem is to solve for the digits.

Each capital letter in the arithmetical problem stands for just one digit 0 to 9. A digit may be represented by more than one letter. The second message, which is expressed in numerical digits, is to be translated (using the same key) into letters so that it may be read; but the spelling uses puns or is otherwise irregular, to discourage cryptanalytic methods of deciphering.

We invite our readers to send us solutions, together with human programs or computer programs which will produce the solutions.

NUMBLE 7311

```
          I F Y O U
        x   G I V E
        -----------
        Y L U Y I T
      Y O T R U O          GV = CU
    E U E U U E
  T Y C U O R
  -----------------
= C T U I O U O V T        327897972
```

Solution to Numble 7310

In Numble 7310 in the October issue, the digits O through 9 are represented by letters as follows:

O = 0
I = 1
E = 2
S = 3
H = 4
W = 5
P = 6
T = 7
R = 8
A = 9

The message is: Eat what is ripe.

Our thanks to the following individuals for submitting their solutions – to **Numble 7310:** Edward A. Bruno, N. Bergen, N.J. – to **Numble 739:** Edward A. Bruno, N. Bergen, N.J.; T. P. Finn, Indianapolis, Ind. – to **Numble 738:** Nihan Lloyd-Thurston, S. Nutfield, Surrey, England.

Nixon and the Mafia — Conclusion

Jeff Gerth
Contributing Editor
SunDance Magazine
1913 Fillmore St.
San Francisco, Calif. 94115

> *"Organized crime will put a man in the White House someday, and he won't even know it until they hand him the bill."*
>
> *— Ralph Salerno*

Part 1 of "Nixon and the Mafia" was published in the September issue of "Computers and Automation"; Part 2, in the October issue. Part 3 begins here with further information about the relation of President-to-be Richard M. Nixon with shady transactions in the Bahamas.

Shakeup in the Bahamas

By the middle Sixties there was a storm brewing. Internal friction had forced out a few people like Lou Chesler, while a wave of public investigations were blaring the role of underworld figures like Meyer Lansky. The 1967 Royal Commission of Inquiry also dredged up another familiar name — Richard Nixon.

Testimony before the Royal Commission by Max Courteney, a Lansky lieutenant, detailed a long bookmaking career and brought out the names of a large clientele, including the then ex-Vice President Richard Nixon.

Mary Carter Paint

The Royal Commission also bared a deal which implicated Richard Nixon far more deeply than passing mention by an underground bookie.

In 1967 Lyndon Pindling became the first black premier ever to serve the almost one hundred percent black citizenry of the island. Pindling was hardly a revolutionary, however, for among the people instrumental in putting him in office was a gambler close to Lansky named Mike McLaney. The Royal Commission branded McLaney a "thoroughly dangerous person" and accused him of maneuvering Pindling into at least one deal involving a questionable gambling concession.

Part of the post-election controversy was a company based in Tampa which bore the innocuous name of "Mary Carter Paint Company".

In 1965 Lansky's front-man (and former Key Biscayne landowner) Wallace Groves, filed a joint application with the Mary Carter Company to open a casino on Paradise Island in the Bahamas. The ubiquitous Sir Stafford Sands handled the legalities. Knowledgeable observers looked for the mystery man, and a Justice Department memo, dated January 18, 1966, predicted that "the atmosphere seems ripe for a Lansky skim".

After Pindling's election, Groves was forced out and the Mary Carter Paint Company had itself two new casinos. At the 1967 opening of one of them — the Nassau Bay Club — the honored guest was Richard Nixon.

The following year — 1968 — the other Mary Carter Club, the Paradise Island Casino, opened for business. The owners felt close enough to Nixon to offer him use of their facilities during the 1968 Republican Convention. Nixon felt more comfortable at Key Biscayne, but some of his staff took up the offer.

Mary Carter Becomes Resorts International

In 1969 Mary Carter — now called Resorts International — reluctantly "released" one Dino Cellini, claiming that while he "had a relatively unsavory background, he had no criminal record, no criminal associates". Cellini hopped across the water to Miami, where, according to Dade County Sheriff Intelligence Reports, he continued to work in conjunction with Paradise Island Casino. The reports allege that Cellini was an almost daily visitor to Resorts International's Miami office, where he checked credits and worked with a company booking junkets to the Paradise Island Casino.

There are those who maintain that Cellini's connections with Resorts International symbolize the influence of Lansky. In a 1971 editorial, the Las Vegas Sun concluded an eleven part series on organized crime — some of which centered on Resorts International — by charging that "however cloaked and cleverly concealed by the guardians, gambling in the Bahamas is controlled by Meyer Lansky and it has been established in police intelligence reports that the fee is fifteen percent of the gross income". The now defunct Toronto Telegram reported in 1970 that "observers believe that the resourceful Lansky is still managing to get his cut from the Bahamas".

Resorts International, through its ninety-one percent owned subsidiary, Intertel, has denied all allegations of involvement with organized crime. It

Reprinted with permission from *SunDance Magazine*, November-December, 1972, Volume 1, Number 3, published by and copyright by Running Dog, Inc., 1913 Fillmore St., San Francisco, Calif. 94115

was Intertel that ITT hired in 1972 to snoop on columnist Jack Anderson.

The latest and possibly most damaging charge in the Resorts International battle came in June 1972 in an IRS inspired indictment of Meyer Lansky and Dino Cellini. The indictment reads in part:

> On or about May 17, 1968, unindicted co-conspirator Vincent Teresa met with defendants Meyer Lansky and Dino Cellini in Miami and had a discussion wherein defendants Lansky and Cellini gave Teresa permission to conduct gambling junkets to the Paradise Island Casino.

Thus government agents allege that in 1968 Lansky maintained at least some control in running junkets to Resorts International's Paradise Island Casino. The junket racket is an integral part of the casino operation, and as recently as 1971 Lansky's cohort Eddie Cellini was reportedly still arranging junkets for the Paradise Island Casino.

Enter Nixon and Rebozo

It was in 1967 — with Lansky still okaying junkets and Cellini still running the Paradise Island Casino — that Richard Nixon and Bebe Rebozo became friends with the head of Resorts International.

It should be no surprise that James Golden, the recently (1969) hired "deputy director of security" for Resorts International is a good friend of Nixon's. As a Secret Service guard for Nixon when he was Vice President, Golden made a good enough impression to be appointed staff security chief for Nixon in 1968. Golden was also security director of Nixon's convention headquarters in Miami that year, and was security director for his subsequent inauguration. Later that year he moved to Resorts International. Golden is just one of a long string of interesting Nixon security appointees, among them Watergate indictees James McCord, Gordon Liddy, and Howard Hunt.

There are rumors, some of which have been aired in the press, that Richard Nixon owns stock in Resorts International. Former Republican Presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey does own stock in the company, and, according to organized crime investigator Hank Messick among others, there are reports of Lansky buying stock as well. Nobody has proved anything one way or another about the stock connections, but that Nixon is connected to Resorts International, at least through Golden, is indisputable.

Perhaps more disquieting than rumors of Nixon stock ownership in an underworld holding company for Bahamian casinos are the reports of his meddling in Bahamian affairs. In 1969 a proposed tax increase on gambling profits to provide money for Bahamian schools was slashed in half by the Minister of Finance. The Minister refused to explain the cut, and told opposition members to "use your imagination" for an explanation.

The advice was taken literally by some Bahamian papers who speculated that pressure came from "outside sources connected with casinos". One Bahamian paper asked openly if "a telephone call from the White House was not responsible?"

Whereas our investigation into Cuban politics brought evidence to light possible violations of the Neutrality Act, we now have the possibility of an American President who has spent a significant amount of his vacation time in the Bahamas also meddling in the affairs of that country.

Richard Nixon, a man with both visible and invisible links to the underworld and politics of pre-Castro Cuba, turns up in the Bahamas with very similar links, bringing some big names along with him.

Enter William Rogers

Two men with histories both in Bahamian politics and in the finances of organized crime have made frequent use of the legal services of a firm whose most prominent partner is Richard Nixon's old friend William P. Rogers, one-time Secretary of State.

The two men are Mike McLaney, charged by the Royal Commission in 1967, and a business cohort of his named William Colusardo. McLaney and Colusardo were investigated in 1967 by the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with a blueberry plantation that McLaney sold to a company controlled by Colusardo. The subsequent corporate jugglings implicated (among others) newly elected Bahamian Premier Lyndon Pindling. Among Colusardo's "favors" for Pindling were the use of his airplane during the election campaign, and a $127,000 contribution in the form of an "interest payment". The law firm that defended McLaney and Colusardo against the SEC was that of William P. Rogers. Rogers had been a close friend and political associate of Nixon's for twenty-five years. He accompanied Nixon on many of his Bahamian jaunts and also made frequent stops with him at the Key Biscayne Inn and Villas. In addition to being an "R & R" sidekick, Rogers was the man Nixon turned to for counsel amidst his personal crises in the Checkers affair and Eisenhower's serious heart attack.

Rogers served the Eisenhower/Nixon team for eight years in the Department of Justice, first as Deputy Attorney General, and then, by 1957, as Attorney General. The Justice Department's record against organized crime in the years following the Kefauver Commission was lackluster, to say the least. It was Rogers who personally rejected the recommendations of the specially constituted Wessell Committee on organized crime set up in the wake of the infamous Appalachian raid in upstate New York that revealed a Mafia summit conference. The Committee's proposals for a concentrated and coordinated war on organized crime were only implemented some years later by Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

A footnote in the Justice Department files was a report by IRS Special Agent Josph Delfine, dated October 19, 1953. The IRS recommended to the Justice Department that "criminal proceedings be instituted against Meyer Lansky in the Southern Judicial District of New York for the willful attempt to defeat and evade a large portion of his income taxes for the years 1945 and 1947 under section 145b of the Internal Revenue Code". The Justice Department — with William Rogers second in command at the time — respectfully declined to prosecute.

Lums Hot Dogs

Upon leaving his post as Attorney General in 1960, Rogers became a member of the New York firm of Royal, Koegel and Wells. In 1969, with its leading partner about to become Secretary of State, Royal, etc. moved with its clients wholeheartedly into the world of gambling casinos and organized crime.

A year later Royal took on the account of the Miami-based hot dog chain, Lums Inc. What did a hot dog chain have to offer a prestigious New York law firm? The answer may lie in where the firm took its client.

In 1969 Lums purchased the Ceasar's Palace Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas for $60,000,000. A month later the Nevada state gambling authorities were looking into the hotels' "catering to twelve underworld figures from Kansas City".

A few months after the purchase the SEC filed suit charging Lums and Ceasar's Palace with "false and misleading" statements. The SEC wondered how Ceasar's managed to lose $1,000,000 in five months when the previous year (before Lums bought in) there was a $2,200,000 profit for a comparable time period.

The SEC also questioned Lums concerning the $3,500,000 Lums paid one Jerome Zarowitz, a convicted professional sports fixer who wasn't even listed as an owner of the casino. Top officials in both Ceasar's and Lums have been under investigation by IRS intelligence in Miami and by Nevada gaming authorities in cases involving organized crime ever since Rogers' firm took on the Lums account.

There is also the question of the 1971 Lums acquisition of a North Miami housing resort development called Sky Lakes. Both Sky Lakes and Ceasar's Palace have received large sums of money from the Teamsters — $12,000,000 for the Miami project and more than $16,000,000 for Ceasar's Palace.

With things going slowly, Lums announced plans for a new $22,000,000 casino next door to Ceasar's Palace. In December of 1971 the company decided that the whole restaurant idea was no longer worth the trouble. In a classic climax to a classic American success they changed their name to Ceasar's World Inc. and sold their hot dog stands.

Meanwhile the Secretary of State's old law firm reaped a bundle with their new-found involvement in the Las Vegas underworld. With such stunning successes at home, one wonders what a firm with a link to the Secretary of State could do abroad, in places like the Bahamas or Vietnam, for example.

Nor do the underworld implications of big names surrounding Nixon end with the Secretary of State. Murray Chotiner, a long-time Nixon aide and architect of his early smear campaigns, has past links to the underworld. In 1962 Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson wrote that "Chotiner ... besides representing the top gangster of Philadelphia, Marco Reginelli, represented a long and amazing list of hoods, concession peddlers, income tax violators and others needing influence in high places ..." It was Chotiner who brought Frank Vitale, "once involved in the biggest bootlegging conspiracy on the West Coast," onto Nixon's special plane to Moscow in 1959.

Nixon's recent appointment of Walter Annenberg as Ambassador to England also echoes the themes of underworld involvement. Annenberg and his father were indicted in 1939 for "aiding and abetting" in connection with their wire service operation in Chicago, an operation run with the protection of Al Capone, for which the Annenbergs paid $1,000,000. The Annenberg family was also a major contributor to Nixon's 1968 election campaign.

Further back in the Nixon saga, and closer to his southern California birthplace, lies San Diego financier, C. Arnholdt Smith and his bookmaker partner John Alessio. In 1946 Alessio and Smith introduced Nixon to another bookmaker named Lew Lipinsky. Lipinsky, who was convicted for bookmaking in 1938, served for three decades as a go-between for the Smith/Alessio interests to their syndicate connections.

Some of the dealings of the Smith/Alessio combine were brought to national prominence by a recent LIFE magazine article which accused Attorney General Richard Kleindienst of "tampering with justice" in a case involving Alessio. According to the Wall Street Journal, Smith raised $1,000,000 for Nixon's 1968 campaign. He and his wife took the first position on the receiving line behind the President at the White House inauguration.

More of the Same in California

Nixon's other favorite resting place besides Key Biscayne is the area near his birthplace in southern California. Here the underworld pattern of his Florida involvements repeats itself — in a strikingly similar pattern.

One story there involves Nixon's multi-millionaire backer, C. Arnholdt Smith, and the Del Charro Hotel in La Jolla, just north of San Diego.

The Del Charro was a favorite stopover for Nixon in the Fifties. Owned by the Murchison brothers, who also owned the nearby Del Mar race track, the hotel played host to numerous Detroit and Las Vegas gangsters. Alan Witwer, a former manager of the hotel, has alleged in statements to this reporter and others that the hotel served as a secret meeting place for politicians and assorted business interests, some of them from the underworld. Witwer specifically cited a 1954 meeting attended by Nixon and chaired by a leading member of ITT. He also claimed that there was a bookmaking operation at the hotel, but has offered no documented proof.

Mrs. C. Arnholdt Smith is a permanent resident of the Del Charro, and the hotel's visitors have included John Connally, Barry Goldwater, and J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover's $15,000-a-year bills were picked up by the stockholders of the Murchison interests.

The fact that certain of Hoover's good friends rubbed elbows, rather warmly, with Meyer Lansky, and the fact that the nation's leading crime fighting agency — the FBI — has come up almost blank in its fight against organized crime may not prove anything about Hoover. On the other hand, these facts don't make it any easier to dismiss questions which might arise about the influence of organized crime at the highest levels of government.

North of the Del Charro and thirty miles south of the San Clemente White House, lies the mammoth La Costa land resort development. The development is tied to both Smith (his daughter is a director) and to the Teamsters.

LaCosta was originally developed by Cleveland syndicate reliables Allard Roen and Moe Dalitz. The development was reorganized in 1968 to bring Teamster control more in line with their investments, which already exceeded $18,000,000. Like Sky Lakes, its Florida counterpart, La Costa attracts a whole range of figures from organized crime. La Costa visitors have included Willie "Ice Pick" Alderman, a St. Louis mob cohort Morris Shenker, and Wallace Groves and Lou Chesler of Bahamas fame.

According to eyewitnesses, when Groves' helicopter sets down, the red carpet is rolled out. It may be because Groves bought a home in La Costa, but more likely it's because, as government agents put it, "where Groves appears, Meyer Lansky will not be far behind".

Another mob frequenter of the La Costa development is Jake Arvey, an organizer of the Republic

National Bank in Miami, the bank through which Bernard Barker channeled funds for the Watergate crime.

The Teamsters Again

A recent visitor to La Costa was Frank Fitzsimmons, a key to Nixon's new-found support in organized labor. Fitzsimmons is president of the Teamsters Union. This summer he stopped in La Costa on his way to see Nixon at San Clemente. Fitzsimmons had just come from dinner in Detroit with a local Mafia figure and soon after his Detroit-La Costa-San Clemente excursion, Fitzsimmons announced his support for Nixon. One wonders whether the Teamster decision to stay on the Pay Board and to support Nixon is somehow related to what the Detroit Free Press has been hinting strongly as of late: that the administration has stopped prosecution of Frank's son Richard Fitzsimmons — the business partner of a Detroit mobster — on charges of missing union funds, in exchange for Teamster support of the Republican President.

Whatever deals Nixon and Fitzsimmons did make, the Teamsters have a long working relationship with organized crime. Their marriage goes back over twenty years, where Jimmy Hoffa was introduced to the Detroit underworld by Paul Dorfman, in exchange for some multi-million dollar insurance business. Dorfman's son, Paul, has residences at both Sky Lakes and La Costa and was recently convicted of taking kickbacks on a Teamster loan.

The Teamster tradition of labor racketeering and corruption made for a ready alliance with the mob. Early government investigations of the Teamsters, such as the Bobby Kennedy-led McClellan Permanent Committee on Investigations, centered on labor racketeering. As Attorney General, Kennedy continued his pursuit of the Teamsters and their boss, Jimmy Hoffa. At one point Kennedy had twenty-nine grand juries simultaneously investigating Hoffa's activity — one of which led to a conviction for mail fraud and jury tampering.

.In 1969, two Oakland Tribune reporters concluded a six-month investigation with the charge that "the $628,000,000 Teamsters Central States, Southeast and Southwest Pension Fund headquartered in Chicago, has become a bankroll for some of America's most sinister underground figure".

Nowhere does the relationship between this fund and the mob surface more dramatically than in Las Vegas, where Teamster trustees have approved loans between $50 and $70,000,000, some shakily secured by second mortgages and subordinated notes. A high-ranking Federal official has commented that "the Teamster fund is a sort of open bank to people well-connected in Las Vegas and well-connected to organized crime".

It was Hoffa's desire "to have [his] own bank in every city" that brought on the Teamster takeover of the Miami National Bank. The Bank in turn is just one of a long list of ventures, suchas Ceasar's Palace, Sky Lakes, La Costa, Worldwide Realty, International Airport Hotel Systems, Truesdale Estates, in which Teamster money amounting to over $60,000,000 figures prominently alongside the social and business partners of Richard M. Nixon — a line of investments that leads from Nixon's three White Houses to a Federal clemency for Jimmy Hoffa and back to organized crime.

The current head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division saw enough evidence in 1967 to say that he "knew for a moral certainty [that] in the upper echelons there is an amalgamation between the Cosa Nostra and the Teamsters Union". In 1971, when a Federal Grand Jury probing the activities of Meyer Lansky questioned Jimmy Hoffa, many wondered whether the links between the two giants were more direct than the numerous transactions between mutual friends.

A few months after his testimony, Hoffa was granted clemency after serving less than five years of his thirteen-year sentence. The freeing of Hoffa and three co-defendents of the 1963 wire fraud pension case is the latest and most crucial event in Nixon's longstanding friendship, a friendship with some clear public benefits for both. Jack Anderson documents, for example, that as early as 1960, then Vice-President Nixon and Attorney General Rogers intervened to halt an indictment against Hoffa in exchange for Hoffa's support in the 1960 election.

ANICO — More of the Same in Texas

In recent years the Teamster fund has been superseded by a giant Texas insurance company as a major source of finance for Las Vegas casinos tied to the mob. The company is the American National Insurance Company (ANICO) of Galveston, Texas. ANICO is close to the heart and pocketbook of the two ranking Texans in the Nixon administration — former Treasury Secretary John Connally and former Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson.

As well as floating more than $40,000,000 to Las Vegas casinos and $13,000,000 to premier mob attorney Morris Shanker, ANICO has made loans to two Florida companies close to Richard Nixon — $1,750,000 in 1966 to the Mary Carter Paint Company, and $3,000,000 in 1970 to a subsidiary of Worldwide Realty.

That year a group of disenchanted stockholders filed a multi-million-dollar suit, charging ANICO officials with having taken control of the company and using it as a private preserve as well as a source of funds for the mob.

The defendants in the suit hired Nixon's New York firm to handle the case. Connally's Houston law firm has also been used by ANICO. The First National Bank of Houston, of which Connally was a director and in which some of his law partners were officers, has provided an interest-free account of more than $1,000,000 for ANICO. Connally was also a director of a savings association which was purchased recently by ANICO.

Will Wilson was "general" of the Justice Department's "war" on crime from 1969-1971. He was head of the Criminal Division until October 1971, when his resignation was forced by disclosures tying him to the scandal-rocked financial empire of Texas wheeler-dealer Frank Sharp. Wilson has been charged by dissident ANICO stockholders of helping to drag ANICO into the twilight zones of finance with such deals as the 1963 absorption of a defaulted $450,000 mortgage held by Sharp. Sharp's attorney and "financial advisor" on the deal was Will Wilson.

While Attorney General of Texas, Wilson sued the foundation which controlled ANICO to bring three new trustees onto the foundation's board of directors. Wilson has no visible ties to the new trustees, whose votes were instrumental in shaping the company's new financial course. But dissident stockholders have charged that the "negotiations" that brought on the shift of control in the foundations were handled by a Galveston law firm linked to the mob. The stockholders also claim that John Connally played a role in these negotiations, albeit a "backstage" role. The ANICO case is part of a long history of Wilson's involvement with the Galveston underworld.

When he came to the Justice Department in Washington, Wilson discovered the organized crime division looking into the affairs of ANICO. Since then there have been no indictments in the case and there are reports that Wilson had the ANICO files locked safely in his personal office. One source of those reports is Stewart Hopps, a former Justice Department investigator.

Some serious conflict-of-interest charges concerning ANICO remain:

- The officers of ANICO who were later represented by Nixon's law firm, made a loan to a company whose top officers are long-time friends of Nixon.
- The criminal division of the Justice Department has been headed by a man with direct links in a company the division is supposedly investigating.
- The company also has clear ties to Nixon's former Treasury Secretary, a man mentioned for the Vice-Presidency, the national chairman of Democrats for Nixon, and a key figure in the President's re-election scheme.

Whose Justice Department?

The ANICO case takes us to a fitting endpoint to the story of Richard Nixon's involvement with the underworld — the Department of Justice. It is an old saw that criminal and criminal-chaser eventually become involved in the same business, but in Richard Nixon that old saw has become more of a reality than perhaps ever before in American history. For Richard Nixon is a man whose name has been synonymous with "law and order" in America for three decades.

Yet the four-year "war" on organized crime by the Nixon administration bears more resemblance to the "peace" in Vietnam than a sincere effort to get at the mob.

In a recent interview in U.S. News and World Report (September 11, 1972), Attorney General Richard Kleindienst hailed "about 1600" indictments of underworld figures brought by the Nixon administration in the past three and half years. The Justice Department claims that many of these indictments involve top mobsters.

Those outside the Nixon administration, however, have charged that the government's prosecution has been both partisan and selective, aimed exclusively at mobsters linked to big-city Democrats such as in Newark, and at the "little fish" who are always in abundance and who make little difference in conducting mob business. Time has reported that quotas have been established (i.e. one hundred hoodlums a month for New York City) and that arrests are "being delayed so that future quotas can be filled". The New York Times has editorialized about the ease with which petty gamblers can and have been rounded up, and wondered aloud if the Justice Department isn't conducting more a publicity war than one on organized crime. A Times report this year found the government was building up a backlog of gambling indictments, saving them for a crucial time during the election campaign.

Indeed, while the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell team has used the spectre of "CRIME" to keep the fear level high and to guarantee large budgets and expanded powers for their Justice Department, the actual "attempts" of the Nixon administration to cope with organized crime have resembled a somewhat sinister update of the Keystone Cops.

For example, up to 1,000 of Kleindienst's vaunted 1600 indictees in gambling and organized crime may have their cases thrown out for somewhat dubious "improper procedures" technicalities. A Miami attorney named James Hogan has "discovered" irregularities on signatures required for electronic surveillance authorizations. Court-approved wiretaps require written authorization by the Attorney General of a designated representative, in this case Will Wilson. Instead of being signed by John Mitchell or by Wilson, the authorizations in question were signed by aides, thus rendering thousands of wiretap authorizations — and the indictments based on them — useless.

Hogan himself is a long-time syndicate attorney and a partner of Ben Cohen, a former political boss of Miami Beach who figures prominently in the Forties' takeover of Miami by organized crime. The case in which Hogan made his discovery involved the busting of the largest heroin/cocaine ring in Miami, many of whose members were Cuban refugees. Inspection of various court papers, including wiretap authorizations, confirmed "irregularities" in the signature — Will Wilson's signature. While resembling his actual handwriting, the signatures appeared as "Wil" instead of "Will".

While it may seem strange for an aide to misspell his boss' name, it seems even stranger that Hogan took the case. His normal fees start in five figures but he has been working on behalf of his court-declared indigent client for more than two years with minimal compensation. While Hogan is known as a "very thorough" attorney, it would be interesting to find out more about the circumstances in which he discovered the "irregularities".

Even more interesting, perhaps, are the circumstances under which Richard Kleindienst was offered a bribe of $100,000 to quash several mob indictments In sworn testimony in November 1971, Kleindienst admitted to being offered the $100,000 bribe (which would be paid in the form of a contribution to Nixon's 1972 campaign) in exchange for stopping prosecution against several underworld figures caught in a stock fraud case. The bribe was offered by an aide of Senator Hiram Fong, a Republican from Hawaii. The aide had worked previously with Kelindienst through Fong's position on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Kleindienst said he refused the offer but he also said he did not realize it was a bribe for an entire week!

In cross examination, the prosecutor asked Kleindienst, "If you had regarded the conversation as something regarding a bribe offer you would have immediately report it, would you not?"

"Yes sir," replied Kleindienst, "I would have."

Kleindienst admitted he reported the bribe a full week later, upon learning from J. Edgar Hoover that Federal agents were investigating the case.

One would expect the Attorney General of the United States to be more alert. But what is more troubling are reports aired in the Washington Post shortly after the indictments in the stock fraud case in question (and ten months before Kleindienst's testimony on the bribe). Those reports quoted "sources at the U.S. Attorney's office in New York" and indicated that after the meeting between Kleindienst and Fong's aide, "Kleindienst immediately contacted Justice's Criminal Division [then headed by Will Wilson] and ... an FBI agent was assigned to infiltrate the group of alleged conspirators".

Do we now believe Kleindienst's story that he "didn't realize" he had been offered a bribe, or do we believe the U.S. Attorney's office in New York? Did Will Wilson and the Justice Department hold off a week while Kleindienst "made up his mind" that he had been offered a bribe, or was the decision whether or not to take it? And did Hoover and the FBI somehow interfere?

Perhaps the answer comes in the final outcome of the actual prosecution involved. The defendants in the stock-fraud case included Meyer Lansky's son-in-law, a former director of the Bank of Miami Beach and Johnny Dio, a notorious racketeer long associated with Jimmy Hoffa. They were acquitted, while the messengers who offered the bribe were convicted. One wonders if that $100,000 did not find its way into the Republican secret treasury after all.

The Tip of the Iceberg

> "The organized criminal relies on physical terror and psychological intimidation, on economic retaliation and political bribery, on citizen's indifference and government acquiescence. He corrupts our governing institutions and subverts our democratic processes."
>
> — Richard Nixon, April 24, 1969

Someone should tell President Nixon that resisting the power of organized crime demands, above all, a President with a clean slate.

Nixon's life is like a complex jigsaw puzzle, the pieces of which have been shuffled so as to defy complete reconstruction. Some of the crucial pieces have been removed, so a full picture cannot be achieved. It is no accident that no other politician has been so much written about, yet so little understood.

Indeed, much has been made of the "enigma" of Richard Nixon, his tight-lipped bearing in relation to his personal life, his unwillingness to divulge what's really on his mind.

But maybe the answer to the enigma lies in his old poker-playing instincts, in the unfailing ability to keep quiet when he's sitting on cards best hidden from the table.

For there is one indisputable fact about Richard Nixon's career — his ascendancy to the pinnacle of American power has required twenty-five years of care and feeding by some very wealthy and very reactionary men, and an extraordinary number of them have maintained connections with the world of organized crime.

During Nixon's years in office the underworld empire in the United States has prospered almost unrestricted by the Federal government. From its base in the gigantic resources of heroin traffic, gambling, prostitution, "protection," and a host of other enterprises of violence against society, organized crime has moved like a bulldozer into the world of legal, "respectable" business.

Every link between Richard Nixon and organized crime, however marginal, is of significance, if for no other reason because he is President. And there are people all over America, from government intelligence agents to hotel waiters, who have Nixon stories to tell. He covers his tracks well, but not well enough.

The full extent of Nixon's involvement with organized crime is just beginning to surface. The evidence in this article is merely the top of a dirty iceberg that will slowly become visible over the coming years.

The milieu in which he has traveled for three decades, and in which so many of his friends, associates, and appointees have been related to the mob, throw a long and permanent shadow over everything Richard Nixon the "public servant" has ever said, and over everything his political life has ever meant.

For in light of his career, both past and present, Richard M. Nixon seems to be the factual embodiment of Ralph Salerno's prediction that organized crime would someday put its own man in the White House.

The information in this article was gathered during a six-month investigation carried out in many cities, primarily Miami, New York, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, San Diego, Las Vegas, Dallas, Austin, Galveston, Tallahassee, and San Francisco. Sources included interviews with over a hundred people; court documents (including deeds, mortgages, etc.); research in the National Archives, Washington, D.C.; organized crime intelligence files (both private and government); and newspaper clippings.

Unsettling, Disturbing, Critical . . .

Computers and Automation, established 1951 and therefore the oldest magazine in the field of computers and data processing, believes that the profession of information engineer includes not only competence in handling information using computers and other means, but also a broad responsibility, in a professional and engineering sense, for:

- The reliability and social significance of pertinent input data;
- The social value and truth of the output results.

In the same way, a bridge engineer takes a professional responsibility for the reliability and significance of the data he uses, and the safety and efficiency of the bridge he builds, for human beings to risk their lives on.

Accordingly, Computers and Automation publishes from time to time articles and other information related to socially useful input and output of data systems in a broad sense. To this end we seek to publish what is unsettling, disturbing, critical — but productive of thought and an improved and safer "house" for all humanity, an earth in which our children and later generations may have a future, instead of facing extinction.

The professional information engineer needs to relate his engineering to the most important and most serious problems in the world today: war, nuclear weapons, pollution, the population explosion, and many more.

ACROSS THE EDITOR'S DESK

Computing and Data Processing Newsletter

Table of Contents

APPLICATIONS

National American Bank Installs Computer-Based Security System 42
Nova Computer Checks Strength of Roof in Coal Mine 42
Phone Books by Computer

EDUCATION NEWS

Digital Equipment Corp. Computer Aids M.I.T. Music Project 43
Composing by Computer at ISU 44
Student Programs Computer for Remedial Instruction 44

RESEARCH

"Talking" Ballpoint Pen Under Development 45

MISCELLANEOUS

ICCP Names Directors and Officers 45
IFIP Congress '74 Travel Grants 47

APPLICATIONS

NATIONAL AMERICAN BANK INSTALLS COMPUTER-BASED SECURITY SYSTEM

Tom Burbank
National American Bank
200 Carondelet
New Orleans, La. 70130

A computer-based system designed to prevent unauthorized access to high security areas has gone into operation at National American Bank here — one of the first U.S. banks to install such a system. The IBM Controlled Access System (CAS) at National American is based on the use of magnetically encoded, wallet-sized identification cards similar to bank credit cards.

Each person authorized to enter a security area is assigned a card coded with his own security number. Employees seeking entry to an area covered by the system simply insert their cards into compact reading devices on entrance doors, and the information is transmitted to an IBM System/7 computer for identification.

Stored in the computer's memory is a list of employee numbers and building areas these numbers are designated for. If the number of the card entitles the bearer access to that area, the computer signals the door to unlock. If the person is unauthorized to enter, the door remains closed and a security guard is notified. The elapsed time is approximately one second.

If a card is lost or stolen, a new card (with a new number) is issued and the system is alerted to deny entry to the original card. If the old card is used, the guard is alerted.

As an additional safeguard, the system can automatically log all entrance activity by individual security code, door number, date and time of day. This helps track who is where and for how long. National American can now analyze the number of times an individual enters and at what time of day or night this activity occurs. The system also has built-in failsafe mechanisms which insure security in the event of a power failure.

"Unfortunately, we are doing business in a time when public and private institutions are increasingly vulnerable to lawless elements," said National American President Louie J. Roussel III. "By adding the IBM Controlled Access System to our current security procedures, we are taking a major step to insure that our customers and employees are protected. And, by controlling access to the collateral instrument storage areas, we can make it very difficult for unauthorized people to gain access to valuable assets stored in the bank."

NOVA COMPUTER CHECKS STRENGTH OF ROOF IN COAL MINE

Edgar E. Geithner
Data General Corp.
Southboro, Mass. 01772

Data General's minicomputers track hurricanes from airplanes for the U.S. Air Force; the Army has mounted them in helicopters; Scripps Oceanographic Institute has one on a ship; a scientist bounces over Canadian glaciers with one mounted in his tracked vehicle; and an oil company uses one of the computers to control an oilfield in the Libyan desert. Now engineers at the University of Texas (Austin) have a minicomputer in the bottom of a mine.

Dr. A. L. Podio, an assistant professor in the university's Department of Petroleum Engineering, and a team of researchers from the Center for Earth Sciences and Engineering, use a Nova 820 computer to detect possible weak spots in the roofs of mines. The computer system, developed for the U.S. Bureau of Mines, has been on the job on the floor of Kaiser Corporation's York Canyon coal mine in New Mexico. "One of the most frequent causes of mine accidents is roof collapse," Dr. Podio said. "This system was designed to use the principles of seismic explorations to identify failure planes and fracture zones in the rocks overlaying the mine roof. If tests show the area around a roof is weakening, it can be supported by beams or roof bolts."

In seismic exploration, a high energy explosion is set off, and sensitive instruments determine the structure and makeup of surrounding land by recording how fast the shock waves travel through the ground. The waveforms can be interpreted to pinpoint probable deposits of oil, and to describe rock formations. "Using a large energy souce like an explosion in a mine is out of the question," Dr. Podio said, "so a manually controlled impact device was designed to generate the shock waves." The impact device, which works like a BB gun, uses air pressure to shoot a round projectile at a striker plate mounted at the end of the barrel.

When the striker plate is pressed against the wall or roof of the mine and the device is triggered, shock waves are sent through the surrounding rock. The shock waves are picked up by wideband transducers, digitized by a fast transient recorder, and processed through the Nova 820 for waveform enhancement. The waveform is then displayed on an oscilloscope, with the results of velocity and depth calculations. Permanent records of the waveform can be made on paper tape, or by transmitting the data to a large scale remote computer.

"A mine could make daily checks with the system to detect changes in rock strata as the working face of the mine advances," Dr. Podio said, "or the system could be transported throughout the mine to make daily checks on the condition of roofs at predetermined key locations." Dr. Podio noted that similar systems could be used to predict the quality of rock in rapid excavation projects or could be used in nondestructive tests of large concrete structures.

PHONE BOOKS BY COMPUTER

Peter A. Cassels
Bell Telephone Laboratories
Mountain Ave.
Murray Hill, N.J. 07974

The Bell System is using computer technology to modernize production of the White Pages telephone books. A system designed to improve customer service, control costs and streamline massive record-keeping operations is now being implemented. The system — called DIR/ECT (for DIRectory projECT) — was developed by Bell Laboratories, the research and development unit of the Bell System. Michigan Bell Telephone Company recently issued its first directory containing listings produced by the system. Michigan Bell also is using the system to produce some of its directory assistance records.

DIR/ECT is a more sophisticated outgrowth of its prototype, PHOTAC, a similar process developed by the New York Telephone Company under sponsorship of the nationwide Bell System. The first directory produced by the PHOTAC system was distributed in 1966. Since then, New York Telephone has converted some 4.5 million listings to the process. Currently the 12 major downstate White Pages directories are produced by PHOTAC.

The DIR/ECT system stores in a computer memory directory information such as the customer's name, address, telephone number — even telephone book delivery instructions. The information in the computer memory then is fed into a device called a photocomposer, which provides ready-to-print listings for White Pages. Besides the annual White Pages directories, DIR/ECT produces daily updates of new listings and monthly reprints for the telephone companies' directory assistance operators.

Although customers may see no obvious differences in the computer-produced directory, listings are easier to read and pages cleaner looking. The directories also have uniform abbreviations. The system has built-in cross-checks for consistent spelling of street names and for obvious errors in street and telephone numbers. There also is provision for massive directory listing changes, caused by renaming of streets and buildings.

Today, listings for phone directories are generally set line-by-line in metal type. Changes in listings must be reset and inserted by hand. With the new system, changes can be made quickly (because information is stored on magnetic computer tape and not metal type), the need to store tons of lead type will end, and the growing cost of publishing directories will be lessened.

EDUCATION NEWS

M.I.T. MUSIC PROJECT USES DEC COMPUTER

News Office
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Mass. 02139

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has begun work on a project aimed at making the Institute a major center for the study and composition of electronic music. Barry Vercoe, assistant professor of music, working with a computer given to the Department of Humanities' music section by Digital Equipment Corp. of Maynard, is in the early stages of developing a major electronic music production facility at the Institute.

Professor Vercoe said the computer facility "will be a tool both in the hands of the teacher and the composer that will greatly aid the development of creativity. The facility also will provide an excellent tool in the teaching of musical composition for conventional instruments.

"This is definitely not a scientific project. I'm not interested in merely getting a computer to sound exactly like a trumpet. The technological application, however, will interest some students who might not approach music otherwise and some of these will be drawn into its aesthetic considerations, through the back door as it were," Professor Vercoe said.

Why compose music for a machine at all?

"I suppose someone asked that very question when man first composed music for what are now traditional instruments, instead of for the human voice alone," Professor Vercoe said. "Electronic music merely expands the forces available to the practicing composer."

The PDP-11/45 computer — coupled with music input — also will lend itself to other forms of music research, such as syntactic analysis of music structures.

Professor Vercoe is the author of the widely used Music 360 language for digital sound synthesis. He has taught at M.I.T. for two years and is director of the Experimental Music Studio. His work, "Metamorphoses for Orchestra," was given its Boston premier early this year by the M.I.T. Symphony and was performed by the orchestra on its subsequent nationwide tour. Working with Professor Vercoe on the project are Richard J. Steiger, a graduate student, and Stephen Haflich, a recent M.I.T. graduate.

COMPOSING BY COMPUTER AT ISU

Information Service
Iowa State University of Science and Technology
Ames, Iowa 50010

Music composers at Iowa State University may turn from their piano keyboards and hand-written scores to a more efficient instrument for composing music — a computer. ISU faculty members are building a computerized electronic music studio — a system that will technologically simplify composing electronic music. The studio is being designed and built by an interdisciplinary group from Iowa State's music, computer science, and electrical engineering departments, under the direction of Stefan Silverston, assistant professor of computer science, Terry Smay, professor of electrical engineering, and Gary White, associate professor of music.

Electronic music is produced by purely electronic means and the Iowa State Computerized Music System (ISMUS) will be doing just that — generating music with computer equipment. A composer will sit at the computer and write a musical composition using an electronic keyboard.

The new system, which was expected to be operable this fall, should be an easier method of modifying and editing a musical piece. The normal hand operations of changing notations on a printed score or splicing tapes of recorded music are "more time-consuming and inaccurate" processes for correcting a composition, according to Gary White.

The computer composing process begins when the composer inserts introductory instructions into a teletype machine. On an electronic keyboard he then begins to compose his piece. The computer records all musical instructions which are transformed through a digital-to-analog sound converter and loudspeaker into sound. This immediate feedback system enables the composer to hear what he is composing simultaneously. The computer also allows the composer to automatically play back and edit what he has written simply by striking another key.

The musician has now completed one "layer" of music. If he wants to add further musical instructions to the composition, he repeats the entire process again. All layers merge together to obtain the product — a completed electronic composition.

The music instructions which the composer inserts into the system are a special electronic music notation — a "computer language." The English words it uses can be compared to musical notation found on a conventional score — treble and bass clefs, notes, rests, and the like.

Electronic music has been used in commercial recordings, and as background music for television, radio and film. The Iowa State system will be sophisticated enough for use in serious compositional study, the production of background music for various media, and for the demonstration of sound properties.

The ISMUS presently being built is a protytype of a full-scale model. If the "test-system" proves satisfactory, "we will look for funding to build a full-scale model," says White. The project is presently supported by a $1,170 grant from Western Electric and a National Science Foundation institutional grant of $8,698. The prototype employs a mini-computer that is owned by Iowa State.

The studio will be used as a teaching tool for the ISU music program. Computer software, the programs (sequences of operations to be performed by the computer) written for the system, will be developed so a composer can use the studio equipment without having prior knowledge of computer programming. Students will be able to learn basic acoustical concepts and principles of electronic music synthesis and to develop sensitivity to timbre with the ISMUS. Also contributing to introductory computer science courses, the system will be a novel example of computer application in a non-scientific field.

STUDENT PROGRAMS COMPUTER FOR REMEDIAL INSTRUCTION

Edward J. Canty
Digital Equipment Corp.
Maynard, Mass. 01754

Using programs developed by a local high school student, School District 91 in Idaho Falls, has put its newly-acquired computer to work as a "super tutor" in remedial studies for disadvantaged children in this southeastern Idaho community. Designed to improve the arithmetic and language arts skills of children in grades 2 through 6, the project was introduced by director of curriculum Dr. Wallace Manning with federal Title 1 aid during the district's 1973 summer session for children largely from rural farm families. According to John A. Christensen, computer sciences coordinator, the project proved so successful in its initial application that it has been continued in the fall semester.

The student programmer is Robert Huntsman, 18, a June graduate of Idaho Falls' Skyline High School. Using the district's PDP-11/20 timesharing computer system installed last December by Digital Equipment Corporation, Huntsman developed programs for arithmetic and language drill to serve between 40 and 50 pupils on each of two teletypewriter terminals situated in local elementary schools.

In a typical arithmetic routine, the computer types a problem and waits for the pupil's response — ten seconds if the problem is a memory exercise, longer if it involves several columns for addition or several digits for multiplication. If the student's answer is correct, Huntsman's program directs the terminal to ring a bell in congratulation; if incorrect, the computer supplies a hint on where the mistake occurred and encourages him to try again.

Answers to English and social studies workbook questions have been entered in the computer memory, allowing students to do their homework at a terminal and receive immediate response. The computer keeps score of right and wrong answers to produce reports for teacher guidance. Spelling-recognition exercises are also in use and Huntsman has undertaken development of an arithmetic program involving fractions

"One of the computer's major advantages is its ability to pay attention to individual children," Christensen said. "Every child enrolled in the regular summer session was able to get experience at a terminal and benefit from these interactive programs." He said high school laboratory assistants will continue to write instructional programs for elementary and junior high levels, expanding the library begun by Huntsman. For future summer sessions, he added, the district hopes to make such computer assistance available at a nearby rural elementary school attended by children of migrant farm workers.

RESEARCH FRONTIER

"TALKING" BALLPOINT PEN UNDER DEVELOPMENT

Ronald I. Deutsch
Stanford Research Institute
Menlo Park, Calif. 94025

A prototype model of a simple, inexpensive "talking" ballpoint pen, under development at Stanford Research Institute (SRI), could reduce massive paperwork and delay in routine business transactions. The pen is similar to an ordinary pen in size and shape except that it is wired to a computer system. The computer is programmed to receive signals generated instantaneously as a person hand-prints characters with the pen to record information.

"Such instantaneous and remote processing of data might be invaluable to large businesses engaged in daily consumer-oriented services, such as banks, insurance companies and utilities," says staff scientist Dr. Hewitt D. Crane, the inventor. For example, the pen could be used by a bank teller crediting a savings or checking account. In this case, according to Dr. Crane, the data would not have to be retranscribed from a piece of paper by another employee, or the paper itself put through expensive automatic reading equipment. Thus, costs and delays could be reduced in crediting accounts or establishing cash requirements.

In another case, a meter reader making his rounds for a utility could use the pen in combination with a cassette recorder. When he returned to his office, the cassette tape would be programmed into the system, thus eliminating the need for manual retranscription of a day's worth of data.

In the present laboratory version, the pen is hooked to an audio unit as well as a teleprinter, so that as a person writes, the characters appear on the teleprinter and are spoken by the audio unit.

SRI holds a patent on the pen and is currently seeking financial support for further development, Dr. Crane says. He estimates that the pen itself might cost about $25 to $50. A central computer unit would be extra but could serve many pens.

MISCELLANEOUS

ICCP NAMES DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

Paul M. Pair, Secretary & Chairman
Institute for Certification of Computer Professionals
P.O. Box 1442
Chicago, Ill. 60690

At a meeting in late September, the incorporators of the Institute for Certification of Computer Professionals, Chicago, Ill., adopted bylaws for the newly-formed organization and named a board of directors which, in turn, held its first meeting and elected officers. The ICCP is the outgrowth of over two years of intensive preparation and study by representatives of major computing societies. Its primary focus is the enhancement of certification activities in the computing industry. It was incorporated August 13, 1973.

LOOK
to
erc
electronic research co
THE
IN FREQUENCY CONTROL PRODUCTS
Quartz Crystals TCXO VCXO
Hybrid Oscillators and Frequency Standards DIGITAL INSTRUMENTS
Counters Panel Meters
Thermometers
IN FACT
time temperature frequency CALL
WRITE TWX your SOLE SOURCE
Telephone
Overland Park, Kansas
Mailing P.O. Box
Shawnee Mission, Kansas
TWX (910) 749-64

Elected as officers by the board of directors were:

- President — John K. Swearingen, Computer Sciences Corp., Las Vegas, Nev., representing Data Processing Management Association (DPMA).
- Vice President — Fred H. Harris, University of Chicago, Association for Computing Machinery.
- Treasurer — William S. Eick, Alexander Grant & Co., Chicago, Association of Computer Programmers and Analysts.
- Secretary — Paul M. Pair, Control Data Institute, Chicago, Association for Educational Data Systems.

Ten professional societies participated in the organization of ICCP and are eligible for charter membership. Of these, seven have exercised their right to such membership, and are entitled to two members on the ICCP board. The seven charter members are: Association of Computer Programmers and Analysts; Society of Certified Data Processors; Association for Computing Machinery; Association for Educational Data Systems; Society of Professional Data Processors; Data Processing Management Association; and Automation 1 Association.

The other three associations eligible for charter membership are: Canadian Information Processing Society, the Computer Society of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the Society of Data Educators. They are expected to act before the end of 1973.

(please turn to page 47)

NEW CONTRACTS

TO	FROM	FOR	AMOUNT
Sanders Associates, Inc., Nashua, N.H.	CAE Electronics, Montreal, Canada	Display system segment of Canadian Joint Enroute Terminal System (JETS) Program: first phase consists of seven Enroute and two Terminal Systems for air traffic control	18.6 million
ITT Creed Limited, Great Britain	British Post Office	6000 machines — teleprinters and associated equipment — to be used mainly for Telex customer-to-customer teleprinter system	$11 million
Univac Div., Sperry Rand Corp., Blue Bell, Pa.	Auto Tell Services, Inc., Villanova, Pa.	1100 Univac DCT-515 Data Communications Terminals to be used by automobile dealers who subscribe to ATS services on-line computerized services	$7 million
Computer Sciences Corp., El Segundo, Calif.	National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	Computer services support to Simulator Computer System Branch at Ames Research Center, Mountain View, Calif.	$6.7 million
Honeywell, Inc., Wellesley Hills, Mass.	State of Arizona, Phoenix, Ariz.	A Honeywell Multics (Multiplexed Information and Computing Service) system, for use by 13 state agencies	$5+ million
Computer Sciences Corp., El Segundo, Calif.	National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	Engineering and related services to NASA's Wallops Station, Wallops Island, Va.	$5 million (approximate)
Philco-Ford Corp. Willow Grove, Pa.	U.S. Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, N.J.	Improving computerized communications network, identified as '73 AEP for AUTODIN Enhancement Program, at 10 overseas AUTODIN sites, Ft. Monmouth, N.J., and Fort Detrick, Md.	$4.6 million
Raytheon Data Systems, Norwood, Mass.	Eastern Air Lines, Miami, Fla.	Data display terminals and associated equipment as part of expansion of EAL's Automated Passenger Processing and Reservation System	$2+ million
National Cash Register Co., Dayton, Ohio	Publix Super Markets, Inc., Lakeland, Fla.	30 NCR 255 supermarket checkout systems involving a total of 357 NCR 255 terminals and 30 NCR 726 in-store minicomputers plus 120 NCR 250 free-standing electronic cash registers	$2 million (approximate)
Computer Sciences Corp., El Segundo, Calif.	National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	Analysis and programming services to Langley Research Center, Hampton, Va.	$1.2 million
Interdata, Inc., Oceanport, N.J.	DATRAN (Data Transmission Co.), Vienna, Va.	Dual processor Model 55 data communications concentrators, with software and technical support, for an information network DATRAN is designed and installing on a turnkey basis for International Brotherhood of Teamsters	$1+ million
McDonnell Douglas Automation Co. (MCAUTO), St. Louis, Mo.	Buffums' Southern California	Computer processing of all company data; includes accounts payable, receivables, sales analyses, payroll, inventory control and statistics	$725,000 (approximate)
Informatics Inc., Western Div., Canoga Park, Calif.	Illinois Bell Telephone Co., Chicago, Ill.	Design and applications programming support for a new payroll/personnel system	$500,000+
Logicon, Inc., Torrance, Calif.	U.S. Air Force	Verifying and validating (V&V) critical missile flight safety (MFS) software used on western test range of Space and Missile Test Center (SAMTEC), Vandenberg AFB, Calif.	$365,000
TRW Inc., Redondo Beach, Calif.	Los Angeles County Road Department (LACRD), Calif.	Designing Integrated Information Management (IIMS); 10 subsystems cover accounting; billing; budgets; management of contracts, and projects, inventory control, production and performance, and road inventory information	$365,000
Systems Engineering Laboratories, Inc., Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	Singer Simulation Products, Div. of Singer Co.	Central control and simulation element of a Nuclear Plant Simulator for Carolina Power & Light Co., Raleigh, N.C.	$330,000
Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., Renton, Wash.	Manufacturing Technology Div., A.F. Materials Labs., Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio	Developing Air Force Computer Aided Manufacturing (AFCAM) master plan	$251,000
Atlantic Research Corp., Alexandria, Va.	Arkansas State Educational Television Commission	Engineering studies and detailed plans for four new ETC (Educational Television) stations, and an interconnecting microwave network	$37,000
Bunker Ramo Corp., Trumbull, Conn.	Reliance Federal Savings & Loan Asso. of New York, Jamaica, N.Y.	31 BR 2001 Universal Teller Terminals for equipping teller stations in all nine Reliance offices; terminals will be tied by highspeed communications circuits to a Univac 9480 computer	——
Collins Radio Co., Dallas, Texas	U.S. Air Force	Continuing development of systems and equipment for the U.S. Air Force Satellite Communication System (AFSATCOM); eventual production awards, depending upon Air Force requirements, could total more than $125 million	——
Diablo Systems, Inc., Subsidiary of Xerox Corp. Hayward, Calif.	Wang Laboratories, Tewksbury, Mass.	Series 40 disk drives to be incorporated into Wang's new line of mini computer systems	——
MRI Systems Corp., Austin, Texas	U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. and New	Lease of SYSTEM 2000 for Farm management applications; at least nine SYSTEM 2000 data	——

NEW INSTALLATIONS

OF	AT	FOR
Burroughs B 4700 system	Computer Management Group (CMG) Ltd., North-west London, England	The first of two B4700 systems (which are included in a five-system order) to be installed at CMG's North-west London, England center (entire 5 computer system order valued at $4.3 million)
	Walter E. Heller & Co., Chicago, Ill. (2 systems)	Providing internal processing speed to keep pace with continued growth of data processing operations; system will allow expansion without reprogramming or recompiling; replaces two Burroughs B3500 systems
Control Data CYBER 70 Model 74 system	Century Research Center Corp. (CRC), Tokyo, Japan	Increasing CRC's processing capabilities to include remote batch data processing services via high speed communication line control devices, and offer a wide range of services to various types of users; system will be connected to a previously installed CDC 6600 computer (system valued at $3 million)
Control Data CYBER 70 Model 76 system	Atmospheric Environment Service of Canada, Montreal, Canada	Upgrading weather forecasting facilities throughout the country; system installed at Canadian Meteorological Center in Montreal, Canada (system valued at $6.3 million)
Control Data 3150 system	Ingalls Iron Works Co., Birmingham, Ala.	Expanding automated design activities; system will operate in conjunction with a previously installed CDC 3150 to support CONSTRUCTS, an automated engineering design software package
IBM System/370 Model 155 system	Educational Information Services (EIS), Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.	Linking with university's IBM System/360 Model 91 to significantly expand a variety of data processing services
IBM System/370 Model 168 system	Datacrown Limited, Willowdale, Ontario, Canada	The first of two systems that will more than double current batch processing capacity and increase its capability to provide for transaction-oriented terminals; replaces Model 165 currently in use (systems valued at $12 million)
Interdata Model 70 systems	U.S. Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, N.J. (2 systems)	Use in experiments involving automated tactical surveillance and target acquisition
NCR Century 101 system	Radyne Limited, Great Britain	An advanced inventory management and control system (system valued at $6.3 million)
NCR Century 200 system	Green Shield Trading Stamp Company of Edgware, Colindale, England	Expansion of automated stock control system for its gift houses and new Argos chain of catalog showrooms
NCR Century 251 system	Columbia EDP Centers, Inc., Columbia, Mo.	General data processing services to a variety of customers including several banks
Univac 1106 system	British Gas Corp., Hinckley, England	Assistance in controlling National Grid pipeline by performing forward simulations on a real-time, round-the-clock-basis; in addition, system will act as a service bureau to scientific and engineering departments within the Corporation
	University of Connecticut Medical Center, Farmington, Conn.	All aspects of Medical Center's work including patient admissions, monitoring patient care, scheduling outpatient appointments, support of library information and research statistical programs, and general accounting and payroll processing chores (system valued at $1.3 million)
Univac 1110 system	Pacific International Computing Corp., Gaithersburg, Md.	The first of two systems whose primary applications include project management, engineering and business data processing; the system will also include time-sharing capability as well as remote job entry from terminals in the field
Univac 9480 system	Reliance Federal Savings & Loan Asso. of New York, Jamaica, N.Y.	Faster customer service at any bank branch

Across the Editor's Desk — *Continued from page 45*

IFIP CONGRESS '74 TRAVEL GRANTS

P. E. Welch
U.S. Committee for IFIP Congress '74
Box 426
New Canaan, Conn. 06840

The National Science Foundation will support a travel grant program for attendance at IFIP Congress 74 to be held August 5-10, 1974, in Stockholm. The triennial IFIP (International Federation for Information Processing) Congresses have become the major international media for exchange of information among developers and users of information processing techniques and technology.

The Division of Mathematical Sciences of the National Research Council will administer the program and award grants to qualified people from the United States whose accomplishments in and potential contributions to the field of information processing are most noteworthy, regardless of the formal labels for their specialties.

Younger members of the information science community are urged to apply. William F. Atchison of the University of Maryland, Financial Support Chairman of the U.S. Committee for IFIP, said that special efforts will be made to support their attendance.

Applications may be obtained through the Math Division, National Research Council, Washington, D.C. 20418. Applications must be received on or before December 31, 1973.

MONTHLY COMPUTER CENSUS

Neil Macdonald
Survey Editor
COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION

The following is a summary made by COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION of reports and estimates of the number of general purpose digital computers manufactured and installed, or to be manufactured and on order. These figures are mailed to individual computer manufacturers quarterly for their information and review, and for any updating or comments they may care to provide. Please note the variation in dates and reliability of the information. A few manufacturers refuse to give out, confirm, or comment on any figures.

Part 1 of the Monthly Computer Census contains reports for United States manufacturers, A to H, and is published in January, April, July, and October. Part 2 contains reports for United States manufacturers, I to Z, and is published in February, May, August, and November. Part 3 contains reports for manufacturers outside of the United States and is published in March, June, September, and December.

Our census seeks to include all digital computers manufactured anywhere. We invite all manufacturers located anywhere to submit infor- that would help make these figures as accurate and complete as possible.

The following abbreviations apply:

(A) — authoritative figures, derived essentially from information sent by the manufacturer directly to COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION
C — figure is combined in a total
(D) — acknowledgment is given to DP Focus, Marlboro, Mass., for their help in estimating many of these figures
E — figure estimated by COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION
(N) — manufacturer refuses to give any figures on number of installations or of orders, and refuses to comment in any way on those numbers stated here
(R) — figures derived all or in part from information released indirectly by the manufacturer, or from reports by other sources likely to be informed
(S) — sale only, and sale (not rental) price is stated
X — no longer in production
- — information not obtained at press time and/or not released by manufacturer

SUMMARY AS OF OCTOBER 15, 1973

NAME OF MANUFACTURER	NAME OF COMPUTER	DATE OF FIRST INSTALLATION	AVERAGE OR RANGE OF MONTHLY RENTAL $(000)	NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS			NUMBER OF UNFILLED ORDERS
				In U.S.A.	Outside U.S.A.	In World	
Part 2. United States Manufacturers I-Z							
IBM	305	12/57	3.6	40	15	55	-
White Plains, N.Y.	650	10/67	4.8	50	18	68	-
(N) (D) (Oct. 1973)	1130	2/66	1.5	2580	1227	3807	-
	1401	9/60	5.4	2210	1836	4046	-
	1401-G	5/64	2.3	420	450	870	-
	1401-H	6/67	1.3	180	140	320	-
	1410	11/61	17.0	156	116	272	-
	1440	4/63	4.1	1690	1174	2864	-
	1460	10/63	10.0	194	63	257	-
	1620 I, II	9/60	4.1	285	186	471	-
	1800	1/66	5.1	416	148	564	-
	7010	10/63	26.0	67	17	84	-
	7030	5/61	160.0	4	1	5	-
	704	12/55	32.0	12	1	13	-
	7040	6/63	25.0	35	27	62	-
	7044	6/63	36.5	28	13	41	-
	705	11/55	38.0	18	3	21	-
	7020, 2	3/60	27.0	10	3	13	-
	7074	3/60	35.0	44	26	70	-
	7080	8/61	60.0	13	2	15	-
	7090	11/59	63.5	4	2	6	-
	7094-I	9/62	75.0	10	4	14	-
	7094-II	4/64	83.0	6	4	10	-
	System/3 Model 6	3/71	1.0	8	-	-	-
	System/3 Model 10	1/70	1.1	5	-	-	-
	System/3 Model 15	-	-	-	-	-	-
	System/7	11/71	0.35 and up	15	-	-	-
	360/20	12/65	2.7	7161	6075	13236	1780
	360/25	1/68	5.1	1112	759	1871	1287
	360/30	5/65	10.3	5487	2535	8022	-
	360/40	4/65	19.3	2454	1524	3978	1363
	360/44	7/66	11.8	109	57	166	39
	360/50	8/65	29.1	1135	445	1580	662
	360/65	11/65	57.2	604	144	748	562
	360/67	10/65	133.8	65	6	71	99
	360/75	2/66	66.9	50	17	67	12
	360/85	12/69	150.3	11	1	12	55
	360/90	11/67	-	5	-	-	-
	360/91	-	-	1	-	-	-
	360/190	-	-	13	2	15	-
	360/195	4/71	232.0	-	-	9	48
	370/115	-	-	-	-	-	-
	370/125	4/73	8.2-13.8	1	-	-	-
	370/135	5/72	14.4	13	-	-	-
	370/145	9/71	23.3	2	-	-	-
	370/155	2/71	48.0	2	-	-	-
	370/158	-/73	49.5-85.0	1	-	-	-
	370/165	5/71	98.7	3	-	-	-
	370/168	-/73	93.0-170.0	1	3	-	-
	370/195	6/73	190.0-270.0	-	-	-	-
Interdata	Model 1	12/70	3.7	244	75	319	-
Oceanport, N.J.	Model 3	5/67	13.1	-	-	200	X
(A) (Oct. 1973)	Model 4	8/68	8.5	274	115	389	32
	Model 5	11/70	X	70	20	90	X
	Model 7/16	-/74	-	-	-	-	-
	Model 7/32	-/74	-	-	-	-	-
	Model 15	1/69	20.0	40	24	64	X
	Model 16	5/71	X	1	6	7	X
	Model 18	6/71	X	2	7	9	X
	Model 50/55	5/72	-	75	10	85	115
	Model 70	10/71	-	466	116	582	107
	Model 74	2/73	-	41	8	49	126
	Model 80	10/72	-	15	3	18	20
	Model 85	6/73	-	1	-	-	-

NAME OF MANUFACTURER	NAME OF COMPUTER	DATE OF FIRST INSTALLATION	AVERAGE OR RANGE OF MONTHLY RENTAL $(000)	NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS			NUMBER OF UNFILLED ORDERS
				In U.S.A.	Outside U.S.A.	In World	
Microdata Corp.	Micro 400/10	12/70	0.1-0.5	139	0	139	-
Irvine, Calif.	Micro 800	12/68	0.2-3.0	2927	810	3737	-
(A) (Sept. 1973)	Micro 1600	12/71	0.2-3.0	914	95	1009	-
NCR	304	1/60	X	5	2	7	X
Dayton, Ohio	310	5/61	X	8	0	8	X
(N) (R) (Oct. 1973)	315	5/62	7.0	255	200	455	-
	315 RMC	9/65	9.0	55	35	90	-
	390	5/61	0.7	160	325	485	-
	500	10/65	1.0	1100	1750	2850	-
	251	-	-	1	-	-	-
	Century 50	2/71	1.6	580	0	580	-
	Century 100	9/68	2.6	1175	783	1958	-
	Century 101	12/72	3.7	50	1	51	-
	Century 200	6/69	7.0	575	335	910	-
	Century 300	2/72	21.0	5	5	10	-
Philco	1000	6/63	X	16	-	-	X
Willow Grove, Pa.	200-210,211	10/58	X	16	-	-	X
(N) (Jan. 1969)	2000-212	1/63	X	12	-	-	X
Raytheon Data Systems Co.	250	12/60	X	115	20	135	X
Norwood, Mass.	440	3/64	X	20	-	-	X
(A) (July 1973)	520	10/65	X	26	1	27	X
	703	10/67	12.5	(S) 179	33	212	0
	704	3/70	7.2	(S) 300	100	400	40
	706	5/69	19.0	(S) 75	17	92	1
Standard Computer Corp.	IC 4000	12/68	9.0	9	0	9	2
Los Angeles, Calif.	IC 6000-6000/E	5/67	16.0	3	0	3	-
(A) (June 1972)	IC 7000	8/70	17.0	4	0	4	1
	IC-9000	5/71	400.0	(S) 1	0	1	-
Systems Engineering Laboratories	SYSTEMS 810A/810B	6-66/9-68	1.8/2.6	382	30	412	-
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	SYSTEMS 71/72	8-72/9-71	0.9/1.0	19	5	24	-
(A) (Sept. 1973)	SYSTEMS 85/86	7-72/6-70	6.0/10.0	47	3	50	-
Texas Instruments Inc.	960	6/70	X	-	-	-	X
Houston, Tex.	960A	11/71	0.2-2.7	-	-	-	-
(A) (June 1973)	980	5/68	X	-	-	-	X
	980A	8/72	0.3-2.7	-	-	-	-
UNIVAC Div. of Sperry Rand	9200	6/67	1.5	1360	616	1976	-
Blue Bell, Pa.	9300/9380	9/67	3.4	795	675	1470	-
(A) (Aug. 1973)	9400/9480	5/69	7.0	212	228	440	-
	9700	-	-	3	11	14	-
	418 III	6/63	11.0	40	77	117	-
	494	-	-	62	46	108	-
	1106	-	-	61	143	204	-
	1108	9/65	68.0	163	92	255	-
	1110	-	-	11	17	28	-
	I & II	3/51 & 11/57	X	23	-	-	X
	File Computers	8/56	X	13	-	-	X
	LARC	5/60	135.0	2	0	2	-
	1107, UIII, 490/1/2, 418II, 1004/5, 1050, SS80/90	-	X	2063	1442	3505	X
UNIVAC - Series 70	301	2/61	7.0	143	-	-	-
Blue Bell, Pa.	501	6/59	14.0-18.0	17	-	-	-
(A) (Feb. 1973)	601	11/62	14.0-35.0	0	-	-	-
	3301	7/64	17.0-35.0	74	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/15, 25	9/65	4.3	18	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/35	1/67	9.2	95	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/45	11/65	22.5	265	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/46	11/68	33.5	30	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/55	11/66	34.0	10	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/60	11/70	32.0	18	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/61	4/70	42.0	7	-	-	-
	70/2	5/71	16.0	63	-	-	-
	70/3	9/71	25.0	7	-	-	-
	70/6	9/71	25.0	24	-	-	-
	70/7	12/71	35.0	7	-	-	-
	EMR 6020	4/65	5.4	15	1	16	0
	EMR 6040	7/65	6.6	6	0	6	0
	EMR 6050	2/66	9.0	15	2	17	0
	EMR 6070	10/66	15.0	7	8	15	0
	EMR 6130	8/67	5.0	34	13	47	0
	EMR 6135	-	2.6	36	5	41	4
	EMR 6145	-	7.2	-	-	-	8
	EMR 6140	-	-	-	-	-	0
Varian Data Machines	620	11/65	X	-	-	75	X
Newport Beach, Calif.	620i	6/67	X	-	-	1300	X
(A) (Mar. 1973)	R-620i	4/69	-	-	-	80	-
	520/DC, 520i	12/69;10/68	-	-	-	500	150
	620/f	11/70	X	-	-	207	X
	620/L, 620/L-OOC	4/71;9/72	-	-	-	740	101
	620/f-100	6/72	-	-	-	100	43
	620/L-100	5/72	-	-	-	200	235
	Varian 73	11/72	-	-	-	40	39
Xerox Data Systems	XDS-92	4/65	1.5	43	4	47	-
El Segundo, Calif.	XDS-910	8/62	2.0	170	10	180	-
(N) (R) (Oct. 1973)	XDS-920	9/62	2.9	120	12	132	-
	XDS-930	6/64	3.4	159	14	173	-
	XDS-940	4/66	14.0	33	3	36	-
	XDS-9300	11/64	8.5	25-30	4	29-34	-
	XDS-530	8/73	7.6	-	-	-	-
	Sigma 2	12/66	1.8	163	36	199	-
	Sigma 3	12/69	2.0	21	1	22	-
	Sigma 5	8/67	6.0	32	14	46	-
	Sigma 6	6/70	12.0	3	-	-	-
	Sigma 7	12/66	12.0	31	7	38	-
	Sigma 8	2/72	-	5	-	-	-
	Sigma 9	-	35.0	7	-	-	-

CALENDAR OF COMING EVENTS

Nov. 28-30, 1973: 1st Annual Systems Engineering Conference, Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York, N.Y. / contact: Technical Services, AIIE, 25 Technology Park/Atlanta, Norcross, GA 30071

Dec. 4-5, 1973: 1973 Vehicular Technology Conference, Sheraton-Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio / contact: Robert Wylie, Motorola Communications, Inc., 12955 Snow Rd., Cleveland, OH 44130

Dec. 6-8, 1973: National Symposium on Computer Applications in the Juvenile Justice System, Marriott Motor Hotel, Atlanta, Ga. / contact: Lawrence A. Boxerman, Project Dir., National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, Univ. of Nevada, Box 8000, Reno, NV 89507

Dec. 9-11, 1973: Computer Architecture, Flagler Inn & Reitz Union, Gainesville, Fla. / contact: G. Jack Lipovski, 229 Larsen Hall, Univ. of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32601

Jan. 16-18, 1974: 3rd Annual AIIE-MHI Seminar, Marriott Motor Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. / contact: Technical Services, AIIE, 25 Technology Park/Atlanta, Norcross, GA 30071

Jan. 16-19, 1974: Internepcon/Japan '74, Harumi Convention Center, Tokyo, Japan / contact: Industrial & Scientific Conf. Mgmt., Inc., 222 W. Adams St., Chicago, IL 60606

Feb. 12-14, 1974: Computer Science Conference, Detroit Hilton, Detroit, Mich. / contact: Seymour J. Wolfson, Computer Science Section, Wayne State Univ., Detroit, MI 48202

Feb. 13-15, 1974: International Solid State Circuits Conference, Univ. of Penna., Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. / contact: Virgil Johannes, Bell Labs., Room 3E331, Holmdel, NJ 07733

Feb. 19-22, 1974: 3rd Annual National Communications Week Convention, Chase-Park Plaza Hotel, St. Louis, Mo. / contact: David C. Brotemarkle, Communications Systems Management Assoc., 1102 West St., Suite 1003, Wilmington, DE 19801

Feb. 26-28, 1974: Computer Conference (COMPCON), Jack Tar Hotel, San Francisco, Calif. / contact: Jack Kuehler, IBM Corp., P 35, Bldg. 025, Monterey & Cottle Rds., San Jose, CA 95114

Mar. 25-29, 1974: IEEE International Convention (INTERCON), Coliseum & Statler Hilton Hotel, New York, N.Y. / contact: J. H. Schumacher, IEEE, 345 E. 47th St., New York, NY 10017

April 3, 1974: Minicomputers — Trends and Applications, Nat'l Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg, Md. / contact: Harry Hayman, 738 Whitaker Ter., Silver Spring, MD 20901

April 8-11, 1974: Computer Aided Design, Int'l Conference & Exhibition, Univ. of Southampton, Southampton, England / contact: Inst. of Civil Engrs., Great George St., Westminster, London SW1, England

April 9-11, 1974: Optical Computing Symposium, Zurich, Switzerland / contact: Samuel Horvitz, Box 274, Waterford, CT 06385

April 21-24, 1974: International Circuits & Systems Symposium, Sir Francis Drake Hotel, San Francisco, Calif. / contact: L. O. Chua, Dept. of EE, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, CA 94720

April 21-24, 1974: 1974 Annual Assoc. for Systems Management Conf., Dallas Convention Center, Dallas, Tex. / contact: R. B. McCaffrey, ASM, 24587 Bagley Rd., Cleveland, OH 44138

May 5-8, 1974: Offshore Technology Conference, Astrohall, Houston, Tex. / contact: Offshore Tech. Conf., 6200 N. Central Expressway, Dallas, TX 75206

May 6-10, 1974: 1974 National Computer Conference & Exposition, McCormick Place, Chicago, Ill. / contact: Dr. Stephen S. Yau, Computer Sciences Dept., Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201

May 13-17, 1974: European Computing Congress (EUROCOMP), Brunel Univ., Uxbridge, Middlesex, England / contact: Online, Brunel Univ., Uxbridge, Middlesex, England

May 13-17, 1974: International Instruments, Electronic and Automation Exhibition, Olympia, London, England / contact: Industrial Exhibitions Ltd., Commonwealth House, New Oxford St., London, WC1A 1PB, England

June 24-26, 1974: Design Automation Workshop, Brown Palace Hotel, Denver, Colo. / contact: ACM, 1133 Ave. of the Americas, New York, NY 10036

June 25-28, 1974: 1974 Annual International Conference & Business Exposition, Minneapolis, Minn. / contact: Data Processing Management Assoc., 505 Busse Highway, Park Ridge, IL 60068

July 15-19, 1974: 1974 Conference on Frontiers in Education, City University, London, England / contact: Conf. Dept., Institution of Electrical Engineers, Savoy Place, London, England WC2R 0BL

July 23-26, 1974: Circuit Theory & Design, IEE, London, England / contact: IEE, Savoy Pl., London WC2R 0BL, England

Aug. 5-10, 1974: IFIP Congress 74, St. Erik's Fairgrounds, Stockholm, Sweden / contact: U.S. Committee for IFIP Congress 74, Box 426, New Canaan, CT 06840

Aug. 5-10, 1974: Medinfo 74, St. Erik's Fairgrounds, Stockholm, Sweden / contact: Frank E. Heart, Bolt Beranek and Newman, Inc., 50 Moulton St., Cambridge, MA 02138

Aug. 21-23, 1974: Engineering in the Ocean Environment International Conf., Nova Scotian Hotel, Halifax, Nova Scotia / contact: O. K. Gashus, EE Dept., Nova Scotia Tech. Coll., POB 100, Halifax, N.S., Canada

---

ADVERTISING INDEX

Following is the index of advertisements. Each item contains: product / name and address of the advertiser / name of the agency, if any / page number where the advertisement appears.

COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION / Computers and Automation, 815 Washington St., Newtonville, MA 02160 / page 52

ELECTRONIC RESEARCH CORP., 7618 Wedd, Overland Park, KS 66204 / ERC Advertising / page 45

INSTRUCTIONAL FACULTY OPENINGS / College of Petroleum & Minerals, c/o Saudi Arabian Educational Mission, 880 Third Ave.—17th Floor, New York, NY 10022 / page 32

THE NOTEBOOK ON COMMON SENSE, ELEMENTARY AND ADVANCED / published by *Computers and Automation*, 815 Washington St., Newtonville, MA 02160 / page 7

RIDE THE EAST WIND: Parables of Yesterday and Today, published by Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co. / Computers and Automation, 815 Washington St., Newtonville, MA 02160 / pages 24, 25

WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING / jointly published by Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., and Berkeley Enterprises, Inc., 815 Washington St., Newtonville, MA 02160 / page 51

13-00000

"WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING"

EDITION 5.2 = 5th EDITION + 2 SUPPLEMENTS ALREADY ISSUED

THE MOST ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING ARE

PEOPLE

Who are they?

What do they do?

Where do they do it?

Consult

"WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING" jointly published by *Computers and Automation* (Berkeley Enterprises, Inc.) and Quadrangle / New York Times Book Co.

"Who's Who in Computers and Data Processing" has been changed to a periodic subscription basis as follows:

1. The latest Cumulative Edition (the 5th edition published 1971, containing over 15,000 capsule biographies, over 1,000 pages long, 3 volumes, hardbound) PLUS
2. Three Updating Supplements per period totaling over 3,000 entries

Both for $34.50 in any period when a cumulative edition is supplied . . . and $15.00 per period when a cumulative edition is not supplied.

BASED ON continual data gathering from computer professionals carried out by *Computers and Automation*

This reference is particularly useful for:

Personnel managers
Libraries
Conference planners
Directors of computer installations
Suppliers to the computer industry
Executive search organizations
Prospective authors
Prospective speakers . . .

anyone who needs to keep up with the important people in the field.

Each computer professional has a capsule biography detailing: last name; first name and middle initial (if any); occupation; year of birth; university education and degrees; year entered the computer field; main interests; job title; organization and its address; publications, honors and memberships; home address.

We are confident that you will find the subscription will repay you many times over. In fact, one day when this wealth of material gives you the inside track with someone important to you, you'll find the information PRICELESS: the most essential component in EDP is CAPABLE PEOPLE.

RETURNABLE IN 10 DAYS FOR FULL REFUND

(if not satisfactory)

(may be copied on any piece of paper)

WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING
815 Washington St., Newtonville, Mass. 02160

( ) YES, please enroll me as a subscriber to WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING at the following rate:

( ) $34.50 including the last cumulative edition

OR

( ) $15.00 since I already have access to the last cumulative edition

I understand that for each period of subscription I shall receive three updating supplements, totaling over 3,000 entries.

( ) Payment enclosed ( ) Please bill me.
( ) Please bill my organization

RETURNABLE IN 10 DAYS FOR FULL REFUND

(if not satisfactory)

Name
Title
Organization
Address
City State & Zip
Your Signature P.O. No. (if company order)

13-00000

C.? .1101-71-33

WILL YOU HELP?

Yes, *you.* It may come as a surprise that you'd be asked ... but as a reader of *Computers & Automation* you are in a unique position to help us.

NAMES . . . people, institutions, companies who should be interested in 1) the computer industry and/or 2) seeking truth in information are very much needed to join you as readers of *C&A*.

Will you tell us who they are? And perhaps even more, will you let us use your name in writing to them? But with or without your name (we'll only use it if you grant permission) we need to know those *you* think might be interested in also reading *C&A*.

*** * * * *reprint from***
computers
and automation

Science and the Advanced Society, by C. P. Snow, Ministry of Technology, London, England (April 1966)
The Information Revolution and the Bill of Rights, by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, M.I.T. (May 1971)
Employment, Education, and the Industrial System, by Prof. John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard Univ. (Aug. 1965)
Computers and the Consumer, by Ralph Nader, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 1970)

Please give us their names and addresses on the form below or add another sheet of paper. Trim out the card with scissors and drop it in the mail. We'll gladly pay the postage to learn of possible new friends. And many thanks for your help! As a token of our appreciation we'll send you our ****Reprint.

P.S. If you like you may mail your list separately to:
R. A. Sykes, Circulation Mgr.
Computers & Automation & People
815 Washington Street
Newtonville, MA 02160

cut here and tuck in flap

cut here

TO: R. A. Sykes, Circulation Mgr.
Computers & Automation & People

I suggest you send information on C&A to . . . (attach list if you like)

(1) Name____________________
Address____________________
City__________ State________ ZIP______

(2) Name____________________
Address____________________
City__________ State________ ZIP______

May we use your name? ☐ YES ☐ NO

Please give us your name and address on the form below so we can send you your ****Reprint. Just cross out the subscription request — unless you also want to enter your new or renewal order.

cut here

cut here

cut here

Fold here — do not cut

B — staple or glue to A

BUSINESS REPLY MAIL

No postage stamp necessary if mailed in the United States

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY BERKELEY ENTERPRISES, INC.

COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION
AND PEOPLE
815 Washington Street
Newtonville, MA 02160

FIRST CLASS
PERMIT NO. 33531
BOSTON, MASS.

bend here and fold

YES, **start my subscription to COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION AND PEOPLE according to the instructions checked below.**

One Year (including the Computer Directory and Buyers' Guide — 13 issues) U.S. only. ☐ $23.50

One Year (excluding the Computer Directory and Buyers' Guide — 12 issues) U.S. only. ☐ $11.50

Name:____________________ Title:________
Organization:____________________
Address:____________________
City:__________ State:________ Zip:______
Country if not U.S.:____________________
Signature:____________________ P.O. No..______

☐ Payment enclosed ☐ Renewal
☐ Bill me ☐ New subscription

To SPEED the processing of your order, please check the one best descriptor in each of the two categories below. (This information will be used for statistical purposes only.)

BUSINESS TYPE

- 01—Computer Manufacturer
- 02—Aerospace Aircraft Manufacturer
- 03—Other Manufacturing
- 04—Raw Materials Processing: (chemical, primary metal, petroleum, food, etc.)
- 05—Mining and Construction
- 06—Computing & Consulting
- 07—Finance, Insurance, Publ., and Service Organizations
- 08—Transportation Companies
- 09—Public Utilities
- 10—Research
- 11—Wholesale, Retail, Sales, and Marketing Firms
- 12—Educational; (College, University, or School)

JOB FUNCTION

- 1—Technical Management; (computer installation management, program management, or engineering mgmt.)
- 2—Computer Center Personnel; (methods & procedure analysts, and operators)
- 3—Programming Personnel; (systems, application & research programmers)
- 4—Professional: (systems analysts, mathematicians, operations researchers, and professors)
- 5—General Management Executives; (corporate officers, owners, and partners)
- 6—Engineering Personnel; (systems engineers, research & development engineers)
- 7—Research Personnel
- 8—Students
- 9—Library Subscription

A — staple or glue to B

cut here

“It's the first lie detector that
can be used on a dead
man. It works on tapes and
other voice recordings”

by George O'Toole

Assassination Tapes

The rulers of the state are the only ones who should have the privilege of lying, either at home or abroad; they may be allowed to lie for the good of the state.
—Plato: *The Republic*, Book Three

It's a little frightening. The machine can listen to what you're saying and tell, with a high degree of reliability, whether or not you are lying. It's called the Psychological Stress Evaluator, and it is, in effect, a lie detector. Unlike the polygraph, it needs no physical connection to the subject; therefore it can be used without his knowledge. It works from recordings of his voice, so anything on tape, sound track or phonograph record is fair game for the machine. It is the first lie detector that can be used on a dead man.

Early this year, one of these instruments came into my hands. I resolved to use it to probe one of the darkest mysteries of recent history, the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I set about collecting every recording I could lay my hands on of anyone who had any direct knowledge of the affair. Soon I had compiled the tape-recorded testimony of twenty-two persons—eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, the pathologist who conducted the autopsy, members and staff of the Warren Commission, Jim Garrison, Clay Shaw, and even Earl Warren.

I ran the tapes through the PSE systematically, taking each controversial point in turn. Did the rifle which belonged to Lee Harvey Oswald kill President Kennedy? Was Oswald the killer? Were others involved? What of those mysterious autopsy photographs which the Warren Commission never saw—do they support the Commission's lone-gunman, single-bullet theory? And what about the Warren Commission itself? Did its members conspire to cover up the truth?

Slowly a picture emerged. It is blurred, and it is not the picture I expected. Not all the details are there, but I guarantee this: you may believe the lone-gunman theory of the Warren Report, or you may believe the government-conspiracy theory of Mark Lane, Jim Garrison and others, but either way you are wrong.

The PSE is not a crystal ball. It was invented as an interrogation aid, a function it performs well. To my knowledge, this was the first instance of its use as a tool for historical research. To understand what I did with the PSE, one should know something about the device itself.

I first heard of the Psychological Stress Evaluator last year, when I met two of its inventors, Allan D. Bell, Jr., and Charles R. McQuiston. Bell and McQuiston, both former lieutenant colonels, retired from Army Intelligence several years ago to form a company called Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Inc. It was a logical second career for the two men. Both are experts in the technology of espionage. Either one could pick the lock on your front door in less time than it takes you to find your key. Colonel Bell wears a Black Belt in karate, is an accomplished swordsman and small-arms expert, and has a dozen inventions to his credit, from anti-bugging devices to a miniaturized microdot camera. Colonel McQuiston is one of the foremost polygraph experts in the U.S., a specialist in radio and audio surveillance, and a qualified locksmith.

The PSE grew from an effort to improve e polygraph. Standard polygraphs easure four variables, pulse, blood pres- re, respiration and perspiration. Some o measure additional physiological vari- les. The more variables measured, the re reliable the polygraph.

Bell and McQuiston discovered that the quencies composing the human voice e not fixed; they shift very slightly from ght to fourteen times every second. But en the speaker is under stress, this nor- l frequency modulation disappears. hat remains are the pure component fre- encies of the voice. And a strong indica- n that the speaker is lying.

The two men developed a device to tect this phenomenon and planned to use as an additional "channel" on the poly- aph. Th[illegible]ey discovered that the new riable was so reliable and accurate a easure of psychological stress there was lly no need to measure the other poly- aph variables.

Freed from the necessity of strapping the bject into a chair, stretching a pneumo- aphic tube across his chest, gluing elec- des to his palms and clamping his arm h a blood-pressure cuff, the PSE proved be much more versatile than the poly- aph. Because it can work from a tele- one or tape recorder, the PSE can be ed without the knowledge or even the ysical presence of the subject.

I asked Colonel Bell to tell me about some the things the PSE was being used for, pecially cases in which a conventional lygraph couldn't be used. He mentioned at the police in Howard County, Maryland, ve been using the PSE for two years; they ve had great success in establishing the nocence of suspects who were afraid to bmit to a polygraph examination because that machine's forbidding aspect.

Bell went on to describe some of his ention's other uses, actual or potential. ktor and the Federal government are ex- oring its use as a defense against skyjack- and telephoned bomb threats, and as neans of speeding up customs inspec- ns. Some doctors and psychiatrists are ing PSEs to study patients' physical and ntal stress. The National Committee to estigate Aerial Phenomena, a private oup that investigates UFO reports, is w using the PSE to interview witnesses UFO sightings.

asked Bell if he would lend me a PSE experiment with, in order to write a piece out the device. He agreed, with two con- ions. First, I must take Dektor's three-day urse in operating the instrument; second, er using the PSE, I must review my erpretation of its output with his staff, in interest of accuracy. This seemed rea- nable, so I agreed.

he course was held in the meeting room a Holiday Inn in Falls Church, Virginia. e eight other students were employees customers who had purchased the vice. These included a private detective ency in Pennsylvania, a New York chain store, and the security service of an East African country. The instructor was Mike Kradz, a criminologist and retired police officer. Kradz projects the tough-cop image, but he is a living rebuttal to the Polish joke. There is nothing about forensic science, from fingerprints to polygraphy, on which the man is not an expert.

The first morning of the course was devoted to the physical operation of the PSE. The device is used in conjunction with a Uher tape recorder, which has four speeds and can be manually wound back to locate a particular point on the tape. The testimony to be evaluated is recorded at a tape speed of 7½ inches per second, then played back and stopped at the beginning of the utterance in question. The recorder is slowed to 15 16 inches per second and played. The sound, no longer recognizable as a human voice, is a long, low rumble.

The PSE itself is built into an attaché case. The case opens to reveal a chart drive, similar to an electrocardiograph, and a number of buttons and knobs. A single cable connects the PSE to the tape recorder.

As the tape recorder reels slowly turn, and a rumble issues from its speaker, the PSE stylus dances back and forth across the moving chart paper, leaving behind a ragged trail. Then the recorder is stopped, the chart paper is stopped, and that's all there is to it. The result is a strip of paper with a squiggly line. The rest is up to the human eye and brain.

On the afternoon of the first day, Kradz showed us what to look for. The unstressed voice looks like an untrimmed hedge, with stalks of different heights sticking up (and down) at irregular intervals. But add some stress, and that hedge begins to look trimmed. The greater the stress, the smoother the shape. If the subject was experiencing the hard stress which accompanies deception, the over-all outline of the figure tends to take on a rectangular shape, a concertina as seen by the player. Kradz showed slide after slide of charts made during actual police interrogations. He told us the background of each case and pointed out the tell-tale signs of deception, whenever they were present.

“

The more I read,
the more I doubted
the official account of
what happened
that day in Dallas

”

That night each student took a PSE back to his room to practice operating it. Some coordination must be learned to become facile in handling the recorder and the PSE, but clearly the difficult part of the course would be learning how to read and interpret the charts.

The next day we learned the theory of polygraph interrogation, which applies to the PSE. There is, first of all, the matter of the "outside issue."

Most people, Kradz pointed out, have some sort of deep secret they don't want known. When faced with a polygraph examination, a person may be more concerned that this outside issue may come to light than he is about the actual substance of the interrogation. This can produce irrelevant stress in some of his answers, and mislead the examiner. Therefore it is is necessary for the examiner to interview the subject before the examination, go over all of the questions he intends to ask, and assure the subject he will ask only these questions.

I had reason to remember this later, when I ran my first real interrogation tape.

The interrogation always includes the question, "Are you afraid that I will ask you about something we have not discussed?" A negative answer with no sign of stress eliminates the outside-issue problem. Also, the examiner always asks some innocuous questions, such as, "Do you like the color blue?" in order to observe the subject's general state of tension. And there is always one "red-herring" question.

The red herring is used to identify the "guilt complex responder." Such a person shows stress when he responds to any accusatory question. The examiner may ask, "Did you steal the watch?" when it is money, not a watch, that is missing. A stressed denial will alert the examiner, who carefully compares this response to the stress produced by questions about the missing money.

That night the class was given tapes of real police interrogations. In most cases, Kradz was the examiner; and in every case, he knew the background and resolution of the matter. One case I was assigned concerned a young man accused of stealing money from his father's store. Kradz started by asking the "outside-issue" question. No, the young man replied, he was not afraid Kradz would ask him a question they hadn't discussed. Then the following exchange took place:

"Do you live in Howard County?"

"Yes."

"Do you suspect someone of having taken the money?"

"No."

"Are you wearing a white shirt?"

"Yes."

"Do you know who took the money?"

"No."

"Are you wearing a ring?"

"Yes."

"Did you take the money?"

"No."

There were a few red-herring questions to check for the guilt complex response. The questions about wearing a white shirt and a ring and living in Howard County had been included to measure the background stress elicited by irrelevant issues.

I ran the tape and charted it on the PSE. All but two of his responses were unstressed. The question about suspecting

.took the money produced enough ess to indicate deception. The other stion which produced stress was, "Are wearing a ring?" In fact, his yes to that s accompanied by such stress as I had n only once or twice in the class slides.

he next morning Kradz called on me. the suspect take the money, he asked. id I didn't think so. Kradz nodded. Did suspect who took the money? Yes, I ught he did. Very good, said Kradz. Did tice anything else about the interroga-n? Well, yes, there was this business ut the ring. Perhaps the suspect had en it. Kradz smiled. No, the kid hadn't en the ring, but he was gay. He had hanged rings with another guy. Nobody w about it. The kid didn't really expect e asked about it, because Kradz had e over all the questions with him. Still, en the ring was mentioned, he panicked.

y the third day of the course, I had begun give some thought to what I might do the PSE. I was particularly interested e fact that the device works from a tape ording. Sound-recording technology is ost a century old (Edison invented the nograph in 1877), and an enormous ount of history is stored on phonograph ords, sound tracks, and tape and wire ordings. I thought how many press conences, interviews and public pronouncets are stored away in the film and tape hives of the world, and how many quess could be settled if we knew for certain that the speaker had told the truth. However, since interrogation with a PSE seemed to require such an elaborate and structured situation, I wondered if it could be used the way I had hoped, as a tool for historical research.

During the lunch break I took Kradz aside and asked him. Could the PSE be used outside interrogations, where the speaker was telling what may or may not have happened? Yes, he said, the PSE could be used for that. Where there was no stress, I could be confident that the speaker was telling the truth. However, when I did find stress, I had to be very careful about reaching conclusions about its cause; it could result from something other than deception. But if I found a stress pattern in the testimony of several witnesses to the same event, I would very probably have uncovered deception.

Encouraged, I reviewed the list of recent mysteries. Watergate was, of course, the first to come to mind. The ITT affair was also of recent interest. The Kent State incident had never been fully cleared up. But one subject seemed to loom above all the rest—the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Like many others, I have found it difficult to believe the Warren Report. When Mark Lane's book came out, I read it carefully. I read much of the other criticism of the Warren Commission's findings. The more I read, the more I doubted the official account of what happened that day in Dallas. I waited for the real story to emerge. It didn't. I hoped that Jim Garrison would prove that he had solved the mystery. He didn't. Time passed, public interest waned, and the details of the controversy dimmed in my mind, leaving only a dull residue of doubt. I had despaired of ever learning the truth. Now I knew what to do with the PSE.

It was all there: the statements made before television cameras by eyewitnesses, policemen, medical examiners, members of the Warren Commission. Somewhere in a network-television vault were the sound tracks, with the tiny, inaudible variations in voice frequency that could settle once and for all the question, "Did Oswald, acting alone, shoot and kill John F. Kennedy?"

My immediate problem was getting access to the recordings. I was certain the television networks would have them, but I wasn't sure exactly what to ask for. There must be thousands of hours of sound recordings relating to the assassination. Where, among all this talk, was the critical testimony?

I started digging and soon discovered the existence of a group called the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, located in Washington, D.C. I called the number listed in the telephone directory and was soon speaking to Bob Smith, the Committee's Research Director. I told Smith that I was a writer and wanted to do a piece on the John F. Kennedy assassination. I asked him for an interview, and he agreed.

We met in the offices of Bernard Fenster-



Voice prints by the
Psychological Stress Evaluator
of former chief justice
Earl Warren in May, 1972
indicating hard stress on
the words "no evidence."

ssassination Tapes

INUED FROM PAGE 47

ld. a successful criminal lawyer and
ector of the Committee, in a modern
ce building a few blocks from the White
use. Fensterwald is a small, dapper man
h a thin beard. Smith is a lean, intense
ain smoker. Both men appeared to be
their forties.

'Before we begin," I said, "I think I should
ntion that I used to work for the CIA."
have run across it often, the theory that
CIA killed Kennedy. It seems absurd
me, and I don't believe it. I worked there
three years and never saw or heard any-
ng suggesting the Agency was involved
the assassination. I never met anyone
re I thought capable of doing it. Still,
ave learned through bitter experience of
suspicion which attaches to former in-
ligence officers. Epidemics of paranoia
d to accompany us through life. I thought
better get that issue out of the way.

Smith and Fensterwald exchanged
nces and smiled. Fensterwald told me
t they did not necessarily believe the CIA
sassin theory, and they certainly didn't
nd talking to a former Agency employee.

Relieved, I began to outline my project.
sked if they had heard of the PSE. Both
n were dimly aware of it. I described
device and started to detail the way it
uld be used as a research tool. They im-
diately understood what I was proposing
d were tremendously enthusiastic. Yes,
y said, there were many key statements
tape somewhere, and they would be glad
compile specific references for me.
rthermore, they could, in some cases,
vide me with the tape. They said they
uld be in contact when they had some-
ng for me.

While I was waiting, I experimented with
PSE. I telephoned a friend and told him
out the device. I asked if he was willing
play a little game to test it out, and he
reed. He picked a number between one
d ten. I asked him, "Is the number one?"
the number two?" and so on, and he
swered no each time. I recorded his
sponses, ran them through the PSE and
lled him back. The number he picked,
old him, was five.

He was dumbfounded. He had not heard
the PSE and had thought I might be con-
cting some elaborate joke at his expense.
t when I called back and correctly iden-
ed the number he had picked, he realized
as serious. And he was shocked.

I played the same game several times
th others and did not always have similar
ccess. With Bernard Fensterwald, I was
le only to narrow the answer down to two
mbers, one of which turned out to be correct. With others I have been completely unable to identify the right number. The problem with this game is that the player knows that it is just that. He knows that I know he is lying, it is a socially acceptable situation and there is nothing at stake. The stress which accompanies real deception is not always present.

I obtained a tape recording from CBS News of a portion of a *Sixty Minutes* program in which Mike Wallace interviewed Clifford Irving. The interview took place during the height of the controversy, while Irving was still claiming to have gotten Howard Hughes' life story through a series of interviews with the billionaire. It was a consummate job of lying, embellished with such convincing details as Irving's disagreement with his colleague Susskind about whether Hughes kept his organic prunes in a paper or a plastic bag. *Sixty Minutes* re-ran the segment after Irving's confession because the man's sheer virtuosity as a prevaricator was amazing. I was interested in the interview for a different reason: at the height of the controversy, Irving had been given a polygraph examination and had passed it. I wanted to see if the man who had beaten the conventional lie detector could also beat the PSE.

I selected a point in the interview at which Mike Wallace suggested that Irving had not interviewed Howard Hughes, but had happened on some transcripts of Hughes' statements. Irving asked how he could have happened on them. Wallace rejoined, "Where *did* you happen on those transcripts?" Irving replied, "I got the transcripts from Howard Hughes." I charted this statement on the PSE.

It was a perfect example of total stress, horizontally blocked, with the smooth, "trimmed-hedge" wave form. Clifford Irving was a master liar, and he had beaten the polygraph, but he would have been caught by the PSE.

A few days after our first meeting, I received a call from Bob Smith. He had turned up a few things for me. I visited him at the Committee's office in downtown Washington. He gave me a tape recording and a typewritten transcript. The recording was the Louis Lomax television program of Sunday, October 16, 1966. Wesley Liebler, a member of the Warren Commission's staff, was the guest. The transcript was of a CBS News television program entitled *The Warren Report*, which had been broadcast in four one-hour segments on June 25, 26, 27 and 28, 1967.

I examined the transcript. The programs had been narrated by Walter Cronkite and other CBS newsmen. They reviewed every major point of controversy that had been raised by the critics of the Warren Report, interviewing eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, medical examiners, ballistic specialists and many others who had some inside knowledge of the assassination of John F. Kennedy. For what I had in mind, it was a gold mine. I telephoned CBS and learned that I could get a copy of the program's soundtrack if I would pay for the dubbing charges. I told them to go ahead.

Next I played the Lomax-Liebler tape. Apparently Mark Lane had been on an earlier Lomax program, and now Liebler was on to rebut him. I didn't need the PSE to know that Liebler was stressed. He seemed very agitated, and his breathing audibly indicated his tension. He was angry about the things Lane had said, the questions Lomax was asking him, and the reaction of the studio audience. Given his highly emotional state, he did not seem a very promising subject for the PSE. Nonetheless, I decided to give it a try.

Charting a tape with the PSE is a long and tedious process, and it was impractical to chart the entire program. I ran some of Liebler's statements which were not in dispute and discovered, as I had expected, a great deal of stress. He was pretty charged up.

Most of the exchange between Liebler, Lomax and the audience was argumentative and did not deal with specific factual points. I found two key statements by Liebler, though, and I charted them.

The first statement, in response to a question by Lomax, was, "I have no doubt about the conclusions of the [Warren] Report." Plenty of stress was evident, but not much more than in other statements.

The second statement related to those Warren Commission documents which were not included in the Report—they were locked up in the National Archives. Lomax asked Liebler if there was anything in the documents which would alter Liebler's opinion. Taken literally, it was a strange question, since Liebler had seen the documents and, if they would alter his opinion, they would already have done so. Lomax probably meant to ask if the documents would conflict with the conclusions of the Warren Report. Whatever Liebler thought the question meant, he answered quickly, "Oh, none, none at all." The PSE showed much more stress here than during any of Liebler's other statements.

It was all pretty confused and fuzzy, and it didn't tell me more than I'd already known: Wesley Liebler was pretty upset when he appeared on the Louis Lomax program. I hoped that the CBS tapes would yield more enlightening results.

I finally received a call from CBS's Washington office saying the tapes had arrived. I broke a few traffic laws getting there to pick up the tapes and returning to my apartment. I had already selected the points I wanted to check from the transcript of the program. I mounted the first tape on the recorder, ran it down to the first point of interest, and turned on the PSE.

For the next three days and nights, I ran charts. When I finished, I had a splitting headache, my kitchen floor was ankle deep in chart paper, but I had a much clearer idea of what did and did not happen that day in Dallas.

Before I describe my results, I feel that I must offer the reader a few comments and [illegible]cation.

Although the PSE is a well-established
rugat[illegible] it has not been validated
tool for historical research. Even though
ents familiar with the machine believe
it can be used in this way, my project
the first attempt to do so.

It is easier to demonstrate with the PSE
a speaker is telling the truth than to
w he is lying. Stress can be caused by
gs other than deception; but the ab-
ce of stress is an extremely reliable
cation of truthfulness. Of course, the
ence of stress does not prove that a
ement is true, only that the speaker
eves it to be true.

Although I found a great deal of stress
the testimony of the assassination tapes,
o single instance can I say that the in-
dual was lying. I point this out not only
protect myself from libel suits but be-
se I am not morally certain any one indi-
ual was [illegible]ing the truth.

Nonetheless, stress in the testimony
iany witnesses to the same event makes
mathematical probability overwhelming
at least some of them were lying.

hese points could not be better illus-
ed than they were by the Jim Gar-
n–Clay Shaw Affair.

iarrison, it may be recalled, was the New
eans District Attorney who, in 1967,
med to have solved the Kennedy assas-
ation. He presented an elaborate case
inst a local businessman, Clay Shaw,
others, as members of an assassination
spiracy. In one of the hour-long pro-
ms, CBS interviewed Garrison, Shaw,
two other people involved in Garrison's
gations.

his interview, Garrison was hostile and
not make many firm, factual statements
uld test with the PSE. However, he did
, "There's no question about it [that he
w how the assassination had been car-
out] . . . we know the key individuals
lved . . . there is no question about the
[the conspirators] were there [in Dealy
za]." The PSE showed good to hard
ss on each of these statements. I also
a noncontroversial statement of Gar-
n's as a control: "Oswald was not killed
e [at the movie theater where he was
sted]," and found no stress. Garrison's
ements about his case against Clay
w strongly indicated deception.

ext I ran some statements by Clay Shaw
ying his involvement in such a conspir-
, and denying ever knowing or meeting
Harvey Oswald. I also ran a control
ement. Shaw turned out to be heavily
ssed throughout.

his was not particularly surprising. The
had been accused of conspiring to
der the President of the United States
was being interviewed about it before
vision cameras. He would have to have
n a pretty cool customer not to show
t of stress, even if he were telling the
plete truth.

inding that both Garrison and Shaw
wed stress was not an encouraging development. Of course, *both* men could be lying. Garrison might have found some valid evidence linking Shaw to the assassination and then, in the time-honored tradition of prosecutors, invented the rest of his case. But Shaw's stress could easily be the result of his predicament, and Garrison's might also be the result of some outside issue. The situation was ambiguous.

I ran the testimony of Lee Odom. Odom, a Dallas businessman, was attempting to explain the mysterious coincidence of the post office box numbers. It seems that the Dallas post office box number 11906 appeared in the notebooks of both Clay Shaw and Lee Harvey Oswald. In his testimony, Odom stated that he could not account for the number appearing in Oswald's notebook, he knew how it got into Shaw's. It was Odom's box number, and he had given it to Shaw, whom he'd met by chance on a business trip to New Orleans. The PSE showed hard stress during his statement. No unrelated control statement was available for me to run for comparison.

This didn't really clear things up. There were several obvious alternative explanations for Odom's stress. For example, there had been a number of rather unsavory allegations in the press about Clay Shaw, unrelated to the Garrison charges. Odom may have felt extremely uncomfortable about linking himself to this man in any way. The coincidence of the box numbers seemed very suspicious, but Bob Smith of the Committee had pointed out to me that both Shaw's and Oswald's notebooks were filled with numbers, so the chance of such a coincidence was not that remote.

“

Deception is not proved
by stress, but given
enough witnesses' testimony,
the PSE is able
to arrive at the truth

”

At this point I began to wonder if the television camera was the "outside issue" in every case. Perhaps just being on television will so thoroughly rattle the average person that, lying or not, he is going to show stress on the PSE. I checked this out by recording and charting a number of people on television programs—public officials, men in the street, even witnesses to a particularly gruesome accident. There was occasional stress, but it never reached the high level I was finding in the assassination tapes.

I also recalled something else which put my mind to rest on this point: the PSE had been used to analyze the statements of contestants on the television program *To Tell The Truth*, and identified "the real Mr. So-and-so" with an accuracy of better than 94 percent. The problem obviously was not the television camera.

I ran the testimony of William Gurvich on the PSE. Gurvich had been Garrison's chief aide in the investigation of Clay Shaw until he resigned, charging Garrison with wrongdoing. He said, "The truth as I see it is that Mr. Shaw should never have been arrested." He was asked if Garrison had known of certain illegal and unethical methods Gurvich had alleged were being used by Garrison's staff. He answered, "Yeah, of course he did. He ordered it." There was no stress in Mr. Gurvich's statements. The PSE showed that he believed what he was saying.

Obviously I did not have enough testimony from a large enough number of witnesses to create a detailed picture of the Garrison–Shaw affair, but it seems probable that, at the very least, Garrison did not have much of a case against Shaw (a view later held by a New Orleans jury) and likely that Shaw was completely innocent of complicity in the assassination. The lesson of this episode is twofold. First, stress in any one person's testimony does not prove deception. Second, given enough testimony by different witnesses, the PSE can arrive at the truth.

The first person I ran on the PSE who had any direct knowledge of the assassination was Oswald's widow, Marina. Unfortunately, only one of her statements was on the CBS tapes—that Oswald had owned a rifle. The PSE said she was telling the truth.

The rifle had been one of the major points of controversy raised by critics of the Warren Report. The debate centered on two points: whether the Mannlicher–Carcano alleged to have belonged to Oswald was the rifle found by the Dallas police in the Texas School Book Depository, and whether that particular gun could have been the murder weapon.

On the tapes, Darrell C. Tomlinson, an employee of Parkland Hospital, testified that he had found a rifle bullet on a stretcher which he believed had carried Governor Connally. There was no stress in his statement. The PSE said he was telling the truth.

Dr. Joseph D. Nicol, Superintendent of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation for the State of Illinois, ran ballistic tests on bullet fragments found in the presidential limousine, and on the intact bullet found by Tomlinson. Nicol testified that both the intact bullet and the bullet fragments had been fired by the Mannlicher–Carcano. He, too, was apparently telling the truth.

Deputy Constable Seymour Weitzman of the Dallas police claimed that he found Oswald's Mannlicher–Carcano on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. However, on the day of the assassination, he had told the press that the rifle he'd found was a German Mauser. The following day he signed an affidavit to that effect. But on the CBS tapes he testified that he had been mistaken about that point, that it had really een Oswald's rifle. The PSE showed considerable stress in his statements.

Patrolman Gerald L. Hill testified that he und three spent bullet hulls on the floor eneath the window from which the fatal ots allegedly were fired. The PSE showed rd stress in his statements.

The rifle was one of the principal points sed by the Warren Commission to link swald to the assassination. The PSE subantiated the testimony that Oswald owned rifle and that the evidence supplied to ballistics expert indicated this rifle was e murder weapon. However, the PSE did t substantiate the controversial claims of allas police regarding the discovery of is evidence.

The hospital employee was apparently lling the truth when he recounted finding e bullet on a stretcher at Parkland Hospil, but many critics have charged that the ullet had been deliberately planted there. his is the famous "single bullet" which the arren Report says passed through the odies of both the President and Governor onnally, and then lodged in Connally's rist. Several researchers have tried to peat this, firing the same type of bullet to the wrist of a cadaver. The bullets never mained perfectly intact, as the one found n the stretcher; they became twisted lumps lead and cooper.

The second link between Oswald and the ssassination is the charge that he killed fficer Tippitt a Dallas policeman, while eeing from the scene of the first shooting. number of eyewitnesses have testified at they saw Oswald shoot Tippitt, and one them, Domingo Benavides, was interewed on the CBS tapes. He was asked there was any doubt in his mind that swald was the man he saw shoot Tippitt. e replied, "No, sir, there was no doubt all." There was absolutely no stress in s statement. He was telling the truth.

The killing of Officer Tippitt by Oswald s fueled the fires of controversy over the arren Report. Tippitt was far from his usual eat when he was shot. Some witnesses ve alleged that Tippitt and Oswald were en together in Jack Ruby's nightclub. ey theorize that the three men were part an assassination conspiracy, and that ppitt had been sent to silence Oswald, t had been beaten to the draw.

The Dallas police radio dispatcher, fficer Murray Jackson, was asked if he ought Tippitt knew Oswald. "No," he plied. "I don't think he knew Oswald." Did ckson know Oswald? "No," answered ckson, "I didn't either." The PSE showed eavy stress in both statements.

Perhaps the greatest source of conversy over the Warren Report is it's claim at all the shots were fired by one gunman. ome eyewitnesses claim to have heard ots and seen gunsmoke in the area of low hillock ahead and to the right of the esidential motorcade. This hillock has me to be known as "the grassy knoll." ne of these witnesses was a railroad orker named S.M. Holland, who observed the scene from an overpass near the knoll. The PSE confirmed that he thought he had seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, but it could not support his claim that he had heard a shot from that direction.

Another witness, Charles Brehm, was quoted by Mark Lane as having said that he had seen a portion of the President's skull flying back over the left rear end of the limousine. Lane offered this as evidence of a shot from the grassy knoll. On the CBS tapes, Brehm stated heatedly that he had been quoted out of context, and emphatically denied that any shots had come from the knoll. Despite his emotional state, there was almost no stress in this statement.

Officer Jacks of the Dallas police, who was riding in the limousine of Vice-President Johnson, denied that any of the shots had come from the direction of the grassy knoll. The PSE turned up a fair degree of stress.

Three witnesses, Mrs. Caroline Walther, Arnold Rowland and Howard Brennan, claimed to have seen gunmen in the windows of the Texas School Book Depository building. Mrs. Walther said she saw two men, one armed with a rifle, the second with a shorter gun. Rowland told the Warren Commission he had seen two men, one an elderly Negro, in the window Oswald is alleged to have fired from, but on the CBS tapes he claimed he had seen an armed man at a different window. The Commission relied heavily on the testimony of Brennan, who claimed to have seen a gunman in the "Oswald window" actually firing the last of the shots. The PSE showed hard stress in the testimony of all three witnesses.

> "
> Chief Justice Warren:
> "We explored both these
> theories and found
> no evidence that
> either group was involved"
> "

The PSE analysis of the eyewitnesses' testimony regarding the source of the snots is ambiguous. It supports Holland's claim to have seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, and Brehm's denial that any shots came from that direction, and it raises serious doubts about all other claims and counterclaims. This contradiction seems to result from the notorious unreliability of eyewitnesses, perhaps compounded by a fair amount of fabrication. Deception, if it is present here, may have been motivated merely by a desire for attention. Or there may have been darker reasons.

There is, however, other evidence and testimony that could shed some light on the existence, number and location of assassins other than Oswald. This brings us to perhaps the most dubious and controversial element in the Warren Commission's version of the event—the autopsy.

Within minutes after the shooting, Kennedy had been rushed to the emergency room at Parkland Hospital, where Dr. Malcolm Perry tried to save his life. The physician saw that the President had suffered a massive head wound and a smaller wound in the throat. Perry performed a tracheostomy, cutting through the throat wound in an attempt to open a breathing passage. Afterward, when hope for the President had been abandoned, Perry met with the press and declared that the wound in the front of the neck had been an entry wound.

The President's body was flown to Washington, D.C. There, approximately eight hours after the shooting, an autopsy was performed at Bethesda Naval Hospital. Because of the tracheostomy, the nature of the neck wound could no longer be observed and was, at first, overlooked. Later, after consulting the Dallas doctors, the Bethesda pathologists concluded that it was an exit wound. The autopsy report stated that there were two entry wounds, one low in the rear scalp and one at the right base of the neck; and two exit wounds, the throat wound and a large irregular wound on the right side of the head.

The confusion was compounded when two FBI agents present at the autopsy reported that a wound had been found in the President's back, and that no corresponding exit wound had been located. Diagrams made during the autopsy seemed to confirm this, showing the lower of the two entry wounds to be below the shoulders, not at the base of the neck. What became of the bullet? The agents reported that Bethesda doctors thought the bullet had dropped from the wound when the Dallas doctors attempted external heart massage. But this was the shot that the Commission claimed had passed through Kennedy and struck Governor Connally.

X-rays and color photographs of the autopsy were made. The brain was removed from the body. Brain and skin tissue slides were prepared for microscopic examination. Remarkably, the Warren Commission never asked to see any of this evidence, relying instead solely on the testimony of Captain James J. Humes, one of the pathologists who conducted the autopsy. Even more incredible is the disappearance of the brain, the slides, and some of the photographs, which were alleged to have been turned over to the National Archives by the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

Both Dr. Perry and Captain Humes were interviewed on the CBS tapes. Perry was asked about the throat wound he'd seen when the President was brought to Parkland Hospital. His answer seemed evasive. He neither confirmed nor denied that he had thought it was an entry wound, talking instead about the difficulty of making such a determination and the fact that his attention had been devoted to saving the President's life. Then the interviewer asked him directly whether he had thought at the time that it was an entry wound. "Actually, I didn't really give it much thought," he replied. He

ssassination Tapes

NTINUED FROM PAGE 1[illegible]

owed hard stress on the PSE. Unfortu- tely, he made no other definite statement out the nature of the wound.

The interview with Captain Humes was ore informative. Just before the interview, 1967, Humes had re-examined the autop- photographs and X-rays, and he dis- ssed them at length on the CBS tapes. e diagrams drawn during the autopsy, said, had not been intended to precisely present the location of the wounds. However, he [illegible] produced a sketch which, he d, did represent these locations accu- ely. The interviewer asked, "Your re- amination of the photographs verify that wounds were as shown here?"

'Yes, sir," he replied. No stress.

Were there any wounds other than one the base of the neck and one up in the ll? "No, sir, there were not." Moderate ess, not enough to suggest deception.

Was there any doubt that the wound at back of the President's head was an ry wound? "There is absolutely no doubt." Again stress but again moderate.

ltogether, how many wounds were re? "There were two wounds of entrance two of exit." At this point the stress be- ne hard.

nd where were the entry wounds lo- ed? "Posteriorly, one low in the right sterior scalp, and one in the base of the k on the right." Hard stress again.

ould he be absolutely certain that what said was an entry wound was, in fact, t. "Yes, indeed we can." Hard stress.

he interview with Humes was one of the gest and most detailed on the CBS es, and I charted most of it with the PSE. as clear to me that he believed much hat he was saying, but the frequent flick- gs of moderate stress and the occasion- lashes of hard stress suggested that he n't nearly as confident of his testimony he claimed to be. As Dr. Perry had nted out, sometimes it's not easy to tell entry wound from an exit wound.

he interviewer asked him one good "bot- line" question:

Do you have any different conclusion, different ideas, any different thoughts , after seeing [the autopsy photographs] in, than you had at that time?"

No," replied Captain Humes, "we think bear up very well, and very closely, testimony before the Warren Commis- ."

he stress was hard.

len Specter, one of the Warren Commis- 's principal investigators, also spoke on CBS tapes. He said that the case against ald fitted together very well, and that lom could one find among actual criminal convictions a case equally persuasive. He added that there was no foundation for the charge that the Commission had been formed to whitewash the facts.

The PSE said he was telling the truth.

John McCloy, a member of the Warren Commission, said much the same thing, and added that he had seen no credible evidence to contradict the findings of the Commission. The PSE backed him up on this, but it failed to do so when, speaking of the Warren Report, he said, "There was nothing fraudulent about it." Here the PSE showed hard stress.

If Specter and McCloy were as confident as the PSE shows them to be in the truthfulness of the Warren Report, what could be fraudulent about it? Perhaps the snipping off of a few loose ends, the suppression of a few pieces of inconvenient evidence which conflicted with a version of events they believed to be essentially true.

The one man who could be expected to have the most informed opinion regarding the work of the Warren Commission is former Chief Justice Earl Warren himself. He had declined to be interviewed on the CBS program in 1967, but he did appear on television in May, 1972, in an interview which was part of a series called *The Brandeis Television Recollections*. Bob Smith of the Committee provided me with the tape.

"...we found no evidence of any kind that there was any conspiracy."
There was very hard stress on "no evidence"

The interview was an hour long, but the Kennedy assassination and the Warren Commission came up only once. The interviewer, Abram Sachar, Chancellor of Brandeis University, was friendly and deferential. I charted some of Warren's remarks unrelated to the assassination and found that he was generally unstressed. Sachar raised the subject of the Commission obliquely, and Warren volunteered several rather lengthy statements about it

Warren said that immediately after the assassination there were two theories, one that Khrushchev and Castro were behind the killing, the other that a group of right-wing Texas oilmen were responsible. He said:

"We explored both of those theories for ten months and found no evidence that either of them was involved in it."

The PSE showed hard stress.

He continued:

" . . . we found no evidence of any kind that there was any conspiracy."

Again there was stress, and particularly hard stress on the words "no evidence."

"I have read everything," said Justice Warren, "that has come to my notice in the press, and I read some of the documents that have criticized the Commission very severely, but I have never found that they have discovered any evidence of any kind that we didn't discover and use in determining the case as we did."

Hard stress once again. The word "never" was a perfectly "trimmed hedge."

"I have found nothing since that time," he continued, "to change my view, nor have I heard of anything that has changed the view of any member of the commission since that time."

The stress was hard. As I had now come to expect, the word "nothing" seemed a particularly beautiful example of stress. Another word seemed to show even more stress: "member." Could he have been thinking of someone in particular? On January 19, 1970, Senator Richard B. Russell, a member of the Warren Commission, revealed that he had never believed that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone.

I had charted the last of the assassination tapes. Of course, these few thousand feet of recording tape are only a small fraction of the relevant testimony recorded and stored away in the archives of television news departments. There is, for example, Lee Harvey Oswald, as he was led through the Dallas police station, denying that he had killed the President. There are statements by Marina Oswald, Jack Ruby and by others.

I have no doubt that with these tapes, a Psychological Stress Evaluator, and time to work on them, a very detailed picture of the assassination of John F. Kennedy could be reconstructed, a picture that might even reveal the identities of the assassins and their co-conspirators. I hope that sooner or later someone does this. I have gone as far as the private resources of a free-lance writer permit.

What, given the sample of testimony I have processed with the PSE, can I say about the assassination?

We should first examine the testimony in which *no* stress was found, since it is almost certain that these people were telling the truth as they saw it. This strongly suggests the following:

1. Oswald owned a rifle.
2. A bullet fired from that rifle was found on Governor Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital.
3. Bullet fragments *alleged* to have been found in the presidential limousine also came from Oswald's rifle.
4. At least one eyewitness believes he saw gunsmoke on the grassy knoll, but another is equally certain no shots came from that direction.
5. Oswald shot and killed Officer Tippitt.
6. At least one member of the Warren Commission and one member of the Commission's staff really believe in the validity of the Warren Report.
7. Jim Garrison had little or no case against Clay Shaw.

Almost all of this tends to support, in one way or another, the Warren Report. But now 's look at the testimony that is called into estion by the PSE:

The claim that Oswald's rifle was ind in the Texas School Book Depository.

2. The claim that bullet hulls matching wald's rifle were found in the same place.

3. The claim that one gunman was seen the "Oswald window" of the Dallas Book pository.

4. The claim that two gunmen were seen this window.

5. The claim that a gunman was seen a different window of that building.

6. Another claim that no shots came from grassy knoll, and a claim by the witness o saw the gunsmoke on the knoll that also *heard* a shot from that direction.

7. A claim by a Dallas policeman that ither he nor Officer Tippitt knew Oswald.

8. The claim by the pathologist—the rren Commission's only source of infortion about the autopsy—that the X-rays d autopsy photographs support his tesony before the Commission.

9. The claim by a member of the Warren mmission that there was nothing fraudut about the Warren Report.

10. The claim by Earl Warren that the mmission found no evidence of a coniracy; that none of the Warren Report's tics ever found anything the Commission d missed; that he had found nothing since publication of the Report to change his w; and that he knew of no Commission mber who had ever changed his mind out their conclusions.

If we accept that each instance of stress indicates deception, an interesting and unexpected possibility emerges:

Oswald was involved in some way in the assassination, if only as a fall guy. Some of the Dallas police force may have been involved, planted the evidence that implicated Oswald, and covered up the fact that there was a conspiracy. The medical examiner believed his own testimony to the Warren Commission, but later had doubts. The Commission found evidence of a conspiracy but didn't believe it, so they covered it up in order to present a tidy package to the public. Later, at least one member of the Commission changed his mind, but since he didn't know what really did happen, he decided to say nothing. So there was conspiracy in Dallas, and in Washington nothing worse than blundering.

I could say all this with certainty if I knew that stress always equals deception. Unfortunately, I do not know that. But the PSE analysis of the assassination tapes has generated a staggering amount of fresh doubt regarding the Warren Report. This doubt rises not only from specific points the PSE has called into question, but from the very sinister implications of the very existence of deception among policemen, government officials and Commission members. The question remains: did such deception exist or was the stress found by the PSE the result, in every case, of an outside issue?

Obviously, whenever stress is found by the PSE and cannot be cross-checked by a structured interrogation, some probability must be accepted that this stress is caused by an outside issue. No study has yet been conducted to establish what this probability might be, but let us pick, for the sake of discussion, a figure that may seem ridiculously high—70 percent. In other words, we are assuming that 70 percent of the times the PSE finds stress in testimony, it results from something other than lying.

Now, let's ignore the deception indicated in the testimony of the eyewitnesses; even if present, it might have resulted from mere desire for attention. That leaves eight "insiders" who have demonstrated stress when making statements supporting the Warren Report: the Dallas policemen Hill, Jacks, Jackson and Weitzman; the medical examiner, Captain Humes; Commission staffer Wesley Liebler; Commission member John McCloy; former Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Assuming that there is a 70 percent chance that any *single* instance of stress is "outside issue," what is the probability that all eight instances are due to factors other than deception? Elementary probability theory tells us that it is seven-tenths raised to the eighth power, or approximately 6 percent.

In other words, even making some fairly conservative assumptions, there is a 94 percent chance that at least one of these eight men is lying.

My own personal opinion? I don't know. I remember the young man with the ring. He said he was wearing it, and he was, but he stressed. He stressed not because he was lying, but because there was something about that ring that really bothered him, something he didn't want the world to know. Perhaps that is also true of these men who, in one way or another, learned some part of the truth about the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

I suppose I'm not absolutely sure even of that. When I first met Bob Smith of the Committee, I asked him if there was any one thing the government could do to clear up the mystery. Yes, he replied, the one thing that would help more than anything else would be to make available the physical evidence — the detailed FBI lab reports, the X-rays and autopsy photographs, the microscopic slides, the bloodstained clothing, yes, even the President's brain, wherever it has been hidden. These things, he said, would go far toward answering the questions about what actually happened that day in Dallas. Maybe they would even confirm the Warren Report.

So when I say I'm not absolutely certain these men are concealing something, I mean I can think of something that could conceivably change my mind. That is, if the government would open all its files on this matter to us and prove that we are wrong—we, the people who ten years later still believe we haven't yet heard the full account of the events of November 22, 1963.

THE LAST THREE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY BULLETS:

1964 – result decided by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy

1968 – result decided by the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy

1972 – result decided by the near-assassination of Governor George Wallace

WHAT is the evidence?

WHO fire the fatal shots?

WHY has there been such a concerted effort to withhold the facts?

WHO was really behind the assassinations?

62.11697-33

COME SHARE THE FINDINGS
OF THE NATION'S EXPERTS

AT A TWO DAY CONFERENCE

SPONSORED BY THE COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

TO BE HELD AT

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

GASTON HALL

Nov. 23-24, 1973

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
1520 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. • (202) 232-1152

DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS

1963 - 1973

JOHN F. KENNEDY • SYLVANUS OLYMPIO • ABDUL KARIM KASSEM • MEDGAR EVERS • "NGO" DINH DIEM • JIGME DORJI • ADIB AL • SHISHAKLI • PIERRE NGENDANDUMWE • HASSAN ALI MANSOUR • MALCOLM X • VIOLA LIUZZO • MARIO MENDEZ MONTENEGRO • SIR ABUBAKAR BALEWA • J.T.V. IRONSI AGUIYI • HENDRIK VERWOERD • TRAN VAN VAN • GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL • CHE GUEVARA • MARTIN LUTHER KING • ROBERT F. KENNEDY • EDUARDO MONDLANE • TOM MBOYA • A.A. SHERMARKE • GEORGE WALLACE • SALVADORE ALLENDE •

DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS

1963 – 1973

PROGRAM

FRIDAY – NOVEMBER 23

9:00 **LATE REGISTRATION –**
Early Registrants pick up passes.

9:30 **WELCOME:**
Mr. Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Executive Director, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
Mr. Norman Mailer, Author and Forwarder of *The Fifth Estate*

10:00 **CURRENT STATUS OF PROMINENT ASSASSINATION CASES:**
JFK CASE – Mr. Robert P. Smith, Director of Research, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
RFK CASE – Mr. Robert Hanson, Attorney, present counsel for Sirhan Sirhan
KING CASE – Mr. James Lesar, Attorney, present counsel for James Earl Ray
WALLACE CASE – Mr. Ronald Van Doren, Newsman, Author, researcher into the background of Arthur Bremer
ROCKWELL CASE – Ms. Meredith Rode, Professor at Federal City College, Authority in killing of George Lincoln Rockwell

11:30 **UNIQUE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES:**
Mr. William Turner, Moderator – Former FBI Agent, Author of numerous books on investigative techniques
Mr. George O'Toole – Former CIA Agent, Free-Lance Writer, expert on the PSE (Psychological Stress Evaluator)
Mr. Robert Saltzman – Computer Engineer, lecturer on the Warren Commission Report

FRIDAY – Continued

12:30 **BREAK FOR LUNCH**

2:00 **MEDICAL AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE:**
Mr. Josiah Thompson, Moderator – Professor at Haverford College, author of *Six Seconds in Dallas*
Dr. Cyril Wecht – Professor of Law and Forensic Medicine at Duquesne University; Coroner of Pittsburgh, Pa.
Ms. Sylvia Meagher – Attorney, UN Official, author of *Accessories After The Fact*
Mr. Roger Hanson – Attorney, counsel to Sirhan Sirhan
Mr. Herbert MacDonnell – Professor of Criminalistics, Corning University; expert in case of Fred Hampton
Mr. Mark Lane – Attorney, author of *Rush To Judgment* and *Executive Action*

6:00 **BREAK FOR DINNER**

8:30 **WARREN COMMISSION REPORT: FACT OR FICTION –**
A slide show and lecture by Mr. Robert Saltzman

* * *

SATURDAY – NOVEMBER 24

9:30 **ASSASSINATIONS AND THE MEDIA:**
Mr. John Henry Faulk, Moderator – Humorist and Author of *Fear On Trial*
Mr. Robert Kaiser – Author of *RFK Must Die*
Mr. Donald Freed – Co-Author of *Executive Action*
Mr. Harold Weisberg – Author of *Frame Up*
Mr. Ted Charach – Author of *Second Gun*
Mr. Peter Noyes – Author of *Legacy Of Doubt*
Mr. Fred Cook – Author of numerous books and articles

12:30 **BREAK FOR LUNCH**

2:00 **THEORIES OF CONSPIRACY:**
Mr. Richard Sprague, Moderator – Computer expert and author
Dr. Richard Popkin, Professor at Washington University; author of *The Second Oswald*
Col. Fletcher Prouty – Former Liaison Officer between Pentagon and CIA; author of *The Secret Teams*
Mr. Robert K. Brown – Former Special Services Officer; expert in attempts on life of Castro
Mr. Earl Golz – Reporter for Dallas Morning News; expert on Organized Crimes
Mr. Victor Marchetti – Former CIA Agent; author
Mr. Peter Dale Scott – Professor at Berkeley; Author of *The War Conspiracy*

5:00 **INDIVIDUAL WORKSHOPS WITH THE SPEAKERS –**
Question and Answer Sessions

AMERICAN POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS:

A BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF WORKS PUBLISHED
1963-1970
RELATED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF
JOHN F. KENNEDY
MARTIN LUTHER KING
ROBERT F. KENNEDY

Compiled by

THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

WASHINGTON, D. C.
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
1973

I. JOHN F. KENNEDY

A. GENERAL

"Aberrations of Bourgeois Democracy: The Fight to Deny Rights." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1 January 1964, p. 25.
"After the Tragedy." Tablet, 30 November 1963, pp. 1181-1182.
"[illegible] in the Assassination." Newsweek, 15 August 1966, pp. 30-33.
"Agony relived; second installment of the death of a President." Time, 27 January 1967, p. 58.
Alston, J. and J. Tamney. "Some Functions of Religious Ritual in Catastrophe: Kennedy Assassination." Sociological Analysis, 25(1964), 212-230.
Allarey, Monina. "That Day In Washington." Philippines Herald Magazine, 25 January 1964, pp. 23-25.
———. "When Night Fell on the U.S." Philippines Herald Magazine, 7 December 1963, p. 12.
Alsop, S. "Johnson Takes Over." Saturday Evening Post, 15 February 1964, pp. 17-23.
"America's Long Vigil." TV Guide, 25 January 1964, pp. 19-22.
"And a child's yellow flowers." Newsweek, 2 December 1963, pp. 36-37.
"And then it was November 22 again." Newsweek, 30 November 1964, pp. 25-28.
"Anniversary of an Assassination." Reconstructionist, 27 November 1964, p. 6.
Antoninus, Brother. "Death has Pounced: Excerpt from Tongs of Jeopardy." Dominicana, September 1965, pp. 9-12.
"Apocalypse and after." Christian Century, 80(1963), 1487.
d'Apollonia, L. "Reflections sur une Tragedie." Relations, January 1964, p. 27.
Appelbaum, Stephen A. "The Kennedy Assassination." Psychoanalytic Review, 53, no. 3(1966), 69-80.
Arnoni, M.S. The Death of a President. Passaic, N.J.: Minority of One, 1964.
"Assassination Given Impetus to Dodd's Gun Bill." Advertising Age, 2 December 1963, pp. 1-2.
Assassination of a President, reprinted from New York Times with intro. by Anthony Lewis. New York, 1963.
"The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 11 December 1963, pp. 3-15.
"The Assassination of President Kennedy." East Europe, January 1964, pp. 25-26.
The Assassination of President Kennedy. (N.P.) Look, 1963. ("Memorial Edition")
"The Assassination: Scene of the Crime." Newsweek, 4 December 1967, pp. 31B-32.
"The Assassination: the Reporter's Story; What was Seen and Read: Television, Newspapers, Magazines; Journalism's Role: Unresolved Issues." Columbia Journalism Review, Winter 1964.
"Assassination: the trial to a verdict; with report by G.R. Ford." Life, 2 October 1964, pp. 40-50B.
"The Autopsy." Time, 27 December 1963, p. 18.
"Awful Interval." Newsweek, 6 January 1964, pp. 19-20.
Bachmann, Ida. "President Johnsons Mordkommission." Frit Danmark, 23, no. 2(1964-65), 4-6.
"Back of the secrecy in the assassination probe." U.S. News and World Report, 24 February 1964, pp. 52+.
"Back to Dallas: Theories of J. Thompson and J. Connally." Time, 24 November 1967, pp. 54-55.
"Background to the Kennedy Film." Film Comment Magazine, Fall/Winter 1967, pp. 39-44.
Bagdikian, B.H. "Assassin." Saturday Evening Post, 4 December 1963, pp. 22-27.
Baker, Dean C. The Assassination of President Kennedy: A Study of the Press Coverage. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Dept. of Journalism, 1965.
Barbieri, Franc. "Dva Atentata." Vjesnik, 24 November 1963.
[illegible]ndell, [illegible]. "The Kennedy Assassination." Vigyl, Autumn 1964, pp. 90-93.
Bealle, Morris A. Guns of the regressive right; the only reconstruction of the Kennedy Assassination that makes sense. Washington: Columbia Pub. Co., 1964.
Bedrick, Stephen B. "Cerf Says Assassination Book to Widen Kennedy-LBJ Rift." Yale Daily News, 15 December 1966, pp. 1-3.
Bebrits, Anna. Elnökgyilkosságtól elnökválasztásig. Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1964.
Belin, David. "Truth was my only goal." Texas Observer, 13 August 1971, pp. 13-15.
"Bell and Howell Camera Used for Assassination Film Now in National Archives." Image Magazine, January 1967.
Berezhkov, V. "More Light on the Kennedy Assassination (book review of Die Wahrheit über den Kennedy-Mord: wie und warum der Warren-Report lügt, by Joachim Joesten)." New Times, 26 October 1966, pp. 28-32.
Berrieres, Luc. Le Jour où Kennedy fut assassiné. Paris: Editions du Gerfaut, 1963.
Berry, Wendell. November Twenty Six Nineteen Hundred Sixty Three (poem). New York:

Bickel, A.M. "Return to Dallas." New Republic, 23 December 1967, p. 34.
Bishop, Jim. The Day Kennedy Was Shot. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968.
"Black Friday, five years later." Newsweek, 25 November 1968, pp. 22-23.
"B'nai Brith, Overseas Mourn JFK; BBYO's 40th Anniversary Service dedicated to JFK; Hille Directors place Wreath at Tomb of President." National Jewish Monthly, January 1964, pp. 24-26.
Bonner, Judy Whitson. Investigation of a Homicide; the Murder of John F. Kennedy. Anderson, S.C.: Droke House, 1969.
Booker, Simeon. "How JFK Surpassed Abraham Lincoln." Ebony, Febryart 1964, pp. 25-28, 3 32-34.
Boonstra, Jan. Zes seconden in Dallas: 22 November 1963. De moord op John F. Kennedy: 1917-1963, President van de Verenigde Staten van Amerika. Amsterdam: Bibliotheek en-documentatie school, 1968.
Bowser, Hallowell. "The Perils of Hasty History." Saturday Review, 31 December 1966, p. 14.
Brand, Sergiu. "Si Totusi Cine?" Cronica, 17 December 1966, p. 12.
Bravo, Francisco. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, el mártir de la esperanza: discurso. Cuenca, 1963.
Breig, J. "Assassination of a People." Ave Maria, 14 December 1963, p. 10.
———. "President Kennedy's Death: Why?" Ave Maria, 11 January 1964, p. 9.
———. "Death in Emergency No. One: Parkland Memorial Hospital." Saturday Evening Post, 14 December 1963, pp. 30-31.
Brienberg, Mordecai. "The Riddle of Dallas." Spectator, 212(1964), 305-306.
Bringuier, Carlos. Red Friday. Chicago: Charles Hallberg & Co. n.d.
Brodie, Israel. Tribute to the late President John Fitzgerald Kennedy...at the Marble Arch Synagogue, London...1963. London: Office of the Chief Rabbi, 1964.
Buchanan, Thomas C. "Pravo Porocilo o Umoru v Dallasu." Delo, 27-29 February 1964, pp. 56-58.
Budimac, Budimir. "Zlocin u Teksasu." Dnevnik, 22(1963), 6124.
Bugialli, Paolo, et al. Chi ha ucciso i Kennedy. Roma: Trapani editore, 1968.
"Business Pledges its Support." Business Week, 30 November 1963, p. 34.
Butler, Ed. "The Great Assassin Puzzle." The Westwood Village Square, 1, no. 2(1968), pp. 21-28; 2, no. 1(1969), pp. 26-27, 37-41.
Cameron, J. "Humane and Sane." Commonweal, 13 December 1963, pp. 338-339.
Caplan, Gerald and Vivian Cadden. "Lessons in Bravery." McCalls, September 1968, pp. 12 85, 115.
Carney, Frederick S. "Crisis of Conscience in Dallas: Soul-searching vs. 'New Faith in Dallas.' Thought on the day of the funeral of Tom F. Driver." Christianity an Crisis, 23 December 1963, pp. 235-241.
Carr, Waggoner. Texas Supplemental Report on the Assassination of President Kennedy and Serious Wounding of Governor John B. Connally, November 22, 1963.Austin, Texas.
Castro, Fidel. Comparecencia del Comandante Fidel Castro, ante el pueblo de Cuba sobre l sucesos relacionados conel asesinato del Presidente Kennedy. Havana: Comision Orientacion Revolucionaria, Direccion Nacional del PURSC, 1963.
A Child's Eyes: November 22, 1963 (motion picture). Group VI Productions (released by Pa Contemporary Films), 1968.
"A Chronology of Tragedy." Time and Tide, 28 November 1963, pp. 7-9..
Ciardi, John. "November 22, 1963." Saturday Review, 7 December 1963, pp. 16+.
———. "Of chaos and courage." Saturday Review, 28 December 1963, p. 25.
Clifford, G. "Warren Report: A New Boost for the Kennedy Memorabilia Industry." Maclea Magazine, 2 November 1964, p. 3.
Cole, Alwyn. "Assassin Forger." Journal of Forensic Sciences, July 1966, pp. 272-288.
"Compendium of Curious Coincidences: Parallels in the Lives and Deaths of A. Lincoln and J.F. Kennedy." Time, 21 August 1964, p. 19.
The Complete Kennedy Saga: Four Dark Days. 4 vols. Hollywood: Associated Professional Services, 1967.
Condon, R. "Manchurian Candidate in Dallas." Nation, 28 December 1963, pp. 449-451.
Connally, John B. "Why Kennedy Went to Dallas." Life, 24 November 1967, pp. 86A-86B.
Connally, Mrs. John B. "Since That Day in Dallas." McCalls, August 1964, pp. 78-79+.
Cook, Fred J. "Assassination Investigations. The Irregulars Take the Field." Nation, 19 July 1971, pp. 40-46.
Cooke, Alistair. "After the President's Assassination." Listener, 5 December 1963, pp. 907-908.
———. "Death of the Young Warrior." Listener, 28 November 1963, pp. 863-864.
———. "Man at Large: the Evidence on the Assassination of President Kennedy." Manchester Guardian, 22 September 1966, p. 8.
Cottrell, John. Assassination: The World Stood Still. London: New English Library,196
Cousins, Norman. "The Legacy of John F. Kennedy." Saturday Review, 7 December 1963, pp. 21-27.
Crawford, Kenneth. "The Enemies He Made." Newsweek, 2 December 1963, p. 35.

James T. The Kennedy Literature: A Bibliographical Essay on John F. Kennedy. New York: New York University Press, 1968.
V. "RM and JFK: Twins of Fate." Philippines Herald Magazine, 14 March 1964, pp. 42, 44, 67, 72.
Icase. JFK Assassination File. Dallas: American Poster and Printing Co., 1969.
Hans W., ed. In memoriam John F. Kennedy. Aus dem Leben eines grosses Staatsmannes. Zurich: Romerhof-Verlag, 1964.
Late Casualty." Newsweek, 28 February 1966, pp. 31-32.
Rejoinder." Nation, 25 May 1964, p. 519.
Revisited." Time, 21 February 1969, pp. 18-19.
Detektivhistoria." Elöre, 10 April 1964, p. 519.
Tragedia." Magyar Szovjet Közgazdasági szemle, 14 October 1964, pp. 273-285.
J. "When Castro Heard the News." New Republic, 7 December 1963, pp. 7-9.
P. "Assessing the Blame in the President's Death: Excerpts from Addresses." U.S. News and World Report, 14 December 1963, p. 73.
W.J. Review of Dead by G. Frank. Commentary, July 1963, pp. 90-92.
——. Review of Dead by G. Frank. Discussion, January 1964, pp. 6+.
JFK died; excerpts from The Day Kennedy Was Shot by Jim Bishop." Ladies Home Journal, November 1968, pp. 151-157.
Kennedy Died." Newsweek, 2 December 1963, pp. 20-26.
in Dallas." Reader's Digest, January 1964, pp. 39-44.
of a modern." Spectator, 29 November 1963, p. 691.
of the President." Commonweal, 6 December 1963, p. 299-301.
Death of a President." Women's Wear Daily, 28 March 1967.
of a President: The Established Facts." Atlantic, March 1965, pp. 112-118.
Death of a President: Told in Direct Testimony, Excerpts." U.S. News and World Report, 7 December 1964, pp. 68-70.
of President Kennedy: Statements by Sir Robert Menzies and Sir Garfield Barwick on 23rd November." Current Notes on International Affairs, November 1963, pp. 38-39.
Death of the President." Illustrated London News, 30 November 1963, pp. 889-899.
on 'Who Killed John Kennedy?' Comments by critics and defenders of the Warren Report." Senior Scholastic, 18 November 1966, pp. 21-22+.
P.R. Feeling in Dallas: on the scene story in pictures. Dallas: The author, 1964.
——. Feeling in Dallas. Dallas: Denco Corporation, 1964.
Martin. "Assassination and the Aftermath." American Opinion, March 1964, pp. 1-10. April 1964, pp. 33-40.
Look at Dallas." U.S. News and World Report, 3 February 1964, pp. 42-46.
B. "Why was JFK Shot?" Atlas, May 1967, pp. 10-13.
R. "Commentary of an eyewitness." New Republic, 21 December 1963, p. 18.
Horvan. Les quatre jours de Dallas. Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1966.
J. "Sad Day in Texas." [illegible], 14(1964), 25-27.
Martin S. "The Kennedy Film Discussed at the Warrenton Seminar." Film Comment, Fall/Winter 1967, pp. 33-34.
: A Shock, Then Recovery." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 92-93.
's Shop Talk." Antioch Review, Winter 1963-64, pp. 403-404.
C. "Winter, 1963: A Time for Quiet Voices." America, 21 December 1963, pp. 787.
and a Beginning." Newsweek, 9 December 1963, pp. 19-20.
Friso. "Washington 25 November 1963." [illegible], 11 March 1967, pp. 18-20.
enterprise: Memorial Boom." Newsweek, 30 December 1963, pp. 49-50.
Edward J. "Der Tod Kam bei Bild 313: eine neue Untersuchung des Kennedy-Mordes." Der Spiegel, 20, no. 29(1966), 63-67.
——. "Final Chapter in the Assassination Controversy." New York Times Magazine, 20 April 1969, pp. 30-31.
on that window." Newsweek, 22 June 1964, p. 32.
two hours without a president: excerpts from testimonies." U.S. News and World Report, 14 November 1966, pp. 68-78.
Harold. Fifty-One Witnesses: The Grassy Knoll. San Francisco: Idlewild Pubs., 1965.
of evidence connected with the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (N.P.) 1963-64.
of evidence connected with the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. 21 vols. in 2 reels microfilm. (Washington) Microcard Editions, 1967.
William F., ed. That Day with God. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.
Power: Same Goals, Sterner Style." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 31-32.
Days." Television, January 1964, pp. 27-33.
Days: The Historical Record of the Death of President Kennedy. New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1964.
"The Hidden Evidence about President Kennedy's Assassination." Saga Maga-

Fox, Sylvan. "Unanswered Questions About President Kennedy's Assassination." National Review, 11 January 1966, pp. 34-37.
"Funeral of John Fitzgerald Kennedy." Illustrated London News, 30 November 1963, pp. 890-893.
Gales, Robert Robinson. "Notes. The Assassination of the President: Jurisdictional Problems." Syracuse Law Review, Fall 1964, pp.69-81.
Gans, H.J. "Why did Kennedy Die?" Trans-Action, July 1968, pp. 5-6.
Gardos, Miklos. A Kennedy Donazie. Budapest, 1960.
Garson, Barbara. MacBird. New York: Grove Press, 1967.
Gellner, J. "Who Killed John Kennedy?" Saturday Night, July 1964, pp. 11-14.
Gershenson, Alvin. Kennedy and Big Business. (N.p.) Book Company of America (n.d.)
Gilliatt, Penelope. "The Current Cinema." New Yorker, 17 June 1967, p. 95.
Gilman, R. "Facts of Morality." Commonweal, 17 December 1963, pp. 337-338.
Glikes, Edwin A., ed. Of Poetry and Power: poems occasioned by the Presidency and death of John Kennedy. New York: Basic Books, 1964.
Goodhart, A.L. "The Mysteries of the Kennedy Assassination and the English Press." Law Quarterly Review, January 1967.
Gordon, Bruce. One and One Make Two Some Times: the Kennedy Assassination. Fullerton, California, 1968.
Gordon, William E. "The Assassination of President Kennedy." Contemporary Review, January 1964, pp. 8-13.
Gotte, Fritz. "Nach John F. Kennedys Tod." Die drei, 1964, pp. 143-145.
"The Government Still Lives." Time, 29 November 1963, pp. 21-32.
Graham, Fred P. "Doctors Inspect Kennedy X-rays." New York Times, 9 January 1972.
Greenberg, Bradley S. "Diffusion of News of the Kennedy Assassination." Public Opinion Quarterly, 28(1964), 225-232.
Grosvenor, Melville Bell. "The last Full Measure." National Georgraphic, March 1964, pp. 307-355.
Gun, Nerin E. Red Roses From Texas. London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1964.
Gurgo, Ottorino. Perche i Kennedy muoiono. Roma: Trevi, 1968.
Habe, Hans. "Die Hälfte der Wahrheit; der Mörder Gefundender Mord Ungeklärt." Weltwoche, 32(1964), 1614.
——. The Wounded Land: Journey through a Divided America. New York: Coward-McCann, 1964.
Hanson, William H. The Shooting of John F. Kennedy. San Antonio, Texas: The Naylor Company, 1969.
Harris, T.G. "Memo About a Dallas Citize." Look, 11 August 1964, pp. 64+.
Hart, L. "The Death of President Kennedy." Columbia, December 1963, p. 3.
——. "A Year of Progress with a Sorrowful Close." Columbia, January 1964, p. 16.
"Hatred knows no logic." Saturday Evening Post, 4 January 1964, p. 80.
"Have We Learned Our Lessons?" Christian Century, 80(1963), 1567-1568.
He Gave His Life. Nashville, Tenn.: The Nashville Tennessean, 1965.
Hegyi, Karoly. "A Dallasi Itelethirdetes Után." Elöre, 17 March 1964, p.3.
Henderson, Bruce. 1:33. New York: Cowles, 1968.
Hercher, W.W. "Thousand well wishers and one assassin." U.S. News and World Report, 2 December 1968, pp. 34-35.
Hessel, D. "To heal the wounds." Christian Century, 81(1964), 15.
"Die Hintergrunde des Kennedy- Morde." Das andere Deutschland, 1963.
"History's Jury." Newsweek, 16 December 1963, pp. 25-27.
Holmes, W.A. " One thing worse than this: Sermon delivered at Northhaven Methodist Church, Dallas, November 24, 1963." Christian Century, 80 (1963), 1555-1556.
Homage to a friend, a memorial tribute by the United Nations for President John F. Kennedy. New York: United States Committee for the United Nations, 1964.
Horowitz, Irving L. "Kennedy's Death, Myths, and Realities." Trans-Action, July 1968, pp. 3-5.
Houts, Marshall. "President Kennedy's Autopsy was Botched." Medical Economics, 4 March 1968, p. 249.
——. Where Death Delights: Adventures in Courtroom Medicine. New York: Coward-McCann, 1967.
"How JFK Died." Newsweek, 30 December 1963, p.55.
Howard, Anthony. "Logistics of the Funeral." Esquire, November 1968, pp. 119-122.
Howe, Irving. "On the death of John F. Kennedy." In his Steady Work: Essays in the Politics of Democratic Radicalism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966.
Hughes, Emmet John. "An Echo in the Silence." Newsweek, 2 December 1963, p. 52.
"Hvem Myrdede Hven og Hvorfor?" Frit Danmark, 22 (1963-64), 3-5.
"Hyannis Port Revisited." Look (17 November 1964: The JFK Memorial Issue), pp. 37-45.
"Hypothetical Case: Letters." National Review, 17 December 1963, pp. 515-516; 14 January 1964, p. 36.
"I Just Heard Some Shots: Three Shots." Editor and Publisher, 30 November 1963, pp. 14-15.

"[illegible]; post-Kennedy assassination threats of magnicide." Newsweek, 23 December 1963, p. 27.

In Memoriam: John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 1917-1963, President of the United States of America; memorial convocation at the University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, November the twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and sixty three. Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1964.

"In 1963 He Survived." Christian Century, 80 (1963), 1599-1601.

In the Shadow of Dallas. San Francisco: Ramparts Magazine, 1966.

"[illegible] on Dallas: The Right to Bear Arms." Tablet, 3 October 1964, pp. 1101-1102.

"International Outlook." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 83-84.

"In[illegible] the Archives, X-rays and photographs of body of JFK." Time, 11 November 1966, p. 33.

[illegible], Abram. Kuda vedut sledy. Moscow, 1964.

[illegible], Boris. "The Dallas Investigation." New Times, 11 December 1963, pp. 10-12.

———. "Echo of Dallas." New Times, 21 December 1966, pp. 29-31.

[illegible], Karl-Heinz. "Wer Ermordete Kennedy? Fakten und Phantome: Suche Nach dem Zweiten Attentäter." Die Zeit, 21, no. 48 (1966), 7.

Jeffries, Jean. "Why Vietnam is Kennedy's War." National Review, 23 April 1968, pp. 396-397.

Jenkins, John B. Neither the Fanatics nor the Fainthearted. The Tour Leading to the President's Death and the Two Speeches He Could Not Give. Austin, Texas: Pemberton Press, 1[illegible].

"JFK Assassination." New Republic, 1 February 1969, pp. 9-10.

"JFK Censored?" New [illegible], 3 October 1966, pp. 65-66.

"JFK would lose." Look, 17 December 1963, pp. 94+.

"JFK Death: a new investigation but..." U.S. News and World Report, 13 March 1967, p. 16.

"JFK Killing: New Findings." U.S. News and World Report, 27 January 1969, p. 4.

"JFK: the death and the doubt." Newsweek, 5 December 1966, pp. 25-26.

"JFK: The Murder and the Myth." Time, 12 June 1964, pp. 44+.

"JFK's Murder: Swarms of Doubt." Newsweek, 6 April 1964, pp. 22-24.

Joaquin, Nick. "An American Tragedy." Philippines Free Press, 7 December 1963, pp. 2-3, 75.

Joesten, Joachim. The Biggest Lie Ever Told. The Kennedy Fraud and How I helped Expose It. 4 vols. The author, 1968.

———. How Kennedy Was Killed. The Full Appalling Story. London: Peter Dawnay, 1968.

———. "Der Kennedy-Mord als 'Politische Wahrheit'." Frankfurte Hefte, Zeitschrift für Kultur und Politik, 21 (1966), 8.

John F. Kennedy, 22 November 1963, Samlet og odsendt af Danmark-Amerika Fondets stipendiat-sektion. Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1965.

"John Fitzgerald Kennedy." Look (17 November 1964: The JFK Memorial Issue), pp. 33-36.

"Johnson Names Commission to Probe Assassination." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 6 December 1963, pp. 2122-2123.

Jones, Penn. "Mysterious Deaths in the Long Aftermath of Dallas." The Times, 25 February 1967, p. 11.

Jones, W. "November in Dallas." Library Journal, 1 January 1964, p. 72.

Jordan, Jiménez Ricardo. Dos viernes trágicos: Asesinato del doctor Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, 9 de abril de 1948; asesinato de presidente John F. Kennedy, 22 noviembre, de 1963. Bogota: Editorial Horizontes, 1968.

Kardorff, Ursula Von. Diary of a Nightmare. London, 1965.

Kavanaugh, J. "A Visit to the Grave." Catholic Digest, July 1964, pp. 8-11.

Kempton, Murray. "Looking Back on the Anniversary." Spectator, 1964, pp. 778-779.

———. "Rage Greater than Grief." Atlantic, May 1967, pp. 98-100.

"Kennedy Alive in hospital." Science News Letter, 10 October 1964, p. 229.

"Kennedy Assassination - Communist Version." Communist Affairs, November-December 1963, pp. 3-6.

"Kennedy assassination; question of a second investigaton." New Republic, 12 November 1966, p. 8.

"Kennedy Assassination: something rotten..." Saturday Evening Post, 2 December 1967, p. 88.

"The Kennedy Book." Commonweal, 6 January 1967, pp. 361-362.

Kennedy, Jacqueline L. "Mrs. Kennedy says thank you to 800,000 friends." Life, 24 January 1964, pp. 32B-32C.

Kennedy, John F. The Unspoken Speech of John Kennedy at Dallas, November 22, 1963. El Paso: Privately printed, 1964.

"[illegible] Kennedys: 'A New Life.'" Newsweek, 16 December 1963, pp. 24-25.

"[illegible]edy's Death: How the Controversy was Reborn." The Times, 21 August 1966, p. 6.

"[illegible] Still Mystery." Science News Letter, 10 October 1964, p. 230.

King, Martin Luther. Die rede bei d. Gedenkfeier für John F. Kennedy anlassl. d. Eroffnung d. Berliner Festwochen. 1964. Vienna: USIS, 1964.

Knebel, Fletcher. "New wave of doubt; concerning Inquest by E.J. Epstein." Look, 12 July

Kopkind, Andrew. "The Kennedy Mystery Reopened." New Statesman, 29 July 1966, p. 163.

Korolovsky, Lajos. "Fanatizmus és Vallásosság. Gondolatok a Kennedy Gyilkosság Hátterérol." Világosság, 5, no. 2 (1964), 80-87.

Kristl, Zvonimir, et al. Kennedy: Drama u Dallasu. Zagreb: Izdavačka Kuća "Stvarnost", 1963.

Kroeger, Albert R. "The Four Days." Television, January 1964, pp. 27+.

Krupp, G.R. "Day the President died; its meaning and impact." Redbook, March 1964, pp.

Kurnoth, Rudolf. "Gedanken um den Tod John F. Kennedy." Frankenstein-Münsterberger Heimatblatt, 10, no. 12 (1963).

"Labor: Union Rally to Johnson." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 46, 48.

Lane, Mark. A Citizen's Dissent: Mark Lane Replies. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Win 1968.

———. Kennedy, o crime e a farsa. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Saga, 1967.

———. "The Man in the Doorway." Film Comment, Fall/Winter 1967.

———. Rush to Judgment. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.

———. Rush to Judgment. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1967.

———. "Who Killed Kennedy? CBS is Wrong." True Magazine, December 1967.

"Lane says JFK death is still unsolved murder." Publishers Weekly, 22 August 1966, p. 58.

Langer, E. "Kennedy's Assassination: Study Organized by Social Scientists." Science, December 1963, pp. 1446-1447.

The Last Two Days (motion picture). Naval Photo Center 1211-69. National Archives and Records Service WHN: 17.

Lattimer, Dr. John K. "Factors in the Death of President Kennedy." JAMA, 24 October 1966

Lauzon, A. "Au Banc Accusés, une Ville: Dallas." Le Magazine Maclean, March 1964, pp. 13-15, 56-58.

Lawrence, D. "Incredible Tragedy." U.S. News and World Report, 2 December 1963, p. 104.

Lawrence, Lincoln [pseud.] Were We Controlled. New Hyde Park, New York: University Book 1967.

Lefever, Ernest W. Uncertain Mandate. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967, 1968.

Lerner, Max. "The World Impact." Illustrated London News, 66, no. 1707 (1963).

———. "The World Impact." New Statesman, 29 November 1963, p. 769.

Leslie, Warren. Dallas City Limit. [N.p.] Grossman [n.d.]

"Letters to the Editor." National Review, 31 December 1963.

"Letters to the Editor; with editorial comment." Senior Scholastic, 10 January 1964, p. 1

Levin, Bernard. "The Bell Tolls in Dallas." Listener, 5 December 1963, p. 914.

Levy, A. "Day JFK died; what people remember now." Good Housekeeping, November 1965, pp. 84-87.

Life. John F. Kennedy memorial edition: all of Life's pictures and text on the most shocking event of our time, including his biography and his most enduring words. Chicago: Time, Inc., 1963.

Life-Itek Kennedy Assassination Film Analysis. Lexington, Mass.: Itek Corporation, 1967.

"A Lonely Summer for Jacqueline." Look (17 November 1964: The JFK Memorial Issue), p. 65.

Love, Ruth. "Television and the Kennedy Assassination." New Society, 13 October 1966, pp. 567-571.

Lützkendorf, Felix. Dallas 22. November, Einszenischer Bericht. [Basel] Desch [1965]

Makai, György. A Kennedy-gyilkosság Kulisszái mögött. Budapest: Kossuth Konyokiadó, 1964.

"Man Who Killed Kennedy." Time, 6 December 1963, pp. 33A-34.

Manchester, William R. The Death of a President, November 20 - November 25, 1963. New York: Harpers, 1967.

———. "The Death of a President." Look, 24 January, 7 February, 21 February, 7 March, 1967.

———. "Dood Van een President." Revu Magazine, 1967 (seven serialized parts):

———. "John F. Kennedy: Portrait of a President." Holiday Magazine, April, May, June 1962.

———. "Mort d'un President." Paris Match, 1967 (eight serialized parts).

———. Portrait of a President. Boston: Little, Brown, 1962.

———. "Der Tod Des Präsidenten." Stern Magazine, 1967 (eight serialized parts).

———. Der Tod des Präsidenten. 20-25. November, 1963. Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1967.

———. "Wie Die Kennedys Mein Buch Bekampfen." Stern Magazine, 26 March 1967.

———. "William Manchester's Own Story." Look, 4 April 1967.

Mandel, P. "End to nagging rumors; the six critical seconds." Life, 6 December 1963, p. 5

Mannes, M. "Long Vigil." Reporter, 19 December 1963.

Mansfield, Michael J. Eulogies to the late President John Fitzgerald Kennedy delivered in the rotunda of the United States Capitol, November 24, 1963. New Britain, Conn.: J.L. Kapica, 1964.

———et al. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, eulogies to the late President delivered in the rotunda of the United States Capitol, November 24, 1963, by Mike Mansfield, Earl Warren and John W. McCormack. Washington: G.P.O., 1963.

[illegible], Stanley J. Murder most foul! The Conspiracy that murdered President Kennedy: 975 questions and answers. Los Angeles: Bureau of International Relations, 1967.

"[illegible]yred President and Nation's Journey." Reconstructionist, 13 December 1963, p. 3.

[illegible], Richard. The Kennedy Curse. New York: Belmont Books, 1969.

"[illegible] of reasonable doubt." Life, 25 November 1966, pp. 38-48B+.

[illegible], J. Four Dark Days in History: November 22-25, 1963. Los Angeles: The author, 1963.

[illegible], Milton. "November 22, 1963." Progressive Magazine, December 1964.

[illegible], Stanley. "What They are Saying." Listener, 28 November 1963, p. 868.

[illegible], John B. Bulletin from Dallas: the President is Dead. New York: Exposition Press, 1967.

[illegible], Thomas M. "The Assassination Industry: A Tentative Checklist of Publications on the Murder of President John F. Kennedy." American Book Collector, Summer 1968.

[illegible], Mary. "After great pain; a formal feeling." America, 14 December 1963, p. 764.

———. In memoriam: John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Washington: Evenign Star Newspaper Co., 1963.

[illegible], M. "Paris, November 22nd, 1963." Immaculate Heart Crusader, November-December 1964, pp. 8-9.

[illegible], C.J. "Après la Mort de Kennedy: L'Amérique devant Elle-Mère." Etudes: Revue Catholique d'intérêt général, 1964.

[illegible], Sylvia. "The Curious Testimony of Mr. Givens." Texas Observer, 13 August 1971, pp. 11-12.

———. Notes for new investigation." Esquire, December 1966, pp. 211+.

———. "On Closing the Doors, Not opening Them; or the Limit of the Warren Investigation." The Minority of One, July-August 1966, pp. 29-32.

———. "Post Assassination Credibility Chasm." The Minority of One, March 1967, pp. 21-22.

———. "A Psychiatrist's Retroactive Clairvoyance." The Minority of One, June 1966, pp. 25-27.

———. "Wheels with Deals: How the Kennedy Investigation Was Organized." The Minority of One, July-August 1968, pp. 23-27.

"[illegible]dical Opinion." Science Digest, February 1967, pp. 35-36.

[illegible] collection of newspaper microfilm chronicling events of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, November 22-26, 1963. Cleveland: Bell and Howell Co., Micro Photo Division, 1964.

[illegible]elsohn, Harold. "Broadcast vs. Sources of Information in Emergent Public Crises: the Presidential Assassinaton." Journal of Broadcasting, Spring 1964, pp. 147-156.

[illegible], Earl F. "Echoes of Dallas." Illustrated London News, 66, no. 1709 (1963), 868-879.

———. "History as Tragedy." Illustrated London News, 66, no. 1707 (1963), 766-768.

[illegible]vilvić, Ivo. "Snajperski Metak na Savijest Amerike." Vjesnik u srijedu, 27 November 1963, p. 604.

———. Tko je ubio Kennedija. Zagreb: "Starnost,/ 1967.

[illegible]ić, Živko. "Amerika je Povela Istragu nad Samom Sobom." Borba, 1 December 1963, pp. 29-30.

———. "Stravicna Hronika 22. Novembra." Borba, 24 November 1963.

———. "Ubijen Predsednik SAD Dzon Kenedi." Borba, 23 November 1963.

[illegible], J. and S. Lynd. "Seeds of Doubt: Some Questions About the Assassination." New Republic, 21 December 1963, pp. 14-17.

[illegible]escu, [illegible]. "Enigma de la Dallas di Semnele ei di Întrevare." Pentru Apararea Păcii, [illegible]cember 1966, pp. 19-22.

"[illegible]ssing Link: photos and X-rays of autopsy." Newsweek, 14 November 1966, pp. 30-31.

[illegible], H. "New Inquiry needed: questions concerning the assassination." New York Times Magazine, 25 December 1966; 8 Jnaurny 1967.

"[illegible]ent of Tragedy." U.S. News and World Report, 2 December 1963, p. 6.

[illegible]gomery, R. "Crystal Ball: Condensation from Gift of Prophecy." Reader's Digest, July 1965, pp. 235-242.

"[illegible]re untold stories concerning the Death of a President by W. Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 30 January 1967, p. 36.

[illegible]in, Relman. Assassination: The Death of President John F. Kennedy. New York: New American Library, 19[illegible].

[illegible]ie, Wright. [illegible]: This Being the Day in November the word from Dallas was Heard in [illegible]. New York: Atheneum, 1965.

[illegible]eridge, [illegible]. "A New Kennedy Theory." New Statesman, 18 November 1966, p. 735.

[illegible], P. "Report from Mexico on Reaction to John Kennedy's Tragic Death." Catholic Messenger, 5 December 1963, p. 12.

[illegible]rdi, S.S. "And All That Might Heart.." Hadassah Magazine, January 1964, p. 24.

[illegible] December 1963, p. 232.

National Broadcasting Company. There Was A President. New York: Random House, 196

"The Nations: How Sorrowful Bad." Time, 29 November 1963, pp. 38-39.

Nelson, Harry. "If Kennedy had Survived: Life in Respirator Might Have Been His Fat Angeles Times, 7 June 1968, pp. 1. 19.

"New Assassination theory: theory of J. Thompson." Newsweek, 27 November 1967, pp.

"New conflict over assassinaton." U.S. News and World Report, 5 December 1966, pp.

"New Light on the Assassination: a secret agent's story." U.S. News and World Rep June 1964, pp. 38-39.

Newmann, Alfred. The Assassination of John F. Kennedy. The Reason Why. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1970.

Nichols, Dr. John. "President Kennedy's Adrenals." JAMA, 10 July 1967, pp. 129-130

"Notes and comment." New Yorker, 7 December 1963, p. 45.

"November 22, 1963, Dallas: Photos by Nine Bystanders." Life, 25 November 1967, pp

"Now the Trumpet Summons Again..." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 21-23.

"How the U.S. gets JFK autopsy." U.S. News and World Report, 14 November 1966, p. 8

O'Brien, Conor C. "The Life and Death of Kennedy." New Statesman, 71, no. 1818 (19 50-51.

———. "No one Else but him." New Statesman, 30 September 1966, pp. 479-481.

O'Toole, Dr. James K. "Mourning a President." Psychiatric Quarterly, 40 (1966), 73 755.

"On the Far Right: The Assassination." Commonweal, 27 December 1963, pp. 384-385.

"On the Writing of Contemporary History." Atlantic, March 1967, pp. 69-74.

"Oswald's Historic Diary." Life, 10 July 1964, pp. 26-31.

"Other Guns." Newsweek, 30 December 1963, p. 15.

Pacis, Vicente A. "Hate Campaign did it." Weekly Graphic, 25 December 1963, pp. 2, 98.

Panter-Downes, Mollie. "Letter from London." New Yorker, 7 December 1963, pp. 196-

"Paris: le Coup de Dallas." New Statesman, 6 December 1963, p. 817.

Parlach, Alexander Von. "Jacqueline Kennedy: das Leben einer Witwe." Stern Magazin 1967, pp. 90+.

"Pathologist Sleuth Reopens Kennedy Controversy: Suggests JFK suffered from Addison's Disease." Science News, 22 July 1967.

"A Permanent Record of What We Watched from November 22-25, 1963." TV Guide, 25 Janu 1964, pp. 23-45.

Phelan, J. "Plot to Kill Kennedy? Rush to Judgment in New Orleans." Saturday Eveni 6 May 1967, pp. 21-25.

"Pilgrimages to Grave of President Kennedy: Shadow Still Cast Over White House." Th 23 November 1966, p. 8.

"Piety of it." Jewish Frontier, December 1963, p. 3.

Pomerantz, Charlotte, comp. The Mood of the Nation. New York: Marzini and Mussell,

"Portrait of a Psychopath." Newsweek, 16 December 1963, pp. 82-84.

Possony, S.T. "Clearing the air." National Revelw, 9 February 1965, pp. 113-114.

Poznanska, A. "Proces a Dallas." Cite libre, April 1964, pp. 26-28.

"President Assassinated by a Gunman at Dallas." Illustrated London News, 30 November pp. 887+.

"President Kennedy Assassinated." The Times, 23 November 1963, p. 8.

President Kennedy's Last Hour (motion picture). Wolper Production, Dallas Cinema Asso

"The Press: Covering the Tragedy." Time, 29 November 1963, p. 84.

"Priceless Role." Newsweek, 16 December 1963, p. 56.

"Primer of Assassination Theories." Esquire, December 1966, pp. 205-210.

Puche, Ignacio, comp. Asesinato: el asesinato de Kennedy en todos sus detalles. Mad Gráfica Ruan, 1963.

"A Quiet and Sad Day." Newsweek, 30 December 1963, p. 34.

Rand, Michael et al., comps. The Assassination of President Kennedy. London: Cape,

Raskin, Marcus. "Rush to Judgment." Yale Law Revelw, January 1967, pp. 581-597.

"Reaction in the South." Newsweek, 16 December 1963, p. 27.

"Reaction to killings." Science News Letter, 7 December 1963, p. 358.

"Reaction to the Assassination; excerpts from reports to Christian Century's news correspondents." Christian Century, 80 (1963), 1618-1619.

"Report from the FBI:" Newsweek, 23 December 1963, pp. 19-20.

Reyes Monroy, Jose Luis. Ramo de orquídeas; la bella flor nacional de Guatemala, a la del gran presidente de los Estados Unidos de America, senor John F. Kennedy. mala: Tip. Nacional, 1965.

Roberts, C. "Eyewitness in Dallas." Newsweek, 5 December 1966, pp. 26-29.

Roberts, Charles W. The Truth About the Assassination. New York: Grosset and Dunlap.

Robertson, A. "Murder most foul." American Heritage, August 1964, pp. 90-106.

Roddy, Jon. "Did this man happen upon John Kennedy's Assassins?" Maclean's Magazine. [illegible]ember 1963, [illegible]

[illegible]er, V. "No time for collective guilt." U.S. News and World Report, 9 December 1963, p. 72.

"[illegible] to buy the report on Kennedy Assassination." U.S. News and World Report, 12 October 1964, p. 20.

"[illegible] to Judgment: A Conversation with Mark Lane and Emile de Antonio." Film Comment, Fall/Winter 1967, pp. 2-18.

[illegible]ell, Bertrand. 16 Questions on the Assassination. Passaic, N.J. n.d.

[illegible]ll, F. "Doubts about Dallas." National Review, 6 September 1966, pp. 887-888+.

[illegible], Martin H. Bio-bibliography of the Kennedy Family. New York: Scarecrow, 1969.

[illegible] telyan, Mikhail. "Dallas. Who? How? Why?" Sputnik Monthly Digest, June, August, 1971.

[illegible]ger, Pierre E.G. "With Kennedy." Good Housekeeping, August 1966, pp. 57-67, 158, 160-168, 170, 172, 174.

——— and Sander Vanocur, eds. A Tribute to John F. Kennedy. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Press, 1964.

[illegible]bury, Harrison E. "Who Killed Kennedy?" Progressive Magazine, November 1966, pp. 36-39.

[illegible]z, F. and J. Wickey. "Resolutions of the Liberal Dilemma in the Assassination of President Kennedy." Journal of Personality, December 1965, pp. 636-648+.

[illegible], Atsuyuki. "New Light on the Assassination: A Secret Agent's Story." U.S. News and World Report, 8 June 1964, pp. 38-39.

[illegible]age, Leo. "As I was Saying." New Leader, 9 November 1964, pp. 8-13.

[illegible], Sirimongkon. Phonglong khattakam prathānāthipbodī Kennedi. Bangkok, 1964.

[illegible]singer, Arthur M., Jr. "A Eulogy: John Fitzgerald Kennedy." Saturday Evening Post, 14 December 1963, pp. 32-32A.

[illegible]dt, Sister M. Bernadette, comp. The Trumpet summons us...John F. Kennedy. New York: Vantage Press, 1964.

[illegible]iber, F.R. and M. Herman. "November 22, 1963, a Psychiatric Evaluation." Science Digest, July 1965, pp. 33-41.

[illegible]er, Alfred. "Im 'Carousel' Sitzen FBI-Agenten. Dallas nach dem Kennedy-Mord." Der Spiegel, 17 (1963),76.

[illegible]elien, Joachim. "Der Mord von Dallas." Die Zeit, 19 (1964), p. 3.

"[illegible]ond Primer of Assassination Theories." Esquire, May 1967, pp. 104-107.

"[illegible]eless Tragedy." Saturday Evening Post, 14 December 1963, p. 19.

[illegible], Naci. Kennedy [illegible]. Istanbul: Bilgin Yayinlari, 1967.

[illegible], Ido. [illegible] naged retche Kenedi. Tel Aviv: N. Tversky, 1964.

"[illegible] 72 Hours and What They Can Teach Us." Life, 6 December 1963, p. 4.

"[illegible]ew on a Grassy Knoll: Photographic-Analysis shows no New Evidence." Time, 26 May 1967, p. 21.

"[illegible] in Dallas" Saturday Review, 28 December 1963, p. 26.

[illegible]on, Robert Lewis. "The Relevant Question." Saturday Review, 14 December 1963, p. 23.

[illegible], J.M., Jr. "News from a Dallas citizen." Look, 24 March 1964, pp. 88+.

"[illegible] Shot That Changed our Future." Time and Tide, 28 November 1963, p. 4.

[illegible]h, L. "Dealey Plaza." Holiday, November 1969, pp. 78-79+.

[illegible]h, Merriman. The Murder of the Young President. United Press International (n.d.)

[illegible]h, William R. Assassination by Consensus: the story behind the Kennedy assassination. Washington: L'Avant Garde, 1966.

———. A Pop Story: from the aftermath of the Kennedy Assassination. Washington: L'Avant Garde, 1968.

[illegible]er, George W. Why Did They Assassinate President Kennedy? The author (n.d.)

"[illegible]ved: Mystery of the Missing Frames." Newsweek, 6 February 1967, p. 17.

"[illegible]ndeskommission Untersucht Kennedy-Attendat." Polizei-Polizei-praxis, 55 (1964), pp. 159-160.

[illegible]nson, Theodore C. "Kennedy." Look, 10 August, pp. 40-50; 24 August, pp. 37-50; 7 September, pp. 42-46, 51-54; 21 September, 48-52, 57-60; 19 October, pp. 50-53.

"[illegible]viet Press Comment Following Kennedy's Death." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 18 December 1963, pp. 3-7.

[illegible]itzer, S.P. and N.K. Denzin. "Levels of Knowledge in an Emergent Crisis." Social Forces, December 1965, pp. 234-237.

[illegible]gue, Richard L. "The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: The Application of Computers to the Photographic Evidence." Computers and Automation, May 1970, pp. [illegible]-60.

[illegible]nson, Adlai E. "Tributes to John F. Kennedy." In Baird, A.C., ed. Representative American Speeches, 1963-1964. New York: Wilson, 1964.

[illegible]t, Charles J. and Bruce Kendall, eds. A man named John F. Kennedy: sermons on his assassination. Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1964.

[illegible]ne, I.F. "We all had a finger on that trigger." Outlook, February 1964, pp. 8-9.

——— [illegible] It Is As If: A Solution of the President Kennedy Death Mystery. New

"Das Teuflische Spiel um den Kennedy-Mord. Der Trick des Weltkommunismus Durchschaut und Missglückt." Schlesische rundschau, 15, no. 49 (1963), 1, 3.

"This is a Great Nation." Economist, 30 November 1963, pp. 901-902.

"This nation, under God: Statement by the editors." Reader's Digest, January 1964, pp. 37-39.

Thomas, J. "Le Monde Libre et le Crime de Dallas." La nouvelle revue internationale, 7 (83-88.

Thompson, Josiah. Six Seconds in Dallas. New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 1967.

Thompson, Thomas. "In Texas a Policeman and an Assassin are Laid to Rest, Too." Look, 6 December 1963, pp. 52B-52E.

Thompson, W.C. A Bibliography of Literature relating to the Assassination of President Joh F. Kennedy. San Antonio, Texas (n.d)

"A Thousand Days." Life, 16 July, 23 July, 30 July, 5 November, 12 November, 19 November 1965.

A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

"Three patients at Parkland." Texas State Journal of Medicine, January 1964, pp. 60-74.

Thruston, Wesley S. The Trumpets of November. New York: Bernard Geis Associates n.d.

"Time between. Reporter, 5 December 1963, p. 14.

"The Times Investigates the Assassination." Newsweek, 12 December 1966, p. 20.

Tobin, Richard L. "If You Can Keep Your Head When All About You: Television and News Coverage of the Kennedy Assassination Story." Saturday Review, 14 December 1963, pp. 53-54.

The Torch Is Passed: the Associated Press Story of the Death of a President. New York: Associated Press, 1964.

"A Tragedy and a Challenge." Business Week, 30 November 1963, p. 124.

"Tragic Day in Texas." Senior Scholastic, 18 November 1966, p. 7.

"Tragic end of John F. Kennedy." U.S. News and World Report, 2 December 1963, pp. 31-32.

Trevor-Roper, Hugh. "Ki Ölte meg Kennedy-t?" Korunk, 25 (1966), 1601-1609.

Troelstrup, Glenn. "New Light on the Assassination: A Secret Agent's Story." U.S. News and World Report, 8 June 1964, pp. 38-39.

Tupa, Stefan. "Dallas: Declaratii si Ipoteze." Lumea, 12 March 1964, pp. 9-10.

Turnbull, J.W. "Notes from Texas." Commonweal, 13 December 1963, p. 337.

Turner, W.W. "Some disturbing parallels; assassination of M.L. King and J.F. Kennedy." Ramparts Magazine, 29 June 1968, pp. 33-36.

"Two Mrs. Kennedys." National Review, 4 April 1967, pp. 335-336.

United Press International. Brochure of front pages of 91 American newspapers, November 22 to 25, 1963. New York: KHR Publications n.d.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Preserving evidence pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy: report to accompany H.R. 9545. Washington: G.P.O., 1965.

———. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Preserving evidence pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy: report to accompany H.R. 9545. Washington: G.P.O., 1965.

U.S. 88th Congress. House Report 1013, authorizing subpoena power for Commission on Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Report from Committee on Judiciary to accompany H.J. Resolution 852. December 10, 1963. Washington: House Documents Room, 1964.

———. Public Law 202. S.J. Res 137, joint resolution authorizing Commission established to report upon assassination of President John F. Kennedy to compel attendance and testimony of witnesses and production of evidence. Approved 13 December 1963. Washington: G.P.O., 1964.

———. 2nd Session, 1964. Memorial addresses in the Congress of the United States and tributes in eulogy of John F. Kennedy, late President of the United States. Washington: G.P.O., 1964.

"Unraveling the mystery of the assassination of John F. Kennedy; the official story." U.S. News and World Report, 5 October 1964, pp. 35-42+.

"Untold Stories: Aftermath of the Assassination." U.S. News and World Report, 12 October 1964, pp. 58-62.

Uruguay. Biblioteca del Poder Legislativo. John F. Kennedy: 1917-1963: noticia biográfica e ocasión de su fallecimiento. Montevideo, 1963.

"USA-Attentat-Aufklarung: Weisser Mann Gesucht." Der Spiegel, 17, no. 49 (1963), 83-86.

"USA-Kennedy-Attentat: Mord in der Sonne." Der Spiegel, 17, no. 49 (1963), 77-83.

"USA Präsidentenschutz: Fenster zu." Der Spiegel, 17, no. 49 (1963) 86-87.

"Use and Abuse of Stock Footage." Film Comment, Fall/Winter 1967, pp. 47-53.

Ushakov, G. "Dallas Merry-go-Round." New Times, 18 March 1964, pp. 27-29.

Van Der Karr, Richard K. Crisis in Dallas: an historical study of the activities of Dallas television broadcasters during the period of President Kennedy's assassination. Bloomington, 1965.

Venkatesvararao, Porluri. Kennedihatya kāṇ [illegible]

"Wall Street Revives Fast After the Crisis." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 28-31.
Warner, Dale. Who Killed the President? New York: American Press, 1964.
"Warner, Fen. "Big Bargain in Rifles." Mechanix Illustrated, 60, no. 437 (1964), 89-91+.
"Was This Man Sane?" Life, 21 February 1964, pp. 26-29.
"Washington Outlook." Business Week, 30 November 1963, pp. 41-42, 109-110.
Weisberg, Harold. Photographic Whitewash, (suppressed Kennedy Assassination pictures). Hyattstown, Md: The author n.d.
———. Post Mortem; suppressed Kennedy Autopsy. Frederick, Md., 1969.
———. Post Mortem III, secrets of the Kennedy Autopsy. Frederick, Md., 1969.
———. Whitewash II, the FBI-Secret Service coverup. Hyattsville, Md., 1966.
Welch, D. and W. Turner. "In the Shadows of Dallas." Ramparts, 25 January 1969, pp. 61-71.
Whalen, R.J. "Kennedy assassination; with editorial comment." Saturday Evening Post, 14 January 1967, pp. 19-25, 74.
"What they saw that Dreadful Day in Dallas: Testimony and Evidence Published." Newsweek, 7 December 1964, pp. 28-30.
Wheeler, Keith. "The Rifle that Killed Kennedy." Life, 27 August 1965, pp. 62-65.
"When Kennedy Died." Newsweek, 14 September 1964, p. 61.
"Where the photo came from." New Republic, 28 December 1963, p. 7.
White, Theodore H. "Assassination inquiry: slow, careful." U.S. News and World Report, 27 January 1964, p. 49.
———. "For President Kennedy: An Epilogue." Look, 6 December 1963, pp. 158-159.
———. "One wished for a Cry, a Sob...Any Human Sound." Look (17 November 1964: JFK Memorial Edition).
"Who Killed Kennedy?" National Review, 2 July 1968, p. 642.
"Who Killed Kennedy? The Crucial Evidence." The Times, 9 October 1966, pp. 7-21.
"Who Killed President Kennedy: Soviet Condolences." New Times, 4 December 1963, pp. 5-7.
"Who was to Blame?" Economist, 7 December 1963, p. 1022.
Wills, Gary. "Dallas: Out There." National Catholic Reporter, 4 January 1967, p. 10.
Wilson, Richard. "What Happened to the Kennedy Program." Look (17 November 1964: JFK Memorial Edition), pp. 117-118+.
Wise, David. "It Will Be Many Years..." Good Housekeeping, February 1964, pp. 90-91+.
———. "Secret Evidence on the Kennedy Assassination." Saturday Evening Post, 6 April 1968, pp. 70-73.
———. and Thomas B. Ross. The Day Kennedy Died. San Antonio: The Naylor Co., 1964.
Witzer, L. "Que s'est-il Passe a Dallas?" Macleans, September 1966, pp. 2-3.
"World After New Year's America: Minds in Ferment." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 8 January 1964, pp. 18-19.
"The World and the White House." New Statesman, 29 November 1963, pp. 56-58.
"World listened and Watched: Radio-TV Meets Greatest Challenge in Wake of JFK Tragedy..." Broadcasting, 2 December 1963, pp. 36-61.
"World mourns in doubt, fear, and hope." Newsweek, 9 December 1963, pp. 56-58.
"X Marks the Spot." Newsweek, 16 December 1963, pp. 27-28.
Yarborough, Ralph. "Sensory Perception." Newsweek, 16 January 1967, p. 6.
"Years of Lightning: Day of Drums." Film Comment, Fall/Winter 1967, pp. 22-23.

B. WORLD OPINION AND EFFECTS

Alonso Pujos, Guillermo. The World Before a Tomb. Barcelona, 1964.
Banta, Thomas J. "The Kennedy Assassination: Early thoughts and Emotions." Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1964, pp. 216-224.
Bradburn, Norman H. and Jacob J. Feldman. Public Apathy and Public Grief. Chicago: National Opinion Center, University of Chicago, 1964.
Branden, H. "Questions from abroad." Saturday Review, 9 May 1964.
Br[illegible]m, Robert. "Russia: No, No, This Cannot be True." Look, 6 December 1963, pp. 129-130.
"Burden of Guilt." Christian Century, 81 (1964), 37-38.
"Collective Guilt in the U.S.? Take a Look at the World: with Excerpts from Address by Thruston B. Morton." U.S. News and World Report, 23 December 1963, pp. 72-74.
"Collective or individual guilt." U.S. News and World Report, 16 December 1963, p. 10.
C[illegible], M.K. "Reaction of Pre-school Children to the Assassination of President Kennedy." Young Children, November 1964, pp. 100-105.
[illegible], Livingston. La eterna antorcha de Arlington: reportajes de un periodista mexicano desde Washington, de la muerte de John F. Kennedy. Mexico: Editorial Academia Literaria, 1966.
Discussion of "Burden of guilt." Christian Century, 81 (1964), 243.
D[illegible]ing, John L. "The Kennedy Assassination as Viewed by Communist Media." Journalism Quarterly, Spring 1964, pp. 163-169.

(Flanner, Janet) ("Genet," pseud.) "Letters from Paris." New Yorker, 7 December 1963, pp. 133-134+.
"From friend and foe in America: sense of shock and dismay at the despicable act, statem U.S. News and World Report, 2 December 1963, p. 49.
Frontek, T. "An American View." Tablet, 8 April 1967, pp. 382-383.
Greenberg, Bradley S. and Edwin B. Parker, eds. The Kennedy Assassination and the Americ public: social communication in crisis. Stanford University Press, 1965.
Greenstein, Fred I. "Popular Images of the President." American Journal of Psychiatry, 122, no. 5 (1965), 523-529.
Habe, Hans. Anatomy of Hatred: the wounded land. London: Harrap, 1964.
Harris, T. George. "Competent American: Eight Views of JFK." Look, 17 November 1964, pp 54, 56, 61, 64.
Hepburn, James. Farewell America. Belgium; Frontier Company, 1968. (Also in German and French texts).
"How America Felt." Newsweek, 16 March 1964, p. 33.
"How sorrowful bad; world reactions." Time, 29 November 1963, pp. 38-39.
"In Jural Procesului de la Dallas. Rănfoind Presa Străină." Scinteia, 9 March 1964, p.
"In the Nation's interest; commission to investigate the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy." America, 21 December 1963.
"Kennedy legacy, the people's task." Commonweal, 13 December 1963, pp. 335-336.
Lineberry, William. "The Lingering 'plot'. Foreign Opinion and the Assassination." New Leader, 27 April 1964, pp. 21-22.
"Lingering doubts; survey of public opinion." Newsweek, 6 January 1964, p. 19.
McGill, R.E. "Speaking out: hate knows no direction." Saturday Evening Post, 14 Decembe 1963, pp. 8+.
"Der Mord von Dallas Mahnt die Welt." Begegnung, Berlin, 12 (1963), no. 3, pp. 1-2.
"L'Occidente e la Morte di Kennedy." Rivista di studi politici internazionali, Florence, 30 (1963), p. 3.
Radojčič, Miroslav. "Kako je Amerika Primila Vest a Zlocinu u Teksasu." Politika, 23 November 1963, p. 18010.
———. "Zasto je Amerika Cutala?" Politika, 2 December 1963, p. 18017.
Raine, Rohn R., comp. Editorials U.S.A. Different opinions on different subjects. John Kennedy assassination. November 22, 1963. Dallas, Texas: The author n.d.
Rajski, Raymond B., ed. A nation Grieves: The Kennedy Assassination In Editorial Cartoo Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1967.
Sheatsley, Paul B. and Norman Bradburn. "Assassination! How the American Public respond American Psychological Asso. Los Angeles, September 1964, pp. 1-19. (paper)
Sheatsley, Paul B. and Jacob J. Feldman. "The assassination of President Kennedy. A Preliminary Report on Public Reactions and Behavior." Public Opinion Quarterly 28 (1964), p. 2.
"Soviet Press Comment Following Kennedy's Death." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 18 December 1963, pp. 3-7.
Tamama, T. Reply to H. Branden's "Questions from abroad." Saturday Review, 27 June 1964.
"Tragedy in Dallas: letters to the editor." Christian Century, 80 (1963), 1588-1590.
Wolfenstein, Martha and Gilbert W. Kliman, eds. Children and the Death of a President; multidisciplinary studies. New York: Doubleday, 1966.
Wilson, J.J. Mood of the Nation. New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1964.
"The World Resounds: Reactions to the President's Murder, a Symposium: New York, by W. Tokyo, by J. Blewett, Rome, by D. Campion, Washington, by S. Quinlan. Bogota, by Andrade. Milwaukee, by Q.Quade. Toulouse, by P. Becheau. London, by A. Boyle." America, 14 December 1963.
"World Weeps and Waits." Business World, 30 November 1963, pp. 30-31.

C. WARREN COMMISSION

"As Warren Inquiry starts; latest on the assassination." U.S. News and World Report, 30 December 1963, pp. 28-30.
"The assassination: The Warren Report." Newsweek, 5 October 1964, pp. 32-40, 45-52, 57-6 63-64.
"Autopsy on the Warren Commission: Time Essay." Time, 16 September 1966, pp. 54-55.
"Between two fires: Mrs. Oswald's testimony to Warren Commission." Time, 14 February 196 pp. 16-20.
Bickel, Alexander M. "Failure of the Warren Report." Commentary, April 1967, pp. 7-8.
———. "Reexamining the Warren Report." New Republic, 7 January 1967, pp. 25-28.
"Brave little woman, M. Oswald before Warren's investigating commission." Newsweek, 17 February 1964, p. 17.

Campbell, A. "What happened in Dallas? Concerning H. Weisberg and E.J. Epstein's theories on the Warren Report." New Republic, 25 June 1966, pp. 23-25.

"The Case Against Mr. X." New Leader, 3 January 1966, pp. 13-18.

Cl[illegible]e, R.A. "Postscript to Warren." Spectator, 27 January 1967, p. 99.

———. "Warren in the Dock Who killed Kennedy." Spectator, 23 September 1966, pp. 371-372.

Cohen, Jacob. "The Warren Commission report and its Critics." Frontier, November 1966, pp. 5-20.

———. "What the Warren report omits: vital documents." Nation, 11 July 1966, pp. 43-49.

Compendium on Warren Commission. Mundelein, Ill.: Callaghan & Co. (n.d.) (Journal of the Forensic Sciences)

Cook, Fred J. "Warren Commission report; some unanswered questions" Nation, 13 June 1966, pp. 705-715.

———. "Warren Commission report: testimony of the eyewitnesses." Nation, 20 June 1966, pp. 737-746.

———. "Warren Report and the Irreconcilables: Theories of Josiah Thompson and Sylvia Meagher." Nation, 26 February 1968, pp. 277-281.

Crawford, Curtis et al. Critical Reactions to the Warren Report. New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1964.

Crawford, K. "Warren impeachers." Newsweek, 19 October 1964, p. 40

Cushman, Robert F. "Why the Warren Commission?" New York University Law Review, May 1965, pp. 477-533.

David, Jay. The Weight of the Evidence: The Warren Report and its Critics. New York: Meredith Press, 1968.

[illegible]e, Marc and Jim Matthews, eds. Highlights of the Warren Report. Covina, Calif.: Collectors Publications, 1967.

———. Highlights of the Warren Report. Los Angeles: Associated Professional Service, 1964.

"Deep and growing doubts questioning the verdict of the Warren Commission." Newsweek, 10 October 1966, pp. 36+.

Dellinger, David. "The Warren Report: The Death of a President." Liberation, January 1965, pp. 11-12.

———. "Editorial: The Warren Report...?" Liberation, March 1965, pp. 3-5.

Dulles, A. "Allen Dulles answers Warren Report Critics; excerpts from statements, December 4, 1966." U.S. News and World Report, 19 December 1966, p. 20.

Ell[illegible]r, W. "The Warren Report." Jubilee, December 1964, pp. 24-27.

Epstein, Edward J. Inquest: the Warren Commission and the establishment of truth. New York: Viking Press, 1966.

———. O relatório de M[illegible]o: A Comissão Warren e a busca da verdade. Trad. do Renato Fernandes. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Inova, 1967.

———. "Who is afraid of the Warren Report?" Esquire, December 1966, pp. 204+.

Fein, Arnold L. "JFK in Dallas: The Warren Report and its Critics." Saturday Review, 21 January 1967, p. 36.

"Five publishers issue Warren panel's report." Publishers' Weekly, 5 October 1964, pp. 43-44.

Fl[illegible], J.P. "As others see us; concerning Warren Commission Report." Saturday Review, 7 November 1964, pp. 35-37.

Fonzi, Gaeton. "Loose Ends." Greater Philadelphia Magazine, January 1967.

———. "The Warren Commission: The Truth and Arlen Specter." Greater Philadelphia Magazine. (Page proofs, 1966?)

Ford, Gerald R. and John R. Stiles. Portraits of an Assassin. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.

Freese, Paul L. "The Warren Commission and the Fourth Shot: A Reflection on the Fundamentals of Forensic Fact Finding." New York University Law Review, May 1965.

Ga[illegible], Charles. An Examination of the Contradictions and Omissions of the Warren Report. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1966.

Gi[illegible], P. "The Warren Commission." Ave Maria, 17 September 1966, pp. 16-17.

Goo[illegible]ll, K. and A.L. Goodhart. "Warren Commission: the critics and the law; theories of E.J. Epstein and M. Lane." Reporter, 15 December 1966, pp. 44-48.

Goodhart, A.L. "The Warren Commission from a Procedural Standpoint." New York University Law Review, May 1965, pp. 404-423.

———. "The Mysteries of the Kennedy Assassination and the English Press." Law Quarterly Review, January 1967, pp. 23-63.

Handlin, O. "Warren Commission." Atlantic, August 1966, pp. 117-118.

"Hatred That Consumes... Address by Chief Justice E. Warren on the Assassination of the President." [illegible] Magazine, December 1963, p. 32.

"Here's what the Warren report will show." U.S. News and World Report, 14 September 1964, pp. 4?-4?.

[illegible] H. "Warren Commission One-Bullet Theory Exploded." Argosy Magazine, July 1967, pp. 108-116.

"[illegible] read the Warren Report." [illegible]

Jacobson, Dan. "Mean Street: Warren Commission Report." New Statesman, 15 January 1 pp. 76-77.

Jaffe, Louis L. "Trial by Newspaper." New York University Law Review, May 1965, pp.

Joesten, Joachim. Die Wahrheit über den Kennedy-Mord: wie und warum der Warren-Report Zurich: Schweizer Verlagshaus, 1966.

———. The Gaps in the Warren Report. New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1965.

Johnson, Marion M., comp. Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the President's Com on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Washington: National Archives a Records Service, General Services Administration, 1970.

Jones, Penn. Forgive My Grief; a critical review of the Warren Commission report on t assassination of John F. Kennedy. Midlothian, Texas: Midlothian Mirror, 19

———. Forgive My Grief. Volume Two. Midlothian, Texas; Midlothian Mirror, 1967.

Kempton, M. "Warren report: a case for the prosecution." New Republic, 10 October 1 pp. 13-17.

"Latest on murder of Kennedy: a preview of the Warren Report." U.S. News and World Re 1 June 1964, pp. 43-44.

Lewis, Richard W. The Scavengers and critics of the Warren Report; the endless parado New York: Delacorte Press, 1967.

Lifton, David S., comp. Document Addendum to the Warren Report. Los Angeles: Sightte Publications Inc., 1968.

Lynd, Staughton. "Comment by Staughton Lynd." Liberation Magazine, 9, no. 10 (1965).

MacDonald, Dwight. "A Critique of the Warren Report." Esquire, March 1965, p. 59.

———. "A Critique of the Warren Report." In Walker, Gerald, ed. Best Magazine Ar 1966. New York: Crown, 1966, p. 19-53.

———. Ghost of Conspiracy. A Critique of the Warren Commission Report. Englewood N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965. (publication withdrawn)

Malow, Richard. The Kennedy Assassination and the Warren Report. Washington: G.P.O.,

Marcus, Raymond. The Bastard Bullet; a search for legitimacy for Commission Exhibit 3 Los Angeles: Rendell Publications, 1966.

Meagher, Sylvia. Accessories after the fact; the Warren Commission, the authorities, a the report. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1967.

———. Subject index to the Warren report and hearings and exhibits. New York: Sc Press, 1966.

Meyer, Karl E. and N. MacKenzie. "Spotlight on Warren." London, New Statesman, 2 Oct 1964, pp. 474-476.

———. "The Warren Report: the Triumph of Caliban." New Leader, 12 October 1964, p

Michel, Armand. L'assassinat de John Kennedy, le Rapport Warren et ses critiques. N. Trinckvel, 1968.

Mills, Andrew. "Who killed Kennedy? The Warren Report is Right." True Magazine, Dec 1967, pp. 32, 72, 75-77.

Montagu, Ivor. "The Warren Report." Labour Monthly, November 1964, pp. 449-503.

Mosk, Richard M. "The Warren Commission and the Legal Process." Case and Comment Mag May-June 1967, pp. 13-20.

Muhlen, Norbert. "Mord und Legende. Die Kritiker des Warren-Reports." Frankfurt am Der Monat, 17 (1965), 14-28.

"Mystery makers; J. Sparrow's evaluation of the Warren Commission report and its criti Time, 22 December 1967, p. 21.

Nash, George and Patricia. "The Other Witnesses." The New Leader, 12 October 1964, p

New York Times. The Witnesses: The Highlights of Hearings before the Warren Commissi the Assassination of President Kennedy. New York: Bantam Books, 1964.

"New York Times Runs 48 Pages of Report." Editor & Publisher, 3 October 1964, p. 61.

"Nightmare revisited; reenactment for Warren Commission." Newsweek, 8 June 1964, p. 4

O'Brien, Conor Cruise. "Veto by Assassination?" Minority of One, December 1967, pp.

Osterburg, James W. "The Warren Commission: Report and Hearing." Journal of the For Sciences, July 1966, pp. 261-271.

Oswald, Frank. "Kan man Stole pa Warren?" Verdens Gang, 1964, pp. 274-279.

Packer, Herbert L. "The Warren Report: A Measure of Achievement." Nation, 2 Novembe pp. 295-299.

Podhoretz, Norman. "The Warren Commission. An Editorial." Commentary, January 1964, p. 24.

Popkin, Richard H. "The Second Oswald: The Case for the Conspiracy Tehory." New Yor Review of Books, 28 July 1966, pp. 11-12.

"Porocilo Warrenove Komisije." Ljubljanski dnevnik, 8 October 1964, pp. 268-275.

"Reaction to Warren Commission Report." Senior Scholastic, 14 October 1964, p. 17.

"Recommendation." JAMA, 11 January 1965, p. 143.

"Reporting the Report." Newsweek, 12 October 1964, pp. 100-101.

Rifkin, S. Reply to M. Kempton. "Warren report: a case for the prosecution." New Re 24 October 1964, p. 29

"Sad and Solemn duty; commission to investigate the assassination of J. Kennedy." Time, 13 December 1963, pp. 26-27.
Salandria, Vincent J. "The Warren Report? A Philadelphia Lawyer Analyzes the President's Back and Neck Wounds..." Liberation, March 1965, pp. 14-32.
Schoenman, Ralph. "Ist der Warren-Bericht uber den Tod President Kennedys Glaubwurdig?" Frankfurter Hefte, 20, no.1(1965), 15-24.
Schwartz, Jay. "A Legal Demurrer to the Report of the Warren Commission." Journal of Forensic Sciences, July 1966, pp. 318-329.
Sobey, Alfredda. "A Lawyer's Notes on the Warren Commission Report..." American Bar Association Journal, January 1965, pp. 39-43.
Shayon, Robert L. "Persistent Devils: CBS News Inquiry; the Warren Report." Saturday Review, 22 July 1967, p. 46.
Slawson, W. David. "The Warren Report: Letters from Readers." Commentary, April 1967, pp. 12, 14, 16.
Smith, R.H. "Thinking the unthinkable: the Warren Commission books." Publishers Weekly, 10 October 1966, p. 55.
Sparrow, John H.A. After the Assassination: a Positive appraisal of the Warren report. New York: Chilmark Press, 1968.
"Symposium on the Warren Commission Report." New York University Law Review, May 1965, pp. 404-524.
"Task of the Warren Commission." Nation, 27 January 1964, p. 81.
"Text of Summary of Warren Commission Report." Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 2 October 1964, pp. 2332-2340.
Thomson, George C. The Quest for Truth: A quizzical look at the Warren Report: or, How President Kennedy was really assassinated. Glendale, California: G.C. Thomson Engineering Co., 1964.
"Those missing exhibits; photographs and X-rays turned over to the National Archives." Nation, 14 November 1966, p. 500.
Towne, Anthony. "The Assassination, the Warren Commission and the public interest." Motive, February 1967, pp. 6-14.
Trevor-Roper, Hugh R. "Slovenly Warren Report." Atlas, February 1965, pp. 115-118.
"Truth about Kennedy Assassination; was the Warren report written in haste to prove a theory? With interview of A. Specter." U.S. News and World Report, 10 October 1966, pp. 44-50.
U.S. President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. A Concise Compendium of the Warren Commission Report on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy. New York: Popular Library, 1964.
———. Hearings. 26 vols. Washington: G.O.P. 1964.
———. Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Washington, D.C., 1964.
———. The Official Warren Report on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, with Nizer and Catton. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964.
———. Report of the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. With added material prepared by the New York Times exclusively for this edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.
———. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Washington: G.O.P., 1964.
———. The Warren Report: Report of the Commission. New York: Associated press, 1964.
———. The Witnesses - selected and edited from the Warren Commission hearings by the New York Times. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.
U.S. Warren Commission. Warren Report über die Ermordung des Praesidenten John F. Kennedy. und kommentiert von Robert M.W. Kempner. Koln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1964.
Wainwright, L. "Book for all to read: Warren Report." Life, 16 October 1964, p. 35.
———. "Warren Report is not enough; voices speaking in contradiction of report; call for investigation." Life, 7 October 1966, p. 38.
"Warren Commission." Nation, 28 December 1963, p. 445.
———. New Republic, 29 February 1964, p. 4.
"Warren Commission and the death of JFK." Senior Scholastic, 18 November 1964, pp. 14-[illegible].
"Warren Commission Report." Time, 2 October 1964, pp. 45-50.
"The Warren Commission Report on the role of the press in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy." In Gross, Gerald, ed. The Responsibility of the Press, New York: Fleet Pub., 1966.
"Warren Commission report; Paraffin test unreliable; killing still a mystery." Science News Letter, 10 October 1964, p. 227.

"Warren Commission Report: Verdict, One Man Alone." World Week Magazine, 7 October 1964, pp. 9-10.
"Warren Commission: Testimony and evidence." Time, 4 December 1964, pp. 25-27.
"Warren findings: some new facts." U.S. News and World Report, 6 July 1964, p. 44.
"Warren Report: A Measure of the Achievement; with editorial comment." Nation, 2 November 1964, 290-295.
"Warren report; comment." Commonweal, 9 October 1964, p. 59.
"The Warren Report: How to Murder the Medical Evidence." Current Medicine for Attorneys, November 1965, pp. 1-28.
"The Warren Report: Letters from Readers." Commentary Magazine, April 1967, pp. 7-12.
"Warren Report Wrong, College Teacher Says." Los Angeles Times, 17 November 1967, p. 18.
"Warren's Secret." National Review, 7 April 1964, pp. 265-266.
"Washington News: Kennedy Shot Twice in the Back." JAMA: 4 January 1964, p. 15.
Weaver, John D. Warren: The Man, The Court, The Era. Boston: Little Brown (n.d.)
Weisberg, Harold. The Report on the Warren Report: or The Six Wise Men of Industan. 1965
———. Whitewash, the report on the Warren Report. Hyattstown, Md., 1965.
West, John R. Death of the President. The Warren Commission on Trial. Covina, California Collectors Pub., 1967.
White, Stephen. Should we Believe the Warren Report?" New York: MacMillan, 1968.

D. LEE HARVEY OSWALD

Amalric, J. Review of L'affaire Oswald, by Leo Sauvage. Atlas, October 1965, pp. 249-250
Ansbacher, Heinz and Rowena R., David and Kathleen Shiverick. "Lee Harvey Oswald: An Adlerian Interpretation." Psychoanalytic Review, 53, no. 3 (1966), 55-68.
"Assassination, as the plot unfolds: case against Oswald: How the President was shot." U.S. News and World Report, 9 December 1963, pp. 68-71.
"Attorney for Oswald." Time, 6 March 1964, p. 47.
Bachmann, Ida. "Hvem Myrdede Praesident Kennedy? Et Defensorat for Oswald Indleveret." Frit Danmark, 22, no. 10 (1963-64), 1-3.
"Boy, Don't You Know I'm on Camera?" New Republic, 29 February 1964, p. 7.
Chapman, Gil and Ann. Was Oswald Alone? San Diego: Publishers Export Company, 1967.
Cooke, Alistair. "Oswald had Psychopathic Personality: no evidence of conspiracy." Manchester Guardian, 27 November 1963, p. 11.
"Counsel for Oswald." U.S. News and World Report, 9 March.1964, p. 16.
Ducovny, Amram and Leon Friedman. "The Trial of Lee Harvey Oswald (A Play)." Playbill Magazine, 4, no. 11, 12.
Feldman, Harold. "Oswald and the FBI." The Nation, 27 January 1964, pp. 86-89.
Graham, J.J. "Acquittal for Oswald; Concerning the movie 'Rush to Judgment'." Commonweal, 21 April 1967, pp. 149-151.
Grove, L. "Did press pressure kill Oswald?" U.S. News and World Report, 6 April 1964, pp. 78-79.
Hastings Michael. Lee Harvey Oswald: A Far Streak of Independence Brought on by Neglect. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966.
"He was my brother: excerpts form Lee (R.L. Oswald and others)." Look, 17 October 1967, pp. 62-66+.
Hewes, Henry. "The Theatre: Sensing History." Saturday Review, 4 May 1968, p. 40.
Holmes, John Clellon. "The Silence of Oswald." Playboy, November 1965, pp. 101-102, 222, 224.
"If Oswald had lived, could Impartial Jury Have Been Found to Try Him." Broadcasting, 6 January 1964, pp. 52-53.
Jackson, Donald. "The Evolution of an Assassin." Life, 21 February 1964, pp. 68A-80.
Joesten, Joachim. "Lazni Osvald." Oslobodenje, 21 (1964), 5297-5938.
———. Marina Oswald. London: Dawnay, 1967.
———. Oswald: Assassin or Fall Guy?" New York: Marzani and Munsell, Inc., 1964.
———. Oswald: The Truth. London: Dawnay, 1967.
Johnson, Priscilla. "Oswald in Moscow." Harper's, April 1964, pp. 46-50.
Kempton, M. "Oswald, May We Have Some Facts, Please." New Republic, 13 June 1964, pp. 13
Lane, Mark. "Oswald Innocent? A Lawyer's Brief." National Guardian Weekly, 19 December
"Lee Oswald's Widow tells her story; summary of testimony by Marina Oswald." U.S. News an World Report, 17 February 1964, p. 19.
Le Manna, Roger and Gene Ringgold. Assassin. The Lee Harvey Oswald Biography. Hollywood Associated Professional Services, 1964.
McBirnie, Dr. W.S. What Was Behind Lee Harvey Oswald? The author (n.d.)
MacDonald, Dwight. "That Oswald Paternity Case." New Republic, 29 February 1964.

"Oswald and the weight of evidence." Newsweek, 9 December 1963, pp. 36+.
"Oswald Diary Publication Stirs Furor." Editor and Publisher, 4 July 1964, p. 14.
"Oswald Killing Discussed." Science News Letter, 7 December 1963, p. 355.
"Oswald mystery grows deeper and deeper." U.S. News and World Report, 30 March 1964, p. 45.
"Oswald's Case Against the Warren Commission." New Leader, 20 December 1965, pp. 5-10.
Pisatrik, Stanley. "The Oswald Case Should be Reopened!" Dissent 13, no. 5 (1966), 469-470.
"Plot to Clear Lee Oswald." National Review, 7 April 1964, p. 265.
Popkin, Richard H. The Second Oswald. New York: Avon Books, 1966.
Reynolds, Ruth. "The Oswald Riddle." Coronet, March 1967, pp. 122-127.
Sauvage, Leo. "Afera Oswald." Vjesnik u srijedu, 25 August 1965, pp. 694-695.
———. L'Affaire Oswald: Response au Rapport Warren. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1965.
———. Gesucht: Kennedys Morder Die Affäre Oswald Wien. München: Molden, 1967.
———. "The Oswald Affair." Commentary, March 1964, pp. 55-56.
———. The Oswald Affair: an examination of the contradictions and omissions of the Warren Report. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1966.
———. "Oswald in Dallas: a Few Loose Ends." Reporter, 2 January 1964, pp. 24-26.
"The Second Oswald: An Exchange of Letters." New York Review of Books, 6 October 1966, pp. 29-34.
Sites, Paul. Lee Harvey Oswald and the American Dream. New York: Pageant Press, 1967.
Snyder, L. "Lee Oswald's Guilt: How Science Nailed Kennedy's Killer." Popular Science, April 1965, pp. 68-73.
Sparrow, John H.A. "Making Mysteries About Oswald." Atlas, March 1965, pp. 173-174.
Stafford, Jean. A Mother in History. London: Chatto & Windus, 1966.
———. "The Strange World of Marguerite Oswald." McCall's, October 1965, pp. 112-113.
"Strange World of Lee Oswald: More Light on the Assassination." U.S. News and World Report, 16 December 1963, pp. 60-62.
Tonahill, Joe H. Why Lee Harvey Oswald would have been acquitted for the murder of John F. Kennedy. (N.P., 1967)
Thornley, Kerry W. Oswald. Chicago: New Classics House, 1965.
"Warren Commission." New Republic, 29 February 1964, pp. 4-5.
"The Warren Commission's Case Against Oswald." New Leader, 22 November 1965, pp. 16-21.
"Was Oswald Guilty? A Judicial Summing up of the Warren Report." New Statesman, 12 March 1965, pp. 399-403.
"Week in the Sun; Marguerite Oswald's Testimony." Newsweek, 7 December 1964, pp. 28-30+.
West, Jessamyn. "Marina Oswald Porter: Seven Years After Dallas." Redbook, August 1970, pp. 57-59, 129-132, 134-135.
Zapata Olivella, Manuel. ¿Quien dio el fusil a Oswald? Bogota: Editorial Revista Columbiana, 1967.

E. JACK RUBY

"The Assassination: A Momentity for History." Time, 13 January 1967, pp. 16-17.
Bedford, Sybille. "Verdict on Jack Ruby." Life, 27 March 1963, pp. 32-34, 34B, 70A-71, 74.
Belli, Melvin M. and M.C. Carroll. Dallas Justice. The Real Story of Jack Ruby and His Trial. New York: David McKay, 1964.
Bloom, S. "Tells his Public Relations Role in Ruby Casw." Editor and Publisher, 1 February 1964, p. 58.
Callahan, Dr. John W. "Did Jack Ruby Kill the Wrong Man?" Argosy, September 1967, pp. 29, 96-101.
"[illegible] Ruby Tell?" Sunday Times, 9 October 1966, p. 8.
[illegible]hlios, Sanford. "Who Killed Jack Ruby?" Real Magazine, April 1967, pp. 40-42.
[illegible]er, Fannie. "The Last Madness of Jack Ruby." The New Republic, 11 February 1967, pp. 19-25.
"[illegible],000 word leak; testimony of Jack Ruby to the Warren Commission." Time, 28 August 1964, p. 40.
Gertz, Elmer. Moment of Madness: People vs. Jack Ruby. Chicago and New York: Follett, 1968.
Gertz, Elmer and Wayne B. Giampietro. "The Trial of 'State Cases': A Postscript on the Ruby Trial." DePaul Law Review, 16, no. 2 (Spring-Summer 1967), 285-308.
H[illegible]n, Ernest. "Defendant Ruby Will Meet the Ghost of a Long Dead Scott." Life, 21 February 1964, pp. 30-31.
[illegible]n, Joachim. The Truth About the Case of Jack Ruby. La Vérité Sur LeCas de Jack Ruby. Paris: Editions Casterman, 1967.
"[illegible]ing the gun; premature disclosures." Newsweek, 13 July 1964, p. 50.
K[illegible]n, John and Jon R. Waltz. The Trial of Jack Ruby. New York: MacMillan, 1965.

Kempton, Murray. "Boy, Don't You Know I'm on Camera?" New Republic, 29 February 1964,
———. "The Disposable Jack Ruby." Spectator, 13 January 1967, p. 35.
———. "Ruby, Oswald, and the State." Spectator, 21 October 1966, pp. 506-507.
Lewis, Richard Warren. "A Fleshy Lawyer for Oswald's Killer." Saturday Evening Post, 8 February 1964, pp. 28-30.
Linn, Edward. "Appointment in Dallas: The Untold Story of Jack Ruby." Saturday Eveni Post, 25 July 1964, pp. 24-26, 28, 33, 36-37, 40, 48-49.
Popa, Stefan. "Dallas 'Paziti'l Bine pe Ruby." Lumea, 26 March 1964, pp. 10-11.
———. "Dallas: Procesul Ruby." Lumea, 27 February 1964, pp. 8-9.
"Public Relations Firm Sets Press Rules for Ruby's Trial." Editor and Publisher, 28 December 1963, p. 9.
"Radio-TV Barred from Ruby Trial." Broadcasting, 23 December 1963, p. 56.
"Radio-TV Newsmen Testify in Ruby Trial." Broadcasting, 16 March 1964, p. 74.
Revere, Guy. "Jack Ruby: The Mafia's Man in Dallas." Saga, March 1967, pp. 28-31, 86-90.
"Ruby and the King of Torts." Times Literary Supplement, 17 March 1966, p. 221.
"Ruby Death Verdict: A TV Spectacular." Editor and Publisher, 21 March 1964, p. 11.
"Screen Test." Newsweek, 10 February 1964, p. 48.
Stern, R. Le Proces Ruby-Dallas. Kapellan, Belgium: Beckers, 1967.
"What's your source?"; premature publication by Journal-American of Ruby's Testimony before Warren." Newsweek, 31 August 1964, pp. 68-69.
Wills, Gary and Ovid Demaris. "The Disposal of Jack Ruby." Esquire, June 1967.
Wills, Gary and Ovid Demaris. Jack Ruby. New York: New American Library, 1968.
Worthington, Peter. "The Limelight: Why Jack Ruby's First Trial Couldn't Happen Here.' Maclean's, 18 April 1964, pp. 3-4.
"You All Know Me! I'm Jack Ruby." Esquire, May 1967, pp. 79-87, 153-164.

F. QUESTION OF CONSPIRACY

"Any number can play: question of whether the assassination was the work of one man." Newsweek, 7 November 1966, pp. 37-38.
Berendt, John. "If They've Found Another Assassin, let them Name Names and Produce the Evidence." Esquire, August 1967, pp. 80-82.
Besson, Waldemar. "Die Schusse von Dallas. War eine Verschwörung des Hasses am werk?' Die Zeit, 19, no. 33 (1964), 6.
Buchanan, Thomas G. Who killed Kennedy? New York: Putnam's, 1964.
Carlos, Newton. A Conspiraçao. Rio de Janeiro: J. Alvaro, 1964.
Cutler, Robert B. The Flight of CE399: Evidence of Conspiracy. Beverly, Mass.: Omni-Print, 1969.
———. Two Flightpaths: Evidence of Conspiracy. Danvers, Mass.: Mirror Press, 1971
Davis, Nord, Jr. Dallas Conspiracy. Hollis, N.H.: The author. (n.d.)
Epstein, Edward J. Counterplot. New York: Viking Press, 1969.
Fairlie, H. "No conspiracy but perhaps two assassins?" New York Times Magazine, 11 September 1966, pp. 52-55+.
Goldberg, Arthur. Conspiracy Interpretations of the Assassination of President Kennedy: International and Domestic. University of California Security Studies Project Paper Number 16. Los Angeles: University of California, 1968.
Gosset, P. and R. L'homme qui crut tuer Kennedy. Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1967.
Hartogs, Renatus and Lucy Freeman. The Two Assassins. New York: Crowell, 1965.
Hermann, Kai. "Wer war Kennedys Mörder?" Die zeit, 19, no. 15 (1964), 7.
Hill, Richard J and Charles M. Bonjean. "News Diffusion: a Test of the Regularity Hypothesis." Journalism Quarterly, 41, no. 3 (1964), 7.
Karp, Irwin. "Debate over Dallas: Theories of John Sparrow and Sylvia Meagher." Saturday Review, 9 March 1968, pp. 113-114.
Lauzon, A. "Oswald a-t-il tué Kennedy?" Maclean's, March 1964, pp. 1-2.
"A Matter of Reasonable Doubt." Revu Magazine, 28 January 1967, pp. 18-26.
"More than one man." America, 7 December 1963, p. 722.
"Mythmakers; mysterious deaths of people involved in case." Time, 11 November 1966, pp. 33-34.
"New Light on Second Assassin Theory." U.S. News and World Report, 29 May 1967, p. 14.
"New Orleans and the Cubans: Who was ready to Help Oswald." The Times, 20 February 1967, p. 12.
"Phantasmagoria; who murdered Kennedy?" Time, 25 November 1966, pp. 34-35.
"Policaj Ubil Kennedija?" Vecernji Sarajevski list, 24 December 1964, pp. 298-300.
Rice, John R. What Was Back of Kennedy's Murder. Murfreesboro, Tenn.: Sword of the Lord Publishers, 1964.

Thomas, Harford. "Chance or design?" Manchester Guardian, 28 September 1966, p. 18.
Thompson, Josiah. "The Cross Fire that Killed President Kennedy: Excerpts from Six Seconds in Dallas." Saturday Evening Post, 2 December 1967, pp. 27-31.
an Bemmelen, J.M. "Did Lee Harvey Oswald Act without Help?" New York University Law Review, 40, no. 3 (1965), 466-467.
"Verdict: One man alone." Senior Scholastic, 7 October 1964, pp. 9-10.
Warren, David M. The Plot to Kill JFK. Chicago: Novel Books, 1965.
Weisberg, Harold. "Kennedy Murder: Buried Proof of a Conspiracy!" Saga, April 1967, pp. 28-31, 89-90, 92, 94-96.
———. Oswald in New Orleans: Case of Conspiracy with the CIA. New York: Canyon Books, 1967.
Welsh, David and David Lifton. "The Case for Three Assassins." January 1967, pp. 77-100.
"Why a plot was feared when Kennedy was Shot." U.S. News and World Report, 6 January 1964, p. 7.

G. JIM GARRISON

"All the elements." Newsweek, 10 March 1969, pp. 36+.
Almanac of Jim Garrison's investigation into the assassination of John F. Kennedy: the crime of silence. Austin: Research Publications, 1968.
Arnoni, M.S. "Garrison and Warren, Anything in Common?" Minority of One, October 1967, pp. 11-12.
"The Assassination: Bourbon Street Rococo." Time, 3 March 1969, p. 26.
"Assassination: History or Headlines." Newsweek, 13 March 1967, pp. 44+.
Autry, James. "The Garrison Investigation: How and Why it Began." New Orleans, April 1967, pp. 5-9.
Aynesworth, H. "J. Garrison's investigation of a plot to kill JFK." Newsweek, 15 May 1967, pp. 35+.
Brener, Milton E. The Garrison Case. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1969.
"Carnival in New Orleans: Jim Garrison's Investigation." Newsweek, 6 March 1967, p. 32.
"The Case for Garrison." New York Review of Books, 14 September 1967, pp. 19-29.
"Charge of Conspiracy." Newsweek, 3 April 1967, pp. 36-37.
"Cashing In; Garrison's unofficial chief investigator quits." Time, 7 July 1967, p. 17.
m, J. and H.C. Chriss. "New Orleans: Act One." Reporter, 6 April 1967, pp. 17-20.
"Covering Big Jim." Newsweek, 17 March 1969, p. 105.
"Curtains for the DA; physicians examine photographs and X-rays." Newsweek, 27 January 1969, p. 27.
"D.A. Wins a Round: Jim Garrison's Investigation." Time, 24 March 1967, pp. 17-18.
"Deadly Iteration." Time, 7 March 1969, pp. 22-23.
"Defiant Defendant." Newsweek, 24 February 1969, p. 33.
[illegible], William F. Jr. "The Press: Its Actions and Reactions." New Orleans, April 1967, pp. 12-13, 52-53.
Epstein, Edward Jay. "Garrison." New Yorker, 13 July 1968, pp. 35-40, 42, 49-52, 54-56, 58-60, 62-76, 79-81.
"Eye of the Hurricane." Newsweek, 3 March 1969, pp. 24+.
Flammonde, Paris. The Kennedy Conspiracy: An uncommissioned report on the Jim Garrison Investigation. New York: Meredith Press, 1969.
Garrison, Jim. A Heritage of Stone. New York: Putnam, 1970.
———. "New Orleans Evidence; excerpts from statements." Reporter, 8 February 1968, p. 10.
"Garrison Under Fire." The Economist, 25 February 1967, p. 730.
"Garrison vs. the People." Time, 14 March 1969, p. 29.
G[illegible]rd, Alex. "Clay Shaw Tells His Story." Transcript of TV Interview, Station WVUE, Channel 12, New Orleans, 11 March 1969.
———. "Jim Garrison Tells His Story." Transcript of TV Interview, Station WVUE, Channel 12, New Orleans, 13 March 1969.
"Inconceivable connivance." Time, 12 January 1968, p. 14.
Irons, Evelyn. "'Several Plots' Claims District Attorney." Sunday Times, 26 February 1967.
James, Rosemary and Jack D. Wardlaw. Plot or Politics? The Garrison Case and its cast. New Orleans: Pelican Publications, 1967.
Joesten, Joachim. The Garrison Inquiry, Truth and Consequences. London: Peter Dawnay, 1967.
"Judge clears Shaw." Senior Scholastic, 21 March 1969, p. 16.
Kirkwood, James. American Grotesque: An Account of the Clay Shaw-Jim Garrison Affair in the City of New Orleans. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.
"[illegible] Disparités [illegible] a lui Jim Garrison." Lumea, 22 June 1967, pp. 97-100.
"Man Who Loved Kennedy." Time, 21 February 1969, p. 18.
"[illegible] Gras Season." Newsweek, 17 February 1969, p. 34.
"[illegible] on the Kennedy Assassination charges, concerning Jim Garrison's TV broadcast." U.S. News and World Report, [illegible]

"More than a Man in the Dock." Time, 14 February 1969, pp. 26-29.
"New Orleans Plot." Senior Scholastic, 14 April 1967, pp. 18-19.
Norden, Eric. "Jim Garrison: A candid conversation with the Embattled District Attorne of New Orleans." Playboy, October 1967, pp. 59+.
"Odd Company." Time, 10 March 1967, p. 24.
Phelan, James. "To Old New Orleans: The Vice Man Cometh." Saturday Evening Post, 8 Ju 1963, pp. 67-71.
Powledge, F. "Is Garrison Faking?" New Republic, 17 June 1967, pp. 13-18.
Roberts, G. "The Case of Jim Garrison and Lee Oswald." New York Times Magazine, 21 May 1967, pp. 32-35.
Rogers, W. "Persecution of Clay Shaw." Look, 26 August 1969, pp. 53-54+.
"Round One." Newsweek, 3 February 1969, p. 33.
"Shutting Up Big Mouth." Time, 25 August 1967, pp. 48-51.
"Sideshows in New Orleans." Time, 31 January 1969, p. 40.
"Sifting Fact From Fantasy: Use of Truth Drugs in Jim Garrison's Investigation." Time, 31 March 1967, p. 41.
"Sleight of Hand: Jim Garrison's Assassination Investigation Extends to FBI and CIA." Newsweek, 22 May 1967, p. 40.
"Smiling through." Newsweek, 27 January 1969, pp. 27-28.
Smith, Merriman. "Jim Garrison and His Sources of Evidence." Manchester Guardian, 18 M 1967, p. 7.
"Tales of Garrison." The Economist, 25 March 1967, p. 1145.
"A Taste for Conspiracy." Newsweek, 20 March 1967, p. 76.
"Thickening the Plot: Judges support Jim Garrison's plot Theory." Newsweek, 27 March 19 p. 37.
Turner, William W. "Garrison Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy..." Ramparts, January 1968, p. 43.
"Two For the Seesaw." Newsweek, 3 July 1967, p. 82.
"What Conspiracy? Testimony of Perry Russo." Newsweek, 24 February 1969, p. 33.
"What Garrison Proved." New Republic, 15 March 1969, p. 9.
Young, Roger. "The Investigation: Where It Stands Today." New Orleans, July 1967, pp.

H. WILLIAM MANCHESTER

"L'Affaire Manchester." Triumph, January 1967, p. 7.
"As the book appears: a close look at the facts; concerning The Death of a President, by William Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 23 January 1967, pp. 50-52
"The Assassination. The Book." Newsweek, 10 April 1967, pp. 34-35.
"The Assassination: Who Can Understand It?" Newsweek, 16 January 1967, pp. 28-29.
"Battle of the Book; Manchester's The Death of a President." Time, 23 December 1966, pp. 15-18.
Bennett, Arnold. Jackie, Bobby and Manchester; The Story Behind the Headlines. New Yor Bee Line Books, 1967.
"Book that backfired; concerning Death of a President by William Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 26 December 1966, p. 36.
Cafiero, L.H. "Manchester Book Alledges Com Lag Day JFK Killed." Electronic News, 3 Apr 1967, p. 22.
Cannon, James M. and Edward Kosner. "Manchester's Own Story." Newsweek, 30 January 1967 pp. 21-24.
Churchill, Randolph S. "The Manchester Book." The Times, 13 February 1967, p. 13, 14 February 1967, p. 11.
Coit, Margaret L. "November 22, 1963." Saturday Review, 15 April 1967, pp. 30-31.
Collins, R.S. "Kennedy vs. Look, Manchester, Harper & Row; an Informal Glossary of Press Relations Techniques." Public Relations Journal, April 1967, pp. 13-15.
Cooke, Alistair. "Fresh Shots in Kennedy Book Battle." Manchester Guardian, 24 January 1967, p. 9.
———. "Mrs. Kennedy Suffers Grief She Sought to Avoid." Manchester Guardian, 21 December 1966, p. 7.
Cory, J. "Manchester Affair." Saturday Review, 9 September 1967, p. 61.
Cunliffe, Marcus. "A courtier's obsequies." (Review of Death of a President). New Society, 20 April 1967, pp. 580-581.
"Death of a President; Excerpts from the Introduction to the Annual Report of the Librari of Congress for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1964." Library Journal, August 1965, pp. 3173-3176.
"Eines Präsidenten Reise in den Tod: William Manchester berichtet die volle Wahrheit [illegible]

Featherstone, Joseph. "Lost Flight from Dallas." New Republic, 22 April 1967, pp. 20-22.
Fein, Arnold L. "The Legal Right of Privacy." Saturday Review, 21 January 1967, pp. 26-27.
"Feud Over Death of a President Intensifies as Manchester Attacks Kennedy Family and Aids." Publishers Weekly, 30 January 1967, pp. 88-89.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. "Was Mrs. Kennedy Justified in Bringing Suit?" Saturday Review, 21 January 1967, pp. 18-21.
Hardwick, Elizabeth. "Blow Up." New York Review of Books, 20 April 1967, pp. 11-12.
Hughes, E.J. "Trials of Government in Exile; Graceless Battle between the Kennedy Family and W. Manchester." Newsweek, 6 February 1967, p. 20.
"The Holiday Spirit." Newsweek, 9 January 1967, p. 25.
"How to Lose a war: Long running row over Manchester's Book." Newsweek, 6 February 1967, pp. 34-35.
"In the Hours After Dallas: the Book and the Testimony: Concerning The Death of a President, by Wm. Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 20 February 1967, pp. 51-52.
"Jacqueline Kennedy's Victory." Newsweek, 2 January 1967, pp. 16-19.
Joesten, Joachim. The Case Against the Kennedy Clan. Munich: The author (n.d.)
Karp, Irwin. "The Author's Right to Write." Saturday Review, 21 January 1967, pp. 28-29.
"The Kennedys: Temporary Cease Fire." Newsweek, 9 January 1967, pp. 20-21.
Kopkind, Andrew. "The Kennedy Book Battle." New Statesman, 30 December 1966, p. 956.
Kosner, Edward. "Jacqueline B. Kennedy, Plaintiff..." Newsweek, 26 December 1966, pp. 39-43.
Krassner, Paul. "The Parts That Were Left Out of the Kennedy Book." Realist, May 1967, pp. 1, 18.
Lisagor, Peter. "A Brilliant Mosaic of Events." Panorama Magazine, 8 April 1967, p. 3.
Little, Stuart W. "Birth Pains of a Book." Saturday Review, 9 September 1967, p. 61.
[illegible], A. "JFK: the Stained Glass Image." American Heritage, August 1967, pp. 4-7.
———. "Outdoor Life and the Death of a President: William Manchester Charges Outdoor Life with Hard Boiled Callousness Toward a National Tragedy." Outdoor Life, October 1967.
Manchester, William. "William Manchester's Own Story." Look, 4 April 1967, pp. 62-66.
"Manchester Book: Despite Flaws and Error, a Story That is Larger than Life or Death." Time, 7 April 1967, pp. 22-23.
Meagher, Sylvia. "After the Battle, The Book." The Minority of One, June 1967, pp. 25, 27.
"Mrs. Kennedy Reaches Accord with Harper & Row and William Manchester." Publishers Weekly, 23 January 1967, p. 222.
Nevins, Allan. "Gargantuan, Honest and Useful, but so exasperating." Panorama Magazine, 8 April 1967, pp. 2-3.
Plumb, J.H. "The Private Grief of Public Figures." Saturday Review, 21 January 1967, pp. 24-25.
"Sequels: Spreading Controversy." Time, 6 January 1967, pp. 16-17.
[illegible]erman, George. "The Book of the Century." This Week Magazine, 7 January 1967, pp. 6-7.
[illegible]nn, Richard M. "Note: Guilt and Depth Reaction to the Death of a President." Psychoanalytic Review, Fall 1966, pp. 81-82.
Talese, Gay. "The Corry Papers." Esquire, June 1967, pp. 24+.
"To Help You Keep the Record Straight About that Book; Concerning The Death of a President, by Wm. Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 6 February 1967, pp. 66-67.
Tomalin, Nicholas. "Just Read the News, Mr. Manchester." New Statesman, 21 April 1967, pp. 547-548.
Tuchman, Barbara W. "The Historian's Opportunity." Saturday Review, 25 February 1967, pp. 27, 31, 71.
Van Gelder, Lawrence. The Untold Story: why the Kennedys lost the Book Battle. New York: Award Books, 1967.
"Where was O'Donnell?" Time, 17 February 1967, p. 78.
"Widow vs. author; concerning W. Manchester's Death of a President." Senior Scholastic, 6 January 1967, p. 16.
Wills, Gary. "Manchester's Upheaval." National Catholic Reporter, 29 March 1967, p. 10.
Wyndham, Francis. "Manchester and the Kennedys." Sunday Times, 15 January 1967, p. 10.

I. LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON

"Growing Rift of LBJ and Kennedy: Behind the Furor over a Book, Concerning the Death of a President, by Wm. Manchester." U.S. News and World Report, 2 January 1967, pp. 22-27.
Haley, J. Evetts. A Texan Looks at Lyndon: A Study in Illegitimate Power. Canyon, Texas: Palo Duro Press, 1964.
Joesten, Joachim. The Case Against Lyndon B. Johnson in the Assassination of President Kennedy. (n.p.) The author, 1967. 2 vols.
———. The Dark Side of Lyndon B. Johnson. London: Peter Dawnay, 1968.
Johnson, L.B. Message to the Congress: address delivered before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Washington: G.P.O., 1963.
Johnson, L.B. "President's Proclamation, June 6, 1968." Vital Speeches, 15 June 1968.
"Johnson takes oath as nation mourns Kennedy." Senior Scholastic, 6 December 1963, p.
Knebel, F Letcher. "After the Shots: the ordeal of Lyndon Johnson." Look, 10 March 19 pp. 26-28+.
"LBJ on the Assassination." Newsweek, 11 May 1970, p. 41.
Lincoln, Evelyn. Kennedy and Johnson. New York: Rinehart & Winston n.d.
McReynolds, D. "New York Letter: Macbeth in the White House." Saturday Night, Decemb 1966, pp. 22-23.

II. MARTIN LUTHER KING

"Accused killer, a clumsy man with closed eyes." Life, 26 April 1968, p. 42B.
Adamo, S.J. "Measuring up the Catholic Press and Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr." Americ 4 May 1968, p. 624.
"As 150,000 said farewell to Dr. King." U.S. News and World Report, 22 April 1968, pp. 38-39.
"Assassination." Time, 12 April 1968, pp. 18-21.
"Assassination according to Capote." Time, 10 May 1968, p. 65.
"Assassination shocks nation; with quotations." Senior Scholastic, 25 April 1968, pp. 18-19.
Bennett, Lerone, Jr. "Martyrdom of M.L. King." Ebony, May 1968, p. 174.
———. What Manner of Man: A Biography of MLK. Chicago: Johnson Pub. Co., 1968.
"Big Hunt for mystery killer." U.S. News and World Report, 29 April 1968, pp. 8+.
Blair, Clay. The Strange Case of James Earl Ray. New York: Bantam Books, 1969.
Boutelle, P. et al. Murder in Memphis. (N.p.) Merit Publications, 1968.
Brown, Mrs. Julia. Please Don't Help Glorify Martin Luther King. TACT Committee. (n.d.
Cameron, J.M. "British view on Martin Luther King." Commonweal, 26 April 1968, p. 164.
Clarke, J.W. and J.W. Soule. "How Southern Children felt about King's Death." Trans-Ac October 1968, pp. 35-40.
"Deepening mystery of Dr. King's Assassination." U.S. News and World Report, 27 May 1968, p. 10.
"Did Ray Kill King?" National Review, 23 April 1968, pp. 376+.
"Doctor King." National Review, 23 April 1968, pp. 376+.
"Doctor King's murder: nagging questions remain." U.S. News and World Report, 24 March p. 13.
Halberstam, M. "Are you guilty of murdering Martin Luther King?" New York Times Magazi 9 June 1968, pp. 27-29+.
Huie, W.B. "Story of James Earl Ray and the plot to assassinate Martin Luther King." L 26 November 1968, pp. 96-97+.
Huie, W. B. et al. "Why James Earl Ray Murdered Dr. King." Look, 15 April 1969, pp. 102-104.
"James Ray: manhunt ends but mysteries remain." U.S. News and World Report, 24 June 196 pp. 34-36.
"King is the man, oh, Lord." Newsweek, 15 April 1968, pp. 34-38.
Lomax, Louis. To Kill a Black Man. Los Angeles: Holloway House, 1968.
"Man in Room 5." Time, 12 April 1968, p. 21.
"Martin Luther King and the right to know." America, 22 March 1969, p. 323.
"Notes and Comment." New Yorker, 13 April 1968, pp. 35-37.
O'leary, J. "Greatest manhunt in law enforcement history." Reader's Digest, August, 19 pp. 63-69.
"Raising a whirlwind; Ray's plea of guilty." Time, 21 March 1969, pp. 16-17.
"Reactions to the slaying of Martin Luther King; symposium." America, April 1968, pp. 534-536.
Turner, W. "Some disturbing parallels." Ramparts, 25 January 1969.
Watters, P. et al. "Beale Street and points North." Nation, 22 April 1968, pp. 529-535
"Where is James Earl Ray?" Newsweek, 29 April 1968, p. 21.
"Who killed King?" Newsweek, 22 April 1968, pp. 31-33.
"Who Killed King?" Time, 26 April 1968, pp. 20-21.
"Widening Search." Time, 19 April 1968, p. 20.
"Willard, Galt, Ray?" National Review, 7 May 1968, p. 432.
Woodbury, R. "Murder clues: hand prints, a car chase and a silly smile." Life, 19 Apri 1968, pp. 40-40A
"Year later: honors for Dr. King; violence, too." U.S. News and World Report, 14 April 1969, p. 8.

III. ROBERT F. KENNEDY

"The Accused: Ray and Sirhan." Life, 21 June 1968, pp. 24-34.
"Aftermath of a tragedy; boy's deep hate, a senator slain." U.S. News and World Report, 17 June 1968, pp. 25-28.
American Heritage, Editors of. RFK: His Life and Death. New York: Dell, 1968.
"Bobby Kennedy Record." U.S. News and World Report, 6 May 1968, pp. 50-54.
"Bobby: To be or Not To Be." Newsweek, 29 January 1968, pp. 18-19.
Buckley, W.F., Jr. "Reflections on the Sirahn trial." National Review, 11 March 1969, p. 247.
Cameron, J.M. "From England: the death of Kennedy." Commonweal, 28 June 1968, pp. 429-30.
Ciardi, John. "Manner of Speaking; TV coverage and radio coverage." Saturday Review, 29 June 1968, p. 37.
"Clashing symbols." Newsweek, 14 July 1969, pp. 36+.
"The Conscience of RFK." Reporter, 22 February 1968, p. 12.
Cooke, Terence J. "Eulogy to Robert F. Kennedy, Delivered at the Funeral." Vital Speeches, 1 July 1968, pp. 547-548.
"Death of a Democrat." America, 19 July 1969, p. 22.
de Toledano, Ralph. RFK. The Man Who Would Be President. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1967.
Diamond, B.L. "Sirhan through the looking glass; testimony of psychiatrist." Time, 4 April 1969, p. 28.
"Does Bobby Kennedy Have a Chance?" Saturday Evening Post, 20 April 1968, p. 88.
Dougherty, Richard. "New Yorkers Weep as Family, Friends Return with Body." Los Angeles Times, 7 June 1968, pp. 1, 12.
[illegible], Ron. "First Court Appearance; Suspect Gives Impression of Cocky, arrogant Confidence." Los Angeles Times, 9 June 1968, pp. 1, 15.
"Friendly [illegible] on the way to a Rostrum; with reports by L. Wainwright and T. H. White." Life, 14 June 1968, pp. 32-42D.
[illegible], John J. "Brother Delivers Eulogy for 'Good and Decent Man'." Los Angeles Times, 9 June 1968, pp. 1, 27.
[illegible], R. D. "Day in June." McCalls, June 1970, pp. 38+.
Halberstam, David. "Travels with Bobby Kennedy." Harper's, July 1968, pp. 51-61.
[illegible], Hal. "Indiana: A Test for Bobby." New York Times Magazine, 5 May 1968, pp. 32-33.
Hill, Gladwin. "Kennedy State 'Extremely Critical'; Suspect, Arab Immigrant, Arraigned; President puts Guard on Candidates." New York Times, 6 June 1968, pp. 1, 20.
Hilsman, Roger. "RFK on Cuba: an Insider's Analysis." Commonweal, 22 November 1968, pp. [illegible].
Houghton, Robert A. Special Unit Senator: RFK Assassination. New York: Random House 1970.
"How Many Conspiracies?" Minority of One, September 1968, pp. 9, 16.
"Humphrey vs. Kennedy: the Odds." U.S. News and World Report, 29 April 1968, pp. 28-30.
"Incredible Year of '68: Year of Shock." Life, 10 January 1969, pp. 30-37.
"Inside story of the latest Bobby-LBJ break." U.S. News and World Report, 1 April 1968, pp. 30-32.
Jansen, Godfrey. Why Robert Kennedy was Killed. New York: Third Press, 1970.
"June 5, 1968" (a poem). See, October 1968, pp. 12-13.
"[illegible] vs. Sirhan." Newsweek, 5 May 1969, pp. 34+.
Kaiser, Robert Blair. "Conversations in jail with Sirhan, a name Meaning Wolf." Life, 17 January 1969, pp. 20-25.
———. RFK Must Die. New York: Grove Press, 1970.
Kendall, John. "Kennedy Made Each of his 42 years count." Los Angeles Times, 7 June 1968, pp. 2, 16.
[illegible], Thomas B. "The Fire of your Love (June 5, 1968)." America, 15 June 1968, back cover.
"Kennedy Assassination: religious overtones." Christian Today, 21 June 1968, p. 39.
"Kennedy Candidacy." Christian Century, 27 March 1968, pp. 380+.

"The Kennedy Cause." New Republic, 15 June 1968, pp. 3-4.
"Kennedys Thank Nation for Providing them With Strength and Hope." New York Times, 16 June 1968, pp. 1, 34.
Kihss, Peter. "Suspect called calm and lucid...Sirhan describes himself as Jordanian born in Jerusalem." New York Times, 6 June 1968, pp. 1, 21.
"Like a father." Time, 21 March 1969, p. 17.
[illegible], Tom. "President sets Sunday as day for mourning." Los Angeles Times, 7 June 1968,
Lawrence, D. "Missing word; reprint." U.S. News and World Report, 17 June 1968, p. 100.
"Lessons of the Kennedy tragedy." U.S. News and World Report, 17 June 1968, pp. 37-38.

"Letter and the Law." Newsweek, 2 June 1969, p. 33.
"Letters to the editor." Ebony, June 1968, pp. 14+.
Lowell, Robert. "RFK; Poem." New Republic, 22 June 1968, p. 27.
Lyons, Louis M. "America Revolt: RFK." Massachusetts Review, Summer 1968, pp. 57
Martin, Dean. "Dean Martin talks about his drinking, the Mafia, Frank Sinatra, Wom Bobby Kennedy. Interview edited by Oriana Fallaci." Look, 26 December 19 pp. 78-85.
Mehdi, M.T. Kennedy and Sirhan: Why? New York: New World Press, 1968.
Moore, T. "A Bit of the Way with RFK." Ave Maria, 28 October 1967, pp. 6-9.
"Mother and son." Newsweek, 17 February 1969, p. 33.
Muggeridge, Malcolm. "Elevation of Senator R.F. Kennedy." Esquire, November 1968, pp. 118+.
Navasky, Victor. "Robert F. Kennedy, Martin L. King, J.E. Hoover – who did it to wh Atlantic, November 1970.
"New clues in RFK death: was there a plot?" U.S. News and World Report, 24 June 196 p. 36.
Newfield, Jack. "Kennedy Lays Out a Gut Campaign." Life, 29 March 1968, pp. 28-31.
"Notes and Comment." New Yorker, 15 June 1968, pp. 21-23.
———. New Yorker, 22 June 1968, p. 19.
O'Lessker, Karl. "Down the Primary Stretch, from Indiana to Oregon." Nation, 27 Ma 1968, pp. 682.
"Once Again, Once Again." Newsweek, 17 June 1968, pp. 20-40.
Osborne, John. "Nebraska Primary, the ifs, ands, and buts." New Republic, 18 May 1 pp. 7-9.
"Other Sirhan; testimony of prosecution's psychiatrist." Newsweek, 14 April 1969, p 44-45.
"Psychiatry on trial." National Review, 6 May 1969, pp. 427-428.
Reeves, Richard. "The Making of a Candidate 1968." New York Times Magazine, 31 Mar 1968, pp. 25-27.
Reich, Ken. "McCarthy Suspends Political Activities; Asks Prayer Vigil." Los Angel Times, 6 June 1968, p.B 18.
Reichley, A.J. "He's Running Himself Out of the Race." Fortune, March 1968, pp. 11
"RFK." Christian Century, 85 (1968), 807-808.
"RFK: The Bob Kennedy we knew." Look, June 1968, entire issue.
"RFK: the man, the dream, the tragedy." U.S. News and World Report, 17 June 1968, p 16-18.
Riesman, David. "McCarthy and Kennedy." New Republic, 13 April 1968, pp. 22-23.
"Robert F. Kennedy and the Negro." Ebony, July 1968, pp. 29-32.
Roberts, S.V. "Sirhan B. Sirhan literary negotiations." Esquire, November 1970, pp. 131-134+.
Rogers, Warren. "Bobby's Decision." Look, 16 April 1968, pp. 72-80.
Rogers, Warren and Stanley Tretick. "The Bob Kennedy we Knew." Look, 9 July 1968, 31-36.
Rovere, Richard H. "Letters from Washington." New Yorker, 15 June 1968, pp. 90-96.
Scheer, Robert. "The Night Bobby Died." Ramparts, 10 August 1968, pp. 56-58.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. "Why I am for Kennedy." New Republic, 18 May 1968, pp. 39-4
"Second thoughts on Bobby." Time, 21 June 1968, p. 48.
"Selectivity in Los Angeles." Time, 3 January 1969, p. 40.
Shihab, Aziz. Sirhan. San Antonio: Naylor Co., 1969.
"Shock of violence hits the campaign." Business Week, 8 June 1968, pp. 38-42.
"Sirhan guilty." Senior Scholastic, 2 May 1969, p. 19.
"Sirhan takes the stand." Newsweek, 17 March 1969, p. 37.
"Sirhan; tragedy of the absurd." Newsweek, 24 March 1969, p. 324.
"Sirhan's trance; testimony of psychiatrist." Newsweek, 7 April 1969, p. 37.
"Sirhan's Verdict." Time, 25 April 1969, pp. 21-22.
"Socking it to 'em: Travels with Bobby." Time, 5 April 1968, pp. 22-23.
Sorensen, Theodore C. "RFK: a Personal Memoir." Saturday Review, 22 June 1968, p. 19
Steinbecker, John. RFK: The Man, the Mysticism, the Murder. Los Angeles: Import Publishers, 1969.
"T.R.B. from Washington; who's guilty." New Republic, 15 June 1968, p. 2.
"Taking the oath." Newsweek, 25 August 1969, p. 42.
"Test case; responses to psychological tests." Newsweek, 7 April 1969, pp. 94-95.
"Three Assassinations." Minority of One, 10, no. 9 (1968), 13-16.
"Toward the Gas Chamber." Time, 2 May 1969, p. 19.
Townsend, Dorothy. "Witness Reports Girl said 'We Shot Him'." Los Angeles Times, 6 1968, p. 11.
"Tragedy in Los Angeles." America, 15 June 1968, p. 763.
"U.S. guilt in Assassinations, the talk and the facts." U.S. News and World Report

"Verdict on Sirhan." *Newsweek*, 28 April 1969, pp. 41+.
Weiss, P. and M. Mannes. "Reflections on a tragedy." *Seventeen*, August 1968, pp. 194-195.
"What was in Sirhan's mind?" *Time*, 24 January 1969, p. 54.
Weick, Paul R. "The Oregon Primary." *New Republic*, 3 June 1968, pp. 14-15.
"Win or lose, the Primary Players." *Life*, 7 June 1968, pp. 35-41.
Wise, David. "How Bobby Plans to Win It." *Saturday Evening Post*, 1 June 1968, pp. 23-27.
"Witnesses speak." *Newsweek*, 24 June 1968, pp. 26-27.
Yoakum, Robert. "Kennedy and McCarthy: 1965-1967 Voting Record." *New Republic*, 11 May 1968, pp. 23-27.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) FOIA IPS 76-382 [WEISBERG LITIGATION]

FROM: DC/E/G

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 1 MAR 78

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. E/Staff A				Cameron: I believe the requestor's inquiry could and should be satisfied with para 3 alone. And recommend deletion of the remaining part of the message on grounds - not relevant - privacy of others - internal procedures/processing - cryptos - name of CIA Station abroad. I agree
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE
2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. c/EUR/Staff A att: Mr. LaClair	1		
2. 4B-4406			
3. E/BC	Rtd 8 mar		✓
4. Eur/F	8 MAR 1978	8	
5. Carole Davidson E/Staff A			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT 28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE 2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE
2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. IPA/SCB AB 1907			h
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER: IPS-76-382

FROM: M. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION: 1595

DATE SENT: 28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE: 2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EA/Staff A att: Ray Smith.	28 FEB 1978		
2. 5D3113			
3. CEA/JAPAN	1 - MAR 1978		✓
4.			
5. EA/STA/EXO	1 - MAR 1978		
6. AC/EA/STA	1 MAR 1978		
7.			
8. EA/STA/EXO	1 MAR 1978		
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO: M. Stilson HT-3

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT 28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE 2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DCD/Staff A: att: Ruth Elliff			
2. 913 Key Bldg.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

This should be coordinated with FBI + State. Ruth

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material. (b)(3) (b)(1)

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO: H. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER

IPS-76-382

FROM:

H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION

1595

DATE SENT

28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE

2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EUR1/FOIA att: Mr. LaClair	1 [illegible]	[illegible]	✓
2. 4B-4406			
3. E/I	2/13/78		
4.			
5. E/Staff A			
6.			
7.			
8.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in re that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -

Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:

H. Stilson HT-3
1 D-4143

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal /Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-78-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HI-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
7 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE
10 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. EA/Staff/EXO att: M. Smith 5D-3115	8 - FEB 1978		
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7. EA/STA/EXO	15 FEB 1978		
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Thanks.

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will fol

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson
I-3 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal / Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER IPS-78-382

FROM: H. Stilson IP-3

EXTENSION 1505

DATE SENT 7 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE 16 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | **DATE** RECEIVED | FORWARDED | **OFFICER'S INITIALS** | **COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/AF/Staff A att: Mr. Foy
2. 3B-17-C
3. H. Stilson HT-3 014845

4. The documents may not be released.

RS Addis Ababa 2200 (IN 99685), 28 April 1968 identifies the source and does not pertain to James Earl Ray or Martin Luther King, or any known suspect, accomplice or associate. To release it would violate the privacy of another U.S. person.

RS The information contained in paras 1 and 3 of IN 00793, 30 April 1968 was acquired from a liaison source, the Nigerian Special Branch. Paragraph 2 identifies a source of intelligence and the information therein does not pertain to James Earl Ray, Martin Luther King, or any known suspect, accomplice or associate. To release the information would vidate the privacy of another U.S. person.

RS CSCI 316/01685-68 may not be released since it merely repeats the information contained in the two cables above, and the exemptions applied to them are equally (please turn over)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the materials for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Thanks,

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

RETURN TO: [illegible]

[illegible]

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/ Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
7 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE
10 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EUR/Staff A. 4B-4406	8 Feb 78		cl
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Done
cl

Thanks,

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson
HT-3 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) James Earl Ray

Harold Weisberg

REQUEST NUMBER 76-382

FROM: H. Stelson HT-3

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT 17 Feb 1978

SUSPENSE DATE 20 Feb 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Ray Smith 5D 3115	17 FEB 1978		
2.			
3. DC/EA/STA	17 FEB 1978	21 FEB 1978	
4.			
5. EA/STA/EXO	21 FEB 1978		
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please do a classification review (and downgrade where possible) the attached docs.

Thanks
Helen

RETURN TO: H. Stelson HT-1

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
7 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE
10 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. LA/Staff/B att. Mr. F Amer	8 Feb	9	
2. 3 C-34			
3.			
4. LA/Staff B att: Mr. F. Amer			
5. 3-C-34			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

These are the King documents

Thanks,

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson
HT-3 ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal/Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HF-5

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT 7 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE 10 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. NE/Staff IA Room 6 D 3113		9 Feb.	By
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the materi for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classificati reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stam with the classification revi stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Thanks.

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

RETURN TO: H. Stilson
HF-5 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ~~☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY~~ ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE
2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EUR/Staff A att: Mr. LaClair	1		
2. 4B-4406			
3. [redacted] E/SC			
4.			
5. E/Staff A			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

Do you approve of proposed sanitization? Pls return today (ASAP) 8 Mar Thanks

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material. OK

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Document that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletion indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal/Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT ~~7 February 1978~~

SUSPENSE DATE ~~10 February 1978~~

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. D e D Room 913 Key	2 Feb	21 Feb	
2.			
3. DDO\ISS\PIAG			
4. Attn: Helen			
5. 104127			
6.			
7. Both documents have to remain			
8. CONFIDENTIAL. Sanitized			
9. per (b)(1) + (b)(3)			
10. Also (b)(6) for 19 Feb 69 name			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the materi for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stampe with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Thanks,

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will foll

RETURN TO: H. Stilson HT-3 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

SECRET

10 JUL 1978

File Weisberg appeal (Martin Luther King James Earl Ray

Mr. Frank Underwood
Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts Branch
J. Edgar Hoover Building, Room 6958
10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20535:

Attention: Connie Fruitt

Gentlemen:

In responding to an FOIA litigation from Harold Weisberg (enclosure 1), we have surfaced reference to 46 documents which originated with your agency. Three of these documents are referred by listing only, and either first pages or full text copies of the remaining 43 documents are enclosed. This information is being forwarded to you for review and direct response to the requester.

We will advise the requester of this referral in our response, which we expect to complete in the near future.

Please note that the documents listed, and those of which just the first pages have been included, have not been reviewed to see if they contain CIA information. In the event that they do, we request that this material be coordinated with us before being released to the requester.

If you have any questions, please contact Karen Wolfe or Allie Falardeau, 351-5615, and refer to our request F76-382.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

Distribution:
Orig - Addse
1 - IPS Chrono
1 - IPS Subject (F-76-382) APPEAL w/attach DDO docs
1 1 - OGC (Launie Ziebell)
① - DDO/IMS/FPG/AL (Helen Stilson)

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED When Separated
From Enclosure

13-00000

SECRET P

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

14 MAY 1968

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Assassination of Martin Luther King

1. On 3 May 1968, an official Italian Intelligence Service provided this Agency's representative in Rome with the following information on one James RAY:

> A James RAY, born in Los Angeles on 8 March 1928 (father's name Oliver), arrived at San Gimignano, Siena, in March 1955 and registered as a student at Perugia. In 1956, RAY was confined at San Gimignano Hospital and in 1957, he was in Sant'Antonio de Fiesole Hospital. These confinements were for "osteomyelitical condition causing bone depression in the cranium, on right parietal temple region." RAY returned permanently to the United States in December 1967.

2. The Italian National Police and the Italian Intelligence Service have turned up no other information thus far. All Italian entry posts have RAY and his aliases on their watchlist.

3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation representative in Rome was advised of the information in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

CSCI 316/01763-68

REC-23 44 38861 3515

EX 109 6 MAY 16 1968

Jan 10, 78
This CSCI was treated as doc #250 in initial review.
BL

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

13-00000

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Rec 5/13/68

MURKIN

16 MAY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S.J. Papich

McGowan

SUBJECT : Investigation in Japan of Report on Suspicious Actions of Gerald Lee Richards, Originally Described as Resembling Suspected Assassin of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. Reference is made to the report concerning the above subject made by telephone to Mr. S.J. Papich at 0930 on 17 April 1968. Following is a full account of the investigation made in this case:

A. On 16 April 1968 a United States National Maritime Union official in Yokohama reported that one Gerald Lee Richards, who bore a general physical resemblance to the description given of the suspected assassin of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. had arrived in Japan about 15 April 1968 and requested a position aboard any ship going anywhere. Richards became agitated when asked for a contact address in Japan and refused to divulge his Japanese residence. The National Maritime Union official described Richards as 5' 10" tall, 155 pounds, with brown hair, a receding hairline on both sides, and a not very prominent scar two and one-half inches long traversing the center forehead, his most outstanding characteristic being a disconcerting, idiotic grin resembling a constant grimace. According to Richards' documents and statements, he was born 8 April 1937, applied for seaman's papers in San Pedro, California, 16 June 1964 and registered there as a United States National Maritime Union member on 21 February 1968 but never shipped out. His Social Security Number is 562-46-5078; his United States Coast Guard Number Z 2711-782.

cc defendants, CR
2258 ?

44-38861-3785

REC 11

14 MAY 22 1968

③

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

66 MAY 2 ? 1968

SECRET

D addressed as
doc. # 251 during
post-trial review

B. A subsequent check with the Japanese National Police Agency confirmed the biographic data supplied by the National Maritime Union official. A ward check indicated that Richards originally resided in Japan from 1963 to 1964 and married TAKAYAMA Michiko in 1963. Both Richards and his wife left Japan for the United States in 1964. Richards returned alone to Japan about 15 April 1968. His wife's address in the United States is listed as 160 Hosoi (phonetic) Street, Carpenteria, California, 93013.

C. A photograph of Richards obtained from the Japanese police was shown to the National Maritime Union official and identified by him as the individual in subparagraph 1A above who had applied for a seaman's berth. The photograph of Richards bears no apparent resemblance to photographs of suspected assassin James Earl Ray provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. The above information has been given to the Legal Attache of the United States Embassy in Tokyo.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-316/01774-68

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

NEW DOCUMENT RECORD

Instructions for Divisions and Staffs:
1. Fill in shaded areas only.
2. Additional comments should be written on back of form.

1

TYPE	YEAR	NUMBER	I/I	DOC. NO.
[✓ FPE]	75 76 77 78			

2

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (30 CHARACTERS)

CABLE
DISPATCH
[✓ MEMO]
REPORT

DAY	MONTH	YEAR
11	DEC	73

3

FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS)	TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS)
CIA - James Angleton	FBI

4

CLASS	WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS)	REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS)	DDO ?	DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS)
		FBI		CIR-316/03107-73

5

SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS)

Conference of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations

6

TYPE OF REVIEW	IAL	DATE OF REVIEW	DAY	MONTH	YEAR

7

Recommendations:

_____ A. Release in full text
__X__ B. Release in sanitized form
_____ C. Deny in toto
_____ D. Defer decision to coordinate with (Specify in Line 8)

_____ E. Sustain initial denial in toto
_____ F. Sustain initial release of of sanitized version
_____ G. Release additional information

8

DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS)	COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS)	NEW CLASS
	OS	

Walter J. Kowalski C/RA/I

SIGNATURE AND OFFICE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

9

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7C OF FOIA

J1 J1B J1C J1E J1F K1 OF PA

5B1 5B2 5B3 5B4 OF E.O. 11652

10

Exemptions are being claimed to protect the following:

_____	1. Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
_____	2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
_____	3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
_____	4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	5. Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	7. Location* of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	8. Location* of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
X	9. Name* of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
X	10. File number	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	11. Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	12. Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	13. Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
_____	14. Name* of an FBI agent	(b)(7)(c)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	15. FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	16. Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
_____	17. Does not pertain to request		
_____	18. Information from another Government agency		
_____	19. Other (Specify in Line 11)		

REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

	TYPE	YEAR	NUMBER	I/I	DOC. NO.	NEW DOCUMENT RECORD
1	[✓ FPE]	75 76 77 78				Instructions for Divisions and Staffs: 1. Fill in shaded areas only. 2. Additional comments should be written on back of form.

2 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (30 CHARACTERS)

CABLE
DISPATCH
[✓ MEMO]
REPORT

DAY	MONTH	YEAR
14	JAN	69

3 FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS): CIA

TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS): FBI

	CLASS	WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS)	REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS)	DDO ?	DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS)
4					CSCI-316/00108-69

5 SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS)

GARRISON and the Kennedy Assassination

	TYPE OF REVIEW	IAL	DATE OF REVIEW	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
6						

7 Recommendations:

_____ A. Release in full text
_____ B. Release in sanitized form
_____ C. Deny in toto
_____ D. Defer decision to coordinate with (Specify in Line 8)

_____ E. Sustain initial denial in toto
__X__ F. Sustain initial release of of sanitized version To FENSTERWALD
_____ G. Release additional information

	DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS)	COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS)	NEW CLASS
8			

Walter J. Kowalski CI/RA/1
SIGNATURE AND OFFICE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

9 EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7C OF FOIA

J1 J1B J1C J1E J1F K1 OF PA

5B1 5B2 5B3 5B4 OF E.O. 11652

10 Exemptions are being claimed to protect the following:

_____	1. Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
_____	2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
_____	3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
_____	4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	5. Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	7. Location* of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	8. Location* of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	9. Name* of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
_____	10. File number	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	11. Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	12. Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	13. Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
_____	14. Name* of an FBI agent	(b)(7)(c)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	15. FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	16. Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
_____	17. Does not pertain to request		
_____	18. Information from another Government agency		
_____	19. Other (Specify in Line 11)		

REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

NEW DOCUMENT RECORD

Instructions for Divisions and Staffs:
1. Fill in shaded areas only.
2. Additional comments should be written on back of form.

1

TYPE	YEAR	NUMBER	I/I	DOC. NO.
[✓ FPE]	75 76 77 78			

2

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (30 CHARACTERS)

CABLE
DISPATCH
[✓ MEMO]
REPORT

DAY	MONTH	YEAR
29	Nov	73

3

FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS): FBI - Mr. E.S. Miller

TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS): FBI - W.A. Branigan

4

CLASS	WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS)	REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS)	DDO ?	DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS)
		FBI		

5

SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS): Committee To Investigate Assassinations

6

TYPE OF REVIEW	IAL	DATE OF REVIEW	DAY	MONTH	YEAR

7

Recommendations:

___ A. Release in full text
[✓ B. Release in sanitized form]
___ C. Deny in toto
___ D. Defer decision to coordinate with (Specify in Line 8)

___ E. Sustain initial denial in toto
___ F. Sustain initial release of of sanitized version
___ G. Release additional information

8

DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS)	COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS)	NEW CLASS
	OS	

Walter J. Kowalski CI/RA/1
SIGNATURE AND OFFICE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

9

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7C OF FOIA
J1 J1B J1C J1E J1F K1 OF PA
5B1 5B2 5B3 5B4 OF E.O. 11652

10

Exemptions are being claimed to protect the following:

___	1. Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
___	2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
___	3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
___	4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	5. Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	7. Location* of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	8. Location* of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
X	9. Name* of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
___	10. File number	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	11. Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	12. Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	13. Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
___	14. Name* of an FBI agent	(b)(7)(c)	(j)(1)(b)
___	15. FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
___	16. Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
___	17. Does not pertain to request		
___	18. Information from another Government agency		
___	19. Other (Specify in Line 11)		

REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

319

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 319

Tab 1-52 contains Dispatch UFGA-29877 dated 11 Apr. 1968.

( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) __________ of ______.

recommended for but not sent to requester by IPS

(X) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) of FOIA.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______________________.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

I RECOMMEND:

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) __________ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______________________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______________________.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______________________ of ________.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______________________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______________________.

(X) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b) (3) of FOIA.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) __________ of ________.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under __________ of ________

The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
(X) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
(X) Pseudonym
(X) Cryptonyms
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

( ) maintained
( ) classified to ______________
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
(X) downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 01

13-00000

570

[redacted] TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - [redacted]

FILE NO - NONE

DATE - 11 ~~QT~~ APRIL 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF, [redacted]

INFO - CHIEF, [redacted] CHIEF, [redacted]

FROM - CHIEF [redacted]

SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE [redacted]

1. ~~QM~~ GRANMA /HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA/, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE - ''LAST MINUTE NEWS - MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS, LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE.''

2. ~~WM~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~X~~ APRIL, FRONT PAGE - ''TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHINGTON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED. SNIPERS CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE UNDER HEAVY GUARD.'' /FULL INFORMATION GIVEN /

3. ~~EH~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~X~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ''/WASHINGTON, 7 ~~U~~ APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS - AFP, FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AMX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING, URGING THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' //THE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTORCADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY.''

[redacted]

319

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 6 Nov 78

[redacted]

4. GRANMA, 8 ~~1~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - ARTICLE ENTITLED ''PRINCIPAL EGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.'', BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE AYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS - THE IOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING MONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE - CONGRESS OF RACIAL QUALITY /CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/, LACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT ATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE EACONS, AND ''THE U.S.''. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE ENTIONED AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE - NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE /NAACP/, NATIONAL RBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SCLC/.

5. ~~IM~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~I~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - '' ~~JJ~~ATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO LAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.''

6. ~~YM~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~I~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - '' ~~JJ~~RACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO ND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.''

7. ~~UM~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~I~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - '' ~~JJ~~THE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE.''

8. ~~IM~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~I~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO TRUGGLE.''

9. ~~OM~~ RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO /HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/, APRIL, 7, 8 ~~UWP- A.M.~~ AND 12 NOON - ''THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA F THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE O AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER ING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST ARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS F THE UNITED STATES.'' ''THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN AVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING, LL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES S TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS,

ID THAT THESE FLAMES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE
PRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH
INDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE
UNTRY.''

10. ~~QPM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL, REP P.M. - '' ~~JJ~~STOKELY CARMICHAEL,
EADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID - ' ~~J~~WE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH
IFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE
ITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION.'
ARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS
RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE
IOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S
EATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN
ITIES.''

11. ~~QQM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL, 5 ~~X~~ P.M. ~~A~~ — '' ~~JJ~~HIS /KING'S/ DEATH SHOWS
NCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY
IOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.''

12. ~~QWM~~ RADIO PROGRESO, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL, 550 ~~XXP~~ P.M. ~~A~~ — '' ~~JJ~~CARMICHAEL SAID
URING A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT 'A SERIOUS MISTAKE HAS BEEN MADE
N ASSASSINATING DR. KING BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF A MOVE-
ENT WHICH URGED THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BURN
HE CITIES, NOT TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL
E NECESSARY TO START AN ALL-OUT REVOLUTION.' CARMICHAEL ADDED -
SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 35 CITIES WHERE THERE HAVE
EEN FIRES, SHOOTING, FIGHTING, AND DEATHS AS A RESULT OF THE CRIME
OMMITTED AGAINST DR. KING. NATURALLY, OTHER SIMILAR THINGS WILL
AKE PLACE. GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGH THE CITIES
ECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT WE CANNOT OPENLY REBEL AGAINST
HE POLICE.' STOKELY CARMICHAEL ENDED THE INTERVIEW BY SENDING
FFECTIONATE REGARDS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN PEOPLE AND THEIR
EADER, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.''

13. RADIO HABANA, ~~1~~ 5 APRIL, ~~U~~ 7 P.M. A JJJUAN /MARI/ BRAS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO RICO, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE INTERVIEW - ~~J~~DR. LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRECIPITATE THE REBELLION OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ALL THE ABUSES OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT.' ~~JJ~~''

14. ~~QRM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, ~~U~~ 7 P.M. ~~A~~ ~~JJ~~THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OF THE ASIAN, AFRICAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION /AALAPSO/ SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE SNCC ON THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING.'' ''THE AALAPSO'S MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PACIFIST ORGANIZATION ENDS AS FOLLOWS A ~~J~~WE BEG YOU TO EXPRESS TO THE FAMILY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING AND TO ALL AFRO-AMERICANS OUR DEEPEST SORROW OVER HIS DEATH, OUR DECISION TO SUPPORT YOUR STRUGGLE, AND OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT THIS TERRIBLE CRIME--WHICH SHOWS US THAT ARMED REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IS THE ONLY WAY OF ACHIEVING GENUINE LIBERATION--WILL HELP STRENGTHEN THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFRO-AMERICAN PEOPLE WHICH IS ALREADY AIMED IN THE DIRECTION OF A TOTAL CONFRONTATION.' ~~JJ~~''

15. ~~QTM~~ RADIO HABANA, ~~1~~ 5 APRIL, ~~U~~ 7 P.M. ~~A~~ ~~JJ~~AGUSTIN /GONZALEZ/ ARTINEZ, BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF CUBA, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - ~~J~~MAY THE TRAGIC DISAPPEARANCE F THIS GREAT LEADER AT LEAST HELP TO SPEED UP THE ARRIVAL OF THE DAY HEN EVERY MAN IN HIS NATION AND IN ALL OTHER NATIONS WILL BE TREATED ITH THE RESPECT WHICH IS DUE TO THEM AS HUMAN BEINGS.' ~~JJ~~''

16 ~~QYM~~ RADIO HABANA, ~~1~~ 5 APRIL, ~~U~~ 7 P.M. ~~A~~ JJREVEREND RAFAEL PASTOR, F THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN LUYANO, HAVANA, MADE THE FOLLOWING TATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - ~~J~~HIS BROTHERS, THE AMERICAN EGROES, WILL LEARN MUCH FROM HIS DEATH. WE CAN ALMOST ASSURE THAT HEY, THE AMERICAN NEGROES WHOSE DIGNITY AND DECORUM HAS BEEN RUSHED, WILL COME BACK TO LIFE AFTER CENTURIES OF LETHARGY AND

ILL RISE FROM THEIR GRAVES AND FORM AN INVINCIBLE ARMY.' ~~JJ~~ ''

11. ~~QUM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL, ~~X~~ 6 P.M. ~~X~~ – EDITORIAL COMMENTS RITICIZING THE NON-VIOLENT LINE WHICH WAS ADVOCATED BY LUTHER KING, AYING THAT THIS LINE WAS INOPERATIVE. ~~JJ~~ ''MARTIN LUTHER KING DID NOT REACH VIOLENCE BUT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE. HE DID NOT NLEASH VIOLENCE BUT VIOLENCE MOWED HIM DOWN.''

15. ~~QIM~~ RADIO HABANA, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL 68, ~~TEF~~ 530 P.M. ~~X~~ – ''JOHNSON POSTPONED IS TRIP. HE CALLED THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS--WHO WERE MORE OR ESS UNDER CONTROL--TO GO TO THE WHITE HOUSE. JOHNSON APPEARED ON ELEVISION. HE EXPRESSED HIS ANGUISH AND HIS SORROW. HE MADE INSPIRED COMMENTS ABOUT MARTIN LUTHER KING. THESE ACTIONS AND THESE ORDS HIDE FEAR OVER THE WAVE OF JUST VIOLENCE WHICH IS STARTING TO PREAD THROUGH THE UNITED STATES.'' ~~JJ~~ ''AT A TIME WHEN COMPLEX INTER-ATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE UNDERWAY, UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS, THIS NEW CRIME WIDENS THE CHASM WHICH DIVIDES THE PEOPLE OF THE NITED STATES AND INCITES THE PEOPLE TO PROMOTE DISTURBANCES WHOSE AR-REACHING EFFECTS ARE HARD TO PREDICT.'' ~~JJ~~ ''THE ASSASSINATION OF ARTIN LUTHER KING CONFIRMS THAT THE VIOLENCE OF IMPERIALIST RACISTS IS ONLY ANSWERED EFFECTIVELY WITH THE VIOLENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY TRUGGLE.''

[redacted]

ISTRIBUTION
IA TELEPOUCH
A [redacted]
A [redacted]
A [redacted]

T

57D

TELEPOUCH

DISP NO -

FILE NO -

DATE - ~~QQ~~ 11 APRIL 1968

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO -

INFO -

FROM -

SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN PREPARED

~~QM~~ 1. GRANMA /HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA/, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE - ''LAST MINUTE NEWS - MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS, LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE.''

~~WM~~ 2. GRANMA, ~~X~~ 8 APRIL, FRONT PAGE - ''TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHINGTON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED. SNIPERS CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE UNDER HEAVY GUARD.'' /FULL INFORMATION GIVEN./

~~EM~~ 3 GRANMA, ~~X~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ''/WASHINGTON, ~~U~~ 7 APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS - AFP, FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AMX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING, URGING THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ~~//~~ ''THE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTORCADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY.''

Previously
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 10 AUG 1993

4. GRANMA, 8 ~~1~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - ARTICLE ENTITLED ''PRINCIPAL NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.'', BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS - THE VIOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE - CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/, BLACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT PATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE DEACONS, AND ''THE U.S.''. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE MENTIONED AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE - NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE /NAACP/, NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE /SCLC/.

5. ~~1M~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~1~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - '' ~~JJ~~ATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO BLAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.''

6. ~~XM~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~1~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - '' ~~JJ~~RACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO AND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.''

7. ~~UM~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~1~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - '' ~~JJ~~THE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE.''

8. ~~1M~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~1~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO STRUGGLE.''

9. ~~OM~~ RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO /HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/, 6 APRIL, 7:0 ~~UWP~~ A.M. AND 12 NOON - ''THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER KING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST MARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS OF THE UNITED STATES.'' ''THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN HAVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING, ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS,

AND THAT THESE FLAMES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE OPPRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HINDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.''

10, ~~QPM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL, REP P.M. - " ~~44~~STOKELY CARMICHAEL, LEADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID - ' ~~/~~WE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH RIFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION.' CARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS A RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S DEATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN CITIES.''

11, ~~QGM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL, 5 ~~X~~ P.M. — ~~X~~ " ~~J0~~HIS /KING'S/ DEATH SHOWS ONCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY VIOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.''

12, ~~QWM~~ RADIO PROGRESO, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL, 550 ~~XXP~~ P.M. — ~~X~~ " ~~JJ~~CARMICHAEL SAID DURING A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT 'A SERIOUS MISTAKE HAS BEEN MADE IN ASSASSINATING DR. KING BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF A MOVEMENT WHICH URGED THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BURN THE CITIES, NOT TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO START AN ALL-OUT REVOLUTION.' CARMICHAEL ADDED - 'SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 35 CITIES WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN FIRES, SHOOTING, FIGHTING, AND DEATHS AS A RESULT OF THE CRIME COMMITTED AGAINST DR. KING. NATURALLY, OTHER SIMILAR THINGS WILL TAKE PLACE. GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGH THE CITIES BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT WE CANNOT OPENLY REBEL AGAINST THE POLICE.' STOKELY CARMICHAEL ENDED THE INTERVIEW BY SENDING AFFECTIONATE REGARDS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADER, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.''

13. RADIO HABANA, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL, ~~X~~ 7 P.M. ~~A~~ — ~~JJ~~ '' JUAN /MARI/ BRAS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO RICO, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE INTERVIEW - ~~J~~ 'DR. LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRECIPITATE THE REBELLION OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ALL THE ABUSES OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT.' ~~JJ~~ ''

~~GKM~~ 14. RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, ~~X~~ 7 P.M. ~~A~~ — ~~JJ~~ '' THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OF THE ASIAN, AFRICAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION /AALAPSO/ SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE SNCC ON THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING.'' ''THE AALAPSO'S MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PACIFIST ORGANIZATION ENDS AS FOLLOWS A ~~J~~ 'WE BEG YOU TO EXPRESS TO THE FAMILY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING AND TO ALL AFRO-AMERICANS OUR DEEPEST SORROW OVER HIS DEATH, OUR DECISION TO SUPPORT YOUR STRUGGLE, AND OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT THIS TERRIBLE CRIME--WHICH SHOWS US THAT ARMED REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IS THE ONLY WAY OF ACHIEVING GENUINE LIBERATION--WILL HELP STRENGTHEN THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFRO-AMERICAN PEOPLE WHICH IS ALREADY AIMED IN THE DIRECTION OF A TOTAL CONFRONTATION.' ~~JJ~~ ''

~~GTM~~ 15. RADIO HABANA, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL, ~~X~~ 7 P.M. ~~A~~ — ~~JJ~~ '' AGUSTIN /GONZALEZ/ MARTINEZ, BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF CUBA, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - ~~J~~ 'MAY THE TRAGIC DISAPPEARANCE OF THIS GREAT LEADER AT LEAST HELP TO SPEED UP THE ARRIVAL OF THE DAY WHEN EVERY MAN IN HIS NATION AND IN ALL OTHER NATIONS WILL BE TREATED WITH THE RESPECT WHICH IS DUE TO THEM AS HUMAN BEINGS.' ~~JJ~~ ''

~~GXM~~ 16 RADIO HABANA, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL, ~~X~~ 7 P.M. ~~A~~ — ~~JJ~~ '' REVEREND RAFAEL PASTOR, OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN LUYANO, HAVANA, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - ~~J~~ 'HIS BROTHERS, THE AMERICAN NEGROES, WILL LEARN MUCH FROM HIS DEATH. WE CAN ALMOST ASSURE THAT THEY, THE AMERICAN NEGROES WHOSE DIGNITY AND DECORUM HAS BEEN CRUSHED, WILL COME BACK TO LIFE AFTER CENTURIES OF LETHARGY AND

WILL RISE FROM THEIR GRAVES AND FORM AN INVINCIBLE ARMY.' '' ~~JJ~~

17. ~~QUH~~ RADIO LIBERACION, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL, 6 ~~X~~ P.M. – ~~X~~ EDITORIAL COMMENTS CRITICIZING THE NON-VIOLENT LINE WHICH WAS ADVOCATED BY LUTHER KING, SAYING THAT THIS LINE WAS INOPERATIVE. '' ~~XX~~MARTIN LUTHER KING DID NOT PREACH VIOLENCE BUT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE. HE DID NOT UNLEASH VIOLENCE BUT VIOLENCE MOWED HIM DOWN.''

18. ~~QIH~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL 68, 530 ~~XXX~~ P.M. – ~~X~~ ''JOHNSON POSTPONED HIS TRIP. HE CALLED THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS--WHO WERE MORE OR LESS UNDER CONTROL--TO GO TO THE WHITE HOUSE. JOHNSON APPEARED ON TELEVISION. HE EXPRESSED HIS ANGUISH AND HIS SORROW. HE MADE INSPIRED COMMENTS ABOUT MARTIN LUTHER KING. THESE ACTIONS AND THESE WORDS HIDE FEAR OVER THE WAVE OF JUST VIOLENCE WHICH IS STARTING TO SPREAD THROUGH THE UNITED STATES.'' '' ~~XX~~AT A TIME WHEN COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE UNDERWAY, UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS, THIS NEW CRIME WIDENS THE CHASM WHICH DIVIDES THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND INCITES THE PEOPLE TO PROMOTE DISTURBANCES WHOSE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS ARE HARD TO PREDICT.'' '' ~~XX~~THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING CONFIRMS THAT THE VIOLENCE OF IMPERIALIST RACISTS IS ONLY ANSWERED EFFECTIVELY WITH THE VIOLENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE.''

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

.570

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~ TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-29877

FILE NO - NONE

DATE - ~~00~~ 11 APRIL 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF, WH DIVISION

INFO - CHIEF, WH/COG - CHIEF, WOLIME

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, 5-8 APRIL 1968

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE AMOTS-

~~QM~~ 1. GRANMA /HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA/, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE - ''LAST MINUTE NEWS - MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS, LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE.''

~~WM~~ 2. GRANMA, ~~X~~ X APRIL, FRONT PAGE - ''TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHINGTON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED. SNIPERS CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE UNDER HEAVY GUARD.'' /FULL INFORMATION GIVEN/

~~EM~~ 3. GRANMA, ~~X~~ 1 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ''/WASHINGTON, ~~U~~ 7 APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS - AFP, FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AMX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING, URGING THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ~~//~~ ''THE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTORCADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY.''

TELEPOUCH

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 009560 & 0012913
date 3 March 1978

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 3 Mar 78
2 IMPDET CL BY 009560 &
0012913

FULL TEXT COPY -- DO NOT RELEASE

52

4. GRANMA, 1 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ARTICLE ENTITLED ''PRINCIPAL EGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.'', BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE AYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS - THE IOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING MONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE - CONGRESS OF RACIAL QUALITY /CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/, LACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT ATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE EACONS, AND ''THE U.S.''. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE ENTIONED AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE - NATIONAL ASSOIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE /NAACP/, NATIONAL RBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SCLC/.

5. ~~IM~~ GRANMA, 1 APRIL, LAST PAGE - JJATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO LAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.''

6. ~~IM~~ GRANMA, 1 APRIL, LAST PAGE - JJRACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO ND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.''

7. ~~IM~~ GRANMA, 1 APRIL, LAST PAGE - JJTHE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE.''

8. ~~IM~~ GRANMA, 1 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO TRUGGLE.''

9. ~~OM~~ RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO /HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/, APRIL, UWP- A.M. AND 12 NOON - ''THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA F THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE O AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER ING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST ARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS F THE UNITED STATES.'' ''THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN AVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING, LL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES S TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS,

AND THAT THESE FLAMES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE OPPRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HINDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.''

10. ~~QPM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, 5 ~~T~~ APRIL, REP P.M. - ''STOKELY CARMICHAEL, LEADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID - 'WE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH RIFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION.' CARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS A RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S DEATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN CITIES.''

11. ~~QCM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 ~~T~~ APRIL, 5 ~~T~~ P.M. - ''HIS /KING'S/ DEATH SHOWS ONCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY VIOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.''

12. ~~QWM~~ RADIO PROGRESO, 5 ~~T~~ APRIL, 550 ~~TTP~~ P.M. - ''CARMICHAEL SAID DURING A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT 'A SERIOUS MISTAKE HAS BEEN MADE IN ASSASSINATING DR. KING BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF A MOVEMENT WHICH URGED THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BURN THE CITIES, NOT TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO START AN ALL-OUT REVOLUTION.' CARMICHAEL ADDED - 'SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 35 CITIES WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN FIRES, SHOOTING, FIGHTING, AND DEATHS AS A RESULT OF THE CRIME COMMITTED AGAINST DR. KING. NATURALLY, OTHER SIMILAR THINGS WILL AKE PLACE. GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGH THE CITIES BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT WE CANNOT OPENLY REBEL AGAINST HE POLICE.' STOKELY CARMICHAEL ENDED THE INTERVIEW BY SENDING AFFECTIONATE REGARDS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADER, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.''

13. RADIO HABANA, 5 T APRIL, 7 U P.M. A JJJUAN /MARI/ BRAS, ECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO ICO, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE NTERVIEW - DR. LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRECIPITATE THE REBELLION OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES GAINST ALL THE ABUSES OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT.' JJ

14. ~~QRM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 U P.M. A JJTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT F THE ASIAN, AFRICAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANI- ATION /AALAPSO/ SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE SNCC ON THE SSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING.'' ''THE AALAPSO'S MESSAGE TO THE MERICAN PACIFIST ORGANIZATION ENDS AS FOLLOWS A WE BEG YOU TO XPRESS TO THE FAMILY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING AND TO ALL AFRO-AMERICANS UR DEEPEST SORROW OVER HIS DEATH, OUR DECISION TO SUPPORT YOUR TRUGGLE, AND OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT THIS TERRIBLE CRIME--WHICH HOWS US THAT ARMED REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IS THE ONLY WAY OF ACHIEV- NG GENUINE LIBERATION--WILL HELP STRENGTHEN THE STRUGGLE OF THE FRO-AMERICAN PEOPLE WHICH IS ALREADY AIMED IN THE DIRECTION OF A OTAL CONFRONTATION.' JJ

15. ~~QTM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 T APRIL, 7 U P.M. A JJAGUSTIN /GONZALEZ/ ARTINEZ, BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF CUBA, MADE THE FOLLOWING TATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - MAY THE TRAGIC DISAPPEARANCE F THIS GREAT LEADER AT LEAST HELP TO SPEED UP THE ARRIVAL OF THE DAY HEN EVERY MAN IN HIS NATION AND IN ALL OTHER NATIONS WILL BE TREATED ITH THE RESPECT WHICH IS DUE TO THEM AS HUMAN BEINGS.' JJ

16. ~~QYM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 T APRIL, 7 U P.M. A JJREVEREND RAFAEL PASTOR, F THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN LUYANO, HAVANA, MADE THE FOLLOWING TATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - HIS BROTHERS, THE AMERICAN EGROES, WILL LEARN MUCH FROM HIS DEATH. WE CAN ALMOST ASSURE THAT HEY, THE AMERICAN NEGROES WHOSE DIGNITY AND DECORUM HAS BEEN RUSHED, WILL COME BACK TO LIFE AFTER CENTURIES OF LETHARGY AND

WILL RISE FROM THEIR GRAVES AND FORM AN INVINCIBLE ARMY.' ~~JJ~~ ''

17. ~~QUM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL, 6 ~~X~~ P.M. ~~A~~ – EDITORIAL COMMENTS CRITICIZING THE NON-VIOLENT LINE WHICH WAS ADVOCATED BY LUTHER KING, SAYING THAT THIS LINE WAS INOPERATIVE. '' ~~JJ~~MARTIN LUTHER KING DID NOT PREACH VIOLENCE BUT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE. HE DID NOT UNLEASH VIOLENCE BUT VIOLENCE MOWED HIM DOWN.''

18. ~~QIM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL 68, 530 ~~TEP~~ P.M. ~~A~~ – ''JOHNSON POSTPONED HIS TRIP. HE CALLED THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS--WHO WERE MORE OR LESS UNDER CONTROL--TO GO TO THE WHITE HOUSE. JOHNSON APPEARED ON TELEVISION. HE EXPRESSED HIS ANGUISH AND HIS SORROW. HE MADE INSPIRED COMMENTS ABOUT MARTIN LUTHER KING. THESE ACTIONS AND THESE WORDS HIDE FEAR OVER THE WAVE OF JUST VIOLENCE WHICH IS STARTING TO SPREAD THROUGH THE UNITED STATES.'' '' ~~JJ~~AT A TIME WHEN COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE UNDERWAY, UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS, THIS NEW CRIME WIDENS THE CHASM WHICH DIVIDES THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND INCITES THE PEOPLE TO PROMOTE DISTURBANCES WHOSE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS ARE HARD TO PREDICT.'' '' ~~JJ~~THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING CONFIRMS THAT THE VIOLENCE OF IMPERIALIST RACISTS IS ONLY ANSWERED EFFECTIVELY WITH THE VIOLENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE.''

MARK F. EFFIELD

DISTRIBUTION
VIA TELEPOUCH
3 A C/WHD
2 A C/WH/COG
2 A C/WOLIME

BT

13-00000

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 320

ab A-51 contains DISPATCH UFGA-29884 dated 11 April 1968.

) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________

✓) Segregable portions Recommended for previously released; but not sent to requester by IPS excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) of FOIA.

) Located during the DDO appeals review.

) Referred to DDO for review by ________________.

urther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of _____.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

X) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b)(3) of FOIA.

) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________.

) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

) Information from a foreign liaison service
) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
) Information which would/could identify the source
) Information pertaining to a source
) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
) Location of CIA overseas installation
✓ Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
) Name of CIA employee
X) File number
X) Pseudonym
X) Cryptonyms
X) Internal organizational data
) Name of FBI agent
) FBI file number
) Privacy of other individual
) OTHER

OMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

uring the DDO classification review, this document which was marked
s SECRET was:

) maintained
) classified to ________
) declassified
desensitized
X downgraded to Confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

13-00000

3P

[redacted] TELEPOUCH

ISP NO - [redacted]

ILE NO - NONE

ATE - 11 QQ APRIL 1968

NDEXING - NONE

ICROFILM - NONE

O - CHIEF, [redacted]

INFO - CHIEF, [redacted] CHIEF, [redacted]

ROM - [redacted]

UBJECT - O SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IAO APRIL 1968

EFERENCE - [redacted]

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IN ADDITION TO THE SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION TRANSMITTED IN REFERENCE, THE OLLOWING SUMMARY FOR 8-9 APRIL HAS BEEN FURNISHED BY THE [redacted]

GM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE ONE - JJMOBILIZATION OF 55,000 ROOPS TO REPRESS THE NEGROES'' A THE ARTICLE REPORTED ALL THE ISTURBANCES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE EATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

WM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJWITH THE ASSASSINATION OF ARTIN LUTHER KING THE IDEOLOGY OF NON-VIOLENCE HAS DIED'' A AN NTERVIEW WITH FLOYD MCKISSICK, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE ONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/. JJTHIS SIMPLY MEANS THAT ON-VIOLENCE HAS CEASED AS A MEANS OF FIGHTING. THE PEOPLE ANNOT BE TAUGHT TO BE NON-VIOLENT WHILE WE ARE INVOLVED IN VIOLENT WAR IN VIETNAM. NON-VIOLENCE CANNOT BE PREACHED TO HE BLACK PEOPLE WHO HAVE TO FACE VIOLENCE EVERY DAY ON THE TREETS OF THIS COUNTRY.'' THIS WAS SAID IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSAION BETWEEN RADIO HABANA AND FLOYD MCKISSICK. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE OSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSASSINATION OF KING, MCKISSICK RELIED - JJI REPEAT THAT WE ARE MAKING NO PREDICTIONS, BUT THE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 6 March 1978

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

AMERICAN NEGRO IS NOT WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE IMPASSIBLY THE ASSASSINATION OF OUR LEADERS, OUR HEROES, AND OUR PEOPLE.''

EM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A ARTICLE BY JUAN MARRERO ENTITLED, JJTHE AMERICAN NEGROES ARE WRITING THEIR FINEST PAGE OF HEROISM.'' JJAGAINST ALL THAT AND MUCH MORE, THE NEGROES ROSE UP TODAY IN MORE THAN SIXTY CITIES. AND IT IS LOGICAL TO EXPECT NEW PAGES OF HEROISM. STOKELY CARMICHAEL, THE NEGRO LEADER, GAVE THIS WARNING ONE DAY AFTER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING - JWHAT HAPPENED ON THE NIGHT WE LEARNED OF THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING IS NOTHING COMPARED TO WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN.' JJ

RM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJTHE WIDOW OF LUTHER KING HEADS THE MARCH IN MEMPHIS.'' THE ARTICLE TELLS ABOUT THE MARCH AND SHOWS PHOTOGRAPHS OF IT.

TM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /755 A.M./ A JJA TENSE CALM REIGNS IN THE U.S. BUT IT IS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS EVENTS. NATIONAL MOURNING DECREED BY LYNDON JOHNSON FOR YESTERDAY, U APRIL, MARKS A LESSENING OF DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO START UP AGAIN AT ANY MOMENT.''

YM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /955 A.M./ A JJ JFORWARD WITH BLACK POWER UNTIL CAPITALIST MISERY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF HUMAN INJUSTICE, IS OVERTHROWN' SAID THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF CHILE IN A CABLEGRAM SENT TO THE AMERICAN NEGRO LEADER, STOKELY CARMICHAEL, ON THE OCCASION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.''

UM RADIO LIBERACION, I APRIL /1230 P.M./ A THIS NEWSCAST REFERS TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH 200 LATIN AMERICAN, ASIAN, AND AFRICAN STUDENTS WERE SAID TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN WARSAW, POLAND, AS A PROTEST OVER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

[redacted]

DISTRIBUTION

13-00000

[redacted] TELEPOUCH [redacted] PAGE THREE

VIA TELEPOUCH

3 A [redacted]

2 A [redacted]

2 A [redacted]

[redacted] TELEPOUCH [redacted] PAGE THREE

BT

13-00000

3P

TELEPOUCH

DISP NO -

FILE NO -

DATE - 11 00 APRIL 1968

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO -

INFO -

FROM -

SUBJECT 0 SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 8-9 1A0 APRIL 1968

REFERENCE -

IN ADDITION TO THE SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION TRANSMITTED IN REFERENCE, THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY FOR 8-9 APRIL HAS BEEN FURNISHED

QM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE ONE - JJMOBILIZATION OF 55,000 TROOPS TO REPRESS THE NEGROES'' A THE ARTICLE REPORTED ALL THE DISTURBANCES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

WM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJWITH THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING THE IDEOLOGY OF NON-VIOLENCE HAS DIED'' A AN INTERVIEW WITH FLOYD MCKISSICK, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/. JJTHIS SIMPLY MEANS THAT NON-VIOLENCE HAS CEASED AS A MEANS OF FIGHTING. THE PEOPLE CANNOT BE TAUGHT TO BE NON-VIOLENT WHILE WE ARE INVOLVED IN A VIOLENT WAR IN VIETNAM. NON-VIOLENCE CANNOT BE PREACHED TO THE BLACK PEOPLE WHO HAVE TO FACE VIOLENCE EVERY DAY ON THE STREETS OF THIS COUNTRY.'' THIS WAS SAID IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RADIO HABANA AND FLOYD MCKISSICK. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSASSINATION OF KING, MCKISSICK REPLIED - JJI REPEAT THAT WE ARE MAKING NO PREDICTIONS, BUT THE

57

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
19 AUG 1976

AMERICAN NEGRO IS NOT WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE IMPASSIBLY THE ASSASSINATION OF OUR LEADERS, OUR HEROES, AND OUR PEOPLE.''

EM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE 3 A ARTICLE BY JUAN MARRERO ENTITLED, JJTHE AMERICAN NEGROES ARE WRITING THEIR FINEST PAGE OF HEROISM.'' JJAGAINST ALL THAT AND MUCH MORE, THE NEGROES ROSE UP TODAY IN MORE THAN SIXTY CITIES. AND IT IS LOGICAL TO EXPECT NEW PAGES OF HEROISM. STOKELY CARMICHAEL, THE NEGRO LEADER, GAVE THIS WARNING ONE DAY AFTER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING - JWHAT HAPPENED ON THE NIGHT WE LEARNED OF THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING IS NOTHING COMPARED TO WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN.' JJ

RM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJTHE WIDOW OF LUTHER KING HEADS THE MARCH IN MEMPHIS.'' THE ARTICLE TELLS ABOUT THE MARCH AND SHOWS PHOTOGRAPHS OF IT.

TM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /755 A.M./ A JJA TENSE CALM REIGNS IN THE U.S. BUT IT IS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS EVENTS. NATIONAL MOURNING DECREED BY LYNDON JOHNSON FOR YESTERDAY, U APRIL, MARKS A LESSENING OF DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO START UP AGAIN AT ANY MOMENT.''

YM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /955 A.M./ A JJ JFORWARD WITH BLACK POWER UNTIL CAPITALIST MISERY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF HUMAN INJUSTICE, IS OVERTHROWN' SAID THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF CHILE IN A CABLEGRAM SENT TO THE AMERICAN NEGRO LEADER, STOKELY CARMICHAEL, ON THE OCCASION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.''

UM RADIO LIBERACION, I APRIL /1230 P.M./ A THIS NEWSCAST REFERS TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH 200 LATIN AMERICAN, ASIAN, AND AFRICAN STUDENTS WERE SAID TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN WARSAW, POLAND, AS A PROTEST OVER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

13-00000

TELEPOUCH PAGE THREE

VIA TELEPOUCH

TELEPOUCH PAGE THREE

3P

ECRET TELEPOUCH
CONFIDENTIAL

ISP NO - UFGA-29884

ILE NO - NONE

ATE - 11 QQ APRIL 1968

NDEXING - NONE

ICROFILM - NONE

O - CHIEF, WH DIVISION

NFO - CHIEF, WH/COG - CHIEF, WOLIME

ROM - COS, JMWAVE

UBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IAO APRIL 1968

EFERENCE - UFGA-29877

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IN ADDITION TO THE SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION TRANSMITTED IN REFERENCE, THE OLLOWING SUMMARY FOR 8-9 APRIL HAS BEEN FURNISHED BY THE AMOTS -

QM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE ONE - JJMOBILIZATION OF 55,000 ROOPS TO REPRESS THE NEGROES'' A THE ARTICLE REPORTED ALL THE ISTURBANCES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE EATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

WM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJWITH THE ASSASSINATION OF ARTIN LUTHER KING THE IDEOLOGY OF NON-VIOLENCE HAS DIED'' A AN INTERVIEW WITH FLOYD MCKISSICK, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE ONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/. JJTHIS SIMPLY MEANS THAT ON-VIOLENCE HAS CEASED AS A MEANS OF FIGHTING. THE PEOPLE ANNOT BE TAUGHT TO BE NON-VIOLENT WHILE WE ARE INVOLVED IN VIOLENT WAR IN VIETNAM. NON-VIOLENCE CANNOT BE PREACHED TO HE BLACK PEOPLE WHO HAVE TO FACE VIOLENCE EVERY DAY ON THE TREETS OF THIS COUNTRY.'' THIS WAS SAID IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RADIO HABANA AND FLOYD MCKISSICK. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE OSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSASSINATION OF KING, MCKISSICK RE- LIED - JJI REPEAT THAT WE ARE MAKING NO PREDICTIONS, BUT THE

CONFIDENTIAL
ECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29884 PAGE ONE

CONFIDENTIAL
Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 0075804 012903
date 2 Mar 1978

Mar 2, 78
0075804
012903

19-4-105

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

CONFIDENTIAL

AMERICAN NEGRO IS NOT WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE IMPASSIBLY THE ASSASSINATION OF OUR LEADERS, OUR HEROES, AND OUR PEOPLE.''

EM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A ARTICLE BY JUAN MARRERO ENTITLED, JJTHE AMERICAN NEGROES ARE WRITING THEIR FINEST PAGE OF HEROISM.'' JJAGAINST ALL THAT AND MUCH MORE, THE NEGROES ROSE UP TODAY IN MORE THAN SIXTY CITIES. AND IT IS LOGICAL TO EXPECT NEW PAGES OF HEROISM. STOKELY CARMICHAEL, THE NEGRO LEADER, GAVE THIS WARNING ONE DAY AFTER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING - JWHAT HAPPENED ON THE NIGHT WE LEARNED OF THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING IS NOTHING COMPARED TO WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN.' JJ

RM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJTHE WIDOW OF LUTHER KING HEADS THE MARCH IN MEMPHIS.'' THE ARTICLE TELLS ABOUT THE MARCH AND SHOWS PHOTOGRAPHS OF IT.

TM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /755 A.M./ A JJA TENSE CALM REIGNS IN THE U.S. BUT IT IS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS EVENTS. NATIONAL MOURNING DECREED BY LYNDON JOHNSON FOR YESTERDAY, U APRIL, MARKS A LESSENING OF DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO START UP AGAIN AT ANY MOMENT.''

YM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /955 A.M./ A JJ JFORWARD WITH BLACK POWER UNTIL CAPITALIST MISERY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF HUMAN INJUSTICE, IS OVERTHROWN' SAID THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF CHILE IN A CABLEGRAM SENT TO THE AMERICAN NEGRO LEADER, STOKELY CARMICHAEL, ON THE OCCASION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.''

UM RADIO LIBERACION, I APRIL /1230 P.M./ A THIS NEWSCAST REFERS TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH 200 LATIN AMERICAN, ASIAN, AND AFRICAN STUDENTS WERE SAID TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN WARSAW, POLAND, AS A PROTEST OVER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

MARK F. EFFIELD

DISTRIBUTION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

IA TELEPOUCH

A C/WHD

A C/WH/COG

A C/WOLIME

CONFIDENTIAL

T

321

13-00000 ☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 321

1. Tab [illegible]-71 contains Cable JMWAVE 2017 dated 12 APR 68.

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ____________ of ______.

   ( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ____________ of ________.

   (X) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ____________________.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) __________ of ______.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________________.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ____________________.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ____________ of ________.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________________.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ____________________.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ____________ of ________.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ____________ of ______.

   (X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   (X) Information which /could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   ( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   ( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
   (X) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   ( ) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   (X) Cryptonyms
   (X) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   ( ) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

   ( ) maintained
   ( ) classified to ____________
   ( ) declassified
   ( ) desensitized
   (X) downgraded to Confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

13-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[redacted]

☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

[redacted] Z

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

FILE [redacted] ☐ RET TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE

[redacted]

[redacted] 121717Z APR 68 CITE [redacted]

12[illegible]00304

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date 14 Mar 1978

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

[redacted]

1. [redacted] HAS JUST REPORTED [redacted] RECEIPT [redacted] OF ENVELOPE WITH RETURN ADDRESS "RAMON ECHAVARRIA, APARTADO 6012 HAVANA", CONTAINING TWO 22X15 INCH BLACK WHITE AND RED POSTERS FEATURING BLACK PANTHER WITH LEGEND "BLACK POWER" IN HIS OPEN MOUTH AND BELOW IT IN LARGE LETTERS STATEMENT "RETALIATION FOR CRIME: REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE" IN ENGLISH FOLLOWED BY APPARENTLY SAME STATEMENT IN SMALLER LETTERS IN SPANISH, FRENCH AND ARABIC. FINALLY LETTERS "OSPAAAL" AT BOTTOM OF POSTER. POSTERS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY MIMEOGRAPHED SHEET WITH FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "ON THE OCCASION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WE HAVE PUBLISHED A POSTER THAT IS NOW BEING CIRCULATED ALL OVER THE WORLD. WE ARE SENDING YOU A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF THESE POSTERS WHICH MAY BE USED IN YOUR COUNTRY FOR THE ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED ON IN THIS REGARD."

[redacted] ARE ASTONISHED BY THE SPEED WITH WHICH THESE POSTERS HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND MAILED. ENVELOPE WAS RECEIVED IN [redacted] POST OFFICE BOX IN WHICH HE NORMALLY

13-00000

[redacted]

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

☐ ▨ COPY

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE ▨ ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE, VR.

3	8
4	9
5	10

PAGE 2 [redacted]

GETS VARIOUS CUBAN MAILINGS INCLUDING [redacted] ITEMS BUT THESE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN VERY SLOW IN COMING AND HAVE USUALLY OBVIOUSLY BEEN SEVERAL WEEKS IN PREPARATION AND TRANSIT. IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH EXACT DATE OF RECEIPT OF PRESENT ITEM BECAUSE [redacted] LAST SERVICED HIS P.O. BOX ON 8 APRIL. ENVELOPE BORE NO DATED POSTMARK, ONLY METERED "PORT PAYE" IN UPPER RIGHT-HAND CORNER. AT ANY EVENT IT IS CLEAR THAT IF POSTERS ARRIVED AT LATEST ON 11 APRIL, IT TOOK CUBANS LESS THAN A WEEK TO PREPARE AND MAIL THEM TO U.S.

3. WHAT HAS OF COURSE OCCURRED TO [redacted] IS POSSIBILITY THAT QUICK CUBAN PERFORMANCE ON THIS SUBJECT MAY INDICATE CUBAN COLLUSION IN ASSASSINATION OR ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WAS TO TAKE PLACE. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE KNOW OF NO OTHER EVIDENCE TO LEND SUPPORT TO THIS ASSUMPTION. THEY ARE CHECKING WITH OTHER LOCAL RECIPIENTS OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA MATERIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER OTHER SUCH PAMPHLET PACKAGES HAVE ARRIVED HERE. THEY ARE ALSO CONTACTING LOCAL [redacted] TO INFORM THEM OF RECEIPT OF THIS MATERIAL.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

[redacted]

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE [redacted] ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ [redacted] COPY

INFO

FILE, VR

PAGE 3 [redacted]

4. [redacted]

BT

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER [illegible] DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION INFO FILE [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL E T 121717Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2017 12 APR 68 IN 90304

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMCARBON

1. AMCARBON-3 HAS JUST REPORTED TO STATION RECEIPT BY HIS COLLEAGUE, AMCARBON-1, OF ENVELOPE WITH RETURN ADDRESS "RAMON ECHAVARRIA, APARTADO 6412 HAVANA", CONTAINING TWO 14X15 INCH BLACK WHITE AND RED POSTERS FEATURING BLACK PANTHER WITH LEGEND "BLACK POWER" IN HIS OPEN MOUTH AND BELOW IT IN LARGE LETTERS STATEMENT "RETALIATION FOR CRIME: REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE" IN ENGLISH FOLLOWED BY APPARENTLY SAME STATEMENT IN SMALLER LETTERS IN SPANISH, FRENCH AND ARABIC. FINALLY LETTERS "OSPAAAL" AT BOTTOM OF POSTER. POSTERS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY MIMEOGRAPHED SHEET WITH FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "ON THE OCCASION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WE HAVE PUBLISHED A POSTER THAT IS NOW BEING CIRCULATED ALL OVER THE WORLD. WE ARE SENDING YOU A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF THESE POSTERS WHICH MAY BE USED IN YOUR COUNTRY IN THE ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED ON IN THIS REGARD."

2. AMCARBONS ARE ASTONISHED AT THE SPEED WITH WHICH THESE POSTERS HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND MAILED. ENVELOPE WAS RECEIVED IN AMCARBON-1'S POST OFFICE BOX IN WHICH HE NORMALLY

CONFIDENTIAL

Downgraded to [illegible]
by authority of 007560 012913
date 15 mar 1978

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 15 mar 78
E2 IMPDET CL BY 007560
012913

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 2017 S E C R E T

GETS VARIOUS CUBAN MAILINGS INCLUDING LASO ITEMS BUT THESE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN VERY SLOW IN COMING AND HAVE USUALLY OBVIOUSLY BEEN SEVERAL WEEKS IN PREPARATION AND TRANSIT. IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH EXACT DATE OF RECEIPT OF PRESENT ITEM BECAUSE AMCARBON-1 WAS IN BAHAMAS COVERING ELECTION FROM 9 THRU 11 APRIL AND LAST SERVICED HIS P.O. BOX ON 8 APRIL. ENVELOPE BORE NO DATED POSTMARK, ONLY METERED "PORT PAYE" IN UPPER RIGHT-HAND CORNER. AT ANY EVENT IT IS CLEAR THAT IF POSTERS ARRIVED AT LATEST ON 11 APRIL, IT TOOK CUBANS LESS THAN A WEEK TO PREPARE AND MAIL THEM TO U.S.

3. WHAT HAS OF COURSE OCCURRED TO AMCARBONS IS POSSIBILITY THAT QUICK CUBAN PERFORMANCE ON THIS SUBJECT MAY INDICATE CUBAN COLLUSION IN ASSASSINATION OR ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WAS TO TAKE PLACE. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE KNOW OF NO OTHER EVIDENCE TO LEND SUPPORT TO THIS ASSUMPTION. THEY ARE CHECKING WITH OTHER LOCAL RECIPIENTS OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA MATERIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER [illegible] SUCH PAMPHLET [illegible] THEY ARE ALSO [illegible] CONTACTING LOCAL [illegible] TO INFORM THEM OF RECEIPT OF THIS MATERIAL.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY AT Z

INDEX

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY PER

ACTION

INFO

☐ RID COPY

FILE VR

PAGE 3 JMWAVE 2017 CONFIDENTIAL

4. ONLY JMWAVE TRACE ON RAMON ECHAVARRIA INDICATES USE AS A MAIL ADDRESS FOR RECEIPT AND SENDING OF CUBAN REGIME PROPAGANDA.

SECRET

BT

13-00000

322

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 322

IN 90561

ab F-53 contains CABLE JMWAVE 2022 dated 12 Apr. 1968.

) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.

✓) Segregable portions ~~previously~~ recommended for ~~released~~ but not sent to Requester by IPS, excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3) of FOIA.

) Located during the DDO appeals review.

) Referred to DDO for review by ____________.

urther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ____________.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ____________ of ________.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ____________.

X) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b)(3) of FOIA.

) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ____________ of ______.

) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ____________ of ________

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

) Information from a foreign liaison service
) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
) Information which would/could identify the source
) Information pertaining to a source
) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
) Location of CIA overseas installation
✓) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
) Name of CIA employee
) File number
) Pseudonym
X) Cryptonyms
X) Internal organizational data
) Name of FBI agent
) FBI file number
) Privacy of other individual
) OTHER

OMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

uring the DDO classification review, this document which was marked
s SECRET was:

) maintained
classified to ____________
declassified
) desensitized
X downgraded to confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

X [illegible]

13-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

[redacted]

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	[redacted]	6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER #

ACTION [redacted] ☐ [redacted] COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE [redacted] ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] T 122103Z APR 68 CITE [redacted]

Rpd 4 Dec 68

12 APR 68 IN 90561

m

DIRECTOR

[redacted]

IN CONNECTION WITH CUBAN MAILING OF BLACK POWER POSTERS REPORTED IN [redacted] (IN 90504) SEE ALSO SHIPMENT ON 7 REPEAT 7 APRIL (I.E., 3 DAYS AFTER DR KING'S ASSASSINATION) MENTIONED IN [redacted]

[redacted]

BT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date 7 March 1978

(53)

[redacted]

(D)

cc [redacted]

[redacted]

13-00000

(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE

2
3
4
5

(10)

4 Dec 68

122103Z APR 68

12 APR 68 IN 90587

DIRECTOR

IN CONNECTION WITH CUBAN MAILING OF BLACK POWER POSTERS REPORTED , SEE ALSO SHIPMENT ON 7 REPEAT 7 APRIL (I.E., 3 DAYS AFTER DR KING'S ASSASSINATION) MENTIONED

BT

Previously
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 19 AUG 1976

53

13-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2	AL	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 26 PER #

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/FI/D 4, C/CA 3, C/CI, C/FI 2

Rpd 4 Dec 68

CONFIDENTIAL 122103Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2022

12 APR 68 IN 90561

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC ZRPERUSAL AMCARBON

IN CONNECTION WITH CUBAN MAILING OF BLACK POWER POSTERS REPORTED IN JMWAVE 2017 (IN 90504), SEE ALSO SHIPMENT ON 7 REPEAT 7 APRIL (I.E., 3 DAYS AFTER DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION) MENTIONED IN 3/O/CUD/T.397-68.

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

BT

53

CONFIDENTIAL

Downgraded to
by authority of 009580 012913
date 2 Mar 1978

FULL TEXT COPY -- DO NOT RELEASE

2 Mar 78

E 2 IMPDET 009580 012913

A

cc JMWAVE

SECRET

TAB# 323

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

[redacted] 323

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

76 IN 90377

1. Tab [redacted] contains CABLE JMWAVE 2009 dated 12 Apr. 68.

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

   ( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

   (X) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

   Located during Appeals review.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

   (X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b)(3) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   ( ) Information which would/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   (X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   ( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
   (X) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   ( ) Name of CIA employee
   (X) File number/name
   ( ) Pseudonym
   (X) Cryptonyms
   (X) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   ( ) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

   ( ) maintained
   ( ) classified to ______
   ( ) declassified
   ( ) desensitized
   (X) downgraded to Confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION [redacted] [redacted] TOTAL COPIES 17 [redacted] AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY [redacted]

N/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

12 #

FILE [redacted] ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[redacted] COPY

INFO:

FILE. VR. [redacted]

3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

[redacted] 121438Z APR 68 CITE [redacted] 12 APR 68 IN 90377

DIRECTOR

[redacted]

[redacted] HAS HAD [redacted] PREPARE TWO SUMMARIES OF [redacted] CUBAN REGIME COVERAGE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION AND RESULTANT DISTURBANCES THROUGH 9 APRIL SENT TELEPOUCH AS [redacted] WE WILL NOW DISCONTINUE THIS REPORTING UNLESS THERE IS A CONTINUED HQS DESIRE TO RECEIVE IT. PLEASE ADVISE.

[redacted]

BT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 7 March 1978

[redacted]

[redacted]

A-125

ILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

C[illegible]IED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	[illegible]	6	
2	DC	7	
3	[illegible]	8	
4		9	
5		10	

NCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT: Z

SEM BY 12 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

TION # WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, FI, CA 5, CA/PROP, CA/OPS, FI/INT 2

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL 121438Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2009 12 APR 68 IN 90377

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

STATION HAS HAD AMOTS PREPARE TWO SUMMARIES OF CUBAN REGIME COVERAGE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION AND RESULTANT DISTURBANCES THROUGH 9 APRIL SENT TELEPOUCH AS UFGA-29877 AND UFGA-29884. WE WILL NOW DISCONTINUE THIS REPORTING UNLESS THERE IS A CONTINUED HQS DESIRE TO RECEIVE IT. PLEASE ADVISE.

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

BT

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 0532732
DO NOT DESTROY

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 2 March 78
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 009560
012913

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

CONFIDENTIAL
Downgraded to
by authority of 009560 012913
date 2 March 78

115

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

324

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 324 Berlin 2149

) [illegible]-54 contains CABLE IN 91216 dated 15 Apr. 1968.

) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

✓) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6) of FOIA.

) Located during the DDO appeals review.

) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

rther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

X) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (B)(1)(b)(3) (b)(6) of FOIA.

) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

e exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

) Information from a foreign liaison service
) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
✓) Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
) Information pertaining to a source
✓) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
✓) Locations of CIA overseas installations
) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
) Name of CIA employee
✓) File number/[illegible]
✓) Pseudonym
✓) Cryptonyms
✓) Internal organizational data
) Name of FBI agent
) FBI file number
✓) Privacy of other individuals
) OTHER

(b)(6) not asserted

MMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. [redacted] CI information that does not pertain to the [illegible] of the Request has been deleted under (b)(6) to protect the privacy of the individuals who were the subject of the reporting. All information pertaining to King/Ray has been identified and is recommended for release.

uring the DDO classification review, this document which was marked s SECRET was:

) maintained
) classified to ______
) declassified
) desensitized
X) downgraded to Confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

UNIT NOTIFIED

[redacted]

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

[redacted]

COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

1 3

FILE [redacted] ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[redacted] COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR. [redacted]

PRECEDENCE

[redacted] 15 APR 68 IN 91216

[redacted] 151351Z APR 68 CITE [redacted]

ECTOR INFO [redacted]

[redacted]

EF A [redacted] IN 70597

B DIRECTOR 49260

1. AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-VIETNAM WAR MITIES IN WEST BERLIN HAS CONTINUED SINCE REF A. BERS OF US CAMPAIGN CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT IR "ACTION NIGHT LIFE," ENTERING GI BARS AND SING OUT LEAFLETS ENCOURAGING AND OFFERING ISTANCE FOR DESERTION. CAMPAIGN MEMBERS CITE ITIVE" RESULSTS IN FACT THAT GI'S WILLING TO K WITH THEM AND TO PASS LEAFLETS ON TO OTHER LDIERS. CAMPAIGN HAS POINTED OUT TO NON-AMERICAN ICIPANTS INTERESTED IN "ACTION" THAT THEY MAY CONTACT SOLDIERS THROUGH US ARMY'S COMMUNITY IONS OFFICE. [redacted]

(k) 6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 14 May 1978

[redacted]

[redacted]

324

CRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
NIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

[redacted]

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

OPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

AT: Z

X-REF TO FILE NO.

PER #

FILE [redacted] ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

☐ [redacted] COPY

INFO:
FILE VR.

GE 2

[redacted]

2. OTHER RELATED US CAMPAIGN PLANS INCLUDED
ETING WITH LOCAL FULBRIGHT SCHOLARS IN HOPE OF
OACHING THEM ABOUT VIETNAM WAR, THE POLITICAL
UATION IN BERLIN, DRAFT AND FULBRIGHT PROGRAM
LF. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS MEETING EVER
PLACE. CAMPAIGN IS ALSO PLANNING THEATER
ENING, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 20 APRIL, ART
ION AND SIMILAR EVENTS, PROCEEDS FROM WHICH
SUPPOSED TO GO TO VIET CONG.

3. RADICAL LEFT ELEMENT IN BERLIN STAGED
APRIL DEMONSTRATION MARCH ON RATHAUS SCHOENEBERG
WAKE OF DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION. IN VIEW OF THE
SSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON LEFTIST STUDENT LEADER
UDI DUTSCHKE ON 11 APRIL, STUDENT ATTENTIONS OVER

[redacted]

LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
ON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

[redacted]

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT: ____________ Z

M BY ____________ PER ________ #

ON ☐ [redacted] COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ____________

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____________

FILE [redacted] ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 3 [redacted]

WEEKEND CENTERED ON FURTHER ATTACKS ON SPRINGER PROPERTY AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN WEST BERLIN.

[redacted]

BT [redacted]

[redacted]

13-00000

15 [illegible] 216

151351Z APR 63

DIRECTOR INFO

REF A

B DIRECTOR 49250

1.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date 10 AUG 1976

54

[illegible]

[illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. RADICAL LEFT ELEMENT IN BERLIN STAGED 5 APRIL DEMONSTRATION MARCH ON RATHAUS SCHOENEBERG IN WAKE OF DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION. IN VIEW OF THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON LEFTIST STUDENT LEADER RUDI DUTSCHKE ON 11 APRIL, STUDENT ATTENTIONS OVER

[illegible]

WEEKEND CENTERED ON FURTHER ATTACKS ON SPRINGER PROPERTY AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN WEST BERLIN.

[illegible]

13-00000

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT: ______ Z

SSEM BY 12 PER Cl #3

TION C/CI 3 ☒ RID COPY

ASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 7

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, C/RF EYES ONLY C/FI, C/EUR 2

OUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	RID	6	
2	cc/Station	7	
3	Chimo	8	
4	OC3	9	
5		10	

PRECEDENCE

15 APR 68 IN 91216

CONFIDENTIAL 151351Z APR 68 CITE BERLIN 2149 (HIBBERT ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO BONN

RYBAT MHPASHA

REF A BERLIN 1812 (IN 70597)*

B DIRECTOR 49260 **

1. AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-VIETNAM WAR ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN HAS CONTINUED SINCE REF A. MEMBERS OF US CAMPAIGN CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT THEIR "ACTION NIGHT LIFE," ENTERING GI BARS AND PASSING OUT LEAFLETS ENCOURAGING AND OFFERING ASSISTANCE FOR DESERTION. CAMPAIGN MEMBERS CITE "POSITIVE" RESULTS IN FACT THAT GI'S WILLING TO TALK WITH THEM AND TO PASS LEAFLETS ON TO OTHER SOLDIERS. CAMPAIGN HAS POINTED OUT TO NON-AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS INTERESTED IN "ACTION" THAT THEY MAY ALSO CONTACT SOLDIERS THROUGH US ARMY'S COMMUNITY RELATIONS OFFICE. US CAMPAIGNERS KEITH CHAMBERLAIN AND PETER STANDISH WERE INVITED TO SPEAK AT 23 MARCH VIETNAM RALLY AND CHOSE AS THEME "HISTORY OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM." THEY

CONFIDENTIAL
Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 001829
date 28 Jul 1978

FULL TEXT COPY -- DO NOT RELEASE

cc US Campaign

C.A.C.

(54)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Jul 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 001829

CONFIDENTIAL

ILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
SON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT:

TEM BY PER #

ION ☐ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR,

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 BERLIN 2149 S CONFIDENTIAL

COORDINATED THEIR REMARKS WITH CAMPAIGN LEADER FRANCIS FULLER AND MEMBERS DAVID HARRIS AND SAM WEBER. CHAMBERLAIN ALSO ACCOMPANIED RUDI DUTSCHKE TO PRAGUE IN LATE MARCH FOR MEETING OF THIRD CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE.

2. OTHER RELATED US CAMPAIGN PLANS INCLUDED MEETING WITH LOCAL FULBRIGHT SCHOLARS IN HOPE OF APPROACHING THEM ABOUT VIETNAM WAR, THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BERLIN, DRAFT AND FULBRIGHT PROGRAM ITSELF. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS MEETING EVER TOOK PLACE. CAMPAIGN IS ALSO PLANNING THEATER EVENING, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 20 APRIL, ART AUCTION AND SIMILAR EVENTS, PROCEEDS FROM WHICH ARE SUPPOSED TO GO TO VIET CONG.

3. RADICAL LEFT ELEMENT IN BERLIN STAGED 6 APRIL DEMONSTRATION MARCH ON RATHAUS SCHOENEBERG IN WAKE OF DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION. IN VIEW OF THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON LEFTIST STUDENT LEADER RUDI DUTSCHKE ON 11 APRIL, STUDENT ATTENTIONS OVER

SECRET

ILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
ON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT: Z

EM BY PER #

ION ☐ RID COPY

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR,

UTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 3 BERLIN 2149 S CONFIDENTIAL

WEEKEND CENTERED ON FURTHER ATTACKS ON SPRINGER PROPERTY AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN WEST BERLIN.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

BT

C/S Comment: *Reported activities of Americans in anti-Vietnam activity.

**Hqs participating in survey of international connections of anti-Vietnam war movement in U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

~~13-00000~~

TAB
#325

JFK 15
F3

[redacted] 325

IN 91393

1. Tab [redacted]-65 contains Cable Mex City 5210 dated 15 Apr. 68

2. (✓) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(liaison) (b)(3), (b)(6). of FOI

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

(X) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOI
 ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
 ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
 ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
 ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

(X) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
(X) Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
(X) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
( ) Pseudonym
(X) Cryptonyms
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

(X) maintained
( ) classified to ______
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
( ) downgraded to ______

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

ECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
UNIT NOTIFIED

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 8

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

AT ______ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

2 1 PER S 2 127 (E.O.) FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

C/WH-2 ☒ RID COPY INFO FILE, VR. AAP, C/CI

EYES ONLY

ECRET 152215Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5210 15 APR 68 IN 91392

IRECTOR

D

HALPHA

EF: DIRECTOR-89694

1. LITEMPO-72, ON 12 APRIL 1968, PROVIDED FOLLOWING REPORTS
LATING TO REFERENCE.

2. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OF THE AFRO-ASIAN LATIN AMERI-
N PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (AALAPSO) IN HAVANA, DIRECTED
RAMON ECHAVARRIA, IS SENDING TO MEXICAN COMMUNISTS LARGE "BLACK
WER" POSTERS, WITH CAPTION "RETALIATION TO CRIME: REVOLUTIONARY
LENCE," IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, SPANISH AND ARABIC. ACKNOWLEDGE-
NT OF RECEIPT OF THIS MATERIAL IS TO BE MADE TO M. OSVALDO
EDES ALVAREZ, SIBISKE NAMESTI, C-1, BUBENEC, PRAGUE, CZECHOSLO-
KIA. POUCHING COPIES OF POSTER.

3. THE INDEPENDENT PEASANTS' CENTRAL (CCI), ON 5 APRIL,
RESSED LETTER TO PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, PROTESTING
INST THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, ATTRIBUTING TI
HE AGGRESSIVE AND FASCIST POLICIES OF U.S. GOVERNMENT. LETTER
NDS ALSO AN END TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

CRET

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 2 MAR '78
E2 IMPDET CL BY 009560
012913

65

KJ

SECRET

13-00000 ☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 326

1. Tab [redacted]-73 contains Memo B-88 dated 18 Apr 68

2. (X) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOI

   ( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

   ( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.
This document was also referred to CIA by the FBI on 25 March 1977.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______

   (X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   ( ) Information which would/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   (X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   (X) Location of CIA overseas installation
   ( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   (X) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   ( ) Cryptonym
   (X) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   ( ) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

   ( ) maintained
   ( ) classified to ______
   ( ) declassified
   ( ) desensitized
   (X) downgraded to confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

[redacted]

B-88

18 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Junior.

1. Your Bureau representative in [redacted] provided our representative with composite photographs of the suspected killer of Martin Luther King, Jr. and asked for a check against [redacted]

2. Checks for persons appearing to resemble the composite photographs were negative [redacted] 1968 an unidentified white [redacted] the [redacted] but the description did not fit either the composite photograph or the description provided by your Bureau representative. However, our representative passed copies [redacted] to your Bureau representative with the notation that he did not appear to be identical with the Bureau suspect. [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 14 May 1978

[redacted]

A-73

[illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

201-0832732

[redacted]

BASIC : [redacted] (IN 93087)

PROJECT: None

LIAISON: None

[redacted]

18 April 1968

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  2 - [redacted]
  1 -
  1 -

[redacted]

201-0832732

CONFIDENTIAL

B-88

18 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Junior.

1. Your Bureau representative in Mexico City provided our representative with composite photographs of the suspected killer of Martin Luther King, Jr. and asked for a check against visitors to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City during the recent months.

2. Checks for persons appearing to resemble the composite photographs were negative at both Embassies. On 30 January 1968 an unidentified white male visited the Soviet Embassy but the description did not fit either the composite photograph or the description provided by your Bureau representative. However, our representative passed copies of the photographs to your Bureau representative with the notation that he did not appear to be identical with the Bureau suspect. Our representative further stipulated that any use of the photographs in an investigation should not reveal that the photographs were made in Mexico or by this Office.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON Feb 9, 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 095604
12913

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 095604 12913
date Feb 9, 1978

(248)

FULL TEXT COPY — DO NOT RELEASE

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-0832732

CONFIDENTIAL

BASIC : Mexico City 5247 (IN 93087)

PROJECT: None

LIAISON: None

WH/1/Charles M. Bounds; jb

18 April 1968

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
- 2 - CI/OPS/DO
- 1 - WH/1/Chrono
- 1 - C/WH/FI

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

201-0832132

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 327

1. Tab B-74 contains Memo B-97 dated 25 April 68.

2. (X) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(6) of FOIA.

   ( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

   ( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.
This document was also referred to CIA by the FBI on 25 Mar 77.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

   (X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(6) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
(X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
(X) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
(X) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
( ) Pseudonym
(X) Cryptonym
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
(X) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

( ) maintained
( ) classified to ______
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
(X) downgraded to confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

[redacted]

B-97

25 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 18 April 1968 which advised that our representative in [redacted] had passed [redacted] of an unidentified American who visited the [redacted]

2. Forwarded herewith are [redacted] passed to your Bureau representative. As noted in our 18 April memo, these [redacted] were passed to your Bureau representative with the notation that they did not appear to be identical with the Bureau's suspect. The Subject of the attached photos was described as 22-27 years of age, approximately 5 feet 9 inches to 5 feet 11 inches in height, weight, approximately 175 pounds, light brown hair, and slightly ruddy complexion.

3. As noted in our 18 April memorandum the [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 14 Feb 1978

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 14 Feb 1978

201-0832932

[redacted]

327

[redacted]

BASIC : [redacted]

PROJECT: [redacted]

25 April 1968

[redacted]

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
1 - [redacted]
2 -
1 -

[redacted]

201-0832732

285

CONFIDENTIAL

B-97

25 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 18 April 1968 which advised that our representative in Mexico City had passed copies of photographs of an unidentified American who visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

2. Forwarded herewith are copies of the photographs passed to your Bureau representative. As noted in our 18 April memo, these photos were passed to your Bureau representative with the notation that they did not appear to be identical with the Bureau's suspect. The Subject of the attached photos was described as 22-27 years of age, approximately 5 feet 9 inches to 5 feet 11 inches in height, weight, approximately 175 pounds, light brown hair, and slightly ruddy complexion.

3. As noted in our 18 April memorandum the photographs may be used in the course of an investigation so long as it is not connected in any way with this Office, and it is not revealed that the photographs were made in Mexico.

CONFIDENTIAL

Downgraded to
by authority of 095604 12913
date 9 Oct 1978

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 9 Oct 1978
E2 IMPDET CL BY 095604
12913

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

201-0832132

2857

CONFIDENTIAL

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

BASIC : HMMA-34503

PROJECT: LIONION

25 April 1968

WH/1/Charles M. Bounds;jb

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  1 - WH/1/Chrono
  2 - CI/OPS/DO
  1 - C/WH/FI

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

201-0832732

285

CONFIDENTIAL





13-0000

328

FIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

Tab 328 contains Press Memo for DCI dated 25 April 1968

( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.

(X) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ________________.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

I RECOMMEND: Release in Toto

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________________.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________________.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________________ of ________.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
( ) Pseudonym
( ) Cryptonym
( ) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as Unclassified was:

(X) maintained
( ) classified to ________________
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
( ) downgraded to ________________

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☒ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

13-00000

TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

PRESS ITEM FOR THE DCI

DISTRIBUTION:

DDCI
ExD
DDI
DDP
DOCI
ONE
OSR
C/OPSCEN
INDICO
CSDO
SAVA-
OSD
[illegible]
e
fe
WH
mea

Date: 25 Apr
Item #12
Ref #

35

KING- SUSPECT (TOPS 7)

MEXICO CITY (AP)-MEXICAN AUTHORITIES QUESTIONED TODAY A U.S. CITIZEN THEY SAID RESEMBLES THE MAN WANTAD ON A CHARGE OF SLAYING OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., THEN RELEASED HIM WITHOUT PRESSING ANY CHARGES.

DANIEL DAVID KENNEDY OF BALTIMORE, WHO SAID HE WAS ON A WALKING TOUR OF THE STATE OF SONORA, DENIED ANY CONNECTION WITH KING'S DEATH. AN FBI AGENT, IDENTIFIED ONLY AS MR. SMITH, SAID THERE WAS NO RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN KENNEDY AND THE SUSPECT, JAMES EARLY RAY, ACCORDING TO POLICE IN THE CITY OF HERMOSILLO.

LT. ROBERTO FLETCHER OF THE JUDICIAL POLICE IN CABORCA, SONORA, HAD TAKEN KENNEDY INTO CUSTODY FROM A CABORCA HOTEL.

IN BALTIMORE, KENNEDY'S MOTHER, PEARK E. KENNEDY,USAID, "THERE IS JUST NO CONNECTION. HE DOESN'T EVEN LOOK LIKE HIM RAY.

CZ1106AES 4/25

Comment:

[redacted]

201-0832732

These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the Office of Current Intelligence to the attached item from the news services.

13-00000

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 329

ib #-60 contains DRAFT MEMO - NO ⌗ dated 26 Apr. 1968.

) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______

☑ Segregable portions ~~previously~~ Recommended for released; but not sent to requester by IRS excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3) of FOIA. *

) Located during the DDO appeals review.

) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

ırther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

* Initial review recommended. FIRST Coordinate draft memo w/ Nat'l Foreign Intell. Board (USIB).

RECOMMEND:

) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

☒ Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

) Information from a foreign liaison service
) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
) Information which would/could identify the source
) Information pertaining to a source
☒ Information pertaining to intelligence methods
☒ Location of CIA overseas installation
) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
) Name of CIA employee
) File number
) Pseudonym
) Cryptonym
) Internal organizational data
) Name of FBI agent
) FBI file number
) Privacy of other individual
) OTHER

OMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

ıring the DDO classification review, this document which was marked
s SECRET was:

) maintained
) classified to ______
) declassified
) desensitized
☒ downgraded to confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

[redacted]

DRAFT

26 April 1968

KING ASSASSINATION AND USIB

DCI:

A. General:

1. Request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation give a full report to USIB on ______________ (date) on the status of the investigation of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

B. Specific:

1. Is there any indication that Ray has left the USA?
2. If so, when, to what country or area, and by what means and route?
3. Is there any indication that Ray had in the past travelled outside the United States other than the October - November 1967 trip to Mexico as Galt?
4. Is there any indication that Ray had been issued a U.S. passport under his true name or any of his aliases?

66

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 13 May 1978

5. Is there any indication that Ray had any connection with any foreign intelligence service? If so, please provide all possible details.

6. Is there any indication that Ray had any connection with foreigners in the United States, especially Cubans and Soviets?

7. Did Ray have any Communist connections?

8. Did Ray ever express any interest in Communism?

9. Did Ray ever indicate any interest in Cuba, Castro, or the Cuban revolution?

10. Does it appear that Ray had any accomplices? If so, have any been identified?

11. Has the FBI identified/any of Ray's close friends or associates?

12. Have any contacts made by Ray in Mexico during October/November 1967 been identified?

13. If any accomplices, associates, or contacts have been identified, are any of them Communists or associated with Communists, foreign officials, or foreign intelligence services?

[redacted]

14. Does the FBI think that Ray was hired to assassinate King?

15. If so, is there any indication that Communists or a foreign power were involved?

16. Has it been possible to recover and trace the origin of any of the $20 bills used by Ray to purchase the rifle and make other payments?

17. On 19 April 1968 CIA furnished to the FBI photographs of an unknown individual resembling Ray. Has the FBI determined whether or not this person is possibly identical with Ray?

[redacted]

201-0832732

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

26 April 1968

KING ASSASSINATION AND USIB

DCI:

A. General:

1. Request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation give a full report to USIB on ____________ (date) on the status of the investigation of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

B. Specific:

1. Is there any indication that Ray has left the USA?

2. If so, when, to what country or area, and by what means and route?

3. Is there any indication that Ray had in the past travelled outside the United States other than the October - November 1967 trip to Mexico as Galt?

4. Is there any indication that Ray had been issued a U.S. passport under his true name or any of his aliases?

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 060595
date 28 ~~Feb~~ 1978

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 060595

(60)

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

CONFIDENTIAL

201-0832732

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Is there any indication that Ray had any connection with any foreign intelligence service? If so, please provide all possible details.

6. Is there any indication that Ray had any connection with foreigners in the United States, especially Cubans and Soviets?

7. Did Ray have any Communist connections?

8. Did Ray ever express any interest in Communism?

9. Did Ray ever indicate any interest in Cuba, Castro, or the Cuban revolution?

10. Does it appear that Ray had any accomplices? If so, have any been identified?

11. Has the FBI identified any of Ray's close friends or associates?

12. Have any contacts made by Ray in Mexico during October/November 1967 been identified?

13. If any accomplices, associates, or contacts have been identified, are any of them Communists or associated with Communists, foreign officials, or foreign intelligence services?

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

14. Does the FBI think that Ray was hired to assassinate King?

15. If so, is there any indication that Communists or a foreign power were involved?

16. Has it been possible to recover and trace the origin of any of the $20 bills used by Ray to purchase the rifle and make other payments?

17. On 19 April 1968 CIA furnished to the FBI photographs taken in October 1967 at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City of an unknown individual resembling Ray. Has the FBI determined whether or not this person is possibly identical with Ray?

CONFIDENTIAL

201-0832 [illegible]

330

13-00000

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 332.

-68 contains DISPATCH OEPA-1097 w/attc (2) dated 29 April 1968

☒ Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6) of FOIA.

☐ Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______________ of ________.

☐ Located during the DDO appeals review.

☐ Referred to DDO for review by ______________.

rther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

☐ Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______________.

☐ Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______________ of ________.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______________.

☐ Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______________ of ________.

☐ Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______________ of ________.

☒ Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(6) of FOIA.

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

☐ Information from a foreign liaison service
☐ Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
☒ Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
☐ Information pertaining to a source
☒ Information pertaining to intelligence methods
☒ Locations of CIA overseas installations
☐ Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
☐ Name of CIA employee
☒ File number
☒ Pseudonyms
☒ Cryptonyms
☐ Internal organizational data
☐ Name of FBI agent
☐ FBI file number
☒ Privacy of other individuals
☐ OTHER

(b)(6) not asserted

OMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. Deletions in this document have been made to protect an operational activity, i.e., the gathering of information on individuals, the reporting of this information and the planning of covert activities [illegible] & the reporting.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

☐ maintained
☐ classified to ______________
☐ declassified
☐ desensitized
☒ downgraded to Confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

13-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, [redacted]

INFO.
Chief, [redacted]; Chief, [redacted]
Chief [redacted]

FROM
Chief, [redacted]

SUBJECT
[redacted]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

[illegible] 9 Dec 68

Reference: [redacted], dated 17 April 1968

1. [redacted] reports that the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King had a dramatic and profoundly disturbing impact upon the American Negro community in Paris. [redacted] her importance in the Black community in Paris is indicated by the prominent place accorded her in the memorial service for Dr. King. (See under separate cover attachment 1) [redacted]

2. We call your attention to the attached clipping from the 24 April Le Monde which reports on a press conference held by James Foreman, head of the International Affairs department of SNCC, to announce a meeting supporting Black Power to be held at La Mutualite on 29 April and to be addressed by Jean Paul Sartre [redacted]

Attachments: 2
1 - Memorial Service Program (u/s/c)
2 - Le Monde clipping h/w

[redacted]

/CONTINUED.../

(68)

Distribution:
1 - [redacted] w/atts
~~2~~ - [redacted] w/atts
1 - [redacted] w/atts
w/atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [redacted]

DATE 29 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 20 May 1978

13-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	[redacted]	[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO: [redacted]

AMERICAN COMMUNITY SERVICE IN MEMORY OF
THE REV. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING
PASTOR - CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER - HOLDER OF THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE
8 APRIL 1968

THE CALL TO WORSHIP - The Rev. Robert A. Spencer - American Church
Prayer of Invocation
The Lord's Prayer

HYMN No. 429 "For All the Saints" (vrs. 1-5) Sino Nomine

PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES - The Hon. Woodruff Wallner, Chargé d'Affaire - U.S. Embassy

OLD TESTAMENT LESSONS - Canon James McNamee - American Cathedral
Psalm 90
Daniel 3:16-25

PRAYERS - Dean Sturgis Riddle - American Cathedral

MESSAGES FROM THE FRENCH CHURCHES

The Rev. Dr. Charles Westphal - Federation Protestante de France
Mgsr. Julien Gouet - Roman Catholic Diocese of Paris
Pastor Henri Vincent- Eglise Baptiste de France

NEW TESTAMENT LESSONS - The Rev. Dr. Clayton E. Williams, Pastor Emeritus - American Church
Romans 8:31-39
Matthew 10:24-39

ANTHEM - The Choir
"Psalm of Penitence" From King David by Arthur Honegger

(Mercy on me, O Lord; pity, according to thy great compassion. Wipe away my transgression; cleanse me unto the depth of my iniquity. In sin was I conceived. In evil was I born. And thou wouldst have a pure soul? I have sinned. Thou hast taught me thy wisdom, and I have failed in my weakness. Mercy on me, O Lord.")

TRIBUTE TO DR. KING - Mrs. Carline Polite - American Author

FROM AN ADDRESS BY DR. KING - Washington, D.C., Aug. 28, 1963
Read by Mr. Neville Aurelius - Actor

PRAYERS - The Rev. Martin v.B. Sargent - American Church

HYMN - "We Shall Overcome" Negro Spiritual

We shall overcome, we shall overcome,
We shall overcome some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall overcome someday.

We shall live in peace, we shall live in peace,
We shall live in peace some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall live in peace some day.

We shall brothers be, we shall brothers be,
We shall brothers be some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall brothers be some day,

RECESSIONAL - The 23rd Psalm

**** A book of condolences is in the chapel to your right for those who wish to sign it.

[illegible] ATTACHMENT 1 TO:

MEETING EN FAVEUR DU « POUVOIR NOIR » LE 29 AVRIL À LA MUTUALITÉ

Au cours d'une conférence de presse donnée lundi à Paris, M. James Foreman, ancien président du Comité de coordination des étudiants non violents (S.N.C.C.), aujourd'hui responsable des affaires internationales du S.N.C.C., a annoncé qu'un meeting en faveur du « pouvoir noir » aurait lieu à la Mutualité, le 29 avril à 20 heures. Outre M. Foreman, qui est également « ministre des affaires étrangères » du parti des Panthères noires, MM. Aimé Césaire, Daniel Guérin, Jean-Paul Sartre et Vercors participeront notamment à cette réunion au cours de laquelle deux films seront projetés : *Now*, de S. Alvarez, et *Jazz d'avant-garde*.

Au cours de sa conférence de presse, M. Foreman a évoqué le meurtre du pasteur King, « *exemple du génocide* » que commet contre les Noirs américains « *la société exploiteuse blanche raciste* », et l'adoption par le Congrès américain du projet de loi interdisant la discrimination raciale dans le logement. Ce texte de loi contient en effet un certain nombre de clauses répressives visant, selon M. Foreman, à « *liquider* » les leaders noirs. M. Foreman a également lancé un appel en faveur de plusieurs membres du parti des Panthères noires emprisonnés à Oakland (Californie), à la suite d'une fusillade avec la police le 6 avril dernier, qui a fait un mort — un jeune Noir de dix-sept ans.

330

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
CONFIDENTIAL/R Y B A T	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME
Chief, WOMUSE; Chief, EUR Division;
Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: MHALPHA/MHPROBE/RODIGAST

Rcd 9 Dec 68

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OEPA-1058, dated 17 April 1968

1. RODIGAST reports that the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King had a dramatic and profoundly disturbing impact upon the American Negro community in Paris. The young female leader of the SNCC girls in Paris flew to the U.S. several days later in order to be "where the action is." She does not plan to return but was very impressed by her stay in Paris saying that she will try to persuade other SNCC members to avail themselves of the valuable experience to be gained from working with the various revolutionary groups in Paris. As we foresaw in Reference this has left the SNCC group in the joint hands of IDENTITIES A and C of Reference. Invitations have poured in to speak at various meetings and it appears likely that IDENTITY A of Reference will represent SNCC at many of these meetings. Her importance in the Black community in Paris is indicated by the prominent place accorded her in the memorial service for Dr. King. (See under separate cover attachment 1) Needless to say, this renders all the more pressing an early decision on the proposal contained in Reference.

2. We call your attention to the attached clipping from the 24 April Le Monde which reports on a press conference held by James Foreman, head of the International Affairs department of SNCC, to announce a meeting supporting Black Power to be held at La Mutualite on 29 April and to be addressed by Jean Paul Sartre. QRPHOTO/1 told RODIGAST that there had been some

Attachments: 2
1 - Memorial Service Program (u/s/c)
2 - Le Monde clipping h/w

FULL TEXT COPY -- DO NOT RELEASE

/CONTINUED.../

Distribution:
1 - C/WOLIME w/atts
2 - C/WOMUSE w/atts
1 - C/EUR w/atts
2 - COS/London w/atts

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Oct 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 001829

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 001829
date 28 Oct 1978

68

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA-1097	29 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	**HQS FILE NUMBER**
	CONFIDENTIAL/R Y B A T	100-6-148/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEPA-1097

confusion regarding Sartre's willingness to speak. He had originally accepted to speak at a culturally oriented "gala" to be held at the Theatre National Populaire and there was a question regarding his willingness to switch to this more political atmosphere. The "gala" (see earlier report, paragraph C of OEPA-918) is now being planned for some time in May.

3. IDENTITY C of Reference is reported by RODIGAST to be working with Foreman in planning for the Mutualite meeting. She is so busy that she has temporarily left her child with her mother. IDENTITY C of Reference is also said to be working on another project—possibly involving travel—which is confidential at this point.

Adrian B. MASLOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO:
OEPA-1097

AMERICAN COMMUNITY SERVICE IN MEMORY OF
THE REV. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING

PASTOR - CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER - HOLDER OF THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

8 APRIL 1968

THE CALL TO WORSHIP - The Rev. Robert A. Spencer - American Church
Prayer of Invocation
The Lord's Prayer

HYMN No. 429 "For All the Saints" (vrs. 1-5) Sine Nomine

PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES - The Hon. Woodruff Wallner, Chargé d'Affaire - U.S. Embassy

OLD TESTAMENT LESSONS - Canon James McNamee - American Cathedral
Psalm 90
Daniel 3:16-25

PRAYERS - Dean Sturgis Riddle - American Cathedral

MESSAGES FROM THE FRENCH CHURCHES

The Rev. Dr. Charles Westphal - Federation Protestante de France
Mgsr. Julien Gouet - Roman Catholic Diocese of Paris
Pastor Henri Vincent - Eglise Baptiste de France

NEW TESTAMENT LESSONS - The Rev. Dr. Clayton E. Williams, Pastor Emeritus - American Church
Romans 8:31-39
Matthew 10:24-39

ANTHEM - The Choir
"Psalm of Penitence" From King David by Arthur Honegger

(Mercy on me, O Lord; pity, according to thy great compassion. Wipe away my transgression; cleanse me unto the depth of my iniquity. In sin was I conceived. In evil was I born. And thou wouldst have a pure soul? I have sinned. Thou hast taught me thy wisdom, and I have failed in my weakness. Mercy on me, O Lord.")

TRIBUTE TO DR. KING - Mrs. Carlîne Polite - American Author

FROM AN ADDRESS BY DR. KING - Washington, D.C., Aug. 28, 1963
Read by Mr. Neville Aurelius - Actor

PRAYERS - The Rev. Martin v.B. Sargent - American Church

HYMN - "We Shall Overcome" Negro Spiritual

We shall overcome, we shall overcome,
We shall overcome some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall overcome someday.

We shall live in peace, we shall live in peace,
We shall live in peace some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall live in peace some day.

We shall brothers be, we shall brothers be,
We shall brothers be some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall brothers be some day,

RECESSIONAL - The 23rd Psalm

**** A book of condolences is in the chapel to your right for those who wish to sign it.

HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO: OEPA-1097

Tho [illegible]
Sh[illegible]
This

MEETING EN FAVEUR
DU « POUVOIR NOIR »
LE 29 AVRIL À LA MUTUALITÉ

Au cours d'une conférence de presse donnée lundi à Paris, M. James Foreman, ancien président du Comité de coordination des étudiants non-violents (S.N.C.C.), aujourd'hui responsable des affaires internationales du S.N.C.C., a annoncé qu'un meeting en faveur du « pouvoir noir » aurait lieu à la Mutualité, le 29 avril à 20 heures. Outre M. Foreman, qui est également « ministre des affaires étrangères » du parti des Panthères noires, MM. Aimé Césaire, Daniel Guérin, Jean-Paul Sartre et Vercors participeront notamment à cette réunion au cours de laquelle deux films seront projetés : *Now*, de S. Alvarez, et *Jazz d'avant-garde*.

Au cours de sa conférence de presse, M. Foreman a évoqué le meurtre du pasteur King, « *exemple du génocide* » que commet contre les Noirs américains « *la société exploiteuse blanche raciste* », et l'adoption par le Congrès américain du projet de loi interdisant la discrimination raciale dans le logement. Ce texte de loi contient en effet un certain nombre de clauses répressives visant, selon M. Foreman, à « *liquider* » les leaders noirs. M. Foreman a également lancé un appel en faveur de plusieurs membres du parti des Panthères noires emprisonnés à Oakland (Californie), à la suite d'une fusillade avec la police le 6 avril dernier, qui a fait un mort — un jeune Noir de dix-sept ans.

JFK15
F3

331

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 331

Tab -69 contains DISPATCH HMMA-34688 w/ 9 atts (missing) dated 20 May 1968.

(✓) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6) of FOIA.

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

Att. C. refers to KING

I RECOMMEND:

☒ Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(6) of FOIA.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

- ☒ Information from a foreign liaison service
- ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
- ☒ Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
- ( ) Information pertaining to a source
- ☒ Information pertaining to intelligence methods
- ☒ Location of CIA overseas installation
- ( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
- ( ) Name of CIA employee
- ( ) File number
- ☒ Pseudonyms
- ☒ Cryptonyms
- ☒ Internal organizational data
- ( ) Name of FBI agent
- ( ) FBI file number
- ( ) Privacy of other individual
- ( ) OTHER

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. This document could be considered an incidental reference to Martin Luther King.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked SECRET was:

- ( ) maintained
- ( ) classified to ______
- ( ) declassified
- ( ) desensitized
- ☒ downgraded to Confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

[illegible] ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL [illegible]BAT

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, WOMUSE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Margaret RANDALL de MONDRAGON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

RYBAT MHALPHA

Action Required: See paragraph 3.

Reference : HMMW-16296, 5 April 1968

1. The following items from LIBIGHT/LIMUD coverage concern contacts of Subject who are believed to be of interest:

A. Attachment A: A letter from CAW, the magazine of Students for a Democratic Society, signed by Jerry *BODANES, thanks Margaret for her poems which they are using. The magazine is scheduled to be off the press around May 10. The letter clearly indicates that the SDS was behind the student seizure of Columbia University. It says, "Right now our glorious brothers have seized Columbia University--now named Malcolm X University--and over which an N.L.F. flag now flies. The others, faculty, deans, managers, are all scurrying and speaking pious--saying SDS this, SDS that, while we hold five buildings in joyousness and the most serious preparations to resist, our movement has over reached." Enclosed is a check made out against the account of the SDS in the Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, 2681 Broadway, New York, for the amount of $50, and signed by Robert M. *SHAPIRO.

Continued....................

Attachments:
As listed (9), h/w

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 2 march 78
E2 IMPDET CL BY 009560 012913

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
2 - C/WOMUSE (w/o atts)

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 009560 012913
date 2 mar 78

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 34688

DATE: 20 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL SECRET/RYBAT

Excluded [illegible]

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

A-69

B. Attachment B: Letter from Heiner *BASTIAN, 1415 Kearny St., San Francisco, California 94135, signed Heiner & Celine. BASTIAN has made arrangements with the editor-in-chief of AKZENTE to publish works of revolutionary poets, and he asks Margaret's help in collecting them. BASTIAN says that he is going to Berlin about 1 July, to Prague in early autumn for a "group 47 meeting," and to Cuba in early November.

C. Attachment C: Letter from Jaime *CARRERO, Art Department of the Interamerican University in San German, Puerto Rico. CARRERO has apparently sent Margaret a series of drawings based on Dr. Martin Luther KING's assassination. He describes them as "poetic...but full with guts and disgust." He says there is a possibility CBS will do a program on his paintings and the work in his Art Department. CARRERO is going to Columbia University in the summer of 1968 to study and plans to distribute El Corno there.

D. Attachment D: Letter from Susan *SHERMAN, 305 E. 6th St., No. 3, New York, N. Y. (see HMMA-33837). She tells of her plans to go to StoneyBrook on 23 April to speak about the conference for their week of protest activities. She tells Margaret that there are three people in Cuba she thinks would be interested in "The Hippie Book." They are Jose *BELL Lara, of Calle J #556, Vedado, Habana, who is connected with Pensimento Critico; Cuban psychologist Gustavo *TORROELLA, Ave. 3A #22, Marianao, Habana; and Lohania *ARUCA, 99-4722, MINREX-Direccion de Organismos Internacionales, Depto. ONU 516, La Habana.

E. Attachment E: Margaret got a letter from someone associated with CATERPILLAR. He is thinking of getting married to Marie *BENOIT in England this summer when he goes there to work in applied philosophy. Therefore, he tells Margaret he cannot go to Cuba as planned.

2. Attachment F: An interesting development was the fact that Margaret RANDALL received a letter from Moscow from Luis *SUARDIAZ, whose return address was given as the Cuban Embassy, Moscow, URSS. SUARDIAZ asks for Suzan SHERMAN (see paragraph 1D above). SUARDIAZ says he will be working as Cultural Counselor in the Cuban Embassy and hopes Margaret will keep in touch with him and send him things of interest (in a literary line).

3. In attachment G, Sergio MONDRAGON, Subject's husband, indicates that Margaret RANDALL is planning to travel to Venezuela from 15 to 30 June. It is suggested that Headquarters may wish to send Venezuela some background information on Margaret with suggestions for action by the Venezuela Station.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL SECRET/RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 34688

4. Attachments H and I concern a book which Margaret is hoping to write on Fidel CASTRO. According to Sergio's letter of April 18, she ~~is~~ planning to go to Cuba in October with a tape recorder, and then, based on these tapes, will write her book. Sergio suggests Doubleday as a publisher; however, on 25 April 1968 Paula McGuire of Pantheon Books (attachment I) wrote Margaret saying that publisher might be interested. It is suggested that WOLIME may have contacts in these two publishing houses.

Elsie I.
for Willard C. CURTIS

13-00000

HMMA-34688

Att A.



CAW (Bedones)
Box 33[illegible]
Cooper Station
New York N.Y. (10003)

Air Mail

Air Mail

Margaret Randall
(El Corno Emplumado)
Apto. Postal 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.
Mexico

NEW YORK, N.Y.
APR 29
PM
68

U.S. POSTAGE 6c
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT

CAW!
MAGAZINE OF
STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
Box 332, Cooper Station
New York, N.Y. 10003
(212) 674-8310

Dear Margaret Randall,

Thank you very much for these great great poems. We are using as many of them as we can. I will let you know exactly which ones. The magazine is coming out around May 10. Right now our glorious brothers have seized Columbia University — now named Malcolm X University — and over which an N.L.F. flag now flies — The others, faculty, Deans, Managers, are all scurrying and speaking plots — saying SDS this, SDS that, while we hold five buildings in joyousness and the most serious preparations, to resist, our movement has ever reached

— Jerry Badanes

check enclosed



No. 69

MOVEMENT FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY April 18 1968 $\frac{1\text{-}12}{210}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Morgarett Randall 50^{00}

Exactly Fifty DOLLARS

CHEMICAL BANK NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY
2681 BROADWAY
NEW YORK 25

Robert M. Shapiro

⑆0210⑉0012⑆ 073⑉00252⑈

13-00000

HMMA-34658

Att. B.

Heiner Bastian
1415 Kearny St
San Francisco
Cal. 94133/USA

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL
APR 10
PM
1968

LAW DAY U
FREEDOM UNDE
MAY

VIA AIR MAIL

Margaret Randall
editor in chief of EL CORNO EMPLUMADO
Apartado Postal Núm. 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.
Mexico

Dear Margaret,

I would like to thank you for your letter and the two issues of "el corno". The reason for my late answer is simply that I waited for the definite decision of the editor in chief of AKZENTE about our project. His answer is a total agreement!

I am very pleased about that and I hope that you are too. I would suggest that you collect about 10 -15 revolutionary poets. You should write an introduction or whatever you like. I also suggest that you and not sergio should collect as many or less "other" poets. If you don't want to do that, please arrange something with sergio. It makes things much easier for me)mailings, translations, proofs, etc)

I need all the material in about 5 -6 weeks. If this date will put pressure on you, let me know.

We are going in about 10 weeks to Berlin, in early autumn to Prague (group 47 meeting) and will go to Cuba early november. At this time we should be able to visit you.

MAO TSE-TUNG: In the last analysis, all the truths of Marxism can be summed up in one sentence: "To rebel is justified."... According to this principle, stand up and resist, struggle, build sozialism.

EVER ONWARD TO VICTORY

Love to you and your children

[illegible] & Céline

HMMA-34688

Att: e

Jaime Carrero
Departmaneto de Arte
Universidad Interamericana
San German, Puerto Rico 00753

Margaret Randall
Editor; EL CORNO EMPLUMADO
apartado postal 13-546
MEXICO DF 13

CORREO AEREO

SAN GERMAN
APR 29
PM
1968
P.R.

San Germán, Puerto Rico
April 27, 1968

Dear Meg:

I've received Bhe group of Cornos #24 and 25,26. I've also sent a serie of drawings based on Dr. Martin Luther King's assasination. They're poetic as usual but full with guts and disgust. The US will get no where with this killing of the best of their sons. Your work is getting there-here- where it is needed, so keep up the excellent job you are doing- since I know that you are working under a tremendous preassure. Very soon I'll send some money. Again I want ten Cornos 24- if you have any left. These drawings are getting a lot of attention especially in our younger generation which is where it counts.
There is a possibility of CBS doing aprogram of what I am doing in painting and in our Art Department- if it comes through I'll put a word or two about el Corno. This is to happen -if- you know- in the fall.
I'm going to New York during Au june- 'till ugust-and I'll be studying at Columbia. I'll take with me some cornos to distribute. If you want to give any messages or anything that I can do in New York while there-please-let me know.
Bueno, Meg- como siempre-la familia receives my best regards and you my sincere love and efforts.

Jim

Be careful which money.

HMMA-31658

Att D

Susan Sherman
305 E. 6th St. #3
New York, N.Y. 10003
U.S.A.

NEW YORK, N.Y.
APR 25
PM
1968

STRI AT CANCER
E
AME ER SOCIETY

VIA AIR MAIL

Margaret Randall
c/o El Corno Emplumado
Apartado Postal #13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.
MEXICO

13-00000

IKON
78 E. 4
STREET
NYC, NY

TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1968

(#67)

Dear Meg,

Just a note--I'm going this afternoon to StoneyBrook to speak about the conference for their week of protest activities. I finally got most of my things & I have a packet of poetry that I'm sure was meant for you--it was the poems Tania meant for you--it must have gotten mixed up in my things. In any case I'm sending them in a separate envelop Air-Mail.

The Hippie Book is really great looking, thank you for it. There are two people in Cuba I think would be very interested in it if you could send them copies. One works on Pensimento Critico--Jose Bell Lara, Calle J #556, Vedado, Habana--he particularly wanted information about the Hippies. The other is a Cuban psychologist Gustavo Torroella, Ave 3A #22, Marianao, Habana, who was also extremely interested in anything concerning hipppies. Also Lohania Aruca, 99-4722, MINREX-Direccion de Organismos Internacionales, Depto. [illegible] ONU 516, La Habana.

It seems now as if I also have a small ulcer which showed up on last weeks X-rays. But I'm feeling much, much better now. Just have to try not to get too excited and eat right for awhile. It should go away if I'm good. (but then I dont give myself agrivation so its only partly up to me). That was what was probably causing all the trouble in Cuba. Anyway, I'm much better now. I really have to learn not to take everything so much to heart--but thats a long lesson.

I'm going to try to get the issue in shape the next few days. will give blow by blow descriptions. so you'll probably be hearing from me quite often. Its lousy cold here again, I think Spring took a look at New York and decided to go elsewhere!

Love, & more,

Susan

HMMA-31658

Att. E



CATERPILLAR
38 GREENE STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10013

NEW YORK, N.Y.
APR 29
PM
1968
CANAL ST. STA.

Meg Randall
Apartado Postal 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.
MEXICO

AIR
MAIL

28 April 1968

dear Meg,

I am sorry to have put the Japanese filmmaker on you; my misjudgement. You were right to send the thing back to me.

Some changes in my life have recently re-determined the summer, and I am doubtful tonight, really doubtful for the first time (tho I have been thinking about this for a couple of weeks, but have not written because Everything was up in the air), about the trip this summer. The thing is that a more important thing has come up, namely going to England this fall to do some very important work in an applied philosophy called Scientology (to go "clear" as they call it), and doing that I must teach all summer to make money and also to do work on the fall issue of CATERPILLAR. Marie Benoit and I are seriously considering getting married in England, and while I could put the trip off until next spring, she wants to do the thing this fall, and we both want to go clear together. So, considering all of this, I think you should scratch my name, and hope I can go to Cuba later as well as hope the Cubans will see fit to invite me later (I have heard nothing from any Cubans about the trip this summer, so I figured it is not completely set). All of the other names I sent you are still to my knowledge good⊗ If I hear otherwise I will write you immediately.

⊗ However, if since I'm not going affects the going of others, let me know + I won't contact them.

CATERPILLAR 3/4 is out, and 3 copies are on their way to you. I will mail a box of #2 and more 3/4s when I get the time. Sorry not to hv sent more, but only 3 went out to the contributors this time and I forgot about you sending some to Cuba when I mailed yours. Saw Sergio a few weeks ago. It was nice to see him. We had supper in Chinatown and I gave him a new poem.

A number of people have commented on your prose/poem in #3/4. Very impressive is the general word. I hope it looks good to you when you see the magazine. I have a great deal new work; are you open to printing more of my poetry in a forthcoming EL CORNO? I hope you are not upset my change in plans. This Sunday is the first day they have been definite. Hoping your life goes well these days,

affectionately,

HMMA-34658

Att F


ПОЧТА СССР 6 коп
ПОЧТА СССР 10 коп
PAR AVION

Margaret Randall
Apartado Postal No. 13-546
Revista "El Corno Emplumado"
México D.F.
México

México abril-20-68
"Año del Guerrillero Heroico"

Mi bella y querida Margaret:

Acabo de llegar. Aquí trabajaré como Consejero Cultural de Cuba (en México-USS) aunque eventualmente viajaré a otros países. Me trajo los dos últimos números de "El Corno..." (25 y 26) y tu libro de poemas. Muy bella la portada con la pieza de la canción protesta. Tú ¿cómo estás? Te siento bastante últimamente aun cuando no he publicado mucho. Trabajaré en Cons aquí, ahora que la muerte ya no enfría la inspiración. No dejes de escribirme y decirme en qué puedo serte útil en algo, así como enviarme números futuros de la revista y todo lo que te →

parecen interesante. Mi dirección es bien sencilla: Luis Guardia
Embajada de Cuba, Moscú, URSS.

¿Qué sabes de Susan Sherman? Saludos a los compañeros mexicanos.

Un abrazo muy cariñoso para ti

Leí cosas muy ingeniosas de Beltrán Morales ¿puedes enviarme su dirección? También gusté de Cecilia Vicuña (me refiero únicamente a las gentes que no conozco, por eso no abundo sobre W.C.W., Roque, Sergio, Cardenal, Torri, Sefeis.....) Nunca antes leí nada de Morales. Y quisiera saber más de él. Gracias por anticipado ___

HMMA-34635

Att: 6

Mondragón
Illinois State U.
Dept. of foreign langs
Normal, Ill., 61761

NORMAL
MAY 1
AM
1968
CITY

Margaret Randall
El Corno Emplumado
Apartado Postal 13-546
México 13, D.F.
MEXICO

SCHEDULE B (Form 1040)
U.S. Treasury Department
Internal Revenue Service

Supplemental Schedule of Income and Retirement Income Credit

(From pensions and annuities, rents and royalties, partnerships, and estates or trusts)

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 1040

1967

Name and address as shown on page 1 of Form 1040

Part I.—PENSION AND ANNUITY INCOME

A.—General Rule (If you did not contribute to the cost of the pension or annuity, enter the total amount received on line 6 and omit lines 1 through 5.)

			AMOUNT
1 Investment in contract		4 Amount received this year	
2 Expected return		5 Amount excludable (line 4 multiplied by line 3)	
3 Percentage of income to be excluded (line 1 divided by line 2)	%	6 Taxable portion (excess of line 4 over line 5)	

B.—Special Rule—Where your employer has contributed part of the cost and your own contribution will be recovered tax-free within 3 years. If your cost was fully recovered in prior years, enter the total amount received on line 5 and omit lines 1 through 4.

1 Cost of annuity (amounts you paid)		4 Amount received this year	
2 Cost received tax-free in past years			
3 Remainder of cost (line 1 less line 2)		5 Taxable portion (excess, if any, of line 4 over line 3)	

Part II.—RENT AND ROYALTY INCOME

1. Kind and location of property	2. Total amount of rents	3. Total amount of royalties	4. Depreciation (explain in Part IV) or depletion (attach computation)	5. Repairs (attach itemized list)	6. Other expenses (attach itemized list)
1 Totals					

2 Net income (or loss) from rents and royalties (column 2 plus column 3 less columns 4, 5, and 6)

Part III.—INCOME (OR LOSSES) FROM PARTNERSHIPS, ESTATES OR TRUSTS, ETC.

1 Partnerships (name, address, employer identification number, and nature of income) ____

2 Small business corporations (subchapter S—name, address, and employer identification number) ____

3 Estates or trusts (name, address, and employer identification number) ____

TOTAL OF PARTS I, II, AND III (Enter here and on page 2, Part II, line 3, Form 1040)

Part IV.—SCHEDULE FOR DEPRECIATION CLAIMED IN PART II ABOVE

—This schedule is designed for taxpayers using the alternative guidelines and administrative procedures described in Revenue Procedures 62-21 and 65-13 as well as for those taxpayers who wish to continue using practices authorized prior to these revenue procedures. Where double headings appear, use the first heading for depreciation under Revenue Procedures 62-21 and 65-13 and the second heading for other authorized practices.

1. Group and guideline class Description of property	2. Cost or other basis at beginning of year —Or— Cost or other basis	3. Asset additions in year (amount) —Or— Date acquired	4. Asset retirements in year (amount) (applicable only to Rev. Proc. 62-21)	5. Depreciation allowed or allowable in prior years	6. Method of computing depreciation	7. Class life —Or— Rate (%) or life	8. Depreciation for this year
1 Total additional first-year depreciation (do not include in items below) →							
Total cost or other basis							
2 Total depreciation (Enter here and in Part II, column 4 above)							

SUMMARY OF DEPRECIATION

	Straight line	Declining balance	Sum of the years-digits	Units of production	Additional first year (section 179)	Other (specify)	Total
1 Under Rev. Proc's. 62-21 and 65-13				▨	▨		
2 Other							

Part V.—RETIREMENT INCOME CREDIT

A.—General Rule

	A		B	
If separate return, use column B only. If joint return, use column A for wife and column B for husband →	A		B	
Did you receive earned income in excess of $600 in each of any 10 calendar years before 1967? (Widows or widowers see instructions, page B–3)	☐ Yes	☐ No	☐ Yes	☐ No
If answer above is "Yes" in either column, furnish all information below in that column.				
1 Retirement income for taxable year:				
(a) For taxpayers under 65 years of age: Enter only income received from pensions and annuities under public retirement systems (e.g. Fed., State Govts., etc.) included on page 1, line 9, Form 1040				
(b) For taxpayers 65 years of age or older: Enter total of pensions and annuities, interest, and dividends included on page 1, line 9, Form 1040, and gross rents from Part II, column 2 of this schedule				
2 Maximum amount of retirement income for credit computation	$1,524	00	$1,524	00
3 Deduct:				
(a) Amounts received as pensions or annuities under the Social Security Act, the Railroad Retirement Acts, and certain other exclusions from gross income				
(b) Earned income received (Does not apply to persons 72 years of age or over):				
(1) Taxpayers under 62 years of age, enter amount in excess of $900				
(2) Taxpayers 62 or over but under 72, enter amount determined as follows: If $1,200 or less, enter zero; If over $1,200 but not over $1,700, enter ½ of amount over $1,200; or if over $1,700, enter excess over $1,450				
4 Total of lines 3(a) and 3(b)				
5 Balance (subtract line 4 from line 2)				
6 Line 5 or line 1, whichever is smaller				

7 (a) Total (add amounts on line 6, columns A and B)		
If line 7(a) is less than $2,286 and this is a joint return and both husband and wife are age 65 or over, complete the Alternative Computation in B below which may result in a larger credit.		
(b) Amount from line 7 of part B below, if applicable		
8 Tentative credit. Enter 15% of line 7(a) or 15% of line 7(b), whichever is greater		
LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT INCOME CREDIT		
9 Amount of tax shown on page 1, line 12, Form 1040		
10 Less: Credits claimed for foreign taxes or tax-free covenant bonds		
11 Subtract line 10 from line 9		
12 Credit. Enter here and on page 2, Part V, line 1, Form 1040, the amount on line 11 or line 8, whichever is smaller		

B.—Alternative Computation (after completing lines 1 through 7(a) above)

This method available if:
- a. You are married and filing a joint return
- b. Both husband and wife are 65 or over, AND
- c. Either one, or both received earned income in excess of $600 in each of any 10 calendar years before 1967.

Furnish the information called for below for both husband and wife even if only one answered "Yes" in column A or B above.

	A—WIFE		B—HUSBAND			
1 Retirement income of both husband and wife from pensions and annuities, interest, and dividends included on page 1, line 9, Form 1040, and gross rents from Part II, column 2 of this schedule						
2 Maximum amount of retirement income for credit computation					$2,286	00
3 Deduct:						
(a) Amounts received as pensions or annuities under the Social Security Act, the Railroad Retirement Acts, and certain other exclusions from gross income						
(b) Earned income received (Does not apply to persons 72 years of age or over): If $1,200 or less, enter zero; If over $1,200 but not over $1,700 enter ½ of amount over $1,200; or If over $1,700, enter excess over $1,450						
4 Total of lines 3(a) and 3(b)						
5 Total (add amounts on line 4, columns A and B)						
6 Balance (subtract line 5 from line 2)						
7 Enter here and on line 7(b) of part A above, the amount on line 6 or line 1, whichever is smaller						



115

SERGIO MONDRAGON
1012 SOUTH MAIN 129
NORMAL, ILLINOIS 61761

May 1st 1968

70-1499
711

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Margaret Randall $150.00

(one hundred and fifty dollars, no/100) DOLLARS

FIRST NATIONAL BANK of normal
NORMAL, ILLINOIS

Sergio Mondragón

FOR

:0711-1496: 815-736

Querida Meg: Aquí te va este dinero para Mayo. Meg, he hecho una encuesta entre varios poetas hispanoamericanos acerca de la poesía. todos prometieron contestar las preguntas por estos días. He estado esperando esas respuestas, y por eso hoy, 1o. de Mayo, todavía no te envío mi tomo; pero seguro el viernes 3, te lo mando. (aunque no incluya esas respuestas de poetas). Ojalá tuviera

② tiempo de ponerme una carta. Cómo están ustedes? cómo fue con tus padres? Mañana voy a dar una conferencia sobre Cuba, en inglés. Espero que no haya dificultades. Yo estoy bien. Gracias por los 2 libros que me enviaste. Me gustan mucho ambos. Estoy de acuerdo en lo que dices de los Hippies. Enteramente de acuerdo. Y tus

③ poemas son muy bellos. Enhorabuena! Pareces muy activa, muy despierta, muy poeta. Parece que nos hizo bien la separación, no? Dime si vas a ir a Venezuela del 15 al 30 de junio, para hacer mis planes. Creo que llegaré allí el 15 ó 16 de junio. Saludos! Sergio

13-00000

HMMA-34653

Att. H

Mondragón - Dept. of foreign languages.

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY
NORMAL, ILLINOIS 61761

NORMAL, IL
APR 18
5 PM
1968
61761

AIR MAIL

margaret randall
el corno emplumado
apartado postal 13-546
méxico 13, d.f.

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY
NORMAL, ILLINOIS 61761

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Department of Foreign Languages
Telephone: 309-438-2211

abril 18 de 1968.

querida meg:

acaban de llegarme como seis cartas tuyas juntas, con fotos, cartas de los chics, noticias, etc. -gracias. lástima del pelo de saris. esa es una de las razones -la única razón- por lo cual no me gusta que los chics pasen la noche en tlalpan. por la insalubridad. estoy seguro que los piojos los toman allá muchas veces. en fin. qué mala noticia lo del coche. meg, no te parece que tus amigos -por lo menos dos amigos- están tomando ventajas de ti? primero fue rodolfo, quien desaparece con la grabadora. ya la devolvió? y ahora otro amigo te choca el coche y no te lo paga. dices que te va a costar más de mil pesos. te parece justo? a mí no.

gracias por los ocho dólares de mi nota. cobraste mis 700 pesos de educación? estuve en nueva york para las vacaciones de pascua. me quedé con leandro y evi. fui también a montreal y visité a los bowering. recordamos muchas cosas, hablamos horas acerca de tiempos felices, cuando tú y yo éramos una pareja llena de amor. allí estaba leonel kearns y otro poeta canadiense que hemos publicado y no recuerdo su nombre. dicen que tal vez vengan pronto a méxico. en n.y. vi a los petersen. me trataron muy bien. te mandan muchos saludos y es casi seguro que vengan a méxico en el verano. yo les invité a quedarse en la casa, ya sea que tú estés allí o en venezuela. siendo tan amigos tuyos creo que está bien. pero ellos alquilarán un apartamento, por lo menos la mayor parte del tiempo. vi también a sara blackburn, mujer maravillosa con quien hice mucha amistad. le entusiasmó la idea de tu libro sobre castro que vas a hacer en octubre con la grabadora , y me dijo que ella podría proponer ese mismo libro a una edotrial grande como Doubleday o otra igual. me parece que te va a escribir. sabes que ella tiene mucha influencia en el mundo literario de la grandes compañías editoriales. quiero pedirte un favor para ella: envíale el libro de o. paz "corriente alterna" a su domicilio, 50 W. 8 st., n.y.c.,10011- cuesta como 12.00 pesos. es urgente. gracias. vi también a clayton eshelman, me invitó a comer. está muy bien, mejor que nunca y muy amistoso. conocí también a su mujer, que me pareció una mujer muy triste, aunque buena. evi y leandro están bien. todos en n.y. te qeieren muchoy te admiran y admiran al corno. la revista se agota en tres días en 8 st. bookshops. andrei codrescu me dijo que debes enviar más ejemplares. tienen en la tienda un aviso de tu libro, anunciado entre las "novedades".

felicidades por tu antología de poesía revolucionaria. y por el manuscrito que te piden en londres. parece que una compañía grande de aquí quiere que les haga una antología de poesía hisp. -vamos a ver. qué sucedió con mi libro en el fondo? la universidad parece que no va a publicar mi libro. mala suerte la de ese aprendiz de brujo. ángela y george están muy bien. parece que se aman mucho. angela y todos, sara, clayton, etc., cuando ~~supieron~~ dije que vas a cuba en octubre, dijeron inmediatamente que tal vez vas a ser mrs. fidel castro, o al menos su amante. sara dijo que se moría de envidia. han salido más cosas del corno en los periódicos? envíame algunos recortes. bueno, ama a los chics y cuídate. te mandé una carta hablándote de los poemas de marco antonio. también envié ya su manuscrito de regreso, y me quedé con unos poemas suyos. escríbeme. dime si crees que los niños están resintiendo mucho la separación, y en qué forma. abrazos y abrazos. Sergio

HMMA-34658

Att I

PANTHEON BOOKS
437 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

AIR MAIL

Miss Margaret Randell
Apartado Postal 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.

PANTHEON BOOKS
437 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
A DIVISION OF RANDOM HOUSE, INC.

Paula McGuire

April 25, 1968

Miss Margaret Randell
Apartado Postal 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.

Dear Miss Randell:

My former colleague Sara Blackburn (who sends her love) has told me that she recently heard through your husband about your plans for a trip to Cuba in order to write a book on Castro. I should be very interested to know more about your plans with a view towards the possibility of publishing your book and hope you'll be able to write me.

Incidentally, we are about to publish Jose Yglesias's In the Fist of the Revolution: Life in a Cuban Country Town. I thought you'd be interested to read it and have sent you a copy under separate cover.

Yours sincerely,

Paula McGuire

PM:ib

TAB
332
NO DOCS
ATTACHED
FILE.
ONE
DOC

32

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] :333

Tab. -55 contains MEMO B-173 W/ATT-(1) NEWSPAPER dated 19 Sept 1968.

☐ Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

☑ Segregable portions previously recommended for but not sent to requester by IPS released, excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3) of FOIA.

☐ Located during the DDO appeals review.

☐ Referred to DDO for review by ______.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

I RECOMMEND:

☐ Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
  - ☐ ADD exemption(s) ______.
  - ☐ DROP exemption(s) ______.

☒ Sustain initial [redacted] sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(3) of FOIA.
  - ☐ ADD exemption(s) ______.
  - ☐ DROP exemption(s) (b)(1).

☐ Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

☐ Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

☐ Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

☐ Information from a foreign liaison service
☐ Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
☐ Information which would/could identify the source
☐ Information pertaining to a source
☐ Information pertaining to intelligence methods
☐ Location of CIA overseas installation
☐ Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
☐ Name of CIA employee
☒ File number/name
☐ Pseudonym
☐ Cryptonym
☐ Internal organizational data
☐ Name of FBI agent
☐ FBI file number
☐ Privacy of other individual
☐ OTHER

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. [redacted]

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

☐ maintained
☐ classified to ______
☒ declassified
☐ desensitized
☐ downgraded to ______

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

( ) CONFIDENTIAL ( ) [illegible] ( ) TOP SECRET

[redacted]

19 SEP 1968

SUBJECT: Stokely CARMICHAEL

1. Attached is a copy of an article appearing in the 9-15 May 1968 issue of Clarte, weekly newspaper of the Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) covering an interview with Stokely CARMICHAEL that was published in the 1 May issue of Humanite Nouvelle, newspaper of the French Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist). The interview was conducted when CARMICHAEL was in Paris, France.

2. Also contained in the clipping is a report of an interview on Radio Havana with CARMICHAEL following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther KING. CARMICHAEL was in Havana, Cuba, at the time.

PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON, MR. S. J. PAPICH

Based on Clarte, Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), 9-15 May 1968

Enclosure: as stated (one) [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 13 March 78

[redacted]

55

13-00000

Le peuple soviétique est fidèle à STALINE !

Clarté

Fondateur : Honoré WILLEMS, fusillé par les nazis, le 29 février 1944.

BIEN QUE LA DIRECTION DU PARTI ET DE L'ETAT SOVIETIQUES SOIT A PRESENT USURPEE PAR DES REVISIONNISTES, JE CONSEILLE AUX CAMARADES D'AVOIR LA CONVICTION QUE LES LARGES MASSES DU PEUPLE SOVIETIQUE, DES MEMBRES DU PARTI ET DES CADRES SONT BONS ET VEULENT FAIRE LA REVOLUTION ; LA DOMINATION DU REVISIONNISME NE SERA PAS LONGUE.

MAO TSE-TOUNG.

RÉDACTION
ADMINISTRATION
32, chaussée d'Alsemberg, 32
BRUXELLES 6
Tél. (02) 37.76.06

ORGANE CENTRAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE (MARXISTE-LÉNINISTE) DE BELGIQUE

HEBDOMADAIRE
NOUVELLE SERIE - Numéro 20
Semaine du 9 au 15 mai 19[illegible]
8 pages - 5 Francs
(Tarif d'abonnements : pages 8)

Stockely CARMICHAEL : Notre objectif final : Nous attaquer ax structures capitalstes des U.S.A.

Dans son numéro du Premier Mai, l'« HumanitéNouvelle », organe central du Parti Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste de France a pubi une interview de Stockely Carmichaël, leader du « Black Power » (Pouvoir Noir)Cette interview a été réalisée par un camarade africain lors du récent séjour de Carmichaël à Paris.

Le Black Power est un mouvement de masse de Afro-américains. Certaines de ses positions peuvent ne pas toujours coïncider avecelles des marxistes-léninistes mais il est évident que le combat du Black Power est hroïque, courageusement anti-raciste, anti-impérialiste.

C'est cela qui est important. C'est pour cette raison que nous reproduisons ce remarquable document.

La grande vague de combativité qui déferle sur les grandes villes américaines, dressant, en un combat héroïque, les larges masses afro-américaines contre les forces réactionnaires, les victimes racistes et l'ordre capitaliste établi, c'est déjà à l'intérieur de la citadelle impérialiste elle-même, l'amorce de « la lutte finale ». Elle consacre, par ailleurs, la faillite du mythe intégrationniste favorisé par la bourgeoisie américai-

STOCKELY CARMICHÆL — L'aspect principal de la situation du peuple afro-américain estcelui d'une nouvelle forme de colonialisme intérieur. Il s'agit d'une situation presque originale qui implique que notre lutte se fixe deux objectifs principaux :

— Objectif numéro 1 : éliminer l'oppression coloniale qui nous vise en tant que Noirs sur le triple plan économique, social et politique.

— Objectif numéro 2 : nous attaquer aux structures capitalistes et impérialistes des U.S.A.

Il est évident que l'objectif n°1 sera essentiellement poursuivi par les seuls afro-américains. Quant à l'objectif n°2, il concernera tous les révolutionnaires [illegible]

[illegible] que [illegible] de l'opprimé ne [illegible] de la violence sanglante du capitalisme américain. Il constitue en cela, un jalon important dans la lutte des peuples – et singulièrement du peuple afro-américain qui a pris conscience que seule la violence révolutionnaire peut véritablement briser le cycle sanglant de la violence contre-révolutionnaire.

Mais l'impérialisme, aux abois, tente dans un ultime effort, de jeter le discrédit sur la juste lutte du peuple afro-américain, en l'assimilant grossièrement à une « caravane d'incendies et de brigandages », en présentant ses leaders comme des « psychopathes, qui incitent publiquement au meurtre » (New York Times 12-1-68). Mais la mauvaise foi des capitalistes, elle aussi, a des limites. On est donc forcé de reconnaître, en une rage d'impuissance certes, « qu'aujourd'hui, la voix d'un Stokely Carmichael est entendue de plus en plus nettement dans le pays » (L'Economist du 11-1, Londres).

Que dit cette voix. De quelle lutte s'agit-il ? D'une simple lutte entre deux races ou de quelque chose d'autrement important ? Pourquoi les marxistes-léninistes et tous les progressistes doivent-ils la soutenir et la faire connaître ?

Des réponses apparaîtront dans le cours de l'exposé que Stokely Carmichael nous a fait récemment et que nous rendons public pour la première fois. Des réponses parfois [illegible]

[illegible] problème du racisme

— le problème de l'exploitation.

J'ai indiqué plus haut que l'objectif n°2 était une œuvre d'ensemble ; simplement parce qu'il visait à résoudre un problème qui n'est pas particulier aux Noirs : le problème de l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme. Il n'est pas nécessairement lié à la couleur de la peau.

Quant au problème du racisme, on peut dire qu'il est spécifique à l'homme noir. On peut même poser l'équation suivante : Noir = Prolétariat du monde. A cause de sa seule po[illegible]

L'Occident Blanc ne peut pas nier s'être d[illegible] sur la sueur du Noir. Prenez les Antilles françaises, holland[illegible] anglaises. La même sauce. Prenez les Etats-Unis des siècle[illegible]cédents. Prenez les Etats-Unis d'aujourd'hui. Prenez l'Afrique. L'[illegible] histoire est éloquente à ce sujet.

Les Blancs de l'Occident trouvent leur ju[illegible]n d'occidental dans la négation du Noir en tant que Noir. Ils o[illegible] du Noir un être sub-humain pour rationaliser l'exploitation du Noir. Pour ne pas s'humilier en tant qu'hommes.

— Oui, bien sûr, il y a le « Code Noir » de Colbert. Mais tout de même, cette exploitation du Noir ne peut pas être simplement un fait de psychologie appliquée, car en fait, le racisme apparaît bien comme une manifestation de la lutte des classes. Il n'y a qu'à reprendre les exemples.

STOCKELY. — D'abord, il y a un problème immédiat : celui de la prise de conscience de la victime en face du bourreau. C'est en tant que Noirs que nous entendons nous battre.

Il reste qu'aux Etats-Unis, un Noir « bien placé » sur le plan économique n'échappe pas au racisme.

Il n'est que de lire la presse américaine pour s'en convaincre. Le problème du racisme ici n'est pas nécessairement lié au problème de l'exploitation.

Le racisme fait partie de l'arsenal idéologique et pratique de l'impérialisme américain. Les Noirs sont d'autant plus exposés que les Blancs occidentaux ont détruit les cultures africaines de l'homme noir, les Noirs, dans le monde, parlent la langue de leurs maîtres.

Or la culture comme dit Fanon, est une « force cohésive ». Il leur faut donc aussi résister à cette culture d'imposition (le pidgin, le petit-nègre ?).

Dans le cadre des Afro-américains cela transparaît sous la forme du christianisme. Le christianisme est une culture d'imposition, c'est-à-dire essentiellement une culture impérialiste, parce que liée à l'idée de la valeur universelle du maître. Vous devez en savoir quelque chose en Afrique, avec le cortège de conversions forcées.

En fait, la libération culturelle est une chose très importante. Elle doit viser à répéter le système d'éducation du maître (en tant que stade final de l'imposition culturelle). L'éducation capitaliste vise à [illegible]

— De quel ordre est-elle ?

— Elle est nécessairement politique.

— L'une des limites objectives des dirigeants qui nous ont précédés est la suivante : il ont fait appel aux oppresseurs et non aux opprimés. Nous, nous faisons appel aux opprimés. Nous leur disons :

« Si vous voulez être libres, il faut vous battre ! » Le président Mao Tsé-toung indique avec raison que « le pouvoir est au bout du fusil ». C'est juste. Nous opposerons nos fusils libérateurs aux fusils racistes de l'impérialisme américain, dans ses propres villes.

Nous le forcerons à se battre comme nous l'entendrons. Comme font nos camarades vietnamiens. S'il veut utiliser du napalm et des rockets sur ses propres villes, nous n'y voyons pas d'inconvénients, mais nous nous battrons, c'est une chose entendue.

— Vois-tu un rapport entre votre lutte et celles des camarades vietnamiens, et des autres peuples en lutte contre l'impérialisme, U.S. en tête ?

Bien évidemment, chaque fois que les bases de l'impérialisme sont minées à l'extérieur, notre lutte s'en trouve proportionnellement avantagée.

Nous voudrions bien par exemple qu'il se trouve un seul pays africain qui se développe par ses propres efforts, et non en allant mendier chez les Blancs occidentaux.

Nous en aurions fait, pour la mobilisation de nos masses fondamentales un modèle psychologique et méthodique à la fois. Mais on ne peut pas dire qu'il y ait un seul pays révolutionnaire en Afrique à l'heure actuelle. C'est d'ailleurs pour cela que l'O.U.A. est paralysée. Aujourd'hui, si des Noirs américains avaient à s'exiler en Afrique, pas un seul pays africain ne les accepterait pour la bonne raison que tous ces pays sont soumis au joug de l'impérialisme américain.

Toutes les petites bourgeoisies contre-révolutionnaires au pouvoir en Afrique sont inféodées à Johnson, et exploitent leur propres frères de couleur.

— Quelle est votre tâche principale en ce moment. Celle qui requiert actuellement la priorité ?

D'abord, éliminer nos ennemis, c'est-à-dire tous les mouvements contre-révolutionnaires voulant s'intégrer à la société capitaliste blanche.

Ensuite, organiser notre peuple pour qu'il acquierre le mordant offensif, condition sine qua non pour briser le statut quo d'aujourd'hui.

Car c'est bien cela que signifie la lutte défensive des Luther King et autres.

Pour vaincre, il s'agit d'attaquer. C'est un programme minimum.

Interview téléphonique à Radio-La Havane

Déclaration de Carmichaël à la suite

13-00000

[illegible] ; mais elles expriment toutes une foi inébranlable en la victoire finale. D'autres naîtront du développement de cette lutte qui n'en n'est qu'à ses débuts. Nous avons tenu à les présenter comme elles sont venues au cours de la conversation.

Stokely parle en responsable. Rien d'extravagant en lui contrairement à ce que suggère une certaine presse. Mise très simple. Il n'a pas eu le temps de se peigner : nous l'avons surpris au saut du lit. La veille, nous avons passé la soirée ensemble. Nous sommes, en tout, cinq camarades : nous parlons très librement. Une camarade afro-américaine - vivant à Paris - assure la régularité de la traduction. Les entretiens durèrent quatre heures.

KIMBA.

rétablir et à perpétuer la société capitaliste.

— Pratiquement, comment tout cela peut-il s'agencer ?

En organisant les Noirs. Historiquement, nous venons tous d'Afrique. En nous dispersant dans leur monde, les Blancs occidentaux nous ont appris, par la négative certes, mais nous ont appris quand même à apprécier l'unité. Nous savons aujourd'hui, que l'unité, c'est la puissance. C'est pour réaliser cet impératif d'unité que nous avons arrêté, dans un premier temps, de nous réaliser culturellement, en rejetant le christianisme (culture d'imposition, liée à l'idée de suprématie de la culture des Blancs occidentaux).

— Le problème à résoudre est celui de créer des révolutionnaires noirs. Pour nous, cela signifie 3 objectifs :

1. Adoption d'une langue nationale africaine : le swahili, par exemple.
2. Destruction du christianisme.
3. Redécouvrir l'Afrique, mais d'une manière scientifique, pour y puiser nos propres héros, au lieu d'assumer les héros blancs occidentaux.

En somme, recréer notre culture pour en faire une force de cohésion.

Dégager une idéologie politique commune. A cet égard l'expérience de la Révolution chinoise est riche d'exemples mobilisateurs.

Notre tâche à nous est de lutter pour acquérir une idéologie correcte, capable d'unifier tous les Noirs.

La chose fondamentale à retenir, c'est de contribuer à développer la conscience qui doit amener l'Américain noir à résister. Cette conscience est nécessaire.

de l'assassinat de Martin Luther King

La guerre de guérilla dans les villes

- Les racistes et les [illegible] nord-américains, notamment [illegible] Brown en prison et hier soir [illegible] assassiné Martin Luther King. Ils ont commis une grave erreur car il était le seul dirigeant qui exhortait la population noire des Etats-Unis à ne pas brûler les villes, à ne pas commettre d'actes de violence. [illegible] nant qu'ils ont assassiné King, [illegible] dirigeant noir ne pourra dire à ses frères de ne pas brûler les villes, [illegible] signifie qu'il sera nécessaire de s'engager à fond dans la révolution.

- Hier soir, comme conséquence de l'assassinat de King, il y a eu de graves incidents dans 25 villes, des incendies, des coups de feu, des combats et des morts. Il est évident qu'il y aura d'autres incidents de ce genre qui se convertiront de plus en plus en guerre de guérilla dans les villes, car il est évident que nous ne pouvons pas affronter la police en rébellion ouverte.

- En conséquence le nombre de personnes qui commencent à penser sérieusement à la guerre de guérilla urbaine à grande échelle augmente car c'est l'unique manière non seulement de donner une réponse adéquate à l'assassinat de King mais d'avancer vers une véritable révolution au sein du pays et de mettre à genoux le système impérialiste. Pour nous, la nécessité de la chute de ce système est évidente pour que l'humanité puisse vivre. Et nous donnerons notre vie pour y arriver.

19 SEP 1968

SUBJECT: Stokely CARMICHAEL

1. Attached is a copy of an article appearing in the 9-15 May 1968 issue of Clarte, weekly newspaper of the Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) covering an interview with Stokely CARMICHAEL that was published in the 1 May issue of Humanite Nouvelle, newspaper of the French Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist). The interview was conducted when CARMICHAEL was in Paris, France.

2. Also contained in the clipping is a report of an interview on Radio Havana with CARMICHAEL following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther KING. CARMICHAEL was in Havana, Cuba, at the time.

PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON,

Based on Clarte, Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), 9-15 May 1968
Enclosure: as stated (one)

Previously
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 19 AUG 1976
With newspaper clippings

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
CI/Ober	5847	B-173
		DATE 19 Sept 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

EYES ONLY, CI/SO Internal Use Only

Originated by: CIOP/DO:M.Taylor
(19 Sept 68)

Based on: Clarte, Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) 9-15 May 1968

Disseminated to: FBI on
17 ~~20~~ Sept 68

File: B-Memos (record copy)
PROD Brussels
cc: CARMICHAEL, Stokely (soft) (w/enc)
PROD
cc: EYES ONLY B-173

28 Jul 1978

WARNING NOTICE
This document contains information exempted from unauthorized disclosure by the Freedom of Information Act and/or the Privacy Act [5 USC 552a; 5 USC 552a(a)].

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET 19 SEP 1968

NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

SUBJECT: Stokely CARMICHAEL

1. Attached is a copy of an article appearing in the 9-15 May 1968 issue of Clarte, weekly newspaper of the Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) covering an interview with Stokely CARMICHAEL that was published in the 1 May issue of Humanite Nouvelle, newspaper of the French Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist). The interview was conducted when CARMICHAEL was in Paris, France.

2. Also contained in the clipping is a report of an interview on Radio Havana with CARMICHAEL following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther KING. CARMICHAEL was in Havana, Cuba, at the time.

PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON, MR. S. J. PAPICH

Based on Clarte, Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist),
9-15 May 1968

Enclosure: as stated (one) (filed in Carmichael sens. soft)

Declassified by 060595
date 28 Feb 1978

FULL TEXT COPY – DO NOT RELEASE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 1978
[redacted] IMPDET CL BY 060595

55

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

13-00000

Le peuple soviétique est fidèle à STALINE !

Clarté

Fondateur : Honoré WILLEMS, fusillé par les nazis, le 29 février 1944.

BIEN QUE LA DIRECTION DU PARTI ET DE L'ETAT SOVIETIQUES SOIT A PRESENT USURPEE PAR DES REVISIONNISTES, JE CONSEILLE AUX CAMARADES D'AVOIR LA CONVICTION QUE LES LARGES MASSES DU PEUPLE SOVIETIQUE, DES MEMBRES DU PARTI ET DES CADRES SONT BONS ET VEULENT FAIRE LA REVOLUTION ; LA DOMINATION DU REVISIONNISME NE SERA PAS LONGUE.

MAO TSE-TOUNG.

RÉDACTION
ADMINISTRATION
32, chaussée d'Alsemberg, 32
BRUXELLES 6
Tél. (02) 37.76.06

ORGANE CENTRAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE
(MARXISTE-LÉNINISTE), DE BELGIQUE

HEBDOMADAIRE
NOUVELLE SERIE - Numéro 20
Semaine du 9 au 15 mai 1969
8 pages - 5 Francs
(Tarif d'abonnements : pages 8)

Stockely CARMICHAEL :

Notre objectif final :

Nous attaquer ax structures capitalstes des U.S.A.

Dans son numéro du Premier Mai, l'« HumanitéNouvelle », organe central du Parti Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste de France a publié une interview de Stockely Carmichaël, leader du « Black Power » (Pouvoir Noir)Cette interview a été réalisée par un camarade africain lors du récent séjour de Carmichaël à Paris.

Le Black Power est un mouvement de masse de Afro-américains. Certaines de ses positions peuvent ne pas toujours coïncider aveccelles des marxistes-léninistes mais il est évident que le combat du Black Power est hroïque, courageusement anti-raciste, anti-impérialiste.

C'est cela qui est important. C'est pour cette raison que nous reproduisons ce remarquable document.

La grande vague de combativité qui déferle sur les grandes villes américaines, démontre, en un combat héroïque, les larges masses afro-américaines contre les forces réactionnaires, les victimes racistes et l'ordre capitaliste établi, c'est déjà à l'intérieur de la citadelle impérialiste elle-même, l'amorce de « la lutte finale ». Elle confirme, par ailleurs, [illegible]

STOCKELY CARMICHÆL — L'aspect principal de la situation du peuple afro-américain est celui d'une nouvelle forme de colonialisme intérieur. Il s'agit d'une situation presque originale qui implique que notre lutte se fixe deux objectifs principaux :

— Objectif numéro 1 : éliminer l'oppression coloniale qui nous vise en tant que Noirs sur le triple plan économique, social et politique.

— Objectif numéro 2 : nous attaquer aux structures capitalistes et impérialistes des U.S.A.

Il est [illegible]

[illegible], les perspectives sont claires : Memphis a démontré que la non-violence de l'opprimé ne saurait préserver de la violence sanglante du capitalisme américain. Il constitue en cela, un jalon important dans la lutte des peuples - et singulièrement du peuple afro-américain qui a pris conscience que seule la violence révolutionnaire peut véritablement briser le cycle sanglant de la violence contre-révolutionnaire.

Mais l'impérialisme, aux abois, tente dans un ultime effort, de jeter le discrédit sur la juste lutte du peuple afro-américain, en l'assimilant grossièrement à une « sarabande d'incendies et de brigandage », en présentant ses leaders comme des « psychopates, qui incitent publiquement au meurtre » (New York Times 12-1-68). Mais la mauvaise foi des capitalistes, elle aussi, a des limites. On est donc forcé de reconnaître, en une rage d'impuissance certes, « qu'aujourd'hui, la voix d'un Stokely Carmichael est entendue de plus en plus nettement dans le pays » (L'Economist du 11-1, Londres).

Que dit cette voix. De quelle lutte s'agit-il ? D'une simple lutte entre deux races ou de quelque chose d'autrement important ? Pourquoi les marxistes-léninistes et tous les progressistes doivent-ils la soutenir et la faire connaître ?

Des réponses apparaîtront dans le cours de l'exposé que Stokely Carmichael nous a fait récemment et que nous rendons public pour la première fois. Des réponses parfois

— le problème du racisme
— le problème de l'exploitation.

J'ai indiqué plus haut que l'objectif n°2 était une œuvre d'ensemble ; simplement parce qu'il visait à résoudre un problème qui n'est pas particulier aux Noirs : le problème de l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme. Il n'est pas nécessairement lié à la couleur de la peau.

Quant au problème du racisme, on peut dire qu'il est spécifique à l'homme noir. On peut même poser l'équatio[illegible]ivante : Noir = Prolétariat du monde. A cause de sa seule pe[illegible]

L'Occident Blanc ne peut pas nier s'être d[illegible] sur la sueur du Noir. Prenez les Antilles françaises, holland[illegible] anglaises. La même sauce. Prenez les Etats-Unis des siècle[illegible]cédents. Prenez les Etats-Unis d'aujourd'hui. Prenez l'Afrique. L'[illegible] histoire est éloquente à ce sujet.

Les Blancs de l'Occident trouvent leur ju[illegible]n d'occidental dans la négation du Noir en tant que Noir. Ils o[illegible] du Noir un être sub-humain pour rationaliser l'exploitation du Noir. Pour ne pas s'humilier en tant qu'hommes.

— Oui, bien sûr, il y a le « Code Noir » de Colbert. Mais tout de même, cette exploitation du Noir ne peut pas être simplement un fait de psychologie appliquée, car en fait, le racisme apparaît bien comme une manifestation de la lutte des classes. Il n'y a qu'à reprendre les exemples.

STOCKELY. — D'abord, il y a un problème immédiat : celui de la prise de conscience de la victime en face du bourreau. C'est en tant que Noirs que nous entendons nous battre.

Il reste qu'aux Etats-Unis, un Noir « bien placé » sur le plan économique n'échappe pas au racisme.

Il n'est que de lire la presse américaine pour s'en convaincre. Le problème du racisme ici n'est pas nécessairement lié au problème de l'exploitation.

Le racisme fait partie de l'arsenal idéologique et pratique de l'impérialisme américain. Les Noirs sont d'autant plus exposés que les Blancs occidentaux ont détruit les cultures africaines de l'homme noir, les Noirs, dans le monde, parlent la langue de leurs maîtres.

Or la culture comme dit Fanon, est une « force cohésive » : Il leur faut donc aussi résister à cette culture d'imposition (le pidgin, le petit-nègre ?).

Dans le cadre des Afro-américains cela transparaît sous la forme du christianisme. Le christianisme est une culture d'imposition, c'est-à-dire essentiellement une culture impérialiste, parce que liée à l'idée de la valeur universelle du maître. Vous devez en savoir quelque chose en Afrique, avec le cortège de conversions forcées.

En fait, la libération culturelle est une chose très importante. Elle doit viser à répéter le système d'éducation du maître (en tant que stade final de l'imposition culturelle). L'éducation capitaliste vise à

— De quel ordre est-elle ?

— Elle est nécessairement politique.

— L'une des limites objectives des dirigeants qui nous ont précédés est la suivante : ils ont fait appel aux oppresseurs et non aux opprimés. Nous, nous faisons appel aux opprimés. Nous leur disons :

« Si vous voulez être libres, il faut vous battre ! » Le président Mao Tsé-toung indique avec raison que « le pouvoir est au bout du fusil ». C'est juste. Nous opposerons nos fusils libérateurs aux fusils racistes de l'impérialisme américain, dans ses propres villes.

Nous le forcerons à se battre comme nous l'entendrons. Comme font nos camarades vietnamiens. S'il veut utiliser du napalm et des rockets sur ses propres villes, nous n'y voyons pas d'inconvénients, mais nous nous battrons, c'est une chose entendue.

— Vois-tu un rapport entre votre lutte et celles des camarades vietnamiens, et des autres peuples en lutte contre l'impérialisme, U.S. en tête ?

Bien évidemment, chaque fois que les bases de l'impérialisme sont minées à l'extérieur, notre lutte s'en trouve proportionnellement avantagée.

Nous voudrions bien par exemple qu'il se trouve un seul pays africain qui se développe par ses propres efforts, et non en allant mendier chez les Blancs occidentaux.

Nous en aurions fait, pour la mobilisation de nos masses fondamentales un modèle psychologique et méthodique à la fois. Mais on ne peut pas dire qu'il y ait un seul pays révolutionnaire en Afrique à l'heure actuelle. C'est d'ailleurs pour cela que l'O.U.A. est paralysée. Aujourd'hui, si des Noirs américains avaient à s'exiler en Afrique, pas un seul pays africain ne les accepterait pour la bonne raison que tous ces pays sont soumis au joug de l'impérialisme américain.

Toutes les petites bourgeoisies contre-révolutionnaires au pouvoir en Afrique sont inféodées à Johnson, et exploitent leur propres frères de couleur.

— Quelle est votre tâche principale en ce moment. Celle qui requiert actuellement la priorité ?

D'abord, éliminer nos ennemis, c'est-à-dire tous les mouvements contre-révolutionnaires voulant s'intégrer à la société capitaliste blanche.

Ensuite, organiser notre peuple pour qu'il acquierre le mordant offensif, condition sine qua non pour briser le statut quo d'aujourd'hui.

Car c'est bien cela que signifie la lutte défensive des Luther King et autres.

Pour vaincre, il s'agit d'attaquer. C'est un programme minimum.

Interview téléphonique à Radio-La Havane

Déclaration de Carm

marades ; mais elles expriment toutes une foi inébranlable en la victoire finale. D'autres naîtront du développement de cette lutte qui n'en n'est qu'à ses débuts. Nous avons tenu à les présenter comme elles sont venues au cours de la conversation.

Stokely parle en responsable. Rien d'extravagant en lui, contrairement à ce que suggère une certaine presse. Mise très simple. Il n'a pas eu le temps de se peigner : nous l'avons surpris au saut du lit. La veille, nous avons passé la soirée ensemble. Nous sommes, en tout, cinq camarades : nous parlons très librement. Une camarade afro-américaine - vivant à Paris - assure la régularité de la traduction. Les entretiens durèrent quatre heures.

KIMBA.

rétablir et à perpétuer la société capitaliste.

— Pratiquement, comment tout cela peut-il s'agencer ?

En organisant les Noirs. Historiquement, nous venons tous d'Afrique. En nous dispersant dans leur monde, les Blancs occidentaux nous ont appris, par la négative certes, mais nous ont appris quand même à apprécier l'unité. Nous savons aujourd'hui, que l'unité, c'est la puissance. C'est pour réaliser cet impératif d'unité que nous avons arrêté, dans un premier temps, de nous réaliser culturellement, en rejetant le christianisme (culture d'imposition, liée à l'idée de suprématie de la culture des Blancs occidentaux).

— Le problème à résoudre est celui de créer des révolutionnaires noirs. Pour nous, cela signifie 3 objectifs :

1. Adoption d'une langue nationale africaine : le swahili, par exemple.
2. Destruction du christianisme.
3. Redécouvrir l'Afrique, mais d'une manière scientifique, pour y puiser nos propres héros, au lieu d'assumer les héros blancs occidentaux.

En somme, recréer notre culture pour en faire une force de cohésion.

Dégager une idéologie politique commune. A cet égard l'expérience de la Révolution chinoise est riche d'exemples mobilisateurs.

Notre tâche à nous est de lutter pour acquérir une idéologie correcte, capable d'unifier tous les Noirs.

La chose fondamentale à retenir, c'est de contribuer à développer la conscience qui doit amener l'Américain noir à résister. Cette conscience est nécessaire.

---

de l'assassinat de Martin Luther King

La guerre de guérilla dans les villes

« Les racistes et les im[illegible] nord-américains maintiennent [illegible] Brown en prison et hier soir [illegible] assassiné Martin Luther King. [illegible] ont commis une grave erreur [illegible] il était le seul dirigeant qui exh[illegible] la population noire des Etats-[illegible] à ne pas brûler les villes, à ne [illegible] mettre d'actes de violence. Ma[illegible]nant qu'ils ont assassiné King, [illegible] dirigeant noir ne pourra dire à [illegible] frères de ne pas brûler les villes [illegible] signifie qu'il sera nécessaire de [illegible]gager à fond dans la révolution.

- Hier soir, comme conséqu[illegible] l'assassinat de King, il y a eu de graves incidents dans 35 villes, [illegible] incendies, des coups de feu, de[illegible] bats et des morts. Il est évident qu'il y aura d'autres incidents de ce genre qui se convertiront de plus en plus en guerre de guérilla dans les villes, car il est évident que nous ne pouvons pas affronter la police en rébellion ouverte.

- En conséquence le nombre de personnes qui commencent à penser sérieusement à la guerre de guérilla urbaine à grande échelle augmente car c'est l'unique manière non seulement de donner une réponse adéquate à l'assassinat de King mais d'avancer vers une véritable révolution au sein du pays et de mettre à genoux le système impérialiste. Pour nous, la nécessité de la chute de ce système est évidente pour que l'humanité puisse vivre. Et nous donnerons notre vie pour y arriver.

JFK 15
F3

334

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 334

ab 0-75 contains MEMO B-191 dated 9 Oct 1968.

(✓) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(Liaison) (b)(3) of FOIA.

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______________ of ________.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______________.

rther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

(X) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.
- ( ) ADD exemption(s) (b)(6).
- ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______________.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______________ of ________.
- ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______________.
- ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______________.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______________ of ________.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______________ of ________.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______________ of ________.

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

- ☒ Information from a foreign liaison service
- ☐ Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
- ☒ Information which would/[redacted] identify the source
- ☐ Information pertaining to a source
- ☒ Information pertaining to intelligence methods
- ☒ Location of CIA overseas installation
- ☐ Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
- ☒ Names of CIA employees
- ☐ File number
- ☐ Pseudonym
- ☐ Cryptonym
- ☒ Internal organizational data
- ☐ Name of FBI agent
- ☐ FBI file number
- ☒ Privacy of other individuals
- ☐ OTHER

MMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

uring the DDO classification review, this document which was marked
s SECRET was:

- (✓) maintained
- ( ) classified to ______________
- ( ) declassified
- ( ) desensitized
- ( ) downgraded to ______________

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

[illegible] ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

UBJECT: (Optional)

ROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
CI/Ober	5847	B-191
		DATE 9 October 1968

O: (Officer designation, room number, and uilding)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

~~CI/SO Internal Use Only~~
EYES ONLY

Originated by: WH/7/R/PROlson
(8 October 68)

Based on: HJK-251
a. para 405
b. para 406
c. para 411
d. para 413
e. para 417
f. para 420

Disseminated to: FBI on
10 Oct 68

~~File~~ B-Memos (record copy)
(w/att)
cc: 100-300-44
cc: PROD Kingston
PROD

EYES ONLY B-191

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

9 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Jamaican Special Branch Report -
Jamaica/United States Black Power Ties

1. Pertinent items from the Jamaican Special Branch monthly report for April 1968, which contains several references to ties between Black Power groups in Jamaica and the United States, are provided, in full, below. A summary of the report, omitting portions concerning the United States or United States citizens, has been disseminated in CS-311/06459-68, a copy of which is attached.

2. The items of possible interest, omitted from the dissemination, are noted below:

a. During April 1968, four meetings of the Wilson faction of the Nation of Islam (NOI) were held. On 3 April, Percy Hayles, the boxer, said that he was impressed with the doctrine and had written to Elijah Mohammed asking for a scholarship to enable him to study in one of the Islam Universities in the United States. Errol Levy said that only a revolution could end the white man's practice of robbing the black people of everything.

b. At the meeting on 24 April, Cecil (Prince Buster) Campbell stated that the premises on 47 Charles Street in Kingston belonged to him and he was willing for it to be used for the assistance of the black race. He called for unity among black people and said that his organization was fighting to rule Jamaica. He told members that they should be prepared to meet the Reverend Sherriffe (aka Thomas View) who would soon be visiting the Island.

c. On the 5th and 8th of April, discussions were held led by George Vassel, leader of the Young Socialist

FULL TEXT COPY -- DO NOT RELEASE

75

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Jul 1978
E2 IMPDET CL BY 060595

League and a member of the Jamaican (Caribbean) Workers Movement, on the possibility of holding demonstrations at the American Embassy in Kingston to protest against the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Vassel claimed that there was a United States citizen hiding in Jamaica to escape the draft who had in his possession recordings of speeches made by the late Malcolm X during 1964. One of these was entitled "The Ballot or Bullets". He stated that King's death disproved his theory of non-violence and was bringing into prominence men like Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown.

d. During April, about 40 persons including Winston Monroe, Joseph Christie, Roy Jeffrey, Leonard Solomon and one Hy Survad, who is the American draft escapee referred to in Paragraph c. above, met at 23 Fourth Street, Trench Town (Dallas Corner), where Survad, identified as a Black Muslim and a member of the Black Power Movement (BPM), answered questions put to him by the gathering. It was understood that Survad was in Jamaica to solicit support for the BPM in the United States as well as to establish a branch here. The record "The Ballot or Bullets" was played by Survad and recorded by Monroe.

e. Survad accepted George Myers' invitation to attend a get-together which he was arranging in Savanna-la-Mar on 11 May, and to spend a week or two with him there. They discussed the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the BPM, and it was suggested that a local Steering Committee should be appointed to consider the formation of a group in Jamaica.

f. (Jamaica Service Comment: Survad has subsequently been identified as John Davis, aka Selvyn Grey, a member of CORE and the Black Muslims. He is in touch with Rastafarians at Kintyre, and the leaders of the Viking and Spade Gangs. He is expecting to meet one Corporal James, aka "Jimmy" of the Jamaica Defence Force, who is said to have complained that he was deprived of promotion because of his views. Arrangements were also being made for him to meet Walter Rodney of the University of the West Indies. Survad has stated that if given the chance he would, within eighteen months, stage a demonstration. He has suggested that if his colleagues can supply marijuana and find a way to export it, he could guarantee an outlet in the United States and the money thus obtained could be used to finance the local Movement. Survad was being supported by his girlfriend, Bernadine Houston, who was expected to arrive from the United States towards the end of the ensuing month. He is now in straitened circumstances.)

WH/7/R/PROlson:mbk (8 October 1968)

Distribution:
Orig - FBI w/att
3 - CI/OPS/DO
1 - WH/7/R/JATS
1 - C/WH/7/JATS
1 - C/WH/FI

Based on: HJK-251
a. - para 405
b. - para 406
c. - para 411
d. - para 413
e. - para 417
f. - para 420

TAB #235 NOT INCLUDED

36

13-00000

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

336 [redacted]

1. Tab 272-
A-80381 contains Two Letter Intercepts dated Sept 17, 1969.

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

(X) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

(X) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) (b)(6) of FOIA.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
( ) Pseudonym
( ) Cryptonym
( ) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. These two letters talk about Dr King in the text. However to release them to Mr. Weinberg would be an invasion of privacy of Mrs King and the individuals writing to Mrs King. These documents should be described as "Letter Intercepts"

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as ______ was:

( ) maintained
( ) classified to ______
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
( ) downgraded to ______

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☒ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

AFTER 5 DAYS RETURN TO:

[redacted]

BERNICE ROBINSON
22 DEWEY ST
CHARLESTON SC 29403

PAR AVION

20 лет Германской

ПОЧТА СССР 6

ПОЧТА СССР 10 КОП.

VIA AIR MAIL

Mrs. Martin Luther King Jr.
230 Sunset Drive N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia
U. S. A.

B

70H03 B

(1)

Leningrad, Russia
U.S.S.R.

Dear Mrs. King:

While on this East European Churchmen's Study Tour, I visited a little town in East Germany, Called Hernhut.

The Moravian Church (Oldest in Hernhut) officials, hosted our group during our visit there. I saw your husbands books on sale in their one good Bookstore.

A Young man who is head of the youth work in Hernhut, informed us that they are setting up a room in the Youth Center, in memory of Dr. King. He wanted your address so that he Could write and let you know what they were doing and the respect they have for Dr. Kings Memory. I gave him your address, so I am writing to let you know that, if you haven't heard from him

(2)

yet, you will be receiving Communications from, Dietrich Heise, 89 Gorlitz D.D.R., Bautzener Str. 38, and you will be aware of what is happening in this small Eastern Germany town, a population of only 2,000.

Respectfully,
Bernice V. Robinson
22 Dewey Street
Charleston, S.C. 29403

Cent.
Atlanta

ПОЧТА СССР 10 КОП.

B



Куда Mrs Martin Luther King
234 Sunset Ave
Northwest Atlanta
Кому Georgia 30314
USA

Адрес отправителя Moscow A319
Krasnoarmeyskaya 21 apt
Raya Orlova

Sept 17, 1969

Mrs Martin Luther
King Jr
234 Sunset ave
Northwest Atlanta
Georgia, 30314!

Dear Mrs King

Three weeks ago I got the book you so kindly sent me and immediately answered you. Only today – two months and a half, – came your letter with a reprint of "Playboy" article. In case my first letter will not reach you, permit me to repeat – it was an honor, a joy and somehow – a new responsibility – to get a letter from you.

I am in correspondence with Martin Luther King Memorial Library, have sent them a copy of a very popular magazine for children "the Pioneer" where last year I published a little essay on the late Martin Luther King. Now I completed a

89525B

new work – Gandhi and Martin Luther King
– but I lack material – Dr King's article
in „Ebony" – „My trip to the land of
Gandhi". It would be of course marve-
lous to ~~have~~ get some articles on
the Nery Price, – how it was...
My long essay on the „Martin
Luther King's road to the Cross" is
still at the publishers. I hope it will
be published at last and I will
have the possibility to send it to
you. If somebody in your country
will place an international symposium
on the life thought and meaning of
Martin Luther King, – please let me know. It
would be my deepest wish to contribute;
I hope you will not consider this
wish immodest, – it is very serious, though,
of course, I could not be the judge
of my own work.

– Thank you again, dear Mrs King,
for your letter.

Yours very sincerely
Raissa Orlova

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

[redacted] 337

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

1. Tab 9-56 contains Cable Budapest 017 dated 19 May 1971.

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

   (✓) Segregable portions ~~previously~~ released ~~under exemption~~(s) recommended for but not sent to the requester ERS (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA. Excised portion [illegible]

   ( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______

   (☒) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   - ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   - ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   - ( ) Information which would/could identify the source
   - ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   - ( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   - (☒) Location of CIA overseas installation
   - ( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   - ( ) Name of CIA employee
   - ( ) File number
   - ( ) Pseudonym
   - (☒) Cryptonyms
   - ( ) Internal organizational data
   - ( ) Name of FBI agent
   - ( ) FBI file number
   - ( ) Privacy of other individual
   - ( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO appeal classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

   - ( ) maintained
   - ( ) classified to ______
   - ( ) declassified
   - ( ) desensitized
   - (☒) downgraded to confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

13-00000

19 14 132 MAY 71

191348Z MAY 71 CITE

HEADQUARTERS

MHCHAOS

REF: HEADQUARTERS

1. IN FINAL COVERAGE ON 18 MAY OF WPC, WHICH ENDED 16 MAY, [redacted] PRESS HAS MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RE U.S. PARTICIPANTS:

A. SIDNEY PECK, IDENTIFIED AS "USA PROFESSOR," SPOKE AT CONGRESS ON VIET NAM WAR.

B. WPC HAS AWARDED JOLIOT CURIE GOLD MED~~ELH~~AL POSTHUMOUSLY TO REV MARTIN LUTHER KING. MEDAL ACCEPTED BY REV RALPH ABERNATHY AND REV W. WALKER "AN AMERICAN PEACE FIGHTER." PHOTOGRAPH (POUCHED) OF PRESENTATION ALSO PICTURES U.S. DELEGATES WILLIAM DOURTHARD ~~ANS~~ AND MRS. ADDIE WYATT.

C. U.S. DELEGATES RUTH GAGE-COLBY AND SYLVIA KUSCHER (SIC) SPOKE AT MEETING OF INDOCHINESE AND AMERICAN DELEGATES.

D. AMERICANS HERBERT APTHEKER AND CARLTON GOODLETT REELECTED TO PRESIDENTIAL BOARD.

2. POUCHING MOST SIGNIFICANT PRESS COVERAGE OF COUNCIL SESSIONS.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 10 March 1978

[redacted]

54

19 14 13Z MAY 71

191348Z MAY 71 CITE

HEADQUARTERS

.CHAOS

REF: HEADQUARTERS

1. IN FINAL COVERAGE ON 18 MAY OF WPC, WHICH ENDED 16 MAY, LOCAL PRESS HAS MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RE U.S. PARTICIPANTS: ✓

A. SIDNEY PECK, IDENTIFIED AS "USA PROFESSOR," SPOKE AT CONGRESS ON VIET NAM WAR.

B. WPC HAS AWARDED JOLIOT CURIE GOLD MED~~ILEH~~AL POSTHUMOUSLY TO REV MARTIN LUTHER KING. MEDAL ACCEPTED BY REV RALPH ABERNATHY AND REV W. WALKER "AN AMERICAN PEACE FIGHTER." PHOTOGRAPH (POUCHED) OF PRESENTATION ALSO PICTURES U.S. DELEGATES WILLIAM DOURTHARD AND MRS. ADDIE WYATT.

C. U.S. DELEGATES RUTH GAGE-COLBY AND SYLVIA KUSCHER (SIC) SPOKE AT MEETING OF INDOCHINESE AND AMERICAN ~~[illegible]~~ DELEGATES.

D. AMERICANS HERBERT APTHEKER AND CARLTON GOODLET REELECTED TO PRESIDENTIAL BOARD.

2. POUCHING MOST SIGNIFICANT PRESS COVERAGE OF COUNCIL SESSIONS.

Previously
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date

54

CONFIDENTIAL
19 1952Z MAY 71

S E C R E T 191340Z MAY 71 CITE BUDAPEST 017

HEADQUARTERS

RYBAT MHCURB MHCHAOS

REF: HEADQUARTERS 2789

1. IN FINAL COVERAGE ON 18 MAY OF WPC, WHICH ENDED 16 MAY, LOCAL PRESS HAS MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RE U.S. PARTICIPANTS: ✓

A. SIDNEY PECK, IDENTIFIED AS "USA PROFESSOR," SPOKE AT CONGRESS ON VIET NAM WAR.

B. WPC HAS AWARDED JOLIOT CURIE GOLD MED~~ALEX~~AL POSTHUMOUSLY TO REV MARTIN LUTHER KING. MEDAL ACCEPTED BY REV RALPH ABERNATHY AND REV W. WALKER "AN AMERICAN PEACE FIGHTER." PHOTOGRAPH (POUCHED) OF PRESENTATION ALSO PICTURES U.S. DELEGATES WILLIAM DOURTHARD ~~ANA~~ AND MRS. ADDIE WYATT.

C. U.S. DELEGATES RUTH GAGE-COLBY AND SYLVIA KUSCHER (SIC) SPOKE AT MEETING OF INDOCHINESE AND ~~S.S.G.~~ AMERICAN DELEGATES.

D. AMERICANS HERBERT APTHEKER AND CARLTON GOODLETT REELECTED TO PRESIDENTIAL BOARD.

2. STATION POUCHING MOST SIGNIFICANT PRESS COVERAGE OF COUNCIL SESSIONS. GP-1

S E C R ~~NNJE~~ ET

FULL TEXT COPY -- DO NOT RELEASE

28 Jul 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 060595

11 B 7-531

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 060595
date: 10 Mar 1978

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 338

1. Tab [redacted]-57 contains Memo 75-2628 dated 21 May 71.

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______

(X) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3) (b)(6) of FOIA.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

(✓) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) ([redacted] of FOIA.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

(X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
(X) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
(X) Name of CIA employee
(X) File numbers
( ) Pseudonym
(X) Cryptonyms
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
(●) Privacy of other individuals
( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. Names of Americans and their file #'s have been deleted + exemption (b)(6) claimed. To release the information to Mr. Weisberg that the CIA collected, reported + disseminated info regarding these individuals + their activities with the WPC would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of their privacy. The info contained in the memo were all reported in the press. However, prior to the date of this document

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

( ) maintained
( ) classified to ______
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
(✓) downgraded to confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☑ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

[redacted]

B-2628
21 MAY 1971

SUBJECT: Americans Attending the World Peace Council (WPC) Conference in Budapest, Hungary, 13-16 May 1971

1. A reliable source has reported that the following Americans spoke at the indicated committee meetings of the WPC Conference:

A. Stanley FAULKNER, Committee on European Peace and Security;

B. Sylvia KUSHNER, Committee on Indochina Aggression;

C. John GILMAN, Committee on the Near East;

D. Mary Angie DICKERSON, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination;

E. Luis GARZA, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination; and

F. Ruth GAGE-COLBY, Committee on Disarmament.

All of the above-named persons were identified specifically as members of the U.S. delegation.

2. According to the same source, S. FAULKNER, "Vice President of the American National Lawyers' Association," functioned as President in a meeting of lawyer delegates to the Congress and the American delegate Albert KAHN translated a message from the widow of artist Rockwell KENT to the Conference.

3. In its final coverage on 18 May of the WPC Conference, which ended 16 May, the Hungarian Press made the following additional observations regarding United States participants:

A. Sidney PECK, identified as "USA Professor," spoke on the war in Vietnam;

PROVED FOR RELEASE
te 10 Mar 78

[redacted]

[redacted]

57

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

B. The WPC awarded the JOLIOT-CURIE GOLD MEDAL posthumously to the Reverend Martin Luther KING. The medal was accepted by the Reverend Ralph ABERNATHY and the Reverend Wyatt T. WALKER, "an American peace fighter." A photograph of the presentation ceremony also included William DOUTHARD and Mrs. Addie WYATT as U.S. delegates to the Conference;

C. U.S. delegates Ruth GAGE-COLBY and Sylvia KUSHNER spoke at a meeting of Indochinese and American delegates; and

D. Americans Herbert APTHEKER and Carlton GOODLETT were re-elected to the Presidential Board of the WPC.

4. For previous information on Subject, please refer to [redacted] dated 14 May 1971, Subject: [redacted] ✓ [redacted] and [redacted]

Please transmit reply via [redacted] channel

Originated by: [redacted]
Based on: [redacted] 18 May 71 [redacted] and [redacted]
19 May 71 [redacted]
Source: [redacted] Hungarian Press
Distribution:
Original - FBI (Mr. Wannall) via [redacted] courier
1 - B memo chrono
1 - extra copy
1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 - KING/Sens/ID (201-760966 [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 - Production [redacted]
1 - Production [redacted]

[redacted]

B-2628
21 MAY 1971

SUBJECT: Americans Attending the World Peace Council (WPC) Conference in Budapest, Hungary, 13-16 May 1971

1. the following Americans spoke at the indicated committee meetings of the WPC Conference:

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

3. In its final coverage on 18 May of the WPC Conference, which ended 16 May, the Hungarian Press made the following additional observations regarding United States participants:

A. Sidney PECK, identified as "USA Professor," spoke on the war in Vietnam;

Previously
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 19 AUG 1976

57

B. The WPC awarded the JOLIOT-CURIE GOLD MEDAL posthumously to the Reverend Martin Luther KING. The medal was accepted by the Reverend Ralph ABERNATHY and the Reverend Wyatt T. WALKER, "an American peace fighter." A photograph of the presentation ceremony also included William DOUTHARD and Mrs. Addie WYATT as U.S. delegates to the Conference;

C. U.S. delegates Ruth GAGE-COLBY and Sylvia KUSHNER spoke at a meeting of Indochinese and American delegates; and

D. Americans Herbert APTHEKER and Carlton GOODLETT were re-elected to the Presidential Board of the WPC.

4.

Please transmit reply channel

Originated by:
Based on:

Source:
Distribution:
Original - FBI via courier
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

B-2628
21 MAY 1971

SUBJECT: Americans Attending the World Peace Council (WPC) Conference in Budapest, Hungary, 13-16 May 1971

1. A reliable source has reported that the following Americans spoke at the indicated committee meetings of the WPC Conference:

A. Stanley FAULKNER, Committee on European Peace and Security;

B. Sylvia KUSHNER, Committee on Indochina Aggression;

C. John GILMAN, Committee on the Near East;

D. Mary Angie DICKERSON, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination;

E. Luis GARZA, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination; and

F. Ruth GAGE-COLBY, Committee on Disarmament.

All of the above-named persons were identified specifically as members of the U.S. delegation.

2. According to the same source, S. FAULKNER, "Vice President of the American National Lawyers' Association," functioned as President in a meeting of lawyer delegates to the Congress and the American delegate Albert KAHN translated a message from the widow of artist Rockwell KENT to the Conference.

3. In its final coverage on 18 May of the WPC Conference, which ended 16 May, the Hungarian Press made the following additional observations regarding United States participants:

A. Sidney PECK, identified as "USA Professor," spoke on the war in Vietnam;

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 1 Sept 78
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 060595

CONFIDENTIAL
Downgraded to ~~[illegible]~~
by authority of 060575
date 1 Sept 78

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

(57)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

B. The WPC awarded the JOLIOT-CURIE GOLD MEDAL posthumously to the Reverend Martin Luther KING. The medal was accepted by the Reverend Ralph ABERNATHY and the Reverend Wyatt T. WALKER, "an American peace fighter." A photograph of the presentation ceremony also included William DOUTHARD and Mrs. Addie WYATT as U.S. delegates to the Conference;

C. U.S. delegates Ruth GAGE-COLBY and Sylvia KUSHNER spoke at a meeting of Indochinese and American delegates; and

D. Americans Herbert APTHEKER and Carlton GOODLETT were re-elected to the Presidential Board of the WPC.

4. For previous information on Subject, please refer to our teletype 3216, dated 14 May 1971, Subject: Ralph ✓ David ABERNATHY and Dr. Carlton GOODLETT.

Please transmit reply via CACTUS channel

Originated by: CI/SO:GMKline:jm
Based on: BUDAPEST 016, 18 May 71 (WPC/Sens/BW) and BUDAPEST 017, 19 May 71 (WPC/Sens/BW)
Source: JKLANCE/Hungarian Press
Distribution:
Original - FBI (Mr. Wannall) via CI/SO courier
1 - B memo chrono
1 - extra copy
1 - WPC/Sens/BW
1 - FAULKNER/Sens/GMK (201-354414/GK)
1 - KUSHNER/Sens/BW (201-878516/BW)
1 - GILMAN/Sens/BW (new)
1 - DICKERSON/Sens/BW (201-854982/BW)
1 - GARZA/Sens/BW (new)
1 - COLBY/Sens/GMK (201-053968/GK)
1 - KAHN/Sens/EC
1 - KENT, Mrs./Sens/GK (201-221724/GK)
1 - PECK/Sens/BW (201-830466/BW)
1 - KING/Sens/JD (201-760966/JD)
1 - ABERNATHY/Sens/JD (201-853022/JD)
1 - WALKER/Sens/JD
1 - DOUTHARD/Sens/BW (201-857634/BW)
1 - WYATT/Sens/BW
1 - APTHEKER/Sens/BW (201-757176/BW)
1 - GOODLETT/Sens/BW (201-742726/BW)
1 - Production Budapest
1 - Production JKLANCE

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

IP CONTROL NO. *(Filled in by IP/CFS)*

FR

HOLMES RUSSELL B HM-788
CI/EXO 2D4921
EXT. 1253 TUBE CT5

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST

DATE OF REQUEST: 15 SEP 1977

BRANCH:

ROOM NO.:

PHONE NO.:

TO:		DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	IP/CFS DT-6			
2	REQUESTER			
3	IP/CFS DT-6			
4				
5				

INSTRUCTIONS

1. *Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/CFS. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)*
2. *Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.*
3. *Indicate type of charge:*

☒ *Temporary* ☐ *Permanent*

4. *Indicate source of reference:*

☐ *Document reference from IP/MI.*

☐ *Document reference from source other than IP/MI.*

SUBJECT *(must be furnished)*: DIMITROV, Dimitur Adamov

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE	DISPOSITION OF REQUEST *(To be completed by IP/CFS)*
?	NR ATHE 3200 (~~IN 46672~~)	25.10.50	NO RECORD IN IP/FILES Copy May Be Obtained In Cable Archives
?	NR ATHE 4821 (~~IN 30224~~)	22.3.51	
?	NR ATHE 5150 (~~IN 36130~~)	20.4.51	
?	NR FRAN 2910 (~~IN 36297~~)	21.4.51	
?	NR ATHE 5205 (~~IN 37092~~)	25.4.51	
?	NR ATHE 5282 (~~IN 37839~~)	29.4.51	

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

16 SEP 1977

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC
CABLE REFERENCE SECTION
IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ES-6

FF HOLMES RUSSELL B
CI/EXO
EXT. 1253

HM-788
2D4921
TUBE CT5 ION

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ____________ (IN/DIR NUMBER)

____________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

☐ ADD: ____________ ____________ ____________

☐ Recall copies from: ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________

☐ Change action from: ____________ To: ____________

Authorized by: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ____________ (EXT.)

In coordination with: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ____________ (EXT.)

☒ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☒ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
IN 46672	ATHE 3200	25.10.50	KELLY
IN 30224	ATHE 4821	22. 3.51	"
IN 36130	ATHE 5150	20. 4.51	"
IN 36297	FRAN 2910	21. 4.51	"
IN 37092	ATHE 5205	25. 4.51	"
IN 37839	ATHE 5282	29. 4.51	"

SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 1604 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

(47)

September 1944

After emerging briefly from hiding in September 1944, DIMITROV again went underground engaging in anti-Communist activities, touring various towns and cities (including sections of Yugoslavia and Macedonia) and urging members of the Agrarian Party to take positive action against the Communists.

104 CAGWU, dated 4 October 1950; Memorandum for the Record, 9.5.51

13-00000

1943

DIMITROV claimed he began underground anti-Fascist activities in 1943 in Macedonia and to have worked closely with Dr. George M. DIMITROV (who headed the left-wing of the Agrarian Party known as Pladne) during this time.

104 CAGWU, dated 4 October 1950; Memorandum for the Record, dated 9.5.51

[redacted]

October 1946

DIMITROV arrested by the police. He believes the reason he was not executed was that the communists wanted to use him as a witness against Nikola PETKOV.

104 CAGWU, dated 4 October 1950; Memorandum for the record, 9.5.51

[redacted]

23 July 1947

He escaped to Greece.

Memorandum for the Record, 9.5.51

[redacted]

30 April 1950 (date of information)

The Bulgarians at Lavrion Camp established a new political organization known as the "P. D. Petkov Organization". The member, who are listed in the protocol (attached to the report), have deserted the Bulgarian Agrarian Party in an effort to retain their "pure" agrarian character. In the opinion of the Petkov Organization, the Agragrian Party has been penetrated by the leftists. Protocol signed on 30 April 1950.

DIMITROV's name appears as a member of the Board of Control.

SO 48993, 16 September 1950

[redacted]

October 1950

The QKSTAIR Field Chief learned of DIMITROV through the local peripheral reporting officer and contacted him covertly. DIMITROV made six agents immediately available for infiltration operations.

ATHE 3200 (IN 46672), 25.10.50; Memorandum for the Record, 9.5.51

[redacted]

OCTOBER 1950

Early in October 1950, DIMITROV visited the Lavrion Camp where he met with a number of his Bulgarian friends and advised them that he had been given a "charter and instructions", by certain members of the American Embassy, to form a committee of five members for the planning and execution of a fight for the liberation of Bulgaria. This committee, according to DIMITROV, would be established in Athens and would cooperate with other similar committees which have already been formed in France, Germany, and other countries. The committee would later expand to 20 members and would establish a so-called "Democratic Agrarian Bloc". Recruits would come from among the members and sympathizers of the Bulgarian Democratic Party (Moushynov) and from the Gichev Agrarians. Eligible Bulgarian emigres would come to Greece from Western Europe to assist in the work, and pro-

[redacted]

minent members of the Gichev Agrarians and of the Democratic Party would be assisted in escaping to Greece (presumably from Bulgaria) to join the organization.

DIMITROV listed the organization's tasks as follows:

a. Intelligence activity in Bulgaria.
b. Organization of an underground resistance movement in Bulgaria, and
c. Organization of sabotage activity against Bulgaria.

DIMITROV revealed that he was the president of the organization.

DIMIRTOV took frequent occasion to mention that the committee had its headquarters in the American Embassy where he has a room assigned for his own use. He also stated that the commitee maintains offices at 13 Patission Street, 7th floor, rooms 2-4, and there are alread working at this address sight Bulgarian-speaking Americans. He also state that hos office has two Bulgarian typewriters and a car with US license plates.

SODB 31992, 14 December 1950

[redacted]

23 October 1950

EE Division requests a~~n~~ provisional/operational clearance for DIMITROV.

Memorandum for II/OS, dated 23 October 1950.

[redacted]

1 November 1950

DIMITROV again visited the Lavrion Camp to inform his recruitsthat they would shortly be moved to a pleasant hime in Athens which the Americans were repainting for the purpose. On the occasion of this visit, the recruits were divided into three groups, as follows:

a. a groupd of 10 men to specialize in intelligence;
b. a group of 6 men to be trained in radio in Germany
c. a group of 15 men to specialize in sabotage.

The source of the information contained in the SODB 31992 described DIMITROV as"an unprincipaled opportunist and Greek agent".

SODB 31992, 14.12.50

During this period of time, DIMITROV was the principal agent in an ill-fated operation which resulted in a major expose and trial in Sofia during 1951. The agents used were those selected by DIMITROV, at least one of whom was ~~0010~~ probably an operative of the Bulgarian Militia and acted as the betrayer of his colleagues.

Ed Edwards 7678

Pat Young 9204

ATHE 4788 (IN 29602). March 1951(?)

23 January 1951

Chief of EE/1 requested that the attached Provisional Operational Clearance be approved for Dimitri A. DIMITROV be approved. He is to be used as a contract agent in Greece for political, psychological, and guerrilla warfare operations under Project QKSTAIR.

In view of the fact that recuritment of Bulgarian agents who are~~s~~ scheduled shortly to begin covert training must be accomplished through Mr. DIMITROV, his clearance is needed immediately.

Memorandum for EAD, dated 23 January 1951.

[redacted]

25 January 1951

Frank G. WISNER, ADPC, approved a Provisional Operational Clearamce for a period of ninety days subject to renewal if the full clearance has not been granted.

Memorandum for EE/1, dated 25 January 1951

3 March 1951

DIMITROV signed a memorandum certifying that he had received three hundred dollars from Lawrence F. MacBRIDE, literary agent, representing a sum paid for a complete and unabridged option on the use and possible publication of three books written by me and brought to Mr. MacBRIDE, in Greek translation, by [ ] who acted in this instance purely informally and as a friend. The option is effective as of this date for a period of c six calendar months.

Memorandum dated 3 March 1951 [attachment to SGAA 24772, n.d. not in file]

[redacted]

13 March 1951

Operational Clearance issued to permit the use of DIMITROV's services as "a contractual agent in Greece engaged in political, psychological, and guerrilla warfare operations under project QKSTAIR.

Memorandum for Chief, EE/1, dated 13 March 1951

22 March 1951

QKSTAIR reported that it was considering breaking off association with DIMITROV because he had become too unpopular and dictatorial and self-important. There were also indications of serious misappropriation of funds (NB: This charge was later proven false - see document)

ATHE 4821 (IN 30224), 22 March 1951

6 April 1951

Discussions held between ADAMSON and HAND of CIA and Colonels COVERDALE, and CARLAN, Mr. TOD, and Captain VILLEMETTE of G-2. Points (given below) the Army wants covered in a cable to OSO in Panama.

a. Fort Clayton hospital detention war considered best possibility.

b. Has this been discussed with G-2 USACARIB? If so, does it meet their approval? Can it be worked without advising Provost Marshal, Washington? (so leave in G-2 channels).

c. AC of S G-2 Washington concurred in principle with proposal of assistance to CIA in this matter.

d. As soon as operational details worked out with USACARIB, cable advising generally that can be effected forwarded by G-2 USACARIB to ACos S G-2 (personal for BOLLING). Details will come back through CIA.

e. Identification of KELLY (DIMITROV) case.

f. Detention period maximum of one year, relieve Army sooner if CAS

[redacted]

[redacted]

facility available.

g. Transportation under escort via MATS to military base Panama proposed.

NB (included at bottom of page): ADAMSON reworked cable and read draft to HAND, CARLAN, TOD, and VILLEMETTE who approved. HAND took draft in order to have OSO get it out today.

Note dated 8 April 1951.

12 April 1951

DIMITROV told (his handler - CIA) that he was to tell FLORIMOND by 13 April whether he would work with him. DIMITROV asked for instructions. He was told that his answer was to be a definte and final no. He was not to see the French again.

Memorandum, dated 18 April 1951

[redacted]

13, 14, and 17 April 1951

DIMITROV saw FLORIMOND on Friday (13th), Saturday (14th) and on Tuesday (17th). On the latter day he also saw a certain French assistant military attache named PIRAY.

Memorandum, 18 April 1951

[redacted]

18 April 1951 (date of memorandum)

Athens Station describes reasons for distrusting DIMITROV (see document)

[redacted]

19 April 1951

According to Yani KOLOMONOS, DIMITROV's friend, stated that the latter agreed to meet PIRAY at the French Embassy between 11 and 12 o'clock on Thursday, 19 April. At this meeting DIMITROV will (1) give the French detailed accounts of all United States operations of which he is aware, with special emphasis on Radio Gorianin, and (2) receive for this information the sum of 10 to 15 million drachmae.

KOLOMONOS suggests that this effort of the French might be a communist inspired attempt to penetrate United States intelligence activities.

Memorandum dated 18 April 1951

[redacted]

Circa 21 April 1951

Discussions concerning disposal of DIMITROV since he had full knowledge of names of next infiltration teams and general knowledge of operations.

WASH 38789 (OUT 97616), 21 April 1951

[redacted]

3 May 1951 (dt of memorandum)

W. G. WYMAN, ADSO, informs ADPC of a report from a fairly reliable source, from an informant who knows DIMITROV from having worked with him, but who may be somewhat biased:

See document.

Memorandum for ADPC, dated 3 May 1951

ATHE 4821 (in 30224), 22. 3. 51

ATHE 5150 (in 36130), 20. 4. 51

FRAN 2910 (in 36297), 21. 4. 51

ATHE 5205 (in 37092), 25. 4. 51)

ATHE 5282 (in 37839), 29. 4. 51)

ATHE 3200 (in 46672), 25. 10. 50

DIMITROV, Dimitur Adamov

7 May 1924, born in the village of Medkovets, District of Lom,
Bulgaria
father :

mother :

Dsp 8015
Athens 588
13.10.50

1941-1942 : finished high school.
1942-1943 : studied philology at Sofia University.
1942 : joined a secret branch of the Bulgarian
National Agrarian Union.
1943 : began underground activities; worked closely
with Dr. G.^{eorge} M. DIMITROV

2.9.44 : emerged from hiding to begin work with the
Mushanov, Guitchev, Moraviev Agrarians.

9.9.44 : After events on 9.9.44 went into hiding
and began work against the communists.

27.10.44 : accused by the government of sabotage because he had agitated against the Russian
occupations troops.
During ensuing months arrested several times
in Ferdinand, Vratsa, and Lom. When released
from prison, he continued his illegal activities,
which seem to have consisted in travelling
from village to village, organizing loose-knit
groups of agrarians to withstand Communist
pressures.
His activities often lead him across the
Yugoslav frontier. Worked in Vardar Macedonia organizing Bulgarian sympathizers

for the cause of Dr. G.M. DIMITROV, and upon the advice of a certain General KITCHHAROV.

April-May 1945 : In Sofia in contact with G.M. DIMITROV, Nikola PETKOV, and Mara RAICHEVA.

: obtained illegal identity card in name of Boris STOIKOV, a member of the 1st Belgrade Shock Brigade. Toured south-western Yugoslavia, "organizing Agrarian posts". Captured by Yugoslav.

Sent back to Bulgaria; escaped during transfer; reached Sofia where he was helped by Peter BELGASHKI, Colonel BAKBLESS, an American sergeant named "Bucky", General Craig, and Mrs. Minnie BALABANOVA. Travelled through Bulgaria organizing "secret posts" — some 250.

18 November 1945 : during elections, spoke at secret meetings in Vratsa, urging people to defeat communism.

16 August 1946 : Captured by police in Sofia. 18 days without bread; 12 days without water. 4 days on an electric torture machine. He believes not executed because communists wished to hold him as a witness in preparation for the trial of Nikola PETKOV.

9.

13.10 – 11.11.46 : tried in Vratsa Court for "having organized subversive groups all over Bulgaria". Sentenced on four counts; to death, 15 years, 6 years, and 3 years; jailed in solitary confinement.

2.6.47 : tried and sentenced to death by Sofia Military Court. Tried and sentenced to death by the court in Lom.

June 1947 : taken to a quarry in Vratsa.

8 July 1947 : escaped from quarry, went to Mesdra. From there to Zverova, then Sofia where he received help from British and Americans. Slept on one occasion in Sofia house of Jack HORNER.

23 July 1947 : crossed Greek frontier south of Zlatograd.

24 July 1947 gave himself up at Shahim.

? : admitted to British hospital in Xanthi;

c. August 1947 18 days later transferred to British hospital in Salonika.

c. Mid-September 1947 : sent to Athens. Greeks sent him to refugee camp at Lavrion. Stayed 9 months.

c. June 1948 : Athens where he obtained employment broadcasting in Bulgarian on Radio Athens.

*see memorandum dated 4.4.52.

1949* "Ulysse 62" : worked for Pierre FLORIMOND, Salonika (French vice consul)

The 1949 files* of the French intelligence network "Ulysse" run by Captain Michel de la RONCIER** [Military Attache of the French Embassy, Athens] listed Dimitro DIMITROV as an agent (Ulysse 62). He is further described as being in contact with Tsenko and Ivan BAREV, two Bulgarians who may have still been working for with the British. In addition, DIMITROV was a contact of the Greek Aliens Directorate. His file contained two reports, one dated ~~6~~ 10 April 1949, containing "the military situation" and the other, dated 6 April 1949, containing an account of "the Greek Government Council of Coordination".

*- These documents were obtained by a penetration of French intelligence files.

** Captain de la RONCIER, was the Military Attache of the French Embassy in Athens, ~~who~~ conducted French operations out of Athens. Another French intelligence officer was Pierre FLORIMOND, French vice consul and chief "of the other network in Greece, operated from Salonica. Captain de la RONCIER described as FLORIMOND's chief.

30 April 1950 : Made a member of the "P.D. PETKOV" organization formed in Lavrion. Says his 12 "hard core" members in his group and 54 interested supporters. will have 90 supporters as soon as he can find the funds to print and distribute his program,

23 September 1950 : Organized memorial service in Lavrion, commemorating the 3rd anniversary of the hanging of Nikola PETKOV.

October 1950 - March 1951: (over)

25 January 1951 : Provisional "Operational Clearance" approved for ninety days (25.1 - 24.4.51)

13 March 1951 : Operational Clearance granted

13, 14, 17 April 1951 : Saw FLORIMOND (in direct violation of our orders)

17 April 1951 : met French assistant military attaché PIRAY.

: Picked up by Greek Alien Directorate (over 2)

19 April 1951 : was to meet PIRAY at French Embassy to (1) give detailed accounts of U.S. operations of which he aware, with special emphasis on Radio Gorianin, and (2) receive 10-15,000,000 drachmae for this information. (Apparently did not make this mtg as he had been arrested, see above.)

: Principal agent in an ill-fated operation run from October 1950 to March 1951. The operation resulted in a major expose and trial in Sofia during 1951. The agents used were those selected by DIMITROV, at least one of whom was probably an operative of the Bulgarian Militia and acted as the betrayer of his colleagues.

(2) : Although the extent of DIMITROV's knowledge of operations was limited, it was considered extremely undesirable to allow these facts into French hands. Arrangements were therefore made with Greek authorities for his arrest just before his scheduled meeting with the French representative to whom he was to deliver the information and from whom he was to receive the money.
*

(3) DIMITROV made six agents immediately available for infiltration operations. Three of these six were successfully infiltrated on 10 December, carrying leaflets signed in the names of the Bulgarian Democratic Bloc, the emigré political group organized and headed by DIMITROV.

*DIMITROV remained under Greek control until he left Greece by air to Frankfurt.

5 September 1951 : Left Frankfurt for Panama where he arrived on 5 September. He was placed in detention at a hospital in Panama.

March 1952 : Transferred to J. ROBALO

28 July 1952 : Operational clearance dated 18.3.51 cancelled

entire family admitted as permanent residents
on 26.11.56

filed a Declaration of Intention in USDC, Chicago
28.12.56.

address (1960) 9 Hillside Avenue, Newark, N.J.

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Athens XX

Chief, NE

PERAMPART (Subject of Reference)

REF: NEAA-02613, 17 July 1969

1. Subject of reference may be remembered by some Athens Station officers under the name, Lyle O. KELLY (P). KELLY was recruited in October 1950 as a P.A. for a political, psychological, and guerrilla warfare project based in Greece and targeted against Bulgaria. He is the subject of a five volume 201 dossier at Headquarters which goes back to 1949.

2. KELLY was born 7 May 1924 in Medkovets, Bulgaria. He studied philology for one year at Sofia University from 1942-43. During the war he worked illegally in Greek Macedonia and Vardar, Macedonia to escape the German authorities. He returned home after the war; he was soon disillusioned by the Communists and went to Sofia. Later he made a clandestine tour of Bulgarian towns urging agrarians to take positive action against communism. Finally captured in Sofia, he stated that his life was spared because he was groomed as a witness against PETKOV. He escaped to Greece in 1947 and subsequently worked for the Greeks doing occasional propaganda under a shortened version of his true first name.

3. KELLY was first contacted in October 1950 by the Field Chief of OPC activities in Athens, Greece. During the period October 1950 through March 1951, he was employed by OPC, Athens and provided 21 agents for infiltration into Bulgaria, but he

Distribution:
3 - COS, Athens

27 AUG 1969

33-2-6

NKAW-1067 25 August 1969

201-045145

never participated in the actual cross-border operations. In early 1951, various operational and administrative difficulties began to manifest themselves and it was decided that KELLY should be removed from his position. In April 1951 it came to OPC's attention that KELLY intended to sell his operational knowledge to the French Intelligence Service. This fact was used as the primary reason for his removal from active participation in Bulgarian operations.

4. Because of operational security considerations stemming from KELLY's duplicity and personal make-up, it was deemed inadvisable to leave him at large in Greece. It was decided to transfer him to a holding facility in the Western Hemisphere. He was airlifted from Athens to Frankfurt where he was hospitalized four days for observation, and then flown to the holding facility, arriving on 4 September 1951. He remained there until January 1954 when at that time it was determined whatever operational knowledge he had was obsolete.

5. After unsuccessful efforts to resettle KELLY in Brazil, he was temporarily removed from the holding area to Syros, Greece. A commitment was made to the Greek authorities that RVROCK would not abandon him in Greece and would take steps to have him resettled in one year. Efforts were made to effect KELLY's migration to Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and elsewhere, but to no avail. After due consideration by the authorities concerned, it was decided that the best effective solution would be to let him immigrate to the United States on his own under the Refugee Relief Act program.

6. Since entering the United States, KELLY has been a continual source of embarrassment. Meglomania is evident in his various communications with U.S. government agencies. Over the years he has written lengthy letters to the Director, Secretary of State, USIA, Vice President Nixon, President Kennedy, etc. A typical example of this correspondence was his letter to the Vice President requesting an appointment as Mr. Nixon's anti-communist advisor, or the statement in his letter to President Kennedy that he could liberate the Balkan countries from Communism in five years if he were allowed to work actively with financial support. Our first knowledge that KELLY was representing himself as a film producer was a 14 May 1957 notice from the Department of State advising that KELLY was trying to interest them in purchasing a feature length film script.

7. The last correspondence from Athens on KELLY is contained in NKAA-990 of 26 April 1968, written by Philip L. BACHMAN (P). On this occasion KELLY appeared at the American Embassy in Athens asking to talk to the First Secretary. He identified himself as leader of "The Bulgarian Liberation Underground Movement Against Communism." The Station at this time reported no traces, but added a comment that he probably was identical with Subject of 201-045145. However, the Station evidently has no record of his pseudo or his early association with us.

8. A final note, concerning his marriage to the Greek woman mentioned in reference, may be of interest considering the events which generated the latest inquiry from the field. At one time during his sojourn in the holding area mentioned above, KELLY confided that his marriage was recognized by both parties as one of convenience. He claimed that he and his former wife agreed to marry in order to be eligible for immigration to the United States

with a minimum waiting period. He gave a lengthy, complicated explanation of how this was supposed to work. However, their well laid plans were wrecked by the arrival of a baby daughter while they were in Rome, Italy on their first step toward immigration. According to KELLY, this event forced their return to Athens where he eventually got involved in Bulgarian operations. He declared that had their plans worked out, he and his former wife had agreed to part company once they were safely ensconced in the United States.

9. We feel this account should be on record at the Station because judging from the past performance the infamous Lyle O. KELLY (P) probably will come to our attention again. We can provide more detailed information on KELLY's operational history if required.

Richard P. SWENTZ

Vernon H. RAPKE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION

X MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, NE

INFO.

Chief of Station, Madrid;
Chief, European Division

FROM

Chief of Station, Athens

SUBJECT

PBRAMPART
Dimitrios DIMITROF

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI and Direct Traces

1. Subject is Dimitrios #*DIMITROF aka General Dico DIMITROV; DPOB: 24 May ~~1~~924 ~~in~~ Bulgaria; Cit~~izenship~~: ~~Unknown~~; Occup~~ation~~; ~~Movie~~ film producer; Address: c/o Marjorie DARE, 360 West 22nd Street New York, New York; Miscellaneous: Claims to have worked for WOFIRM.

2. Subject came to Station attention as a result of a pre-marital investigation which was being conducted by LNEASE on Kalliopi Stylianou GERALEXIS, aka "Poppy", Mrs. Dimitrios DIMITROF, born 18 August 1941 in Athens, Greece who was married to Subject in a civil ceremony in Italy on 4 July 1962. The marriage was not recognized by Greek law. Under separate cover is a copy of the LNEASE memo which outlines Subject's allegations regarding collaboration with WOFIRM.

3. The marital investigation turned up the following traces from the Liaison Section of the American Embassy in Madrid, Spain: "This office has information on a Diko DIMITROFF, who may be identical with Subject's (GERALEXIS') former husband. A source of unknown reliability reported in 1965 that Diko DIMITROFF had connections with the Bulgarian Intelligence Service and with a dissident group in Bulgaria. DIMITROFF represents himself as a film producer".

4. The only remotely identifiable traces at Athens Station are on a Dimitri DIMITROV aka Dimitur Adamov DIMITROV, DOB circa 1920, who was a member of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party and a student who fled to Greece in 1946. (Source: PGA-4769 of 8 March 1950, file 33-5-2). He was in contact with the A.D. at that time and reported that he had an order to go to Washington for a time. The above is carded info only with a caption: "French I.S.".

5. Subject also has travelled to Italy, France, England, and Switzerland in connection with the movie industry, but we defer to Headquarters regarding possible notification of other field stations until after they have conducted traces. In the meantime we have informed LNEASE/Athens that Subject has no connection with WOFIRM

Att: LNEASE Memo; USC Distribution: ~~1~~-Chief, NE; Att USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO S/C ATT'D BY Dated 24 Jul	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER NKAA-2613	DATE 1-COS, Madrid; Att. USC 1-Chief, EUR; Att. USC 201-045145
CS COPY FILED IN 33-2-6 201-045145	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~33-2-6~~

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. NKAA-2613

and that his use of the name of the current head of WOFIRM was probably a means of attracting attention.

Oliver M. COAKLEY

Walter D. NEWBY

201-045145

SECRET

10 May 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Office of Security

ATTENTION: Mr. James Thompson, PSD

SUBJECT: General Dico DIMITROV

REFERENCE: Memo of 13 March, same topic

1. General DIMITROV called the undersigned on 30 March to say hello and request a meeting. We met for dinner at the Astoria Restaurant at 8 p.m., 31 March.

2. During the course of the evening, Dico said he had seen my boss. When I asked whom he meant, he replied, Dick Helms. He said he had known Helms for years and further that he had seen him that Thursday in order to find out his position on the new organization the General was in which was holding its first rally the next evening in New York. (This organization has something to do with rabid anti-communism and support for the U.S. in the Vietnam war.) The General said Helms' position was one of go ahead; he had no strong feelings supporting or condemning such a group.

3. Dico made further loud comments about support for the war. Our waitress overheard and mentioned that she was leaving the next morning for Saigon to entertain troops and to find out what the war was really about. Dico made a small scene about how wonderful this was, etc.

4. The General is the most rabid anti-communist I have ever met. For him there can be no compromise between them and the Free world; they must all be destroyed. After continuing on in this vein for some time, he finally quit. Also, he stated at the beginning of the evening that he did not drink and then proceeded to have a combination of drinks fairly fast. He did not appear drunk, but with each drink he got louder and louder. The other diners paid little attention, however, due to music and other covering noises.

SECRET

5. I have not seen the General since that evening. My mother saw him one time (3 April) just after his return to New York, but has not seen him since. She still contends that she never mentioned where I worked and says he must have put two and two together. Any guidance you can provide on this matter would be appreciated.

Carol L. Robarge
FI/SIG/SSB
x 1433 Red

4 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : DIMITROFF, Dimiter Adamoff
aka: DIMITROV, Dico, General

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. On 30 March 1967 the Subject, who identified himself as General Dimitrov, called your Office seeking an interview. During the afternoon of the same date two representatives of my Office interviewed the Subject in his hotel room in Washington, D.C.

3. The Subject stated that he was born in Bulgaria, is currently stateless and has applied for United States citizenship. He related a detailed account of his former activities as a Bulgarian Freedom Fighter; claimed that he cooperated with a United States military mission in Bulgaria in the 1940's and stressed the fact that his only goals in life are the elimination of the world-wide menace of Communism and the liberation of Bulgaria. He claims to have cooperated in the past with the United States Information Agency and Radio Free Europe and to have offered his services and those of his freedom fighters to former Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy.

4. The Subject claimed to have visited your Office in April 1962 as a result of a referral from the White House. He advised that he is currently a Vice-President of the Anti-Communist International and works closely with former United States Representative Hamilton Fish from New York who is one of the principal sponsors of this organization. Dimitrov is currently staying in New York City and advised that he came to Washington to congratulate you on your appointment as Director of Central Intelligence; to advise you that he is attempting to form a World Tribunal

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

4/4/67

to counteract the anti-American feeling which Betrand Russell is spreading throughout the British Isles and Europe; and to seek $50,000 from CIA to enable him to start production in Greece and Spain on a movie concerning the history of Greek mythology. The Subject claimed that, once he had successfully completed this film, he would be given world recognition and could then do what he feels is his real goal in life, namely to produce films depicting the evils of Communism.

5. A review of Agency files discloses that, during the period October 1950 through March 1951, the Subject was utilized by OPC in Athens, Greece and provided 21 agents for infiltration into Bulgaria. In early 1951, various operational and administrative difficulties began to manifest themselves and it was decided that the Subject should be removed from his position. In April 1951 it came to OPC's attention that Subject intended to sell his knowledge of CIA's activities to the French Intelligence Service. Because of operational security considerations stemming from his duplicity and personal make-up, it was deemed inadvisable to leave the Subject at large in Greece and it was decided that he should be transferred to the CIA holding facility at Fort Clayton, Panama. He remained there until January 1954.

6. In May 1953, a CIA case officer was dispatched from Headquarters to Fort Clayton where he interrogated the Subject. It was determined at that time that whatever operational knowledge the Subject had of CIA, its methods, personnel and operations were obsolete.

7. On or about 12 January 1954, while still at Fort Clayton, the Subject signed a Certificate of Understanding and was temporarily removed to Greece due to the termination of the holding facility and the fact that there were no immediate

possibilities to resettle him. CIA made a commitment to the Greek authorities that it would not abandon the Subject in Greece and would take steps to remove him from Greek soil within one year. Efforts were made to effect the Subject's migration to Canada, New Zealand, Australia and elsewhere, but to no avail. After due consideration by interested Headquarters elements and the Athens Station, it was decided that the most effective solution for the Subject's disposal would be to let him immigrate to the United States on his own under the Refugee Relief Act program, but without any assistance from CIA.

3. Since his arrival in the United States, the Subject has come to our attention on the following occasions:

> On 14 May 1957, the Department of State informed CIA that the Subject had contacted their Office and tried to interest them in purchasing a feature length film script and asked if a representative of CIA would like to meet the Subject and discuss the script. The offer was turned down.
>
> On 28 June 1960, the Subject attempted to arrange a meeting with the then Vice-President Richard M. Nixon. A member of Mr. Nixon's staff turned the matter over to Mr. F. J. Sheridan, Contact Division, Office of Operations. Mr. Sheridan interviewed the Subject at length, acting on behalf of Mr. Nixon's staff, with no CIA connection. No commitments were made to the Subject.

On 29 September 1961, the Subject called the Office of the DCI requesting an appointment. The matter was referred to Mr. Sheridan who advised Mr. Hill of the DCI Protective Staff to tell the Subject that his story was a matter of record and that there would be no purpose in further interviews unless he had something new to add.

9. On 31 March 1967, in view of the above information concerning the Subject's past activities, a representative of my Office called the Subject at his hotel in Washington, D.C., and advised him that the results of his interview of 30 March had been passed to appropriate Agency officials and that if any interest developed he would be contacted.

10. No further action will be taken in this matter unless requested by you.

H J Osborn

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

BULLOCK:dr
3 April 1967

Distribution:
Orig. - Return to OS
2 - DD/S
1 - ER

Anti-Communist International

U.S.A. OFFICE: 2188 BROADWAY - NEW YORK
OX 7-5895

The A. C. I. is starting V.V. (VICTORY FOR VIETNAM)

RALLIES

SATURDAY, APRIL 1, 1967, 7:00 P.M. at 4 W. 43rd St.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY CLUB will be the first rally with these important main speakers.

Adm. Joseph J. Clark (U.S.N. Ret.)
Hon. Hamilton Fish
Vito Battista, Taxpayers Org.
Lee Sterling, American Property Rights Assn.
General Dico Dimitroff
Arnold McCullogh, Peter Fechter Brigade
Edward Rorer, American Patriots for Freedom
Jason Friedman, Director Jewish Section of the A. C. I.

Make reservations either by phone, OX 7-5895 or by mail, P.O. Box 1095, N. Y. 10017.

Bring your friends. Be there to help the fighting boys in Vietnam and the Vietnamese People. Help the President of the U.S.A. and his Military Leaders in Vietnam to win the war in the battlefield, which will produce the VICTORY PEACE TALKS.

Mail adress:
P. O. Box 1095
New York, N. Y. 10017

Dr. Wm. GLASKOW, Chrmn.
A. R. K. JERIC, Treasurer
S. KRAWEC, Publish. Dept.
Haviv SCHIEBER, Gen'l. Sec.

Anti-Communist International

U.S.A. OFFICE: 2188 BROADWAY · NEW YORK

Mail adress:
P. O. Box 1095
New York, N. Y. 10

Phone: OX-76895

r. Wm. GLASKOW, Chrmn.
R. K. JERIC, Treasurer
KRAWEC, Publish. Dept.
aviv SCHIEBER, Gen'l. Sec.

February 19, 1967

RECEPTION TO WELCOME His Excellency BUI DIEM
South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States,
at the Park Sheraton Hotel in New York City.

To all friends of the ANTI-COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL and participating guests and organizations:

This important event was successful.

Messages of greeting and support arrived from U.S. Senators: Thomas J. Dodd, J.W. Fulbright, Joseph Tydings, H.A. Williams Jr., Peter H. Dominick, Edward W. Brooke, Russell B. Long and James B. Pearson; Congressmen: Daniel J. Flood, Herman T. Schneebeli, John J. Rhodes, Robert J. Corbett, Joseph P. Addabbo, Charles E. Bennett, William L. Dickinson, Porter Hardy Jr., Joe Pool, William S. Mailliard and James B. Utt; Governors: John H. Chafee, Claude R. Kirk, Winthrop Rockefeller, Dan Moore, George Romney, Richard J. Hughes and Lieut. Governor Malcolm Wilson; President of the Cancil of the City of New York Frank D. O'Connor; Presidents of the N.Y.C. Boroughs of Manhattan, Bronx and Queens Percy E. Sutton, Herman Badillo and Mario J. Cariello; also from the Permanent Missions to the U.N. of Malta and New Zealand.

A large number of representatives of civic, patriotic and anti-communist organizations were there.

The Honorable Hamilton Fish, a congressman of 40 years, who originated the House Committee on Un-American Activities was chairman of the event.

These people spoke on behalf of their organizations:

Edward Rorer for American Patriots for Freedom;
Arnold McCullogh for Peter Fechter Brigade;
Lee S. Sterling for American Property Rights Association;
Maxwell Miller for CHIP (Community Housing Improvement Program, Inc.);
Juan Lugo of Local 6 of the Hotel' and Club Employees' Union;
General Dico Dimitroff of the Bulgarian polotical exiles;
Prof. Dr. Nakashidzé of Columbia University, Captive Nations Committe, Buenos Aires, Argentina;
Thomas Veteska, general secretary of the Union of Slovak Combatants;
Cathryn Dorney of the American Education association;
Captain Janes Jones, recently returned from long service in Vietnam.

In the name of the Anti-Communist International spoke:
Dr. Wm. Glaskow ("Soviet Russia is fighting the Vietnam war by proxy")
A. R. K. Jeric ("Communism in practice is a one-man-monopoly-ownership-



The Order of Lafayette

Is Honored In Conferring Its Membership On

GENERAL DICO DIMITROV

☆⚜☆ PREAMBLE OF THE ORDER OF LAFAYETTE ☆⚜☆

For God and Country, we pledge our support:

To maintain mutual understanding and cooperation between the United States and France, and to uphold and defend the ideals of JUSTICE, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY and PEACE, for which we fought.

To Unite the destinies of both Republics in defense of a free world realizing that any weakening of our traditional friendship would help World Communism and jeopardize the survival of Free Nations.

VIVE LA FRANCE — GOD BLESS AMERICA

Hamilton Fish
President-General

March 10, 1967
Date

ılie Andrews Signed ›r Hitchcock Film

ɴEW YORK — Alfred Hitchcock
signed Julie Andrews to star op-
ite Paul Newman in his forthcom-
spy tale, "Torn Curtain," to be
ased by Universal Pictures. Mis
lrews will report to the director
ın completion of her role in
waii."

Torn Curtain" will be Hitchcock's
h picture and his first under his
ntly signed three-picture deal
h Universal. He plans to begin
duction Oct. 1, with exterior se-
nces to be filmed on foreign loca-
— and the interiors shot at Uni-
al City Studios.

atz

(*Continued from page* 1)

pictures for theatrical and tele-
on outside the United States and
ada.

atz has been affiliated with Hy-
ı since 1954 with the formation of
nan's Associated Artists Produc-
s which later became United Art-
Associated. He subsequently
ed as director of foreign opera-
s for United Artists Associated
United Artists Television.

ΛG Pact

(*Continued from page* 1)

...ation community talking to
ıselves:

The fee formula sets seven base
gories against which payments are
ıe computed. For an actor who
ed one day in a picture, the base
100; two days, $150; three days,
; four days, $250; five days or
week, $300; more than one week
not more than two weeks, $400;
than two weeks, $500.

or the first TV release of a film,
rs will receive 30 per cent of
base. When the producer's gross
hes $125,000, players will receive
dditional 12½ per cent; at $200,-
an additional 25 per cent; at
,000, an additional 22½ per cent;
400,000, an additional 22½ per
at $500,000, an additional 20
cent; for each $100,000 above
,000, an additional 10 per cent.
'hen a film is released on a major
ork in prime time, players are
...tered 70 per cent of the base
nt."

:erson Acquires Four

)LLYWOOD—Joseph C. Emer-
president of Emerson Entertain-
Enterprises, announced yester-
the acquisition of four features
lobal scope for U.S. release.
n Against the Sun" is a World
II story shot in Technicolor in
alia. "Make Like a Thief" is a
story in Technicolor filmed in
nd starring Richard Long.
e Swords for Rome" was filmed
ly and "Saturday Night in Apple
y," stars Mimi Hines, Paul Ford
Cliff Arquette.

AROUND THE TV CIRCUIT

with PINKY HERMAN

LUNCHING Friday with Diko Dimitroff and enjoying the exuberant presentation of his plans to produce-direct a $20,000,000 film saga, "The Loves of the Greek Gods," based on Greek mythology reminded this reporter of the time many years ago when a Boston exhibitor named Joseph E. Levine (whom we met through a mutual friend, WORL Deejay Norm Prescott) revealed his ideas of "how to produce and exploit motion pictures" with the result that the following week we printed in this pillar a paragraph in which we predicted Levine would "make motion picture history by sheer showmanship." After two months in Gotham, finalizing pre-production plans, Diko leaves Thursday for his office in Madrid where he'll set in motion his ambitious production on this epci to be filmed in Greece skedded to start in the Spring of 1966 and featuring 30 international stars. . . .

☆ ☆ ☆

The zoom film effects, one of the many features of the "Pack & Jingle" TV spot, MPO-produced "Newport" cigarets commershill for Lennen & Newell, all of which added up to copping top mixed technique class honors at the Cannes International Film Festival, were achieved by Eastern Effects, Inc., New York—based film opticals and effects firm which used the new EMELL Camera. Prexy Maurice Levy of Eastern Effects has also personally developed several camera techniques as well as improved optical benches in the past decade. . . . Formerly with Paramount and Universal on the west coast and more recently director of press information and promotion for ABC-TV's News Division, Frank Little has joined McFadden, Strauss, Eddy & Irwin as account executive. . . . Young man in a hurry is Michael Stanwood, a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania in 1964, who's already starred in three Broadway productions, just been signed to a Universal-TV contract and will debut in the "Kiss Me As You Go" seg of that studio's "Run for Your Life" series, starring Ben Gazzara, Barry Sullivan and Brenda Scott and megged by Leslie Martinson. . . .

☆ ☆ ☆

Lucille Ball, who will be CBSeen as Steve Lawrence's first guest when his program preems Monday, Sept. 13 (10-11 P.M., EDT) sat beside Steve in the howda of Wanda, the pink elephant, when the pachyderm strode through Shubert's Alley last Wednesday to highlight the program's introduction to N'Yawkers. . . . The many luminaries including Rudy Vallee, Johnny Carson, Vaughn Monroe, who've been enjoying the Chinese cuisine featured at co-owner Ging Tom's Six Happiness may or may not be aware of the fact that the gracious Ging is the fifth generation of the famous family or restauranteurs. . . . Hollis Alpert has written an interesting story on the coming 20th Century- Fox TV CBScience-fiction series, "Lost In Space," in the current issue of *Woman's Day* Magazine. Miss Alpert believes this one could last longer than "I Love Lucy," which is quite a prediction. . . . Freemantle International's "Romper Room," created and produced live 13 years ago by Bert & Nancy Claster in Baltimore, is now seen in Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Japan, The Philippines, Great Britain and in six markets in Australia. . . .

☆ ☆ ☆

Lee Savage, winner of the 1963 Guggenheim Fellowship and well known creative artist, and Harold Friedman, former veepee and exec producer at Elektra Films, have formed a new TV production firm, Savage-Friedman, Inc. . . . Ex-Newspaperman ("Cleveland News") and formerly gen. mgr. of WJW-TV, Ben Wickham resigned his post with TV Information Office and as of next Monday joins MGM-TV as a general sales exec headquartering in Gotham. . . . Last CBSaturday afternoon we liked the novel TV'er, profiling li'l ole N'Yawk and especially enjoyed the ditty, "New York's a Great Place to Be," cleffed by Joan Bender and Bob Hughes. . . . Official Films has purchased an as yet unpublished novel entitled, "Manhattan House" by David Rintels, which will be developed into a full hour dramatic teleseries to be produced by Robert Blees. This marks Blees' fourth package, the other three already skedded for launching by Official next season are a dramatic-musical by Herbert Baker, a half-hour comedy series, "Off We Go" by Bob Kaufman and Bill Fox, and "Meet the Mooses" by Henry Garsson and Edmund Beloin. . . . ABC Films will shoot a pilot for a new music series, featuring "The Song Spinners" and tentatively slated for a 10 P.M. slot Saturdays over WABC-TV with additional showings on a syndication basis. Program will be co-directed by Hal Tolchin, who recently directed the "Swinging World of Sammy Davis" special, and Jimmy Starbuck, choreographer on many top-notch TV'ers including "Your Show of Shows," "Carol Burnett Show" and others. Exec producer will be Stanley S. Greene. . . .

Berle Adams to Direct Broadcasting Awards

NEW YORK — Berle Adams, v
president of MCA, Inc., has accep
the post of general chairman of
1965-66 International Broadcast
Awards, according to James
Thompson, president of the Hol
wood Advertising Club, sponsor of
event.

More than 1,000 broadcasting
ecutives from all over the world
expected to attend the judging
radio and television commerci
which will be held this year at
Hollywood Palladium March 25. T
festival is now in its sixth year.

TENT TALI

**MIAMI—Henry Oxell, chief bark
of the local Variety Club, Tent 3
already is signing up members for t
Variety Club International conventi
in London next April, and so far h
34 reservations for the Miami-Lisbo
London flight.**

△

BOSTON—The 17th annual Jimn
Fund drive, to raise money for t
Children's Research Foundation, w
launched recently, according to Thon
as A. Yawkey, president of the foun
dation. At the same time, one
the most unusual tieins ever made w
scheduled in connection with t
drive. Northeast Airlines vice-pres
dent Edwin W. Breed and Jimn
Fund executive director William
Koster have completed arrangemen
whereby the airline will supply ai
craft during the month of Augu
in Boston, Portland, Me., New Be
ford, Mass., and Manchester, N.H. f
a one-hour sightseeing trip witho
charge to persons contributing $5
more to the Jimmy Fund.

Northeast pilots and stewardess
have volunteered their services for 2
scheduled flights from Cape Cod
the White Mountains, into Main
Vermont and other scenic New Eng
land areas. A celebrity will accom
pany each flight. Baseball's Ted Wi
liams will be on the first flight.

British Admissions Declined During May

From THE DAILY Bureau

LONDON — A drop in cinema ad
missions in the United Kingdom i
May this year produced the lowe
figure on record since the Board c
Trade has compiled weekly averag
admission figures. The figure was
weekly average of 5.5 million durin
May—a fall of 700,000 on the 6.
million average weekly admissions i
May 1964.

Takings, however, were equal at
weekly average of £1.03 million. Th
fall in admissions in May, compare
with the previous month, followe
the seasonal pattern with a drop o
two million on the weekly average
Takings in April average £1.38 mil
lion weekly.

Guidepost, January 22, 1965

joan allen

ment to back it, the Zarzuela Theatre on Jovellanos, 4, has rounded up a brilliant group of actors, singers and directors and has come back with some really exciting revivals.

AWC members and their husbands can call **Jo Pitts** 250 03 35; **Cherry Danos** 253-60-79; or **Jane Cabanyes** for tickets.

Cocktails At The Ross'. The **Ross A. Ross'** red carpet was well and truly rolled out this last week for visiting and handsome son **Dean** taking leave from the U.S.S. *Springfield* and looking up old friends in his one-time stomping ground.

Among those welcoming Dean at a cocktail party given by **Mary-Alice** and Ross last Thursday at their Generalisimo apartment were **Stewart Baxter** of American Express; **Major Ben Clark** and his wife **Alma**; writer **Alfred Brown** and his wife **Adriana**; **José María Garriga**, head of the Aira Travel Agency; **Major Mike Payne** and his wife **Nina**; **Anni** and **Dale Brannon**; American stage and screen actor **Ben Tatar**; Air Force Contractor **Jesse Greene**; **Ken Crosby** of Merrill Lynch, whose wife **Cricket** was not present but was, according to Ken, «helping **Larry Bell's** wife **Jeanne** have her baby.» (It was a boy!); **Mariano Blitz**, General Motors Distributor and his wife; **Corinne Jordy**, ex Madrid classmate of Dean's; **Araceli** and **Ed Kreisler**; **Tony Blomfield**, just returned from the U.S. and minus his wife **Harriette**, who had a touch of La Grippe. The Blomfields left later to join their yacht in Alicante; **Col. John Ferry** and his wife **Carmen**; **Franz Krell** of Casa Americana and his attractive daughter **Olivia**; **Oliver Tritton**, who is with the Banco Español de Crédito, Banesto; and **Nick Fogarty** of the maintenance company Tumpane.

The Moment Of Truth. Christine Harding, daughter of the British Vice Consul in Madrid, might well look pleased (candles don't count at 16!) as she cuts a birthday cake dedicated to «Man of the Year» El Cordobés. The cake of course represented the bullring, complete with *toro, matador* and swords. Giving her a helping hand were, among others, **Clive Bruton** whose father is with the British Institute; **Phillipa Samuel**, daughter of **Ian Samuel**, Minister at the British Embassy; and **Ann** and **Anthony Blackie**, whose father **Jim Blackie** is the Australian Consul General in Madrid.

An old hand at birthdays and somewhat of a rolling stone, Christine takes credit for having spent her previous ones in nine different countries.

NEW BRITISH PRESS ATTACHE — Greeting the British Ambassador SIR GEORGE LABOUCHERE, left, at their party given in Madrid's International Press Club are Mr. KEITH, the new Press Attaché at the British Embassy, and his wife, BETTY.

CHRISTINE HARDING, British Vice-Consul's daughter entertains (left to right) CLIVE BRUTON, PHILLIPA SAMUEL, ANN and ANTHONY BLACKIE at her recent birthday party.

«Greek Gods» To Roll In June. Going big all the way is **Diko Dimitroff**, Bulgarian-born poet, screen-writer, director and producer, who flashed into our office this week with plans to make the biggest movie of all time. Slightly built, with hazel eyes, the softly spoken head of Diko Productions Inc. went on to tell us more about his 15-year-old dream. *The Loves of the Greek Gods*, which he plans to film in Spain and Greece. Interiors are to be done in Madrid with the use of the Bronston equipment. All exteriors will be shot in Greece involving the use of Mount Olympus and

continued.

talk about spain *continued*

other authentic sites. The producer went on to explain, «I plan to bring all the 'Gods' together to make this movie.» He named such box office 'draws' as Victor Mature to play the role of Zeus; Kirk Douglas as Adonis; Tony Curtis as Apollo; Peter Ustinov as Dionysus; and Jean Simmons as Athena. According to the producer, there are many candidates for the role of Aphrodite (Venus) but as yet she has not been named. «I'm using the largest cast ever,» Dimitroff told us, «at Olympia alone there will be 30,000 extras and there are 65 starring roles.» A 4-hour-long epic, the cost of making it is estimated at twenty million dollars and shooting is expected to take a full year, starting in June—Greek Gods willing!

costa del sol

Congresses In Winter. Congresses, like birds, tend to come south in winter. Our sunny Coast — six average hours of sunshine a day from November to April — is becoming their favorite winter ground, so much so that a huge congress hall is now planned.

Following the fashion to pick sunny climes for winter work, the executive committee of the International Union of Architects have just spent six days at Hotel Pez Espada, fixing the agenda for their big annual congress in July. The summer congress, of course, will be held up north, in Paris. Flags were hoisted outside Málaga Airport and the hotel for each of the 22 nationalities attending, including the «hammer and sickle» for the Moscow delegate. The seven three-hour sessions, presided over by Sir Robert Matthew, were spent sifting subjects to be discussed at the Paris congress. An interpreter sent along by the local tourist office withered under the crossfire of languages, so an urgent call went out to Fuengirola for Lana, wife of ex-Soviet painter, Sacha Lioutikoff, who speaks five languages including Russian.

Delegates took a day off for some sunshine and an extensive tour of the Coast. They mostly agreed that the Coast has some fine buildings, but sadly lacks a master plan. The Russian, Guerogui Orlov, said he was particularly impressed by Marbella's Ciudad Residencial, the State holiday resort for workers. Local Spanish reporters eager for an interview found the Russian rather untalkative, though he did confess he liked Flamenco. The delegates rounded off the busy week with a dinner gala in the hotel, and left Saturday.

Gibralfaro Castle - A Tourist Center? The ruined ninth-century castle on Gibralfaro, the pine-covered hill overlooking Málaga, is probably going to be urbanized as a tourist center. It has been suggested that an auditorium, with rooms for gatherings like international congresses, be built within the castle walls. The idea was put to Málaga's Mayor, Sr. Rafael Betes, by the Under Secretary of Tourism, Sr. García Rodriguez-Acosta, during his short visit here last week. He said Gibralfaro's beautiful position and views should be utilized more. The Mayor later took a bird's eye view of the site from the helicopter of the visiting American flag ship, USS *Springfield*. Gibralfaro is a great favorite with everyone. Tourists climb it to explore the castle, gasp at the breathtaking views of the town and harbor and eat at the State restaurant built just below the castle walls. The hill also overlooks the bullring and hundreds of *malagueños* climb it to take a free peek at *corridas*.

Winter Course For Foreigners. Below Gibralfaro's battlements, just a spear's throw away, lies the comparatively new Casa de Cultura where, on Friday last week, the Mayor opened the 18th Winter Course for Foreigners. More than 100 students have come from many countries for this extensive two-month course in Spanish language and culture, which happens to coincide with Málaga's equally famous Winter Sports Festival. Students are lodged with local families and most days attend lectures by university professors, go on excursions and take part in all sorts of social and cultural events.

Tied in with this year's course is a three-week exhibition of paintings by five well-known southern artists with strong local connexions. They are Alberka, Barbadillo, Brinkmann, Hernández and Prinado. Gabriel Alberka, 30, lives in Torremolinos and has

GETTING YOUR HAIR BACK IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE, BUT IT

CAN BE SAVED

Not every case is the same!!

YOUR CASE MAY REQUIRE SPECIAL TREATMENT

Ask for information and a study of your case, and you will learn the cause of loss and the appropriate remedy.

ADLER

HAIR TREATMENT CENTER

(under medical direction)

MADRID: Torre de Madrid 8.° 9 - Tel: 2 41 44 75
BARCELONA: Vía Layetana, 180 - Tel. 2 27 05 74

CPS 872

IS WHAT I AM TRYING TO DO NOW

Film DAILY
THE INTERNATIONAL NEWSPAPER OF MOTION PICTURES
Established May 8, 1918

7 TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 1964 TEN CENTS

RT THROWS OUT PAY-TV SUIT

s for
[illegible]
tions

attack on some prevent a free tures in seven unched by the ation of Film ons, Ralph Het- association and the Motion Pic- America, said g to New York.

Page 5)

Film
Drive

president of ill serve as lotion Picture

MANDEL

goal appeal

odern Art
Y Festival

odern Art may he New York ear, a Museum lged yesterday. of participa- decided by the

Page 5).

AB-PT Income Rises; Theatre Take Larger

American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres showed record income for 1963 accompanied by a rise in earnings from the theatre division, President Leonard H. Goldenson disclosed yesterday. The AB-PT overall income was $386,729,000 for the year compared to $379,741,000 in 1962.

Theatre earnings, not usually revealed, were $76,209,000 for 1963 compared to $75,956,000 in 1962. Merchandise sales were $29,948,000

(Continued on Page 2)

Jacobellis Case Up To High Court Again

Washington Bureau of THE FILM DAILY

Washington — The Supreme Court yesterday set the long-awaited second argument of the Nico Jacobellis case for next week. The second arguments will be heard just before a book obscenity case, and the decision of the highest court to listen again may presage a more sweeping decision on obscenity in motion pictures than has been handed down in previous cases.

Cleveland Heights theatre manager Jacobellis was convicted under

(Continued on Page 4)

Jimmy Grainger Heads Sales for AllStar

West Coast Bureau of THE FILM DAILY

Hollywood — J. R. "Jimmy" Grainger, industry veteran who formerly headed RKO Radio Pictures, is back in action with the formation here of AllStar Films, a new distribution-production company.

Grainger, one-time Fox and

(Continued on Page 4)

'Greatest' Campaign Focus on Pictorial

Except for the picture itself the photography in George Stevens' "The Greatest Story Ever Told" will constitute "the single greatest selling tool," according to United Artists plans.

Gabe Sumner, UA national director of advertising, publicity and exploitation, said yesterday "The Greatest Story" promotion promises to be "the most exten-

STEVENS

(Continued on Page 4)

British Box Office Attendance Stronger

London — Both film box office receipts and attendance for January, 1964, were up over January, 1963, statistics of the Board of Trade here reveal.

Weekly average theatre take in January, 1964, was £1.24 million compared to £1.08 million. Weekly attendance for January, 1964 was 7.9 million compared to 7.6 million in the same month last year. (The pound is at $2.82).

Exhibs Win First Round in Calif.; S TV Plans Moves

By WILLIAM ORNSTEIN
West Coast Editor of THE FILM DAILY

Hollywood — Subscription TV lost the first round of a four-round bout in the California arena with the Crusade for Free TV. The initial round dropped to theatre owners was dismissal by U.S. District Court Judge William C. Mathis of the $117,541,500 antitrust and conspiracy suit filed last Dec. 17 against the Crusade and 20 defendants, including theatre com-

(Continued on Page 5)

Naify Fills Skouras Spot in Magna Pix

Marshall Naify, president of United Artists Theatre Circuit and of United California Theatres, has been elected president of Magna Pictures Corp. Naify fills the vacancy in Magna created by the death of George P. Skouras.

Another vacancy caused by Skouras' death, the presidency of Todd-AO, has been filled by Salah Hassanein, United Artists Theatre Circuit Executive Vice-President.

Naify said that Magna, which produced "Oklahoma!" and "South Pacific" would step up its picture production in both in Dimension 150 for roadshow presentation and in [illegible]5mm for regular release.

Greek Gods' to Roll in '65 At $20 Million Budget

Diko Prod., Inc., a new American-Greek company with headquarters in Athens, plans to produce "The Loves of the Greek Gods" in Greece and in the Bronston Studios in Madrid at "a cost

(Continued on Page 2)

ISN'T IT TIME YOU CAME HOME TO ROOST AT Pathé
Hollywood
New York
Toronto

THIS IS WHAT I AM TRYING TO DO NOW

THE Film DAILY

THE INTERNATIONAL NEWSPAPER OF MOTION PICTURES
Established May 8, 1918

VOL. 124, NO. 57 TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 1964 TE

COURT THROWS OUT PAY-TV SU

IFFPA Moves for Free Film Flow In Seven Nations

Madrid—A united attack on some of the barriers that prevent a free flow of motion pictures in seven nations will be launched by the International Federation of Film Producers Associations, Ralph Hetzel, president of the association and acting president of the Motion Picture Association of America, said here before returning to New York.

(Continued on Page 5)

Mandel Heads Film Division of UJA Drive

Harry Mandel, president of RKO Theatres, will serve as chairman of the Motion Picture and Amusement Division of the United Jewish Appeal of Greater New York.

MANDEL

"It is most important for our industry," Mandel declared "to give additional support to UJA in order that we may help ease the problems of those in need."

Nationwide UJA goal appeal is $105,000,000.

Museum of Modern Art May Pass Up NY Festival

The Museum of Modern Art may not participate in the New York Film Festival this year, a Museum spokesman acknowledged yesterday. He said the question of participation was yet to be decided by the

(Continued on Page 5)

AB-PT Income Rises; Theatre Take Larger

American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres showed record income for 1963 accompanied by a rise in earnings from the theatre division, President Leonard H. Goldenson disclosed yesterday. The AB-PT overall income was $386,729,000 for the year compared to $379,741,000 in 1962.

Theatre earnings, not usually revealed, were $76,209,000 for 1963 compared to $75,956,000 in 1962. Merchandise sales were $29,948,000

(Continued on Page 2)

Jacobellis Case Up To High Court Again

Washington Bureau of THE FILM DAILY

Washington — The Supreme Court yesterday set the long-awaited second argument of the Nico Jacobellis case for next week. The second arguments will be heard just before a book obscenity case, and the decision of the highest court to listen again may presage a more sweeping decision on obscenity in motion pictures than has been handed down in previous cases.

Cleveland Heights theatre manager Jacobellis was convicted under

(Continued on Page 4)

Jimmy Grainger Heads Sales for AllStar

West Coast Bureau of THE FILM DAILY

Hollywood — J. R. "Jimmy" Grainger, industry veteran who formerly headed RKO Radio Pictures, is back in action with the formation here of AllStar Films, a new distribution-production company.

Grainger, one-time Fox and

(Continued on Page 4)

'Greatest' Campaign Focus on Pictorial

Except for the picture itself the photography in George Stevens' "The Greatest Story Ever Told" will constitute "the single greatest selling tool," according to United Artists plans.

STEVENS

Gabe Sumner, UA national director of advertising, publicity and exploitation, said yesterday "The Greatest Story" promotion promises to be "the most exten-

(Continued on Page 4)

Exhibs Win First Round in Calif.; S TV Plans Move

By WILLIAM ORNSTE
West Coast Editor of THE FI

Hollywood — Subs TV lost the first rou four-round bout in t fornia arena with the Cr Free TV. The initial roun to theatre owners was dis U.S. District Court Judg C. Mathis of the $117,541 trust and conspiracy suit Dec. 17 against the Crusa defendants, including the

(Continued on Page

Naify Fills Skou Spot in Magna

Marshall Naify, presi United Artists Theatre and of United California has been elected presi Magna Pictures Corp. N the vacancy in Magna cr the death of George P. Sk

Another vacancy ca Skouras' death, the presi Todd-AO, has been filled Hassanein, United Artis tre Circuit Executive Vi dent.

Naify said that Magn produced "Oklahoma!" an Pacific" would step up its production in both in Di 150 for roadshow presenta in 35mm for regular rel

Greek Gods' to Roll At $20 Million Bu

Diko Prod., Inc., a new can-Greek company wit quarters in Athens, plans duce "The Loves of th Gods" in Greece and in th ston Studios in Madrid at

(Continued on Page 2

British Box Office Attendance Stronger

London — Both film box office receipts and attendance for January, 1964, were up over January, 1963, statistics of the Board of Trade here reveal.

Weekly average theatre take in January, 1964, was £1.24 million compared to £1.08 million. Weekly attendance for January, 1964 was 7.9 million compared to 7.6 million in the same month last year. (The pound is at $2.82).

For Skill
And S
In Sight
And Sound

ISN'T IT TIME YOU CAME HOME TO ROOST AT Pathé

Hollywo
New Yor
Toronto

THE FILM DAILY

Established May 8, 1918

Vol. 124, No. 57, Tues., March 24, 1964 10 Cts.

CHAS. A. ALICOATE : : Edit. in Chief & Pub.

HARRY WISMER : : : Associate Publisher & Executive Vice-President

AL FINESTONE : : : : : : : : Editor

BOONE MANCALL : : Vice-Pres. Dir. of Adv.

WILLIAM SPECHT : : : : : Associate Editor

MERLIN LEWIS : : : : : Vice-Pres.-Gen. Mgr.

Published daily except Saturdays, Sundays, and Holidays at 1501 Broadway, New York 36, N. Y., Wid's Films and Film Folk, Inc. Chas. A. Alicoate, President & Treasurer; Nelson E. Garringer, Vice-President & Secretary. Second Class postage paid at New York, N. Y. Terms (Postage free) United States $15.00 one year. Foreign $20.00. Address all communications to THE FILM DAILY, 1501 Broadway, New York 36, N. Y. Telephones: BRyant 9-7117, 9-7118, 9-7119, 9-7120, 9-7121. Cable Address: Filmday, New York.

'Becket' Grosses Tops In First Five Engagaments

Hal Wallis' "Becket" shapes up as one of the top roadshow films of recent years on the basis of its first five engagements in the U.S. and Canada, according to Paramount.

In its second week, at Loew's State here, "Becket" scored $30,070 in six performances. Others include $16,959, seven shows, Warner Beverly, Los Angeles; $11,849, six performances, Chicago Cinestage; $12,370, seven performances, Eglinton, Toronto.

Brandt to West Coast For 'Weekend' Confabs

Bingo Brandt, vice president of Brandt Theatres, leaves today for the West Coast for promotion conferences with Emanuel Barling, distributor of "Weekend" which opens at the renovated Globe Theatre here at the end of April. Brandt will also discuss picture possibilities for Lotte Tarp, who is featured in "Weekend."



AB-PT Income Rises; Theatre Take Larger

(Continued from Page 1)

compared with $75,965,000 in 1962.

The AB-PT operating earnings for 1963 were $7,358,000 or $1.65 a share compared to $10,757,000 or $2.41 a share in 1962.

Goldenson explained the paradox of lower operating earnings when the record income exceeded that of 1962 as reflecting 1962-1963 television business and the cost of covering President Kennedy's assassination. He anticipated progressive improvement during 1964, better than 1963.

He noted, too, an improvement in theatre business despite a slow start in 1963. AB-PT, he said, continued its policy of disposing marginal theatres and attempting to replace them with modern units in growing suburban areas. The company, he revealed, dropped 14 theatres during 1963 and opened three new ones. Theatres are under construction in Charlotte, N.C. and Sunnyland, Fla., and a third is on the drawing board.

Levy Signs Sandy Oliver To Compose for 'Fanny'

West Coast Bureau of THE FILM DAILY

Hollywood—Robert Levy, president of Pebble Productions, has signed noted song writer and dramatist Sandy Oliver to write an original song for the company's color featurette, "A Comedy Tale of Fanny Hill", which begins rolling at Producers Studio in April, starring Judy Cannon. Working title for the tune is "The Song of Fanny Hill".

Levy has also set Cy Roth as production manager for the film which is aimed for July 4 nationwide release.

Batschelet Succeeds Sweeten as Denver Mgr.

Denver, Colo.—Ralph J. Batschelet, manager of the Mayan Theatre and member of the cabinet of Fox Inter-Mountain Theatres, has been named managing director of the Denver Theatre, according to Ray W. Davis, area supervisor for the Fox organization, and John O. Denman, Denver district manager.

Batschelet succeeds Robert G. Sweeten, promoted to national advertising director for National General Corp. in Beverly Hills, Calif., the parent company.

Peter Lorre Dead

West Coast Bureau of THE FILM DAILY

Hollywood — Peter Lorre died here yesterday. He would have been 60 in June. The Hungarian-born actor was known to film audiences for his character roles in a score of motion pictures, most recently in a series with American International.

FINANCIAL

(March 23)

NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE

	High	Low	Close	Net Chg.
ABC Vending.	14⅜	14	14¼	+ ¼
ABC-Par	36⅜	35⅛	36⅜	+ 1⅛
Am. News....	23½	23⅛	23⅜	+ ⅛
Am. Optical..	68⅝	67¾	68	— ½
Am. Seat.....	35	35	35	......
Ampex	16⅛	15½	15⅞	+ ¾
Auto. Canteen	13⅞	13⅝	13⅝	— ¼
Bausch & Lomb	34⅛	33¼	33½	— ¾
Bell & Howell.	23⅛	22⅝	23⅛	+ ⅝
CBS	43½	43	43	— ¼
Columbia Picts.	21⅞	21⅝	21⅝	— ⅛
Decca	46¼	46¼	46¼	— ½
Disney	45	44	44⅞	+ 1⅛
East. Kodak..	129½	128	128¼	— ¾
Gen. Prec. Eq.	28⅞	28½	28½	— ¼
Glen Alden...	14¼	14⅛	14¼	+ ⅛
Lear Siegler..	13⅞	13⅝	13⅞	— ⅛
Litton Indus...	66⅜	65⅜	65⅞	— ½
Loew's Thea..	22	21¾	21¾	— ⅛
MCA	56⅛	56⅛	56⅛	— ⅜
MCA CVP....	36	35¾	35¾	+ ⅛
MGM	30¼	30	30	......
Nat. General..	9	8⅞	8⅞	— ⅛
Paramount ...	58	57	57¾	+ 1⅜
RCA Common.	36⅜	35⅞	36⅝	+ ¼
RCA 1st Pfd...	77⅜	77⅜	77⅜	......
Republic Corp.	7⅞	7¾	7¾	— ¼
Republic Pfd..	15¼	15	15¼	+ ¼
Stan. Warner.	26½	25⅜	26½	+ 1
20th-Fox	22⅞	22½	22½	— ¼
United Artists.	25	24⅜	24½	— ¼
Warner Bros..	28⅜	27⅞	27⅞	......
Zenith Radio..	84⅝	83	83	......

AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE

	High	Low	Close	Net Chg.
Allied Artists.	2⅜	2⅜	2⅜	......
Audio Dv....	12½	12¼	12⅜	— ⅛
Cinerama Inc..	11⅛	11	11	— ⅛
Filmways	8¼	8⅛	8¼	+ ⅛
MPO VA.....	12⅝	11⅞	11⅞	— ⅛
Reeves Indus..	3¼	3	3	......
Screen Gems..	19¼	19	19	— ½
Sonotone	5	5⅞	5	......
Technicolor ..	18⅜	17⅞	17⅞	— ⅛
TV Indus.....	¾	¾	¾	......
Trans-Lux	12⅛	12⅛	12⅛	— ¼

OVER THE COUNTER

(Supplied by the National Association of Security Dealers)

	Bid	Asked
Commonwealth Pr.	5⅝	6½
Du Art Corp.	4¼	5
General Drive-In	10⅝	11⅝
General Artists Corp.	7½	8½
Magna Pictures	2	2⅜
Medallion	16¾	17
Seven Arts Production	10⅝	11¾
Skiatron	2¼	2⅝
Subscription TV	11¼	12⅛
Universal	66	70½
UA Theatres	8	9
Walter Reade	2½	2⅞
Wometco	34¼	36⅝

'Greek Gods' to Roll in '65 At $20 Million Budget

(Continued from Page 1)

of $20 million."

Diko Dimitroff, head of the new company, has set next January for start of filming. Financing has been obtained from a Wall Street firm, the National Organization to Assist Small Business.

Shooting on the four-hour wide-screen production is expected to take a full year. All exteriors will be done in Greece and will involve the use of Mount Olympus itself.

COMING AND GO

MAX A. COHEN, head of Cinem and MRS. COHEN returned yester Europe.

M. J. FRANKOVICH, Columbia p head, returned to the coast from Paris and Rome.

BERNARD J. GATES, Allied Art national v.p., has returned from European trip.

JOSEPH E. LEVINE, Embassy Pict ident, to Boston on business. H tomorrow.

MO ROTHMAN, Columbia Inte executive v.p., returned from Bue following the company's Latin Ame vention in Uruguay.

LOU FORMATO, MGM assistan sales manager, to Seattle and Por returns Friday.

WILLIAM J. DEVANEY, MGM division sales manager in Seattl heading for Portland, Ore.

FRED HYNES, Todd-AO vice-pre the coast, has returned there fr

SHELDON SMERLING, head of B terprises, returned to the coast fortnight here on his theatre inter include Eastern Management hous

SAMUEL TAYLOR, who will screenplay for "Three on a Couc Irving Pincus production for huddling in Hollywood.

RUTH POLOGE, American Int eastern publicity director, to Chic

Producer LAWRENCE TURMAN turned to the coast after UA ta lease of "The Best Man."

DIRK BOGARDE and SARAH turned to London; ditto JOSEPH LO directed "The Servant," in which

BETTE DAVIS is here from the co

PETER GLENVILLE, director of H "Becket," has returned to Lon N. Y. for tomorrow's premiere at Theatre.

'Yesterday' Rolls Bi In New York and L

Joseph E. Levine's "Ye Today and Tomorrow," lo the biggest grossing film Manhattan's East Side, ac to Embassy, which repo expected first week's g $59,000 at the Festival and East.

In Los Angeles, the film $15,304 in first three days Fox Wilshire, Embassy r

'Servant' Breaks 30- Record at Little Ca

Ely Landau's "The S broke the 30-year record Little Carnegie with a fir gross of $20,402, the comp ports.

'Word' Here Today

"The Given Word," Films release, has its U. miere today at the Beekm atre under auspices of Dora A. de Vasconcellos, General of Brazil.

SECRET

20 JAN 1964

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: DIMITROFF, Dimiter Adamoff
/aka: DIMITROV, Dimitur Adamov/

1. Reference is made to the request received 15 January 1964 from Mr. Jessup concerning Subject. The files of this office contain the following information.

2. Subject of your request is Dimitur Adamov DIMITROV, born 7 May 1924 in Medkovets, Bulgaria. He escaped to Greece in 1947 and participated actively in anti-Communist activities among Bulgarian refugees there. He was described as being dictatorial and egotistical to the point of having delusions of grandeur. Subject felt that he could cause the downfall of the Communist government of Bulgaria and would become prime minister of the country thereafter. By September 1951, his behavior had become so peculiar that he was detained for mental observation and treatment. In February 1954, Subject was considered well enough to be returned to normal refugee channels in Greece and was transferred to the Syros refugee detention camp to await disposition.

3. Subject immigrated to the United States in 1956. Since that time he has written numerous letters to the White House and government agencies proposing rather far-fetched anti-Communist schemes in which he inevitably proposes himself for the leading role. Whereas Subject is not regarded as insane and is not known to be disposed to violence, the above letters do indicate that he is something of a "crackpot" on the subject of anti-Communism. It is conceivable that he does harbor some bitterness toward Greece as a result of his detention mentioned above.

CSCI-3/779,614
BC: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
RID/CE: JMA/MC/dcl
Based on: 201-45145*
EE/BR

201-45145

CS COPY
FILE IN 201-45145

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1 Encl

SECRET
CONTROL
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEC 14 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Activities of Dimiter Adomov Dimitrov in Greece

1. The following information concerning the activities of Subject in Greece was recently received from the field. It is brought to your attention for your information, and for such comments as you may be able to make.

2. According to a fairly reliable informant, Subject, allegedly acting on instructions from members of the American Embassy at Athens, has lately become very active among Bulgarian refugees in Greece. Early in October 1950, Subject visited the Lavrion Camp where he met with a number of his Bulgarian friends and advised them that he had been given a "charter and instructions," by certain members of the American Embassy, to form a committee of five members for the planning and execution of a fight for the liberation of Bulgaria. This committee, according to Subject, would be established in Athens and would cooperate with other similar committees which have already been formed in France, Germany and other countries. The committee would later expand to 20 members and would establish a so-called "Democratic Agrarian Bloc."

3. Subject is further reported to have stated that recruits would come from among the members and sympathizers of the Bulgarian Democratic Party (Moushynov) and from the Gichev Agrarians. The members of the Leftist Agrarian Party (G.M. Dimitrov or "Pladne" group) and right-wing elements would be excluded. Eligible Bulgarian emigres would come to Greece from Western Europe to assist in the work, and prominent members of the Gichev Agrarians and of the Democratic Party would be assisted in escaping to Greece (presumably from Bulgaria) to join the organization.

4. Subject outlined the tasks of the organization as follows:

a. Intelligence activity in Bulgaria,

b. Organizing an underground resistance movement in Bulgaria, and

SECRET
CONTROL
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

201-45145

c. Organizing sabotage activity against Bulgaria.

5. Subject also revealed that the members of the committee at present were: himself as president; Ivan Mitev Hristonov, secretary; Ivan Donev Ivanov; Dimiter Donev Ivanov; and a fifth member whose name was not supplied by source.

6. In addressing the group at Lavrion, Subject took frequent occasion to mention that the committee has its headquarters in the American Embassy where he has a room assigned for his own use. He also stated that the committee maintains offices at 13 Patission Street, 7th Floor, rooms 2-4, and he stated that eight Bulgarian-speaking Americans are already working at this address. Possibly in an effort to impress his listeners, Subject commented that his office had two Bulgarian typewriters and a car with U. S. A. license plates.

7. Following his address to the group at Lavrion, Subject and Ivan Mitev Hristonov, secretary of the so-called committee, prepared a list of prospective members of the organization based on their screening of the refugees at Lavrion on the basis of birthplace, education, military training, and similar factors, the list having been prepared for submission to the American Embassy for approval, according to Subject.

8. On 1 November 1950, Subject again visited the Lavrion Camp to inform his recruits that they would shortly be moved to a pleasant home in Athens which the Americans were repainting for the purpose. On the occasion of this visit, the recruits were divided into three groups, as follows:

a. A group of 10 men to specialize in intelligence,

b. A group of 6 men to be trained in radio in Germany, and

c. A group of 15 men to specialize in sabotage.

9. On or about 10 November 1950, the following six members of Group "A" moved to Athens: Peter Zlatev, Krustyu Kiryanov, Ivan Hristonov, Ivan Gogov, Todor Djadiev, and one whose name is unknown. The others were to follow shortly.

10. According to our source, the radio group comprises Ivan Iskrov, Boris Popov, Georgi Nikolov, and others, while the sabotage group includes Serafim Vangelov Kouyoumdjiev, Nikola Manev, Todor Nikolov Todorov, Marko Korchev and others.

11. In submitting the above report our source commented that Kouyoumdjiev is a dangerous Communist, although he did not cite facts to support this accusation. Our source also described Subject as an unprincipled opportunist and Greek agent. According to our source, Subject had previously worked for the Greeks and was in contact with the British last spring.

Robert A. Schow
ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director
Special Operations

SO DB-31992

SECRET

13 November 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: II/OS

SUBJECT: Dimiter Adamov Dimitrov

REFERENCE: Request for Operational Clearance for Subject dated 23 October 1950.

1. Attached is additional biographic data on Subject, forwarded for your information.

Gratian M. Yatsevitch
Chief, EE-I

EE-I/CFA/lb

cc: Orig & 1 - addressee
#3, 4 - EE-I
5, 6 - III/RE

SECRET 201-45145

SECRET

DIMITER ADAMOV DIMITROV

Dimiter Adamov Dimitrov was born on 7 May 1924 in the village of Medkovets, district of Lom, Bulgaria. His father was a farmer. His primary education was completed in Lom. He finished his high school training in 1941-1942 in Sofia, and studied philology for one year at Sofia University (1942-1943).

In 1942 he joined a secret branch of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. In 1943, he claims to have begun underground activities, due to persecution by "Fascists". On 2 September 1944, he emerged from hiding to begin work with various Agrarian leaders. After the events of 9 September 1944, however, he again went into hiding and began activities aimed against Communists.

On 28 October 1944, he allegedly was accused by the government of sabotage because he had agitated against the Russian occupation troops. During the ensuing months, he was arrested several times in Ferdinand, Vratsa, and Lom. When released from prison, he continued his illegal activities. His organizational activities often lead him across the Yugoslav frontier. Allegedly he worked in Vardar Macedonia in order to organize Bulgarian sympathizers for the Agrarian Party cause. In April and May 1945, Dimitrov was in Sofia. At one point he procured an illegal identity card add under the name "Boris Stoikov, a member of the 2nd Belgrade Shock Brigade", he toured southwestern Yugoslavia, "organizing Agrarian posts", and was eventually captured by the Yugoslav authorities and sent back to Bulgaria. During the elections of 18 November 1945 he spoke at secret meetings in Vratsa, urging the people to defeat the Communists.

On 16 August 1946, he was captured by the police in Sofia. He claims to have been kept eighteen days without bread and twelve days without water, and to have spent four days on an electric torture machine which caused temporary blindness. From 13 October to 11 November 1946, he was tried in the Vratsa court for having organized subversive groups all over Bulgaria and sentenced on four counts. On 2 June 1947, he was tried and sentenced to death by the Sofia Military Court. On 8 July he escaped from the authorities, and on 23 July 1947 he crossed the Greek frontier.

ACTION,

He now works for Radio Athens and lives at Hotel New Phaleron, Greece.

SECRET

13-00000

SIGNAL CENTER COPY

[illegible]

INFORMATION: [illegible]

DELAYED

WASH- [illegible] PARI-S FRAN- [illegible] TO: ATHE-S 6 3200 / 3200

QKSTAIR.

1. FLAKES HAVE AGREED MY USE OF LYLE D KELLY ~~IDENTITY ONE~~ (1). LATTER HAS GIVEN ME NAMES SIX HIS FOLLOWERS (2) (3) TWO IN THREE READY TO INFILTRATE IMMEDIATELY. FLAKES NOW CLEARING. FIRST TASK ONE TEAM TO BRING OUT ~~FOUR~~ (4). THINK WE HAVE SOMETHING GOOD HERE. WE ARE ALL SET. REQUEST IMMEDIATE GO AHEAD ON BASIS OUR LOCAL AND FLAK~~O~~E CLEARANCE TO GET THIS HERETOFORE BOGGED DOWN SHOW ON ROAD.

2. KELLY ALSO CAN SUPPLY TRAINED SABOTEURS, NOT NOW IN FLAKE, BEST FOR TRAINING JOBS IN HTSTEIN, OTHERS FOR OPS. WILL INFORM FURTHER.

3. ALSO REQUEST CLEARANCE ~~FIVE~~ (5), KELLYS LOCAL LIEUTENANT.

4. NOTE KELLY HAD BEEN UNDER CLOSE 24 HOUR PER DAY SURVEILLANCE SINCE 14 OCTOBER. ~~NOTE SIX SELECTED MEN~~ (6) EXPERIENCED IN UNDERGROUND WORK [illegible] WORKERS.

23 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: II/OS

SUBJECT: Operational Clearance for Dimitri Adamov Dimitrov

1. It is requested that the necessary investigation be initiated for the issuance of an operational clearance for Dimitri Adamov Dimitrov.

2. Subject will be used in psychological and political warfare operations in Greece in connection with project QKSTAIR. Clearance should permit occasional trips to such countries as Italy, France, Germany, Switzerland, and England.

3. All possible efforts should be made to prevent any U. S. government or CIA interest being shown in this man. His usefulness would be severely restricted, if not eliminated, if it should become known in Bulgarian emigre circles that the U. S. government was intending to utilize his services.

4. Because of his background and experience subject can make significant contributions to QKSTAIR operations in Greece. He is needed as soon as possible to participate in operations which are already underway. A provisional clearance is requested for 17 Nov. 1950.

5. All Biographical data available at present is attached.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Chief, EE-I

Attachments: 3

cc: EE-I file
EE-I chrono
OPC file
OPC chrono
EE-I/MSB/ej

SECRET

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

DIMITROV, Dimitri Adamov

Dimitrov was born in Ferdinand, now Mihailongrad, in 1924. There is little information about his youth but it appears he is fairly well educated. He was an active Albanian Agrarian at a young age. During the war he worked illegally in Greek Macedonia and Vardar, Macedonia to escape authorities. He returned home after the war; soon disillusioned by Communists, went to Sofia for help from Agrarian headquarters. He then made clandestine tour of various Albanian cities and towns urging Agrarians to take positive action against Communists. Finally captured in Sofia, he was given usual treatment and says life was spared because he was being groomed as witness against Petkaov. Escaped to Greece, where he has remained since, doing occasional propaganda for Greeks under nom de plume Diko. Subject was strong Georges M. Dimitrov man but has now veered to Tenev group, and is anti-Dimitrov.

SECRET

201-45145

SECURITY :

515834

26
REC'D
OCT 20

CONFIDENTIAL AIR POUCH

Enclosures: 10 DST-18015

ACTION
EUR*

ATHENS 588 October 13, 1950 769.00/10-1350

INFO
DCR
NEA
OLI
IE
L
R
EUR/X
P
C

--

State F

PERIPHERAL: ACTIVITIES OF DIMITER ADAMOV DIMITROV ("DIKO") BULGARIAN REFUGEE PRESENTLY IN GREECE

Dimiter Adamov Dimitrov, a young Bulgarian refugee known as "Diko", seems to be the most active Bulgarian now in Greece. His youth, energy and capabilities indicate that he might become a figure of importance in Bulgarian emigre circles. This report on him is divided into the following sections:

1. Biography
2. Present activities
   a. Employment
   b. Publications
   c. The "Democratic Bloc"
   d. Memorial services for Nikola Petkov
3. Comments

201-45145

RETAIN ~~OR DESTROY~~

1. **Biography**

The following biographic details were supplied by Dimitrov himself, and cannot be checked in Athens.

Dimiter Adamov Dimitrov was born on May 7, 1924, in the village of Medkovets, district of Lom, Bulgaria. His father was a farmer. His primary education was completed in Lom. He finished his high school training in 1941-1942 in Sofia, and studied philology for one year at Sofia University (1942-1943).

In 1942 Diko joined a secret branch of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. In 1943, he claims to have begun underground activities, due to persecution by "Fascists." He claims to have worked closely with Dr. G. M. Dimitrov during the time. (This claim is partially substantiated by letters written to Diko by Dr. G. M. Dimitrov in 1947.) Georgi

On September 2, 1944, Diko emerged from hiding to begin work with the Mushanov, Guitchev, Moraviev Agrarians. After the events of September 9, 1944, however, he again went into hiding and began activities aimed against Communists.

201-45145 40-42
~~200~~ 7-50

WAllan:vg

IID COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

On October 28, 1944, he allegedly was accused by the government of sabotage because he had agitated against the Russian occupation troops. During the ensuing months he was arrested several times in Ferdinand, Vratsa and Lom. When released from prison, he continued his illegal activities, which seem to have consisted in travelling from village to village, organizing loose-knit groups of Agrarians to withstand Communist pressures.

Diko's organizational activities often lead him across the Yugoslav frontier. Allegedly he worked in Vardar Macedonia in order to organize Bulgarian sympathizers for the cause of Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, and upon the advice of a certain General Kitchharov.

In April and May, 1945, Diko was in Sofia, in contact with Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, Nikola Petkov and Mara Raicheva. After Diko learned that GeMe had left Bulgaria, he went to Skoplje and asked American and English officers there to help him get to Bari. He did not receive such help.

Diko procured an illegal identity card and, as "Boris Stoikov, a member of the 2nd Belgrade Shock Brigade," he toured southwestern Yugoslavia, "organizing Agrarian posts." Eventually, Diko was captured by the Yugoslav authorities.

Upon the suggestion of "Gosho, the leader of the partisans of Greek Macedonia," Diko was sent back to Bulgaria. He escaped during this transfer and, although he was ill, he went to Sofia where, he says, he was helped by a number of people, including Peter Belgashki, an American Colonel named "Bekeles," an American Sergeant named "Bucky," General Craig and Mrs. Minnie Balabanova.

When he had recovered his health, Diko left Sofia and travelled throughout Bulgaria, organizing "secret posts." Allegedly he organized 250 of these throughout Bulgaria. During the elections of November 18, 1945, he spoke at secret meetings in Vratsa, urging the people to defeat the Communists.

On August 16, 1946, he was captured by the police in Sofia. He claims to have been kept eighteen days without bread and twelve days without water, and to have spent four days on an electric torture machine which caused temporary blindness. (His "indescribable tortures" are all described in detail in his book "The Liberation of Bulgaria." See enclosure No. 1.) Diko believes that he was not executed because the Communists wished to hold him as a witness in preparation for the trial of Nikola Petkov.

From October 13 to November 11, 1946, Diko was tried in the Vratsa court for "having organized subversive groups all over Bulgaria." The chief prosecutor was a man named Chernev, the presiding judge was a certain Pencho Spasov. Diko was sentenced on four counts: to death, to 15 years, to 6 years and to 3 years imprisonment. He was jailed and put in solitary confinement.

On June 2, 1947, he was tried and sentenced to death by the Sofia Military Court. Also, he states, he was tried and sentenced to death by the court at Lom.

In June, 1947, Diko was taken to a quarry in Vratsa where he worked loading rock. On July 8, he escaped from the quarry and went to Mesdra. In Mesdra he contacted the post which he had established there, and received help in travelling further. He went to Zverova and then to Sofia. While in Sofia he asked for and received some help both from the British and from the Americans. He claims that on one occasion he slept in the Sofia house of Jack Horner, of the American Legation. (At this time Mr. Horner was living in his summer home at Simeonovo.) Diko claims also to have stayed with Michael Shipkov.

On July 23, 1947 he crossed the Greek frontier south of Zlatograd. He gave himself up the next day at Shahim.

British authorities in Sofia had notified the British in Salonika, and they made arrangements for Diko to be admitted to the British hospital in Xanthi. After eighteen days in the hospital there he was transferred to the British hospital in Salonika. After a month and a half in Salonika he was sent to Athens. Greek authorities sent him to the refugee camp at Lavrion. Diko spent nine months in Lavrion, then went to Athens, where he obtained employment broadcasting in Bulgarian on Radio Athens. His subsequent activities in Greece are discussed in section 2, below.

Diko speaks Bulgarian, Serbian, Russian, some Greek and a very little English.

2. Activities

a. Employment. Diko works for Radio Athens. He broadcasts every Sunday evening in Bulgarian. He receives 30,000 drachmae per broadcast. (60,000 if his text is also used in a Greek language broadcast.) Unfortunately, however, it costs him twenty to thirty thousand drachmae to have his text translated into Greek for the benefit of the Greek censor. Additional expenses, such as those for renting a typewriter and local transportation costs, give him a net return from this work of about zero drachmae. In addition to his money pay, however, the Greek Government provides him with quarters in a run-down hotel in New Phaleron and it pays him 2800 drachmae per day subsistence. (Generally, a refugee is not entitled to subsistence money if he has any employment whatsoever.)

Diko also writes articles for various Athens newspapers (see enclosure No. 6) and has received money for them. Other literary activities are described in section 2. b., below.

A Mr. Humphries, technical adviser of the BBC at Radio Athens, allegedly has offered Diko a job with BBC in London. Diko has refused to accept this offer to date, because of his primary interest in organising refugees into a "Democratic Bloc." Should he find it impossible to acquire funds necessary for his continued activities in Greece, however, he plans to go to London with BBC.

b. Publications. Diko is a prolific author and is at present writing an eight part work on Bulgaria to be entitled "Under the Whip of Stalin." The eight parts of the book are:

(1) The Liberation of Bulgaria
(2) In the Hands of the Militia
(3) Justice and Communism
(4) Prisons and Camps
(5) Agrarians and Communism
(6) Workers and Communism
(7) Army and Communism
(8) Church and Communism

Diko has already written parts 1, 5 and 7. Parts 1 and 5 have been published in Greece. They are enclosures No. 1 and No. 2 to this despatch. Part 7 (enclosure No. 3) is being published by the Greek General Staff and is at the printers at the present time. Diko received about 3,000,000 drachmae for each part of his book which has been published; he expects to earn about the same amount for Part 7, and for subsequent parts.

Diko states that he has written the books which have been published "for the Greek audience." He realizes that they will not meet approval in the West, largely because they are too emotional. Also, he has omitted from the Greek versions of his book certain anti-Monarchist sentiments which he did not express "for political reasons." Diko has re-written the first two parts of his book "for the American audience" and is very anxious to have them published in the United States. Enclosures No. 4 and No. 5 are the Greek texts of these revised portions.

Diko refers to himself often as "the new Kravchenko - better than Kravchenko." The Peripheral Reporting Unit asked Mrs. Mary Johnston, former Press Attache at the United States Legation in Sofia, to read the Greek text of Diko's books and check on this boast. (Diko's books are available only in Greek at the present time.) Mrs. Johnston stated that "Diko is certainly no worse than Kravchenko."....Mrs. Johnston believes that Diko is an interesting and graphic author and that -- if he could abstain from frequent use of Balkan epithets -- his work might merit publication in English. Mrs. Johnston selected a short passage from "Agrarians and Communism" as being typical of his better writing. Enclosure No. 6, "Incident in Vulchedram," is a translation of this passage.

D BULGARIAN — directed by Dimiter Adamov Dimitrov

c. ~~The~~ "Democratic Bloc." Diko is engaged in trying to ~~organize a "Democratic Bloc."~~ His present efforts are directed almost entirely toward Bulgarian refugees in the camp at Lavrion. Diko was made a member of the "P. D. Petkov" organization which was formed in Lavrion on April 30, 1950. (See CAS report E-3295, September 16, 1950.) He has taken over and expanded the activities of this group, and now considers himself its leader.

Diko claims that he has twelve "hard core" members in his group and fifty-four interested supporters. He claims that he will have ninety supporters as soon as he can find the funds to print and distribute his program, and to provide other concrete proofs of his growing strength.

Diko appears to be an excellent organizer. He keeps up-to-date lists of all the Bulgarians in the camp at Lavrion. The Bulgarians are listed according to Diko's estimate of their political position. Thus there is a group called Supporters, there is one called Potential Supporters, there is a group of "hard core" Gemetoists, a list of Nationalists, etc. Diko also files all of his ideas and correspondence and, in general, seems to have a good idea of what he has done and is doing.

Diko makes it a point to visit the camp at Lavrion regularly, and to bring with him cigarettes and food which he distributes among new arrivals. Allegedly, he tells these new arrivals that the presents are given to them because they are Bulgarians, not as a bribe to join his political group. "In actual fact, however," Diko admits, "this is a very successful way of getting people to support us." Diko claims that he pays for these little gifts himself; he emphatically denies having received outside help in this matter.

The basic program of Diko's Democratic Bloc is to be found in the "Constitution of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union," as published in Sofia in 1922. Diko carries an old and dog-eared copy of this publication with him. Presumably a copy is available in Washington.

In addition to these basic tenets, Diko's group has evolved a supplementary program. The points of this supplementary program are listed on enclosure No. 8. In general, Diko's program appears democratic and idealistic.

Diko's group is opposed unalterably to the Bulgarian National Committee and to Dr. G. M. Dimitrov. Diko states that, although he worked with Dr. Dimitrov for many years, he has come to realize that Dr. Dimitrov is guilty of those same totalitarian and terrorist leftist practices of which the Communists are guilty. Diko states that the final break with Dr. Dimitrov came over the following incident:

> Dr. G. M. Dimitrov knew that Diko had organized many secret posts throughout Bulgaria and, after Diko escaped from Bulgaria, Dr. Dimitrov asked Diko to name the posts. Diko thought it wise not to write down the names of the persons in charge of the posts, and was also suspicious of this request. When Dr. Dimitrov did not receive the information he wanted, he became very angry and "showed his true totalitarian hand."

(Diko has made available to the Peripheral Reporting Unit many of his files, including those on his correspondence with Dr. Dimitrov. It appears that he does know GeMe and that GeMe at one time thought well of Diko. For instance, in a letter dated October 31, 1947, Dr. Dimitrov spoke of Diko as a "hero" and in a letter dated January 2, 1948, Dr. Dimitrov stated that he had sent Diko some clothing and shaving equipment.)

X-REF 201-652

At the present time, Diko is collaborating with the Paris group of Toncho Tenev and Vakrel Yanev. (The four Bulgarians in Lavrion who stated that they supported Toncho Tenev -- see Athens despatch 380, September 1, 1940 -- seem to be Diko's men now.) Diko makes it very clear, almost illogically and stubbornly clear, that he will continue to work with Toncho Tenev only so long as Tenev does not change his present program. Diko seems to suspect that Tenev might later evince "Monarchist" or "Gemetoist" tendencies.

Diko corresponds with Toncho Tenev, Vakrel Yanev and Yanko DONEV and Zhetcho Donev in France, with Groziu Danev and (Lt. Col) Nikola Alexandrov in Italy, with Panayot Panayotov in Venezuela, and with other Bulgarian refugees. Enclosure No. 8 is a translation of part of the text of a letter from Vakrel Yanev, which throws some light on the activities of the Tanev clique and the Barev brothers.

d. Memorial Services for Nikola Petkov. On Saturday, September 23, 1950, Diko organized a memorial service in Lavrion, commemorating the third anniversary of the hanging of Nikola Petkov. Diko stated that about eighty refugees came to his church service. (Pictures of the occasion, see enclosure No. 10, indicate that about sixty were present.) The majority of the people in attendance were Bulgarians, but there were also a few refugees of other nationalities, a Greek priest and sacristan, and a few town officials.

The memorial service lasted for more than an hour and included a mass, and a speech by Diko. Diko claims that his speech was so moving that all of the refugees cried, including himself. Following the service, Diko laid a wreath at the town soldier's monument and the group repaired to a tavern for refreshments.

The cost of the memorial service, indicated below, was not inconsiderable. Diko states that he paid about half of it himself, and that the other half was paid for from collections among the refugees.

COST OF MEMORIAL SERVICE

1.	Wreath	100,000	drachmae
2.	Priest	110,000	"
3.	Wine	40,000	"
4.	Ceremonial wheat-and-sugar	200,000	"
5.	Candles	100,000	"
6.	Food and drink at tavern	320,000	"
		870,000	"

It is interesting to note that no Gemetoists took part in or attended the memorial service. This was claimed by Diko, and corroborated by a Gemetoist who visited the Embassy early in October to complain about the "high-handed audacity of Diko in pretending to speak for Democracy." (Note: The Peripheral Reporting Unit had been invited to attend the Memorial Service but did not do so since it did not wish to appear to sponser one refugee group as against another.)

3. Comments

Diko is a pleasant, hard working young man of average intelligence. He shows a politician's glibness which is extraordinary in a man of his age. He can talk for hours about

"Democracy," "our program," etc., without actually saying anything, yet creating the impression that he is all-knowing.

As an example of Diko's awareness of the politician's role, it might be mentioned that he now wears a well cut suit of the finest materials, a pair of excellent imported shoes, a silk shirt and a silk tie. Diko is buying these on credit, at 150,000 drachmae ($10) per month. He claims that a good appearance is necessary if he is to inspire the confidence and cooperation of the refugees among whom he is working.

Diko is a rugged individualist and it would seem that his individualism is his greatest enemy at present. He is intolerant and suspicious of others, and is the type of person who would prefer to lead his own small group to suicide than to follow as a private in a larger army whose aims were not exactly his own.

There is a very great deal of the charlatan about Diko. CAS spoke with him on two occasions, and then discarded him as a "phony." The Peripheral Reporting Unit believes, however, that, notwithstanding his superficiality and the exaggerations to which he is prone, Diko has such an intuitive grasp of the rudiments of political deportment and showmanship, and he is so devoted to his self-appointed task of organizing his "Democratic Bloc," that he might become an important Bulgarian figure.

Robert B. Memminger

Robert B. Memminger,
First Secretary of Embassy.

10 Enclosures:
(Listed on page 9.)

Copies to:
(less enclosures 1,2,3,4,5,6, and 10)
Paris (PR)
Rome (PR)
Vienna (PR)
Istanbul (PR)
Frankfort (PR)
Trieste (PR)

13-00000

SECURITY: CONFIDENTIAL

ENS 588

ENCLOSURES

I. " Οἱ ἀπελευθερωταί τῆς Βουλγαρίας" (Part 1 - Greek version. 1 copy only. Unclassified.)

2. " Ἀγρότες καί κομμουνισμός" (Part 5. Greek version. 1 copy only. Unclassified.)

3. " Οἱ Ῥῶσσοι ἐλευθερωτές" (Part 7. Greek version. 1 copy only. Unclassified.)

4. " Ὁ ἐρυθρός Βουλγαρικός Στρατός" (Part 1. Revised text. 1 copy only. Unclassified.)

5. " Ἀγρότες καί Κομμουνισμός" (Part 5. Revised text. 1 copy only. Unclassified.)

6. Six newspapers containing articles about or by Diko. (1 copy only. Unclassified.)

7. "Incident in Vulchedram," translation of excerpt from Diko's "Agrarians and Communism." (Unclassified.)

8. Program of the "Democratic Bloc." (Confidential.)

9. Text of letter from Vakrel Yanev to Diko, dated April 15, 1950. (Confidential.)

10. Seven photographs of Diko and the 1950 Nikola Petkov Memorial Service at Lavrion. (1 copy only of each. Restricted.)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY: **UNCLASSIFIED**

Enclosure No. 7 to ATHENS 588,
October 13, 1950.

"INCIDENT IN VULCHEDRAM"

Excerpt from Agrarians and Communism, by Dimiter Adamov Dimitrov

So one day Yamkov ...(was)... told to go to the "Committee." The invitation was made personally by Tinko so that it would not have the meaning and character of an order. (He was the father of a Communist who probably had an important post in the capital.)

"We have missed you, Yamkov, we see nothing of you."

"Oh, well, business you know."

"Why don't you come to the office of the People's Committee so that we can sit and have a talk?"

"To the office? What would I be doing there?"

"Oh, having a talk."

"What do we have to talk about?"

"Well, as men and as fellow villagers we have much to talk about."

Fellow villagers? Yamkov felt his blood boiling and rising to his head. That expression "fellow villagers" struck his ears as an irony, as an insult. He felt he was being defiled by the mouth of that sordid murderer; because it was against these fellow villagers that his mania and extremism had been directed and his fellow villagers had been killed on his instructions; killed by the rabid mob of the Party during its first onslaught. And among these fellow villagers whom this jackal had killed there were his friends: the kind priest, the teacher and the doctor, all those who were the heart and mind of the village.

"Like fellow villagers?"

"Anyway, like friends. ... I want to discuss something with you. It's necessary that I should have a talk with you."

"Now I understand. That's right, be blunt about it. At what time do you order me to be in your office?"

"But don't take it that way, Yamkov. I am not ordering you, I'm inviting you."

"Okay, when do you want me to come?"

"Come this afternoon, unless you'd prefer tomorrow."

"Either today or tomorrow makes no difference to me. I'm coming this afternoon."

Before going there, Yamkov passed by the druggist's, the only survivor of the circle of intellectuals, and told him about the invitation Tinko had made to him. He was the only man with whom he spoke with confidence and with whom he exchanged ideas. The druggist rose, shocked, from his desk, affixed his spectacles with hands which were trembling, then put his hands on Yamkov's shoulders as if they were expressing his love and anxiety.

"Be careful, my friend Yamkov. You are a bit hotheaded and cannot control your tongue. Mind you don't misbehave. Control your nerves, because we mustn't lose you. We need you, we need you. Your home and your family and your village need you. You must not be missing when the moment arises...."

Yamkov left, greatly moved, and with a decision to listen to whatever they had to tell him at the People's Committee without expressing the disgust and indignation he felt for them. He had decided to be patient, to swallow his tongue, and to listen quietly to all the filth of that social disgrace, Tinko, like a little pupil of the elementary school who is chastised by his master.

"The devil take him!" he spat with disgust.

At the People's Committee, apart from the two "eminent" Party members - Tinko and Yanev - there was a Russian organizer, a large brute with an elephant neck and with a well-shaved Asiatic head. Through his large nostrils, which rhythmically closed and opened with his breathing, one felt that one was about to see the size of his mind. It seemed that he knew who Yamkov was, because his grey eyes were constantly fixed on him, insistently and inquiringly. Tinko introduced him.

"He has a son too, a Party man, our man."

"Bravo, congratulations. Where is he now?" he asked.

"In ... (he felt like saying, Hell) ... Sofia," he corrected himself.

"Is he studying?"

"Yes, he is studying to become a doctor." (He thought to himself: "a loafer.")

"Fine," remarked the Russian with satisfaction. "In our set-up we respect doctors, just as we respect every scientist. We think highly of them. We give them the means to promote their science for the benefit of the whole and, of course, for their own benefit too."

"Yes, yes. You love them. I have seen that with my own eyes," agreed Yamkov, scarcely managing to control himself. And there passed before his eyes the tragic scene of the assassination of the doctor a few days ago.

After these words had been exchanged and he was sitting comfortably on his chair, the Russian opened his legs wide, assumed a serious air, and started the discussion. He spoke Bulgarian with great ease, like a Bulgarian.

"The comrades," he said, pointing to Tinko and Yanev, "spoke to me with flattering words about you and your home. You are an honest and industrious family, respectable persons, and such persons who know how to appreciate work and honesty are valuable and dear to us. It is even more fortunate because, as I was told, you are on our side. This is only too natural, of course, since you have your son...."

"My son has his own ideas and I have mine," interrupted Yamkov, who had started growing angry.

The Russian pretended not to notice the meaning of the interruption.

"Yes, I understand. Your son, being younger and more progressive, went further ahead. Youth has the lead. So I was about to say...what was I saying? Oh yes, that you have a son who could go ahead if you, too, helped, and if you didn't it would be the other way. You understand what I mean?"

Yamkov felt that he was choking with anger, but he controlled himself. He swallowed his tongue.

"I understand," he said, between clenched teeth.

"It's good to hear that," added the Russian. "It shows that you understand things in the right way, from the proper angle, like a reasonable man and like a father." He looked satisfied. He thought that he had scared Yamkov with his threatening insinuation. He thought that he had him now at his mercy.

"And now let us speak about the specific and interesting question for which we invited you."

"Let us speak," the other man agreed.

"People like you are valuable for us. You are exactly what is required in each village to serve as an example to be followed by others, to overcome the stupid hostility of the villagers toward our social system and thus to facilitate its completion. Such persons offer an immense service to our cause. That is why we give them our respect and our confidence, and we reward them richly, both morally and materially. We know how to honor honest men."

"Yes, indeed. I can see that," said Yamkov and threw a glance at the other two "honest men," Yanev and Tinko.

Yamkov's highly expressive hint did not escape the attention of the Russian, but he pretended not to understand. The two "honest men" went red to the roots of their ears and their eyes sparkled with anger.

"After all this," the Russian went on, "the only thing that remains is for me to tell you about my proposal. You should enter the kolkhoz. There you will be able to develop all your activity, you will benefit the social whole and you will create the fundamental pre-requisites for the proper development and progress of your son."

Yamkov rose. From the first words the Russian organizer had uttered he understood what he was about to come to. And, of course, he did not intend to accept the proposal for participation in the kolkhoz but had intended - following the advice of his friend, the druggist - to express his refusal in quiet and well chosen words. But when the Russian had made his son's progress dependent upon his own consent to become an organ of the party - thus indirectly blackmailing him -, and especially when he clearly intimated that he wanted him to use as the bait for his fellow villagers, his honest and pure soul revolted. The wave of anger which he scarcely managed to control broke out like a torrent. The druggist's prescription was cast away, forgotten.

"It seems to me," he replied, "that your affinity with base individuals like Tinko and Yanev, and undoubtedly with others still worse, has led you to believe that all the

Bulgarians are tailored to fit your plans. For otherwise you would not have spoken to me about moral and material rewards for my person, about coins of treachery, and you wouldn't have threatened me with the 'development' of my good-for-nothing son. Oh no, Mr. Russian, you are wrong in thinking that all the Bulgarians take after your 'comrades'. There are a few who cannot be bought, who do not give way to threats and do not become bait."

He put on his hat and left with dignity.

The others remained there, stupified and spellbound, looked at the departing Yamkov.

When he had overcome the surprise which had stupified him, Tinko got hold of his revolver and hastened to reach Yancho Yamkov, who was descending the stairs without being aware of this. But the Russian organizer stopped him.

"No nonsense. This isn't the time for it. We shall think over how and when and where it must be done."

And he did think about it. A few days later Yamkov was found dead in a field outside the village. He had been stabbed with wild ferocity.

Tinko and the militia made every effort to find the murderers. And they found them. They were two peasants, two stolid and incorrigible anti-Communists, who, according to their own 'confession', written and signed before the militia, had committed the murder because they were informed that Yamkov had registered for participation in the kolkhoz and because he insistently and persistently had urged his fellow villagers to join him. The two murderers were taken away for trial and never reappeared.

Yamkov's belongings, in accordance with a statement which he had "signed," were taken over by the kolkhoz.

13-00000

SECURITY : **CONFIDENTIAL**

Enclosu[illegible] 8 ATHENS 588
October 13, 1950

PROGRAM OF THE DEMOCRATIC BLOC

1. The program is based upon the policies of the great Agrarians such as Nikola Petkov, Dimiter Guitchev, Nikola Mushanov, Constantin Moraviev, Verdil Dimov, Alexander Gerginov and Alexander Stambouliski.

2. The Bloc accepts the help and collaboration of all Bulgarian anti-Communists who agree to work along the path of Democracy.

3. The Bloc refuses to collaborate with Communists, Leftist elements of any type such as the party of Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, extreme Rightists, former Monarchists, Fascists, or with the Ivan Mihailov group. This Democratic Bloc must remain purely democratic, in the American manner.

4. The Bloc will ally itself with similar blocs now being formed among Albanian and Yugoslav refugees.

5. As soon as the Bloc can procure the necessary funds, it will prepare and publish protocols, resolutions, etc., and distribute these both to Bulgarian emigrants abroad and to Bulgarians inside Bulgaria. The first of these brochures will explain what the Bloc is, what it wants and why it does not support Dr. G. M. Dimitrov. The brochure will ask for the help of all Democratic Bulgarians.

6. "After the Bloc has proved itself", it will request help from the United States and from the Greek Government in penetrating and propagandizing Bulgaria.

7. The Bloc expects to help annoy the Communists in Bulgaria and -- when the time comes -- to help liberate the country.

8. When the country has been freed, the Bloc desires free elections under a democratic system, restoration of all personal freedoms, the adoption of a bill of rights along the American system, the restoration of private ownership, the abolition of cooperative farms and the abolition of the people's courts.

9. The program advocates just and proper trials of all Communist leaders -- no terrorism.

10. In external affairs the Bloc advocates Balkan cooperation and cooperation with all democratic peoples.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY : **CONFIDENTIAL**

Enclosur[illegible] 9 to ATHENS 588,
October 13, 1950.

Letter from Vakrel Yanev, 37, Rue de Berne, Paris 8, France, to Dimiter Adamov Dimotrov, Hotel Action, New Phaleron, Greece, dated April 15, 1950.

EXCERPT

.....I am here concentrating more on organizational work so that we can safeguard the idealistic purity of the Agrarian Union so heavily stepped upon and frightened by the self-willed and evil activity of the Doctor and those who circle around him. Here in Paris we finally have an Agrarian Union and we have published a circular letter in which we announce in a clear manner the division among the emigrants. I sent you some of these letters and am now again sending you one so that you can distribute it wherever necessary and to people who are interested. I will await your prompt advice as to how it is received. I know how the Barev people will receive it, but now this means nothing to us. The Bulgarian problem in its entirety interests us and we will not allow it to be misused on account of our National cause.

I have not started a newspaper yet, but everything has been thought out and I hope that early next month I can release the first issue. It is not easy. You know how poor we are and it is hard to get money from the poor emigrants. Newsprint is very expensive here. My material circumstances are not any better than before. The newspaper has been thought out in its serious form and contents, so many people will have to swallow their tongues.

About the National Committee: I have nothing in common with them. My opinion is that all in a very short time will be reorganized from the roots, if we honestly desire to do good for our enslaved homeland.

To Dimitrov follow[illegible]
[illegible]

x. Tsenko [illegible]
Barev [illegible]

The temporary leadership of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union in exile has been formed to include Eng./Tenev, as also Dinko Argirov. The fight with the Barevites has started strongly and even though Dr. Dimitrov is on their side we shall continue the fight, and will not stop, because it is for the pure, honest triumph of overrun Democracy.

The activity on the part of the Barevites about which you wrote is this: they want to make a sub-committee and for this purpose they want Slavi Neikov as a representative. You see to what low levels they have reached and who are the leaders for the Doctor! I wonder why up to now the emigrants in Greece have not organized and picked out a committee there, which will promulgate common interests and not allow outside interference.

CONFIDENTIAL

You had promised me that you would send me documentation on the bad activity of the Barevites in Greece but up to now you haven't done it, which has troubled me. You know that I am very strong on promises. I believe the declarations you have made more than once and shall await the fulfillment as quickly as possible of these promises.

I had read in the papers about the killing of Marin and others. I'd like to have you acquaint me with the circumstances of the emigrants and what are the fronts, which faces come out as leaders, what kind of attitude they take, etc. ...

CONFIDENTIAL

201-45145

~~200-7-50-40/2~~

MEMORANDUM 18 April 1951

To: Oliver G. Martell

From: Terence U. Nasmith

Subject: The Hanging of Lyle O. Kelly.

1. The most serious accusation against Kelly is based upon the developments with regard to Kelly's connection with the French. He told us about recent contacts he made with Pierre and Mrs. Florimond from Salonika. He denied that he had ever had contacts with them previously. We have learned from Ogive that, in 1949, Kelly worked for Florimond.

On Thursday April 12 Kelly stated that he was to tell Florimond by Friday, April 13, whether or not he would work with him. Kelly asked us for instructions. We told Kelly his answer was to be a definite, final no. In other words he was never to see the French again. We know definitely, however, that Kelly saw Florimond on Friday, on Saturday and on Tuesday. On Tuesday he saw also a certain French Assistant Military Attache named Piray.

Yani Kolomonos, Kelly's friend, stated that Kelly has agreed to meet Piray at the French Embassy between 11 and 12 o'clock on Thursday, April 19. At this meeting Kelly will (1) give the Frenchman detailed accounts of all U. S. ~~intelligence~~ operations of which he is aware, with special emphasis on Radio Gorianin, and (2) receive for this information 10 to 15 million drachmae.

It is imperative that this meeting be stopped. For instance, two of the Dreamer radio announcers are known to Kelly and hated by Kelly. Since they have relatives inside Dreamland, their our position should be as secure as possible.

Our Greek informant suggests, not without plausibility, that this effort of the French might be Communist-inspired attempt to penetrate U. S. intelligence activities. The Greek bases his guess only upon the reasoning that normal French intelligence activities would not be so interested in penetrating U. S. work, since -- allegedly -- we are close allies.

2. We accuse Kelly also of manyyproven lies and of theft of funds. These malpractices, known to us through personal observation over a period of several months, include such things as the following:

a. Kelly stated that he wrote three books, for which he was paid a sum of money. He did not write the books as he himself has testified on the enclosed photostat of a document which he signed.

b. On one occasion

201-45145

b. On one occasion Nasmith personally gave Kelly $300 in dollars for an option on his books. Kelly signed a receipt for this. Kelly showed a signed copy of the receipt to the true author, stating that he could not divide the money with the author since, although he had signed the receipt, he had not received any money -- that Mr. Nasmith had forced him to sign the receipt so that Nasmith could steal the $300 for himself.

c. Money given to Kelly specifically for the purpose of paying salaries to the members of his Committee was not turned over to the Committee in its entirity. Kelly stated on several occasions definitely that he no longer had any connections with Greek authorities. At the time he was making these statements he was observed by our people to be going into the Aliens Directorate, Radio Athens, and other official Greek residences. (Note: We ~~were~~ pleased to have Kelly maintain contact with Greek officials; we dislike only his lying about it.)

d. On at least 4 occasions Kelly has stated unequivocally that he had no relations with Ibrahim Mohammed. A friendly observer saw Kelly pay Mohammed gold pounds prior to Mohammed's recent trip to Turkey. Furthermore, mysterious receipts have appeared in Kelly's accounts signed by Ibrahim Mohammed.

It is interesting to note that aroused by our continued interest in Ibrahim, Kelly has given us a long song and dance -- intending to force us to drop the subject -- about Ibrahim's being a Greek spy.

e. On one occasion Kelly told us about having received money from Major Nikoloupolos of the Aliens Directorate. This is (1) an obvious attempt to drive a wedge between our closely cooperating organizations, and (2) evidence of Kelly's untrustworthiness.

f. Kelly has been warned repeatedly to maintain as good security as possible regarding the purpose for which he has rented offices at 13 Patissia Street. Nevertheless, Kelly has blabbed his business (and ours!) all over Athens, so that ~~he~~ ~~is~~ve constantly visited by all manner of unnecessary people including a galaxy of street-walkers.

g. Kelly maintains constant relations with several people who seem unduly interested in our work. We do not attempt to dictate his friends but we do consider it improper when he deliberately lies in denying to us that he sees such people. (Example: A certain Papas, an elderly Greek who seems to be working with the French Mission here.)

3. In addition to the serious charges which we have against Kelly as indicated above, there is the additional charge equally

serious but less

serious but less specific, that he appears actually to be insane, to be suffering from delusions of grandeur (meglomania). For instance, his many references to his future role as prime minister of Bulgaria, and his illustrative anecdotes regarding the purpose of the meeting recently held between the members of the Committee and Mr. Manfield.

4. It is recommended urgently that Kelly be removed immediately from circulation and that the Aliens Directorate be kind enough to discuss with us in the next few days or weeks what final solution we may evolve for the Kelly menace.

PRECEDENCE : ROUTINE

DATE : 22 MARCH 51

ACTION : [illegible]

FILE NUMBER : IN 30224

INFORMATION: [illegible]

NO PARAPHRASE REQUIRED

EDITED BY:

ATHE 4821

TO: WASH G INFO PARI G CITE ATHE G

DELAYED

QKSTAIR

1. DO YOU KNOW OF DREAMER POLITICAL COMMITTEE CALLED (1) PURPORTED TO BE FORMED IN ZRMETAL? HAVE NO DETAILS. POSSIBLY GLANTZ SPLINTER?

2. NEW SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY WE WILL SOON PUT LYLE O. KELLY ON ICE. REASON: SMALL SUCCESS HAS GONE TO HEAD AND IS OUT-GLANTZING GLANTZ ON FUNDS AND DICTATORIAL APPROACH. THEREBY BEGINNING TO ALIENATE FOLLOWERS. ALSO POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN SUBJECT OF WASH 33606 (OUT 90204). OKINSANE WOULD CONTINUE UNDER MORE MATURE AND ABLE LEADERSHIP OF (2) WHO IS PRESENTLY COMMITTEE MEMBER. SHOWDOWN NOT YET OCCURRED THEREFORE THIS IS FYI ONLY UNTIL FURTHER INFO FROM US. IF WE DO REORGANIZE KELLY, ARE CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY BRINGING (3) FROM HBFAIRY TO ADD HIS TALENTS TO COMMITTEE. ANY COMMENT FROM HBJOINT ON THIS?

3. NEW SUBJECT: FYI (4) OF 19 MARCH PRINTS LONG ARTICLE ON KMSCHEME. QUOTES SOME TEXTS. WE HAD BELIEVED JAMMED-OUT.

TOR: 1025Z 22 MAR 51

[illegible]

SECRET

13 March 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE 1

SUBJECT: Dimitri Adamov Dimitrov MW

REFERENCE: Your request for clearance dated 23 October 1950. Provisional Clearance approved 25 January 1951.

1. In view of the information and recommendation contained in a memorandum from the Chief, Special Security Branch, Inspection and Security Staff dated 10 March 1951, an Operational Clearance is hereby issued which will permit the utilization of Subject's services as a contractual agent in Greece engaged in political, psychological and guerrilla warfare operations under project QKSTAIR.

2. This Clearance is for the particular services for which it was requested. If at a later date it is decided to utilize Subject in a different capacity, or otherwise change his status, the matter must be brought to the attention of the Operational Security Officer without delay.

3. Attached hereto is a copy of the recommendation upon which this clearance is based.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

for Dillon
W. R. CORNELISON
Acting Operational Security Officer

Attachment

Memo dated 10 March 1951.

cc: OPC Registry
II/CS

II/CS

SECRET

201-45145

13-00000

ADPC
Attention: Security Officer
Chief, Special Security Branch

10 March 1951

Dimitri Adamov Dimitrov

SECRET

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 25 October 1950 regarding the Subject and the background information furnished by your office, concerning him.

A check of pertinent Government agencies and the indices of CIA produced no information regarding the Subject in addition to that furnished by your office.

2. Conclusion and Recommendation: Due to limitations placed upon this office's inquiries, we were unable to develop any further information concerning the Subject since there is no indication in background information or in the results of a check of appropriate Government agencies and the indices of CIA, that Subject has ever resided in this country.

However, based on the lack of any deregatory information in the files of pertinent government agencies, and the indices of CIA, this office does not wish, at this time, to interpose any objection to the proposed use of the Subject by this organization, providing Inspection and Security is furnished with the results of the Field Check when available.

If the situation should be altered and information obtained from which an investigation in the United States would be productive, this office would gladly perform the same.

This memorandum pertains only to the assignment mentioned above. Should you desire to use this individual in a staff capacity or otherwise change his status at a later date, the matter should be taken up with Inspection and Security. In the latter event, it is suggested that action be taken, if possible, sufficiently in advance so that no delay is caused in the transition.

Transmitted herewith are the attachments listed below. If it should be necessary, for any reason, to return the attachments, it is requested that they be returned in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Alone" to the writer.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA

R H Cunningham
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

Attachments
Name Check Data
Additional Copy of Summary

This data is property of Inspection and Security Staff [illegible] to re-
[illegible] [illegible], or disclosed, [illegible] of
c[illegible] not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers
direc[illegible] concerned

Copy
SECRET

SECRET

25 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: EE I

SUBJECT: Dimitri A. Dimitrov

1. It has been ascertained from the Chief, Special Security Branch, Inspection and Security Staff, that as of 19 January 1951, the files of CIA fail to reflect any reason why Subject should not be operationally utilized by this office.

2. In view of the above and due to the urgency of obtaining Subject's services, it is recommended that a Provisional Operational Clearance be issued for Subject's use as a contractual agent in Greece for political, psychological, and guerrilla warfare operations in connection with project QKSTAIR.

3. Inasmuch as there is a calculated security risk involved in using an individual on a provisional operational clearance, you should use precaution in handling Subject until a full clearance is granted.

4. This Provisional Operational Clearance is recommended for a period of ninety days subject to renewal if the full clearance has not been granted.

W. R. Cornelison

W. R. CORNELISON
Acting Operational Security Officer
OPC

APPROVED: 25 January 1951.

SECRET

FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

[illegible]

201-45145

SECRET

23 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: EAD

SUBJECT: Provisional Operational Clearance for Dimitri A. Dimitrov.

1. It is requested that the attached Provisional Operational Clearance for Dimitri A. Dimitrov be approved. Mr. Dimitrov will be used as a contract agent in Greece for political, psychological, and guerrilla warfare operations under Project QKSTAIR.

2. In view of the fact that the recruitment of Bulgarian agents who are scheduled shortly to begin covert training must be accomplished through Mr. Dimitrov, his clearance is needed immediately.

Gratian M. Yatsevitch

Gratian M. Yatsevitch
Chief, EE-I

SECRET

13-00000

FILE COPY

PAGE NO. __

DECIPHERED BY: JMK
CHECKED BY :
RELEASED BY :

CK. NO. 071

PRECEDENCE : ROUTINE

DATE : 25 APRIL 51

FILE NUMBER : IN 37092

(6-5)

(6-9-51)

NO PARAPHRASE REQUIRED

EDITED BY:

SPECIAL

[illegible] ATHEO

[illegible]

[illegible]

FOR RAGSDALE.

REF WASH 38789 (OUT 97616) AND FRAN 2910 (IN 36297).

1. IT WOULD APPEAR SOMEWHAT INCREDIBLE THAT IN ALL WESTERN WORLD WE CANNOT FIND A LUMBER CAMP EXDEPOT CAMP OR RANCH, ETC. WHERE SUCH CHARACTERS AS KELLY CAN BE OUR GUESTS. REPEAT THAT KELLY STILL THINKS WE HIS PATRONS. KNOW THERE ARE NOW NO FACILITIES STEIN OR CURIO. WAS SUGGESTING THAT YOU MAKE FACILITIES AVAILABLE AND FIND STAFF.

2. ALTHOUGH PERMANENT DISPOSAL EASIEST MANFIELD WILL NOT GIVE THIS ORDER. AMONG OTHER THINGS IN LAST FEW WEEKS KELLY APPEARS TO HAVE BECOME SLIGHTLY UNBALANCED AND THEREFORE EVEN [illegible] MIGHT NOT RECEIVE JUST PENALTY IN A COURT [illegible]

3. MUST ADMIT HAVE IMPRESSION THAT UPON RECEIPT OUR [illegible] METAL'S FIRST REACTION WAS BY-OFF REASON BUT [illegible] 1 [illegible]. THEREFORE REPEAT REQUEST WITH SUGGESTION OF POSITIVE [illegible]

DONE

[illegible]

MATTER. UNDERSTAND THERE IS A DISPOSAL UNIT IN [illegible]. [illegible] IT IT HELP? KELLY PROBLEM IN DRINK INCREASED SINCE KELLY WAS PART TIME INFORMANT FOR BGKANTER AND WHILE NOW HOLDING AT OUR REQUEST, DO SO RELUCTANTLY.

4. ALSO MANFIELD FEELS COMPELLED RESPECTFULLY TO [illegible] CEASE REFERENCES TO THE MIRACLES WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE UPON ARRIVAL OF SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE. IT HAS ADVERSE EFFECT ON MORALE OF WHOLE OF STAFF WHO HAVE BEEN BANGING HEADS AGAINST PROBLEMS FOR MONTHS. SURE YOU CAN UNDERSTAND PSYCHOLOGY OF THIS.

TOR: 155[illegible]Z [illegible] [illegible] 61

TOR:

FORM NO. 35-8
April 1950

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM: FRANKFURT

TO: POLICY COORDINATION

ACTION: OPC (1-2-3-4-5)

INFORMATION: S/C (6-7-8)

PRIORITY

21 A[illegible] 51

IN 30297

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (I) 60.4 AR-380-5

SECRET

[illegible] PRIORITY

DATE : 21 APR 51

FULL IN COORDINATION

FILE NUMBER : IN 36297

[illegible]

SAS (6-7-8)

NO PARAPHRASE REQUIRED EDITED BY: ______

TO: ATHEG, WASHG INFO: HEID3, MUNIG CITE: FRANG

EGRESS
QKSTAIR
RE ATHE 5150 (IN 36 30)

1. HTSTEIN HAS NEITHER STAFF NOR FACILITY HOLD CHARACTER SUCH AS KELLY AND EXTENDED PERIOD.

2. IN VIEW KELLY'S KNOWLEDGE 22 DREAMER TRAINEES NOW HTSTEIN AND PAST CONTACTS HTOURID PERSONNEL, ROCHELL DOUBTS TEMPORARY CONFINEMENT ANY PERIOD WOULD ELIMINATE RISK TO QKSTAIR OPERATIONS. MOREOVER, KELLY'S ATTEMPTED MANEUVER LAST SENTENCE PARA 1 REF SUGGESTS PERMANENT DISPOSAL NOT ONLY JUSTIFIED BUT ONLY SOLUTION REALLY SECURE.

3. AS MANFIELD AWARE, IDENTITY (A) BEING GROOMED FOR ROLE AS IDENTITY (B). DO NOT HIS RELATIONS KELLY SO CLOSE AS TO OVERWEIGH HIS LOYALTY TO US, PARTICULARLY WHEN BRIEFED CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. ROCHELL WILL EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES USING IDENTITY (A) THIS MISSION SOON AS ADVISED WHETHER ZRMETAL WOULD CONSIDER THIS MEASURE.

5. IF ZRMETAL APPROVES, SUGGEST KELLY BE REMOVED FROM SCENE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR IDENTITY (A)'S INFILTRATION DREAMLAND. AM CONSIDERING FURTHER DETAILS METHOD PERMANENT DISPOSAL, BUT FEEL MOST UNDESIRABLE TO INVOLVE HTSTEIN.

1604Z 21 APR 51

FOR:

SECRET

CK. NO. 022	PRECEDENCE : PRIORITY
TO :	DATE : 20 APRIL 1951
ACTION : OPC (1-9)	FILE NUMBER : IN 36130
INFORMATION: S/C (10-11-12)	

ATHE 5150.

NO PARAPHRASE REQUIRED
RELAY ACTION TAKEN

EDITED BY:

TO: WASH G FRAN G (ROCHELL) INFO: PARI G CITE: ATHE G

BGSTAIR.

1. ON 18 APRIL WE HAD LYLE O. KELLY PICKED UP BY BGKANTAR AND PUT UNDER PROTECTIVE ARREST. HE IS TOLD LIFE IS THREATENED AND DOES NOT KNOW OF OUR ROLE. REASONS WE FOUND IT NECESSARY: GLANTZ-LIKE ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MEGLOMANIA, LACK OF SECURITY, AND MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS. MOST SERIOUS WAS THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO SELL KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OPERATION TO THE LOCAL FAIRYS FOR AN INITIAL SUM OF LOCAL EQUIVALENT OF $600 [redacted] A [redacted] PRICE WE CONSIDERED INSULTING LOW.

2. UNFORTUNATELY KELLY IS SO HOT AND IRREPRESSIBLE THAT OUR NORMAL FLAKE DISPOSAL SYSTEM IS NOT SAFE. RUN OF MILL REJECTS MANAGE TO MAIL LETTERS SO CERTAINLY KELLY WOULD.

DONE

3. CAN ZRMETAL OR BGMIDDY TAKE HIM OFF OUR HANDS. REPEAT HE STILL THINKS WE HIS PROTECTOR SO HE CAN BE PERSUADED TO LEAVE HERE VOLUNTARILY. HE MUST HOWEVER BE DENIED MAIL FACILITIES. REQUEST UTMOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AID. WHOLE DREAMER OPS IN SECURITY JEOPARDY. THREE MONTHS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO PUT HIM OUT OF DATE AND THEREFORE

TOR:

PAGE 2

ATHE 5150. IN 36130

COMPARATIVELY HARMLESS TO OPS.

4. KELLY'S COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE. REQUEST METAL HASTEN CLEARANCE ON (1) in CASE WE WISH HIM FILL IN. REQUEST HBJOINT ANSWER ATHE 4821 (IN [illegible]) PARA 2.

TOR: 1625Z 20 APRIL 1951 SECRET

INFOR

TO:

ANI

DOE

ACT

OF

OUR

EQU

NORM

TO N

THIN

TABI

SERI

THREI

TOR:

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET
Security Information

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Chief, SE

DATE: 21 July 1953

FROM : Michael A. Hemovich, SE/2

SUBJECT: Lyle O. KELLY

1. In accordance with your instructions received through Mr. Donald F. Ewing, CSE/2, and in coordination with Mr. Mahoney of WH Division, I flew to DTROBALO, arriving there at noon on 26 May 1953, for the purpose of determining whether Subject has current operational information concerning SE operations and personnel that would make him a security risk if he were allowed to resettle within the next calendar year.

2. Upon arrival at DTROBALO I discussed the case with KELLY's case officer, Mr. Philip A. Tocmey, and the Station Security Officer and learned that KELLY had been in detention until approximately 15 May when he was released from confinement and allowed to attend classes and live with other persons who are being prepared for resettlement.

3. Between 1300 and 1600 hours on 26 May, I reviewed the DTROBALO Station files on KELLY and made an appointment with KELLY's case officer to have a conference with KELLY at 0800 hours 27 May. It was decided to use the office of the Station Security Officer for the meeting because of its invulnerability to other agents and to the laborers who were working in the area. The Security Officer stated that the office would be made available for the time specified.

4. At 0800 hours 27 May KELLY's case officer escorted me to the prearranged meeting site and introduced me as Mike Vargas to KELLY who had been waiting in the office. The case officer informed KELLY that I had arrived from Washington, D. C. to discuss his problems with him and would endeavor to resolve all matters possible. KELLY appeared elated and in broken English said that he was very happy to learn that the organization (I presume he meant CIA) finally acknowledges him as a friend. KELLY stated that he has been waiting 25 months to speak to someone from Washington. The case officer departed from the room and left KELLY and me standing in the center of the room. I asked KELLY to be seated and told him that I speak Serbo-Croatian and inquired if he understood Serbo-Croatian. KELLY replied that he does speak Serbian and is glad that I speak the language also because his English was not fluent and he has difficulty expressing himself. All conversations hereafter were conducted in Serbo-Croatian.

5. I opened the conversation by telling KELLY that his reports and letters were received and studied very carefully at Washihgton and assured him that pressing duties made it impossible for anyone to visit him at any time prior to the present. KELLY replied that he felt relieved that he was not forgotten by his friends and that he could now reveal everything that has been a puzzle to him since his apprehension by the Greeks in 1951, and perhaps learn the causes

for certain

SECRET

for certain actions that were directed against him. KELLY stated that he was imprisoned a few times and that he suffered terribly during those periods because of his inability to withstand imprisonment.

6. In order that I might have a clear picture of his background and initial contacts with the Americans in Sofia and later in Athens, as well as his associations with other intelligence services in Bulgaria and Greece, KELLY stated that he preferred to start from the beginning of his clandestine work in Bulgaria and chronologically bring me up to date on his activities and ensuing events. Since much of KELLY's discussion is repeated in a report he had previously prepared and which is in his files and since a great deal of the discussion had no direct bearing on the purpose of the mission, I will for the sake of brevity and clarity avoid those portions of his story.

7. According to KELLY, the highlights of his background and activities are as follows: When the Communist regime gained control in Bulgaria he realized the position the people of Bulgaria were placed in and that under Communism the people were not going to be any better off than they were under the Fascists or Nazis. The only salvation for the Bulgarian people was for the Democratic powers to achieve control and thereby extend their form of government to the Bulgarian people. He therefore proceeded to exploit Bulgaria with a view to organizing adherents into clandestine groups in order to overthrow the Communist government that was in control. KELLY stated that he had organized over 250 cells consisting of some 10,000 persons throughout Bulgaria and Macedonia.

8. According to KELLY, in 1945 he met the American General Crane in Sofia and the General requested KELLY to prepare a program of his organization outlining its mission, functions, etc.. Upon complying with this request KELLY stated that General Crane informed him that his program was very favorable and that he (General Crane) desired KELLY to work for him. KELLY said he agreed and proceeded personally to exploit the cells of his organization in Bulgaria.

9. In 1946 while KELLY was inspecting units of his organization in Bulgaria he was arrested by the Communists and tried and found guilty on four counts and imprisoned. According to KELLY the only reason he was not given the death sentence was because the Communists had hoped to use him as a witness against Nikola Petkov, Agrarian leader in Bulgaria who was also fomenting unrest among the Agrarian factions. KELLY continued by stating that he remained in prison for approximately six months near Vratsa where he was tortured by the police in an effort to extract from him information on his organization and people with whom he was associated, particularly Americans. KELLY said he did not reveal the information which the police desired.

10..Early in 1947 through members of his organization he was able to make his escape from the prison. He made his way to Sofia where he tried to contact General Crane, but learned that General Crane was no longer in Sofia and that his replacement was a Mr. Horne (probably John Horner, Chagge d'Affairs A.I. of the Political Mission in Sofia). Through the Mission secretary, KELLY made an appointment to see Mr. Horne and when he did meet him Mr. Horne told him

that he was not

that he was not aware of anything that had existed between KELLY and General Crane, but for KELLY to telephone him several days later. KELLY stated that he telephoned Mr. Horne a week later but received no satisfactory response from him.

11. KELLY realizing that he was wanted in Bulgaria by the police for his escape from prison proceeded to work his way out of Bulgaria. He was assisted by one Fancha Fernandova near Plovdiv. On crossing the Bulgarian border into Greece KELLY stated that he surrendered to a Greek patrol who immediately channeled him through its interrogation center. During this process KELLY said he was approached by British Intelligence, a Mr. Andros (possibly Andrews) and Mr. Scott, and was told that the British had heard of his organization and wanted him to work for them. KELLY refused the offer and told the British that he preferred to work with the Americans. KELLY also said that the Greek IS had asked him to work for them, and that he refused them also. He was then placed in a refugee camp in Athens with other Bulgarian refugees.

12. In 1949 during KELLY's stay in the refugee camp he said that he learned the art of making trinkets as a trade and was allowed to leave the refugee camp and seek employment in a shop where he could continue his trade. He found a shop that offered him a job and he accepted. He stated that he had no intentions of making a livlihood in that occupation but it did give him an opportunity to get out of the refugee camp and continue to seek means to combat the Communists in Bulgaria. While on this job KELLY met a Greek woman by the name of Flora Vavanou who said she had an aunt who lives in Chicago, Illinois. Since they both wished to go to the United States, they decided to get married and, with an affidavit of support from Flora's Aunt, get visas to the U. S.. Their next move was to get to Italy through IRO channels.

13. KELLY claims that he did not know the Aunt's address or name other than that she was referred to as Teresa. KELLY said that he and Flora planned to separate on reaching the United States. According to KELLY, he checked with the IRO in Athens and learned that because he was a Bulgarian immigrant he was eligible for emigration through IRO and since Flora had probable means of getting him to the United States he decided to go through with the plan. He married Flora in February 1949 and by the latter part of March they were en route to Italy.

14. While in Italy KELLY stated that Flora communicated with her Aunt in Chicago who was preparing to process the necessary affidavit for their entry into the United States. However, during this period KELLY learned that Flora was pregnant and according to Italian Immigration officials she could not be considered for emigration from Italy until after the birth of her child. On learning this, KELLY said his whole plan had collapsed and that he could not go through with it. He decided to return to Athens and leave his wife with her parents. They returned to Athens in October 1949. A daughter was born in November 1949.

15. Now that he

15. Now that he had returned to Athens KELLY's intentions were to earn sufficient funds ($2000) to build a home for his daughter. He was not concerned with Flora as he had married her for the purpose of getting to the United States. The marriage was to be a temporary affair as they were not in love with each other and had no intentions of remaining married. Our information shows that KELLY worked for the Propaganda Section of the Greek General Staff headed by Lt. Colonel M. A. Alexandrakis on his return to Athens. In order to earn money KELLY decided to write several books on anti-Communism. Since he was not fluent in Greek be sought the assistance of a Greek scholar who could translate his writings from Bulgarian into Greek. KELLY said he wrote two texts and turned them over to a Greek educator to translate.

16. In August 1950 KELLY decided to take his texts to the American Embassy in Athens and inquire as to the possibility of having the texts translated into English and published in the United States. He said he was directed to a Mr. Ewning (probably Mr. Donald F. Ewing), Chief of Information Service, who in turn introduced him to a Mr. Willard Allan also an official at the American Embassy in Athens. KELLY stated that after several meetings with Mr. Allan he was asked by Mr. Allan to work with the Americans. KELLY immediately volunteered and was told in order to get an organization that could accomplish its mission he would need several assistants. He explored the Layrion refugee camp for potential staff personnel and was given the names of Ivan Hristonov and Ivan and Dimitur Donev. Upon the suggestion of the Americans, KELLY said he accepted the persons named. He established a headquarters and proceeded planning operations to penetrate Bulgaria. KELLY claimed the Greeks and certain Bulgarian emigre leaders in Greece were opposed to his position with the Americans and did everything possible to belittle his position and impair his operations. The results of KELLY's abortive missions into Bulgaria are contained in a report which KELLY prepared at DTROBALO and which is now in his file.

17. During the period in which he was trying to get his operations mounted into Bulgaria, KELLY was approached by the French IS to work for them. KELLY stated that he immediately informed his American superiors regarding the French approach and was thereafter directed by the Americans in his dealings and associations with the French IS.

18. KELLY listed the following American personnel with whom he coordinated all his activities : The Chief, name unknown to KELLY —probably Mr. MacLean, Mr. Willard Allan, Miss Vera George (Mr. Allan's secretary), Mrs. Kingsley (connected with the Radio Station), Mr. George and Mr. Clef (training officers). KELLY referred to the following Bulgarian personnel as having been associated with his organization and with whom he was acquainted: Ivan Hristonov, whom he believes supplanted him in the organization in Athens; Ivan and Dimitur Donev, whom he claims are presently in Argentina; Choyo Stonovski (probably Stoyo Chonovski); Andon Andonov; Gospodin Gospodinov; Hristo Traikov; Vasil Yanchev; Rafail Karakachanov; Dimitur Tabakov; Todor Hadjiev and Ivan Gagov.

19. KELLY continued

19. KELLY continued by stating that he was apprehended by the Greek Police, allegedly for safe keeping in April 1951. He was placed in detention and remained under Greek control until his departure from Greece to Frankfurt by air. From Frankfurt he was transported to Panama where he arrived on 5 September 1951. He was placed in detention at a hospital in Panama and was of the opinion that perhaps the hospital was an exterminating establishment for undesirables. Later, however, he said he learned otherwise and through a friend, Mr. Stanley, learned that he was sent to Panama to undergo several physical check-ups and that after that was completed he would be removed to an area some 50 miles away where he would enjoy full freedom. Also that he would remain at his new location long enough to learn a language and prepare himself for resettlement. When he inquired how long that would be he was told that would be about six months.

20. In March 1952 KELLY was transferred to DTROBALO. He stated that he remained at DTROBALO for six months and after that period he confronted the authorities concerning his release and resettlement. Approximately one month later KELLY said he informed the Station authorities that he would leave the area if they did not release him as initially promised. He stated that he was apprehended and placed in confinement until his release in May 1953.

21. KELLY advised that the above is a true account of his past experiences and in view of my limited stay in DTROBALO would appreciate any answer I could give him regarding questions that have never been resolved and consequently have disturbed him. KELLY apparently had a list of questions prepared which he drew from a notebook and proceeded to read. The questions were as follows:

a. Why was he apprehended by the Greek Police?

b. Why was he placed in confinement in Panama and later at DTROBALO?

c. How much longer must he remain at DTROBALO?

d. Is there any possibility of his working with the organization (CIA) to complete the mission he initiated?

e. What happened to the texts he wrote that were taken to the United States by Mr. Willard Allan?

f. Why haven't any of his old friends visited him during the past two years?

g. In regards to his family —KELLY stated that only as a last resort and only if he had to remain at DTROBALO would he want his family there. He would prefer working and saving sufficient money($2000) to purchase or build a home for them in Greece and drop the whole matter.

In response to the above questions I told Kelly that:

a. He was apprehended by the Greek Police because of his proposed negotiation with the French IS.

b. He was placed

b. He was placed in confinement at Panama to undergo mental and physical check-ups to assure his recovery from the ordeal which he had undergone. His confinement at DTROBALO was to prevent his contemplated and announced escape.

c. KELLY's stay at DTROBALO apparently is dependent on his qualifications to meet resettlement requirements. I told him I was not able to judge when he had fulfilled those requirements. There was also the task involved of finding suitable positions for individuals with varied skills in South America.

d. I told KELLY that there was no opportunity for him to work with the organization because the men and organization as known to him are no longer existent.

e. I told KELLY that I believe the texts were returned to Greece but that I would make a further check on my return to Washington.

f. KELLY was told that the people whom he knew in Athens and Sofia were no longer with the organization and therefore it was impossible for them to visit him.

g. I told KELLY that I did not know anything about his wife and child other than the fact that KELLY was married and that his wife and child resided in Athens. I again queried KELLY concerning his wishes regarding his family. KELLY asked how long it would take to bring the family to South America if that were possible. I replied that I had no definite answer. KELLY said that only if he knew he had to remain at DTROBALO indefinitely would he request to have his wife and child with him.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. I found KELLY to be a frail, nervous, alert, and extremely talkative person. During the twelve hour conference with KELLY I frequently interrupted him to query him on persons and activities he referred to in his story only to find him replying briefly and persistently requesting to be allowed to continue relating his thoughts and feelings.

B. In relating his story of the organization he established and members who comprised the organization KELLY appeared to have a clear and concise picture of operations he directed and names and descriptions of people with whom he had come in contact.

C. It is my opinion that KELLY knows little about operations in Greece. I believe KELLY was so wrapped up in his own abortive missions and personnel difficulties while in Greece that he paid little, if any, attention to operations that were running concurrently. KELLY mentioned names of agents who are bing currently used in Bulgarian operations; however, he referred to them as Bulgarians

whom he had met

whom he had met in Athens and tried to recruit for his organization, or else he had been told of them by other sources. In reply to queries and in his own story, he made no statement which would indicate that he is cognizant of current Bulgarian operations.

D. I feel confident that KELLY realizes that his chances of resuming his role in Greece are at an end and therefore he has resolved to do the next best thing and that is to contact a former Greek companion (Mr. Karapides) who is a successful business man in Caracas, Venezuela and seek employment. KELLY is eager to be resettled and to get out of DTROBALO.

E. I recognize that KELLY is familiar with certain former operations and agents involved in those operations which, if revealed to unauthorized persons, could become embarrassing. However, I feel that KELLY's knowledge of current operations is so minute that the security risks involved to our current operations would be very little, if any, if he were resettled. Therefore, my recommendation is to process himfor resettlement.

13-00000

SECRET
Security Information

27 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~ACTING CHIEF, OPERATIONS, DD/P~~ Chief, FI/STC

SUBJECT: Lyle O. Kelly

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Acting Chief, Operations, DD/P dated 7 January 1953, to Chief, SE

1. Since this Division has no facilities for the disposal of hard-core cases, the matter of Subject's disposal was discussed with the Chief, DDP/Admin after receipt of reference. It is our understanding that his office is making arrangements for the handling of such cases at any time in the near future.

2. For your information in making ultimate disposition of this case, this Division has reached the conclusion, based on facts set forth in the following paragraphs, that Kelly, if released from confinement, will be a source of serious embarrassment to CIA.

3. Subject, a Bulgarian refugee in Greece, was the principal agent in an ill-fated operation run from October 1950 to March 1951. The operation resulted in a major expose and trial in Sofia during 1951. The agents used were those selected by Subject, at least one of whom was probably an operative of the Bulgarian Militia and acted as the betrayer of his colleagues.

4. Subject's behavior during his employment was extraordinarily bad and characterized by a complete lack of security and a conscious effort on his part to aggrandize himself at the expense of the United States and his fellow agents. Unfortunately, during the time of his use by us, he acquired considerable information about certain CIA personnel, operations and installations in Greece. He was permitted to come and go freely in ~~the~~ certain CIA offices in the American Embassy.

5. Through another informant the Athens Station learned in early 1951 that Subject had contacted French Intelligence officers in Greece and had agreed to sell complete details on U. S. plans for operations against Bulgaria for the sum of 16,000,000 drachmae. All subsequent information on this transaction corroborates the veracity of the original informant's story including a French document secured through another CIA channel which shows that as early as 1949 Subject had been an agent of a French Intelligence network run by the Military Attache of the French Embassy in Athens.

6. At the urgent request of the Athens Station that Subject be removed immediately from Athens, arrangements were made for his transportation and ~~incarceration~~ detention at DTROBALO. To facilitate his removal, Subject was told that he was being taken to the United States for a meeting of important satellite refugee leaders. He was flown by CIA plane to Germany, and from there to Panama by U.S. Army plane.

SECRET

201-45145

SECRET
Security Information

7. The American case officer who handled him in Athens reported, "Early in our relations with Kelly we foresaw the need to curb him or eliminate him from our operations. Since, however, he was necessary to us, we tried to use him, restraining him and teaching him the while. Kelly, unfortunately, did not learn - he got worse. He 'borrowed' and stole money from many sources. He lied to many people, including us, and he developed an infantile megalomania in which he persisted in considering himself the forthcoming Minister-President of Bulgaria." During his detention ~~incarceration~~ at DTROBALO, we understand that these same character traits have been evident.

8. This Division believes that Subject's confinement should be continued for some time ~~indefinitely~~ to preclude the probability that he would again try to contact the French or another Intelligence Service, foreign Governments, or the press in order to capitalize on the information he possesses concerning CIA, its operations against Bulgaria, the details of his removal from Athens and information of disposal methods acquired during his ~~incarceration at Panama.~~ detention at DTROBALO.

JOHN E. BAKER
CHIEF, SE

C/OPS
cc [illegible]
Chief, WHD

SECRET

File Kelly

Re KELLY CASE 4 April 1952

1. A well-placed, reliable source (A-1) has stated that the 1949 files of French Intelligence network "Ulysse" of Captain Michel de la Roncier (Military Attache of the French Embassy, Athens) listed Dimitri Dimitrov as an agent and contains the following information:

"30 years old, a member of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party. He is a student and fled to Greece in 1946. He was in contact with the British brothers Baret (or Barev) while the later were in Greece. He is a contact of the Aliens Directorate. He received an order from the Americans requesting him to go to Washington for a time. His file contains two reports, one dated 10 ~~6~~ April 1949 concerning the military situation and the other dated 6 April 1949 containing an account of the Greek Government Council of Co-ordination. (Translations of these two documents was not made because the contents no longer seem to be of any importance)."

2. His prior connection with the French in 1949 doubtless led Dimitrov to make the later offer to Florimond to sell US information for 16,000,000 drachmae. Florimond was chief of the other French network in Greece operating from Salonica while de la Roncier conducted French operations out of Athens.

3. The Baret or Barev brothers undoubtedly are Tsenko and Ivan Barev, now in Paris and Rome, respectively. They are Bulgarians who have worked and may be still working with the British.

LT

Above memo given to Col Smith. The info was furnished by Mr. Driscoll of SO-3. French Intel documents giving the above were intercepted by a penetration of French Intel files. Dimitrov was designated as Uly 62 on the list of agents. LT

251

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

29 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH DIVISION

ATTENTION: Colonel Smith

SUBJECT: Kelly Case

1. In accordance with your request, the following information, which may be helpful in connection with subject's rehabilitation, is furnished.

2. All the information we have concerning Kelly's life prior to his arrival in Greece was furnished by Kelly himself and is almost wholly unsubstantiated. This, in brief, is Kelly's story: He was born 7 May 1924 in Medkovets, Bulgaria. He studied philology in 1942-43 at the University of Sofia. In 1942 he joined a secret branch of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union and worked closely with Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov in anti-Fascist activities (a claim which Dr. Dimitrov has denied.) After emerging briefly from hiding in September 1944, he again went underground, engaging in anti-Communist activities in various cities and towns in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Macedonia where he urged members of the Agrarian Party to take action against the Communists. In October 1946 he was arrested by the police, sentenced to death, but not executed as the Communists wished to use him as a witness against the Agrarian leader Nikola Petkov. On 23 July 1947 he escaped to Greece.

3. Further light is thrown on Kelly's experiences in a manuscript which he claimed to have written and delivered to U. S. authorities in Greece with the prupose of finding a publisher for this, and other, material. It subsequently developed that Kelly was not the author of these papers but rather had furnished information to a Greek friend (John Calavanos) who was the real author. A rough translation of one of these documents is enclosed.

4. Because of his undeniable organizational ability, tremendous energy and glib, but largely untruthful, salesmanship, Kelly was able to organize a group of Bulgarian immigrants in Greece into what he called the Bulgarian Democratic Bloc. His use by this agency was believed advisable inasmuch as his organization provided the potential for recruiting infiltration agents within a shorter time and with fewer political strings attached than any other emigre groups. Furthermore, his organization provided a convenient name for use as a front to cover operational activities. As a result of the limited recognition and support given him and of his own success in providing agents, Kelly developed a certain megalomania and consequently lost his initial popularity through dictatorial conduct and completely unwarranted behavior as the future head of the liberated Bulgarian state. An American case officer who was intimately involved with the Kelly operations at this period has furnished the following statement:

"Early in

SECRET

201-45145

> "Early in our relations with Kelly we foresaw the need to curb him or eliminate him from our operations. Since, however, he was necessary to us, we tried to use him, restraining him and teaching him the while. Kelly, unfortunately, did not learn - he got worse. He 'borrowed' and stole money from many sources. He lied to many people, including us, and he developed an infantile megalomania in which he persisted in considering himself the forthcoming Minister-President of Bulgaria."

On the Kelly credit side, the statement adds:

> "We suspected at the time that he was not the new 'white hope', but we needed someone through whom we could obtain bodies. We obtained bodies through Kelly and actually have accomplished some substantive work. Thus it must be remembered that Kelly performed a useful service for us."

5. The incident which made of Kelly an immediate disposal problem developed along these lines: In early 1951 Kelly informed a member of our staff in Athens that he had been contacted by a French Vice Consul in Salonica with a view to obtaining his, Kelly's services, for the French. We informed Kelly that he could continue his contacts with the Vice Consul until it could be determined what the French had in mind. Upon our ascertaining that Kelly's connection with the French was counter to U. S. interests, Kelly was instructed to break off all contacts. This he failed to do. In the meantime, a former Kelly man, who had become disillusioned with Kelly's misrepresentations, informed us that Kelly had agreed to give the French complete information on U. S. plans for operations against Bulgaria for the sum of 16,000,000 drachmae. All subsequent information on this transaction which our Athens station was able to learn corroborates the veracity of the account.

6. Although the extent of Kelly's knowledge of operations was limited, it was considered extremely undesirable to allow these facts to fall into French hands. Arrangements were therefore made with Greek authorities for Kelly's arrest just prior to his scheduled meeting with the French representative to whom he was to deliver the information and from whom he was to receive the money. In view of these facts, it was immediately apparent that Kelly was of no further operational use and presented a definite security threat, for he was revealed as the type who, in order to reap personal advantage or to curry favor with potential supporters, was likely to reveal to the highest bidder whatever operational information he had gathered. There have been no later developments which have changed our position in the matter.

7. Information concerning subsequent developments in the handling of this disposal case are already known to your division.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy forPolicy Coordination, SE

Enclosure

SE/PC/2-LT-lf
Distribution: Addressee -Orig & 1
SE/PC - 2 SD/RE - 2

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

21 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Col. Smith of WH re Kelly Case, 20 December 1951.

1. Messrs. Potts, Adamson, and Gregg met with Col. Smith on 20 December 1951 for the purpose of discussing a new development in the Kelly case and determining the future course of action in regard to the disposal of Kelly. The new development was the statement by the Athens Senior CIA Representative during his visit to Washington in early December to the effect that Kelly no longer constitutes a security hazard to current Bulgarian operations in Greece since the knowledge that Kelly has about Bulgarian operations is now outdated. At present as far as Bulgarian operations in Greece are concerned the main problem is to keep Kelly out of Greece and, if possible, prevent his direct correspondence with people in Greece, in order to preclude his interfering with and stirring up the Bulgarian emigration in that country.

2. It was pointed out to Col. Smith that in view of this new development, SE/PC feels that it is now possible to begin planning and effecting the permanent disposal of Kelly. Col. Smith indicated that he felt that no immediate solution would be necessary, as Kelly could be treated as an exploited agent and handled under the disposal and rehabilitation projects which the WH Division is now developing. Col. Smith felt that Kelly could be held for a few more months, if necessary, in his present location until these projects were approved. However, in view of the possible immediate and permanent solution to Kelly's disposal offered by his friend Johannes Karapides in Caracas, Venezuela, it was agreed that the following action would be taken as soon as possible:

a. WH would brief the Caracas Chief of Station and investigate Karapides.

b. WH would attempt to learn more from Panama about Kelly's relationship to Karapides.

c. WH should investigate the problem of documenting Kelly for

SECRET

possible disposal in Caracas.

d. SE/PC would attempt to check on Karapides' life and activities when he was in Greece.

3. During the discussion of possible solutions to the Kelly case, it was explicitly understood and agreed between Col. Smith and the representatives of SE/PC that responsibility and initiative for Kelly's disposal now clearly rests with the WH Division and that the responsibility of SE/PC extends only to that support and assistance specifically requested by the WH Division. It was further understood, however, that SE/PC still has a direct interest in Kelly's disposal in view of his wife and child's presence in Greece and their present undetermined relationship to Kelly's permanent disposal, i. e. whether it is possible and desirable that they join him.

CHARLES F. ADAMSON

13-00000

7 JAN 52
file

PARTIAL -PERSO... ..TY HISTORY OF LYLE KELLY

1.Financial Finagling in Greece

(a) In February, 1951, when Kelly was head of the BULGARIAN Democratic Bloc, three of his men arrived in Athens, coming directly from IRO camps. They needed shelter, but had no money. They were put on salary, but it was not enough to cover the sixmonths advance rent which it is the custom to pay when a lease is made in Athens. Thus Kelly's advance account was credited with the amount of ~~(circa)~~ about $850, which was to be used to pay the rental advance. The three men were to pay it back in monthly installments.

Two such installments were paid by the men when Kelly was "interned" by our people. The men were then able to complain that Kelly had forced them into quarters best described as "very inadequate, insecure and unhealthy."

Comparing the quality of the quartess with the amount advanced for rent,it becomes quite certain that Kelly made some sort of deal with the landlord in order to make some money.

It should be kept in mind that Kelly forced three of his own countrymen to live in these quarters, from which they were forthwith removed for health and security reasons.

(b) Just prior to his removal, it was discovered that Kelly had a cash shortage of over $100 which was not accounted for in any way.When an attempt was made to collect the money, it was discovered that Kelly had spent it on himself.

2. Manuscript Episode

In December, 1950, Willard Allen, in accordance with a promise made to Kelly, brought with him to this country three manuscripts, ostensibly written by Kelly. Allen was to see what he could do to have these manusripts published here. Kelly hoped to thus exploit and dramatize his escape from Bulgaria. He was given, by us, a $300 advance on the publication of the manuscripts.

On December 14, 1951, in a conversation with Mr. Allen, it was learned by us that Kelly had not written the manuscripts at all. Allen learned this himself when the real author wrote to him demanding the return of his works. The author said that he had a statement from Kelly disclaiming all credit for the manuscripts. Furthermore, the real author had seen nothing of the $300 gizen to Kelly, although they apparently had agreed to go 50-50 on any profits realized from the publication of the manuscripts.

It is clear that Kelly lied to us, and used someone else's literary talentsin the hope of gaining noteriety and money himself.

3. Relations with the French

In early 1951, Kelly informed our people in Athens that a French Vice Consul from Salonica had contacted him in the hope of getting Kelly to work for his country. Kelly was allowed by us to continue seeing this man until it was determined just what the French wanted in the way of information. This point was reached, and Kelly was told not to see his Frenchman or any Frenchmen after a certain Thursday. We know definitely that Kelly saw saw his Frenchman on the following Friday, Saturday, and

201- 45145

Tuesday.

We do not know what was said, but from a source whom we have no reason to doubt, (an ex-friend of Kelly's who deserted Kelly and came to us to warn us of the situation with the French) we learned that for a sum amounting to 16,000,000 drachmae, Kelly had agreed to give the French the names of all the American staffinvolved in plans to infiltrate Bulgaria, plus information on Radio Gorianin. Kelly was immediately picked up by the Greek Alien Directorate, acting upon orders from Henry McLean.

4. Reaction of Others to Kelly

(a) The Senior Representative of OPC in Athens, Sept. 1951

"Kelly was a notoriously insecure, disreputable, opportunistic individual over whom control, other than physical, was next to impossible to exercise.....He had a positive genius for trouble-making intrigue, rare even in this part of the world; his continued presence in Greece would have rendered impossible any oiling of the stormy Bulgarian refugee waters here. Kelly was tied in even more closely than other Bulgarian agents with the Embassy here,,,, and could be counted on to use that fact, a matter of common knowledge in the Bulgarian colony, to his own advantage and to the disadvantage of the best interests of U. S. Government policy."

(b) Chief of Station, OPC in Athens, May 1951

"Kelly, unfortunately, is of an essentially irresponsible Irish nature. Moreover, in his stupidity, he conceives all others to be equally stupid. Early in our relations with Kelly,... we foresaw the need to curb Kelly or to eliminate him from our operations. Since, however, he was still necessary to us, we tried to use him, restraining him and teaching him the while. Kelly, unfortunately, did not learn- he got worse. He 'borrowed' and stole money from many sources. he lied to many people, including us, and he developed an infantile megalomania in which he persisted in considering h8mself the forthcoming Minister-President of Bulgaria. Things took a serious turn when Kelly's committee, men he himself had chosen, came to us behind his back complaining about him. This became more serious when Kelly's closest friend,... deserted Kelly and came to us apparently in an honest desire to safeguard America and the struggle against Communisn from further involvement with a character as shady as Kelly. ... Since that time we have examined more closely into the Kelly affair and have found more lies, more secret agreements, more stolen funds... We have enough proof of untrustworthiness to have a complete case against Kelly. We cannot contimue with Kelly. He is finished."

5. Kelly's Relation with his Wife

6 DEC 1951 (a) From Chief of Station, Panama; "...it was learned through interrogation that Kelly has no particular concern or love for his wife."

7 NOV 1951 (b) From a letter written by Kelly to his wife; "...I think of you daily and know in detail how you are getting along. I believe you understand this both by the money and by all that you are receiving, when you want it. It is I that arranged all that."

(c)

(c) From Memorandum for the Record, 27 Nov. 1951, signed by ~~mr~~ Wilson Prichett; "Kelly's wife is being supported at the rate of one million drachmas a month through Alien Directorate by (BulgarianProject)"

(d) From a letter written by Kelly to a friend in Greece, dated 27 December, 1951. " ... I succeeded in leaving Greece, and freeing my soul from the slavery of Flora.... I want for the present that Flora will lose all traces of me."

(e) From Kelly's letter to his wife. "... you should be happy to ask God to protect us from harm and to unite us soon if possible."

SECRET

18 May 1951

MEMORANDUM

TO: Gerald I. Manfield

FROM: Terence U. Nasmith

SUBJECT: Lyle O. Kelly

It occurs to me, lying happily upon my hepatitic bed as I am, that some sort of a statement regarding the "demise" of Lyle O. Kelly might be in order "for the record". I shall discuss two aspects of Kelly in this memorandum, apologizing in advance for the vagueness of the discussion which is due, I shall maintain, to my present horizontal position far from records, calendars and the recollectionful clink of the Ismailic gold pound.

1. The good of Lyle O. Kelly.

In the summer of 1950 QKStair was in the ridiculous position of being unable to do anything because the alien support on which it depended, allegedly forthcoming from the reverend Dr. Glantz, was not forthcoming. In a bit of a tizzy, anxious to get cracking, we picked up Lyle O. Kelly. We suspected at the time that he was not the new "white hope", but we needed someone through whom we could obtain bodies. We obtained bodies through Kelly and actually have accomplished some substantive work. Thus it must be remembered that Kelly performed a useful service for us.

2. The bad of Lyle O. Kelly.

Kelly, unfortunately, is of an essentially irresponsible Irish nature. Moreover, in his stupidity, he conceives all others to be equally stupid. Early in our relations with Kelly, before I left LCDrink in October, we foresaw the need to curb Kelly or to eliminate him from our operations. Since, however, he was still necessary to us, we tried to use him, restraining him and teaching him the while.

Kelly, unfortunately, did not learn - he got worse. He "borrowed" and stole money from many sources. He lied to many people, including us, and he developed an infantile megalomania in which he persisted in considering himself the forthcoming Minister-President of Dreamland.

SECRET

Things took a serious turn when Kelly's committee, men he himself had chosen, came to us behind his back complaining about him. This became more serious when his "closest" friend, a Flake, the man who had actually written the books for which Kelly took credit, deserted Kelly and came to us apparently in an honest desire to safeguard America and the struggle against Communism from further involvement with a character as shady as Kelly.

The most serious matter, one which could not be ignored, involved Kelly's relations with the HBFairies. Kelly had advised us that a Fairy Vice Consul from Salonica had contacted him with regard to working together. We told Kelly he might go ahead and continue his relations with this gentleman until we learned exactly what the gentleman wanted. We learned what was wanted and advised Kelly he was not repeat not to see the Fairy agent, or any other Fairies, after a certain Thursday. We know definitely that Kelly did see this Fairy on the following Friday, Saturday, and Tuesday.

We do not know what he discussed with the Fairy but we have no reason to doubt the word of his Flake friend which is essentially as follows:

> That the Fairies were interested primarily in the names and numbers of all the players (us, that is) in plans for infiltration of Dreamland, in information on Radio Gorianin, etc.; that Kelly had agreed to sell this information to the Fairies for a sum of 16,000,000 drachmae and that he had an appointment to complete the transaction at 11 o'clock the following morning.

On this information we had Kelly picked up, and are now troubled with the question of disposing of him.

Since that time we have examined more closely into the Kelly affair and have found more lies, more secret agreements, more stolen funds, more of that good, Irish whimsicality for which Kelly is already so famous. (Note that even if the hearsay evidence regarding the sell-out to the Fairies is erroneous - although it is backed by several independent bits of substantial evidence - we still have enough proof of untrustworthiness to have a complete case against Kelly.) We cannot continue with Kelly. He is finished.

(It is pertinent to note that Kelly's committee, and his party in general, feel no feeling of loss since his removal from active politics. Not a single person has asked about him except his wife - whome he continuously disowned - who wanted only to know how she might get in touch with him to ask him for some money. The committee and refugees in LCFlake in general, are in much better spirits than they have ever been before. Kelly's removal is in every way a tonic.)

SECRET

I repeat, however, that at certain juncture in our efforts, Kelly represented the first and only alien body we had and, however unwittingly and briefly, served his country well. One hopes he will eventually come out of his present habitat with somewhat stronger moral fiber.

SECRET

SECRET

9 May 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Development of the Rift with DIMITRI A. DIMITROV

1. Biography: (See 104 CAGWU, dated 4 October 1950) Born 7 May 1924 in Medkovets, Bulgaria. Education—studied philology for one year at Sofia University, 1942-43. In 1942 joined secret branch of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. Claims to have begun underground, anti-Fascist activities in 1943 in Macedonia and to have worked closely with Dr. G. M. Dimitrov during this time. After emerging briefly from hiding in September 1944, he again went underground engaging in anti-Communist activities, touring various cities and towns, (including sections of Yugoslav/Macedonia) and urging members of the Agrarian party to take positive action against the Communists. In October, 1946, he was arrested by the police. He believes the reason he was not executed was that the Communists wished to use him as witness against Nikola Petkov. On 23 July 1947 he escaped to Greece.

2. Initial operation: (See Athe 3200 (IN 46672), 25 October 1950) In October, 1950, the QKSTAIR Field Chief learned of Dimitrov through the local peripheral reporting officer and contacted him covertly. Dimitrov made six agents immediately available for infiltration operations. Three of these six were successfully infiltrated on 10 December, carrying leaflets signed in the name of the Bulgarian Democratic Bloc, the emigre political group organized and headed by Dimitrov.

3. Subsequent activities: Dimitrov has supplied an additional 21 agents for QKSTAIR infiltration operations, 15 of whom have just completed training in Germany and are being prepared for infiltration by mid-May.

4. Origins of QKSTAIR break with Dimitrov:

a. In Athe 4821, IN 30224, Manfield reported on 22 March that he was considering breaking off association with Dimitrov because he had become too unpopular and dictatorial and self-important. There were also indications of serious misappropriation of funds. Manfield felt that Dimitrov's group could continue to be utilized under the leadership of Ivan Donev Ivanov.

b. In Athe 5150 (IN 36130) dated 20 April 1951, Manfield cabled that he had had the Greek Aliens Directorate pick up Dimitrov and put him under protective arrest for the reasons indicated above and because Dimitrov was about to sell out to the French. (This was discovered through an OPC penetration of Dimitrov's organization.) He also requested instructions on how to dispose of Dimitrov for a period of three months, which he felt was sufficient time in which to render him harmless to QKSTAIR operations.

SECRET

201-45145

c. Wash 38789 (OUT 97616) dated 21 April 1951 stated that there were no facilities in the United States or Germany for handling Dimitrov and pointed out that temporary disposal for three months would be insufficient in view of Dimitrov's detailed knowledge of the names of present agents and his general familiarity with QKSTAIR infiltration operations. It was suggested that the possibility of indefinite confinement by the Greek Intelligence Service should be explored.

d. Fran 2910 (IN 36297) dated 21 April 1951 confirmed that there were no facilities in Germany for holding Dimitrov and suggested that he be assassinated.

e. Athe 5205 (IN 37092) dated 25 April 1951 requested further investigation of disposal facilities.

f. Athe 5282 (IN 37839) indicated on 29 April 1951 that Dimitrov had been transferred from the Greek Aliens Directorate to Makronisis where he would be held by the Greek Intelligence Service.

CHARLES ADAMSON

EE 1/CFA/auh

SECRET

14 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR

SUBJECT : Source Lead - Dimitur Adamov DIMITROV

REFERENCE : K- 4928

1. We have been informed by the Department of State that Dimitur Adamov DIMITROV (aka DIKO) is presently in Washington, at the tourist home of Mrs. Julia Rogers Smith, 2036 P Street, N. W. His visit to Washington is for the purpose of interesting any U. S. Government agency in a feature-length film script that he has written. Both USIA and the State Department, the latter due to both lack of funds and not within its responsibility, have refused Dimitrov's offer. Previously, the script was rejected by New York representatives of commercial filming companies.

2. Dimitrov allegedly headed partisan units in Bulgaria and worked for American operational services during World War II, and claims to have known General Clark, head of the Military Mission in Sophia. He escaped to Greece in 1947 and continued his contact with the American operational services, carrying out "anti-Communist work". He came to the U. S. with the aid of the Queen of Greece and now lives in Newark with his wife and seven year old child. He is approximately 32 years old.

3. The above is passed to you for your information. While State Department has not seen the film script, they will attempt to borrow it if you so desire. Dimitrov may also be able to provide information of intelligence interest. We should appreciate your comments as soon as possible in order that State Department not be delayed in discontinuing contact with Dimitrov.

SECRET

U5145

COPY 201- ~~32576~~

~~201-45145~~

SECRET

4. Any questions pertaining to this information may be referred to Mr. William Hopkins on extension 8641.

/S/ Tennyson L. E[illegible]

EDWARD J. CARROLL
Chief, RQM/OIS

WEH
RQM/OIS/WEHopkins/lms
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI/AN
3 - OIS

SECRET

45145
201-32076
~~201-45111~~

Free Europe Committee, Inc.

TWO PARK AVENUE NEW YORK 16, N.Y. TELEPHONE: LExington 2-8902
CABLE ADDRESS: NATFECOMM

April 12, 1957

Dear Mr. Dimitroff:

I was most pleased to meet you and to learn of your aspirations to bring into being an Anti-Communist moving picture for use throughout the world.

From what you told me of the scope of this project, I must concur with the opinion given by the head of the Motion Picture Section of the U.S. Information Agency. This is a matter for a major studio.

Accordingly, I would suggest first that you prepare a one-page resume of your professional qualifications; second that you prepare in English a brief resume of your proposed film; third that you mail these for consideration to the heads of major motion picture studios, such as, Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Paramount and 20th Century Fox.

Please accept all of our best wishes for your success.

Sincerely yours,

Stetson S Holmes

Stetson S. Holmes

SSH:cf

Mr. Dimiter A. Dimitroff,
9 Hillside Avenue,
Newark, New Jersey.

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

IS M

'D B

March 19, 1957

Dear Mr. Dimitroff:

Your recent letter to President Eisenhower, outlining a film you propose to make, has been referred to this Agency.

Officers of the Motion Picture Service have read your proposal, and feel that the film "Under the Communist Whip", as you described it, would require the spectacular and dramatic skills and talents of one of the major studios which could build into the film the drama and emotional appeal needed in a first-class theatrical feature. This film would demand treatment and re-enactment beyond the scope of the documentary films we produce for use in our overseas information program.

We have read with interest the material you submitted, and we wish you success in your project.

Sincerely yours,

Turner B. Shelton
Director
Motion Picture Service

Mr. Dim. Ad. Dimitroff
29-19 - 37th Avenue
Astoria, Long Island, New York

SECRET

COPY

SGAW-3830

28.1.54

: Senior Representative, Athens
ATTN: Raymond M. Wormer & Alan H. Medhurst
: AC/SE

- THROWOFF/BGCONVOY
- Contact Report (THROWOFF/3, Lyle O. Kelly, GOHAVEN)

Reference: DIR 33889

1. Purpose of contact:

a. On 8 January 1954, James P. Entler arrived in DTRABALO to contact Subjects. The primary purpose of the contact was to persuade Subjects to sign the Syros agreement which would result in their being confined to Syros under complete Greek custody and jurisdiction.

2. THROWOFF/3:

a. THROWOFF/3 was contacted on 8 and 9 January and related to Entler what had developed since they last saw each other in Athens in September 1952. During the course of the discussion the following pertinent comments were made by THROWOFF/3:

i. An unidentified Greek Gendarmerie officer told him that KUBARK and not the Greek authorities were preventing his marriage.

ii. He was sent to DTRABALO primarily for security reasons.

iii. He resisted efforts to teach him Spanish and a trade because he believed that he could not be helped by it, but he did request that he be taught to drive a vehicle.

iv. He was accused of threatening a fellow refugee with a knife (he denies this) and as a result was confined for six months.

v. He did not resist emigration nor did he insist on being returned to Greece, but he did seek to be united with his fiance.

vi. He will not resist emigration from Greece unless his staying in Greece would enable him to marry.

b. THROWOFF/3

C.M.Freer,AC/SE SE/2 WH/3 FI/RQM C.English,SE/ACRI

SECRET

2of 45145

b. THROWOFF/3 was set right on point (1a) above and the conditions of the Syros agreement convinced him that he was mistaken. Realizing that no other course of action was open to him, THROWOFF/3 reluctantly signed the agreement.

c. THROWOFF/3 was told by Entler that this office has no objections to his resuming contact with, or marrying, his fiance, but that such action would require the approval of the Greek authorities.

3. Lyle O. Kelly:

a. Kelly was contacted on 8 January and again on 9 January at his request. Immediately after meeting Kelly on 8 January he made some remark that Entler and those who knew him would probably be working for him at some future date. However, when informed that he was being sent to Syros, he settled down and was most attentive. The following is a list of questions raised by Kelly and the answers given to him:

i. Would he be permitted to have his wife and child with him at Syros? Ans. That action would have to be arranged with the Greek authorities.

ii. What will prevent the Greek authorities from imprisoning him as soon as he arrived in Greece? Ans. The terms of the agreement specify that he will remain at Syros awaiting emigration unless he is involved in an action which is punishable under Greek law.

iii. Does the Greek government have any jurisdiction over him at the present time which necessitates his being returned to Greece? No direct answer to this question was given, but Kelly was told that it was necessary to return him to Greece under the conditions of the Syros agreement. (At this point Kelly made a statement to his DTRABALO case officer which indicated that he believed his marriage to a Greek woman gave the Greek authorities jurisdiction over him.)

iv. Is this office throwing him out completely or would they, in the event of war or some emergency, contact him in the future? Ans. This office will always keep a check on anyone who has ever had connections with it.

b. Kelly indicated that he was anxious to discover whether the Americans or the Greeks were responsible for his being placed in confinement in Greece in 1951, and the crime he was supposed to have committed; he would raise this question should he meet any Americans (presumably from this office) while he is in Greece. Entler told Kelly that he was not familiar with this aspect of his case, but that in his opinion Kelly would be in prison now if he had committed a serious crime. Kelly was also told that he will serve no useful purpose by raising this question at a future date and he agreed to forget the matter.

c. Several times during the two contacts with Kelly he asked that Entler give Kelly's best regards to all who know him and to mention that he would never forget them.

4. COHAVEN:

COPY SGAW-3830

4. GOHAVEN:

a. GOHAVEN was contacted only once on 9 January. He was told that, in recognition for his past services and his excellent behavior at DTRABALO, those concerned with his case were making an effort to obtain his entry into the United States or the U.S. Army. He was reminded several times during the discussion that this effort may not be successful. He was also told that his transfer from DTRABALO was necessary in the very near future and in the event that his entry into the United States or the U.S. Army was still pending he would be moved to Syros. He was told that his transfer to Syros would be certain in the event that he was not permitted to enter the United States or the U.S. Army. At this point he was asked to sign the Syros agreement; he refused stating that he could not sign any agreement which indicated a voluntary severance of relations with the Americans. However, GOHAVEN added that he would not resist his transfer to Greece should the Americans desire to send him there. He pointed out that living conditions at Syros are such that his health would certainly deteriorate and, being a Bulgarian, he could not look forward to fair treatment at the hands of the Greeks.

b. GOHAVEN was instructed not to reveal to anyone what took place during the discussion and was told that he would without question be sent to Syros if he violated these instructions. He stated that he would followinstructions and would gladly sign a statement to that effect.

CHRISTIAN M. FREER,
Acting Chief, SE

Athens: 3 w/attachment under separate cover
(2 copies Syros agreement in Greek,
1 copy Syros agreement in English)

SE-1/GStevens/672/acf/13 Jan
Dist: RI
EE/SE
SE-1
SE-2
FI/RQM
WH/3

..GRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

Date 28 July 1953

TO : Chief SE/2

ATTENTION: Hemovich

FROM : FI/STC/SPB

SUBJECT : Lyle O. Kelly

1. The action checked below concerning Subject of this memorandum is hereby cancelled:

a. Operational Clearance ~~No.~~ dated 13 March 1951

b. Provisional Operational Clearance No.

c. Covert Security Clearance dated

d. Covert Name Check dated

e. Other

2. This cancellation action is taken because of:

a. Memorandum dated 28 March 1953

b. Termination of Project ☐

c. Removal of Subject from Project ☐

d. Other

3. Before Subject can be used operationally in the future, it will be necessary to furnish an up-to-date clearance request to STC/SPB.

INITIALS
JWA/mh

FORM NO. 59-62
MAR 1953

SECRET

201-45145

(9)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET
Security Information

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Foreign Intelligence DATE: 21 July 1953

FROM : Acting Chief, SE

SUBJECT: Lyle O. KELLY

1. As a result of discussions between WHD, SE, CFI, and DD/A, it was decided to send an SE representative to DTROBALO to interview Lyle O. KELLY for the purpose of determining whether he represented sufficient security hazard to current SE operations out of Greece to warrant his being retained in maximum detention.

2. In accordance with this agreement, Major Michael A. Hemovich was sent to DTROBALO where he arrived at noon on 26 May 1953.

3. Major Hemovich discussed the case with the case officers concerned at DTROBALO, and then spent twelve hours talking to KELLY. As a result of this, it has been ascertained to our satisfaction that KELLY does not appear to have information of sufficient currency regarding staff or agent personnel, or current operations, in Greece to make his resettlement within the course of the next twelve months a serious security risk.

4. We therefore recommend that Lyle O. KELLY be given whatever training in language and trade WH Division feels is required, and that efforts then be made to resettle him in South America. Our only request is that this Division be kept informed of the progress of this rehabilitation and be advised of the steps taken to resettle KELLY. In this connection it should be pointed out that KELLY has a wife and child in Greece. When queried by Major Hemovich about them, he professed no interest in having the wife or child join him, stating that he would like to provide some money for the support of the child if and when he got a job and could put aside some money for this purpose. It is therefore our intention to have KELLY write his wife a letter telling her that he has no further interest in her, that she should obtain a divorce, but that he will provide her with a certain sum of money for the child. (This sum will be provided by this Division and will probably be in the neighborhood of $1000).

5. Major Hemovich's report is attached herewith.

SE/2-DFEwing-lf
Distribution:
Addressee - Orig & 1
WHD - 1
DD/A - 1
AC/SE - 1
SE/2 - 2

201-45145
[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET

201 file
201-45145

6 December 1961

written by CI/R+A
(Don Piatt)

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Dimitri Adamoff DIMITROV

1. Subject was born on 7 May 1924 in Medkovets, Bulgaria. He studied philology for one year at Sofia University from 1942-1943. During the war he worked illegally in Greek Macedonia and Vardar, Macedonia to escape authorities. He returned home after the war; he was soon disillusioned by the Communists, and went to Sofia. Later he made a clandestine tour of Bulgarian towns and cities urging agrarians to take positive action against communism. Finally captured in Sofia, he stated that his life was spared because he was groomed as a witness against PETKOV. He escaped to Greece in 1947. He worked for the Greeks doing occasional propaganda under nom de plume "Diko."

2. In 1950, the American Embassy in Athens evaluated Subject as having a very great deal of the charlstan about him, and was considered a "phony." However, notwithstanding his superficiality and the exaggeration to which he was prone, Subject had an intuitive grasp of the rudiments of political deportment and showmanship and he was so devoted to his self-appointed task of organizing his "democratic block" that it was thought that he might become an important Bulgarian figure.

3. In November, 1950, because of his background and experience, Subject was considered as an individual who could make significant psychological and political warfare contributions to operations in Greece. Subject was then very active among Bulgarian refugees in Greece. Early in October, 1950, he visited the Lavrion Camp where he spoke to the Bulgarian refugees and outlined the tasks that he was to assume, which included intelligence activities in Bulgaria, organizing an underground resistance movement in Bulgaria, and organizing sabotage activity against Bulgaria. Subject was not security conscious; he revealed the location of his office and told his listeners that his office had two Bulgarian typewriters and that he had a car with United States

license plates. In April, 1951, Subject was in contact with the French Vice-Consul and his wife, a French diplomat stationed in Athens, an elderly Greek who worked and otherwise had close connections with the French, and other Greek personalities. In April, 1951, besides his wife he had several other bed partners. Because of the operational security violations which had arisen, it was recommended urgently that Subject be removed from circulation.

4. Observers in Athens considered Subject to be too dictatorial and self-important and if he was not actually insane, he appeared to be suffering from delusions of grandeur. For instance, he made references to his future role as prime minister of Bulgaria. Because of Subject's neurotic, unstable character, it was deemed advisable to transfer Subject to Panama. Subject was taken to Panama on 6 September 1951 and was considered as a neuro-psychiatric case. On 9 October 1951, he began a hunger strike at midnight and did not break the fast until 9 a.m. on 14 October 1951. He asked that his former secretary in the Partisan Movement, who was located somewhere in Bulgaria, be brought to Panama. The doctors' concern, particularly the neuro-psychiatrist, indicated that they could not treat Subject adequately.

5. In February, 1954, Subject was returned to Greece. Prior to his return to Greece, Subject signed an agreement which would have resulted in his confinement to Syros under complete Greek custody and jurisdiction. (Attachment A)

6. In October, 1955, Subject sought admission to the United States under the Refugee Relief Program. Because years had passed since he had been in operational contact with Bulgarian refugees, it was felt that Subject should not be prevented from entering the United States.

7. Since entering the United States, Subject has been a continual source of embarassment. His megalomania is evident in the various communications with government agencies. For example, he recently commented in one letter that he would like to be appointed Richard Nixon's anti-communist adviser for Albania, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. He stated that he could liberate all these countries within five years if he were allowed

to work actively with financial support. His first objective would be to liberate Bulgaria, his homeland, make it a free democracy, and the 51st state of the United States.

8. More details on Subject's thinking, attitude, megalomania, and background can be found in the following attachments:

A. Certificate of Understanding.
B. Interview with Dimiter DIMITROFF, 28 June 1960.
C. Informal Memorandum from EE/BR, 1 July 1960.
D. OO Contact Report, 12 October 1961.
E. Memorandum for the Record, 17 November 1961.

Attachments: a/s

13-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FILE DATE: 20 Nov 1961

FROM : ACTING CHIEF, RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

SUBJECT: DEMITER ADAMOFF DIMITROFF
#46165

THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF SECURITY ASKED THAT THIS FILE BE DOCUMENTED TO REFLECT THE FOLLOWING:

FRED BLUMENTHAL OF PARADE MAGAZINE CALLED MR. GROGAN, ASSISTANT TO THE DCI, THIS DATE AND STATED THAT SUBJECT HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH HIM WITH AN ANTI-CIA STORY. DIMITROFF WAS IDENTIFIED BY FULL NAME AND BIRTH DATA. HE CLAIMED THAT HIS CODE NAME WAS "DIKO", THAT HE WAS A MOVIE DIRECTOR AND SCRIPT WRITER AND THAT HE HAD BEEN CONNECTED WITH THE UNDERGROUND IN EUROPE. HE CLAIMED, ACCORDING TO BLUMENTHAL, THAT CIA TOOK HIM TO PANAMA, HAND CUFFED HIM AND HELD HIM IN CAPTIVITY.

MR. BANNERMAN REVIEWED DIMITROFF'S FILE AND ADVISED MR. GROGAN OF THE BACKGROUND IN THIS CASE. MR. GROGAN WAS ADVISED THAT DIMITROFF IS NOT NOW CONNECTED WITH CIA; THAT HE HAS HAD PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS, TRIED TO GET MONEY FROM FORMER VICE PRESIDENT NIXON TO FINISH A BOOK, MADE WILD CLAIMS ABOUT CIAS TREATMENT OF HIM AND HAS, IN GENERAL, EXHIBITED AN ERRATIC BEHAVIOR PATTERN, CHARACTERIZING HIM AS UNRELIABLE AND UNTRUSTWORTHY.

David H. Woldorf
DAVID H. WOLDORF

SECRET

To: Chief, Contact Division
Attn: Support Branch (Crowley)

12 October 1961
00-A-3198985

From: Chief, Washington Office

("DIKO")

Subject: Dimiter Adamoff Dimitreff - Renewed Effort for CIA Support

1. Mr. Hill of the DCI Security Office called Sheridan on 29 September 1961 to state that a Dimiter Dimitroff was trying to meet the DCI, and Mr. Bricker felt he should be handled by the Washington Field Office. Hill was told that Dimitroff had been interviewed at length in the Washington Field Office on 28 June 1960 after an effort to see Vice President Nixon (00-AS 3,161,567 under Case 33329). Sheridan suggested that Hill tell Dimitroff that his story was a matter of record, and there would be no purpose in further interview unless he had something new to contribute.

2. Nonetheless, an appointment was made for 2 October 1961 at the Washington Field Office. Dimitroff was obviously disappointed to be sent back to Sheridan and admitted that he had been trying to find another entre to the Agency for his proposals. He pointed out that he was still against the Democratic Party but was in favor of President Kennedy because of his strong anti-communist stand, and had been encouraged to resume his efforts by the president's appeals against communism.

3. Dimitroff stated that he can keep his country of Bulgaria, Albania, Macedonia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland in a turmoil against the USSR if given authority and backing by the CIA. He reiterated that he had been the youngest underground leader and was imprisoned by US citizens in the jungle for three years for continuing his fight. Although his former contacts are now ten years old, he is sure that they can be re-established and that his former comrades will rally to him in an active movement against the communists, rather than to continue in passive roles.

4. His latest plan is to form a Liberation Committee with himself as president. It would publish a Bulgarian/English paper for world distribution to Bulgarian emigres in an effort to alert supporters. The tone would be cultural rather than openly political. He would also establish a central point to help Bulgarian refugees. With this under way, Dimitroff said that ninety percent of Georgi Dimitrov's (Bulgarian National Committee) followers would defect to him. He said that Dimitrov is on the United States payroll and had called him a traitor to Bulgaria last week.

201-45745

SECRET

5. Dimitroff's real aim is to recruit five thousand supporters of fighting age. These would be used to invade Bulgaria by air drop into the southern mountain tier about April 1962. They would easily seize the cities of that area, which are held by mere hundreds of police and communist officials. The attacks would be at night and in sufficient strength to surprise and overwhelm the opposition. Proclamations would be issued, prisoners released, recruiting carried out and a border area set up in the mountains with the passes heavily defended. He said there are only four major roads into this southern area, so that it could be quickly and effectively sealed off. The United Nations would be called to intervene immediately, as it has done in Korea and the Congo.

6. This enclave in Bulgaria would be the start of the overthrow of the communist government in that country. When this is achieved, Dimitroff said he would want only five years as the head of the state to establish true democracy on the United States order. Thereafter, he would be happy to retire, having fulfilled his promise to his followers that he would never give up the fight. He said that he was willing to die for the cause of a free Bulgaria and hopes that he can make it the fifty-first state of the United States.

7. To these ends he wrote a letter on 15 June 1961 to President Kennedy (copy attached). When he did not receive a reply, he called personally and was referred by a secretary to the State Department and then to CIA. Dimitroff needs funds and support from CIA and commented that if the Agency does not decide to support him in his anti-communist work, he will try to uncover the names of the US citizens responsible for wrecking his underground activities and for holding him prisoner for three years. This, he said, he owed to his supporters because he has been able to do nothing without support.

8. Belatedly, he mentioned that he had written one of the greatest motion picture scripts ever. It is fictional but based on complete truths and is very strongly anti-communist. Unfortunately, he cannot find financial backers and could use CIA money if his major project cannot be immediately adopted. The title of the piece is "One Dark Night".

9. Dimitroff was informed that his visit and comments would be passed to any interested officials, and he would be contacted should there be any need to do so. He insisted, however, that he would remain in Washington for a reasonable time awaiting an answer and will definitely try to open other doors than those of CIA. He is using a letter drop and answering service - 422 Washington Building, DC5, ST 3-9474, in the pseudonym of Dimitriou. In the future he can always be reached through another name - Dimo Petroff - at 67 Richmond Street West, Suite 304, Toronto 1, Ontario, Canada.

F. J. Sheridan

Enclosure: as noted
W-14977

1 July 1960

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Dimitur Adamov DIMITROV aka "Diko" DIMITROV

1. A review of Agency files reveals the following data concerning Subject and his association with CIA.

2. Subject was first contacted in October 1950 by the Field Chief of OPC activities in Athens, Greece. The purpose of this contact was to assess Subject as a principal agent and focal point in the recruitment of Bulgarians to participate in OPC operations directed against Bulgaria. For this purpose, an organization called the Democratic Bloc was established, and Subject was placed as its ostensible organizer and chief.

3. During the period October 1950 through March 1951, Subject remained in the employ of OPC in Athens and provided 21 agents for infiltration into Bulgaria, but he never participated in the cross-border operations.

4. In early 1951, various operational and administrative difficulties began to manifest themselves and it was decided that Subject should be removed from his position. In April 1951 it came to OPC's attention that Subject intended to sell his knowledge of CIA's activities to the French Intelligence Service. This fact was used as the primary reason for his removal from active participation in Bulgarian operations.

5. Because of operational security considerations stemming from his duplicity and personal make-up, it was deemed inadvisable to leave Subject at large in Greece and it was decided that he should be transferred to a CIA holding facility at Fort Clayton, Panama. He was airlifted from Athens to Frankfurt where he was hospitalized four days for observation, and then flown black to Fort Clayton, arriving on 4 September 1951. He remained there until January 1954.

6. A CIA case officer was dispatched from headquarters in May 1953 to Fort Clayton where he interrogated Subject. It was determined at that time that whatever operational knowledge Subject had of CIA, its methods, personnel, and operations was obsolete.

7. With termination of the holding facility at Fort Clayton, Subject was temporarily removed to Greece since there were no other immediate possibilities to resettle him. (The attached understanding with Subject was effected o/a 12 January 1954 at the time of his removal from Fort Clayton.) CIA made a commitment to the Greek authorities that CIA would not abandon Subject in Greece and would take steps to remove him from Greek soil within one year. Efforts were made to effect Subject's migration to Canada, New Zealand, Australia and elsewhere, but to no avail. After due consideration by interested headquarters elements and the Athens Station, it was decided that the best effective solution for Subject's disposal would be to let him immigrate to the United States on his own under the Refugee Relief Act program, but without any assistance from CIA.

8. Since arrival in the United States, Subject has come to our attention on the following occasion:

> On 14 May 1957, the Department of State informed CIA that Subject had contacted their office and tried to interest them in purchasing a feature length film script. At that time Subject told the Department of State that he was living in Newark, New Jersey, with his wife and seven-year-old daughter and was in Washington on a visit. The State Department had no interest in the film script and asked if members of this Agency would like to meet Subject and discuss the script. This offer was turned down. The case officer involved understood that State Department then discontinued all contact with Subject. There is no further information available.

9. Although he was considered to be of operational value at the time he was originally picked up by elements of CIA, Subject's subsequent actions, lack of integrity and poor security indicated that he was unworthy of any further operational consideration. He has a tendency to exaggerate to the point of lying and become involved in deals of which he was the financial benefactor. Throughout all his deals, however, there is the thread of alleged national pride and desire to project himself in the fight against Communism. There have been reported rumors of his having been a Bulgarian IS agent even during the time when he was employed by CIA. No concrete evidence, however, was actually uncovered to substantiate these allegations, which are believed to be typical of denunciations made by rival political factions among emigres.

10. As the result of the review of Subject's case, it is recommended that nothing further be done for him since he does not possess any damaging information concerning current operations and his memory of past operations and personalities is between nine and ten years old. (In view of the circumstances of termination, it should be pointed out to Subject that in pressing the United States Government for further assistance he is liable for prosecution under the espionage and secrecy laws of the United States Government.)

Attachment: Certification of
understanding

SECRET

Pl
Musulin

Chief, Contact Division

28 June 1960

Attn: Mr. Forrest

See George
Mr.
you?

Chief, Washington Office

33254
Case ~~33255~~ - Dimiter Dimitroff (Dike)

1. On 27 June, George Forrest notified Sheridan that General Cushman of Vice President Nixon's office had requested an immediate contact with a Dimitre Gatsopolous. Gatsopolous had asked for an appointment with the Vice President and had indicated that he was a Balkan underground leader. After several attempts, contact was made and an appointment was set for the Washington Office at 10 AM on 28 June.

2. On 28 June Gatsopolous arrived and it turned out that his name is actually "Dim. At. Dimitroff". He explained, by way of introduction, that he was an important underground leader in Bulgaria during and after World War II; had had a long history of anti-Communist activities; and was very anxious that Vice President Nixon be elected President. He felt that Nixon was young, zealous, anti-Communist and would take the necessary aggressive steps against world Communism. He suggested that he would like to be appointed Nixon's anti-Communist advisor for Albania, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. He stated that he could liberate all these countries within five years if he were allowed to work actively with financial support, but without pay to himself. His first objective is to liberate Bulgaria, his homeland; make it a free democracy, and even effect the dream of becoming the fifty-first US state.

3. Dimitroff then gave his detailed history. In 1941 when he was about 20 years old, he had just discovered his talents as a poet at about the time the German military forces took over the country. He proceeded to criticize the Germans and the Soviets in print, while praising US democracy. Because of this stand he acquired a name and stature. In 1943, the US and the UK sent a military mission to the Balkans under a US general who saw Dimitroff's pamphlets and brochures. A meeting was arranged in the mountains and the general told Dimitroff that they were looking for such a young, vigorous leader who had the US viewpoint. The US would personally support him in all ways if he would lead an underground force. The general asked him to prepare the ground in Bulgaria for the US arrival when the Germans finally retreated.

4. On the basis of this meeting, Dimitroff formed the Danube Liberation Movement. He operated fairly openly and soon was seized by the Germans in the Macedonian Mountains. They wished to execute him, but the Bulgarian governor, Dimiter Raichev, told the Germans that the people would rise up if they killed "Dike" (his nom-de-plume and nom-de-guerre). He was therefore turned over to Raichev, who confined him to his native town of Lom where he was held for approximately two months and during which he lost contact with the US Mission. He finally

SECRET

SECRET

sent his [illegible]s [illegible] and tell the Missi[illegible] his situation. The brought b[illegible]ard to continue his efforts [illegible] escape if possible to the mountains. The guards were lax and he did succeed in getting away to revive his Movement as the Bulgarian Democratic Bloc, which was based on US democratic principles. At this stage, this same US military mission was also supporting Tito, and there were frequent military clashes between Tito's Communists and Dimo's group. The general told Dimo that Tito was fighting for the same cause but the general actually personally supported the Democratic partisans. He added that all would come out alright after the War.

5. In 1944 when the Germans left Bulgaria the US did not fulfill the promise of going into the Balkans. The Soviets arrived instead. Dimo's people began to question his leadership but still tried to resist the Soviets, who crushed them at Shumen. The remnants retreated to the mountains to the north. Dimitroff came down to see Colonel Backless (sic) of the new US military mission to Bulgaria, chief of which was General Crane (sic). Colonel Backless knew nothing of the activity of the former military mission which by this time was operating exclusively in Yugoslavia. However, he was interested in supporting Dimitroff against the Soviets and the Communists. He requested permission and aid from Washington but no word was forthcoming for several months while Dimitroff's partisans were without supplies in the mountains. Dimitroff therefore went to Yugoslavia and met General Cook, successor to the original US general Dimitroff had met. Cook could not help him because of area jurisdiction.

John Bakeless

6. Throughout the winter Dimitroff's group supplied themselves with guns stolen from military stores in Bulgaria and started their fight again in the Spring of 1945. Dimitroff heard that his original US general was in Yugoslavia and journeyed out to see him. He was again told that the general had no jurisdiction any longer for Bulgaria. On the way to say goodbye to the General, Dimitroff was seized by Tito's police and put in jail for 65 days on bread and marmalade. He was interrogated on his contacts with the US Mission during this time. The Bulgarian Communist Government wanted Dimitroff alive so the Yugoslavs turned him over at the border to a Bulgarian lieutenant colonel. Dimitroff persuaded the colonel to defect and they both went to Colonel Backless' house, where Dimitroff remained to recover his health and the lieutenant colonel was sent to Turkey. With Backless' assistance Dimitroff opened his underground headquarters in a convent about two miles from Sofia, although there was still no concrete aid from Washington. His people in the mountains were desperate and began to break up.

7. At this time the military mission was ordered out of the country and was replaced by a US civilian group headed by a Mr. Gregorieff. After several meetings Gregorieff finally told Dimitroff he should no longer fight the Soviets; that he would get no support from the US; that Gregorieff would not ask Washington for help and Dimitroff should give himself up. On the basis of this meeting Dimitroff considers Gregorieff a Communist. Dimitroff went to Sofia to meet Ambassador Barnes to express his suspicions about Gregorieff and to complain about the false

SECRET

promises of over a year. Before he could meet the Ambassador, Dimitroff was betrayed at his [safe] house in Sofia by the landlady for one million leva, and was arrested by the Bulgarian secret police. He was tortured by electricity, physical means, water, devices, and starvation. During this time he was regularly questioned by a Soviet Commissar but told nothing because he knew he was to die and had to create an example. Finally sentenced to death by hanging, he waited daily for nine months for it to be carried out. Later he learned he had not been executed because the authorities wanted him to testify at the trial of Nikola Petkov that Petkov had supported Dimitroff's movement.

8. In 1947 he was working in a labor gang and was rescued by the underground, which sent him to the house of the US Ambassador. Arrangements were made through US personnel, over a period of two weeks, to send Dimitroff to Greece. He was warned not to use his name "Diko" but did use his regular name. The Communists offered a million leva reward for his death or capture in brochures with his picture.

9. In Greece, UK military personnel recognized him from the photographs and took him from a Greek hospital. UK General Scott met and offered him complete support and a radio station at Salonika to renew underground activities. Scott was very anti-US and for that reason Dimitroff refused the offer. The following day all uniforms and gifts given him by UK personnel were removed and he was turned back to the Greeks, who employed him in a radio station in Athens broadcasting against Bulgarian Communists.

10. During 1948, Communist agents were sent to Athens to kill him. For this reason he went to Italy at the suggestion of the Greek Government. In 1949 while at Bari, a Mr. Clark from the US Embassy in Greece, who knew him as "Diko", asked Dimitroff to return to Greece and to renew the fight with his underground if it could be revived. At its peak it had consisted of 250 secret posts and ten thousand active members. They returned together to Athens and set up an open Liberation Committee with Dimitroff as president. The organization trained Bulgarians in Frankfurt and near Athens. Many of these were later parachuted into Bulgaria starting in 1949. His operations were purely military and did not involve espionage. Another US service in Greece, primarily interested in espionage, was headed by a Mr. Ewing (sic) or Ubing (sic) for which all types of Bulgarians were working for money. When Dimitroff's men attempted to cross the Bulgarian frontier they were sometimes ambushed by Ewing's people or were betrayed to the Bulgarian Communists. To check personally he went on an inspection of the frontier with a US Army representative, a Mr. George. They talked to his people who had been forced back and George realized that Ewing was collaborating with the Communists. George reported this to Clark who returned to Washington with the story and never came back to Greece.

11. Clark was replaced by a Mr. Allen, of German origin, Russian speaking, Moscow educated, and a Communist. At their first meeting, Allen told Dimitroff to take it easy, that there was plenty of time to fight the Communists. Thereafter it was apparent that Ewing was learning all of Dimitroff's plans, schedules, and secrets through Allen, and Ewing's people began openly to deride Dimitroff. This killed the

spirit of Dimitroff's people in the camps. George told Dimitroff that Allen too was a Communist and cooperating with Ewing. Allen put pressure on Dimitroff for the location of the secret posts in Bulgaria but Dimitroff refused to give the information. George checked Washington to see who had sent Allen to Greece and learned that it was a Mr. White, a Truman advisor who later committed suicide for being a Communist. George took this information to the US via Frankfurt and never returned to Greece.

12. Dimitroff continued to resist Allen's demands for details of his movement. Allen said there was no use fighting the Communists; that they could not beat the Soviets; that Communism was not too bad, and that it would be best to break up the movement. Allen denied being a Communist but said he would withdraw his financial support, to which Dimitroff replied that he could turn to other nations which had approached him. Allen told him to go ahead on his own. That night Dimitroff was called to a building near the Soviet Embassy where he was arrested by Greek police at Allen's request based on cable authority from Washington. After about a week Allen arranged for him to be taken to a Greek island to identify Bulgarians sent to kill him. At the island there were no Bulgarians but only a few Greek prisoners under guard. He was kept there four months. After a five-day hunger strike, arrangements were made by the Greek authorities with Allen to have him sent to another island where there were some Bulgarians. A month later Allen sent a letter to Dimitroff that he was leaving Greece and had arranged for Dimitroff to go to Washington. The two met in Athens and Allen gave Dimitroff a passport in the name of Christo Boboff, presumably because Dimitroff's life was in danger. Allen took him on a military plane from Athens to Italy to Frankfurt where they had to remain for documents for about a week because of the secrecy of their movements. At this time Allen ran down a German woman with his car and was held for trial.

13. Another individual named George then took Dimitroff from Frankfurt to the airport during which they changed cars six times. They boarded a four-engine plane secretly and Dimitroff was told he was hiding from the German police although only US MP's were in sight. After landing at the Azores they remained aboard until no one was around before getting off for food. At Bermuda they changed to another military plane which flew him to Panama (1951). In Panama City he remained hidden in the tail of the plane, despite his protests, until a frightened US colonel in uniform took them by car to his house. Dimitroff's baggage and papers were taken from him and he was told that he had to be checked at a hospital before entering the US. At the hospital he was put in a room, which was actually a cell, and was checked by a Dr. Stafford. He was told he was too weak to go to the US for a few days, and should rest. A man named Ivan Stanley came from Washington, told him not to worry about his safety any longer, that he would be well cared for by a US doctor and nurse and a US sergeant. He asked for books on English in order to be able to communicate. He had not been permitted to speak to anyone throughout the trip. Finally he was able to talk to Sergeant Barry (sic) who warned him that the group were a Communist ring and that Dimitroff's life was in danger. The Sergeant offered to help and asked Dimitroff not to betray him.

14. Shortly thereafter Dimitroff was rushed out of the hospital without any of his belongings, having been told that they were taking him to Venezuela. Actually he was taken to Colon to an old abandoned coast artillery building. He was threatened not to try to escape and was left with five US civilian guards. When he became ill a doctor arrived and gave him shots. For the next three years he was kept there. During this period a series of US personnel arrived from Washington to see him. Finally he threatened to walk out and they could shoot him if they wished. At this, he was told he would be taken to Mexico but at the airport there was only an ambulance. He was tied and gagged in the Communist fashion and taken back by the ambulance to the same artillery area but placed in an old shell magazine under guard. He never had enough air although he was kept in the hole for seven months. The US guards told him that they would kill him when the time came. Finally he had serious pains in his chest and a doctor from Washington was brought in who diagnosed that he would die within twenty-four hours if not removed. He was returned to his old building for three or four months.

15. After President Eisenhower's election there was obviously panic among the guards and fewer were assigned. One day he found that there were no longer any about but he was afraid to pass yellow blazes on the trees beyond which they would shoot him down. Finally three new US individuals arrived and asked him whether he was alright. They stated that they were from Vice President Nixon's office and had come there to save him. They further stated that the Vice President had found Communist records in his office in the White House when he took it over and had immediately sent the three to help Dimo. They offered him a life pension and a villa in Virginia but Dimo was still afraid of tempting offers and preferred to be returned to Greece. The individuals brought him a suitcase of clothes and took him to a hotel in Cristobal. They reported to Vice President Nixon who orderedthem to do anything Dimo wanted.

16. They returned him in the Spring of 1954 to the Greek authorities in Athens. He met a new US group who became very friendly with him and to whom he told much of his story. These included Haffiver of the United Nations, Emrich (sic) US Cultural Attache and some USIA officials. They assured him that he could go to the US as a free man without danger. He arrived in New York in November 1956 with the intention of writing his story in an Anti-Communist book. At first he worked as a janitor in Newark, New Jersey. At this time he met the Greek Ambassador who sent him to Spyros Skouras. Skouras refused to help, saying that Communists had never hurt him and he did not wish to be involved. Dimo also met, in New York City, James T. Martin, a US Immigration official who had assisted his departure from Greece. Martin suggested that he write President Eisenhower for support, which he did. The letter was referred to the State Department and USIA being ultimately answered by Turner B. Shelton of USIA. Dimitroff met Shelton in Washington to discuss the possibility of support in filming his story but Shelton obviously thought Dimitroff unbalanced by suggesting that he would be script writer, producer, and director.

17. Thereafter Dimitroff went to Hollywood where he appeared several times on television with his general anti-Communist story. He worked as a house painter while writing half of the book. Finally, without funds, he again wrote Shelton for a five-thousand dollar loan but received no help. When Vice President Nixon ran into trouble on his trip to Latin America, Dimitroff wrote to President Eisenhower again, receiving an answer from Cushman of the Vice President's office suggesting that he contact USIA. Dimitroff also wrote a card to the Vice President at Christmas 1959 wishing him well with the presidency, to which he got a personal answer.

18. Two months ago, Dimitroff received a letter from a Nixon volunteer group in California asking him to join. He replied with a request for five thousand dollars to complete his 4-500 page book which would help Nixon enormously with the presidential election. It would be published just a month before the election and would prove the Democrats had inadvertently allowed the Communists to operate in the Government; it would also show how Nixon had gone out of his way to save one poor man. The book would also show the dangers of Communism to the US. Dimitroff believes that it is his duty to finish and publish his story for the US people since it is proof of Communist activities.

19. Dimitroff is in desperate financial straits, being approximately five to six thousand dollars in debt. While in Hollywood he encountered a medical doctor - J. Tenner, 4930 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles 5, California, WEbster 3-5531, who produces motion pictures on the side. The two agreed that Dimitroff should write a script for a movie, which he did complete after borrowing the money to live on while working on it. When the script was presented to the doctor, Dimitroff's background was requested. The doctor then recognized him as an Anti-Communist Bulgarian leader and obviously did not like this fact. He insisted on discussing the advantages of Communism and described himself as being very liberal. The upshot was that Dimitroff never received payment.

20. Dimitroff told his whole story to Nixon's brother named Don in California who thought the story important and would try to get help from rich friends, as well as try to arrange an interview with Cushman. Two weeks ago Dimitroff borrowed sufficient money to come to Washington to see the Vice President or his assistant to explain the value of his project and to make a desperate plea for financial aid. He stated that the Vice President must give him financial support or he will go to jail in California for debt. The money could come from US Anti-Communist funds or he would be willing to borrow it until the book is sold. Dimitroff believes that every publisher would take the book to discredit international Communism. He needs 10-12 thousand dollars immediately to pay his bills, to finish the book, and properly to develop the necessary publicity.

21. Dimitroff believes that in talking to Sheridan he was talking to a member of Mr. Nixon's staff. He was assured that it would probably be impossible for the Vice President to comply, even should he wish to do so. Dimitroff refused to accept this, believing completely in the Vice President's authority in such matters. He said that he would wait in his hotel (Lehmann's Tourist Home, 1939 F Street, N. W., Telephone: District 7-8663, METropolitan 8-7131 where he is registered as Gekopolous)

SECRET

for word from the Vice President.

22. Dimitroff added he only had three or four dollars with him but that he would borrow further and begged that he receive some answer by the end of this week. He feels sure that the Vice President, who came directly to his aid in Panama, will assist him at this stage and he is sure that his book will be helpful to Nixon in the election. Dimitroff urged that this memorandum be closely held in the Vice President's office and feared that he might be endangered should the Democrats learn of it. He stated that he would probably also contact James Haggerty, the White House Press Secretary and George Allen, head of USIA, although he preferred to await word from the Vice President.

23. Dimitroff's home address is 1424 South Kenmore Avenue, Los Angeles 6, California. He is heavily overdue with his rent at present. Dimitroff has applied for US citizenship but stated that if a Democrat be elected he would flee the country.

24. No commitments were made other than that Dimitroff would probably receive an answer. He has the Washington Office telephone and we anticipate a call within the next few days. Please have Mr. Nixon's office reply to Dimitroff or provide us with further instructions in view of the urgency and political implications involved.

F. J. Sheridan

Enclosure: W-13341

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

THIS

May 27, 1958

Mr. Dim. Ad. Dimitroff
1424 S. Kenmore Avenue
Los Angeles 6, California

Dear Mr. Dimitroff:

On behalf of the Vice President I wish to acknowledge your letter of May 20 concerning your plans to fight Communism.

You may be sure that the Vice President sympathizes with your desire and your firmness of purpose; however, I must tell you that the State Department and the United States Information Agency are the operative agencies in this field. I can only suggest, therefore, that as you continue to develop your ideas you keep in touch with them so that they can give your projects careful consideration.

I know that the Vice President would want me to extend to you his good wishes and his appreciation for your generous comments concerning his South American trip.

Sincerely,

R. E. Cushman, Jr.

R. E. Cushman, Jr.
Executive Assistant
to the Vice President

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1958

Dear Mr. Dimitroff:

I appreciated your thoughtful letter of May 5 relative to the cultural agreement between the USSR and the United States signed January 27, 1958.

As you know from talking with me, I am fully cognizant of the problems that exist relative to the Soviet Union and their relations with the Free World. It is, however, because of the serious problems that we believe it is so very necessary to reach the people of the Soviet Union by the means of motion pictures, radio, television and other methods of communication in order that they may have a better understanding of the freedom and way of life which we have the great honor and privilege to enjoy.

I assure you that everyone connected with matters relative to the purchase and sale of American and Soviet motion pictures is completely aware of the problems relative to these matters, as well as to the opportunities which are presented.

Let me thank you most sincerely for your interest and assure you that we will not fail to exercise caution and deliberation in connection with the implementation of this agreement.

Sincerely yours,

Turner B. Shelton
Director
Motion Picture Service

Mr. Dim. Ad. Dimitroff
1424 S. Kenmore Avenue
Los Angeles 6, California

General Dico Dimitrov, Bulgarian Freedom Fighter spoke briefly to the assembly as he urged everyone to do all in their power to overcome the evil of Communism. Write your elected officials in Washington telling them how you feel.

Citizen-News photo

DIKO, REFUGEE BULGARIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST
. . . claims Reds still peril him

Byram Warns Today County Tax Deadline

County Tax Collector Howard Byram warned property owners that they must pay current tax bills by 5 p.m. today or be subject to penalties.

After the deadline, delinquent taxpayers will be charged a set fee of $2.50 plus six per cent of the total due.

Byram said about 76 per cent of the total tax charge of $63,000,000 has been collected so far.

Property owners may pay bills in person at the tax collector's office, 840 S. Hill St.

Remittances by mail will also be acceptable provided they are postmarked by 5 p.m.

However, Byram advised citizens to mail their payments at least by noon to make sure they clear postoffices.

Dinner-Dance Slated

The Men's Club of the Sunair Foundation will hold a dinner-dance April 17 at the Sportsmen's Lodge in North Hollywood.

GUARDS AGAINST REDS

Refugee Lives in Fear of Tormentors

By DAN SWINTON

A square-jawed Bulgarian refugee said today he is living a life of fear and flight even in Los Angeles because of communist tyranny.

Diko, a panedonym that once ignited resistance to Red force, said that even here he had to guard against the vengeful hand of his Old World tormentors.

"They do not give up. Even in America the peril is great. I am always in danger," he said.

Diko is Dimiter Adamoff Dimitroff, five-foot five, 140 pounds. He spells his name with the double "f" because the Russians like to spell it with a "v."

He said he made one TV appearance in Hollywood. Which was followed by a threat of physical violence, presumably Red-inspired.

SPARKED UNDERGROUND

The pocket-sized, hazel-eyed poet and writer once sparked the Bulgarian underground. His name flamed from resistance pamphlets to teach Red puppets that the pen can be mightier than the sword.

His mission today is to "show the free world how things were before and how they are now and what can happen here if the Reds take over. If they like the picture, let them go ahead and accept it."

[illegible] —He first [illegible] against tyranny when he was 17. He left the village of his father to meet a challenge: the Nazi hand.

When the Reds took over in Bulgaria, Diko stayed underground.

Resistance is a Bulgarian's legacy. For centuries the nation has wrestled to escape the bonds of succeeding masters. Those who choose to fight can find many trails blazed. So speaks Diko.

COMMUNISM'S MEANING

"I'm an anti-communist. I feel obliged to tell this story, the story I lived. I feel it would be a crime not to tell what Communism means to the average person's life," he says.

This story is wrapped up in a book Diko has written. It is based on the facts of his running fight in Bulgaria with the Reds; his imprisonment and death sentence in 1946 after a betrayal; his torture by electricity at the hands of the Reds; his forced starvation for 18 days; his forced thirst for 12 days; the slaughter of his parents because they bore a resistance leader.

He said Bulgarian resistance was grass roots resistance. "This was different from the revolts in Hungary and Poland," said Diko.

"In Hungary and Poland the uprising originated among the Communists themselves. Those among the populace who hated the Reds joined later. But at first it was an attempt to set up a Tito form of Nationalist Communism," Diko explained.

ESCAPED TO GREECE

His first anti-Red unit in Bulgaria was the Danube Valley Organization for Resistance. This folded for lack of outside help. It was promptly replaced by the Bulgarian Democratic Bloc, which survived from 1944 to 1953.

After Diko escaped from his 1946 imprisonment, he continued the battle from Greece. Four attempts were made on his life but he kept pounding out the fight talk in pamphlets like "Farmers and Communism."

In 1953, Uncle Sam offered him refuge in Virginia, including a house, a car and an income, he said. But he insisted on staying with the mountain people in Greece to guide the attack on tyranny.

Fourteen months ago Diko decided he must tell his story to the West. He came to the U.S. as a political refugee.

STILL IN HIDING

here. I have been writing my story. Besides, I have to be careful about disclosing my whereabouts," said Diko.

Yankee dedication to honesty and veracity may lose the cold war with Communism, Diko warned.

"Americans have to be tougher, rougher. They have to learn to lie the way the Reds lie. You can't pick up this snake with your hands," he said.

He warns against the Soviet culture infiltration. "This is the biggest kind of propaganda. Let them show the prisons and the torture camps, instead of the ballets and the motion pictures," said Diko.

He hopes the message will get through. But he admits his urgings may not sail any ships.

"I'm not as important as I was," says Diko. "But I'm still the same fellow."

[illegible]

OBITUARIES

JOSEPH M. GASKI

Rosary was recited today for Joseph M. Gaski, [illegible] retired Los Angeles police sergeant. Requiem Mass [illegible] brated at 10 a.m. tomorrow at Holy Trinity Catholic Church. He lived at 1235 Brunswick Ave. and died Tuesday. He was with the police force since 1924 and retired on a disability pension in 1954. He leaves his widow Brigitta; two daughters, Mary Anne and Mrs. Betty Wells.

MRS. IDA M. MURRAY

Requiem Mass for Mrs. Ida N. Murray, 93, widow of Mexico and western mining engineer Capt. M. D. Murray, was celebrated today in Holy Name Catholic Church. She died Saturday at her home, 2658 S. Hobart Blvd. She leaves a daughter, Eva A.; a son, Mark and a grandchild. Interment will be in Calvary Cemetery.

FUNERALS

HOLDEN—Maria Holden.
Beloved wife of Henry A. Holden, sister of Richard D. and Donald R. Berry.
Services Friday, 9 a.m., at

'Miss Van Nuys' Off to Penitentiary

Mrs. Anita Baxter Esterwold, 20, attractive former "Miss Van Nuys," began a five-

Citizen-News
Thursday 10.4.58

THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF AMERICAN PENWOMEN
LOS ANGELES BRANCH
Charter No.1

Dear Penwomen,

A HAPPY NEW YEAR! Our new year of 1958 begins with our next Meeting - Tuesday, January 14th, - let's all be there. Our Program starts at 12:00 Noon, at the Hotel Knickerbocker, 1714 Ivar Street, Hollywood, California.

A General Workshop will be conducted at 11:00 A. M.

Joe Balding will lead us in the Salute To The Flag.

Dr. Edna M. Phillips, Vice President, will give the Invocation,

M. Demitroff, author, journalist, writer and poet, is our Guest Speaker. We look forward with pleasure and anticipation to hearing him speak on "The Role of the Bulgaria Writers Before and After the Communist Regime."

Mr. A. J. Burns, Educational Manager of the Western Division of the Readers' Digest, will be presented with great pride. His subject, "Building A Better World Through Better Reading" should strike to all our hearts as writers.

Dr. Lucia Liverette, President, with her husband, Dr. Jack Liverette, Pastor of the Community Church of Los Angeles, will present a Musical Program of Accordion and Saxaphone Numbers.

Dean Callerias of St. Sophia Greek Orthodox Church is our Honor Guest.

BOARD MEETING will follow the Program.

We wish to thank our President again for the most enjoyable time as guests in her home on December 29th.

PLEASE remember to pay 1958 Dues and help our Treasurer to start her work in our behalf.

DR. EDNA M. PHILLIPS,
Program Chairman

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1957

Dear Mr. Dimitroff:

I very greatly appreciated your thoughtful letter of July 17. I shall certainly take occasion to watch the television program to which you refer at my next opportunity.

Please accept my best wishes.

Sincerely,

Turner B. Shelton
Director
Motion Picture Service

Mr. Dim. Ad. Dimitroff
1236 S. Menlo Avenue
Los Angeles 6, California

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Document Number 1271-1029
for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

[redacted]

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. /The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department

DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States./

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens
M. D. Stevens

[redacted]

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded [illegible] automatic~~

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief of Station, WH/Miami			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Target Study: Jesus CRUZ Gonzalez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: HMMA-38920, 25 May 1970, Previous Target Study
HMMA-39753, November 1970, Details of Cuba Month
UFAA-2430, 22 October 1970, and related correspondence concerning Miami Station Contact with CRUZ' relatives in Miami

MICROFILMED
DEC 29 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Forwarded under separate cover is the up-dated Target Study on Jesus CRUZ Gonzalez, the Cuban Press Attache in Mexico, and his wife, Mercedes MARTINEZ Moreno, Secretary to the Ambassador and Chargé. As is clear from the attached study and the log of activities of CRUZ during October 1970, CRUZ is extremely busy, has many contacts, and is probably one of the more accessible members of the Cuban Embassy. On the other hand, he is so busy with his overt activities working with press matters, and handling the Cuban Embassy side of Prensa Latina, that the Station does not believe he has practically any time free for intelligence assignments. (Since the arrival of the Cultural Attache in January 1970, CRUZ has dropped all cultural activities. He no longer handles the Mexican-Cuban Cultural Institute.) He is on the phone with or visiting the Prensa Latina offices several times each day. He arranges for subscriptions to publications (magazines and newspapers) through Prensa Latina from the United States and Latin American countries and he orders books from various bookstores in Mexico City. He also handles the press material, including news film, coming to Mexico via commercial flights from the Prensa Latina representative in Peru. He orders photographic and other related supplies in Mexico and New York, and handles visas for newsmen who wish to travel to Cuba. Mercedes does a lot to help CRUZ, as he does not have his own secretary. As can be seen from the attached log, twice he dictated a cable over the phone for her to type for his signature. It is believed that when she returns in the afternoon to the Embassy with CRUZ it is to help him.

Document Number 1226-1129C for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

Continued......

Attachment:
Target Study u/s/c

Distribution:
√ Orig. & 1 - Chief, WHD (left half, h/w; right half, u/s/c) (att., u/s/c)
1 - COS, WH/Miami (left half, h/w; right half, u/s/c) (att., u/s/c)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
att NSM	HMMA - 39809	2 December 1970
too many pages	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER √ 201-337669 P-4061 FFN

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISF H SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 39809

201-265064

2. The LIEMBRACES have surveilled CRUZ quite often, and only one unusual contact was noted. That was a three hour luncheon with an Argentine leftist, Maximo SIMPSON Grinberg, a foreign correspondent in Mexico for the magazine Medico Moderno. Generally speaking, CRUZ leaves the Embassy during the working day alone on his errands, rather than with another Embassy employee, which is more often the rule with the other officers. CRUZ usually goes with his wife on errands during the lunch hour or in the afternoon before returning to the Embassy. These errands are on personal business such as to the furniture store, super market, optics, doctor, etc; but also on business, such as to bookstores. CRUZ' days are very long, as can be seen from the attached log.

3. While Mercedes and CRUZ are very busy and have many contacts, they do not seem to make close personal friends, and the persons with whom they are in contact appear almost exclusively to be business contacts. The Station has been unable to locate any person who might make a good access agent to CRUZ. None of the Station's agents mentioned in paragraph 6 of HMMA-38920 were close to CRUZ. The closest companion would be the Subject of 201-860095. The Station is reporting separately on its attempts to develop and recruit this person.

4. The Station has even considered approaching CRUZ' maid, especially when it became known she was so unhappy with her lot as a servant. However, since the maid almost never leaves the apartment and she is virtually inaccessible, the Station has been unsuccessful in having any asset establish any degree of rapport with her, although a contact of LITAINT-2 has been able to engage her in telephone contact and hopes to date her eventually.

5. Since the Station believes that CRUZ is almost entirely dedicated to press affairs, and no really good access agents are in view, the Station will not make a priority effort to develop an entre into CRUZ' circle except via the operation now underway to recruit 201-860095. If this operation is successful, the Station would have an excellent asset in frequent contact with CRUZ for a better personal assessment and information on CRUZ' assignment in Mexico for the Cubans. Until this type of information becomes available, however, the Station believes it has identified CRUZ' role as almost purely press, and we have been unable to detect any vulnerability data on either CRUZ or his wife.

Elsie I. Scaletti
Elsie I. SCALETTI

SECRET

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

201-337669
P-4061
November 1970

TARGET STUDY

A. Basic Biographic Data

1. Full Name: Jesus CRUZ Gonzalez

   Jose de Jesus CRUZ Gonzalez (HMMW 15729)

2. Nicknames:

   "Chaparro" (Shorty) by Sergio Pineda of Prensa Latina

3. Date and place of birth:

   Jesus: 18 November 1939, Sancti Spiritus, Las Villas, Province, Cuba

   Mercedes: 18 April 1940

4. Citizenship: Cuban (both)

5. Official identity or travel papers:

   Arrived Mexico 20 November 1967 with following passports:

   Jesus, PP D/67/818

   Mercedes, PP D/67/819

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

6. Father:

   a) of Jesus:

   Jesus CRUZ Morales, Prior to exit from Cuba lived on a 2 1/2 caballerias farm, Carreno farm, La Chorrera del Calvario, Havana Municipal District and Province. Against regime. Arrived U.S. 13 November 1969 on Refugee Airlift. Died 23 June 1970.

SECRET

CS COPY

S/C Att to HMMA 39809 201-337669

b) of Mercedes:

Name not known. He is known to have had a "taller" (probably auto repair shop) which was nationalized. He apparently was given nothing for it, just earned a straight salary, which Mercedes' mother said was not enough to live on. Mother wrote Mercedes in May 1968 they were receiving 123 Cuban pesos and she was unable to maintain the house with that. (Source: LISAMPAN/BAKER) (Comment: It is not known whether Mercedes contributes to her parents.)

7. Mother:

a) of Jesus:

Carmen Elodina GONZALEZ Monteagudo. Arrived U.S. 13 November 1969 on Refugee Airlift. Resides 1223 N.W. 111th St., Miami, Tel. 75799866. Lives with daughter. Has high blood pressure.

b) of Mercedes:

Name not known. Still living in Havana with her husband.

8. Spouse:

Mercedes MARTINEZ Moreno, born 18 April 1940.

Married on 3 September 1960. Cruz was 22, Mercedes 19.

9. Children:

Ivan, born in Paris 15 October 1962.
Abel, born 12 December, about 1966, in Havana.
Axel, born the end of 1969 in Havana.

Note: Mercedes says she was very ill with her first child. It was born premature and died. (Source: LISAMPAN/BAKER).

10. Siblings:

a) of Jesus:

Digna CRUZ Gonzalez, h. Humberto YERO Costa who is a naturalized U.S. citizen. Reside: 1223 N.W. 111th St., Miami, Florida, Phone: 757-9866 (UFAA 603). Digna has been in u.s. since about 1957. Born about 1931. Has a ladies dress store, "Miss Digna's Fashions" at 12320 West Dixie Highway, North, Miami, Florida. Tel: 757-0886.

Santa Ma. CRUZ Gonzalez, h. Edmundo Leopoldo ALONSO Escalona. 3 children. Reside: 1258 N.W. 100 Terrace, Miami, Florida. ALONSO, A 18 219 991, working aluminum factory, but trying to get job as technician in hospital. In U.S. since 13 November 1968.

Roger CRUZ Gonzalez, born 1941, w. Caridad GONZALEZ Banes, 3 children. Roger is epileptic. Airlifted to Miami in end 1969. Has been receiving medical treatment at Jackson Memorial Hospital for his epilepsy and is responding well. He has had no attacks since starting the pills. He works and is very happy.

Juan Enrique CRUZ Gonzalez, born 14 February 1935. w. Bertha Jose SAINZ Gonzalez, both live Miami.

b) of Mercedes:

No information on how many sisters or brothers Mercedes has. However, according to LISAMPAN, her Mother and Father are her only family in Cuba.

11. Other relatives by blood or marriage:

Jesus is known to have a very large family. See UFAA 603. However apparently from the debriefing conducted by WH/Miami of some members, none of the family except Jesus is pro-Castro, and none hold high level or important positions in Cuba.

Mercedes said in 1968 that her Mother and Father were the only family she had in Cuba. (Note: It was impossible to interpret whether she meant part of her family was outside Cuba, or this was all there was to the family.)

LISAMPAN/BAKER: reported in 1968 that Mercedes said she had sent her nephew "Robertico" a pair of stockings.

12. Religion:

UFAA 603, Source Jesus' sister, said that Cruz' family is large and all are devout Catholics. Nine members are priests or nuns. Until 1956 Jesus CRUZ was a student at La Salle Seminary. An aunt on the father's side was the Mother Superior of a convent in Cuba, and is now in a convent in Spain.

Mercedes: No indication Mercedes is Catholic nor agnostic. In March 1968 she said she didn't think the Soviets should have held a reception of the Soviet poet Yevshenko in view of the death of the Soviet astronaut GAGARIN a few days before.

13. Education:

Jesus: UFAA 603. Was a student at La Salle Seminary in Havana from 1946 to 1956 studying to be priest. Left in 1956 to attend high school. He was graduated in 1957.

Mercedes: Said she did not study either at secundaria or preparatoria. (This means no high school education.) Instead she said she studied some commercial courses. (Note: She is a good secretary, and takes shorthand and types. Source: LISAMPAN/BAKER.)

14. Languages:

Jesus: speaks some French (was stationed in Paris)

Mercedes: speaks some French and some English. She thinks the English has been useful, but Jesus apparently refuses to learn English and has chided Mercedes about her having studied it. Mercedes is proud of her French and likes to correct people's pronunciation of French words. She says that when she speaks a lot of English it is hard for her to express herself in French. She has no trouble translating either French or English. She studied English for 5 years. (LISAMPAN/BAKER) (Source: Station appraisal of Mercedes' English is that it is only fair.)

15. Military service:

Not known.

16. History of employment:

a) Jesus:

1958 or 59: Western Union in Havana. (This is where Jesus met Mercedes who was also working for Western Union.)

Nov. 1961 - Sept 1964: Jesus was Press Attaché in Paris. (Mercedes worked in Paris as personal secretary to Amb. CARRILLO. The Cuban Diplomatic and Consular Missions Abroad listed Mercedes as an Attaché in Paris in January 1963. It was also reported she was Foreign Service II Assistant which is an Attaché.

HMMA 36071 reported Mercedes said she was in Paris only during 1962 and 1963, but Jesus remained until 1964.

LISAMPAN/BAKER reported on 21 August 1968 that Mercedes said she was separated from Jesus for 9 months while he was in Europe, serving in Prague.

LISAMPAN/BAKER, 1968, Mercedes said that Mexico was colder than Paris, and later Prague. Said she arrived in Prague in full winter.

1965-1967: Jesus was in Cuba working for the Foreign Ministry (Source: Digna, the sister. Digna, however, was wrong about the dates of Jesus' assignment in Paris which she gave as late 1962 to late 1965)(Note: Possibly he was in Prague 1964-65.)

Mercedes may have worked in the Cuban Foreign Ministry during the same period. HMMA 35071 reported she worked in the "Direccion" with a girl who was going to marry Pedro LLOPIS Salles, a courier.

LISAMPAN/BAKER reported on 8 August 1968 that Mercedes made reference to the fact she worked in the "Ministry".

LISAMPAN/BAKER reported in November 1968 that Mercedes gave instructions on typing of "Confidential" correspondence. She said one copy goes to Raul ROA (Foreign Minister). She said, "Don't forget, I worked within the Secretary". HMMA 36071.

20 November 1967 CRUZ arrived PCS in Mexico as Press and Cultural Attaché (Second Secretary). Mercedes became the private secretary for the Ambassador. (Note: She is one of two secretaries who are paid in the Embassy.)

17. Record of arrests:

Not known.

18. Physical description:

	Jesus	Mercedes
Sex:	Male	Female
Age:	31	30
Apparent age:	35	30
Height:	5'6"	5'5"
Weight:	150 lbs.	120 lbs.
Build:	Medium	Medium
Posture:	Regular	Regular
Face:	Oval	Oval
Eyes:	Dark	Dark
Hair:	Black	Black (dyed)
Beard or mustache:	Clean shaven	
Complexion:	White	White (One reference to her as mulatto. Has full lips but does not look negroid.)
Teeth:	Regular	Regular
Scars:	None known	
Habits of dress:	Suit	Desses quite well
Ethnic type appearance:		Latin

	Jesus	Mercedes
General appearance:	good	good
Prominent features:	none	none
Other identifying features:	always wears prescription glasses	

B. Curriculum Vitae (Chronologically by year from birth to present.)

Jesus' youth was that of a normal middle class Cuban. The father had a small farm and from the profits gave his family a comfortable life. They were not, however, rich or from the upper crust of the social ladder. Jesus' sister said "we had everything we needed. We were middle class Cubans, not rich, but not poor." Jesus was a student during the Batista era before Castro. He did not have to work; he just asked father for his expense money. Sister thinks Mercedes was from a middle class family. (UFAA 2430, 22 October 1970)

Apparently in Havana, then Paris, Havana, Mexico City. See Job history. Some question whether they went to Prague, when, why, and for how long, possibly this was after Paris.

C. Personal and Private Data

1. Address and telephone number of present residence:

Amsterdam 218, Apt. 201
Mexico City, Mexico (DOI: November 1970)
Phone: 574-0224

2. Nature and description of lodging and surroundings:

a) previous apartment in Mexico City was only one bedroom apartment. They lived there during their first tour until Mercedes went home to have her third baby. In January 1969 she said that when she returned from Cuba she would seek new quarters. Her apartment was uncomfortable and she couldn't receive people there, they always had to eat out. Mercedes indicated to a Embassy officer she would not ask for authorization from Havana first as she might be turned down, then she would not be allowed to move.

She indicated she brought from Recuperación de Bienes a dining room and living room furniture. She bought in Mexico her beds, and a refrigerator out of her own salary. She thought she fared worse than other employees.

b) In early 1970 they rented their present apartment, which has three bedrooms and two baths, plus a maid's bedroom and bath. Living room, kitchen, dining room.

3. Location of resident, with respect to target installation:

15 blocks almost directly East from the Embassy.

4. Servants:

Rollock 100201

Clara Santa, Cuban, negro. Has special Cuban passport and is in Mexico as part of Cruz' household. Born about 1936. Called a "technical export".

In 1968 the Felix LUNA (201-759016) family also had a Cuban maid which they brought with them when they came PCS. That maid is no longer here. She was also negro.

July 1968 Carlota, the other maid, said she saw the records, and they were to get 1,000 pesos salary. But deductions were to be made for food, etc. In mid-1968 both Carlota and Clara Santa each got 500 pesos (U.S. $40) per month. Mercedes always pays Clara promptly, but she is a stingy mistress, and deducts from Clara Santa's salary every cent paid for the maid's medicines, etc.

It is known that the Cuban government gives some money to Clara Santa's mother in Cuba. How much is not known. Clara Santa wanted to ask for a part of her mother's money in Mexico to help buy shoes, clothes, etc. to take back to Cuba, but she was told this was a capitalistic approach.

Mercedes, though strict, is good about sending packages of medicines back to Cuba for Clara.

Clara is apparently very color conscious. Always asks what color a person is. She says the Mexicans like Negro women, therefore she had to be careful. (Note: It is possible Mercedes told her this to keep her home, as this was insinuated once.) Mercedes does not like for Clara Santa to talk with people on the phone. The other maid, Carlota, commented Mercedes treated Clara like a child.

Clara's main complaint is that she has no free time, is tied to the apartment, does not have time for the movies, to get her hair done, etc. She also complains things are expensive in Mexico. Likes to buy clothes. Mercedes does help her with the washing and ironing. Mercedes also helps by sending a lot of the laundry out, especially that which needs ironing, like shirts. Compared to the Luna's, the Cruz' do very little entertaining, thus lightening Clara's work.

de ZULUETA, W0201

22 September 1970: Daisy called Santa re the farewell party given for Mrs. Luna. Santa said that Mercedes asked Santa if she wanted to go, but Santa felt she had to tell Mercedes she was the one who should go. Daisy and Santa criticize all the women who work at the Embassy, saying they are a bunch of hypocrites. (Main complaint seems to be the other women have money, buy clothes, etc.) Santa said she would be glad when December came as she can then return to Cuba (did not say for vacation or PCS).

November 1970: Clara still seldom goes out. Her best friend appears to be Daisy ZULUETA, also a negro. Daisy does Clara's hair, sometimes shop together.

5. Meals, where, when and with whom:

Jesus and Mercedes both generally return to the Embassy after lunch. Lunch is often hurried at home. Comparatively speaking they have few luncheon guests. Apparently they often eat the evening meal out (in Mexico this is the light meal of the day).

For an evening snack they often go to "El Farolita" on the corner of Juanacatlan and Altata.

6. Barber:

Not known, but Cruz always appears neat.

Mercedes goes to the beauty shop quite often. She keeps her hair dyed--black.

7. Tailor:

Jesus: As of September 1968 Jesus had two suits. He apparently brought one with him from Cuba. He had one made in Mexico. Cost him over 1,000 pesos (U.S. $80)

When in Yucatan during 1968, both Cruz and Mercedes bought a lot of things (LIFEAT implied in the clothes line). When Cruz returned in July 1968 he bought a lot of Guayaberas (typical Yucatecan sport shirts).

Mercedes: In late 1968 it was commented Mercedes had no long evening gown. She wore a short dress to a special function.

Mercedes likes good clothes and buys good clothes for herself and for the children. (LIFEAT).

8. Dentist; physician:

no 201

Dentist: (May 1969) ✓ Carlos CRISTO Campos, Gutemberg 34-7

no 201

Pediatrician: Dr. ✓ Roberto Zorrilla. Phone 525-51-62
(June 1970) Durango No. 243-401

9. Shops frequented:

10. Church attended:

Jesus was a Catholic. His current (1970) church affiliation not known.

Mercedes: Church affiliation not known. No mention that children are baptized, etc.

11. Sports, participant:

4 September 1968 the maid said Cruz went out to play ball. (Type of ball not specified.) LIFEAT

12. Sports, spectator:

Sister reported UFAA 603 that Cruz liked sports in general.

13. Time at residence:

14. Normal after hours activity:

Cruz almost always returns to the Embassy after a late lunch to work. He apparently works late at the Embassy. In the evening he also has appointments.

Mercedes returns to the Embassy also. She either helps Cruz, or sits in the gatehouse and gossips.

Cruz and Mercedes go to the movies a lot in the evening.

They both leave the Embassy together at 14:00 every day and then surveillance shows that Mercedes and Jesus generally run errands (grocery, dry cleaning, etc.) after work and before or after lunch. Therefore they take a long lunch break. Cruz also meets with Carlos FERREIRA of Prensa Latina in Ferreira's apartment or in Cruz' <meets frequently with Cuban Press attache 201-860095 Jesus Cruz Gonzalez 201-337669>

15. Theater, cinema, ticket agencies:

Cruz and his wife do not appear to attend the theater. There is mention that Mercedes will go to the movie in the afternoon, after lunch, instead of returning to the Embassy with Cruz to work.

16. Night clubs, cafes, pubs:

There is little indication Cruz and his wife go to night clubs, cafes. On 15 August 1968 they did go to CARDINI's, but this probably because a Cuban singer was playing there.

17. Vacations:

Cruz and Mercedes do not appear to take vacations in Mexico nor to travel much in Mexico on weekends. Mercedes does, apparently, think it is important to see the tourist sights as has told this to visiting Cubans.

They also seldom go to Cuba. The whole family, including maid, returned to Cuba for one month home leave in January 1969, after having been in Mexico for 2 years. Mercedes had not returned to Cuba in this time, nor had the children.

She returned again with the children the end of September 1969 to have her third baby. They all returned to Mexico the end of January 1970.

18. Hobbies, clubs, lodges:

Cruz' sister indicated Cruz has no hobbies.

From information available to the Mexico City Station neither Cruz nor Mercedes have been noted to have hobbies.

19. Mistresses or lovers:

No indication Cruz has a mistress, nor that he is interested in other women. The same, Mercedes does not seem to flirt with other men.

20. Personal friends:

Cruz and his wife do not seem to have close personal friends. They seem to be colder, prefer to be alone, and spend most of their time working or running family errands. They do not even appear to develop close freindships with their fellow employees. Mercedes likes to gossip with the other employees, but her friendship appears to stop there. Most of their contacts appear to be in Cruz' line of work--press or cultural, and are for business purposes.

21. Persons who visit Subject at residence:

Other fellow employees. Carlos Ferreira of Prensa Latina.

22. Correspondents:

FR 201-130235

Paris: HMMA 35050: Esther Maria OSSES of the University of Paris wanted to go to Cuba and asked (JESUS) Cruz to write her via the Cuban Press Attaché in Paris. [illegible] She appeared to be a friend of Cruz from his days in Paris. (Mexico City Station has no record that the Paris Station followed up this lead.) No other letters from OSSES have been noted.

23. Telephone contacts:

Cruz receives and makes many long distance phone calls at his home. Calls came in from Havana, the Cuban Mission in New York, and from cultural/press contacts throughout Mexico. This was quite true during the pre-Olympic season when the Cubans had many cultural affairs (dance teams, art, etc.) circulating around Mexico. Now the calls mainly concern press matters. He calls the Cuban Missions in Canada and New York re purchases they are making for him. Also calls Havana and they call him at home.

24. Tobacco:

Mercedes used to smoke "KOOL" cigarettes when she was in Paris.

As of November 1970 it does not appear either smoke now. (LITAINT-2)

25. Alcohol:

March 1968 Mercedes said Cruz was drunk the previous night. No more details. (LISAMPAN/BAKER).

LITAINT-2 reports Cruz cannot hold liquor, but insists on drinking cogñac. (November 1970) Gets drunk occasionally.

26. Eating habits:

15 August 1968: Cuban maid said Mercedes and Cruz eat very little ordinarily. They prepare barely enough so nothing is left over, and a last minute guest is a problem. Insinuation is that Mercedes is very tight.

Mercedes does not like picante food. It does not agree with her.

LITAINT-2 said Cruz eats heavily.

27. Mode of transportation:

Cruz has and has always had a QP car in Mexico. While he shares this with other Embassy officers occasionally, it is usually his.

Cruz usually picks Mercedes up at home if she has to do something or go to the Embassy late. But she also quite often calls a cab to take her someplace. Once she commented she had taken a bus.

Mercedes took driving lessons in Mexico on May 1970, and occasionally drives alone but not as much as the other driving wives.

28. Chattel property:

Cubans provided Cruz with living and dining room furniture, but in Mexico they bought their own beds, and a refrigerator.

Bought a Phillips TV in Mexico.
Bought a company tablecloth June 1968.
Brought a vacuum from Cuba.

Mercedes commented she had a lovely bedspread in Cuba and had to buy more here in Mexico.

29. Personal bank accounts:

No known bank accounts, but it is believed Mercedes and Cruz are saving every cent they can and are investing in things to take back to Cuba.

30. Other relevant personal information:

30 June 1968: Mercedes said she wanted to take a TV and refrigerator back to Cuba as these things were permitted.

D. Political Data

1. Party membership:

15 May 1968: Mercedes indicated that Jesus Cruz was not yet a member of the Party, but was a candidate and should be accepted as a full-fledged member before the end of the month. (LISAMPAN/BAKER) HMMA 36071

(OTA 2080 said Jesus' brother was interviewed in Cuba in February 1969 in investigation to make Jesus CPC mbr.)

2. Party functions:

Cruz was invited to a lunch for members of the Party in the Embassy in Mexico. Mercedes complained that the Embassy should pay, not Cruz, because he was not a member yet.

3. Degree of political conviction and indoctrination:

August 1968: On the occasion of the USSR invasion of Czechoslovakia, Mercedes at first did not believe it, then said she was sure it couldn't happen to Cuba because Cuba had no frontiers, and they (USSR?) are far away. (LISAMPAN/BAKER)

February 1969: Mercedes criticized many of the things done by the government in Cuba, but seemed to remain faithful to the Revolution, and at times commented on the advantages gained by the poor people. (Comments by Rita BLAZEK, LIFEAT/LISAMPAN transcriber.)

February 1969: Cruz' two sisters and brother-in-law in Miami believe Cruz is totally in favor of the current regime, and nothing could induce him to defect or collaborate with the U.S. One sister commented, however, that he might have a favorable reaction if his parents got out of Cuba. (Note: The sister was very emotional at this point, and gave no reason why she thought Cruz would change his mind.) UFAA 603

UFAA 1966: Sister said Cruz is idealist, truly believes in Castro. Convinced what he is doing is good for Cuba.

He is definitely a Fidelista, but not a Communist. (LITAINT-2, November 1970)

6. Other political data:

All of Cruz' family, except Cruz himself, is anti-Castro and very pro-Catholic.

Mercedes' family is also anti-regime and several are in exile. (See UFAA 603, no more details.)

Cruz was anti-Batista and took part in the struggle against Batista. (UFAA 603)

The brother-in-law does not know if Cruz is anti-American, but does not believe he would collaborate with the U.S. (UFAA 603)

The Cuban government nationalized Mercedes' father's plant and now they cannot live on their income.

Oldest boy - 8 years old gave his father a present--a Cuban boat shooting down U.S. plane. Mother's surprise was tank with Cuban flag shooting down U.S. plane.

Mercedes pretends to be a hard-core Revolutionary, but tries to escape the menial revolutionary tasks, like taking her turn at the office in various things.

E. Job Data

1. Job title and PCS arrival: 20 November 1967

201-743389

Jesus: Second Secretary, Press and Cultural Attaché (When Jorge HERNANDEZ Ojeda arrived PCS Mexico on 5 January 1970 he took over Cultural Attache. Since then Cruz is only Press Attaché.)

Mercedes: Private Secretary to the Ambassador.

2. Official documents and credentials carried:

diplomatic passports

3. Rank and salary:

Jesus: not known

Mercedes: gets 150 (presumably Cuban pesos) per month plus "nivel de vida".

4. Allowances:

Rent allowance, and "nivel de vida" (probably a equalization allowance.)

5. Where employed:

Cuban Embassy, Mexico City. Mercedes is in the anteroom to the Ambassador's office in the main building. Cruz' office is in a building in the rear of the compound in another building also occupied by the Commercial offices.

In June 1970 the Portero said Jesus has no fixed hours at the Embassy. Jesus generally arrives at the Embassy with Mercedes anywhere from about 8:30 to 9:30. They leave together about 14:00 - 14:30 for lunch and return about 17:00 or 18:00.

6. Basic duties:

Jesus Cruz:

a) In Paris, Jesus was head of the Press Department and was responsible for distribution of over-all work in the Embassy. Constantly tried to make high level French contacts, and was involved in France-Cuba association. Also handled liaison with Soviet Bloc establishments, particularly Russian and Czech Embassies. (HMMW 16254)

b) In Mexico, from date of arrival November 1967 till January 1970 Cruz handled both Cultural and Press matters for the Cubans in Mexico, including most Olympic cultural matters.

c) One of his main press jobs is the responsibility for Prensa Latina. This responsibility includes the control of Prensa Latina's finances. All the bills must be submitted to Cruz, and Cruz reimburses PL based on accountings. The PL Telex bills, for example,

d) In the cultural field his main responsibility was liaison with the Cultural Institutes throughout Mexico. He provided the institutes with propaganda material, film. He attended or saw that someone else attended major functions at the various institutes; arranges cultural events such as art exhibits, visiting Cuban musicians and artists, etc. During the pre-Olympic period in the summer and fall of 1968 this cultural responsibility was extremely time consuming as the Cubans were very active in this cultural exchange field.

e) Cruz also attended various meetings held in honor of Cuba, the Cuban Revolution, Che Guevara, etc. mainly in Mexico City.

f) In line with both the press and cultural jobs, Cruz was responsible for the handling of visas for persons connected in both the press and cultural fields. He, not the Consulate, would obtain the visas and was the Cuban contact. After January 1970, Cruz' responsibility is limited to the press field. In May 1968 Cruz was the Embassy employee to whom students were referred if they planned to visit Cuba to attend various celebrations. (HMMA 34705)

g) In July 19, 1968, the Embassy said that Cruz was needed to sign some passports. (It is not known whether this concerned visas or actual issuance of passports.) Note: In 1970 only the Cuban Chargé and Consul were authorized to issue visas.

201-777875

h) In the press field, in July 1968 it was Cruz who was responsible for arranging with Dr. Arnaldo Orfila of the publishing house Siglo XXI for the publication of Che Guevara's diary in Spain. Publisher

i) In April 1969 Cruz dedicated an exhibition of engravings by Cuban artists in the Coyoacan theater. (This showing was also to be circulated to Guadalajara, Monterrey, Veracruz, and Merida.)

No 201 201-853378

j) On 5 June 1969 Jorge SANTIESTEBAN, a Peruvian journalist, arrived in Mexico from Cuba and contacted Cruz at the Embassy. He said that Telesforo DIAZ who is head of Foreign Press of the Cuban Foreign Ministry had asked him (SANTIESTEBAN) to see Cruz who would give him "the photos".

Jesus 201-337669

k) When Cuban Press Office was negotiating for Telex equipment Cruz was named as the person responsible for technical service of the equipment. (HMMA-36065, 19 December 1968)

Mercedes:

a) In Mexico her main responsiblity is as private secretary to the Ambassador. Cruz also gives her a lot of his work to do. Now (November 1970) she is secretary for the Charge.

b) A regular job is handling the diplomatic mail. She apparently is responsible for the outgoing pouch, even though she usually gets help from one of the men in closing the pouch. In July 1968 she made a reference that her biggest cross to bear is the preparation of the pouch each Friday and Monday (the days of the Cubana flights). LISAMPAN/BAKER (HMMA 36071). On 4 September 1968 she told the Austrian Embassy that she was in charge of the diplomatic mail to Cuba. Apparently, however, she doesn't always open or distribute the incoming pouch. In November 1968 the Ambassador's chauffeur had opened the pouch and Mercedes did not know what was in the pouch.

c) There is also an indication Mercedes is responsible for all classified filing and material in the Embassy. Before she arrived, each man handled and kept his won. She now maintains the safes and gives instructions on the handling of classified materials.

d) In 1970, Nov., she said she was responsible for all "duty exemptions" (franquicias)

8. Special duties (IS):

Jesus:

a) The end of June and early July 1967 there were four inspectors at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. (Source: LIRING-4, MEXICO CITY 2053, 10 July 1967). A study of flight manifests showed that one of two Cubans who was in Mexico for a long TDY around this time was Jesus Cruz who was in Mexico 12 June to 15 July on Prensa Latina matters. LIENVOY showed he was in working contact with LIRING-9 and 201-776733. (MEXICO CITY 2219, 20 July 1967)

AMBEDEW-1 identified Cruz as DGI, Section II-1 (DIR 04323, 22 May 1969) Identified as DSE (HMMW 15729)

201-732870

According to Heriberto JORRIN, Embassy gatehouse keeper, Cruz replaced Julian LOPEZ Diaz (LIENVOY, 11 December 1967) LOPEZ Diaz (201-351555) was the former Cuban Press and Cultural Attaché who was forced to leave Mexico on 30 September 1966 because of involvement in subversive activities (arms shipments) in Mexico.

201-843271

15 September 1968: Cruz was seen meeting with Silvia Gaytan, who was apparently a Cuban source at the University. The meeting was at Sanborns and she showed Cruz some pamphlets and papers. She also made an appointment with Cruz for the 18th.

The Ambassador signs at least some of Cruz' confidential correspondence. (HMMA 35308, 26 August 1968)

201-353229

In Paris Cruz was in contact with Juan MARI Bras, Puerto Rican independence leader and Cuban intelligence agent. (HMMW 15729) in contact with Jesus Cruz 201-337669 in Paris

Mercedes:

201-759014

b) Mercedes is known to pull special guard or other duty in which the employees take turns. In November 1968 she got out of this duty on some pretext and was found out as she was seen shopping downtown. Rosa Luna complained that Mercedes did not like taking the duties. The maid complained of the same thing, that Mercedes always tried to get out of these duties, by saying she had to go out with Jesus, stay home, etc.

9. Superiors: degree of intimacy:

201-301755

a) In May 1968 the Ambassador Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas appeared to be defending himself to Cruz, maintaining that he, HERNANDEZ, has not made a political statement as it was published in the newspaper El Heraldo. HMMA 34728.

201-759016 NO 201

b) In August 1968, Felix Luna referred to Eduardo MUÑOZ Gutierrez of the Cuban National Council of Culture was Cruz' boss. (MEXICO CITY 6837, 20 August 68).

former boss of Jesus Cruz 201-337669

c) Rita BLAZEK, transcriber, commented that Mercedes is very correct with the Ambassador, yet is also friendly and relaxed with him.

10. Subordinates:

Jesus Cruz' principal subordinates are the Prensa Latina chief. He appears to rely more on his wife than he does his part-time secretary for business matters. The Station believes he can use Rosa FERNANDEZ de ALVAREZ, the secretary of Jorge HERNANDEZ, Cultural Attaché.

NO 201

With the Prensa Latina men, he gives quite specific instructions. He believes he should be consulted more by Prensa Latina, so that it can be sure to follow the line. He is on the phone constantly with Prensa Latina, going to their office or having Prensa Latina employees come to the Embassy.

Mercedes appears to get along well with all the employees in the Embassy, and is very friendly with official Cuban visitors. She especially likes to gossip. In this gossip she often criticizes the other compañeras in the Embassy.

30 July 1968: LIFEAT: Luna had 19 to eat the day before, but Mercedes said she wouldn't have these (?) people to eat. Said it was poor taste. The maid commented that the Cruz' talk poorly of these people. Then the maid said Astorga is a diplomat. (It cannot be told if Astorga who is lower level employee of the Embassy, was included in the dinner crowd.)

11. Business and Personal Contacts:

Invited subject of 201-332669 to his home

March 1968: Cruz was invited to the home of Guatemalan Mario Monteforte Toledano, with a group of socialist newsmen. (LIENVOY).

201-085148

201-810397

May 1968: Jesus was invited to eat by Mario MENENDEZ Rodriguez leftist Mexican publisher. Cruz preferred to eat out in the evening, 8:30. <contact of Jesus Cruz 201-332669>

15 June 1968: Mercedes and Jesus were invited to Alfonso ARAU's home. (actor)

Prensa Latina representative in Puebla, Mexico

HO201

16 June 1968: Guillermo Trejo Oviedo of Prensa Latina weekly newspaper in Puebla, called the Embassy. Gatehouse gave him Cruz' home phone. Cruz was upset that Trejo was given this number. Trejo wanted a loan as he needed money to run his newspaper, he hadn't paid for the paper yet. Cruz indicated this was not up to him, but the decision of the Embassy and for Trejo to call there. (Trejo is long time contact of the Embassy and the newspaper has printed articles favorable to Cuba.) MEXICO CITY 5972, June 1968. Possible Cubans subsidizing the paper.

9 July 1968: Sr. Guillermo Trejo Olviedo called Cruz at the Embassy. Cruz wasn't in.

SECRET

Professor Barón of Liceo-Franco Mexicano met Cruz at an Embassy reception. He called Cruz because he had a friend who wanted to go to Cuba. Cruz had some books and publications he thought might interest Baron. Cruz was invited to Baron's home. Phone 562-37-46.

NO 201

23 July 1968: Mrs. Marta Tamayo tried to reach Mercedes de Cruz.

201?, INSUF BIO DATA

24 August 1968: One Carlos Perez, believed to be from Prensa Latina, was trying desperately to reach Jesus at home. A Member OF Prensa Latina, contact of Jesus Cruz 201-337669

September 1968: One "Maruja" was calling Cruz at home. She said they would meet "at the same time and place agreed on".

< contact of Jesus Cruz 201-337669

September 1968: One Sylvia called and left word she would meet Cruz for Sunday breakfast at Sanborns on Durango. (May be clandestine contact Sylvia Duran.) 201-740720

FR 201-835560

February 1968: Sanchez McGregor of the University of Puebla, was receiving packages of university material from Cuba via Cruz. (LIENVOY) 201-337669

NO 201

May 1968: Ma. Teresa Chagoya, of the Asociacion de la Juventud de Oaxaca, stopped by the Embassy to see Cruz. contact of Jesus Cruz 201-337669

FR 201-225327

Sr. Bernard Diederich (P-3851), Life/Time correspondent in Mexico, was invited by Cruz to a film showing at the Embassy. contact of Jesus Cruz 201-337669

NO 201

Jorge Godoy of the Teatro Coyoacan, borrows film from Cruz.

October 1968: maid said Mercedes went to lunch with some newsmen.

NO 201

Jaime Casillas of AMEX assigned Habana, has been in touch with Cruz. 201-337669

NO 201

January 1969: Cruz was contacted by Carlos REBOLLEDO in Caracas. Rebolledo is from the Departamento de Cine, the University of Merida, Venezuela. They discussed Casa de las Americas matter. (MEXICO CITY 8828)

with Jesus Cruz 201-337669

SECRET

SECRET

no 201

11 January 1969: Anibal CORTINES, of the magazine Punto Final of Chile, contacted Cruz. (MEXICO CITY 8712)
"Contact of Jesus Cruz 201-337264 [illegible] A [illegible]"

Jaime Delgado from Chihuahua.

no 201

January 1969: Miss Valentina BORREMAN, Cuernavaca Phone 2-45-90.

no 201

17 January 1969: Fernando CASTILLO, from Guatemala, contacted Cruz for a visa.

no 201

25 January 1969: Margarita BAUCHE, protest singer, was inviting group together. Bauche's sister contacted Cruz to come to cocktail party for cultural revolutionary groups.

4 March 1969: Sr. Villalba of Coyoacan, identifying himself as LUJUAN (ph), called Cruz. Cruz agreed to see him late that Thursday.

26 April 1969: Prof Rosenthan of UNAM, Prof of electronics, promised to call Cruz and stop by and see him.

no 201

3 May 1969: Mario Aurelio ESPITIA (P-13,505) in Morelia, Michoacan, contacted Cruz re a cultural week in Morelia. (LIENVOY)

no 201

24 June 1969: Cruz invited Victor SANDOVAL of Aguascalientes, phone 3443, to go to Cuba. (LIENVOY)

no 201 20 April 1970: Cruz called Paris, France, KLE 5230, for Arnold WALL. Operator said noone answered the Embassy or Residence phones. (LIENVOY)

no 201

20 April 1970: Mario GODOY of Novedades.

no 201

21 April 1970: Jorge VIVEROS insisted on talking to Cruz. He was finally given an appointment.

no 201

21 April 1970: Jorge SALDAÑA of Televicentro was referred to Cruz to get a visa to visit Cuba for a story.

SECRET

SECRET

no 201

June 1970: Haydee Alemán de Rodriguez, Dept. de Pesquera, Banco Industrial de Peru, sent a letter to Jesus, marked on envelope "para Jaime". Letter was for her brother, Jaime Aleman V., in Cuba.

no 201

July 1970: Cruz ordered an olive green bush hat and bush jacket from LITAINT-2, with web belt, guerrilla dagger, and 8 utensil knife like that used by boy scouts.

201-265064

9 July 170: ate lunch with Argentine Maximo SIMPSON, 3-6 p.m. Chalet Italiano (SIMPSON is Argentine with long leftist record. In medical publication business in Mexico.)

24 July 1970: LIMUD: Mercedes got a letter from a Georgine VIERA, Calle 110- No. 302-3, Miramor, Marinao.

no 201

10 August 1970: Cruz took a long distance call from Patzcuaro from Esteban ATLAS who asked for Cruz. Cruz denied he was in.

5 September 1970: (Thursday) Cruz and Carlos Ferreira of Prensa Latina planned to visit the beach together Sunday. Then Gabriela called Cruz from Prensa Latina to tell him the Press Club palnned to visit Taxco Sunday. Not known which Cruz finally did.

8 September 1970: LIENVOY: Cruz called Domeo in Havana re 3 packages he had sent to Cuba of printing materials--duplimats, pencils, tapes, erasers, etc. Cruz said he had received the money.

Later that same day Cruz called Prensa Latina and talked with Ferreira regarding the things sent for Dacourt. Ferreira said the first pacakge held 300 masters, 13 erasers, 6 pencils, correcotr, and 400 DUPLIMATS. 2nd package held 30 tapes, 1,000 DUPLIMATS, and still outstanding were 2 erasers, 600 DUPLIMATS. Cruz asked for the bills..

no 201

10 September 1970: LIENVOY: Cruz called NY from his home, talked with Haydee Piedra Cueva re info on Cruz' request for 2 Phillips model 4408 semi professional tape recorders.

SECRET

SECRET

NO 201

14 September 1970: LIENVOY: Antonio ROSETTE asked for Cruz and whether the material had arrived on Monday's flight.--Had not.

14 September 1970: LIENVOY: Francisco Mora (541-2852) artist, wanted to introduce Cruz to Raul KAMPFNER, NO 201 Director of Cine.

15 September 1970: LIENVOY: Antonio Rosette called Cruz to see if the material he had filmed (presumably in Cuba) had arrived. Cruz said he would query Cuba and would go to Rosette's house on Thursday the 17th, alone, to discuss this. Rosette phones: 549-49-55; 516-01-58.

Ins bio data

15 September 1970: Alberto LOPEZ called Cruz at the Embassy. Cruz not in.

NO 201

15 September 1970: Maria Eugenia Saul called Cruz at the Embassy, not in.

NO 201

15 September 1970: LIENVOY: Cruz called Prensa Latina. Roger MENENDEZ was there so Cruz talked to him. Roger said Cruz was hard worker as never could find him. Agreed to talk next week to make a date to get together.

15 September 1970: LIFEAT: 8:49 Mercedes calls Cruz at the office, not in. She left word people were in the apartment waiting for Cruz. (Had supper engagement, presumably at home.)

201-252880

17 September 1970: LIENVOY: Prof. Edelberto TORRES was at the Embassy looking for Cruz at noon. (Comment: Possibly connected with series of talks TORRES sponsored at UNAM on Chile, pro-Cuba and pro-Commie.)

Ins bio data

17 September 1970: LIFEAT: Avila Camacho took an envelope to Cruz' apartment. Cruz was at Prensa Latina.

NO 201

17 September 1970: LIFEAT: Carlos Carrillo called Cruz at home, Cruz not in.

SECRET

17 September 1970: Cruz called Sr. Jerez at Tampico, phone 22466.

17 September 1970: In background conversation from phone call at home, could be overheard following: Mercedes was complaining to Cruz that everyone at the Embassy gave her work to do while others play around. Cruz told her not to pay any attention to Angel.

Cruz then called Sr. Jerez, Cia Villasana, 2-24-66, Tampico, Customs Brokers, re shipment from Holand. He needed info to get the franchise to get a shipment of 2 record players and one TV through customs. Cruz was told to call the Representaciones Maritimas in Mexico City, Avenida Juarez 42, Edificio D-11th floor and they would notify the Tampico office.

Later Cruz called airlines to see about air freight from Tampico.

N0201

18 September 1970: LIFEAT: Cruz called from home to Havana 30-49-70, Araceli (Arita) Herrero to see what happened to the things, she was to send him. She told Cruz they were ready but not picked up. Cruz told her to call "Papo" in the pouch section and have him send it to Cruz.

18 September 1970: Cruz from home called Prensa Latina to discuss new subscriptions he wanted from Panama and Caracas. Also ordered the Xerox machine to be changed.

18 September 1970: LIENVOY: Cruz met the Cubana flight.

19 September 1970: Sr. Arredondo, Morelos #5, Apt. 3 Tlalnepantla, Edo. de Mexico, contacted Cruz to say he was going to have a Cine Club at the Municipal Cmte of the PRI. Cruz promises film. Cruz promises to see Arredondo the next week to coordinate a trip to the interior.

19 September 1970: Luna called Cruz to go over to his apartment. (ca. 5:30 afternoon)

SECRET

21 September 1970: Cruz indicated he would not be in the next day, Mirabal would take his place. He went out of town, not known where.

21 September 1970: Cruz called Tampico and Canada from his apartment again.

Ins bio data

21 September 1970: ✓ Avila Camacho offered Cruz his projection room (probably at Banco).

✓ no201

21 September 1970: LIFEAT: Woman outside (Marina de Corrales) called Cruz to give him her new address. Amsterdam 302. She had something to tell Cruz.

201-743083

22 September 1970: ✓ Miguel DONOSO called Cruz to see if Cruz had received a word from his daughter. Cruz said no. Cruz then tells Donoso re showing of film at Teatro Orientacion, Thursday, 5:30 and would see him there.

23 September 1970: Domeo in Havana called Cruz to get the price on 400 boxes of photographic paper agfa-gebaer BS-1, 8.24 cmts.

22 September 1970: LIENVOY: Cruz talked with Moya re a new Bell and Howell 16mm projector.

22 September 1970: Cruz called Sr. Tomeo of COR Nacional.

23 September 1970: LIENVOY: Havana told Cruz the U.S. $2,800 was deposited for Cruz to buy the photographic material from Gustavo Tomeo.

✓ no201

no201 ✓ 23 September 1970: LIENVOY: Cruz called Aurora Velasco and Antonio ROSETTE (549-49-85) to invite them to a special film showing 24 September.

23 September 1970: Jesus and Mercedes worked at Embassy until 19:30.

23 September 1970: LIENVOY: Cruz called Quebec re the purchase in Canada of tape recorders.

SECRET

24 September 1970: Cruz spoke with Jerez of Villasena y Cia re packages in Tampico. There was a problem with the markings.

24 September 1970: Embassy movie ____________ 17:30 at Teatro Orientaciones.

ND201

25 September 1970: Got call from Raul CHIN, made arrangements visit Cruz at Embassy.

29 September 1970: Went to official despedida of Luna (all evening affair).

28 September 1970: Discussed with Mercedes at Embassy doing some newspaper clippings.

ND201

29 September 1970: Called Imprenta Madera, spoke with Sra. Neus Estresate, said he left 2 packages of books on Che at the gatehouse. He had promised her these.

30 September 1970: Attended cocktails at Foreign Press Club.

30 September 1970: Went to LITAINT-2's home 2:40 to pick up clothing for his children that LITAINT-2 had supposedly brought from States. Cruz and wife would stop by later in evening about 9:00 p.m. for the things, but did not show. Cruz took the tennis racquet, promising to pay later.

201-069995

17 September 1970: Antonio Nuñez Jimenez, President of the Cuban Academy of Sciences, wrote "Compañero Jesus Cruz Gonzalez", thanking him for sending the Academy a copy of the book "Submarine Geology".

ND201

17 September 1970: Israel Garcia Avila, Director of the Instituto de Biologia wrote to Comp. Jesus Cruz Gonzalez thanking Cruz for the packages of books. (This is under the Cuban Academy of Science). The books were from the Biblioteca del Congreso of USA. Apparently some books were missing that had been listed on the shipment. The Director lists this and would like to know what happened. Examples are:

Carl P. Swanson, The Cell, 1969.

William L. Homes, Drugs affecting lipid metabolism, 1969.

G.E. Nelson, Fundamental concepts of biology, 1970.

Karl Stiles, College zoology, 1970.

October 1970: See attached log.

4 November 1970: Ferreira set up a meeting in evening for Cruz and heads of Excelsior--got rum from the Embassy for the party.

12. Work schedule:

LISAMPAN/BAKER: June 1968: Mercedes complained that Jesus Cruz always had something to do--was always busy.

Cruz and Mercedes both arrive at work early--leave about 2:00 for lunch, then return later in the afternoon.

13. Lunch and rest periods:

Cruz and Mercedes often go home just for a quick lunch. Then have a meeting, or back to the office.

14. Times, routes, vehicles, from lodgings to and from work:

Cruz almost always drives to the office in his QP.

Mercedes drives with him usually. Otherwise, she takes a cab or bus.

Seldom does anyone other than Mercedes accompany Cruz.

15. Travel:

Date	Who	From	To	Why
20 Nov 67	Cruz	Cuba	Mexico	PCS
23 Feb 68	Cruz	Mexico	Cuba	
1 Mar 68	Cruz	Cuba	Mexico	
16 May 68	Cruz, Mercedes	Mexico	Merida	Invited by Governor to Technological school inauguration
27 May 68	Cruz	Mexico	Cuba	
7 June 68	Cruz	Cuba	Mexico	
29 Nov 68	Cruz	Mexico	Cuba	
2 Dec 68	Cruz	Cuba	Mexico	
31 Jan 69	Cruz, Mercedes, 2 boys, maid	Mexico	Cuba	vacation
28 Feb 69	Cruz, Mercedes, 2 boys	Cuba	Mexico	
7 Mar 69	maid	Cuba	Mexico	
17 Apr 69	Cruz	Mexico	Monterrey	visited Cultural Institute, Monterrey
18 Apr 69	Cruz	Monterrey	Mexico	
4 July 69	Cruz	Mexico	Cuba	
7 July 69	Cruz	Cuba	Mexico	
5 Sept 69	Cruz	Mexico	Vancouver	Arrived Paris from London 6 Sept., left for Prague 9 September.

Date	Who	From	To	Why
20 Sept 69	Mercedes, 2 boys	Mexico	Cuba	Mercedes to give birth
15 Dec 69	Cruz	Cuba	Mexico	
2 Jan 70	Cruz	Mexico	Cuba	
23 Jan 70	Cruz, Mercedes, 3 sons	Cuba	Mexico	

16. Subject's access to safes:

August 1968: Mercedes was trying to finish a "confidential" in time for the pouch. She reportedly is in charge of all classified material in the Embassy. She is known to have safes in her room. (LISAMPAN, LITAMIL-7)

17. Passes or keys carried:

October 1968: Mercedes left the keys in her raincoat pocket at home. Had to go after them in order to "open everything up". (LIFEAT)

18. Professional reputation:

Jesus:

201-784463

28 April 1968: Lino Salazar Cuban Consul in Veracruz, had arranged a big innauguration for the Cultural Institute there with plans for the Ambassador to attend. When he contacted the Ambassador directly, the latter said Cruz had mentioned nothing and therefore, the Ambassador already had plans. (HMMA 34634)

May 1968: A Mexican called the Embassy and Ambassador to complain about Cruz and how he was handling the matters of the ballet, etc. The complaint centerd on the propaganda for the cultural events--program drafts were full of errors, arrived late at the printers. He also complained he could never find Cruz, and Cruz didn't understand the problems. Ambassador promised to speak to Cruz.

June 1968: Someone from Morelia asked the Ambassador for a written report inviting Mexican artisans and ballet (presumably to Cuba). Hernandez knew nothing about the plans.

June 1968: In connection with Cuban Olympic cultural performances Cruz complained that the Cubans didn't give him adequate photos, catalogues, etc., and the Cubans complained Cruz didn't give them information on itinerary. Said Cruz should have given more details on what was needed. LIFEAT

no 201

7 May 1970: Venezuelan newspaperman Ciro Medina complained to a Prensa Latina contact that Jesus Cruz was a little "slow" (inefficient) and didn't know the score. He had had Medina's papers for a visa for a week and hadn't touched them. (LIENVOY)

Mercedes seems to be quite efficient, and Jesus seems to depend a lot on her in his work.

F. Control Data

1. Family difficulties:

None. Cruz lets Mercedes run the show.

2. Difficulties in office:

Cruz: none

September 1970: Mercedes complained to Cruz that everyone at the Embassy gave her work to do while others played around. Cruz told her not to pay any attention to Angel (Morales, Chargé and her boss).

201-868134

3. Difficulties with friends:

Avoids people he owes money to until he pays them back.

4. Persons to whom most attached:

5. Material things to which most attached:

6. Information which could be used to blackmail:

7. Information which could be used to shock or depress:

He could be shocked by potential loss of salary or potential Prensa Latina flap, which is his greatest fear.

G. Psychological Assessment

1. Appearance, habits and mannerisms:

a) Appearance:

1) Describe personal appearance:

Mercedes pays a lot of attention to the way people dress and she pays a lot of attention to her own dress and that of the children. She pays a lot of attention to her hair and spends a lot of time at the beauty parlor.

Cruz is always neat.

2) Describe ordinary style of dress--undressing and clothes in general:

August 1968: LIFEAT: Maid said Cruz was changing his shirts twice a day but leaves them black because does not take a bath.

August 1968: Maid said Cruz has two suits. Brought one with him, had one made in Mexico which cost more than 1,000 pesos.

Cruz' spend a lot on clothes.

b) Expressiveness:

1) How expressive? Gestures? etc.:

Uses gestues and expressions to prove point. (LITAINT-2

The sister says that Cruz is agreeable, affectionate with his family, especially with his parents.

Mercedes is very talkative and communicative. (LIFEAT/LISAMPAN)

2) Signs of tension:

Nervous, always worried about flaps.

3) Use of profanity:

No.

2. Health and Stamina:

1) What is general state of health?

Both Mercedes and Cruz and the children seem to be quite healthy.

3. Skills:

a. What specific skills or abilities does he possess:

Mercedes takes dictation and types. The telex was installed in her office for a time, and it is believed she can run a telex.

4. Interpersonal behavior:

a. Typical social behavior--natural, comfortable, warm, shy, passive, etc.

LIFEAT - 16 August 1968: Cuban maid said Mercedes puts on a good act with visitors--i.e., that she is happy to see them.

31 July 1968: Maid reported that when a man came to visit whom Mercedes knew very well, Mercedes did not lift a hand to help Clara. But when a man came whom Mercedes did not know too well, she tries to impress the man by working in the kitchen to impress the man with her feelings of equality.

Maid said Mercedes does not like visitors. She does not go along with the confraternity idea and of establishing good relations with one's comrades. Mercedes does not want this at her house.

When being introduced to a stranger, Cruz is very business-like.

5. Summary of estimate of his poise and self assurance:

Mercedes appears to have a strong personality. From her language she does not appear to be well-bred. The low-level Embassy employee on occasion kidded her about being mulatto. (HMMA 36767)

6. Family Orientation:

Transcribers note: Cruz often gives his wife work, He relies on his wife. He talks fast, and sounds domineering when talking to his wife. (BLAZEK).

29 March 1968: Mercedes explained Cruz was going to Monterrey and she couldn't go. In Cuba he never wanted to take her. (Apparently on business trips). LISAMPAN/BAKER.

June 1968: Mercedes recounted in a dream she mentioned the name "Oscar" just as Jesus arrived home from outside and overheard her. He got furious. (He is very jealous). When Mercedes asked if Cruz didn't trust her, he said "the danger is in over-confidence".

August 1968: (BAKER): Mercedes told a fellow female worker that no matter how much you love your mother and father, when you are married, you have your husband.

21 August 1968: (BAKER): Mercedes says she believes you should be with your husband. That is why she is married--to live with her husband. She left Cuba with her husband even though she knew her Mother would miss her. Mercedes and Jesus were separated once, and she said it was not good for them nor the children.

HMMA 36071 (BAKER): Mercedes is very loving with her children and pampers them a lot.

BLAZEK: February 1969: Mercedes worries about her sons, but sometimes has to scold the eldest because he behaves badly in school (classes in the Embassy). Since school is in the Embassy he is often in her office with her.

Mercedes has mentioned the problem of the children being influenced by TV programs, and she said she intended to send the boys to Cuba with her mother in the event she stays much longer in Mexico. She doesn't want them to acquire bad capitalistic habits.

Mercedes often quarrels with her husband in the office over the fact that he gives her too much work to do. She claims she is over-worked anyway.

LISAMPAN/BAKER: 5 September 1968: Mercedes tells fellow-employee that she (Mercedes) does not have to ask permission from Jesus to buy something unless it is a large investment.

LISAMPAN/BAKER: Cruz entered the office, asked for a kiss, and Mercedes replied, "Tu me quieres nada más para que te resuelva todos los lios que tu formas". (You only love me because of the messes I have to get you out of.)

LISAMPAN/BAKER: 12 November 1968: When Mercedes was on the phone with the maid, Santa, the conversatinn appeared to concern gossip over Jesus' family. Mercedes indicated that "that will change the matter, Jesus said yesterday, we are going to maintain our distance, she is just bringing a story, and there are many in Cuba living in this way." Later Mercedes said her in-laws were in Cuba and a problem. Mercedes tells a fellow-employee the problem she has had with Jesus' family. They were very religious, and racists. When the Revolution was a success, they wanted Jesus to obtain jobs for all of them, and Jesus told them he hadn't made the Revolution to get jobs for them. They had to resolve their own problems. Her mother-in-law hadn't wanted Jesus to marry Mercedes and did not attend the wedding. Later Mercedes said, "it seems clear that when she (probably the sister Digna) came it is because the vieja (mother-in-law?) has asked for a visa. (See HMMA 36071)

In view of UFAA 603, this conversation is probably referring to the visit of Digna, Jesus' sister to Cuba to see about visas for the family to get out of Cuba. Per UFAA 603, Digna was in Mexico in November 1968 and saw Cruz at the Embassy re visas. She begged him to help her so that these relatives could leave Cuba, and Cruz refused. He said he also wanted his parents with him, but he could do nothing to help them. (Source: sister, commented she believed Jesus probably did not want his parents to leave Cuba as it might compromise him or might affect his own (wife and children) family's freedom to leave Cuba with him.)

UFAA 603: Sister believed Mercedes has great influence on Jesus.

b. Miscellaneous:

Mercedes' personality:

April 1968: Mercedes complained that when she arrived home in the eveing she had to wash diapers. Complained about the soap in Mexico, and the high cost of living. (LISAMPAN/BAKER).

June 1968: Clara (Cuban maid) said that they didn't iron the sheets here. Clara does not iron much, but Mercedes helps with the washing and ironing. They send most of the things to the laundry, especially the things that need ironing (like shirts).

Mercedes also helps Clara in the kitchen some.

Baker: August 1968: Mercedes says she worries, but knows it won't solve anything, so doesn't let herself suffer.

Mercedes' attitude toward Mexico:

1968: She believed that Cubans in Mexico had to be careful of themselves and their children as there was personal risk because they are Cubans.

She doesn't like Mexico because of the high robbery rate, the fact that children are "stolen" and disappear.

She complains about the poverty in Mexico, especially in the small pueblos, the fact the people go barefoot, beg, about the poverty in general.

Mercedes thinks that when one reaches 35 years old, you are on the downhill.

c. What are feelings about family when they are separated?

Mercedes claims to miss Cruz when he is away. She says she is lonely.

December 1968: When Jesus was in Guadalajara, apparently to a cultural event, he called Mercedes to see about the family, and to leave messages for the office. He told her he would call her every evening--collect.

7. Personal and professional goals:

a. What seems to be his general life goals?

Keep active physically and stay on in diplomatic work.

b. To what extent is he motivated by self interest? family interest? etc:

UFAA 603: Jesus' sister said Mercedes is the type of person who likes to live well without working. The sister commented she took a Cuban maid with her.

(Mexico City Station Comment: Since all the Cubans in Mexico have maids, but Mexican ones, to whom they pay about the same as Mercedes pays the Cuban, do not believe this indicates Mercedes is lazy. As a matter of fact, she pitches in more than most of the Cuban señoras.)

Sister said Cruz is capable of extensive personal sacrifice for a cause. She believes he is not primarily interested in salary and position, but he is an idealist.

c. What are his personal pursuits, sources of satisfaction, hobbies, avocations, etc:

Hunting, swimming, fishing, skin diving, jai alai tennis.

d. What are his pet peeves, complaints, grievances?

Unknown

e. Is he receptive to new ideas? Tolerant?

Yes

f. Compare him with the "typical man".

A cut above the normal man (LITAINT-2).

SECRET

23 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Call from Jon French of DCD Concerning Frank STURGIS

1. The following information was provided to Jon French by his DCD Miami office on 23 August. The information was given to the DCD Miami office by a contact (not identified) on 23 August who obtained it from Oscar FREELY. FREELY is writing a book on Frank STURGIS.

2. STURGIS is to appear on the Tomorrow Show at 2 a.m. on 24 August, which is to be narrated by Tom Schneider. STURGIS just recently returned to Miami from taping the show in New York.

3. While in New York STURGIS saw Marita LORENZ and obtained from her a book which, according to source, appeared to be cryptographic material and seemed to relate to Albania. The DCD source saw a "few copies" of what he described as "mathematical matrix" material.

4. STURGIS currently (today - 23 August) is attempting to contact Senator Baker to turn over the material to him. DCD plans to ask the source to monitor the situation and advise whether the material in fact is turned over to Baker.

File

Chris Hopkins
LA/COG/CIOS

201- 242256 STURGIS

Told Jon French that DCD should alert ADDO & Phil FENDIG - he will do.
8/23

D002140

13-00000

TYPE: [✓ F] P E

YEAR: 80 [✓ 81] 82 83 84

0351

D-002140

Instructions for Divisions and Staffs:
1. Fill in and Sign on line 11.
2. Use back of form for additional comments.

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (Circle if appropriate) (30 CHARACTERS)
CABLE
DISPATCH
[✓ MEMO]
REPORT
FORM
LETTER
AIRGRAM

DAY	MONTH	YEAR
23	AUG	76

1 FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS): LA/COG/CIOS

TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS): The RecorD

	CLASS	WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS)	REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS)	DDO ?	DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS)
1	S				201-242256

SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS)

5 CAll FRom JON FRENCH OF DCD CONCERNING

6 FRANK STURGis

TYPE OF REVIEW: I A [✓ L]

DATE OF REVIEW: DAY MONTH YEAR

7 Determinations:

_____ A. Release in full text
_____ B. Release in sanitized form
_____ C. Deny in toto
_____ D. Defer decision to (Specify in line 8)
_____ H. Coordinate with (Specify in line 8)
_____ E. Sustain initial denial in toto
_____ F. Sustain initial release of of sanitized version
_____ G. Release additional information

	DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS)	COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS)	NEW CLASS
8			

SIGNATURE OF DO/IMS/FPLG REVIEWING OFFICER

9 EXEMPTIONS AND PROVISIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)

FOIA: B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7C
PA: B J1 J1 J1 K1
E.O. 12356

10 Exemptions and Provisions claimed to protect the following:

		FOIA	PA
_____	1. Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
_____	2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	5. Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	7. Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	8. Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	9. Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	10. File number	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	11. Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	12. Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	13. Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)
_____	14. Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)(c)	(j)(1)
_____	15. FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)
_____	16. Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(b)
_____	17. Does not pertain to request		
_____	19. Other (Specify in line 11)		

11 REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)

SIGNATURE/OFFICE OF DO COMPONENT REVIEWING OFFICER

REMARKS (160 CHARACTERS)

12 HSCA Box 2 #16

13

14

This Form is Unclassified Unless The Classification is Ch
and The Information below is completed.
CL BY: _______
DECL OADR
DRV FROM: _______

Page Count off

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

FROM: Norbert A. Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O
2D0109

EXTENSION: 1542

NO.:

DATE: 8 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Philip F. Fendig SA/DO/O	8 April			
2.				
3. Mr. William Wells DDO 7E26 Hqs.	8 APR 1977	4/8		FYI only
4. SA/DO/O				
5. (Shepanek)				MARCHETTI
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

DD/O 77-3194

8 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Divisions and Certain Staffs

FROM : Philip F. Fendig
SA/DO/O

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

1. Subject book was published in 1974 with 168 deleted items demanded by CIA and involved court trial and decision. The lawyer for the authors has, in effect, requested that a review be made of the 168 deleted items to determine which can now be declassified and removed from the court's injunction, particularly in view of the official disclosures since the publication of the book. The Department of Justice has advised that such a review is in order.

2. Since the courts decided the 168 deleted items were properly classifiable and classified in accordance with the appropriate Executive Order in effect at the time of the initial classification, including Executive Order 11652, the review at this time must include two points:

(a) Is the item still classified under Executive Order 11652,

(b) Has the item been placed in the public domain by official disclosure by the United States, such as by an official in the Executive Branch authorized to declassify the item, or by a report of a Congressional committee, or by the courts.

3. Each addressee is requested to appoint a focal point officer to review each component's respective items which are held by this office. This office also has the DDO documentation submitted in support of deleting each item in 1973. These can be reviewed by each focal point official as necessary.

A review will also be needed of those items which may have been cleared or released by CIA when reviewing manuscripts submitted by other authors since the publication of the Marchetti book. A few items will need to be referred by some of the components to other departments and agencies of government for their review.

4. Please advise this office of the name of your focal point officer by COB 11 April 1977.

Philip F. Fendig

O/SA/DO/O:SHalpern:(NAShepanekx1542)

Distribution
Orig & 1 - DDO
1 - C/EA
1 - C/EUR
1 - C/LA
1 - C/FR
1 - C/NE
1 - C/AF
1 - C/SE
1 - C/DCD
1 - C/SIA info only
1 - C/PCS " "
1 - C/CI " "
2 - SA/DO/O

For Sammy:

Testimony of
Kerry & Meyer
before the Multi
National Subcommittee
in 1973 - Joan

Dick Elliot re
Comms to POW's

1972 - today -
Radio -

13-00000

open Testimony by Intel. before (CIA, N.S.A, State, DoD, FBI) dealing with cong committees

ex: Allan re Commo sites around World.

open Testimony b4 Cong. dealing with AID cut off during Cyprus ~~situation~~

any Testimony re am POWs in MIA N. Vietnam: CIA secret method of commo. any index?

Any indexing Pike or other

John Donahue x6136 has Review Staff
Cubby Miller x7676
6/2!

RSM

TSD open Testimony Specifics of Commo

DOD controls

Broe -

~~[illegible]~~ + Meyer

Dick Elliot IOLC and testimony before Multi Nat Subcommittee 1973

SUBJECT: Review of Deletions from Marchetti Book for Declassification - Request for Documents.

1. In order to review the deletions from the Marchetti book, The Cult of Intelligence, Mr. Halpern must determine if any official of the U.S. Government placed any of the classified material in the public domain in open testimony before a Congressional Committee. The following material or information is required:

a. Is there any index to public statements by senior government officials on the subject of intelligence? Is there any index to the Pike Committee or Church Committee testimony ?

b. Mr. Halpern would like to have copies of the open testimony before a Congressional committee by senior officials of the
CIA,
NSA,
State Dept,
Dept of Defense,
FBI,
which deals with intelligence.

c. Any open testimony before Congressional committees by senior U.S. officials dealing with the cutoff of AID during the Cyprus disturbances.

d. Any testimony (open) concerning American POWs (MIA) in Vietnam and CIA's method of communication with them.

/Artcle

Hussein on His CIA Money

Following the disclosure that Jordan's King Hussein had for years taken secret payments from the CIA. NEWSWEEK'S Arnaud de Borchgrave flew to Amman last week for an exclusive interview with the King. The result was what Hussein called "my first and very last words" on The Washington Post's revelation of the payments and their possible impact on chances for peace in the Middle East. Some excerpts:

DE BORCHGRAVE: ***How much truth is there in the story that appeared in The Washington Post?***

HUSSEIN: The whole thing is ridiculous and insulting. But I am prepared to answer questions about it.

Q. ***Your government spokesman said the story was a combination of "fabrication and distortion." What has been fabricated and what has been distorted?***

A. What was fabricated in the story was everything about funds handed over personally for private benefit. When friendly Arab countries extend aid, it has been traditional for the checks to be made out to the Head of State, which then are deposited in the state budget account. This is not an uncommon practice. All assistance received by us is handled in the same way. What is true is that for a number of years, we have been offered security and intelligence assistance, which the government of Jordan accepted gratefully.

As for the story that the CIA paid for the protection of my children at school in America, my request was made to the State Department which kindly agreed to ensure their security. Remember that there have been many extremist plots against me and my family and this was a perfectly normal request. If Amy Carter decided to come to school in Jordan, we would, needless to say, be responsible for her security and would not be sending a bill to the U.S. Government for an elementary courtesy and security measure.

Q. ***How do you feel about President Carter ordering the arrangement—code-named "No Beef"—stopped?***

A. We had, I promise you, never heard anything about all this before. If the reference is to the assistance we have been receiving for security and intelligence, then I have not been advised about its suspension, either officially or unofficially.

Q. ***The Intelligence Oversight Board set up in February 1976 reported to President Ford a few months later that they regarded the payments as improper and he did nothing about it. What do you feel was improper about those payments?***

A. What is a proper way to support a friend and ally is strictly your business. The subject never came up before and I was totally unaware that this assistance to Jordan had come into question last year. What is proper in some minds is apparently improper in others. As far as I am concerned, anything I can get for Jordan and my people is proper. And five of your Presidents [Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford] thought so, too.

Q. ***Since you say the assistance was proper and just another form of U.S. aid, why, then, the secrecy and method of payment?***

A. If you mean the report that payments were made directly to the King and for his [personal] benefit and with political conditions and obligations, this is a complete fabrication. The assistance was designed only to enhance our intelligence and security capabilities period.

To us, the CIA is a part of the U.S. Government. We have sought to acquire know-how, equipment and new capabilities to defend ourselves in the face of a worldwide battle, be it hot or cold, which is still with us. And wherever there is an identity of interests between our two countries, I will continue to advocate fruitful and mutual cooperation.

Q. ***What do you feel was the principal motivation of those [sources] who contributed to the Washington Post story?***

A. To undermine the credibility and integrity of those who are able and willing to contribute to the forces of peace. My people know me and I know them and these attacks are futile in terms of the Jordanian scene. We are stronger than anything that can be leveled against us. It was hardly coincidental that these attacks were made as the peace offensive was picking up steam and on the very day that Secretary Vance arrived in Amman. It is obvious to me that those who wish to sabotage the peace process—and help Israel stay put in the occupied territories—are even willing to engage in character assassination of persons whose dearest wish is for a just and durable peace.

Q. ***Who benefits?***

A. Two quarters. One, in your own country, that has been trying to undermine one of your key institutions engaged in a worldwide struggle to try to neutralize the actions of the KGB in its efforts to promote Communism. The other is a powerful group that is not interested in a settlement and which also feels it has a score to settle with Jordan. Don't forget it was the Israeli lobby that launched the campaign to block the Hawk anti-aircraft missile defense system to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby failed.

Alexandra de Borchgrave—Gamma-Liaison

Choice of targets: Jordan's King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range

Q. ***How much of a setback do you feel the story has been to the peace-with-Israel campaign?***

A. I fervently hope, of course, that it will not be a setback. Admittedly, it may have a deleterious effect on our peace efforts, but I plan to persevere regardless of attempts to sabotage a just and durable peace.

Q. ***What, for example, do you feel the story will do to your differences with the PLO and attempts to form a joint delegation for the Geneva talks? Is a joint delegation still a realistic possibility?***

A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this week and the whole question of a joint delegation is still very much in question.

The d
nian
was
begui
can b
thing
few n
tion o

Q. ***I***
ready
coexis
Gaza

A.
But it
the Is
the P
There
ity—
Pales
recog

Q. ***I***
PLO p
tween
Bank

A.
leade
struc
ly p
But I
mism
confe
if it
then
letdo
back
fore

Q.
affect
ed St

A.
been
of th
frien
your
our
resp
yonc
relat
deep
jecti
in th

M
hum
rity
trem
road
peac
Was
bea
rece
sam
ple
am
very
son
my
free

F
agai
you
ther
not

His CIA Money

The subject never came up before and I was totally unaware that this assistance to Jordan had come into question last year. What is proper in some minds is apparently improper in others. As far as I am concerned, anything I can get for Jordan and my people is proper. And five of your Presidents [Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford] thought so, too.

Q. ***Since you say the assistance was proper and just another form of U.S. aid, why, then, the secrecy and method of payment?***

A. If you mean the report that payments were made directly to the King and for his [personal] benefit and with political conditions and obligations, this is a complete fabrication. The assistance was designed only to enhance our intelligence and security capabilities period.

To us, the CIA is a part of the U.S. Government. We have sought to acquire know-how, equipment and new capabilities to defend ourselves in the face of a worldwide battle, be it hot or cold, which is still with us. And wherever there is an identity of interests between our two countries, I will continue to advocate fruitful and mutual cooperation.

Q. ***What do you feel was the principal motivation of those*** [sources] ***who contributed to the Washington Post story?***

A. To undermine the credibility and integrity of those who are able and willing to contribute to the forces of peace. My people know me and I know them and these attacks are futile in terms of the Jordanian scene. We are stronger than anything that can be leveled against us. It was hardly coincidental that these attacks were made as the peace offensive was picking up steam and on the very day that Secretary Vance arrived in Amman. It is obvious to me that those who wish to sabotage the peace process—and help Israel stay put in the occupied territories—are even willing to engage in character assassination of persons whose dearest wish is for a just and durable peace.

Q. ***Who benefits?***

A. Two quarters. One, in your own country, that has been trying to undermine one of your key institutions engaged in a worldwide struggle to try to neutralize the actions of the KGB in its efforts to promote Communism. The other is a powerful group that is not interested in a settlement and which also feels it has a score to settle with Jordan. Don't forget it was the Israeli lobby that launched the campaign to block the Hawk anti-aircraft missile defense system to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby failed.

Alexandra de Borchgrave—Gamma-Liaison

Choice of targets: Jordan's King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range

Q. ***How much of a setback do you feel the story has been to the peace-with-Israel campaign?***

A. I fervently hope, of course, that it will not be a setback. Admittedly, it may have a deleterious effect on our peace efforts, but I plan to persevere regardless of attempts to sabotage a just and durable peace.

Q. ***What, for example, do you feel the story will do to your differences with the PLO and attempts to form a joint delegation for the Geneva talks? Is a joint delegation still a realistic possibility?***

A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this week and the whole question of a joint delegation is still very much in question. The dialogue [interrupted by the Jordanian civil war in 1970, when the PLO was driven out of Amman] has barely begun. To what degree political action can be coordinated among us is something we will be exploring over the next few months. And the whole Arab position on this problem is yet to crystallize.

Q. ***Is it your impression that the PLO is now ready to amend its basic charter and agree to coexist peacefully with Israel in a West Bank-Gaza state?***

A. This is the decision they must face. But it is equally important to know what the Israeli position will be. Why should the PLO take such a step unilaterally? There must be a degree of simultaneity—Israel recognizes a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian state and the Palestinians recognize Israel.

Q. ***Is it your intention to negotiate with the PLO prior to Geneva a new organic link between a possible Palestinian state on the West Bank and Jordan proper?***

A. This has been suggested by many leaders in the area as a possible constructive development and we certainly plan to explore the possibilities. But I must caution you against overoptimism. The resumption of the Geneva conference by itself means nothing and if it doesn't produce quick results . . then there will be the danger of a letdown, of the pendulum swinging back and the extremists coming to the fore again.

Q. ***How do you think the latest CIA story will affect relations between Jordan and the United States?***

A. Throughout all these years I have been very proud of the growing strength of the relationship with our American friends. We identified with principles your forefathers held dear. We built our relations on the basis of mutual respect, confidence and faith, and beyond that anything I did to cement relations with the U.S. was based on a deep conviction about our common objectives—stability, peace and progress in the Middle East.

My duty is to develop my country, its human resources, armed forces and security and intelligence services, to face the tremendous threats that lie ahead. The road is strewn with mines to sabotage the peace process. One has just exploded in Washington. There will be others. But bear in mind that Jordan is not unique in receiving such help. Israel falls into the same category and is a far greater example of all kinds of assistance. As far as I am concerned, these will be my first and very last words on that matter. My personal pride is a very touchy subject. And my main concern is to preserve Jordan in freedom.

Finally, regarding your media attacks against a branch of your government, if you choose to denude a vital arm that is there to protect you, that is your affair, not Jordan's.

21 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA

FROM : M. L. Latta
Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : Fairways Corporation

1. Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168 items previously deleted by court order from the book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corporation was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in this connection.

2. Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items (107, 128, 129, 279, on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respectively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on all four items is that they are still classified, since they describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S., and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B)(2) of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.

3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that the subject be withheld from public disclosure.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

4. Per our conversation, CCS has stated in its response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may have been placed in the public domain since the court order (i.e., since February 1975).

5. Please direct your comments to SA/DO/O. For your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line x9588, is preparing an overall response on the subject for the SA/DO/O.

M. L. Latta

① Shep reported that Tom Peck could not do a review by country name — list reduced to 28 items

② Shep said Peck review of the 28 item revealed only one hit and that was re Penkovsky Papers but no information was released.

21 April 77

13-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Tom Peck, FIOA		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☒	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: Request any FIOA releases on any of the subjects on attached sheets.

This is in connection with crash declassification review of deletions from Marchetti book, The Cult of Intelligence.

Info required SOONEST.

(Consult with Shep or Sam Halpern, 9588, on any questions or hits.)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
N.A. SHEPANEK x1542	21 apr 77

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

*USGPO: 1976 — 202-953 (40)

1. RTV
2. SHAH (IRAN)
3. HUSSEIN
4 INDIA
5 INDIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
6 NANDA DEVI
7 DALAI LAMA
8 CHIANG CHING-KUO
9 TAIWAN
10 CHIANG KAI-SHEK
11 SORBONNE
12 TIBET
13 TIBETANS
14 CAMP HALE, COLORADO
15 CAMBODIA
16 CAMBODIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
17 SIHANOUK
18 VIETNAMESE CONFEDERATION OF LABOR
19 TRAN NGOC BUU
20 THIEU
21 PENKOVSKY PAPERS
22 OLEG PENKOVSKY
23 GEORGY POKROVSKY
24 DAVID MURPHY
25 NTS (NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF SOLIDARISTS)

26 ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
27 ISRAEL
28 AFRICAN FORUM
29 AFRICA REPORT
30 KENYATTA
31 MOBUTU
32 RHODESIA
33 RHODESIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
34 SOUTH AFRICA
35 SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
36 WILLY BRANDT
37 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, GERMANY
38 SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, GERMANY
39 SOCIALISTS, GERMANY
40 LA FRANCE OUVRIERE
41 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, ITALY
42 MAKARIOS
43 CYPRUS
44 GREECE
45 GREEK INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
46 NORWAY
47 NORWEGIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
48 FRANCE
49 FRENCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
50 WEST GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMA

51 WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
52 JAPAN
53 JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
54 ITALY
55 ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
56 GREAT BRITAIN
57 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ~~[illegible]~~ SERVICE
58 CANADA
59 CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
60 AUSTRALIA
61 AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
62 NEW ZEALAND
63 NEW ZEALAND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
64 FRANKFURT
65 ATHENS
66 MUNICH
67 BERLIN
68 HAMBURG
69 LONDON
70 PARIS
71 BOLIVIA
72 BOLIVIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
73 BRAZIL
74 BRAZILIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

75 KENYA

76 KENYAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

77 JORDAN

78 JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

79 PANAMA

80 PANAMANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

81 FORBES BURNHAM

82 MEXICO

83 MEXICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Acting Chief, Latin America Division	EXTENSION	NO.	DATE 21 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. SA/DO/O				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

22 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977

The following are the LA Division comments on the review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book.

Item 1, page 11, Chile
Classified. Dept. of State/INR

Item 3a, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 3b, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 4, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 5, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 11, page 15, Chile
Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012180

SECRET

SECRET

Item 29, page 49, Guyana
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3

Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile
Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 89, page 106, Cuba p. 139 ff.
Declassified. ~~Footnote 1, page 177,~~ Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (?)

Item 201, page 222, Brazil
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2

Item 261, page 338, Panama
Classified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI

Item 292, page 420, Chile
Declassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 307, page 435, Cuba p. 139 ff.
Declassified. ~~Footnote 1, page 177,~~ Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 317, page 468, Chile
Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There is no record that the intelligence report on which this item was based has been declassified.

Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico
Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)
There has never been official acknowledgement by either the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.

SECRET

Item 338, page 508, Chile
Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile 1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil
Problem area. CIA presence in Brazil and Bolivia has not been officially acknowledged and is classified information. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). However, David Phillip's book, *The Night Watch*, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela. Page 209 of *The Night Watch* concerns CIA in Bolivia.

George V. Lauder
George V. Lauder

SECRET

22 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977

The following are the LA Division comments on the review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book.

Item 1, page 11, Chile
Classified. Dept. of State/INR

Item 3a, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 3b, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 4, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 5, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 11, page 15, Chile
Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012180

SECRET

Item 29, page 49, Guyana
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3

Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile
Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 89, page 106, Cuba p.139ff
Declassified. ~~Footnote 1, page 177~~, Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 201, page 222, Brazil
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2

Item 261, page 338, Panama
Classified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI

Item 292, page 420, Chile
Declassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 307, page 4~~58~~35, Cuba p.139ff
Declassified. ~~Footnote 1, page 177~~, Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 317, page 468, Chile
Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There is no record that the intelligence report on which this item was based has been declassified.

Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico
Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)
There has never been official acknowledgement by either the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.

SECRET

Item 338, page 508, Chile
Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile 1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil
Problem area. CIA presence in Brazil and Bolivia has not been officially acknowledged and is classified information. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). However, David Phillip's book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela. Page 209 of The Night Watch concerns CIA in Bolivia.

/s/ George V. Lauder
George V. Lauder

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
C/CCS GH-56 Hqs.

EXTENSION: 9164 5407

NO.

DATE: 21 APR 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/AF 3 B 21 Hqs. Attn: Ed Foy			✓	
2.				
3. C/EUR 4 B 4405 Hqs. Attn: Wm. Phelps	22	22		HAND CARRY CALL
4.				
5. C/LA 3 C 2019 Hqs. Attn: Wm. Sturbitts	2	✓		
6.				
7. C/NE 6 D 3107 Hqs. Attn: George Walsh		Apr 22		
8.				
9. C/CA 3 D 0004 Hqs. Attn: Susan Watkins				
10.				
11. SA/DO/O 2 D 0109 Hqs.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

21 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : Erich W. Isenstead
Chief, Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,
fr SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject

1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its files and effected coordination with interested components on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review. Results are described below.

2. It has been determined that the following items continue to be classified under E.O. 11652, and are exempt from the E.O. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated by paragraph citations in brackets:

a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B)(2), (B)(3)]

b. Item 48, page 71a -- BERLINER VEREIN. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record.

c. Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICAN FORUM. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record.

d. Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICA REPORT. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] ~~AF Division~~ CA Staff advises that

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

SECRET

the African American Institute, which published Africa Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pg. 263. However, the Report gave as its source for the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should not be considered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsorship of the Institute. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

e. Item 48, page 71a -- PREUVES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

f. Item 48, page 71a -- ENCOUNTER. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

g. Item 48, page 71a -- FORUM. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

i. Item 51, page 72 -- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5(B)(2)]

j. Item 55, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

l. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respectively -- FAIRWAYS CORPORATION. Classified SECRET; describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that the DCI may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air Advisor confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

m. Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES (NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria. [Section 5(B)(2)]

n. Item 130, page 133 -- SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section 5(B)(2)]

o. Item 226, page 257 -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods by describing a cover arrangement with a commercial company. [Section 5(B)(2)]

p. Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)". Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods exposing an operation which provided cover. [Section 5(B)(2)]

q. Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods which expose an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET because they described sources and methods in identifying a support base located in the United States, but are now considered to have been placed in the public domain.

Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129 and 130 -- INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation, Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9, and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218.

4. The following items fall into the questionable area as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by authorized Government officials:

a. Item 49, page 71a -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN. Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several newspaper publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'." It is questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who left the Agency long before that, can be considered as constituting official Agency disclosure of this information.

b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe intelligence sources and methods and identification of operations based in England. Forum World Features was referred to -- but not by name -- in Book I of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another example of the damages of [propaganda] 'fallout' involved two proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two

13-00000

press services." It may be argued that although Forum World Features continues to be protected to a degree by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA disclosure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place and depending on how it was handled, placed the subject in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff confirm the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

cc: C/AF
C/EUR
C/LA
C/NE
C/CA

CONCUR:

for Edward J Fox
Chief, AF Division — 22 April 77
Date

f William W. Phelps
Chief, EUR Division — 22 Apr 77
Date

for
Chief, LA Division — 22 APR 77
Date

for George T. Walsh
Chief, NE Division — April 22, 1977
Date

Chief, CA Staff — 22 April 1977
Date

21 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : Erich W. Isenstead
Chief, Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,
fr SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject

1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its files and effected coordination with interested components on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review. Results are described below.

2. It has been determined that the following items continue to be classified under E.O. 11652, and are exempt from the E.O. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated by paragraph citations in brackets:

a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B)(2), (B)(3)]

b. Item 48, page 71a -- BERLINER VEREIN. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record.

c. Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICAN FORUM. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record.

d. Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICA REPORT. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] ~~AF Division~~ CA Staff advises that

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

The African American Institute, which published Africa Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pg. 263. However, the Report gave as its source for the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should not be considered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsorship of the Institute. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

e. Item 48, page 71a -- PREUVES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

f. Item 48, page 71a -- ENCOUNTER. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)]. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

g. Item 48, page 71a -- FORUM. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

i. Item 51, page 72 -- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5(B)(2)]

j. Item 55, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

l. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respectively -- FAIRWAYS CORPORATION. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that the DCI may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air Advisor confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

m. Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES (NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria. [Section 5(B)(2)]

n. Item 130, page 133 -- SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section 5(B)(2)]

o. Item 226, page 257 -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods by describing a cover arrangement with a commercial company. [Section 5(B)(2)]

p. Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)". Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods exposing an operation which provided cover. [Section 5(B)(2)]

q. Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods which expose an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET because they described sources and methods in identifying a support base located in the United States, but are now considered to have beenpplaced in the public domain.

Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129, and 130 -- INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation, Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9, and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218.

4. The following items fall into the questionable area as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by authorized Government officials:

a. Item 49, page 71a -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN. Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several newspaper publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'." It is questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who left the Agency long before that, can be considered as asconstituting official Agency disclosure of this information.

b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe intelligence sources and methods and identification of operations based in England. Forum World Features was referred to -- but not by name -- in Book I of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another example of the damages of [propaganda] 'fallout' involved two proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two

press services." It may be argued that although Forum World Features continues to be protected to a degree by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA disclosure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place and depending on how it was handled, placed the subject in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff confirm the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

/s/ ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

cc: C/AF
C/EUR
C/LA
C/NE
C/CA

CONCUR:

Chief, AF Division ____ Date ____

Chief, EUR Division ____ Date ____

Chief, LA Division ____ Date ____

Chief, NE Division ____ Date ____

Chief, CA Staff ____ Date ____

SECRET

22 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977

The following are the LA Division comments on the review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book.

Item 1, page 11, Chile
Classified. Dept. of State/INR

Item 3a, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 3b, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 4, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 5, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 11, page 15, Chile
Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012180

SECRET

Item 29, page 49, Guyana
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3

Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile
Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 89, page 106, Cuba
Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 201, page 222, Brazil
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2

Item 261, page 338, Panama
Classified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI

Item 292, page 420, Chile
Declassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 307, page 468, Cuba
Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 317, page 468, Chile
Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There is no record that the intelligence report on which this item was based has been declassified.

Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico
Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)
There has never been official acknowledgement by either the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.

Item 338, page 508, Chile
Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile 1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil
Problem area. CIA presence in Brazil and Bolivia has not been officially acknowledged and is classified information. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). However, David Phillip's book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela. Page 209 of The Night Watch concerns CIA in Bolivia.

George V. Lauder

SECRET

21 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : Erich W. Isenstead
Chief, Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,
fr SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject

1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its files and effected coordination with interested components on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review. Results are described below.

2. It has been determined that the following items continue to be classified under E.O. 11652, and are exempt from the E.O. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated by paragraph citations in brackets:

a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B)(2), (B)(3)]

b. Item 48, page 71a -- BERLINER VEREIN. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record.

c. Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICAN FORUM. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record.

d. Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICA REPORT. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] AF Division advises that

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

SECRET

the African American Institute, which published Africa Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pg. 263. However, the Report gave as its source for the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should not be considered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsorship of the Institute. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

e. Item 48, page 71a -- PREUVES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

f. Item 48, page 71a -- ENCOUNTER. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

g. Item 48, page 71a -- FORUM. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

i. Item 51, page 72 -- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5(B)(2)]

j. Item 55, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

l. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respectively -- FAIRWAYS CORPORATION. Classified SECRET; describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that the DCI may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air Advisor confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

m. Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES (NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria. [Section 5(B)(2)]

n. Item 130, page 133 -- SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section 5(B)(2)]

o. Item 226, page 257 -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods by describing a cover arrangement with a commercial company. [Section 5(B)(2)]

p. Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)". Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods exposing an operation which provided cover. [Section 5(B)(2)]

q. Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods which expose an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET because they described sources and methods in identifying a support base located in the United States, but are now considered to have been placed in the public domain.

Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129 and 130 -- INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation, Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9, and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218.

4. The following items fall into the questionable area as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by authorized Government officials:

a. Item 49, page 71a -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN. Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several newspaper publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'." It is questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who left the Agency long before that, can be considered as constituting official Agency disclosure of this information.

b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe intelligence sources and methods and identification of operations based in England. Forum World Features was referred to -- but not by name -- in Book I of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another example of the damages of [propaganda] 'fallout' involved two proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two

press services." It may be argued that although Forum World Features continues to be protected to a degree by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA disclosure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place and depending on how it was handled, placed the subject in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff confirm the need for continued classification and will comment separately.

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

cc: C/AF
C/EUR
C/LA
C/NE
C/CA

CONCUR:

Chief, AF Division — Date

Chief, EUR Division — Date

Chief, LA Division — Date

Chief, NE Division — Date

Chief, CA Staff — Date

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks

FROM:
Alyson Ward
SIA/I alw

EXTENSION
6343
1602

NO.

DATE
22 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. C/SIA/I	22	apr	W	
2.				
3. C/SIA	22 APR 1977		S	
4.				
5. SA/DDO/O 2D0109 Hqs.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

22 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

VIA : Chief, Staff for International Activities

FROM : Robert D. Wiecha
Chief, SIA/Israeli Branch

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 from Mr. Fendig, same subject

1. This office has reviewed the five items concerning Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has determined that all items are still not releasable for the following reasons:

a. Item 182, page 196: According to Mr. Vernon Weimar, the CIA's liaison contact in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this item is still classified "SECRET" under Executive Order (E.O.) 11652, Section 5(B)(2)(intelligence sources and methods).

b. Item 197, page 218: This item is still classified "SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5 (B)(1)(foreign liaison) and (2).

c. Item 198, page 219: This item is still classified "TOP SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5 (B)(2).

d. Item 224, page 252: This item is still classified "TOP SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5 (B)(2).

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059748

SECRET

e. Item 256, page 329: This item is still classified "SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5 (B)(1) and (2).

2. Any questions regarding this memorandum should be directed to Alyson Ward, SIA/I, extension 1602.

RWiecha
Robert D. Wiecha

SECRET

22 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

VIA : Chief, Staff for International Activities

FROM : Robert D. Wiecha
Chief, SIA/Israeli Branch

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 from Mr. Fendig, same subject

1. This office has reviewed the five items concerning Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has determined that all items are still not releasable for the following reasons:

a. Item 182, page 196: According to Mr. Vernon Weimar, the CIA's liaison contact in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this item is still classified "SECRET" under Executive Order (E.O.) 11652, Section 5(B)(2)(intelligence sources and methods).

b. Item 197, page 218: This item is still classified "SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5 (B)(1)(foreign liaison) and (2).

c. Item 198, page 219: This item is still classified "TOP SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5 (B)(2).

d. Item 224, page 252: This item is still classified "TOP SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5 (B)(2).

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059748

SECRET

e. Item 256, page 329: This item is still classified "SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5 (B)(1) and (2).

2. Any questions regarding this memorandum should be directed to Alyson Ward, SIA/I, extension 1602.

Robert D. Wiecha

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Addendum to LA Division Memorandum dtd 22 April 1977

FROM:
George V. Lauder
Acting Chief
Latin America Division

EXTENSION: 1039

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. SA/DO/O				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

S E C R E T

26 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Addendum to LA Division Memorandum
Dated 22 April 1977

1. It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State, INR/OIL who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and item 337 page 509 are still classified.

2. Item 19 page 14, Chile

According to Mr. David Carpenter, State/INR/OIL lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" and line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry' through line 29 continue to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee" through line 24 ending "the covert action programs." has been declassified. The substance can be found on pages 166-170, 190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.

3. Item 10 page 15 Chile

Line 1 through "his nominal superior" and line 2 beginning "Meyer was" through line 4 continue to be classified according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through 11 are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.

4. Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T. Kelly, Director, Intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour Young, PCS/LSN. Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified.

Geo. V. Lauder
George V. Lauder

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 121780

S E C R E T

SECRET

26 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Addendum to LA Division Memorandum
Dated 22 April 1977

1. It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State, INR/OIL who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and item 337 page 509 are still classified.

2. Item 19 page 14, Chile

According to Mr. David Carpenter, State/INR/OIL lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" and line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry" through line 29 continue to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee" through line 24 ending "the covert action programs." has been declassified. The substance can be found on pages 166-170, 190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.

3. Item 10 page 15 Chile

Line 1 through "his nominal superior" and line 2 beginning "Meyer was" through line 4 continue to be classified according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through 11 are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.

4. Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T. Kelly, Director, Intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour Young, PCS/LSN. Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified.

/s/ George V. Lauder

George V. Lauder

SECRET

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Marchetti-Marks Manuscript

FROM:
C/CAS

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 25 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. SA/DO/O				
2. Sam				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

25 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM: Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE: Memo for All Divisions and Certain Staffs, from SA/DO/O, 8 April 1977, same subject

Following are Covert Action Staff comments on items 24, 48, 54, 55, 56, 236, and 280, which are among the passages containing classified information that were deleted before publication of the Marchetti-Marks manuscript:

a) Items 24 (p. 47), 55 (p. 80), 56 (p. 81), and 280 (p. 404) are classified secret, and are exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2) of EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and methods of operation. Specifically, these items name RTV, Inc. and describe it as a CIA proprietary that was used for clandestine operations in a variety of countries. In addition, items 55 and 56 are especially sensitive because they describe an operation in Jordan, exposure of which could be harmful to United States relations in the Middle East (Section 5 b 3).

b) Items 54 and 236 (on p. 80 and p. 262) are classified secret, and are exempt from publication under Section (5) (b) (2) of EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and methods of operation. These items name Forum World Features, describe it as a CIA proprietary that was used for clandestine propaganda operations, specify that the clandestine operations were directed especially at the Third World, and further specify that the man who ran FWF was an experienced CIA operator. It may be worth noting that the Senate Select Committee declined to publish the name of this clandestine proprietary when the Agency advised the Committee that publication would damage the former director of Forum World Features, who had entered into a clandestine relationship with the U.S. Government in good faith.

SECRET

c) Item 48 (p. 71a) is classified *secret*, and is exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2) of EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and methods of operation. This item names *African Forum*, *Africa Report*, *Preuves*, *Encounter*, and *Forum* as magazines that received CIA subsidies. In the case of *Preuves*, *Encounter*, and *Forum*, these magazines were published by the former Congress for Cultural Freedom. The Government has not acknowledged covertly subsidizing CCF or its magazines, although *Encounter* magazine's ties to CIA have been the subject of press speculation. *Preuves* magazine has been the subject of little or no press speculation, as far as we know, and it is our understanding that French laws prohibit covert foreign subsidies to French publications, which makes it especially important to protect the former CIA tie to that magazine. Exposure of the two Africa magazines would be damaging to a number of prominent people and organizations in this country and in Africa that have worked for improved social conditions in Africa and for good relations between this country and Africa, which would be harmful to this country's relations with Africa. (Section 5 b 3)

Donald J. Purcell

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Richard S. Sampson
Chief, European Division

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 25 APR 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. SA/DO/O PS-7				
2. (DX-6)				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
External Oversight

FROM: Richard S. Sampson
Chief, European Division

SUBJECT: Marks-Marchetti Manuscript:
Review of Deletions

1. As requested, the European Division has reviewed the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the original manuscript because of the Agency position they were classified information. We can find only one instance in which an authorized official of the U.S. Government has placed any of these references in the public domain since first publication of the book. The specific references are listed below, together with the grounds for classification and the components who have been consulted.

2. References which European Division believes are still classified and should remain so are:

Name/Cite #/Page	E.O. 11652 Exemption Category	Coordination
Alex Springer (#50, p 72)	5 (b) 2	EUR/G
Rome Daily American (#49, p 71a)	5 (b) 2	CCS, EUR/Italy
Magazines: Preuves, Forum (#48, p 71a)	5 (b) 2	CA
Encounter (#48, p 71a)	See note	
Forum World Features (#54, #256, p 80, p 262)	5 (b) 2	CA, EUR/BC

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 003283

SECRET

Name/Cite #/Page	E.O. 11652 Exemption Category	Coordination
LCPIPIT (#334, 335, 336, p 483-4)	5 (b) 3	CA
Bases in Germany (#234, p 262)	5 (b) 3	EUR/G, CCS
Release of Satellite photos to British (#62, p 86)	5 (b) 2	EUR/BC
Liaison relations CANUKUS (#194, 5, 7, p 215, 6, 8) (#308, p 437)	5 (b) 2	EUR/BC
Liaison, others (#196, 225, 333, p 217, 253, 483)	5 (b) 2	AF
MAKARIOS, Base rental deal (#296, 298, 300 p 425, 426)	5 (b) 1	EUR/CGT
Political subsidies: SPD, CDU, Italy (#21, 273, p 45, 380)	5 (b) 3	EUR/Italy
Willy Brandt (#18 - 20, 28, 52, p 42-45, 48, 77)	5 (b) 2	EUR/G

25 April 77
CA Staff
memo says
NO.

NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act.

R.S.S
Richard S. Sampson

SECRET

2 5 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

FROM: Richard S. Sampson
Chief, European Division

SUBJECT: Marks-Marchetti Manuscript: Review of Deletions

1. As requested, the European Division has reviewed the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the original manuscript because of the Agency position they were classified information. We can find only one instance in which an authorized official of the U.S. Government has placed any of these references in the public domain since first publication of the book. The specific references are listed below, together with the grounds for classification and the components who have been consulted.

2. References which European Division believes are still classified and should remain so are:

Name/Cite #/Page	E.O. 11652 Exemption Category	Coordination
Alex Springer (#50, p 72)	5 (b) 2	EUR/G
Rome Daily American (#49, p 71a)	5 (b) 2	CCS, EUR/Italy
Magazines: Preuves, Forum (#48, p 71a)	5 (b) 2	CA
Encounter (#48, p 71a)	See note	
Forum World Features (#54, #256, p 80, p 262)	5 (b) 2	CA, EUR/BC

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 003283

SECRET

Name/Cite #/Page	E.O. 11652 Exemption Category	Coordination
LCPIPIT (#334, 335, 336, p 483-4)	5 (b) 3	CA
Bases in Germany (#234, p 262)	5 (b) 3	EUR/G, CCS
Release of Satellite photos to British (#62, p 86)	5 (b) 2	EUR/BC
Liaison relations CANUKUS (#194, 5, 7, p 215, 6, 8) (#308, p 437)	5 (b) 2	EUR/BC
Liaison, others (#196, 225, 333, p 217, 253, 483)	5 (b) 2	AF
MAKARIOS, Base rental deal (#296, 298, 300 p 425, 426)	5 (b) 1	EUR/CGT
Political subsidies: SPD, CDU, Italy (#21, 273, p 45, 380)	5 (b) 3	EUR/Italy
Willy Brandt (#18 - 20, 28, 52, p 42-45, 48, 77)	5 (b) 2	EUR/G

5 April 77 CA Staff memo says NO.

NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act.

R.S. Sampson
Richard S. Sampson

DDO/EUR/FP/FC:William Phelps:kdh (25 April 77) (x1872)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/EUR
1 - E/FP/FC

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: SE/OSG 5B4806

EXTENSION: 1705

NO.

DATE: 26 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. SA/DO/O 2D0109				Sam This takes care of SE. Only NE to go. Slep
2. Mr. Halpern				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

26 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

FROM : George T. Kalaris
Chief, Soviet/East European Division

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject, dated 8 April 1977

1. We have reviewed the seven items relating to SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in 1974 from the Marchetti and Marks' book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, againt official disclosures and have determined that with one exception, the items are still properly classified under Executive Order 11652:

A. Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains classified SECRET. It describes intelligence sources and methods of operations directed against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3).

B. Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating to the Penkovskiy Papers remains classified SECRET. They describe intelligence sources and methods of an operation directed against the Soviet Union. They are exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3).

C. Item Nos. 148 and 149 relating to the AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They describe intelligence sources and methods of an operation based in Tokyo directed against the Soviets and also identify Agency personnel under cover.

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014652

2. The one item excepted is Item No. 57. This item relates to the Penkovskiy Papers. Marchetti and Marks wrote in their manuscript: "One of the CIA's most famous venture (sic) in book publishing was The Penkovsky Papers (sic). This chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal of the actual spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky." The Penkovskiy Papers are mentioned in the Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book I, page 194, dated 26 April 1976, as follows:

> "Another CIA book, the Penkovskiy Papers, was published in the United States in 1965 'for operational reasons', but actually became commercially viable. The book was prepared and written by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case materials. Publication rights to the manuscript were sold to a publisher through a trust fund which was established for the purpose. The publisher was unaware of any U.S. Government interest."

3. In view of this published statement by the Senate Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public domain by official disclosure by the United States. It can no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652.

G. Kalaris
George T. Kalaris

SECRET

26 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

FROM : George T. Kalaris
Chief, Soviet/East European Division

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject, dated 8 April 1977

1. We have reviewed the seven items relating to SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in 1974 from the Marchetti and Marks' book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, againt official disclosures and have determined that with one exception, the items are still properly classified under Executive Order 11652:

A. Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains classified SECRET. It describes intelligence sources and methods of operations directed against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3).

B. Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating to the Penkovskiy Papers remains classified SECRET. They describe intelligence sources and methods of an operation directed against the Soviet Union. They are exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3).

C. Item Nos. 148 and 149 relating to the AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They describe intelligence sources and methods of an operation based in Tokyo directed against the Soviets and also identify Agency personnel under cover.

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 01465

2. The one item excepted is Item No. 57. This item relates to the Penkovskiy Papers. Marchetti and Marks wrote in their manuscript: "One of the CIA's most famous venture (sic) in book publishing was The Penkovsky Papers (sic). This chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal of the actual spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky." The Penkovskiy Papers are mentioned in the Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book I, page 194, dated 26 April 1976, as follows:

> "Another CIA book, the Penkovskiy Papers, was published in the United States in 1965 'for operational reasons', but actually became commercially viable. The book was prepared and written by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case materials. Publication rights to the manuscript were sold to a publisher through a trust fund which was established for the purpose. The publisher was unaware of any U.S. Government interest."

3. In view of this published statement by the Senate Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public domain by official disclosure by the United States. It can no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652.

George T. Kalaris

DDO/SE:JDKenney (x1705 26 April 1977)clh

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SE/RAO
1 - SE/CI
2 - SE/OSG

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Memorandum

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
NE/COPS - Samuel H. Rickard	R-1188	DATE 27 [redacted] April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. SA/DO/O Attn: Mr. P. Fendig Room: 2D 01 09				
2. Tube: DX-6				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

27 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

ATTENTION : Mr. Philip F. Fendig

FROM : Samuel H. Rickard
Chief of Operations, NE Division

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

not public domain since there has been no "official public" disclosure

1. The following deleted items in subject book have been placed in the public domain as cited below:

a. Item 72, page 97: This item, which was placed in the public domain in Harry Rositzke's book, The CIA's Secret Operations, on pages 173 and 174, is a problem area. The author of this book is a former senior CIA officer who allowed the Agency to review his manuscript prior to publication. However, CIA did not approve the manuscript for publication and, therefore, in our view Item 72 remains classified under Executive Order 11652 under Exemption 5B (2).

b. Item 152, page 165 and Item 28, page 48: These two items also fall in a problem area. The following references to CIA's special relationship with the Shah of Iran imply, but do not specifically state, that such a relationship exists. See Book 1 of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, page 552, and Ray S. Cline's book entitled, Secrets, Spies and Scholars; Blueprint of the Essential CIA, pages 131 and 132. Additionally, though Mr. Cline, a former senior CIA officer, allowed the Agency to review his manuscript prior to publication, CIA did not approve the manuscript for publication. Therefore, in our view Items 152 and 28 remain classified under Executive Order 11652 under Exemption 5B (2).

P.552 is a reprint of an article by Tom Braden and not the official report of the Committee

2. The following items remain classified under Executive Order 11652:

Item	Manuscript Page	Exemption
55	80	5B (2)
24	47	5B (2)
56	81	5B (2)
280	404	5B (2)
152	165	5B (2)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 056382

SECRET

Item	Manuscript Page	Exemption
23	46	5B (2)
22	46	5B (2) (3)
73	97	5B (2)
172	189	5B (2)
74	98	5B (2)
331	482	5B (2) (3)
332	482	5B (2) (3)
160	182	5B (2)
224	252	5B (2)
159	181	5B (2) (3)
160	182	5B (2)
161	183	5B (2)
162	184	5B (2)

Samuel H. Rickard

13-00000

22 April 77 -

Talked to Foy re AF memo:

✓ a) correction of para 3: item 41/ page 65 not p 64

✓ b) item 339, page 509: review mention of Congo in item 339; Congo revealed in Church Comm'te "Alleged Assassination Plots"

c) para 4: ~~to~~ check with State & NSC again on Monday to get "no objection" comment at least, if possible get full coordination

27 April 77

a) Received AF comment on Congo item 339 & incorporated into draft report

b) Ed Foy has NSC coordination on para 4 & will get State's on Monday (2 May) after State officer returns from TDY.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Marchetti/Marks Book

FROM:
Chief, Africa/Plans

EXTENSION
1326

NO.

DATE
27 APR 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. SA/DO/O Attn: Mr. Shepanek				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

27 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert Shepanek

FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa/Plans

SUBJECT : Marchetti/Marks Book

1. Mr. Sam Halperin has questioned our request that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the reference to the Congo.

2. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We believe the item should remain classified and that exemption 5(b)(3) would apply in the case of the Congo.

Edward J. Foy

Edward J. Foy, Jr.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904

SECRET

SECRET

27 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert Shepanek

FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa/Plans

SUBJECT : Marchetti/Marks Book

1. Mr. Sam Halperin has questioned our request that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the reference to the Congo.

2. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We believe the item should remain classified and that exemption 5(b)(3) would apply in the case of the Congo.

/s/ EDWARD J. FOY, JR.

Edward J. Foy, Jr.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/AF/PLS

EXTENSION: 1326

NO.

DATE: 21 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. SA/DDO/O				
2. Attn: Mr. Shepanek				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

2 1 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek

FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memo dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject

1. The information which pertains to Africa and which was deleted by court order from subject book remains classifiable and classified. The information is national security information, bears directly on the conduct of our foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized disclosure. None of the items of information ordered deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified by any United States Government official authorized to declassify national security information.

2. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items are as follows:

Item 29, Page 49	Exemptions 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 79, Page 100	Exemptions 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Items 283 and 284, Page 413	Exemption 5(B)(3)
Items 286 and 287, Page 414	Exemptions 5(B)(3)
Item, 287a, Page 415	Exemption 5(B)(3)
Item 288, Page 416	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Items 290 and 291, Page 417	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

3. The following items, all of which relate to matters of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified:

Item 41, Page 6~~4~~5	Exemption 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 42, Page 65a	Exemption 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 47, Page 71	Exemption 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 48, Page 71a	Exemption 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 55, Page 80	Exemption 5(B)(2)
Item 130, Page 133	Exemption 5(B)(2)
Item 170, Page 189	Exemption 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 197, Page 218	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Item 198, Page 219	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Item 301, Page 427	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Item 339, Page 509	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)

4. Items 283, 284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290 and 291 pertain to National Security Council proceedings. Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Henze, National Security Council staff, have been informed by telephone this date that CIA will refuse the request of the attorney of Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.

Edward J. Foy, Jr.

2 1 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
External Oversight

ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek

FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memo dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject

1. The information which pertains to Africa and which was deleted by court order from subject book remains classifiable and classified. The information is national security information, bears directly on the conduct of our foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized disclosure. None of the items of information ordered deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified by any United States Government official authorized to declassify national security information.

2. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items are as follows:

Item 29, Page 49	Exemptions 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 79, Page 100	Exemptions 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Items 283 and 284, Page 413	Exemption 5(B)(3)
Items 286 and 287, Page 414	Exemptions 5(B)(3)
Item, 287a, Page 415	Exemption 5(B)(3)
Item 288, Page 416	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Items 290 and 291, Page 417	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

3. The following items, all of which relate to matters of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified:

Item 41, Page 6~~4~~5	Exemption 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 42, Page 65a	Exemption 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 47, Page 71	Exemption 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 48, Page 71a	Exemption 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 55, Page 80	Exemption 5(B)(2)
Item 130, Page 133	Exemption 5(B)(2)
Item 170, Page 189	Exemption 5(B)(2)(3)
Item 197, Page 218	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Item 198, Page 219	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Item 301, Page 427	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Item 339, Page 509	Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)

4. Items 283, 284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290 and 291 pertain to National Security Council proceedings. Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Henze, National Security Council staff, have been informed by telephone this date that CIA will refuse the request of the attorney of Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.

/s/ EDWARD J. FOY, JR.

Edward J. Foy, Jr.

27 April '77

Sam:

Here's your answer to the Cambodian item on C.I.A. activities in Cambodia.

John Boldin

THE VIETNAM-CAMBODIA EMERGENCY, 1975

Part IV—Cambodia Evacuation: Testimony of Ambassador John Gunther Dean

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

MAY 5, 1976

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-094 WASHINGTON : 1976

made on behalf of Cambodia. To insure that the program was tailored to real requirements, to insure that equipment was received by personnel trained in their use and to insure that material provided under MAP had reasonable expectancy of maintenance support, items such as force structure, military organization, technical assistance and logistics became matters that came under the purview of the MEDTC. To have closed our eyes to these aspects in my view, would have ignored congressional concerns regarding efficient management. I did not consider these functions a violation of the congressional intent in banning advisors and these functions continued during my tenure. In my belief the ban would have been violated had personnel been assigned to military units or activities on an around-the-clock basis and involved themselves in most of the matters affecting their units or activity. In prescribing the limits of our assistance, the views of the GAO report were useful in guiding our judgment.

Question 10. During your tenure as Ambassador, did any U.S. Military Attachés serve with Khmer military units in the field?

—What regulations did the U.S. Embassy have to govern the activities of U.S. Military Attaches and the Military Equipment Delivery Team?

—Were any changes in the regulations made after the incident at Kampot involving Major Lawrence Ondecker in March 1974?

Answer. No U.S. military served with Khmer military units in the field. U.S. personnel from both the Defense Attache Office and the Office of the Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia routinely visited and reported the military status of Cambodian military units as part of their duties; however. U.S. personnel did not remain with units in the manner which U.S. advisors did in South Vietnam. U.S. personnel were extensively briefed upon arrival regarding the Congressional restrictions against advisers to the Cambodian military. The Kampot incident occurred prior to my arrival in Cambodia. Shortly after my arrival in Phnom Penh. I received the instructions in effect and determined that they were adequate. I did, however, personally impress upon my military staff, on several occasions, the need to abide scrupulously by these instructions and to avoid situations which might be interpreted as infringements of their prescribed duties.

Question 11. In November 1974, the *Washington Post* reported and the Defense Department acknowledged that data on potential bombing targets in Cambodia was gathered by American reconnaissance flights from Thailand and passed on to Cambodian military authorities.

—When did this practice begin?

—Did you know about it, and did you have a role in it?

—Do you consider it a violation of the Congressional ban on American advisors with Khmer Republic forces?

Answer. It would be inconceivable to me that in a situation as existed in Cambodia that military information which we had would be deliberately withheld or denied to a country to which we were providing enormous military and economic assistance. The information we had concerning enemy activities in Cambodia was a by-product of our own intelligence collecting effort on communist forces throughout Indochina. This information was provided to Cambodian military authorities but the decision on what action, if any, would be taken was one which the Cambodians made for themselves. The provisions of information preceded my arrival and I am not aware exactly when the practice may have begun. I was aware of the practice although I did not play a pivotal part in the process and did not consider this procedure as violating congressional restrictions on American advisors.

Question 12. Did CIA personnel in Cambodia ever act as advisers to Khmer Republic forces in a fashion similar to their activities in Laos (even if on a smaller scale)?

—Could you tell us what role China Airlines played in Cambodia and if it was in any way associated with CIA activities?

—What was the U.S. role in organizing and applying the Khmer "Middle Range Reconnaissance Patrols" (MERPS)?

Answer. Having served both in Laos and Cambodia, and knowing the CIA operations in both countries, I can honestly say that the CIA did not act as advisers to the Khmer Republic forces in a fashion similiar to their activities in Laos. China Airlines, under contract to Air America, transported supplies, not including weapons and ammunition, for U.S. agencies in Cambodia. The Middle Range Reconnaissance Patrols received U.S. military equipment as part of the Khmer Armed Forces and also received some intelligence collection training.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

FROM: Robert L. Skidmore
CEA/CA
5D3102, Hqs

EXTENSION: 1383

NO.:

DATE: 15 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. ACEA/OPS		15/4		
2.				
3. DCEA			✓	
4.				
5. CEA			✓	
6.				
7. SA/DO/O				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				Call Kathy (1383) for hand carry

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

16 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

FROM : William J. Graver
Chief, East Asia Division

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject

East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted subject book items per Reference request and conclude they are:

1) still classified under Executive Order 11652,

2) still not in the public domain through official disclosure; and

3) still not contained in material cleared by the Publications Review Board.

William J. Graver

Attachment - Detail Listing

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 022438

SECRET

Attachment

E. O. 11652 Exemptions for Items in

The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence

Item	Manuscript Page No.	Exemption
26	p. 47	5 B (1) (2)
27	p. 48	5 B (1) (2)
28	p. 48	5 B (1)
31	p. 54	5 B (2)
38	p. 63	5 B (2) (3)
41	p. 65	5 B (2) (3)
42	p. 65 a	5 B (2) (3)
43	p. 65 a	5 B (2) (3)
46	p. 70	5 B (2)
47	p. 71	5 B (2) (3)
67	p. 92	5 B (3)
152	p. 165	5 B (1)
197	p. 218	5 B (1)
319	p. 470	5 B (2)
320	p. 471	5 B (2)
321	p. 471	5 B (2)

16 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

FROM : William J. Graver
Chief, East Asia Division

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject

East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted subject book items per Reference request and conclude they are:

1) still classified under Executive Order 11652,

2) still not in the public domain through official disclosure; and

3) still not contained in material cleared by the Publications Review Board.

William J. Graver

Attachment - Detail Listing

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 022438

S E C R E T

Attachment

E. O. 11652 Exemptions for Items in The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence

Item	Manuscript Page No.	Exemption
26	p. 47	5 B (1) (2)
27	p. 48	5 B (1) (2)
28	p. 48	5 B (1)
31	p. 54	5 B (2)
38	p. 63	5 B (2) (3)
41	p. 65	5 B (2) (3)
42	p. 65 a	5 B (2) (3)
43	p. 65 a	5 B (2) (3)
46	p. 70	5 B (2)
47	p. 71	5 B (2) (3)
67	p. 92	5 B (3)
152	p. 165	5 B (1)
197	p. 218	5 B (1)
319	p. 470	5 B (2)
320	p. 471	5 B (2)
321	p. 471	5 B (2)

13-00000

DD/O 77-3850

28 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Greaney
Office of General Counsel

FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Review of the 168 Deleted Items in "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

In reply to your oral request, attached is the report of the review of the deleted items which are the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate components of the DDO reviewed their respective items for classification and their findings are contained in the attached report. Specific classification and exemption authority for each item which is still classified is available, if needed, in each component's response filed with SA/DO/O.

William W. Wells

William W. Wells

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - OGC
2 - DDO
2 - SA/DO/O

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018630

SECRET

SECRET

DD/O 77-3850/1

27 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

VIA : Mr. Ralph J. Katrosh
Special Assistant to the DDO
for External Oversight

FROM : Samuel Halpern

SUBJECT : Review of 168 Deleted Items in
"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

(U) 1. This is the report of the review done by the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items which are the basic responsibility of the DDO. The remaining deleted items which are the basic responsibility of the DDS&T and DDA were reviewed by those Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC. Responsible components did the necessary inter- and intraagency coordinations.

(U) 2. Several points need to be highlighted concerning the completeness of the review, especially as regards those items declassified by "official public disclosure" as defined by the courts. While I am sure that as diligent a search as possible was done by the DDO components, a thorough and absolutely complete search is impossible for the following reasons:

(U) a. There is no index of any kind, let alone having the material in machine form such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published hearings and reports of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), the six published hearings and proceedings of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission);

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018630

(U) b. There is no comprehensive readily available record of precisely what information has been declassified and released in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act; there are separate collections with a limited capability to retrieve some such information;

(U) c. There is no available record of the information that officials of the Executive Branch of government, with authority to declassify information, have said or written in public either before Congressional committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows, college symposiums, the general lecture circuit, other public forums, etc.

In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee that those items which are still classified by the DDO components have not been deliberately or inadvertently declassified in whole or in part as "official public disclosure."

(U) 3. Bearing in mind the above, attachment A lists those items of the DDO deleted items which have been declassified by "official public disclosure." These thirteen complete and parts of four other items can therefore be released from the court injunction.

(S) 4. Attachment B (seven parts) contains eleven deleted items (seven subjects) which are still classified but about which there may be some possible question. These are highlighted here so that cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with due regard for all legal and policy aspects.

(U) 5. Attachment C lists all DDO remaining items which the DDO components advise are still classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and cannot be released from the court injunction.

Samuel Halpern

ATTACHMENT A

Item No.	MSS p. no.	Official Public Disclosure
3	11	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 168, 190
4	12	Church Committee Vol. 7, p. 168
5	12	Church Committee Vol. 7, p. 190
9 (line 17 thru ninth word on line 24)	14	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190
10 (last four words of line 1 and first 11 words of line 2; and lines 5-11)	15	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190
11	15	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 160, 170, 172
46 (line 20 thru first three words of line 24)	70	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 148, 165, 166, 171
57	84	Church Committee Book I, p. 194
89	106	Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots pp. 139 ff.
124	129	Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church Committee Book I, pp. 208-209
126	130	Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church Committee Book I, pp. 208-209
127	130	Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church Committee Book I, pp. 208-209

SECRET

Item No.	MSS p. no.	Official Public Disclosure
292	420	Church Committee Vol. 7, p. 205
307	435	Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots pp. 139 ff.
317	468	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 168, 189, 205
338	508	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 144-209
339 (line 1, third, fourth, eighth, ninth words; and line 2, first three words)	509	CIA presence has been officially disclosed in the following only: a. Congo - Church Committee report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, pp. 13-70. b. Cambodia - Amb. John Gunther Dean testimony before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, May 5, 1976, p. 672 c. Laos - Director Colby, 13 September 1974, in an address to the Fund for Peace Conference on CIA and Covert Actions and in Church Committee Book I, pp. 120 and 155; Book IV, p. 68. d. Vietnam - Church Committee report on Alleged Assassination pp. 217-224; Book I, pp. 23 and 120. e. Philippines - Church Committee, Book I, p. 23.

ATTACHMENT B (1)

Item No. 22, 28, 152, 172   MSS pp. no. 46, 48, 165, 189

(U) NE Division has highlighted these items.

(S) Item 22 states in part "A notable example of such a 'special relationship' is Iran, where a CIA organized coup d'etat restored the Shah to power in 1953. The Shah was understandably grateful..." Item 28 lists the Shah among other "world leaders with whom CIA has developed special relationships" as does Item 152 and a similar statement is made in Item 179.

(U) Ray S. Cline in his book "Secrets, Spies and Scholars," pp. 131-132, states:

> "... a covert operation so successful that it became widely known all over the world was carried out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had been driven out of Iran by his left-leaning Premier, Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the local Communist (Tudeh) Party and from the Soviet Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful clandestine services officer who flew to Iran, hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian military men loyal to the Shah how to take over the local radio station, and paved the way for the Shah's triumphal return."

(U) The Church Committee, Book I, p. 111, briefly mentioned "the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran" as one of CIA's "boldest, most spectacular covert operations."

(S) There is a vast difference between the classified deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship" with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh. The former is still properly classifiable and classified.

ATTACHMENT B (2)

Item No. 49 MSS p. no. 71a

(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Daily American is still classified SECRET because it describes intelligence sources and methods as related to newspaper publications. CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'." It is questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who left the Agency long before that, can be considered as constituting official Agency disclosure of this information.

ATTACHMENT B (3)

Item No. 54, 236 MSS p. no. 80, 262

(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World Features is still classified SECRET because both items describe intelligence sources and methods and identifies operations based in England. Forum World Features was referred to - but not by name - in Book I of the Church Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in Europe... The larger of the two was subscribed to by over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two press services." While Forum World Features was not named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper editors may be considered as "official public disclosure."

ATTACHMENT B (4)

Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25)   MSS p. no. 92

(S) Under injunction as classified information is "For its Tibetan operation of the early sixties, the Agency constructed extensive support facilities in Northeast India and brought large numbers of guerrillas to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special training." Underlining (line 25, ninth thru twenty-third word) indicates the questionable part of the item since MSS page 97, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly brought to the United States for special paramilitary training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado." This sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and appears in boldface type on page 115 in the published book.

ATTACHMENT B (5)

Item No. 72 MSS p. 97

(U) NE Division has highlighted this item.

(S) The deleted item is "The CIA quickly made contact with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established. Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he was..."

(U) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret Operations" pp. 173-174, states "As the Korean war was winding down, the CIA began sending intelligence agents into Tibet to assess the situation and see what could be done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving him a channel of communication with the West.

"When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa to avoid capture by the Chinese forces in 1959, he was accompanied on his flight by a CIA-trained radio operator who was able to keep Washington posted on his often hazardous progress."

(S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA "close relationship" with the Dalai Lama and his being "financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators being with the Dalai Lama. These are two different comments with the first being properly classifiable and classified.

ATTACHMENT B (6)

Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279   MSS pp. 123, 132, 133, 403

(S) CCS states that all four items which refer to Fairways Corporation as a CIA-owned proprietary company are still classified since they describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S. and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5 (B) (2) of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.

(S) According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that the subject be withheld from public disclosure.

ATTACHMENT B (7)

Item No. 339 MSS p. no. 509

(S) CIA presence in Bolivia and Brazil has not been officially acknowledged and is still classified because it involves sources and methods.

David Phillips in his book The Night Watch, chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970-1972" describes his presence as Chief of Station of CIA in Brazil and on page 209 he discusses CIA in Bolivia.

(S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, MSS p. no. 509), Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We believe the item should remain classified and that exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo."

It is not a question of whether to agree or not to declassification of reference to the Congo. The Church Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made "official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the subject moot. In addition, as Item 339 in Attachment A shows, four other countries of the Third World are also mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone. What adverse effect could be expected now by another public reference to CIA presence in the Congo as of the original 1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has not changed since the 1975 release of the information by the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse effects there might be have already occurred.

SECRET

ATTACHMENT C

ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT

Item No.	MSS p. no.
1	11
9 (lines 14-16; line 24, last two words thru line 29)	14
10 (line 1, first 7 words; line 2, last 2 words thru line 4)	15
18	42
19	43
20	44
21	45
22	46
23	46
24	47
26	47
27	48
28	48
29	49
31	54
34	59
38	63
41	65
42	65a
43	65a
46 (line 24, fourth word thru line 31)	70
47	71
48	71a
49	71a
50	72
51	72
52	77
53	78
54	80
55	80
56	81
58	84
59	85
62	86

Item No.	MSS p. no.
63	86
67	92
72	97
73	97
74	98
79	100
107	123
128	132
129	133
130	133
148	155
149	156
152	165
159	181
160	182
161	183
162	184
182	196
194	215
195	216
196	217
197	218
198	219
201	222
224	252
225	253
226	257
234	262
236	262
256	329
261	334
273	380
278	400
279	403
280	404
283	413
284	413
286	414
287	414
287a	415
288	416
290	417
291	417
296	425
298	426

SECRET

Item No.	MSS p. no.
300	426
308	437
318	469
319	470
320	471
321	471
322	473
323	474
331	482
332	482
333	483
334	483
335	483
336	484
337	507
339 (line 1, first two words and fifth, sixth and seventh words)	509

28 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Greaney
Office of General Counsel

FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Review of the 168 Deleted Items in "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

In reply to your oral request, attached is the report of the review of the deleted items which are the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate components of the DDO reviewed their respective items for classification and their findings are contained in the attached report. Specific classification and exemption authority for each item which is still classified is available, if needed, in each component's response filed with SA/DO/O.

/s/

William W. Wells

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - OGC
2 - DDO
2 - SA/DO/O

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018630

SECRET

27 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

VIA : Mr. Ralph J. Katrosh
Special Assistant to the DDO
for External Oversight

FROM : Samuel Halpern

SUBJECT : Review of 168 Deleted Items in
"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

(U) 1. This is the report of the review done by the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items which are the basic responsibility of the DDO. The remaining deleted items which are the basic responsibility of the DDS&T and DDA were reviewed by those Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC. Responsible components did the necessary inter- and intraagency coordinations.

(U) 2. Several points need to be highlighted concerning the completeness of the review, especially as regards those items declassified by "official public disclosure" as defined by the courts. While I am sure that as diligent a search as possible was done by the DDO components, a thorough and absolutely complete search is impossible for the following reasons:

(U) a. There is no index of any kind, let alone having the material in machine form such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published hearings and reports of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), the six published hearings and proceedings of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission);

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018630

(U) b. There is no comprehensive readily available record of precisely what information has been declassified and released in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act; there are separate collections with a limited capability to retrieve some such information;

(U) c. There is no available record of the information that officials of the Executive Branch of government, with authority to declassify information, have said or written in public either before Congressional committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows, college symposiums, the general lecture circuit, other public forums, etc.

In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee that those items which are still classified by the DDO components have not been deliberately or inadvertently declassified in whole or in part as "official public disclosure."

(U) 3. Bearing in mind the above, attachment A lists those items of the DDO deleted items which have been declassified by "official public disclosure." These thirteen complete and parts of four other items can therefore be released from the court injunction.

(S) 4. Attachment B (seven parts) contains eleven deleted items (seven subjects) which are still classified but about which there may be some possible question. These are highlighted here so that cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with due regard for all legal and policy aspects.

(U) 5. Attachment C lists all DDO remaining items which the DDO components advise are still classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and cannot be released from the court injunction.

Samuel Halpern

ATTACHMENT A

Item No.	MSS p. no.	Official Public Disclosure
3	11	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 168, 190
4	12	Church Committee Vol. 7, p. 168
5	12	Church Committee Vol. 7, p. 190
9 (line 17 thru ninth word on line 24)	14	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190
10 (last four words of line 1 and first 11 words of line 2; and lines 5-11)	15	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190
11	15	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 160, 170, 172
46 (line 20 thru first three words of line 24)	70	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 148, 165, 166, 171
57	84	Church Committee Book I, p. 194
89	106	Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots pp. 139 ff.
124	129	Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church Committee Book I, pp. 208-209
126	130	Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church Committee Book I, pp. 208-209
127	130	Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church Committee Book I, pp. 208-209

SECRET

Item No.	MSS p. no.	Official Public Disclosure
292	420	Church Committee Vol. 7, p. 205
307	435	Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots pp. 139 ff.
317	468	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 168, 189, 205
338	508	Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 144-209
339 (line 1, third, fourth, eighth, ninth words; and line 2, first three words)	509	CIA presence has been officially disclosed in the following only: a. Congo - Church Committee report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, pp. 13-70. b. Cambodia - Amb. John Gunther Dean testimony before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, May 5, 1976, p. 672 c. Laos - Director Colby, 13 September 1974, in an address to the Fund for Peace Conference on CIA and Covert Actions and in Church Committee Book I, pp. 120 and 155; Book IV, p. 68. d. Vietnam - Church Committee report on Alleged Assassination pp. 217-224; Book I, pp. 23 and 120. e. Philippines - Church Committee, Book I, p. 23.

ATTACHMENT B (1)

Item No. 22, 28, 152, 172   MSS pp. no. 46, 48, 165, 189

(U) NE Division has highlighted these items.

(S) Item 22 states in part "A notable example of such a 'special relationship' is Iran, where a CIA organized coup d'etat restored the Shah to power in 1953. The Shah was understandably grateful..." Item 28 lists the Shah among other "world leaders with whom CIA has developed special relationships" as does Item 152 and a similar statement is made in Item 179.

(U) Ray S. Cline in his book "Secrets, Spies and Scholars," pp. 131-132, states:

> "... a covert operation so successful that it became widely known all over the world was carried out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had been driven out of Iran by his left-leaning Premier, Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the local Communist (Tudeh) Party and from the Soviet Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful clandestine services officer who flew to Iran, hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian military men loyal to the Shah how to take over the local radio station, and paved the way for the Shah's triumphal return."

(U) The Church Committee, Book I, p. 111, briefly mentioned "the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran" as one of CIA's "boldest, most spectacular covert operations."

(S) There is a vast difference between the classified deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship" with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh. The former is still properly classifiable and classified.

ATTACHMENT B (2)

Item No. 49 MSS p. no. 71a

(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Daily American is still classified SECRET because it describes intelligence sources and methods as related to newspaper publications. CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'." It is questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who left the Agency long before that, can be considered as constituting official Agency disclosure of this information.

ATTACHMENT B (3)

Item No. 54, 236 MSS p. no. 80, 262

(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World Features is still classified SECRET because both items describe intelligence sources and methods and identifies operations based in England. Forum World Features was referred to - but not by name - in Book I of the Church Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in Europe... The larger of the two was subscribed to by over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two press services." While Forum World Features was not named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper editors may be considered as "official public disclosure."

ATTACHMENT B (4)

Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25)   MSS p. no. 92

(S) Under injunction as classified information is "For its Tibetan operation of the early sixties, the Agency constructed extensive support facilities in Northeast India and brought large numbers of guerrillas to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special training." Underlining (line 25, ninth thru twenty-third word) indicates the questionable part of the item since MSS page 97, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly brought to the United States for special paramilitary training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado." This sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and appears in boldface type on page 115 in the published book.

ATTACHMENT B (5)

Item No. 72 MSS p. 97

(U) NE Division has highlighted this item.

(S) The deleted item is "The CIA quickly made contact with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established. Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he was..."

(U) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret Operations" pp. 173-174, states "As the Korean war was winding down, the CIA began sending intelligence agents into Tibet to assess the situation and see what could be done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving him a channel of communication with the West.

"When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa to avoid capture by the Chinese forces in 1959, he was accompanied on his flight by a CIA-trained radio operator who was able to keep Washington posted on his often hazardous progress."

(S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA "close relationship" with the Dalai Lama and his being "financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators being with the Dalai Lama. These are two different comments with the first being properly classifiable and classified.

ATTACHMENT B (6)

Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279   MSS pp. 123, 132, 133, 403

(S) CCS states that all four items which refer to Fairways Corporation as a CIA-owned proprietary company are still classified since they describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S. and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5 (B) (2) of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.

(S) According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that the subject be withheld from public disclosure.

ATTACHMENT B (7)

Item No. 339 MSS p. no. 509

(S) CIA presence in Bolivia and Brazil has not been officially acknowledged and is still classified because it involves sources and methods.

David Phillips in his book The Night Watch, chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970-1972" describes his presence as Chief of Station of CIA in Brazil and on page 209 he discusses CIA in Bolivia.

(S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, MSS p. no. 509), Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We believe the item should remain classified and that exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo."

It is not a question of whether to agree or not to declassification of reference to the Congo. The Church Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made "official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the subject moot. In addition, as Item 339 in Attachment A shows, four other countries of the Third World are also mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone. What adverse effect could be expected now by another public reference to CIA presence in the Congo as of the original 1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has not changed since the 1975 release of the information by the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse effects there might be have already occurred.

ATTACHMENT C

ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT

Item No.	MSS p. no.
1	11
9 (lines 14-16; line 24, last two words thru line 29)	14
10 (line 1, first 7 words; line 2, last 2 words thru line 4)	15
18	42
19	43
20	44
21	45
22	46
23	46
24	47
26	47
27	48
28	48
29	49
31	54
34	59
38	63
41	65
42	65a
43	65a
46 (line 24, fourth word thru line 31)	70
47	71
48	71a
49	71a
50	72
51	72
52	77
53	78
54	80
55	80
56	81
58	84
59	85
62	86
63	86
67	92
72	97
73	97
74	98
79	100
107	123
128	132
129	133
130	133
148	155
149	156
152	165
159	181
160	182
161	183
162	184
182	196
194	215
195	216
196	217
197	218
198	219
201	222
224	252
225	253
226	257
234	262
236	262
256	329
261	334
273	380
278	400
279	403
280	404
283	413
284	413
286	414
287	414
287a	415
288	416
290	417
291	417
296	425
298	426

Item No.	MSS p. no.
300	426
308	437
318	469
319	470
320	471
321	471
322	473
323	474
331	482
332	482
333	483
334	483
335	483
336	484
337	507
339 (line 1, first two words and fifth, sixth and seventh words)	509

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

FROM : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : DDO Coordination on DDS&T's Review of Deletions from The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks

REFERENCE : DDS&T-5193-76/1 dated 27 May 1977

1. Appropriate Components of the DDO have reviewed the following items (deletions) listed at Tab C of referent for coordination with the DDO and concur with the DDS&T that they are all properly classified in accordance with E.O. 11652 and should so remain:

Item	Manuscript Page
25	47
159	181
160	182
161	183
162	184
163	184
164	185
205	234
208	235
209	236
295	424
297	425
299	426
301	427

2. In Tab D of referent, the DDS&T deferred to DDO or OS the decision on the classification of Item 190, manuscript page 214, relating to Soviet capabilities to make intelligible the sounds picked up by audio devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in Moscow. The appropriate DDO Component finds that this item must remain classified SECRET since it relates to cryptography and is exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of

[illegible]
SENSITIVE [illegible] SOURCES
AND [illegible]

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630

E.O. 11652, exemption category 5B(2).

3. Specific classification and exemption authority for each item, if needed, is available from SA/DO/O.

William W. Wells

O/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)

Distribution
Original & 1 - Addressee
2 - DDO
1 - ADDO
1 - Ex Reg
2 - DDS&T
2 - SA/DO/O

SECRET

DDS&T-5193-76/1

27 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

ATTENTION : John Greaney

SUBJECT : Review of Deletions from The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks

1. The responsible and knowledgeable components of this directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from subject book per your request. The review was made to determine whether each deletion was still classified under EO 11652 or whether the information in each deletion has been officially released by the U.S. Government.

2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items reviewed by this directorate. Tab B is a list of those items of primary interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classified; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab C is a list of those items which we determined are still classified under EO 11652; however, some portions of three items can be released, but we recommend that all of the items in Tab C be coordinated with other indicated elements. Tab D is a list of items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab E is a list of the four items mentioned above which we believe portions can now be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified and should not be released.

3. Since many of the deleted items involved the National Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determinations through our contacts at NSA. We were told that any coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA General Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with other elements was attempted.

4. This memorandum completes the DDS&T action on the court ordered review of the deletions from subject book.

Ernest J. Zellmer

ERNEST J. ZELLMER
Associate Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

Attachments:
As Stated

E2 IMPDET CL BY 005166

SECRET

TAB A

DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T

Item	Page	Item	Page
25	47	190	214
86	104	191	214
87	104	192	215
88	105	204	233
91	106	205	234
92	107	208	235
135	134	209	236
136	135	245	268
155	177	248	269
157	179	254	327
158	180	258	331
159	181	259	331
160	182	260	331
161	183	267	337
163	184	268	337
164	185	269	337
165	185	275	394
166	185	295	424
167	185	297	425
170	189	299	426
171	189	301	427
172	189	302	427
173	190	304	430
174	191	306	431
175	191	312	442
176	192	313	450
177	193	324	474
178	194	325	474
187	200	327	475
188	201	328	476
189	202	329	480

Tab B

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THE DDS&T
AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED

Item	Manuscript Page	
91	106	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
92	107	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
*135	134	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
136	135	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
155	177	SECRET, 5B(3)
158	180	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
163	184	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
165	185	SECRET, 5B(3)
166	185	CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)
167	185	CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)
188	201	TOP SECRET, 5B(2)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

Tab C

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS

Item	Manuscript Page	
* 25	47	DDO
* 87	104	DOD (DIA)
88	105	DOD (DIA)
157	179	OS
159	181	DDO, OC, ERDA
160	182	DDO, OC, ERDA
161	183	DDO, OC, ERDA
162	184	DDO, OC, ERDA
163	184	DDO
164	185	DDO
172	189	NSA
187	200	DOD (Navy)
189	202	DOD (Navy)
204	233	NSA and DDO
205	234	DDO
208	235	DDO
209	236	DDO
245	268	DOD (SAFSS)
248	269	DOD (SAFSS)
254	327	DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff
258	331	DOD (SAFSS)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

Tab C
Continued

Item	Manuscript Page	
259	331	DOD (SAFSS)
260	331	DOD (SAFSS)
267	337	DOD (Navy)
268	337	DOD (Navy)
269	337	DOD (Navy)
*275	394	OL
295	424	DDO
297	425	DDO
299	426	DDO, NSA
301	427	DDO, OC, NSA
302	427	NSA
304	430	NSA
306	431	DOD (Navy)
312	442	NSA
313	450	NSA
329	480	NSC Staff

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS

Item	Manuscript Page	
86	104	O/DCI
170	189	NSA
171	189	NSA
173	190	NSA
174	191	NSA
175	191	NSA
176	192	NSA
177	193	NSA
178	194	NSA
190	214	DDO or OS
191	214	State Department
192	215	State Department
324	474	DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff
325	474	DOD
327	475	DDI and DOD
328	476	DDI, DOD and NSC Staff

Tab E

ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE

Item 135, Manuscript page 134

"A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred in 1967 when CIA decided to get rid of a technical research laboratory in the Boston area."

Item 25, Manuscript page 47

"Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revolution."

Item 87, Manuscript page 107

"The Agency also had a project to determine where American prisoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to communicate with them. Scale models of the prisons were constructed from aerial and satellite photography and from other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which prisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate. Some of the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus, the Agency worked out schemes to use return mail from the families to send answers back. Meanwhile, the Technical Services Division of the"

Item 275, Manuscript page 394

"new optics for satellite cameras and improvements in 'over the horizon' radars. These technical contracts were almost always drawn up under the cover of being between the scholar (or the university) and some government agency other than the CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were the most"

Tab C

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS

	Item	Manuscript Page	
EA - China –	* 25 ①	47	DDO
	* 87	104	DOD (DIA)
	88	105	DOD (DIA)
	157	179	OS
China/India –	159 ②	181	DDO, OC, ERDA
" "	160 ③	182	DDO, OC, ERDA
" "	161 ④	183	DDO, OC, ERDA
" "	162 ⑤	184	DDO, OC, ERDA
" "	163 ⑥	184	DDO
" "	164 ⑦	185	DDO
	172	189	NSA
	187	200	DOD (Navy)
	189	202	DOD (Navy)
	204	233	NSA and DDO
NE Iran	205 ⑧	234	DDO
LA –	208 ⑨	235	DDO
LA –	209 ⑩	236	DDO
	245	268	DOD (SAFSS)
	248	269	DOD (SAFSS)
	254	327	DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff
	258	331	DOD (SAFSS)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

Tab C
Continued

	Item	Manuscript Page	
	259	331	DOD (SAFSS)
	260	331	DOD (SAFSS)
	267	337	DOD (Navy)
	268	337	DOD (Navy)
	269	337	DOD (Navy)
	*275	394	OL
EA China	295 ⑪	424	DDO
EA-China/EUR Cyprus	297 ⑫	425	DDO
EA/EUR	299 ⑬	426	DDO, NSA
AF	301 ⑭	427	DDO, OC, NSA
	302	427	NSA
	304	430	NSA
	306	431	DOD (Navy)
	312	442	NSA
	313	450	NSA
	329	480	NSC Staff

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

Tab D

ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS

Item	Manuscript Page	
86	104	O/DCI
170	189	NSA
171	189	NSA
173	190	NSA
174	191	NSA
175	191	NSA
176	192	NSA
177	193	NSA
178	194	NSA
SE – 190	214	DDO or OS
191	214	State Department
192	215	State Department
324	474	DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff
325	474	DOD
327	475	DDI and DOD
328	476	DDI, DOD and NSC Staff

~~Page 43~~

Hussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a desire to counter its anti-American, anti-Hussein line (which was not new), so the CIA funded the building of a Jordanian television station. A CIA owned, New York based proprietary company, named RTV, provided the technical expertise and management skills to put the station in operation. (24)

Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special relationship is Nationalist China. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's link is not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent, Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA chief of station, Ray Cline, now the State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all-night drinking bouts with the younger Chiang.

Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revolution. (25)

In South Vietnam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally conducting all important meetings with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was accompanied by the CIA chief of station when there was Agency business to be discussed. But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President. According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea.

Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu personally with ~~personallywith~~ millions of dollars in untraceable, "black bag" funds (laundered money) ~~in addition to the hundreds of~~ (26)

the information straight forwardly, thereby, handicapping the analysts in making a confident judgment of the accuracy of the report's content.*

Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive large numbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from actual agents. But by mixing together information supplied by audio surveillance (which is, by definition, an accurate account of what was said) with agent reports which are sometimes exaggerated or false, the Clandestine Services confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose function it is to analyze foreign events and indirectly those leaders who make decisions based on that intelligence analysis.

[In the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and the experts of the Scientific and Technical Directorate combined forces to carry out one of the Agency's most imaginative (if ultimately unsuccessful) intelligence collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level U.S. government officials were disturbed by repprts that Communist China was on the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system. They knew that the threat posed by Chinese ICBM's would play an important part in the decision, then under consideration, to go ahead with an American anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtzu, the Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia. (159)

The Agency's technical specialists responded by designing a nuclear-ppwered device which could monitor certain key electronic emissions coming from the missile site, well over a thousand miles away, and then rely the information to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain peak called the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, in the Indian Himalayas from where it would have an unobstructed "line-of-sight" to the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA laboratories, the Clandestine Services took on the responsibility for the most] difficult phase of the operation -- installing the machine on the mountain top.

The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project. Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry the device, complete with its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb. Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an experienced CIA case officer.

That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top of Nanda Devi. Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda Devi.

Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the would do. Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by a small party of climbers accompanied by a few porters. Soon after the group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes. The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now well off schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news of the successful installation was radioed back to the staging area.

But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headwaters of the sacred Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about religious pollution, not ecological.

The CIA reacted by planning another climb of the mountain for the following year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring system -- this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team, led by Bishop, was gathered together again and this time it reached the top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year

~~Page 260~~

before was not found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor device (162) stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical malfunction.

At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the Communist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were thanked and compensated for their cooperation. And the American climbers were presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA.

The fertile imaginations of the [redacted]/S&T experts during the following years produced many more unique collection schemes aimed at solving the mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential. The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into the denied area where, after performing his espionage mission, he would assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border. Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with this scheme, and the project died on the drawing boards.

A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could (163) be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, an aerial rising from its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a foreign and hostile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine raised serious questions as to the system's utility and worth. The [redacted]S&T

specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however, (164) oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear attack. Development of the Coastly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation that the device failed to self-activate and function properly.

A third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird, (165) such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras would be turned on to record activities below and relay the information either to its launch site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the CIA in research on this "baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was to be, of course, that if and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an Agency-sponsored spying mission.

The technical difficulties involved in the air-drop system and the model (166) airplane device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully (167) developed by their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement for these questionable and potentially provocative collection systems before they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value -- were also being

~~restore the Shah to power. Over the years, the Shah had shown his gratitude by allowing the Agency to use Iran as a base for electronic and radar surveillance of the Soviet Union. The CIA station chief in Iran usually maintained much closer contact with the Shah than the American ambassador. (With the 1973 appointment of former CIA Director Helms to the past of American ambassador in Iran, any Agency-State conflicts then presumably disappeared.)~~

No ¶ The issue arose after ~~By 1968~~, the Agency had developed a new type of over-the-horizon radar which it wished to install ~~near the Soviet border~~ in Iran for surveillance of the Soviet Union. As was normally the case, CIA representatives carried out most of the negotiations with the Iranis. However, when Ambassador Armin Meyer was informed of the details of the proposed agreement, he raised some questions with the CIA station chief that blossomed into an inter-agency dispute. At this point Meyer cabled the State Department for instructions and advice. 205

In the way of background, it should be understood that CIA communications clerks handle nearly all classified cables between American embassies overseas and Washington -- for both the CIA and the State Department. To have a separate code room for each agency in every embassy would be a wasteful procedure, so a senior CIA communications expert is regularly assigned to the administrative part of the State Department in order to oversee CIA's communicators who work under State cover. In theory, CIA code clerks are not supposed to read the messages they send for State, but any code clerk who wants to have a successful career quickly realized that his promotions depend on the CIA and that he is well advised to show the CIA station chief copies of all important State messages. The State Department long ago implicitly recognized that its most secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special communications channels which spppposedly cannot be deciphered by the CIA.

When, in 1968, Ambassador Meyer ran into troubles with the CIA station chief in Teheran, Meyer switched his "secure" communications channel (Roger) with State Dept. Hqs ~~in Washington, to one of these "secure" channels, called "Roger."~~ He needed to be able to discuss the [situation in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. They had figured out a way to intercept his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Written on top of each intercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be kept especially confident because State was unaware that the CIA had a copy.

Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information,] Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even after these two men met at CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so aggravated by this continued resistance that he personally telephoned Secretary of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing completely to the CIA position.

[Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercppt the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements were normal procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which cooperated in good faith. (208) out

FI/D's liaison with the South American country continued for a long period of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over unrelated issues, and as a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship. However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could be restored.]

[Sometime later, Bbb suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and wether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to be a matter concerning CIA. Only later did the executive suite officer learn from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American country in which liaison would be restored in return for a Comsat channel(which CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme even with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office.

Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel; the country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that country's secret messages.]

Bob's job with FI/D is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even lies within the U.S. government -- not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into liaison agreements with FI/D.

Bob X is one of these ordinary looking people who mow their lawn, love their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.

~~Tow~~ Two other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and E. Howard Hunt. Both had long, relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper-middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt was an operator who played a leading role in the Bay of Pigs and who took part

Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its operation against Cuba. The President may have set the original policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply by approving an attack on Cuba, he would set in train Agency paramilitary activities against Guatamala.

CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on American foreign policy/ they can subject the country to blackmail if something goes wrong. For instance, after the CIA pilot was shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, within five days the US government approved the sale for local currency of 37,000 tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on $1 million in small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that moment, the CIA was actively backing an armed revolution against the Sukarno regime these would have been strange actions indeed for the US government to take if it were not extremely concerned about saving the captured pilot.

xx

A somewhat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960 after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trustworthy. When the Agency technician plugged in his polygraph machine in a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building.* The lie detector man, a CIA case officer, and the local agent were soon all under arrest. The Singapore government and the British, who were in the process of granting Singapore its independence, were both quite disturbed bythe indident. Negotiations then ensued to secure the men's release. According to Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the US government offered$3.3 million to get them out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten times as much and consequently took nothing. In any case, the two CIA officials were subsequently freed, the newly installed Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a secret letter of apology to the Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in a speech as an example of the type of activities engaged in by the CIA. The State Department then issued a routine denial furnished by the CIA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee's charges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusk's letter of apology, and State was forced to retract its original statement, although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered. As well as embarrassing the US government and making headlines around the world, the incident caused the State Department to revamp its internal system for making announcements about intelligence matters.

---

*This was not the only time that the CIA blew major fuses overseas. During the mid-1960s, the Agency added to its numerous facilities on Taiwan by building a huge electronic ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] (295)

Blackmail was agin the theme in the mid-1960s when the (296) President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, quietly informed the

installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When the device was turned on for the first time, it knocked out a large (297) part of the island's power. In this case, the local government reacted in a much more friendly manner than did Singapore's.

US government that he might oust certain intelligence installations from his island. The CIA had a major interest in the matter, since it operated a Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS) listening post there, and the Pentagon was also concerned about the possible loss of its large electronic surveillance facilities. The view in the intelligence community was that Makarios had to be mollified at practically all costs. Finally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the wily old archbishop, and he received a special payment of about $10 million in return for letting the bases remain. The CIA put up half of the money, using the Director's Contingency Fund for this unforseen expense. 298

In general, the presence of American intelligence facilities in a foreign country can have an important effect on American policy toward that country, especially in the Tgird World. Closely aligned countries, such as England, Germany, Japan, and Australia, have usually allowed the United States to set up electronic spying bases as part of the general framework of cooperation between allies. 299 But to the less developed countries, the presence of an American installation is both a threat and an opportunity. The threat comes from domestic opposition forces who look on the base as an example of "neo-colonialism" and use it as a weapon against those in power. The opportunity arises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly for the right to install its eavesdropping equipment--and to keep it in place, as Archbishop Makarios discovered. 300

[The only American military bases in Africa are in fact primarily intelligence facilities. These are Kagnew in Ethiopia and Kenitra in Morocco.] (301) Both host governments have been severely criticized by internal forces and neighboring countries for giving the United States a foothold in their nations, but both have been handsomely rewarded in terms of receiving American military and economic assistance which had added up over the years into the hundreds of millions of dollars. While comparatively modest amounts of aid would have probably been supplied, even if there had been no bases, the large size of the programs represented, in effect, a direct payment for the intelligence facilities.

Similarly, from 1956 until the end of 1969, the US Air Force operated a huge base near Peshawar in Pakistan, which was primarily an intelligence facility. For several years before Francis Gary Powers' abortive flight over the Soviet Union in 1960, CIA U-2 planes used Peshawar as a principal take-off point for reconnaissance flights over and along the edges of the Soviet Union. In addition, [military intelligence set up a vast array of electronic listening devices there to monitor activities within the Soviet Union.] (302) From the early days of the Eisenhower administration, the United States had allied itself more closely with Pakistan than with India in those two countries' traditional struggle. Yet, at least some experts on the region believe that an important factor in the American "tilt" toward Pakistan, at least until the late 1960s, was the desire to hold on to the penetration, while clearly fortuitous, are not unique in clandestine operations. In 1964, it was learned that the American embassy in Moscow had been thoroughly bugged by the KGB. Scores of Soviet audio devices were found throughout the building. Counterespionage and security specialists determined that the equipment had been installed in 1952 when the embassy had been renovated, and that the bugs had been operational for roughly twelve years. The damage report asserted that during this entire period -- at the height of the cold war -- Soviet intelligence had probably intercepted every diplomatic cable between Washington and the embassy. [This assessment was based on the discovery of electron (190) audio devices in the code room which ~~would have~~ allowed the Soviets to hear distinctly the sounds being maded by the typewriters and cryptographic equipment. It was a reasonably easy technological feat -- well within Soviet capabilities -- to translate such sounds into their true alphabetical meaning.]

American suspicions about the Soviet eavesdropping were apparently aroused early in 1964 when Soviet leader Khrushchev made a remark to Ambassador ~~Fay~~ Foy Kohler about Kohler's role in blocking the shipment to the Soviet Union of steel for an important pipeline. Taken in context, Khrushchev's remark indicated to Kohler that there was a leak somewhere in American security. Kohler started a massive investigation, and within a month or two, forty-odd bugs were found embedded in walls throughout the embassy. Although Kohler would later claim there was no connection between the discovery of the bugs and the investigation he ordered after his conversation with Khrushchev, the timing would seem to indicate otherwise.

[In any case, the official damage report concluded that for those twelve (191) crucial years at the height of the Cold War, the Soviets almost certainly knew every diplomatic secret which was communicated between the American embassy in Moscow and Washington. The damage report noted, however, that this Soviet knowledge may well have worked to the advantage of the United States at least in one instance in 1953 when the Korean War armistice was being negotiated. At the time, U.S. bargaining position with the North Koreans was that if a particular

SECRET

DDA 77-2412
28 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Halpern

FROM: H.G. Bean
Acting Executive Officer/DDA

SUBJECT: Fairways Corporation

REFERENCE: Attached memorandum from Central Cover Staff

1. With reference to paragraph 4 in the attached memorandum from Mr. Latta, to the very best of our knowledge the CIA sponsorship of the Fairways Corporation has not been officially placed in the public domain. There has been at least one newspaper article relating to Fairways and, in addition, at least one short television news item on the same subject. However, official confirmation of the allegations of a relationship which was made in these media presentations has been carefully avoided.

2. There has been official acknowledgement of the fact that CIA's Office of Training runs a proprietary to provide executive transportation. Such a statement appeared in the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. However, here again there has been no acknowledgement that such an entity was identical with or related to the Fairways Corporation.

3. The DDA concurs with the position of CCS as expressed in paragraph 2 of Mr. Latta's memorandum.

H.G. Bean

Attachment

cc: CCS

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 058779

SECRET

DD/A 77-2340

21 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA

FROM : M. L. Latta
Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : Fairways Corporation

1. Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168 items previously deleted by court order from the book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corporation was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in this connection.

2. Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items (107, 128, 129, 279, on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respectively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on all four items is that they are still classified, since they describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S., and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B)(2) of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.

3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that the subject be withheld from public disclosure.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

4. Per our conversation, CCS has stated in its response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may have been placed in the public domain since the court order (i.e., since February 1975).

5. Please direct your comments to SA/DO/O. For your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line x9588, is preparing an overall response on the subject for the SA/DO/O.

M. L. Latta

MEMORANDUM FOR: Record

attached are DDO Division responses coordinating DDS+T response to John Greany, OGC, on declassification of deletions from The Cult of Intelligence by Marks-Marchetti.

On the basis of the attached a memo of DDO position was prepared and sent to Mr. Greany over the DDO's signature.

action Completed. MA Shepanek

Date June 1977

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : Norbert A. Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O

SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks

1. In conjunction with the current review of the deletions in subject book for possible declassification, the DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached (see page 3).

2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the details.

3. The following items should be reviewed by the components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by 23 June 1977:

Item	Manuscript Page	Review Responsibility
25	47	EA Division
159	181	EA Division and NE Div.
160	182	" " " "
161	183	" " " "
162	184	" " " "
163	184	" " " "
164	185	" " " "
205	234	NE Division
208	235	LA Division
209	236	LA Division
295	424	EA Division
297	425	EA Division and EUR Div.
299	426	EA Division and EUR Div.
301	427	AF Division
190	214	SE Division (Office of Security may be appropriate action office for this item)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630

SECRET

4. Where more than one Division is involved, a single coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions, please contact the writer on x1542.

N. A. Shepanek

Attachments
As Noted Above

O/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)

Distribution
Original - C/EA/CA ✓ /17 June
1 - E/FP/FC
1 - NE/COPS
1 - C/AF/Plans
1 - C/SE/OSG
1 - LA/FOIA ✓
2 - SA/DO/O

DDS&T-5193-76/1

27 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

ATTENTION : John Greaney

SUBJECT : Review of Deletions from The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks

1. The responsible and knowledgeable components of this directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from subject book per your request. The review was made to determine whether each deletion was still classified under EO 11652 or whether the information in each deletion has been officially released by the U.S. Government.

2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items reviewed by this directorate. Tab B is a list of those items of primary interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classified; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab C is a list of those items which we determined are still classified under EO 11652; however, some portions of three items can be released, but we recommend that all of the items in Tab C be coordinated with other indicated elements. Tab D is a list of items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab E is a list of the four items mentioned above which we believe portions can now be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified and should not be released.

3. Since many of the deleted items involved the National Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determinations through our contacts at NSA. We were told that any coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA General Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with other elements was attempted.

4. This memorandum completes the DDS&T action on the court ordered review of the deletions from subject book.

Ernest J. Zellmer

ERNEST J. ZELLMER
Associate Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

Attachments:
As Stated

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 005166

TAB A

DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT
REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T

Item	Page	Item	Page
25	47	190	214
86	104	191	214
87	104	192	215
88	105	204	233
91	106	205	234
92	107	208	235
135	134	209	236
136	135	245	268
155	177	248	269
157	179	254	327
158	180	258	331
159	181	259	331
160	182	260	331
161	183	267	337
163	184	268	337
164	185	269	337
165	185	275	394
166	185	295	424
167	185	297	425
170	189	299	426
171	189	301	427
172	189	302	427
173	190	304	430
174	191	306	431
175	191	312	442
176	192	313	450
177	193	324	474
178	194	325	474
187	200	327	475
188	201	328	476
189	202	329	480

Tab B

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THE DDS&T
AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED

Item	Manuscript Page	
91	106	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
92	107	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
*135	134	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
136	135	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
155	177	SECRET, 5B(3)
158	180	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
163	184	SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
165	185	SECRET, 5B(3)
166	185	CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)
167	185	CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)
188	201	TOP SECRET, 5B(2)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

Tab C

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS

Item	Manuscript Page	
* 25	47	DDO
* 87	104	DOD (DIA)
88	105	DOD (DIA)
157	179	OS
159	181	DDO, OC, ERDA
160	182	DDO, OC, ERDA
161	183	DDO, OC, ERDA
162	184	DDO, OC, ERDA
163	184	DDO
164	185	DDO
172	189	NSA
187	200	DOD (Navy)
189	202	DOD (Navy)
204	233	NSA and DDO
205	234	DDO
208	235	DDO
209	236	DDO
245	268	DOD (SAFSS)
248	269	DOD (SAFSS)
254	327	DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff
258	331	DOD (SAFSS)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

Item	Manuscript Page	
259	331	DOD (SAFSS)
260	331	DOD (SAFSS)
267	337	DOD (Navy)
268	337	DOD (Navy)
269	337	DOD (Navy)
*275	394	OL
295	424	DDO
297	425	DDO
299	426	DDO, NSA
301	427	DDO, OC, NSA
302	427	NSA
304	430	NSA
306	431	DOD (Navy)
312	442	NSA
313	450	NSA
329	480	NSC Staff

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

13-00000

Tab D

ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS

Item	Manuscript Page	
86	104	O/DCI
170	189	NSA
171	189	NSA
173	190	NSA
174	191	NSA
175	191	NSA
176	192	NSA
177	193	NSA
178	194	NSA
190	214	DDO or OS
191	214	State Department
192	215	State Department
324	474	DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff
325	474	DOD
327	475	DDI and DOD
328	476	DDI, DOD and NSC Staff

Tab E

ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE

Item 135, Manuscript page 134

"A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred in [1967] when CIA decided to get rid of a technical research [laboratory] in the [Boston] area."

Item 25, Manuscript page 47

"Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the [Nationalists] first to run guerrilla attacks against [mainland China] and then in more recent years to use [Taiwan] [as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revolution.]"

Item 87, Manuscript page 107

"The Agency also had a project to determine where American prisoners of war were being held in North Vietnam [and to communicate with them.] Scale models of the prisons were constructed from aerial [and satellite photography] and from other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which [prisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate. Some of the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus, the Agency worked out schemes to use return mail from the families to send answers back.] Meanwhile, the Technical Services Division of the"

Item 275, Manuscript page 394

'[new optics for satellite cameras and improvements in 'over the horizon' radars.] These technical contracts were almost always drawn up under the cover of being between the scholar (or the university) and some government agency other than the CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were the most"

Tab C

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS

Item	Manuscript Page	
* 25	47	DDO
* 87	104	DOD (DIA)
88	105	DOD (DIA)
157	179	OS
159	181	DDO, OC, ERDA
160	182	DDO, OC, ERDA
161	183	DDO, OC, ERDA
162	184	DDO, OC, ERDA
163	184	DDO
164	185	DDO
172	189	NSA
187	200	DOD (Navy)
189	202	DOD (Navy)
204	233	NSA and DDO
205	234	DDO
208	235	DDO
209	236	DDO
245	268	DOD (SAFSS)
248	269	DOD (SAFSS)
254	327	DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff
258	331	DOD (SAFSS)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

Tab C
Continued

Item	Manuscript Page	
259	331	DOD (SAFSS)
260	331	DOD (SAFSS)
267	337	DOD (Navy)
268	337	DOD (Navy)
269	337	DOD (Navy)
*275	394	OL
295	424	DDO
297	425	DDO
299	426	DDO, NSA
301	427	DDO, OC, NSA
302	427	NSA
304	430	NSA
306	431	DOD (Navy)
312	442	NSA
313	450	NSA
329	480	NSC Staff

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

Tab D

ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS

Item	Manuscript Page	
86	104	O/DCI
170	189	NSA
171	189	NSA
173	190	NSA
174	191	NSA
175	191	NSA
176	192	NSA
177	193	NSA
178	194	NSA
190	214	DDO or OS
191	214	State Department
192	215	State Department
324	474	DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff
325	474	DOD
327	475	DDI and DOD
328	476	DDI, DOD and NSC Staff

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Norbert A. Shepanek O/SA/DO/O 2D0109	EXTENSION 1542	NO. DATE 14 June 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Ralph J. Katrosh SA/DO/O		14 June		
2.				
3. Mr. Robert Skidmore C/EA/CA 5D3102 Hqs.	15 JUN 1977	16 JUN 1977	RLS	The EA items cited should remain classified as they reveal sources + methods and have not been placed in the public domain by the USG. R.L. Skidmore
4.				
5. ACEA	16 June			
6.				
7. SA/DO/O				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

S E C R E T

14 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : Norbert A. Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O

SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks

1. In conjunction with the current review of the deletions in subject book for possible declassification, the DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached (see page 3).

2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the details.

3. The following items should be reviewed by the components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by 23 June 1977:

Item	Manuscript Page	Review Responsibility
25	47	EA Division
159	181	EA Division and NE Div.
160	182	" " " "
161	183	" " " "
162	184	" " " "
163	184	" " " "
164	185	" " " "
205	234	NE Division
208	235	LA Division
209	236	LA Division
295	424	EA Division
297	425	EA Division and EUR Div.
299	426	EA Division and EUR Div.
301	427	AF Division
190	214	SE Division (Office of Security may be appropriate action office for this item)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630

S E C R E T

4. Where more than one Division is involved, a single coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions, please contact the writer on x1542.

Norbert A Shepanek

N. A. Shepanek

Attachments
As Noted Above

O/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)

Distribution
Original - C/EA/CA
1 - E/FP/FC
1 - NE/COPS
1 - C/AF/Plans
1 - C/SE/OSG
1 - LA/FOIA
2 - SA/DO/O

[Hussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a desire to counter its anti-American, anti-Hussein line (which was not new), so the CIA funded the building of a Jordanian television station. A CIA owned, New York based proprietary company, named RTV, provided the technical expertise and management skills to put the station in operation.] (24)

Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special relationship is Nationalist CHina. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's link is not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent, Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA chief of station, Ray Cline, now the State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all-night drinking bouts with the younger Chiang.

[Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revolution.] (25)

In South Vietnam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally conducting all important meetings with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was accompanied by the CIA chief of station when there was Agency business to be discussed. But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President. According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea.

[Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu personally with ~~personallyywith~~ millions of dollars in untraceable, "black bag" funds (laundered money) ~~in addition to the hundreds of~~] (26)

the information straight forwardly, thereby, handicapping the analysts in making a confident judgment of the accuracy of the report's content. *

Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive large numbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from actual agents. But by mixing together information supplied by audio surveillance (which is, by definition, an accurate account of what was said) with agent reports which are sometimes exaggerated or false, the Clandestine Services confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose function it is to analyze foreign events and indirectly those leaders who make decisions based on that intelligence analysis.

[In the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and the experts of the Scientific and Technical Directorate combined forces to carry out one of the Agency's most imaginative (if ultimately unsuccessful) intelligence collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level U.S. government officials were disturbed by repprts that Communist China was on the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system. They knew that the threat posed by Chinese ICBM's would play an important part in the decision, then under consideration, to go ahead with an American anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtzu, the Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia. (159)

The Agency's technical specialists responded by designing a nuclear-ppwered device which could monitor certain key electronic emissions coming from the missile site, well over a thousand miles away, and then rely the information to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain peak called the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, in the Indian Himalayas from where it would have an unobstructed "line-of-sight" to the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA laboratories, the Clandestine Services took on the responsibility for the mos difficult phase of the operation -- installing the machine on the mountain top.

The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project. Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry the device, complete with its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb. Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an experienced CIA case officer.

That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top of Nanda Devi. Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda Devi.

Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the would do. Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by a small party of climbers accompanied by a few porters. Soon after the group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes. The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now well off schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news of the successful installation was radioed back to the staging area.

But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headwaters of the sacred Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about religious pollution, not ecological.

The CIA reacted by planning another climb of the mountain for the following year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring system -- this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team, led by Bishop, was gathered together again and this time it reached the top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year before was not found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor device stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical malfunction. (162)

At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the Communist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were thanked and compensated for their cooperation. And the American climbers were presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA.

The fertile imaginations of the [redacted]S&T experts during the following years produced many more unique coolrction schemes aimed at solving the mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential. The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into the denied area where, after performing his espionage mission, he would assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border. Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with this scheme, and the projectydied on the drawing boards.

A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could (163) be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, an aerial rising from its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a foreign and hostile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine raised serious questions as to the system's utility and worth. The [redacted]S&T

specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however (164) oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear attack. Development of the costly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation that the device failed to self-activate and function properly.

A third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird, (165) such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras would be turned on to record activities below and relay the information either to its launch site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the CIA in research on this "baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was to be, of course, that if and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an Agency-sponsored spying mission.

The technical difficulties involved in the air-drop system and the model (166) airplane device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully (167) developed by their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement for these questionable and potentially provocative collection systems before they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value -- were also being

Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its operation against Cuba. The President may have set the original policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply by approving an attack on Cuba, he would set in train Agency paramilitary activities against Guatamala.

CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on American foreign policy/ they can subject the country to blackmail if something goes wrong. For instance, after the CIA pilot was shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, within five days the US government approved the sale for local currency of 37,000 tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on $1 million in small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that moment, the CIA was actively backing an armed revolution against the Sukarno regime these would have been strange actions indeed for the US government to take if it were not extremely concerned about saving the captured pilot.

XX

A somewhat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960 after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trustworthy. When the Agency technician plugged in his polygraph machine in a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building.* The

---

*This was not the only time that the CIA blew major fuses overseas. During the mid-1960s, the Agency added to its numerous facilities on Taiwan by building a huge electronic ~~[illegible]~~ espionage 295

SECRET

lie detector man, a CIA case officer, and the local agent were soon all under arrest. The Singapore government and the British, who were in the process of granting Singapore its independence, were both quite disturbed bythe indident. Negotiations then ensued to secure the men's release. According to Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the US government offered$3.3 million to get them out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten times as much and consequently took nothing. In any case, the two CIA officials were subsequently freed, the newly installed Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a secret letter of apology to the Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in a speech as an example of the type of activities engaged in by the CIA. The State Department then issued a routine denial furnished by the CIA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee's charges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusk's letter of apology, and State was forced to retract its original statement, although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered. As well as embarrassing the US government and making headlines around the world, the incident caused the State Department to revamp its internal system for making announcements about intelligence matters.

[Blackmail was agin the theme in the mid-1960s when the (296) President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, quietly informed the]

[installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When the device was turned on for the first time, it knocked out a large (297) part of the island's power. In this case, the local government reacted in a much more friendly manner than did Singapore's.]

426

US government that he might oust certain intelligence installations from his island. The CIA had a major interest in the matter, since it operated a Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS) listening post there, and the Pentagon was also concerned about the possible loss of its large electronic surveillance facilities. The view in the intelligence community was that Makarios had to be mollified at practically all costs. Finally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the wily old archbishop, and he received a special payment of about $10 million in return for letting the bases remain. The CIA put up half of the money, using the Director's Contingency Fund for this unforseen expense. 298

In general, the presence of American intelligence facilities in a foreign country can have an important effect on American policy toward that country, especially in the Tgird World. Closely aligned countries, such as England, Germany, Japan, and Australia, have usually allowed the United States to set up electronic spying bases as part of the general framework of cooperation between allies. But to the less developed countries, the presence of an American installation is both a threat and an opportunity. The threat comes from domestic opposition forces who look on the base as an example of "neo-colonialism" and use it as a weapon against those in power. The opportunity arises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly for the right to install its eavesdropping equipment--and to keep it in place, as Archbishop Makarios discovered. 299 300

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Norbert A. Shepanek O/SA/DO/O 2D0109	EXTENSION 1542 9564	NO. DATE 14 June 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Ralph J. Katrosh SA/DO/O		14 June		
2.				
3. Crocky Hogg LA/FOIA 3C34 Hqs.		16 June		
4.				
5. Norbert Shepanek O/SA/DO/O 2D0109				To 5: To the best of our knowledge, items 208 and 209 have not been made public.
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

14 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : Norbert A. Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O

SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks

1. In conjunction with the current review of the deletions in subject book for possible declassification, the DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached (see page 3).

2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the details.

3. The following items should be reviewed by the components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by 23 June 1977:

Item	Manuscript Page	Review Responsibility
25	47	EA Division
159	181	EA Division and NE Div.
160	182	" " " "
161	183	" " " "
162	184	" " " "
163	184	" " " "
164	185	" " " "
205	234	NE Division
208	235	LA Division
209	236	LA Division
295	424	EA Division
297	425	EA Division and EUR Div.
299	426	EA Division and EUR Div.
301	427	AF Division
190	214	SE Division (Office of Security may be appropriate action office for this item)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630

SECRET

4. Where more than one Division is involved, a single coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions, please contact the writer on x1542.

(signed) **Norbert A. Shepanek**

N. A. Shepanek

Attachments
As Noted Above

O/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)

Distribution
Original - C/EA/CA
1 - E/FP/FC
1 - NE/COPS
1 - C/AF/Plans
1 - C/SE/OSG
1 - LA/FOIA
2 - SA/DO/O

[situation in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. They had figured out a way to intercept his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Written on top of each intercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be kept especially confident because State was unaware that the CIA had a copy.

Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information,] Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even after these two men met at CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so aggravated by this continued resistance that he personally telephoned Secretary of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing completely to the CIA position.

(208) out

[Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercppt the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements were normal procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which cooperated in good faith.

FI/D's liaison with the South American country continued for a long period of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over unrelated issues, and as a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship. However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could be restored.]

[Sometime later, Bbb suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and wether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to be a matter concerning CIA. Only later did the executive suite officer learn from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American country in which liaison would be restored in return for a Comsat channel(which CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme even with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office.

Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel; the country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that country's secret messages.]

Bob's job with FI/D is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even lies within the U.S. government -- not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into liaison agreements with FI/D.

Bob X is one of these ordinary looking people who mow their lawn, love their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.

~~Tow~~ Two other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and E. Howard Hunt. Both had long, relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper-middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt was an operator who played a leading role in the Bay of Pigs and who took part

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
E/FP/FC
4 B 4406

EXTENSION
1872

NO.

JUN 23 9 59 AM '77

DATE
23 June 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. O/SA/DO/O Mr. Shepanek				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

S-E-C-R-E-T

23 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O

FROM : William W. Phelps
EUR/FP/FC

SUBJECT : Coordination of Deletions in Marks-Marchetti Book

REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977

European Division concurs that the two items involving EUR (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should remain classified.

William W Phelps
William W. Phelps

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 003283

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

23 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O

FROM : William W. Phelps
EUR/FP/FC

SUBJECT : Coordination of Deletions in Marks-Marchetti Book

REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977

European Division concurs that the two items involving EUR (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should remain classified.

William W. Phelps

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 003283

S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: NE/COPS	EXTENSION 9165	NO. DATE 23 June 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. O/SA/DO/O Attn: Mr. Shepanek TUBE: DX-6				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

JUN 23 1 12 PM '77

23 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O

ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek

FROM : Joyce R. Herrmann
Chief of Operations, NE Division

SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the *Cult of Intelligence* by Marchetti - Marks

NE Division has researched the seven DDS&T items cited in reference and to our knowledge none of the items cited have been legally placed in the public domain. Therefore, the items remain classified under Executive Order 11652 as listed below:

Item	Manuscript Page	Exemption
159	181	5B (2) (3)
160	182	5B (2) (3)
161	183	5B (2) (3)
162	184	5B (2) (3)
163	184	5B (2) (3)
164	185	5B (2) (3)
205	234	5B (2) (3)

Joyce R. Herrmann

Joyce R. Herrmann

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

AC/SE
5B4803

EXTENSION NO. 9045

JUN 24 10 26 AM '77

DATE 23 June 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. O/SA/DO/O 2D0109		24 rh		
2.				
3. Skip				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

23 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO for External Oversight

ATTENTION : Norbert A. Shepanek

FROM : Katharine C. Hart
Acting Chief, Soviet/East European Division

SUBJECT : Deletions in the The Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Subject: DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks, dated 14 June 1977

1. We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division interests referred to the DDO for coordination by the DDS&T. This concerns an item from the Marchetti and Marks book, The Cult of Intelligence. Checking against official disclosures we have determined the item is still properly classified under Executive Order 11652.

2. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, relating to Soviet capabilities to make intelligible the sounds picked up by audio devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in Moscow, remains classified SECRET. This item relates to cryptography and is exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(2).

Katharine C. Hart
Katharine C. Hart

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014652

SECRET

23 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO for External Oversight

ATTENTION : Norbert A. Shepanek

FROM : Katharine C. Hart
Acting Chief, Soviet/East European Division

SUBJECT : Deletions in the The Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Subject: DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks, dated 14 June 1977

1. We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division interests referred to the DDO for coordination by the DDS&T. This concerns an item from the Marchetti and Marks book, The Cult of Intelligence. Checking against official disclosures we have determined the item is still properly classified under Executive Order 11652.

2. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, relating to Soviet capabilities to make intelligible the sounds picked up by audio devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in Moscow, remains classified SECRET. This item relates to cryptography and is exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(2).

Katharine C. Hart
Katharine C. Hart

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014652

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti-Marks

Jul 6 5 53 PM '77

FROM: Chief, Africa Plans

EXTENSION: 1326

NO.:

DATE: 6 JUL 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. O/SA/DO/O Attn: Mr. Shepanek				File -
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

6 JUL 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O
Attn: Mr. Shepanek

FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans

SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti-Marks

We concur in the DDS&T's conclusion that Item 301, page 247 remain classified.

Edward J. Foy

Edward J. Foy, Jr.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

SECRET

6 JUL 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O
Attn: Mr. Shepanek

FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans

SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti-Marks

We concur in the DDS&T's conclusion that Item 301, page 247 remain classified.

/s/ EDWARD J. FOY, JR.
Edward J. Foy, Jr.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

PAGE 1 TOP

LEFT SIDE ARTICLE

Transcript of the President's News Con

Following is a transcript of President Carter's news conference in Washington yesterday afternoon, as recorded by The New York Times through the facilities of ABC News:

Opening Statement

Good afternoon everybody. I'd like to make a very brief statement as a progress report to the American people of some items that are important to us.

We have submitted and the Congress is now considering legislation to give me the authority to reorganize the executive branch of Government. The Senate Committee under Senator Ribicoff has now completed their hearings and they'll be marking up the bill beginning tomorrow.

The House Committee on Government Operations under Congressman Jack Brooks has scheduled hearings to begin on March 1.

So because of the interest of the American people and the Congress and myself in completing this very crucial project I think the Congress is moving with great expedition to give me that authority.

We've also initiated with directions to the members of the Cabinet and other agency heads a new program to cut down on the extremely great overload of paper work with a requirement that those who prepare Government regulations be responsible for the preparation assigned them. I've asked my Cabinet officers to read the regulations that are forthcoming from their departments each week until they see the volume and the complexity of them, and we hope to eliminate unnecessary regulations, abbreviate those that are necessary and express them in a language so that we can all understand them.

I've also asked major elements of our own society, the university professors and the state officials in this last week to give me their suggestions on how the regulations might be improved.

We have done the same thing with reports required by the Federal Government. I hope to reduce drastically the number of reports and the frequency of those reports and the complexity of them.

We will complete the proposed legislation on creating a new Department of Energy this week. The proposed legislation is now on my desk. It will be submitted to the Congress for action the first of next week. And we've consulted very closely with the key leaders in the Congress and I believe there's going to be a rapid creation of this new department and a heavy emphasis on the importance of energy questions to our people.

We will also present to the American people probably at a joint session of the Congress a speech by me about April 20, a comprehensive energy policy which would involve all the complexities of the energy question. It's something that's long overdue and it's going to be quite profound in its impact on the American consciousness and our society, and I hope it will be compre-

President Carter walking past reporters after news conference at the E

I'm not going to leave of not commenting directly on any specific C.I.A. activity. But I can tell you that I have begun a complete analysis which will be completed within the next week of all activities by the C.I.A. I've received substantial reports already.

I've reviewed the more controversial revelations that have been publicized in the last few days, some quite erroneous, some with some degree of accuracy. These same operations have been reviewed by the Intelligence Oversight Board, an independent board, and also by my predecessory, President Ford. I have not found anything illegal or improper.

If in future assessments, which will come quite early, I discover such an impropriety or an illegality I will not only take immediate action to correct it but also will let the American people know about it.

I might say this. This is a very serious problem of how in a democracy to have adequate intelligence gathered, assessed and used to guarantee the security of our country. It's not part of the American nature to do things in secret. Obviously, historically and still at this modern time there is a necessity to protect sources of information from other nations. Sometimes other Governments cooperate with us fully; sometimes they don't.

But I'll try to be sure, and so will Stan Turner, who will be the next director of the intelligence community. He will try to be sure that every thing we do is not only proper and legal, but also compatible with the attitudes of the American people.

One other point I'd like to make is this. It can be extremely damaging to our relationship with other nations, to the potential security of our country

with labor and management. Bu whether I'll be successful, I don't know I'm just going to have to do my best.

6. Human Rights Abroad

Q. In your letter to Mr. Sakharov you said that the United States would use its good offices to seek the release of prisoners of conscience. And you said that you wanted to continue to shape a world responsible to human aspirations. As you know there are human rights problems in many other countries. And some of them like Iran or the Philippines we support with arms, or we support with American aid. These are countries where many people believe we have more leverage than we might have in the Soviet Union. What if anything do you plan to try to do to help victims of political repression in these countries?

A. I think without my trying to take credit for it there has been a substantial move toward concern about human rights throughout the world. I think this has taken place in probably a dozen or more different countries. There's an arousing interest in the position that our own Government here in our free country does take. Obviously there are deprivations of human rights even more brutal than the ones on which we've commented up to now.

In Uganda the actions there have disgusted the entire civilized world and, as you know, we have no diplomatic relationships with Uganda. But here is an instance where both Ambassador Andrew Young and I have expressed great concern about what is there. The British are now considering asking the United Nations to go into Uganda to assess the horrible murders that apparently are taking place in that country—

13-00000

PAGE 2
MIDDLE
LEFT SIDE

in the Congress and I believe there's going to be a rapid creation of this new department and a heavy emphasis on the importance of energy questions to our people.

We will also present to the American people probably at a joint session of the Congress a speech by me about April 20, a comprehensive energy policy which would involve all the complexities of the energy question. It's something that's long overdue and it's going to be quite profound in its impact on the American consciousness and our society, and I hope it will be comprehensive enough so that it can be well-balanced and fair to all.

We are quite concerned about the pressures of inflation. The advisers to me on economics are trying to assess all Government programs and private actions that contribute to inflationary pressures. When this analysis is done I will use every means that I have available to me to express these concerns and possibly corrective actions to the American people as well.

And the last point is that we will have a complete analysis underway now on deregulation. And the first question is the deregulation of the air lines. Legislation is in the Congress now. We'll ~~be~~ submitting a message to Congress very shortly on that subject. We will not submit administration legislation because the Congress has already moved substantially forward in dealing with this important issue.

And now I'd like to answer questions. Mr. Frank Cormier.

Questions and Answers

1. Defense Budget

Q. Mr. President, you told the Democratic Platform Committee that you thought present defense expenditures could be reduced by five to seven billion dollars. Now I think you may have modified your position somewhat since then. Obviously in your short time in office you didn't find the opportunity to make cuts like that in your precedessor's budget. But isn't it also likely that next year's budget for the defense will exceed this year's.

A. Well because of inflationary pressures and because of an impossibility of assessing the potential threat to our country from other nations, it's hard to predict exactly what the level of defense spending will be. In the short time that we had available to work on the previous Administration's budget—about three weeks of hard work—we were able to reduce the suggested expenditures by almost $3 billion. I think about $2.75 billion.

This was done—and I think Senator Stennis in his recent public statements has confirmed that it has been done without weakening our own defense capability. And the substantial savings in defense spending that will still leave us muscle will be in such things as the standardization of weapons, long-range planning, a more businesslike allocation of defense contracting, an assessment of the defense contracts for construction or repair already outstanding.

A reassessment of priorities of the evolution of new weapons which in the future can become enormously expensive; a longer assignment of military personnel to a base before they are transferred; some emphasis on the correction of inequities and unfairnesses in the retirement system.

These things obviously can't be done in three weeks, but they will be an ongoing effort on my part. And I think the 1979 budget, which will be my Administration's first budget, will

other nations. Sometimes other Governments cooperate with us fully; sometimes they don't.

But I'll try to be sure, and so will Stan Turner, who will be the next director of the intelligence community. He will try to be sure that every thing we do is not only proper and legal, but also compatible with the attitudes of the American people.

One other point I'd like to make is this. It can be extremely damaging to our relationship with other nations, to the potential security of our country even in peacetime, for these kinds of operations which are legitimate and proper to be revealed. It makes it hard for us to lay a groundwork on which we might predicate a successful meeting of a threat to us in time of war if we don't have some degree of secrecy.

I'm quite concerned about the number of people now who have access to this kind of information. And I've been working very closely with the Congressional leaders, yesterday and today, to try to reduce the overall number of people who have access to the sources of information that within the bounds that I've ~~described—propriety~~ and legality and American attitudes toward secrecy—I'll do the best I can not ever to make a mistake. And I'm also assuming on a continuing basis a direct personal reponsibility for the operation of all the ingelligence agencies in our Government to make sure that they are meeting these standards.

3. Correcting Errors on C.I.A.

Q. If there has been erroneous information, wouldn't it behoove you to correct the record?

A. In some ways we are correcting the record, but if I began to either dispute or confirm every individual story that's written whether correct or erroneous on every matter relating to the C.I.A., then these matters which are necessarily secret would no longer be secret, so I'm not going to comment on individual items that relate to intelligence.

4. Difference With Meany

Q. Mr. President, George Meany says he won't go along with your idea for pre-notification on wage and price increases. And my question really is, how hard are you going to press Mr. Meany to go along and do you have anything else in mind that you could use in the way of Government involving itself to try to control inflation?

A. I announced earlier my firm commitment not to have mandatory wage and price laws or authority, not to have standby wage and price authority. I've not made any proposal to Mr. Meany or any other labor leader nor to any representative of industry or manufacturing. But I will retain the option in the future of assessing what we need to do to control inflation.

I've emphasized always the word "voluntary." And to the extent that I can arrive at a common understanding with industry and labor leaders that a certain amount of cooperation and information can be exchanged before a major proposal is made. I think that's a legitimate pursuit of mine. I can't force it. It's got to be voluntary. And that's as far as I can go with my answer.

5. Wage-Price Guidelines

Q. You mean just directly about wage

there are deprivations of human rights even more brutal than the ones on which we've commented up to now.

In Uganda the actions there have disgusted the entire civilized world and, as you know, we have no diplomatic relationships with Uganda. But here is an instance where both Ambassador Andrew Young and I have expressed great concern about what is there. The British are now considering asking the United Nations to go into Uganda to assess the horrible murders that apparently are taking place in that country—the persecution of those who have aroused the ire of Mr. Amin.

I've expressed my concern about imprisoned political prisoners in South Korea, in Cuba, in many countries—in several countries, rather,—in South America and I'll continue to do so. I have never had an inclination to single out the Soviet Union as the only place where human rights are being abridged.

We have, I think, a responsibility and a legal right to express our disapproval of violations of human rights. The Helsinki Agreement, so called Basket Three Provision, insures that some of these human rights shall be preserved. We are a signatory of the Helsinki agreement. We are ourselves culpable in some ways for not giving people adequate rights to move around our country or restricting unnecessarily, in my opinion, visitation to this country by those who disagree with us politically.

So I think that we all ought to take a position in our own country and among our friends and allies, among our potential adversaries, that human rights is something on which we should bear a major responsibility for leadership. And I have made it clear to the Soviet Union and to others in the Eastern European community that I'm not trying to launch a unilateral criticism of them; that I'm trying to set a standard in our own country and make my concerns expressed throughout the world, not singled out against any particular country.

Q. Mr. President, the other day, getting back to this C.I.A. thing, when that story broke your Press Secretary, when he issued what amounted to a "no comment" by the White House, someone asked him if this story had broken back during the campaign when you were running for President, would you have given a similar response? And he said "well I don't know." So can I ask you, what would have been your response? Would it have been the same? A. I don't know.

7. Review of C.I.A. Activities

Q. Mr. President, on that same subject, you said earlier that your review of C.I.A. activities had found nothing illegal or improper and you later said that these activities are legitimate and proper. Isn't that a value judgment that the American public might like to share? But how can they if you refuse to give them any idea of what you have discovered during this review about payments, including ones made in secret?

A. That is a value judgment. It's made by the independent Intelligence Oversight Board, which was established and appointed by President Ford. This board has made itself available to the Inspector General and to any employee within the C.I.A. or within the defense intelligence agencies or any other to receive even rumors of impropriety.

LEFT SIDE

pressures of inflation. The advisers to me on economics are trying to assess all Government programs and private actions that contribute to inflationary pressures. When this analysis is done I will use every means that I have available to me to express these concerns and possibly corrective actions to the American people as well.

And the last point is that we will have a complete analysis underway now on deregulation. And the first question is the deregulation of the air lines. Legislation is in the Congress now. We'll be submitting a message to Congress very shortly on that subject. We will not submit administration legislation because the Congress has already moved substantially forward in dealing with this important issue.

And now I'd like to answer questions. Mr. Frank Cormier.

Questions and Answers

1. Defense Budget

Q. Mr. President, you told the Democratic Platform Committee that you thought present defense expenditures could be reduced by five to seven billion dollars. Now I think you may have modified your position somewhat since then. Obviously in your short time in office you didn't find the opportunity to make cuts like that in your predecessor's budget. But isn't it also likely that next year's budget for the defense will exceed this year's.

A. Well because of inflationary pressures and because of an impossibility of assessing the potential threat to our country from other nations, it's hard to predict exactly what the level of defense spending will be. In the short time that we had available to work on the previous Administration's budget—about three weeks of hard work—we were able to reduce the suggested expenditures by almost $3 billion. I think about $2.75 billion.

This was done—and I think Senator Stennis in his recent public statements has confirmed that it has been done without weakening our own defense capability. And the substantial savings in defense spending that will still leave us muscle will be in such things as the standardization of weapons, long-range planning, a more businesslike allocation of defense contracting, an assessment of the defense contracts for construction or repair already outstanding.

A reassessment of priorities of the evolution of new weapons which in the future can become enormously expensive; a longer assignment of military personnel to a base before they are transferred; some emphasis on the correction of inequities and unfairnesses in the retirement system.

These things obviously can't be done in three weeks, but they will be an ongoing effort on my part. And I think the 1979 budget, which will be my Administration's first budget, will show these improvements to a substantial degree.

Q. Will next year's defense budget actually be lower then than the one that you just revised. A. I can't say yet.

2. C.I.A. Accountability

Q. Do you think it was proper for the C.I.A. to pay off King Hussein and other foreign leaders? And what steps are you taking to make yourself more knowledgeable and more accountable for what the C.I.A. does?

A. Well, I've adopted a policy which for us to lay a groundwork on which we might predicate a successful meeting of a threat to us in time of war if we don't have some degree of secrecy.

I'm quite concerned about the number of people now who have access to this kind of information. And I've been working very closely with the Congressional leaders, yesterday and today, to try to reduce the overall number of people who have access to the sources of information that within the bounds that I've described—propriety and legality and American attitudes toward secrecy—I'll do the best I can not ever to make a mistake. And I'm also assuming on a continuing basis a direct personal reponsibility for the operation of all the ingelligence agencies in our Government to make sure that they are meeting these standards.

3. Correcting Errors on C.I.A.

Q. If there has been erroneous information, wouldn't it behoove you to correct the record?

A. In some ways we are correcting the record, but if I began to either dispute or confirm every individual story that's written whether correct or erroneous on every matter relating to the C.I.A., then these matters which are necessarily secret would no longer be secret, so I'm not going to comment on individual items that relate to intelligence.

4. Difference With Meany

Q. Mr. President, George Meany says he won't go along with your idea for pre-notification on wage and price increases. And my question really is, how hard are you going to press Mr. Meany to go along and do you have anything else in mind that you could use in the way of Government involving itself to try to control inflation?

A. I announced earlier my firm commitment not to have mandatory wage and price laws or authority, not to have standby wage and price authority. I've not made any proposal to Mr. Meany or any other labor leader nor to any representative of industry or manufacturing. But I will retain the option in the future of assessing what we need to do to control inflation.

I've emphasized always the word "voluntary." And to the extent that I can arrive at a common understanding with industry and labor leaders that a certain amount of cooperation and information can be exchanged before a major proposal is made. I think that's a legitimate pursuit of mine. I can't force it. It's got to be voluntary. And that's as far as I can go with my answer.

5. Wage-Price Guidelines

Q. You mean just directly about wage and price "guidelines" which might be voluntary. How is that for an idea?

A. Well I think rigid guidelines are a mistake. If we said, for instance, that no price increase or no wage increase could exceed 6 percent this would be too restrictive. It would be contrary to my own philosophy of Government and I think that because of the diversity of our society and the fact that it is a free enterprise system, you've got to have some flexibility.

But I'd prefer to deal with these problems that arise on increasing prices on an individual bases and I also prefer, of course, to work harmoniously

prisoned political prisoners in South Korea, in Cuba, in many countries—in several countries, rather,—in South America and I'll continue to do so. I have never had an inclination to single out the Soviet Union as the only place where human rights are being abridged.

We have, I think, a responsibility and a legal right to express our disapproval of violations of human rights. The Helsinki Agreement, so-called Basket Three Provision, insures that some of these human rights shall be preserved. We are a signatory of the Helsinki agreement. We are ourselves culpable in some ways for not giving people adequate rights to move around our country or restricting unnecessarily, in my opinion, visitation to this country by those who disagree with us politically.

So I think that we all ought to take a position in our own country and among our friends and allies, among our potential adversaries, that human rights is something on which we should bear a major responsibility for leadership. And I have made it clear to the Soviet Union and to others in the Eastern European community that I'm not trying to launch a unilateral criticism of them, that I'm trying to set a standard in our own country and make my concerns expressed throughout the world, not singled out against any particular country.

Q. Mr. President, the other day, getting back to this C.I.A. thing, when that story broke your Press Secretary, when he issued what amounted to a "no comment" by the White House, someone asked him if this story had broken back during the campaign when you were running for President, would you have given a similar response? And he said "well I don't know." So can I ask you, what would have been your response? Would it have been the same? A. I don't know.

7. Review of C.I.A. Activities

Q. Mr. President, on that same subject, you said earlier that your review of C.I.A. activities had found nothing illegal or improper and you later said that these activities are legitimate and proper. Isn't that a value judgment that the American public might like to share? But how can they if you refuse to give them any idea of what you have discovered during this review about payments, including ones made in secret?

A. That is a value judgment. It's made by the independent Intelligence Oversight Board, which was established and appointed by President Ford. This board has made itself available to the Inspector General and to any employee within the C.I.A. or within the defense intelligence agencies or any other to receive even rumors of impropriety. They have assessed these operations. They made their inquiries in the past, which is in accordance with an executive order issued by President Ford to the Attorney General of the United States and also to the President.

I have read that correspondence. It's quite voluminous and I think that it's accurate to say that Senator Inouye's committee in the Senate and the appropriate committees in the House have also received this information in the past.

I have talked to Senator Inouye and he confirms what I've just told you. And I think he would also confirm that

PAGE 3 BOTTOM

13-00000

Right side article

PAGE 1 TOP

ference on Foreign and Domestic Matters

The New York Times/Teresa Zabala

cutive Office Buiding in Washington

the impropriety or the illegality does not exist on any ongoing C.I.A. operation.

8. Problems With Congress

Q. Mr. President, Charles Kirbo, your friend Charles Kirbo seems to feel that you're going to be having a continuing problem with the Congress and that you'll have to go over Congress's head to the people in order to get results. Is this true?

A. I think if you read the whole statement that Mr. Kirbo made, which is just a private citizen's opinion, he would say that every President has had arguments and debates and disagreements with the Congress. And I think that's inevitable in our system of Government. That's part of the checks and balances that's very precious to us all.

I have found up to now a growing sense of cooperation with the Congress. I think last week when I was asked roughly the same question that the troubles were perhaps underestimated by the news media. I think now perhaps the troubles with the Congress are overestimated. I have frequent meetings with the Congressional leaders both Democratic and Republican. And I think that the progress of the legislation that we consider to be crucial which seemed to be moving very slowly in the past is now speeding up.

So I don't believe that we'll have nearly the problems with the Congress that has been the case in recent years. And I have to say in summary that I am very pleased with my relationship with the Congress now.

9. The Election Process

Q. Mr. President, in view of your assignment to Vice President Mondale regarding the election laws, could you give us your view, sir, on the direct

But I will work with Congress on the deregulation of natural gas as a part of an overall energy policy. By April 20 I think we'll be prepared to present to you, the news media, and the people and the Congress more specific proposals involving direct legislation proposals that will answer your question more fully.

13. Energy Program Sacrifices

Q. Mr. President, we've been told that the central thrust of your new energy program will involve sacrifice and voluntary conservation, yet the public's always reading stories in the paper of how the major oil companies are withholding natural gas. So I'd like to ask how are you going to expect the public to make sacrifices when there's such widespread public suspicion about the role of the oil companies in the energy crisis.

A. I think the comprehensive nature of the proposal that takes in all these very disparate and sometimes conflicting elements at one time and a long-range projection of our needs and a tangible demonstration to the American people, to the extent that I'm able to put it forward, that there will be direct ultimate benefits to them will be the elements that will cause them to make those sacrifices. At the same time, I want to increase the surety that we have that the reserve supply data given to us by the oil companies and others are accurate.

We are now conducting some admittedly superficial studies by Secretacy Cecil Andrus in Interior and also they'll be followed up by more detailed studies under Dr. Schlesinger, to see whether or not the reserve supplies are adequate and whether or not the oil companies are giving us accurate data. I think it's obvious to all of us that there are some instances where natural gas is withheld from the market. That's understandable. If I was running an oil company I would reserve the right to release or to reserve some supplies of natural gas.

With the emergency legislation that the Congress did pass, I think in about a week of assessment during the frigid part of the winter—it's still very cold—we were given some authority to buy extra gas at a very high price. This is obviously a transcient circumstance.

But I believe the American people will be willing to make the sacrifices required, if they are convinced that future reports will be accurate, that supplies will not be withheld from the market and if we can let the oil companies know in a predictable way what our policy will be two months or two years or 20 years in the future—within the bounds of human reason—then I think they'll be much less likely to withhold supplies of oil and natural gas from the market just hoping that they'll get some bonanza increased price in the future if the policies do change.

14. Rise in Gasoline Tax

Q. Another question, sir, on the sacrifices that you say your upcoming energy program is going to demand. Is it likely that one of those sacrifices is going to come in the form of a largely increased Federal gasoline tax?

A. I don't know how to answer your

was a waste. You also promised to cut the waste out of the defense budget. When would you expect to stop production of the B-1 as opposed to research and development on the B-1?

A. I think I cut out about more than $200 million from the B-1 program in the budget just submitted to the Congress. I have serious questions about whether or not the B-1 ought to be in the future the center of our airborne defense capability.

I have several more months before I have to make a decision on that matter and the National Security Council, which combines, as you know, State, Treasury, Defense and other elements of the Government, working very closely with me, is now making a complete reassessment of the need for the B-1 bomber.

I don't know whether we will decide to go on with it or not. And I don't know whether we'll expedite production of it or not, at this time.

Part of the factor to be assessed is the attitude of the Soviet Union. If we can have a general lessening of tension, a demonstrated commitment on their part toward disarmament, it would certainly make it less likely that we would go ahead with the B-1.

But I can't answer that question until I complete my own study, and I think that would have to be terminated by the end of May.

18. Campaign Financing Law

Q. Mr. President, I was a little unclear about what you're going to propose in the campaign finance law. Are you saying that you will propose to have all Congressional elections publicly financed? A. That's my preference, yes. Q. Is that what you will propose to Congress? A. The Vice President is now doing a study on a complete election law package. And I'd like to reserve my own judgment until I see what his report is to me. But that's my own inclination. It's a position that I took during the campaign and so far I have no reason to change my mind.

19. Foreign Policy Turntable

Q. You gave us a kind of a timetable for your domestic program in your preliminary statement. I wonder if you have a similar timetable of what you hope to achieve in foreign policy between now and the end of the year, such as Middle East peace, Cyprus, the treaty with Panama.

A. Of course I can't answer that question specifically because I don't know what cooperation we will get from other nations and I don't know what the inclination of those nations in disputed regions of the world want to do toward one another.

Secretary Cyrus Vance has just returned from what I consider to be a very successful trip to the Middle East. He not only probed with the heads of those Governments and their Cabinet members their own positions, both public and private on the controversial issues that have so far prevented a peace in the Middle East. He also had a chance to compare their positions on issues—which ones they found to be in harmony, which ones there was

page 2
middle

And I have to say in summary that I am very pleased with my relationship with the Congress now.

9. The Election Process

Q. Mr. President, in view of your assignment to Vice President Mondale regarding the election laws, could you give us your view, sir, on the direct election of a President versus the Electoral College. And also do you think that the public financing should be extended to Congress as well as the Presidency?

A. There are three basic questions that come up. In the first place, I do favor at least an automatic vote by Presidential electors once the general election is completed. I think the Electoral Colllege, for instance, should be eliminated. Whether the ratio among states of votes ought to be changed I'm not prepared to comment on now.

As far as the financing of Congressional elections by public funds—it has proved to be successful, I believe, in the Presidential election. I strongly favor that, yes. And the other element of the overall package would be a simple way for American people who are citizens and 18 years old to register to vote. And I am committed to that proposition and the Vice President has graciously consented to take on this overall election process responsibility. Those three will be basic elements of the proposals.

10. Relations With Cuba

Q. Mr. President, are you prepared to lift the trade embargo against Cuba as one step toward normalizing relations?

A. I think any substantial move in our relationship with Cuba would have to await further discussions with them indirectly, and also some tangible evidence on our part that they are willing to restore basic human rights in Cuba, involving the number of prisoners who are being held, their attitude toward overseas adventures such as the one in Angola, and other matters. So I can't say what might come in the future.

I'm willing, though, to discuss these matters with the Cuban leaders. At this time we have no direct relationships with them, political. But through intermediaries comments are being exchanged back and forth. Most of my comments are in public statements like this, but we do have messages coming back from people who visit Cuba.

11. Defense Savings Goal

Q. In answer to an earlier question, Mr. President, you said that you couldn't say whether next year's defense budget will be lower or higher than this year's. But as I understood your earlier postion, you did want to achieve a five to seven billion dollar savings regardless of the overall level of spending. Do you still hold with that figure? Is that still your goal and a commitment?

A. Yes. The analyses that I've made of the defense budget so far—which as you know has been limited to about a month's study just part-time—indicate that that's a goal that will be reached.

12. Natural Gas Deregulation

Q. Mr. President, in letters to the governors of Oklahoma, Texas and Louisiana last October, you said unconditionally that you would work with Congress to deregulate new natural gas. And I wondered if you planned to keep that promise, and if so how you will go about it?

future if the policies do change.

14. Rise in Gasoline Tax

Q. Another question, sir, on the sacrifices that you say your upcoming energy program is going to demand. Is it likely that one of those sacrifices is going to come in the form of a largely increased Federal gasoline tax?

A. I don't know how to answer your questions about specifics of the proposal. I want to make this clear. The purpose of the energy policy evolution is not to cause sacrifice or hardship among the American people.Unless I can demonstrate that in balance the temporary sacrifices in a certain area are far overcome by immediate and ultimate benefits then nobody's going to buy it.

And I believe that we've now got such a horrible conglomeration of confusion in the energy field that nobody knows what's going to happen next. So I think that the sacrifices will be far overcome by the benefits that the American people will be easily able to discern for themselves.

15. U.S. Role on Canada

Q. You said that in spite of the fact that the Canadian people would have to determine their future for themselves, particularly in regard to the separatism issue in Quebec that you had confidence that the issue would be straightened out relatively peacefully. Do you really think that there is little concern in this country about the future of a unified Canada and is there anything really that we can do about it?

A. There's a great deal of concern in this country about the future of Canada and I have complete confidence, as I said in an interview with the Canadian news media in the sound judgment of the Canadian people.

I'm familiar—and even more familiar today than I was two days ago after Prime Minister Trudeau's visit—with the problems in Quebec and the inclination of some of the French Canadians to have an independent status from the rest of Canadian Provinces.

I don't know what's going to be the ultimate outcome. But I believe that we are so closely tied together with Canada on a mutually beneficial basis, sharing problems, sharing opportunities, sharing trade, sharing manufacturing companies that have joint ownership, our exchange of energy sources, our sharing of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the Great Lakes as far as water pollution is concerned, the bringing of Alaskan oil and natural gas down to us that we have got to have a continuing relationship with Canada.

My own personal preference would be that the commonwealth stay as it is and that there not be a separate Quebec province. But that's a decision for the Canadians to make and I would certainly make no private or public move to try to determine the outcome of that great debate.

16. Keeping Campaign Promises

Q. Mr. President, you've had a month now to enjoy the view from the Oval Office. Do you think you'll be able to keep fully all the campaign promises you made?

A. As you know, we have issued what I believe is the complete book of my campaign promises, which is, I presume, being made available to all of you. My determination is to keep all those promises.

Obviously if circumstances should change I would have to reserve the right to go back to the American people

very successful trip to the Middle East. He not only probed with the heads of those Governments and their Cabinet members their own positions, both public and private on the controversial issues that have so far prevented a peace in the Middle East. He also had a chance to compare their positions on issues—which ones they found to be in harmony, which ones there was still a dispute.

We also invited the leaders of all those nations to meet with me. They have all accepted and I will be meeting with the heads of the nations in dispute in the Middle East, all of them, before the end of May. The first visit of one of those leaders will be Mr. Rabin, I believe, March 12. And he will be followed by the leaders from Egypt, from Jordan and from Syria, from Saudia Arabia and I look forward to meeting with them.

At that point I hope I will have a very clear picture of what role the American Government ought to play.

The same thing applies to the situation that exists between ourselves and Turkey, ourselves and Greece, ourselves and Cyprus

We can't impose our will on other people. But if they honestly want to seek a solution, we are perfectly willing to offer our good offices as a country with influence and interest to help them resolve their own differences. But it's got to be done primarily by those countries involved.

We have begun again, and within the last week, our discussions on the Panama Canal Treaty. We have two extremely good negotiators and I hope that we will have success there. There's no way that I can say at this point what degree of progress we have made. It's just beginning.

So throughout the areas of high dispute, including South Africa and others that I don't have time to mention we're probing as best we can to discern some possibility of resolution of those tension areas.

We are meeting today, in fact all this week with the British, to try to get a renewed proposal to make concerning the question surrounding Rhodesia. And then, of course, we'll still have left Nambia and ultimately majority rule question in South Africa.

But I've only been in office a month. I don't claim to know all the easy answers. And these questions that have are not going to be easy to solve. But we're going to do the best we can openly and forcefully offering our good services, not trying to impose our will on other people.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

Carter Errs on Rabin And U.S.-Uganda Ties

WASHINGTON, Feb. 23 (AP)—President Carter made two errors in his news conference today, which the White House staff later corrected.

Mr. Carter used a wrong date for the forthcoming visit to the United States of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. The President said that he thought the visit would take place March 12.

The White House later corrected that to say "the proposed visit is tentatively planned for March 7 and 8."

The White House also corrected the President's statement that the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Uganda.

"This is not strictly accurate," the

nded to Congress as well as the Presi- ency?

A. There are three basic questions ıat come up. In the first place, I do ıvor at least an automatic vote by residential electors once the general ection is completed. I think the Elec-)ral Colllege, for instance, should be iminated. Whether the ratio among ates of votes ought to be changed m not prepared to comment on now. [illegible] the financing of Congres- onal elections by public funds—it has roved to be successful, I believe, in ıe Presidential election. I strongly ıvor that, yes. And the other element the overall package would be a sim- le way for American people who are tizens and 18 years old to register vote. And I am committed to that roposition and the Vice President has raciously consented to take on this verall election process responsibility. hose three will be basic elements of ıe proposals.

10. Relations With Cuba

Q. Mr. President, are you prepared lift the trade embargo against Cuba one step toward normalizing rela- ons?

A. I think any substantial move in ır relationship with Cuba would have await further discussions with them directly, and also some tangible evi- ence on our part that they are willing restore basic human rights in Cuba, volving the number of prisoners who e being held, their attitude toward verseas adventures such as the one Angola, and other matters. So I can't ıy what might come in the future. I'm willing, though, to discuss these atters with the Cuban leaders. At this me we have no direct relationships ith them, political. But through inter- ediarics comments are being ex- ıanged back and forth. Most of my)mments are in public statements like ıis, but we do have messages coming ıck from people who visit Cuba.

11. Defense Savings Goal

Q. In answer to an earlier question, r. President, you said that you could- t say whether next year's defense ıdget will be lower or higher than ıis year's. But as I understood your ırlier postion, you did want to achieve five to seven billion dollar savings gardless of the overall level of spend- g. Do you still hold with that figure? that still your goal and a commit- ent?

A. Yes. The analyses that I've made the defense budget so far—which you know has been limited to about month's study just part-time—indi- ıte that that's a goal that will be ached.

12. Natural Gas Deregulation

Q. Mr. President, in letters to the)vernors of Oklahoma, Texas and)uisiana last October, you said uncon- tionally that you would work with ongress to deregulate new natural ıs. And I wondered if you planned keep that promise, and if so how)u will go about it?

A. I don't know how I'll go about I do try to keep my promises. The)sition that I have taken, and the)sition that the governors of Oklaho- a and Texas took at governors con- rences to which I was referring, was ıe deregulation of natural gas for a mited period of time, four to five ears, to see how it works out, leaving cisting contracts in effect.

is not to cause sacrifice or hardship among the American people. Unless I can demonstrate that in balance the temporary sacrifices in a certain area are far overcome by immediate and ultimate benefits then nobody's going to buy it.

And I believe that we've now got such a horrible conglomeration of confusion in the energy field that nobody knows what's going to happen next. So I think that the sacrifices will be far overcome by the benefits that the American people will be easily able to discern for themselves.

15. U.S. Role on Canada

Q. You said that in spite of the fact that the Canadian people would have to determine their future for themselves, particularly in regard to the separatism issue in Quebec that you had confidence that the issue would be straightened out relatively peacefully. Do you really think that there is little concern in this country about the future of a unified Canada and is there anything really that we can do about it?

A. There's a great deal of concern in this country about the future of Canada and I have complete confidence, as I said in an interview with the Canadian news media in the sound judgment of the Canadian people.

I'm familiar—and even more familiar today than I was two days ago after Prime Minister Trudeau's visit—with the problems in Quebec and the inclination of some of the French Canadians to have an independent status from the rest of Canadian Provinces.

I don't know what's going to be the ultimate outcome. But I believe that we are so closely tied together with Canada on a mutually beneficial basis, sharing problems, sharing opportunities, sharing trade, sharing manufacturing companies that have joint ownership, our exchange of energy sources, our sharing of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the Great Lakes as far as water pollution is concerned, the bringing of Alaskan oil and natural gas down to us that we have got to have a continuing relationship with Canada.

My own personal preference would be that the commonwealth stay as it is and that there not be a separate Quebec province. But that's a decision for the Canadians to make and I would certainly make no private or public move to try to determine the outcome of that great debate.

16. Keeping Campaign Promises

Q. Mr. President, you've had a month now to enjoy the view from the Oval Office. Do you think you'll be able to keep fully all the campaign promises you made?

A. As you know, we have issued what I believe is the complete book of my campaign promises, which is, I presume, being made available to all of you. My determination is to keep all those promises.

Obviously if circumstances should change I would have to reserve the right to go back to the American people and say "now that circumstances have changed this a better approach to that particular problem." But I will do my utmost to keep all the campaign promises that I made to the American people.

17. Production of B-1

Q. Mr. President, you said at various times during the campaign that the B-1

have all accepted and I will be meeting with the heads of the nations in dispute in the Middle East, all of them, before the end of May. The first visit of one of those leaders will be Mr. Rabin, I believe, March 12. And he will be followed by the leaders from Egypt, from Jordan and from Syria, from Saudia Arabia and I look forward to meeting with them.

At that point I hope I will have a very clear picture of what role the American Government ought to play.

The same thing applies to the situation that exists between ourselves and Turkey, ourselves and Greece, ourselves and Cyprus.

We can't impose our will on other people. But if they honestly want to seek a solution, we are perfectly willing to offer our good offices as a country with influence and interest to help them resolve their own differences. But it's got to be done primarily by those countries involved.

We have begun again, and within the last week, our discussions on the Panama Canal Treaty. We have two extremely good negotiators and I hope that we will have success there. There's no way that I can say at this point what degree of progress we have made. It's just beginning.

So throughout the areas of high dispute, including South Africa and others that I don't have time to mention we're probing as best we can to discern some possibility of resolution of those tension areas.

We are meeting today, in fact all this week with the British, to try to get a renewed proposal to make concerning the question surrounding Rhodesia. And then, of course, we'll still have left Nambia and ultimately majority rule question in South Africa.

But I've only been in office a month. I don't claim to know all the easy answers. And these questions that have are not going to be easy to solve. But we're going to do the best we can openly and forcefully offering our good services, not trying to impose our will on other people.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

right-side

PAGE 3

BOTTOM

Carter Errs on Rabin And U.S.-Uganda Ties

WASHINGTON, Feb. 23 (AP)—President Carter made two errors in his news conference today, which the White House staff later corrected.

Mr. Carter used a wrong date for the forthcoming visit to the United States of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. The President said that he thought the visit would take place March 12.

The White House later corrected that to say "the proposed visit is tentatively planned for March 7 and 8."

The White House also corrected the President's statement that the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Uganda.

"This is not strictly accurate," the correction said, explaining:

"While the United States has withdrawn its mission from Uganda and has no direct diplomatic representation there, United States affairs in the Republic of Uganda are carried out through the West German embassy and the Republic of Uganda has an operating embassy and charge d'affaires in Washington."

13-00000

A7

WASHINGTON POST

Board
There's the Ballgame!
W
w File Marchetti

CIA Admits Working to Raise Sub

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has finally acknowledged publicly that it was "involved" in the Glomar Explorer's attempts to raise a sunken Russian submarine from the Pacific Ocean floor.

The terse acknowledgement came in a court document filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals by the Justice Department two weeks ago. The document asked that a suit against the CIA by a private group concerning the Glomar's financing be sent back to a lower court for further hearings.

The filing marks an abrupt change from the previous position taken by the Justice Department in the 18-month-old case that the mere acknowledgement of the CIA's involvement in the project would be harmful to national security. Although the CIA's operation of the project has been reported in numerous publications, the agency has been adamant in its refusal to say publicly whether those reports were true.

The case brought by the nonprofit Military Audit Project, which monitors spending by the defense and intelligence establishments, has involved an unprecedented amount of secret court proceedings as the CIA attempted to prove the need for secrecy to U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell. The suit seeks the financial details of the Glomar project.

For example, Gesell was forced to issue a secret opinion in the case last October that even the attorneys involved still have not been able to read. The opinion was issued in that secret fashion upon direct orders of the U.S. Court of Appeals, which instructed Gesell to accept secret affidavits from high-level government officials concerning the case.

Public affidavits filed at the time by former President Ford's top national security adviser, Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, said disclosures of the CIA involvement or other details about the project might prompt other nations offended by the project to retaliate against the United States.

Scowcroft said that retaliation might take the form of "strong measures" that might "endanger U.S military and diplomatic personnel and businessmen overseas."

The federal government had previously acknowledged only that the ship was part of a 1969 classified U.S. government project "to accomplish certain secret tasks in furtherance of national security objectives."

re: HCSA Request of 9 March, 1978, item #2:

> "A statement, including any written regulations, which establishes the criteria utilized by the CIA in classifying its relationships with individuals with whom it has had contact...."

Attached are:

1. DEFINITIONS OF: AGENT, ASSET, SOURCE, COLLABORATOR, WITTING & UNWITTING

2. Hqs Regulations on Management of Nonstaff Personnel

    20-53 on Contract Personnel to define Contract Employees and Independent Contractors and

    20-54 Agents (& clearly distinguish between agents and contract personnel)

3. DOI 50-10 on Restrictions on Operational Use of Certain Categories of Individuals (a primer on do's & don'ts)

4. DOI (CSI) 10-5 on Covert Approvals and Related Matters (processes required before an individual may be used in any way)

From Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary

AGENT:
1) A power that acts; a moving force; as by some human AGENT.

2) One who acts or performs an act or who has power to act; as, a free moral AGENT.

3) That which produces or will produce a certain effect; an active cause; also, esp. chem., a substance or element capable of producing a reaction.

4) A means or instrument.

5) One who acts for, or in the place of, another, by authority for him.

ASSET:
2) That which is a resource; as, character is an asset.

SOURCE:
2) The origin; the first or ultimate cause.

3) A person, book, document, etc. that supplies information.

COLLABORATOR: n.
COLLABORATE:
1) To work or act jointly, esp. to share in literary, scientific, or other intellectual production.

2) To cooperate voluntarily as a nation with another or other nations in international political or economic adjustment.

3) To comply with, cooperate with, or assist willingly the conquerors occupying one's country;--usually with an implication of traitorous dealing in distinction from passive acquiescence; also, sometimes to give to an enemy nation aid of nonmilitary kind, as by radio propaganda in enemy service.

WITTING: Done with the knowledge of the doer, or knowingly; not unintentional.

UNWITTING:
1) Not knowing; unconscious; unaware.

2) Unintentional.

S-E-C-R-E-T

HQ. INSTRUCTION SHEET 733

REMOVE			INSERT			EXPLANATION
REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	
HR 20	iii 125-127	2/6/73 3/9/64	HR 20	iii 125-127	2/23/73 2/23/73	Paragraph 53 is revised to redefine categories of contract personnel. Minor revisions are made to update the paragraph.
	128	6/16/70		128-131	2/23/73	Former paragraph 54, Procurement Contracts for the Services of Individuals, is renumbered 55 with no change in text. New paragraph 54, Agents, is added to establish authorities and responsibilities for the management of agents and to clearly distinguish between agents and contract personnel.
HN 20-129		3/9/64				Rescinded.

Arrows in the page margin show the locations of the changes described above.

DISTRIBUTION: AB

E2 IMPDET
S-E-C-R-E-T CL BY: 002230

CONTENTS—Continued

Paragraph Title Page

j. VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT 118.10
k. DISCONTINUED SERVICE BENEFITS 118.10
l. Not used.
m. INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT 118.10
n. MANDATORY RETIREMENT FOR AGE 118.11
o. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FUND 118.11
p. PERIOD OF SERVICE FOR ANNUITIES 118.13
q. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES 118.16
r. RECALL OF RETIRED PARTICIPANT 118.19
s. REEMPLOYMENT OF RETIRED PARTICIPANT 118.19
t. MONIES 118.19
u. LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF RETIREMENTS 118.20

SECTION VIII: MANAGEMENT OF NONSTAFF PERSONNEL

51. PERSONNEL DETAILED TO OR FROM THE AGENCY 119
52. CONSULTANTS 123
53. CONTRACT PERSONNEL 125
54. AGENTS 128
55. PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS FOR THE SERVICES OF INDIVIDUALS 130
56–59. Reserved

SECTION IX: RECORDS AND REPORTS

60. PERSONNEL RECORDS AND REPORTS 155

Figure Title Page

1. DISTINGUISHED INTELLIGENCE CROSS 94.1
2. DISTINGUISHED INTELLIGENCE MEDAL 94.1
3. INTELLIGENCE STAR 94.1
4. INTELLIGENCE MEDAL OF MERIT 94.1
4a. CAREER INTELLIGENCE MEDAL 94.1
5. EXCEPTIONAL SERVICE MEDALLION 94.1
6. RETIREMENT MEDALLION 94.1
7. FORM 600, RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD 95
8. Reserved
9. OFFICIAL SEAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 100.2
10. AGENCY FLAG 100.2
11. AGENCY PLAQUE 100.2
12. TABLE OF PERMISSIBLE CHANGES IN ENROLLMENT OF EMPLOYEES 106

Attachment Title Page

1. BIOGRAPHIC DATA TO BE SUBMITTED BY AN EMPLOYEE UNDER COVER ON AN INTENDED SPOUSE 29
2. FORM 3154, SERVICE ABROAD AGREEMENT 52.1

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 002230

53. CONTRACT PERSONNEL. This paragraph sets forth policy, authorities, and responsibilities concerning the management of contract personnel. It does not apply to consultants (see HR 20-52), to personal services acquired through industrial or procurement contracts (see HR 20-55), to personnel employed by proprietary projects (see HR 230-8), or to agents (see HR 20-54).

a. **GENERAL.** There are two categories of contract personnel: contract employees and independent contractors.

(1) CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. Although they are not appointed employees, contract employees are employees of the U.S. Government. They have all the rights and privileges granted by law to U.S. Government employees in accordance with their citizenship status as well as those rights and privileges specified in their contracts. They work under supervised conditions and are compensated on a salary basis. Contract employees are grouped into three categories:

(a) **Career Associate (Type C) Contract Employees:** Contract employees who perform duties, usually of a clandestine and operational nature, on a career basis. They are normally required to demonstrate their operational value to the Agency for not less than three years, in the case of U.S. citizens, or not less than five years, in the case of foreign nationals, to qualify for career associate status. When it is necessary for a career associate to have the staff-type access to an Agency installation or classified information, he must meet the same security approval criteria as a staff employee.

(b) **Internal (Type I) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work inside Agency installations. They are required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees, but are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(c) **External (Type E) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work outside Agency installations. They are not required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees and are not permitted the same access to Agency installations as staff employees or internal contract employees. They are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(2) INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals who are engaged under contract to provide specific services. They receive only the compensation and benefits considered necessary to retain their services. In the Operations Directorate, their duties are normally limited to historical research and analysis and to the direction, utilization, spotting, or support of agents. They normally do not carry out espionage or covert action tasks. (Care must be taken to distinguish between independent contractors, defined herein, and agents, defined in HR 20-54.)

b. **POLICY**

(1) Contract personnel may be engaged when

(a) it is necessary to provide for operational or support needs which cannot be met through the use of available staff personnel;

(b) services are required of particularly well-qualified individuals who cannot meet all requirements for staff employment;

E2 IMPDET
CL By: 002230

(c) there is a requirement to meet operational needs without obligating the Agency to long-term employment;

(d) the nature of the mission for which the individual is being engaged precludes his being subject to administrative control or working specifically defined hours;

(e) the individual's primary employer or interest is not the Agency and the services the Agency desires from him are supplementary to his primary interest or vocation; or

(f) there is a long term requirement for personal services which, for operational or security reasons, cannot be performed by Agency staff personnel.

(2) The engaging of contract personnel is subject to the following restrictions:

(a) New contracts, contract renewals, and contract amendments for individuals under current or anticipated nonofficial cover, must have prior approval of the appropriate component of the Operations Directorate.

(b) Contract personnel may be engaged only for approved activities for which funds have been made available. Funds for these activities will be budgeted annually and will not exceed limitations imposed by the head of the component concerned.

(c) Contract employees are subject to directorate manpower controls and ceilings established by the Director of Central Intelligence during the annual budgetary review cycle. Independent contractors are excluded from ceiling controls.

(d) Contracts will, whenever possible, be written and signed. However, when special security or operational factors prevent the execution of a formal written contract, a memorandum in lieu of such a contract may be prepared to document the commitments and obligations of the Agency and the individual.

(d) Appropriate security or operational approvals will be obtained before any contractual commitments are made to individuals and before any disclosure to them of classified information.

(f) No commitments relating to the use of the services of an employee of another Government agency will be made without prior approval of the Operating Official or Head of Independent Office concerned and the Director of Personnel.

(g) No commitments will be made to contract personnel that appointed employment status will be offered at the conclusion of or during any period of their contract service, without prior approval of the Director of Personnel and the Director of Security.

(h) Contract employees must meet Agency medical standards prior to the approval and authentication of their contracts. A psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation of those contract employees in whom the Agency may have more than a short-term interest will be carried out whenever feasible.

(i) Independent contractors are normally not required to meet Agency medical standards; however, if their contract contains any provision which obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits, a satisfactory medical examination is required, to include a psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation, if necessary.

SONNEL
obligating
; engaged
king spe-
ency and
ry to his
a, for op-
ency staff
strictions:
ts for in-
nust have
ons Direc-
ivities for
vities will
ed by the
ntrols and
luring the
e excluded
However,
ecution of
a contract
ons of the
ned before
before any
nployee of
pproval of
erned and
appointed
luring any
ne Director
rior to the
ical assess-
s in whom
be carried
eet Agency
y provision
y benefits,
a psycho-

(j) Contract personnel candidates whose employment with the Agency cannot be acknowledged must be provided adequate cover and an appropriate cover legend. This requires that legal entitlements and other contractual benefits be provided and tax liabilities satisfied in a manner consistent with the character of the cover and cover legend.

(k) Although staff employees are expected to sever active connections with the Agency upon retirement, there may be instances in which continuation in service under contract after retirement is necessary or clearly in the best interests of the Agency. The use of retired annuitants under contract is governed by policies specified in HR 20-13.

(l) Not used.

(m) Contracts providing for basic compensation at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum annual rate for a GS-15, will not be executed without the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence. All such requests will be forwarded through the Director of Personnel for his recommendation.

c. RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL will

- (a) formulate contract personnel management policies and procedures and provide guidance in improving the effectiveness and flexibility of the program within the Agency;
- (b) monitor contract personnel management to assure consistency among the directorates while giving due regard to their differing needs;
- (c) provide a repository for sensitive suitability information using the guidelines for special files set forth in HR 20-60b(4);
- (d) approve and authenticate contracts;
- (e) monitor contract employee ceiling authorizations established by the Director of Central Intelligence;
- (f) maintain computer-based records on contract personnel and ensure currency and accuracy of input and output data.

(2) THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY will

- (a) establish standards and procedures for granting security approvals which meet the Agency's contract personnel requirements;
- (b) grant security approvals for the use of contract personnel including their access to classified information and Agency installations;
- (c) ensure currency and adequacy of security approvals by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;
- (d) provide a repository for all security information pertaining to contract personnel.

(3) THE CHIEF, CENTRAL COVER STAFF will

- (a) provide cover and cover legends for contract personnel whose employment by the Agency cannot be publicly acknowledged;
- (b) ensure currency of such cover and cover legends by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;
- (c) ensure that the methods of providing legal entitlements and contractual benefits and satisfying tax liabilities are consistent with assigned cover and cover legends.

(4) THE DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL SERVICES will

- (a) establish standards and procedures for medical and psychiatric evaluations and for psychological assessment of contract personnel;

E2 IMPDET
CL By: 002230

(b) make periodic reviews and medical reevaluations of contract personnel when requested to do so.

(5) DEPUTY DIRECTORS AND HEADS OF INDEPENDENT OFFICES will ensure directorate uniformity of contract administration in matters such as qualifications determination, compensation, allowances and other benefits, personnel record keeping, systematic cost accounting, performance evaluations, cover determination and training, terminations, and security and medical approval processing requirements.

(6) THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING will provide appropriate training courses and facilities for contract personnel.

(7) THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE will
   (a) administer pay, leave, and allowance entitlements of contract personnel consistent with contract provisions and cover requirements;
   (b) in coordination with the Covert Tax Board, administer a secure system for the settlement of Federal income tax and social security tax obligations.

d. AUTHORITIES

(1) The Director of Personnel, his Deputy, and the Special Contracting Officer (Chief, Contract Personnel Division) are, upon request of a Deputy Director, an Operating Official, Head of Independent Office, or a duly appointed contract approving officer, authorized to execute, amend, renew, and terminate contracts with contract personnel.

(2) Deputy Directors and Heads of Independent Offices may designate Contract Approving Officers to approve contracts when payment is to be charged against funds under their control.

(3) Authority delegated to Chiefs of Station and Base under the provisions of FR 20-31 is subject to the following limitations:
   (a) All contracts executed in the field will be subject to review by the Director of Personnel.
   (b) Deputy Directors may limit the exercise of the authority granted to chiefs of field installations to any extent they deem desirable.
   (c) Contracts prepared by headquarters will be amended only by, or with the prior approval of, headquarters. Contracts executed in the field may be amended in the field, but all such amendments must be forwarded to headquarters.

(4) All contracts written under the authority of this regulation will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

e. PROCEDURES. Requirements and procedures concerning personnel records, personnel actions, security approvals, cover, cover salary, medical evaluations, compensation, qualifications determination, training, and processing of contracts, are set forth in HHB 20-12.

54. AGENTS. This paragraph sets forth policy, responsibilities, and authorities concerning the engagement and the management of agents.

a. GENERAL. Agents are witting manpower assets, unique to the Operations Directorate, who carry out espionage and covert action tasks on behalf of the Agency. Agents are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals whose services may be acquired or terminated at any time. Care must be taken to distinguish between agents, defined herein, and independent contractors, defined in HR 20-53a(2).

---

b. POLICY

(1) Agents cannot
Government em
with normal pe
(a) Initial appr
commitmen
an agent.
(b) Agents will
and a man
and control
(1) No com
pensati
at a rat
maxim
This lir
does no
(2) No com
fits, wi
benefit
normal
expens
(3) No cor
will be
mitme
Operat
Securit
(c) Engageme
controls.
(d) In general
ards. How
to provide
be carried
(e) Agents wh
the United
their asso
tax liabili
20-35.)
(f) The use of
will be go
(2) All commitme
Formal Agree
(a) A Formal
an author
tiated wh
(b) A Memora
ment, sig
agent. Us
those cas
agent's si
(c) An agent
randum o

b. **POLICY**

(1) Agents cannot claim rights and privileges normally granted to U.S. Government employees; therefore, they will not be managed in accordance with normal personnel and administrative standards.

(a) Initial approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff is required before any commitments are made or any classified information is disclosed to an agent.

(b) Agents will receive compensation, benefits, and emoluments in amounts and a manner deemed best by the Operations Directorate to motivate and control them, subject to the following limitations:

(*1*) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide gross compensation (basic compensation, additional compensation, fees, etc.) at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum rate for a GS-15, without prior approval of the Director. This limitation applies only to payments made by the Agency. It does not apply to bona fide cover income.

(*2*) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide special benefits, without the prior approval of the Director of Personnel. Special benefits are Agency obligations other than basic compensation, normal overseas cost of living payments, and travel or operational expenses.

(*3*) No commitment may be made to an agent that appointed status will be offered at the conclusion of his service unless such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security, and has been approved by the Director of Personnel.

(c) Engagement of agents will not be subject to Agency personnel ceiling controls.

(d) In general, agents will not be required to meet Agency medical standards. However, if an agreement with an agent obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits, a medical examination will be carried out, unless precluded by security considerations.

(e) Agents who are U.S. citizens, resident aliens, or foreign nationals in the United States, must pay Federal tax on all income derived from their association with the Agency. Procedures for satisfying Federal tax liability will be determined by the Covert Tax Board. (See HR 20-35.)

(f) The use of retired civilian annuitants of the U.S. Government as agents will be governed by policy set forth in HR 20-13.

(2) All commitments made or implied to agents will be recorded in either a Formal Agreement or a Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

(a) A Formal Agreement is a written agreement, signed by the agent and an authorized Agency representative. Formal Agreements will be negotiated whenever operationally feasible.

(b) A Memorandum of Oral Commitment is a written record of an agreement, signed by an authorized Agency representative but not by the agent. Use of Memorandums of Oral Commitment will be limited to those cases when it is in the Agency's best interest not to solicit an agent's signature on a Formal Agreement.

(c) An agent will never be given a copy of the Formal Agreement or Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

c. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES

(1) The Deputy Director for Operations is authorized to

(a) formulate procedures for the engagement and management of agents and to issue operating directives and special instructions, as necessary, to control the use of agents by headquarters and field units;

(b) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment with agents; and to review Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment executed in the field;

(c) suspend procedures implied in this regulation upon his personal determination that operational and security aspects of an agent's management are so sensitive as to require processing through special channels.

(2) The Director of Personnel is authorized to

(a) approve, after coordinating with affected Agency components, the commitment to an agent that he will receive special benefits;

(b) approve the commitment to an agent that he will be offered appointed status at the conclusion of his service, when such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security;

(c) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment when requested to do so by the appropriate Operations Directorate approving officer. This authority may also be exercised by the Deputy Director of Personnel and the Special Contracting Officer, Office of Personnel.

(3) All Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment written under the authority of this paragraph will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

55. PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS FOR THE SERVICES OF INDIVIDUALS

a. **POLICY.** Procurement contracts whose basic purpose is to obtain the services of one or more individuals, negotiated with profit and nonprofit institutions, associations, partnerships, proprietorships, and other organizations, are permitted only when the particular services sought cannot be obtained in any other practicable way.

b. **PROCEDURES**

(1) Except as provided in subparagraph b(3) below, all proposals for such procurement contracts and their renewal must be justified in writing by the component seeking the services and be submitted to the Director of Personnel for his approval before commitments are made or negotiations started. These proposals will describe in some detail the services to be rendered, the qualifications required, the proposed duration of the task, and the reason or reasons why a procurement contract is judged to be the best method of acquiring the needed services.

---

(2) The Direct
personnel a
examine th
sonnel. If t
rector of P
Office of L
tract reque
are written
HR 45-2.

(3) The approv
(a) for pro
dental
reports,
task pe
time (p
(b) for pro
require
testing,
follow-
tion—r
above.

c. RESTRICTIONS

(1) Operating
through th
erly briefed
Agency info
Operating
the relation
affects the
curity clear

(2) Technical
procuremen
employer-e
organizatio
istrative au
the Agency
cies, private

56–59. Reserved.

(2) The Director of Personnel will ascertain whether any staff or nonstaff personnel are available to perform the needed services. If not, he will examine the feasibility of satisfying the requirement by hiring new personnel. If this latter course of action also proves impracticable, the Director of Personnel will approve the proposal and return it either to the Office of Logistics or to the originator for subsequent submission of a contract request to the appropriate procurement unit. Procurement contracts are written under the authority of the Director of Logistics as stated in HR 45-2.

(3) The approval of the Director of Personnel is not required

(a) for procurement contracts involving the services of individuals incidental to research and development or the preparation of studies or reports, where the fee reflects an end product (a report written, a task performed, etc.) rather than a computation based mainly on time (per hour, per man year);

(b) for procurement contracts involving the purchase of equipment which requires the services of experts or technicians in delivery, installation, testing, initial operation or maintenance, training, etc. However, any follow-on contract for services only—such as maintenance or operation—requires the Director of Personnel's prior approval as set forth above.

c. RESTRICTIONS

(1) Operating Officials are responsible for monitoring all personnel acquired through these procedures. They will ensure that such personnel are properly briefed and thoroughly understand any limitations on their access to Agency information and buildings and other pertinent security restrictions. Operating Officials are required to advise appropriate offices at any time the relationship or use of such individuals is subject to a change which affects the terms of their contractual arrangements, their status, or security clearances.

(2) Technical representatives and other types of personnel engaged under procurement contracts or other agreements which do not create a direct employer-employee relationship are prohibited by law from holding formal organizational positions or positions requiring the exercise of any administrative authority. They are also prohibited from formally representing the Agency in meetings with representatives of other Government agencies, private industry, or foreign governments or industries.

56-59. Reserved.

E2 IMPDET
CL By: 002230

DOI 50-10

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970

1. GENERAL

a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In general, it is DDO policy to select agent assets with primary regard to the agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following:

(1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to restrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of individuals.

(2) The Agency has entered into a special restrictive agreement with an organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a category of individuals.

(3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently pertain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where appropriate, reference has been made to another publication which provides more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI and DOI-F 10-5. (attached)

E-2 IMPDET

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*
Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*
Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*
Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):
   (a) Members and trainees of ACTION;
   (b) Fulbright grantees;

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

- (c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom;
- (d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations;
- (e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies.

(2) *Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence* (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.

- (a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
- (b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
- (c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;
- (d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand;
- (e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
- (f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) *Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO* (see paragraph 7):

- (a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;
- (b) CARE employees;
- (c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
- (d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;
- (e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned;
- (f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
- (g) Officials of the Vatican State;
- (h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
- (i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
- (j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
- (k) Volunteers to America.

(4) *Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division* (see paragraph 8):

- (a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
- (b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.;
- (c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION*

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION.

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. *Fulbright Grantees*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

e. *Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations.

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies*
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions.

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI.

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*

The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

For Germans only\ seamen only

e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.

b. *CARE Employees*

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.

d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United ~~States~~* NATIONS
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations*

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute*

Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America*

Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)
The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.*
The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community.

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is

operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad. DDO Approval

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

CSI NO. 10-5

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

SECURITY
Revised 17 July 1958

COVERT APPROVALS AND RELATED MATTERS

Reference: CSI-F No. 10-5, 17 July 1958

Rescission: CSI No. 10-5, 31 January 1955

CONTENTS

Page

PURPOSE 1
GENERAL 1
INVESTIGATIONS 2
OPERATIONAL APPROVALS 2
COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS AND PROPRIETARY APPROVALS 3
COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS FOR LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS 5
SERVANTS OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES 5

Page

EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN SERVICES 5
NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OR DISCONTINUANCE OF COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS OR PROPRIETARY APPROVALS 5
SPECIAL SERVICES 6
DOUBLE AGENTS 6
DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT IN PLACE 6

1. PURPOSE

This instruction describes the functions of headquarters components with regard to covert approvals and related matters which are the subject of CSI-F No. 10-5.

2. GENERAL

a. The Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, is delegated authority to act for the Deputy Director (Plans) in the exercise of all functions which are the latter's responsibility with regard to the granting of Operational Approvals and Provisional Operational Approvals.

b. The Director of Security has designated the Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support, Office of Security, to represent him in discharging the functions which are reserved to him with regard to the granting of Covert Security Approvals, Provisional Covert Security Approvals, Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. It is the basic intent of both components that sensitive operational data shall remain within the custody and knowledge of the Clandestine Services, and that sensitive security investigative data shall remain in the custody and knowledge of the Office of Security. It is recognized, however, that such data may be necessary for proper performance by either component and, consequently, where necessary, it shall be made available or shall be discussed to the extent necessary.

CSI NO. 10-5

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

SECURITY
Revised 17 July 1958

3. INVESTIGATIONS

The function of performing all investigations in the United States in connection with approval matters, except for the check of certain Agency records, is reserved to the Office of Security.

4. OPERATIONAL APPROVALS

a. The assembly and analysis of all file material (including the files of the Records Integration Division) in the Clandestine Services will be accomplished by professional personnel of the interested operating divisions under the technical supervision of the Counter Intelligence Staff and subject to spot check by the Counter Intelligence Staff. Certification will be made in each case by a responsible official of the requesting division that the material furnished is complete and accurate.

b. The requesting division will assemble any biographical data; information of investigative or security significance (such as additional names the subject may have used); information relating to character, reputation, politics, or other activities, favorable and unfavorable information or comments; background information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. Any information previously furnished by the subject concerning himself (such as a personal history statement, records of activities or employments, memberships in organizations, etc.) will be furnished verbatim. All pertinent information thus produced--including that resulting from technical interrogations, personal observation, field investigations, etc.--will be furnished to the Counter Intelligence Staff for necessary transmission to the Office of Security. It is also necessary to forward PRQ Part II to the Counter Intelligence Staff before an Operational Approval will be issued. The Counter Intelligence Staff will not forward PRQ Part II to the Office of Security. In rare, complicated, or sensitive cases the Office of Security, in coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff, may wish actually to review the material of the Records Integration Division. A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of the proposed usage of the subject will be furnished to the Office of Security along with the other data.

c. The requester should also furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff for transmission to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

d. Following appropriate investigation and analysis of a case, the Office of Security will forward its recommendation to the Counter Intelligence Staff, with the investigative data enclosed. Upon receipt of this material the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or his designee, will, if the Office of Security does not recommend against the use of the individual, determine whether an Operational Approval should be granted and will notify the Office of Security of its decision. However, in the event the Office of Security recommends against the use of an individual and the Clandestine Services still desires, on a calculated risk basis, to use the individual, the Counter Intelligence Staff will inform the Office of Security of this fact. In this event, the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Security Support Division will endeavor to arrive at an agreed position and, to this end, the former will hold the granting of the Operational Approval in abeyance until five days have elapsed after the Office of Security has been advised of this intention. The Counter Intelligence Staff will notify the Office of Security whenever it has:

(1) Granted an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval.

(2) Cancelled an Operational Approval.

e. In Operational Approval cases the Office of Security will forward investigative reports, name check results, etc., to the Counter Intelligence Staff. In extremely sensitive cases, however, particularly those in which the security or good of the Agency as a whole is involved, the Office of Security will not be obliged to furnish all investigative material. In such cases the Office of Security will inform the Counter Intelligence Staff that such material has been withheld and will, upon request, discuss the matter with the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or other appropriate official of the Clandestine Services.

f. A Provisional Operational Approval may also be requested where circumstances warrant. A search of the indices of the Agency, including those of the Office of Security, is a minimum requirement for issuance of a Provisional Operational Approval.

g. Whenever interest in an individual under consideration for either an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval is terminated for any reason, the requester, in order to prevent needless processing, will notify the Counter Intelligence Staff promptly so that the latter may in turn advise the Office of Security.

5. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS AND PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

a. All background material will be assembled by the interested divisions and will include any biographic data; information of an investigative or security significance; information relating to character, reputation, politics, past employment, residences, and other activities; favorable and unfavorable information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. This material is forwarded directly to the Office of Security in its original form. (Traces need not be obtained from the Records Integration Division; see paragraph 5.b., below.) A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of use of the subject will also be furnished to the Office of Security. The requester should also furnish to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as, special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

b. In Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases, the files of the ✓Records Integration Division will be searched by representatives of the Office of Security. All files of the Records Integration Division, except those portions containing specific sensitive operational data, will be made available to the representatives of the Office of Security. In those instances where a document of interest contains sensitive operational data, designated professional personnel within the operating division will review that portion of the information and furnish therefrom to the representatives of the Office of Security all information of the nature described in paragraph 5.a., above. The Office of Security will conduct appropriate investigation in each case and will issue or deny Covert Security Approvals and Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Covert Security Approvals and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. The Office of Security will retain the investigative files in Covert Security Approval cases or Proprietary Approval cases, but will:

(1) Make available to the Counter Intelligence Staff any significant information in cases where Covert Security Approvals or Proprietary Approvals are granted.

(2) Immediately call to the attention of the Counter Intelligence Staff any new evidence in Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases that reflects the subject's connection with a foreign government, the Communist Party, or any front organization of the Communist Party.

d. Where the Office of Security issues or denies a Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval, formal notification will be directed to the requester. In the case of disapproval one copy of the security disapproval will be forwarded to the Counter Intelligence Staff. Where a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval is denied and the Clandestine Services still desires to use the subject on a calculated risk basis, the Office of Security will, upon request, furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff a summary of the investigative data. Thereafter, the Counter Intelligence Staff, the requester, and the Security Support Division will attempt to reach an agreed position.

e. A Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval may be preceded by a Provisional Covert Security Approval or a Provisional Proprietary Approval.

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

SECURITY
19 September 1963

f. Unless otherwise designated by the Office of Security, investigative data in either Operational Approval or Covert Security Approval cases involving aliens may be shown to proper offices of the division and may, if deemed necessary by the division, be forwarded to the field. The dispatch or cable in such cases will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Office of Security. No investigative data will be transmitted or disclosed to other than Agency staff officials without the specific prior approval of the Office of Security. The need-to-know principle will be applied strictly in such cases. No investigative data regarding United States citizens will be transmitted to the field without the specific prior approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Director of Security and subsequent to such approval without coordination with the Office of Security on the dispatch or cable involved.

6. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS FOR LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

Requests for Covert Security Approvals for Liaison with U. S. officials, whether such officials are in the United States or abroad, will be transmitted directly to the Office of Security. Each request shall be specifically indicated as a request for a Covert Security Approval for Liaison. The request shall be accompanied by all available biographic information, to include wherever possible in cases of civilian employees of United States Government agencies the name, date and place of birth, the employing agency, and the position and assignment of the person involved. In cases involving military personnel the minimum biographic information required shall consist of the name, date and place of birth, rank and serial number, and the parent service. In each case the details of the liaison with the individual must be set forth.

7. SERVANTS OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES

Requests to headquarters for appropriate checks on domestic personnel employed in the homes of Agency employees overseas shall be forwarded by the requester to the Office of Security accompanied by all available biographical information and the results of overseas investigations.

8. EMPLOYEES OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Proper clearance of staff or contract employees (including indigenous employees) of other U.S. Government agencies for operational use includes notification to and approval by the employee's parent agency in Washington. Requests for clearance will be forwarded to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, Attention: CI/Liaison. Clearance will not be given until the approval of the parent agency has been obtained. If, after such approval is obtained, it is decided that the employee will not be used as requested, or upon termination of use, CI/Liaison will be notified so that the employee's parent agency may be advised.

9. EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN SERVICES

Requests for searches of the indices of other United States agencies or the Office of Security, or investigation of employees or officials of foreign intelligence services with whom Agency employees maintain liaison, shall be forwarded by the requester to the Counter Intelligence Staff for processing to the Office of Security. Such requests shall be transmitted with complete results of field traces, all available biographical information, and a statement as to the service which the subject represents.

10. NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OR DISCONTINUANCE OF COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS OR PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

The Office of Security shall be promptly advised by the requester of the discontinuance of interest in or termination of employment or use of a person on whom a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval has been requested or granted.

11. SPECIAL SERVICES

a. Requests for Covert Name Checks and Special Inquiries will be transmitted to the Office of Security through the Counter Intelligence Staff. Each request shall indicate the reason for the inquiry, shall specify the exact action required, and shall contain all available background and/or biographical information concerning the subject.

b. In the case of Special Inquiries, the request should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed during the inquiry and any other information which would provide guidance as to the conduct of the investigation.

12. DOUBLE AGENTS

The operational decision authorizing the doubling of an agent of a foreign power will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff even though no Operational Approval or Provisional Operational Approval is required.

13. DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT IN PLACE

No attempt to defect or recruit in place (a) a member of the Communist Party or (b) a government official of a denied area country shall be made in the United States without prior coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff which will immediately inform the Director of Security and such other United States agencies as may be appropriate.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET

June 1977

SUBJECT: Juan FALCON Tamar

1. This name was traced because FALCON claimed support of CIA in activities against Cuba. There is no indication in Headquarters traces that he worked for the CIA.

2. UFGA 4948 (Memo from AMOT-2 from AMDIAL-2, #AA 134, dated 18 July 1962:

On 17 July 1962 Cuban Station "Radio Rebelde" interviewed Juan FALCON Tamar, alleged National Coordinator of the MRR - Revolutionary Recovery Movement - under arrest in Cuba. FALCON stated that they engaged in performing a series of sabotages, such as burning the "Petroquimica" of Cotorro; a plan to destroy national transport in general; destruction of 3 buses of Rte #33; a plan for systematic destruction of the economy which included, among other things, the poisoning of cattle. FALCON admitted planning the assassination of Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ; which he attributed to CIA, and also mentioned assassination of Fidel CASTRO. FALCON said that the assassinations were being planned when he was arrested. FALSON claimed to have the support of the CIA.

3. For document, see MRR Section of Task Force material.

Researcher: [Martin Miller] 3 LAD/JFK Task Force

1/mc

13-00000

FALCON ZAMAR JUAN

SEX M DOB ?

019-120-018
UFGA 0[illegible]18
26 JUL 62

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA, HAVANA,
SUBJ CLAIMS TO BE FORMER OFFICIAL MRR
RF RADIO INTERVIEW OVER CUBAN RADIO 17 JUL 62.

‡

0103937

FALCON ZAMAR, JUAN

SEX M DOB ?

019-132-032
UFGA-08466 E01
19 APR 63
P20

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA
AKA ESTEBAN, JUAN
WORKED IN PROPAGANDA SECTION OF MRR IN
AUG 60

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 607 629

FALCON ZAMAR, JUAN

SEX M DOB ?

019-120-018
UFGA-09395 E01
11 JUN 63
019-132-5-96/6
P2

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA
LEADERS OF MRR TRIED AND SENTENCED BEFORE
THE ORDINARY WAR COUNCIL IN MAR 63,
HABANA, CUBA.

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 669 932

FALCON ZAMAR, JUAN ESTEBAN

SEX M DOB ?

019-005-030
UFGA-25924
09 SEP 66
P4

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
MRR MEMBER, POLITICAL PRISONER AT LA
CABANA, NOV 64.
FFN 19-120-30-71/4

FLD INDEX ONLY

UFGA 050

FALCON ZA[illegible]R, JUAN

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA, HAVANA,
SUBJ CLAIMS TO BE FORMER OFFICIAL MRR
RE RADIO INTERVIEW OVER CUBAN RADIO 17 JUL 62.

019-120-018
UFGA-01918
26 JUL 62

‡

0103937

FALCON ZAMAR, JUAN

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA
AKA ESTEBAN, JUAN
WORKED IN PROPAGANDA SECTION OF MRR IN
AUG 60

019-132-032
UFGA-08466 E01
19 APR 63
P20

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 607 629

FALCON ZAMAR, JUAN

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA
LEADERS OF MRR TRIED AND SENTENCED BEFORE
THE ORDINARY WAR COUNCIL IN MAR 63,
HABANA, CUBA.

019-120-018
UFGA-09395 E01
11 JUN 63
◊19-132-5-96/6
P2

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 669 932

FALCON ZAMAR, JUAN ESTEBAN

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
MRR MEMBER, POLITICAL PRISONER AT LA
CABANA, NOV 64.
FFN 19-120-30-71/4

019-005-030
UFGA-25924
09 SEP 66
P4

FLD INDEX ONLY

UFGA Q50

FALCON, JUAN

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-120-018
UFGA-04820
19 JUL 62
P1

RE PRESS CLIPPINGS, ETC. CONCERNING SUBJ'S 17 JUL 62 PRESENTATION ON CUBAN TV.

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
0515341

FALCON, JUAN

SEX M DOB ?
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA, HAVANA CITY.

019-300-011
UFGA-11653
11 OCT 63
♦19-132-5-96/3

LDR OF THE MRR IN HAVANA.

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 886 712

FALCON, JUAN

SEX M DOB C 39

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-120-018
UFGA-04977 A C
21 AUG 62
♦19-9-9
P7

AKA ESTEBAN
DATA ON MBR MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA /MRR/. MRR NATIONAL COORDINATOR. MAR 62. /3/ MRR LEADER /JAN 62/ REPORTEDLY VALIANT AND GENEROUS BUT GETS LOST IN SMALL DETAILS. /8/ PRESENTLY IN PRISON IN PBRUMEN JUL 62.∞

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 302 179

FALCON, JUAN

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA

019-132-032
UFGA-08466 E01
19 APR 63

AKA ESTEBAN, JUAN
MBR MRR

JJ

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 614 636

FALCON, JUAN

019-120-018
UFGA-04820
19 JUL 62
P1

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
RE PRESS CLIPPINGS, ETC. CONCERNING SUBJ'S 17 JUL 62 PRESENTATION ON CUBAN TV.

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
0515341

FALCON, JUAN

019-300-011
UFGA-11653
11 OCT 63
♦19-132-5-96/3

SEX M DOB ?
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA, HAVANA CITY.
LDR OF THE MRR IN HAVANA.

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 886 712

FALCON, JUAN

019-120-018
UFGA-04977 A·C
21 AUG 62
♦19-9-9
P7

SEX M DOB C 39

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
AKA ESTEBAN
DATA ON MBR MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA /MRR/. MRR NATIONAL CO-ORDINATOR. MAR 62. /3/ MRR LEADER /JAN 62/ REPORTEDLY VALIANT AND GENEROUS BUT GETS LOST IN SMALL DETAILS. /8/ PRESENTLY IN PRISON IN PBRUMEN JUL 62.∞

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 302 179

FALCON, JUAN

019-132-032
UFGA-08466 E01
19 APR 63

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA
AKA ESTEBAN, JUAN
MBR MRR

‡

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 614 636

FALCON, Juan Cuba

Subject, former coordinator of the MRR, was interviewed on CMQ Television by REVOLUCION director Carlos Franqui, EL MUNDO director Luis Gomez Wanguemert, and HOY assistant director Raul Valdes Vivo. A portion of this interview was monitored from Havana Radio. Text follows.

(Havana, 18 July 1962, FBIS No. 140.)

FALCON, Juan

Subj, national treasurer of MRR in about May 1962 was apprehended with about 35 other MRR members.

00-3,278,507, 23 Oct 63.

FALCON, JUAN
201-281397
UFGA-03804
16 APR 62
P1

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
△ CUBA
AKA ESTEBAN, NOM DE GUERRE
CONTACT SUBJ OF 201-281397. NATIONAL COORDINATOR OF THE MRR SINCE MAY 61.

*

1 312 732

FALCON, Juan CUBA

Subj is a well known Communist in Alguizar, Habana Province. Is about 30 years old.
(00-A-3,215,261, 28 Mar 62)

FALCON, Juan Cuba

Subject, former coordinator of the MRR, was interviewed on CMQ Television by REVOLUCION director Carlos Franqui, EL MUNDO director Luis Gomez Wanguemert, and HOY assistant director Raul Valdes Vivo. A portion of this interview was monitored from Havana Radio. Text follows.

(Havana, 18 July 1962, FBIS No. 140.)

FALCON, Juan

Subj, national treasurer of MRR in about May 1962 was apprehended with about 35 other MRR members.

00-3,278,507, 23 Oct 63.

FALCON, JUAN
201-281397
UFGA-03804
16 APR 62
P1

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA
AKA ESTEBAN, NOM DE GUERRE
CONTACT SUBJ OF 201-281397. NATIONAL
COORDINATOR OF THE MRR SINCE MAY 61.

‡

1 312 732

FALCON, Juan CUBA

Subj is a well known Communist in Alquizar, Habana Province. Is about 30 years old.
(00-A-3,215,261, 28 Mar 62)

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003

FBI w/o
REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 9/20/98 [illegible]

☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

RETIRED FILE
JOB 84-772R
BOX 1 FOLDER 001
DESENSITIZED
per DOI 70-17

13-00000

TOP SECRET
~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: Latin America Division/DDO	CONTROL NUMBER: SC-01755-77
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 29 June 1977	DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED:
COPY NUMBER (S): 1 and 5	LOGGED BY:
NUMBER OF PAGES: 148 DOCUMENT NO:	
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS: 4	

FROM: AC/LA Division

DATE: 29/6/77

	TO OFFICE	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE
1	SA/C/LAD	William C. Sturbitts	W C Sturbitts	6/30/77
2	C/LA/COG	[Frederick W. LaTrash] 3	[Frederick W LaTrash] 3	6/30/77
3	AC/LAD	George V. Lauder	George V. Lauder	30 June 76
4	ADDO	Theodore G. Shackley	T Shackley	
5	IG	Scott Breckinridge, Jr.	S. D. Breckinridge	13 July 77

☐ Approval
☐ Action
☐ Comment
☐ Concurrences
☐ Information
☐ Direct Reply
☐ Preparation of Reply
☐ Recommendation
☐ Signature
☐ Return
☐ Dispatch
☐ File

SEC. CL.	ORIGIN	CONTROL NO.
		[illegible]-77

DATE OF DOC	DATE REC'D	DATE OUT	SUSPENSE DATE

CROSS REFERENCE OR POINT OF FILING

TO
FROM
SUBJ.

ROUTING	DATE SENT
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	
	6

COURIER NO.	ANSWERED	NO REPLY

2

Handle via Comint Channels

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~
~~TOP~~ SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

2/MC

SC-01755-77

30 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

ATTENTION : Mr. Scott Breckinridge, Jr.

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Operations

FROM : George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Latin America Division Task Force Report of Possible Cuban Complicity in the John F. Kennedy Assassination

1. Attached is the Latin America Division report of findings relative to Cuban complicity in the assassination of former President John F. Kennedy. This research which was conducted from mid-October 1976 to June 1977 at the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, E. Henry Knoche, reviewed all Agency operations conducted against Cuba from 1 January 1960 to 1 January 1965 (concentrating on the period 1 January 1960 to 22 November 1963). We found no definitive proof that the Castro regime was implicated in the Kennedy assassination.

2. The report is comprised of the following sections:

LAD/JFK Task Force - How Research was conducted

Attachment A: Chronology of Findings (125 pages) with a Top Secret Annex (14 pages)

Attachment B: List of Task Force participants

Attachment C: Outline of the complete LAD/JFK Task Force files and description of their contents.

This massive and thorough research effort with all back-up documents has been assigned the official classification number 019-604-001. This report is submitted in the format requested by Mr. Scott Breckinridge, Jr., Task Force Leader.

George v. Lauder
George V. Lauder

Attachments, a/s

June 1977

SUBJECT: Latin America Division/JFK Task Force How
Research was Conducted

1. The LA Division Task Force to investigate records in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy was formally organized in mid-October 1976. Its purpose, basically, was to research all Agency operations conducted against Cuba from 1 January 1960 to 1 January 1965 (concentrating on the period up to 22 November 1963) for any evidence that such operations might have provoked the Government of Cuba to take executive action against President Kennedy. Researchers were also alert to activities seemingly directed against the U.S./CIA.

2. Reference to material for this research was obtained from the LAD Registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by ISS (Information Services Staff). It was originally thought that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900 operational folders, plus related 201 dossiers. It was later determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional operational and subject files which brought the total to well over two thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it, both operational

99

and subject, has been retired to Archives at [Warrenton, Virginia]. The remainder is held at Headquarters in IP/Files or IP/Archives. All 201 dossiers are retained at Headquarters. This material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the LAD/JFK Task Force files (too numerous to cite herein.)

3. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and organization of the material:

a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed:

1.	Operational (601 with findings and 1,128 with no findings)	1,729	
2.	Subject (186 with findings and 361 with no findings)	547	
3.	Cuba Policy Files	101	
4.	C/WHD Chrono Files (TFW Chronos)	37	(13 -49)
5.	Official 201 dossiers	100	plus
	TOTAL	2,514	

b. Criteria Used in the Research:

As a guide the research group followed some 33 Terms of Reference provided by the Deputy IG, which were compiled on the basis of issues raised in Book V,

1/mc

of the Senate Select Committee Final Report on the Assassination. (Book V, and a 23 May 1967 Memorandum for the Record by the Inspector General on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro, were required reading for the researchers.) In addition to the Terms of Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest brought to its attention by the IG staff, on an ad hoc basis. A name trace was always run, and/or 201 dossier, if available, reviewed, on any individual allegedly involved in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975, based on traces of the names in the Black Book that Fidel Castro passed to George McGovern which dealt with individuals allegedly involved in assassination attempts against Castro.

c. Findings and Organization of the Findings:

Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the Subject of the folder (s) reviewed, a brief description of the activity, and a copy of the document (s) (findings) which contained information believed to be pertinent to the review. Also included were Job numbers, Official File numbers, inclusive dates of material researched, and number of volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or other government agencies knowledge of information. Separate, finished, memoranda were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document number (s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing the gist of the document (s) for purpose of easy and quick reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document (s) attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official LAD/JFK Task Force files under the official classification number 019-604-001 (Volumes XI through XX). Also included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X) containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings.

4. Appended are the following:

A) Chronology of Findings (125 pages) with Top Secret UMBRA Annex (14 pages);

B) List of Task Force participants and their functions;

C) Outline of the complete LAD/JFK Task Force files and description of their contents.

ATTACHMENT A

CHRONOLOGY of FINDINGS (125 Pages)

with a TOP SECRET Annex (14 Pages) Code Word Material

CHRONOLOGY OF FINDINGS

Anti-Castro Activities - Cuba 19-9-9

HVCA 11020 dated 28 February 1964

A Caracas Station asset reported an operation called "Plan Judas" being constructed at that time inside Cuba. The plan reportedly involved an internal uprising with the support of certain Cuban military figures conspiring against Fidel CASTRO. Key figures reportedly included Juan ALMEIDA, Efigenio AMEIJEIRAS Delgado, Pepin NARANJO, Regino BOTTI, and two COSSIO brothers. On 24 February 1964, Francisco SUAREZ Quinones, a JURE (Revolutionary Junta) member in Caracas, told U.S. Embassy officials that JURE was then sponsoring a plan to assassinate Fidel CASTRO and other high-ranking Cuban Government officials as part of an operation designed to incite an internal rebellion in Cuba. The Station reported this plan, speculating that it may be connected in some way with Plan Judas.

DBA 77673 dated 15 July 1964 (FBI)

Reported plan of Cuban exile leaders to assassinate selected Cuban Government leaders. Individuals involved included Byron CAMERON, owner of m.v. "Cayman Hope," Teofilo BABUN Franco, co-owner of Antillean Marine Shipping

Corp. and two BABUN employees, Oscar FERNANDEZ Veigo and Eliseo GOMEZ (Fernandez; also, Jose "Pepin" BOSCH, Julio LOBO Olavarria and Eduardo GARCIA of the Garcia Lines, New York City. One of the ship owners allegedly had contacts with the underworld through his partner, a former police officer from St. Louis with tie-in to elements of the "Cosa Nostra."

DBA 92798 dated 7 December 1964 (FBI)

An FBI source reported an attempt to be made against Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO and "Che" GUEVARA within Cuba during period 20 Dec 64 to 10 Jan 65 by a small elite group in La Cabana Military Base, Havana, which belonged to a security section inside of the Cuban Intelligence Service. Plans were to be carried out by Cubans in Cuba with no help from the U.S.

Anti-CASTRO PM Operations 19-9-9

DBA 43687 dated 20 June 1963 (FBI)

On 18 June 1963 an unnamed representative of Ejercito Cubano Anticomunista (Cuban Anti-Communist Army) met with a representative of Santos TRAFFICANTE, described as a former gambling czar in Cuba and presently a member of the Mafia in the U.S., in an effort to obtain rockets, high explosives, and detonators for use in raids against Cuba.

DBA 45327 dated 12 July 1963 (FBI)

Manolo AGUILAR, 829 S.W. 9th Avenue, Miami, leader of the Frente Revolucionario Anticomunista (FRAC) (Anti-Communist Revolutionary Front) obtained some 100 Beretta 7.65 caliber pistols with silencers which his organization planned to eventually use in Cuba to assassinate various Cuban leaders. AGUILAR allegedly obtained these pistols from an unidentified American who had connections with the Mafia.

DBA 45895 dated 19 July 1963 (FBI)

On 15 July 1963 the Miami News carried an article "Back Stage with Bobby" by Hal Hendrix, which related growing speculation in Miami and Washington that Attorney General Robert Kennedy was quietly backing a new anti-Castro operation with exiles Manuel ARTIME, Enrique RUIZ Williams, and Roberto and Jose SAN ROMAN. All held high posts in Brigade 2506 (Bay of Pigs). Speculation linked Kennedy's close association with these exiles to a deal with Nicaragua through ex-President Luis SOMOZA.

Anti-CASTRO PM OPERATIONS 19-9-9/1

DBA 78251 dated 18 August 1964 (FBI)

Reported plan of Cuban exile leaders to assassinate selected Cuban Government leaders. Prices allegedly agreed upon were $100,000 to assassinate Fidel CASTRO; $20,000 for Raul CASTRO; and $20,000 for "Che" GUEVARA. This information was provided to the FBI by another Government Agency that allegedly had several meetings with one Byron CAMERON, Fort Lauderdale, Fla. CAMERON allegedly was acquainted with several policemen in St. Louis with ties to the underworld. CAMERON denied involvement with policemen connected with the underworld and said he had never discussed with anyone plans to assassinate Fidel or others.

JMARC Operation - 19-120-15

DIRECTOR 36823 (OUT 90086) 25 June 1960

Cable to Mexico and Havana. Reported that five Castro agents recently left Cuba, 3 for Miami and 2 for New York, with task to abduct AMHAWK (Manuel Antonio VARONA y Loredo). Source was PELAEZ (fnu) thru BARKER's wife. Information was passed to the FBI. Suggested that VARONA be warned to take normal security precautions.

XAAZ 6269 (OUT 90031) 26 June 1960

The Agency provided the above information on proposed abduction of VARONA to the FBI, and advised that the same information was being sent to I&NS. —

JMARC - PM Operations General 19-132-2

DIRECTOR 09972 (OUT 88974) 31 Oct 1960

Cable to Guatemala giving details of training of assault force for paramilitary ops against Cuba.

GUAT 821 (IN 1688) 13 January 1961 to BELL.

FYI: Reported that Alexander ROURKE, free lance newsman from New York City in Miami, told ESOLEO-1 that Frank FIORINI and Dr. Orlando BOSCH of Miami, representing man in Cuba named DIEGO (fnu), were recruiting and equipping force in Florida to assault Cuba 18 January. The organization was receiving financial aid from an organization in New York City known as Anti-Communist International Association.

DBF 90801 dated 10 March 1961 (FBI)

New York FBI office advised that invasion of Cuba was to take place week of 6 March 1961 by members of an anti-Castro group from Nassau, Bahamas, British West Indies.

JMARC Program 19-120-15/2

MASH 1470 (IN 38669) 6 Nov 1960.

Cable to CIA Headquarters and Havana stating that RECAREY, (fnu), cousin of a Guat trainee, arrived MASH from Havana on 5 November to check bonafides of Eduardo OJEDA Camaraza. OJEDA had made contact with AMYUM/AMRUNG Havana and told details of MASH recruitment, training, names of trainees and mission in Cuba. MASH feared AMRUNG/AMYUM may try kill OJEDA as Castro penetration/provocateur if bonafides not established.

RIMM 5846 (IN 2708) 4 June 1961

Radio message #84 from agent in Cuba advised "functionary of Italian Embassy by name of MORATORI says he works for one intelligence org. of yours, says he is in contact with Martin Elena and others and that you have plans for invasion within 30 days after killing Fidel. Advise if we can confide in MORATORI."

BELL 0987 (OUT 9804) 6 June 1961

Radio message #72 to agent 'MORATORI unknown to us. Do not confide in him. MORATORI's information of pending invasion within 30 days after killing Fidel not true. Beware of rumor mongers and provocateurs."

AMBLEAK 19-6-58/3,4

UFG 2267 dated 23 January 1963

Reported on activities of Manuel Antonio VARONA of "Rescate" (Revolutionary Democratic Rescue) in Costa Rica and other Central American countries re discussing Cuban situation with foreign ministers of those countries. While in Costa Rica he negotiated with local political personalities to recruit and train an anti-Communist paramilitary force along lines then being developed in Colombia.

AMBRUSH Operation 19-5-6

Document dated 19 August 1961 (No document symbol)

Handcarried to Headquarters from JMWAVE. Document contains comments from AMPAL-1 on pro-Cuban sources in the U.S. He reported information from other sources that Fidel CASTRO is sending in many G-2 women instead of men for his clandestine operations between U.S. and Cuba. Also reported that the Russians have spies in the Pentagon that pull for Fidel CASTRO, and agents in all branches of the U.S. Government of importance including the CIA. Further, that all people in Cuba picked up for working for CIA are done so because of information from these agents. The source was told of suspicions of one Eugenio, a Cuban. /COMMENT: SLIPSTREAM-1 in 1976 advised that one Eugenio MARTINEZ in Miami was a Castro agent. One Eugenio Rolando MARTINEZ Careaga was a Miami Station agent involved in the Watergate breakin.[7] There was no reference to assassination in this file.

AMCANOE Operation 19-6-91

TDCSDB 3/654,571 dated 9 May 1963

Reported meeting on 7 May 63 between Paulino A. SIERRA, a Cuban lawyer from Chicago, and representatives of 43 Cuban exile groups in Miami. SIERRA claimed he had backing of wealthy Chicago business people who were willing to loan up to $30 million dollars for the purpose of overthrowing the Castro Government. SIERRA said the money could be made available to organizations having the capability of carrying out clandestine activity in Cuba.

WAVE 8743 (IN 43724) 22 May 1963

A Miami Station asset reported information from Julio GARCERAN del Vall y Souza, of the PGCC,(Pro-Constitutional Government of Cuba in Exile) who,on 9 May 63,said that Cuban exile groups were puzzled with regard to the American policy toward Cuba and the exile community. GARCERAN said that among persons who recently visited him were Enrique RUIZ Williams Alfert, a personal friend of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and Jaime VARELA Canosa;also

PERULLERO (fnu). Those three reportedly represented a group of members of Brigade 2506 who had been training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. RUIZ Williams was trying to form a nucleus for an invasion force. GARCERAN had been offered use of a large ranch in Colombia for operations against Cuba but feared that use of such would create an international incident and provoke a war between Cuba and Colombia.

Memorandum for the Record by Carl Trettin 3 Mar 1964

AMCANOE-1 reported that an acquaintance of his (unidentified), a businessman and ship owner with interest in slot machine business - placing them in gambling houses - placed the man in contact with elements in the underworld primarily through his partner, a former St. Louis police officer. Through the latter, there was tie-in with the Cosa Nostra. The Cosa Nostra interests alleged to have numerous contacts still available to them in Cuba and offered to assassinate Castro for $150 thousand dollars.

UFGA 15233 dated 15 April 1964

Report on a Byron CAMERON who said that he represented an unidentified group of persons who had made contact with two Cuban gangsters who were willing to kill Fidel CASTRO. CAMERON reportedly was associated with a Mr. S.W. TYLER (no identifiable traces) of Caribbean Producer, Inc., Miami Springs, Fla., and Herbert F.

JENNE (no traces) with the firm F.A. Johnson, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Fla. CAMERON was reported as allegedly belonging to the Mafia.

UFGA 15954 dated 11 May 1964

On 3 March 64 CAMERON held a meeting with Teofilo BABUN Franco, Oscar FERNANDEZ Viego, Eliseo GOMEZ Fernandez, Freddie GARCIA, Eddie GARCIA and Miguel Guillermo TRUYOL-Gimeno. CAMERON mentioned that he was in contact with an unidentified group who would be willing to assassinate select Cuban officials for cash: specifically CAMERON was interested in assassinating Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO and "Che" GUEVARA. They agreed on $100 thousand for Fidel, $20 thousand for Raul and $20 thousand for "Che." CAMERON made it fairly clear at the beginning that the Mafia was involved.

AMCLOCK Production and Correspondence 19-6-133/4
(Currently PLSLSTEEL)
ESGW 193 dated 2 September 1960

Dispatch from Headquarters to Geneva and Bern forwarding general requirements for asset. One question was precautions taken to prevent possible assassination attempts of top Cuban officials.

TDCSDB 3/651,885 dated 25 October 1962

Reported view of Soviet diplomat on the Cuban situation. The Soviet diplomat, Minister MOLYAKOV, told a Bloc diplomat that he thought the U.S. action with regard to Cuba was "an election affair." He professed to believe that Kennedy learned on an election tour that his popularity had dropped and undertook the Cuban measure to "become the leader again," and gain mass support. Further, that it worked, and Kennedy again had succeeded in being the "man of the nation." The Soviet diplomat commented that the USSR would not let the American move go without retaliation. [COMMENT: This no doubt referred to the missile crisis.]

TDCSDB 3/652,011 dated 1 November 1962

Reported reaction of Satellite officials to the Cuban missile developments. One remarked that Cuba was as important to the USA as to the USSR and thus conflict was inevitable. Some agreed that President Kennedy had made a tactical error in not simply invading Cuba without warning. An East European remarked that all the European nations had shown understanding of "Kennedy and his ships, and would let him play around with them until the elections, but after the elections he would have to put them away and negotiate seriously." The source commented that it was clear that the officials had no clear insight into Soviet intentions, or what the real ramifications of Cuba would be, but were talking to reinforce their faith.

GNVA 6117 (IN 00894) dated 18 January 1964

Report on Soviet Bloc officials' attitude towards U.S. internal political developments. An East European attributed the assassination of President Kennedy to the Birch Society but stated that something must have gone wrong at the last moment. He speculated that an attack on the USSR was to have followed on the heels of the assassination but had somehow been forestalled.

GNVA 4523 (IN 38202) dated 19 December 1962

Reported that Soviet offensive missiles were introduced into Cuba as part of a twofold Soviet-Cuba plan which was agreed upon "several months ago." Emplacement of Soviet defensive missiles was to constitute the first phase. For the second phase, a major Soviet fleet unit was to have been invited to visit Cuba on a cruise. This was expected to cause immediate U.S. reaction, but the presence of Soviet fleet units surrounding Cuba was considered an effective guarantee that the U.S. would not resort to immediate invasion or other armed action to eliminate missile threat. Purpose of exercise was to force a major change of U.S. policy towards Cuba. It was anticipated that U.S. reaction would be violent, and from the beginning the plan called for immediate withdrawal at the price of agreement by U.S. that it would end hostile attitude towards Cuba. The Soviets did not implement phase two. This disappointed and angered the Cubans. The Cuban leaders considered that the Soviets had besmirched its own honor and offended the pride of Cuba. KHRUSHCHEV composed a letter to President Kennedy proposing a deal concerning Soviet missile bases in Cuba and American bases in Turkey. KHRUSHCHEV reportedly later regretted the phraseology and not having consulted with Cuba prior to dispatch of the letter.

GNVA 6316 (IN 31199) dated 3 March 1964

Raul ROA said that prior to his assassination, President Kennedy "established certain contacts" with Cuba. Kennedy had sent emissaries to contact Cubans. ROA specifically cited contacts that had taken place in New York. ROA thought that Kennedy would have gone on to negotiate with Cuba, for practical reasons, which would have been to Cuba's advantage. He thought that President Johnson was unaware of Kennedy's actions.

AMCOBRA (later AMBANTY) Operation 19-132-11

WAVE 7250 (IN 57364) dated 12 November 1963

Radio message from agent. "The sewage chief of Havana was executed. He was accused of having given the sewage plans to the CIA in order to install the bombs that exploded during Fidel's speech to the Defense Committees."

WAVE 7523 (IN 61119) dated 15 November 1963

Radio message from agent. "The obligatory military service makes us reduce intelligence information. I will have to decide between insurrection and departing Cuba. I have decided on insurrection. I hope you will help me with the weapons I need."

WAVE 7594 (IN 61966) dated 16 November 1963

Message to agent. "As you agreed when you were here, there can be no insurrection in Cuba until it can take place simultaneously throughout Cuba. Such a total uprising is not possible at this time."

WAVE 7593 (IN 61967) dated 16 November 1963

Message to agent. "If you insist on precipitant action before the whole plan is ready you are going to draw all the enemy forces down upon you and the people of Pinar which will result in the complete destruction of everything you and your men have labored so hard to create. We cannot support an insurrection now. We will continue to support you and group as agreed upon."

WAVE 7707 (IN 62544) dated 17 November 1963

Message to agent. We are unable to support insurrection in Pinar now because it would be premature.

WAVE 8125 (IN 67382) dated 24 November 1963

Message from agent. "Sincere grief and condolence for loss of the greatest leader and statesman of our time, John Kennedy."

WAVE 8598 (IN 75428) dated 6 December 1963

Message to agent. "Thank you for sincere condolences on death of President Kennedy."

AMCOG Operation 19-6-63

WAVE 1465 (IN 11710) dated 4 February 1964

Agent reported that he was told that OSWALD was in Havana between 2 and 7 October 1963. A lady saw him in shirt sleeves, wearing good shoes and smoking American cigars accompanied by Clemente MORERA, an employee of Terminales Mambisas who belongs to the DSE. He (OSWALD) was seen by the sister of Comandante MIRANDA."

/COMMENT: Note document # 517-218 for FOIA Review on June 1976./

COMMANDOS MAMBISAS 19-126-45

A 4 November 1963 Miami Herald article, and 12 November 1963 Washington Post article revealed that Fidel CASTRO was extremely upset at the recent successes of the Commandos Mambisas raids targetted principally against sugar cane industry.

AMCONCERT Project - 19-6-41

The Agency began this project in March 1960. Its objective was to provide information on plans and activities of the Government of Cuba and opposition to the GOC. The principal asset was Francisco VARONA Alonso (201-234983.) VARONA was recruited in April 1959 to elicit information from contacts in Cuba. He was arrested in April 1961, released, and returned to Miami in February 1962. He was used by Miami Station as an informant and terminated February 1969 for being unproductive, unreliable, a poor security risk, and hostile to the U.S. and the U.S.G.

Control of Cuban Travelers 200-9-49

KNGS 0948 (IN 54974) dated 5 November 1963

On 15 October 63 Dominican student Carlos Manuel CABRAL Lofontaine attempted to enter Cuba via Kingston ostensibly to attend architect conference. Jamaican authorities, suspecting the trip to be a pretext, returned CABRAL to the Dom. Rep.

The First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy Ottawa, Osvaldo RELOVA, visited Kingston from 14-21 October 1963, purpose unexplained. While there he lived in the Consulate the entire stay.

HABA 12,838 dated 5 November 1963

Report concerning unofficial irregular air service established between Cuba and Brazil, for transportation of political rather than commercial travelers.

POSN 0340 (IN 54917) dated 5 November 1963

On 25 October 1963 a Russian plane arrived in Pointe-A-Pitre, Guadeloupe, with 60 passengers. 41 transferred to Panama for Rio; the remainder left on the "Russian" plane. /COMMENT: note on cable states that the Cubans were returning from architects congress./

AMCOVE Operation 19-6-93/2,3,4

WAVE 7356 (IN 58343) dated 10 November 1963

Re security crackdown in Cuba, largest since early 1961. Believed to be due to discontent among Cuban populace re economic failures, and CASTRO's fears of impact of recent raids on Cuba which would increase spontaneous sabotage inside Cuba which he may interpret as meaning U.S. Government has stepped up activities to overthrow his regime. CASTRO plans to counter these aspirations by USG with full use of police powers and repressive measures.

TDCSDB 3/658,075 dated 27 November 1963

All Cuban combat units were confined to bases effective 23 November 1963. Following news of death of President Kennedy, Defense Committee members and personnel at certain work centers in Cuba began to celebrate event.

AMCOVE-1 SW Message #60 dated 24 November 1963

Reported strange activities at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana following news of President Kennedy's death 22 November 1963.

AMCOVE-1 SW Message #66 dated 5 December 1963

Report giving names of travelers from Prague on 22 November 1963; travelers from Spain on 23 November 1963. Also, report that high figures of CASTRO regime were very nervous on the day of Kennedy's death. This information came from AMCOVE-11 who obtained it from a doctor friend, who obtained it from a Navy Comandante who was not a sympathizer of the regime.

AMCOVE-1 SW Message #68 dated 6 December 1963

5

AMCOVE-11 [Dr. Pedro Antonio RODRIGUEZ Inigo] reported "rumors in Cuba that Lee OSWALD, assassin of Kennedy, was photographed in Varadero and Pinar del Rio, and that his (sic) sister, employed at Cuban Embassy Mexico, was a prisoner in Dallas, Texas, with personal documentation of OSWALD and $65,000 dollars. Swiss Ambassador Havana told employees that Lee OSWALD was an associate of Fidel CASTRO."

AMCROAK Operation 19-6-97

MADR 9866 (IN 74333) dated 5 December 1963

AMCROAK-1 (Dr. Bernardo MILANES Lopez) discussed an operational plan with AMOT-2 (Joaquin SANJENIS Perdomo) which consisted of elimination of high GOC personalities. MILANES had not mentioned the plan to the case officer. (MILANES was recruited by CIA in Madrid in December 1963. At the time of recruitment he was involved with a group planning to kill CASTRO, a completely extra- CIA affiliation.)

MADR 9928 (IN 78595 dated 11 December 1963

The above plan mentioned by MILANES concerned the physical elimination of Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO, and "Che" GUEVARA. MILANES said that seven persons were involved in the plan and that they had studied it for eight months. The case officer told MILANES that the USG did not look with approval on such activities, but he would pass the information on /to his supervisors7

DIRECTOR 88949 dated 12 December 1963

In discussions with MILANES he was to be told that a coup against CASTRO resulting in ouster of CASTRO and the Communist regime was an internal affair for which only Cubans could be responsible. That in the event of a real coup against the CASTRO regime, the U.S. Government was prepared to render full support, upon invitation.

UFGA 13793 dated 27 January 1964

When discussing the plan with MILANES, the case officer learned that Mario SALABARRIA Aguiar was one of the principal planners. When the case officer told MILANES that the US Government did not condone such actions, MILANES replied that in view of our lack of support of this undertaking, he considered it not prudent to reveal further details, but added that he actually did not know the names of any other possible participants and had only a general idea of the scheme which was to waylay CASTRO as he was leaving an apartment.

UFGA 13794 dated 28 January 1964 (JMWAVE to Hqs.)

In January 1963 Fidel CASTRO asked MILANES what he thought of President Kennedy and his relationship with Fidel. MILANES replied that Fidel probably underestimated Kennedy, that the latter by no means was illiterate or the imbecile Fidel often described him to be, and in the long run Kennedy would be Fidel's undoing. Fidel laughingly replied that he would be the one who ruined Kennedy because within eight months Fidel would have Latin America burning. Fidel made an obscene motion and said he would have Kennedy "in the air."

/COMMENT: Mario SALABARRIA, who worked closely with MILANES, reportedly drew up the assassination plans and allegedly obtained money and weapons from the U.S. MILANES and SALABARRIA were arrested in mid-1965. SALABARRIA was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. As of May 71 his name appeared on a list of prisoners of Guanajay Prison, Pinar del Rio, Cuba. MILANES, according to one of his sub-sources, served only a few years of his sentence because of collaboration with the Cuban Government. As of 1973 MILANES reportedly was living in Miami, Florida and had been singled out for elimination by members of the Cuban exile community in Miami._7

CUBANA Airline Manifests (non-CS) No File

The Cubana Airline Manifest for 27 November 1963, showing air travel from Mexico City to Havana, lists one Gilberto LOPEZ PP #310162. /See separate file on Gilberto POLICARPO Lopez, both the 201-741600, and the file set up by LAD/JFK Task Force._/

Cuban Army of Liberation 19-9-17

DBA 80042 (FBI) dated 14 July 1964

Concerns an interview of Julio LOBO in July 1964.

LOBO claimed he was contacted by Teofilo BABUN and asked to contribute $100,000.00 toward a plot to assassinate Fidel CASTRO and other Cuban leaders. The assassins were described as three or four "Chicago-type Cosa Nostra" individuals who would be going to Havana, Cuba on other legitimate business.

CUBAN Developmental Operations 19-120-40

UFGA 4176 dated 31 May 1962

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters Task Force W, concerning the debriefing of Dr. Jaime CARBONELL Rivero, former nightclub operator in Havana, about two proposals by him to assassinate Fidel CASTRO. Both plans were considered amateurish and not acceptable by CIA officers in Miami.

CUBAN Foreign Relations 19-9-2

DBF 47612 (FBI) dated 27 April 1960

This document deals with Luis CONTE Aguero, a former JMWAVE Station asset, and controversial personality. CONTE, in the U.S. as of April 1960, among other things associated himself with the White Rose Organization through his nephew Carlos RIVERO Collada. /COMMENT: RIVERO was one of the ransomed returnees from the Bay of Pigs, December 1962. In 197~~3~~4 he defected to Cuba, saying he had been a CASTRO agent and penetration of exile organizations in the U.S. all the while.7 /COMMENT: CONTE in 1960 was attempting to be placed in charge of anti-Cuban programs of the "Voice of the Americas." Hqs. has speculated that CONTE Aguero might be iden/with Bernardo MORALES, recipient of a letter dated 29 November 1962 from a Jose MENENDEZ in Cuba concerning a plot to assassinate President Kennedy. See LAD/JFK Task Force folder on CONTE7.

The FBI informant learned that a person by the name of Roberto had requested biographical and personal information from the Cuban Foreign Ministry on a fnu BEATON and CONTE Aguero for writing of articles concerning these persons, for the "Fact Sheet." Roberto may be iden/w Robert TABER listed in a 6 April 1960 New York Times article as a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. TABER reportedly had made trips to Havana, Cuba from New York City to confer with Fidel CASTRO.

CUBAN GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO 50-9-12

((Mexico City Station Teltap Operation Against Cuban Embassy - LIENVOY) (Job #64-518/84)

FOLDER #20 (Covers Teltap Traffic 20 Aug - 2 Sept 63)

30 Aug 63 - Incoming call to Embassy. OSVALDO with JORRIN. OSVALDO says he is one of the scholarship holders and wants to speak with AZCUE.

FOLDER # 22 (Covers 24 Sept - 3 Oct. 63)

HMMA 22252 dated 4 October 1963

24 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1707 hours from Prensa Latina reporter to Fernandez ROA. Asks if Embassy has any statement about the supposed attempt against CASTRO. ROA says they have no declaration; it's the work of the sick mind of the pseudo-Cubans in Miami. (Item #18).

24 Sept 63 - Call from Embassy at 2007 hours from Raul to OSVALDO, saying Saturday they are having a party. (Item #290).

24 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1835 hours. Luis PRIETO calling in to Luisa asks her if what they are saying about Fidel is true; he has been so alarmed that he has called everyone. Luisa says if they kill Fidel or do something it's worse yet because what remains is terrible. (Item #574).

24 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1258 hours. Woman calling in asks LLAGOSTERA (Cuban Embassy gardner) if he knows about the attempt against CASTRO. LLAGOSTERA says he knows nothing. She asks if the news comes from Miami. He says yes. (Item #272).

25 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1731 hours. OSVALDO calling in asks to speak with AZCUA, so that he will get the medicine for them and LLAGOSTERA. After informing OSVALDO that he isn't there, suggests that he call the Condesa Pharmacy, ask for the medicine and pass the bill to the Embassy. OSVALDO accepts. (Item #343).

25 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1754 hours. Woman from the Condesa Pharmacy says that they made a request for Sr. Osvaldo HERNANDEZ of Chiapas 148, but as it concerns about $300 (pesos) she wants to know if she should supply it. LLAGOSTERA says he will let Srita. MECHE know if she should dispatch it. MECHE accepts. (Item #404).

25 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy from male university student to man in Embassy, to tell him that a few minutes ago they heard news that Fidel had died and they wanted to know if it were true. He says it is news from Miami going around a few days ago; that yesterday's newspaper from Havana says Dr. Fidel CASTRO is enjoying perfect health. (Item #954).

26 Sept 63 - Call from Embassy at 1721 hours. Raul in Embassy talks with Osvaldo. Osvaldo talks to him about the exams he's having all this week and next. Osvaldo asks if they are collecting tomorrow, Saturday's the party. That about the dirty thing will be left until next week.(Item 714

27 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1054 hours. Silvia talks with Guillermo RUIZ (DGI). RUIZ still has not been able to speak with the Consul and that's why he hasn't called her. Silvia asks him to give her the Consul's number because there isn't any time for that. RUIZ says don't get angry; and asks if she wants to speak directly with him. Silvia says yes. RUIZ says it's 11-28-47. She says fine. (Item #191).

2 Oct 63 - Call from Embassy at 1206 hours. Teresa talks with Sra. Neus and says the Ambassador wants the History of the CIA, all the latest books, a copy of each one. Neus says they will be sent. (Item #452).

/COMMENT: The name "Osvaldo" is mentioned in several conversations. In one he gave his name as Osvaldo HERNANDEZ and resided at the same place as the Cuban Ambassador, whose last name is also HERNANDEZ. It is speculated that they might be related. Traced Osvaldo HERNANDEZ, but could not positively identify him for lack of more data./ /COMMENT: Above is the only call made by or to Silvia (DURAN) on the 27th of September the day on which Lee Harvey OSWALD reportedly came to the Cuban Embassy, according to Washington Post article dated 26 Nov 76.

FOLDER #25 (Covering teltap from 15 Nov - 30 Nov 63)

22 November 1963

ITEM 038 Page 1

1648 hours - Long Distance call from Vera Cruz.
Caller (SAMA) (Ovilio SAMA, Cuban Vice Consul in Vera Cruz).
Receiver Ambassador HERNANDEZ Armas.

HERNANDEZ: Tells SAMA that tomorrow's meeting will have to be postponed until another Saturday at the same time because he has another invitation and possibly will have to leave.

SAMA : Accepts and asks if there is any instructions regarding the recent incident.

HERNANDEZ: Says no, all is perfectly well.

SAMA : Says yes, there is some instruction concerning Kennedy's death.

HERNANDEZ: Says no, that the thing is very lamentable, but "we are here as always."

SAMA : Says that the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps will call at eight in the evening to go give their condolences, but they will not go.

HERNANDEZ: Gives him the reason, and asks that he explain to the Dean that they cannot go because of the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

ITEM 084 Page 2

Hour not specified - Call to the Embassy.

Caller (Guillermo OCHOA de Novedades), spoke with Receiver (PEREGRINA) inside the Embassy.

OCHOA : Called to say that that afternoon he went to the Embassy to see if there was an article for the newspaper regarding Kennedy's death.

PEREGRINA: Told OCHOA that the Ambassador had been invited to a dinner and that OCHOA should call back at 5 o'clock in the evening at which time she will tell him something about the matter. PEREGRINA tells OCHOA to wait a minute, then says that the Ambassador has not arrived yet and up to now has not said anything. She tells OCHOA he can call back later if he wishes.

OCHOA : Said that he would call that night.

ITEM 101 Page 2

1730 hours - Call to Embassy.

Caller (Unidentified man) calls LUISA (inside Embassy)

Caller : Asks if she knows the latest news.

LUISA : Jokingly said "yes, of course, I knew about it almost before Kennedy ."

Caller : Laughs and comments that that is very bad.

In principle they thought it was one of those reactionary extremists who was against the integration and all ... but it seems that they apprehended a man who is nothing more than the president of one of those Fair Play for Cuba Committees.

LUISA : Says she also knows that.

CALLER : As of yet nothing is confirmed but it appears that whoever did it was crazy, independently (so deranged) that he could have blamed that to Kennedy... say the international conditions and internal conditions in the United States... because...

LUISA : And more external principally.

CALLER : That's why I say international... one can see a sufficient effect and not suffer a big change, with a change of President or with a thing of this type ... above all...

LUISA : Was it a gringo (American) that killed him?

CALLER : Yes, but he said he had been in Russia, that he wanted to become a Russian citizen, but Russia didn't want to give him the citizenship.

LUISA : Surprised...said listen, how do they know those things over there?

CALLER : He knows Russian well, and moreover this fellow went with Fidel's forces into the mountains, or wanted to go, something like that. Who knows how the thing was?

LUISA : Serious.

CALLER : Asks how much more they know over there?

LUISA : Almost precisely that. They heard about it sometime ago and now they are ...

CALLER : That is very bad. He was eating with some friends and commenting on the magazine Politica which had just come out, when one arrived and gave them the news. That really surprised him and he thought they were being kidded.

LUISA : She was looking at the magazine but her friend must have accidentally taken it away.

CALLER : Said his friend commented that a Mexican had killed him (Kennedy) because he (the Mexican) realized that the United States had taken Texas from them and he killed the President for vengeance; that it was all a joke but they didn't believe him until he said that they should turn on the radio; that's when they heard about it. The last thing he heard, a little while ago, is that the fellow is someone named OSWALD. They believe he is the one but he hasn't confessed anything.

LUISA : But they already know that he speaks Russian and belongs to a pro-Cuba committee. They know that he wanted to be naturalized, but the man hasn't confessed.

CALLER : Says the reason may be they are trying to find out something about the man, because...

LUISA : Says wait a minute, can you tell me?

CALLER : We thought that if it had been, or appeared to the public to be one of the segregationist or those opposed to integration that had assassinated Kennedy, that there might be a civil struggle, or a Civil War in the United States. Considering the critical situation the country is going through, they will find a resolution to that man, no? Already it is more international. Are they going to find out for certain, who knows? Let's see what happens.

LUISA : Laughs and asks what will happen.

CALLER : Who knows?

LUISA : Figuratively, one, two, three, and already there are three. (She laughs). What barbarians!

CALLER : That will probably be the topic of conversation at Silvia's party today.

LUISA : It was cancelled because they couldn't go.

CALLER : Asks why.

LUISA : "So they can later say that we were celebrating Kennedy's death" (sic). /COMMENT: appears that transcriber left out negative - can not say7. Silvia agreed to change the party to next week, but not to coincide with the funeral (laugh).

CALLER : One must take that into consideration.

LUISA : What will be after the sorrow, the mourning, and all that junk.

CALLER : Asks where she is going to stay now.

LUISA : Says that she plans to move to the doctor's house tonight.

CALLER : Asks if all is known there.

LUISA : Says yes, but she doesn't know how everything is or if they have to stay at the Embassy; however, she believes that it will not be possible today, because everyone left for the airport and there isn't a car at the Embassy. Possibly tomorrow morning, instead of going to the study group, she will move.

CALLER : Said he would talk to her tomorrow.

LUISA : Said that he should inquire at the Embassy or at the house. It she doesn't stay at the Embassy, she will go to her house, where she will be by 10.

CALLER : Concurs.

ITEM 118 Page 2

1721 hours - Call to the Embassy.

CALLER (identity unknown) wants to talk with FERNANDEZ Roa.

RECEIVER (PEREGRINA) says he is outside of Mexico and there is no one there from the news department.

CALLER : Says he is from the revolutionary newspaper and would like the opinion of Dr. Roa regarding the assassination of Kennedy.

PEREGRINA : Repeats that Roa is in Havana, and with regards to Kennedy, they can't say anything because they know nothing about it and the Ambassador isn't around at the moment.

ITEM 159 Page 3

1744 hours - Call to the Embassy.

CALLER (Norma) tells Bertica (in the Embassy) that at this moment the following news story is appearing on the teletype: "Interrogation of young OSWALD who assassinated President Kennedy, says that he was in the Soviet Union, married a Soviet woman, wanted Soviet citizenship but wasn't granted it. He is president of a pro-Cuban committee called PERPLEX (Fair Play) for Cuba. The note says that these committees, pro-Cuban, are committees that fight ... without sympathizers of Fidel CASTRO and make propaganda for the Cuban Government."

ITEM 205 Page 3

Hour unknown - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (female) Asks LLAGOSTERA (Cuban Embassy gardner) if he has the radio turned on.

LLAGOSTERA: Says yes.

CALLER : Asks if LLAGOSTERA heard the news that an attempt was made on life of Kennedy.

LLAGOSTERA: Says no. He changed the conversation and said that his wife and son, Pepito, were arriving the coming month.

CALLER : Said that is good and asked LLAGOSTERA to turn on the radio at 1,000 because that's where the news was given.

LLAGOSTERA: Agrees.

ITEM 236 Page 3

1319 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (COTY) Asks LLAGOSTERA if he is listening to the the radio.

LLAGOSTERA: Says yes.

COTY : Asks if it is true that Kennedy has been killed.

LLAGOSTERA: Says no, but that an attempt was made against his life.

COTY : Says there is no radio where he is and he doesn't know what is going on. They say that he was shot three times and died. At that moment it was being given in a bulletin and that LLAGOSTERA should turn on the radio to hear the news.

LLAGOSTERA: Says he will.

ITEM 275 Page 4

Hour not given - Call to the Embassy.

CALLER (Female) Asks ROGELIO to come to see her right away because she has something very important to tell him.

ROGELIO : Asks if it is to tell him that Kennedy was killed.

CALLER : Says yes.

ROGELIO : Says he already knows it.

ITEM 294 Page 4

1340 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (Alejandro) Advised LLAGOSTERA that he will be in the Foreign Relations office in case the man calls.

LLAGOSTERA : Says that's fine.

Alejandro : Said "you know that your patron died, no?"

LLAGOSTERA : Yes, very well.

Alejandro : That there was an attempt against Kennedy's life, and it seems that he died.

LLAGOSTERA : Said he did not know that. That he will call back later.

ITEM 302 Page 4

1350 hours - Call from Embassy to Tele # 35-54-12.

Jorge ROJAS : Asks his wife, Cachita, if she knew about the news.

Cachita : Said yes, that they were just giving it on the radio.

ROJAS : Said what a dreadful thing.

Cachita : Replied what imbeciles, what do they gain with terrorism.

ROJAS : Who knows what will happen now.

Cachita : Changed the subject and told her that "the airplane arrives after four" and that he is going over there right now.

Cachita : Said she will wait for him.

ITEM 317 Pages 4 & 5

1400 hours - Call to Embassy

CALLER (COTY) Asks LLAGOSTERA if it's confirmed.

LLAGOSTERA : Said yes, that's correct, may his soul rest in peace.

COTY : Asks if the plane arrived.

LLAGOSTERA : Said the plane will arrive at 4:15.

COTY : Said it was strange that LANDRIAN or MENA had not called him, because he had some things of theirs.

LLAGOSTERA : Said that's correct.

ITEM 339 Page 5

1402 hours - Call to Embassy

CALLER (PENA) Asks for ROGELIO.

LLAGOSTERA : Said he wasn't in.

PENA : Said he called to tell him the news.

LLAGOSTERA : Said they already know it.

PENA : Said then he is happy.

LLAGOSTERA : Said no, the only thing they desired, was to make him a ..... of flowers.

PENA : Laughed and agreed.

ITEM 347 Page 5

1405 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (CONCEPCION's wife) Tells LLAGOSTERA that when her husband, (Oscar CONCEPCION) arrives, tell him that he left some candies "here". [The CUIS had a commo drop in Mexico City referred to as Candy.]

LLAGOSTERA : Said he will, but if Oscar arrived at home first, to tell him that the airplane arrives at 4:15.

CONCEPCION's wife : Agreed and said that the problem is that she bought some candies to send to VEGA but her husband forgot them.

LLAGOSTERA : Said, today a good man died.

CONCEPCION's Wife: Asks who.

LLAGOSTERA : Responded, Kennedy.

CONCEPCION's Wife: Laughs.

LLAGOSTERA : Said, poor man, may God have him in glory.

CONCEPCION's Wife: Laughs again.

ITEM 522 Page 8

1330 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (Female,unidentified) Asks if LUISA knows about the news of Kennedy's death.

LUISA : Surprised, says it is a lie and asks who.

CALLER : Said in an attempt in Texas.

LUISA : Again surprised, LUISA questions if the news is official and asked when it occurred.

CALLER : It happened at 1300 hours.

LUISA : Becomes joyful and says "how great!"

CALLER : Langhs and indicates that his (Kennedy's) brother and wife were also injured.

LUISA : Laughs and says again, "how great, nevertheless, I don't believe it."

CALLER : Says turn on the radio.

LUISA : Asks for her husband whom she hasn't seen.

CALLER : Said "he was here, but he left."

LUISA : Said she has been waiting for him for a while because she has to give him a list of people to review (or revise).

CALLER : Told LLAGOSTERA that he should turn on the radio.

LUISA : Again rejoices and says how great it is.

CALLER : Became serious and asked if LUISA knows the consequences.

LUISA : Says "good."

CALLER : Said she felt sorry because he was a man and the father of a family.

LUISA : Said she felt sorry because he was a father, but he was "a degenerate, unfortunate, an aggressor."

CALLER : Apart from his politics with Cuba, she didn't believe anything had been resolved; "one must now wait to see what will happen."

LUISA : After asking her to wait, asked what more was said.

CALLER : Said they have now been given the news; he has died, was shot three times in the face.

LUISA : Said perfect. Now I'm going to come down.

CALLER : Replied, good.

ITEM 571 Page 9

1344 hours - Call to Embassy.

NICO (Called in) Asked if any calls had come for him.

LUISA : Until now, nothing.

NICO : Asked if VACILIO had called.

LUISA : Said, no, only SOLORAZANO called saying it was not possible for him to send the note because of a problem. For major reasons it was not possible that day; maybe not until Monday. If he wishes to speak with him, he will be at 21-35-70 until one in the afternoon.

NICO : Correct.

LUISA : Said that NELA just called to give her the news of Kennedy's death and the wounding of his brother; that it happened in Texas. Asked what NICO thought about it.

NICO : "can you imagine!"

LUISA : Laughs and adds that that is all for now; that the list is almost ready, she is finishing the last page.

NICO : Says okay. Asks what time the airplane will arrive.

LUISA : Says at 4 and that at 4:30 they must be at the airport.

NICO : Says okay.

ITEM 594 Page 9

Hour not given - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (YOYA) Asks LUISA if she has already heard the news.

LUISA : Says yes.

YOYA : Asks what she thinks of it.

LUISA : "Well, I don't know. I still don't know what opinion to have about it."

YOYA :"What brutes. A good shot. Direct. Listen, now they are going to say that it was from here; that it was some Cuban."

LUISA :"That is possible, then if they don't say it, they will die."

YOYA : "That is certain."

LUISA : Changed the conversation and asked how her mother is.

YOYA : Said she is better; that when she arrived at the house, she received the news and it caught her by surprise.

LUISA : That even he was caught by surprise.

YOYA :"Yes, well if he was alerted, they would have done nothing; what brutes! What is going to happen today, is that it was some Cuban."

LUISA "That it will be a problem for world politics. It is a large problem; enormous."

YOYA :"It is going to be that."

LUISA :"Now no way, it already happened, and it happened in Dallas, Texas."

FOLDER #25 -

25 NOVEMBER 1963

ITEM #93 Page 1

0946 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER : Asks for ROA.

RECEIVER : (JORRIN) Replied that he wasn't in.

CALLER : Identified self as John RETTY, BBC Correspondent from London. Asked receiver if he had read the report in that day's EXCELSIOR (Mexico City newspaper), about the presence in Mexico in September of the presumed assassin of Kennedy.

JORRIN : Said he hadn't read anything.

RETTY : Said that OSWALD was here in Mexico and went to the Cuban Embassy asking for a visa to go to the Soviet Union; and that he also was in the Soviet Embassy. RETTY asked if JORRIN could confirm the story.

JORRIN : Said RETTY would have to call the Consulate later on 11 28 47 -- 55.

FOLDER #25

27 NOVEMBER 1963

ITEM #26 Page 1

1026 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (Male) From Ultimas Noticias says that they have had a cable from Havana stating that an employee of the Foreign Relations Office of the embassy had been badly treated with regard to finding out about OSWALD's passport; OSWALD, Kennedy's assassin. That they would like to confirm if it is true.

CHELO : Ignores him, since they had not received the cable directly from Havana.

CALLER : Said Cuba had protested against Mexico for that action.

CHELO : Said, wait a moment. The embassy has no news concerning that particular --

CALLER : Tells PEREGRINA that the cable is from Miami. A radio transmission from Havana was picked up. Minister Raul ROA announced that he had delivered a protest to Ambassador Gilberto BOSQUES of Mexico against the Mexican authorities who had arrested Silvia DURAN, an employee of the Cuban Embassy, supposedly concerning OSWALD's passport.

PEREGRINA : Said they had no news with regard to that.

CALLER : Asked if the arrest took place.

PEREGRINA : Said no, they have no news of that.

CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 19-5-1

OOA 3/215,189 dated 27 March 1962

Concerns Fidel CASTRO's intelligence service that operated out of the 13th floor of the INRA Bldg., in Havana. Appears that its mission was to infiltrate counter-revolutionary groups operating in Cuba and the U.S. Juan ORTA was head of it before he defected to the U.S.

OOA 3/215,192 dated 27 March 1962

Concerns agents of Fidel CASTRO's intelligence service. Luis TACORNAL made several trips to the U.S. on missions for Fidel. TACORNAL told Juan ORTA he was recruited by Rolando MASFERRER to form resistance unit in Havana. ORTA told TACORNAL to carry out mission to see how many counterrevolutionaries he could get to join the resistance unit.

DBA 67028 (FBI) dated 24 March 1964

Concerns interview of Harry DEAN in California on 10 December 1963. DEAN said he was connected with July 26th Movement as early as 1958; visited Havana and saw Juan ORTA personally in June 1960; and on return to Chicago joined the FPCC (Fair Play for Cuba Committee) at the instigation of Cuban Consul in Chicago. DEAN met in Cuba man by the name of Frank VEGA who spoke perfect English, and is believed to have identified himself as G-2; was disturbed that DEAN saw ORTA before seeing him (VEGA).

CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES - General 19-5-1

CSCI 3/764,016 dated 20 February 1961

Jose PAZ Novas, an exile formerly with the G-2, reported that Juan ORTA worked for the Premier's group; a group of intelligence operators who worked directly under Fidel CASTRO with offices on the 18th floor of the INRA Building.

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (CRC) 19-124-25

UFGA 3926 dated 1 May 1962

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters. Noted that the Station had major concern with regard to the extent and scope of non-CIA support, in the clandestine field, to the Cuban exiles and to the Cuban underground.

WAVE 6617 (IN 98730) dated 1 April 1963

Cable from WAVE to Headquarters, states widespread anti-Kennedy, anti-U.S. reaction to U.S. State Dept.

ban on travel of Cuban exiles outside Dade County, Fla.

DGI (GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE) Organization, Functions, Policies, Standards (Soft File)

CSCI 3/777,001 dated 10 July 1963.

Bureau "N" in the National Section of the G-2 was charged with controlling six targets including hotels, casinos and former gambling groups.

DGI - Targets and Assignments (Soft File)

Cross-reference form, 3 September 1963 (FBI doc?)

Subject of document - Alwin Artilano ODIO TAMAYO y Suarez. "Target of greatest importance was to penetrate Cuban Army of Liberation to determine date of any possible invasion of Cuba. Leaders were to be identified to be assassinated later."

DGI - Guerrilla and Miscellaneous Training of Foreigners
Soft File

TDCSDB 3/657,936 dated 18 Nov 1963

Source AMTURVY-1 (Arturo Maria de Jesus VERONA Alonso), from sub-source, a militiaman: As of 17 November 1963 rumors were circulating that Fidel CASTRO may have left Cuba for China or the Soviet Union.

DSE - DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY A-13 - General

Non-Official file - No file no. - Soft File

TDCSDB 3/656,765 dated 20 September 1963

A Bogota [24 liaison] source reported that Manuel PINEIRO said that the Cubans were aware of two CIA agents among delegation of U.S. students; also, that the CIS was aware of an assassination plot against Fidel CASTRO by a group in the GOC being directed by CIA.

DSE - Soft File

CSCI 3/779,828 dated 4 February 1964

Report on Mario GUTIERREZ, nicknamed "Mayito", a Cuban, who in February 1964 was residing in the U.S. In 1959 he was working in hotels and night clubs and acting as a penetration agent for the Cuban Intelligence Service. GUTIERREZ and Manola ALVAREZ worked for the Chief of "N" Bureau of the National Section of the G-2 Secret Aparat in Havana.

AMDOSE Project 19-6-77/2-4

OSMA 14727 Att. A. dated 2 January 1962

SW message from agent, AMDOSE-1, dated 7 December 1962, includes the statement "the majority of us hope that Kennedy finishes with Fidel before Christmas." /Seems to be

1/mc

more a statement of mood or feeling rather than fact.7

AMEMBER Operation 19-6-116/2,3,4

Memorandum to the DCI from the DDP dated 10 June 1964

Concerns plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban Government leaders. Persons, who were parties to this action, advised Agency officers of plans to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Further advised there was tie-in with elements of Cosa Nostra with on-island contacts who could do the job. Agency officers made clear that the U.S. Government would not condone such action.

AMFAUNA Project 19-6-50/3

UFGA 10,085 dated 24 July 1963

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters, advised that AMFAUNA-1 reported that a friend of AMFAUNA-7 was planning to assassinate Fidel CASTRO before the 26th of July and wanted financial support.

SW Message from AMFAUNA-1 received 30 July 1963

(Mge #134 dated 15 July 1963)

AMFAUNA-7 reportedly asked AMFAUNA-1 to inform the latter's friend abroad (CIA) about A-7's plans to assassinate CASTRO and to request financial support. A-1 said he was one of the five persons who knew the identity of the person who was organizing it, but could not reveal it, even to CIA, because those Cubans believed that U.S. policy toward Cuba had been so wrong that the U.S. Government agencies must have been penetrated by traitors to democracy. A-1 said he did not believe in assassination but felt it was his duty to report it. A-1 said the conspirators didn't know him (A-1) at all, that they knew only A-7, but they did know that the above information reached CIA.

WAVE 2086 (IN 91617) dated 2 August 1963

On 23 July 1963 an unidentified individual said he was raising money for the purchase of more dynamite to use in the assassination of Fidel CASTRO. He said that he was one of six men planning to kill Fidel. RENGO (fnu), formerly an official of the CASTRO Government, was leader of the group. They planned to trigger an explosion in a sand truck when Fidel went by. If not killed by the explosion, Fidel was to have been shot by five of the group who would close in on him.

WAVE 2316 (IN 95289) dated 8 August 1963

SW Message #143 dated 1 August 1963

Reported information from a Bernardo ALVAREZ Mon, that an attempt on CASTRO's life had been prepared for 26 July banquet at the Presidential Palace. A large caliber machine gun on a tripod had been discovered behind a curtain. AMFAUNA-1 said that this had nothing to do with AMFAUNA-7's plan which was still pending.

UFGA 13428 dated 15 January 1964

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters, reported information from HULAKE-1 01 on 8 Jan 64 indicating that there had been a general roundup in Cienfuegos, which began on 26 Dec 63, possibly in connection with a suspected plot against the life of Fidel CASTRO. At least 17 persons were arrested. One person appeared to be AMLAME-5 (Luis PUIG Tabares 201-329604). Neither AMFAUNA-26 nor AMLAME-5 were believed to be involved in any plot against the life of Fidel, but could have been high on the general suspect list.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO 19-9-11/1

(Democratic Revolutionary Front)

UFGA 1933 dated 24 July 1961

Dispatch from JMWAVE to Headquarters, transmitting an operational plan presented to WAVE Base by Raul F. HERRERO Morales, Member of the Executive Board, Frente Revolucionario Jose A. ECHEVARRIA. HERRERO was told by a WAVE Base contact that the Agency could not help him. The plan called for the physical elimination of Fidel CASTRO, several members of the Cuban Communist

1/mc

Party, the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba, a few members of the Minister's Council and some other 2,000 persons connected with the Communist Party or Cuban Government.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO (FRD) 19-9-11 (General)
(Revolutionary Democratic Front)
DBF 71256 (FBI) dated 15 January 1962

On 19 January 1961 Thomas Frank MIKA and Thomas Lawrence KANE told the Chicago FBI office the following: KANE said he was recruited into the CASTRO movement in Miami in May 59, went to Cuba, became disillusioned and returned to the U.S. in December 1959. He visited the FRD office in Chicago, and was advised of a plan to assassinate the principal members of the CASTRO regime; Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO, and "Che" GUEVARA. Allegedly members of the FRD sounded out KANE for participating in such an attempt. If the mission could be successfully executed, the members participating would be paid $500,000.00.

AMHIM Project 19-126-41/3,4

UFGA 15383 dated 8 May 1964

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters. AMHIM-2 learned during a visit to San Juan, Puerto Rico in late March 1964 that Manuel RAY Rivero, leader of JURE (Cuban Revolutionary Junta), planned to infiltrate Cuba. Included in RAY's plans was a plot to kill Fidel CASTRO.

JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA CUBANA (JURE)
(Cuban Revolutionary Junta)

SJAN 0884 (IN 44753) dated 4 January 1963

Manuel RAY Rivero, head of JURE, told SKDIKE-1 (San Jose Station source) that JURE was then concentrating on infiltrating Cuban militia through which he hoped ultimately to effect the assassination of the Cuban hierarchy.

WAVE 7824 (IN 05509) dated 13 June 1964

Manuel RAY Rivero on 11 June 1964 denied to AMCARBON-1 (JMWAVE Station contact) that he and JURE were receiving CIA help. He indicated, however, that he was getting non-specific help from Tad SZULC of the *New York Times*, Karl MEYER of the *Washington Post*, and Sam HALPER of *Time*.

The ZRKNICK section, because of its classification - TOP SECRET UMBRA - is included as an annex. According to Mr. King, Richard King, the Comint Control Officer for the Office of Sigint Ops, the material should retain that classification.

AMLACE Operation 19-6-62/2,3,4

3

Memorandum to Chief, TFW/FI from [F.W. Flott] dated 1 October 1962

AMLACE-1 was asked about succession in the event of CASTRO's death. He responded in October 1962 that in the event of CASTRO's death, even the gusanos (worms) say it would be useless to kill Fidel. No one thinks that his death would be useful to the counter-revolution.

AMLEG Operation 19-6-80/2,3,4

DIRECTOR 33866 dated 19 April 1963

Cable from Headquarters to the Hague, stating that approval has been granted for sabotage of Cuban ships ranging from delaying ship to putting ship out of commission.

DIRECTOR 34099 Dated 20 April 1963

Cable from Hqs. to the Hamb and Fran, stating sabotage program against Cuban shipping of sufficiently high priority to require utilization any appropriate asset.

HAGU 3698 (IN 22804) Dated 22 April 1963

Proposed that AMLEG-29 place a four hour delay explosive "CLAM" to one of 34 drums of "TETRAHYDROFURAN" which to be loaded on the deck of the HAVANA.

DIRECTOR 35006 Dated 24 April 1963

Cable from Hqs. to HAGU, BRUS, HAMB, FRAN, CASB, RABA stating U.S. Govt policy calls for all feasible forms pressure on CASTRO Regime to inhibit its success and culminate in disorder leading to its downfall. Realize motivation of assets will be major key to success ops, and that difficulties will be encountered due their interpretation USG policy, Burden of positive motivation thus rests on case officers involved who must decide each case on own merits and use considerable judgement to induce cooperation.

DIRECTOR 41673 Dated 21 May 1963

Sabotage operation failed for reasons yet unclear. Prohibition on use explosives or incendiary devices has been removed. All addressees now urged consider utilization full range sabotage and harrassment techniques against Cuban ships and cargoes. Now appears AMLEG agents generally unsuited for violent sabotage.

DIRECTOR 39186 Dated 11 May 1963

Restriction on sabotage applies only to explosive and incendiary type actions such as limpets and shape charges. Wish to explore possibility of non-violent methods of sabotaging Cuban ships. Wish to minimize USG sponsorship of sabotage acts whenever possible. This program is to be held on stict need to know basis. Therefore, no briefing of State personnel without prior Hqs. approval. Request for approval in most cases will be denied. Rationale for revision is that State fully represented in approval this program and may brief their Chiefs of Mission thru own channels if they wish. /RESEARCHER COMMENT: In view of large number of persons briefed on the program in a short period of time, it appears likely that the Gov't of Cuba could have possibly learned of the program by June 1963, some four months before the assassination of President Kennedy. The State Dept. approved the operation and Ambassadors were to be informed on a strictly "need to know basis." There was a minor flap when it was learned that Amb. McArthur (Belgium) was informed of the program./

AMLEO Operation 19-6-75/2,3,4

UFGA 15995 Dated 2 June 1964

In February 1963 AMLEO-3 (Capt. Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez) Cuban defector, in debriefing claimed that he had high-level anti-Communist contacts in the GOC (whom he refused to name) who would listen to Rebel Army exiles but would take no positive action with them unless they demonstrated their power by eliminating Fidel or carrying out other strong action that would prove they had strong outside backing. RABEL said that the death of Fidel would be the best way to change the Government of Cuba. /COMMENT: RABEL was used in relation to the AMTRUNK Operation. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965. RESEARCHER COMMENT: Appears possible RABEL may have been CIS provocation agent whose mission was to convince the CIA or some exile group to try to undertake a plot to assassinate Fidel./

LIAISON with Department of the Army (ACSI) re Cuba 19-2-12

WAVE 1196 (IN 07492) Dated 20 June 1964

A letter from AMSHOT-1 (now SLFREE-1) on-island, dated 8 January 1964, advised that one Francisco BLANCO was arrested on 17 Oct 1963 for involvement in a planned assassination of Fidel CASTRO. BLANCO was employed by the Office of Planificacion (sic) JUCIPLAN. JMWAVE Station provided a copy of the letter to local FBI office.

LIAISON WITH OTHER U.S. AGENCIES 19-2-4

DIRECTOR 03964 Dated 8 December 1962

Hqs. CIA Cabled Secret Service, FBI and State Dept. Security, giving text of a letter from Havana, dated 27 November 1962, concerning a plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Letter also stated that Fidel was very anxious to know how plans were progressing. Letter was addressed to a Post Office Box in Miami belonging to the Radio Libertad La Voz Anti-Comunista de America. Since the addressee was unknown to members of Radio Libertad, one of their Maimi reps. passed the letter to a contact of JMWAVE Station. Addressee was Bernardo Adalberto MORALES-Rivero. [COMMENT: See CUBAN Foreign Relations 19-9-2, DBF 47612, 27 Apr 1960.]

DIRECTOR 04013 Dated 8 December 1962

Hqs. CIA provided White House Secret Service, FBI and State Dept Security with traces on Bernardo MORALES, above, who entered the U.S. in May 62 on fraudulent visa.

DBA 28980 (FBI) Dated 12 December 1962

Advised the Agency that the FBI had no information iden/with MORALES-Rivero, intended recipient of the above letter, or Jose MENENDEZ, the sender.

UFGA 15233 Dated 20 April 1964

JMWAVE Station forwarded to Hqs. Special Affairs Staff, copy of a report on Byron CAMERON which it had sent locally to the FBI. A usually reliable source reported that CAMERON said he was representing an unidentified group of persons who had made contact with two Cuban gangsters who were willing to kill Fidel CASTRO.

DIRECTOR 23308 Dated 22 May 1964

Hqs. CIA sent to State Dept. EYES ONLY to CRIMMINS and BOWDLER, message which Harvey SUMM asked CAS Miami Station to transmit to Office of Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Dept. of State. During visit to SUMM'S office 21 May, Tad SZULC mentioned conversations he had had with Manuel RAY of JURE within past few days. RAY expressed appreciation for help he had received thus far from USG, and said he could use more.

DBA 73544 (FBI) Dated 8 June 1964

Memo from FBI Newark, N.J. office. Reportedly man or men working for H.L. Hunt, Texas millionaire, discussed the possibility of doing away with Cheddi Jagan or CASTRO or both. Was on private basis; not in any way connected with U.S. Government. Reportedly the CIA knew about it though.

DIRECTOR 61320 Dated 2 November 1964

Cable from Hqs. to WAVE, stating FBI requested declassificatin of pages 1,8,10 and 11 of FBI Miami Report, 20 December 1963, File # 105-8342, Subj: Lee Harvey OSWALD, based on WAVE info. dated 7,11,12 December 1963. Material required for use Warren Commission.

AMLILAC Operation 19-132-29/1,3,4

UFGA 13775 dated January 1964

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Hqs. Special Affairs Staff providing a list of sabotage and caching attempts and the results, conducted during January 1963 through January 1964. There were 7 successes out of 25 attempts; several failures; most were cancelled for one reason or another.

MEMORANDUM Dated 3 June 1964

Lists following sabotage operations (raids) run by CIA from 1 August 1963 to date of memo. Those from Aug to Nov were:

19 Aug 63 - attack on sulphuric acid plant at Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province; considerable fire damage.

30 Sep 63 - sabotage operation to destroy a lumber mill in Baracoa, Oriente. Heavy damage was inflicted.

21 Oct 63 - an underwater demolition team attacked a dredge in La Isabela harbor, Las Villas Province. Vessel

was sunk.

15 Nov 63 - had information that Cuban defense forces were on the alert and possibily forewarned of upcoming operations.

23 Nov 63 - sabotage operation against sawmill postponed indefinitely.

AMLISP Project 19-6-59/3

SW Message #352 dated 24 January 1964, from AMLISP-1 reported an attempt on life of Fidel CASTRO that failed because one of the conspirators talked. Was to have been carried out at meal in Jagua Castle. Many persons in Cienfuegos allegedly were executed.

SW Message # 44 dated 18 March 1964 to AMLISP-1
Agency requirements were sent to asset for more details on all assassination attempts and plots against CASTRO by civilians or disaffected military.

SW Message #390 dated 14 March 1964 from AMLISP-1
Reported conversation with a Cuban military officer who said "they can prepare it (a coup d'etat) but when its ready the government will pull the string and squash it, because everything was under control." It is unknown whether this information was sent to the FBI or other agencies.

AMLOAN Operation 19-6-79/3

EGGA 3171 Dated 2 November 1964

Dispatch from Hamburg Base to Hqs. On 15 Oct 1964, after publication of the Warren Commission Report, untested source Prof. 6 5 Walter SIMON reported the following to AMLOAN-1 (Wilhelm Bernhardt 5 4 John KESSLER.) 6 5 SIMON obtained the information from well-known Cuban scientist APIAGAS (fnu) in Havana on 23 November 1963. APIAGAS claimed he was at the Havana Airport, by chance, on 22 Nov 63 when at 1700 hours an aircraft with Mexican markings landed and parked at the far side of the field. Two men whom he recognized as Cuban "gangsters" (identities not given), alighted, entered the rear entrance of the administration building and disappeared without going through the normal customs procedures. APIAGAS learned that the aircraft had just arrived from Dallas, Texas via Tijuana and Mexico City. The plane had been forced to land at Tijuana due to engine trouble. By combining the date, the origin of the flight, and the known reputation of the two men, APIAGAS theorized that the two men must have been involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. APIAGAS speculated that Lee Harvey OSWALD had acted in the pay of CASTRO, and that

3/mc

the two Cubans had been in Dallas to organize or oversee the operation. APIAGAS said he had been greatly distressed by what he had seen and heard.

CSCI 316/02545-64 dated 15 December 1964

Provided the foregoing information to the FBI. It did not include the name of APIAGAS (fnu) or Prof. Δ5 Walter SIMON but did state that follow-up was impossible because the source (SIMON) δ5 had since passed away.

DBA 94347 dated 31 December 1964 (FBI)

The FBI responded that "in view of the geographical location of Tijuana in relation to Dallas and Mexico City, it seemed unlikely the aircraft would have landed there due to engine trouble if it was on a flight from Dallas to Mexico City. Also, that due to the distances between Dallas and Tijuana, Tijuana and Mexico City, and Mexico City and Havana, the aircraft would have had to leave Dallas a number of hours before the assassination of President Kennedy to arrive in Havana at 5 p.m." The FBI suggested that CIA may wish to determine at the airport in Tijuana whether any aircraft

2/mc

landed there from Dallas on 22 November 1963 reporting engine trouble and then proceeded on to Mexico City. The FBI advised it was making no investigation of the matter in the absence of further information from CIA.

/COMMENT: There is no name trace record of APIAGAS (fnu), [Walter SIMON] or his widow. Since [SIMON's] widow had been willing to provide information in the first interview, a subsequent interview after her husband's death might have yielded results. In view of vagueness of original report, its receipt a year after the assassination, and lack of CIA assets in Tijuana, Headquarters decided not to follow-up./

t 5

5 6

7/mc

MISCELLANEOUS - Cuba 19-500

DBF 54461 Dated 4 August 1960 (FBI)

Dr. and Mrs. Benjamin WARENSAJOLD advised the FBI Honolulu office on 1 August 60 that on 29 July 60 an unidentified male, said to be Cuban, whom they met at Canlis Broiler Cocktail Lounge Honolulu, said the U.S. would find its President with a bullet hole in his head and that Cuba would get even with the U.S. for what this country did to Cuba in the sugar field. Unidentified Cuban was described as: ca. 30 years old, 5'10" tall, 160 lbs., black hair, brown eyes, prominent teeth, well built, handsome and prosperous looking. Said he was in the sugar business.

DBA 72715 Dated 21 May 1964 (FBI)

On 12 May 1964 one Orlando Antonio Salomon DIAZ Canal, Cuban, appeared at Dallas, Texas FBI office; had a scrapbook which reflected he had plans to go to Cuba for the purpose of assassinating Fidel CASTRO. /COMMENT: traces show that he claimed (in 1963) to be founder of organization called "Suicide Battalion" with 200 men in U.S. and about 50 in Cuba, with purpose to assassinate CASTRO7

UFGW 4420 Dated 12 October 1964

Dispatch from Hqs. SAS to JMWAVE Station requesting WAVE Station reaction to request from FBI to declassify for release to public by Warren Commission, report believed to have been passed to FBI Miami by WAVE Station. Concerned information from a Western diplomat alleging that the assassination of President Kennedy was the result of a plot prepared and executed jointly by Chinese Communists and Fidel CASTRO through intermediaries. The intermediaries were alleged to be Ramon B. CORTES, Mexican-American, and FERNANDEZ Feito (fnu), a Cuban, both located in Dallas, Texas. It was also alleged that these men were financed through an unidentified bank at 14 Wall Street, New York City.

Memorandum to the FBI from CIA (SAS) Dated 7 Dec 1963

Reported the above information to the FBI. Also noted that reportedly Fidel CASTRO was extremely worried about the current probings taking place into the assassination of President Kennedy and about the possible findings. The utterances about the plot came from SAAVEDRA (fnu), allegedly a close friend of Celia SANCHEZ. It further states that there appeared to have been no Soviet participation in the plot because at that time the Soviets were too close to the Americans. We advised the FBI of no Agency traces on CORTES and FERNANDEZ, but cited a Robert NIETO then living in Miami who could give details on CORTES and FERNANDEZ. CIA advised the FBI that the Agency was taking steps to further develop the information and to identify the original source and additional data would be provided the FBI immediately.

DBA 88772 dated 23 October 1964 (FBI)

FBI Miami Office, reported that one John H. WILLINGHAM (true name Virdell WILLINGHAM) at that time lived in Charlotte, North Carolina. He had served 10 months in U.S. Penitentiary Atlanta, Georgia for mailing a letter threatening the life of the President of the U.S. WILLINGHAM wrote a letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense in August 1964 stating that he would be released from prison in a few months and would like a pass so that he could go directly from the U.S. to Cuba. He added that he would try to join the Cuban military service and would not be returning from Cuba.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES A/2

American Embassy Havana Document #1347 dated 24 Mar 60

Juan ORTA and another officer in CASTRO's office made arrangements in which Cuban Col. Damasco MONTESINO was arrested March 1960 for attempting to leave Cuba. (The other officer was Alfredo GUERRA).

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR A/3 (Job #70-540 - No File Number)

DBF 95904 Dated 8 December 1961 (FBI)

Sent to Secret Service, I&NS, State Department Security, and CIA. Stated that I&NS Office in Honolulu was requested by I&NS Regional Office in San Pedro, Calif., 4 December 1961 to place lookout notice on Aldo Pedro MARGOLLES Duenas. MARGOLLES was reported to be son of Chief of National Police in Cuba, and attempting to enter the U.S. to meet with CASTRO agents to assassinate President John Kennedy.

WAVE 0793 (IN 13094) Dated 18 January 1962

WAVE advised it had photos of MARGOLLES and Emilio ARAGONES (also involved in plot) and would attempt to develop further information on the assassination plot.

UFGA 3134 Dated 23 January 1962

JMWAVE Station forwarded to Hqs. photos and bio. data on MARGOLLES and ARAGONES.

DIRECTOR 38056 (OUT 94877) Dated 27 January 1962)

Cable to Latin American Stations and Bases concerning plot by MARGOLLES and ARAGONES. Requested any info their current whereabouts, on priority basis.

MEMO WAS 50/7 Dated 29 January 1962 to Regional Commissioner from District Director, Wash., D.C.

To Regional Intelligence Officer giving information on Raul DIAZ Arguelles. DIAZ reportedly trained in

Czech. to be head of political police of Cuba. Reportedly took refuge in Brazilian Embassy Havana which appeared to be cover-up to carry on secret activity. Attended school in U.S. for several years (believed to be military school in Georgia) and to be a graduate of the University of Havana. His father reportedly lived in Miami at this time (1962). An uncle by the same name, living in Cuba in 1962, is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. In 1962 DIAZ was head of the Department of Technical Investigation (DTI) of the Rebel Army. A known terrorist, he is said to be capable of use of explosive bombs and automatic weapons. Is believed to have directed assassinations in the past from somewhere in Mexico. A good friend of Rolando CUBELA.

MEXI 0092 (IN 26086) Dated 10 February 1962

According to [Mexico 24 immigration] records, MARGOLLES and ARAGONES arrived Mexico City by air on 27 June 1957 as political refugees from Batista regime. Both sought political asylum in Mexican Embassy Havana in mid-1957.

MEMO For The Secret Service from William McClare Dated 13 February 1962

Gives summary of information on Raul DIAZ Arguelles.

1/mc

Although DIAZ has a position of great influence in the DTI, he is poorly regarded. He is (62) reportedly working with former U.S. gangsters who were deported from the U.S. and also affiliated with the narcotics racket. Is believed to be in complete charge of "any activity as contemplated by Aldo Pedro MARGOLLES-Duenas, which involved a plot to assassinate the President of the United States."

UFGA 3302 Dated 16 February 1962

JMWAVE Station advised Hqs. of information on DIAZ, MARGOLLES and ARAGONES that it had sent to U.S. Secret Service Miami, Florida.

CICS 3/769,904 Dated 26 March 1962

CIA provided U.S. Secret Service, FBI and I&NS information on MARGOLLES and ARAGONES.

Unofficial Memo - Mr. Alfred Cox from Ernest Aragon Undated

States ARAGONES is believed to be General Coordinator of the National 26th of July Movement and National Chief of CASTRO's militia. Is one of CASTRO's right hand men and accompanies CASTRO in all public appearances. ARAGONES is coordinator of alleged plot (against President Kennedy.) Both ARAGONES and MARGOLLES have fanatical tendencies.

UFGA 15107 dated 8 April 1964

Transmitted to Headquarters Target Personality Study on Aldo Pedro MARGOLLES Duenas (201-315161).

MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO (CDM) 19-120-13

(Christian Democratic Movement)

U.S. Embassy Foreign Service Dispatch, Havana, #1614 dated 9 May 1960 (837,432/5-2460)

Reported that the Revolutionary Government has skillfully maneuvered Rolando CUBELA, the President of the FEU, and his pro-Communist cohorts into a position of power. First, on May 7, it was CUBELA who was given the task of inciting the mob and bruiting the fact that the powers-that-be disapproved of Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango. Communist "goon-squad" tactics had become so vicious that even many students who had heretofore been circumspectly apolitical are afraid to attend classes. The Vice-Secretary of the School of Agronomy asked how it was that if CUBELA leadership so deplored violence that it had remained impassive in the face of the physical violence perpetrated against his person by members of the Communist Youth from the Instituto de la Habana, who had entered the University grounds completely armed. CUBELA and Angel QUEVEDO, went about the campus carrying arms, in direct violation of the University regulations.

MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO del PUEBLO (MRP) 19-120-22

(Peoples Revolutionary Movement)

5

Memo to Cleve (Dr. Cleveland C. Cram) from M. Oldfield

Dated 8 November 1961

Concerns a Cuban Government report published in the press which claimed that the Peoples Revolutionary Movement directed and supplied by the U.S. CIA and Department of State, planned acts of sabotage and more recently planned an attempt to assassinate Fidel CASTRO and other government leaders early in October. The attempt on Fidel allegedly was discovered the day before it was due to take place.

Moscow TASS in English to Europe 8 November 1961

Reported the information in the 8 November 1961 Memorandum, above, and cited it as new proof of American imperialism's criminal conspiracy against free Cuba.

1/mc

MOVIMIENTO de RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO (MRR) 19-120-18

(Revolutionary Recovery Movement)

UFGA 4948 Dated 18 July 1962 Report No. AA 134

One Juan FALCON Tamar, alleged National Coordinator of the MRR in Cuba was interviewed on Cuban "Radio Rebelde" Station 17 July 1962. He said he planned the assassination of Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ. He also talked about a plot to assassinate Raul CASTRO on 26 July 61, a plot he attributed to the CIA. He also mentioned the assassination of Fidel at the same time. FALCON claimed that the plot against Raul was invented by the CIA, and that the CIA provided financial support to MRR activities.[No indication FALCON worked for CIA.]

WAVE 5879 (IN 30751) Dated 18 July 1962

WAVE Station advised that FALCON's presentation appeared previously taped and poorly rehearsed. Cable is slugged AMBRONC-5 complex. [AMBRONC-5 was an Agency asset executed by the Cuban Government.]

Memo to Chief, Task Force W from COS, JMWAVE, 16 Aug 62 The Ops That Failed/MRR

Concerns interview 14 Aug 62 of Victor MARTINEZ Zambrano, a former hot-shot activist of the MRR in Havana who was an asylee in the Argentine and Brazilian Embassies and left Cuba. In Sept. 61 he organized the operation which failed, the plan to assassinate Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ. Reportedly one of the persons involved pulled the pin of the hand grenade prematurely, it exploded, one man was killed and another critically injured. MARTINEZ escaped, went into hiding, and later came to the U.S.

MOVIMIENTO de RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO (MRR) 19-300-11

(Revolutionary Recovery Movement)

TDCSDB 3/656,595 Dated 12 September 1963

On 7 September 1963 the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR-Insurrectional Movement for Revolutionary Recovery) made an abortive attempt to bomb a target in Cuba. On 8 September 1963, Jack GRIFFIN (U.S. citizen), an unidentified American, and a Cuban described only as a demolition expert and former member of Brigade 2506, bombed a sugar plant and dropped 6,000 leaflets near Moron, Camaguey Province. Five of the six bombs exploded with violent force, and started several fires in the sugar mill. There was estimated 50% destruction. This was done in the name of the MIRR. An American by the name of Bill Johnson, reportedly had full control over all MIRR operations. Money was supplied by Orlando BOSCH Avila, obtained from Chiri MENDOZA. Johnson worried for fear that their next planned raid, target of a military nature, could cause international repercussions and/or bring them under prosecution on the neutrality act. BOSCH and MENDOZA were collaborating with Jose Mario "Pepin" BOSCH Lamarque and two former sugar mill owners to back a daylight raid on a Cuban MIG base with two rocket-firing P-51's.

AMMUG Project (Cuban DGI Defector) 19-6-102

Memo for the Record dated 4 June 1964

Re Debriefing Report #119 of AMMUG-1 (Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lahera). He did not recognize photo of Braulio MARTINEZ Alfonso, Cuban born naturalized U.S. citizen. MARTINEZ returned to Cuba after the fall of Batista. Also known as "SUAREZ" and Francisco De RAVIRICH, he has been reported as an intelligence officer.

HHTA 3782 dated 16 June 1964

Dispatch from Tegucigalpa to Mexico City. A Tegucigalpa Station asset assigned to [monitor certain Honduran ham radio operators] of interest to the Station, reported the following, most unusual,

24

1/mc

conversation. On 14 June Mexico came in very clear and by chance picked up a strange conversation from a ham station in Cuba. The Cuban station was talking to Mexico ham radio operator named Alfonso, call letters XRIWA. Cuban station told Alfonso to contact a famous band leader named Antonio Maria Romero and kept referring to "El Corsario Negro." The Cuban station instructed Alfonso that once he contacted Romero he should have him record "Tres Lindas Cubanas."

Memo for C/WH/PO/A from C/WH/SA/CI dated 15 Oct 1964
19-6-102/3 AMMUG-1 Debriefing Report #203.
AMMUG-1 said when President Kennedy died "Augusto" DGI Deputy Chief, Carlos Sixto CHAIN Soler, arranged a meeting at the National Liberation Building in Havana. He asked the National Liberation officers to urgently prepare commo system for a message to their agents to be transmitted by Radio Havana. Musical recording to accompany message was "Three (or Six) Beautiful Cubans."

HHTW 1721 dated 15 October 1964
Dispatch that transmitted the foregoing information to Tegucigalpa from Hqs. WH/SA.
/COMMENT: The AMMUG information duplicates that recorded under ZRKNICK./

NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL INSIDE CUBA 19-9-13

Memo to Chief, Contact Division, OO from Chief, Washington Field Office, 31 July 1961

Julio HUERTEMATTE, Vice-President of National Bank of Washington, told OO on 25 July 61 that a Cuban underground leader (identity unknown) who had been in prison in Cuba and recently come to Miami, told HUERTEMATTE that CIA agent Pedro CUELLAR had denounced five underground leaders to the CASTRO authorites. /COMMENT: This confirms previous information that CUELLAR was a double agent. He reportedly caused the execution of a number of counter-revolutionaries operating in Cuba. CUELLAR's dependents have been paid under Project [SLSTIPEND] since the early 1960's. In view of evidence that CUELLAR was not executed by the CASTRO Regime as publicized in the Washington Post in the early 1960's, it has been recommended to the Commercial Cover Staff that administers the [SLSTIPEND] Project, to further investigate the case and stop payments if possible./

WAVE 7900 (IN 39024) dated 14 Sept 61; and DIRECTOR 13231 (OUR 99328) dated 20 Sept 61

Both these cables discuss CIA support to AMBLESS-1 [Alberto del JUNCO Mesa] one of the Agency's best

4

3/mc

controlled on-island CA asset. We provided financial and other support for on-island operations. /Comment: if brought to the attention of the GOC, such activities might have prompted the GOC to consider retaliatory action against the U.S. Government./

OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE 19-126-4

Memo to C/WH/4 from Dave Phillips dated 2 July 1960

Concerns propaganda action to be taken against visit of Nikita KHRUSHCHEV to Cuba re 25th of July celebration, including rumor of attempted assassination against KHRUSHCHEV. Speculation on the assassination attempts was to be surfaced on WRUL program, in AMPACA's paper, etc.

Memo to Director of Central Intelligence from C/WHD dated 5 July 1960

In effort to prevent or counteract KHRUSCHEV's visit to Cuba, Hqs. proposed prop action to instigate a rumor or rumors that KHRUSHCHEV's life woud be in danger while in Cuba, from a well-planned assassination attempt. This would be propagated from other Latin American countries.

DIRECTOR 84642 dated 22 November 1963

Prop guidance to WAVE Station for media assets. Requested they use tape excerpts of appropriate portions of

Kennedy speech to LA newspaper conference held in Miami that week, and to note in broadcasts that President's last major address directed to LA audience concentrated on Cuban freedom. This was to be broadcast over JMHOPE with tributes and appropriate comment on 25 November, and have JMHOPE stress religious theme on Sunday 24 November.

AMOT Project (Later Became SLIGO Project) 19-5-3

TDCSDB 3/655,033 dated 12 June 1963 (UFG 3021)

Report that members of Cubanos Libres (Free Cubans) left Florida on 6 June 63 with mission to infiltrate Cuba and assassinate Fidel CASTRO Ruz. Was intercepted by Cuban boat, exchanged gunfire, and returned to Florida. Mission was unsuccessful. Manuel QUIZA Docal, leader of Cubanos Libres, a Cuban exile action group, had officially committed himself to JURE for any executive action which JURE might undertake against CASTRO's Cuba. [QUIZA was not connected with CIA.]

UFG 5099 dated 4 May 1964 19-6-95/4 (AMOT Report)

Concerned a plot discovered by the DSE (Department of State Security) on 9 or 10 March 64 to assassinate CASTRO. The assassination was planned for 13 March when Castro was expected to visit the CMQ Radio and TV Studio in Havana.

DIRECTOR 31178 dated 25 June 1964

This referenced documents (UFGA 15954 and WAVE 7129 (IN 93714) having to do with plot to assassinate CASTRO. This information was dissemed to the Special Group and other key officials. The Special Group was concerned about the matter and referred it to the Dept. of Justice as a matter of law enforcement.

WAVE 9168 (IN 26320) dated 12 July 1964 Cable to Hqs.

AMWAX-1 (Oscar FERNANDEZ Viega) and [UQAMBER-2 (Miguel Guillermo TRUYOL-Gimeno)] were independently interviewed by local FBI reps. concerning plot to assassinate CASTRO. Both denied any knowledge of or participation in any plan to assassinate CASTRO. For Hqs. FYI: "Regarding AMWAX-1 and [UQ]AMBER-2, WAVE wishes emphasize that both sources clearly understand they have no sanctions from WAVE to directly or indirectly promote, sponsor, or support such plan or any similar plans regardless of person against whom they directed."

WAVE 5446 (IN 32990) dated 1 Dec 1964

AMOT Report DD-1206 dated 19 Nov 1964 stated that as part of plan to assassinate CASTRO, a rumor was to be floated that one of the organizations belonging to the alliance was fighting inside Cuba. The rumors were

3/mc

expected to impress U.S. Government officials who were already having talks with Manuel URRUTIA Lleo, and willing to provide financial assistance to him.

PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. 100-300-12

DIRECTOR 03964 dated 8 December 1962

Cable from Agency to Secret Service, FBI and State Dept. Security forwarding text of a letter from Havana, dated 27 Nov 62, to Miami, concerning plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Letter was addressed to a Post Office Box in Miami belonging to the Radio Libertad La Voz, Anti-Comunista de America. Since the addressee was unknown to members of Radio Libertad, one of their Miami reps. passed the letter to a contact of JMWAVE Station. Addressee was Bernardo Adalberto MORALES-Rivero.

DIRECTOR 4013 dated 8 December 1962

Cable from Agency to addressees cited above. Provided traces on Bernardo Adalberto MORALES-Rivero who entered the U.S. in May 62 on a fraudulent visa.

UFGA 6884 dated 10 December 1962

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Hqs. Stated that letter similar to 27 Nov 62 one cited above, possibly written by same author, was in possession of Treasury Dept., Wash., D.C. by official who was in contact with CIA on the matter. JMWAVE forwarded the 29 Nov 62 letter, from Jose MENENDEZ to Bernardo MORALES in Miami, and suggested that Hqs. pass it to the Treasury Dept. for technical handling. JMWAVE was anxious to receive results of both of the letters on the grounds that they may be part of a planned G-2 PW operation in the U.S. or against U.S. targets.

DIRECTOR 04538 dated 11 December 1962

Hqs. CIA cabled to Secret Service, FBI and State Security, traces on Olga DUQUE de Heredia and Aida MAYO, Miami reps. of the org. Radio Libertad La Voz Anti-Comunista de America, address to which letter to MORALES was addressed. DUQUE and MAYO turned the letter over to a contact of CIA, since MORALES was reportedly unknown to them. DUQUE was married to Humberto LOPEZ Perez, operator of Radio Libertad, Caracas, Venezuela; Aida MAYO was a close friend of Fidel CASTRO and was believed to act occasionally on behalf of the Cuban Government.

DIRECTOR 04501 dated 12 December 1962

Hqs. advised JMWAVE Station that Hqs. in disseming information did not reveal [Cesar Augusto 4 GAJATE Puig] as intermediary between WAVE and DUQUE and MAYO. Suggested WAVE advise Secret Service of [4 GAJATE's] role since Secret

2/mc

Service investigation would surface him anyway. Asked that the Secret Service protect his identity.

WAVE 2266 (IN 33425) dated 11 December 1962

WAVE cabled to Hqs. traces on DUQUE, MAYO and Radio Libertad.

Memo dated 12 December 1962 re Information from Sedret Service

Gives information from a usually reliable source on Jose MENENDEZ Ramos. MENENDEZ, born in Cuba, was a baker in Tampa, Fla., and member of Executive Committee of the FPCC. After Oct. 61 his wife defected to Cuba with the children, and Jose left to join her shortly thereafter. Jose was later seen in Cuba by people who said he had a top job there. Jose also was reported to be connected with INRA, (Agrarian Reform Institute).

PRO-GOBIERNO CONSTITUCIONAL de CUBA (PGCC) 19-9-15

UFGA 2242 dated 30 August 1961

A sub-agent of JMWAVE Station outside unit (AMOT's) reported on 22 Aug. 61 a statement by Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona that Kennedy was still backing him and was going to give him immediately the sum of four million dollars for sabotage and propaganda.

WAVE 9026 (IN 18296) dated 6 November 1961

WAVE cabled Hqs. info. from independent sources following meetings between HURWITCH, PASSAVOY and MIRO Cardona. AMCLATTER-1 (Bernard Barker of Watergate fame) reported that HURWITCH and a CIA official were discussing revolutionary affairs with MIRO Cardona, and that CARDONA and his group were backed by President Kennedy. It was further reported that CARDONA had full powers from President Kennedy and was in a position to give orders to CIA which would be on a secondary level. In addition CARDONA reportedly stated that he had U.S. Government support to direct CASTRO underground activities, and that all other groups must join him to get support. Other groups not interested in joining CARDONA, because his ideology was different from their's. CARDONA had never come out strongly as anti-CASTROITE.

UFGA 3806 dated 20 April 1962

Concerned plans of Central American countries for action against Cuba. One General SOMOZA (President of Nicaragua) stated that CIA would be handling the intelligence ramifications toward organizing a Cuban military group in Central America. The dispatch deals with additional U.S. Government aid. Also, one YDIGORAS (President of Guatemala) was to be in Wash., D.C. on 28 April 62 as a guest of President Kennedy, at which time he expected to present the Cuban-in-exile plan.

UFK-16 dated 15 May 1962

Reported information from GARCERAN, leader of the Pro-Gobierno Constitucional en el Exilio (an anti-Castro organization operating out of Miami, Fla.) GARCERAN stated that lawyer Geno NEGRETI had made an appointment to see him stating that a Mr. WARBELL wanted to see him. NEGRETI made his appointment on 8 May 62. It was GARCERAN's understanding that WARBELL was the go-between for a Mr. TROUTMAN from Atlanta, Georgia, who had been the boy friend of President Kennedy's sister (the one who had died). WARBELL indicated that he wanted the appointment to see what GARCERAN's needs were and what aid and assistance GARCERAN wanted for carrying the war to Cuba.

Department of State Memo dated 14 July 1965

Had attached to it a PGCC memo to the Department. It contained a quote of Fidel CASTRO that he wanted to arm Cuba with the most modern equipment (arms, planes, etc.) capable of stopping the United States, and the Latin American countries as well, "before they discover our strategic plans. To that end I need from hundreds of thousands of light infantry arms to planes and long range artillery. Every country in the

Continent must be the target of our guns, from New York and Washington to Santiago de Chile and Buenos Aires." On 2 Jan 61 CASTRO asked Latin Americans to take arms against their own governments; on 26 July 62 he demanded a continental revolutionary drive; in 1963 he predicted that Venezuela and Guatemala would surrender the said year. CASTRO's sister Juana (Juanita) arrived in Mexico City from Cuba on 20 June 64. Although she was considered a defector of the CASTRO regime, she had been an agent (CIA) for the prior two and a half years.

AMPUNCH Project 19-6-118/2,3,4

23 November 1963 open text letter from asset, in Cuba, Filed in SW Chrono June 63 -Dec.

Acknowledged the death of President Kennedy.

AMQUAR Project 19-124-28/1-4

HAMB 3879 (IN 50361) dated 30 Oct 63; HAMB 3880 (IN 50478) Identities

Concerns debriefing of [CASAILOR-25] on 24 and 25 Oct 63.

He reported that Faustino PEREZ, born ca. 1923, commander in CASTRO's army in Havana Hqs., Granma veteran and former minister in CASTRO's Government, told C-25 in August 1963 that CASTRO must be killed and all resistance groups organized. C-25 described PEREZ as an opportunist who would need promise of advantage in return for help.

AMRANGE Project 19-6-81/1-4

Memo for Chief TFW from DC/TFW/FI re DEGRIP Report dated 28 August 1962

Concerns one Vasco CECCHI, proprietor of the MONTECATINI Restaurant in Vedado quarter of Havana frequented by Fidel CASTRO and his entourage. Employees of the restaurant reportedly were anti-Castroites. Source of the report called attention to closet, partly under stairs used for storage, but which he believed could be used to hide man comfortably. On one of the floors above the restaurant lived a certain Lt. RAMOS who was evidently an intimate of Fidel CASTRO. CASTRO often visited him. /COMMENT: See File "Plots to Assassinate the President of the U.S."100-300-12, Memo from Secret Service dated 12 December 1962, concerning one Jose MENENDEZ Ramos who may be identifiable with Lt. RAMOS7.

MEXI 6844 (IN 57745) dated 8 November 1963

Cable to Hqs. DEGRIP reported that CASTRO visited restaurant at least once a month and was "a sitting duck." CECCHI reported to be cowardly type."

MEXI 0880 (IN 73754) dated 14 Sept 1964

Cable to Hqs. reported that CECCHI was arrested and imprisoned in La Cabana Fortress and to be tried for plotting against life of Fidel CASTRO. Prosecutor to ask for 30 year sentence. Employees of reataurant in mid-Aug 64 told source CECCHI was arrested for illegal currency transactions. /COMMENT: No 201 file on CECCHI. Preliminary traces do not indicate connection with CIA.7

AMRAPT Project - La Voz de Cuba 19=126-10

WAVE 0662 (IN 44282) dated 13 April 1965

In April 1965 Francisco CHAO Hermida revealed to a WAVE case officer his "grand plan" for which he requested CIA support. Plan was to recruit trusted men in Miami, infiltrate Cuba, surveil CASTRO, and at opportune time, assassinate him. C/O told CHAO CIA was not interested and could not do business with him.

RESCATE (MOVIMIENTO de RESCATE CONSTITUCIONAL DEMOCRATICO) (Cuban Revolutionary Democratic Rescue Committee) 19-120-39

Anti-Castro revolutionary group; one of among groups forming FRD (Democratic Revolutionary Front) and subsequent CRC (Cuban Revolutionary Council). Was controlled by Antonio de VARONA with Hqs. in Miami.

RIMM 4359 (IN 2330) dated 8 April 1961

Radio message from on-island agent. Concerns fact that Cuban by name of Hilly PATTEN, who was in exile in Miami a year previously, belonged to Rescate group and apparently would be bringing arms in from Venezuela soon. Agent said his personal opinion was that Tony VARONA wanted to produce armed action before other groups and for that reason had purchased arms on his own.

DBA 5681 dated 28 March 1962 (FBI)

Stated that Sergio APARICIO, Sec. Gen. of Rescate in New York City advised State Dept. rep. that Rescate had purchased about 30 weapons which were delivered to Miami and then by boat to the underground in Cuba. Jose F. GONZALEZ, associated with Rescate and VARONA, called APARICIO to Wash., D.C. on 2 March 62 and told him not to engage in collection of funds for purchase of any arms or munitions, because there was nothing the Cubans could do in a military way which would be capable of overthrowing the present Government of Cuba. An FBI source advised on 16 Mar 62 that APARICIO and Rescate were making arrangements to picket the White House on 14 Apr 62 for several hours to ask President Kennedy to keep his word re assisting the Cuban exiles in overthrowing the CASTRO Government. APARICIO described the 30 weapons as M-1's delivered to Miami and taken to Cuba by boat and distributed among the underground. APARICIO stated that they had been attempting to supply Osvaldo RAMIREZ, who was in the Escambray Mountains. The weapons were reportedly delivered to Cuba by Commandante AUGUSTO, war name for Ramon RUISANCHEZ, brother-in-law of Tony VARONA.

DBA 23967 dated 28 September 1962 (FBI)

Reported that a small group of Cuban exiles living in Panama was planning to assassinate highest Cuban Gov't official attending 9th Central American Games in Kingston and hoped that it would be Fidel CASTRO. Plotters were reported to be: Rene MARSELLA Garaboto, Conrado RODRIGUEZ Sanchez, Eulogio LOPEZ, Antolin SANCHEZ Govin, and Jose Julio FERNANDEZ. Garaboto planned to leave Panama for U.S. 3 Aug 62 to present plan to Manuel Antonio de VARONA, ranking member of CRC (Cuban Revolutionary Council), request financial and visa assistance and moral support. MARSELLA said that he worked actively in a clandestine manner for Rescate. VARONA did not give much encouragement to the plan; in fact, said he could not sanction or assist in assassination plan.

REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA OF NATIONAL LIBERATION 19-9-12/1
(Right-wing Anti-Castro Group in Exile)
Prensa Latina Havana Broadcast 21 July 1961

Reported that "Cuban Counterrevolutionary Council, headed by Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona, was liquidated together with the mercenary brigade of the CIA in the Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs) disaster. However, a new team has emerged which intends to form a government in exile to be supported and recognized by the U.S. New York Congressman Victor L. ANFUSO, intimate friend of former Cuban dictator Fulgensio BATISTA is principal promoter of idea, which is based on uniting all counterrevolutionary groups established inthe U.S." /COMMENT: ANFUSO planned to call a meeting in Washington in a few days to set up the new government. List of participants had not been announced, but included among those believed to be present was Guillermo ALONSO Pujol. DGI defector

SLIPSTREAM-1 in Nov 71 said that ALONSO was a Cuban Gov't agent. He had high USG contacts back then (in 60/61) and knowledge of U.S. Government/CIA cover for activities. ALONSO was used as a cut-out, or intermiediary, supposedly unwittingly, in sensitive Agency operations, in the late 60's and early 70's.]

ZRRIFLE Project Job # 69-S-551 - No File Number

ZRRIFLE/Administrative Financial Folder

OIRT 2173 dated 13 October 1960, Att. Top Secret

DEPIGRAM, Italian Interpol representative, source and spotter for Corsicans. Altman to pick his brain and pinpoint his ability to do this job for us, but once selection made, DEPIGRAM to be cut out of the operation.

Memo to C/FI from William Harvey, 27 June 1963

"As far as ZRRIFLE aspects this op, which have been covered under the QJWIN authorization for security reasons and with which Fletcher Knight is fully familiar, except for one precautionary 'life line', aspects of this case have been terminated and need no longer be considered part of this project."

Folder entitled Personality Sketches

Tab M - Harold MELTZER

Harold MELTZER with aliases was involved in the rackets with upper echelon "hoodlums" throughout the U.S. (pg. 1 Encl. 3 dated 19 Dec 1960.) "In 1959 he furnished information to our QJWIN California office but has not since cooperated with us. N.B. He has the background and talent for the matter we discussed but it is not known whether he would be receptive."

Tab Y - Hanna YAZBECK

YAZBECK lived in Beurit and worked for QJWIN's office intermittendly during the past 10 years (dates not given - possibly 51-61). YAZBECK's chief bodyguard from 50-58 (not named) was a convicted murderer. The bodyguard was murdered. States that YAZBECK has an available pool of assassins.

JMROC Project (Travel of President Johnson to Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1967) 200-6-351/9 Memo OO-2-39,887 to Mr. James Ludlum Liaison Officer CI Staff, dated 7 March 1967

Concerns individual by name of Jose PEREZ, Colombian. Document shows undetermined association with assassinations in Guatemala.

CP-9212 dated 10 March 1967

Concerns Jaime CARDONA-Londono, Colombian, arrested in New Orleans in May 64 for trespassing. He had in his possession typewritten document which purported to be proposed constitution for new super world government with provisions to condemn to death various personages including L. Johnson, daughter of L. Johnson, and Mrs. J. Kennedy. When interviewed 12/22/64 he did not indicate any interest in the death of the President.

16-17

[CARACAS] 6104 (IN 8778) dated 25 February 1967

A usually reliable source reported to CIA that well-known

1/mc

Venezuelan terrorist, Carlos SAVELLI Maldonado, by own admission met on 30 April and 1 May 1965 with leftist extremist reps. to discuss assassination of, among others, American ambassador (presumably American ambassador to Venezuela).

AMSANTA Project 19-6-73/3

MEMO for the Record dated 10 July 1963 by Lou De Santi

Concerns FBI informant Victor Thomas VICENTE, Puerto Rican citizen, who penetrated Communist Parties in New York City, left New York for Cuba via Mexico as guest of ICAP (Cuban Peoples Friendship Institute). Was debriefed by CIA staffer Lou DeSanti upon return to the U.S. in July-Aug 63. VICENTE stated he had had interviews with CASTRO and Che GUEVARA. VICENTE penetrated the FPCC, the Casa Cuba, and Jose Marti Club in New York City. [COMMENT: Page 127 of IG 1967 report mentions unnamed Puerto Rican who claims he participated in CASTRO inspired assassination plot in Dallas. Don't know if VICENTE could be that individual.]

AMSLOUCH Project 28-6-33

RIOD 2944 (IN 83322) dated 18 December 1963

Mario Rogerio MESTRINHO de Mello, official in Brazillian Embassy Havana, reported the following to Rio Station contact in Rio on 13 December 1963:

a) wide rumor of assassination attempt against Fidel CASTRO after his TV appearance 6 Dec resulting in killing of man next to him. CASTRO uninjured. Would be killer at large.

b) wide rumor Cuban Jose "Pepe" LLANUZA met Lee OSWALD in Mexico before Kennedy assassination.

AMSOUR Project 19-6-70

SW Message #27 from agent dated 11 October 1964

"On the assassination attempt against Fidel, we know they took two civilians wounded by shooting to the Calixto Garcia Hospital. Moments later, two soldiers from Fidel's guards presented themselves in said hospital taking away the wounded. We do not have more details."

CSDB 312/01128-64 dated 19 November 1964

In late September 1964 a Cuban soldier guarding the Algerian Embassy in Havana attempted to assassinate Premier Fidel CASTRO Ruz, who was in the embassy at the time. The soldier killed another sentry before being shot on the spot by the security forces. By early October 11 officers and men involved in the attempt on Fidel's life were apprehended while trying to escape and were executed without trial. [COMMENT: In Aug 64 there were rumors of uprising and plots against the Castro regime, some within the armed forces, which reportedly lead to summary arrests and secret executions. During this period underground sources reported that 70 Cuban Army officers had been arrested in connection with a plot to topple CASTRO's regime; the plot allegedly had been discovered by a CASTRO agent who pretended to be a participant. (Could this have been the AMTRUNK Operation.?]

AMSPELL Project - Directorio Revolutionario Estudiantil (Student Revolutionary Directory) 19-124-26 (Project) and 19-120-19 Subject File

Memorandum dated 22 May 1962 in 201-316766 (Luis FERNANDEZ-Rocha Rodriguez) File

Last para of page 2 "Jose I. LASAGA has returned from

Washington and is very depressed. He claims that JFK has decided on the co-existence line and that everything is going down the drain. He states that present American policy is to work towards an acceptance of Castro."

WAVE 9060 (IN 29221) dated 26 September 1962

FERNANDEZ has accepted bid to appear on nationwide TV networks and is leaving for NYCity morning 26 Sept. Publicity schedule included how DRE 24 Aug attack on Teatro Blanquita was planned, and adverse reaction within Cuba to President Kennedy's definition of defensive arms.

Contact Report dated 16 Nov 1962 (201-316766)

Contact with AMHINT-2 and FERNANDEZ

FERNANDEZ mentioned meeting in Wash., D.C. in which broad proposal for AMBARB funding [(Prop. project 24 to place students in universities in Latin America)] was discussed. FERNANDEZ mentioned "negotiation" underway with "three industrialists" in Texas who were sympathetic and would provide AMBARB delegates in these countries (Latin American countries?) with Agency representations for their products.

UFGW 1595 from TFW to JMWAVE dated 18 January 1963

Forwarded answer from State Dept. to the DRE letter written to President Kennedy.

1/mc

DIRECTOR 8214 to WAVE dated 2 January 1963

HURWITCH (State Dept. Cuban Coordinator) replying briefly to AMSPELL letter to President Kennedy by referring DRE organization to President Kennedy's 29 December Miami speech as latest official statement of U.S. policy.

"Using DRE 26 Dec coded broadcast over WMIE as opening wedge, NEWBY reprimanded FERNANDEZ for failure report unusual substance text. Also pointed out this flagrant violation FCC regulations thus placing CIA in embarrassing position. FERNANDEZ apologized but said it urgently necessary alert Cuba DRE to penetration danger. This was first time existence of penetration was reported by FERNANDEZ or other DRE member. To inquiry why FERNANDEZ withheld such info. from CIA, although known to DRE for months, FERNANDEZ replied DRE merely suspected penetration before but only now certain. Avoided giving specifics. [COMMENT: After four years as chief of CIA subsidized DRE group, FERNANDEZ resigned July 64 to pursue medical studies.]

UFGA 7383 from JMWAVE to Hqs. dated 28 January 1963

Stated that Jorge MEDINA Bringuier, Sec. Gen. of the DRE in Cuba, was G-2 agent. That MEDINA was in contact with FERNANDEZ while in Cuba and planned to use FERNANDEZ to establish his bona fides with CIA.

WAVE 4222 (IN 17952) dated 12 September 1963

IMMEDIATE Action: Stated that Nov 63 issue of See Magazine already on newsstands contained wanted poster of Fidel CASTRO on front cover. Poster read "wanted dead or alive, Fidel CASTRO for crimes against humanity, 10 million dollars reward." Same copy highlighted these stories with top billing given story titled "The CIA needs men - can you quality?" The wanted poster was part of a story, gist of which was DRE offers 10 million dollar reward "to person or persons who with the help of the DRE will assassinate Fidel CASTRO." Offer alleged that reward was on deposit with Banco de Santo Domingo, and was signed by Luis FERNANDEZ-ROCHA Rodriguez. [COMMENT: FERNANDEZ first came to the U.S. in May 1960. Was polygraphed Mar 62, suspected of being G-2. Clearance granted 18 Apr 62 for use in DRE; encrypted AMHINT-53. Featured on Channel 4 TV 26 Sept 62 as having been organizing DRE underground Cuba since 20 May and having directed attack 24 Aug on Teatro Blanquita.]

AMSPILL Project 19-6-76/2-4

Ops Folder July 62 - May 64: SW Outgoing Mge #7, 5 Dec 62

"can you confirm or deny through contacts in medical field about assassination attempt of Lazaro PENA by (sic) on? Fidel?" [COMMENT: Message #46 from A-1 was dated 13 Sept 63. Next message in file is #56 dated 27 Dec 63. File has a gap of 10 messages which are unaccounted for. Message #58 dated 27 Dec 63 mentions interruption of contact. A-1 did not specify how long he was without contact. It may be that contact was indeed non-existent from 13 Sept to 27 Dec but the numbering system should have picked up and continued from the last number.]

PLSLSTEEL-1 Project 68-6-147

TDCSDB 3/651,885 dated 25 Oct 1962 filed 68-6-147/4

Minister MOLYAKOV told a Bloc diplomat that he thought the U.S. action [missile crisis] was an "election affair"; that President Kennedy discovered that his popularity had dropped and undertook the Cuban measure to "become the leader again."

GNVA 4357 (OUT 53779) 25 Oct 1963 filed 68-6-147/4

MOLYAKOV commented that the USSR would not let the American move go without retaliation. That with this measure he [President Kennedy] had become the "man of the nation" again, and the nation was in a state of hysteria behind him.

GNVA 4376 (OUT 53800) 27 Oct 1962 filed 201-9239

At a dinner party on 25 Oct 62 in Geneva attended by orbit officials, MOLYAKOV reportedly stated that KHRUSHCHEV was aware that Kennedy was mad, an adventurer, and must not be allowed to pull strings, meaning, to retain initiative or control pace in the current international situation.

GNVA 4470 (OUT 53909) 19Nov 62 (TDCSDB 2/652,244)
Filed 68-6-147/4

Reported the following on the probable reaction of Fidel CASTRO and his principal associates to the Soviet withdrawal of offensive missiles from Cuba and to U.S. demands re the withdrawal of Soviet IL-28 aircraft and on-spot inspection: Source said that CASTRO's vanity was immense and no matter how it had been explained to him by MIKOYAN or other Soviet officials, he must have been furious at the fact that the Soviet Union had "backed down" before the U.S. and was negotiating with the U.S. on an independent basis. CASTRO must have considered himself as being in a desperate situation. Source said that CASTRO was dominated by vanity, had megalomaniacal tendencies, and possessed a compulsion for revenge which was notorious; on occasion his compulsion caused him to reach back as far as twenty years to revenge actions taken against him at that time. Source added that in the current situation CASTRO was fully capable of undertaking an act of desperation, for example the aerial bombardment of the U.S. or some gross act against the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba.

GNVA 5006 (OUT 54584) 28 Mar 1963 (TDCSDB 3/653,939)
Filed 68-6-147/4

At the height of the October 62 Cuban crisis, CASTRO haranged a Soviet commander about the "impossibility" of permitting U.S. planes to photograph Cuba. The Soviet succumbed to CASTRO's persuasiveness and took action which resulted in shooting down a U-2 plane. The Soviet command was furious and the Soviet officer was returned to the USSR under arrest.

GNVA 6022 (IN 79271) 12 Dec 63 filed 68-6-147/3

Report that there was no speculation among orbit or Soviet officials re implications of Johnson's accession. There was a special alert status ordered for Cuban Missions as a result of the assassination of President Kennedy. The alert was still in effect 9 December 1963.

GNVA 6029 (OUT 65853) 12 Dec 63 (TDCSDB 3/658,469)

Filed 68-6-147/4

Report that circa 2 days after the assassination of President Kennedy, Cuban dip missions abroad began to receive a series of messages placing them on a special alert status. These messages were obviously due to apprehension by the Cuban Government that the circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy might lead to hostile activity directed against the missions. They were instructed, among other things, to be certain that there were "no compromising documents on the premises."

GNVA 6313 (IN 30483) 2 March 1964 filed 201-9293

Source reported at 29 February meeting that CASTRO was concerned that Johnson would not follow Kennedy's course which might have lead to negotiations. KHRUSHCHEV was convinced that CASTRO's Caribbean Peace must be strengthened.

/COMMENT: Ref. IG Memo dated 25 April 1967 SECRET EYES ONLY, Page 112 - Discussion of Assassination at High-Level Government Meetings. HURWITCH of State, and McGeorge BUNDY, White House, among others, attended 10 Aug 62 Special Group (Augmented) meeting at Dept. of State. Bill Harvey attended with McCone for CIA. Remember Harvey's Mafia contacts. Also, keep in mind that Tad SZULC allegedly had access to Hurwitch, both President and Attorney General Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy. Could he have learned or heard of the plot and let the word out? McCone recalled that liquidation of CASTRO, and other regime officials, was mentioned at JCS op room meeting 8 or 9 August 1962. It was later determined that McCone's recollection was probably faulty, that assassination came up for discussion at the 10 August State meeting._7

AMSWEEP Operation 19-6-69

SW Message #45 from Agent (undated)

Expressed deepest sympathy for death of President Kennedy. Added that death of Kennedy produced great nervousness and concern in CASTRO and his close associates. Further, that there was a great mobilization of troops throughout the country.

SW Message #14 from AMSWEEP-12 dated 19 Nov 1964

Reported attempt against Fidel CASTRO's life at odontological building located at 23rd Street; one of his bodyguards was killed.

AMTRUNK Operation 19-6-84/1-4

UFGA 11375 dated 30 September 1963

AMLEO-3 (Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez) defected to the U.S. in December 1962, became a JMWAVE asset, and was used to screen names for the AMTRUNK Operation. His wife reportedly had direct contact with Fidel CASTRO on 7 September 1963 and requested permission for herself and children to join RABEL in the U.S. CASTRO reportedly expressed knowledge that RABEL phoned his wife in Cuba every day. RABEL was terminated in July 1964, reportedly due to conflict with JMWAVE Station for not having exfiltrated his wife and children. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, arrested, and set free in July or August 1967. There are two firm accusations that he was a CASTRO agent as early as July 1963. If true, he could have been providing CASTRO information on the AMTRUNK Operation.

UFGA 11829 dated 18 October 1963

Tad SZULC wrote an article on changing trends among high-level personnel within the CASTRO Government, which appeared in a major daily newspaper, and which he told a high-level U.S. Government official was sourced to Dr. MORENO, the AMTRUNK team leader. Debriefing of

MORENO produced information of considerable variance to that in the article. He admitting talking to SZULC but denied that article was based on information he provided. The article (not in files) created considerable furor in Washington, D.C. /COMMENT: If true, SZULC' article(s) could have been used as a channel for providing information to the Cuban Government, wittingly or unwittingly.7

WAVE 7300 (IN 58037) dated 9 November 1963

A radio message to the AMTRUNK's in Cuba on 9 November 1963 asked if they had developed any leads into the higher echelons of the Rebel Army, and who at higher levels appeared to be good prospects for recruitment. It cited rumors that persons in top positions of the army were dissatisfied to the point that they may have been thinking of plotting against Fidel. /COMMENT: There is no proof that this information came to the attention of CASTRO; however, if the AMTRUNK operation was penetrated, as it appears it might have been, this information could have reached him.7

WAVE 9630 (IN 87039) dated 25 December 1963

AMTRUNK-9 (Modesto OROZCO) reported in an SW Message dated 6 November 1963, that during the early part of November Fidel CASTRO, in the course of a private conversation, expressed fear of the possibility of "Commando Insurrections" which might take place on a large scale in Cuba, as the Cuban economy was such that he could not maintain a state of military alert for a long time. He indicated that any prolonged period of military alert might cause discontent among the troops, a situation which would be dangerous and create irreparable consequences. So as to negate the possibility, CASTRO was undertaking an intensive propaganda campaign to give confidence to his troops and to limit the occurrence of any internal uprising.

MEMORANDUM for the Record by Mike Maney dated 23 Jan 1961

Rufo LOPEZ Fresquet allegedly leaked confidential information re U.S. Government backing of provisional government in Cuba, following invasion, given to him by President Kennedy in strictest confidence.

/COMMENT: Tad SZULC reportedly had a standing invitation for direct contact with President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy, since November 1961. SZULC reportedly kept abreast of all important AMTRUNK operational developments but took no active part in the operations. SZULC was in touch with George VOLSKY, one of the operations planners, who was in touch with Manuel PINEIRO (DGI) at the time of the missile crisis in 1962.

Aldo VERA Serafin, then in Miami, formerly with the Department of Technical Investigation (of the DIER - Department of Investigations of the Revolutionary Army), was considered for use in the AMTRUNK Operation. (VERA was assassinated in October 1976 in San Juan, Puerto Rico.) VERA reportedly was receiving financial aid from Santos TRAFFICANTE and the Mafia for arms and ammunition, but there is no indication that such activity was related to the Agency._7

AMTABBY Operation 19-132-30

Part of the net, a major PM operation consisting of numerous sabotage operations against on-island targets, was wrapped up by CASTRO in November 1962. Through captured agents, CASTRO learned that the operations were approved at the highest levels of the U.S. Government and that the major sabotage operations were approved by President Kennedy. The captured agents appeared on TV. The Cubans referred to operation CUPID (true) and to Robert Wall (CI Staff.) /_We wonder how the agent knew the operational crypt. The Cubans believed Wall to be a close friend of Robert Kennedy. Mr. Wall said he had never met Kennedy, but that the agent's case officer phoned him once in the agent's presence, and referred to Wall by true name._7

AMTAUP Operation 19-132-19

SW Message #32 from Agent - Undated

Sent condolences on death of President Kennedy and added that"the traitors rejoiced with the news. The radios never turned off the happy music. When they learned through the news services the background and history of the assasin they were preoccupied and on the same Friday they placed all troops on alert and also all the doctors were alerted and kept at the hospitals."

AMTHEO Project 19-6-99

SW Message #14 from agent, undated

Reported that "relatives of neighbors of a sub-source in Santiago de Cuba were arrested for being involved in a frustrated plot to kill Fidel when a bomb was found under the floor of the house in which Fidel was to be the guest on the occasion of the celebration of 26th of July."

SW Message #28, undated

Reported that a sub-source confirmed the frustrated assassination of Fidel at the corner of 10th and 23rd Streets (Vedado) in which one of Fidel's bodyguards was killed.

THIRTIETH OF NOVEMBER GROUP (MRTN) 19-120-37

Specific document not cited

/RESEARCHER COMMENT: "Of interest is the fact that a delegation of MRTN members held a meeting in Dallas, Texas in May 63. They complained about the fact that the U.S. Government was prohibiting further hit and run raids on Cuba and stated that if within 30 days these raids were not allowed to continue, the organization would conduct a protest march to Washington, D.C. Most of the documents in the file are from the FBI./

2506 BRIGADE 19-300-2

Memo for Attorney General Robert F.Kennedy from John A. McCone, Director, CIA 25 January 1963

Concerned interrogation of members of 2506 Brigade ransomed and returned to the U.S. in December 1962. One individual interviewed (A 13 310 184) said he was very mad at Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Rusk and Mr. Kennedy, the President of the U.S. for denying needed support. (By this he meant, by air and Naval gunfire).

Memo for the Record dated 28 January 1963 by Robert MORONEY, Office of Security Subj: Roberto PEREZ San Roman (201-282287)

PEREZ was to speak with HURWITCH of State Department. PEREZ had a dinner appointment with Robert Kennedy at Kennedy's Palm Beach home 26 Jan 1963. Kennedy was to explain in detail plans for future use of the Brigade which emerged from a high-level meeting Friday 25 January 1963.

WAVE 3068 (IN 45935) dated 8 January 1963

Concerned 5 January 1963 meeting between ZAMKA (Dave Morales) CIA and Manuel ARTIME for purpose of re-recruiting ARTIME, debriefing him on brigade activities, and to provide guidance. RUIZ-Williams reportedly told ARTIME that Robert Kennedy instructed RUIZ, OLIVA and Jose PEREZ, not to accept any money from the CRC or CIA; that Kennedy was setting aside $25,000 dollars from families committee funds for brigade leadership use for trips, expenses, etc. WAVE Station had no other information to confirm or deny this statement by Robt. Kennedy to RUIZ. WAVE Station commented that within the present policy framework the CRC could engage in: full spectrum of prop and political action activities; intell. collection; military training of officers and enlisted men via current DOD program; counter-insurgency training;

leadership development training, etc. Should USG policy become more aggressive re Cuba, they could also have commando raids on Cuban coast, attacks on Bloc shipping going to or from Cuba, and sabotage operations in Cuba.

WAVE 3103 (IN 46462) dated 8 January 1963

Reported that Brigade leaders asked families committee for $25,000 ops funds which they claimed Robert Kennedy indicated to RUIZ Williams and Roberto (PEREZ)/SAN ROMAN, should be made available to them through establishment of joint bank account between committee and the Brigade. The families committee turned down the Brigade request but was disturbed that the request was made.

Memo for the Record dated 24 January 1964

Subj: Roberto PEREZ San Roman (201-282287)

In his 23 January meeting with Robert Kennedy, PEREZ remarked that he had discussed Brigade problems, in general, with the writer (Office of Security) whom he apparently identified only as his Agency contact. According to PEREZ, the Attorney General asked for the writer's identity, which PEREZ, who knows the writer only as "Bob", was unable to give. (Was Robert F. Moroney).

AMWARM Operation,. 19-6-57

SW Message #45 from Agent dated 1 December 1963

Sent condolences on untimely passing of President Kennedy and speculated that CASTRO was not entirely out of the planning if Moscow had anything to do with it, although it could have been one of his (CASTRO's) unpredictable movements which is backfiring.

Radio Message #64 to Agent dated 4 April 1964

Requested any information the agent had picked up on plots against Fidel and others, and identity of those behind the plots.

1

AMWEE Operation 19-6-68/2-4

WAVE 9577 (IN 35284) dated 6 Oct 1962

1

AMWEE-1 on Sept. visit to Miami reported that on 11 September Cuban Army trucks delivered large trunks to house across the street from him (Nr. 116 Calle 18 Miramar, Havana), at that time occupied by a Chilean technician. From other activities in front of house, AMWEE-1 concluded that house was being used as LP target probably for the house of Cuban Supreme Court Chief Luis M. BUCH who lived around the corner from A-1.

8 10

16 8

1

8 01

6/mc

13-00000

The Chilean technician threw out a corrugated box brought there a few days previously by an Army truck escorted by the G-2. A-1 retrieved the box and noted it contained the address Acoustic Research, Inc. Cambridge, Mass. (The Agency checked with the firm and learned that the firm dealt in manufacture of high fidelity components for home consumption. Firm official said if box found its way to Cuba it no doubt was used for second time and original contents removed).

/_In 3 [Don Heath] 22 March 1977 Memo on Miami Station Action to Aid USG Investigation of Murder of John F. Kennedy, 3 [Heath] said 1 [AMWEE-1] reported that on the night of the day of the Kennedy assassination 1 [A-1] saw Osmani CIENFUEGOS drive up to the house 10 [across the street] at about 0100 hours; he stayed several hours. The house at that time was occupied by an American expatriate technician who built audio surveillance gear for the CUIS._7

WAVE 2171 (IN 92822) 3 Aug 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

A letter intended for Fidel CASTRO was given to 1 [AMWEE-1] in 11 [Mexico] on 2 August. He was to mail it within a day or two after return to Cuba on 2 August.

WAVE 2286 (IN 95047) 7 Aug 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

1 [AMWEE-1] was given letter on 2 August for wife of AMLEO-3, returned to Cuba that day, and was instructed

8/mc

to deliver the letter to her soonest. Included in the letter was the name of the Mexican Ambassador in Cuba given as an emergency contact for wife of AMLEO-3. /COMMENT: If AMLEO-3 was an agent of CASTRO, as suspected, this information could have fallen into the hands of CASTRO./

WAVE 3331 (IN 06371) dated 23 Aug 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

States that DIRECTOR 63497 instructed [AMWEE-1] not to use W/T set except for urgent messages such as report on Fidel CASTRO's death and related momentous developments. We purposely did not tell [A-1] that his radio reportedly was blown.

DIRECTOR 72045 from Hqs. to WAVE 30 Sept 63 filed 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

Para 2 states "see CASTRO reference in 28 September speech to money caches."

WAVE 2329 (IN 81847) dated 26 Sept 1964 filed W/T Chrono 19-6-68/3 Vol. #3

x 24

[AMWEE-1] message #2. ["My government (Italian] has intervened violently re imprisonment of Vasco CECCHI, Italian citizen who owned Montecatini Restaurant, Havana. Requests immediate release or else will take severe measures.

4/mc

WAVE 8316 (IN 70529) dated 30 Nov 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #4

Para 1 gave translation of WAVE 8279 (IN 69695) Mge. 45 from AMWEE-1 to Case Officer: "Our condolences on death President. MAURI (Mario MAURI, Italian diplomat) reports on 22 Nov the Cubana aircraft delayed its departure five hours from 1700 to 2200 waiting for an important passenger who arrived Mexico City Airport in private twin motor aircraft at 2130 hours Mexi time transferring directly from his plane to the Cubana plane without going through customs or immigration. Travelled in pilot's cabin. MAURI returned on same aircraft to Cuba. I shall come out 29 Nov but do not know whether I can stay. Best that you come to the airport that day. Here there is great movement of troops toward Pinar del Rio." /COMMENT: See AOCOVE Operation Memo, AMCOVE-1 SW Mge #71, dated 10 Dec 63. A-1 reported that Mario MAURI flew from Mexico to Havana on 23 November.

AMWEE-1 Production Folder #6 Oct 63 thru May 65: 19-6-68/4

There is nothing between 24 Oct 63 and 4 Dec 63 (void). WAVE 8100 (IN 67217) 23 Nov 63 contains no requirements to AMWEE-1 re assassination, nor do subsequent messages through 30 December 63.

4/mc

AMWEE-1 SW Chrono 14 Jan 63 thru 20 Apr 65 Folder #9

19-6-68/3

There are no messages between SW #119 dated 12 Nov 63, received Miami 20 Nov 63, and SW #124 dated 15 Apr 1964, received Miami 20 April 1964. Four messages are missing from this file.

Message to Agent (IN 04498) dated 12 June 64

Asked if agent had learned the name of the young man in peasant clothes who rides Cubana plane to Mexico and back every Friday.

Message from Agent (IN 81847) dated 26 Sept 64

States that Vasco CECCHI was arrested "some months ago" and charged with dollar dealings and being part of a plot against CASTRO.

AMWEE-1 Operational File 19-6-68/3 Vol. #4

Memo dated 4 November 1964

Shows that 8 names gleaned from the "Warren Commission documents" were checked in WH/SA/IOS (Cuba Desk) files with negative results. Reports traces attached.

2/mc

AMWORLD Operation 19-124-27

Memo for the Record by Henry Hecksher, 10 July 1963 Washington, D.C. Meeting with ARTIME (BOX 18)

ARTIME related events prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. Manuel RAY had just arrived in the U.S. from Cuba. He enjoyed strong Department of State support. It was his intent to get the U.S. to withdraw support from the FRD and to obtain control over the training camps himself. VARONA's and CARILLO's intention was to see the FRD go down. Hecksher said he masterminded RAY's defeat and RAY knew it.

Memo by Henry D. Hecksher on AMWORLD Meeting in Washington 7 to 10 Nov 1963 Subj: Dr. La Saga (BOX 18)

LaSaga was the MRR delegate in the U.S. while ARTIME was imprisoned in Cuba (following the Bay of Pigs invasion.) ARTIME demoted LaSaga. LaSaga described by Hecksher as one of the most intelligent men he had ever met. It was LaSaga's firm position that while President Kennedy was in power it would be impossible to defeat CASTRO.

WAVE 6925 (IN 89430) dated 23 May 1964

Concerns Tad SZULC' articles in the New York Times 19, 20 and 21 May which AMCARBON-1 believes were fabricated and violated newsbeat agreement he had with AMCARBON-1.

Memo for Chief, Special Affairs Staff, by Henry Hecksher dated 3 September 1963 19-124-27/3 (Box 28)

A Tad SZULC article in a special to The New York Times datelined Key West, 1 Sept(1963) quotes "the judgement of authoritative quarters in Cuba" that Washington tolerance of small refugee groups that are identified with political factions objectionable to most Cubans, specifically the groups that apparently operate from Nicaragua and are identified with ARTIME, works against the emergence of meaningful opposition. [Hecksher comment: I wonder who is actually behind what looks to me like a concerted denigration campaign?]

DBA 42843 dated 3 June 1963 (FBI) 19-124-27 (Box 29)

From interview of Santiago ALVAREZ Rodriguez on 23 May 1963 and information from his contact in April 1963 with attorney Paulino A. SIERRA. SIERRA planned to go to Miami, from Chicago, to help establish a unity movement among Cuban political groups. SIERRA wanted ALVAREZ to meet an American arriving in Miami from Chicago (name unknown) who claimed to have $30,000,000. available to donate to Cuban exiles to establish unity and provisional government in exile. The American said the money would be given on condition that the unity would be established, and that the group he represented would be given certain concessions in Cuba in the future. The American claimed he did not represent the U.S. Government but had good contacts with the government. It was not known what he meant by the term concessions - whether that was with reference to gambling concessions, business franchises or possible business contracts with the Cuban Government. ALVAREZ concluded that the American was completely unreliable. The American was described as white, male, about 45 years old, 5 ft. 10 inches, 180 lbs., well-dressed, businessman type who spoke a little Spanish and obviously had been in Havana at one time. The American indicated that he was from Chicago.

WAVE 1013 (IN 78067) dated 11 July 1963 (Box 29)
Concerns activities of Cuban Committee for Liberation (CCL) sparked by Guillermo ALONSO Pujol 21 May 1963. (Agency learned from DGI defector SLIPSTREAM-1 in Nov 71 that ALONSO was a Cuban intelligence agent.) Cable goes on to state that Enrique RUIZ Williams had apparently been inactive, at least in Miami circles, since denying via local press on 22 May that he was hand-picked by Attorney General Kennedy to unify anti-Castro exiles.

CSDB 3/656,611 dated 13 September 1963 (Box 29)
Indicates that SIERRA's actions relating to Cuba Committee for Liberation would lead to chaos and anarchy.

At a meeting 20 Aug 1963 members of the group decided to report SIERRA's irregularities to the group's financiers in Chicago. Calls were made to Chicago to VANDERBUILT (fnu) and Dillon BRADEN.

WAVE 8562 (IN 74653) dated 5 Dec 1963 (Box 29)

Reports that PRIO's declarations wherein he accused the U.S. Government of agreement with Russia to replace CASTRO with Tito-type government originated with Guillermo ALONSO Pujol in Washington. It was received by PRIO through Guillermo BELT. Pujol has friendly relations with certain members diplomatic circle Washington and thinks he is well informed although he lives in Europe. Guillermo MARQUEZ, publisher of New York weekly Ahora and Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling are both part of PRIO's plan and allegedly have become associated with Richard NIXON in accordance with Republican Party plan to bring up Cuban case before the elections.

WAVE 8563 (IN 84654) dated 6 Dec 1963 (Box 29)

Information from Francisco CHAO Hermida, who attended 10 Nov 63 meeting with Miguel A. "Cuco" LEON - involved PLAN JUDAS. LEON told CHAO that while in Wash., D.C., he met with Enrique RUIZ Williams. RUIZ informed him that he (RUIZ) was to lead new Cuban republic and had been so named by Robert Kennedy who had gone to New York to interview him. Kennedy allegedly said that RUIZ could work with any or every sector he wished but important point was that RUIZ was to be the boss.

Memo for the Record by Alfonso RODRIGUEZ dated 23 June 1964 re Telecon with Tad SZULC (Box 29)

SZULC stated that the detention of RAY was due to "double" nature of U.S. policy; meaning by that that the U.S. Government was anxious to depose Fidel CASTRO, but would not permit anyone to act against Cuba. RODRIGUEZ pointed out to SZULC that RAY as well as "all of the other fellows" have been constantly reminded that they cannot use U.S. territory as a base but apparently they have got to lose all of their assets before they realize that this is a serious policy.

AMWREN Operation 19-6-51/1-4

AMWREN-1 Report dated 5 February 1962 19-6-51/4

Report that during a speech on 4 February 1962 Fidel stopped reading the text prepared by the Communist Party and, on his own, referred to Kennedy as "impudent". He tried to separate himself from the text and continue on his own, but was brought back in line by Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ and Anibal ESCALANTE.

On 1 February 1962 AMTURVY-1 reported that Rolando CUBELA and other prominent government figures were under arrest in La Cabana Fortress and were kept separated from the other prisoners.

AMYUM Operation 19-132-32

UFGA 8466 dated 12 April 1963 19-132-32

Transmitted intelligence debriefing reports on Operation FINA exfiltrees. Debriefing of Caridad MACIAS Rodriguez. On 26 July 1961 MACIAS was involved in an action to kill Fidel CASTRO at the 26th of July ceremony at the Plaza Civic. The action was to kill Fidel CASTRO by firing a bazooka shell at the speaker's platform. This action failed because of a defective firing device on the bazooka. The G-2 had had persons involved, working in resistance, under surevillance for some time. MACIAS was connected with the MRR. A G-2 interrogator said that the Cuban security forces knew everything that was going on in the resistance movement. They permitted these resistance organizations to organize and exist until it was decided to roll up the group. She seemed to be connected with AMBRONC-5 (a CIA on-island asset) who was arrested and executed the latter part of August 1962.

ATTACHMENT B

List of Task Force Participants

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

LAD/JFK Task Force Participants

William Sturbitts	Task Force Supervisor
Chris Hopkins	Group leader
Jane Zerance	Researcher and Administrative back-up to Ms. Hopkins. Served from mid-Oct [redacted] 1976 to mid-February 1977.
3 [Felipe Acevedo]	Researcher and Translator Served from mid-October 1976 to mid-February 1977.
3 [Kathleen Blevins]	Researcher and Translator Served from mid-October 1976 to mid-February 1977.
3 [Taylor (Mike) Belcher]	Researcher (Strong along CI lines) Served from mid-October 1976 to January 1977, prior to PCS assignment.
3 [Daryl Geisler]	Researcher Served from mid-October 1976 to mid-November 1976. (Part-time due to personal tragedy).
3 [Martin Miller]	Researcher Served approximately 3 weeks from January to mid-February 1977.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

5/mc

3 [Barbara Boyle]	Researcher Served approximately three weeks from January to mid-February 1977.
3 [Alva King]	Researcher Served approximately 2 weeks in February 1977.
3 [Howard Brubaker]	Researcher Served approximately 2 weeks in February 1977.
Annie Goodpasture	Recalled from retirement by the IG Staff. Served with LAD Task Force from mid-March to mid-May 1977. See following paragraph on Ms. Goodpasture.

Based on her long tenure at the Mexico City Station which spanned the critical period, September to November 1963, Ms. Goodpasture was recalled by the IG Staff in February 1977 to answer numerous questions which focused primarily on Mexico City Station activities. The IG Staff has written a statement regarding Ms. Goodpasture's review of the Mexico City Station files. After assisting the IG Staff, Ms. Goodpasture then joined the LAD Task Force from mid-March to mid-May 1977. Her contribution during that period consisted primarily of the following:

a) Recall, review and translation from Spanish to English (when not provided) of microfilm of Mexico City Station

3/mc

teltap take against the Soviet Embassy during the period September through November 1963, to determine a possible Soviet link with OSWALD.

b) Preparation of report on Cubana flights and flights from Mexico City to Havana based on research and translations by other members of the Task Force.

c) Preparation of report on Gilberto Policarpo Lopez based on research and findings by other LAD Task Force members.

d) Reviewed at Headquarters and [Warrenton] 99 photo coverage of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for pictures of the "unidentified man."

e) Reviewed 8 boxes of policy material for possible findings.

13-00000

TS (CODE WORD) ANNEX
TO ATTACHMENT "A"

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. SC-01755-77A

~~Handle Via~~

~~**COMINT**~~

~~Channels~~

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~(Security Classification)~~

~~E2 IMPDET~~

ZRKNICK Operation 200-5-38 (FBI Monitoring of Cuban Espionage Net in Miami, International in Scope)

BOX I - Non-CS Documents Filed AMAPOLA (Juan AMESTOY Folder)

On 8 April 1963 the FBI intercepted an SW message from ZRKNICK agent in Miami to CUIS Headquarters in Havana. Said Juan ARMESTOY /should read AMESTOY; was CIA agent7 told ZRKNICK agent about a trip he planned to Cuba with other Cubans. That an internal uprising was being prepared and six men, four Cubans and two foreigners, had already arrived in Cuba to assassinate Fidel. "Ricardo CABRERA told RIN last night that from now until December 63 many things are expected in Cuba and that the American Government will take advantage of the opportunity of the attack on the Russian boat to control the gusanos (worms) who work on their own and then in the work of CIA in its job of infiltration. ARMESTOY says that they always take an American with them and it is he who gives the orders and communicates by radio with the airplanes which explore the route. ARMESTOY took eleven thousand five hundred pesos to Cuba. Be careful. Regards." /COMMENT: ZRKNICK at request of CUIS Havana, continued to report on AMESTOY. AMESTOY was later arrested and killed in a gun battle or executed by the Cuban Government.7

CSCI 3/776,625 Dated 19 June 1963 Memo to FBI from CIA

Subject: Ricardo CABRERA Amoedo

Attached memo dated 30 April 1963 states that Ricardo CABRERA Amoedo aka "Cayo" who lived in the U.S., returned to Cuba when CASTRO assumed power in January 1959, returned to Miami in 1960 as an active G-2 member and continued to work as an informer for CUIS. During 1960 he went to Cuba and had an interview with VALDES, Fidel CASTRO, NARANJO and Juan ORTA, then secretary to Fidel. In Miami CABRERA worked for the G-2, together with PIMENTAL (fnu) and Pepe NOVA, who were chiefs of G-2 in Miami. Was a man who would sell his mother. Became an American citizen and used to brag about being a member of CIA.

VOLUME II (Box I) Summary of Relations with FBI

TOP SECRET DINAR

On 15 March 1963 the FBI's ZRKNICK supervisor met with CIA personnel for discussion of the case and promised to keep CIA Headquarters informed of all developments. The FBI provided text of SW message from AMAPOLA letter drop indicating travel of one Evaristo FERNANDEZ to Costa Rica in connection with some kind of operation. CIA sent the information immediately to Costa Rica in view of President's trip.

VOLUME II (Box I) Memo from FBI to CIA dated 12 Aug 1963

Memo attached text of intercepted message; although in code, deciphered, it said the following: "Antonio ROJAS told me the following. CIA is still recruiting people but they are warned before hand that they have to accept Huber MATOS as their leader. My friend, Luisito AQUIAR, who was second in command to Tom DIQUE, was recruited and he will soon be sent to Cuba. RID told me the following: my prison mate Ernesto SANTANA, was also recruited a few days ago and sent by CIA and transferred to another place for his preparation. Tony, no good, and I believe the attempt (on the life) of the horse would be more effective, tell us how the check-out is going."

Memorandum for Chief of Station, Mexico dated 3 Sept 1963 (Box I) TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 5 para 7 A states that AMAPOLA /crypt for CUIS/ with outstation located in the Miami area, has for its main objective the penetration of CIA and exile organizations directed against Cuba. One important agent, possibly the P/A /Jose CARBONNEL Marrero/ has been identified by the FBI and is a naturalized U.S. citizen of Cuban birth. The FBI is currently reading his S/W messages, and CIA is interrogating a WAVE asset (?) who has an unexplained connection with the agent. Another WAVE asset (name unknown) who has had contact with the agent has been interrogated and found to be clean. A third WAVE asset (identity unknown) in contact with the agent, has been turned over to the FBI for possible use against the agent."

VOLUME III (Box I) Intercepted Message from Cuba to Agent in Miami, Dated 24 Nov 1963 TOP SECRET DINAR

Asked following questions:

1. Whether there is concentration of the Yankee Army.
2. Whether there is a concentration of mercenaries.
3. Whether there is an increase in pressure on those sympathetic to Cuba and the left.
4. Whether active counter-revolutionaries are disappearing.
5. To inform fully via CANDI (CUIS clandestine drop in Mexico City) the reaction of the Gusanos and the Republicans to the death of Kennedy.

VOLUME III (Box I) Memo for Chief, JMWAVE from SAS/CI Dated 11 March 1964 - TOP SECRET DINAR

Memo attached copies of ZRKNICK intercepts provided CIA by the FBI:

25 Dec 63 plain text letter (translated from Spanish to English) to Irma SUAREZ in Cuba. Para 6 states "I will tell you about Kennedy's death in the other letter when I am in New Jersey. All that is a ?."

30 Dec 63 letter from Miami to Irma in Cuba. Para 3 states "Irma, I certainly did not forget those medicines you asked me for. I was very sure that they would give them to you and that you would be able to go to Camaguey to see Pepe."

VOLUME IV - FBI Summaries TOP SECRET DINAR (Box 1)

Letter to Irma SUAREZ in Cuba from H. DIAZ in Miami, dated 17 Oct 63. Second para. of SW text states "Irma, do not bother asking Manolo GARCIA about the letters which he has sent me, since I turned them over to CONTE AGUERO and he has read them." /COMMENT: This appears to be Luis CONTE Aguero, a former JMWAVE Station asset terminated in 1969. His file indicates that he is (was) a suspected CASTRO agent. He reportedly got the Cuban vote for President-elect Carter and was in Wash., D.C. in December 1976 with the Carter transition team./.

BOX 2 - "NOE" FOLDER - TOP SECRET DINAR

25 November 1963 intercept of message from Cuba to agent in Miami. "In view of the assassination attempt in the U.S., report the reaction in that city, commentaries in government circles, right and left. Report change, accelleration, or maneuvers of any kind with regard to the aggression plan against Cuba."

SJOS 6429 (IN 68164) Dated 26 November 63 (BOX 2)

Cable from San Jose to Headquarters. "Costa Rican Deputy Julio SUNOL Leal (ZRKNICK suspect, Communist fellow traveller and pro-CASTRO propagandist) planned depart 24 Nov to attend Peace Conference in Poland. Delayed departure and now planning leave San Jose by air for Poland 26 Nov. Plans stop en route in Texas repeat Texas. Then will travel on to Poland. Station suspected SUNOL will attempt gather data in Texas for use in pro-Communist CASTRO propaganda re assassination Kennedy. SUNOL travelling with dip. passport."

MEXI 7085 (IN 68561) Dated 27 November 1963

Cable to Headquarters from Mexico City. "Subject arrived Mexico Taca Flt. 772 1600 26 Nov. Leaving KLM Flt. 684 for Amsterdam 27 Nov. Flt. stops Houston and Montreal en route."

HZPA 13,960 Dated 3 December 1963 (BOX 4)

Dispatch from Panama City to Headquarters. "At 22 Nov 63 Esterline-HYSAGE-1 (Thelma King) meeting, news was received of President Kennedy's death. This had a profound effect on H-1. Her first reaction was that it must have been done by racial extremists and she spent a considerable time extolling the virtues of President Kennedy, and what he had been trying to do. At the 27 Nov 63 Esterline-HYSAGE-1 meeting, H-1 made quite a point of saying that she was absolutely positive that Fidel CASTRO could have had nothing to do with the act.

(BOX 10) TOP SECRET DINAR - Intercepted Message from Cuba to Agent in Miami dated 27 Oct 1962

Stated "Principal objective is the physical elimination of counter-revolutionary scum and the destruction of their centers. The less important ones you can beat up and request their expulsion from the country. Keep the material secured from the Yankee Embassy in a safe place until receipt of further instructions."

(BOX 10) PAMELA Folder - Periodic Activity Report Presumably dated December 1963

PAMELA Folder (CUIS agent). "In addition to the regular bi-weekly schedules held on 10 and 24 November, a special schedule was held on 29 November, as was done in the case of AMAPOLA (CARBONNEL). Among various matters dealt with in the message transmitted on 10 November, one in particular was of high interest. This was the request for a man to be chosen to handle commo in cases of emergency inasmuch as it would be more difficult to accomplish this as "the struggle worsens." An exhaustive report on all aspects of counter-revolutionary groups and activities was also requested of the agent." On 24 Nov 63, as in the case of AMAPOLA, a special code was set up to enable "A--CH (illegible) to report by cable directly to drops in Cuba on the situation in Puerto Rico after the assassination of President Kennedy. SANTOS, the agent who actually receives all messages transmitted to PAMELA was to contact AB--N (illegible) and have him report on the development of any of the following situations:

a. if a contingent of gusano (worm) Cubans has arrived there;
b. if mobilization of resident gusano Cubans is noticed;
c. if mobilization of U.S. forces is noticed;
d. if the Cubans who arrived and those who were there before have "developed circulation;"
e. if activities of repressive organs against popular forces have increased.

A special transmission was scheduled for the following Thursday at the same time. As there were no adverse developments in the situation after the President's death, this subject was not dealt with in the special transmission made on 29 Nov (1963).

(BOX 10) SEPIO File

The "SEPIO" file contains a letter from MENENDEZ in France to Oliva LOPEZ, Mexico. /COMMENT: believe letter may have been written by the MANENDEZ who wrote letter to a Bernardo MORALES in Miami 27 Nov 62, discussing plans for assassination of President Kennedy. See MENENDEZ shadow file.7

(BOX 10) "ROBERTO Folder" Periodic Activity Report
Dated (presumably) December 1963

On 25 November (63) the agent was asked to report on the reaction of the assassination of President Kennedy by governmental right-wing and left-wing circles. The agent (Roberto) was also asked to report on the status of plans of aggression against Cuba.

(BOX 10) Memo to Chief of Station, JMWAVE from C/SAS/CI
Dated 6 December 1963

Cites memos of 22 and 29 November 63 attached (which are not attached to document). 22 Nov 63 memo reportedly included an intercepted SW message which mentioned one Ricardo IRURETA Goyena who worked at the Hotel Fontainebleau in Miami. The 29 November 63 memo reportedly contained an intercepted SW message, a letter addressed to Irma SUAREZ in Cuba in both open text and in secret writing, and another letter which apparently was intended for Manolo GARCIA, also both in open text and secret writing.

ZRKNICK Unnumbered Box - VOL. III
PACY 1073 (IN 48464) dated 26 October 1963

Cable from Panama City to Headquarters. "Hope you understand that PONCHAY (Jake Esterline) and Station CI group as dissatisfied with unresolved aspects HYSAGE Ops. as is Hqs. Do not, however, at this point, see spectre of Soviets or massive provocation efforts directed by Soviets and/or CASTRO in progress. /COMMENT: PONCHAY was in touch with HYSAGE-1 (Thelma King), a Panamanian left-wing politician, pro-Castro Deputy to National Assembly, and personal friend of Fidel CASTRO. Recruited by Fidel Aug 62 to perform espionage mission in Panama./

MEXI 6969 (IN 64256) Dated 19 Nov 63 (VOL. III)

Cable from Mexico to Hqs. "16 Nov. LICOOKY-1 with LINLUCK-1 visited Maj. Alfonso PRERA Sierra, employed by Francisco "Paco" AMADO at Maquinas Coloso. "Paco" still involved Guatemala guerrilla ops and receives money from Cubans to pass to Guats. "Paco's" wife says "Paco" now in U.S. but Alfonso thinks he either in Guatemala or Cuba. Alfonso's brother Enrique still firmly pro-Cuban."

DIRECTOR 84449 Dated 21 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Cable from Hqs. to WAVE. "Hqs. has sensitive information indicating that Cuban Intelligence Service is targetting against person employed in State Dept. office in Miami. (Matter discussed with the FBI.)

DIRECTOR 84791 Dated 22 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Cable from Headquarters to Panama City. "HYSAGE-2 (Victor Augusto NAVAS-King) turned plane ticket over to "MEDINA" on 22 Nov. Ticket expires 7 Dec 63. Has decided remain U.S. over Xmas holidays. Wants to raise grade at

Georgetown (University). Was much affected by death of President and did not want to talk much.

DIRECTOR 85343 Dated 27 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Cable from Hqs. to WAVE and Panama City. "Hqs. suspects Blanca Alicia FRANCO may be spearhead of penetration of AMOT/CIA ops on behalf ZRKNICK complex. AMOTS [JMWAVE Station Ops.] in direct contact with FRANCO. FRANCO, suspect Cuban agent, in contact with AMOT-110 (Norberto Felipe MARTINEZ Garcia).

HDCA 3405 Dated 29 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Dispatch from Santo Domingo to Hqs.concerning one Eduardo TAVARES Justo. TAVARES queried EMGLUE-1 ( ) on 2 Oct 63 about his experiences in the U.S. but did not give any indication that he was going there. On 9 Oct. five days after TAVARES departure, EMGLUE-1 reported that TAVARES had not gone to Canada as planned, but to New York. On 22 Nov 63 EMGLUE-1 reported that as of 17 Nov TAVARES was still in New York. E-1 believed TAVARES a Communist, or at least has Communist ideas.

HMMA 22632 Dated 18 December 1963 (VOL. III)

Dispatch from Mexico City to Hqs. "On 21 Nov 63 LICOOKY-1 obtained following info re Francisco AMADO. For past year AMADO has continued to receive visits from emissaries of Fidel CASTRO and to make mysterious trips. On each occasion (sic) AMADO receives money for various expenditures.

Right after receiving these visitors and the money, AMADO goes on trips. AMADO was in Cuba for a while last year. He may be working for the Govt of Cuba in intelligence work. AMADO's wife was educated in the U.S. She has friends in Washington and also at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico. As of this date, AMADO has been outside Mexico for some time. His wife explains that he is in the U.S. Last year when AMADO went to Guatemala, taking funds from CASTRO for the guerrillas, he applied for membership in the Guatemalan Communist Party. He has CASTRO's confidence and performs services for the Communists."

DIRECTOR 90507 Dated 20 December 1963 VOL. III)
Cable from Hqs. to Panama City and Bern. "Appears likely someone may have used HYSAGE-1 ticket. Can Panama City identify? Was HYSAGE-1 in Panama 4-17 Dec?

DBA 57414 (FBI) Dated 21 November 1963 100-5-14 (VOL. IV)
Page 11, para 3, mentions a Manolo GARCIA who had in his possession driver's license in name Manolo RODRIGUEZ. /This Manolo RODRIGUEZ may be iden/ with one Manuel RODRIGUEZ Seoane (201-920072) Cuban DSE officer in 1964 responsible for recruiting Emilio ECHARTE Pedroso. ECHARTE's mission was to enter the U.S. for the purpose of assassinating Cuban exile, Manolo RAY. DIRECTOR 501359, 15 Jan 74/ .

ZRKNICK Continued

PACY 4074 (IN 30576) dated 17 July 1964 (Vol. VII)

Cable from Panama City to Hqs. "Station will do everything possible to get additional answers and clarification from HYSAGE-1. If H-1 trying to divert attention from more important target or activity any of the following possibilities may be considered:

c. H-1 may be involved in or aware of impending action. Perhaps a golpe de Estado (coup d'etat) or assassination, and is trying detract attention from persons actually involved."

BOGO 4761 (IN 41774 dated 3 August 1964 (Vol. VII)

Cable from Bogota to Hqs. "On 28 July 64 a State Dept. officer received information that there was a pro-CASTRO group in the Civil Aeronautics Administration and names Alvaro REYES Nieto as a member of the group. REYES, a Colombian, is a radio technician, now in Wash., D.C. area on ODWIFE (International Corporation Administration) training grant. Hernando REYES Nieto, believed to be Alvaro's brother, reportedly travelled to Cuba via Mexico in January 1962. CSDB 3/654,557 lists him as architect in employ of the Cuban Government.

HHTW 1721 dated 15 October 1964 (Vol. VIII)

Dispatch from Hqs. to Tegucigalpa. "When President Kennedy died, Augusto (DGI) directed officers in National Liberation Bldg., to prepare radio communication using song "Three Beautiful Cubans" or "Six Beautiful Cubans," which could be transmitted by Radio Havana, Cuba and be used to send easily understood ciphered messages. AMMUG-1 (DGI defector) believed that Norberto HERNANDEZ Curbelo (DGI) officer chose the musical recording. Augusto is believed to be iden/with Carlos Sixto CHAIN Soler, Deputy to Manuel PINEIRO, Chief of the DGI.

ATTACHMENT C

Outline of the Complete LAD/JFK Task Force Files and Description of Their Contents.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

LAD (Cuba) Task Force to Investigate Assassination of President Kennedy

019-604-001

Vol. I	Administrative - Background Working Papers
Vol. II	Administrative - Background Working Papers
Vol. III	Administrative - Background Working Papers
Vol. IV	Press Clippings
Vol. V	Interagency Memoranda
Vol. VI	Interagency Memoranda
Vol. VII	Terms of Reference - Folders 1 thru 34 Cuba/Mexico
Vol. VIII	Interim Report on AMTRUNK Operation and Operation to Split Castro Regime
Vol. IX	Memoranda (Draft) - Operational and Subject Files Negative Findings A thru H
Vol. X	Memoranda (Draft) - Operational and Subject Files Negative Findings I thru Z
Vol. XI	Memoranda with Findings Attached - A and B
Vol. XII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - C
Vol. XIII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - D thru J
Vol. XIV	Memoranda with Findings Attached - K
Vol. XV	Memoranda with Findings Attached - L
Vol. XVI	Memoranda with Findings Attached - M and Mc
Vol. XVII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - N thru R
Vol. XVIII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - S thru V
Vol. XIX	Memoranda with Findings Attached - W thru Z

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Vol. XX	Memoranda on Personalities Checked - A thru N
Vol. XXI	Memoranda on Personalities Checked - O thru Z
Vol. XXII	Final Report - How Research was Conducted - Chronology of Findings List of Participants Outline of LAD/JFK Official Files

FILE NO.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

-3-

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 97713
OUT 97713

TO INFO CITE DIR 35831
35831

ABIJ	ACCR	ADDI	ALGI	AMMA	ANCH	ANKA	ASUN
ATHE	BAGH	[redacted]	BANG	BEIR	BELG	BRLN	BERN
BOGO	BOMB	BONN	BRAZ	BRUS	CAIR	CALC	CAPT
CARA	TRUJ	COLO	CNRY	LISB	COPE	DKAR	DAMA
DARE	DJAK	FRAN	GUAT	HAGU	HELS	HONG	HULA
ISTA	JIDD	KABU	KAMP	KAHI	KTMN	KHAR	KUAL
KUWA	LAGS	LAPA	LEOP	LIMA	LOND	[redacted]	LUXE
MADR	MANA	MANI	MELB	MEXI	MOGA	MNRV	MONT
MUNI	NOBI	NEWD	OTTA	PACY	PARI	PENH	PRIN
PRET	QUIT	RABA	RNGO	BEYK	RIOD	ROME	SAIG
SLBY	SANJ	JUAN	SAGO	SALV	SEOU	SING	STOC
TAMI	THAR	TEGU	TEHE	TOKY	TPLI	TNIS	VIEN
VETN	WELL	YAOU					

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1359 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

5834

[illegible] Hospital
[illegible] E. 25th ST. - HIALEAH, FLA.

PATIENT'S NAME & [illegible]
PEREZ, RIGOBERTO (CRUZ) 6
1700 N.W. 21 TERRACE 8
MIAMI, FLA.

8 TO
SA[redacted])
P.O. BOX 1608
MIAMI, FLA.

[redacted]

TYPE INSURANCE OR PRE-PAYMENT
DATE ADMITTED 4-12-66 TIME 3:00 PM INITIALS
DATE DISCHARGED TIME INITIAL
DOCTOR A. VARGAS

DATE	ROOM NO.	RATE	NO. DAYS
4-12	165A SP	21.00	

ROOM			DRESSINGS COSTS & SUPPLIES	COLUMN A AMOUNT	COLUMN B AMOUNT / CODE	OTHER SERVICE	TOTAL CHARGES	PAYMENTS	OLD BALANCE PICK UP	DATE	BALANCE
21.00							21.00			APR 12'66	21.00
21.00	83.00	15.25	.25	28.00+23 LIVER SCAN 30.00+[illegible]	1.50+23 KIT	80.00	306.00		21.00	APR 13'66	327.00
21.00 21.00	11.00	6.00	9.75 5.00	30.00+20		35.00	112.75		327.00	APR 14'66	439.75
21.00	6.00	26.50	2.00	10.00+19		85.00	171.50		439.75	APR 16'66	611.25
21.00	3.00						24.00		611.25	APR 17'66	635.25
21.00	13.00	3.50					37.50		635.25	APR 18'66	672.75
21.00	2.00	3.25					27.25		672.75	APR 19'66	700.00
.00	3.00	19.25				35.00	78.25		700.00	APR 20'66	778.25
1.00			1.25	20.00+19			42.25		778.25	APR 21'66	820.50
21.00		5.50									
1.00	25.00	6.00	2.00	[illegible]+19			[illegible]		820.50	APR 23'66	[illegible]
.00		3.00		[illegible]+19 20.00+19			34.00		[illegible]	APR 24'66	942.00
		10.00		30.00+19			.00		943.00	APR 24'66	943.00
21.00		2.50		10.00+19							
		10.00		10.00+19			34.50		943.00	APR 25'66	977.50
21.00		4.75		10.00+19			35.75		977.50	APR 26'66	1,013.25
21.00		6.25		10.00+19			37.25		1,013.25	APR 27'66	1,050.50
21.00	12.00	[illegible]	2.00	10.00+19			46.25		1,050.50	APR 29'66	1,096.75
251.00	160.00	91.00	17.25	200.00	1.50	216.00	1096.75				

TOTAL BALANCE FORWARD

PAID
MAY 10 19[illegible]
CHECK NO. 2156

WE DO OUR BEST TO HAVE A FINAL BILL WHEN REQUESTED. AT TIME OF DISCHARGE THIS IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE, SO MEDICINE GIVEN AND SERVICES RENDERED ON DAY OF DISCHARGE WHICH ARE NOT CHARGED WHEN PATIENT LEAVES THE HOSPITAL WILL BE BILLED LATER.

ADD INSURANCE DEDUCTIBLE
DUE FROM PATIENT
LESS PAYMENTS
BALANCE DUE

DISPOSITION OF CASE
FINAL DIAGNOSIS
OPERATION
SHOULD [illegible] BE MADE TO SUBSCRIBER YES NO
YES NO YES NO

BILLING
APPROVED

SPECIAL SERVICES CODE EXPLANATION

COLUMN A	COLUMN B
16 ELECTROCARDIOGRAM	7 PATHOLOGY
18 ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAM	9 X RAY THERAPY
19 PHYSICAL THERAPY	21 BLOOD & BLOOD PLASMA
20 TRANSFUSION SET UP	24 ORTHOPEDIC EQUIPMENT
23 EMERGENCY SERVICE	40 TEL & TEL.
27 RADIO ISOTOPES	

* BY: H. M. SIMON, JR., M.D.
RALPH L. PIPES, M.D.
RADIOLOGISTS

OUR BUSINESS OFFICE IS CLOSED FROM SUNSET FRIDAY TO SUNSET SATURDAY.

3/12

FORM 2-62 1303a

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 26 AUG 62

FILE:

PRECEDENCE			INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	DEFERRED	PRIORITY			
	RR ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS K	251743Z	Ø9376

TO DIR WAVE INFO CITE RIOD 8325 NUMBER

GYROSE AMLACE

1. AMTOAD-1 SAYS HE PERSUADED AMLACE-1'S WIFE (HEREAFTER AMLACE-2) TO SEND HIM REPORTS FROM HAVANA. BELIEVES SHE WOULD BE WILLING ACT AS COURIER FOR ANTI CASTRO REFUGEES. REPORTS TO BE SENT VIA DIP POUCH TO MARIA C. NIEMEYER (NO RECORD STATION FILES) OF BRAZIL CONSULATE MIAMI. RENARD AND HARRY V. WITHERBY, NEW GYROSE CASE OFFICER VICE ANDRIETTE, DISPLAYED NO PARTICULAR INTEREST. AMTOAD-1 OF COURSE UNAWARE OUR TIE TO AMLACE-1. AMTOAD WILL PROBABLY ~~RRRRRR~~ REPORT AMLACE-2 OP TO AMBUD HQS AND MAY SEEK TRIP TO MIAMI TO EXPLOIT.

2. THIS MAY BE MINOR INFORMAL AGREEMENT ON WHICH AMLACE-2 DOES NOT INTEND TO ACT, ALTHO AMSTRUT-1 HAS STATED AMLACE-2 STRONGLY ANTI CASTRO AND WILLING WORK.

3. WE FEEL THIS DEVELOPMENT NO THREAT TO AMLACE-1 SECURITY. WILL TAKE NO CORRECTIVE ACTION UNLESS ADDEES INSTRUCT OTHERWISE.

END OF MESSAG

INFO
CVS
CCIS
DC/OS
SO
EX
CI
IM
IS
SEC
SUPP
AIR
MAIL
TR
COMMO
RI

GKB

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

FORM 1302a
1-61

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: ~~2X5~~ 25 AUG 62

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
RR ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS K	242040Z	09350

TO WAVE INFO DIR CITE RIOD 8317 NUMBER

GYROSE

REF RIOD 8316

IDEN - ANT[illegible]NIO L. NEVES

AMERICAN EMBASSY - POL

APO 676

NEW YORK N.Y.

END OF MESSAG

ACTION INFO

COS

/

RI

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

[illegible]

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

REPORT NO. UFG-1759

FROM: JMWAVE

DATE OF REPORT: 25 October 1962

REPORTING OFFICER: Alice B. CAPONONG
Douglas C. NISLEY

RD NO.:

REPORTS OFFICER: Wilma J. MARKWALTER/dml

PROJ.:

APPROVING OFFICER: Andrew K. REUTEMAN

S'CE CR.:

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

GYROSE

Source: Para 1. AMBUD-1 by letter dated 24 September from friend Melquia from Habana. Para 2. AMFAUNA-13 by SW message 11 dated 9 October, received by WAVE/Techs on 15 October. Legibility of message was somewhat impaired; the footnote stating that the vessels had discharged their cargo as signified by the (D) is confusing since the date of the message is earlier than the last expected date of arrival (19 Oct.)

Accompanying report are attached untranslated shipping documents entitled "Movement of Steamships in the Republic", for dates 5 through 16 August 1962, supplied by AMFAUNA-1, received 18 October 1962.

OPTIONAL. ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
Attachment: H/W Shipping Documents 4 - Headquarters w/mat & atts. 1 - OO/C 1 - File	

COUNTRY:

NO. OF ENCLOSURES:

NO. PAGES: 2

SUBJECT:

[illegible]

REFERENCES:

PADA:

APPR:

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DOI:

FORM 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
8-60

(20)

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	UFG-1759
SUBJECT	Soviet Merchant Vessels in Cuban Ports	DATE OF REPORT	25 October 1962
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	1 September - 19 October 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Cuba (24 September - 16 October 1962)		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Para 1: Leading official (C) in an anti-Castro group, from a Habana resident. Para 2: Cuban businessman (F). Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. From 1 to 10 September the following Soviet merchant vessels, transporting war materiel, arrived at the port of Isabela de Sagua:

KHIRUG VISHNEVSKY	9,600 tons
BELORETSK	8,700 tons
MICHURINSK	7,532 tons
VOLGOLES	4,345 tons
DVINOGORSK	7,838 tons
USOLYE	4,500 tons

2. The following merchant vessels arrived at the ports listed on the dates indicated, with the following cargo:

Ship	Date	Port of Origin	Tons	Cargo	
MARKX	2 Oct.	Habana	424	General Cargo	(D)
PAMIT	3 Oct.	Habana	446 1,094	Cattle also General Cargo	(D) (D)
ARKHANGELSK	3 Oct.	Habana	226	Trucks	(D)
REINHOLT	3 Oct.	Habana	3,400	Gral	(D)
MATOUBA	3 Oct.	HABANA	957	Potatoes	(D)

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

MATOURA	ID	ID	158	Grease	(D)
USOLYE	3 Oct.	Matanzas	5,000	Cement	(D)

TANKERS DUE TO ARRIVE FROM THE BLACK SEA

LISICHANSK	3 Oct.	Habana	231,000 (barrels)	Petroleum	(D)
DEUZHEA	8 Oct.	Habana	269,000 (barrels)	Petroleum	(D)
UKRAINY	9 Oct.	Habana	21,000 (barrels) also,	Petroleum	(D)
			9,500 (barrels) also,	Oil	(D)
			31,600 (barrels)	Gasoline	(D)
OCEAN EXPLORER	14 Oct.	Habana	170,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)
BAUSKA	10 Oct.	Habana	Cargo unknown		
LONDON PRESTIGE	14 Oct.	Santaigo de Cuba	171,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)
LENKORAN	7 Oct.	Habana	234,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)
ALDEBARAN	5 Oct.	Santiago de Cuba	143,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)

NOTE:

(D) Indicates that cargo was disembarked (unloaded).

DOMINGO 2-9-62

HABANA	[illegible]	1090	5	1559	7479	--	Gral.	D
NICARO	[illegible]	1073	2	1130	1400	--	nickel	C

HABANA	[illegible]	1975	3	0205	550 [illegible]	7	Gral.	D
HABANA	[illegible]	1050	5	[illegible]	[illegible]	--	arroz	D
HABANA	[illegible]	[illegible]	4	[illegible]	4	Superf.	Gral.	D
HABANA	[illegible]	2105	3	2055	[illegible]	--	Fert.	C
HABANA	FUNDADOR	[illegible]	3	2555	[illegible]	--	Fert.	C

SANTIAGO	[illegible]	[illegible]. 5	[illegible]	--		café	C
HABANA	[illegible]	6	[illegible]	--		Gral.	D
CIENFUEGOS	[illegible]	7	7097	--		Gral.	D
HABANA	[illegible]	7	[illegible]	--		Gral.	D
HABANA	[illegible]					[illegible]	
HABANA	[illegible]	9		--		Gral.	D
HABANA	[illegible]	9	[illegible]	--		Gral.	D
SANTIAGO	CARLA	9	[illegible]	--		arroz	D
NICARO	BAHIA [illegible]	[illegible]	240	--		nickel	C
HABANA	HABANA	13	2000	--		Gral.	D
HABANA	[illegible]	14	[illegible] hierro 500 arroz	800 conserv 534		Gral.	D

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Lunes [illegible]

[illegible] Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

Cienfuegos [illegible] 1029 4 [illegible] 51,000 Brrls. Gal.Motor

S. de Cuba [illegible] 1034 5 0700 100,000 " de P. Crudo

S. de Cuba ALDEBARAN 1048 148,000 " " " "

Habana [illegible] 1038 Ago.10 240,000 Brrls. P. Crudo

Habana O. PIONEER 1015 Ago. 6 174,000 " " "

Nicaro VLADIMIR 1069 Ago. 11 49,000 " " F. Oil
[illegible] 122,000 " " P. Crudo
[illegible] " " " "

FRUNZE 1070

L. SPI[illegible]

(Cargar)...Antilla [illegible] 1029 1,600,000 Glns. de Miel
Nuevitas " " 1,900,000 " " "

I.de Sagua [illegible] 1050 [illegible],400,000 " " "

Nuevitas " " [illegible]00,000 " " "

[illegible] 6 Y 12

HABANA	[illegible]	7 1958	[illegible]	[illegible]	--	[illegible] D
HABANA	[illegible]	[illegible]7	[illegible]	[illegible]	--	pulpa rayón D
HABANA	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	122 2500	-- --	ajo D cebolla D
CIENFUEGOS	[illegible]	Ago. 8		7097	--	arroz D
HABANA	[illegible]	Ago. 8		[illegible]	--	Gral. D
HABANA	CABO [illegible]	"		[illegible]	--	mantequilla D
HABANA	[illegible]					
SANTIAGO	[illegible]	"		[illegible]	"	arroz D
HABANA	[illegible]	"		[illegible]	--	Gral. D
HABANA	[illegible]	"		[illegible]	--	Gral. D
NICARO	BAHIA DE [illegible]	Ago. 13		[illegible]	--	nickel [illegible]
HABANA	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	--	Gral. [illegible]
HABANA	[illegible]	" 13		[illegible]	--	Gral. D
HABANA	[illegible]	" 13		245	--	ganado D

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

S. de Cuba [illegible] 1048 2 0730 140,000 Brrls. P. Crudo

S. de Cuba [illegible] 1034 5 0700 100,000 " " "

Cienfuegos KRASNOVODSK 1029 5 1430 53,000 Brrls. C. Motor

Nuevitas JACOB 1052 Ago. 7 [illegible] hrs. 700,000 [illegible] Mieles

" Antilla THORSOY 1019 1,[illegible]00,000 " "
" Nuevitas " " 1,500,000 " "

Habana [illegible] 1099 Ago. 1[illegible] 122,000 Brrls. P. Crudo

Antilla VLADIMIR 1069 Ago. 11 49,000 " " Oil
551,500 [illegible] Amoniaco Liq.

L. SPIRIT 1075 Ago. 13

[illegible] 1070 " "

Habana [illegible] 1050 Ago. 11 240,000 Brrls. de P. Crudo

S. de Cuba [illegible] 1097 Ago. 11 0000 hr. 124,000 " " " "

Habana [illegible] 1015 174,000 " " "

[illegible]

Cesión de Buques Tanques, Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol.

Habana [illegible] 9500 75,000 Brls. C. Oil

(Carga...) Nuevitas JACOB 1955 7 1300 [illegible]00,000 Gls. de Mieles

S. de Cuba [illegible] 1954 7 9730 100,500 Brls. de P. Crudo

(Carga)... Antilla [illegible] 1955 1,500,000 Gls. de Mieles
Nuevitas " 1,900,000 " " "

S. de Cuba VASSILEVA [illegible] Ago. 11 124,000 Brls. de P. Crudo

Habana [illegible] " 16 237,000 " " " "

Habana [illegible] [illegible] " 16 122,000 " " " "

Nicaro [illegible] [illegible] " 11 149,000 " " F. Oil
551,500 Kgs. de Amoniaco Liq.

Habana C. PIONEER [illegible] " 6 174,000 Brls. de P. Crudo

Habana LUGANSK [illegible] " 11 240,000 " " " "

[illegible] [illegible]

Lunes 8 13 62

Sección de Buques Tanques, Petroleo, Mieles y Alcohol

	Habana	LUGANSK	11	240,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
	S. de Cuba	VASSILIKI	11	124,000 " " "
(Cabotaje)	Nuevitas	KRASNOVODSK	19	56,330.28 Brrs de Gas Oil Carga tomada en la Habana
	Nicaro	VLADIMIR	11	49,000 Brrls de Fuel Oil 551,500 Kls Amoniaco
(Cabotaje)	Cienfuegos	KRASNOVODSK	14/8/62	20,000 Brrls de Gas Oil Carga tomada en la Habana
		L. SPIRIT		
	Habana	MIR	18/8/62	267,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
	Nuevitas Habana	CHERNOVCI "	18/8/62	36,000 Brrls de [illegible]
		G. GARIBALDI	22/8/62	
	S. de Cuba	TRUD	22/8/62	
	Habana	BAUSKA	16/8/62	122,000 Brrls Petróleo Cru

- -

(Cargar)	Antilla	SHORSOY	1,600.000 Glns de Mieles
"	Nuevitas	"	1,100.000 " "
			800,000 " "

Lunes 8.13 62

Sección Carga General

Matanzas	TROLLEHOLM	8	592	rayón	D
Habana	[illegible]	10	8956	Gral	D
Santiago	[illegible]	9	8500	arroz	D
Habana	OLBRATT	12	1800 Hierro, 800 Conservas 500 arroz, 531 Gral		D
Habana	CAMAGUEY	13	245	Ganado y Correo	D
Habana	[illegible]	11	2000	Gral	D
Habana	GOLFO DI NAPOLI	12	10160	Cemento	D
Santiago	KORDUN	11	462	café	C
Habana	OLGA	10	10,161	Gral	D
Habana	LUBEN KARAVELOV	12	5,754	Gral	D
Habana	CHILEAN REEFER	13	1,731	Gral	D
Habana	SAINT JAMES	13	5,083	papel	D
Habana	GLORIA	14	10201	Gral	D
[illegible]	[illegible] MAESTRA	14	4778	Gral	D
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Gral	D
Habana	BUCCANERO	14	2000	papas	D
Habana	HELGA WITT	14	5000	Superfósfato	D
Habana	ATLANTIC GLADIATOR	15	12915	Sulfato	D
Habana	BIRTE OLDENDORFF	16	5300	Gral	D
Habana	ROTTE	17	11425	arroz	D

Martes 8-14-62

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

(Cargar)	S de Cuba	N. [illegible]ICO	18/8/62		Mieles
"	Cienfuegos	" "			"
	Nuevitas	CHERNOVCI ~~[illegible]~~	18/8/62	36,000	Bbls de Gasolina
	Habana			19,300	" " Aceite de Aviación
				9,606	" " " Vapor
	S de Cuba	[illegible]		54,000	" " 7. Crudo
	Matanzas	"			Amoniaco
	Habana	MIR	18/8/62	267,000	" " 7. Crudo
	Habana	G.GARIBALDI		209,000	" "
	S. de Cuba	TRUD		162,000	" "
	Habana	BAUSKA		122,000	" "
	S. De Cuba	L. SPIRIT	23/8/62	110,000	" "

Jueves 8 16 62

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

	Cienfuegos	KRASSVODOSK	15	20,00 Tnls ~~Brrls de~~ Gas-Oil
(Cargar)	I. de Sagua	CHERNOVCI	29	7,000.000 Ltrs. Alcohol

****

S. De Cuba Cienfuegos	[illegible]		Mieles "
Antilla			

- -

Habana	BAUSKA	22	122,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
Habana	MIR	18	267,000 " "
Habana	G. GARIBALDI	22	209,000 " "
Habana	PEKIN	22	196,000 " "
S. de Cuba	TRUD	22	162,000 " "
S. de Cuba	M. SPIRIT	23	110,000 " "
Habana	RABARUSKAYA (SU)	28	78,000 " "
S. de Cuba Guantánamo	FRUNZE "	29	54,000 " " 546 Tons de Amoniaco
Habana	CHERNOVCE	20	19,300 Brrs Aceite Aviación 9,606 " " Vapor
Nuevitas	"	20	36,000 " Gasolina

Jueves 6 16 62

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

	Cienfuegos	KRASSVODOSK	15	20,00 Tns ~~Brrls de~~ Gas-Oil
(Cargar)	I. de Sagua	CHERNOVCI	29	7,000.000 Ltrs. Alcohol

****

S. De Cuba Cienfuegos	M RINELLA D. [illegible] "	19	Mieles "
Antilla Nuevitas	THORSOY "	15	" "
Habana	BAUSKA	22	122,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
Habana	MIR	18	267,000 " "
Habana	G. GARIBALDI	22	209,000 " "
Habana	PEKIN	22	196,000 " "
S. de Cuba	TRUD	22	162,000 " "
S. de Cuba	LE SPIRIT	23	110,000 " "
Habana	RABANUSKAYA([illegible])	28	
S. de Cuba Guantánamo	FRUNZE "	29	54,000 " " 546 Tons de Amoniaco
Habana	CHERNOVCÉ	20	19,300 Brrs Aceite Aviació 9,606 " " Vapor
Nuevitas	"	20	36,000 " Gasolina

6537

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: CAS 8 (CAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1450 9 DEC/LMS)
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, RI/AN, WH 7, CC 8, VR

SECRET 091900Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7003 9 Dec 63 IN 78536

TYPIC COMMO

1. REQUEST PRITY POA TO INCLUDE COMMO TRAINING FOR MARIA (VALDES) HERNANDEZ, SINGLE, D/O LUCAS AND JULIA, DPOB 22 JULY 29, MATANZAS, RESIDING MAZON NUMBER 163 HAVANA.

2. (VALDES) EMPLOYED AS STATISTICIAN MINISTRY HEALTH AND WELFARE HAVANA. SHE SCHEDULED RETURN CUBA CA 09 DEC FROM MEXI WHERE RECENTLY COMPLETED LENGTHY STUDIES PROGRAM UNDER AUSPICES WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.

3. NO MEXI TRACES. INDEX.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/SAS 5 (WE AND SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT [illegible] 13 DEC 63)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/WH [illegible], C/FI [illegible], CA [illegible]

S E C R E T 131[illegible]Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7373

RYBAT TYPIC KEYWAY VASLOUCH

13 Dec 63 IN 80239

REF MEXI 7359 (IN 7[illegible])

DIR 88855

DIR 88858

C/S COMMENT: [illegible] SERVICED.
C/S COMMENT: **VASLOUCH-2 CALL STATION [illegible] DEC ON DIFFICULTY WITH MEXICAN CUSTOMS ON BAGGAGE.

1. STATION OFFICER ACCOMPANIED VASLOUCH-2 AGAIN TO AIRPORT MORNING 13 DEC. AFTER ROUTINE DELAY ADMITTED TO AIR CARGO AREA. DOCTOR'S CASE INSPECTED. THIS TIME TWO BOTTOM STUDS ONLY WERE MISSING. VASLOUCH-2 HAD INSPECTED DAY PREVIOUSLY AND FOUND THREE OF FOUR MISSING. NOTE THAT FIRST INSPECTION WAS IN ANOTHER BUILDING. CONSEQUENTLY BETWEEN TIME VASLOUCH-2 SAW BAG 12 DEC AND 1030 MORNING SOMEONE HAD INSERTED ONE MISSING STUD. GOOD. VASLOUCH-2 SAYS SHE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN SHE NOT MISTAKEN CONCERNING ABOVE.

2. DOCTOR'S BAG AND OTHER FIVE PIECES REMOVED FROM CARGO AREA BUT WERE NOT PASSED BY BUILDING DOOR INSPECTOR WHO INSISTED ON OPENING ALL SIX PIECES. VASLOUCH-2 PROTESTED. CHARGE HER LOCAL EMBASSY CONTACTED AND HE SPOKE ON TELEPHONE TO CUSTOMS OFFICIAL TO NO AVAIL. VASLOUCH-2 THEN SAW CHIEF AIRPORT CUSTOMS WHO REITERATED FACT THAT PARCELS WOULD BE INSPECTED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

UNLESS LOCAL EMBASSY OBTAINED FREE ENTRY. STATED REASON WAS BAGGAGE ARRIVED "DESTINATION MEXICO" RATHER THAN "IN TRANSIT". CUSTOMS CHIEF REFUSED RECONSIDER EVEN AFTER OFFER OF BRIBE BY VASLOUCH-2.

3. BY THIS TIME PRACTICALLY EVERY CARGO AND CUSTOMS OFFICIAL AIRPORT AWARE OF SITUATION AND OF ASSISTANCE BEING GIVEN VASLCUCH-2 BY STATION OFFICER WHOSE KUBARK FACE WAS GROWING LESS AND LESS FINNISH.

4. PARCELS WERE RETURNED AIR CARGO STORAGE AREA. ALL INCLUDING DOCTOR'S BAG WERE FIRMLY BANDED. VASLCUCH-2 THEN TURNED OVER PAPERS TO LOCAL EMBASSY WHICH WILL OBTAIN FREE ENTRY AND KEEP ALL PARCELS MEXI. VASLCUCH-1 WILL TRAVEL MEXI SOON AFTER 7 JAN TO RECOVER THEM. CONSEQUENTLY STATION WILL NOT HAVE ACCESS TO DOCTOR'S BAG UNTIL THAT DATE.

5. VASLCUCH-2 TALKED TO VASLCUCH-1 AFTERNOON 12 DEC. LATTER INSISTED SHE RETURN PERUVIAN FLIGHT 13 DEC AS HER EMPLOYERS WERE PROTESTING TARDY ARRIVAL.

THIS COMBINED WITH VASLCUCH-2 FEAR THAT DOCTOR'S BAG HAS BEEN TAMPERED WITH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE PERSUADE HER REMAIN MEXI LONGER. SHE PLANS DEPART 13 DEC IF FLIGHT LEAVES. IT NOW CONFIRMED AS DELAYED AND MAY NOT DEPART UNTIL 14 DEC.

6. LAST FIRM STATION CONTACT WITH VASLCUCH-2 IS AT 1400 LOCAL 13 DECEMBER. CANNOT PROMISE ANY INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE FROM HQS WILL REACH HER VIA STATION AFTER THAT HOUR.

7. REGRET THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND FACT THAT RS-48 WILL BE HELD (IF IT STILL IN DOCTOR'S CASE) FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES FELT FURTHER STATION INVOLVEMENT AND MORE PRECIPITOUS ACTION CONSTITUTED UNACCEPTABLE SECURITY RISK.

S E C R E T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3X SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WE 6
INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, O/OA, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 142235Z
DIR INFO STOC CITE MEXI 7384
KEYWAY PBRUMEN TICRYSTAL
REF DIR 84498 *

IN 80448

LETTERS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO: ANGEL GUADALUPE RIVERA, HAMBURGO 72, DEPT. 302, MEXICO, D.F.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED MEXI PROVIDE LETTER DROP FOR TICRYSTAL-1.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

WH 8

CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, VR

ECRET 171636Z

IORITY TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7416 17Dec63IN82479

F DIR 89728

1. AT 16 DEC MTG SVLUCK/1 SAID WIFE WROTE SHE ARRIVING MERIDA 23 C BY AIR AND WILL COME ON MEXI CITY SPEND XMAS WITH HIM. HE LIEVES SHE BRINGING CHILDREN AND WANTS GO MERIDA MEET HER.

. S/1 REQUESTED 150 DOLLARS IN VIEW WIFE'S VISIT AND TO PURCHASE NTA CLAUS FOR CHILDREN. ALSO MENTIONED XMAS BONUS BUT DID NOT ESS POINT.

3. REQUEST TEGU DECISION ON AMOUNT BE GIVEN S/1. ALL PAYMENTS RE WILL BE MADE IN PESOS.

. S/1 ASSIGNED BY PARTY LEADERS HERE LIVE ALONE IN HOME OF LIODORINA GARCIA, PCM MEMBER, CALLE NO. 17, COLONIA MONTEZUMA. RCIA IS DIRECTOR OF NEARBY SCHOOL WHERE FIVE PCM MEMBERS TEMPORARIL ARTERED. S/1'S WIFE AND CHILDREN WILL LIVE WITH HIM AT ABOVE DRESS WHILE MEXI.

. NEXT OP MTG WITH S/1 SCHEDULED 20 DEC.

ECRET

C/S COMMENT: REQUESTED INFO ON PRESENT STATUS SVLUCK/1 IN MEXICO AND OUTLOOK FOR NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET

[illegible]

TO: MEXI MANILA HONG KONG

[illegible]

TO: [illegible] MEXI [illegible] 00781

[illegible] 1923, [illegible] MEXICO CITY C. 1950-55 [illegible] JAPAN, [illegible] MANILA, [illegible] 1956-62

NO OBJECTION [illegible] LIAISON CHECKS PROVIDE NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST [illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/3
[illegible] Bart
[illegible] Aikan
[illegible] Sweet
[illegible] GW Stair
C/[illegible] W. Weston
[illegible] Carl Wilson

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

[illegible] 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SEE BELOW

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

ROUTING

ACOP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WE 4, NE 9, FE 6, WH 7, VR

INFO

CITE DIR

PARI BONN STOC HELSINKI COPE [redacted] ROME
[illegible] LOND [illegible] VIEN GNVA BERN ATHE
[illegible] PRAN [illegible] SUBA TOKY ANKA TEHR
[illegible] [illegible] KARU KARA MEXI BUEN MOSC
[illegible]
LOND BRUS HAGU [redacted]

100

[illegible]

REF: DIR 50553

1. FOLLOWING POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS ON CURRENT SOVIET ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. AS NOTED REF, THESE INTENDED AS OPERATIONAL AID FOR ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION SOVIETS, AND AS MEANS SOW DOUBT RE REGIMES ABILITY DEAL WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT USE ALL THESE BUT SELECT THOSE APPROPRIATE FOR OWN USE. REPORT RESULTS CONTACTS VIA OPS CHANNELS. HQS WILL SCREEN FOR VALUE [illegible].

2. WESTERN PRESS (REUTERS VIENNA 16 NOV) REPORTED STRIKE BY WORKERS KRIVOI ROG. REASONS WERE BREAD SHORTAGE AND DEMAND FOR WAGE INCREASES [illegible] RISING FOOD COSTS. SINCE NO ANNOUNCEMENTS FOOD PRICE INCREASES TO DATE, ARE THEY BEING RAISED SECRETLY? WHAT ITEMS AFFECTED? BREAD PRICES BEING INCREASED? HOW MUCH? AS MUCH AS THIRTY PERCENT RISE MEAT PRICES LAST YEAR? IF PRICES BEING RAISED, IS FAILURE MAKE THIS PUBLIC RELATED GOVERNMENT FEARS RIOTS SUCH AS LAST YEAR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE TWO

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 91660

NOVOCHERKASSK WHEN MEAT AND MILK PRICES INCREASED?

3. KHRUSHCHEV IN [illegible] SPEECH SAID GRAIN CROP TWENTY PERCENT BELOW LAST YEAR BUT MEAT SUPPLIES UP. IS LATTER RESULT EXTENSIVE [illegible] SLAUGHTERING LIVESTOCK IN VIEW SEVERE FODDER SHORTAGE? KHRUSHCHEV ALSO SAID MILK PRODUCTION DOWN THIS YEAR. DOES THIS INDICATE EVEN MILK COWS BEING SLAUGHTERED DUE FODDER SHORTAGE?

4. IF FODDER IN SUCH SHORT SUPPLY WIDESPREAD SLAUGHTERING NECESSARY, WILL SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOLLOW HUNGARY EXAMPLE AND BUY FEED GRAINS ABROAD, IN ADDITION WHEAT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION?

5. KHRUSHCHEV SAID SOVIET CITIZENS STARVED 1947 WHILE GRAIN BEING EXPORTED, PRESUMABLY TO PAY FOR IMPORTS MACHINERY AND OTHER CAPITAL GOODS. COULD SITUATION BECOME THAT SERIOUS THIS YEAR? HAS OR WILL SOVIET GOVERNMENT PUT MORATORIUM ON ALL FOOD SHIPMENTS ABROAD, OR WILL IT CONTINUE SHIP FOOD EASTERN EUROPE AND CUBA AS IN PAST YEARS WHETHER HARVEST GOOD OR BAD?

6. WESTERN PRESS (REUTERS VIENNA 10 NOV) REPORTED SOVIET [illegible] ODESSA REFUSED LOAD BUTTER FOR CUBA. HAVE SUCH SHIPMENTS BEEN STOPPED? KHRUSHCHEV SAID SUGAR SUPPLIES DOWN THIS YEAR IN USSR. SINCE USSR NORMALLY BUYS CUBAN

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

PAGE THREE

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

INFO

CITE DIR - 91660

[illegible] WILL [illegible] AS CALLED CONTINUE FOOD SHIPMENTS CUBA IN EXCHANGE REGARDLESS [illegible] AT HOME? [illegible] FOOD USSR HAS SENT FOOD PRODUCING EQUIPMENT [illegible] CUBA. WILL THESE SHIPMENTS CONTINUE OR WILL GOODS BE DIVERTED [illegible] NEW AGRICULTURAL EFFORT?

[illegible] CHEMICAL PROGRAM WILL BE TREMENDOUS DRAIN ON SOVIET ECONOMY, [illegible] SOVIET MILITARY POWER OR SLACKENING ECONOMIC GROWTH. THEREFORE WILL NOT CONSUMPTION SECTOR BEAR BRUNT THIS INVESTMENT? SINCE INVESTMENT PROGRAM (FERTILIZER, INSECTICIDES, HERBICIDES) LARGELY [illegible] FOOD AND FIBER PRODUCTION, AND [illegible] TALKED OF INCREASING FOOD AND CLOTHING PRODUCTION THROUGH CHEMICAL PROGRAM, WILL NOT MUCH OF BURDEN INVESTMENT FALL ON HOUSING, ONLY [illegible] CONSUMPTION SECTOR REMAINING? WILL NOT HOUSING CONSTRUCTION BE CUT SHARPLY OR ALMOST HALTED? BESIDES WILL NOT HOUSING PROBLEM BE INTENSIFIED BY INFLUX WORKERS TO MAN NEW CHEMICAL FACTORIES, MANY OF WHICH [illegible] OF AREAS WHERE LITTLE HOUSING NOW AVAILABLE?

8. IS KHRUSHCHEV DEMAND FOR CREDIT FROM WEST TO FINANCE INVESTMENT PROGRAM INDICATION SOVIET GOLD RESERVES AT MINIMUM LEVELS? IS THERE EFFORT IMPROVE MINING METHODS OR FIND NEW GOLD DEPOSITS TO PAY FOR MASSIVE IMPORTS?

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

DIRECTOR

PAGE FOUR

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

CITE DIR 97660

9. IF USSR RECEIVES LONG TERM CREDITS FROM WEST FOR CHEMICAL [illegible] AND [illegible] [illegible], WHAT MEASURES BE TAKEN PAY BACK LOANS? WILL INVESTMENTS BE SOUGHT, [illegible] [illegible] OTHER SOLUTION AT HAND?

10. PRIVATE PLOTS OF FARM WORKERS MOST PRODUCTIVE PART SOVIET AGRICULTURE, [illegible] ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT THEREIN WOULD RESULT LARGEST GAIN FOOD SUPPLY. WILL [illegible] FERTILIZER PRODUCED BE SOLD PEASANTS FOR USE ON PLOTS?

11. SOVIET GOVERNMENT MUST REALIZE FROM NEP PERIOD AND WESTERN EXPERIENCE, PLUS EXAMPLE OF [illegible] PRIVATE PLOTS SINCE 1930s THAT GIVING LAND TO PEASANTS WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY ASSURE ENOUGH FOOD FOR SOVIET POPULATION. NEITHER POLITICAL [illegible] IS NOT ANOTHER REASON THIS NOT BEING DONE FEAR OF [illegible] [illegible] CRISIS SUCH AS OCCURRED DURING NEP PERIOD. THIS INFLATION WOULD RESULT FROM OVERPRODUCTION ON FARMS, FOR WHICH NO CONSUMERS GOODS TO EXCHANGE? IS NOT STAGNANT AGRICULTURE AND POOR PEASANTRY ONE WAY HOLD DOWN DEMAND FOR CONSUMERS [illegible], WHICH [illegible] IN [illegible] [illegible], AND TO CONCENTRATE ON MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION WITHOUT EXCESSIVE INFLATIONARY PRESSURE? [illegible] [illegible] AGRICULTURE, WOULD SOVIET GOVERNMENT REALLY WANT PROSPEROUS PEASANTRY, [illegible] [illegible] MILITARY POWER, FOREIGN AMBITIONS, ECONOMIC GROWTH?

[illegible] INCOME TEACHERS AND DOCTORS TOO LOW AND MOST

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

TO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

PAGE FIVE

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

INFO

CITE DIR 91660

[illegible] INCREASED. AGRICULTURAL WORKERS LOWEST PAID IN SOVIET UNION. DOES NOT GOVERNMENT ALSO BELIEVE THEIR INCOMES TOO LOW AND MUST BE INCREASED?

13. CHEMICAL PROGRAM LATEST IN LONG SERIES PANACEAS, INCLUDING NEW LANDS, [illegible] PROGRAM, PLAN TO CATCH UP TO U. S. IN MEAT AND MILK OUTPUT, FALLOW LAND PLOW UP PROGRAM AND OTHERS, ALL OF WHICH FAILED. EACH PROMISED ASSURE ABUNDANCE IN FUTURE. WILL SOVIET PEOPLE BE WILLING WAIT AGAIN, THIS TIME TILL 1970, WHILE LATEST PANACEA TESTED, OR THEIR PATIENCE AND HOPE EXHAUSTED? DO THEY BELIEVE GOVERNMENT SERIOUS IN PUTTING FORTH PROGRAM, OR THEY THINK IT JUST ANOTHER ATTEMPT BY REGIME GAIN TIME IN HOPE PROBLEM SOMEHOW DISAPPEAR?

14. MUCH OF SOVIET UNION TOO DRY FOR EFFECTIVE FERTILIZER UTILIZATION, ESPECIALLY GRAIN AREAS. WILL CONCOMITANT INVESTMENT IRRIGATION BE MADE SO FERTILIZER, IF AND WHEN PRODUCED, BE EFFECTIVELY USED? WHERE WILL INVESTMENT FUNDS FOR THIS COME FROM?

15. IN PLENUM SPEECH KHRUSHCHEV ONCE MORE TURNED TO LYSENKO AS EXAMPLE SCIENTIFIC PRACTITIONER. DOES THIS MEAN LYSENKO AND HIS THEORIES, COMPLETELY DISCREDITED BY AGRICULTURAL SCIENTISTS EVERYWHERE OUTSIDE BLOC, CONTINUE HAVE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ [illegible] IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR

PAGE SIX

INFO

CITE DIR

GREAT INFLUENCE IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE EVEN IN TIME OF CRISIS?

11. [illegible] SHOULD BE [illegible] ONLY IN THOSE [illegible]

[illegible] FAMILIAR TYUTCHEV.

END OF MESSAGE

IN DRAFT:

(CSR/CI - Mr. [illegible] Hailey
(CSR/CS - Mr. James Dorson
(CSR/CS - Mr. Hugh Montgomery
(SR/DR - Mr. A. S. Valvada
(LE - Mr. George Allman
([illegible] - Mr. Orvis Magill
(UT - Mr. Paul F. Paxton
(WE - Mr. Tom Thiele
([illegible] - Mr. Walter L. O'Brien
● [illegible]/PROT [illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CSR/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

EE 6

CI/CA, CCS 3, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 202235Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7479

OXASSAY LPSHRINX

REF: MEXI 7400 (IN 85135)

IDEN IS MR. GEORGE STEERS.

S E C R E T

20 [illegible] 85191

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: [illegible] 8

INFO: [illegible], ADDP, [illegible]/L, DDS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, [illegible] / [illegible], WE 4, WH, [illegible], AD/CI 2, AD/[illegible], AD, [illegible] 3, [illegible]

TDCS

S E C R E T 210302 DEC 21 0142 63 IN 85247

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7480

INTEL TYPIC DUSIGNET

REF DIR [illegible]

SUPDATA SOURCE DUSIGNET FROM ITALIAN AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS TO CUBA, CUBAN MERCHANTS AND SUGAR EXPERTS

FILED 21/0235Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM-8185 SUBJECT EFFORTS OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO INITIATE COMMERCIAL BARTER WITH WEST EUROPEAN CONTRIES DOI DEC 63 PADA MEXICO MEXICO CITY 20 DEC 63 APP 3 SOURCE WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESSMAN WHO TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO CUBA WHERE HIS COMPANY MAINTAINS COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TO PORT [illegible] HAS BEEN MADE [illegible] PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING TECH:
DATE DISTRIBUTED:
BASED ON:
LIAISON:

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY

REPORT NO. TDCS

SUBJECT

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCES IN 5524[illegible]

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS RESULTING FROM EXPROPRIATIONS MADE FROM CERTAIN WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESS INTERESTS. THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE IS TRYING TO INTEREST WEST GERMANY, ITALY AND FRANCE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES SO THAT A FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE WILL PREVAIL AT THE TIME OF THE COMPLETION OF THE SUGAR CROP HARVEST, IN MARCH 1964, WHEN THE COMMODITY IS NORMALLY MARKETED. NEGOTIATIONS FOR REPARATIONS ARE TAKING FORM IN CUBAN OFFERS TO SELL TOBACCO AT DISCOUNT PRICES.

2. IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO OBTAIN

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OSI OO

STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

RELEASING

FERTILIZER, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS IN EXCHANGE FOR SUGAR ON A STRAIGHT BARTER DEAL. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTS A BIGGER CROP IN 1964 WHICH, IF SOLD AT THE AVERAGE WORLD PRICE OF 8 CENT A POUND (US CURRENCY), SHOULD PRODUCE ABOUT 800 MILLION DOLLARS (US) IN CREDITS.

3. FIELD COMMENT. SOURCE SAID THAT EXAMINATION OF THE CROP CONFIRMS THAT IT IS ONE OF THE BEST CUBA HAS HAD IN YEARS.

4. FIELD DISSEM STATE ECON CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Mr. Wainwright:swk
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 17 April 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : GENEVA BERN MADRID ROME PARIS

AMLASH/1

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 3, VR

17 APR 64 18 08z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO GNVA INFO BERN MADR ROME PARI CITE DIR 15094

DESENSITIZED PBRUMEN AMWHIP

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AMWHIP-1 PROCEED GNVA.

REF: GNVA 6486 (IN 62186) (not sent ROME PARI)*

1. RE PARA 2 REF, AMWHIP/1 (IDEN) UNABLE LEAVE NEW YORK PRIOR 24-25 APRIL. HAS MINIMUM THREE DAY PRTY KUBARK BUSINESS PARIS. WILL TRY EXPEDITE BUT DOUBT AMWHIP/1 AVAILABLE GNVA BEFORE 30 APRIL. WOULD HOPE THEREFORE ROME CAN ASK AMWHIP/2 BE AVAILABLE FOR ASSISTANCE, PRIOR A/1 ARRIVAL.

2. FOR PARIS. WILL COMMENT SUBSEQUENT TRAFFIC RE ARRIVAL AND USE AMWHIP/1 FOR PARIS BUSINESS RE CARRILLO AND ROBRENO.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SA/EOB ________
WE/5/C RC Loeb
WE/3 ________
WE/4 ________
EE/SA/S ________
WH/SA/SO/NS ________

W H O'Brien
~~BRONSON TWEEDY~~
D C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

12-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-252234

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : Mr. Wainwright:svk
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 17 April 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

17 APR 64 18 08z

TO : GENEVA BERN MADRID ROME PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 3, VR

NOB CS SB AR CA

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO GNVA INFO BERN MADR ROME PARI CITE DIR

15093

DESENSITIZED PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: DIR 15094 *

IDEN IS CARLOS (TEPEDINO) GONZALEZ, AGE 38 (LOOKS 45), 5'8", 170 LBS. MOUSTACHE, ROUND, FULL, KIND-LOOKING FACE, THINNING, GRAYING BLACK HAIR COMBED STRAIGHTE BACK, BOW-LEGGED.

END OF MESSAGE

* Cable Sec: PLEASE REF ATTACHED CABLE.

WH/SA/EOB
WE/5/C RC
WE/3
WE/4
EE/SA/S
WH/SA/SO/NS

BRONSON TWEEDY
DC/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

17-4

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-252234

734

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 29 NOV 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 29 0152Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 26114

PRITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE PARI 4521 IN26114

GYROSE

RE PARI 4520 (IN 26113)

IDEN:

NORMAND POULIN

C/O U S EMBASSY

APO 230

NEW YORK, N Y

END OF MESSAGE

C/WE/3 ✓	C/IIO
DC/WE/3	PA
Reports	Labor
C/EYO ✓	FCP
Liaison	Prop
3rd Country ✓	Press
CE	Support

29 NOV 1962

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

2nd December, 1963

from [illegible]
[illegible]
Service

Dear J.

Subject: Jack RUBENSTEIN
Your RJ 2995 of Nov. 29, 63
and further to our tele com.
of Dec. 1st.

The only Jack RUBENSTEIN known to have arrived in ISRAEL during 1962 stated that he is a native of POLAND, born 1905 and a resident of NEW-YORK.

He arrived on May 17 and departed on June 7, accompanied by his wife Mimi.

K.

ORIG : D. [illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 6153
DATE : 21 NOV. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

22 Nov 63 21 58z

TO : MULTI - ADDRESSEE CABLE SEE BELOW

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 6

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE 4, WE 4, NE 4, FE 6, WH 7, ~~VR~~, (POUCH FRAN 9, BONN 5, BRLN 5, [illegible] 5, ATHE 6, ALL OTHER STA'S 3)

SAS CEN
~~DEFERRED~~

☒ ROUTINE

CITE DIR 65387

MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE

PERUMEN ZRPRIMA

LOND PARI BRUS HAGU COPE STOC OSLO MADR

ROME

CABLE SEC: (PLS POUCH CABLE TO FOLLOWING:) (WRENCH POUCH)

FRAN 7 FROB BONN 5 HAMB BRLN MUNI 5 VIEN ATHE 6

BERN GNVA CAIR BEIR TEHE TELA RIOD SAOP

MEXI MRID SAGO MONT BUEN CARA LAPA LIMA

QUIT GUAT SNTO MELB TOKY HONG WAVE BARC

HELS LISB MILA OTTA TRIE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : D. RONIS:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 8153
DATE : 21 NOV. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-47

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

12-61

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

22 Nov 63 17 03 z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO : CERTAIN STATIONS AND BASES

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

TO MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE INFO CITE DIR 85387

RERUMEN ZRPRIMA

REF: DIR 22218

1. RECENTLY CONCLUDED HQS REVIEW OF ZRPRIMA[1] PROGRAM SHOWS THAT KUBARK[2] EFFORTS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ANY SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND CONTINUATION OF PROGRAM AS SUCH NO LONGER WARRANTED. MAIN REASON FOR KUBARK[2] FAILURE IS THAT CUBAN TECHNICIAN RECRUITING PROGRAM HAS BEEN MISERABLE FAILURE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST FIDEL'S ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF 2000 TECHS FROM WESTERN EUROPE ALONE. THOUGH OUR FIGURES NOT COMPLETE, WE ESTIMATE PROBABLY LESS THAN FIFTY CANDIDATES HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL AND WE ABLE CONFIRM ABOUT TEN WHO HAVE ACTUALLY MADE IT TO THE ISLAND. KUBARK[2] SUCCEEDED IN INSERTING ABOUT THIRTY RECRUITED TECHS INTO THE VARIOUS HIRING CHANNELS, BUT SO FAR ONLY TWO HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL FROM HAVA.

2. CUBAN FAILURE TO RECRUIT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS APPEARS DUE LARGELY TO RELUCTANCE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS PURSUE TECH RECRUITING MISSION AGGRESSIVELY, BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE IN HAVANA, FEAR OF INFILTRATION OF HOSTILE AGENTS

CONT...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

AND PROBABLE LOSS OF INTEREST IN THE PROGRAM ON PART OF CASTRO HIMSELF. THESE FACTORS WHICH EMERGE FROM OUR STUDY OF THE CUBAN PERFORMANCE ACCOUNT FOR LACK OF RESPONSE FROM EMBASSIES TO APPLICATIONS, LONG DELAY IN GETTING WORD BACK FROM HAVANA AND SMALL NUMBER OF TECHS ULTIMATELY HIRED. LONG TIME LAG BETWEEN INITIAL APPLICATION AND ULTIMATE APPROVAL FROM HAVA, WHICH RUNS SIX TO NINE MONTHS, HAS COST CUBANS NUMBER OF TECHS WHO WERE INITIALLY EAGER BUT SUBSEQUENTLY LOST INTEREST OR TOOK OTHER JOBS.

3. IN FACE OF FOREGOING WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE TO CONTINUE INTENSIVE SEARCH FOR ZRPRIMA CANDIDATES FOR INSERTION INTO CUBAN HIRING CHANNEL. WISH STRESS STATIONS WITH ACTIVE LEADS SHOULD STAY WITH THEM IN THE HOPE THEY MAY STILL BE HIRED, BUT CEASE EFFORTS TO GENERATE LEADS FROM SCRATCH. ON OTHER HAND, THERE ARE FAIR NUMBER NON BLOC TECHS IN CUBA AND IT LIKELY CUBANS WILL CONTINUE TO HIRE NEEDED TECHS ON LIMITED SELECTIVE BASIS AS THEY DID PRIOR TO ZRPRIMA PROGRAM. STATIONS THEREFORE ARE URGED TO CONTINUE BE ALERT FOR SUCH OPPORTUNITIES AND TO EXPLOIT THEM IN SAME MANNER AS ALL OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO PLACE RESIDENT AGENTS IN CUBA.

CONT...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CABLE MESSAGE

SECRET

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT MOST PBRUMEN[3] OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECRUITING TECHS TEND TO RELY HEAVILY ON LOCAL CP STAMP OF APPROVAL OR OTHER STRONG INDICATION THAT CANDIDATE IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. LACKING THIS THEY MAY EITHER IGNORE THE APPLICATION OR REJECT IT.

4. RESPONSE OF MOST STATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING ZRPRIMA[1] HAS BEEN MOST GRATIFYING. WE PROVIDED CUBANS WITH GOOD NUMBER HIGHLY QUALIFIED ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS WHICH THEY FOR REASONS CITED UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ACCEPT. KUBARK[2] HAS MADE A RESPECTABLE EFFORT TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY AND FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS IS MERELY REFLECTION CUBAN CONFUSION AND INEPTITUDE WITH RESULTANT FAILURE ACHIEVE THEIR OWN GOALS.

5. DISCONTINUE USE ZRPRIMA[1] SLUG AND FILE 200-120-47.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Cable pre-dates CS files. Copy may be seen in CIA reference file.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

P A G E F O U R

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE 35387

SAS/EOB [illegible]

SAS/EOB [illegible]

WE/5 R C Loebe

C/WE Thomas F. Thiele

SC/EE [illegible]

C/WE/[illegible] [illegible]

C/EE W. Hood

C/FE [illegible]

[illegible] 100/17

WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
C/[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible]

INFO: [illegible], C/WH 2, D/OS 2, VR

☐	[illegible]
☒	ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

65974

KUDESK ZROCEAN

RE DIR-

IDEN A RUREK DUDIN 201-83827.

IDEN B ARLETTE FRANCOISE HEZARIFEND ALIAS CARTIER BORN 2 MARCH 36 PARIS FRANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

(Please cross-ref to attached outgoing)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZROCEAN CABLES.

C/WH

C/WH/3

DC/CI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

SECRET

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/CI
INFO: ADDP, FI/AN DUPONT, C/WH 2, D/CI 2, VR

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 65975

KUDESK ZROCEAN

RE MEXI 7005 (IN 66032)

1. SUBJ IS PSEUD CALVIN E RAKERRAND (IDEN A) WHO HAS COOPERATED WITH ODENVY AND KUBARK IN CONTINUING INVESTIGATION BEGUN 1960 BASIS SURFACING / IN EMIGRE CHANNELS BY KGB OF TOP SECRET ODYOKE DOCUMENT ACQUIRED THROUGH ESPIONAGE OP.

2. SUBJ CURRENTLY IN MEXI STUDYING SPANISH CONNECTION PLAN DEVELOP JOURNALIST EMPLOYMENT LATIN AMERICA. HAS WORKED AS RFE SCRIPT WRITER AND ANNOUNCER FOR VOA AND CURRENTLY DOING SOME SCRIPT WRITING ON PIECE WORK BASIS. BELIEVE WOMAN JOINING HIM MEXI IS MISTRESS(IDEN B)RATHER THAN WIFE WHO EMPLOYED NEW YORK CITY. NO DEROG.

3. REQUEST NO STATION ACTION. ODENVY WILL HAVE NO CONTACT MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZROCEAN CABLES.

(Ref is trace request on subject)

C/WH

C/WH/3

DC/CI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

L.G. MORRIS:jpm
WH/3/Mexico
5940
21 Oct 1963

SECRET

MEXICO CITY

77180

TO: PRIORITY MEXI

LILINK

REF DIR 77179

1. IDEN A: ASH & COMPANY, NEW 420 LEXINGTON AVE NEW YORK, N.Y.

2. IDEN B: OVERSEAS REALTY SURVEY ASSOCIATES, SEATTLE WASHINGTON (KUVEST NOTIONAL)

END OF MESSAGE

J.C. [illegible]
[illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J.M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

JANET NIXON:10
SAS/EOB
[illegible] X
22 OCT 63 X

S E C R E T/RYBAT

200-120-80

22 [illegible] 47Z

MADRID GENEVA ROME CASABLANCA RABAT FRANKFURT
HAMBURG BRUSSELS HAGUE LONDON MILAN OTTAWA PARIS
MEXICO CITY

SIG CEN

C/SAS 5

DDP, ADDP, C/SOD [illegible], C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/AF 3, C/EE 3,
C/WE 2, C/WH 5, RF, VR

IMMEDIATE MADR INFO HAMB BRUS HAGU LOND CASB
(ROUTINE) [illegible] OTTA PARI MEXI

WAVE ROME XXXXXXXX

77347

FRAN MILA

RYBAT ZRWAGON T[illegible]

1. FOLLOWING IS FBIS TICKER ITEM FROM CASTRO'S 21 OCTOBER SPEECH: "CASTRO REVEALS THAT HIS SECURITY FORCES HAVE JUST DISCOVERED AN ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE OF THE CUBAN MERCHANT SHIP LAS VILLAS. CASTRO CLAIMS THAT THE CIA PLACED A BOMB ABOARD THE VESSEL IN GENOA, ITALY, BUT THAT IT WAS DEFECTIVE AND FAILED TO GO OFF. THE BOMB WAS FOUND, HE SAYS, WHEN THE SHIP WAS BEING UNLOADED."

2. KUBARK XXX POLICY IS NO COMMENT AND COMPLETE DENIAL IF SPECIFICALLY ASKED.

END OF MESSAGE

EE/G West Parker by phone
WE/BC/C Mr. J[illegible] by pho
WE/2 Jack Delaney by phone
WE/3 Mr. Pierre pho
WE/4 Steve Munger by phone
WE/3 Mr. Molloy ph
WE/5 Vaughn Sherman by phone
WE/BC Joe Lynch by phone
[illegible] Arthur Maloney by phone
[illegible] Austin Jones by phone
AF/1 Mr. Charles Baker by phone

Desmond FitzGerald
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

Richard P. Helms
RICHARD P. HELMS
C/WE/X

EDWARD A. M[illegible]LLIUC
C/SAS/EOB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

22-17 S E C R E T/RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG: [illegible] I. MONGER/AVH
UNIT: DC/WE/4/X
EXT: 5559
DATE: 3[illegible] SEPT 1963

SECRET

TO: MEXICO ROME WAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WE 2
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

1 OCT 63 [illegible] 53z

SIG CEN

X ROUTING

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE

KAPOK KEYWAY PERUMEN

72346

REF: ROME C534 (IN 28856)* (NOT SENT MEXI)

1. DESIGHET (IDEN A), FORMER LONG TERM RESIDENT PERUMEN, WILL RETURN PERUMEN ON BUSINESS TRIP FOR IDEN B. LATTER IS FIRM HE REPRESENTED ALONG WITH OTHERS. PLANS DEPART ITALY 6 OCT TO VISIT FRIENDS SUISSE THEN PROCEEDING MADRID TO TAKE IBERIA FLIGHT DIRECT PERUMEN 11 OCT HAS ITAL SERVICE PASSPORT. WILL ATTEMPT EXIT PERUMEN APPROX TWO WEEKS AFTER ARRIVAL FOR BRIEF TRIP MEXI FOR DEBRIEFING BRIEFING BY KUBARKER. HOPES RETURN PERUMEN FOR TWO OR THREE MONTHS MORE.

2. REQ MEXI CABLE ROME CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PASSAGE DESIGHET PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. HQS FORWARDING MEXI FULL DETAILS THIS OP.

END OF MESSAGE

* DESIGHET will travel PERUMEN; requests contact Mexico City for brief exit.

WE/5
SAS/EOB
SAS/[illegible]
C/WH/3
C/WE/[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ORIG: STEPHEN I. MUNGER/AVH
UNIT: DC/WE/4/X
EXT: 5559
DATE: 30 SEPT 1963

S E C R E T

TO: MEXICO ROME WAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WE 2
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

XX ROUTING

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE CITE DIR

72347

KAPOK KEYWAY PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 72346

IDEN A GIULIO MONDELLO, BORN 26 FEB 1917 IN ITALY, ITAL CITIZEN, FORMERLY AGENT IN CUBA FOR FIAT AND OWNER TV TUBE FACTORY.

IDEN B NEBIOLO (LINOTYPE) FIRM, TURIN

END OF MESSAGE

WE/5
SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG: W. [illegible]/bib
UNIT: SAS/IOS
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 30 SEPT 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-733547
201-338838

TO: JMWAVE MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/SAS 5
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, RI/AN DUMMY, C/WH 5, RF, VR

1 OCT

XX

TO: WAVE INFO MEXI CITE DIR 72383

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: WAVE 4369 (IN 20073)*

JOSE LUIS (ZALA) SUBJ PARA 4 REF, RESIDENCE ULTIMAS NOVEDADES S.A., [redacted] 37-219 MEXI IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JOSE LUIS (ZALA), 201-338838, SAME ADDRESS WHO CURRENTLY REGISTERED ANOTHER SERVICE. 201 FILE CONTAINS NO OTHER INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/COMMENT: *REF is RYBAT.

SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
SAS/CI Austin Horn (in draft)
WH/3/MEXI Whitten (by phone)

for
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

1-1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for J. K. KING
C/SAS/INTEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Manuel Aragon
CA/35
5352
8 October 1963

PARIS/[illegible] INFO [illegible]

PALP [illegible]

4043

TYPIC [illegible]

REF DIR [illegible]

[illegible]

IDEN A ALFONSO DIBILDOX PRESIDENT [illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CA

WH/3/[illegible]

*CABLE [illegible] PLEASE [illegible] ATTACHED CABLE

C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible] G. CARLI
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

D. Ronis

ORIG D. RONIS : tw
UNIT SAS/EOB
EXT 8172
DATE 8 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-6-73

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, RF, VR

8 OCT 63 2 25z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 74184

TYPIC AMLONG

IDENTITY A ALFREDO DAVINS

[illegible] RONIS

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/3

J. C. KING
C/WHD

[illegible] A. [illegible]
C/SAS/[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

R. E. SCOTT
WH/3/MEXICO
3940
6 NOVEMBER 196[illegible]

S E C R E T

TO : [illegible] MERIDA   MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS 5, [illegible]

TO MRID INFO MEXI CITE DIR 81481

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REF: MRID 0312 (IN 53124)

1. ODCOIL MEXI SHOULD BE GIVEN LEAD ON MILTON LYNN, AVOIDING KUBARK INVOLVEMENT THIS CASE.

2. NO TRACES ERNESTO ABREU GOMEZ. AGREE HE IS TARGET FOR DEVELOPMENT FOR PBRUMEN OPERATIONS. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ABREU GOMEZ ON LYNN CASE AND POSSIBLY LATER INTRODUCTION TO ODCOIL AGENT MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPING RAPPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref reported U.S. citizen LYNN told Merida police chief of drugs case. Chief suggested U.S. agent be inserted in net. Merida wishes develop Chief ABREU for PBRUMEN ops.

SAS/EOB Ronis (In Draft)

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

D. RICHARDS
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : L. [illegible]
UNIT : WH/3
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : 8 NOV 1963

TO : MEXICO CITY PANAMA CITY RIO DE JANEIRO
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, VR

TO MEXI FOR [illegible] INFO PACY RIOD (ROUTINE) CITE DIR 81525

(IMMEDIATE)

1. ENINBEING TOLD BOIZELLE HE PROVIDING CR$ 5,000,000 TO ARI CAMPISTA, PRESIDENT GUANABARA CHEMICAL WORKERS FEDERATION, THRU RIO TPROODCAP OFFICE FOR USE IN DECEMBER CNTI ELECTIONS. CAMPISTA USING FUNDS GAIN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC SLATE, HOWEVER DEMOCRATIC GROUP NOT ABLE AGREE ON SLATE NOR WHO TO HEAD IT.

2. REQUEST OP DETAILS FROM ENINBEING AS RIOD DEVELOPING PARALLEL ELECTION OP AND ANXIOUS AVOID CONFLICT OR COMPETITION AMONG DEMOCRATS. BELIEVE ENINBEING OP NOT NECESSARILY COUNTERING RIOD PLAN BUT NEED CLARIFICATION.

3. FYI RIOD PREPARING PROVIDE FUNDS TO HUGO GOMES DA COSTA, OF ALCOHOL AND SUGAR WORKERS, WHO NAMED AS MEMBER OF CAMPISTA'S DEMOCRATIC GROUP.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/4 Mr. Ozga (in draft)
WH/3/Mexico Reichhardt
WH/CA

W Wood
J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. B. NOLAND
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

[illegible]
[illegible]/MEXICO
[illegible]40
[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

MEXICO CITY

MEXI

LCIMPROVE

REF DIR 21-08

81809

IDEN A - JOSEPH MONTLLOR

IDEN B - JOHN H BARBER

IDEN C - GOODWIN SHAPIRO

END OF MESSAGE

J. C. KING
C/WHD

BERNARD E. REIC[illegible]
AC/WH[illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Nael Benson
WH/3/CAN
6312
[illegible]

S E C R E T

ROME PRIORITY

[illegible] 17 45z

SIG CEN

INFO: [illegible]

TO PRIORITY ROME INFO MEXI, SALV

OUT 83692

REF: SALV 4839 (IN 63096)

IF PCI DOES NOT GIVE DEVISTA-1 CONTACTS IN SALV, STATION SHOULD PASS TO DEVISTA-1 ONLY FIRST FOUR NAMES OF ABOVE REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: Suggested Communists as possible contacts DEVISTA-1

C/WH/3
WE/Italy S. Munger
WH/3/MEXI
WH/3/CAN

Thomas P. Thiele
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

106/14 OCT 63/cs

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible] - V. [illegible]

S E C R E T/RYBAT

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

11 OCT [illegible]

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: BRUSSELS HAMBURG FRANKFURT HAGUE MADRID PARIS LONDON
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SAS 5
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, RF,
ADDED: C/AF 3, C/WH 5, RF, VR

11 Oct 63 22 [illegible]

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO BRUS INFO HAMB FRAN HAGU MADR (ROUTINE) PARI LOND DIR 75 24

RYBAT KEYWAY PBRUMEN ZRWAGON

REF: BRUS 8460 (IN 38181)* (NOT SENT PARIS AND LOND)

1. HURRICANE FLORA DAMAGE TO CUBA WILL PROBABLY RESULT HEAVY CONCENTRATION FOOD AND MEDICINE IN MARITIME CARGOES TO CUBA, THUS ALTERING PERCENTAGES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ANY SABOTAGE OPS AGAINST CUBAN SHIPPING. WISE EFFECT MORATORIUM SABOTAGE OPS UNTIL THIS FACTOR DISAPPEARS AND USE INTERVAL TO MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES IN APPROACH.

2. FURTHER GUIDANCE FORTHCOMING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/Comments: * Plans for sabotaging Rio Crouro.

SAS/[illegible] [illegible]
TSD/CAD Wally Jones by phone
WE/2 Jack Delaney by phone
WE/5 Vaughn [illegible] in draft
WE/3 Roger Pierre (by phone)
WE/BC [illegible] (P)
EE/G West Gaines by phone

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

THOMAS THIELE
C/WE/INT

11-2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWARD A. [illegible]
C/[illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T/RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : BECKY FRANK
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-736761

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

12 OCT 63

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/FE 6
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

SIG CEN

~~DEFERRED~~
ROUTINE

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

RYBAT
KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF MEXI 6488 (IN 38148)*

1. LIANG SSU CH'ENG 2733 1835 2052, 201-736761 BORN 1901, TOKYO. LANGUAGE ENGLISH. MEMBER CCP.

BACKGROUND:

1923 BA TSINGHUA UNIV
28 BA, MA UNIV PENN
28 MA HARVARD
28-31 PROF AT NATIONAL NORTHEASTERN UNIV, CHINA
31-41 RESEARCH FELLOW, INSTITUTE/CHINESE ARCHITEC URE
32-33 PROF NATIONAL PEKING UNIV; PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING
41-43 RESEARCH FELLOW, ACADEMIA SINICA
46 PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING
47 HONORARY PHD YALE: VISITING PROF YALE
50-61 MEMBER OF TSINGHUA UNIV
53-61 HEAD OF DEPT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE, TSINGHUA; VICE PRESIDENT ARCHITECTURE SOCIETY

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : [illegible] FRANK
UNIT : FE/[illegible]
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 October 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

56 ASSOC, DEPARTMENT CIVIL AND ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEERING, ACADEMY OF SCIENCES CPR, [illegible]

DEC 58 MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, THIRD CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHINA DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE

SEP 58 MEMBER NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHINA SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ASSOC

APR 59 DEPUTY SECOND NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS FROM PEKING; MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, THIRD NATIONAL COMMITTEE CPPCC

OCT 62 VICE CHAIRMAN CHINA ARCHITECTURAL SOCIETY

SEP 63 DEPUTY LEADER OF CPR DELEGATION TO SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ARCHITECTS, HAVANA

2. RE SELF CRITICISM FOLLOWING EXTRACTS FROM LIANG'S SPEECH TO THE NPC, JULY 13 1957 ENTITLED "WHY I LOVE OUR PARTY". DEPUTY LIANG, AFTER DESCRIBING "THE BRILLIANT INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUR NATION," TOLD OF HIS PAST ANXIETY AND PERPLEXITY IN HIS OWN WORK. HE SAID THAT AT THE TIME HE HAD USED OUT-DATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES TO TEACH THE YOUNG INSTRUCTORS AND STUDENTS OF THE TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY BECAUSE HE WAS BOTHERED

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1242

ORIG : BECKY FRANK
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 OCTOBER 196[illegible]

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

BY THE STATEMENT THAT EVERYTHING OF THE PARTY WAS GOOD. HE SAID THAT AFTER HE HAD WRITTEN ARTICLES, MADE REPORTS, AND DELIVERED LECTURES ON HIS ANTIQUATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES, HE SUDDENLY DISCOVERED THAT HE WAS A NATIONAL TARGET FOR REFUTATION. HE SAID "I WAS DOWNHEARTED. I HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE PARTY. I WAS SURE I WAS BEING SUBJECTED TO CRITICISM BECAUSE MY ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES DID NOT FIT INTO THE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. MY PAIN WAS AS DEEP AS THAT OF A CHILD BEING PUNISHED BY HIS MOTHER. WHY? BECAUSE I TRUSTED OUR PARTY AS MUCH AS I HAD TRUSTED MY MOTHER. THE PARTY, HOWEVER, WAS VERY PATIENT WITH ME. AFTER I HAD STRAIGHTENED OUT MY THOUGHTS, I ADMITTED MY MISTAKES." HE SAID: "I WAS A PRODIGAL SON. AFTER THIS EDUCATION, I WILL NEVER LEAVE OUR PARTY --- NOT EVEN A STEP AWAY FROM IT."

[redacted]

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: RICKY FRANK
UNIT: FE/CIOP
EXT: 5661
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE FOUR

TO: IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

3. STPLATE 1 (IDEN) WHO STUDIED UNDER LIANG AT UNIV YALE OF OPINION THAT LIANG WOULD NOT ACCEPT RECRUITMENT IN PLACE BUT THERE IS CHANCE HE WOULD DEFECT IF OFFERED CHANCE LEAVE COMMIE CHINA. HQS CONSIDERS LIANG GOOD CANDIDATE FOR DEBRIEFING OR DEFECTION. DOUBTFUL DUE AGE AND BACKGROUND THAT WOULD MAKE GOOD IN PLACE AGENT.

4. SENDING STPLATE 1 TO WORK UNDER STATION DIRECTION AS A POSSIBLE BRIDGE TO LIANG. STPLATE 1 LONG TIME KUBARK CONTACT BUT IS NOT TRAINED CASE OFFICER. HAS BEEN USED PRINCIPALLY IN FRENCH WORK IN PAST. SANSEED ~~CAN~~ MAY BE FILL FURTHER BACKGROUND.

5. STPLATE 1 WILL USE TOURIST COVER AND WILL REMAIN ONLY TWO DAYS DUE HEAVY PERSONAL COMMITMENTS. HIS FUNCTION WILL BE TO USE PAST FRIENDSHIP TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CONTACT LIANG AND DETERMINE WHETHER LIANG INTERESTED DEFECTION. IF SO STATION SHOULD BE PREPARED SAFEHOUSE UNTIL FURTHER STEPS CAN BE TAKEN.

6. STPLATE 1 ARRIVING MEXI 12 OCTOBER 2105 HOURS VIA EASTERN AIR LINES FLITE 305. HAVE BRIEFED HIM WILL BE MET BY SANSEED. STPLATE 1

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

12-62

KI FRANK
FE/CIOP
EXT 5661
22 OCTOBER 1963

SECRET

INDEX
IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE FIVE

INFO

CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

WILL WEAR RED WHITE BLUE TIE. IF CONTACT MISSED STPLATE 1 TO PROCEED CITY AND CONTACT MARINE GUARD AT EMBASSY ASKING FOR SANSEED. AUTHORIZE STATION ADVANCE OPERATIONAL FUNDS AND PER DIEM AS NECESSARY TO STPLATE 1 SINCE NO OPPORTUNITY DO SO HERE. CHARGE LCHARVEST OOA.

END OF MESSAGE

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)

DC/PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)

CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)

DCFE(C) ✓

C/WH/3 J. Whitten (by phone)

William Co
CFE

RAFORD W. HERBERT
DC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: BECKY FRANK
UNIT: FE/CIOP
EXT: 6708
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-730701

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/FE 6
INFO: DDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 75339

IMMEDIATE MEXI

KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 75338

IDEN:

Chairman, DEPARTMENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
RICHARD WALKER, /UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)

DC/PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)

CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)

DCFE(C)

C/WH/3 [illegible] (by phone)

RAYMOND W. HERBERT
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

William Colby
C/FE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

Polly Pike
WH/LOG
7282
16 October 1963

Mexico City

DIRECTOR

WH 8

OL 4, ..., VR

18 OCT 63 15 27z

SIG CEN

X ROUTINE

MEXI INFO MIDW CITE DIR **76566**

REF: MEXI 6547 (IN 40710)*
MIDW 3207 (NOT SENT MEXI)

MIDW ADVISES CARTRIDGES DELIVERED CORPUS CHRISTI 1 OCTOBER ONE BOX FIFTY POUNDS CARGO 64-M51104 MDIF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: *Requests Hdqs advise action taken on Reqn 559-5-64.

C/WH/3

Telecoord:
OL/TD/CB, Mr. Daly

WILLIAM E. BROOKS
CHIEF, WH SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Charles F. Reiner
CHARLES F. REINER
ACTING CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

1. Attached is Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO - which is part of the summary entitled, Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, (copy number 7) dated 1 October 1968. The aforementioned summary was forwarded for your review on 13 March 1978.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 7) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

~~SECRET~~

1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278 281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and 357

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

CONTENTS

PAGE

VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964) (Cont.)

Deputy Chief of Seventh Department (July 1962-January 1964) 291
  KGB Operations 292
    Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY 292
    Investigation of SLESINGER 293
    Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN 295
    GRU Agent SHUBIN 296
    Arrest of BARGHOORN 298
    Investigation of OSWALD 303
      Residence in USSR 303
      Request to Return to USSR 305
      Post-Assassination Review of KGB File 307
    The CHEREPANOV Papers 309
      Contents 314
      NOSENKO's Travel Document 315
  Return to Geneva (January-February 1964) 316
    Purpose of Trip 317
    Visits to KGB Legal Residency 318
    Availability for Meetings with CIA 318
    NOSENKO's Written Notes 319
    NOSENKO's Defection 320
    The Recall Telegram 324
  Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations 325
  Operational Activities (July 1962-January 1964) 326
KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists 326
  Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE 327
  KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations 327
  NOSENKO's Information 330
  Summary 331
Summary and Conclusion 331

~~Top Secret~~

CONTENTS

PAGE

IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE 335

- Relationship with General GRIBANOV 335
- Communist Party Status 338
- Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures 342
- Awards and Decorations 345
- Sourcing 349
- Ranks 350

X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT 355

XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES 357

Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO 361

Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text 399

Index of Personalities 437

TS No. 197124

~~Top Secret~~

Copy 10

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in Annex A.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by a jealous naval officer whom he then protected by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, and that he actually did accidently shoot himself. a sensitive source [redacted] quoted [redacted] a KGB offic to the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a naval college in 1942.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued)
After NOSENKO's defection was publicized, Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered to CIA that he had known the son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.
A sensitive source
[redacted] is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO served in the RU. According to [redacted], NOSENKO attended this sou
the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU Information Department for about a year before securing a transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports) Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held Reports assignments.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

A sensitive source [redacted] has quoted two KGB officers [redacted] respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947 or 1949.

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the FRIPPEL case.)

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter. According to [redacted] a sensitive source, FRIPPEL, who is now in New York City, is a current target of the [redacted] Soviet intelligence service.

Johannes PREISFREUND

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961) and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.

Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175) and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.

who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961, but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counterintelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and 'not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow, a sensitive sourc[redacted] identified him as "an employee of the KGB": and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still "under suspicion", according to [redacted] a sensitive source.

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Yu.I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A), because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUK was dismissed from the KGB.

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Headquarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.

Comment: A sensitive source [redacted] had reported to the FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer [redacted] "might be trying to develop SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some other agent capacity."

NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether SLESINGER had "ever been bothered by the FBI."

Comment: (Continued)
In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case.

KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent [redacted]

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, but from the description he provided he is believed identical with [redacted] a KGB S&T agent [redacted] identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report from [redacted] a sensitive source.

NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN.

Comment: Earlier, a sensitive source [redacted] identified an [redacted] agent apparently identical with SHUBIN and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel to the USSR in summer 1961 and in September 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHEREPANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.

Comment: Other sources, including sensitive sources, [redacted] have also reported various aspects of the CHEREPANOV incident.

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's Information

On 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of 4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived, instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to participate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thenceforth in CIA custody.

Comment: ✓Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's assertion regarding the existence of the recall telegram. According to Special Intelligence, there were enciphered communications from Moscow to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and later, but there was none from 1815 on 3 February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

[redacted]

NOSENKO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram

NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he signed the following statement:

> "On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY, the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held. [redacted]

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists 1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Other Sources - 1964 and 1965

As indicated in Annex A, a sensitive source [redacted] reported several items of information he stated he obtained from various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO's defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired because he had been NOSENKO's friend and patron, that GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO's father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief despite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence, and that GRIBANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence", paralyzed the work of [redacted] KGB [redacted]

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?

TOP SECRET

1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

TOP SECRET

Annex A

Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

4 February 1964

NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

6 February 1964

The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February. They speculated privately between themselves that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an automobile accident.

8 February 1964

An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four days.

9 February 1964

Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February 1964

The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

A U.S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

[redacted]

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted]. Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

Comment: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in Geneva; he asserted that some others, known by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.

[redacted]

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

According to a sensitive source [redacted] NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine.

Comment: NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until 1953, when he entered the KGB.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] several KGB It appeared quite certain to [redacted] officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been a KGB lieutenant colonel.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] from KGB officers [redacted] The photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO. One [redacted] KGB officer worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: [redacted]. The photograph accompanying American and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection was by error not that of NOSENKO but of Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom [redacted] a sensitive source and NOSENKO both identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working against American citizens.

Comment: Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962 (before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.

11 February 1964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release, and to demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February 1964

S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

(Annex A)

12 February 1964 (continued)

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.

NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.

12-13 February 1964

[redacted]

14 February 1964

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

(Annex A)

14 February 1964 (continued)

"gross provocation by American Intelligence organs". GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

18 February 1964

Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of International Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV, NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~Top Secret~~

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted].

[redacted]

TS No. 197124

Copy ______

~~Top Secret~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate. [redacted] NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books. A KGB officer [redacted] expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. [redacted] a KGB office [redacted] said that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."

Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB telephone book referred [redacted] to above.

~~Top Secret~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] in [redacted] response to a question whether NOSENKO actually defected or whether [redacted] the defection might be a KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

22 February 1964

According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel

> stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the Embassy. [redacted]

Comment: Although NOSENKO knew that there were microphones in three general locations in the Embassy, his specific information regarding the number and location of microphones was limited to that contained in a written list brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he claimed no one in the KGB knew he had. [redacted]

24 February 1964

Women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time, expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his family and country and requesting a personal meeting with him. [redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

24 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife and mother on the basis of physical descriptions. On only one previous occasion have members of a defector's family called on a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him.

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] KUROCHKIN (fnu), a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor referred to the name.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

February 1964

Nikolay ARTAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO's defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO in 1944-1946.

Comment: ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved differs from those claimed by NOSENKO.

KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a CIA double agent in Vienna. TULAYEV said that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV later said on another occasion that he had friends who knew NOSENKO well.)

Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied knowing him.

[redacted]

~~Top Secret~~

February-March 1964

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source:

[redacted]: A KGB commission was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was very large, formed from different departments of the KGB. The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many details about life of the leaders of the country, in the government...that he knew very much about internal relations between the people working in the KGB, that he had many close friends among them and [spent] days and nights together with them. The whole history of his life was studied step by step very carefully."

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

9 March 1964 [redacted]

According to a sensitive [redacted] source, [redacted] (from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers [redacted]: NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms until the January-March 1965 interrogations, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room".

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

23 March 1964

The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

(Annex A)

27 March 1964

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted] certain [redacted]: There seems to be unanimous opinion among [redacted] KGB chiefs [redacted] that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some [redacted] KGB "chiefs" [redacted] that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.

Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB directories described.

31 March 1964

KGB officers I.I. PETUKHOV nad P.P. BORISOV in Canada told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intelligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be prepared for himself and his family. SPRECHER asked whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recently publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it, asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".

(Annex A)

31 March 1964 (continued)

Comment: When PETUKHOV recontacted SPRECHER in February 1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENKO had in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he had had some connection with NOSENKO, and NOSENKO may have known something of what the KGB was doing in Canada.
NOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name was unknown to him, who apparently is identical to SPRECHER.

March 1964

According to a sensitive source who [redacted], was briefed in his office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief Directorate officer of the American Department. Personnel of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served until his defection, were so shocked at the event that they would not mention it at all.

Comment: In this and other contexts a sensitive source [redacted] has stated or implied that NOSENKO served in the American Department in 1963-1964. NOSENKO asserts he left the American Department in January 1962 and served in the Seventh Department until his defection.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TS No. 197124
Copy 10

(Annex A)

April-May 1964

KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See p. 24 for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

May 1964: According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB officers [redacted]): Two commissions have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

(Annex A)

20 May 1964
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.

[redacted]

[redacted]

12 June 1964

Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a profligate with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow to be someone they are well rid of.

22 June 1964
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted]): The consensus among some KGB employees [redacted] is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to

22 June 1964 (continued)

the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

29 June 1964

GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959. When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department. NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during 1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsibilities or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or 1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the Section during this period.

(Annex A)

29 June 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in 1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not identify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied since defection that he has ever met or even seen him.

June 1964

According to a sensitive source

[redacted]: "Just after" NOSENKO's defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some sixty Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return to Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known [redacted] to [redacted] Source had been discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. According to one rumor, the chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed, would also lose his job.

by a sensitive source

Comment: MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly stationed in New York City, was said by [redacted] to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conducted interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. [redacted] identified MEDVEDEV,

Another sensitive source

(Annex A)

June 1964 (continued)

Comment: (Continued)
[redacted] a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.

29 July 1964

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] (from unnamed sources, presumably KGB officers [redacted] [redacted]): An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK [BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB

(Annex A)

29 July 1964 (continued)

Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.

Comment: NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identified by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO said he had never worked with him at KGB Headquarters since GOLUBEV had always been in the First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the USSR on 28 August 1964.

July-August 1964

According to a sensitive source: [redacted]: The first information [redacted] about NOSENKO was [redacted] from KGB Headquarters which reported the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The letter, which was very brief, said that "the loss was very great and some new forms of work should be created to be efficient in the future". The Legal Residency had not before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's escape".

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

November 1964

Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American acquaintance that they had not been told officially but they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. It was in this way, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance. According to the "grapevine", the defection was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States.

(Annex A)

November 1964 (continued)

Comment: GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements, actions, and unusual freedom of solitary movement while on visits to the United States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he had met with their American counterparts". During that 1964 meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country".

[redacted]

[redacted]

December 1964

Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's a [redacted] source roommate in Geneva at the time of his defection, told [redacted] that he had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection, and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK reported to source [redacted] the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what RESHETNYAK said, [redacted] source thought the KGB might go so far

(Annex A)

December 1964 (continued)

as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. ([redacted] later identified RESHETNYAK as a KGB officer.) Source

Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation.

29 January 1965
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers [redacted]): It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.

Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV was responsible for sending him to Geneva in 1964, but after retracting his claim that GRIBANOV had played any special role in his assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father and GRIBANOV were acquainted.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]): Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, [redacted] the KGB officer on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these. Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the KGB. [redacted] the KGB officer attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified the KGB officer [redacted] NOSENKO always claimed that he had been a lieutenant colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when he retracted that claim and asserted that he had been only a captain.

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965 (continued)

Comment: GRIBANOV was reported in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat until late autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's defection), when he turned over that contact to another KGB officer.

9 February 1965

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Early June 1965

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from conversations with KGB officers [redacted]: Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing".

(Annex A)

15 July 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted] who attended the Moscow meeting described): A meeting of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second (British) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A. TARABRIN, about three and a half months earlier. I.A. BELOV and other officers also attended the meeting. According to official statements made at the meeting, after the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there. [redacted] described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.

a sensitive source

Comment: NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met GRIBANOV socially only three times during his KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or November 1963 in circumstances similar to those referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source [redacted]): As a result of NOSENKO's defection, many KGB officers were punished, expelled from the Party, and from the KGB. These included KGB Chairman SEROV, and Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and they were "buddies and night buddies".

Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.

Winter 1965-1966
Source, a [redacted] self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962. [redacted] said Source that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations against the American Embassy in Moscow):

NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.

(Annex A)

Winter 1965-1966 (continued)

Source's
Comment: [redacted] allegation is the single report from any source describing NOSENKO as other than a KGB officer.

[redacted]

March 1966
According to a sensitive source,
[redacted] (from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO, who was not personally known to [redacted], was an important Source boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and "not very good". He was to have been discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion Source of persons to whom [redacted] talked that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the microphones.

March 1966 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he, like [redacted], called the GRU Military Academy), by choice accepting assignment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in 1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO did attend the school, he could not have served as he claimed in the GRU. [redacted] is the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged NOSENKO served in the GRU.

Source

Source

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TS No. 197124
Copy 10

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Mid-1966

Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

Comment: KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International Moscow correspondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. KOROLEV has travelled previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik, and to Japan and the United States as a correspondent for Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by an official Soviet press representative of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent.

October 1966

Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors to provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their

(Annex A)

October 1966 (continued)

life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.: it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident [the defection]. Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family could be obtained and that interviews with them and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent.

Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request.

28 January 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from personal knowledge): Referring to his own knowledge of KGB organization, [redacted] said if NOSENKO heard his explanation, he would call [redacted] a child, since NOSENKO knew these matters better than [redacted] because he had served at KGB Headquarters longer.

Source

(Annex A)

February 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow): NOSENKO worked only in RU Information Department of the GRU, and only for about five or six months, after which he went to the KGB.

May 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted] The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.

According to a sensitive source [redacted]: When NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked only in the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went to the KGB.

5 June 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted]: There had been some KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of SHAKHOV.

Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV.

ANNEX A - STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS

ABOUT NOSENKO

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX A

STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT NOSENKO

Pages 361 - 398 of the previous summary contain statements by Soviet officials including several sources in regard to NOSENKO. These remarks cover the period of February 1964 to June 1967.

None of the quoted information with the exception of a statement a Source (a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agen by [redacted] who stated NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB, raises a question concerning the identity of NOSENKO or whether he was actually a KGB officer. It is not considered that the remark by SOURCE [redacted] can be given any particular weight or that it represents any material evidence he was not a KGB officer.

Of the cited information from Soviets in regard to NOSENKO, the most important, other than statements by GOLITSYN which are cited elsewhere, is the information from sensitive Source #1 [redacted], sensitive Source #3 [redacted] and sensitive Source #2 [redacted] and probably in that order. Source #1 [redacted], Source #3 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] had no personal knowledge of NOSENKO and most of their comments were based on information from third parties or obtained through conversation. There are discrepancies between what Source #1 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

said, but under the given circumstances of how Source #1 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected. No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted that Source #2 [redacted], Source #3 [redacted] and Source #1 [redacted] have furnished no information that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector.

It is felt that information from Source #1 [redacted], Source #3 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] is a factor which should be given due consideration in the NOSENKO case, but the fact that they furnished no information indicating that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector should not be considered as absolute proof he was not dispatched by the KGB. A decision as to whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched should be based on a full consideration of all available information. It must be realized there is a possibility NOSENKO could have been dispatched by the KGB and Source #1 [redacted], Source #3 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] be completely unaware; conversely, a determination that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB does not establish the bona fides of Source #1 [redacted], Source #3 [redacted] or Source #2 [redacted].

[redacted]

NOSENKO, until October 1966, stated that a telegram had been received in the Geneva Residentura ordering NOSENKO to return to the USSR in connection with an expected conference on tourist matters. The telegram, according to NOSENKO in interviews prior to October 1966, had been received in the Residentura the morning of the same day he met his CIA contacts and stated he had defected.

In October 1966, NOSENKO responded to a casual mention of the "recall telegram" with a complete retraction of his previous statements on the subject. NOSENKO stated, and has subsequently maintained, that there was not a "recall telegram." He has explained that he invented the "recall telegram" matter because he was concerned about his personal safety in remaining "in place" for a longer time. NOSENKO has stated he thought the alleged "recall telegram" would be accepted by CIA as a logical reason for his precipitate defection.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted].

Certain of the discrepancies noted in the previous summary between information from Source #1 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] and from NOSENKO have been clarified and certain discrepancies could not be clarified. In some instances the information from Source #1 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] is adjudged to be inaccurate. The judgment is based on the hearsay nature of the reporting by Source #1 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] measured against the absence of any reason to question this part of his life as related by NOSENKO. Examples are information from Source #1 [redacted] that NOSENKO had been affiliated with the KGB since about 1947 and information from Source #2 [redacted] that NOSENKO attended the GRU Military Academy and that NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department in Moscow. There are also certain discrepancies between information furnished by Source #2, [redacted], Source #1 and Source #3 in [redacted] and [redacted] in regard to the life and career of NOSENKO prior to 1964.

In regard to discrepancies previously noted between information from Source #1 [redacted] as to certain KGB officers whom Source #1 [redacted] understood NOSENKO had personally met and concerning whom NOSENKO had previously indicated no knowledge, a satisfactory explanation has been obtained for certain of the discrepancies during current interviews with NOSENKO. In certain other instances, a completely adequate explanation is not available but there is just as adequate reason to believe Source #1 [redacted] had obtained incorrect or incomplete information as there is to believe NOSENKO is being deceptive in his failure to recognize a name and/or photograph.

As an example of previous noted discrepancies which have now been completely clarified, it was previously stated that NOSENKO had never commented on the KGB telephone book which Source #1 [redacted] had reported NOSENKO, [redacted] had in his possession. During current interviews, NOSENKO, in response to a query concerning how an officer in the SCD would obtain the telephone number of an FCD officer, gave a detailed report including information that there was at least one complete SCD telephone directory in each room occupied by SCD officers. In addition, NOSENKO stated he had access to a directory which was maintained in the office of the Chief of the Department and which listed the KGB officers down to Section Chiefs in the various geographical Directorates throughout the USSR.

It is interesting to note that there is a discrepancy between the information furnished by Source #1 [redacted] concerning the telephone directory and the description furnished by NOSENKO. This is quite logical since Source #1 [redacted] could hardly give an accurate description of a telephone directory which he had never seen.

007-029-042

26-MAY-82.

ACTIVIDADES DE "LEE HARVEY OSWALD", EN MEXICO.

El 26 de septiembre de 1963, Oswald, tomó el omnibus No. 5133 - de la Linea Continental Trailways, en Houstón y partió a las 2.35 A.M., rumbo a Laredo, Texas, pasando por Corpus Christi y Alice. Dos turistas britanicos- el Dr. John B. McFarland y su Esposa que tomaron el mismo Autobus, se fijaron en Oswald, aproximadamente a las 6 A.M. y Oswald, les comentó que iba- a Cuba, via la Ciudad de México.

Oswald, cruzo la frontera entre Laredo, Texas y Nuevo Laredo, - Mexico, entre la 1.30 y las 2.00 P.M. De Nuevo Laredo, Mex., viajó con destino al Distrito Federal en el Autobus No. 516, de la Linea Flecha Roja, que partió a las 2.15 P.M. el cual tenia calculada su llegada al D.F., a las 9.45 A.M. del día siguiente (27), en el curso del viaje que duró 20 horas aproximadamente Oswald, conoció a dos jóvenes de nacionalidad australiana a las que les comentó que hacia tiempo habia visitado la Unión Soviética, y que les recomendaba - cuando arribaran a México, D.F., se hospedaran en el Hotel "Cuba", ya que él en anteriores visitas se habia hospedado en ese lugar.

El Autobus, llegó a la Ciudad de México, con 15 minutos de retraso, eran las 10 A.M. aproximadamente, posteriormente Oswald, se hospedó en la habitación No. 18, del Hotel "Comercio", ubicado en la Calle de Sahagun -- No. 9, Colonia Guerrero.

Luego de haberse registrado en el mencionado Hotel Oswald, se- dedicó sin demora a la tarea de obtener el permiso para entrar a Cuba, - ---- porque, las Autoridades mexicanas no permiten a ningun Ciudadano Estadounidense que viaje abordo de un Avión con destino a Cuba, sin la visa correspondiente; el pasaporte de Oswald, tenia un sello que le impedia viajar a Cuba.

Ese mismo dia se entrevistó con SILVIA TIRADO DE DURAN, Ciudadana mexicana, empleada de la Embajada de Cuba en México y le solicitó un - visado para Cuba en Transito para la Unión Soviética y fundamentó ésta solicitud, con la presentación de su pasaporte en el cual se indicaba que habia vivido en Rusia, durante tres años, presentó tambien su Cedula de trabajo de ese -

país, escrita en ruso, cartas en el mismo idioma y comprobantes de que estaba casado con una mujer de nacionalidad Soviética llamada MARINA OSWALD.

Ademas dijo que era director de una Organización de apoyo a --- Cuba en la Ciudad de Nueva Orleans y miembro del Partido Comunista de los - Estados Unidos. Dijo que tenia la intencion de viajar a Cuba el día 30 de sep--- tiembre de 1963, y permanecer por dos semanas o más tiempo.

Oswald, antes de visitar la Embajada Cubana, se habia entrevistado con PAVEL ANTONOVICH YATSKOV y con VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH --- KOSTIKOV, ambos funcionarios consulares de la Embajada de la URSS. en --- México, que prestaban servicio como Agentes de la KGB. Sin embargo Oswald - no pudo lograr el visado soviético.

Ese mismo dia por la tarde, Oswald, regresó a la Embajada Cuba-- na, llevando fotografias de pasaporte, siendo recibido por la Señora DURAN, --- ésta llamó a la Embajada de la URSS., para preguntar si se le iba a otorgar la -- visa a Oswald, en la Embajada Soviética le contestaron que habria una demora- para esa visa de unos 4 meses, Oswald, al enterarse de esa situación se puso -- furioso, ya que al no obtener la visa Soviética, le negaban automáticamente la - visa en transito para Cuba. La Señora DURAN, al notar la actitud de Oswald, -- llamó a EUSEBIO AZQUE, Consul de la Embajada de Cuba en México, para que - tratara de calmar a Oswald, pero la conversación entre ambos se tornó en agresiva. AZQUE, le dijo a Oswald, que en su opinión, gente como él perjudicaba a- la Revolución Cubana y que por lo tanto no se le daría la visa que solicitaba.

Durante el día 28 de ese mismo mes y año, Oswald, siguio insis-- tiendo ante las Embajadas de la URSS. y de Cuba, para obtener los visados co--- rrespondientes, sin obtener resultados positivos.

El 29 de septiembre de 1963, Oswald, asistió a una corrida de to--- ros y que por la tarde habia visitado algunos museos y habia visto una película en algun Cine de la Ciudad de México.

El lunes 30 del mismo mes, Oswald, comenzo a hacer los preparativos para regresar a los Estados Unidos, reservando un espacio en Transpor_ tes del Norte a través de la Agencia de Viajes "Transportes Chihuahuenses" -

2

para las 8.30 A.M., del dia 2 de octubre de 1963, se le designó el asiento No. 12 a nombre de H.O. LEE.

El día 1/o. de octubre del mismo año, Oswald, pagó la cuenta -- del Hotel incluida esa noche y alrrededor de las 06;30 A.M., salió del Hotel para dirigirse a la Terminal de Transportes del Norte y abordar el Autobus -- 332, asiento No. 12 de la Linea mencionada, que salió a las 8.30 A.M. con -- destino a Laredo, Mex. En la Ciudad de Monterrey, N.L., los pasajeros del -- Autobus 332, transbordaron un vehículo de relevo, el No. 373 de la misma -- Linea, que continuó hacia Laredo, esa noche a las 10. P.M.

Cuando el Autobus llegó a Laredo, Mex., Autoridades mexica-- nas de Migración detuvieron a Oswald, debido a supuestas irregularidades en sus documentos turisticos. Oswald, se quejo de las Autoridades mexicanas - cuando regresó al Autobus, despues de que las Autoridades Migratorias habian checado sus documentos, hizo comentarios negativos de las mismas.

Siendo aproximadamente la 1.35 A.M., del día 3 de octubre del mismo año, Oswald, cruzo el puente internacional para dirigirse a la Ciudad de Dallas, Texas, a donde arribó ese mismo dia.

Se sabe que el expediente de Lee Harvey Oswald, existe en la Di-- rección General de Servicios Migratorios de la Secretaría de Gobernación y --- está clasificado como confidencial.

RESPETUOSAMENTE.

176

Sabado 28 de Sep. 1963

Nº	Nombre	Procedencia	Ocupación	Nacionalidad
1	Alicia Plaza	Aguascalientes Ags.		
2	Jorge Roldan -	Puebla Pue	Empleado	Mex
3	Sr. Villa -	Puebla Puebla	Empleado	mex
4	Antonio Oliva y Sra	D. F.	medico	mex
5	Sr. Ramirez y Sra	Queretaro Qro	Empleado	mex
6	Fernando Valenzuela	Chihuahua	Empleado	mex
7	Angelica Pereyda	Torreon Coah	Hogar	mex
8	Ernesto Lima - -	Reynosa Tamps	Empleado	mex
9	Martin Guerrero	San Luis Pot.	Empleado	mex
10	Jose Luis Macias	Chihuahua	Empleado	mex
11	Pedro Quijano	Torreon Coah	Empleado	mex
12	Manuel Santos	Saltillo Coah	Empleado	mex
13	Fidencio Garcia -	San Luis Pot.	Empleado	mex
14	Gabriel Contreras -	C. Juarez Chih -	Comerciante	mex
15	Julio Liñan -	San Luis Pot.	Empleado	mex
16	Carlos Marquez	Veracruz Ver.	Empleado	mex
17	Rodolfo Rodriguez	Chihuahua	Empleado	mex
18	LEE HARVEY	USA TEXAS		
19	Perez Pliego	San Luis Pot.	Empleado	mex
20	Santos Pedraza	Leon Gto	Empleado	mex
21	Mario Resendiz	Saltillo Coah	Empleado	mex
22	Sr. Rodriguez y Familia	Chihuahua	Comerciante	mex
23	Sr. Ramirez -	Torreon - Coah	Empleado	mex
24	Sabino Martinez	Queretaro Qro	Empleado	mex
25	Sr. C. Sanchez de la Rosa	Monterrey NL	Empleado	mex
26	Alfredo Garcia -	Guanajuato Gto.	Empleado	mex
27				
28	Mario Ala-Torre -	Puebla Pue	Comerciante -	mex
29	Manuel Samali -	Monterrey NL	Empleado	mex
30				

Comercio - 29 de Sep 196

DEPARTAMENTO DEL DISTRITO FEDERAL
OFICINA DE LICENCIAS
G. TERCERO

Nº	Nombres	Procedencia	Ocupación	
1				
2	Leonardo Bezama	Guanajuato	Empleado	mex
3	Mario Cela Torre -	Puebla Pue	Empleado	mex
4	Antonio Oliva -	D.F. -	Musico	mex
5				
6	Fernando Valenzuela -	Chihuahua -	Empleado	mex
7	Aquilino Arreyda -	Torreon Coah	Empleado	me
8	Ernesto Lima	Reynosa Tamp	Empleado	mex
9	Martín Guerrero	S L Potosi	Empleado	mex
10	José Luis Macías -	Chihuahua -	Empleado	mex
11	Pedro Quijano	Torreon Coah	Empleado	mex
12	Raul Ramirez -	Veracruz-Ver	Empleado	mex
13	Raul Ramirez -	Veracruz-Ver	Empleado	mex
14	Gabriel Contreras -	C Juarez Ch	Empleado	mex
15	Julio Lizcano -	San Luis Potosi	Empleado	mex
16	Hernando Martínez y Sra	Guadalajara	[illegible]	
17	Rodolfo Rodriguez -	Chihuahua -	Empleado	mex
18	LEE HARVEY	USA TEXAS		Americano
19	Alfonso Beltran -	Ocotlan Jal -	[illegible]	mex
20	Santos Preciado	Leon Gto	Empleado	mex
21	Mario Resendiz -	Saltillo Coah	Empleado	mex
22				
23	Alicia Plaza	Aguascalientes	Hogar	mex
24	Tomas Gallegos -	Querétaro Qro	Empleado	mex
25	Sanchez de La Rosa -	Monterrey	Empleado	mex
26	Alfredo Garcia -	Guanajuato Gto	Empleado	mex
27				
28				
29	Manuel Serrato	Monterrey NL	Empleado	mex
30				

RESERVACIONES PARA LAS 13 · HORAS., CON DESTINO A LAREDO
SALIDA No. 2º EN BUS No. 340 EL DIA 2º MES ~~No~~ Octubre de 1963

Asiento No.	Boleto No.	NOMBRE DEL PASAJERO	LUGAR DE DESTINO
1	39633	Fco. [illegible]	[illegible]
2			
3	39634	Fco. [illegible]	[illegible]
4		~~[illegible]~~	Laredo
5	10347	Sra. Sandoval	Laredo
6	39648	J. Ramon Hernandez	Mty.
7	10357	y esposa.	Laredo
8	39649	Miguel Gallegos	[illegible]
9	10348	Sra. Morales	Laredo.
10	Pase	Nicolas Gonzalez	[illegible]
11	10351	Rafael Flores	Laredo.
12	10354	[illegible]	[illegible]
13		Angel Perez	
14	39650	Alfonso [illegible]	Mty.
15	10356	Sra. [illegible]	Laredo.
16	10353	[illegible]	[illegible]
17	10352	Constantino Garcia	
18	39659	Elizondo Gonzalez	Mty.
19	10353	Constantino Soriano	Laredo
20	3966[illegible]	y [illegible]	Mty.
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

20

16

8

Lunes, 30 de Septiembre 1963

Nº	Nombres	Procedencia	Ocupación	Nacionalidad
1	Jesus Gomez y Familia			
2	Leonardo Becerra	Leon Gto	Comerciante	Mex
3	Juan Reforza	S L P.		Mex
4	Antonio Avila	D F	Musico	mex
5	Jesus Gomez			
6	Fernando Valenzuela	Chihuahua	Empleado	mex
7	Angelica Vergara	Torreon Coah	Hogar	Mex
8	Ernesto Luna	Reynosa Tamps	Empleado	mex
9	Martin Guerrero	S L Poti	Empleado	mex
10	Jose Luna Meneses	Leon Gto	Empleado	mex
11	Pedro Quijano	Torreon Coa		Mex
12	Manuel Santos	Saltillo Coah	Empleado	mex
13	Raul Ramirez	Veracruz Ve.	Empleado	mex
14	Gabriel Contreras	Cd Juarez Ch	Empleado	mex
15	Julio Limon	S L Poti	Empleado	mex
16	Rodolfo V. Hernandez	Puebla Pue	Empleado	mex
17	Rodolfo Rodriges	Chihuahua	Empleado	mex
18	Lee HARVEY	S U A		
19	Cap Carrijo	Veracruz Ve	Cap mta	Mex
20	Santos Pedroza	Leon Gto	Empleado	mex
21	Moises Resendiz	Saltillo Coah	Empleado	
22	Guillermo Flores	Queretaro	Empleado	mex
23	Apolinar Raboza	Aguascalientes	Empleado	mex
24	Teofil. Velazquez	Irapuato Gto		Mex
25	Sanchez de La Rosa	Monterrey NL	Empleado	mex
26	Armando Rodriges	San Luis Poti	Empleado	mex
27				
28	Gregorio Perez	Puebla Pue	Empleado	mex
29	Manuel Gomez	Monterrey	Empleado	mex
30	Jose Gomez	Aguascalientes	Chofer	mex

7.

F.M.-8

ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS
SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION

DUPLICADO **Nº 24085**

0059

VALIDA POR 15 DIAS

BUENA PARA UN SOLO VIAJE POR ~~[illegible]~~ DIAS

Apellidos y nombre LEE, HARVEY OSWALD
FOTOGRAFO

Sexo H ☒ M ☐ Edad 23 AÑOS Estado Civil S ☐ C ☒

Documento con el que acredita su nacionalidad:
ACTA NACIMIENTO

Menores que lo acompañan:

Destino MEXICO, D. F.

NUEVA ORLEANS, LA., EUA., 17 SEPTIEMBRE DE 1963.
Lugar y fecha

CONSULADO GENERAL DE MEXICO

Lee H Oswald
Firma del Interesado

PARA SER LLENADO EXCLUSIVAMENTE POR LAS AUTORIDADES DE POBLACION (MIGRACION).

ENTRADA
SET 26 1963
Sello fechador
HELIO [illegible] [illegible]
NUEVO LAREDO, TAMPS.

SALIDA
Sello fechador

T. G. N.—4505-63

ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS
SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION

ORIGINAL **Nº 24085**

0099

VALIDA POR 15 DIAS

BUENA PARA UN SOLO VIAJE POR ~~(CINCO)~~ DIAS

Apellidos y nombre LEE, HARVEY OSWALD
FOTOGRAFO

Sexo H ☒ M ☐ Edad 23 AÑOS Estado Civil S ☐ C ☒

Documento con el que acredita su nacionalidad:
ACTA NACIMIENTO

Menores que lo acompañan:

Destino MEXICO, D. F.

NUEVA ORLEANS, LA., EUA., 17 SEPTIEMBRE DE 1963.
Lugar y fecha

CONSULADO GENERAL DE MEXICO

Lee H Oswald
Firma del Interesado

PARA SER LLENADO EXCLUSIVAMENTE POR LAS AUTORIDADES DE POBLACION (MIGRACION).

ENTRADA
SET 26 1963
Sello fechador
HELIO [illegible] [illegible]
NUEVO LAREDO, TAMPS.

SALIDA
Sello fechador

SRIA. DE GOBERNACION
OFICINA DE POBLACION
AUTORIZO
ALBERTO ARZAMENDI CHAPA
Nuevo Laredo, Tamps
OCT. 1963

ADVERTENCIAS

1. EL IMPUESTO QUE CAUSA E[illegible]E DOCUMENTO ES DE $ 6.25.
2. Autoriza al titular a permanecer en México 5 (cinco) días improrrogables, a partir de la fecha de su entrada al país.
3. No podrá desarrollar actividades distintas a las de recreo.
4. Si el titular se internó con menores, deberá salir acompañado de ellos.
5. Este documento deberá ser entregado a las Autoridades de Migración del lugar por donde efectúe su salida del país.

ATTENTION

1. TAX APPLICABLE TO THIS DOCUMENT: $ 6.25 MEXICAN CURRENCY (DLS. 0.50).
2. The legal holder of this permit is authorized to remain in Mexico for a period not to exceed 5 (five) days (not renewable) starting from the date of his entry into the country.
3. Issued only for pleasure trips.
4. If bearer enters the country accompanied by minors, upon departure he must leave with them.
5. This document must be surrendered to the Migration Authorities at the time and place of departure from the country.

OBSERVATION IMPORTANTE

1. CE DOCUMENT EST SOUMIS A UN IMPOT DE $ 6.25 PESOS MEXICAINS (U.S. $ 0.50).
2. Le titulaire de ce document est autorisé à séjourner au Mexique pendant une période qui ne pourra, en aucun cas, dépasser 5 (cinq) jours à partir de la date de son entrée dans le pays.
3. Il ne pourra exercer aucune activité autre que celle de touriste.
4. Si le titulaire est entré au Mexique accompagné de mineurs, ceux-ci devront obligatoirement quitter le pays en même temps que lui.
5. Ce document devra être remis aux Autorités Mexicaines du port de sortie au moment du départ du pays.

ADVERTENCIAS

1. EL IMPUEST[illegible]UE CAUSA ESTE DOCUMENTO ES DE $ 6.25.
2. Autoriza al titular a permanecer en México 5 (cinco) días improrrogables, a partir de la fecha de su entrada al país.
3. No podrá desarrollar actividades distintas a las de recreo.
4. Si el titular se internó con menores, deberá salir acompañado de ellos.
5. Este documento deberá ser entregado a las Autoridades de Migración del lugar por donde efectúe su salida del país.

ATTENTION

1. TAX APPLICABLE TO THIS DOCUMENT: $ 6.25 MEXICAN CURRENCY (DLS. 0.50).
2. The legal holder of this permit is authorized to remain in Mexico for a period not to exceed 5 (five) days (not renewable) starting from the date of his entry into the country.
3. Issued only for pleasure trips.
4. If bearer enters the country accompanied by minors, upon departure he must leave with them.
5. This document must be surrendered to the Migration Authorities at the time and place of departure from the country.

OBSERVATION IMPORTANTE

1. ÇE DOCUMENT EST SOUMIS A UN IMPOT DE $ 6.25 PESOS MEXICAINS (U.S. $ 0.50).
2. Le titulaire de ce document est autorisé à séjourner au Mexique pendant une période qui ne pourra, en aucun cas, dépasser 5 (cinq) jours à partir de la date de son entrée dans le pays.
3. Il ne pourra exercer aucune activité autre que celle de touriste.
4. Si le titulaire est entré au Mexique accompagné de mineurs, ceux-ci devront obligatoirement quitter le pays en même temps que lui.
5. Ce document devra être remis aux Autorités Mexicaines du port de sortie au moment du départ du pays.

36-69

VINCENT THEODORO LEE.

Escritor norteamericano, soltero, de 35 años de edad.

Entró al país, procedente de New York, por Aeronaves de México, el día 26 de diciembre de 1962, de tránsito para Cuba, con el Pasaporte B-073217 y con la FM5 - 4242757.

Salió el 29 del mismo diciembre por Cubana de Aviación, rumbo a La Habana, Cuba, para asistir a los festejos del IV Aniversario del -- triunfo de la Revolución Cubana.

Regresó a México por la misma compañía el 21 de enero de 1963,- saliendo a New York al día siguiente, por Aeronaves de México.

Se ~~rumora~~ Sabe que el citado escritor tenía relaciones con LEE HARVE OSWALD y que inclusive cruzaba correspondencia con éste, motivo por el que se le investiga.

36-69-63 DIC 16 196 ARCHIVO

10 de diciembre de 1963.

EL TITULAR SALE DEL PAIS CON ESTA FECHA

SELLO DE LA OFNA. DE POBLACION

LUGAR Y FECHA

FIRMA DEL FUNCIONARIO DE POBLACION

FIRMA DEL TURISTA

ADVERTENCIAS

1.—Este documento es improrrogable; sólo debe ser usado por su titular; no debe ser transferido ni usado por otra persona; deberá entregarlo a las autoridades de Migración a su salida del país; de no hacerlo así, por causas imprevistas, deberá remitirlo por correo a: SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION, DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION, BUCARELI 99, MEXICO, D. F.

2.—El turista sólo podrá permanecer en México el tiempo autorizado, y tiene estrictamente prohibido trabajar o dedicarse a cualquiera actividad remunerada o lucrativa.

3.—La violación de cualquiera de las disposiciones anteriores será severamente castigada por mandato de la Ley.

ATTENTION

1.—This card is valid only for the period of time granted and cannot be extended; it can only be used by the person in whose name it is issued; it should be given to the migration officers upon leaving this country; if due to unforeseen circumstances you cannot deliver it as specified above, it must be mailed to: SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION. DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION. BUCARELI 99, MEXICO, D. F.

2.—the tourist can only remain in Mexico for the time authorized by this permit and may not engage in any work nor carry on any activity for gain or remuneration.

3.—The violation of any of the foregoing regulations will be severely punished.

36-69

ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION

DUPLICADO **Nº 4242757**

ESTE DOCUMENTO AUTORIZA A SU TITULAR PARA INTERNARSE EN LA REPUBLICA MEXICANA HASTA EL DIA 19 de Marzo de 1963 Y PARA PERMANECER EN LA MISMA 180 Días DIAS DESDE LA FECHA DE ENTRADA EN CALIDAD DE "TURISTA".

AUTORIZACION DE GOBERNACION

AERONAVES DE MEXICO
DEC 24'62
3-NEW YORK

New York 19, Dec. 1962

LUGAR DE EXPEDICION DEL DOCUMENTO Y FECHA

SELLO DE LA OFICINA EXPEDIDORA DEL DOCUMENTO

FIRMA DEL FUNCIONARIO DE POBLACION

LISTA DE PASAJEROS
PASSENGER MANIFEST

PROPIETARIO O ADMINISTRADOR
Owner or Operator
AERONAVES DE MEXICO

AERONAVE *Aircraft*: XA-NUS DC-8 MEXICANA.
MATRICULA, MARCA NACIONALIDAD (*Registration Marks and Nationality*)
VUELO No. *Flight No.*: 400
FECHA *Date*: 22 JANUARY 1963.
PUNTO DE EMBARQUE *Point of Embarkation*: MEXICO, D. F. MEXICO.
(LUGAR Y PAIS) (*Place and Country*)
PUNTO DE DESEMBARQUE *Point of Disembarkation*: IDLEWILD NEW YORK, U.S.A.
(LUGAR Y PAIS) (*Place and Country*)

APELLIDO E INICIALES *Surname and Initials*	SOLO PARA USO DEL PROPIETARIO O ADMINISTRADOR *For use by Owner or Operator Only*	PARA USO OFICIAL SOLAMENTE *For Official use Only*
1.- BABITLER BEATRICE.		
2.- LEONARD SONYA.		
3.- VIDAL SERRA GUILLERMO.		
4.- BUSH JOHN.	(F)	
5.- BUSH LOIS.	(F)	
6.- TARRE SEÑOR MORRIS.		
7.- TARRE SEÑORA NATALIE B.		
8.- PIZZELLA JEAN.		
9.- OBERMAN ABBY.		
10.- COTZ ADAM.	(F)	
11.- MORTKER ALEXANDER KIERAN.	(F)	
12.- THOMPSON WILLIAM B.		
13.- ZASTRO JAMES JOMACK.		
14.- GERSHON SADYE.		
15.- MORENO SANCHEZ MANUEL.	(F) "VIP"	
16.- ZAPATA VELA CARLOS.	(F) "VIP"	
17.- OTAMENDI CONTRERAS NICOLAS.	(F) "VIP"	
18.- THEODORE VICENT LEE.	X	
19.- ROMAN CELIS CARLOS.	(F) "VIP"	
20.- AVENDAÑO VALDEZ JORGE.		
21.- ARANO DE AVENDAÑO DORA.		
22.- MATTY VALDEZ.		
23.- LARIS JOSE LUIS.	(F) "VIP"	
24.- MC AULIFFE JOHN.		
25.- MC AULIFFE BROWN MARTHA.		
26.- BESSUDO PEREZ ISAAC.	(F) "VIP"	
27.- AZUAR HOEFLICH TOBIAS.		
28.- DONOHUE JOHN.		
29.- FELIX JORGE ARCOS.		
30.- SALAZAR MORENO MARIA DEL CARMEN.		
31.- RAIMOTTO ANDREINA.	(F)	
32.- GRASSETTO DORA.	(F)	
33.- GRASSETTO IVONNE.	(F)	
34.-		
35.-		

AUTORIZADA LA SALIDA

26.

5

LISTA DE PASAJEROS
PASSENGER MANIFEST

PROPIETARIO O ADMINISTRADOR / Owner or Operator: **AERONAVES DE MEXICO, S.A.**

AERONAVE / Aircraft: XA-NUS DC-8 MEXICAN (Matrícula, Marca y Nacionalidad) (Registration Marks and Nationality)   VUELO No. / Flight No.: 401   FECHA / Date: DEC. 26/62

PUNTO DE EMBARQUE / Point of Embarkation: NEW YORK CITY, USA (Lugar y País) (Place and Country)   PUNTO DE DESEMBARQUE / Point of Disembarkation: MEXICO D.F., MEXICO (Lugar y País) (Place and Country)

	APELLIDOS E INICIALES Surnames and Initials		SOLO PARA USO DEL PROPIETARIO O ADMINISTRADOR For use by Owner or Operator Only		PARA USO OFICIAL SOLAMENTE For Official use Only
1	BOLATIN GEORGE		USA	16A	
2	BELFER FLORENCE		USA	18B	
3	SCOTT PETER		USA	22A	
4	OLIVET MARILYN		U.S.A.	11A	
5	ZIMMER ISRAELA		U.S.A.	19E	
6	ZIMMER MICHAEL		U.S.A.	19F	
7	MASKOWSKI CARL		U.S.A. CHD	6E	
8	MASKOWSKI HENRY		U.S.A.	6F	
9	MOLINA ELKIN		COLOMBIAN	20B	
10	GUERRERO DALIA		COLOMBIAN	20A	
11	WINZINGER GEORGE	(F)	U.S.A.	5A	
12	WINZINGER FLORENCE	(F)	U.S.A.	5B	
13	REIFSNYDER PAUL		U.S.A. CHD	6A	
14	REIFSNYDER DAVID		U.S.A.	6B	
15	REIFSNYDER MARGARET		U.S.A.	6C	
16	PORTER VICTOR LUIS		ARGENTINE	19A	
17	TANNENBAUM FRED		U.S.A.	12A	
18	RIVERA MARIA		U.S.A.	9F	
19	MCKARGEL TERNA		U.S.A.	18F	
20	DOUGHTY WILLIAM		U.S.A.	17A	
21	VALDESPINO G. JUVENAL		MEXICAN	22F	
22	KELLER HUGO	(F)	U.S.A.	5D	
23	HAHL SALLY		U.S.A.	6F	
24	LEE VINCENT		X U.S.A.	14D	
25	DALE FRANK		U.S.A.	8A	
26	GRIER HARRY		U.S.A.	17F	
27	CIUDAD GOMEZ JOSEFA		SPANISH	16A	
28					TOTAL PAX 26
29					
30					
31					
32					
33	ONE UNACCOMPANIED BAG TAG # 1293[illegible]				

12

54



VIGENT LEE

2.67

LA HABANA, CUBA

FOR USE BY OWNER OR OPERATOR ONLY
PARA USO EXCLUSIVO DEL PROPIETARIO O ADMINISTRADOR

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PARA USO EXCLUSIVO DE [illegible] AUTORIZADOS

Sur 97 # 13 Mex 8
32 [illegible] DE MADRIGAL, Esperanza — F MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 [illegible] — [illegible]-28

Calle 104-15 U. Modelo
33 RAMOS [illegible], [illegible] — F [illegible] RGJ PTY [illegible] — [illegible]

Sale a Merida
34 ALVAREZ DE GUTIERREZ, Zoila — F MEXICO RGJ PTY [illegible] — [illegible]

NO VIAJA
35 SANCHO [illegible], Antonia — NO VIAJA — MEXICO RGJ PTY [illegible] — [illegible]-28

Calle 30 - # 31 Col Mex Merida Yuc
36 [illegible], Celia — MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-30389[illegible] — [illegible]

18 Pte 2226 Puebla Pue. — M.B.8198-28
37 [illegible], Julia — MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303937 — PP-1195

Ayda 23 - Esquina — M.B.8198-28
[illegible] (…EDIO) — F MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303844 — PP-78996

Camelias — M.B.8198-28
[illegible] — MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303842 — PP-78996

San Angel Inn — M.B.8198-28
[illegible] — MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303843 — PP-78996

Camelia 22 Mex 20
[illegible] — MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303845 — PP-79137

Apdo Post 31 A[illegible] — M.B.8198-28
[illegible], Maria — F MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-30390[illegible] — PP-80306

Igual — Igual — M.B.8198-28
[illegible], Irendira — F MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303099 — PP-80325

Consulado 81-6 Mex 17 — M.B.8198-28
[illegible] OSUNA, [illegible] — F MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-304592 — PP-00515

Rep Salvador 147-2 — M.B.8198-28
45 ECHAVARRIA DE GUTIERREZ, Berta — F MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303957 — PP-78149

Sur 71 A 223 Mex 13 — M.B.8198-28
46 [illegible] MARTINEZ, Donist — F MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303897 — PP-80336

Cuauhtemoc 1-7 Mex 14 — M.B.8198-28
47 [illegible] CARRASCO, Maria D. — F MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303926 — PP-77043

Oro 273-16 — M.B.8198-28
48 [illegible] DE MORA, Elizabeth — F MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303831 — PP-78647

Calle 104 # 15 Mex 13 — M.B.8198-28
49 LEZA [illegible], Tania — F MEXICO RGJ PTY [illegible]46257 — PP-27889

Victoria 4 [illegible] — M.B.8198-28
50 CAMPOS, Rafael — M MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303959 — PP-76432

[illegible] 66 — M.B.8198-28
51 PLIEGO GALICIA, Sara — F MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303955 — PP-37060

Gral Anaya 51 Churubusco — M.B.8198-28
52 RAMIREZ ORTEGA, Socorro — F MEXICO RGJ PTY 1 62-303927 — PP-03435

Perro [illegible] $ 6.10 1565-4437 — DIPLOMATICO $28.00
Emb Cubana
53 GARCIA LARA, Jose A. — M CUBA [illegible] 1 62-298706 — PD-62/213

TROA — M.B.8075-24
54 LEE, Vincent (TR[illegible]) — M USA RGJ — 1 62-298730 — PP-D-073217

TROA — M.B.8202-28
55 LECHARD, Sonya (TR[illegible]) — F USA RGJ PTY [illegible]2-53032 — PP166645

Brado — DIPLOMATICO
56 FERNANDEZ [illegible] — M NICARAGUA RGJ PTY [illegible]113093 — PP-860

TACA — M.B.8146-23
57 GUILLEN [illegible] — [illegible] — [illegible]303977 — PP-37450

TACA TACA — M.B.8147-28
[illegible] — [illegible] — PP-23542

Igual — M.B.8148-27
[illegible] — [illegible] — PP-31560

H. Canada — [illegible]-28
[illegible] — [illegible] — [illegible]73069

Igual — [illegible]1-28
H. Canada — [illegible] — [illegible]59145

56

OWNER OR OPERATOR
PROPRIETARIO OU RESPONSAVEL
PROPIETARIO O ADMINISTRADOR

COMPAÑIA CUBANA [illegible]

AIRCRAFT / AERONAVE: CUT -469
(REGISTRATION MARKS AND NATIONALITY) (MATRICULA E NACIONALIDADE) (MATRICULA, MARCAS Y NACIONALIDAD)

FLIGHT NO. / VIAGEM No. / VUELO No.: 465

DATE / DATA / FECHA: DIC 26, 6[illegible]

POINT OF EMBARKATION / PONTO DE EMBARQUE / PUNTO DE EMBARQUE: MEXICO, D.F., MEXICO.
(PLACE AND COUNTRY) (LUGAR E PAIS) (LUGAR Y PAIS)

POINT OF DISEMBARKATION / PONTO DE DESEMBARQUE / PUNTO DE DESEMBARQUE: HABANA, CUBA.
(PLACE AND COUNTRY) (LUGAR E PAIS) (LUGAR Y PAIS)

SURNAME AND INITIALS SOBRENOME E INICIAIS APELLIDOS E INICIALES	FOR USE BY OWNER OR OPERATOR ONLY PARA USO EXCLUSIVO DO PROPRIETARIO OU RESPONSAVEL SOLO PARA USO DEL PROPIETARIO O ADMINISTRADOR	FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PARA USO EXCLUSIVO DAS AUTORIDADES PARA USO OFICIAL SOLAMENTE
63 - FERRADA MERCEDES	PP 07048 CHILE CORT ICAP PTY60	
64 - JULIA DEL CARMEN SOTO	PP 66375 CHILE CORT H LIBRE PTY	
65 - PERLA GRIMBLATT K	PP 1037 CHILE CORT H LIBRE PTY	
66 - DE FORNO AMERICA ROSA	PP 131653 GUA CORT ICAP PTY6	
67 - FORNO ENRIQUE CARLOS	PP 131657 GUA CORT ICAP PTY	
68 - CASTELLANOS PROSPERO J	PP 131680 GUA CORT ICAP PTY	
69 - LEE VICENT	PP B073217 X U.S.A H LIBRE 2/20	
70 - RASOUMEININ MIKHAEL	PP 12090 RUSIA EMB R. 2/150	
71 - SAMOILOV PTR	PP 12066 RUSIA EMB R PTY	
72 - JOSE DE JESUS GAMBOA P	PP PROV YUCATAN 1592 MEX TUR RIVIERA 2/20	
73 - EMILIO FELIPE VERA	PP PROV YUCATAN 1593 MEX TUR RIVIERA 2/20	
74 - MENENDEZ ALVARO	PP 44989 PANAMA CORT H LIBRE 3/29	
75 - RUFINA BORGHEZ Y DE LA F	PP 8430 MEX CORT H NAL DE C SIN	
76 - PEPIN FRANCOIS	PP DIP 370 FRANCIA DIP E. F. 3/50	
77 - PEPIN IVONNE	PP DIP 371 FRANCIA DIP E. F. PTY	
78 - BOLAN PEREIRA GILBERTO	PP 36130 MEX TUR H LIBRE 1/12	
79 - ENIO BENITEZ GIMENO	PP D/61/249 CUBA DIP MINREX 2/40	
80 GERARDO GONZALEZ O	PP D/62/468 CUBA DIP MINREX PTY	
81 - NORBERTO ALMARAL GONZALEZ	PP D/62/ 217 DIP CUBA MIRENR PTY	

SALIDA AUTORIZADA POR MIGRACION A LAS 7.00 HS CON 81 PASAJEROS Y 07 TRIPULANTES

26

15

PREPARED BY ———— PAGE / FOLHA ———— OF / DE ————

LEE HARVEY OSWALD

Con motivo del asesinato del presidente de los Estados Unidos **John F. Kennedy**, se tuvo conocimiento que **Lee Harvey Oswald**, había estado en México anteriormente, por lo que se procedió a efectuar la investigación correspondiente.

Actividades de **Lee Harvey Oswald** en México.

El 26 de septiembre de 1963, **Oswald** tomo el ómnibus número 5133 de la línea Continental Trailways en Houston y partió a las 2:25 AM rumbo a Laredo Texas, pasando por Corpus **Christy** y **Alice**, dos turistas británicos, el **Dr. Johnson B. McFarland** y su esposa de fijaron en Oswald aproximadamente a las 6:00 AM, y **Oswald** les comentó que iba a Cuba vía la Ciudad de México.

Oswald obtuvo un permiso de estancia por 15 días (folio 149 FM8)y cruzó la frontera entre Laredo, Texas y Nuevo Laredo México, entre la 1:30 y 2:00 PM. En Nuevo Laredo, México, viajó con destino al Distrito Federal en el autobús 516 de la línea Flecha Roja, que partió a las 2:15 PM, el cual tenía calculada su llegada al Distrito Federal a las 9:45 AM. Al día siguiente (27), en curso del viaje que duró 20 horas aproximadamente **Oswald** conoció a dos jóvenes de nacionalidad Australiana a los que les comentó que hacia tiempo había visitado la Unión Soviética, y que les recomendaba cuando arribaran a México, D.F., se hospedaran en el hotel "Cuba", ya que él en anteriores visitas se había hospedado en él, el autobús arribó a la ciudad de México, con 15 minutos de retraso, eran las 10:00 AM, aproximadamente. Posteriormente **Oswald** se hospedó en la habitación 18 del hotel "Comercio" (cuyo propietario **es Guillermo García Luna**) ubicado en la calle de Shagun 9, Col. Guerrero.

Luego de haberse registrado en el mencionado hotel, **Oswald** se dedicó sin demora a la tarea de obtener el permiso para entrar a Cuba, por que las autoridades mexicanas no permiten que ningún ciudadano estadounidense que viaje a bordo de un avión con destino a Cuba sin la visa correspondiente, el pasaporte de **Oswald** tenía un sello en su pasaporte que le impedía viajar a Cuba.

Ese mismo día se entrevistó con **Silvia Tirado de Durán**, ciudadana mexicana, empleada de la embajada de Cuba en México, y le solicitó un visado para Cuba en tránsito para la Unión Soviética y fundamento esta solicitud con la presentación de su pasaporte en el cual especificaba que había vivido en Rusia durante tres años, presentó también su cédula de trabajo en ese país escrita en ruso, cartas en el mismo idioma, y comprobantes de que estaba casado con una mujer de nacionalidad soviética llamada **Marina Oswald**, además dijo que era director un organismo de apoyo a Cuba en la ciudad de Nueva Orleans y miembro del Partido Comunista de los Estados Unidos, dijo que tenía la intención de viajar a Cuba el 30 de septiembre de 1963, y permanecer por dos semanas o mas tiempo.

Oswald antes de visitar la embajada de Cuba se había entrevistado con **Pavel Antonovich Yatskov** y con **Valeri Vladimirovich Kostokov**, ambos funcionarios consulares de la embajada de la URSS en México, y que prestaban servicio como agentes de la KGB, sin embargo **Oswald** no pudo lograr el visado soviético. Ese mismo día por la tarde **Oswald** regresó a la embajada cubana llevando fotografías de pasaporte, siendo recibido por la señora **Durán**, esta llamó a la embajada de la URSS para preguntar si se le había otorgado la visa a **Oswald**, en la embajada soviética le contestaron que habría una demora para esa visa de unos cuatro meses, **Oswald** al enterarse de esa situación se puso furioso ya que al no obtener la visa soviética le negaron automáticamente la visa de tránsito para cuba, la señora **Durán** al notar la actitud **Oswald** llamó a **Eusebio Azcue** Cónsul de la Embajada de Cuba en México para que tratara de calmarlo, pero la conversación entre ambos se tornó agresiva, **Azcue** dijo a **Oswald** que en su opinión que gente como el perjudicaban a la Revolución Cubana por lo tanto no se le daría la visa que solicitaba.

Durante el día 28 de ese mismo mes y año **Oswald** siguió insistiendo ante las embajadas de Cuba y Rusia, para obtener los visados correspondientes, sin resultados positivos. El 29 de septiembre de 1963 **Oswald** asistió a una corrida de toros y por la tarde habría visitados unos museos y había visto una película en algún cine de la Ciudad de México.

El lunes 30 del mismo mes **Oswald** comenzó hacer los preparativos para su regreso a los Estados Unidos, reservando un espacio en Transportes del Norte a través de la agencia de viajes Transportes Chihuahua.

A las 8:30 AM, del 2 de Octubre de 1963, se le designo el asiento número 12 a nombre **H.O. LEE**, el día primero de octubre pago la cuenta del hotel incluida esa noche y alrededor de las 6:30 AM, salió del hotel para dirigirse a la terminal de Transportes del Norte y a bordar el autobús 332, asiento número 12 de la línea mencionada que salió a las 8:30 AM, con destino a Laredo, México, En la Ciudad de Monterrey, los pasajeros del autobús 332, transbordaron a un vehículo de relevo número 373 de la misma línea, que continuó hacia Laredo esa noche a las 10:00 PM. Cuando el autobús llegó a Laredo, México, autoridades mexicanas de Migración detuvieron a **Oswald**, debido a supuestas irregularidades en sus documentos turísticos, **Oswald** se quejo de las autoridades mexicanas cuando regresó al autobús, después de que las autoridades migratorias habían checado sus documentos. Hizo comentarios negativos de las mismas.

Siendo aproximadamente la 1:35 AM, del día 3 de octubre del mismo año, **Oswald** cruzó el puente internacional para dirigirse a Dallas, Texas, a donde arribó ese mismo día.

Se sabe que el expediente de Lee Harvey Oswald, existe en la Dirección General de Servicios Migratorios de la Secretaría de Gobernación y esta clasificado como confidencial.

23 noviembre de 1963

Con relación a **Rubén Durán Navarro**, quien fue detenido hoy en las calles de Heródoto No. 14-7 lugar donde fueron detenidos **Silvia Tirado de Durán** y su esposo **Horacio Durán Navarro** se tiene conocimiento de los siguiente:

Rubén Durán Navarro expresó ser originario de los Angeles, California, casado con **Betty Cerratos**, tener 38 años de edad, encontrándose en trámite su solicitud de nacionalidad mexicana, su oficio es decorador y esta empleado con su hermano **Horacio Durán Navarro** en un despacho que este último tiene en las calles de Veracruz 42 en esta ciudad y con teléfono 14-10-31. En 1960 se paso para Miami y visitó Cuba en donde permaneció 2 días y posteriormente se dirigió a Petesburgo, donde realizó un trabajo de decoración, hace aproximadamente un año visitó una exposición de pinturas en las calles de Tokio 63 en esta capital, lleva amistad con el **General José de Jesús Clark Flores**, a quien le ha hecho trabajos de decoración en Tijuana Baja California y a quien acompañó en un viaje que hizo a Rusia, permaneciendo 7 días en ese país, sus ingresos mensuales fluctúan entre 5 y 6 mil pesos, con respecto a su presencia en las calles de Heródoto No. 14-7 indicó a que esto obedeció a que vive en ese lugar junto con su esposa, a cerca de la presencia de **Silvia Tirado de Durán** y de **Horacio Durán Navarro** en su domicilio manifestó que su esposa tiene amistad con esas personas y que el día de hoy se encontraban de visita en ese lugar. **Rubén Durán Navarro** manifestó no conocer **a Lee Harvey Oswald**, presunto asesino del presidente de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica

Filiación de **Silvia Tirado Durán**

23 de Noviembre de 1963

Fecha de nacimiento: 22 de noviembre de 1937,
Lugar de nacimiento: México, D.F.
Nombre de los Padres: **Germán Tirado** y **Cleo Bazán.**
Esposo: **Horacio Durán Navarro**
Estado Civil: Casada
Estatura: 1:62 mts
Color: Blanco
Pelo: Castaño obscuro
Nariz: Recta
Ojos: Cafés claros
Cejas: Pobladas
Boca: Mediana
Mentón: vertical
Ocupación: Secretaria Bilingüe
Dirección: Av. Constituyentes 143-3
Señas particulares: ninguna visible
Estudios: Primaria, 3 años de Comercio en la escuela Bancaria y Comercial, estudios especiales, idioma Inglés y francés, filosofía un año
Ocupación Actual: Secretaria del Consulado de Cuba

Manifiesta nunca haber estado detenida por ningún delito.

Las declaraciones están firmadas por el declarante, así como por el Subdirector Federal de Seguridad, **Cap. Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, y por** los testigos de asistencia, **Lic. Fernando Ortíz de la Peña** y **Lic. Carlos Duran Lanz.**

Documento sin fecha que dice:

En relación con las aseveraciones contenidas en la protesta que con fecha 27 del presente mes, presentó el gobierno de la República de Cuba en la embajada de México en La Habana, en términos tales que fue devuelta como es sabido al propio gobierno cubano y que se refería a los supuestos actos violentos cometidos en la persona de la Sra. **Silvia Tirado de Duran**, durante la investigación de que fue objeto la tarde del sábado último, se aclara que en efecto con la finalidad de precisar algunos hechos la Dirección Federal de Seguridad la sometió ese día a un interrogatorio, desde luego no fue localizada la Sra. **Tirado de Duran** en el consulado cubano, ya que las autoridades mexicanas no tenían ninguna noticia de que estuviera al servicio de ese consulado, pues nunca la embajada de Cuba comunicó a la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, que ella estuviese empleada ahí, ni la propia Secretaría le exigió nunca un carnet de identificación. Además la **Sra. Tirado** nunca ha solicitado permisos al Congreso de la Unión para servir a un gobierno extranjero, por tanto la investigación que se efectuó con ella no fue en su calidad de empleada en el consulado de Cuba en México, pues nunca así la ha considerado el gobierno cubano, fue localizada en el domicilio de familiares suyos en las calles de Heródoto No.14 de esta ciudad, de donde sin emplear violencia alguna, ya que ella accedió a ocurrir en la oficina en la que se le citaba, fue traslada ahí y sometida a un interrogatorio sin coacción alguna.

Resultado del interrogatorio formulado a **Silvia Tirado de Duran** en la mañana del **28 de noviembre de 1963:**

Manifestó que conoció a **Carlos Lechuga Evil**, quien fue embajador de Cuba en México, y que llegó aquí cuando ella trabajaba como coordinadora en el Instituto Mexicano Cubano de Relaciones Culturales, personas con las que llegó a ser amistad, pero nunca le hizo trabajos personales que dicho ex embajador llegó a visitarla a su casa con motivo de una fiesta que hizo y la consideraba como su amiga, al que veía de forma mas o menos frecuente, que él mismo también llegó a entablar amistad con el esposo de ella, pero ella lo veía con mas frecuencia, al preguntársele si conocía a **Carol Soles, Thomas L. Ross, Richard J. Aranda, Harry Lee** y **Ramón Palomino** respondió que ni los conocía ni había oído hablar de ellos, excepto al último, al que aunque desconoce si sabe de él y a las actividades a las que se dedica también las desconoce, tampoco conoce a **Patricia Noriega**.

Dijo que trabajaba en el Instituto antes indicado, antes de prestar servicios como secretaria en el consulado, asistía a la embajada a ayudar a **Teresa Proensa**, consistiendo en tal ayuda en contestar los teléfonos y hacer labores secundarias pero que a la declarante nunca le asignó comisiones dicha Agregada Cultural fuera de la embajada, que a la misma la conoció desde antes de ser coordinadora del Instituto, ya que fue muy amiga de **Raúl Flores Guerrero**, esposo de la cuñada del de la voz, quien murió hace como tres años y medio por cuyo conducto la conoció que su referido concuño era maestro y escritor. Que tiene su actual ideología desde hace cinco años por convicción y basada en estudios, que no perteneció ni pertenece a grupos estudiantiles, respecto a la Liga Leninista-Espartáco expresó conocerla pero no esta de acuerdo con ella, sucediendo lo mismo con su esposo, pues admiran a **José Revueltas** como escritor, pero no como político dado que esta en desacuerdo con el lema de este instituto intitulado "Proletariado sin Cabeza" en el que plantea su tesis, y por tanto la del grupo Espartaco en la que trata de probar la existencia del Partido Comunista Mexicano, siendo que es obvio que el mismo sí existe aunque desorganizado, que no ha pertenecido a este organismo pero sí tiene amistad con sus directivos, como **José Revueltas** y los dos **Lizalde**, en cuanto al Partido Comunista aseguró no pertenecer a él ni haber tratado de hacerlo por no estar de acuerdo con el mismo, excepto en el aspecto de que él mismo apoya a Cuba, siguió diciendo que en el consulado entró ganado 1,500.00 mensuales, lo mismo que sigue percibiendo sin ingresos extras, ni siquiera por tiempo extra o por comisiones pues esto en Cuba se llama trabajo voluntario y no es remunerable, que cuando explicó su problema al embajador consistente en que había sido detenida le expresó que creía que no era necesario que él interviniera pero él le dijo que iba a formular una propuesta, que con este motivo no le dieron ningún otro tipo de ayuda ni le ofrecieron que se fuera a Cuba o se hiciese ciudadana cubana por que siempre ha quedado bien sentado de que la declarante y su esposo son mexicanos y no han querido irse a Cuba, que en una ocasión al saberse que su esposo era diseñador y esbozo una idea de hacer una escuela en Cuba le pidieron que fuera a hacerla o a diseñarla cosa que no aceptó por que como dice antes que nada es mexicano.

Respecto al Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos, se trata de una Institución coordinada en donde se centralizan las invitaciones que hacen diversos grupos que son los que pagan los gastos de los individuos, pero siempre por conducto del ICAP que no necesariamente son jóvenes los que van a Cuba como invitados por el ICAP, que ella esta agradecida por tal invitación pues recibió buen trato y satisfacciones cuando fue a Cuba, pero no sigue en contacto con el mismo ni tiene intervención con él dentro de sus funciones y tampoco puede facilitar el viaje a otros elementos por carecer de contactos con la gente de Cuba, pero las visas que solicita el ICAP las tramita directamente la embajada como lo hace con todos los individuos y esta clase de visas de cortesía o especiales no pasan por el consulado, que se limita a tratar los casos de visas pagadas, que no tiene contacto con nadie de la embajada Rusa, a la que únicamente ha asistido dos veces, una en la recepción que se le hizo a **Tereskova Igagari** y en el último aniversario de la Revolución de la URRSS, en esta vez última fue por que el Cónsul no tenía coche y le pidió que la acompañara pero solo estuvo ahí veinte minutos. Agrego que sí conoce a **María Dolores de la Mora**, que puede ser como de 27 años de edad. periodista que la conoció en la embajada de Cuba con motivo de la crisis de octubre y sólo la ha visto dos o tres veces tratándose de una persona muy simpática con la que ha entablado afinidad recíproca desde el momento en el que se conocieron y que una vez que la vio en el Instituto Mexicano Cubano ha tenido pláticas con ella pero en forma mínima, que no ha ido a su casa ni ella a la de esta, pero sí se han visto en el consulado sabiendo que pertenece a una familia aristocrática sin ser reaccionaria y que no va mucho a la embajada o por lo menos la declarante no la ha visto, que es guapa, que conoce a **Luisa Calderón**, Secretaría de la Delegación Comercial en la embajada cubana ya que trabajó ahí cuando la declarante empezó a trabajar en el consulado, persona soltera que aún cuando no la frecuenta la considera como su amiga tratándose de una persona blanca como de 22 a 23 años sin saber el cargo que ocupa, puede ser primera, segunda, tercera secretaría de la citada delegación comercial, misma que sí ha ido a la casa de la de la voz el día de su cumpleaños, vive con su mamá pero hace dos semanas se fue a Cuba por que su papá estaba enfermo y con ella fue al cine una vez.

A preguntas especiales contestó que en el consulado nada mas estaba ella y en cónsul respecto a **Lee Harvey Oswald** no se fijó muy bien en él la primera vez que estuvo en el consulado en la mañana a preguntar informes de cómo se iba a Cuba, pero en la tarde cuando tuvo el altercado con el Cónsul sí se fijó perfectamente en él y esta segura de que no lleva anteojos, respecto a un negro de pelo rojo no hay ninguno de esas características en la embajada a donde últimamente no ha llegado ningún elemento nuevo y con Carlos Lechuga no ha vuelto a tener ninguna relación por carta, telegrama o por medio de terceras personas, que a raíz de que le platicó al embajador lo de su detención no se le hizo ninguna insinuación para llevarla a Cuba y reitera que no conoce a nadie de la embajada Rusa.

Respecto a su viaje a Cuba donde estuvo con su esposo quince días narra lo siguiente:

Los últimos días del mes de noviembre de 1961, me dirigí a Cuba sin ser invitada y cubriendo los gastos de transportación de mi propio peculio, al arribo a La Habana en Cubana de Aviación me trasladé al hotel Victoria donde pagué mi hospedaje, siendo el segundo día de mi estancia en La Habana cuando me presente con el Sr. **Masola**, Director del Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos, para quien llevaba una carta de presentación del embajador **Portuondo**, en la que nos recomendaba a mi esposo y a mí para que fuéramos invitados, habiendo tomado habitación en La Habana Riviera que es el hotel para invitados, ya por cuenta del ICAP. El arribo de mi esposo a La Habana se efectuó a los tres días siguientes de mi llegada, dado que así lo habíamos convenido en viajar separadamente por temor a algún accidente aéreo y para no dejar en completo desamparo a nuestras familias, fuimos invitados a recorrer la provincia de Oriente, en compañía de una señora de origen brasileño y de nombre **Antonia**, esposa del pintor **Elvio Romero**, así como un individuo de origen africano del cual desconozco su nombre, y a invitación expresa del Sr. **Fernando Revueltas**, Director de Prensa Latina en Pinar del Río, lo acompañamos a visitar a su hija **Albita Revueltas**. En la Casa de las Américas fuimos recibidos por el Sr. **María Leyseca** y el Sr. **Mariano Rodríguez**, pintor, habiendo hecho recorridos desde La Habana a Santiago en automóvil y visitando los puntos intermedios, así mismo visitamos Manzanillo y en Centro escolar Camilo Cienfuegos, que esta al pie de la Sierra Maestra, estuvimos en Olguín, visitando granjas del pueblo y regresamos a Santiago en donde abordamos un avión de pasajeros con destino a La Habana, en esta última capital visitamos casi todas las escuelas de estructura de artes siendo atendidos por el personal de la casa de las Américas que se han mencionado, la esposa del escritor **Alejo Carpantier**, a pedido nuestro nos llevo a hacer una visita de cortesía al Sr. **Embajador Bosques**, en Varadero estuvimos, con el poeta **Pablo Armando Fernández** durante un día, en Pinar del Río en las Islas de Matambre, estuvimos en un campamento de alfabetizadores con **Fernando Revueltas**, el viaje de regreso lo hicimos igual que del de ida por separado, habiendo salido mi marido el viernes y yo el lunes siguiente.

Actividades Narradas por la **Sra. Silvia Tirado de Duran**, el domingo 24 de noviembre de 1963.

Estuvo el domingo por la mañana en la casa de su cuñado **Rubén Durán**, en la calle de Heródoto 14 Col. Anzures, donde ahí comieron, posteriormente se dirigieron cerca de las 18:00 horas, a visitar a un amigo de nombre **Orlando Barona**, quien es un profesor en el Instituto Politécnico Nacional, como a las 20:00 horas nuevamente estuvieron en su domicilio ubicado en Constituyentes 143 departamento 3, donde fue a visitarlos el **Lic. Luis Prieto** y como es muy amigo de su marido y de ella le plantearon todo lo relacionado a su detención, que los días lunes y martes se presento como de costumbre a su trabajo, pero como la habían encontrado nerviosa, le preguntaron que es lo que tenía y les platicó todo lo relacionado a su detención, al Cónsul y al Embajador de Cuba que había sido tratada con lujo de fuerza, ya que se le encontraba relacionada con **Lee Oswald**, por que fue la persona que trato de conseguir su visa para trasladarse a Cuba y que ella lo había atendido. Que ambos le dijeron que si en algo le ayudaban, a lo que ella les dijo que les agradecía su interés, pero que no lo creía necesario por lo que siguió trabajando normalmente.

Se encuentra una tarjeta de **Vincent Theodoro Lee**, escritor norteamericano, de 35 años de edad, entró a México procedente de Nueva York, el día 26 de diciembre de 1962, en tránsito para Cuba, con el pasaporte E-073217 y la FM5 4242757, salió el 29 del mismo diciembre por Cubana de Aviación, rumbo a La Habana, Cuba, para asistir a los festejos del IV aniversario del triunfo de la Revolución Cubana, regresó a México el 21 de enero de 1963 por Cubana de Aviación, saliendo a Nueva York el día siguiente por Aeronaves de México.

Se rumora de que el citado escritor tenía relaciones con **Lee Harvey Oswald**, y que inclusive cruzaba correspondencia con este, motivo por el cual se le investiga.

23 deNoviembre de 1963:

Gilberto Alvaro Ugarte (a) Alberto Sánchez, Nicaragüense de ideología comunista, que se encuentra alojado en el hotel Necaxa cuarto 208, ubicado en carretones 39 esquina anillo de Circunvalación, quien se sabe se trasladará a Cuba con pasaporte falso como ciudadano mexicano, con el objeto de llevar acabo un curso sobre terrorismo en aquel país, a expresado que el estuvo presente cuando **Lee Harvey Oswald** fue a entrevistar a los funcionarios del Consulado Cubana y también el se dio cuenta de que le fueron entregados 6.500 dólares al referido **Oswald** y que de esa entrega se dio cuenta la señora **Silvia Durán**, por que ella estaba presente. Se procedió a su detención.

Horacio Duran Navarro, ser mexicano por nacimiento, hijo de padre chileno y madre mexicana, dijo que su actividad es la diseñador industrial, que lleva una cátedra sobre esta materia en la Escuela Nacional de Artes Plásticas dependiente de la UNAM, recibiendo por esto un sueldo de 1.400 pesos mensuales, de 40 años de edad, casado, sin religión, con domicilio en Constituyentes 143 departamento 3 en esta ciudad, que los primeros ocho años de su vida los vivió en Los Angeles, California y posteriormente se vino a esta capital con sus padres **Rufino Durán** y **Lidia Navarro de Durán**, mas tarde se fueron a vivir a Santiago de Chile en donde permaneció por espacio de año y medio, volviendo a México el declarante con su hermano **Rubén**, viniendo despejés su hermana **Lidia** con su Madre, ingresó a la Escuela Nacional de Agricultura de Chapingo, en donde cursó cinco años de la carrera de Ingeniero Agrónomo, y como había practicado como diseñador industrial ahora practica siendo maestro de tal asignatura en la escuela de Artes Plásticas de la UNAM, dedicando su tiempo libre a trabajos particulares como diseñador por lo cual obtiene un ingreso aproximado de 5 mil pesos mensuales, que en 1950 contrajo matrimonio con la francesa **Lucille Dejardin** con la que procreo un hijo de nombre **Paul Durán Dejardin** quien a la fecha cuenta con 10 años de edad habiendo durado este matrimonio poco más o menos 6 años y a la desilusión, del vínculo matrimonial. El 5 de noviembre de 1958 contrajo nuevo matrimonio con su actual esposa **Silvia Tirado de Durán**, con la que ha procreado una niña de nombre **Patricia** de 3 años y medio de edad, que cuando conoció a su actual esposa esta trabajaba como secretaria en la galería "Proteo" y después empezó a avanzar con otras personas entre ellas el profesor **Agustín Cue Cánovas**, los agregados culturales de la embajada de Cuba y otros , en el Instituto Cubano de Relaciones Culturales "José Martí" donde prestó sus servicios como coordinadora y hace alrededor de cuatro meses presta sus servicios como secretaria en el consulado general de Cuba en esta ciudad, habiendo trabajado primero con el **Cónsul Eusebio Azcue** y ahora con **Mirabal**, percibiendo un sueldo de mil 500 pesos mensuales reconociendo que su ideología es de izquierda y simpatizante de la Revolución Cubana, aduciendo ser este el motivo por el cual le permite a su esposo trabajar y dedicarse a las actividades que desarrolla, manifestó que al comentar con su esposa el asesinato del presidente Kennedy, ya conociendo el nombre del presunto **autor Lee Harvey Oswald**, su esposa le comentó que le parecía que se trataba del mismo individuo que en últimos días había estado en el consulado cubano solicitando una visa para Cuba en tránsito hacía Rusia, dio curso a sus papeles de solicitud de visa pero al indicar que era necesaria primera la visa del consulado Ruso así como remitir su solicitud al consulado de Cuba, lo que desde luego tardaría algunos días **Oswald** se enojo y comenzó a alterarse por lo que **Silvia** llamó al cónsul **Azcue**, con quien tuvo un fuerte disgusto el solicitante, agregó que el nunca vio ni conoció a **Lee Harvey Oswald** y que en diciembre de 1961 hizo un viaje a Cuba acompañado de su esposa habiendo ellos pagado sus pasajes.

Silvia Tirado de Duran, manifestó ser mexicana por nacimiento de 26 años de edad, casada, sin religión, empleada con domicilio en el departamento 3 de la casa 143 de las calles de Constituyentes de esta ciudad, que esta casada con **Horacio Durán Navarro** desde el 5 de Noviembre de 1958, con el que ha procreado una hija de nombre **Patricia** que a la fecha cuenta con 3 años y medio de edad, que en julio o agosto de 1961 fue invitada a ingresar al Instituto Mexicano Cubano de Relaciones Culturales, que entonces presidía **Agustín Cue Canóvas** como coordinadora, que desde hacía tiempo tenía relaciones y visitaba con frecuencia a los funcionarios de la embajada Teresa Proenza **y Luis Albero** así como con las empleadas, pero principalmente con la secretaria del Cónsul **Eusebio Azcue, Mari Carmen Olabarri** de nacionalidad española y pariente de **Azcue**, que por este trabajo percibía 500 pesos mensuales, que en diciembre de 1961 la declarante y su esposo hicieron un viaje en avión a la habana, cubriendo sus respectivos pasajes pero todos los demás gastos en su visita a la isla fueron costeados por el

Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos, y la casa de Cultura, que no sabe cuanto gana su marido por sus entradas son muy irregulares siendo su único ingreso fijo el de la escuela con mil 200 cada mes, que tanto ella como su marido tienen automóvil y que simpatizan con el movimiento cubano y el socialismo, fue coordinadora del Instituto Mexicano Cubano de Relaciones Culturales, desde julio o agosto de 1961, que cursó la carrera de secretaria bilingüe en la escuela Bancaria, domina el inglés y sabe algo de francés y tiene estudios de filosofía, que es de ideología de izquierda de convicción, que esta de acuerdo con el comunismo pero no pertenece a ningún organismo político, ni ha participado en mítines ni actos de esta naturaleza, que en su casa han estado funcionarios de la embajada cubana, inclusive el Cónsul, conoce a casi todos los principales elementos de izquierda sin ser amiga de ellos, que excepto una visita a Brownsville, Texas, no conoce los Estados Unidos, que respecto al atentado del presidente Kennedy, cuando supo la noticia pensó que el autor era un maniático loco, que cuando supo que se trataba de un elemento del "Trato Justo a Cuba" no lo creyó al principio, que durante la visita del presidente Kennedy a México, no asistió a ningunos de los actos que le dedicaron en su honor, no tuvo ninguna intervención, en cuanto a su asesinato comentó con su esposo que pudiera haber sido por cuestiones raciales y cuando se enteró de que se trataba de **Lee Harvey Oswald** lo reconoció como la misma persona que hacía como dos meses se había presentado en el consulado cubano a solicitar una visa de tránsito para Rusia, habiéndosele grabado su nombre por las características especificas que este presentaba, que estaba casado con una rusa y pertenecía al "Trato Justo para Cuba", que checo sus datos en el archivo del consulado y entonces estuvo segura de que si se trataba del mismo individuo, que es rubio, bajo y vestido no elegante y el rostro se le ponía rojo cuando discutía, que se le negó la visa porque el cónsul le dijo que para obtenerla era preciso que previamente tuviera la visa del consulado de la U.R.S.S., y como este tramite dilataba como 4 meses y al solicitante le urgía salir de México, se alteró por lo que la declarante tuvo que llamar al Cónsul con el que tuvo un altercado, que la ayuda que pudo darle consistió en que le aconsejó que fuera al consulado Ruso, para lo cual habló con el encargado de esa oficina por teléfono y fue informada de que el tramite debía consultarse a Moscú por lo que el tramite demoraría unos 4 meses, y que en la tarde del mismo día regresó Lee al consulado cubano y la declarante le confirmó que solo le daría la visa cuando tuviera la del consulado Ruso, dándole un papel con los datos de su nombre y teléfono de la oficina, pero que por ningún motivo le dio a conocer su dirección porque no tenía porque dársena, dentro de sus atribuciones no esta la de llamar al consulado de la URSS y si lo hizo en forma oficiosa fue para ayudar a **Lee Harvey Oswald**, por su interés de servir y por el celo en su función, que si le dio a conocer su teléfono fue para que le preguntará posteriormente si ya se había obtenido el visado pero que jamás volvió a llamar.

Se hace mención que en el domicilio donde fueron detenidos los **Durán** en Heródoto No. 14-7, casa del cuñado de Silvia Durán de nombre **Rubén Durán** se detuvieron a las personas que estaban en ese domicilio.

Detención de la **Sra. Silvia Tirado de Durán**

27 de noviembre de 1963

Nos permitimos hacer de su superior conocimiento a usted, el día de la fecha, siendo las 09:32 horas de acuerdo con las ordenes recibidas nos trasladamos al domicilio de la Sra. **Silvia Tirado de Duran**, ubicado en Constituyentes No. 143 departamento 3 con el objeto de invitarla a estas oficinas a fin de interrogarla sobre los puntos relacionados a la investigación que se llevó a cabo el día 23 del presente mes. La Sra. **Silvia Tirado de Durán** ya en estas oficinas y a preguntas que se le hicieron contesto.

1 Que después de que fue detenida el sábado próximo pasado por la tarde tuvieron conocimiento en el consulado ~~de~~ cubano, ya que su hijo de 10 años avisó a unas personas quienes habían visitado su domicilio preguntando por ella.

2 Que el mismo 25 de los corrientes se presentó a trabajar haciéndole preguntas al respecto de su detención todo el personal del consulado, y posteriormente fue llamada por el Cónsul Sr. **Alfredo Mirabal y Díaz** para que le explicará y le diera todos los pormenores de su detención, estando presente también en esta entrevista el Sr. Embajador Dr. **Joaquín Hernández Armas**.

3 Que ella le narró todos los pormenores de esta detención y que únicamente le hicieron saber que si no se encontraba muy nerviosa que podía seguir trabajando.

4 Niega que ninguna persona tanto de la embajada, como del consulado cubano le haya dado la idea, aconsejado o invitado a que se fuera a La Habana, Cuba, inclusive dice que en ningún momento lo ha pensado primeramente por no dejar a su familia y no tener los medios para ir y en segundo lugar porque no tiene objeto dicho viaje.

29 de noviembre del 63.

El 27 de noviembre en acto para conmemorar, el 92°. Aniversario del fusilamiento de ocho estudiantes de medicina en cuba, celebrado en el Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil Delegación México, **Angel González**, Jefe del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil Cubano en México, culpó a Cuba de la muerte del Presidente **Kennedy** por que el asesino, **Lee Harvey Oswald**, quien pertenecía a un comité llamado "Trato Equitativo con Cuba", quien en el Fiar Play For Cuba Comitee, con sede en Nueva Orleans, en realidad es una agencia del comunismo internacional y estaba sufragado por el tirano **Castro Ruz**, lo cual se comprueba con una carta con orden de pago del Ministro de Educación de Cuba **Armando Harp**, al expresidente del Banco Nacional de Cuba Dr. **Raúl Cepero Bonilla**, fallecido recientemente en Brasil, y en cheque 11686, dirigido para su cobro al escritor norteamericano **Waldo Frank**, destacado dirigente del Comité Revolucionario.

13 de diciembre de 1963. En este expediente investigación relacionado con las personas que tuvieron que ver con el asesinato del Expresidente de los Estados Unidos **John F. Kennedy** y de la detención de **Silvia Tirado de Durán**, secretaria del Cónsul Cubano en México, con motivo de que **Lee Harvey Oswald**, presunto homicida del presidente de los Estados Unidos había estado en México, en septiembre.

De **Silvia Tirado de Duran** se sabe de fuente fidedigna que fue amante de **Carlos Lechuga Evía**, hasta el punto que la señora del embajador hizo las gestiones para un divorcio, para ayudar en cualquier interrogatorio de Durán las preguntas siguientes posiblemente podrán desarrollar algunos datos útiles e interesantes:

Amistad o contacto con un tal **Carol J. Soles**.- Detalles, americano residente en Corpus Christy, Texas, dueño de un Fiat 62, pacas 63 Texas KU-94-95, **Silvia** estaba con **Soles** en este coche en el mes de enero 1963 y se cree que tuvieron relaciones íntimas.

Amistad o contactos con un tal **Tomas L. Ross** - prueba - nombre supuesto.

Amistad o contactos con un tal **Richard J. Aranda**, americano residente en Texas, dueño de un Cadillac 1950, placas de Texas 1963 JF-96-75. **Silvia** estaba con **Aranda** en el coche arriba mencionado, en el mes de enero de 1963, y se cree que tuvieron relaciones íntimas.

Contacto con **Harvey Lee Saffe** – Detalles, americano residente en San Antonio, Texas, dueño del Chevrolet 1959, el cual estaba estacionado frente de la casa de la hermana de **Silvia** en el mes de enero de 1963.

Contacto con **Ramón Palomino** – Detalles.

Contacto con **Larry Fister** - prueba. Nombre supuesto.

¿Cómo fue la primera vez que Silvia sabía del complot de asesinar al presidente Americano? Detalles.

¿Otras personas metidas en el complot?

¿Que papel tuvo **Durán** en el complot?

¿Cuánto se pagó al asesino?

¿Fuera de **Durán**, las demás personas en la embajada cubana con quien tuvo contacto **Oswald**?

¿Cuánto recibió **Durán** por el papel en el Complot?

¿Por que quiso **Durán** irse a Cuba?

¿Quién dio a **Durán** las instrucciones para el viaje a Cuba?

¿Hace cuanto tiempo **Durán** trabajó con el G-2 cubano?

¿Detalles sobre el empleo, quien fue el contacto?

¿Que papel tuvo **Carlos Lechuga Evía** en el complot?

¿Cuál fue en último contacto de Durán con la embajada de la URSS, por que, con quien trataba **Durán** allá?

¿Cuánto recibe **Durán** por su empleo en la embajada cubana?

¿Cuando ~~de~~ se afilio **Durán** con el Partido Comunista?

¿En que banco depositaban los fondos de **Durán**?

¿En que nombre se depositan los fondos de **Durán**?

¿Quién es **Patricio Noriega**?- Prueba- (nombre supuesto)

¿Quién prometió a **Durán** el asilo en Cuba, cuando?

¿Quién indicó a **Durán** que recibiría la nacionalidad cubana?

¿Contacto con **Teresa Proensa**?- Detalles.

¿Cuando de afilio **Durán** con liga Leninista-Espartica?

¿La última vez cuando **Durán** viajo a Cuba, Detalles, Itinerario?

¿Conexión con I.A.C.P., detalles?

¿Nombre completo de **Durán**, fecha y sitio de nacimiento?.
¿Hace cuanto tiempo que **Durán** estaba metida en la labor de conseguir pasaportes mexicanos falsos para que viajen estadounidenses o de otra nacionalidad a Cuba?

¿ Con quien trabajó en este proyecto?

¿ Naturaleza del contacto con **María Dolores de la Mora**?- Detalles

¿Naturaleza del contacto con **Luisa Calderón**?- Detalles

¿Quién fue el jefe de **Durán** en la Embajada Soviética durante el mes de junio de 1963.

¿Oficiales recién llegados a la embajada cubana desde el primero de septiembre de 1963, sus cargos?- Detalles

¿Identidad de oficiales cubanos mandados especialmente en relación al complot de asesinar al presidente **Kennedy**?

¿Quién de los oficiales recién llegados tuvo contacto con **Oswald?**

¿Llevó **Oswald** anteojos durante los contactos con **Durán**?

¿La identidad del negro pelirrojo con cicatriz del lado derecho del mentón quien hace poco visitaba frecuentemente la embajada cubana, es empleado allá?- Detalles

Nota: Se hace notar que todas estas preguntas se encuentran entre corchetes con la leyenda D.O.S.-NO

Silvia Duran, cuyo nombre completo es **Silvia Tirado Bazán de Duran.**

Desde hace varios meses no presta ya sus servicios en el consulado de Cuba en esta capital, al ser detenida en estas oficinas, manifestó expresamente que es socialista y simpatizadora de la doctrina Marxista-Leninista siendo también simpatizante de la Revolución Cubana, aunque expresa no haber pertenecido nunca a ningún partido político, su domicilio sigue siendo Av. Constituyentes 143-3, aunque se pudo comprobar que en la actualidad se encuentra ausente de la ciudad de México, pero su esposo **Horacio Duran Navarro** sí esta en la capital viviendo en el domicilio antes expresado, tiene número telefónico 15-78-11 que se encuentra a nombre de **Rubén Duran Navarro.**

Entrevista a Gilberto Nolasco Alvarado Ugarte
Nacional Nicragüense

OSWALD

ACTIVIDADES DE
LEE HARVEY OSWALD
Y DOCUMENTOS
VARIOS

------En la Ciudad de México, Distrito Federal, siendo las -- 11.00 once horas del día 29 veintinueve de Noviembre de 1963 mil novecientos sesenta y tres, el suscrito Capitán FERNANDO GUTIERREZ BARRIOS, Subdirector de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad, que actúa legalmente con testigos de asistencia, HACE CONSTAR: Que habiendo sido presentado en esta Oficina el señor GILBERTO NOLASCO ALVARADO UGARTE, con el objeto de ser interrogado sobre los hechos que a continuación se expresan, se procedió a levantar la presente acta.------------------

------En seguida, presente el que en su estado normal manifestó llamarse GILBERTO NOLASCO ALVARADO UGARTE y protestado para que se conduzca con verdad y después de hacersele saber las penas en que incurren quienes declaran falsamente, por - sus generales dijo: llamarse como está escrito, de 24 veinticuatro años de edad, soltero, católico, con instrucción, -- de oficio chofer, originario de Ciudad Rama, Departamento de Celaya, Nicaragua, habiendose internado al País en forma ilegal por Ciudad Cuauhtémoc, Chiapas, y con domicilio en las - Calles de Pino 173 ciento setenta y tres, de esta ciudad, e- interrogado sobre los hechos que se investigan, DECLARO; - - Que llegó a México, el día 29 veintinueve de Agosto próximo-pasado, habiendose internado al País, como lo dijo en sus generales, en forma ilegal y cohechando con la suma de $ 200.00 doscientos pesos mexicanos, a un empleado de Migración, en - la frontera Mexicana-Guatemalteca; que la finalidad con que - vino a México, era compenetrarse de los movimientos comunistas en esta capital, especialmente de nicaragüenses, ya sea - residentes en el país o de tránsito hacia Cuba, lo que informaba al Mayor ROGER JEREZ ALFARO, Agregado Militar, adscrito- a la Embajada de Nicaragua en México; que el Mayor JEREZ, desde su arribo a México, conoció la misión que el de la voz - - traía, ya que la misma le fué ordenada por el Servicio de Inteligencia Militar de su País, con quien viene trabajando des trabajo de investigador e informador particular, esto es -- sin ningún carácter oficial, y por lo tanto devenga honorarios en relación con la información que pasa; que independientemente de ello y como ayuda para sus gastos personales, el Mayor ROGER JEREZ le pasa una ayuda de $ 400.00 cuatrocientos pesos al mes; que la información que él proporciona lo hace, al Mayor ROGER JEREZ y al General GUSTAVO MONTIEL, Jefe del Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército Nicaraguense, quien reside en Managua; que de acuerdo con lo que convenga al declarante, informa ya sea a JEREZ y a MONTIEL conjuntamente o lo que él estime pertinente para cada uno de ellos, por lo tanto hay información que dá a JEREZ sin pasarla a -- MONTIEL o a éste último sin el conocimiento de JEREZ; que -- con la finalidad de seguir de cerca los procedimientos que -. sus connacionales comunistas llevan a cabo para lograr ir a Cuba, el declarante se conectó, aparentando también ser comunista con la Embajada de Cuba, siendo introducido a la -- representación diplomática de dicho País, por conducto del - Profesor EDELBERTO TORRES, conocido comunista nicaraguense - con domicilio en General Zuazua número 37 treinta y siete interior 8 ocho, de esta capital, por lo que el citado Profesor lo presentó con un individuo a quien conoció con el nombre de CARLOS JOSE, funcionario de la Embajada Cubana, sin - que pueda precisar el cargo concreto que desempeñaba en la - misma, manifestando que ésto ocurrió más o menos el trese o cuatro de Septiembre último; que las señas de CARLOS JOSE -- de quien ignora su apellido, son las siguientes: como de un metro ochenta centímetros de estatura, de complexión gruesa, panzón, con papada y cachetón, de pelo castaño, ralo y lacio; que usa lentes color natural , y de piel color blanca; que - l presentarlo, el Profesor EDELBERTO TORRES le dijo a CARLOS OSE que el declarante era el muchacho de quien le había hablado, que era un

125

que solo había leído algunos libros sobre Marxismo, y que entonces el cubano le dió una palmada en el hombro diciéndole que "sería un buen camarada". Que al día siguiente, el de la voz volvió a ir a la Embajada Cubana, y en el patio de la misma vió a CARLOS JOSE, que le guiñó el ojo y al acercarse el declarante hacia él, pensando que lo llamaba, el cubano le hizo una seña con la mano dándole a entender que no se acercara, por lo que el dicente fué a la Oficina de la Embajada, donde le dieron varios folletos y propaganda impresa en Cuba; que en esta ocasión ya no habló con CARLOS JOSE ni lo ha vuelto a ver desde entonces; que ya no volvió a ir a la Embajada Cubana, pero que aproximadamente el diez o doce del mismo mes de Septiembre, el dicente fué con EDELBERTO TORRES al Consulado Cubano, y el profesor dejó al declarante en la puerta de dicho Consulado, pues tenía que ir a hacer un mandado, según le dijo al de la voz, por la calle Insurgentes; que tal parece que ya conocían el nombre del declarante en el citado Consulado, pues al llegar el de la voz y mencionar su nombre a una señorita, ésta le dió una hoja con un largo cuestionario para que lo llenara, cosa que ahí mismo hizo el que habla, devolviéndosela debidamente firmada a la propia señorita, la cual al recibir el cuestionario manifestó al de la voz que debía llevar tres fotografías; que hasta la fecha el declarante no ha llevado dichas fotografías, pero no obstante ello, siguió yendo al Consulado con la finalidad de ver si obtenía alguna información que pudiera servirle para proporcionarla al Mayor JEREZ o al General MONTIEL, por lo que se presentaba en las oficinas consulares ya mencionadas, con diversos pretextos, uno de ellos el de preguntar acerca de cómo le iban a proporcionar papeles para viajar a Cuba, ya que él no tenía pasaporte y está ilegalmente en el País, y así fué como se enteró de que por conducto de un abogado a a Cuba; que fué en una de estas ocasiones, y precisamente el miercoles 18 del repetido mes de Septiembre, en que al llegar el dicente al Consulado, alrededor de las once horas, vió sentado en un sillón, al lado izquierdo de la sala de espera del Consulado, entrando por la puerta de la esquina, a un norteamericano de un metro setenta y cinco centímetros de estatura, más o menos, complexión regular, más bien delgado, vistiendo pantalón gris, saco sport negro, camisa blanca y una corbata de cordón tipo texano, calzando zapatos cafés; que le llamó la atención del de la voz, el cutis muy pálido del individuo, su aspecto de tristeza y los ojos muy hundidos, siendo estos de color oscuro y que le dió la impresión de ser un drogadicto; que también le llamó la atención que el pelo de ese sujeto era oscuro en su mayor parte, pero tenía partes o mechones rubios, calculándole unos veintiseis años de edad aproximadamente. Que además de este individuo, que fué quien más le llamó la atención, estaban también en el Consulado una muchacha rubia, de pelo ondulado, y de unos veintiseis años de edad, más o menos, y una señora gorda como de treinta y ocho años, blanca, con pelo castaño, ésta al parecer mexicana por el acento de su voz; también estaba en el Consulado el Cubano que generalmente se ocupa de recibir y atender a las personas que llegan a esas oficinas; que el declarante se sentó en un sillón al lado opuesto de la entrada en que el norteamericano que le llamó la atención, se encontraba, y se puso a leer un libro; que cuando estaba en su lectura, notó que se estacionó un automóvil de alquiler en la puerta del Consulado, bajándose del vehículo dos personas, un negro, alto, de un metro ochenta y dos centímetros, aproximadamente, de estatura, de complexión delgada, pero fuerte, de ojos saltones, pómulos salientes, labios gruesos, pelo rojizo y muy aborregado, vistiendo traje color café, y un blanco, joven, como de veinte años, con apariencia de setenta centímetros y de complexión robusta; que al penetrar estas dos personas a la sala de espera del Consulado, inmediatamente se puso de pie el norteamericano a que hizo mención anteriormente, y se abrazó con cada uno de ellos, y juntos todos, atravesaron la sala de espera, entrando al privado del Cónsul, sin que el dicente los viera más por el momento; que según supo por lo que expresó la señora gorda en el interior del Consulado, el individuo blanco que llegó con el negro, es de nacionalidad canadiense, pues llevaba en la mano un pasaporte color rojo acreditando dicha nacionalidad; que alrededor de quince minutos después de que dichos individuos desaparecieron de su vista, el deponente atravesó la sala de espera del consulado con el objeto de penetrar al cuarto de los servicios sanitarios, y en el momento de bajar dos escalones que conducen a dicho cuarto, vió a un individuo fortachón, color moreno, alto, con lentes blancos qye trabaja en la Embajada Cubana porque posteriormente lo ha visto en la misma, hacer entrega al negro pelirrojo de un paquete aparentemente con dinero; que el dicente hizo uso del servicio sanitario y al salir del cuarto de baño, subiendose el cierre de la bragueta del pantalón, vió que en el extremo del pasillo anexo al excusado, estaban conversando acaloradamente, el negro, el canadiense y el norteamericano que antes habían entrado juntos al privado del Cónsul; que en este momento pudo notar que el negro ostentaba una cicatriz muy visible al lado derecho del mentón, y que contaba dinero que entregaba al norteamericano, alcanzando a oír el de la voz que mencionaba la cifra "six thousand and fivehundred dollars"; que al ver tal cosa, el dicente volvió a meterse al sanitario, dejando la puerta entreabierta, para poder seguir viendo y escuchando, y entonces notó que tanto el canadiense como el norteamericano, usaban fundas sobaquerascano: "I can go with you ", contestando el norteamericano -- "You are not a man", agregando: "I can do it, I can killhim"; que después de oír lo anterior, el declarante salió rápidamente del baño, percatándose con el rabillo del ojo de que -- las tres personas antes aludidas aún se encontraban en el extremo del pasillo, y subiendo los escalones que conducen a -- la sala de espera, el de la voz fué a sentarse al mismo sillón en que antes había estado. Que a los pocos instantes de haber se sentado, penetraron a la sala el negro con los dos blancos, aclara y dice que solamente entraron los dos blancos, esto es el norteamericano y el canadiense, y que se pusieron a platicar con una cubana rubia, de ojos azules grandes y de cejas - y pestañas bastante pobladas, y que tiene la particularidad - de ser muy alocada y fumadora, pareciéndole al dicente una -- prostituta, y que el canadiense le dió una nalgada en forma - familiar; que la empleada de referencia, le dijo al norteamericano, con quien se hablaba en forma efusiva, que vivía en - Juárez 407 cuatrocientos siete; que nuevamente el norteamericano y el canadiense penetraron al privado del Cónsul, y el - declarante salió a la calle con el objeto de comprar una paleta helada, y cuando ésto hacía, vió que también salían por la puerta principal de la Embajada, tanto el norteamericano como el canadiense y el negro, abordando un automóvil color negro, l parecer marca Cheyrolet y de reciente modelo, alejándose - umbo al centro. Que en esos momentos el de la voz pensó que- e estaba fraguando un crimen, por lo que pensó poner los he- hos en conocimiento de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de- orteamérica, no ocurriéndosele comunicar los hechos al Mayor OGER JEREZ ALFARO, Agregado Militar de Nicaragua en México,- de quien depende económicamente, debido a que creyó que no- incumbía o que tales hechos no eran de interés para él; -- e para el caso telefoneó, el veinte de septiembre, o sea -- s dias después de ocurridos los hech--

mal español tomó los datos que el dicente le proporcionó y que son los siguientes: JORGE KINOTH, Teléfono 30-19-52 treinta diecinueve cincuenta y dos, que corresponde al del lugar donde el de la voz trabajaba, o sea "Legumbres de México", S. A., ubicada en José T. Cuéllar y Calzada del Chavacano; que quedaron en la Embajada de llamarle por la tarde, pero como no lo hicieron, el declarante volvió a llamar al siguiente día, y manifestó a la persona que le contestó que quería pasar una información que creía de interés para la Embajada y que lo comunicaran con algún funcionario de la misma; que lo requirieron para que dijera de qué se trataba y al contestarles que era un asunto confidencial, le dijeron que no estuviera molestando, que si tenía algo que decir fuera personalmente a la Embajada, y le colgaron. Que no fué a la Embajada, en virtud de que, dado que se está conectando en la Embajada Cubana, pensó que seguro estaría vigilado por los G-2 Cubanos, lo que pondría en peligro su comisión; que se olvidó del asunto hasta que por la prensa se enteró del magnicidio cometido en la persona del Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica; que al ver publicada en la prensa la fotografía del presunto asesino del Presidente Kennedy, que entonces supo se llamó LEE HARVEY OSWALD, inmediatamente lo reconoció como el sujeto norteamericano que había visto el 18 dieciocho de Septiembre anterior en el Consulado Cubano en México, mismo a quien el negro le había entregado la cantidad de Dlls. 6,500 seis mil quinientos dólares y que había hablado de matar a alguien; y que nuevamente revivió en su mente los hechos presenciados por él, el mes de Septiembre, decidiendo a todo trance comunicarse a la Embajada Americana, por lo que llamó nuevamente por teléfono y en esta ocasión, sí logró hacer contacto con un funcionario de dicha representación Diplomática, que citó al de la voz, que había llamado a la Embajada Americana el lunes 25 veinticinco de recibiendo a la vez las de dos personas con las que se reuniría a la hora señalada; que exactamente a la hora indicada y estando el declarante en la esquina del Hotel María Isabel, llegó un automóvil pequeño, color verde, del que descendieron dos norteamericanos, uno de ellos muy alto, grueso, de anteojos, viejo, y el otro de estatura mediana, de unos treinta y ocho años de edad, rubio y de complexión robusta; el primero hablaba muy poco español, en tanto que el más joven hablaba ese idioma con bastante fluidez; que inmediatamente se reconocieron y una vez hecho ésto, el de la voz abordó junto con los norteamericanos el automóvil en que habían llegado, dando vuelta por una de las calles inmediatas al Hotel María Isabel, y yendo a estacionarse como a tres cuadras del mismo; que en este lugar comenzó a narrar los hechos sobre los que ha declarado, manifestándoles que lo hacía en forma desinteresada y con el solo deseo de serles útil, y les comunicó también que estaba actualmente incrustado entre el elemento comunista de su país, para pasar información en ese sentido y que además también estaba en tratos con la Embajada de Cuba para irse a La Habana, en Enero, ya que en dicha capital recibiría un curso de terrorismo y sabotaje; que en esta ocasión se identificó plenamente con los norteamericanos, dándoles su nombre verdadero y ellos a su vez se identificaron con el de la voz, enseñándole credenciales del F. B. I., y citándose para el día siguiente a las 9.15 nueve horas quince minutos en el Restaurante Gena, ubicado en la esquina de Avenida Morelos y Paseo de la Reforma; que el dicente llegó a la cita puntualmente y ya estaban ahí esperándolo el individuo más joven de los del día anterior y otro, chaparrito, rubio, de unos 40 cuarenta años de edad, con lentes oscuros, y que se llama RODOLFO GAVALDON, recordando bien este nombre por ser un nombre latino; el viejo del día anterior no hizo acto de presencia en esta ocasión; que en vez de entrar al "Jena", atravesaron la calle y pone-

-- alusión alguna al motivo que los reunía, saliendo GAVALDON -- del café a traer un automóvil, regresando con éste unos diez-minutos después de su salida, y abordando el vehículo los - - tres, se fueron por el anillo Periférico, conversando dentro del automóvil del asunto pero en forma muy superficial; que - -- en un momento dado GAVALDON quien conducía el automóvil, se-- estacionó en una calle desconocida para el de la voz y dentro -- del vehículo entraron ya en materia, narrando nuevamente los-hechos que había puesto en conocimiento de los norteamericanos el día anterior; que al terminar su relato, los norteamericanos le dieron un billete de $ 100.00 cien pesos, que el - - - de la voz rehusó, asegurándoles a los gringos que él les estaba dando la información desinteresadamente, dejando el billete sobre el asiento del coche; que no obstante , los norteamericanos insistieron y finalmente afuerza le metieron en una - - bolsa el mencionado billete; que quedó citado con los mismos-para el mismo día, pero sin fijar la hora, pues quedaron los- -- americanos de llamar al declarante al Hogar en que se aloja,-con teléfono 41-07-31 cuarenta y uno cero siete treinta y uno, llamándole a las 20:45 veinte horas cuarenta y cinco minutos.-

al Cónsul MIRAVAL, a la cubana de ojos azules que recibió la nalgada del canadiense y que los propios norteamericanos le dijeron que se llama MARIA LUISA, y a un cubano viejito que hace funciones de ordenanza en la Embajada y en el Consulado Cubano; que también identificó al cubano que funge como recepcionista en el Consulado Cubano, y a otras personas más que ha visto también en la Embajada Cubana, cuyos nombres y cargos ignora.- Que después de haber narrado los hechos y de haber hecho un croquis del Consulado Cubano, señalando lugares tanto de personas como de muebles, para ilustrar su relato, los propios norteamericanos le sugirieron, contra su voluntad, la conveniencia de cambiarse a un Hotel, usando nombre supuesto y le dieron $ 500.00 quinientos pesos para sus gastos, pidiéndole que al día siguiente o sea el 27 veintisiete de los corrientes, se vieran nuevamente frente al Hemiciclo a Juárez, donde el dicente daría a CAVALDON, las señas relativas a su Hotel, el nombre que hubiera usado para ocuparlo y el número de su cuarto y teléfono; y como se convino el que habla estuvo a las 11 once en punto en el sitio indicado, y ya estaba ahí CAVALDON, entregándole el de la voz una tarjeta con los datos requeridos; que hasta el momento no ha vuelto a ver a ningún funcionario de la Embajada Norteamericana, pero que el día de ayer el declarante se comunicó por teléfono con la misma, tratando de comunicarse con CAVALDON y dándose cuenta de que se lo estaban negando premeditadamente; que finalmente, el día de ayer a las 22.00 veintidos horas, al llegar a su Hotel que es el Necaxa, ubicado en Anillo de Circunvalación y Carretones, fué detenido por Agentes de esta oficina, quienes lo condujeron a la misma.- Que expontáneamente y después de recapacitar, desea manifestar que el norteamericano al que se ha referido en el cuerpo de su declaración y que dice que vió el día 18 dieciocho de Septiembre del año en curso, en el Consulado Cubano, tenía un cierto parecido, en un 60 sesenta por ciento, a LEE HARVEY como las que inicialmente señaló, a fin de provocar una reacción enérgica desde el punto de vista político de parte de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, en contra del Gobierno de FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, y que no tuvo otro motivo más que el profundo odio que siente por el comunismo. Que el declarante toda su vida se ha dedicado a combatir al comunismo y que lamenta en este momento, no haber logrado su objetivo, en el sentido de causar alguna reacción del Gobierno Norteamericano en contra del de FIDEL CASTRO.- Que la llamada telefónica a la que también antes se refirió en su declaración, no la hizo el día 20 veinte de Septiembre, como indicó, sino con posterioridad a la muerte del señor Presidente Kennedy, y precisamente el día 25 veinticinco del mes en curso, en que marcó el número 46-94-00, que corresponde al conmutador de la Embajada Norteamericana y de donde le proporcionaron el número 181 ciento ochenta y uno como extensión, para hablar en los términos que ya anteriormente ha mencionado. Que es todo lo que tiene que declarar, lo que ratifica previa lectura y firma al márgen para constancia.--

-----Se cierra y autoriza lo actuado.---- Damos fé.------------

EL SUBDIRECTOR FEDERAL DE SEGURIDAD.

CAP. FERNANDO GUTIERREZ BARRIOS.

T. de A.

Lic. FERNANDO ORTIZ DE LA PEÑA.

T. de A.

Lic. CARLOS DURAN LANZ.

——En la Ciudad de México, Distrito Federal, siendo las -- 18 dieciocho horas del día 23 veintitres de Noviembre de -- 1963 mil novecientos sesenta y tres, el suscrito Capitán FERNANDO GUTIERREZ BARRIOS, Subdirector Federal de Seguridad, que actúa legalmente con testigos de asistencia, HACE CONSTAR: - Que habiendo sido presentada en esta Oficina la señora SILVIA TIRADO DE DURAN, con el objeto de ser interrogada sobre los hechos que a continuación se expresan, se procedió a levantar la presente acta ----------------

——En seguida, presentó la que en su estado normal manifestó llamarse SILVIA TIRADO DE DURAN, y protestada para que se conduzca con verdad y después de hacérsele saber las penas - en que incurren quienes declaran falsamente, por sus generales dijo: llamarse como está escrito, de 26 veintiseis años de edad, casada, sin religión, empleada, con instrucción, originaria y vecina de esta ciudad, con domicilio en Constituyentes Número 143 Departamento 3 tres, y sobre los hechos que se investigan DECLARO: que la de la voz está legalmente casada con el señor HORACIO DURAN NAVARRO, desde el 5 cinco de Noviembre de 1958 mil novecientos cincuenta y ocho, habiendo -- procreado una niña de nombre PATRICIA, que a la fecha cuenta con tres años y medio de edad; que en el mes de julio o agosto de 1961 mil novecientos sesenta y uno, la dicente fué invitada a ingresar al Instituto Mexicano Cubano de Relaciones -- Culturales, que entonces presidía el Lic. AGUSTIN CUE CANOVAS, como Coordinadora, y aún cuando no recuerda concretamente la persona que la recomendó, sí puede aclarar que desde -- hacía tiempo, tenía relaciones y visitaba con frecuencia a -- los funcionarios de la Embajada Cubana, teniendo personal - - amistad con el Embajador PORTUONDO, así como con los Agrega--

que asistían en ocasiones los mencionados Agregados Culturales y algunos cubanos, pero en mayor número eran mexicanos, - siempre artistas e intelectuales, sin que nunca discutieran- temas políticos, recordando que únicamente cuando la crisis- cubana de Octubre, relativa a la pretendida invasión de Cuba y posterior bloqueo de la Isla por el Gobierno Norteamericano, en un radio de onda corta escuchaban las noticias que daba Prensa Latina, de las cuales formaba un boletín al que se daba lectura, siendo las noticias que escuchaban procedentes directamente de La Habana, aceptando que también a dichas - reuniones asistían cubanos y mexicanos que en lo personal - discutían sobre el problema político de Cuba, pero sin que - se hiciera en forma oficial; que la declarante disfrutaba de un sueldo de $ 500.00 quinientos pesos mensuales, por su función de Coordinadora en el Instituto, siendo sus horas de labores de las dieciséis a las veinte horas, diariamente, obteniendo el dinero para el sostenimiento del propio Instituto- de una subvención mensual de la Embajada Cubana, cuyo importe desconoce, pero además cada uno de los socios cubría una- cuota y se recibían aportaciones de personas cuyos nombres - no recuerda, porque la mayoría lo hacía sin identificarse, - sin poder precisar el ingreso mensual, no obstante que la declarante era quien personalmente recibía todas las cantidades que ingresaban al Instituto; que además de la de la voz, únicamente el señor FELIPE ROJAS, quien trabajaba en las mañanas en el Instituto, como Secretario, percibía un sueldo mensual-- de igual cantidad de $500.00 quinientos pesos, empleándose el resto del dinero que ingresaba en el pago de la renta del local y otros gastos inherentes al funcionamiento. Que en el - mes de Diciembre de 1961 mil novecientos sesenta y uno, la declarante y su esposo hicieron un viaje por avión a La Habana, tura denominada de las Américas, cuyo viaje duró quince días, sin que tuvieran contacto ni relaciones en este viaje con funcionarios del Gobierno Cubano. Que como ya dijo la dicente es simpatizante del socialismo y la doctrina Marxista, desde hace cuatro años, habiendo estudiado filosofía y existencialismo, y en particular ha simpatizado y simpatiza desde sus inicios con la Revolución Cubana. Que desde hace tres meses más o menos, comenzó a prestar sus servicios como Secretaria del Cónsul de Cuba en esta ciudad, señor EUSEBIO ASCUE, quien dejó de fungir como tal hace cinco días o sea el lunes 18 dieciocho del actual, siendo substituido por el señor ALFREDO MIRAVAL Y DIAZ, haciendo la aclaración que desde un principio entró a prestar sus servicios con el carácter de provisional y con motivo de la muerte en un accidente de tránsito de su amiga MARICARMEN OLAVARRI, que era quien desempeñaba dicho puesto, y en tanto llega alguna persona de Cuba que deberá hacerse cargo del mismo, teniendo a su cargo el trámite administrativo y el llenado de las visas que se expiden, así como el darle curso a las solicitudes de tales visas, que invariablemente son enviadas al Gobierno de Cuba, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores para su aprobación, habiendo obtenido este cargo directamente del ex Cónsul ASCUE, con quien la liga una buena amistad, por lo que inclusive la dicente organizó una fiesta de despedida a éste, en el domicilio de la que habla, a la que asistieron casi todos los funcionarios y empleados de la Embajada y el Consulado, exceptuando al Embajador. Que la de la voz no pertenece a ningún Partido Político y nunca ha asistido a manifestaciones o mítines, ni tampoco ha dictado conferencias ni pronunciado discursos, lo que sí ha hecho su esposo ya que éste ha escrito varios artícupor los beneficios que acarrearía al País. Que el día de ayer cuando se encontraba trabajando en el Consulado Cubano, en donde presta sus servicios de diez a catorce, y de diez y seis a dieciocho horas, diariamente, por el cual percibe un sueldo de $1,500.00 mil quinientos pesos mensuales, ya cerca de la hora de salida, al mediodía, una compañera comentó que acababa de escuchar en el radio una noticia relativa a que el Presidente KENNEDY había sufrido un atentado, en el que le habían disparado tres balazos, por lo que le llamó por teléfono a su esposo y comentaron acerca de tal noticia, contestándole éste que ya lo sabía, calificando a dicho atentado de "monstruoso" y acordando que al reunirse en su domicilio platicarían sobre ese particular, lo cual hicieron a la hora de la comida pero en forma muy breve, ya que desconocían los incidentes del atentado y nombre y señas del presunto autor del mismo, siendo hasta por la noche cuando leyeron en una "extra" la nota relativa y posteriormente, en el radio de su domicilio, escuchó la de la voz el nombre de LEE HARVEY OSWALD, el cual le hizo recordar que este nombre corresponde a un norteamericano que en los últimos días de Septiembre o primeros días del mes de Octubre del año en curso, se presentó al Consulado Cubano solicitando una visa para Cuba, en tránsito hacia Rusia, y apoyando su solicitud con la exhibición de su pasaporte en el que constaba que había estado viviendo en este último País por espacio de tres años, su carnet de trabajo del propio País, escrito en idioma ruso y cartas en igual idioma, así como comprobaba estar casado con una mujer de nacionalidad rusa así como ser dirigente al aparecer en la ciudad de Nueva Orleans, de la organización denominada "Trato Justo para Cuba", con la pretensión de que se le aceptaba como "amigo" de la Revolución Cubana, por lo que la di-

123

llamó por telefono al Consulado Ruso, con el interés por -- su parte de facilitar el trámite del visado Ruso a LEE HARVEY OSWALD, pero de ahí le contestaron que el trámite duraría cuatro meses aproximadamente, lo que molestó al solicitante, porque según afirmó tenía suma prisa en obtener las visas que le permitieran viajar a Rusia, insistiendo en su derecho a ello por sus antecedentes y su partidarismo y actividades personales en pro del Movimiento Cubano, sin que pueda precisar por no recordarlo la declarante, si le dijo o no, que fuera miembro del Partido Comunista, y que su esposa ya mencionada de nacionalidad rusa estaba en ese entonces en la ciudad de Nueva York, de donde lo seguiría, siendo su procedencia de la citada ciudad de Nueva Orleans; que una vez que OSWALD entendió que no era posible darle la visa Cubana, sin obtener previamente la Rusa, porque aquella era en tránsito, se exhaltó o enojó mucho, por lo que la dicente llamó al Cónsul ASCUE, quien en ese momento se encontraba en su privado en compañía de su posterior sustituto - MIRAVAL, saliendo el primero, comenzó a alegar en inglés -- con OSWALD, en forma muy alterada, terminando por decirle - ASCUE, que "de ser por él no le daría la visa", y que "un - individuo como él en vez de beneficiar a la Revolución Cubana, le causaba daño", en la inteligencia de que en su discusión se referían a la Revolución Socialista Rusa y no a la Cubana, aduciendo OSWALD que tenía dos razones para solicitar con toda premura la visa y que eran, una, que se le vencía su permiso de estancia en México y otra, que con toda - urgencia necesitaba llegar a Rusia; que a pesar del disgusto, la de la voz le entregó a OSWALD un papel igual al que en este momento manuscribe en el que le anotó su nombre - -

concesión de la visa, pero condicionándola a que previamente obtuviera la Rusa, aunque no recuerda si OSWALD con posterioridad llamó o no a la declarante al Teléfono del Consulado que le proporcionó; que toda la plática que sostuvo la dicente con OSWALD, al igual que la del Cónsul ASCUE, fué en idioma inglés, ya que aquel no habla nada de español, y que al tener a la vista su fotografía que apareció en los periódicos de hoy, precisamente en el Periódico "El Día", desde luego lo reconoció e identificó como el mismo al que se ha venido refiriendo como LEE HARVEY OSWALD. Que en una sola ocasión, la declarante asistió a una ceremonia de recepción, en la Embajada Rusa que se les dió en ocasión de su visita a los astronautas GAGARIN y TERESHKOVA, por invitación personal que le hizo a la de la voz, el Consul Ruso YACKSOV, al visitar a ASCUE y MIRAVAL, llevándoles sus respectivas invitaciones en el Consulado Cubano. Que respecto a sus cuñados LIDIA y RUBEN DURAN NAVARRO, la primera en varias ocasiones asistió en compañía de la declarante a las reuniones que se celebraban en el Instituto, en tanto que el segundo únicamente lo hizo en una o dos ocasiones y con motivo de exposiciónes de pinturas, y por cuanto a BETY SERRATO AZUCAR, esposa de RUBEN, siempre se ha mantenido al márgen de estas actividades, aunque todos son de ideología de izquierda, pero sin participar activamente en ningunas actividades; que BARBARA ANN BLITS TRESMOND ESQUIVEL y A GATA ROSENO GARCIA, son amigas de BETY, y la de la voz las ha tratado muy poco y superficialmente, por lo que desconoce sus actividades e ideología y en lo que respecta al señor que ahora sabe se apellida BENTLEY, antes de ahora nunca lo había visto y supone que sea amigo de BARBARA, ya que se dió cuenta que a esta era la ue trataba, y se encontraban comiendo en la casa de la depuesto, ratifica y firma al margen para constancia.---------

------Se cierra y autoriza lo actuado.----Damos fé.----------

EL SUBDIRECTOR FEDERAL DE SEGURIDAD.

CAP. FERNANDO GUTIERREZ BARRIOS.

124

T. de A.   T. de A.

Lic. FERNANDO ORTIZ DE LA PEÑA.   Lic. CARLOS DURAN LANZ.

Date:09/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : DOS
RECORD NUMBER : 119-10021-10413

RECORDS SERIES :
INR FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : FBI

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : DOS
FROM : CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUB
TO : MEMBERS OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON CASTRO

TITLE :
REPORT FOR JULY - AUGUST ON ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMBAT CASTRO-COMMUNIST S

DATE : 09/30/63
PAGES : 23

SUBJECTS :
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/09/93

OPENING CRITERIA :
DOD AND CIA REVIEW

COMMENTS :
Draft subcommittee report attached.

***
***
***
* *
W
I
T
H
D
R
A
W
A
L
* *
C
A
R
D
* *
***
***
***

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

September 30, 1963

TO: Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion.

FROM: Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion

SUBJECT: Report for July - August on ~~Actions~~ Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

Attached is a draft of the Subcommittee's report for July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-communist subversion in the hemisphere. The draft has been prepared on the basis of the material which you furnished with certain modification. The CIA member will note that I have extracted from his submission the items of action taken and placed these in the body of the report. The intelligence information contained in the submission I have made into an annex. I think it is very [illegible] to have the intelligence data form part of the report and suggest that in the future the CIA member prepare his submission in two parts.

May I have your comments on the draft by close of business October 1, 1963.

Copies to: CIA - Mr. [illegible] (2)
DOD - Col. [illegible] (1)
USIA - Mr. [illegible] (1)
ARA - Mr. Herr (1)
Justice - Mr. [illegible] (1)

62-108553-5

ARA:[illegible]ler:js
9/[illegible]/63

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

DRAFT SECRET 2 of 7 copies

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished by him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

SECRET 62-108553-5

ENCLOSURE

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of theCongress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica ~~has~~ presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least

until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the ~~government of~~ Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be

returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed U.S. Missions in Curaceo and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew sh scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor

indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago

urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegates to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29-October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a commercial basis, that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the month of July at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which

was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Havana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defence

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies.

Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.

Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and countersubversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident

brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS."

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commerical and Cultural Missions.

Central Intelligency Agency

(To be filled in by Mr. Wheeler)

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Reassured President Schick of Nicaragua in the most emphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty did not mean that our attitude toward Castro has altered in the slightest, and stressed our interest in seeing steady progress by all the Isthmian countries in implementing the recommendations of the Managua Security Conference to block Cuban subversive efforts.

d. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 23 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments in the hourly newscasts.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on

three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

SECRET

September 30, 1963

TO: Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion.

FROM: Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion

SUBJECT: Report for July - August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

Attached is a draft of the Subcommittee's report for July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-communist subversion in the hemisphere. The draft has been prepared on the basis of the material which you furnished with certain modification. The CIA member will note that I have extracted from his submission the items of action taken and placed these in the body of the report. The intelligence information contained in the submission I have made into an annex. I think it is very useful to have the intelligence data form part of the report, and request that in the future the CIA member prepare his submission in two parts.

May I have your comments on the draft by close of business October 1, 1963.

Copies to: CIA - Mr. Wheeler (2)
DOD - Col. Haig (2)
USIA - Mr. Vagley (1)
EAR - Mr. Hert (1)
Justice - Mr. Geoghegan (1)

ARA:WGBowdler:js
9/30/63

62-108553-5

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

4

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered Cubana Airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected

SECRET

62-108553-5

ENCLOSURE

to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, are apparently receiving encouragement and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina.

Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accelerating subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 22 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Juliao to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

In mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrano, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. The purchase of arms and supplies and the recruitment of Nicaraguans for a movement against Nicaragua are also reportedly underway in Costa Rica.

Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator, left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned after attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, was assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July. He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicatin that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/20/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10058-10420
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	62-109060-3385

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	LEG, LO
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/23/1964
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	LHO, POST-RP, POSSIBLE CUBAN, ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	02/14/1994
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	REFERRAL TO CIA

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 6/23/64

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

4-22-93 9803-RDW/sk (JFK special)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (62-109060)

FROM LEGAT, LONDON (62-358) (RUC)

SECRET

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY 11/22/63, DALLAS, TEXAS
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Classified by 2040
Exempt from GDS, Category 1
Date of Declassification Indefinite

10-25-93
Classified by 9803 RDA/EH
Declassify on: OADR JFK

On 6/22/64 [Mr. R. E. CARTER, CIA, London] (S) on a highly confidential basis, furnished the following information [which comes from a tisur on the Cuban Embassy, London, operated by British Security Service, MI-5 and British Secret Intelligence Service, MI-6. (S) This conversation occurred on 5/8/64 and was between MARIO RIVA PATTERSON, Counselor, Cuban Embassy, London and an unidentified male visitor, possibly a Colombian. [The conversation was in Spanish and indistinct at times] (S) Information is as follows: (U)

Cuba

"The visitor [after a question half of which is not heard] (S) asks if in the case of the assassination of KENNEDY if (?) FOSTER [(ph and indistinct)] (S) was ever in Cuba. RIVA replies in the negative. He says that this man applied for a visa to go to Cuba at the Consulate in Tampico. He was refused a visa. Had he been to Cuba he would have had his passport (U)

VISITOR: "A typical F.B.I. job (U)

RIVA: "A thing (una cosa) of the Imperialists - to kill him in the end - really disgusting - (U)

It is possible that the individual referred to above as FOSTER may have been OSWALD. Above furnished for the Bureau's information (U)

REC 25 62-109060-

③- Bureau
1 - Liaison (sent direct)
1 - London
CWB:rn
(5)

SECRET 18 JUN 26 1964

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. As Bracketed 10-20-93

Approved: C. C. Wick Special Agent in Charge

Sent __________ M Per __________

79 JUL 2 - 1964

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10062-10456
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 105-82555-1ST NR 5370

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, BR
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 01/05/1965
PAGES: 1
SUBJECT: LANE, MARK, ADMIN

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 06/30/1997
UPDATE_DATE: 01/19/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

5-124 (Rev. 7-2-64)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 4/14/97

TO : Director, FBI **(100-409763)** DATE: **1/5/65**

FROM : Legat, Bern **(105-284) (RUC)** ~~CONF~~

~~Classified by 2040~~
~~Exempt from GDS Category 1~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
7/1/77 EFG/TLC

SUBJECT: **MARK LANE**
SM - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

O
Lee Oswald

Re **Bern letter 12/28/64.**

Enclosed are **5** copies of the following:

Letterhead Memorandum dated **1/5/65**

Communication dated

Information in the enclosure was received by Legat Bern on **1/4/65**

Source in the memorandum or originator of communication is:

☐ Bundesministerium für Inneres, Abteilung 13 (Austrian Federal Criminal Police), Vienna, Austria (AFCP).

☐ Schweizerisches Zentralpolizeibureau (Swiss Central Police Bureau), Bern, Switzerland (SCPB).

☐ Abteilung II, Gruppe Staatspolizei, Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austrian Federal Security Police), Vienna, Austria, (AFSP).

☐ Schweizerische Bundespolizei (Swiss Federal Police), Bern, Switzerland (SFP). (S)

☐ Office of Special Assistant (covert CIA), American Embassy, Bern, Switzerland (OSA). (S)

☐ Research Branch (covert CIA), American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.

☒ Other: **American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.**

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure is classified **Unclassified** ☐ By source ☐ See remarks

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES~~
~~AND FIELD OFFICES~~
~~ADVISED BY ROUTING~~
~~SLIP(S) OF~~ classification
~~DATE~~ 6-14-[illegible] TLC

☐ Check name(s) in Bufiles.
☐ Check name(s) and/or fingerprints in Identification Division.
☐ Furnish results of requested investigation for referral to requesting agency.
☒ For information.

④ **- Bureau (Encl. 5)**
(1 - Liaison)(Encl.)
(1 - New York)(100-117844)
1 - Bern

~~Classified by~~ 6/14/93 9803 RDD/GAT
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK)

HDG:mls
(5)

SECRET

105-82555
NOT RECORDED
199 JAN 18 1965

60 JAN 19 1965

62 NR 5370

(JFK) 4/28/97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)
(Per CIA - JM - 4/14/97)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-409763-154

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10114-10010
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-109090-356

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, PA
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 10/28/1964
PAGES: 9
SUBJECT: WC, ASSISTANCE, NEWS MEDIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 09/24/1997
UPDATE DATE: 01/23/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INC DIRECTOR, FBI RESPONSE, TRANSLATION FROM SPANISH AND CIA LTR TO LEG, PA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~RDR~~

ENCLOSURE

TO : Director, FBI (62-109090) **Secret** DATE: 10-28-64

FROM : Legat, Paris (62-148) (P.)

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, [redacted] ER
Except Brackets
[redacted]
(K 3/10/97)

~~DeLoach~~ Dru

Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of a self-explanatory [Paris Embassy CAS (Controlled American Source - CIA)] memorandum along with a copy of the letter in Spanish mentioned in the memorandum. ~~(S)~~ (U) [S]

The Paris Office has referred this matter to the High General Staff (HGS), Madrid, Spain, with a request for investigation by that service in an effort to locate and identify the sender of the letter, and to interview him for any data he may be able to supply. The results of this Paris request of the HGS will be promptly reported when available. ~~(S)~~ (U)

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Enc. 2)
(1 - Liaison Section)
1 - Paris
HPW:HD
(4)

Sent to DL with 1 xerox
of enclosures & Legat let also
1 cc of Spanish translation to DL & Paris.
11-5-64 RDR/mas

NR Cantilever Servicio ... Staff Espionage
Service Staff 11-2- 4:18P RDR

REC- 53 62-109090 - 356

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF clas.
DATE 7/23/77 CP6/at

EX-114

11-9
OCT 30 1964

4-29-93 Classified by 9803 RDD/mk
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK Special)

FBI
NOV 2 4 54 PM '64
REC'D DE LOACH

NOV 5 3 34 PM '64
RECEIVED
FBI INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

NOV 3 15 33 PM '64
RECEIVED
FBI ANNEX

Classified by 2040 Category 1,2
Exempt from CDS Category 1,2
Date of Declassification Indefinite
Secret

Reviewed By RB 6/27/77

SIX

35

11 ... 10

SECRET

(S)
[CAS]-2290 (X)
20 October 1964

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT (K) 3/10/97

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Norman Philcox
Legal Attache

FROM : [CAS] (S)

SUBJECT : Crank Letter Concerning Warren Commission Document

[Our office in Madrid] (S) has sent us a copy of the attached Spanish-language letter addressed to the American Ambassador to Spain, and signed by one Antilin PERIS, alleging in the first paragraph that the author has some information of interest to impart. After opening the second paragraph by saying that he had to flee Paris due to an indiscretion committed there, the author states:

France
Spain

> "There (apparently Paris), in the home of some American friends, I got hold of an authentic document about the assassination in Dallas, which they say was swiped from the Warren Commission and which is certainly prejudicial for President Johnson. I have it on good authority that they are currently trying to sell it to no less than the Director of "Paris-Match." Someone from the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Paris is involved in the matter."

The author closes by suggesting that an advertisement be inserted in a Madrid newspaper if there be any interest in further details.

There are no traces from Madrid on Antilin PERIS, which according to [CAS, Madrid] is almost certainly an alias. Needless [S] to say there is no return address on the letter or envelope, which was mailed from Barcelona on 26 September 1964. [CAS, Madrid] has [S] forwarded us a copy of the letter on the off chance that we may have received similar allegations; in such case [Madrid] would [S] appreciate learning the details so that they might inform the Embassy. It was also suggested that we show you this letter.

[CAS, Paris] (S) has no traces on Antilin PERIS.

62-109090-356

cc: United States Secret Service
Attn: Mr. John Hanly

SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10115-10027
RECORD SERIES: DL
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-3588-29

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, PA
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 10/28/1964
PAGES: 1
SUBJECT: SEE FBI 62-109090-356

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 09/24/1997
UPDATE DATE: 01/23/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

SECRET

Director, FBI (62-109090) 10-28-64

Legat, Paris (62-148) (P.)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT
Except Brackets (K 3/26/97)

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT KENNEDY

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of a self-explanatory [Paris Embassy CAS (Controlled American Source - CIA)] memorandum along with a copy of the letter in Spanish mentioned in the memorandum. ~~(S)~~ ~~(C)~~(U) [S]

The Paris Office has referred this matter to the High General Staff (HGS), Madrid, Spain, with a request for investigation by that service in an effort to locate and identify the sender of the letter, and to interview him for any data he may be able to supply. The results of this Paris request of the HGS will be promptly reported when available. ~~(S)~~(U)

3 - Bureau (Enc. 2)
(1 - Liaison Section)
1 - Paris
HPW:HD
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Re: ANTILI PERIS

4-29-93 9803-RBD/mk
Classified by
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK special)

Classified by ~~202~~ 2040
Exempt from GDS, Category 1,2
Date of Declassification INDEFINITE
R/S 7/23/99

62-3588-29

SEARCHED.........INDEXED W
SERIALIZED R FILED R
NOV 9 1964
FBI — DALLAS
W

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10150-10104
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 62-109060-3681

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, BR
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 08/21/1964

PAGES: 1

SUBJECT: JFK, OPINION, DRAGOMIR, ANGHEL, INTERVIEW

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret

NEW CLASSIFICATION:

REVIEW_DATE: 06/30/1997

UPDATE_DATE: 02/09/2001

STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/21/64

Transmit the following in SECRET
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

REC-60

Kp 2/10/97

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT ~~6#4138 3B#~~ (As Sanitized) 9803 RDD/GAT 7/9/93

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TO : Director, FBI (62-109060)

FROM : Legat, Bern (62-43) (RUC)

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
11/22/63, DALLAS, TEXAS
MISC. - INFO CONCERNING

#6454.

Classified by Elb-Bjorlunde
Declassify on: OADR 1/17/89
Per CIA letter 9/23/88.

ReBuairtel 8/7/64.

Enclosed for Dallas are 25 copies each of insert pages 1 and 2 with results of interview of ANGHEL DRAGOMIR. As instructed by the Bureau, this insert incorporates the translated letter from DRAGOMIR with appropriate comments concerning the matter having been referred to the Bureau for investigation.

Information on an individual by the name ANGHEL DRAGOMIR from Bureau files as included in reairtel has not been included in insert since identity has not been proven and the information is not pertinent in any case.

The other Government agency referred to in the insert is the Research Branch (Covert CIA) the Embassy, Vienna, Austria. (S) (S)

6 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)(Encl.)
(2 - Dallas)(89-43)(Encl. 50)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(7)

1cc of airtel & encl
25 copies sent DL
via 8-1 action
8/28/64 RDR/[illegible]

REC-60

62-109060-3691

NOT RECORDED
AUG 27 1964

ENCLOSURE

50

ST-104

CONSOLIDATION
NO ACTION

Encl

1cc of each retained as holdback [illegible]

17 xerox copies made of encl
& 1cc [illegible] to DL

1 d

C.C. Wick

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent SECRET M Per

56 SEP 3 1964

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 11/18/20

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10158-10061

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-82555-1ST NR 5373

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, BR
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 01/08/1965
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
LANE, MARK, ACT, SURVEILLANCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/10/1997

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. AS SANITIZED
KP 2/11/97

FBI

Date: 1/8/65

SECRET

Transmit the following in ____________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : Director, FBI (100-409763)

FROM: Legat, Bern (105-284) (P)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

MARK LANE
SM - C

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (6)
(JFK) 12/1/97

Lee Oswald

Brennigan
Lepidus

Re Bern letter 1/5/65. U

On 1/6/65 [JOHN DIMMER, Chief, Office of Special Assistant (covert CIA)] (S) the Embassy, Bern confidentially informed that he had learned that LANE was to speak in Zurich, Switzerland, some time in the next two weeks on the subject of OSWALD's innocence in the killing of President KENNEDY. LANE's talk is allegedly to be sponsored by HEINRICH BUCHBINDER, well known Swiss Trotskyite who is prominent in the Swiss Movement Against Atomic Armament (Schweizerische Bewegung gegen die Atomare Aufrüstung - SBGAA). (S)

At [DIMMER's] (S) request, he was furnished background material concerning LANE. [DIMMER] (S) stated that he would keep this office informed of further developments in this matter. [redacted] U

1-8-7 4/13/93
~~Classified by 9803 RJD/BAT~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK)

105-82555
NOT RECORDED
199 JAN 19 1965

5 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
(1 - New York) (100-117844)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(6)

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES~~
~~AND FIELD OFFICES~~
~~ADVISED BY ROUTING~~
~~SLIP(S) OF~~
~~DATE 6-9-77 CG/SAH~~

EX. 112 REC-1 ~~100-409763~~-155

10 JAN 21 1965

Copy to New York
by routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 1/12/65
by

~~CLASSIFIED BY 2040~~
~~EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2 & 3~~
~~DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE~~
7-6-77 CEQ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1st NR 5373

C. C. Wick

60 JAN 19 1965

Approved: ____________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-409763-155

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10163-10134
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-109060-3942

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLANS
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 12/04/1964
PAGES: 6
SUBJECT: JFK, ASSISTANCE, SUSPECT, RIDDERSTRALE, KARL-ERIK, ALBRECHT, ADOLPH JAY, ABERG, CHARLOTTE, NAME CHECK
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 09/24/1997
UPDATE DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INCLUDES SEARCH SLIPS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

FOI/PA # 6454
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
E.O. # 12356
DATE 1-17-89 INITIALS
Per CIA letter 9/23/88.

[redacted] DEC 1964

BJa 6/28/77

REC- 11

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Adolph Jay ALBRECHT

10/25/93
Classified by
Declassify on: OADR

1. Adolph Jay ALBRECHT, born 15 June 1926 in New Jersey, is an industrial advertising copywriter currently residing in Stockholm, Sweden. The holder of U.S. passport No. D 294080, issued 18 April 1963 at New York City, Subject served with the United States Navy from about 1947 to 1955, on active duty for only two weeks, however. As of November 1963 Subject said he was employed by the Andersson and Lembke Advertising Agency, Luntmakargaten 95, Stockholm.

2. On 29 November 1963 Subject, of his own volition, visited the American Embassy in Stockholm and asked to speak with the embassy "security officer." He was interviewed by a representative of this Agency (S) Subject said that a former girlfriend, Charlotte ABERG (Swedish citizen, born ca. 1943), told him that Karl-Erik RIDDERSTRALE (Swedish citizen, born 24 September 1922), while drunk on 15 November 1963, predicted that within two weeks President KENNEDY would be assassinated while on a trip among his own people. Following the assassination Charlotte was upset and called ALBRECHT on 27 November 1963 to inform him of RIDDERSTRALE's statement made while he was visiting Charlotte and her mother on 15 November. Charlotte described RIDDERSTRALE as normally quiet and refined and one of her mother's suitors. According to Subject, RIDDERSTRALE, though wealthy and a member of Swedish nobility, is a left winger and strong supporter of Fidel CASTRO.

REC 114 62-109060 - 3942

3. Through Subject, arrangements were made for Charlotte ABERG to be interviewed at the American Embassy on 4 December 1963. Charlotte related substantially the same story as did Subject, with minor contradictions. She said RIDDERSTRALE's comments were made about ten days before the assassination and that he had not given a two-week deadline; he merely said, "soon." She said she knew nothing about RIDDERSTRALE's background. Charlotte was advised to report the foregoing to Swedish authorities. Following an interview with Swedish police officials, Charlotte returned to the American Embassy on 9 December 1963.

EX-105 DEC 15 1964

24 DEC 1964

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

No Investigation Conducted by FBI Pertinent to your inquiry. This is the result of a request for an FBI file check only and is not to be considered clearance.

cc to CIA by Liaison, 12-22-64

Secret

NAT. INT. SEC.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

69 JAN 5 1965

He could not explain such an expression since he could not remember having said anything like it. He knew nothing whatever beforehand about the murder of the President."

6. The files of this Agency contain no recorded identifiable traces on ALBRECHT, ABERG, or RIDDERSTRALE.

7. This office would appreciate receiving any pertinent information your Bureau's files may contain on the Subject, cleared, where possible, for passing to an official Swedish source. (S) An early reply would be appreciated.

8. The information contained in paragraphs 1 through 3, above, was given to the Legal Attache in London during early December 1963.

CSCI-316/02509-64

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10164-10151
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 62-109060-8169

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 02/22/1980
PAGES: 4
SUBJECT: JFK, ASSA, ASSISTANCE, OPINION, SUSPECTS

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 06/30/1997
UPDATE_DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INC FBI MEMO

S E C R E T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. as Sanitized KP 2/11/97

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
AS BRACKET JEH 1-26-94

22 FEB 1980

Classified by
Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
U.S. Secret Service
Attention: Intelligence Division

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Intelligence Division

FROM : Deputy Director for Operations

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT : Alleged Information on Assassination of President Kennedy

18

1. The following information was provided by [our representatives] in Rio de Janeiro and is being forwarded for your information and such action as you deem appropriate.

a. An unidentified caller phoned the Consul General in Rio de Janeiro 29 January 1980, to offer "secret information" on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. An Agency officer interviewed the individual on 30 January in the Consulate.

V-16 DE-47 62-109060-8169

b. At first, the walk-in refused to identify himself or give the names of persons in his story, but agreed to do so after the interviewer impressed on him the importance when evaluating information of the identity of the source and of the other persons involved. The walk-in reluctantly produced an ID card (106151 issued by the technical police on 8/29/66) identifying himself as Laszlo KOVACS, born 30 October 1926 in Sao Paulo of Hungarian parents Gergchy and Pastia BORBALO. According to ~~Kovacs,~~ HUNGARIAN at age five he returned to Europe with his parents and lived in Hungary and Yugoslavia, mostly the latter, until 1961 when he returned to Brazil. He stands about five feet seven inches, stocky build, hazel eyes, no glasses, light brown hair receding at the temples and graying. His hands appear those of a mason, which he claims to be. The interview was conducted in Portuguese, of which

X BORRALO HUNGARY

APR 10 1980

ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCMENT ARE CLASSIFIED S E C R E T

DERIVATIVE CL BY 035268
REVW ON 19FEB00
DERIVED FROM D9C.1

CIA advised 3/5/80 okay to give to DOJ.

S E C R E T

recd from courier 2/26/80 JK

SUBJECT : Alleged Information on Assassination of President Kennedy

cause of Vlasenco's nationality, and the timing of the assassination six months after the blockade of Cuba, Kovacs concludes that the assassination was ordered by "Brezhnev and Fidel Castro."

e. Vlasenco told Kovacs in November, 1963 that he rented the apartment, dealt in precious stones, and had lived there for four years. Vlasenco was away from the apartment during the day, dressed well, had no family and no car. Kovacs guesses he saw him three times during the two week period.

f. Kovacs asked that the above story be passed to Senator Edward Kennedy, and at first refused to identify himself and the characters in his story to anyone but the Senator or his emissary because he was afraid for his life. It was for that reason also that he claims he did not come forward until now. Kovacs was assured that his story would not appear in any newspaper or magazine (which he feared would happen), but would be sent to Washington by a coded message. Towards the end of the interview Kovacs alluded to his need for money (CR $500,000 about US $11,500) to fund his inventions; one a dirigible which could carry "any amount of cargo," and one a pump which could pump liquids hundreds of miles. When asked if he had made an effort to interest local entrepreneurs, Kovacs replied that he had expended considerable effort, "but they laugh at me." Kovacs appears to have a confused thinking process and lively imagination and his story is contradictory. He probably came forward in the hope that his information would be worth money. We do not know whether he himself believes the story he related.

2. [Our representative] (6) in Rio de Janeiro has been advised to have no further contact with Kovacs. Should addees wish to pursue the matter, Kovacs' present address is Rua A. 46, Vila Luiza, Pavuna, Rio de Janeiro.

3. This Agency has no identifiable traces on Kovacs or Vlasenco.

CIR 316/00637-80

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

EBF 665

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

62-116395-665	ENCL. 7 16	SFP:eks 9-9-75

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Re is made to the SSC August 20, 1975, request for FBI materials and specifically, to Part V, for which delivery was requested by September 9, 1975. Enclosed for ur approval and forwarding to the SSC is the orig of a memorandum in full response to Part V. Also enclosed for ur records is a copy of the memo prepared for the SSC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

SSC-REQUEST , August 20, 1975

Part V, 1

Retain:
UNEXCISED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

167-10498

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES G[illegible]ER[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-19949)

DATE: 6/5/72

FROM : SA [illegible]BERT G. BENJAMIN

SUBJECT: "CHANGED"
BELLA ST[illegible]O, aka
Della Coover
SM - ~~C (TRASHY[illegible]) (ADEX)~~
OO: Los Angeles

excesed to protect FBI informant

On 5/31/72, <CSLA 6596-S> advised DELLA COOVER is using the pseudonym Bella Stumbo, so this matter has been marked "changed".

CSLA indicated COOVER is using the Bella Stumbo alias in connection with her position as a staff writer for the "Los Angeles Times".

ACTION

ADEX should be changed to include the new alias and subject's position as a staff writer for the Times. Also, since subject is writing under a still different pseudonym, for the Monterey Park Progress newspapers, it is suggested that consideration be given to advising the Internal Revenue Service that she may be receiving payroll checks under these pseudonyms and not reporting her total income correctly. Appropriate investigation should be conducted to verify subject's use of the additional pseudonym.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

1

100-19949-[illegible]

SEARCHED [illegible] INDEXED [illegible]
SERIALIZED [illegible] FILED [illegible]
JUN [illegible] 1972
FBI — LOS ANGELES
Kinder

excised to protect FBI informant

1 - <134-3171A (CSLA 6596-S)>
1 - 80-420 (LOS ANGELES TIMES)

GGB/scb
(3)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

11000 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90024
July 25, 1972

District Director
Internal Revenue Service
P. O. Box 391
Los Angeles, California 90053

Dear Sir:

For your information the Los Angeles Office of the FBI is conducting an official investigation involving a Della Coover, born September 1, 1920, Social Security Account Number 557-16-3963.

It has come to the attention of the Los Angeles Office that Della Coover is a staff officer for the "Los Angeles Times" newspaper using pseudo name of Bella Stumbo and that she may not be reporting her earnings from this employment.

Enclosed is a recent article written by Bella Stumbo.

This information is being brought to your attention for whatever action you deem necessary.

Very truly yours,

WGG

WESLEY G. GRAPP
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/ew

Enclosure 1

100-19949-

2 - Addressee (RM)
(1) - Los Angeles(100-19949)
DPK/bab
(3)

SEARCHED ____
INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____
FILED ____

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

3 FAMILIES VISITED

"They Said He Shot a Little Girl"

BY BELLA STUMBO

Times Staff Writer

Early in the evening of July 2, a 4-year-old girl named Joyce Ann Huff was shot to death as she played in a yard in Hawaiian Gardens. She was hit with 42 shotgun pellets fired from a passing car. Subsequently, three Chicano youths from the neighboring Norwalk barrio were arrested. Being held on suspicion of murder in the killing are Donald Antelo, 21, Oscar Hernandez, 22, and Michael Ramirez, 17.

Donald Antelo's mother Beatrice, 50, is a devout Catholic. She has a makeshift altar in her bedroom where she prays each night before going to bed. She had just finished her rosary the night police came looking for her son.

"There were four of them at the door. They rushed through the house, searching for Don. I said he wasn't home, but what did they want him for? And they said because he shot a little girl, that my boy killed a child."

Beatrice Antelo was sitting at her kitchen table, staring listlessly at a cold cup of coffee in front of her, her voice a weary whisper.

"They didn't have uniforms on, so I thought maybe they were some of Don's friends playing a bad joke. I told them to stop fooling around about something so awful."

Though it was nearly noon now, Beatrice Antelo still wore her houserobe and slippers. Her small kitchen was half lost in the stagnant gloom of drawn shades and closed windows.

"I said no, it was impossible. Not my son. He would never in his life do such a terrible thing."

Beatrice Antelo dropped her head into her hands. An [illegible] woman who lost a lung to tuberculosis years ago, she has now taken a three-week vacation from her job. She spends most of her days in bed reliving the night she lost her son.

"They told me I better help them find Don. They said dozens of police were searching all over the [illegible] about him all night."

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

IV-1 Los Angeles Ti
Los Angeles, Calif.

Date: 7/19/72
Edition: Wednesday final
Author:
Editor:
Title: Dell - Coover

Character:
or
Classification: 100-19949
Submitting Office: Los Angele

☐ Being Investigated

SEARCHED.......INDEXED.......
SERIALIZED.......FILED.......
JUL 24 1972
FBI-LOS ANGELES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY

A Famil[illegible]eared on Welfare

Be[illegible] Antelo, a long[illegible] divorcee, has two [illegible] 19 [illegible] older than Don [illegible] died [illegible] of [illegible]. "Until the boys were old enough to [illegible] by without me at home," she says, she reared them on welfare. Then she went to work at a local food packing plant where she earns [illegible] a month. Rent on her small, two-bedroom house, which is no better, no worse than most of the other dilapidated bungalows lining the [illegible] streets of Norwalk's half-square mile Mexican-American barrio, is [illegible] a month.

"I [illegible] sure they would kill him," Mrs. Antelo continued [illegible]. "So I went with two of them. We drove everywhere I could think of looking for my boy."

During that futile search, she says, she tried to tell the [illegible] officers, who listened politely, that they had made some grotesque mistake.

She knew her son. He was a good boy. He loved children. He and his girlfriend wanted to have a big family when they got married—which would be as soon as Don found a job. It isn't easy to find a job when you don't have a car to look outside the barrio, she had explained.

Meantime, she pointed out, Don was a good student at Cerritos College. He studied hard, made good grades, "was determined to make something out of himself."

Beatrice Antelo absentmindedly stroked a tiny brown dog sleeping peacefully in her lap. He is her watchdog. When strangers approach the house, he pokes his head through a broken living room window pane and barks with comic ferocity.

Don had been in trouble before, of course, she continued, an edge of bitterness creeping into her voice as she told how he had been thrown out of Excelsior High School four years ago because "he had long hair before it was common." He had brushes with the police before, too, she said, without elaborating—but most barrio youths have similar experiences.

'Won't Care About Saving Him'

"You have to live here to know what it's like. Police everywhere, poverty you can't escape, no jobs . . ." Her voice trailed off in a resigned shrug. She makes less than $3,000 annually, so she can't afford to hire a private attorney to defend her son, she said. And she's certain the court-appointed public defender "won't care about saving him."

A cough suddenly seized her. The doctor has warned her against interviews, she explained. She doesn't answer the telephone much anymore either because it often turns out to be somebody calling her the mother of a monster or threatening to bomb her house or, worse still, to harm her older son, 31, a father of two with a job outside Norwalk.

"I guess it makes people feel better to get the hate off their chests when something as horrible as this happens," she sighed. "I just hang up."

But her mind clearly wasn't on herself—it was still on that last night on the scene that had awaited her when she and the two officers returned home.

"They had already found Don and the Ramirez boy," she said. "They were standing out front, surrounded by police. [illegible] had handcuffs on."

Beatrice Antelo turned her face away, toward the wall, where a huge calendar of the Ascension hung in the gloom. The police had freed his hands so she could [illegible] to him, she said.

"He ran to me and put his arms around me and he said, 'Mama, I didn't do it. I didn't do it.'"

She paused, fighting back tears. "And he cried like a little child."

Then Beatrice Antelo, weary with an agony few mothers ever know, laid her head down on her table and sobbed in helpless, hopeless despair.

Helen Hernandez, [illegible], and her husband Antonio, 55, sat side by side on their couch in a spotless living room overflowing with glittering sports trophies and photographs of their five sons, ages [illegible]-13. They looked stunned, like two people who have tried, yet failed to comprehend fully what has happened to them this summer.

Which is probably understandable, for nothing in their experience has prepared them to deal with a murder charge against a member of their family—least of all against Oscar, their quietest, eldest son.

Helen and Antonio Hernandez are a soft-spoken, almost timid couple. They came to Norwalk from Phoenix 25 years ago. Since then, they have evidently lived according to a single, uncomplicated philosophy — namely, people who work hard, worship God, discipline their children, and mind their own business will make out accordingly. Life might be meager, but it will advance smoothly and peaceably and, perhaps, for their children, it may even become progressively richer.

And, until July, the Hernandez formula had seemed a sound one.

Antonio, a big solid man dressed in neat polyester slacks and a crisp button-down shirt, is a grinder in a nearby steel foundry. He has saved his money and now almost owns his modest little pink house which by barrio standards, is a comfortable one. He takes pride in it.

Bashful Woman

Helen, a stout, bashful woman with a fresh-scrubbed, friendly face, prone to twisting nervously at her wedding rings, has always been single-mindedly devoted to her duties as a wife and mother. Never has she even considered working outside her home, though the Hernandez family, like most in the barrio, has always needed more money than they have had.

Both devoted Jehovah's Witnesses, the couple have also enforced a rigid brand of religion in their household. Their sons have been taught, among other things, that violence is evil.

It is, therefore, with boundless pride that Helen and Antonio Hernandez report there are no high school dropouts in their family —and no loafers, no hippies, no bums, no convicts. Only hard-working, sports-minded, clean-living, patriotic Americans. Especially the latter.

When Helen Hernandez's 19-year-old son was drafted, she beams, he went to serve his country without question. He was in the Army for a year, until an automobile accident earned him both a medical discharge and a permanent speech impediment. Now he works in a Norwalk packing plant.

Likewise, when Oscar Hernandez was drafted he too went willingly, serving as a guard at Da Nang Air Force base in Vietnam until his discharge with two Bronze Stars, last summer. He had been looking for a job ever since.

"He never really talked much about Vietnam. Except he was glad he didn't have to kill anybody," says Helen Hernandez, her voice shy, hesitant.

"Oscar never liked to box in high school either, because he didn't like to hit anybody. So he played baseball. And track."

She blushed, embarrassed, it seemed, to defend her son's passive nature.

Indeed, it soon becomes amply apparent to a stranger in the Hernandez household that making excuses for Oscar—who is accused of driving the car that carried Joyce Ann Huff's killer—is considered somehow undignified, even unpatriotic, insofar as it might imply a fear that the American system of justice is incapable of discovering truth impartially and dispassionately on its own.

And in addition to their abiding faith that justice will be done, the Hernandez couple have the added solace, unlike Beatrice Antelo, of having a private attorney, a family friend, who will represent their son in court.

'So Easygoing'

"Oscar was so quiet, so easygoing. He stayed home almost all the time," says Helen Hernandez proudly. "He watched television, he read a lot of books and sports magazines. And he always helped me around the house. Every morning we made the beds together and washed the dishes."

Abruptly, she vanished into a back room, returning instantly with a bulging photograph album. It turned out to be what, in her heart, Helen Hernandez considers immutable proof of her son's innocence in this bizarre episode.

The book was filled with pictures Oscar had taken in Vietnam — photos of children. Waifs, orphans, refugees who hung around with Oscar and Oscar's friends.

"He loved children," said Helen Hernandez, as Antonio nodded vigorous agreement. She looked suddenly grim, as if she had realized, maybe for the first time, how seriously important that point might eventually become.

"I haven't visited him yet," she said, self-consciously admitting she was "afraid to see that he's really locked up in jail." She would probably just cry, she said.

But, she added, she's gotten past her initial hysteria with a dose of tranquilizers—and by having her telephone number changed. Like Mrs. Antelo, she was getting hate calls at a daily rate.

"I've been trying to get up the courage to call Mrs. [illegible]," she said nervously, fingering the album in her lap. "But, I guess I'm afraid. I just don't know what to say to her. Except that I know how she must be feeling. And I cry for her child, too, just as I cry for Oscar."

Normally, 12 people live in the four-room household of Miguel Ramirez, 53, a disabled construction worker. At present, however, there are only 10 because his wife Rose is visiting an ailing brother in Mexico and his son Michael, 17, is in jail.

On a recent hot weekday morning, eight family members were scattered about the tiny squalid living room, dank with the sour odors of diapers, cooking foods and too many bodies packed too close together without benefit of even a fan.

There was Ramirez himself, a raw, grizzled man who sat in his undershirt in a corner chair, somehow projecting rock solid stability in an otherwise incredibly fluid human scene unfolding before him.

Three of his four daughters—all mothers, all unmarried and two of them now pregnant again—sat sprawled on the ragged, filthy chairs and couches. All were rendered inordinately ill-tempered by the miserable heat, they said.

And four of Ramirez's grandchildren—two boys and two girls, aged 2 to 4—crawled, ran and scrambled in a shrieking, laughing fury through the house, chasing a single ravaged dog and, more often than not, taking advantage of one of their own, too—a pathetic 4-year-old boy, the red-eyed victim of chicken pox.

Senior Daughter

On a couch, half covered by a sheet, Yolanda Ramirez, 24, the senior daughter, was outshouting a Popeye cartoon blaring on the television. Now seven-months pregnant, for the third time, she was trying to resolve the question of a missing blouse with her sister Marina, 21, six months pregnant, who sat methodically rolling breakfast beans into tortillas, burrito style, at the end of the room.

A near-obese third daughter, Sylvia, mother of two of the rampaging children, sat bulging out of her tight shorts, fanning herself with a purple crochet doily which she had snatched from a screaming baby who had spun it wildly in the air long enough finally to knock the fire off her cigaret and get smacked for it.

"God, they'll all get the pox and what a mess that'll be," lamented Sylvia.

"Well, hell, they all gotta get it sometime," observed Yolanda sagely, demonstrating that, of the three women, she is by far the most philosophic.

"None of us are married," she said, looking downright amused at the question, "because the guys who knocked us up are all either bums or they don't have the jobs to support families."

So, she said, they all [illegible] Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits -- including Ramirez himself who, for undisclosed reasons, hasn't been able to acquire welfare aid himself although he suffers from a severely arthritic back. Lately, too, he grinned, he's been suffering from a finger that was half bitten off the other night in a bar fight.

"The guy really had some set of teeth," he chuckled, relishing the memory of "the little squabble."

But seriously, he said, he would like to tell the state to go shove its welfare.

"I want to work, but all I ever knew was hard labor. Now, who's going to hire a 53-year-old Mexican for a desk job? I can barely even read."

Without AFDC aid, he added, "we'd all probably starve." As it is, he's $1,000 behind in his house payments so, sooner or later, they'll all probably be out on the street anyway.

Nobody looked very alarmed.

Nobody looked, either, like they even remembered their brother Michael, until Ramirez suddenly reminded them.

"I don't even have the money for gas to go see my son," he said.

The mood in the room changed instantly to seriousness.

What concerned everybody present, it seemed, was not so much Mike's plight, but rather the effect it would have on his mother when she returns from Mexico, sometime later this week.

She has suffered from severe nervous disorders for years, they said. And when she finds out what's happened to her son--the seventh of her eight children--it "just may push her over the edge."

"God, I wish we could get her to stay down there till this is over," lamented Sylvia, lighting another cigaret.

"Yeh, but if we try that, she'll just get suspicious something's wrong," observed Yolanda, always the realist.

Miguel Ramirez, who has a certain indisputable dignity born of uncompromising honesty, had grown somber in his corner.

"As you can see, it's mostly just a question of survival, like in a jungle, for Mexicans like us. We just live from day to day. That's why a lot of Chicanos hang on to their pride and get mad easy--it's all they got."

He shrugged, looking around at his daughters, who listened, suddenly silent.

Most of his kids had either been kicked out of school for making trouble or they had quit in disgust, he continued.

One son, 22, was in jail already, for undisclosed reasons. Only his oldest boy, 28, had even gotten out of the Norwalk barrio, although, Ramirez digressed, he had hopes for his youngest son, 15, who was "a good student and a hard worker."

One Thing Sure

Meantime, whatever his kids had done, Ramirez said, he knew one thing for sure.

"My son Mike would never hurt a kid or be part of a rotten thing like that. He may have been mean sometime, but he would not take it out on babies."

But, sighed Ramirez, it's out of his hands now. And the whole family expects the worst.

"They'll just figure he's a dirty Mexican capable of anything. What did the cops call it--a joy killing? They'll probably just lock him up for good, without thinking twice about it," said Yolanda, shrugging cynically, philosophizing to the end.

11000 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90024
June 5, 1973

District Director
Internal Revenue Service
Post Office Box 391
Los Angeles, California 90053

ATTN: LYNN SULLIVAN (Field Audit #1502)

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to our letter of July 25, 1972, relating to an investigation we were conducting at that time involving Della Coover, born September 1, 1920, Social Security Account Number 557-16-3963; and to the telephone call between Special Agent Gilbert G. Benjamin of this office and Lynn Sullivan, at your office located at 9150 East Flair Drive, El Monte, California, 91731, on Monday, June 4, 1973.

To aid in your investigation in this matter, there are enclosed two xerox duplications of articles which appeared in the "Los Angeles Free Press," issues of March 20 and June 19, 1970, bearing the byline of Della Rosa, which is believed to be another pseudonym utilized by Mrs. Coover.

This information is being furnished for whatever action may be appropriate.

Very truly yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

JOE D. JAMIESON
Assistant Director in Charge

Enclosures 2

100-19949-

SEARCHED
INDEXED
SERIALIZED
FILED

2 - Addressee (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (100-19949)

GGB/cll
(3)

RETAIN:

SSC-REQUEST, August 20, 1975

Part V, 2.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ACM/RW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Mem[illegible]dum • UNITED [illegible] GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 12/21/49

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

The Director has inquired concerning the procedure which was followed in the Atomic Energy Act applicant case whereby the Washington Field Office was not alerted to the fact that Harold Ickes, whose name was given as a reference, should not be interviewed.

There is attached a memorandum dated December 20, 1949 from Mr. Rosen to Mr. Ladd with respect to the specific Atomic Energy case mentioned, namely Fred Ernest Schnepfe, who had given Harold Ickes as a reference on his PSQ or application form. From a reading of the attached memorandum which was prepared by Section Chief G. C. Callan of the Applicant Section, it is obvious that the Supervisors who handle applicant matters in the Investigative Division do not have any policy with respect to the interviewing of references, former employers, associates or others except where the Bureau has specifically indicated that certain individuals should not be contacted, such as Henry Steele Commager, personnel of CBS and the like. As a matter of fact, the present policy in effect at the Seat of Government concerning applicant investigations is to interview all references and the attached memorandum indicates that Harold Ickes had been interviewed in the past in connection with applicant investigations and has exhibited a cooperative attitude. It would seem, therefore, that no action should be taken with respect to the supervisory personnel at the Seat of Government concerning the referral of Harold Ickes' name to the Washington Field Office for interview in connection with the Atomic Energy Act case mentioned.

As you know, at the Executives Conference the Director's wishes with regard to interviewing persons who have demonstrated hostile attitudes toward the Bureau have been considered in the past and no instructions have been issued to the Supervisors at the Seat of Government or to the field concerning this matter except as to specific individuals whose names have been sent to the field in the recent past in an SAC Letter. This matter was called to the attention of the Executives Conference as recently as December 20, 1949 and the Conference felt it would be undesirable for the Bureau to embark upon a program of advising the field to not interview certain individuals in connection with various types of investigations conducted by the Bureau. The Executives Conference realized that the hostile attitude toward the Bureau stems not from our criminal investigative work but from the Bureau's investigative activity in the field of applicant investigations and the Loyalty Program. The Conference feels that the blacklisting of individuals is fundamentally bad and will ultimately result in extreme embarrassment to the Bureau. It is also felt it is extremely

COPY DESTROYED
150 NOV 25 1964

RECORDED 62-72[illegible]

difficult to draft a letter to all SAC's pointing up the problem to them and expecting them to adhere to any policy which will eliminate the difficulty which we have encountered heretofore.

I have discussed this matter with Mr. Carlson in some detail and he feels that we may be able to control to some extent the interviewing of persons hostile to the Bureau at the Seat of Government without furnishing a "black list" or statement of policy to the field. Mr. Carlson feels, and I agree with him, that the major portion of our difficulty stems from the Loyalty investigations and applicant investigations. Mr. Carlson and I therefore propose that the following procedure be instituted immediately at the Seat of Government in order to meet the objectives desired by the Director in connection with this matter:

1. The Crime Records Section shall be responsible for preparing and maintaining in a current status a list of those individuals known to be hostile to the Bureau. It is felt that it is imperative that a list be prepared because the judgment of individual Supervisors referring cases to the field will differ depending upon the extent of their day to day newspaper reading, radio listening and perusal of various and sundry periodicals. It would also mean that each Supervisor would have to either prepare his own list or endeavor to depend on a faulty memory. Furthermore, an individual may at one time appear to be hostile to the Bureau and subsequently his attitude may change and it may be very desirable to interview him.

2. This list shall be furnished to only those Supervisors at the Seat of Government who have the responsibility for assigning Loyalty or applicant cases to the field. This will include Supervisors in the Loyalty Section of the Security Division, the Applicant Section of the Investigative Division and those Supervisors in the Administrative Division handling Bureau applicant cases. This will mean that not more than 25 Supervisors at most at the Seat of Government will have possession of such a list. These Supervisors shall check all references and present and former employers against this list before referring the case to the field for investigation.

It should be realized that the procedure recommended will not provide against interviews with neighbors of the applicants or associates whose names are brought up during the course of the investigation. It is felt, however, that the bulk of the people who are interviewed in these cases are set out as references by the applicant and it would only be on a rare occasion that a person hostile to the Bureau will be interviewed on a neighborhood investigation or as an associate of the applicant.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-2000 BY SP2ALM/RW

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: 1/4/50

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: [illegible]

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

The Executives Conference of January 4, 1950, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Harbo, Ladd, Rosen, Clegg, Carlson, Nease and Mohr, in accordance with the Director's instructions, considered the attached memorandum of December 21, 1949, with respect to the procedures in conducting applicant investigations and particularly the method suggested to avoid interviews with those individuals having a hostile or critical attitude toward the Bureau and its work.

It was pointed out to the Conference that apparently the hostility and criticism of the Bureau stem not from our normal day to day criminal investigative work but to a very slight extent to investigations in the Internal Security field and very specifically and definitely to applicant and Loyalty investigations. It was felt that if some procedure could be devised to avoid interviews with individuals in applicant type cases where the individuals have exhibited a hostile or critical attitude toward the Bureau that much could be accomplished to eliminate the difficulties experienced in the past. The Conference felt it would be undesirable to prepare a list of any sort which might be termed a "blacklist" to be distributed to all of the divisional offices. It was proposed that the following procedure be instituted immediately at the Seat of Government in order to meet the objectives desired by the Director in connection with this matter:

1. The Crime Records Section shall be responsible for preparing and maintaining in a current status a list of those individuals known to be hostile to the Bureau. It is felt that it is imperative that a list be prepared because the judgment of individual Supervisors referring cases to the field will differ depending upon the extent of their day to day newspaper reading, radio listening and perusal of various and sundry periodicals. It would also mean that each Supervisor would have to either prepare his own list or endeavor to depend on a faulty memory. Furthermore, an individual may at one time appear to be hostile to the Bureau and subsequently his attitude may change and it may be very desirable to interview him.
Each name should be the subject of a memo.

2. This list shall be furnished to only those Supervisors at the Seat of Government who have the responsibility for assigning Loyalty or applicant cases to the field. This will include Supervisors in the Loyalty Section of the Security Division, the Applicant Section of the Investigative Division and those Supervisors in the Administrative Division handling Bureau applicant cases. This will mean that not more than 25 Supervisors at most at the Seat of Government will have possession of such a list. These Supervisors shall check all references and present and former employers against this list before referring the case to the field for investigation.

RECORDED
INDEXED
1950
LADD

It was pointed out that the procedure recommended will not provide against interviews with neighbors of the applicants or subjects under investigation in connection with the Loyalty Program nor would it provide against interviews of associates whose names are brought up during the course of the investigation. Likewise it would not provide against interviews with college professors whose names were not given by the applicant or the Loyalty subject as references, but who are contacted in the course of the ordinary investigation. It was felt, however, that the bulk of the people who are interviewed in these cases are set out as references by the applicant and it would only be on a rare occasion that a person hostile to the Bureau would be interviewed in a neighborhood investigation, as an associate or as a college professor.

It was also unanimously recommended by the Conference that in addition to the preparation of the list recommended and the checking at the Seat of Government by the indicated Supervisors, that where a specific individual has manifested hostility or unjust criticism against the Bureau that the specific field office or offices which would likely contact the individual be advised in writing in the form of a Personal and Confidential SAC letter. In these letters the SAC will be instructed that it is his responsibility to advise all of the Agents in the office of the undesirability of contacting the individual in question without prior Bureau authority. The field will be instructed that in addressing their communications to the Bureau requesting authority to contact such individuals, the letter or communication should not contain the phraseology that the interview will be conducted unless advised to the contrary but specific approval must be obtained from the Bureau before such a contact is made.

Should the Director agree with the recommendations of the Conference set forth in this memorandum, appropriate steps will be taken to inaugurate the policy recommended.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

CC - Mr. Clegg

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LET[illegible]R 66-78

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 15, 1966

RE: COURTNEY A. EVANS
PERSON NOT TO BE CONTACTED

On December 10, 1966, Senator Robert F. Kennedy released to the press a copy of a letter to him dated February 17, 1966, from former Assistant Director Courtney A. Evans. In direct contradiction to official memoranda prepared by Evans for Bureau files during the early 1960's, his February 17, 1966, letter to Kennedy stated that Evans "did not discuss the use of "microphones by the FBI" with Kennedy during his tenure as Attorney General--nor did Evans "know of any written material that was sent to you" (Kennedy) "at any time concerning" microphone surveillances.

In view of Evans' obvious lack of integrity, disregard for the truth and duplicity toward the FBI, he should not be contacted without prior Bureau approval.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES G

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: July 7, 1961

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING SECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

In line with the Director's approval, the Attorney General was contacted this morning, July 7, 1961, relative to his observation as to the possibility of utilizing "electronic devices" in organized crime investigations.

It was pointed out to the Attorney General that we had taken action with regard to the use of microphone surveillances in these cases and while they represented an expensive investigative step, we were nevertheless utilizing them in all instances where this was technically feasible and where valuable information might be expected. The strong objections to the utilization of telephone taps as contrasted to microphone surveillances was stressed. The Attorney General stated he recognized the reasons why telephone taps should be restricted to national-defense-type cases and he was pleased we had been using microphone surveillances where these objections do not apply wherever possible in organized crime matters.

The Attorney General noted that he had approved several technical surveillances in connection with security-type investigations since he took office, but that he had not kept any record and didn't really know what he had approved and what surveillances were currently in operation. He said that for his own information he would like to see a list of the technical surveillances now in operation. He added that this could be brought over to him personally and that he would look it over and immediately return it because he realized the importance of having these records maintained under the special security conditions which only the FBI had.

If the Director approves, we will have the list of technical surveillances prepared, delivered personally to the Attorney General and then returned to the Bureau's file.

REC- 3

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue

CAE:lds

8 AUG 2

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: August 17, 1961

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES

The Attorney General was contacted on the morning of August 17, 1961, with reference to the situation in New York City concerning the obtaining of leased lines from the telephone company for use in connection with microphone surveillances. This matter was discussed with the Attorney General and he was shown a specimen copy of the proposed letter which would be used. The Attorney General approved the proposed procedure in this regard and personally signed the attached memorandum evidencing such approval.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan

B-A 8/17

CAE:sp
-8-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

66-[illegible]-1032

EX 100 REC- 51

17 AUG 31 1961

ENCLOSURE

SEP 14 19[illegible]

TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

August 17, 1961

In connection with the use of microphone surveillances it is frequently necessary to lease a special telephone line in order to monitor such a surveillance. These situations occur when it is impossible to locate a secure monitoring point in the immediate vicinity of the premises covered by the microphone. Even though a special telephone line is utilized, this activity in no way involves any interception of telephonic communications and is not a telephone tap.

In the New York City area the telephone company has over the years insisted that a letter be furnished to the telephone company on each occasion when a special telephone line is leased by the FBI. It is required that such a lease arrangement be with the approval of the Attorney General. In the past we have restricted the utilization of leased lines in New York City to situations involving telephone taps, all of which have been approved by the Attorney General.

We have not previously used leased lines in connection with microphone surveillances because of certain technical difficulties which existed in New York City. These technical difficulties have, however, now been overcome. If we are permitted to use leased telephone lines as an adjunct to our microphone surveillances, this type of coverage can be materially extended both in security and major criminal cases. Accordingly, your approval of our utilizing this leased line arrangement is requested. A sample of the letter which it is proposed will be sent to the telephone company if a leased line is secured in connection with microphone surveillances is attached.

Approved: ______________________

Date: ______________________

TOP SECRET

OPTI[illegible]). 10 5010-106
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Felt
- Bates
- Bishop
- Callahan
- Campbell
- Cleveland
- Conrad
- Dalbey
- Jenkins
- Marshall
- Miller, E.S.
- Ponder
- Soyars
- Walters
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Kinley
- Mr. Armstrong
- Ms. Herwig
- Mrs. Neenan

TO : Mr. Bishop DATE: 7-11-72

FROM : M. A. Jones

ALL [illegible] HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/Rw

SUBJECT: NOT TO CONTACT LIST

The Not To Contact list is a card index of 332 individuals whose statements or attitude, generally when contacted on official business, gave rise to doubts as to the advisability of contacting them again. When a person was placed on the Not To Contact list, the Field Office covering the residence or occupation or both was advised that this particular individual should not be contacted without prior Bureau authority. Thus, the Not To Contact list did not prohibit future contact, but specified it could be made only after clearance with the Bureau.

Examples of the type of individuals on this list are set forth below.

Dr. Vannevar Bush: Dr. Bush was placed on the Not To Contact list in June, 1964, at which time he was connected with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was so designated when he made derogatory statements concerning the Bureau when contacted on an applicant-type case.

Rex Stout: Rex Stout is an author who was designated for this list in 1965 because of his then-new mystery novel, "The Doorbell Rang." This novel presented a highly distorted and most unfavorable picture of the FBI in its operations as they relate to the plot of the book.

Enclosure — Sent 7-13-72 REC-30 541

EX 101

1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Bates
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Conrad

1 - Mr. Dalby
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Miller
1 - Mr. Ponder
1 - Mr. Soyars
1 - Mr. Walters
1 - M. A. Jones

20 JUL 18 1972

CRIME RESEARCH

DGH:djm
(15)

OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED OVER

↓ ↓

70 JUL 24 1972

M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop Memo
RE: NOT TO CONTACT LIST

OBSERVATIONS:

It is not felt that the list continues to serve a useful purpose, and it is further believed that the responsibility of restricting contact with a person who is antagonistic toward the FBI or law enforcement in general should be that of the Agent in Charge.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the attached memorandum be forwarded to all offices.

2. That if approved, the attached memorandum be returned to the Crime Records Division for dissemination to the field.

Handled
7/14/72

TEB

1. & 2. Approved.

7-12-72
10:56 PM

SAC, Albany July 13, 1972

Acting Director, FBI

NOT TO CONTACT LIST

As you know, in the past from time to time, various individuals have been placed on captioned list. This action has been taken because of derogatory statements or adverse action regarding the FBI or law enforcement agencies in general by the individuals involved.

This is to advise you that the Not To Contact list is being discontinued, and you should use your own best judgment if a question arises as to the desirability of a particular contact in an investigative matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

1 - All Other Field Offices

EX-115

REC 43

TEB RA
542

NOTE: See M. A. Jones to Bishop Memo, captioned, "Not to Contact List," dated 7-11-72.

DGH:djm
(6) djm

19 JUL 17 1972

Felt ____
Bates ____
Bishop ____
Callahan ____
Campbell ____
Cleveland ____
Conrad ____
Dalbey ____
Jenkins ____
Marshall ____
Miller, E.S. ____
Ponder ____
Soyars ____
Walters ____
Tele. Room ____
Mr. Kinley ____
Mr. Armstrong ____
Ms. Herwig ____
Neenan ____

MAILED 3
JUL 14 1972
FBI

70 JUL 24 1972

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SSC-Request, August 20, 1975

PART V (3) for delivery 9-9-75

UNEXCISED -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

1. Information identifies a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation.

2. Information identifies a peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operation.

3. Information identifies a foreign intelligence agency.

4. Information identifies another U.S. Government agency.

~~PART V (3) for delivery 9-9-75~~

~~UNEXCISED~~ -

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : ALL SUPERVISORS - LATIN-AMERICAN, RESEARCH-SATELLITE, NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE AND SOVIET SECTIONS

DATE: (Revised) August 10, 1967

FROM : W. R. WANNALL

COPY NO. 62

SUBJECT: CONTROL - REFERENCE FILES

Attached is a document which has been issued in all Sections to serve as a ready reference for all Supervisors.

It is designed (1) to enable Supervisors to channel newspaper clippings, publications data, and other material to specific files where it can be readily located for use when needed (quick reference to this document will enable you to designate material for logical file by file number); (2) to eliminate creation of unnecessary control or reference files where one already exists; (3) to provide Supervisor with ready reference titles to utilize when writing material of general nature; (4) to provide a new Supervisor with a starting point whereby he can get familiar with background of work under his supervision; and (5) to enable Supervisors to have available a starting point for necessary research.

Revisions and additions are being issued as they are received. Each Supervisor should furnish suggested additions and revisions as they occur so document will be current and workable. The cooperation of each Supervisor is needed to keep it complete and up to date. Send suggested revisions or additions to W. R. Wannall, Room 614 - 9&D.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~Classified by~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

ams

10-27-00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EW
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
#MDR-16

~~Classified by 6283~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category II + III~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

SECRET

ONTROL FILES SET UP WITH STANDARD FOREIGN SUB-FILE LIST

SECRET

Files listed below are applicable to all countries simply by addition of the sub-file number of the particular country. (See Standard Sub-File list for Foreign Countries which follows this listing.) In many instances the sub-file may not have been made up yet because it has not been needed. However, if you designate material for such sub-files, the sub-file will be made up where presently nonexistent. In the event you desire to use one of these files for correspondence you are not bound by the precise title here. The titles should likewise be made applicable to each country by addition of the country name, for example "Diplomatic List - Hungary."

File	File Number
<Anagram ※1	65-62456> (S)
Clandestine Shipments of Material to Russia and Satellite Countries	105-20964
Communist Party	64-200
Current Soviet Espionage and Subversive Activities	64-211
Defectors	100-357681
Diplomatic List	62-6404
Diplomatic or International Organization Visa Holders	105-16424
Economic Matters	110-6
Exchange of Cultural Relations (or Educational Exchanges)	64-25441
Foreign Funds Outside the U.S.	112-8
Foreign Miscellaneous	64-175
Foreign Political Matters	109-12
Inquiries to the State Department Regarding Relatives, Property and Funds in Foreign Countries (or Requests for Information from Foreign Countries)	64-27223
Intelligence Matters	65-63987
Labor Conditions	100-341561
Legal Attaches <Informants, Sources, and Contacts> ※2	64-4123>
Legal Attaches - Accomplishments	64-44362
Military and Naval Matters	113-7
National Intelligence Survey	64-35693
National Group Coverage	105-97459
Police Matters	64-29833
Political Matters	109-12
Smuggling Activities	64-309
Social Conditions	111-1

SECRET

Control - Reference Files
Revised Page 2
December 5, 1962

SECRET

Control Files Set Up with Standard
Foreign Sub-File List

Soviet Diplomatic Activities (SODAC)	64-211
United Nations Delegation	62-77787
United Nations Personnel	62-77787
Visa Applicants	105-7

For more specialized files, see listing for each country or see special category files which are listed later.

SECRET

Control - Reference Files
Page 2a
December 5, 1962

SECRET

STANDARD SUBFILE LIST
FOR FOREIGN COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	SUBFILE	COUNTRY	SUBFILE
ADEN	395	BRITISH WEST INDIES	324
AFGHANISTAN	321	BULGARIA	261
ALBANIA	273	BURMA	264
ALGERIA	278	BURUNDI	407
ANDORRA	281	BYELORUSSIAN	329
ANGOLA	380	CAMBODIA	364
ANGUILLA	418	CAMEROUN	369
ARGENTINA	201	CANADA	243
ARMENIA	308	CANARY ISLANDS	291
AUSTRALIA	303	CAPE VERDE ISLANDS	292
AUSTRIA	252	CENTRAFRICAN REPUBLIC	390
AZORES	310	CEYLON	266
BAHAMA ISLANDS (NASSAU)	202	CHAD	388
BAHRAIN (OR BAHREIN) ISLANDS	410	CHILE	207
BARBADOS	417	CHINA (COMMUNIST)	246
BELGIUM	254	CHINA (NATIONALIST)	274
BERMUDA ISLANDS	203	COLOMBIA	208
BHUTAN	371	REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (KINSHASA)	336
BOLIVIA	204		
BORNEO	293	REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)	391
BOTSWANA	404	COSTA RICA	209
BRAZIL	205	CUBA	210
BRITISH HONDURAS	206	CURACAO	298

SECRET

STANDARD SUBFILE LIST
FOR FOREIGN COUNTRIES

SECRET

COUNTRY	SUBFILE	COUNTRY	SUBFILE
CYPRUS	277	GERMANY (EAST)	397
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	263	GHANA (GOLD COAST)	366
DAHOMEY	385	GREECE	253
DANZIG	309	GREENLAND	360
DENMARK	256	GUAM	333
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	211	GUATEMALA	213
ECUADOR	212	GUIANA (DUTCH)	215
EGYPT	259	GUIANA (FRENCH)	216
ENGLAND	241	GUINEA	378
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	377	GUYANA (FORMERLY BRITISH GUIANA)	214
ESTONIA	283	HAITI	217
ETHIOPIA	313	HONDURAS	218
ERITREA	356	HONG KONG	295
FAR EAST	352	HUNGARY	249
FIJI ISLANDS	402	ICELAND	314
FINLAND	255	INDIA	257
FRANCE	231	INDONESIA	331
FRENCH WEST INDIES	341	IRAN	251
FRENCH WEST AFRICA	343	IRAQ	282
GABON	392	IRELAND	311
GAMBIA	401	ISRAEL	345
GERMANY (WEST--GENERAL)	232	ITALY	233

SECRET

STANDARD SUBFILE LIST FOR FOREIGN COUNTRIES

SECRET

COUNTRY	SUBFILE	COUNTRY	SUBFILE
IVORY COAST	386	MACEDONIA	346
JAMAICA	219	MADAGASCAR	335
JAPAN	234	MALAGASY REPUBLIC	335
JAVA	289	MALAWI	326
JORDAN	332	MALAYSIA	405
KENYA	325	MALAYA	279
KOREA	265	MALDIVE ISLANDS	414
KOREA	381	MALI	384
KUWAIT	367	MALTA	340
LAOS	365	MANCHURIA	275
LATVIA	294	MARTINIQUE	230
LEBANON	287	MAURITANIA	398
LEEWARD ISLANDS	220	MAURITIUS ISLAND	394
LESOTHO (FORMERLY BASUTOLAND)	412	MEXICO	221
LIBERIA	297	MIDDLE EAST (ALSO NEAR EAST)	350
LIBYA	300	MONACO	363
LITHUANIA	262	MONGOLIA	271
LUXEMBOURG	280	MOZAMBIQUE	276
MACAO	362	MOROCCO	235

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD SUBFILE LIST FOR FOREIGN COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	SUBFILE	COUNTRY	SUBFILE
NEAR EAST (ALSO MIDDLE EAST)	350	PERU	225
NEPAL	353	PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	239
NETHERLANDS	258	POLAND	250
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES	247	PORTUGAL	236
NEW CALEDONIA	269	PORTUGUESE GUINEA	403
NEW HEBRIDES	400	QUATAR	415
NEW ZEALAND	320	RUMANIA	244
NEWFOUNDLAND	338	RUSSIA	240
NICARAGUA	222	RYUKYU ISLANDS	368
NIGER	387	RWANDA	408
NIGERIA	323	SALVADOR	226
NORTH KOREA	265	SAMOA	358
NORWAY	260	SAN MARINO	299
NYASALAND; MALAWI	326	SARDINIA	318
PAKISTAN	342	SAUDI ARABIA	245
PALESTINE	248	SCOTLAND	285
PANAMA	223	SENEGAL	393
PAPUA; TERRITORY OF PAPUA		SIERRA LEONE	355
PARAGUAY	224	SINGAPORE	316

SECRET

Control-Reference Files
Page 5a
Revised April 25, 1969

SECRET

STANDARD SUBFILE LIST FOR FOREIGN COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	SUBFILE	COUNTRY	SUBFILE
SOLOMON ISLANDS (BRITISH)	409	TONGA ISLANDS	374
SOMALI REPUBLIC	349	TRANSYLVANIA	312
SOUTH AFRICA	317	TRANSJORDAN	332
SOUTH KOREA	265	TRIESTE	337
SOUTH WEST AFRICA	382	TRINIDAD	229
SOUTHEAST ASIA	413	TRUCIAL STATES	406
SOUTHERN RHODESIA	327	TIBET	344
SPAIN	237	TUNISIA	296
SUDAN	339	TURKEY	238
SUMATRA	284	UGANDA	322
SURINAM	215	UKRAINE	329
SWAZILAND	416	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	376
SWEDEN	267	UPPER VOLTA	390
SWITZERLAND	268	URUGUAY	227
SYRIA	286	VATICAN CITY	359
TAHITI	375	VENEZUELA	228
TANZANIA	373	VIET MINH--DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM	370
THAILAND	288	VIETNAM	330
TOGO	372	VIRGIN ISLANDS	315

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD SUBFILE LIST
FOR FOREIGN COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	SUBFILE	AREAS	SUBFILE
VOLTAIC REPUBLIC	390	ASIA	301
WALES	328	AFRICA	302
WEST IRIAN	357	CENTRAL AMERICA	354
YEMEN	334	EUROPE	304
YUGOSLAVIA	272	LATIN AMERICA	307
ZAMBIA	351	MIDDLE EAST	350
STATELESS	361	NORTH AMERICA	305
		SOUTH AMERICA	306
		WESTERN HEMISPHERE	307

SECRET

Control-Reference Files
Page 6a
Revised April 25, 1969

SECRET

In connection with the operation of various control files there may be set up a complete or partial group of subfiles for each field office. For ready reference, the standard subfile list is set out below:

Office	Subfile	Office	Subfile
Albany	1	Memphis	28
Albuquerque	62	Miami	29
Anchorage	22	Milwaukee	30
Atlanta	2	Minneapolis	43
Baltimore	3	Mobile	61
Birmingham	4	Newark	31
Boston	5	New Haven	32
Buffalo	6	New Orleans	33
Butte	7	New York	34
Charlotte	8	Norfolk	56
Chicago	9	Oklahoma City	35
Cincinnati	10	Omaha	36
Cleveland	11	Philadelphia	37
Columbia	66	Phoenix	38
Dallas	12	Pittsburgh	39
Denver	13	Portland	40
Detroit	15	Richmond	41
El Paso	16	St. Louis	42
Honolulu	18	Salt Lake City	44
Houston	19	San Antonio	45
Indianapolis	21	San Diego	46
Jackson	20	San Francisco	47
Jacksonville	63	San Juan	48
Kansas City	23	Savannah	49
Knoxville	24	Seattle	50
Las Vegas	65	Springfield	52
Little Rock	25	Tampa	64
Los Angeles	26	Washington Field	53
Louisville	27		

SECRET

SECRET

COUNTRY LISTINGS

This list has been compiled from available sources and on basis of data furnished by Supervisors. It is only as complete as each Supervisor desires to make it. Many countries do not appear simply because no separate listings were found or warranted.

AFRICA

African Activities in the U. S.	105-87964

ALBANIA

Albanian Activities in the U. S.	100-211013
Albanian Funds	65-33033
Albanian Intelligence Activities Abroad	100-353164
Albanian Intelligence Activities in the U. S.	100-78816
Albanian Intelligence Service	100-353164
Americans Residing in Albania	105-65671
Movement of Albanian Nationals	100-354033
Repatriation of Emigres to Albania	105-39234
Soviet - Albania Relations	65-58216
Visitors to Albania	105-94414

ARGENTINA

Argentine Activities in the U. S.	65-46146
Argentine Intelligence Service	65-57185
Argentine Revolutionary Activities	105-137559

ARMENIA

Armenian Activities in the U. S.	100-196469
Armenian Publications in the U. S.	105-12157
Armenian Revolutionary Federation	61-1364
Armenian Intelligence Activities	105-19483
Armenian Repatriation Activities	100-341862

AUSTRIA

Austrian Activities in the U. S.	100-114854
Austrian Funds	65-32065
Movement of Austrian Nationals	105-49050
Relationship Between Austria and Soviet Russia	65-56877

AUSTRALIA

#3

Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO)	62-74549 (S)

SECRET

SECRET

BRAZIL

Brazilian National Security Council	64-35551
Brazilian Socialist Party	109-498
Communist Party of Brazil (CPB--Chinese Faction)	105-143939

BULGARIA

Americans Residing in Bulgaria	100-360958
Bulgarian Activities in the United States	100-66
Bulgarian Defectors	100-357681-261
Bulgarian Diplomatic Activities in the U. S.	100-347211
Bulgarian Embassy - Italy	62-81474
Bulgarian Embassy - Paris	105-92334
Bulgarian Funds	65-34794
Bulgarian Intelligence Activities in the U. S.	100-356259
Bulgarian Intelligence Service	62-82654
Bulgarian Legation	65-38869
Bulgarian National Council	105-94207
Bulgarian National Committee	100-361364
Bulgarian National Front of America, Inc.	105-82043
Bulgarian Repatriation	105-38885
Bulgarian Trade Unions	105-48241
Bulgarian Visitors to Spain	105-73018
Movement of Bulgarian Nationals	100-354032
Relationships Between Bulgaria and the U. S.	65-38868
Visitors to Bulgaria	105-94413

CANADA

Relations with RCMP ※3	62-35717 (S)
Security of Canadian and Mexican Borders	62-60366
Security of Canadian Border	100-426407

CHINA

Americans in Communist China	100-362994
China Daily News	100-196148
Chinese Aliens Entering the U. S. (Formerly 105-76690 re aliens and 105-86568 re students)	105-135923
Chinese Communist Activities (Use standard sub-file list for field offices and foreign countries)	100-40
Chinese Communist Activities in the United Nations	105-41561
Chinese Communist Activities in Racial Matters	105-158698
Chinese Communist Contacts with Scientists in U. S.	105-168542
Chinese Communist Couriers	105-144471
Chinese Communist Intelligence Biographic Data Album	105-147569
Chinese Communist Intelligence Operations in U. S.	65-53286
Chinese Communist Intelligence Operations in Foreign Countries	65-65807

SECRET

CHINA (Continued)

Chinese Entering the U. S. Claiming U. S. Citizenship	105-12752
Chinese Embassy, Washington, D. C.	62-55263
Chinese Employees in United Nations Secretariat (CHISEC)	105-142165
Chinese Funds	105-159163
Chinese Nationalist Party (KUOMINTANG)	100-81019
Chinese Nationalist Intelligence Activities in U. S.	105-48030
Chinese Seamen Deserters	105-129735
Chinese Security Investigations (FBI Schools and Training)	1-6830
Chinese Universities and Graduate Schools	105-137333
CIA Recruitment of Chinese Aliens in U. S. for Overseas Intelligence Operations *2 & *4	105-60238
Communist Infiltration of Chinese Nationalist Diplomatic and Official Establishments in the U. S.	105-52794
Communist Infiltration of Chinese Students in the U. S.	105-12536
Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese Communist Intelligence Operations in the U. S. (CHICOIN) *2	105-135614
Foreign Assets Control	105-13771
New China News Agency	100-369921
Sino-Soviet Relations (Political)	65-52604
Unauthorized Travel by U. S. Citizens to Communist China	105-156647
U. S. Residents Traveling to Hong Kong	105-144107
Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U. S. Residents with Chinese Communist Diplomatic Establishments (CABBAGE)	105-144424

COSTA RICA

Costa Rican Revolutionary Activities	109-652

CUBA

American Communists' Participation in Cuban Activities	105-88457
Anti-Fidel Castro Activities	109-584
Communist Penetration of Cuban Diplomatic Establishments	105-89084
Cuban Acts of Violence Against U. S. Citizens	64-47305
Cuban Activities in Puerto Rico	64-47532
Cuban Activities in the United States	105-83195
Cuban Censorship	64-23200
Cuban Consulate, Tampica, Mexico	105-152962
Cuban Embassy, Belgium	65-67286
Cuban Embassy, Canada	105-35674
Cuban Embassy, France	65-68514
Cuban Embassy, Italy	62-108562
Cuban Embassy, Mexico	105-93893
Cuban Embassy, Philippines	105-104333
Cuban Embassy, Spain	65-55759

SECRET

CUBA (Continued)	
Cuban Emergency Plans	105-97549
Cuban Funds	62-105411
Cuban Government in Exile	105-95357
Cuban Government's Supression of Religion	64-47544
Cuban Intelligence Activities in the United States	105-80787
Cuban Matters - Counterintelligence Program	105-99938
Cuban Mission to the United Nations	62-77787-210
Cuban Prisoner Exchange	105-99200
Cuban Propaganda Activities in the United States	64-45716
Cuban Rebel Activities in Cuba	105-95461
Cuban Refugee Problem in the United States	105-93163
Cuban Subversion Toward Latin America	109-653
Cuba's Relations with Soviet-bloc Countries	64-47156
Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAALA)	105-15543
Radio Havana (Maria Montero Triana)	100-445759
Tri-Continental Conference	105-146802

SECRET

SECRET

CUBA (Continued)

Fair Play for Cuba Committee	97-4196
Fidel Castro	109-539
Individuals Offering Services in Cuban Crisis	105-114340
July 26 Movement	109-551
Possible Penetration of Cuban Intelligence Service Through Radio Havana	105-151671
Prensa Latina	105-80145
Travel Controls - Cuba	105-7-210

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

American Embassy, Prague	62-81260
Americans Residing in Czechoslovakia	105-65672
CEDOK (Official Czech Travel Agency)	105-60680
Czech Activities in the U. S.	61-10730
Czech Diplomatic Activities in New York	105-11768
Czech Diplomatic Activities in Mexico	100-348756
Czech Diplomatic Activities in Washington, D. C.	105-14537
Czech Diplomatic Couriers	105-68715
Czechoslovakian Embassy, Italy	65-65910
Czechoslovakian Embassy, Paris	65-58268
Czech Funds	65-31621
Czech Intelligence Activities in the U. S.	65-38136
Czech Legation, Ottawa, Canada	100-350422
Czech Refugee Activities	105-10686
Czech Security Service	100-340678
Exiles' Movement for Return to the Homeland (HEPND)	105-36620
Expose	65-60545
Information and Cultural Activities of Czech Embassy, Washington, D. C.	105-74665
Movement of Czech Nationals	100-354029
Relationship Between Czechoslovakia and the United States	65-42908
United Nations Personnel - Czechoslovakia	62-77787-263
Visitors to Czechoslovakia	105-93942

SECRET

SECRET

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Communist Infiltration of Dominican Exile Groups	105-91529
Dominican Activities in the U. S.	100-237194
Dominican Funds	105-105060
Dominican Intelligence Activities	105-93789
Dominican Intelligence Agents in the U. S.	105-83709
Dominican Lobbying Activities in the U. S.	105-95904
Dominican Revolutionary Activities	105-77731
Embassy of the Dominican Republic, Washington, D. C.	65-47134

EGYPT

Egyptian Consulate, New York City	62-101947
Egyptian Diplomatic Activities in the U. S.	105-52622
Egyptian Embassy, Washington, D. C.	65-58070
Egyptian Intelligence Service	65-58530
Rapprochement Between Russia and the Arab Nations	105-21904

ESTONIA

Movement of Estonian Nationals	100-354578
Organizations of Estonian-Americans in the U. S.	105-11188
Repatriation of Emigres to Estonia	105-42034

FAR EAST

Far East Situation	62-73361

FINLAND

Finnish Activities in the U. S.	65-1440
Finnish Embassy, Washington, D. C.	65-40289
Finnish Intelligence Activities in the U. S.	65-56811
Movement of Finnish Nationals	100-354027

FRANCE

Embassy of France, Washington, D. C.	65-30150 (S)
French Consulate, New York City	65-41022
Relations with Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE) X3	100-189256
French Activities - General	65-29441
French Intelligence Activities	105-154506

GERMANY

Abwehr	65-37193
Berlin Situation	105-77297
East German Intelligence Service	65-61827
East German Activities in Cuba	105-84904
East German Propaganda	105-84034

SECRET

GERMANY (Continued)

German Consulate - Boston	65-26130
German Consulate - Chicago	65-23926
German Consulate - Detroit	65-26110
German Consulate - New Orleans	65-14760
German Consulate - New York City	65-26112
German Consulate - San Francisco	65-26109
German Embassy - Washington, D. C.	105-24201
German Intelligence Activities in the U. S.	65-9180
German Scientists	105-8090
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD)	64-200-232
Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MFS) (Ministry for State Security, East Germany)	65-61827
Movement of East German Nationals	105-88769
Socialist Unity Party (SED) (Sozialistische Einheitspartel Deutschlands) (East German Communist Party)	100-351136
Movement of German Nationals	105-125970

GHANA

Ghana Activities in the United States	105-78601

GREAT BRITAIN

Relations with MI-6 *3	62-64178 (S)
Relations with MI-5 and MI-6 *3	65-5081 (S)
British Embassy, Washington, D. C.	62-41850

GREECE

Gardenia #4	105-42448
Greek Activities in the United States	61-9587
International Brigade for Greece	100-35233

GUATEMALA

Guatemalan Revolutionary Activities	64-43798

GUINEA

Guinea Activities in the United States	105-78602

GUYANA

Peoples Progressive Party	64-200-214
Progressive Youth Organization	105-143320

HAITI

Haitian Revolutionary Activities	105-95677

SECRET

HONG KONG

Investigations at Hong Kong	62-99680 and 65-53286-124

HUNGARY

Americans Residing in Hungary	105-65673
Dart #2	65-61394
Hungarian Activities in the U. S. (Sub for each field office)	100-89
Hungarian Diplomatic Activities in the United States	105-23044
Hungarian Embassy - Ottawa, Canada	105-69553
Hungarian Embassy - Washington, D. C.	65-39010
Hungarian Emergency Refugee Program (Control)	105-54509
Hungarian Emergency Refugee Program (Name Checks)	105-54508
Hungarian Funds	65-32424
Hungarian Intelligence Activities in the United States	100-354194
Hungarian Intelligence Abroad	65-55041
Hungarian Intelligence Service	65-57965
Hungarian Secret Police	105-9847
Movement of Hungarian Nationals	100-354030
Repatriation of Emigres to Hungary	105-38887
Visitors to Hungary	105-93959

INDIA

Consulate General of India	105-54374

SECRET

SECRET

IRAN

Consulate General of Iran, New York City	62-93147
Embassy of Iran	62-73579
Iranian Diplomatic Activities in the U. S.	100-381876

IRAQ

Consulate of Iraq, New York City	62-96543
Embassy of Iraq	65-55156
Iraq Diplomatic Activities in the U. S.	105-32502

IRELAND

Coverage of Irish Activities	105-75895
Irish Republican Army	61-7606

ISRAEL

Intelligence Coverage of Israeli Activities - NYC ※3	105-72272
Israeli Consulate - Chicago	105-18322
Israeli Consulate - Los Angeles	105-13545
Israeli Consulate - New York City	65-58190
Israeli Embassy - Washington, D. C.	105-10828
Israeli Intelligence Funds	105-73606
Israeli Intelligence Service ※3	65-58700 (S)

ITALY

Italian Embassy	65-30892
Italian Fascist Activities in the U. S.	105-18021

JAPAN

Sokagakkhai	64-41658

JORDAN

Embassy of Jordan	65-61885
Jordanian Consulate, New York City	105-55014

KOREA

Embassy of Korea	65-61877
Korean Activities in the U. S. (Subs for each field office)	100-25
North Korean Espionage Activities	65-65631
North Korean Intelligence Activities	105-143909

LATIN AMERICA

Caribbean Political Activities	109-581
Central America - Assessment of Internal Security	64-48874
Cuban Subversion Toward Latin America	109-653
Continental Latin-American Students Organization	105-88932
Latin-American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (CLASC)	109-666

SECRET

SECRET

LATIN AMERICA (Continued)

Latin-American Organization of Solidarity (LASO)	105-149973
Organization of American States	64-32630
Pan American Union	62-20344
Potential Political Ramifications in Latin America as a Result of Cuban Revolution	109-576

LATVIA

Movement of Latvian Nationals	100-354598
Repatriation of Emigres to Latvia	105-39949

LITHUANIA

Repatriation of Emigres to Lithuania	105-41116

MACEDONIA

Macedonian Activities in the United States	65-2809
Macedonian Peoples League	100-186807
Macedonian Political Organization	100-186806

MEXICO

American Communist Group in Mexico	100-422116
Border Coverage XX /	100-356015
Circle of Mexican Studies	105-40545
Mexican Revolutionary Activities	105-75820
Party of Mexican Laborers and Farm Workers	100-370053
Popular Socialist Party (PPS) of Mexico	100-359378
People's Revolutionary Army of Mexico	105-132381

MIDDLE EAST

Arab Intelligence Activities in the United States	105-53464
Middle East Situation	105-53922
Translation Matter - Arabic	62-1077-247

MONGOLIA

Mongolian People's Republic (General)	105-104751
National Intelligence Survey - Mongolia	64-35693-271
Political Matters - Mongolia	109-12-271
United Nations Personnel - Mongolia	62-77787-271
Visa Applicants - Mongolia	105-7-271
Visitors to Mongolia	105-133625

NICARAGUA

Embassy of Nicaragua	100-143895
Nicaraguan Revolutionary Activities	109-645

PARAGUAY

Paraguayan Exile Activities in the United States	105-107249

SECRET

SECRET

POLAND

Americans Residing in Poland	105-65675
Movement of Polish Nationals	100-354028
Office of Economic Minister, Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C.	105-62792
Polish Activities in Brazil	105-104003
Polish Activities in the U. S. (Miscellaneous)	65-40955
Polish Commercial Counselor, New York	105-79464
Polish Commercial Office, Chicago, Illinois	105-90343
Polish Consulate, Chicago	65-55273
Polish Diplomatic Activities (General)	105-12340
Polish Diplomatic Couriers	105-68808
Polish Embassy, Canada	65-57264
Polish Embassy, Mexico	62-77545
Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C.	62-56597
Polish Funds	65-32839
Polish Intelligence Activities Abroad	65-38135
Polish Intelligence Activities in the U. S.	100-350264
Polish Military Intelligence (Z-II)	65-58426
Polish Security Service (UB)	100-344405
Polish Trade Mission, New York	105-98402
Relationship Between U. S. and Poland	65-56253
Repatriation of Emigres to Poland	105-39233
Visitors to Poland	105-64753
Who's Who in Poland	105-9869

PORTUGAL

Anti-Salazar Activities	105-95512

ROMANIA

American Embassy, Bucharest, Romania	62-81259
Americans Residing in Romania	105-44733
Foreign Funds Outside the United States	112-8
Free Romanian Movement	102-119
Funds Transmitted to Residents of Romania	100-363308
<Jakober Ransom Channel ※ |	105-108786>
Monograph (Romania)	62-80750-1070
Movement of Romanian Nationals	100-354031
Relationship Between United States and Romania	65-38867
Repatriation of Emigres to Romania	105-38985
Romanian Activities in the U. S.	100-46
Romanian-American Activities in the U. S.	105-15520
Romanian Diplomatic Activities	105-25263
Romanian Embassy - Paris, France	105-105768
Romanian Embassy - Tokyo, Japan	105-118698
Romanian Embassy - Washington, D. C.	65-38144
Romanian Funds	100-359722
Romanian Intelligence Activities in the U. S.	105-23993

SECRET

SECRET

ROMANIA (Continued)

Romanian Intelligence Service	100-350268
Romanian Iron Guard	105-12450
Romanian Legation	65-57411
Romanian Liberation Movement	105-10412
Romanian Military Intelligence	105-102535
Romanian Orthodox Church	105-15386
Romanul American	100-264688
United States Citizens Repatriated from Romania	105-44733
Visitors to Romania	105-94412

RUSSIA

Aliens in United States Who Hold Valid Soviet Passports (Nondiplomatic)	62-102232
American Embassy, Moscow	62-75450
Americans Residing in the USSR	105-37111
Amtorg	61-5381
Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR	100-346963
Censorship - Russian	100-344043
Funds Transmitted to Residents of Russia	100-353496
Importation and Sale of Soviet Publications	100-365088
Monitoring of Soviet-Controlled Establishments in the United States	105-25490
Movement of Soviet Nationals (Mosnat)	100-308748
Office of Soviet Military Attache	100-357510
Office of Soviet Naval Attache	105-12488
Office of Soviet Air Attache	100-379757
Pravda	100-23694
Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets	105-36365
Red Navy; Soviet Naval Intelligence	100-346132
Relationship Between the United States and Russia	65-37939
Repatriation and Redefection to USSR	105-61716

SECRET

SECRET

RUSSIA (Continued)

ROVS (White Russian Intelligence Organization)	100-355888
Russian Funds	65-28939
Russian Immigrants to the U. S.	62-102232
Searches of Diplomatic Shipments X2	105-19581
Soviet Attempts to Convert Looted German Bonds (SOVLOOT)	105-23578
Soviet Attempts to Defect American Personnel	65-62958
Soviet Bloc Capital Invested in the U. S.	105-49099
Soviet Commercial Activities	65-63880
Soviet Defector Operations	65-62958
Soviet Derelictions	100-365823
Soviet Diplomatic Activities (SODAC)	65-30092
Soviet Diplomatic Couriers	61-771
Soviet Earth Satellites	62-104279
Soviet Embassy Lookouts	105-30046
Soviet Foreign Policy	100-342046
Soviet Identity Documents	100-348008
Soviet Intelligence Activities in Latin America	100-332412
Soviet Intelligence Album	100-342424
Soviet Intelligence Couriers - Airlines - Seamen	65-63360
Soviet Intelligence Service (General)	65-57884
Soviet Intelligence Service (Red Army)	65-56847
Soviet Intelligence Service (KGB)	61-3499
Soviet Intelligence Service (Smersch)	100-351413
Soviet Intelligence Service (Recruitment)	65-57774
Soviet Intelligence Service (Sabotage)	65-67761
Soviet Intelligence Service (Training)	65-57[illegible]
Soviet Intelligence Service (Security Precautions)	65-57773
Soviet Intelligence Service (Cover Stories)	65-57969
Soviet Intelligence Service (Travel and Entry)	65-57971
Soviet Intelligence Service (Method of Communication)	65-57768
Soviet Intelligence Service (Method of Payment)	65-57970
Soviet Intelligence Service (Information Sought)	65-57967
Soviet Intelligence Service (Modus Operandi)	65-57772
Soviet Intelligence Service (Information Obtained)	65-59508
Soviet Intelligence Service (Diplomatic Assistance)	65-57960
Soviet Intelligence Service (Communist Party)	65-57972
Soviet Intelligence Service (Technical Services)	65-69346
Soviet Intelligence Service (Unsolved Situations)	65-57771
Soviet Looting of German Bonds	105-23578
Soviet Officials Abroad (CIA Check List)	105-24309
Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activity (SPIA)	100-354839
Soviet Officials Album	100-353113
Soviet Propaganda Activities	61-6341
Soviet Travel Control	65-61940
Soviet War Plans	100-343044

SECRET

RUSSIA (Continued)

Summer Resort Facilities of Soviet Personnel	105-14175
Summary of Soviet Espionage Activities in U. S.	100-345686
Tass News Agency	100-183386
U. S. Defectees to USSR	105-82754
USSR Nationals Employed at UN Secretariat	105-22865
Who's Who in Soviet Union	100-304397

SAUDI ARABIA

Embassy of Saudi Arabia	65-56926

SPAIN

Repatriation of Spanish Prisoners of War from Russia	65-62599
Spanish Revolutionary Activities	109-587

SUDAN

Sudanese Activities in the U. S.	105-72096

SYRIA

Embassy of Syria	65-59148
Syrian Intelligence Service	65-58397

TUNISIA

Embassy of Tunisia	65-64170

TURKEY

Embassy of Turkey	65-59169
Turkish Intelligence Service	65-57289
Turkish Diplomatic Activities in the U. S.	105-74769
Turkish Consulate, New York City	105-73522

UKRAINE

Movement of Ukrainian Nationals	105-58701
Organization for Rebirth of the Ukraine	102-8

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Embassy of the United Arab Republic, Washington, D. C.	105-68165
United Arab Republic Consulate, New York City	105-68352
United Arab Republic Diplomatic Activities in the U. S.	105-52622

VENEZUELA

Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN)	105-135158
Communist Infiltration or Influence Among Venezuelan Exiles in the U. S.	105-107996
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)	105-143104
National Liberation Front	105-157726
Venezuelan Revolutionary Activities in the U. S.	105-101555

SECRET

YEMEN	
Legation of Yemen	105-58065
YUGOSLAVIA	
Demonstrations Against Yugoslav Establishments	105-119149
Diplomatic Communications - Yugoslavia X/	65-57668
Foreign Political Matters - Yugoslavia	109-12-272
Key Personalities - Yugoslavia	64-35693-27
Miscellaneous Yugoslav Activities in the U. S.	105-14307
Movement of Yugoslav Nationals	100-354170
Office of Yugoslav Commercial Attache	100-359904
Office of Yugoslav Military Attache	105-11051
Savez Komunista Jugoslavijo (League of Communists of Yugoslavia)	105-37421
U. S. - Yugoslav Relations	109-237
Yugoslav Activities in the U. S.	100-32820
Yugoslav Consulate - New York	65-57367
Yugoslav Consulate - Chicago	65-58528
Yugoslav Consulate - Pittsburgh	105-13764
Yugoslav Consulate - San Francisco	65-58966
Yugoslav Diplomatic Activities	100-345359
Yugoslav Embassy - Washington, D. C.	65-40979
Yugoslav Information Center	97-2977
Yugoslav Intelligence Activities in the U. S.	100-346268
Yugoslav Intelligence Service	105-8611
Yugoslav - USSR Relations	65-57240
Yupia	105-31417
Repatriation of Emigres to Yugoslavia	105-39242

SECRET

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION FILES

Acquisition of Unclassified Intelligence Data by Soviet Bloc Representatives in the U. S.	105-27754
Acquisition of Latent Fingerprints of Soviet Bloc Officials in the U. S. (Lift) ※2	65-65816
American Citizens Residing Abroad	64-31479
American Seamen Suspected of Contacting Soviet Agents	65-57868
Americans Traveling in Iron Curtain Countries	100-351585
Arab Intelligence Activities in the U. S.	105-53464
Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty Organization)	105-42549
Biological Warfare	100-93216
Briefs on Soviet Bloc Espionage	65-65438
Burn Memoranda (Intelligence Fabricators)	105-19395
Caribbean Political Activities	109-581
Caribbean Revolutionary Activities	109-581
Central Intelligence Agency Matters ※4	62-80750
Central Intelligence Bulletin ※4	65-63735
Clandestine Radio Communications	65-58776
Classification of Information	66-7225
Commission on Government Security	62-101916
Communications Security	105-128045
Contacts with Soviet, Satellite or Yugoslav Officials and/or Establishments by Americans While Abroad	105-81776
Current Espionage Digest	65-64939
Current Foreign Relations	109-631
Defections of Foreign Officials in the U. S.	100-357681
Development of Selected Contacts (DESECO) ※2	105-71688
Development of Sources in Foreign Nationality Groups	105-90171
Double Agents	65-49443
Double Agents - Biological Warfare	65-58698
Double Agents - Income Tax	134-7326
Double Meaning File ※2	80-742
East-West Exchanges	105-42300
Entrance into the U. S. of Individuals who are a Threat to Internal Security of the U. S.	105-9746
Foreign Influence in Black Nationalist Movement	157-8141
Foreign Language Training	66-18979
Flying Saucers	62-83894
Full Utilization of Confidential Informants and Sources of Information	66-18772
Guided Missile Research	62-87975
Immigrants and Repatriates from Soviet Bloc Countries	105-78187
Immigration and Nationality Act	100-390629
Immunity Bill	62-51542
Importation and Sale of Soviet and Satellite Publications	100-365088

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION FILES (Continued)

Infiltration of the United Nations by Subversive American Citizens	105-13893
Infiltration of the United Nations and other Public International Organizations by Subversive Resident Aliens	105-26004
INS Waiver Control File	100-390629
Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations	65-63113
Intelligence Techniques	105-102952
International Organizations, Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside the Soviet Bloc	105-14879
Investigative Jurisdiction - Bureau	66-3012
Legislation - Security	66-18949
Loopholes in the Coverage of Internal Security	100-359391
Mail Drops	65-46006
Movement of Miscellaneous Nationals	64-5003
Movement of Satellite Nationals	100-354139
National Security Council	62-85205
National Intelligence Estimates	62-93351
NATO Special Committee	62-98719
Prevention of Departure of Aliens with Scientific or Technical Training	105-19164
Project Permanent ※4	62-96327
Psychological Warfare	65-48066
Public Appearance of Soviet Officials	105-166516
Refugee Relief Program	62-100044
Responsibilities of the FBI in the Internal Security Field	62-[illegible]
Satellite Cultivation of Foreign Officials of Non-Soviet bloc Countries	105-128907
Satellite Intelligence Album	65-63778
SATPIA (Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities)	65-63483
Searches of Diplomatic Shipments ※2	105-18233
SEATO	62-102032
Security Informants (Subs for each field office)	66-2542-3
Security Schools	1-43
Soviet and Satellite Passports	65-43015
Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U. S.	65-63478
Soviet Cultivation of Foreign Officials of Non-Soviet-Bloc Countries	105-128906
Soviet Illegal Espionage Activities	65-63234
Soviet Intelligence Services (Disinformation and Deception)	65-68951
Soviet-Satellite Efforts to Penetrate the U. S. Intelligence Community	105-132051
Soviet Use of Records of Birth	105-69253
Special Installations in U. S. Embassies Abroad ※2	105-19581
Speech Privacy Equipment	62-101410
"Sputniks"	62-104279

SECRET

Control-Reference Files
Page 20a - Revised
August 10, 1967

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION FILES (Continued)

Studies in Intelligence	65-66944
Submarine Activities	65-39557
Supervision - Internal Security (Nationalistic Tendency Matters)	105-00
Supervision - Espionage	65-00
Supervision - Neutrality Matters	2-00
Supervision - Registration Act	97-00
Third Country Operations	65-66691
Tracing American Money Used in Espionage Operations	65-65405
United Nations Liaison Matters	105-14228
United States Evaluation Board ※ 4	62-96781
Visitors to Iron Curtain Countries	100-351585

ATOMIC ENERGY MATTERS

Activities in the Atomic Energy Field in Foreign Countries	110-141
Atomic Energy Act - General	66-00-116
Atomic Energy Act (Violations, Supervision, etc.)	66-00-117
Atomic Energy Commission	62-82221
Atomic Energy Facilities	117-833
Cinrad	100-190625
Control of Atomic Energy	100-345079
Countermeasures Required to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction of Atomic Weapons into U. S.	117-268
Foreign Scientists Training Program for Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy	117-1852
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy	62-83626
Radiation Fall-Out	62-104057
Security Risk Program	117-1654
Tripartite Conference on Security of Atomic Energy Information Between Canada, U. S. and Great Britain	105-15419
United Nations Committee on Control of Atomic Energy	100-345471

SECRET

COMMUNIST FILES

SECRET

(Restricted to Listing of those possibly related to work of Section)

Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Council	105-72281
Alleged Communist Infiltration of the FBI	100-97391
American Association of Scientific Workers	100-203763
Arab Communists in the United States	105-84464
Cominform	100-353813
Comrap	100-203581
Communist Infiltration of Foreign Language Groups	100-47852
Communist International (All Union Party of Soviet Union)	61-16
Communist Party Seamen Couriers	100-358614
International Communist Organizations	105-87393
International Association of Democratic Lawyers	100-348689
International Federation of Resistance Fighters	100-397080
International Union of Students	100-346144
Women's International Democratic Federation	100-343636
World Federation of Democratic Youth	100-185087
World Federation of Scientific Workers	100-350410
World Federation of Trade-Unions	100-260007
World Peace Council	100-361031

SECRET

Control - Reference Files
Revised Page 22
April 26, 1962

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10168-10040
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 62-116391-41X

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: PAPICH, SAM
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 03/13/1970
PAGES: 85
SUBJECT: CIA ACT, ANTI-CASTRO ACT

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 11/03/1998
UPDATE_DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(A)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(C)

COMMENTS: EBF, INC ADMIN PAGES

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

[redacted]

Memorandum

Prior Release was made to Rockefeller Commission

TO : The Director

DATE: 3/13/70

FROM : SA Sam Papich

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

3/16/81

CLASS. & EXT. BY SPA-[illegible]
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2,3
DATE OF REVIEW 3/13/90
FOIPA #22,330

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CIA Info on pg 21 & 22 only was Declassed per John E. Bacon 8/27/80

Reference is made to my letters dated March 2 and March 5, 1970. In my letter of March 5, 1970, I stated "it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances." It is my understanding that the Director desired that this list be identified. Enclosed herewith is a list of approximately 75 items.

This list should not be considered absolutely complete. Preparation was predicated on my personal recollection and a review of Bureau records. To make this list more complete and specifically accurate would necessitate the review of thousands of files. The enclosed list can be supported by Bureau records. What CIA records reflect on the same items is unknown. This also must be kept in mind in connection with our evaluation of the alleged CIA grievances which I previously listed.

I realize that it is presumptuous on my part, but if the Director feels that our Bureau work can benefit by a personal discussion between the Director and myself, I am available until April 3, 1970. I plan to leave the area immediately thereafter for an extended period.

ACTION:

REC-87

62-80750-4718

For information.

ST 102

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. [redacted]

10 APR 1 1970

Enclosure

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Papich

[redacted]

1/26/94

SJP: [redacted]
(4)

HP 1/8/98

~~11/1/93 9803 RDD/GAT~~
~~Classified by~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
(JFK)

~~Classified by~~ T2
Exempt from ~~GDS Category~~ 2+3
Date of ~~Declassification Indefinite~~
21-11-75

ENCLOSURE

2/6/98 5668 SLD/GCL (JFK)

[redacted]

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

✓

K BRACKETED PG.3

KP 1/8/98

20 March 1970

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

FBI INFO

5668 SLD/GCL

(JFK) 2/9/98 1X(6) 4/2/98

Dear Mr. Hoover:

We have completed our review of domestic positive intelligence collection engendered by your letter of 11 March 1970. We warmly welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the implementation of the 1966 agreement and the collection of positive intelligence which you proposed. I concur also with your comments that there is a need for close coordination of our efforts in the field of positive and counterintelligence collection. To be most effective, I agree that it is essential for this Agency, together with your Bureau, to conduct a continuing analysis of clandestine collection activity. The product is of growing importance to the national security and to the United States Intelligence Community. Therefore we endorse your proposal for a reexamination and bespeak your desires as to how this might be conducted.

With regard to the 1966 set of ground rules, which you sent to the then Director, Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., the competent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an effective and realistic agreement. I welcome your statement that no major problems have been encountered since its adoption.

I feel strongly that there are other related subjects, of similar importance to the national security, which warrant periodic reexamination since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine collection of positive intelligence.

EXP. PROC.
MAR 20 1970

REC 8 [redacted]

1 MAY 6 1970 [redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

As a result of our review, engendered by your letter, I believe that the following subjects are deserving of your personal consideration:

(1) Audio coverage. Audio coverage provides timely intelligence of inestimable worth to U. S. officials for policy planning, early warning, and accurate guidance necessary for the improvement of operational and collection activity here and abroad. Audio coverage is unique production because it is readily subject to local cross-checking and evaluation which is far more difficult and costly to achieve abroad. Further, such coverage is on targets which affect directly the national interests.

For several years your Bureau had been receptive to requirements and leads which resulted in valuable coverage. The quality of your production proved that your Bureau alone possesses capabilities and experience which cannot be duplicated by any other U. S. agency.

On 2 October 1969 two related requests for audio coverage were submitted by this Agency pertaining to positive intelligence targets, one of whom had KGB connections. (I refer to the case of [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted].) Your Bureau replied that henceforth the Agency should refer all such cases directly to the Attorney General for approval.

It is suggested that the question of audio coverage be reopened between representatives of your Bureau and this Agency. I would welcome your thoughts and observations on this subject.

I wish to assure you that I believe that this sensitive type of collection should be implemented under rigid and stringent controls. This is absolutely necessary in order to maintain the highest standard of security both in instituting the coverage and for the exploitation of the product. (An excellent example of this is demonstrated in your effective and secure production of [SCOPE.)] (S)

(2) Mail Coverage. Another much needed intelligence tool is mail coverage. Its importance has been proven in the past. I have the impression that it has been discontinued, and I would suggest that our representatives should confer and examine together whether this asset might be deployed against communications of the Soviet Bloc, the New Left, and identified foreign agents. ~~(S)~~(U)

(3) CIA Technical Services. A significant expenditure of this Agency's money and personnel has been committed to research and development for the improvement of technical aids. This Agency has provided your Bureau with an appreciation of our resources and capabilities, and has offered you at cost or gratis our most sophisticated equipment. * [redacted] (S)

Although we will continue these services, we would welcome any suggestions from your Bureau for improvement in the technical field including proposals how these assets can be better employed. Your comments will be particularly appreciated in view of our mutual interests in implementing Operation [redacted] (S)

(4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting. Since the collection and reporting of positive foreign intelligence is, as you say, only incidental to your main internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, I realize that your personnel are somewhat at a disadvantage in carrying out the evaluating and reporting processes necessary for the conduct of positive intelligence. At our 1966 conference we offered to institute positive intelligence training courses, including reports writing and

* this section describes sources for technical intelligence collection.

analysis, for FBI personnel. In soliciting your views on the desirability of this type of training, I wish to reiterate our willingness to provide such instruction. It would be designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community in depth, thus making the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL) more meaningful to your personnel.

(5) Seminars on Opposition Services. Given the growing sophistication and increased capabilities of hostile intelligence services, it is suggested that CIA and FBI experts in this field meet as required at our respective Headquarters, the Washington and New York Field Offices, in order to keep abreast of new developments, *modus operandi*, operational tasks, and diverse missions of opposition services. I know that you will agree with me that no opportunities for improvement should be overlooked which might help to negate the efforts of hostile services who are charged with undermining the security of the United States. These sessions should also provide an opportunity to explore and devise new means to penetrate and neutralize these inimical forces.

(6) Live Bloc Sources. The record of our cooperation and coordination to exploit live penetrations and defectors from Bloc sources proves the success of our mutual effort.

I believe that there is room for substantial improvement in achieving a more uniform and efficient exploitation of the positive intelligence potential of certain of these sensitive sources. I would invite your thoughts on how we may better coordinate requirements for these sources and establish a more thorough evaluation of their positive intelligence production before it is given general dissemination within the Government. Our review would suggest that there are good reasons for consultation to explore the development of higher quality live sources, for example [code clerks.] (S)

(7) Live Sources in the Non-Bloc Area. Sources such as code clerks (S) and diplomats are a fertile field for procurement of much-needed intelligence relating to the activities of certain Latin American and Middle Eastern countries which are expanding their subversive and terrorist activities, even to the United States. I do not feel confident that both agencies have adequately exploited the full potential of this field, and would urge that this subject be explored by our respective representatives.

(8) New Left and Racial Matters. There is already a substantial exchange of information in this field. Limitations of manpower raise a serious question as to whether both agencies can keep pace with future unpredictable developments. The increasingly close connection between these forces in the United States and hostile elements abroad has been well established by both of our agencies. I feel it would be in our mutual interest to determine how we can best employ more wisely our limited manpower, knowing that this problem, which embraces bombings, hijacking, assassination, and the demeaning of law enforcement officers, is international in scope.

(9) Relations with Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches. I do not feel that there are any serious conflicts in this area but there may be room for improving the quality of liaison in order to expand positive intelligence collection. Given the changing situations both here and abroad, periodic re-examination of field relations could assist both agencies to make mutually-agreed adjustments.

Mr. Hoover, I wish to assure you that I value highly your personal judgment in affairs bearing on the national security. I know that your experience is derived from a unique lifetime of dedicated service to our country. In this spirit, I welcome sincerely your observations on the foregoing agenda and solicit your thoughts regarding any other item which you deem worthy of the attention of your Bureau and this Agency.

Faithfully yours,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

SECRET

[illegible] IN THIS DOCUMENT KP 1/8/98

CASES AND/OR SITUATIONS INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(1) MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most part in 1957. The case had many wide foreign ramifications and historically has been, and undoubtedly will be, one of the most important and involved cases of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We did not disseminate any information of significance in this case until 1954. On various occasions when the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated arguments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to cooperate with the Agency. The position taken by CIA was that it should have been advised regarding the Soviet operational activity in foreign countries, claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity to develop more information of significance, identify Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. We did not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the extreme sensitivity of the case. We actually did not permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to the MOCASE until 1957.

In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had every right to have received the information earlier because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA employees and operations. CIA further argued that it had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the Agency at the same time that the case was publicized. The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case permitted the French, rather than the U. S., to play a dominating role in Europe.

PER MANGOLD RELEASE (C.A. 88-1826)
5668 SLD/GCL
(1)(6)
(JFK) ~~2/9/98~~ 4/2/98

SECRET

How much information CIA has developed over the years concerning our operational activity in Mexico City is unknown. However, we should bear in mind that former Special Agent George Munro (S) handled many of our operations in Mexico, including key informants, and subsequently began performing services for CIA after he left the Bureau. We also should not forget that Americans operating in Latin American countries for one agency are heavily exposed to the resources of another U. S. intelligence or investigative agency. This Agent knows from personal experience that operating in these areas constitutes a "very small world" and the exposure to leaks and errors is considerable.

(3) THE ABEL CASE

Although CIA has not raised the point for several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably still exists, that the FBI did not play it square with CIA in the Abel case by not making certain that the Agency was given the proper recognition for its contributions. CIA feels that in the first place, there would not have been any U. S. access or availability to the source in this case, Reino Hayhanen, because CIA took the full responsibility for moving Hayhanen from France to the U. S. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined to become involved in any operation designed to transport Hayhanen to the U. S. It should be noted that Hayhanen was an alcoholic and that his first contacts with CIA in Paris raised questions concerning Hayhanen's mental stability.

After Hayhanen arrived in the U. S., we arranged access to him for a period, the purpose of which was to obtain a complete story of his intelligence activities in the U. S. and we were particularly interested in identifying all of his associates, especially the man who later was identified as Rudolph Abel. After a short handling period in the U. S., we dropped Hayhanen because he became a problem. It was an extremely critical situation because we had not yet identified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility for the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but we countries with far better impressions than in the past. In addition, we have learned more about these countries, their services, and their security chiefs by spending a few minutes with them. Needless to say, this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped our Legal Attaches.

(7) [CIA](S) - [DUTCH](S) INTEREST IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

In 1965, the [Dutch Internal Security Service](S) was in the process of investigating individuals in [Holland](S) who allegedly had been engaged in Soviet-espionage activity. The [Dutch](S) wanted to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached [CIA](S) to make inquiry at the Bureau. At that time, our relations with the [Dutch](S) had been practically nonexistent because the [Dutch](S) had failed to honestly deal with us in the case of [Joseph Petersen, a Dutch](S) official who had been clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National Security Agency. When [CIA](S) approached us, we told [the Agency](S) that the [Dutch](S) could submit their request through diplomatic channels. We subsequently told [CIA](S) we would not handle the interviews for the [Dutch.](S) We stuck to our position. [CIA surrendered but](S) felt that we were impairing their efforts to gather information concerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe. (Walter G. Krivitsky, Bufile - 100-11146)

(8) COLONEL JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

Colonel John Grombach was a retired U. S. Army officer who, during World War II, established a private intelligence network, operating throughout the world but primarily in Europe. His sources included any number of European exiles who came to the U. S. While he was in business, he was financed by the State Department, then the Department of the Army, and in the later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA. Grombach established contact with the Bureau through one of his subordinates, Pat O'Brien, who periodically called on us and furnished information which Grombach felt was of interest to us. This dissemination through Pat O'Brien continued during the period of Grombach's relationship with CIA. We never informed CIA that we were receiving such information which also was of interest to the Agency. It is possible that Grombach had given the same data to CIA but we do not know. CIA and Grombach clashed and the relationship was severed in an atmosphere of severe bitterness. In the last years of its dealings with Grombach, [the Agency](S) had successfully penetrated the latter's organization and allegedly had identified many of the sources. CIA hinted to the Liaison Agent that it had become aware of the relationship between Grombach's organization and the Bureau. How much CIA really learned about this relationship is not known but if its penetrations were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence to justify a charge that the Bureau had withheld information from CIA, particularly when we were receiving the data from an organization which [was financed by the Agency.](S) (Bufile - 62-77306)

(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

(Herbert Hoover Commission - 1954)

In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under the leadership of General Mark W. Clark. In January, 1955, we were advised by a representative of the task force that Senator Joseph McCarthy had furnished the group a list of CIA employees who were considered subversive. CIA became cognizant of this development and there was talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished the names to the Senator. When the Liaison Agent was informally approached on this, he flatly told the Agency to officially submit its charges. The Agency never did. What information CIA may have had on this matter as it pertained to the Bureau is not known. It is possible that the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee. (Relations with CIA, Bufile - 62-80750)

(10) INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in the U. S. In many instances we did not see fit to notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that you could not separate "internal Security" from "counterintelligence," namely a lead in France pertaining to a communist in the U. S. warranted advising CIA, if not, at least asking the Agency to handle the lead. In the last several years, it is not believed that there is any basis for complaint since we have regularly been notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel abroad. If the Legal Attache is investigating, CIA is notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts. There have been exceptions where we have taken the position that CIA should not be notified because of the sensitivity of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to CIA cannot be established from our files; however, we should bear in mind that when our Legal Attaches investigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials normally contacted by CIA. How many of these foreign officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll, is unknown.

(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA

We operated informants in Cuba when we had a Legal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported on activities of communists and other subversives in that country. During the period we operated these informants, we did not coordinate our operations [with CIA. We did not advise the Agency that we had such sources.](S) However, in 1960, after Castro came on the scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants in a secure manner. [Approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. What these informants may have subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had evidence to establish that we had been operational in Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant to Directives.](S) (Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont, February 5, 1960, re: "Partido Socialista Popular," 64-200-210, 2377 and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, February 3, 1960, re: ["Narcisco Tauler Beneficto,"](S) 134-[8539-4)](S)

(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN [BRAZIL] (S) - 1959

In 1959 the U. S. Ambassador in Brazil accused our Legal Attache of engaging "in uncoordinated covert intelligence activity "of a nature which I believe exceeds his terms of reference." The Ambassador further indicated that CIA was unhappy over the Legal Attache's activities and the Agency allegedly had told the Ambassador that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from a source who was a fabricator or a provocator. This situation arose as a result of the Legal Attache's operation of an informant in [Brazil] (S) Some of the information that he received from the informant was of a derogatory nature and related to a [Brazilian] (S) who was being touted as a Presidential candidate. CIA asked for the identity of the informant and we told the Agency that the person could not be identified because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed. This case is being cited because CIA may have evidence that we had been operational in [Brazil] (S) had not coordinated pursuant to Directives, and that the matter was further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability of the information. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, May 1, 1959, re: "William I. Friedman, Legal Attache, Rio de Janeiro," 67-429840) and (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, May 25, 1959, re: "Soviet-Satellite Activities - [Brazil] (S)," 134-[7667-48)] (S)

(13) BORDER COVERAGE

In June, 1957, our Phoenix Office presented a problem concerning the Bureau's handling of informants on the Mexican border. These informants were operating inside Mexico. The problem was predicated on situations which might arise as the result of CIA's endeavors to develop informants who already were being handled by the Bureau. It was pointed out that CIA logically could come in contact with such sources and could make approaches for recruitment. It was recommended and approved that in order to protect our coverage in the border area, a valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would continue to be utilized even if he were contaced by CIA. Our policy was that we would not identify our sources to the Agency.

How much CIA learned about our border coverage is not known. Again, it is pointed out that former Bureau Agent [George Munro](S) may have been knowledgeable. As indicated, he later began performing services for CIA. If CIA learned that we were operating informants in Mexico, it could use such information as additional evidence of Bureau failure to cooperate and coordinate with the Agency pursuant to Directives. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, June 14, 1957, re "Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border, Relations with CIA," 100-356015-1238)

(14) [CARPORT CASE](S)

In May, 1957, the Bureau's double Agent(S) in the captioned case was advised by [his Soviet contact](S) that he was to have a meeting in [Switzerland](S) during the period [June 16-19](S), 1957. A question arose as to whether CIA should be informed concerning the [double Agent's] ~~(S)~~ (U) travel to [Switzerland.](S) It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA.

What is important here is that CIA established contact with [our double agent] ~~(S)~~ (U) at one point. The Agency may have had further contact without our knowledge. The Agency may have also picked up the contact with the [Soviet](S) in [Switzerland.](S) The case is being highlighted since we cannot exclude the possibility that the Agency has evidence to demonstrate that we were operational [in Europe](S) and we did not coordinate with the Agency. (Memorandum Branigan to Belmont, June 10, 1957, re; ["CARPORT," 105-25453-1825)](S)

(15) CIA REQUESTS FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired if W. C. Sullivan could give a lecture on the communist movement in the U. S. It was recommended that Sullivan give the lecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts of the Government. The Director made the notation "We cannot make Sullivan available to this outfit." The Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies. (Memorandum Sullivan to Belmont, October 1, 1958, re: "Request for Lecture on Communism by CIA,")

(16) CASE OF [redacted]

On July 9, 1956, an official of the State Department confidentially advised the Bureau that [redacted] a CIA employee in Moscow, had been involved in an affair with a Soviet girl. According to our source, [redacted] allegedly had furnished information to the Soviet girl. We checked with the State Department and CIA and we confirmed that [redacted] had been involved in an affair and that he had been recalled. According to CIA and State Department, there was no indication that [redacted] had been involved in any espionage against the U. S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau to identify its source and then changed its mind. Whether CIA has documented this as an instance where the Bureau failed to cooperate by not volunteering the source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case that should be kept in mind. (Bufile - [redacted])

(17) THE [redacted] OPERATION

In April, 1963, we became involved with CIA in that Agency's efforts to collect sensitive information relating to [French Government](S) intentions to conduct espionage against the U. S. CIA had access to a sensitive source, [redacted] who was in a position to make available highly important [French](S) documents. On April 11, 1963, CIA informed us that our Legal Attache in [Paris](S) had locally contacted CIA concerning this matter. CIA Headquarters was highly disturbed because its office in [Paris](S) had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted to be informed regarding the nature and the extent of our dissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We determined that the Legal Attache had made inquiries in [Paris](S) in response to leads which had been sent from Bureau Headquarters. This matter is being highlighted because it was a vitally important operation to CIA and the Agency had received indications that information had been leaked to [French authorities.](S) We have no evidence or reason to believe that the Legal Attache Office ever involved itself in any such leak. However, we should not, under any circumstances, discount the fact that CIA [has penetrated French services](S) and has had access to sensitive information [in Paris.](S) The [French](S) have always had an outstanding capability of tapping phones and installing microphones in [Paris.](S) Such coverage on U. S. officials, including their residences, should never be excluded. The information we had conveyed to our Legal Attache possibly may have been acquired by the [French](S) through clandestine coverage. CIA possibly could charge us with handling their sensitive information in an insecure manner by transmitting it to [Paris](S) without conferring with the Agency.

In connection with alleged [French](S) espionage activity in the U. S., CIA has never been satisfied with the efforts made by the Bureau. The Agency possibly could take the position that we looked lightly at the allegations and did not pursue a matter which, in their eyes, merited a more aggressive approach. (Bufile - [redacted])

For some time, CIA has held to a position that the [French Intelligence Service (SDECE)](S) is penetrated by the [Soviets.](S) The Agency has pointed out that if the [French](S) are collecting sensitive information in the U. S., the product is ending up in [Moscow.](S) In January, 1964, we reviewed the status of our investigation of [French](S) intelligence activities in the U. S. The Director commented "I think this whole thing has been imaginary on the part of CIA which has been played as a sucker by [redacted] I would waste no more time on it at least until all CIA restrictions are removed." CIA did impose restrictions by not permitting us to pursue certain leads because it feared that its sensitive source would be jeopardized. (Bufile - [redacted]) from CIA. We did not obtain clearance from CIA for the inclusion of this information in our monograph. Clearance approval was not obtained because of the urgency of the document. CIA was irritated because it considered our action a distinct violation of the third agency rule. The Agency never made any protest.

(21) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN [GUATEMALA](S)

In 1966, and 1967, we were operating informants in [Guatemala.](S) At the inception of our operational activity, CIA was not informed. In one case, we finally were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA whereby the Bureau would be permitted to run the informant in [Guatemala.](S) In the second instance, we established an agreement with CIA in October, 1967, that we could continue handling an informant in [Guatemala](S) with the understanding that the Bureau Agent, on the occasion of each visit, would confer with [the local CIA office](S) on political information collected from the informant. These two cases had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was under the definite impression that we had been running these informants before we had finally coordinated with them. It is true that [the CIA Chief](S) in [Guatemala](S) was much incensed but no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and the matter was put to rest.

CIA may have developed concrete evidence that we were operating in [Guatemala](S) bearing in mind that in a place such as [Guatemala City](S) it would not be difficult for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an FBI Agent in contact with [Guatemalans.](S) Our potential vulnerability is that we were operating in [Guatemala](S) without coordinating with CIA. ([redacted], [redacted], [redacted])

(22) [redacted]

The information emanating from the captioned sensitive Bureau operation has been disseminated to CIA and other agencies for several years. The sensitive source has traveled abroad numerous times and his trips

(25) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1960 (S)

In January, 1960, our Legal Attache, Bonn, traveled to Holland (S) for the purpose of exploring arrangements for liaison with appropriate Dutch (S) authorities. The U. S. Ambassador raised questions, pointing out that over the years, all relations with the Dutch (S) authorities (S) had been handled through CIA. (S) He indicated that before there was any change in procedure, it would be necessary for CIA and FBI to come to some form of an agreement. Allen Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that his Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to exploring the liaison arrangement. We eventually conferred with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all parties concerned.

Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where we failed to coordinate with the Agency in line with National Security Council Directives. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, March 3, 1960, re: "Legal Attache Operations - Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands," 66-18973-123)

In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legal Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark. The purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not inform CIA of our intentions. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, January 14, 1960, re: "Legal Attache Operations, The Netherlands," 66-18973-113)

(26) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - 1962

By letter dated November 7, 1962, CIA raised questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination of counterintelligence information to foreign intelligence services. CIA, at that time, had particular reference to information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the Greek (S) Intelligence Service concerning KGB operations. CIA took the position that pursuant to the coordinating

Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to such dissemination. The particular data had emanated from one of our sensitive [redacted] sources [redacted]. We responded to CIA by stating that the information was the product of an internal security operation and did not relate to any operational activity abroad. CIA again surrendered. The Agency could argue that it was responsible for following Soviet matters with the [Greek]S Intelligence Service and that we had an obligation of coordinating with the Agency. (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan, November 9, 1962, re: [redacted]

(27) "THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT," A BOOK AUTHORED BY DAVID WISE AND THOMAS ROSS

In August, 1963, we received information indicating that Wise and Ross were in the process of gathering material for a book pertaining to activities of U. S. intelligence activities. Both Ross and Wise contacted the Bureau. It was recommended that liaison orally advise CIA that these two individuals were preparing a book concerning U. S. intelligence agencies. The Director noted "I see no reason doing so."

It is not known if CIA was aware of the contact with the Bureau. Wise and Ross subsequently published the book which contained extremely derogatory information concerning CIA. (Memorandum Jones to DeLoach, re: "David Wise of the "New York Herald Tribune" and Thomas Ross of the "Chicago Sun Times")

(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward developing coverage in Africa. CIA was looking for the services of any Negro informant who might be available. The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to

In the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau would reestablish technical surveillance coverage on [redacted] who CIA felt was a key figure in the transmittal of scientific intelligence data to the [redacted] [Intelligence Service.](S) We declined to reinstitute the coverage. CIA considered the matter important because of its relationship to the [Mideast Crisis.](S)

On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the Attorney General.

CIA has never made any official comment or protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned action by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency has looked to the Bureau as the logical point of contact and as the only organization having the resources and capabilities of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.

(30) MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

The Liaison Agent recalls fragments of oth situations or conflicts which occured over the years and which resulted in the voicing of CIA displeasure or criticism. The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is necessary to acquire the required data. There was one instance early in the 1950's which involved information received from a source of unknown reliability charging Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while in Europe. We disseminated the information to several agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest.

The Agent also has recollection of instances when CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by Bureau revelation of CIA information during the course of interviews conducted by us. Technically, this would be a violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly if an important informant was lost. CIA never made any official issue or protest.

SECRET

LIST OF BUREAU GRIEVANCES

1. ATTACKS AGAINST BUREAU (MEXICO CITY AND FRANCE - 1951)

Although Agent Papich did not begin handling Liaison with CIA until 1952, it is important to refer to highly significant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious conflict in the Fall of 1951. Our Legal Attaches in Mexico City and Paris reported that CIA representatives were attacking the Bureau, were endeavoring to place us in an unfavorable light, were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging remarks concerning the Bureau. Some of this was summed up by characterizing it as covert hostility within CIA, stemming largely from disgruntled former employees of the FBI.

In October, 1951, General Walter Beddil Smith, then Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the existing differences. General Smith denied that there was any covert hostility against the Bureau and maintained that there was a general feeling of respect for us. He admitted that there had been isolated instances of friction for which CIA must accept its share of responsibility.

It is my recollection that the Director and other Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations between the two agencies. I was not able to find a memorandum of record covering this meeting. ([redacted])

2. PROSELYTING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIA

The Agent clearly recalls that early in the 1950's we encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly was recruiting Bureau-employed personnel. We vigorously protested, and subsequently the Agency advised that it would follow a policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period of at least thirty days. The Agent could not locate the background of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is possible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file of some former Bureau Agent.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(6)
(JFK) ~~2/6/98~~ 4/2/98

ENCLOSURE

62-80750-4784

KP 1/8/98

7. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN - DEFECTORS - 1954

By letter dated October 13, 1954, a very strong letter of protest was sent to General T. J. Betts of the Interagency Defector Committee at CIA. This letter made reference to political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government. General Betts disseminated a memorandum indicating that members of the Committee had agreed that in view of commitments made by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse effect on the over-all United States Defector Program. We emphasized to General Betts that this matter had never been officially presented before the Defector Committee. He was informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.

8. CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955

On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was referred to a matter which had not yet developed into a serious situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts between the two agencies. Dulles was referred to the contacts of aliens in the United States made by CIA personnel without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. The requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an established agreement. (62-80750; memorandum Roach to Belmont September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")

9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)

In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA approached a National Academy graduate to utilize his services in Guatemala. (S) This approach was made while the graduate was attending National Academy classes. (u) A protest was made to key CIA officials for not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the Academy graduate. (Re: [redacted]

10. [redacted]

In December, 1955, we received information indicating that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was developing for utilization in a double agent operation. We learned that CIA representatives had established contact with [redacted] and had given him some advice and guidance without first checking with the Bureau. We protested to CIA. ([redacted]) us that he had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI would be furnishing operational guidance to him. We had never become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined that a CIA official had been in error in making the above-described misrepresentation. We protested the CIA official's handling of this matter. (Re: *[Dr.] [redacted] (U) (S)

15. [redacted]

On July 20, 1956, we determined (S) that one [redacted] had been in contact with [the Czech] Military Attache* ~~(S)~~, Washington, D. C. We further ascertained that [redacted] was a CIA employee. We were informed by CIA on July 21, 1956, that the Agency had no information concerning [redacted] reported contacts with [the Czechs] (S) We later interviewed [redacted], and it was indicated that [redacted], in fact, had been in contact with a CIA official concerning his meetings with [the Czech] (S) Military Attache.* ~~(S)~~ We protested and CIA submitted a letter of apology. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman July 21, 1956 [redacted])

16. [redacted]

In July, 1956, a statement was made by a State Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly had advised that the subject, *a Soviet agent,* was being permitted to enter the United States so that his activities could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position to promote a defection. The Bureau was not in possession of any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry of the subject for the purpose described above. The State Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative. We were not in a position to identify the CIA employee without conducting investigation within the Agency or without the Agency coming up with the identity. (Re: [redacted]) (U)

17. [redacted]

By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly protested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had interviewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. It should be noted that there was a well-established agreement whereby it was incumbent upon CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any alien in the United States. (Letter to CIA November 8, 1956, [redacted])

18. [DARRELL PATRICK HAMMER] (S)

[Hammer] (S) was a former student at Columbia University with whom we had been in contact because of his association with a [Soviet] (S) assigned to the United Nations. (S) In December, 1956, [Hammer] (S) made a trip to [Russia] (S) where he was contacted by an unidentified individual and was given a letter indicating that the writer was [a Colonel in the KGB] (S) and that he was interested in cooperating with the United States. When [Hammer] (S) returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to interview the subject because of the Agency's foreign intelligence interests. We subsequently interviewed [Hammer] (S), at which time he informed us that he had been cautioned by CIA not to furnish pertinent information to the Bureau. CIA denied that any such statement was made. (Re: [Darrell Patrick Hammer] (S))

19. CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA-1957

The San Francisco Office furnished information indicating that CIA had requested a firm in California to furnish that Agency information regarding all foreign inquiries pertaining to a high-speed camera manufactured by the company. The matter was reviewed because we wanted to be certain that CIA was not invading our jurisdiction. We did not develop evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction. The Director did make a notation, "O.K., but it does seem to me we give CIA a pretty wide authority to explore such a field. H" (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman April 10, 1957, "Flow of Intelligence Information to Soviets and Satellites through So-Called Channels")

20. [redacted]

On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its representatives in the field had interviewed the captioned [redacted] alien who had agreed to cooperate with the Agency after he returned to [redacted]. CIA conducted this interview without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to an established agreement. A vigorous protest was made to the Agency. (Re: [redacted] - [redacted])

21. CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES - 1957 (S)

(S) In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several Colombian officials who were coming to this country under CIA invitation. CIA was told that no tours would be given to the Colombians (S) because in the past a Colombian (S) ambassador had grossly insulted the Bureau after we had arrested the ambassador's chauffeur on White Slave Traffic Act charge. (~~S~~)

If we so desired, we could give consideration to accusing CIA of trying to impose upon us individuals whom we considered undesirable in light of the foregoing. (Memorandum July 15, 1957, Roach to Belmont "Representatives of Colombian Intelligence Service - Request for Bureau Tour by CIA") (~~S~~) (S)

22. REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS - NEW YORK CITY - 1957 (~~S~~) (u)

On November 15, 1957, our New York Office was contacted by the local CIA representative who desired to be informed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the premises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located across the street from a building occupied by the Soviet - United Nations Delegation. (~~S~~) The CIA representative indicated that his visit to our office was pursuant to instructions received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was concerned about the possibility of the Soviets (~~S~~) establishing coverage of conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council. It should be noted that the Council included as members many well-known personalities, including officials of the United States Government. (~~S~~)(u)

Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dulles was informed on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used by CIA in that such a sensitive matter had been taken up at the field level rather than through Bureau Headquarters. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont November 19, 1957, re "Council on Foreign Relations") (~~S~~)(u)

23. [redacted] [redacted]

In October, 1957, we received information from [redacted] indicating that a Polish scientist then visiting in the United States might defect. (S) We followed developments through [redacted] and we kept CIA advised. The Agency was fully aware of the situation and particularly knew that we were in contact with [redacted]. We subsequently received information indicating that [redacted] [redacted], a CIA employee, established contact with [redacted] for the purpose of developing information concerning the work of Polish scientists. (S) A protest was made to CIA for not properly coordinating their interests with us, bearing in mind that the action taken by [redacted] possibly could have jeopardized a Bureau operation. (Re: [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] - [redacted])

24. [redacted]

By letter dated February 10, 1958, we directed a protest to CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the subject, a Romanian alien, without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. (S) (Re: [redacted] - [redacted])

25. ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYEE

On April 23, 1958, we received information indicating that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being with the FBI when she tried to arrange an interview with [redacted], an official of the International Association of Machinists in Washington, D. C. [redacted] gave a signed statement in which he claimed that he had received a phone call from a Miss [redacted] who said she was with the FBI. Upon checking with CIA, we were informed that Miss [redacted] denied that she had made such representation. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont April 25, 1958, "Unknown Subject; [redacted]")

26. [redacted]

By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested to CIA for interviewing an alien in the Detroit area without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to established agreement. (Re: [redacted] - [redacted])

30. [GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN] (S)

The Legal Attache, Bonn, advised by letter dated June 10, 1958, that he had been invited to visit [General Reinhard Gehlen] (S) the head of the [West German Intelligence Service.] (S) CIA became aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative informed our Legal Attache that it was not desired that the Legat visit with [Gehlen.] (S) Our Legat was instructed by the Bureau to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position.

We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as being uncooperative. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 17, 1958, "Relations with CIA")

31. CIA INTEREST IN [CHINESE] ALIENS (S)

In June, 1958, we raised the question concerning CIA's failure to adhere to an agreement relating to CIA's recruitment of [Chinese] aliens in the United States for overseas intelligence operations. Under the agreement, CIA was not to approach any [Chinese] alien without first checking with us. A situation developed in Illinois indicating that CIA allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and even took some action without first checking with us. We expressed our disapproval in a letter to CIA June 12, 1958. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman June 9, 1958, "Recruitment of [Chinese] Aliens in the United States for Overseas Intelligence Operations") (S) (S) (S)

32. CIA OFFICIAL's CRITICISM OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"

Our Legal Attache, Tokyo, obtained a copy of a memorandum sent to an official in our Embassy in Tokyo by [redacted], [Chief of the CIA Office in Japan.] In his communication [redacted] belittled the value of "Masters of Deceit" as an anticommunist weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book pertained only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a small, ineffective, fraction-ridden organization. He stated that the author of the book was not an intellectual but rather a policeman. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 12 and 24, 1958, "Masters of Deceit.") (S)

33. CIA DEVELOPMENT OF INDONESIAN (S) GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES (S)

In May, 1958, CIA furnished identifying and background data concerning three individuals - [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted], all employees of the Indonesian (S) Government and assigned to the United States. [redacted] had been developed as a source of information by CIA in [redacted]. [redacted] came to CIA in Washington, D. C. and volunteered his services. [redacted] had been developed as a source by CIA and had been furnishing some information to the Agency. In a letter dated June 24, 1958, we told CIA that in the case of [redacted], we felt that the Agency should have notified us at an earlier date in order that we could have considered exploitation for internal security purposes at the outset. (Re: Indonesian (S) Activities - 100-254749) (S)

34. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, AKA DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE (S)

The subject, a former member of the Polish (S) Intelligence Service, defected to the United States and furnished extremely valuable information. The beginnings of this case include information raising questions concerning CIA cooperation.

In June, 1958, we developed information indicating that CIA may have opened a letter in Switzerland (S) which had been addressed to the Director by an individual who had identified himself as Dr. Heinrich Schutze. (S) The writer further indicated that he might be connected with the Polish (S) Intelligence Service. The letter addressed to the Director had been placed in an envelope which, in turn, had ended up in the office of the United States Ambassador in Switzerland. (S) We subsequently received a copy of the particular communication from CIA, and the contents were such at that time that no action was required by the Bureau. We asked CIA for particulars leading to the alleged opening of the letter which had been addressed to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the letter. We were confidentially informed by an Agency representative that the Ambassador (S) had opened the letter and then referred the matter to CIA. The contents were such that investigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA in Europe. What actually happened at the United States Embassy is something we may never know. (Michal Goleniewski - 65-65192) (S)

35. [redacted]

By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concern regarding CIA's alleged interview of [a Chinese] alien whom CIA was considering for overseas recruitment. CIA denied that an approach of the alien had been made. Our investigation contradicted the statements emanating from CIA. (Re [redacted], Bureau file [redacted]) (S)

36. [COMPROMISE OF FBI TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE] (S)

On July 18, 1958, CIA requested the Bureau for permission to [play a recording of a telephone conversation] (S) obtained by the Bureau to [King Hussein of Jordan] (S) The [recording] (S) had been developed through our [sensitive coverage of the Egyptian Embassy] (S) in Washington, D. C. On June 5, 1958, we had obtained the contents of a [conversation between Mahmoud Rousan of the Jordanian Embassy and the Egyptian Air Attache.] (S) The conversation strongly indicated that [Rousan] (S) was working closely with the [Egyptians.] (S) Subsequently, CIA developed information indicating that [Rousan] (S) was a key figure in a revolutionary plot, the objective of which was to overthrow [King Hussein.] (S)

[Rousan] (S) returned to [Jordan] (S) and was imprisoned by [King Hussein] (S) based upon information made available through CIA. [Rousan] (S) denied any implication in any revolutionary activity and he was strongly supported by certain top officials in the [Jordanian] (S) Government. [The King] (S) told CIA that he was on the spot and that he needed proof of [Rousan's] (S) conspiratorial activity. CIA asked if we would permit the [recording to be played to the King] (S), stressing that this was the only way [King Hussien] (S) could be convinced. ~~(S)~~

On July 18, 1958, a CIA official was advised that the Bureau positively would not grant permission to [playing of the recording] (S) We maintained that if we granted such permission, our other [coverage of a sensitive nature] (S) could be seriously imperiled. ~~(S)~~

On July 21, 1958, Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau would reconsider its position in view of the critical situation in [the Middle East] (S) Pursuant to instructions, CIA was then told that in view of the position in which the Bureau had been placed, we acceded to Dulles' request. CIA was further told that we were seriously considering the [termination of all of our technical surveillances] (S) because we did not intend to be placed in such a position in the future. ~~(S)~~

On July 22, 1958, Dulles told the Liaison Agent that he was very much disturbed over the Director's reaction. ~~(S)~~ He stated that he was not interested in holding a pistol to anybody's head and he further indicated that he was deliberating whether or not the [recording](S) should be used. It was recommended that the Liaison Agent follow the matter for the purpose of determining if the [recording](S) was to be used by CIA. The Director's notation was, "No. The fat is in the fire now and it is useless to waste any more time on it. We will probably hear of any details in Pearson's column. H." (~~S~~)

The strong position we took in resisting the dissemination of such sensitive information to a foreign government was fully justified. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, dated July 22, 1958, re "CIA Request for Permission to [Play Technical Surveillance Recording to King Hussien, Jordan"] (S)

37. X[CIA ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN MEXICAN GOVERNMENT DEPORTATION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS]X (~~S~~)(U)

In 1958, CIA officially informed us that it was engaged in a program designed to disrupt overall communist activity in Mexico. We became concerned because this program was to involve deportation of undesirables, including American communists residing in Mexico. The implementation of such a program would have resulted in the return of American communists to the United States. CIA denied that it was engaged in any operation specifically designed to oust American communists. In September, 1958, we were informed that the Mexican Government had embarked on a strong anticommunist program and certain Americans were ordered deported. We checked with CIA and the Agency's chief in Mexico City claimed that his Agency was not involved. (~~S~~)(U)

The Liaison Agent subsequently was informed on a strictly confidential basis that the American Ambassador had been in contact with certain Mexican officials concerning possible anticommunist activities. The Ambassador had consulted with the local CIA chief and had asked for a list of Americans who could be considered as being deportable. The CIA officer reportedly furnished a list of approximately 40 names. (memorandum Roach to Belmont, September 17, 1958, "Legal Attache's Office, Mexico City, Relationship with Embassy and CIA") (~~S~~)(U)

38. [redacted]

We expressed our displeasure to CIA in X[September, 1958,]X because of that Agency's unauthorized investigation in the United States of a X[Romanian]X citizen who was here in connection with an exchange program. The X[Romanian]X indicated to an American friend that he was interested in staying in the United States, but was not ready for actual defection because of a (~~S~~) (~~S~~) (U) to notify the Bureau. A letter dated September 16, 1959, was also sent to [redacted] and he was told that the Bureau was disappointed in him because he had failed to make any objection to the article and had not alerted us concerning the impending attack against the Bureau. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, August 27, 1959, "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock, 'True' Magazine, September, 1959"; and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, September 4, 1959, "Allen Dulles")

45. * [ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - 1959] * (~~S~~)(U)

We received information in September, 1959, that the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviews with American businessmen in the Boston area, which dealt with meetings between the businessmen and visiting [Soviets] (S) CIA reportedly was interested in developing positive intelligence information, * but it so happened that (S) one of the [Soviets] (S) was involved in a [double agent operation] (S) being handled by the Bureau. The Bureau already had notified CIA of our interest in the [Soviet.] By letter (S) dated September 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the manner in which CIA had handled this. (Re [redacted], Bureau file [redacted]) (~~S~~)

46. APPEARANCE OF COLONEL FRANTISEK TISLER BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HCUA) - 1959

On November 6, 1959, information was received indicating that HCUA was interested in obtaining Colonel Frantisek Tisler, a Czech defector, to testify before the Committee. HCUA advised us that it had contacted the State Department who, in turn, had conferred with CIA. Allen Dulles allegedly informed HCUA that Tisler was agreeable to appearing before the Committee and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security instructions.

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority to make a defector available to a congressional committee without first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was informed that CIA did not have such authority because a National Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency Defector Committee. In this particular case the aforementioned Committee had not called a meeting, but the chairman, a CIA official, had made certain phone calls. A Bureau representative was contacted by phone on November 6, 1959, but at that time we had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted the chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee had no objection to making Tisler available.

On November 13, 1959, CIA representatives were informed that we were opposed to making the defector available to HCUA. On that same date we were told that CIA was informing HCUA it was reversing its position and that upon reconsideration, it did not feel that Tisler could be made available.

By memorandum dated November 14, 1959, the developments in this matter were reviewed and it was recommended that at the next Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the HCUA request. (Bureau file 105-38088)

47. CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR

On April 11, 1960, [redacted], [redacted] of Reicco Company, Caracas, Venezuela, informed the Bureau that he recently held a conversation with [redacted], an official of the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. [redacted] was [a CIA employee] (S) [redacted] took exception to complimentary statements made by [redacted] concerning the Director and the FBI. [redacted] stated that the Director should have retired five years ago for the good of all concerned. A protest was made to Allen Dulles on April 20, 1960. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, [redacted]")

48. [redacted], CIA OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA - 1960

In February, 1960, Name [redacted], Position [redacted] [redacted] for the Richardson Foundation, volunteered information concerning statements allegedly made by [redacted], a top CIA official. [redacted] allegedly advocated recognition of Red China.

This matter was called to the attention of Allen Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent that he had conducted an inquiry, had reviewed a tape recording of [redacted] talk, and was satisfied that [redacted] had not made the statement attributed to him.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to dispute the position taken by Dulles. If the evidence clearly established that [redacted] had made such a statement, we could use the information to support a position that we would have been warranted in being most circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, [redacted])

49. ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S. PREMISES ABROAD BY CIA

A State Department representative informed the Bureau that a microphone had been found in the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City; that it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allegedly had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had to know what was going on in U.S. establishments. The implication was left that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies through technical installations. Inquiries developed information indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy in 1952 at the request of a State Department official. The Office of Security in State Department was contacted in an effort to pin this down in a more specific manner. We were told by State that their records did not contain any information concerning the microphone.

Subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal Attaches instructing them to be on the alert for technical installations which may affect Bureau operations. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, May 2, 1960, "Installation of Microphones on U.S. Premises Abroad by CIA")

50. [redacted]

We received information indicating that the subject a former Cuban intelligence agent and the subject of a Bureau investigation, had planned to defect in New York City. We permitted a CIA representative to contact the subject in order to orient him so that maximum propaganda effect would be derived through newspaper publicity. We were told that the CIA representative in New York City had been instructed by his headquarters to tell the subject that he would not be prosecuted by the U.S. Government. We complained to CIA stressing that the Agency had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, September 30, 1960, [redacted] (U) [redacted]")

(u) (u) ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

51. [redacted]

Miss [redacted], a CIA employee, obtained a position as a secretary in the Office of the [redacted] Delegation to the United Nations. Prior to receiving this job, CIA checked with the Bureau. The Liaison Agent subsequently learned that [redacted] had informed the [redacted] that she was leaving her job. The [redacted] inquired if she could recommend somebody else. She gave them the name of another CIA employee, Miss [redacted] [redacted].

(S) ~~(S)~~

The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was out of line by not first checking with the Bureau before recommending [redacted] to the [redacted], that the Bureau was interested in developing intelligence information which might be useful to the U.S. Government; and that, in this instance, CIA was obstructing operations by not appropriately coordinating with the Bureau. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, October 31, 1960, [redacted]) (u)

~~(S)~~

52. CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN A U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT

On March 30, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted Allen Dulles concerning CIA's failure to obtain Bureau clearance for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document. No known damage had been done, but the Agent stressed the sensitivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence of such errors. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, March 30, 1961, [redacted]

53. "SPY IN THE U.S." BOOK AUTHORED BY PAWEL MONAT

In July, 1961, our Chicago Office received galley proofs of the book "Spy in the U.S.," written by Pawel Monat. A review of these proofs disclosed several references which portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable light. Since CIA was responsible for Monat and for any writing which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA. It turned out that CIA had not been following the preparation of the book. We were told that steps would be taken to protect Bureau interest. The publishers had indicated to CIA that they would cooperate on changes. Although some changes were made, the book still came out with some information which was not entirely favorable to the Bureau. (Pawel Monat, Bureau file 105-40510)

54. CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ATTACHE*[MEXICO CITY*] 1961 (~~S~~)(u)

On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache,*[Mexico City*] (~~S~~)(u) received information indicating that the*[Czech Embassy*] in that (~~S~~)(u) city was planning to protest harassment of its personnel by U.S. Intelligence. The Legal Attache was told by the*[local CIA office*] (~~S~~)(u) that the Agency was not involved. On October 12, 1961, the same CIA officer changed his position and admitted that CIA had been involved to a certain extent. The Liaison Agent objected to these tactics. It was important to him to know the facts so he could be guided accordingly. (Memorandum*[L'Allier to Sullivan, October 18, 1961, ["Czechoslovakian Diplomatic Activities] (S) - Mexico"*] (~~S~~))

55. CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES - 19

When he defected in December, 1961, [redacted] furnished information concerning alleged penetration of American intelligence. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer, [redacted] was a logical suspect. We conferred with CIA and on February 9, 1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the investigation.

instructions were sent to the field and we then learned in *[New York City*] that CIA allegedly planned to make a recruitment approach. The matter was taken up with CIA headquarters and a protest was made because of the wide discrepancy in the reports we received on CIA intentions. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 18, 1966, [redacted] (U) (S)

67. PASSING OF BUREAU DOCUMENTS TO SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD BY CIA EMPLOYEE - 1966

In September, 1966, we developed information indicating that copies of FBI documents had been passed to Senator Byrd by CIA. The matter was discussed with the Director of CIA and the Agency subsequently conducted an investigation and established that one of its employees, [redacted], had submitted a name check request to the Bureau concerning one [redacted] who was the subject of the material in question. At that time [redacted] had a responsibility of handling name check requests for CIA and, in this connection, was in contact with our Name Check Section. He admitted that he instituted a name check on an "off the cuff basis" for another CIA employee named [redacted].

It is my recollection that one or both CIA employees were subsequently fired or asked to resign. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, September 21, 1966, "Leak of FBI Documents Concerning [redacted] to Senator Robert C. Byrd")

68. *[ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF BUREAU DOUBLE AGENT]* (S)(U)

In March, 1967, we protested to CIA in connection with a matter relating to our mutual interest in a [chemist](S) (S) connected with [redacted] [Corporation*] in [redacted] *[New Jersey.]* (S) We were utilizing [the chemist](S) as a [double agent in an operation (S) directed against the Soviets](S). CIA had established a relationship with the same person for the purpose of acquiring positive intelligence relating to the field of [redacted]. Our *[Newark*] (S)(U) Office received information indicating that a CIA officer, without authorization, compromised our relationship with *[the chemist](S) by discussing the matter with the president of the firm. (Memorandum Sullivan to DeLoach, March 15, 1967, "[redacted]) (S)

69. [redacted]

In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where the Agency allegedly had failed to report to us concerning a communication which a Cuban exile, residing in the United States, had received from the Cuban Intelligence Service. The particular communication had instructed the exile to initiate preparations

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Samuel Adason Jaffe
105-28333

Soviet defector ["Sammy"] (U) has advised that Jaffe was recruited by the KGB, in about 1962 while he was in Moscow, through his relationship with a Soviet female. [Soviet defector "Shamrock" has confirmed that Jaffe was approached but does not believe the approach was successful.] c Jaffe reported to the New York Office in 1963 what he interpreted as a recruitment effort, and he was extensively reinterviewed in 1969 concerning his association with KGB officers in Moscow. [There is no information in Jaffe's file that he was ever reported on by Col. Penkovskiy, as Jaffe reportedly has claimed.] c During the interviews with Jaffe, he denied any overt acts helpful to the KGB, although he admitted a continuing relationship with several KGB officers. Both the New York and Washington Field Offices came to the conclusion that Jaffe was a KGB agent while in Moscow, but that there was doubt as to whether he continued in that role after he was expelled.

Our relations with Jaffe were tempered by ["Sammy's"] (U) allegation, and Bureau Agents in contact with him were circumspect in any dealings with him thereafter. Jaffe very likely detected a change in the Agents' attitude which accounts for his statement that he felt his relationship with them had cooled off.

There is no evidence contained in Jaffe's file that either New York or Washington Field or the Bureau has ever taken any action which would affect Jaffe's livelihood. Following his return from Hong Kong, Jaffe told his handling Agents that he was experiencing difficulty in finding a job. He several times mentioned his concern that his association with the FBI might be the reason. On each occasion, he was assured that the FBI had never divulged his confidential relationship and would not do so any time in the future. u

Jaffe's file does disclose that during an interview with Washington Field Agents in 1969, he said that he had learned from a British Intelligence contact in Hong Kong that [his recall from that city was caused by [his refusal to cooperate with CIA. He also related that he later mentioned this to a CIA contact] in Washington who responded that the British

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Samuel Adason Jaffe
105-28333

JFK
(1)(B)

Intelligence representative "had no right to tell you this." [CIA has informed us that they did have contacts with Jaffe while he was in Hong Kong and that he reported on Communist Chinese of interest to the Agency.] His file also records that Jaffe told New York Agents in 1969 that a recently published book on the Council of Foreign Relations described him as having a subversive background. He was also described in the book as being a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy. Jaffe connected the appearance of this book with his then recent recall from Hong Kong by ABC.

ACTION:

That this memorandum be referred to the SENSTUDY project in view of probable inquiries from SSCIO.

JEN TN WOV

[illegible] to [illegible]
8/25/75
TI JK/[illegible]

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

601 THRU 1ST NR 605

607, 1ST NR 607

609 THRU 616

618 THRU 620

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

TO ALEXANDRIA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
DALLAS
EL PASO
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JACKSONVILLE
LOUISVILLE
LOS ANGELES
MEMPHIS
MIAMI
NEW YORK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
ST. LOUIS
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE

SEPTEMBER 5, 1975

PERSONAL ATTENTION

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

SEP 05 1975
3 442P
TELETYPE

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

REC-47 62-116395-620

REBUTELS MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975.

1 SEP 9 1975

SFP:eks
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KL

ST-110

SEE NOTE PAGE 9

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ____
Inspection ___
Intell. ____
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

9 SEP 17 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED WHEREABOUTS OF A NUMBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES INDICATING THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC STAFF. LISTED BELOW, BY FIELD OFFICE TERRITORY, ARE THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES AS CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES.

INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SAs LITRENTO AND STEWART DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA CONCERNING MAIL OPENING ACTIVITIES. ALL OTHERS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER SAC, ASAC, OR BOTH, DURING PERIOD 1959 - 1966 IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI, NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGTON FIELD. THEY PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING MAIL OPENINGS.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS

FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.

CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

ALEXANDRIA.

W. DONALD STEWART, CRYSTAL HOUSE I, APARTMENT 202, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

JAMES H. GALE, 3307 ROCKY MOUNT ROAD, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

THOMAS E. BISHOP, 8820 STARK ROAD, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA

BALTIMORE:

ANTHONY P. LITRENTO, 2810 STONYBROOK DRIVE, BOWIE, MARYLAND

PAUL O'CONNELL, JR., 2417 STRATTON DRIVE, POTOMAC, MARYLAND

DONALD E. RONEY, 131 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE, WINDSOR HILLS, WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

VICTOR TURYN, 2645 TURF VALLEY ROAD, ELLICOTT CITY, MARYLAND

DONALD W. MORLEY, BOX 222, NEW MARKET, MARYLAND

BIRMINGHAM:

JOHN DAVID POPE, JR., 221 REMINGTON ROAD, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

BOSTON:

LEO L. LAUGHLIN, 9 EVERETT AVENUE, WINCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

EDWARD J. POWERS, 10 COLONIAL DRIVE, BEDFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

J. F. DESMOND, 185 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

CHICAGO:

MARLIN W. JOHNSON, CANTEEN CORPORATION, THE MERCHANDISE MART, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

HARVEY G. FOSTER, 1012 SOUTH HAMLIN, PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS

CINCINNATI:

PAUL FIELDS, 2677 CYCLORAMA DRIVE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMCREST LANE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

DALLAS:

PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014 CHATTERTON DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

EL PASO:

KARL W. DISSLY, POST OFFICE BOX 9762, EL PASO, TEXAS

INDIANAPOLIS:

DILLARD W. HOWELL, 6413 CARDINAL LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

ALLAN GILLIES, 8228 HOOVER LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

JACKSON:

WILLIAMS W. BURKE, JR., 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

JACKSONVILLE:

DONALD K. BROWN, 826 BROOKMONT AVENUE, EAST JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, 4857 WATER OAK LANE, JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

LOUISVILLE:

BERNARD C. BROWN, 2301 NEWMARKET DRIVE, N.E., LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

LOS ANGELES:

WILLIAM G. SIMON, 2075 LOMBARDY ROAD, SAN MARINO, CALIFORNIA

WESLEY G. GRAPP, 4240 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS, CALIFORNIA

ARNOLD C. LARSON, 4232 ABBINGTON COURT, WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH K. PONDER, 3719 CARRIAGE HOUSE COURT, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 3030 SOUTH RED HILL AVENUE, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

MEMPHIS:

E. HUGO WINTERROWD, 1550 NORTH PARKWAY, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

MIAMI:

THOMAS MC ANDREWS, 324 NEAPOLITAN WAY, NAPLES, FLORIDA

FREDERICK F. FOX, 11450 W. BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA

NEW YORK:

JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, 656 HUNT LANE, MANHASSET, NEW YORK

HENRY A. FITZGIBBON, 76 EASTON ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK

OKLAHOMA CITY:

JAMES T. MORELAND, 108 FERN DRIVE, POTEAU, OKLAHOMA

LEE O. TEAGUE, 2501 N.W. 121ST STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA

OMAHA:

JOHN F. CALLAGHAN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, CAMP DODGE, POST OFFICE BOX 130, JOHNSTON, IOWA

PHILADELPHIA:

RICHARD J. BAKER, 219 JEFFREY LANE, NEWTON SQUARE, PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN F. MALONE, 25 GARFIELD AVENUE, CARBONDALE, PENNSYLVANIA

PHOENIX:

PALMER M. BAKEN, JR., 3832 EAST YUCCA STREET, PHOENIX, ARIZONA

ST. LOUIS:

THOMAS J. GEARTY, 6630 CLAYTON ROAD #105, RICHMOND HEIGHTS, MISSOURI

WESLEY T. WHALEY, 286 GREEN TRAILS DRIVE, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI

SAN DIEGO:

FRANK L. PRICE, 2705 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO:

CURTIS O. LYNUM, 644 EAST HILLSDALE BOULEVARD, SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA

HAROLD E. WELBORN, 13067 LA VISTA COURT, SARATOGA, CALIFORNIA

SAVANNAH:

TROY COLEMAN, 36 CROMWELL ROAD, WILMINGTON PARK, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

JOSEPH D. PURVIS, 721 DANCY AVENUE, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

SEATTLE:

LELAND V. BOARDMAN, ROUTE 3, BOX 268,SEQUIM, WASHINGTON

RICHARD D. AUERBACH, P. O. BOX 1768, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

JAMES E. MILNES, 4317 - 50TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

PAUL R. BIBLER, 15134 - 38TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

NOTE:

Referenced Bureau teletypes furnished field general background and instructions relating to our cooperation with the SSC and procedures concerning interviews of current and former employees. Former employees listed herein derived from an SSC request dated 8/19/75, to which we have responded by LHM 9/5/75 being furnished the SSC through the AG. After dispatch of instant teletype, we will arrange for copies to be filed in the respective personnel files of the former employees listed.

PLAINTEXT TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall 9/5/75
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU TELEPHONE CALL 9/5/75.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT SPECIAL AGENT DOUGLAS MAC DOUGALL BE MADE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., FOR INTERVIEW BY THAT COMMITTEE ON 9/9/75 AT 10 A.M. THE INTERVIEW WILL INVOLVE SA MAC DOUGALL'S KNOWLEDGE IN THE PARTICIPATION IN MAIL COVERAGE.

SA MAC DOUGALL SHOULD ARRANGE TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., IN TIME TO BE BRIEFED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONS AT 3 P.M. ON 9/8/75 IN ROOM 4509 IN THE JUSTICE BUILDING.

REC-47 62-11632-619

~~ST-110~~

SEP 9 1975

NOTE: James Dick, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, made the request for the interview of SA MacDougall concerning mail covers. This interview will be a Staff interview. Reference phone call ~~to~~ advised the New York Office of this request and of the fact that SA MacDougall should be available for the briefing on 9/8/75 by the Legal Counsel and Intelligence Divisions. This communication will serve as approval for the waiver of an existing employment agreement signed by SA MacDougall for purposes of this interview.

JBH/PVD/PJD

PVD:lad
(10)

4D

SEP 05 1975

TELETYPE

79 SEP 17 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

Mr. W. R. Wannall

8/12/75

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

A. B. Fulton

COINTELPROS

This is to identify additional copies of excised material which is being made available in room 4171 of the JEH building for review by staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The copies have been excised to protect sensitive sources and delete information from other agencies where there were sensitivities.

Each serial, prior to being made available for review to members of the SSC staff in room 4171, is approved by the responsible Section Chief.

Attached for the file are 23 copies of excised serials regarding the New Left which were made available for review to the SSC on 8/7/75, and 336 copies of the Black Extremist which were made available on 8/8/75 for review. The latter 336, which consists of four volumes, are being maintained in room 4426, JEH.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures
62-116009

62-116395

10

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
1 - 100-449698 (New Left)
1 - 100-448006 (Black Extremist)

DKP:lfj
(11)

NDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 5P2ALM/KP

1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

8/5/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

Mr. W. R. Wannall

A. B. Fulton

COINTELPROS

This is to identify additional copies of excised serials which are being made available in room 4171 of the JEH building for review by staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). Copies have been excised to protect sensitive sources and delete information from other agencies where there were sensitivities.

Each serial, prior to being made available for review to members of the SSC staff, is approved by the appropriate responsible Section Chief.

Attached for the file are 44 copies of excised serials as they were made available for review to the SSC on 8/1/75: 36 relate to the Communist Party, USA, Cointelpro, five to the New Left and three to the Socialist Workers Party Cointelpros; 105 copies regarding the New Left Cointelpro which were also made available on 8/1/75, and 41 copies of New Left Cointelpro which were made available for review on 8/4/75.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures
62-116009

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
1 - 100-449698 (New Left)
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)
1 - 100-436291 (SWP)

62-116[illegible]7
NO[illegible]
[illegible] 1975

DKP:lfj
(12)

NDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

70 SEP 8 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

August 18, 1975

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Director, FBI

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

NDR-14
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2

Reference is made to the August 8, 1975, meeting in your office, wherein members of your staff and officials of this Bureau discussed matters relating to the current inquiries of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as relates to our Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros) documents and to the protection of FBI sources utilized in these programs.

At your request there is attached a memorandum summarizing known results in our Cointelpros directed against the Communist Party, USA, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate Groups, New Left and Black Extremists. These summaries do not indicate any actions were conducted under these programs which resulted in physical injury to the targets or that electronic techniques, surreptitious entries, or mail openings were used in connection with Cointelpro actions.

Enclosure
62-116009

ENCLOSURE

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)

DKP/DR:lfj
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
170 AUG 20 1975

62-116009-80

ORIGINAL FILED IN

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

DUPLICATE YELLOW

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The Attorney General, on 8/8/75, and the Deputy Attorney General, met with Associate Director Nicholas P. Callahan, Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, and Inspector John B. Hotis to discuss the request of the Senate Select Committee for the identities of sources utilized to effect Cointelpro activities. The Attorney General indicated prior to discussing this problem, which relates to the overall confidentiality of FBI sources, with Senator Church, Chairman of the Committee, he desired to be furnished information which would enable him to insure himself there were no Cointelpro activities of a scandalous or infamous nature which at a later date could cause embarrassment to the Department. The attached memorandum was prepared during the period 8/8-12/75 by personnel of the Internal Security Branch of the Intelligence Division. It represents a careful review of all Cointelpro actions where results were known. It is pointed out in the majority of authorized Cointelpro actions results were not recorded. Also, because of the wide variety of Cointelpro actions, results in many areas are not subject to measurement. For example, there is no way of determining how many individuals left the Communist Party as a result of our documented mailings relating to Soviet anti-semitism.

SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

August 18, 1975

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

Classified because sets forth information which, if disclosed, could compromise sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

In an effort to assess possible damage incurred by subversive and extremist organizations and individuals as a result of Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activity, a current review has been made of the programs relating to the Communist Party, USA, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate Groups, New Left and Black Extremists.

The "Study Committee Report on FBI Counterintelligence Programs," prepared in May, 1974, by the Department-FBI Committee headed by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen, tabulated 3,208 proposals for counterintelligence action during the period 1956 until all programs were discontinued on April 28, 1971. Of these, according to the Petersen report, 2,340 were reported approved and implemented and results were reported as known in 516 instances. Our current review has developed 620 instances where results of varying degrees are known. Excluding results of actions which appear to have been appropriate and proper law enforcement procedures, we have summarized results in 164 instances. In any instance where there was any question regarding the propriety of the action, doubts were resolved by preparing a summary.

For ready review, summaries of the actions in these 164 instances have been placed in categories and are attached as follows:

1. Anonymously furnishing information. (34 instances) Pages 3-36.

62-116009
① - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
DKP/DR:lfj
(9)

SECRET

ORIGINAL FURNISHED THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
COPY FURNISHED THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

Classified by 4375
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE 62-116395

Counterintelligence Programs

2. Furnishing information to news media. (39 instances) Pages 37-75.

3. Use of informants for disruption. (9 instances) Pages 76-84.

4. Alerting employers, credit bureaus and creditors to illegal, immoral, radical or subversive activity. (10 instances) Pages 85-94.

5. Alerting business and individuals with whom individual or group has economic dealings to illegal, immoral, radical or subversive activity. (16 instances) Pages 95-110.

6. Alerting religious and civic leaders and organizations to immoral, subversive, illegal, or radical activity. (22 instances) Pages 111-132.

7. Alerting family or associates to illegal, immoral, radical or subversive activities. (5 instances) Pages 133-137.

8. Alerting educational institutions to immoral, illegal, radical or subversive activity. (17 instances) Pages 138-154.

9. Miscellaneous. (12 instances) Pages 155-166.

Extreme care should be exercised in connection with any use of the attached material. Public disclosure of some of this material could result in physical jeopardy to present and former FBI sources utilized in these programs.

/

Counterintelligence Programs

In July, 1964, an anonymous letter was sent to a number of individuals in the Superior, Wisconsin, area who advertised in "Tyomies-Eteenpain," a Finnish language newspaper published in Wisconsin noting the similarity of editorials in "The Worker," published by the Communist Party, USA, to alert these advertisers to the communist nature of this newspaper so they might withdraw their support.

There was no known withdrawal of support for this newspaper, but at the same time, the newspaper was applying for membership in the Superior, Wisconsin, Chamber of Commerce and their application was denied.

JPM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-30-77, 82, 84

Counterintelligence Programs

In December, 1969, an anonymous letter was directed to selected members of the United Klans of America, Inc. (UKA), by the Richmond Office. This letter denounced Robert H. Hudgins, Grand Dragon of Virginia, characterizing him as one interested in personal gain only. The content of the letter suggested that it had been prepared by Raymond Adams, a former UKA member, who had been banished and had been at odds with Hudgins.

The anonymous mailing resulted in continuing disruption and mistrust in certain Klan units. Hudgins' leadership was challenged. The unrest at Danville, Virginia, caused a great reduction in income for the UKA in Virginia, and affected Hudgins' salary and expenses. Information available does not indicate whether money for Hudgins' salary and expenses obtained from UKA or his employer.

TCD:bmf
(9)

157-9-41-113, 115, 116, 118

Counterintelligence Programs

FBI Headquarters, in October, 1962, authorized the preparation of an anonymous mimeographed leaflet criticizing individuals and small groups with communist backgrounds who consistently attacked the United States but never took a stand against the Soviet Union. This was to be done in connection with the scheduled October 31, 1962, appearance of Herbert Eugene Aptheker, a member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, at the State University of New York at Buffalo (UB), as a part of a lecture series entitled "A Political Spectrum of a Contemporary World." Such individuals had been openly critical of an earlier appearance by a British fascist.

Authority was also granted to anonymously mail public source information on Aptheker to Dr. Charles Ebert, UB, a faculty member critical of the far left.

The leaflets were anonymously distributed to the local news media, the student newspaper and to 28 campus organizations and/or students.

Aptheker's scheduled speech was deferred by a last minute injunction in New York State Court. It is not known if the leaflets or letter had any bearing on the injunction. An appellate court later ruled the University had the right to invite Aptheker to speak.

RWH:tdp (9)
100-3-104-6-36, 42 44, 78

Counterintelligence Programs

In August, 1963, the FBI in Seattle, Washington, became aware that a factional problem existed in the Communist Party (CP) Northwest District as a result of the Sino-Soviet split in which the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), supported the Soviet Union.

A Red Chinese letter stating their position in the ideological dispute was condensed; criticisms of the CPUSA pro-Soviet position were added, and an anonymous letter prepared and mailed to 25 selected CP members in the Northwest District.

The Seattle FBI Office later reported that some members of the Seattle area CP registered their disapproval with the National CP pro-Soviet position and that this contributed to some disharmony in CPUSA circles. The letter was discussed at CP state and local club levels in Seattle.

RPF:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-50-89, 92, 96

Counterintelligence Programs

During May, 1967, a leaflet was mailed to about 40 individuals in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, area. Recipients were labor union leaders, churchmen, members of the American Society of Friends, and the American Legion Posts in vicinity of the residence of Arthur Edelman. Some of the recipients were associated with Edelman in promoting demonstrations against the war in Vietnam and the leaflet was designed to present the membership and leadership role of Edelman and his wife, Beth, in the Western Pennsylvania Communist Party (CP).

Arthur Edelman, after being made aware of leaflet, announced it was time to come out in the open. An informant advised that Arthur Tuden, a college instructor in Pittsburgh, who was active in the antiwar movement, commented he was considering being more circumspect in his dealings with Edelman. Subsequent to circulation of leaflet, Edelman claimed the organization Trade Unionists For Peace in Pittsburgh was on verge of collapse because of friction among its leaders.

HPB:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-39-148, 150, 154 SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

During mid-1966, the New Orleans Office mailed a series of letters to Assistant Grand Dragon Bill Windham, Louisiana United Klans of America, Inc., in the name of a fictitious organization, The National Committee for Domestic Tranquility (NCDT), an anti-Klan group. The letters, which indicated that Windham was cooperating with NCDT, were addressed in a manner that they would be intercepted by a Klan member and furnished to another Klan leader.

Resulted in a split in Klan leadership and ultimately in Windham's resignation from the Klan.

RLL: vb
(9)

157-9-33-46, 48, 49, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia FBI Office was authorized to mail an anonymous letter to Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard, United Klans of America (UKA), Tuscaloosa, Alabama, from a "member of the Minutemen" in Pennsylvania, urging that Shelton drop Roy Frankhouser from Ku Klux Klan leadership in Pennsylvania. This letter would also suggest that Pennsylvania authorities, although not true, were considering Frankhouser as a murder suspect at that time.

During March, 1967, Robert Shelton mentioned he had dropped Frankhouser from membership in the UKA and that he had written acknowledgment from Frankhouser of this fact.

ELS:dsh/lfj
(9)

157-9-37-35, 37, 38

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia FBI Office during June, 1964, mailed an anonymous letter, ostensibly prepared by a disgruntled Communist Party (CP) youth in Philadelphia, to Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA, complaining about the domineering and overbearing attitude toward the CP youth on the part of Frances Gabow, Organizational Secretary of the CP of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware. The letter indicated Gabow had also lost the respect of adult members because of her relationship with a married man.

Gabow lost her position as CP Organizational Secretary.

ELS:bmf/lfj
(9)

100-3-104-37-124

Counterintelligence Programs

During August, 1968, the Los Angeles Office mailed an anonymous letter to selected faculty associates of Robert A. Nieman, an Assistant Professor at California State College and a candidate for the Peace and Freedom Party for the California Assembly. The letter ridiculed Nieman, pointing out that he was white, did not truly represent the blacks, that he had been arrested for possession of marijuana, and of his background with the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Nieman was very active in SDS and supported SDS in anti-Vietnam War demonstrations. His arrest record, under FBI Identification Number 274-888-G, reveals that he was arrested by the Los Angeles, California, Police Department, on 9/29/67 for violation of the Health and Safety Code (Possession of Marijuana).

Nieman lost the election, which he said he expected, but also stated that the letter had caused him much embarrassment, both at the school, where an effort was being made to remove him, and among black militants, who in some cases were being taught by him.

RLL:vb/lm
(9)

100-449698-26-7, 13, 18

Counterintelligence Programs

A leaflet entitled "Call...to Progressive-Minded America Announcing the Holding of a Conference Preliminary to the Founding Convention of a New, American Labor-Negro Vanguard Party" in November, 1961, was sent anonymously by the Newark Office to Communist Party (CP) officials throughout the country. The aim was to hinder the formation of the American Labor-Negro Vanguard Party (ALNVP) which was a project of the Harriet-Tubman Section which had already been expelled from the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). It was also to make the Harriet-Tubman Section appear as a provocative agent of the FBI trying to raid the CPUSA of its membership and financial support.

The mailing created considerable confusion in the CPUSA, which found it necessary to warn its members through its newspaper, of the formation of the ALNVP and to warn against being taken in by this group.

JPM:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-31-3, 15

Counterintelligence Program

During June, 1970, the Charlotte Office prepared about 100 copies of a leaflet, in the form of a news item, prepared by a reporter for Southern Vanguard Revolutionary Party, (a defunct extremist organization formed by purged Panther Jose Gonzalvez). The leaflet, sent to news services and to a number of residents in the vicinity of Black Panther Party (BPP) headquarters, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, was intended to publicize the split in the BPP group at Winston-Salem and to highlight that outside leadership has been brought to the BPP Winston-Salem. Leaflet mentioned Douglas Miranda, former BPP leader in New Haven, Connecticut, had been transferred to Winston-Salem and also attacked Larry Little, a BPP leader in Winston-Salem, as radical and insinuated he is pocketing donations obtained for BPP Breakfast for Children Program. The leaflet contained truthful information.

After distribution of this leaflet, sales of the BPP newspaper in Winston-Salem dropped considerably and respect for BPP leaders in Winston-Salem was reported to have been lost by members.

EFG:bmf/lm
(9)

100-448006-1829, 2088, 2094

Counterintelligence Programs

Douglas Paul Miranda was a successful leader and organizer of the Black Panther Party (BPP) during 1969 and 1970 in New Haven, Connecticut. An anonymous letter was sent to BPP Headquarters in San Francisco in March, 1970, using BPP slang alleging that Miranda had embezzled BPP funds and questioned whether his promiscuity was in the best interest of the BPP. There was no specific information known to the FBI that Miranda was, in fact, embezzling BPP funds, but allegations had been received that he was having sexual relations with numerous females in the New Haven area.

Miranda fell into disfavor with the BPP leadership and disciplinary action was taken with the approval of the national office. He was transferred to Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

HPB:bmf
(9)

105-165706-32-1150
100-448006-1722

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 9, 1969, an informant advised that Michael Baynham, a Detroit Black Panther Party (BPP) member, disappeared from Detroit June 6, 1969, after taking $150 of BPP funds. He allegedly purchased a gun with part of this money and left Detroit. The BPP was reportedly very upset over Baynham's actions.

On June 12, 1969, Lt. William McCoy, Special Investigations Bureau, Detroit, Michigan, Police Department advised that Baynham was found fatally shot that date in the hallway of Jackie Spicer's residence, 13529 Dequindre, Detroit, Michigan. Spicer was present at the time of the shooting and advised police he had committed suicide.

The Wayne County, Michigan Medical Examiner's Office subsequently advised Baynham's death could possibly have been a suicide.

On September 15, 1969, FBI Headquarters authorized Detroit Office to mail an anonymous communication to a "representative number of Detroit BPP leaders" and members and to BPP National officer, David Hilliard. This communication, mailed September 17, 1969, would question the death of BPP member "Brother Michael Baynham," who it was believed committed suicide and would raise the question of possible responsibility on the part of national BPP leaders for the suicide. The letter would also be prepared in a manner to cause suspicion that Jackie Spicer, a BPP leader in Detroit, was the author of the letter and thus cause disruption in the BPP.

On September 19, 1969, an informant advised the receipt of the letter by Detroit BPP personnel convinced them that Jackie Spicer and Anita Hartman (also BPP member) wrote the letter. As a result, Frank Meyers of the Detroit Chapter contacted BPP National Headquarters on September 18, 1969, to so advise them. As a result, Meyers was told to stay away from Spicer since she was probably a police informant and the letter had come from the police through her.

At a BPP meeting held September 18, 1969, a decision was made to confront Spicer regarding the letter and consequently, she and Anita Hartman were purged from the Detroit BPP group.

PEN:cah (9)
100-448006-1251, 1303, 1359; 157-14024-5

Counterintelligence Programs

The Richmond Office of the FBI prepared an anonymous letter addressed to George Lincoln Rockwell, National Commander of the American Nazi Party (ANP) wherein it was alleged Alan Welch, Deputy Commander of the ANP, is a homosexual and had engaged in an unusual sex act with another ANP member. Further, that Welch was turning away recruits from the National Headquarters who appeared to be "too manly." A source who had furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Welch had been described by Rockwell in the past as "a reformed queer." The Richmond Office furnished this letter to the Dallas Office where it was mailed on September 23, 1965.

On November 26, 1965, Rockwell appeared at the Alexandria, Virginia, Resident Agency of the FBI with four letters he received, one of which was the above, inquiring if these letters were in violation of Federal law. Rockwell advised the above letter caused a great deal of disruption in the ANP and it cast suspicion on one of his most trusted workers, namely Welch.

LEB:bmf
(9)

157-9-41-11, 17, 19

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 3, 1969, the Salt Lake City Office sent an anonymous letter to James Lucien Bever, President of the University of Utah chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) alleging that Larry Hammel, a University of Utah student leader devoted to SDS, was an informant. On October 7, 1969, Bever appeared at an SDS meeting and confronted Hammel. Bever announced that he received information that Hammel was a traitor to SDS principles and an informant for the "Feds."

The above resulted in considerable dissension among SDS adherents at that meeting and in future meetings. Hammel's loyalty to SDS remained in doubt even though he attempted to refute the attack. Shortly after the above action SDS became totally inactive at the University of Utah.

TCD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-44-10

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1971, the Seattle Office advised that the following action was taken to discredit Michael Thomas Justesen and Clayton Van Lydegraf among their fellow New Left associates. During December, 1970, in connection with the "Seattle 8" trial, it was apparent that the defendants and their attorneys were under the impression that the Government intended to uncover other informants in addition to the one who was surfaced for testimony. (The "Seattle 8" is a name coined by news media to describe eight persons indicted by a Federal Grand Jury at Seattle, Washington, on April 16, 1970, for violation of the anti-riot law and conspiracy to destroy Government property.) Although there was general speculation that one of the defendants was a Government informant, this was not true. The Government had no other informants to uncover. Following the declaration of a mistrial in the case, an anonymous call was made to Defense Counsel Jeffrey Steinborn. (The mistrial was declared as a result of actions by a defendant who was cited for contempt.) The anonymous caller offered to help Steinborn in defense of the case but related a fear that Steinborn's phone might be bugged. Steinborn was instructed to proceed to a particular pay telephone booth directly across from the Seattle Police Department. He was observed entering the phone booth and the call was placed to him. Steinborn was advised that he was then under observation by the caller which left the impression that the call emanated from the Seattle Police Department. The caller disclosed an intention to get even with United States Attorney Stan Pitkin of Seattle, and the FBI for what they did to the Seattle Police Department. (It is noted that Pitkin handled the Government's case concerning the "Seattle 8," and also received considerable publicity in 1970 in connection with an expose of police corruption before the Federal Grand Jury.) The anonymous caller advised him that Michael Justesen and Clayton Van Lydegraf were FBI informants. (Justesen was in fugitive status at the time and Van Lydegraf's whereabouts were not known.) In reality neither was an informant. United States Attorney Pitkin was not aware of the above action.

As a result, Steinborn confronted Pitkin a few months later and warned that disclosure during any future trial that one of the defendants was actually an FBI informant would jeopardize the Government's case. Pitkin denied any knowledge that the FBI might have an undisclosed informant within the "Seattle 8." Information from other sources indicated that some persons sympathetic with the "Seattle 8" felt that Justesen was an informant. This gave further indication of the effect of the anonymous call made to Steinborn.

TCD:dsh (9)
100-449698-50-13, 14

Counterintelligence Programs

Philadelphia Office submitted anonymous letter to Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and Mortimer Daniel Rubin, responsible for Party youth activities discrediting Jarvis Tyner as being ineffective in making arrangements for a convention and establishing a working organization.

Tyner was subsequently downgraded in his position within the Party and had to coordinate all matters with other individuals in New York.

KAM:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-37-121, 126

Counterintelligence Programs

In January, 1967, James Dolsen, Communist Party (CP) leader in Philadelphia, was informed by the FBI, through an anonymous telephone call, of current status and trial date concerning Aaron Libson, a CP member arrested for sodomy. This was a continuation of previous anonymous information provided Dolsen in November, 1966, about Libson's arrest.

After Libson entered a guilty plea in February, 1967, the fact was published in a newspaper. Daniel Rubin, National Organizational Secretary, stated Libson was dropped from CP.

HPB:vb
(9)

100-3-104-364, 371, 374

Counterintelligence Programs

In September, 1966, an anonymous letter was mailed by the Jackson Division to United Klans of America (UKA) leaders and members near the Headquarters of the Knights of Green Forest (KGF) denouncing Dale Odus Walton, Imperial Wizard, KGF, in typical Klan language.

Many Klansmen discontinued their support of Walton and this organization became inactive.

PWC:dew
(9)

157-9-54-39, 41, 50

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1967, George Lucas, Miami Communist Party (CP) Chairman since May, 1966, was engaged in an attack on the primarily Jewish CP membership in the Miami area. It was approved that an anonymous letter in Yiddish about this situation be sent to Isaac Dantzig, Vice Chairman of the Miami CP who was regarded as a leader of the progressive Jewish movement in the area. The letter was to question the loyalty of Lucas and his wife to the CP. It was also approved, since Lucas had been determined as the source of a series of anonymous letters to the FBI, that a number of CP members be interviewed about the letters in a way that they suspect Lucas as the writer.

Mr. Lucas and his wife were both given indefinite suspensions by the CP. However, Lucas had also been sending anonymous letters to the FBI and through interviews with CP members they became aware that Lucas was the writer of these letters. Ruth Lucas was interviewed but was uncooperative. Also, CP operations in the area were thoroughly disrupted, CP membership became disorganized, and CP sources of funds dwindled.

JPM:cah (9)
100-3-104-29-9, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 27

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1961, Communist Party literature was anonymously mailed to the residences of a cross section of employees of the Olson Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, creating an indignant reaction by the recipients. Mr. Peter Olson, an executive of the company, felt one of his employees, Mary Blair, was responsible for the mailings as she was the only known communist in the company.

Mary Blair was discharged from her employment at the Olson Publishing Company on November 9, 1961.

JPM:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-2982
100-3-104-30-2

Counterintelligence Programs

In November, 1966, 250 post cards cancelling a fund raising bazaar in Detroit, Michigan, scheduled by "The Volunteers," a front group of the Michigan District Communist Party (MDCP) to promote "The Worker," were anonymously mailed just before the opening of the bazaar. It was anticipated the mailing would be blamed on Breakthrough, a conservative anticommunist group in Detroit, since the communists knew a member of Breakthrough had infiltrated "The Volunteers" about three years previously and would therefore have a mailing list. It was also anticipated that this action would lead to the criticism of William Allan, a top MDCP functionary, as he sponsored the infiltrator.

Attendance at the bazaar was less than half of the previous year's attendance, and proceeds for "The Worker" were also less than half of the previous year's proceeds. The proceeds for the 1966 bazaar were $428.00.

JCF:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-15-294, 309, 310, 314

Counterintelligence Programs

During July, 1969, the Los Angeles Office sent anonymous leaflets to selected leaders and members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) and New Left organizations accusing Donald Freed of being a police informant. Freed was active in the Los Angeles area in developing a close working relationship between the BPP and New Left organizations.

During a meeting of the BPP United Front Against Fascism where the leaflets were also distributed, Freed abruptly left and never returned. Although given a vote of confidence by "The Friends of the Black Panthers" a few weeks later, he showed a noticeable effect of the experience and it may have impaired his efficiency and command of his following.

RLL:dsh
(9)

100-449698-26-31, 39

Counterintelligence Programs

By letter April 23, 1969, FBI Headquarters authorized Jackson Office to mail anonymous letter to Donald Wilson Jackson, also known as Muhammad Kenyatta. Letter would be ostensibly from a student defense committee and designed to discourage Jackson from returning to Tougaloo College, Tougaloo, Mississippi. Jackson and his associates, all associated with the Black Panther Party and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, had been involved in incidents of violence on the campus during week of April 10-13, 1969. Letter was mailed to Jackson on April 25, 1969.

Jackson Office subsequently advised that through a confidential informant, it was learned that Jackson was disturbed about the letter and on May 23, 1969, planned to leave the Jackson, Mississippi, area and to return to his home in Pennsylvania.

JTA:bmf
(9)

100-448006-863,869,970,987

Counterintelligence Programs

Fanny Hechtman of the New York Communist Party, in 1965, was a hard and successful worker for the cause of "The Worker," a national publication of the Communist Party, USA. Hechtman was reported to be extremely neurotic. The New York Office made a pretext telephone call to Hechtman on May 7, 1965, wherein the caller advised Hechtman she was a friend of hers and wanted to warn Hechtman that the national Communist Party leadership was contemplating removing Hechtman from the national office and transferring her to Philadelphia because of her neurotic tendencies.

Hechtman advised a friend later of this call and was visibly upset and disturbed by the phone call.

LEB:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-34-1011, 1028

Counterintelligence Programs

The National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF) annual rally was held in Carnegie Hall, New York, on November 12, 1964. Prior to the rally, 238 bogus post-cards were mailed by the New York Office to selected Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), members in the New York area with a message denouncing the Chinese communists and calling for support of the "new Soviet leadership." The cards were mailed to the member's place of employment.

William Melish, Chairman, NCASF, denounced this as an attempt by an unknown right-wing group to embarrass and disrupt the NCASF. Many of the recipients of these postcards may have been subjected to embarrassment at their places of employment.

LEB:tdp (9)
100-3-104-34-909, 935

Counterintelligence Programs

In 1964 a fraudulent FBI informant report which implicated William Albertson, member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), as an FBI informant was purposely misdirected to the CPUSA office in New York. The report was read and believed by the CPUSA.

Albertson was subsequently expelled from the CPUSA causing a major disruption in the CPUSA leadership.

LEB:cah (9)
100-3-104-34-690

Counterintelligence Programs

The San Francisco Office placed an anonymous telephone call to Mrs. Thelma Seale, mother of Bobby Seale, National Black Panther Party (BPP) leader. Seale, after a speech in Connecticut on May 19, 1969, was to make speeches in Eugene, Corvallis and Portland, Oregon. Telephone call was ostensibly from a "brother" in Oregon telling Mrs. Seale it would be dangerous for Bobby to make the Oregon appearances. Mrs. Seale told BPP Headquarters about the call and it was decided that Seale should not go.

Results, as reported in San Francisco letter May 26, 1969, were that Seale passed up $1, 130 in Eugene and $600 in Corvallis and possibly caused rift with affiliates of the Students for a Democratic Society who were to appear with him.

JTA:lfj
(9)

100-448006-967

Counterintelligence Programs

An anonymous letter was prepared and sent by the Pittsburgh Office on April 24, 1969, to 35 individuals and leaders of Pittsburgh area peace organizations alleging that Walter and Kay Tillow, leaders of the Pittsburgh Peace and Freedom Center, were being unduly influenced by members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). The publication of the Center was likened to that of the "Guardian" and "Daily World" in content. The letter also alluded to the Tillows' association with Art and Beth Edelman, who in turn were alleged to be associated with CPUSA leader Gus Hall.

The letter resulted in controversy. An informant advised that Walter Tillow believed that the letter was written by the FBI in an attempt to harass him.

TCD:cah (9)
100-449698-39-9, 10

Counterintelligence Programs

Information was developed through informants that Albert Taylor, a member of the United Klans of America (UKA), Lawrence Lodge #610, Montgomery, Alabama, was suspected by George Harris, another member of that lodge, of being an FBI informant. Taylor was not an informant of the FBI. On March 17, 1971, a letter, designed to confirm Harris' suspicions, was mailed by the Mobile Office to Harris. Additionally, an FBI automobile was driven through an area near Taylor's place of employment in a further attempt to convince Harris of Taylor's alleged cooperation with the FBI.

According to informants, since the time of the mailing of the letter, Taylor has not been seen at meetings of Lodge #610.

HWP:hp
(9)

157-9-61,59,61

Counterintelligence Programs

Headquarters sent to Southern offices having substantial Klan activity a supply of three different post cards to be mailed anonymously to a selected number of known Klan members. These post cards contained a caricature of a member of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in his hood and robe and two attacked the Klan's secrecy of membership and the other inferred the Klan leaders are using Klan money for high living, both sensitive points in the Klan.

Numerous mailings were made, some of which received newspaper publicity thereby causing disruption in the Klan membership. Specific individuals to whom mailings were made are not identified in Headquarters files.

TED:lfj
(9)

157-9-30, 33, 34, 29

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

In order to increase the friction between the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Black Panther Party (BPP), the New York Office, in August, 1968, made pretext telephone calls to the SNCC office in an attempt to convey the impression to SNCC that the BPP was "out to get them." Purpose was to increase existing friction between SNCC and BPP.

This was effected and subsequently our New York Office received information indicating that James Forman, SNCC leader, was recently threatened by the BPP who said they would "get him." Forman was making himself scarce with his location known only to his wife and SNCC officials.

VRT:dsh
(9)

SECRET

100-448006-229, 271

34

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 18, 1960, the San Francisco Office directed a letter to the San Francisco Branch Headquarters of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) inviting attendance at an address to be given by Daniel Rubin, National Youth Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), on October 19, 1960, at the Peter Wright School of Dance in San Francisco.

Trotskyist SWP members attended meeting, as did a reporter. Trotskyists caused considerable disruption and exposed Rubin as being a communist, which he was attempting to conceal by claiming to be merely the editor of "New Horizons." The SWP Trotskyists identified "New Horizons" as a communist paper being published by the Communist Party attempting to influence youth.

JDP: vb
(9)

100-3-104-2031

Counterintelligence Programs

Anonymous letters were mailed by the Chicago Division on September 11, 1961, to Board members and on September 14, 1961, to rank-and-file members of the Chicago Council of American-Soviet Friendship (CCASF) relative to a Board meeting of the CCASF held September 13, 1961, to discuss a policy statement on the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear testing.

The CCASF released a statement which incorporated a critical approach to the Soviet Union resuming nuclear retesting. The First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Dmitri D. Muraviev, appeared at the Offices of the CCASF and reprimanded Hedda Basker, a member of the Board of Directors.

JDM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-2885, 2934

2

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 21, 1966, Jim Felder, UPI reporter at Montgomery, Alabama, was confidentially contacted and furnished information about the resignation, for financial reasons, of United Klans of America (UKA) Grand Dragon William Brassell. Prior to that date, there had been no local publicity in Montgomery papers and Bureau efforts were directed toward discrediting Brassell.

On May 23, 1966, a UPI story by Felder regarding Brassell's ouster from the UKA appeared in the Montgomery Advertiser Journal, resulting in adverse publicity to the UKA.

HWP: vb
(9)

157-9-61, 14, 15, 20

Counterintelligence Programs

Miami Division advised Isadon Nochman, Bureau Chief, "Palm Beach Post-Times," Belle Glock, Florida, of a severe beating of a white male teenager following which a Klansman placed a card on the victim stating, "You have just served a proud Klansman, United Klan of America, Incorporated, Palm Beach County. Yours to good health, in God we trust." Newspaper article resulted in unfavorable publicity regarding the Klan.

As a result of the publicity, one of the Klansmen involved in the beating resigned from the Klan and was discharged from his employment due to his public identification as a Klansman. This individual's identity was not shown. Publicity also caused a great deal of internal criticism in the Klan of Klan leader Lee Granims.

TED:dsh
(9)

157-9-29-77, 83

Counterintelligence Programs

In early 1966, the Miami Office determined that a building located at 232 Southwest 30th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, was being used as a United Klans of America, Incorporated, (UKA) operation. This information was disclosed to Milton J. Kelly, Managing Editor of the "Ft. Lauderdale News," and J. Lester Holt, Chief of Police, Ft. Lauderdale Police Department, was notified after a joint meeting of all klaverns commenced in the Klan building that this was the opportune time to set up roadblocks.

The April 19, 1966, edition of the "Ft. Lauderdale News" contained an article captioned "Check Follows Meeting Here - Klan Says Police Violate Rights" reported that a group of suspected Ku Klux Klansmen returning from a secret meeting April 18, 1966, ran into a police checkpoint. Newspaper photographers took pictures and numerous Klansmen were identified. Among those stopped by police were: David J. Zbin, 2600 Southwest Second Avenue; Richard Harley, 4600 Southwest 32nd Drive, West Hollywood; Drew Eugene Johnson, 1429 Southwest 33rd Court; Frederick Paul Attix, 1625 Northwest 15th Place; Sam Richard McBroom, 1420 Northwest First Avenue; Jessie Gay Taylor, 1425 Northwest First Avenue; Conda Lewis Mc Connaughay, 612 Southwest Eighth Avenue, and Harold Carlstedt, 3205 Northwest Third Street. Chaos and confusion was created among the Klansmen and the affair was given extensive publicity.

TJS:tdp (9)
157-9-29-30, 38, 44.

Counterintelligence Programs

Miami Division alerted "Fort Lauderdale News" of Klan and National States Rights Party rally at Vero Beach-Winter Park, Florida, August 29, 1966, and participation of Charles Baker Riddlehoover. Newspaper articles of a negative nature were written regarding the Klan and Riddlehoover.

As a result of unfavorable publicity in newspaper articles, Riddlehoover's organization failed to gain a following and rally at Winter Beach was a failure.

TED: vb
(9)

157-9-29-75, 76

Counterintelligence Programs

Public source information which exposes the Communist Party affiliation of Hunter Pitts O'Dell, a consultant to the field staff of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), was furnished October 19, 1962, to contacts in the news media field in Augusta, Savannah, Charleston, and Atlanta.

The exposure of O'Dell's communist background in newspapers resulted in his resignation from SCLC.

DML:tdp (9)
100-3-104-34-295, 314

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

The Portland Office contacted Richard Ross, News Director, Station KGW-TV, Portland, Oregon, concerning planned arrival in Portland of Hyman Lumer, National Committee member, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), on February 25, 1964. Lumer was to conduct a class in Marxism for CP youth and intended CP members. Ross arranged coverage of Lumer's arrival in Portland.

Lumer was incensed at the attempted interview and photographing of his arrival at the Portland airport. He cursed Richard Ross and swung his briefcase at the photographer. The film clip of Lumer's conduct was shown locally in Portland and subsequently on February 27, 1964, by NBC on the nationally televised Huntley-Brinkley news broadcast.

HPB:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-40-12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

The Cleveland Office furnished questions relating to the background and activities of Frank Wilkinson, Executive Director, National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, and Richard Criley, member of the District Committee, Communist Party of Illinois, for the use on May 18, 1962, when the two were to appear on the Mike Douglas Show on KYW-TV in Cleveland.

Wilkinson was evasive and on the defensive during his appearance. Criley did not appear due to a change in plans.

TJD:cah (9)
100-3-104-11-22

Counterintelligence Programs

FBI contacted Morris Litman of the "Philadelphia Inquirer" to alert him to the background and plans of the Philadelphia branch of the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) and specifically its plans to picket the Democratic National Convention. The point to the contact was to uncover the DCA effort to conceal its Communist Party association. Articles appeared in the July 27 and August 23, 1964, issues of the "Inquirer."

The DCA members admitted "Inquirer" articles hindered their organization efforts and that the articles reduced the number of persons who ultimately traveled to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to picket the convention.

RHR:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-37-146, 163 p. 2

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 14, 1964, Milford Sutherland held a press conference in Seattle, Washington, where he announced his intention to run for Governor of Washington. One hundred nominating signatures were required to be placed in nomination.

On August 5, 1964, Lyle Burt, Reporter, Seattle Times, contacted the Seattle Office for background information regarding Sutherland, which Burt said he would publish in the August 9, 1964, issue of the newspaper. Material relating to Sutherland's Communist Party background was given to Burt. Such an article was published documenting this background information, and on September 4, 1964, Sutherland withdrew his candidacy for Governor. Sutherland blamed the Attorney General's Office, the Secretary of State (California), and the Washington State Supreme Court for dilatory tactics in not making a decision regarding his refusal to sign a loyalty oath.

JWM:dsh
HWP:hp
(9)

100-3-104-50,136,137,141

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 28-30, 1966, a convention of the Northwest District, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) was held at Seattle. The CPUSA intended this convention to be secret.

Confidential sources of the Seattle Office were made aware of this "secret" convention which resulted in considerable newspaper and television publicity given to the event. Additionally, anti-CPUSA leftists and members of the Socialist Worker's Party were invited via an FBI produced invitation. Upon appearing at the convention these people were denied admittance or expelled from the convention, thus bringing the convention into disarray.

Reporter Jack Eddy, KIRO-TV, one of the newsmen confidentially advised of the convention, and his cameraman, were recommended for a raise as a result of their outstanding news coverage of the CPUSA convention and the general manager of the station indicated that he was interested in nominating Eddy's coverage for a Sigma Delta Chi award for excellence in television reporting the next time such awards were to be granted.

JWM:cah (9)
100-3-104-50-199, 200, 201, 202

Counterintelligence Programs

St. Louis Office of FBI furnished to Richard Amberg, Publisher, St. Louis "Globe Democrat," a copy of Law Enforcement Bulletin plus 19 newspaper articles relating to W. E. B. DuBois Club of America (DCA). Information was used to publicize appearance of Herbert Aptheker, theoretician of Communist Party (CP) and member of National Committee CP, before DCA group in St. Louis on February 14, 1965. Publicity in newspapers resulted.

Adverse publicity resulting was assessed by St. Louis Office as having dealt DCA in St. Louis a severe blow.

HPB:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-42-71, 72

Counterintelligence Programs

In November or December, 1965, information regarding a replevin suit filed by Almoreen R. Woods against three Klansmen who took his Klan robes and book from his car after he was thrown out of the Lake Wales Klavern of the United Florida Ku Klux Klan was furnished "anonymously" (method of transmittal unknown) to the "Lakeland Ledger Daily" newspaper.

Klan received bad publicity.

WDF:lfj
(9)

157-9-64-37

Counterintelligence Programs

On April 2, 1969, the Pittsburgh Office furnished information regarding David Owens to Sherley Uhl of the "Pittsburgh Press" newspaper. Owens, a candidate for Pittsburgh City Council and an employee of the Urban League, was arrested March 30, 1969, following a gun battle between Detroit police and members of the Republic of New Africa (RNA). Since Owens was on bond in Pittsburgh following involvement in a shooting incident with Pittsburgh police, it was hoped Uhl's disclosure would cause Owens' bond to be revoked. Also, the Pittsburgh Office furnished this same information to an informant of that office.

Information furnished to Mr. Uhl resulted in unfavorable publicity for Owens as a City Council candidate. The information furnished to the informant resulted in Owens' losing his Urban League job.

JTA: vb
(9)

100-448006-820, 846

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1960, an anonymous letter was mailed to the publisher of the Chicago neighborhood weekly newspaper "Southwest News Herald," which enclosed a copy of a "Chicago Daily Tribune" article dated December 5, 1956, which names Vicki Starr and her husband Ed Starr as communists. Vicki Starr was a candidate for the President of the Parent Teacher Association (PTA) of the Mark Twain Public School in Chicago. The "Southwest News Herald" was a conservative neighborhood newspaper which regularly reported the activities of this PTA. The December 3, 1959, issue carried a photograph of Vicki Starr and described her as vice president of this PTA group.

It was learned from an informant that Vicki Starr was no longer considered a candidate for the position of PTA President.

PWC: vb
(9)

100-3-104-1485, 1497

Counterintelligence Programs

Public source information was furnished to Dennis M. Higgins, special features reporter, "The Philadelphia Inquirer," to expose activities, programs, officers, and true nature of the Philadelphia Social Science Forum Committee (PSSFC), a Communist Party, USA front group. Two articles were prepared to be published about January 17, 1965, and January 24, 1965, in the newspaper. The publications were to bracket a scheduled PSSFC meeting on January 22, 1965.

One article was printed on January 10, 1965. The meeting on January 22, 1965, where Dirk J. Struik spoke attracted 125 persons. Prior meetings with other speakers had attracted 200 persons. A follow-up article appeared on January 23, 1965. Elease Sullivan, a member of the Independent Citizen's Committee, a communist front group, was blamed for furnishing the information to the "Inquirer," which was included in the "Inquirer" article of January 23, 1965.

RHR:vb/jmn
(9)

100-3-104-37-179, 199, 200

Counterintelligence Programs

The National States Rights Party (NSRP), Jackson, Mississippi, intended to use a building located at 188 Longino Street, Jackson, as a meeting hall and in an attempt to organize a new NSRP unit and recruit new members. In May 1970, a letter, purportedly a complaint from a neighbor on Longino Street that Number 188 was being used in violation of residential zoning laws, was mailed by the Jackson Office to the "Jackson Daily News 'Jack Sunn'" column. The letter pointed out that Number 188 had been used for a meeting on April 26, 1970.

On June 1, 1970, the letter appeared in the "Jackson Daily News." Although the precise results were unknown, no further public meetings were held by the NSRP at 188 Longino Street.

The NSRP was organized in 1957 in Knoxville, Tennessee, and through propaganda promotes hatred of Jews, Negroes, Communists, and certain law enforcement agencies.

HWP:hp
(9)

157-9-54, 66, 67, 69

Counterintelligence Programs

An article prepared at FBI Headquarters concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., being the keynote speaker at a fund-raising activity sponsored by the Communist Party-controlled Freedomways Associates, publishers of the magazine "Freedomways," on February 23, 1968, was released to the mass media prior to the date of the speech.

Article appeared in "The Birmingham News," Birmingham, Alabama, on March 7, 1968, and March 10, 1968, which set forth King's Communist Party connections in the past and updated his connections with the "Freedomways" magazine.

KAM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-34-1661, 1662, 1671

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia Office furnished public source information to Ivan Scott, announcer for radio station WIP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, prior to March 31, 1962, depicting the true facts in regard to Morton Sobell's trial and conviction for Conspiracy to Commit Espionage in effort to counteract propaganda being spread by the communists. Scott interviewed several pickets during a demonstration on March 31, 1962, sponsored by the Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell at Philadelphia and asked if they were communists.

Tapes made during interviews were played on news broadcast March 31, 1962, and portion used was to the disadvantage of the National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell and the Philadelphia Sobell Committee. It was felt questions by Scott may have the effect of curtailing future picket activities of the Sobell Committee.

KAM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-37-21
100-387835-2877

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1968, the St. Louis Office confidentially advised Mr. George Killenkey, Associate Editor of the "St. Louis Globe-Democrat," that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in St. Louis announced an intention to make inroads into area high schools. Newspaper articles concerning SDS appeared in the "St. Louis Globe-Democrat."

As a result of the newspaper articles, Lindbergh High School cancelled an SDS speaking engagement. It also resulted in countering further SDS attempts to make inroads into that school.

TCD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-42-5

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 13, 1964, Henry Winston, Vice Chairman, Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA), was scheduled to appear on radio station WBZ in Boston. Prior thereto, the Boston Office contacted WBZ officials in an effort to have Winston's appearance cancelled.

The June 13, 1964, radio appearance of Winston's was cancelled.

LEB:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-34-776 and 808

Counterintelligence Programs

In June, 1966, Los Angeles Division made anonymous telephone calls to major newspapers in the Los Angeles area to alert them to an upcoming Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA) District Convention to be held in the Los Angeles area.

Because of resultant press coverage, some sessions of the Convention were cancelled.

JPM:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-26-249

Counterintelligence Programs

During August, 1963, a Cleveland informant advised that Frank Wilkinson, Executive Director of the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee (NCAHUAC), was scheduled to speak at the Unitarian Society in Cleveland, Ohio, on October 13, 1963. The Cleveland Office recommended furnishing "The Plain Dealer" newspaper, Cleveland, Ohio, and "The Youngstown Vindicator" newspaper, Youngstown, Ohio, with the following public source information regarding Frank Wilkinson and the NCAHUAC:

1. Citizens for Constitutional Rights (CCR) letter dated August 1, 1963, which announced Wilkinson's appearance October 13, 1963, at above meeting.

2. News article "House Quiz Opposed by Visitor Here" from the May 19, 1962, issue of "The Plain Dealer."

3. Citation of the NCAHUAC contained in the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" prepared by the HUAC.

The October 11, 1963, issue of "The Youngstown Vindicator" carried an article announcing two Wilkinson appearances.

The October 14, 1963, issue of "The Plain Dealer" contained an article captioned "Racism Charged to House Unit" concerning the above-noted Wilkinson appearance. The article noted that a 20-second scuffle occurred when Mrs. Leta M. Wood of the Organization to Fight Communism demanded to know why Wilkinson had not mentioned that he had served time in Federal prison in a contempt of Congress case. Mrs. Wood and three supporters then left the meeting which apparently continued.

TEB:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-11-108, 117

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1961, a note with a photostat copy of an article appearing in the May 5, 1954, issue of the Detroit Free Press was sent to Mr. James C. McGahey, President of the United Plant Guard Workers of America. This article alluded that Ann Sargent Crowe, an employee of Mr. McGahey, had communist affiliations.

On April 22, 1963, Ann Crowe resigned as Secretary for the United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 13722 Linwood, Detroit, Michigan. On May 13, 1963, Mr. James C. McGahey advised that because of information he had obtained concerning Ann Crowe's subversive background, he had instituted an investigation of this individual. He further advised that he felt that as a result of this investigation, somewhere along the line word got back to Ann Crowe that she would be dismissed and that he was going to take the matter up with the Executive Board of the Union and this precipitated her voluntary resignation. Mr. McGahey stated that Ann Crowe's last day of employment at the Union was Friday, May 3, 1963.

PWC:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-15-2
100-372282-34

SECRET

Counterintelligence Program

In February, 1964, the New York Office discreetly informed particular newspaper representatives that Bayard Rustin, civil rights leader who was in the forefront of a boycott of New York City schools, was to attend a cocktail party at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations on February 4, 1964.

Considerable unfavorable publicity concerning Rustin resulted.

RDS:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-34-599

Counterintelligence Programs

The Atlanta Division furnished written material intended to expose and ridicule the Klans in the South to Ralph McGill, of "The Atlanta Constitution" who in turn passed on this material, without disclosing source, to Hal Martin for utilization in article to appear in the "Saturday Evening Post."

This information was also utilized in part by Ralph McGill who published two articles containing unfavorable publicity regarding Klan activities. Articles appeared in "The Atlanta Constitution."

TED:ekw
(9)
157-9-2-4, 7, 12

Counterintelligence Programs

Herbert Aptheker, member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, was invited to speak at Ohio State University on May 21, 1965, by a newly formed student group to challenge an earlier ruling by the University denying an earlier scheduled appearance by the communist leader. Public source data on Aptheker was furnished local news sources and college officials were given a letter from the National Economic Council, Incorporated, which argued against campus appearances by communists.

Aptheker appeared, but sat silently while other persons read selections of his writings.

TJD:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-10-11, 12, 13

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1966, the "Chicago Daily News" newspaper was furnished information regarding the ownership of an apartment building in a slum area by Claude Lightfoot, Chairman of the Illinois Communist Party. The building was in the area of Martin Luther King's headquarters for a slum clearance drive.

Newspaper articles about Lightfoot's ownership of a "rat-infested slum" appeared in Chicago on May 2-3, 1966, and the Party official was ordered to appear before the Compliance Board of Building Commissioners in Chicago.

TJD: vb
(9)

100-3-104-9-560, 561, 562

Counterintelligence Programs

Richard Henry, one of the leaders of The Republic of New Africa (RNA) appeared in Jackson, Mississippi, during early July, 1970, and proposed that a conference of the RNA be held in Jackson, Mississippi, during the period July 31 to August 1, 1970. Henry made several contacts with legitimate Negro figures regarding a possible site for the conference.

The Jackson Office made available to Jimmy Ward, Editor, Jackson Daily News, Jackson, Mississippi, public-type information available regarding the RNA, showing involvement of its members in violence or in situations showing them in an unfavorable light.

The evening before the scheduled RNA conference in Jackson, Mississippi, the Jackson Daily News printed articles exposing the RNA's violent objectives. The articles caused local black leaders to withdraw their support of the RNA conference, the scheduled agenda for the conference had to be shelved and the conference dealt entirely with criticism of the RNA's violent objectives. One local black group denied the RNA the use of its facilities to hold meetings due to their history of violence as exposed in the newspaper.

EFG:dsh
(9)

100-448006-1893
157-9079-980

Counterintelligence Programs

On August 14, 1970, the Pittsburgh Office confidentially advised Sherley Uhl, "Pittsburgh Press," Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that the Peace and Freedom Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in cooperation with both legitimate and subversive organizations, was sponsoring an Ohio Valley Regional Coalition Conference. It was emphasized to him that certain sponsoring organizations were subversive and/or extremist in nature.

Mr. Uhl prepared an article on the conference which appeared in the August 14, 1970, issue of the "Pittsburgh Press." Two follow-up articles also appeared in the "Pittsburgh Press." The conference received unfavorable publicity and some disruption occurred during the conference.

TCD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-39-18, 19

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 16, 1960, the Chicago Office was authorized to advise reporters of the "Chicago Tribune" of forthcoming meeting of the Communist Party, USA, to be held September 17-18, 1960, to be attended by well-known communist figures Carl Winter, Sam Kushner and others.

On September 18, 1960, "Chicago Tribune" reporter "Sandy" Smith and two photographers caused extensive consternation when they tried to interview the attendees. The September 19, 1960, "Chicago Tribune" had article captioned "20 Top Reds Hold Secret Talks Here," sub-captioned "Parley is Linked to Nikita Visit."

JDP:tdp (9)
100-3-104-1920, 1929

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

Detroit Office called the "Detroit Times," "Detroit News," and the "Detroit Free Press," local newspaper publications, advising them the Global Books Forum was sponsoring a lecture with Harvey O'Connor as the featured speaker to be held October 21, 1960, at Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan. They were asked whether the newspapers could comment in view of their interest and Wayne State University's policy of not allowing communist organizations the use of any of its campus buildings. They all replied they had no knowledge of this situation, whereupon the telephone calls were immediately terminated.

Shortly after the placing of the anonymous telephone calls, Mr. Homer Strong, Director of McGregor Conference Center, Wayne State University, and Director of Alumni Relations, Wayne State University, telephonically contacted the Detroit Office. He advised the University had been approached by the "Detroit Times" newspaper and asked if the scheduled lecture for October 21, 1960, was a communist meeting. Mr. Strong pointed out that a check of "Who's Who in America" determined that Harvey O'Connor was listed as an author and to have been connected with a number of "anti-organizations" and "civil rights groups."

The speech appearance was cancelled by officers of Wayne State University. The cancellation caused consternation amongst the Communist Party (CP), which was sponsoring the meeting, and Helen Winter, CP Headquarters, sought an injunction. Wayne Circuit Judge George E. Bowles granted the injunction and ordered Wayne State University to permit the meeting. The meeting was held October 21, 1960, at Wayne State University and about 100 persons attended.

Helen Winter, supra, subsequently quit her job at the Weldwire Company, 3341 Puritan, Detroit, Michigan, reportedly because the adverse newspaper publicity was too much for her and she felt she would be fired anyway.

JDM:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-2036, 2037

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 3, 1969, FBIHQ furnished Miami Office copies of the Director's testimony on the Nation of Islam (NOI) group given before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on February 10, 1966, February 16, 1967, and February 23, 1968, and a copy of a statement by the Director before the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, September 18, 1969, which sets out information on the NOI on page 9. These items were to be furnished Gene Strul, News Director of WCK-TV, Miami, Florida, for use of that station's expose of the NOI.

The documentary expose was shown at 9:30 p.m., October 9, 1969, to an audience rating of in excess of 200,000 persons. It showed the NOI leaders to be of questionable character and living in luxury through the large amount of money taken as contributions from their membership. The extreme nature of NOI teachings was underscored. As a result, NOI leaders displayed concern and attempted to rebut the program at each opening meeting of the NOI (per Bureau source).

Attendance by visitors at weekly NOI meetings reportedly dropped 50 percent subsequent to this expose.

PEN: vb
(9)

100-448006-1256, 1381, 1382, 1650

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1967, the Miami Office furnished newspaper articles to television station WCKT-TV regarding bombings and firebombings. Some individuals involved in the firebombings and bombings were Klansmen and were identified as such in the newspaper articles.

The articles were used in an expose concerning the Klan aired October 22, 1967, by WCKT-TV, Miami, Florida, entitled "KKK - A Change of Linen."

The expose resulted in disruption in the Florida Klan and lack of success in Klan recruiting.

WDF: vb
(9)

157-9-29-166, 170, 171

Counterintelligence Programs

Between February and April, 1969, the Miami Office furnished a number of items or topics which could be explored by Managing Editor, Mr. Milt Kelly, "Ft. Lauderdale News" in a follow-up news article concerning Klan activity in Broward County, Florida.

A two-article series was published in the "Ft. Lauderdale News" which ridiculed Klan secrecy. Two Klansmen, Robert Quarterman and Jack Mavro, resigned as a result of the articles being published. Dissension and suspicion were created within the Klan.

WDF:tdp (9)
157-9-29-206, 210

Counterintelligence Programs

Anonymous letters were mailed to Marion L. Huit, Dean of the Office of Student Affairs, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, and the "Daily Iowan," student newspaper at the State University of Iowa on October 19, 1962, indicating Frank Wilkinson, who was described as having been identified as a Communist Party member in California during House Committee on Un-American Activities hearings in 1958 and had served a prison sentence for contempt of Congress, was to speak at the college on October 22, 1962.

The "Daily Iowan" published an article subsequent to Wilkinson's appearance on the campus in which it was pointed out he had served a prison sentence for contempt of Congress, which information, according to the article, had been determined during an interview of Wilkinson by the paper.

KAM:bmf/lm
(9)

100-3-104-36-1, 2, 3, 4

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1967, Boston Office furnished to confidential sources at WBZ-TV, Boston, Massachusetts, public source data regarding communist background and/or connection with the communist movement of the following organizations: Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), Communist Party (CP), and the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA). WBZ-TV made a television documentary which presented an in-depth television study of campus radicalism in the metropolitan Boston area. The public source data was used by WBZ-TV to show the connection between the SWP and the YSA, the CP and the DCA and other groups, showing that the preparations for "Vietnam Week" were formulated with the connivance and aid of representatives from these groups.

WBZ-TV received numerous favorable comments concerning the television documentary, and the image of the aforementioned groups was damaged.

RDS:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-5-228, 229

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 20, 1969, the Jackson Office prepared a fictitious signature letter exposing the Nation of Islam (NOI) as an organization bleeding its members of money and preaching segregation of races. This letter was sent to the "Jackson Daily News" for use in the "Jack Sunn" column. Immediately after mailing the letter, Jackson Office Agents contacted Editor Jimmy Ward to advise him that Agents had learned a relative of a Muslim had sent some type of letter to the newspaper critical of the NOI, and Ward was requested to contact the Jackson Office when the letter was received so Agents could prepare an appropriate response to be published with the letter in Ward's regular column which aired complaints and gave advice. There is no indication Ward was aware that the fictitious letter originated with the Jackson Office.

On receipt of the letter, Ward notified the Jackson Office and the response was printed in the "Jack Sunn" column, following preparation of same by the Jackson Office. The article was then mailed by the Jackson Office to Elijah Muhammad, "Muhammad Speaks" newspaper, and Muhammad's Mosque Number Two, all in Chicago. Shortly after the article appeared in the "Jackson Daily News," the Jackson NOI group was told by persons responsible for allowing NOI use of a particular building for meetings that the building could no longer be used for weekly NOI meetings. The persons responsible for allowing building use are not identified.

JPG:HWP:tdp (9)
100-448006, 1354, 1380, 1486

Counterintelligence Programs

Warden Woodland, Editor of the "Los Angeles Examiner" was furnished a list of possible questions to be used for the purpose of interviewing Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, National Chairman of the Communist Party, USA during a press interview on May 4, 1961.

Questions asked of Flynn during the press conference succeeded in frustrating her and seemed to embarrass her, keeping her from using the conference to propagandize.

JDM:cah (9)
100-3-104-2571

74

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1970, the Miami Office furnished information to Milt Kelly, Managing Editor, "Fort Lauderdale News," regarding the arrest of Reverend Armand James Chandonnet, a local klansman. He was furnished information regarding Chandonnet's being charged with forgery and misappropriating church funds.

As a result of this information, articles appeared in the "Fort Lauderdale News" on May 27, 1970, and on June 1, 1970, exposing the situation, and thereafter, dissension between two klan chapters was intensified; at least five klan members resigned and Klavern (Chapter) #108 was dissolved.

WDF:lfj
(9)

157-9-29-222, 223

3

Counterintelligence Programs

Three informants of the Cleveland Office associated with the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (WEBDCA) were approved November 10, 1965, for use in an attempt to discredit Ted Cohen, Midwest Organizer of the communist youth group. The effort was to bring to the attention of Phil Bart, Ohio Communist Party Chairman, Cohen's questionable management of funds and his personal insults toward Bart. The aforementioned informants then commenced to bring Cohen's shortcomings to Bart's attention.

Subsequently on December 3, 1965, Bart advised one of the informants that Cohen had been removed from his position as Midwest Organizer of the WEBDCA because of his questionable financial manipulations, his inefficient methods of operation and his promiscuity.

TEB:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-11-241, 248

Counterintelligence Programs

In order to cause an increase in factionalism among the Communist Party (CP) membership in Philadelphia, in March, 1965, an informant was directed to suggest to Aaron Libson, youth leader of the CP in Philadelphia, that Francis (sic) Gabow, District CP Board member, be forced to take a six-month leave of absence for health reasons. Gabow was critical of Libson (and vice-versa) but had been previously ordered by her doctor to have bed rest because of a nervous condition. It was hoped that Gabow would be forced from CP work because of this and/or resent Libson's effort.

Gabow tendered her resignation from all positions of leadership in the CP Eastern Pennsylvania District on May 4, 1965.

RHR:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-37-207, PH airtel, 5/12/65 (original filed in 100-3-69-10441)

Counterintelligence Programs

During January, 1965, Communist Party (CP) informants of the FBI in Seattle, Washington, area were instructed to contact Henry Huff, an influential CP member and former Smith Act subject, to express dissatisfaction with Fred Sandborg, a member of the CP in Seattle. Sandborg was known to criticize his CP club leadership and to be disliked by Huff. Sandborg was a strong financial supporter of the CP and it was hoped to oust him from the CP.

Formal CP criticism of Sandborg was made by the leadership, but he was not ousted. He complained about his being criticized. Huff was also criticized by the leadership. Huff and Sandborg continued hostility toward each other which caused tension within their CP club.

HPB:vb
(9)

100-3-104-50-162, 171

Counterintelligence Programs

The Tampa Office, during 1969, directed an informant to oppose the klan activities of Norman Bennett Carter, a newly reactivated member of the Melbourne, Florida, Klavern of the Knights of the Invisible Empire.

As a result of the informant's efforts, Carter left the klavern and joined another group.

RLL:bmf
(9)

157-9-64-141

Counterintelligence Programs

During 1968, the Students For a Democratic Society (SDS) Chapter at California State College was factionalized. The Los Angeles Office directed informants to attempt to widen the breech between the groups by implying that Robert Ray, head of the SDS Chapter, was using SDS funds to support his drug habit and that Delfin Lugo, an active SDS member, had used SDS funds for his own use while he had been treasurer of the Chapter. Although Ray, according to one informant, was a heavy drug user, we are unable to verify whether he or Lugo actually misappropriated SDS funds.

At subsequent SDS meetings, there were fist fights between the groups, thus disrupting the meetings. Additionally, members of one faction made threatening early morning phone calls to members of the other faction if they showed up at the meetings. Robert Ray was eventually discredited and replaced as Chairman of the SDS Unit.

RLL: vb
(9)

100-449698-26-17, 27

Counterintelligence Programs

In June, 1968, an informant in the San Diego, California, area, who was a Communist Party (CP) member, claimed to have been offended by Ben Dobbs, Executive Secretary of Southern California CP, who was running for state-wide office. The informant, a black, claimed to have been ignored by Dobbs and raised the issue that he engaged in discrimination against blacks in Southern California District CP. The claim was made at a Southern California District CP Negro Commission meeting, and a tape recording made of the meeting.

Dobbs apologized to the informant. The above tape recording was played to the CP District Board members and caused internal dissension between Board members. Some maintained the taped meeting was designed to discredit Dobbs and was staged by Board member Bill Taylor. Taylor, in turn, was angry at the other Board members.

HPB:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-4, 5, 6, 7

Counterintelligence Programs

In October or November, 1966, the Miami Office made it known to the Ku Klux Klan in Okeechobee, Florida, through an informant, that James W. Crawford had a felony conviction. Crawford was thereafter voted out of the Klan for this reason on November 30, 1966.

WDF:tdp (9)
157-9-29-95-106

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 26, 1968, FBIHQ approved plan by Tampa Office to have informants attend a State Officers' meeting of the Knights of the Invisible Empire (KOIE) on August 2, 1968, to vote for removal of Bill Richardson, Grand Dragon, KOIE. Action suggested following a recent arrest of Richardson for arson.

This action isolated Richardson's influence and reduced his effectiveness.

JTA:vb
(9)

157-9-64-128, 130

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 25, 1967, FBI Headquarters approved recommendation that an informant of the Tampa Office attempt to buildup antagonism toward Edward R. Jones, Exalted Cyclops of the Orlando, Florida, Klavern, United Klans of America, Incorporated, (UKA), Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in efforts to have him removed from that position. This action followed an unsuccessful Klan rally held May 13, 1967, which Jones organized.

On May 10, 1967, it was reported that Jones resigned from the Klan as a result of antagonism within the Orlando Klavern.

JTA:tdp (9)
157-9-64-97, 106

Counterintelligence Programs

In September, 1966, George Judd, Director of Safety and Security, Great Lakes Steel Corporation, Ecorse, Michigan, advised that Joseph Kransdorf was on sick leave from August 26, 1966, to September 13, 1966, and that he had presented a certificate from a doctor in New York when he returned to work. Joseph Kransdorf was a member of the Youth Group of the Michigan District Communist Party and son of a leading national functionary of the Communist Party, USA. The sick leave was during the same period as a Communist Party, USA Youth School at Camp Webatuck, New York. Judd was furnished newspaper articles concerning the camp. A letter was sent by Great Lakes Steel Corporation to the doctor who responded that he did not examine Kransdorf.

In October, 1966, Kransdorf was given a ten day suspension from his employment for fraudulently obtaining sick leave. His address at that time was 12963 Woodward, Highland Park, Michigan.

JCF:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-15-274, 282, 286, 299

Counterintelligence Programs

The Little Rock Office directed anonymous letters to the employers of members of the Forrest City Klavern of the United Klans of America in which were enclosed copies of an article dated September 24, 1970, which appeared in "The Arkansas Gazette," a Little Rock daily newspaper, concerning the arrest of klavern members at Parkin, Arkansas. Thirteen individuals were arrested for nightriding and other charges.

Amos and Leonard Holland were discharged from their employment with Tom's Peanut Company. Sam Littlejohn was discharged from his employment with the DX Oil Company. The employer of Steven Golden advised Forrest City Resident Agency he was curtailing the activities of Steve Golden which would cause embarrassment to the employer.

TED:lfj
(9)

157-9-25-47, 49, 51
157-370-25-66

Counterintelligence Programs

Memphis Division forwarded anonymous letter to headquarters of Kimberly-Clark Company concerning efforts of Clinton Eugene Daniel, an employee of Kimberly-Clark in Memphis, to recruit Klan members at the company's Memphis operation.

Daniel was placed on a predominantly night shift shortly after anonymous letter was sent. This prevented Daniel from attending local Klan meetings which were held in the evenings and Daniel was expelled from Klan for nonattendance of Klavern meetings.

TED:dsh
(9)

157-9-28-22, 28

Counterintelligence Programs

During the Summer of 1967, William Virgil Fowler, State Chairman and Honorary State Cyclops of the California Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (KKKK), departed the Los Angeles area leaving behind unpaid debts. Fowler moved to Stone Mountain, Georgia. The Los Angeles Office subsequently arranged to have letters, purportedly over the signature of Fowler, sent to his creditors instructing them to forward unpaid bills to James R. Venable, a Klan leader, for payment.

As a result of the above letters, a split developed between Fowler and Venable, and Venable reported that Fowler was no longer affiliated with the KKK, but had moved to Florida.

TJS:dsh
(9)

157-9-26-31, 32, 33, 36

Counterintelligence Program.

Authority granted November 18, 1960, for Los Angeles Office to advise Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) official at Burbank, California, by anonymous telephone call that YMCA part-time assistant instructor Richard Lund is a communist, as is his wife Nancy Rosenfeld Lund, citing testimony before House Committee on Un-American Activities as source.

On January 9, 1961, it was determined Lund's employment had been terminated at the request of the YMCA Personnel Committee.

JDM:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-2029
100-3-104-2154
100-3-104-2209

Counterintelligence Programs

The Cincinnati Office advised on March 19, 1969, that Reverend Augustus Taylor, Steubenville, Ohio, had visited Huey Newton, Black Panther Party (BPP) leader, and as a result wrote an article favorable to Newton published in the "National Catholic Reporter." Since Taylor had a regular television show on WSTV-TV, Steubenville, Ohio, to air his black nationalist views, FBI Headquarters approved on March 28, 1969, that an anonymous letter be mailed to WSTV-TV criticizing Taylor and revealing that his article had been reprinted in the BPP newspaper.

On May 15, 1969, Cincinnati advised that Father Mitchell Wilamoski, Principal of Catholic Central High School, Steubenville, Ohio, disclosed on April 9, 1969, that at a meeting at the Bishop's Office it was decided Reverend Taylor could no longer continue his Sunday television program. The Bishop had given Reverend Taylor a job requiring constant travel and was considering a transfer for Taylor.

JTA:lfj
(9)

100-448006-785, 876, 923

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 25, 1969, the Washington Field Office confidentially advised a source at First Virginia Finance Plan, Inc., 2924 Columbia Pike, Arlington, Virginia, of the location of the car of Dorothy Jean McQueen Hughes, secretary to Stokely Carmichael, a well-known black extremist. Hughes was three months in arrears on her car payments.

The car was repossessed on March 2, 1969.

VRT: vb
(9)

100-448006-686, 737

Counterintelligence Programs

On March 13, 1969, the Miami Office mailed an anonymous letter, containing true facts, to Elijah Muhammad, national leader of the Nation of Islam (NOI), Chicago, Illinois, advising him of extramarital activities of Earl King, Minister of Mosque 29, Miami, Florida.

The Minister was removed from his position, but remained in Miami as a rank-and-file member of the NOI.

VRT: vb
(9)

100-448006-681, 824

Counterintelligence Programs

During June, 1969, Mr. Patrick Poulte, Poulte Realty Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan, was contacted by the Detroit FBI Office and confidentially furnished public source information concerning the Radical Education Project (REP), which is the educational arm of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), in that REP had office space in a building owned by Mr. Poulte.

REP offices were vacated on about July 1, 1969, when they were unable to secure extensions on their lease.

ELS:bmf/lfj
(9)

100-449698-26, 28

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 11, 1964, Kenneth S. Smith, Treasurer of the University Circle Development Foundation, Incorporated, Cleveland, Ohio, advised that Michael Cooperman was employed as a Community Relations Coordinator with the above organization. This information was developed apparently during the course of FBI investigation concerning Cooperman's subversive background. Mr. Smith advised he was concerned about Cooperman's background.

FBIHQ approved Cleveland's recommendation to confidentially furnish Mr. Smith "lead" information for his assistance in verifying Cooperman's background.

On July 27, 1964, Cooperman appeared at the Cleveland FBI Office and stated he wished "to set record straight." He stated that in the past he had been contacted by FBI Agents at which time he had not been fully cooperative. He wanted to now advise the FBI that he no longer believed in communism or the Communist Party (CP) and had nothing to do with communists for the past five years. When asked what prompted his visit at this time, he stated that Oliver Brooks, Vice President of the University Circle Development Foundation, had requested his resignation effective October 1, 1964. Cooperman added the reason given by Brooks was that it had come to their attention that Cooperman, in the past, had used an assumed name. Cooperman admitted to Brooks that this was so and Brooks then went on to explain that the Foundation, which was attempting to raise a large sum of money, could not risk unfavorable publicity as the result of the activities of employees.

Cooperman said he was considering accepting one of several other employments available to him and in this connection he was attempting to make it known in appropriate circles that he had been disassociated from the CP for many years.

TEB: vb
(9)

100-3-104-11-156, 157, 168

Counterintelligence Programs

On December 5, 1966, W. G. O'Neal, Chief Investigator, North Carolina State Insurance Department, was confidentially contacted by the Charlotte Office about an insurance program, the Widows Benevolent Fund, being administered by J. R. Jones, Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in North Carolina. The insurance program was set up in February, 1966, and certain apparent discrepancies in management were noted. The FBI action was an attempt to deny the KKK a source of funds.

On October 29, 1967, the N.C. Insurance Commission, following examination of Jones' books and procedures in handling the fund, decided the fund would be terminated. At termination, there was reportedly $3,800 in the treasury, with $1,000 to be paid to each of three widows.

HWP:hp
(9)

157-9-8, 55, 57, 59, 64, 70, 73, 116, 122, 135

Counterintelligence Programs

In August, 1964, Mrs. C. P. Kandahl, Seattle Ski Club, was contacted in order to have her deny use of Seattle Ski Club site at Snoqualmie Pass, Washington, to members of the Young Political Explorers League (YPEL), a Communist Party (CP) front, for use as a summer camp. YPEL had arranged camp rental under guise of using camp for underprivileged children. Mary Sutherland, wife of District CP Organizational Secretary, Milford Sutherland, was advised that camp's water system had broken down; therefore, the camp could not be held.

JWM:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-50, 134, 135, 138

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 14, 1966, the Richmond Office of the FBI mailed anonymous letters to six individuals who were financial contributors to the American Nazi Party (ANP), telling them to discontinue contributing to the ANP because the Federal Government would probably obtain their names and harass the contributors in the same manner the Government is harassing the ANP.

Subsequent to the above mailing, George Lincoln Rockwell, national leader of the ANP, claimed that Karl Allen of the White Party of America was trying to force him out of business by writing the above-mentioned letters. Rockwell considered suing Allen in this matter. Allen formerly worked for Rockwell in the ANP office and left to form his own group.

LEB:lfj
(9)

157-9-41-19X, 42

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 16, 1970, the San Francisco Office contacted Fred Green, manager, Hunters Point Housing Project, concerning activities of the Black Panther Party (BPP) within the project. During this contact with Green it was mentioned that Apartment 304 in the housing project rented for occupancy by a woman on welfare and her two children had become a BPP Community Center. It was further noted that the windows of the apartment were covered with large BPP posters and that several Housing Authority rules regarding occupancy of this apartment were being violated.

On October 21, 1970, Green advised that he had been able to evict the members of the BPP from Apartment 304 and that all BPP posters had been removed. The woman and children were not evicted since their name was on the lease.

EFG:ekw
(9)
100-448006-1835, 2020

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 27, 1966, the Richmond Office sent an anonymous letter to businessmen in Amelia, Virginia, critical of the Ku Klux Klan and its disagreements with the Amelia Dress Company, a new dress manufacturing plant which was having to lay off a small number of employees. Several Klan "throw aways" entitled "The Ku Klux Klan is watching you" had been sent to the plant superintendent and had caused concern in the town that the plant might move away from Amelia.

The anonymous letter sent to the businessmen by the Richmond Office united businessmen against the Klan and subsequently caused disruption within the Klan.

WDF:lek (9)
157-9-41-57, 72, 81

Counterintelligence Programs

The Indianapolis Division determined in late 1969 that the Indianapolis Black Panther Party (BPP) Chapter owed the Indiana Bell Telephone Company for several months of telephone service.

Unknown representative of the Indiana Bell Telephone Company was encouraged to remove the telephone service from BPP headquarters. Telephone service was cut off at the BPP office on or about September 15, 1969.

PEN

PEN:tdp (9)
100-448006-1116, 1271, 1310

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 2, 1962, the Cleveland Office alerted the Ohio Savings Bank to the fact that Jack Kling, Chicago editor of the Jewish-language communist newspaper, "Morning Freiheit," was to speak at the bank's auditorium on May 4, 1962.

Permission to use the auditorium was withdrawn on May 3, 1962, necessitating finding an alternate site on one day's notice.

TJD: vb
(9)

100-3-104-11-20, 21

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 30, 1965, Joseph Corley, Manager, Seth Boyden Terrace, a public housing project, Newark, New Jersey, was furnished public source material concerning the communist background of Harry Bloksberg, a resident of Seth Boyden Terrace, who had requested permission from Corley to organize a club among the teen-agers of the Terrace. It was believed the purpose of the club was to indoctrinate youth in Marxism.

Corley, when furnished the public source information, advised he would not permit Bloksberg to organize the club.

DML: vb
(9)

100-3-104-31-345, 341

Counterintelligence Programs

On August 29, 1969, FBIHQ authorized the Milwaukee Division to anonymously mail copies of articles, furnished that office previously, from issues of the Black Panther Party's (BPP) newspaper, showing hatred of the white man by the black community as advocated by the BPP, to various churches and main offices of grocery stores which were involved or might become involved in contributing to the BPP's Breakfast For Children Program.

In subsequent interview with Kenneth Berry of the Godfrey Company, Waukesha, Wisconsin, which handled Sentry Food Stores in the Milwaukee area, it was learned he had been approached by members of the BPP regarding contributions to the Breakfast program. The request was turned down as a result of the above mailings. Berry indicated that other chain stores had done the same thing.

PEN: vb
(9)

100-448006-1244, 1499

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 9, 1969, the New York Office contacted United Air Lines (UAL)-Air Freight Division, New York, International Airport, Jamaica, New York, and advised that the Black Panther Party (BPP) was shipping its newspapers via air on a weekly basis. UAL was charging BPP the general rate for printed matter. However, after UAL officials were alerted to the contents of the BPP shipments, the UAL began charging the BPP newspaper freight rates.

The additional shipping costs to the BPP, New York, amounted to between $225 to $300 per week. UAL also advised they were considering a suit for recovery of the difference in freight tariff collected for the past six to eight months from the New York BPP. It was estimated that this difference would be in excess of $10,000.

EFG:cah (9)
100-448006-1376, 1377

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1965, a mimeographed leaflet was circulated exposing the "Labor Press Spring Bazaar" to be held at the Jewish Music Center, 14868 Schafer, Detroit, Michigan, on March 20-21, 1965, as a front effort by the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), in Michigan to raise funds for a financially beleaguered communist newspaper. Also in February, 1965, an anonymous letter enclosing newspaper advertisement on the spring bazaar was sent to patriotic veterans organizations in Detroit area, protesting this communist endeavor and calling for these groups to stop this function.

This bazaar was cancelled by owners of the building where it was to be held as a result of floods of protests.

PWC:dew
(9)

100-3-104-15-158, 162, 164

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 21, 1965, the Dalsemer Real Estate Company, specifically Ben Powdermaker and Dick Dalsemer, were contacted regarding recent vandalism damage, i.e., two windows broken by unknown persons, incurred by a building owned by them at 3260 North Broad Street, Philadelphia, and rented by the Philadelphia Chapter of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA). They were advised that such damage might continue because of friction in the neighborhood if the DCA continued to rent the building. The desired result was to have the month-by-month lease terminated.

The owners required DCA to pay $85.00 for the broken windows which was done in November, 1965. DCA was notified by Dick Dalsemer of eviction to be effective December 30, 1965. DCA was evicted on December 31, 1965.

RHR: vb
(9)

100-3-104-37-264, 267, 269, 294, 304

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1964, an anonymous letter was sent to Mary Urbant, operator of Beachnut Grove Picnic Grounds, 6166 Middlebelt Road, Romulus Township, Michigan, indicating that it was well known among neighbors that she rents grounds to Communist Party (CP) members. This was an effort to disrupt the communist picnic scheduled to be held on May 30, 1964.

Mrs. Urbant refused to allow the planned communist picnic.

PWC:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-15-118

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 14, 1965, the Charlotte Office confidentially alerted W. G. O'Neal, Chief Investigator, North Carolina State Insurance Department, that the United Klans of America (UKA), Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, through Marshall Kornegay, a member, was promoting a group health insurance plan for members of the UKA. O'Neal agreed to have his Department investigate the plan to determine if it met state requirements.

On June 3, 1965, Mr. O'Neal contacted the FBI to advise the above insurance plan, issued by the International Life and Accident Insurance Company, Wilmington, North Carolina, had been transferred to the Life Insurance Company of Florida, Miami, Florida, as this company had bought the former insurer. Following inquiries at the new company, which learned of the UKA association with the health plan, the health program was cancelled.

HWP:ekw
(9)
157-9-8, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 19

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 24, 1969, San Diego Office placed a fictitious name phone call to Norman Kay of the Cabrillo Realty Company, San Diego, California, the personal representative of Henry E. Jackson, Jr., owner of the building at 6181 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, California, which was being used by the black extremist US organization as its meeting place. The caller, using the name T. E. Ellis, complained of activities being conducted at the above address and expressed fear for the safety of himself and his family. Caller also demanded something be done to control the US group or to effect its eviction.

Mr. Kay appeared surprised and disturbed over receipt of the complaint and the activities at the Imperial Avenue address.

The following day, July 25, 1969, US was evicted from the address at 6181 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, California.

PEN:cah (9)
100-448006-1174, 1179

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 19, 1968, Mr. L. B. Egenberger, Supervisor of Security, Illinois Bell Telephone Company (IBT), Chicago, Illinois, was contacted by the Chicago FBI Office for the purpose of ascertaining if all telephone service to the Chicago Office of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) could be discontinued in view of telephone charges that were unpaid by NMC.

On July 19, 1968, Mr. Egenberger was contacted and, at this time, he advised that the NMC had made a deposit of $850.00 for use of the Wide Area Telecommunications System (WATS), which would not be returned and in addition, there were charges outstanding in the amount of $2,167.00 for WATS service. Mr. Egenberger stated the NMC's WATS service was being terminated in view of excessive, outstanding charges. NMC's regular telephone service was not discontinued.

ELS: vb
(9)

100-449698-9-7, 11

Counterintelligence Programs

On 1/27/65 the Birmingham Office made anonymous mailings to fifteen Negro churches identifying Carl Ridout, Manager of Ensley Finance Company, Inc., Birmingham, as a member of the National Executive Committee of the National States Rights Party. Ridout was then transferred to the Fairfield Finance Company, 5011 Gary Avenue, Birmingham, which was under same ownership as Ensley Finance Company. Fifteen letters were then anonymously mailed to Negro churches identifying Ridout as Manager of the Fairfield Finance Company and also a member of the National Executive Committee of the National States Rights Party.

Ridout was subsequently fired but we are unable to determine if this was a direct result of the Counterintelligence Program activities.

The National States Rights Party is a white hate group that has been involved in violent activities directed toward minority groups.

TED:cah/lm
(9)

157-9-4-12, 16, 17, 20

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1959, an anonymous letter was sent to Mr. Theodore A. Jones, President of the Chicago branch National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), advising him that a "left caucus" slate called Coordinating Committee of NAACP comprised of members of the Communist Party (CP), Socialist Workers Party (SWP), socialists and other Negro nationalist-type individuals, had been formed and its objective was to oust him from leadership.

The "left caucus" slate was defeated at the membership meeting.

PWC:dew
(9)

100-3-104-1077, 1078, 1080

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia Office was authorized to contact prominent Jewish organizations, such as the American Jewish Congress, and Morris Litman, City Editor of the "Philadelphia Inquirer," in an effort to have them contact Harry Beichman and David S. Landes, Office Secretary of Boslover Hall and President of Boslover Ahavas Achim Belzer Association, respectively, in an effort to have an appearance of Gus Hall cancelled at Boslover Hall before the Philadelphia Social Science Forum Committee on January 24, 1964. Contact was to indicate bad publicity received and advise of riot which ensued following a previous appearance of Hall before the same committee during 1962.

Boslover Hall cancelled the meeting which had been scheduled for January 24, 1964, and Gus Hall did not appear in the Philadelphia area.

KAM: vb
(9)

100-3-104-37-97, 98, 101

In September, 1969, a series of three anonymous telephone calls were made by Agent personnel of the San Diego Office to Bishop John Quinn, Auxiliary Bishop of the San Diego, California, Archdiocese, in protest of activity on the part of Catholic priest Reverend Frank Curran, Christ the King Roman Catholic Church, 32nd and Imperial, San Diego, California. Reverend Curran had indicated an open advocacy of the Black Panther Party's Breakfast for Children Program and had used his church as a sanctuary for Black Panther Party (BPP) members.

An anonymous letter for mailing to the Bishop was also approved by FBIHQ on September 11, 1969, outlining objections to Father Curran's activities. This letter was to be signed T. E. Ellis, a fictitious name, and was to indicate its writer was a member of Father Curran's parish.

Father Curran subsequently transferred from the San Diego archdiocese and the BPP Breakfast for Children Program collapsed.

PEN:lfj
(9)

100-448006-1264, 1269, 1282, 1388, 1648

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1962, the Seattle FBI Office contacted Lawrence Timbers, former Chairman of the Anti-Subversive Committee of the Washington State American Legion, to make arrangements for a group of anticommunist citizens to attend a public meeting at Washington Hall, Seattle, on April 27, 1962. Herbert Eugene Aptheker, member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), was a scheduled speaker at this meeting.

Mr. Timbers, a commercial printer by trade, obtained a $1.50 ticket in advance of the meeting and printed and distributed several hundred tickets. These were distributed to persons known for their anticommunist sentiments.

As a result the Communist Party did not receive revenue for over 100 persons who attended the meeting. Aptheker completed his speech, but was intermittently heckled and booed by the anticommunist attendees. This group later marched through the aisles singing patriotic songs.

CPUSA leadership was displeased at the way the Seattle CP group organized and handled the affair.

RPF:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-50-25, 30

Counterintelligence Programs

The Communist Party of Illinois scheduled a bazaar to raise money for the Party newspaper, "The Worker." Party members received letters allowing each recipient to receive, on behalf of the bazaar, $3 in goods, money, or trading stamps from the Jewel Tea Company, which had 101 stores in the area. Each store to donate $3 as noted. Chicago Office alerted the Jewel Tea Company to the nature of the bazaar.

A former FBI Special Agent employed by the Jewel Tea Company made arrangements to insure no donations were made by the company.

TJD:ekw/cah (9)
100-3-104-9-627, 648

Counterintelligence Programs

In December, 1967, an anonymous letter was mailed to officials of Carrsville Community Center, Carrsville, Isle of Wright County, Virginia, stating that the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) was using the community center for holding dances. The Klan was using the cover of Southhampton Activities Club. The group was part of United Klans of America, Inc., KKK, and was raising funds through the dances.

After February, 1968, the lease to the Klan was terminated. The officials considered the dances had become rowdy and they did not know previously that the Klan was involved.

HPB:lfj
(9)

157-9-56-34, 35

Counterintelligence Programs

In July, 1968, the Pittsburgh Office confidentially alerted a staff worker for the Mellon Foundation of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that Unity Incorporated, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, has a store which is utilized as a black power center, and one of the leaders of Unity Incorporated said the basement of the store would be remodeled as a target range. The leader of the group was in possession of a suitcase containing several pistols and ammunition. The purpose of this contact was to prevent Unity Incorporated from receiving a grant of $150,000 which that organization had requested from the Mellon Foundation.

Unity Incorporated did not get the $150,000 grant.

VRT:dsh/lfj
(9)

100-448006-171, 255, 280

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1965, an anonymous mailing was sent to three ministers (Dr. James H. Laird, Reverend Charles E. Sutton, and Reverend Norman E. Dewise) associated with the Methodist Church, 23 E. Adams Street, Detroit, Michigan. This mailing enclosed a newspaper clipping depicting Nikita Khruschev and Herbert Aptheker, a high Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) official, at bier of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, late CPUSA Chairman, in Moscow. The purpose of this mailing was to alert church officials of Aptheker's CPUSA affiliation and his appearance at this church would be discouraged or cancelled.

Herbert Aptheker speakers' appearance at this church was not advertised in weekly church bulletin as is customary. As a result, attendance at talk was poor and collection taken was insufficient to meet expenses of the affair.

PWC:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-15-149

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1959, a flyer, revealing Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), as true sponsors of May First Celebration scheduled to be held at the United Plant Guard Workers of America Local 114 Hall at 13722 Linwood, Detroit, Michigan, was sent Mr. James C. McGahey, president of the union.

The CPUSA was locked out of the union hall and they had to hold the affair elsewhere. Mr. McGahey refunded the rental fee to the CPUSA.

PWC:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-1054

Counterintelligence Programs

During late 1967 an anonymous letter was mailed to the National Rifle Association by the Jackson Office advising that the Concordia Pistol and Rifle Club at Ferriday, Louisiana, was actually a club organized to disguise a unit of the Minuteman organization. The club was organized by James Lee Scarborough, an active Klansman, who had applied for club membership in the National Rifle Association.

During January, 1968, Scarborough advised the members of the club that the National Rifle Association had turned down their application for charter membership.

RLL:dsh
(9)

157-9-54-51, 53, 54, 55, 58

Counterintelligence Programs

In November, 1968, the Detroit Office mailed several anonymous letters to expose the extremist nature of the "South End," the student newspaper at Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, which is a state-supported university. This newspaper has a black extremist viewpoint and is self-described as "revolutionary." The anonymous letters were supposedly from a concerned parent and a concerned student and were directed to state and university authorities responsible for funding this newspaper, including Governor Romney of Michigan. A letter was also sent to the Archbishop of Detroit concerning a Catholic group funding W. E. B. DuBois Institute of Black Studies at Wayne State University, which funding was publicized in the "South End."

These anonymous mailings played a part in the reduction of yearly funds granted to the newspaper by $10,000.

VRT:lfj
(9)

100-448006-354, 631

Counterintelligence Programs

Two anonymous letters were sent between April and July, 1965, to nine responsible officials of the Hartford Avenue Baptist Church, Detroit, Michigan, protesting the action by Reverend Charles A. Hill, the pastor, in allowing Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) functionaries to openly speak at his church and in allowing communists use of the church for secret meetings. In August, 1965, a follow-up letter was sent to individuals residing in the neighborhood of the church complaining about the communist use of the church.

During September, 1965, information was received that Reverend Hill was forced to cancel a communist bazaar at the church due to the letter distributed in the area which was critical of the use of church premises for communist meetings and related affairs.

JCF:cah (9)
100-3-104-15-179, 180, 181, 195

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 15, 1969, Jack Noble, Assistant State Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, contacted the Santa Fe Resident Agency of the FBI and requested that he be furnished public source information regarding Peter Gunn Montague to assist Governor David F. Cargo in deciding whether or not to appoint Montague to the Governor's Technical Advisory Committee on Air and Water Pollution. Montague had been affiliated with the Albuquerque Movement for a Democratic Society which was affiliated with Students for a Democratic Society.

On November 18, 1969, Mr. Noble advised public source information regarding Montague enabled the Governor to make the correct decision in deciding against appointing Montague.

JWD:cah (9)
100-449698-15, 17

Counterintelligence Programs

In July, 1968, the Pittsburgh Office casually suggested to a member of the Beverly Heights Presbyterian Church, in Pittsburgh, that Reverend William R. Taylor, of that church, might be interested in her information about Carl Nicholas Flournoy, a militant black nationalist. Flournoy had been receiving finances from the Presbyterian and Catholic Churches jointly.

It was subsequently determined that this action was apparently instrumental in part in influencing three churches in refusing to provide supporting funds to racial groups unless sound reasons exist for doing so.

VRT:dsh
(9)

100-448006-173, 225

Counterintelligence Programs

On December 1, 1964, James Farmer, National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), was furnished information about Eugene Joseph Tournour, employed as an organizer of CORE, 317 Evergreen Street, Chicago, Illinois. Tournour had been active in Communist Party organizations since 1957 and in 1964 was considered a Communist Party member by leaders of the Party in Chicago. An FBI Headquarters official furnished this information to Mr. Farmer.

On January 25, 1965, Tournour advised an informant that he received a letter from CORE's National Office firing him.

TJD:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-9-430, 480

Counterintelligence Programs

In February and March, 1967, informants disclosed that certain members of the security guard, Belmont, North Carolina, Klavern of the United Klans of America (UKA), had joined or were joining the National Rifle Association (NRA). An informant advised that, under certain circumstances, the Director of Civilian Marksmanship, U. S. Army, would supply NRA-affiliated clubs with rifles and ammunition, and that the UKA was joining for this purpose. An anonymous letter was mailed to the NRA on May 2, 1967.

On June 20, 1967, an informant advised that the NRA had not accepted the Belmont Rifle and Pistol Club (of the UKA) application for a charter. The informant stated that, for all practical purposes, the club was at an end, had met on only a few occasions, had never constructed a desired range, and had not undertaken real target practice.

HWP: vb
(9)

157-9-8, 82, 95, 104, 112

Counterintelligence Programs

In November, 1959, information was made available by a source to Mr. Theodore A. Jones, President of the Chicago Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), that the "left caucus," comprised of Milton Cohen and Lester Davis, members of the Illinois State Communist Party (CP) Committee, Fritzie Englestein, Illinois CP member, Barney Taylor, Socialist Workers Party (SWP) member, Saul Mendelson, former member of Independent Socialist League National Committee and the Bullock-Abner Coalition, planned to elect nine leftist delegates to the NAACP National Convention.

No one from the "left caucus" candidate slate was elected.

PWC: vb
(9)

100-3-104-1342

Counterintelligence Programs

On April 1, 1970, the Pittsburgh Office confidentially advised Mr. Richard M. Larry, Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation, Pittsburgh, concerning a conference at Carnegie-Mellon University (CMU), scheduled for the next weekend by the Gulf Action Project (GAP), to plan for the disruption of a Gulf Oil stockholders meeting scheduled for April 28, 1970, at Pittsburgh. Mr. Larry advised the CMU Administration.

CMU officials contacted representatives of GAP cancelling the conference. GAP protested the cancellation and ultimately CMU allowed the conference to take place provided same did not include planning for the disruption of the stockholders meeting.

TCD: vb
(9)

100-449698-39-15, 17

Counterintelligence Programs

Between July 1, 1968, and October 1, 1968, the Miami Office sent an anonymous letter to Mayor Dunham, Okeechobee, Florida, advising him that city employee Charles Franklin Smith has been seen at Ku Klux Klan (KKK) meetings.

It is not known what action was taken; however, the employee was noted to not be in attendance at Klan meetings thereafter.

WDF:tdp (9)
157-9-29-196
157-9-29-201

Counterintelligence Programs

The Albany Office on April 1, 1969, confidentially alerted the President of the Council of Churches, Syracuse, New York, of the extremist nature of the United Black Brothers (UBB), Syracuse, and of the criminal backgrounds of UBB leaders and membership. The Council of Churches was funding the UBB.

Council of Churches President advised he would recommend no further funding for UBB.

VRT:vb
(9)

100-448006-758, 972

Counterintelligence Programs

It was learned the National Episcopal Church (NEC), New York City, furnished the Afro-American Society of Greater Atlanta (AASGA) funds totaling $34,000 ostensibly to improve race relations in Atlanta. NEC then retrieved the money to check status of the AASGA. Since AASGA was actually a front name for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), FBI Headquarters authorized Atlanta Office on March 11, 1969, to furnish information to this effect to Jack Tarver, President of Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia. It is unknown if anything furnished to Tarver was published.

NEC subsequently recalled this $34,000 grant from Charles E. Jenkins, leader of SNCC in Atlanta.

JTA:cah/lfj
(9)

100-448006-751, 771, 836

Counterintelligence Programs

Decedent Walter Stochmal died in Ohio during 1964 and bequeathed $1,000 to "Glos Ludowy," and the remainder of his estate, after payment of just debts and other bequests, to "The Worker." "Glos Ludowy" is a pro-Polish Government foreign language newspaper published at Detroit, Michigan. "The Worker" was an east coast communist newspaper, now defunct.

On July 22, 1964, FBI Headquarters authorized anonymous communication to decedent's son-in-law John Henninger containing public source data relating to the communist backgrounds of the executor, attorney and witnesses to the will of Stochmal in effort to persuade Stochmal's surviving relatives to contest the will, thereby thwarting bequests to "Glos Ludowy" and "The Worker."

Subsequently, Mr. Henninger advised FBI he had received certain anonymous material concerning communist connections of executor, etc. On October 6, 1964, Henninger advised that the family was contesting the Stochmal will.

An entry in the Cuyahoga County Probate Court records (Ohio), dated August 16, 1965, revealed the court authorized executor to pay the surviving spouse the widow's allowance (one-third of estate). The estate at such time was valued at $12,000.

TEB:vb
(9)

100-3-104-11, 163, 165, 166, 167, 172, 176, 258

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 17, 1970, the St. Louis Office sent an anonymous letter to Richard Simon, the husband of Jane Simon. She is an officer in ACTION, a biracial black extremist group. The letter accused her of infidelity. This letter, sent to Richard Simon, was designed to confirm his suspicions about the relationship between his wife, white, and black males associated with ACTION.

It was learned that shortly after the receipt of this letter, the couple involved separated following a series of marital arguments.

EEG:lfj
(9)

100-448006-1603, 1863

Counterintelligence Programs

Between June and October, 1967, the U. S. Commissioner, Palm Beach, Florida, Edgar G. Hamilton, was advised that his son, Jan Hamilton, was active in the Klan at Okeechobee, Florida. He was also told that the Klan was holding meetings at a restaurant where the son was employed as a manager and which was partly owned by the Commissioner.

The Klan was banned from further meetings in the restaurant, the son resigned as manager of the restaurant, and a heated argument ensued between the Commissioner and his son.

WDF:dsh
(9)

157-9-29-138, 160

Counterintelligence Programs

The Chicago Division recommended in May, 1962, that Mrs. Sam Kushner, wife of Sam Kushner, Illinois Editor of "The Worker," be anonymously advised by telephone that her husband was planning to drive to Mexico with Flo Hall, Illinois Communist Party district functionary, to get a Mexican divorce without his wife's knowledge so he would be free to marry Hall. The Chicago Division advised Kushner had been trying to divorce his wife, a long-time communist and head of a local Communist Party club, but she had been fighting the divorce because of a disagreement over the property settlement.

On September 5, 1962, an informant advised Mrs. Kushner was suing Flo Hall for "depriving her and her son of livelihood" and was attempting to discredit Sam Kushner with the "People's World" where he was then employed.

RWH:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-43, 77

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 13, 1970, the Baltimore Office placed a telephone call to the Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters, San Francisco, California, during which a complaint was lodged against John Clark, Defense Captain, Baltimore, BPP. The caller complained that several of the BPP members in Baltimore had been run out of the BPP headquarters so that Clark could live alone with a white woman Malika Aigroz. The unknown woman at Panther Headquarters advised that the BPP would check this complaint out and take whatever action was necessary.

Clark was subsequently ordered by the BPP Headquarters to leave the Baltimore BPP and travel to the "coast."

ELG: vb
(9)

100-448006-1601, 1632, 1751

Counterintelligence Programs

The Boston FBI Office, on a confidential basis, furnished information to Robert Tonis, Security Officer and Chief of the Harvard University Police, Cambridge, Massachusetts, to the effect that Jared Michael Israel, who was employed by the Harkness Commons, a Harvard University Restaurant, was involved in Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) activities.

On December 29, 1969, Mr. Tonis advised that Israel's employment was to be terminated on December 31, 1969.

ELS:ekw
(9)
100-449698-5-24

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 20, 1969, the Boston FBI Office, on a confidential basis, furnished information to Robert Tonis, Security Officer and Chief of the Harvard University Police, Cambridge, Massachusetts, to the effect that Nancy Schwarzman, Secretary, has been identified as the mistress of Michael Kazin, a Harvard Senior and Students For a Democratic Society (SDS) Committee member of the Harvard-Radcliffe Chapter.

On November 3, 1969, Mr. Tonis advised that Miss Schwarzman was no longer employed by Harvard University as of close of business October 31, 1969.

ELS:tdp (9)
100-449698-5-21

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1964, Professor Francis E. Barkman, Department of Law, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio, advised that Leon Letwin had applied for a position at the University. Barkman stated he had heard rumors that Letwin had been connected with various communist organizations. Public source material was furnished to Professor Barkman which reported Communist Party (CP) associations of Letwin.

On June 17, 1964, Professor Barkman advised that the school's Board of Trustees had decided to reject Letwin's application. The Board announced no reason for its refusal; however, Barkman attributed the rejection to public source information concerning Letwin's CP associations.

TEB: vb
(9)

100-3-104-11-145, 148, 151, 158

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 24, 1965, the Cleveland Office made available copies of Socialist Workers Party (SWP) literature relating to Rod Holt to Mr. George Dobrea, member, Cleveland Board of Education, to alert him to the association of Holt's wife, Marilyn Holt, a Cleveland schoolteacher with the SWP.

On July 2, 1965, Dobrea advised the Cleveland Office that based on this information, it did not appear that Marilyn Holt's contract would be renewed. Subsequently, her contract was not renewed.

DML:dew
(9)

100-3-104-11-202, 213, 220

Counterintelligence Programs

Public source material concerning Robert Ehrlich and his wife Cornelia Ehrlich and Victor Pasche, who were active in the Parent Teachers Association (PTA) in the Ringwood, New Jersey, public school system and allegedly were considered to have Communist Party (CP) leanings, was furnished to Chief of Police Ray Van Tassel, Ringwood, New Jersey, on April 18, 1961 and May 4, 1961.

Robert Ehrlich was not re-elected to his position with the Ringwood Library Association. Bernice Pasche, wife of Victor Pasche, was discharged from her position as a teacher in a high school in Pompton Lakes, New Jersey. Public source material concerning Victor Pasche was read at PTA meeting. Victor Pasche was vice president of the PTA.

JDM:cah (9)
100-3-104-2574
100-3-104-2991
100-3-104-31-25
100-3-104-31-23

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 28, 1968, the Miami Office confidentially alerted John Tyler, Chief, Security Section, Dade County Department of Public Instruction, Miami, Florida, that Edwin Franklin Dean, a teacher at Mays Senior High School, Miami, and an assistant minister of the Nation of Islam, Miami, was arrested and convicted for molesting women at Knoxville, Tennessee, in March, 1958.

On March 7, 1968, Mr. Tyler advised he had verified Deans' arrest and conviction in Knoxville for molesting women and that Dean has been eliminated from the Dade County School System.

VRT:ekw
(9)
100-448006-16-23

Counterintelligence Programs

In March 3, 1964, contact was made with Father James Orford, Regent of the Law School at Marquette Law School, Milwaukee, to preclude Mary's Bookshop, a communist bookshop, from placing advertising in "The Marquette Tribune," a college newspaper.

The advertisement for Mary's Bookshop was located and not published in the school newspaper.

JPM: vb
(9)

100-3-104-30-69

144

Counterintelligence Programs

The FBI anonymously mailed to high school and college officials newspaper articles which had been printed in "The Philadelphia Inquirer." The articles exposed the nature of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA). Articles were mailed October 13, 1964, to four high schools and two colleges in the Philadelphia area.

As of October, 1964, the principal of Germantown High School, Philadelphia, had called in members of DCA unit at the school and advised their parents of the true nature of the club. This DCA unit was considered defunct and the DCA dropped plans to grant them a charter.

RHR:vb
(9)

100-3-104-37-165
100-3-104-37-174

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 5, 1963, the Newark Office confidentially furnished Dr. R. T. Jacobsen, Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Union County High School System, Berkeley Heights, New Jersey, public source information concerning a school teacher, Joseph Edelman. This information revealed Edelman's association with the People's Rights Party, a communist influenced group.

On December 10, 1963, Dr. Jacobsen informed Newark Office that Edelman's teaching contract would not be renewed next year.

DML: vb
(9)

100-3-104-31-186, 194, 196, 223

Counterintelligence Programs

The New York FBI Office was authorized to furnish to the St. Brendan Forensic Society of St. Brendan's High School, New York, New York, appropriate public source data regarding Pete Seeger, who has been publicly identified as "the best known of all the Communist Party entertainers," in an attempt to cause his cancellation or prevent his appearance at Catholic-sponsored affairs in Brooklyn. Seeger was scheduled to appear at Brooklyn College under the sponsorship of the above high school.

On February 20, 1968, background data regarding Seeger was furnished to the Right Reverend Monsignor Raymond Rigney, Superintendent of Schools, Archdiocese of New York, 30 East 50th Street, New York City. On March 15, 1968, Monsignor Rigney stated that due to pressure of business, he was unable to inform Brooklyn Diocesan officials of Seeger's appearance at Brooklyn College, prior to his appearance. Monsignor Rigney further advised that he had prepared a memorandum for his assistants concerning Seeger's subversive background. This memorandum, according to the Monsignor, would serve to answer inquiries which may be received from any high schools or colleges in this Archdiocese of New York. This memorandum also stated that all schools should be discouraged with respect to the possible booking of Seeger to perform.

ELS:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-34-1659, 1669

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 22, 1964, the Boston Office made available to a confidential source at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, public source material regarding the communist background of Leon Letwin who was at that time a teaching fellow (law) at Harvard. At that time there was no indication that Letwin's appointment at Harvard would be extended. However, at that time he indicated a desire to obtain a position at the University of Toledo Law School. Source at Harvard University was of the opinion that the Harvard Corporation would in all probability reject any application by Letwin on the strength of the public source data furnished to Harvard. Letwin's fellowship was not reactivated at Harvard. It is noted, however, that prior to disclosure of the public source information Letwin expressed a desire to move on.

In view of this, the Cleveland Office made available to a source at the University of Toledo Law School public source data compiled by them as well as additional public source data compiled by the Boston Office regarding Letwin's communist background. Cleveland Office advised that the Board of Trustees, University of Toledo Law School, had rejected Letwin's application for employment on the strength of the public source data.

RDS:cah (9)
100-3-104-5-120-123, 137, 138

Counterintelligence Programs

On January 18, 1971, an anonymous letter was mailed by the Mobile FBI Office to Mr. Wilson M. Hawkins, Director of Operations, University of South Alabama, Mobile, Alabama, setting forth information regarding two instructors at the University of South Alabama, Larry Eugene Holmes and Lloyd Dendinger, who were supporting and giving finansial assistance to "Rearguard," an underground newspaper.

On February 3, 1971, Dr. Frederick Whiddon, President, University of South Alabama, confidentially advised that the University staff had received complaints concerning Holmes and Dendinger and, in view of this and other information he had received about these individuals, he had placed them in a probationary status, which would prevent them from getting any annual increments until he removes them from their probationary status.

JWD:tdp (9)
100-449698-61-14, 13

Counterintelligence Programs

On January 28, 1971, the Charlotte FBI Office discussed with Oscar Petty, Director of Financial Aid, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, the New Left activities of Stanley Theodore Gutman, also known as Huck, a faculty member who had made application for financial aid.

On February 2, 1971, Mr. Petty advised Gutman's request for aid had been denied, as a result of which Gutman told Mr. Petty he was withdrawing from Duke University.

ELS:dsh
(9)

100-449698-8-16

Counterintelligence Programs

On August 18, 1969, Mr. Malcom Kispert, Vice President for Academic Administration, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, Massachusetts, advised he had confidentially received from the Boston FBI Office public source material relating to Vernon Grizzard and Nicholas Egleson, who were instructors at MIT and active in New Left activities.

Mr. Kispert advised that he was able to have Grizzard's and Egleson's reappointments to the Staff of MIT cancelled.

ELS:tdp (9)
100-449698-5-17

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 25, 1970, the Charlotte FBI Office contacted Angus A. McKellar, Attorney, Northhampton County School Board, Jackson, North Carolina, and at that time information relating to the New Left activities of Joseph Holt Woodside, a faculty member, was furnished to Mr. McKellar.

On June 15, 1970, Mr. McKellar advised that Woodside had elected not to renew his teaching contract for the forthcoming year.

ELS:cah (9)
100-449698-8-14

Counterintelligence Programs

On March 23, 1965, the Newark Office was authorized to send an anonymous letter to Joseph Caviello, Principal, North Bergen High School, North Bergen, New Jersey, outlining the communist background of Elizabeth Nagy, a Communist Party member and teacher at North Bergen High School.

Dr. Herman G. Kline, Superintendent of Schools, Board of Education, North Bergen, and Caviello contacted the Newark Office, showed the anonymous letter received and asked for advice. When told no advice of this nature could be given, Dr. Kline volunteered the fact that Mrs. Nagy had tenure and could not be removed except for specific reasons. Kline advised that Mrs. Nagy would be confronted with the contents of this letter and if she admits the allegations, she would be asked to resign. Mrs. Nagy was subsequently interviewed by school authorities and agreed to resign.

DML:tdp (9)
100-3-104-31-310, 340, 349

Counterintelligence Programs

On March 6, 1970, the Albuquerque Office confidentially furnished Mr. Daryl Harrell, a former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and then Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent of the Albuquerque Public Schools, public source material setting forth Michael Otis Colvin's activities in Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at the University of New Mexico. Colvin was an applicant for a part-time position as a teacher with the Albuquerque Public School System.

On April 1, 1970, Mr. Harrell advised that primarily based on the information furnished, the Albuquerque Public School System was no longer considering Colvin's application for a part-time position as a teacher.

JWD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-62-19

Counterintelligence Program

During the Presidential Inauguration activities in Washington, D. C., January, 1969, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC), was utilizing walkie-talkies on the "citizen band" to coordinate movements and activities.

NMC communications were disrupted and confusing orders were issued when the Washington Field Office of the FBI, utilizing similar communications methods, identified with the NMC network and countermanded orders or supplied misinformation to NMC marshals.

HWP:ekw
(9)
100-449698-53, 23

Counterintelligence Programs

The "East Village Other," a bimonthly newspaper, planned to hire a pilot to "bomb" the Pentagon with flowers on October 20, 1967, the day before the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam was to hold its march in Washington, D. C. The New York Office made a number of pretext calls to the "East Village Other" wherein the caller, posing as a pilot for this venture, made inquiries regarding this venture and eventually agreed to fly the plane. It was decided to "bomb" the Pentagon on October 21, 1967. The caller arranged with Allan Katzman of the newspaper to have the Publishing-Editor-In-Chief of the "East Village Other," Walter Bowart, accompany him on this mission. The caller was to meet Bowart at the Eastern Airlines terminal at Dulles Airport at 1:45 p.m. on October 21, 1967, with 100 to 200 pounds of flowers.

Bowart and other individuals apparently connected with the "East Village Other" arrived at Eastern Airlines ticket counter at 1:00 p.m. on October 21, 1967, in a Volkswagen bus loaded with four cartons of flowers. The group waited until approximately 3:30 p.m. and finally left in disgust.

LEB:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-34-1645, 1659, 1669

Counterintelligence Programs

In January, 1967, a confidential source in the Tax Assessor's Office, Brevard County, Florida, was contacted by the FBI to cause an early tax assessment to be scheduled for properties owned by Richland Agency, a Communist Party (CP) investment group. The assessment rate on the local parcel owned by Richland Agency rose a total of $191,560 between 1966 and 1967, which should have resulted in an increased tax of $4,997 from 1966 to 1967. It is unknown whether these taxes exactly amounted to $4,997 or whether they were, in fact, paid.

JWM:bmf/cah (9)
100-3-104-64-8, 10, 11, 12

Counterintelligence Programs

Robert E. Scoggins, South Carolina Grand Dragon, United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, had been receiving a veteran's pension from U. S. Government on a 100 percent disability. Despite this, he had been self-employed in the plumbing, electrical and contracting business. This information was furnished to the Veterans' Administration (VA).

VA conducted an investigation which resulted in Scoggins disability payments being discontinued.

TED: vb
(9)

157-9-18
157-1530

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1969, the New York Office sent spurious postcards, which duplicated the type used by Rochell Kendrick, 792 Columbus Avenue, New York, New York, Chief of the New York Consulate of the Republic of New Africa (RNA), a black extremist organization, to advise members of RNA meetings. The spurious postcards were sent on short notice to reschedule or cancel RNA meetings.

The above-mentioned postcards caused disruption and suspicion among RNA members in the New York City area.

VRT: vb
(9)

100-448006-703, 903

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

The San Francisco Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office learned through an informant that Dolores Berg, common-law wife of Delmar Berg, nominal head of the Stanislaus County, California, Communist Party (CP), had made a complaint to the County Sheriff's Office that Howard Keylor, head of the CP in San Joaquin County, had committed two acts of sexual intercourse with her 16-year-old daughter, Antoinette Marie Romo, in April, 1962. Although the matter had been referred to the Stockton, California, Police Department, no action had been taken as Dolores Berg had not signed a complaint at the Police Department. The daughter did admit to the Sheriff's Office that the intercourse occurred. In May, 1962, the San Francisco FBI Office contacted Sheriff Dan Kelsay, Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office, to have his office attempt to convince Dolores Berg to sign a formal complaint with the Stockton Police Department.

Dolores Berg signed a complaint, as a result of which on May 28, 1962, Howard Keylor was arrested on a charge of Statutory Rape and was incarcerated. The arrest notice was published on May 29, 1962, in the "Stockton Daily Record," a local newspaper.

The victim failed to appear in court on May 29, 1962, and the charge was dismissed for reason of lack of direct evidence. Keylor was released.

As a result of the above action and/or attendant publicity, Howard Keylor was suspended from the Communist Party.

SECRET

RPF:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-47-43, 44, 45

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 26, 1970, the Philadelphia Office sent a letter to the national headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP) bearing an excellent facsimile of the signature of Jonathan Pinkett, a former BPP official in Philadelphia who was expelled on May 19, 1970, after falling out with the BPP leadership in Philadelphia. The letter accused the members of the BPP in Philadelphia of stealing clothing, food and drugs collected for poor children. All of the accusations in the letter were true.

Subsequent to the letter being sent to the headquarters of the organization, several chapter members were given disciplinary transfers. Headquarters had to send other members to the chapter in Philadelphia to straighten out the local situation.

EFG:tdp (9)
100-448006-1805, 1836, 1856

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1965, a mailing of a leaflet prepared by the FBI was made to residents, businesses and organizations in the neighborhood where the Philadelphia Clubhouse of the W. E. B. DuBois Club of America (DCA) was relocating (3260 N. Broad Street, Philadelphia). The leaflet was an announcement of the opening of the DCA and set out a disclaimer of its being a communist group. Its intent was to put anticommunist groups on notice of the DCA's presence.

The minister of a church in the area gave a sermon denouncing communism and announced that the DCA was opening an office in the neighborhood. Businesses in the area refused to publicize the opening of the DCA. Only nine persons attended the DCA open house.

RHR:bmf/jmn
(9)

100-3-104-37-190, 201, 212

Counterintelligence Programs

The Boston Office in October, 1966, furnished to a confidential source public source information relating to the communist plans to open a new bookstore in Boston known as the "Frederick Douglass Books" and the fact that Edward Teixiera, Communist Party (CP) District Organizer, will be directing the activities of the store.

As a result, the October 23, 1966, issue of the "Boston Sunday Herald" contained a photograph showing the store being picketed by members of the American Veterans Committee protesting the use of the name of the 19th Century Negro abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, for the store where Marxist books are being sold.

The "Boston Herald" issue of October 22, 1966, contained an article captioned "Red Bookstore Opens." The article featured a photograph of Edward Teixiera. The article describes Teixiera as a member of the CP by his own admission. Teixiera denied any connection between the store itself and the Party.

As a result of the notoriety achieved regarding the opening of the bookstore, Teixiera was furious and expressed great displeasure. Teixiera subsequently advised a source that the failure of the store to be the success envisioned by the CP of New England can be blamed on the adverse publicity given to the store at its opening.

RDS: vb
(9)

100-3-104-5-216, 217, 225

Counterintelligence Programs

The San Francisco Office advised on September 12, 1960, that through its continuing informant coverage of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), it was aware of new subscribers to the CPUSA newspaper, "Peoples World" (PW). San Francisco instituted policy of interviewing each new subscriber to PW.

Archie Brown, a Northern California CPUSA leader, complained that a major problem in trying to increase the membership of the CPUSA is that new subscribers to the PW are interviewed by the FBI. This has caused these subscribers to drop their subscriptions and to disassociate themselves from CP members.

JDP:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-1901

Counterintelligence Programs

Sometime prior to January 3, 1966, a talk show appearance scheduled for December, 1965, by Otis Archer Hood, Chairman, District Committee, Communist Party, USA, was cancelled by Radio Station WNAC, Boston, Massachusetts. The cancellation followed the Boston Division's providing public source information concerning Hood's Communist Party background to a confidential source.

RWH:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-5-188, 189

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 6, 1968, FBI Headquarters reminded the Detroit FBI Office to be alert to take advantage of all possible disruptive activities during the forthcoming National Convention of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which was to be held at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan.

A press release by the SAC, Detroit FBI Office, in June, 1968, of the Director's testimony concerning the New Left was made at the time of the SDS National Convention. This release was well received and several State Legislators, after visiting the SDS Convention site at Michigan State, severely criticized University officials for allowing SDS to utilize the campus. As a further result, the Michigan State Legislature, in late June, 1968, passed a resolution to the effect that state universities which permitted disruption (which occurred during the National SDS Convention) will suffer appropriation cuts in proportion to the number of students permitted to disrupt state university campuses.

ELS: vb
(9)

100-449698-15-2

146

~~SECRET~~ 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
'CONFIDENTIAL' 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General August 25, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. T. D. J. Brooks

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

MDR-16
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/bp
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1.6

On August 13, 1975, a former Special Agent of the FBI advised that he was interviewed by a representative of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations (SSCIO) concerning allegations by Samuel Adason Jaffe that vindictive actions taken by the FBI have prevented him from obtaining or keeping a job in the news media field. According to the SSCIO representative, Jaffe reported that he had a pleasant relationship with Special Agents of the FBI during the time he had furnished information regarding Soviet intelligence matters; however, he detected a coolness of these FBI Agents towards him after his return from Hong Kong in 1968. He attributed this coolness to his being "fingered" by Soviet defector Oleg V. Penkovskiy, who allegedly reported that he saw Jaffe's name on a piece of paper on the desk of a Soviet intelligence officer. Upon learning this, the FBI felt that Jaffe was a double agent. Since his return from Hong Kong he cannot hold a job and believes the FBI is the cause of his predicament. The former Special Agent of the FBI advised that the SSCIO representative told him he is looking into this matter to determine if Jaffe's statements are true and to determine if some controls could be created so that the FBI could not be vindictive in similar situations. (C)

Oleg V. Penkovskiy is a former Colonel in the Soviet intelligence services (SIS) who had cooperated with the West. He was arrested and tried in the Soviet Union in 1963 and reportedly was executed. (C)

CLASS. & EXT. BY 19320 Pwl/Kus 9-3-81
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 9-25-95

105-28333

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)

TDJB:sjm/yi
(11)

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
AUG 29 1975

~~SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

~~Classified by 4091~~
~~Exempt from GDS~~, Categories 2 and 3
~~Date~~ of Declassification ~~Indefinite~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

DUPLICATE YELLOW 'CONFIDENTIAL'

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 SEP 8 1975

Jaffe, a former correspondent for ABC and CBS television networks, was an informant of our New York Office from 1958 to 1961. During this period he furnished extensive information on his numerous contacts with Soviet nationals whom he met through his assignment as a CBS correspondent at the United Nations, New York, New York. In 1961 he was assigned to Moscow, USSR, as a correspondent for ABC and served there until he was expelled in 1965 following his reporting of information unfavorable to the Soviet Union. He thereafter was transferred to Hong Kong where he served until 1968. According to information from a former SIS officer currently residing in the West, Jaffe in about 1961, while in Moscow, was recruited by the Committee for State Security (KGB). Our investigation regarding this allegation has failed to either substantiate or refute this allegation. Jaffe, however, in 1963 reported to our New York Office that while in Moscow, he was approached in what he considered an attempt at recruitment by the SIS. During interviews with Jaffe he denied any overt acts helpful to the KGB, although he admitted a continuing relationship with several KGB officers. c

[No information is contained in the files of the FBI indicating Jaffe was ever reported on by Colonel Penkovskiy.] c With regard to his employment difficulties, this matter was the subject of discussion with Jaffe on several occasions after his return from Hong Kong in 1968, when he explained to Special Agents in contact with him that he was experiencing difficulty in finding a job and his concern that his association with the FBI was the reason for this difficulty. On every occasion he was assured that the FBI had not disclosed his confidential relationship with the FBI. Jaffe in 1969 advised that he had learned from a British intelligence service contact in Hong Kong that his recall from that city by ABC was caused by his refusal to cooperate with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He related that he later mentioned this to a CIA contact in Washington who indicated that the British intelligence service representative had no right to relate to Jaffe this information.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General

The files of the FBI were reviewed to determine if Jaffe's allegations had any foundation in fact and no information was contained therein supporting this allegation. His observations concerning the change of attitude of FBI personnel in dealing with him to one of coolness can be accounted for on the basis of information received from the Soviet intelligence officer alleging his recruitment by the KGB. Our relationship with him thereafter was circumspect and undoubtedly he detected a change in the Agents' attitude.

Whatever employment difficulties may have been encountered by Jaffe did not arise out of any action taken by the FBI.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
        Special Counsel for
        Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

See memorandum W. A. Branigan to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated August 14, 1975, captioned "Samuel Adason Jaffe, Information Concerning."

Classified "Secret" since it discloses FBI interest in Soviet nationals and in order to protect sensitive sources of information.

Regarding W. A. Branigan to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum dated August 14, 1975, Mr. Wannall commented "Suggest memorandum to AG."

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 2 8 1
TELETYPE

NR001 MM CODE

10:13PM IMMEDIATE AUGUST 28, 1975

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL AUGUST 26, 1975.

FORMER MIAMI ASAC FREDERICK F. FOX CONTACTED AUGUST 27, 1975 PER INSTRUCTION.

FOX'S RESIDENCE ADDRESS SHOULD BE CORRECTED IN BUREAU RECOR~~E~~DS TO 11450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI 33161.

END

VLN FBIHQ CLR

REC 5 8

62-116395-618

RECORDED
12 SEP 2 1975

cc 67-120166 (Fox)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALMKP

84 SEP 4 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 8/6/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714) (P)

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Re Bureau teletypes dated 7/30/75 and 7/31/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM reflecting interview of SA EARL M. PETERSEN by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member LESTER SEIDEL on 7/31/75.

Extra cc destroyed

REC-56

(2) - Bureau (Encls. 8) (RM)
2 - San Diego

EX 104

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-616

16 AUG 11 1975

EMP:bk
(4)

1-9063

Records
cc - Personnel files

62-116395

8/18/75

RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS

29 SEP 17 1975

Approved: ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ____________ M Per ____________

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY 5212AUH/KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Special Agent (SA) Earl M. Petersen was interviewed at the San Diego office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on July 31, 1975, by U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel. The interview began at 10:05 A.M. and ended at 11:35 A.M. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger was available nearby for consultation. He was not consulted during the interview.

Prior to the interview, SA Petersen had been advised by San Diego FBI officials that FBI Headquarters had waived the employee agreement not to furnish information for the purpose of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

SA Petersen was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source; that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques; or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

SA Petersen was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see appendix).

ENCLOSURE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-616

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Lester Seidel identified himself to SA Petersen and stated that he was not warning SA Petersen of his rights as the interview was such that such a warning was not required. He advised SA Petersen that he did not have to talk to him and that any information furnished was on a voluntary basis. He stated that information furnished to him would be handled with discretion.

Mr. Seidel: Were you in charge of the COINTELPRO in San Diego from March, 1968 through October, 1968?

SA Petersen: This was possible but the dates the program was assigned to me are not recalled.

Mr. Seidel: What was the name of the squad to which you were assigned at that time?

SA Petersen: The Security Squad.

Mr. Seidel: Who did the squad investigate? Was it groups such as US, Inc. (see appendix) and the BPP?

SA Petersen: Yes, such groups as US, Inc., the BPP, and the Nation of Islam (NOI) (see appendix).

Mr. Seidel: And possibly splinter groups?

SA Petersen: Yes, groups that would form and disband and which could possibly be called splinter groups.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: How long have you been in the Bureau?

SA Petersen: Twenty-four years as of June 25, 1975.

Mr. Seidel: Where have you been assigned?

SA Petersen: In Boston, Baltimore, New York, Tampa, and San Diego.

Mr. Seidel: The Bureau has indicated that you were a coordinator of the COINTELPRO in San Diego. As such, what were your duties?

SA Petersen: The duties for the most part consisted of preparing letters to the Bureau asking for authority to take some specific action in the program; awaiting the reply from the Bureau; and then, if any action was taken, to advise the Bureau of the results of such action. It is noted that many of the requests to take specific action were turned down by the Bureau.

Mr. Seidel: Were you the focal point of the program?

SA Petersen: Yes, in the sense that any idea for action to be taken in the program was transmitted to the Bureau for approval by me and if approval was received, it would be related to whomever had suggested the activity. I would then report any results to the Bureau.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Did you get heavy pressure from Bureau officials to take action in this program?

SA Petersen: Not any more than any other case, and I had a number of other cases assigned to me at the time the COINTELPRO was assigned to me.

Mr. Seidel: What type of things did you do?

SA Petersen: I do not recall at this time any specific action taken in the program. I do recall that a Black Panther leader, Walter Wallace, was removed as leader of the party in San Diego. I believe it was suspected that he might have cooperated with the FBI. This could have been accomplished by interviewing him where the interview could be seen by other party members. If the Agents shook his hand, smiled, and acted like he was a friend, it might plant the seed of suspicion in the minds of other BPP members. I do not recall specifically whether this happened but at any rate, Wallace was not trusted and was removed as leader of the party.

Mr. Seidel: Could such a thing get Wallace killed or injured?

SA Petersen: I do not see how it would because there would be no way anyone could determine whether or not Wallace was, in fact, cooperating with the FBI. He was probably removed by the BPP as a precautionary measure. I cannot recall whether or not Wallace was removed while I was coordinator of the program.

Mr. Seidel: Was COINTELPRO successful?

SA Petersen: I was not too impressed with its success in San Diego while I had it assigned to me because it was a new program and it took some time to get it established and working. Most of the success was probably due to information obtained regarding criminal violations, mostly local in nature, which was furnished to local law enforcement officers, causing the arrest of BPP members. This would have been done whether or not we had a COINTELPRO. It was necessary to prepare a letter to the Bureau asking authority to take action and then wait for a reply authorizing the activity. Many times suggested COINTELPRO activity suggestions would be turned down.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel made available Xerox copies of Bureau letters captioned, "Counter-Intelligence Program; Black Nationalist - Hate Groups," dated August 25, 1967 and March 4, 1968. These were read by SA Petersen, who said he could not specifically recall reading the letters.

Mr. Seidel:	Was contact with the police formal or informal?
SA Petersen:	Contact was personal or telephonic contact and at one time, information furnished to individual officers was confirmed by letter to the Chief of Police. It is not recalled if this was the policy during the time COINTELPRO was assigned to me.
Mr. Seidel:	What happened to SA Roy Burns?
SA Petersen:	He was transferred to the Butte, Montana Field Office.
Mr. Seidel:	Did he do anything wrong? I understand Agents were sometimes transferred to Butte as a disciplinary measure.
SA Petersen:	SA Burns wanted to be transferred to Butte and requested the transfer. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Mr. Evans, was transferred there and may have helped SA Burns get moved there.
Mr. Seidel:	How old is Bob Baker:
SA Petersen:	Probably 51 or 52 years old.

Mr. Seidel: Did he retire early?

SA Petersen: No. He was in a position to retire and retired because he wanted to take advantage of a cost of living increase by retiring prior to a certain date, such as June 30.

Mr. Seidel: Were the BPP and US, Inc. both violence oriented groups?

SA Petersen: Very definitely. There was extreme friction between the BPP and US, Inc. at all times.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some caricatures used in connection with COINTELPRO?

SA Petersen: Yes.

Mr. Seidel: Who had the program at that time?

SA Petersen: I believe SA Burns had it then.

Mr. Seidel: What were the cartoons?

SA Petersen: I recall seeing them but do not recall any specific cartoon.

Mr. Seidel: Do you think anything done in COINTELPRO could have had a reaction causing someone to kill an individual in the other group?

SA Petersen: Because of the extreme antagonism between the two groups, anything we did would have had about the same effect as a gnat biting an elephant. I do not think COINTELPRO had that kind of impact.

Mr. Seidel: Did you ever supervise any technical installation or electronic surveillance of the BPP in San Diego?

SA Petersen: No. I don't recall anything like that being done here.

Mr. Seidel: How would you feel about writing a letter to a wife saying her husband was sleeping with various other women if the husband was a BPP leader?

SA Petersen: I would hesitate to do this because it might break up a family. If the facts were true and this might cause the BPP leader to be less effective, it would probably be a good counter-intelligence move.

Mr. Seidel: I am referring to Page 91 of a BPP COINTELPRO summary which indicates that a BPP leader was living with a white girl and an anonymous letter was written to others in the BPP saying that this individual was living with a white girl. Do you recall anything about that?

SA Petersen: I believe that leader could have been Kenneth Denmon in San Diego. I recall that he was living with a white woman and that others in the BPP were made aware of this in some manner. The BPP in San

SA Petersen (continued): Diego was teaching children to hate and kill police officers. They planned violent criminal acts and were making plans to take over the established government at the first opportunity. If a leader of such a group could be discredited and removed, it would help to keep the group from becoming stronger, as they would have to select a new leader, and he would have to get the group reorganized. Denmon had many additional weaknesses which could be used in a counter-intelligence program.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall a letter being sent to BPP Headquarters saying a leader of the BPP was cooperating with the police in Los Angeles?

SA Petersen: I do not recall such a letter.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some cards being sent to San Diego from Los Angeles saying, "Ron Karenga is impotent"?

SA Petersen: No, I do not recall such cards. Ron Karenga was a leader of US, Inc., not the BPP.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall that cartoons were to be sent to BPP members to discredit the leaders?

SA Petersen: I recall the cartoons but do not recall whether they were sent to BPP members.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall an anonymous letter being sent to the Catholic Church to have the priest of the church where the BPP breakfast program was operated removed from his office?

SA Petersen: I do not recall such an anonymous letter; however, I do recall that the priest was transferred by the church.

Mr. Seidel: Knowing that the BPP paper was a paper that taught and advocated violence and had cartoons in it that encouraged the killing of police officers by blacks and was a violence oriented paper, how would you feel about putting a corrosive liquid on the paper to keep it from being distributed?

SA Petersen: I would not do it as I would feel that it was a violation of the law and too drastic. I would not do it personally or personally approve of it.

Mr. Seidel: You have been very helpful and the information you have provided will be used in considering new legislation at some time in the future.

SA Petersen: In these tranquil times, it disturbs me greatly to read in the papers and to hear news broadcasts containing all kinds of allegations against the FBI and the CIA and

SA Petersen (continued):	other intelligence agencies. I like to work within the law and to be guided by legislation in my work. I would, however, hate to see such restrictive legislation passed that at some time in the future when we might be faced with violence-prone organizations trying to take control of the government, we would be unable to properly handle our responsibility for the internal security of the United States.
Mr. Seidel:	Thank you for your cooperation.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Formerly Known As
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

The Black Panther Party (BPP), organized in December, 1966, at Oakland, California, by Huey P. Newton and Bobby George Seale, has the publicly-stated purpose of organizing black people to take control of the life, politics and destiny of the black community. The Party, operating the Black Panther Intercommunal News Service, publishes a newspaper called "The Black Panther," which at one time openly advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in a revolutionary program to end the oppression of the black people but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival program pending revolution. BPP national headquarters, aka Black Panther Intercommunal Headquarters, is located in Oakland, California.

While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order. Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 1973, issue of "Playboy" magazine, stated the Panthers' chief ambition is to change the American Government by any means necessary but that ultimately such change will be through armed violence.

Despite its claimed dedication to community service, indicators of the BPP's continued attraction to violence persist. Since July, 1974, Newton and other BPP members have been arrested in Oakland, California, for threatening police officers, murder of a 17-year-old female and the pistol whipping of Newton's tailor. Newton failed to appear on these charges and is now a local fugitive. Additionally, one died and three were wounded as a result of a shooting at a BPP-sponsored dance in Oakland, California, in October, 1974.

APPENDIX

"US"
Also Known As
"US", Incorporated

"US" was chartered by the State of California as a non-profit corporation in September, 1966, with offices at 8211 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California. The corporation alleges that "US" is primarily an Afro-American cultural organization.

During the spring of 1968, however, a source advised that MAULANA RON KARENGA, true name RONIE MC KINLEY EVERETT, Founder-Chairman of "US", published a booklet entitled "The Quotable Karenga", in which he talked of revolution, black power, and condemned Christianity for the plight of the black man.

In this booklet, KARENGA stated "...You must have a cultural revolution before the violent revolution. The cultural revolution gives identity, purpose, and direction. ...The revolution being fought now is a revolution to win the minds of our people. If we fail to win this, we cannot wage the violent one. ...When the word is given, we'll see how tough you are. When it's 'burn', let's see how much you blow up. And when it's 'take that white girl's head too', we'll see how tough you are..."

The above source advised that "US" members are required to study and memorize this booklet. "US" members are also assigned Swahili names which they use in lieu of their given names.

A second source advised that KARENGA had spoken at various meetings in Los Angeles at which time he talked of creating an "US" army of 1,000 men, obtaining weapons and ammunition, guerrilla warfare tactics, and revolution. KARENGA also stated "The only way to get life is to take a life and as we get stronger, we will take what we want from the white man's United States." He also stated that if the police killed any "US" members, the "US" organization would kill some of them.

APPENDIX CONTINUED

The first source above advised that KARENGA also stated that race riots throughout the country were not riots but were actually revolts or revolutions and that the black people were going to win their freedom by violence, if necessary.

A third source advised that KARENGA stated that a revolution would take place in the future and that no one can believe in black revolution without believing in armed conflict because the two go hand in hand.

A fourth source advised in August, 1974, that the US Organization has been evicted from its headquarters at 4302 South Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles, and because of lack of funds, has been unable to locate a new meeting place. The organization has terminated all public meetings.

APPENDIX

Revised 5/22/75

NATION OF ISLAM (NOI)
CHARACTERIZATION OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION
EXTREMIST MATTER

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is a black nationwife organization headquartered at Muhammad's Temple #2, 7351 South Stony Island Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Elijah Muhammad, self-styled "Messenger of Allah" and divinely appointed leader of the black race in America, was leader of the NOI until his death on February 25, 1975, at which time his son, Wallace D. Muhammad, became Supreme Minister of the NOI. The NOI seeks a separate black nation, espouses its own version of the Islamic Religion, and has considered all "whites" to be devils; however, Wallace D. Muhammad in an interview published in "Muhammad Speaks", March 21, 1975, same being a weekly and the official NOI newspaper, stated there would no longer be stress put on the white people's status as "devils"; that whites have "begun to reform" and "The past is the past until it is dug up. We will not dig it up." NOI official policy instructs members to obey laws of the United States that do not conflict with NOI laws; to defend NOI officials, property, women, and themselves at all costs, if attacked; and to disarm any attacker and use the attacker's weapon against him.

The NOI body is broken down into: 1) the Fruit of Islam (FOI), an all male military-type group, to which instruction in judo and karate is given, and which has as its mmission security of officials, membership, and property of the NOI, and enforcing discipline in the NOI; and 2) the Muslim Girls Training (MGT), an all female quasi military-type group which has as its mission homemaking and child guidance in accordance with NOI teachings.

NOI activity is widespread among black inmates in many prisons in the United States. In recent years internal dissidence and difficulties with rival Muslim groups and other adversaries have produced considerable violence, some involving physical confrontations and acts of violence with law enforcement agencies.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

2

FBI

Date: 8/5/75

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
(ATT: INTD-W.O. CREGAR)

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714) (P)

SUBJECT: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA LAWRENCE F. WIRICK
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP8ALM/KP

ReButeletype to LA dated 7/31/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and seven copies of an LHM regarding captioned titles.

Appendix pp all refs to appendix deleted [illegible] Encl. 8

Extra cc's destroyed 1-4063

ENCLOSURE

2-Bureau (Encls. 8) (RM)
2-San Diego

LFW/asc
(4)

Typo corrections made on pp 1, 4 & 6 (SD) telephonically 8/13/75 ASAC Badger

REC-56

62-116395-615

62-116395

EX 104

AUG 11 1975

Route to Personnel files

79 SEP [illegible]

W. O. Cregar

FILE

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

8/18/75

Approved: ______________ Sent ________M Per ______________
Special Agen[illegible]arge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 5, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

By communication dated July 30, 1975, Clarence M. Kelley, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, advised as follows concerning an interview by representative of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) of ~~and~~ Special Agent (SA) Lawrence F. Wirick, concerning Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and Bureau investigation of the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see Appendix page). Director Kelley stated as follows:

"I have waived your employment agreements for purposes of these interviews. Each should note that he has the right to counsel; however, the FBI is unable to provide private counsel. There are certain privileged areas concerning which SAs would not be required to answer questions. Areas concern information which might divulge identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect on-going FBI investigations; and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-615

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

On July 31, 1975, at 11:45 a.m. Mr. Lester Seidel of the United States Senate Select Committee (SSC) interviewed SA Lawrence F. Wirick at the San Diego Office of the FBI. No Advice of Rights was furnished SA Wirick and it was not necessary for the interviewee to consult with an FBI representative. The interview was terminated at 12:50 p.m. and as best recalled included the following discussion in the form of questions and answers:

Seidel: You understand that this is an informal interview and is in connection with the Bureau's COINTELPRO as it relates to the FBI investigation of the BPP?

Wirick: Yes, but for what purpose is the Senate conducting this survey?

Seidel: To aid in formation of new legislation so that the FBI and other Government agencies will have more definite guidelines to follow.

Wirick: I believe the Congress already through lack of information, isolated instances and some hysteria has enacted too many restrictive laws that prevent the FBI and other Government agencies from protecting the law abiding element of our society from the "bad guys".

Seidel: (He was in general agreement) Did you handle the COINTELPRO from 1970 through March, 1971?

Wirick: Yes, but I believe the BPP ceased to function locally about November or December, 1970. As I recall my function was to write a progress type letter regarding progress which described the illegal activities of members of the BPP and to report that this information had been furnished local police agencies but information generally emanated from confidential informants.

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Seidel: What type of illegal activities and did your program in any way instigate illegal activities on the part of the BPP?

Wirick: Criminal acts committed by local members of the BPP are what I was referring to. I don't believe it was ever necessary to instigate any illegal acts or in any way entrap BPP members in criminal acts. The majority of local BPP members were thieves, narcotics addicts, lazy, unemployed and were hero worshipers of the BPP in Oakland, California. They wanted to emulate the Oakland organization, but their own dishonesty, et cetera, was a constant source of turmoil amongst the local group.

I recall, date unknown, information was received regarding Kenny Denmon (Kenneth Lee Denmon), one time head of the local BPP, that he was using stolen credit cards.

Information was received that Walter Wallace (Walter Carl Wallace, Jr.) was on narcotics and that he and his wife, Velma, were stealing to get money for narcotics and that Velma's mother was also involved in local thefts.

All above information was furnished local law agencies and local arrests were made. Furnishing the above type of information is a function and responsibility of the FBI.

The BPP in San Diego was very effective in causing their own problems and their own extinction and their criminal activities were not restricted to the examples I've given.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO try to disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program?

Wirick: No, not to my knowledge. I recall that soon after the Breakfast Program was started that other members of the BPP accused Ken Denmon of stealing money from contributions made to the Program.

On second thought I believe we did disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program in that we received complaints from several dairys and bread companies, et cetera, that they had been approached by BPP members with veiled threats of extortion if they did not donate quantities of food, et cetera, to the BPP Breakfast Program. The FBI and local police investigated and I believe as a result their practices were discontinued, but the investigation failed to establish a prosecutable offense of extortion.

Seidel: Did you have any connection with distribution of "cartoons" depicting BPP members as compromising each other, et cetera?

Wirick: No, but I have seen "cartoons" in the BPP newspaper. Have you ever seen or read copies of the BPP newspaper?

Seidel: No

Wirick: They featured "cartoons" showing the "pigs" (police) being killed, stabbed, et cetera. I believe I recall seeing some "cartoons" showing how the BPP would kill the "honkies" (white people). They were similar to the propaganda leaflets used by the Nazis against American troops before an attack. The articles in the BPP newspaper were even more foul.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO promote dissen~~t~~sion between the BPP and the US Group (see Appendix page)?

Wirick: Not to my knowledge. As I recall there was never any need to. They were constantly at odds with each other and on a gang type basis were trying to eliminate each other. I believe Sylvester Bell, a San Diego BPP member was killed by an US Group member and John Savage, another local BPP member was killed by an US Group member.

In Los Angeles two other BPP members, names not recalled, were allegedly killed by US Group members. I believe this led to the popular saying in Southeast San Diego section where most blacks live that the score (game) was, "US 4 - BPP 0".

Seidel: What do you think of the merits of a proposal to spray shipments of the BPP newspaper with a noxious acid so that readers would be confronted with a vile odor when attempting to read the paper?

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Wirick: After thought, no. Because the paper itself was so vile and anti-white that the odor would never stop BPP members from reading same. I've always hoped that a large segment of the population, especially the "do-gooders" could or would experience the nauseous reaction I have felt after reading the illiterate, foul-mouthed, anti-white, anti-Government, BPP paper. I think everybody should read a copy of the BPP paper so that they will know the type and character of BPP members.

Seidel: What do you think about anonymous letters sent to spouses of BPP members saying the husband was sleeping with a white girl, et cetera?

Wirick: Most wives of the members I recall were also BPP members and/or common-law-wives. Many BPP members did have liaison with white girls but I doubt if such a letter would bother most spouses of BPP members. However, such a letter might be of value under certain circumstances, example: the stories that were spread during World War II which were not necessarily all true regarding Hitler, Mussolini, General Patton and others.

Seidel: In your opinion was the COINTELPRO of any value? Should it be changed? Do you have any suggestions for changes, or should it be eliminated completely?

Wirick: Yes, as I recall, it acted as a progress letter of the BPP, its direction, its dissension, its change in leadership, and indications of its slow local demise because of the character of the local BPP members, and as a summary of its activities for FBIHQ. I recall that

we made certain requests to conduct some types of counterintelligence against the BPP, but I do not recall that the Bureau ever authorized any counterintelligence act which might be productive.

Change? COINTELPRO is not being utilized to the best of my knowledge and has not been for some time.

I believe that in about two or three years Congress will be frantically asking the FBI why we did not furnish them intelligence, advance knowledge of a demonstration, a riot and other civil unrest and elimination of the COINTELPRO has been another step in the direction of placing the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in a position where we cannot react to the activities of groups such as the BPP which have been formed with the main purpose of overthrowing the United States.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Formerly Known As
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

The Black Panther Party (BPP), organized in December, 1966, at Oakland, California, by Huey P. Newton and Bobby George Seale, has the publicly-stated purpose of organizing black people to take control of the life, politics and destiny of the black community. The Party, operating the Black Panther Intercommunal News Service, publishes a newspaper called "The Black Panther," which at one time openly advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in a revolutionary program to end the oppression of the black people but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival program pending revolution. BPP national headquarters, aka Black Panther Intercommunal Headquarters, is located in Oakland, California.

While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order. Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 1973, issue of "Playboy" magazine, stated the Panthers' chief ambition is to change the American Government by any means necessary but that ultimately such change will be through armed violence.

Despite its claimed dedication to community service, indicators of the BPP's continued attraction to violence persist. Since July, 1974, Newton and other BPP members have been arrested in Oakland, California, for threatening police officers, murder of a 17-year-old female and the pistol whipping of Newton's tailor. Newton failed to appear on these charges and is now a local fugitive. Additionally, one died and three were wounded as a result of a shooting at a BPP-sponsored dance in Oakland, California, in October, 1974.

APPENDIX

"US"
Also Known As
"US", Incorporated

"US" was chartered by the State of California as a non-profit corporation in September, 1966, with offices at 8211 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California. The corporation alleges that "US" is primarily an Afro-American cultural organization.

During the spring of 1968, however, a source advised that MAULANA RON KARENGA, true name RONIE MC KINLEY EVERETT, Founder-Chairman of "US", published a booklet entitled "The Quotable Karenga", in which he talked of revolution, black power, and condemned Christianity for the plight of the black man.

In this booklet, KARENGA stated "...You must have a cultural revolution before the violent revolution. The cultural revolution gives identity, purpose, and direction. ...The revolution being fought now is a revolution to win the minds of our people. If we fail to win this, we cannot wage the violent one. ...When the word is given, we'll see how tough you are. When it's 'burn', let's see how much you blow up. And when it's 'take that white girl's head too', we'll see how tough you are..."

The above source advised that "US" members are required to study and memorize this booklet. "US" members are also assigned Swahili names which they use in lieu of their given names.

A second source advised that KARENGA had spoken at various meetings in Los Angeles at which time he talked of creating an "US" army of 1,000 men, obtaining weapons and ammunition, guerrilla warfare tactics, and revolution. KARENGA also stated "The only way to get life is to take a life and as we get stronger, we will take what we want from the white man's United States." He also stated that if the police killed any "US" members, the "US" organization would kill some of them.

APPENDIX CONTINUED

The first source above advised that KARENGA also stated that race riots throughout the country were not riots but were actually revolts or revolutions and that the black people were going to win their freedom by violence, if necessary.

A third source advised that KARENGA stated that a revolution would take place in the future and that no one can believe in black revolution without believing in armed conflict because the two go hand in hand.

A fourth source advised in August, 1974, that the US Organization has been evicted from its headquarters at 4302 South Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles, and because of lack of funds, has been unable to locate a new meeting place. The organization has terminated all public meetings.

FD-[illegible] (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 8/6/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714) (C)

SUBJECT: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Re Bureau teletypes 7/30/75 and 7/31/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM reflecting the interview of former SA ROBERT S. BAKER by SSC Staff Member LESTER SEIDEL.

The information in the enclosed LHM was voluntarily furnished to SA EARL M. PETERSEN by former SA BAKER.

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ASAC Barger SD, telephonically adv. that SD inadvertently failed to send the 7 copies: 8/13/75 B

Appendix pp. all refs. to appendix deleted prior to diss. B

Extra cc's destroyed 1-4063

62-116395-614

REC-56

18 AUG 1975

EX 104

62-116395

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (Enc. 8) (RM)
1 - San Diego
EMP:sp
(3)

Rec'd [illegible] cc- Personnel files

Enc. 8

1st to [illegible] 1-Pnf 8/18/75

9 SEP 17 1975

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Former Special Agent Robert S. Baker was interviewed at his home at 4268 Hortensia, San Diego, California, by U.S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel on August 1, 1975. The interview began at 10:30 AM and lasted until 12:30 PM. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), San Diego, California, was telephonically available for consultation. Former Special Agent Baker did not consult with anyone during the course of the interview.

Prior to the interview, Former Special Agent Baker had been advised that FBI Headquarters had waived the agreement as a former employee not to furnish information received during the period of his employment, for purposes of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source, that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques, or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see appendix).

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-611

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Seidel identified himself to Mr. Baker, stating that the interview would be in the form of an informal discussion and that information furnished by Mr. Baker would be placed in a memorandum for the SSC. Mr. Seidel stated that he did not intend to use the names of individuals interviewed in his memorandum. He stated that Mr. Baker did not have to talk to him, and that any information he furnished would be furnished voluntarily.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker was a supervisor with the San Diego Office of the FBI from sometime in 1968 through April, 1971.

Mr. Baker advised that he was a supervisor of the security squad but could not recall if the dates mentioned by Mr. Seidel were correct.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to the nature of matters supervised by him, to which Mr. Baker replied that matters such as investigation of the Communist Party (see appendix), the Socialist Workers Party (see appendix), the Black Panther Party, US, Incorporated (see appendix), the Nation of Islam (see appendix), Espionage, Sabotage matters, and other investigations were conducted on the squad supervised by him, which consisted of from 12 to 15 Special Agents.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker supervised the COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker advised that he did supervise this program which was initiated by FBI Headquarters and not on the field office level. He stated that as he recalled, a letter was submitted either monthly, quarterly or semi-annually. The letter was submitted by a Special Agent whose case load was such that he could take the time to prepare the letter.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Special Agent Roy Burns was more of a young, eager, type Agent.

Mr. Baker replied that this was not true but that Special Agent Burns had been assigned the COINTELPRO case because his case load was such that he was able to handle the program.

Mr. Seidel inquired whether Special Agent Roy Burns was transferred to the Butte Office of the FBI for disciplinary reasons.

Mr. Baker replied that Special Agent Burns was originally from Washington State and had wanted to be transferred to that area.

Mr. Seidel asked if the Bureau encouraged Agents to participate in disruptive programs and then rewarded them financially for their efforts.

Mr. Baker replied that the Bureau had an incentive award program, and if an Agent did a good job in any field, he could get recognition through an incentive award. Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall any award being given as a result of COINTELPRO activity.

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he could recall any information concerning the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that the operation of the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP was followed through sources. They advised that some of the BPP officials were stealing money from funds which were to be spent on the breakfast program. The breakfast program was served at a local Catholic church. Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that an official of the Catholic church in San Diego was contacted regarding the priest in charge of the church where the breakfast program was being held, who was reportedly an alcoholic. Mr. Seidel was advised that the priest was transferred from the church.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked what Mr. Baker's definition of the COINTELPRO was.

Mr. Baker replied that the COINTELPRO was a disruptive type program.

Mr. Seidel stated that the FBI had apparently written a letter regarding a white girl friend of Kenneth Denman, a BPP leader in San Diego. He inquired as to why this letter was written.

Mr. Baker stated that Denman was considered one of the stronger leaders of the San Diego Branch of the BPP, and if it was possible to keep him from becoming a strong leader, it would be disruptive to the party. The fact that Denman was living with a white girl was considered derogatory toward him by BPP members in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether such activity would have been taken against a leader in an organization such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) (see description) if the leader of such a group had been living with a white woman. Would such a letter be appropriate?

Mr. Baker replied that he did not feel that such a letter would be appropriate in this case because this organization involved a religious leader and our program was not directed at religious groups but was directed toward black militant and extremist groups.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker recalled individuals in the BPP named Tate, Wallace, Denman and Bell.

Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall anything specific about any of these individuals, except what he had previously stated concerning Denman. He said he could recall the names but nothing more concerning these individuals.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then mentioned an incident wherein the San Diego Office of the FBI had furnished information to the Los Angeles Office of the FBI for transmission to local authorities concerning a group of BPP members from San Diego who were traveling to Los Angeles to attend a funeral.

Mr. Baker stated that he could recall that such an incident occurred and that information was furnished stating that BPP members from San Diego would be carrying concealed weapons. He said he thought the furnishing of this information resulted in some of the BPP members being arrested in Los Angeles.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker could recall someone from the FBI in San Diego visiting the mother of a girl who was an alleged member of the BPP in San Diego, and whether the FBI went to the mother to put pressure on another member of the family.

Mr. Baker stated that he vaguely recalled such a case but could not recall the details and could not be certain this had occurred.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether the FBI had any technical surveillances on the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker stated that he knew of none and added that such coverage was not needed in San Diego because there were good sources in the BPP who could furnish excellent coverage. Mr. Baker stated that he believes he would have known of any such installations covering the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker knew of San Francisco using any such techniques against the BPP.

Mr. Baker replied that he believed that San Francisco had used such techniques.

Mr. Seidel then asked why such techniques were not used in San Diego if they were used in San Francisco.

Mr. Baker replied that such techniques were not needed in San Diego due to the good source coverage of party activity.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether there was a conflict between US, Incorporated, and the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that US, Incorporated, headquarters were in Los Angeles. There was a power struggle between the two groups for membership of blacks and much travel occurred by US, Incorporated, leaders from Los Angeles to San Diego and Mexico, and from San Diego to Los Angeles. There were considerable conflict between the two groups.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled Ron Karenga.

Mr. Baker replied that he did recall Ron Karenga as being the Los Angeles leader of US, Incorporated.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled some cards stating "Ron Karenga is impotent" which were printed in Los Angeles and some of which might have been sent to San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that he does not recall these cards but this could have been correct.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker recalled some cartoons being drawn concerning the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that there were two or three cartoons prepared depicting strife between US, Incorporated, and the BPP.

Mr. Seidel then stated that these cartoons were prepared by the Bureau Laboratory.

Mr. Baker stated that he did not recall.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that US, Incorporated, and the BPP were led by and made up of people with extensive criminal records, and because of this and their general demeanor, the FBI did not really have to provoke or disrupt them because they kept themselves in a constant state of turmoil. He stated that Special Agents connected with the COINTELPRO did not devote much time to the program because of heavy case loads of other matters and because they assisted in working criminal matters such as bank robberies and other criminal violations.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that a great deal of time was spent by the Special Agents working with their sources because they had to be extremely careful that they were protected. If a crime was planned and a source had knowledge of it, the source would try to keep the crime from being committed. If it was not possible to prevent the crime, the source might be forced to participate, and if arrested, a problem would be created in attempting to get the source out of jail and still conceal his identity as a source.

Mr. Seidel inquired of Mr. Baker as to the names of the Agents he dealt with in Los Angeles and San Francisco in connection with COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that Supervisor Albert Clark had something to do with the program in San Francisco, and in Los Angeles he dealt with Supervisor Richard Bloeser and Bill Knowland.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he was acquainted with Richard Held.

Mr. Baker stated that Richard Held was assigned as Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego, and he knew him at that time. He stated that he is aware that Richard Held is now the Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Office of the FBI.

Mr. Seidel stated to Mr. Baker that he was going to interview Assistant Director Robert Gebhardt and Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates.

This concluded the interview of former Special Agent Robert S. Baker by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was an organization founded by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., with the theme of new life for poor people. Dr. King, a leader in civil rights, was assassinated on April 4, 1969.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Formerly Known As
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

The Black Panther Party (BPP), organized in December, 1966, at Oakland, California, by Huey P. Newton and Bobby George Seale, has the publicly-stated purpose of organizing black people to take control of the life, politics and destiny of the black community. The Party, operating the Black Panther Intercommunal News Service, publishes a newspaper called "The Black Panther," which at one time openly advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in a revolutionary program to end the oppression of the black people but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival program pending revolution. BPP national headquarters, aka Black Panther Intercommunal Headquarters, is located in Oakland, California.

While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order. Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 1973, issue of "Playboy" magazine, stated the Panthers' chief ambition is to change the American Government by any means necessary but that ultimately such change will be through armed violence.

Despite its claimed dedication to community service, indicators of the BPP's continued attraction to violence persist. Since July, 1974, Newton and other BPP members have been arrested in Oakland, California, for threatening police officers, murder of a 17-year-old female and the pistol whipping of Newton's tailor. Newton failed to appear on these charges and is now a local fugitive. Additionally, one died and three were wounded as a result of a shooting at a BPP-sponsored dance in Oakland, California, in October, 1974.

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

Title 50, U. S. Code, Section 781 (Internal Security Act of 1950) stated that, as a result of evidence adduced before various committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, Congress found the existence of a world communist revolutionary movement, whose purpose is to establish a communist totalitarian dictatorship in the world's countries through the medium of a world-wide communist organization. Communist action organizations in various countries endeavor to carry out the objectives of the world communist movement by bringing about the overthrow of existing governments by any means. The communist organization in the United States - the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) - pursuing its stated objectives, presents "a clear and present danger to the security of the United States." The Subversive Activities Control Board, established by Section 791 of the above Act, found the CPUSA to be a communist action organization. This finding was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in June, 1961. The CPUSA has continued to be an arm of the international communist movement dominated by the Soviet Union. The CPUSA, in its dependence on the Soviet Union, has never knowingly adopted a position contrary to Soviet policy. Its leaders frequently confer with Soviet leaders to receive guidance and direction on the policies the CPUSA is to follow. There has been no evidence that the primary aims of the CPUSA, as they conform to Soviet objectives, have changed over the years.

APPENDIX

Revised 5/22/75

NATION OF ISLAM (NOI)
CHARACTERIZATION OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION
EXTREMIST MATTER

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is a black nationwife organization headquartered at Muhammad's Temple #2, 7351 South Stony Island Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Elijah Muhammad, self-styled "Messenger of Allah" and divinely appointed leader of the black race in America, was leader of the NOI until his death on February 25, 1975, at which time his son, Wallace D. Muhammad, became Supreme Minister of the NOI. The NOI seeks a separate black nation, espouses its own version of the Islamic Religion, and has considered all "whites" to be devils; however, Wallace D. Muhammad in an interview published in "Muhammad Speaks", March 21, 1975, same being a weekly and the official NOI newspaper, stated there would no longer be stress put on the white people's status as "devils"; that whites have "begun to reform" and "The past is the past until it is dug up. We will not dig it up." NOI official policy instructs members to obey laws of the United States that do not conflict with NOI laws; to defend NOI officials, property, women, and themselves at all costs, if attacked; and to disarm any attacker and use the attacker's weapon against him.

The NOI body is broken down into: 1) the Fruit of Islam (FOI), an all male military-type group, to which instruction in judo and karate is given, and which has as its mmission security of officials, membership, and property of the NOI, and enforcing discipline in the NOI; and 2) the Muslim Girls Training (MGT), an all female quasi military-type group which has as its mission homemaking and child guidance in accordance with NOI teachings.

NOI activity is widespread among black inmates in many prisons in the United States. In recent years internal dissidence and difficulties with rival Muslim groups and other adversaries have produced considerable violence, some involving physical confrontations and acts of violence with law enforcement agencies.

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is a revolutionary, Trotskyist-communist organization, which is headquartered in New York City. Its purpose, as stated in its Declaration of Principles, is the overthrow of the U. S. Government and the institution of a dictatorship of the working class and the eventual achievement of a communist society. It was founded in 1938 and maintains close association with international Trotskyist organizations as a "sympathizing" group, but it denies formal membership in any foreign group to escape application of the Voorhis Act, which regulates certain types of organizations subject to foreign control. While the SWP does not openly advocate the use of violence at the present time to overthrow the U. S. Government, it believes that eventual violent revolution in the U. S. is inevitable. Its objection to the current use of violence is based on the ground that it believes violence is premature at this time. The SWP seeks to precipitate a revolution when conditions are ripe and to seize control of the revolution and to direct it when it occurs.

APPENDIX

"US"
Also Known As
"US", Incorporated

"US" was chartered by the State of California as a non-profit corporation in September, 1966, with offices at 8211 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California. The corporation alleges that "US" is primarily an Afro-American cultural organization.

During the spring of 1968, however, a source advised that MAULANA RON KARENGA, true name RONIE MC KINLEY EVERETT, Founder-Chairman of "US", published a booklet entitled "The Quotable Karenga", in which he talked of revolution, black power, and condemned Christianity for the plight of the black man.

In this booklet, KARENGA stated "...You must have a cultural revolution before the violent revolution. The cultural revolution gives identity, purpose, and direction. ...The revolution being fought now is a revolution to win the minds of our people. If we fail to win this, we cannot wage the violent one. ...When the word is given, we'll see how tough you are. When it's 'burn', let's see how much you blow up. And when it's 'take that white girl's head too', we'll see how tough you are..."

The above source advised that "US" members are required to study and memorize this booklet. "US" members are also assigned Swahili names which they use in lieu of their given names.

A second source advised that KARENGA had spoken at various meetings in Los Angeles at which time he talked of creating an "US" army of 1,000 men, obtaining weapons and ammunition, guerrilla warfare tactics, and revolution. KARENGA also stated "The only way to get life is to take a life and as we get stronger, we will take what we want from the white man's United States." He also stated that if the police killed any "US" members, the "US" organization would kill some of them.

APPENDIX CONTINUED

The first source above advised that KARENGA also stated that race riots throughout the country were not riots but were actually revolts or revolutions and that the black people were going to win their freedom by violence, if necessary.

A third source advised that KARENGA stated that a revolution would take place in the future and that no one can believe in black revolution without believing in armed conflict because the two go hand in hand.

A fourth source advised in August, 1974, that the US Organization has been evicted from its headquarters at 4302 South Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles, and because of lack of funds, has been unable to locate a new meeting place. The organization has terminated all public meetings.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA.GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SECRET

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 8/14/75

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

FROM : W. A. Branigan

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALMKP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

CLASS. & EXT. BY ~~0320~~ Rwc/KAAS 9-3-81
REASON - FCIM 11, ~~1-2. 4. 2~~ 2
DATE OF REVIEW 8-14-95

Attached New York teletype advises of information from former Bureau Agent, who is a current informative asset, that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations (SSCIO) has become aware of Jaffe's allegations that the FBI has taken actions which have prevented him from obtaining or keeping a job in the news media field. Jaffe claims that his association with Bureau Agents with regard to Soviet intelligence matters cooled off after he was identified by a Soviet defector as cooperating with Soviet Intelligence and that the FBI has since deprived him from making a living in his profession. The SSCIO is looking into Jaffe's situation to determine if his allegations are true and if the FBI can be prevented from taking such actions in other similar situations. C

ORIGINAL FILED IN

BACKGROUND:

Jaffe is a former correspondent for ABC and CBS who was a symbol number informant of the New York Office from 1958 to 1961. During this period, he furnished information on his numerous contacts with Soviet nationals whom he met through his assignment as a CBS correspondent at the United Nations. In 1961, he joined ABC as its correspondent in Moscow where he served until he was expelled in 1965 following the publication of an article unfavorable to the Soviet Union. He was then transferred to Hong Kong where he remained until 1968. Since 1968, he has worked for various news media and has acted as a free lance journalist. Following his return from Hong Kong, he took up residence in Washington, D. C., and was in contact with the Washington Field Office, furnishing information on Soviets and Chinese nationals whom he met in the course of his employment. U

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REC-16

IST-110

Enclosure
105-28333

SECRET

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

CONTINUED - OVER

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

AUG 20 1975

~~Classified by 4091~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

RGK:yjd
(4)

Records

CC-62-116395

NOT RECORDED
SEP 17 1975

ENCLOSURE

84 SEP 18 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Soviet defector ["Sammy"] (U) has advised that Jaffe was recruited by the KGB, in about 1962 while he was in Moscow, through his relationship with a Soviet female. [Soviet defector "Shamrock" has confirmed that Jaffe was approached but does not believe the approach was successful.]c Jaffe reported to the New York Office in 1963 what he interpreted as a recruitment effort, and he was extensively reinterviewed in 1969 concerning his association with KGB officers in Moscow. [There is no information in Jaffe's file that he was ever reported on by Col. Penkovskiy, as Jaffe reportedly has claimed.]c During the interviews with Jaffe, he denied any overt acts helpful to the KGB, although he admitted a continuing relationship with several KGB officers. Both the New York and Washington Field Offices came to the conclusion that Jaffe was a KGB agent while in Moscow, but that there was doubt as to whether he continued in that role after he was expelled.

Our relations with Jaffe were tempered by ["Sammy's"] (U) allegation, and Bureau Agents in contact with him were circumspect in any dealings with him thereafter. Jaffe very likely detected a change in the Agents' attitude which accounts for his statement that he felt his relationship with them had cooled off.

There is no evidence contained in Jaffe's file that either New York or Washington Field or the Bureau has ever taken any action which would affect Jaffe's livelihood. Following his return from Hong Kong, Jaffe told his handling Agents that he was experiencing difficulty in finding a job. He several times mentioned his concern that his association with the FBI might be the reason. On each occasion, he was assured that the FBI had never divulged his confidential relationship and would not do so any time in the future. u

Jaffe's file does disclose that during an interview with Washington Field Agents in 1969, he said that he had learned from a British Intelligence contact in Hong Kong that his recall from that city was caused by his refusal to cooperate with CIA. He also related that he later mentioned this to a CIA contact in Washington who responded that the British

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Samuel Adason Jaffe
105-28333

Intelligence representative "had no right to tell you this." [CIA has informed us that they did have contacts with Jaffe while he was in Hong Kong and that he reported on Communist Chinese of interest to the Agency.] His file also records that Jaffe told New York Agents in 1969 that a recently published book on the Council of Foreign Relations described him as having a subversive background. He was also described in the book as being a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy. Jaffe connected the appearance of this book with his then recent recall fron Hong Kong by ABC.

ACTION:

That this memorandum be referred to the SENSTUDY project in view of probable inquiries from SSCIO.

JGN WRW

[illegible] to [illegible]
8/25/75
[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 13 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 024 NY CODE

7:35 P.M. NITEL 8-13-75 PLQ

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-14660)

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTN: INTD

Cregar

SENSTUDY, 1975.

NEW YORK 6811-IA TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED SPECIAL AGENT JOSEPH J. PALGUTA ON AUGUST 13, 1975, AND FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: c

ON AUGUST 11, 1975, MR. PATRICK A. SHEY, A MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (SSCIO), TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED NEW YORK 6811-IA, AND THEY MADE AN APPOINTMENT TO MEET IN NYC AT 2:00 PM ON AUGUST 13, 1975. SOURCE MET WITH SHEY AS ARRANGED ON AUGUST 13, 1975. SHEY TOLD SOURCE THAT SAM JAFFE (FORMER NEW YORK 2524-S) VISITED A FRIEND OF HIS, MR. MILLER, WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE SSCIO. WHILE IN MILLER'S OFFICE, JAFFE WAS RELATING TO MILLER THAT HE HAD A c

MDR-16
CLASSIFIED BY 5P2ALM/KP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

~~CLASS. & EXT. BY 10320 RWK/KWS 9-3-81~~
~~REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2. 4.2 2~~
~~DATE OF REVIEW 8-13-95~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE
CONFIDENTIAL

145

PLEASANT RELATIONSHIP WITH FORMER SPECIAL AGENTS (SAS) JOHN G. WALLIS AND EDWARD F. GAMBER WITH REGARD TO SOVIET INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. c

DURING THE TIME THAT JAFFE WAS RELATING ABOVE DATA TO MILLER, SENATOR CHURCH, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SSCIA, ENTERED MILLER'S OFFICE AND BECAME VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN JAFFE'S STATEMENTS. JAFFE RELATED TO MILLER THAT AS A REPORTER FOR THE COLUMBIA BROADCASTING COMPANY, HE COVERED THE STORY INVOLVING THE RELEASE OF FRANCIS G. POWERS BY THE SOVIETS (POWERS WAS THE FORMER U-2 PILOT WHO WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE USSR IN 1960). JAFFE RELATED TO MILLER THAT THEREAFTER HE WENT TO HONG KONG. JAFFE ALSO TOLD MILLER THAT WHEN HE RETURNED FROM HONG KONG (SOURCE BELIEVES THIS TO BE IN 1966-1968), HE LEARNED THAT HE WAS "FINGERED" BY A SOVIET DEFECTOR BY THE NAME OF PENKOVSKIY. THIS DEFECTOR ALLEGEDLY REPORTED THAT HE SAW JAFFE'S NAME ON A PIECE OF PAPER ON THE DESK OF A SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. JAFFE TOLD MILLER THAT THE FBI, UPON LEARNING THAT INFORMATION FELT THAT JAFFE WAS A "DOUBLE AGENT" BECAUSE OF THE COOLNESS OF BUREAU PERSONNEL TOWARD HIM WHEN HE RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES FROM HONG KONG. JAFFE c

TOLD MILLER THAT EVER SINCE HIS RETURN FROM HONG KONG, HE CANNOT HOLD A JOB, AND BELIEVES THE FBI IS THE CAUSE OF HIS PREDICAMENT. JAFFE IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE FBI IS BEING VINDICTIVE TOWARD HIM IN PURSUING THIS MATTER AND DEPRIVING HIM OF MAKING A LIVELIHOOD. c

MR. SHEY TOLD THE SOURCE THAT THE SSCIO IS LOOKING INTO THE ABOVE MATTER TO DETERMINE IF JAFFE'S STATEMENTS ARE TRUE, AND TO DETERMINE IF SOME CONTROLS COULD BE CREATED SO THAT THE FBI COULD NOT BE VINDICTIVE IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS. c

SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE TOLD SHEY THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE FBI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JAFFE AFTER 1964, SINCE HE RETIRED FROM THE BUREAU THAT YEAR. SOURCE ADVISED THAT SHEY TOLD HIM THAT AS YET HE HAS NOT TALKED TO FORMER SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, BUT MAY INTERVIEW HIM IN THE FUTURE. c

SOURCE ADVISED THAT SHEY TOLD HIM THAT JAFFE IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS A FREE-LANCE REPORTER WORKING IN WASHINGTON, DC. SOURCE STATED THE HE INFORMED SHEY OF FORMER SA GAMBER'S CURRENT EMPLOYMENT. c

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE MET WITH SHEY ON AUGUST 13, 1975 FROM 2:30 PM UNTIL 3:30 PM. c

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM THE SOURCE IN A GUARDED MANNER, AND ONLY THE PERTINENT FACTS WERE OBTAINED. c

THE NYO WILL PERSONALLY REINTERVIEW THE SOURCE REGARDING THE ABOVE AND OBTAIN COMPLETE DETAILS CONCERNING THE MATTER. c

~~CLASSIFIED BY 2649, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

END.

LRF FBIHQ CLR

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

August 18, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Enclosed for your information are two copies each of four memoranda concerning interviews by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of an FBI Assistant Director and two current and one former FBI Special Agents. One set of these memoranda is for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 8

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-613

SFP:lhb lhb
(10)

MAILED 20
AUG 20 1975
FBI

REC-56

EX 104

SEP 4 1975

NOTE:

LHMs ~~being~~ furnished to the Attorney General were received by airtels from Los Angeles, 8/7/75, and from San Diego (three), one dated 8/5/75 and two dated 8/6/75, all in connection with Senstudy 75. Copies of the airtels and the LHMs will be designated for the respective personnel files of the personnel who were interviewed.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

4 ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 SEP 8 1975

GPO 951-546

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEWS ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of interviews by SSC Staff Member of incumbent FBI Special Agents Earl M. Petersen, Lawrence F. Wirick, Assistant Director in Charge Robert E. Gebhardt and former Special Agent Robert S. Baker.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Counterintelligence
Surveillance, electronic
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

COINTELPRO of the FBI as it related to the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5-woc 18

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/gp

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE ROBERT E. GEBHARDT BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 7, 1975, Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt, Los Angeles Division, was interviewed in the Los Angeles FBI Office by Mr. Lester Seidel, Staff Member of the Senate Select Committee, United States Senate.

Gebhardt's rights were not explained to him by Seidel although Seidel did explain the purpose of the interview, that is, the Cointel Program of the FBI as it related to the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party when Gebhardt was the Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco Division from 1970 to 1972.

The interview lasted from 9:05 AM until 10:30 AM, and it was not necessary for Gebhardt to consult with any Bureau representative.

Gebhardt had previously been advised by a Bureau representative of his right to counsel, the privileged areas of information, consultation privileges, and the parameters of interview.

Seidel inquired at the outset as to whether Gebhardt was aware of the Cointel Program relative to the Black Panther Party investigation on a day to day basis being specifically advised details of the investigation as it relates to the Cointel Program. It was explained to Seidel that as Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco FBI Office wherein over 500 employees were located at the time, Gebhardt had many responsibilities in the operation of that division and

PROPERTY OF THE FBI
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-613

therefore, relied upon the experience, expertise, and judgment of the various supervisors assigned to the office for the day to day direction of the various matters under investigation, including the investigation of the Black Panther Party.

It was further explained that if a problem was encountered or a particularly unusual situation developed, Gebhardt was, of course, consulted and was available for such consultation to resolve any particular problem areas.

Gebhardt was next asked if he recalled being SAC when the electronic coverage of the Black Panther Party and the various officials at BBP was instituted and eventually terminated. Seidel was advised that the electronic coverage was already in effect upon Gebhardt's arrival, however, he does recall receiving a phone call after the "Keith Decision" was handed down instructing that all electronic coverage of the BPP and the various members of the BPP be discontinued. The call was received from Bureau Headquarters and the discontinuance was effected immediately.

Seidel inquired as to whether Gebhardt felt the intelligence type investigations should be completely removed from the criminal investigations which investigations would be looking toward eventual prosecution.

Seidel was informed by Gebhardt that even in criminal investigations looking toward prosecutions, much intelligence information is obtained from time to time which really has no value from a prosecutive standpoint, but does have possible value with respect to the direction of the investigation. In some criminal investigations a great deal of intelligence information may be obtained and in other types, very little. Insofar as the FBI is concerned, however, every effort is made to make certain there is some Federal law which would be a basis for an investigation which procedures would include matters commonly referred to as security investigations.

In some instances, in such security investigations a great deal of intelligence information would be obtained therefore, it was Gebhardt's opinion that so-called intelligence type investigations should not be removed from or differentiated from criminal type investigations looking toward prosecutions since intelligence information is an outgrowth of the basic investigation.

Gebhardt was asked if he felt the Cointelpro was a separate entity distinguished from the basic investigation and it was explained that the Cointelpro was a phase of the overall investigation in any particular organization or individual.

Gebhardt was asked if he felt Congress should enact legislation which would set forth specific investigative techniques that could or could not be utilized by the FBI or other Federal investigative agencies. He was advised in Gebhardt's opinion, such legislation should not be enacted, and in reply to the question as to why such legislation should not be enacted, it was pointed out that as an investigative agency, there must of necessity be allowed a certain flexibility because no two investigations are exactly alike and the circumstances of such investigations could possibly not be related to such Federal law.

In answer to the question as to how Congress should assure the American public that questionable activity such as the Cointelpro, was not being engaged in by an investigative agency such as the FBI, Seidel was informed that the Congress and the American people must rely upon the integrity and honesty of the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General.

It was pointed out that both the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General are nominated by the President, hearings are held before the various Congressional Committees and finally approved by the Senate. It was further pointed out that Director Kelley has recently stated in connection with the publicity relative to Cointelpro, that he has no intention of permitting this program to be reinstituted in the FBI and if circumstances ever arose which circumstances he could not contemplate at this time, wherein it was thought such activities should be embarked upon, he would obtain the personal approval of the Attorney General prior to such instituting. Seidel was informed that Gebhardt was in total agreement with this statement of Mr. Kelley.

Gebhardt was asked as to what his feelings were relative to what the relationship should be between the FBI and Congress. He was informed that a Senate Oversight Committee was recently established and it was felt that this was a good start and that this Committee should formalize and

standardize their oversight responsibilities and make regular inquiries of the Director and other officials of the FBI as to our activities. He was informed that there should be either a joint oversight committee between the House and Senate or if the Congress decided on two oversight Committees in both the House and Senate, these committees should be the entities through which all information relative to the activities of the FBI should flow.

It was emphasized however, that there should be regular consultation between these representatives and the FBI.

Inquiry was made as to Gebhardt's opinion relative to the relationship between the Department of Justice and the FBI and Seidel was informed the relationship, in Gebhardt's opinion, is excellent, should continue, and there should be a free flow of information between the FBI and the Department of Justice.

At the conclusion of the interview, Gebhardt summed up his comments by stating that Congress should definitely set up a structured oversight procedure of the activities of the FBI with due regard to the confidentiality of many of the FBI operations and investigations and must assure itself that the members of the Committee and its staff will maintain the confidentiality where necessary.

Secondly, in the areas of investigative matters usually referred to as national defense, national security or intelligence operations, all of the FBI investigations must be based on the application of the facts toward a particular Federal statute and if the facts are so oblique that they cannot be clearly applied to a particular Federal statute, consultation with the Department of Justice should be had in all instances.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Former Special Agent Robert S. Baker was interviewed at his home at 4268 Hortensia, San Diego, California, by U.S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel on August 1, 1975. The interview began at 10:30 AM and lasted until 12:30 PM. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), San Diego, California, was telephonically available for consultation. Former Special Agent Baker did not consult with anyone during the course of the interview.

Prior to the interview, Former Special Agent Baker had been advised that FBI Headquarters had waived the agreement as a former employee not to furnish information received during the period of his employment, for purposes of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source, that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques, or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) ~~(see appendix)~~. destroyed

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-615 3

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Seidel identified himself to Mr. Baker, stating that the interview would be in the form of an informal discussion and that information furnished by Mr. Baker would be placed in a memorandum for the SSC. Mr. Seidel stated that he did not intend to use the names of individuals interviewed in his memorandum. He stated that Mr. Baker did not have to talk to him, and that any information he furnished would be furnished voluntarily.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker was a supervisor with the San Diego Office of the FBI from sometime in 1968 through April, 1971.

Mr. Baker advised that he was a supervisor of the security squad but could not recall if the dates mentioned by Mr. Seidel were correct.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to the nature of matters supervised by him, to which Mr. Baker replied that matters such as investigation of the Communist Party (see appendix), the Socialist Workers Party (see appendix), the Black Panther Party, US, Incorporated (see appendix), the Nation of Islam (see appendix), Espionage, Sabotage matters, and other investigations were conducted on the squad supervised by him, which consisted of from 12 to 15 Special Agents.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker supervised the COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker advised that he did supervise this program which was initiated by FBI Headquarters and not on the field office level. He stated that as he recalled, a letter was submitted either monthly, quarterly or semi-annually. The letter was submitted by a Special Agent whose case load was such that he could take the time to prepare the letter.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Special Agent Roy Burns was more of a young, eager, type Agent.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Baker replied that this was not true but that Special Agent Burns had been assigned the COINTELPRO case because his case load was such that he was able to handle the program.

Mr. Seidel inquired whether Special Agent Roy Burns was transferred to the Butte Office of the FBI for disciplinary reasons.

Mr. Baker replied that Special Agent Burns was originally from Washington State and had wanted to be transferred to that area.

Mr. Seidel asked if the Bureau encouraged Agents to participate in disruptive programs and then rewarded them financially for their efforts.

Mr. Baker replied that the Bureau had an incentive award program, and if an Agent did a good job in any field, he could get recognition through an incentive award. Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall any award being given as a result of COINTELPRO activity.

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he could recall any information concerning the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that the operation of the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP was followed through sources. They advised that some of the BPP officials were stealing money from funds which were to be spent on the breakfast program. The breakfast program was served at a local Catholic church. Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that an official of the Catholic church in San Diego was contacted regarding the priest in charge of the church where the breakfast program was being held, who was reportedly an alcoholic. Mr. Seidel was advised that the priest was transferred from the church.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked what Mr. Baker's definition of the COINTELPRO was.

Mr. Baker replied that the COINTELPRO was a disruptive type program.

Mr. Seidel stated that the FBI had apparently written a letter regarding a white girl friend of Kenneth Denman, a BPP leader in San Diego. He inquired as to why this letter was written.

Mr. Baker stated that Denman was considered one of the stronger leaders of the San Diego Branch of the BPP, and if it was possible to keep him from becoming a strong leader, it would be disruptive to the party. The fact that Denman was living with a white girl was considered derogatory toward him by BPP members in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether such activity would have been taken against a leader in an organization such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) (see description) if the leader of such a group had been living with a white woman. Would such a letter be appropriate?

Mr. Baker replied that he did not feel that such a letter would be appropriate in this case because this organization involved a religious leader and our program was not directed at religious groups but was directed toward black militant and extremist groups.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker recalled individuals in the BPP named Tate, Wallace, Denman and Bell.

Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall anything specific about any of these individuals, except what he had previously stated concerning Denman. He said he could recall the names but nothing more concerning these individuals.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then mentioned an incident wherein the San Diego Office of the FBI had furnished information to the Los Angeles Office of the FBI for transmission to local authorities concerning a group of BPP members from San Diego who were traveling to Los Angeles to attend a funeral.

Mr. Baker stated that he could recall that such an incident occurred and that information was furnished stating that BPP members from San Diego would be carrying concealed weapons. He said he thought the furnishing of this information resulted in some of the BPP members being arrested in Los Angeles.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker could recall someone from the FBI in San Diego visiting the mother of a girl who was an alleged member of the BPP in San Diego, and whether the FBI went to the mother to put pressure on another member of the family.

Mr. Baker stated that he vaguely recalled such a case but could not recall the details and could not be certain this had occurred.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether the FBI had any technical surveillances on the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker stated that he knew of none and added that such coverage was not needed in San Diego because there were good sources in the BPP who could furnish excellent coverage. Mr. Baker stated that he believes he would have known of any such installations covering the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker knew of San Francisco using any such techniques against the BPP.

Mr. Baker replied that he believed that San Francisco had used such techniques.

Mr. Seidel then asked why such techniques were not used in San Diego if they were used in San Francisco.

Mr. Baker replied that such techniques were not needed in San Diego due to the good source coverage of party activity.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether there was a conflict between US, Incorporated, and the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that US, Incorporated, headquarters were in Los Angeles. There was a power struggle between the two groups for membership of blacks and much travel occurred by US, Incorporated, leaders from Los Angeles to San Diego and Mexico, and from San Diego to Los Angeles. There were considerable conflict between the two groups.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled Ron Karenga.

Mr. Baker replied that he did recall Ron Karenga as being the Los Angeles leader of US, Incorporated.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled some cards stating "Ron Karenga is impotent" which were printed in Los Angeles and some of which might have been sent to San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that he does not recall these cards but this could have been correct.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker recalled some cartoons being drawn concerning the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that there were two or three cartoons prepared depicting strife between US, Incorporated, and the BPP.

Mr. Seidel then stated that these cartoons were prepared by the Bureau Laboratory.

Mr. Baker stated that he did not recall.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that US, Incorporated, and the BPP were led by and made up of people with extensive criminal records, and because of this and their general demeanor, the FBI did not really have to provoke or disrupt them because they kept themselves in a constant state of turmoil. He stated that Special Agents connected with the COINTELPRO did not devote much time to the program because of heavy case loads of other matters and because they assisted in working criminal matters such as bank robberies and other criminal violations.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that a great deal of time was spent by the Special Agents working with their sources because they had to be extremely careful that they were protected. If a crime was planned and a source had knowledge of it, the source would try to keep the crime from being committed. If it was not possible to prevent the crime, the source might be forced to participate, and if arrested, a problem would be created in attempting to get the source out of jail and still conceal his identity as a source.

Mr. Seidel inquired of Mr. Baker as to the names of the Agents he dealt with in Los Angeles and San Francisco in connection with COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that Supervisor Albert Clark had something to do with the program in San Francisco, and in Los Angeles he dealt with Supervisor Richard Bloeser and Bill Knowland.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he was acquainted with Richard Held.

Mr. Baker stated that Richard Held was assigned as Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego, and he knew him at that time. He stated that he is aware that Richard Held is now the Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Office of the FBI.

Mr. Seidel stated to Mr. Baker that he was going to interview Assistant Director Robert Gebhardt and Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates.

This concluded the interview of former Special Agent Robert S. Baker by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel.

~~The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was an organization founded by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., with the theme of new life for poor people. Dr. King, a leader in civil rights, was assassinated on April 4, 1969.~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 5, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/VP

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

By communication dated July 30, 1975, Clarence M. Kelley, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, advised as follows concerning an interview by representative of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) of Special Agent (SA) Lawrence F. Wirick, concerning Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and Bureau investigation of the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see Appendix page). Director Kelley stated as follows:

"I have waived your employment agreements for purposes of these interviews. Each should note that he has the right to counsel; however, the FBI is unable to provide private counsel. There are certain privileged areas concerning which SAS would not be required to answer questions. Areas concern information which might divulge identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect on-going FBI investigations; and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-613

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

On July 31, 1975, at 11:45 a.m. Mr. Lester Seidel of the United States Senate Select Committee (SSC) interviewed SA Lawrence F. Wirick at the San Diego Office of the FBI. No Advice of Rights was furnished SA Wirick and it was not necessary for the interviewee to consult with an FBI representative. The interview was terminated at 12:50 p.m. and as best recalled included the following discussion in the form of questions and answers:

Seidel: You understand that this is an informal interview and is in connection with the Bureau's COINTELPRO as it relates to the FBI investigation of the BPP?

Wirick: Yes, but for what purpose is the Senate conducting this survey?

Seidel: To aid in formation of new legislation so that the FBI and other Government agencies will have more definite guidelines to follow.

Wirick: I believe the Congress already through lack of information, isolated instances and some hysteria have enacted too many restrictive laws that prevent the FBI and other Government agencies from protecting the law abiding element of our society from the "bad guys".

Seidel: (He was in general agreement) Did you handle the COINTELPRO from 1970 through March, 1971?

Wirick: Yes, but I believe the BPP ceased to function locally about November or December, 1970. As I recall my function was to write a progress type letter regarding progress which described the illegal activities of members of the BPP and to report that this information had been furnished local police agencies but information generally emanated from confidential informants.

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Seidel: What type of illegal activities and did your program in any way instigate illegal activities on the part of the BPP?

Wirick: Criminal acts committed by local members of the BPP is what I was referring to. I don't believe it was ever necessary to instigate any illegal acts or in any way entrap BPP members in criminal acts. The majority of local BPP members were thieves, narcotics addicts, lazy, unemployed and were hero worshipers of the BPP in Oakland, California. They wanted to emulate the Oakland organization, but their own dishonesty, et cetera, was a constant source of turmoil amongst the local group.

I recall, date unknown, information was received regarding Kenny Denmon (Kenneth Lee Denmon), one time head of the local BPP, that he was using stolen credit cards.

Information was received that Walter Wallace (Walter Carl Wallace, Jr.) was on narcotics and that he and his wife, Velma, were stealing to get money for narcotics and that Velma's mother was also involved in local thefts.

All above information was furnished local law agencies and local arrests were made. Furnishing the above type of information is a function and responsibility of the FBI.

The BPP in San Diego was very effective in causing their own problems and their own extinction and their criminal activities were not restricted to the examples I've given.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO try to disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program?

Wirick: No, not to my knowledge. I recall that soon after the Breakfast Program was started that other members of the BPP accused Ken Denmon of stealing money from contributions made to the Program.

On second thought I believe we did disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program in that we received complaints from several dairys and bread companies, et cetera, that they had been approached by BPP members with veiled threats of extortion if they did not donate quantities of food et cetera to the BPP Breakfast Program. The FBI and local police investigated and I believe as a result their practices were discontinued, but the investigation failed to establish a prosecutable offense of extortion.

Seidel: Did you have any connection with distribution of "cartoons" depicting BPP members as compromising each other et cetera?

Wirick: No, but I have seen "cartoons" in the BPP newspaper. Have you ever seen or read copies of the BPP newspaper?

Seidel: No

Wirick: They featured "cartoons" showing the "pigs" (police) being killed, stabbed, et cetera. I believe I recall seeing some "cartoons" showing how the BPP would kill the "honkies" (white people). They were similar to the propaganda leaflets used by the Nazis against American troops before an attack. The articles in the BPP newspaper were even more foul.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO promote dissension between the BPP and the US Group (see Appendix page)?

Wirick: Not to my knowledge. As I recall there was never any need to. They were constantly at odds with each other and on a gang type basis were trying to eliminate each other. I believe Sylvester Bell, a San Diego BPP member was killed by an US Group member and John Savage, another local BPP member was killed by an US Group member.

In Los Angeles two other BPP members, names not recalled, were allegedly killed by US Group members. I believe this led to the popular saying in Southeast San Diego section where most blacks live that the score (game) was, "US 4 - BPP 0".

Seidel: What do you think of the merits of a proposal to spray shipments of the BPP newspaper with a noxious acid so that readers would be confronted with a vile odor when attempting to read the paper?

Wirick:	After thought, no. Because the paper itself was so vile and anti-white that the odor would never stop BPP members from reading same. I've always hoped that a large segment of the population, especially the "do-gooders" could or would experience the nauseous reaction I have felt after reading the illiterate, foul-mouthed, anti-white, anti-Government, BPP paper. I think everybody should read a copy of the BPP paper so that they will know the type and character of BPP members.
Seidel:	What do you think about anonymous letters sent to spouses of BPP members saying the husband was sleeping with a white girl, et cetera?
Wirick:	Most wives of the members I recall were also BPP members and/or common-law-wives. Many BPP members did have liaison with white girls but I doubt if such a letter would bother most spouses of BPP members. However, such a letter might be of value under certain circumstances, example: the stories that were spread during World War II which were not necessarily all true regarding Hitler, Mussolini, General Patton and others.
Seidel:	In your opinion was the COINTELPRO of any value? Should it be changed? Do you have any suggestions for changes, or should it be eliminated completely?
Wirick:	Yes, as I recall, it acted as a progress letter of the BPP, its direction, its dissension, its change in leadership, and indications of its slow local demise because of the character of the local BPP members, and as a summary of its activities for FBIHQ. I recall that

we made certain requests to conduct some types of counterintelligence against the BPP, but I do not recall that the Bureau ever authorized any counterintelligence act which might be productive.

Change? COINTELPRO is not being utilized to the best of my knowledge and has not been for some time.

I believe that in about two or three years Congress will be frantically asking the FBI why we did not furnish them intelligence, advance knowledge of a demonstration, a riot and other civil unrest and elimination of the COINTELPRO has been another step in the direction of placing the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in a position where we cannot react to the activities of groups such as the BPP which have been formed with the main purpose of overthrowing the United States.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 5BALMKP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Special Agent (SA) Earl M. Petersen was interviewed at the San Diego office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on July 31, 1975, by U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel. The interview began at 10:05 A.M. and ended at 11:35 A.M. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger was available nearby for consultation. He was not consulted during the interview.

Prior to the interview, SA Petersen had been advised by San Diego FBI officials that FBI Headquarters had waived the employee agreement not to furnish information for the purpose of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

SA Petersen was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source; that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques; or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

SA Petersen was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see appendix).

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-615 6

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Lester Seidel identified himself to SA Petersen and stated that he was not warning SA Petersen of his rights as the interview was such that such a warning was not required. He advised SA Petersen that he did not have to talk to him and that any information furnished was on a voluntary basis. He stated that information furnished to him would be handled with discretion.

Mr. Seidel:	Were you in charge of the COINTELPRO in San Diego from March, 1968 through October, 1968?
SA Petersen:	This was possible but the dates the program was assigned to me are not recalled.
Mr. Seidel:	What was the name of the squad to which you were assigned at that time?
SA Petersen.	The Security Squad.
Mr. Seidel:	Who did the squad investigate? Was it groups such as US, Inc. (see appendix) and the BPP?
SA Petersen:	Yes, such groups as US, Inc., the BPP, and the Nation of Islam (NOI) (see appendix).
Mr. Seidel:	And possibly splinter groups?
SA Petersen:	Yes, groups that would form and disband and which could possibly be called splinter groups.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel:	How long have you been in the Bureau?
SA Petersen:	Twenty-four years as of June 25, 1975.
Mr. Seidel:	Where have you been assigned?
SA Petersen:	In Boston, Baltimore, New York, Tampa, and San Diego.
Mr. Seidel:	The Bureau has indicated that you were a coordinator of the COINTELPRO in San Diego. As such, what were your duties?
SA Petersen:	The duties for the most part consisted of preparing letters to the Bureau asking for authority to take some specific action in the program; awaiting the reply from the Bureau; and then, if any action was taken, to advise the Bureau of the results of such action. It is noted that many of the requests to take specific action were turned down by the Bureau.
Mr. Seidel:	Were you the focal point of the program?
SA Petersen:	Yes, in the sense that any idea for action to be taken in the program was transmitted to the Bureau for approval by me and if approval was received, it would be related to whomever had suggested the activity. I would then report any results to the Bureau.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Did you get heavy pressure from Bureau officials to take action in this program?

SA Petersen: Not any more than any other case, and I had a number of other cases assigned to me at the time the COINTELPRO was assigned to me.

Mr. Seidel: What type of things did you do?

SA Petersen: I do not recall at this time any specific action taken in the program. I do recall that a Black Panther leader, Walter Wallace, was removed as leader of the party in San Diego. I believe it was suspected that he might have cooperated with the FBI. This could have been accomplished by interviewing him where the interview could be seen by other party members. If the Agents shook his hand, smiled, and acted like he was a friend, it might plant the seed of suspicion in the minds of other BPP members. I do not recall specifically whether this happened but at any rate, Wallace was not trusted and was removed as leader of the party.

Mr. Seidel: Could such a thing get Wallace killed or injured?

SA Petersen: I do not see how it would because there would be no way anyone could determine whether or not Wallace was, in fact, cooperating with the FBI. He was probably removed by the BPP as a precautionary measure. I cannot recall whether or not Wallace was removed while I was coordinator of the program.

Mr. Seidel: Was COINTELPRO successful?

SA Petersen: I was not too impressed with its success in San Diego while I had it assigned to me because it was a new program and it took some time to get it established and working. Most of the success was probably due to information obtained regarding criminal violations, mostly local in nature, which was furnished to local law enforcement officers, causing the arrest of BPP members. This would have been done whether or not we had a COINTELPRO. It was necessary to prepare a letter to the Bureau asking authority to take action and then wait for a reply authorizing the activity. Many times suggested COINTELPRO activity suggestions would be turned down.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel made available Xerox copies of Bureau letters captioned, "Counter-Intelligence Program; Black Nationalist - Hate Groups," dated August 25, 1967 and March 4, 1968. These were read by SA Petersen, who said he could not specifically recall reading the letters.

Mr. Seidel: Was contact with the police formal or informal?

SA Petersen: Contact was personal or telephonic contact and at one time, information furnished to individual officers was confirmed by letter to the Chief of Police. It is not recalled if this was the policy during the time COINTELPRO was assigned to me.

Mr. Seidel: What happened to SA Roy Burns?

SA Petersen: He was transferred to the Butte, Montana Field Office.

Mr. Seidel: Did he do anything wrong? I understand Agents were sometimes transferred to Butte as a disciplinary measure.

SA Petersen: SA Burns wanted to be transferred to Butte and requested the transfer. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Mr. Evans, was transferred there and may have helped SA Burns get moved there.

Mr. Seidel: How old is Bob Baker:

SA Petersen: Probably 51 or 52 years old.

Mr. Seidel: Did he retire early?

SA Petersen: No. He was in a position to retire and retired because he wanted to take advantage of a cost of living increase by retiring prior to a certain date, such as June 30.

Mr. Seidel: Were the BPP and US, Inc. both violence oriented groups?

SA Petersen: Very definitely. There was extreme friction between the BPP and US, Inc. at all times.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some caricatures used in connection with COINTELPRO?

SA Petersen: Yes.

Mr. Seidel: Who had the program at that time?

SA Petersen: I believe SA Burns had it then.

Mr. Seidel: What were the cartoons?

SA Petersen: I recall seeing them but do not recall any specific cartoon.

Mr. Seidel: Do you think anything done in COINTELPRO could have had a reaction causing someone to kill an individual in the other group?

SA Petersen: Because of the extreme antagonism between the two groups, anything we did would have had about the same effect as a gnat biting an elephant. I do not think COINTELPRO had that kind of impact.

/

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Did you ever supervise any technical installation or electronic surveillance of the BPP in San Diego?

SA Petersen: No. I don't recall anything like that being done here.

Mr. Seidel: How would you feel about writing a letter to a wife saying her husband was sleeping with various other women if the husband was a BPP leader?

SA Petersen: I would hesitate to do this because it might break up a family. If the facts were true and this might cause the BPP leader to be less effective, it would probably be a good counterintelligence move.

Mr. Seidel: I am referring to Page 91 of a BPP COINTELPRO summary which indicates that a BPP leader was living with a white girl and an anonymous letter was written to others in the BPP saying that this individual was living with a white girl. Do you recall anything about that?

SA Petersen: I believe that leader could have been Kenneth Denmon in San Diego. I recall that he was living with a white woman and that others in the BPP were made aware of this in some manner. The BPP in San

SA Petersen (continued): Diego was teaching children to hate and kill police officers. They planned violent criminal acts and were making plans to take over the established government at the first opportunity. If a leader of such a group could be discredited and removed, it would help to keep the group from becoming stronger, as they would have to select a new leader, and he would have to get the group reorganized. Denmon had many additional weaknesses which could be used in a counter-intelligence program.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall a letter being sent to BPP Headquarters saying a leader of the BPP was cooperating with the police in Los Angeles?

SA Petersen: I do not recall such a letter.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some cards being sent to San Diego from Los Angeles saying, "Ron Karenga is impotent"?

SA Petersen: No, I do not recall such cards. Ron Karenga was a leader of US, Inc., not the BPP.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall that cartoons were to be sent to BPP members to discredit the leaders?

SA Petersen: I recall the cartoons but do not recall whether they were sent to BPP members.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall an anonymous letter being sent to the Catholic Church to have the priest of the church where the BPP breakfast program was operated removed from his office?

SA Petersen: I do not recall such an anonymous letter; however, I do recall that the priest was transferred by the church.

Mr. Seidel: Knowing that the BPP paper was a paper that taught and advocated violence and had cartoons in it that encouraged the killing of police officers by blacks and was a violence oriented paper, how would you feel about putting a corrosive liquid on the paper to keep it from being distributed?

SA Petersen: I would not do it as I would feel that it was a violation of the law and too drastic. I would not do it personally or personally approve of it.

Mr. Seidel: You have been very helpful and the information you have provided will be used in considering new legislation at some time in the future.

SA Petersen: In these tranquil times, it disturbs me greatly to read in the papers and to hear news broadcasts containing all kinds of allegations against the FBI and the CIA and

SA Petersen (continued):	other intelligence agencies. I like to work within the law and to be guided by legislation in my work. I would, however, hate to see such restrictive legislation passed that at some time in the future when we might be faced with violence-prone organizations trying to take control of the government, we would be unable to properly handle our responsibility for the internal security of the United States.
Mr. Seidel:	Thank you for your cooperation.

OFF[illegible] OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENE[illegible]
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

W

TO: John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: WCL K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Attached for your information is a letter regarding the "proposed procedures" to the Attorney General from Senate Select Committee. I am attaching two extra copies of it, as I am sure that Mr. Adams and the Director may also wish to see it.

B

REC-56 62-116395-612

EX-104

7 AUG 6 1975

B

6 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

84 SEP 8 1975

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Proposed procedu

July 18, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/dP

62-116395-64

ENCLOSURE

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 13 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 5P2A LMK

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader/or the Senior Staff has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Proposed guidelines

July 18, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 15 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

or the Senior Staff

(b) If the Task Force Leader/has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Proposed procedures

July 18, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 13 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

or the Senior Staff

(b) If the Task Force Leader/has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

TO: Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Senstudy '75

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Responses to Request for Comments on Proposed Procedures

1. The Deputy Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, and Civil Rights Division register no objections to the proposed procedures on access. OLA suggests inclusion of a preamble referencing security agreements and the need for proper security assurances from the Committee to the Attorney General.

2. Both the Criminal Division and Office of Legal Counsel address the short response time frames imposed upon the Attorney General, and OLC suggests certain language changes for purposes of clarity and focus.

3. The Attorney General is troubled by Item 9 and its need for modification as to categories of material not treatable by these proposed procedures or as to a later discovered need to make presently unanticipated changes to effect a smoother operation of the procedures.

4. The Bureau's comments on the proposed procedures are attached and should be read. This Office does not agree with the Bureau that the proposed procedures should be presented to the President and the President's Counsel.

5. No response has been received from the Solicitor General.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

EX 104 REC-56 62-116395-611

7 AUG 6 1975

14 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 SEP 8 1975

6. This Office recommends that Item 9 be modified as suggested by the Attorney General and that the language modifications suggested by OLC for Items 3 and 6 be adopted.

7. It is further suggested that the Attorney General convene a meeting of the senior Bureau officials for the purpose of informing them of his policy decision in this matter.

Copies to:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
✓Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: K. William O'Connor

DATE: July 18, 1975

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FILES

In response to your memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned as above, we observe that the "substantial negotiations" which produced the proposed procedures did not include participation by a representative of the FBI and that the request for our views concerning disclosure of highly sensitive FBI material was first received at 11:14 a.m. today with a reply expected by 2:00 p.m. today. We respectfully suggest that not only should you afford greater opportunity for an expression of our views on this matter, but that any such proposed procedures should be presented to the President's Counsel for concurrence and for an expression of the President's views as to the general policy of the Executive Branch in this regard. Further, you may want to consider addressing the problem of the impact such general disclosure of files would have on pending criminal investigations.

A preliminary review in the time available revealed that certain items require considerable modification. For example, Item (3)(c) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for information that would tend to identify sources to whom the FBI has an obligation of confidentiality as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity already has been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identity to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman."

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975
KWO'C

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/VP

U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Item (6)(b) should be reconsidered with the following language:

"If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the FBI will furnish a written statement of the grounds for its position to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation within 24 hours."

Item (8) should be reconsidered with the following language:

"The Staff and the Members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the Staff is given access as extensively as necessary between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, in the FBI J. Edgar Hoover Building at Room 4171."

In light of the difficulties described, it is my strong recommendation that such procedures should not be hastily agreed upon with the Committee and that full discussion should be had concerning this matter by representatives of the FBI, the Attorney General, the Committee and the Counsel to the President.

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. 48 hour lead time is very short and may create problems; 24 hour reaction time may be unreasonable for Attorney General.
2. The provision seems a little odd, out of context of negotiations.
3. Suggest that in 3(a), last line, word and should be or and "peculiarly sensitive" read to modify both foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.
4. No comment
5. No comment
6. Time frames are very restrictive; there should be a stated opportunity for TFL to work out any objections with FBI, before raising to Special Counsel "...if the issue is not promptly resolved between the TFL and the FBI, the materials in issue will be conveyed..."
7. Define "screened" by reference to 6(a) above
8. No comment
9. No comment

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. No problem with this procedure, but feels that the time limits are too tight
2. No central policy objection
3. Suggest incorporate a preamble phrase that makes reference to security agreements; a specific means for assurance to the AG by the Chairman and Vice Chairman of proper security measures

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

Views of Thornburg and Kevin Maroney

1. Time frames a bit skimpy
2. looks as though we're giving up a lot, but that's probably what's required

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

No objection to proposed procedures on access

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

TO: Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Responses: Congressional Access to Personal Files Maintained by the FBI

With the exception of the Solicitor General's Office, all Departmental components whose views were solicited have provided their views on the question of Congressional Access to Personal FBI Files.

OLC, OLA, and Criminal Division favor a combination of options 1 and 3. Civil Rights Division favors option 1. The Bureau chooses option 3.

This office recommends the adoption of the position articulated by OLC and concurred in by OLA and Criminal.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/jp

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

Suggest combine option 1 and option 3; make deletion per option 1, but make oral explanation of the deletion; entire paragraph or document should be withheld to protect source.

Feels there is a serious, if not constitutional, issue as to the prospective trespass upon a citizen's rights to give information in confidence to his government.

Option 4 is absolutely unacceptable; would fight it in the courts.

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

Opts for 1 & 3 consolidation
Same gist as Scalia

FBI

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

FBI would choose 3, but say "portion of papers" instead of "papers"

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

		ACTION
1 TO *(Name, office symbol or location)*	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	DATE	COORDINATION
2 Mr. Thornburgh	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

I agree with your recommendations on this, except "sensitive sources" should be read to include identity of any person who has furnished info or opinion re the Senator, as, e.g., in a background investigation.

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM *(Name, office symbol or location)* KEVIN T. MARONEY	DATE 1/1/79
	PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

048—16—81594-1 532-103 GPO 5041-101

My view is that item 9 goes too far in that there must be some provision which allows the Department or the Committee to abrogate the arrangement. I should think the agreement could provide that at any time the Chairman of the Committee or the Attorney General could give a notification that the (1)agreement was not suitable for a particular category of material or(2)that for some reason the agreement was not operating suitably and that as to either one or two there would then be an endeavor to work out a suitable modification or different arrangement (but I think it has to be said that the arrangement can be cancelled by either party)

OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

7/18/75

To: Bill O'Connor

From: Doug Marvin

Attached is the Attorney General's comment on the procedures for dealing with the Senate Select Committee

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

Approves Option 1. (memo to follow)

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY 5Y2ALM KP

TO: See Distribution

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Congressional Access to Personal Files Maintained by the FBI

Certain members of the Senate Select Committee have requested access to their personal files. The preferred mode of access is the subject of pending consideration by the Attorney General. As you know, under the mandate of the Senate Select Committee, access to the personal file of a member of the Senate Select Committee may be had without any consideration of Freedom of Information Act issues.

The Attorney General has considered several options, and has asked that you consider them and indicate hereon your view; he has asked that these views be delivered to me not later than 1:00 p.m., this afternoon so that he may promptly consider them. The options considered are not exclusive. If you have any suggestions other than the options indicated, please attach it to your response. Responses should be delivered to me in Room 4213, Main Justice, by the time indicated. Thank you for your cooperation.

OPTIONS

Option 1: Departmental staff examine the documents in the file and delete any references to sensitive sources or ongoing criminal investigation; thereafter, the file is made accessible to the Senator under controlled circumstances at the Department of Justice.

✓ Approved ______ Disapproved

Comment:

EITHER THIS OR 3 IS PREFERABLE BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW WHAT "PERSONAL FILES" LOOK LIKE, HARD TO CHOOSE

Option 2: Same as Option 1, except that a xerox of the documents as excised is delivered to the Senator.

______ Approved   X Disapproved

Comment: PERHAPS SOME CONSIDERATION TO XEROX COPIES OF SPECIFIED DOCS AFTER REVIEW. EVEN THIS IS QUESTIONABLE, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF "LEAK" PROBLEM.

Option 3: The file is assembled and the Senator given access to it, with certain papers withheld and the Senator is orally advised of the reasons for withholding of the documents.

✓ Approved   ______ Disapproved

Comment:

SEE COMMENT TO #2

Option 4: The Senator is furnished his entire individual file without any excisions or deletions, for review at the Department of Justice.

______ Approved   X Disapproved

Comment:

Distribution:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. Thornburgh, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

July 18, 1975

TO: Bill O'Connor

FROM: Stan Pottinger

SUBJECT: July 18 memo--congressional access to personal files maintained by the FBI

Without knowing how these files were compiled (public sources? wiretap? confidential informant?), or what is in them (personal matter of derogatory nature? national security information?), or why they exist, (I have read in newspapers that they exist, but that's all), I would probably choose in the absence of knowing something about these Option #1, with the understanding that copies of releaseable information can then be made available to the Senator according to criteria spelled out in the Freedom of Information Act. I assume, however, that whoever is advising the AG about this has actually read the files in question, at least sufficient to know in a generic sense the answers to the questions raised above.

Despite the fact that I am operating in a vacuum on this, I do appreciate being consulted.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 16, 1975

RECEIVED
JUL 16 1975
KWO'C

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

I have received your letter of July 15 regarding access/delivery of documents requested in the Committee's letter of July 9, 1975. The following relates specifically to the procedure suggested for handling documents on the so called "Kissinger 17" surveillance, which is also applied in your letter to materials relating to electronic surveillance of the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City in August 1964, materials relating to the electronic surveillance of Dr. King, and possibly the O & C files.

I regard this suggested procedure as a major step forward and a recognition that previous arrangements were too cumbersome and time-consuming. Nevertheless, there are certain practical problems with the procedure which may be resolved by interpretation. For example, I assume that application of the procedure to the Atlantic City convention matters does not foreclose the Committee from receiving for use at its offices actual documents or portions of documents, as well as summaries. I understand that the FBI has no objection to providing such documents on this matter to the Committee for use at its offices.

Therefore, in order that the procedure you suggest may be applicable to all areas of Committee inquiry claimed by the Department to involve particularly sensitive matters, it should be interpreted as follows: the Committee staff will have direct access to all files and materials at FBIHQ; the Committee staff shall select certain documents from the files which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiry and necessary for the examination of witnesses or the establishment of certain facts during the course of the

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2 ALM/KP

Recd O'C
12 45 P 7/16/75

inquiry; the FBI shall at that time designate specific portions of such documents which might jeopardize particularly sensitive sources or methods; with respect to such specifically designated portions of documents, the Committee staff will prepare appropriate excisions or summaries of the information; the summaries will be checked at that time with senior Bureau executives to ensure the protection of particularly sensitive FBI sources or methods; thereafter, the excised documents and summaries will be removed to the Committee's offices; the Committee staff may check back to the original documents as extensively as necessary; staff notes on the designated specific portions of documents will not be removed from FBIHQ; and Committee members may, of course, at any time see the documents which the staff has seen.

I believe this interpretation can serve as a workable framework for Committee access to particularly sensitive FBI materials. You may be assured that the Task Force shares your concern for the need to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials, as indicated in the Outline for Inquiry Procedures. We hope this interpretation will facilitate the mutual effort by the Committee and the Department of Justice to accomplish this purpose.

I would appreciate receiving your immediate advice to me as to whether any further interpretation of this matter is required. Any public discussion of these arrangements and interpretations should be cast in such terms as will not jeopardize particularly sensitive FBI sources.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 15 1975

Mr. John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Re: Access/Delivery of Documents Requested in Senate Select Committee Letter of July 9, 1975

Dear Mr. Elliff:

Pursuant to our conversation of July 11, and confirming it, the following arrangements are approved for access to materials and delivery of materials to the Senate Select Committee staff, in addition to that which has already been made available.

All the provisions of this letter, hereinafter stated, are, of course, subject to the agreements embodied in the Outline for Inquiry Procedures referenced in the Committee's letter of June 27, 1975. Particular reference will periodically be made to the second sentence of paragraph B, page 2, of that document which specifies:

> "...The agency will also specifically indicate any of such materials which are extraordinarily sensitive in order to facilitate the mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate..."

Special handling techniques in addition to those indicated herein may be required in order to protect the security of sensitive materials covered herein.

cc: Paul Wallach

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/00 BY SP2ALM KP

Please refer to the attachments to the July 9, letter:

Page 3, Paragraph 2, Subsection A. All of the FBI files on the so called "Kissinger 17" surveillance will be made available to you and specific appropriately cleared staff in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building. These documents may be reviewed and studied there, and you and such staff may take such notes as you deem appropriate; we have agreed that the notes are to be left in the secure room of the Hoover Building during your study. When your study is completed, you may prepare a summary of the information which you consider to be appropriate for Committee use. The summary must be checked with senior Bureau executives to ensure the protection of national security matters, protection of confidential sources of information, and observation of privacy considerations. Thereafter, the approved summary may be removed to the Committee's office and all the staff notes will be destroyed. You may check the summary back to the original documents as extensively as necessary, in Room 4171.

Page 3, Paragraph 2, Subsection B. Materials have already been transmitted regarding the Kraft matter and the agreement between his attorney and the Attorney General. When you have reviewed those materials, and have contacted Mr. Kraft's attorney, should you deem that appropriate, I understand you will contact me if further information is requested.

Page 5, Paragraph 3, A & B. As you may know, representatives of the King family, including Mr. Harry H. Wachtel, attorney, have formally expressed to the Department a special concern regarding any public disclosure of any derogatory information regarding Dr. King which may be contained in Bureau files. Subject to your reaching an agreement with such representatives of the King family, and the acceptance by the Department of such a written agreement, all of the materials related to the electronic surveillance of Dr. King, in the custody of the FBI, will be made available to you and specific appropriately cleared staff under the same conditions and with the same agreements as specified above with regard to the "Kissinger 17" surveillance.

Page 6, Paragraph 4. Those materials in the custody of the FBI which reflect and relate to electronic surveillance of the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City in August 1964, will be provided under the same conditions as articulated above with regard to the "Kissinger 17" surveillance.

Page 9, Paragraph C. A summary of procedures for mail covers has been provided by my recent letter to you. In addition to that, a ~~statistical~~ summary of mail covers on closed matters will be made available to you in Room 4171, together with access to the underlying documentation requesting the individual mail covers.

Documentation relating to the opening of mail will be withheld at present, due to ongoing investigations.

After your review of the mail cover summaries and any underlying documents you wish to review, we will discuss any further access which you may request to mail cover information.

Page 10, Paragraph E. I understand and accept your explanation that the word "implementation" in line 2 of paragraph E(1) does not seek access to the "raw" files of COINTELPRO programs. All of the memoranda originating the several COINTELPRO programs will be made available to you and specific appropriately cleared staff for review in Room 4171.

We will furnish to you, for your study at Senate Select Committee offices, a complete set of the excised exhibits A-E to the Petersen Report; as previously agreed, your staff may have access to any unexcised pages of Exhibits A-E which you may wish to see, and which will be maintained at Room 4171. The back up materials underlying any particular summary in A-E will be extracted from the "raw" files upon your request and made available to you for your study in Room 4171. General access to the "raw" files is not required, as I understand it, for your purposes under this agreement. General disclosure of information derived from documents other than the excised pages of Exhibits A-E will be made available subject to limitations to be determined, dependent upon the sensitivity of such information, in conference with appropriate Bureau officials and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph B of the Outline for Inquiry Procedures, to protect the considerations outlined above.

Page 14, Item I. This will confirm your understanding that certain Huston Plan documents prepared by the Bureau in response to your request under this heading have been delivered to the White House for "third agency clearance". This statement formally confirms my previous discussions with you of this fact when we met with Mr. Schwarz and Mr. Smothers on July 2. Be advised that the documents which have been transmitted to the White House for clearance will be forwarded to you, or made available for access, if appropriate, upon our receipt of the White House directions.

Page 16, Paragraph J. This will confirm our understanding that on July 14, there will be available for your review in Room 4171, a 160 page summary document reflecting an analysis of the O & C files.

After you have reviewed that analysis, I will discuss with you an appropriate further step with regard to the O & C files if such is indicated; such an agreement would be generally similar in terms to the foregoing arrangements.

I trust that this letter accurately reflects our understanding as reached in our discussion on July 11. If it does not, your immediate advice to me of any particulars in which we disagree in our understanding will be appreciated. In the meantime, I have furnished a copy of this letter to the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General and have requested the Bureau's cooperation in promptly making available the information indicated.

I would appreciate meeting with you and Mr. Schwarz and Mr. Smothers around July 18, for the purpose of discussing any problems which you may have identified and to clarify any outstanding documentary request which you may have, and to agree upon an appropriate schedule. Since we have received several additional requests from you, since the July 9, letter was delivered, it would seem appropriate to re-analyze your requirements in light of the agreements reached on July 11, reflected herein.

Sincerely,

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

cc: Attorney General
Deputy Attorney General

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

[illegible] 7/22/75

TO : The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: K. William O'Connor

DATE: July 18, 1975

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FILES

62-116395-616

LFS

In response to your memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned as above, we observe that the "substantial negotiations" which produced the proposed procedures did not include participation by a representative of the FBI and that the request for our views concerning disclosure of highly sensitive FBI material was first received at 11:14 a.m. today with a reply expected by 2:00 p.m. today. We respectfully suggest that not only should you afford greater opportunity for an expression of our views on this matter, but that any such proposed procedures should be presented to the President's Counsel for concurrence and for an expression of the President's views as to the general policy of the Executive Branch in this regard. Further, you may want to consider addressing the problem of the impact such general disclosure of files would have on pending criminal investigations.

A preliminary review in the time available revealed that certain items require considerable modification. For example, Item (3)(c) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for information that would tend to identify sources to whom the FBI has an obligation of confidentiality as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity already has been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identity to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman."

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975
KWO'C

Liaison cc 62-116395-616

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Item (6)(b) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the FBI will furnish a written statement of the grounds for its position to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation within 24 hours."

Item (8) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "The Staff and the Members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the Staff is given access as extensively as necessary between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, in the FBI J. Edgar Hoover Building at Room 4171."

In light of the difficulties described, it is my strong recommendation that such procedures should not be hastily agreed upon with the Committee and that full discussion should be had concerning this matter by representatives of the FBI, the Attorney General, the Committee and the Counsel to the President.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP.

TO: See Distribution

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Proposed Procedures for Access to Department of Justice Files

Attached hereto is a sequence of proposed procedures which are being considered by the Attorney General for dealing with the Senate Select Committee, in regard to its desire for access to materials in the Departmental/FBI files.

This document is the result of substantial negotiations; it represents what we understand to be the ultimate scope of access desired by the Senate Select Committee.

The Attorney General wishes to be advised this afternoon of the views of the addressees; accordingly, he has asked that each of you call me before 2:00 p.m., and advise me of your general approval, disapproval, or view. Please excuse the urgency of the requested response; it is necessary to react on a very short fuse because of the extreme pressures which have been generated in this matter. Please call me on 739-5211, by the time indicated above. Your cooperation is appreciated.

Distribution:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
✓Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

5

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

non-delegable

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/160

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader, chief counsel, c Minority cou requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential inf has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 197

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

TO: Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Responses to Request for Comments on Proposed Procedures

1. The Deputy Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, and Civil Rights Division register no objections to the proposed procedures on access. OLA suggests inclusion of a preamble referencing security agreements and the need for proper security assurances from the Committee to the Attorney General.

2. Both the Criminal Division and Office of Legal Counsel address the short response time frames imposed upon the Attorney General, and OLC suggests certain language changes for purposes of clarity and focus.

3. The Attorney General is troubled by Item 9 and its need for modification as to categories of material not treatable by these proposed procedures or as to a later discovered need to make presently unanticipated changes to effect a smoother operation of the procedures.

4. The Bureau's comments on the proposed procedures are attached and should be read. This Office does not agree with the Bureau that the proposed procedures should be presented to the President and the President's Counsel.

5. No response has been received from the Solicitor General.

6. This Office recommends that Item 9 be modified as suggested by the Attorney General and that the language modifications suggested by OLC for Items 3 and 6 be adopted.

7. It is further suggested that the Attorney General convene a meeting of the senior Bureau officials for the purpose of informing them of his policy decision in this matter.

Copies to:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

My view is that item 9 goes too far in that there must be some provision which allows the Department or the Committee to abrogate the arrangement. I should think the agreement could provid that at any time the Chairman of the Committee or the Attorney General could give a notification that the (1) agreement was not suitable for a particular category of material or (2) that for some reason the agreement was not operating suitably and that as to either one or two there would then be an endeavor to work out a suitable modification or different arrangement (but I think it has to be said that the arrangement can be cancelled by either party)

OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

7/18/75

To: Bill O'Connor

From: Doug Marvin

Attached is the Attorney General's comment on the procedures for dealing with the Senate Select Committee

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 18, 1975

Proposed procedures

Daly

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 572 ALM/gl

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 13 1975

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. No problem with this procedure, but feels that the time limits are too tight

2. No central policy objection

3. Suggest incorporate a preamble phrase that makes reference to security agreements; a specific means for assurance to the AG by the Chairman and Vice Chairman of proper security measures

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. 48 hour lead time is very short and may create problems; 24 hour reaction time may be unreasonable for Attorney General.

2. The provision seems a little odd, out of context of negotiations.

3. Suggest that in 3(a), last line, word and should be or and "peculiarly sensitive" read to modify both foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

4. No comment

5. No comment

6. Time frames are very restrictive; there should be a stated opportunity for TFL to work out any objections with FBI, before raising to Special Counsel "...if the issue is not promptly resolved between the TFL and the FBI, the materials in issue will be conveyed..."

7. Define "screened" by reference to 6(a) above

8. No comment

9. No comment

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

Views of Thornburg and Kevin Maroney

1. Time frames a bit skimpy
2. looks as though we're giving up a lot, but that's probably what's required

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

No objection to proposed procedures on access

OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

7/18

TO: Director, FBI

FROM: Bill O'Connor

ATTN: James Adams

FYI

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 582AUMVP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY

The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: K. William O'Connor

July 18, 1975

Director, FBI

EX 104 REC-56 62-116395-610

PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FILES

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Daly

In response to your memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned as above, we observe that the "substantial negotiations" which produced the proposed procedures did not include participation by a representative of the FBI and that the request for our views concerning disclosure of highly sensitive FBI material was first received at 11:14 a.m. today with a reply expected by 2:00 p.m. today. We respectfully suggest that not only should you afford greater opportunity for an expression of our views on this matter, but that any such proposed procedures should be presented to the President's Counsel for concurrence and for an expression of the President's views as to the general policy of the Executive Branch in this regard. Further, you may want to consider addressing the problem of the impact such general disclosure of files would have on pending criminal investigations.

A preliminary review in the time available revealed that certain items require considerable modification. For example, Item (3)(c) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for information that would tend to identify sources to whom the FBI has an obligation of confidentiality as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity already has been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identity to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JAM:mfd

1 XEROX
SEP 4 1975
JFK

JAM

Delivered to K William O'Connor at 1:55 pm 7/18/75 JAM

84 SEP 8 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Item (6)(b) should be reconsidered with the following language:

"If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the FBI will furnish a written statement of the grounds for its position to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation within 24 hours."

Item (8) should be reconsidered with the following language:

"The Staff and the Members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the Staff is given access as extensively as necessary between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, in the FBI J. Edgar Hoover Building at Room 4171."

In light of the difficulties described, it is my strong recommendation that such procedures should not be hastily agreed upon with the Committee and that full discussion should be had concerning this matter by representatives of the FBI, the Attorney General, the Committee and the Counsel to the President.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

TO: See Distribution

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

SUBJECT: Proposed Procedures for Access to Department of Justice Files

Attached hereto is a sequence of proposed procedures which are being considered by the Attorney General for dealing with the Senate Select Committee, in regard to its desire for access to materials in the Departmental/FBI files.

This document is the result of substantial negotiations; it represents what we understand to be the ultimate scope of access desired by the Senate Select Committee.

The Attorney General wishes to be advised this afternoon of the views of the addressees; accordingly, he has asked that each of you call me before 2:00 p.m., and advise me of your general approval, disapproval, or view. Please excuse the urgency of the requested response; it is necessary to react on a very short fuse because of the extreme pressures which have been generated in this matter. Please call me on 739-5211, by the time indicated above. Your cooperation is appreciated.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-610

REC-56

7 AUG 6 1975

EX 104

Distribution:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
✓Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

LEGAL COUNSEL

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

non-delegable

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-610

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader, chief counsel, or Minority couns requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential infor has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

The Attorney General

August 27, 1975
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/00 BY SP2ALM KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information are two copies each of two memoranda concerning interviews by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of two FBI Special Agents. One set of these memoranda is for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SFP:lhb lhb
(10)

REC-56 62-116395-609

EX 104

12 SEP 4 1975

NOTE: 2 ENCLOSURE

LHMs being furnished to the Attorney General ~~were~~ received by airtels from Los Angeles 8/15/75 (Ward interview), and 8/7/75 (Bloeser interview), both in connection with Senstudy 75. Copies of the airtels and the LHMs will be designated for the respective personnel files of the personnel who were interviewed.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAILED 7
AUG 28 1975
FBI

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 SEP 8 1975

GPO 954-546

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1975

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 5, 1975, Supervisor Richard H. Bloeser was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel at the Los Angeles FBI Office regarding the COINTELPRO/Black Panther Party (BPP).

Mr. Seidel advised Supervisor Bloeser that the interview was voluntary, but did not advise Supervisor Bloeser of his rights in this matter.

Mr. Seidel inquired of Supervisor Bloeser as to how many offices he had served in, his length of service in the Bureau, and how long had been spent on intelligence investigations. Supervisor Bloeser replied that he had served in Philadelphia, El Paso and Los Angeles, had been in the Bureau approximately 24½ years, and had been assigned to intelligence work for 22 years.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Supervisor Bloeser believed that the Bureau had placed undue pressure on the field to come up with counter intelligence proposals concerning the BPP and was it difficult to come up with a proposal. Supervisor Bloeser responded that there was no undue pressure placed on the field by the Bureau, that the COINTELPRO/BPP was merely another case assigned to an agent and that agent, as in any other case, had the responsibility of handling the matter whether it concerned the solving of a case or the submission of proposals. Mr. Seidel was also informed that it was not unduly difficult to come up with a proposal and that a number of proposals were rejected at the field level and never submitted to the Bureau.

Mr. Seidel inquired specifically as to counter intelligence proposals involving cartoons ridiculing the BPP.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-609

Supervisor Bloeser responded that he vaguely remembered such proposals but without reviewing the file had no definite recollection. Mr. Seidel did not request that the file be reviewed.

Mr. Seidel inquired specifically about a business card which allegedly had been prepared by the Bureau bearing the phrase "Karenga is impotent." Mr. Seidel requested Supervisor Bloeser's views on the distribution of this card by the FBI. Supervisor Bloeser responded that he vaguely remembered the card, that he thought it was humorous, and that the word impotent had various meanings.

Mr. Seidel then inquired about the blood feud which existed in the past between the US Organization and the BPP and the efforts of the Bureau to keep this feud alive and thus promote violence. He specifically inquired as to the personal feelings of Supervisor Bloeser concerning any counter intelligence proposals which, if placed in operation, could lead to violence between the two groups.

Supervisor Bloeser responded first that personally he had no apologies for the counter intelligence program as a whole, that proposals submitted six or seven years ago were believed necessary at that time due to the circumstances, specifically that at that time the BPP and the US Organization were involved in violent activity against the community as a whole. Mr. Seidel was informed that the feud between the US Organization and the BPP occurred long before the FBI COINTELPRO became involved in the feud and that any proposals approved by the Bureau had relatively little effect on the violence committed by either group. Mr. Seidel was also reminded that six or seven years ago the Congress of the United States fully supported the war in Vietnam in which thousands of people were killed but that under today's circumstances no support has been given to South Vietnam.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);
INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then posed a hypothetical question involving the following factors: Would Supervisor Bloeser now or in the past approve a counter intelligence proposal whereby one extremist with a criminal record of violence be anonymously informed that another extremist with a record of criminal violence was an informant for the FBI, knowing that the alleged informant might be injured or killed. Supervisor Bloeser replied that under the present conditions such a proposal would not be approved, but that he could not give an answer as to what his feelings might have been six or seven years ago under any given situation. Mr. Seidel was again reminded that Congress in the past has not hesitated to support wars which kill thousands of people but that recently they have criti~~zed~~cized the CIA for allegedly plotting to assassinate one individual whose death might prevent a war. Mr. Seidel was also informed that it was ironic that Congress was investigating another agency of the Federal Government which was attempting to prevent revolutionary violence in this country.

Mr. Seidel then inquired into the counter intelligence proposals approved by the Bureau in relation to the actress Jean Seberg and Raymond Hewitt, a leader of the BPP. This proposal concerned the fact that Seberg, who was then married to a French producer, admitted being pregnant by Hewitt who was also married at the time. The Bureau approved anonymously leaking this information to a Hollywood columnist. Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Supervisor Bloeser did or did not believe that this was an invasion of privacy. Supervisor Bloeser responded that the item was news worthy and that it would have been any fair game for any newsmen had they come across it in the course of their business which they could have probably easily done, and that certainly Congress would not have criti~~zed~~cized a newspaper for printing such an item or claim it to be an invasion of privacy. Mr. Seidel inquired as to the purpose of this particular operation and he was informed that Miss Seberg was giving support to the BPP and that it was hoped that such publicity would prevent any future support by her of the BPP.

He was further advised that it was the responsibility of the FBI to determine who was funding revolutionary groups in this country.

Mr. Seidel then inquired as to whether or not it was difficult to conduct intelligence investigations under present statutes and under the Criminal Rules of Procedure. He was informed that it was somewhat difficult to conduct an effective intelligence operation under present circumstances and that perhaps new legislative or executive orders would be helpful to the FBI in order to allow the FBI to continue its investigations in the Domestic Intelligence field. Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether it would be helpful to have specific legislation which might completely separate criminal and intelligence operations so one would not taint the other. He was informed that if such legislation could be enacted that it would undoubtedly help the FBI.

The interview lasted approximately two hours and it was not necessary to consult with another Bureau representative during this time.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
August 15, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/KG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF SA WALLACE E. WARD BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 5, 1975, Special Agent (SA) Wallace E. Ward was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel at Los Angeles Field Office regarding Cointelpro/Black Panther Party. The interview lasted from 9:12 a.m. to 9:22 a.m.

SA Ward was advised by Mr. Seidel that the interview was voluntary but SA Ward was not advised of his rights in this matter.

Seidel asked how long SA Ward had been a Special Agent with the FBI, and SA Ward responded nine years. He further requested previous offices SA Ward had been assigned to, and SA Ward responded Cincinnati, Ohio. Seidel advised the Bureau informed him that SA Ward had been assigned Cointelpro/Black Panther Party in June 1969. Seidel requested to know what work SA Ward had been assigned before this, to which SA Ward responded he could not remember, but believed general criminal work.

Seidel requested to know what specific instructions were issued with regard to operating Cointelpro/Black Panther Party. SA Ward advised that due to his employment agreement, the sensitive nature of the Bureau work, and the possible overlap of Bureau investigation, he did not feel he could respond to any further questions. Seidel advised he understood SA Ward's position as he, Seidel, had worked criminal matters himself and knew the need for secrecy. The official interview was terminated at this point.

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-609

In a friendly conversation that followed for approximately ten to fifteen minutes, SA Ward advised Seidel that he had only been assigned the Cointelpro/Black Panther Party matter for three months and had no knowledge that would be of value to Seidel. The Cointelpro/Black Panther Party matter was not further discussed. The rest of the time was involved in discussing points of interest in the Los Angeles basin of tourist value, such as Marineland, Palos Verdes, and Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles.

SA Ward advises that he is aware that the Director waived his employment agreement with certain exceptions regarding privileged areas. With this in mind, SA Ward reviewed his employment agreement and concluded, after noting the following quotation, that he could not disclose any information without following the prescribed procedure:

"The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed, and in this regard, I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure".

With this in mind, SA Ward answered Mr. Seidel as noted heretofore.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEWs ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/27/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of interviews by SSC Staff Member of Supervisor Richard H. Bloeser andSpecial Agent Wallace E. Ward.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Counterintelligence

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

COINTELPRO of the FBI as it related to the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WOC/8

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 8/20/75

1 - Personnel File - Richard H. Ross
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Lester B. Seidel, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, requested on 8/19/75 that SA Richard H. Ross be made available for Staff interview concerning the Bureau's investigation of the Black Panther Party and COINTELPRO as it applies to the Black Panther Party. Seidel stated that he would prefer handling this particular interview in conjunction with his interview of SA Richard W. Held. He requested he be advised when the appropriate clearance procedures have been completed and SA Ross is available for interview. SA Ross is currently assigned to the Intelligence Division. SA Held was previously cleared for interview by memorandum dated 8/1/75.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That SA Ross be released from existing employment agreement for purposes of an interview concerning the Bureau's investigation of the Black Panther Party and COINTELPRO as it relates to the Black Panther Party.

(2) That an Intelligence Division representative be available but not present during the interview of SA Ross to assist in making a determination whether a question may be properly responded to.

EX 104

REC-56

JBH/pld

62-116395-607

13

ENCLOSURE

SEP 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/00 BY SP2ALM/VLP

PVD:lad
(8)

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 SEP 8 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

Right to Counsel

(1) You have the right to counsel during interview and/or testimony.

(2) The FBI cannot provide you with private counsel.

(3) If you are unable to secure private counsel, you may so state and request assistance in securing counsel.

Secrecy Agreements

(1) You must request a waiver by the Director, FBI of any applicable employment or secrecy agreement prior to interview or testimony in order that you may be authorized to furnish the information requested.

(2) If your testimony is pursuant to a subpoena, order, or other demand, you must obtain the approval of the Department of Justice prior to furnishing testimony.

Representative from FBI

(1) A representative from the FBI will be available during interview and/or testimony for consultation.

(2) The FBI is concerned with possible impairment of FBI's current and future efforts to discharge its reponsibilities.

(3) You are not to discuss the following matters without prior authorization from the FBI"

A. Information provided by sources (or any other

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-607

information), which might tend to identify a confidential source.

B. Information concerning sensitive investigative techniques.

C. Information derived from other Government agencies, including information from foreign intelligence sources.

D. Any information the disclosure of which could adversely affect ongoing investigations.

AUG 20 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Seymor Phillips

The attached letter is self-explanatory and, though mentioning no name, concerns Seymor Phillips.

On Friday, August 15, 1975, I orally advised Messrs. Callahan and Wannall that the Deputy Attorney General thought that Senator Church's letter had some merit and that for the sake of appearances it was the Deputy's suggestion that Mr. Phillips be removed from such conspicuous and open involvement with the SSC's requests and agent interviews as they may relate to Martin Luther King matters.

REC-56 62-116395-605

EX 104

12 SEP 4 1975

cc: ✓Mr. Callahan
Mr. Wannall

File 5

Treat as original

LEGAL COUNSEL

ENCLOSURE

79 SEP 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM KP

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 14, 1975

Rec'd 8-14-75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I am writing to call your attention to a matter which may be a cause of concern to you and to the Select Committee at some time in the future.

As you may know, a special unit has been established in the FBI Intelligence Division to handle this Committee's requests for materials and to handle certain arrangements for the Committee staff's interviews. The Special Agents assigned to this unit accompany Bureau witnesses to the Committee offices, travel to out-of-town locations where Committee staff interviews are conducted, and apparently "de-brief" interview subjects after the interviews.

One possible problem has arisen with this arrangement. As you are aware, one of the alleged abuses which the Committee is examining pursuant to S. Res. 21 involves the FBI's activities with respect to the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. As the inquiry has proceeded, information has been developed to indicate that one of the Special Agents who has been handling Committee staff interviews, "de-briefing" witnesses, and, presumably, compiling materials with respect to the King matter was also the supervisory case agent during the time that some of the alleged FBI improprieties regarding Dr. King took place. Moreover, as a logical step in our investigation, it was

RECEIVED
15 1975

62-116395-605

ENCLOSURE

recently necessary to interview this Special Agent to determine the nature and extent of his involvement in and knowledge of the alleged abuses at the time when he served as supervisory case agent with respect to the King case. During the interview he did provide detailed information concerning his substantial participation in this matter.

The Committee in no way intends at this juncture to pre-judge the propriety of the FBI's activities with respect to Dr. King, and it would be inappropriate to characterize the conduct of any of the Bureau's personnel regarding this case until all the facts are in. Nevertheless, I am concerned that in this kind of situation, the interests of the FBI and the Department of Justice might best be served, from the standpoint of appearances, by reconsidering the assignment of this Special Agent to the King matters. It is possible that some may conclude that there is a conflict between the Special Agent's personal interest, and the interests of the FBI and the Justice Department in ensuring that full disclosure to the Committee is made with respect to this case.

Finally, let me assure you that the Committee has no evidence that the present arrangement has prevented the Committee from obtaining the full disclosures sought; but it seems to me that it would be mutually beneficial for appropriate steps to be taken so that we will both be able to assure the American people and the Congress that our oversight responsibilities were fulfilled in an objective and impartial way.

I hope you will share my view that this course will best serve our respective interests and, of course, the interests of the country.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman

The Attorney General August 27, 1975

Director, FBI 62-1

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
~~1 - Mr. Daly~~

LETTER FROM SENATOR CHURCH
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DATED
AUGUST 14, 1975

Senstudy - 75

Attached for your information are the original and a copy of a letter I addressed to Senator Church in response to his letter to you dated August 14, 1975, which was brought to my attention by referral by Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination.

If you concur in my response, please forward the original of the letter to Senator Church.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Mr Michael Shaheen advised 9/12/75 that instant letter not sent. DAG Tyler Jr sent letter to Senator Church dated 9/10/75 copy of which placed in file
WOG
9/15/75

62-116395-604

EX 104 REC-56

12 SEP 4 1975

JAM:mfd
(7)

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Approved by Director 8/26
Hand delivered to Shaheen 8/26 by Mr. Wannall and Mintz

84 SEP 8 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

August 27, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

Honorable Frank Church
Chairman, Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2-ALM/KP

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your thoughtful letter of August 14, 1975, to the Attorney General was referred to me and it has been carefully considered. I certainly agree with the view expressed therein that it is important the Committee's oversight responsibilities be fulfilled in an objective and impartial way. To that end, I have required employees with experience to assist in locating the full documentation called for in Committee requests. The voluminous files and variety of indices entries would have been much more difficult to sort for your benefit without the assistance of persons having such expertise.

I appreciate your assurance that the Committee has no evidence that our arrangements have prevented the Committee from obtaining the full disclosure sought. I have absolute confidence that those FBI employees participating in our current efforts to assist your Committee are working in good faith and have not inhibited full disclosure. Further, I have required close supervision of this work by superiors and thereby avoided the possibility of an improper decision by any one individual affecting the responses.

ENCLOSURE

EX 104

REC-56 62-116395-604

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NOTE: Based on incoming memorandum from Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., 8/20/75, enclosing copy of letter from Senator ~~Church to the~~ Attorney General.

12 SEP 4 1975

JAM:mfd
(7)

Approved by the Director 8/26
Hand delivered to Shaheen 8/26 by Mr. Wannall and Mintz

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Honorable Frank Church

As to the availability of an FBI representative during Committee staff interviews of present or former FBI employees concerning alleged "abuses," I have determined that such no longer will be generally afforded. The subject matters requiring consultation with such witnesses are essentially four: (1) information which identifies or may identify FBI confidential sources; (2) information which may adversely affect on-going FBI investigations; (3) information concerning sensitive methods and techniques; and (4) information obtained from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Witnesses may be cautioned prior to interview concerning such problem areas and refrain from furnishing the information pending consultation with FBI Headquarters. This modification is effective immediately.

I hope that you will bring this matter to the attention of your staff and that in so doing you also will review the standards of objectivity and impartiality being followed in their interviews to assure protection of individual rights.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

August 29, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated August 28, 1975. The letter is self-explanatory.

I would appreciate it if you would treat this request with the highest priority.

I have discussed with Mike Epstein (in Elliff's absence) of the SSC and with Elmer Larson of the Bureau the demands this request will pose for the Bureau, and we have agreed to defer responding to Elliff's requests of August 20, 1975, for Parts IV and V, from September 4 to September 9, in an effort to meet the response date (September 3) of the attached request.

62-116395-603

REC-56

ENCLOSURE

EX 104

12 SEP 4 1975

MDR-16 FBI 10/17/00

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KT

1cc to Ad Hoc
8-29-75

79 SEP 17 1975

5-Encl

August 29, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated August 28, 1975. The letter is self-explanatory.

I would appreciate it if you would treat this request with the highest priority.

I have discussed with Mike Epstein (in Elliff's absence) of the SSC and with Elmer Larson of the Bureau the demands this request will pose for the Bureau, and we have agreed to defer responding to Elliff's requests of August 20, 1975, for Parts IV and V, from September 4 to September 9, in an effort to meet the response date (September 3) of the attached request.

FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR.,
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 28, 1975

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I would like to bring to your personal attention a situation which has severely restricted our efforts to establish the relevant facts with respect to one of the areas of alleged abuse which is the subject of inquiry pursuant to S. Res. 21.

I have been informed by the staff that numerous materials which have been requested during the past several weeks which pertain to the FBI's activities with respect to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., have been withheld from the Committee by the Department because of concern expressed by Mr. Harry Wachtel, the attorney for the King family and estate, as to the appropriateness of the Department's "disseminating" to the Committee contents of conversations monitored during electronic surveillances of Dr. King.

Upon reviewing the lists of materials requested, I am at a loss to understand how most of those items could conceivably be encompassed by the issues raised by Mr. Wachtel, especially in view of the fact that our letters of request have specifically pointed out that tape recordings and transcripts should not be supplied.

Accordingly, I want to take this opportunity to place the Committee formally on record as reaffirming all of the outstanding requests for materials relating to the King matters, with the limited exception of (1) Mr. DeLoach's August 24 - 27, 1964 memoranda which pertain to the 1964 Democratic National Convention, and (2) those portions of any other requested materials which actually summarize or quote from conversations monitored during any electronic surveillance of Dr. King.

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

RECEIVED
AUG 28 1975
3 4 5 6 7 8

62-116395-603

Delivery is requested by Wednesday, September 3, 1975, pursuant to the provisions of the general procedural agreement between the Department and the Committee which governs all Committee requests. I understand that the Bureau has been collecting the King-related materials upon receipt of each of our requests, and therefore I presume that there will be no substantial burden in meeting the September 3 date.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

I am taking the liberty of sending Mr. Wachtel a copy of this request.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

CC: Harry Wachtel

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 07 OM PLAIN

10:20 PM CST NITEL JUNE 19, 1975 IJS

TO DIRECTOR

MINNEAPOLIS

FROM OMAHA 62-3439 (P)

Sep 4 - 75

ATTENTION: JOHN C. GORDON, GID.

SENATOR CHURCH'S COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES.

SENSTUDY 75. INFORMATION CONCERNING.

RE OMAHA TELCALLS TO BUREAU AND MINNEAPOLIS, JUNE 19, 1975.

IN THE JUNE 19, 1975 AFTERNOON ISSUE OF THE OMAHA WORLD HERALD, A DAILY NEWSPAPER, OMAHA, NEBRASKA, APPEARED THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE CAPTIONED "SENATE COMMITTEE SENDING INVESTIGATIOR TO GORDON, NEBRASKA". THE ARTICLE APPEARED UNDER A WORLD HERALD WASHINGTON BUREAU DATELINE.

CONTACT WITH OMAHA WORLD HERALD AUTHORITIES AT OMAHA FAILED TO DEVELOP THE NATURE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION AT GORDON, NEBRASKA. WORLD HERALD AUTHORITIES

END PAGE ONE

62-116395-602

EX 104 REC-56

12 SEP 4 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/5/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Bowers

5-EWR

84 SEP 8 1975

EXPLAIN THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP THIS INFORMATION IN WASHINGTON.

THE ARTICLE REFERRED TO ABOVE IS SET FORTH BELOW VERBATIM:

"AN INVESTIGATOR IS BEING SENT TO GORDON, NEB., BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE THAT IS INVESTIGATING THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OTHER GOVERNEMTN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, A SOURCE SAID.

"A COMMITTEE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE INVESTIGATION HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT TAKEOVER OF WOUNDED KNEE, S. D. HE SAID HE COULD NOT DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER.

"WE HAVEN'T BEEN IN THE CUSTOM OF IDENTIFYING DIFFERENT INTERROGATIONS THAT ARE GOING ON, A COMMITTEE SPOKESMAN SAID. TO DO SO, HE SAID, 'COULD DRY UP SOURCES.'

" MUCH THE SAME REPLY CAME FROM AN AIDE TO SEN. JOHN TOWER OF TEXAS, THE RANKING REPUBLICAN ON THE COMMITTEE THAT IS HEADED BY SEN. FRANK CHURCH, D-IDA. 'WE HAVEN'T BEEN

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREEE

"TALKING AT ALL ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES', HE SAID.

"WHILE THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS ATTRACTED THE MOST ATTENTION, IT ALSO IS LOOKING INTO THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES, SUCH AS THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION."

OMAHA UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION.

INASMUCH AS SIX SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI ARE NOW USING GORDON, NEBRASKA, AS LIVING QUARTERS WHILE HANDLING CIR INVESTIGATIONS ON PINE RIDGE RESERVATION UNDER DIRECTION OF MINNEAPOLIS OFFICE, MINNEAPOLIS BEING FURNISH THIS INFORMATION.

END LSG FBIHQ CLR FOR ONE AND TKS

ac-5

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR007 MP CODE

6:47 PM NITEL JUNE 20, 1975 LSB

TO DIRECTOR

WFO

OMAHA (62-3439)

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (66-3610) Senstudy 75

ATTENTION: JOHN C. GORDON, ROOM 5078, GENERAL CRIMES UNIT, Mr. Gordon Rm 5078

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

SENATOR CHURCH'S COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES, SENSTAD 75, INFORMATION CONCERNING.

RE OMAHA NITEL TO DIRECTOR JUNE 19, 1975.

INFORMATION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATOR'S TRAVEL TO GORDON, NEBRASKA, IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTACTING AND INTERVIEWING A FORMER MEMBER OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. THIS INDIVIDUAL WHO OWNS A BUSINESS IN GORDON, NEBRASKA, IS BELIEVED TO BE JERRY BORMAN, WHO OPERATES A CHEVROLET DEALERSHIP IN GORDON AND PRESUMABLY WAS A MEMBER OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVING OVERSEAS. 62-116395-601

EX 104 REC-56

END

HOLD

MDR-16 10/5/00
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/5/00 BY SP3ALM/KP

4509

5-End

6RB

84 SEP 8 1975

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

601 THRU 1ST NR 605

607, 1ST NR 607

609 THRU 616

618 THRU 620

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

TO ALEXANDRIA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
DALLAS
EL PASO
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JACKSONVILLE
LOUISVILLE
LOS ANGELES
MEMPHIS
MIAMI
NEW YORK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
ST. LOUIS
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE

SEPTEMBER 5, 1975

PERSONAL ATTENTION

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

SEP 05 1975
3 442P
TELETYPE

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTELS MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975.

REC-47 62-116395-620

1 SEP 9 1975

SFP:eks
(6)

ST-110

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM

SEE NOTE PAGE 9

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

9 SEP 17 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED WHEREABOUTS OF A NUMBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES INDICATING THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC STAFF. LISTED BELOW, BY FIELD OFFICE TERRITORY, ARE THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES AS CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES.

INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SAs LITRENTO AND STEWART DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA CONCERNING MAIL OPENING ACTIVITIES. ALL OTHERS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER SAC, ASAC, OR BOTH, DURING PERIOD 1959 - 1966 IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI, NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGTON FIELD. THEY PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING MAIL OPENINGS.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS

FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.

CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

ALEXANDRIA.

W. DONALD STEWART, CRYSTAL HOUSE I, APARTMENT 202, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

JAMES H. GALE, 3307 ROCKY MOUNT ROAD, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

THOMAS E. BISHOP, 8820 STARK ROAD, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA

BALTIMORE:

ANTHONY P. LITRENTO, 2810 STONYBROOK DRIVE, BOWIE, MARYLAND

PAUL O'CONNELL, JR., 2417 STRATTON DRIVE, POTOMAC, MARYLAND

DONALD E. RONEY, 131 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE, WINDSOR HILLS, WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

VICTOR TURYN, 2645 TURF VALLEY ROAD, ELLICOTT CITY, MARYLAND

DONALD W. MORLEY, BOX 222, NEW MARKET, MARYLAND

BIRMINGHAM:

JOHN DAVID POPE, JR., 221 REMINGTON ROAD, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

BOSTON:

LEO L. LAUGHLIN, 9 EVERETT AVENUE, WINCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

EDWARD J. POWERS, 10 COLONIAL DRIVE, BEDFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

J. F. DESMOND, 185 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

CHICAGO:

MARLIN W. JOHNSON, CANTEEN CORPORATION, THE MERCHANDISE MART, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

HARVEY G. FOSTER, 1012 SOUTH HAMLIN, PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS

CINCINNATI:

PAUL FIELDS, 2677 CYCLORAMA DRIVE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMCREST LANE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

DALLAS:

PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014 CHATTERTON DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

EL PASO:

KARL W. DISSLY, POST OFFICE BOX 9762, EL PASO, TEXAS

INDIANAPOLIS:

DILLARD W. HOWELL, 6413 CARDINAL LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

ALLAN GILLIES, 8228 HOOVER LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

JACKSON:

WILLIAMS W. BURKE, JR., 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

JACKSONVILLE:

DONALD K. BROWN, 826 BROOKMONT AVENUE, EAST JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, 4857 WATER OAK LANE, JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

LOUISVILLE:

BERNARD C. BROWN, 2301 NEWMARKET DRIVE, N.E., LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

LOS ANGELES:

WILLIAM G. SIMON, 2075 LOMBARDY ROAD, SAN MARINO, CALIFORNIA

WESLEY G. GRAPP, 4240 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS, CALIFORNIA

ARNOLD C. LARSON, 4232 ABBINGTON COURT, WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH K. PONDER, 3719 CARRIAGE HOUSE COURT, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 3030 SOUTH RED HILL AVENUE, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

MEMPHIS:

E. HUGO WINTERROWD, 1550 NORTH PARKWAY, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

MIAMI:

THOMAS MC ANDREWS, 324 NEAPOLITAN WAY, NAPLES, FLORIDA

FREDERICK F. FOX, 11450 W. BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA

NEW YORK:

JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, 656 HUNT LANE, MANHASSET, NEW YORK

HENRY A. FITZGIBBON, 76 EASTON ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK

OKLAHOMA CITY:

JAMES T. MORELAND, 108 FERN DRIVE, POTEAU, OKLAHOMA

LEE O. TEAGUE, 2501 N.W. 121ST STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA

OMAHA:

JOHN F. CALLAGHAN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, CAMP DODGE, POST OFFICE BOX 130, JOHNSTON, IOWA

PHILADELPHIA:

RICHARD J. BAKER, 219 JEFFREY LANE, NEWTON SQUARE, PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN F. MALONE, 25 GARFIELD AVENUE, CARBONDALE, PENNSYLVANIA

PHOENIX:

PALMER M. BAKEN, JR., 3832 EAST YUCCA STREET, PHOENIX, ARIZONA

ST. LOUIS:

THOMAS J. GEARTY, 6630 CLAYTON ROAD #105, RICHMOND HEIGHTS, MISSOURI

WESLEY T. WHALEY, 286 GREEN TRAILS DRIVE, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI

SAN DIEGO:

FRANK L. PRICE, 2705 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO:

CURTIS O. LYNUM, 644 EAST HILLSDALE BOULEVARD, SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA

HAROLD E. WELBORN, 13067 LA VISTA COURT, SARATOGA, CALIFORNIA

SAVANNAH:

TROY COLEMAN, 36 CROMWELL ROAD, WILMINGTON PARK, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

JOSEPH D. PURVIS, 721 DANCY AVENUE, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

SEATTLE:

LELAND V. BOARDMAN, ROUTE 3, BOX 268,SEQUIM, WASHINGTON

RICHARD D. AUERBACH, P. O. BOX 1768, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

JAMES E. MILNES, 4317 - 50TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

PAUL R. BIBLER, 15134 - 38TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

NOTE:

Referenced Bureau teletypes furnished field general background and instructions relating to our cooperation with the SSC and procedures concerning interviews of current and former employees. Former employees listed herein derived from an SSC request dated 8/19/75, to which we have responded by LHM 9/5/75 being furnished the SSC through the AG. After dispatch of instant teletype, we will arrange for copies to be filed in the respective personnel files of the former employees listed.

71 ~~Tim~~

PLAINTEXT TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall 9/5/75
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU TELEPHONE CALL 9/5/75.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT SPECIAL AGENT DOUGLAS MAC DOUGALL BE MADE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., FOR INTERVIEW BY THAT COMMITTEE ON 9/9/75 AT 10 A.M. THE INTERVIEW WILL INVOLVE SA MAC DOUGALL'S KNOWLEDGE IN THE PARTICIPATION IN MAIL COVERAGE.

SA MAC DOUGALL SHOULD ARRANGE TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., IN TIME TO BE BRIEFED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONS AT 3 P.M. ON 9/8/75 IN ROOM 4509 IN THE JUSTICE BUILDING.

REC-47 62-116395-619

~~ST-110~~

SEP 9 1975

NOTE: James Dick, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, made the request for the interview of SA MacDougall concerning mail covers. This interview will be a Staff interview. Reference phone call ~~to~~ advised the New York Office of this request and of the fact that SA MacDougall should be available for the briefing on 9/8/75 by the Legal Counsel and Intelligence Divisions. This communication will serve as approval for the waiver of an existing employment agreement signed by SA MacDougall for purposes of this interview.

JBH/PVD/PJD

PVD:lad
(10)

4D

SEP 05 1975

TELETYPE 0228

WRW

79 SEP 17 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

Mr. W. R. Wannall

8/12/75

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

A. B. Fulton

COINTELPROS

This is to identify additional copies of excised material which is being made available in room 4171 of the JEH building for review by staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The copies have been excised to protect sensitive sources and delete information from other agencies where there were sensitivities.

Each serial, prior to being made available for review to members of the SSC staff in room 4171, is approved by the responsible Section Chief.

Attached for the file are 23 copies of excised serials regarding the New Left which were made available for review to the SSC on 8/7/75, and 336 copies of the Black Extremist which were made available on 8/8/75 for review. The latter 336, which consists of four volumes, are being maintained in room 4426, JEH.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures
62-116009

62 116-395

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
1 - 100-449698 (New Left)
1 - 100-448006 (Black Extremist)

DKP:lfj
(11)

NDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

8/5/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

Mr. W. R. Wannall

A. B. Fulton

COINTELPROS

This is to identify additional copies of excised serials which are being made available in room 4171 of the JEH building for review by staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). Copies have been excised to protect sensitive sources and delete information from other agencies where there were sensitivities.

Each serial, prior to being made available for review to members of the SSC staff, is approved by the appropriate responsible Section Chief.

Attached for the file are 44 copies of excised serials as they were made available for review to the SSC on 8/1/75: 36 relate to the Communist Party, USA, Cointelpro, five to the New Left and three to the Socialist Workers Party Cointelpros; 105 copies regarding the New Left Cointelpro which were also made available on 8/1/75, and 41 copies of New Left Cointelpro which were made available for review on 8/4/75.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures
62-116009

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
1 - 100-449698 (New Left)
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)
1 - 100-436291 (SWP)

62-116[illegible]
NOT [illegible]
[illegible] 1975

DKP:lfj
(12)

NDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP3ALM/KP

70 SEP 8 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

August 18, 1975

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Director, FBI

NDR-14
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2[illegible]

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

Reference is made to the August 8, 1975, meeting in your office, wherein members of your staff and officials of this Bureau discussed matters relating to the current inquiries of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as relates to our Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros) documents and to the protection of FBI sources utilized in these programs.

At your request there is attached a memorandum summarizing known results in our Cointelpros directed against the Communist Party, USA, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate Groups, New Left and Black Extremists. These summaries do not indicate any actions were conducted under these programs which resulted in physical injury to the targets or that electronic techniques, surreptitious entries, or mail openings were used in connection with Cointelpro actions.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116009-80

Enclosure
62-116009

ENCLOSURE

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)

DKP/DR:lfj
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
170 AUG 20 1975

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

DUPLICATE YELLOW

8 AUG [illegible] 1975

NOTE:

The Attorney General, on 8/8/75, and the Deputy Attorney General, met with Associate Director Nicholas P. Callahan, Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, and Inspector John B. Hotis to discuss the request of the Senate Select Committee for the identities of sources utilized to effect Cointelpro activities. The Attorney General indicated prior to discussing this problem, which relates to the overall confidentiality of FBI sources, with Senator Church, Chairman of the Committee, he desired to be furnished information which would enable him to insure himself there were no Cointelpro activities of a scandalous or infamous nature which at a later date could cause embarrassment to the Department. The attached memorandum was prepared during the period 8/8-12/75 by personnel of the Internal Security Branch of the Intelligence Division. It represents a careful review of all Cointelpro actions where results were known. It is pointed out in the majority of authorized Cointelpro actions results were not recorded. Also, because of the wide variety of Cointelpro actions, results in many areas are not subject to measurement. For example, there is no way of determining how many individuals left the Communist Party as a result of our documented mailings relating to Soviet anti-semitism.

SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

August 18, 1975

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

Classified because sets forth information which, if disclosed, could compromise sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

In an effort to assess possible damage incurred by subversive and extremist organizations and individuals as a result of Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activity, a current review has been made of the programs relating to the Communist Party, USA, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate Groups, New Left and Black Extremists.

The "Study Committee Report on FBI Counterintelligence Programs," prepared in May, 1974, by the Department-FBI Committee headed by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen, tabulated 3,208 proposals for counterintelligence action during the period 1956 until all programs were discontinued on April 28, 1971. Of these, according to the Petersen report, 2,340 were reported approved and implemented and results were reported as known in 516 instances. Our current review has developed 626 instances where results of varying degrees are known. Excluding results of actions which appear to have been appropriate and proper law enforcement procedures, we have summarized results in 164 instances. In any instance where there was any question regarding the propriety of the action, doubts were resolved by preparing a summary.

For ready review, summaries of the actions in these 164 instances have been placed in categories and are attached as follows:

1. Anonymously furnishing information. (34 instances) Pages 3-36.

62-116009
① - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
DKP/DR:lfj
(9)

SECRET

ORIGINAL FURNISHED THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
COPY FURNISHED THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

Classified by 4375
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE 62-116595-

Counterintelligence Programs

2. Furnishing information to news media. (39 instances) Pages 37-75.

3. Use of informants for disruption. (9 instances) Pages 76-84.

4. Alerting employers, credit bureaus and creditors to illegal, immoral, radical or subversive activity. (10 instances) Pages 85-94.

5. Alerting business and individuals with whom individual or group has economic dealings to illegal, immoral, radical or subversive activity. (16 instances) Pages 95-110.

6. Alerting religious and civic leaders and organizations to immoral, subversive, illegal, or radical activity. (22 instances) Pages 111-132.

7. Alerting family or associates to illegal, immoral, radical or subversive activities. (5 instances) Pages 133-137.

8. Alerting educational institutions to immoral, illegal, radical or subversive activity. (17 instances) Pages 138-154.

9. Miscellaneous. (12 instances) Pages 155-166.

Extreme care should be exercised in connection with any use of the attached material. Public disclosure of some of this material could result in physical jeopardy to present and former FBI sources utilized in these programs.

/

Counterintelligence Programs

In July, 1964, an anonymous letter was sent to a number of individuals in the Superior, Wisconsin, area who advertised in "Tyomies-Eteenpain," a Finnish language newspaper published in Wisconsin noting the similarity of editorials in "The Worker," published by the Communist Party, USA, to alert these advertisers to the communist nature of this newspaper so they might withdraw their support.

There was no known withdrawal of support for this newspaper, but at the same time, the newspaper was applying for membership in the Superior, Wisconsin, Chamber of Commerce and their application was denied.

JPM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-30-77, 82, 84

Counterintelligence Programs

In December, 1969, an anonymous letter was directed to selected members of the United Klans of America, Inc. (UKA), by the Richmond Office. This letter denounced Robert H. Hudgins, Grand Dragon of Virginia, characterizing him as one interested in personal gain only. The content of the letter suggested that it had been prepared by Raymond Adams, a former UKA member, who had been banished and had been at odds with Hudgins.

The anonymous mailing resulted in continuing disruption and mistrust in certain Klan units. Hudgins' leadership was challenged. The unrest at Danville, Virginia, caused a great reduction in income for the UKA in Virginia, and affected Hudgins' salary and expenses. Information available does not indicate whether money for Hudgins' salary and expenses obtained from UKA or his employer.

TCD:bmf
(9)

157-9-41-113, 115, 116, 118

Counterintelligence Programs

FBI Headquarters, in October, 1962, authorized the preparation of an anonymous mimeographed leaflet criticizing individuals and small groups with communist backgrounds who consistently attacked the United States but never took a stand against the Soviet Union. This was to be done in connection with the scheduled October 31, 1962, appearance of Herbert Eugene Aptheker, a member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, at the State University of New York at Buffalo (UB), as a part of a lecture series entitled "A Political Spectrum of a Contemporary World." Such individuals had been openly critical of an earlier appearance by a British fascist.

Authority was also granted to anonymously mail public source information on Aptheker to Dr. Charles Ebert, UB, a faculty member critical of the far left.

The leaflets were anonymously distributed to the local news media, the student newspaper and to 28 campus organizations and/or students.

Aptheker's scheduled speech was deferred by a last minute injunction in New York State Court. It is not known if the leaflets or letter had any bearing on the injunction. An appellate court later ruled the University had the right to invite Aptheker to speak.

RWH:tdp (9)
100-3-104-6-36, 42 44, 78

Counterintelligence Programs

In August, 1963, the FBI in Seattle, Washington, became aware that a factional problem existed in the Communist Party (CP) Northwest District as a result of the Sino-Soviet split in which the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), supported the Soviet Union.

A Red Chinese letter stating their position in the ideological dispute was condensed; criticisms of the CPUSA pro-Soviet position were added, and an anonymous letter prepared and mailed to 25 selected CP members in the Northwest District.

The Seattle FBI Office later reported that some members of the Seattle area CP registered their disapproval with the National CP pro-Soviet position and that this contributed to some disharmony in CPUSA circles. The letter was discussed at CP state and local club levels in Seattle.

RPF:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-50-89, 92, 96

Counterintelligence Programs

During May, 1967, a leaflet was mailed to about 40 individuals in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, area. Recipients were labor union leaders, churchmen, members of the American Society of Friends, and the American Legion Posts in vicinity of the residence of Arthur Edelman. Some of the recipients were associated with Edelman in promoting demonstrations against the war in Vietnam and the leaflet was designed to present the membership and leadership role of Edelman and his wife, Beth, in the Western Pennsylvania Communist Party (CP).

Arthur Edelman, after being made aware of leaflet, announced it was time to come out in the open. An informant advised that Arthur Tuden, a college instructor in Pittsburgh, who was active in the antiwar movement, commented he was considering being more circumspect in his dealings with Edelman. Subsequent to circulation of leaflet, Edelman claimed the organization Trade Unionists For Peace in Pittsburgh was on verge of collapse because of friction among its leaders.

HPB:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-39-148, 150, 154

Counterintelligence Programs

During mid-1966, the New Orleans Office mailed a series of letters to Assistant Grand Dragon Bill Windham, Louisiana United Klans of America, Inc., in the name of a fictitious organization, The National Committee for Domestic Tranquility (NCDT), an anti-Klan group. The letters, which indicated that Windham was cooperating with NCDT, were addressed in a manner that they would be intercepted by a Klan member and furnished to another Klan leader.

Resulted in a split in Klan leadership and ultimately in Windham's resignation from the Klan.

RLL: vb
(9)

157-9-33-46, 48, 49, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia FBI Office was authorized to mail an anonymous letter to Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard, United Klans of America (UKA), Tuscaloosa, Alabama, from a "member of the Minutemen" in Pennsylvania, urging that Shelton drop Roy Frankhouser from Ku Klux Klan leadership in Pennsylvania. This letter would also suggest that Pennsylvania authorities, although not true, were considering Frankhouser as a murder suspect at that time.

During March, 1967, Robert Shelton mentioned he had dropped Frankhouser from membership in the UKA and that he had written acknowledgment from Frankhouser of this fact.

ELS:dsh/lfj
(9)

157-9-37-35, 37, 38

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia FBI Office during June, 1964, mailed an anonymous letter, ostensibly prepared by a disgruntled Communist Party (CP) youth in Philadelphia, to Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA, complaining about the domineering and overbearing attitude toward the CP youth on the part of Frances Gabow, Organizational Secretary of the CP of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware. The letter indicated Gabow had also lost the respect of adult members because of her relationship with a married man.

Gabow lost her position as CP Organizational Secretary.

ELS:bmf/lfj
(9)

100-3-104-37-124

Counterintelligence Programs

During August, 1968, the Los Angeles Office mailed an anonymous letter to selected faculty associates of Robert A. Nieman, an Assistant Professor at California State College and a candidate for the Peace and Freedom Party for the California Assembly. The letter ridiculed Nieman, pointing out that he was white, did not truly represent the blacks, that he had been arrested for possession of marijuana, and of his background with the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Nieman was very active in SDS and supported SDS in anti-Vietnam War demonstrations. His arrest record, under FBI Identification Number 274-888-G, reveals that he was arrested by the Los Angeles, California, Police Department, on 9/29/67 for violation of the Health and Safety Code (Possession of Marijuana).

Nieman lost the election, which he said he expected, but also stated that the letter had caused him much embarrassment, both at the school, where an effort was being made to remove him, and among black militants, who in some cases were being taught by him.

RLL:vb/lm
(9)

100-449698-26-7, 13, 18

Counterintelligence Programs

A leaflet entitled "Call...to Progressive-Minded America Announcing the Holding of a Conference Preliminary to the Founding Convention of a New, American Labor-Negro Vanguard Party" in November, 1961, was sent anonymously by the Newark Office to Communist Party (CP) officials throughout the country. The aim was to hinder the formation of the American Labor-Negro Vanguard Party (ALNVP) which was a project of the Harriet-Tubman Section which had already been expelled from the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). It was also to make the Harriet-Tubman Section appear as a provocative agent of the FBI trying to raid the CPUSA of its membership and financial support.

The mailing created considerable confusion in the CPUSA, which found it necessary to warn its members through its newspaper, of the formation of the ALNVP and to warn against being taken in by this group.

JPM:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-31-3, 15

Counterintelligence Program

During June, 1970, the Charlotte Office prepared about 100 copies of a leaflet, in the form of a news item, prepared by a reporter for Southern Vanguard Revolutionary Party, (a defunct extremist organization formed by purged Panther Jose Gonzalvez). The leaflet, sent to news services and to a number of residents in the vicinity of Black Panther Party (BPP) headquarters, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, was intended to publicize the split in the BPP group at Winston-Salem and to highlight that outside leadership has been brought to the BPP Winston-Salem. Leaflet mentioned Douglas Miranda, former BPP leader in New Haven, Connecticut, had been transferred to Winston-Salem and also attacked Larry Little, a BPP leader in Winston-Salem, as radical and insinuated he is pocketing donations obtained for BPP Breakfast for Children Program. The leaflet contained truthful information.

After distribution of this leaflet, sales of the BPP newspaper in Winston-Salem dropped considerably and respect for BPP leaders in Winston-Salem was reported to have been lost by members.

EFG:bmf/lm
(9)

100-448006-1829, 2088, 2094

Counterintelligence Programs

Douglas Paul Miranda was a successful leader and organizer of the Black Panther Party (BPP) during 1969 and 1970 in New Haven, Connecticut. An anonymous letter was sent to BPP Headquarters in San Francisco in March, 1970, using BPP slang alleging that Miranda had embezzled BPP funds and questioned whether his promiscuity was in the best interest of the BPP. There was no specific information known to the FBI that Miranda was,in fact, embezzling BPP funds, but allegations had been received that he was having sexual relations with numerous females in the New Haven area.

Miranda fell into disfavor with the BPP leadership and disciplinary action was taken with the approval of the national office. He was transferred to Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

HPB:bmf
(9)

105-165706-32-1150
100-448006-1722

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 9, 1969, an informant advised that Michael Baynham, a Detroit Black Panther Party (BPP) member, disappeared from Detroit June 6, 1969, after taking $150 of BPP funds. He allegedly purchased a gun with part of this money and left Detroit. The BPP was reportedly very upset over Baynham's actions.

On June 12, 1969, Lt. William McCoy, Special Investigations Bureau, Detroit, Michigan, Police Department advised that Baynham was found fatally shot that date in the hallway of Jackie Spicer's residence, 13529 Dequindre, Detroit, Michigan. Spicer was present at the time of the shooting and advised police he had committed suicide.

The Wayne County, Michigan Medical Examiner's Office subsequently advised Baynham's death could possibly have been a suicide.

On September 15, 1969, FBI Headquarters authorized Detroit Office to mail an anonymous communication to a "representative number of Detroit BPP leaders" and members and to BPP National officer, David Hilliard. This communication, mailed September 17, 1969, would question the death of BPP member "Brother Michael Baynham," who it was believed committed suicide and would raise the question of possible responsibility on the part of national BPP leaders for the suicide. The letter would also be prepared in a manner to cause suspicion that Jackie Spicer, a BPP leader in Detroit, was the author of the letter and thus cause disruption in the BPP.

On September 19, 1969, an informant advised the receipt of the letter by Detroit BPP personnel convinced them that Jackie Spicer and Anita Hartman (also BPP member) wrote the letter. As a result, Frank Meyers of the Detroit Chapter contacted BPP National Headquarters on September 18, 1969, to so advise them. As a result, Meyers was told to stay away from Spicer since she was probably a police informant and the letter had come from the police through her.

At a BPP meeting held September 18, 1969, a decision was made to confront Spicer regarding the letter and consequently, she and Anita Hartman were purged from the Detroit BPP group.

PEN:cah (9)
100-448006-1251, 1303, 1359;   157-14024-5

Counterintelligence Programs

The Richmond Office of the FBI prepared an anonymous letter addressed to George Lincoln Rockwell, National Commander of the American Nazi Party (ANP) wherein it was alleged Alan Welch, Deputy Commander of the ANP, is a homosexual and had engaged in an unusual sex act with another ANP member. Further, that Welch was turning away recruits from the National Headquarters who appeared to be "too manly." A source who had furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Welch had been described by Rockwell in the past as "a reformed queer." The Richmond Office furnished this letter to the Dallas Office where it was mailed on September 23, 1965.

On November 26, 1965, Rockwell appeared at the Alexandria, Virginia, Resident Agency of the FBI with four letters he received, one of which was the above, inquiring if these letters were in violation of Federal law. Rockwell advised the above letter caused a great deal of disruption in the ANP and it cast suspicion on one of his most trusted workers, namely Welch.

LEB:bmf
(9)

157-9-41-11, 17, 19

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 3, 1969, the Salt Lake City Office sent an anonymous letter to James Lucien Bever, President of the University of Utah chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) alleging that Larry Hammel, a University of Utah student leader devoted to SDS, was an informant. On October 7, 1969, Bever appeared at an SDS meeting and confronted Hammel. Bever announced that he received information that Hammel was a traitor to SDS principles and an informant for the "Feds."

The above resulted in considerable dissension among SDS adherents at that meeting and in future meetings. Hammel's loyalty to SDS remained in doubt even though he attempted to refute the attack. Shortly after the above action SDS became totally inactive at the University of Utah.

TCD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-44-10

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1971, the Seattle Office advised that the following action was taken to discredit Michael Thomas Justesen and Clayton Van Lydegraf among their fellow New Left associates. During December, 1970, in connection with the "Seattle 8" trial, it was apparent that the defendants and their attorneys were under the impression that the Government intended to uncover other informants in addition to the one who was surfaced for testimony. (The "Seattle 8" is a name coined by news media to describe eight persons indicted by a Federal Grand Jury at Seattle, Washington, on April 16, 1970, for violation of the anti-riot law and conspiracy to destroy Government property.) Although there was general speculation that one of the defendants was a Government informant, this was not true. The Government had no other informants to uncover. Following the declaration of a mistrial in the case, an anonymous call was made to Defense Counsel Jeffrey Steinborn. (The mistrial was declared as a result of actions by a defendant who was cited for contempt.) The anonymous caller offered to help Steinborn in defense of the case but related a fear that Steinborn's phone might be bugged. Steinborn was instructed to proceed to a particular pay telephone booth directly across from the Seattle Police Department. He was observed entering the phone booth and the call was placed to him. Steinborn was advised that he was then under observation by the caller which left the impression that the call emanated from the Seattle Police Department. The caller disclosed an intention to get even with United States Attorney Stan Pitkin of Seattle, and the FBI for what they did to the Seattle Police Department. (It is noted that Pitkin handled the Government's case concerning the "Seattle 8," and also received considerable publicity in 1970 in connection with an expose of police corruption before the Federal Grand Jury.) The anonymous caller advised him that Michael Justesen and Clayton Van Lydegraf were FBI informants. (Justesen was in fugitive status at the time and Van Lydegraf's whereabouts were not known.) In reality neither was an informant. United States Attorney Pitkin was not aware of the above action.

As a result, Steinborn confronted Pitkin a few months later and warned that disclosure during any future trial that one of the defendants was actually an FBI informant would jeopardize the Government's case. Pitkin denied any knowledge that the FBI might have an undisclosed informant within the "Seattle 8." Information from other sources indicated that some persons sympathetic with the "Seattle 8" felt that Justesen was an informant. This gave further indication of the effect of the anonymous call made to Steinborn.

TCD:dsh (9)
100-449698-50-13, 14

Counterintelligence Programs

Philadelphia Office submitted anonymous letter to Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and Mortimor Daniel Rubin, responsible for Party youth activities discrediting Jarvis Tyner as being ineffective in making arrangements for a convention and establishing a working organization.

Tyner was subsequently downgraded in his position within the Party and had to coordinate all matters with other individuals in New York.

KAM:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-37-121, 126

Counterintelligence Programs

In January, 1967, James Dolsen, Communist Party (CP) leader in Philadelphia, was informed by the FBI, through an anonymous telephone call, of current status and trial date concerning Aaron Libson, a CP member arrested for sodomy. This was a continuation of previous anonymous information provided Dolsen in November, 1966, about Libson's arrest.

After Libson entered a guilty plea in February, 1967, the fact was published in a newspaper. Daniel Rubin, National Organizational Secretary, stated Libson was dropped from CP.

HPB:vb
(9)

100-3-104-364, 371, 374

Counterintelligence Programs

In September, 1966, an anonymous letter was mailed by the Jackson Division to United Klans of America (UKA) leaders and members near the Headquarters of the Knights of Green Forest (KGF) denouncing Dale Odus Walton, Imperial Wizard, KGF, in typical Klan language.

Many Klansmen discontinued their support of Walton and this organization became inactive.

PWC:dew
(9)

157-9-54-39, 41, 50

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1967, George Lucas, Miami Communist Party (CP) Chairman since May, 1966, was engaged in an attack on the primarily Jewish CP membership in the Miami area. It was approved that an anonymous letter in Yiddish about this situation be sent to Isaac Dantzig, Vice Chairman of the Miami CP who was regarded as a leader of the progressive Jewish movement in the area. The letter was to question the loyalty of Lucas and his wife to the CP. It was also approved, since Lucas had been determined as the source of a series of anonymous letters to the FBI, that a number of CP members be interviewed about the letters in a way that they suspect Lucas as the writer.

Mr. Lucas and his wife were both given indefinite suspensions by the CP. However, Lucas had also been sending anonymous letters to the FBI and through interviews with CP members they became aware that Lucas was the writer of these letters. Ruth Lucas was interviewed but was uncooperative. Also, CP operations in the area were thoroughly disrupted, CP membership became disorganized, and CP sources of funds dwindled.

JPM:cah (9)
100-3-104-29-9, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 27

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1961, Communist Party literature was anonymously mailed to the residences of a cross section of employees of the Olson Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, creating an indignant reaction by the recipients. Mr. Peter Olson, an executive of the company, felt one of his employees, Mary Blair, was responsible for the mailings as she was the only known communist in the company.

Mary Blair was discharged from her employment at the Olson Publishing Company on November 9, 1961.

JPM:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-2982
100-3-104-30-2

Counterintelligence Programs

In November, 1966, 250 post cards cancelling a fund raising bazaar in Detroit, Michigan, scheduled by "The Volunteers," a front group of the Michigan District Communist Party (MDCP) to promote "The Worker," were anonymously mailed just before the opening of the bazaar. It was anticipated the mailing would be blamed on Breakthrough, a conservative anticommunist group in Detroit, since the communists knew a member of Breakthrough had infiltrated "The Volunteers" about three years previously and would therefore have a mailing list. It was also anticipated that this action would lead to the criticism of William Allan, a top MDCP functionary, as he sponsored the infiltrator.

Attendance at the bazaar was less than half of the previous year's attendance, and proceeds for "The Worker" were also less than half of the previous year's proceeds. The proceeds for the 1966 bazaar were $428.00.

JCF:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-15-294, 309, 310, 314

Counterintelligence Programs

During July, 1969, the Los Angeles Office sent anonymous leaflets to selected leaders and members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) and New Left organizations accusing Donald Freed of being a police informant. Freed was active in the Los Angeles area in developing a close working relationship between the BPP and New Left organizations.

During a meeting of the BPP United Front Against Fascism where the leaflets were also distributed, Freed abruptly left and never returned. Although given a vote of confidence by "The Friends of the Black Panthers" a few weeks later, he showed a noticeable effect of the experience and it may have impaired his efficiency and command of his following.

RLL:dsh
(9)

100-449698-26-31, 39

Counterintelligence Programs

By letter April 23, 1969, FBI Headquarters authorized Jackson Office to mail anonymous letter to Donald Wilson Jackson, also known as Muhammad Kenyatta. Letter would be ostensibly from a student defense committee and designed to discourage Jackson from returning to Tougaloo College, Tougaloo, Mississippi. Jackson and his associates, all associated with the Black Panther Party and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, had been involved in incidents of violence on the campus during week of April 10-13, 1969. Letter was mailed to Jackson on April 25, 1969.

Jackson Office subsequently advised that through a confidential informant, it was learned that Jackson was disturbed about the letter and on May 23, 1969, planned to leave the Jackson, Mississippi, area and to return to his home in Pennsylvania.

JTA:bmf
(9)

100-448006-863,869,970,987

Counterintelligence Programs

Fanny Hechtman of the New York Communist Party, in 1965, was a hard and successful worker for the cause of "The Worker," a national publication of the Communist Party, USA. Hechtman was reported to be extremely neurotic. The New York Office made a pretext telephone call to Hechtman on May 7, 1965, wherein the caller advised Hechtman she was a friend of hers and wanted to warn Hechtman that the national Communist Party leadership was contemplating removing Hechtman from the national office and transferring her to Philadelphia because of her neurotic tendencies.

Hechtman advised a friend later of this call and was visibly upset and disturbed by the phone call.

LEB:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-34-1011, 1028

Counterintelligence Programs

The National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF) annual rally was held in Carnegie Hall, New York, on November 12, 1964. Prior to the rally, 238 bogus postcards were mailed by the New York Office to selected Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), members in the New York area with a message denouncing the Chinese communists and calling for support of the "new Soviet leadership." The cards were mailed to the member's place of employment.

William Melish, Chairman, NCASF, denounced this as an attempt by an unknown right-wing group to embarrass and disrupt the NCASF. Many of the recipients of these postcards may have been subjected to embarrassment at their places of employment.

LEB:tdp (9)
100-3-104-34-909, 935

Counterintelligence Programs

In 1964 a fraudulent FBI informant report which implicated William Albertson, member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), as an FBI informant was purposely misdirected to the CPUSA office in New York. The report was read and believed by the CPUSA.

Albertson was subsequently expelled from the CPUSA causing a major disruption in the CPUSA leadership.

LEB:cah (9)
100-3-104-34-690

Counterintelligence Programs

The San Francisco Office placed an anonymous telephone call to Mrs. Thelma Seale, mother of Bobby Seale, National Black Panther Party (BPP) leader. Seale, after a speech in Connecticut on May 19, 1969, was to make speeches in Eugene, Corvallis and Portland, Oregon. Telephone call was ostensibly from a "brother" in Oregon telling Mrs. Seale it would be dangerous for Bobby to make the Oregon appearances. Mrs. Seale told BPP Headquarters about the call and it was decided that Seale should not go.

Results, as reported in San Francisco letter May 26, 1969, were that Seale passed up $1, 130 in Eugene and $600 in Corvallis and possibly caused rift with affiliates of the Students for a Democratic Society who were to appear with him.

JTA:lfj
(9)

100-448006-967

Counterintelligence Programs

An anonymous letter was prepared and sent by the Pittsburgh Office on April 24, 1969, to 35 individuals and leaders of Pittsburgh area peace organizations alleging that Walter and Kay Tillow, leaders of the Pittsburgh Peace and Freedom Center, were being unduly influenced by members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). The publication of the Center was likened to that of the "Guardian" and "Daily World" in content. The letter also alluded to the Tillows' association with Art and Beth Edelman, who in turn were alleged to be associated with CPUSA leader Gus Hall.

The letter resulted in controversy. An informant advised that Walter Tillow believed that the letter was written by the FBI in an attempt to harass him.

TCD:cah (9)
100-449698-39-9, 10

Counterintelligence Programs

Information was developed through informants that Albert Taylor, a member of the United Klans of America (UKA), Lawrence Lodge #610, Montgomery, Alabama, was suspected by George Harris, another member of that lodge, of being an FBI informant. Taylor was not an informant of the FBI. On March 17, 1971, a letter, designed to confirm Harris' suspicions, was mailed by the Mobile Office to Harris. Additionally, an FBI automobile was driven through an area near Taylor's place of employment in a further attempt to convince Harris of Taylor's alleged cooperation with the FBI.

According to informants, since the time of the mailing of the letter, Taylor has not been seen at meetings of Lodge #610.

HWP:hp
(9)

157-9-61,59,61

Counterintelligence Programs

Headquarters sent to Southern offices having substantial Klan activity a supply of three different post cards to be mailed anonymously to a selected number of known Klan members. These post cards contained a caricature of a member of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in his hood and robe and two attacked the Klan's secrecy of membership and the other inferred the Klan leaders are using Klan money for high living, both sensitive points in the Klan.

Numerous mailings were made, some of which received newspaper publicity thereby causing disruption in the Klan membership. Specific individuals to whom mailings were made are not identified in Headquarters files.

TED:lfj
(9)

157-9-30, 33, 34, 29

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

In order to increase the friction between the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Black Panther Party (BPP), the New York Office, in August, 1968, made pretext telephone calls to the SNCC office in an attempt to convey the impression to SNCC that the BPP was "out to get them." Purpose was to increase existing friction between SNCC and BPP.

This was effected and subsequently our New York Office received information indicating that James Forman, SNCC leader, was recently threatened by the BPP who said they would "get him." Forman was making himself scarce with his location known only to his wife and SNCC officials.

VRT:dsh
(9)

SECRET

100-448006-229, 271

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 18, 1960, the San Francisco Office directed a letter to the San Francisco Branch Headquarters of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) inviting attendance at an address to be given by Daniel Rubin, National Youth Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), on October 19, 1960, at the Peter Wright School of Dance in San Francisco.

Trotskyist SWP members attended meeting, as did a reporter. Trotskyists caused considerable disruption and exposed Rubin as being a communist, which he was attempting to conceal by claiming to be merely the editor of "New Horizons." The SWP Trotskyists identified "New Horizons" as a communist paper being published by the Communist Party attempting to influence youth.

JDP: vb
(9)

100-3-104-2031

Counterintelligence Programs

Anonymous letters were mailed by the Chicago Division on September 11, 1961, to Board members and on September 14, 1961, to rank-and-file members of the Chicago Council of American-Soviet Friendship (CCASF) relative to a Board meeting of the CCASF held September 13, 1961, to discuss a policy statement on the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear testing.

The CCASF released a statement which incorporated a critical approach to the Soviet Union resuming nuclear retesting. The First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Dmitri D. Muraviev, appeared at the Offices of the CCASF and reprimanded Hedda Basker, a member of the Board of Directors.

JDM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-2885, 2934

2

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 21, 1966, Jim Felder, UPI reporter at Montgomery, Alabama, was confidentially contacted and furnished information about the resignation, for financial reasons, of United Klans of America (UKA) Grand Dragon William Brassell. Prior to that date, there had been no local publicity in Montgomery papers and Bureau efforts were directed toward discrediting Brassell.

On May 23, 1966, a UPI story by Felder regarding Brassell's ouster from the UKA appeared in the Montgomery Advertiser Journal, resulting in adverse publicity to the UKA.

HWP: vb
(9)

157-9-61, 14, 15, 20

Counterintelligence Programs

Miami Division advised Isadon Nochman, Bureau Chief, "Palm Beach Post-Times," Belle Glock, Florida, of a severe beating of a white male teenager following which a Klansman placed a card on the victim stating, "You have just served a proud Klansman, United Klan of America, Incorporated, Palm Beach County. Yours to good health, in God we trust." Newspaper article resulted in unfavorable publicity regarding the Klan.

As a result of the publicity, one of the Klansmen involved in the beating resigned from the Klan and was discharged from his employment due to his public identification as a Klansman. This individual's identity was not shown. Publicity also caused a great deal of internal criticism in the Klan of Klan leader Lee Granims.

TED:dsh
(9)

157-9-29-77, 83

Counterintelligence Programs

In early 1966, the Miami Office determined that a building located at 232 Southwest 30th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, was being used as a United Klans of America, Incorporated, (UKA) operation. This information was disclosed to Milton J. Kelly, Managing Editor of the "Ft. Lauderdale News," and J. Lester Holt, Chief of Police, Ft. Lauderdale Police Department, was notified after a joint meeting of all klaverns commenced in the Klan building that this was the opportune time to set up roadblocks.

The April 19, 1966, edition of the "Ft. Lauderdale News" contained an article captioned "Check Follows Meeting Here - Klan Says Police Violate Rights" reported that a group of suspected Ku Klux Klansmen returning from a secret meeting April 18, 1966, ran into a police checkpoint. Newspaper photographers took pictures and numerous Klansmen were identified. Among those stopped by police were: David J. Zbin, 2600 Southwest Second Avenue; Richard Harley, 4600 Southwest 32nd Drive, West Hollywood; Drew Eugene Johnson, 1429 Southwest 33rd Court; Frederick Paul Attix, 1625 Northwest 15th Place; Sam Richard McBroom, 1420 Northwest First Avenue; Jessie Gay Taylor, 1425 Northwest First Avenue; Conda Lewis Mc Connaughay, 612 Southwest Eighth Avenue, and Harold Carlstedt, 3205 Northwest Third Street. Chaos and confusion was created among the Klansmen and the affair was given extensive publicity.

TJS:tdp (9)
157-9-29-30, 38, 44.

Counterintelligence Programs

Miami Division alerted "Fort Lauderdale News" of Klan and National States Rights Party rally at Vero Beach-Winter Park, Florida, August 29, 1966, and participation of Charles Baker Riddlehoover. Newspaper articles of a negative nature were written regarding the Klan and Riddlehoover.

As a result of unfavorable publicity in newspaper articles, Riddlehoover's organization failed to gain a following and rally at Winter Beach was a failure.

TED: vb
(9)

157-9-29-75, 76

Counterintelligence Programs

Public source information which exposes the Communist Party affiliation of Hunter Pitts O'Dell, a consultant to the field staff of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), was furnished October 19, 1962, to contacts in the news media field in Augusta, Savannah, Charleston, and Atlanta.

The exposure of O'Dell's communist background in newspapers resulted in his resignation from SCLC.

DML:tdp (9)
100-3-104-34-295, 314

Counterintelligence Programs

The Portland Office contacted Richard Ross, News Director, Station KGW-TV, Portland, Oregon, concerning planned arrival in Portland of Hyman Lumer, National Committee member, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), on February 25, 1964. Lumer was to conduct a class in Marxism for CP youth and intended CP members. Ross arranged coverage of Lumer's arrival in Portland.

Lumer was incensed at the attempted interview and photographing of his arrival at the Portland airport. He cursed Richard Ross and swung his briefcase at the photographer. The film clip of Lumer's conduct was shown locally in Portland and subsequently on February 27, 1964, by NBC on the nationally televised Huntley-Brinkley news broadcast.

HPB:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-40-12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

The Cleveland Office furnished questions relating to the background and activities of Frank Wilkinson, Executive Director, National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, and Richard Criley, member of the District Committee, Communist Party of Illinois, for the use on May 18, 1962, when the two were to appear on the Mike Douglas Show on KYW-TV in Cleveland.

Wilkinson was evasive and on the defensive during his appearance. Criley did not appear due to a change in plans.

TJD:cah (9)
100-3-104-11-22

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

FBI contacted Morris Litman of the "Philadelphia Inquirer" to alert him to the background and plans of the Philadelphia branch of the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) and specifically its plans to picket the Democratic National Convention. The point to the contact was to uncover the DCA effort to conceal its Communist Party association. Articles appeared in the July 27 and August 23, 1964, issues of the "Inquirer."

The DCA members admitted "Inquirer" articles hindered their organization efforts and that the articles reduced the number of persons who ultimately traveled to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to picket the convention.

RHR:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-37-146, 163 p. 2

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 14, 1964, Milford Sutherland held a press conference in Seattle, Washington, where he announced his intention to run for Governor of Washington. One hundred nominating signatures were required to be placed in nomination.

On August 5, 1964, Lyle Burt, Reporter, Seattle Times, contacted the Seattle Office for background information regarding Sutherland, which Burt said he would publish in the August 9, 1964, issue of the newspaper. Material relating to Sutherland's Communist Party background was given to Burt. Such an article was published documenting this background information, and on September 4, 1964, Sutherland withdrew his candidacy for Governor. Sutherland blamed the Attorney General's Office, the Secretary of State (California), and the Washington State Supreme Court for dilatory tactics in not making a decision regarding his refusal to sign a loyalty oath.

JWM:dsh
HWP:hp
(9)

100-3-104-50,136,137,141

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 28-30, 1966, a convention of the Northwest District, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) was held at Seattle. The CPUSA intended this convention to be secret.

Confidential sources of the Seattle Office were made aware of this "secret" convention which resulted in considerable newspaper and television publicity given to the event. Additionally, anti-CPUSA leftists and members of the Socialist Worker's Party were invited via an FBI produced invitation. Upon appearing at the convention these people were denied admittance or expelled from the convention, thus bringing the convention into disarray.

Reporter Jack Eddy, KIRO-TV, one of the newsmen confidentially advised of the convention, and his cameraman, were recommended for a raise as a result of their outstanding news coverage of the CPUSA convention and the general manager of the station indicated that he was interested in nominating Eddy's coverage for a Sigma Delta Chi award for excellence in television reporting the next time such awards were to be granted.

JWM:cah (9)
100-3-104-50-199, 200, 201, 202

Counterintelligence Programs

St. Louis Office of FBI furnished to Richard Amberg, Publisher, St. Louis "Globe Democrat," a copy of Law Enforcement Bulletin plus 19 newspaper articles relating to W. E. B. DuBois Club of America (DCA). Information was used to publicize appearance of Herbert Aptheker, theoretician of Communist Party (CP) and member of National Committee CP, before DCA group in St. Louis on February 14, 1965. Publicity in newspapers resulted.

Adverse publicity resulting was assessed by St. Louis Office as having dealt DCA in St. Louis a severe blow.

HPB:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-42-71, 72

Counterintelligence Programs

In November or December, 1965, information regarding a replevin suit filed by Almoreen R. Woods against three Klansmen who took his Klan robes and book from his car after he was thrown out of the Lake Wales Klavern of the United Florida Ku Klux Klan was furnished "anonymously" (method of transmittal unknown) to the "Lakeland Ledger Daily" newspaper.

Klan received bad publicity.

WDF:lfj
(9)

157-9-64-37

Counterintelligence Programs

On April 2, 1969, the Pittsburgh Office furnished information regarding David Owens to Sherley Uhl of the "Pittsburgh Press" newspaper. Owens, a candidate for Pittsburgh City Council and an employee of the Urban League, was arrested March 30, 1969, following a gun battle between Detroit police and members of the Republic of New Africa (RNA). Since Owens was on bond in Pittsburgh following involvement in a shooting incident with Pittsburgh police, it was hoped Uhl's disclosure would cause Owens' bond to be revoked. Also, the Pittsburgh Office furnished this same information to an informant of that office.

Information furnished to Mr. Uhl resulted in unfavorable publicity for Owens as a City Council candidate. The information furnished to the informant resulted in Owens' losing his Urban League job.

JTA: vb
(9)

100-448006-820, 846

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1960, an anonymous letter was mailed to the publisher of the Chicago neighborhood weekly newspaper "Southwest News Herald," which enclosed a copy of a "Chicago Daily Tribune" article dated December 5, 1956, which names Vicki Starr and her husband Ed Starr as communists. Vicki Starr was a candidate for the President of the Parent Teacher Association (PTA) of the Mark Twain Public School in Chicago. The "Southwest News Herald" was a conservative neighborhood newspaper which regularly reported the activities of this PTA. The December 3, 1959, issue carried a photograph of Vicki Starr and described her as vice president of this PTA group.

It was learned from an informant that Vicki Starr was no longer considered a candidate for the position of PTA President.

PWC: vb
(9)

100-3-104-1485, 1497

Counterintelligence Programs

Public source information was furnished to Dennis M. Higgins, special features reporter, "The Philadelphia Inquirer," to expose activities, programs, officers, and true nature of the Philadelphia Social Science Forum Committee (PSSFC), a Communist Party, USA front group. Two articles were prepared to be published about January 17, 1965, and January 24, 1965, in the newspaper. The publications were to bracket a scheduled PSSFC meeting on January 22, 1965.

One article was printed on January 10, 1965. The meeting on January 22, 1965, where Dirk J. Struik spoke attracted 125 persons. Prior meetings with other speakers had attracted 200 persons. A follow-up article appeared on January 23, 1965. Elease Sullivan, a member of the Independent Citizen's Committee, a communist front group, was blamed for furnishing the information to the "Inquirer," which was included in the "Inquirer" article of January 23, 1965.

RHR:vb/jmn
(9)

100-3-104-37-179, 199, 200

Counterintelligence Programs

The National States Rights Party (NSRP), Jackson, Mississippi, intended to use a building located at 188 Longino Street, Jackson, as a meeting hall and in an attempt to organize a new NSRP unit and recruit new members. In May 1970, a letter, purportedly a complaint from a neighbor on Longino Street that Number 188 was being used in violation of residential zoning laws, was mailed by the Jackson Office to the "Jackson Daily News 'Jack Sunn'" column. The letter pointed out that Number 188 had been used for a meeting on April 26, 1970.

On June 1, 1970, the letter appeared in the "Jackson Daily News." Although the precise results were unknown, no further public meetings were held by the NSRP at 188 Longino Street.

The NSRP was organized in 1957 in Knoxville, Tennessee, and through propaganda promotes hatred of Jews, Negroes, Communists, and certain law enforcement agencies.

HWP:hp
(9)

157-9-54, 66, 67, 69

Counterintelligence Programs

An article prepared at FBI Headquarters concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., being the keynote speaker at a fund-raising activity sponsored by the Communist Party-controlled Freedomways Associates, publishers of the magazine "Freedomways," on February 23, 1968, was released to the mass media prior to the date of the speech.

Article appeared in "The Birmingham News," Birmingham, Alabama, on March 7, 1968, and March 10, 1968, which set forth King's Communist Party connections in the past and updated his connections with the "Freedomways" magazine.

KAM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-34-1661, 1662, 1671

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia Office furnished public source information to Ivan Scott, announcer for radio station WIP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, prior to March 31, 1962, depicting the true facts in regard to Morton Sobell's trial and conviction for Conspiracy to Commit Espionage in effort to counteract propaganda being spread by the communists. Scott interviewed several pickets during a demonstration on March 31, 1962, sponsored by the Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell at Philadelphia and asked if they were communists.

Tapes made during interviews were played on news broadcast March 31, 1962, and portion used was to the disadvantage of the National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell and the Philadelphia Sobell Committee. It was felt questions by Scott may have the effect of curtailing future picket activities of the Sobell Committee.

KAM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-37-21
100-387835-2877

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1968, the St. Louis Office confidentially advised Mr. George Killenkey, Associate Editor of the "St. Louis Globe-Democrat," that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in St. Louis announced an intention to make inroads into area high schools. Newspaper articles concerning SDS appeared in the "St. Louis Globe-Democrat."

As a result of the newspaper articles, Lindbergh High School cancelled an SDS speaking engagement. It also resulted in countering further SDS attempts to make inroads into that school.

TCD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-42-5

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 13, 1964, Henry Winston, Vice Chairman, Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA), was scheduled to appear on radio station WBZ in Boston. Prior thereto, the Boston Office contacted WBZ officials in an effort to have Winston's appearance cancelled.

The June 13, 1964, radio appearance of Winston's was cancelled.

LEB:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-34-776 and 808

Counterintelligence Programs

In June, 1966, Los Angeles Division made anonymous telephone calls to major newspapers in the Los Angeles area to alert them to an upcoming Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA) District Convention to be held in the Los Angeles area.

Because of resultant press coverage, some sessions of the Convention were cancelled.

JPM:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-26-249

Counterintelligence Programs

During August, 1963, a Cleveland informant advised that Frank Wilkinson, Executive Director of the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee (NCAHUAC), was scheduled to speak at the Unitarian Society in Cleveland, Ohio, on October 13, 1963. The Cleveland Office recommended furnishing "The Plain Dealer" newspaper, Cleveland, Ohio, and "The Youngstown Vindicator" newspaper, Youngstown, Ohio, with the following public source information regarding Frank Wilkinson and the NCAHUAC:

1. Citizens for Constitutional Rights (CCR) letter dated August 1, 1963, which announced Wilkinson's appearance October 13, 1963, at above meeting.

2. News article "House Quiz Opposed by Visitor Here" from the May 19, 1962, issue of "The Plain Dealer."

3. Citation of the NCAHUAC contained in the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" prepared by the HUAC.

The October 11, 1963, issue of "The Youngstown Vindicator" carried an article announcing two Wilkinson appearances.

The October 14, 1963, issue of "The Plain Dealer" contained an article captioned "Racism Charged to House Unit" concerning the above-noted Wilkinson appearance. The article noted that a 20-second scuffle occurred when Mrs. Leta M. Wood of the Organization to Fight Communism demanded to know why Wilkinson had not mentioned that he had served time in Federal prison in a contempt of Congress case. Mrs. Wood and three supporters then left the meeting which apparently continued.

TEB:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-11-108, 117

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1961, a note with a photostat copy of an article appearing in the May 5, 1954, issue of the Detroit Free Press was sent to Mr. James C. McGahey, President of the United Plant Guard Workers of America. This article alluded that Ann Sargent Crowe, an employee of Mr. McGahey, had communist affiliations.

On April 22, 1963, Ann Crowe resigned as Secretary for the United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 13722 Linwood, Detroit, Michigan. On May 13, 1963, Mr. James C. McGahey advised that because of information he had obtained concerning Ann Crowe's subversive background, he had instituted an investigation of this individual. He further advised that he felt that as a result of this investigation, somewhere along the line word got back to Ann Crowe that she would be dismissed and that he was going to take the matter up with the Executive Board of the Union and this precipitated her voluntary resignation. Mr. McGahey stated that Ann Crowe's last day of employment at the Union was Friday, May 3, 1963.

PWC:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-15-2
100-372282-34

Counterintelligence Program

In February, 1964, the New York Office discreetly informed particular newspaper representatives that Bayard Rustin, civil rights leader who was in the forefront of a boycott of New York City schools, was to attend a cocktail party at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations on February 4, 1964.

Considerable unfavorable publicity concerning Rustin resulted.

RDS:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-34-599

Counterintelligence Programs

The Atlanta Division furnished written material intended to expose and ridicule the Klans in the South to Ralph McGill, of "The Atlanta Constitution" who in turn passed on this material, without disclosing source, to Hal Martin for utilization in article to appear in the "Saturday Evening Post."

This information was also utilized in part by Ralph McGill who published two articles containing unfavorable publicity regarding Klan activities. Articles appeared in "The Atlanta Constitution."

TED:ekw
(9)
157-9-2-4, 7, 12

Counterintelligence Programs

Herbert Aptheker, member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, was invited to speak at Ohio State University on May 21, 1965, by a newly formed student group to challenge an earlier ruling by the University denying an earlier scheduled appearance by the communist leader. Public source data on Aptheker was furnished local news sources and college officials were given a letter from the National Economic Council, Incorporated, which argued against campus appearances by communists.

Aptheker appeared, but sat silently while other persons read selections of his writings.

TJD:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-10-11, 12, 13

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1966, the "Chicago Daily News" newspaper was furnished information regarding the ownership of an apartment building in a slum area by Claude Lightfoot, Chairman of the Illinois Communist Party. The building was in the area of Martin Luther King's headquarters for a slum clearance drive.

Newspaper articles about Lightfoot's ownership of a "rat-infested slum" appeared in Chicago on May 2-3, 1966, and the Party official was ordered to appear before the Compliance Board of Building Commissioners in Chicago.

TJD: vb
(9)

100-3-104-9-560, 561, 562

Counterintelligence Programs

Richard Henry, one of the leaders of The Republic of New Africa (RNA) appeared in Jackson, Mississippi, during early July, 1970, and proposed that a conference of the RNA be held in Jackson, Mississippi, during the period July 31 to August 1, 1970. Henry made several contacts with legitimate Negro figures regarding a possible site for the conference.

The Jackson Office made available to Jimmy Ward, Editor, Jackson Daily News, Jackson, Mississippi, public-type information available regarding the RNA, showing involvement of its members in violence or in situations showing them in an unfavorable light.

The evening before the scheduled RNA conference in Jackson, Mississippi, the Jackson Daily News printed articles exposing the RNA's violent objectives. The articles caused local black leaders to withdraw their support of the RNA conference, the scheduled agenda for the conference had to be shelved and the conference dealt entirely with criticism of the RNA's violent objectives. One local black group denied the RNA the use of its facilities to hold meetings due to their history of violence as exposed in the newspaper.

EFG:dsh
(9)

100-448006-1893
157-9079-980

Counterintelligence Programs

On August 14, 1970, the Pittsburgh Office confidentially advised Sherley Uhl, "Pittsburgh Press," Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that the Peace and Freedom Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in cooperation with both legitimate and subversive organizations, was sponsoring an Ohio Valley Regional Coalition Conference. It was emphasized to him that certain sponsoring organizations were subversive and/or extremist in nature.

Mr. Uhl prepared an article on the conference which appeared in the August 14, 1970, issue of the "Pittsburgh Press." Two follow-up articles also appeared in the "Pittsburgh Press." The conference received unfavorable publicity and some disruption occurred during the conference.

TCD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-39-18, 19

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 16, 1960, the Chicago Office was authorized to advise reporters of the "Chicago Tribune" of forthcoming meeting of the Communist Party, USA, to be held September 17-18, 1960, to be attended by well-known communist figures Carl Winter, Sam Kushner and others.

On September 18, 1960, "Chicago Tribune" reporter "Sandy" Smith and two photographers caused extensive consternation when they tried to interview the attendees. The September 19, 1960, "Chicago Tribune" had article captioned "20 Top Reds Hold Secret Talks Here," subcaptioned "Parley is Linked to Nikita Visit."

JDP:tdp (9)
100-3-104-1920, 1929

Counterintelligence Programs

Detroit Office called the "Detroit Times," "Detroit News," and the "Detroit Free Press," local newspaper publications, advising them the Global Books Forum was sponsoring a lecture with Harvey O'Connor as the featured speaker to be held October 21, 1960, at Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan. They were asked whether the newspapers could comment in view of their interest and Wayne State University's policy of not allowing communist organizations the use of any of its campus buildings. They all replied they had no knowledge of this situation, whereupon the telephone calls were immediately terminated.

Shortly after the placing of the anonymous telephone calls, Mr. Homer Strong, Director of McGregor Conference Center, Wayne State University, and Director of Alumni Relations, Wayne State University, telephonically contacted the Detroit Office. He advised the University had been approached by the "Detroit Times" newspaper and asked if the scheduled lecture for October 21, 1960, was a communist meeting. Mr. Strong pointed out that a check of "Who's Who in America" determined that Harvey O'Connor was listed as an author and to have been connected with a number of "anti-organizations" and "civil rights groups."

The speech appearance was cancelled by officers of Wayne State University. The cancellation caused consternation amongst the Communist Party (CP), which was sponsoring the meeting, and Helen Winter, CP Headquarters, sought an injunction. Wayne Circuit Judge George E. Bowles granted the injunction and ordered Wayne State University to permit the meeting. The meeting was held October 21, 1960, at Wayne State University and about 100 persons attended.

Helen Winter, supra, subsequently quit her job at the Weldwire Company, 3341 Puritan, Detroit, Michigan, reportedly because the adverse newspaper publicity was too much for her and she felt she would be fired anyway.

JDM:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-2036, 2037

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 3, 1969, FBIHQ furnished Miami Office copies of the Director's testimony on the Nation of Islam (NOI) group given before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on February 10, 1966, February 16, 1967, and February 23, 1968, and a copy of a statement by the Director before the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, September 18, 1969, which sets out information on the NOI on page 9. These items were to be furnished Gene Strul, News Director of WCK-TV, Miami, Florida, for use of that station's expose of the NOI.

The documentary expose was shown at 9:30 p.m., October 9, 1969, to an audience rating of in excess of 200,000 persons. It showed the NOI leaders to be of questionable character and living in luxury through the large amount of money taken as contributions from their membership. The extreme nature of NOI teachings was underscored. As a result, NOI leaders displayed concern and attempted to rebut the program at each opening meeting of the NOI (per Bureau source).

Attendance by visitors at weekly NOI meetings reportedly dropped 50 percent subsequent to this expose.

PEN: vb
(9)

100-448006-1256, 1381, 1382, 1650

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1967, the Miami Office furnished newspaper articles to television station WCKT-TV regarding bombings and firebombings. Some individuals involved in the firebombings and bombings were Klansmen and were identified as such in the newspaper articles.

The articles were used in an expose concerning the Klan aired October 22, 1967, by WCKT-TV, Miami, Florida, entitled "KKK - A Change of Linen."

The expose resulted in disruption in the Florida Klan and lack of success in Klan recruiting.

WDF: vb
(9)

157-9-29-166, 170, 171

Counterintelligence Programs

Between February and April, 1969, the Miami Office furnished a number of items or topics which could be explored by Managing Editor, Mr. Milt Kelly, "Ft. Lauderdale News" in a follow-up news article concerning Klan activity in Broward County, Florida.

A two-article series was published in the "Ft. Lauderdale News" which ridiculed Klan secrecy. Two Klansmen, Robert Quarterman and Jack Mavro, resigned as a result of the articles being published. Dissension and suspicion were created within the Klan.

WDF:tdp (9)
157-9-29-206, 210

Counterintelligence Programs

Anonymous letters were mailed to Marion L. Huit, Dean of the Office of Student Affairs, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, and the "Daily Iowan," student newspaper at the State University of Iowa on October 19, 1962, indicating Frank Wilkinson, who was described as having been identified as a Communist Party member in California during House Committee on Un-American Activities hearings in 1958 and had served a prison sentence for contempt of Congress, was to speak at the college on October 22, 1962.

The "Daily Iowan" published an article subsequent to Wilkinson's appearance on the campus in which it was pointed out he had served a prison sentence for contempt of Congress, which information, according to the article, had been determined during an interview of Wilkinson by the paper.

KAM:bmf/lm
(9)

100-3-104-36-1, 2, 3, 4

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1967, Boston Office furnished to confidential sources at WBZ-TV, Boston, Massachusetts, public source data regarding communist background and/or connection with the communist movement of the following organizations: Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), Communist Party (CP), and the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA). WBZ-TV made a television documentary which presented an in-depth television study of campus radicalism in the metropolitan Boston area. The public source data was used by WBZ-TV to show the connection between the SWP and the YSA, the CP and the DCA and other groups, showing that the preparations for "Vietnam Week" were formulated with the connivance and aid of representatives from these groups.

WBZ-TV received numerous favorable comments concerning the television documentary, and the image of the aforementioned groups was damaged.

RDS:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-5-228, 229

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 20, 1969, the Jackson Office prepared a fictitious signature letter exposing the Nation of Islam (NOI) as an organization bleeding its members of money and preaching segregation of races. This letter was sent to the "Jackson Daily News" for use in the "Jack Sunn" column. Immediately after mailing the letter, Jackson Office Agents contacted Editor Jimmy Ward to advise him that Agents had learned a relative of a Muslim had sent some type of letter to the newspaper critical of the NOI, and Ward was requested to contact the Jackson Office when the letter was received so Agents could prepare an appropriate response to be published with the letter in Ward's regular column which aired complaints and gave advice. There is no indication Ward was aware that the fictitious letter originated with the Jackson Office.

On receipt of the letter, Ward notified the Jackson Office and the response was printed in the "Jack Sunn" column, following preparation of same by the Jackson Office. The article was then mailed by the Jackson Office to Elijah Muhammad, "Muhammad Speaks" newspaper, and Muhammad's Mosque Number Two, all in Chicago. Shortly after the article appeared in the "Jackson Daily News," the Jackson NOI group was told by persons responsible for allowing NOI use of a particular building for meetings that the building could no longer be used for weekly NOI meetings. The persons responsible for allowing building use are not identified.

JPG:HWP:tdp (9)
100-448006, 1354, 1380, 1486

Counterintelligence Programs

Warden Woodland, Editor of the "Los Angeles Examiner" was furnished a list of possible questions to be used for the purpose of interviewing Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, National Chairman of the Communist Party, USA during a press interview on May 4, 1961.

Questions asked of Flynn during the press conference succeeded in frustrating her and seemed to embarrass her, keeping her from using the conference to propagandize.

JDM:cah (9)
100-3-104-2571

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1970, the Miami Office furnished information to Milt Kelly, Managing Editor, "Fort Lauderdale News," regarding the arrest of Reverend Armand James Chandonnet, a local klansman. He was furnished information regarding Chandonnet's being charged with forgery and misappropriating church funds.

As a result of this information, articles appeared in the "Fort Lauderdale News" on May 27, 1970, and on June 1, 1970, exposing the situation, and thereafter, dissension between two klan chapters was intensified; at least five klan members resigned and Klavern (Chapter) #108 was dissolved.

WDF:lfj
(9)

157-9-29-222, 223

3

Counterintelligence Programs

Three informants of the Cleveland Office associated with the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (WEBDCA) were approved November 10, 1965, for use in an attempt to discredit Ted Cohen, Midwest Organizer of the communist youth group. The effort was to bring to the attention of Phil Bart, Ohio Communist Party Chairman, Cohen's questionable management of funds and his personal insults toward Bart. The aforementioned informants then commenced to bring Cohen's shortcomings to Bart's attention.

Subsequently on December 3, 1965, Bart advised one of the informants that Cohen had been removed from his position as Midwest Organizer of the WEBDCA because of his questionable financial manipulations, his inefficient methods of operation and his promiscuity.

TEB:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-11-241, 248

Counterintelligence Programs

In order to cause an increase in factionalism among the Communist Party (CP) membership in Philadelphia, in March, 1965, an informant was directed to suggest to Aaron Libson, youth leader of the CP in Philadelphia, that Francis (sic) Gabow, District CP Board member, be forced to take a six-month leave of absence for health reasons. Gabow was critical of Libson (and vice-versa) but had been previously ordered by her doctor to have bed rest because of a nervous condition. It was hoped that Gabow would be forced from CP work because of this and/or resent Libson's effort.

Gabow tendered her resignation from all positions of leadership in the CP Eastern Pennsylvania District on May 4, 1965.

RHR:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-37-207, PH airtel, 5/12/65 (original filed in 100-3-69-10441)

Counterintelligence Programs

During January, 1965, Communist Party (CP) informants of the FBI in Seattle, Washington, area were instructed to contact Henry Huff, an influential CP member and former Smith Act subject, to express dissatisfaction with Fred Sandborg, a member of the CP in Seattle. Sandborg was known to criticize his CP club leadership and to be disliked by Huff. Sandborg was a strong financial supporter of the CP and it was hoped to oust him from the CP.

Formal CP criticism of Sandborg was made by the leadership, but he was not ousted. He complained about his being criticized. Huff was also criticized by the leadership. Huff and Sandborg continued hostility toward each other which caused tension within their CP club.

HPB: vb
(9)

100-3-104-50-162, 171

Counterintelligence Programs

The Tampa Office, during 1969, directed an informant to oppose the klan activities of Norman Bennett Carter, a newly reactivated member of the Melbourne, Florida, Klavern of the Knights of the Invisible Empire.

As a result of the informant's efforts, Carter left the klavern and joined another group.

RLL:bmf
(9)

157-9-64-141

Counterintelligence Programs

During 1968, the Students For a Democratic Society (SDS) Chapter at California State College was factionalized. The Los Angeles Office directed informants to attempt to widen the breech between the groups by implying that Robert Ray, head of the SDS Chapter, was using SDS funds to support his drug habit and that Delfin Lugo, an active SDS member, had used SDS funds for his own use while he had been treasurer of the Chapter. Although Ray, according to one informant, was a heavy drug user, we are unable to verify whether he or Lugo actually misappropriated SDS funds.

At subsequent SDS meetings, there were fist fights between the groups, thus disrupting the meetings. Additionally, members of one faction made threatening early morning phone calls to members of the other faction if they showed up at the meetings. Robert Ray was eventually discredited and replaced as Chairman of the SDS Unit.

RLL: vb
(9)

100-449698-26-17, 27

Counterintelligence Programs

In June, 1968, an informant in the San Diego, California, area, who was a Communist Party (CP) member, claimed to have been offended by Ben Dobbs, Executive Secretary of Southern California CP, who was running for state-wide office. The informant, a black, claimed to have been ignored by Dobbs and raised the issue that he engaged in discrimination against blacks in Southern California District CP. The claim was made at a Southern California District CP Negro Commission meeting, and a tape recording made of the meeting.

Dobbs apologized to the informant. The above tape recording was played to the CP District Board members and caused internal dissension between Board members. Some maintained the taped meeting was designed to discredit Dobbs and was staged by Board member Bill Taylor. Taylor, in turn, was angry at the other Board members.

HPB:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-4, 5, 6, 7

Counterintelligence Programs

In October or November, 1966, the Miami Office made it known to the Ku Klux Klan in Okeechobee, Florida, through an informant, that James W. Crawford had a felony conviction. Crawford was thereafter voted out of the Klan for this reason on November 30, 1966.

WDF:tdp (9)
157-9-29-95-106

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 26, 1968, FBIHQ approved plan by Tampa Office to have informants attend a State Officers' meeting of the Knights of the Invisible Empire (KOIE) on August 2, 1968, to vote for removal of Bill Richardson, Grand Dragon, KOIE. Action suggested following a recent arrest of Richardson for arson.

This action isolated Richardson's influence and reduced his effectiveness.

JTA:vb
(9)

157-9-64-128, 130

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 25, 1967, FBI Headquarters approved recommendation that an informant of the Tampa Office attempt to buildup antagonism toward Edward R. Jones, Exalted Cyclops of the Orlando, Florida, Klavern, United Klans of America, Incorporated, (UKA), Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in efforts to have him removed from that position. This action followed an unsuccessful Klan rally held May 13, 1967, which Jones organized.

On May 10, 1967, it was reported that Jones resigned from the Klan as a result of antagonism within the Orlando Klavern.

JTA:tdp (9)
157-9-64-97, 106

Counterintelligence Programs

In September, 1966, George Judd, Director of Safety and Security, Great Lakes Steel Corporation, Ecorse, Michigan, advised that Joseph Kransdorf was on sick leave from August 26, 1966, to September 13, 1966, and that he had presented a certificate from a doctor in New York when he returned to work. Joseph Kransdorf was a member of the Youth Group of the Michigan District Communist Party and son of a leading national functionary of the Communist Party, USA. The sick leave was during the same period as a Communist Party, USA Youth School at Camp Webatuck, New York. Judd was furnished newspaper articles concerning the camp. A letter was sent by Great Lakes Steel Corporation to the doctor who responded that he did not examine Kransdorf.

In October, 1966, Kransdorf was given a ten day suspension from his employment for fraudulently obtaining sick leave. His address at that time was 12963 Woodward, Highland Park, Michigan.

JCF:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-15-274, 282, 286, 299

Counterintelligence Programs

The Little Rock Office directed anonymous letters to the employers of members of the Forrest City Klavern of the United Klans of America in which were enclosed copies of an article dated September 24, 1970, which appeared in "The Arkansas Gazette," a Little Rock daily newspaper, concerning the arrest of klavern members at Parkin, Arkansas. Thirteen individuals were arrested for nightriding and other charges.

Amos and Leonard Holland were discharged from their employment with Tom's Peanut Company. Sam Littlejohn was discharged from his employment with the DX Oil Company. The employer of Steven Golden advised Forrest City Resident Agency he was curtailing the activities of Steve Golden which would cause embarrassment to the employer.

TED:lfj
(9)

157-9-25-47, 49, 51
157-370-25-66

Counterintelligence Programs

Memphis Division forwarded anonymous letter to headquarters of Kimberly-Clark Company concerning efforts of Clinton Eugene Daniel, an employee of Kimberly-Clark in Memphis, to recruit Klan members at the company's Memphis operation.

Daniel was placed on a predominantly night shift shortly after anonymous letter was sent. This prevented Daniel from attending local Klan meetings which were held in the evenings and Daniel was expelled from Klan for nonattendance of Klavern meetings.

TED:dsh
(9)

157-9-28-22, 28

Counterintelligence Programs

During the Summer of 1967, William Virgil Fowler, State Chairman and Honorary State Cyclops of the California Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (KKKK), departed the Los Angeles area leaving behind unpaid debts. Fowler moved to Stone Mountain, Georgia. The Los Angeles Office subsequently arranged to have letters, purportedly over the signature of Fowler, sent to his creditors instructing them to forward unpaid bills to James R. Venable, a Klan leader, for payment.

As a result of the above letters, a split developed between Fowler and Venable, and Venable reported that Fowler was no longer affiliated with the KKK, but had moved to Florida.

TJS:dsh
(9)

157-9-26-31, 32, 33, 36

Counterintelligence Program.

Authority granted November 18, 1960, for Los Angeles Office to advise Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) official at Burbank, California, by anonymous telephone call that YMCA part-time assistant instructor Richard Lund is a communist, as is his wife Nancy Rosenfeld Lund, citing testimony before House Committee on Un-American Activities as source.

On January 9, 1961, it was determined Lund's employment had been terminated at the request of the YMCA Personnel Committee.

JDM:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-2029
100-3-104-2154
100-3-104-2209

Counterintelligence Programs

The Cincinnati Office advised on March 19, 1969, that Reverend Augustus Taylor, Steubenville, Ohio, had visited Huey Newton, Black Panther Party (BPP) leader, and as a result wrote an article favorable to Newton published in the "National Catholic Reporter." Since Taylor had a regular television show on WSTV-TV, Steubenville, Ohio, to air his black nationalist views, FBI Headquarters approved on March 28, 1969, that an anonymous letter be mailed to WSTV-TV criticizing Taylor and revealing that his article had been reprinted in the BPP newspaper.

On May 15, 1969, Cincinnati advised that Father Mitchell Wilamoski, Principal of Catholic Central High School, Steubenville, Ohio, disclosed on April 9, 1969, that at a meeting at the Bishop's Office it was decided Reverend Taylor could no longer continue his Sunday television program. The Bishop had given Reverend Taylor a job requiring constant travel and was considering a transfer for Taylor.

JTA:lfj
(9)

100-448006-785, 876, 923

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 25, 1969, the Washington Field Office confidentially advised a source at First Virginia Finance Plan, Inc., 2924 Columbia Pike, Arlington, Virginia, of the location of the car of Dorothy Jean McQueen Hughes, secretary to Stokely Carmichael, a well-known black extremist. Hughes was three months in arrears on her car payments.

The car was repossessed on March 2, 1969.

VRT: vb
(9)

100-448006-686, 737

Counterintelligence Programs

On March 13, 1969, the Miami Office mailed an anonymous letter, containing true facts, to Elijah Muhammad, national leader of the Nation of Islam (NOI), Chicago, Illinois, advising him of extramarital activities of Earl King, Minister of Mosque 29, Miami, Florida.

The Minister was removed from his position, but remained in Miami as a rank-and-file member of the NOI.

VRT: vb
(9)

100-448006-681, 824

Counterintelligence Programs

During June, 1969, Mr. Patrick Poulte, Poulte Realty Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan, was contacted by the Detroit FBI Office and confidentially furnished public source information concerning the Radical Education Project (REP), which is the educational arm of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), in that REP had office space in a building owned by Mr. Poulte.

REP offices were vacated on about July 1, 1969, when they were unable to secure extensions on their lease.

ELS:bmf/lfj
(9)

100-449698-26, 28

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 11, 1964, Kenneth S. Smith, Treasurer of the University Circle Development Foundation, Incorporated, Cleveland, Ohio, advised that Michael Cooperman was employed as a Community Relations Coordinator with the above organization. This information was developed apparently during the course of FBI investigation concerning Cooperman's subversive background. Mr. Smith advised he was concerned about Cooperman's background.

FBIHQ approved Cleveland's recommendation to confidentially furnish Mr. Smith "lead" information for his assistance in verifying Cooperman's background.

On July 27, 1964, Cooperman appeared at the Cleveland FBI Office and stated he wished "to set record straight." He stated that in the past he had been contacted by FBI Agents at which time he had not been fully cooperative. He wanted to now advise the FBI that he no longer believed in communism or the Communist Party (CP) and had nothing to do with communists for the past five years. When asked what prompted his visit at this time, he stated that Oliver Brooks, Vice President of the University Circle Development Foundation, had requested his resignation effective October 1, 1964. Cooperman added the reason given by Brooks was that it had come to their attention that Cooperman, in the past, had used an assumed name. Cooperman admitted to Brooks that this was so and Brooks then went on to explain that the Foundation, which was attempting to raise a large sum of money, could not risk unfavorable publicity as the result of the activities of employees.

Cooperman said he was considering accepting one of several other employments available to him and in this connection he was attempting to make it known in appropriate circles that he had been disassociated from the CP for many years.

TEB: vb
(9)

100-3-104-11-156, 157, 168

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

On December 5, 1966, W. G. O'Neal, Chief Investigator, North Carolina State Insurance Department, was confidentially contacted by the Charlotte Office about an insurance program, the Widows Benevolent Fund, being administered by J. R. Jones, Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in North Carolina. The insurance program was set up in February, 1966, and certain apparent discrepancies in management were noted. The FBI action was an attempt to deny the KKK a source of funds.

On October 29, 1967, the N.C. Insurance Commission, following examination of Jones' books and procedures in handling the fund, decided the fund would be terminated. At termination, there was reportedly $3,800 in the treasury, with $1,000 to be paid to each of three widows.

HWP:hp
(9)

157-9-8, 55, 57, 59, 64, 70, 73, 116, 122, 135

Counterintelligence Programs

In August, 1964, Mrs. C. P. Kandahl, Seattle Ski Club, was contacted in order to have her deny use of Seattle Ski Club site at Snoqualmie Pass, Washington, to members of the Young Political Explorers League (YPEL), a Communist Party (CP) front, for use as a summer camp. YPEL had arranged camp rental under guise of using camp for underprivileged children. Mary Sutherland, wife of District CP Organizational Secretary, Milford Sutherland, was advised that camp's water system had broken down; therefore, the camp could not be held.

JWM:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-50, 134, 135, 138

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 14, 1966, the Richmond Office of the FBI mailed anonymous letters to six individuals who were financial contributors to the American Nazi Party (ANP), telling them to discontinue contributing to the ANP because the Federal Government would probably obtain their names and harass the contributors in the same manner the Government is harassing the ANP.

Subsequent to the above mailing, George Lincoln Rockwell, national leader of the ANP, claimed that Karl Allen of the White Party of America was trying to force him out of business by writing the above-mentioned letters. Rockwell considered suing Allen in this matter. Allen formerly worked for Rockwell in the ANP office and left to form his own group.

LEB:lfj
(9)

157-9-41-19X, 42

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 16, 1970, the San Francisco Office contacted Fred Green, manager, Hunters Point Housing Project, concerning activities of the Black Panther Party (BPP) within the project. During this contact with Green it was mentioned that Apartment 304 in the housing project rented for occupancy by a woman on welfare and her two children had become a BPP Community Center. It was further noted that the windows of the apartment were covered with large BPP posters and that several Housing Authority rules regarding occupancy of this apartment were being violated.

On October 21, 1970, Green advised that he had been able to evict the members of the BPP from Apartment 304 and that all BPP posters had been removed. The woman and children were not evicted since their name was on the lease.

EFG:ekw
(9)
100-448006-1835, 2020

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 27, 1966, the Richmond Office sent an anonymous letter to businessmen in Amelia, Virginia, critical of the Ku Klux Klan and its disagreements with the Amelia Dress Company, a new dress manufacturing plant which was having to lay off a small number of employees. Several Klan "throw aways" entitled "The Ku Klux Klan is watching you" had been sent to the plant superintendent and had caused concern in the town that the plant might move away from Amelia.

The anonymous letter sent to the businessmen by the Richmond Office united businessmen against the Klan and subsequently caused disruption within the Klan.

WDF:lek (9)
157-9-41-57, 72, 81

Counterintelligence Programs

The Indianapolis Division determined in late 1969 that the Indianapolis Black Panther Party (BPP) Chapter owed the Indiana Bell Telephone Company for several months of telephone service.

Unknown representative of the Indiana Bell Telephone Company was encouraged to remove the telephone service from BPP headquarters. Telephone service was cut off at the BPP office on or about September 15, 1969.

PEN

PEN:tdp (9)
100-448006-1116, 1271, 1310

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 2, 1962, the Cleveland Office alerted the Ohio Savings Bank to the fact that Jack Kling, Chicago editor of the Jewish-language communist newspaper, "Morning Freiheit," was to speak at the bank's auditorium on May 4, 1962.

Permission to use the auditorium was withdrawn on May 3, 1962, necessitating finding an alternate site on one day's notice.

TJD: vb
(9)

100-3-104-11-20, 21

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 30, 1965, Joseph Corley, Manager, Seth Boyden Terrace, a public housing project, Newark, New Jersey, was furnished public source material concerning the communist background of Harry Bloksberg, a resident of Seth Boyden Terrace, who had requested permission from Corley to organize a club among the teen-agers of the Terrace. It was believed the purpose of the club was to indoctrinate youth in Marxism.

Corley, when furnished the public source information, advised he would not permit Bloksberg to organize the club.

DML: vb
(9)

100-3-104-31-345, 341

Counterintelligence Programs

On August 29, 1969, FBIHQ authorized the Milwaukee Division to anonymously mail copies of articles, furnished that office previously, from issues of the Black Panther Party's (BPP) newspaper, showing hatred of the white man by the black community as advocated by the BPP, to various churches and main offices of grocery stores which were involved or might become involved in contributing to the BPP's Breakfast For Children Program.

In subsequent interview with Kenneth Berry of the Godfrey Company, Waukesha, Wisconsin, which handled Sentry Food Stores in the Milwaukee area, it was learned he had been approached by members of the BPP regarding contributions to the Breakfast program. The request was turned down as a result of the above mailings. Berry indicated that other chain stores had done the same thing.

PEN: vb
(9)

100-448006-1244, 1499

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 9, 1969, the New York Office contacted United Air Lines (UAL)-Air Freight Division, New York, International Airport, Jamaica, New York, and advised that the Black Panther Party (BPP) was shipping its newspapers via air on a weekly basis. UAL was charging BPP the general rate for printed matter. However, after UAL officials were alerted to the contents of the BPP shipments, the UAL began charging the BPP newspaper freight rates.

The additional shipping costs to the BPP, New York, amounted to between $225 to $300 per week. UAL also advised they were considering a suit for recovery of the difference in freight tariff collected for the past six to eight months from the New York BPP. It was estimated that this difference would be in excess of $10,000.

EFG:cah (9)
100-448006-1376, 1377

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1965, a mimeographed leaflet was circulated exposing the "Labor Press Spring Bazaar" to be held at the Jewish Music Center, 14868 Schafer, Detroit, Michigan, on March 20-21, 1965, as a front effort by the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), in Michigan to raise funds for a financially beleaguered communist newspaper. Also in February, 1965, an anonymous letter enclosing newspaper advertisement on the spring bazaar was sent to patriotic veterans organizations in Detroit area, protesting this communist endeavor and calling for these groups to stop this function.

This bazaar was cancelled by owners of the building where it was to be held as a result of floods of protests.

PWC:dew
(9)

100-3-104-15-158, 162, 164

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 21, 1965, the Dalsemer Real Estate Company, specifically Ben Powdermaker and Dick Dalsemer, were contacted regarding recent vandalism damage, i.e., two windows broken by unknown persons, incurred by a building owned by them at 3260 North Broad Street, Philadelphia, and rented by the Philadelphia Chapter of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA). They were advised that such damage might continue because of friction in the neighborhood if the DCA continued to rent the building. The desired result was to have the month-by-month lease terminated.

The owners required DCA to pay $85.00 for the broken windows which was done in November, 1965. DCA was notified by Dick Dalsemer of eviction to be effective December 30, 1965. DCA was evicted on December 31, 1965.

RHR: vb
(9)

100-3-104-37-264, 267, 269, 294, 304

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1964, an anonymous letter was sent to Mary Urbant, operator of Beachnut Grove Picnic Grounds, 6166 Middlebelt Road, Romulus Township, Michigan, indicating that it was well known among neighbors that she rents grounds to Communist Party (CP) members. This was an effort to disrupt the communist picnic scheduled to be held on May 30, 1964.

Mrs. Urbant refused to allow the planned communist picnic.

PWC:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-15-118

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 14, 1965, the Charlotte Office confidentially alerted W. G. O'Neal, Chief Investigator, North Carolina State Insurance Department, that the United Klans of America (UKA), Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, through Marshall Kornegay, a member, was promoting a group health insurance plan for members of the UKA. O'Neal agreed to have his Department investigate the plan to determine if it met state requirements.

On June 3, 1965, Mr. O'Neal contacted the FBI to advise the above insurance plan, issued by the International Life and Accident Insurance Company, Wilmington, North Carolina, had been transferred to the Life Insurance Company of Florida, Miami, Florida, as this company had bought the former insurer. Following inquiries at the new company, which learned of the UKA association with the health plan, the health program was cancelled.

HWP:ekw
(9)
157-9-8, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 19

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 24, 1969, San Diego Office placed a fictitious name phone call to Norman Kay of the Cabrillo Realty Company, San Diego, California, the personal representative of Henry E. Jackson, Jr., owner of the building at 6181 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, California, which was being used by the black extremist US organization as its meeting place. The caller, using the name T. E. Ellis, complained of activities being conducted at the above address and expressed fear for the safety of himself and his family. Caller also demanded something be done to control the US group or to effect its eviction.

Mr. Kay appeared surprised and disturbed over receipt of the complaint and the activities at the Imperial Avenue address.

The following day, July 25, 1969, US was evicted from the address at 6181 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, California.

PEN:cah (9)
100-448006-1174, 1179

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 19, 1968, Mr. L. B. Egenberger, Supervisor of Security, Illinois Bell Telephone Company (IBT), Chicago, Illinois, was contacted by the Chicago FBI Office for the purpose of ascertaining if all telephone service to the Chicago Office of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) could be discontinued in view of telephone charges that were unpaid by NMC.

On July 19, 1968, Mr. Egenberger was contacted and, at this time, he advised that the NMC had made a deposit of $850.00 for use of the Wide Area Telecommunications System (WATS), which would not be returned and in addition, there were charges outstanding in the amount of $2,167.00 for WATS service. Mr. Egenberger stated the NMC's WATS service was being terminated in view of excessive, outstanding charges. NMC's regular telephone service was not discontinued.

ELS: vb
(9)

100-449698-9-7, 11

Counterintelligence Programs

On 1/27/65 the Birmingham Office made anonymous mailings to fifteen Negro churches identifying Carl Ridout, Manager of Ensley Finance Company, Inc., Birmingham, as a member of the National Executive Committee of the National States Rights Party. Ridout was then transferred to the Fairfield Finance Company, 5011 Gary Avenue, Birmingham, which was under same ownership as Ensley Finance Company. Fifteen letters were then anonymously mailed to Negro churches identifying Ridout as Manager of the Fairfield Finance Company and also a member of the National Executive Committee of the National States Rights Party.

Ridout was subsequently fired but we are unable to determine if this was a direct result of the Counterintelligence Program activities.

The National States Rights Party is a white hate group that has been involved in violent activities directed toward minority groups.

TED:cah/lm
(9)

157-9-4-12, 16, 17, 20

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1959, an anonymous letter was sent to Mr. Theodore A. Jones, President of the Chicago branch National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), advising him that a "left caucus" slate called Coordinating Committee of NAACP comprised of members of the Communist Party (CP), Socialist Workers Party (SWP), socialists and other Negro nationalist-type individuals, had been formed and its objective was to oust him from leadership.

The "left caucus" slate was defeated at the membership meeting.

PWC:dew
(9)

100-3-104-1077, 1078, 1080

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia Office was authorized to contact prominent Jewish organizations, such as the American Jewish Congress, and Morris Litman, City Editor of the "Philadelphia Inquirer," in an effort to have them contact Harry Beichman and David S. Landes, Office Secretary of Boslover Hall and President of Boslover Ahavas Achim Belzer Association, respectively, in an effort to have an appearance of Gus Hall cancelled at Boslover Hall before the Philadelphia Social Science Forum Committee on January 24, 1964. Contact was to indicate bad publicity received and advise of riot which ensued following a previous appearance of Hall before the same committee during 1962.

Boslover Hall cancelled the meeting which had been scheduled for January 24, 1964, and Gus Hall did not appear in the Philadelphia area.

KAM: vb
(9)

100-3-104-37-97, 98, 101

In September, 1969, a series of three anonymous telephone calls were made by Agent personnel of the San Diego Office to Bishop John Quinn, Auxiliary Bishop of the San Diego, California, Archdiocese, in protest of activity on the part of Catholic priest Reverend Frank Curran, Christ the King Roman Catholic Church, 32nd and Imperial, San Diego, California. Reverend Curran had indicated an open advocacy of the Black Panther Party's Breakfast for Children Program and had used his church as a sanctuary for Black Panther Party (BPP) members.

An anonymous letter for mailing to the Bishop was also approved by FBIHQ on September 11, 1969, outlining objections to Father Curran's activities. This letter was to be signed T. E. Ellis, a fictitious name, and was to indicate its writer was a member of Father Curran's parish.

Father Curran subsequently transferred from the San Diego archdiocese and the BPP Breakfast for Children Program collapsed.

PEN:lfj
(9)

100-448006-1264, 1269, 1282, 1388, 1648

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1962, the Seattle FBI Office contacted Lawrence Timbers, former Chairman of the Anti-Subversive Committee of the Washington State American Legion, to make arrangements for a group of anticommunist citizens to attend a public meeting at Washington Hall, Seattle, on April 27, 1962. Herbert Eugene Aptheker, member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), was a scheduled speaker at this meeting.

Mr. Timbers, a commercial printer by trade, obtained a $1.50 ticket in advance of the meeting and printed and distributed several hundred tickets. These were distributed to persons known for their anticommunist sentiments.

As a result the Communist Party did not receive revenue for over 100 persons who attended the meeting. Aptheker completed his speech, but was intermittently heckled and booed by the anticommunist attendees. This group later marched through the aisles singing patriotic songs.

CPUSA leadership was displeased at the way the Seattle CP group organized and handled the affair.

RPF:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-50-25, 30

Counterintelligence Programs

The Communist Party of Illinois scheduled a bazaar to raise money for the Party newspaper, "The Worker." Party members received letters allowing each recipient to receive, on behalf of the bazaar, $3 in goods, money, or trading stamps from the Jewel Tea Company, which had 101 stores in the area. Each store to donate $3 as noted. Chicago Office alerted the Jewel Tea Company to the nature of the bazaar.

A former FBI Special Agent employed by the Jewel Tea Company made arrangements to insure no donations were made by the company.

TJD:ekw/cah (9)
100-3-104-9-627, 648

Counterintelligence Programs

In December, 1967, an anonymous letter was mailed to officials of Carrsville Community Center, Carrsville, Isle of Wright County, Virginia, stating that the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) was using the community center for holding dances. The Klan was using the cover of Southhampton Activities Club. The group was part of United Klans of America, Inc., KKK, and was raising funds through the dances.

After February, 1968, the lease to the Klan was terminated. The officials considered the dances had become rowdy and they did not know previously that the Klan was involved.

HPB:lfj
(9)

157-9-56-34, 35

Counterintelligence Programs

In July, 1968, the Pittsburgh Office confidentially alerted a staff worker for the Mellon Foundation of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that Unity Incorporated, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, has a store which is utilized as a black power center, and one of the leaders of Unity Incorporated said the basement of the store would be remodeled as a target range. The leader of the group was in possession of a suitcase containing several pistols and ammunition. The purpose of this contact was to prevent Unity Incorporated from receiving a grant of $150,000 which that organization had requested from the Mellon Foundation.

Unity Incorporated did not get the $150,000 grant.

VRT:dsh/lfj
(9)

100-448006-171, 255, 280

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1965, an anonymous mailing was sent to three ministers (Dr. James H. Laird, Reverend Charles E. Lutton, and Reverend Norman E. Dewise) associated with the Methodist Church, 23 E. Adams Street, Detroit, Michigan. This mailing enclosed a newspaper clipping depicting Nikita Khruschev and Herbert Aptheker, a high Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) official, at bier of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, late CPUSA Chairman, in Moscow. The purpose of this mailing was to alert church officials of Aptheker's CPUSA affiliation and his appearance at this church would be discouraged or cancelled.

Herbert Aptheker speakers' appearance at this church was not advertised in weekly church bulletin as is customary. As a result, attendance at talk was poor and collection taken was insufficient to meet expenses of the affair.

PWC:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-15-149

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1959, a flyer, revealing Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), as true sponsors of May First Celebration scheduled to be held at the United Plant Guard Workers of America Local 114 Hall at 13722 Linwood, Detroit, Michigan, was sent Mr. James C. McGahey, president of the union.

The CPUSA was locked out of the union hall and they had to hold the affair elsewhere. Mr. McGahey refunded the rental fee to the CPUSA.

PWC:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-1054

Counterintelligence Programs

During late 1967 an anonymous letter was mailed to the National Rifle Association by the Jackson Office advising that the Concordia Pistol and Rifle Club at Ferriday, Louisiana, was actually a club organized to disguise a unit of the Minuteman organization. The club was organized by James Lee Scarborough, an active Klansman, who had applied for club membership in the National Rifle Association.

During January, 1968, Scarborough advised the members of the club that the National Rifle Association had turned down their application for charter membership.

RLL:dsh
(9)

157-9-54-51, 53, 54, 55, 58

Counterintelligence Programs

In November, 1968, the Detroit Office mailed several anonymous letters to expose the extremist nature of the "South End," the student newspaper at Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, which is a state-supported university. This newspaper has a black extremist viewpoint and is self-described as "revolutionary." The anonymous letters were supposedly from a concerned parent and a concerned student and were directed to state and university authorities responsible for funding this newspaper, including Governor Romney of Michigan. A letter was also sent to the Archbishop of Detroit concerning a Catholic group funding W. E. B. DuBois Institute of Black Studies at Wayne State University, which funding was publicized in the "South End."

These anonymous mailings played a part in the reduction of yearly funds granted to the newspaper by $10,000.

VRT:lfj
(9)

100-448006-354, 631

Counterintelligence Programs

Two anonymous letters were sent between April and July, 1965, to nine responsible officials of the Hartford Avenue Baptist Church, Detroit, Michigan, protesting the action by Reverend Charles A. Hill, the pastor, in allowing Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) functionaries to openly speak at his church and in allowing communists use of the church for secret meetings. In August, 1965, a follow-up letter was sent to individuals residing in the neighborhood of the church complaining about the communist use of the church.

During September, 1965, information was received that Reverend Hill was forced to cancel a communist bazaar at the church due to the letter distributed in the area which was critical of the use of church premises for communist meetings and related affairs.

JCF:cah (9)
100-3-104-15-179, 180, 181, 195

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 15, 1969, Jack Noble, Assistant State Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, contacted the Santa Fe Resident Agency of the FBI and requested that he be furnished public source information regarding Peter Gunn Montague to assist Governor David F. Cargo in deciding whether or not to appoint Montague to the Governor's Technical Advisory Committee on Air and Water Pollution. Montague had been affiliated with the Albuquerque Movement for a Democratic Society which was affiliated with Students for a Democratic Society.

On November 18, 1969, Mr. Noble advised public source information regarding Montague enabled the Governor to make the correct decision in deciding against appointing Montague.

JWD:cah (9)
100-449698-15, 17

Counterintelligence Programs

In July, 1968, the Pittsburgh Office casually suggested to a member of the Beverly Heights Presbyterian Church, in Pittsburgh, that Reverend William R. Taylor, of that church, might be interested in her information about Carl Nicholas Flournoy, a militant black nationalist. Flournoy had been receiving finances from the Presbyterian and Catholic Churches jointly.

It was subsequently determined that this action was apparently instrumental in part in influencing three churches in refusing to provide supporting funds to racial groups unless sound reasons exist for doing so.

VRT:dsh
(9)

100-448006-173, 225

Counterintelligence Programs

On December 1, 1964, James Farmer, National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), was furnished information about Eugene Joseph Tournour, employed as an organizer of CORE, 317 Evergreen Street, Chicago, Illinois. Tournour had been active in Communist Party organizations since 1957 and in 1964 was considered a Communist Party member by leaders of the Party in Chicago. An FBI Headquarters official furnished this information to Mr. Farmer.

On January 25, 1965, Tournour advised an informant that he received a letter from CORE's National Office firing him.

TJD:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-9-430, 480

Counterintelligence Programs

In February and March, 1967, informants disclosed that certain members of the security guard, Belmont, North Carolina, Klavern of the United Klans of America (UKA), had joined or were joining the National Rifle Association (NRA). An informant advised that, under certain circumstances, the Director of Civilian Marksmanship, U. S. Army, would supply NRA-affiliated clubs with rifles and ammunition, and that the UKA was joining for this purpose. An anonymous letter was mailed to the NRA on May 2, 1967.

On June 20, 1967, an informant advised that the NRA had not accepted the Belmont Rifle and Pistol Club (of the UKA) application for a charter. The informant stated that, for all practical purposes, the club was at an end, had met on only a few occasions, had never constructed a desired range, and had not undertaken real target practice.

HWP: vb
(9)

157-9-8, 82, 95, 104, 112

Counterintelligence Programs

In November, 1959, information was made available by a source to Mr. Theodore A. Jones, President of the Chicago Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), that the "left caucus," comprised of Milton Cohen and Lester Davis, members of the Illinois State Communist Party (CP) Committee, Fritzie Englestein, Illinois CP member, Barney Taylor, Socialist Workers Party (SWP) member, Saul Mendelson, former member of Independent Socialist League National Committee and the Bullock-Abner Coalition, planned to elect nine leftist delegates to the NAACP National Convention.

No one from the "left caucus" candidate slate was elected.

PWC: vb
(9)

100-3-104-1342

Counterintelligence Programs

On April 1, 1970, the Pittsburgh Office confidentially advised Mr. Richard M. Larry, Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation, Pittsburgh, concerning a conference at Carnegie-Mellon University (CMU), scheduled for the next weekend by the Gulf Action Project (GAP), to plan for the disruption of a Gulf Oil stockholders meeting scheduled for April 28, 1970, at Pittsburgh. Mr. Larry advised the CMU Administration.

CMU officials contacted representatives of GAP cancelling the conference. GAP protested the cancellation and ultimately CMU allowed the conference to take place provided same did not include planning for the disruption of the stockholders meeting.

TCD: vb
(9)

100-449698-39-15, 17

Counterintelligence Programs

Between July 1, 1968, and October 1, 1968, the Miami Office sent an anonymous letter to Mayor Dunham, Okeechobee, Florida, advising him that city employee Charles Franklin Smith has been seen at Ku Klux Klan (KKK) meetings.

It is not known what action was taken; however, the employee was noted to not be in attendance at Klan meetings thereafter.

WDF:tdp (9)
157-9-29-196
157-9-29-201

Counterintelligence Programs

The Albany Office on April 1, 1969, confidentially alerted the President of the Council of Churches, Syracuse, New York, of the extremist nature of the United Black Brothers (UBB), Syracuse, and of the criminal backgrounds of UBB leaders and membership. The Council of Churches was funding the UBB.

Council of Churches President advised he would recommend no further funding for UBB.

VRT: vb
(9)

100-448006-758, 972

Counterintelligence Programs

It was learned the National Episcopal Church (NEC), New York City, furnished the Afro-American Society of Greater Atlanta (AASGA) funds totaling $34,000 ostensibly to improve race relations in Atlanta. NEC then retrieved the money to check status of the AASGA. Since AASGA was actually a front name for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), FBI Headquarters authorized Atlanta Office on March 11, 1969, to furnish information to this effect to Jack Tarver, President of Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia. It is unknown if anything furnished to Tarver was published.

NEC subsequently recalled this $34,000 grant from Charles E. Jenkins, leader of SNCC in Atlanta.

JTA:cah/lfj
(9)

100-448006-751, 771, 836

Counterintelligence Programs

Decedent Walter Stochmal died in Ohio during 1964 and bequeathed $1,000 to "Glos Ludowy," and the remainder of his estate, after payment of just debts and other bequests, to "The Worker." "Glos Ludowy" is a pro-Polish Government foreign language newspaper published at Detroit, Michigan. "The Worker" was an east coast communist newspaper, now defunct.

On July 22, 1964, FBI Headquarters authorized anonymous communication to decedent's son-in-law John Henninger containing public source data relating to the communist backgrounds of the executor, attorney and witnesses to the will of Stochmal in effort to persuade Stochmal's surviving relatives to contest the will, thereby thwarting bequests to "Glos Ludowy" and "The Worker."

Subsequently, Mr. Henninger advised FBI he had received certain anonymous material concerning communist connections of executor, etc. On October 6, 1964, Henninger advised that the family was contesting the Stochmal will.

An entry in the Cuyahoga County Probate Court records (Ohio), dated August 16, 1965, revealed the court authorized executor to pay the surviving spouse the widow's allowance (one-third of estate). The estate at such time was valued at $12,000.

TEB:vb
(9)

100-3-104-11, 163, 165, 166, 167, 172, 176, 258

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 17, 1970, the St. Louis Office sent an anonymous letter to Richard Simon, the husband of Jane Simon. She is an officer in ACTION, a biracial black extremist group. The letter accused her of infidelity. This letter, sent to Richard Simon, was designed to confirm his suspicions about the relationship between his wife, white, and black males associated with ACTION.

It was learned that shortly after the receipt of this letter, the couple involved separated following a series of marital arguments.

EEG:lfj
(9)

100-448006-1603, 1863

Counterintelligence Programs

Between June and October, 1967, the U. S. Commissioner, Palm Beach, Florida, Edgar G. Hamilton, was advised that his son, Jan Hamilton, was active in the Klan at Okeechobee, Florida. He was also told that the Klan was holding meetings at a restaurant where the son was employed as a manager and which was partly owned by the Commissioner.

The Klan was banned from further meetings in the restaurant, the son resigned as manager of the restaurant, and a heated argument ensued between the Commissioner and his son.

WDF:dsh
(9)

157-9-29-138, 160

Counterintelligence Programs

The Chicago Division recommended in May, 1962, that Mrs. Sam Kushner, wife of Sam Kushner, Illinois Editor of "The Worker," be anonymously advised by telephone that her husband was planning to drive to Mexico with Flo Hall, Illinois Communist Party district functionary, to get a Mexican divorce without his wife's knowledge so he would be free to marry Hall. The Chicago Division advised Kushner had been trying to divorce his wife, a long-time communist and head of a local Communist Party club, but she had been fighting the divorce because of a disagreement over the property settlement.

On September 5, 1962, an informant advised Mrs. Kushner was suing Flo Hall for "depriving her and her son of livelihood" and was attempting to discredit Sam Kushner with the "People's World" where he was then employed.

RWH:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-43, 77

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 18, 1970, the Baltimore Office placed a telephone call to the Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters, San Francisco, California, during which a complaint was lodged against John Clark, Defense Captain, Baltimore, BPP. The caller complained that several of the BPP members in Baltimore had been run out of the BPP headquarters so that Clark could live alone with a white woman Malika Aigroz. The unknown woman at Panther Headquarters advised that the BPP would check this complaint out and take whatever action was necessary.

Clark was subsequently ordered by the BPP Headquarters to leave the Baltimore BPP and travel to the "coast."

ELG: vb
(9)

100-448006-1601, 1632, 1751

Counterintelligence Programs

The Boston FBI Office, on a confidential basis, furnished information to Robert Tonis, Security Officer and Chief of the Harvard University Police, Cambridge, Massachusetts, to the effect that Jared Michael Israel, who was employed by the Harkness Commons, a Harvard University Restaurant, was involved in Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) activities.

On December 29, 1969, Mr. Tonis advised that Israel's employment was to be terminated on December 31, 1969.

ELS:ekw
(9)
100-449698-5-24

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 20, 1969, the Boston FBI Office, on a confidential basis, furnished information to Robert Tonis, Security Officer and Chief of the Harvard University Police, Cambridge, Massachusetts, to the effect that Nancy Schwarzman, Secretary, has been identified as the mistress of Michael Kazin, a Harvard Senior and Students For a Democratic Society (SDS) Committee member of the Harvard-Radcliffe Chapter.

On November 3, 1969, Mr. Tonis advised that Miss Schwarzman was no longer employed by Harvard University as of close of business October 31, 1969.

ELS:tdp (9)
100-449698-5-21

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1964, Professor Francis E. Barkman, Department of Law, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio, advised that Leon Letwin had applied for a position at the University. Barkman stated he had heard rumors that Letwin had been connected with various communist organizations. Public source material was furnished to Professor Barkman which reported Communist Party (CP) associations of Letwin.

On June 17, 1964, Professor Barkman advised that the school's Board of Trustees had decided to reject Letwin's application. The Board announced no reason for its refusal; however, Barkman attributed the rejection to public source information concerning Letwin's CP associations.

TEB: vb
(9)

100-3-104-11-145, 148, 151, 158

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 24, 1965, the Cleveland Office made available copies of Socialist Workers Party (SWP) literature relating to Rod Holt to Mr. George Dobrea, member, Cleveland Board of Education, to alert him to the association of Holt's wife, Marilyn Holt, a Cleveland schoolteacher with the SWP.

On July 2, 1965, Dobrea advised the Cleveland Office that based on this information, it did not appear that Marilyn Holt's contract would be renewed. Subsequently, her contract was not renewed.

DML:dew
(9)

100-3-104-11-202, 213, 220

Counterintelligence Programs

Public source material concerning Robert Ehrlich and his wife Cornelia Ehrlich and Victor Pasche, who were active in the Parent Teachers Association (PTA) in the Ringwood, New Jersey, public school system and allegedly were considered to have Communist Party (CP) leanings, was furnished to Chief of Police Ray Van Tassel, Ringwood, New Jersey, on April 18, 1961 and May 4, 1961.

Robert Ehrlich was not re-elected to his position with the Ringwood Library Association. Bernice Pasche, wife of Victor Pasche, was discharged from her position as a teacher in a high school in Pompton Lakes, New Jersey. Public source material concerning Victor Pasche was read at PTA meeting. Victor Pasche was vice president of the PTA.

JDM:cah (9)
100-3-104-2574
100-3-104-2991
100-3-104-31-25
100-3-104-31-23

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 28, 1968, the Miami Office confidentially alerted John Tyler, Chief, Security Section, Dade County Department of Public Instruction, Miami, Florida, that Edwin Franklin Dean, a teacher at Mays Senior High School, Miami, and an assistant minister of the Nation of Islam, Miami, was arrested and convicted for molesting women at Knoxville, Tennessee, in March, 1958.

On March 7, 1968, Mr. Tyler advised he had verified Deans' arrest and conviction in Knoxville for molesting women and that Dean has been eliminated from the Dade County School System.

VRT:ekw
(9)
100-448006-16-23

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

In March 3, 1964, contact was made with Father James Orford, Regent of the Law School at Marquette Law School, Milwaukee, to preclude Mary's Bookshop, a communist bookshop, from placing advertising in "The Marquette Tribune," a college newspaper.

The advertisement for Mary's Bookshop was located and not published in the school newspaper.

JPM: vb
(9)

100-3-104-30-69

Counterintelligence Programs

The FBI anonymously mailed to high school and college officials newspaper articles which had been printed in "The Philadelphia Inquirer." The articles exposed the nature of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA). Articles were mailed October 13, 1964, to four high schools and two colleges in the Philadelphia area.

As of October, 1964, the principal of Germantown High School, Philadelphia, had called in members of DCA unit at the school and advised their parents of the true nature of the club. This DCA unit was considered defunct and the DCA dropped plans to grant them a charter.

RHR:vb
(9)

100-3-104-37-165
100-3-104-37-174

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 5, 1963, the Newark Office confidentially furnished Dr. R. T. Jacobsen, Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Union County High School System, Berkeley Heights, New Jersey, public source information concerning a school teacher, Joseph Edelman. This information revealed Edelman's association with the People's Rights Party, a communist influenced group.

On December 10, 1963, Dr. Jacobsen informed Newark Office that Edelman's teaching contract would not be renewed next year.

DML: vb
(9)

100-3-104-31-186, 194, 196, 223

Counterintelligence Programs

The New York FBI Office was authorized to furnish to the St. Brendan Forensic Society of St. Brendan's High School, New York, New York, appropriate public source data regarding Pete Seeger, who has been publicly identified as "the best known of all the Communist Party entertainers," in an attempt to cause his cancellation or prevent his appearance at Catholic-sponsored affairs in Brooklyn. Seeger was scheduled to appear at Brooklyn College under the sponsorship of the above high school.

On February 20, 1968, background data regarding Seeger was furnished to the Right Reverend Monsignor Raymond Rigney, Superintendent of Schools, Archdiocese of New York, 30 East 50th Street, New York City. On March 15, 1968, Monsignor Rigney stated that due to pressure of business, he was unable to inform Brooklyn Diocesan officials of Seeger's appearance at Brooklyn College, prior to his appearance. Monsignor Rigney further advised that he had prepared a memorandum for his assistants concerning Seeger's subversive background. This memorandum, according to the Monsignor, would serve to answer inquiries which may be received from any high schools or colleges in this Archdiocese of New York. This memorandum also stated that all schools should be discouraged with respect to the possible booking of Seeger to perform.

ELS:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-34-1659, 1669

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 22, 1964, the Boston Office made available to a confidential source at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, public source material regarding the communist background of Leon Letwin who was at that time a teaching fellow (law) at Harvard. At that time there was no indication that Letwin's appointment at Harvard would be extended. However, at that time he indicated a desire to obtain a position at the University of Toledo Law School. Source at Harvard University was of the opinion that the Harvard Corporation would in all probability reject any application by Letwin on the strength of the public source data furnished to Harvard. Letwin's fellowship was not reactivated at Harvard. It is noted, however, that prior to disclosure of the public source information Letwin expressed a desire to move on.

In view of this, the Cleveland Office made available to a source at the University of Toledo Law School public source data compiled by them as well as additional public source data compiled by the Boston Office regarding Letwin's communist background. Cleveland Office advised that the Board of Trustees, University of Toledo Law School, had rejected Letwin's application for employment on the strength of the public source data.

RDS:cah (9)
100-3-104-5-120-123, 137, 138

Counterintelligence Programs

On January 18, 1971, an anonymous letter was mailed by the Mobile FBI Office to Mr. Wilson M. Hawkins, Director of Operations, University of South Alabama, Mobile, Alabama, setting forth information regarding two instructors at the University of South Alabama, Larry Eugene Holmes and Lloyd Dendinger, who were supporting and giving finansial assistance to "Rearguard," an underground newspaper.

On February 3, 1971, Dr. Frederick Whiddon, President, University of South Alabama, confidentially advised that the University staff had received complaints concerning Holmes and Dendinger and, in view of this and other information he had received about these individuals, he had placed them in a probationary status, which would prevent them from getting any annual increments until he removes them from their probationary status.

JWD:tdp (9)
100-449698-61-14, 13

Counterintelligence Programs

On January 28, 1971, the Charlotte FBI Office discussed with Oscar Petty, Director of Financial Aid, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, the New Left activities of Stanley Theodore Gutman, also known as Huck, a faculty member who had made application for financial aid.

On February 2, 1971, Mr. Petty advised Gutman's request for aid had been denied, as a result of which Gutman told Mr. Petty he was withdrawing from Duke University.

ELS:dsh
(9)

100-449698-8-16

Counterintelligence Programs

On August 18, 1969, Mr. Malcom Kispert, Vice President for Academic Administration, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, Massachusetts, advised he had confidentielly received from the Boston FBI Office public source material relating to Vernon Grizzard and Nicholas Egleson, who were instructors at MIT and active in New Left activities.

Mr. Kispert advised that he was able to have Grizzard's and Egleson's reappointments to the Staff of MIT cancelled.

ELS:tdp (9)
100-449698-5-17

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 25, 1970, the Charlotte FBI Office contacted Angus A. McKellar, Attorney, Northhampton County School Board, Jackson, North Carolina, and at that time information relating to the New Left activities of Joseph Holt Woodside, a faculty member, was furnished to Mr. McKellar.

On June 15, 1970, Mr. McKellar advised that Woodside had elected not to renew his teaching contract for the forthcoming year.

ELS:cah (9)
100-449698-8-14

Counterintelligence Programs

On March 23, 1965, the Newark Office was authorized to send an anonymous letter to Joseph Caviello, Principal, North Bergen High School, North Bergen, New Jersey, outlining the communist background of Elizabeth Nagy, a Communist Party member and teacher at North Bergen High School.

Dr. Herman G. Kline, Superintendent of Schools, Board of Education, North Bergen, and Caviello contacted the Newark Office, showed the anonymous letter received and asked for advice. When told no advice of this nature could be given, Dr. Kline volunteered the fact that Mrs. Nagy had tenure and could not be removed except for specific reasons. Kline advised that Mrs. Nagy would be confronted with the contents of this letter and if she admits the allegations, she would be asked to resign. Mrs. Nagy was subsequently interviewed by school authorities and agreed to resign.

DML:tdp (9)
100-3-104-31-310, 340, 349

Counterintelligence Programs

On March 6, 1970, the Albuquerque Office confidentially furnished Mr. Daryl Harrell, a former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and then Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent of the Albuquerque Public Schools, public source material setting forth Michael Otis Colvin's activities in Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at the University of New Mexico. Colvin was an applicant for a part-time position as a teacher with the Albuquerque Public School System.

On April 1, 1970, Mr. Harrell advised that primarily based on the information furnished, the Albuquerque Public School System was no longer considering Colvin's application for a part-time position as a teacher.

JWD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-62-19

Counterintelligence Program

During the Presidential Inauguration activities in Washington, D. C., January, 1969, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC), was utilizing walkie-talkies on the "citizen band" to coordinate movements and activities.

NMC communications were disrupted and confusing orders were issued when the Washington Field Office of the FBI, utilizing similar communications methods, identified with the NMC network and countermanded orders or supplied misinformation to NMC marshals.

HWP:ekw
(9)
100-449698-53, 23

Counterintelligence Programs

The "East Village Other," a bimonthly newspaper, planned to hire a pilot to "bomb" the Pentagon with flowers on October 20, 1967, the day before the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam was to hold its march in Washington, D. C. The New York Office made a number of pretext calls to the "East Village Other" wherein the caller, posing as a pilot for this venture, made inquiries regarding this venture and eventually agreed to fly the plane. It was decided to "bomb" the Pentagon on October 21, 1967. The caller arranged with Allan Katzman of the newspaper to have the Publishing-Editor-In-Chief of the "East Village Other," Walter Bowart, accompany him on this mission. The caller was to meet Bowart at the Eastern Airlines terminal at Dulles Airport at 1:45 p.m. on October 21, 1967, with 100 to 200 pounds of flowers.

Bowart and other individuals apparently connected with the "East Village Other" arrived at Eastern Airlines ticket counter at 1:00 p.m. on October 21, 1967, in a Volkswagen bus loaded with four cartons of flowers. The group waited until approximately 3:30 p.m. and finally left in disgust.

LEB:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-34-1645, 1659, 1669

Counterintelligence Programs

In January, 1967, a confidential source in the Tax Assessor's Office, Brevard County, Florida, was contacted by the FBI to cause an early tax assessment to be scheduled for properties owned by Richland Agency, a Communist Party (CP) investment group. The assessment rate on the local parcel owned by Richland Agency rose a total of $191,560 between 1966 and 1967, which should have resulted in an increased tax of $4,997 from 1966 to 1967. It is unknown whether these taxes exactly amounted to $4,997 or whether they were, in fact, paid.

JWM:bmf/cah (9)
100-3-104-64-8, 10, 11, 12

Counterintelligence Programs

Robert E. Scoggins, South Carolina Grand Dragon, United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, had been receiving a veteran's pension from U. S. Government on a 100 percent disability. Despite this, he had been self-employed in the plumbing, electrical and contracting business. This information was furnished to the Veterans' Administration (VA).

VA conducted an investigation which resulted in Scoggins disability payments being discontinued.

TED: vb
(9)

157-9-18
157-1530

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1969, the New York Office sent spurious postcards, which duplicated the type used by Rochell Kendrick, 792 Columbus Avenue, New York, New York, Chief of the New York Consulate of the Republic of New Africa (RNA), a black extremist organization, to advise members of RNA meetings. The spurious postcards were sent on short notice to reschedule or cancel RNA meetings.

The above-mentioned postcards caused disruption and suspicion among RNA members in the New York City area.

VRT: vb
(9)

100-448006-703, 903

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

The San Francisco Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office learned through an informant that Dolores Berg, common-law wife of Delmar Berg, nominal head of the Stanislaus County, California, Communist Party (CP), had made a complaint to the County Sheriff's Office that Howard Keylor, head of the CP in San Joaquin County, had committed two acts of sexual intercourse with her 16-year-old daughter, Antoinette Marie Romo, in April, 1962. Although the matter had been referred to the Stockton, California, Police Department, no action had been taken as Dolores Berg had not signed a complaint at the Police Department. The daughter did admit to the Sheriff's Office that the intercourse occurred. In May, 1962, the San Francisco FBI Office contacted Sheriff Dan Kelsay, Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office, to have his office attempt to convince Dolores Berg to sign a formal complaint with the Stockton Police Department.

Dolores Berg signed a complaint, as a result of which on May 28, 1962, Howard Keylor was arrested on a charge of Statutory Rape and was incarcerated. The arrest notice was published on May 29, 1962, in the "Stockton Daily Record," a local newspaper.

The victim failed to appear in court on May 29, 1962, and the charge was dismissed for reason of lack of direct evidence. Keylor was released.

As a result of the above action and/or attendant publicity, Howard Keylor was suspended from the Communist Party.

SECRET

RPF:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-47-43, 44, 45

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 26, 1970, the Philadelphia Office sent a letter to the national headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP) bearing an excellent facsimile of the signature of Jonathan Pinkett, a former BPP official in Philadelphia who was expelled on May 19, 1970, after falling out with the BPP leadership in Philadelphia. The letter accused the members of the BPP in Philadelphia of stealing clothing, food and drugs collected for poor children. All of the accusations in the letter were true.

Subsequent to the letter being sent to the headquarters of the organization, several chapter members were given disciplinary transfers. Headquarters had to send other members to the chapter in Philadelphia to straighten out the local situation.

EFG:tdp (9)
100-448006-1805, 1836, 1856

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1965, a mailing of a leaflet prepared by the FBI was made to residents, businessess and organizations in the neighborhood where the Philadelphia Clubhouse of the W. E. B. DuBois Club of America (DCA) was relocating (3260 N. Broad Street, Philadelphia). The leaflet was an announcement of the opening of the DCA and set out a disclaimer of its being a communist group. Its intent was to put anticommunist groups on notice of the DCA's presence.

The minister of a church in the area gave a sermon denouncing communism and announced that the DCA was opening an office in the neighborhood. Businessess in the area refused to publicize the opening of the DCA. Only nine persons attended the DCA open house.

RHR:bmf/jmn
(9)

100-3-104-37-190, 201, 212

Counterintelligence Programs

The Boston Office in October, 1966, furnished to a confidential source public source information relating to the communist plans to open a new bookstore in Boston known as the "Frederick Douglass Books" and the fact that Edward Teixiera, Communist Party (CP) District Organizer, will be directing the activities of the store.

As a result, the October 23, 1966, issue of the "Boston Sunday Herald" contained a photograph showing the store being picketed by members of the American Veterans Committee protesting the use of the name of the 19th Century Negro abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, for the store where Marxist books are being sold.

The "Boston Herald" issue of October 22, 1966, contained an article captioned "Red Bookstore Opens." The article featured a photograph of Edward Teixiera. The article describes Teixiera as a member of the CP by his own admission. Teixiera denied any connection between the store itself and the Party.

As a result of the notoriety achieved regarding the opening of the bookstore, Teixiera was furious and expressed great displeasure. Teixiera subsequently advised a source that the failure of the store to be the success envisioned by the CP of New England can be blamed on the adverse publicity given to the store at its opening.

RDS: vb
(9)

100-3-104-5-216, 217, 225

Counterintelligence Programs

The San Francisco Office advised on September 12, 1960, that through its continuing informant coverage of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), it was aware of new subscribers to the CPUSA newspaper, "Peoples World" (PW). San Francisco instituted policy of interviewing each new subscriber to PW.

Archie Brown, a Northern California CPUSA leader, complained that a major problem in trying to increase the membership of the CPUSA is that new subscribers to the PW are interviewed by the FBI. This has caused these subscribers to drop their subscriptions and to disassociate themselves from CP members.

JDP:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-1901

Counterintelligence Programs

Sometime prior to January 3, 1966, a talk show appearance scheduled for December, 1965, by Otis Archer Hood, Chairman, District Committee, Communist Party, USA, was cancelled by Radio Station WNAC, Boston, Massachusetts. The cancellation followed the Boston Division's providing public source information concerning Hood's Communist Party background to a confidential source.

RWH:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-5-188, 189

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 6, 1968, FBI Headquarters reminded the Detroit FBI Office to be alert to take advantage of all possible disruptive activities during the forthcoming National Convention of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which was to be held at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan.

A press release by the SAC, Detroit FBI Office, in June, 1968, of the Director's testimony concerning the New Left was made at the time of the SDS National Convention. This release was well received and several State Legislators, after visiting the SDS Convention site at Michigan State, severely criticized University officials for allowing SDS to utilize the campus. As a further result, the Michigan State Legislature, in late June, 1968, passed a resolution to the effect that state universities which permitted disruption (which occurred during the National SDS Convention) will suffer appropriation cuts in proportion to the number of students permitted to disrupt state university campuses.

ELS:vb
(9)

100-449698-15-2

146

~~SECRET~~ 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
CONFIDENTIAL 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General August 25, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. T. D. J. Brooks

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

MDR-16
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

On August 13, 1975, a former Special Agent of the FBI advised that he was interviewed by a representative of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations (SSCIO) concerning allegations by Samuel Adason Jaffe that vindictive actions taken by the FBI have prevented him from obtaining or keeping a job in the news media field. According to the SSCIO representative, Jaffe reported that he had a pleasant relationship with Special Agents of the FBI during the time he had furnished information regarding Soviet intelligence matters; however, he detected a coolness of these FBI Agents towards him after his return from Hong Kong in 1968. He attributed this coolness to his being "fingered" by Soviet defector Oleg V. Penkovskiy, who allegedly reported that he saw Jaffe's name on a piece of paper on the desk of a Soviet intelligence officer. Upon learning this, the FBI felt that Jaffe was a double agent. Since his return from Hong Kong he cannot hold a job and believes the FBI is the cause of his predicament. The former Special Agent of the FBI advised that the SSCIO representative told him he is looking into this matter to determine if Jaffe's statements are true and to determine if some controls could be created so that the FBI could not be vindictive in similar situations. (C)

Oleg V. Penkovskiy is a former Colonel in the Soviet intelligence services (SIS) who had cooperated with the West. He was arrested and tried in the Soviet Union in 1963 and reportedly was executed. (C)

CLASS. & EXT. BY 1/320 Pw/Kus 9-3-81
REASON - FCIM 11 1-2. 4. 2 2
DATE OF REVIEW 8-25-95

ORIGINAL FILED IN

105-28333

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED

AUG 29 1975

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)

~~SECRET~~

TDJB:sjm/yi
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

~~Classified by 4091~~
~~Exempt from GDS~~, Categories 2 and 3
~~Date~~ of Declassification ~~Indefinite~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

DUPLICATE YELLOW CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 SEP 8 1975

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General

Jaffe, a former correspondent for ABC and CBS television networks, was an informant of our New York Office from 1958 to 1961. During this period he furnished extensive information on his numerous contacts with Soviet nationals whom he met through his assignment as a CBS correspondent at the United Nations, New York, New York. In 1961 he was assigned to Moscow, USSR, as a correspondent for ABC and served there until he was expelled in 1965 following his reporting of information unfavorable to the Soviet Union. He thereafter was transferred to Hong Kong where he served until 1968. According to information from a former SIS officer currently residing in the West, Jaffe in about 1961, while in Moscow, was recruited by the Committee for State Security (KGB). Our investigation regarding this allegation has failed to either substantiate or refute this allegation. Jaffe, however, in 1963 reported to our New York Office that while in Moscow, he was approached in what he considered an attempt at recruitment by the SIS. During interviews with Jaffe he denied any overt acts helpful to the KGB, although he admitted a continuing relationship with several KGB officers.

[No information is contained in the files of the FBI indicating Jaffe was ever reported on by Colonel Penkovskiy.] With regard to his employment difficulties, this matter was the subject of discussion with Jaffe on several occasions after his return from Hong Kong in 1968, when he explained to Special Agents in contact with him that he was experiencing difficulty in finding a job and his concern that his association with the FBI was the reason for this difficulty. On every occasion he was assured that the FBI had not disclosed his confidential relationship with the FBI. Jaffe in 1969 advised that he had learned from a British intelligence service contact in Hong Kong that his recall from that city by ABC was caused by his refusal to cooperate with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He related that he later mentioned this to a CIA contact in Washington who indicated that the British intelligence service representative had no right to relate to Jaffe this information.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General

The files of the FBI were reviewed to determine if Jaffe's allegations had any foundation in fact and no information was contained therein supporting this allegation. His observations concerning the change of attitude of FBI personnel in dealing with him to one of coolness can be accounted for on the basis of information received from the Soviet intelligence officer alleging his recruitment by the KGB. Our relationship with him thereafter was circumspect and undoubtedly he detected a change in the Agents' attitude.

Whatever employment difficulties may have been encountered by Jaffe did not arise out of any action taken by the FBI.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
        Special Counsel for
        Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

See memorandum W. A. Branigan to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated August 14, 1975, captioned "Samuel Adason Jaffe, Information Concerning."

Classified "Secret" since it discloses FBI interest in Soviet nationals and in order to protect sensitive sources of information.

Regarding W. A. Branigan to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum dated August 14, 1975, Mr. Wannall commented "Suggest memorandum to AG."

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 28 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

NR001 MM CODE

10:13PM IMMEDIATE AUGUST 28, 1975

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL AUGUST 26, 1975.

FORMER MIAMI ASAC FREDERICK F. FOX CONTACTED AUGUST 27, 1975 PER INSTRUCTION.

FOX'S RESIDENCE ADDRESS SHOULD BE CORRECTED IN BUREAU RECORDS TO 11450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI 33161.

END

VLN FBIHQ CLR

REC 5 - 8

62-116395-618

RECORDED
12 SEP 2 1975

cc 67-120166 (Fox)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALMKP

84 SEP 4 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

2

FBI

Date: 8/6/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714) (P)

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Re Bureau teletypes dated 7/30/75 and 7/31/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM reflecting interview of SA EARL M. PETERSEN by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member LESTER SEIDEL on 7/31/75.

Extra cc destroyed

REC-56

(2) - Bureau (Encls. 8) (RM) EX 104
2 - San Diego

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-616

16 AUG 11 1975

F

62-116395

EMP:bk
(4)

1-9063

Records
cc - Personnel file

[illegible]

RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS

8/18/75

79 SEP 17 1975

Approved: ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ____________ M Per ____________

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2AUHKP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Special Agent (SA) Earl M. Petersen was interviewed at the San Diego office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on July 31, 1975, by U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel. The interview began at 10:05 A.M. and ended at 11:35 A.M. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger was available nearby for consultation. He was not consulted during the interview.

Prior to the interview, SA Petersen had been advised by San Diego FBI officials that FBI Headquarters had waived the employee agreement not to furnish information for the purpose of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

SA Petersen was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source; that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques; or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

SA Petersen was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see appendix).

ENCLOSURE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-616

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Lester Seidel identified himself to SA Petersen and stated that he was not warning SA Petersen of his rights as the interview was such that such a warning was not required. He advised SA Petersen that he did not have to talk to him and that any information furnished was on a voluntary basis. He stated that information furnished to him would be handled with discretion.

Mr. Seidel: Were you in charge of the COINTELPRO in San Diego from March, 1968 through October, 1968?

SA Petersen: This was possible but the dates the program was assigned to me are not recalled.

Mr. Seidel: What was the name of the squad to which you were assigned at that time?

SA Petersen: The Security Squad.

Mr. Seidel: Who did the squad investigate? Was it groups such as US, Inc. (see appendix) and the BPP?

SA Petersen: Yes, such groups as US, Inc., the BPP, and the Nation of Islam (NOI) (see appendix).

Mr. Seidel: And possibly splinter groups?

SA Petersen: Yes, groups that would form and disband and which could possibly be called splinter groups.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: How long have you been in the Bureau?

SA Petersen: Twenty-four years as of June 25, 1975.

Mr. Seidel: Where have you been assigned?

SA Petersen: In Boston, Baltimore, New York, Tampa, and San Diego.

Mr. Seidel: The Bureau has indicated that you were a coordinator of the COINTELPRO in San Diego. As such, what were your duties?

SA Petersen: The duties for the most part consisted of preparing letters to the Bureau asking for authority to take some specific action in the program; awaiting the reply from the Bureau; and then, if any action was taken, to advise the Bureau of the results of such action. It is noted that many of the requests to take specific action were turned down by the Bureau.

Mr. Seidel: Were you the focal point of the program?

SA Petersen: Yes, in the sense that any idea for action to be taken in the program was transmitted to the Bureau for approval by me and if approval was received, it would be related to whomever had suggested the activity. I would then report any results to the Bureau.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Did you get heavy pressure from Bureau officials to take action in this program?

SA Petersen: Not any more than any other case, and I had a number of other cases assigned to me at the time the COINTELPRO was assigned to me.

Mr. Seidel: What type of things did you do?

SA Petersen: I do not recall at this time any specific action taken in the program. I do recall that a Black Panther leader, Walter Wallace, was removed as leader of the party in San Diego. I believe it was suspected that he might have cooperated with the FBI. This could have been accomplished by interviewing him where the interview could be seen by other party members. If the Agents shook his hand, smiled, and acted like he was a friend, it might plant the seed of suspicion in the minds of other BPP members. I do not recall specifically whether this happened but at any rate, Wallace was not trusted and was removed as leader of the party.

Mr. Seidel: Could such a thing get Wallace killed or injured?

SA Petersen: I do not see how it would because there would be no way anyone could determine whether or not Wallace was, in fact, cooperating with the FBI. He was probably removed by the BPP as a precautionary measure. I cannot recall whether or not Wallace was removed while I was coordinator of the program.

Mr. Seidel: Was COINTELPRO successful?

SA Petersen: I was not too impressed with its success in San Diego while I had it assigned to me because it was a new program and it took some time to get it established and working. Most of the success was probably due to information obtained regarding criminal violations, mostly local in nature, which was furnished to local law enforcement officers, causing the arrest of BPP members. This would have been done whether or not we had a COINTELPRO. It was necessary to prepare a letter to the Bureau asking authority to take action and then wait for a reply authorizing the activity. Many times suggested COINTELPRO activity suggestions would be turned down.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel made available Xerox copies of Bureau letters captioned, "Counter-Intelligence Program; Black Nationalist - Hate Groups," dated August 25, 1967 and March 4, 1968. These were read by SA Petersen, who said he could not specifically recall reading the letters.

Mr. Seidel:	Was contact with the police formal or informal?
SA Petersen:	Contact was personal or telephonic contact and at one time, information furnished to individual officers was confirmed by letter to the Chief of Police. It is not recalled if this was the policy during the time COINTELPRO was assigned to me.
Mr. Seidel:	What happened to SA Roy Burns?
SA Petersen:	He was transferred to the Butte, Montana Field Office.
Mr. Seidel:	Did he do anything wrong? I understand Agents were sometimes transferred to Butte as a disciplinary measure.
SA Petersen:	SA Burns wanted to be transferred to Butte and requested the transfer. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Mr. Evans, was transferred there and may have helped SA Burns get moved there.
Mr. Seidel:	How old is Bob Baker:
SA Petersen:	Probably 51 or 52 years old.

Mr. Seidel: Did he retire early?

SA Petersen: No. He was in a position to retire and retired because he wanted to take advantage of a cost of living increase by retiring prior to a certain date, such as June 30.

Mr. Seidel: Were the BPP and US, Inc. both violence oriented groups?

SA Petersen: Very definitely. There was extreme friction between the BPP and US, Inc. at all times.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some caricatures used in connection with COINTELPRO?

SA Petersen: Yes.

Mr. Seidel: Who had the program at that time?

SA Petersen: I believe SA Burns had it then.

Mr. Seidel: What were the cartoons?

SA Petersen: I recall seeing them but do not recall any specific cartoon.

Mr. Seidel: Do you think anything done in COINTELPRO could have had a reaction causing someone to kill an individual in the other group?

SA Petersen: Because of the extreme antagonism between the two groups, anything we did would have had about the same effect as a gnat biting an elephant. I do not think COINTELPRO had that kind of impact.

Mr. Seidel: Did you ever supervise any technical installation or electronic surveillance of the BPP in San Diego?

SA Petersen: No. I don't recall anything like that being done here.

Mr. Seidel: How would you feel about writing a letter to a wife saying her husband was sleeping with various other women if the husband was a BPP leader?

SA Petersen: I would hesitate to do this because it might break up a family. If the facts were true and this might cause the BPP leader to be less effective, it would probably be a good counter-intelligence move.

Mr. Seidel: I am referring to Page 91 of a BPP COINTELPRO summary which indicates that a BPP leader was living with a white girl and an anonymous letter was written to others in the BPP saying that this individual was living with a white girl. Do you recall anything about that?

SA Petersen: I believe that leader could have been Kenneth Denmon in San Diego. I recall that he was living with a white woman and that others in the BPP were made aware of this in some manner. The BPP in San

SA Petersen (continued): Diego was teaching children to hate and kill police officers. They planned violent criminal acts and were making plans to take over the established government at the first opportunity. If a leader of such a group could be discredited and removed, it would help to keep the group from becoming stronger, as they would have to select a new leader, and he would have to get the group reorganized. Denmon had many additional weaknesses which could be used in a counter-intelligence program.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall a letter being sent to BPP Headquarters saying a leader of the BPP was cooperating with the police in Los Angeles?

SA Petersen: I do not recall such a letter.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some cards being sent to San Diego from Los Angeles saying, "Ron Karenga is impotent"?

SA Petersen: No, I do not recall such cards. Ron Karenga was a leader of US, Inc., not the BPP.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall that cartoons were to be sent to BPP members to discredit the leaders?

SA Petersen: I recall the cartoons but do not recall whether they were set to BPP members.

Mr. Seidel:	Do you recall an anonymous letter being sent to the Catholic Church to have the priest of the church where the BPP breakfast program was operated removed from his office?
SA Petersen:	I do not recall such an anonymous letter; however, I do recall that the priest was transferred by the church.
Mr. Seidel:	Knowing that the BPP paper was a paper that taught and advocated violence and had cartoons in it that encouraged the killing of police officers by blacks and was a violence oriented paper, how would you feel about putting a corrosive liquid on the paper to keep it from being distributed?
SA Petersen:	I would not do it as I would feel that it was a violation of the law and too drastic. I would not do it personally or personally approve of it.
Mr. Seidel:	You have been very helpful and the information you have provided will be used in considering new legislation at some time in the future.
SA Petersen:	In these tranquil times, it disturbs me greatly to read in the papers and to hear news broadcasts containing all kinds of allegations against the FBI and the CIA and

SA Petersen (continued): other intelligence agencies. I like to work within the law and to be guided by legislation in my work. I would, however, hate to see such restrictive legislation passed that at some time in the future when we might be faced with violence-prone organizations trying to take control of the government, we would be unable to properly handle our responsibility for the internal security of the United States.

Mr. Seidel: Thank you for your cooperation.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Formerly Known As
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

The Black Panther Party (BPP), organized in December, 1966, at Oakland, California, by Huey P. Newton and Bobby George Seale, has the publicly-stated purpose of organizing black people to take control of the life, politics and destiny of the black community. The Party, operating the Black Panther Intercommunal News Service, publishes a newspaper called "The Black Panther," which at one time openly advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in a revolutionary program to end the oppression of the black people but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival program pending revolution. BPP national headquarters, aka Black Panther Intercommunal Headquarters, is located in Oakland, California.

While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order. Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 1973, issue of "Playboy" magazine, stated the Panthers' chief ambition is to change the American Government by any means necessary but that ultimately such change will be through armed violence.

Despite its claimed dedication to community service, indicators of the BPP's continued attraction to violence persist. Since July, 1974, Newton and other BPP members have been arrested in Oakland, California, for threatening police officers, murder of a 17-year-old female and the pistol whipping of Newton's tailor. Newton failed to appear on these charges and is now a local fugitive. Additionally, one died and three were wounded as a result of a shooting at a BPP-sponsored dance in Oakland, California, in October, 1974.

APPENDIX

"US"
Also Known As
"US", Incorporated

"US" was chartered by the State of California as a non-profit corporation in September, 1966, with offices at 8211 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California. The corporation alleges that "US" is primarily an Afro-American cultural organization.

During the spring of 1968, however, a source advised that MAULANA RON KARENGA, true name RONIE MC KINLEY EVERETT, Founder-Chairman of "US", published a booklet entitled "The Quotable Karenga", in which he talked of revolution, black power, and condemned Christianity for the plight of the black man.

In this booklet, KARENGA stated "...You must have a cultural revolution before the violent revolution. The cultural revolution gives identity, purpose, and direction. ...The revolution being fought now is a revolution to win the minds of our people. If we fail to win this, we cannot wage the violent one. ...When the word is given, we'll see how tough you are. When it's 'burn', let's see how much you blow up. And when it's 'take that white girl's head too', we'll see how tough you are..."

The above source advised that "US" members are required to study and memorize this booklet. "US" members are also assigned Swahili names which they use in lieu of their given names.

A second source advised that KARENGA had spoken at various meetings in Los Angeles at which time he talked of creating an "US" army of 1,000 men, obtaining weapons and ammunition, guerrilla warfare tactics, and revolution. KARENGA also stated "The only way to get life is to take a life and as we get stronger, we will take what we want from the white man's United States." He also stated that if the police killed any "US" members, the "US" organization would kill some of them.

APPENDIX CONTINUED

The first source above advised that KARENGA also stated that race riots throughout the country were not riots but were actually revolts or revolutions and that the black people were going to win their freedom by violence, if necessary.

A third source advised that KARENGA stated that a revolution would take place in the future and that no one can believe in black revolution without believing in armed conflict because the two go hand in hand.

A fourth source advised in August, 1974, that the US Organization has been evicted from its headquarters at 4302 South Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles, and because of lack of funds, has been unable to locate a new meeting place. The organization has terminated all public meetings.

APPENDIX

Revised 5/22/75

NATION OF ISLAM (NOI)
CHARACTERIZATION OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION
EXTREMIST MATTER

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is a black nationwife organization headquartered at Muhammad's Temple #2, 7351 South Stony Island Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Elijah Muhammad, self-styled "Messenger of Allah" and divinely appointed leader of the black race in America, was leader of the NOI until his death on February 25, 1975, at which time his son, Wallace D. Muhammad, became Supreme Minister of the NOI. The NOI seeks a separate black nation, espouses its own version of the Islamic Religion, and has considered all "whites" to be devils; however, Wallace D. Muhammad in an interview published in "Muhammad Speaks", March 21, 1975, same being a weekly and the official NOI newspaper, stated there would no longer be stress put on the white people's status as "devils"; that whites have "begun to reform" and "The past is the past until it is dug up. We will not dig it up." NOI official policy instructs members to obey laws of the United States that do not conflict with NOI laws; to defend NOI officials, property, women, and themselves at all costs, if attacked; and to disarm any attacker and use the attacker's weapon against him.

The NOI body is broken down into: 1) the Fruit of Islam (FOI), an all male military-type group, to which instruction in judo and karate is given, and which has as its mmission security of officials, membership, and property of the NOI, and enforcing discipline in the NOI; and 2) the Muslim Girls Training (MGT), an all female quasi military-type group which has as its mission homemaking and child guidance in accordance with NOI teachings.

NOI activity is widespread among black inmates in many prisons in the United States. In recent years internal dissidence and difficulties with rival Muslim groups and other adversaries have produced considerable violence, some involving physical confrontations and acts of violence with law enforcement agencies.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

2

FBI

Date: 8/5/75

Transmit the following in ________________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
(ATT: INTD-W.O. CREGAR)

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714) (P)

SUBJECT: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA LAWRENCE F. WIRICK
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

ReButeletype to LA dated 7/31/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and seven copies of an LHM regarding captioned titles.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Extra cc's destroyed
1-4063

ENCLOSURE

2-Bureau (Encls. 8) (RM)
2-San Diego

LFW/asc
(4)

Typo corrections made on pp 1 & 6 (SD) telephonically 8/13/75 ASAC Barker

Appendix pp all refs appendix deleted from no. 8

62-116395-615

62-116395

REC-56

EX 104

AUG 11 1975

Record in Personnel files

W.O. Cregar

8/18/75

79 SEP 1 1975

FILE

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agen[illegible]arge

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 5, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

By communication dated July 30, 1975, Clarence M. Kelley, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, advised as follows concerning an interview by representative of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) of ~~and~~ Special Agent (SA) Lawrence F. Wirick, concerning Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and Bureau investigation of the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see Appendix page). Director Kelley stated as follows:

"I have waived your employment agreements for purposes of these interviews. Each should note that he has the right to counsel; however, the FBI is unable to provide private counsel. There are certain privileged areas concerning which SAs would not be required to answer questions. Areas concern information which might divulge identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect on-going FBI investigations; and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-615

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT (SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On July 31, 1975, at 11:45 a.m. Mr. Lester Seidel of the United States Senate Select Committee (SSC) interviewed SA Lawrence F. Wirick at the San Diego Office of the FBI. No Advice of Rights was furnished SA Wirick and it was not necessary for the interviewee to consult with an FBI representative. The interview was terminated at 12:50 p.m. and as best recalled included the following discussion in the form of questions and answers:

Seidel: You understand that this is an informal interview and is in connection with the Bureau's COINTELPRO as it relates to the FBI investigation of the BPP?

Wirick: Yes, but for what purpose is the Senate conducting this survey?

Seidel: To aid in formation of new legislation so that the FBI and other Government agencies will have more definite guidelines to follow.

Wirick: I believe the Congress already through lack of information, isolated instances and some hysteria has enacted too many restrictive laws that prevent the FBI and other Government agencies from protecting the law abiding element of our society from the "bad guys".

Seidel: (He was in general agreement) Did you handle the COINTELPRO from 1970 through March, 1971?

Wirick: Yes, but I believe the BPP ceased to function locally about November or December, 1970. As I recall my function was to write a progress type letter regarding progress which described the illegal activities of members of the BPP and to report that this information had been furnished local police agencies but information generally emanated from confidential informants.

Seidel: What type of illegal activities and did your program in any way instigate illegal activities on the part of the BPP?

Wirick: Criminal acts committed by local members of the BPP are what I was referring to. I don't believe it was ever necessary to instigate any illegal acts or in any way entrap BPP members in criminal acts. The majority of local BPP members were thieves, narcotics addicts, lazy, unemployed and were hero worshipers of the BPP in Oakland, California. They wanted to emulate the Oakland organization, but their own dishonesty, et cetera, was a constant source of turmoil amongst the local group.

I recall, date unknown, information was received regarding Kenny Denmon (Kenneth Lee Denmon), one time head of the local BPP, that he was using stolen credit cards.

Information was received that Walter Wallace (Walter Carl Wallace, Jr.) was on narcotics and that he and his wife, Velma, were stealing to get money for narcotics and that Velma's mother was also involved in local thefts.

All above information was furnished local law agencies and local arrests were made. Furnishing the above type of information is a function and responsibility of the FBI.

The BPP in San Diego was very effective in causing their own problems and their own extinction and their criminal activities were not restricted to the examples I've given.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO try to disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program?

Wirick: No, not to my knowledge. I recall that soon after the Breakfast Program was started that other members of the BPP accused Ken Denmon of stealing money from contributions made to the Program.

On second thought I believe we did disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program in that we received complaints from several dairys and bread companies, et cetera, that they had been approached by BPP members with veiled threats of extortion if they did not donate quantities of food, et cetera, to the BPP Breakfast Program. The FBI and local police investigated and I believe as a result their practices were discontinued, but the investigation failed to establish a prosecutable offense of extortion.

Seidel: Did you have any connection with distribution of "cartoons" depicting BPP members as compromising each other, et cetera?

Wirick: No, but I have seen "cartoons" in the BPP newspaper. Have you ever seen or read copies of the BPP newspaper?

Seidel: No

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Wirick: They featured "cartoons" showing the "pigs" (police) being killed, stabbed, et cetera. I believe I recall seeing some "cartoons" showing how the BPP would kill the "honkies" (white people). They were similar to the propaganda leaflets used by the Nazis against American troops before an attack. The articles in the BPP newspaper were even more foul.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO promote dissen~~t~~sion between the BPP and the US Group (see Appendix page)?

Wirick: Not to my knowledge. As I recall there was never any need to. They were constantly at odds with each other and on a gang type basis were trying to eliminate each other. I believe Sylvester Bell, a San Diego BPP member was killed by an US Group member and John Savage, another local BPP member was killed by an US Group member.

In Los Angeles two other BPP members, names not recalled, were allegedly killed by US Group members. I believe this led to the popular saying in Southeast San Diego section where most blacks live that the score (game) was, "US 4 - BPP 0".

Seidel: What do you think of the merits of a proposal to spray shipments of the BPP newspaper with a noxious acid so that readers would be confronted with a vile odor when attempting to read the paper?

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Wirick: After thought, no. Because the paper itself was so vile and anti-white that the odor would never stop BPP members from reading same. I've always hoped that a large segment of the population, especially the "do-gooders" could or would experience the nauseous reaction I have felt after reading the illiterate, foul-mouthed, anti-white, anti-Government, BPP paper. I think everybody should read a copy of the BPP paper so that they will know the type and character of BPP members.

Seidel: What do you think about anonymous letters sent to spouses of BPP members saying the husband was sleeping with a white girl, et cetera?

Wirick: Most wives of the members I recall were also BPP members and/or common-law-wives. Many BPP members did have liaison with white girls but I doubt if such a letter would bother most spouses of BPP members. However, such a letter might be of value under certain circumstances, example: the stories that were spread during World War II which were not necessarily all true regarding Hitler, Mussolini, General Patton and others.

Seidel: In your opinion was the COINTELPRO of any value? Should it be changed? Do you have any suggestions for changes, or should it be eliminated completely?

Wirick: Yes, as I recall, it acted as a progress letter of the BPP, its direction, its dissension, its change in leadership, and indications of its slow local demise because of the character of the local BPP members, and as a summary of its activities for FBIHQ. I recall that

we made certain requests to conduct some types of counterintelligence against the BPP, but I do not recall that the Bureau ever authorized any counterintelligence act which might be productive.

Change? COINTELPRO is not being utilized to the best of my knowledge and has not been for some time.

I believe that in about two or three years Congress will be frantically asking the FBI why we did not furnish them intelligence, advance knowledge of a demonstration, a riot and other civil unrest and elimination of the COINTELPRO has been another step in the direction of placing the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in a position where we cannot react to the activities of groups such as the BPP which have been formed with the main purpose of overthrowing the United States.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Formerly Known As
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

The Black Panther Party (BPP), organized in December, 1966, at Oakland, California, by Huey P. Newton and Bobby George Seale, has the publicly-stated purpose of organizing black people to take control of the life, politics and destiny of the black community. The Party, operating the Black Panther Intercommunal News Service, publishes a newspaper called "The Black Panther," which at one time openly advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in a revolutionary program to end the oppression of the black people but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival program pending revolution. BPP national headquarters, aka Black Panther Intercommunal Headquarters, is located in Oakland, California.

While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order. Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 1973, issue of "Playboy" magazine, stated the Panthers' chief ambition is to change the American Government by any means necessary but that ultimately such change will be through armed violence.

Despite its claimed dedication to community service, indicators of the BPP's continued attraction to violence persist. Since July, 1974, Newton and other BPP members have been arrested in Oakland, California, for threatening police officers, murder of a 17-year-old female and the pistol whipping of Newton's tailor. Newton failed to appear on these charges and is now a local fugitive. Additionally, one died and three were wounded as a result of a shooting at a BPP-sponsored dance in Oakland, California, in October, 1974.

APPENDIX

"US"
Also Known As
"US", Incorporated

"US" was chartered by the State of California as a non-profit corporation in September, 1966, with offices at 8211 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California. The corporation alleges that "US" is primarily an Afro-American cultural organization.

During the spring of 1968, however, a source advised that MAULANA RON KARENGA, true name RONIE MC KINLEY EVERETT, Founder-Chairman of "US", published a booklet entitled "The Quotable Karenga", in which he talked of revolution, black power, and condemned Christianity for the plight of the black man.

In this booklet, KARENGA stated "...You must have a cultural revolution before the violent revolution. The cultural revolution gives identity, purpose, and direction. ...The revolution being fought now is a revolution to win the minds of our people. If we fail to win this, we cannot wage the violent one. ...When the word is given, we'll see how tough you are. When it's 'burn', let's see how much you blow up. And when it's 'take that white girl's head too', we'll see how tough you are..."

The above source advised that "US" members are required to study and memorize this booklet. "US" members are also assigned Swahili names which they use in lieu of their given names.

A second source advised that KARENGA had spoken at various meetings in Los Angeles at which time he talked of creating an "US" army of 1,000 men, obtaining weapons and ammunition, guerrilla warfare tactics, and revolution. KARENGA also stated "The only way to get life is to take a life and as we get stronger, we will take what we want from the white man's United States." He also stated that if the police killed any "US" members, the "US" organization would kill some of them.

APPENDIX CONTINUED

The first source above advised that KARENGA also stated that race riots throughout the country were not riots but were actually revolts or revolutions and that the black people were going to win their freedom by violence, if necessary.

A third source advised that KARENGA stated that a revolution would take place in the future and that no one can believe in black revolution without believing in armed conflict because the two go hand in hand.

A fourth source advised in August, 1974, that the US Organization has been evicted from its headquarters at 4302 South Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles, and because of lack of funds, has been unable to locate a new meeting place. The organization has terminated all public meetings.

FD- v. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 8/6/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714) (C)

SUBJECT: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Re Bureau teletypes 7/30/75 and 7/31/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM reflecting the interview of former SA ROBERT S. BAKER by SSC Staff Member LESTER SEIDEL.

The information in the enclosed LHM was voluntarily furnished to SA EARL M. PETERSEN by former SA BAKER.

ASAC Barger SD, telephonically adv. that SD inadvertently failed to send the 1 copies: 8/13/75 B

Appendix pp. all appendix deleted. refs to appendix prior to diss. B

62-116395-614

REC-56

18 AUG 1975

EX 104

Ltrs & cc's destroyed 1-4063

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Enc. 8

1st tel'd 1-Bris SEP 11 8/18/75

ENCLOSURE

(2) - Bureau (Enc. 8) (RM)
1 - San Diego
EMP:sp
(3)

Retype cc - Personnel file

62-116395

79 SEP 17 1975

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Former Special Agent Robert S. Baker was interviewed at his home at 4268 Hortensia, San Diego, California, by U.S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel on August 1, 1975. The interview began at 10:30 AM and lasted until 12:30 PM. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), San Diego, California, was telephonically available for consultation. Former Special Agent Baker did not consult with anyone during the course of the interview.

Prior to the interview, Former Special Agent Baker had been advised that FBI Headquarters had waived the agreement as a former employee not to furnish information received during the period of his employment, for purposes of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source, that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques, or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see appendix).

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-641

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Seidel identified himself to Mr. Baker, stating that the interview would be in the form of an informal discussion and that information furnished by Mr. Baker would be placed in a memorandum for the SSC. Mr. Seidel stated that he did not intend to use the names of individuals interviewed in his memorandum. He stated that Mr. Baker did not have to talk to him, and that any information he furnished would be furnished voluntarily.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker was a supervisor with the San Diego Office of the FBI from sometime in 1968 through April, 1971.

Mr. Baker advised that he was a supervisor of the security squad but could not recall if the dates mentioned by Mr. Seidel were correct.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to the nature of matters supervised by him, to which Mr. Baker replied that matters such as investigation of the Communist Party (see appendix), the Socialist Workers Party (see appendix), the Black Panther Party, US, Incorporated (see appendix), the Nation of Islam (see appendix), Espionage, Sabotage matters, and other investigations were conducted on the squad supervised by him, which consisted of from 12 to 15 Special Agents.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker supervised the COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker advised that he did supervise this program which was initiated by FBI Headquarters and not on the field office level. He stated that as he recalled, a letter was submitted either monthly, quarterly or semi-annually. The letter was submitted by a Special Agent whose case load was such that he could take the time to prepare the letter.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Special Agent Roy Burns was more of a young, eager, type Agent.

Mr. Baker replied that this was not true but that Special Agent Burns had been assigned the COINTELPRO case because his case load was such that he was able to handle the program.

Mr. Seidel inquired whether Special Agent Roy Burns was transferred to the Butte Office of the FBI for disciplinary reasons.

Mr. Baker replied that Special Agent Burns was originally from Washington State and had wanted to be transferred to that area.

Mr. Seidel asked if the Bureau encouraged Agents to participate in disruptive programs and then rewarded them financially for their efforts.

Mr. Baker replied that the Bureau had an incentive award program, and if an Agent did a good job in any field, he could get recognition through an incentive award. Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall any award being given as a result of COINTELPRO activity.

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he could recall any information concerning the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that the operation of the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP was followed through sources. They advised that some of the BPP officials were stealing money from funds which were to be spent on the breakfast program. The breakfast program was served at a local Catholic church. Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that an official of the Catholic church in San Diego was contacted regarding the priest in charge of the church where the breakfast program was being held, who was reportedly an alcoholic. Mr. Seidel was advised that the priest was transferred from the church.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked what Mr. Baker's definition of the COINTELPRO was.

Mr. Baker replied that the COINTELPRO was a disruptive type program.

Mr. Seidel stated that the FBI had apparently written a letter regarding a white girl friend of Kenneth Denman, a BPP leader in San Diego. He inquired as to why this letter was written.

Mr. Baker stated that Denman was considered one of the stronger leaders of the San Diego Branch of the BPP, and if it was possible to keep him from becoming a strong leader, it would be disruptive to the party. The fact that Denman was living with a white girl was considered derogatory toward him by BPP members in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether such activity would have been taken against a leader in an organization such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) (see description) if the leader of such a group had been living with a white woman. Would such a letter be appropriate?

Mr. Baker replied that he did not feel that such a letter would be appropriate in this case because this organization involved a religious leader and our program was not directed at religious groups but was directed toward black militant and extremist groups.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker recalled individuals in the BPP named Tate, Wallace, Denman and Bell.

Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall anything specific about any of these individuals, except what he had previously stated concerning Denman. He said he could recall the names but nothing more concerning these individuals.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then mentioned an incident wherein the San Diego Office of the FBI had furnished information to the Los Angeles Office of the FBI for transmission to local authorities concerning a group of BPP members from San Diego who were traveling to Los Angeles to attend a funeral.

Mr. Baker stated that he could recall that such an incident occurred and that information was furnished stating that BPP members from San Diego would be carrying concealed weapons. He said he thought the furnishing of this information resulted in some of the BPP members being arrested in Los Angeles.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker could recall someone from the FBI in San Diego visiting the mother of a girl who was an alleged member of the BPP in San Diego, and whether the FBI went to the mother to put pressure on another member of the family.

Mr. Baker stated that he vaguely recalled such a case but could not recall the details and could not be certain this had occurred.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether the FBI had any technical surveillances on the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker stated that he knew of none and added that such coverage was not needed in San Diego because there were good sources in the BPP who could furnish excellent coverage. Mr. Baker stated that he believes he would have known of any such installations covering the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker knew of San Francisco using any such techniques against the BPP.

Mr. Baker replied that he believed that San Francisco had used such techniques.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then asked why such techniques were not used in San Diego if they were used in San Francisco.

Mr. Baker replied that such techniques were not needed in San Diego due to the good source coverage of party activity.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether there was a conflict between US, Incorporated, and the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that US, Incorporated, headquarters were in Los Angeles. There was a power struggle between the two groups for membership of blacks and much travel occurred by US, Incorporated, leaders from Los Angeles to San Diego and Mexico, and from San Diego to Los Angeles. There were considerable conflict between the two groups.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled Ron Karenga.

Mr. Baker replied that he did recall Ron Karenga as being the Los Angeles leader of US, Incorporated.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled some cards stating "Ron Karenga is impotent" which were printed in Los Angeles and some of which might have been sent to San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that he does not recall these cards but this could have been correct.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker recalled some cartoons being drawn concerning the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that there were two or three cartoons prepared depicting strife between US, Incorporated, and the BPP.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then stated that these cartoons were prepared by the Bureau Laboratory.

Mr. Baker stated that he did not recall.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that US, Incorporated, and the BPP were led by and made up of people with extensive criminal records, and because of this and their general demeanor, the FBI did not really have to provoke or disrupt them because they kept themselves in a constant state of turmoil. He stated that Special Agents connected with the COINTELPRO did not devote much time to the program because of heavy case loads of other matters and because they assisted in working criminal matters such as bank robberies and other criminal violations.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that a great deal of time was spent by the Special Agents working with their sources because they had to be extremely careful that they were protected. If a crime was planned and a source had knowledge of it, the source would try to keep the crime from being committed. If it was not possible to prevent the crime, the source might be forced to participate, and if arrested, a problem would be created in attempting to get the source out of jail and still conceal his identity as a source.

Mr. Seidel inquired of Mr. Baker as to the names of the Agents he dealt with in Los Angeles and San Francisco in connection with COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that Supervisor Albert Clark had something to do with the program in San Francisco, and in Los Angeles he dealt with Supervisor Richard Bloeser and Bill Knowland.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he was acquainted with Richard Held.

Mr. Baker stated that Richard Held was assigned as Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego, and he knew him at that time. He stated that he is aware that Richard Held is now the Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Office of the FBI.

Mr. Seidel stated to Mr. Baker that he was going to interview Assistant Director Robert Gebhardt and Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates.

This concluded the interview of former Special Agent Robert S. Baker by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was an organization founded by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., with the theme of new life for poor people. Dr. King, a leader in civil rights, was assassinated on April 4, 1969.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Formerly Known As
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

The Black Panther Party (BPP), organized in December, 1966, at Oakland, California, by Huey P. Newton and Bobby George Seale, has the publicly-stated purpose of organizing black people to take control of the life, politics and destiny of the black community. The Party, operating the Black Panther Intercommunal News Service, publishes a newspaper called "The Black Panther," which at one time openly advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in a revolutionary program to end the oppression of the black people but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival program pending revolution. BPP national headquarters, aka Black Panther Intercommunal Headquarters, is located in Oakland, California.

While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order. Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 1973, issue of "Playboy" magazine, stated the Panthers' chief ambition is to change the American Government by any means necessary but that ultimately such change will be through armed violence.

Despite its claimed dedication to community service, indicators of the BPP's continued attraction to violence persist. Since July, 1974, Newton and other BPP members have been arrested in Oakland, California, for threatening police officers, murder of a 17-year-old female and the pistol whipping of Newton's tailor. Newton failed to appear on these charges and is now a local fugitive. Additionally, one died and three were wounded as a result of a shooting at a BPP-sponsored dance in Oakland, California, in October, 1974.

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

Title 50, U. S. Code, Section 781 (Internal Security Act of 1950) stated that, as a result of evidence adduced before various committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, Congress found the existence of a world communist revolutionary movement, whose purpose is to establish a communist totalitarian dictatorship in the world's countries through the medium of a world-wide communist organization. Communist action organizations in various countries endeavor to carry out the objectives of the world communist movement by bringing about the overthrow of existing governments by any means. The communist organization in the United States - the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) - pursuing its stated objectives, presents "a clear and present danger to the security of the United States." The Subversive Activities Control Board, established by Section 791 of the above Act, found the CPUSA to be a communist action organization. This finding was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in June, 1961. The CPUSA has continued to be an arm of the international communist movement dominated by the Soviet Union. The CPUSA, in its dependence on the Soviet Union, has never knowingly adopted a position contrary to Soviet policy. Its leaders frequently confer with Soviet leaders to receive guidance and direction on the policies the CPUSA is to follow. There has been no evidence that the primary aims of the CPUSA, as they conform to Soviet objectives, have changed over the years.

APPENDIX

Revised 5/22/75

NATION OF ISLAM (NOI)
CHARACTERIZATION OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION
EXTREMIST MATTER

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is a black nationwife organization headquartered at Muhammad's Temple #2, 7351 South Stony Island Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Elijah Muhammad, self-styled "Messenger of Allah" and divinely appointed leader of the black race in America, was leader of the NOI until his death on February 25, 1975, at which time his son, Wallace D. Muhammad, became Supreme Minister of the NOI. The NOI seeks a separate black nation, espouses its own version of the Islamic Religion, and has considered all "whites" to be devils; however, Wallace D. Muhammad in an interview published in "Muhammad Speaks", March 21, 1975, same being a weekly and the official NOI newspaper, stated there would no longer be stress put on the white people's status as "devils"; that whites have "begun to reform" and "The past is the past until it is dug up. We will not dig it up." NOI official policy instructs members to obey laws of the United States that do not conflict with NOI laws; to defend NOI officials, property, women, and themselves at all costs, if attacked; and to disarm any attacker and use the attacker's weapon against him.

The NOI body is broken down into: 1) the Fruit of Islam (FOI), an all male military-type group, to which instruction in judo and karate is given, and which has as its mmission security of officials, membership, and property of the NOI, and enforcing discipline in the NOI; and 2) the Muslim Girls Training (MGT), an all female quasi military-type group which has as its mission homemaking and child guidance in accordance with NOI teachings.

NOI activity is widespread among black inmates in many prisons in the United States. In recent years internal dissidence and difficulties with rival Muslim groups and other adversaries have produced considerable violence, some involving physical confrontations and acts of violence with law enforcement agencies.

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is a revolutionary, Trotskyist-communist organization, which is headquartered in New York City. Its purpose, as stated in its Declaration of Principles, is the overthrow of the U. S. Government and the institution of a dictatorship of the working class and the eventual achievement of a communist society. It was founded in 1938 and maintains close association with international Trotskyist organizations as a "sympathizing" group, but it denies formal membership in any foreign group to escape application of the Voorhis Act, which regulates certain types of organizations subject to foreign control. While the SWP does not openly advocate the use of violence at the present time to overthrow the U. S. Government, it believes that eventual violent revolution in the U. S. is inevitable. Its objection to the current use of violence is based on the ground that it believes violence is premature at this time. The SWP seeks to precipitate a revolution when conditions are ripe and to seize control of the revolution and to direct it when it occurs.

APPENDIX

"US"
Also Known As
"US", Incorporated

"US" was chartered by the State of California as a non-profit corporation in September, 1966, with offices at 8211 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California. The corporation alleges that "US" is primarily an Afro-American cultural organization.

During the spring of 1968, however, a source advised that MAULANA RON KARENGA, true name RONIE MC KINLEY EVERETT, Founder-Chairman of "US", published a booklet entitled "The Quotable Karenga", in which he talked of revolution, black power, and condemned Christianity for the plight of the black man.

In this booklet, KARENGA stated "...You must have a cultural revolution before the violent revolution. The cultural revolution gives identity, purpose, and direction. ...The revolution being fought now is a revolution to win the minds of our people. If we fail to win this, we cannot wage the violent one. ...When the word is given, we'll see how tough you are. When it's 'burn', let's see how much you blow up. And when it's 'take that white girl's head too', we'll see how tough you are..."

The above source advised that "US" members are required to study and memorize this booklet. "US" members are also assigned Swahili names which they use in lieu of their given names.

A second source advised that KARENGA had spoken at various meetings in Los Angeles at which time he talked of creating an "US" army of 1,000 men, obtaining weapons and ammunition, guerrilla warfare tactics, and revolution. KARENGA also stated "The only way to get life is to take a life and as we get stronger, we will take what we want from the white man's United States." He also stated that if the police killed any "US" members, the "US" organization would kill some of them.

APPENDIX CONTINUED

The first source above advised that KARENGA also stated that race riots throughout the country were not riots but were actually revolts or revolutions and that the black people were going to win their freedom by violence, if necessary.

A third source advised that KARENGA stated that a revolution would take place in the future and that no one can believe in black revolution without believing in armed conflict because the two go hand in hand.

A fourth source advised in August, 1974, that the US Organization has been evicted from its headquarters at 4302 South Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles, and because of lack of funds, has been unable to locate a new meeting place. The organization has terminated all public meetings.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA.GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

SECRET

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 8/14/75

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

FROM : W. A. Branigan

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALMKP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

CLASS. & EXT. BY 0320 RWJ/KAVS 9-3-81
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2. 4. 2 2
DATE OF REVIEW 8-14-95

Attached New York teletype advises of information from former Bureau Agent, who is a current informative asset, that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations (SSCIO) has become aware of Jaffe's allegations that the FBI has taken actions which have prevented him from obtaining or keeping a job in the news media field. Jaffe claims that his association with Bureau Agents with regard to Soviet intelligence matters cooled off after he was identified by a Soviet defector as cooperating with Soviet Intelligence and that the FBI has since deprived him from making a living in his profession. The SSCIO is looking into Jaffe's situation to determine if his allegations are true and if the FBI can be prevented from taking such actions in other similar situations. C

ORIGINAL FILED IN

BACKGROUND:

Jaffe is a former correspondent for ABC and CBS who was a symbol number informant of the New York Office from 1958 to 1961. During this period, he furnished information on his numerous contacts with Soviet nationals whom he met through his assignment as a CBS correspondent at the United Nations. In 1961, he joined ABC as its correspondent in Moscow where he served until he was expelled in 1965 following the publication of an article unfavorable to the Soviet Union. He was then transferred to Hong Kong where he remained until 1968. Since 1968, he has worked for various news media and has acted as a free lance journalist. Following his return from Hong Kong, he took up residence in Washington, D. C., and was in contact with the Washington Field Office, furnishing information on Soviets and Chinese nationals whom he met in the course of his employment. U

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REC-16

IST-110

Enclosure
105-28333

SECRET

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

CONTINUED - OVER

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL AUG 20 1975

~~Classified by 4091~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3~~
Date of Declassification Indefinite

RGK:yjm
(4)

Records

CC- 62-116395

NOT RECORDED
SEP 17 1975

ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 SEP 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Samuel Adason Jaffe
105-28333

Soviet defector ["Sammy"] X(U) has advised that Jaffe was recruited by the KGB, in about 1962 while he was in Moscow, through his relationship with a Soviet female. [Soviet defector "Shamrock" has confirmed that Jaffe was approached but does not believe the approach was successful.] c Jaffe reported to the New York Office in 1963 what he interpreted as a recruitment effort, and he was extensively reinterviewed in 1969 concerning his association with KGB officers in Moscow. [There is no information in Jaffe's file that he was ever reported on by Col. Penkovskiy, as Jaffe reportedly has claimed.] c During the interviews with Jaffe, he denied any overt acts helpful to the KGB, although he admitted a continuing relationship with several KGB officers. Both the New York and Washington Field Offices came to the conclusion that Jaffe was a KGB agent while in Moscow, but that there was doubt as to whether he continued in that role after he was expelled.

Our relations with Jaffe were tempered by ["Sammy's"] X(U) allegation, and Bureau Agents in contact with him were circumspect in any dealings with him thereafter. Jaffe very likely detected a change in the Agents' attitude which accounts for his statement that he felt his relationship with them had cooled off.

There is no evidence contained in Jaffe's file that either New York or Washington Field or the Bureau has ever taken any action which would affect Jaffe's livelihood. Following his return from Hong Kong, Jaffe told his handling Agents that he was experiencing difficulty in finding a job. He several times mentioned his concern that his association with the FBI might be the reason. On each occasion, he was assured that the FBI had never divulged his confidential relationship and would not do so any time in the future. u

Jaffe's file does disclose that during an interview with Washington Field Agents in 1969, he said that he had learned from a British Intelligence contact in Hong Kong that his recall from that city was caused by his refusal to cooperate with CIA. He also related that he later mentioned this to a CIA contact in Washington who responded that the British

CONTINUED - OVER

Intelligence representative "had no right to tell you this." [CIA has informed us that they did have contacts with Jaffe while he was in Hong Kong and that he reported on Communist Chinese of interest to the Agency.]S His file also records that Jaffe told New York Agents in 1969 that a recently published book on the Council of Foreign Relations described him as having a subversive background. He was also described in the book as being a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy. Jaffe connected the appearance of this book with his then recent recall fron Hong Kong by ABC.

ACTION:

That this memorandum be referred to the SENSTUDY project in view of probable inquiries from SSCIO.

JGN TW WRW

Memo to I.G.
8/25/75
TI JK/[illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 13 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 024 NY CODE

7:35 P.M. NITEL 8-13-75 PLQ

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-14660)

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTN: INTD

SENSTUDY, 1975.

NEW YORK 6811-IA TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED SPECIAL AGENT JOSEPH J. PALGUTA ON AUGUST 13, 1975, AND FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: C

ON AUGUST 11, 1975, MR. PATRICK A. SHEY, A MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (SSCIO), TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED NEW YORK 6811-IA, AND THEY MADE AN APPOINTMENT TO MEET IN NYC AT 2:00 PM ON AUGUST 13, 1975. SOURCE MET WITH SHEY AS ARRANGED ON AUGUST 13, 1975. SHEY TOLD SOURCE THAT SAM JAFFE (FORMER NEW YORK 2524-S) VISITED A FRIEND OF HIS, MR. MILLER, WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE SSCIO. WHILE IN MILLER'S OFFICE, JAFFE WAS RELATING TO MILLER THAT HE HAD A C

MDR-16
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

CLASS. & EXT. BY 10320 RWK/KWS 9-3-81
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2. 4.2 2
DATE OF REVIEW 8-13-95 1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE
CONFIDENTIAL

145

PLEASANT RELATIONSHIP WITH FORMER SPECIAL AGENTS (SAS) JOHN G. WALLIS AND EDWARD F. GAMBER WITH REGARD TO SOVIET INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. c

DURING THE TIME THAT JAFFE WAS RELATING ABOVE DATA TO MILLER, SENATOR CHURCH, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SSCI, ENTERED MILLER'S OFFICE AND BECAME VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN JAFFE'S STATEMENTS. JAFFE RELATED TO MILLER THAT AS A REPORTER FOR THE COLUMBIA BROADCASTING COMPANY, HE COVERED THE STORY INVOLVING THE RELEASE OF FRANCIS G. POWERS BY THE SOVIETS (POWERS WAS THE FORMER U-2 PILOT WHO WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE USSR IN 1960). JAFFE RELATED TO MILLER THAT THEREAFTER HE WENT TO HONG KONG. JAFFE ALSO TOLD MILLER THAT WHEN HE RETURNED FROM HONG KONG (SOURCE BELIEVES THIS TO BE IN 1966-1968), HE LEARNED THAT HE WAS "FINGERED" BY A SOVIET DEFECTOR BY THE NAME OF PENKOVSKIY. THIS DEFECTOR ALLEGEDLY REPORTED THAT HE SAW JAFFE'S NAME ON A PIECE OF PAPER ON THE DESK OF A SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. JAFFE TOLD MILLER THAT THE FBI, UPON LEARNING THAT INFORMATION FELT THAT JAFFE WAS A "DOUBLE AGENT" BECAUSE OF THE COOLNESS OF BUREAU PERSONNEL TOWARD HIM WHEN HE RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES FROM HONG KONG. JAFFE c

TOLD MILLER THAT EVER SINCE HIS RETURN FROM HONG KONG, HE CANNOT HOLD A JOB, AND BELIEVES THE FBI IS THE CAUSE OF HIS PREDICAMENT. JAFFE IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE FBI IS BEING VINDICTIVE TOWARD HIM IN PURSUING THIS MATTER AND DEPRIVING HIM OF MAKING A LIVELIHOOD. c

MR. SHEY TOLD THE SOURCE THAT THE SSCIO IS LOOKING INTO THE ABOVE MATTER TO DETERMINE IF JAFFE'S STATEMENTS ARE TRUE, AND TO DETERMINE IF SOME CONTROLS COULD BE CREATED SO THAT THE FBI COULD NOT BE VINDICTIVE IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS. c

SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE TOLD SHEY THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE FBI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JAFFE AFTER 1964, SINCE HE RETIRED FROM THE BUREAU THAT YEAR. SOURCE ADVISED THAT SHEY TOLD HIM THAT AS YET HE HAS NOT TALKED TO FORMER SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, BUT MAY INTERVIEW HIM IN THE FUTURE. c

SOURCE ADVISED THAT SHEY TOLD HIM THAT JAFFE IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS A FREE-LANCE REPORTER WORKING IN WASHINGTON, DC. SOURCE STATED THE HE INFORMED SHEY OF FORMER SA GAMBER'S CURRENT EMPLOYMENT. c

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE MET WITH SHEY ON AUGUST 13, 1975 FROM 2:30 PM UNTIL 3:30 PM. c

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM THE SOURCE IN A GUARDED MANNER, AND ONLY THE PERTINENT FACTS WERE OBTAINED. c

THE NYO WILL PERSONALLY REINTERVIEW THE SOURCE REGARDING THE ABOVE AND OBTAIN COMPLETE DETAILS CONCERNING THE MATTER. c

~~CLASSIFIED BY 2649, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

END.

LRF FBIHQ CLR

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
August 18, 1975
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

Enclosed for your information are two copies each of four memoranda concerning interviews by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of an FBI Assistant Director and two current and one former FBI Special Agents. One set of these memoranda is for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 8

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-613

SFP:lhb lhb
(10)

REC-56

EX 104

SEP 4 1975

MAILED 20
AUG 20 1975
FBI

NOTE:

LHMs ~~being~~ furnished to the Attorney General were received by airtels from Los Angeles, 8/7/75, and from San Diego (three), one dated 8/5/75 and two dated 8/6/75, all in connection with Senstudy 75. Copies of the airtels and the LHMs will be designated for the respective personnel files of the personnel who were interviewed.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

4 ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 SEP 8 1975

GPO 951-546

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING	X	INTERVIEWS		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

	SSC
	HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of interviews by SSC Staff Member of incumbent FBI Special Agents Earl M. Petersen, Lawrence F. Wirick, Assistant Director in Charge Robert E. Gebhardt and former Special Agent Robert S. Baker.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Counterintelligence
Surveillance, electronic
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

COINTELPRO of the FBI as it related to the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5-woc 18

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE ROBERT E. GEBHARDT BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 7, 1975, Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt, Los Angeles Division, was interviewed in the Los Angeles FBI Office by Mr. Lester Seidel, Staff Member of the Senate Select Committee, United States Senate.

Gebhardt's rights were not explained to him by Seidel although Seidel did explain the purpose of the interview, that is, the Cointel Program of the FBI as it related to the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party when Gebhardt was the Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco Division from 1970 to 1972.

The interview lasted from 9:05 AM until 10:30 AM, and it was not necessary for Gebhardt to consult with any Bureau representative.

Gebhardt had previously been advised by a Bureau representative of his right to counsel, the privileged areas of information, consultation privileges, and the parameters of interview.

Seidel inquired at the outset as to whether Gebhardt was aware of the Cointel Program relative to the Black Panther Party investigation on a day to day basis being specifically advised details of the investigation as it relates to the Cointel Program. It was explained to Seidel that as Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco FBI Office wherein over 500 employees were located at the time, Gebhardt had many responsibilities in the operation of that division and

PROPERTY OF THE FBI
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-615

therefore, relied upon the experience, expertise, and judgment of the various supervisors assigned to the office for the day to day direction of the various matters under investigation, including the investigation of the Black Panther Party.

It was further explained that if a problem was encountered or a particularly unusual situation developed, Gebhardt was, of course, consulted and was available for such consultation to resolve any particular problem areas.

Gebhardt was next asked if he recalled being SAC when the electronic coverage of the Black Panther Party and the various officials at BBP was instituted and eventually terminated. Seidel was advised that the electronic coverage was already in effect upon Gebhardt's arrival, however, he does recall receiving a phone call after the "Keith Decision" was handed down instructing that all electronic coverage of the BPP and the various members of the BPP be discontinued. The call was received from Bureau Headquarters and the discontinuance was effected immediately.

Seidel inquired as to whether Gebhardt felt the intelligence type investigations should be completely removed from the criminal investigations which investigations would be looking toward eventual prosecution.

Seidel was informed by Gebhardt that even in criminal investigations looking toward prosecutions, much intelligence information is obtained from time to time which really has no value from a prosecutive standpoint, but does have possible value with respect to the direction of the investigation. In some criminal investigations a great deal of intelligence information may be obtained and in other types, very little. Insofar as the FBI is concerned, however, every effort is made to make certain there is some Federal law which would be a basis for an investigation which procedures would include matters commonly referred to as security investigations.

In some instances, in such security investigations a great deal of intelligence information would be obtained therefore, it was Gebhardt's opinion that so-called intelligence type investigations should not be removed from or differentiated from criminal type investigations looking toward prosecutions since intelligence information is an outgrowth of the basic investigation.

Gebhardt was asked if he felt the Cointelpro was a separate entity distinguished from the basic investigation and it was explained that the Cointelpro was a phase of the overall investigation in any particular organization or individual.

Gebhardt was asked if he felt Congress should enact legislation which would set forth specific investigative techniques that could or could not be utilized by the FBI or other Federal investigative agencies. He was advised in Gebhardt's opinion, such legislation should not be enacted, and in reply to the question as to why such legislation should not be enacted, it was pointed out that as an investigative agency, there must of necessity be allowed a certain flexibility because no two investigations are exactly alike and the circumstances of such investigations could possibly not be related to such Federal law.

In answer to the question as to how Congress should assure the American public that questionable activity such as the Cointelpro, was not being engaged in by an investigative agency such as the FBI, Seidel was informed that the Congress and the American people must rely upon the integrity and honesty of the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General.

It was pointed out that both the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General are nominated by the President, hearings are held before the various Congressional Committees and finally approved by the Senate. It was further pointed out that Director Kelley has recently stated in connection with the publicity relative to Cointelpro, that he has no intention of permitting this program to be reinstituted in the FBI and if circumstances ever arose which circumstances he could not contemplate at this time, wherein it was thought such activities should be embarked upon, he would obtain the personal approval of the Attorney General prior to such instituting. Seidel was informed that Gebhardt was in total agreement with this statement of Mr. Kelley.

Gebhardt was asked as to what his feelings were relative to what the relationship should be between the FBI and Congress. He was informed that a Senate Oversight Committee was recently established and it was felt that this was a good start and that this Committee should formalize and

standardize their oversight responsibilities and make regular inquiries of the Director and other officials of the FBI as to our activities. He was informed that there should be either a joint oversight committee between the House and Senate or if the Congress decided on two oversight Committees in both the House and Senate, these committees should be the entities through which all information relative to the activities of the FBI should flow.

It was emphasized however, that there should be regular consultation between these representatives and the FBI.

Inquiry was made as to Gebhardt's opinion relative to the relationship between the Department of Justice and the FBI and Seidel was informed the relationship, in Gebhardt's opinion, is excellent, should continue, and there should be a free flow of information between the FBI and the Department of Justice.

At the conclusion of the interview, Gebhardt summed up his comments by stating that Congress should definitely set up a structured oversight procedure of the activities of the FBI with due regard to the confidentiality of many of the FBI operations and investigations and must assure itself that the members of the Committee and its staff will maintain the confidentiality where necessary.

Secondly, in the areas of investigative matters usually referred to as national defense, national security or intelligence operations, all of the FBI investigations must be based on the application of the facts toward a particular Federal statute and if the facts are so oblique that they cannot be clearly applied to a particular Federal statute, consultation with the Department of Justice should be had in all instances.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SBAUMKP

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Former Special Agent Robert S. Baker was interviewed at his home at 4268 Hortensia, San Diego, California, by U.S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel on August 1, 1975. The interview began at 10:30 AM and lasted until 12:30 PM. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), San Diego, California, was telephonically available for consultation. Former Special Agent Baker did not consult with anyone during the course of the interview.

Prior to the interview, Former Special Agent Baker had been advised that FBI Headquarters had waived the agreement as a former employee not to furnish information received during the period of his employment, for purposes of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source, that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques, or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) ~~(see appendix)~~. destroyed

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-615 3

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Seidel identified himself to Mr. Baker, stating that the interview would be in the form of an informal discussion and that information furnished by Mr. Baker would be placed in a memorandum for the SSC. Mr. Seidel stated that he did not intend to use the names of individuals interviewed in his memorandum. He stated that Mr. Baker did not have to talk to him, and that any information he furnished would be furnished voluntarily.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker was a supervisor with the San Diego Office of the FBI from sometime in 1968 through April, 1971.

Mr. Baker advised that he was a supervisor of the security squad but could not recall if the dates mentioned by Mr. Seidel were correct.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to the nature of matters supervised by him, to which Mr. Baker replied that matters such as investigation of the Communist Party (see appendix), the Socialist Workers Party (see appendix), the Black Panther Party, US, Incorporated (see appendix), the Nation of Islam (see appendix), Espionage, Sabotage matters, and other investigations were conducted on the squad supervised by him, which consisted of from 12 to 15 Special Agents.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker supervised the COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker advised that he did supervise this program which was initiated by FBI Headquarters and not on the field office level. He stated that as he recalled, a letter was submitted either monthly, quarterly or semi-annually. The letter was submitted by a Special Agent whose case load was such that he could take the time to prepare the letter.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Special Agent Roy Burns was more of a young, eager, type Agent.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Baker replied that this was not true but that Special Agent Burns had been assigned the COINTELPRO case because his case load was such that he was able to handle the program.

Mr. Seidel inquired whether Special Agent Roy Burns was transferred to the Butte Office of the FBI for disciplinary reasons.

Mr. Baker replied that Special Agent Burns was originally from Washington State and had wanted to be transferred to that area.

Mr. Seidel asked if the Bureau encouraged Agents to participate in disruptive programs and then rewarded them financially for their efforts.

Mr. Baker replied that the Bureau had an incentive award program, and if an Agent did a good job in any field, he could get recognition through an incentive award. Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall any award being given as a result of COINTELPRO activity.

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he could recall any information concerning the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that the operation of the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP was followed through sources. They advised that some of the BPP officials were stealing money from funds which were to be spent on the breakfast program. The breakfast program was served at a local Catholic church. Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that an official of the Catholic church in San Diego was contacted regarding the priest in charge of the church where the breakfast program was being held, who was reportedly an alcoholic. Mr. Seidel was advised that the priest was transferred from the church.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked what Mr. Baker's definition of the COINTELPRO was.

Mr. Baker replied that the COINTELPRO was a disruptive type program.

Mr. Seidel stated that the FBI had apparently written a letter regarding a white girl friend of Kenneth Denman, a BPP leader in San Diego. He inquired as to why this letter was written.

Mr. Baker stated that Denman was considered one of the stronger leaders of the San Diego Branch of the BPP, and if it was possible to keep him from becoming a strong leader, it would be disruptive to the party. The fact that Denman was living with a white girl was considered derogatory toward him by BPP members in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether such activity would have been taken against a leader in an organization such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) (see description) if the leader of such a group had been living with a white woman. Would such a letter be appropriate?

Mr. Baker replied that he did not feel that such a letter would be appropriate in this case because this organization involved a religious leader and our program was not directed at religious groups but was directed toward black militant and extremist groups.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker recalled individuals in the BPP named Tate, Wallace, Denman and Bell.

Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall anything specific about any of these individuals, except what he had previously stated concerning Denman. He said he could recall the names but nothing more concerning these individuals.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then mentioned an incident wherein the San Diego Office of the FBI had furnished information to the Los Angeles Office of the FBI for transmission to local authorities concerning a group of BPP members from San Diego who were traveling to Los Angeles to attend a funeral.

Mr. Baker stated that he could recall that such an incident occurred and that information was furnished stating that BPP members from San Diego would be carrying concealed weapons. He said he thought the furnishing of this information resulted in some of the BPP members being arrested in Los Angeles.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker could recall someone from the FBI in San Diego visiting the mother of a girl who was an alleged member of the BPP in San Diego, and whether the FBI went to the mother to put pressure on another member of the family.

Mr. Baker stated that he vaguely recalled such a case but could not recall the details and could not be certain this had occurred.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether the FBI had any technical surveillances on the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker stated that he knew of none and added that such coverage was not needed in San Diego because there were good sources in the BPP who could furnish excellent coverage. Mr. Baker stated that he believes he would have known of any such installations covering the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker knew of San Francisco using any such techniques against the BPP.

Mr. Baker replied that he believed that San Francisco had used such techniques.

Mr. Seidel then asked why such techniques were not used in San Diego if they were used in San Francisco.

Mr. Baker replied that such techniques were not needed in San Diego due to the good source coverage of party activity.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether there was a conflict between US, Incorporated, and the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that US, Incorporated, headquarters were in Los Angeles. There was a power struggle between the two groups for membership of blacks and much travel occurred by US, Incorporated, leaders from Los Angeles to San Diego and Mexico, and from San Diego to Los Angeles. There were considerable conflict between the two groups.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled Ron Karenga.

Mr. Baker replied that he did recall Ron Karenga as being the Los Angeles leader of US, Incorporated.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled some cards stating "Ron Karenga is impotent" which were printed in Los Angeles and some of which might have been sent to San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that he does not recall these cards but this could have been correct.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker recalled some cartoons being drawn concerning the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that there were two or three cartoons prepared depicting strife between US, Incorporated, and the BPP.

Mr. Seidel then stated that these cartoons were prepared by the Bureau Laboratory.

Mr. Baker stated that he did not recall.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that US, Incorporated, and the BPP were led by and made up of people with extensive criminal records, and because of this and their general demeanor, the FBI did not really have to provoke or disrupt them because they kept themselves in a constant state of turmoil. He stated that Special Agents connected with the COINTELPRO did not devote much time to the program because of heavy case loads of other matters and because they assisted in working criminal matters such as bank robberies and other criminal violations.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that a great deal of time was spent by the Special Agents working with their sources because they had to be extremely careful that they were protected. If a crime was planned and a source had knowledge of it, the source would try to keep the crime from being committed. If it was not possible to prevent the crime, the source might be forced to participate, and if arrested, a problem would be created in attempting to get the source out of jail and still conceal his identity as a source.

Mr. Seidel inquired of Mr. Baker as to the names of the Agents he dealt with in Los Angeles and San Francisco in connection with COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that Supervisor Albert Clark had something to do with the program in San Francisco, and in Los Angeles he dealt with Supervisor Richard Bloeser and Bill Knowland.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he was acquainted with Richard Held.

Mr. Baker stated that Richard Held was assigned as Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego, and he knew him at that time. He stated that he is aware that Richard Held is now the Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Office of the FBI.

Mr. Seidel stated to Mr. Baker that he was going to interview Assistant Director Robert Gebhardt and Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates.

This concluded the interview of former Special Agent Robert S. Baker by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel.

~~The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was an organization founded by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., with the theme of new life for poor people. Dr. King, a leader in civil rights, was assassinated on April 4, 1969.~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 5, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALW/YP

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

By communication dated July 30, 1975, Clarence M. Kelley, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, advised as follows concerning an interview by representative of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) of Special Agent (SA) Lawrence F. Wirick, concerning Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and Bureau investigation of the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see Appendix page). Director Kelley stated as follows:

"I have waived your employment agreements for purposes of these interviews. Each should note that he has the right to counsel; however, the FBI is unable to provide private counsel. There are certain privileged areas concerning which SAS would not be required to answer questions. Areas concern information which might divulge identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect on-going FBI investigations; and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-613

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

On July 31, 1975, at 11:45 a.m. Mr. Lester Seidel of the United States Senate Select Committee (SSC) interviewed SA Lawrence F. Wirick at the San Diego Office of the FBI. No Advice of Rights was furnished SA Wirick and it was not necessary for the interviewee to consult with an FBI representative. The interview was terminated at 12:50 p.m. and as best recalled included the following discussion in the form of questions and answers:

Seidel: You understand that this is an informal interview and is in connection with the Bureau's COINTELPRO as it relates to the FBI investigation of the BPP?

Wirick: Yes, but for what purpose is the Senate conducting this survey?

Seidel: To aid in formation of new legislation so that the FBI and other Government agencies will have more definite guidelines to follow.

Wirick: I believe the Congress already through lack of information, isolated instances and some hysteria have enacted too many restrictive laws that prevent the FBI and other Government agencies from protecting the law abiding element of our society from the "bad guys".

Seidel: (He was in general agreement) Did you handle the COINTELPRO from 1970 through March, 1971?

Wirick: Yes, but I believe the BPP ceased to function locally about November or December, 1970. As I recall my function was to write a progress type letter regarding progress which described the illegal activities of members of the BPP and to report that this information had been furnished local police agencies but information generally emanated from confidential informants.

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Seidel: What type of illegal activities and did your program in any way instigate illegal activities on the part of the BPP?

Wirick: Criminal acts committed by local members of the BPP is what I was referring to. I don't believe it was ever necessary to instigate any illegal acts or in any way entrap BPP members in criminal acts. The majority of local BPP members were thieves, narcotics addicts, lazy, unemployed and were hero worshipers of the BPP in Oakland, California. They wanted to emulate the Oakland organization, but their own dishonesty, et cetera, was a constant source of turmoil amongst the local group.

I recall, date unknown, information was received regarding Kenny Denmon (Kenneth Lee Denmon), one time head of the local BPP, that he was using stolen credit cards.

/ Information was received that Walter Wallace (Walter Carl Wallace, Jr.) was on narcotics and that he and his wife, Velma, were stealing to get money for narcotics and that Velma's mother was also involved in local thefts.

All above information was furnished local law agencies and local arrests were made. Furnishing the above type of information is a function and responsibility of the FBI.

The BPP in San Diego was very effective in causing their own problems and their own extinction and their criminal activities were not restricted to the examples I've given.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO try to disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program?

Wirick: No, not to my knowledge. I recall that soon after the Breakfast Program was started that other members of the BPP accused Ken Denmon of stealing money from contributions made to the Program.

On second thought I believe we did disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program in that we received complaints from several dairys and bread companies, et cetera, that they had been approached by BPP members with veiled threats of extortion if they did not donate quantities of food et cetera to the BPP Breakfast Program. The FBI and local police investigated and I believe as a result their practices were discontinued, but the investigation failed to establish a prosecutable offense of extortion.

Seidel: Did you have any connection with distribution of "cartoons" depicting BPP members as compromising each other et cetera?

Wirick: No, but I have seen "cartoons" in the BPP newspaper. Have you ever seen or read copies of the BPP newspaper?

Seidel: No

Wirick: They featured "cartoons" showing the "pigs" (police) being killed, stabbed, et cetera. I believe I recall seeing some "cartoons" showing how the BPP would kill the "honkies" (white people). They were similar to the propaganda leaflets used by the Nazis against American troops before an attack. The articles in the BPP newspaper were even more foul.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO promote dissension between the BPP and the US Group (see Appendix page)?

Wirick: Not to my knowledge. As I recall there was never any need to. They were constantly at odds with each other and on a gang type basis were trying to eliminate each other. I believe Sylvester Bell, a San Diego BPP member was killed by an US Group member and John Savage, another local BPP member was killed by an US Group member.

In Los Angeles two other BPP members, names not recalled, were allegedly killed by US Group members. I believe this led to the popular saying in Southeast San Diego section where most blacks live that the score (game) was, "US 4 - BPP 0".

Seidel: What do you think of the merits of a proposal to spray shipments of the BPP newspaper with a noxious acid so that readers would be confronted with a vile odor when attempting to read the paper?

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Wirick: After thought, no. Because the paper itself was so vile and anti-white that the odor would never stop BPP members from reading same. I've always hoped that a large segment of the population, especially the "do-gooders" could or would experience the nauseous reaction I have felt after reading the illiterate, foul-mouthed, anti-white, anti-Government, BPP paper. I think everybody should read a copy of the BPP paper so that they will know the type and character of BPP members.

Seidel: What do you think about anonymous letters sent to spouses of BPP members saying the husband was sleeping with a white girl, et cetera?

Wirick: Most wives of the members I recall were also BPP members and/or common-law-wives. Many BPP members did have liaison with white girls but I doubt if such a letter would bother most spouses of BPP members. However, such a letter might be of value under certain circumstances, example: the stories that were spread during World War II which were not necessarily all true regarding Hitler, Mussolini, General Patton and others.

Seidel: In your opinion was the COINTELPRO of any value? Should it be changed? Do you have any suggestions for changes, or should it be eliminated completely?

Wirick: Yes, as I recall, it acted as a progress letter of the BPP, its direction, its dissension, its change in leadership, and indications of its slow local demise because of the character of the local BPP members, and as a summary of its activities for FBIHQ. I recall that

we made certain requests to conduct some types of counterintelligence against the BPP, but I do not recall that the Bureau ever authorized any counterintelligence act which might be productive.

Change? COINTELPRO is not being utilized to the best of my knowledge and has not been for some time.

I believe that in about two or three years Congress will be frantically asking the FBI why we did not furnish them intelligence, advance knowledge of a demonstration, a riot and other civil unrest and elimination of the COINTELPRO has been another step in the direction of placing the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in a position where we cannot react to the activities of groups such as the BPP which have been formed with the main purpose of overthrowing the United States.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SBALMKP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Special Agent (SA) Earl M. Petersen was interviewed at the San Diego office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on July 31, 1975, by U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel. The interview began at 10:05 A.M. and ended at 11:35 A.M. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger was available nearby for consultation. He was not consulted during the interview.

Prior to the interview, SA Petersen had been advised by San Diego FBI officials that FBI Headquarters had waived the employee agreement not to furnish information for the purpose of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

SA Petersen was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source; that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques; or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

SA Petersen was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see appendix).

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-61 6

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Lester Seidel identified himself to SA Petersen and stated that he was not warning SA Petersen of his rights as the interview was such that such a warning was not required. He advised SA Petersen that he did not have to talk to him and that any information furnished was on a voluntary basis. He stated that information furnished to him would be handled with discretion.

Mr. Seidel:	Were you in charge of the COINTELPRO in San Diego from March, 1968 through October, 1968?
SA Petersen:	This was possible but the dates the program was assigned to me are not recalled.
Mr. Seidel:	What was the name of the squad to which you were assigned at that time?
SA Petersen.	The Security Squad.
Mr. Seidel:	Who did the squad investigate? Was it groups such as US, Inc. (see appendix) and the BPP?
SA Petersen:	Yes, such groups as US, Inc., the BPP, and the Nation of Islam (NOI) (see appendix).
Mr. Seidel:	And possibly splinter groups?
SA Petersen:	Yes, groups that would form and disband and which could possibly be called splinter groups.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: How long have you been in the Bureau?

SA Petersen: Twenty-four years as of June 25, 1975.

Mr. Seidel: Where have you been assigned?

SA Petersen: In Boston, Baltimore, New York, Tampa, and San Diego.

Mr. Seidel: The Bureau has indicated that you were a coordinator of the COINTELPRO in San Diego. As such, what were your duties?

SA Petersen: The duties for the most part consisted of preparing letters to the Bureau asking for authority to take some specific action in the program; awaiting the reply from the Bureau; and then, if any action was taken, to advise the Bureau of the results of such action. It is noted that many of the requests to take specific action were turned down by the Bureau.

Mr. Seidel: Were you the focal point of the program?

SA Petersen: Yes, in the sense that any idea for action to be taken in the program was transmitted to the Bureau for approval by me and if approval was received, it would be related to whomever had suggested the activity. I would then report any results to the Bureau.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Did you get heavy pressure from Bureau officials to take action in this program?

SA Petersen: Not any more than any other case, and I had a number of other cases assigned to me at the time the COINTELPRO was assigned to me.

Mr. Seidel: What type of things did you do?

SA Petersen: I do not recall at this time any specific action taken in the program. I do recall that a Black Panther leader, Walter Wallace, was removed as leader of the party in San Diego. I believe it was suspected that he might have cooperated with the FBI. This could have been accomplished by interviewing him where the interview could be seen by other party members. If the Agents shook his hand, smiled, and acted like he was a friend, it might plant the seed of suspicion in the minds of other BPP members. I do not recall specifically whether this happened but at any rate, Wallace was not trusted and was removed as leader of the party.

Mr. Seidel: Could such a thing get Wallace killed or injured?

SA Petersen: I do not see how it would because there would be no way anyone could determine whether or not Wallace was, in fact, cooperating with the FBI. He was probably removed by the BPP as a precautionary measure. I cannot recall whether or not Wallace was removed while I was coordinator of the program.

Mr. Seidel: Was COINTELPRO successful?

SA Petersen: I was not too impressed with its success in San Diego while I had it assigned to me because it was a new program and it took some time to get it established and working. Most of the success was probably due to information obtained regarding criminal violations, mostly local in nature, which was furnished to local law enforcement officers, causing the arrest of BPP members. This would have been done whether or not we had a COINTELPRO. It was necessary to prepare a letter to the Bureau asking authority to take action and then wait for a reply authorizing the activity. Many times suggested COINTELPRO activity suggestions would be turned down.

/

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel made available Xerox copies of Bureau letters captioned, "Counter-Intelligence Program; Black Nationalist - Hate Groups," dated August 25, 1967 and March 4, 1968. These were read by SA Petersen, who said he could not specifically recall reading the letters.

Mr. Seidel: Was contact with the police formal or informal?

SA Petersen: Contact was personal or telephonic contact and at one time, information furnished to individual officers was confirmed by letter to the Chief of Police. It is not recalled if this was the policy during the time COINTELPRO was assigned to me.

Mr. Seidel: What happened to SA Roy Burns?

SA Petersen: He was transferred to the Butte, Montana Field Office.

Mr. Seidel: Did he do anything wrong? I understand Agents were sometimes transferred to Butte as a disciplinary measure.

SA Petersen: SA Burns wanted to be transferred to Butte and requested the transfer. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Mr. Evans, was transferred there and may have helped SA Burns get moved there.

Mr. Seidel: How old is Bob Baker:

SA Petersen: Probably 51 or 52 years old.

Mr. Seidel: Did he retire early?

SA Petersen: No. He was in a position to retire and retired because he wanted to take advantage of a cost of living increase by retiring prior to a certain date, such as June 30.

Mr. Seidel: Were the BPP and US, Inc. both violence oriented groups?

SA Petersen: Very definitely. There was extreme friction between the BPP and US, Inc. at all times.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some caricatures used in connection with COINTELPRO?

SA Petersen: Yes.

Mr. Seidel: Who had the program at that time?

SA Petersen: I believe SA Burns had it then.

Mr. Seidel: What were the cartoons?

SA Petersen: I recall seeing them but do not recall any specific cartoon.

Mr. Seidel: Do you think anything done in COINTELPRO could have had a reaction causing someone to kill an individual in the other group?

SA Petersen: Because of the extreme antagonism between the two groups, anything we did would have had about the same effect as a gnat biting an elephant. I do not think COINTELPRO had that kind of impact.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Did you ever supervise any technical installation or electronic surveillance of the BPP in San Diego?

SA Petersen: No. I don't recall anything like that being done here.

Mr. Seidel: How would you feel about writing a letter to a wife saying her husband was sleeping with various other women if the husband was a BPP leader?

SA Petersen: I would hesitate to do this because it might break up a family. If the facts were true and this might cause the BPP leader to be less effective, it would probably be a good counterintelligence move.

Mr. Seidel: I am referring to Page 91 of a BPP COINTELPRO summary which indicates that a BPP leader was living with a white girl and an anonymous letter was written to others in the BPP saying that this individual was living with a white girl. Do you recall anything about that?

SA Petersen: I believe that leader could have been Kenneth Denmon in San Diego. I recall that he was living with a white woman and that others in the BPP were made aware of this in some manner. The BPP in San

SA Petersen (continued): Diego was teaching children to hate and kill police officers. They planned violent criminal acts and were making plans to take over the established government at the first opportunity. If a leader of such a group could be discredited and removed, it would help to keep the group from becoming stronger, as they would have to select a new leader, and he would have to get the group reorganized. Denmon had many additional weaknesses which could be used in a counter-intelligence program.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall a letter being sent to BPP Headquarters saying a leader of the BPP was cooperating with the police in Los Angeles?

SA Petersen: I do not recall such a letter.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some cards being sent to San Diego from Los Angeles saying, "Ron Karenga is impotent"?

SA Petersen: No, I do not recall such cards. Ron Karenga was a leader of US, Inc., not the BPP.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall that cartoons were to be sent to BPP members to discredit the leaders?

SA Petersen: I recall the cartoons but do not recall whether they were sent to BPP members.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall an anonymous letter being sent to the Catholic Church to have the priest of the church where the BPP breakfast program was operated removed from his office?

SA Petersen: I do not recall such an anonymous letter; however, I do recall that the priest was transferred by the church.

Mr. Seidel: Knowing that the BPP paper was a paper that taught and advocated violence and had cartoons in it that encouraged the killing of police officers by blacks and was a violence oriented paper, how would you feel about putting a corrosive liquid on the paper to keep it from being distributed?

SA Petersen: I would not do it as I would feel that it was a violation of the law and too drastic. I would not do it personally or personally approve of it.

Mr. Seidel: You have been very helpful and the information you have provided will be used in considering new legislation at some time in the future.

SA Petersen: In these tranquil times, it disturbs me greatly to read in the papers and to hear news broadcasts containing all kinds of allegations against the FBI and the CIA and

SA Petersen (continued):	other intelligence agencies. I like to work within the law and to be guided by legislation in my work. I would, however, hate to see such restrictive legislation passed that at some time in the future when we might be faced with violence-prone organizations trying to take control of the government, we would be unable to properly handle our responsibility for the internal security of the United States.
Mr. Seidel:	Thank you for your cooperation.

OFF[illegible] OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENE[illegible]
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

W

TO: John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: MCL K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Attached for your information is a letter regarding the "proposed procedures" to the Attorney General from Senate Select Committee. I am attaching two extra copies of it, as I am sure that Mr. Adams and the Director may also wish to see it.

B

REC-56 62-116375-612

EX-104

7 AUG 6 1975

6 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

84 SEP 8 1975

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Proposed proc

July 18, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

62-116395-64

ENCLOSURE

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader/or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 1? 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 5P2ALMKP

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

or the Senior Staff
(b) If the Task Force Leader/has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Proposed procedures

July 18, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 15 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

or the Senior Staff

(b) If the Task Force Leader/has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Comittee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Proposed procedure

July 18, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

or the Senior Staff

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader/will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 13 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

TO: Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Senstudy '75

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Responses to Request for Comments on Proposed Procedures

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1. The Deputy Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, and Civil Rights Division register no objections to the proposed procedures on access. OLA suggests inclusion of a preamble referencing security agreements and the need for proper security assurances from the Committee to the Attorney General.

2. Both the Criminal Division and Office of Legal Counsel address the short response time frames imposed upon the Attorney General, and OLC suggests certain language changes for purposes of clarity and focus.

3. The Attorney General is troubled by Item 9 and its need for modification as to categories of material not treatable by these proposed procedures or as to a later discovered need to make presently unanticipated changes to effect a smoother operation of the procedures.

4. The Bureau's comments on the proposed procedures are attached and should be read. This Office does not agree with the Bureau that the proposed procedures should be presented to the President and the President's Counsel.

5. No response has been received from the Solicitor General.

EX 104

REC-56

62-116395-611

7 AUG 6 1975

14 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 SEP 8 1975

6. This Office recommends that Item 9 be modified as suggested by the Attorney General and that the language modifications suggested by OLC for Items 3 and 6 be adopted.

7. It is further suggested that the Attorney General convene a meeting of the senior Bureau officials for the purpose of informing them of his policy decision in this matter.

Copies to:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: K. William O'Connor

DATE: July 18, 1975

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FILES

In response to your memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned as above, we observe that the "substantial negotiations" which produced the proposed procedures did not include participation by a representative of the FBI and that the request for our views concerning disclosure of highly sensitive FBI material was first received at 11:14 a.m. today with a reply expected by 2:00 p.m. today. We respectfully suggest that not only should you afford greater opportunity for an expression of our views on this matter, but that any such proposed procedures should be presented to the President's Counsel for concurrence and for an expression of the President's views as to the general policy of the Executive Branch in this regard. Further, you may want to consider addressing the problem of the impact such general disclosure of files would have on pending criminal investigations.

A preliminary review in the time available revealed that certain items require considerable modification. For example, Item (3)(c) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for information that would tend to identify sources to whom the FBI has an obligation of confidentiality as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity already has been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identity to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman."

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975
KWO'C

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/VP

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Item (6)(b) should be reconsidered with the following language:

"If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the FBI will furnish a written statement of the grounds for its position to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation within 24 hours."

Item (8) should be reconsidered with the following language:

"The Staff and the Members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the Staff is given access as extensively as necessary between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, in the FBI J. Edgar Hoover Building at Room 4171."

In light of the difficulties described, it is my strong recommendation that such procedures should not be hastily agreed upon with the Committee and that full discussion should be had concerning this matter by representatives of the FBI, the Attorney General, the Committee and the Counsel to the President.

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. 48 hour lead time is very short and may create problems; 24 hour reaction time may be unreasonable for Attorney General.

2. The provision seems a little odd, out of context of negotiations.

3. Suggest that in 3(a), last line, word and should be or and "peculiarly sensitive" read to modify both foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

4. No comment

5. No comment

6. Time frames are very restrictive; there should be a stated opportunity for TFL to work out any objections with FBI, before raising to Special Counsel - "...if the issue is not promptly resolved between the TFL and the FBI, the materials in issue will be conveyed..."

7. Define "screened" by reference to 6(a) above

8. No comment

9. No comment

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. No problem with this procedure, but feels that the time limits are too tight

2. No central policy objection

3. Suggest incorporate a preamble phrase that makes reference to security agreements; a specific means for assurance to the AG by the Chairman and Vice Chairman of proper security measures

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

Views of Thornburg and Kevin Maroney

1. Time frames a bit skimpy
2. looks as though we're giving up a lot, but that's probably what's required

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

No objection to proposed procedures on access

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

TO: Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Responses: Congressional Access to Personal Files Maintained by the FBI

With the exception of the Solicitor General's Office, all Departmental components whose views were solicited have provided their views on the question of Congressional Access to Personal FBI Files.

OLC, OLA, and Criminal Division favor a combination of options 1 and 3. Civil Rights Division favors option 1. The Bureau chooses option 3.

This office recommends the adoption of the position articulated by OLC and concurred in by OLA and Criminal.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

2

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

Suggest combine option 1 and option 3; make deletion per option 1, but make oral explanation of the deletion; entire paragraph or document should be withheld to protect source.

Feels there is a serious, if not constitutional, issue as to the prospective trespass upon a citizen's rights to give information in confidence to his government.

Option 4 is absolutely unacceptable; would fight it in the courts.

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

Opts for 1 & 3 consolidation
Same gist as Scalia

FBI

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

FBI would choose 3, but say "portion of papers" instead of "papers"

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		ACTION
1 TO *(Name, office symbol or location)*	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	DATE	COORDINATION
2 Mr. Thornburgh	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

I agree with your recommendations on this, except "sensitive sources" should be read to include identity of any person who has furnished info or opinion re the Senator, as, e.g., in a background investigation.

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM *(Name, office symbol or location)* KEVIN T. MARONEY	DATE 1/1/74
	PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41 048—16—81594-1 532-103 GPO 5041-101
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

My view is that item 9 goes too far in that there must be some provision which allows the Department or the Committee to abrogate the arrangement. I should think the agreement could provide that at any time the Chairman of the Committee or the Attorney General could give a notification that the (1) agreement was not suitable for a particular category of material or (2) that for some reason the agreement was not operating suitably and that as to either one or two there would then be an endeavor to work out a suitable modification or different arrangement (but I think it has to be said that the arrangement can be cancelled by either party)

OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

7/18/75

To: Bill O'Connor

From: Doug Marvin

Attached is the Attorney General's comment on the procedures for dealing with the Senate Select Committee

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

Approves Option 1. (memo to follow)

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY 5Y2ALMVP

TO: See Distribution

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Congressional Access to Personal Files Maintained by the FBI

Certain members of the Senate Select Committee have requested access to their personal files. The preferred mode of access is the subject of pending consideration by the Attorney General. As you know, under the mandate of the Senate Select Committee, access to the personal file of a member of the Senate Select Committee may be had without any consideration of Freedom of Information Act issues.

The Attorney General has considered several options, and has asked that you consider them and indicate hereon your view; he has asked that these views be delivered to me not later than 1:00 p.m., this afternoon so that he may promptly consider them. The options considered are not exclusive. If you have any suggestions other than the options indicated, please attach it to your response. Responses should be delivered to me in Room 4213, Main Justice, by the time indicated. Thank you for your cooperation.

OPTIONS

Option 1: Departmental staff examine the documents in the file and delete any references to sensitive sources or ongoing criminal investigation; thereafter, the file is made accessible to the Senator under controlled circumstances at the Department of Justice.

✓ Approved　　　　＿＿＿ Disapproved

Comment:

EITHER THIS OR 3 IS PREFERABLE BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW WHAT "PERSONAL FILES" LOOK LIKE, HARD TO CHOOSE

Option 2: Same as Option 1, except that a xerox of the documents as excised is delivered to the Senator.

______ Approved   X Disapproved

Comment: PERHAPS SOME CONSIDERATION TO XEROX COPIES OF SPECIFIED DOCS AFTER REVIEW. EVEN THIS IS QUESTIONABLE, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF "LEAK" PROBLEM.

Option 3: The file is assembled and the Senator given access to it, with certain papers withheld and the Senator is orally advised of the reasons for withholding of the documents.

✓ Approved   ______ Disapproved

Comment:

SEE COMMENT TO #1

Option 4: The Senator is furnished his entire individual file without any excisions or deletions, for review at the Department of Justice.

______ Approved   X Disapproved

Comment:

Distribution:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. Thornburgh, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

July 18, 1975

TO: Bill O'Connor

FROM: Stan Pottinger

SUBJECT: July 18 memo--congressional access to personal files maintained by the FBI

Without knowing how these files were compiled (public sources? wiretap? confidential informant?), or what is in them (personal matter of derogatory nature? national security information?), or why they exist, (I have read in newspapers that they exist, but that's all), I would probably choose in the absence of knowing something about these Option #1, with the understanding that copies of releaseable information can then be made available to the Senator according to criteria spelled out in the Freedom of Information Act. I assume, however, that whoever is advising the AG about this has actually read the files in question, at least sufficient to know in a generic sense the answers to the questions raised above.

Despite the fact that I am operating in a vacuum on this, I do appreciate being consulted.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 16, 1975

RECEIVED
JUL 16 1975
KWO'C

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

I have received your letter of July 15 regarding access/delivery of documents requested in the Committee's letter of July 9, 1975. The following relates specifically to the procedure suggested for handling documents on the so called "Kissinger 17" surveillance, which is also applied in your letter to materials relating to electronic surveillance of the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City in August 1964, materials relating to the electronic surveillance of Dr. King, and possibly the O & C files.

I regard this suggested procedure as a major step forward and a recognition that previous arrangements were too cumbersome and time-consuming. Nevertheless, there are certain practical problems with the procedure which may be resolved by interpretation. For example, I assume that application of the procedure to the Atlantic City convention matters does not foreclose the Committee from receiving for use at its offices actual documents or portions of documents, as well as summaries. I understand that the FBI has no objection to providing such documents on this matter to the Committee for use at its offices.

Therefore, in order that the procedure you suggest may be applicable to all areas of Committee inquiry claimed by the Department to involve particularly sensitive matters, it should be interpreted as follows: the Committee staff will have direct access to all files and materials at FBIHQ: the Committee staff shall select certain documents from the files which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiry and necessary for the examination of witnesses or the establishment of certain facts during the course of the

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2 ALM KP

Recd O'C
1245 P 7/16/7

inquiry; the FBI shall at that time designate specific portions of such documents which might jeopardize particularly sensitive sources or methods; with respect to such specifically designated portions of documents, the Committee staff will prepare appropriate excisions or summaries of the information; the summaries will be checked at that time with senior Bureau executives to ensure the protection of particularly sensitive FBI sources or methods; thereafter, the excised documents and summaries will be removed to the Committee's offices; the Committee staff may check back to the original documents as extensively as necessary; staff notes on the designated specific portions of documents will not be removed from FBIHQ; and Committee members may, of course, at any time see the documents which the staff has seen.

I believe this interpretation can serve as a workable framework for Committee access to particularly sensitive FBI materials. You may be assured that the Task Force shares your concern for the need to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials, as indicated in the Outline for Inquiry Procedures. We hope this interpretation will facilitate the mutual effort by the Committee and the Department of Justice to accomplish this purpose.

I would appreciate receiving your immediate advice to me as to whether any further interpretation of this matter is required. Any public discussion of these arrangements and interpretations should be cast in such terms as will not jeopardize particularly sensitive FBI sources.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 15 1975

Mr. John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Re: Access/Delivery of Documents Requested in Senate Select Committee Letter of July 9, 1975

Dear Mr. Elliff:

Pursuant to our conversation of July 11, and confirming it, the following arrangements are approved for access to materials and delivery of materials to the Senate Select Committee staff, in addition to that which has already been made available.

All the provisions of this letter, hereinafter stated, are, of course, subject to the agreements embodied in the Outline for Inquiry Procedures referenced in the Committee's letter of June 27, 1975. Particular reference will periodically be made to the second sentence of paragraph B, page 2, of that document which specifies:

> "...The agency will also specifically indicate any of such materials which are extraordinarily sensitive in order to facilitate the mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate..."

Special handling techniques in addition to those indicated herein may be required in order to protect the security of sensitive materials covered herein.

cc: Paul Wallach

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

Please refer to the attachments to the July 9, letter:

Page 3, Paragraph 2, Subsection A. All of the FBI files on the so called "Kissinger 17" surveillance will be made available to you and specific appropriately cleared staff in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building. These documents may be reviewed and studied there, and you and such staff may take such notes as you deem appropriate; we have agreed that the notes are to be left in the secure room of the Hoover Building during your study. When your study is completed, you may prepare a summary of the information which you consider to be appropriate for Committee use. The summary must be checked with senior Bureau executives to ensure the protection of national security matters, protection of confidential sources of information, and observation of privacy considerations. Thereafter, the approved summary may be removed to the Committee's office and all the staff notes will be destroyed. You may check the summary back to the original documents as extensively as necessary, in Room 4171.

Page 3, Paragraph 2, Subsection B. Materials have already been transmitted regarding the Kraft matter and the agreement between his attorney and the Attorney General. When you have reviewed those materials, and have contacted Mr. Kraft's attorney, should you deem that appropriate, I understand you will contact me if further information is requested.

Page 5, Paragraph 3, A & B. As you may know, representatives of the King family, including Mr. Harry H. Wachtel, attorney, have formally expressed to the Department a special concern regarding any public disclosure of any derogatory information regarding Dr. King which may be contained in Bureau files. Subject to your reaching an agreement with such representatives of the King family, and the acceptance by the Department of such a written agreement, all of the materials related to the electronic surveillance of Dr. King, in the custody of the FBI, will be made available to you and specific appropriately cleared staff under the same conditions and with the same agreements as specified above with regard to the "Kissinger 17" surveillance.

Page 6, Paragraph 4. Those materials in the custody of the FBI which reflect and relate to electronic surveillance of the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City in August 1964, will be provided under the same conditions as articulated above with regard to the "Kissinger 17" surveillance.

Page 9, Paragraph C. A summary of procedures for mail covers has been provided by my recent letter to you. In addition to that, a statistical summary of mail covers on closed matters will be made available to you in Room 4171, together with access to the underlying documentation requesting the individual mail covers.

Documentation relating to the opening of mail will be withheld at present, due to ongoing investigations.

After your review of the mail cover summaries and any underlying documents you wish to review, we will discuss any further access which you may request to mail cover information.

Page 10, Paragraph E. I understand and accept your explanation that the word "implementation" in line 2 of paragraph E(1) does not seek access to the "raw" files of COINTELPRO programs. All of the memoranda originating the several COINTELPRO programs will be made available to you and specific appropriately cleared staff for review in Room 4171.

We will furnish to you, for your study at Senate Select Committee offices, a complete set of the excised exhibits A-E to the Petersen Report; as previously agreed, your staff may have access to any unexcised pages of Exhibits A-E which you may wish to see, and which will be maintained at Room 4171. The back up materials underlying any particular summary in A-E will be extracted from the "raw" files upon your request and made available to you for your study in Room 4171. General access to the "raw" files is not required, as I understand it, for your purposes under this agreement. General disclosure of information derived from documents other than the excised pages of Exhibits A-E will be made available subject to limitations to be determined, dependent upon the sensitivity of such information, in conference with appropriate Bureau officials and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph B of the Outline for Inquiry Procedures, to protect the considerations outlined above.

Page 14, Item I. This will confirm your understanding that certain Huston Plan documents prepared by the Bureau in response to your request under this heading have been delivered to the White House for "third agency clearance". This statement formally confirms my previous discussions with you of this fact when we met with Mr. Schwarz and Mr. Smothers on July 2. Be advised that the documents which have been transmitted to the White House for clearance will be forwarded to you, or made available for access, if appropriate, upon our receipt of the White House directions.

Page 16, Paragraph J. This will confirm our understanding that on July 14, there will be available for your review in Room 4171, a 160 page summary document reflecting an analysis of the O & C files.

After you have reviewed that analysis, I will discuss with you an appropriate further step with regard to the O & C files if such is indicated; such an agreement would be generally similar in terms to the foregoing arrangements.

I trust that this letter accurately reflects our understanding as reached in our discussion on July 11. If it does not, your immediate advice to me of any particulars in which we disagree in our understanding will be appreciated. In the meantime, I have furnished a copy of this letter to the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General and have requested the Bureau's cooperation in promptly making available the information indicated.

I would appreciate meeting with you and Mr. Schwarz and Mr. Smothers around July 18, for the purpose of discussing any problems which you may have identified and to clarify any outstanding documentary request which you may have, and to agree upon an appropriate schedule. Since we have received several additional requests from you, since the July 9, letter was delivered, it would seem appropriate to re-analyze your requirements in light of the agreements reached on July 11, reflected herein.

Sincerely,

K. William O'Connor

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

cc: Attorney General
Deputy Attorney General

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

[illegible]
7/22/75

TO : The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: K. William O'Connor

DATE: July 18, 1975

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FILES

62-116395-610

In response to your memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned as above, we observe that the "substantial negotiations" which produced the proposed procedures did not include participation by a representative of the FBI and that the request for our views concerning disclosure of highly sensitive FBI material was first received at 11:14 a.m. today with a reply expected by 2:00 p.m. today. We respectfully suggest that not only should you afford greater opportunity for an expression of our views on this matter, but that any such proposed procedures should be presented to the President's Counsel for concurrence and for an expression of the President's views as to the general policy of the Executive Branch in this regard. Further, you may want to consider addressing the problem of the impact such general disclosure of files would have on pending criminal investigations.

A preliminary review in the time available revealed that certain items require considerable modification. For example, Item (3)(c) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for information that would tend to identify sources to whom the FBI has an obligation of confidentiality as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity already has been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identity to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman."

Liaison cc 62-116395-610

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975
KWOC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Item (6)(b) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the FBI will furnish a written statement of the grounds for its position to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation within 24 hours."

Item (8) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "The Staff and the Members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the Staff is given access as extensively as necessary between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, in the FBI J. Edgar Hoover Building at Room 4171."

In light of the difficulties described, it is my strong recommendation that such procedures should not be hastily agreed upon with the Committee and that full discussion should be had concerning this matter by representatives of the FBI, the Attorney General, the Committee and the Counsel to the President.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

TO: See Distribution

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

SUBJECT: Proposed Procedures for Access to Department of Justice Files

Attached hereto is a sequence of proposed procedures which are being considered by the Attorney General for dealing with the Senate Select Committee, in regard to its desire for access to materials in the Departmental/FBI files.

This document is the result of substantial negotiations; it represents what we understand to be the ultimate scope of access desired by the Senate Select Committee.

The Attorney General wishes to be advised this afternoon of the views of the addressees; accordingly, he has asked that each of you call me before 2:00 p.m., and advise me of your general approval, disapproval, or view. Please excuse the urgency of the requested response; it is necessary to react on a very short fuse because of the extreme pressures which have been generated in this matter. Please call me on 739-5211, by the time indicated above. Your cooperation is appreciated.

Distribution:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
✓Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

5

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

non-delegable

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/6P

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader, chief counsel, c Minority cou requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential inf has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

[illegible]

JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 572AUMKP

TO: Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Responses to Request for Comments
on Proposed Procedures

1. The Deputy Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, and Civil Rights Division register no objections to the proposed procedures on access. OLA suggests inclusion of a preamble referencing security agreements and the need for proper security assurances from the Committee to the Attorney General.

2. Both the Criminal Division and Office of Legal Counsel address the short response time frames imposed upon the Attorney General, and OLC suggests certain language changes for purposes of clarity and focus.

3. The Attorney General is troubled by Item 9 and its need for modification as to categories of material not treatable by these proposed procedures or as to a later discovered need to make presently unanticipated changes to effect a smoother operation of the procedures.

4. The Bureau's comments on the proposed procedures are attached and should be read. This Office does not agree with the Bureau that the proposed procedures should be presented to the President and the President's Counsel.

5. No response has been received from the Solicitor General.

6. This Office recommends that Item 9 be modified as suggested by the Attorney General and that the language modifications suggested by OLC for Items 3 and 6 be adopted.

7. It is further suggested that the Attorney General convene a meeting of the senior Bureau officials for the purpose of informing them of his policy decision in this matter.

Copies to:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

My view is that item 9 goes too far in that there must be some provision which allows the Department or the Committee to abrogate the arrangement. I should think the agreement could provic that at any time the Chairman of the Committee or the Attorney General could give a notification that the (1) agreement was not suitable for a particular category of material or (2) that for some reason the agreement was not operating suitably and that as to either one or two there would then be an endeavor to work out a suitable modification or different arrangement (but I think it has to be said that the arrangement can be cancelled by either party)

OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

7/18/75

To: Bill O'Connor

From: Doug Marvin

Attached is the Attorney General's comment on the procedures for dealing with the Senate Select Committee

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Proposed procedures

July 18, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Daly

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials . .

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 592 ALM/CP

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 13 1975

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

or the Senior Staff
(b) If the Task Force Leader/has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. No problem with this procedure, but feels that the time limits are too tight

2. No central policy objection

3. Suggest incorporate a preamble phrase that makes reference to security agreements; a specific means for assurance to the AG by the Chairman and Vice Chairman of proper security measures

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. 48 hour lead time is very short and may create problems; 24 hour reaction time may be unreasonable for Attorney General.

2. The provision seems a little odd, out of context of negotiations.

3. Suggest that in 3(a), last line, word and should be or and "peculiarly sensitive" read to modify both foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

4. No comment

5. No comment

6. Time frames are very restrictive; there should be a stated opportunity for TFL to work out any objections with FBI, before raising to Special Counsel "...if the issue is not promptly resolved between the TFL and the FBI, the materials in issue will be conveyed..."

7. Define "screened" by reference to 6(a) above

8. No comment

9. No comment

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

Views of Thornburg and Kevin Maroney

1. Time frames a bit skimpy
2. looks as though we're giving up a lot, but that's probably what's required

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

No objection to proposed procedures on access

OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

7/18

TO: Director, FBI

FROM: Bill O'Connor

ATTN: James Adams

FYI

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 322AUM VP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SBALMKP

The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: K. William O'Connor

July 18, 1975

Director, FBI

EX 104 REC-56 62-116395-610

PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FILES

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Daly

In response to your memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned as above, we observe that the "substantial negotiations" which produced the proposed procedures did not include participation by a representative of the FBI and that the request for our views concerning disclosure of highly sensitive FBI material was first received at 11:14 a.m. today with a reply expected by 2:00 p.m. today. We respectfully suggest that not only should you afford greater opportunity for an expression of our views on this matter, but that any such proposed procedures should be presented to the President's Counsel for concurrence and for an expression of the President's views as to the general policy of the Executive Branch in this regard. Further, you may want to consider addressing the problem of the impact such general disclosure of files would have on pending criminal investigations.

A preliminary review in the time available revealed that certain items require considerable modification. For example, Item (3)(c) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for information that would tend to identify sources to whom the FBI has an obligation of confidentiality as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity already has been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identity to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman."

Delivered to K William O'Conna at 1:55 pm 6/18/75 PVD

JAM:mfd

1 XEROX
SEP 4 1975
JFK

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

84 SEP 8 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Item (6)(b) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the FBI will furnish a written statement of the grounds for its position to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation within 24 hours."

Item (8) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "The Staff and the Members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the Staff is given access as extensively as necessary between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, in the FBI J. Edgar Hoover Building at Room 4171."

In light of the difficulties described, it is my strong recommendation that such procedures should not be hastily agreed upon with the Committee and that full discussion should be had concerning this matter by representatives of the FBI, the Attorney General, the Committee and the Counsel to the President.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

TO: See Distribution

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM KP

SUBJECT: Proposed Procedures for Access to Department of Justice Files

Attached hereto is a sequence of proposed procedures which are being considered by the Attorney General for dealing with the Senate Select Committee, in regard to its desire for access to materials in the Departmental/FBI files.

This document is the result of substantial negotiations; it represents what we understand to be the ultimate scope of access desired by the Senate Select Committee.

The Attorney General wishes to be advised this afternoon of the views of the addressees; accordingly, he has asked that each of you call me before 2:00 p.m., and advise me of your general approval, disapproval, or view. Please excuse the urgency of the requested response; it is necessary to react on a very short fuse because of the extreme pressures which have been generated in this matter. Please call me on 739-5211, by the time indicated above. Your cooperation is appreciated.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-616

REC-56

7 AUG 6 1975

EX 104

Distribution:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
✓Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

[illegible]

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

non-delegable

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-610

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader, chief counsel, or Minority couns requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential inform has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

The Attorney General

August 27, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Enclosed for your information are two copies each of two memoranda concerning interviews by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of two FBI Special Agents. One set of these memoranda is for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SFP:lhb lhb
(10)

REC-56 62-116395-609

EX 104

12 SEP 4 1975

NOTE: 2 ENCLOSURE

LHMs being furnished to the Attorney General ~~were~~ received by airtels from Los Angeles 8/15/75 (Ward interview), and 8/7/75 (Bloeser interview), both in connection with Senstudy 75. Copies of the airtels and the LHMs will be designated for the respective personnel files of the personnel who were interviewed.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAILED 7
AUG 28 1975
FBI

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 SEP 8 1975

GPO 954-546

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1975

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 5, 1975, Supervisor Richard H. Bloeser was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel at the Los Angeles FBI Office regarding the COINTELPRO/Black Panther Party (BPP).

Mr. Seidel advised Supervisor Bloeser that the interview was voluntary, but did not advise Supervisor Bloeser of his rights in this matter.

Mr. Seidel inquired of Supervisor Bloeser as to how many offices he had served in, his length of service in the Bureau, and how long had been spent on intelligence investigations. Supervisor Bloeser replied that he had served in Philadelphia, El Paso and Los Angeles, had been in the Bureau approximately 24½ years, and had been assigned to intelligence work for 22 years.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Supervisor Bloeser believed that the Bureau had placed undue pressure on the field to come up with counter intelligence proposals concerning the BPP and was it difficult to come up with a proposal. Supervisor Bloeser responded that there was no undue pressure placed on the field by the Bureau, that the COINTELPRO/BPP was merely another case assigned to an agent and that agent, as in any other case, had the responsibility of handling the matter whether it concerned the solving of a case or the submission of proposals. Mr. Seidel was also informed that it was not unduly difficult to come up with a proposal and that a number of proposals were rejected at the field level and never submitted to the Bureau.

Mr. Seidel inquired specifically as to counter intelligence proposals involving cartoons ridiculing the BPP.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-609

Supervisor Bloeser responded that he vaguely remembered such proposals but without reviewing the file had no definite recollection. Mr. Seidel did not request that the file be reviewed.

Mr. Seidel inquired specifically about a business card which allegedly had been prepared by the Bureau bearing the phrase "Karenga is impotent." Mr. Seidel requested Supervisor Bloeser's views on the distribution of this card by the FBI. Supervisor Bloeser responded that he vaguely remembered the card, that he thought it was humorous, and that the word impotent had various meanings.

Mr. Seidel then inquired about the blood feud which existed in the past between the US Organization and the BPP and the efforts of the Bureau to keep this feud alive and thus promote violence. He specifically inquired as to the personal feelings of Supervisor Bloeser concerning any counter intelligence proposals which, if placed in operation, could lead to violence between the two groups.

Supervisor Bloeser responded first that personally he had no apologies for the counter intelligence program as a whole, that proposals submitted six or seven years ago were believed necessary at that time due to the circumstances, specifically that at that time the BPP and the US Organization were involved in violent activity against the community as a whole. Mr. Seidel was informed that the feud between the US Organization and the BPP occurred long before the FBI COINTELPRO became involved in the feud and that any proposals approved by the Bureau had relatively little effect on the violence committed by either group. Mr. Seidel was also reminded that six or seven years ago the Congress of the United States fully supported the war in Vietnam in which thousands of people were killed but that under today's circumstances no support has been given to South Vietnam.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);
INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then posed a hypothetical question involving the following factors: Would Supervisor Bloeser now or in the past approve a counter intelligence proposal whereby one extremist with a criminal record of violence be anonymously informed that another extremist with a record of criminal violence was an informant for the FBI, knowing that the alleged informant might be injured or killed. Supervisor Bloeser replied that under the present conditions such a proposal would not be approved, but that he could not give an answer as to what his feelings might have been six or seven years ago under any given situation. Mr. Seidel was again reminded that Congress in the past has not hesitated to support wars which kill thousands of people but that recently they have criti~~zed~~cized the CIA for allegedly plotting to assassinate one individual whose death might prevent a war. Mr. Seidel was also informed that it was ironic that Congress was investigating another agency of the Federal Government which was attempting to prevent revolutionary violence in this country.

Mr. Seidel then inquired into the counter intelligence proposals approved by the Bureau in relation to the actress Jean Seberg and Raymond Hewitt, a leader of the BPP. This proposal concerned the fact that Seberg, who was then married to a French producer, admitted being pregnant by Hewitt who was also married at the time. The Bureau approved anonymously leaking this information to a Hollywood columnist. Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Supervisor Bloeser did or did not believe that this was an invasion of privacy. Supervisor Bloeser responded that the item was newsworthy and that it would have been any fair game for any newsmen had they come across it in the course of their business which they could have probably easily done, and that certainly Congress would not have criti~~zed~~cized a newspaper for printing such an item or claim it to be an invasion of privacy. Mr. Seidel inquired as to the purpose of this particular operation and he was informed that Miss Seberg was giving support to the BPP and that it was hoped that such publicity would prevent any future support by her of the BPP.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);
INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

He was further advised that it was the responsibility of the FBI to determine who was funding revolutionary groups in this country.

Mr. Seidel then inquired as to whether or not it was difficult to conduct intelligence investigations under present statutes and under the Criminal Rules of Procedure. He was informed that it was somewhat difficult to conduct an effective intelligence operation under present circumstances and that perhaps new legislative or executive orders would be helpful to the FBI in order to allow the FBI to continue its investigations in the Domestic Intelligence field. Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether it would be helpful to have specific legislation which might completely separate criminal and intelligence operations so one would not taint the other. He was informed that if such legislation could be enacted that it would undoubtedly help the FBI.

The interview lasted approximately two hours and it was not necessary to consult with another Bureau representative during this time.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
August 15, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY 5P2NMKG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF SA WALLACE E. WARD BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 5, 1975, Special Agent (SA) Wallace E. Ward was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel at Los Angeles Field Office regarding Cointelpro/Black Panther Party. The interview lasted from 9:12 a.m. to 9:22 a.m.

SA Ward was advised by Mr. Seidel that the interview was voluntary but SA Ward was not advised of his rights in this matter.

Seidel asked how long SA Ward had been a Special Agent with the FBI, and SA Ward responded nine years. He further requested previous offices SA Ward had been assigned to, and SA Ward responded Cincinnati, Ohio. Seidel advised the Bureau informed him that SA Ward had been assigned Cointelpro/Black Panther Party in June 1969. Seidel requested to know what work SA Ward had been assigned before this, to which SA Ward responded he could not remember, but believed general criminal work.

Seidel requested to know what specific instructions were issued with regard to operating Cointelpro/Black Panther Party. SA Ward advised that due to his employment agreement, the sensitive nature of the Bureau work, and the possible overlap of Bureau investigation, he did not feel he could respond to any further questions. Seidel advised he understood SA Ward's position as he, Seidel, had worked criminal matters himself and knew the need for secrecy. The official interview was terminated at this point.

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

62-116395-609

ENCLOSURE

In a friendly conversation that followed for approximately ten to fifteen minutes, SA Ward advised Seidel that he had only been assigned the Cointelpro/Black Panther Party matter for three months and had no knowledge that would be of value to Seidel. The Cointelpro/Black Panther Party matter was not further discussed. The rest of the time was involved in discussing points of interest in the Los Angeles basin of tourist value, such as Marineland, Palos Verdes, and Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles.

SA Ward advises that he is aware that the Director waived his employment agreement with certain exceptions regarding privileged areas. With this in mind, SA Ward reviewed his employment agreement and concluded, after noting the following quotation, that he could not disclose any information without following the prescribed procedure:

"The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed, and in this regard, I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure".

With this in mind, SA Ward answered Mr. Seidel as noted heretofore.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEWs ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/27/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum reporting results of interviews by SSC Staff Member of Supervisor Richard H. Bloeser andSpecial Agent Wallace E. Ward.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Counterintelligence

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

COINTELPRO of the FBI as it related to the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WOC/8

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 8/20/75

1 - Personnel File - Richard H. Ross
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY -75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

Lester B. Seidel, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, requested on 8/19/75 that SA Richard H. Ross be made available for Staff interview concerning the Bureau's investigation of the Black Panther Party and COINTELPRO as it applies to the Black Panther Party. Seidel stated that he would prefer handling this particular interview in conjunction with his interview of SA Richard W. Held. He requested he be advised when the appropriate clearance procedures have been completed and SA Ross is available for interview. SA Ross is currently assigned to the Intelligence Division. SA Held was previously cleared for interview by memorandum dated 8/1/75.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That SA Ross be released from existing employment agreement for purposes of an interview concerning the Bureau's investigation of the Black Panther Party and COINTELPRO as it relates to the Black Panther Party.

(2) That an Intelligence Division representative be available but not present during the interview of SA Ross to assist in making a determination whether a question may be properly responded to.

EX 104

REC-56

62-116395-607

ENCLOSURE

SEP 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

PVD:lad
(8)

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 SEP 8 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Right to Counsel

(1) You have the right to counsel during interview and/or testimony.

(2) The FBI cannot provide you with private counsel.

(3) If you are unable to secure private counsel, you may so state and request assistance in securing counsel.

Secrecy Agreements

(1) You must request a waiver by the Director, FBI of any applicable employment or secrecy agreement prior to interview or testimony in order that you may be authorized to furnish the information requested.

(2) If your testimony is pursuant to a subpoena, order, or other demand, you must obtain the approval of the Department of Justice prior to furnishing testimony.

Representative from FBI

(1) A representative from the FBI will be available during interview and/or testimony for consultation.

(2) The FBI is concerned with possible impairment of FBI's current and future efforts to discharge its reponsibilities.

(3) You are not to discuss the following matters without prior authorization from the FBI"

A. Information provided by sources (or any other

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-6[illegible]7

information), which might tend to identify a confidential source.

B. Information concerning sensitive investigative techniques.

C. Information derived from other Government agencies, including information from foreign intelligence sources.

D. Any information the disclosure of which could adversely affect ongoing investigations.

AUG 2 0 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Seymor Phillips

Sensitivity - HS

The attached letter is self-explanatory and, though mentioning no name, concerns Seymor Phillips.

On Friday, August 15, 1975, I orally advised Messrs. Callahan and Wannall that the Deputy Attorney General thought that Senator Church's letter had some merit and that for the sake of appearances it was the Deputy's suggestion that Mr. Phillips be removed from such conspicuous and open involvement with the SSC's requests and agent interviews as they may relate to Martin Luther King matters.

REC-56 62-116395-605

EX 104

12 SEP 4 1975

cc: ✓Mr. Callahan
Mr. Wannall

[illegible]

[illegible]

File 5

Treat as original

LEGAL COUNSEL

ENCLOSURE

79 SEP 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALMKP

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 14, 1975

Rec'd 8-14-75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SPBALM/GP

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I am writing to call your attention to a matter which may be a cause of concern to you and to the Select Committee at some time in the future.

As you may know, a special unit has been established in the FBI Intelligence Division to handle this Committee's requests for materials and to handle certain arrangements for the Committee staff's interviews. The Special Agents assigned to this unit accompany Bureau witnesses to the Committee offices, travel to out-of-town locations where Committee staff interviews are conducted, and apparently "de-brief" interview subjects after the interviews.

One possible problem has arisen with this arrangement. As you are aware, one of the alleged abuses which the Committee is examining pursuant to S. Res. 21 involves the FBI's activities with respect to the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. As the inquiry has proceeded, information has been developed to indicate that one of the Special Agents who has been handling Committee staff interviews, "de-briefing" witnesses, and, presumably, compiling materials with respect to the King matter was also the supervisory case agent during the time that some of the alleged FBI improprieties regarding Dr. King took place. Moreover, as a logical step in our investigation, it was

RECEIVED
15 1975

62-116395-605

ENCLOSURE

recently necessary to interview this Special Agent to determine the nature and extent of his involvement in and knowledge of the alleged abuses at the time when he served as supervisory case agent with respect to the King case. During the interview he did provide detailed information concerning his substantial participation in this matter.

The Committee in no way intends at this juncture to pre-judge the propriety of the FBI's activities with respect to Dr. King, and it would be inappropriate to characterize the conduct of any of the Bureau's personnel regarding this case until all the facts are in. Nevertheless, I am concerned that in this kind of situation, the interests of the FBI and the Department of Justice might best be served, from the standpoint of appearances, by reconsidering the assignment of this Special Agent to the King matters. It is possible that some may conclude that there is a conflict between the Special Agent's personal interest, and the interests of the FBI and the Justice Department in ensuring that full disclosure to the Committee is made with respect to this case.

Finally, let me assure you that the Committee has no evidence that the present arrangement has prevented the Committee from obtaining the full disclosures sought; but it seems to me that it would be mutually beneficial for appropriate steps to be taken so that we will both be able to assure the American people and the Congress that our oversight responsibilities were fulfilled in an objective and impartial way.

I hope you will share my view that this course will best serve our respective interests and, of course, the interests of the country.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

The Attorney General **August 27, 1975**

Director, FBI 62-1

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
~~1 - Mr. Daly~~

LETTER FROM SENATOR CHURCH
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DATED
AUGUST 14, 1975

Senstudy-75

Attached for your information are the original and a copy of a letter I addressed to Senator Church in response to his letter to you dated August 14, 1975, which was brought to my attention by referral by Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination.

If you concur in my response, please forward the original of the letter to Senator Church.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Mr Michael Shaheen advised 9/12/75 Tyler Jr
that instant letter not sent. DAG
sent letter to Senator Church dated 9/10/75
copy of which placed in file
WOG
9/15/75

62-116395-604

EX 104 REC-56

12 SEP 4 1975

JAM:mfd
(7)

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Approved by Director 8/26
Hand delivered to Shaheen 8/26 by Mr. Wannall and Mintz

84 SEP 8 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

August 27, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

Honorable Frank Church
Chairman, Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your thoughtful letter of August 14, 1975, to the Attorney General was referred to me and it has been carefully considered. I certainly agree with the view expressed therein that it is important the Committee's oversight responsibilities be fulfilled in an objective and impartial way. To that end, I have required employees with experience to assist in locating the full documentation called for in Committee requests. The voluminous files and variety of indices entries would have been much more difficult to sort for your benefit without the assistance of persons having such expertise.

I appreciate your assurance that the Committee has no evidence that our arrangements have prevented the Committee from obtaining the full disclosure sought. I have absolute confidence that those FBI employees participating in our current efforts to assist your Committee are working in good faith and have not inhibited full disclosure. Further, I have required close supervision of this work by superiors and thereby avoided the possibility of an improper decision by any one individual affecting the responses.

ENCLOSURE

EX 104

REC-56 62-116395-604

NOTE: Based on incoming memorandum from Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., 8/20/75, enclosing copy of letter from Senator ~~Church to the~~ Attorney General.

SEP 4 1975

JAM:mfd
(7)

JBA
PLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Approved by the Director 8/26
Hand delivered to Shaheen 8/26 by Mr. Wannall and Mintz

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Honorable Frank Church

As to the availability of an FBI representative during Committee staff interviews of present or former FBI employees concerning alleged "abuses," I have determined that such no longer will be generally afforded. The subject matters requiring consultation with such witnesses are essentially four: (1) information which identifies or may identify FBI confidential sources; (2) information which may adversely affect on-going FBI investigations; (3) information concerning sensitive methods and techniques; and (4) information obtained from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Witnesses may be cautioned prior to interview concerning such problem areas and refrain from furnishing the information pending consultation with FBI Headquarters. This modification is effective immediately.

I hope that you will bring this matter to the attention of your staff and that in so doing you also will review the standards of objectivity and impartiality being followed in their interviews to assure protection of individual rights.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

August 29, 1975

1 - [illegible]

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated August 28, 1975. The letter is self-explanatory.

I would appreciate it if you would treat this request with the highest priority.

I have discussed with Mike Epstein (in Elliff's absence) of the SSC and with Elmer Larson of the Bureau the demands this request will pose for the Bureau, and we have agreed to defer responding to Elliff's requests of August 20, 1975, for Parts IV and V, from September 4 to September 9, in an effort to meet the response date (September 3) of the attached request.

REC-56

62-116395-603

ENCLOSURE

EX 104

12 SEP 4 1975

FBI
MDR-16 10/17/00
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY [illegible]

1cc to Ad Hoc
8-29-75

79 SEP 17 1975

5-Encl

August 29, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated August 28, 1975. The letter is self-explanatory.

I would appreciate it if you would treat this request with the highest priority.

I have discussed with Mike Epstein (in Elliff's absence) of the SSC and with Elmer Larson of the Bureau the demands this request will pose for the Bureau, and we have agreed to defer responding to Elliff's requests of August 20, 1975, for Parts IV and V, from September 4 to September 9, in an effort to meet the response date (September 3) of the attached request.

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR.,
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 28, 1975

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I would like to bring to your personal attention a situation which has severely restricted our efforts to establish the relevant facts with respect to one of the areas of alleged abuse which is the subject of inquiry pursuant to S. Res. 21.

I have been informed by the staff that numerous materials which have been requested during the past several weeks which pertain to the FBI's activities with respect to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., have been withheld from the Committee by the Department because of concern expressed by Mr. Harry Wachtel, the attorney for the King family and estate, as to the appropriateness of the Department's "disseminating" to the Committee contents of conversations monitored during electronic surveillances of Dr. King.

Upon reviewing the lists of materials requested, I am at a loss to understand how most of those items could conceivably be encompassed by the issues raised by Mr. Wachtel, especially in view of the fact that our letters of request have specifically pointed out that tape recordings and transcripts should not be supplied.

Accordingly, I want to take this opportunity to place the Committee formally on record as reaffirming all of the outstanding requests for materials relating to the King matters, with the limited exception of (1) Mr. DeLoach's August 24 - 27, 1964 memoranda which pertain to the 1964 Democratic National Convention, and (2) those portions of any other requested materials which actually summarize or quote from conversations monitored during any electronic surveillance of Dr. King.

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

3 4 5 6 7 8
RECEIVED
AUG 28 1975

62-116395-603

Delivery is requested by Wednesday, September 3, 1975, pursuant to the provisions of the general procedural agreement between the Department and the Committee which governs all Committee requests. I understand that the Bureau has been collecting the King-related materials upon receipt of each of our requests, and therefore I presume that there will be no substantial burden in meeting the September 3 date.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

I am taking the liberty of sending Mr. Wachtel a copy of this request.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

CC: Harry Wachtel

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
- Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
  - Admin.
  - Comp. Syst.
  - Ext. Affairs
  - Files & Com.
  - Gen. Inv.
  - Ident.
  - Inspection
  - Intell.
  - Laboratory
  - Plan. & Eval.
  - Spec. Inv.
  - Training
- Legal Coun.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

NR 07 OM PLAIN

10:20 PM CST NITEL JUNE 19, 1975 IJS

TO DIRECTOR

MINNEAPOLIS

FROM OMAHA 62-3439 (P)

Sept 4-75

ATTENTION: JOHN C. GORDON, GID.

SENATOR CHURCH'S COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES.

SENSTUDY 75. INFORMATION CONCERNING.

RE OMAHA TELCALLS TO BUREAU AND MINNEAPOLIS, JUNE 19, 1975.

IN THE JUNE 19, 1975 AFTERNOON ISSUE OF THE OMAHA WORLD HERALD, A DAILY NEWSPAPER, OMAHA, NEBRASKA, APPEARED THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE CAPTIONED "SENATE COMMITTEE SENDING INVESTIGATIOR TO GORDON, NEBRASKA". THE ARTICLE APPEARED UNDER A WORLD HERALD WASHINGTON BUREAU DATELINE.

CONTACT WITH OMAHA WORLD HERALD AUTHORITIES AT OMAHA FAILED TO DEVELOP THE NATURE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION AT GORDON, NEBRASKA. WORLD HERALD AUTHORITIES

END PAGE ONE

62-116395-602

EX 104 REC-56

12 SEP 4 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/5/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Bowers

84 SEP 8 1975

EXPLAIN THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP THIS INFORMATION IN WASHINGTON.

THE ARTICLE REFERRED TO ABOVE IS SET FORTH BELOW VERBATIM:

"AN INVESTIGATOR IS BEING SENT TO GORDON, NEB., BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE THAT IS INVESTIGATING THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OTHER GOVERNEMTN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, A SOURCE SAID.

"A COMMITTEE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE INVESTIGATION HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT TAKEOVER OF WOUNDED KNEE, S. D. HE SAID HE COULD NOT DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER.

"WE HAVEN'T BEEN IN THE CUSTOM OF IDENTIFYING DIFFERENT INTERROGATIONS THAT ARE GOING ON, A COMMITTEE SPOKESMAN SAID. TO DO SO, HE SAID, 'COULD DRY UP SOURCES.'

" MUCH THE SAME REPLY CAME FROM AN AIDE TO SEN. JOHN TOWER OF TEXAS, THE RANKING REPUBLICAN ON THE COMMITTEE THAT IS HEADED BY SEN. FRANK CHURCH, D-IDA. 'WE HAVEN'T BEEN

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREEE

"TALKING AT ALL ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES', HE SAID.

"WHILE THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS ATTRACTED THE MOST ATTENTION, IT ALSO IS LOOKING INTO THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES, SUCH AS THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION."

OMAHA UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION.

INASMUCH AS SIX SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI ARE NOW USING GORDON, NEBRASKA, AS LIVING QUARTERS WHILE HANDLING CIR INVESTIGATIONS ON PINE RIDGE RESERVATION UNDER DIRECTION OF MINNEAPOLIS OFFICE, MINNEAPOLIS BEING FURNISH THIS INFORMATION.

END LSG FBIHQ CLR FOR ONE AND TKS

ac-5

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR007 MP CODE

6:47 PM NITEL JUNE 20, 1975 LB

TO DIRECTOR

WFO

OMAHA (62-3439)

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (66-3610) Senstudy 75

Mr. Gordon
Rm 5078

ATTENTION: JOHN C. GORDON, ROOM 5078, GENERAL CRIMES UNIT, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

SENATOR CHURCH'S COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES, SENSTAD 75, INFORMATION CONCERNING.

RE OMAHA NITEL TO DIRECTOR JUNE 19, 1975.

INFORMATION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATOR'S TRAVEL TO GORDON, NEBRASKA, IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTACTING AND INTERVIEWING A FORMER MEMBER OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. THIS INDIVIDUAL WHO OWNS A BUSINESS IN GORDON, NEBRASKA, IS BELIEVED TO BE JERRY BORMAN, WHO OPERATES A CHEVROLET DEALERSHIP IN GORDON AND PRESUMABLY WAS A MEMBER OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVING OVERSEAS. 62-116395-601

EX 104 REC-56

END

MBLD

MDR-16 10/5/00
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/5/00 BY SP3ALM/KP

4509

5-End

Byers

6RIB

84 SEP 8 1975

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

EBF 1086

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

INQUIRY # 1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Address Reply to the
Division Indicated
and Refer to Initials and Number

July 20, 1973

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr Marshall
Mr Miller E.S.
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Thompson
Mr Walters
Tele Room
Mr. Baise
Mr. Barnes
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Mr. Conmy
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Eardley
Mrs. Hogan

Mr. Malmfeldt
Mr. Heim

JUL 20 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Clarence M. Kelley
Director, FBI

FROM: William D. Ruckelshaus

SUBJECT: Substantive Issues Regarding the Future of the FBI

F.B.I.

Pursuant to our conversation earlier this week, I hereby submit a list of issues that will undoubtedly be coming up from time to time regarding the present and future status of the FBI. This list is by no means exhaustive, but is a good starting point from which to go forward and come to grips with many of the problems that will have to be addressed in the near future in one form or another. The list, in no particular order, is as follows:

1. Wiretaps. The whole question of wiretaps should be reviewed with a view toward developing a firm Department-wide policy on the issues involved.

2. The issue of whether the function of intelligence gathering should be separated from the law enforcement function of the FBI. This issue should be studied with particular reference to those countries which have adopted this division and a clear analysis of the pros and cons developed. From this analysis again should flow a clear policy.

3. The statutory basis for the FBI's intelligence gathering functions. Is there any statutory basis? Is the whole function based on Presidential and Attorney General directives? Should a firm statutory basis be sought?

ENCLOSURE

REC-58 — 334

EX-109

18 AUG 3 1973

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

XEROX

AUG 16 1973

70 AUG 22 1973

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

7-27 73

4. Should the FBI Director be appointed for a term of years? (All the issues surrounding the appointment and tenure of the Director should be explored.)

5. Should the FBI be an independent agency or continue as part of the Justice Department? The pros and cons of this recurrent question should be analyzed again with the purpose of adopting a firm policy.

6. Assuming the FBI remains a part of the Justice Department, what should be the relationship of the Director to the Attorney General? All the organizational and substantive relationships should be examined.

7. Investigative techniques. The whole question of the variety of techniques from clearly legal to clearly illegal should be examined in some detail. In addition, the question of authorization and Congressional oversight should be touched upon in this examination.

8. The whole question of files and their disclosure must be studied with a view toward understanding why files are kept, what categories of files there are, what information is contained in the files and whether the purposes for maintaining files are being met under present policy. In the issue of disclosure, when, where, and to whom must also be thoroughly examined.

9. The question of a Civilian Review Board for the intelligence gathering activities of the FBI should be examined. This is a recurrent suggestion which came up at the Princeton conference in addition to other forums.

10. What should be the relationship between the FBI and the other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government? To what extent should the FBI keep tabs on other Departments and Agencies through the development of sources and informants in those Agencies?

X

11. Should the FBI have foreign officers reporting directly to the Director?

This list is not exhaustive, but should get us started toward an indepth examination of some of the problems facing the Bureau in the future.

WDR:fhm

INQUIRY # 2

Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus
The Deputy Attorney General - Designate

August 24, 1973

Director, FBI

Security Jurisdiction

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

~~SCOPE OF FBI JURISDICTION
AND AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS~~

Reference is made to my memorandum to the Attorney General August 7, 1973, captioned as above, which among other things proposed that an Executive order be issued which would define FBI responsibilities concerning Federal statutes relating to the national security.

My memorandum made reference to new guidelines recently issued in manual form and to a study which was prepared in August, 1972, at the request of Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III.

On August 15, 1973, Mr. Jack Goldklang, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, called Mr. Nicholas P. Callahan's office and referred to the guidelines and study mentioned above. He said that these documents are likely to be pertinent to his analysis of the proposal set forth in my memorandum, and he asked that the two documents be made available to him.

For your information, the guidelines referred to are the recently revised Section 87 of our Manual of Instructions concerning Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals. As you know, our Manual of Instructions has not heretofore been disseminated outside the FBI, although this particular Section (87) was loaned to the Department for study recently in connection with a request made of the Department by Senator Edward M. Kennedy.

REC-77 62-[illegible]

EX-103

AUG 28 1973

The study made in August, 1972, for Mr. Gray was written and intended purely for in-house use and deliberations and was not prepared for purposes of dissemination or use by any agency outside the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Cong. Serv. ____
Corr. & Crm. Research ____
Press Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TJS:bjr (6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAILED 3
AUG 27 1973
FBI

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

57 AUG 28 [illegible]

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus
The Deputy Attorney General - Designate

However, we recognize that these two documents may assist the Department in analyzing our proposal concerning the issuance of an Executive order and therefore I am enclosing a copy of the two documents requested by Mr. Goldklang. We request that these documents not be disseminated outside the Department of Justice; that the documents not be duplicated or photographed; and that, if possible, they be returned to the FBI after they have served their purpose.

If you, or members of your staff, feel that additional information would clarify our proposal, it is suggested that consideration be given to arranging conferences between members of your staff and the FBI officials in the Intelligence Division and our Legal Counsel's Office who have conducted considerable research into the matter.

Enclosures - 2

NOTE:

See memo T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 8/23/73, captioned as above, prepared by TJS:bjr.

ISSUE: Should the Intelligence Gathering-Function of the FBI Be Separated From the Law Enforcement Function of the FBI?

Note that the issue, as originally raised, referred to law enforcement and intelligence functions. What was meant by intelligence was the missions of internal security and counterintelligence. Criminal intelligence, e.g., against organized crime, was intended to fall within the law enforcement mission. However, the functions of the FBI do not neatly fall within "intelligence" and "law enforcement" categories. Internal security cases are both intelligence and law enforcement operations, and counterintelligence sometimes involves arrests and prosecutions, i.e., law enforcement. To most accurately reflect the diverse missions of the FBI the terms law enforcement, internal security, and counterintelligence will be used throughout this paper.

Preface

1. The Problem: revolves around the question whether the three missions can be accommodated by one agency. That is, are they so distinct in nature that an organizational structure set up to perform one of the missions absolutely cannot perform the others; or can all three missions be accommodated but only to the detriment of the others; or can all the missions be adequately performed by one agency?

2. The Present Policy: is that all three missions are performed by the FBI. The FBI organizational structure is primarily a unitary one, i.e., there is one organization with a multiplicity of responsibilities, which can be broken down into three general missions, law enforcement, internal security (domestic) and counterintelligence (foreign). The organization's personnel are hired and catalogued into one of three general functional categories, agent, steno, and to a lesser degree, clerks, without further differentiation based on mission, i.e., no employees, with rare exceptions, are criminal or counterintelligence specialists, all are generalists and are regularly interchanged among the three general missions. The administration of cases at headquarters and, to a lesser extent, the conduct of investigations in the field follow the same format in all three general areas of responsibility.

The underlying rationale for, and history behind, these concepts is:

Personnel - the generalist allows for a highly flexible, mobile force which can be deployed, generally solely on the basis of manpower needs, i.e., any agent can do any job in the FBI. There are some exceptions; some employees have unique abilities which tend to make them less mobile in the eyes of administrators, e.g., language or technical factors in the case of agent deployment and promotion; they are more determinative in cases of clerks: special employees, translators, etc.

Administration of cases and conduct of investigation these were originally geared to accommodate a relatively few criminal and civil investigative matters, and as the responsibilities of the organization grew they were modified and adapted, within the unitary structure, to accommodate the various missions. Thus they are quite similar in all three missions.

3. The Issues Raised:

a. Are the missions of law enforcement, internal security, and counterintelligence separable?

b. If so, is complete separation possible, practical or politically feasible or desirable?

c. Can the three missions be accommodated in one organization?

d. By doing so, do any of the missions suffer?

e. If all three missions can be accommodated in one agency, is the FBI currently doing it the best way possible?

f. If not, is it practically or politically feasible or desirable to change the FBI's way of performing the mission?

g. Why are other Western intelligence services separate from law enforcement agencies?

4. Options for Future Policy:

The missions of law enforcement, internal security, and counterintelligence are separate, distinct and distinguishable functions, even though each partakes a little of each other. Law enforcement is investigation after a crime has been committed to identify suspects and build a case for prosecution; counterintelligence is the identification, penetration and neutralization of foreign intelligence activity in the U. S.; and internal security is identification and thwarting of home-grown plots to subvert the government and activities within the U. S. in illegal support of foreign causes, whether by U. S. citizens of foreigners.

The missions overlap to some degree. For example, law enforcement requires some intelligence collection, and is intimately concerned with internal security criminal acts, e.g., foreign related terrorist bombings, skyjackings, gunning, and subversive groups' kidnappings, bank robberies, bombings, etc. Counterintelligence sometimes results in criminal prosecution, and some internal security groups are funded by, and act on behalf of, foreign intelligence services. Internal security is a hybrid; the basis for its investigation is that acts, politically motivated, are being committed in violation of the U. S. criminal law. Yet, the investigation may be a continuing effort, based on continuing acts threatening the internal security without actually violating the criminal law, and thus the investigation is more like a counterintelligence investigation, than like the typical law enforcement closed cycle of crime, investigati and prosecution.

While counterintelligence could adequately, and with more success in some cases, be handled by an organization totally separate from one with law enforcement powers, internal security work, in many cases, is directly related to criminal prosecution. There has been little effort, and less success, in most English speaking Western democracies in prosecuting domestic "subversives," even those with foreign ties; however, prosecution is often a principal, if not primary, objective in cases involving emigre bombing and harassment of foreign diplomatic establishments, fund and arms procurement for foreign political groups, politically motivated terrorist acts, e.g., skyjacking, etc.

An examination of the services of the democracies mentioned above, viz., Britian, Australia and Canada, reveal that all do distinguish between the pure law enforcement function and the counterintelligence/internal security function; however, there is not a total separation of the functions. For example, the British Security Service (MI-5) handles counterintelligence exclusively with MI-5 case officers, but places it's internal security investigations in the hands of the Special Branches of the local constabularies (comparable to the intelligence divisions of local U. S. police departments). The Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), modeled after MI-5, and of recent vintage (post W.W.II), handles all counterintelligence and internal security investigation with its own officers; however, it is rivailed to some extent in the internal security field by the Intelligence Bureau of the national Commonwealth Police. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, a truly national police force, with extensive local and Federal jurisdiction, has branched off its intelligence division into a new, near autonomous Security Service, with operational procedures more akin to MI-5 and ASIO than to traditional law enforcement.

In short, these countries recognize that the political, social and foreign policy considerations which must go into counterintelligence and internal security investigations make them a different animal from "routine" criminal investigation; yet, they also recognize that the agency with internal security jurisdiction must also have an intimate and close working relationship with a law enforcement agency.

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

Complete separation, at least of the internal security function from law enforcement, does not appear to be practically feasible. MI-5 and ASIO were originated without law enforcement powers, and MI-5 candidly admits it would like to become part of a national police force. RCMP Security Service case officers would not consider surrendering their police powers.

Separation of the counterintelligence function would be more practically feasible; however, the commingling of counterintelligence and internal security interests, and the threat of a merger of the counterintelligence function with the positive foreign intelligence collection agency, especially in the U. S., are both practical and political reasons militating against this course.

Separation of the internal security function also presents serious political considerations. Internal security or as some say, at least in reference to its "subversive" investigations, political intelligence, is the most controversial of government's intelligence collection activities. In the U. S., this function was originally given to the FBI which had established for itself a reputation for being responsible, competent, and most importantly, politically neutral, and had the confidence of most Americans. It is recognized that this reputation is not etched in stone, and that because of the diversity of peoples, political views, and activities tolerated in the U. S. no internal security agency can, using human judgement, attempt to fulfill its responsibility without offending someone, sometime, someplace.

It is to the advantage of an internal security agency, which is subjected to such political pressures, to be somewhat insulated by being part of a larger, respected organization which has a high profile as a competent and fair investigative agency in the less politically complex law enforcement and counterintelligence fields. Adding to this insulation is the tradition of FBI political independence, and the new Congressional concern with keeping the FBI politically independent. While the law enforcement and counterintelligence wings of the FBI dislike the controversies into which its internal security wings drags the FBI name, separation of internal security into a separate agency would probably subject it to more intense political pressures, both from within the administration and without, which pressures it might not be capable of withstanding. Such separation appears politically unfeasible and undesirable.

Practical considerations against divestiture of the counterintelligence and internal security functions from the FBI are that: basic criminal investigative experience equips men in many areas to be intelligence officers; a pool of trained criminal investigators is available to the intelligence missions to draw from, either on an ad hoc emergency basis, e.g., seizure of an embassy or political kidnapping or skyjacking, or as candidates for the position of intelligence officer; a divestiture might result in the loss to the counterintelligence and internal security wings of the effective use of the FBI name, reputation, and contacts and sources built-up over years using the FBI name.

The RCMP has shown that all three missions can be accommodated in one agency, although the distinctive character of each mission requires internal adjustments of policy, structure, administration, personnel considerations, and operations.

Implementation of adjustments within the FBI is being considered at this time.

Consequently, based on above considerations, the FBI recommends that all three missions of law enforcement, internal security, and counterintelligence remain with the FBI.

Former Attorney General
William D. Ruckelshaus'
memorandum, 7/23/73, to F. B. I.
Director, Clarence M. Kelley,
setting forth the 11 areas of
inquiry.

62-116395-~~[illegible]~~ 1086

enc. ~~4~~ 3

30

10/31/75

The Attorney General

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Re let from SSC 10/2/75, requesting, inter alia, series of studies of various aspects of FBI operations previously prepared by FBI at request of former Deputy AG Ruckelshaus. Original of memo submitted for approval & forwarding to Committee. A copy for your records.

SSC REQUEST OF 10/2/75

File Copy

1 - Mr. Baker
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus
The Deputy Attorney General - Designate

September 20, 1973

1 - Mr. J. F. Miller

Director, FBI

JUNE

T. J. S.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REGARDING
THE FUTURE OF THE FBI

Technical Surveillance - general

Reference is made to your memorandum of August 20, 1973, detailing a format to be followed in setting forth our responses to your memorandum of July 20, 1973, captioned "Substantive Issues Regarding the Future of the FBI." Attached is an undated study of 17 pages with a five-page appendix captioned "Electronic Surveillance."

This study was prepared in response to your July 20, 1973, request, prior to receipt of your format memorandum of August 20, 1973. The responses to most of the questions raised in your August 20, 1973, memorandum are contained in this study. Rather than repeat points considered in this study, it is attached and it is recommended it be read prior to the attached paper dated September 14, 1973, written according to your suggested format. This second paper considers issues raised in your August 20, 1973, memorandum not discussed in our first study, e.g., "Options for Future Policy." Attached to the September 14, 1973, paper is a copy of a petition for rehearing in U.S. v. Ivanov, and a July 11, 1973, memorandum concerning the Ivanov case to that date. These attachments pertain to a discussion of foreign national security electronic surveillance in the September 14, 1973, paper.

EX. 103 REC-2 66-8160-3513

CAUTION: THE APPENDIX TO THE UNDATED PAPER CAPTIONED "ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE," AND THE JULY 11, 1973, MEMORANDUM ARE CLASSIFIED "SECRET, NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD."

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures - 4

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 2:42 pm
DATE 9-24-73
BY pkm

JFM:rlc
(8)

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

343

OCT 12 1973

NOTE:

The above memorandum and enclosures are in response to the Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus' memoranda of 7/20 and 8/20/73 concerning "Substantive Issues Regarding the Future of the FBI." These materials are in response to issue number one "Wiretaps."

c. Dir. ____
. Dir.:
nin. ____
np. Syst. ____
. Affairs ____
es & Com. ____
. Inv. ____
nt. ____
pection ____
ell. ____
oratory ____
n. & Eval. ____
c. Inv. ____
ining ____
l Coun. ____
phone Rm. ____
ctor Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

EM

ENCLOSURE

66-8160-3513

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. Authorization of Consensual, Title III, and National Security Electronic Surveillances . . . 1

A. Consensual 1

B. Title III. 1

C. National Security. 2

II. Background of Federal Electronic Surveillance Law. 4

III. National Security Electronic Surveillance. . . . 6

A. Domestic 6

1. The Keith Decision 6

2. Guidelines and Procedures Currently Used by the FBI and the Department of Justice in Determining Whether a Proposed National Security Electronic Surveillance Falls Within/Without the Keith Decision. . . . 7

3. Status 11

B. Foreign. 11

IV. Value of National Security Electronic Surveillances. 13

V. Domestic "Internal Security" Electronic Surveillance: Alternatives to Keith Prohibition. . . . 14

Appendix i

I. AUTHORIZATION OF CONSENSUAL, TITLE III, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES

The legal foundation for each of the above types of electronic surveillance differs, and in part as a consequence of that, the administrative procedure for securing authorization to use each type differs.

A. Consensual

The current law is that as long as one party to a conversation, whether over the telephone or in person, consents to a monitoring of that conversation by another or a recording of that conversation by another or by himself, such a monitoring or recording is legal, and may be introduced into evidence in a legal proceeding.

At present, the monitoring or recording of telephone conversations by the FBI with the consent of one of the parties, e.g., via a device attached to the consenting party's telephone or a monitoring via use of an extension telephone, is authorized internally within the FBI by either a Special Agent in Charge or, if the case is "sensitive," by a Headquarters official, generally the Director. On the other hand, the present policy with regard to consensual monitoring of nontelephone conversations, e.g., body or hidden recorders or transmitters, is that the Attorney General must approve these in advance, except in an emergency, at which time the Director (or someone designated by him) can approve them and then promptly notify the Attorney General. The method of requesting Attorney General approval, or of notifying the Attorney General of the exercise of the emergency authorization, is a memorandum to the Attorney General setting forth the identity of the target, the background of the case, and the reason for the request or authorization.

B. Title III

These electronic surveillances are permitted by act of Congress for the purpose of gathering evidence of enumerated crimes. A requirement for the submission of an affidavit to a court showing probable cause that a crime is being committed and that evidence not obtainable otherwise can be obtained via the electronic surveillance is set forth in the statute. Current procedure is to submit to the Attorney General a copy of the affidavit the FBI proposes to submit to the court, with a cover memorandum setting forth the background of the case. The affidavit has been worked out between FBI field personnel and the local United States or Strike Force attorney, and between FBI Headquarters personnel and Department of Justice attorneys before submission to the Attorney General. The Attorney General either approves or disapproves proceeding with the application for court approval via a memorandum to the Director.

C. National Security

The continuous position of the Department of Justice and several Presidents has been that the President has the constitutional power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillances in the exercise of his Articles II and IV responsibilities "to conduct foreign affairs" and "to protect the States against invasion." This power has generally been exercised by the Attorney General for the President. While not specifically approving this interpretation or intending to grant or restrict any powers along these lines, but rather as a declaration of noninterference, Congress, when it passed Title III, stated in 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) that nothing in Chapter 119, Title 18, of the U.S.C. or in Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 limited the constitutional powers of the President (whatever they might be) to authorize electronic surveillance: (1) to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power; (2) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; (3) to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities; (4) to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means; (5) (to protect) against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.

In United States versus U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (407 U.S. 297), commonly called the Keith case after Judge Damon Keith, the Supreme Court held that the President did not have the power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance directed against purely domestic organizations (and their members). The Court stated that the issue in Keith fell within the language of categories 4 and

5, as above, of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3), and that it was not deciding on cases involving individuals or organizations that had a "significant connection" with a foreign power.

Consequently, since Keith, the only requests for national security warrantless electronic surveillance referred to the Attorney General for approval involve individuals or organizations with a "significant connection" with a foreign power. The procedure for submitting these requests is uniform. The Director submits to the Attorney General a memorandum requesting approval for initiation or continuation of an electronic surveillance on a particular individual or organization; an attachment which is a summary of background information and the circumstances on which the request is based; and a memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director approving the electronic surveillance based on, and in the language of, one or more of categories 1 - 3 of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3). If the Attorney General approves the electronic surveillance, he signs and returns this latter memorandum and keeps for his records a copy of the Director's memorandum to him and a copy of the attached summary.

II. BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LAW

The term electronic surveillance encompasses both wiretapping (tap), i.e., the interception of a telephone conversation by a third party, and microphone surveillance (bug), i.e., the interception of a nontelephone conversation by means of a microphone which can lead either to a recorder or merely transmit the conversation to a third party, or both. Both wiretapping and microphone surveillance can be conducted with or without the knowledge and consent of the parties to the conversation. Consensual monitoring, i.e., tapping or bugging with the consent of one of the parties to the conversation, has generally been held to be legal, and is not considered in the following discussion.

The separate development of the law pertaining to wiretapping and microphone surveillance is, since passage of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Keith decision, apparently of historical interest only.

Prior to Title III and Keith, the law that developed around electronic surveillances concerned itself primarily with the admissibility of evidence obtained from electronic surveillances rather than with the basic issue of the "legality" of electronic surveillance itself. Evidence, or evidence obtained from leads, gathered via wiretapping was excluded from any criminal prosecution on the basis that presentation of such evidence was a "disclosure" prohibited by Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act; and evidence, or evidence obtained from leads, gathered via a microphone surveillance or a wiretap was excluded if it was determined the installation required a "trespass" and was thus an unlawful search and seizure. (These decisions often turned on technicalities such as minimal physical penetration by a "spike mike.")

Title III established the Congressional intention that electronic surveillance, under specific conditions, is to be lawful and the evidence obtained therefrom admissible.

Title III also, while not conferring any statutory authority on the President, indirectly recognized that he was authorizing warrantless electronic surveillances in matters affecting national security, and stated that Title III or Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act did not affect any such powers he might have.

Title III did not distinguish between wiretaps and microphone surveillances, and court decisions since Title III involving both criminal and national security matters seem to be drifting away from the artificial bases that distinguished these electronic surveillances in the past and are looking at the real issue of governmental powers versus Fourth Amendment rights and the right to privacy. The requirement of prior judicial review, the element on which Keith turned, is a new factor in judicial consideration of electronic surveillances, introduced by Title III.

III. NATIONAL SECURITY ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

A. Domestic

1. The Keith Decision

The case originated as U.S. versus Plamondon, et al., and involved Federal prosecution of defendants accused of bombing the CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in September, 1968. Pursuant to a defense motion, Federal Government electronic surveillance records were checked and revealed Plamondon had been intercepted via a national security wiretap on the Black Panther Party office in Oakland, California.

Under current court procedure regarding national security electronic surveillances, the Government is required to disclose to the court all interceptions; the judge then determines whether the interception was legal or illegal. If he finds it to be illegal, he orders the prosecution to make available to the defense all the logs and tapes pertaining to the interception so that the defense can determine if any of the case against it is based on illegally obtained electronic surveillance evidence.

The trial Judge Damon Keith held that the President had no power to authorize electronic surveillance of the Black Panther Party without prior judicial approval, i.e., a warrant, that therefore the wiretap was illegal, and the prosecution had to turn the logs and tapes of the conversation over to the defense.

The Government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, thus the case at that level was titled U.S. versus U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, commonly called the Keith case.

On June 19, 1972, the Supreme Court affirmed Keith's decision and held that the President has no warrantless, national security power to authorize electronic surveillance of domestic organizations (or their members). The Supreme Court defined a domestic organization as one having no "significant connection" with a foreign power, its agents or agencies.

The Justice Department, in the words of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin J. Maroney before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure on June 29, 1972, stated that it understands "significant connection" to mean that the domestic organization must be substantially financed by, or in active collaboration with a foreign power for the purpose of committing unlawful activities against the United States Government.

2. Guidelines and Procedures Currently Used by the FBI and the Department of Justice in Determining Whether a Proposed National Security Electronic Surveillance Falls Within/Without the Keith Decision

The Keith decision applies solely to a domestic organization (and its members) "with no significant connection with a foreign power." The issues are what constitute a "domestic organization" and "significant connection."

The Department of Justice has issued the FBI no formal oral or any written guidelines on these issues.

The reason is that the standard to be applied is a "facts and circumstances" test in each case in the light of the Supreme Court's language in the Keith case and the Department of Justice's position as stated by Mr. Maroney before the Subcommittee.

The Supreme Court in Keith said that while it was "attempt(ing) no precise definition" the scope of its decision was limited to a "domestic organization...composed of citizens of the United States...which has no significant connection with a foreign power, it agents or agencies." The Court also recognized the difficulty in distinguishing "between 'domestic' and 'foreign' unlawful activities directed against the Government of the United States where there is collaboration in varying degrees between domestic groups or organizations and agents or agencies of a foreign power."

The Subcommittee asked the Department of Justice what level of foreign dominance and control of a domestic group would be considered sufficient to bring the group into the area of foreign activities on which the Court has not yet ruled. Maroney replied:

"The Keith decision has suggested a standard of 'significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies.' We do not interpret this as meaning casual, unrelated contacts and communications with foreign governments or agencies thereof. We would not try to apply this standard without the presence of such factors as substantial financing, control by or active collaboration with a foreign government and agencies thereof in unlawful activities directed against the Government of the United States. Obviously, such factors will be present in a very minimum number of situations. (Emphasis added.)

"I wish to assure the (sub)Committee on behalf of the Attorney General, that the Department of Justice accepts both the letter and the spirit of the Court's ruling in the Keith case. It is the intention of the Executive Branch to utilize electronic surveillance in present and future national security matters in full and ungrudging application of the rationale of the decision." (Emphasis added.)

The FBI carried on an informal dialogue with the Department of Justice after the Keith decision in an attempt to establish some general guidelines in the abstract, but the discussions eventually came back to the above language, and the conclusion that each case requires a facts and circumstances test, and an exercise of the independent judgment of the Attorney General on the facts presented.

As a result, the FBI submitted some borderline cases, which it recognized as such, to the Attorney General in order to get a feeling of how he and the Department of Justice applied the above standard to specific fact situations. Some were approved, some refused. As a result the FBI feels it has a fairly clear idea of the outer limits, beyond which no electronic surveillance will be approved.

The lack of formal guidelines beyond the Court's language and Maroney's testimony presents no practical or administrative difficulty within the FBI. As Maroney noted, the factors he related would be present in a very minimum number of cases. That is true. Prior to Keith, domestic national security electronic surveillances conducted by the FBI had been winding down for some time. At the time of the Keith decision only six, four telephone and two microphone, were in effect. The few cases in which are present some of the factors noted by Maroney are subjected to joint scrutiny by, and discussion between, FBI field and Headquarters supervisory personnel, and only after these feel the FBI may have a case does the field initiate the request, which must be personally approved by the field supervisor and the Special Agent in Charge. Upon receipt, the Headquarters supervisor drafts a memorandum to the Attorney General, setting forth all pertinent facts, including those showing foreign involvement, on which the request is believed justified. He must also be able to justify the request in the language of one or more of the first three categories of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3). The request is presented through channels (i.e., Headquarters unit chief, section chief, branch chief, Assistant Director of the Intelligence Division, Associate Director, and Director) to the Attorney General who must make an independent judgment.

There are arguments pro and con that the lack of formal written guidelines pose an added threat to the Fourth Amendment rights or right to privacy of a domestic organization or individual. The argument that it does pose an added threat would seem to be based on the supposition that formal guidelines would be exclusive, and binding in all instances. Any guidelines issued would probably be more illustrative of the above standard than definitive. Formal written guidelines made available to the public might curtail criticism that we are operating without a definitive standard, however, they might also trigger criticism that they are too vague, not interpretive of the Court's intent, etc.; and, should a case arise that does not fit squarely within the guidelines but could possibly be justified on a broader standard, reasonably within the Court's language, we could be criticized for not adhering to our own guidelines. Both career professionals in the FBI and Department of Justice attorneys review the electronic surveillance request for need, sufficiency, and legality. The Department of Justice has committed itself, and the FBI, to abiding by the letter, spirit, and rationale of the Keith decision (and has expanded upon the decision to the extent of Maroney's testimony). If legal action ensues, whether criminal or civil, the courts in looking at the legality of a national security electronic surveillance are bound only by the Keith decision regardless of any Department of Justice guidelines.

In summary then, the procedure is: the FBI does not submit a request to the Attorney General for approval of an electronic surveillance upon a domestic organization composed of

United States citizens, unless it has a "significant connection" with a foreign power, its agents or agencies; by "significant connection" the FBI and the Department of Justice understand that the domestic organization must be substantially financed by, controlled by, or in active collaboration with such foreign power for the purposes of committing unlawful activities against the United States Government. The FBI presents its request to the Attorney General with all the facts and circumstances on which the request is based, and he must exercise an independent judgment as to whether the request falls within this standard and the letter, spirit, and rationale of the Keith decision.

****

Senator Kennedy has expressed concern in the past that a political appointee, the Attorney General, rather than career professionals, is the final authority on these matters. This is a two-edged sword. If the ultimate authority were non-public career professionals, there would be less response from them than from the appointee of an elected official to public pressure criticizing procedures and decisions.

On the other hand, the Attorney General's decision could possibly be based more on personal political attitudes and motivation than on his interpretation of the law.

The present procedure attempts to meet both shortcomings. The Attorney General does not recommend or initiate electronic surveillance requests; they are initiated by and processed through several levels of career professionals who at each step judge whether the request falls within the standard. The request is then sent to the Attorney General, who refers it to the Internal Security Section, Criminal Division, of the Department for its independent judgment, before he makes the ultimate decision. Thus, any electronic surveillance request, if it makes it to the Attorney General, has already been approved by the career professionals. It is arguable that a career professional might be more cautious if he, and his agency, bore the final authority and responsibility rather than passing both on to another agency. There is no airtight response to this; it is a question of human motivation, sense of obligation, duty and responsiblity. The impulse to be less than diligent is countered by an employee's professionalism and career considerations.

****

3. Status

The President has no warrantless power to authorize purely domestic national security electronic surveillances. He may have the power to subject domestic targets to electronic surveillance, but these electronic surveillances must be subjected to prior judicial review, i.e., a warrant, before installation. Admissibility of evidence obtained from such electronic surveillances is a correlative question, not yet directly considered. Presumably, such evidence would be admissible.

B. Foreign

The legality and admissibility of evidence issues have not yet been directly considered by the Supreme Court. The issue of "legality," based on whether prior judicial review is required (key issue in Keith), was resolved in the Government's favor by the United States District Court, District of New Jersey, in United States versus Ivanov. Following an *ex parte*, *in camera* inspection of the surveillance logs by the district court and argument on the legality issue by the parties, the court sustained the authority of the Attorney General to acquire foreign intelligence information by warrantless electronic surveillance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, assuming, arguendo, that the President did have such authority and that therefore any electronic surveillances in the case were legal. Further, the Appellate Court felt it had to assume "in the present posture" of the case, that the case was in fact built on electronic surveillance evidence. Consequently, the Appellate Court held that since the case arose prior to passage of Title III, Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 applied, and it prohibited "divulging" of electronic surveillance results as evidence in court.

The issue of the legality of foreign national security electronic surveillances is also currently under advisement by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the case of United States versus Enten. In Keith, the Supreme Court specifically noted that two lower courts (the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States versus Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (1970) and the United States District Court, Central District of California in United States versus Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (1971)) have held that "warrantless surveillance... may be constitutional where foreign powers are involved."

The argument that even foreign related electronic surveillances should be subject to initial judicial review is based on the argument that this is the only guaranteed method of protecting the Fourth Amendment rights and right to privacy of aliens, and United States citizens who might be involved. The argument on the other side is that the nature and objective of the activity, viz., foreign intelligence gathering, the needs of security, the many nonprosecutive factors to be considered, and often the time element, do not lend themselves to effective or efficient initial judicial review; consequently, the Government must be granted a measure of confidence to utilize this technique on its own authority, with the safeguards of protection from conviction or the remedies of a civil action available to any target of an electronic surveillance, if the Government abuses this authority.

This area is still in limbo, the same condition as prior to Title III and Keith. Until Ivanov and Enten, or more likely until a post Section 2511(3) espionage case, actually built on electronic surveillance evidence, are decided by the Supreme Court, the Government, to be safe, must be willing to sacrifice a criminal prosecution to obtain electronic surveillance intelligence.

IV. VALUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES

(See classified Appendix)

V. DOMESTIC "INTERNAL SECURITY" ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: ALTERNATIVES TO KEITH PROHIBITION

There are several elements within United States society which pose a threat to the safety and tranquility of segments of that society, e.g., police officers, symbols of the "Establishment," etc. While some of these elements claim to be "revolutionary" and claim as an ultimate objective the overthrow of the United States Government, there is no responsible opinion that feels any of these elements have any chance of success in toppling the Government. Yet, they do pose a significant threat of inflicting serious, and sometimes extensive, damage on individuals and property.

In combatting these elements, law enforcement is confronted with the opposite of its usual task. Ordinarily, law enforcement is confronted with a completed crime and investigates to identify suspects and to prove guilt; in these cases it has the suspects, e.g., individuals or groups have said they intend to murder police officers, bomb buildings, etc., so law enforcement's job is then to thwart commission of the crime. This is an intelligence investigation. It is conducted prior to a threatened criminal act, not after the act, and as such ranges wider and looks into more fawcets of the suspect's behavior. Yet, it is not a "fishing expedition"; it is based on some solid indication that the suspect intends to, and has the capability of, committing some crime.

Because of the exaggerated rhetoric of many of these elements, which never do actually commit a crime, the difficulties in identifying specific individuals as suspects, in showing a cause-effect relationship between the urgings and claims of group leaders and the act of the actual triggerman or bomber, and in showing suspected imminence of the criminal act, it is almost impossible to make a probable cause showing, as we understand that term today, to support a warrant for restricted types of investigation. Essentially what law enforcement has, or depending on your emphasis, all that law enforcement has, is a suspicion, based on stated criminal objectives of these elements, claims of criminal accomplishments, and indications from behavior and attitudes, that these elements may engage in destructive criminal behavior sometime in the future.

Because these elements threaten and commit crimes in furtherance of their stated goal of overthrowing the United States Government, investigation of them has often proceeded on a "national security" basis; and because there is no practical, immediate prospect of their accomplishing this goal, the "national security" foundation for investigation of them has, in many quarters, not been taken seriously, and is often suspect because of the latitude that has been allowed in "national security" investigations as opposed to simple criminal investigations.

The difficulty is that these domestic "internal security" cases lie somewhere between what is generally accepted as "national security" matters and plain, simple criminal violations. If one interprets national security to mean only matters which threaten the stability of the Government, either from within or without, then these cases are not national security matters; yet, they pose a threat to the safety and tranquility of the community beyond individual incidents of crime, or even random sprees of criminal acts by an individual or group. These cases also have some effect on national and international attitudes towards U.S. standards, morale, government, law enforcement, and the elements involved, e.g., "Why can't law enforcement protect society, and itself, against attacks"; or "These people are victims of a repressive system and attack is their only effective avenue of protest for change."

Consequently, law enforcement is confronted with a situation wherein it is threatened with criminal acts in furtherance of a claimed political goal, the mere condition of being so threatened often having an impact beyond a completed routine criminal act (although many of these threats are eventually carried out); yet, this condition is generally insufficient to show probable cause to justify a warrant for an electronic surveillance.

Assuming that there is valuable intelligence to be obtained from electronic surveillance in these matters to be used in attempting to thwart these crimes, how can we fill the void created by Keith?

Title III has very limited value in this area. Its stated purpose is to gather evidence of crimes that we have probable cause to believe are being, or are about to be, committed. It is doubtful whether the threats of these elements, or even evidence of past attacks, would be sufficient probable cause to support a continuing electronic surveillance with no specific crime in immediate view. Title III could perhaps be used in some of these cases where the investigation has developed to a point where we do have probable cause for a specific crime, but the probable cause would be momentary and would expire after the act or probability of the act. Title III also has limited value for continuing intelligence purposes because of its applicability only to specified crimes; the short time period (30 days per request); the requirement that the target eventually be given notice and the results of the electronic surveillance (this can be postponed but not indefinitely); and the number of people who could become involved with and thus aware of a recurring monthly application to a court.

After the Keith decision, there was extensive debate within the FBI and between the FBI and the Department of Justice on its effect, and how we could proceed, within the Keith restriction, in cases where we felt there was a clear "internal security" (which went undefined) threat where electronic surveillance would be valuable. It was accepted that Title III would be of minimal value because of the problems noted above. Within the FBI it was also argued, and finally accepted, that FRCrP 41, might be utilized to obtain a routine search warrant to install an electronic surveillance where Title III was inapplicable. Assistant Attorney General Olson and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maroney disagreed, feeling that Title III was intended to preempt all other methods of securing electronic surveillances, besides Presidentially approved surveillances.

The argument is largely theoretical. FRCrP 41, like Title III, requires a showing of probable cause, so it likewise is available only when specified criminal acts are believed to be going on or are imminent. FRCrP 41 warrants must also be executed forthwith, and notice must be given to the target and he must be served with an inventory of the items seized. Given a case which falls within both Title III and FRCrP 41, Title III procedures are preferable because they are less restrictive and more clear cut since they deal exclusively with electronic surveillances.

Title III is fairly broad in specifying the crimes for which electronic surveillances can be authorized under its sections. It is difficult to think of a threat to the internal security so significant that acts in furtherance of the threat would not involve criminal violations specified in Title III. Of course, the FBI would be limited to basing its requests for electronic surveillances on Federal crimes enumerated in Title III, and the threatened destructive acts might involve solely local offenses, e.g., murders of policemen. Title III provides for local authorities to use electronic surveillances in such cases.

Even assuming that there was a case falling outside of Title III, but within FRCrP 41, the FBI is still limited to using search warrants obtained thereunder to seize evidence of Federal crimes; if the threatened act is a local violation only FRCrP 41 is of no value to the FBI.

Without a showing of probable cause of an ongoing or imminent crime, it is doubtful if either Title III or FRCrP 41 could be used to secure an electronic surveillance. It is believed an ongoing intelligence-gathering electronic surveillance based on indications but not probable cause, that the target might engage in purely domestic criminal activity, for the purpose of thwarting that activity, no matter how potentially destructive, will require enabling legislation. Mr. Maroney in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure stated that the Department of Justice was not requesting such legislation at that time, but that if it became evident that a void clearly detrimental to United States security interests had been created by Keith, the Department of Justice will seek new legislation.

Chance for passage of such legislation at this time is probably nil.

APPENDIX

IV. VALUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES

A. Foreign

Electronic surveillances provide positive intelligence regarding the positions and activities of foreign nations, and thus are of value to United States Government policymakers and diplomats, and also provide information of assistance in our counterintelligence efforts against foreign intelligence services operating against the United States.

1. Positive Intelligence

Examples of positive intelligence obtained via electronic surveillances, not directly related to our counterintelligence responsibility, are as follows:

At 7:40 p.m. on August 20, 1968, the New York Office called Headquarters to inform that our wiretap on the Soviet Mission to the United Nations was intercepting an inordinate amount of traffic, approximately 40 intercepts in the preceding 30 minutes. The Soviets were calling representatives of many of the delegations to the United Nations stating they had a message which they desired to deliver urgently, and would meet the representatives anywhere, even on a street corner.

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION

The Headquarters duty supervisor thought this activity might relate to a recently completed full plenum of the Supreme Soviet on the Czechoslovakian question, reported on the UPI ticker. He relayed this information to Mr. Hoover, the White House Situation Room, and the State Department.

Classified by E. S. Miller
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION

Later in the evening State Department informed us that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin had visited the President that evening, left, and State was now urgently attempting to locate him. Via our wiretap on the Romanian Embassy, we were able to inform State that Dobrynin was with the Romanian Ambassador at that time.

The first indicator the CIA received of abnormal activity regarding the Czechoslovakian question was a telephone call from the White House Situation Room at 9:30 p.m., August 20, 1968.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred August 20, 1968.

There was a great deal of intercept activity during the days following the invasion, which reflected on various governments' positions and reactions. This raw material was relayed as fast as it came in to the State Department and the White House Situation Room.

This example indicates the potential value of such intercepts in extreme national security emergencies directly affecting the United States, e.g., by indicating withdrawal of official and diplomatic personnel from the United States, movement of foreign nationals to certain areas of the country, or hostile intentions against the United States. Such information is a priority requirement of the United States Intelligence Board.

During the Arab-Israeli Six Day War and the India-Pakistan War, our intercepts on various missions to the United Nations and embassies in the United States provided many indicators as to the intercepted parties' relative positions and sympathies, and consequently assisted State Department and the White House in its dealings with these nations on that issue.

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Via an electronic surveillance we obtained information concerning the location of Soviet ships removing missiles from Cuba in 1962.

2. Counterintelligence

Electronic surveillances assist our counterintelligence efforts by providing personality data and information regarding the contacts and activities of known and suspected foreign intelligence officers. This information assists in planning counterintelligence activity, assessing defection potential, analyzing routines and patterns, conserving manpower, and in directing sources against these officers.

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

There are currently 165 known and 70 suspected Soviet intelligence officers, and 72 known and 43 suspected Soviet-bloc intelligence officers in the United States.

Examples of information obtained via electronic surveillance of value to our counterintelligence responsibility are as follows:

An individual was detected in contact with a hostile intelligence service in September, 1972. He expressed a desire to defect and to offer information regarding United States naval intelligence to which he had access. Although the interception did not give us his name, it provided sufficient information to conduct an investigation which established his identity, confirmed that he had been engaged in very sensitive naval communications intelligence, and disclosed that he was a fugitive, wanted on local charges. He was arrested on November 23, 1972.

In one case, electronic surveillance furnished information, within four days of its installation, of a contact between an official of the Soviet Illegal Support Branch and an individual who appears to be a Soviet illegal agent.

Electronic surveillance furnished information concerning an attempt in 1969 by a United States serviceman to defect to the Soviets.

An example of the value of electronic surveillance coverage in foreign terrorist matters involved an Al Fatah leader formerly in the United States. In the Summer of 1972 he departed this country for a visit to the Middle East. He later applied for a reentry permit which was denied. In late November, 1972, a telephone surveillance disclosed a contact by an individual suspected to be the Al Fatah leader. An investigation was initiated and a second electronic surveillance revealed the Al Fatah leader had reentered the United States using a variation of his family name. This information enabled his arrest by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

B. Domestic

The primary value derived from intelligence gathering, as opposed to evidentiary, electronic surveillances in this area is in obtaining plans for carrying out threatened criminal acts, evidence of foreign influence or financing, and information which assists in planning apprehensions of wanted individuals with less risk to the lives of officers and bystanders.

Examples: Via electronic surveillance of the Black Panther Party, Cleaver Faction, in New York City; Huey P. Newton in Oakland, California; and the Los Angeles Black Panther Party, the following information was obtained.

On November 6, 1971, plans to kill New York Police Commissioner Murphy were discussed.

On September 14, 1971, use of police radios to monitor New York City Police Department activity was discussed.

On April 26, 1971, electronic surveillance identified Robert Vickers as the assailant of a New York City police officer killed April 19, 1971. (Although this information was also evidentiary, it identified Vickers as a triggerman for the group who could be used in the future.)

On December 28, 1970, electronic surveillance reported that Newton received $1,400 from a Swedish group.

On September 20, 1971, electronic surveillance reported a communication between Newton and the President of Tanzania.

On September 28, 1971, electronic surveillance reported Newton's travel plans to China, and on October 19, 1971, it reported details of his visit.

During July, 1971, a conversation was intercepted, and when pieced together with previously monitored conversations and other background, enabled us to apprehend, without injury or incident, two Black Panther Party members wanted for the murder of a policeman.

Physical surveillance of a meeting to plan the murder of Black Panther Party rivals, the meeting site having been learned of via electronic surveillance, resulted in the apprehension of two fugitives. The apprehension caused a gun battle, however, the electronic surveillance information allowed for advance planning which cut the risk to arresting officers and bystanders.

Electronic surveillance of the Students for a Democratic Society Headquarters, Chicago, Illinois, provided information on plans for the "Days of Rage" violent demonstrations in Chicago during October, 1969. This advance information, relayed to Chicago police, enabled them to anticipate, to some degree, destructive activity, and to concentrate their force where needed.

September 14, 1973

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

1. The Problem:

Use of electronic surveillance falls into three broad areas: criminal, domestic national security, and foreign national security.

Little policy consideration need be given to use in criminal cases. Such use is prescribed and proscribed in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, has been upheld by the courts, and has been used to great advantage under the current procedures and policy. In short, there is no policy problem in this area.

Electronic surveillance in both domestic and foreign national security cases is primarily used for intelligence purposes, not evidentiary purposes; however, it often produces information of evidentiary value.

The only Congressionally approved electronic surveillance is for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence of stated crimes (Title III).

Foreign national security electronic surveillances produce a good deal of positive intelligence value to U.S. foreign policymakers, a good deal of information necessary for counterintelligence activity, and, rarely, information of evidentiary value.

Domestic national security electronic surveillances produce information valuable to law enforcement in thwarting murders, serious injury to persons, and extensive damage to property, and also, rarely, information of evidentiary value.

Electronic surveillance in domestic national security cases which was previously approved by the Attorney General for the President utilizing his Constitutional powers has been prohibited by the Supreme Court in the Keith case, i.e., held illegal without prior judicial approval.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

EM

The issue of the legality of warrantless, Presidentially approved electronic surveillance in foreign national security cases has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court; this issue is now pending in two Circuit Courts of Appeals.

Thus the specific problems with regard to domestic national security electronic surveillance are that it produces information of value not obtainable by other means; it has been prohibited without prior judicial approval; there is no mechanism to obtain prior judicial approval. Consequently, we conduct no domestic national security electronic surveillances.

The specific problems with regard to foreign national security electronic surveillance are that: it produces information of value not obtainable by other means; the legality of the President to authorize its use without prior judicial review is being challenged; if it is held illegal there probably will also be no mechanism to obtain prior judicial review; current court procedure requires in camera disclosure of the existence of national security electronic surveillance in criminal trials and if found illegal, disclosure of the content of the intercepts to the defense, which for overriding security and foreign policy reasons can usually not be made.

2. Present Policy

Domestic National Security Cases:

We do not conduct electronic surveillance in these cases.

Foreign National Security Cases:

Pending Supreme Court consideration of the "legality" of electronic surveillance in these cases, they continue to be approved by the Attorney General, and utilized without warrant.

3. The Issues

The main issue in both domestic and foreign national security electronic surveillance cases is the right and need of the Government to obtain intelligence information in cases involving (1) U.S. foreign policy considerations; (2) threats to our security as a nation from without; and (3) threats to the tranquility and safety of U.S. society from within, versus 4th Amendment rights and the right to privacy.

The specific issues with regard to domestic cases are: (1) Is the threat to the safety and tranquility of U.S. society posed by certain domestic groups of such magnitude to justify electronic surveillance as an intelligence-gathering device to be used against them? (2) If so, is the threat of national, i.e., Federal dimensions, or is the threat primarily to local or regional interests? (3) If this coverage is needed, has Keith presented obstacles; and if so, how can they be overcome? (4) If enabling legislation is the answer to (3), should the electronic surveillance intelligence-gathering authority be given to the Federal or local government, or both as in Title III? What should enabling legislation entail? (5) Is there any option other than enabling legislation?

The primary issue with regard to foreign cases is: Is Presidentially approved, warrantless electronic surveillance in cases involving a "significant connection" with a foreign power constitutional, or "legal." On the resolution of this issue hangs all else in these cases, viz., admissibility of electronic surveillance evidence in court; degree of disclosure to be required in criminal proceedings; and if held illegal, the judicial review procedure to be proposed in order to continue such surveillances, if they are deemed of sufficient importance to continue them in the face of additional risks inherent in a judicial review.

4. Options for Future Policy

The chief issue for future policy consideration is, will the Department support the argument for the need for intelligence electronic surveillance? In foreign cases? In domestic cases?

If so, then the discussion centers on Department policy regarding the means to effect such surveillances.

Foreign national security cases:

Hopefully, the examples of intelligence value set out in the classified appendix of the attached study carried the argument that electronic surveillance in these cases is highly desirable, if not essential, to our counterintelligence efforts and to our foreign policy considerations. Even without specific examples of value derived from these surveillances, the bottom line argument is that electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence services is at least an inconvenience to them, and makes it more difficult for them to carry on their intelligence activities.

The present policy is to support the legality of the President's authority to conduct this surveillance without warrant, to restrict disclosure of the existence or contents of such surveillances, and presumably, to support the argument that any evidence obtained from such surveillance is admissible in a criminal proceeding.

These issues are discussed very well in the Government's petition for rehearing in U.S. v. Ivanov, attached. Also attached is a classified memorandum summarizing the case up to the petition for rehearing.

Until these issues are resolved, consideration of future policy options would be speculative, and may be unnecessary.

Domestic national security cases:

The FBI Intelligence Division feels there is something of intelligence value to be gained from electronic surveillance coverage of some domestic groups. The opinion of former Assistant Attorney General Olson and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maroney is that there is no need to utilize this type of electronic surveillance and therefore no need to seek enabling legislation at this time, but that if a need does appear the Government will seek such legislation.

The examples set out in the classified appendix to the attached study show the value that can be derived from intelligence coverage of domestic groups. Is information of this type worth the financial manpower expenditure (which is considerable) to obtain it? Is it worth the task of trying to write enabling legislation (providing for judicial review to satisfy Keith) to allow intelligence electronic surveillance in domestic cases? Is it worth the fearsome battle such a bill would cause in Congress? Does such a bill have a chance at this time, or in the foreseeable future?

Upon reconsideration, the blanket pessimisim on chance for passage of such legislation in the attached study seems extreme. It is believed that the Department and the FBI should attempt to write a bill, with as restrictive judicial control as necessary in order to obtain Congressional approval, to permit intelligence electronic surveillance against domestic groups which threaten death or "extensive damage" (to be either defined or specifically enumerated, e.g., plane hijackings, bombings, murders of officials or police, etc). A restrictive enumeration of specific acts which if threatened, but not to the extent of producing probable cause, would justify appeal to a court or magistrate for an intelligence electronic surveillance, might have some chance for passage. The judicial review would satisfy the 4th Amendment requirements; and a specific list of acts limited to major contemporary concerns would allow for item deletions and additions as conditions change. Such a specific section to the bill would allow for not only effective judicial review, but also effective Congressional review.

Such a bill, in our opinion, should avoid mention of controversial and difficult to define terms such as "domestic national security," "internal security," "threats to the existence or structure of the Government," and all terms with political connotations; and should use terms emphasizing the aim of preventing serious criminal acts which threaten life and limb (without mention of motivation, whether political or otherwise).

In our opinion, such a bill should make intelligence electronic surveillance available to both local and Federal agencies. It is envisioned that such a bill would cover purely local groups which, e.g., threaten murder of local police officers, and groups national in scope, e.g., Black Liberation Army.

As discussed in the attached study, Title III and FRCrP 41 do not seem to offer practical alternatives for this type of coverage.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
Appellee, :
v. : No. 72-1741
IGOR A. IVANOV, :
Appellant. :

PETITION FOR REHEARING

HERBERT J. STERN
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On the Brief:

JONATHAN L. GOLDSTEIN
JOHN J. BARRY
Assistant United States Attorneys

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
Appellee, :
v. : NO. 72-1741
IGOR A. IVANOV, :
Appellant. :

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The United States petitions the Court to grant a rehearing in this case and modify its opinion and decision. We limit our request to that portion of the decision which relates to the disclosure to defendant of the logs of electronic surveillance initiated with the express authorization of the Attorney General to obtain foreign intelligence information.

In our view, the decision, insofar as it relates to said disclosure, is not in accord with the Supreme Court's prior mandate in this case and has misapprehended relevant precedent relating to disclosure in instances where there has been no violation of Fourth Amendment rights.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In its initial decision in this case, the Court affirmed appellant's conviction of conspiracy to violate the espionage statute, 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) and (c). 384 F.2d 554 (1967). While appellant's *certiorari* petition was pending, the Solicitor General informed the Supreme Court that appellant had been electronically overheard. The Supreme Court considered the effect of such disclosures in this case and in one arising from the Tenth Circuit in *Alderman* v. *United States*, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) and remanded both cases to the respective District Courts:

> "for a hearing, findings, and conclusions (1) on the question of whether with respect to any petitioner there was electronic surveillance *which violated his Fourth Amendment rights*, and (2) if there was such surveillance with respect to any petitioner, on the nature and relevance to his conviction of any conversations which may have been overheard through that surveillance."
> 394 U.S. 186 (emphasis added)

The Supreme Court, in elaborating on its instructions, repeated again that the scope of inquiry was to be confined to possible Fourth Amendment violations. It ordered that:

> *The District Court should confine the evidence presented by both sides to that which is material to the question of the possible violation of a petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights,* to the content of conversations illegally overheard by surveillance which violated those rights and to the relevance of such conversations to the petitioner's subsequent conviction. The District Court will make such findings of fact on those questions as may be appropriate

> in light of the further evidence and of the entire existing record. If the District Court decides on the basis of such findings (1) that there was electronic surveillance with respect to one or more petitioners but not any which violated the Fourth Amendment, or (2) that although there was a surveillance in violation of one or more of the petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights, the conviction of such petitioner was not tainted by the use of evidence so obtained, it will enter new final judgments of conviction based on the existing record as supplemented by its further findings, thereby preserving to all affected parties the right to seek further appropriate appellate review. 394 U.S. 186-87 (emphasis added)

On remand, the Government conceded for purposes of the hearing that one set of electronic surveillances, contained in logs designated 4001-S* and 4002-S*, violated appellant's Fourth Amendment rights and voluntarily disclosed those logs to him (1095a). A taint hearing resulted in a finding by the District Court that appellant's conviction was not tainted from these logs and that finding was unanimously upheld by this Court. (Opinion pp. 12, 22).

The Government further disclosed that there existed a second set of logs, designated Government Exhibits A-1, A-2 and A-3. The Government represented that these logs were duly obtained by the Department of Justice in the exercise of the President's right to obtain foreign intelligence information and that, although certain conversations of Ivanov were overheard, he was not the subject of the electronic surveillance reflected on those logs (14a, 20a). These logs were submitted to the Court for an in camera inspection, along with an affidavit of Attorney General Mitchell, designated Government Exhibit B. A copy of the affidavit was made available to Ivanov. Upon review of these materials, the District Court made the following findings:

1. that the surveillances here under attack were expressly authorized by the Attorney General shown in the exhibits;

2. that they were not made pursuant to a surveillance of the defendant Ivanov;

3. that said surveillances were directed against certain premises in which Ivanov had no interest, the description and location of said premises being set forth in the exhibits;

4. that said surveillances were conducted and maintained solely for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information;

5. that it was reasonable and necessary to authorize such surveillances in the national interest; and

6. that it would prejudice the national interest to make a disclosure of the particular facts concerning said surveillances. (20a)

Based on these findings, the Court concluded that disclosure need not be made because the surveillances were lawful and not in violation of any Fourth Amendment rights of Ivanov (20a). Although not directed to do so by the Supreme Court's mandate, the Court also concluded that disclosure was not required by reason of the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 because that Act was inapplicable to the situation disclosed by the withheld material (23a).

On appeal, this Court reversed the District Court holding in a split decision (per Aldisert, J.) that 47 U.S.C. § 605 barred "any use of the intercepted material beyond the confines of the Executive branch" (Opinion pp 20-21), that, in the present procedural posture of the case, "it must be assumed that the conversations of Ivanov overheard on the wiretaps led to evidence used at this trial" (Opinion p. 13) and, therefore that appellant is entitled "to disclosure or an evidentiary hearing" (Opinion p. 21). In reaching this conclusion, the majority accepted, for purposes of analysis, the proposition that the interceptions were a lawful exercise of the Presidential power vested by Article II of the Constitution. (Opinion p. 15)

The majority did not even consider the question of whether Ivanov's Fourth Amendment rights might have been violated. In dissent, Judge Adams concluded both that the proposition accepted by the majority for purposes of analysis was, in fact, correct and that Ivanov's Fourth Amendment rights were not violat

As the case presently stands, therefore, there has been no determination of the issue which the Supreme Court specifically directed to be determined and disclosure is being ordered on a misapprehension of the legal necessity for such disclosure.

ARGUMENT

POINT I

ASSUMING THE CORRECTNESS OF THE COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF 47 U.S.C. § 605, APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE DISCLOSURE OF THE SURVEILLANCE LOGS OR TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WITH RESPECT THERETO

In remanding this case the United States Supreme Court was very careful and very specific as to the scope of its mandate. It ordered the District Court to determine whether or not there has been any electronic surveillance which violated Appellant's *Fourth Amendment rights*. It did not ask the District Court to consider whether or not there may have been a violation of § 605 or any other federal statute. It is in this context that the Court's language as to disclosure must be understood because there exists no precedent which requires the United States to turn over the logs of a foreign intelligence surveillance where such surveillance has not violated any *Fourth Amendment rights* of a defendant.

The necessity for the disclosure of the records of electronic surveillances only arises where such disclosure is necessary to protect a defendant's *Fourth Amendment rights*. *Alderman* v. *United States*, 394 U.S. 165, 182-85 (1969); *Taglianetti* v. *United States*, 394 U.S. 316, 317 (1969); see also the concurring opinion of Stewart, J., in *Giordano* v. *United States*, 394 U.S. 310 (1967), the opinions of Douglas, J., in granting a stay in *Russo v. B[illegible]rne*, U.S. , 34 L.[illegible]. 30 (1972) and dissenting from the denial of a petition for *certiorari* in the same case, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972).

As stated by the Court in *Taglianetti*:

> Nothing in Alderman v. United States, Ivanov v United States, or Butenko v. United States, ante, p. 165, requires an adversary proceeding and full disclosure for resolution of every issue raised by an electronic surveillance. On the contrary, an adversary proceeding and disclosure were required in those cases, not for lack of confidence in the integrity of government counsel or the trial judge, *but only because the in camera procedures at issue there would have been an inadequate means to safeguard a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.* 394 U.S. at 317 (Emphasis added)

As stated by Mr. Justice Stewart in *Giordano*:

> As we made explicit in Alderman, Butenko, and Ivanov, the requirement that certain products of governmental electronic surveillance be turned over to defense counsel was *expressly limited to situations where the surveillance has violated the Fourth Amendment.* 394 U.S. 310, 313 (Emphasis added)

In *Alderman*, the Court concluded that although *in camera* procedures were sufficient to vindicate statutory rights, such as those under the Jencks Act and certain due process rights, such as the right to the disclosure of the identity of an informer (384 U.S at 182-83, f.n. 14), such procedures "are unable to provide the scrutiny which the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule demands" *in* those circumstances where there exist "a large volume of factual materials". 384 U.S. 183-84.

Thus, *Alderman* cannot be read to require disclosure where there has been no violation of *Fourth Amendment rights*. Indeed, even in cases involving a possible violation of *Fourth Amendment rights*, *Alderman* can be read as not requiring disclosure where there exist compelling reasons for nondisclosure and the factual materials involved are neither voluminous nor require complex judgments. United States v. Lemonakis, __ F.2d __, No. 71-1745, D.C. Ct. of App. June 29, 1973, pp. 35-40.

In the Lemonskis case, the Court, like the majority of the Court in the case at bar, pretermitted the constitutional issues involved in the executive authorization of foreign intelligence gathering by means of electronic surveillance and held, based on its own in camera examination of the logs in question, that that material contained therein had no relevance to the issues or evidence in appellant's trial and that, because of the national interest involved in the revelation of logs of foreign intelligence operations, the logs need not be revealed. Id.

If the teachings of both Alderman and Lemonakis be applied to the case at bar in its present posture, it is clear that the logs in question need not be disclosed for two reasons. First, as the Court has assumed, there has been no Fourth Amendment violation. Second, as the Court can readily ascertain from its own examination of Government Exhibits A-1, A-2 and A-3, the logs are not voluminous and the task of evaluating them is neither burdensome nor complex.1/

1/ In this connection, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the question of whether disclosure of logs of foreign intelligence surveillances is required. In United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, [illegible], f.n. 21 (1972), in which the Court expressly reserved decision as to the constitutional issues involved in foreign intelligence

(cont'd)

Therefore there is no legal justification for disclosing sensitive logs of a foreign intelligence surveillance of a spy for a foreign power. To do so would not only be inconsistent with the narrowly and specifically drawn mandate of the Supreme Court in this case but would, in addition, make a mockery of the assumed conclusion by this Court that the surveillance itself was lawful. The procedural question of whether and under what circumstances disclosure should be made is fully as sensitive and delicate as the constitutional question of the presidential power to conduct the surveillance, and procedures ought not to be employed which would emasculate the constitutional power.

Surely the considerations which compel the conclusion that the President is vested under Article II of the Constitution of the United States to conduct foreign intelligence operations by means of electronic surveillance equally compel the conclusion

---

1/ (cont'd)
surveillances, the Court also found it "unnecessary at [that] time and on the facts of [that] case" to reexamine "the basis and the scope of the ... decision in *Alderman*" insofar as that decision related to the disclosure of the records of surveillances where *Fourth Amendment rights* had been violated. In denying *certiorari* in *Russo v. Byrne*, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972), the Court let stand a Ninth Circuit decision which upheld an *in camera* determination by the Trial Court that the records of an arguably foreign intelligence electronic overhearing of defendant's counsel were not relevant to any issue in defendant's trial. Dissent from denial of *certiorari*, *Ibid*. See also opinion per Mr. Justice Douglas granting a stay of the Ninth Circuit's ruling. U.S. , 34 L.Ed. 30 (1972).

that the results of such surveillance should not be disclosed where no Fourth Amendment rights of any individual have been violated because to do otherwise would reveal information which would make the surveillance valueless in the future.

To conclude otherwise would be to put the Government to an untenable election. It would have to elect between disclosure of a vital and proper intelligence operation, on the one hand, and prosecution of a criminal who may have blundered or even intruded himself on the other. Such a construction would even give to a criminal the power to prevent his prosecution by simply taking steps to ensure that a conversation of his is overheard during the course of a foreign intelligence surveillance.

POINT II

PRIOR JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 47 U.S.C. § 605 REINFORCE THE CONCLUSION THAT DISCLOSURE OF THE SURVEILLANCE LOGS IS NOT REQUIRED IN THIS CASE

The correctness of the conclusion that disclosure is inappropriate in circumstances where there has been no Fourth Amendment violation is further reinforced by the considerations which underlie prior judicial constructions of 47 U.S.C. § 605. In those cases, courts have made it clear that wiretap evidence and its fruits are to be suppressed only in those instances where the wiretap was utilized by law enforcement officers improperly to obtain evidence.

As stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860, 864 (1957):

> Wiretap evidence is excluded by the federal courts in order to discourage persons from undertaking the proscribed activities in an effort to obtain evidence for use in those courts. Where exclusion would not serve this purpose, the evidence is admitted.

If the Government was acting lawfully in conducting the surveillance, there is no illegal conduct to deter and hence no reason for applying the remedy of suppression in this case. If there is no reason for suppressing, there is no reason for either disclosure or for an evidentiary hearing.

It is clear beyond cavil, that, in construing § 605 to bar either testimony as to the contents of an intercepted conversation or the derivative use of an intercepted conversation to obtain evidence, the Supreme Court did so, solely to deter law enforcement personnel from utilizing wiretapping as a means of obtaining evidence. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 389 (1937); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (Nardone II).

In Nardone I, the Supreme Court held that the Communications Act of 1934 barred testimony by federal agents as to the con of messages intercepted by wiretaps by application of the principle of statutory construction "that the sovereign is embraced by general words of a statute intended to prevent injury and wrong". 302 U.S. at 384. The "injury and wrong" which the Court perceived and it speculated that, in enacting § 605, "Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders should go unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with personal liberty". Id. at 383.

In Nardone II, the Court, to further the policy expressed in Nardone I, held that where "a substantial portion of the case" against a defendant is proven by him to have been developed by means of illicit wire-tapping, his conviction cannot be permitted to stand. In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that § 605 only barred testimony as to the content of an intercepted message stating that:

> Such a reading of § 605 would largely stultify the policy which compelled our decision in Nardone v. United States, supra. That decision was not the product of a merely meticulous reading of technical language. It was the translation into practicality of broad considerations of morality and public well-being. This Court found that the logically relevant proof which Congress had outlawed, it outlawed because "inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty." 302 U.S. 379, 383. To forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized but to put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very methods deemed "inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty." 308 U.S. at 340

In other words, the linchpin of analysis in both Nardone decisions is the perceived Congressional rejection of wiretapping for the purposes of obtaining evidence -- wiretapping which was in the Court's view "illicit". Divulgence was held to include use in obtaining evidence and was comprehended by the statute solely because the Court determined that such a construction was necessary to discourage officers from wiretapping to obtain evidence.

In the case at bar, the wiretap was not for the purposes of obtaining evidence but rather for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information. The "broad considerations of morality and public well-being" deemed relevant to the former purpose are not *mutatis mutandis* translatable to the latter purpose.2/

If those considerations are not so translatable then the exclusionary rule forged by the Court in *Nardone II* is not so translatable. As the Court makes clear, the derivative use of intercepted messages is prohibited not because of the statutory language but solely to preclude illicit wiretapping.3/

If, as the Court is willing to assume, the wiretap in issue in this case was not illicit but was, instead, a proper exercise of Presidential power pursuant to Article II of the Constitu

---

2/ For this reason, we urge the Court to reconsider those decisi cited at pages 44-47 of our main brief and at pages 22-29 of Judge Adams' dissenting opinion which hold that 47 U.S.C. § 605 has no applicability to the type of wiretapping in issue here. See also *United States* v. *Lemonakis*, *supra* at pp. 35-40.

3/ In this respect, the basic justification for the rule is thus identical to that with respect to the Fourth Amendment exclusionar rule -- the belief that it is the only effective deterrent to po misconduct. *Terry* v. *Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); *Mapp* v. *Ohio*, U.S. 643, 655 (1961); *Linkletter* v. *Walker*, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (

there exists no rational purpose for holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the wiretap has been derivatively used against *Ivanov*.[4]

None of the cases cited by the majority are authority for the proposition that such a hearing is required in cases where the interception was not illicit. *Benanti* v. *United States*, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), does not carry the absolutist implications which the majority reads into it. (Opinion, p. 14) The *Benanti* decision simply holds that the provisions of § 605 cannot be superseded by state law and that state agents as well as federal agents are included within its coverage. In the course of its opinion, the Court made clear that it was dealing with the kind of wiretapping, it had earlier characterized as "illicit" in both *Nardone* decisions, *i.e.*, wiretapping for the purposes of obtaining evidence. The opinion does not suggest that a divulgence of a lawful interception would constitute a violation of § 605. Moreover, it expressly refused to reach the issue reached by the majority in this case -- *i.e.*, whether both interception and divulgence are necessary elements of a § 605 violation. 355 U.S. at 100, f.n. 5. Thus, all that *Benanti* stands for is the proposition that §605 applies uniformly to state and federal officers.

---

[4] In advancing this contention, we do not mean to be understood as implicitly stating that there was, in fact, any such derivative use much less that "a substantial portion of the case" against Ivanov was the fruit of the wiretap in issue. As either this Court or the District Court can readily determine *in camera*, the wiretap materials are wholly irrelevant to the issues and evidence in this case.

Indeed, the very same day the Court decided Benanti, it also decided in Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957), that not every interception is an "interception as Congress intended the word to be used" in 47 U.S.C. § 605, stating that "(e)very statute must be interpreted in the light of reason and common understanding to reach the results intended." 355 U.S. at 109. In that case, over a strong dissent, the Court held that where one party to a telephone conversation gives the police authority to listen in on an extension, there has been no interception "as Congress intended the word to be used." Id. (Emphasis added) See also United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1955), affd per curiam 351 U.S. 916 (1956) (holding it would defeat the policy of § 605 to bar testimony as to the content of an intercepted illegal private broadcast).

Therefore, neither Benanti nor United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir., 1950), also relied upon by the majority require a hearing in this case because neither case addressed the legality of the wiretaps in question "Instead", as Judge Adams correctly notes with specific reference to Coplon, "the court merely assumed that the surveillance itself was illegal under section 605." Id. Such an assumption is not proper under the facts of this case and, indeed, is flatly inconsistent with the assumption of legality made by the majority.

CONCLUSION

The Court should amend its decision to require that disclosure of the surveillance logs not be made.

Respectfully submitted,

HERBERT J. STERN
United States Attorney

On the Brief

JONATHAN L. GOLDSTEIN
JOHN J. BARRY
Assistant United States Attorneys

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr [illegible] S. Miller
1 - Mr. [illegible] A. Brannigan
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Thompson
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Baise
Mr. Barnes
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Mr. Conmy
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Eardley
Mrs. Hogan

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 7/11/73

1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. J. F. Miller

FROM : T. J. Smith

SUBJECT: U. S. VS. JOHN WILLIAM BUTENKO AND IGOR A. IVANOV, IGOR A. IVANOV, APPELLANT

On June 21, 1973, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the conviction of Ivanov for violations of 18 U.S.C. 794 (a) and (c), and 18 U.S.C. 951, and the court remanded the case for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Ivanov, an Amtorg Trading Corporation chauffeur, and Butenko, a U. S. citizen, were originally convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. 794 (a) and (c) (espionage) and a conspiracy violation of 18 U.S.C. 951 (by causing Butenko to act as an agent of the Soviet Union without prior notification to the U. S. Secretary of State).

On appeal the Supreme Court found the electronic surveillance issue in their cases was "nearly identical" to the electronic surveillance issue in Alderman et al v. U. S., and considered it in conjunction with that case (394 U.S. 165). (Alderman had been convicted of conspiracy to transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce.)

In Alderman the Supreme Court, noting that no evidence or evidence obtained from leads which were obtained from an illegal electronic surveillance i.e., one which violated a defendant's 4th Amendment rights, could be utilized in a criminal trial, disregarded the Government's contention that a trial court's in camera inspection of electronic surveillance records was sufficient, and held that the defendant was the only one in a position to adequitely knowingly review such records to determine if the case against him was built on electronic surveillance. Consequently the defendant was to be given access in a discovery hearing to illegal electronic surveillance records of interceptions of his conversations.

Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, distinguished between routine criminal cases and foreign intelligence-espionage criminal cases, arguing that while full disclosure to the defendant was acceptable in the

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

JFM:kaf
(6)

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD former, it was not in the latter and might prejudice on-going intelligence operations vital to the national security. In these cases, he argued on behalf of disclosure to the defendant of only those portions which the trial court in camera found "arguably relevant" to the Government's case against the defendant.

The Ivanov and Butenko cases were remanded to the District Court, 1) to determine whether there was electronic surveillance which violated either defendant's 4th Amendment rights and 2) if so, to determine whether any of the intercepted conversations were relevant to his conviction. The Supreme Court stated that if the District Court found 1) that there was electronic surveillance but it did not violate the defendant's 4th Amendment rights, or 2) there was electronic surveillance which did violate the defendant's 4th Amendment rights but his conviction was not tainted by evidence obtained from that surveillance, the District Court should enter new judgements of conviction based on the existing record, along with its further findings, thus preserving the defendant's right to further appeal.

On remand in Ivanov the case revolved around two sets of FBI electronic surveillances on which Ivanov was monitored during 1963: 1) 2 microphones at the homes of Ivanov and Karatsuba, a KGB officer and neighbor of Ivanov (for the sake of argument, the District Court held them both to be directed at Ivanov), and 2) a wiretap on the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, and a wiretap and a microphone at Amtorg.

The residence microphones, which at that time Department procedures did not require to be authorized by the Attorney General, were conceded by the Government to be illegal, thus falling within the disclosure requirement of Alderman. The District Court held that the Government, on remand, made full disclosure on these microphones, after some argument, and ruled that the defendant had not shown, and the Government had carried its burden to refute, that Ivanov's case was built on evidence from these microphones.

The more important issues related to the other set of surveillances. The Government contended that those surveillances were duly authorized under the President's national security

CONTINUED - OVER

powers to obtain foreign intelligence, thus were legal and therefore it was not required to disclose the logs to the defense or to participate in an evidentiary hearing regarding these surveillances. The District Court, by reference to its finding on remand in Butenko (318 F. Supp. 66), agreed, finding that these surveillances and the Government's use of the logs from them did not violate Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 or the 4th Amendment, and upheld the Government's refusal to disclose or participate in an evidentiary hearing.

The District Court in Butenko found that 4th Amendment rights are not absolute, that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that the President's responsibility for foreign affairs and national security do not preclude him from authorizing a warrantless foreign intelligence electronic surveillance. It also found that, since Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, specifically 18 U.S.C. 2511 (3), clearly showed Congress' inclination not to limit or interfere with the President's power of obtaining foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance, Section 605 also must not have intended to limit this power.

OPINION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, JUNE 21, 1973.

The Court of Appeals makes it clear at the outset that it is not considering Title III since the interceptions in issue occured prior to passage of that Act. Both the Government and the appellant agreed that the governing statute at the time of the interceptions in issue was Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934.

The Court of Appeals found no error in the District Court's ruling that the Government had given full disclosure on the concededly illegal microphones, and that these did not taint Ivanov's conviction.

The Court of Appeals cites Alderman for the proposition that the question of whether or not the Government's evidence was obtained from electronic surveillance could be resolved only by an evidentiary hearing, and because the Government would not participate in a hearing on the second set of surveillances the Court of Appeals felt it had to assume "in the present posture of this case" that the Government had intercepted com-

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

munications and utilized the results from them in the criminal proceedings against Ivanov. (The District Court made an in camera review of the second set of surveillances, but never made a written finding that none of the Government's case was based on information from these surveillances; he only found in camera that they did not violate the 4th Amendment or Section 605, and therefore could not "...properly be considered on the taint issue" (342 F. Supp. at 931).)

(Note that Alderman ruled only on "illegal" electronic surveillances, and instructed the District Court that if, on remand, it found the defendant's 4th Amendment rights had not been violated it should reimpose judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court did not discuss the effect of Section 605 on the cases before it in Alderman.)

The Court of Appeals states that it is not defining the parameters of the President's national security surveillance powers under Section 605, but that the limited issue before it, with respect to the second surveillance is: assuming a constitutional power of the President to have ordered electronic surveillance of foreign agents in 1963, was it permissable for the Government, under Section 605, to utilize the products of such surveillance in a criminal prosecution.

The Court of Appeals then decides the case on this evidentiary issue and thus avoids the larger 4th Amendment issue of whether or not the President has the power to authorize foreign intelligence warrantless electronic surveillances.

The Court of Appeals recognizes that the President has constitutional powers to defend against foreign intelligence activities and to obtain foreign intelligence, and assumes, solely for the sake of argument, that he had the constitutional power to authorize these surveillances; however, the Court of Appeals draws the distinction, that was drawn by the Government for years, between the President's power to authorize such surveillances and the power of the Congress and Court to make an evidentiary rule excluding evidence obtained from such surveillances in criminal proceedings.

The Court of Appeals holds that the Supreme Court opinion in U. S. vs. Nardone (308 U.S. 338), interperting Section 605 as being a complete bar to the introduction of electronic surveillance results into evidence in a Federal criminal proceeding, was governing.

CONTINUED - OVER

Section 605 states that "... no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge...the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person." The Supreme Court in Nardone held that "no person" encompassed federal agents, and "divulge...to any person" barred testimony in court.

This Court accepts the interpretation that what Section 605 prohibits is the interception and divulging, i.e., that both elements must be present to incur the prohibition of Section 605. Thus, the President is not violating Section 605 if he only intercepts the conversation, but he is prohibited from also divulging the contents of the interception in court.

Since this Court assumed that intercepted electronic surveillance information was used in the trial and therefore was divulged in violation of Section 605, Ivanov's conviction was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings, viz., to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if in fact any of the Government's case was built on electronic surveillance information.

In further defining "divulging" the Court of Appeals accepts the argument that, the President himself will not conduct the interceptions, but that agents of the Executive Branch, acting as his representatives will, and that many others within the Executive Branch can also be his representatives to receive the results of such a surveillance, and that therefore it is not inconsistent with Section 605 to consider the Executive Branch (or at least all persons within the Executive Branch with a right to such information) as "a person", so that disclosure within the Executive Branch does not violate the Section's prohibition against divulging the contents of such interceptions.)

MINORITY OPINION, THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, JUNE 27, 1973

Judge Adams, disagrees that Section 605 on its own, or as interpreted by Nardone, requires the exclusion of evidence obtained from a Presidentially approved warrantless foreign intelligence electronic surveillance in a Federal criminal proceeding.

CONTINUED - OVER

He argues that Section 605 itself, its legislative history, and subsequent case law do not indicate that Section 605 intended to prohibit the President from utilizing electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence or to use the information gathered in cases involving a defendant's foreign intelligence gathering. He traces the legislative history of the Communications Act and finds its main purpose was to establish a Communications Commission and that it extended to wire communications almost the identical provisions of Section 27 of the Radio Act of 1927, which was thought neither to apply to federal officers nor to bar testimony relating to the contents of radio messages intercepted by them. Judge Adams notes there was no Congressional debate over the meaning of the provisions of Section 605, implying that if it had been intended to limit the President's foreign intelligence powers, there probably would have been debate.

Similarly, Judge Adams finds that in response to the Government's argument in Nardone that "a construction be given Section 605 which would exclude Federal agents since it is improbable Congress intended to ... impede ... the detection and punishment of crime.", the Supreme Court concluded "that the question is one of policy." Judge Adams argues that where the Supreme Court might, as a matter of policy, find that Congress intended to exclude electronic surveillance evidence in run-of-the-mill domestic criminal cases, there is no evidence it would extend the exclusion to cases involving the gathering of foreign intelligence. Additionally, this surveillance was not aimed solely at securing evidence to convict a person of crime, but at gathering foreign intelligence deemed essential to the security of the U. S. He thus concludes that the Nardone interpretation of Section 605 is not applicable to this kind of case, and argues that in view of the breadth of the President's authority in foreign affairs, Section 605 should be interpreted to limit that power only if Congress' intent to do so is clearly manifest, which he argues it is not.

Judge Adams then addresses the constitutional question avoided by the majority, viz., does the 4th Amendment allow the President to authorize warrantless electronic surveillances in foreign intelligence cases. He concludes that it does. He argues that constitutional rights are not absolute; they must be weighed against competing rights; and the 4th Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures.

Judge Adams finds that the constitutional responsibility to conduct foreign affairs is vested in the President; that the gathering of foreign intelligence and the protecting against foreign intelligence activities is concerned with the very existence of the nation; that as a result, the President has great latitude in this area; and that to require a judicial warrant prior to his use of electronic surveillance presumes that a warrant could be denied, thus interjecting the courts into foreign affairs decisions, in effect overruling the President in a field where he has the responsibility and they do not.

Thus concluding that the 4th Amendment does not and the courts cannot, prohibit the President from utilizing electronic surveillance in foreign affairs, Judge Adams argues that a defendant's 4th Amendment rights can still be reconciled with the President's electronic surveillance power by a judicial post surveillance review. If the court finds that the surveillance is related to the conduct of foreign affairs it would, ipso facto, be reasonable and therefore not in violation of the 4th Amendment. If unrelated, it would be unreasonable, and its results excluded from a criminal trial.

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

ANALYSIS

As previously noted Alderman dealt exclusively with illegal electronic surveillances, i.e., surveillances in violation of a defendant's 4th Amendment rights. It did not distinguish between "routine" criminal cases and foreign intelligence-espionage cases when it required that full disclosure of all interceptions of the defendant be made to him so that he, in an adversary proceeding, might determine if the Government's case against him was "tainted." Justice Harlan, objecting to full disclosure in foreign intelligence-espionage cases, and on behalf of disclosure only of portions deemed "arguably relevant" to the Government's case by the trial court after an in camera review, did not raise the issue of "legal" vs. "illegal" electronic surveillance, so presumably he was also talking about, and intending to limit disclosure even on surveillances which violated the 4th Amendment.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals assumes the Ivanov surveillances in issue were legal, but still cites Alderman as requiring an evidentiary hearing, and without that hearing feels it must conclude that Ivanov's conviction was based on electronic surveillance evidence, introduction of which must be excluded under Section 605.

At the conclusion of Alderman, when remanding Ivanov, the Supreme Court instructed the District Court that if it found the surveillance in question did not violate the defendant's 4th Amendment rights it should reimpose judgments of conviction. The Supreme Court did not consider the effect of Section 605 on the cases before it in Alderman.

The case has been remanded for further proceedings, apparently an evidentiary hearing on the second set of surveillances. The Government can opt to save Ivanov's conviction by participating in such a hearing, since none of his case was actually built on surveillance information; however this would require disclosure to Ivanov of his intercepted conversation at the Mission and Amtorg, a disclosure concession we don't want to have to make because of the impact it would have on diplomatic relations, ongoing counterintelligence operations, and possibily on future prosecutions. Additionally, the salvaging of Ivanov's conviction falls far short of the original purpose of continuing the appeals in this case, viz., to obtain a Supreme Court ruling on the legality of Presidential warrantless foreign intelligence electronic surveillances. Consequently, the Government probably will either ask for dismissal of the case or appeal the Third Circuit's ruling to the Supreme Court.

If Ivanov is appealed the Supreme Court will face three possible issues, the 4th Amendment issue of the legality of warrantless foreign intelligence electronic surveillance, the disclosure issue, and the Section 605 evidentiary issue. The Court could seize onto the Section 605 evidentiary issue, not considered by it in Alderman, to dispose of the case without reaching the 4th Amendment or disclosure questions; or it could stand on its instructions to the District Court and rule on the District Court's remand finding that the surveillance did not violate the 4th Amendment.

If the Supreme Court found the surveillance illegal, presumably Alderman's requirement of full disclosure would apply, and the case would be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to exclude any electronic surveillance evidence, and the Section 605 issue would be avoided.

If the Court found the surveillances legal it could:

1) extend Alderman and require full disclosure of all interceptions even if legal, possibly arguing something to the effect that Congress in Title III has imposed the requirement of full disclosure in those cases, and that a similar safeguard should be imposed on Presidential surveillances;

2) allow in camera review and require disclosure limited to elements "arguably relevant" to the Government's case;

3) not require disclosure at all if the Government proved in camera that the surveillances were related to foreign intelligence, possibly arguing that since the defendant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure were not violated, he has not been injured, the Government's case is not illegally "tainted," therefore, disclosure is not necessary, and, additionally, disclosure would be very damaging to national security.

Even if the surveillances were found legal, however, the Section 605 evidentiary issue would remain. A Hearing or an in camera review would have to determine whether any of the Government's case was built on electronic surveillance, and, if so, the Section 605 evidentiary bar decided with respect to foreign intelligence-espionage cases. Since the Ivanov case is not built o electronic surveillance evidence, presumably the convictions would be reimposed; however, supposedly the Supreme Court does not know this, and it would conclude that if the District Court found electronic surveillance evidence to be involved, it would be bound by the Third Circuit's finding that the Section 605 bar did apply, and the case would find its way back to the Supreme Court for a final determination on this point. Thus if the Supreme Court chose to rule on the 4th Amendment issue and found the surveillance legal, it would have to rule on two issues immediately, the 4th Amendment issue and the disclosure issue, and might eventually have to decide the third issue, the Section 605 evidentiary issue; if the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, it would have to decide only the Section 605 evidentiary issue.

CONTINUED - OVER

CONCLUSION

The constitutional issue here is, as was the issue in Nardone, a policy question. Given today's climate and public attitude towards electronic surveillances in general, unchecked Presidential (White House) power, the distinction between use of electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes vs. use for criminal prosecution, and the Supreme Court's tradition of avoiding constitutional issues if it can decide a case on lesser issues, I am inclined to think the Court would grasp the "out" of the Section 605 evidentiary issue, thus leaving the constitutional issue unresolved and allowing Presidentially approved foreign intelligence electronic surveillances to continue for the time being.

The practical result of this of course would be only to reverse the conviction of one man, Ivanov, presently at home in the Soviet Union. This ruling would not preclude post 1968 prosecutions based on foreign intelligence electronic surveillance information, since 2511 (3) presumably expresses Congress' intent to negate the evidentiary effect of Section 605 with respect to such cases: "The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the (powers enumerated in the statute, generally relating to foreign intelligence and efforts to unlawfully overthrow or endanger the structure of the Government) may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable..."

With the Section 605 evidentiary obstacle presumably disposed of by 2511 (3), it would seem that a post 1968 case on facts similar to Ivanov, or preferably one actually built on electronic surveillance information, would be the best vehicle for eventually getting a ruling on the 4th Amendment issue.

ACTION:

For information.

INQUIRY # 3

1 - Mr. Baker
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus
The Deputy Attorney General - Designate

September 17, 1973

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Sizoo

re SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REGARDING
THE FUTURE OF THE FBI

F.B.I.

Reference is made to your memorandum to me captioned "Substantive Issues Regarding the Future of the FBI" dated July 20, 1973, enumerating issues on which you desired the Bureau's comments.

Concerning Issue Three in your memorandum, I call your attention to memorandum from me to the Attorney General captioned "Scope of FBI Jurisdiction and Authority in Domestic Intelligence Investigations," dated August 7, 1973, as well as my August 24, 1973, memorandum to you under the same caption.

My August 7, 1973, memorandum proposed an Executive order to define FBI responsiblities concerning Federal statutes relating to national security. Mr. Jack Goldklang, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, pursuant to his analysis of the proposal in my August 7, 1973, memorandum, requested a copy of Section 87 of our Manual of Instructions concerning Investigation of Subversive Organizations and Individuals, as well as a copy of a study prepared in August, 1972, at the request of former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. These were furnished with my August 24, 1973, memorandum.

Inasmuch as this Bureau's extensive analysis regarding authority for our intelligence gathering was previously furnished for the Department's consideration in August 7 and 24, 1973, memoranda, I assume that your needs to study Issue Three can be met by reference to those communications without additional submissions.

62-[illegible]-34

REC-52

Assoc. Dir. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JMS:rlc
(7)

MAILED 2
SEP 19 1973
FBI

EX-110

12 SEP 19 1973

NOTE:

See memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 9/13/73, captioned as above, prepared by JMS:rlc.

70 SEP 21

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person- the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JM/T

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Baker

The Attorney General

August 7, 1973

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

Director, FBI

SCOPE OF FBI JURISDICTION
AND AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

0
Security Jurisdiction

During our meeting on July 26, 1973, you referred to a discussion you had with Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland during your confirmation hearings as to the statutory authority of the FBI and the Department of Justice in the field of domestic intelligence investigations. You then asked Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus to work with the FBI in weighing the pros and cons with regard to statutory authority in this area. I mentioned that research was being performed on this subject at the present time and that we would be in touch with Mr. Ruckelshaus with regard to this matter when we have completed the results of our consideration and findings within the FBI.

Actually, a study has been going on in the FBI for more than two years as to the scope of FBI jurisdiction and authority in domestic intelligence investigations. When Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III, was designated as Acting Director of the FBI, he instructed that a position paper be prepared concerning the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. A position paper was prepared which in essence stated that authority of the FBI in this field is based on legislative enactments, even though we may have publicly relied heavily on Presidential directives as the basis for such authority. Mr. Gray ordered an in-depth study made of the position and in August, 1972, a detailed report was furnished to him. The following is a summary of that report.

REC-29 62-66727-1824

Over a period of several months there were a number of public statements questioning authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations, particularly where there is no clear-cut legislative authority apparent. One of the most searching inquiries was contained in a paper presented by Professor John T. Elliff at a two-day conference at Princeton University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public Justice.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Cong. Serv. ____
Corr. & Crm. Research ____

TJS:rlc
(8)

16 AUG 8 1973

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

XEROX
AUG 13 1973
FBI

SEE NOTE PAGE EIGHT

A major thrust of Professor Elliff's paper concerned FBI authority derived from legislative enactments as opposed to that derived from Presidential directives, beginning with a directive issued by President Roosevelt in September, 1939. Professor Elliff is of the opinion that the 1939 directive, which was reiterated on three subsequent occasions, was magnified by the FBI from its original purpose to a definitive order to conduct intelligence-type investigations.

Senator Sam J. Ervin, as you know, had been probing into the nature and extent of FBI intelligence-type investigations. Senator Ervin had even announced that he intended to propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any person without that individual's consent, unless the Government has reason to believe that person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Other Congressmen indicated a similar interest in FBI investigative activities.

Our study revealed that the FBI had declared publicly over a long period of time that its responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field are authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential directives, and instructions of the Attorney General. The Presidential directives are obviously the 1) directive dated September 6, 1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953, and 2) Executive Order 10450 dated April 27, 1953 (and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order 11605 dated July 2, 1971).

In carefully analyzing the language of the first directive, dated September 6, 1939, and considering that the subsequent directives are all hinged on that one, we believe that there is a misconception as to the extent of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBI by these directives. It appears that while the 1939 directive fixed responsibility on the FBI to handle espionage, sabotage, and neutrality matters, it did not convey any authority or jurisdiction which the FBI did not already have from legislative enactments. It is difficult to read into this directive or in any of those which followed any authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations which would or could not be conducted under an umbrella of legislative enactments.

As a matter of historical fact, President Roosevelt in August, 1936, did request former Director J. Edgar Hoover to conduct investigations of subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism. This request, however, was a confidential oral request and there is doubt that any record of it was made outside the FBI. This request, or Presidential mandate, was based, incidentally, on the fact that the law provided that the FBI could conduct such investigations if the Secretary of State should so request.

The study revealed that while the 1939 et seq. directives did not grant any special intelligence-gathering authority to the FBI, we were responsible under these directives to collect all intelligence information furnished by local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies and patriotic citizens and to sift and coordinate all such information for indications of subversive activity covered by Federal statutes.

The study concluded that the FBI has the responsibility to conduct whatever investigations are necessary to determine if statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditious conspiracy, advocacy of overthrowing the Government, and other such crimes affecting the national security have been violated. In this connection we note that in a letter dated September 14, 1967, the Department of Justice advised that the FBI is continually alert to the problem of recurring riots and is submitting intelligence reports to the Department of Justice concerning such activity. This letter enumerated several Federal statutes and stated these could be applicable in using maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing on the question of schemes or conspiracies to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.

In other words, the Department was requesting all possible intelligence-type investigative activity based on the existence of certain statutes. We see this as being no different from our intelligence-type investigations relating to plans of groups or individuals to overthrow, destroy, interfere with or threaten the survival of effective operation of national, state, and local governments.

The Attorney General

Based on this study, we believe that had there never been a single one of the Presidential directives in question the FBI would have conducted and will, through necessity, continue to conduct the same intelligence-type investigations as were conducted from 1939 to the present date. We also believe, however, that in order to counter the criticism and skepticism of such individuals as Professor Elliff and Senator Sam J. Ervin that an up-to-date Executive order should be issued clearly establishing a need for intelligence-type investigations and delineating a clear authority for the FBI to conduct such investigations based on guidelines established by the Attorney General and adhering to constitutional principles.

The study concluded with two basic recommendations. 1) That the Department of Justice be requested to sponsor comprehensive legislation spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of intelligence information relating to the national security and; 2) that the Department of Justice be requested to seek a comprehensive Executive order which would cover any possible gap between statutory authority and Executive necessity in protection of the national security.

At first glance these recommendations may appear to contradict our position that we already have statutory authority to conduct security-type investigations; that this being the case we do not need additional legislative enactments, nor do we need an Executive order. But being realistic we think that the basic statutes upon which we rely for our authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations need to be updated to fit 1973 needs. Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2383, 2384, and 2385 relate to the national security, but the legislative history of 2383 and 2384 indicates that they were designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth Century, and Section 2385 has been reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court. These statutes are unquestionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introduced as H.R. 6046 and S. 1400 in the 93rd Congress appear to contain language which should fill our statutory needs, except perhaps for those groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteed rights.

As to the need for an Executive order, we think that two issues are involved. We have statutory authority, but what we need is a definitive requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelligence data he requires in the pursuit of his responsibilities based on our statutory authority. In other words, there is a need, from our standpoint, for both authoritative and definitive guidelines. The statutes give us the authority. The Executive order would define our national security objectives.

Members of Congress, including such men as Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, have proposed legislation to spell out jurisdiction and authority of the FBI in this field. It would appear that the President would rather spell out his own requirements in an Executive order instead of having Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill his obligations and responsibilities as President.

The political climate of suspicion and distrust resulting from disclosures coming out of the Watergate hearings could present an obstacle to getting any such Executive order signed in the immediate future. However, the rationale is nevertheless valid and when scrutinized closely, the language in the Executive order we hereinafter propose establishes definitive guidelines which have heretofore been unclear. It is my belief that we should go forward with this.

We therefore propose and recommend that an Executive order along the following lines be submitted to the White House with a strong recommendation for approval. The language which follows is merely to illustrate the type of Executive order which we think would be appropriate and does not necessarily represent an ideal format or style which should be submitted to the White House.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Whereas the Constitution of the United States was established to insure, among other things, domestic tranquility; to provide for the common defense; and to promote the general welfare for the people of the United States; and

"Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally imposed responsibility of defending the Constitution and the existence of the Government thereunder; and

"Whereas there have been continuing unlawful acts of violence perpetrated against the Government of the United States or against citizens of the United States or against persons entitled to the protection of the United States thereby endangering the domestic tranquility, threatening the common defense, and jeopardizing the general welfare of the people of the United States; and

"Whereas the Congress has enacted laws prohibiting acts such as treason, sedition, sabotage, espionage, insurrection and rebellion, seditious conspiracy, civil disobedience, rioting, assassination, kidnaping, deprival of civil rights, and conspiracies to commit such acts; and

"Whereas the President of the United States as Chief Executive in the maintenance of the Government thereunder must have intelligence information for appropriate decisions in the discharge of his constitutionally imposed responsibilities;

"Now by authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States and in the interest of orderly operation of this Government and in furtherance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general welfare of the people of the United States it is ordered that;

"The Attorney General prepare and issue guidelines, conforming to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis intelligence information essential to the execution of laws pertaining to subversive activity and other such activity affecting the national security, domestic tranquility, and general welfare of the United States."

The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concept of urban guerrilla terrorism has been adopted by various extremist elements in the United States. Bombings of public buildings and national institutions;

killing of police officers who, by their uniform, are a symbol of the democratic establishment; hijacking of aircraft in furtherance of revolutionary movements; terrorist assaults on foreign diplomatic personnel and establishments; and open declaration of war on our form of government are only a few of the violent acts which have been perpetrated by domestic subversives who seek to destroy or seriously cripple our Government. Terrorist guerrilla attacks which were once confined to far away places and related to problems of no immediate concern of ours are now possible in this country. Foreign terrorist groups in collusion with domestic terrorists have laid plans for an airport massacre of the type which recently occurred in Israel. Other foreign terrorist elements have laid plans for terrorist attacks on American soil. Already one foreign official has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists.

It would be folly to adopt an investigative policy based on the concept of investigation only when there is reason to believe a crime involving the national security has been committed. The FBI must obviously anticipate the crimes described above. We believe that in order for the Government to be in position to defend itself against revolutionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it, the FBI must have sufficient investigative authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations not normally associated with enforcement of the statutes. In other words we think the President has the inherent Executive power to expand by further defining the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance information concerning the plans and aspirations of terrorists and revolutionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Government. However, we also believe that such expanded authority must be formally set forth in an Executive order and that this recommendation is responsive in the Attorney General's expressed interest in laying more formal guidelines to our work in areas where definition is not now clear.

We consider the issuance of a new Executive order delineating our jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility to gather and report intelligence information relating to the national security to be a very important and high priority matter. We believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney General under Title 28, Section 533, United States Code, to be equally important.

The Attorney General

For your information, our own investigative guidelines as contained in our Manual of Instructions relating to domestic subversive investigations have been completely rewritten to conform with the concept that our domestic intelligence-type investigations are based on Federal statutes. These guidelines provide that in each instance, the domestic intelligence investigation must be predicated on information indicating that the organization or individual is engaged in activity which could involve a violation of specific statutes relating to the national security. A copy of the new guidelines was previously provided to the Department of Justice in connection with the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy to obtain a copy of the FBI's Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions. The effective date of the new guidelines was August 1, 1973.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

NOTE :

See memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 8/6/73, captioned as above, prepared by TJS: bjr.

Mr. J. B. Adams 5/9/74

W. R. Wannall

RUCKELSHAUS' ISSUE #2:
SHOULD THE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING FUNCTION
OF THE FBI BE SEPARATED FROM THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT FUNCTION OF THE FBI?

Reference my memorandum, 4/16/74.

Referenced memorandum enclosed a lengthy analysis of the above issue, which contained recommendations for in-house consideration. Mr Adams asked that an abbreviated version be prepared for referral to the Department of Justice, containing the conclusion that all three missions of the FBI, viz., law enforcement, internal security, and counterintelligence be retained by the FBI.

ACTION:

Attached is abbreviated position paper for referral to the Department of Justice.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

JFM:vb
(4)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
T ① - Mr. J. F. Miller

INQUIRY # 4

The Deputy Attorney General October 1, 1973

Director, FBI

TENURE OF THE DIRECTOR

Appointment of Director
of 7.39.

In response to your request, the following is submitted concerning the tenure of the Director of the FBI:

1. The problem:

In view of the unique position occupied by the FBI Director, is it in the best interests of the Government and the Nation to limit the term of office?

2. The present policy:

By statute, the Director of the FBI shall be appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate. There is no specified term of office.

ST-114

3. The issues raised:

REC-11 63-7865-108

There have been a number of bills introduced in the last fifteen months proposing legislation limiting the tenure of the Director to varying terms up to fifteen years. There has been no affirmative action taken on any of them.

MAILED 3
OCT 3 - 1973
FBI

OCT 5 1973

4. Options for future policy:

ENCLOSURE

The options are whether the tenure of the Director of the FBI should have no limitation or that a fixed term be established.

In my testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary in June, 1973, I indicated that I felt independence is achieved through tenure, and expressed my thought that nine years would be a proper term.

GLM:lmm (6)
1 - Mr. Callahan (Direct)
1 - Mr. Walsh (Direct)

~~Based on~~ Memo Walsh to Hunsinger, 9/28/73, GLM:pas.

ssoc. Dir.
sst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
egal Coun.
elephone Rm.
irector Sec'y

F257

54 OCT 10 1973 MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After assuming the office of Director I have had an opportunity to afford further thought to this question and appreciate that there are some substantial considerations that question whether the Director of the FBI should be restricted to a given term of office. From a practical standpoint, it is doubted that legislation to specifically restrict the term of office of a Presidential appointee is necessary. We know of no clear-cut authority to remove an official who has received a Presidential appointment. However, in the final analysis, the President would likely get his way because he has the power to appoint a successor, in this case the Director. In effect, in absence of tenure, the Director will be serving at the pleasure of whoever is President.

Should the position of Director of the FBI be singled out for restriction as to term of office? An informal check by this Bureau has disclosed no restrictions on the tenure of heads of other investigative agencies; namely, Central Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Secret Service. Accordingly, to single out the Directorship of the FBI would be in effect an exception. To provide tenure for the Director of the FBI would be tantamount to placing him in the same category as heads and commissioners of regulatory bodies and the Interstate Commerce Commission who do serve for specific periods. The latter officials make regulatory decisions affecting the Nation and specific terms of office have the effect of assuring a continuing balance of political power. The office of Director of the FBI is not political.

Experience has shown that cooperation by other law enforcement agencies and the general public has been instrumental in FBI investigative success. While it cannot be precisely measured, the degree of confidence inspired by the individual serving as Director influences the quality and quantity of such cooperation. The office of Director, a non-political one, has been charged with the responsibility of providing factual information upon which administrations of diverse political persuasions could formulate prosecutive policy and look after the internal security interests of the country. Singling out the position of Director of the FBI for a restricted term of office could suggest that perhaps the confidence heretofore placed in the FBI is no longer merited. Whether this would have any impact on the confidence and cooperation by the public would be problematic.

After weighing the foregoing and considering the unique role of and regard for the Director of the FBI, it is my conclusion that the Nation would feel comfortable with tenure for the Director of the FBI, and tenure would contribute toward countering any construction that appointment of any Director was political in the sense that the Directorship would not necessarily change hands with each administration. I feel the incumbent senses a greater independence through tenure.

I feel that tenure should be for a period such as nine years to minimize the occasions when appointive consideration would coincide with a change in administrations. Such a period would also provide the incumbent a sufficient feeling of independence. However, this Bureau defers to the Department on the subject of length of time.

INQUIRY # 5

The Deputy Attorney General   October 16, 1973

Director, FBI

F.B.I.

Should the Federal Bureau of Investigation
be an Independent Agency?

In response to your request, the following is submitted regarding Question #5, "Should the FBI be an independent agency or continue as part of the Justice Department?"

1. Problem: Should the FBI be an independent agency or continue as part of the Department of Justice?

2. Policy: At the present time the FBI is a bureau within the Department of Justice and, as such, is responsible to the Attorney General.

3. The Issues Raised: The question has arisen on several occasions whether the FBI, with its vast resources and knowledge, should be under the control of a political appointee, the Attorney General, or separated from the Department of Justice and established as an independent agency within the Executive Branch.

REC-38 62-24172

MAILED 2
OCT 17 1973
FBI

4. Options for Future Policy: The main options for the future of the FBI are two: (1) Remove it from its position as an integral part of the Department of Justice and establish it as an independent agency, or (2) maintain the present status of the FBI in its role as the investigative arm of the Department and, as such, responsive to the directives of the Attorney General.

20 OCT 19 1973

A brief look at history indicates that in 1908 Congress created the Bureau of Investigation and designated it as a part of the Department of Justice. The main reason for this action was that a certain void existed prior to this time in the enforcement function performed by the Attorney General. While the Department traditionally bore the responsibility of enforcing the laws of the United States and prosecuting violators of these laws, there existed no permanent group of individuals who could

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI

Assoc. Dir. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JFA:CSH (6)
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Baker
1 - Mr. Ahearn

XEROX
OCT 19 1973

Cover memo, Baker to Callahan,
10/4/73, re "Issues Raised by
Mr. Ruckelshaus - re future of FBI"
(JFA:csh)

JAM
OTJ

MAIL ROOM ☐   TELETYPE UNIT ☐

conduct the fact-finding investigations necessary to sustain successful prosecutions. The creation of this "detective" force by Congress aimed to fill that void.

Over the years the responsibilities of this agency, which eventually became known as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have increased tremendously. From a small agency charged with the task of conducting investigations regarding relatively few matters, the FBI has developed into an agency held accountable for investigating violations of over 180 categories of Federal Law. In addition, the FBI has become more than just an investigating agency, due to its maintenance of various data in certain areas indispensable to a criminal justice system.

The proposal to make the FBI an independent agency within the Executive Branch has been voiced on several occasions in Congress. Within the very recent past two bills were introduced in the Senate to achieve this aim. Additionally, as far back as 1947, Congressional sentiment existed to separate the FBI as an independent agency.

The proponents of this move have made it clear that the possibility of a politically motivated FBI has caused them great concern and led to the introduction of measures which they feel would go a long way toward preventing undue political influence. The argument is made that the Attorney General is almost always a political appointee of the President, whose views generally conform with his own. Those espousing this argument point to recent events as examples of how an Attorney General could use his position to political advantage and fear that because of this motivation he could easily manipulate an agency possessing vast amounts of sensitive information and substantial resources, such as the FBI, and easily misuse this organization which is subject to his directives as a part of the Department he heads.

The question arises at this point whether removal of the FBI from the Department of Justice is the proper means of assuring its justifiable degree of independence and freedom from undue political pressure. The designation of the FBI as an independent agency would simply mean that the Director would no longer report to the Attorney General, but would instead be responsible directly to the White House, as is the case with existing independent agencies. There appears to be some serious doubt whether an FBI Director would be more or less subject to political pressure when placed in this posture. The FBI must be responsive to the desires and needs of the American public and in this sense only should it be considered politically responsive. The danger of becoming enmeshed in partisan political dealings might easily be increased by removing this additional layer of Executive Branch responsibility which now exists in the person of the Attorney General.

Opponents of these proposed Senate bills note that, while some danger does exist in the FBI's reporting to a political appointee, a far greater danger would exist if the FBI, performing as an independent agency, became the arm of a politically motivated Director who was responsible to no one but the White House.

When one considers the possibility of an independent FBI, it is difficult to ignore the specter of a national police force at the disposal of the incumbent administration, a condition generally repugnant to our citizens.

The relationship between the investigator and the prosecutor is a very delicate, yet vital one. Neither can properly fulfill his role without the wholehearted assistance of the other. So it is with the FBI and the Department of Justice. A close working relationship has developed and must be maintained if the responsibilities of each are to be met.

The FBI does need a certain amount of independence and this fact has been recognized by even its most severe critics. In addition, Congress, in creating a new Subcommittee on FBI Oversight, has in effect insured a certain degree of FBI independence.

In consideration of all the foregoing, it is believed the FBI should remain a Bureau within the Department of Justice where it can properly perform its function to investigate violations of various Federal laws and report its impartial findings to those who will conduct the prosecution of these violations in our judicial system.

INQUIRY # 6

The Deputy Attorney General October 16, 1973

Director, FBI

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REGARDING
THE FUTURE OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reference is made to your memoranda to me, captioned as above, and dated July 20 and August 20, 1973.

Attached hereto is the FBI response to Issue #6.

Enclosure

JFH:CSH (6)

NOTE: Mr. Ruckelshaus' memorandum of 7/20/73 enumerated 11 issues regarding FBI organization and operation being studied by him. The 8/20/73 memo from him set forth the format for response. Issue #6 concerns the relationship between the Director and the Attorney General, assuming that the Bureau remains a part of the Justice Department.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Baker
1 - Mr. Emery

62-24172-349

REC-56

EX-112

OCT 19 1973

ENCLOSURE

MAILED 2

OCT 19 1973

XEROX
OCT 19 1973
FBI

F11

Assoc. Dir. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

56 OCT 24 1973

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Issue #6: Assuming the FBI remains a part of the Justice Department, what should be the relationship of the Director to the Attorney General? All the organizational and substantive relationships should be examined.

1. The problem: By Congressional enactment, the Attorney General has been designated the head of the Department of Justice and has been charged with the responsibility of supervising and directing the administration and operation of that Department. Further, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been placed in the Department of Justice with the Director of the FBI as its head. The FBI, through Congressional enactment, Executive Order, and Directive of the Attorney General, has been charged with the responsibility of performing certain duties subject to the general supervision and direction of the Attorney General. The Director of the FBI, a Bureau chief within the Department, having been granted enormous responsibility, must attain a proper balance between independence and responsiveness in order to properly discharge this responsibility.

2. The present policy: Disclosures of political and business corruption and unethical practices during the investigation of land-fraud and antitrust cases in the early 1900's, coupled with the recognition of the need for an investigative arm within the Department of Justice subject to its control, led to the creation of the Bureau of Investigation (forerunner of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) within the Department in 1908. In an effort to reverse a trend of political influence within the Bureau and the Department, Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone in 1924 appointed J. Edgar Hoover as Acting Director of the Bureau. Shortly thereafter Attorney General Stone dictated that the Director of the FBI be directly responsible to him with respect to the operations of the Bureau as a whole. In addition, it was understood that the Bureau was to operate free of political influence and limit its investigative activity to certain violations over which the Bureau had jurisdiction.

This pact was formed to give the Director, charged primarily with delegated investigative responsibility, a degree of independence recognized as so necessary for him to properly discharge his duties and

JFH:CSH (6)

Attachment to memo to Deputy Attorney General,
10/16/73, captioned "Substantive Issues re Future
of the FBI"

ENCLOSURE 62-2412-349

still remain subordinate to the Attorney General, who had been charged primarily with a prosecutive function. Codification of duties to be performed by the Attorney General as head of the Department of Justice, and the Director as head of the FBI within that Department, plus recognition that both must attempt to perform their related duties within the criminal justice system to the optimum, has led to the necessity for a substantial degree of independence on the part of the Director, balanced with a responsiveness by him to reasoned counsel, guidance, supervision and control by the Attorney General.

3. The issues raised:

(a) During the "Princeton Conference" it was said that time and practice have made the FBI a totally separate power answerable to no one. More specifically, the Attorneys General, Presidents and Congress have granted power and responsibility to the FBI but have failed to direct, guide and control it.

(b) During the course of the FBI investigation of the "Watergate break-in," allegations were made that the FBI has been too responsive to demands made upon it, particularly those of a political nature.

4. Options for future policy: The Director of the FBI, as head of the principal investigative Bureau within the Department of Justice, must be permitted to discharge his responsibilities free from political or unethical pressure. This must be balanced with his responsibility to remain responsive to the Attorney General's leadership and direction of that Department having as one of its principal functions the enforcement of the Federal law through prosecution. A Congressional oversight committee, available to give the FBI counsel, guidance and direction, could greatly assist the FBI in achieving and maintaining this balance.

There must be an efficient working relationship, with free and open channels of communication between the Director and the Attorney General, due to their mutual and interlocking responsibilities in the criminal justice field, primarily investigative on the part of the FBI and prosecutive on the part of the Department. This relationship should generate, at descending levels in the Department and the FBI, a commitment to accomplish an efficient work flow, in appreciation of the impact of this interaction on the entire criminal justice system. Because of the multiple and varied responsibilities of the FBI, the Attorney General-Director relationship and the counterpart division relationships should insure a smooth and coordinated effort which will enable the accomplishment of major objectives, while at the same time providing necessary FBI services to other elements of the criminal justice system.

That we are well aware of our role and responsibilities in this regard, and to cite only one of several examples, is evidenced by the operation of the Computerized Criminal History Program which provides much needed data to all branches of the system. Thus, to the extent possible, these relationships should be such that both objective achievement and mutual assistance between components of the systems are enhanced.

With regard to other continuing relationships having a bearing on the Attorney General-FBI Director relationship, the FBI head must communicate directly with the President on occasion, and with the recent establishment of a Congressional oversight committee, direct contact will be maintained with this group. Concerning ultimate alternatives in the relationship, the FBI Director must be in a position to register reasoned disagreement at times and, if the situation dictates, to take up important matters of disagreement with the President and with the Congressional oversight committee.

[illegible] - 1

INQUIRY # 7

1 - Mr. Miller
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. T. Smith

The Acting Attorney General

December 11, 1973

ST-114 REC-38 62-24172-356

Director, FBI

C ST

STUDY OF FBI PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

Reference is made to your letter of December 5, 1973, captioned as above.

I fully support the idea of a study being launched for the purpose of considering the need for additional legislation to enable the FBI to counter violence in the time of crisis such as existed at the time the FBI implemented the COINTELPRO - New Left.

As you know, the FBI has conducted an in-depth study of the scope of FBI jurisdiction and authority and it was concluded that additional legislation is needed to enable us to more fully discharge our responsibilities relating to the national security. Copies of this study have been furnished to the Department.

As for the general study of programs and policies of the FBI which was initiated by former Attorney General Richardson and former Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus, we have completed compiling most of the information requested. However, as pointed out during our meeting on December 5, 1973, information requested in item No. 7 relating to Investigative Techniques was so broadly requested by Mr. Ruckelshaus that it encompasses extremely sensitive foreign intelligence collection techniques. Such information is so closely held in the FBI that it is handled on a strictly need-to-know basis. We therefore do not feel that the information should be included in a study of this type which will be beyond the control of the FBI.

Mr. Petersen noted at the meeting that such information is needed if we expect to get legislation which would give us the authority we need in the sensitive foreign field. We recognize this,

94-4-2439
62-5047-
66-16337-
100-449698

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TJS:mah (7)

SEE NOTE, PAGE TWO

DEC 11 10 35 AM '73
RECEIVED

MAILED 2
DEC 11 1973
FBI

mah

4 - Xerox
JAN 8 1974

TJS

PERS. REC. UNIT

58 JAN 8 1974

MAIL ROOM

but we feel that such could be handled during oral briefings during high-level conferences. In this regard, you have designated Messrs. Henry E. Petersen, Robert Dixon, J. Stanley Pottinger, and Irving Jaffe to be available for consultation and advice.

I am designating Assistant to the Director-Deputy Associate Director Edward S. Miller; Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Intelligence Division; Inspector John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel; and Inspector Thomas J. Smith, Intelligence Division, to meet with the aforesaid for the purpose of resolving issues bearing on FBI programs and policies.

I feel that it would be highly profitable if the Department and FBI representatives could arrange a two- or three-day conference away from Washington, possibly at our Quantico facilities, where an uninterrupted discussion of the various problems could be held and during which recommendations for positive action could be formulated. If you agree, I will try to arrange something for soon after the first of the year.

NOTE:

A conference was held 12/5/73, between Mr. Bork and the Director. Also present were Assistant to the Director Edward S. Miller and Inspector Thomas J. Smith from the Bureau and Mr. Henry E. Petersen. Relet was discussed at the conference. The letter was deemed necessary because of the Carl Stern suit involving his request under the Freedom of Information Act for documents relating to the COINTELPRO - New Left. Mr. Bork feels that the Bureau and Department should study need for future legislation in connection with issues relating to the COINTELPRO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 'DJ-150
(Ed. 4-26-65)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF J

Info - mw

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	✓
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: December

FROM : Robert H. Bork, Acting Attorney General RHB

SUBJECT: Study of FBI Programs and Policies

Mr. Miller - See me plo

As you know, a general study of the programs and policies of the FBI was initiated in July by former Attorney General Richardson, former Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus, and yourself.

As Acting Attorney General, I have continued to support this effort and you and I have discussed various approaches to further implementation of the study. In addition, I have discussed the matter with Senator Saxbe to assure that he is properly advised of on-going matters pending before the Department. As a result of my conversation with him, I am certain the study will continue to receive the highest priority when the new Attorney General assumes office.

A new dimension was added, however, as a result of a suit filed against the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act by a reporter for the National Broadcasting Company, Carl Stern. The suit brought to my attention certain information which demonstrates anew the importance of the study. In my capacity as Solicitor General, I decided that the law and the public policy expressed in the Freedom of Information Act did not warrant appealing the district court's decision that the documents in question must be provided to Mr. Stern. I understand that the material is in the process of being turned over to Mr. Stern.

ST-114 REC-38 62-24172-356

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-

62-55

Meanwhile, it is appropriate--indeed imperative--that you complete as rapidly as possible the inquiry into investigative techniques that you and Mr. Ruckelshaus had begun. As you and I have agreed, the study should focus in particular on the programs and activities referred to in the documents involved in the Stern litigation. I ask that you report on these matters as expeditiously as possible, and that your report include a detailed summary of conduct in the past under such programs and actions taken to insure that the rights of individuals are not violated while essential FBI investigations are pursued. In terms of priority, I think that the program COINTELPRO--New Left should receive first

EX-PROC.

DEC 5 1973

12/11/73 TJS/mad

DEC 18 1973

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

XEROX

REC. UNIT

consideration. I also seek your recommendations as to any corrective action that should be taken either by you or by the Attorney General. It may be that the best solution would be additional legislation.

In addition to the general support of the Department and its personnel to assist you in your undertaking, I am specifically designating four Department officials to make themselves available to you, individually or as a group, for consultation and advice. They are Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, Robert Dixon, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, and the acting head of the Civil Division, Irving Jaffe. They will also be available to the incoming Attorney General for the same purpose.

I know that you agree with me that it is critical to the national interest that the FBI be able effectively to counter violence in time of crisis and that there be no occasion for public doubt concerning the legitimacy of its actions.

INQUIRY # 8

Issue #8

FILES AND THEIR DISCLOSURE

I. Problem:

Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus, in item #8 of memorandum to the Director dated 7/20/73, stated, "The whole question of files and their disclosure must be studied with a view toward understanding why files are kept, what categories of files there are, what information is contained in the files and whether the purposes for maintaining files are being met under present policy. In the issue of disclosure, when, where, and to whom must also be thoroughly examined."

As problems involved in creation and maintenance of files and disclosure of information contained in them are rather complex they are being discussed separately. Identification Division records consisting of fingerprint cards and identification records (Rap Sheets) are not considered to fall in this category of "Files" and their use is not being commented upon.

II. Present Policy

A. Why Files Are Kept:

Age of information in FBI files covers a relatively short span of years. FBI had very few files until the President in 1939, directed the FBI be responsible for the Internal Security of the United States. In view of this, and as the number of violations of law over which the FBI has jurisdiction has nearly doubled since 1939, the vast majority of FBI files have been created since 1939.

Regulations of National Archives and Records Service, (NARS) General Services Administration, which are based on Title 44, Chapter 33, Sections 3301 and 3302, U.S. Code, govern the type of material which we must maintain. Record material is described as including "all books, papers, maps, photographs, or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by an agency of the United States Government under Federal Law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the informational value of data contained therein."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

In view of this definition of record material, we are required to retain any material which we have made or received during the course of public business, and which has been preserved or is appropriate for preservation.

In 1969, NARS surveyed the records of the Department of Justice including those of FBI and subsequently instructed that certain categories of FBI files at FBIHQ be retained indefinitely. Included were files which would have historical value and would document policies, procedures, functions, budgetary policies, etc. In addition, vast majority of investigative files must be kept indefinitely although it was prescribed that only a representative sampling of certain types of violations at five year intervals be retained. These requirements apply only to files at FBIHQ. NARS has previously approved destruction of closed field files as all pertinent information is in file at FBIHQ. As a practical matter, however, field investigative files are retained 20 years before being destroyed.

The FBI has an active program to keep its records at FBIHQ to the barest minimum. While certain categories of our files, as previously mentioned, must be retained permanently, some are obsolete and valueless. With approval of NARS we destroy certain categories of such obsolete material. Examples of the larger categories are: Results of investigations over 25 years old regarding alleged subversive and espionage activities wherein complaints were nebulous and no derogatory information was developed, and investigations where the perpetrators of the crimes were never identified.

In order to reduce amount of storage space required for files we microfilm, with approval of NARS, majority of files regarding criminal violations which are over 10 years old.

B. Categories of Files

Material is filed into one of the following general types of files:

Main Files

A main file is opened on an individual, organization, or subject matter when there will be an adequate volume of mail or the matter is deemed of sufficient importance to be assembled in one place. Main files are referred to as "Case Files" when we are making an investigation.

General Files

General files are used for nonspecific violations, complaints over which we have no jurisdiction, and miscellaneous matters. General files are also maintained on various individuals; organizations; foreign, local, and state law enforcement agencies as well as Federal agencies (for information regarding cooperation, liaison, general organization, etc.); associations; patriotic organizations such as the American Legion; newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations which cooperate with the Bureau in publishing fugitives and to whom we give press releases; and activities of foreign nations such as Soviet and satellite activities, etc.

Control Files

Control files are maintained for the purpose of having all information regarding a specific matter immediately available without the necessity of reviewing numerous case files. An example is "Threats Against the President." Individual case files are opened for each threat on which we conduct an investigation; however, a copy is placed in the control file so that all such threats are recorded in one place.

Policy Files

A policy file is maintained for each violation over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction along with various specific programs arising from this jurisdiction.

Administrative Files

Administrative files are maintained on statistical reports, appropriations, conferences, training schools, FBI National Academy matters, and related subjects.

Set-up Files

These are files which are set up by locality or special category with subs for field offices, states, continents, or foreign nations. Almost any type of file can be made a set-up file if the volume of mail expected is great enough or if the supervision of the subject matter is divided among several Special Agent Supervisors according to locality.

C. Type of Information Contained in the Files

Generally speaking, there are no limits as to the type of information in our files. The FBI, by the very nature of its jurisdiction and its worldwide reputation as an elite law enforcement agency, attracts information. In addition to being responsible for investigations relating to interstate criminal activity throughout the United States, the FBI is also responsible for the Internal Security of the United States. Any intelligence organization survives on information uncovered by investigation or received from other sources. Citizens write to the FBI regarding any matter which they feel is against the best interests of the United States or where they feel an individual or organization might be violating a law. The average citizen is not aware of the jurisdiction of the various investigative agencies, local, state or Federal and many of them bring their problems to the FBI. The FBI will promptly disseminate any matter which is under the jurisdiction of another agency to that agency. The nondisseminated information is either acted upon and filed, or filed because no action is required.

In addition to the filing of material relating to criminal and security matters, the Bureau is responsible for a number of applicant-type (background) investigations and the information developed during these investigations is filed.

D. Disclosure of Information in FBI Files

1. Responsibility for Proper Utilization of Information

Among the foremost of the FBI's responsibilities is the proper utilization of information received either through investigative activities or through other means as this information may be of vital interest to another Government agency or a local law enforcement agency. It is extremely important that the FBI keep these agencies informed concerning matters in which they would have a legitimate interest. Information is disseminated at both field and Headquarters level, with FBIHQ making the information available to Federal agencies at the national level.

2. Basis for Dissemination

a. To Government Agencies

The FBI is under obligation to act as a clearing house for information which affects the Internal Security of the United States. This obligation is based on the following:

1. Beginning in 1939, various Presidential directives requested all law enforcement officers to report information regarding espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters to the FBI. These directives charge the FBI with the responsibility of correlating the material and referring matters under jurisdiction of other Federal agencies to the appropriate agencies.

2. The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the Armed Forces intelligence agencies provides that the responsibilities assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest. In addition, a supplemental agreement provides that certain information of general interest to the intelligence services of the Armed Forces be furnished them.

3. The National Security Act of 1947 provides that upon written request from the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the Bureau shall make available information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination essential to national security.

4. Executive Order 10450 (Security of Government Employees) requires the FBI to check names of all civil applicants and civil incumbents of any department or agency of the Executive Branch against records of the FBI.

5. Supplement Number Four (Revised) of Departmental Order 3464, signed by the Attorney General in January, 1953, classified all official records and information of the FBI as "Confidential." However, in accordance with long-standing policy concurred in by the Attorney General, the practice of passing to other Government agencies information coming to the FBI's attention in connection with the conduct of investigations normally within the Bureau's jurisdiction was entirely appropriate and correct. The Attorney General advised the Bureau it would be remiss in its duty if it failed to pass along information which might prove of interest to the general welfare.

b. White House Requests

Pursuant to requests from the White House, the names of individuals who attend, serve or perform at White House functions, or who may be considered for Presidential appointments are checked against Bureau files including Identification Division records for any derogatory data which indicates the individual might pose a threat or embarrassment to the President or members of his family. Such requests are handled expeditiously and any derogatory information is reported directly to the White House staff security officer by appropriate communications depending upon the time factors involved. At the request of the White House, the FBI conducts background investigations on Presidential appointees, White House employees and persons having regular access to the White House.

For a number of years we have followed the practice of furnishing significant intelligence information, both in the domestic and foreign areas, on a timely basis directly to the White House concurrent with the dissemination of the same data to the Attorney General and other interested agencies. The Bureau disseminates by teletype to the White House and other interested agencies summary data concerning civil unrest and acts of violence as they occur in the U.S. We also provide the White House by letter or teletype, as circumstances indicate, top-level intelligence data developed through our sources when it appears the President or senior members of his staff would have an interest. Much of this originates with our Legats and through our coverage of foreign establishments in the U.S. Simultaneous dissemination is made to the Attorney General who is advised of our dissemination to the White House.

It is noted that frequently the value of information being disseminated depends entirely on the timeliness of our dissemination. Therefore, direct and immediate dissemination to the White House is the only effective way to handle these matters.

FBI Legal Counsel on 7/20/72, set forth the opinion that the FBI had no legal basis to disseminate information to the White House concerning a current criminal case. It is the obligation of the FBI to keep the Attorney General fully informed and leave further dissemination to him. Acting FBI Director Gray instructed this policy be followed and we have been complying with this direction.

c. Exceptions

1. Congressional Committees

The Attorney General on 6/14/54, ruled that the FBI shall make name checks and investigations of individuals being considered for staff positions of the following Congressional Committees when such requests are made by the chairmen:

a. Senate and House Appropriations Committee

b. Senate and House Judiciary Committee

c. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
(Cooperation extended to this Committee pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946)

d. Senate Armed Services Committee

e. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

2. Supreme Court

The Bureau conducts name checks for the Supreme Court, which checks are normally limited to employees such as charwomen, elevator operators and individuals of this type.

3. Foreign Intelligences Services

As a matter of cooperation with friendly intelligence services, the Bureau conducts name checks for the following such agencies who have liaison representatives stationed in Washington, D.C.

a. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Canada)

b. MI-5 (British Security Service)

c. Australian Security Intelligence Organization (Australia)

d. New Zealand Security Service (New Zealand)

e. French Foreign Intelligence and Counterespionage Service

f. MI-6 (British Secret Intelligence Service)

g. BFSS (Bureau For State Security) (South Africa)

In addition, name check requests are conducted for cooperative foreign police and intelligence services through the Bureau's Legal Attaches stationed in foreign countries. In a very limited number, name check requests are handled for cooperative foreign police agencies by direct correspondence.

d. To Local and State Law Enforcement Agencies

The FBI traditionally has cooperated with local and state law enforcement agencies in matters of common interest. Pertinent information regarding local criminal matters if furnished to local and state law enforcement agencies when such dissemination will not jeopardize FBI investigations or informants. During Fiscal Year 1973, 189,910 items of criminal information were furnished by the FBI to local and state law enforcement agencies.

E. Type of Information Disseminated

Name check requests received from agencies within the Executive Branch, as a general rule, are checked against FBI files for "subversive-type" references only and criminal-type references are not reviewed. However, for some agencies, at their specific request, all references in Bureau files are reviewed. All agencies are aware of the limitation on the type of search made as they are furnished a copy of an FBI booklet describing procedures for requested name checks.

The policy of disseminating only "subversive-type" information is based on the fact that any agency desiring to obtain a copy of the individual's identificatio record showing his arrests may do so by submitting a separate request directly to the Identification Division. A second reason for limiting the search is due to economy as searching criminal-type references would require additional personnel and an increase in the cost of conducting name checks.

In response to name check requests, the Bureau disseminates the results of Bureau investigations, information received from reliable sources concerning membership in subversive groups, pertinent public source information, and information which good judgment and common sense dictate should be furnished. Information falling in the category of rumor or gossip which is found in Bureau files is not disseminated unless a compelling reason exists therefor, and when such information is disseminated to a requesting agency, that agency is alerted to the nature of the information and the fact that it has not been verified by the FBI.

Derogatory information on Federal employees is furnished to the Civil Service Commission and where common sense dictates, it is also furnished to the employing agency.

F. How Dissemination is Made

1. Name Checks

When possible a copy of the FBI communications is furnished to the requesting agency. A record is maintained on the original of this communication that a copy was furnished to the particular agency. When information is located in numerous FBI communications, the pertinent data is abstracted and summarize into a separate communication. A copy of this communication is retained in FBI files.

2. Other Than Name Check Requests

Any information received by the FBI which is of interest to another Federal Agency is furnished in writing to that agency.

G. Protection of Information Disseminated

When reports or letterhead memoranda already in the file are disseminated to a requesting agency, each such document contains the following statement:

> "This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency."

Data abstracted from the files and disseminated by letter or in letterhead memoranda form contains, in substance, terminology appearing above.

III. Issues

Basic issue appears to be whether FBI should retain and disseminate information in its files which is not acquired as a direct result of its investigations.

IV. Options

There are no options. We are required by law to retain information which has been made or received in connection with the transaction of public business and which has been preserved or which is appropriate for preservation as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities or because of the informational value of data contained there. With respect to the dissemination of information to Federal agencies, we are required by law, Presidential directives, and instructions of the Attorney General to furnish information in our files to agencies of the Executive Branch. The exceptions cited previously are logical and no change is believed necessary.

Likewise, the welfare of the general public requires that we continue our policy of furnishing pertinent information regarding local criminal matters to local and state law enforcement agencies.

INQUIRY # 9

1 - Mr. Baker
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus
The Deputy Attorney General - Designate

September 19, 1973

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. Sizoo

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REGARDING
THE FUTURE OF THE FBI

F.B.I.

Reference is made to your memoranda to me captioned as above and dated July 20 and August 20, 1973. Attached is the FBI's response to Issue Nine of your July 20, 1973, memorandum.

Enclosure

JMS:rlc
(7)

NOTE:

REC-38 62-24172-344

Mr. Ruckelshaus' memorandum 7/20/73 enumerated 11 issues regarding FBI organization and operation being studied by him. The 8/20/73 memorandum from Mr. Ruckelshaus set forth the format for response for Issue Nine, which concerns the question of a Civilian Review Board over FBI intelligence gathering activities. Our response opposes creation of such a board.

6 SEP 20 1973

ENCLOSURE

MAILED 2
SEP 20 1973
FBI

Assoc. Dir.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

EM

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person nel without the express approval of the FBI.

JMS/TJD

54 SEP 24 1973

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

9. Problem - The question of a Civilian Review Board for the intelligence-gathering activities of the FBI should be examined. This is a recurrent suggestion which came up at the Princeton Conference, in addition to other forums.

Policy - There is no Civilian Review Board to monitor the FBI inasmuch as various checks and reins are available to check or control the FBI. (See Options)

Issue - Is it necessary to have a group of civilians review the FBI's policy and activities to insure that nothing improper is being done and to handle complaints regarding the FBI?

Options - No Civilian Review Board is required since numerous means exist to control the FBI. These specifically include: a Senate Oversight Committee, the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Civil Service Commission, the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, the Federal Courts, the news media, and of course public opinion. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is in reality a civilian review board for the President. Its members are non-government personnel qualified in matters relating to national defense on the basis of their knowledge and experience. Especially is the FBI opposed to the concept of civilian boards exploring the field of FBI counterintelligence and intelligence-gathering operations which would adversely affect this Bureau's relations with foreign intelligence agencies. In general, we feel that the Congressional oversight concept should have put this question to rest.

JMS:rlc

NOTE:

See memorandum to Mr. Ruckelshaus, captioned "Substantive Issues Regarding the Future of the FBI: dated 9/19/73, prepared by JMS:rlc.

62-24172-344

ENCLOSURE

INQUIRY # 10

Issue # 10

I. THE PROBLEM:

What should be the relationship between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government? To what extent should the Federal Bureau of Investigation keep tabs on other Departments and Agencies through the development of sources and informants in those Agencies?

II. THE PRESENT POLICY:

A. Relationship between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government

The Federal Bureau of Investigation enjoys a close working relationship with the other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government and traditionally has cooperated fully with local, State and Federal agencies in matters of common interest.

Cooperation among the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal Departments and Agencies takes a variety of forms, including high-level coordinating committees, contractual agreements, and written guidelines for investigative jurisdiction in areas in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation and one or more Departments or Agencies have concurrent jurisdiction and share responsibility for enforcing a Federal Statute. The purposes of the committees, agreements, and guidelines are to promote the closest possible cooperation and coordination between the involved agencies, to insure there is no duplication of effort in any field, and to insure that proper coverage is maintained.

In addition to the above cooperative means, the Federal Bureau of Investigation maintains the following programs relevant to its relationship with other Federal Agencies and Departments:

1. FBI Liaison Program

In order to insure adequate and effective liaison arrangements with other Government agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation maintains a Liaison Section within its Intelligence Division at Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters. The objective of this section is to insure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's business with other U. S. Government Agencies is accomplished promptly, effectively, economically, and with a minimum of jurisdictional or policy problems, through appropriate high-level liaison with key officials of these Agencies.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

By the establishment of effective liaison contacts, we recognize and solve minor problems before they become major problems, requiring protracted and expensive negotiations between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Agencies. These objectives are achieved by placing experience FBI representatives in contact with officials at the highest levels of other Government Agencies where the Federal Bureau of Investigation either needs assistance or has concurrent interests. The Federal Agencies with which the Federal Bureau of Investigation currently maintains direct personal liaison are:

(a) The White House
(b) Office of the Vice President
(c) National Security Council
(d) Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(e) Drug Enforcement Administration
(f) Central Intelligence Agency
(g) Postal Inspection Service
(h) Department of Defense
  (includes direct liaison with various elements of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps)
(i) National Security Agency
(j) Atomic Energy Commission
(k) Department of Transportation
(l) Department of State
(m) Department of the Treasury
  (Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Secret Service)
(n) Immigration and Naturalization Service
(o) U. S. Marshal Service

Liaison with other Federal Agencies is handled by receiving telephone calls and visits from representatives of those Agencies, and by contacts with them on an irregular basis as the need may arise.

In addition to maintaining close liaison with various Federal Agencies at the Headquarters level in Washington, D. C., FBI regulations call for an effective liaison program at the field level. The Special Agents in Charge (SACs) of the FBI's fifty-nine field offices are directed to specifically designate an Agent (or Agents) to be responsible for developing and maintaining liaison with other Federal Agencies represented locally. In each instance, liaison contacts are developed to include a close friendly relationship, mutual understanding of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Agency jurisdictions, and an indicated willingness by the Agency representative to coordinate activities and to discuss problems of mutual interest.

2. Dissemination of Information

The proper utilization of information received by the FBI, either through investigation or otherwise, is foremost among our responsibilities. Such information may be of vital interest to another Government Agency and/or local law enforcement agency, and it is not FBI policy to withhold from dissemination information to which other agencies are justifiably entitled. Dissemination of information to other agencies is handled at the Headquarters level in Washington, D. C., as well as in the field.

The FBI serves as a clearing house for information affecting the internal security of the United States. This is based on various Presidential directives which have specifically requested all law enforcement officers to report information regarding espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters to the FBI. These directives charge the FBI with the responsibility of correlating this material and referring matters which are under the jurisdiction of any other Federal Agency with responsibilities in this field to the appropriate Agencies.

Various agreements between the FBI and other Federal Agencies provide for exchange of information of mutual interest and require that the FBI disseminate certain information to other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government. An example is the agreement between the FBI and U. S. Secret Service concerning protective responsibilities which requires that we disseminate to Secret Service certain information which by its nature reveals a definite or possible threat to the President's safety.

Under provisions of Executive Order 10450 the FBI checks names of all civil applicants and civil incumbents of any department or agency of the Executive Branch against FBI records.

In August, 1972, the FBI instituted a program aimed at providing effective and expanded coordination of efforts with the local, state and Federal Agencies having direct responsibilities in the narcotics field. Each FBI office has designated an Agent to act in a liaison capacity as a narcotics coordinator and FBI Headquarters has designated a national narcotics coordinator to expedite this program. Any information received by the FBI concerning narcotics is promptly disseminated to the Drug Enforcement Administration, which is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the various drug laws.

3. Cooperative Services

In its traditional role of seeking professionalism at all levels of law enforcement, the FBI is enthusiastically committed to providing expert assistance to local, State and Federal law enforcement agencies. Some of the facilities of the FBI available to Federal law enforcement agencies are:

(a) The FBI Identification Division. The FBI is the central repository for fingerprint identification information. Data from the identification records are furnished to law enforcement and governmental agencies at the Federal, State, and local levels for official use only.

(b) The FBI Laboratory. The FBI maintains a well-equipped technical laborato at its Headquarters in Washington, D. C., for the investigative and probative use of local, State and Federal law enforcement agencies, and prosecutors throughout the United States. An excellent working relationship now exists between the FBI Laboratory and the laboratories of other Federal Agencies for the exchange of technical data and procedures. The services of the FBI Laboratory are made available on a cost-free basis to all Federal Agencies in civil and criminal matters, and to State and local law enforcement agencies in criminal matters only. Expanded programs of scientific aid and training to State and local crime laboratories are presently under development and will involve the continuing, close cooperative efforts of local, State and Federal Agencies and the FBI.

(c) The National Crime Information Center (NCIC). The FBI's NCIC is a computerized information system established as a service to all law enforcement agencies--local, State and Federal. The system operates by means of computers, data transmission over communication lines, and telecommunication devices. Its objective is to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement through the more efficient handling and exchange of documented police information. In the beginning NCIC contained data concerning stolen property and wanted persons. In November, 1971, NCIC operations were expanded to include a file of offenders' criminal histories, which is known as the Computeri Criminal History (CCH) file.

(d) The FBI National Academy. Since its establishment in 1935, the FBI National Academy has provided a professional training program of highest quality to career officers from throughout the law enforcement community. At its new training facilities at Quantico, Virginia, during Fiscal 1973, 1,044 officers from various local, state, Federal and friendly foreign law enforcement agencies completed the intensive 12-week course. This course is designed to enhance an officer's capabilities as a law enforcement administrator and to better prepare him to teach his fellow officers.

Although many officers from other Federal law enforcement agencies attend the FBI National Academy each year, the number in attendance is limited due to the mandate that the FBI provide this service to local and state law enforcement officers.

B. Extent to which the FBI should keep tabs on other Departments and Agencies through the development of sources and informants in those Agencies

The FBI does not have the authority or responsibility to keep tabs on other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government; therefore, it does not have any policy whereby it checks on other Departments and Agencies. Because of the lack of FBI jurisdiction to keep tabs on other Federal Departments and Agencies, no effort has ever been made for the development of sources and informants in those Agencies for that purpose.

Although the FBI does not keep tabs on other Departments and Agencies, it has long been an accepted procedure among other Agencies of the Government that the FBI would conduct investigations of violations of Federal law in those Agencies where primary investigative jurisdiction is vested in the FBI, and we do so on a regular basis. Violations of Federal law involving personnel of other Government Agencies over which the FBI has statutory investigative jurisdiction include bribery, civil rights, Fraud Against the Government, Theft of Government Property, and Federal Housing Administration matters. This is not a situation unique to the FBI. A comparable situation exists in which the U. S. Secret Service is charged with investigating the theft of a Government check. It carries out its responsibilities not only in its own Department (Treasury) but in all other Federal Agencies as well.

III. THE ISSUES RAISED:

A. Relationship between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government

No issues are known to have been raised relative to the FBI's present policy regarding its relationship with other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government.

B. Extent to which the FBI should keep tabs on other Departments and Agencies through the development of sources and informants in those Agencies

In regard to the present policy of not developing sources and informants in other Federal Departments and Agencies for the purpose of keeping tabs on those agencies, no issues are known to have been raised.

IV. OPTIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY:

A. Relationship between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government

It is imperative that there be a friendly, cooperative association between the FBI and other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government. There must be an efficient working relationship, with free and open channels of communications, among all Federal Agencies. The Director of the FBI and the heads of other Federal Agencies should confer periodically on matters of mutual interest and definitely work together on all occasions. In order to avoid duplication of effort and problems of jurisdictional responsibilities there should be a clear delineation of duties and investigative limits for all Federal investigative Agencies.

A prevailing cooperative spirit throughout the entire Federal law enforcement community is a vital necessity in our Nation's war on crime and subversion. The rapid escalation of serious crime and the complexities of upholding the law in today's society have made it imperative that information, expertise, and resources be freely and expeditiously shared by all Federal investigative Agencies. Cooperation is a bilateral obligation. If the FBI does not continue to cooperate and reciprocate in exchange of information and resources with other Federal Agencies, it cannot conduct a successful operation. Therefore, it is my recommendation that the FBI continue its policy of working closely and cooperating fully with other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government.

B. Extent to which the FBI should keep tabs on other Departments and Agencies through the development of sources and informants in those Agencies

Inasmuch as no issues have been raised regarding the FBI's current policy in this area, and since a change in policy involving the FBI keeping tabs on other Federal Departments and Agencies through the development of sources and informants in those agencies could be most detrimental to all concerned, I recommend there be no change in the FBI's present policy in this area.

INQUIRY # 11

The Deputy Attorney General

October 1, 1973

5.15.- administrative

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Baker
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. Boynton
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REGARDING
THE FUTURE OF THE FBI Legal attaches
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to your memorandum to me captioned as above and dated July 20, 1973. Attached is the FBI's response to Issue Eleven of that memorandum in the format requested in your August 20, 1973, memorandum captioned as above.

Enclosure

JMS:rlc/bjr
(8)

NOTE:

Mr. Ruckelshaus' memorandum 7/20/73 enumerated 11 issues regarding FBI organization and operation being studied by him. The 8/20/73 memorandum from Mr. Ruckelshaus set forth the format for response for Issue Eleven, which concerns the retention of FBI Legal Attaches abroad to carry out FBI responsibilities. Our response recommends retention of the Legal Attaches.

1-ENCLOSURE

ST-117

JK

REC. 27

3 OCT 4 1973

MAILED 3
OCT 3 - 1973
FBI

ssoc. Dir.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
raining
gal Coun.
lephone Rm.
ector Sec'y

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

11. Problem - Should the FBI have foreign officers reporting directly to the Director?

Policy - The FBI has had Agents stationed abroad in American Embassies since 1940. This has not been a secret or classified fact. They are known as Legal Attaches and are not operational. They do not conduct investigations but depend upon law enforcement and security agencies of the host government for coverage of FBI leads overseas. They maintain regular liaison with such agencies in countries where stationed, as well as in other countries that they visit on road trips.

Legal Attaches are regularly called upon to secure in-depth cooperation from foreign agencies on criminal and security matters which are frequently of a complicated and sensitive nature. These matters frequently include requests for surveillances, complicated interviews, information from normally confidential records of foreign agencies, apprehensions and informal deportations. In order to handle such matters effectively, a Legal Attache must be proficient in the language of the foreign country involved and must have an extensive knowledge of its culture, customs and judicial process. On the other hand, he must have a thorough knowledge of FBI jurisdiction, regulations and policy. This knowledge, which can only be achieved through years of experience as an FBI Agent, is extremely broad.

In addition, in order to maintain the cooperation of foreign agencies, Legal Attaches assist these agencies by having investigations conducted in the United States concerning matters of interest to the foreign countries involved. These matters frequently involve major criminal cases, espionage and terrorist cases which are often of substantive interest to the FBI.

Numerous problems arise in connection with handling leads abroad and matters in this country on behalf of foreign countries. Since each country is different with regard to its laws, customs, language and tradition, the FBI has found it necessary and in fact invaluable to have a man stationed abroad, on the scene, who can insure that prompt and efficient action is taken and that cooperative relationships are nurtured and protected.

JMS:rlc
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE 6

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395-1445

ENCLOSURE

While our representatives abroad are still FBI employees, they are well aware that the American Ambassadors hold authority through various Presidential directives over the entire American presence in their respective countries of assignment and that all matters of interest must be coordinated with Ambassadors and their staffs. This includes political intelligence information acquired by Legal Attaches.

Issue - Is the FBI to continue using Legal Attaches to meets its responsibilities abroad?

Options:

1. Retain FBI representatives to carry out functions which have served since 1940 to assist the FBI and U.S. law enforcement agencies in their responsibilities having foreign ramifications, as well as to assist foreign law enforcement and security agencies.

The liaison function of FBI representatives serves to develop and maintain close, cooperative relationships with police and other investigative agencies of the countries covered. In the modern-day world, with the speed and facility of communication and transportation, crime has taken on immense international aspects which require constant liaison attention.

Accomplishments attained by the FBI through the liaison activities of the Legal Attaches with foreign law enforcment agencies in the past fiscal year (1973) include 1,047 FBI fugitives located; 109 fugitives located for state, local and other agencies; 167 automobiles recovered; and total property recovered worth $2,260,725.00.

Retention of Legal Attaches will permit further accomplishments, such as in several specific cases set forth below. It is firmly believed that these successes would not have occurred in the absence of personal and direct FBI liaison with foreign police agencies in the countries involved.

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE

The Legal Attache, Beirut, has obtained through contacts a considerable amount of vital information concerning Arab terrorist activities which have become in recent years a major law enforcement problem throughout the world. The Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department have congratulated us on the intelligence information developed by this particular Legal Attache. In addition, he recently uncovered an international car theft ring involving the theft of over 180 cars stolen in the U.S. and valued at $700,000.

The Legal Attache, Buenos Aires, located and is currently attempting to arrange for the return of a subject from Argentina who was involved in a $200,000 fraudulent traveler's check case. This office has also been successful in tentatively identifying two individuals in Argentina who have been involved in the disposition of part of $8,000 worth of securities and blank money orders stolen in Chicago in 1971 during a robbery in which the owner was shot. This Legal Attache was commended by the American Ambassador in Buenos Aires for the part he played in the successful recovery of a hijacked American airliner in Buenos Aires which occurred without loss of life or damage to the aircraft. The Legal Attache, Buenos Aires, also played a leading role in preventing Meyer Lansky, the financial wizard of U.S. organized crime, from receiving asylum in South America. This action resulted in Lansky's return to the U.S. and arrest by the FBI on Federal criminal contempt charges.

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE

The Legal Attache, London, has valuable contacts not only with New Scotland Yard but also with all major police departments in Great Britain. Time and again his office has acted as a conduit in major cases involving British and FBI interests. He also maintains close liaison with British intelligence services. The recent rash of letter bombs, one of of which wounded an employee of the British Embassy in Washington, has called for immediate and close liaison with British authorities. FBI bomb experts collaborated closely with Scotland Yard in London to the benefit of both agencies. Since the U.S. and Great Britain are prime targets of Soviet espionage, numerous instances of cooperation in this very delicate and secretive field have occurred between the FBI and the British intelligence service. This would be most difficult had we not had a Legal Attache stationed in London.

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE

The Legal Attache, Madrid, through the cooperation of Spanish police, was able to effect 24-hour coverage on an Arab Al Fatah representative from Puerto Rico who visited and made contacts in Spain in June of this year. He also was able to arrange similar coverage on a visit to Madrid in 1973 of John Joseph Lombardozzi of the Carlo Gambino family of La Cosa Nostra. The extensive police work needed for such coverage would certainly not have been put forth by the Spanish police had they not had a close personal friendship with and confidence in our Legal Attache in Madrid.

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE

The Legal Attaches in Manila and Mexico City combined in a joint effort which resulted in the capture and return to the U.S. of a fugitive in connection with the theft of over 1 million dollars in California. This individual had fled to Australia in 1970 and extradition was impossible. The Legal Attache, Manila, who handles Australia, determined that subject regularly traveled to Mexico. The Legal Attache, Mexico City, arranged for his apprehension by Mexican authorities on a visit to that country.

Another example of the importance of foreign offices concerns the kidnaping of a Mexican child in Pueblo, Mexico, by an American citizen. Ransom in the amount of $105,000 was paid in New Orleans and the child was safely recovered in a motel in Louisiana. Mexican police authorities developed very little information concerning this matter. The Legal Attache, Mexico City, however, through investigative guidance established the identity of the kidnaper and the fact that he had an estranged wife residing in Australia. The Legal Attache, Manila, working through Australian police had this woman interviewed with negative results. Australian police authorities were then guided into checking her finances and determined she had received large sums of money from Tel Aviv, Israel.

The Legal Attache, Tel Aviv, through Israeli police located the subject, recovered part of the ransom money and arranged for his extradition to the U.S. where he is awaiting trial in New Orleans. There is no doubt that this case would not have been solved had we not had Legal Attaches in the above-mentioned locations. The foreign police agencies involved had come up with negative information and only through personal contact and on-the-scene counsel by our experienced Legal Attaches, were local authorities able to produce the information required for the successful conclusion of this case.

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE

The Legal Attache, Tel Aviv, has effected a close working relationship with Israeli police and intelligence agencies and regularly furnishes information which is vital to our coverage of the militant Jewish Defense League's activities in the U.S. and of Arab terrorist activities. It is extremely doubtful that we would regularly receive such information were it not for the presence of our representative in Israel.

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE

The tracing of Watergate funds by Legal Attache, Mexico City, through established Mexican banking sources, is another example of the capabilities developed by our Legal Attache system.

2. Attempt to accomplish FBI responsibilities with foreign ramifications by having other Embassy personnel handle FBI work. This option, while removing FBI personnel from foreign embassies, would require an increase in State Department personnel to assume a work load, based on August 31, 1973, figures, of 4,283 FBI cases in the 20 FBI posts abroad, including 734 in Mexico, 527 in Hong Kong, 498 in Canada and 401 in Great Britain. Expenses involved in the returning of all FBI personnel and equipment in these 20 offices would be considerable and would be doubled by similar expenses to assign additional State Department personnel abroad to handle the work formerly handled by FBI personnel.

More important, such a change would result in the FBI being represented abroad by personnel with no experience in law enforcement and no knowledge of the internal policies and regulations of the FBI. It would also result in a person outside the Bureau, not under FBI control, becoming intimately acquainted with numerous sensitive matters and thereby opening the gate to leaks or other embarrassing situations from a security point of view. It is not believed that Foreign Service officers who differ greatly in background, experience and training from law enforcement officers could effectively represent the FBI with foreign law enforcement and security agencies.

3. Have FBI interests abroad handled by the Drug Enforcement Agency, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Secret Service or other Federal law enforcement agencies which currently maintain liaison offices abroad. None of these agencies have the broad scope of investigative jurisdiction which the FBI is required to shoulder. Their standards, policies, methods of operations, investigative techniques and calibre of personnel differ greatly from that of the Bureau. Some of these agencies are actually operational abroad. No matter how well intentioned such a representative might be on behalf of the FBI, it is not felt that he would have the necessary experience and/or knowledge of Bureau operations to successfully function as a representative of the FBI. It is, therefore, not believed that this option would be advantageous.

4. End all FBI pursuit of foreign ramifications in criminal and security responsibilities by FBI personnel stationed abroad and conduct them by direct communications. This option does not appear to have any advantageous aspects and would tend to stifle effective foreign liaison. Only a man on the scene can be thoroughly aware of the local customs, tradition and judicial process of the numerous foreign countries involved. Each country is different and the unique understanding of these differences is vital for successful communication and cooperation. It is not believed that a supervisor stationed in Washington can adequately grasp these unique situations. If such an option is adopted, it is felt that our present outstanding relationships with hundreds of foreign police agencies would quickly disintegrate. Furthermore, such communications, because of a lack of direct cable connections with foreign countries, would force the FBI to utilize direct mail or public cable systems as opposed to secure methods presently being utilized. This would not only create long delays, but would also pose serious security risks. This option is, therefore, not acceptable.

Conclusion

For the reasons set out above, it is felt that the only effective way for the FBI to discharge the full scope of its responsibilities is to maintain its liaison posts abroad.

NOTE:

See memorandum to Mr. Ruckelshaus dated 10/1/73, captioned "Substantive Issues Regarding the Future of the FBI," prepared by JMS:rlc/bjr.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

1320- Bulky

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88296 Date: 2025

62- HQ -116395

Serial 1320 PT 2

62-HQ -116395-E1320 PT 2

FBI - CENTRAL RECORDS CENTER

HQ - HEADQUARTERS BOX 4254

Class / Case #	Sub	Vol.	Serial #	
0062 116395		1	1320	ONLY

2/13/100588

RRP004ZGA6

116395 - 1320 PT 2

SSC REQUEST

December 18, 1975

ITEM 1 a.
b.

1/13/76 AG letter

106

This has been abstracted

9, 11, (14- [illegible]) 21, [illegible]

Incident # 6, 9, 11

Question A

(Revised 2/24/75)

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY FOR SELF-DEFENSE
CHARACTERIZATION OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION
EXTREMIST MATTER - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The Black Panther Party (BPP), organized in December, 1966, at Oakland, California, by Huey P. Newton and Bobby George Seale, has the publicly-stated purpose of organizing black people to take control of the life, politics and destiny of the black community. The Party, operating the Black Panther Intercommunal News Service, publishes a newspaper called "The Black Panther," which at one time openly advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in a revolutionary program to end the oppression of the black people but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival program pending revolution. BPP national headquarters, aka Black Panther Intercommunal Headquarters, is located in Oakland, California.

While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order. Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 1973, issue of "Playboy" magazine, stated the Panthers' chief ambition is to change the American Government by any means necessary but that ultimately such change will be through armed violence.

Despite its claimed dedication to community service, indicators of the BPP's continued attraction to violence persist. Since July, 1974, Newton and other BPP members have been arrested in Oakland, California, for threatening police officers, murder of a 17-year-old female and the pistol whipping of Newton's tailor. Newton failed to appear on these charges and is now a local fugitive. Additionally, one died and three were wounded as a result of a shooting at a BPP-sponsored dance in Oakland, California, in October, 1974.

Incident #14 & 15

Question A

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Secret Army Organization (SAO) was clandestinely formed during the Fall of 1971 in Arizona. Membership to date has been small and it appears to have the same basic tenets as the Minutemen. In fact, several of those involved in SAO were formerly active in the Minutemen. The mail drop for this organization reportedly is in care of an individual in Ramona, California, who has been involved in Minutemen and white-hate activities in the past.

This ultraconservative paramilitary organization was recently involved in extremist activities in San Diego, California. Members of this group reportedly made threatening telephone calls to a local college professor who is active in a group which plans to organize demonstrations at the forthcoming Republican National Convention. Following these telephone calls, a member of SAO fired shots from an automobile into the professor's home, wounding a guest.

Incident # 21

Question a.
(predation)

#1A

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-6908) DATE: 4/15/74

FROM : SAC, NEWARK (157-2011) (P)

SUBJECT:
FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.
EM-WHITE ACTION MOVEMENT
OO: NEWARK

Re Newark teletype to Bureau 1/14/74; Bureau letter to Newark 2/13/74; Springfield teletype to Bureau 3/8/74; Springfield letter to Bureau 3/21/74.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. Enclosed is one LHM for each receiving office for information purposes.

NK T-1 is ~~PH 811-E.~~ informant
NK T-2 is ~~an acquaintance of subject.~~ confidential source
NK T-3 is ~~IP 3373-E.~~ informant
NK T-4 is ~~an individual in the Dover Township PD.~~ confidential source

This investigation is based on information which indicates the subject is possibly engaged in activities which could involve a violation of Title 18, USC, Section 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights of Citizens), Section 245 (Federally Protected Activities), Civil Rights Act of 1968, or related Civil Rights Statutes.

The subject claimed on 9/27/73 to be the acting Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan.

It is recommended DRAGER be continued as a subject of ADEX, inasmuch as he has since 9/12/73, been traveling the East Coast claiming to be a Grand Dragon of the KKK and overall coordinator for all right-wing organizations located on the

1cc 622 08

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

EX-115

157-6908-77

REC-10

2-Bureau (Enc. 7)
1-Cincinnati (Enc. 1) (Info)
1-Indianapolis (Enc. 1) (Info)
1-Kansas City (Enc. 1) (Info)
1-Miami (Enc. 1) (Info)
1-Philadelphia (Enc. 1) (Info)
1-Springfield (Enc. 1) (Info)
2-Newark
CFM/mla/jz
(10)

4 APR 18 1974

1 cc ISS
1 cc [illegible]
1 cc SS
WD71pen
5-8-74

7 MAY 21 1974

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

East Coast. The subject has twice been arrested for possession of weapons since September, 1973, and has been in receipt of white-hate extremist literature. DRAGER has shown a propensity for violence in the past and has allegedly admitted participation in a bombing. DRAGER has shown a willingness and capability to engage in terrorism or other such acts which would result in the interference with or a threat to the survival and effective operation of National, State or local governments.

One copy of LHM being disseminated locally to Secret Service, Newark.

Two copies of FD-376 attached, along with photograph of DRAGER.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

Newark in receipt of insufficient information to characterize the American White Nationalist Party mentioned in attached LHM.

Incident #22

Question A

On September 6, 1974, detailed information developed during Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation concerning the discovery of five (5) sticks of dynamite inside the Meditation Room of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Building, New York, New York, on August 7, 1974, was presented to a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ), Southern District of New York (SDNY), New York, New York, which subsequently returned a sealed true bill indictment against MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN, 101 Cherry Road, Berea, Kentucky, charging BROWN with violation Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371 (Conspiracy), 112A (Attempt to Injure Foreign Diplomat or Official Guest of the United States) and 970 (Protection of Foreign Diplomatic Establishments and International Organizations), on same date. Following the above indictment, a bench warrant was issued for MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN by United States District Court Judge WILLIAM C. CONNOR, SDNY, New York, New York, with $100,000 surety bond recommended.

SSC REQUEST

December 18, 1975

ITEM 1 b.

for retention, SSC unit

Dividers to

6, 9, 11, (14, 15), 21, 22

The following symbols were utilized to delineate some of the agencies to which the FBI disseminated information. These symbols are located on the bottom half of the first page of each document disseminated.

ACSI - Army Intelligence
ONI - Naval Intelligence
OSI - Air Force Intelligence
DEPT (ISD, CRD, RAO, IDIV, CRIM, IDN) - U. S. Department of Justice
SS; SEC SER - Secret Service

Incident #9

Question b.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 3/12/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-165706-41)

FROM: SAC, RICHMOND (105-5504) -P-

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM

Re Richmond teletype to the Director and WFO dated 2/27/69 and WFO teletype to the Director and Richmond dated 2/28/69.

Enclosed for Bureau dissemination are nine copies of LHM re possible burglary of Hunter's Haven, aka Potomac Arms at 0 Prince Street, Alexandria, Va., which is a gun dealer firm. Dissemination being made via FD 342 to the following:

116th MIG, Washington, D.C.
NISO, Washington, D.C.
OSI, Suitland Hall, Washington, D.C.
U. S. Secret Service, Washington, D.C.
Alcohol, Tobacco Tax Division, Washington, D.C.

Enclosed for the information of San Francisco and WFO is one copy of LHM.

RAO: ISD, CRO, CRIM, IDIU;
SS, ACSI, OSI
by RIS 3/18/69
HEF/lec

REC-103

105-165706-41 - 3

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encl. 9) (RM)
1 - San Francisco (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - WFO (Encl. 1) (RM) (157-2159)
4 - Richmond
(2 - 105-5504)
(1 - 157-2304)
(1 - 66-2521A)
RMC:skl (7)

17 MAR 17 1969

RACIAL INT. SECT.

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Richmond, Virginia

March 12, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Information was received from Inspector Francis Johnson, Alexandria, Virginia Police Department on February 27, 1969 to the effect that an unknown source of information to the Alexandria, Virginia Police Department had recently been approached by persons, which that source described as Black Panther members, had requested the floor plans for Hunter's Haven, also known as Potomac Arms, located at 0 Prince Street, Alexandria, Virginia. This company conducts business in the sale of firearms and ammunition.

COULD IDENTIFY SOURCE OF OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

The Alexandria, Virginia Police Department established appropriate surveillance at this company, and an unknown person was seen to cut through the cyclone fence approximately 7:30 P.M. on March 1, 1969, and thereafter crawl under the building. An attempt was made by this individual to saw a hole through the floor of the building, but the would-be burglar was hampered in his sawing operation by guns and cases, which obstructed his sawing as well as the cold and water under the building. He was seen to depart through the hole in the fence, which he then temporarily repaired. He was not successful in gaining access to the building nor in obtaining any weapons. No arrests were made, hoping that accomplices would also be involved.

Inspector Johnson advised on March 3 and March 10, 1969 that the police have a "monitoring device" at the building, which will alert them at the police headquarters to any unusual noises after working hours, inasmuch as they have withdrawn their surveillance team. He stated that the source of information is not a member of the Black Panthers, but that the source continues to describe the burglars as such.

A characterization of the Black Panther Party is attached hereto.

105-165706-3

ENCLOSURE

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther", which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America , revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITE[illegible]ATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST[illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Richmond, Virginia

March 12, 1969

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference Richmond communication dated
and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

Incident #
6-11

Question 6.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11/12/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO: Director, FBI (105-165706 Sub 15)

FROM: SAC, Detroit (157-3075) (P)

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
DETROIT DIVISION
RM
OO: Detroit

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-14-94 BY SP8MAC/EH (JFK)

Re Detroit airtel to Bureau, dated 11/8/68, captioned "DEVELOPMENT OF RACIAL INFORMANTS IN THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), RM, OO: SAN FRANCISCO".

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM and for San Francisco two copies of an LHM regarding captioned matter. Two copies of the LHM are furnished Secret Service and G-2 and one copy of the LHM is furnished the USA, all Detroit, Michigan.

The Detroit Division has pending cases in regards to LUKE TRIPP, LEONARD BROWN, VICTOR STEWART, MARIAN KRAMER, JOHN WILLIAMS and LONNIE PEEKS. Vigorous investigation is being conducted by the Detroit Division to ascertain all background information in regard to the above subject and if any allegiance is connected with the Black Panther Party of San Francisco.

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (157-1204)(Enc. 2)(RM)
8 - Detroit
  (1 - 157- (LUKE TRIPP)
  (1 - 157-2986 (LEONARD BROWN)
  (1 - 157- (MARIAN KRAMER)
  (1 - 157- (VICTOR STEWART)
  (1 - 157-2354 (JOHN WILLIAMS)
  (1 - 157- (LONNIE PEEKS)
JMP/cc
(13)

ENCLOSURE

REC-76

105-165706-15-6

NOV 15 1968

ACSI, OSI, SEC. SERV., ISD, DIV.
HOW FORW. R/S
DATE FORW. 11/18/68
BY:

DEC 1968

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

67 NOV 22 1968

This matter is being pursued intensively by the Detroit Office and contact is maintained on a daily basis with the Intelligence Unit of the Michigan State Police and the Special Investigations Bureau of the Detroit Police Department, both having direct interest in local black nationalist activities and conduct surveillances in regard to key black nationalist figures in the Detroit area. Racial informants, who are familiar with the black nationalist activity in the Detroit area, are contacted often in regard to an organized BPP in the Detroit area. Contact with the above sources has revealed that no organized BPP has been established in the Detroit area wherein the BPP is holding regular scheduled meetings.

In the event any information is received to show that a BPP is organized and meeting at a regularly scheduled time, the Bureau and other appropriate offices will be properly advised.

Sources utilized in the enclosed LHM are as follows:

Lt. WILLIAM MC COY, Special Investigations Bureau, Detroit Police Department;

Detective GORDON HURLEY, Intelligence Unit, Michigan State Police;

DE 1284-R (Prob);

DE 1286-R (Prob);

DE 1172-R;

CARL SIMPSON
Racial Informant-Probationary-Ghetto;

DE 1295-R (Prob-Ghetto)

The television program mentioned in the enclosed LHM was viewed in its entirety by SA JAMES M. PAIGE of the Detroit Division.

The enclosed LHM is classified confidential to protect sources of continuing value.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Detroit, Michigan
November 12, 1968

DECLASSIFIED BY SP8MAC/EH
ON 4-14-93 (JFK)

Re: Black Panther Party (BPP)
Detroit Division

A characterization of the BPP is contained in the appendix attached hereto.

Sources hereinafter referred to have furnished reliable information in the past.

On November 11, 1968, from 7:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m., WTVS Channel 56, a local educational television station in the Detroit area, carried a program entitled, "Facts About the Black Panther Party". The program was moderated by Lonnie Peeks, a local black militant associated with the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

A characterization of the SNCC is contained in the appendix attached hereto.

This was a panel type program with the following persons, all from the Detroit area, appearing:

Lonnie Peeks
Luke Tripp
Leonard Brown
Victor Stewart
Marian Kramer

Mich

Peeks advised that Marian Kramer was a replacement for John Williams, who had another engagement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and declassification~~

ENCLOSURE

105-165706-15-6

The panelists were introduced by the moderator Lonnie Peeks with the following titles:

Luke Tripp - Deputy Minister of Information

Leonard Brown - Deputy Minister of Education

Victor Stewart - Deputy Chairman

Marian Kramer - No title

Luke Tripp stated that the Black Panther Party is not a party that adheres to violence but is geared towards political education for the black people. Tripp stated that the Black Panther Party is running Eldridge Cleaver, leader of the BPP in San Francisco, California, for the presidency of the United States in Michigan. Cleaver is being sponsored by the New Politics Party. Tripp stated that the BPP is not interested in seeking or getting votes, rather it is concerned with presenting its program for revolution to the American people. Tripp stated that social turmoil as manifested by George Wallace, youth rebellions and riots in the streets, can be blamed on power being in the hands of the establishment and not in the hands of the people where it belongs. Tripp stated that the black economic, political and social condition as opposed to the condition of the whites is far below normal. The system has as its basis a cast system based on race. It is the relationship of the oppressor and the oppressed, superior to the inferior. Tripp stated that socially the black man is unable to control his destiny. School, police and welfare are all in the hands of the white people and the black people must grasp for what is left.

Tripp further stated the BPP has a ten point program that is geared towards elevating the black people out of the slums. He further stated that the BPP in the Detroit area is in the process of organizing a party and at this point has no definite meeting place or date. However, any persons interested in assisting the organization of the BPP in the Detroit area may do so by contacting Luke Tripp or Leonard Brown.

Leonard Brown mentioned the fact that the white policemen must realize that the black people are not afraid of them and will defend themselves in any critical situation. Brown mentioned the fact that a good example of the white police officer is the incident that occurred in New York City where 200 white off-duty policemen attacked innocent members of the BPP. Brown further stated that the black political leaders in the country are nothing but "phonies" and "Uncle Toms". He further stated it is time for the white power structure to realize that it is impossible to dictate to the black people as they have been doing for years and that the black people only want a chance to govern their community as they see fit.

Victor Stewart stated that the BPP in its useful state is not an "underground party" but an "above the ground party". Stewart stated that the only way the black people can excel or exist in this world controlled by the white man is to take what he wants. Stewart stated that this does not mean asking or getting on your knees begging the white power structure. He further stated that the key to the black man's destiny is through black political education classes in which he will be cognizant of the political structure in this country. Stewart further stated that the BPP's motto is "All power to the people; Black power to black people".

Marian Kramer, Negro, female, stated that the black female must awaken and play a vital role in organizing the BPP. She stated for years the black female has been neglected from the political system in our country.

Sources in the Detroit area who are familiar with the black nationalist movement, stated that they have no information at this time that a BPP is organized in the Detroit area and conducts regular scheduled meetings. These sources further advised that during other black militant organizational meetings the name Black Panther Party has come up; however, no significant meaning as to actually being established in the Detroit area is known.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

Re: Black Panther Party
Detroit Division

APPENDIX

1

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, also known as Black Panther Party for Self Defense

A source advised that the Black Panther Party for Self Defense (BPPSD) was formed by HUEY PERCY NEWTON, Minister of Defense, and BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, Chairman, in December, 1966, as a militant black nationalist political organization to combat "police brutality", to unite militant black youth, and to determine the destiny of black communities. The political philosophy was taken from writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of Communist China and black militant writers.

In March, 1968, the name of the organization was changed to Black Panther Party (BPP).

The official BPP publication, "The Black Panther Party - Black Community News Service", states that the BPP advocates use of guns and guerrilla tactics in their violent revolutionary program to end oppression of black people.

On February 17, 1968, ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, Minister of Information, announced merger of the BPP and Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and bestowed title of Minister of Justice, BPP, upon H. RAP BROWN, Chairman of SNCC.

SNCC is a militant Negro organization which preaches black supremacy.

~~NEWTON, aforementioned, is incarcerated in the Alameda County Jail, Oakland, California, awaiting trial on charge of murder of an Oakland police officer.~~

Headquarters of BPP and Huey P. Newton Defense Fund are located at 4421 Grove Street, Oakland, California.

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 Re: Black Panther Party
Detroit Division APPENDIX

STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE

The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), headquartered at 360-362 Nelson Street, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia, is a non-membership organization, which was born out of the sit-in movement that erupted across the South beginning in 1960.

Today SNCC identifies itself as an organization in the revolutionary vanguard. It advocates that to be successful it is necessary to develop a revolutionary ideology and revolutionary program.

According to SNCC, the year 1967 marked a historic milestone in the struggle for the liberation of black people in the United States and the year that revolutionaries throughout the world began to understand more fully the impact of the black movement. SNCC declared that "liberation will come only when there is final destruction of this mad octupus--the capitalistic system of the United States with all its life-sucking tentacles of exploitation and racism that choke the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The realities of black life, together with the recognition instilled in SNCC workers forced its members to further popularize the legitimacy of self-defense and rebellious when oppression became too great."

From May, 1966, until May, 1967, STOKELY CARMICHAEL was National Chairman of SNCC. As of July, 1968, CARMICHAEL resided in Washington, D.C., where he was affiliated with SNCC and active as temporary chairman of a black coalition group. In May, 1967, CARMICHAEL was replaced by HUBERT GEROID BROWN, commonly known as H. RAP BROWN, who served until June, 1968.

In June, 1968, at the Staff and Central Committee meeting of SNCC held in Atlanta, Georgia, it was decided to restructure the organization by equalization of responsibility by creating ten deputy or vice chairmanships. The primary purpose for this change is to take law enforcement pressure off any single individual.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
also known as
Black Panther Party for S[illegible]f Defense

According to the official newspaper of the BPP, the BPP was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY G. SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, Minister of Defense, BPP.

The official newspaper, called "The Black Panther," regularly states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to as "pigs" who should be killed.

The newspaper, in its issue of September 7, 1968, had an article by the then Minister of Education, GEORGE MURRAY. This article ended with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

The BPP newspaper, issue of October 5, 1968, had an article introduced with the following statement: "We will not dissent from American government. We will overthrow it."

DAVID HILLIARD, Chief of Staff, BPP, in a speech at the San Francisco Polo Field on November 15, 1969, said "We will kill Richard Nixon."

DAVID HILLIARD, in the "New York Times," issue of December 13, 1969, was quoted as follows: "We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government by way of force and violence."

In the issue of April 25, 1970, the BPP newspaper had an article by Minister of Culture EMORY DOUGLAS as follows:

> "The only way to make this racist US government administer justice to the people it is oppressing, is...by taking up arms against this government, killing the officials, until the reactionary forces...are dead and those that are left turn their weapons on their superiors, thereby passing revolutionary judgement against the number one enemy of all mankind, the racist US government."

The BPP Headquarters is located at 1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California. Branches of the BPP, and Committees to Combat Fascism, under control of the BPP, have been established in various locations in the USA.

APPENDIX

Incdet #
14-15
Gaitán b.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/22/71

FROM : SAC, PHOENIX (157-NEW)(P)

SUBJECT: SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION
EXTREMIST MATTERS

There are enclosed to the Bureau and to interested offices a letterhead memorandum pertaining to captioned organization. Five copies of the LHM are designated for the Bureau and three copies are designated for pertinent field offices.

INFORMANT

The confidential informant who ~~furnished the~~ information contained in the LHM is PX 783-E, who furnished the information on 10/18/71 to the Phoenix office.

COULD IDENTIFY INFORMANT

Inasmuch as the organizing group that met at Yuma, Arizona, was small and only one person from Arizona attended the meeting in question, the ~~possibility of uncovering~~ Phoenix' confidential informant would be an easy task. It is, therefore, recommended that the LHM not be disseminated outside the Bureau. No dissemination is being made at Phoenix. It is felt that this could be done at a later date when the organization has been developed in more concrete form.

NO

Phoenix' informant advised that the individuals spearheading the organization of the Secret Army Organization seemed to be SAM DAVIS, aka JERRY DAVIS, together with (FNU) BARRY, both of San Diego. The mail drop for the organization will be care of HOWARD CLARK, 1080 6th Street, Ramona, California 92065. Informant advised that (FNU) STAN seemed to lack enthusiasm for the new organization, and seemed to be more politically oriented along the lines of the American Nazi Party. Informant himself took a cautious stand toward the deliberations of the group. Names mentioned in the course of the meeting as being knowledgeable about the new organization are: ~~JOE BURTON~~, Las Vegas, Nevada; and (FNU) DOYLE, Las Vegas, Nevada.

COULD IDENTIFY INFORMANT

ST-103 REC 9 EX-101 23577

2 - Bureau (Enc. 5)(RM)
2 - San Diego (Enc. 3)(RM)
2 - Seattle (Enc. 3)(RM)
2 - Las Vegas (Enc. 3)(RM)
2 - Phoenix
CLC/jsh
(10)

ST-103

1cc 806

MCT 6 18 OCT 26 1971

AGENCY: ~~ICPSS, NIC, OSI~~, SEC. SERV, ~~IRS~~
DEPT: ISD, ~~~~, IDIU, ~~CD~~
HOW FORW:
DATE FORW:

EXT. ~~INT.~~ SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

PX 157-NEW
CLC/jsh

Source made reference to the opening paragraph in the "HISTORY OF THE SECRET ORGANIZATION" material attached to this LHM wherein a group of six Minutemen allegedly met in Northern Arizona in February 1970. Based on the general tenor of the conversations at Yuma incidental to the organizational meeting there informant feels that the meeting he attended at Yuma is the first official organizational meeting of the group. The assassination of Minutemen leader has reference to TROY HAUGHTON, former State Coordinator of the Minutemen in California, who has been missing approximately three years.

COULD IDENTIFY INFORMAN

Source advised that the organizing group mentioned in the attached LHM met in Yuma for the purpose of having access to the gun show that took place at the Fairgrounds there on October 16 and 17, 1971, under the sponsorship of the Kiwanis Club. This organizing group is interested in establishing the availability of automatic weapons.

COULD IDENTIFY INFORMA

[illegible] ATTention

LEADS:

The SAN DIEGO, SEATTLE and LAS VEGAS DIVISIONS will through confidential sources establish the full identity of the individuals who met in secret at Yuma, Arizona, on October 16, 17, 1971, in connection with this matter.

COULD IDENTIFY INFORMANT

The LHM is being classified CONFIDENTIAL to protect the identity of source, who is of continuing value and whose exposure could be detrimental to the national defense.

11/3/71

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

Phoenix, Arizona
October 22, 1971

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

On October 16 and 17, 1971, a coterie of five men met clandestinely in a motel in Yuma, Arizona, and oriented themselves with the plans and process of reorganizing the Minutemen under the same basic tenets but under the new name "Secret Army Organization". PX T-1 advises that the five known individuals who attended this meeting used first names only and traveled to this meeting place from San Diego, California; Seattle, Washington; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Phoenix, Arizona. The five are identified briefly as follows:

COULD IDENT INFORMANT

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

ARIZ

Name	Jerry Davis, also known as Sam Davis
Address	From San Diego
Race	White
Sex	Male
Nationality	American
Height	5'8"
Weight	150 pounds
Age	Age 33 (Approx.)
Name	(FNU) Barry
Address	From San Diego
Race	White
Sex	Male
Nationality	American
Height	5'10"
Weight	175 pounds
Hair	Brown
Miscellaneous	Wears glasses

Chief

B approx 1938.

COULD IDENTIFY INFORMANT

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

157-23577-

ENCLOSURE

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

Name	(FNU) Stan
Address	From San Diego CALIF
Race	White
Sex	Male
Nationality	American
Height	6'1"
Weight	225 pounds
Hair	Short brown hair
Eyes	Hazel
Build	Stocky
Miscellaneous	Wears small goatee
Name	(FNU) Si
Address	From Seattle, Washington
Race	White
Sex	Male
Nationality	American
Height	6'1"
Weight	235 pounds
Hair	Short, light brown
Eyes	Blue
Build	Pudgy
Name	(FNU) Everett
Address	Phoenix, Arizona
Race	White
Sex	Male
Nationality	American
Height	5'10"
Weight	190 pounds
Hair	Brown
Miscellaneous	Wears glasses
Age	38 (Approx.)

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

COULD IDENTIFY INFORMA

Source furnished the following four items of printed material, which had been prepared before the meeting for recruitment purposes and for dissemination to prospective

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

members for captioned organization; this material is self-explanatory as to a statement of principles for the organization and is being made an appendage of this memorandum.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

History of the Secret Army Organization

CONFIDENTIAL

One early morning in February, 1970, a group of six Minutemen leaders from four states met secretly in Northern Arizona to discuss the crisis that the arrest and imprisonment of two top Minutemen leaders and the assassination of a third had brought on the organization. Although some of these men had met before in their roles as Minutemen group leaders, others were meeting for the first time.

After much discussion, two principal points were agreed upon. First, that the Minutemen as a national coordination organization of militant right-wing groups had effectively been destroyed by the pro-communist elements inside the Justice Department. While individual units still existed throughout the country, few had the financial support or leadership to be really effective. Second, that the need for such a coordinating organization was greater than ever in view of the increased revolutionary activity by communists in the United States.

With these two points in mind, suggestions were put forward on a course of action to be followed. After a meeting that lasted all that day and far into the next morning, an overall plan of action was finally agreed upon. All present agreed to merge their individual units together and form a new organization under the command of one leader elected from among themselves, with the other five to be members of a General Staff that would advise and assist the new leader.

While retaining the basic programs and policies of the Minutemen, it was decided that not only should this new organization have a different name, but also a completely new chain of command and organizational structure. If the new organization was going to survive the attacks that befell the old one, a whole new approach would be needed. Never again could the arrest or death of a few leaders be allowed to cripple the entire organization.

For this reason it was decided that only a highly disciplined military type orgainization with a definite chain of command would have any chance of success. This then, was the beginning of the Secret Army Organization. Beginning with an original force of hard core patriots that numbered fewer than two hundred, the Secret Army Organization began the job of picking up the pieces and continuing to fight for national and individual freedom. Using this cadre of dedicated personnel as a nucleus, the S. A. O. has been recruiting and training new members in the skills they will need as the freedom fighters of tomorrow.

The leaders of the S. A. O. have no idea of fighting a last ditch stand. We have no desire to commit suicide ourselves, or to let our members do so. We have a strategy which we believe will ultimately lead to victory. Only one thing is essential. We must start preparing and training NOW! We of the S. A. O. believe that our country is worthy of any sacrifice. If you feel the same way, we invite you to join us.

CONFIDENTIAL

To Prospective Members Of The
SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secret Army Organization is the most active, most completely dedicated and most selective in its membership of all the many patriotic organizations in America. We are willing to make any sacrifice for our country and we fully expect that some of us will have to make the ultimate sacrifice before victory is achieved. Our very lives depend on each other. There is no place in this organization for bunglers, playboys or lukewarm conservatives. If you join the Secret Army Organization, there might easily come a time that your life would depend on how competently some other member had learned his job.

Unless you are especially well informed on the domestic and world political situation, it is probable that you have a lot to learn about the present threat our nation faces. Unless you have had many years experience in actual underground warfare, there is undoubtedly a lot you can learn from the experts in our organization who have developed and supervised our training program.

OUR NATION IS IN IMMEDIATE DANGER

It is possible that within a very few years, perhaps even within months, our nation could be conquered and enslaved by the communists. To prevent this we must know as much as possible about our enemies. Unless we know who they are and what they are doing we will not succeed in our efforts to maintain a free America.

THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

In driving an invader from your land the resistance involved goes through three stages of development.

1) The Underground Network
2) Active Guerrilla Warfare
3) Open or Conventional Warfare

The conventional warfare stage uses everything in the way of weapons that the enemy does but must also have active guerrillas and underground agents working against the enemy, too. In the present state of military tactics conventional warfare cannot succeed unless these other two ingredients are used simultaneously.

The first step is to form an underground network. An active guerrilla system must have the support of an underground network of approximately three times its own size. This underground must supply the active guerrilla fighter with supplies, concealment, information, etc. An underground network starts with departments of intelligence, security and propaganda in that order.

Sabotage, espionage, subversion, infiltration, escape and evasion, training, clandestine fabrication of supplies, counterfeiting enemy documents, recruiting, communications and propaganda are other phases of underground activity. Each member of the Secret Army Organization, to be effective, must have a working knowledge of all these tactics as well as the military tactics more commonly associated with guerrilla activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

ASSIGNMENT TO UNITS

CONFIDENTIAL

Many people that inquire about membership in the Secret Army Organization seem to have an idea that they will be immediately accepted into an active unit. Look at it this way. Suppose you had spent a year or more carefully recruiting and training until you had a hard hitting team where every individual was reliable, dedicated, and had confidence in his fellow unit members. Wouldn't it make you mad to have the national or regional organization assign some rank amateur to your unit that you you knew little or nothing about?

Before any new member is assigned to an active unit or to an important underground project, he must undergo a period of training. During this training he will be directed through the mails by an experienced member and some of his activities may be observed by other members without his knowledge. Only when a new member proves himself to be conscientious, trustworthy, self-disciplined and able to operate effectively alone will he be accepted as a "secure member" and invited to participate with other unit members in a teamwork operation.

EXPENSES

Unfortunately, most good things don't come cheap. Although we make every effort to keep down the expense of membership in the Secret Army Organization, you must expect to pay your own way.

Dues to the Secret Army Organization are $3.00 per month. This money is absolutely necessary for use to maintain our central files and headquarters, for postage and printing, to finance our extensive intelligence network, and to maintain training areas.

Each member will have other expenses depending on the type of activity he is engaged in. Every member will be expected to buy his own gun, ammunition and other basic combat equipment. During training the new member may be expected to buy certain books or subscribe to certain magazines that his work requires. During this time the new member will also be supplied with reading material on the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare. This home work will make it possible for him to fit in quickly to an active unit and participate effectively in actual maneuvers, marksmanship training, etc.

Following this preliminary training a member may be either assigned to an existing unit, assisted in organizing his own unit if he has shown sufficient leadership qualities or become part of an underground network.

Upon your acceptance into the Secret Army Organization you will be given a definite series of projects described in writing so you will know exactly what will be expected of you.

We hope that you can succeed in this effort because your country desperately needs patriots at this time.

CONFIDENTIAL

Secret Army Organization

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE TO APPLICANT: All information on this form will be kept confidential. All records of members of the Secret Army Organization are stored in a way that they can be swiftly destroyed to keep them from falling into unauthorized hands.

Name ______________________ Sex ________ Age ________

Address ______________________ Marital Status ________
(Street)

State ______________________ Wife's Name ________

Zip Code ______________________ Telephone ________

Date of Birth ______________________
(Month) (Day) (Year)

Occupation ______________________ Education ________

Special Subjects Studied ______________________

Do You Speak or Read Any Foreign Language? ______________________

Veteran ________ Branch ________ Highest Rank ________

What Service Training Have You Had That You Feel Would Be Beneficial To This Organization? ______________________

Physical Description: Height ________ Weight ________ Color Eyes ________

Color Hair ________ Health: Good ________ Fair ________ Poor ________

Any Physical Disabilities or Limitations? ______________________

Any Public Speaking or Organizing Experience? ________ If Yes, Pleas Explain: ________

____

How Many Hours A Week Could You Devote To Working And Training With the S. A. O. ?

Hours ________ Best Time: AM ________ PM ________ Weekdays ________ Weekends ________

CERTIFICATION

I am a loyal American Citizen dedicated to the defense and survival of the United States as a Constitutional Republic, free from all socialist and communist policies. Enclosed is my $5.00 membership fee. I agree to pay $3.00 each month to the Secret Army Organization as membership dues.

CONFIDENTIAL

Signature of Applicant ______________________ Date ________

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Phoenix, Arizona
October 22, 1971

Title SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

Character

Reference Memorandum, dated and captioned as above, at Phoenix, Arizona.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Incident #21

Question b.

(1st dissem.)

#14

FD-263 (Rev. 3-17-65)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
RICHMOND	RICHMOND	1/31/67	4/8/66 - 1/21/67

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.	SA JOSEPH A. MARION, JR.	nlh
	CHARACTER OF CASE RM (ORGANIZATION)	

SUMMARY REPORT

ENCLOSURE:

TO BUREAU: (1) One photograph of FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:

This report is the initial nonprosecutive summary report concerning captioned individual.

The original of a FD-376 and a copy thereof are being used to transmit two of the seven copies designated for the Bureau; another copy of the FD-376 is being used to transmit a copy of this report to the U. S. Secret Service, 1800 G Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

Case has been: Pending over one year ☐ Yes ☐ No; Pending prosecution over six months ☐ Yes ☐ No

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

7-Bureau (Encl. 1)(REGISTERED MAIL)
1-Newark (157-2011)(Info)(RM)
1-Military District of Washington, WDC (REGISTERED MAIL)
1-U. S. Naval Investigative Service Office, WDC (REGISTERED MAIL)
1-OSI, Suitland Hall, WDC (RM)
1-U. S. Secret Service, 1800 G St., N. W., WDC (RM) (Encl. 1)
2-Richmond (157-1558)

ENCLOSURE

6908-1

FEB 6 1967

MCT-43

REC-82

INT. SEC.

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	AGENCY: ACSI, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.;	
Request Recd.	[illegible] ISD, CRD, RAO	
Date Fwd.	DATE FORW:	3/13/67
How Fwd.	HOW FORW:	R/S
By	BY: FEB 15 1967	JAM:jr

Notations

INFORMANTS:

Identity	Location
RH T-1 is CS RH 94-R Confidential Source	157-1558-4 Instant Report 1/21/67 157-1558-4 157-1558-1 157-1558-2 157-1558-4 157-93-7881
RH T-2 is. DL 318-CS Confidential Source	157-93-8485

LEAD:

RICHMOND

AT RICHMOND, VIRGINIA Will prepare a non-prosecutive summary report after a six-months period.

FD-376 (Rev. 11-12-65)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
January 31, 1967

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.
2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.
3. ☐ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.
4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.
5. ☒ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:
    - (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
    - (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
    - (c) ☒ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.
6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☒ enclosed ☐ is not available
☐ may be available through ______

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s) 2 (Photo and report)
U. S. Secret Service, 1800 G Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. (RM)

Enclosure(s) 1
(REGISTERED MAIL)

(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REGISTERED MAIL:
1-Military District of Washington, Washington, D. C.
1-U. S. Naval Investigative Service Office, Washington, D. C.
1-Office of Special Investigations, Suitland Hall,
Washington, D. C.
Copy to: 1-U. S. Secret Service, 1800 G Street, N. W., Washington,
D. C. (Enclosure 1)

Report of: JOSEPH A. MARION, JR. **Office:** Richmond
Date: January 31, 1967

Field Office File #: 157-1558 **Bureau File #:**

Title: FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.

Character: RACIAL MATTERS (ORGANIZATION)

Synopsis:

Subject born 8/4/40 at Trenton, New Jersey; received a General Discharge under honorable conditions from the U. S. Air Force 9/2/60; sent to Mercer County Workhouse, Trenton, New Jersey, on 3/6/64 for nine months for assault with a deadly weapon; made application for membership in the American Nazi Party (ANP) 7/26/65; was assigned duties of purchasing of materials and quality control on ANP presses on 10/26/66; and is presently employed on a full-time basis by the ANP, Arlington, Virginia. Background, including criminal record, previous employments and residences, marital status, and education set forth.

- P* -

ENCLOSURE:

TO: U. S. SECRET SERVICE, 1800 G
STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C.

One photograph of FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. BACKGROUND -- 3

A. Birth -- 3
B. Citizenship Status -- 3
C. Education -- 3
D. Marital Status -- 3
E. Residences -- 4
F. Employments -- 4
G. Military Service -- 5
H. Credit and Criminal Record -- 6
I. Physical Description -- 9
J. Make and Model of Automobile Used by Subject ------ 10
K. Special Abilities of Subject, Including Knowledge of Weapons, Explosives, Radio and Electronics -- 10
L. Associates, Both Business and Social -------------- 11
M. Up-to-date Photograph of Subject ------------------ 11

II. CONNECTIONS WITH KLAN-TYPE AND HATE-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS -- 11

III. STATEMENTS BY THE SUBJECT CONCERNING VIOLENCE AND ACTIVITY IN RACIAL SITUATIONS -------------------- 12

APPENDIX -- 14

DETAILS:

I. BACKGROUND

A. Birth

On August 17, 1966, the records of the New Jersey Bureau of Vital Statistics, State Health Building, Trenton, New Jersey, were reviewed by SA NORMAN A. HENDRICKS, and a birth record for FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, II, was located. This record showed he was born August 4, 1940, at Trenton, New Jersey, and his parents were listed as FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, age 23, white, occupation - farmer, and who was born in Pennsylvania; and his mother was listed as MINNIE MOORE DRAGER, age 18, white, housewife, who was born in Pennsylvania. The residence of the subject's parents was listed as RD #1, Lower Makefield Township, Pennsylvania.

B. Citizenship Status

The subject is a citizen of the United States by virtue of birth.

C. Education

could identify source

Identifies source

On July 1, 1966, RH T-1 made available an application for membership in the American Nazi Party (ANP) dated July 26, 1965. This application pertained to FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR. Under the section marked "Education," DRAGER indicated that he had attended elementary school in Trenton, New Jersey, from 1945 to 1954. He then attended Hamilton Junior High School in Trenton, New Jersey, from 1954 to 1956; and Pemberton High School, Pemberton, New Jersey, from 1956 to 1958. The application also indicated he had attended Omaha University in Omaha, Nebraska, nights, from 1958 to 1960, but did not receive a degree.

Concerning the ANP, see Appendix.

D. Marital Status

Identifies source

The above-mentioned ANP application pertaining to the subject reflected that DRAGER, as of July 26, 1965, was single.

E. Residences

1. Present Residence

On January 21, 1967, RH T-1 advised that DRAGER presently resides at 6150 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia, in a dwelling known as the "Barracks." This building houses the ANP National Headquarters. The source stated that DRAGER spends approximately one-half of his time living in the ANP printing building, located in Spotsylvania County, Virginia.

2. Past Residences

The records of the Mercer County Probation Office, Trenton, New Jersey, as made available on August 17, 1966, by JOSE WILLIAMS to SA NORMAN A. HENDRICKS, reflected the following residences for the subject:

Confidential source

214 East Franklin Street, Trenton, New Jersey (15 years legal residence);

44 Dill Avenue, S. W., Atlanta, Georgia, 1964;

180 13th Street, N. E., Atlanta, Georgia, 1964.

F. Employments

1. Present Employment

On January 21, 1967, RH T-1 advised that DRAGER is presently employed on a full-time basis by the ANP. His place of employment is normally located at the ANP printing press building located in Spotsylvania, Virginia, but he sometimes does odd jobs at the ANP Headquarters, 6150 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia. The source stated DRAGER receives room and board and a small amount of spending money for his efforts. He is considered an assistant to ANP member JOHN PATLER, the ANP printer.

2. Previous Employments

DRAGER's probation record, as mentioned above, on August 17, 1966, listed employments by the subject as a cook at the Holiday Inn, Princeton, New Jersey, for three and one-half months; the White Horse Bowling Alley for four weeks (place not shown); and the Hotel Stacey Trent (place not shown), one month, during the period 1964-1966. Specific dates were not listed for these employments, and a notation in the probation record reflected that the subject had been fired from each job.

identifies source

On July 1, 1966, RH T-1 made available the subject's ANP application which indicated that as of July 26, 1965, DRAGER was employed at the Park Colonial Restaurant, 18 East Park Avenue, Trenton, New Jersey, as a waiter and cook. His Social Security Number was listed as 139-30-1035. Previous places of employment on this application reflected that from October, 1964, to December, 1964, he was employed at "Trader Eng's" in Atlanta, Georgia, as a waiter; and from September, 1964, to October, 1964, he was employed by OTIS BAKER, Atlanta, Georgia, as a painter, part-time.

G. Military Service

A review on December 23, 1966, of the military records on file at the Military Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri, by IC EDWARD J. MERGEN, indicated that FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, II, Serial Number AF 21 780 489, enlisted in the U. S. Air Force on August 22, 1958, and entered active duty on the same date at Newark, New Jersey. He was given a General Discharge under honorable conditions on September 2, 1960, as an Airman Basic at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, by reason of being involved in frequent incidents of a discreditable nature with civil or military authorities.

His commanding officer recommended discharge action based on two Summary Courts-martial for sleeping on guard post and for absence without official leave; for being arrested by Sarpy County, Nebraska, authorities for alleged larceny of automobile accessories, for which he was fined $25.00 and court costs of $2.00; for being cited by civil authorities for loaning his vehicle operator's license to an unauthorized person; for a civilian arrest for careless driving, for which he was fined $35.00 and costs of $4.00.

His commanding officer further reported that he had an improper attitude.

His military occupation was shown as Apprentice Air Policeman, and he was shown as having attended Air Police Course at Lackland Air Force Base from September, 1958, to November, 1958.

confidential source

The records of the U. S./Selective Service System, Local Board #6, Mount Holly, New Jersey, as made available on August 8, 1966, by Miss JUNE HARMON, to SA NORMAN A. HENDRICKS, reflected that DRAGER was classified at that time as 4-A. The records also reflected that he originally registered with Local Board #6 on August 8, 1958, and at that time was residing at Box 995, New Egypt-Cookstown Road, New Egypt, New Jersey. He had previously enlisted in the National Guard in New Jersey on August 5, 1957, as a Private and was assigned to Company D, 216th Armed Infantry Battalion of the New Jersey National Guard. He received Serial Number 21780489 at the time of this enlistment, and was discharged on August 21, 1958, in order to allow him to enlist in the U. S. Air Force.

H. Credit and Criminal Record

The records of the Credit Bureau of Trenton, New Jersey, as checked by SA NORMAN A. HENDRICKS on August 18, 1966, contained a credit record pertaining to DRAGER, which listed his age as of May, 1963, as 22. The record contained no information concerning him except that he had been arrested on May 17, 1963, as a burglary suspect by the Trenton, New Jersey, Police Department.

confidential source

The records of the Atlanta,/Georgia, Credit Bureau, as made available by Mr. ROBERT EIDSON on November 15, 1966, to IC JAMES L. MARTIN, failed to reflect any information concerning the subject.

On November 15, 1966, Miss JO PRESLEY, Identification Division, Atlanta Police Department, Atlanta, Georgia, advised IC JAMES L. MARTIN her records failed to reflect any information concerning the subject.

A check of the records of the following agencies was made, on the indicated dates, with negative results regarding DRAGER:

Source	Date Checked	Checked By
Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C.	November 8, 1966	IC KENNETH SHAFFER
The Credit Bureau, Inc., Washington, D. C.	November 9, 1966	IC HOWARD SCOTT MAYNARD
U. S. Park Police, Washington, D. C.	November 8, 1966	IC WILLIAM H. LYERLY, JR.
Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department	November 8, 1966	IC WILLIAM H. LYERLY, JR.
Prince Georges County, Maryland, Police Department	November 9, 1966	IC WILLIAM H. LYERLY, JR.
Arlington County, Virginia, Police Department	November 8, 1966	IC THOMAS E. DREWRY
Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department	November 8, 1966	IC THOMAS E. DREWRY
Alexandria, Virginia, Police Department	November 9, 1966	IC THOMAS E. DREWRY

The records of the Identification Division of the FBI reflected the following information, under date of August 15, 1966, and under FBI #405 550 E, pertaining to FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.:

Contributor of Fingerprints	Name and Number	Arrested or Received	Charge	Disposition
Co Jail Mt Holly NJ	Frank A. Drager 2nd #8771	1/9/63	armed rob 2A:151-41	
SPol Princeton NJ	Frank August Drager II #C7693	1/9/63	material witness	
PD Trenton NJ	Frank August Drager II #20118	5/13/63	BE&L & aslt D/weapon CCW Poss of burg tools	
Co-Pros Office Trenton NJ	Frank August Drager II #12925	5/13/63	CCW; Poss of burg tools; B&E w/i to steal; aslt w/DW	
PD Trenton NJ	Frank August Drager 2nd #20118	7/9/63	poss burg tools unl use DW PL from auto	
Co-Pros Off Trenton NJ	Frank August Drager #12925	7/11/63	L BE & L poss burg tools poss D/W	committed Mercer County Jail
Hamilton Twp Pol Trenton NJ	Frank August Drager #29069	7/11/63	B E & L	
Mercer Co WH Trenton NJ	Frank August Drager, Jr. #116-64	3/6/64	aslt w DW	9 mos
Hamilton Twp Pol Trenton NJ	Frank August Drager, Jr. #C/R 90	1/15/65	criminal registration only	prob until -----

confidential source

On August 17, 1966, Mr. JOSE WILLIAMS, Probation Officer, Mercer County Probation Office, Trenton, New Jersey, advised SA NORMAN A. HENDRICKS that subject had been arrested on various burglary charges in Trenton, New Jersey, during 1963 and 1964. He stated that DRAGER had Trenton Police Department Number 20118, and New Jersey State Identification Number 758412. Mr. WILLIAMS stated that as to a sentence on March 6, 1964, for nine months for assault with a deadly weapon, this particular crime was committed by DRAGER in a service station on May 12, 1963. The owner of the station surprised him committing a larceny at the station at 1:00 a.m., and DRAGER shot at the owner, firing through a window, and thus making his escape. He was later arrested and identified as the burglar by the owner of this station. The subject later claimed he had fired the pistol in the air. He received a two-year probation sentence after the nine months for assault, and his probation ended on March 6, 1966.

I. Physical Description

The following description of the subject was obtained from subject's military records and the probation records in Trenton, New Jersey:

Name:	FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.
Born:	August 4, 1940, Trenton, New Jersey
Race:	White
Sex:	Male
Height:	5'11"
Weight:	185 pounds
Hair:	Blond
Eyes:	Blue
Build:	Muscular
Complexion:	Fair
Scars & Marks:	Burn scar lower left arm; tattoo of dog upper left arm
Social Security Number:	139-30-1035
Relatives:	Mother - MINNIE MOORE DRAGER, 214 East Franklin Street, Trenton, New Jersey;

B. APPROX.

Relatives (Continued)

Father - FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, SR. (deceased November 27, 1965);

B. Annex. [illegible]

Brother - CARL ~~R.~~ DRAGER, age 22, factory worker, Trenton, New Jersey;

B. Annex. [illegible]

Brother - RAYMOND ~~F.~~ DRAGER, age 19, U. S. Navy, Seaman;

B. Annex. [illegible]

Brother - JOHN ~~E.~~ DRAGER, age 16, 214 East Franklin Street, Trenton, New Jersey

Uncle - C. ~~L.~~ MOORE, 844 Dill Avenue, S. W., Atlanta, Georgia

FBI Number: 405 550 E.

J. Make and Model of Automobile Used by Subject

confidential source

On January 25, 1965, Mrs. BARBARA OLIVER, Clerk, Virginia State Division of Motor Vehicles, Richmond, Virginia, advised that she could locate no information in her files to show that a motor vehicle is currently registered in the name of FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR., in the State of Virginia.

On January 21, 1967, RH T-1 advised that DRAGER does not own an automobile, but has, as a member of the ANP, access to automobiles utilized by that organization. One of these automobiles is a 1965 El Dorado bearing 1966 Virginia License CO 4364. He added that a 1963 Ford, four-door sedan, bearing 1966 Virginia License 863-696, is also available for use by ANP members.

K. Special Abilities of Subject, Including Knowledge of Weapons, Explosives, Radio and Electronics

A review of the subject's Military Personnel Records, supra, failed to contain any information indicating subject had any specific knowledge or training in the field of demolition or explosives.

On January 21, 1967, RH T-1 advised that DRAGER, in 1966, came to Arlington, Virginia, and when he arrived he had no weapons whatsoever. The source added that as a Lieutenant in the ANP, DRAGER would have access to a small cache of weapons maintained at the ANP Headquarters and at Spotsylvania, Virginia.

L. Associates, Both Business and Social

On January 21, 1967, RH T-1 advised that subject, since arriving in Arlington, Virginia, in 1966, has been closely associated only with other members of the ANP; and to the knowledge of this source, DRAGER has not made any outside acquaintances.

M. Up-to-date Photograph of the Subject

On August 8, 1966, Detective AL CALLAHAN, Trenton, New Jersey, Police Department, made available to SA NORMAN A. HENDRICKS a photograph of the subject taken at the time of his arrest in 1963.

II. CONNECTIONS WITH KLAN-TYPE AND HATE-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS

On April 8, 1966, RH T-1 advised that "Probationary Trooper" FRANK DRAGER had joined the ANP on March 9, 1966, and attended a meeting of the ANP held on March 13, 1966, at the ANP Barracks, 6150 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia.

On April 22, 1966, RH T-1 advised that "Probationary Trooper" FRANK DRAGER attended a formal meeting of the ANP held April 3, 1966, at the ANP Barracks, Arlington, Virginia.

On October 31, 1966, RH T-2 advised that as of October 26, 1966, DRAGER was assigned the following duties in his employment with the ANP: "Printing operations, including purchase of materials, quality control on press, and bindery operations, as well as on call for special assignments."

On January 21, 1967, RH T-1 advised that DRAGER is presently a "Lieutenant" in the ANP, attached to National Headquarters, 6150 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia.

III. STATEMENTS BY THE SUBJECT CONCERNING VIOLENCE AND ACTIVITY IN RACIAL SITUATIONS

identifies source

As noted before, on July 1, 1966, RH T-1 made available an ANP application pertaining to DRAGER dated July 26, 1965. Under a section of this application entitled "State In Your Own Words Why You Want To Join The American Nazi Party," the following was contained:

> "I have tired of the unecessary and rediculous Negro gains to overthrow the United States and dominate the white race. I find it nealy impossible to locate non Jew owned businesses and feel that the American Jew is nerly in control of our nations capitol. I feel that it is time for something to be done. The ANP seems to be the only organization combating the existing racial problems in the U. S. and I want to do my part."

identifies source

The above application was signed "Frank A. Drager, Jr."

On June 12, 1966, ALAN WELCH, who advised he was Deputy National Commander of the ANP, stated that eight ANP members, including the subject, would attend a Klan rally at Camp Springs, Maryland, on that date. WELCH stated the members have been invited to attend by the Interstate Klan leaders.

Concerning the Interstate Klan, see Appendix.

On June 13, 1966, RH T-1 advised that DRAGER did attend a rally given by the Interstate Klan at Camp Springs, Maryland, on June 12, 1966. No incidents or arrests were noted.

On October 7, 1966, Captain FRANCIS JOHNSON, Alexandria, Virginia, Police Department, advised that 26 members of an organization known as the Action Coordinating Committee to End Segregation in the Suburbs (ACCESS) had marched from Gum Springs, described as a Negro section of Fairfax County, Virginia, to Alexandria, Virginia, starting at 2:00 p.m., and ending at approximately 3:45 p.m.

Captain JOHNSON stated that preceding the parade by ACCESS was a member of the ANP, who identified himself as FRANK DRAGER. Captain JOHNSON stated that DRAGER was astride a horse and carried a sign "The Niggers Are Coming." Captain JOHNSON stated that DRAGER was allowed to use this horse until he reached the City Limits of Alexandria, Virginia, at which time he was told to dismount and remove himself and the horse from the parade. JOHNSON stated that this was done to prevent violence within Alexandria.

At approximately 11:00 p.m., on October 7, 1966, Captain JOHNSON advised that the 26 members of ACCESS had reached a public housing development in Alexandria, Virginia, and at 8:00 p.m., had conducted a rally. The rally, according to JOHNSON, was peaceful, and no incidents or arrests had been made by the Alexandria Police Department during the day of October 7, 1966.

On October 9, 1966, Major WILLIAM FAWVER, Chief of Police, Arlington County, Virginia, advised that thirteen individuals in a group led by MATTHIAS KOEHL, National Secretary of the ANP, marched in front of the Buckingham Theater, Glebe Road and Pershing Drive, Arlington, Virginia, from approximately 1:30 p.m. to 4:40 p.m., on that date. They carried signs reading, "The Niggers Are Coming;" "Who Needs Niggers;" "White Power."

Major FAWVER stated that approximately 110 persons representing ACCESS appeared in the same area at 4:00 p.m., and marched until 4:40 p.m., carrying signs criticizing "Segregated Housing at the Apartments." The Major added that at a rally held later on that date by ACCESS, JOHN PATLER, who described himself as an ANP member, was escorted from the park for heckling speakers of the ACCESS group.

1

APPENDIX

AMERICAN NAZI PARTY OF THE WORLD UNION OF FREE ENTERPRISE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS, ALSO KNOWN AS THE GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL PARTY

In his book "This Time The World", copyrighted in 1961, George Lincoln Rockwell identified himself as Commander, American Nazi Party of the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (ANP - WUFENS), Arlington, Virginia.

The April 4, 1963, issue of "The Richmond News Leader", a Richmond, Virginia, daily newspaper, reported that George Lincoln Rockwell had, on the previous day, again applied for the American Nazi Party to be chartered in the State of Virginia, but this request was turned down by the Virginia State Corporation Commission. This action was taken pursuant to an act of the 1962 Virginia Assembly which prohibits use of "Nazi" or "National Socialism" in a Virginia charter. This article further pointed out that Rockwell's Party is presently chartered in the State of Virginia as the George Lincoln Rockwell Party.

On August 14, 1964, a source advised that the ANP - WUFENS was organized by George Lincoln Rockwell at his residence in Arlington, Virginia, on February 26, 1959, as an international "National Socialist" movement based on the German Nazi Party headed by Adolf Hitler. He added that Rockwell is the dominant force and personality in this party; that he is espousing a "line" of hatred against the Jews and Negroes; and that he is seeking, through speeches, distribution of literature and picketing, to establish a cohesive and dominant political party in the United States and in foreign countries.

According to the "Stormtrooper's Manual", an official publication of the ANP, the phases of ANP struggle for power are fourfold, namely, first "to make ourselves known to the masses"; second, "the dissemination of our program and truth about the Party"; third, "organizing the people who have been converted to our propaganda"; and fourth, "the attainment of power through the votes of the newly-won masses".

On August 19, 1966, the source advised that George Lincoln Rockwell presently believes that he has completed the first two phases in his struggle for power and is well into the third stage, to wit, "the organizing of the people who have been converted to our propaganda". The source added that Rockwell had previously believed that he would be elected Governor of Virginia in November, 1965, and when defeated, he made the statement that he was not ready for stage four.

APPENDIX

RE: INTERSTATE KLAN,
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

A source advised on June 12, 1966, that on that date, FRANCIS XAVIER EDWARDS, then Exalted Cyclops of the Wheaton, Maryland, Klavern of the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA), at an open meeting of that organization at Camp Springs, Maryland, publicly stated that his organization, the Wheaton, Maryland, Klavern of the UKA would cooperate with but not merge with the American Nazi Party (ANP) as they had a common goal. At the above meeting, EDWARDS also announced publicly that his Klavern was leaving the UKA and would be known as the Maryland Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (MKKK).

A second source advised that EDWARDS' group was expelled from the UKA, June 12, 1966, for cooperating with the ANP.

Subsequent to the above time, a third source determined that the MKKK had changed its name to the Interstate Klan, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (IK) with national office at Post Office Box 185, Savage, Maryland, and FRANCIS XAVIER EDWARDS its Imperial Wizard and highest official.

The third source advised that the oath taken by new IK members includes pledges of loyalty to the country, the Klan and white supremacy.

The IK, according to the third source, claims members in Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Washington, D. C.

UN ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF J ICE
DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIG ION

Richmond, Virginia
January 31, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-1558

TITLE:	FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.
CHARACTER:	RACIAL MATTERS (ORGANIZATION)
REFERENCE:	Report of SA JOSEPH A. MARION, JR., dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Questioned #22

Question B

FD-263 (Rev. 1-7-72)

FEDERAL UREAU OF INVE IGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
NEW YORK	NEW YORK	8/28/74	8/7-8/21/74

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
UNSUB; Five Sticks of Dynamite Found Inside Meditation Room, First Floor, United Nations General Assembly Building, August 7, 1974	SA JAMES L. BECK	mfw
	CHARACTER OF CASE PFO - ATTEMPTED BOMBING - SUBVERSIVE; EID	

REFERENCES: New York teletypes to the Bureau, 8/7, 8/8, 8/12, 8/16, 8/21/74.
Louisville teletype, 8/10/74.
Bureau teletypes, 8/14, 8/19/74.
FBI Laboratory Report dated 8/20/74.

- P -

ENCLOSURES:

Enclosed for the Bureau, AUSA, SDNY, and the Louisville Office are three photographs of the captioned device taken by UN Security Force personnel on 8/7/74. Also enclosed for the AUSA, SDNY, is a UN pamphlet captioned, "A Room of Quiet".

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED				☑ NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☒ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☒ NO

APPROVED John F Malone SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

7-Bureau (185-351) (Encls. 3) (RM)
1-USA, SDNY (Encls. 4) (RM)
(Att: AUSA MAURICE MC DERMOTT)
2-Alexandria (185-24) (RM)
2-Los Angeles (185-114) (RM)
2-Louisville (185-6) (Encls. 3)
2-New Haven (185-6) (RM)
2-Newark (185-23) (RM)
1-New York (185-229)

38 REC-79

SEP 3 1974

Dissemination Record of Attached Report			
Agency			
Request Recd.			
Date Fwd.	9/ /74		
How Fwd.			
By			

Notations

DATA PROCESSING

64OCT 3 1974

1-706

COVER PAGE

ADMINISTRATIVE

As set forth in the initial New York teletype, interview of UN employees was prohibited by the Secretary-General's office until 8/20/74. Since that date, however, the Legal Department of the Secretary-General's office has advised the NYO that it will authorize the interview and appearance for testimony of all UN employees necessary to the successful prosecution of the captioned matter. All interviews, however, must be held outside the UN premises.

The suspect in this matter, MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN, FBI #313 717 E, previously known to the Los Angeles and Alexandria Offices as a former member of the American Nazi Party in 1966 through 1967 and a one-time bodyguard of GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL, founder of that organization. Los Angeles files indicate that in 1969 BROWN was identified as a member of the Iron Cross Motorcycle Club, a pro-Nazi motorcycle group in Glendale, California.

The Louisville Office has obtained, by subpoena, the suspect's toll call records for the period covering the captioned incident. Initial investigation tends to support theory that after departure from Berea, Kentucky, BROWN contacted pro-Nazi associates in Falls Church, Virginia, Hicksville, NY, and the NYC area during the period of the captioned incident.

Initial opinion of AUSA confirmed by separate communication.

LEADS

ALEXANDRIA

At Falls Church, Virginia

(1) Will contact logical informants covering the American Nazi Party and other white hate group sources to determine possible assistance rendered to BROWN in the captioned incident.

LEADS (CONT'D)

LOS ANGELES

At Los Angeles and Glendale, California

(1) Will, through logical informant coverage, attempt to determine relationship of the captioned incident with the Identity Group and the Iron Cross Motorcycle Club.

LOUISVILLE

At Berea, Kentucky

(1) Will conduct logical investigation to trace disposition of dynamite shipped to Berea Sewer Service Commission, Berea, on 8/21/73. Will also consider review of employees' records to determine possible relationship of MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN.

(2) Will continue efforts to obtain current photograph of BROWN.

(3) Will continue to discreetly follow BROWN's activities.

NEWARK

At Newark, New Jersey

(1) Will contact logical informants in pro-Nazi and white hate group areas for information regarding the captioned incident.

(2) Will continue efforts to identify GABRIEL KORDOVI (ph), as previously set forth.

NEW YORK

At New York, New York

(1) Will maintain liaison with the UN Security Force and will exhibit photograph of BROWN when furnished by Louisville.

(2) Will exhibit photograph of BROWN to logical employees at the Commodore Hotel, NYC, in an attempt to identify BROWN as hotel guest.

COVER PAGE

-C*-

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNIT[illegible] STATES DEPARTMENT OF J[illegible]ICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1-USA, SDNY (RM) (Encls. 4)
(Att: AUSA MAURICE MC DERMOTT)

Report of: JAMES L. BECK **Office:** New York, New York
Date: 8/28/74

Field Office File #: New York (185-229) **Bureau File #:** 185-351

Title:

UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Five Sticks of Dynamite Found Inside Meditation Room, First Floor, United Nations General Assembly Building, August 7, 1974

Character:

ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS-ATTEMPTED BOMBING-SUBVERSIVE; EXPLOSIVE AND INCENDIARY DEVICE

Synopsis:

On 8/7/74, the US Mission to the UN advised captioned device found by UN Security Force inside Meditation Room of the UN General Assembly Building on that date. AUSA, SDNY, advises further FBI investigation warranted in accordance with Title 18, USC, Section 970, Protection of Foreign Officials and Diplomatic Establishments. Captioned device removed by NYCPD Bomb Squad. Evidence submitted to FBI Laboratory. Interviews of UN Security Force and NYCPD Bomb Squad set forth. On 8/9/74, LARRY and JAY STAFFORD, Richmond, Kentucky, advised of approach on 7/22/74 by MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN, FBI #313 717 E, to blow up UN statuary. On 8/16/74, the Louisville Office obtained, by subpoena, toll records of BROWN. Investigation at Commodore Hotel, NYC, set forth. FBI Laboratory Report set forth. Investigation continues. ARMED AND DANGEROUS

- P -

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O - 466-840

DETAILS: Enclosed for the Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York are 3 photographs of the captioned device obtained from the United Nations (UN) Security Force on August 7, 1974, and a UN pamphlet captioned, "A Room of Quiet".

Investigation in this matter is predicated upon receipt of information from the United States Mission to the United Nations (USMUN) on August 7, 1974, that an explosive device, consisting of five sticks of dynamite, had been located in the southwest corner of the Meditation Room, UN General Assembly Building, New York, New York.

On August 7, 1974, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) MAURICE MC DERMOTT, Southern District of New York (SDNY), was apprised of the details in this matter, and advised that it was his opinion that further FBI investigation was warranted in accordance with Title 18, USC, Section 970, regarding the protection of foreign diplomatic establishments and international organizations.

The following investigation was conducted at New York, New York:

DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 8/12/74

Detective CHARLES WELLS, Bomb Squad, New York City Police Department (NYCPD) furnished the following information to SA JAMES R. LYONS:

On August 7, 1974, he and Officer BRIAN MURRAY were working an 8:00AM to 4:00PM tour of duty. At 9:55AM, he received a telephone call from the United Nations Security Section and was advised that a bomb was discovered in the United Nations General Assembly building.

Detective WELLS further advised that he and Officer MURRAY responded to the United Nations General Assembly building, U.N. Plaza, and were led to the Meditation Room located on the first floor just inside the main lobby.

WELLS observed five loose sticks of dynamite located in a corner of the room beneath a small wicker stool. He also observed a length of red firecracker type fuse which was placed on one stick of dynamite, a book of matches, and a partially burned Lucky Strike cigarette butt.

WELLS stated that he removed the above described material to the NYCPD bomb truck. The explosive filler was transported to the NYCPD Range, Rodman's Neck, New York, and the dynamite wrappers, the book of matches, cigarette butt and fuse were taken to the NYCPD Bomb Squad office.

Detective WELLS described the dynamite as five sticks of Hercules 60 Percent Gelatine Extra, manufactured August 21, 1973, and measuring 1 1/4 inches by 8 inches.

Interviewed on 8/9/74 at New York, New York File # 185-229

by SA JAMES R. LYONS:jas Date dictated 8/12/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 8/12/74

Detective ANDREW HAUFMAN, Bomb Squad, NYCPD, furnished the following items of evidence to SA JAMES R. LYONS:

1) Five Hercules, Inc. Gelatin Extra Dynamite Wrappers, Code Number "Aug 21, 1973 1B";

2) One length of red fuse;

3) One white matchbook with orange and black lettering;

4) One Lucky Strike cigarette butt.

Detective HAUFMAN advised that the above described items were removed from the Meditation Room, United Nations General Assembly building, UN Plaza, by Detective CHARLES WELLS, who is also assigned to the Bomb Squad.

Interviewed on 8/8/74 at New York, New York File # 185-229

by SA JAMES R. LYONS:jas Date dictated 8/12/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

There follows sketches of the UN General Assembly main lobby and a detailed sketch of the Meditation Room:

NY 185-229


FIRST AVENUE
NORTH →
UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
U.N.G.A. BUILDING
REVOLVING DOORS
SECURITY OFFICER POST #115 PUBLIC LOBBY
STAIRCASE TO SECOND FLOOR
SECOND FLOOR BALCONY
ELEVATORS
INFO DESK
GUEST REGISTERS
SECURITY OFFICER POST #114
SECURITY OFFICER POST #117
MEDITATION ROOM
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL ROOM

MEDITATION ROOM


BOMB
GLASS
GLASS
SECURITY OFFICER
X
GLASS DOOR
SMALL WICKER STOOLS
STONE
1-FRESCO
15 FEET
20 FEET
30 FEET

On August 8, 1974, SA JAMES R. LYONS submitted evidence as obtained from the NYCPD Bomb Squad for latent fingerprint examination to the FBI Laboratory. There follows the results of that examination:

1-336 (Rev. 7-16-73)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C. 20537

REPORT
of the
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

YOUR FILE NO. 185-229 August 22, 1974
FBI FILE NO.
LATENT CASE NO. A-94767

TO: SAC, New York

RE: UNSUB.;
FIVE STICKS OF DYNAMITE
FOUND INSIDE MEDITATION ROOM
FIRST FLOOR, UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING
8-7-74
PFO - ATTEMPTED BOMBING - SUBVERSIVE

REFERENCE: Airtel 8-8-74, teletypes 8-12-74 and 8-15-74, and Louisville teletype 8-10-74
EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: New York and Louisville
SPECIMENS: Five dynamite wrappers bearing pieces of tape, Q1 through Q5
Seven pieces of tape from fuse, Q6
Match book, Q7
Cigarette butt, Q8

This report supplements and confirms information furnished New York by Bucal 8-14-74.

Listed Q specimens further described in separate Laboratory report, which will include disposition of specimens.

One latent fingerprint of value developed on cover of match book, Q7. One latent impression, either fingerprint or

(Continued on next page)

2 - Louisville (185-6)
1 - Newark (185-23)
1 - New Haven (185-8)
1 - Los Angeles (185-114)

CMKelley
Clarence M. Kelley, Director

THIS REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

palm print, of value developed on sticky side of tape from Q6. No latent impressions of value appear or were developed on remaining specimens.

Latent fingerprint identified as fingerprint of Robert Colonell, U.S. Civil Service Commission, applicant to United Nations. Remaining latent impression compared, insofar as possible, with fingerprints of following named persons, but no identification effected:

Robert Colonell
Richard Lee Granger, United Nations Security Officer applicant
Michael Halsey Brown, FBI #313717E
Larry David Stafford, FBI #774553K9, #18113, PD, Jefferson County, Louisville, Kentucky
Teresa Anne Franz, FBI #100529M7, #1620801, SO, San Diego, California
Theresa Ann Frantz, FBI #949860G
Raymond Frantz, #A42213, South Gate, California, PD
William Porter Gail, FBI #284932G
Terry Howard Frantz, #153-165, New Orleans, Louisiana, PD

No palm prints located here for any of the above-named persons. Major case prints necessary for conclusive comparisons.

Basis information furnished, no fingerprint record located here for Jay Stafford, Henry Hunter, Hunter Ray Frantz or Gabriel Kordovi.

1-336 (Rev. 7-16-73)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NY 185-229

Washington, D. C. 20537

REPORT
of the
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

YOUR FILE NO. 185-8

FBI FILE NO.

LATENT CASE NO. A-34767

August 20, 1974

TO: SAC, Louisville

RE: UNSUB;
FIVE STICKS OF DYNAMITE FOUND INSIDE
MEDITATION ROOM, FIRST FLOOR
UNICA BUILDING, AUGUST 7, 1974
PFO-ATTEMPTED BOMBING - SUBVERSIVE
EID

REFERENCE: Teletype 8-16-74

EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: Louisville

SPECIMENS:

The latent impression previously reported and remaining unidentified in this case was compared, insofar as possible, with fingerprints of Keith William Smith, FBI #523797D, but no identification effected. No palm prints here for Smith. Major case prints necessary for complete comparisons with this latent impression.

Based on information furnished, no fingerprint record located here for Gerald Dee Kay.

2 - New York (185-229)

SEARCHED ______ INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
AUG 21 1974
FBI — NEW YORK

CMKelley
Clarence M. Kelley, Director

THIS REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

There follows the results of the interviews conducted with the UN Security Force:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 8/20/74

RICHARD LEE GRANGER, Security Officer, Security and Safety Section, United Nations (UN) General Assembly (UNGA) Building, was interviewed in the vicinity of 43rd Street and UN Plaza, New York, New York. Security Officer GRANGER furnished the following information:

On Wednesday, August 7, 1974, he reported to his place of employment at the UN Building, New York, New York, at approximately 9:00 a.m. At 9:15 a.m., the guard shift for that day underwent inspection and he was assigned security post 117, which is the Meditation Room, First Floor, UN Building. GRANGER described the Meditation Room as a small, darkened room set aside for purposes of prayer and meditation for persons of all religious faiths. He described the room as being almost rectangular in shape with one end being smaller than the other, however. The room contains a small square stone, and the west end of the room contains ten small benches utilized for the purposes of prayer or meditation. GRANGER further stated that following his assignment, he obtained the key to the Meditation Room from the basement Conference Room at 9:25 a.m. and proceeded directly to the Meditation Room, which is normally locked, except for the hours of operation of 9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., seven days a week. He advised that after unlocking the room, he undertook the normal procedure of physically searching the room with a flashlight for packages or articles of clothing possibly left by visitors to the UN Building. He advised that he searched the east end of the room near the large painting first, and then proceeded to search in the vicinity of the west end, turning over each of the small benches in the process of searching. He advised that when he turned over the small bench in the extreme southwest corner of the room, he saw what appeared to be five sticks of dynamite. He advised that on looking closer, he observed what appeared to be two sticks of dynamite taped together, three loose sticks, an open pack of matches, a cigarette, and a fuse assembly lying in the corner of the room. He advised that the cigarette was not smoking. He advised that he immediately left the room, without touching any part of the device, locking the door behind him and notified his immediate superior, Sergeant MITCHELL. GRANGER advised that he did not re-enter the room until

Interviewed on 8/19/74 at New York, New York File # NY 185-229

by SAs JAMES L. BECK and DAVID E. VON HOLLE JLB/ss Date dictated 8/20/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

approximately 3:30 p.m., by which time the explosive device had already been removed by the New York City Police Department (NYCPD).

GRANGER advised that the guard posts at the UN are rotated frequently and that he had only been assigned duty at the Meditation Room on a few other occasions in his four years of employment with the UN Security Force. He advised that he had not worked at the UN on either Monday or Tuesday, these dates being his days off that week and that he had not observed any suspicious activity in the vicinity of the Meditation Room prior to his unlocking the room. He added that no visitors had been allowed in the UN Building as yet that morning and that he could think of no possible motive for the attempted bombing. Security Officer GRANGER advised that he could furnish no further information.

ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 8/20/74

NEIL BREEN, Lieutenant, Special Services Unit, United Nations (UN) Security and Safety Section, was interviewed in the vicinity of 43rd Street and UN Plaza, New York, New York. Lieutenant BREEN furnished the following information:

On Wednesday, August 7, 1974, he was on duty in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Building, when he was notified by Sergeant MITCHELL that an explosive device had been discovered in the Meditation Room. Lieutenant BREEN advised that he then participated in the clearing of the UN lobby of all visitors. He advised that the New York City Police Department (NYCPD) Bomb Squad arrived shortly thereafter and removed the explosive device through the UN main entrance.

Lieutenant BREEN advised that he then participated with other members of the Special Services Unit in the interview of UN security personnel on duty that morning. Lieutenant BREEN advised that the Meditation Room is open only from the hours of 9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., seven days a week. He advised that the room is normally cleaned daily, during the morning hours usually. He further stated that no smoking is permitted in the Meditation Room and that no packages are allowed to be carried into the room. Lieutenant BREEN advised that the room is a small, dark enclosure frequently used for purposes of prayer and meditation by both UN delegates and visitors. He added that normally there are three UN security officers on duty in the main lobby of the UN at all times.

Lieutenant BREEN stated that the officers on duty are instructed to search incoming packages and that visitors are invited to check packages and related items at the UN main gate prior to entry into the UN Building. He advised that on occasion various ethnic and political groups during the course of demonstrations in the UN had staged sit-down strikes, but that there had never been any warning or indication regarding the use of explosives. Lieutenant BREEN advised that he could furnish no further information regarding the incident at the present time.

Interviewed on 8/19/74 at New York, New York File # NY 185-229

by SAs JAMES L. BECK and DAVID E. VON HOLLE JLB/ss Date dictated 8/20/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

The following investigation was conducted at Lexington and Berea, Kentucky:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 8/13/74

WILLIAM JUNIOR STAFFORD, residing at 1103 Claridge Lane, Lexington, Kentucky, and known to interviewing agent as JAY STAFFORD, furnished the following information.

STAFFORD advised that an individual known to him as MIKE BROWN appeared at Stafford Lock Shop, Lexington, Kentucky, in the fall of 1973 and at that time involved JAY and his brother LARRY [illegible] STAFFORD in a conversation concerning the STAFFORDS' knowledge of locks, their ability to pick locks and their attitudes concerning involvement in any activities which might require the unauthorised picking or opening of locks. STAFFORD advised that neither he nor his brother expressed any interest in BROWN's suggestions and BROWN left the Stafford Lock Shop and was not seen again until his appearance at the Stafford Lock Shop on or about Monday, July 22, 1974.

JAY STAFFORD advised that on or about Saturday, July 20, 1974, an article appeared on the front page of the Richmond, Kentucky, Newspaper and this article referred to the fact that JAY and his brother, LARRY, had been involved in a burglary in Frankfort, Kentucky, on the evening of July 3, 1974. On this appearance by BROWN at the Stafford Lock Shop on July 22, 1974, BROWN disclosed that he had read this article concerning JAY and his brother LARRY and advised that he felt like the STAFFORDS were his kind of people. BROWN suggested that the STAFFORD brothers might need some help in getting out of this mess and that if they were willing to "go for broke", he would disclose to them a scheme to be considered, wherein the STAFFORDS' participation might gain them influence and friends who could assist the STAFFORDS with the resolution of their problem. BROWN then advised the STAFFORDS that if they were interested in this scheme that they should contact him at his residence at 101 Cherry Street, Berea, Kentucky.

Interviewed on 8/9/74 at Lexington, Kentucky File # LS 185-6

by SA JOHN W. GILL / jt Date dictated 8/12/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

JAY STAFFORD advised that he and his brother proceeded to the residence in [illegible], Kentucky, on July [illegible], 1974, arriving there at approximately 5:00 p.m. Upon arrival, JAY and his brother were invited into the BROWN residence and JAY STAFFORD, at that time, observed a white female mowing the yard in the back of the residence. This female is described as being approximately 5'5", weighing around 115 pounds. JAY STAFFORD advised that he assumed this female to be [illegible] wife.

STAFFORD stated that while at the BROWN residence, BROWN disclosed to he and his brother that he, BROWN, was a member of the Iron Cross Motorcycle Gang, an organization which originated in the state of California. BROWN advised that the Iron Cross Motorcycle Gang is now active in the state of Texas and that BROWN had been instrumental in bringing this motorcycle gang to Kentucky on a previous occasion. BROWN talked about the fact that he had a Harley Davidson Motorcycle which BROWN described as a "chopper" and that this motorcycle was currently loaned to a friend of his in the state of Florida.

BROWN exhibited to JAY STAFFORD and his brother, a number of newspaper articles and clippings to include photographs which BROWN stated were the result of his activities at demonstrations around the country. BROWN disclosed to the STAFFORD brothers that he had been involved in various movements wherein he was hired and paid to participate in a [illegible] march or event for the purpose of creating disturbances and starting fights during the course of the demonstrations.

BROWN further displayed to JAY STAFFORD and his brother a number of photographs which STAFFORD recalled as totaling five, and these photographs, according to BROWN, were of the United Nations facilities in New York City. BROWN pointed out to JAY STAFFORD particulars of these photographs, noting on some of them that guards at the United Nations facilities did not wear sidearms, but merely contained a canister of mace on their belts. One of these photographs was of a group of people outside the United Nations building and STAFFORD advised that it appeared that this photograph was made of a tour group. BROWN also explained one photograph as being taken inside the United Nations facilities and related to the fact that a surveillance camera, not in the photograph, would appear adjacent to the upper right hand corner of this photograph, if it encompassed a greater area of the facilities.

BROWN advised JAY and his brother LARRY, that he was at one time in the United States military and that he had been a paratrooper during his enlistment.

BROWN questioned JAY STAFFORD and his brother as to their knowledge of firearms, asking if they had had any experience with pistols, and further asking if JAY and LARRY STAFFORD had ever given thought to shooting anyone or if the STAFFORD brothers, if trapped, would be willing to shoot their way out of a situation. After this discussion, BROWN then introduced the subject of the STAFFORD brothers' participation in a plan to destroy statues in the United Nations building at New York City. BROWN discussed the fact that several statues in the United Nations building related to philosophies that that he was opposed to and that these statues should be destroyed. BROWN described to the STAFFORD brothers one statues which is located on the Main Floor of United Nations building which BROWN stated depicted evil and was the devil in disguise. BROWN then described another statue which is contained in the basement of the United Nations facilities which BROWN felt depicted a pagan idol relating to pagan ritual and sacrifice.

JAY STAFFORD stated BROWN then discussed a scheme with he and his brother LARRY wherein BROWN was financed by a retired Colonel or General of the Army and this individual had contracted with BROWN to destroy the statues. JAY STAFFORD stated that BROWN disclosed that he had contracted to "perform" and had received $250 in payment to go to the United Nations building and destroy the statues. The $250 was allegedly payment for supplies and expenses during the trip. BROWN disclosed a plan wherein he was to place incendiary or explosive devices around the base of this statue and solicited the involvement of JAY and LARRY STAFFORD for the purpose of keeping people off of his back and causing disturbance while he placed explosives around the statue base and lit the fuse. BROWN discussed the possibility of having an expert pistol shot shoot out the surveillance camera, which covered the area of the devil statute. BROWN also discussed the possibility of arriving at the United Nations building in a van type vehicle which would be lettered with the name Acme Image and Engraving Repair, Incorporated. BROWN felt that this type of vehicle would be inconspicuous inasmuch as the name Acme Image and Engraving Repair, Incorporated lettered on the side of the van would indicate that he and his accomplices were employed by a company which maintained, repaired, or cleaned statues in the United Nations facilities. BROWN also discussed the possibility of having an individual in a wheel chair, sitting on the explosive charge, and suggested that entrance to the United Nations facilities could be accomplished this way without suspicion.

BROWN also discussed with JAY STAFFORD and his brother the possibility of involving another individual in this scheme, explaining that this individual had been teaching or instructing BROWN in the use of rappelling walls with ropes. BROWN discussed the fact that a freeway was adjacent to or under the United Nations facilities and that escape could be made out the rear of that facility and down an embankment or wall and, once escaping the facilities in this manner, an automobile could be stopped, a pistol stuck in the face of the occupant and the occupant forced to drive BROWN and other members of the group to any destination in New York.

JAY STAFFORD advised that BROWN, apparently in an attempt to impress he and his brother, related to the fact that if they were interested in involving themselves in this type of scheme and could "perform" well, that they would acquire a number of influential friends and might even be able to see Governor GEORGE WALLACE. BROWN related to the fact that the STAFFORD brothers would have no expenses if they involved themselves on the trip to New York City inasmuch as he, (BROWN) had a number of friends and associates who they could lodge with to and from New York. JAY STAFFORD advised that BROWN repeatedly referred to the term "performance" and STAFFORD interpreted the word "performance" to mean or identical with pulling off some type of job. BROWN related that he had not "performed" in several years and needed to "perform" at this time in order to regain influence or re-establish himself with prior associates.

BROWN further briefly discussed religious philosophies with JAY STAFFORD and his brother, relating the fact that the Bible had been misinterpreted. BROWN stated that the Bible referred to or authorizes man to have at least seven wives and also related to the fact that the destruction of statues in the United Nations building would be accomplished for religious as well as political reasons.

BROWN then asked of JAY STAFFORD and his brother, if they were aware of anyone in Kentucky who could furnish him dynamite. JAY STAFFORD advised that he might have given BROWN information concerning a younger brother of a person known to JAY STAFFORD as GLENN LYNN DEORTING, of Lexington, Kentucky. JAY STAFFORD advised that he at one time was a friend of DEORTING and believed that DEORTING's younger brother had experience with nitroglycerin and had perhaps attempted to, or had in fact, produced nitroglycerin in the garage of DEORTING's residence in Lexington, Kentucky. STAFFORD advised he could not say for certain whether or not he gave BROWN DEORTING's name. BROWN discussed the possibility of using dynamite on the statue that was in the basement of the United Nations building.

JAY STAFFORD advised that BROWN exhibited a box upstairs at the BROWN residence and this box contained some bags of white powder. BROWN described these bags of powder as being ingredients which were to be incorporated in a chemical composition, this composition being capable of producing extremely high temperatures if it was ignited. BROWN expressed the fact that this composition would completely melt any bronze or steal item and that it would acquire a temperature of 50,000 degrees. BROWN stated that he was expecting a shipment of another ingredient which he did not have at the time, and once this ingredient arrived, he would be able to manufacture the heat producing product. JAY STAFFORD advised that BROWN called the name of this ingredient and that it either had something to do with, sounded like, or incorporated aluminum.

JAY STAFFORD stated that BROWN made a number of references to "swine pigs". BROWN then asked JAY STAFFORD and his brother if it wouldn't be more rewarding to let the "swine pigs" know that their days were numbered than to be rich. BROWN suggested that the STAFFORD brothers could involve themselves in activities that he had in mind, and if they "performed" well, they would not have any money or other problems.

BROWN advised that he was going to place the explosives at the United Nations building whether or not JAY STAFFORD and his brother wanted to go along. BROWN gave the impression that he was committed to do this some time around the first of August. BROWN told the STAFFORD brothers that it would have to be done and that he would do it alone if necessary. BROWN told the STAFFORDS that he had proposed this scheme to some of his associates which he had known for ten years and that they had refused to go along with it. BROWN discussed the fact that he had been charged on a number of counts in the state of California, but had never been convicted. BROWN also alleged that he was using an alias and that if he used his true name, he would not be able to get employment. BROWN also exhibited to the STAFFORD brothers, a motorcycle magazine, which BROWN suggested he was publishing or some how involved in the publication of this magazine. JAY STAFFORD further advised that he observed four high powered rifles in one of the upstairs rooms of the BROWN residence. STAFFORD described the upstairs of BROWN's residence as being an attic which had been converted into utility space containing two rooms, one of these rooms being walled with a paneling material and unfinished and the other room used to store what appeared to be personal items.

JAY STAFFORD advised that neither he nor his brother LARRY considered BROWN's proposal to be legitimate at the time and that their visit with BROWN was terminated with the understanding or feeling that JAY and LARRY would recontact him if and when they were interested in involving themselves in the type of activity which BROWN had described. JAY STAFFORD stated that he felt that BROWN trusted he and his brother, probably basing this trust on the fact that JAY and LARRY had been involved in a burglary-safe cracking attempt. JAY STAFFORD advised that he and his brother left the BROWN residence on the evening of July 23, 1974, and have not seen nor been contacted by BROWN since that time.

JAY STAFFORD described BROWN as a white male, 6'2", 180 pounds, blond hair (combed back), full beard with mustache. BROWN drives an old green Chevrolet automobile, possibly a 1967 model.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 8/13/74

LARRY ~~SWEENEY~~ STAFFORD, 3676 Crosby Drive, Lexington, Kentucky, known to the interviewing agent by previous association, furnished the following information:

Lair [illegible]

STAFFORD advised that an individual known to him as MIKE BROWN appeared at the Stafford Lock Shop of Richmond, Kentucky, in August, 1973. The Stafford Lock Shop is a business owned and managed by LARRY SWEENEY STAFFORD and WILLIAM JUNIOR (JAY) STAFFORD from the fall of 1973 until approximately August 1, 1974. During this visit by BROWN in the fall of 1973, BROWN involved LARRY STAFFORD and his brother JAY in a conversation which was interpreted by LARRY STAFFORD as designed to produce LARRY's and JAY's feelings or attitudes concerning the possibility of the STAFFORD brothers' involvement in burglary or unauthorized lock picking activities. LARRY STAFFORD advised that neither he nor his brother JAY gave the impression that they would be interested in those type of activities and BROWN subsequently left the STAFFORD Lock Shop and was not heard of nor seen again until July 22, 1974.

On July 22, 1974, BROWN again appeared at the Stafford Lock Shop and disclosed the fact that he had read an article in the Richmond, Kentucky, newspaper wherein JAY and LARRY STAFFORD were described as two individuals arrested on July 4, 1974, burglarizing the Grant's Department Store in Frankfort, Kentucky. BROWN made reference to the fact that he had read this article and disclosed to the STAFFORD brothers that he felt that they were his kind of people. LARRY STAFFORD advised that BROWN then asked if he and his brother JAY would be interested in "going for broke". BROWN suggested that LARRY and JAY STAFFORD might be interested in involving themselves in some activities which he (BROWN) had in mind and if these activities were a success, LARRY and JAY STAFFORD would gain a number of influential

Interviewed on 8/9/74 at Lexington, Kentucky File # LS 185-6

by SA JOHN W. GILL / jt Date dictated 8/12/74

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
FBI—NEW YORK

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

friends who could help them with any problem they had. STAFFORD advised BROWN suggested that they meet at his residence at 101 Cherry Street, Berea, Kentucky, and further discuss ideas that he (BROWN) had in mind.

LARRY STAFFORD stated that he and his brother JAY STAFFORD drove to Berea, Kentucky, on the following day, July [illegible], 1974, and met with BROWN at BROWN's residence at 101 Cherry Street, Berea, Kentucky. During an ensuing visit at that residence, BROWN proposed a scheme involving he, (BROWN) and LARRY and JAY STAFFORD wherein the three of them would travel to New York City and destruct several statues in the United Nations building. BROWN described one of these statues as depicting or being the devil in disguise, this statue being on the main floor of the United Nations building. STAFFORD advised that BROWN then described a statue in the basement of the United Nations building which depicted some type of idol worship or, pagan sacrifice.

LARRY STAFFORD advised that BROWN discussed a number of alternative methods of destroying these statues in the United Nations building, these alternatives involving the use of a van type truck with lettering on the side which suggested that the truck belonged to some type of statue cleaning or repair service. BROWN also exhibited to LARRY STAFFORD and his brother a number of photographs which BROWN stated were taken of the United Nations facilities in New York City and pointed out several items in these photographs of interest, to include the fact that guards in the photograph did not wear sidearms. LARRY STAFFORD stated that BROWN further discussed the possibility of shooting out a surveillance camera in the United Nations building in order to restrict the taking of pictures or photographs of them while they placed explosives in that facility. BROWN talked about his participation in a motorcycle gang named the Iron Cross and also discussed the fact that this motorcycle gang originated or was headquartered in California. BROWN also exhibited a number of newspaper articles and clippings in a scrap book and made reference to the fact that he was involved in activities and demonstrations reported in these clippings. BROWN [illegible] that he had other individuals had been [illegible] in the past to go to peaceful, public demonstrations and create disturbances and fights in order to alter the nature of those events.

LARRY STAFFORD further disclosed that BROWN exhibited a box in his residence which he claimed contained chemicals required to make explosives and exhibited several bags of what appeared to be white powder. BROWN talked about the fact that he required one remaining ingredient to included in an explosive or incendiary formula and that this ingredient was to arrive soon in the mail. BROWN described the end product of these chemicals as being some type of incendiary composition, which, when lit, produced a burning effect of such a high temperature, that it would melt any bronze or steel statue.

LARRY STAFFORD advised that BROWN continuously made reference to activities which he referred to as "performances" and was apparently attempting to impress he and his brother, [illegible] STAFFORD, with the fact that alignment with his (BROWN's) philosophies would gain them a great deal of influence and friends.

LARRY STAFFORD advised that BROWN claimed to be a publisher or distributor of some type of magazine and the impression was given that BROWN either published or participated in the publication of a motorcycle oriented magazine. STAFFORD advised that BROWN inquired of he and his brother how he might obtain dynamite and further discussed plans of using dynamite to destroy statues in the United Nations facilities. STAFFORD stated that BROWN was attempting to convince he and his brother, JAY, to involve themselves in placing explosives in the United Nations Building, the STAFFORD brothers' involvement being that of causing a disturbance while BROWN placed chemicals around the base of the devil type statue on the main floor of the United Nations Building. BROWN further discussed alternative methods of getting into the building, one of the methods being the use of an individual in a wheel chair who would sit on explosives to conceal them. BROWN further discussed the possibility of exiting out the rear of the United Nations facilities which BROWN described as being built adjacent to or over a freeway. BROWN discussed the use of ropes to rappel walls and the possibility of an escape method wherein the freeway would be reached, and then a passing motorist would be flagged down. Once the passing motorist stopped, a pistol would be shoved in his face and he could be forced to take an individual or several individuals anywhere they wanted to go.

LARRY STAFFORD advised that BROWN claimed that he had contracted to destroy statues at the United Nations building and that his orders or contract came from a retired Colonel or General in the Army. BROWN talked about having $250 expense money which would be used for the purchase of explosives and travel to and from New York State. BROWN discussed the fact that little money was needed inasmuch as he had associates or friends in route to New York, who would provide food and lodging.

LARRY STAFFORD advised that BROWN continued to use the expression "performance" and advised that he would travel to New York and complete this contract assignment whether or not LARRY and his brother participated. BROWN also discussed the fact that a friend or another individual was currently giving him instructions on rappelling walls and cliffs.

STAFFORD advised that BROWN is described as a white male, approximately 6'1"-2", 170-180 pounds (slim), light blondish brown hair, full, medium length beard and moustache, and BROWN's hair is combed back on his head [illegible] medium to conservative length. STAFFORD advised that BROWN is observed to drive a green Chevrolet, approximately 1963 vintage.

STAFFORD advised that the meeting was terminated with the feeling that he and his brother, JAY STAFFORD, could recontact BROWN if they felt like they were interested in involving themselves in the United Nations scheme.

On August 16, 1974, the telephone records for the residence of MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN, 101 Cherry Road, Berea, Kentucky, telephone number 502-986-9744, were obtained by subpoena. The following toll charges and information pertaining to each are set forth:

August 2, 1974	Call from BROWN's residence at Berea, Kentucky, to Falls Church, Virginia, 703-532-1527.
August 3, 1974	Collect call to BROWN's residence from Falls Church, Virginia. Records reflect call was made from a coin phone with the first three digits 532.
August 3, 1974	A third party call by MIKE BROWN from coin phone at Falls Church, Virginia, 703-532-9515, to New York City, New York, 212-877-7048.
August 3, 1974	A third party billing by MIKE BROWN from Falls Church, Virginia, coin phone, 703-532-1527 to Hicksville, New York, 516-938-8700.
August 5, 1974	A collect call from 687 telephone exchange in New York City accepted at the residence of MIKE BROWN in Berea, Kentucky.
August 6, 1974	A collect station-to-station call to Darien, Connecticut (the call appears on the bill to be from BROWN's residence at Berea, Kentucky) number 655-1950.

It is noted that 687 exchange (or MUrray Hill 7) is used by the New York Telephone Company for the area in Manhattan from East 37th Street north to East 47th Street and from Fifth Avenue east to the East River. WILLIAM F. MC GARTY, New York Telephone Company, stated that recording of only exchange numbers on a long distance collect call, i.e. 687, indicates that the call was placed from a coin box in the above-described area.

Results of interviews with employees of the Commodore Hotel, New York City follow:

FD-302 (Rev. 11-27-70)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 8/23/74

GEORGE MENEGUS, 37 Schenck Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, telephone (212) 647-8368, was interviewed at the Commodore Hotel, 42nd Street and Park Avenue, Manhattan, New York City, where he is employed as Chief of Security.

He advised that a hotel registration card indicates that MIKE BROWN registered at the hotel at 7:15 p.m., August 5, 1974, and was assigned Room 1092. BROWN indicated that his address was Rt. 7, Box 236, Little Rock, Arkansas. BROWN paid $29.08 cash in advance for the room and checked out sometime on August 6, 1974. MENEGUS stated that there is no check-out time stamped on the registration card and BROWN presumably checked out sometime before the hotel's 1 p.m. check-out time. MENEGUS stated that the registration card indicates that BROWN checked in alone and that no additional charges, such as telephone calls, were billed to him. The registration indicates that Commodore Hotel clerk #16, Mr. BILL FOSTER, handled the transaction with BROWN.

MENEGUS stated that the original registration card is maintained by Mr. JAMES J. SHEVLIN, General Credit Manager, Hotel Biltmore, Madison Avenue at 43rd Street, Manhattan. MENEGUS explained that the Commodore Hotel and Biltmore Hotel are part of the same chain and records of both hotels are maintained at the Biltmore.

Interviewed on 8/21/74 at New York, New York File # NY 185-229

by SA VINCENT MILACCIO, JR. VM:mfw Date dictated 8/23/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 11-27-70)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 8/23/74

1

ED BLUHM, Parking Attendant, Commodore Hotel, Park Avenue at 42nd Street, Manhattan, advised that if a customer requests that his car be parked at the Manhattan Parking and Realty Corp. Parking Lot, located at 213 East 43rd Street, which is the parking lot utilized by the Commodore Hotel, the license plate number is recorded before the vehicle is driven to the parking lot.

BLUHM stated that a review of the entries made on August 5, 1974, for vehicles so parked did not reflect any vehicle with Kentucky license plates.

Interviewed on 8/21/74 at New York, New York File # NY 185-229

by SA VINCENT MILACCIO, JR. Date dictated 8/23/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (REV. 11-27-70)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1.

Date of transcription 8/26/74

On August 22,1974, New York Office(NYO), Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) Special Agents(SAs) DREW H. CARR and COREY W. HART obtained a subpoena duces tecum from Assistant United States Attorney(AUSA) JOHN H. GROSS, Southern District of New York (SDNY), for the original registration card for one MIKE BROWN, who was registered on August 5,1974 at the Commodore Hotel, Park Avenue at 42nd Street, New York (NY), NY. It is noted the subpoena duces tecum was prepared in the name of Hotel Biltmore, Madison Avenue and 43rd Street, NY, NY, since the Commodore Hotel records are maintained at the Biltmore Hotel.

On August 22,1974, at 12:00 Noon, aforementioned agents served the subpoena duces tecum to JAMES L. BONNER, Assistant General Credit Manager for the Biltmore Hotel. BONNER complied with the subpoena request and released original registration card.

Interviewed on 8/22/74 at New York, New York File # NY 185-229

by SAs DREW H. CARR & COREY W. HART/mad Date dictated 8/22/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

T34

IN VIEW OF SUSPECT'S, MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN'S, PRIOR ARREST FOR DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM INTO AN OCCUPIED BUILDING, AND HIS USE OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS IN THE MATTER UNDER INVESTIGATION, BROWN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

Incident #22

Question 6.

J. Carne

B for

GKN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106-03
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 1/19/65

SS 9/20/74
Spec. Request
A1B0

FROM : SAC, HONOLULU 157-103 (C)

SUBJECT: MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN,
Aka Mike H. Brown
RM - HAWAII
OO: HN

Enclosed are nine copies of LHM captioned as above.

Inasmuch as subject has made a threat concerning Chief Justice EARL WARREN, a copy of LHM is being made available locally to Secret Service and an additional copy for the Bureau in the event it is desired to furnish Secret Service a copy at Washington, D. C.

Investigation at Honolulu was conducted by SA LEO S. BRENNEISEN.

confidential source

HN T-1 is Mrs. LEO S. BRENNEISEN, contacted 1/13/65, who requested her identity be concealed.

Source who described ANP on APPENDIX page is CS RH 94-R.

Since there is no indication BROWN is an officer of the American Nazi Party and no indication the organization has formed in Hawaii, no further investigation is being conducted in this matter. However, in the event any information is received of possible formation of ANP in Hawaii, this matter will be reopened and consideration given to requesting Bureau permission to interview subject.

② Bureau (RAM) (Enc. 9)
2 Honolulu 157-103; 62-407 (Secret Service)

LSB/ogh

4

ENCLOSURE

157-2503-1

JAN 25 1965

AGENCY: ACSI, ONI, OSI, SEC SER
DEPT ISD, CRD
DATE FORW: 2-3-65
HOW FORW: R.S.
BY

FEB 4 1965

UNIT STATES DEPARTMENT OF J TICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Honolulu, Hawaii

January 19, 1965

Re: MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN
(Also Known As MIKE H. BROWN)
RACIAL MATTER - HAWAII

On November 23, 1964, William File, 634 East Boulder Street, Colorado Springs, Colorado, advised that his daughter Irene had been arrested approximately three months ago in Pueblo, Colorado, on a charge of robbing a filling station. He reported his daughter had been placed in the custody of her parents until such time as there is an additional hearing in the matter.

While Irene was in the Pueblo County Jail she started receiving letters from Brown, a person whom she has never personally met. File pointed out Irene's picture had appeared in newspapers after her arrest, and it is possible Brown may have gotten her name and address from a newspaper article.

File made available a copy of a letter of November 9, 1964, addressed to his daughter. He advised she is not aware of the fact he had made such a copy. The letter is quoted as follows:

"Nov. 9, 1964

"Dear Irene,

"Looks like my boy Barry sure took a shellacking, doesn't it? I lost $115 on that clown. Next time I'll back Robert Shelton (Grand Imperial Wizard of the KKK) or somebody I can get better odds on. As long as I'm going to lose I'd like better than 4 to 1 odds like I got on Goldwater.

"Commander George Lincoln Rockwell (head of the American Nazi Party) spoke here last week at the university. He was fabulous! If he's ever in Colorado speaking be sure to hear him. My little band of extremists and I had dinner with him and decided to cast our lot with his movement--the guy really knows some things. Like did you

157 2503-1

ENCLO

hear that 15 out of 17 convicted traitors since 1945 have been Jews? (Of course, 17 out of 17 members of the Mafia are Italians). Or that Jews run the NAACP (PRES; Sidney Fineberg), CORE, etc? Or that three Russian Jews own ABC. CBS, and NBC (For a record of their activities see 'None Dare Call it Treason ')? What he said that really hit me between the eyes, though, was when he referred to the 6 million Jews Hitler allegedly gassed: 'Dont' you think those people DID something'?

"What really drove his point home to me, however, was a full page ad in our city newspaper- 'Six Reasons Why You Should Worry About Extremism' Put out by the National Council for Civic Responsibility (A very left-wing outfit). Most of the people listed as directors, etc of the organization were you-know-what. Seems they're scared stiff of the John Birch Society, etc., because they might repeal the income tax and impeach Earl Warren. It's too bad they didn't mention us Nazis- we're not going to impeach Earl Warren when Rockwell gets to be President in '72. We're going to hang him.

"Sure will be glad when I get back to the states. All the girls over here are a bunch of coon-loving bleeding hearts and it makes my Alabama blood boil.

"Is there any race problem in Colorado? My buddy in the photo is going there in a year or two and if there's a demand for white men to stand up to the racemixers I might go with him. The way the Negroes are pushing now we're headed for a full-scale racial war: I don't want to be left out when it starts.

"You sure got over on your jail time. I got six months in the stockade once for just having a pistol. Colorado must be a swinging state.

"Well, be good. Lots of Luck,

"Mike

"M. H. Brown
1926 Awapuhi St.
Honolulu, Hawaii"

RE: MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN

On January 8, 1965, Mrs. R. S. Lowrey, 1920 Awapuhi Street, Honolulu, advised as follows:

Mrs. S. H. Snodgrass, a woman in her early 60's, has resided next door at 1926 Awapuhi for at least 12 years. Mrs. Lowrey stated she has no idea of Mrs. Snodgrass' background and does not know if she is a divorcee or widow. She related that Mrs. Snodgrass lives a quiet life, has a substantial home, and enjoys a good reputation in the community. She related that Mrs. Snodgrass has a divorced daughter, Mrs. Brown, who is a local school teacher. Mrs. Brown formerly lived on Oahu Avenue and her two children, Mike and Leilani, have occasionally stayed with the grandmother. Mrs. Lowrey stated she believes Leilani Brown is presently in school in England. Mike Brown, about 20 years of age, has recently returned to Honolulu to live with his grandmother. He has been in one of the branches of the armed services for some three years and is now attending the University of Hawaii. Mrs. Lowrey stated Mrs. Snodgrass had expressed relief that her grandson had enrolled at the university, explaining that when he had graduated from high school he had not wanted to go on with his schooling.

On January 13, 1965, HN T-1 advised as follows:

Dr. Dorothy Brown has taught in the English Department of the University of Hawaii at Honolulu for at least 13 years. She is presently Assistant Professor at the university and resides in the Kalia Apartments. Mrs. Brown is a divorcee and has two children, Mike, aged 22, and Leilani, about 17.

During the early 1950's Dorothy Brown resided on campus with her two children. Mike was a large boy for his age and his mother found him a difficult problem as far as discipline was concerned. When he was some 14 years of age he was caught burglarizing the ROTC Armory on the campus. The following year he was sent to Arkansas to live with his maternal grandfather and finish high school there. Mrs. Brown has related in the past that Mike is fond of guns and has been a disciplinary problem and also experienced some trouble in the Army. Mike returned to Honolulu before the fall semester of 1964 and enrolled at the University of Hawaii as a freshman intending to major in political science. In late October 1964 the Associated Students of the University of Hawaii sponsored a political symposium featuring speakers of diverse political views including George Lincoln Rockwell, head of the American Nazi Party, a characterization of which is appended hereto.

RE: MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN

Mrs. Brown, after the political symposium, had stated that many of the immature students at the university had been very impressed with Rockwell's speech.

Confidential

source On January 11, 1965, Mrs. Beatrice Shinoda, Office of the Dean of Student Personnel, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, reported that university files reveal Mike H. Brown, born September 11, 1942, Montgomery, Alabama, is presently enrolled at the university as a freshman. University records indicate he was graduated from Fountain Lake High School, Hot Springs, Arkansas.

A check of the records of the Honolulu Police Department under File Numbers G83259, G82369 and G8230I, reflected that Michael Halsey Brown, born September 11, 1942, Montgomery, Alabama, was arrested on April 25, 1957, for burglary and released that date to Juvenile Crime Prevention. Those files reflect Brown, then a resident of 2648B Rock Road, was a 14-year-old juvenile attending St. Louis High School. He had been arrested along with Robert Vincent Fletcher of 1839 Keller Road who was 13 years old and attending the University High School. Police files reflect that on about April 13 or 14, 1957, forced entry had been made into the university snack bar. Cones, icecream, coin wrappers, and possibly coins were taken. On the same date the ROTC Armory and Supply Room were entered through a forced entry. Apparently nothing was taken from the Supply Room but two .22 rifles valued at $60 were taken from the Armory. The rifles were found before police were notified - one on the rifle range and one in the ROTC garage. On April 20 - 22, 1957, the ROTC Supply Room was again entered. Fletcher and Brown, when questioned by the police, admitted the above burglaries and the fact they had taken some $6.95 in cash, $5 in school supplies and $10 worth of ROTC equipment. They also admitted entering a campus service station by taking screws off door hinges on April 14, 1957, and taking some $5 in tools.

Police File under Number K40001 notes a notice of AWOL of Michael Halsey Brown, Army Serial Number RA25434648, Social Security Number 576-40-3284. The notice reflects that Brown was AWOL on August 6, 1962, from Company E, First ABG, 501st Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The AWOL notice listed Brown's father as Robert Arthur Sylvester Brown, whereabouts unknown; mother as Dorothy Snodgrass Brown, 2865 Oahu Avenue, Honolulu.

RE: MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN

HN T-1 furnished the following description of Brown:

Race:	White
Sex:	Male
Age:	22
Height:	6'
Weight:	180 pounds
Eyes:	Blue
Complexion:	Fair
Hair:	Brown - wavy

APPENDIX

RE: MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN

1

AMERICAN NAZI PARTY OF THE WORLD UNION OF FREE ENTERPRISE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS, ALSO KNOWN AS THE GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL PARTY

In his book, This Time The World, copyrighted in 1961, George Lincoln Rockwell identified himself as Commander, American Nazi Party of the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (ANP - WUFENS), Arlington, Virginia.

The April 4, 1963 issue of "The Richmond News Leader," a Richmond, Virginia daily newspaper, reported that George Lincoln Rockwell had, on the previous day, again applied for the American Nazi Party to be chartered in the State of Virginia, but this request was turned down by the Virginia State Corporation Commission. This action was taken pursuant to an act of the 1962 Virginia Assembly which prohibits use of "Nazi" or "National Socialism" in a Virginia charter. This article further pointed out that Rockwell's party is presently chartered in the State of Virginia as the George Lincoln Rockwell Party.

On August 14, 1964, a source advised that the ANP - WUFENS was organized by George Lincoln Rockwell at his residence in Arlington, Virginia, on February 26, 1959, as an international "National Socialist" movement based on the German Nazi Party headed by Adolf Hitler. He added that Rockwell is the dominant force and personality in this party; that he is espousing a "line" of hatred against the Jews and Negroes; and that he is seeking, through speeches, distribution of literature and picketing, to establish a cohesive and dominant political party in the United States and in foreign countries.

According to the "Stormtrooper's Manual," an official publication of the ANP, the phases of ANP struggle for power are fourfold, namely, first "to make ourselves known to the masses;" second "the dissemination of our program and the truth about the Party;" third "organizing the people who have been converted to our propaganda;" and fourth "the attainment of power through the votes of the newly-won masses."

On February 17, 1964, Karl Rogers Allen, Jr., former Deputy National Commander of the ANP, advised that George Lincoln Rockwell believes he has completed the first two phases in his struggle for power and is now well into the third phase. Allen said, however, in his opinion, Rockwell has only completed phase one.

RE: MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY. IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY.

FD-323 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Honolulu, Hawaii

January 19, 1965

Title	MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN
Character	RACIAL MATTER - HAWAII
Reference	Memorandum dated January 19, 1965, at Honolulu, Hawaii

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SSC REQUEST

December 18, 1975

Item 1 e.

(Part I)

377

Incident #
6-11

Questionnaire

FD-263 (Rev. 1-7-73)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
DETROIT	SAN FRANCISCO	7/9/74	5/14/73 - 6/20/74

TITLE OF CASE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

REPORT MADE BY: SA ROBERT W. MEYERS, JR.

TYPED BY: dmz

CHARACTER OF CASE: EM

REFERENCE: Detroit report of SA LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, 5/9/73.

O-7 to DE -action
Re De Report 7/9/74,
Page 5, last para., line 2 Aug. 11, 1974
should be 1973,
Bucopies corrected. Correct your copies
RDS/RJG 7/26/74

-RUC-

ADMINISTRATIVE

Detroit chapter of BPP has closed all its offices, terminated all of its activities and all but two members have relocated in Oakland, California. In view of this fact, Detroit is considering this matter RUC.

Detroit is maintaining cases on all active members until their location in Oakland, California is verified by San Francisco.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE					ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED: SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:
3 - Bureau (105-165706 sub 15) (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
2 - San Francisco (157-1204) (RM)
1 - Detroit (157-3075)

INTELLIGENCE DIV. RECEIVED

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

105-165706-15-1119

REC 27

7 JUL 22 1974

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Notations

2cc-CD(ISS-SLW)
2cc-destroyed
1cc-SS
1cc-618q^th^ID
RDS/RJG 7/26/74
1cc-LHM-670

56 JUL 31 1974

COVER PAGE

179-10221

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source

DE T-1 is 3605-EI ⟩ INFORMANTS
DE T-2 is 3909-PEI ⟩

DE T-3 is CSDE 4833-EI - CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

DE T-4 is DE 5123-PEI ⟩ INFORMANTS
DE T-5 is DE 5125-PEI ⟩

DE T-6 is a well placed source.

DE T-7 is a well placed source.

DE T-8 is CSDE 2216-EI - CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

DE T-9 is DE 4027-PEI - INFORMANT

DE T-10 is a well placed source.

One copy of report is being furnished Secret Service, Detroit.

-B-
COVER PAGE

NON SYMBOL SOURCE ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

DE T-6 is DAVID COHEN, Partner in the C.C.C. Management Company.

DE T-7 is Lieutenant JOHN VAN HAAREN, Tactical Reconnaissance Unit, Detroit Police Department.

DE T-10 is MARY MADISON of Apple Realty, Detroit, Michigan.

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - Secret Service, Detroit

Report of: SA ROBERT W. MEYERS **Office:** Detroit, Michigan
Date: 7/19/74

Field Office File #: 157-3075 **Bureau File #:** 105-165706 sub 15

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Character: EXTREMIST MATTER

Synopsis: BPP headquarters formerly located at 2228 Bewick and 10438 McNichols, Detroit. The office on Bewick closed during month of November, 1973, and office at 10438 McNichols closed February, 1974, both facilities vacated. BPP leader PHILANDER LONNIE DARDEN and majority of active members relocated to Oakland California to assist the National Headquarters in that city. All community programs and related activities terminated. Identities of leaders, active members, relocating members set out. Activities conducted and financial status set out.

-RUC-

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O - 406-840

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE DETROIT BLACK PANTHER PARTY 1
- A. Location of Detroit BPP Offices . . . 2-3
- B. Connections With BPP National Headquarters 3-4

II. MEMBERSHIP 4
- A. BPP Local Leaders. 4
- B. Active Members 4-5

III. BPP NEWSPAPER 5

IV. BPP SPONSORED PROGRAMS AND COMMUNITY ACTIVITY 5
- A. Free Bussing to Prison 5-6
- B. Free Breakfast and Lunch Program . . . 6
- C. Free Food Programs 7
- D. Befenits 7

V. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES 8

IV. FUNDS 8-9

VII. MISCELLANEOUS 10*

DETAILS:

I. OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE DETROIT BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It formerly advocated the use of guns and guerilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government. Since early 1971, it has preached a policy of "survival pending revolution".

A. Location of Detroit BPP Offices

The BPP registered its name with the City of Detroit and used 2228 Bewick, Detroit, as its official address.

DE T-1
May 14, 1973

The BPP must vacate 2228 Bewick by August 15, 1973.

DE T-2
June 1, 1973

Donations to the BPP Free Breakfast program were to be directed to 2228 Bewick.

DE T-1
June 6, 1973

The BPP used 2228 Bewick as their official address in solicitations for their Free Food program.

DE T-3
June 27, 1973

The BPP office is at 2228 Bewick, with members living upstairs and this has an address of 2226 Bewick.

DE T-2
June 20, 1973

The residence at 2228 Bewick is still being used as Party headquarters.

DE T-1
September 13, 1973

There were BPP officials at 2228 Bewick.

DE T-4
September 21, 1973

The BPP office and headquarters are located at 2228 Bewick.

DE T-5
September 26, 1973

On November 17, 1973, the BPP vacated their former offices and moved into an office located at 10438 McNichols, Detroit.

DE T-6
December 17, 1973

On January 10, 1974, the BPP placed their office for sale in anticipation of a move to Oakland, California.

DE T-6
January 22, 1974

The BPP officially closed their office in Detroit on February 1, 1974.

DE T-5
February 19, 1974

The BPP sold the building which housed their offices on March 12, 1974.

DE T-6
March 12, 1974

B. Connections with BPP National Headquarters

LEONARD MONGO, a Detroit BPP Member, remained in California to help on the political campaign of BOBBY SEALE.

DE T-1
June 6, 1973

BOBBY SEALE is the National Chairman of the BPP in Oakland, California.

BOBBY SEALE held a discussion program at Wayne State University on November 15, 1973.

DE T-7
November 16, 1973

LONNIE DARDEN, LORRAINE BANKS, TRACY WILSON, known Detroit BPP members, were to depart Detroit and relocate in Oakland, and work for the BPP in California.

DE T-1
February 5, 1974

II. MEMBERSHIP

A. BPP Local Leaders

The following individuals are considered to hold leadership positions in the Detroit chapter of the BPP:

PHILANDERS LONNIE DARDEN, also known as Lonnie Darden, In Charge (Minister of Information) [illegible]

Rollin Reid ROLLIN GARY REID, Head of the Paper Program [illegible]

ALEASE STALLWORTH, in charge of office

DE T-1
May 3, 1973

B. Active Members

The following listed individuals were known members of the Detroit BPP. Those who functioned only on a part-time basis are so indicated:

LORENE CHASETTE BANKS, Part-time [illegible] Mich Cal

ERMA MORRIS Mich Calif.

TRACY WILSON

WESSIE MAE COOPER

Mich

GWENDOLYN JEAN RICHARDSON

WAYNE KEITH CURTIS, Part-time

EDGAR ROBINSON, Part-time

WALTER ROZIER, Part-time

DE T-1
June 20, 1974

III. BPP NEWSPAPER

DE T-1 and DE T-8, advised that the BPP newspaper arrived irregularly from Chicago on a Cash on Delivery basis between November, 1973, and February, 1974. Papers were disposed of on a door to door basis by community workers. ROLLIN REID was responsible for the program

DE T-8
January 30, 1974

IV. BPP SPONSORED PROGRAMS AND COMMUNITY ACTIVITY

A. Free Bussing to Prison

According to DE T-1, free busses between Detroit and the Jackson, Michigan State Prison were provided on the following dates:

May 27, 1973
June 3, 1973
June 17, 1973
June 21, 1973
July 8, 1973
August 11, 1973

The free bus trips to Jackson, Michigan were stopped by a lack of funds after the trip on August 11, 197~~4~~3. All of the trips left from the BPP office at 2228 Bewick.

DE T-1
October 26, 1973

The BPP obtained busses and provided free trips between Detroit and Jackson on December 23, 1973.

DE T-9
December 26, 1973

On January 20, 1974, the BPP held their cost free bus trip prior to closing their Detroit office.

DE T-1
January 22, 1974

B. Free Breakfast and Lunch Program

The BPP was feeding approximately 80 children per day in the Breakfast program when it was terminated for the summer.

DE T-1
June 4, 1973

The BPP fed 15-20 children per day with the lunch program on donated food during July and August, 1973.

DE T-1
August 21, 1973

The BPP stopped the free lunch program and did not start the Breakfast program due to a lack of donations.

DE T-1
September 24, 1973

The BPP re-instituted the free breakfast program for December, 1973 and January, 1974. The program was permanently terminated January 25, 1974.

C. Free Food Programs

The BPP was to distribute free food at the Jeffries Housing Project on June 28, 1973, and June 29, 1973.

DE T-1
June 21, 1973

The Jeffries Housing Project is a low income housing development located in Detroit.

The BPP held a free bar-b-que for friends and members of the party on July 4, 1973.

DE T-1
August 21, 1973

The BPP did not plan any free food give-a-way for the Christmas holidays because of insufficient contributions.

DE T-1
December 18, 1973

D. Benefits

The BPP held a testimonial dinner on May 22, 1973, at Ben's High Chapparal Restaurant for Judges JAMES DEL RIO and JUSTIN RAVITZ of the Detroit Recorders Court.

DE T-2
June 1, 1973

The BPP held a senior citizens dinner on August 2, 1973, and they provided free transportation for senior citizens and had local Detroit political candidates for speakers.

DE T-7
August 3, 1973

The BPP held a "Bobby Seale Honorarium Benefit" at Ben's High Chaparral on October 16, 1973. Proceeds of the benefit were to go to the BPP Committee Action Programs.

DE T-7
October 17, 1973

V. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

On June 10, 1974, DE T-10 furnished two .22 caliber rifles abandoned by members of the BPP when vacating a home used as a safe house. Home was at 11746 Littlefield, Detroit, and was used by LONNIE DARDEN and his girlfriend between January and March, 1974.

Examination of the two abandoned weapons failed to disclose their use in any crime in Detroit nor had they ever been reported stolen.

In addition to the two rifles, there was some Literature found in the house. This consisted of 24 all purpose greeting cards, two black extremist newspapers, a book by BOBBY SEALE, a book on "Chou-En-Lai" by HAI-YU-HSU, and a pamphlet entitled "Watch That Black Dollar" by ALICE THOMPSON.

VI. FUNDS

DE T-1 and DE T-2 advised that between June 1, 1973, and January 1, 1974, the main source of BPP revenue was from the Benefit Dinner's held at Ben's High Chaparrell, with each dinner being less successful than the preceeding one.

The BPP made $100.00 on a benefit dance and collected $150.00 in donations during the second week of June, 1973.

DE T-2
June 18, 1973

The BPP collected $151.00 in donations during the last part of June, 1973.

DE T-2
June 26, 1973

The BPP bussing program was suspended due to lack of money.

DE T-1
October 26, 1973

The benefit dinner of October 16, 1973, was a financial failure due to poor attendance.

DE T-1
October 17, 1973

The BPP decided to vacate its offices because the owner was going to charge them rent for the house.

DE T-1
December 18, 1973

The BPP rented a commercial bus for its free bussing program on December 22, 1973, and paid the rent of $124.50 with quarters.

DE T-9
December 26, 1973

Contributions to the BPP are almost nonexistent, and the free breakfast program was halted due to a lack of funds.

DE T-1
January 28, 1974

The free bus to prison scheduled for February 3, 1974, was canceled due to a lack of money.

DE T-1
February 5, 1974

The Michigan Bell Telephone Company canceled the telephone service to the BPP office due to non-payment of the bill.

DE T-1
February 27, 1974

The safe house used by LONNIE DARDEN was repossessed by the lender as a result of non-payment by the BPP. The home was located at 11746 Littlefield.

DE T-10
June 10, 1974

VII. MISCELLANEOUS

DE T-6 advised that the office building purchased for the BPP office was paid for by a Detroit Real Estate agent, and this agent guaranteed all payments, and handled the sale of the office when the BPP vacated and relocated in California.

DE T-1 advised they also used the apartment at 4200 Buena Vista as a residence for the BPP female members and this residence was vacated when active members relocated in California.

Relocating in Oakland, California and working for the BPP headquarters located in that city are PHILANDERS LONNIE DARDEN, ERMA MORRIS, LORENE BANKS and ALEASE STALLWORTH. All were active members of the Detroit chapter.

DE T-1
February 5, 1974

FD-263 (Rev. 1-7-72)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
DETROIT	SAN FRANCISCO	5/9/73	11/8/72 - 5/3/73	
TITLE OF ~~CASE~~		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
BLACK PANTHER PARTY		SA LAWRENCE W. LEVINE		mjk
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		EM		

REFERENCE: Detroit report of SA JOHN V. INSOGNA, 11/7/72.

- P -

LEAD

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Will closely follow and report activities of the Black Panther Party on a semi-annual basis.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE					ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED NW/88 SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

105-165706-15-1047

COPIES MADE:

11 - Bureau (105-165706 Sub 15)(RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit
2 - San Francisco (157-1204)(RM)
2 - Detroit (157-3075)

12 MAY 14 1973

REC-7

ST-112

57 MAY 30 1973

Dissemination Record of Attached Report					
Agency	~~Copy to~~ CD-2 (155 & GCS)	SS	ICS	6180	5-D
Request Recd.	by routing slip for				
Date Fwd.	☒ info ☐ action				
How Fwd.	date 5-29-73				
By	~~by~~ PEN gm				

Notations

ADMINISTRATIVE

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source

✓DE T-1 is DE 3605-E.
✓DE T-2 is DE 3909-E Prob.

INFORMANTS

✓DE T-3 is CSDE 2962-E.
✓DE T-4 is CSDE 2216-E.
✓DE T-5 is CSDE 2580-E.

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

✓DE T-6 is DE 3688-PSI.
✓DE T-7 is DE 4027-UI.
✓DE T-8 is DE 2446-E.
✓DE T-9 is DE 1330-E.
✓DE T-10 is DE 3866-E.

INFORMANTS

All individuals mentioned in instant report as affiliated with the Black Panther Party (BPP) are subjects of Detroit Office files.

Identity of Special Agent of the FBI who spoke with ORELL BENJAMIN on March 12, 1973, is SA DONALD V. RITENOUR.

Identities of Special Agents of the FBI conducting search of 157 Collingwood on March 13, 1973, are SA LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, SA ROBERT JAMES GILMORE and SA WILLIAM T. HEALY.

Information regarding BPP fortifications and apparent target practice at 157 Collingwood by BPP members was furnished to the Intelligence Section of the Detroit, Michigan Police Department on March 13, 1973.

Identity of Special Agent of the FBI conducting pretext interview of LONNIE DARDEN is SA JOHN V. INSOGNA. Pretext used was that of a concerned citizen of the Detroit Black community.

One copy of instant report is being furnished to Secret Service, Detroit.

UNI STATES DEPARTMENT OF JU ICE
DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIO

Copy to: 1 - Secret Service, Detroit

Report of: SA LAWRENCE W. LEVINE
Office: Detroit, Michigan
Date: May 9, 1973

Field Office File #: 157-3075
Bureau File #: 105-165706 Sub 15

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Character: EXTREMIST MATTER

Synopsis: BPP headquarters is located at 2228 Bewick, and a BPP "pad" is located at 4200 Buena Vista, Detroit, Michigan. Detroit BPP Chapter leader is PHILANDERS LONNIE DARDEN, also known as Lonnie Darden, the Minister of Information The BPP operates a Free Breakfast Program and a Free Busing to Prison Program and continues to sell "The Black Panther" newspaper. Identities of leaders and members as well as BPP activities and financial summary set out.

- P -

DETAILS:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O - 406-840

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE DETROIT BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

- A. Goals, Guidelines and Objectives . . . 3-4
- B. Location of BPP Offices 4
- C. Connections with BPP National Headquarters 5-6
  - 1. Travel of Members 5
  - 2 Communications with BPP National Headquarters 6

II. MEMBERSHIP

- A. Requirements for Membership 6
- B. Identities of BPP Local Leaders and Members 6-8

III. BPP PUBLICATIONS

- A. Distribution of the BPP Newspaper . . 8-9
- B. BPP Literature Distributed in the Detroit Area 9-16

IV. BPP SPONSORED PROGRAMS AND GENERAL COMMUNITY ACTIVITY

- A. The BPP Free Busing to Prison Program. 17-18
- B. The BPP Free Breakfast and Lunch Programs 18-19

Page

C. BPP Free Food Programs 19-20

D. Political Education Classes . . 20-21

E. Rallies and Demonstrations . . . 21

V. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

A. Weapons and Fortifications . . . 22-26

B. Arrests 27

VI. CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER BLACK EXTREMIST GROUPS 27-28

VII. BPP FUNDS 28-29

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS 29

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE DETROIT BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The Black Panther Party (BPP) is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It formerly advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Goernment. Since early 1971, it has preached a policy of "survival pending revolution".

A. Goals, Guidelines and Objectives

The goals and objectives of the Detroit Chapter of the BPP remain in accord with those specified by BPP National Headquarters in Oakland, California. The Party advocates a non-violent philosophy of education of the black community to the "evils of the oppression and suppression of the poor by a racially oriented society." The Party has put aside the gun and no longer advocates the use of guerrilla tactics to change the political system. An additional goal of the Party is to change the community image of the Panthers as "thugs dressed in black".

DE T-1
April 27, 1973

It is against the laws of the BPP for members to carry guns or to use hard drugs.

DE T-2
November 8, 1972

BPP members must dedicate their entire energies to the furtherance of the programs and philosophies of the Party and all personal desires must assume a secondary role.

DE T-1
April 27, 1973

In a February 2, 1973, article entitled "Black Panthers Seek to Expand Survival Service", which appeared in the "Michigan Chronicle", a weekly black oriented Detroit newspaper, LEONARD MONGO, a BPP member, was quoted as saying, "Our goal is not recognition but service to the people". The article further quoted MONGO as saying, "Much of our image in the past was created by an unfriendly press. Our goal continues to be survival of the people. The people themselves will determine the approaches to be used in the meantime. The Black Panther Party makes itself available for guidance and assistance. Our survival services are essential to the daily existence of the people."

B. Location of Detroit BPP Offices

The BPP Office on Detroit's east side located at 2228 Bewick, closed down at the end of December, 1972. This site was the location of the BPP Free Breakfast Program. The only office now in operation is the Ministry of Information Office located at 157 Collingwood on Detroit's west side.

DE T-3
January 4, 1973

The BPP Ministry of Information Office on Collingwood was closed down on February 28, 1973 and the Party relocated its members to 2228 Bewick, the former site of the Party's east side office. The 2228 Bewick address is a temporary location.

DE T-1
March 12, 1973

The BPP continues to rent a "pad" located at 4200 Buena Vista, Detroit.

DE T-2
April 4, 1973

The BPP operates no offices or pads in Michigan outside the Detroit City limits.

DE T-3
May 1, 1973

C. Connections with BPP National Headquarters

1. Travel of Members

BLACK PanTher PaRTY

ROLLIN GARY REID, a Detroit BPP member recently returned from California where he worked at the BPP's campaign for the election of BOBBY SEALE as Mayor of Oakland, California.

mick

ROLLIN / Reid

DE T-1
November 21, 1972

BOBBY SEALE is the National Chairman of the BPP in Oakland, California.

LEONARD MONGO, a Detroit BPP Member, flew from Detroit, Michigan, to California on April 6, 1973 to help in the BPP's campaign for the election of BOBBY SEALE.

DE T-1
April 9, 1973

JODY WEAVER and LOUIS TOLBERT JOHNSON, both BPP members from Detroit, remain in the San Francisco, California area where they are reportedly engaged in working on the programs of the BPP.

DE T-1
April 27, 1973

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

2. Communication with BPP National Headquarters

DE T-1 advised on April 27, 1973 that LONNIE DARDEN, Detroit BPP Minister of Information, received a telephone call in late April, 1973, from BOBBY SEALE in California. SEALE reportedly told DARDEN that the Detroit BPP Chapter has the least number of actively involved members of all BPP Chapters throughout the country. SEALE also complained that the Detroit Chapter is operating only two survival programs (the Free Breakfast Program and the Free Busing to Prison Program) and warned DARDEN that the Detroit Chapter will have to take steps to initiate a substantial number of survival programs to serve the Detroit Black community as it deserves to be served.

II. MEMBERSHIP

A. Requirements for Membership

The BPP is constantly attempting to recruit community workers from the black community to help in the operation of the BPP programs. Outsiders, however, are not trusted by established Party members and community workers are not allowed inside the Party Office or pad. They are required to sell BPP newspapers and to perform various other duties "in the field".

DE T-1
October 12, 1972

B. Identities of BPP Local Leaders and Members

The following individuals are considered to hold a leadership position in the Detroit Chapter of the BPP.

AC PHILANDERS LONNIE DARDEN, also known as Lonnie Darden -- In Charge (Minister of Information)

AC ROLLIN GARY REID -- Acting Second in Command

AC LEONARD MONGO -- In Charge of Distribution and Communications

AC ALEASE PATRICIA STALLWORTH -- In Charge of Finances

BLACK PANTHER PARTY DETROIT MICH

DE T-1
May 3, 1973

The following individuals are members of the Detroit BPP. Those who function only on a part-time basis are so indicated.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

AC LORENE CHASETTE BANKS - part-time

ALVIN BROWN

AC ALVIN LEE BROWN - part-time

CLOSED WESSIE MAE COOPER

AC WAYNE KEITH CURTIS - part-time

AC WILLIE CHARLES HALL - part-time

AC ERMA MORRIS

CLOSED GWENDOLYN JEAN RICHARDSON

AC EDGAR ROBINSON - part-time

AC WALTER ROZIER - part-time

AC TRACY JOANNE WILSON

DE T-1
May 3, 1973

There are also approximately six community workers who are young high school age blacks who are interested in the BPP and help sell BPP newspapers and solicit donations to the Party. They hold no official Party status and their interest in the Party's work vacillates and their work is irregular and inconsistent.

DE T-2
April 4, 1973

The fact that four Detroit Party members are presently in California, the fact that so many Detroit Party members work for the Party on a very limited basis and the wavering interest of the community workers has severely hurt the BPP's success in the last six months in Detroit.

DE T-1
May 3, 1973

AC AC

GERALD CRAWFORD and CAROLYN STURDIVANT, former stalwarts of the Detroit BPP Chapter, have ceased all activity in the Party in the last few months. They are no longer considered Party members.

DE T-1
May 1, 1973

III. BPP PUBLICATIONS

A. Distribution of the BPP Newspaper

DE T-4 and DE T-5 advised on various dates between November, 1972 and April, 1973 that the BPP received the following number of copies of the "Black Panther" newspaper from BPP National Distribution, New York City, New York:

November, 1972	6,000
December, 1972	6,000
January, 1973	4,000
February, 1973	4,000
March, 1973	4,000
April, 1973	4,000

Party members and community workers sell BPP newspapers on street corners at two locations in the Detroit area and have recently taken up "paper routes" in the black community and attempt to sell newspapers door to door.

DE T-1
March 2, 1973

B. BPP Literature Distributed in the Detroit Area

DE T-1, DE T-2, DE T-3 and DE T-6 furnished the following leaflets which were distributed in the Detroit area by the BPP between November, 1972 and April, 1973:

FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM FOR



SCHOOL

CHILDREN

****

THE YOUTH OF OUR BLACK COMMUNITY ARE IN SCHOOL AGAIN, AND AGAIN THE PROBLEM OF PROVIDING A HEALTHY WELL BALANCED "FREE BREAKFAST" FOR THESE YOUNG BROTHERS AND SISTERS STILL EXIST IN OUR COMMUNITY.

AS YOU KNOW, IN ORDER TO BEGIN EACH SCHOOL DAY FULLY PREPARE TO COMPREHEND AND APPLY WHAT IS BEING TAUGHT TO THEM, OUR BEAUTIFUL YOUTH MUST HAVE A COMPLETE AND NOURISHING BREAKFAST. THE PURPOSE OF THE FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM IS TO PROVIDE THIS, ALONG WITH POINTING OUT TO OUR YOUTH THE INCONSISTENCIES WITHIN THIS SOCIETY, AND THE AFFECT OF THESE INCONSISTENCIES UPON THEIR DAILY LIVES.

BREAKFAST WILL BE SERVED AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

2228 BEWICK AND 157 COLLINGWOOD, FROM 7:30-8:30 A.M.

WE ARE THEREFORE, AGAIN REQUESTING OF YOU, THE BUSINESSMEN AND COMMUNITY PEOPLE, YOUR FULL PARTICIPATION IN THIS NECESSARY SURVIVAL PROGRAM, BY MAKING CONTRIBUTIONS OF BREAKFAST FOOD AND/OR MONETARY DONATIONS IN ORDER TO SUBSTAIN THIS PROGRAM AND THUS HELP TO PROVIDE OUR YOUTH WITH THIS VITAL NECESSITY. WE REMIND YOU THAT OUR FUTURE IS IN OUR YOUTH, AND THAT IN ORDER FOR OUR YOUTH TO SURVIVE, OUR YOUTH MUST BE FED.

YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NEEDED AND WELCOMED.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE CONTACT THE DETROIT BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AT 867-7742 OR 43.

" ALL POWER TO THE YOUTH "

" ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE "

10



INTERCOMMUNAL SURVIVAL CENTER

DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
157 COLLINGWOOD

NOVEMBER, 1972

TO THE CONCERNED BUSINESSMEN:

THE DETROIT BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY WOULD LIKE TO TAKE TIME OUT TO THANK YOU FOR THE MANY TIMES YOU HAVE DONATED TO THE SURVIVAL PROGRAMS THAT WE HAVE HAD. IN THE PAST, YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS HAVE ENABLED US TO GIVE AWAY 1,600 FREE BAGS OF GROCERIES TO THE MASSES OF PEOPLE IN DIFFERENT AREAS THOUGHOUT THE CITY.

SINCE THERE ARE SO MANY HUNGRY PEOPLE IN THE CITY OF DETROIT, WE FEEL WE CAN'T JUST STOP FEEDING THEM. SO IN THE FUTURE, WE PLAN TO START STOCKING UP ON FOOD TO GIVE TO THE PEOPLE ON A DAY TO DAY BASIS. BUT WE CANNOT DO THIS WITHOUT THE BEAUTIFUL HELP THAT YOU, THE STORE OWNERS GIVE BY JUST DONATING ONE OR TWO ITEMS A WEEK. WE ALSO IN TURN, INFORM THE COMMUNITY WHICH STORES HAVE DONATED - FOR WHEN YOU HELP THE COMMUNITY IN RETURN THEY HELP YOU. SO, IF YOU ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE COMMUNITY THEN SHOW THEM, BY GIVING YOUR SUPPORT.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

LONNIE DEE









A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL

Free Breakfast Program

Provides children a free, hot breakfast every school morning.

People's Free Food Program

Provides free food to Black and other oppressed people.

Liberation Schools

Provides free educational facilities and materials to Black and other oppressed children to promote a correct view of their role in the society.

David Hilliard People's Free Shoe Program

Provides free shoes to the people made at the David Hilliard Free Shoe factory and elsewhere.

People's Free Clothing Program

Provides new, stylish and quality clothing free to the people.

Free Bussing to Prisons Program

Provides free transportation to prisons for families and friends of incarcerated men and women.

THIS IS THE LIST OF THE PROGRAMS THAT THE DETROIT BRANCH IS SPONSERING. BUT THEY CAN'T BE SUCCESSFUL WITH OUT THE HELP FROM THE PEOPLE. FOR MORE INFORMATION PLEASE CALL--- 823-1968

12



A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL

Free Breakfast Program

Provides children a free hot breakfast every school morning.

Free Busing to Prisons Program

Provides free transportation to prisons for families and friends of incarcerated men and women.

David Hilliard People's Free Shoe Program

Provides free shoes to the people made at the David Hilliard Free Shoe factory and elsewhere.

People's Free Food Program

Provides free food to Black and other oppressed people.

THIS IS THE LIST OF THE PROGRAMS THAT THE DETROIT BRANCH IS SPONSORING

BUT THEY CAN'T BE SUCCESSFUL WITHOUT THE HELP FROM YOU, THE PEOPLE!

******* FURTHER INFORMATION---822-0635 2228 BEWICK ***********

13

David Hilliard



14

NECESSARY INFORMATION NEEDED TO VISIT INMATES IN JACKSON STATE PENITENTARY ARE:

(1) INMATES NAME AND I.D. NUMBER.

(2) WHETHER OR NOT HE'S A TRUSTEE.

(3) YOU MUST BE ON INMATES VISITING LIST.

(4) MAKE YOUR RESERVATION A WEEK IN ADVANCE.

(5) YOU SHOULD ARRIVE AT 8:00 FOR EARLY SEATING ARRANGEMENT.

LOCATION OF DEPARTURE IS 157 COLLINGWOOD, TIME OF DEPARTURE IS 9:00 AND TIME OF ARRIVAL 5:00.

Free Busing to Prison Program

MONTHLY SCHEDULE.

TRUSTEE

MARCH 11

APRIL 8

MAY 6

GEN. POPULATION

MARCH 25

APRIL 22

MAY 20

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
2228 [illegible]

Lets CRAZY LEG FOR SURVIVAL

15

SATURDAY
JANUARY 20, 1973
AT
ST. MARGARET MARY
CHURCH
**5055 LEMAY
(corner of east warren)
8:00 TILL 1:00
$1.00 DONATION
ALL PROCEEDS WILL GO TO THE SURVIVAL PROGRAMS

SPONSORED BY THE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
157 COLLINGWOOD
867-6[illegible]4



BOBBY SEALE

FOR

MAYOR

OF OAKLAND

BOBBY SEALE and ELAINE BROWN are very serious candidates, they are organizing and conducting a community wide campaign. BOBBY is the only candidate for Mayor of Oakland, known throughout the city. HE and ELAINE are the only candidates that daily encounter the Black, Latin and poor peoples of Oakland, answering their questions, explaining the campaign, asking their advice and welcoming them as participants to discuss the demands of the community.

You can give your support here in Detroit by sending in donations for the campaign to the Detroit Branch of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY

2228 Bewick
Detroit - 48214
(822-0835)

ELAINE BROWN

FOR

COUNCILWOMAN



...man • Bobby For Mayor • Elaine For Councilwoman • Bobby For May...

Bobby For Mayor • Elaine For Councilwo...

16

IV. BPP SPONSORED PROGRAMS AND GENERAL COMMUNITY ACTIVITY

A. The BPP Free Busing to Prison Program

The Free Busing to Prison Program provides free transportation to persons in the black community for families and friends of incarcerated men and women to visit Jackson, Michigan, State Penitentiary.

DE T-1
April 27, 1973

The BPP sponsored a bus trip to Jackson State Prison on January 7, 1973. The bus was rented from a commercial carrier and departed 157 Collingwood, Detroit at 9:00 a.m.

DE T-7
January 10, 1973

The BPP sponsored bus trips to Jackson State Prison on January 27 and 28, 1973.

DE T-8
January 29, 1973

DE T-1 advised on various dates during March and April, 1973, that the BPP sponsored bus trips to Jackson State Prison on each of the following dates: March 11, March 16, March 25, April 8, April 14 and April 22, 1973.

An article which appeared in the February 17, 1973, edition of the "Michigan Chronicle" entitled "Panthers Appeal for Support of Prison Busing Program" quoted ROLLIN REID, a BPP member as saying "The Community should do more to support the program. Basically we cannot get more community support because of the old BPP image of leather coats and guns. People think we are thugs."

An article which appeared in the February 27, 1973, edition of the "Detroit News", a daily Detroit newspaper, entitled "Panthers Appeal for Bus Funds" quoted LONNIE DARDEN, BPP leader as saying that what the Panthers are seeking is "a good used vehicle" which would cost them around $2,500.00. DARDEN stated that commercial rental costs are too high and that the BPP funds would not allow the Party to purchase a used bus even if one were to be found. DARDEN stated that the Party funds at the present time for the purchase of a used bus stand at zero.

An article which appeared in the April 20, 1973, edition of the "Detroit News" entitled "Panthers Add Trips to Prison Program" stated that the Panthers are appealing to Churches and other civic groups for the loan of vans or busses for their busing to prison services and have been successful in receiving aid from the Burnette Baptist Church in Detroit which has offered to make their vans available.

B. The BPP Free Breakfast and Lunch Programs

The Free Breakfast Program provides free hot breakfasts for school children in the black community from 7:30 to 8:30 a.m. on each school day. The Free Lunch Program is an alternate program which is run during the summer months when schools are closed and provides a free lunch to children who live in the vicinity of the BPP Office. The Free Lunch Program was suspended in September, 1972 and will be reinstituted in June, 1973.

DE T-1
April 27, 1973

The Free Breakfast Program at 2228 Bewick was shut down in late December, 1972 when the Party closed down that office. During November and December, 1972, approximately 80-85 children were fed each day at the Bewick Office.

DE T-3
January 4, 1973

During January and February, 1973, approximately 20-25 children were provided a free breakfast at the 157 Collingwood Office.

DE T-1
March 6, 1973

Between February 28, 1973 and April 13, 1973, the Free Breakfast Program was suspended by the Party due to the relocation of the Party Office to the Bewick address. From April 13, 1973 to May 1, 1973, the Party has again provided a free breakfast for approximately 80-85 children on each school day.

DE T-1
May 3, 1973

Some of the food for the Free Breakfast and Free Lunch Programs is provided by local grocery stores and some is purchased by the Party.

DE T-1
March 21, 1973

C. BPP Free Food Programs

The BPP gave away three hundred bags of groceries during the Party's "Black Christmas Free Food Giveaway Survival Day Program", on December 23, 1972.

DE T-2
January 9, 1973

Survival Day refers to a program implemented by the BPP with purpose of giving away bags of groceries to oppressed families living in the inner city of Detroit.

Due to the great expense of purchasing the necessary large quantities of groceries for Survival Day Programs, the Party has not held a Free Food Giveaway in the past three months.

DE T-1
April 27, 1973

D. Political Education Classes

Political Education classes are no longer held on a regular basis. The classes are held occasionally during the week as the Party feels it is more beneficial to personally come into contact with members of the black community on a one-to-one basis. For this reason, Party members solicit donations and sell BPP newspapers door to door and attempt to "rap" with the people concerning the BPP, its aims and programs.

DE T-2
April 3, 1973

For example, DE T-2 advised on January 30, 1973 that a Political Education class was conducted by ALVIN BROWN, BPP Member at the 157 Collingwood Office on January 29, 1973. The class was entitled "Liberalism in the Red Book of Chairman Mao". Only three non-Party members were in attendance.

In order to establish a better rapport with the members of the black community and in order to raise money for the Party, the Party organized and sponsored the following events:

January 5, 1973
"Skate To Survive" -- Roller Skating Party attended by approximately 30 non Party members.

DE T-2
January 15, 1973

January 20, 1973
"Crazy legs Dance for Survival"

DE T-1
January 22, 1973

February 1, 1973
"Dance for Survival"

DE T-2
February 5, 1973

March 13, 1973
"The People's Campaign Benefit" -- a dance which resulted in a profit to the Party of $100.00

DE T-1
April 4, 1973

E. Rallies and Demonstrations

The BPP sponsored no rallies and held no demonstrations between November, 1972 and April, 1973.

DE T-3
May 1, 1973

V. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

A. Weapons and Fortifications

On March 12, 1973, DE T-1 advised that the BPP Headquarters, Ministry of Information Office, 157 Collingwood, Detroit, had been closed down and that the Party members had moved out temporarily and relocated their office at 2228 Bewick, Detroit.

On March 12, 1973, ORELL BENJAMIN, 18580 Dequindre, Detroit, owner of the residence located at 157 Collingwood, Detroit, advised that the BPP had vacated the residence recently and relocated their members to a different office. BENJAMIN stated that the FBI was free to enter the premises if they so desired.

On March 13, 1973, a search of the residence located at 157 Collingwood, Detroit, was conducted by Special Agents of the FBI. Results of the search are set out below as well as descriptions of rooms and floor space.

The residence of 157 Collingwood, Detroit, is a two story dwelling with a basement and attic space. The BPP Office space at 157 Collingwood comprised one side of a two family duplex type dwelling. The Party occupied one half of the entire dwelling.

The first floor consists of a living room, dining room, kitchen and pantry. Steps off the kitchen lead down to the basement. Four bedrooms and a bathroom are located on the second floor. Steps lead upstairs to an attic area from the second floor.

Physical observation of the interior of the residence revealed that all furniture had been removed and that the house was not habitable.

No pertinent BPP literature of any kind was observed in any rooms of the house.

The windows of the living room which face the north front entrance to the dwelling were painted black. Built in wooden boxes beneath these three windows were filled with sand. Two other windows facing east were boarded up. The front north windows in the attic space were covered with a heavy iron grate and draped with blankets.

The north and south basement brick walls were pocked with large holes which penetrated deep into the brick and masonry work.

Also observed stored in the basement was a four foot by eight foot sheet of three-quarter inch plywood covered with a heavy gauge metal grate.

On March 20, 1973, DE T-1 and DE T-2 advised that KENNETH BERNARD HORSTON, former BPP Minister of Information and various other BPP members selected by HORSTON had on occasion taken target practice in the basement of BPP Office at 157 Collingwood. Above sources stated, however, that it has been over one year since Party members fired or possessed weapons. Sources stated that LONNIE DARDEN, the present BPP Minister of Information, in view of the BPP's new philosophy of non-violence, has prohibited the use and possession of weapons by Party members. Sources advised that no weapons are currently maintained by any Party members.

Sources further advised that the sandbox and iron mesh grates for fortification also date back to the "old days" of the Party when the Party was "at war" with the establishment and in constant fear of being raided by law enforcement agencies.

On May 1, 1973, DE T-3 provided the following floor plan of the former BPP Headquarters Office at 157 Collingwood, Detroit, Michigan:


FIRST FLOOR
PANTRY
DINING ROOM
KITCHEN
To BSMT
LIVING ROOM
FIRE PLACE
HALL
UPSTAIRS
CLO
N

SECOND FLOOR


BED ROOM
BED ROOM
To Attic
UP
BATH
HALL
L.S.
CLO
BED ROOM
BED ROOM
N

B. Arrests

No members of the Detroit BPP were arrested during the period November, 1972 to April, 1973.

DE T-3
May 1, 1973

VI. CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER BLACK EXTREMIST GROUPS

BPP Members are not allowed to hold membership in any other group or organization. The BPP operates independently and has no affiliation with other extremist groups. BPP members do not officially come into contact or associate with members of other militant organizations.

DE T-1
February 14, 1973

DE T-1, DE T-2, DE T-9 and DE T-10 all advised in January, 1973, that the BPP faction headed by HUEY P. NEWTON remains diametrically opposed to the BPP faction headed by ELDRIDGE CLEAVER.

> HUEY P. NEWTON is the leader of the BPP-Newton Faction (NF) headquartered in Oakland, California.
>
> ELDRIDGE CLEAVER is a leader in the BPP and early in 1971 was expelled from that organization and those members of the BPP who continue to support him and advocate the use of guns and guerrilla tactics became known as the BPP-Cleaver Faction (CF).

On December 20, 1972, LONNIE DARDEN, BPP-NF leader at Detroit, was interviewed under suitable pretext by a Special Agent of the FBI and DARDEN made the following statement regarding ELDRIDGE CLEAVER:

> "Eldridge Cleaver will not be allowed back in the BPP. We're (BPP-NF) not saying that there is a peaceful co-existence that will exist between the BPP and Eldridge Cleaver. We're saying that the court systems are responsible for the execution of poor and oppressed people and we in turn are exposing the court system in this particular racist attitude against poor and oppressed people and not trying to build a peaceful co-existence with a particular element that had defected from the Party."

VII. BPP FUNDS

The following is a summary of the financial situation of the BPP provided by DE T-1 and DE T-2 from November, 1972 to April, 1973. Income was from such sources as the sale of BPP newspapers, donations, and contributions from Party members. Expenses were for such items as food, lodging, transportation, and telephone.

Month	Income	Expenses
November, 1972	$1,400	$2,080
December, 1972	1,200	2,170
January, 1973	437	1,819
February, 1973	410	1,734
March, 1973	600	1,850
April, 1973	575	1,800

Above sources noted that Party assets are considerably higher than indicated above due to the fact that Party members turn over large amounts of money to the Party from their welfare checks.

The BPP maintains neither a checking nor a savings account at any banking institution in the Detroit area.

DE T-2
March 27, 1973

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS

In a December 21, 1972 edition of the "Detroit Free Press", a Detroit daily newspaper, an article appeared entitled "Black Panthers Charge Police with Harassment". LONNIE DARDEN, BPP leader, charged the Detroit Police Department with harassing Panthers while they were selling the Party newspaper at the corner of State and Woodward in Detroit. DARDEN charged that Party members had been ticketed more than 25 times in the past year for loitering and interfering with pedestrian traffic. DARDEN went on to state that members of the Party are being harassed because they are black. DARDEN stated that the police are attempting to stop the selling of the Party newspaper because the BPP is involved in various programs to serve the people of the community.

DE T-1 advised on April 27, 1973, that the BPP's lease on 2228 Bewick expires on September 15, 1973, and that the Panthers must vacate the premises on or before that date. Source further advised that LONNIE DARDEN is currently seeking suitable office space for the Party's headquarters.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

May 9, 1973

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Character EXTREMIST MATTER

Reference Detroit report dated and captioned
as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
DETROIT	SAN FRANCISCO	11/7/72	5/9 - 10/31/72

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
BLACK PANTHER PARTY Detroit	SA JOHN V. INSOGNA	jmh
	CHARACTER OF CASE EM	

REFERENCE: Report of SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR., at Detroit, 5/11/72.

- P -

LEAD

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Will follow and report activities of the BPP, Detroit Division, on a semi-annual basis.

ADMINISTRATIVE

All persons mentioned herein as being connected with the Detroit Branch, BPP, are currently under investigation by the Detroit Division

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

105-165706-15-1110

12 NOV 13 1972

REC-53

ST-105

COPIES MADE:

11 - Bureau (105-165706 Sub 15) (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - USA, Detroit (RM)
2 - San Francisco (157-1204) (RM)
1 - Detroit (157-3075)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency	Copy to 150 2/53/80-45/6-D			
Request Recd.	by routing slip for			
Date Fwd.	☒ info ☐ action			
How Fwd.	date 11.27.72 by PEA			
By				

Notations

EX-105 REC. SEC.

57 NOV 28 1972

COVER PAGE

* GPO : 1968 O - 299-4

DE 157-3075

INFORMANTS

DE T-1 is DE 2446-E
DE T-2 is DE 3605-E
DE T-3 is DE 2650-E
DE T-4 is DE 2824-CI
DE T-5 is SF 5362-E
DE T-6 is DE 1718-E

INFORMANTS

DE T-7 is CSDE 2580-E
DE T-8 is CSDE 2962-E

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

DE T-9 is DE 1330-E - INFORMANT

U[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]TICE
[illegible]EDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - USA, Detroit (RM)

Report of: SA JOHN V. INSOGNA **Office:** Detroit, Michigan
Date: 11/7/72

Field Office File #: 157-3075 **Bureau File #:** 105-165706 Sub 15

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Character: EXTREMIST MATTERS

Synopsis: Detroit BPP headquarters located at 157 Collingwood, with an office at 2228 Bewick and a pad at 4200 Buena Vista, all Detroit, Mich. They continue to operate the free breakfast program for school children and sell "The Black Panther" newspaper. Additional programs and activity set forth. The Detroit BPP operates under the leadership of LONNIE DARDEN, Minister of Information.

- P -

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. nor duplicated within your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : [illegible] O - 416-940

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA OF THE DETROIT BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) 4

- A. Location of Detroit BPP Headquarters and Offices 4
- B. Local Leaders and Membership Totals 4
- C. Funds 6
- D. Connections with BPP National Headquarters . 6
- E. Publications 8
  - 1. Distribution of the BPP Newspaper 8
  - 2. BPP Literature Distributed in the Detroit Area 8
- F. Philosophy of the BPP 14
- G. Arrests 15
- H. Weapons 15
- I. Fortifications 15
- J. Rallies and Demonstrations 16
- K. Programs 16
  - 1. Free Breakfast for School Children . . . 16
  - 2. Free Lunch Program 17
  - 3. Free Bussing Program 17

Page

4. Free Food Program 18

5. Liberation School 18

L. Teaching Revolutionary Programs and Policies . 19

M. Travel of Party Members 19

II. MISCELLANEOUS 20

DETAILS:

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA OF THE DETROIT BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A. Location of Detroit BPP Headquarters and Offices

The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government.

The Ministry of Information continues to be located at 157 Collingwood, Detroit, Michigan.

The BPP continues to operate an office at 2228 Bewick, Detroit, which is the location for the free breakfast program. This location is rented by LORENE BANKS, who coordinates the free breakfast program and is an active member of the BPP in Detroit.

The BPP has a pad at 4200 Buena Vista, Detroit.

DE T-1
June 16, 1972

The BPP continues to operate offices at the following locations:

157 Collingwood, Detroit
2228 Bewick, Detroit
Pad - 4200 Buena Vista, Detroit

DE T-2
October 25, 1972

B. Local Leaders and Membership Totals

The following is a summary of membership totals for the BPP during the period May - October, 1972, which was furnished by DE T-1 and DE T-2:

Month	Community Workers	Members	Temporarily Elsewhere
May, 1972	6	8	0
June, 1972	9	17	0
July, 1972	13	20	0
August, 1972	17	18	3
September, 1972	13	15	3
October, 1972	10	15	3

During the months of August - October, 1972, sources advised that three members of the BPP are currently in California assisting in the campaign of Chairman BOBBY SEALE.

> BOBBY SEALE is the National Chairman of the BPP currently running for Mayor of Oakland, California.

> LONNIE DARDEN is Minister of Information and in charge of BPP operation in Detroit.

DE T-3
May 9, 1972

Mich.

LEONARD MONGO is in charge of finance.

DE T-1
June 16, 1972

LORENE BANKS is in charge of the free breakfast program at 2228 Bewick, Detroit.

DE T-2
September 12, 1972

GERALD CRAWFORD is in charge of 2228 Bewick, Detroit.

DE T-2
September 12, 1972

CAROLYN STURDIVANT is Assistant Coordinator of the free bussing program.

DE T-2
September 12, 1972

ALVIN BROWN is in charge of the Liberation School at 2228 Bewick, Detroit.

DE T-4
August 3, 1972

C. Funds

A summary of financial activity was provided by DE T-1, DE T-2 and DE T-7 from May - October, 1972:

Month	Income	Expenses
May, 1972	$2,500.00	$2,916.40
June, 1972	3,300.00	3,040.00
July, 1972	2,650.00	2,496.00
August, 1972	3,200.00	2,880.00
September, 1972	2,650.00	2,655.00
October, 1972	2,400.00	2,550.00

D. Connections with BPP National Headquarters

LONNIE DARDEN and JODY WEAVER flew to BPP headquarters in Oakland, California. Purpose of this trip unknown.

DE T-3
May 9, 1972

JODY WEAVER has been an active member of the Detroit BPP and is currently in California.

LONNIE DARDEN talked about his trip to San Francisco, California, and the activities at the BPP headquarters. He noted that BOBBY SEALE will soon cross the United States on a special train, handing out free groceries and making political speeches. This supposedly is to get SEALE's name in the public's mind for his upcoming bid for Mayor of Oakland, California.

DE T-3
May 10, 1972

LONNIE DARDEN said the situation at BPP headquarters in Oakland, California, is very tense with all of the members carrying guns on their person at all times. Everyone is jockeying for the number two position. No one trusts anyone else. Confusion, competition, contention, and bad feelings mark the mood of the office. They all seem to be out to get each other. DARDEN seemed to be making these statements out of personal observation when he was in California.

DE T-3
May 31, 1972

LEONARD MONGO contacted BPP headquarters in Oakland, California, requesting additional copies of the BPP newspaper.

DE T-5
June 10, 1972

The BPP chapter in Detroit contacted the Oakland headquarters and advised them that ROLAND REID will depart June 18, 1972, at 5:15 PM on American Airlines flight 91 and will arrive in San Francisco at 7:50 PM.

Gary [illegible]

DE T-5
June 18, 1972

ROLAND REID has been an active member of the BPP in Detroit.

LONNIE DARDEN is sending money to BPP headquarters in California. Amount of money and reason for sending money are unknown.

DE T-6
June 30, 1972

E. Publications

1. Distribution of the BPP Newspaper

DE T-1, DE T-2 and DE T-7 advised from May - October, 1972, the BPP received the following copies of "The Black Panther" newspaper from BPP national distribution, New York City, New York:

May, 1972	6,000
June, 1972	10,000
July, 1972	8,000
August, 1972	11,000
September, 1972	9,000
October, 1972	8,000

2. BPP Literature Distributed in the Detroit Area

DE T-8 furnished the following leaflets which were distributed by the BPP during the period May - October, 1972:

LIBERATION SCHOOL
AND
FREE LUNCHEON PROGRAM

DEAR PARENT (S):

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE,

AFTER CAREFUL STUDY AND ANALYSES OF THE CHILDREN'S LIBERATION SCHOOL AND FREE LUNCH PROGRAM, WE HAVE FOUND THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE YOUTH ATTENDING THE PROGRAM, COME FOR JUST THE FREE LUNCH PORTION. NO QUESTION ABOUT IT BROTHERS AND SISTERS, FOOD IS LACKING IN THE COMMUNITY, AND THE FREE LUNCH PROGRAM HELPS TO QUELL THE HUNGER IN OUR STOMACHS.. WE ALSO MUST REMEMBER, BROTHERS AND SISTERS, THAT ANOTHER NEEDED THING IN OUR POOR AND OPPRESSED COMMUNITY IS EDUCATION THAT TEACHES US OUR TRUE ROLE IN THIS DECADENT SOCIETY, A SOCIETY THAT REFUSES TO MEET THE BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AND DESIRES OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING AMERIKKKA THE RICHEST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD TODAY. REMEMBER IT WAS OUR BLOOD AND SWEAT THAT WAS AND/IS EXPLOITED. OUR YOUTH MUST BE EDUCATED TO THE TRICKERY THAT HAS KEPT US DIVIDED FOR TO LONG. SO THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY URGES YOU AS A PARENT TO SEND OR BRING YOUR CHILDREN TO THE LIBERATION SCHOOL!!

SAVE THE BABIES!
ALL POWER TO THE YOUTH!

INTERCOMMUNAL SURVIVAL CENTE
DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

What Will You Do For Our Survival?





DAVID HILLIARD FREE Food PROGRAM

"SURVIVAL DAY"

AUGUST 11, 1972 500 BAGS OF FOOD

TARGET AREA-1 (Liberation School & Free Luncheon-
Location: 167 Collingwood)

DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
867-7742 OR 867-7743

DAVID HILLIARD

"FREE BUSING PROGRAM TO PRISON?

WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRY'S CARS AND OTHER MOTOR VEHICLES BEING MANUFACTURED IN DETROIT, MANY PEOPLE IN THIS STATE OF MICHIGAN STILL CAN'T GET TO THE PRISONS TO VISIT THEIR LOVED ONES.

REALIZING THE NEED FOR TRANSPORTATION, THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY INITIATED A "FREE BUSING PROGRAM" FOR FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF PRISONERS. IN MANY OF OUR CHAPTERS AND BRANCHES, SUCH PROGRAMS ARE UNDERWAY ALREADY, SERVING THE COMMUNITY.

WE (THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY) WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE TO SERVE YOU ON A CONSISTANT BASIS TO THE PRISON. ON SUNDAY JUNE 4, 1972 THE BUS WILL BE LEAVING FOR THOSE WHO ARE VISITING REGULAR INMATES, AND ON SUNDAY JUNE 18, 1972 THE NEXT TRIP ARE FOR THOSE WHO ARE VISITING TRUSTEE (ONLY).

THE BUS WILL BE LEAVING AT 9:00 A.M. AND WILL RETURNBBY 6:00 P.M. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU ARRIVE AT 157 COLLINGWOOD AT 8:00 A.M. FOR EARLY SEATING ARRANGEMENTS.

NECESSARY ITEMS OR INFORMATION NEEDED TO VISIT INMATES IN JACKSON STATE PENITENTIARY ARE:

(1) INMATES NAME AND I.D. NUMBER.

(2) WHETHER HE IS AN TRUSTEE OR NOT.

(3) YOUR NAME, ADDRESS, ZIPCODE AND PHONE NUMBER.

(4) YOU MUST BE ON INMATES' VISITING LIST. IF NOT, WRITE INMATE OR CALL 867-7742 OR 43 TO OBTAIN METHODS OF GETTING ON INMATES VISITING LIST.

(5) YOUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE INMATE.

MAKE YOUR RESERVATION TODAY, AS SEATS ARE LIMITED, FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:



BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
157 COLLINGWOOD

11

SUPPORT THE FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN

THE FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM SPONSORED BY THE DETROIT, BRANCH OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY HAS OPENED IT'S SECOND "BREAKFAST CENTER". TH NEWEST CENTER IS LOCATED AT 157 COLLINGWOOD BETWEEN SECOND AND WOO- WARD. PRESENTLY THE WESTSIDE IS SERVING APPROXIMATELY 25 TO 35 YOU



THE OTHER LOCATION IS AT 2228 BE BETWEEN VERNOR AND KERCHEVAL ON T EASTSIDE. IT IS PRESENTLY SERVI MORE THAN 85 CHILDREN EVERY SCHOO MORNING.

HOT MEALS (SUCH AS GRITS, CA WAFFLES, BACON, EGGS, ETC.) ARE BE- ING SERVED BETWEEN 7:00 A.M. THRU 8 A.M., MONDAY THRU FRIDAY.

THE PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY ARE WELCOME TO COME TO THE BREAKFAST PRO- GRAM, AND CAN VOLUNTEER TO GIVE ASSISTANT IN SERVING THE CHILDREN I THEY DESIRE TO DO SO. AND CAN INFORM OTHERS OF THE PROGRAM. IF TH ANY QUESTION CONCERNING THE BREAKFAST PROGRAM, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO THE NUMBERS ARE LISTED BELOW.

DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
867-7742 OR 867-7743

12

FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN WEEKLY MENU

SEPTEMBER 18-22

MONDAY
OATMEAL OR EGGS
SAUSAGES
APPLESAUCE
MILK
CIN. TOAST

TUESDAY
GRITS
BACON
EGGS
CHOC. MILK
TOAST

WEDNESDAY
GRILLED CHEESE
SAUSAGE
JUICE
FRUIT
EGGS

THURSDAY
PANCAKES
SYRUP
BACON
MILK

FRIDAY
GRITS
BACON
EGGS
JUICE
TOAST

THIS IS THE OFFICIAL BREAKFAST MENU FOR THIS WEEK, THE SURVIVAL OF THE BREAKFAST PROGRAM IS FUNDED BY YOU, THE PEOPLE. ALL BREAKFAST FOODS AND / OR MONEY DONATIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE. CONTACT EITHER. BREAKFAST LOCATIONS: 2228 BEWICK (EASTSIDE) OR 157 COLLINGWOOD (WESTSIDE).

INTERCOMMUNAL SURVIVAL CENTER
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

F. Philosophy of the BPP

In explaining the new Panther image, GERALD CRAWFORD stated, "For too long the Panther Party has found itself in the role of defender, rather than educator of the community. We feel the Party should be a vehicle to take the community to liberation and not the force which consistently finds itself in conflict with the Police. We are now moving toward the role of humanitarians, and our goal is humanization of all mankind. We would like to remove all racial and class barriers. Our struggle is more a class struggle -- rather than a racial one, and our role is to educate the community to that fact. We are not trying to teach individuals what to think, but instead, we are trying to teach them to think for themselves and objectively analyze the situation we find ourselves in.

"Ironically, those people who can best perform this service turn their backs on the community and help those forces which are oppressing all of us. College students today do not bring their talents back to the community, but help to build the system which they have suffered under. In order for us to successfully perform our duty, we need the support of the community. The Panthers are a part of the community and need its entire support. Without this support, we will be unable to continue our fight against oppression.

"For the past ten years, the Black Panther Party has found itself on the covers of national magazines and in newspapers. Reporters have described Panther members as Communists and revolutionaries: But for several reasons this description is not applicable to today's Black Panther Party. In the past two years, the Panther Party has undergone drastic changes. Black Panther members have tried to drop the role of guerilla fighters and are putting every effort into being known as educators and humanitarians.

"The Party's Detroit Chapter is trying extremely hard to change its image from community bodyguard to community servant."

DE T-8
August 17, 1972

G. Arrests

On May 29, 1972, Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY, Detroit Police Department, advised that GARY ROLAND REID was arrested by the Detroit Police Department for oustanding traffic violation.

On October 24, 1972, Lieutenant MC COY advised that LEONARD MONGO was ticketed by the Detroit Police Department for violation of city ordinance - vending and interfering with pedestrian traffic. MONGO was selling the BPP newspaper at the time he was given the ticket.

H. Weapons

DE T-1, DE T-2 and DE T-3 advised during May - October, 1972, there was no mention of weapons and no effort to acquire any guns. The guns that are available are discreetly kept out of sight.

I. Fortifications

There are no fortifications at the BPP office at 2228 Bewick, Detroit.

DE T-4
July 10, 1972

There are no fortifications at the BPP pad at 4200 Buena Vista, Detroit.

DE T-1
July 26, 1972

The BPP office at 157 Collingwood, Detroit, has metal mesh screens which can be pulled down over the windows at night. The sand bag barricades have been removed.

DE T-2
August 25, 1972

J. Rallies and Demonstrations

During the period May - October, 1972, the Detroit Chapter of the BPP did not hold any rallies or sponsor any demonstrations.

DE T-8
October 26, 1972

K. Programs

1. Free Breakfast for School Children

The breakfast program continues to be in operation at 2228 Bewick, Detroit.

DE T-6
May 5, 1972

The breakfast program at 2228 Bewick, Detroit, has been suspended temporarily in lieu of a free lunch program during the summer months. The breakfast program will be reinstituted at the start of the school year in September, 1972.

DE T-6
June 16, 1972

The free lunch program has been replaced by the free breakfast program.

DE T-2
September 6, 1972

The breakfast program is also in operation at 157 Collingwood, Detroit, and at 2228 Bewick, Detroit. Food for the programs is solicited from store owners in the area and some food is purchased by the Party.

DE T-2
September 14, 1972

The following is a summary of the number of children attending the breakfast program from May - October, 1972. Information was furnished by DE T-1, DE T-2 and DE T-4:

May, 1972	75
June, 1972	75
July, 1972	120
August, 1972	95
September, 1972	75
October, 1972	65

2. Free Lunch Program

The free lunch program is not operational at either 157 Collingwood or 2228 Bewick, Detroit.

DE T-2
September 4, 1972

3. Free Bussing Program

On June 3, 1972, the BPP sent a bus to the State Prison of Southern Michigan (SPSM), Jackson, Michigan.

DE T-1
June 16, 1972

On August 24, 1972, the BPP was making plans to reinstitute its bussing program to Jackson, Michigan. The Party did not send a bus to Jackson all summer.

DE T-2
August 28, 1972

No busses have been chartered by the Party recently.

DE T-2
September 12, 1972

The bussing program was advertised on a local Detroit radio station.

DE T-9
September 16, 1972

The Party is making plans to send a bus to Jackson on November 4, 1972. The Party is also planning a bus on November 19, 1972.

DE T-1
October 31, 1972

4. Free Food Program

On May 21, 1972, the BPP held a "Survival Day" in the Jeffries Projects. The advertised purpose of Survival Day was to give 1,000 bags of free groceries to families in the inner city.

DE T-9
May 21, 1972

> Survival Day refers to a program implemented by the BPP with the purpose of giving free bags of groceries to oppressed families living in the inner city of Detroit.

On August 11, 1972, the Party sponsored a second Survival Day program. The Party advertised that 500 bags of groceries were given away.

DE T-1
August 15, 1972

On October 21, 1972, the Party sponsored another Survival Day program. At this program the Party gave away 150 bags of groceries.

DE T-1
October 30, 1972

5. Liberation School

Liberation School is held at 2228 Bewick, Detroit, in conjunction with the free breakfast program. The aims of the Liberation School are to enlighten the children with the aims of the BPP. ALVIN BROWN is currently in charge of this program.

DE T-4
July 12, 1972

L. Teaching Revolutionary Programs and Policies

Political education classes are no longer regularly held on Sundays. The classes are now held at random during the week as the BPP is currently more concerned with its survival programs.

DE T-2
September 14, 1972

M. Travel of Party Members

On May 6, 1972, LONNIE DARDEN and JODY WEAVER flew to Oakland, California. On May 9, 1972, DARDEN returned to Detroit. JODY WEAVER remained in California.

DE T-3
May 9, 1972

ROLAND GARY REID and WILLIAM ARTHUR ELDER are presently in California and do not intend to return to Detroit.

DE T-2
July 17, 1972

WILLIAM ARTHUR ELDER has been an active member of the BPP in Detroit.

On August 21, 1972, LOUIS TOLBERT JOHNSON travelled to California to help work in the BPP campaign to elect BOBBY SEALE as Mayor of Oakland, California.

DE T-2
August 27, 1972

LOUIS TOLBERT JOHNSON has been an active member of the BPP, Detroit.

II. MISCELLANEOUS

KENNETH HORSTON, former leader of the BPP-NF, is believed to have disassociated himself with the BPP. HORSTON was recently observed by members of the Detroit Chapter in the Detroit area. HORSTON probably avoided having contact with these members and has made no effort to contact the Detroit Chapter.

DE T-2
August 4, 1972

FD-323 (Rev. 8-1-72)

U[illegible]D STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]TICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Detroit, Michigan
November 7, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title Black Panther Party

Character Extremist Matters

Reference Report at Detroit, dated
and captioned as above

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency nor duplicated within your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
DETROIT	SAN FRANCISCO	5/18/71	4/5 - 4/29/71

TITLE OF CASE C BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF) DETROIT DIVISION	REPORT MADE BY SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR.	TYPED BY ah
	CHARACTER OF CASE RM - SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND INSURRECTION	

REFERENCE: Detroit report of SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR., 4/5/71.

- P -

LEAD

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Will maintain contact with logical informants and submit evidentiary report 30 days from date of this report.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED NDNC SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

- C 11 - Bureau (105-165706 Sub 15) (RM)
- 1 - MIG, Detroit (RM)
- 1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
- 1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
- 1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)
- 2 - San Francisco (RM)
- 2 - Detroit (157-3075)

105-165706-15-901

REC- 66

17 MAY 21 1971

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Notations RACIAL INT. SECT.

AGENCY: ~~[illegible]~~, ~~NIS~~ OSI, SEC. SERV., IRS, ACSI, CA

Request Recd. DEPT. ISD, ~~CRD~~, IDIU, ~~CD~~ Chief Postal Insp.

HOW FWD: RS

DATE FWD: 5-27-71

BY: [illegible]

1cc 8H.D. [illegible] RCMP

Not ~~INT. SEC.~~

54 JUN 2 1971

COVER PAGE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O—375-134

(1)

DE 157-3075

ADMINISTRATIVE

This report is classified confidential to protect sources of a continuing value.

All persons mentioned herein who are active in the Detroit Division are currently under investigation.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source	Location
DE T-1 is DE 1330-R	170-637R-355 157-3075-2402 -2455
DE T-3 is a well placed source Lt. William McCoy - DEPD mb	157-3075-2431 157-3233-812
SF T-16 is SF 3215-R	157-3075-2446
DE T-24 is a well placed source Lt. Louis SZABO Intelligence Unit. Mich P.D. mb	157-6749R-24 26

This serial may not be destroyed without prior Bureau authority.

- B*-
Cover Page

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - MIG, Detroit (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)

Report of: SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR. Office: Detroit, Michigan
Date: 5/18/71

Field Office File #: 157-3075 Bureau File #: 105-165706-15

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF)
DETROIT DIVISION

Character: RACIAL MATTERS - SMITH ACT OF 1940;
SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY,
REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Synopsis:

The Detroit NCCF continues to operate under the direction of BPP National Headquarters, Oakland, Calif. Detroit continues to sell "The Black Panther" newspaper and operate a Free Breakfast for School Children Program. EDGAR ROBINSON and KENNETH HORSTON, both Detroit NCCF members visited BPP National Headquarters in 4/71. Four NCCF members were arrested by the Detroit PD for Murder I as a result of a holdup in which a man was killed. A purged Detroit NCCF member has been contacting the Cleaver Faction of the BPP in New York, however, no attempts have been made to start a Cleaver group in Detroit.

- P -

DETAILS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 351-075

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BPP LEADERS 3

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM ...3

III. TEACHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM...............4

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 5

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY 8

VI. FACTIONALISM 8

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BPP LEADERS

On April 28, 1971, DE T-1 advised that the Ministry of Information for the Detroit National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF), organizing bureau for the Black Panther Party (BPP), was moved to a new office at 157 Collingwood, Detroit, Michigan, by orders of KENNETH HORSTON, leader of the Detroit NCCF.

DE T-1 advised that 611 Continental, Detroit, Michigan, is Community Information Center Number One.

A characterization of the BPP is contained in the appendix pages attached hereto.

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

DE T-1 advised on April 5, 1971, that 157 Collingwood, Detroit, was being opened as NCCF Community Information Center Number Two on that date.

DE T-1 advised on April 12, 1971, that four members of the Detroit NCCF, ANTHONY NORMAN, RONNIE IRWIN, RONALD SMITH, and LARRY POWELL, held up what they believed to be a dope house and one of the victims was killed.

Detective Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY, Security Section, Intelligence Division, Detroit Police Department, advised on April 14, 1971, that Murder One warrants were obtained on April 14, 1971, for LARRY POWELL, RONNIE IRWIN, and ANTHONY NORMAN, all NCCF members.

A search warrant executed by the Detroit Police Department on April 14, 1971, at the home of BARBARA PLISKOW, white female associate of the NCCF, resulted in her arrest as well as the arrest of the above three, RONALD SMITH, and CAROLYN SMITH, members of the NCCF, and recovery of property stolen in a robbery on April 11, 1971, in which one man was killed.

DE T-1 advised on April 21, 1971, that the Free Breakfast for School Children Program is currently operating five days a week at the following locations:

611 Continental (30 children)
157 Collingwood (15 children)
St. Leo's Church (15 children)

DE T-1 advised on April 21, 1971, that the Detroit NCCF scheduled a free community dinner in front of 611 Continental, Detroit, on Saturday, April 24, 1971, at 5:30 p.m. Tables will be set up to serve the food buffet style and there is to be no gathering at the dinner as seating will not be provided.

DE T-3 advised on April 26, 1971, that there were not over 30 people at the NCCF dinner on April 24, 1971, at any one time, and that no incidents occurred.

DE T-1 advised on April 27, 1971, that the NCCF prepared servings of food for about 400 people for the dinner on April 24, 1971, and that all of the food was passed out.

DE T-24 advised on April 28, 1971, that someone is assigned to a desk facing the front door of 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, on a daily basis. A loaded M-1 is kept at the desk to prevent anyone from entering the house who is not supposed to. Posters have been removed from some first floor windows so they can see anyone approaching the house. These measures were instituted due to the raid by the police in March, 1971, which caused the NCCF in Flint to loose face as the police took over so easily.

III. TEACHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

DE T-1 advised on April 24, 1971, that political education classes are held at 611 Continental, Detroit, every Sunday and that the classes consist of reading from and discussing articles appearing in "The Black Panther" newspaper, particularly the center section.

DE T-24 advised on April 28, 1971, that only nine people, mainly young kids, showed up for the political education class on April 18, 1971. Attendance at the classes have fallen off sharply since the police raid in March, 1971.

DE T-24 advised on April 29, 1970, that political education classes are held at the NCCF, Flint, Michigan, every Sunday and that the classes consist of reading from and discussing articles, primarily the center-fold of "The Black Panther" newspaper.

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

On April 9, 1971, DE T-3 provided copies of the following leaflets entitled "Wanted by the People" and "Free Breakfast Program for Children", which were distributed by the Detroit NCCF.

Free Breakfast Program
FOR CHILDREN

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE'S TO COMBAT FASCISM, IS MOVING TO MEET BASIC NEEDS OF THE POOR UNDERPRIVILEDGED OF OUR COMMUNITY. ONE THE WAYS IN WHICH WE DO THIS IS BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A FREE AKFAST FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM.

THE BREAKFAST PROGRAMS ARE NOT ONLY TO FEED THE CHILDREN IN COMMUNITY, BUT ALSO TO BRING THE CHILDREN, PARENTS AND ALL PEO- OF THE COMMUNITY TOGETHER TO WORK AND SEE TO IT THAT EVERY LD IS FED A WELL-BALANCED BREAKFAST EACH MORNING.

THIS BEING THE PEOPLE'S BREAKFAST, OUR GOAL IS TO SPREAD THIS GRAM THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITIES IN MICHIGAN. THIS IS THE PEOPLE'S GRAM AND WITHOUT THE PEOPLE'S SUPPORT, WE HAVE NOTHING SINCE S IS A BASIC NECESSITY, IT HAS TO BE MET.



Locations:

COMMUNITY INFO.
CENTER NO. 1
611 Continental

ST. LEO'S CHURCH
15th & Grand River

All Power To The
YOUTH

DAYS: MON-FRI

TIME: 7:30 - 8:30 AM

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
611 CONTINENTAL
DETROIT MICH.

WANTED

BY THE PEOPLE

RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON

NAMES KNOWN BY: Richard M. Nixon, Richard Nixon, "Tricky Dick"



Richard Nixon

DESCRIPTION
AGE: 57, born January 9, 1913, Yorba Linda, Calif.
HEIGHT: 5' 11½"
WEIGHT: 170 pounds
BUILD: medium
HAIR: black
EYES: brown
COMPLEXION: mottled
RACE: white
NATIONALITY: American
LAST KNOWN ADDRESS: 1600 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, D.C.

CAUTION
NIXON REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH PERSONS WHO ADVOCATE THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES AND MAY HAVE ACQUIRED FIREARMS. CONSIDER DANGEROUS.

NIXON IS WANTED FOR CONSPIRING TO COMMIT GENOCIDE AGAINST BLACK PEOPLE AND IN FACT, KILLING THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS AND VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND OTHER POOR AND OPPRESSED PERSONS. HE IS ALSO WANTED FOR MURDERING 30 OF THE PEOPLE'S WARRIORS AND ALL THOSE WHO ARE BEING HELD CAPTIVE IN THE MEDIVAL DUNGEON OF BABYLON.

PEOPLE HE IS KNOWN TO ASSOCIATE WITH: J. EDGAR HOOVER, JOHN NICHOLS, SPIRO AGNEW, ROMAINE GRIBBS, AND RENEGADES ELDRIDGE CLEAVER AND HIS RUNNING LACKIES.



REWARD

A Progressive Move In Our Struggle For Liberation

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY

SF T-16 advised on April 17, 1971, that KENNETH HORSTON, leader of the Detroit NCCF, was in California, and talked with Minister of Defense, HUEY NEWTON, on April 16, 1971.

DE T-1 advised on April 21, 1971, that EDGAR ROBINSON, distribution manager of "The Black Panther" newspaper for the Detroit NCCF, left Detroit en route Oakland, California, on April 20, 1971, apparently to attend the funeral of SAM NAPIER, a member of the BPP who was killed in New York.

DE T-1 advised on April 24, 1971, that LONNIE DARDEN, a member of the Detroit NCCF, went to Toledo to check on the situation there as some members apparently walked into the office wearing Cleaver buttons on April 23, 1971, but were put out. He was then to proceed to Cleveland where HUEY NEWTON, Minister of Defense for the BPP was scheduled to appear, however, he failed to show up.

DE T-3 advised on April 29, 1971, that LONNIE DARDEN, member of the Detroit NCCF, returned from Cleveland, Ohio on April 25, 1971.

DE T-3 further advised that EDGAR ROBINSON, distribution manager of "The Black Panther" newspaper, returned from California on April 26, 1971.

DE T-1 advised on various dates in April, 1971, that Detroit received approximately 31,600 copies of "The Black Panther" newspaper during April, 1971, from BPP distribution, New York. DE T-1 advised that money for payment of the newspaper is sent to BPP headquarters, Oakland, California.

VI. FACTIONALISM

NY T-5 advised on April 12, 1971, that OLIVER MC CLURE, also known as Malik arrived in New York from Detroit over the weekend of April 9-11, 1971, for consultation with leaders of the BPP Cleaver Faction.

MC CLURE was the leader of the Detroit NCCF but was purged. Detroit continues to be loyal to NEWTON.

DE T-1 advised on April 14, 1971, that OLIVER MC CLURE returned to Detroit from New York on April 12, 1971, and brought with him an unknown number of Cleaver Faction newspapers, "Right On". MC CLURE has not made any attempts to organize a Cleaver Faction in Detroit to source's knowledge.

DE T-1 advised on April 20, 1971, that MC CLURE is currently in New York.

DE T-1 advised on April 27, 1971, that MC CLURE returned to Detroit from New York about 3:00 p.m. on April 27, 1971.

DE T-1 learned on April 28, 1971, that MC CLURE allegedly was ordered to kill VIRON REDWINE and KENNETH HORSTON, and to use his judgment as whether or not to kill CHARLES HOLT. These three are leaders in the Detroit NCCF. DE T-1 advised that HOLT has expressed sympathy for the Cleaver Faction and is probably no longer being considered for assassination.

APPENDIX

1

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, also known as Black Panther Party for Self Defense

According to the official newspaper of the Black Panther Party (BPP), the BPP was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby G. Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, BPP.

The official newspaper, called "The Black Panther," regularly states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to as "pigs" who should be killed.

The newspaper, in its issue of September 7, 1968, had an article by the then Minister of Education George Murray. This article ended with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

The BPP newspaper, issue of October 5, 1968, had an article introduced with the following statement: "We will not dissent from American government. We will overthrow it."

David Hilliard, Chief of Staff, BPP, in a speech at the San Francisco Polo Field on November 15, 1969, said, "We will kill Richard Nixon."

David Hilliard, in the "New York Times," issue of December 13, 1969, was quoted as follows: "We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government by way of force and violence."

CONFIDENTIAL

In the issue of April 25, 1970, the BPP newspaper had an article by Minister of Culture Emory Douglas as follows:

"The only way to make this racist U. S. Government administer justice to the people it is oppressing, is . . . by taking up arms against this government, killing the officials, until the reactionary forces . . . are dead, and those that are left turn their weapons on their superiors, thereby passing revolutionary judgement against the number one enemy of all mankind, the racist U. S. Government."

The BPP headquarters is located at 1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California. Branches of the BPP, and Committees to Combat Fascism, under control of the BPP, have been established in various locations in the U. S.

CONFIDENTIAL

UN[illegible]D STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]STICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Detroit, Michigan
May 18, 1971

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF), DETROIT DIVISION

Character RACIAL MATTERS - SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Reference Detroit report dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INV STIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
DETROIT	SAN FRANCISCO	11/4/71	12/22/70 - 10/28/71	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) DETROIT DIVISION		SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR.		ah
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		EM		

REFERENCE: Detroit report of SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR., 1/26/71.

- P -

LEAD

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Will follow and report activities of the Detroit BPP on a semi-annual basis.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED NDW SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

105-165706- 15 -993

REC-3

NOV 11 1971

COPIES MADE:

(6)1 - Bureau (105-165706 Sub 15)(RM)
1 - G-2, Detroit (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - USA, Detroit (RM)
2 - San Francisco (157-1204)(RM)
2 - Detroit (157-3075)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency	ISD	IDIU	SS, NSA, DIA	
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.	11-15-71			
How Fwd.	B/S			
By	REC/JLS			

Notations

RCMP

2-D

SEC.

MAR 20 1972

XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O—375-131

57 NOV 19 1971

COVER PAGE

ADMINISTRATIVE

All persons mentioned herein as being connected with the Detroit Branch of the BPP, are currently under investigation by Detroit except for some of those who have received extensive jail sentences.

The investigative period of this report overlaps that of the previous report in order to include information not received in time to be included in the prior report.

Inasmuch as the Cleaver Faction is now a separate case, no mention of them is made in this report, except where the Newton Faction is involved. A separate report will be submitted on the Cleaver Faction.

This report is classified confidential to protect sources whose identity, if revealed, could adversely affect the national defense.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source

DE T-1 is
DE 1423-E (PROB)

INFORMANTS

DE T-2 is
DE 1330-E

DE T-3 is
a well placed source

DE T-4 is
DE 1560-E (PROB)

DE T-5 is
SF 3259-E

INFORMANTS

DE T-6 is
SF 3215-E

DE 157-3075

DE T-7 is
NY 7034-E

DE T-8 is
CG 7392-E

INFORMANTS

DE T-9 is
CSDE 2116-E

DE T-10 is
CSDE 2580-E

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

DE T-11 is
a well placed source

DE T-12 is
DE 347-E

DE T-13 is
DE 1339-E

DE T-14 is
NY 6155-E

INFORMANTS

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

DE T-3 is
Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY
Security Section
Intelligence Division
Detroit PD

DE T-11 is
Lieutenant LOUIS SZABO
Flint, Michigan PD

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:
1 - G-2, Detroit (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - USA, Detroit (RM)

Report of: SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR. Office: Detroit, Michigan
Date: 11/4/71

Field Office File #: 157-3075 Bureau File #: 105-165706 Sub 15

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY - DETROIT DIVISION

Character: EXTREMIST MATTERS

Synopsis: The Detroit NCCF was raised to full BPP status, 5/71. Their headquarters the Ministry of Information, is located at 157 Collingwood, Detroit, with offices at 2531 Pennsylvania, and 2435 Pennsylvania, Detroit. The office at Flint, Michigan, was closed during this period. Detroit continues to be directed from BPP headquarters, Oakland, California, and have contact with other BPP chapters. Detroit continues to sell "The Black Panther" newspaper, which is their main source of funds, although sales fell off during 9/71 and 10/71. A number of NCCF members were arrested the first part of 1971, in connection with robberies, beatings. Some members of the Detroit BPP have become disenchanted with NEWTON's policies and are switching to the faction of the BPP supporting ELDRIDGE CLEAVER.

- P -

DETAILS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA 3
  A. Location of Detroit NCCF and BPP Headquarters and Branches 3
  B. Local Leaders and Membership Totals 5
  C. Funds 7
  D. Connection With BPP National Headquarters 8
  E. Contact With Other BPP and NCCF Chapters 11
  F. Publications 12
    1. Distribution of "The Black Panther" Newspaper 12
    2. Local Publications 13
  G. Propensity for Violence and Preparation for Confrontation 79
  H. Arrests 80
  I. Weapons 82
  J. Fortifications 83
  K. Meetings and Rallies 85
  L. Programs of Detroit NCCF and BPP 86
    1. Free Breakfast for School Children 86
    2. Free Lunch Program 89
    3. Free Clothing Program 89

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

M. Teaching Revolutionary Programs and Policies 90

N. Factionalism 90

O. Miscellaneous 91

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA

The National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF) is the organizing bureau for the Black Panther Party (BPP).

The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the U.S. Government.

A. Location of Detroit NCCF and BPP Headquarters and Branches

The Flint Branch of the Detroit NCCF continues to function at 2009 Albert Street, Flint, Michigan.

DE T-1
January 7, 1971

The Ministry of Information is located at 613 Continental, Detroit, Michigan.

Community Information Center Number One (CIC #1) is located at 611 Continental, Detroit.

CIC #2 is located at 3595 17th Street, Detroit, Michigan.

DE T-2
January, 1971

The office at 3595 17th Street, Detroit, closed in February, 1971.

DE T-2
February, 1971

157 Collingwood, Detroit, is being opened as CIC #1 on April 5, 1971.

DE T-2
April 5, 1971

DE 157-3075

address; 4200 Buena Vista

The Ministry of Information for the Detroit NCCF was moved to a new office at 157 Collingwood, Detroit, Michigan, by orders of KENNETH HORSTON, leader of the Detroit NCCF.

611 Continental, Detroit, was designated CIC #1.

DE T-2
April 28, 1971

The NCCF office at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, was abandoned by the NCCF because the member who had been paying the rent dropped out of the NCCF. Flint members plan to function out of Detroit.

DE T-1
May 17, 1971

The BPP moved out of 611-13 Continental, Detroit, the first of June, 1971, and moved into 2591 Pennsylvania, Detroit.

The Detroit NCCF was raised to full BPP status in May, 1971.

DE T-3
June 3, 1971

The BPP is using the residence of LORENE BANKS, one of their members, at 2435 Pennsylvania, Detroit, as an office for the lunch program and liberation school. Mich.

DE T-4
July 27, 1971

Mich

The BPP leaders have acquaired an apartment at 4200 Buena Vista, Detroit, which is used by KENNETH HORSTON, DIANE BROWN and EDGAR ROBINSON, apparently to get away from the rank and file.

Cab

DE T-4
August, 1971

Tc & dc

B. Local Leaders and Membership Totals

WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON is in charge of the Flint Branch of the Detroit NCCF, YVONNE COOPER is secretary.

DE T-1
January 7, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON, leader Detroit NCCF
CHARLES HOLT, second in command
RONNIE IRWIN, in charge 3595 17th Street, Detroit
ALICE RAYFORD, in charge of finances
LORENE BANKS, in charge of Breakfast Programs
EDGAR ROBINSON, distribution manager
RONALD SMITH, in charge of Free Clothing Program

DE T-2
January, 1971

In March, 1971, the Detroit NCCF had 25 active members, including five community workers.

DE T-2
March, 1971

DE T-2 advised in April, 1971, that the membership and leaders of the Detroit NCCF for April, 1971, are as follows:

KENNETH HORSTON, leader
CHARLES HOLT, second in command
VIRON REDWINE, coordinator
EDGAR ROBINSON, distribution manager
LORENE BANKS, Breakfast Program.

31 active members including four community workers.

DE T-2 advised in April, 1971, that the leader of the Flint branch of the Detroit NCCF is WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON and that Flint has ten active members, including three community workers.

DE T-2 advised in May, 1971, that during May, 1971, LONNIE DARDEN was officer of the day at 157 Collingwood and that the membership consisted of 38 active members including six community workers.

CHARLES HOLT, second in command of the NCCF, has been reduced to a community worker by KENNETH HORSTON.

DE T-2
May 11, 1971

DE T-2 advised during June, 1971, that the membership of the BPP in June, 1971, consisted of 34 active members and five community workers.

When KENNETH HORSTON is not available, EDGAR ROBINSON, distribution manager, is in charge of 157 Collingwood, and LONNIE DARDEN is in charge of 2591 Pennsylvania.

DE T-4
July 2, 1971

DE T-4 advised in July, 1971, that the BPP consisted of 24 active members and four community workers in July, 1971.

DE T-4 attributed the decrease in membership to the fact that some people were unhappy with HUEY NEWTON's policy of non-violence and because they had been directed to attend church.

DE T-4 advised during August, 1971, that the following persons were leaders of the Detroit BPP during August, 1971:

KENNETH HORSTON, leader
DIANE BROWN, Minister of Information
LONNIE DARDEN, CIC #1
EDGAR ROBINSON, distribution manager
LORENE BANKS, Breakfast and Lunch Programs
WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON, finances

DE T-4 advised in August, 1971, that the BPP had 18 active members, eight of which were community workers.

DE T-4 advised in September, 1971, that during September, 1971, the BPP had 22 active members including four community workers.

DE T-4 advised during October, 1971, that in October, 1971, the BPP membership decreased to ten active members plus two community workers.

WAYNE THEODORE ✓ROBERTSON quit the BPP and no one has yet replaced him handling finances.

DE T-4
October 8, 1971

✓DIANE BROWN has returned to her home in Jackson, Michigan, and may not be returning to Detroit, however, at the time she left she indicated she was taking a temporary leave as she was needed by her family in Jackson, Michigan.

DE T-4
October 28, 1971

C. Funds

The following summary of financial activity was provided by DE T-2 and DE T-4 from February, 1971 through October, 1971:

Month	Income	Expenses
February	$1,550.00	$1,550.00
March	4,800.00	3,396.00
April	6,825.00	6,191.00
May	4,295.00	4,938.00
June	4,880.00	4,646.00

Month	Income	Expenses
July	7,368.00	7,209.00
August	4,344.00	4,718.00
September	2,575.00	2,227.00
October	2,375.00	2,066.00

The income reflected above generally consisted of sales of "The Black Panther" newspaper and donations. Expenses consisted of payments for the newspaper, shipping charges, rent, food for the members, miscellaneous expenses including transportation, lunch, and telephone calls for people selling newspapers and collecting donations and expenses for clothing and pocket money for the leaders.

D. Connection With BPP National Headquarters

CHARLES HOLT, second in command of the Detroit NCCF, requested that BPP National Headquarters, Oakland, California, send Detroit 10,000 copies of the current issue of "The Black Panther" newspaper.

DE T-5
December 22, 1970

✓

KENNETH HORSTON, leader of the Detroit NCCF, contacted BPP headquarters, Oakland, California, requesting back issues of "The Black Panther" as some of the people in Detroit were unable to understand the BPP position in the paper about the Zionist movement.

ahs public

DE T-6
December 31, 1970

OLIVER MC CLURE, former leader of the Detroit NCCF, who had been purged from the NCCF contacted ROOSEVELT HILLIARD, BPP Assistant Chief of Staff, Oakland, California, and requested that he be reinstated. MC CLURE was instructed to contact KENNETH HORSTON, leader, Detroit NCCF, to discuss being reinstated.

DE T-6
January 11, 1971

VIRON REDWINE, a Detroit NCCF member, is currently in BPP Headquarters, Oakland, California, possibly performing some tasks for HUEY NEWTON. Huey P. Newton

DE T-2
January 21, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON left Detroit for San Francisco on March 6, 1971 and returned to Detroit on March 8, 1971.

DE T-6
March 8, 1971

VIRON REDWINE flew from Detroit to San Francisco on March 8, 1971. REDWINE contacted Detroit on March 9 and 10, 1971, advising that he was stranded in Oakland, California, without funds to return to Detroit.

DE T-6
March 10, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON was ordered to report to Oakland, California, immediately by JUNE HILLIARD, BPP Assistant Chief of Staff, and HORSTON left for California late March 29, 1971, or early March 30, 1971.

DE T-2
March 30, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON was in Oakland, California, at BPP Headquarters on April 14, 1971.

DE T-6
April 14, 1971

EDGAR ROBINSON, distribution manager, of the BPP paper for Detroit NCCF, left Detroit en route Oakland, California, April 20, 1971, to attend the funeral of slain BPP member SAM NAPIER, who was killed in New York.

DE T-2
April 21, 1971

ROBINSON returned from California on the evening of April 26, 1971.

DE T-3
April 29, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON returned from San Francisco, California, to Detroit on April 30, 1971.

DE T-6
May 1, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON contacted BPP National Headquarters on May 12, 1971, to determine if the Detroit NCCF had been raised to a full BPP chapter and determined that it may have been.

DE T-6
May 12, 1971

LONNIE DARDEN, a member of the Detroit BPP, claimed that as of Sunday, May 16, 1971, all Detroit NCCF chapters, including Detroit, had been raised to full BPP status by BPP headquarters, Oakland, California.

DE T-2
May 17, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON, leader Detroit BPP, contacted BPP headquarters, Oakland, California, on June 11, 1971, for advice.

DE T-6
June 11, 1971

DE T-6 advised from February, 1971 through August, 1971, that the Detroit NCCF-BPP made inquiries regarding the BPP paper with BPP headquarters, Oakland, California, at least once each month.

E. Contact With Other BPP and NCCF Chapters

KENNETH HORSTON, leader of the Detroit branch of the BPP, was in contact with BPP, New York on December 31, 1970.

DE T-7
December 31, 1970

ZAYD SHAKUR, Deputy Minister of Information for New York, arrived in Detroit the evening of January 9, 1971, and returned to New York, January 11, 1971.

DE T-2
January 11, 1971

BOBBY RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois Chapter, BPP, held a regional staff meeting at Chicago, on January 17, 1971, and was extremely irritated because Detroit and several other offices failed to send a representative.

DE T-8
January 17, 1971

A representative of the Toledo, Ohio NCCF was to obtain the film "The Battle of Algiers" through the Detroit NCCF.

DE T-5
January 21, 1971

SAM NAPIER, BPP, New York, contacted BPP Chicago and requested six boxes of newspapers sent to Chicago from New York be sent to the Detroit NCCF.

DE T-8
March 26, 1971

YVONNE KING, Communications Secretary, Illinois BPP, returned to Chicago from Detroit on June 4, 1971.

Mich

DE T-8
June 4, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON, Detroit BPP, contacted YVONNE KING, BPP Chicago, in an effort to have her appear at a rally for the Detroit 15 on June 25, 1971, at Detroit. KING indicated she would probably appear, however, had to clear it through BPP headquarters, Oakland, California.

DE T-8
June 11, 1971

The Detroit 15 consisted of 15 members and associates of the NCCF who were arrested at an NCCF office, 3376 16th Street, Detroit, on October 24, 1970, in connection with the shooting of two Detroit Police Officers on that date.

MARY FORD, member of the Detroit BPP, was sent to Toledo, Ohio, to help reinforce the chapter there.

DE T-2
June 1, 1971

F. Publications

1. Distribution of "The Black Panther" Newspaper

Sales of "The Black Panther" newspaper have fallen off in Flint, Michigan, and only half of the 2,200 papers received at Flint from Detroit had been sold.

DE T-1
January 7, 1971

DE T-2, DE T-4 and DE T-10 advised that the Detroit NCCF-BPP received the following number of copies of "The Black Panther" newspaper:

Month	Copies
February	15,000
March	16,000
April	31,600
May	42,000
June	18,400
July	35,000

August	19,774
September	7,500
October	7,200

Copies of "The Black Panther" newspaper are shipped to EDGAR ROBINSON, 611 Continental, Detroit, from New York Distribution, 146-20 Rockaway Boulevard, Jamaica, New York.

DE T-9
May 20, 1971

2. Local Publications

The following are copies of publications which were either produced or reproduced by the Detroit NCCF-BPP for distribution to members, associates and to the general public attending political education meetings:

DE T-1 furnished a copy of the following leaflet on January 14, 1971:

STUDY LIST AND SIX WEEKS EXAMINATION - FOR COMMUNITY WORKERS AND NCCF MEMBERS

PART I - FIRST SIX WEEKS

1. TEN POINT PLATFORM AND PROGRAM OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
2. RULES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
3. MOTTO
4. CARDINAL RULE
5. PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE B.P.P.
6. MASS LINE
7. PARTY LINE
8. SPECIFIED CHAPTERS OF THE RED BOOK
9. THREE MAIN RULES OF DISCIPLINE
10. EIGHT POINTS OF ATTENTION
11. EVERY MEMBER OF N.C.C.F. MUST KNOW THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF B.P.P.
12. KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS
13. KNOW EVERY BLACK PANTHER PARTY MEMBER MURDERED BY THIS SYSTEM

PART II - SECOND SIX WEEKS

1. IDEOLOGY OF BPP - ELDRIDGE
2. ESSAYS OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE - HUEY P. NEWTON
3. GENIOUS OF HUEY P. NEWTON
4. EDUCATION AND REVOLUTION - ELDRIDGE
5. CONVERSATION WITH ELDRIDGE CLEAVER
6. SEIZE THE TIME BOBBY SEALE
7. HUEY TALKS TO THE MOVEMENT
8. MANDATES OF THE B.P.P.
9. CENTERFOLD OF ALL RECENT B.P.P. NEWSPAPERS
10. MINI MANUAL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

WORD LIST - PART I

1. SLAVE
2. OPPRESSED
3. OPPRESSOR
4. CAPITALISM
5. NEO-COLONIALISM
6. IMPERIALISM
7. PENAGONISM
8. FASCISM
9. RACISM
10. REACTIONARY
11. REVOLUTION (ARY) (IST)
12. SOCIALISM
13. SELF - DEFENSE
14. COLONIALISM
15. JUCHE
16. ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE
17. FRIEND OF THE PEOPLE
18. SUBJECTIVISM
19. INDIVIDUALISM
20. SECATARIANISM
21. PUCHISM
22. A ULTRA - DEMOCRACY
23. PURELY MILITARY VIEWPOINT
24. DEPARTMENTALISM
25. CLIQUEISM

ATTENTION COMMUNITY WORKERS AND N.C.C.F. MEMBERS
DETROIT CHAPTER

E FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS AN ORDER AND WILL BE CARRIED OUT IMMEDIATELY

LL POWER TO THE PEOPLE COMRADES;

BECAUSE OF THE NECESSITY TO INTENSIFY THE STRUGGLE HERE IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, T IS NECESSARY TO INTENSIFY OUR KNOWLEDGE OF STRUGGLE, AND TO TIGHTEN UP OUR IDEOLOGY HICH IS OUR FIRST STEP TOWARDS BEING TRUELY A MATCH FOR A HUNDRED.

OUR CHAIRMAN IS FACING THE ELECTRIC CHAIR, ELDRIDGE OUR MINISTER OF INFORMATION S STILL IN EXILE. THE LIFE OF OUR BELOVED MINISTER OF DEFENSE, HUEY P. NEWTON IS IN ONSTANT DANGER OF ASSASINATION, SOME 30 MEMBERS OF OUR PARTY HAVE ALREADY BEEN MURDRED AND COUNTLESS OF OUR COMRADES ARE IMPRISONED. ALL THIS IS REALITY AND YET SOME F US ARE STILL VERY SLIP-SHOD IN OUR WORK.

BECAUSE OF THE LEVEL OF STRUGGLE INWHICH WE ARE NOW ENGAGED - THE BEGINNING PHASES F ACTUAL ARMED STRUGGLE - IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO CONDENSE THIS TRAINING AND TO EVELOPE INTO A VANGAURD SOLDIER.

OUT LINES OF TRAINING PROGRAMS WILL BE GIVEN EACH MEMBER AND COMMUNITY WORKER. T THE COMPLETION OF THESE TRAINING PROGRAMS, TESTS WILL BE GIVEN TO DETERMINE JUST HAT LEVEL A COMRADE WILL WORK.

THE FIRST SIX WEEKS TRAINING WILL ESTABLISH WHETHER OR NOT ONE WILL BECOME A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEES TO COMBAT FASCISM.

THE SECOND SIX WEEKS WILL ESTABLISH THOSE TO BE PUT IN CHARGE OF LEADERSHIP POSITIONS AND THOSE WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE OF INFORMATION CENTERS THROUGH-OUT THE STATE OF ICHIGAN.

OMMUNITY WORKERS ------------------ ARE ALL THOSE WHO CANNOT FUNCTION FULL TIME AND ALL THOSE WHO CAN AND DO FUNCTION FULL TIME, BUT HAVE NOT COMPLETED THEIR FIRST SIX WEEKS RAINING. THOSE WHO PRIMARILY SELL NEWSPAPERS, PASS OUT LEAFLETS ETC.

EMBERS OF N.C.C.F. ---------- ARE THOSE WHO FUNCTION FULL TIME AND HAVE PASSED THEIR SIX WEEKS TRAINING PROGRAM. WHO SELL NEWSPAPERS AND WORK IN ASSIGNED AREAS UNDER THOSE WHO CORDINATE PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.

THOSE WORKING AS ORGANIZERS IN CHARGE OF OFFICES, PROGRAMS, ETC; ARE THOSE WHO-WHO COMPLETE PHASE TWO OF THEIR TRAINING COURSE. THESE PEOPLE WILL BE LOOKED UPON AS THE DRIVING FORCE OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEES. THESE PEOPLE WILL ORGANIZE VARIOUS AREAS IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.

**THOSE IN PHASE TWO WILL NOT DRINK HARD ALCOHOL SUCH AS WINE AND WHISKEY, OR SMOKE

*IT WILL BE PERMISSIBLE TO DRINK BEER AT THIS TIME

PHASE THREE WILL NOT BE GIVEN BUT MEMBERS OF THE B.P.P. WILL BE RECRUITED FROM IT'S RANKS

I WISH YOU ALL SUCCESS IN OUR STRUGGLE TO TRUELY BE A MATCH FOR A HUNDRED.

RIGHT ON COMRADES

DE T-1 furnished a copy of the following leaflets on February 8, 1971:

Piggy Wiggy BANG BANG

NIXON OH NIXON, OH PIG ASS NIXON
YOU WAR MONGREAL FOOL!
YOU HAVE COMPLETELY BLOWN YOUR COOL!
YOU WHO OINK TO THE PEOPLE,
AND LIE AND LIE AND LIE. THE PEOPLE SAY
OH PIGGY WIGGY, FOR THIS YOU MUST DIE!

WE KNOW OF YOUR PLAN OF GENOCIDE
THIS FACT SO TRUE YOU CANNOT HIDE
YOU BEAST WHO ARE SO LOW
FOR YOU, WE WILL SHO NO WOE!
OUR PEOPLE ARE BEING EDUCATED
AND ARE SOON TO BE LIBERATED
FOR THEIR BODY WILL CONNECT WITH THEIR MIND
THEN DIG IT - WE GONNA SIEZE THE TIME!
FOR WE - THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE OF FASCIST
BABYLON ARE OUT TO DO - WHAT HAS TO BE DONE!



THERE IS NO RECTIFICATION
NOR JUSTIFICATION
FOR YOUR ADVOCATION
OF THE BRUTALIZATION
OF THE PEOPLE, WHICH YOU OPPRESS

PIGS OF THE POWER STRUCTURE, YOU ARE INSANE!
SO ALL WE CAN SAY IS PIGGY WIGGY BANG BANG!

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

LIBERATION BY ANY MEANS

DETROIT "16"

POLITICAL PRISONERS OF U.S. FASCIS

FREE THE DETROIT 16



POLITICAL PRISONERS DEFENSE FUND

Erone C. Desaussure a/k/a Benjamin W. Fondren

Benjamin W. Fondren

Ben Fondron
Erone Desaussure
David Johnson
Shanti Joneson
Cassandra Parker
Jerome Lee
William Cunningham
Victor Grayson
Mrs. Beverly Fleming
Kim Gardner
Carol E. Smith a/k/a Carolyn
Sylvia Robinson
Diana Brown
Pat Duncan
Lonnie Darden
Linda Warnsley

THE 15 MEMBERS OF THE N,C,C,F, ARRESTED ON CHARGES OF MURDER AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER, ARE STILL BEING HELD IN THE WAYNE COUNTY JAIL. LONNIE DARDEN, THE 16th MEMBER TO BE INCARCERATED, WAS INDICTED AND IS ALSO BEING HELD WITH A VERY HIGH RANSOM.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

COMMUNITY INFORMATION CENTER
2009 ALBERT
FLINT MICH.

David A. Johnson

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
613 CONTINENTAL
DETROIT MICH.

Support The Children's Free Breakfast Program

Huey P. Newton
Minister of Defense
Black Panther Party



FLINT N.C.C.F. INFO. CENTER 2009 ALBERT ST.

DAYS: MON-FRI

TIME: 7:00 - 8:30 AM

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE'S TO COMBAT FASCISM, IS MOVING TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE POOR UNDERPRIVILEDGE OF OUR COMMUNITY. ONE OF THE WAYS IN WHICH WE DO THIS IS BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A FREE BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM.

THE BREAKFAST PROGRAMS ARE NOT ONLY TO FEED THE CHILDREN IN OUR COMMUNITY, BUT ALSO TO BRING THE CHILDREN, PARENTS AND ALL PEOPLE OF THE COMMUNITY TOGETHER TO WORK AND SEE TO IT THAT EVERY CHILD IS FED A WELL-BALANCED BREAKFAST EACH MORNING.

THIS BEING THE PEOPLE'S BREAKFAST, OUR GOAL IS TO SPREAD THIS PROGRAM THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITIES OF MICHIGAN. THIS IS THE PEOPLE'S PROGRAM AND WITHOUT THE PEOPLE'S SUPPORT, WE HAVE NOTHING. SINCE THIS IS A BASIC NECESSITY, IT HAS TO BE MET.

Youth Makes The Revolution



MAR 27 1972

XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN

144-3

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
613 CONTINENTAL
599-2879

[illegible] COMMITTEE TO COMBAT F[illegible]
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
613 CONTINENTAL
DETROIT MICH.
499-2878

N#72 2-8-71

Where Is Freedom ??

...When we are not even secure from being savagely beaten, jailed, and murdered by "POLICEMAN"— who stand before the WORLD; YET go "Unpunished"!

...GENOCIDE IN HOSPITALS...

"New Bethel"
"Detroit-16"

"Algiers Motel"
"1967 Rebellion"

FREE THE DETROIT

FREE-DOM "16" FREE-DOM

SEND:

Checks — Money Orders
Property Slips — Surety

TO:

Stronghold Consolidated Productions Inc.
611 Continental Detroit-48215
Mich



LINE THEIR POCKETS WITH THE PEOPLE'S MONEY, RE-DECORATE THEIR OFFICES AND DRIVE AROUND IN THEIR FINE CARS WITH PRIVATE PHONES WITH A DIRECT LINE


ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

TO PIG RUTHERFORD, CHEIF HOG. BUT YET, THEY ARE SUPPOSE TO BE MEETING THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE HERE IN FLINT.

WE AS MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM AND THE PEOPLE, KNOW THESE BAFFONS FOOLS FOR WHAT THEY ARE, POUCHIST, OPPORTUNIST HOUSE NIGGER LACKEYS. WE SAY THAT IT'S GOT TO BE AN IMMEDIATE END TO THIS PIG ACTIVITY AND TRICKERY THAT THE OMBUDSMAN ARE USING ON THE PEOPLE. BLACK PEOPLE WILL TOLERATE THIS NO LONGER, AND BLACK PEOPLE SAY IF THESE THINGS GO ON ANY LONGER, WE WILL PUT A STOP TO THIS PIG ACTIVITY BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY.

DEATH TO THE HOUSE NIGGER
LACKEY AND HIS RUNNING DOG

"IT'S TIME TO
INTENSIFY THE STRUGGLE!

TIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCIS
COMMUNITY INFORMATION CENTER
2009 ALBERT
FLINT MICH. -

COMMUNITY NEWS

EVERY SINCE THE BLACK LIBERATION MOVEMENT STARTED IN 1965, GREEDY INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN PIMPING OFF THE PEOPLE. ONE SUCH BAND OF INDIVIDUALS EXIST IN FLINT, GOING UNDER THE GUISE OF BRO-HAM, BROTHERS OF HAM.

WILLY NOLAND, JOHN (BIG WORD) COLEMAN, AND WILL (RUN THE SHOW) FRANKLIN STARTED THIS ORGANIZATION SUPPOSEDLY TO SERVE THE PEOPLE. THROUGH TRICKERY AND DEMAGOGIC STRATEGY, THEY WENT ON TO DECEIVE THE PEOPLE INTO THINKING THAT THIS ORGANIZATION WAS A RIGHTEOUS BLACK MILITANT ORGANIZATION, INTENT ON SERVING THE PEOPLE AND BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE.

RUN THE SHOW FRANKLIN AND LOUDMOUTHED COLEMAN, USED WILL NOLAND AS A HAND TOOL. THEY ALSO TRICKED A LOT OF UNKNOWING BROTHERS INTO DOING THEIR LITTLE DEEDS. LIKE GETTING MONEY FROM THEIR COHERENCE, THE PIGS. FROM THERE, THEY MOVED ON TO A HIGHER LEVEL, OMBUDSMAN, WHICH IS NO MORE THAT AN ORGANIZATION THAT IS BUILT AROUND TELLING THE PEOPLE ONE THING AND THEN TELLING THEIR COHERENCE ANOTHER. GETTING MONEY AND SAYING THAT THEY ARE GOING TO HELP THE PEOPLE IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY, WHILE THE PIGS ARE STILL BRUTALIZING, BEATING AND KILLING NIGGERS.

BLACK PEOPLE ARE STILL LIVING IN ROACH AND RAT INFESTED HOUSES. BLACK PEOPLE ARE BEING HERDED INTO URBAN RENEWAL PROJECTS, WHICH ARE IN ESSENCE, NIGGER REMOVAL PROJECTS. BLACK CHILDREN ARE STILL HUNGRY, WHILE PIGS STILL PATROL AND CONTROL THE COMMUNITY, AND APART FROM THIS, 17 NEW PIG RIDES HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE BLACK COMMUNITY TO HARASS THE COMMUNITY.

EVEN THE STUDENTS IN SCHOOL ARE BEING VAMPED ON WHILE THE BOOT-LICKING LACKEYS, RUN THE SHOW AND BIG WORD, LOUDMOUTHED LYING COLEMAN, ARE RUNNING AROUND WITH .25'S IN THEIR POCKETS, SITTING AROUND ON THE BOARD OF THE URBAN COALITION WITH PIG PROSECUTOR, TWO FACED ROBERT LEONARD, GREEDY, AVARICIOUS BUSINESSMEN SOMMERFIELD AND OTHER PIG BUSINESSMEN, WHO AIN'T GONNA GIVE A DIME TO ANY BLACK PEOPLE AT ALL. THEY DRINK PLENTY OF LIQUOR.



ey P. Newton,



NATIONAL [illegible]ITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
COMMUNITY INFORMATION CENTER
2009 ALBERT
FLINT MICH.

Free Breakfast Program
FOR CHILDREN

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE'S TO COMBAT FASCISM, WHICH IS A POLITICAL OR-
ANIZING BUREAU OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, HAS SET UP IN FLINT, A FREE
REAKFAST PROGRAM FOR CHILDREN IN THE COMMUNITY. THE BREAKFAST IS SET
P TO BRING THE CHILDREN AND THE COMMUNITY TOGETHER AND FEED THE CHILDREN
WELL-BALANCED HOT MEAL EVERY MORNING, THE CHILDREN ARE BEING EDUCATED
NTO THE AWARENESS OF BLACK REVOLUTIONARY ART, REVOLUTIONARY SONGS, THE
EN POINT PLATFORM OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY WHICH IS WHAT BLACK PEOPLE
EED, WANT AND MUST HAVE. PEOPLE WHO ARE INTERESTED IN WHAT THEIR CHILD-
EN ARE DOING, SHOULD COME THROUGH THE OFFICE WITH THEIR CHILD OR WHEN
EY HAVE THE SPARE TIME TO FIND OUT HOW THEY COULD BE OF HELP AND FIND
UT WHAT THEIR CHILDREN ARE LEARNING.

BUT THE PEOPLE'S FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM IS BEING SABOTAGED BY A FEW
NDIVIDUALS WHO DON'T WANT THESE CHILDREN EXPOSED TO THE TRUTH. THESE
EOPLE ARE THE LACKEY TEACHERS, AND THEIR HIRED BODY GUARDS, THE LOCAL
OLICEMEN (PIGS). SOME OF THESE SCHOOLS ARE DORT, DOYLE, COOK, KENNEDY,
ND ALL INSTILL FEAR IN THESE CHILDREN MINDS WITH THREATENING FAILURE
OTICES FOR BEING LATE OR FOR COMING THROUGH OUR OFFICE. AMONG THE OTHER
OWL THINGS GOING DOWN, THE PANTHER PAPERS ARE BEING TAKEN FROM THE CHILD-
EN. BUT EVEN THIS LEVEL OF REPRESSION WILL NOT STOP THE PEOPLE'S FREE
REAKFAST PROGRAM FROM BUILDING THAT FACE TO FACE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
EOPLE OF THE COMMUNITY, NOR OUR CONCERN FOR THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE OF
N MEETING THEIR BASIC NEEDS.

WE, THE N.C.C.F. AND THE PEOPLE WILL NOT LET THIS BREAKFAST PROGRAM
E SABOTAGED BECAUSE OF FASCIST PIGS, OR ANY OF THE PEOPLE'S PROGRAMS,
ECAUSE TOGETHER AS A WHOLE, WE WILL HAVE COMMUNITY CONTROL.

Free Breakfast Program

FOR CHILDREN

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE'S TO COMBAT FASCISM, IS MOVING TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE POOR UNDERPRIVILEDGED OF OUR COMMUNITY. ONE OF THE WAYS IN WHICH WE DO THIS IS BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A FREE BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM.

THE BREAKFAST PROGRAMS ARE NOT ONLY TO FEED THE CHILDREN IN OUR COMMUNITY, BUT ALSO TO BRING THE CHILDREN, PARENTS AND ALL PEOPLE OF THE COMMUNITY TOGETHER TO WORK AND SEE TO IT THAT EVERY CHILD IS FED A WELL-BALANCED BREAKFAST EACH MORNING.

THIS BEING THE PEOPLE'S BREAKFAST, OUR GOAL IS TO SPREAD THIS PROGRAM THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITIES IN MICHIGAN. THIS IS THE PEOPLE'S PROGRAM AND WITHOUT THE PEOPLE'S SUPPORT, WE HAVE NOTHIHG SINCE THIS IS A BASIC NECESSITY, IT HAS TO BE MET.



Locations:

FLINT N.C.C.F.
INFO. CENTER
2009 ALBERT ST.

Youth Makes The Revolution

DAYS: MON-FRI

TIME: 7:00 - 8:30 AM

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
611 CONTINENTAL
DETROIT MICH.

Free B[illegible]eakfast Prog[illegible]

FOR CHILDREN

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE'S TO COMBAT FASCISM, IS MOVING TO MEET HE BASIC NEEDS OF THE POOR UNDERPRIVILEDGED OF OUR COMMUNITY. ONE OF THE WAYS IN WHICH WE DO THIS IS BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A FREE BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM.

THE BREAKFAST PROGRAMS ARE NOT ONLY TO FEED THE CHILDREN IN OUR COMMUNITY, BUT ALSO TO BRING THE CHILDREN, PARENTS AND ALL PEOPLE OF THE COMMUNITY TOGETHER TO WORK AND SEE TO IT THAT EVERY CHILD IS FED A WELL-BALANCED BREAKFAST EACH MORNING.

THIS BEING THE PEOPLE'S BREAKFAST, OUR GOAL IS TO SPREAD THIS PROGRAM THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITIES IN MICHIGAN. THIS IS THE PEOPLE'S PROGRAM AND WITHOUT THE PEOPLE'S SUPPORT, WE HAVE NOTHIHG SINCE THIS IS A BASIC NECESSITY, IT HAS TO BE MET.



Locations:

FLINT N.C.C.F.
INFO. CENTER
2009 ALBERT
ST.

Youth Makes
The
Revolution

DAYS: MON-FRI

TIME: 7:00 - 8:30 AM

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
611 CONTINENTAL
DETROIT MICH.

NATION[illegible]OMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCI
[illegible]STRY OF INFORMATION
611 CONTINENTAL
DETROIT MICH.



Open Letter To The Community

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM IS AN ORGANIZING BUREAU OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THIS MEANS THAT WE WILL BE IMPLEMENTING AND ANIZING THE VARIOUS SOCIALISTIC PROGRAMS FOR THE PEOPLE IN THE COMMU- Y AS ESTABLISHED BY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

THE FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM WHICH IS SOON TO BE STARTED, WILL FEED THE YOUTHS IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY A GOOD WHOLESOME MEAL. WE RECOGNIZE T A CHILD CANNOT STUDY, LEARN OR CONCENTRATE AS WELL ON AN EMPTY ACH AS HE CAN AFTER HAVING EATEN A HEALTHY MEAL. CAPITALISM, THE Y OF ALL PEOPLE, HAS CAUSED MANY BLACK FAMILIES TO HAVE TO SEND THEIR DREN TO SCHOOL IN THE MORNING WITHOUT FOOD. BUT THROUGH OUR PROGRAM, S PROBLEM WILL BE ELIMINATED.

THE FREE MEDICAL HEALTH CARE CLINIC WILL SUPPLY THE PEOPLE WITH MUCH ED FREE HEALTH CARE. TIME AND AGAIN, BLACK PEOPLE HAVE DIED FROM LACK EDICAL TREATMENT BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T HAVE THE MONEY TO PAY THE MONEY RY DOCTORS. WE MUST SUFFER FOR HOURS IN CROWDED DOCTORS OFFICE'S TO MEDICAL TREATMENT WHICH IS SIMILAR TO BEING TREATED LIKE A PIECE OF INERY ON A FACTORY ASSEMBLY LINE. OUR FREE MEDICAL CLINIC WILL GIVE TREATMENT AND MEDICINE TO THE PEOPLE THROUGH THE SERVICES OF QUALI- LICENSED DOCTORS AND NURSES.

WE TOO, REALIZE THAT DOPE ADDICTION IS A VERY PRESSING PROBLEM IN THE K COMMUNITY. IT IS LITERALLY ASSISTING THE ENEMIES OF BLACK PEOPLE HEIR PLANS OF EXTERMINATION OF OUR RACE. OUR YOUNG BROTHERS AND SIS- AND SONS AND DAUGHTERS ARE LOSING THEIR LIVES CONSTANTLY BECAUSE OF VERDOSE OF SOME POISON DRUG. THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND ITS ORGANI- BUREAU, THE N.C.C.F., HAS STOOD FORTH BOLDLY AND CONDEMED THOSE WHOM BLAME SHOULD REALLY REST ON. IT IS THE GREEDY AVARIOUS BUSINESSMEN THE CROOKED BRIBE TAKING PIG POLICEMEN, WHO ARE LETTING AND PROMOTING ENTRANCE OF HERION AND COCAINE INTO THE BLACK COMMUNITY. AND NOW THEY TRYING TO COVER UP FOR IT WITH A PROGRAM THAT GETS THE ADDICTS STRUNG ON METHODONE, A DRUG SIMILAR TO HERION. WE NOW HAVE A PROGRAM WHICH NOW WILL END THIS PROBLEM ONCE AND FOR ALL.

WE ALSO HAVE A FREE CLOTHING PROGRAM WHICH WILL MEET THE CLOTHING S OF THE PEOPLE THROUGH THE DONATIONS WE RECEIVE, AND ARE WORKING ENGENTLY TOWARD OPENING A FREE SHOE FACTORY, A FREE PEOPLE'S LIBRARY A NO-INTEREST LOAN PROGRAM.

AVE JUST RECENTLY OPENED A NEW OFFICE IN YOUR COMMUNITY AT 2009 RT. THE OFFICE HOURS ARE FROM 9:00 A.M. TO 9:00 P.M. YOU ARE OME TO COME THROUGH ANY DAY.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

FLINT N.C.C.F.

DE 157-3075

On February 17, 1971, DE T-11 furnished copies of the following leaflets:

2/16/71

THE CATECHISM OF THE REVOLUTIONIST
BY Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin
with Introduction by Minister of
Information Black Panther Party

The Catechism of the Revolutionist, by Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin, is one of the most important formulation of principles in the entire history of revolution. A contemporary of Marx, Bakunin was the epitome of the activist and his deeds spoke louder than his words. But his words, are what history has allowed to endure, Bakunin's message. The history of revolutionary movements all over the world attest to the fact that Bakunin's message must be unearthed and scrutinized by a new generation faced with a new tyranny. In the midst of all this Evil and human suffering there is too much co-existence going on. Peach seekers co-existing with War Mongers. Communists co-existing-with Capitalist; Slaves co-existing with Slave Masters. Black nationalists co-existing with Anti-Aro-American hordes.

It's time to intensify the struggle. Within the black colony of Afro-America, this means a declaration of war upon the black bourgeoisie and upon the class of Big Business Men who have turned the National Liberation Struggle into Big Business. These Civil Rights Executives must be allowed one choice and one choice only: return to your people, bringing with you your wealth and skills, and put it at the disposal of your people's cause. You have nothing that is sacred—not even your life.

Intesifying the Struggle means, at this stage within the white mother country, arising from the sleep of tradition and making some new definitions. Some new distinctions. Within the ranks of the white mother country radicals, the new generation must part company with the old at the very least. Preferably, the new generation should take hold of the old and bend them or break them. There is nothing left for them to prove. They must be demoted to advisory and technical positions. Pressure on them must be stepped up to the maximum and kept there. Stop at nothing.

Compared to the job that Afro-American Revolutionaries and white mother country radicals have on their hands, all revolutions and national liberation struggles of the past have been childs play. What must be kept clear is that white mother country radicals are fighting for a revolution--while Afro-American revolutionaries are fighting for national liberation -- against a common enemy: White Racist Capitalism and its bastard offsprings, Colonialism, Imperialism, and Neo-Colonialism.

Read the Catechism. Perhaps you will find a word or phrase that will enhance your revolutionary perspective and intensify your activity. At the very least you have to appreciate Bakunin's spirit. "If you got Bakunin's message, then the whole world will have moved a little closer to the future.

28

Minister of Information
Black Panther Party

THE CATECHISM OF THE REVOLUTIONIST

The Revolutionist's Attitude Toward Himself

The revolutionist is a doomed man. He has no personal interests,
ffairs, sentiments, attachments, property, not even a name of his
Everything in him is absorbed by one exclusive interest, ont tho-
, one passion -- the revolution.

In the very dept of his being, not merely in word but in deed, he
broken every connection with the social order and with the whole
ated world, with all the laws, appearances, and generally accepted
ventions and moralities of that world which he considers his ruthless
Should he continue to live in it, it will be solely for the pur-
of destroying in more surely.

The revolutionist despises every sort of doctrinairism and has re-
nced the peaceful scientific pursuits, leaving them to future generation
ons. He knows only one science, the science of destruction. For this
only this purpose he makes a study of mechanics, physics, chemistry
possibly medicine. For this purpose he studies day and night the
ing science of human beings, their characters, situation, and all
conditions of the present social system in its various strats. The
ect is but one__ The quickess possible destruction of that ignoble
tem.

He despises public opinion. He despises and hates the present day
e of morals with all its motivations and manifestation.. To him,
tever side the triumph of the revolution is ethical; all that which
ders it is unethical and criminal.

The revolutionist is a doomed man. He is merciless toward the State
toward the entire system of privileged educated classes; he need in
n expect no mercy from them. Between him and them there is continuous
irreconcilable war to the bitter end, whether it be-waged openly or
retly. He must be ready to die at any moment. He must train himself
stand torture.

Rigorous towards himself, he must also be severe with others. All
der, softening sentiments of kinship, friendship, love, gratitude, and
en honor itself must be snuffed out in him by the one cold passion of
revolutionary cause. For him there is only one satisfaction, con-
lation, and delight---the success of the revolution. Day and night we
st have one thought, one aim--inexorable destruction. Striving coldly
unfairly towards this aim, he must be ready to perish himself and to
stroy with his own hands everything that hinders its realization.

The nature of a real revolutionist precludes every bit of sentimen-
lity; romanticism, of infatuation and exaltation. It precludes even
rsonal hatred and revenge. Revolutionary passion having become a nor-
l phenomenon, it must be combined with cold calculation. At all times
d places the revolutionist must not be that towards which he is impell-
by personal impulses, but that which the general interests of the

The Relations of the Revolutionists Toward His Comrades in the Cause

8. A revolutionist may feed friendship or attachment only for those who have proven themselves by their actions to be revolutionists like himself. The measure of friendship, devotion, and other obligations towards such a comrade is determined solely by the degree of his usefulness to the cause of the alldestructive revolution.

9. Solidarity of the revolutionists goes without saying. The whole strength of the revolutionary cause is based on it. The fellow revolutionists who stand in the same plane of revolutionary understanding and ardor must, as far as possible, discuss all important matters jointly and decide them unamimously. In the execution of a plan thus decided upon, however, everyone must, as far as possible, count upon himself. In carrying out acts of destruction each one must act alone and resort to the counsel and aid of comrades only when this is necessary for success.

10. Each comrade must have at hand several revolutionists of the second and third degree, i.e. such as are not entirely initiated. He must consider them a part of the common revolutionary capital placed at his disposal. He must spend his portion of the capital economically, always striving to extract the greatest possible use from it. He is to consider himself as capital, fated to be spent for the triumph of the revolutionary cause; however, he has no right personally and alone to dispose of that capital without the consent of the aggregate of the fully initiated.

11. When a comrade comes to grief, in deciding the question whether or not to save him, the revolutionists must take into consideration not his personal feelings, but solely the interests of the revolutionary cause. Therefore, he must weigh on the work contributed by the comrade, and on the other, the expenditure of revolutionary forces necessary to rescue him, and he is to decide according to which side.

The Revolutionist's Relations with Society

12. The admission into the organization of a new member, who has proved himself not in words but in deeds, can be effected only by unanimous agreement.

13. The revolutionist enters the world of the State and of the educated privilege classes and lives in it only for the purpose of its fullest and quickest destruction. He is not a revolutionist if he is attached to anything in this world, if he can stop before the annihilation of any situation, relation, or person belonging to this class or world--everything and everybody must be equally hateful to him. All the worse to him if he has any relations of kinship, friendship, or love; he is not a revolutionist if they can stop his hand.

14. For the purpose of ruthless destruction, the revolutionist may and frequently must live in society, pretending to be something entirely different from what he is. The revolutionist must penetrate everywhere, into all the higher and middle classes, the merchant's store, the church the nobleman's home, the bureaucratic world and military circles, into literature, into the Third Department (Secret Police), and even into

draw up a list of persons thus condemned in the order of their relative harmfulness to the success of the cause so that the preceding numbers may be removed before the subsequent ones.

16. In making up such lists and for the purpose of establishing the above mentioned order, one should by no means be guided by the personal villainy of the individual, nor even by the hatred of which he calls forth in the association or among the people. This villainy and this hatred may even by party useful by helping to arouse the masses of the revolt. It is necessary to be guided by the measure of usefulness which would result from his death, to the revolutionary cause. Thus, first of all, those men must be destroyed who are particularly harmful to the revolutionary organization and also those whose sudden and violent death may fill the government with the greatest fear and shake its power by depriving it of its cleaver and energetic man.

17. The second category must consist of persons whose lives would be spared only temporaily so that, by a series of brutal acts, they bring the people to the point of inevitable revolt.

18. To the third category belong a great many brutes in high positions not distinguished by any particular intellect or energy, but due to their position, enjoy riches, connections, influence, and power. It is necessary to exploit them in every possible way; trap them into one's slaves. Their power, influence, connections, riches, and strength will become the inexhaustible treasury and support of various revolutionary enterprises.

19. The fourth category consists of ambitious officeholders and liberals of various shades. One may conspire with them in accordance with their programs, making them in accordance that one follows them blindly and at the same time one should take hold of them, get possessions of all their secrets, compromise them to the utmost; so that no avenue of escape may be left to them and use them as instruments for stirring up distrubances in the State.

20. The fifth--doctrinaires (refers to Bakunin's opponents within the revolutionary camp), conspirators, revolutionist talking idly in groups and on paper. They must be continually pushed and pulled forward, towards practical neckbreaking statements, the result of which would be the complete destruction of the majority and the real revolutionary training of a few.

21. The sixth and very important category includes women who should be classified under three main divisions; empty headed, stupid, soulless who may be under like the third and fourth category of men; others ardent, devoted, capable, but not with us because they have not yet worked themselves up to the real phraseless and genuine revolutionary understanding; they are to be made use of like the men in the third category; finally, women, entirely ours, i.e. fully initiated and having completely accepted our program. They are our comrades. We must look upon them as our most precious treasure. Without the aid of with we cannot get along.

The Attitudes of the Association Toward The People

22. The association has no other aim other than the complete liberation and happiness of the masses, i.e. of the people who live by manual labor. But, convinced that this liberation and the achievement of this liberation and happiness is possible

Only through an all-destroying popular revolution and the Association will by all means and all its power further the developement and extension of those evils and those calamities which must at last exhaust the patience of the people and drive them to a general uprising.

23. By Revolution the Association does not understand a regulated movement after the classical Western model. A movement which always bowing to the property rights and the traditions of the social systems of so-called civilization and morality, has until now limited itself everywhere to the overthrow of one political form in order to replace it by another and striven to create a so-called revolutionary state. Only that revolution will be beneficial to the people which will destroy at the very root every vestige of statehood and will annihilate all of this country's old traditions, institutions, and classes.

24. The Association therefore does not intend to force on the people any organization from above. The future organization will no doubt evolve out of popular movement and out of life itself. But this is the business of future generations. Our business in destruction, terrible, complete, universal, and merciless.

25. Therefore, in getting closer to the people, we must first of all join those elements of the masses, which, since the foundation of the U.S. powers, have never ceased to protest, not in words alone but in deeds as well, against everything which is directly or indirectly connected with the State: against nobility, the bureaucracy, the clergy, the guilds (meaning the merchants and capitalist in general) and against the parasitie kulak. Let us join hands with the cold and bold hands and world of the bandits--the only genuine revolutionist in the U.S.

26. To consolidate this world into one invincible, all-destroying force is the sole subject of our organization; this is our conspiracy; our task.

DE 157-3075

On February 23, 1971, DE T-11 furnished copies of the following leaflets:

ATTENTION COMMUNITY WORKERS AND BLACK PANTHER PARTY MEMBERS
DETROIT BRANCH

THE FOLL[illegible] INFORMATION IS AN ORDER AND WI[illegible]E CARRIED
OUT IMMEDIATELY

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE COMRADES:

BECAUSE OF THE NECESSITY TO INTENSIFY THE STRUGGLE HERE IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, IT IS NECESSARY TO INTENSIFY OUR KNOWLEDGE OF STRUGGLE, AND TO TIGHTEN UP OUR IDEOLOGY WHICH IS OUR FIRST STEP TOWARDS BEING TRUELY A MATCH FOR A HUNDRED.

THE LIFE OF OUR BELOVED MINISTER OF DEFENSE, HUEY P. NEWTON IS IN CONSTANT DANGER OF ASSASINATION, SOME 30 MEMBERS OF OUR PARTY HAVE ALREADY BEEN MURDERED AND COUNTLESS OF OUR COMRADES ARE IMPRISONED. ALL THIS IS REALITY AND YET SOME OF US ARE STILL VERY SLIPSHOD IN OUR WORK.

BECAUSE OF THE LEVEL OF STRUGGLE IN WHICH WE ARE NOW ENGAGED, SURVIVAL-PENDING REVOLUTION. IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO CONDENSE THIS TRAINING AND TO DEVELOPE INTO A VANGUARD SOLDIER.

OUTLINES OF TRAINING PROGRAMS WILL BE GIVEN EACH MEMBER AND COMMUNITY WORKER. AT THE COMPLETION OF THESE TRAINING PROGRAMS, TESTS WILL BE GIVEN TO DETERMINE JUST WHAT LEVEL A COMRADE WILL WORK.

THE FIRST SIX WEEKS WILL ESTABLISH THOSE TO BE PUT IN CHARGE OF INFORMATION CENTERS THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.

COMMUNITY WORKERS --------ARE ALL THOSE WHO CANNOT FUNCTION FULL TIME AND HAVE NOT COMPLETED THEIR FIRST SIX WEEKS TRAINING. THOSE WHO PRIMARILY SELL NEWSPAPERS, PASS OUT LEAFLETS, ETC.

MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY ----- THOSE WHO FUNCTION FULL TIME AND HAVE PASSED THEIR FIRST SIX WEEK TRAINING PROGRAM. WHO SELL NEWSPAPERS AND WORK IN ASSIGNED AREAS UNDER THOSE WHO COORDINATE PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.

THOSE WORKING AS ORGANIZERS IN CHARGE OF OFFICES, PROGRAMS, ETC: ARE THOSE WHO HAVE COMPLETED PHRASE TWO OF THEIR TRAINING COURSE. THESE PEOPLE WILL ORGANIZE AND BE LOOKED UPON AS THE DRIVING FORCE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

PHRASE THREE WILL NOT BE GIVEN BUT MEMBERS OF THE B.P.P. WILL BE RECRUITED FROM IT'S RANKS.

ALL SUCCESS IN OUR STRUGGLE TO TRULY BE A MATCH FOR A HUNDRED.

RIGHT ON COMRADES.

MAR 27 1972
709
XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN
7443

34

STUDY LIST AND SIX WEEKS EXAMINATION - FOR COMMUNITY WORKERS AND BPP MEMBERS

PART I -FIRST SIX WEEKS

1. TEN POINT PLATFORM AND PROGRAM OF THE B.P.P.
2. RULES OF THE B.P.P.
3. MOTTO
4. CARDINAL RULE
5. PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE B.P.P.
6. MASS LINE
7. PARTY LINE
8. SPECIFIED CHAPTERS OF THE RED BOOK
9. THREE MAIN RULES OF DISCIPLINE
10. EIGHT POINTS OF ATTENTION
11. EVERY MEMBER OF THE B.P.P. MUST KNOW THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
12. KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS
13. KNOW EVERY BLACK PANTHER PARTY MEMBER MURDERED BY THIS SYSTEM

PART II - SECOND SIX WEEKS

1. ESSAYS OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE - HUEY P. NEWTON
2. GENIUS OF HUEY P. NEWTON
3. SEIZE THE TIME - BOBBY SEALE
4. HUEY TALKS TO THE MOVEMENT
5. MANDATES OF THE B.P.P.
6. CENTERFOLDS OF ALL RECENT B.P.P. NEWSPAPERS

WORD LIST - PART I

1. SLAVE
2. OPPRESSED
3. OPPRESSOR
4. CAPITALISM
5. NEO-COLONIALISM
6. IMPERIALISM
7. PENAGONISM
8. FASCISM
9. RACISM
10. REACTIONARY
11. Revolution (ary) (ist)
12. SOCIALISM
13. SELF-DEFENSE
14. COLOIALISM
15. JUCHE
16. ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE
17. SUBJECTIVISM
18. FRIEND OF THE PEOPLE
19. INDIVIDUALISM
20. SECTARIANISM
21. PUCHISM
22. ULTRA-DEMOCRACY
23. PURELY MILITARY VIEWPOINT
24. DEPARTMENTALISM
25. CLIQUISM

MANDATORY READING

BY MINISTER OF EDUCATION

1. RULES OF LEGAL FIRST-AID
2. ESSAYS FROM MINISTER OF DEFENSE
3. RED BOOK PRINCIPLES (QUOTATIONS FROM MAO)
4. WRETCHED OF THE EARTH - FRANTZ FANON
5. NEO-COLONIALISM: THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM --KWANE NKRUMAH
6. COMMUNIST MANIFESTO - KARL MARX
7. IMPERIALISM - THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM - V.I. LENIN
8. STATE & REVOLUTION - V.I. LENIN
9. WHAT IS TO BE DONE - V.I. LENIN
10. AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X - MALCOLM X (ALSO RECORDS "MESSAGE TO THE GRASS ROOTS")
11. THE BALLOT OR THE BULLET --MALCOLM X
12. THE WEST ON TRIAL - CHEDI JAGAN
13. REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION - REGIS DEBRAY
14. THE CHALLENGE OF THE CONGO - KWANE NKRUMAH
15. GUERILLA WARFARE - CHE GUEVARA
16. AXIOMS OF KWANE NKRUMAH (FREEDOM FIGHTERS EDITION)
17. PERIODICALS - NEWSPAPERS
    BLACK PANTHER PARTY - INTERCOMMUNAL NEWS SERVICE
    MUHAMMAD SPEAKS (PAPER)
    GRAMMA --OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA
    TRI-CONTINENTAL - JOURNAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF SOLIDARITY OF THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA
    MINORITY OF ONE - MAGAZINE
18. SEIZE THE TIME - BOBBY SEALE
19. MALCOLM X SPEAKS - MALCOLM X
20. KIM IL SUNG - VOL. I II III
21. CONCENTRATION CAMPS IN U.S.A. - ALLAN

The following is the text of an article which appeared in the March 27, 1971 edition of "The Black Panther" newspaper, page three, and according to DE T-2, was written by WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON:

"PIGS FEEBLE ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE
FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM

"THE NEWLY OPENED OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (N.C.C.F.), THE POLITICAL ORGANIZING BUREAU OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AT 2009 ALBERT ST. HAS IMPLEMENTED A FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM FOR CHILDREN.

"THIS PROGRAM WAS STARTED BECAUSE WE OF THE N.C.C.F. KNOW THE FININCIAL STATUS OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY AND KNOWING THAT MOST BLACK FAMILIES ARE NOT ALWAYS ABLE TO FEED THEIR CHILDREN A HOT, WELL BALANCED, NOURISHING BREAKFAST. WE KNOW THAT CHILDREN AREN'T ABLE TO CONCENTRATE ON THEIR STUDIES IN SCHOOL AS OPPOSED TO PAINS OF HUNGER WITHOUT A NOURISHING HOT BREAKFAST; SO THAT THRY WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN AN EDUCATION TO BETTER THEIR CONDITIONS OF LIVING IN THE YEARS UP COMING.

"WHEN THE FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM FIRST STARTED, WE SAW THAT QUITE A FEW CHILDREN WERE INTERESTED BUT RELUCTANT TO COME. IN OUR TIRELESS EFFORT TO BETTER SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY, WE IMMEDIATELY STARTED TO INVESTIGATE

THE REASON BEHIND THE CHILDREN NOT COMING TO THE FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM. IN OUT INVESTIGATION, WE DISCOVERED THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM; WHICH LIES AT DORT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, LOCATED AT THE CORNER OF HAMILTON AND AVE. A.

"YOUR CHILDREN ARE CONSTANTLY BEING HARASSED, FRIGHTENED BY MEMBERS OF A PROFESSIONAL STAFF, BETTER KNOWN AS TEACHERS. ONE SUCH RACIST LACKEY'S MISS BROWN, MURPHEY, A MISS COLDPEPPER, A MR. HOLIDAY AND YOUR EVERYDAY PRINCIPAL SIMMONS.

"THESE FOWL LOW NATURED TEACHERS ARE HARASSING YOUR CHILDREN ABOUT COMING TO THE FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM. THEY TELL THEM THAT IF THEY COME TO THE FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM THAT THEY WILL BE KICKED OUT OF SCHOOL, THAT WE PUT DOPE IN THE FOODS, OR THAT WE INTEND TO HARM THEM.

"ALONG WITH HARASSMENT BY THA TEACHERS THEY ARE EVEN SUBJECTED TO BEING HARASSED BY YOUR UNFRIENDLY BLUE-SUITED PIG. THEY ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH JUST LYING TO THE CHILDREN, THEY HAVE MOVED IT TO A HIGHER LEVEL, TO INSURE THAT THE CHILDREN OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY WOULD NOT RECIEVE AMPLE NOURISHMENT, AND SO THAT THEY COULD FURTHER ENHANCE THEIR GENOCIDAL PRACTICES OF THIS DECADENT COMMUNITY.

"THESE FOWL INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING HAVE UNIFORMED PIGS ALONG WITH THEIR NIGGER LACKEYS TO PATROL THE HALLS OF THE SCHOOL, ARMED WITH . 357 MAGNUMS/ PISTOLS, UNSTRAPPED AT THEIR SIDES.

"THESE PIGS PATROL THE HALLS DAILY UNDER THE PRETENSE OF KEEP-' OLDER STUDENTS FROM OTHER SCHOOLS OUT OF DORT. INSTEAD THEY RUN AROUND IN THE HALLS, TAKING CHILDREN TO THE OFFICE THAT COME IN LATE, TAKING CHILDREN OUT OF CLASS ON A PASS FOR THE BATHROOM, TO THE OFFICE.

"THESE LOW NATURED BEASTS GO SO FAR AS TO DO SUCH THINGS AS TO THREATEN YOUR CHILDREN WITH SHOOTING THEM, AND TAKE THE CHILDREN TO SOME SECLUDED AREA AND BEAT THEM. WHEN THERE IS CLEARLY A LAW IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN THAT CHILDREN ARE NOT TO BE WHIPPED, BEATEN OR PADDLED WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE PARENTS.

"THIS CLEARLY INDICATED HOW THE FASCIST RACIST PIGS OF FLINT AND THEIR LACKEYS THAT ARE WORKING IN THE INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING HAVE NO REGARDS FOR THE RIGHTS AND WELL BEING FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY.

"WE THE MEMBERS OF THE N.C.C.F. AND THE PEOPLE SAY THAT WHEN THE PUBLIC FACILITIES NO LONGER WORK TO SERVE THE PEOPLE AS THEY WERE DESIGNED FOR, BUT WORK ONLY IN THE INTEREST OF THHE FEW THAT CONTROL THIS CORRUPT DECADENT SOCIETY KNOWN AS THE RULING CIRCLE, THAT WHEN THIS HAPPENS IT SHALL BE DEALT WITH BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY. IN KNOWING THIS WE KNOW THAT THE ONLY WAY IS WITH THE HAND TOOLS OF LIBERATION.

"DEATH TO THE PIGS AND THEIR LACKEYS IN THE FASCIST INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING.

FLINT N.C.C.F.
TEDDY ROBERTSON"

DE T-3 furnished a copy of the following leaflet on March 17, 1971:

FREE



THE DETROIT "16"

THE DETROIT "16" IS "16" BROTHERS AND SISTERS WHO ARE BEING HELD IN THE MEDIVAL DUNGEONS BETTER KNOWN AS WAYNE COUNTY JAIL, ON CHARGES OF MUDER AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER.

ON OCTOBER 24, THESE BROTHERS AND SISTERS WERE TAKEN OUT OF THE BLACK (16th & MYRTLE) COMMUNITY FOR FEEDING HUNGRY KIDS IN THE MORNINGS, FOR TRYING TO ESTABLISH A FREE MEDICAL CLINIC WHICH WOULD SERVE ALL THE PEOPLE, AND OTHER SURVIVAL PROGRAMS. BUT THE PIGS JUSTIFICATION FOR TAKING THE PEOPLE'S WARRIORS OFF THE STREET, WAS FOR THE MURDER OF PIG GLENN SMITH AND CONSPIRING TO MURDER PIG GLENN SMITH.

5 OF THE 8 SISTERS ARE OUT ON $5,000 BONDS EACH. ONLY ONE OF THE EIGHT BROTHERS, LONNIE DARDEN, HAVE BOND WHICH IS $20,000 AND TWO SURITIES. THE REMAINING 7 ARE WITHOUT BONDS.

THE UNJUST TRIAL OF THE DETROIT 16 HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR MAY 10, 1971, BUT YOU, ONLY YOU, THE MASSES OF PEOPLE CAN TURN THIS UNJUST TRIAL INTO A JUST TRIAL, BY SEEING TO IT THAT THE DETROIT 16 WALK THE STREETS AGAIN——BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY.

IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE BROTHERS AND SISTERS OF THE PROPER DEFENSE, DEFENSE FUNDS AND BAIL MONEY IS NEEDED. ALL CHECKS- MONEY ORDERS, PROPERTY SLIPS-SURETIES ARE TO BE SENT TO THE NATIONAL COMMITTEES TO COMBAT FASCISM, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, 613 CONTINENTAL, DETROIT, MICH.

"....But You Know Mr. D.A., Our Dealings With You Will Be Just As Cold-Blooded As Your Dealings In That Court Room"



FREE ALL



POLITICAL PRISONERS

"...Remember, you make the Revolution. We can not free political prisoners. Only the people can free political prisoners."

MAR 27 1972

XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN

#43

DE T-4 furnished copies of the following leaflets on August 9, 1971:

ON THE DEFECTION OF ELDRIDGE CLEAVER
FROM THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
AND THE DEFECTION OF
THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
FROM THE BLACK COMMUNITY

BY HUEY P. NEWTON,

MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE

THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY BASES ITS IDEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY ON A CONCRETE ANYALYSIS OF CONCRETE CONDITIONS, USING DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AS OUR ANALYTICAL METHOD. AS DIALECTICAL MATERIALIST WE RECOGNIZE THAT CONTRADICTIONS CAN LEAD TO DEVELOPMENT. THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE OF OPPOSITES BASED UPON THEIR UNITY CAUSES MATTER TO HAVE MOTION AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT. WE RECOGNIZE THAT NOTHING IN NATURE STANDS OUTSIDE OF DIALECTICS, EVEN THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. BUT WE WELCOME THESE CONTRADICTIONS, BECAUSE THEY CLARIFY AND ADVANCE OUR STRUGGLE. WE HAD A CONTRADICTION WITH OUR FORMER MINISTER OF INFORMATION, ELDRIDGE CLEAVER. BUT WE UNDERSTAND THIS IS NECESSARY TO OUR GROWTH. OUT OF THIS CONTRADICTION HAS COME NEW GROWTH AND A NEW RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL VISION OF THE PARTY.

EARLY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY I WROTE AN ESSAY TITLED "THE CORRECT HANDLING OF A REVOLUTION". THIS WAS IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER CONTRADICTION - THE CRITICISMS RAISED AGAINST THE PARTY BY THE REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT (R.A.M.). AT THAT TIME R.A.M. CRITICIZED US FOR OUR ABOVE-GROUND ACTION -- OPENLY DISPLAYING WEAPONS AND TALKING ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR THE COMMUNITY TO ARM ITSELF FOR ITS OWN SELF-DEFENSE. R.A.M. SAID THAT THEY WERE UNDERGROUND, AND SAW THIS AS THE CORRECT WAY TO HANDLE A REVOLUTION. I RESPONDED TO THEM BY POINTING OUT THAT YOU MUST ESTABLISH YOUR ORGANIZATION ABOVE GROUND SO THAT THE PEOPLE WILL RELATE TO IT IN A WAY THAT WILL BE POSITIVE AND PROGRESSIVE TO THEM. WHEN YOU GO UNDERGROUND WITHOUT DOING THIS, YOU BURY YOURSELF SO DEEPLY THAT THE PEOPLE CAN NEITHER RELATE TO NOR CONTACT YOU. THEN THE TERRORISM OF THE UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATION WILL BE JUST THAT--STRIKING FEAR INTO THE HEARTS OF THE VERY PEOPLE WHOSE INTEREST THE ORGANIZATION CLAIMS TO BE DEFENDING--BECAUSE THE PEOPLE CANNOT RELATE TO THEM AND THERE IS NOBODY THERE TO INTERPRET THEIR ACTIONS. YOU HAVE TO SET UP A PROGRAM OF PRACTICAL ACTION AND BE A MODEL FOR THE COMMUNITY TO FOLLOW AND APPRECIATE.

(43)

THE ORIGINAL VISION OF THE PARTY WAS TO DEVELOP A LIFELINE TO THE PEOPLE BY SERVING THEIR NEEDS AND DEFENDING THEM AGAINST THEIR OPPRESSORS WHO COME TO THE COMMUNITY IN MANY FORMS--FROM ARMED POLICE TO CAPITALIST EXPLOITERS. WE KNEW THAT THIS STRATEGY WOULD RAISE THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE PEOPLE AND ALSO

MAR 27 1972
XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN

4443

THE PEOPLE WOULD SUP[illegible]T US AND DEFEND US. THEY WOULD KNOW THA[illegible]N SPITE OF THE OPPRESSOR'S INTER[illegible]TATIONS, THAT OUR ONLY DESIRE WAS TO SERVE THEIR TRUE INTERESTS; AND THEY WOULD DEFEND US. IN THIS MANNER WE MIGHT BE FORCED UNDERGROUND, BUT THERE WOULD BE A LIFELINE TO THE COMMUNITY WHICH WOULD IDENTIFY WITH US AND NOT WITH OUR COMMON ENEMY.

FOR A TIME THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY LOST ITS VISION AND DEFECTED FROM THE COMMUNITY. WITH THE DEFECTION OF ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, HOWEVER, WE CAN MOVE AGAIN TO A FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR ORIGINAL VISION AND COME OUT OF THE TWILIGHT ZONE WHICH THE PARTY HAS BEEN IN DURING THE RECENT PAST.

THE ONLY REASON THAT THE PARTY IS STILL IN EXISTENCE AT THIS TIME, AND THE ONLY REASON THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SURVIVE THE REPRESSION OF THE PARTY AND MURDERS OF SOME OF OUR MOST ADVANCE COMRADES IS BECAUSE OF THE TEN POINT PROGRAM -- OUR SURVIVAL PROGRAM. OUR PROGRAMS WOULD BE MEANINGLESS AND INSIGNIFICANT IF THEY WERE NOT COMMUNITY PROGRAMS. THIS IS WHY IT IS MY OPINION THAT AS LONG AS THE BLACK COMMUNITY AND OPPRESSED PEOPLE ARE FOUND IN NORTH AMERICA THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY WILL LAST. THE PARTY WILL SURVIVE AS A STRUCTURED VEHICLE, BECAUSE IT SERVES THE TRUE INTERESTS OF OPPRESSED PEOPLE AND ADMINISTERS TO THEIR NEEDS -- THIS WAS THE ORIGINAL VISION OF THE PARTY. THE ORIGINAL VISION WAS NOT STRUCTURED BY RHETORIC NOR BY IDEOLOGY. IT WAS STRUCTURED BY THE PRACTICAL NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE, AND ITS MEMBERS WERE ARMED WITH AN IDEOLOGY WHICH PROVIDED A SYSTEMATIC METHOD OF ANALYSIS OF HOW BEST TO MEET THOSE NEEDS.

WHEN BOBBY SEALE AND I CAME TOGETHER TO LAUNCH THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, WE HAD BEEN THROUGHT MANY GROUPS. MOST OF THEM WERE SO DEDICATED TO RHETORIC AND ARTISTIC RITUALS THAT THEY HAD WITHDRAWN FROM LIVING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. SOMETIMES THEIR ANALYSES WERE BEAUTIFUL, BUT THEY HAD NO PRACTICAL PROGRAMS WHICH WOULD DELIVER THEIR UNDERSTANDINGS TO THE PEOPLE. WHEN THEY DID TRY TO DEVELOP PRACTICAL PROGRAMS, THEY OFTEN FAILED, BECAUSE THEY LACKED A SYSTEMATIC IDEOLOGY WHICH WOULD HELP THEM DO CONCRETE ANALYSES OF CONCRETE CONDITIONS TO GAIN A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMMUNITY AND ITS NEEDS. WHEN I WAS IN DONALD WARDEN'S AFRO AMERICAN ASSOCIATION, I WATCHED HIM TRY TO MAKE A REALITY OF COMMUNITY CONTROL THROUGH BLACK CAPITALISM. BUT WARDEN DID NOT HAVE A SYSTEMATIC IDEOLOGY AND HIS ATTEMPTS TO INITIATE HIS PROGRAM CONTINUALLY FRUSTRATED HIM AND THE COMMUNITY TOO. THEY DID NOT KNOW WHY CAPITALISM WOULD NOT WORK FOR THEM, EVEN THOUGH IT HAD WORKED FOR OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS.

WHEN WE FORMED THE PARTY, WE DID SO BECAUSE WE WANTED TO PUT THEORY AND PRACTICE TOGETHER, IN A SYSTEMATIC MANNER. WE DID THIS THROUGH OUR BASIC TEN POINT PROGRAM. IN ACTUALITY IT WAS A 20-POINT PROGRAM, WITH THE PRACTICE EXPRESSED IN "WHAT WE WANT" AND THE THEORY EXPRESSED IN "WHAT WE BELIEVE". THIS PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR A STRUCTURED POLITICAL VEHICLE.

44

THE ACTIO[illegible] WE ENGAGED IN AT THAT TIME WERE STRICTL[illegible]ATEGIC ACTIONS, FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. THEY WERE DESIGNED TO MOBILIZE THE COMMUNITY. ANY ACTION WHICH DOES NOT MOBILIZE THE COMMUNITY TOWARD THE GOAL IS NOT A REVOLUTIONARY ACTION. THE ACTION MIGHT BE A MARVELOUS STATEMENT OF COURAGE, BUT IF IT DOES NOT MOBILIZE THE PEOPLE TOWARD THE GOAL OF A HIGHER MANIFESTATION OF FREEDOM, IT IS NOT MAKING A POLITICAL STATEMENT AND COULD EVEN BE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY.

WE REALIZED AT A VERY EARLY POINT IN OUR DEVELOPMENT, THAT REVOLUTION IS A PROCESS. IT IS NOT A PARTICULAR ACTION, NOR IS IT A CONCLUSION. IT IS A PROCESS. THIS IS WHY WHEN FEUDALISM WIPED OUT SLAVERY, FEUDALISM WAS REVOLUTIONARY. THIS IS WHY WHEN CAPITALISM WIPED OUT FEUDALISM, CAPITALISM WAS REVOLUTIONARY. THE CONCRETE ANALYSIS OF CONCRETE CONDITIONS WILL REVEAL THE TRUE NATURE OF THE SITUATION AND INCREASE OUR UNDERSTANDING. THIS PROCESS MOVES IN A DIALECTICAL MANNER AND WE UNDERSTAND THE STRUGGLE OF THE OPPOSITES BASED UPON THEIR UNITY.

MANY TIMES PEOPLE SAY THAT OUR TEN-POINT PROGRAM IS REFORMIST; BUT THEY IGNORE THE FACT THAT REVOLUTION IS A PROCESS. WE LEFT THE PROGRAM OPENENDED, SO THAT IT COULD DEVELOP AND PEOPLE COULD IDENTIFY WITH IT. WE DID NOT OFFER IT TO THEM AS A CONCLUSION; WE OFFERED IT AS A VEHICLE TO MOVE THEM TO A HIGHER LEVEL. IN THEIR QUEST FOR FREEDOM, AND IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT THE OPPRESSOR FROM STRIPPING THEM OF ALL THE THINGS THEY NEED TO EXIST, THE PEOPLE SEE THINGS AS MOVING FROM A TO B TO C; THEY DO NOT SEE THINGS AS MOVING FROM A TO Z. IN OTHER WORDS THEY HAVE TO SEE FIRST SOME BASIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS, IN ORDER TO REALIZE THAT MAJOR SUCCESSES ARE POSSIBLE. MUCH OF THE TIME THE REVOLUTIONARY WILL HAVE TO GUIDE THEM INTO THIS UNDERSTANDING. BUT HE CAN NEVER TAKE THEM FROM A TO Z IN ONE JUMP, BECAUSE IT IS TOO FAR AHEAD. THEREFORE, WHEN THE REVOLUTIONARY BEGINS TO INDULGE IN Z, OR FINAL CONCLUSIONS, THE PEOPLE DO NOT RELATE TO HIM. THEREFORE HE IS NO LONGER A REVOLUTIONARY, IF REVOLUTION IS A PROCESS. THIS MAKES ANY ACTION OR FUNCTION WHICH DOES NOT PROMOTE THE PROCESS - NON-REVOLUTIONARY.

WHEN THE PARTY WENT TO SACRAMENTO, WHEN THE PARTY FACED DOWN THE POLICEMEN IN FRONT OF THE OFFICE OF RAMPARTS MAGAZINE, AND WHEN THE PARTY PATROLLED THE POLICE WITH ARMS, WE WERE ACTING (IN 1966) AT A TIME WHEN THE PEOPLE HAD GIVEN UP THE PHILOSOPHY OF NON-VIOLENT DIRECT ACTION AND WERE BEGINNING TO DEAL WITH STERNER STUFF. WE WANTED THEM TO SEE THE VIRTUES OF DISCIPLINED AND ORGANIZED ARMED SELF-DEFENSE, RATHER THAN SPONTANEOUS AND DISORGANIZED OUT-BREAKS AND RIOTS. THERE WERE POLICE ALERT PATROLS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY, BUT WE WERE THE FIRST ARMED POLICE PATROL. WE CALLED OURSELVES THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY FOR SELF DEFENSE. IN ALL OF THIS WE HAD POLITICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY OBJECTIVES IN MIND, BUT WE KNEW THAT WE COULD NOT SUCCEED WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE.

OUR STRATEGY WAS BASED ON A CONSISTENT IDEOLOGY, WHICH HELPED US TO UNDERSTAND THE CONDITIONS AROUND US. WE KNEW THAT THE LAW WAS NOT PREPARED FOR WHAT WE WERE DOING AND POLICEMEN WERE SO SHOCKED THAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO DO. WE SAW THAT THE PEOPLE FELT A NEW PRIDE AND STENGTH BECAUSE OF THE EXAMPLE WE SET FOR THEM; AND THEY BEGAN TO LOOK TOWARD THE VEHICLE WE WERE BUILDING FOR ANSWERS.

LATER WE DROPPED THE TERM "SELF-DEFENSE" FROM OUR NAME AND JUST BECAME THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. WE DISCOURAGED ACTIONS LIKE SACRAMENTO AND POLICE OBSERVATIONS BECAUSE WE RECOGNIZED THAT THESE WERE NOT THE THINGS TO DO IN EVERY SITUATION OR ON EVERY OCCASION. WE NEVER CALLED THESE REVOLUTIONARY ACTION. THE ONLY TIME AN ACTION IS REVOLUTIONARY IS WHEN THE PEOPLE RELATE TO IT IN A REVOLUTIONARY WAY. IF THEY WILL NOT USE THE EXAMPLE YOU SET, THEN NO MATTER HOW MANY GUNS YOU HAVE, YOUR ACTION IS NOT REVOLUTIONARY.

THE GUN ITSELF IS NOT NECESSARILY REVOLUTIONARY, BECAUSE THE FASCISTS CARRY GUNS--IN FACT THEY HAVE MORE GUNS. A LOT OF SO-CALLED REVOLUTIONARIES SIMPLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN MAO THAT "POLITICAL POWER GROWS OUT OF THE BARREL OF A GUN." THEY THOUGHT CHAIRMAN MAO SAID POLITICAL POWER IS THE GUN, BUT THE EMPHASIS IS ON GROWS. THE CULMINATION OF POLITICAL POWER IS THE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE LAND AND THE INSTITUTIONS THEREON, SO THAT YOU CAN THEN GET RID OF THE GUN. THAT IS WHY CHAIRMAN MAO MAKES THE STATEMENT THAT, "WE ARE ADVOCATES OF THE ABOLITION OF WAR, WE DO NOT WANT WAR; BUT WAR CAN ONLY BE ABOLISHED THROUGH WAR, AND IN ORDER TO GET RID OF THE GUN, IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE UP GUN." HE IS ALWAYS SPEAKING OF GETTING RID OF IT. IF HE DID NOT LOOK AT [illegible] THOSE TERMS, THEN HE SURELY WOULD NOT BE REVOLUTIONARY. IN OTHER WORDS, [illegible] BY ALL REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES IS A TOOL TO BE USED IN OUR STRATEGY; [illegible] AN END IN ITSELF. THIS WAS A PART OF THE ORIGINAL VISION OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

I HAD ASKED ELDRIDGE CLEAVER TO JOIN THE PARTY A NUMBER OF TIMES. BUT HE DID NOT JOIN UNTIL AFTER THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE POLICE IN FRONT OF THE OFFICES OF RAMPARTS MAGAZINE, WHERE THE POLICE WERE AFRAID TO [illegible] THEIR GUNS. [illegible] KNOWLEDGE, HE TOOK THIS AS THE REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY. [illegible] IT WAS NOT UNTIL POINT 7 THAT WE MENTIONED THE GUN, AND THIS WAS IN [illegible]. WE WERE TRYING TO BUILD A POLITICAL VEHICLE [illegible] WHICH THE PEOPLE COULD EXPRESS THEIR REVOLUTIONARY DESIRES. [illegible] RECOGNIZED THAT NO PARTY OR ORGANIZATION CAN MAKE THE REVOLUTION, ONLY THE PEOPLE CAN. [illegible] WE COULD [illegible] AS A GUIDE TO THE PEOPLE. BECAUSE [illegible] IN A PROCESS, AND [illegible] THE PROCESS MOVES IN A DIALECTICAL MANNER, [illegible] THE SAME ACTION COULD BE IMPROPER AT ANOTHER [illegible] CRETE ANALYSIS OF CONCRETE CONDITIONS, AND [illegible] CONDITIONS AS A WAY OF MOBILIZING THE PEOPLE AND L[illegible]

CONSCIOUSNESS.

PEOPLE CON[illegible]Y THOUGHT THAT WE WERE SECURITY GUARD[illegible] COMMUNITY POLICE OR SOMETHING LIKE THIS. THIS IS WHY WE DROPPED THE TERM "SELF DEFENSE" FROM OUR NAME AND DIRECTED THE ATTENTION OF THE PEOPLE TO THE FACT THAT THE ONLY WAY THEY WOULD GET SALVATION IS THROUGH THEIR CONTROL OF THE INSTITUTIONS WHICH SERVE THE COMMUNITY. THIS WOULD REQUIRE THAT THEY ORGANIZE A POLITICAL VEHICLE WHICH WOULD KEEP THEIR SUPPORT AND ENDORSEMENT THROUGH ITS SURVIVAL PROGRAMS OF SERVICE. THEY WOULD LOOK TO IT FOR ANSWERS AND GUIDANCE. IT WOULD NOT BE AN ORGANIZATION WHICH RUNS CANDIDATES FOR POLITICAL OFFICE, BUT IT WOULD SERVE AS A WATCHMAN OVER THE ADMINISTRATORS WHOM THE PEOPLE HAVE PLACED IN OFFICE.

BECAUSE THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY GROWS OUT OF THE CONDITIONS AND NEEDS OF OPPRESSED PEOPLE, WE ARE INTERESTED IN EVERYTHING THE PEOPLE ARE INTERESTED IN, EVEN THOUGH WE MAY NOT SEE THESE PARTICULAR CONCERNS AS THE FINAL ANSWERS TO OUR PROBLEMS. WE WILL NEVER RUN FOR POLITICAL OFFICE, BUT WE WILL ENDORSE AND SUPPORT THOSE CANDIDATES WHO ARE ACTING IN THE TRUE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE. WE MAY EVEN PROVIDE CAMPAIGN WORKERS FOR THEM AND DO VOTER REGISTRATION AND BASIC PRECINCT WORK. THIS WOULD NOT BE OUT OF A COMMITMENT TO ELECTORAL POLITICS, HOWEVER. IT WOULD BE OUR WAY OF BRINGING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE TO BEAR ON SITUATIONS IN WHICH THEY ARE INTERESTED. WE WILL ALSO HOLD SUCH CANDIDATES RESPONSIBLE TO THE COMMUNITY, NO MATTER HOW FAR REMOVED THEIR OFFICES MAY BE FROM THE COMMUNITY. SO WE LEAD THE PEOPLE BY FOLLOWING THEIR INTERESTS, WITH A VIEW TOWARD RAISING THEIR CONSCIOUSNESS TO SEE BEYOND PARTICULAR GOALS.

WHEN ELDRIDGE JOINED THE PARTY IT WAS AFTER THE POLICE CONFRONTATION, WHICH LEFT HIM FIXATED WITH THE "EITHER-OR" ATTITUDE. THIS WAS THAT EITHER THE COMMUNITY PICKED UP THE GUN WITH THE PARTY OR ELSE THEY WERE COWARDS AND THERE WAS NO PLACE FOR THEM. HE DID NOT REALIZE THAT IF THE PEOPLE DID NOT RELATE TO THE PARTY, THEN THERE WAS NO WAY THAT THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY COULD MAKE ANY REVOLUTION, BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE PEOPLE ARE THE MAKERS OF THE REVOLUTION AND OF WORLD HISTORY.

SOMETIMES THERE ARE THOSE WHO EXPRESS PERSONAL PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL TERMS, AND IF THEY ARE ELOQUENT, THEN THESE PERSONAL PROBLEMS CAN SOUND VERY POLITICAL. WE CHARGE ELDRIDGE CLEAVER WITH THIS. MUCH OF IT IS PROBABLY BEYOND HIS CONTROL, BECAUSE IT IS SO PERSONAL. BUT WE DID NOT KNOW THAT WHEN HE JOINED THE PARTY, HE WAS DOING SO ONLY BECAUSE OF THAT ACT IN FRONT OF RAMPARTS. WE WEREN'T TRYING TO PROVE ANYTHING TO OURSELVES, ALL WE WERE TRYING TO DO, AT THAT PARTICULAR POINT, WAS DEFEND BETTY SHABAZZ. BUT WE WERE STRANDED BY THE PEOPLE.

UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ELDRIDGE CLEAVER THE PARTY GAVE THE COMMUNITY NO ALTERNATIVE FOR DEALING WITH US, EXCEPT BY PICKING UP THE GUN. THIS MOVE WAS REACTIONARY SIMPLY BECAUSE THE COMMUNITY WAS NOT AT THAT POINT. INSTEAD OF BEING A CULTURAL

(47)

CULT GROUP, WE BECAME, BY THAT ACT, A REVOLUTIONARY CULT GROUP. BUT THIS IS A BASIC CONTRADICTION, BECAUSE REVOLUTION IS A PROCESS, AND IF THE ACTS YOU COMMIT DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PROCESS THEN THEY ARE NON-REVOLUTIONARY.

WHAT THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY NEEDS IS A VERY STRONG STRUCTURE. THIS STRUCTURE CAN ONLY EXIST WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE AND IT CAN ONLY GET ITS SUPPORT THROUGH SERVING THEM. THIS IS WHY WE HAVE THE SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE PROGRAM - THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IN THE PARTY. WE WILL SERVE THEIR NEEDS, SO THAT THEY CAN SURVIVE THROUGH THIS OPPRESSION. THEN WHEN THEY ARE READY TO PICK UP THE GUN, SERIOUS BUSINESS WILL HAPPEN. ELDRIDGE CLEAVER INFLUENCED US TO ISOLATE OURSELVES FROM THE BLACK COMMUNITY, SO THAT IT WAS WAR BETWEEN THE OPPRESSOR AND THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, NOT WAR BETWEEN THE OPPRESSOR AND THE OPPRESSED COMMUNITY.

THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY DEFECTED FROM THE COMMUNITY LONG BEFORE ELDRIDGE DEFECTED FROM THE PARTY. OUR HOOK-UP WITH WHITE RADICALS DID NOT GIVE US ACCESS TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY, BECAUSE THEY DO NOT GUIDE THE WHITE COMMUNITY. THE BLACK COMMUNITY DOES NOT RELATE TO THEM, SO WE WERE LEFT IN A TWILIGHT ZONE, WHERE WE COULD NOT ENTER THE COMMUNITY WITH ANY REAL POLITICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS; YET WE WERE NOT DOING ANYTHING TO MOBILIZE WHITES. WE HAD NO INFLUENCE IN RAISING THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY AND THAT IS THE POINT WHERE WE DEFECTED.

WE WENT THROUGH A FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT IN THE PARTY, WHICH WAS NOT NECESSARY AND ONLY FURTHER ISOLATED US FROM THE BLACK COMMUNITY. WE HAD ALL SORTS OF PROFANITY IN OUR PAPER AND EVERY OTHER WORD WHICH DROPPED FROM OUR LIPS WAS PROFANE. THIS DID NOT HAPPEN BEFORE I WAS JAILED, BECAUSE I WOULD NOT STAND FOR IT. BUT ELDRIDGE'S INFLUENCE BROUGHT THIS ABOUT. I DO NOT BLAME HIM ALTOGETHER; I BLAME THE PARTY BECAUSE THE PARTY ACCEPTED IT.

ELDRIDGE WAS NEVER FULLY IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY. EVEN AFTER BOBBY WAS SNATCHED AWAY FROM US, I DID NOT PLACE ELDRIDGE IN A POSITION OF LEADERSHIP, BECAUSE HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN THAT. I MADE DAVID HILLIARD ADMINISTRATOR OF PROGRAMS. I KNEW THAT ELDRIDGE WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING TO LIFT THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE COMRADES IN THE PARTY. BUT I KNEW THAT HE COULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION; AND I PRESSED HIM TO DO SO. I PRESSED HIM TO WRITE AND EDIT THE PAPER, BUT HE WOULDN'T DO IT. THE PAPER DID NOT EVEN COME OUT EVERY WEEK UNTIL AFTER ELDRIDGE WENT TO JAIL. BUT ELDRIDGE CLEAVER DID MAKE GREAT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY WITH HIS WRITING AND SPEAKING. WE WANT TO KEEP THIS IN MIND, BECAUSE THERE IS A POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SIDE TO EVERYTHING.

THE CORRECT HANDLING OF A REVOLUTION IS NOT TO OFFER THE PEOPLE AN "EITHER-OR" ULTIMATUM. WE MUST INSTEAD GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE THROUGH SERVING THEIR NEEDS. THEN WHEN THE POLICE OR ANY OTHER AGENCY OF REPRESSION TRIES TO DESTROY THE PROGRAM, THE PEOPLE WILL MOVE TO A HIGHER LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND ACTION.

(48)

THEN THE ORGANIZED STRUCTURE CAN GUIDE THE PEOLE TO THE POINT WHERE THEY ARE PREPARED TO DEAL IN MANY WAYS. THIS WAS THE STRATEGY WE USED IN 1966 WHEN WE WERE RELATED TO IN A POSITIVE WAY.

SO THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY HAS REACHED A CONTRADICTION WITH ELDRIDGE CLEAVER AND HE HAS DEFECTED FROM THE PARTY, BECAUSE WE WOULD NOT ORDER EVERYONE INTO THE STREETS TOMORROW TO MAKE A REVOLUTION. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OUR DIALECTICS OR IDEOLOGY, OUR CONCRETE ANALYSIS OF CONCRETE CONDITIONS SAY THAT IT IS A FANTASY, BECAUSE THE PEOPLE ARE NOT AT THAT POINT NOW. THIS CONTRADICTION AND CONFLICT MAY SEEM UNFORTUNATE TO SOME, BUT IT IS A PART OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCESS. THE RESOLUTION OF THIS CONTRADICTION HAS FREED US FROM INCORRECT ANALYSES AND EMPHASES.

WE ARE NOW FREE TO MOVE TOWARD THE BUILDING OF A COMMUNITY STRUCTURE WHICH WILL BECOME A TRUE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, PROMOTING THEIR INTERESTS IN MAY WAYS. WE CAN CONTINUE TO PUSH OUR BASIC SURVIVAL PROGRAM. WE CAN CONTINUE TO SERVE THE PEOPLE AS ADVOCATES OF THEIR TRUE INTERESTS. WE CAN TRUELY BECOME A POLITICAL REVOLUTIONARY VEHICLE WHICH WILL LEAD THE PEOPLE TO A HIGHER LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS, SO THAT THEY WILL KNOW WHAT THEY MUST REALLY DO IN THEIR QUEST FOR FREEDOM, AND THEY WILL HAVE THE COURAGE TO ADOPT AND OBTAIN THAT FREEDOM.

HUEY P. NEWTON
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE

(49)

DE T-4 furnished copies of the following leaflets on September 1, 1971:

WORD LIST

REVOLUTION- Revolution means change. A revolutionary is one who is dissatisfied with a system that brutalizes, murders, exploits and oppresses the people it pretends to serve (Amerikkka). He is not only dissatisfied but he also moves to change the system by educating the people to truth and setting examples of how to change it, so that it functions for the poor and not just the rich.

BOURGEOISIE- the select few that own and control the businesses,etc.

PETTY BOURGEOISIE- Owners of small businesses, and professionals for example doctors, lawyers and teachers.

PROLETARIAT- The workers, those that produce the goods and services the wealth that is taken away by the Bourgeoisie.
LUMPEN-PROLETARIAT- unemployed, students, hustlers, etc.

ATROCITIES- in human crimes committed against the people (My Lai killings at Jackson and Augusta)

MONOPLY- very large and powerful businesses, which control whole industries, or large parts of industries (Standard Oil, General Moters)

MERCENARY- A soldier who only fights for pay, doing the dirty work for someone else.

HOUSE NIGGER- The slave that thinks he is free because the master invites him for coffee (but not for dinner) and then is used to control the field niggers.

FIELD NIGGER - Slave who must work the hardest but gets almost nothing and therfore revolts against the master.

ECONOMICS- How people produce goods and wealth, and how these are distributed, accumulated and consumed. In othe r words, who gets what and how they get it.

COLONIALISM- control by a powerful nation over a dependent nation or people.

COLONY- A community, nation or country that is owned and controlled outright by an outside country. In our case, Black people live in a colony and arthorefore colonized. Our community is controlled by the white mother country economically, politically, militarily, and culturall etc.

CAPITALISM- A social system based on profit (amerikkka, Britain,France) where only a seledt few own and controll the businesses, courts, law making and dicisions in their own interest and at the expense of and not in the interest of the masses of people.

BEWARE

Michigan

NAME: TYRONE BOWMAN
WEIGHT: 165 lbs.
HEIGHT: 5' 11"

NAME: ELVAGE N. POWDREN
WEIGHT: 147 lbs.
HEIGHT: 6'



NAME: ROBERT EARLY SMITH
WEIGHT: 160 lbs.
HEIGHT: 5' 8"



NAME: DAVID LESIUS
WEIGHT: 175 lbs.
HEIGHT: 5' 8"

NAME: PAULETTE FRYE
WEIGHT: 115 lbs.
HEIGHT: 5' 5½"

NAME: MARY FORD
WEIGHT: 150 lbs.
HEIGHT: 5' 2"

(NO PHOTO)
NAME: BRENDA JACKSON
WEIGHT: 110 lbs.
HEIGHT: 5'

(5-8)

(NO PHOTO)
NAME: WILLIAM (BILL) CUNNINGHAM
WEIGHT: 155 lbs.
HEIGHT: 6'

MAR 27 1972

XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN

BEWARE!

Michigan



NAME: CLEVELAND (CHICO) HOLT
WEIGHT: 165 lbs.
HEIGHT: 6'





NAME: VIRON ERIC REDWIN
WEIGHT: 152 lbs.
HEIGHT: 5' 10"

NAME: CHARLES (CHUCK) HOLT
WEIGHT: 285 lbs.
HEIGHT: 6' 1"





NAME: SYLVIA ROBINSON
WEIGHT: 130 lbs.
HEIGHT: 5' 6"



NAME: WENDELL CALLOWAY
WEIGHT: 150 lbs.
HEIGHT: 6'





NAME: MICHEAL CUNNINGHAM
WEIGHT: 162 lbs.
HEIGHT: 6' 2"

53

The following leaflets were furnished by DE T-21 on September 3, 1971:

FREE LUNCH PROGRAM and LIBERATION SCHOOL

THE PEOPLE OF DETROIT:

THE DETROIT BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY IS HAVING A LIBERATION SCHOOL AND CHEON PROGRAM TO BETTER SERVE THE NEEDS OF OUR YOUTH HERE IN THE COMMUNITY OF ROIT.



LIBERATION SCHOOL PROVIDES FOR OUR YOUTH A FURTHER EDUCATION WHERE AS HELPING TO IMPROVE THEIR LEARNING ABILITY. CLASSES TAUGHT AT LIBERATION SCHOOL WILL BE: MATH, PROJECTS, HISTORY, IDEOLOGY OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, AND PRIMARY SKILLS, FOR THOSE WHO ARE BETWEEN THE AGES OF 3 TO 4½ YRS. OLD.

IF YOU WOULD LIKE FOR YOUR CHILDREN TO ATTEND LIBERATION SCHOOL BRING OR SEND THEM TO 2435 PENNSYLVANIA.

TIONS OF FOOD, SUPPLIES, AND MONEY WILL BE APPRECIATED.

PROGRAM LOCATIONS:

DETROIT BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
157 COLLINGWOOD
868-6217

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
INFORMATION CENTER NO. 1
2591 PENNSYLVANIA
DETROIT, MICHIGAN

CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS
1048 PERALTA ST.
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

Every member of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY throughout this country of racist America must abide by these rules as functional members of this Party. CENTRAL COMMITTEE members, CENTRAL STAFF, and LOCAL STAFFS, including all captains subordinate to either national, state, and local leadership of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY will enforce these rules. Length of suspension or other disciplinary action necessary for violation of these rules will depend on national, state, or state area, and local committees and staffs where said rule or rules of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY WERE VIOLATED.

Every member of the Party must know these verbatim by heart And apply them daily. Each member must report any violation of these rules to their leadership or they are counter-revolutionary and are also subjected to suspension by the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

RULES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

1. No Party member can have narcotics or weed in his possession while doing Party work.

2. Any Party member found shooting narcotics will be expelled from this Party.

3. No Party member can be DRUNK while doing daily Party work.

4. No Party member will violate rules relating to office work, general meetings of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, and meetings of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY ANYWHERE.

5. No Party member will USE, POINT, or FIRE a weapon of any kind unnecessarily or accidentally at anyone.

6. No Party member can join any other army force other than the BLACK LIBERATION ARMY.

7. No Party member can have a weapon in his possession while DRUNK or loaded off narcotics or weed.

8. No Party member will commit any crimes against other Party members or Black people at all, and cannot steal or take from the people, not even a needle or piece of thread.

9. When arrested BLACK PANTHER MEMBERS will give only name, address, and will sign nothing. Legal first aid must be understood by all Party members.

10. The Ten Point Platform and Program of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must be known and understood by each Party member.

11. Party Communications must be National and Local.

12. The 10-10-10-program should be known by all members and understood by all members.

13. All Finance officers will operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.

14. Each person will submit a report of daily work.

15. Each Sub-Section Leader, Section Leader, Lieutenant, and Captain must submit Daily reports of work.

16. All Panthers must learn to operate and service weapons correctly.

17. All Leadership personnel who expel a member must submit this information to the Editor of the Newspaper, so that it will be published in the paper and will be known by Chapters and Branches.

18. Political Education Classes are mandatory for general membership.

MAR 27 1972

~~XEROXED~~ ORIGINAL-RETAIN

19-13

(OVER)

(56)

THE RULES ARE:

19. Only office personnel assigned to respective offices each day should be there. All others are to sell papers and do Political work out in the community, including Captains, section Leaders, etc.

20. COMMUNICATIONS--all Chapters must submit weekly reports in writing to the National Headquarters.

21. All Branches must implement First Aid and/or Medical Cadres.

22. All Chapters, Branches, and components of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must submit a monthly Financial Report to the Ministry of Finance, and also the Central Committee.

23. Everyone in a leadership position must read no less than two hours per day to keep abreast of the changing political situation.

24. No Chapter or Branch shall accept grants, poverty funds, money or any other aid from any goverment agency without contacting the National Headquarters.

25. All Chapters must adhere to the policy and the ideology laid down by the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

26. All Branches must submit weekly reports in writing to their respective Chapters.

57

The following leaflet was furnished on September 22, 1971, by DE T-3:

THE SAN QUENTIN BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY OPENS!

A NEW ERA HAS ARISEN IN THE UNITED STATES. INSURRECTION, REVOLUTION AND LIBERATION HAS KNOCKED AT THE DOOR OF AMERICA, THE WORLD'S NOW MOST POTENT BASTION OF IMPERIALISM. HISTORICAL CONDITIONS HAVE FORCED THE CONFLICTING ASPECTS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY TO THE POINT OF DIVISION. NOW ONLY THE STRAGGLERS ARE PICKING WHICH SIDE THEY WISH TO FIGHT ON, THE SIDE OF THE FORCES OF OPPRESSION, RACISM AND FASCISM OR WITH THE FORCES OF LIBERATION - THE PEOPLE'S JUST CAUSE OF FREEDOM. BECAUSE THIS CONFRONTATION IS ALREADY RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF SPORADIC MILITARY ENCOUNTERS- REVOLUTIONARIES SHOOTING IT OUT WITH THE PIGS, REVOLUTIONARIES BEING HARASSED FOR SELLING PAPERS REVOLUTIONARIES LIBERATING THE GOODS THAT HAVE BEEN EXPORTED FROM THE COMMUNITY - MANY BROTHERS ARE BEING LOCKED UP IN NUMEROUS PRISONS AND JAILS OF BABYLON.

THE INCREASE IN REVOLUTIONARY PRISONERS HAS PROPORTIONATELY INCREASED THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL AWARENESS THROUGHOUT THE PENAL SYSTEM. SAN QUENTIN, BECAUSE OF ITS LARGE POPULATION, IS GETTING ITS SHARE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. REAGAN'S GOVERNMENT AND HIS PUPPET PRISON ADMINISTRATORS ARE WELL AWARE OF THIS AND ALSO ITS EFFECT. THAT AWARENESS CREATES A REPRESSIVE ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT THE PENS. HERE IN SAN QUENTIN WE ARE FEELING THAT REPRESSION FULL FORCE. ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN PREVALENT FROM THE TIME OUR COMRADES JONATHAN JACKSON, WILLIAM CHRISTMAS AND JAMES MCLAIN MADE THEIR SUPREME SACRIFICE FOR FREEDOM, IT HAS INTENSIFIED, CULMINATING WITH A WEEK OF STORYBOOK REIGN OF TERROR. THE NEW EXCUSE AND PRETEXT FOR LOCKING BROTHERS IN THE HOLE IS "POSSESSION OF INFLAMMATORY LITERATURE". THIS LITERATURE IS, OF COURSE, REVOLUTIONARY, AND IS IN OUR POSSESSION BECAUSE WE ARE TRYING TO BRING OUR INCARCERATED BROTHERS UP TO A HIGHER LEVEL OF AWARENESS. THEY CAN THEN CHANGE THEIR OUTMODED IDEAS OF INDIVIDUAL MATERIAL GAIN THROUGH EXPLOITATION OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY.

THE PIGS SEE US AND ANYONE WHO ASSOCIATES CLOSELY WITH THE CADRE HERE TAKING ON A NEW COMPLEXION, A NEW OUTLOOK ON SOCIAL CONDITIONS. WE ARE BECOMING MORE DISCIPLINED AND ARE STARTING TO UNIFY AROUND THE IDEOLOGY OF ESTABLISHING REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL POWER FOR BLACK PEOPLE. THE PIGS KNOW THAT ONCE WE ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY POLITICAL POWER THEY CAN NO LONGER EXPLOIT AND OPPRESS US. THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LOCKUP OUR WARRIORS IN PRISONS AND JAILS ANY LONGER. THEY ALSO REALIZE THAT ONCE THE MASSES OF ANGRY BLACKS BECOME POLITICALLY AWARE, WE ARE GOING TO BRING THE MACHINERY OF OPPRESSION TO A SCREECHING HALT, THROUGH VIOLENT, BLOODY, BUT JUSTIFIED WARFARE.

THIS HARASSMENT TAKES ON A FAMILIAR FORM. THEY WATCH A GROUP OF BROTHERS WHO ARE KNOWN REVOLUTIONARIES, THEN ACCUMULATE THIS KNOWLEDGE INTO SPECIAL FOLDERS, LABELED "MILITANTS, VANGUARDS, REVOLUTIONARIES AND BLACK PANTHERS," ALONG WITH PHOTOGRAPHS. THIS INFORMATION IS KEPT AT THE FOREPOST (A CENTRAL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS HERE IN QUENTIN, SIMILAR TO THE PENTAGON OR THE F.B.I. HEADQUARTERS). WHENEVER THE PIGS GET THE ITCH OR URGE THEY DIG OUT THIS FOLDER AND PROCEED TO SYSTEMATICALLY SHAKE DOWN OUR CELLS. (THE SHAKE DOWN IS A PROCEDURE WHEREBY THEY GO INTO A PERSON'S CELL AND SEARCH IT THROUGHLY, DIGGING UP THE BEDS, TEARING ALL OF THE PICTURES OFF THE WALLS AND GENERALLY MAKING A PIGGISH MESS. THEY SIT DOWN AND READ EVERY LETTER, DOCUMENT, PERSONAL WRITING AND ANYTHING ELSE, HOPING TO FIND SOMETHING SPEAKING AGAINST THE PRESENT SOCIAL ORDER. THAT IS THEN LABELED "INFLAMMATORY LITERATURE", AND THE OWNER OF THE MATERIAL IS TAKEN TO THE "HOLE" OR THE ADJUSTMENT CENTER TO WAIT A HIGH TRIBUNAL OF TRANSPLANTED KU KLUX KLANSMEN AND DISPOSSESSED NAZI PRISON CAMP TENDERS.

MAR 27 1972

102

XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN

24-1

(59)

SINCE A MAN'S TH[illegible]HTS REFLECT HIS ATTITUDE AND HIS [illegible]TINGS MIRROR BOTH, WE AS POLITICALLY AWARE INDIVIDUALS WILL HAVE THIS SO-CALLED INFLAMMATORY LITERATURE IN OUR POSSESSION ONEHUNDRED PERCENT OF THE TIME. THIS WEEK FIVE BROTHERS WERE TAKEN OFF THE YARD: JAMES ELLISON, KENNY FAVRE, CHARLES AUGUSTINE, J.P. TROTTER AND EDDIE CHILLIES. ALL WERE CHARGED WITH HAVING REVOLUTIONARY MATERIAL IN THEIR POSSESSION. THERE WAS ONCE A TIME WHEN WE WOULD RUN TO OUR CELLS AND DESTROY ALL WRITINGS IN HOPE THAT WE COULD KEEP THE BUST FROM COMING DOWN ON US. THAT TIME HAS PASSED. NOW WE REALIZE THAT THIS PIG HAS NO LAWS WHICH WE AS OPPRESSED PEOPLE ARE BOUND TO RESPECT. HE CANNOT STIFLE OUR THOUGHTS IN ORDER TO SLOW UP HISTORICAL INEVITABLE REVOLUTION - LIBERATION. WE SAY DAMN HIM AND ALL OF HIS REACTIONARY, FASCIST RUNNING DOGS, BECAUSE WE WILL CONTINUE TO WRITE AND EDUCATE WHENEVER WE ARE AMONG THE MASSES AND REGARDLESS OF THE REPRESSIVE MEASURES AND REPERCUSSION HAPPENING BEHIND IT. IT IS TIME THAT WE AS PEOPLE STAND UP AND FIGHT OFF THIS PIG POWER STRUCTURE. WE ARE RIGHT; HISTORY HAS PROVEN BEYOND A SHADOW OF A DOUBT THAT WE ARE MORALLY, INTELLECTUALLY AND SPIRITUALLY JUSTIFIED IN TAKING OUR FREEDOM BY THE MOST DRASTIC MEANS AVAILABLE.

THE LINES HAVE BEEN DRAWN AND TO THE PIGS WE SAY COME ON, FOR HISTORY AND UNBORN GENERATIONS ARE WATCHING OUR ACTION CLOSELY. IF WE DO NOT TAKE A STAND FOR LIBERATION NOW, THEN WE DO NOT DESERVE TO BREATH THE OXYGEN WE INHALE, OR THE SPACE WE TAKE UP. THIS IS THE YEAR OF THE YOUTH, SO WE MUST GIVE THE YOUTH THE PROPER TOOLS TO FIGHT AND DESTROY THIS SYSTEM OF RACISM, FASCISM AND IMPERIALISM. THE TOOLS NEEDED ARE BRAVERY, LOYALTY TO THE CAUSE OF LIBERATION AND FAITH IN THE PEOPLE. WE CANNOT GIVE THEM ANYTHING TO FIGHT WITH, IF WE ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE BACKED INTO A CORNER WITH OUT PUTTING UP ANY STRUGGLE. IF WE DO NOT GIVE THE YOUTH ANYTHING BUT A FLEETING GLANCE AT A REVOLUTIONARY ACT, THAT IS MUCH BETTER THAN FOUR HUNDRED YEARS OF TOMISM AND STEP N' FETCH IT, FOOTSHUFFLING, SPINELESS COWARDICE.

ONCE, WE AS MEN, ARE RECONGIZED AS WHAT WE ARE, POLITICAL PRISONERS, A NEW SITUATION DEVELOPS. THE CORRUPT PRISON OFFICIAL, THE GOVERNOR, THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE WORLD LOOK AT US AS POLITICAL PRISONERS AND TREAT US IN ACCORD WITH THE GENEVA CONVENTION'S MANDATE FOR THE TREATMENT OF THE POLITICAL PRISONER AND THE PRISONER OF WAR. AS OF NOW WE ARE NOT TREATED ANY BETTER THAN ANIMALS IN A CAGE. ONCE OUR PEOPLE, THE SENSIBLE PEOPLE OF THE COUNTRY, REALIZE THE NATURE OF A POLITICAL PRISONER, THEY WILL DEMAND OUR HUMANE TREATMENT, UNTIL THEY BUILD UP THE NECESSARY FORCES TO DO JUST WHAT THE FRENCH PEOPLE DID TO THE BASTILLE IN THE 18th CENTURY. THEY WILL NOT SIT AROUND AND WAIT FOR THE COURTS OR THE PAROLE BOARDS OR ANY OF THE OTHER SHAMS OF JUDICIAL MOCKERY TO RELEASE US. THE PEOPLE WILL AND MUST DO IT THEMSELVES. YOU OUT THERE, MOLD YOURSELVES INTO A POLITICAL AND MILITARY UNITE; AND ONCE ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLE UNITE AROUND THE BANNER OF LIBERATION, NO FORCE IN THE WORLD CAN STOP THE NATURAL COURSE OF HISTORY. THE FRENCH COULD NOT STOP THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE, THE VIETNAMESE OR ALGERIAN PEOPLE; THE JAPANESE AND THE REACTIONARY CHINESE COULD NOT STOP THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE OF CHINA; IAN SMITH AND HIS APARTHEID PARTNERS WILL NOT STOP THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA, SOUTH AFRICA OR SOUTH WEST AFRICA FROM GAINING THEIR FREEDOM.

THE PIGS IN THIS COUNTRY, REGARDLESS OF THE TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, CANNOT STOP THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION. THE PIGS HERE IN SAN QUENTIN REGARDLESS OF THE INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT CANNOT STOP THE EXCHANGE OF REVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE. THEY ARE ONLY MAKING SURE OF THEIR DEATH BY CONTINUING TO INDULGE IN THE CHILDISH GAMES OF COPS AND ROBBERS.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
SAN QUENTIN BRANCH

*VOL. VI NO. 5
**FEB. 27,1971

On September 30, 1971, DE T-4 furnished copies of the following leaflets:

SUPPORT THE "FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN"

THE YOUTH OF OUR BLACK COMMUNITY ARE IN SCHOOL AGAIN, AND AGAIN THE PROBLEM OF PROVIDING A HEALTHY WELL BALANCED "FREE BREAKFAST" FOR THESE YOUNG BROTHERS AND SISTERS STILL EXIST IN OUR COMMUNITY.

DURING THE SUMMER VACATION, THE DETROIT BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY PROVIDED A "FREE LUNCH AND LIBERATION SCHOOL". AT THIS SCHOOL SUBJECTS SUCH AS MATH, HISTORY, ENGLISH AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY WERE TAUGHT.



THE EARLY PART OF THIS YEAR A "FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM" WAS INTIATED BY THE PARTY AND WE WERE ABLE TO FEED AS MANY AS 50 CHILDREN A DAY. WE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO THIS WITHOUT YOUR HELP. WE MUST STRIVE TO EXTEND THE "FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM" TO ALL THE YOUTH IN OUR COMMUNITY, WHICH MEANS WE WILL NEED YOUR HELP MORE THAN EVER TO DO THIS. YOUR CONTRIBUTION WILL HELP PROVIDE A FREE BREAKFAST FOR THE SCHOOL CHILDREN.

REQUESTED ITEMS: EGGS, MILK, BREAD, CANNED FRUITS, JUICES, BACON, SAUSAGES, HAMS, ETC.

DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
157 COLLINGWOOD

(61)

Re-printe[illegible] Vol. VII No.4
of the Black Panther Party
Intercommunal News

COMRADE GEORGE JACKSON: ON MEMBERSHIP IN THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

THE FOLLOWING LETTER WAS SENT TO US ON JUNE 21, 1971, FROM OUR THEN INCARCERATED COMRADE, GEORGE JACKSON. BECAUSE OF CONFUSION CREATED PARTICULARLY BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S PROPAGANDA MEDIA SURROUNDING COMRADE GEORGE'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, AND, BECAUSE THE MESSAGE THE LETTER CONTAINS IS SO CLEARLY IMPORTANT AS A GUIDE TO OUR STRUGGLE, WE FEEL IT APPROPRIATE TO NOW PRINT THE LETTER HERE:

****

MASS MOVEMENTS THAT ARE EGALITARIAN AND AIMED AT THE FUTURE ESTABLISHMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY MASS SOCIETY MUST AT ALL SUBSTRUCTURAL LEVELS BE GUIDED BY AN AGGRESSIVE AND DISCIPLINED VANGUARD POLITICAL PARTY. WITHOUT THIS LEADERSHIP, POSITIVE ACTIONS AND UNITARIAN CONDUCT OF THE PEOPLE'S AFFAIRS IS NOT POSSIBLE. ONE SIMPLY CANNOT ACT WITHOUT A HEAD. FOR THE VANGUARD PARTY, IT IS ALWAYS THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE AND THEIR FORWARD MOVEMENT THAT IS OF PRIMARY CONCERN. WITHOUT THE VANGUARD PARTY, THOUGH, ALL ARE IN FACT EQUAL. THE PARTY ITSELF CANNOT ACT WITH PURPOSE WITHOUT THE TRUEST EXPRESSION OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM: THE PARTY CADRE, FREELY ELECTED OR OTHERWISE DISTINGUISHED IN THE SERVICE OF THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE, MUST REACH FOR MAJORITY DECISIONS THAT ONCE ARRIVED AT MUST BE RESOLUTELY CARRIED OUT BY ALL, EVEN THOSE WHO MAY HAVE IN THE PROCESS OF DECISION-MAKING OPPOSED THE MEASURE.

NOTHING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT SUCH DISCIPLINED AND PRINCIPLED CONDUCT. WE HAVE TO CONTEND WITH NOT ONLY THE ENEMY FORCES THAT WOULD RESTRICT OUR MOVEMENT, BUT ALSO PRIMAL IMPULSES WITHIN EACH OF US, LITTLE UNDERSTOOD AND AT MOST OCCASIONS JUST BARELY UNDER CONTROL.

MAR 27 1972

XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAINED

163

DISCIPLINARIAN CONDUCT IS THE CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO SUPPRESS THE EGOTISM, SELF-INDULGENCE, INTROVERSION THAT WE ABSORBED WHILE STILL IN THE HELPLESS NON-CONSCIOUS STATE. IT IS ACTIVELY COMBATING THE SELF-[illegible], THE PIG IN EVERY MAN THAT FORCES HIS BEHAVIOR TO

THE PRISON MOVEMENT - NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE OPPOSITE PRISON "REFORM" MOVEMENT - BUT THE PRISON MOVEMENT, AIMED AT THE PROTECTION AND LIBERATION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND THE CONVICT CLASS IN GENERAL, AND ALSO POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TO PROVE TO THE AMERIKAN FASCISM-CORPORATIVISM THAT THE CONCENTRATION CAMP TECHNIQUE WILL NOT RESTRAIN OUR MOVEMENT, WAS, FROM THE OUTSET, FASHIONED AND FORWARDED BY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE SEVERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOVEMENT WERE CONCEIVED BY THE SUPREME SERVANT, HUEY NEWTON; THE CHAIRMAN, BOBBY SEALE; AND CHEIF OF STAFF, DAVID HILLIARD. THESE INCLUDED THE BUSSING PROGRAMS, DESIGNED TO COMBAT SOME OF THE ISOLATIONIST ASPECTS BUILT INTO PRISON CAMP LIFE, RELATIVES, FRIENDS AND LEGAL AIDS ARE TRANSPORTED TO THE VARIOUS PRISONS FREE OF CHARGE; IN SPECIAL CASES ATTORNEYS WERE AND AND ARE BEING EMPLOYED TO HELP PRISONERS WITH PROBLEMS THAT CAN STILL BE ADDRESSED IN LEGAL FORMS OF STRUGGLE. REVOLUTIONARY ART AND LITERATURE ARE BEING PROVIDED PRISONERS TO FURTHER DEVELOP THEIR POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE EAGER MOVEMENT UPON RELEASE. THEN, OF COURSE, SOME OF THE NECESSITIES THAT CAN BE PURCHASED WITH MONEY ARE BEING FUNNELED INTO THE PRISONS AND PRISONERS. MASS ATTENTION IS BEING FOCUSED UPON THE RATIONALE OF THE CONCENTRATION CAMP TECHNIQUE.

WHEN WE THREE SOLEDAD PRISONERS, FLEETA, JOHN AND MYSELF, WERE SINGLED OUT FOR PERSECUTION IN THE DEATH OF A PIG IN THE WING THAT WE WERE HOUSED IN JANUARY OF 1970, IT WAS THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY THAT PROVIDED THE FIRST $10,000. THAT WENT TOWARD OUR LEGAL DEFENSE; THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY THAT DID MOST OF THE HEAVY POLITICAL WORK AND ORGANIZING AROUND THE CASE; THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY THAT BURIED OUR DEAD AFTER THE TRIAL OF COMBAT IN MARIN - AUGUST 7th. THEY GATHERED UP THE BODIES, CLEANED THEM, EXPLAINED THEM AND NEVER THOUGHT TO DENY OR CONDEMN THEIR PEOPLE'S INTENSE LONGING TO BE FREE. BUT IN THE TRUE MARXIST-LENINIST INTERPRETATION OF PEOPLE'S GUERILLA WARFARE SUPPORTED IT ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT PEOPLE FIGHT "...IN CER--TAIN PERIODS OF ACUTE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISES...", AND BECAUSE WE KNOW THAT "...IT IS NOT GUERILLA ACTIONS WHICH DISORGANIZE THE MOVEMENT, BUT THE WEAKNESS OF A PARTY WHICH IS INCAPABLE OF TAKING SUCH ACTIONS UNDER ITS CONTROL." (V.I. LENIN) I HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY SINCE THE SUPREME SERVANT APPOINTED ME, WHEN HE HIMSELF WAS STILL IN PRISON. I HOLD MY MEMBERSHIP AND OBLIGATION TO SERVE THE PEOPLE WITH ALL THE SINCERITY OF WHICH I AM CAPABLE. SO FAR, INSTEAD OF PLACING OUR TOTAL DEFENSE, LEGAL AND

POLITICAL, IN THE HANDS OF THE PARTY, WE HAVE ALLOWED VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE NON-PARTISAN BLACK AND RADICAL WHITE COMMUNITIES TO CONDUCT ASPECTS OF OUR DEFENSE ON THE THEORY THAT INVOLVEMENT ON SUCH A BASIS WOULD PROMOTE WIDER MOBILIZATION INTO THE MOVEMENT IN GENERAL FROM OUR SUBSTRUCTURAL LEVEL; THAT IS, EXPOSURE IN THIS PARTICULAR AREA OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT WOULD SERVE TO MOVE THEM INTO ACTIONS LATER ON AT HIGHER LEVELS. INSOLUBLE CONTRADICTIONS HAVE RESULTED...

WE CONDEMN NO ONE. WE THANK ALL THOSE SWEET, EARNEST PEOPLE WHO TRIED TO ACT IN OUR BEHALF. BUT, WE DO NOW RECOGNIZE THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE MOVEMENT THROUGH THE TWO STAGES, REBELLION AND SOCIALIZATION, MUST PROCEED UNDER THE PURPOSEFUL GUIDANCE OF THE PEOPLE'S VANGUARD PARTY.

GEORGE JACKSON
SAN QUENTIN PRISON
JUNE 21, 1971

Calif

(65)

G. Propensity for Violence and Preparation for Confrontation

On January 4, 1971, EDGAR ROBINSON, distrobution manager for the Detroit NCCF, visited the office at Flint, Michigan, and told a woman from the neighborhood who dropped in that there are eight million Panthers in the country who will take up the gun and take over the country, giving it a blood bath if two BPP members on trial in New Haven, Connecticut are convicted.

DE T-11
January 8, 1971

On Sunday, January 10, 1971, members of the NCCF were marching in the street in front of 611-13 Continental after the political education meeting, and were made to move by the police.

DE T-2
January 13, 1971

On Sunday, January 17, 1971, members of the NCCF again marched in front of 611-13 Continental and had observers from the community patroling the streets, hoping to get some favorable publicity by causing an incident when the police arrived, however, no police cars were seen, and no more marching is planned.

DE T-2
January 18, 1971

WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON, leader of the Flint branch of the Detroit NCCF, at their regular political education meeting on January 31, 1971, placed emphasis on the brothers arming themselves and recommended that they get a pistol to carry as soon as possible.

DE T-1
February 8, 1971

DE T-2 advised on April 12, 1971, that four members of the Detroit NCCF, ANTHONY NORMAN, RONNIE IRWIN, RONALD SMITH and LARRY POWELL held up what they believed to be a dope house and one of the victims was killed.

A desk has been placed facing the front door of the Flint Office of the NCCF, where a member now sits during the hours the office is open with a .30 caliber M-1 carbine to prevent anyone from entering that is not supposed to. They have removed posters from the downstairs windows so that the police cannot sneak up on them and the person on duty at the desk has been ordered to kill any police who attempt to enter.

DE T-11
April 28, 1971

H. Arrests

EDGAR ROBINSON was arrested by the Detroit Police Department on warrants charging assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder per Detective Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY, Detroit Police Department, January 25, 1971.

CHARLES HOLT was arrested by the Detroit Police Department for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder on January 27, 1971, and lodged in Wayne County Jail in lieu of $25,000 bond according to Lieutenant MC COY on January 27, 1971.

Lieutenant MC COY advised that eleven members and associates of the NCCF were charged along with EDGAR ROBINSON and CHARLES HOLT in connection with the beating of an NCCF associate January 21, 1971. On January 29, 1971, the charges against all eleven were dropped when the victim changed his story and claimed he was unable to identify anyone who beat him.

Lieutenant MC COY advised on January 13, 1971, that CLEVELAND HOLT, an associate of the NCCF, was arrested January 12, 1971, charged with larceny under $100.00 and released on $50.00 bond.

Lieutenant MC COY advised that KENNETH HORSTON was arrested on March 28, 1971, for possession of a stolen airline ticket valued at over $100.00, however, this charge was dismissed at the examination.

Detective Lieutenant LOUIS SZABO, Flint, Michigan, Police Department, advised on March 30, 1971, that the following persons were arrested at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, the Flint office of the Detroit NCCF:

Name	Date	Place	Charge
HUBERT HENSON	3/30/71	Flint, Michigan	Armed Robbery
WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON	"	" "	Traffic
LOUIS TOLBERT JOHNSON	"	" "	Bond Default
YVONNE COOPER	"	" "	Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
JERRY PAGE	"	" "	Breach of Peace
CALVIN SUTTON, JR.	"	" "	Armed Robbery
JOHN SMITH	"	" "	Armed Robbery

Detective Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY, Detroit Police Department, advised of the arrest of the following members of the Detroit NCCF:

Name	Date	Place	Charge
✓LARRY POWELL	4/14/71	Detroit, Michigan	Murder One
RONNIE IRWON	"	" "	"
✓ANTHONY NORMAN	"	" "	"
✓RONALD SMITH	"	" "	"
✓VIRON REDWINE	4/26/71	" "	Carrying a Concealed Weapon

On July 21, 1971, ERONE C. DESSAUSURE, BENJAMIN W. FONDREN and DAVID M. JOHNSON were sentenced to three to four years, State Prison of Southern Michigan, Jackson, Michigan, by Detroit Recorders Court Judge JOHN R. MURPHY, on a charge of Felonious Assault.

DE T-13
July 21, 1971

The above three individuals were members of the Detroit 15, 15 members and associates of the Detroit NCCF arrested on October 24, 1970, at the NCCF office, 3370 16th Street, Detroit, in connection with the shooting of two Detroit Police Officers on that date. Of the 12 who were tried regarding this matter, all were found not guilty except the above three.

DE T-13 advised on July 7, 1971, that RONALD SMITH pled guilty to second degree murder, RONNIE IRWIN, LARRY POWELL and ANTHONY NORMAN pled guilty to armed robbery, before Detroit Recorders Court Judge JOHN R. MURPHY on July 7, 1971.

On August 23, 1971, Detective Sergeant WILLIAM HENAHAN, Detroit Police Department, advised that POWELL was sentenced to 20 to 40 years, NORMAN to 15 to 30 years, and SMITH life in prison. IRWIN changed his plea.

DE T-3 advised on September 23, 1971, that IRWIN was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison on September 23, 1971.

I. Weapons

The Flint branch of the NCCF has several handguns, .38 revolvers or .357 magnums and one .45 caliber automatic as well as several 12 gauge shotguns.

DE T-1
January 7, 1971

The NCCF has about nine rifles and shotguns at 611-13 Continental.

DE T-2
January 22, 1971

The Detroit NCCF currently has about seven rifles, most of which are FN assault rifles, two of which do not work, and two 12 gauge shotguns, one of which does not work, probably due to the fact that KENNETH HORSTON knows little about guns.

DE T-2
March 11, 1971

The Flint branch of the Detroit NCCF has gathered materials to make pipe bombs and have also been acquiring ammunition.

DE T-11
March 12, 1971

J. Fortifications

The following diagram was provided by DE T-3 on January 25, 1971:


CONFIDENTIAL
KITCHEN
BATH
ALL WINDOWS COVERED WITH HEAVY SCREEN
B.R.
TABLE
WOOD FRAME TO SILL FILLED WITH BRICK & SAND
B.R.
CLOSET
TABLE
DESK
PORCH

The front window of the NCCF branch at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, is barricaded completely with sand leaving only places for guns to be pushed through.

DE T-1
February 8, 1971

All of the windows in the NCCF office, 2009 Albert, Flint, are covered with heavy wire mesh, similar to that found on school buildings. Around each window and built up from the floor 3½ to 4 feet high are wooden frames standing approximately two to three feet from the wall, which are filled with sand for the purpose of stopping any bullets filed into the house. The rear door is covered with heavy wire mesh and braced with two 2 inch by four inch boards to keep it shut. The front door is also covered with wire mesh and can be barred closed with a two inch by four inch board which fits into brackets.

DE T-11
April 7, 1971

K. Meetings and Rallies

The Flint branch of the Detroit NCCF holds political education meetings at their office, 2009 Albert, Flint, every Sunday.

DE T-1
February 8, 1971

The Detroit NCCF continues to hold political education classes every Sunday at CIC #1, 611 Continental, Detroit, Michigan.

DE T-2
March 2, 1971

DE T-1 and DE T-2 further advised on the above dates that the political education classes consist of indoctrinating members and people of the community into the doctrine of the BPP as well as leading and discussing articles appearing in "The Black Panther" newspaper.

The Detroit branch of the BPP held a rally in support of the Detroit 15 in Kenneth Square, Detroit, from

1:00 to 4:00 p.m. on June 25, 1971. KENNETH HORSTON, leader, Detroit BPP, was master of ceremonies and introduced the speakers. Mrs. JOSEPH SMITH, mother of CAROLYN SMITH, one of the Detroit 15, spoke regarding political prisoners.

YVONNE KING, BPP, Chicago, spoke regarding efforts of the BPP to help black men.

CHOKWE LUMUMBA, Consul of the Republic of New Africa (RNA)(Richard Henry Faction) spoke of obtaining power through the acquisition of land.

> The RNA was founded in Detroit, Michigan, in March, 1968. Its purpose is to establish an independent black nation within the U.S., demanding the States of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, and $10,000 per black citizen for reparations. The RNA, a violence-prone, black extremist, separatist organization, is now headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana.

Approximately 700 persons, a majority being Negroes in their late teens, attended the rally, which was peaceful.

DE T-4
June 25, 1971.

L. Programs of Detroit NCCF and BPP

1. Free Breakfast for School Children

The Free Breakfast Program in Flint is slacking off due to lack of money and interest in the community.

DE T-1
January 7, 1971

The interest in the Flint branch of the NCCF is continuing to decrease, only about five children are showing up for the Breakfast Program, this is probably due to the preparation of the food, which is very bad.

DE T-1
January 14, 1971

DE T-2 advised on various dates in January, 1971, that the Breakfast Program operated at the following locations, five days a week:

St. Leo's Church, 15th and Grand River, Detroit
about seven children per day

3591 17th Street, Detroit
about ten children per day

3595 17th Street, Detroit
about ten children per day

611 Continental, Detroit
about forty children per day

The Breakfast Program in Flint decreased to less than eight children per day in February, 1971.

DE T-1
February, 1971

The Detroit Breakfast Program has been discontinued due to lack of funds.

DE T-2
February 10, 1971

The Breakfast Program was reinstituted the last week in March, 1971, at 611 Continental, and St. Leo's Church, Detroit.

DE T-2
April 1, 1971

The Breakfast Program in Flint is a flop as no one is showing up for meals.

DE T-1
March 24, 1971

DE T-2 advised on April 21, 1971, that the Breakfast Program is currently operating at the following locations:

611 Continental, Detroit
30 children per day

157 Collingwood, Detroit
15 children per day

St. Leo's Church
15 children per day

DE T-2 advised that the Breakfast Program is operating at the following locations in May, 1971:

611 Continental, Detroit
34 children per day

157 Collingwood, Detroit
20 children per day

The Free Breakfast Programs were temporarily dis= continued during June, 1971.

DE T-2
June, 1971

The Free Breakfast Programs have been reinstituted at 157 Collingwood and 2591 Pennsylvania, both BPP offices. They operate five days a week and feed 20-25 children per day, however, KENNETH HORSTON is disappointed because of lack of response.

DE T-4
July 2, 1971

The Breakfast Programs currently are being operated at 157 Collingwood and 2435 Pennsylvania, Detroit.

DE T-4
August, 1971

About 40 to 50 children are being fed at 2435 Pennsylvania each day.

DE T-4
September 30, 1971

2. Free Lunch Program

A Free Lunch Program was opened at 2591 Pennsylvania in July, 1971, which was attended by only 20 to 25 persons until the Archdiocese began providing box lunches and the attendance jumped to about 150 children.

DE T-4
July, 1971

The Free Lunch Program is held at 2435 Pennsylvania five days a week from 10:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

DE Tpr
August, 1971

About 40 to 50 children are being fed each day, the Archdiocese is no longer furnishing lunches.

DE T-4
September 30, 1971

3. Free Clothing Program

The Free Clothing Program is operating at 3591 17th Street, Detroit, Monday through Saturday.

DE T-2
January, 1971

The Free Clothing Program has been discontinued due to lack of funds.

DE T-2
February 10, 1971

M. Teaching Revolutionary Programs and Policies

Attendance is poor at the political education classes in Flint, Michigan. There were only eleven persons at the last meeting and each meeting is gernally made up of new faces.

DE T-1
January 7, 1971

Political Education classes are currently held each Sunday at 611 Continental, Detroit. Classes have been discontinued on 3595 17th Street, Detroit.

DE T-2
January, 1971

DE T-4 advised on various dates in 1971, through October, 1971, that the Detroit BPP attempted to regularly hold political education meetings at its various offices. These meetings were generally boring and consequently poorly attended. Various BPP members would lead discussions of articles appearing in "The Black Panther" newspaper and a number of persons attending the meetings would have a tendency to sleep.

A liberation school has been initiated at 2435 Pennsylvania, Detroit, and is operated in conjunction with the Free Lunch Program. About 30-40 children are being indoctrinated in BPP philosophy at this school, which opened July, 1971.

DE T-4
July 27, 1971

The liberation school was closed the first of October, 1971, as everyone was needed to sell papers. The attendance at the school had dropped to 20-25 children.

DE T-4
October 8, 1971

N. Factionalism

DE T-14 advised on February 28, 1971, that DAVID HILLIARD, BPP Chief of Staff, purged ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, BPP Minister of Information, and his Algerian associates from the BPP.

On February 28, 1971, representatives of the New York BPP met and decided to separate from the California-based BPP headed by HUEY P. NEWTON and to support CLEAVER.

DE T-14
February 28, 1971

CHARLES HOLT, a member of the Detroit NCCF, which supports HUEY P. NEWTON, Minister of Defense, BPP, contacted ZAYD SHAKUR, BPP Cleaver Faction in New York, to determine his standing with the Cleaver Faction and was requested to travel to New York to confer with Cleaver Faction members.

DE T-2
March 17, 1971

OLIVER MC CLURE, also known as Malik, former leader of the Detroit NCCF, who had been purged, was in New York the weekend of April 9-11, 1971, for consultation with leaders of the BPP, Cleaver Faction.

DE T-14
April 12, 1971

A BPP, Cleaver Faction was begun in Detroit the end of June, 1971, and during July, 1971, some members of the BPP Newton Faction who were discontent with his policies, quit and became associated with the Cleaver Faction.

DE T-2
July, 1971

O. Miscellaneous

An NCCF community workers, accused of stealing guns and television sets belonging to the NCCF was beaten by NCCF members in the basement of 611 Continental, Detroit.

A second individual, a short time member of the NCCF, stole two pistols from the NCCF. He was located by NCCF members, forcibly taken to the NCCF office at 611 Continental, Detroit, where he was scalded, burned and severely beaten.

DE T-2
January 25, 1971

VIRON REDWINE, Detroit NCCF member who went to California to act as Newton's bodyguard, was disillusioned with the BPP on his return to Detroit, claiming that NEWTON was crazy, sniffs cocaine, and that everyone follows his lead and does whatever he commands without question. REDWINE claimed that internal discipline is disintegrating as female Panther members in Oakland use birth control pills and everyone uses marijuana.

DE T-2
March 5, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON is losing popularity with BPP members, wears expensive clothes and drinks excessively.

DE T-4
July, 1971

The BPP had a booth at the Michigan State Fair the end of August and the first of September, 1971, at which they sold papers, flags, and sought donations. All members in the booth were clean, neatly dressed and polite, in an effort to change the rough, violent image of the BPP.

DE T-4
September, 1971

DE T-3 advised on September 23, 1971, that KENNETH HORSTON, leader, Detroit BPP, held a press conference on that date. HORSTON claimed that early on the morning of September 23, 1971, Detroit Police Officers fired on the BPP office at 2591 Pennsylvania, Detroit, and presented a woman claiming to be a witness to the shooting. The woman stated that she saw four men in a black car with "Detroit Police" on the side fire at 2591 Pennsylvania, Detroit.

CONFIDENTIAL

DE T-3 advised that 2591 Pennsylvania is in the area covered by the Fifth Precinct, Detroit Police Department and that no complaint of any shooting into 2591 Pennsylvania has been made. Source further advised that the Detroit Police Department was not aware of the alleged shooting until HORSTON's press conference,

DE T-3 advised on October 18, 1971, that no complaint has been made to the Detroit Police Department regarding alleged shooting into 2591 Pennsylvania, Detroit, and consequently no investigation will be conducted by the Detroit Police Department.

DE T-3 advised that an informal inquiry by the Detroit Police Department failed to substantiate the charges made by KENNETH HORSTON.

DE T-~~1~~2 and DE T-4 are not aware of any shooting at the BPP office, 2591 Pennsylvania, Detroit, and believe that HORSTON was attempting to obtain publicity by making the above charge.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Detroit, Michigan
November 4, 1971

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY - DETROIT DIVISION

Character EXTREMIST MATTERS

Reference Detroit report dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
DETROIT	SAN FRANCISCO	5/11/72	10/17/71 - 5/3/72

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)	SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR.	AH
	CHARACTER OF CASE EM	

REFERENCE: Detroit report of SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR., 11/4/71.

- P -

LEAD

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Will follow and report activities of the Detroit BPP on a semi-annual basis.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED NJW SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

105-165706-15-1043

8 MAY 17 1972

REC-58

ST-105

COPIES MADE:

11 - Bureau (105-165706 Sub 15)(RM)
1 - G-2, Detroit (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - USA, Detroit (RM)
2 - San Francisco (157-1204)(RM)
1 - Detroit (157-3075)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency	Copy to 1SD - 2/SS/IRS/~~DIS~~/POST INSP/80th D/2-Dest			
Request Recd.	by routing slip for			
Date Fwd.	☒ info ☐ date 5/17/72			
How Fwd.	by PCIV			
By				

Notations

EXT. INT. SEC.

54 JUN 19 1972

COVER PAGE

★ GPO : 1968 O - 293-885

DE 157-3075

ADMINISTRATIVE

All persons mentioned herein as being connected with the Detroit Branch of the BPP are currently under investigation by Detroit.

The speech of BOBBY SEALE on 12/10/71, is not being set forth in this report as it was previously disseminated under his caption.

Pretext call to the BPP Office on 4/12/72, was made by SA JOHN V. INSOGNA.

Special Agent who observed KENNETH HORSTON on 12/3/71, was SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source

DE T-1 is
DE 2446-E

DE T-2 is
DE 2650-E (PROB)

DE T-3 is
DE 1560-E (PROB)

DE T-4 is
SF 3215-E

DE T-5 is
DE 1552-E

DE T-6 is
SF 3215A-E

DE T-7 is
LA 5430-E

DE T-8 is
CG 7392-A-E

INFORMANT

DE T-9 is
CSDE 2580-E

DE T-10 is
CSDE 2962-E

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

DE 157-3075

DE T-11 is
DE 1718-E (PROB)

DE T-12 is
DE 2524-E (Ghetto)

INFORMANTS

DE T-13 is
CSDE 2907-E - CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

DE T-14 is
DE 1515-C

DE T-15 is
DE 1330-E

INFORMANTS

- C* -
Cover Page

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:
1 - G-2, Detroit (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - USA, Detroit (RM)

Report of: SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR. Office: Detroit, Michigan
Date: 5/11/72

Field Office File #: 157-3075 Bureau File #: 105-165706 Sub 15

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Character: EXTREMIST MATTERS

Synopsis: The Detroit BPP headquarters is located at 157 Collingwood, with an office at 2228 Bewick, Detroit. They continue to operate the Free Breakfast for School Children Program and sell "The Black Panther" newspaper. Additional programs and activity set forth. The Detroit BPP continues to receive direction from BPP National Headquarters and contacts other BPP chapters.

- P -

DETAILS

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O - 406-840

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONS DATA OF DETROIT BPP 3

- A. Location of Detroit BPP Headquarters and Offices 3
- B. Local Leaders and Membership Totals 3
- C. Funds 4
- D. Connection With BPP National Headquarters . 5
- E. Contact with Other BPP Chapters 5
- F. Publications 6
  - 1. Distribution of "The Black Panther" Newspaper 6
  - 2. Local 6
- G. Propensity For Violence and Preparation For Confrontation 20
- H. Arrests 20
- I. Weapons 20
- J. Fortifications 21
- K. Meetings and Rallies 21
- L. Programs 22
  - 1. Free Breakfast For School Children 22
  - 2. Free Lunch Program 22
  - 3. Free Bussing Program 22
  - 4. Free Food Program 23
  - 5. Youth Cadre 23
- M. Teaching Revolutionary Programs and Policies 24
- N. Factionalism 24

II. MISCELLANEOUS 25

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA OF THE DETROIT BPP

A. Location of Detroit Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters and Offices

The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government.

The offices at 2591 Pennsylvania and 2435 Pennsylvania have been closed and a new office opened at 2228 Bewick, Detroit, Michigan, which is the location of the Breakfast For School Children Program. This location is rented by LORENE BANKS, who coordinates the Breakfast Program.

The Ministry of Information continues to be at 157 Collingwood, Detroit.

The BPP has a pad at 4200 Buena Vista, Detroit.

DE T-1
November 17, 1971

The Detroit BPP continues to operate offices at the following locations:

157 Collingwood, Detroit

2228 Bewick, Detroit

Pad - 4200 Buena Vista, Detroit

DE T-2
April 12, 1972

B. Local Leaders and Membership Totals

The following is a summary of membership totals for the Detroit BPP from November, 1971, through April, 1972, which was furnished by DE T-1 and DE T-3:

	Community Workers	Members
November	4	10
December	4	10
January	5	15
February	5	15
March	6	16
April	6	15

EDGAR ROBINSON, Detroit BPP, advised BPP National Headquarters that he had removed himself from the staff of the Detroit Chapter.

DE T-4
October 30,1971

KENNETH HORSTON is leader of the Detroit Chapter of the BPP.

DE T-1
October 27, 1971

Since the departure of EDGAR ROBINSON, who was distribution manager for the BPP, LONNIE DARDEN is second in command to KENNETH HORSTON.

DE T-1
November 4, 1971

LORENE BANKS is in charge of the Breakfast Program.

DE T-1
November 17, 1971

LONNIE DARDEN is referring to himself as the Minister of Information while KENNETH HORSTON is in California.

DE T-1
January 19, 1972

LEONARD MONGO is currently in charge of finances.

DE T-1
March 21, 1972

C. Funds

The following summary of financial activity was provided by DE T-1, DE T-3 and DE T-5 from November, 1971 through April, 1972:

Month	Income	Expenses
November	$2,225.00	$2,207.00
December	2,700.00	2,669.00
January	3,300.00	3,269.27
February	2,512.50	2,227.31
March	2,462.50	2,321.33
April	2,925.00	2,656.97

D. Connection With BPP National Headquarters

EDGAR ROBINSON, a member of the Detroit BPP, contacted BPP National Headquarters, Oakland, California, on October 30, 1971, to advise that Detroit was having problems as the members did not want to listen to the leadership.

DE T-4
October 30, 1971

GERALD CRAWFORD, a Detroit BPP member, was in Oakland, California, working for the Party and planned to return to Detroit on November 17, 1971.

DE T-4
November 16, 1971

A Detroit BPP member complained to BPPNational Headquarters that a brother of the Cleveland Chapter borrowed his leather coat and failed to return it.

DE T-6
December 28, 1971

BPP National Headquarters requested Detroit send them a list of all community workers and a copy of their mailing list.

DE T-6
February 8, 1972

E. Contacts With Other BPP Chapters

The Los Angeles, California chapter of the BPP shipped 600 copies of "The Black Panther" to Detroit as too many copies of the paper had been shipped to Los Angeles from New York.

DE T-7
October 17, 1971

The West Side area captain of the Chicago, Illinois BPP chapter contacted the Detroit BPP on November 5, 1971.

DE T-8
November 5, 1971

EMMA MORRIS, member, Detroit BPP was to visit the Chicago BPP to learn about the Free Bussing Program.

DE T-8
November 4, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON advised the Chicago BPP that LONNIE DARDEN and several Detroit BPP members would be sent to Chicago in connection with Survival Week activities in Chicago.

DE T-8
December 1, 1971

F. Publications

1. Distribution of "The Black Panther" newspaper

DE T-1, DE T-3 and DE T-9 advised from November, 1971 through April, 1972, that the Detroit BPP received the following copies of "The Black Panther" newspaper from BPP National Distribution, New York, New York:

Month	Copies
November	7,600
December	7,200
January	11,500
February	7,250
March	7,250
April	8,500

Each BPP member is required to sell 150 newspapers per week.

DE T-1
October 29, 1971

2. Local

DE T-10 furnished the following leaflet on November 12, 1972, which was being distributed by the BPP:

FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN

THERE WILL BE A FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN PROGRAM, SPONSORED BY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, STARTING MONDAY NOVEMBER 15,1971 AT 2228 BEWICK (DOWNSTAIRS), BETWEEN VERNOR AND KERCHEVAL.

HOT MEALS (SUCH AS GRITS, OATMEAL, WAFFLES, BACON, EGGS. ETC.)

WILL BE SERVED TO THE YOUTH IN THE COMMUNITY AND THOSE THAT ATTEND SCRIPPS ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AT 2100 HULBURT. BREAKFAST WILL BE SERVED BETWEEN 7:00a.m. AND 8:30a.m. MONDAY THRU FRIDAY.

PARENTS IN THE COMMUNITY ARE WELCOME TO COME TO THE BREAKFAST PROGRAM AND CAN VOLUNTEER TO GIVE ASSITANCE IN SERVING THE CHILDREN IF THEY DESIRE TO DO SO OR YOU AN INFORM YOUR FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS OF THE PROGRAM. IF THERE ARE ANY UESTIONS CONCERNING THE PROGRAM PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CALL THE TELEPHONE UMBERS LISTED BELOW.

DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

On January 6, 1972, DE T-11 furnished copies of the following leaflets being distributed by the BPP:

REE BREAKFAST
OR SCHOOL CHILDREN
PROGRAM

EEKLY MENU — WEEK OF DEC.13, - DEC. 17,

ONDAY

RANGE JUICE
CON
GS
ITS

TUESDAY

OATMEAL
TOAST
JELLY
SALAMI(FRIED)

WEDNESDAY

CHOC. MILK
HOT DOGS(FRIED)
CREAM OF WHEAT
PEACHES

DAY

S -
E & ORANGE)
LETTUCE &
TOMATO

ON TOAST
GE

FRIDAY

ORANGE JUICE
GRILLED CHEESE
BACON
SLICED PEACHES

9

FOOD DONATIONS FOR THE BREAKFAST PROGRAM ARE NEEDED SUCH AS BREAKFAST MEATS, DRY GOODS, MILK, BREAD, ETC. ALSO MONEY TO OBTAIN THESE ITEMS ARE EXCEPTABLE.

IF YOU WISH TO DONATE OR GIVE ASSISTANCE IN HELPING OUT AT THE BREAKFAST PROGRAM CALL 867-7742 OR COME TO THE BREAKFAST SITE AT 2228 BEWICK BETWEEN VERNOR AND KERCHEVAL.

DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
157 COLLINGWOOD
867-7742

SURVIVAL THROUGH SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE

VOLUNTEER SERVICE FORM

I HEREBY VOLUNTEER TO SERVE THE PEOPLE AS I MAY BE NEEDED (print)

NAME ______________________________

ADDRESS ______________________________

CITY ______________ COUNTY ______________ STATE ______________

ZIP CODE ______________

I would like to work in the following activity (ies) :

1. Free Breakfast Program ________
2. Health Clinics ________
3. Liberation School ________
4. Bussing To Prisons Program ________
5. Welfare Loans ________
6. Free Clothing ________
7. Free Shoes ________
8. Sell Newspapers ________
9. Peoples Barber shop ________
10. Any Program ________

How many hours a week are you available? ______________

List any special skills you have or special services you can perform :

____

____

____

10

____
SIGNATURE

On December 22, 1972, DE T-10 furnished a copy of the following leaflet which was being distributed by the BPP:



TO: THE BROTHERS & SISTERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION!

BECAUSE OF A NEED FOR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE INSIDE THE PRISONS AND OUTSIDE THE PRISONS (CONCENTRATION CAMPS). THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY IS SPONSORING A "FREE BUSING PROGRAM" TO JACKSON STATE PENITENTIARY. THE FIRST BUS WILL BE LEAVING ON DECEMBER 23, 1971 FROM 157 COLLINGWOOD AT 10:00 A.M. AND RETURN AT 6:00 P.M. WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE BUSING PROGRAM ON A MORE CONSISTENT BASIS SUCH AS:

(1) HAVING A BUS OR BUSES GOING TO PRISONS MORE THAN JUST ONCE A MONTH.

(2) HAVING MORE THAN ONE BUS.

IN ORDER TO HAVE A SUFFICIENT BUSING PROGRAM, SUPPORT IS NEEDED, EITHER BY GETTING A BUS DONATED OR SUPPLYING SOME FINANCIAL AID TO THE PROGRAM. WITH THE UNDERSTANDING WE ALL HAVE BY BEING PART OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND KNOWING THE NECESSITY OF THE BUSING PROGRAM, WE HOPE THAT YOUR ORGANIZATION WILL COOPERATE WITH THE PROGRAM AND ASSIST US WITH IMPLEMENTING A SUCCESSFUL BUSING PROGRAM.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

12

DETROIT BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION 157 COLLINGWOOD

On January 19, 1972, DE T-1 furnished a copy of the following leaflet being distributed by the BPP:

2

SUPPORT THE "FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN"

THE FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN PROGRAM, SPONSORED BY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, IS NOW FEEDING MORE THAN 50 KIDS A DAY AT 2228 BEWICK (DOWNSTAIRS), BETWEEN VERNOR AND KERCHEVAL.

HOT MEALS (SUCH AS GRITS, OATMEAL, WAFFLES, BACON, EGGS, ETC.) WILL BE SERVED TO THE YOUTH IN THE COMMUNITY AND THOSE THAT ATTEND SCRIPPS ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AT 2100 HURLBUT. BREAKFAST WILL BE SERVED BETWEEN 7:00 A.M. AND 8:30 A.M., MONDAY THRU FRIDAY.

PARENTS IN THE COMMUNITY ARE WELCOME TO COME TO THE BREAKFAST PROGRAM AND CAN VOLUNTEER TO GIVE ASSISTANCE IN SERVING THE CHILDREN IF THEY DESIRE TO DO SO, OR YOU CAN INFORM YOUR FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS OF THE PROGRAM. IF THERE ARE ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE PROGRAM, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CALL THE TELEPHONE NUMBERS LISTED BELOW.

DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
157 COLLINGWOOD
867-7742 or 867-7743
"ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE"

14

On May 3, 1972, DE T-2 furnished copies of the following leaflets being distributed by the BPP:

SUPPORT THE "FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN"

THE FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM SPONSORED BY THE DETROIT, BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY HAS OPENED IT'S SECOND "BREAKFAST CENTER". THE NEWEST CENTER IS LOCATED AT 157 COLLINGWOOD BETWEEN SECOND AND WOODWARD, THE OPENING DATE OF THE SECOND CENTER IS APRIL 12, 1972.



THE OTHER LOCATION IS AT 2228 BEWICK BETWEEN VERNOR AND KERCHEVAL ON THE EASTSIDE. IT IS PRESENTLY SERVING MORE THAN 85 CHILDREN EVERY SCHOOL MORNING.

HOT MEALS (SUCH AS GRITS, OATMEAL, WAFFLES, BACON, EGGS, ETC.) ARE BEING SERVED BETWEEN 7:00A.M. THRU 8:30 A.M., MONDAY THRU FRIDAY.

THE PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY ARE WELCOME TO COME TO THE BREAKFAST PROGRAM, AND CAN VOLUNTEER TO GIVE ASSISTANT IN SERVING THE CHILDREN IF THEY DESIRE TO DO SO. AND CAN INFORM OTHERS OF THE PROGRAM. IF THERE IS ANY QUESTION CONCERNING THE BREAKFAST PROGRAM, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CALL THE NUMBERS ARE LISTED BELOW.

16

DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
867-7742 OR 867-7743

OTOR CITY BUSES ROLLING

"FREE BUSING PROGRAM TO PRISON"

WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRY'S CARS AND OTHER MOTOR VEHICLES BEING MANUFACTURED IN DETROIT, MANY PEOPLE IN THIS STATE OF MICHIGAN STILL CAN'T GET TO THE PRISONS TO VISIT THEIR LOVED ONES.

REALIZING THE NEED FOR TRANSPORTATION, THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY INITIATED A "FREE BUSING PROGRAM" FOR FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF PRISONERS. IN MANY OF OUR CHAPTERS AND BRANCHES, SUCH PROGRAMS ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY, SERVING THE COMMUNITY.

WE (THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY) WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE TO SERVE YOU ON A CONSISTANT BASIS TO THE PRISON. ON SUNDAY APRIL 16, 1972, THE BUS WILL BE LEAVING FOR THOSE WHO ARE VISITING REGULAR INMATES, AND THE FOLLOWING SUNDAY APRIL 23, 1972, WILL BE THE NEXT TRIP FOR THOSE WHO ARE VISITING TRUSTEE (ONLY).

THE BUS WILL BE LEAVING AT 9:00 A.M. AND WILL RETURN BY 6:00 P.M. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU ARRIVE AT 157 COLLINGWOOD AT 8:00 A.M. FOR EARLY SEATING ARRANGEMENTS.

NECESSARY ITEMS OF INFORMATION NEEDED TO VISIT INMATES IN JACKSON STATE PENITENTIARY ARE:

(1) INMATES NAME AND I.D. NUMBER.

(2) WHETHER HE IS AN TRUSTEE OR NOT.

(3) YOUR NAME, ADDRESS, ZIPCODE AND PHONE NUMBER.

(4) YOU MUST BE ON INMATES' VISITING LIST. IF NOT, WRITE INMATE OR CALL 867-2742 OR 43, TO OBTAIN METHODS OF GETTING ON INMATES VISITING LIST.

(5) YOUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE INMATE.

MAKE YOUR [illegible] TODAY, [illegible], FOR [illegible]

[illegible]



BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
157 COLLINGWOOD
867-7742 or 867-7743
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

1972

DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM YOU OF "SURVIVAL DAY" IN THE BLACK AND OPPRESSED COMMUNITY. THE DATE SET ASIDE FOR THIS EVENT IS MAY 20,1972. SURVIVAL DAY IS DESIGNED TO HELP ELIMINATE SOME OF THE OPPRESSION IN OUR COMMUNITY. ONE OF THE GREATEST CONCERNS OF POOR AND OPPRESSED PEOPLE IS SURVIVAL THROUGH THE BASIC NECESSITY OF EATING. DURING THE SURVIVAL DAY CEREMONIES, WHICH WILL BE SPONSORED BY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SUPPORTED BY THE BUSINESSMEN OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY, WE HAVE PLANNED A FREE FOOD GIVE AWAY. UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR FOOD COMBINED WITH THE ROLE OF THE BUSINESSMEN IN THE COMMUNITY, WE ARE ASKING THE CONCERNED BUSINESSMEN TO HELP SUPPORT THE COMMUNITY THROUGH YOUR DONATIONS OF GOODS NECESSARY TO FURNISH THE PEOPLE WITH A FULL BAG OF GROCERIES.

WE WOULD LIKE TO NOTIFY YOU THAT ON FRIDAY APRIL 21, AND SATURDAY APRIL 22, COMRADES GERALD CRAWFORD AND WILLIAM ELDER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTY, WILL COME TO YOUR PLACE OF BUSINESS TO GIVE YOU FURTHUR INFORMATION ON THE EVENT.

LISTED BELOW ARE SOME OF THE ITEMS NECESSARY:

1. CHICKENS - 1,000
2. SUGAR - 1,000 lbs.
3. CANNED PEAS - 2,000
4. CANNED CORN - 2,000
5. RICE - 1,000 lbs.
6. FRUIT - apples, oranges, and bananas.
7. BREAD - 1,000 [illegible]

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CALL:
867-7742 or 867-7743

DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
157 COLLINGWOOD

18

POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

What Will You Do For Our Survival ?

IGELA DAVIS
REE Food
PROGRAM

rticipate in **"SURVIVAL DAY"**

MAY 20TH - 1,000 BAGS
BE GIVEN AWAY IN THE JEFFERIES
PROJECTS

URTHER INFORMATION
CALL:

DETROIT BRANCH
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
157 COLLINGWOOD
867-7742/867-7743

19

G. Propensity for Violence and Preparation for Confrontation

The BPP has a shooting range in the basement of 157 Collingwood, Detroit, which consists of cardboard and a mattress banked against the basement wall.

DE T-3
October29, 1971

LONNIE DARDEN stays at 4200 Buena Vista, Detroit, and keeps a shotgun in his bedroom.

DE T-12
March 30, 1972

H. Arrests

Detective Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY, Detroit Police Department (PD), advised on February 2, 1972, that LONNIE DARDEN and GERALD CRAWFORD were stopped by officers of the Fifth Precinct. DARDEN was released and CRAWFORD was arrested and charged with using and displaying the license of another. CRAWFORD appeared in traffic court on February 2, 1972, was found guilty, sentenced to five days in the Detroit House of Corrections and $50.00 fine.

On February 7, 1972, Detective Lieutenant MC COY, supra, advised that WILLIE CHARLES HALL, a former BPP member, was arrested February 7, 1972, for being Absent Without Leave and was returned to military control.

LEONARD MONGO and WALTER L. ROZIER were arrested on February 18, 1972, by the Highland Park, Michigan, PD, for disorderly person and loitering in connection with their soliciting money and interfering with customers at a store in connection with the BPP.

DE T-13
March 2, 1972

I. Weapons

DE T-1, DE T-5, DE T-11 advised during March and April, 1972, that there is no mention of weapons and no effort to acquire any guns. The guns that are available are discretely kept out of sight.

J. Fortifications

The BPP office at 157 Collingwood, Detroit, has metal mesh screens which can be pulled down over the windows at night. The front windows are barricaded with pillow cases filled with sand.

DE T-5
December 3, 1971

There are no fortifications at the BPP office at 2228 Bewick, Detroit.

DET-11
April 24, 1972

There are no fortifications at the BPP pad at 4200 Buena Vista, Detroit.

DE T-1
April 24, 1972

K. Meetings and Rallies

DE T-14 advised on December 14, 1971, that BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, Minister of Defense, BPP, arrived in Detroit from Oakland, California, on December 9, 1971, spent the evening with the Detroit BPP and on December 10, 1971, proceeded to Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he spoke at the John Sinclair Freedom Rally, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

DE T-14 heard SEALE comment to a small group of people that the BPP is opening free food clinics and that "if the pigs interfere with him in any way, he will open free gun clinics and distribute free guns". SEALE further commented that "we have access to all the guns we want and will kill any pig that gives us trouble". DE T-14 advised that SEALE spoke regarding plans and programs of the BPP.

JOHN SINCLAIR is chairman of the White Panther Party (WPP), also known as the Rainbow Peoples Party.

The WPP is a national white, hippie-oriented revolutionary organization which was founded ostensibly to offer support to the BPP. [illegible] ched ten-point [illegible] s added a ten-point program of its own, all of which call for the [illegible] freedom of the individual.

L. Programs

1. Free Breakfast for School Children

The Breakfast Program has dropped offand they are having trouble with funds, however, will continue to operate the program at all costs so they will have a reason to collect donations and a program to point to.

DE T-1
November 3, 1971

The Breakfast Program is currently being held at 2228 Bewick, Detroit, Michigan.

DE T-1
November 17, 1972

The following is a summary of the number of children attending the Breakfast Program from November, 1971 through April, 1972, by DE T-1, DE T-3, and DE T-5:

Month	Children
November	15-20
December	20
January	60
February	50-75
March	50
April	35-40

2. Free Lunch Program

The Lunch Program has been cut due to lack of funds

DE T-3
November 3, 1971

3. Free Bussing Program

A Free Bussing Program is in the planning stage in Detroit.

DE T-8
November 14, 1971

On December 27, 1971, DUANE SHOALES, Administrative Assistant to the Warden, State Prison of Southern Michigan, at Jackson, Michigan, advised that two busses arrived at the prison from Detroit on December 23, 1971, bringing relatives to visit inmates. Mr. SHOALES advised that he later learned that the busses were sponsored by the Detroit BPP.

The BPP is attempting to sponsor two bus trips to Jackson Prison per month for relatives of inmates. One bus has been sent thus far in March.

DE T-1
March 21, 1972

The Detroit BPP sponsored a bus to Jackson Prison on Easter Sunday, April 2,1972.

DE T-1
April 3, 1972

4. Free Food Program

The BPP is planning to give away 1000 bags of food sometime in the next month or two.

DE T-1
March 21, 1972

The BPP is attempting to collect donations to raise money to pay for groceries to be given away in the Free Food Program.

DE T-1
April 3, 1972

5. Youth Cadre

On April 12, 1972, a pretext call was made by a Special Agent of the FBI to the East Side Office of the Detroit BPP, 2228 Bewick, Detroit, and GERALD CRAWFORD provided the following information:

A program designated as the Youth Cadre has recently been initiated to teach children black history, the tradition of the black people, black dignity and respect, and to analyze things for themselves.

CRAWFORD advised that this is an educational program given to all the children who attend the Breakfast Program and is not militant in nature. He advised that this program is operated only at the East Side Office by those who operate the Breakfast Program.

Prior to the Breakfast Program, GERALD CRAWFORD holds an indoctrination class, which is primarily a question and answer session. Most of the discussion seems to go oer the heads of the children who are too young to understand.

DE T-2
April 12, 1972

M. Teaching Revolutionary Programs and Policies

A political education class was held at 157 Collingwood, Detroit, on October 24, 1971. The class was led by EDGAR ROBINSON and consisted of reviewing the "Red Book". KENNETH HORSTON and LONNIE DARDEN, leaders of the Detroit Chapter, were present.

DE T-1
October 26, 1971

Political education classes are no longer regularly held on Sundays. The classes are now held at random during the week as the BPP is currently more concerned with the survival of its members rather than the community.

DE T-3
November 3, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON, leader of the Detroit BPP, currently in BPP National Headquarters, Oakland, California, advised Detroit to get involved in the church, stay away from ideological debates, and try to bring the church people around to their thinking.

DE T-6
January 2, 1972

N. Factionalism

LOUIS TOLBERT JOHNSON, a member of the BPP - Newton Faction and CHARLES HOLT, a member of the BPP - Cleaver Faction, appeared [illegible] on October 18, 1971, on a charge of [illegible]on in an automobile, for which they were arrested together prior to the Newton-Cleaver split. HOLT and his associates sat on one side of the courtroom while JOHNSON and his associates sat on the other, not communicating with each other.

DE T-15

II. MISCELLANEOUS

KENNETH HORSTON, leader, Detroit BPP, has started wearing very expensive clothes and has recently acquired a diamond ring.

DE T-2
November 1, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON was involved in an automoblle accident in Highland Park, Michigan.

DE T-1
November 17, 1971

On December 3, 1971, KENNETH HORSTON was observed selling "The Black Panther" newspaper at the corner of Woodward and State, Detroit, Michigan, by a Special Agent of the FBI.

KENNETH HORSTON was involved in a traffic accident on November 8, 1971, did not display a driver's license and left the scene without further identifying himself. Source advised on January 5, 1972, that a traffic warrant has been issued and he will be arrested should he appear in the Detroit area.

DE T-13
November 15, 1971

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Detroit, Michigan
May 11, 1972

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Character EXTREMIST MATTERS

Reference Detroit report dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERA JREAU OF IN IGATION

REPORTING OFFICE DETROIT	OFFICE OF ORIGIN SAN FRANCISCO	DATE 1/26/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 7/2/70 - 1/4/71

TITLE OF CASE

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF)
DETROIT DIVISION

REPORT MADE BY
SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR.

CHARACTER OF CASE
RM

REFERENCES: Detroit report of SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR., 7/29/70.

- P -

Rademacher
Sutton

LEADS

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Will follow and report activities of the Detroit NCCF on a semiannual basis.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE

CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES	ACQUIT-TALS

CASE HAS BEEN:
PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES
PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

105-165706-15-14

REC-14

EX-103

4 FEB 8 1971

COPIES MADE:

11 - Bureau (105-165706-Sub 15) (RM)
1 - MIG, Detroit (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - USA, Detroit (RM)
2 - San Francisco (157-1204) (RM)
2 - Detroit (157-3075)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency ~~AGENCY: ICDSO, NIC, OSI, SEC. SERV, IRS~~ (Wright), RCMP,
Request Recd. ~~DEPT. ISD, [redacted] IDIU, [redacted]~~ ~~Chief Postal Inspector~~
Date Fwd. HOW FORW: RS
How Fwd. DATE FORW: 2/8/71
By BY: CH/cel

Notations

61 MAR 16 1971

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1970

COVER PAGE

DE 157-3075

ADMINISTRATIVE

All persons mentioned in this report as being connected with the NCCF, who reside in the Detroit Division, are listed on the SI or are currently under investigation.

This report is classified confidential to protect sources whose identity, if made known, would be prejudicial to the internal security of the U.S.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source

✓DE T-1 is
DE 1330-R INFORMANT

✓DE T-3 is
Detective Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY, [illegible]
Security Section,
Intelligence Division
Detroit PD

✓DE T-21 is
DE 1414-R* - [illegible]

✓DE T-26 is
DE 1423-R (PROB) - INFORMANT

✓CG T-6 is
CG 7392-R*

✓SF T-16 is
SF 3215-R*

✓SF T-22 is
SF 3259-R*

LES

✓DE T-24 is
Lieutenant LOUIS SZABO
Intelligence Unit
Flint, Michigan PD - CONFIDENTIAL Source

✓DE T-23 is
RONALD EDWARD SMITH, RI - Ghetto INFORMANT

- B* -
Cover Page

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:
1 - MIG, Detroit (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - USA, Detroit (RM)

Report of: SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR. **Office:** Detroit, Michigan
Date: 1/26/71

Field Office File #: 157-3075 **Bureau File #:** 105-165706 Sub 15

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF)
DETROIT DIVISION

Character: RACIAL MATTERS

Synopsis: The Ministry of Information for the Detroit NCCF is located at 613 Continental, Detroit. Branch Community Information Center offices are located at 611 Continental, Detroit, 3595 17th St., and 2009 Albert, Flint, Mich. Detroit continues to operate under the direction and guidance of BPP national headquarters, Oakland, Calif, who sent KENNETH HORSTON to take charge of the Detroit NCCF. Detroit continues to have financial difficulties. Sales of "The Black Panther" newspaper are down and Detroit has been receiving fewer copies lately. Detroit has also been distributing a number of its own leaflets. Detroit has been operating free breakfast programs and recently initiated a free clothing program. Representatives of the Detroit NCCF went to both the BPP Convention at Philadelphia and the one in Washington, D.C. NCCF members were involved in shooting at a TV news car and two Detroit Police Officers. Detroit continues to maintain weapons.

- P -

DETAILS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA 4

- A. Location of Detroit NCCF Headquarters and Branches 4
- B. Officers and Members 5
- C. Funds 7
- D. Connection with BPP National Headquarters ... 8
- E. Contact with Other BPP and NCCF Chapters 10
- F. Publications 12
  - 1. Distribution of "The Black Panther" Newspaper 12
  - 2. Local Publications 14
- G. Locally Stated Aims and Policy 61
- H. Propensity to Violence and Preparation for Confrontation 65
- I. Arrests 68
- J. Weapons 71
- K. Meetings and Rallies 72
- L. Programs of Detroit NCCF 73
  - 1. Free Breakfast for School Children 73
  - 2. Free Lunch Program 75
  - 3. Free Clothing Program 75

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

M. Teaching Revolutionary Programs and Policies ... 76

N. Miscellaneous 76

II. APPENDIX 78

I. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONAL DATA

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is contained in the appendix pages attached hereto.

A. Location of Detroit NCCF Headquarters and Branches

The Detroit National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF), organizing branch of the BPP, is going to operate three centers in Detroit, 2219 Indiandale, which will be Community Information Center (CIC) Number One, 7708-12 Mack Avenue, CIC Number Two, and 12847 14th Street, which will be the Ministry of Information.

DE T-1
July 15, 1970

The Detroit NCCF is currently operating the above three locations.

DE T-1
August 21, 1970

The Detroit NCCF moved from 7708-12 Mack Avenue and 2219 Indiandale Streets, Detroit, to 3376 16th Street on October 15 and 16, 1970, respectively.

DE T-1
October, 1970

The Detroit NCCF has opened a branch in Flint, Michigan, at 2009 Albert Street, which is headed by WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON.

DE T-26
November 12, 1970

The Detroit NCCF is to move into 611-13 Continental, Detroit, Michigan, on November 24, 1970.

DE T-3
November 23, 1970

The 613 Continental, Detroit, location is the Ministry of Information for the Detroit NCCF.

The 611 Continental location is CIC Number One.

DE T-1
November, 1970

The NCCF opened a new office at 3595 17th Street, Detroit, which has been designated CIC Number Two.

DE T-1
December, 1970

B. Officers and Members

OLIVER MC CLURE, III, also known as Malik, is in charge of the Detroit NCCF and the Ministry of Information, 12847 14th Street, Detroit, Michigan.

CHARLES HOLT is second in command of the Detroit NCCF and is in charge of CIC Number Two, 7708-12 Mack Avenue, Detroit.

MICHAEL DENNIS HILL, BPP, California, is currently in charge of CIC Number One, 2219 Indiandale, Detroit.

DE T-1
July 15, 1970

LORENE BANKS is the only member of the Detroit NCCF who is currently receiving any type of welfare assistance, she receives Aid to Dependent Children.

DE T-1
August 26, 1970

OLIVER MC CLURE is no longer leader of the Detroit NCCF.

DE T-1
September 9, 1970

BRENDA JACKSON, member Detroit NCCF, had a baby girl, fathered by Malik (OLIVER MC CLURE), former leader of the Detroit NCCF.

DE T-1
October 5, 1970

MICHAEL DENNIS HILL, BPP, California, is now leader of the Detroit NCCF; OLIVER MC CLURE having been purged. CHARLES HOLT is second in command and LORENE BANKS is financial secretary. EDGAR ROBINSON is distribution manager for "The Black Panther" newspaper, and RONALD SMITH is in charge of the Free Clothing Program.

WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON is in charge of the NCCF branch at Flint, Michigan.

DE T-1
November, 1970

KENNETH HORSTON, BPP, San Francisco, is the present leader of the Detroit NCCF as MICHAEL DENNIS HILL, former leader, left the area because he was afraid of being implicated in the shooting of two Detroit Police Officers on October 24, 1970.

RONALD SMITH is in charge of the Free Clothing Program.

EDGAR ROBINSON is in charge of distribution of "The Black Panther" newspaper.

RONNIE IRWIN is in charge of the NCCF office at 3595 17th Street, Detroit, and resides at this location.

CI

TONY NORMAN is officer of the day at 3595 17th Street, Detroit, and resides at this location.

CI

LARRY POWELL is officer of the day at 611 Continental, Detroit, and resides at this location.

DORTHEA SMITH is in charge of communications.

CI

ALICE RAYFORD is in charge of finances.

LORENE BANKS, who is now living at 611 Continental, is in charge of the Breakfast Program.

WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON is in charge of the Flint Branch of the Detroit NCCF.

DE T-1
January 4, 1971

C. Funds

Gestetner (phonetic) Corporation, from whom the NCCF purchased printing equipment, have threatened to obtain a court order to confiscate the equipment because it has not been paid for.

DE T-1
July 17, 1970

OLIVER MC CLURE, leader of the Detroit NCCF, who is currently in San Francisco, contacted Detroit on August 5, 1970, requesting that he be sent $100.00 plane fare in order for him to return to Detroit as the NCCF is broke after putting up the money for HUEY P. NEWTON's bond.

DE T-1
August 5, 1970

As of August 7, 1970, the Detroit NCCF owed National Headquarters about $3,000.00 for "The Black Panther" newspaper.

DE T-1
August 7, 1970

The Detroit NCCF held a picnic at Belle Isle Park, August 30, 1970, but the turnout was poor and the NCCF lost about $200.00.

DE T-1
August 31, 1970

The Detroit NCCF receives most of its funds through sale of "The Black Panther" newspaper. They also acquire some money through donations and raids on dope houses. Most of the NCCF money is spent for payment of the newspapers, for food, and housing for the NCCF members. The telephone, when they can afford to pay for it, is also a heavy drain on NCCF finances.

DE T-1
September 15, 1970

The Detroit NCCF did not pay any bills in September, 1970, and put up $1,000.00 to get CHARLES HOLT, second in command, Detroit NCCF, out of jail.

DE T-1
October 14, 1970

During three speaking engagements on November 16 and 17, 1970, by HUEY P. NEWTON, Minister of Defense, BPP, $7,300.00 was collected. This money was supposedly for the defense fund for the Detroit 16, however, NEWTON kept it all, leaving the NCCF no benefit from his appearance.

DE T-1
November, 1970

The rent for 613 Continental is $75.00 per month and 611 Continental is $85.00 per month.

The Detroit NCCF has not been selling quite half of the papers they have been receiving and consequently are not making enough to pay the paper bill.

DE T-1
November, 1970

D. Connection with BPP National Headquarters

OLIVER MC CLURE, leader, Detroit NCCF, left Detroit Metropolitan Airport, August 3, 1970, en route BPP San Francisco, where he plans to confer with BPP leaders regarding Detroit's receipt of "The Black Panther" newspaper.

DE T-1
August 4, 1970

OLIVER MC CLURE departed San Francisco on United Airlines Flight 86 to arrive in Detroit at 7:15 p.m., August 8, 1970.

SF T-16
August 8, 1970

DAVID HILLIARD, BPP Chief of Staff, instructed THOMAS JOLLY, BPP, New York, to take Malik (OLIVER MC CLURE) out of the leadership position of the Detroit NCCF, which

JOLLY did when he and MC CLURE were at the BPP Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 5 to 7, 1970.

DE T-1
September 9, 1970

On October 5, 1970, LINDA WARNSLEY, Detroit NCCF, requested instructions from National Headquarters, San Francisco, regarding the setting up of a medical cadre.

SF T-16
October 5, 1970

On October 17, 1970, CHARLES HOLT, second in command, Detroit NCCF, sent a report to JUNE HILLIARD, Assistant Chief of Staff, BPP, that the NCCF had moved out of 7708 Mack Avenue, and into the community as he had directed.

SF T-16
October 17, 1970

HUEY NEWTON, Minister of Defense for the BPP, is scheduled to arrive in Detroit on November 16, 1970, along with his secretary, CONNIE MATTHEWS, and DAVID HILLIARD, BPP Chief of Staff. NEWTON will speak at three universities in the Detroit area to raise funds for the Detroit 16.

DE T-1
November 15, 1970

THOMAS JOLLY, BPP, New York, left Detroit at 10:30 p.m., December 16, 1970, and is scheduled to arrive at San Francisco at 12:30 a.m., December 17, 1970.

SF T-22
December 16, 1970

KENNETH HORSTON, BPP, San Francisco, returned from California to Detroit on December 23, 1980, he is currently in charge of the Detroit NCCF.

DE T-1
December 24, 1970

E. Contact with Other BPP and NCCF Chapters

OLIVER MC CLURE and CHARLES HOLT, leaders of the Detroit NCCF, left Detroit for the weekly meeting at BPP, New York, at 8:00 p.m., July 25, 1970.

DE T-1
July 25, 1970

On August 13, 1970, MICHAEL D. HILL, Detroit NCCF, took SELINA JACKSON, former BPP member, from Detroit to Kennedy Airport, New York, from where they were to drive to New Haven. JACKSON is to try and discredit a witness in the ALEX RACKLEY murder trial, New Haven.

DE T-1
August 14, 1970

OLIVER MC CLURE, leader Detroit NCCF, flew from Detroit to New York on August 28, 1970, leaving about 6:00 p.m.

The Detroit NCCF attempted to obtain a speaker from the Chicago BPP for a picnic at Belle Isle Park that Detroit was planning for August 30, 1970.

CG T-6
August 26, 1970

Three busses left the Detroit NCCF, 2219 Indiandale, along with two cars about 3:00 p.m., September 4, 1970, apparently en route to the BPP Convention, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

DE T-3
September 4, 1970

THOMAS JOLLY, BPP, New York, arrived in Detroit the weekend of September 13, 1970, and returned to New York the morning of September 13, 1970, with MICHAEL D. HILL, Detroit, NCCF, for the regular Sunday meeting at the East Coast Ministry of the BPP in New York. OLIVER MC CLURE, Detroit NCCF, left Detroit about 5:00 p.m., September 13, 1970, en route New York to appear at the meeting of the East Coast Ministry in an attempt to regain his leadership of the Detroit NCCF.

DE T-1
September 15, 1970

JOHN HENRY BOWMAN, BPP Philadelphia, is scheduled to fly from Detroit to New York via United Airlines Flight 602 on September 20, 1970, at 11:27 a.m.

DE T-21
September 20, 1970

On September 27, 1970, MICHAEL D. HILL, leader Detroit NCCF, made reservations to leave Detroit on September 27, 1970, via United Airlines Flight 602 arriving New York 11:27 a.m., and reservations on United Airlines Flight 623 leaving La Guarda 6:30 p.m., arriving Detroit 7:15 p.m.

DE T-21
September 27, 1970

ZAYED SHAKUR, BPP, New York, flew to Detroit the evening of October 6, 1970, and will be returning to New York October 7, 1970.

DE T-1
October 7, 1970

MICHAEL D. HILL, leader, Detroit NCCF, returned from a meeting with the BPP New York on October 12, 1970.

DE T-1
October 14, 1970

ZAYED SHAKUR, BPP New York and JOHN HENRY BOWMAN, BPP Philadelphia, came to Detroit to join with MICHAEL D. HILL, leader Detroit NCCF, on October 6, 1970, to record a television show for "Black Talk", a weekly television show which appears on Channel 7, Detroit, every Sunday at 3:00 p.m., with issues of interest to the black community. This show was televised on October 18, 1970, and participants primarily discussed and expressed their versions of the raids on BPP Offices in Philadelphia and New Orleans.

DE T-1
October 19, 1970

BEVERLINA POWELL, financial secretary, Illinois Chapter BPP, arrived in Detroit on November 19, 1970, where she conferred with CHARLES HOLT, second in command, Detroit NCCF regarding the possibility of borrowing busses for the use of Chicago in going to the Constitutional Convention in Washington, D.C., however, none were available.

DE T-1
November 20, 1970

JOHN HENRY BOWMAN, BPP Philadelphia, arrived in Detroit, Friday, December 11, 1970, and left Sunday, December 13, 1970, returning to Philadelphia. He apparently came to Detroit to see LINDA WARNSLEY, one of the Detroit 16 recently released from jail as he did not do anything else while in Detroit.

DE T-1
December 14, 1970

F. Publications

1. Distribution of "The Black Panther" newspaper

The following copies of "The Black Panther" newspaper were received by the Detroit NCCF from National Distribution, 1336 Fillmore Street, San Francisco, California:

Number	Issue date
10,000	July 4, 1970
7,000	July 11, 1970
7,000	July 18, 1970
12,000	July 25, 1970

DE T-1
July 20, 1970

NCCF members are required to sell 150 copies of "The Black Panther" each day.

DE T-1
August 6, 1970

The newspapers dated August 1, 1970, were refused by the NCCF in view of the fact that the airline was unable to locate them until it was time for the NCCF to pick up the papers dated August 6, 1970.

Number	Issue Date
9,600	August 6, 1970
15,000	August 14, 1970
10,000	August 24, 1970
15,000	August 29, 1970

DE T-1
August, 1970

The Detroit NCCF did not pay their newspaper bill during September, 1970.

DE T-1
September 30, 1970

Number	Issue Date
4,200	October 3, 1970
3,000	October 10, 1970
4,000	October 17, 1970
5,000	October 24, 1970
20,000	October 31, 1970

DE T-1
October, 1970

13,000	November 7, 1970
15,000	November 14, 1970
14,000	November 21, 1970
14,000	November 28, 1970

DE T-1
November, 1970

None	December 5, 1970
2,400	December 12, 1970
2,000	December 19, 1970
7,400	December 26, 1970

DE T-1
December, 1970

2. Local Publications

The following articles were published by the Detroit NCCF:

"Fascist Pigs of Highland Park"

"Free People's Picnic"

"Why Should We Re-write the Constitution of the U.S.?"

"Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention"

"Press Release"

"Press Statement"

"Registration Form - Revolutionary People's Plenary Session"

"That's Why I'll Die"

Article on Self-Defense Groups

"Essays From the Minister of Defense, Huey Newton"

"Free Revolutionary Movie"

"Support the Childrens Free Breakfast Program"

"Donate and Support the Children's Free Breakfast"

"Free Busing to Prison Program"

"Organizing Self-Defense Groups"

"Press Release"

Letter regarding the Free Breakfast Program

"Organizing Self-Defense Groups, Part 3"

"Free the Detroit Panthers"

"The Prisons and Jails are Filled with Political Prisoners"

"Fund Raising Rally"

"Free the Detroit 15"

Newspaper article from "The Black Panther" titled "Out With the Old Fascists, in with the New".

"Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention"

"Black Policemen"

"Community News"

"At This time We Must Not Fail Angela"

"Free the Detroit 16"

Poem regarding President Nixon

The above leaflets were furnished July, 1970 through December, 1970, by DE T-1, DE T-3, DE T-23, and DE T-24.

Ministry of Information
Detroit National Committees
To Combat Fascism
2219 Indiandale 8689836
7708 Mack 9213854



FACIST PIGS OF HIGHLAND PARK

Jerome Lawlah was shot and killed on July 10 by this racist owner of the Kozy Korner Bar in Highland Park. This brother was killed in cold blood because he was black. The racist bar owner was taken down to the pig station where he was charged with first degree murder which was later dropped to 2nd degree murder. The brothers and sisters in Highland Park couldn't relate to this murder of this brother and nothing being done about it. The brothers and sisters had protested at the bar. The people of Highland Park were witnesses to the unjustful laws used by the pig's for their unjust act. Saturday evening the bar was burned down. This was an open opportunity for the pig Mayor of Highland Park Blackwell to call in the gestapo pig force into the community. These pigs were carrying weapons in our community that are used in combat in Vietnam. There was an illegal curfew put on in Highland Park by this pig Mayor to try to control the tension of the Community. This low-lifed pig Mayor had the nerve enough to make a statement saying that the people of the community go to their homes and let the local pig force department handle the problems. These pig's came in the community with blood in their eyes and the power of the gun. The inhuman pig's who call themselves protectors of Liberty, are nothing but facists outlaws who patrol our community looking for brothers and sisters to rip off in the name of law and order.

About 150 bloods were arrested on trumped up charges. The brothers and sisters were told to get off the streets or be shot. We as Black People must realize we

Highland Park is th[illegible]ame community where little Da[illegible] Smith was shot down by these racist pigs. The[illegible]eople of this community are no[illegible]going to stand still and see another little Danny Smith get shot down.

Some of the brothers and sisters who are members of the N.C.C.F. were victims of pig harrassment. These brothers and sisters were relating to the people in the community of Highland Park. They were beaten and kidnapped off the streets of Babylon. This is the plot and plan of the facists to try to exterminate the Black Panther Party. The pig's are openly making statements on radio and T.V. to try and destroy the Party. But the Black Panther Party is strong. It is strong because it's the peoples party. After the statement was made by Pig Mayor Blackwell, J. Hog-Head Hoover made a statement about the Black Panther Party being the most dangerous and violent organization in the country. This pig knows that the Black Panther Party is relating the real deal about this foul system. How these pig forces are carrying out the orders of fascism against the American People in general and Black People in particular. J. Hog Head Hoover knows he is a pig and a pig is a pig is a pig. Right On!!

The lying politicians runs this cold game on the people that the U.S. Government is existing for the benefit of the people. The real deal is that the U.S. Government is the largest facist force there is. And the Black Panther Party is hip to the game these low-lifed pigs are trying to run down. So there is no way out for these pigs.

SEIZE THE TIME..BEFORE TIME SEIZES YOU
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DETROIT N.C.C.F.







'PEOPLES FREE PICNIC"

Sunday – August 9, 1970 12 pm – Until

—Belle Isle Park—

"At Band Shell"

345

$1.00 Donations for "Plate Dinners"

All Donations Used For

Political Prisoners Defense fund",

AND

"Constitutional Convention"

Sponsored by – N.C.C.F.

12847 14th-Detroit

—Entertainment — Literature—

—Games—

East Co[redacted], Ministry of Infor.
1370 Boston Road
Bronx, N.Y. 11212
(212) 328 9911-9909

Detroit, [redacted] Ministry of Information
12847 14th Street
Detroit Michigan
or call this number
9213854 Info. Center #2

WHY SHOULD WE REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

The Constitution of the U.S.A. does not and never has protected our people or guaranteed to us those lofty ideals enshrined within it. When the Constitution was first adopted we were held as slaves. We were held in slavery under the constitution. We have suffered every form of indignity and imposition under the Constitution, from ecomic exploitation, political subjugation to physical extermination.

We need no further evidence that there is something wrong with the Constitution of the United States of America. We have had our Human Rights denied and violated perpetually under this Constitution-- for hundreds of years. As a people, we have received neither the Equal Protection of the Laws nor Due Process of Law. Where Human Rights are being daily violated there is denial of Due Process of Law and there is no Equal Protection of the Law. The Constitution of the United States does not guarantee and protect our Economic Rights, or our Political Rights, nor our Social Rights. It does not even guarentee and protect our most basic Human Right, the right to LIVE!

The pigs here in fascist America are using their power to repress the masses of poor and oppressed people. The oppressor makes the laws and then turns these same laws into weapons to be used against the masses of oppressed people.

Evidence of this is seen daily through out the Black Community. Such as the unauthorized imposing of curfew by the mayor of Ecorse, We all learned then that the mayor does not have the authority to impose curfews, on June 12,1970 Mayor Blackwell of Highland Park imposed another of these unauthorized curfews, in which black people were beaten, gased, shot, arrested , for violation of this illegal curfew.

June 28,1970 Red, Lawrence White, and Michael Anderson were attacked, gased, fired upon, arrested, and incarcerated by the Detroit Police Department, and held for 75,000 dollars ransom apiece. These brothers are in Jail today because they chose to defend themselves when attacked, rather than accepting their own murder in the name of so-called law and order.

June 17, 1970 Mrs. Mc Clure and her two sons Malik and, William Mc Clure, and Tommy Ward were for no other reason other than general harassment stopped, harassed viciously beaten, arrested, and charged with resisting and obstructing justice, after which they were also incarcerated.

These are only a very few of the incidents that take place in the oppressed communities through out the United States of America, under the existing constitution of the United States.

We therefore call for a Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention, to be convened by the American people, to write a new Constitution that will guarantee and deliver to every American Citizen the inviolable Human Right to Life, Liberty, and The Pursuit of Happiness!

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEATH TO ALL PIGS
DETROIT N.C.C.F.

Ministry of Information
Detroit National Committees
To Combat Fascism
2219 Indiandale 8689836
7703 Mack 921-3054

HUEY P. NEWTON

REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLES CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. Revolutionary Peoples Planning Session, August 8th and 9th, Washington D.C. The purpose of this session is to construct, and organize the plenary session and to pool resources for the event.

A. Establishing machinery to provide for the following:
   1. A place for the plenary session in Philadelphia.
   2. Housing transportation, and food.
   3. Communications.
   4. Information.
   5. Funds.

B. Implementation of Constitutional Convention Information Center (to be held on national levels) Tentatively the role of the Constitutional Convention Information Center will be to organize and educate around the plenary session and the Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention. This will include the distribution of information and the coordination of efforts to get people to come to the plenary session and the Constitutional Convention.

2. Revolutionary People's Plenary Session (Sept. 5-7, 1970);

The purpose of the Revolutionary Peoples Plenary Session is to bring all progressive forces together for the Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention, lay the bases and organize the structure for a Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention, which will convene on November 4, 1970, at a place to be announced in the near future.

The plenary session will be the first step towards a constitution that will guarantee us the right to life, liberty, and the persuit of happiness; a consitution that has respect for the people, a constitution that serves the people instead of a constitution that serves the ruling class.

The plenary session will lay the ground-work for a true people's constitution. A constitution that takes into account the ethnic and pluralistic nature of this society, and that guarantees proportional representation to all of its people in a society free of the exploitation of man by man.

3. The Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention will be on November 4,70. The location agenda, in particular, for the Revolutionary People's Constitutional convention will be decided at the plenary session.

The locations of the Revolutionary People's Planning Session, August 8th and 9th in Washington, D.C., and the revolutionary Peoples Plenary Session, September 5-7, will be given in later Progress Reports.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
National Headquarters
Ministry of Information
1048 Peralta St.
W. Oakland, California

Wash., D.C., Ministry of Information
2327 18th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009
(202) 265-4418- 19

20

PRESS RELEASE

ON JULY 15, 1979 FBI CHIEF J. EDGAR HOOVER ISSUED A STATEMENT CALLING THE B.P.P. THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF AMERICA; IN THE HISTORY OF THE NATION DAYS AFTER THIS STATEMENT MEMBERS OF THE DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT VICIOUSLY ATTACKED THREE MEMBERS OF THE N.C.C.F. HERE.

MALIK AND WILLIAM McCLURE AND TOMMY WARD WERE HELPING TO PAINT THE HOME OF MRS. EARLENE McCLURE (MOTHER OF MALIK AND WILLIAM). WHEN THEY RAN OUT OF PAINT MALIK AND WILLIAM VOLUNTEERED TO GET MORE. THEY WERE THREE DOORS FROM THE HOUSE WHEN 50 STORMTROOPERS STOPPED THEM AND DEMANDED A CAR REGISTRATION. WHEN THIS WAS PRODUCED THEY COMPLAINED THAT IT WAS UNCLEAR AND SAID THAT THE BROTHERS WERE LYING. THIS WAS ENOUGH FOR THEM TO HAND CUFF THE BROTHERS.

THE TWO BROTHERS TRYED TO CLARIFY THE ISSUE, AND WERE HIT IN THE HEAD WITH GUNS AND CLUBS. BY THIS TIME MRS. McCLURE AND TOMMY HAD COME OUT OF THE HOUSE. WHEN TOMMY CAME OUT ON THE PORCH, THE RACIST DOGS TURNED ON HIM. MRS. McCLURE WAS ATTACKED WHEN SHE WENT OVER TO FIND OUT WHAT WAS HAPPENING TO HER SONS.

MRS. McCLURE, MALIK, TOMMY AND WILLIAM PROTECTED THEMSELVES AS BEST THEY COULD BUT ALL WERE BRUTALLY BEATEN. MALIK SUFFERED SEVERE HEAD WOUNDS, INTERNAL BLEEDING AND BRUISES OVER THE FACE AND UPPER PART OF HIS BODY. TOMMY SUFFERED UNCONCIOUSNESS, BRUISES ON THE FACE AND HEAD, HE HAS FOUR STICHES. WILLIAM AND HIS MOTHER RECEIVED CUTS AND LACERATIONS.

ALL THREE BROTHERS WERE CHARGED WITH RESISTING ARREST, AND OBSTRUCTION OF "JUSTICE" AND RELEASED ON $500.00 BONDS. WE RECOGNIZE THIS MOST RECENT ACT OF BRUTALITY AS AN INTRICATE PART OF THE PREPLANNED ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND ITS ORGANIZATIONAL BUREAUS. FRED HAMPTON SAID IN 1969, THAT YOU CAN KILL A REVOLUTIONARY BUT, YOU CAN'T KILL THE REVOLUTION. WE WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST THE GENOCIDAL POLICYS OF THIS CORRUPT SYSTEM. WE WILL NOT STOP FEEDING HUNGRY CHILDREN OR PROVIDING CLOTHING FOR OUR PEOPLE. THE MURDERES OF AMERICA KNOW THAT WE ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A FREE MEDICAL CLINIC IN DETROIT AND THEY THINK THEY CAN STOP US WITH THEIR FOUL ACTS. OUR ANSWER TO THESE ATTACKS ARE THE SAME- WE WANT AN IMMEDIATE END TO POLICE BRUTALITY AND MURDER OR THE RACIST DOG POLICEMEN WILL FACE THE WRATH OF AN ARMED PEOPLE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

PRESS STATEMENT

SINCE FBI CHIEF J. EDJAR HOOVER ISSUED A STATEMENT ON JULY 15, 1970 CALLING THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF AMERICA; IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, HIS MAIN TASK HAS BEEN TO LIQUIDATE THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY BY MURDER, IMPRISONMENT, AND FRAME - UPS.

AUGUST 10, 1970 TONY NORMAN, ROBERT SMITH, RONNIE IRWIN, DELPHINE Mc RAY, AND TEDDY ROBERTSON ALL MEMBERS OF THE N.C.C.F., WERE VICIOUSLY ATTACKED, AND BRUTALLY BEATEN, BY MEMBERS OF THE DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT. THE EXCUSE USED THIS TIME BY THE D.P.D. TO SO CALLED JUSTIFY THE ATTACK, STEMMED FROM AN ACCUSATION MADE BY THE OFFICER ON THE BEAT AT THE CORNERS OF STATE AND WOODWARD, THAT LINDA LAURA: ALSO A MEMBER OF THE N.C.C.F. ., HAD THROWN SOME PAPER ONTO THE SIDEWALK. LINDA TOLD HIM THAT SHE HAD NOT, THE OFFICER SAID "EITHER PICK UP THE PAPER OR I'LL GIVE YOU A TICKET FOR LITTERING" THEN HE RADIOED FOR REINFORCEMENT AND PROCEEDED TO ARREST THE SISTER. 30 STORMTROOPERS ANSWERED THE CALL TO ARREST ONE SISTER. TONY, TEDDY, RONNIE, ROBERT, AND DELPHINE, ALONG WITH OTHER PEOPLE WENT OVER TO FIND OUT JUST WHAT WAS GOING ON, AFTER FINDING OUT THEY BEGAN TO RELATE TO THE PEOPLE AROUND THEM OF THE INJUSTICE TAKING PLACE, THE STORMTROOPERS IMMEDIATLY ATTACKED THEM BEATING THEM WITH THEIR FISTS, BILLY CLUBS, BLACK JACKS, AS THEY FELL THE BEATING CONTINUED THEY WERE STOMPED AND KICKED, NEARLY UNCONSIOUS. THESE BROTHERS AND SISTERS PROTECTED THEMSELVES AS BEST THEY COULD, BUT ALL WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LINDA WERE TAKEN TO THE 1st PRECINCT, AFTER REACHING THE 1st PRECINCT RONNIE WAS AGAIN BEATEN.

ALL FIVE WERE THROWN INTO CELLS AND NOT INFORMED OF THEIR CHARGES, TONY AND TEDDY WERE HOSPITALIZED WITH CUTS AND BRUISES, RECEIVED DURING THE BEATING, TEDDY RECIEVED 13 STICHES TO THE HEAD AND RIGHT HAND, TONY HAS A POSSIBLE CONCUSSION.

WE REALIZE THAT THIS ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THESE MEMBERS OF THE DETROIT N.C.C.F. IS PART AND PARCEL OF J. EDGAR HOOVERS' PREPLANNED LIQUIDATION OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY. THEY BELIEVE THAT THESE ATTACKS WILL DISCOURAGE USE IN OUR STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION, BUT WE WILL NOT BE DISCOURAGED. IT ONLY SHOWS MORE CLEARLY THAT OUR STRUGGLE IS JUST AND VERY NECESSARY.

AS #7 OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY PLATFORM AND PROGRAM STATES: "WE WANT AN IMMEDIATE END TO POLICE BRUTALITY AND MURDER OF BLACK PEOPLE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DETROIT N.C.C.F.

22

REGISTRATION FORM

for REPRESENTATIVES or INDIVIDUALS for the

REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S PLENARY SESSION

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY GYMNASIUM
McGONIGLE HALL
BROAD & MONTGOMERY STREET, PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

SEPTEMBER 5-7, 1970

UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED OF CHANGE:

CHECK-IN CENTER IS ------	Church of the Advocate 18th & Diamond Streets Philadelphia, Pa.
CHECK-IN TIME STARTS ----	Friday, September 4th at 12 noon thru Saturday, September 5th, 4 PM
PLENARY SESSION STARTS --	Saturday evening, September 5th at 7 PM

We suggest to all people, representatives and parties of organizations to arrive early as possible starting Friday, September 4th, 12 noon so that everyone can be properly assisted in getting housing and other necessary information that many thousands will need to know for the duration of the Plenary Session.

(Cut along this line and mail this section of the Registration)

Please check all appropriate squares:

☐ I AM COMING TO THE REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S PLENARY SESSION.
☐ I WILL NOT NEED HOUSING ARRANGEMENTS.
☐ I WILL NEED HOUSING ARRANGEMENTS.
☐ I WILL NOT NEED TRANSPORTATION. ☐ I WILL NEED TRANSPORTATION
☐ OTHER MEMBERS OF MY ORGANIZATION WILL ALSO ATTEND.
☐ I WOULD LIKE TO ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION INFORMATION CENTER IN MY AREA. (If this is for an organization, please send name, address and other pertinent particulars.)

PLEASE SEND REGISTRATION BLANKS, INFORMATION ETC., SO THAT I MAY AID THE PLENARY SESSION BY DUPLICATING AND DISTRIBUTING MATERIALS, LEAFLETS, POSTERS, BUMPER STICKERS, ETC.

I WILL ENCLOSE $________ TO HELP WITH THE COST OF THE PLENARY SESSION.

****

NAME______________________________
STREET ADDRESS______________________________
CITY________________STATE__________ZIP__________
HOME PHONE______________ORGANIZ.______NON-ORGANIZ.__________
PHONE (FOR ORG.)______________ADDRESS______________________
CITY______________________STATE______________________

****

The REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION is PROJECTED to NOVEMBER 4, 1970 (ELECTION DAY) LOCATION and PLANS will be DEVELOPED at the PLENARY SESSION

MAIL THIS REGISTRATION FORM TO:

Western Regional Headquarters
National Headquarters - Ministry of Information
1048 Peralta Street - W. Oakland, California
(415) 465-5047/48/49

Northeast Regional Headquarters
East Coast Ministry of Information
1370 Boston Road - Bronx, New York 11212
(212) 328-9911/9009

Midwest Regional Headquarters
Illinois Chapter
2350 W. Madison - Chicago, Illinois
(312) 738-0778/779

Southern Regional Headquarters
Ministry of Information
2327 18th St., NW - Wash., DC 20009
(202) 265-4418/19

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
N.C.C.F. DETROIT
12847 14th ST.
869-1058

THESE ARE THE SAME TANKS THAT OCCUPIED THE BLACK COMMUNITY IN DETROIT IN 1967 AND THEY ARE THE SAME TANKS THAT WILL ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY THE COMMUNITY In 1970!

THAT'S WHY I'LL DIE

I was born September 7, 1942--a baby--a boy--a slave. I died sometime in August, 1970--an ex-slave--a revolutionary.

My name is Michael D. and as much as I dig life, as much as I want to be with my family, my three children; Eric, Damon and Oneke and everyone I love, my mother--just everyone, but I think that the time has come when the price for struggling against this murderous, fascist government and all its repressive forces and lackey running dogs, has to be paid.

The eminence of death has been with me since I joined the Black Panther Party in September 1968, but it has never been as strong as it is now. It seems as though all that my mind is turned to now is how to die like a man. My sons and my daughter and my people deserve nothing less. My only regret is that I wish I would have worked harder and been able to see with my own eyes, the people rising like a mighty storm-with guns--with guns for self-defense in their hands.

I have already tasted the fruits of socialism within the ranks of the Party. It is a good taste. I have seen niggas from off the street become educated and given a socialist consciousness. Those who once stole and lied and cheated and robbed, and pimped and sold dope to black people now sharing and doing without to make sure his or her comrade had some. Niggas excepting someone elses child as their own. Niggas who like myself, lived only for themselves, now ready to give their most precious jewels to the people--their lives.

24

Today is August 2, 1970. I am in the city of Detroit, working with the N.C.C.F. here. A lot of us will be dead soon--very soon. The chief of Pigs in this city--Murphy has conspired with the head of the F.B.I., J. Edgar Hoover (Pig) to attack and destroy the members of the N.C.C.F. here. At this very moment the 10th precinct is and has been for two weeks stock piling weapons, and when I say weapons, I mean tanks and half tracks and all the conventional weapons of modern warfare to attack what they call the "Panther Complex"--not office but complex. They (the pigs) have been trying hard to create an incident. First the news media comes out with a lie that we have over 200 weapons and over 100,000 rounds of ammunition at this office alone. This statement was made a week after a minor rebellion went down in an area known as Highland Park where the Mayor stated after occupying the community, shooting and beating Black people--"I don't know why the Black Panthers want to pick on my little city." When in actuality it was the people responding to the racist murders of people at the Kozy Korner Bar. The brother was shot after an argument ensued because the brother didn't have the money for a drink. The brother was Black--the murderer was White--the brother was unarmed. The people's response was; the bar was immediately burnt down and niggas hit the streets. The Panthers were the scapegoat. When we went into the area to educate the people to the pigs tactics we were immediately arrested.

About four days ago the people around the office here on Indiandale hung posters and when the pigs attempted to tear them down they were run away. Then the people got really uptight and began saying that this is their community, and they have a right to do what they want to do. So they changed the street from Indiandale & 14th to Panther Ave. and Free Red. They sang revolutionary songs and rapped about how they would like things to be for everybody. The following morning a pig was shot at, trying to sneak up and pull down the sign. The N.C.C.F. was blamed immediately, a few hours later a channel 50 news car was fired on in the same neighborhood, again the N.C.C.F. was blamed -- immediately the area was surrounded by pigs of the 10th precinct. They did this without permission from Pig Chief Murphy. They were about to attack when orders came and they were instructed not to make a move because they were not equipped to handle the situation. That they were in reality about to be barbequed because it just so happens that the people here relate to the Black Panther Party and it would be impossible to move on us without moving on the whole West Side. That's why the 10th Precinct right now has tanks and half tracks and 50 cal. machine guns--to kill niggas. That's why today August 2nd, pigs have been going door to door telling people where to lay in their house when the attack comes. They also stated that if they were to come out on the street that they would be killed.

So this is no joke, this is war in the truest sense of the word. This is the highest form of politics. We want freedom--they want blood. I say they can have mine, I guess I won't see my mother or "Li'l Bra" any more or Maria, or Kathy or Ora--e women most close to my heart. Or drink no more wine with [illegible], or get cursed out Landon and Big Bob, the two niggas I learned the most from.

All because they have people that have no respect for the needs and desires of he masses of people. Because they would rather kill and oppress rather than share n the vast wealth that this planet possesses. Because they oppose all that is proressive, we must die. Eldridge is in exile--but he's coming home, Huey was in jail--ut he's home, Bobby is in jail facing the electric chair but he's coming home, andon and Rory and countless other prisoners of war will be back--right here on the treets--niggas will be free and that is a fact that the reactionary pig forces on't want to relate too. Niggas will have the power to determine their own destiny nd that's what I'm fighting for and that's why I'll die.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS!
N.C.C.F. DETROIT MICHIGAN
MICHAEL D.


Each of us must be a match for a hundred.
We as a people united must move now to achieve our goals of complete and total freedom to determine our own destinies.

26

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
N.C.C.F. DETROIT
12847 14th St.
869-1058

PART 1

In organizing self-defense groups at this stage of the struggle the most important consideration is whether or not the person to be in incorporated into the group understands fully that what he or she is doing is the right thing to do. At this stage of the struggle if any members of a self-defense group are weak minded or do not understand that the only way to put an end to brutality & murder is to organize self-defense groups & counter-attack, practice has shown that if this weak minded person is ever captured he or she will certainly not be able to withstand the methods of persuasion used by the fascist pigs and they will talk, give up information. So the first priority for any self-defense group is to be armed ideologically.

Because of the consequences if anything goes wrong during an operation, members within the group must maintain a face to face relationship, get to know each others strength and weaknesses thoroughly, and participate fully in the planning of operations. Liberalism at this level can cost the lives of comrades and/or jeopardize the success of an operation.

At this time self-defense groups should have no more than four to six members. The struggle at this time requires no operation that cannot be hanlced by four to six people. Also security is sacrificed the larger the group. At this time self-defense groups should be formed all across Babylon, North, South, East and West. However, at this time groups must work autonomously. Under no circumstances should any group seek out and try to make contact with another group. Due to the fact that this level of struggle is in its embryonic stages and fools, agents and provacateurs are scattered all across Babylon; if autonomy is maintained when a member of a group is captured he or she will only be able to give up information on one group, their own.

27



Field Marshall
DON COX

Know the enemy. At this time t
pigs have three things going for th

1 Communication
2 mobility
3 information

C. M. I.

COMMUNICATION



MOBILITY



INFORMATION

When planning any operation the pi

PART 11

Due to the brainwashing done by TV, movies, comics ect, there are a lot of incorrect ideas about firearms that must be cleared up. The first thing to understand is, there is no piece (gun) that covers any and all situations. Although they show pigs on TV and in the movies killing people a block away with a snub-nose 38 revolver, in reality this is not very practical and shouldn't even be attempted unless you are an expert's expert. From seeing to much Wyatt Earp and Mat Dillon, too many people think that if they have a hand gun either pistol or revolver that they are ready for anything. All that is necessary to give you a different perspective is to examine the armament of the pigs that occupy our Black Communities anywhere in Babylon. When you do that you will discover that most pig cars have at least one .12 gauge pump or automatic shotgun, one or two semi-automatic or automatic assault rifles, one or two bolt action rifles with a scope mounted for snipping purposes, and of course, the pigs have strapped on at least one handgun either an automatic pistol or a revolver. In San Francisco, the S.F. Tactical Squad members carry two handguns, their standard service revolver plus a second handgun which is their personal preference; in many cases an automatic pistol. So at this time let's examine these three types of weapons; the shotgun, the rifle, and the handgun.





.12 GUAUGE SHOTGUN: the pigs use the hotgun, either pump or semi-automatic, oaded with 00 buckshot generally in rowd situations such as rebellions. The tandard load is nine (9) buckshot pellets er shell, however there is the magnum oad of 12 pellets per shell. These magnum loads are to be used only in magum shot-ns. If you

The pigs also use slugs, 1 giant lea ball. In the plans the Berkeley pig dept. had drawn up to attack National Headquart of the Black Panther Party, they inte to use slugs to knock the amour plate off of our windows and to knock out the doors This photograph shows what slugs used by Chicago pigs did to the steel plate on the door of our office there.





There is also a tear gas shell now designed to be fired from a .12 gauge gun.

Every Black home should have at leas one .12 gauge shotgun to be used to prot the door. Use 00 buckshot and it will dea with any criminals trying to enter uninvi Cuban guerrilas used shotguns very succes fully in the revolutionary war led by Fid Castro. They would set up ambushes close to roads usually only a few feet away and shotguns loaded with 00 buck would have a devastating effect upon the occupants of cars and/or trucks.

There is one thing about shotguns that possibly can be viewed as in our fav at this time, that is, that the barrel is smooth inside so it doesn't put any marks on the pellets; therefore, the pigs can't make an investigation based on ballistic marks.



28



THE RIFLE: The bolt-action rifle in .30-06 or .308 (7.62 MM Nato) with a four (4) power scope (or better) mounted, is a snipping weapon. A specialist piece. This virulent (deadly) combination is for one purpose, and one purpose only-to fire ONE well placed shot. So each self-defense unit needs only one such weapon at this time. There is nothing else to say about that.

The assault rifle is either semi-automatic or preferable one that can be fired either semi-automatic or fully automatic. The limit here is that posed by the limit of the enemy's arsenal. Here we will discuss the most common seen in our communities carried by the gestapo pig forces. The AR-15 caliber .223 is the semi-automatic civilian model called "sporting" model of the M-16 used in Vietnam. The M-16 fires either semi-auto or fully auto. After the lives of many brothers were lost in Vietnam because the weapon was new and untested, it has now been de-bugged and is fairly reliable. It can be found on all military bases and some gestapo police arsenals. The AR-15 was taken off the public market and has been replaced by the AR-180 caliber .223. The AR-180 does not appear to be as good as the AR-15. However, many pig departments are stocking up on them.



Another very good assault rifle is the M-14 caliber 7.62MM Nato (.308 in English). This is a very good weapon although it has been replaced by the lighter M-16 in the fascist military. Most national guard units, at least here in California, are equipped with the M-14. Check your local National Guard availability.

The Thompson Sub-Machine gun if in good working order is very reliable in ..45 ACP caliber. It fires either semi or fully auto. One rewarding feature is it uses the same ammunition as the .45 automatic pistol cutting down on the variety of ammunition necessary for you [illegible]

Finally the age-old M1-Garand
caliber 30-06. Very good, plenty of t
around, heavy and accurate way out, e
to get and plenty of ammo. around. Ch
your pawn shops and gun shops also se
national guard units and college ROTC
units have them readily available.

The M1-30 caliber carbine? Use i
for target practice and training.

Assault rifles are to be used in
fire fights, more commonly known as s
outs. People waging wars of liberatio
around the world also use assault rif
to annihilate (wipe out) their enemy'
in ambushes and in counter attacks ag-
ainst fascist military outpost.

HANDGUNS: There are two types,
semi-automatic pistols and revolvers.
There are so many different brands an
calibers, I will only deal with what
consider to be the best choices.



.357 Magnum revolver made by eit
Colt or Smith & Wesson. It holds six
shots and with armour piercing ammo is
supposed to crack an engine block. Man
pig departments have switched or are swit
from .38 special to .357. There was an in
dent where a brother was defending himsel
against a pig and fired at the pig with a
special. The bullet hit the pig's badge a
was deflected. Had the brother been using
.357 magnum that would have been one bar-
que pig.



9MM automatic pistol. Although pistol
are called 'automatic' they really are sem
automatic. The trigger has to be pressed f
every shot. I recommend the Browning 9MM

If you put one in the chamber that means 14 shots available. If you're up against someone with a 6 shot revolver, they will have to reload 2 times and you've still got two shots left. You can also purchase a 21 shot magazine. That's a lot of fire power for a handgun.



.45 Automatic pistol. This is still the sidearm issued to the U.S. fascist military troops. They also can be purchased in stores. There also seems to be a lot of these available in the streets. Check with your local street merchants.

Even if you have the finest self-d
weapons they are no better than clubs i
you don't know how to use them. By the
token if you practice, it is possible t
good enough to kill elephants with a .2
However with enough practice with the a
mentioned weapons and being armed ideol-
ically with the invincible thought of t
Black Panther Party, it is possible lik
the Panthers who were attacked in Los A
in December to be a match for one hundr

COUNTER ATTACK
D.C.

"...Only by taking up arms can we seize power. Without taking up arms we cannot attain power.. In order to seize power we should wage an armed struggle; it is impossible to seize power by playing elections."

"ARM YOURSELF OR
HARM YOURSELF"

ESSAYS FROM
THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE
HUEY NEWTON

"IN DEFENSE OF SELF DEFENSE:
THE CORRECT HANDLING OF A REVOLUTION."

The Vanguard Party must provide leadership for the people. It mus teach the correct strategic methods of prolonged resistance through literature and activities. If the activities of the party are respected b the people, the people will follow the example. This is the primary jo of the party. This knowledge will probably be gained second-hand by th masses just as the above mentioned was gained indirectly. When the peo le learn that it is no longer advantageous for them to resist by going into the streets in large numbers, and when they see the advantage in t activities of the guerrilla warfare method, they will quickly follow th example.

But first, they must respect the party which is transmitting this message. When the Vanguard group destroys the machinery of the oppres by dealing with him in small groups of three and four, and then escapes the might of the oppressor, the masses will be overjoyed and will adher to this correct strategy. When the masses hear that a gestapo policem has been executed while sipping coffee at a counter, and the revolution executioners fled without being traced, the masses will see the validit of this type of approach to resistance. It is not necessary to organiz thirty million Black people in primary groups of two's and three's but important for the party to show the people how to go about revolution. During slavery, in which no vanguard party existed and forms of communication were severely restricted and insufficient, many slave revolts occurred.

The Black Panther Party for Self Defense teaches that in the final analysis, the amount of guns and defense weapons, such as hand grenades bazookas, and other necessary equipment, will be supplied by taking the weapons from the power structure, as exemplified by the Viet Cong. The fore, the greater the military preparation on the part of the oppressor the greater is the availability of weapons for the black community. I is believed by some hypocrites that when the people are taught by the vanguard group to prepare for resistance, this only brings the man down on them with increasing violence and brutality; but the fact of the mat is that when the man becomes more oppressive, this only heightens the r olutionary fervor. The people never make revolution. The oppressors b their brutal actions cause the resistance by the people. The vanguard party only teaches the correct methods of resistance. So, if things car get worse for oppressed people, then they will feel no need for revoluti or resistance. The complaint of the hypocrites that the Black Panther Party for Self Defense is exposing the people to deeper suffering is an incorrect observation. People have proved that they will not tolerate more oppression by the racist dog police through their rebellions in th black communities across the country. The people are looking now for guidance to extend and strengthen their resistance struggle.



ARM YOURSE 3/ OR HARM YOURSELF

C

FREE
Revolutionary

Sunday
3:00 P.M.
Sept. 27

MOVIE

"THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS"

THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS IS A MOVIE THAT SHOWS HOW THE POOR OPPRESSED MASSES OF ALGIERS DEALT DEATH BLOWS TO THE FRENCH ARMY WHO WERE IN THEIR COMMUNITIES, HARRASSING, BRUTALIZING AND MURDERING, THE SAME WAY THE AMERICAN ARMY PIGS AND NATIONAL GUARDS ARE IN OUR COMMUNITY.

THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS IS SHOWING THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE'S OF ALGIERS DEALING WITH URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE, CONSTANTLY INTENSIFYING THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FRENCH PIGS, STRIVING TOWARD THEIR GOAL OF LIBERATION. SHOWING ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLE'S OF THE WORLD THAT IN ORDER TO GET RID OF THE GUN ONE MUST PICK UP THE GUN.

WE NEED A NEW CONSTITUTION

THE MOVIE WILL BE SHOWN AT 12847 14th STREET, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION FOR THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM. A POLITICAL ORGANIZING BUREAU OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CALL- 8691058

SUPPORT THE CHILDRENS FREE BREAKFAST PROGRAM

THE WORLD IS YOURS, AS WELL
AS OURS, BUT IN THE LAST
ANALYSIS, IT IS YOURS.
YOU YOUNG PEOPLE,
FULL OF VIGOR
AND VITALITY
ARE IN THE BLOOM
OF LIFE,
LIKE THE SUN AT
EIGHT OR NINE IN
THE MORNING.
OUR HOPE
IS PLACED
ON YOU!



SCHOOL IS OPEN AND THE END OF SUMMER VACATION HAS COME ALSO THE END OF THE FREE LUNCH PROGRAM.

THERE WILL BE FOUR CENTERS OPEN TO SERVE THE FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN. ALL THE YOUTH OF THE COMMUNITY OF DETROIT WILL BE FED A BALANCED HOT BREAKFAST BEFORE THEY GO TO SCHOOL.

THE RESPONSE TO THE LUNCH PROGRAM WAS RIGHT ON, WE WERE SERVING APPROX. 350 CHILDREN LUNCHES THIS SUMMER OUT OF TWO CENTERS. LETS STRIVE TO TOP THE LUNCH PROGRAM AND FEED EVERY CHILD IN DETROIT A HOT MEAL EVERY SCHOOL DAY MORNING.

TIME 7:00 am TIL 8:30 am
DAYS MON. THRU FRI.
LOCATIONS:

INFO. CENTER #1
2219 INDIANDALE
INFO. CENTER #2
7703 MACK
ST. LEO
15th GRAND RIVER
NORTH END
BELMONT & JOHN R.

WE NEED DONATIONS OF FOOD, MONEY AND WORKERS. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT OUR OFFICE AT: 2219 INDIANDALE, 869-1058 OR AT 7703 MACK. OFFICE HOURS ARE FROM 9:00 A.M. UNTIL 9:00 P.M. EVERYDAY OF THE WEEK. MON-SUN.

33

N.C.C.F. DETROIT
12845 14th ST.

Free
ALL
political
prisoners

FREE BUSING TO PRISON PROGRAM

E OF THE PURPOSES OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE'S TO COMBAT FASCISM
TO IMPLEMENT PROGRAMS AND SERVICES THAT ARE FREE AND BENEFICIAL
THE BLACK COMMUNITY. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE ARE IMPLEMENTING A
EE BUSING TO PRISONS PROGRAM FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE FRIENDS, SON'S
RELATIVES AT JACKSON STATE PENITENTIARY. THE INMATES THERE ARE
ST ALLOWED THREE VISITS A MONTH AND ARE SUBJECTED TO DEHUMANI-
NG LIVING CONDITIONS. NUMBER EIGHT OF OUR TEN POINT PARTY PLAT-
RM STATES: WE WANT FREEDOM FOR ALL BLACK MEN HELD IN FEDERAL,
ATE, COUNTY, CITY, PRISONS AND JAILS. WE KNOW THAT THEY HAVEN'T
CIEVED A FAIR TRIAL IN RACIST BABYLON. BLACK PEOPLE ARE BEING
DGED BY A JURY OF RACIST WHITES AND BLACKS OF A DIFFERENT PEER
OUP THAT HAS NO UNDERSTANDING OF THE AVERAGE MAN FROM THE BLACK
MMUNITY. WE FEEL THAT BLACK PEOPLE SHOULD BE RETRIALED IN THE
ACK COMMUNITY BY PEOPLE FROM THE SAME SOCIAL AND ECONMICAL BACK-
ROUND. THE FREE PRISON BUSSING PROGRAM WILL PROVIDE A MEANS OF
ANSPORTATION FOR THE RELATIVES AND A BOOST FOR THE INMATES MORALE.
'RE ASKING ALL CONCERNED ORGANIZATIONS, GROUPS, SOCIAL CLUBS,
URCHES AND INDIVIDUALS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PROGRAM.

WE NEED: BUSES OR VANS
DRIVERS
MONEY

E FREE PRISON BUSING PROGRAM WILL START SATURDAY OCTOBER 3, 1970
SITING DAYS ARE WEDNESDAY'S AND SATURDAY'S FROM 8 A.M. TO 5 P.M.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CALL

FO. CENTER #1
219 INDIANDALE
TROIT, MICH.
9-1058

OR
CONTACT

INFO. CENTER #2
7708 MACK
DETROIT, MICH.

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS
NATIONAL COMMITTEE'S TO COMBAT
FASCISM

35

Do.. te & Support

The Children's Free Breakfast Program

ys: mon-fri

7:00 - 8:30

INISTRY OF INFO.

12847 14th

NORTH END

BELMONT & JOHN R.

FO. CENTER #2

7708 MACK

ST. LEO'S

15th GRAND RIVER

The National Committees to Combat Fascism, organizing bureau of the Black Panther Party would like to inform the communities of the childrens free breakfast program at this time.

The breakfast programs are not only to feed the children in our community but also to bring the children, parents, and all people of the community together, to work and see to it that every child is fed a balanced breakfast each morning.

This being the peoples breakfast, our goal is to spread this program throughout the communities in Michigan. This is the peoples program and without the peoples support we have nothing. Since this is a basic necessity, it has to be met.

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
12845 14th

24

V1

ORGANIZING SELF DEFENSE GROUPS

6 ON REVOLVERS

Y PRECAUTIONS:

heck to see if gun is loaded. You do on a revolver by swinging out the cylin- Pull back on the cylinder latch and y push out on the cylinder. (see unload- revolver photo #2)

eep your finger off the trigger unless icing trigger squeeze or firing.

oint your gun away from where someone o shot-Point at the ceiling or to the , but wherever you point, make sure no s in the way and can be harmed.

ver leave the hammer cocked on a revol- (Explanation later on cocking a revolver.)

OF REVOLVERS:

ubnose - This gun has only a 2" barrel hoots 38's. It is very easy to conceal.

ecial - Has a 4" barrel and shoots 38's.

agnum - This is the type of handgun the rries. The ammo for this is .357 magnum. piercing bullets will pierce an engine This is the best type of revolver to

d .44 Magnums - Have more knock down than a .357 Magnum. The highway Patrol s these to shoot through car doors, .357 will go through a car door also 57 ammunition is more plentiful.

UNLOADING:

Holding gun in left hand (pointed in safe direction) release cylinder latch with right hand, (#3). Push out cylinder with the fingers of left hand (#2). Now that you have swung out the cylinder and the bullets are visible you gently push down on the extractor and let bullets drop out into your right hand (#4).

LOADING:

To load, simply follow the same steps in unlatching the cylinder. Then drop bullets into the chambers of your cylinder. Gently push cylinder closed, and you are ready to fire. DO NOT SLAM CYLINDER CLOSED, this causes extra wear on your gun.

COCKING A REVOLVER:

Put the tip of your thumb on the hammer holding revolver steady in the palm of your hand. Do not put your finger in the trigger. Pull straight back steadily on your hammer spur until your hammer locks back. Your gun is ready to fire. After cocking hammer, place your thumb directly on the frame besides the hammer, resting the tip of your thumb on the cylinder latch. (Photo #4) Your forefinger should be placed on the other side of the gun straight out just above the trigger guard until ready to fire. Everytime you cock the hammer before firing, this is called single action firing.

PARTS OF A REVOLVER:
PHOTO # 1

REVOLVER TERMS



36



PHOTO # 2



ADING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 3

CKING A REVOLVER PHOTO #4

UN-COCKING A REVOLVER [illegible]ADED):

Keep your finger off the trigger! With gun already cocked, place your thumb on the hammer firmly, Now with the gun firmly in your hand, pointed in a safe direction, and thumb firmly on the hammer (still cocked) squeeze the hammer releasing. IMMEDIATELY TAKE YOUR FINGER OFF THE TRIGGER and slowly let the hammer go down into place with your thumb still holding it. DO NOT TAKE YOUR THUMB OFF THE HAMMER, let your thumb ride with the hammer very slowly until it is completely depressed and uncocked. By leaving your finger in the trigger, or letting the hammer fly forward you will FIRE THE GUN. Practice cocking and uncocking your revolver with the gun unloaded. (Photo# 6)



UNLOCKING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 6

SINGLE ACTION PHOTO # 5

STEPS IN FIRING A REVOLVER:

The following steps must be observed in accurate shooting. If you don't pay attention to all four steps you will end up shooting just anywhere. Before you can learn to just draw and shoot you must observe the first steps in shooting. Practice these steps with your gun unloaded, until you can get them down pat, you will be able to see if you are following them correctly by the way you shoot.

ITIONS IN FIRING:

here are various positions in firing (shown) ow). Each one is used for a different battle dition. The prone position is for when you being shot at and you have no cover, lay n as shown below making yourself as small a get as possible. The kneeling position is when you can get behind a car or something, in making yourself as small a target as sible, and your standing position can be d in defense (for making yourself a small get) or for use in pursuit or offense. You ld learn and become comfortable in each of e positions, because you never know what a ation might dictate.



DOUBLE ACTION PHOTO # 7



STANDING (DEFENSE)



KNEELING POSITION



PRONE POSITION

Sight Alignment is aligning your rear sight front sight together,

Sight Picture is placing the sights on your get with your already aligned.

Breath Control consists of taking a breath, ting a little out, holding the rest until have completed your trigger squeeze and the t has been fired.

Trigger squeeze is very important in accu- e shooting. When shooting single action apply w steady pressure on the trigger. The shot uld not be anticipated, it should not be a prise to you, When shooting double action or id firing, quick steady pressure must be app- d. Be sure not to jerk the trigger. Use the of your finger. When shooting double action might have to use more pressure."



TOS # 5&7

38

TONS OF POINTING, SINGLE AC N, CTION, AND RAPID FIRE

ction: cocking the hammer each time be-
ing. Cock the hammer and then pull the

ction: just pulling the trigger each
t cocking the hammer first. Try not to
snap the trigger. The action is fast but

: the process of firing quickly without
ght alignment. You simply draw and point
el at your target and fire.
ring: drawing, pointing, and shooting
ction. When you practice rapid firing,
f two shots in succession as quickly as

YOUR REVOLVER:

l of the revolvers listed at the beginning
rticle you can use a .38 caliber cleaning
will need a cleaning rod, bore brush tip,
ber cleaning solvent, and gun oil. For
you can use material like flannel, and some
cotton, any material that does not ravel
ry linty, cut into circles about 2" in
. All of this cleaning material can be pur-
n any gun store.

evolver should be cleaned twice a week, and
me after firing. Keep it free of dust and
to avoid rusting. If you do not clean your
diately after firing it can cause corrosion
arrel and eat away at it causing your shoot-
ecome inaccurate because of holes that can
from the powder eating away at the
rust from a lack of cleaning and damp-

r firing your barrel and chambers in
nder have to be scrubbed with your bore
d solvent everytime. Attach brush to
brush in solvent, and use a brisk move-
and out of barrel and chambers in cy-
cleaning out all of the particles by
barrel up to light to see if it shines
and you will be able to see any part-
till holding on.
and 9
ach bore brush and put tip on the end of
ip a patch through the tip and mop the
and cylinder until the patch comes out
Use each patch about 10 times. You will
use more than one patch to mop barrel
ely clean.
n attach clean patch to rod and add 2 to
of oil on patch and mop already dried
with oil. DO NOT soak patch in oil.

PHOTO # 8



PHOTO # 9

39

. After cleaning the barrel [illegible]d cylinder, take
patch with a little solvent on it and wipe—
ff your extractor and all other metal parts
outside of cylinder, and the inside of the gun.
ock the hammer and wipe it off thoroughly,
rop a couple of drops of oil down in hammer.)
HOTOS 11 and 12

. Take a patch and with a couple of drops of
il on it rub your revolver, (all metal parts)
ightly. There should be no visible finger
rints on your revolver or excessive streaks on
he outside. Your gun should not have an oily
urface, just apply enough oil for protection
gainst rust.
HOTO 10

, Sometimes for extra hard to get arears you
ll have to use a toothbrush dipped into a
ittle solvent and brush briskly the hard to get
reas. Sometimes your bore brush will not remove
l rust; in that case use fine steel wool and
lvent, rubbing lightly to remove rust.

**For normal cleaning just run a patch through
he barrel and cylinder and wipe off the gun
ith a few drops of oil on patch.



PHOTO # 10:



PHOTO # 11

PHOTO # 12

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
N.C.C.F. DETROIT
12847 14th St.
869-1058

7

past articles of our newsp. . ult rifles have been lightly [illegible]e . This article will go into the 2 c assault rifles that are most com- at the present time.

e first weapon that we will deal with he AR-15/16, which is the latest dev- ment in combat weaponry. This rifle sed by the fascist pig army in Viet It was a replacement for the M-14. M-16 is a 5.56 mm, Magazine fed, gas- ated air-cooled, shoulder weapon. By ging the position of a selector lever rifle can be made to shoot fully auto- c. The rifle also has a flash suppres- mounted on the muzzle. The barrel is ounded by heat resistant material, of fiberglass, which has been shaped a handguard and forearm. There are accessories that can be added such as: net, grenade launcher, and rocket cher, The gun holds a 20 or 30 round zine, but to insure operation it is able to never fill any magazine to stated capacity. Nineteen(19) in the hot magazine, and 27 - 28 in the 30 magazine will work best. The rifle has zle velocity of 3,250 feet per second muzzle energy of 1,300 pounds. What means is that the bullet leaves the traveling 3,250 feet in one second ng someone with 1,300 foot pounds of energy. So as yo[illegible]an see this small bullet travels at a very[illegible]igh rate of speed. The bullet is said to be one of the most deadly caliber of all; when it hits its target it starts to tumble, tearing everything it hits. The picture above shows what damage this rifle can do.

Firing semi-automatic the M-16 will shoot up to 45 to 65 rounds per minute; Fully-automatic it shoots 150 to 200 rounds per minute. The gun has a killing range up to 500 yards. (100 yards is the length of a football field). Comparing the M-16 to the M-14, the M-16 fires faster semi-automatic than the M-14 does fully automatic. The ammunition that the M-16 uses, 5.56 mm, also called .223 caliber, weighs half as much as the 7.62 NATO, that the M-14 shoots or the 30.06 which the M-I Garrand shoots. Therefore it is possible to carry twice as much
The model that has been explained so far is the government military version. There is a commercial model that is still being sold in gun stores, although not in large quantities; it is called the AR-15. The only difference between the two is the AR-15 does not have a selector switch that enables you to change the fire from semi-automatic to automatic fire. The bolt of the AR-15 is not chrome-plated like the M-16, and the M-16 is made up of a heavy mat-

PHOTO #2

RIFLE, 5.56-MM, XM16E1, RIGHT AND LEFT SIDE VIEWS


FRONT SIGHT ASSEMBLY
HANDGUARD
SLIP RING
CARRYING HANDLE
CHARGING HANDLE
FLASH SUPPRESSOR
BOLT CATCH
BIPOD
MAGAZINE
SELECTOR LEVER
STOCK
FORWARD ASSIST ASSEMBLY
REAR SIGHT DRUM
RUBBER RECOIL PAD
EJECTION PORT
SLING
BAYONET STUD
DUST COVER
REAR SLING SWIVEL
PISTOL GRIP
TRIGGER
MAGAZINE RELEASE BUTTON
UPPER SLING SWIVEL
BIPOD

41

PRESS RELEASE OCTOBER 25, 1970

On October 24, 1970, at approximately 6:30 PM, two racist pigs from the 2nd Precinct, without provocation, brutally beat 2 black youths on the corners of Myrtle and 16th Streets. Two brothers from the local National Committee To Combat Fascism, interceeded, simply exposing the police brutality to the people in the community, and they also were beaten by the pigs. People in the crowd that had formed came to the brothers aid and began to attack the pigs. At this point, Mod Squad, bootlicking, yardnigger pigs Forrest Harvey, Glenn Smith and Marshall Emerson, responding to their masters orders and wantonly opened fire on the crowd.

The crowd defended theselves and one treacherous dog police was dead and to others layed wounded. Many people from the community ran into the newly opened National Committee to Combat Fascism office at 3376 16th Street.

The Detroit gestapo forces moved in with its overkill machinery, which included 2 tanks, automatic weapons and other types of lethal weapons exactly like the ones these same imperialist use in Vietnam. The pigs indiscriminately opened fire on our office and other houses in the community. The fork tongued police have said that they used "great restraint," but we know that if it wasn't for the swift actions taken by the black community and other progressive people, Commissioner Nicholas' henchmen would have committed mass murder. The sisters and brothers in the N.C.C.F. office, not taking the word of lying pigs, refused to come out and didn't do so until they were insured by trusted people from the community that conditions were favorable.

We see this as part and parcel of the relentless attempt by the fascist U.S. government to destroy the Black Panther Party and its organizing bureau's, The National Committee to Combat Fascism. For the last six months, since the Nixon, Agnew, Mitchell, Hoover gang has been oinking its fascistic "law and order" rhetoric, gangsters, disguised as "guardians of the law" have attacked Black Panther Party and National Committee to Combat Fascism offices, all across the country. Our Party offices and N.C.C.F. offices in Philadelphia, New Orleans, Toledo, Ohio and New Bedford, Mass. have been under attacked by the forces of repression. And now, here in Detroit, police Commissioner Nicholas' and [illegible] forces have joined in this fascist act.

However, we want the people here in Detroit and throughout the world to know that the Black Panther Party and its organizing bureau's, the National Committee to Combat fascism, will not quiver in the wake the U.S. inspired onslaught that is being waged against our Party, Black people and other oppressed people throughout the world. And we have said it before and we will say it again:

THE RACIST DOG POLICEMEN MUST WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY FROM OUR COMMUNITIES AND THE COMMUNITIES OF THE WORLD, CEASE THEIR WANTON MURDER AND BRUTALITY AND TORTURE OF OPPRESSED PEOPLE, OR FACE THE WRATH OF THE ARMED PEOPLE.

The Courts in Detroit are holding our comrades in Preventive detention and have placed a astronimical ransom on our sisters and brothers.

CHARGED WITH MURDER AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER

Ben W. Fondron, Held Without Bond
Erone Desaussure, Held Without Bond
David M. Johnson, Held Without Bond
Shanti Joneson, Bond Set at $25,000
Jerone Lee, Bond Set At $25,000
William Cunningham, Bond Set At $25,000
Cassandra Parker, Bond Set At $25,000

Mrs. Beverly Fleming, $10,000 Bond
Kim Gardner, $10,000
Carol E. Smith, $10,000
Sylvia Robinson, $10,000
Diana Brown, $10,000
Linda Warnsley, $10,000
Pat Duncan, $10,000

CHARGED WITH ASSAULTING A POLICE OFFICER

Douglas Irwin, Held on $100 Bond
Anthony Norman, Held On $100 Bond

CHARGED WITH MALICIOUS DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

Louis Johnson, Held on $1,000 Bond

BAIL MONEY IS BADLY NEEDED. GIVE TO POLITICAL PRISONERS DEFENSE FUND.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 584-8953

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
12845 14th STREET
DETROIT, MICH

b.i
Bl Panthers

Handed with demand
for contribs on 12th St

Ministry of Information
12845 14th St.
Community Information Center:
#1 2219 Indiandale
#2 7708 Mack
Detroit, Michigan
For further information call:
8691058

Dear Sir:

The Free Breakfast for School Children has covered the the country and has been initiated in every city where there is a Black Panther Party and National Committee To Combat Fascism. This program was created because we as black people and human beings understand that our children need a nourishing breakfast every morning so that they can learn.

These breakfasts include every nutrient that they need for the day. For too long our people have gone hungry and without the proper health aids they need. It is beautiful to see our children eat in the morning for it is a fact this enables them to think.

To begin and continue this program it takes donations from concerned people, businessmen, merchants and grocers who draw their profits from the black and oppressed people in Detroit. We need donations of foods which can be stored, such as cereal, grits, sugar, cocoa, salt and pepper, jelly and cooking oil, also syrup.

We need daily and weekly donations of perishable foods such as eggs, milk, oranges, bacon, sausage, ham, butter, bread and cheese, etc..

We need donations of money to buy food and utensils with which to prepare the breakfast.

If you want to help make the Free Breakfast for Children a program that truly satisfies the pressing needs of Black People,)donate or offer your services.

POWER TO THE YOUTH

Chuck Holt, Breakfast Co-ordinator
Detroit Chapter
National Committee to Combat Fascism

44

ORGANIZING SELF DEFENSE GROUPS

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
N.C.C.F. DETROIT
12847 14th St.
869-1058

PART 3 TRAINING

When planning any operation, the pigs' C.M.I. must be taken into consideration in planning tactics.

Practice - Practice - Practice - Practice - Practice - Practice

In order to perform well in your work on all levels it is necessary to practice. The more you practice, the better you perform. Don't think just because you read something you can do it. You can memorize a book on how to drive a car but until you get behind the wheel and practice, you still can't drive.

The first things to understand before you ever put a round of ammo in a chamber are basic safety rules. 99% of all accidental shootings happen with guns that aren't loaded and/or by people that say "I'm sorry, I didn't know it was loaded." Therefore, rule #1 is: the first thing you do when you pick up a weapon is check to see if it is loaded, keep your finger off the trigger and follow the following procedure. Point gun away from area where someone could possibly be shot. If it is a revolver swing out the cylinder; if it is a pistol, remove the magazine and pull back the slide. Even after you have unloaded the gun or see that it is unloaded, treat the gun in the manner as if it were still loaded. Never touch the trigger unless you are practicing trigger squeeze (explanation later), firing on training ground or dealing with the enemy. Never point a gun at anyone you don't intend to shoot. I can't stress these points enough however, people that generally haven't had any experience with pieces violate these rules constantly. If I am ever shot accidentally by some idiot it will be very difficult to suppress the desire to blow his or her head off, providing I'm only wounded.

The next step is to learn to disassemble and assemble your pieces, also care and maintenance. Due to the fact that self-defense activity will not be limited to daylight hours you should learn to break your piece down and assemble it even in the dark. Your life depend on it. So do it.


CLEAN BARREL AND METAL PARTS WITH GOOD COMMERCIAL SOLVENT


CLEAN BORE UNTIL DRY PATCH COMES THROUGH AS CLEAN AS POSSIBLE


ALL METAL PARTS SHOULD GET LIGHT COAT OF OIL


BORE SHOULD BE CLEANED THROUGH BREECH END WHERE POSSIBLE


RUN OILY PATCH THROUGH BARREL


STORE IN HORIZONTAL POSITION


AFTER STORAGE RUN CLEAN PATCH THROUGH BORE BEFORE FIRING


REMOVE ALL EXCESS GREASE AND OIL

After you've gotten this down, the next step is to learn how to aim and fire your weapons properly. All of this is to be done before you ever put your first round of

45

ammo in the chamber, the first thing to deal with is proper s [illegible] alignment. Sight alignment is lining up your front sight with your rear sight and both lined up on the target is called the "sight picture". The correct sight picture basically is having the front not too high or too low, not to the right or to the left, but having the target resting on top of the front sight. The sight picture will not always appear perfect, but if the correct sight picture is understood practice will bring improvement.

The next thing to get down with is trigger squeeze. That's right you squeeze the trigger, you don't pull it or jerk it, contrary to what ever you saw on t.v., trigger squeeze is a process of putting slow steady pressure on the trigger until a shot goes off. If you try to anticipate the shot, you will jerk and mess up your aim.

It would be ideal if you could incorporate into your group a veteran of the pigs' military service. Veterans are of great value and assitance in helping with the above training also when you are ready to begin practice with live ammunition. When practicing with live ammunition make sure your location is where you won't be hasseled by pigs. Actual combat conditions can be deadly as a training ground. When practicing with live ammo., remember it is valuable. Don't just start popping caps for the heck of it; the whole purpose is to prepare yourself to be "a Match for One Hundred" which will only come about as a result of correct practice.

One thing to guard against is flinching. Flinching is caused by being intimidated by the sound and kick of your weapon. With proper trigger squeeze and breath control, you won't have any problems with flinching. If you have problems keeping all your shots in a fairly small group or if you have a problem just getting your shots on the target anywhere you are probably flinching. Have someone watch you as you fire and they will be able to tell you whether or not you are flinching.

The basic thing in the training of members of self-defense groupsis to know how to handle fire arms of all types, hand guns, rifles shot-guns [illegible]chine guns, etc.

The use of different types of ammunition and explosives should be considered also.



PART 4 RECIPES

I will begin by pointing out that we must not allow the racist power structure to defi our struggle. What I mean is the language th we use like everything else in this society in the service of the racist capitalist bandi They control the educational institutions, t news media and the means of production to tu out all the educational material. We sometim are trapped by the rhetoric (words) of the s master. In our 400 year struggle for survival it has been the guns and force manifested in the racist pig cops that occupy our communit that directly oppress, repress, brutalize an murder us. So for us to talk about self-defe against this brutality and murder that is de ined by the racist power structure as justif homicide. So when a self-defense group moves against this oppressive system, by executing a pig by any means, sniping, stabbing, bombi etc., in defense against the 400 years of ra ist brutality and murder this can only be de fined correctly as self-defense. The slavema however, through his lackeys and puppets call it "terrorism", the work of crazed men, crim insane killers, etc.. We must define our str ggle not the pigs. Carlos Marighella an urba guerrilla in Brazil who was assassinated Nov 1969 just one month before Fred Hampton and Clark, says, "the accusation of assault or te rorism no longer has the pejorative (negativ meaning it used to have. It has acquired new coloration. It does not factionalize, it doe not discredit; on the contrary it represents focal point of attraction."

is a quality that ennobles any honorable man because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary engaged in [illegible] struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and its monstrosities."

So with that, I say this, all self-defense groups must strike blows against the slavemaster until we have secured our survival as a people and if this takes shooting every pig and blowing up every pig sty then let's get on up.



SELF IGNITING MOLOTOV COCKTAIL

CAUTION: POTASSIUM CHLORATE IS VERY VOLATILE. IT CAN IGNITE ALMOST SPONTANEOUSLY IN THIS MIXTURE. IT CAN BE IGNITED OR DETONATED BY A SINGLE SPARK, OR EXCESSIVE HEAT OR MERELY BY THE FRICTION OF STIRRING THE INGREDIENTS TOGETHER. SO USE PLASTIC OR WOODEN UTENSILS FOR MIXING. DO-NOT-USE-METAL. USE EXTREME CAUTION

Mix 3 parts of potassium chlorate with 2 parts of sugar. Add water to make a solution. Take a large sock, soak in the mixture then dry. Keep dry sock away from heat.

throughly
hen the
wine
of sulphuri
the way up
slowly, it
Cap the bot
can't leak
water. To c
able to use
water becau
tal. Don't
right. When
in the sock
mix and kno
at target.
breaks it w
acid contac
sugar mixtu
will spread
this fire be
into contac
chlorate on
that gives
formation,
if the mixt
it is more

ther you thr
n where you
take a fift
to 1/4 full
the rest of
Pour the ga
and heat up.
Make sure it
at it first
it is prefer
h a rubber b
lastic and r
le hold it u
put the bot
chlorate su
the top. The
nd the glass
the sulphur
um chlorate
. The gasoli
principal
lphuric acid
ure of potass
is an explos
at. For your
will work e
k is wet. H
dry.



47

One more warning before placing bottle with gas and acid into s make sure outside of bottle is clc nd is not contaminated with a acid.

PEOPLE'S HANDGRENADE

Take a (water) pipe about 3" in diameter and 8" long with caps to screw on at ends. Screw on bottom cap then put wadding in the bottom. (Wadding can consist of cardboard, rubber or toilet tissue) for tighter packing and prevent leaking. Put in about one inch of shot or scrap metal, then put tube with BLACK POWDER packed in it and put fuse into pipe taped at ends, then pour shot or scrap metal between tube and pipe wall (as shown in drawing) leave about one inch space at top of pipe for top wadding (don't put wadding tightly around fuse). Put top pipe cap on and tighten. Then bend to side of pipe and tape to keep it from being pulled out.

This handgrenade should be tested by using a small amount of ingredients, then taken out away from people so the person using it could test his work before moving on his or her objective. It will normally move outward in all directions or could have some directional pattern, depending upon the placement of the container.

PART 5 HOW TO COMBAT C.M.I.

The principal of Juche (self-reliance) clarified by Eldridge Cleaver, the Minister of Information to the Black Panther Party, is "use what you got to get what you need." To answer the question of how do you combat the pigs' C.M.I. (communication, mobility and information), we must first determine what we have going for ourselves. Checking out the practice of self-defense groups, we see that we have the power to determine what is to happen, when it is to happen and how it is supposed to go down. What, When and How (W.W.H.)—the element of surprise. The pigs have C.M.I. and self-defense groups have W.W.H.

To consider a self-defense operation suc cessful : t to just plan and execute bu to plan, execute AND escape. There have be too many instances where members of self-defense groups have planned and executed righteous blows against this racist system only to be captured, wounded or killed. Th are the consequences for revolutionary activity, however we must keep casualties wit an acceptable minimum. The slogan must be Maximum Damage to the Enemy, Minimum Damag to Us. Practice has shown that when planni W.W.H. if it is done with knowledge and an understanding of C.M.I. casualties will be kept within an acceptable minimum. Too oft much attention is given to a plan up to th point of execution without giving the same attention to evasion and escape, that phas of the operation that determines success. This is a subjective approach, a one-sided approach. W.W.H. is only one side of the c C.M.I. is the other side. Because self-def groups use W.W.H., the pigs' C.M.I. does n go into operation until a self-defense gro commits itself by actually executing some of self-defense activity.

All of us should be aware that once C.M.I is activated pigs start showing on the set from 30 seconds to 1 minute maximum in ever major city in Babylon, therefore the succes or failure of a defense operation is depend upon the attention given to C.M.I. and the planning of evasion and escape. As I see it learning to deal with the pigs' C.M.I. is t number one military problem facing revoluti forces in Babylon today, It is time for all have something to teach, by example, to ste forward. And remember, to die honorably, on does not need company.

COMMUNICATION



INFORMATION

48



MOBILITY

FREE THE DETROIT PANTHERS

BEN W. FONDRON
ERONE DESAUSSURE
DAVID M. JOHNSON
SHANTI JONESON
CASSANDRA PARKER
JERONE LEE
WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM

VICTOR GRAYSON

MRS. BEVERLY FLEMING
KIM GARDNER
CAROL E. SMITH
SYLVIA ROBINSON
DIANA BROWN
LINDA WARNSLEY
PAT DUNCAN

ON THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 24, 1970 5:30 PM, THE REACTIONARY GESTAPO FORCES, UNDER THE COMMAND OF COMMISSIONER JOHN F. NICHOLS, STAGED AN ATTACK OF THE N.C.C.F. OFFICE LOCATED AT 16th AND MYRTLE.

IN THE COURSE OF THE ATTACK, THE OFFICE WAS BOMBARDED WITH A BARAGE OF BULLETS AND TEAR GAS BOMBS, RESULTING WITH THE ARREST OF 15 MEMBERS ON TRUMPED-UP CHARGES OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER AND MURDER. THEIR RANSOM (SO-CALLED BONDS) RANGED FROM $100 TO $25,000

WE SEE THIS OVERT ACTION AS ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND IT'S EFFORTS IN COMBATING FASCISM HERE IN THIS OPPRESSIVE SOCIETY AND THE WORLD OVER.

THE PRISONS AND JAILS ARE FILLED WITH POLITICAL PRISONERS



BAIL MONEY NEEDED

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

WE ARE ASKING FOR YOUR SUPPORT IN OUR EFFORTS TO RAISE MONEY FOR THE POLITICAL PRISONERS DEFENSE FUND. FREE THE DETROIT "PANTHERS"

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 584-8953

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
12845 14th STREET
DETROIT MICH.

80

FUND RAISING

RALLY

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM

POLITICAL PRISONERS DEFENSE FUND

ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 24th, FRIDAY, 2 N.C.C.F. MEMBERS WERE HARASSED BY MEMBERS OF THE DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT. RESULTS OF THIS ENCOUNTER LEAD TO A SEIGE OF THE INFORMATION CENTER WHICH ENDED IN THE ARREST OF 15 N.C.C.F. MEMBERS.

North End Family Center

150 Belmont & John R

SUN NOV. 1, 1970

TIME: 7:00 PM

****
* THE OFFICE, LOCATED ON 16th *
* AND MYRTLE, WAS OPENED FIRE *
* UPON BY FASCIST POLICEMEN WITH *
* OVER-KILL WEAPONS OF WAR, *
* WHICH WERE ALSO POINTED AT THE *
* PEOPLE WHO HAD GATHERED TO *
* VIEW THE ATTACK. *
****

CONFIDENTIAL



5/

6-70
rulers Conf.
7 Justice
JB



free the

Fifteen members of the local National Committee to Combat Fascism, the organizing bureau of the Black Panther Party, are in jail. Each of them has been charged with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

They were in or near the N.C.C.F. office on Saturday evening, October 24, when two pigs beat two black youths who were selling the Black Panther Newspaper. The people in the community responded by defending the two brothers; and when more pigs came on the scene with their guns out and shooting, the people again defended themselves, leaving one pig dead and another wounded. A whole army of officers converged upon the N.C.C.F. office, and finally, after about eight hours, the 15 sisters and brothers inside surrendered.

DETROIT

15

BAIL MONEY IS BADLY NEEDED.

GIVE TO POLITICAL PRISONERS DEFENSE FUND.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 584-8953

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
12845 14th STREET
DETROIT, MICH

52

OUT WITH THE OLD FASCIST
IN WITH THE NEW

The pig media has been broadcasting the resignation of Chief Pig Commissioner Murphy as a great loss to Detroit and again for New York. The pig media is oinking that Detroit has lost a great pig Commissioner who is well experienced and has done many things to improve Detroit and the police forces here. At the same time that the Detroit Pig Dept. is expressing great sorrow for such a grevious loss, they wish him luck in his exciting and new job. So with tears in their eyes the Detroit Pig Dept. pig Mayor Gribbs etc., wish him a fond farewell.

To black people and other oppressed people the whole buildup and play sounds like a story from Mother Goose. That's exactly what it is, one of the biggest fairy tales the pigs have ever tried to get over. Pig Murphy and no other pigs have done anything for poor and oppressed people. To get the books straight, pig Murphy didn't have a choice on whether to resign or not, he was told either to retire or get another job. To dig where I am coming from, you must understand how and who controls the oppressive pig forces in Detroit and the events that lead to pig Murphy getting his hat. The pig forces are controlled by the D.P.O.A. (Detroit Police Officers Association), Chief Detective, Field Lt. and related conspirators. Murphy got the position of Chief Pig Commissioner during the time he was an Inspector for the New York Pig Dept. This made a lot of top pigs in Detroit mad because they had been working on the pig force all their low-lives and thought that if anybody should get the position it should come out of their little circle instead of a pig from New York that nobody ever heard of. So antagonistic conditions existed from the jump. Many things came into play that strained the relationship between the Pig Commissioner and the D.P.O.A.



PIG CHIEF MURPHY

The black community began to respond to the continuous pig brutality and murder of black people with shots of gun fire and dead pigs. Pigs were getting up-tight because all across the nation people were defending their homes [illegible] the pig administrators and the pig Commissioners by the D.P.O.A., the Chief Detective and the top pigs to give them more liberties to deal with the people. The stop and frisk laws and the no-knock laws were passed to benefit these racist pigs. Other demands were made to pig Murphy by the D.P.O.A. The N.C.C.F. (organizing bureau of the Black Panther Party) was beginning to grow rapidly and these racist dogs demanded the green light to vamp on our office. The Pig Commissioner told them to hold off until they could get a warrant or a trumped-up conspiracy charge.

Two major events happened recently within the black community that caused pig Murphy to get his walking papers quick. In the area around the N.C.C.F. office on Indiandale, members of the N.C.C.F. and people in the community were putting up posters and passing out free posters to the community. The pigs came into the area and began tearing the posters down and harassing the people. Shouts of "kill the pigs" and "get out of our community" came from the people as they dug the pigs tearing up their posters. The next day a news car that looked exactly like a pig's car came into the area to take pictures and to get posters. Someone in the community thought that it was the pigs intimidating the people once again, therefore they righteously shot at them. When the report of the shooting got to the 10th precint, these pigs immediately saw their chance to vamp on our office. Without notifying pig Murphy and the rest of the pigs downtown the [illegible] called in all their units [illegible] Indiandale. We got a message from the 10th precinct that we better be out of Detroit by 10:00 p.m.

A press conference was held at our office and the only news reporters that were present were the very ones who had been shot at. We informed them that the shots didn't come from our office and they agreed that they didn't believe they did. Pig Murphy realized that he didn't have an alibi to justify a raid on the office, so he told the 10th precint to call the raid off. This sent the D.P.O.A., the Chief Detective, Field Lt. etc, into an outrage. They had exposed their half-track tanks in the parking lot of the 10th precint and flooded the Indiandale area with mod-squad pigs but most of all they didn't feel that they had to justify raiding a Panther office and pig Murphy had the audacity to call it off. There wasn't any future at all left for pig Murphy in Detroit. The fascist D.P.O.A. hooked up their machinery to either force Murphy to come down on the black community and raid our office on Indiandale or lose his job, one way or the other. Information started flooding our office that the fascist pigs were really putting pressure on Murphy to raid our office.

This was the last straw for pig Murphy. the D.P.O.A., the Chie Detective, Ku Klux Klan etc. had hooked up and demanded a nev pig Commissioner, pig Murphy was pawned off to New York agai and the stage was set for completely new fascist pig Commissioner. Nigger Sheriff Lucas coat-tail had been pulled to refus the top paying Commissioner's jo if he wanted to stay on good relations with his bosses. They ha just got pig Murphy out and ye know they couldn't trust a nigge in that position even if he is a goo nigger. Now the lying pig newspapers are saying that it will b hard to decide who will be the nex pig Commissioner. Well th D.P.O.A., the Chief Detecti Field Lt. and Roman Gribbs hav already decided. If there is an doubt about who the next pig Commissioner is it must be a toss up between Hitler and Spiro Agne

DEATH TO ALL PIG COMMISSIONERS
N.C.C.F. Detroit

NATE 11-

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
12845 14th STREET
DETROIT MICH.

REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE:

YOUR POSITION CONCERNING THE LIBERATION OF POOR AND OPPRESSED PEOPLES, HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY. WHAT WE, IN THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY ARE BASICALLY CONCERNED WITH, IS MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE. THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY HAS CALLED FOR A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF WRITING A CONSTITUTION WHICH RELATES TO THE OPPRESSED MASSES OF BABYLON (U.S.) A CONSTITUTION WHICH WILL EMBODY THE PRACTICAL IDEOLOGY FOR THE ELIMINATION OF OPPRESSION. THE R.P.C.C. WILL TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON D.C., WITH BLACK AND ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLES, FAMILIES, TAKING PART IN WRITING A NEW CONSTITUTION.

THERE ARE CERTAIN SUPPLIES WE NEED TO TAKE PROPER CARE OF THE CHILDREN., WE ARE ASKING YOUR FULL SUPPORT IN SEEING TO IT THAT THE NECESSARY SUPPLIES ARE OBTAINED SO OUR CHILDREN ARE WELL TAKEN CARE OF. A LIST OF THE THINGS WE WILL NEED IS ATTACHED.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

N.C.C.F. DETROIT

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

54

— BLACK . POLICEMAN —

"Blackman listen to the voices of the PEOPLE"

OUR HISTORY IN THIS COUNTRY HAS BEEN WRITTEN IN BLOOD. OUR BLOOD. E MOST TRAGIC SCENES IN THAT HISTORY ARE THOSE OF BLACK BLOOD BEING ILLED BY BLACK MEN. IT IS NOW TIME TO CHANGE THOSE SCENES. IT IS E TO REGAIN THAT HONOR THAT WAS TAKEN FROM OUR PEOPLE BY THOSE IN- VIDUALS THAT HAVE ALLOWED THEMSELVES TO BE USED AS PAWNS, AND CANNON DDER'S BY THE OPPRESSORS OF THE PEOPLE.

JUST AS OUR BLACK MEN ARE USED IN VIETNAM TO KILL THE POOR PEOPLE VIETNAM FOR OUR OWN OPPRESSORS WHO ALSO EMPLOY PEOPLE WITH WEAPONS WAR TO PATROL, BRUTALIZE AND KILL BLACK PEOPLE HERE IN THE UNITED ATES, HERE IN DETROIT.

JUST AS THE BLACK G.I. MUST SALVAGE HIS HONOR, OUR HONOR BY REFUS- G TO BE COME A PART OF THE MONSTEROUS WAR MACHINE ABROAD. YOU MUST FUSE TO BECOME A PART OF THE MONSTEROUS WAR MACHINE HERE IN THE THER COUNTRY OF WAR - THE AMERICAN EMPIRE.

WE HAVE TO PULL AWAY FROM THAT FLUNKEYISM. ESPECIALLY WHEN IT'S ALING WITH THE WELL BEING OF OUR PEOPLE AND THE HONOR OF YOUR OWN SOUL. . MUST NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO FIGHT FOR THE PRIVATE INTERESTS OF A FEW DIVIDUALS OR A NARROW CLIQUE, BUT FOR THE INTERESTS OF ALL OUR PEOPLE. : MUST FIGHT FOR FREEDOM AND SANITY.



YOU MUST MAKE THE DECISION NOW, IF YOU ARE GOING TO WORK HARD TO LL US, OR WORK WITH US TO OBTAIN OUR FREEDOM. AS FAS AS OUR OWN DESIRE CONCERNED, WE DON'T WANT TO FIGHT EVEN FOR A SINGLE DAY. BUT IF CIR- MSTANCES FORCE US TO FIGHT, WE CAN FIGHT TO THE FINISH.

IF ANYONE WHETHER HE BE WHITE OR BLACK ATTACKS US AND IF CONDITIONS E FAVORABLE FOR BATTLE, WE WILL CERTAINLY ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE TO WIPE M OUT RESOLUTELY, THOROUGHLY, WHOLLY AND COMPLETELY.

WE WILL NOT AND CAN NOT STRIKE RASHLY, BUT WHEN WE DO STRIKE, WE JST WIN.

ME HOME BLACK MAN TO YOUR TRUE FAMILY, YOUR BLACK FAMILY, YOUR SLAVE MILY.


OFF THE PIG!
By "Any" Means Necessary!

FREE The Detroit "16"

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
12845 14th STREET
DETROIT MICH.

INTENSIFY THE STRUGGLE

COMMUNITY INFORMATION CENTER
2009 ALBERT
FLINT MICH.

COMMUNITY NEWS

EVERY SINCE THE BLACK LIBERATION MOVEMENT STARTED IN 1965, GREEDY INIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN PIMPING OFF THE PEOPLE. ONE SUCH BAND OF INDIVIDUALS XIST IN FLINT, GOING UNDER THE GUISE OF BRO-HAM, BROTHERS OF HAM.

WILLY NOLAND, JOHN (BIG WORD) COLEMAN, AND WILL (RUN THE SHOW) FRANKIN STARTED THIS ORGANIZATION SUPPOSEDLY TO SERVE THE PEOPLE. THROUGH RICKERY AND DEMAGOGIC STRATEGY, THEY WENT ON TO DECEIVE THE PEOPLE INTO HINKING THAT THIS ORGANIZATION WAS A RIGHTEOUS BLACK MILITANT ORGANIZAION, INTENT ON SERVING THE PEOPLE AND BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE.

RUN THE SHOW FRANKLIN AND LOUDMOUTHED COLEMAN, USED WILL NOLAND AS HAND TOOL. THEY ALSO TRICKED A LOT OF UNKNOWING BROTHERS INTO DOING HEIR LITTLE DEEDS. LIKE GETTING MONEY FROM THEIR COHERENCE, THE PIGS. ROM THERE, THEY MOVED ON TO A HIGHER LEVEL, OMBUDSMAN, WHICH IS NO MORE HAT AN ORGANIZATION THAT IS BUILT AROUND TELLING THE PEOPLE ONE THING ND THEN TELLING THEIR COHERENCE ANOTHER. GETTING MONEY AND SAYING THAT HEY ARE GOING TO HELP THE PEOPLE IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY, WHILE THE PIGS RE STILL BRUTALIZING, BEATING AND KILLING NIGGERS.

BLACK PEOPLE ARE STILL LIVING IN ROACH AND RAT INFESTED HOUSES. BLACK EOPLE ARE BEING HERDED INTO URBAN RENEWAL PROJECTS, WHICH ARE IN ESSENCE IGGER REMOVAL PROJECTS. BLACK CHILDREN ARE STILL HUNGRY, WHILE PIGS TILL PATROL AND CONTROL THE COMMUNITY, AND APART FROM THIS, 17 NEW PIG IDE'S HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE BLACK COMMUNITY TO HARASS THE COMMUNITY.

EVEN THE STUDENTS IN SCHOOL ARE BEING VAMPED ON WHILE THE BOOT-LICKING ACKEYS, RUN THE SHOW AND BIG WORD, LOUDMOUTHED LYING COLEMAN, ARE RUNNING ROUND WITH .25'S IN THEIR POCKETS, SITTING AROUND ON THE BOARD OF THE RBAN COALITION WITH PIG PROSECUTOR, TWO FACED ROBERT LEONARD, GREEDY, VARICIOUS BUSINESSMAN SOMMERFIELD AND OTHER PIG BUSINESSMEN, WHO AIN'T ONNA GIVE A DIME TO ANY BLACK PEOPLE AT ALL. THEY DRINK PLENTY OF LIQUOR

D DRIVE AROUND IN THEIR HE CARS WITH PRIVATE PHON WITH A DIRECT LINE



ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

PIG RUTHERFORD, CHEIF HOG. BUT YET, THEY ARE SUPPOSE TO BE MEETING THE
IC NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE HERE IN FLINT.

WE AS MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM AND THE PEO-
, KNOW THESE BAFFONS FOOLS FOR WHAT THEY ARE, POUCHIST, OPPORTUNIST
SE NIGGER LACKEYS. WE SAY THAT IT'S GOT TO BE AN IMMEDIATE END TO THIS
ACTIVITY AND TRICKERY THAT THE OMBUDSMAN ARE USING ON THE PEOPLE. BLACK
PLE WILL TOLERATE THIS NO LONGER, AND BLACK PEOPLE SAY IF THESE THINGS
ON ANY LONGER, WE WILL PUT A STOP TO THIS PIG ACTIVITY BY ANY MEANS
ESSARY.

58

DEATH TO THE HOUSE NIGGER
LACKEY AND HIS RUNNING DOG
PARTNERS

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
613 CONTINENTAL
DETROIT MICH.



AT THIS TIME,

WE MUST NOT FAIL ANGELA

ANGELA DAVIS, A BRILLIANT SCHOLAR, AN ADVOCATE OF WOMEN RIGHTS AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS NOW INCARCERATED IN A NEW YORK PRISON, FIGHTING EXTRADITION TO CALIFORNIA WHERE SHE FACES THE GAS CHAMBER FOR MURDER, KIDNAPPING AND CONSPIRACY.

THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY ACCUSES A REACTIONARY AUTHORITY OF CALIFORNIA AND THE U.S. OF USING ANGELA DAVIS AS A SCAPE GOAT. THE TRADITIONAL JUDICIARY ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EVENT THAT TOOK PLACE IN MARIN COURTROOM AND THE POLICE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF THE JUDGE, JONATHAN JACKSON, WILLIAM CHRISTMAS AND JAMES McCLAIN AS WELL AS THE WOUNDING OF THE HOSTAGES. IN ORDER TO DRAW ATTENTION FROM THE RESPONSIBLE PERSONS, ANGELA DAVIS WAS HUNTED, CAPTURED AND ACCUSED OF CRIMES OF WHICH THE AMERICAN REACTIONARY SYSTEM IS IN FACT, GUILTY OF.

ANGELA DAVIS HAS EXEMPLIFIED THE HIGHEST EXPRESSION OF CONCERN FOR THE PEOPLE. WE THE PEOPLE SHOULD SHOW OUR APPRECIATION OF THIS BY COMING TO HER AID IN THIS HOUR OF NEED. SHE HAS GIVEN HER ENERGY AND DEVOTION TO THE PEOPLE'S CAUSE WITHOUT REFERENCE TO HER PERSONAL SAFTY, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO HER PERSONAL GAINS.

THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY CALLS UPON BLACK PEOPLE IN PARTICULAR AND ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLE IN GENERAL TO RISE AND DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO FREE ANGELA DAVIS. SHE HAS GIVEN IN A FREE AND IN A VERY PURE WAY. IN A WAY THAT SETS AN EXAMPLE FOR PEOPLE EVERYWHERE.

AT THIS TIME, WE MUST NOT FAIL ANGELA DAVIS.

57

EXCERPTS FROM A PRESS RELEASE BY HUEY P. NEWTON

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

POLITICAL PRISONERS DEFENSE FUND

[illegible] OIT NCCF, INCAR-
[illegible] COUNTY JAIL ON
[illegible] OF MURDER, CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
[illegible] DESTRUCTION OF PO-
[illegible], HAVE BECOME VICTIMS OF
[illegible] ANNIHILATION OF THE
[illegible] PANTHER PARTY AND IT'S ORGANIZING
[illegible]S.
[illegible] JAIL, THE DETROIT 15 HAVE
[illegible] TO INHUMAN ACTS OF HARAS-
[illegible] OOD RECEIVED BY THE 15 HAS
[illegible] AND LEAVES THE COMRADES
[illegible]. THE SISTERS RECEIVE THREATS OF
[illegible]INGS AND ONE SISTER WAS LOCKED UP IN
[illegible] WHERE SHE AWAKENED WITH "CRABS"
[illegible]ER HER. F.B.I. AGENTS HAVE BEEN IN-
[illegible]TING THEM AND THE MATRONS HARASSING
. THESE SADISTIC ACTS ARE TO BREAK
[illegible] COMRADES SPIRIT AND TO SHOW THE SUPER-
[illegible]MAGE OF POWER AND AUTHORITY BY THOSE
[illegible]NTROL.
[illegible] COMMITTEE TO FREE THE DETROIT "15"
[illegible] UP A DEFENSE FUND TO OBTAIN MONEY
[illegible] HE RELEASE OF THE COMRADES. ALL CON-
[illegible]TIONS WILL BE SENT TO:

"FREE DETROIT '15' FUND"
P.O. BOX 694
DETROIT MICH. 48231



FREE THE DETROIT 15



"We will fight from one generation to the next"

- BEN FONDRON
- ERONE DESAUSSURE
- DAVID JOHNSON
- SHANTI JOHNSON
- CASSANDRA PARKER
- JEROME LEE
- WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM
- VICTOR GRAYSON
- MRS. BEVERLY FLEMING
- KIM GARDNER
- CAROL E. SMITH
- SYLVIA ROBINSON
- DIANA BROWN
- PAT DUNCAN
- LONNIE DARDEN

60

G. Locally Stated Aims and Policy

LARRY POWELL, member of the Detroit NCCF, conducted the political education classes on July 5, 1970, at which time the topic of discussion was the center page of the July 4, 1970, issue of "The Black Panther" newspaper. Those in attendance were instructed as follows:

Whenever you say "death to the pigs" mean it. Put your words into action. Use the slogan "all power to the people" as the pigs think they are the power. Now we have to add to our slogan "death to the pigs," so stop talking and start putting your words into action. The pigs are planning genocide against us. The reason there are more pigs in the community this year than last year is because they are planning to get rid of all blacks, and they want all blacks to move into the projects so all they would have to do is put a fence around it and give them just enough money to get food. They want to take everything away from us, but we still have the power to destroy and there is no way the pigs can destroy the BPP. If they kill us off, our struggle will be taken up by the people in the community as we are the people's party. If we don't go to the people then we are not serving the people. Our struggle is not confined and exists also in the South in the field of Civil Rights. We have to fight for national salvation, deal with repression and will fight for the liberation of all oppressed peoples.

DE T-3
July 8, 1970

CHARLES HOLT, second in command of the Detroit NCCF, appeared at a demonstration at the Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, Michigan, August 31, 1970, where he told a news commentator that the BPP supports the Revolutionary Black Lawyers.

DE T-1
September 1, 1970

The following is the transcript of a tape recording made by RONNIE IRWIN, Detroit NCCF, which was recovered on October 16, 1970, by the Detroit Police Department, behind 7708 Mack Avenue, Detroit, an NCCF Office which had been abandoned on October 15, 1970:

"I say hungry children should be fed. Not because they got money but because they're hungry. This morning the children sitting here at this free breakfast for children program. This is Chairman Bobby Seale's idea. He organized the breakfast for childrens program for you children and you know where Chairman Bobby Seale is right now? He's in Connecticut. There fascist pigs tried to murder him in the electric chair for feeding all the children.

"Now you children know what we are going to do to the pigs for that? Right on. (Group in background replies "Right On.")

"Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party was murdered in his sleep for implementing the socialistic programs that Chairman Bobby Seale laid down for him. The free breakfast for children program, the free medical health care clinic is why.

"He was murdered in his sleep, you know? (response from group in background "Right On.")

"You can look at, you can look at the pigs and you can see every time somebody tries to help the people are do some for the people or serve the people like the members of the Black Panther Party and National Committees to Combat Fascism do, the pigs will vamp down on them. Pigs will start coming down on them hard. And that shows you that they're doing their job. But there's a lot of people running around here who call themselves serve the people call themselves so-called revolutionaries, you know. And the pigs they don't care nothing about them. They don't look at them twice. All the pigs do is laugh at them. And you know they ain't doing their job. You know? Revolution comes out the barrel of a gun, not out of the sleeve of no dashaki. Right On? (people in background respond "Right On.")

The Association of Black Students, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, sponsored a rally in support of the Detroit 16 on November 16, 1970, featuring HUEY P. NEWTON.

The main theme of the speech given by HUEY P. NEWTON on November 16, 1970, at Oakland University, was that all poor blacks and poor whites, the working classes, the oppressed of the world, must all join forces as a united body against the "ruling circle" in the United States. NEWTON repeatedly referred to this "ruling circle" throughout his entire speech and apparently interpreted this "ruling circle" as those leaders of Government and industry, the imperialists or those who are rich in this society. NEWTON wanted equality for everyone with no one being superior to his fellow man. He indicated the Negro is a class brother with the poor whites and they must join in their effort to overcome the "ruling circle."

NEWTON stated,"The Black Panther Party is the vanguard of the revolution on a world-wide level because the world is really one community and we've taken Marxist-Leninist to a greater level-and, therefore, we are the greatest Marxist-Leninists that ever lived, and we say this not to be arrogant because some times I wish that someone else would carry that banner because the way is narrow and the burden is heavy."

In conclusion, the speech by NEWTON was a rambling, many times incoherent Marxist-Leninist influenced, low-key revolutionary type speech which attempted to show a connection between the BPP and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (LRBW), as well as a unity between the BPP and all oppressed persons of the world.

A characterization of the LRBW is contained in the appendix pages attached hereto.

His speech called for the release of the Detroit 16, freedom for ANGELA DAVIS, BOBBY SEALE, and all the oppressed brothers and for the ultimate overthrow of the pigs.

The speech appeared to be rather poorly organized and NEWTON was easily diverted from the main topics which he seemed to be pursuing. The speech had very few references to any actual radical action or violent confrontation.

The Black Student Union, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, sponsored a rally in support of the Detroit 16 on November 17, 1970, featuring HUEY NEWTON.

NEWTON stated that the working class will be the ones to carry out the "revolution" and carry the "revolution banner" and will most likely initiate the creation of the new order. Throughout his speech, NEWTON talked about the new order which will occur when the world is taken over by Communism. Throughout the speech, NEWTON refers to capitalism stating that while it has caused many problems, it has also laid the foundation for Communism. He stated that the wealthy are the ruling circle and named ROCKEFELLER and FORD as being in this circle. NEWTON stated that they offered troops to the Vietnamese people, however, did not get a definite answer on their proposal.

DE T-20
November 17, 1970

The Black Liberation Front International, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, sponsored a rally in support of the Detroit 16 on November 17, 1970, featuring HUEY NEWTON.

The speech given by NEWTON was scheduled for 10:00 a.m.,,in the auditorium at Michigan State University. The doors were open prior to 10:00 a.m., and persons admitted after a thorough search, for a fee of $2.00, except Negro females, who were charged 25 cents. Those persons attending the speech were advised that they were not allowed to leave, applaud, or stand during the speech, and that anyone leaving could not return. NEWTON arrived at approximately 11:30 a.m., and spoke on Marxist-Leninist theories placing particular emphasis on the Russian Revolution and its relationship to the BPP. The body of the speech was concluded at 1:45 p.m. At approximately 1:00 p.m., most of the audience had left because they were unable to understand NEWTON and were getting fed up with the treatment they were receiving. After a question and answer session, NEWTON finished speaking at 2:30 p.m.

DE T-25
November 17, 1970

H. Propensity to Violence and Preparation for Confrontation

JESSE HARRIS, who was selling papers for the NCCF in Flint, Michigan, sold papers and kept the money. OLIVER MC CLURE, leader of the Detroit NCCF, and possibly one or two others from Detroit, went to Flint and worked HARRIS over. HARRIS is no longer associated with the NCCF.

DE T-26
July 2, 1970

A number of members of the Detroit NCCF assaulted and seriously beat LIONEL MAURICE ALEXANDER, a State witness who testified against DERRICK K. DRAW, who was convicted of second degree murder. The NCCF members accused ALEXANDER of being a "pig." The act of brutality allegedly occurred on July 7, 1970, at 2219 Indiandale, headquarters of the Detroit NCCF, where ALEXANDER had gone upon their invitation.

DE T-3
July 20, 1970

On July 17, 1970, Detroit Police Officers observed a car traveling at a high rate of speed, which had the trunk lock punched out. This vehicle was stopped and the three Negro occupants exited the car and the driver was asked for his registration, but claimed he had none. OLIVER MC CLURE, leader of the Detroit NCCF, began swearing at the police officers and the driver, WILLIAM BYRON MC CLURE, brother of OLIVER, also began yelling insults. WILLIAM MC CLURE jumped on one of the officers' backs and appeared to grab for his gun, which fell to the ground, and was picked up by a second officer. While the officers were struggling with the MC CLUREs, an additional scout car arrived and the third passenger of the car, THOMAS KIRK WARD, also a member of the Detroit NCCF immediately jumped one of the officers from this car. The above three individuals were subdued and warrants were issued charging all three with resisting and obstructing a police officer.

DE T-3
July 20, 1970

On July 18, 1970, a Detroit Police Officer was walking to a call box at the intersection of Woodward and State Streets, Detroit, when he was pushed off the curb and down into the street and continued to be assaulted by LARRY POWELL, member of the Detroit NCCF. Witnesses indicated that the attack was completely unprovoked. POWELL was arrested and charged with Assault and Battery on a police officer.

DE T-3
July 20, 1970

Detective Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY, Security Section, Intelligence Division, Detroit Police Department, advised on July 30, 1970, that about 9:30 a.m., this date, a Channel 50 television news car was in the vicinity of Detroit NCCF headquarters, 2219 Indiandale, Detroit, when a Negro male, age 25 to 30 years, 6'2", 200 pounds, with beard and moustache, fired three shots at the news car from the porch of the office. There were no injuries to the occupants of the car, which was probably in the vicinity to film traffic signs in the vicinity of the above office, which had been painted black and had posters pasted on them.

On October 24, 1970, Detective Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY, supra, advised that at 5:45 p.m., October 24, 1970, two Detroit Police Department Officers put out a radio "officer in trouble" call due to difficulty in subduing individuals who had been given loitering tickets, apparently in connection with their distributing NCCF literature.

Two unmarked patrol cars with plain clothes officers responded and arrived in the area almost immediately, however, a crowd had gathered and one of the officers was recognized and the crowd began to attack the car with bottles and rocks. When the officers attempted to leavethe area by driving across a vacant lot, the car was hit by gunfire and one officer suffered minor injuries.

The second police car had stopped near the corner of 16th and Myrtle near an NCCF office and a short time later another shot hit one of the patrolman on the back of the head and he was dead on arrival at the hospital.

The NCCF office at 3376 16th Street was immediately surrounded and a search warrant obtained.

At the first meeting of the branch of the Detroit NCCF at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, November 15, 1970, WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON asked who had guns and stated that they were no problem to obtain as all you would have to do is kill a policeman and take his equipment. It was also mentioned that they should be willing to give their lives for the NCCF.

DE T-24
November 17, 1970

The Flint Chapter of the Detroit NCCF has begun work on fortifying the house at 2009 Albert by placing plywood a few inches from the wall which they then plan to fill with sand.

DE T-24
December 4, 1970

At approximately 1:45 a.m., December 25, 1970, a marked police vehicle driving south on 17th Street from Magnolia observed a man whom they believed had a pistol in his hand. Upon circling the block the officers observed the same Negro male standing on the porch of 3591 17th Street, an office of the NCCF, with a rifle, which he pointed at the police car, which immediately left.

DE T-3
December 28, 1970

The first floor of CIC Number One, 2219 Indiandale, Detroit, has sandbags piled to the bottom edge of the windows and piled to the ceiling on the second floor with the exception of one wall. There are heavy wire screens over all the windows, which they plan to fasten with hinges so they can be opened.

DE T-1
August 6, 1970

The NCCF sent ten people to a shooting range at 21 Mile Road and Gratiot on September 10, 1970, at a cost of $2.50 per person.

DE T-1
September 11, 1970

When OLIVER MC CLURE returned from New York the weekend of August 30, 1970, he advised that the battle tactics for the NCCF and BPP are to hide weapons outside of headquarters at various locations, and if they learn of an impending raid, most of the members are to be sent out of the office to obtain guns, and after the police have surrounded the office, will attack from the rear.

DE T-1
September 4, 1970

I. Arrests

Name	Date	Place	Charge
OLIVER MC CLURE	July 17, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Resisting and Obstructing a Police Officer
WILLIAM B. MC CLURE	July 17, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Resisting and Obstructing a Police Officer
ST THOMAS KIRK WARD	July 17, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Resisting and Obstructing a Police Officer
LARRY POWELL	July 18, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Assault and Battery
RONALD KEVIN IRWIN	July 21, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Assault and Battery on Police Officer
ST ANDRE ANTHONY MITCHELL	August 10, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Assault and Battery
WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON	August 10, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Resisting and Obstructing a Police Officer
RONALD K. IRWIN	August 10, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Resisting and Obstructing a Police Officer
ANTHONY NORMAN	August 10, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	" "
ROBERT SMITH	August 10, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	" "
DELPHINE MC RAY	August 10, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	" "

RODNEY HILL	August 13, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Resisting and Obstructing a Police Officer
ROBERT SMITH	August 13, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	" "
LONNIE DARDEN	August 19, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Vender Impeding Pedestrian traffic
VIRON KEITH REDWINE	September 16, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Assault and Battery, Police Officer
LONNIE DARDEN	"	Detroit, Michigan	" " "
CHARLES HOLT	"	Detroit, Michigan	Obstruction of Justice and Felonious Assault
ROBERT EARLY SMITH	September 24, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Distribution of Leaflets and pamphlets within 300 feet of a school
WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM	"	Detroit, Michigan	" "
ALICE RAYFORD	September 25, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Resisting Arrest
MARY FORD	"	Detroit, Michigan	Resisting Arrest
DOUGLAS EDWARD IRWIN	October 24, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Assault and Battery on Police Officer
ANTHONY NORMAN	"	Detroit, Michigan	" "
LOUIS T. JOHNSON	October 27, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Malicious Destruction of Property
BEN WILLIAM FONDRON	October 25, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Murder One and Conspiracy to Murder
DAVID JOHNSON	"	Detroit, Michigan	" "

ERONE CARL DESAUSSURE	October 25, 1970	Detroit, Michigan	Murder One and Conspiracy to Murder
JEROME LEE	"	Detroit, Michigan	" "
SHANTI JOHNSON	"	" "	" "
WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM	"	" "	" "
CASSANDRA PARKER	"	" "	" "
SYLVIA ROBINSON	"	" "	" "
BEVERLY FLEMING	"	" "	" "
DIANE BROWN	"	" "	" "
KIM GARDNER	"	" "	" "
LINDA WARMSLEY	"	" "	" "
CAROL EUDORA SMITH	"	" "	" "
PAT DUNCAN	"	" "	" "
VICTOR LEE GRAYSON	"	" "	" "
ANTHONY NORMAN	October 24, 1970	" "	Assault and Battery on Police Officer
LONNIE DARDEN	November 9, 1970	" "	Assault with Intent to do Great Bodily Harm

DE T-3
Various

LARRY HENSON	December, 1970	Flint, Michigan	Breaking and Entering

DE T-24
December, 1970

J. Weapons

A member of the NCCF along with an associate of the White Panther Party (WPP) stole some dynamite of which the NCCF acquired about 100 pounds.

DE T-1
July 20, 1970

The NCCF has approximately 12 rifles and shotguns, three handguns, 3000 rounds of ammunition and gas masks at 2219 Indiandale, Detroit.

DE T-1
July 30, 1970

The weapons located at the Ministry of Information, 12847 14th Street, Detroit, are approximately as follows: two Aris rifles, two shotguns, three .45 caliber pistols with extra long clips (25 rounds) and 5000 to 6000 rounds of ammunition.

Located at CIC Number One, 2219 Indiandale, are approximately the following: eight FN assault rifles, four or five shotguns and an unknown amount of ammunition.

Located at CIC Number Two, 7708-12 Mack Avenue, are approximately the following: one AR 15 rifle and one .3006 caliber rifle.

DE T-1
August 5, 1970

The Detroit NCCF currently has the following weapons:

approximately eight shotguns
one AR 15 rifle
two M1 rifles
one FN assault rifle
one .3006 rifle
five .38 caliber revolvers
two .30 caliber revolvers
one .357 magnum

The NCCF also has two radios for monitoring police bands.

DE T-1
November, 1970

K. Meetings and Rallies

The Detroit NCCF sponsored a picnic at Belle Isle Park, Detroit, Michigan, on Sunday August 7, 1970, which lasted from approximately 12:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. There were approximately 150 persons present most of the time, however, around 4:00 p.m., music was played over the public address system which attracked crowds up to about 400 people, the majority of whom appeared to be present because of curiosity rather than motivation by BPP doctrine.

DE T-3
August 10, 1970

The Detroit NCCF held a picnic at Belle Isle Park, Detroit, on Sunday, August 16, 1970, which began about 12:00 noon and ended at approximately 8:00 p.m. The NCCF supplied food and asked for donations as well as selling "The Black Panther" newspaper, buttons and posters.

DE T-1
August 17, 1970

The Detroit NCCF held a picnic at Belle Isle Park, Detroit, on August 31, 1970, which was considered to be a flop as less than 40 persons attended and the NCCF lost about $200.00.

DE T-1
August 31, 1970

Members of the Detroit NCCF traveled to the BPP Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, scheduled for September 5 - 7, 1970, leaving Detroit on September 4, 1970.

DE T-1
September 16, 1970

The Detroit NCCF sponsored a rally at the Malcolm X Community Center, Inkster, Michigan, at 7:00 p.m., on October 30, 1970, to raise funds for the defense of the Detroit 15. About 50 people attended and approximately $200.00 worth of papers, buttons, and literature were sold. Speakers from the NCCF talked about the police coming into the community stating that the community should defend itself.

The NCCF also sponsored a rally at the Northside Family Center, 150 Belmont, Detroit, on November 1, 1970, at 7:30 p.m. and NCCF speakers again talked about the police coming into the community and stating that the community should defend itself.

DE T-1
November 2, 1970

A contingent from the Detroit NCCF left Detroit on November 26, 1970, en route to the Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention organized by the BPP, November 27 to 29, 1970, Washington, D.C.

DE T-3
November 26, 1970

The Detroit NCCF had a rally and dance at the Northland Community Center, 150 Belmont, Detroit, on November 1, 1970, where a noted BPP leader was to be a speaker, however, he did not show up. Newspapers and posters were on sale.

DE T-23
November 2, 1970

RONNIE IRWIN, Detroit NCCF, at a rock concert to raise money for the NCCF Defense Fund on November 10, 1970, Wayne State University, Student Center Building, made a speech regarding the shooting of the Detroit Police Officers on October 24, 1970, and stated that the white radicals should support the Detroit 16. He stated that the "pigs" came down on the community and the NCCF responded, and that if community leaders had not interceded, the NCCF members would have been killed.

DE T-1
November 11, 1970

L. Programs of Detroit NCCF

1. Free Breakfast for School Children

The NCCF has one Breakfast Program which is currently located at the Ministry of Information, 12847 14th Street, Detroit, and serves approximately 32 children, five days a week.

DE T-1
October 26, 1970

The Breakfast Program was not operating the last few days of November, 1970, due to the NCCF moving to a new office.

DE T-1
November, 1970

The Free Breakfast for Children Program is currently operating in the following locations:

3591 17th Street,
Detroit, Michigan
feeding about 25 children per day

611 Continental
Detroit, Michigan
feeding about 35 children per day

St. Leo's Church
15th and Grand River
Detroit, Michigan
feeding less than ten children per day.

DE T-1
December, 1970

A Breakfast Program is operating at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan.

DE T-26
December, 1970

The Breakfast Program is currently operating five days a week at the following locations:

St. Leo's Church
15th and Grand River
feeding about seven children per day

3591 17th Street
feeding about ten children

3595 17th Street
feeding about ten children

611 Continental
feeding about 40 children per day

2. Free Lunch Program

The NCCF has a Free Lunch Program at both 7708-12 Mack Avenue and 2219 Indiandale, Detroit, and has been feeding about 165 children per day at both locations.

DE T-1
July 24, 1970

The Free Lunch Program was discontinued when school opened and the Free Breakfast Program has not been reinstituted.

DE T-1
September 30, 1970

3. Free Clothing Program

A Free Clothing Program is operating at 3591 17th Street, Detroit, Michigan.

DE T-1
December, 1970

The Free Clothing Program is currently in operation Monday through Saturday at 3591 17th Street, Detroit.

DE T-1
January 4, 1971

M. Teaching Revolutionary Programs and Policies

Political education classes are held every Sunday at 2219 Indiandale, Detroit.

July 30, 1970

Political education classes will be held at 611 Continental, Detroit, beginning December, 1970.

DE T-1
November, 1970

Political education classes are currently being held at 611 Continental, Detroit, but have been discontinued at 3595 17th Street, Detroit.

DE T-1
January 4, 1971

N. Miscellaneous

HUEY NEWTON, Minister of Defense, BPP, has been making strange statements, such as supporting the Gay Liberation Movement and that the fellows should not relate to the girls so much.

DE T-1
September 4, 1970

DE T-26 advised on November 30, 1970, that one of the trucks being driven by the Detroit NCCF members headed for the Constitutional Convention in Washington, D.C. broke down on the turnpike near Pittsburgh, on November 26, 1970. While stopped, they called Washington, D.C. and determined that the convention had been called off and were instructed to return to Detroit. The group was upset upon receipt of this information but decided to return to Detroit, and the truck that had broken down was left to be repaired and the rest of the convoy made a U-turn on the Pennsylvania Turnpike and headed back to Ohio. Upon reaching the end of the Pennsylvania Turnpike, all vehicles had to pay the full toll after which they again called Washington, D.C. and determined that the convention had been re-scheduled so they turned around and headed back to Washington, D.C. picking up the truck which had broken down en route.

ROBERT BAY, BPP, New York, was hit on the head with a gun butt by JUNE HILLIARD, Assistant Chief of Staff, BPP, because BAY beat up someone he thought was a police informer.

DE T-1
December 14, 1970

On December 2, 1970, Detective WILLIAM HENNAHAN, Security Section, Intelligence Division, Detroit Police Department, advised that he was contacted by the Detroit Edison Electric Company, who advised that a crew from the electric company went out to check the meter at 611 Continental, Detroit, a NCCF office, which is in the rear of the house, as the house was occupied and a request for service had not been received. They discovered that the meter had been jumped and were going to disconnect service at the meter but were chased away by occupants of the house. The electric company is not going to take any further action as they consider it too dangerous to attempt to cut off the electricity and are going to let the NCCF have the electricity.

APPENDIX

1

LEAGUE OF REVOLUTIONARY BLACK WORKERS
Also known as
Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM)

A source advised on April 22, 1970, that the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (LRBW) is a black extremist labor union, with headquarters at 179 Cortland, Highland Park, Michigan, in the greater Detroit metropolitan area. Source advised that the LRBW is attempting to oust the United Auto Workers (UAW) from their position as bargaining representative for black workers in the Detroit area automotive plants. Source advised that the LRBW has used threats of violence against both black and white supervisory personnel and UAW leaders in an attempt to intimidate them into an agreement with LRBW demands. The LRBW has referred to the automotive industry and the UAW as "racist".

A second source advised that membership in the LRBW is limited to Negroes only, by virtue of the LRBW constitution which states "membership is denied to all honkies due to the fact that said honkey has been the historic enemy, betrayer and exploiter of black people." Membership in the LRBW is less than 25 persons.

The second source also stated that the LRBW had suborganizations operating at Ford Motor Company which was known as the Ford Revolutionary Union Movement (FRUM) and Eldon Avenue Gear and Axle Plant (ELRUM) as well as other assembling and supplying plants, but that at the present the LRBW is active only at the Dodge Main Assembly Plant in Hamtramck, Michigan. This suborganization is known as Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM). The other suborganizations are now defunct.

APPENDIX

2

The first source stated that in 1969 RONALD LEE MARCH, KENNETH JOHN WATSON and GENERAL GORDON BAKER, JR., who source identified as members of the Central Committee of the LRBW, met with diplomatic representatives of the North Vietnamese Government in Windsor, Ontario, Canada, to request support of the LRBW both morally and financially by the North Vietnamese.

The official publication of the LRBW is the "Inner City Voice".

A characterization of "Inner City Voice" is attached hereto.

APPENDIX

1

"INNER CITY VOICE"

The "Inner City Voice" (ICV) was registered with the Wayne County Clerk's Office, Assumed Names Division on August 4, 1967, by KENNETH JOHN WATSON, under Certificate Number 208945.

A bulletin entitled, "Build Black Newspaper" dated July, 1967, stated, "A group of black revolutionaries in Detroit, Michigan, have begun work on the production of a new newspaper. It is hoped that the first edition of the 'Inner City Voice', will appear on the newsstand in August of 1967." According to the bulletin, the ICV's goal is the building of a mass circulating revolutionary propaganda program. The bulletin stated the newspaper was to concentrate on local news, cultural and social events, as well as providing coverage of radical politics.

A source advised on March 17, 1970, that the ICV was published from July of 1967 through June of 1968, when it was terminated. In the fall of 1969 a newspaper similar to ICV appeared on Detroit newsstands which was called "SAUTI", meaning Voice in Swahili. This publication, in its first edition stated that it emerged from the ICV, and its purpose, in addition to the above, would be to exist as the official organ of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (LRBW). In January of 1970, an edition of "SAUTI" stated that it would continue publication under the old name of "Inner City Voice" and would provide coverage of the black extremist labor movement. In the spring of 1970, the ICV did not publish the inflammatory articles which were common in 1967-68, but called for the overthrow of the United Auto Workers (UAW) leadership and control of black workers at Detroit area auto plants.

Source advised that the editors of the ICV are KENNETH JOHN WATSON, LUKE SAMUEL TRIPP, GENERAL GORDON BAKER, MICHAEL C. HAMLIN and RONALD LEE MARCH, all of whom source identified as members of the Central Committee of the LRBW.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP
also known as
Black Panther Party for Self Defense

According to the official newspaper of the BPP, the BPP was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY G. SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, Minister of Defense, BPP.

The official newspaper, called "The Black Panther," regularly states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to as "pigs" who should be killed.

The newspaper, in its issue of September 7, 1968, had an article by the then Minister of Education, GEORGE MURRAY. This article ended with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

The BPP newspaper, issue of October 5, 1968, had an article introduced with the following statement: "We will not dissent from American government. We will overthrow it."

DAVID HILLIARD, Chief of Staff, BPP, in a speech at the San Francisco Polo Field on November 15, 1969, said "We will kill Richard Nixon."

DAVID HILLIARD, in the "New York Times," issue of December 13, 1969, was quoted as follows: "We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government by way of force and violence."

In the issue of April 25, 1970, the BPP newspaper had an article by Minister of Culture EMORY DOUGLAS as follows:

> "The only way to make this racist US government administer justice to the people it is oppressing, is...by taking up arms against this government, killing the officials, until the reactionary forces...are dead and those that are left turn their weapons on their superiors, thereby passing revolutionary judgement against the number one enemy of all mankind, the racist US government."

The BPP Headquarters is located at 1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California. Branches of the BPP, and Committees to Combat Fascism, under control of the BPP, have been established in various locations in the USA.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Detroit, Michigan
January 26, 1971

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF)

Character RACIAL MATTERS

Reference Detroit report dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE DETROIT	OFFICE OF ORIGIN SAN FRANCISCO	DATE 2/17/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 12/31/70 - 1/27/71

TITLE OF CASE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF)
DETROIT DIVISION

REPORT MADE BY: SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR.
TYPED BY: ah

CHARACTER OF CASE
SM - SMITH ACT OF 1940;
SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY
REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

REFERENCES: Detroit report of SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR., 1/6/71, at Detroit.

- P -

LEADS

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Will maintain contact with logical informants and submit evidentiary report 30 days from date of this report.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED NJW SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:
- 11 - Bureau (105-165706 Sub 15) (RM)
- ~~1~~ - MIG, Detroit (RM)
- 1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
- 1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
- 1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)
- 2 - San Francisco (157-2305) (RM)
- 2 - Detroit (157-3075)

105 - 165706 - 804

REC-14

17 FEB 22 1971

EX-104

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	ICDSO, ~~[illegible]~~, OSI, SEC. SERV, IRS (Wright)			
Request Recd.	DEPT: ISD, ~~[illegible]~~, IDIU, ~~CD~~ Chief Investigator			
How Fwd.	RS			
Date Fwd.	3/5/71			
By				

Notations

RACIAL INT. SECT.

70 MAR [illegible]

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O—375-135

COVER PAGE

ADMINISTRATIVE

This report is being classified confidential to protect sources of a continuing value.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source	Location
✓ DE T-1 is DE 1330-R INT [illegible]	170-637R-316 318 321 328 326 323 329
✓ NY T-66 is NY 7034-R* ELSUR	157-3075-2100
✓ DE T-24 is Lieutenant LOUIS SZABO Intelligence Flint, Michigan PD -CONF. SOURCE	157-6749-R-16 13
✓ DE T-26 is DE 1423-R (PROB)	170-806-P&P-3 170-806-R-10 9
✓ DE T-3 is Detective Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY Security Section Intelligence Division Detroit PD -CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE	This report
✓ SF T-22 is SF 3259-R* ELS[illegible]	157-3075-2198

- B* -
Cover Page

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - MIG, Detroit (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)

Report of: SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR. Office: Detroit, Michigan
Date: 2/17/71

Field Office File #: 157-3075 Bureau File #: 105-165706-sub 15

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF)
DETROIT DIVISION

Character: SECURITY MATTER - SMITH ACT OF 1940;
SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY
REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Synopsis:

The Detroit NCCF continues to operate under the direction of BPP National Headquarters, Oakland, Calif. The Detroit NCCF operates a Free Clothing Program in Detroit and Free Breakfast for School Children Programs in Detroit and Flint, Michigan. Following political education classes in January, 1971, NCCF members and associates marched in the street in front of 611 Continental, Detroit. Detroit NCCF members beat two associates suspected of theft. Detroit continues to receive copies of "The Black Panther" newspaper from BPP National Distribution, San Francisco, California.

- P -

DETAILS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BLACK PANTHER PARTY LEADERS 3

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 3

III. TEACHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 5

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM ... 6

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY 9

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BLACK PANTHER PARTY LEADERS

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is contained in the appendix pages attached hereto.

The Detroit National Committee to Combat Fascisn (NCCF), organizing bureau for the BPP, believes the Detroit Police Department will attempt to stop their marching in the street in front of 611 Continental on Sundays and are telling the community to come see the confrontation between the police and NCCF when the police attempt to interfere with their parade.

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

A Free Clothing Program is currently in operation Monday through Saturday at 3591 17th Street, Detroit, Michigan.

DE T-1
January 4, 1971

The Free Breakfast for School Children Program is operating five days each week at the following locations:

St. Leo's Church,
15th and Grand River,
Detroit, Michigan,
feeding about seven children per day

3591 17th Street,
Detroit, Michigan,
feeding about ten children per day

3595 17th Street,
Detroit, Michigan,
feeding about ten children per day

611 Continental,
Detroit, Michigan
feeding about 40 children per day

DE T-1
January 4, 1971

A .38 caliber revolver is kept in the reception desk at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, Flint branch of the Detroit NCCF, and a 12 gauge shotgun is kept on a blanket on the floor behind the desk.

DE T-24
January 7, 1971

After the NCCF political education meeting on January 10, 1971, persons attending the meeting went out into the street and marched up and down the block in formation, a practice they have followed since the beginning of January, 1971.

DE T-1
January 11, 1971

On January 10, 1971, about 4:20 p.m., Detroit Police Officers arrived on Continental Street, Detroit, where about 16 persons were marching in the street in front of 611 Continental, Detroit, NCCF Office, blocking traffic. The police approached the individual directing the marching and requested that the people move onto the the sidewalk, which request this individual ignored. The police car was forced to back down the street, and was shortly joined by two other police cars, at which time the marchers left the street and entered 611 Continental.

DE T-3
January 13, 1971

The interest in the Flint branch of the Detroit NCCF has continued to decrease and there are approximately five children showing up for the Breakfast for School Children Program.

DE T-26
January 14, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON, BPP, Oakland, California, currently in charge of the Detroit NCCF, has been trying to raise funds for the BPP Defense Fund, which he is to send to Stronghold Productions, New York, New York.

DE T-1
January 13, 1971

Members of the Detroit NCCF tortured and beat two persons who had both been affiliated with the NCCF for a short time and were accused of stealing guns from the NCCF on separate occasions. The NCCF members talked of killing both, however, they were both released.

DE T-1
January 25, 1971

III. TEACHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

Political Education Classes are currently held at 611 Continental, Detroit, Michigan, every Sunday, but have been discontinued at 3595 17th Street, Detroit, Michigan.

DE T-1
January 4, 1971

Members of the Flint branch of the Detroit NCCF are required to memorize the 15 political prisoners who were arrested by the Detroit Police Department, members of the BPP Central Committee, Ten Point Program, and other items including various paragraphs from the "Thoughts of Mao."

DE T-26
January 7, 1971

A political education class was held at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, on Sunday, January 24, 1971, at which all present read from the current issue of "The Black Panther".

DE T-24
January 27, 1971

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

On January 14, 1971, DE T-26 furnished the following leaflet entitled "Attention Community Workers and NCCF Members Detroit Chapter" which was distributed by the Detroit NCCF.

ATTENTION COMMUNITY WORKERS AND N.C.C.F. MEMBERS
DETROIT CHAPTER

HE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS AN ORDER AND WILL BE CARRIED OUT IMMEDIATELY

LL POWER TO THE PEOPLE COMRADES;

BECAUSE OF THE NECESSITY TO INTENSIFY THE STRUGGLE HERE IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, T IS NECESSARY TO INTENSIFY OUR KNOWLEDGE OF STRUGGLE, AND TO TIGHTEN UP OUR IDEOLOGY HICH IS OUR FIRST STEP TOWARDS BEING TRUELY A MATCH FOR A HUNDRED.

OUR CHAIRMAN IS FACING THE ELECTRIC CHAIR, ELDRIDGE OUR MINISTER OF INFORMATION S STILL IN EXILE. THE LIFE OF OUR BELOVED MINISTER OF DEFENSE, HUEY P. NEWTON IS IN ONSTANT DANGER OF ASSASINATION, SOME 30 MEMBERS OF OUR PARTY HAVE ALREADY BEEN MURDRED AND COUNTLESS OF OUR COMRADES ARE IMPRISONED. ALL THIS IS REALITY AND YET SOME F US ARE STILL VERY SLIP-SHOD IN OUR WORK.

BECAUSE OF THE LEVEL OF STRUGGLE INWHICH WE ARE NOW ENGAGED - THE BEGINNING PHASES F ACTUAL ARMED STRUGGLE - IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO CONDENSE THIS TRAINING AND TO EVELOPE INTO A VANGAURD SOLDIER.

OUT LINES OF TRAINING PROGRAMS WILL BE GIVEN EACH MEMBER AND COMMUNITY WORKER. T THE COMPLETION OF THESE TRAINING PROGRAMS, TESTS WILL BE GIVEN TO DETERMINE JUST HAT LEVEL A COMRADE WILL WORK.

THE FIRST SIX WEEKS TRAINING WILL ESTABLISH WHETHER OR NOT ONE WILL BECOME A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEES TO COMBAT FASCISM.

THE SECOND SIX WEEKS WILL ESTABLISH THOSE TO BE PUT IN CHARGE OF LEADERSHIP POSITIONS AND THOSE WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE OF INFORMATION CENTERS THROUGH-OUT THE STATE OF ICHIGAN.

OMMUNITY WORKERS ------------------ ARE ALL THOSE WHO CANNOT FUNCTION FULL TIME AND ALL HOSE WHO CAN AND DO FUNCTION FULL TIME, BUT HAVE NOT COMPLETED THEIR FIRST SIX WEEKS RAINING. THOSE WHO PRIMARILY SELL NEWSPAPERS, PASS OUT LEAFLETS ETC.

EMBERS OF N.C.C.F. ---------- ARE THOSE WHO FUNCTION FULL TIME AND HAVE PASSED THEIR IX WEEKS TRAINING PROGRAM. WHO SELL NEWSPAPERS AND WORK IN ASSIGNED AREAS UNDER THOSE HO CORDINATE PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.

THOSE WORKING AS ORGANIZERS IN CHARGE OF OFFICES, PROGRAMS, ETC; ARE THOSE WHO HO COMPLETE PHASE TWO OF THEIR TRAINING COURSE. THESE PEOPLE WILL BE LOOKED UPON AS HE DRIVING FORCE OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEES. THESE PEOPLE WILL ORGANIZE VARIOUS AREAS N THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.

**THOSE IN PHASE TWO WILL NOT DRINK HARD ALCOHOL SUCH AS WINE AND WHISKEY, OR SMOKE
*IT WILL BE PERMISSIBLE TO DRINK BEER AT THIS TIME
HASE THREE WILL NOT BE GIVEN BUT MEMBERS OF THE B.P.P. WILL BE RECRUITED FROM IT'S RANKS

I WISH YOU ALL SUCCESS IN OUR STRUGGLE TO TRUELY BE A MATCH FOR A HUNDRED.

RIGHT ON COMRADES
MICHAEL D.

DY LIST AND SIX WEEKS EXAMINATION - FOR COMMUNITY WORKERS AND NCCF MEMBERS

PART I - FIRST SIX WEEKS

TEN POINT PLATFORM AND PROGRAM OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RULES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MOTTO
CARDINAL RULE
PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE B.P.P.
MASS LINE
PARTY LINE
SPECIFIED CHAPTERS OF THE RED BOOK
THREE MAIN RULES OF DISCIPLINE
EIGHT POINTS OF ATTENTION
EVERY MEMBER OF N.C.C.F. MUST KNOW THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF B.P.P.
KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS
KNOW EVERY BLACK PANTHER PARTY MEMBER MURDERED BY THIS SYSTEM

PART II - SECOND SIX WEEKS

IDEOLOGY OF BPP - ELDRIDGE
ESSAYS OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE - HUEY P. NEWTON
GENIOUS OF HUEY P. NEWTON
EDUCATION AND REVOLUTION - ELDRIDGE
CONVERSATION WITH ELDRIDGE CLEAVER
SEIZE THE TIME BOBBY SEALE
HUEY TALKS TO THE MOVEMENT
MANDATES OF THE B.P.P.
CENTERFOLD OF ALL RECENT B.P.P. NEWSPAPERS
MINI MANUEL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

WORD LIST - PART I

SLAVE
OPPRESSED
OPPRESSOR
CAPITALISM
NEO-COLONIALISM
IMPERIALISM
PENAGONISM
FASCISM
RACISM
REACTIONARY
REVOLUTION (ARY) (IST)
SOCIALISM
SELF - DEFENSE
COLONIALISM
JUCHE
ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE
FRIEND OF THE PEOPLE
SUBJECTIVISM
INDIVIDUALISM
SECTARIANISM

21. PUCHISM
22. A ULTRA - DEMOCRACY
23. PURELY MILITARY VIEWPOINT
24. DEPARTMENTALISM
25. CLIQUEISM

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

KENNY HORSTON, BPP, Oakland, California, currently in charge of the Detroit NCCF, contacted the Bronx, New York Chapter of the BPP on December 31, 1970, for advice.

Mich

NY T-66
December 31, 1970

ZAYD SHAKUR, BPP, New York, arrived in Detroit the evening of January 9, 1971, and returned to New York January 11, 1971.

Mich

DE T-1
January 11, 1971

VIRON REDWINE, member of the Detroit NCCF, is still working at BPP headquarters, California.

DE T-1
January 21, 1971

A BPP staff meeting has been called for January 24, 1971, at Chicago, Illinois, at which the Detroit NCCF is supposed to have a representative.

DE T-1
January 18, 1971

EDGAR ROBINSON placed an order for 7500 copies of "The Black Panther" newspaper on January 20, 1971.

Calif

SF T-22
January 20, 1971

During January, 1971, the Detroit NCCF received approximately 4,000 papers per week from National Distribution, San Francisco, California.

DE T-1
January, 1971

1

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP),
also known as
Black Panther Party for Self Defense

According to the official newspaper of the BPP, the BPP was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY G. SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, Minister of Defense, BPP.

The official newspaper, called "The Black Panther," regularly states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to as "pigs" who should be killed.

The newspaper, in its issue of September 7, 1968, had an article by the then Minister of Education, GEORGE MURRAY. This article ended with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

The BPP newspaper, issue of October 5, 1968, had an article introduced with the following statement: "We will not dissent from American government. We will overthrow it."

DAVID HILLIARD, Chief of Staff, BPP, in a speech at the San Francisco Polo Field on November 15, 1969, said "We will kill Richard Nixon."

DAVID HILLIARD, in the "New York Times," issue of December 13, 1969, was quoted as follows: "We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government by way of force and violence."

In the issue of April 25, 1970, the BPP newspaper had an article by Minister of Culture EMORY DOUGLAS as follows:

> "The only way to make this racist US government administer justice to the people it is oppressing, is...by taking up arms against this government, killing the officials, until the reactionary forces...are dead and those that are left turn their weapons on their superiors, thereby passing revolutionary judgement against the number one enemy of all mankind, the racist US government."

The BPP Headquarters is located at 1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California. Branches of the BPP, and Committees to Combat Fascism, under control of the BPP, have been established in various locations in the USA.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Detroit, Michigan
February 17, 1971

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF), DETROIT DIVISION

Character SM - SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Reference Detroit report dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
DETROIT	SAN FRANCISCO	3/15/71	1/28/71 - 3/2/71

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF) DETROIT DIVISION	SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR.	ab
	CHARACTER OF CASE RM - SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY REBELLION AND INSURRECTION	

REFERENCE: Detroit report of SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR., 2/17/71.

- P -

Fulton

LEAD

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Will maintain contact with logical informants and submit evidentiary report 30 days from date of this report.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					☐ NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED NWR SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

11 - Bureau (105-165706 Sub 15) (RM)
1 - MIG, Detroit (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)
2 - San Francisco (157-2304) (RM)
2 - Detroit (157-3075)

105-165706-15-815

REC- 5

17 MAR 17 1971

EX 105

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency
AGENCY: ICDSO, NIC, OSI, SEC. SERV., IRS, (Wright), RCMP,
Request Recd.: DEPT: ISD, [redacted], IDIU, ~~CB~~ Chief Postal Inspector
HOW FWD: RS
DATE FORW: 3/30/71
BY: [illegible]

Notations

~~INT. SEC.~~ SEC

RACQ

57 MAR 31 1971

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O—375-329

COVER PAGE

DE 157-3075

ADMINISTRATIVE

This report is being classified confidential to protect sources of a continuing value.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source	Location	
✓NK T-24 is NK 3162-R	157-3075-2259	INFORMANTS
✓DE T-1 is DE 1330-R	170-637R-336	
✓SF T-16 is SF 3215-R*	157-3075-2260	-ELSUR
✓DE T-26 is DE 1423-RI (PROB)	170-806-R-11	-INFORMANT
✓NY T-112 is DANIEL P. ORLAN, Balan Printing Company Brooklyn, New York	157-4565-247 249	-CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - MIG, Detroit (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)

Report of: SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR. Office: Detroit, Michigan
Date: 3/15/71

Field Office File #: 157-3075 Bureau File #: 105-165706-15

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP),
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF)
DETROIT DIVISION

Character: Racial
[redacted] MATTERS - SMITH ACT OF 1940;
SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY
REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Synopsis:

The Detroit NCCF continues to operate under the direction of BPP National Headquarters, Oakland, California. Detroit continues to receive and sell "The Black Panther" newspaper, which is currently being shipped to Detroit from New York City. Political education classes are held on Sunday at both the Flint branch of the Detroit NCCF and in Detroit. Detroit currently has no other programs in operation due to a lack of funds.

- P -

DETAILS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 351-076

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BLACK PANTHER PARTY LEADERS 3

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 3

III. TEACHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 4

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 4

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY 4

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BLACK PANTHER PARTY LEADERS

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is contained in the appendix pages attached hereto.

WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON, leader of the Flint Mich. branch of the Detroit National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF), organizing bureau for the BPP, at the regular political education meeting on January 31, 1971, placed emphasis on the "Brothers arming themselves" and recommended that they get a pistol to carry as soon as possible. The main topic of the meeting was a discussion of the center fold of "The Black Panther" newspaper dated January 30, 1971 and of party policies.

DE T-26
February 8, 1971

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

The Breakfast for Children Program is operating only at 611 Continental, Detroit, Michigan, where only five or six children are being fed per day.

DE T-1
February 17, 1971

The front window of the NCCF branch at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, is barricaded completely with sand, leaving only places for guns to be pushed through. They station lookouts at the front windows on the first and second floors, but ignore the rear of the house.

DE T-26
February 8, 1971

The Detroit NCCF is continuing to collect donations for the Breakfast Program which consist primarily of food, which is used to feed NCCF members as no programs are currently in operation due to a lack of funds.

DE T-1
March 2, 1971

III. TEACHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

The Flint branch of the Detroit NCCF holds political education meetings at their office, 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan each Sunday.

DE T-26
February 8, 1971

The Detroit NCCF continues to hold political education classes every Sunday at Community Information Center Number One, 611 Continental, Detroit.

DE T-1
March 2, 1971

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

No new leaflets were published by the Detroit NCCF in February, 1971.

DE T-1
March 2, 1971

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY

A member of the BPP in Newark, New Jersey sent cigarettes and books to a member of the Detroit 16 who is in jail in Detroit, Michigan.

NK T-24
January 28, 1971

VIRON REDWINE, Detroit NCCF member, returned to Detroit from BPP Headquarters, California, on Feburary 16, 1971, at the request of HUEY NEWTON to check up on the activities of the Detroit NCCF.

DE T-1
February 17, 1971

KENNETH HORSTON advised that HUEY NEWTON, Minister of Defense, BPP, is to appear in Chicago for a speaking engagement on February 19, 1971.

DE T-1
February 17, 1971

Kenneth Horston,

KENNY HORSTON, San Francisco BPP member, presently operating the Detroit NCCF, reported to National Headquarters, Oakland, California, that VIRON REDWINE is presently in Flint, Michigan, due to a shortage in personnel as some members operating at Flint, Michigan, had been sent to Chicago to assist.

SF T- 16
February 19, 1971

The Detroit NCCF received 3000 copies each of "The Black Panther" newspaper issues dated February 6, 13 and 20, 1971, and 6000 copies dated February 27, 1971. The newspaper is currently being published in New York and San Francisco.

DE T-1
March 2, 1971

NY T-112 advised on February 11, 1971 and February 19, 1971, that copies of "The Black Panther" newspaper dated February 13, 1971 and February 20, 1971 were shipped from New York to Detroit.

APPENDIX

1 BLACK PANTHER PARTY, also known as Black Panther Party for Self Defense

According to the official newspaper of the Black Panther Party (BPP), the BPP was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby G. Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, BPP.

The official newspaper, called "The Black Panther," regularly states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to as "pigs" who should be killed.

The newspaper, in its issue of September 7, 1968, had an article by the then Minister of Education George Murray. This article ended with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

The BPP newspaper, issue of October 5, 1968, had an article introduced with the following statement: "We will not dissent from American government. We will overthrow it."

David Hilliard, Chief of Staff, BPP, in a speech at the San Francisco Polo Field on November 15, 1969, said, "We will kill Richard Nixon."

David Hilliard, in the "New York Times," issue of December 13, 1969, was quoted as follows: "We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government by way of force and violence."

In the issue of April 25, 1970, the BPP newspaper had an article by Minister of Culture Emory Douglas as follows:

"The only way to make this racist U. S. Government administer justice to the people it is oppressing, is . . . by taking up arms against this government, killing the officials, until the reactionary forces . . . are dead, and those that are left turn their weapons on their superiors, thereby passing revolutionary judgement against the number one enemy of all mankind, the racist U. S. Government."

The BPP headquarters is located at 1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California. Branches of the BPP, and Committees to Combat Fascism, under control of the BPP, have been established in various locations in the U. S.

U[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT O[illegible]USTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Detroit, Michigan
March 15, 1971

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASICSM (NCCF), DETROIT DIVISION

Character Racial [redacted] MATTERS - SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Reference Detroit report dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

DE T-112 with whom insufficient contact has been made to evaluate reliability, but who is in a position to furnish reliable information.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
DETROIT	DETROIT	1/6/71	11/28 - 12/30/70

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF) DETROIT DIVISION	SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR.	ah
	CHARACTER OF CASE SM - SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND INSURRECTION	

REFERENCES: Detroit report of SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR. 12/17/70.

- P -

LEAD

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Will maintain contact with logical informants and submit evidentiary report 30 days from date of this report.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

11 - Bureau (105-165706 sub 15) (RM)
1 - MIG, Detroit (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)
2 - San Francisco (157-2305) (RM)
2 - Detroit (157-3075)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

105-	165706-15	754	REC- 5
18 JAN 11 1971			~~ST-100~~

RACIAL INT. SECT.

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency: AGENCY: [redacted], NIC, OSI, SEC. SERV., [redacted], Chief Postal Inspector, CIA
DEPT. ISD, [redacted], IDIU, [redacted]
Request Recd.
Date Fwd. HOW FORW: RS
How Fwd. DATE FORW: 1/18/71
By BY: GTT/ird

Notations: 1cc Legat, Ottawa by O-7 for RCMP

6/11

1cc 80C/D Iced

57 JAN [illegible] 1971

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O--375-139

COVER PAGE

DE 157-3075

ADMINISTRATIVE

This report is classified confidential to protect sources of continuing value.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source	Location
✓ DE T-1 is DE 1330-R INFORMANT	157-3075-2005 170-637R-307 308 304 315 312
✓ SF T-16 is SF 3215-R* ELSURS	157-3075-2019 2020 1997
✓ SF T-22 is SF 3259-R*	157-3075-2024 2030 2039
✓ DE T-24 is Lieutenant LOUIS SZABO, Intelligence, Flint, Michigan PD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE	157-6749-R-8
✓ DE T-26 is DE 1423-R (PROB) INFORMANT	170-306R-7
✓ DE T-3 is Detective Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY Security Section, Intelligence Division, Detroit PD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE	This report

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - MIG, Detroit (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)

Report of: SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR. **Office:** Detroit, Michigan
Date: 1/6/71

Field Office File #: 157-3075 **Bureau File #:** 105-165706 Sub 15

Title:
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF)
DETROIT DIVISION

Character:
SECURITY MATTER - SMITH ACT OF 1940;
SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Synopsis:

The Detroit NCCF continues to operate under the direction of BPP National Headquarters, Oakland, Calif., who sent a representative to take charge of the Detroit NCCF. The Detroit NCCF is operating Free Breakfast and Clothing Programs in Detroit and a Free Breakfast Program in Flint, Michigan. In Flint they are in the process of fortifying their office. Detroit is receiving free electric service at 611-613 Continental as the NCCF has bypassed the electric meter and refuse to allow the electric company on the property to turn off the electricity. The NCCF continues to hold political education classes on Sundays and recently obtained Army manuals on explosives.

- P -

DETAILS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BLACK PANTHER PARTY LEADERS 3

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 5

III. TEACHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 6

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 7

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY 7

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BLACK PANTHER PARTY LEADERS

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is contained in the appendix pages attached hereto.

The following is an article by the Detroit National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF), organizing bureau of the BPP, which appeared in "The Black Panther" newspaper dated November 28, 1970, author unknown:.

FREE THE DETROIT 15

The judicial system is proving at every turn of events that it is impossible for Black people to receive a fair trial in Babylon. Fifteen members of the Detroit N.C.C.F. are illegally being held in the Wayne County jail. Seven brothers and eight sisters are being held on charges of murder, conspiracy to commit murder and malicious destruction of police property.

These charges stem from an incident that happened On October 24th when a nine year old youth and 2 members of the N.C.C.F. were severly beaten by the fascist pigs The people in the community showed their contempt for the pigs by hurling bricks and bottles in their direction. In response, the pigs drew their guns and began firing into the crowd of people. An exchange of fire took place between the pigs and an unknown assailant. The results were one dead pig and one wounded pig, and a victory for the people.

Using this as an excuse the pigs raided the N.C C F. office. The brothers and sisters inside the office relating to Executive Mandate No. 3, defended their home in a confrontation that lasted from 6:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. the next morning. The pigs had alerted the national guard and they were about to enforce the McCarran Act. If the whole community would have been armed the cowardly pigs wouldn't have even come into the community brutalizing the people. the brothers and sisters would not be in jail and the people would have had an even greater victory.

As it stands now they are all being held on trumped-up charges. The sisters have ransoms of $10,000 with 2 sureities; the brothers' ransoms are $25,000 except for one brother (Erene; whose bail ransom is $30,000 plus 2 sureities.

They have all been brutally beaten and constantly harassed by the dogs since they have been incarcerated. Cassandra limps, (due to a beating from the pigs). The entire left side of Linda's face is swollen from being beaten; David's face is also swollen from being beaten. Kim's right forearm was busted by a pig who slamed a cast iron door on it. And Jerome has severe burns (his face, neck, ears and right arm), from a pig trying to set him on fire.

They were arraigned in court on the 25th of October and had their preliminary hearing on the 30th of October. A preliminary hearing is held to determine if the pigs have enough evidence to prosecute the defendants.

If there isn't sufficient evidence produced then the defendant is to be released from custody. The pigs realizing that they didn't have any evidence whatsoever to continue the confinement of the brothers and sisters, decided to employ the fascist tactics of "the 17-man citizens grand jury". This grand jury has been given the authority to continue the confinement of the defendant on given word from the police department. "The 17-man citizens grand jury' was ruled unconstitutional by Genesee Circuit judge Elra H. Papp. Judge Papp ruled against the grand jury law on three counts.

The first issue deals with the provision in the law that a defense attorney cannot see grand jury testimony from a witness until after that witness has testified at the trial. Judge Papp found that this procedure does not "adhere to the principles of a fair trial".

"Never could I effectively prosecute or defend without thorough investigation, discovery and preparation", she said.

The second issue concerns the right of an accused person to have an effective attorney.

The judge ruled that an attorney cannot be effective when he gets a copy of grand jury testimony during the trial.

"He can neither properly prepare a defense , nor can he recommend to his client that he plead guilty without knowledge of what witnesses have said against that client" Judge Papp said.

The third issue involves the denial of a preliminary examination to persons indicated by a citizens grand jury.

"Preliminary examination or at least access to the grand jury transcript before trial is vital for one accused of a crime" she said.

A preliminary examination's purpose is to determine if there is evidence to force a person to stand trial.

Judge Papp said that under the citizens grand jury law, this is done by inexperienced lay people "acting as an arm of the prosecutor".

The pigs are desperately trying to make a case. They have no evidence, since all of the original complaints and warrants have been dismissed. But the fascists are still trying to railroad these brothers and sisters on make believe trumped-up charges. This is just another example of the need for a Revolutionary, People's Constitutional Convention

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS

N.C.C.F. Detroit

WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON, leader of the Flint, Michigan branch of the Detroit NCCF, lead a discussion at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, on December 1, 1970, during which the following items were discussed:

Tactics to eliminate the foot patrolman in the black community through the use of three-man squads to attack them and obtain their weapons and radios. The police are not to be killed if possible, however, this is permissible if there is no other means. The attacking of police stations and knocking out power facilities was also discussed as a future tactic.

DE T-24
December 4, 1970

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

On December 2, 1970, Detective WILLIAM HENNAHAN, Security Section, Intelligence Division, Detroit Police Department, advised that he was contacted by the Detroit Edison Electric Company, and advised that a crew from the electric company went out to check the meter at 611 Continental, Detroit, an NCCF office, which is on the rear of the house, since a request for service had not been received, and found that the meter had been jumped. They were going to disconnect the electricity at the meter but were chased away by occupants of the house. The electric company is not going to cut the wire at the pole as they consider it too dangerous and are going to let the NCCF have the electricity.

The Flint Chapter of the Detroit NCCF has begun work on fortifying the house at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, by placing plywood a few inches from the wall, which they then plan to fill with sand.

DE T-24
December 4, 1970

The NCCF is currently operating the Free Breakfast for School Children Program at three locations in Detroit, feeding a total of approximately 60 persons.

The NCCF also began a Free Clothing Program on December 5, 1970, which is scheduled to be open every Saturday.

DE T-1
December 7, 1970

The NCCF branch at Flint, Michigan, has a Free Breakfast for School Children Program which operates five days a week and feeds approximately 50 children per day.

DE T-26
December 11, 1970

At approximately 1:45 a.m., December 25, 1970, a marked police vehicle driving south on 17th Street from Magnolia Street, Detroit, observed a man who they believed had a pistol in his hand. The police car, upon circling the block, found same Negro male standing on the proch of 3591 17th Street, an office of the NCCF, with a rifle, which he pointed at the police car, which immediately left.

DE T-3
December 28, 1970

III. TEACHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

Political education classes will be held at Community Information Center Number 1, 611 Continental and Center Number 2, 3595 17th Street, beginning Sunday, December 13, 1970.

DE T-1
December 9, 1970

The Detroit NCCF has been studying the following U.S. Army Manuals:

"Unconventional Warfare Devices and Techniques"

"Military Explosives"

"Explosives and Demolitions"

DE T-1
December 30, 1970

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

No new leaflets were distributed in Detroit by the NCCF during December.

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY

VIRON REDWINE, Detroit NCCF, is currently on temporary assignment in the San Francisco area.

SF T-16
December 3, 1970

NORMAN MC KEE, Detroit NCCF member, is scheduled to return to Detroit from a visit to BPP National Headquarters, Oakland, California, American Airlines Flight 136, 6:45 a.m., December 10, 1970.

SF T-16
December 10, 1970

SAM NAPIER and KENNETH HORSTON, both BPP San Francisco, are scheduled to arrive Detroit, December 10, 1970.

SF T-22
December 10, 1970

JOHN HENRY BOWMAN, BPP Philadelphia, arrived in Detroit, December 11, 1970, and returned to Philadelphia, December 13, 1970.

DE T-1
December 14, 1970

SAM NAPIER, distribution manager for "The Black Panther" newspaper, was in Detroit and planned to fly to

Chicago on American Airlines Flight 193, December 15, 1970, have a brief conference at the airport with members of the Chicago BPP and continue on to San Francisco via United Airlines Flight 139.

SF T-22
December 14, 1970

THOMAS JOLLY, BPP New York, arrived in Detroit December 14, 1970.

DE T-1
December 15, 1970

RON GARDNER and NATE MC DOWELL from Knoxville, Tennessee, visited Detroit the end of November, 1970, as they desired to start an NCCF Chapter in Knoxville. They were furnished instructions and told to contact National Headquarters, Oakland, California, for authorization.

DE T-1
December 15, 1970.

THOMAS JOLLY, BPP New York, left the Detroit NCCF December 16, 1970, 10:30 p.m., en route to San Francisco, where he expects to arrive at 12:30 a.m., December 17, 1970.

SF T-22
December 16, 1970

KENNETH HORSTON, a representative of the BPP Central Committee, Oakland, California, currently running the Detroit NCCF, was en route to San Francisco, California, on December 19, 1970. Mich.

SF T-16
December 19, 1970

KENNETH HORSTON returned to Detroit from Oakland, California on December 23, 1970.

DE T-1
December 24, 1970

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
Also known as
Black Panther Party for Self Defense

According to the official newspaper of the BPP, the BPP was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY G. SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, Minister of Defense, BPP.

The official newspaper, called "The Black Panther," regularly states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to as "pigs" who should be killed.

The newspaper, in its issue of September 7, 1968, had an article by the then Minister of Education, GEORGE MURRAY. This article ended with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

The BPP newspaper, issue of October 5, 1968, had an article introduced with the following statement: "We will not dissent from American government. We will overthrow it."

DAVID HILLIARD, Chief of Staff, BPP, in a speech at the San Francisco Polo Field on November 15, 1969, said "We will kill Richard Nixon."

DAVID HILLIARD, in the "New York Times," issue of December 13, 1969, was quoted as follows: "We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government by way of force and violence."

In the issue of April 25, 1970, the BPP newspaper had an article by Minister of Culture EMORY DOUGLAS as follows:

> "The only way to make this racist US government administer justice to the people it is oppressing, is...by taking up arms against this government, killing the officials, until the reactionary forces...are dead and those that are left turn their weapons on their superiors, thereby passing revolutionary judgement against the number one enemy of all mankind, the racist US government."

The BPP Headquarters is located at 1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California. Branches of the BPP, and Committees to Combat Fascism, under control of the BPP, have been established in various locations in the USA.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Detroit, Michigan
January 6, 1971

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF)
DETROIT DIVISION

Character SM - SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Reference Detroit report dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

G OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
DETROIT	SAN FRANCISCO	12/17/70	10/28 - 12/3/70	

F CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF) - DETROIT DIVISION	SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR.	ah
	CHARACTER OF CASE RM - SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND INSURRECTION	

REFERENCE: Detroit report of SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR., 11/13/70.

- P -

LEAD

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Will maintain contact with logical informants and submit evidentiary report 30 days from date of this report.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED — SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

11 - Bureau (105-165706-15) (RM)
1 - MIG, Detroit (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)
2 - San Francisco (157-2305) (RM)
2 - Detroit (157-3075)

105-165706-15-7

REC-14

DEC 21 1970

105

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency — ~~AGENCY: ICDSO, NIC OSI, SEC. SERV., IRS~~ (Wright)
Request Recd. — DEPT. ISD, ~~CRD~~, IDIU, CD (6, Du)
Date — HOW FORW: RA
How Fwd. — DATE FORW: 12/24/70
By — BY:

Notations: CIA Chief Postal Inspector

55 DEC 30 1970

COVER PAGE

ADMINISTRATIVE

Special Agent RICHARD C. POHLMAN recorded HUEY NEWTON's speech at Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, on 11/16/70.

This report is classified confidential to protect sources of a continuing value.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source		Location
✓DE T-1 is DE 1330-R	INFORMANT	157-3075-1827 170-637R-285 284 273 274 283 291 295 298
✓DE T-23 is RONALD EDWARD SMITH RI - Ghetto	INFORMANT	157-3075-1827
✓SF T-22 is SF 3259-R*	ELSUR	157-3075-1834 1952
✓DE T-3 is Lieutenant WILLIAM MC COY Security Section Intelligence Division Detroit PD	CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES	157-3238-656 157-3075-1950
✓DE T-24 is Lieutenant LOUIS SZABO, Intelligence Flint, Michigan PD		157-3075-1889 1904
✓DE T-25 is DAVID MAURICE GODDARD Detroit Panel Source	INFORMANT	134-2605

✓DE T-26 is
DE 1423-R (PROB) 170-806R-4

INFORMANTS

✓DE T-27 is
FRANK NITTY- R (GHETTO) 170-854

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UN[illegible]D STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]TICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - MIG, Detroit (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Detroit (RM)
1 - OSI, Dayton, Ohio (RM)
1 - NIS, Chicago (RM)

Report of: SA DONALD V. RITENOUR, JR. Office: Detroit, Michigan
Date: 12/17/70

Field Office File #: 157-3075 Bureau File #: 105-165706-15

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF) - DETROIT DIVISION

Character: RACIAL MATTERS - SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Synopsis: The Detroit NCCF continues to operate under the direction of BPP National Headquarters, Oakland, California. HUEY NEWTON spoke at three Michigan universities in 11/70, to raise funds for the Detroit 16. The Detroit NCCF has opened a branch in Flint, Mich. The NCCF continues to operate a Breakfast for Children Program, and holds political education classes on Sundays. Several leaflets were distributed to the black community regarding the Detroit 16. The Detroit NCCF continues to sell "The Black Panther" newspaper.

- P -

DETAILS

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) LEADERS

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is contained in the appendix pages attached hereto.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BLACK PANTHER PARTY LEADERS 1

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 4

III. TEACHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 5

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 5

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY 44

The Association of Black Students, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, sponsored a rally in support of the Detroit 16 on November 16, 1970, featuring HUEY P. NEWTON.

HUEY P. NEWTON is the Minister of Defense, BPP.

The main theme of the speech given by HUEY P. NEWTON on November 16, 1970, at Oakland University, was that all poor blacks and poor whites, the working classes, the oppressed of the world, must all join forces as a united body against the "ruling circle" in the United States. NEWTON repeatedly referred to this "ruling circle" throughout his entire speech and apparently interpreted this "ruling circle" as those leaders of Government and industry, the imperialists or those who are rich in this society. NEWTON wanted equality for everyone with no one being superior to his fellow man. He indicated the Negro is a class brother with the poor whites and they must join in their effort to overcome the "ruling circle."

NEWTON stated, "The Black Panther Party is the vanguard of the revolution on a world-wide level because the world is really one community and we've taken Marxist-Leninist to a greater level and, therefore, we are the greatest Marxist-Leninists that ever lived, and we say this not to be arrogant because some times I wish that someone else would carry that banner because the way is narrow and the burden is heavy."

In conclusion, the speech by NEWTON was a rambling, many times incoherent Marxist-Leninist influenced, low-key revolutionary type speech which attempted to show a connection between the BPP and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (LRBW), as well as a unity between the BPP and all oppressed persons of the world.

A characterization of the LRBW is contained in the appendix pages attached hereto.

His speech called for the release of the Detroit 16, freedom for ANGELA DAVIS, BOBBY SEALE, and all the oppressed brothers and for the ultimate overthrow of the pigs.

The speech appeared to be rather poorly organized and NEWTON was easily diverted from the main topics which he seemed to be pursuing. The speech had very few references to any actual radical action or violent confrontation.

The Black Student Union, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, sponsored a rally in support of the Detroit 16 on November 17, 1970, featuring HUEY NEWTON.

NEWTON stated that the working class will be the ones to carry out the "revolution" and carry the "revolution banner" and will most likely initiate the creation of the new order. Throughout his speech, NEWTON talked about the new order which will occur when the world is taken over by Communism. Throughout the speech, NEWTON refers to capitalism stating that while it has caused many problems, it has also laid the foundation for Communism. He stated that the wealthy are the ruling circle and named ROCKEFELLER and FORD as being in this circle. NEWTON stated that they offerred troops to the Vietnamese people, however, did not get a definite answer on their proposal.

DE T-20
November 17, 1970

The Black Liberation Front International, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, sponsored a rally in support of the Detroit 16 on November 17, 1970, featuring HUEY NEWTON.

The speech given by NEWTON was scheduled for 10:00 a.m., in the auditorium at Michigan State University. The doors were open prior to 10:00 a.m., and persons admitted after a thorough search, for a fee of $2.00, except Negro females, who were charged 25 cents. Those persons attending the speech were advised that they were not allowed to leave, applaud, or stand during the speech, and that anyone leaving could not return. NEWTON arrived at approximately 11:30 a.m., and spoke on Marxist-Leninist theories placing particular emphasis on the Russian Revolution and its relationship to the BPP. The body of the speech was concluded at 1:45 p.m. At approximately 1:00 p.m., most of the audience had left because they were unable to understand NEWTON and were getting fed up with the treatment they were receiving. After a question and answer session, NEWTON finished speaking at 2:30 p.m.

DE T-25
November 17, 1970

On Sunday, November 15, 1970, a meeting of the National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF), organizing bureau for the BPP, was held at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, at which WAYNE THEODORE/ROBERTSON was in charge. Everyone present was asked if they had a weapon and those that did not were told to get one and that it was no big problem to obtain weapons as all they would have to do is kill some "pigs" and take their weapons and equipment. ROBERTSON emphasized that Flint was overdue in the killing of police officers and also commented that if you owned a gun, there would never be an excuse for being arrested for carrying a concealed weapon as Flint Police Officers worked only two men to a car and the officers should be killed if confronted. It was also mentioned that they would attempt to get a black policeman to become an informer for the NCCF.

DE T-24
November 17, 1970

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

The Detroit NCCF sponsored a rally at the Malcolm X Community Center, Inkster, Michigan, at 7:00 p.m., on October 30, 1970, to raise funds for the defense of the Detroit 15. About 50 people attended and approximately $200.00 worth of papers, buttons, and literature were sold. Speakers from the NCCF talked about the police coming into the community stating that the community should defend itself.

The NCCF also sponsored a rally at the Northside Family Center, 150 Belmont, Detroit, on November 1, 1970, at 7:30 p.m., and NCCF speakers again talked about the police coming into the community and stating that the community should defend itself.

DE T-1
November 2, 1970

RONNIE IRWIN, Detroit NCCF, at a rock concert to raise money for the NCCF Defense Fund on November 10, 1970, Wayne State University, Student Center Building, made a speech regarding the shooting of the Detroit Police Officers on October 24, 1970, and stated that the white radicals should support the Detroit 16. He stated that the "pigs" came down on the community and the NCCF responded, and that if community leaders had not interceded, the NCCF members would have been killed.

DE T-1
November 11, 1970

The Detroit NCCF has opened a new branch at 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan, which is to be used as headquarters and the branch will be headed by WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON. A number of individuals at Flint have been selling the BPP newspaper in order to produce funds to help establish the local branch. A general meeting and political education class is to be held on November 15, 1970.

DE T-26
November 12, 1970

On November 18, 1970, members of the Flint branch of the Detroit NCCF, nailed 2 x 4s around the down stairs windows as a framework for some heavy screen or fence which they plan to stretch across the windows. WAYNE THEODORE ROBERTSON ordered that sand should be brought in to bullet proof the walls by using plywood sheets to box in an area approximately three feet from the outer walls of the house both upstairs and downstairs and then filling the area with sand. They also feel that heavy screening on the windows will prevent tear gas from being thrown or shot through the windows. A sign "National Committee to Combat Fascism" has been placed in front of 2009 Albert, Flint, Michigan.

A discussion was held as to the obtaining of gas masks, water canteens, and a fire extinguisher.

DE T-24
November 23, 1970

III. TEACHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

A political education class was held on November 15, 1970, at the NCCF, 12845 14th Street, Detroit, Michigan. "The Black Panther" newspaper was used as a source of discussion and the topics used concerned the "Battlefield in Cairo."

DE T-27
November 17, 1970

Political education classes are held by the Detroit NCCF every Sunday at 12845 14th Street, Detroit, Michigan.

DE T-1
November 24, 1970

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

On November 2, 1970, DE T-23 furnished copies of two leaflets, one entitled "Free the Detroit Panthers" on the front and "The prisons and Jails are Filled with Political Prisoners" on the back and the other "Fund Raising Rally."

FREE THE DETROIT PANTHERS



BEN W. FONDRON
ERONE DESAUSSURE
DAVID M. JOHNSON
SHANTI JONESON
CASSANDRA PARKER
JERONE LEE
WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM
VICTOR GRAYSON
MRS. BEVERLY FLEMING
KIM GARDNER
CAROL E. SMITH
SYLVIA ROBINSON
DIANA BROWN
LINDA WARNSLEY
PAT DUNCAN

ON THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 24, 1970 5:30 PM, THE REACTIONARY GESTAPO FORCES, UNDER THE COMMAND OF COMMISSIONER JOHN F. NICHOLS, STAGED AN ATTACK OF THE N.C.C.F. OFFICE LOCATED AT 16th AND MYRTLE.

IN THE COURSE OF THE ATTACK, THE OFFICE WAS BOMBARDED WITH A BARAGE OF BULLETS AND TEAR GAS BOMBS, RESULTING WITH THE ARREST OF 15 MEMBERS ON TRUMPED-UP CHARGES OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER AND MURDER. THEIR RANSOM (SO-CALLED BONDS) RANGED FROM $100 TO $25,000

WE SEE THIS OVERT ACTION AS ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND IT'S EFFORTS IN COMBATING FASCISM HERE IN THIS OPPRESSIVE SOCIETY AND THE WORLD OVER.. 7

[illegible]

FREE [illegible] POLITICAL PRISONERS



BAIL MONEY NEEDED

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

WE ARE ASKING FOR YOUR SUPPORT IN OUR EFFORTS TO RAISE MONEY FOR THE POLITICAL PRISONERS DEFENSE FUND. FREE THE DETROIT "PANTHERS"

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 584-8953

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
12845 14th STREET
DETROIT MICH.

CONFIDENTIAL

FUND RAISING

RALLY



NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM



POLITICAL PRISONERS DEFENSE FUND



ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 24th, FRIDAY, 2 N.C.C.F. MEMBERS WERE HARASSED BY MEMBERS OF THE DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT. RESULTS OF THIS ENCOUNTER LEAD TO A SEIGE OF THE INFORMATION CENTER WHICH ENDED IN THE ARREST OF 15 N.C.C.F. MEMBERS.

North End Family Center



150 Belmont & John R

SUN NOV. 1, 1970

TIME: 7:00 PM

****

THE OFFICE, LOCATED ON 16th AND MYRTLE, WAS OPENED FIRE UPON BY FASCIST POLICEMEN WITH OVER-KILL WEAPONS OF WAR, WHICH WERE ALSO POINTED AT THE PEOPLE WHO HAD GATHERED TO VIEW THE ATTACK.

****

CONFIDENTIAL

FREE
ALL
POLITICAL
PRISONERS
OF
WAR

On November [illegible], 1970, DE T-3 furnished a copy of a leaflet entitled "Police Attack Detroit Panthers."

N.C.C.F. [illegible]ADQUARTERS UNDER SIEGE F[illegible] NINE HOURS

> "The racist dog policeman must withdraw immediately from our communities, cease their wanton murder and brutality and torture of Black people, or face the wrath of the armed people."

On Saturday, October 24, the Second Precinct Police Station led an assault on the new
adquarters of the Detroit chapter of the National Committee to Combat Fascism, (NCCF).

The attack began about 5:00 P.M. when the Police officers accosted NCCF members selling
: Black Panther Newspaper near Myrtle and 14th Street. The Siege continued until about
0 A.M. Sunday morning, when Police arrested fifteen Black youth who were in the NCCF
dquarters, under the watchful eyes, and some not so watchful eyes, of citizens of the
munity. Eight of those arrested were women.

ONE POLICE ATTACKER WAS KILLED AND TWO
THERS WOUNDED IN THE POLICE SIEGE ON THE
CF HEADQUARTERS. NO ONE INSIDE THE NCCF
ADQUARTERS WAS HURT DURING THE SIEGE,
EN THOUGH THE POLICE USED ALL KINDS OF
VER-KILL" WEAPONS AND CHEMICAL WARFARE
ENTS. DURING THE ASSUALT ON THE
MMUNITY AROUND MYRTLE AND 16th ST.

'eople were forced out of their homes at
point and were prevented free passage
ugh their own Community. The Police
: over, with armed force, the Myrtle and
teenth Community, and People came to
rstand that the only way to regain the
rol of their Community and their lives
o develop a Force greater than that of
Police and the other agencies who were
and to assist the Police-the State Pol-
the Justice Department, and the Nation-
uard were all on alert and had observers
he Siege.

uring the assault and siege, crowds of
unity people gathered to give symbolic
ort to the Black youth inside the house
r attack. The People were there to show
the Community disagreed with the actions
e supposed "Protectors of Liberty".

he Crowd was unorganized and had no way to
the armed Police respond to their wishes
OP THE SIEGE AND WITHDRAW FROM THE COM-
Y.

"THE TIME WHEN PEOPLE CAN SIT BACK AND VIEW PROCESSES OF INJUSTICE AND INEQUALITY HAS COME TO AN END"

The response of the Fascist Police was to harass, intimidate, and arrest the concerned people who represented the entire Community. At least five people were arrested and numerous persons were harassed and brutalized and all were intimidated by the threat of "mass murder" and the realization of their lack of security and control over what happen in their own communities

WHEN THE POLICE BEGAN TO ATTACK THE CROWD THE PEOPLE BECAME A FRIGHTENED MOB AND THE ATTACKING POLICE WERE ABLE TO DISPERSE THE CROWD WITH NO RESISTANCE FROM THE PEOPLE THAT HAD GATHERED TO SUPPORT THE YOUTH IN THE HEADQUARTERS ON 16th STREET.

ice Department and the FBI working with
alled Local Law Enforcement Agencies.

T THE ATTACK AGAINST THE NCCF COMPLETES A
RIES OF ATTACKS IN MAJOR CITIES ATTEMP-
TO DESTROY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND
NIZING BUREAU, THE NATIONAL COMMIT-
TO COMBAT FASCISM.

ek before the attack on 16th Street
lice attacked two NCCF offices, but
ffices had been vacated earlier to move
the Sixteen Street headquarters. The
e used the excuse of serving an eviction
e to attack the two empty NCCF offices.



MUST FIGHT BACK AND WILL FIGHT BACK,

The Police say that after they harassed
attempted to brutalize the NCCF members
14th and Myrtle, the brothers ran into the
F headquarters on 16th Street. The Police
d the same excuse to justify their assault
the New Bethel Church on March 29, of last

hundreds of bull[illegible] into the church.)

It seems that the Government is attempting to destroy th[illegible]ck Panther Party by involving them and their supporters in legal fight and keeping their members in jail with high Bails.

THEREFORE WE DEMAND:

- * THAT ALL PERSONS ARRESTED BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT ANY CHARGES.
- * THE SHOOTING OF THE POLICE OFFICERS BE RULED JUSTIFIABLE , SELF DEFENSE AND THAT NO ONE BE SOUGHT FOR THE SHOOTINGS.
- * THAT THE COMMUNITY HAVE THE POWER TO CONTROL THE POLICE.
- * THAT ALL OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THE ASSAULT ON THE PANTHER HEADQUARTERS BE REVIEWED BEFORE A CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD WITH THE POWER TO DISCHARGE, SUSPEND, FIRE AND ISSUE WARRANTS.

UNLESS THESE DEMANDS ARE MET IMMEDIATELY, NO PIG WILL BE SAFE IN OUR COMMUNITIES.



WE
must
survive
america

On November 12, 1970, DE T-3 furnished copies of two leaflets entitled "Free The Detroit 15" and "Who are the Black Panth

[illegible] Court
J. Justice
JE

free the



Fifteen members of the local National Committee to Combat Fascism, the organizing bureau of the Black Panther Party, are in jail. Each of them has been charged with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

They were in or near the N.C.C.F. office on Saturday evening, October 24, when two pigs beat two black youths who were selling the Black Panther Newspaper. The people in the community responded by defending the two brothers, and when more pigs came on the scene with their guns out and shooting, the people again defended themselves, leaving one pig dead and another wounded. A whole army of officers converged upon the N.C.C.F. office, and finally, after about eight hours, the 15 sisters and brothers inside surrendered.

DETROIT

15

BAIL MONEY IS BADLY NEEDED.

GIVE TO POLITICAL PRISONERS DEFENSE FUND.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 584-8953

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
12845 14th STREET
DETROIT, MICH

Who Are The Black Panthers?

The 10 point program of the Black Panthers Party begins "We want our freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our black community." The Black people in America were brought here from their native land as slaves, and ever since they have been kept on the lowest level of American society. They are a community of people with their own history, economic life, and culture. Yet they've never had political power over their own community. The Black Panther Party formed to fight for this political power.

But the founders of the Black Panther Party, led by Huey P. Newton, knew that they had to have more than their goals. They had to understand how they were going to achieve them. Huey's answer was "Serve the People" and "Pick up the gun." The Black Panthers realized that the people can be liberated only by their own efforts, and that the Panthers had to reach out to their community, find out its needs, and respond to them. And they realized that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," that the people in the black community were being mowed down by the police and had to defend themselves, and that political power over their community would never leave the hands of the rich and enter their own hands unless they combatted the police--the army of the rich.

Huey first put his understanding of serving the people and picking up the gun into practice when he and Bobby Seale went out one night with a hammer and a shot gun to put up a stop sign that was badly needed by the community. Bobby stood guard with the shot gun while Huey hammered in the sign. Later, the Panthers started many health clinics, breakfast for children programs, and other community services.

Because of what the Panthers want for their people, because they are going about getting it, and because the community is beginning to look towards them for leadership, their enemy is scared. So scared that they have started a nation wide campaign to destroy the Panthers. Fred Hampton was murdered in Chicago while he slept, Bobby Hutton was murdered in Oakland, Calif. as he walked out of a house with his hands up, both by police officers that still remain free. Black Panther and N.C.C.F. offices all across the nation (L.A., New Orleans, Toledo, Philadelphia) have been attacked and ransacked by police officers. And now Detroit joins the list, just as the N.C.C.F. here was beginning to start a free community health clinic and to gain the support of the community.

But the Panthers continue to grow and sink deeper and deeper roots among the people. And all of us poor and working people, black and white, should be glad, should defend the Panthers and help them grow. For the Panthers are fighting the enemy of all poor and working people: the rich (e.g. the owners of GM) who run this country and control not only the black community but all of our communities, schools and factories. Huey says "We don't hate white people; we hate the oppressor." And so do we. We say right on Huey P. Newton. Power to the Black Panther Party! Power to the People! Free the Detroit 15!

Committee to Free the Detroit 15

On December 2, 1970, DE T-3 furnished copies of two leaflets entitled "Piggy Wiggy Bang-Bang" and "Political Prisoners Denfese Fund".

NIXON OH NIXON, OH PI[illegible]ASS NIXON
YOU WAR MONGREAL FOOL!
YOU HAVE COMPLETELY BLOWN YOUR COOL!
YOU WHO OINK TO THE PEOPLE,
AND LIE AND LIE AND LIE. THE PEOPLE SAY
OH PIGGY WIGGY, FOR THIS YOU MUST DIE!

WE KNOW OF YOUR PLAN OF GENOCIDE
THIS FACT SO TRUE YOU CANNOT HIDE
YOU BEAST WHO ARE SO LOW
FOR YOU, WE WILL SHO NO WOE!
OUR PEOPLE ARE BEING EDUCATED
AND ARE SOON TO BE LIBERATED
FOR THEIR BODY WILL CONNECT WITH THEIR MIND
THEN DIG IT - WE GONNA SIEZE THE TIME!
FOR WE - THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE OF FASCIST
BABYLON ARE OUT TO DO - WHAT HAS TO BE DONE!



THERE IS NO RECTIFICATION
NOR JUSTIFICATION
FOR YOUR ADVOCATION
OF THE BRUTALIZATION
OF THE PEOPLE, WHICH YOU OPPRESS

PIGS OF THE POWER STRUCTURE, YOU ARE INSANE!
SO ALL WE CAN SAY IS PIGGY WIGGY BANG BANG!

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

LIBERATION BY ANY MEANS

DETROIT "16"

POLITICAL PRISONERS OF U.S. FASCISM

MEMBERS OF THE DETROIT NCCF, INCAR-
TED IN THE WAYNE COUNTY JAIL ON
GES OF MURDER, CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
ER AND MALICIOUS DESTRUCTION OF PO-
PROPERTY, HAVE BECOME VICTIMS OF
PLOT OF TOTAL ANNIHILATION OF THE
K PANTHER PARTY AND IT'S ORGANIZING
AU'S.
SIDE THE JAIL, THE DETROIT 15 HAVE
SUBJECTED TO INHUMAN ACTS OF HARAS-
TS. THE FOOD RECEIVED BY THE 15 HAS
DRUGGED AND LEAVES THE COMRADES
SY. THE SISTERS RECEIVE THREATS OF
INGS AND ONE SISTER WAS LOCKED UP IN
OM WHERE SHE AWAKENED WITH "CRABS"
OVER HER. F.B.I. AGENTS HAVE BEEN IN-
OGATING THEM AND THE MATRONS HARASSING
. THESE SADISTIC ACTS ARE TO BREAK
COMRADES SPIRIT AND TO SHOW THE SUPER-
IMAGE OF POWER AND AUTHORITY BY THOSE
ONTROL.
E COMMITTEE TO FREE THE DETROIT "15"
SET UP A DEFENSE FUND TO OBTAIN MONEY
THE RELEASE OF THE COMRADES. ALL CON-
UTIONS WILL BE SENT TO:

"FREE DETROIT '15' FUND"
P.O. BOX 694
DETROIT MICH. 48231



FREE THE DETROIT "16"



"We will fight from one generation to the next"

BEN FONDRON
ERONE DESAUSSURE
DAVID JOHNSON
SHANTI JONESON
CASSANDRA PARKER
JEROME LEE
WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM
VICTOR GRAYSON
MRS. BEVERLY FLEMING
KIM GARDNER
CAROL E. SMITH
SYLVIA ROBINSON
DIANA BROWN
PAT DUNCAN
LONNIE DARDEN

On December 3, 1970, DE T-3 furnished a copy of a leaflet entitled "Black Policeman."

"Blackman listen to the voices of the PEOPLE

OUR HISTORY IN THIS C[illegible]NTRY HAS BEEN WRITTEN IN [illegible]OD. OUR BLOOD. E MOST TRAGIC SCENES IN THAT HISTORY ARE THOSE OF BLACK BLOOD BEING ILLED BY BLACK MEN. IT IS NOW TIME TO CHANGE THOSE SCENES. IT IS ME TO REGAIN THAT HONOR THAT WAS TAKEN FROM OUR PEOPLE BY THOSE IN-VIDUALS THAT HAVE ALLOWED THEMSELVES TO BE USED AS PAWNS, AND CANNON DDER'S BY THE OPPRESSORS OF THE PEOPLE.

JUST AS OUR BLACK MEN ARE USED IN VIETNAM TO KILL THE POOR PEOPLE VIETNAM FOR OUR OWN OPPRESSORS WHO ALSO EMPLOY PEOPLE WITH WEAPONS WAR TO PATROL, BRUTALIZE AND KILL BLACK PEOPLE HERE IN THE UNITED ATES, HERE IN DETROIT.

JUST AS THE BLACK G.I. MUST SALVAGE HIS HONOR, OUR HONOR BY REFUS-G TO BE COME A PART OF THE MONSTEROUS WAR MACHINE ABROAD. YOU MUST FUSE TO BECOME A PART OF THE MONSTEROUS WAR MACHINE HERE IN THE THER COUNTRY OF WAR - THE AMERICAN EMPIRE.

WE HAVE TO PULL AWAY FROM THAT FLUNKEYISM. ESPECIALLY WHEN IT'S ALING WITH THE WELL BEING OF OUR PEOPLE AND THE HONOR OF YOUR OWN SOUL. MUST NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO FIGHT FOR THE PRIVATE INTERESTS OF A FEW DIVIDUALS OR A NARROW CLIQUE, BUT FOR THE INTERESTS OF ALL OUR PEOPLE. MUST FIGHT FOR FREEDOM AND SANITY.



YOU MUST MAKE THE DECISION NOW, IF YOU ARE GOING TO WORK HARD TO ILL US, OR WORK WITH US TO OBTAIN OUR FREEDOM. AS FAS AS OUR OWN DESIRE S CONCERNED, WE DON'T WANT TO FIGHT EVEN FOR A SINGLE DAY. BUT IF CIR-UMSTANCES FORCE US TO FIGHT, WE CAN FIGHT TO THE FINISH.

IF ANYONE WHETHER HE BE WHITE OR BLACK ATTACKS US AND IF CONDITIONS RE FAVORABLE FOR BATTLE, WE WILL CERTAINLY ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE TO WIPE HEM OUT RESOLUTELY, THOROUGHLY, WHOLLY AND COMPLETELY.

WE WILL NOT AND CAN NOT STRIKE RASHLY, BUT WHEN WE DO STRIKE, WE UST WIN.

OME HOME BLACK MAN TO YOUR TRUE FAMILY, YOUR BLACK FAMILY, YOUR SLAVE AMILY.


OFF THE PIG!
By "Any" Means Necessary!

FREE The Detroit "16"

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
12845 14th STREET
DETROIT MICH.

booklets,
New York,

On December 1, 1970, DE T-1 furnished the following which were received from BPP East Coast Distribution, for use in instructing political education classes:

1. "The Palestinian Revolution"
2. "Address by the Al-Fateh Delegation to the Second International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples"
3. "Dialogue with Abu-Amar."

A copy of each of the above follows:

The Palestinian Revolution

Message from The Palestine
National Liberation Movement
(Fateh)
to the 17th Annual Convention
of Arab Students in the
United States and Canada
held in Ann Arbor, Michigan
August 26-31, 1968

It is indeed an honor to address this Seveneenth Convention of the Organization of Arab Students n the United States and Canada. I wish to thank the rganization for its kind invitation to Fateh to ddress this conference which represents a cornertone of active Arab thought vis-a-vis the Palestinian Revolution. It is evident from the delegates, the rogr[illegible], and the guests, that we are concerned here not with rhetoric but with conscious analysis, planning, and understanding of the importance of the Palestinian Revolution and its far-reaching impact upon the Palestinian people, the Arab nation, the world's conscience and all humanistic values.

As you no doubt know, the Palestinian people have not ceased to struggle against their oppressors ever since they first realized that world colonialism and expansionist Zionist settler colonialism were conspiring to rob them of their Palestinian homeland. To Zionists, this was the first step toward seizure and control of the Arab nation's resources which will effectively hinder its economic development and cultural progress.

* As you also know, the Palestinian people subsequent to the 1948 catastrophe have been subjected to severe constraints, as well as destitution, poverty, dispersion, and persecution. It is indeed amazing that this treatment has not led to the loss of the Palestinian people's identity, destruction of their will, and their total dispersion, as was originally intended. The Palestinians' genuine revolutionary will, their clear understanding that they are part of the Arab nation and that their struggle against Zionism is in reality the Arab nation's struggle, their ultimate victory, and their mature understanding of the moral and human imperatives for the liberation of their homeland are all various elements combined

to thwart their opponent's well-laid plans. The Palestinian people withstood all pressures and continued to resist by different means. Finally, they stood to take once again the full responsibility for their own destiny, especially after the continuous failure of the Arab governments became blatantly evident.

The beginning of 1965 signaled the end of dependency and asserted the Palestinians' right to take command of their own struggle. Hence the Palestinian people formed the general framework of the Revolution according to the following principles:

1. All action must be guided by a free and independent Palestinian will in thought, words, and deed.
2. Protecting the Revolution from any influence or interference from any Arab government and avoiding involvement in the internal affairs of the Arab governments.
3. Considering the struggle for the liberation of Palestine a phase of national struggle and hence must absorb all strata and all segments of the Palestinian society, asserting that the "liberation of Palestine is the road to unity."
4. Fusing the Palestinian people and the revolutionary vanguards through armed struggle.
5. Fusing the Palestinian people with the Arab masses through the armed revolution, for the Palestinian Revolution is Palestinian in inception, Arab in depth, and national in goals and objectives.
6. Setting the liberation of Palestine over all other Arab issues.

24

7. Mobilizing the channeling forces in the Arab world toward the Palestinian Revolution.

8. Rejecting the principle of conventional warfare due to the international imperialist circumstances which protect the Zionist forces in our occupied Palestine and due to the contradictions in the Arab countries which resulted in a passive atmosphere and led to continuous failure regarding the Palestinian question, thus enabling the enemy to grow and prepare for its next expansionist battle.

9. Adopting "armed struggle" as the only means for the liberation of Palestine and "people's war" as the only method for action.

10. Adopting the concept of "national security of the Arab nation" instead of "divided regional security" which parcels responsibilities and leads its proponents into a morass of cost-benefit accounting.

11. Rejecting any international patronage which is inevitably allied to the interest of colonialism and Zionist influence.

This persistent insistance of the Palestinian people to revolt, their conscious rebellion against any and all attempts to impose upon them external limitations or solutions, and their rejection of resettlement or compensation plans would have been impossible were there not material, national, moral, and human imperatives far stronger than those external forces.

The material imperative is clearly demonstrated in the loss of their homeland and the attack on all their rights for livelihood. This also includes the Arab people who live under the constant threat of Zionist expansion. The Arab economies are being [illegible] defense expenditures to counter

the Zionist presence which caused and still causes tremendous dislocation in the social and political fibers of the Arab world. The result of this has been the continuing backwardness of the Arab people and will be their ultimate destruction.

From this point, the national imperative for the Palestinian Revolution becomes apparent, for in the process of liberating Palestine, the Revolution will also destroy that ever-present expansionist Zionist threat to the Arab people. By so doing, it also destroys the most important stronghold for world colonialism in the Arab land. Such development would open the way for the Arab nation to assert its cultural presence, material progress, and would allow it to cooperate with the other nations of the world to realize peace.

The moral imperative of the Palestinian Revolution finds concrete expression in the people's rejection of the injustices heaped upon them, the aggressions committed against their national and human rights and in their rejection of all forms of oppression and injustice. This is what gives the Palestinian Revolution its humanitarian foundation and goals since it is a struggle against world Zionism whose foremost base is occupied Palestine.

Why?

--because Zionism is a movement of an aggressive and racist nature, employing neo-Nazi fascist means to achieve its expansionist settlement aims.

--because a Zionist victory in Palestine deprives all previous liberation movements their human content.

Hence it follows:

1. The Palestinian Revolution does not aim at annihilating the Jews, for such an act is based on racism, against which the revolution is struggling. Furthermore, the Arab

people, of whom the Palestinians are an integral part, have not known racism throughout their long history.

2. Likewise, the Palestinian Revolution is not an anti-semitic movement, for "anti-semitism" is a Western concept alien to the Arab past.

3. The Palestinian Revolution aims at destroying the Zionist structure in Palestine as represented by the political entity of the State of Israel. It has been pseudo-legitimized by so-called international recognition which ignored the will of the Palestinian people, their right to self-determination and to sovereignty on their Palestinian soil.

4. The Palestinian Revolution aims at regaining the lost rights of the Palestinian people. After the liberation of our homeland, we shall live with those who will live with us according to our inherent belief in the principles of equality, justice, and humanity.

The Palestinian people hate war as much as any other people, but the continued presence of Zionism on our land and the continued political existence of Isra[illegible] our country impose war on us because the victory of Zionism does not mean peace. It means continuous oppression and danger. Likewise, it encourages all racist movements and ideologies to act viciously against truth and justice. This leads to nothing but war. Therefore, it is imperative that we fight, and fight until victory. This is a just struggle for the welfare of justice and true peace.

The Zionist movement today is a new form of Nazism; in other words, opposing it and fighting it are human duties, for the struggle is merely an extension of the world's struggle against Nazism and the continuation of the long chain of human struggle against forces of oppression, injuctice, and racism. The destruction of Zionism, of the political entity of Israel, is essential; otherwise, all those who gave their lives in World War II and in all wars of liberation throughout history will have died in vain, will have been robbed of their imperatives and values that motivated these sacrifices.

Brothers: In spite of their dispersion and destitution, the Palestinian people stand today through their Revolution as the front line of defense of their rights, the Arab nation's right, and the rights of humanity at large.

The principles of the Revolution, having been declared long before the June, 1967, War, aim at more than merely removing the effects of that aggression. The Revolution's basic principle, "Revolution till Victory," means that it is a movement aiming at the liberation of Palestine and the world from one of the most dangerous international movements threatening man's humanity, dignity, and freedom. Thus, exposing Zionism's dangers and fighting it everywhere is as important as the military struggle being waged by your brothers in the occupied areas, though obviously it is no substitute for it.

Having clarified the basic principles and the position of the Palestinian Revolution, we must now proceed to analyze the present condition of this revolution and its strength in facing the future.

The Fedayeen vanguards of the Palestinian people who began their commando activities against the enemy on January 1, 1965, were, and still are, fully aware of the difficulties that lie ahead of them on their road to revolution and freedom.

The phase through which we passed prior to June, 1967, was that of preparation for the revolution, preparation for it through steadfast resistance and in a manner drowned in secrecy due to the tremendous pressures and limitations imposed upon the Palestinian people by the Arab states. These constraints and the concomitant secrecy were the two prime obstacles preventing the creation of a widespread cadres among the Palestinian people and obstructing the cohesion of the vanguards and the people. This, in turn, slowed down the growth of the Revolution, for the organic development of the movement requires a total merging of the Palestinian people with the revolutionary vanguards. They, in turn, should unite with the Arab masses, for then and only then will the Revolution come into its own as a revolution that is Palestinian in inception, Arab in depth, capable of effective action and continuous growth to meet the enemy's challenge.

After the June War, however, the Palestinian Revolution moved from preparatory stage to the actual launching of the revolutionary struggle. The June War proved the validity of the operational and theoretical foundation underlying the Palestinian armed struggle. The War turned opponents of the Revolution into supporters and to a great degree effectively silenced the doubters and the skeptics. In general, a widespread shift in the attitude of the Arabs as a whole, and the Palestinian people in particular, occurred. Some changed because of their true belief in the principles of the Revolution; others for emotional reasons. We believe, however, that continued action, continued mobilization and organization, and continued struggle will alleviate the dangers inherent in such an emotional allegiance, and reinforce a principled commitment, which leads to fusion between the Palestinian Revolution and the Arab people in a conscious organized struggle.

Therefore, the Revolution must succeed as it gradually acquires its Arab and human depth, for it is a revolution based on the masses. It aims to

alleviate the injustice that has befallen the Palestinians as the first victims of Zionism, to safeguard the Arab rights insofar as they are the ultimate goal of expansionist Zionism, and to reaffirm those human rights that the world community cherishes and that are threatened by racist movements everywhere starting with Zionism.

Brothers: Since the basic aim of the Palestinian Revolution is the liberation of Palestine, it is clear that it must mobilize, absorb, and utilize all Palestinian and Arab potentialities regardless of their social and economic status. It was therefore inevitable that we should raise the slogan of "non-interference in the internal affairs of any Arab state." This does not mean that we do not recognize the relationship of the Palestinians to the Arab people. It simply means that we consider the current phase of our struggle as one of national liberation; and, therefore, the interest of the Revolution is best served by avoiding entanglement in secondary fights and side issues. This is particularly feasible since Zionism is not opposed to any specific Arab doctrine, but rather aims at the Arab lands which it seeks to occupy, the Arab nation which it seeks to destroy, and the Arab individual whom it seeks to enslave. This only means that the Arab states are also living in a state of national struggle, for they, too, are threatened by the same danger regardless of their political orientation. This fact of paramount importance gives opposition to Zionism the primary position in any ranking of Arab problems. Furthermore, protracted armed confrontation with the Zionist enemy is certain to produce greater cohesiveness and cooperation among the Arabs and will eventually destroy many of the obstacles hitherto encountered on the path to unity.

The newly born Palestinian Revolution was conceived of the will of the Palestinian people to face all challenges and through their belief in armed struggle as the unescapable path to freedom. Though it is still in the developing stages, it undoubtedly will reach the required level of action through continuous struggle. The remaining road is still a long one, but it befits us to pause and analyze the future prospects of the Revolution and to shed some light upon its state since the June War.

It is evident that the Revolution today is passing through a new phase in which two opposite forces are active:

First: Escalating of commando activity which has qualitatively changed the nature of the confrontation and created a new spirit of commitment and unity among the Palestinian people.

Second: The counter-revolutionary forces attempting to destroy our movement and abort our Revolution by limiting our actions and forbidding us from acting in two critical fields: confronting the enemy, which when blocked prevents our commando activity from evolving into a full-scale war of national liberation; and, interacting with the Arab masses in a revolutionary manner whose inevitable effects, the counter-revolutionary forces fear.

These two opposite orientations point directly to the responsibility of the Palestinians and the Arab citizens. They are to oppose all attempts to impede the Revolution by following clear systematic and organized action aiming at the escalation of the armed struggle to the point where all aborting attempts will be fruitless.

The catastrophe of June, 1967, has not only proven the validity of the principles and strategy of our Revolution, it also pointed out many aspects of the counter-revolutionary movements, the most evident of which are the following:

1. It is noticeable that after each catastrophe we have suffered starting with 1948 and ending with 1967, the Arab nation found itself subjected to tremendous political pressures in which the international aspect completely overshadowed the Arab aspect, in general, and the Palestinian aspect, in particular. These pressures inevitably assert the new "fait accompli" for Israel and further legitimize Israeli military gains by giving them international sanctions and protection. The pressures following the June War, however, are of a special and more dangerous nature, since they aim at completely liquidating the Palestinian issue under the guise of "political settlement" or so-called "peaceful settlement." These efforts revolve around three main points: returning to the pre-June 5th situation in exchange for ending the state of belligerency, ensuring safe frontiers for Israel along with other international guarantees, and destroying the identity of the Palestinian struggle by creating what they call a "frail political society," or the "dummy Palestinian identity."

2. If we can say that the partition resolution of 1947 opened the dossier of Zionist usurption of Palestine, then it is equally correct to infer that the projects for "political settlement" aim at closing that same dossier permanently. Likewise, as the 1947 partition resolution gave the Zionists a political entity upon our land, the present efforts aim at completing the past efforts by legitimizing all the demands of that entity on one hand, and putting, on the other hand, Palestinians and the Arab people in the impotent position of being unable to undertake or to justify any future action for liberation.

3. These dangerous prospects transcend the above-mentioned goals into a systematic psychological warfare that uses the military debacle to create a feeling of impotence among the Arab vis-a-vis Israeli military superiority and hence to entrench even further the fear of Israeli expansionism. From here, it is but a short step, after imposing the peace settlement, to justify ending the period of armed resistence against the Israeli aggression which, in turn, would pave the way for striking at the Palestinian resistence movement and embroil it in secondary disputes that would weaken it and divert it from its well-marked course of action against Zionist occupation.

Brothers: The Palestinian Revolution rejects all such proposals and rationalizations, for in reality it is but a new way of presenting an unconditional surrender leading to the eventual destruction of the Palestinian people. None of these efforts acknowledges the basic premise of the Israeli political entity. This is the basic strategic foundation upon which the Palestinian Revolution is based and for which it strives under its slogan [illegible]volution until Victory." For this reason, armed struggle must be escalated to a degree that will paralyze the forces opposing the Revolution.

The current phase of the Revolution is the most critical one in spite of the victories we have so far achieved. It is imperative that we confront all those counter-revolutionary attempts and stand fast by the Revolution, protecting it from the internal Arab contradictions and partisan fights, allowing it to concentrate on its main task and to avoid secondary struggle. It is our duty to exert our utmost pressure on the Arab governments and the [illegible] support the Revolution instead

of competing with it or attempting to contain it under the pretexts of its "Arab nature" or of "increasing its effectiveness."

Actually, increasing the effectiveness of the Revolution occurs in two main fields:

1. In the Palestinian realm, which includes the Palestinian people and the armed struggle in the occupied areas;

2. In the Arab realm, which includes the Arab people, land, and government.

The Palestinian Revolution needs both the Palestinian people and the Arab people.

The Revolution, likewise, needs the Arab land as well as Palestine.

Training must occur on Arab soil. Movement of armaments and supplies must pass through Arab land. Storage of arms and supplies must be in Arab land. Financial support comes from the Arab people. Information and news must go through Arab channels.

The mobilization and organization of the Palestinian people must be accomplished in Arab land where they are located.

All this means that the Revolution is affected in one way or another by Arab conditions and Arab power structures. This highlights the extent of the effort to be expended in the Arab countries in order to harness all the potential in support of the Revolution.

Now comes the role of the Arab citizen.
Now comes the role of the Arab organizations.
Now comes the role of the Arab political parties.

Now comes the role of the Arab governments.
Now comes the role of whoever grasps the
future implications of the Palestinian Revolution, its needs, and
demands within the Arab realm.

The tremendous amount of Arab administrative, intellectual, and executive efforts required by the Palestinian Revolution are now clear............... It is also clear that at the present the duty of the [illegible]ab people is to direct their efforts within th[illegible]rab realm to serve the Revolution; solidify it; aid it; fulfill its moral, financial, and material needs...............

This needed work in the Arab realm must be carried out with complete dedication based on absolute conviction that one's duty is to support and to strengthen the Revolution, not to compete with it by creating new organizations, then calling for their unification on the pretext that "unity is preferable to division." One should protect the Revolution by not creating differences within it and then ask for their resolution on the grounds that "such differences weaken the Revolution."

Brothers: It is necessary to believe in the na[illegible] for strengthening the power of the Revolution as a Palestinian national movement, not to weaken it by introducing into it internal Arab contradictions, be they regional, political, or ideological.

If they accept this concept of the Revolution, the Arab citizen, the Arab political party, and the Arab government can participate in the Revolution just as much as the Palestinian. If fact, their participation, emanating from such a clear understanding, is critical to the ultimate success of the Revolution. For only then would all the requirements and needs mentioned above be adequately met.

Brothers: These are the basic tenets of the Palestinian Revolution, the validity of which has been unquestionably confirmed by the actual active experience of the last four years. We must in all honesty work to make this Revolution more and more successful until victory is attained. This is all the more important since the "honeymoon period" we are experiencing with some Arab governments may come to an abrupt end in the near future, and this means that the future holds possibilities and dangers that can only be met by adopting the concepts and strategies we have just discussed..........

Brothers: Your responsibility here is not less than that of your brothers who bear arms on the field of battle in the occupied land. The Revolution is a complexity of complementary efforts needing intellect, specialization, organization, funds, and military capabilities, each in its own place, within a general framework emanating from a clear vision of objectives and a clear understanding of the underlying tenets and realities.

You bear a responsibility that your brothers back home cannot bear and vice versa. Through this basic complementary work, we must proceed to our victory through our Revolution: Victory for the Arab nation; victory for humanity.

The Palestine National
Liberation Movement,
"Fateh"

Address by the Al-Fateh Delegation to the Second International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples

Cairo, January 1969

ADDRESS BY THE AL-FATEH DELEGATION TO THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE ARAB PEOPLES

Cairo, January 1969

Friends,

In the name of the people of Palestine, in the name of the Palestinian Revolution, in the name of Justice and Peace for which we fight, we thank you for your concern and the concern of your people in Justice and Peace in our part of the world.

We are very happy to have the opportunity to meet with you, because you represent people who fought for peace based on justice.

We can see among you people who fought the Nazi invasion and the fascist terror in Europe.

We also find among you people who fought, and are still fighting, imperialism and colonialism and racial discrimination in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

We honestly feel that we stand among friends and comrades who believe in the right of every people to self-determination and its right to enjoy liberty on its own land, free of oppression and discrimination.

* * *

Our people were deprived of their rights to self-determination and to the enjoyment of life on their own land without oppression. This was the result of a serious racist aggression carried out by an imperialist organisation: Zionism.

The aggression of the 5th of June is one manifestation of this basic aggression that had its roots in the 19th century, and whose culmination was the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The major victim of this aggression was the Arab Palestinian people who were forced to evacuate their homes and land under a reign of terror and oppression.

We therefore refuse to consider the 1967 aggression as a separate and distinct phenomenon, and we refuse to accept any solution focussed on the results of the last aggression without considering the source of the aggression itself.

The Resolution of the Security Council, November 22nd 1967, and all further proposals explaining or modifying it, are inadequate and irrelevant from our point of view, and therefore are totally and categorically unacceptable to us.

All such proposals skirt the real issue and avoid its core, namely: the right of the Palestinians to liberate their country, to enjoy [illegible] land and homes, and to have the right to decide how they want [illegible] run it.

We, the people of Palestine, are carrying on an armed revolution in order to re-establish peace with justice in the Holy Land.

* * *

We would like you to consider the magnitude of our problem. For we are facing a Zionist structure that had its roots in 19th century Europe, at the heart of the imperialist movement. Zionism is one of the most oppressive and aggressive forms of imperialism, one that has as its major goal the total uprooting of one people from a country to replace them by another.

The roots of the aggression lie in the Zionist ideology itself, with its belief in the need to bring a select, chosen people without a land, to a land that is to be evacuated by its inferior people.

[illegible] methods used to accomplish this objective are terror, oppre[illegible] and deceit.

Let me quote one of the original Jewish pioneers in Palestine, Nathan Chofshi, who wrote to the editor of the *Jewish Newsletter* in February 1959:

"If you really wanted to know what happened, we old Jewish settlers in Palestine who witnessed the fight could tell you how and in what manner we Jews forced the Arabs to leave cities and villages...Some of them were driven out by force of arms; others were made to leave by deceit, lying and false promises. It is enough to cite the cities of Jaffa, Lydda, Ramleh, Beer Sheba, and Acre from among numberless others." Nathan Chofshi continued. "Here we have people who lived on its own land for 1,300 years. We came and turned the native Arabs into tragic refugees. And still we dare to slander and malign them, to besmirch their name. Instead of being deeply ashamed of what we did and of trying to undo some of the evil we committed, by helping these unfortunate refugees, we justify our terrible acts and even attempt to glorify them."

Professor Erich Fromm, the noted Jewish writer and thinker, had this to add: "It is often said that the Arabs fled, that they left the country voluntarily, and that they therefore bear the responsibility for losing their property and their land. But, in general international law, the principle holds true that no citizen loses his property or his rights of citizenship, and the citizenship right is a de facto right to which the Arabs in Palestine have much more legitimacy than the Jews. Just because the Arabs fled?" Professor Fromm asks. "Since when is that punishable by confiscation of property and by being barred from returning to the land on which a people's forefathers have lived for generations? The claim of the Jews to the land of Israel cannot be a realistic political claim. If all nations would suddenly claim territories in which their forefathers have lived two thousand years ago this world would be a madhouse."

* * *

The Zionists went ahead coldbloodedly with their sinister scheme to vacate Palestine of its people, by the use of terror, massacres and frightening rumors.

Arthur Koestler, the pro-Zionist author, described what happened at Deir Yassin on April 9th, 1948, as the "blood bath that was the psychologically decisive factor in the Arabs' spectacular exodus."

On that day, the Zionist terrorist organization Irgun Zvei Leumi killed 250 men, women and children. After 1948 there were other mass killings in occuped Palestine, e.g. Ikrit (1951), Al Tira (1953), Abu Ghosh (1953), Kafr Kassem (1956), etc., as part of the systematic Zionist plan for the complete evacuation of the Palestinians, to be replaced by Jewish settlers from all over the world.

These were the conditions that forced the Palestinians to leave their homeland.

The Zionists did not come to a country without people. There lived in Palestine a people with a civilization. They reacted to the

Zionist challenge by education, economic and human mobilization, and competed with the Zionists in the fields of management, finance and technology.

With all their efforts, by 1947 the Zionists had only been able to acquire 5.6% of the total area of Palestine. However, the 1947 U.N. resolution for partition allowed them 56% of Palestine, and by terror and aggression they went on to occupy 80% in 1948. Today, after the June 5 1967 aggression, the rest of our Palestine is occupied, as well as Sinai and the Golan Heights.

* * *

For twenty years, the Palestinians were the victims of world procrastination. While many resolutions were passed in the United Nations, the Israelis continued to occupy more and more territory while the world remained indifferent. Under such conditions, the only alternative left to the Palestinians was armed revolution.

I am sure that the facts of the case are very clear to you. You can visualize the conditions under which our people have suffered. For twenty years most of the Palestinians have lived in a diaspora of shabby tents, misery and the humiliation of a meager dole. In this schizophrenic world of [illegible] the rights of Africans, Asians and Polynesians were recognized and espoused, while Palestinian rights were disregarded and forgotten. Not even the tragedy of the heroic Angolans, South Africans and Zimbabwans equalled theirs. For, alon[illegible] ong these oppressed people, the Palestinians were totally uprooted from their land and completely denied the right to live on it and enjoy its fruits.

Our people have risen to arms because all other means have been exhausted. We refuse to accept misery and diaspora as our fate, and we refuse charity and compromise as solutions to our problem. We shall overcome: through a long-term liberation revolution to destroy the bases of colonialist aggression that frustrate the exercise of our inalienable rights, and to bring an end to the racist militarist regime that oppresses our people. We will fight so that peace with justice is restored to our land.

* * *

Our revol[illegible] started its first operations at the beginning [illegible] ce the June 5 war. With old rusty weapons and against heavy odds, our youth embarked on the revolution with all the determination and persistence of a long-oppressed people. Now as we embark on our fifth year of struggle, the fruits of our sacrifices are beginning to show. The Palestine Liberation Movement has succeeded in awakening our people, in rekindling its hope for a better future with dignity and respect in our own land. We are forcing the enemies of peace to admit their failure to extinguish our revolution, we are winning battles, and we are starting to shape our destiny. We are not swayed by emotional appeals, we are not seekers of revenge, we are not bloodthirsty terrorists. We are freedom fighters with clear and mature goals. We are fighting today to create the new Palestine of tomorrow: A progressive, democratic, secular Palestine in which Christian, Moslem and Jew will worship, work, live peacefully and enjoy equal rights. This is no utopian dream or false promise, for we have always lived in peace, Moslems, Christians and Jews in the Holy Land. The Palestinian Arabs gave a refuge, a warm shelter and a helping hand to Jews fleeing persecution in Christian Europe and to the Armenians fleeing persecution in Moslem Turkey, as well as to Greeks, Circassians and Maltese among others.

Our Palestinian revolution still stretches its welcoming hand to all human beings who want to fight for, and live in, a democratic, tolerant Palestine, irrespective of race, color or religion.

During the last four years, some 500 of our people have given their lives on the battlefield. During the same period many more than that have died in refugee camps from bitter cold, poor nourishment and disease.

We are here to assert to you, and to ask you to confirm to your people, that our people will not lay down their arms until Palestine is liberated and our rights restored. We will not accept any settlement that denies us these rights, be it the Security Council's resolution, or any other proposal or political settlement ensuing from it. We will not accept any substitute to a war of national liberation and will tenaciously hold to it regardless of sacrifices and costs. Could anybody have asked you to accept anything less than total freedom from Nazism, fascism or colonialism? We are confident the people of the world will back our struggle and will support our revolution, for it is the struggle of man to achieve the loftiest of man's values: peace and justice.

"Dialogue
with
Abu-Ammar"
(Yasir Arafat)

Published by The Palestine
National Liberation Movement
(Fateh)

Translator's Introduction

This dialogue was conducted with "Abu-Amar" by Talal Salman, a Lebanese journalist who visited the fedayeen bases and wrote a series of articles in al-Sayyad, a Lebanese weekly magazine. The first article, "Dialogue with Abu-Amar", appeared in al-Sayyad on January 2, 1969.

The article is an important document because it presents the ideas and thoughts of the leader of al-Fateh in a comprehensive manner. "Abu-Amar" discusses the ideas of the Movement in clear terms, and attempts to answer critics by further explaining the Movement's stand on certain ambiguous questions.

A number of important ideas are clarified in this article. First, the emergence of "Palestinian identity" as an independent force, adopting armed struggle to regain the "land" and confront the Imperialist presence. Second, Fateh's relation to Arab governments is clarified. "Abu-Amar" stresses that the movement does not interfere in the local politics of the Arab governments. It depends on popular support and on the masses for protection. Fateh seeks a certain independence and in that sense it interferes in the affairs of Arab States; by existing on their territory, by moving freely, and by exercising the right to fight for liberation of the occupied territories. Third, Fateh appears as a unifying force, since its bases exist in most Arab states and its men move freely from one state to another. Fateh, therefore, works against regionalism and promotes Arab unity in action. Fourth, the question of ideology or leftist vs. rightist contraversy is clarified. "Abu-Amar" stresses that all Fateh men are of the wretched of the earth since they lack the means for existence.

Moreover, this is a stage of "liberation struggle," where actions are more important than words, and where efforts of all Palestinians are needed. Fateh has its orientation, however, and in terms of armed struggle against Imperialism, it is more leftist than the Soviet Union and the Arab Communist parties. Disagreement between Communist parties and Fateh exist over proposals for "peaceful settlement" of the conflict, for Fateh rejects any "peaceful settlements" and believes in armed struggle as the only solution.

At this stage of Arab history, Fateh ideas are popular and represent a turning point in Arab thought. They represent the beginning of a new Arab re-awakening, an attempt at the re-definition of the Arab being in terms of armed struggle. Fateh spearheads this re-awakening, it is the vanguard of the revolution, and it leads by action and armed struggle.

Fateh is thus the antithesis of Arab "revolutionary" thought, which was limited to slogans and devoid of any action in the form of armed struggle. Fateh is action and armed struggle, and the new synthesis between action and thought will be [illegible] free and liberated Arab human being.

This article is the product of an open discussion with "Abu Amar". I hope it represents a true and comprehensive picture of his ideas, which are the ideas of the "Palestine National Liberation Movement - Fateh".

As I entered the cave, Abu Amar's voice greeted me: "Welcome." He then added, "We are in a state of alert as you know, and this make it necessary for us to cancel many of our meetings. I am sorry for having made you wait this morning."

I shook his hand and greeted the men as I walked inside. I sat on a chair facing his small table. Abu Amar smiled as I looked at his small face: his shiny eyes, his flat nose, and the natural moustache. His clothes were simple, the same as what other fighters wore.

I began with, "I have a number of questions in mind, as do many people, about "Fateh" and its ideas and operations. Much has been written and said about "Fateh" and its ideas and operations. Much has been written and said about "Fateh" in newspapers and magazines all over the world, and it is necessary to explain and answer."

He said quickly: "I do not understand this concern with Fateh. Everybody asks of Fateh; others criticize Fateh, and every time the accusation is different. Once we were accused of being "Moslem Brethren", another time of being "Chinese Communists", a third time "Ba'thists", and after June 5th it was said we were "Nasserites". Others, of course, insist we are a satellite of Saudi Arabia. Why? How can we be all these things at the same time? We do not find it necessary to deny these accusations because they are not true and the contradictions in them are the proof." He continued with a smile, before I asked him a new question: "Now the situation is different. Poems of praise are written about us. Those who accused us before, now view us as heroes who have given back to this Arab nation its confidence and its hope for victory at a time when it was sunk in the shame of defeat."

I said: "Some explain the accusations against you as a result of not clarifying your ideological ide[illegible]y ..." Abu Amar moved and said: "This is the [illegible]ux of the matter. Let us first define our terms. What is meant by ideological identity? Is it to declare to people my belief in Marxism? Is this what I have to do at this stage? Everybody inquires about the social content of our movement and our revolution. Is this the time for defining the social content? Are we not, still, at a stage of national liberation? How do you expect me, then, to deprive many classes of the Palestinian people of their right to participate in the struggle for liberation?"

I said, arguing: "Let us define, at the same time, the forces we are fighting. The enemy is Israel, Zionism, and the imperialist powers that sup[illegible]t it..."

Abu Amar interrupted me: "Usually people describe Israel as a fort guarding imperialist interests in the Arab World ... I prefer to compare Israel to the East India Company."

I then continued: "The battle then is not only against the state of Israel, but against all imperialist presence on Arab soil. Thus it is not a battle for Palestinians alone, but for all Arabs. Israel now occupies, in addition to Palestine, Egyptian and Syrian territories, and its expansionist designs include Lebanon, East Jordan, and parts of Iraq."

Abu Amar said: "That is true. But I am a Palestinian first, and as a Palestinian I am a refugee, homeless, without a country or a land. Is it expected of me to wait and slumber until the Arab revolution explodes? I have to struggle to regain my country. Others, too, need to struggle. The Syrian people must struggle to liberate their occupied territories, the Egyptian people must fight to regain Sinai. As for me, my battle is here, on Palestine's land and for it." I said: "But you do not exist in isolation. You move within specific conditions imposed upon you by the imperialist presence."

Abu Amar continued, as he pointed to his Soviet machine gun: "For me, as a Palestinian, I made the choice and chose to face the Imperialist presence...with the gun alone I confront it." --"You are free in your choice, but you will certainly clash with the present Arab 'establishments'."

Abu Amar said seriously: "Yes, the clash did, in fact, occur. Before June 5th, we were accused of aiming at involving Arab governments in a war for which they were not prepared. It was said that, as agents of CENTO, we were conspiring to embarass the progressive governments and preparing for their overthrow. After June 5th, we were told, 'If you fire one bullet we will consider you criminals and traitors... your action now would be irresponsible, and will lead to the destruction of the Arab nation, so calm down and stop your play ... or else.'" Abu Amar smiled and went on: "If our movement was not genuine and was not expressing the consciousness and will of our people, we would be hanged in a number of Arab states for high treason." He added: "When they (the governments) saw the Israeli alarm about our Movement and the Arab popular support we received because we refused to accept defeat and surrender, they rallied to us."

He continued: "Before, the Arab governments could delay our struggle and prevent it. But the situation has changed now. We have become strong, much stronger than they think, and the source of our strength is not guns or the number of men who carry them, rather the source of our strength is the Arab people. You might ask here: 'Why, then, do we proclaim that we will not interfere in other Arabs' affairs?' This question has caused much [illegible] and has been used against us. Let me, however, assure you; we are the ones who interfere in Arab affairs the most. We impose our presence on all Arab governments, and impose on them the fulfillment of all our demands. We get from them all we ask for. This cannot be an indication of weakness, but on the contrary. There is no necessity for a conflict with them if they support the Palestinian revolution. But if they forbid us what we need, then we will not remain silent."

Without being interrupted, he continued: "Let me give you an example from Lebanon to clarify the idea. In principle, we have no right to give an opinion about the present Lebanese regime. It is not our duty to demand or work for a change of government; that is the duty of the Lebanese people, and it is not for us, therefore, to give an opinion about internal matters, to demand the resignation of Al-Yafi's government or the appointment of this or that minister. Our only interest is that the Lebanese regime does not stand against the Resistance Movement to destroy it. Even if the regime attempts to strike against us, we would not retaliate to overthrow it. Rather we would let the Lebanese people express their will. The day the incident of Kafr Shuba occurred, Fateh men and the Al-Asifah fighters did not demonstrate to demand protection for the Resistance Movement. It was the Lebanese people who demonstrated and demanded protection for the Resistance Movement. This is also [illegible] concerning Jordan. We never thought of

asking King Hussein to remove such and such minister, and appoint another. We never asked him to remove any officer or governor and such internal matters. We do, however, exercise our right for self-protection and for the continuation of our struggle."

Abu Amar continued in a serious tone: "Do you know how many martyrs we lost on 4/11/1968 (referring to the clash between the Jordanian security forces and the Resistance Movement)? We had 17 martyrs. Hundreds of innocent and unarmed civilians were also injured. If we had not been wise that day and if we had not controlled ourselves, we would have witnessed a great massacre. We informed the King of our intentions clearly. We told him that we will not interfere in his government's internal affairs, except when our own existence is threatened. What is our basic demand from Jordan at this stage? Our demands are: to exist on its territory, to move freely among Palestinians, and to have the right of dying for our land."

I asked him: "The relation between Arab governments and the Palestinian Resistance Movement could deteriorate...if a "peaceful settlement" is reached the picture will change and the governments would attempt to liquidate the Resistance Movement. What then?"

Abu Amar answered: "That is possible, and I assure you that we are in a state of alertness, because we expect attempts at our liquidation anytime. We know that some Arab governments are using us, in their international contacts, as a trump card in their play at reaching a "peaceful settlement". But these governments do not know that we are now stronger than ever. We are the third largest force here ... right after the Jordanian Army and the Iraqi forces in Jordan. This is our own military strength. We also derive strength from popular support here, in Jordan, and abroad. This support stems from the determination of our nation to resist defeat and to attain victory.

I am not boasting when I say that we (Fateh) have affirmed the nation's will for victory. After June 5th, we alone moved and declared with our bullets that the war was not ended, that the Palestinian people still exist and that the Arab nation is stronger than defeat. Our revolution is the clear declaration of our will. We regard all "peaceful settlements" as surrender and nothing else. You must have heard what "Al-Asifah" Radio said about the Soviet proposal. "Al-Asifah" criticized it in strong terms, and affirmed that the Palestinian people alone determine their destiny."

I listened, engrossed, as he continued: "It is strange that we are accused of regionalism when we, in practice, have ended all divisions. We do not recognize borders. Our men move from one Arab state to another with Fateh identity cards only. We work on every Arab soil and wherever Palestinians are. We have bases in Syria, we train our forces in Iraq, Egypt and Algeria, and wherever the opportunity is offered us (China and Viet-Nam). We have active groups in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf area. It is not reasonable for us, in order to defend ourselves against the accusation of regionalism, to attempt to overthrow King Faisal, or the government in Qatar or Bahrain or any other Arab state. We are not willing to discuss the problems and orientations of any Arab government and we are not willing to take a stand vis-a-vis any government on the basis of its outlooks - for example, about socialism."

I then said: "Now we are beginning to discuss the problem of the left...."

Abu Amar answered in a strong voice: "Everybody asks if we are right or left ... foreign correspondents ask about this. Our brethren, the [illegible] (Al-Qawmiyun Al-Arab) accuse

us of being rightists. I read an article in Al-Huriyah a few days ago, which claimed that we betray the armed struggle due to our class composition."

He turned to the men around him, laughed and asked: "Men, I have forgotten where my father's property is.... Do you remember?" He continued, as the men quieted down: "There are no capitalists, exploiters or bourgeois among Fateh men. You have visited our bases. Did you see any rich fighters? We are all of the wretched of the earth. Actually, we are the poorest of the world, for as Palestinians, we lack not only the means for existence, but our own country, and that is the worst kind of poverty."

I said: "You are now confirming what the leftists are saying ..."

Abu Amar answered with emotion: "I am a refugee. We are a nation of refugees. Do you know the meaning of being a refugee? I am a human being who has lost everything. I own nothing. Even my country has been taken from me and I have been kicked out. What is the meaning of Left or Right in this liberation struggle? I want my country even if the devils liberate it for me. As a Palestinian, I do not, anyhow, have the time to spend on arguing left or right. Am I in a position to refuse the participation and help of any human being? Do you ask me to refuse money from Saudi Arabia because they are rightists? But with their money, we buy weapons from China. How do you call this action, leftist or rightist? The problem in my mind and in the mind of other Palestinians is simple, and there is no need for complications. We have been expelled from our country which is being occupied by another people through the force of arms and by the aid of Imperialism. It is our duty and our right to work for the liberation of our land and to regain it even by force of arms. The confusion is due to extraneous complications. If we deal with the situation in simple terms, we can understand it better. Words do not mean a thing. What is important is action and results."

I said: "But action is tied to thought ... and Fateh, as a revolutionary movement, must have a clear ideology. Not every person who carries a gun is a revolutionary. In this complex battle which was imposed on the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, ideology seems to be the most needed instrument ... " Abu Amar calmly asked me to explain what I meant exactly. I said: "Isn't our battle against Israel and Zionism a battle against colonialism and imperialism at the same time?" He answered: "Yes, certainly ... "

- "Are Israel's designs limited to Palestine alone?"

- "No, they include most Arab states... "

- "Isn't the Zionist presence directly related to imperialist interests in our area?"

- "Yes.... "

- "Aren't imperialist interests reflected in one way or another by Arab governments?"

- "Yes... "

- "Isn't then our confrontation with Israel, as an imperialist base and outpost for the protection of imperialist interests, a direct clash with all imperialist forces?"

Abu Amar answered: "You mean from this analysis that we should be in the 'leftist' camp. Let me tell you then: we are the most 'leftist' of all people on earth. Don't be surprised. Isn't the Soviet Union the leader of the 'leftist' camp in the world? We are more 'leftist' than the Soviet Union itself, because the Soviet Union calls for a "peaceful settlement" and presents proposals for that purpose. We refuse "peaceful settlements" and all their proposals. Are the Arab Communist parties more 'leftist' than us? Let me say frankly that they are not, for Communist parties advocated at one time, peace with Israel, which you call an imperialist base in our midst, on our land."

I said: "But I am not arguing with you from a Communist point of view."

He then continued: "I understand that.. But they have, until this time, reservations about the Resistance Movement, and they (the Communists) say that we are fanatics and extremists, driven by religious feelings. The Soviets told me that; they said that we are making matters worse, that we do not understand the nature of our present struggle and, therefore, we are overextending ourselves. I want to ask you: Is our struggle with Israel simply due to its military fascist regime? And if leftists do reach power in Israel would that solve the problem?"

I said: "Rest assured that there are no true socialists in Israel, for socialism cannot survive in an exclusive society based on religion and race."

Abu Amar continued: "Even if you believe that, it is still premature to demand that our new revolutionary movement have a social content. Do you want us to specify the nature of the regime to be in Palestine after its liberation, now? That discussion would be too early. Moreover, to speak of a social content for our Resistance Movement at this time would reflect a leftist missionary zeal and a leftist immaturity. We are now in a stage of national liberation. At this stage all ideological differences which are a form of theoretical luxury, must be forgotten until liberation is won. Then, we can disagree among ourselves as much as we like over leftist, rightist, socialist or liberal ideas...

We are not a party. We are a group of Palestinians who have discovered, before others, that our country will not be returned to us unless we fight for its liberation. So, we have carried weapons and begun the armed struggle without trying to exhaust our thoughts over ideological analyses."

I said: "But when you carry the gun, then by necessity you are in the leftist camp."

Abu Amar explained: "It is not fair that you ask us to be more radical than Mao Tse-Tung. He fought Chiang Kai-Shek who defended the bourgeoisie; but when Japan occupied China, Mao formed an alliance with Chiang Kai-Shek, because the liberation of the country was more important than the ideological differences over the form of government. Why do you ask us to remove basic and effective nationalist forces from our revolution, especially at a time when we need the effort of all the Palestinian people? What right do I have to classify Palestinians? The only criteria for judgment is dedication to the revolution. Those who join the revolution are therefore nationalists. We cannot refuse the financial aid of those who provide it because they are bourgeois or capitalists. Can you, anyhow, show me any Palestinians who are capitalists? They do not exist. Those who became wealthy had lived for years in the Arabian Gulf and made their wealth by hard work and by their own efforts; there are no capitalists among us. The majority are homeless, refugees. I need money, and money is a basic factor for the revolution, for with money I buy arms and protect the martyrs' families. Where can I get

I answer it: "From the people..."

He continued: "Do I get money from the governments? No, I get it from the people. But I am not going to examine the money to determine whether it came from small business men or big business men. There is no difference among them except in their devotion to the revolution. Many people claim that our money comes from "reactionary governments" because we are, according to them, "Moslem Brethren". You can trust, however, that most of Fateh's money comes from popular contributions ... but we do not refuse aid if it comes from the far right or the far left.

"Let us examine matters in simple terms. Our problem is clear: our land is occupied and we [illegible] to fight for its liberation. We have sacrificed [illegible] for this purpose. What more can we do to prove that we are loyal to our people's cause? We are refugees. You have seen the refugees, standing in line before the UNRWA offices - waiting for their rations. That picture is changing, and we are changing it. Compare that picture to what you see in the guerrilla bases. Without using leftist childishness or leftist zeal we can tell you in simple terms: while this nation experienced the pain of defeat, our young [illegible] to [illegible] back [illegible] [illegible]. We have [illegible] ourselves to the Arab nation. Some claimed that we were a backward people that could not determine our own destiny. We have proved this contention to be false. We have proved it by our action and not by discussions around the coffee tables. We are struggling. Let others struggle too; let them realize [illegible] and we will salute them. We struggle and through action our thoughts will emerge and crystallize. At this stage, theoretical discussions about social content, left or right are a waste of time and effort."

42

Abu Amar glared at me: "Look at the Israelis. They liquidated all their ideological differences and united as ONE. Shouldn't we unite?"

The time was already 2:00 after midnight. The men were still wide awake and ready. I said to Abu Amar: "I have taken much of your time."

He replied: "Not at all. You are always welcome. We welcome questions and the exchange of views, but we will not disregard, for a moment, our enemies' plans. We are always on the alert. We try to uncover the aims of our enemy and that takes time. Believe me, the most important thing at this stage is to direct all energies to the battle."

I bid him and the men farewell and left with some fedayeen (freedom fighters) for Amman.

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY

New York received 51,199 copies of "The Black Panther" newspaper from National Distribution, San Francisco, California, and in turn forwarded 1,700 copies to Agusta, Georgia, and 4,800 copies to Detroit.

SF T-22
October 28, 1970

13,000 papers dated November 7, 1970, were received via Trans World Airlines. The papers for Cleveland also arrived Detroit via American Airlines as Cleveland was apparently having a shipping problem.

DE T-1
November 10, 1970

The Detroit NCCF received the following number of newspapers from National Distribution, San Francisco, California:

Number of papers	Newspapers dated
15,000	November 14, 1970
14,000	November 21, 1970
14,000	November 28, 1970

DE T-1
November 30, 1970

A shipment consisting of 43 boxes of newspapers consigned to Community Center, 2219 Indiandale, Detroit, Michigan, from National Distribution, 1336 Fillmore, San Francisco, California, arrived in Detroit on November 12, 1970, via United Airlines. On November 13, 1970, EDGAR ROBINSON called United Airlines and said he would pick up the papers.

DE T-18
November 16, 1970

A shipment of 29 boxes of newspapers consignee and shipper as above, arrived in Detroit, November 20, 1970, via United Airlines.

DE T-18
November 23, 1970

A shipment consisting of seven boxes of newspapers consigned to NORMAN MC KEE, NCCF, 2219 Indiandale, Detroit, shipper as above, arrived Detroit 5:10 p.m., November 26, 1970, via United Airlines, with instructions to hold at airport.

DE T-18
November 30, 1970

HUEY P. NEWTON, leader of BPP, is scheduled to speak at the following locations in an effort to raise funds for the Detroit 16:

Date	Location
November 16, 1970	Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan
November 17, 1970	Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan
November 17, 1970	University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
November 18, 1970	Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan

DE T-1
November 12, 1970

BEVERLINA POWELL, Financial Secretary, Illinois Chapter, BPP, arrived in Detroit, November 19, 1970, and returned to Chicago, November 20, 1970. She attempted to borrow busses for the transportation of the Chicago group to the Constitutional Convention, Washington, D.C., but was refused.

DE T-1
November 20, 1970

ROBERT BAY and ZAYD SHAKUR, BPP, New York, DAVID HILLIARD, CONNIE MATTHEWS, and HUEY NEWTON, BPP San Francisco, arrived in Detroit October 16, 1970, and left October 18, 1970, en route to New York. These individuals were in Detroit to accompany NEWTON on a speaking tour to raise funds for the Detroit 16.

DE T-16
November 20, 1970

Reservations were made on American Airlines Flight departing San Francisco for Detroit, 11:50 p.m., November 25, 1970, for RONNIE IRWIN and NORMAN MC KEE, both Detroit NCCF members. A third Detroit NCCF member, VIRON REDWINE, was to remain in California.

SF T-22
November 25, 1970

Approximately 40 persons, both Negro and white, including members of the Detroit NCCF left Detroit in two Hertz van-type trucks and at least two cars on November 26, 1970, en route to the Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention, Washington, D.C.

DE T-3
November 26, 1970

also known as
Black Panther Party for Self Defense

According to the official newspaper of the BPP, the BPP was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY G. SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, Minister of Defense, BPP.

The official newspaper, called "The Black Panther," regularly states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to as "pigs" who should be killed.

The newspaper, in its issue of September 7, 1968, had an article by the then Minister of Education, GEORGE MURRAY. This article ended with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

The BPP newspaper, issue of October 5, 1968, had an article introduced with the following statement: "We will not dissent from American government. We will overthrow it."

DAVID HILLIARD, Chief of Staff, BPP, in a speech at the San Francisco Polo Field on November 15, 1969, said "We will kill Richard Nixon."

DAVID HILLIARD, in the "New York Times," issue of December 13, 1969, was quoted as follows: "We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government by way of force and violence."

In the issue of April 25, 1970, the BPP newspaper had an article by Minister of Culture EMORY DOUGLAS as follows:

> "The only way to make this racist US government administer justice to the people it is oppressing, is...by taking up arms against this government, killing the officials, until the reactionary forces...are dead and those that are left turn their weapons on their superiors, thereby passing revolutionary judgement against the number one enemy of all mankind, the racist US government."

The BPP Headquarters is located at 1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California. Branches of the BPP, and Committees to Combat Fascism, under control of the BPP, have been established in various locations in the USA.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

1

LEAGUE OF REVOLUTIONARY BLACK WORKERS Also known as Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM)

A source advised on April 22, 1970, that the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (LRBW) is a black extremist labor union, with headquarters at 179 Cortland, Highland Park, Michigan, in the greater Detroit metropolitan area. Source advised that the LRBW is attempting to oust the United Auto Workers (UAW) from their position as bargaining representative for black workers in the Detroit area automotive plants. Source advised that the LRBW has used threats of violence against both black and white supervisory personnel and UAW leaders in an attempt to intimidate them into an agreement with LRBW demands. The LRBW has referred to the automotive industry and the UAW as "racist".

A second source advised that membership in the LRBW is limited to Negroes only, by virtue of the LRBW constitution which states "membership is denied to all honkies due to the fact that said honkey has been the historic enemy, betrayer and exploiter of black people." Membership in the LRBW is less than 25 persons.

The second source also stated that the LRBW had suborganizations operating at Ford Motor Company which was known as the Ford Revolutionary Union Movement (FRUM) and Eldon Avenue Gear and Axle Plant (ELRUM) as well as other assembling and supplying plants, but that at the present the LRBW is active only at the Dodge Main Assembly Plant in Hamtramck, Michigan. This suborganization is known as Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM). The other suborganizations are now defunct.

APPENDIX

2

The first source stated that in 1969 RONALD LEE MARCH, KENNETH JOHN WATSON and GENERAL GORDON BAKER, JR., who source identified as members of the Central Committee of the LRBW, met with diplomatic representatives of the North Vietnamese Government in Windsor, Ontario, Canada, to request support of the LRBW both morally and financially by the North Vietnamese.

The official publication of the LRBW is the "Inner City Voice".

A characterization of "Inner City Voice" is attached hereto.

APPENDIX

1

"INNER CITY VOICE"

The "Inner City Voice" (ICV) was registered with the Wayne County Clerk's Office, Assumed Names Division on August 4, 1967, by KENNETH JOHN WATSON, under Certificate Number 208945.

A bulletin entitled, "Build Black Newspaper" dated July, 1967, stated, "A group of black revolutionaries in Detroit, Michigan, have begun work on the production of a new newspaper. It is hoped that the first edition of the 'Inner City Voice', will appear on the newsstand in August of 1967." According to the bulletin, the ICV's goal is the building of a mass circulating revolutionary propaganda program. The bulletin stated the newspaper was to concentrate on local news, cultural and social events, as well as providing coverage of radical politics.

A source advised on March 17, 1970, that the ICV was published from July of 1967 through June of 1968, when it was terminated. In the fall of 1969 a newspaper similar to ICV appeared on Detroit newsstands which was called "SAUTI", meaning Voice in Swahili. This publication, in its first edition stated that it emerged from the ICV, and its purpose, in addition to the above, would be to exist as the official organ of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (LRBW). In January of 1970, an edition of "SAUTI" stated that it would continue publication under the old name of "Inner City Voice" and would provide coverage of the black extremist labor movement. In the spring of 1970, the ICV did not publish the inflammatory articles which were common in 1967-68, but called for the overthrow of the United Auto Workers (UAW) leadership and control of black workers at Detroit area auto plants.

Source advised that the editors of the ICV are KENNETH JOHN WATSON, LUKE SAMUEL TRIPP, GENERAL GORDON BAKER, MICHAEL C. HAMLIN and RONALD LEE MARCH, all of whom source identified as members of the Central Committee of the LRBW.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

U[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]STICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

December 17, 1970

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF) - DETROIT DIVISION

Character RACIAL MATTERS - SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND ~~Reference:~~ INSURRECTION

Reference Detroit report dated and captioned as above

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

179-10221

SSC REQUEST

December 18, 1975

Item 1 e.

(Part II)

149

Incident #14-15

Question e.

(Rev. 12-19-67)

12

FEDERAL [illegible]UREAU OF IN[illegible]IGATION

REC 9

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
SAN DIEGO	SAN DIEGO	1/21/72	10/8/71 - 1/7/72

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION (SAO)	SA STEVEN L. CHRISTENSEN	jam
	CHARACTER OF CASE EXTREMIST MATTERS - SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION	

REFERENCE: Phoenix letter to the Bureau and LHM dated 10/22/71;
Bureau letter to Phoenix dated 11/9/71;
Las Vegas letter to the Bureau dated 12/6/71;
Phoenix letter to the Bureau dated 12/17/71;
Phoenix letter and LHM to the Bureau dated 12/22/71.

- P -

IDENTITY OF INFORMANTS

It is noted that the large volume of information reported herein was furnished by SD 1155-E, the sole source

Informant

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☒ NONE						ACQUITTALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☒ NO
							PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☒ NO

Deleted Copy Sent [illegible]
by Letter [illegible]
Per FOIA Request

APPROVED ~~SPECIAL AGENT~~ IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

8 - Bureau (157-23577)

(Copies cont'd on Cover Page B)

7/16/75 G.T.T.

2 - San Diego (157-2815)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

REC-50

REC 9

EX-112

18 JAN 28 1972

EXT. INT. SEC.

Notations

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	ISD, I DEC/SS, ATFD, ACSI
Request Recd.	
Date Fwd.	2/7/72
How Fwd.	R/S
By	

MAR 29 1972

COVER PAGE

☆ GPO : 1968

179-10221

Copies Made (cont'd):

1 - U.S. Secret Service, San Diego
2 - Baltimore
1 - El Paso (Info)
2 - Kansas City
2 - Las Vegas (157-997)
1 - Los Angeles (Info)
1 - Oklahoma City (Info)
1 - Portland (Info)
1 - Sacramento (Info)
2 - Seattle

---

of such information in the San Diego Division. Much of this information is known only to the source and to one other individual within the organization. Therefore, in order to afford this source additional security, he has been assigned two T symbol numbers for the purpose of reporting information in the report as follows:

Identifies Source

SD T-1 and SD T-2 are 157-2815 (Instant Report)
SD 1155-E Informants

ADMINISTRATIVE

The identity of HOWARD B. GODFREY is known to the Bureau.

This report is being classified "Confidential" because it contains information from SD T-1 and SD T-2, a confidential source of continuing value to the Bureau in security matters. The unauthorized disclosure of the information contained in the report could reasonably result in the identification of the informant which would be prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation.

All individuals referred to herein as leaders of the SAO in the San Diego area are either being actively investigated or have been so investigated in the past to determine whether they should be placed on the ADEX.

For the additional information of the Bureau and Kansas City, which is Office of Origin in the Minutemen investigation, all individuals associated with the Secret Army Organization (SAO) at San Diego are former members of the Minutemen organization or sympathizers or supporters of that organization. Inasmuch as information contained in this report covers the main areas of Minutemen-type activity within the San Diego area and due to the fact that the individuals who have formed the SAO consider the Minutemen organization to effectively be non-existent, this report is being submitted to Kansas City in lieu of the regular report on Minutemen activity at San Diego.

INFORMANT

For the information of the Phoenix Division, SD 1155-E reported on 11/9/71 that the SAO had received a written request from one CHARLES MANLEVE, 2938 North Seventeen Drive, Phoenix, Arizona, asking for information regarding the SAO.

In connection with its investigation of the individual named JOHN OWEN BURTON as referred to in Las Vegas letter dated 12/6/71 and Phoenix letter dated 12/17/71, Oklahoma City should note that, in early January, 1972, JERRY LYNN DAVIS, SAO leader at San Diego, indicated to SD 1155-E that there were one or — INFORMANT more individuals in the State of Oklahoma, exact location not known, who DAVIS referred to as contacts of the SAO.

INFORMANT

In addition, it is noted that SD 1155-E has advised of other contacts of the SAO or written requests for information about the SAO from areas within the Kansas City, El Paso, Baltimore, Los Angeles, Portland, and Sacramento Divisions.

Part II, C., of this report sets forth information regarding an incident in which a young woman, PAULA ELAINE THARP, was injured by sniper fire while at the residence of a San Diego State College professor named PETER GEORGE BOHMER.

Both THARP and BOHMER are subjects of investigation in the San Diego Division on the basis of their activities in the New Left Movement.

BOHMER's residence is a commune known as "The Box," which is a focal point of New Left activity in San Diego and, at this time, is primarily concerned with formulating plans for confrontations and demonstrations during the 1972 Republican National Convention at San Diego. It has been determined that THARP's wound is not serious in nature. SD 1155-E, who was present during the incident on an intelligence gathering assignment for the SAO, has identified the assailant as GEORGE M. HOOVER (San Diego 100-15356) who accompanied informant on this assignment. Informant has advised that this incident was not premeditated by the SAO or any member of it, including HOOVER, and that it was a spur of the moment action on HOOVER's part. This information has been disseminated on a confidential basis to the San Diego Police Department, which is investigating the incident.

Informant

Identifies Source

It is noted that much of the printed literature and propaganda of the SAO has been forwarded to the Bureau via referenced Phoenix communications. However, in order to assure the completeness of this report, one copy of each piece of printed material distributed by the SAO is being included at the end of this report in a section marked "Addendum."

It is noted that details of this report include information dated prior to that of the investigative period. This information is included so as to show a more complete picture of the origin and structure of this organization.

A copy of this report is being disseminated locally to U.S. Secret Service, San Diego, California.

LEADS

EL PASO, LOS ANGELES, OKLAHOMA CITY, PORTLAND, and SACRAMENTO DIVISIONS

SD 157-2815

LEADS (cont'd)

Information copies of this report are being directed to the above offices for their reference and possible investigative assistance in view of the fact that contacts or requests for information regarding the SAO have been reported within those Divisions.

BALTIMORE

Baltimore is requested to furnish San Diego with basic information regarding the group allegedly operated by JESSE CLAYBURN STEVENS and to contact knowledgeable sources regarding this group, to determine the extent of any alliance or connection with the SAO.

LAS VEGAS

AT LAS VEGAS, NEVADA. 1. Will identify ED (LNU), Post Office Box 2191, Las Vegas 89101, telephone number 384-2046, and determine any activities on his part in behalf of the SAO.

2. Will determine if the JACK DOYLE, telephone number 642-4467, referred to in this report is the same as JACK CONAN DOYLE, JR., (Las Vegas 157-553) mentioned in referenced Las Vegas letter to the Bureau.

PHOENIX

AT PHOENIX, ARIZONA. Will identify CHARLES MANLEVE, 2938 North Seventeen Drive, Phoenix, and determine the nature of his activities, if any.

SEATTLE

AT BOTHELL, WASHINGTON. Will identify CY ANDERSON, 10418 N.E. 168th Place, Bothell, and determine the nature of his activities.

SAN DIEGO

- E -
COVER PAGE

LEADS (cont'd)

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA. Will attempt to identify additional members of the SAO and follow and report activities of this organization.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNIT[illegible] STATES DEPARTMENT OF JU[illegible]TICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

Copy to: 1 - U.S. Secret Service, San Diego

Report of: SA STEVEN L. CHRISTENSEN Office: SAN DIEGO
Date: January 21, 1972

Field Office File #: San Diego 157-2815 Bureau File #: 157-23577

Title: SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION (SAO)

Character: EXTREMIST MATTERS - SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

Synopsis:

Secret Army Organization (SAO) formed at San Diego, California, in late September, 1971, by JERRY LYNN DAVIS to replace Minutemen (MM) organization considered defunct in the San Diego area. Organization formed to provide military-type training for self defense, to oppose communism and totalitarian government, and to take over political power in the United States if the present government fails. JERRY LYNN DAVIS considered "Commander" of the SAO at San Diego and other officers set forth. Members of the SAO active in acquring and possessing firearms and explosives. Tentative arrangements made for extension of SAO with branches at Las Vegas, Nevada; Phoenix, Arizona; and Seattle, Washington. Additional SAO contacts claimed at Portland, Oregon; El Paso, Texas; Los Angeles, California, and in the States of Kansas and Oklahoma. Contact made with JESSE CLAYBURN STEVENS, alleged leader of East Coast portion of MM organization and tentative arrangements made for alliance between STEVENS' group and SAO. SAO has total of 8 members at San Diego, California, with approximately same number of supporters and sympathizers. Number of possible members or supporters at Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Seattle not known. Membership fees for initiation are

[redacted]

[redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI [redacted] it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

$5.00, monthly dues are $3.00. Other financial information set forth. SAO to publish monthly news and training bulletin and other special bulletins, posters and stickers as need and occasion arises.

- P -

DETAILS: AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

I. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A. Location of Headquarters

On May 5, 1971, it was reported that JERRY LYNN DAVIS, leader of the SAO, in laying plans for the formation of the organization, wanted it to appear in several cities at the same time. However, the headquarters would be at San Diego, California.

(SD T-1, May 5, 1971)

On September 13, 1971, it was reported that, in preparation for future organizational work, DAVIS had rented several Post Office boxes in the San Diego area which would be used for this purpose. These included Post Office Box 5791, San Diego, California 92105, which was rented in DAVIS' name, and Post Office Box 503, Lemon Grove, California 92045, which was rented in the name of "Artist Supply." It was reported that "Artist Supply" was the name utilized for a mail drop operated by TROY HAUGHTON, former West Coast leader of the Minutemen (MM) organization.

(SD T-1, September 13, 1971)

The Minutemen (MM) is a paramilitant group organized in June, 1960, by ROBERT B. DE PUGH in Norborne, Missouri, as a resistance to the spread of communism in the United States by use of guerrilla tactics. DE PUGH is currently incarcerated in a Federal penitentiary for violation of the Federal Firearms Act.

The Patriotic Party has been the political arm of the Minutemen.

[illegible] Patrick McDonald [illegible]

On January 7, 1972, it was reported that the organization has no formal headquarters and that it is operated out of the homes of JERRY LYNN DAVIS and other members.

[illegible]

(SD T-2, January 7, 1972)

[illegible] Spring Valley, Calif.

B. Charter Information

On January 7, 1972, it was reported that the SAO has no plans for formulating charters as such for the parent or subsidiary groups.

(SD T-2, January 7, 1972)

C. Objectives

On May 5, 1971, it was reported that JERRY LYNN DAVIS was highly interested in forming a new Right Wing group to organize people in various localities and to provide them with military-type training for the purpose of being ready to eventually take over political power in the United States when the present government fails due to oppression or communist influence.

(SD T-1, May 5, 1971)

On December 20, 1971, it was reported that, in correspondence with another similar group, DAVIS stated that, although the SAO was a new organization with a new name, it would continue to adhere to the tenets and principles of the old MM organization.

(SD T-1, December 20, 1971)

On January 7, 1972, it was reported that the SAO intended to conduct intelligence-type operations and to offer training in urban guerrilla warfare to be used against Left Wing groups and suspected enemies of the United States.

A leaflet entitled, "Join the Secret Army Organization" was made available which offered the following statements of purpose:

"1) To prepare the means of personal defense and survival in case of enemy attack.

2) To resist and expose the spread of communist influence and propaganda within our own national boundaries.

3) To investigate by means of our own secret memberships the infiltration of communist sympathizers into American organizations of government, business, labor, religion and education.

4) To resist by any and all means the passage of laws which regulate the private ownership of firearms or which detract from the individual's ability to defend his own family and personal property.

5) To promote knowledge and skill in the use of arms by our own members and by the general public.

6) To form in advance of actual need a secret underground organization equipped to spy upon, harrass and destroy troops of any foreign power that might occupy United States territory.

7) To lend assistance and support wherever possible to other resistance organizations, domestic or foreign, opposing communist expansion or subversion.

8) To pursue these programs as private citizens motivated only by patriotism and to remain entirely free of government subsidies or control."

(SD T-2, January 7, 1972)

D. Officers

On January 7, 1972, it was reported that, if the organization continues to progress as originally envisioned, it will eventually be operated by a General Staff. This General Staff will be composed of JERRY LYNN DAVIS, 2393 Washington, Spring Valley, California, with the title of "Commander," and the leaders of various area groups who will hold the title of "Captain." At the present time, such area groups tentatively exist in the following places:

San Diego, California
with the "Captain" being HOWARD B. GODFREY
746 Graves
El Cajon, California

GODFREY is a former MM and will be Number Two man in the SAO.

Phoenix, Arizona
where the "Captains" will be EVERETT MOORE and his wife. The MOOREs are known MM leaders in the Phoenix area.

Seattle, Washington
where the "Captain" will be CY ANDERSON
10418 N.E. 168th Place
Bothell, Washington

Las Vegas, Nevada
where the "Captains" will be JACK DOYLE and
ED (LNU)
Post Office Box 2191
Las Vegas, Nevada
These individuals allegedly have former
connections with the MM organization.

(SD T-2, January 7, 1972)

E. Summary of Overall Activities

On May 5, 1971, it was reported that JERRY LYNN DAVIS was continually talking about the plans he was making to start a new organization. According to DAVIS, he considered the MM organization to be defunct, at least in the San Diego area and in most of the Western states, and felt the need to organize a new Right Wing group to fill the power vacuum which it had left. He indicated that he knew people in Phoenix, Arizona; Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington, and Las Vegas, Nevada, who he wanted to contact regarding such an organization, feeling that they would be highly interested in helping to organize and get it going. He said his plans included having Post Office boxes rented for the new organization in all these cities and having leaflets and stickers regarding the organization printed using the respective Post Office box numbers. On a pre-determined day, press releases would be made in each of these cities announcing the formation of the organization with the leaflets and stickers being put up in the cities on the same day. This would be done for the purpose of disguising the location of the national headquarters, which would be actually located in San Diego, California.

(SD T-1, May 5, 1971)

On September 13, 1971, it was reported that DAVIS had become very interested in the National Socialist White Peoples Party (NSWPP) as a possible answer to the need for a

Right Wing group in the San Diego area. He was reportedly studying that organization and considering becoming a member.

(SD T-2, September 13, 1971)

> The National Socialist White Peoples Party, also known as The American Nazi Party, American Nazis, and The George Lincoln Rockwell Party, was organized on February 26, 1956, at Arlington, Virginia, based upon the concept of an international "National Socialist" movement as espoused by the German Nazi Party headed by Adolf Hitler. The organization supports and follows the line of hatred against Negroes, Jews, and communists through various propaganda media seeking a legitimate dominant political party in the United States and foreign countries.

On September 16, 1971, it was reported that, while very interested in the NSWPP, DAVIS was still considering going ahead with plans for the new organization. In addition, DAVIS indicated that he expected to obtain membership lists and the necessary materials for setting up application forms, bulletins and training literature for the new organization from BETTIE HAUGHTON, wife of TROY HAUGHTON. DAVIS said he would attempt to have the bulletins, training materials, and membership application forms printed in the near future and that, tentatively, the responsibility for making the monthly mail-outs would alternate between DAVIS and GODFREY. DAVIS advised that O. A. ALEXANDER of Alex Rapid Print, 7609 El Cajon Boulevard, La Mesa, California, had agreed to print some of these materials. ALEXANDER was described as a former MM supporter who had allowed TROY HAUGHTON to use his printing facilities for the benefit of the West Coast MM organization.

Other plans for the new organization included eventually setting up two membership lists which would be recorded on microfilm. One of the lists would be maintained by DAVIS and the other by GODFREY. The purpose in placing the membership lists on microfilm was for easy destruction. Two lists were to be maintained to guard against the possibility of one being lost or destroyed.

(SD T-2, September 16, 1971)

On October 8, 1971, it was reported that DAVIS had chosen the name "Secret Army Organization" for his new group. In addition, it was learned DAVIS had had 1,000 copies each of letterhead stationery and membership application forms for the SAO printed up the previous weekend. DAVIS also advised that he, GODFREY, and other associates would attend the Annual Yuma Gun Show at Yuma, Arizona, on October 16 and October 17, 1971, at which time he expected contact would be made with people attending the gun show from Phoenix, Arizona, and Seattle, Washington, regarding the SAO.

(SD T-1, October 8, 1971)

On October 16, and October 17, 1971, DAVIS, GODFREY, and STANLEY DON MC DADE, a prospective member of the SAO residing at 4114 Massachusetts, La Mesa, California, were in attendance at the Yuma Gun Show. Following the gun show, a meeting was held in a motel room at Yuma, Arizona, with persons in attendance, including the above three individuals and EVERETT MOORE and his wife from Phoenix, Arizona, and CY ANDERSON from Seattle, Washington. The topic of discussion was the SAO and those attending the meeting were in general agreement that a new cohesive force was necessary among Right Wing groups as a result of the power vacuum left by the disintegration of the MM organization. MOORE and ANDERSON tentatively agreed to having their respective groups join the SAO subject to the approval of the members of these groups. Copies of printed material of the SAO, including a leaflet entitled, "History of the Secret Army Organization," a copy of the first bulletin of the SAO entitled, "To Prospective Members of the Secret Army Organization," and membership application forms were passed around among the group.

It was decided that subsequent contacts regarding expansion of the SAO would be made and that the San Diego area mail drop for the Phoenix group would be the address of HOWARD FRANCIS CLARK, 1080 6th Street, Ramona, California, a former member of the MM organization.

En route to the gun show, CY ANDERSON's automobile had broken down some place in the State of Nevada and it had been necessary for him to hire transportation from there to the gun show. After the gun show, DAVIS drove to Las Vegas, Nevada, accompanied by ANDERSON, to make contact with people known to him regarding the SAO.

It was reported that DAVIS, who is part American Indian, had abandoned the idea of joining the NSWPP when he learned in late September, 1971, that the NSWPP is adamantly opposed to persons having American Indian blood, considering them to be of an inferior race. It was felt that this fact was responsible for DAVIS' decision to finally go ahead and organize the SAO.

It was also reported that, in addition to the letterhead stationery and application forms, several thousand copies of the history leaflet and the first bulletin had also been printed at the same time as well as a number of stickers advertising for the SAO. The printing of these materials was done by BETTIE HAUGHTON on an offset press which she had maintained since the time her husband was in the MM organization. Many copies of these printed materials have been sent out to people known in the past to have been MM members or other Right Wing sympathizers.

The meeting mentioned in the first paragraph of the history leaflet is actually a disguised reference to the meeting which took place in the motel room at Yuma, Arizona, on October 17, 1971.

(SD T-2, October 20, 1971)

DAVIS returned home from Las Vegas, Nevada, on the evening of October 23, 1971. He stated that the reason for this delay was that he had become very involved in Las Vegas with meeting people and with organizing the SAO indicating that arrangements had been made for the group he contacted at Las Vegas to join the SAO. He further advised that arrangements had been made to get insignia patches from CY ANDERSON for the berets that SAO members would be given to wear.

(SD T-2, October 26, 1971)

On October 27, 1971, DAVIS was reported to have advised that ANDERSON had gone to El Paso, Texas, from Las Vegas, Nevada, to make contact with people known to him there. DAVIS advised he expected ANDERSON to be in San Diego on October 29, 1971, for additional discussions regarding the organizing of the SAO. DAVIS said he also felt the need for him and GODFREY to travel to Phoenix, Arizona, sometime in December, 1971, for the purpose of recontacting EVERETT MOORE regarding the SAO.

(SD T-2, October 27, 1971)

On November 9, 1971, it was reported that CY ANDERSON had spent approximately a day and a half at DAVIS' residence discussing the SAO. Resulting from these discussions were tentative plans for a trip during December, 1971, or January, 1972, during which DAVIS and ANDERSON would travel through Arizona to El Paso, Texas, following which they would cross the border at Juarez, Mexico, and drive to Mexico City. Returning from Mexico City, they would travel to Las Vegas where the individual named ED (Last Name Unknown) would be picked up and who would then travel with them to Denver, Colorado, and the State of Montana. The purpose of the trip would be to contact people regarding expansion of the SAO and to solicit support for that organization.

(SD T-2, November 9, 1971)

On December 17, 1971, correspondence was observed at the DAVIS residence from an individual named JESSE CLAYBURN STEVENS at Silver Springs, Maryland. The correspondence, which was addressed to the SAO, indicated that STEVENS was in control of at least part of what was left of the former MM organization on the East Coast. In the letter, STEVENS expressed hatred for ROBERT BOLIVAR DE PUGH, former national leader of the MM organization, and interest in establishing future contact with the SAO. STEVENS also indicated that he corresponded with several individuals in the San Diego area and did not know who had furnished him information on the SAO. According to DAVIS, this was done by STANLEY DON MC DADE. In addition, DAVIS advised he is known to STEVENS by the alias of PATRICK MC DONALD.

A letter replying to the above correspondence from STEVENS which DAVIS had written was also observed. In this letter, DAVIS also expressed interest in making contact with STEVENS' group. DAVIS indicated in his letter that, even though the SAO was a new organization with a new name, it would continue to adhere to the tenets and principles of the old MM organization.

(SD T-1, December 20, 1971)

[illegible]

On December 20, 1971, the SAO distributed several hundred copies of a special intelligence bulletin which it had prepared regarding PETER GEORGE BOHMER, a professor of Economics at San Diego State College, and a well-known figure in New Left activities in the San Diego area. The information contained in the bulletin was obtained by the SAO primarily from research of newspaper articles and surveillance of BOHMER's activities.

(SD T-1, December 20, 1971)

On December 29, 1971, it was reported that DAVIS had received additional correspondence from JESSE CLAYBURN STEVENS. In this letter, STEVENS agreed to the formation of an alliance between his group and the SAO. Guidelines which were set up would have STEVENS' group in control of Right Wing activities in the East and in the South, while the SAO would operate in the Western states. It was also agreed that the two groups should work on finding an individual in or near Chicago, Illinois, to act as coordinator of Right Wing activities in the Midwest area. DAVIS mentioned JAMES EVAN POTO as a good possibility in this regard. POTO, an SAO member at San Diego, is employed by a national restaurant chain and is expecting to be transferred to the Chicago area in the early part of 1972 to open a new restaurant there.

In addition, arrangements were made between SAO and STEVENS' group regarding the trading of information on individuals of interest to these organizations who reside in each other's areas. Furthermore, it was agreed that members of their respective groups would be transferred from one group to another if they should move to a new area.

STEVENS indicated that his group has microfilming equipment and "secure" messages between the two groups will be transmitted by microfilm as soon as the SAO acquires the necessary equipment.

(SD T-1, December 29, 1971)

On December 29, 1971, it was reported that BETTIE HAUGHTON will remarry in the near future and, upon doing so, expects to leave the San Diego area. At that time, she will give the offset press, which she has, to the SAO for its use.

DAVIS has been very busy recently preparing the next SAO bulletin. According to what he has said, this bulletin will contain eight pages of technical information dealing with explosives, booby traps and other weapons and will have two pages of general information regarding news, recruiting, and training.

(SD T-2, December 29, 1971)

On January 5, 1972, it was reported that the new SAO bulletin had been printed and was ready for distribution. In addition, DAVIS was reported to have stated that he wanted to begin work on a new special bulletin such as the one done by the SAO on PETER GEORGE BOHMER. However, this time the target of the bulletin would be a nationally-known figure of the New Left Movement.

(SD T-1, January 5, 1972)

F. Acquisition of Firearms and Explosives

On January 7, 1972, it was reported that most members of the SAO possess several firearms and frequently are armed. Furthermore, members of the SAO are endeavoring to acquire explosives and munitions of all descriptions.

(SD T-2, January 7, 1972)

II. ACTIVITIES OF LOCAL GROUPS

A. Name, Location, and Estimated Membership

On January 7, 1972, it was reported the SAO leadership considers that the organization has groups established at the following locations:

San Diego, California

The group at San Diego controls the State of California and has the same location as the national headquarters. This group has eight members and approximately the same number of prospective members and supporters.

Phoenix, Arizona

Moore

The Phoenix group controls the State of Arizona. There are only two individuals, EVERETT MORRE and his wife, known at this time, although, allegedly, a larger groups exists.

Seattle, Washington

This group controls the State of Washington and possibly Idaho and Oregon as well. Contact with only one individual, CY ANDERSON, is known, although a larger group allegedly exists.

Las Vegas, Nevada

This group controls the State of Nevada with at least two individuals, JACK DOYLE and ED (Last Name Unknown) and possibly more in the group.

In addition, DAVIS has claimed to have two members, names not known, at Carson, near Los Angeles, California, and to have made contact regarding the SAO with acquaintances in the States of Oklahoma and Kansas.

Furthermore, DAVIS has advised that individuals near Redding, California, and in the State of Maryland have written in requesting information on the SAO.

(SD T-2, January 7, 1972)

B. Officers

On January 7, 1972, it was reported that, for the time being, officers of local groups of the SAO will be the same as those listed for national and state positions of the SAO.

(SD T-2, January 7, 1972)

C. Summary of Activities

It is noted that most of the information regarding activities of the SAO at San Diego has been reported in the section entitled "Overall Activities" in order to more easily show the organization and growth of the group.

On January 7, 1972, an article appeared in the San Diego Union, daily newspaper at San Diego, California, and reported that, on the previous evening, a young woman at the residence of PETER GEORGE BOHMER had been wounded by sniper fire from an unknown assailant. According to the article, stickers regarding the SAO had been placed on the door of BOHMER's office at San Diego State College earlier that day and BOHMER had allegedly received threatening telephone calls from the SAO.

The article stated that the San Diego Police Department was investigating the incident.

On January 7, 1972, Detective ERNIE TRUMPER, Investigative Support Division, San Diego Police Department, advised that a witness at the scene of the shooting incident had described seeing two shots fired from a light blue 1964 Plymouth Valiant automobile. According to TRUMPER, the individual firing the shots had been described as a white male in his middle 20's, slender build, with dark curly hair and a light, neatly trimmed beard.

On January 7, 1972, it was reported that members of the SAO had indeed placed stickers on BOHMER's office door during the day on January 6, 1972. However, it was reported that the description of the vehicle and the assailant as furnished by the San Diego Police Department did not match any known SAO member or vehicle belonging to any SAO member.

(SD T-2, January 7, 1972)

III. FINANCES

On September 16, 1971, JERRY LYNN DAVIS was reported to have stated that he estimated the monthly operating cost of the organization he had in mind to be approximately $100.00.

He further advised that O. A. ALEXANDER of Alex Rapid Print had agreed to do printing for the SAO at cost.

(SD T-2, September 16, 1971)

On October 8, 1971, it was reported that initiation fees in the SAO would be $5.00 and that monthly dues of membership would be $3.00.

(SD T-1, October 8, 1971)

On November 26, 1971, DAVIS was reported to have stated that he had spent $300 of his own money on printing materials for the SAO and for other expenses.

(SD T-1, November 26, 1971)

On December 20, 1971, it was reported that the SAO had then spent $140 on printing its literature. The last bulletin put out by the group had been done at Alex Rapid Print at a cost of $3.50 for 200 copies. A total of $16.00 was spent on stamps to mail the bulletin out.

(SD T-2, December 20, 1971)

IV. PUBLICATIONS AND PROPAGANDA

On January 7, 1972, it was reported that present plans of the SAO call for putting out a monthly bulletin for members of the group and for other special bulletins, leaflets, posters and stickers as the need and occasion arises. Future plans call for the eventual publication of a bulletin which will be distributed publicly.

The SAO is presently contemplating using the slogan "We're Everywhere."

(SD T-2, January 7, 1972)

V. MISCELLANEOUS

Included at the end of this report as a special section marked "Addendum" is one copy of each piece of literature printed so far by the SAO.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

ADDENDUM

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Dear Fellow American,

At the request of a mutual friend we are sending you this invitation to join the Secret Army Organization. Those of us who have been members for some time sincerely believe that our organization can be of real value in preserving for future generations the land of freedom and opportunity which our forefathers handed down to us.

It is the belief of our organization that the communist-socialist conspiracy has infiltrated the United States Government to such an extent that the American people cannot rely on this country's elected leaders to protect them from communist domination and slavery.

We believe that the time will come when the American people will have to fight for their lives, and their liberty. In this belief, we have formed in advance a secret underground army with but one objective, to defend our constitutional republic and to help our fellow Americans to do the same.

We do no want lukewarm members. We are an organization of people willing to make any sacrifice necessary for our country. If you feel the same way, we invite you to join us.

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Dear Fellow American,

Your letter of inquiry concerning the Secret Army Organization was received a few days ago. We have had so many inquiries during the past few months that it has been impossible to answer each of them promptly with a personal letter.

We certainly appreciate your interest in our organization and we hope you will join us in our battle for national and individual freedom. As you learn more about the Secret Army Organization I'm sure you will come to realize that we are not radicals, but are far more inclined to be quietly dedicated and clear thinking individuals.

Enclosed is some further information about our organization, its history, objectives and programs. After you have given this material careful study, we hope you will use the enclosed application form to join our organization. When sending in your application, do not put your return address or name on the outside of the envelope.

After your membership application has been processed, we would certainly welcome having you work with one of our local units, or better still, help you organize your own unit with our assistance after you have completed preliminary training.

Sincerely yours,

Captain Patrick McDonald
S. A. O. Headquarters Staff

20

History of the Secret Army Organization

One early morning in February, 1970, a group of six Minutemen leaders from four states met secretly in Northern Arizona to discuss the crisis that the arrest and imprisonment of two top Minutemen leaders and the assassination of a third had brought on the organization. Although some of these men had met before in their roles as Minutemen group leaders, others were meeting for the first time.

After much discussion, two principal points were agreed upon. First, that the Minutemen as a national coordination organization of militant right-wing groups had effectively been destroyed by the pro-communist elements inside the Justice Department. While individual units still existed throughout the country, few had the financial support or leadership to be really effective. Second, that the need for such a coordinating organization was greater than ever in view of the increased revolutionary activity by communists in the United States.

With these two points in mind, suggestions were put forward on a course of action to be followed. After a meeting that lasted all that day and far into the next morning, an overall plan of action was finally agreed upon. All present agreed to merge their individual units together and form a new organization under the command of one leader elected from among themselves, with the other five to be members of a General Staff that would advise and assist the new leader.

While retaining the basic programs and policies of the Minutemen, it was decided that not only should this new organization have a different name, but also a completely new chain of command and organizational structure. If the new organization was going to survive the attacks that befell the old one, a whole new approach would be needed. Never again could the arrest or death of a few leaders be allowed to cripple the entire organization.

For this reason it was decided that only a highly disciplined military type orgainization with a definite chain of command would have any chance of success. This then, was the beginning of the Secret Army Organization. Beginning with an original force of hard core patriots that numbered fewer than two hundred, the Secret Army Organization began the job of picking up the pieces and continuing to fight for national and individual freedom. Using this cadre of dedicated personnel as a nucleus, the S. A. O. has been recruiting and training new members in the skills they will need as the freedom fighters of tomorrow.

The leaders of the S. A. O. have no idea of fighting a last ditch stand. We have no desire to commit suicide ourselves or to let our members do so. We have a strategy which we believe will ultimately lead to victory. Only one thing is essential. We must start preparing and training NOW! We of the S. A. O. believe that our country is worthy of any sacrifice. If you feel the same way, we invite you to join us.

JOIN THE
SECRET ARMY
ORGANIZATION

An organization of loyal Americans dedicated to the preservation of both national and individual freedom.

1. To prepare the means of personal defense and survival in case of enemy attack.
2. To resist and expose the spread of communist influence and propaganda within our own national boundaries.
3. To investigate by means of our own secret memberships the infiltration of communist sympathizers into American organizations of government, business, labor, religion and education.
4. To resist by any and all means the passage of laws which regulate the private ownership of firearms or which detract from the individual's ability to defend his own family and personal property.
5. To promote knowledge and skill in the use of arms by our own members and by the general public.
6. To form in advance of actual need a secret underground organization equipped to spy upon, harrass and destroy troops of any foreign power that might occupy United States territory.
7. To lend assistance and support wherever possible to other resistance organizations, domestic or foreign, opposing communist expansion or subversion.
8. To pursue these programs as private citizens motivated only by patriotism and to remain entirely free of government subsidies or control.

22

The Secret Army Organization is a national organization of patriotic Americans who are preparing themselves as a last line of defense against communism. To exemplify the necessity of such an organization, we quote the 1960 Annual Report of the Committee on Un-American Activities as follows:

"Events of the past year have provided convincing evidence that the American people cannot rely completely on this country's armed forces to protect themselves from communist domination and slavery. This is not because our military forces lack the power or the will to defend this country, but rather because the nature of the attacks being made on the United States by it's major and only significant enemy are so designed as to render conventional military forces as ineffective as possible for defense purposes."

Starting from nothing 50 years ago, communism now rigidly controls one-third of the human race and has subverted to varying degrees the remaining two-thirds. In the past 20 years the communists have conquered 20 sovereign nations, one by armed conquest and 19 by internal subversion or negotiation.

There is not one of these countries in which the communists rule by the consent of the people. Everywhere they must perpetuate themselves by terror. They remain in power only through the use of the most brutal police state tactics.

The communists consider their party workers not simply as an accessory to armed conquest but as the actual spearhead of any invasion into new territory. From this point of view the United States was "invaded" by Soviet troops more than 30 years ago. It has been authoritatively estimated that the communists now have an army of 500,000 combatants already landed on American shores and already working by the most insidious means to destroy our American way of life.

The cold war is very real. It must be fought and won. The only alternative is to lose and to lose means that future Americans for generations to come must live in terror and in slavery. Appeasement is futile. We cannot bargain with moral barbarians who never have and never will know the meaning of honesty.

Communism must be defeated, not merely resisted. We must rid our country of traitors and fellow travelers. We must embark on a massive offensive turning every communist trick - from propaganda to infiltration - against our mortal enemy. This is the one and only way to win the struggle for survival.

Send 20¢ in coin or stamps for full information on the Secret Army Organization programs and membership application to: S. A. O., P. O. Box 5791, San Diego, California 92105.

23

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Secret Army Organization is the most active, most completely dedicated and most selective in its membership of all the many patriotic organizations in America. We are willing to make any sacrifice for our country and we fully expect that some of us will have to make the ultimate sacrifice before victory is achieved. Our very lives depend on each other. There is no place in this organization for bunglers, playboys or lukewarm conservatives. If you join the Secret Army Organization, there might easily come a time that your life would depend on how competently some other member had learned his job.

Unless you are especially well informed on the domestic and world political situation, it is probable that you have a lot to learn about the present threat our nation faces. Unless you have had many years experience in actual underground warfare, there is undoubtedly a lot you can learn from the experts in our organization who have developed and supervised our training program.

OUR NATION IS IN IMMEDIATE DANGER

It is possible that within a very few years, perhaps even within months, our nation could be conquered and enslaved by the communists. To prevent this we must know as much as possible about our enemies. Unless we know who they are and what they are doing we will not succeed in our efforts to maintain a free America.

THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

In driving an invader from your land the resistance involved goes through three stages of development.

1) The Underground Network
2) Active Guerrilla Warfare
3) Open or Conventional Warfare

The conventional warfare stage uses everything in the way of weapons that the enemy does but must also have active guerrillas and underground agents working against the enemy, too. In the present state of military tactics conventional warfare cannot succeed unless these other two ingredients are used simultaneously.

The first step is to form an underground network. An active guerrilla system must have the support of an underground network of approximately three times its own size. This underground must supply the active guerrilla fighter with supplies, concealment, information, etc. An underground network starts with departments of intelligence, security and propaganda in that order.

Sabotage, espionage, subversion, infiltration, escape and evasion, training, clandestine fabrication of supplies, counterfeiting enemy documents, recruiting, communications and propaganda are other phases of underground activity. Each member of the Secret Army Organization, to be effective, must have a working knowledge of all these tactics as well as the military tactics more commonly associated with guerrilla activities.

24

ASSIGNMENT TO UNITS

Many people that inquire about membership in the Secret Army Organization seem to have an idea that they will be immediately accepted into an active unit. Look at it this way. Suppose you had spent a year or more carefully recruiting and training until you had a hard hitting team where every individual was reliable, dedicated, and had confidence in his fellow unit members. Wouldn't it make you mad to have the national or regional organization assign some rank amateur to your unit that you you know little or nothing about?

Before any new member is assigned to an active unit or to an important underground project, he must undergo a period of training. During this training he will be directed through the mails by an experienced member and some of his activities may be observed by other members without his knowledge. Only when a new member proves himself to be conscientious, trustworthy, self-disciplined and able to operate effectively alone will he be accepted as a "secure member" and invited to participate with other unit members in a teamwork operation.

EXPENSES

Unfortunately, most good things don't come cheap. Although we make every effort to keep down the expense of membership in the Secret Army Organization, you must expect to pay your own way.

Dues to the Secret Army Organization are $3.00 per month. This money is absolutely necessary for use to maintain our central files and headquarters, for postage and printing, to finance our extensive intelligence network, and to maintain training areas.

Each member will have other expenses depending on the type of activity he is engaged in. Every member will be expected to buy his own gun, ammunition and other basic combat equipment. During training the new member may be expected to buy certain books or subscribe to certain magazines that his work requires. During this time the new member will also be supplied with reading material on the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare. This home work will make it possible for him to fit in quickly to an active unit and participate effectively in actual maneuvers, marksmanship training, etc.

Following this preliminary training a member may be either assigned to an existing unit, assisted in organizing his own unit if he has shown sufficient leadership qualities or become part of an underground network.

Upon your acceptance into the Secret Army Organization you will be given a definite series of projects described in writing so you will know exactly what will be expected of you.

We hope that you can succeed in this effort because your country desperately needs patriots at this time.

Secret Army Organization

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

NOTICE TO APPLICANT: All information on this form will be kept confidential. All records of members of the Secret Army Organization are stored in a way that they can be swiftly destroyed to keep them from falling into unauthorized hands.

Name______________________________Sex________Age_______

Address______________________________Marital Status________
(Street)

State______________________________Wife's Name__________

Zip Code______________________________Telephone__________

Date of Birth______________________________
(Month) (Day) (Year)

Occupation______________________________Education__________

Special Subjects Studied______________________________

Do You Speak or Read Any Foreign Language?______________________________

Veteran__________Branch______________________________Highest Rank__________

What Service Training Have You Had That You Feel Would Be Beneficial To This Organization?______________________________

Physical Description: Height__________Weight__________Color Eyes________

Color Hair__________Health: Good__________Fair__________Poor__________

Any Physical Disabilities or Limitations?______________________________

Any Public Speaking or Organizing Experience?__________If Yes, Pleas Explain:________

____

How Many Hours A Week Could You Devote To Working And Training With the S. A. O. ?

Hours__________Best Time: AM______PM______Weekdays__________Weekends______

CERTIFICATION

I am a loyal American Citizen dedicated to the defense and survival of the United States as a Constitutional Republic, free from all socialist and communist policies. Enclosed is my $5.00 membership fee. I agree to pay $3.00 each month to the Secret Army Organization as membership dues.

Signature of Applicant______________________________ Date

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Dear Fellow American,

Your application for membership in the Secret Army Organization has been processed and approved. It is our profound hope that your membership in the S. A. O. will prove to be a benefit to the organization and yourself as well. A dedicated member will find that his association with our organization is a way of life that is far more rewarding than the ordinary mediocre existence of his fellow enlightened citizens.

For security purposes all records regarding individual members are listed by numbers only. Your number will be ______________. Please sign all future correspondence addressed to the organization with this number. You need not list your address unless it is different from the one in our records.

Another security measure employed by our organization is the use of mail drops. The mail drop is an address listed in a fictitious name of a person or company not connected with the organization. Each member is assigned one that he will use in sending all reports, correspondence, materials, etc., to the organization. Your assigned mail drop is:

We have a tremendous job ahead of us. Certainly, none of us pretend to know what the future holds for ourselves or for our native land. We do feel, however, that our freedom is gravely threatened. It is not always possible to know the best thing to do. But we do know this - our forefathers have given us a life of freedom and opportunity such as never existed before in all history. We must strive to pass this heritage on to future generations intact.

Our organization is not suggesting or doing anything more than Americans have always done - starting in 1776.

Enclosed is some further information about our organization, its history, objectives, and programs. Your record has been turned over to our training section and you should receive your first training program within two weeks.

Sincerely yours,

27

Captain Patrick McDonald
S. A. O. Headquarters Staff

THE COMBAT TEAM

General Outline

The "Combat Team" is the smallest organizational unit used by the Secret Army Organization. When organized in the proper manner it is capable of operational initiative when detached from the parent organization. When developed to its highest degree of efficiency the Combat Team is almost totally self-sufficient and able to perform any one of several missions. To attain these aims the following elements are essential:

a. Equipment should be well-chosen and standardized as much as possible.

b. Communications, internal and external, must be capable of rapid transmission, be varied in nature, and be exercised with prime emphasis on security.

c. Internal coordination should be automatic in response. Confidence among members of the team must be developed.

d. Selection of each position on the team should be based on psychological aspects as well as technical competence.

e. Training of the men in each function should be at regular intervals and continuous. Field problems should be given dry runs in detail.

f. The logistics problem should be studied with care, and made simple and direct.

g. Each team will have a "leader" (Lieutenant) and an "assistant leader" (Sergeant). These men shall be given special training by the Secret Army Organization at "leadership seminars".

h. Team "marshalling points" should be selected in advance and be well defined. Practice "alerts" will determine the team's efficiency in response and security.

i. Terrain familiarity within the expected operational radius of the team must be developed.

j. Weapons familiarity must be obtained through live firings at various targets. Team action must be stressed as well as individual competence.

k. The team leader should see that a constant flow of information is provided to team members on the ideological struggle. This will help induce the proper frame of mind in each member.

l. Team missions and targets must be identified and the proper training equipment made available for each assignment.

m. The team leaders will be responsible for maintaining the overall security of the unit. Personal feelings should not affect decisions involving reprimand or dismissal of men from the team for reasons that endanger its operation or security.

n. Intelligence gathering as an important part of each team member's duties should be stressed. Information on the location and movements of local communist and left-wing enemies of the organization should be sent to either Regional or General Headquarters.

o. The team leaders will be responsible for maintaining contact with higher command and for the transmission of orders from same.

ORGANIZATION

The "Combat Team" will consist of six men. These six men will be divided into two sub-teams (Sections). Number One Section will consist of the Team Lieutenant and two other team members. Number Two Section will consist of the Team Sergeant and the two remaining team members. When completely assembled the unit will act directly under the command of the Team Lieutenant. When split into sections the Team Sergeant will carry out the orders of the Team Lieutenant during missions, but will be in immediate command of the Number Two Section. In the absence of the Team Lieutenant the Sergeant will take command of the Unit.

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation of the Combat Team will be effected by the use of two carriers. Interception and/or destruction of one carrier will not, then, immobilize the team. In addition, each carrier can serve as a scouting element for the other. Motorized carriers should be as inconspicuous as possible and still serve their purpose. Jeeps and pickup trucks should be used only where such vehicles are owned and used commonly by the general population or where the terrain makes their use necessary. Most often an ordinary passenger car will suffice. The model selected should have a good road clearance so it can be used on dirt roads. Tire chains (if needed), hydraulic jacks, extra gas, water, and suitable tools should be stored in the vehicle.

TRAVEL PROCEDURES

Underway, Carrier #1 will lead and Carrier #2 will trail. The "interval" will vary with conditions. In cities close-aboard trailing will be used. Open road, by day, will require an interval of approximately 300 yards. At night this will be reduced to approximately 100 yards. During travel, all equipment (especially arms and ammunition) should be kept out of sight. Special team equipment and weapons should be locked in the trunk of the vehicle until needed. The trunk key should be carefully hidden so as to make it difficult to search the trunk in case law enforcement agents should stop the car on some pretext with the intention of searching it illegally.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

Selection of w[illegible]pons and supplies should give the [illegible]mbat Team maximum flexibility to meet any condition that may be encountered in either rural or urban warfare. Consideration should be given to all possible situations that may develop relating to both traditional guerrilla warfare and modern underground warfare techniques. It should be kept in mind that the Combat Team is a functional part of a resistance network. It's activities should be coordinated with other teams to take maximum advantage of its striking powers.

Disregarding the inclusion of weapons peculiar to a given mission, the standard distribution of men and weapons could be as follows:

#1 (Team Lieutenant) AR-180 Assault Rifle, automatic pistol, sheath knife, flare gun, and binoculars. 300 rounds of ammunition loaded in clips should be carried for the rifle, plus 50 extra rounds of ammunition for the pistol.

#2 (Team Member) Riot Shotgun, automatic pistol, sheath knife, and wire cutters (with insulated handles). 100 rounds of No. 4 Buckshot in pouches for the shotgun, and 50 rounds of pistol ammunition.

#3 (Team Member) AR-180 Assault Rifle, automatic pistol, sheath knife, and smoke grenades or flares. 300 rounds of ammunition in clips for the rifle, and 50 rounds of pistol ammunition.

#4 (Team Sergeant) AR-180 Assault Rifle, automatic pistol, sheath knife, flare gun, and binoculars. Ammunition requirement is the same as #1 man.

#5 (Team Member) M1903 Springfield Rifle with sniper scope, automatic pistol, sheath knife, and entrenching shovel. 100 rounds of AP ammunition in bandoleers for the rifle, and 50 rounds of pistol ammunition.

#6 (Team Member) AR-180 Assault Rifle, automatic pistol, sheath knife, and 30 feet of climbing rope with grappling hook. Ammunition requirement is the same as #1 man.

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

In addition to the weapons and supplies already listed each team member should have the following basic equipment:

a. Sleeping bag and waterproof ground cloth
b. Canteen (1 quart army type)
c. Survival rations for three days
d. First aid kit
e. Gas mask with extra filter
f. Flashlight with extra batteries
g. Fatigue or camouflage clothing
h. Combat or paratrooper boots

PRACTICAL SECURITY MEASURES

1. Use deceptive measures. Subscribe to one or more left-wing periodicals or get on the mailing list of some "peace movement". This will keep the postal inspecotrs guessing as to which side you are really on. While doing this our members can be of great assistance in searching this left-wing literature for names and addresses of fellow travelers and forwarding this information for our Central Intelligence files. We desperately need people to assist in this work. Please inquire as to detailed instructions for such activity.

2. Always use two envelopes in sending mail to any patriotic organizations or to any other member of our own organization. Do not put a return address on the outer envelope. Put your return address on the inside envelope with the words, "return postage guaranteed".

3. Place some opaque material such as tin foil, carbon paper, etc. between the inner and outer envelopes to prevent your mail from being read by infra-red cameras.

4. Send all letters from corner mail boxes or from post offices where you are not known.

5. Be careful in the use of the telephone. Avoid telephone calls to known members of the organization as much as possible.

6. Prepare telephone codes ahead of time for future protection.

7. In recruiting new members always learn as much as you can about the prospective recruit and make sure he is not an infiltrator before you identify yourself as a member of the organization.

8. Members of the organization in each area should be divided into four groups:

A. Those who have been identified publicly or by law enforcement agencies as members of the Secret Army Organization.

B. Those persons not known as members of this organization but who are generally known as being patriots.

C. Those persons who have kept their political beliefs hidden.

D. Members who profess to be liberal for the purpose of infiltrating enemy organizations.

All members should be very careful in making contact with persons in a different category than themselves. For example, people in Class D should be very secret in their contacts and communications with persons of Class A or Class

8. Each member must respect the security of every other member. Do not, under any circumstances, identify one member of the organization even to other members without his expressed permission on each and every occasion.

9. Avoid loose talk. Do not discuss organizational plans in public places where you could be overheard. Do not even hint at such a discussion in the presence of non-members.

10. Do not write patriotic letters to newspapers or magazines under your own name. To do so achieves very little except to identify you to the enemy.

11. If you are already known as a patriot, or as a member of this organization you may find it advisable to spread the rumor that you have become disillusioned with the right-wing or for you to pretend a gradual loss of interest.

12. Classify your various members addresses, you communications and your other activities as "top secret", "secret" or "restricted". Use your most secret lines of communication only for the most important messages rather than flooding them with unimportant material.

13. Demand obedience to all security measures from all members. Persistent disregard for security measures should be cause for disciplinary action.

14. Check your lines of communication from time to time by sending phoney messages to make certain they are not intercepted.

15. Change mail drops, meeting places, etc. frequently.

16. Prepare secret rendevous points, mail drops, etc. now that may be used in time of some future emergency.

17. Each unit should assign some member the rank of Security Officer and should set up a system of fines or other penalties for failure to comply with security precautions.

18. Observe the "need to know" rule. Each member should be given only that information which is needed by him in the performance of his duty or which he will need in cooperating with other members of the unit. No member should feel "left out" because he is denied such information. Instead every member should willingly avoid information which he does not need.

19. Be careful that you are not followed in going to and from meeting places or in making contact with other members of the organization.

20. Keep all records and correspondence carefully hidden and in a manner that they can be easily destroyed. Records should be kept in code whenever possible.

32

S A O

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

S A O

Dear Fellow American,

Enclosed with this letter is your Preliminary Training Program. This first program is only a brief outline of some of the material that will be covered in later programs. There are four basic programs used by the Secret Army Organization: Intelligence, Security, Propaganda, and Recruiting, in that order. Each program will cost the new member $3.00 and will take between one to three weeks to complete.

The correspondence training program serves a number of purposes, but the two major purposes are:

1. It lets us know which members of the organization have the patience and determination to finish assignments given them.

2. It lets us be certain that the members have the necessary basic training in intelligence, security, etc., which is essential to almost any important task which we could assign a member in underground warfare.

Proper training in these four basic skills is absolutely essential for every member of an underground army. A member may be an expert in survival techniques, use of weapons, urban warfare tactics and all the rest but experience has shown that without these other basic skills they seldom do much fighting - they just commit suicide.

For those of you who wish to become active and trusted members of the Secret Army Organization, let us emphasize again that the quickest way of doing so is to begin and diligently complete the basic training programs.

After you have completed the five work projects listed in the Preliminary Training Program send $3.00 in to your regular mail drop and we will send you the first training program on Intelligence. In view of the urgent situation we now face some of our new members may receive special assignments after having completed the first two training programs. If this happens please try to redouble your efforts so that your special assignments can be taken care of while continuing to complete your regular training program.

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

33

Secret Army Organization

PRELIMINARY TRAINING PROGRAM

It would be a mistake to think that our enemies have one set plan for the conquest of the United States. They are maintaining many continuous attacks on many fronts at the same time - political, education, business, labor, and even religion. They are continuously probing for weak spots in the defenses of our nation. During the past fourty years so many openings have been left to them by the stupidity and collusion of our national leaders that they have been able to advance almost at will.

There is little we can do to change this situation at this time. Rather than deplete our limited resources on futile attempts to do so, we must concentrate on building a workable anti-communist underground army based on realities rather than wishful thinking and organized on the tried and proven principles of underground warfare.

The communists have fifty years experience in supressing anti-communist underground activity. If we are to fight them successfully - if we are to hold out until the final victory of freedom over tyranny - then our underground army is going to have to be the most skillful and dedicated that the world has ever known. There is only one kind of member that can qualify for such an army - the very best!

This will require intensive training and practice. There is no short cut to perfection. By drawing on the talents of several of our more experienced members we think we now have a training program that can develop that kind of underground army.

In this program four different types of training will be involved:

1. Correspondence and printed material.

2. Tape recordings, picture slides, charts, etc., sold or loaned to S. A. O. units or members.

3. Actual experience - "On the job" training by carrying out assignments under supervision of more experienced members.

4. Training maneuvers - Due to the difficulty of keeping large training sessions secret the General Staff has decided that such training sessions will be held only for small select groups that have already completed sufficient preliminary training at the local level.

INTELLIGENCE - SECURITY - PROPAGANDA

This preliminary training lesson is designed to give our members basic knowledge and practice in intelligence, security and propaganda. This first lesson is basic preparation for advanced training in these three important activities which will be dealt with in greater detail further on in the training program.

INTELLIGENCE

Underground warfare, as we customarily think of it, cannot succeed unless it is supported by a well developed organization comprising all the essential functions of intelligence, security, propaganda, communications, supply, medical services, etc.

Of all these, intelligence is most important. Let's consider one example: Suppose you picked up a telephone book, opened it up to any page at random, closed your eyes and put your finger on one name. Now suppose you read that name for the first time and said to yourself, "Sometime in the next 30 days I'm going to kill this man."

Consider the situation - one man, picked at random is marked for death. He might be the most powerful, the wealthiest, the most influential man in that city but none of thes things woul help him in the least. He would be defenseless. Why? Because you would have one thing that he did not have - intelligence. You would know his identity and he would not know yours. So long as that condition continued, there would be no possible way in which he could arrange an adequate defense against you.

Exactly the same situation exists between ourselves and our communist and socialist enemies. Our success will be directly proportionate to our knowledge of them and inversely proportionate to their knowledge of us.

Whatever a member's principal job may be in the Secret Army Organization, he must have a basic knowledge of intelligence techniques. This subject is therefore the first to be considered in our training program.

The word "intelligence", when used in a military sense refers to those methods that can be used to gain useful information. We usually think of this as knowledge of the enemy but it also includes information about the terrain, general population, available supplies and all other facts that will help in planning future activities.

Intelligence is roughly divided into three parts:

1. Observation. During a hot war this includes scouting and patrolling, observation of enemy troop movements, etc. On the cold war front this includes shadowing of enemy personnel, surveillance of enemy officers, tapping of telephones, interception of messages, etc.

2. Research and Analysis. Collecting and cataloging all possible useful information from general sources, newspapers, radio, trade magazines, etc., then matching up isolated scraps of information until an accurate picture is obtained of some situation that would not therwise be known.

3. Espionage. [illegible]s involves the placing or recru[illegible]g of agents within the enemy personnel where they can learn the enemy's plans first hand, steal the enemy's documents or materials, influence or misdirect the enemy's plans or policies.

Suppose you had a chance to see some important document for just a few minutes. How quickly could you scan it for its essential content? How well could you separate the important from the unimportant? Could you record this information in a written message that can be easily read and will not be misinterpreted?

Imagine that you are the leader of a patrol sent forward to observe and track an enemy column prior to a possible ambush. From time to time you will need to send back your observations in written form. Each S. A. O. member must develop the ability to put his thoughts on paper in such a way that they will be easily read and unmistakable.

The first two projects are designed to give the new member an opportunity to test those skills while learning (or reviewing) basic elements of espionage activity. When these have been completed more advanced material will be furnished to the member directly. Useful intelligence projects of increasing complexity and importance will be assigned to those wishing to specialize in this work.

SECURITY

It is obvious what a great advantage we can gain over our enemies by proper information about their plans and activities. It is equally true that much of this advantage will be lost unless we can keep our plans and activities secret from them. This is the basic purpose of all security activities. Overall security operations of an underground movement can be divided into five basic parts:

1. Protecting the identity of underground personnel and their families.

2. Keeping secret the location, movements and plans of underground units.

3. Keeping secret the location of underground headquarters, alternate hideouts and supply depots.

4. Protecting the identity of civilians, or individual members of the population that are friendly to underground forces.

5. Maintaining secrecy of communications.

As we have already said it is difficult to even guess what forms the coming conflict will take. Nevertheless, the strategy of all successful underground movements must satisfy these three basic principles:

First, is the "Principle of Deliberate Delay". During this state, the underground gathers its forces, checks its security, prepares its intelligence, establishes its lines of communications and waits for the enemy to become complacent and overconfident.

3k

Second is the "Principle of Provocation". At the beginning of this stage only a few real patriots are willing to take part in underground activity. The vast majority of the population is still wishfully thinking that they can "get along" with the oppressive forces. They want only to be left alone and will not take action until they are personally threatened. During this stage the underground conducts a series of actions which provoke the enemy forces into making harsh repressive measures on the general population. This turns the general population against the oppressive forces and convinces them that the underground is really their only hope.

Stage Three may be called "Principle of Natural Allies". When the government's action against the general population becomes sufficiently brutal then large numbers of people will be willing to help or join the underground. Their reasons for doing so may be numerous and their ideology man not always be the same as the basic underground movement. During this stage minor differences between different underground groups must be minimized and all of our natural allies must be rallied to the cause of freedom.

The intelligence branch of our organization is well aware of the communist infiltration and control of the present United States government. It can rightly be said that we are now partially controlled by a foreign ideology. Thus, we are already engaged in Phase I of this conflict. How long this will continue until open warfare breaks out is anyone's guess. Once again, the best prediction of our intelligence department is that Stage II will last for several months, perhaps even years. This will be a time of assessination and counter assassination, terror and counter terror. During this phase the "average citizen" may avoid direct conflict at the price of his dignity and individual freedom. Known patriots will be in extreme danger.

For most people membership in the Secret Army Organization will not materially increase their danger during this time. For many years our enemies have carefully catalogued the name and address of every person who has ever written a patriotic letter to a newspaper. The membership lists of the more prominent "conservative" organizations have long been available to communist infiltrators in these organizations.

Continued activity and membership in other conservative organizations by members of the S. A. O. is desirable in many cases but those individuals should not identify themselves as members of the Secret Army Organization. For most of our own members it will be best if you do not take part in the activities of these other organizations. Although many of you are already "marked" men a certain degree of security can still be achieved by quietly dropping out of other right-wing activities and keeping your membership in the S. A. O. secret from all except your most trusted fellow members.

There may come a time when the average American is still able to go about his business with little regimentation but during which you as a known or suspected patriot, may be sought out for arrest or assassination.

37

Project III liste[illegible]t the end of this chapter may mak[illegible]t possible for the organization to contact you and render assistance should you ever find it necessary to go into hiding with little advance notice.

Project IV is a first step toward learning more about your enemies and at the same time, confusing them as to which side you are really on.

PROPAGANDA

Another essential function of the underground is to convincingly inform the general public of what they stand for and thus gain the support of the general population. This must be done through propaganda, both written and spoken. Under conditions of enemy occupation the spreading of anti-communist propaganda would obviously be very dangerous. Even now there are certain phases of our propaganda effort that is best done by surreptitious means. Thus, observation, communication and propaganda are three elementary duties of every underground member.

Never before has propaganda been so important to the ultimate outcome of a major conflict. The ultimate object of any war is to force your desires on the minds of your enemies. Our enemies are attempting to do this by the non-violent means of psychological warfare.

38

Secret Army Organization

PRELIMINARY TRAINING LESSON

Project No. 1

Look over the various books in your local public library that have been written on intelligence and espionage. Select two that seem best and read them carefully.

Project No. 2

Write a brief outline of these two books and send it to your regular assigned mail drop or to General Headquarters.

Project No. 3

Get in touch with one trusted friend that you do not ordinarily see too often. Preferably one that does not live in your present neighborhood. Inform him that he may, in the future, receive letters with an inner envelope with your name on it. Make sure he will keep these envelopes confidential and will secretly pass them on to you or hold them until you can pick them up. Let us know this alternate address in case we need to contact you in extreme circumstances.

Project No. 4

Make necessary preparations to use a fictitious name for receipt of left-wing literature and correspondence. An important part of each members duties is to keep yourself and our organization informed on left-wing and communist activity in your area.

A phoney organization that includes the word "Peace" as part of its name is always a suitable cover. The address can be a P. O. Box, that of a friend, or even your own address. Mail several letters to the name and address you decide on to get the postal employees accustomed to it now. Then you will be ready to use it for the real thing.

Project No. 5

While working in the library, place the enclosed Secret Army Organization leaflets in between the pages of various books where they will be found and read by others.

39

Secret Army Organization

TRAINING PROGRAM

INTELLIGENCE

We are faced with a dangerous enemy who has repeatedly boasted of his plans to destroy our Constitutional Republic and to enslave our people.

For more than fourty years they have been infiltrating their agents into the most sensitive areas of labor, press, entertainment, education, law, communications, religion, industry and government. The degree of their success is made obvious by our government's failure to oppose communism internationally and by our fellow citizens' lack of interest in their own preservation.

We already know a considerable amount about this enemy; their origin, objectives, approximate strength, organizational structure and general methods of operation.

There are four areas where we especially need additonal information:

1. Details of the techniques used in espionage, infiltration and subversion by individual agents, including the methods by which they control their fellow travelers.

2. The equipment used for surveillance, communication, assassination, sabotage, etc., by individual enemy agents.

3. Working details of their short range programs either in operation or planned for the near future.

4. The actual identity of enemy agents, fellow travelers and sympathizers along with details regarding their work, place of residence, cover operation, means of transportation, travel pattern, personal appearance, mental characteristics, personal lives, business and organizational activities.

Our ultimate victory or defeat may depend on our ability to obtain enough of this vitally important information.

There are literally thousands of sources from which bits of valuable information can be obtained. These range from such extremes as the local newspapers to documents stolen from the enemy's guarded vaults.

42

The methods of gathering intelligence are roughly divided into two groups: 1) Research and Analysis, and 2) Espionage.

Espionage includes all the "illegal" means of obtaining information, such as wire-tapping, interception of mail, stealing of documents, secretly photographing records, infiltrating spies into enemy organizations, bribing or blackmailing individuals of the enemy apparatus.

Research and Analysis includes the careful systematic search of all newspapers, magazines, trade journals, house organs, political pamphlets, books, public records, etc., to sift a few "needles" of valuable intelligence from several "haystacks" of general information.

Professional intelligence organizations obtain about 95% of their information from Research and Analysis and only about 5% from Espionage. When espionage techniques are used, they prove most effective when a specific mission is carefully planned out in advance which takes advantage of all possible background information that may be obtained by research methods.

Let's examine how these various techniques might be used to obtain additional information of the four basic types we need most.

1. Details of the techniques used in espionage, infiltration and subversion by individual agents including methods by which they control their fellow travelers.

An agent trainee may learn something of the general espionage methods used by communist agents who have defected from the party and have then written about their experiences. Beyond this they are of very little value. The actual details of such techniques are uniformly neglected.

More useful information can be obtained from the study of past court records in which evidence has been presented in espionage cases. Hints and clues may occasionally be picked up from continuous and careful study of the regular news media. Really basic information of this type, however, must be obtained by infiltration and espionage techniques.

2. The equipment used for surveillance, communications, assassination, sabotage, etc., by individual agents.

Hints about the type of hidden microphones, short wave transmitters, miniture tape recorders, etc. used in surveillance and communication by espionage agents sometimes are mentioned by chance in the regular press or news magazines, in connection with reported spy cases. Technical details and construction plans occasionally are given in the electronics or "Popular Science" type magazines. Other information may be requested directly from the manufacturers of such equipment.

The type of short[illegible]ting or long acting poisons best su[illegible]d for assassination under various conditions might be anticipated by a careful study of toxicology: from "Chemical Abstracts" and Biological Abstracts"; from current magazines on pharmacology, as well as from such magazines as "Scientific Monthly" and "Science Newsletter", all available from larger city libraries.

Information on explosives is available from ordinance journals, literature from manufacturers, technical books, mining and drilling magazines, etc.

Naturally, such special fields of interest are best pursued by some person who already has an aptitude in each particular line.

This is one of the things that makes us feel that the American people are uniquely equipped to form a deadly effective underground. Nowhere else in the world does any population have as many useful hobbies and avocations that could be adapted to underground warfare. Many by products of these hobbies can be used as sabotage instruments. Just one typical example - the dust from grinding wheels in metal shops should be saved to mix with grease for the bearings of enemy machinery.

3. Working details of their immediate and future plans and activities.

Advance information about "peace marches" and racial demonstrations can be had by subscribing to appropriate communist front publications. Details as to the size of the demonstration and degree of violence anticipated must be obtained by infiltrating such organizations. Communist plans for future propaganda campaigns, subversion, espionage, blackmail of government officials, etc., may be learned directly by infiltration or may be deduced from a close study of their past activities.

4. Identity and personal information about enemy agents.

This requires the full scope of counter espionage activity; research and analysis of enemy publications, monitoring of communist sponsored meetings, surveillance of party offices, infiltration of enemy apparatus, recruitment of double agents, interception of enemy communications, etc., etc.

TECHNIQUES OF EFFECTIVE RESEARCH

1. Every researcher should be constantly on the alert for useful information in the general news media - radio, TV, magazines, etc.

2. Each researcher should have one field of interest to which he gives special attention.

For example:

One researcher might read every book available on "escape and evasion" and all the stories or articles written on prison escapes, looking for ideas that might someday help our members escape from a concentration camp.

Another researcher might continuously search the communist front publications for names of fellow travelers; for announcements of future meetings, rallies or similar activities; for additional information that would tie suspected communists to known communist organization; for friendships, business connections and family relationships between known communists and unknown communists.

Each city should have one researcher that carefully reads the daily papers to extract such information as: names of speakers at left wing meetings, names and addresses of both left and right wing letters to the editor, social functions attended by known communists, names of persons who might be potential recruits, news of coming "peace marches" and similar demonstrations, expressions of either pro or anti communist sentiments by local public officials, educators, businessmen, ministers, etc., evidence of communist inspired violence, sabotage or blackmail.

There is an almost endless variety of areas that need to be covered. Based on his or her own interests and abilities each researcher should choose the specialty for which they are best qualified.

3. Be as specific as possible. Look for details. Include blue-prints, drawings or photographs of all technical equipment when possible. Don't expect your analyist to be a "mind reader". Include all the facts. Continuously ask yourself the questions: Would this information be of value to the Secret Army Organization? To individual espionage agents? To other members? To our technical specialists?

4. Avoid editorial opinions and general news items as these are of little value and needlessly swamp our limited staff of analysts.

5. Do all the work locally that you possibly can. If the person is local, look them up in the telephone book or cross index. Double check to make sure the address is correct and that they still live there. Type cards if possible, otherwise, print plainly. Include phone numbers and licence numbers of cars whenever possible.

6. Use standard 3 x 5 inch index cards for sending in information on individuals. Clip pages of magazines or photostat important articles. In outlining books, be sure important facts are fully covered.

7. Always state the source of all information reported to the organization.

Printed below is a sample index card showing the proper placement of information. Use it as a guide when making out your cards.

Smith, John D. December 1, 1970

Home Address: 657 Riverside Drive
Los Angeles, California 90000
Telephone: 222-3323

Automobile: 1968 Ford, Green 4-Door, Lic. No. CAL 555

Activities: Gave a talk against war to the Santa Ana Chapter of the Peace and Freedom Party. Smith is a full Professor of Political Science at UCLA. (source: Los Angeles Times, page A-4, November 28, 1970)

XXXX
(member's ID number)

INTELLIGENCE

WORK PROJECTS

1. Write to the following "peace publication" (most of them are actually communist fronts) and ask for subscription price and a sample copy.

(A) When these sample copies are received by you, proceed to make out an index card on each person mentioned as supporting or taking part in any peace organization. Do not forget to include the magazine staff (editor, circulation manager, authors, etc.) include a description of the position held or activity referred to for each.

(B) Analyze the propaganda content of each magazine - in what way does it serve the communist cause? When completed, send these magazines in to your regular assigned mail drop along with your index cards, comments and analysis.

2. Using your fictitous name, write to the following "peace organization". Tell them you are concerned about the world situation and would like to help in the peace movement. Ask for the location of their nearest headquarters or a local member you could contact, as well as further information about their organizational plans and objectives.

(A) Make out index cards on all persons listed on their letterhead and in their literature.

(B) Analyze their propaganda literature and forward it to your regular mail drop along with your comments on how this particular organization promotes communist objectives.

(C) Send a note to let us know what research specialty you feel best qualified for and what plans you are making to gain useful information in this field.

45

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

SPECIAL BULLETIN

No doubt most citizens of San Diego are aware of the controversy surrounding the activities of San Diego State Economics Professor PETER G. BOHMER. For any of you who are not, here is a brief run down:

Bohmer, age 27, is a self-proclaimed left wing radical professor out at San Diego State who amoung other things has been teaching that the communist economic system is superior to our own free enterprize system. That the tax payers have to put with this kind of treason is bad enough, but it does not end there. Bohmer, who has a long record of communist activities behind him, has made it his policy to give lower grades to students in his classroom who do not share his left wing views. One of his students was a veteran of the Vietnam War, with a fine combat record. This student was a special target of Bohmer, who never missed an opportunity to ridicule and insult this students beliefs.

A quick look at Bohmer's record will show why he hated this student. In 1970 Bohmer's record will show 45 days in the pokey for anti-war protesting. This was when he was a graduate student at MIT in Massachusetts. The demonstration that earned him his jail was against defense research conducted on the MIT campus. He was also a member of SDS and a supporter of the Black Panther Party while at Harvard and MIT. It does seem strange that San Diego State was not able to find another professor somewhere who was not a communist jail bird.

For any of our readers who may care to look up this Red Scum, and say hello, here is some information that may help. His address is 5155 Muir, Ocean Beach, telephone number is 222-7243, he drives a dark blue 1968 VW Sedan, California license DKT 147. Just to make sure you talk to the right guy here is his descriptions he has dark brown shoulder length hair, green eyes, weight is about 160 lbs. and he is 5'10" tall. Now in case any of you don't believe in hitting people who wear glasses, to be fair I guess we will have to tell you he wears contact lences.

If you do run out to see Bohmer one night here are a few other people you may run into: Michele Mansky, she is Bohmer's girl friend and lives at the same address as he. She is a student at San Diego State. She is no doubt the "Teacher's Pet". One can bet she gets good grades. She drives a bronze two door Corvair with the front smashed in, California license KUZ 777. Next comes George Katsiaficas, a good friend of Bohmer's. George came from Boston a short time after Bohmer, and lives at the Muir address too. Next in line comes Sharl Ann Whitehead, she is George's girl friend and lives at the Muir address part of the time. The rest of the time you can find her at 302 Whaley, Oceanside. She drives a 1965 two door Dodge Dart, number PGH 420. And lastly we come to Elizabeth Jane Laird of 5544 Indiana St, San Diego. Her car is a Plymouth Valiant 1964 light blue, license number EKJ 385. Who's girl friend she is, is your guess.

46

FD-323 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
January 21, 1972

Title	SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION (SAO)
Character	EXTREMIST MATTERS-SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION
Reference	Report of SA STEVEN L. CHRISTENSEN dated and captioned as above at San Diego, California

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Incident #21

Question e

263 (Rev. 1-7-72)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REC-93

REPORTING OFFICE NEWARK	OFFICE OF ORIGIN NEWARK	DATE 8/30/74	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 9/12/73 - 8/9/74	
TITLE OF CASE FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR. NR Frank J. Shiner FRANK Drager Jr. FRANK A. Drager Jr		REPORT MADE BY SA CHARLES F. MOFFETT		TYPED BY mla
		CHARACTER OF CASE EM - WHITE ACTION MOVEMENT 10-31-74		

REFERENCES: Newark teletype to Bureau, 6/18/74.
Newark airtel to Bureau, 7/15/74.
Newark nitel to Bureau, 7/16/74.

Code Name Gorman

- P -

~~**ENCLOSURES:**~~

Enclosed for each receiving office is one photograph each of FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR., and WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL. Also enclosed for each receiving office is one copy of a two-page hand-written list of names which appears to be an organizational chart; this list starts with the name REVEREND POTITO and ends with the name MARE.

Enclosed for Birmingham is one xerox copy of a portion of a map of Anniston, Alabama.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☒ NONE					ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☒ YES ☐ NO
					0	PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☒ NO

APPROVED — SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

157-6908-184

REC-93

COPIES MADE: 100-63094

6 - Bureau (157-6908)
1 - LEGAT, OTTAWA
1 - USA, NEWARK
1 - ATF, NEWARK (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Newark (RM)
1 - IRS, Newark (RM)

(Copies continued Page B)

NOV 5 1974

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	100-SS/USS/SLK/CRD/IRS/ATF
Request Recd.	200 - Legat ottawa by 0-7
Date Fwd.	9/10/24
How Fwd.	R/S
By	JJK/mmm

Notations

57 NOV

#57 word change, all copies to guerrilla file/sm

COPIES

1 - Albany (Enc. 2)
1 - Alabama (Enc. 2)
1 - Atlanta (Enc. 2)
1 - Baltimore (Enc. 2)
2 - Birmingham (Enc. 3)
2 - Boston (Enc. 2)
1 - Buffalo (Enc. 2)
1 - Charlotte (Enc. 2)
1 - Chicago (Enc. 2)
1 - Cincinnati (Enc. 2)
1 - Cleveland (Enc. 2)
1 - Columbia (Enc. 2)
2 - Detroit (Enc. 2)
1 - Indianapolis (Enc. 2)
1 - Jackson (Enc. 2)
2 - Jacksonville (Enc. 2)
1 - Kansas City (Enc. 2)
1 - Knoxville (Enc. 2)
1 - Little Rock (Enc. 2)
1 - Las Angeles (Enc. 2)
1 - Louisville (Enc. 2)
2 - Memphis (Enc. 3)
2 - Miami (Enc. 2)
1 - Milwaukee (Enc. 2)
1 - Minneapolis (Enc. 2)
2 - Mobile (Enc. 3)
1 - New Haven (Enc. 2)
1 - New Orleans (Enc. 2)
1 - New York(Enc. 2)
1 - Norfolk (Enc. 2)
1 - Phoenix (Enc. 2)
1 - Philadelphia (Enc. 2)
1 - Pittsburgh (Enc. 2)
1 - Richmond (Enc. 2)
1 - San Francisco (Enc. 2)
1 - San Juan (Enc. 2)
2 - Seattle (Enc. 2)
1 - St. Louis (Enc. 2)
1 - Savannah (Enc. 2)   2
1 - Springfield (Enc. 2)
1 - Tampa (Enc. 2)
1 - WFO (Enc. 2)
4 - Newark (157-2011)
(2 - 157-7252 WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL)

ENCLOSURES - CONTINUED

Enclosed for Memphis is one xerox copy of a portion of a map of the Hohenwald (Lewis County), Tennessee, area.

Enclosed for Mobile is a xerox copy of a portion of a map of the Central and Kent, Alabama, area.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

For all receiving offices, DRAGER is presently carried as an ADEX subject. Inasmuch as DRAGER has indicated he advocates the violent overthrow of the US. Government and has overtly been attempting to recruit personnel, arms and ammunitions in efforts to accomplish this end, it is recommended DRAGER be continued as an ADEX subject and his activities be closely followed.

Information copies of instant report are being made available to designated offices, inasmuch as investigation has revealed the subject has associates and contacts residing within these divisions. Subject is believed to have travelled within these divisions between September, 1973 and June, 1974.

Investigation by Newark Division has failed to identify any members of a group called the National Revolutionary Army. DRAGER and WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL have claimed to have recruited disgruntled right wing patriots from the Ku Klux Klan, Minutemen and Nazi Party.

Information copies are further being made available inasmuch as DRAGER and CARROLL have been involved in extensive criminal activities throughout these divisions in efforts to support themselves while travelling throughout the U.S.

This report is classified confidential to protect the identity of NK T-1, NK T-2 and NK T-3, whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security.

(Identifies Source)

Inasmuch as these sources mentioned in this report are not indicated in the details to have first hand knowledge of the June 5, 1973 meeting at the residence of ALBERT P. LENTZ, in York, Pennsylvania, it is noted these sources were present and efforts have been made to hide their identity in the details.

Informant

Inasmuch as PH1966-PEI was the only person in the company of ALBERT LENTZ, on June 13, 1974, the following information was not included in the details. On June 13, 1974, LENTZ displayed to source what appeared to be and what was described by LENTZ as being official diagrams of the sewer system and waste system of Washington, D.C., and implied these charts were associated with DRAGER's plans for July 4, 1974.

(Identifies Informant)

Those known to have been present at this meeting were ALBERT P. LENTZ, JOE CHANCE of Indiana, (FNU) DUNCAN of Indiana, CHUCK KING of York, Pennsylvania, JAMES CADILLAC (PH) of York, Pennsylvania, LEE FICK, Pennsylvania, ROY FRANK HOUSER, Reading, Pennsylvania, and JAKE KING, Florida (probably identical to WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL with a known alias of "JAKE") and lastly FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.

NK 157-2011

INFORMANTS

Identity	Location
NK T-1 is PH 811-E	NK 157-2011-314
NK T-2 is IP 3373-E	NK 157-2011-314
NK T-3 is PH 1966-PEI	NK 157-2011-342

Informants

LEADS

All receiving offices are requested to contact logical sources in efforts to determine the activities of FRANK DRAGER and WILLIAM CARROLL and their alleged group called The National Revolutionary Army.

All receiving offices be alert to the fact the subject has bragged about committing an armed robbery (possibly a bank robbery).

Only positive information need be reported to the Newark Division.

BIRMINGHAM

AT ANNISTON, ALABAMA: Will attempt to determine from enclosed map the significance of the darkened area of the map located in DRAGER's vehicle. Will determine if this area around Anniston, Alabama is possibly related to extremist activities, bank robberies or possible "training grounds" for the NRA.

BOSTON

AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS: Will be alert to the possibility that DRAGER may have committed a bank robbery or armed robbery in the Boston area, inasmuch as WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL mentioned this possible occurrance to JAMES KEITH prior to their apprehension in DRAGER's vehicle on 6/13/74.

DETROIT

AT WARREN, MICHIGAN: Will contact MARHALL L. MC ELWANEY, 5635 Casmere, and obtain full particulars regarding the disposition of a .45 caliber Colt commander, Serial Number 70SC19183, sold to him by Gell's Sporting Goods, 17242 Greydale, Detroit, Michigan, on 9/17/73.

JACKSONVILLE

AT TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA: Will attempt to develop background information re the subject through Florida State Employment Service, inasmuch as subject had in his possession an identification card for Florida State Employment Service, bearing the name FRANK DRAGER, JR., Social Security Account Number 139-40-1035, date of birth 8/4/40. Local Office noted to be FSES Key West, with apparent visits noted as being 12/3/73, 12/18/73 and 12/26/73.

2. Will through Department of Motor Vehicles, attempt to locate all vehicle information and driver's license information regarding FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR., born 8/4/40, and WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL, born 8/30/55.

MEMPHIS

AT HOHENWALD (LEWIS COUNTY), TENNESSEE: Attempt to determine the significance of enclosed map showing a circle around Route #13, at Hohenwald. Determine if this area has any significance related to extremist matters, bank robberies or possible "training grounds" used by the NRA.

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA: If not already done, make Monroe County Sheriff's Office aware of DANIEL JAMES BRODERICK's knowledge regarding the theft of checks from the Marathon Cay Sal Billfish Tournament and the possibility of the use of his testimony against DRAGER and WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL.

AT HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA: Will contact Neil's Jewelry, 15 So. Khrome Ave. (Chrome), regarding the disposition of a .30 caliber Plainfield Machine Co. carbine, allegedly sold to a FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR., on 4/13/74.

MOBILE

AT KENT, ALABAMA: Will attempt to determine any significance for the darkened area of enclosed map located between Central and Kent, Alabama.

2. Will determine if this area is possibly related to extremist activities, bank robberies or possible "training grounds" for the NRA.

NEWARK

AT TRENTON, NEW JERSEY: Will maintain contact with the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, in efforts to develop information re the weapons confiscated from DRAGER subsequent to his arrest on 9/12/73, at Toms River, NJ and will follow their possible prosecution of subject for a legal purchase of firearms.

2. Will follow prosecution of subject re his charges at Lawrence Township, NJ, for fraud-theft of a motor vehicle.

3. Will continue to follow the activities of DRAGER.

AT WEST TRENTON, NEW JERSEY: Will maintain liaison with NJSP, to determine results of lab examination of chemicals found in vehicle allegedly stolen by DRAGER on 3/11/74.

SEATTLE

AT BELLVUE, WASHINGTON: Will interview Mr. OLAF WILLIAM AIKEN, 1846 West Lake, Famamish Parkway, regarding the full particulars of the disposition of a Stoeger, .22 caliber lugar automatic, Serial Number 363, purchased by him on 1/20/69, at the Seattle Sporting Goods, 4740 Rosenfelt Way, Northeast, Seattle, Washington.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:
1 - USA, Newark
1 - ATF, Newark (RM)
1 - Secret Service, Newark (RM)
1 - IRS, Newark (RM)

Report of: SA CHARLES F. MOFFETT
Office: Newark, New Jersey
Date: 8/30/74

Field Office File #: 157-2011
Bureau File #: 157-6908

Title: FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.

Character: EXTREMIST MATTER - WHITE ACTION MOVEMENT

Synopsis: FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR., W/M, DOB 8/4/40, Trenton, NJ, former member of Ku Klux Klan and founder of White Action Movement, presently claiming to be officer in his newly formed National Revolutionary Army. DRAGER previously travelling U.S., contacting all right wing groups. DRAGER, since September, 1973, travelling with a WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL, W/M, DOB 8/30/55. DRAGER and CARROLL both claim to be officers of NRA. Both have been criminally active with buying weapons, stealing and uttering forged checks and stealing a motor vehicle in efforts to support their right wing activities and travel. DRAGER arrested September, 1973, Toms River, NJ, and February, 1974, at Springfield, Ill., for possession of weapons, possession of marijuana (CDS) and stolen property. DRAGER arrested June, 1974, for fraud (theft of stolen motor vehicle), Mercer County, NJ. Confidential sources advised DRAGER in receipt of diagrams of sewer system in Washington, D.C., and had plans to bomb the IRS Building, 7/4/74. Sources further advise subject was going to kill Special Agents of the

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by 1653.
Exempt From GDS, Category 2.
Date of Declassification Indefinit

SOURCES WHOSE IDENTITIES ARE CONCEALED HEREIN HAVE FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE NOTED.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O - 406-840

FBI and a Judge GUBOW in Michigan. DRAGER presently in custody Mercer County Jail with local and federal detainers lodged against him. Descriptive data set forth.

- P -

DETAILS:

PREDICATION

This investigation is based on information which indicates that the individual is engaged in activities which could involve a violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights of Citizens); Section 245 (Federally Protected Activities); Civil Rights Act of 1968; or related Civil Rights Statutes.

This individual claimed in September of 1973 to be the acting Grand Dragon of the National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan for the State of New Jersey.

On July 17, 1974, Mr. WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL was interviewed by Special Agent CHARLES F. MOFFETT at Mt. Holly, NJ, and indicated FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR., had conspired to blow up the Internal Revenue Service Building, Washington, D.C., on July 4, 1974.

> The National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., (NKKKK), was granted a charter in Georgia in 1963 as a "patriotic, secret, social, and benevolent order." The NKKKK, a consolidation of various Klans in Southern states, continues to be anti-Negro, anti-Jewish, anti-Catholic, and anti-foreign born.

I. BACKGROUND

A. BIRTH

Records at the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Trenton, N.J., were caused to be searched on July 17, 1974, and revealed FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR., was born August 4, 1940, at Trenton, NJ.

B. EMPLOYMENTS

Investigation to date has revealed the following employments since August, 1973.

On July 15, 1974, Captain THOMAS WALTON, Toms River, NJ, Police Department, advised DRAGER used the name FRANK J. SHAYNE while employed at the Captain Courageous Restaurant, Route 37, Toms River, NJ, during the summer of 1973.

On January 29, 1974, Mr. DANNY RICHMOND, Chief of Security, Ocean Reef Club, North Key Largo, Fla., advised DRAGER was employed as a chef from November 16, 1973, until December 25, 1973, utilizing a home address of Post Office Box 968, Marathon, Fla.

C. RESIDENCES

On September 15, 1973, Captain THOMAS WALTON, Toms River Police Department, advised DRAGER used the address Post Office Box 968, Marathon, Fla., when arrested on September 12, 1973, by their department.

Captain WALTON further advised DRAGER utilizes the address 214 East Franklin Street, Trenton, NJ.

Investigation has revealed this address is occupied by DRAGER's brother, ROBERT DRAGER, and his aunt, EDNA GRABER.

D. RELATIVES

On July 15, 1974, Detective JOHN REYNOLDS, New Jersey State Police, West Trenton, NJ, advised the records of the Mercer County Jail, Trenton, NJ, revealed the following relatives as noted on the subject's visitors' list:

MINNIE DRAGER, Mother
P.O. Box 1272
Browns Mills, NJ

ROBERT DRAGER, Brother
214 East Franklin Street
Trenton, NJ

EDNA GRABER, Aunt
214 East Franklin
Trenton, NJ

JOHN DRAGER, Brother
Brodentown, NJ

CARL DRAGER, Brother
No address noted

E. ASSOCIATES

On March 5, 1974, the Springfield Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was made available xerox copies of printed materials taken from the vehicle of FRANK DRAGER when arrested by the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office in February of 1974.

Similar xerox copies were made available to the Newark Division of the FBI by Detective JOHN REYNOLDS, New Jersey State Police, subsequent to the arrest of DRAGER by the New Jersey State Police on June 18, 1974.

Set forth are all names, addresses, and telephone numbers taken from these two groups of materials. It is noted some of these names and numbers were extremely illegible and thusly some are subject to error and inaccuracies.

Alabama:

JIM DE WITT
423 Polk
Montgomery, Alabama
Telephone 205-262-0954, 205-263-2707

1973 Ford Pinto, Dark Green, Bearing
Vehicle Identification Number 3T11X211332

EMORY BURKE
RR #2, Box 192
Eletic, Alabama
Telephone 205-544-3481, 288-1680, 265-1898

ASA CARTER
Route #6, Box 330
Oxford, Alabama 36201
Telephone 205-236-8451, 362-2647

Simpson
JAMES and NANCY SIMPSON
Route #3
Kansas, Alabama

Arizona:

MURRAY
Telephone 602-944-2828 or 997-1142

Arkansas:

JACK FREDERICKS
Delmar Point, Box 98
Harrison, Arkansas

California:

ALLAN FORMULARIE
Box 435 (Possibly 438)
Eureka, California
(Poor man's James Bond)

Dr. J. K. WARNER
P.O. Box 1776
Hollywood, California
Also: P.O. Box 1896
Hollywood, California 90028

Canada:

MARTIN K. WEID
1530 McLarenwood Terrace,
London, Ontario, Canada

Connecticut:

TOM HART
37 Cleveland Avenue
Milford, Connecticut
Telephone 203-878-8765

BILL YULE
153 Evergreen Road
Cronwell, Connecticut
Telephone 203-342-6448

Delaware:

JOHN DUFFY
Box 3129
Newport, Delaware 19804
Telephone 302-999-9486

Florida:

Tip-Top Hotel
446 North Miami, FLA
JERRY DEITZ

ORVILLE LIPPERT
Bingham Subdivision
DeFunak, Fla.
904-892-2906

Telephone 305-367-9061

ROSE
904-767-2479
RR #2, Box 1551
O.B. (D.B.)
B2019

TOM MIDDAUGH Thomas Middaugh
519 Orange Avenue
Port Orange, Fla. 32019

Dr. PATITO
904-685-2173

Mobile YJ3-5256
(Possible a mobile telephone)
P.O. Box 412
Ocala, Fla. 32670

RALPH FORBES (Sword of Truth)
Box 7863
Jacksonville, Fla.

A driver's license in the name of
WAYNE JOSEPH MARTIN, 407 Oak Place,
Port Orange, Fla. 32019, License
#M635-890-58-010-000

License Plates 8RV-1301 and 8G/K-7675

Temporary Florida driver's permit DENIS DEAN
RITTER, 860 Terrace Drive, Daytona Beach; and
Social Security Card 299-36-7801. FLA.
OHIO

Illinois:

MARILYN SCHEIDER
220 West Locust
DeKalb, Ill.
815-758-6530

ROB STANHOPE
1713 Dearfiled Road
Chatham, Ill. 62629
483-3803

MIKE STEWART
3237 North Kinmore
Chicago, Ill. 60657
312-49701295

BILL FRIEDLE,
With notation "Cop Now"
17 West Rand
Arlington Heights, Ill.
864-6356

INDIANA:

RAY TURNER
110 North Holland
Edinburgh, Indiana
Also: 112 North Holland

Kentucky:

MIKE BROWN
101 Cherry Lane
Berea, Kentucky
606-986-4744

GEORGE WARE
RR #3 Hoover Pike
Nicholasville, Kentucky

LISA LOVE
9220 Aylebury Drive
Rolling Hills Subdivision
Louisville, Kentucky
502-425-1896

MIKE BROWN and KEITH SMITH
CPO 18
Maria, Kentucky 42403

MIKE BROWN
P.O. Box 213
Richmond, Kentucky

Maryland:

FLOYD FLEMMING
3924 Oliver Street
Hyattsville, Md. 20782
846-6356

Massachusetts:

WAYNE CHARLES FORTH
Social Security Account No. 028-44-0613
94 Holmes Avenue
Brockton, Mass.
Also: Date of birth February 27, 1954
Social Security Account No. 191-05-425
Place of Birth Boston, Mass.

CHRIS TRASKOS
BILL YULL
Rock Harbor Road
Orleans, Mass.
P.O. Box 1254
c/o SONNY PFMATTER

ANGELO SUPER, MKA
94 Holmes Avenue
Brockton, Mass.

Michigan:

BOB MILES
10587 Byron Road
Howl, Michigan
517-546-5852

RUSS ROBERTS
30686 8 Mile Road
Farmington, Michigan
313-474-1507

DON ZINN
823 North Kinney
Mt. Pleasant, Michigan
517-773-9266

JUDGE GUBOW
#123

RUSS ROBERTS
Livonia Boulevard
Detroit, Michigan

CHARLIE HAYNARD
RFD Rich Road
Alma, Michigan

Minnesota:

FRANK NILES
1872 Montana Avenue
St. Paul, Minnesota
771-0977

FRANK J. SMITH
P.O. Box 117
Ellsworth Falls, Minnesota
207-667-2622

North Carolina:

LAWRENCE LITTLE
1831 Blue Ridge Voulevard
Raleigh, N.C.
--2-7607

New Jersey:

Sheraton Motel
U.S. 206
Bordentown, NJ
Room 100

373-4131

396-7753

HOWARD SPIELER
1995 Kennedy Boulevard
Apartment 2
Jersey City, NJ 07305

MICHAEL WILBERT
807 Ocean Road 201-399-3535
Point Pleasant, NJ 201-244-4340

Storage -
Pierce Van Lines
Lot 552
800 New York Avenue
Trenton, NJ

609-448-9607 (Hightstown Pay)

ANN
Tunnel Road
Blumsbury, NJ
201-479-4896

CANOLL (illegible)
201-257-6756
7 Plymouth Lane
East Brunswick, NJ

MARY ARMSTRONG
3 Donna Road
East Brunswick, NJ
201-254-6042

Mr. N
609-893-9646

4 ED PADDOCK
609-695-2438

RED
609-396-9028

HOWARD THURON p.d.
5 695-4037
695-4072

MARK
393-0722

DICK REDNER
394-8091

6 H. L. LANDER (son) JONATHAN LANDER
205 Afton Avenue
695-4331

N.J.

7 JOHN HARTY
72 Poplar Street
392-4382

ZACHAMEIR
East Brunswick, NJ
238-0391

ROBERT PAPAY
8 224 Centre
Trenton, NJ 08611
396-4893

PAHOS
201-484-7171

BILL PERRY
587-3468

LOU MARTZ
9 609-586-1587
586-7566

FRANK MIZER
10 201-446-4675

MOM DRAGER
893-9646

DOUG KAYE
11 Box 114 Essex Falls, NJ 07021
201-686-3326
201-MU (or MO) 8-6874

HERNIMANN
609-547-5495

RAY DOERFLER
12 392-8979

BARBRA
East Brunswick
251-5922

DANNY BELMONT
116 Centre
393-9267

MIKE WILLARD
995 Grace Drive
Toms River, NJ 08753

JIM DIEHL (RED)
42 Florence Court
Toms River, NJ 08753

PAT CURRY (Idiot)
33 Hollybrook Drive
Toms River, NJ

KATE EISSING
954 Indian Hill Road
Toms River, NJ 08753

609-894-9252

RICHARD P. LEANDRO
16 Ridgewood Avenue
Tabor, NJ
L2031 65577 12542, exp. 1/31/74

BLACKWELL
737-0582

BILL
EX 4-5581

LOU MORTZ
586-7566

B. PERRY
587-3468

PHIL
587-0410

BOB READE
396-0339

RAY HIGHT
448-1209

FRANK
396-7753

TOM
393-4950

FLOSS
587-5089

Reverend ANDREW WATSON
Bridgeton, NJ
692-1918

NEIL
585-6190

GENE OSBORNE
Bridgeton, NJ
[illegible]

New Orleans:

TERRI ROLANTS
2111 Dauphine
New Orleans, Louisiana 70116
504-949-2548

New York:

Mr. J. GLASSER
212-924-7800

Mr. CHEVITNY
84 Fifth Avenue
NY, NY,

Mr. KARIN
212-739-2585
212-963-3200 work

GEORGE LINK
1765 Townsend Avenue
Apartment #1
Bronx, NY 10433
212-878-2149

KEVIN O'BRIEN
212-369-1512

LOUIS MUSTACHIO
Kopling House #421
165-167 East 88th
NYC

JAMES MADDLE (NRP)
10 West 90th Street
NYC
212-877-7048

Ohio:

United White P.P.
4319 Clark Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44109

FRANK ZORETICH
P.O. Box 02119
Cleveland, Ohio 44109

Mrs. PHILLIPS
3508 Library Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44109

Driver's License in the name of:
DENNIS DEAN RITTER
5924 Lakeside
Toledo, Ohio 43611

DENIS D. RITTER (employee's card)
Reliance Electric Company
Toledo Sales and Systems
#7700, signed DENIS D. RITTER

City of Toledo, Ohio
Handguns' Identification Card #13668
DENIS D. RITTER
5924 Lake Side

DENNIS RITTER August 28, 1973
1330 Alexis, Toledo, Ohio
1957 Harley Davidson Sportster
dated August 28, 1973 - Title #482420682

MICHEY RAY HALCOMB
400-88-4802 (Social Security Card)

Pennsylvania:

ED MC GOVERN
3328 Fairdale Road
Philadelphia, Pa. 19154
Home - NE 7-0437
Lantern: 757-9147

Mrs. KNOWLES
929-9461 - work
373-1405 - home

Mr. KARIM
Reading
372-5520

ROGER MELLINGER
215-929-8415

AL LENTZ
717-843-9109

215-373-9515
215-678-9587

PHILIP MAIER P.O. Box 797
Reading, Pa. 19603 (Berks County Prison)
Letter to FRANK DRAGER

Pennsylvania Liquor ID Card
PHILIP ALAN MAIER
320 Harvard Boulevard
Reading, Pa. 19609
Date of Birth July 29, 1949

Driver's License #1551476
PHILIP ALAN MAIER
302 Harvard Boulevard
Lincoln Park, Reading, Pa. 19609
Date of Birth July 29, 1949

RICHARD SINGLETON
717-366-0854
215-929-8031

GARY SMITH
412-371-3205 - home
412-371-3428 - public

BOB SEVERN
Route #3 (60 Girard)
Montrose, Pa.
717-553-2516

TOD WILSON
215-374-8283

BILL SICKLE (Artan Klan)
459 3rd
Pitcairn, Pa. 15140
412-373-2669

DOC KIGY
215-739-3618

AL LENTZ
717-845-2897

ALBERT LENTZ
920 West College Avenue
York, Pa. 17404
717-873-2557

Albert P. LENTZ
330 North Street
York Pa

ED GILMORE (NSWPP)
326 South 18th
Allentown, Pa. 18104
215-434-8765

RICHARD GRIMM
215-433-4879

GEORGE HOUSER
(Farm) 494-9884
215-HU 5-4843
215-FL 2-3082

NK 157-2011

[illegible] Ralph

ROY FRANKHOUSER
133 South Fourth Street
Reading, Pa.
215-678-7167

DENNIS
215-RE 9-5765

ALBERT P. BAILEY
1100 Cobbs Street
Dexel Hill (Delaware County), Pa.

GENE CONNALLY
215-926-5999

BEILERMAN (swastica)
215-RE 9-5624

FRED HERMET
215-757-4801

GEORGE K
215-739-3618

RED
215-355-5696

ROY
215-355-1509

DEBBIE
215-547-0746
392-5900

Parking Ticket:
Bureau of Police, Reading, Pa. #18025
Dated June 6, 1974, 1:41 p.m.,
green Ford, 282302374 Alabama
Reverse Side: 373-9515
Fourth Street
678-9587
LUND

Puerto Rico:

Checking Account:
FRANK A. DRAGER, JR.
The Chase Manhattan Bank, National Association,
Charlotte Amalie Branch, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands
#02160602720-1-032286

Rhode Island:

BILL (possibly TUCKER)
P.O. Box 63
Annex Station
Providence, Rhode Island

Texas:

JERALD WALRAVEN
1207 Pioneer
Dallas, Texas 75224
214-941-7199

Virginia:

KOEHL, MATT
NSWPP
703-524-2175

SKYLAR FERRIS
703-552-1527

PALLER JR. (CHESTY's son)
Richmond
648-6614

J. V. MORGAN
Alexandria, Va.
768-6321

CHARLES MC KAY
2713 Bayview Boulevard
Portsmouth, Va.

JOHN GAOBICK (Reporter)
Free Lance Star
616 Amelia Street
Fredericksburg, Va.

Washington, D.C.:

BARBRA VON GOETZ
711 Perpetual Building
Washington, D.C.
783-7700

It is further noted that DRAGER has been in the company of a WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL, date of birth August 30, 1955, Newark, NJ, and a DANIEL JAMES BRODERICK, date of birth June 4, 1944, Trenton, NJ.

Fla.

Daniel Broderick

F. VEHICLES

On July 17, 1974, Detective JOHN REYNOLDS, New Jersey State Police, West Trenton, NJ, advised the following license plates and registrations were noted to be located in the 1973 green Ford Pinto stolen by DRAGER at Lawrence Township, NJ, on March 11, 1974, and recovered on June 13, 1974, at Columbus, NJ.

8GK-1701
Listed to JAMES A. GEORGE
249 South ~~Hall Avenue~~
Deland, Fla.
On a 1968 Chevrolet, bearing
Vehicle Identification Number PS158F163020

8GK-6025
Listed to FRANK A. DRAGER, JR.,
Route 2, Box 1551
Daytona Beach, Fla.,
On a 1970 Ford, bearing Vehicle
Identification Number F25YNJ31980

8RV-1301
Listed to FRANK A. DRAGER, JR.
Route 2, Box 1551
Daytona Beach, Fla.
On a 1966 home-made camber,
Bearing Vehicle Identification
Number 139301035, Title #9892259,
Issued August 13, 1973

XBV-31W
Listed to FRANK A. DRAGER, JR.
214 East Franklin Street
Trenton, NJ
On a 1965 Chevrolet pick-up,
Vehicle Identification Number C1535F121059Z

Driver's License #P71512676108404,
Listed to FRANK A. DRAGER, JR.
214 East Franklin Street
Trenton, NJ
Date of Birth, August, 1940, Trenton, NJ; expires April, 1977

G. ARRESTS:

Set forth is an Identification Record for FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, FBI #405550E.

RAL BUREAU OF INVESTIG
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

10-11-73 600 KB

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

The following FBI record, NUMBER 405 550 E, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
Co Jail Mt Holly NJ	Frank A Drager 2nd #8771	1-9-63	armed rob 2A:151-41	
SPol Princeton NJ	Frank August Drager II #07693	1-9-63	material witness	
PD Trenton NJ	Frank August Drager II #20118	5-13-63	BE&L & aslt D/weapon CCW Poss of burg tools	
Co-Pros Office Trenton NJ	Frank August Drager II #12925	5-13-63	CCW; Poss of burg tools; B&E w/i to steal; aslt w/ DW	
PD Trenton NJ	Frank August Drager 2nd #20118	7-9-63	poss burg tools unl use DW PL from auto	
o-Pros Off renton NJ	Frank August Drager #12925	7-11-63	L BE &L poss burg tools poss D/W	committed Mercer County Jail see supplement
amilton Twp Pol renton NJ	Frank August Drager #29069	7-11-63	B.E & L	
Mercer Co WH [illegible]	Frank August [illegible] #116-64	3-6-64	aslt w DW	9 mos [illegible]

22

Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. Where final disposition is not shown or further explanation of charge is desired, communicate with agency contributing those fingerprints.

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
RAL BUREAU OF INVESTIG
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

10-11-73 680 KB

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

2

The following FBI record, NUMBER 405 550 E, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
Hamilton Twp Pol Trenton NJ	Frank August Drager Jr. #C/R 90	1-15-65	criminal registration only	prob [illegible]
PD Chgo Ill	Frank A. Drager #236554	5-13-69	dis cond	$25 & $5 C
SO New Brunswick NJ	Frank August Drager Jr. #A-10612	5-28-71	impairing morals of minor	
St B of I West Trenton NJ	Frank A Drager #192-28	FP 5-29-71	Contributing to Deliq of Minor	
Air Force	Frank August Drager II AF 21 780 489	8-22-58		
SO Toms River NJ	Frank August Drager 17738 SID 753412	9-12-73	C.C.W. & Poss of C.D.S.	

Residence: 214 E. Franklin St. Trenton, NJ

23

Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. Where final disposition is not shown or further explanation of charge is desired, communicate with agency contributing those fingerprints.

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

3

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

10-11-73 680

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

The following FBI record, NUMBER 405 550 E, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION

#12025 7-11-63. L BE & L poss burg tools poss *D/W March 6, 1964, Mercer County Workhouse nine months; Probation two years, consecutively to first charge to run concurrently on other charges on charge of September Term 1962 Indictment Nos. 428-62 Assault w/dangerous Weapon; 431-62 Breaking and Entering w/intent to Steal; 472-62 Possession of Burglars Tool 473-62 Breaking, Entering & Larceny and 474-62 Larceny.

SUPPLEMENT
24

Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. Where final disposition is not shown or further explanation of charge is desired, communicate with agency contributing those fingerprints.

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1963 O-[illegible]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20537

10-11-73 680 KB

The following FBI record, NUMBER 405 550 E, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. WHERE DISPOSITION IS NOT SHOWN OR FURTHER EXPLANATION OF CHARGE OR DISPOSITION IS DESIRED, COMMUNICATE WITH AGENCY CONTRIBUTING THOSE FINGERPRINTS.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
CC-Ocean County Prosecutor's Office Court House Square Toms River, NJ 08753				

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

10-11-73 680 KB

1-DJ

The following FBI record, NUMBER 405 550 E, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. WHERE DISPOSITION IS NOT SHOWN OR FURTHER EXPLANATION OF CHARGE OR DISPOSITION IS DESIRED, COMMUNICATE WITH AGENCY CONTRIBUTING THOSE FINGERPRINTS.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
	Civil print from PD Wash DC #EM 4 was identified with this record and returned to contributor 10-24-67			

26

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

It is also noted DRAGER was arrested February 19, 1974, at Springfield, Ill., Sangamon County Sheriff's Office, for possession of burglary tools, marijuana (CDS) and weapons.

It is noted on April 1, 1974, Mr. DONALD CADAGIN, Assistant State's Attorney, Sangamon County, Ill., advised that DRAGER failed to appear for his trial on March 18, 1974, and his $250 bond was forfeited by the court. CADAGIN further advised no further pending action is being taken against DRAGER. At the time of arrest, DRAGER was in the company of WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL.

On June 18, 1974, DRAGER was arrested by the New Jersey State Police, Bordentown, NJ, and turned over to the Lawrence Township, NJ, Police Department for the charge of fraud - theft of a stolen motor vehicle. DRAGER is presently in custody of the Mercer County Jail, Trenton, NJ, where he has been indicted for this charge.

On July 17, 1974, Captain THOMAS WALTON, Toms River, NJ, Police Department, further advised DRAGER forfeited bond for his arrest on September 12, 1973, and it is anticipated further charges will be filed against DRAGER for the altering of numerous checks stolen from the Captain Courageous Restaurant, Route 37, Toms River, NJ.

DRAGER has been charges also with violation of U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1073, for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution from the Monroe County, Fla. A warrant was issued June 3, 1973, for uttering false instrument.

On April 29, 1974, Detective RICHARD ROTH, Monroe County Sheriff's Office, Marathon, Fla., advised that on or about April 11, 1974, approximately 55 checks from the Marathon Caysal Billfish Tournament had been stolen from the Sombrero Beach Country Club. On that date twenty checks had been since returned, all made out to FRANK AUGUST DRAGER. These checks range from $97.00 to $150.00.

G. DESCRIPTIVE DATA

Name	FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.
Race	White
Sex	Male
Date of Birth	August 4, 1940
Place of Birth	Trenton, N.J.
Social Security Account Number	139-30-1035
Height	5'11"
Weight	185 pounds
Build	Medium
Eyes	Blue
Residence	214 East Franklin Trenton, N.J. Post Office Box 896 Marathon, Fla.
Scars and Marks	1" scar above right eye; scar lower right underside of forearm; tattoo of dog on upper left arm;
Occupation	Chef, painter
Previous Employments	Ocean Reef Club Key Largo, Fla. Chef Captain Courageous Route 37 Toms River, NJ Charter Club Princeton, NJ
Education	Claims 2 years college, Omaha, Nebraska, University (later admitted four year degree from Omaha University and admitted taking classes in law from Harvard and University of Southern California)
Marital Status	Single
Military Service	U.S. Air Force, Service #217-804-89
Arrests	Multiple arrests, New Jersey and Illinois
Pecularities	DRAGER is a self-admitted homosexual

II. EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

On September 12, 1973, DRAGER, in the company of DANIEL JAMES BRODERICK and WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL, were arrested by the ~~Toms River, New Jersey~~, Police Department, for possession of marijuana (controlled dangerous substance-CDS), possession of weapons and possession of stolen property. A search of their vehicle, a 1974 camper truck, bearing Florida registration 8G-K6025, revealed the following articles:

1. One Walther P-38, serial number 7965B.
2. One Colt .22 caliber automatic, serial number 336260.
3. One Springfield .410 shotgun, model 39A (no serial number noted).
4. 1,000 rounds of assorted ammunition for above weapons and other caliber weapons.
5. German insignias and armbands.
6. One white Ku Klux Klan silk robe.
7. One black Ku Klux Klan silk robe.
8. One water pipe.
9. Two pounds of marijuana (39 packets).

It is noted the black Ku Klux Klan robe is worn by Ku Klux Klan enforcers, whose duties range from being "muscle men" to "assassins".

On September 25, 1973, the "Asbury Park Evening Press" ran an article on page 1, entitled "Klansmen Claims Group Maligned". The article quotes DRAGER as claiming to the the New Jersey's acting grand dragon of the Ku Klux Klan.

On October 2, 1973, NK T-1 advised that on October 1, 1973, the Bucks County Unit, Number 12 (Bucks County, Pennsylvania), had a car caravan during the early PM hours. The caravan drove around Trevose, Pennsylvania area, advertising the Ku Klux Klan. The source advised DRAGER was present at this event and was in the company of several white males wearing Nazi uniforms.

On February 16, 1974, DRAGER and WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL were arrested by Lake Springfield, Illinois, Police Department, Sangamon County, Illinois, charged with possession of more than 10 grams, less than 30 grams, of marijuana and possession of burglary tools. A subsequent search of DRAGER's vehicle at that time of his arrest revealed extremist materials consisting of cassette tape recordings, address books, guerrilla training manuals, Ku Klux Klan literature, American Nazi Party literature, locations where crosses have allegedly been burned, wiretap equipment, and other right-wing literature. The subject was also in possession of numerous identification cards, such as driver's license and Social Security cards.

> The American Nazi Party - The World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists was organized by George Lincoln Rockwell on February 26, 1956, based upon the concept of an international "National Socialist" movement, as espoused by the German Nazi Party, which was headed by Adolf Hitler. On January 1, 1967; the official name of this organization was changed to National Socialist White People's Party. The NSWPP supports and follows the line of hatred against blacks, Jews and communists through various propaganda media, demonstrations, and other publicity-seeking devices for the purpose of seeking a legitimate dominant political party within the United States and in foreign countries. Headquartered in Arlington, Virginia, the NSWPP is currently led by Matthias Koehl, Jr.

On February 19, 1974, DRAGER was interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at the Sangamon County Jail, Springfield, Illinois. DRAGER stated that he was unemployed and maintains no permanent address. He admitted membership in the "light action movement" but denied current membership in any extremist organization, although he claimed to be coordinating the activities among all right wing organizations in the eastern half of the United States.

Set forth is the interview of DRAGER and WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL, who was arrested and interviewed under the name THOMAS MIDDAUGH.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 2/21/74

FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR. was interviewed while incarcerated in the Sangamon County Jail. He was furnished the identity of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview and he furnished the following information.

DRAGER stated that he is presently not a member of any right wing organization. He did admit to being the organizer and leader of the White Action Movement (WAM) which operated at one time out of Trenton, New Jersey, and Reading, Pennsylvania. He advised that the headquarters operations of that organization were disbanded due to a lack of finances. He declined to comment on the names of any members or of the total number of individuals involved in the WAM. DRAGER stated the aim of his movement was victory for all right wing organizations and this was to be accomplished through political elections or other necessary methods. His methods included preaching to the public concerning goals of his organization and by supporting the right type of individuals for public office. He considered BOB MILES, who is presently incarcerated in the Federal Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, to be the type of individual qualified to hold public office.

DRAGER stated that his WAM has adopted a philosophy of being the coordinator between all right wing organizations currently operating in this country. He stated that the strategies and ideals of all right wing groups actually are very similar and that when the conditions are right there will be a unification for all these groups into one large organization that will effectively be able to take control of the country. He stated he originally founded the WAM in 1970 and for a time published and distributed literature in an attempt to educate the public concerning his beliefs. He advised that WAM was unable to accomplish its goals as an above ground organization and as a result several years ago he decided to take the organization "under ground". Although there is no longer any formal organization or financial backing, WAM still has its officers and membership but the extent of its activities consists of himself and others traveling the country preaching the right wing philosophy to any group that will listen. DRAGER declined to comment on the number of individuals presently in WAM but did state

---

Interviewed on 2/19/74 at Springfield, Illinois File # SI 157-4376

SA MICHAEL G. [illegible]
SA WILLIAM A. [illegible]

by SA DAN [illegible] MGG/cms Date dictated 2/20/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

he had previously issued 300 membership cards. He again declined comment concerning the names of any of the organization's leadership or its membership. He did state that the majority of WAM members were disillusioned members of other right wing organizations. He advised the uniform of WAM consists of military fatigues with a pistol belt with a half swastika emblem on the collar. This is the uniform he usually wears during his speaking engagements.

DRAGER stated that recently he had been vacationing in Florida, living mainly on previous savings. He did work for approximately 17 days as a chef at the Ocean Reef Club, Key Largo, Florida. He was paid $250 per week there and had accumulated about $500 at the time of his departure from the Florida Keys area. He also advised he was currently existing on survival tablets, taking up to 12 tablets daily as a method to supplement his normal meals. He stated he could easily maintain his health and weight by use of these tablets. DRAGER claimed that he is traveling by camper truck and that since leaving Florida he was en route to New Jersey when arrested in Springfield, Illinois. He declined to comment on when he left Florida or to where he had traveled since that time. He further declined comment concerning any meetings he may have attended or any communication he has had with any individuals connected with extremist organizations during his travels. He advised that he usually camps nightly in either State or Federal park campsites or if none are available would utilize a commercial camp grounds.

DRAGER stated that the individual who was arrested with him in Springfield and who has been traveling with him since leaving Florida is CHARLES MIDDAUGH, who has been a friend of the family for several years in New Jersey. He stated MIDDAUGH has been in trouble since the age of 13 and was most recently released in January, 1973, from a juvenile detention facility in New Jersey. He stated MIDDAUGH worked with him in Florida and that he is currently MIDDAUGH's legal guardian and will be until his 18th birthday in December, 1974. He advised MIDDAUGH shares some of his same basic beliefs but is not politically motivated in any way.

He admitted that DANIEL BRODERICK was the individual who was arrested with him by local authorities in New Jersey in September, 1973, and that he traveled with him for a period but that BRODERICK had stayed in Florida. He advised that BRODERICK contacted his lawyer concerning the pending charges in New Jersey and has probably returned to New Jersey.

DRAGER did admit to past memberships in the American Nazi Party, National Socialist White Peoples Party, Ku Klux Klan, Knights of Constantine, as well as generally claiming membership in all right wing organizations at one time or another during the past 15 years.

He stated he was recently the self-appointed Acting Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan in New Jersey. He felt the organization needed leadership and that he had the respect of other leaders in the group, but did have some conflicts with some other independent Klan organizations in New Jersey.

DRAGER stated that he, in the past, has been harassed by local authorities and the Federal Bureau of Investigation but that he has never had any problems with any of the leadership of any right wing organization.

He claimed he is not currently a member of the Minutemen organization but that he does personally know ROBERT DEPUGH. He declined to comment on the last time he had any communications with DEPUGH.

DRAGER stated he personally knows several individuals associated with the American Nazi Party, including MATT KOEHL and DON PARSONS in Virginia, and first name unknown COLEMAN in Chicago. He advised that from 1961-1967 he was a member of the American Nazi Party and worked in its national headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. He worked closely with GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL during this period as his second in command although he would never accept any rank higher than lieutenant. For a period during 1964-1967 he worked mainly at the party's training camp in Pennsylvania as the individual in charge of the printing of all literature for the party. After ROCKWELL's death, DRAGER advised he was asked to take command of the party but he declined because of his past criminal record, a decision he regrets to this day. Approximately three months after ROCKWELL's death he left the Nazi Party. DRAGER feels that MATT KOEHL, the present commander of the party, has the guts but not the know-how to run the party organization. He does not feel that he has the charisma that ROCKWELL has and he does not reach the public effectively with the party's message. DRAGER stated he currently has no association with the American Nazi Party or with the National Socialist White Peoples Party.

DRAGER advised he knows no one in Illinois associated with the American Nazi Party or the National Socialist White Peoples Party and the name DAN DEMMER means little to him. He does recall DEMMER writing to his WAM but stated DEMMER was not at Nazi Party Headquarters in Arlington during the same period that he served there.

He advised that he knows no one in the Phoenix, Arizona area since the death of WESTBROOK PAYO (phonetic). He knows of no right wing activity in that area but he did recall in the past he communicated with a Nazi Party member there but he no longer recalls this individual's name.

DRAGER stated that all of his travels are basically politically motivated and that the main philosophy of his WAM is victory for white Christianity and a return to the natural order. He feels that the white race was placed on this earth as the "gifted race" and that a geographical separation of the races is necessary to prevent interbreeding of the races. He contributes the basis of his beliefs to the writings of HITLER but stated that many of the ancient philosophers preached the same white supremacy philosophy. He believes that interbreeding of the races will eventually lead to the degeneration of our society and its eventual downfall.

DRAGER stated that in the event the political system fails as a means for the right wing groups in this country to save the country from its external and internal enemies, then any other means necessary will be used to achieve their goals. He feels that if the Government will not act to save the country then right wing organizations must act to do so.

DRAGER stressed the danger of an internal enemy in the form of an overly suppressive Government that would no longer act for the well-being of the average white American. Although he stated again that the right wing extremist organizations will attempt to gain power by legitimate political process, if this process should break down any method, including that of violence, would be used to accomplish their goals. He stated the targets of the right wing would be any suppressive

Government agencies or any left wing organization that would be doing the "bidding" of the suppressive Government in power. Additional targets of the right wing would include the United States Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service, and such organizations as the Jewish Anti-Defamation League, who although is not a Government agency, he feels it receives its authority to act from the Government.

DRAGER agreed that to succeed in the violent overthrow of the country a supply of weapons and ammunition would be necessary. He stated he knows of no right wing organization who currently has a stockpile of weapons and advised that the source of weapons at the right time would be the United States military establishment, whose leaders and white members he predicts will join his cause when it is time for action. Although he has heard that the Minutemen organization was stockpiling weapons, he has no evidence that that organization currently has any large supply of weapons in its possession.

He stated that he also felt that all the State units of Government will join his cause at the right time and that they will revolt against the suppression placed on them by the Federal Government. He feels that even personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will join his cause because of their basic conservative beliefs and because of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's concern for the good of the country. He feels that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is now only a "pawn" of the Justice Department from which it receives its orders.

DRAGER continued to state his personal philosophy concerning the power and influence exerted by the Jewish population in this country. He considers the total Jewish control on the American political system to be the greatest internal threat present today in our system. He believes that the Communist movement, all racial organizations, and all liberal left wing organizations operating in this country are tools of the Jewish population in the United States. He predicts a complete economic takeover by the Jewish segment of our society. As examples of the extent of the Jewish control in this country, DRAGER uses the appointment of HENRY KISSINGER as Secretary of State as well as the fact that the NIXON administration is controlled by his high-ranking Jewish advisors and by political contributions furnished by the Jewish population in this country. He also stated that all sectors of the news media are controlled by Jews and that they directly control all newspaper publications either by direct ownership or by controlling the advertising that newspapers need for their survival. In addition, he pointed out that the three major radio-television networks are all headed by Jewish individual and as such they are able to direct public broadcasting to benefit their own views and the views of the Jewish segment of our society. DRAGER further stated that this great influence exerted by Jews in this country will eventually lead to the degeneration of our society unless their activities are stopped by actions from the right wing.

DRAGER stated that as a result of his travels throughout the country he has coordinated activities between the various right wing groups to such a degree that all that is needed for them to act in unison would be the right conditions to exist in this country. He feels that his activities are currently peaceful in nature and that he is determined to work within the present political system for change, but if conditions should become too suppressive toward the average white citizenry in this country, then a time for action will be at hand and if a violent revolution is necessary to bring about change, it will be used. When it is time for action DRAGER predicted a unification of all the right wing organizations in this country for the good of the common man.

DRAGER admitted that he confines his activities and travels to the area east of the Mississippi River and that he feels that the West is organized enough. He did admit to having spoken in the past in Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Toledo, and Columbus, Ohio, and Chicago. He again declined to comment further regarding his activities or individuals he may have been in contact with during his travels since leaving New Jersey.

DRAGER refused to comment on any aliases he may use or upon the various identifications found in his possession at the time of his arrest in the names of DENIS DEAN RITTER - WAYNE JOSEPH HANSEN, RICHARD P. LILORO, ROBERT WHITFIELD CROUSE, HARLEY RAY MALCOLM, and WILLIAM ERICK CORNELL.

The following information concerning DRAGER was obtained through interview and observation:

Name:	FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, JR.
Race:	White
Sex:	Male
Date of Birth:	February 4, 1940
Place of Birth:	Trenton, New Jersey
Height:	5'11"
Weight:	185
Build:	Stocky
Hair:	Brown
Eyes:	Blue
Marks and Scars:	1" scar above right eye; scar lower right underside of forearm; tattoo of dog on upper left arm
Residence:	Claims no permanent residence, admitted to traveling throughout the country in a camper truck
Telephone:	Unlisted number but declined to furnish
Occupation:	Chef, printer, lithographer
Employment:	Unemployed
Previous Employment:	Chef, Ocean Reef Club, Key Largo, Florida; admitted being a purchasing agent for a chemical company owned by Jews in New Jersey
Education:	Two years college, Omaha, Nebraska University (later admitted four year degree from Omaha University and admitted taking correspondence in law from both Harvard and the University of Southern California)
Marital Status:	Single
Family Members:	Mother - In New Jersey, declined to give name or address; Brothers - ROBERT and RAY DRAGER, who live at 1214 East Franklin, Trenton, New Jersey; JOHN DRAGER, Trenton, New Jersey area
Social Security Number:	139-30-1035

Military:	Air Force service number 217-804-09. Admitted service United States Air Force August, 1958 - August, 1960, and served as an air policeman, Strategic Air Command, Omaha
Arrests:	Admitted multiple arrests in the past, most recent being in Orange County, New Jersey, September, 1973.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 2/21/74

THOMAS CHARLES MEDDAUGH was interviewed while incarcerated in the Sangamon County Jail, Springfield, Illinois. He was furnished the identity of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview. He furnished the following information. Chas

MEDDAUGH stated that FRANK DRAGER has been a long-time friend of the family and was his legal guardian for approximately four years until he reached his 18th birthday in December, 1973. His family was originally from the New Brunswick, New Jersey area and DRAGER is from the Trenton, New Jersey area.

He stated he has been traveling with DRAGER in DRAGER's camper truck since October, 1973, at which time DRAGER came through Daytona Beach, Florida, on his way to the Florida Keys area. He advised since that time they have spent time in Marathon, Florida, Key West, Florida, Key Largo, Florida, and the Everglades area of Florida. His last employment was as a cook at the Ocean Reef Club, Key Largo, Florida, for approximately a two week period in December, 1973.

MEDDAUGH stated he and DRAGER left Florida approximately two weeks ago en route to the West Coast and that they traveled through Alabama, Tennessee, Arkansas, and were somewhere in Colorado when they decided to return to New Jersey. He stated they were stranded somewhere in Alabama for five days because of the gasoline shortage but he does not recall the exact city in Alabama. Upon reaching Colorado, DRAGER was in telephonic contact with his lawyer in New Jersey and after that conversation he decided to return to New Jersey to take care of a local pending matter in Toms River, New Jersey, resulting from a September, 1973 arrest.

MEDDAUGH stated that he believes in white supremacy and considers himself to be anti-semitic but he denied having been or currently being a member of any right wing extremist organization. He does not personally believe that that type of organization is operating effectively in this country and that very few people actually believe in or are persuaded by their philosophy. He stated DRAGER is not currently active in any right wing organization but he does know that he was

Interviewed on 2/19/74 at Springfield, Illinois File # SI 157-4275

SA MICHAEL G. GOERGEN
by SA WILLIAM A. [illegible] MGG/cmm Date dictated 2/20/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

formerly Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan organization in New Jersey. He further stated that he has never been present at any meeting of any right wing organization nor does he know if DRAGER has attended any meetings or has contacted any leaders of right wing organizations during their travels.

He stated he knows no one in the State of Illinois and that DRAGER was not on his way to any meeting in Illinois at the time of their arrest in Springfield. They had only stopped overnight en route to New Jersey.

MIDDAUGH advised that they had approximately $250 when they left Florida but DRAGER had friends all over the country that would supply them with food and financial backing if necessary. He declined to name any of these individuals, claiming he had never met any of them. He stated DRAGER has an aunt in New Jersey who would occasionally wire them funds. He does not recall her name.

MIDDAUGH also stated that DRAGER has a telephone number located somewhere in New Jersey that he periodically calls for messages and other information. He claimed he does not know the number nor the individual who DRAGER calls.

MIDDAUGH stated that DANIEL BRODERICK was a friend of DRAGER's who was traveling with them for a short time in Florida. The last time he saw BRODERICK was in the Florida Keys area and he believes that he has currently returned to New Jersey.

MIDDAUGH denied knowing a DENNIS DEAN RITTER, Toledo, Ohio, and denied knowing anything about the false identification and false vehicle titles found in DRAGER's camper at the time of their arrest.

The following information concerning MIDDAUGH was obtained through observation and interview:

Name:	THOMAS CHARLES MIDDAUGH
Alias:	CHUCK
Race:	White
Sex:	Male
Date of Birth:	December 17, 1955
Place of Birth:	New Brunswick, New Jersey
Height:	5'7"
Weight:	130

Build:	Slender
Hair:	Brown
Eyes:	Hazel
Marks and Scars:	Tattoo of a cross on left forearm
Residence:	Rural Route 2, Daytona Beach, Florida
Occupation:	Cook and welder
Employment:	Unemployed
Last Employment:	Ocean Reef Club, Key Largo, Florida
Education:	12 years high school
Marital Status:	Single
Family Members:	Father - RICHARD MEDBAUGH Mother - ROSE MEDBAUGH Rural Route 2 Daytona Beach, Florida
Selective Service:	Classified III, registered Daytona Beach, Florida
Arrests:	Admitted several arrests in New Jersey as a juvenile

On March 1, 1974, DRAGER and CARROLL were released on bond from the Sagamon County Jail. The subject's vehicle, a 1970 Ford pickup truck, with a camper truck unit, was left by DRAGER at the Sheriff's Impound Lot.

On March 6, 1974, NK T-2 advised he obtained information that FRANK DRAGER had visited ROBERT DE PUGH, Titular, Head of the Minutemen Organization, in Norborne, Missouri.

> The Minutemen organization was organized in 1960, reportedly to resist the spread of communism in the United States by use of guerrilla tactics. Robert B. DePugh, national coordinator of the Minutemen, was sentenced in October, 1970, for violations of the Federal Firearms Act. At the time of his arrest DePugh was in possession of documents concerned with guerrilla warfare and other paraphernalia, including hand grenades, gun silencers, and a machine gun. DePugh was released on parole during April, 1973, and in June, 1973, indicated he planned to revitalize the Minutemen into a "two-armed organization". Arm number one was to be utilized as a political front organization to sway elections and control local and state political structures. Arm number two was to be an underground guerrilla organization made up of "strike teams". These "strike teams" are to be under direct control of DePugh and their existence is to be unknown to everyone, including Minutemen State Coordinators.

After leaving Norborne, DRAGER was arrested in Springfield, Illinois. DRAGER was scheduled to proceed to Columbus, Ohio to meet with JOHN GERHARDT, Leader of the American White Nationalist Party (AWNP) and was to continue to Reading, Pennsylvania, to meet with ROY FRANKHOUSER.

DRAGER was supposedly carrying a message from DE PUGH to GERHARDT and FRANKHOUSER. GERHARDT and his brother, ED GERHARDT, are leaders of the AWNP in Columbus, Ohio. The GERHARDTs and a JAMES THOMPSON were arrested for shooting the homes of school officials in Columbus, Ohio. JAMES THOMPSON allegedly turned stated witness against the GERHARDT brothers. The GERHARDT brothers contacted the Indiana coordinator of the Minutemen and ROY FRANKHOUSER to make plans to prevent THOMPSON's testimony and have discussed possible execution. FRANKHOUSER allegedly advised

GERHARDT he had a man who was unknown and could take care of THOMPSON. This individual is believed to be FRANK DRAGER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION~~

On March 7, 1974, Mr. DANIEL JAMES BRODERICK, Staff Quarters, Ocean Reef Club, North Key Largo, Florida, advised DRAGER and he have been long time friends having met in Trenton, New Jersey. BRODERICK stated DRAGER claims to be "acting dragon" in the Ku Klux Klan and was known to him to have close links with the United Klan Leader ROBERT SHELTON. He further advised DRAGER did carry some type of firearm with him on his person at most times.

~~CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION~~

On May 16, 1974, BRODERICK was recontacted by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the Ocean Reef Club, North Key Largo, Florida. At that time, he stated ROY FRANKHOUSER and DRAGER have a small arsenal of weapons, primarily automatic rifles. All or most part of these guns are stolen. The arsenal consists of three satchels, one belonging to FRANKHOUSER, the other to DRAGER and the third to both. Apparently only FRANKHOUSER knows their present whereabouts.

~~CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION~~

BRODERICK also stated that while in Florida City, DRAGER told him that he and CARROLL had stolen the checks made out to the Marathon Cay Sal Billfish Tournament and had been cashing them in the Florida Keys area. According to DRAGER, CARROLL committed the actual theft, while DRAGER waited in his truck nearby.

~~CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION~~

DRAGER also told BRODERICK, during that Florida City meeting, that he had purchased an automatic rifle in Miami.

On April 22, 1974, a tape cassette case with tape cassette inside was received at FBI Headquarters enclosed in a white envelope, bearing notation "20 April 1974; 85th birthday of Adolf Hitler; thought you guys might like to hear from us. FRANK DRAGER, WILLIAM CARROLL, National Revolutionary Army." The speaker on the tape claims to be FRANK DRAGER. An examination of the envelope by the Identification Division revealed three fingerprints of subject, FBI Numer 405-550-E. Copies of this tape was also sent to the "Trentonian Newspaper", Trenton, New Jersey, and the "United Press International", in New Orleans, Louisiana, as a press release for the National Revolutionary Army (NRA). This tape in transcript form is set forth below:

Transcript prepared from tape recording received at FBIHQ on 4/22/74 with speaker identifying himself as Frank Drager.
157-6908

"I had originally planned for this communication to be typewritten, but since I stole this tape recorder, I guess it's just as appropriate as a letter.

Clarence Kelley, Director of the FBI,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kelley:

I had always praised the thoroughness of the FBI, even though on scores of occasions you've permitted your paranoia and your lack of human understanding could foul you up. Your drooling excitement and your paranoic stupidity and your fruitless eagerness at having Frank Drager in your grimy grubs in Springfield, Illinois, make super idiots of the Federal Bureau of Integration. You now realize how many foolish errors you made. In the near future you will be employed by the new natural government of America rather than the Jew Justice Department and such stupidity will not be tolerated. How ridiculous for a gang of trained investigators to be fooled and beaten by a teenager. Have you idiots put all the pieces together yet? Whether or not you have, we both thank God for your paranoid stupidity for now we are free to continue tying together the few remaining loose ends which will permit the National Revolutionary Army to eliminate criminal Jewish control of America. Now our armies can continue to join forces to eliminate this alien enemy government. Continue your search for Frank Drager and Bill Carroll. It'll be useless and frustrating. If you are lucky enough to capture one of our soldiers in the future, beware, there's a speeding soft-nose for all of our enemies. Unfortunately, most fellow Agents are mercenaries. They are actually with us in spirit but they will still follow the orders of their Jewish superiors to attempt to detect and capture our people and unfortunately we will have to deal with these Agents ruthlessly until they realize that they are dominated and controlled by alien enemies of America and begin working on the side of right. At one time not too long ago we patriots were as useless as a bunch of foolish boobs and nothing going for us by idealistic goals

SERIALIZED FILED

Now our goals are within our grips and our armies are beginning to activate. A large segment of the left and the right are no longer shooting at each other. Yes, the fear of our enemies is now realistic. The bullets of all pro-American revolutionaries are aimed at the alien enemies in control and not at each other. Summer is near. Federal Agents beware. We mean business and we have the facilities not to be stopped. Your laws don't bother us; your jails don't scare us; and your bullets will be returned with more bullets. Your leaders have bankrupted our people, have starved them, and caused enough materialistic havoc that we now have the will of the people with us. Even the stupidist in America see through the grain shortages, fuel shortages, price gougings, meat shortages, work stoppages, and various other criminal corruption by the enemy aliens in control. America's masses are in the corner. Now just stand back and watch them come out shooting. When the smoke clears, America shall be the victor.

White Power."

"The following portion of this communication will be the only press release of the New Revolutionary Army. In future months, as our movement gains momentum, I wish for the press to understand what we are about rather than what the FBI tells them. There is a brief but somewhat inclusive listing of our program included.

The New Revolutionary Party herewith immediately declares that the present Government of the United States of America is an illegal confederation of aliens and enemies of the people of America. The New Revolutionary Army, its officers and followers henceforth secede from the United States of America until such time we may be able to restore a Government of the people, by the people and for the people and oust the enemy aliens now in control. Through force and violence and whatever means available to the NRA, we will totally, forcefully and quickly restore sanity to our American republic. We have adopted the American Constitution in its original form, revised the Bill of Rights, and eliminated or revised all the amendments to the Constitution. We have formed a national caucus of the hundreds of known and unknown political leaders whose present identity will remain anonymous, who at the time the enemy aliens perish or relinquish control, will immediately be brought before the American voter to seize popular control of vacant political offices.

We of the NRA are the people, we speak for the people, and we will violently eliminate America's enemies with the haste of a speeding bullet. The NRA has chosen for its spokesman a well-known adversary for the return of America to a natural social order. The revolutionaries of the NRA are ordered to maintain in every way possible or to avoid detection by the enemy, but are ordered not to deny their association if at such time they are detected by the enemy or captured. All NRA members and associates are instructed that if captured they are governed by the laws set at the Geneva Conference for captured soldiers and prisoners of war. This is by all means a declaration of war. The enemies of white America will fall like flies at a Raid party.

The following is a very brief synopsis of the goals of the NRA once we seize power.

#1. All non-whites immediately loose citizenship and prepare for repatriation.

#2. The Federal Reserve will be abolished and all illegal tender returned and it will be replaced with legal notes once citizenship is confirmed.

#3. Israel immediately declared an illegal enemy state.

#4. Immediate deportation of all Jews, either racial or religious.

#5. Income tax abolished. (Product) taxation and industrial support.

#6. Cancellation of the national debt immediately.

#7. Immediate elimination of foreign, Jewish and enemy control in banking and financing institutions.

#8. Immediate seizure of all properties and interests of all Jewish and/or enemies of America.

#9. Immediate reinstatement of a healthy racial standard. Interracial marriage will be illegal.

#10. Abolition of foreign aid until necessary determination can be investigated.

#11. Immediate release of all political prisoners presently being held by the enemy Government.

#12. Immediate and total revision of the judiciary system.

#13. Immediate reorganization and/or elimination of all useless Government agencies.

#14. Immediate and total reorganization of the welfare and all other give-away Government agencies.

#15. Immediate arrest and rapid trials of America's enemies and those persons who have willfully conspired to sell out America's working masses. Harsh punishments to those convicted.

#16. Protection by the Government of citizens against illegal seizure of personal property and monies by alien usurers.

#17. Right-to-work and receive a fair wage to helpfully maintain all citizens and their families.

#18. Immediate return to our original form of represented republic as described by the founding fathers.

#19. Immediate abolition of all unfair usury practices; i.e., unfair mortgage interest, etc.

#20. Immediate reorganization of the nation's unsatisfactory school system.

#21. Immediate return to the sovereign rights of states.

#22. Instant revision of the social security system to allocate appropriate relief immediately and henceforth to those elderly and needy citizens.

#23. Immediate abolition of all Government payoffs to corporations and farms for not producing or growing products and for ridiculous depletion payoffs.

#24. Immediate allocation to the formation of an agency to scientifically and objectively investigate thoroughly the harm and damages caused by various use of all drugs. Their rapid but thorough study will be presented to the American public, thus creating in some cases more liberal and in some cases more stringent laws governing the use of drugs.

A. Stiffer penalties for users of illegal drugs.

B. Harsher penalties for sales of drugs.

C. Death penalties for suppliers of forbidden drugs.

D. Abolition of drug give-away programs.

#25. Immediate reestablishment of a just law and order for the protection of all American citizens and the elimination of America's enemies.

This tape was prepared by Frank Drager for immediate shipment to the FBI. Copies are made by William Carroll and forwarded to the press services for immediate release. Frank Drager and Bill Carroll are both officers of the NRA and are presently being sought by the FBI.

White Power."

49

On June 11, 1974, NK T-2 advised he developed information that would indicate a meeting was held at the residence of AL LENTZ, Grand Dragon of the National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in the York, Pennsylvania area. In attendance, were numerous members of the Ku Klux Klan and Minutemen organization.

FRANK DRAGER was known to have been at this meeting. DRAGER outlined his plans for establishing an organization called the National Revoluntionary Army. DRAGER explained that the goals of this group were to "destroy" the United States Government and replace it with members of his own group. DRAGER was believed to have mentioned he contacted H. RAP BROWN, a black extremist, and other activist leaders and plans to united these various groups to achieve his goals.

DRAGER also indicated he had a large quantity of dynamite and plans to blow up two city blocks on July 4, 1974. DRAGER stated that he did not have blasting caps at that time but might be able to get them from a Minuteman member in Indiana.

DRAGER alleges to have traveled to various parts of the country and has urged members of the right wing to commit acts of violence on July 4, 1974, so that the NRA could take credit for these acts. The source was advised DRAGER exhibited four .45 caliber pistols, three .30 caliber carbines and one bolt action rifle at this meeting.

The source was further advised DRAGER braggs about his passing bad checks in Florida and his using stolen credit cards to purchase gasoline, food and lodging. DRAGER supposedly plans to obtain $200,000.00 in the near future and this might be accomplished through a kidnapping or bank robbery.

DRAGER further indicated sometime during the meeting that he would like to know how to make letter bombs.

On June 13, 1974, NK T-3 advised he learned a meeting was held at the home of ALBERT LENTZ, head of a small group called the Independent Ku Klux Klan of York, Pennsylvania. FRANK DRAGER was known to have been in attendance with six or seven other right wing sympathizers. At that meeting, DRAGER stated he plans to blow up two city blocks by placing dynamite in the sewer system of this city.

DRAGER also requested the group to cause incidents such as explosions on July 4, 1974, so a group he is forming called the NRA could take credit for it. DRAGER stated he was going underground and would use the code name GORMAN.

DRAGER was known to have stayed at AL LENTZ' residence from June 3, 1974 to June 6, 1974.

On June 15, 1974, NK T-2 advised that in conversation with a Ku Klux Klan member in Philadelphia, it was learned six or seven individuals met at the home of AL LENTZ, on June 5, 1974, in York, Pennsylvania. All in attendance represented a small group of independent Ku Klux Klan members and several Indiana representatives of the Minutemen. FRANK DRAGER was in attendance and discussed his plans for the forming of a group called "NRA" and the source also developed information that DRAGER was planing to blow up two city blocks on July 4, 1974.

On July 2, 1974, Mr. ROY FRANKHOUSER was interviewed by Special Agents of the FBI in the presence of his attorney. FRANKHOUSER stated he met FRANK DRAGER on June 7, 1974, at the Coach House Restaurant, 5th and Walnut Streets, Reading, Pennsylvania. FRANKHOUSER was brought to the restaurant by a JAKE (LAST NAME UNKNOWN) an associate of DRAGER's; however, JAKE was not present during this meeting. During the meeting, DRAGER wanted FRANKHOUSER's help in obtaining fuses for timing devices for explosives and requested further assistance in several projects. FRANKHOUSER stated he declined in both cases. DRAGER stated he had looked into the Gubow matter in Michigan, and indicated he and his group were going to kill Judge GUBOW. DRAGER stated he had been to Michigan and "cased" the judge's home. DRAGER stated he tried to contact the wife of Reverend ROBERT MILES, in Michigan, but she would not talk to him. DRAGER stated the only reservation he had about killing Judge GUBOW was whether or not it would effect the appeal of Reverend MILES.

It is noted Judge GUBOW is the Federal judge who sat in on the case involving Reverend ROBERT MILES, who was tried and convicted for the bombing of school buses in Pontiac, Michigan.

FRANKHOUSER stated DRAGER also stated he was going to take care of two FBI agents and mentioned the names CLONINGER (phonetic) and MIFFLIN (phonetic). DRAGER indicated he was going to "blow them out" and kill them. DRAGER also indicated he needed enough explosives to "level a one story building". DRAGER stated that at one point he was going to blow up an IRS building, but did not mention any specific location.

It is noted Special Agents of the FBI mentioned above are possibly identical to SAS BURL E. CLONINGER and CHARLES F. MOFFETT, who have worked Ku Klux Klan matters in the Trenton, New Jersey area.

FRANKHOUSER stated he accompanied DRAGER and they walked to the vicinity of 3rd and Walnut Streets, Reading, Pennsylvania, where a relatively new car was parked. DRAGER opened the trunk and FRANKHOUSER observed numerous handguns and rifles and believed there were explosives in the trunk. FRANKHOUSER could not furnish further description of this vehicle. DRAGER showed FRANKHOUSER the weapons to show them "we mean business".

FRANKHOUSER then stated that DRAGER indicated he had a "caper" planned that would meant $100,000.00. DRAGER did not further discuss the caper. FRANKHOUSER concluded on his own that the "caper" was possibly a bank robbery. FRANKHOUSER denied any specific knowledge regarding any bank robberies on DRAGER's part.

FRANKHOUSER stated he was contacted by DRAGER via telephone call on one occasion subsequent to June 7, 1974 meeting. At this time, DRAGER indicated two of his men had been arrested and the "caper" was delayed. This contact was about two days prior to DRAGER's arrest in New Jersey.

It is noted the New Jersey State Police made available a xerox copy of a parking ticket in the recovered 1973 Pinto, stolen by DRAGER on March 11, 1974, indicating he was ticketed on June 6, 1974, at 1:41 pm, in the vicinity of 4th Street, Reading, Pennsylvania, Ticket Number 18025, thusly verifying that DRAGER was in the Reading area on or about the date DRAGER and FRANKHOUSER had their clandestine meeting.

On June 14, 1974, Detective JOHN REYNOLDS, New Jersey, State Police, West Trenton, New Jersey, advised a WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL and a JAMES KEITH were arrested by the New Jersey State Police at Bordentown, New Jersey, when they were noticed to have illegally passed a stopped school bus on Route #206, at Columbus, New Jersey, and it was subsequently determined their vehicle was a stolen motor vehicle.

CARROLL when stopped, produced a driver's license for a WILLIAM R. JENKINS, 364 South Olden Avenue, Trenton, New Jersey. The arresting officer observed several other documents which appeared to be driver's license in the wallet of CARROLL, thusly arousing his investigative curiosity. The officer further noted a carbine protruding from a cardboard carton in CARROLL's vehicle. The Vehicle Identificatio

Number was put into the National Crime Information Center computers (NCIC) and it was determined this car was stolen from Lawrence Township, New Jersey, on March 11, 1974, by FRANK DRAGER, JR.

A further search of the vehicle revealed four pistols and two Ml .30 caliber carbines, numerous urban guerrilla mini-manuals, military handbooks, Nazi and Minutemen handbooks, camping gear, gas masks and chemicals.

The weapons were specifically noted to be as follows:

1. One Savage .32 caliber automatic, serial number 75190.
2. One Stoeger .22 caliber Luger automatic, serial number 363.
3. One .30 caliber carbine, Plainfield Machine Company, serial number 44837.
4. Colt pistol .45 caliber automatic, serial number 1883084.
5. Colt pistol .45 caliber automatic, Commander Model, serial number 70SC19183.
6. .30 caliber Ml carbine, United States Government, serial number 3329743.

A check with the NCIC computers failed to indicate any of these weapons as having been stolen property.

Also contained in the vehicle were numerous chemicals as noted below:

1. One bottle marked M-Hexane.
2. Two bottles of hydrochloric acid.
3. One bottle of Xylene.
4. One bottle of Nitric acid.

5. One glass distiller.

6. Rubber gloves.

7. Plastic tubing.

8. Amonia.

9. One red can marked motor oil.

These chemicals are presently in the custody of New Jersey State Police Laboratory, West Trenton, New Jersey.

On April 17, 1974, Detective JAMES HEWITT, Lawrence Township, New Jersey, Police Department, advised that their department had a warrant for the subject's arrest. He is charged with fraud for failure to return a 1973 Ford rental car, rented by DRAGER on March 11, 1974. On August 6, 1974, Mr. HAROLD LANG, Lang Enterprises, 209 Lawrence Road, Lawrence Township, New Jersey, owner of the Econo-Car Rental System, advised DRAGER rented a 1973 green Ford Pinto, bearing New Jersey plates YOK-300, on March 11, 1974. The vehicle was to be returned on March 18, 1974. DRAGER deposited $75.00 cash, and produced a New Jersey driver's license issued to FRANK A. DRAGER, JR., 214 East Franklin Street, Trenton, New Jersey, driver's license number D7151 26761 08404.

LANG advised he reported the car stolen to the Lawrence Township, New Jersey, Police Department, when the vehicle was not returned on March 18, 1974. LANG was then contacted by Detective HEWITT on June 19, 1974 and was advised he could pick up the recovered vehicle from the New Jersey State Police, at Bordentown, New Jersey. LANG made available the rental agreement which appears to be signed by DRAGER. During the three months the vehicle was gone, DRAGER totaled 16,509 miles having accured a bill totaling $2,393.71. On July 12, 1974, Special Agent RONALD DECKER, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Trenton, New Jersey, advised a trace of the abovementioned weapons seized on June 13, 1974, at Bordentown, New Jersey, were traced to their department which revealed the following information:

1. The Savage .32 caliber automatic, serial number 75190, was sold to Simmons Hardware Company, (no address noted) on October 23, 1912.

2. The Stoeger .22 caliber Luger automatic, serial number 363, was sold to OLAF WILLIAM AIKEN 1846 West Lake, Famimish Parkway, Bellvue, Washington. AIKEN was noted to be a white male, born October 17, 1939, at Webster, South Dakota. He is 5'8", 150 pounds, having Washington State License AIKENOW61PP. This weapon was purchased April 18, 1959, from the Seattle Sporting Goods, 4740 Rosenfelt Way, Northeast, Seattle, Washington.

3. The .30 caliber Plainfield carbine was allegedly purchased by FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, 100-101 Ocean Street, Marathon, Florida, on April 13, 1974.

4. Colt .45 caliber Commander, serial number 70SC19183, was last known to be owned by MARSHALL L. MC ELWANEY, 5635 Casmere, Warren, Michigan, on November 16, 1973. MC ELWANEY is a white male, born April 12, 1950, Detroit, Michigan, 6', 158 pounds, having Michigan driver's license number M245-585-497-285. He purchased this from Gell's Sporting Goods, 11557 12 Mile Road, Warren, Michigan.

5-6. The colt pistol .45 caliber automatic serial number 1883084 and the .30 caliber M1 carbine serial number 3329743, were determined to be United States Government weapons. The director of civilian marksmanship, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, advised they have no records reflecting these weapons were sold to civilians.

RON DECKER, Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms (ATF) advised these last two weapons are undoubtedly stolen but were probably stolen prior to the institution of NCIC and are not longer maintained on Government records.

James Keith

On July 1, 1974, JAMES EDWARD KEITH and WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL were interviewed by Special Agents of the FBI at the Burlington County Jail, Mount Holly, New Jersey, and neither subject appeared cooperative. On July 17, 1974, the subjects were re-interviewed and set forth is information obtained during the interview.

"TEX"

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/29/74

1

WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL, in-mate, Burlington County Jail, was made known the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the inquiry. CARROLL was advised of his Constitutional Rights and indicated he understood these rights but was unwilling to sign any forms indicating such or to sign any statements. CARROLL was advised that the interviewing agent was specifically seeking information regarding the activities of he and FRANK AUGUST DRAGER and a group called the National Revolutionary Army (NRA). CARROLL related the following information:

He stated he met FRANK DRAGER in the presence of a THOMAS MIDDAUGH prior to the summer of 1973. MIDDAUGH was described as his close friend and they both attended a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) rally in Upper New Jersey, at which time MIDDAUGH introduced him to DRAGER. DRAGER is known to be the legal guardian for MIDDAUGH. He was much impressed by the zeal and philosophy of FRANK DRAGER and immediately became his close friend and associate. Even though it was later learned by CARROLL that DRAGER was a homosexual, he decided to be tolerant of this fact and they would continue to travel together and expound their right wing philosophy.

He stated he felt he had quite a bit to do with FRANK DRAGER re-joining the right wing element. He stated that they talked a lot about how the right wing could change the country and felt they could work together as a highly proficient team. He stated that many of their activities were planned while they were high on marijuana.

James

Later that summer he and DRAGER were in Trenton, N.J., where he was introduced to one of DRAGER's best friends by the name of JIM BRODERICK. BRODERICK was known to have an extensive criminal record and at that time was dealing in marijuana. BRODERICK was also seen on numerous occasions with stolen checks believed to have been taken from the Trenton area businesses. He, DRAGER and BRODERICK left the Trenton area inasmuch as BRODERICK was involved in some way with a 200 pound marijuana buy which involved a shooting. CARROLL stated he did not know the specifics of this incident.

Interviewed on 7/17/74 at Mt. Holly, N.J. File # NK 157-2011

by SA CHARLES F. MOFFETT /mla Date dictated 7/23/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

They then went to the Jersey Shore where BRODERICK and DRAGER obtained employment at the Captain Courageous Bar. BRODERICK and DRAGER were known to have stolen numerous checks from the Captain Courageous Bar and passed these checks to obtain money to travel to Florida.

In September of 1973, he, DRAGER and BRODERICK were arrested in Toms River, N.J., in what he felt was a "set up". He stated he believed the FBI had made their presence known to the local authorities so the local authorities would arrest and harass them for the FBI. The three of them made bail and purchased 40 pounds of marijuana and left for Florida in FRANK DRAGER's camper truck. They took several jobs under assumed names, working as dishwashers and cooks. BRODERICK then took a job at the Ocean Reef Beach Club in Key Largo, Fla. He and DRAGER also worked there for a short time but were fired.

During this period of time, DRAGER purchased an M-1 Carbine and a .45 caliber automatic pistol while in Florida. He and DRAGER then travelled to New Orleans, where they made a drug buy and stole a .32 caliber handgun from a drug pusher on the New Orleans waterfront.

After making several right wing contacts, they left New Orleans and travelled to Springfield, Ill., to meet other right wing sympathizers. On their journey, they had met ROBERT SHELTON of the KKK and ROBERT DE PUGH of the Minutemen. SHELTON and DE PUGH promised ~~full~~ support for the NRA, which CARROLL stated was the same as the White Action Movement founded by DRAGER several years ago at Trenton, N.J. On their way to Springfield, they stopped at the residence of DON ZINN in Michigan. CARROLL indicated that during their travels they were constantly seeking weapons, ammunition, and manuals on ~~gorilla~~ guerrilla warfare.

While in Springfield, Ill., in February, 1974, they were arrested for possession of marijuana, burglary tools, and dangerous weapons. CARROLL again advised he felt the FBI had something to do with this arrest and expressed the thought that possibly DE PUGH was an informant or else the FBI had seen them with DE PUGH and followed them to the location of their arrest. CARROLL stated he used the identification of THOMAS MIDDAUGH inasmuch as he thought the FBI and the Florida authorities had warrants for he and DRAGER.

DRAGER obtained bail money for them and upon their release from jail they tried to obtain the camper truck back but were advised by the local authorities it was going to be used as evidence in their pending case.

Inasmuch as they had no transportation, they then hitchhiked from Springfield, Ill., to York, Pa., where they visited with AL LENTZ. They then proceeded to Trenton, N.J., and obtained a rental car which they did not return. CARROLL indicated they then left the Trenton area and went to Boston, Mass., in efforts to get him a driver's license. While in Boston they tried to cash several more Captain Courageous checks but were not successful, inasmuch as everybody required photographic identification.

After having left Boston, Mass., they travelled to Washington, D.C., and visited a SKYLER FERRIS (phonetic). They tried to obtain maps of the sewer system of Washington, D.C., from him. FERRIS was advised of their plans to bomb the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and at first FERRIS was not agreeable. FERRIS was then guaranteed that the local authorities would be advised of the bomb a half hour prior to its detonation on July 4, 1974. FERRIS was agreeable to this plan and supplied them with the diagram of the sewer system. FERRIS is further known to be a right wing patriot and supplied names of local patriots to DRAGER.

After departing Washington, D.C., they travelled to Florida and visited with an ORVILLE LIPPERT.

They then proceeded to Alabama where they registered the vehicle they stole in Trenton, N.J. They then travelled back to York, Pa., and saw AL LENTZ again. They visited several days with LENTZ and then returned to Trenton, N.J., where they looked up a JAMES KEITH, who is known to be a close friend of JAMES BRODERICK. They requested him to find them an apartment which they could rent for several weeks prior to their planned July 4 attempt to bomb the IRS, Washington, D.C.

KEITH, DRAGER, and he were going to the Florence Motel in Florence, N.J., to move into a room they had rented. DRAGER was dropped off at an Acme Market to buy groceries inasmuch as there was not room in the vehicle for the three of them and groceries. They were heading toward the motel to deposit their equipment and clothes when they were arrested by the New Jersey State Police for passing a stopped school bus. He stated he was going to shoot it out with the New Jersey State Trooper but became concerned when KEITH did not appear to go along with the idea. They were going to stay at the motel for approximately two weeks and then return to Pennsylvania and get dynamite from some patriots in Pennsylvania. If this plan was unsuccessful, they had planned to go to one of the Western States and obtain dynamite under the guise of future prospectors. He stated that the chemicals that were in the car at the time of his arrest were experimented with by he and DRAGER in efforts to make a bomb. These efforts were not too successful and thusly they decided dynamite would be a better method.

CARROLL advised the NRA is identical to the White Action Movement formed by DRAGER in 1970 in Trenton, N.J. He claims to have organized chapters all over the United States and Canada and these groups are composed of disgruntled right wing patriots who are not satisfied with the passive activities of the KKK and the Minutemen Organization. He claimed to have taken an oath and could not divulge who any of these other members are. He claimed this group is storing weapons and explosives and no chapter knows where the other chapter's weapons are.

CARROLL stated the NRA believes in doing anything necessary to support themselves while they are endeavoring to overtake the U.S. Government. The NRA believes in bank robbery, armored car heists, and cashing stolen checks. He said presently the NRA has no plans for political kidnappings. He stated all their members are instructed to die for the cause if necessary. The NRA has devised a code system whereby one member can contact another member without the Federal authorities knowing this is being done. He stated they have several training grounds throughout the East Coast and Mid-West areas and their men are being trained in the use of all kinds of weapons.

When specifically asked who other members of the NRA were, CARROLL refused to identify any of these members and it appeared as if possibly no members did, in fact, exist.

CARROLL advised JAMES KEITH, who was arrested with him in the stolen motor vehicle, was not a right wing Patriot and could not be trusted. KEITH's services were requested by DRAGER inasmuch as KEITH is a close friend of JAMES BRODERICK and was known to be active in criminal endeavors in the Trenton area. He and DRAGER believed KEITH might be able to financially help their cause.

CARROLL advised the NRA's philosophy was an incorporation of much of the thoughts of the KKK, Minutemen, and the American Nazi Party. He stated they were more revolutionary and would actively and ardently endeavor to overthrow the U.S. Government and replace it with the National Revolutionary Army. He expounded the philosophy that the NRA was anti-Jewish, anti-Negro, and anti-Catholic. The NRA is promoting the deportation of all non-native born Americans and the return of the Jews and Negroes to their homelands. He stated they were definitely against the Federal Income Tax, which is what led them to decide to blow up the IRS building in Washington, D.C. The NRA further advocates political assassinations if necessary. He stated that DRAGER had considered killing a Judge GUBOW in Michigan but decided not to inasmuch as the judge's death might hinder the appeal of Reverend BOB MILES who has been sentenced to prison by Judge GUBOW for the bombing of school buses in Michigan. CARROLL stated he and DRAGER have cashed numerous stolen checks throughout the U.S. to support themselves. He indicated DRAGER was possibly involved in an armed robbery in the Boston, Mass., area but then decided he did not want to talk further about this matter.

DRAGER had obtained numerous handguns and rifles while travelling throughout the U.S. Most of these weapons were purchased in the name of FRANK DRAGER, using identification DRAGER had obtained in his own name in Florida.

CARROLL was asked about his knowledge of a tape recording sent to ORVILLE LIPPERT in Florida, where DRAGER requests LIPPERT's assistance in returning his camper truck, which LIPPERT purchased from him, to his aunt EDNA GRABER in Trenton, N.J. In this tape, DRAGER identified himself to LIPPERT so that EDNA GRABER can purchase back this vehicle for DRAGER. CARROLL stated LIPPERT purchased this vehicle from DRAGER for $1.00. LIPPERT went to Springfield, Ill., and obtained the truck from the Springfield, Ill., police authorities. At the end of this tape, DRAGER makes reference to the fact he killed "two pigs", in Atlanta and one in Miami Beach but with zero publicity. DRAGER then states "watch out for the third pig." CARROLL advised the word pig referred to the barnyard type and not to police officers. He stated they obtained pigs which they killed and carried into a Jewish synagogue in Atlanta and one in Miami Beach. He stated in no way would he believe DRAGER would kill a police officer unless it was in self-defense.

The following description was obtained through observation and interview:

Name	WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL "JAKE"
Alias	William Jenkins
Race	White
Sex	Male
Nationality	American
Date of Birth	August 30, 1955
Place of Birth	Newark, N.J.
Address	206 Milltown Road East Brunswick, N.J.
Height	5'7"
Weight	140-150 pounds
Build	Thin
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Blue
Marital Status	Single

William Carroll

[illegible] Milldagger

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/29/74

1

JAMES KEITH, in-mate, Burlington County Jail, was made ~~known the~~ identity of the interviewing agent by a show of credentials and was advised the FBI was inquiring of him any information he had regarding the activities of WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL, FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, and a group called the National Revolutionary Army.

KEITH stated he has known FRANK DRAGER for approximately two years. He was introduced to DRAGER by a JAMES BRODERICK, who was described by him to be his best friend. KEITH advised he personally has no political philosophy, and more specifically is not involved in any form or phase with DRAGER or his right wing extremist activities.

On June 11, 1974, two days before his arrest with WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL, known to him as JAKE, JAKE and DRAGER appeared at his apartment at 125 Dye Street, Trenton, N.J., requesting his help in efforts to find an apartment. He stated BRODERICK had given DRAGER his address. DRAGER and JAKE stayed at his apartment for one night. DRAGER stated he needed a place to lay low for two weeks inasmuch as he planned to travel to Washington, D.C., to blow up the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) building at Washington, D.C. KEITH advised he felt DRAGER was a braggart and did not believe DRAGER would actually blow up the IRS Building. DRAGER stated that they were presently operating a stolen motor vehicle and were wanted by the FBI. KEITH stated he found an apartment on the corner of Hamilton and Chambers Streets in Trenton, N.J., but DRAGER refused this inasmuch as it was on the third floor rather than the first floor. That next evening, on the 12th of June, they visited a close friend of KEITH's by the name of VINNY RAMPONE, 545 Hamilton Avenue, and requested of RAMPONE a garage in which to hide the stolen motor vehicle. He stated he did not tell RAMPONE specifically the nature of the request inasmuch as he felt RAMPONE might call the police if he knew the car was stolen. KEITH advised he knew DRAGER had numerous weapons concealed in the vehicle. KEITH stated that he did not wish DRAGER and JAKE to stay with him, so he recommended they obtain an

VINCENT RAMPONE

Interviewed on 7/17/74 at Mt. Holly, N.J. File # NK 157-2011

by SA CHARLES F. MOFFETT /mla Date dictated 7/ 23/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

efficiency apartment at the Florence Motel in Florence, N.J. On the evening of June 13, 1974, he and JAKE dropped FRANK DRAGER off at a grocery store in the Florence, N.J., area, and as they were travelling to the motel they were arrested by the New Jersey State Police on a traffic charge. At the time they were stopped, CARROLL reached under the front seat and drew out a .45 caliber automatic and stated he was going to shoot it out with the trooper. KEITH told him he was crazy, inasmuch as JAKE did not even know why they were stopped. The officer advised them they had illegally passed a school bus and requested to see JAKE's identification. JAKE then handed the trooper a driver's license and the trooper evidently noticed JAKE had several other driver's licenses in his wallet. The trooper then apparently became suspicious and made them stand against the car while he looked around. The trooper then spotted one of the guns, placed them under arrest, and later determined the car to have been stolen.

KEITH stated he is a parole violator inasmuch as he has been arrested. KEITH indicated he had no involvement with DRAGER and JAKE and had requested he transfer to another jail inasmuch as his involvement with JAKE might get him into further trouble.

He stated that in his conversations with JAKE while in the Burlington County Jail he has determined the following information:

DRAGER and JAKE had received a map of the diagram of the sewer system in Washington, D.C., from a friend of DRAGER's who works for the Sewer Department in Washington, D.C. JAKE and DRAGER indicated they were going to blow up the IRS Building in Washington, D.C. It was also determined that DRAGER has dynamite and guns buried on a farm, which is in Pennsylvania. The name GEORGE HOUSER was mentioned in reference to this farm. JAKE had indicated he and DRAGER had gone to the Boston, Mass., area and possibly were involved in a bank robbery. JAKE and DRAGER had pre-arranged plans to make an escape at any courthouse the other one was to appear if apprehended. A person by the name of DE PUGH was to have gotten a copy of the sewer plans of Washington, D.C., from FERRIS. A RAYMOND DOERFLER from Trenton, N.J., went to a Ku Klux Klan meeting at Rising Sun, Md., in efforts to get money for FRANK DRAGER's bail and further monies in efforts to help DRAGER purchase his camper truck from a ORVILLE LIPPERT.

It is further noted ROY FRANKHOUSER, Reading, Pa., is believed to use the code name "RALPH". FRANK DRAGER and JAKE had planned to rob a bank and had considered also an armored car robbery.

JAKE had mentioned on several occasions a training grounds used by the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) for the purpose of the invasion of Cuba and the NRA claims support from the Cuban underground. The NRA supposedly plans to invade Cuba on July 4, 1976.

It was further learned that the camper truck, which is a home-made camper and in the possession of ORVILLE LIPPERT, was designed specifically to be used in smuggling guns across the Canadian border. The walls of the camper truck have secret compartments and DRAGER is supposed to have a gun contact in Canada. Presently there are believed to be two 9mm. lugers located somehwere in the camper body. JAKE also stated DRAGER has a close friend who is affiliated with the Ford Motor Company as an inventor. This individual is an excellent machinist and has made numerous silencers for the right wing element.

KEITH advised he did not condone the right wing activities of JAKE and DRAGER and stated he would help the FBI in any way possible.

Inasmuch as DRAGER and CARROLL have been in possession of identification, i.e., driver's license, Social Security cards and Selective Service cards and etc., of known friends and acquaintances, interviews were conducted to determine how DRAGER was in receipt of the identification of WILLIAM R. JENKINS, 364 South Olden Avenue, Trenton, New Jersey, VINCENT RAMPONE, 545 Hamilton Avenue, Trenton, New Jersey, and RAYMOND DOERFLER, 549 Center Street, Trenton, New Jersey. Set forth are the results of these interviews:

md. RAY DOERFLER

FD-302 (REV. 11-27-70)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 8/12/74

1

Mr. WILLIAM R. JENKINS, 364 South Olden Avenue, Trenton, N.J., was interviewed regarding his knowledge involving his identification papers being found on a WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL when CARROLL was arrested on June 13, 1974, by the New Jersey State Police at Columbus, N.J.

JENKINS initially advised he had no knowledge as to how WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL could be in receipt of his driver's license and Social Security Card. He stated he had lost his wallet several months back and did not know its whereabouts. At that time, it was pointed out to him that CARROLL was a travelling companion of FRANK AUGUST DRAGER, and that DRAGER had had his White Action Movement Headquarters just two houses from the JENKINS' residence. At that time, JENKINS advised that he knew FRANK DRAGER and related the following information:

He stated that early in the Spring of 1974 he saw FRANK DRAGER in a camper truck with Pennsylvania tags across the street from his residence. DRAGER had spotted him coming home from school and pulled over to talk to him. DRAGER had stated that he was wanted by the FBI and needed phoney identification. JENKINS advised he could not help him and could not supply any information how he might obtain such.

JENKINS then advised that around the first of June, 1974, he again met DRAGER in the front of his residence and DRAGER, at that time, was driving a green Ford Pinto believed to have Florida license plates. Again DRAGER requested false identification, and JENKINS advised he could not supply him with any. JENKINS then noticed his driver's license was about to expire and asked DRAGER to take him down to the Department of Motor Vehicles, Trenton, N.J., where he could obtain a new license. JENKINS then stated he must have accidently lost his wallet in DRAGER's car when they were returning from the Department of Motor Vehicles. Again DRAGER indicated he was wanted by the FBI and local police authorities. He stated he was only passing through Trenton and was not staying in the area.

Interviewed on 7/31/74 at Trenton, N.J. File # Newark 157-2011

by SA CHARLES F. MOFFETT /mla Date dictated 8/6/74

ment contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; ontents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

JENKINS advised he also observed a .45 caliber automatic handgun in a holster which was shown to him by DRAGER. DRAGER also indicated he was wanted for a comspiracy to blow up something but DRAGER was not more specific about this charge. DRAGER also mentioned he was wanted for passing bad checks in several states.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 8/13/74

1

VINCENT RAMPONE, 545 Hamilton Avenue, was interviewed regarding any knowledge he may have as to how WILLIAM ERIC CARROLL was in possession of RAMPONE's driver's license and Social Security Card.

RAMPONE advised he is a close friend of JAMES KEITH, known to him as TEX, and on the evening of June 12, 1974, KEITH and JAKE visited his apartment. They stayed there for several hours talking about things in general.

JAKE then began to go off on a right wing tangent and talked about "niggers and how they should be sent back to Africa." RAMPONE told KEITH that this individual was not welcome in his house inasmuch as he, RAMPONE, did not advocate the right wing program. At that time KEITH stated a FRANK DRAGER needed a garage to park his car. RAMPONE then realized DRAGER was also a right wing extremist and declined this request. He stated that at that time JAKE had access to his bedroom and bathroom and possibly obtained some of this identification at that time. RAMPONE showed his original driver's license and indicated the only thing JAKE could have obtained was an old temporary driver's license which was probably laying on his dresser.

Interviewed on 8/1/74 at Trenton, N.J. File # NK 157-2011

by SA CHARLES F. MOFFETT /mla Date dictated 8/7/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (REV. 11-27-70)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/29/74

1

Mr. RAYMOND DOERFLER, 549 Centre Street, Trenton, N.J., voluntarily appeared at the Trenton Resident Agency of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and advised he was a close friend to FRANK AUGUST DRAGER. He stated he and DRAGER had been active together over the past several years in matters involving the activities of the National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Bucks County, Pa. DOERFLER advised he is presently a leading officer of the Bucks County Chapter.

DOERFLER advised that inasmuch as FRANK DRAGER has appeared ultra-radical in his right wing activities and has been committing many criminal violations, DOERFLER felt it was in the best interest of the Klan if they would separate themselves from any of DRAGER's activities.

On March 12, 1974, DRAGER contacted DOERFLER at DOERFLER's place of employment, The Pennington Furnace, Pennington, N.J., and asked DOERFLER to supply him with phoney identification. DRAGER stated the green Ford Pinto he was drivingwas stolen and he had plans of leaving the State of New Jersey. DOERFLER stated that DRAGER was in the company of a young white male known to him by the name JAKE. It was also noted that several weapons were observed in this vehicle.

DOERFLER said to DRAGER he could not supply him with any phoney identification, and more specifically could not give him his.

DOERFLER was told by DRAGER that he, DRAGER, was going to leave the area and head toward Penndel, Pa., to meet a FRED SHAFFLER at the Lantern Inn in Penndel. SHAFFLER is known to be employed at Fernell's Auto Body in Levittown, Pa.

Interviewed on 7/17/74 at Trenton, N.J. File # Newark 157-2011

by SA CHARLES F. MOFFETT /mla Date dictated 7/23/74

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SKYLAR/FERRIS

D.C.

On June 27, 1974, Mr. SCHUYLER DAVENPORT FERRIS, 2903 Brook Drive, Falls Church, Virginia, was interviewed by Special Agents of the FBI. He stated he continues his employment with the District of Columbia Government, where he checks on and takes remedial action concerning sludge buildup where sewage pipes enter the Potomac and Anacostia Rivers in the Washington, D.C. area. FERRIS related anyone claiming to be an engineer or to acting on behalf of an engineer, may obtain free copies of diograms of water and sewer systems of Washington, D.C. area, by contacting Third Floor of the District Building, 12th and Pennsylvania Avenues, Washington, D.C. FERRIS denied having furnished any such documents to anyone and emphasized that anyone could obtain these diograms. FERRIS was asked if he had knowledge of any plans to disrupt water or sewer systems in any major cities and he denied knowing of any such plans. On June 30, 1974, FERRIS telephonically contacted the FBI and advised Special Agents that he desired to provide additional information in connection with his interview as conducted on June 27, 1974. He stated that the defense plans for the City of Chicago, Illinois, are available on request from that City Government and that they show the water and sewer systems. FERRIS stated he has maps of Washington, D.C., water and sewer systems which he uses in his work for the District of Columbia, but has never furnished same to any individual or group nor has he ever been requested to obtain this information.

FERRIS was asked if he had recently had any personal contact with persons from out-of-town who share his same political beliefs. FERRIS then volunteered he had seen FRANK DRAGER earlier in June 1974. After DRAGER telephoned him at his home, DRAGER requested and obtained from FERRIS a list of names and addresses of persons described by FERRIS as "patriots". He would not elaborate further on this but described DRAGER as a worthless "bragger and fink", who was recently arrested in Illinois and was thereafter released on personal recognizance whereas ROY FRANKHOUSER, described by FERRIS as another patriot, had to post $100,000.00 bond for his release from jail. FERRIS stated that DRAGER made no reference to any proposed distruction of any city on or about July 4, 1974 and FERRIS denied having any such discussion with DRAGER or anyone else. FERRIS stated he does not know if DRAGER would participate in any such scheme and felt certain that "no right wing patriot" would participate in any such act of violence.

On July 2, 1974, Mr. JAMES C. ROBERTSON, Director, Engineering and Construction Administration, Department of Environmental Services, District of Columbia Government, Room 309, Prudential Building, 415 12th Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C., was interviewed and it was determined that ROBERTSON's office maintains for distribution 1/1000 scale maps of the entire District of Columbia sewer system and 1/1000 scale maps of the entire District of Columbia water system. These maps are for persual and available free of charge to persons having a valid reason but are not given away indiscriminatly because of the cost. These maps have no dimensions and show no detail except in a very general way. There is no record maintained of the distribution. ROBERTSON advised the system is coded to the map described above relating to detail map with scales of 1 inch to 100 feet and 1 inch to 50 feet, showing the exact locations of the water mains, the connections and valves. The maps are available primarily to architects preparing building plans. He stated to obtain copies of the detailed maps, the District of Columbia Government requires a release to limit the liability of the district in the event of a law suit.

On July 30, 1974, Mr. HASKELL L. COUNTS, Chief, Construction and Engineering Division, Department of Environmental Services (DES), Government of the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C., was interviewed. Mr. COUNTS stated that DES maintains for its own use and the use of a limited number of others having a need for them, 1 inch to 1000 feet scale maps of the overall water and sewer system of the District of Columbia. He said that blueprints scaled 1 inch to 50 feet or 1 inch to 100 feet can be obtained from DES for specific locations throughout the district. The blueprints show exact locations of sewers, water mains, valves, connections, etc., and generally are available to contractors and others having a need for them. COUNTS advised that SCHUYLER DAVENPORT FERRIS, who is employed by the Construction and Engineering Division, DES, as a member of a survey party concerned with the city water and sewer system, would have access to both maps of the overall water and sewer systems and detailed blueprints for specific locations in the District of Columbia.

On September 3, 1974, Mr. ALBERT P. LENTZ was interviewed at his employment, Quaker City Paper, 300 North Sherman Street, York, Pennsylvania, by Special Agents of the FBI. LENTZ stated that DRAGER stayed with him at his residence 330 North Street, York, Pennsylvania, during the first week of June. He stated that DRAGER had several guns in his possession at that time. LENTZ advised that there were other Klan type individuals from Indianapolis in attendance while DRAGER was there, and they and DRAGER held secret discussions towhich LENTZ was not privy. LENTZ advised that he never heard DRAGER talk about bombing but knows that DRAGER was talking big about going underground. LENTZ advised that no one in his group favors "weatherman tactics" and that if he had learned of a bombing plot, he would have contacted Captain MC CAFFERY, of the York, Pennsylvania, Police Department, before he would have allowed destruction or killing. Regarding DRAGER's claim to bomb the city on the Fourth of July, LENTZ advised he never heard such plans and regards DRAGER as a blow-hard. LENTZ said he has a news letter from DRAGER dated 1972 where DRAGER claims to be underground.

On June 13, 1974, a search of the 1973 Pinto, stolen by DRAGER on March 11, 1974, produced the following type pages apparently prepared by CARROLL describing the NRA, the formation of an NRA cell, a message to the Left, though CARROLL speaks, Commandant Reports, official position on non-whites, and letter to the Director of Federal Bureau of Integration.

Frank Drager and Bill Carrol have built a small but well armed Army during the past [illegible] consisting of persons [illegible] had become dissident with membe[illegible] in various above ground [illegible]anisations.

While on a National tour visiting various leaders in both the Right and Left Wings, Frank and Bill found themselves well received by most factions and found that the support had become overwhelming in favor of a true Rightist Revolutionary underground. Unfortunately many leaders were not personally contacted because the Federal idiots briefly interrupted our tour with some minor phony harassment charges. Those of you who had not been contacted have probably already heard of our many exploits into the enemies camp and understand exactly what we have in mind.

We were able to "set up" quite a system around the Nation amoung our Revolutionary Conrads before our capture in Illinois and we have been free to continue our efforts since that time. Being wanted by several States and the Federal Government has to some degree hindered our Revolutionary efforts but our accomplishments in the past several months have been overwhelmingly satisfactory to us and alarming to the Feds.

In the very near future you will begin to hear much more about the National Revolutionary Army. You shall hear of and read about Revolutionary exploits and many co-ordinated efforts in several States at the same time. We are now capable to act in nearly every State at the same time. We have the weapons and technology and our present strength will soar as our feats occur with more frequency.

Some of our feats (Such as killing pigs in Satans Temple) will appear to accomplish nothing but we do still need the enemies paranoid fright to assist us to reach our end goal.

The Revolutionaries in the N.R.A. do not consider themselves the new leaders of our holy movement, we are merely Actionaries who will co-ordinate the inevitable Revolution.

Our Soldiers will operate in total secrecy and anonomidity except for such times they might unfortunately be detected by the enemy and at that time they shall openly proclaim the very same things that we publicly proclaim.

We are operating in "cells" of between 4 and 10 men and women and no "cell" knows of the existance or leadership of another "cell". There are 5 persons in 5 separate sections of North America who know all the "cell" leaders and are capable to co-ordinate Action if any of the National Staff are captured by the enemy.

We will gather our finances by taking by force the enemies money. We will rob banks, kidnap, forge checks, float credit cards and generally extort our financial existance from our wealthy and influential enemy. Our enemy is the Jew our present Government is the Jew.

Can we change all this? Yes and the N.RA. will.

We will bring their tot[illegible]itarian Economic dictato[illegible]ip to its knees and replace it with a healthy system as prescribed by our founding Fathers and return to the Constitutional free Republic that this was meant to be.

We will not rest until every traitor to our system is eliminated and the Communist and Zionist World conspiracy to dominate the White Race is rendered useless.

When we see the Communist clenched fist, we will cut it off. When we see the Zionists star of david it will enrage us to attack. When we see the jew nose, we will be looking down the sites of our rifles.

When we find a Government enemy within our Range we won't hesitate to lite our fuces.

Enemies Beware, the N.R.A. is playing for keeps.

FORMATION OF CELLS

If you are of a true "[illegible]htist" Revolutionary nat[illegible]e, do not hesitate to form an NRA cell of your own. Committ Revolutionary Acts, Rob Banks and if it was done in the spitit of the White Racial Movement, we will accept credit for it and in all probability contact and recruit you into the "inter-circle" of our Movement.

It will be rather difficult from this point on to contact us because we are already in permanent hideouts which we refer to as Camps. We don't mix with the public and only leave our Camps to commit a Revolutionar act.

But if you should decide to be one of us, in all probability some one in your area is already a member and we could arrange for a contact.

We have a code system set up throughout North America so that we can stay in continual contact with our Comrads and I rather doubt the Feds will ever be able to break our system.

Beware if you are an enemy agent yourself. We have in our possession a lie detector, sodium pinethol, the technoligy to use this equipment and the ways and means of eliminating enemies.

We have many automatic weapons and chemicals for making high explosives and the technology for doing so. We have explosives which have been stolen over the years from various enemy camps We will buy and steal more automatic weapons and explosives and we will recruit more persons who have already stored away cashes of such. We have scopes, silencers and the contacts to get more. We have acids and other horifying goodies.

We don't intend being stopped and we have the materials necessary to avoid capture and to kill the enemy.

We are presently working on a device which can be remote controlled over a great distance which will horify the enemy with gigantic explosions. We are attempting to perfect a sound device which will blow up the enemies war devices at a safe distance. We are looking into the production of lazer equipment and shall have answers soon.

We are working with an anti-Communist group and shall perhaps have a safe foreign base within the next several months. This would even supply us with nuclear missles, etc. Wow!!!

MESSAGER TO THE LEFT

We have recruited into our ranks many persons and some leaders who have over the years worked for the so-called left in the United States. Once they looked into our philosophy and found that the philosophy that has been pumped into their brains over the past several years, they could not resist finding out more. Once the so-called leftist found out that they were lured into the leftist (Red) encampments with drugs, sex-and generally nothing philosophies, they were ready for us.

Once they lived with groups of non-Whites and drug addicts, they found that they wanted nothing to do with the Reds. Most dropped out, began to wonder, returned to Nature and health food diets and kept their ears and eyes open. When they finally discover the real Natural elements such as the great outdoors and what could be done for them by sticking to a health food or Natural diet, they never again could think seriously about the so-called leftist philosophy.

They became potention recruits for the Natural Movement. The movement which desires to return to the Natural State of things. The Government had become their enemy,The regular foods their poison, the left became a negative and impossible philosophy.

What next? They became Racists, dropouts and began to wonder in search of their next "high". Finally a "high" wasn't enough and the entire drug culture began to become a shadow of their past. Is there any hope they began to wonder. Then finally we came along. They read Hitlers Mein Kampf, Rockwells White Power, they talked to Nationalists and they found what they have been searching for for so long.

We invite people with so-called leftist leanings to thoroughly study our program--OBJECTIVELY. We invite leftist Revolutionarys to study our Positive Constructive Program and canpare it with their negativ destructive program.

Revolution without cause must cease. Join the Right side and fight for the Natural freedoms all mankind should desserv.

Why should the alien jew be the leader you follow? Why should the Spocks, Dellingers, Rubins, Hoffmans, Apthekers, Mailers, etc., tell you, White America what it is all about? Do you need the jew to lead your Revolution?

The left is not our enemy, the Right is not your enemy, The Government is OUR enemy and we must bring this jewish conspiracy called the Republicans and Democrate to its knees and replace it with a government of the people, by the people and for the people.

Through the many years of failure for the Right [illegible], no-one has succeeded in stoping the Zionist-jew-Communist Revolution that has taken place throughout the World. In this time the Politicians have deserted us, our Presidents have sold us out for more power for themselves and our money has been consumed by the very sows who are chewing away at our society.

Our cities are almost completely destroyed by junkies, queers and degenerates of in-imaginable sorts. There is the smell of a hospitol in the air, as a congloneration of sick people gather in the hearts of our once beautiful cities.

Most young people have just dropped out. They're not Communist, they are just nothing! What have we offered them for a replacement for Communism or Capitolism which has become subseviant to free enterprise and the master of our people rather than the vehicle to maintain freedom.

Our Youth are looking for something, as we all know, but they are right in the middle of a hugh power struggle in which every side is saying, "This is what you are looking for". Each side knows that Victory lies in the Youth so they must give the Youth a reson to fight and tell them who should be opposed. They are constantly hitting our Youth with negatives and rarely, if ever anything positive or constructive.

Now that our Youth have been supplied with nothing but negative philosophies and solutions from all sides, they've come up with a logical conclusion: That the World or at least Civilization as we know it is coming to an end so "To hell with it all and lets get what we want while we still can".

The common attitude of American people is; 'Who cares what is happening as long as it doesn't affect me personally"? When a group robs a bank or absconds with large sums of money, one might hear a law abiding citizen make the following statement: "Boy, what will they do next, wish I had all that money, I hope they don't get caught because it was a well planned robbery and so forth". Usually no cry of stop the theives, only sympathy. Recent noisy groups of anti-Civilization Reds have gotten the attention of the youth but not their sympathy because our noise making Reds do not have anything to offer them. Our Youth want more than noise and WE WILL GIVE IT TO THEM! We pledge to eliminate such noisy criminal Red gangs that now abound the entire state of California.

We must eliminate certain prädujuces in the Right Wing. I constantly hear Right Wingers paralelling Reds with long hair. If a youth group began calling all short haired people Nazis, few people would think much of that groups opinion. Because long hair came about due to a hugh left wing Campaign, does not mean that all long haired people are Reds. Making such rash statements not only separates our Youth from the Right Wing thus eliminating the remotest possibility of creating a conversation with the Youth but it also drives them even further from the Right side.

One single tropical plant has had more to do with the failures of Right Wingers to reach the Youth and the successes of the left to reach them than any other single issue that comes to my mind and that is Ma[illegible]uana. The Right Wing is [illegible] it and the left wing for it. The real purpose of Pot (now) is not as most Right Wingers believe, i.e., to destroy the minds of the Youth, but rather to separate Right Wingers from Pot smokers. The average person who indulges in a little Pot smoking is not a left winger but since most Right Wingers are anti-Pot, the probability of the two getting together is remote even though they might have the same basic political thoughts. Pot is political and more and more Right Wingers are beginning to take a more leisurly attitude at Pot smokers as they find their ranks dwindling.

If we allow things that are not basic issues to divide us, then we will surely loose. We cannot afford this. The Revolution is here and Victory is at hand. We are joining forces with other Nationalistic groups here and abroad. Many men have been waiting years for this time. Segments of the Right and left are joining forces. Many have lost their lives preparing for this day and we dnn't intend letting them down.

As a great man once said "THIS TIME THE WORLD".

Those of you who are fighting on our side, be it directly or indirectly, underground or above, let us strike only at the real enemy, the jew and the jew infested Government.

May reason be our guide, may our will be our strength, may our sacred duty to act in this way give us determination and above all my our faith protect our people.

Seig Heil, Revolution

William E. Carroll
Maj., U.N.R.A.
U.S.N.R.A.
Youth Commandant

North Eastern: Frank [illegible]rything going well, awai[illegible]g word from the council for planned activities. Four men busted for non-political charges, they'll be OK. Slight problem with two Connecticut units--seems like they've been infiltrated.

South Eastern: No problems, giving the Feds hell. No new units this month but existant units are all ready for action. Lets get going.

Central: Lots of Federal activity out here and we haven't been able to do much. Waiting for word on Nationally co-ordinated effort. Eleven new cells formed, find information enclosed. Good meeting last month, keep up the good work.

North Western: Apparently little or no Federal harassment. I think we are really in the clear out here. They still have little of no knowledge of the existance of our section.

South Eastern: A real political hot bed. Following your instructions to lay low until we can get our hands on the Red bastards getting all the publicity. [illegible] Can't hold the units down out here they're all after blood. Hope they don't begin doing things without permission or until our little National thing can be done.

Canada: Lots of excitment up here. Have made many in-roads with other groups and should really get Central Canada going good soon.

The New Natural Government of America fully recognizes that there has been considerable mis-treatment of the Non-Whites in America. We don't take any blame for it but we also do not get upset at our ancestors because of it.

It is our firm opinion that the cultures of the White and Non-Whites will never mix well. There will always be race hatred on both sides. Segregation did not work, Integration is not working which leaves us with one solution: Separation.

We think that the majority of Blacks would approve of separation and we know that the majority of Whites would also. The only real problem in a Separation program is where are the Separtees to go. There are Black movements who want a part of the United States and there are those who favor repatriation to Africa.

There are White organizations who approve of either or both plans and there are White organizations who favor genocide of the American Blacks.

We think we have come up with a plan which will eventually gain the support of both Blacks and Whites. We must remember that in a situation like this someone must always get hurt but we would like to do it with as little suffering ax possible.

It is a known fact that the majority of our penal institutions are overwhemingly populated by Blacks. It is a known fact that the majority of our Welfare program goes to the support of the Black Community. It is a fact that there are scores of Government agencies whose total financial allocation goes to the support of Blacks. Because of the amount of Black crime, at least a large percentage of our police are only necessary because the Blacks are there.

If we took the Billions of ~~[illegible]~~ tax dollars which now is allocated for the support of blacks and put those tax dollars to a constructive use, we could solve the problem without too much pain and suffering on either side.

If we would ernestly undertake the following project I think we can eliminate Racial hallocaust in America. We select a favorable section of Africa and begin to build a Community in which the Blacks of America could maintain a healthy society that could compete industrially with other Nations. On this piece of Real Estate in Africa we build several cities of the very highest quality. We construct enough Industrial centers and places of business so that all Blacks could be gainfully employed or etch a living. We supply their Government which will be elected by the Blacks themselves with enough know how and capitol to begin its operation. We supply each Black with enough money until such time he can get re-settled in his new land. We supply free transportation to Africa for all Blacks and any Whites they have married who wish to go with them.

We pledge to purchase any of the industrial products that the Black Nation produces. We have an armament agreement with the Black Nation [illegible] they won't fear attack from other nation and also supply them with enough arms to protect themselves from attack.

In other words, we give them what every person wants. A free society in Africa with the technoligy, know how and support to run their Nation as they see fit without interferance from the White Nations.

If this program could be ernestly and objectively examined by everyone, we feel such a program could easily be put into operation.

The Blacks are not our enemies even though sometimes it might appear as they are. The blacks have been the tools of the jewish conspiracy to foment Revolution for their eventual total military takeover of America.

The Blacks woke up when great men like Malcom X began telling them like it was. The great Malcom X was a thinker. He looked around and saw a jew at the head of every Black organization. He saw the do-nothing Black organizations were financed by the jew. He saw that these groups were going no-place. Then he looked at the Ghettos and discovered that the very same jew who was preaching Black freedom and equal rights was the liquor store owner, the owner of the rat infested tenements, The parasite who was sucking the Black blood while at the same time pretending to help them.

Yes, Malcom X saw it, the Blacks of today see it and even the Whites are beginning to see it in what the jew calls alarming numbers. Oh where oh where will you jews hide this time?

We've got to reach the Black, we've got to stop shooting at each other. The Black and White are not each others enemy in America. The Government is our enemy and the jew has taken over our Government.

Black Revolutionaries, this is an appeal to you to turn your guns toward the aliens in control of this screwed up society and work amoung your Ranks to adopt our program for the good of all Whites and Blacks in America.

The Naitional Revolutionary Army is the militant underground faction of an already existant Government who is ready and capable of seizing immediate power in the United States at the very moment the N.R.A. is successful in eliminating the enemy aliens now in Power.

The N.R.A. pledges destruction of the existant Government of the United States and a full return to a truly represented Government of the people, by the people and for the people.

There has already been a Revolution in America in the past 50 years but it was a silent Revolution. The Zionist jew and Russian Communist (usually one in the same) have told us repeatedly that they were going to take us without firing a single shot and they have succeeded to do so.

Yes, a world wide conspiracy of Communist athéistic jews have blatently crepted into the Government of the United States and with their power and money have continually brainwashed America into believing that they should rightfully maintain high Government positions. Even now there is a movement to eliminate still another portion of our holy Constitution and permit a foreign born to seek the Presidency of the United States. Of course we know the foreign born these creeps have in mind, it is that globe-trotting Israel born jew Zionist traitor to America Henry Kissinger

These foreign born jew, Communist and or Zionist creeps have almost totally brainwashed America with their Television and Newspapers. It is not unknown even to the average citizen that the T.V. and most newspapers are owned and or controlled by these alien enemy parasites.

These minipulators of money have taken total control of our economy and have created a depression like State whereas we are now so economically enslaved to them that they now run our every day life. The average working man is making much more money than he has ever made before but he is finding it increasingly difficult to put food on the table for his family. A created gas shortage has put the fuel prices so far out of reach that Americas working masses can no longer drive for pleasure and is cold in the Winter. Their created meat shortages put beef so far out of range that Americas families had to change their diets considerably. Of course they found they had to relax their rapid rising prices because the meat was rotting as America started shifting diets. Everything in our Economic system depends upon the jew minipulator.

Even our National debt has climed to a rediculous astronomical figure of 472 or more Billion dollars. Our gold reserves have dwindled to an all time low of 9 Billion whereas the interest on the National debt is several times higher than the money we have in reserve. Our interest on the National debt is higher than our National budget was in 1933. AND WHO DO WE PAY THIS INTEREST TO? To the damnable jewish world bank of course which is owned and controlled by theparasitical and egotistical Rothschilds.

Somewhere, U.S.A.
April___1974

Director,
Federal Bureau of Integration
Washington 25, District of Coons

Dear Mr. Kelly:

I've always praised the thoroughness of the F.B.I. even though, on scores of occassions you've permitted your paranoia and your lack of human understanding to foul you up. Your drooling excitement, your paranoid stupidity and your fruitless eagerness at having Frank Drager in your grimy grips in Springfield, Ill. made super idiots of the Federal Bureau of Integration. You now realize how many foolish errors you made.

In the near future you will be employed by the New Natural Government of America rather than the jew Justice Department and such stupidity will not be tolerated. How rediculous for a "gang" of "trained" investigators to be fooled and beaten by a teenager. Have you idiots put all the pieces together yet? Whether or not you have or have not, we both thank God for your paranoid stupidity, for now we are free to continue tying together the few remaining loose ends which will permit the National Revolutionary Army to eliminate criminal jewish control of America. Now our Armies can continue to join forces to eliminate this alien enemy government.

Continue your search for Frank Drager and Bill Carrol, xxx it'll be useless and frustrating. If you are lucky enough to capture one of our soldiers in the future,--BEWARE!!!, there is a speeding soft nose for all our enemies.

Unfortunately, most Federal Agents are Mercenary. They are actually with us in spirit but they will still follow the orders of their jewish superiors to attempt to detect and capture our people and unfortunately we will have to deal with these agents ruthlessly until they realize that they are dominated and controlled by alien enemies of America and begin working on the side of "Right".

At one time, not too long ago, we Patriots were as useless as a bunch of foolish "boobs" with nothing going for us but our idealistic goals. Now our goals are within our grips and our Armies are beginning to activate. A large segment of the "left" and the "right" are no longer shooting at each other. Yes, the fear of our enemies are now realistic. The bullits of the pro-America Revolutionaries are aimed at the alien enemies in control and not at each other.

The following is a t[illegible] of a tape sent to the F.. I.[illegible]and the news services in early April,[illegible]974.

The new Revolutionary Army herewith immediately declares that the present Government of the United States of America is an illegal confederation of aliens and enemies of the people of America.

The National Revolutionary Army (NRA), its officers and followers henceforth Seceed from the United States of America until such time we may be able to restore a Government of the people, by the people and for the people and oust the enemy aliens now in control.

Through force and violence and what ever means available to the NRA, we will, totally, forcefully and quickly restore sanity to our American Republic.

We have adopted the American Constitution in its original form, revised the Bill of Rights and eliminated or revised all of the Amendments to the Constitution.

We have formed a National Caucus of hundreds of known and some un-known political leaders whose present identities will remain anionomous, who at the time the enemy aliens perish or relinquish control, will immediately be brought before the American voter to seize popular control of the vacant political offices.

We of the NRA are the people. We speak for the people. And we will violently eliminate Americas enemies with the haste of a speeding bullit.

The NRA has chosen for its spokesman a well known adversary for the return of America to a Natural Social Order. The Revolutionaries of the N.R.A. are ordered to maintain secrecy in every way possible and to avoid detection by the enemy, but are ordered not to deny their association if at such time they are detected by the enemy or captured.

All N.R.A. members and associates are instructed that if captured they are governed by the laws as set forth at the Geneva Conference for captured soldiers and prisoners of war.

This is by all means a Declaration of War. The enemies of White America will fall like flies at a "Raid" party.

WHITE POWER

FRANK DRAGER AND BILL CARROL

THE FOLLOWING IS BASICALLY THE PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL REV* OLUTIONARY ARMY EXACTLY AS IT WAS RELEASED TO THE F.B.I. AND NEWS SERVICES IN EARLY [illegible]RIL 1974. IT IS ONLY A [illegible]IEF" VERSION OF SOME OF OUR GOALS AND AT A MUCH LATER DATE A VERSION WILL BE RELEASED THAT WILL TOTALLY AND THOROUGHLY EXPLAIN OUR POLITICAL PLATFORM.

1. All non-Whites loose citizenship and prepare for repatriation, i.e/ separated society until transportation can be arranged.

2. Federal Reserve abolished and all illegal tender returned and replaced with legal notes to those persons who are legal U.S. Citizens.

3. Israel immediately declared an illegal enemy State.

4. Immediate deportation of all jews--Racial or Religious.

5. Income tax abolished. Product taxation and industrial support for the National budget.

6. Immediate cancellation of the National debt.

7. Immediate elimination of Foreign, Jewish and enemy control of banking and financial institutions.

8. Immediate seizure of all properties and interests of all jewish and/or enemies of America.

9. Immediate re-instatement of a healthy Racial standard.

10. Abolition of foreign aid until necessary determination can be investigated.

11. Immediate release of all political prasoners presently being held by the enemy Government.

12. Immediate and total revision of the Judiciary system.

13. Immediate re-organization and/or elimination of all useless Government agencies.

14. Immediate re-organization and/or elimination of the Welfare and all other Federal "give away" Government agencies.

15. Immediate arrests and rapid trials of Americas enemies and those persons who have willfully conspired to "sell out" Americas working masses. Harsh punishments to those convicted.

16. Protection by the Government of citizens against illegal seizure of personal property and monies by alien users.

17. Right to work and recieve a fair wage to healthfully maintain alll citizens and their families.

18. XXX Immediate return to our original form of a Represented Republic as prescribed by our founding Fathers.

19. Immediate abolition of all unfair usery practices. i.e./ Unfair mortgage practices, etc.

20. Immediate re-organization of the Nations unsatisfactory school system. Estabishment of free education system and trade school and apprentice program.

21. Immediate return to the Soverign Rights of States.

22. Instant revision of the Social Security system to allocate appropriate relief immediately and henceforth to those elderly and needy citizens.

23. Immediate abolition of all Government "payoffs" to corporations and farms for not producing or growing products and for rediculous depletion payoffs. Total elimination of all Government price fixing but not necessarilly certain price ceilings and/or some controls to protect the public.

24. Immediate allocation to the formation of an agency to scientiffically and objectively investigate thoroughly, the harm and damages caused by various use of all drugs. Their rapid but thorough study will be presented to the American public thus creating in some cases more liberal and in other cases more stringent laws governing the use and sale of drugs.

- a. Stiffer penalties for users of illegal drugs.
- b. Harsher penalties for sales of drugs.
- c. Death penalties for suppliers of forbidden drugs.
- d. Abolition of drug "give away" programs.

25. Immediate re-establishment of a just law and order for the protection of all American Citizens and the elimination of mericas enemies.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

601 THRU 1ST NR 605

607, 1ST NR 607

609 THRU 616

618 THRU 620

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

TO ALEXANDRIA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
DALLAS
EL PASO
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JACKSONVILLE
LOUISVILLE
LOS ANGELES
MEMPHIS
MIAMI
NEW YORK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
ST. LOUIS
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE

SEPTEMBER 5, 1975

PERSONAL ATTENTION

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

SEP 0 5 1975
3 442P
TELETYPE

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

REC-47 62-116395-620

REBUTELS MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975.

1 SEP 9 1975

SFP:eks
(6)

ST-110

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KL

SEE NOTE PAGE 9

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

9 SEP 17 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED WHEREABOUTS OF A NUMBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES INDICATING THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC STAFF. LISTED BELOW, BY FIELD OFFICE TERRITORY, ARE THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES AS CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES.

INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SAs LITRENTO AND STEWART DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA CONCERNING MAIL OPENING ACTIVITIES. ALL OTHERS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER SAC, ASAC, OR BOTH, DURING PERIOD 1959 - 1966 IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI, NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGTON FIELD. THEY PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING MAIL OPENINGS.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS

FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.

CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

ALEXANDRIA.

W. DONALD STEWART, CRYSTAL HOUSE I, APARTMENT 202, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

JAMES H. GALE, 3307 ROCKY MOUNT ROAD, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

THOMAS E. BISHOP, 8820 STARK ROAD, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA

BALTIMORE:

ANTHONY P. LITRENTO, 2810 STONYBROOK DRIVE, BOWIE, MARYLAND

PAUL O'CONNELL, JR., 2417 STRATTON DRIVE, POTOMAC, MARYLAND

DONALD E. RONEY, 131 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE, WINDSOR HILLS, WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

VICTOR TURYN, 2645 TURF VALLEY ROAD, ELLICOTT CITY, MARYLAND

DONALD W. MORLEY, BOX 222, NEW MARKET, MARYLAND

BIRMINGHAM:

JOHN DAVID POPE, JR., 221 REMINGTON ROAD, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

BOSTON:

LEO L. LAUGHLIN, 9 EVERETT AVENUE, WINCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

EDWARD J. POWERS, 10 COLONIAL DRIVE, BEDFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

J. F. DESMOND, 185 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

CHICAGO:

MARLIN W. JOHNSON, CANTEEN CORPORATION, THE MERCHANDISE MART, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

HARVEY G. FOSTER, 1012 SOUTH HAMLIN, PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS

CINCINNATI:

PAUL FIELDS, 2677 CYCLORAMA DRIVE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMCREST LANE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

DALLAS:

PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014 CHATTERTON DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

EL PASO:

KARL W. DISSLY, POST OFFICE BOX 9762, EL PASO, TEXAS

INDIANAPOLIS:

DILLARD W. HOWELL, 6413 CARDINAL LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

ALLAN GILLIES, 8228 HOOVER LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

JACKSON:

WILLIAMS W. BURKE, JR., 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

JACKSONVILLE:

DONALD K. BROWN, 826 BROOKMONT AVENUE, EAST JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, 4857 WATER OAK LANE, JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

LOUISVILLE:

BERNARD C. BROWN, 2301 NEWMARKET DRIVE, N.E., LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

LOS ANGELES:

WILLIAM G. SIMON, 2075 LOMBARDY ROAD, SAN MARINO, CALIFORNIA

WESLEY G. GRAPP, 4240 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS, CALIFORNIA

ARNOLD C. LARSON, 4232 ABBINGTON COURT, WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH K. PONDER, 3719 CARRIAGE HOUSE COURT, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 3030 SOUTH RED HILL AVENUE, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

MEMPHIS:

E. HUGO WINTERROWD, 1550 NORTH PARKWAY, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

MIAMI:

THOMAS MC ANDREWS, 324 NEAPOLITAN WAY, NAPLES, FLORIDA

FREDERICK F. FOX, 11450 W. BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA

NEW YORK:

JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, 656 HUNT LANE, MANHASSET, NEW YORK

HENRY A. FITZGIBBON, 76 EASTON ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK

OKLAHOMA CITY:

JAMES T. MORELAND, 108 FERN DRIVE, POTEAU, OKLAHOMA

LEE O. TEAGUE, 2501 N.W. 121ST STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA

OMAHA:

JOHN F. CALLAGHAN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, CAMP DODGE, POST OFFICE BOX 130, JOHNSTON, IOWA

PHILADELPHIA:

RICHARD J. BAKER, 219 JEFFREY LANE, NEWTON SQUARE, PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN F. MALONE, 25 GARFIELD AVENUE, CARBONDALE, PENNSYLVANIA

PHOENIX:

PALMER M. BAKEN, JR., 3832 EAST YUCCA STREET, PHOENIX, ARIZONA

ST. LOUIS:

THOMAS J. GEARTY, 6630 CLAYTON ROAD #105, RICHMOND HEIGHTS, MISSOURI

WESLEY T. WHALEY, 286 GREEN TRAILS DRIVE, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI

SAN DIEGO:

FRANK L. PRICE, 2705 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO:

CURTIS O. LYNUM, 644 EAST HILLSDALE BOULEVARD, SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA

HAROLD E. WELBORN, 13067 LA VISTA COURT, SARATOGA, CALIFORNIA

SAVANNAH:

TROY COLEMAN, 36 CROMWELL ROAD, WILMINGTON PARK, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

JOSEPH D. PURVIS, 721 DANCY AVENUE, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

SEATTLE:

LELAND V. BOARDMAN, ROUTE 3, BOX 268,SEQUIM, WASHINGTON

RICHARD D. AUERBACH, P. O. BOX 1768, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

JAMES E. MILNES, 4317 - 50TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

PAUL R. BIBLER, 15134 - 38TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

NOTE:

Referenced Bureau teletypes furnished field general background and instructions relating to our cooperation with the SSC and procedures concerning interviews of current and former employees. Former employees listed herein derived from an SSC request dated 8/19/75, to which we have responded by LHM 9/5/75 being furnished the SSC through the AG. After dispatch of instant teletype, we will arrange for copies to be filed in the respective personnel files of the former employees listed.

PLAINTEXT TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall 9/5/75
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU TELEPHONE CALL 9/5/75.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT SPECIAL AGENT DOUGLAS MAC DOUGALL BE MADE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., FOR INTERVIEW BY THAT COMMITTEE ON 9/9/75 AT 10 A.M. THE INTERVIEW WILL INVOLVE SA MAC DOUGALL'S KNOWLEDGE IN THE PARTICIPATION IN MAIL COVERAGE.

SA MAC DOUGALL SHOULD ARRANGE TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., IN TIME TO BE BRIEFED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONS AT 3 P.M. ON 9/8/75 IN ROOM 4509 IN THE JUSTICE BUILDING.

REC-47 62-116395-619

~~ST-110~~

SEP 9 1975

NOTE: James Dick, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, made the request for the interview of SA MacDougall concerning mail covers. This interview will be a Staff interview. Reference phone call ~~to~~ advise the New York Office of this request and of the fact that SA MacDougall should be available for the briefing on 9/8/75 by the Legal Counsel and Intelligence Divisions. This communication will serve as approval for the waiver of an existing employment agreement signed by SA MacDougall for purposes of this interview.

JBH/PVD/PVD

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

PVD:lad
(10)

4D

SEP 05 1975

TELETYPE 0228

79 SEP 17 1975

WRW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM KP

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

Mr. W. R. Wannall

8/12/75

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

A. B. Fulton

COINTELPROS

This is to identify additional copies of excised material which is being made available in room 4171 of the JEH building for review by staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The copies have been excised to protect sensitive sources and delete information from other agencies where there were sensitivities.

Each serial, prior to being made available for review to members of the SSC staff in room 4171, is approved by the responsible Section Chief.

Attached for the file are 23 copies of excised serials regarding the New Left which were made available for review to the SSC on 8/7/75, and 336 copies of the Black Extremist which were made available on 8/8/75 for review. The latter 336, which consists of four volumes, are being maintained in room 4426, JEH.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures
62-116009

62 116-395

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy) (0)
1 - 100-449698 (New Left)
1 - 100-448006 (Black Extremist)

DKP:lfj
(11)

NDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

8/5/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

Mr. W. R. Wannall

A. B. Fulton

COINTELPROS

This is to identify additional copies of excised serials which are being made available in room 4171 of the JEH building for review by staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). Copies have been excised to protect sensitive sources and delete information from other agencies where there were sensitivities.

Each serial, prior to being made available for review to members of the SSC staff, is approved by the appropriate responsible Section Chief.

Attached for the file are 44 copies of excised serials as they were made available for review to the SSC on 8/1/75: 36 relate to the Communist Party, USA, Cointelpro, five to the New Left and three to the Socialist Workers Party Cointelpros; 105 copies regarding the New Left Cointelpro which were also made available on 8/1/75, and 41 copies of New Left Cointelpro which were made available for review on 8/4/75.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures
62-116009

62-116[illegible]
[illegible] 1975

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
1 - 100-449698 (New Left)
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)
1 - 100-436291 (SWP)

DKP:lfj
(12)

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

70 SEP 8 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

August 18, 1975

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Director, FBI

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

NDR-14
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2

Reference is made to the August 8, 1975, meeting in your office, wherein members of your staff and officials of this Bureau discussed matters relating to the current inquiries of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as relates to our Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros) documents and to the protection of FBI sources utilized in these programs.

At your request there is attached a memorandum summarizing known results in our Cointelpros directed against the Communist Party, USA, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate Groups, New Left and Black Extremists. These summaries do not indicate any actions were conducted under these programs which resulted in physical injury to the targets or that electronic techniques, surreptitious entries, or mail openings were used in connection with Cointelpro actions.

Enclosure
62-116009

ENCLOSURE

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)

DKP/DR:lfj
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-116009-80

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
170 AUG 20 1975

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

DUPLICATE YELLOW

8 AUG 29 1975

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The Attorney General, on 8/8/75, and the Deputy Attorney General, met with Associate Director Nicholas P. Callahan, Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, and Inspector John B. Hotis to discuss the request of the Senate Select Committee for the identities of sources utilized to effect Cointelpro activities. The Attorney General indicated prior to discussing this problem, which relates to the overall confidentiality of FBI sources, with Senator Church, Chairman of the Committee, he desired to be furnished information which would enable him to insure himself there were no Cointelpro activities of a scandalous or infamous nature which at a later date could cause embarrassment to the Department. The attached memorandum was prepared during the period 8/8-12/75 by personnel of the Internal Security Branch of the Intelligence Division. It represents a careful review of all Cointelpro actions where results were known. It is pointed out in the majority of authorized Cointelpro actions results were not recorded. Also, because of the wide variety of Cointelpro actions, results in many areas are not subject to measurement. For example, there is no way of determining how many individuals left the Communist Party as a result of our documented mailings relating to Soviet anti-semitism.

SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

August 18, 1975

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

Classified because sets forth information which, if disclosed, could compromise sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

In an effort to assess possible damage incurred by subversive and extremist organizations and individuals as a result of Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activity, a current review has been made of the programs relating to the Communist Party, USA, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate Groups, New Left and Black Extremists.

The "Study Committee Report on FBI Counterintelligence Programs," prepared in May, 1974, by the Department-FBI Committee headed by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen, tabulated 3,208 proposals for counterintelligence action during the period 1956 until all programs were discontinued on April 28, 1971. Of these, according to the Petersen report, 2,340 were reported approved and implemented and results were reported as known in 516 instances. Our current review has developed 626 instances where results of varying degrees are known. Excluding results of actions which appear to have been appropriate and proper law enforcement procedures, we have summarized results in 164 instances. In any instance where there was any question regarding the propriety of the action, doubts were resolved by preparing a summary.

For ready review, summaries of the actions in these 164 instances have been placed in categories and are attached as follows:

1. Anonymously furnishing information. (34 instances) Pages 3-36.

62-116009
① - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
DKP/DR:lfj
(9)

SECRET

ORIGINAL FURNISHED THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
COPY FURNISHED THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

Classified by 4375
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE 62-116395

Counterintelligence Programs

2. Furnishing information to news media. (39 instances) Pages 37-75.

3. Use of informants for disruption. (9 instances) Pages 76-84.

4. Alerting employers, credit bureaus and creditors to illegal, immoral, radical or subversive activity. (10 instances) Pages 85-94.

5. Alerting business and individuals with whom individual or group has economic dealings to illegal, immoral, radical or subversive activity. (16 instances) Pages 95-110.

6. Alerting religious and civic leaders and organizations to immoral, subversive, illegal, or radical activity. (22 instances) Pages 111-132.

7. Alerting family or associates to illegal, immoral, radical or subversive activities. (5 instances) Pages 133-137.

8. Alerting educational institutions to immoral, illegal, radical or subversive activity. (17 instances) Pages 138-154.

9. Miscellaneous. (12 instances) Pages 155-166.

Extreme care should be exercised in connection with any use of the attached material. Public disclosure of some of this material could result in physical jeopardy to present and former FBI sources utilized in these programs.

Counterintelligence Programs

In July, 1964, an anonymous letter was sent to a number of individuals in the Superior, Wisconsin, area who advertised in "Tyomies-Eteenpain," a Finnish language newspaper published in Wisconsin noting the similarity of editorials in "The Worker," published by the Communist Party, USA, to alert these advertisers to the communist nature of this newspaper so they might withdraw their support.

There was no known withdrawal of support for this newspaper, but at the same time, the newspaper was applying for membership in the Superior, Wisconsin, Chamber of Commerce and their application was denied.

JPM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-30-77, 82, 84

Counterintelligence Programs

In December, 1969, an anonymous letter was directed to selected members of the United Klans of America, Inc. (UKA), by the Richmond Office. This letter denounced Robert H. Hudgins, Grand Dragon of Virginia, characterizing him as one interested in personal gain only. The content of the letter suggested that it had been prepared by Raymond Adams, a former UKA member, who had been banished and had been at odds with Hudgins.

The anonymous mailing resulted in continuing disruption and mistrust in certain Klan units. Hudgins' leadership was challenged. The unrest at Danville, Virginia, caused a great reduction in income for the UKA in Virginia, and affected Hudgins' salary and expenses. Information available does not indicate whether money for Hudgins' salary and expenses obtained from UKA or his employer.

TCD:bmf
(9)

157-9-41-113, 115, 116, 118

Counterintelligence Programs

FBI Headquarters, in October, 1962, authorized the preparation of an anonymous mimeographed leaflet criticizing individuals and small groups with communist backgrounds who consistently attacked the United States but never took a stand against the Soviet Union. This was to be done in connection with the scheduled October 31, 1962, appearance of Herbert Eugene Aptheker, a member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, at the State University of New York at Buffalo (UB), as a part of a lecture series entitled "A Political Spectrum of a Contemporary World." Such individuals had been openly critical of an earlier appearance by a British fascist.

Authority was also granted to anonymously mail public source information on Aptheker to Dr. Charles Ebert, UB, a faculty member critical of the far left.

The leaflets were anonymously distributed to the local news media, the student newspaper and to 28 campus organizations and/or students.

Aptheker's scheduled speech was deferred by a last minute injunction in New York State Court. It is not known if the leaflets or letter had any bearing on the injunction. An appellate court later ruled the University had the right to invite Aptheker to speak.

RWH:tdp (9)
100-3-104-6-36, 42 44, 78

Counterintelligence Programs

In August, 1963, the FBI in Seattle, Washington, became aware that a factional problem existed in the Communist Party (CP) Northwest District as a result of the Sino-Soviet split in which the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), supported the Soviet Union.

A Red Chinese letter stating their position in the ideological dispute was condensed; criticisms of the CPUSA pro-Soviet position were added, and an anonymous letter prepared and mailed to 25 selected CP members in the Northwest District.

The Seattle FBI Office later reported that some members of the Seattle area CP registered their disapproval with the National CP pro-Soviet position and that this contributed to some disharmony in CPUSA circles. The letter was discussed at CP state and local club levels in Seattle.

RPF:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-50-89, 92, 96

Counterintelligence Programs

During May, 1967, a leaflet was mailed to about 40 individuals in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, area. Recipients were labor union leaders, churchmen, members of the American Society of Friends, and the American Legion Posts in vicinity of the residence of Arthur Edelman. Some of the recipients were associated with Edelman in promoting demonstrations against the war in Vietnam and the leaflet was designed to present the membership and leadership role of Edelman and his wife, Beth, in the Western Pennsylvania Communist Party (CP).

Arthur Edelman, after being made aware of leaflet, announced it was time to come out in the open. An informant advised that Arthur Tuden, a college instructor in Pittsburgh, who was active in the antiwar movement, commented he was considering being more circumspect in his dealings with Edelman. Subsequent to circulation of leaflet, Edelman claimed the organization Trade Unionists For Peace in Pittsburgh was on verge of collapse because of friction among its leaders.

HPB:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-39-148, 150, 154 SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

During mid-1966, the New Orleans Office mailed a series of letters to Assistant Grand Dragon Bill Windham, Louisiana United Klans of America, Inc., in the name of a fictitious organization, The National Committee for Domestic Tranquility (NCDT), an anti-Klan group. The letters, which indicated that Windham was cooperating with NCDT, were addressed in a manner that they would be intercepted by a Klan member and furnished to another Klan leader.

Resulted in a split in Klan leadership and ultimately in Windham's resignation from the Klan.

RLL: vb
(9)

157-9-33-46, 48, 49, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia FBI Office was authorized to mail an anonymous letter to Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard, United Klans of America (UKA), Tuscaloosa, Alabama, from a "member of the Minutemen" in Pennsylvania, urging that Shelton drop Roy Frankhouser from Ku Klux Klan leadership in Pennsylvania. This letter would also suggest that Pennsylvania authorities, although not true, were considering Frankhouser as a murder suspect at that time.

During March, 1967, Robert Shelton mentioned he had dropped Frankhouser from membership in the UKA and that he had written acknowledgment from Frankhouser of this fact.

ELS:dsh/lfj
(9)

157-9-37-35, 37, 38

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia FBI Office during June, 1964, mailed an anonymous letter, ostensibly prepared by a disgruntled Communist Party (CP) youth in Philadelphia, to Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA, complaining about the domineering and overbearing attitude toward the CP youth on the part of Frances Gabow, Organizational Secretary of the CP of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware. The letter indicated Gabow had also lost the respect of adult members because of her relationship with a married man.

Gabow lost her position as CP Organizational Secretary.

ELS:bmf/lfj
(9)

100-3-104-37-124

Counterintelligence Programs

During August, 1968, the Los Angeles Office mailed an anonymous letter to selected faculty associates of Robert A. Nieman, an Assistant Professor at California State College and a candidate for the Peace and Freedom Party for the California Assembly. The letter ridiculed Nieman, pointing out that he was white, did not truly represent the blacks, that he had been arrested for possession of marijuana, and of his background with the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Nieman was very active in SDS and supported SDS in anti-Vietnam War demonstrations. His arrest record, under FBI Identification Number 274-888-G, reveals that he was arrested by the Los Angeles, California, Police Department, on 9/29/67 for violation of the Health and Safety Code (Possession of Marijuana).

Nieman lost the election, which he said he expected, but also stated that the letter had caused him much embarrassment, both at the school, where an effort was being made to remove him, and among black militants, who in some cases were being taught by him.

RLL:vb/lm
(9)

100-449698-26-7, 13, 18

Counterintelligence Programs

A leaflet entitled "Call...to Progressive-Minded America Announcing the Holding of a Conference Preliminary to the Founding Convention of a New, American Labor-Negro Vanguard Party" in November, 1961, was sent anonymously by the Newark Office to Communist Party (CP) officials throughout the country. The aim was to hinder the formation of the American Labor-Negro Vanguard Party (ALNVP) which was a project of the Harriet-Tubman Section which had already been expelled from the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). It was also to make the Harriet-Tubman Section appear as a provocative agent of the FBI trying to raid the CPUSA of its membership and financial support.

The mailing created considerable confusion in the CPUSA, which found it necessary to warn its members through its newspaper, of the formation of the ALNVP and to warn against being taken in by this group.

JPM:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-31-3, 15

Counterintelligence Program

During June, 1970, the Charlotte Office prepared about 100 copies of a leaflet, in the form of a news item, prepared by a reporter for Southern Vanguard Revolutionary Party, (a defunct extremist organization formed by purged Panther Jose Gonzalvez). The leaflet, sent to news services and to a number of residents in the vicinity of Black Panther Party (BPP) headquarters, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, was intended to publicize the split in the BPP group at Winston-Salem and to highlight that outside leadership has been brought to the BPP Winston-Salem. Leaflet mentioned Douglas Miranda, former BPP leader in New Haven, Connecticut, had been transferred to Winston-Salem and also attacked Larry Little, a BPP leader in Winston-Salem, as radical and insinuated he is pocketing donations obtained for BPP Breakfast for Children Program. The leaflet contained truthful information.

After distribution of this leaflet, sales of the BPP newspaper in Winston-Salem dropped considerably and respect for BPP leaders in Winston-Salem was reported to have been lost by members.

EFG:bmf/lm
(9)

100-448006-1829, 2088, 2094

Counterintelligence Programs

Douglas Paul Miranda was a successful leader and organizer of the Black Panther Party (BPP) during 1969 and 1970 in New Haven, Connecticut. An anonymous letter was sent to BPP Headquarters in San Francisco in March, 1970, using BPP slang alleging that Miranda had embezzled BPP funds and questioned whether his promiscuity was in the best interest of the BPP. There was no specific information known to the FBI that Miranda was, in fact, embezzling BPP funds, but allegations had been received that he was having sexual relations with numerous females in the New Haven area.

Miranda fell into disfavor with the BPP leadership and disciplinary action was taken with the approval of the national office. He was transferred to Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

HPB:bmf
(9)

105-165706-32-1150
100-448006-1722

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 9, 1969, an informant advised that Michael Baynham, a Detroit Black Panther Party (BPP) member, disappeared from Detroit June 6, 1969, after taking $150 of BPP funds. He allegedly purchased a gun with part of this money and left Detroit. The BPP was reportedly very upset over Baynham's actions.

On June 12, 1969, Lt. William McCoy, Special Investigations Bureau, Detroit, Michigan, Police Department advised that Baynham was found fatally shot that date in the hallway of Jackie Spicer's residence, 13529 Dequindre, Detroit, Michigan. Spicer was present at the time of the shooting and advised police he had committed suicide.

The Wayne County, Michigan Medical Examiner's Office subsequently advised Baynham's death could possibly have been a suicide.

On September 15, 1969, FBI Headquarters authorized Detroit Office to mail an anonymous communication to a "representative number of Detroit BPP leaders" and members and to BPP National officer, David Hilliard. This communication, mailed September 17, 1969, would question the death of BPP member "Brother Michael Baynham," who it was believed committed suicide and would raise the question of possible responsibility on the part of national BPP leaders for the suicide. The letter would also be prepared in a manner to cause suspicion that Jackie Spicer, a BPP leader in Detroit, was the author of the letter and thus cause disruption in the BPP.

On September 19, 1969, an informant advised the receipt of the letter by Detroit BPP personnel convinced them that Jackie Spicer and Anita Hartman (also BPP member) wrote the letter. As a result, Frank Meyers of the Detroit Chapter contacted BPP National Headquarters on September 18, 1969, to so advise them. As a result, Meyers was told to stay away from Spicer since she was probably a police informant and the letter had come from the police through her.

At a BPP meeting held September 18, 1969, a decision was made to confront Spicer regarding the letter and consequently, she and Anita Hartman were purged from the Detroit BPP group.

PEN:cah (9)
100-448006-1251, 1303, 1359; 157-14024-5

Counterintelligence Programs

The Richmond Office of the FBI prepared an anonymous letter addressed to George Lincoln Rockwell, National Commander of the American Nazi Party (ANP) wherein it was alleged Alan Welch, Deputy Commander of the ANP, is a homosexual and had engaged in an unusual sex act with another ANP member. Further, that Welch was turning away recruits from the National Headquarters who appeared to be "too manly." A source who had furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Welch had been described by Rockwell in the past as "a reformed queer." The Richmond Office furnished this letter to the Dallas Office where it was mailed on September 23, 1965.

On November 26, 1965, Rockwell appeared at the Alexandria, Virginia, Resident Agency of the FBI with four letters he received, one of which was the above, inquiring if these letters were in violation of Federal law. Rockwell advised the above letter caused a great deal of disruption in the ANP and it cast suspicion on one of his most trusted workers, namely Welch.

LEB:bmf
(9)

157-9-41-11, 17, 19

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 3, 1969, the Salt Lake City Office sent an anonymous letter to James Lucien Bever, President of the University of Utah chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) alleging that Larry Hammel, a University of Utah student leader devoted to SDS, was an informant. On October 7, 1969, Bever appeared at an SDS meeting and confronted Hammel. Bever announced that he received information that Hammel was a traitor to SDS principles and an informant for the "Feds."

The above resulted in considerable dissension among SDS adherents at that meeting and in future meetings. Hammel's loyalty to SDS remained in doubt even though he attempted to refute the attack. Shortly after the above action SDS became totally inactive at the University of Utah.

TCD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-44-10

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1971, the Seattle Office advised that the following action was taken to discredit Michael Thomas Justesen and Clayton Van Lydegraf among their fellow New Left associates. During December, 1970, in connection with the "Seattle 8" trial, it was apparent that the defendants and their attorneys were under the impression that the Government intended to uncover other informants in addition to the one who was surfaced for testimony. (The "Seattle 8" is a name coined by news media to describe eight persons indicted by a Federal Grand Jury at Seattle, Washington, on April 16, 1970, for violation of the anti-riot law and conspiracy to destroy Government property.) Although there was general speculation that one of the defendants was a Government informant, this was not true. The Government had no other informants to uncover. Following the declaration of a mistrial in the case, an anonymous call was made to Defense Counsel Jeffrey Steinborn. (The mistrial was declared as a result of actions by a defendant who was cited for contempt.) The anonymous caller offered to help Steinborn in defense of the case but related a fear that Steinborn's phone might be bugged. Steinborn was instructed to proceed to a particular pay telephone booth directly across from the Seattle Police Department. He was observed entering the phone booth and the call was placed to him. Steinborn was advised that he was then under observation by the caller which left the impression that the call emanated from the Seattle Police Department. The caller disclosed an intention to get even with United States Attorney Stan Pitkin of Seattle, and the FBI for what they did to the Seattle Police Department. (It is noted that Pitkin handled the Government's case concerning the "Seattle 8," and also received considerable publicity in 1970 in connection with an expose of police corruption before the Federal Grand Jury.) The anonymous caller advised him that Michael Justesen and Clayton Van Lydegraf were FBI informants. (Justesen was in fugitive status at the time and Van Lydegraf's whereabouts were not known.) In reality neither was an informant. United States Attorney Pitkin was not aware of the above action.

As a result, Steinborn confronted Pitkin a few months later and warned that disclosure during any future trial that one of the defendants was actually an FBI informant would jeopardize the Government's case. Pitkin denied any knowledge that the FBI might have an undisclosed informant within the "Seattle 8." Information from other sources indicated that some persons sympathetic with the "Seattle 8" felt that Justesen was an informant. This gave further indication of the effect of the anonymous call made to Steinborn.

TCD:dsh (9)
100-449698-50-13, 14

Counterintelligence Programs

Philadelphia Office submitted anonymous letter to Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and Mortimor Daniel Rubin, responsible for Party youth activities discrediting Jarvis Tyner as being ineffective in making arrangements for a convention and establishing a working organization.

Tyner was subsequently downgraded in his position within the Party and had to coordinate all matters with other individuals in New York.

KAM:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-37-121, 126

Counterintelligence Programs

In January, 1967, James Dolsen, Communist Party (CP) leader in Philadelphia, was informed by the FBI, through an anonymous telephone call, of current status and trial date concerning Aaron Libson, a CP member arrested for sodomy. This was a continuation of previous anonymous information provided Dolsen in November, 1966, about Libson's arrest.

After Libson entered a guilty plea in February, 1967, the fact was published in a newspaper. Daniel Rubin, National Organizational Secretary, stated Libson was dropped from CP.

HPB:vb
(9)

100-3-104-364, 371, 374

Counterintelligence Programs

In September, 1966, an anonymous letter was mailed by the Jackson Division to United Klans of America (UKA) leaders and members near the Headquarters of the Knights of Green Forest (KGF) denouncing Dale Odus Walton, Imperial Wizard, KGF, in typical Klan language.

Many Klansmen discontinued their support of Walton and this organization became inactive.

PWC:dew
(9)

157-9-54-39, 41, 50

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1967, George Lucas, Miami Communist Party (CP) Chairman since May, 1966, was engaged in an attack on the primarily Jewish CP membership in the Miami area. It was approved that an anonymous letter in Yiddish about this situation be sent to Isaac Dantzig, Vice Chairman of the Miami CP who was regarded as a leader of the progressive Jewish movement in the area. The letter was to question the loyalty of Lucas and his wife to the CP. It was also approved, since Lucas had been determined as the source of a series of anonymous letters to the FBI, that a number of CP members be interviewed about the letters in a way that they suspect Lucas as the writer.

Mr. Lucas and his wife were both given indefinite suspensions by the CP. However, Lucas had also been sending anonymous letters to the FBI and through interviews with CP members they became aware that Lucas was the writer of these letters. Ruth Lucas was interviewed but was uncooperative. Also, CP operations in the area were thoroughly disrupted, CP membership became disorganized, and CP sources of funds dwindled.

JPM:cah (9)
100-3-104-29-9, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 27

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1961, Communist Party literature was anonymously mailed to the residences of a cross section of employees of the Olson Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, creating an indignant reaction by the recipients. Mr. Peter Olson, an executive of the company, felt one of his employees, Mary Blair, was responsible for the mailings as she was the only known communist in the company.

Mary Blair was discharged from her employment at the Olson Publishing Company on November 9, 1961.

JPM:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-2982
100-3-104-30-2

Counterintelligence Programs

In November, 1966, 250 post cards cancelling a fund raising bazaar in Detroit, Michigan, scheduled by "The Volunteers," a front group of the Michigan District Communist Party (MDCP) to promote "The Worker," were anonymously mailed just before the opening of the bazaar. It was anticipated the mailing would be blamed on Breakthrough, a conservative anticommunist group in Detroit, since the communists knew a member of Breakthrough had infiltrated "The Volunteers" about three years previously and would therefore have a mailing list. It was also anticipated that this action would lead to the criticism of William Allan, a top MDCP functionary, as he sponsored the infiltrator.

Attendance at the bazaar was less than half of the previous year's attendance, and proceeds for "The Worker" were also less than half of the previous year's proceeds. The proceeds for the 1966 bazaar were $428.00.

JCF:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-15-294, 309, 310, 314

Counterintelligence Programs

During July, 1969, the Los Angeles Office sent anonymous leaflets to selected leaders and members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) and New Left organizations accusing Donald Freed of being a police informant. Freed was active in the Los Angeles area in developing a close working relationship between the BPP and New Left organizations.

During a meeting of the BPP United Front Against Fascism where the leaflets were also distributed, Freed abruptly left and never returned. Although given a vote of confidence by "The Friends of the Black Panthers" a few weeks later, he showed a noticeable effect of the experience and it may have impaired his efficiency and command of his following.

RLL:dsh
(9)

100-449698-26-31, 39

Counterintelligence Programs

By letter April 23, 1969, FBI Headquarters authorized Jackson Office to mail anonymous letter to Donald Wilson Jackson, also known as Muhammad Kenyatta. Letter would be ostensibly from a student defense committee and designed to discourage Jackson from returning to Tougaloo College, Tougaloo, Mississippi. Jackson and his associates, all associated with the Black Panther Party and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, had been involved in incidents of violence on the campus during week of April 10-13, 1969. Letter was mailed to Jackson on April 25, 1969.

Jackson Office subsequently advised that through a confidential informant, it was learned that Jackson was disturbed about the letter and on May 23, 1969, planned to leave the Jackson, Mississippi, area and to return to his home in Pennsylvania.

JTA:bmf
(9)

100-448006-863,869,970,987

Counterintelligence Programs

Fanny Hechtman of the New York Communist Party, in 1965, was a hard and successful worker for the cause of "The Worker," a national publication of the Communist Party, USA. Hechtman was reported to be extremely neurotic. The New York Office made a pretext telephone call to Hechtman on May 7, 1965, wherein the caller advised Hechtman she was a friend of hers and wanted to warn Hechtman that the national Communist Party leadership was contemplating removing Hechtman from the national office and transferring her to Philadelphia because of her neurotic tendencies.

Hechtman advised a friend later of this call and was visibly upset and disturbed by the phone call.

LEB:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-34-1011, 1028

Counterintelligence Programs

The National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF) annual rally was held in Carnegie Hall, New York, on November 12, 1964. Prior to the rally, 238 bogus postcards were mailed by the New York Office to selected Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), members in the New York area with a message denouncing the Chinese communists and calling for support of the "new Soviet leadership." The cards were mailed to the member's place of employment.

William Melish, Chairman, NCASF, denounced this as an attempt by an unknown right-wing group to embarrass and disrupt the NCASF. Many of the recipients of these postcards may have been subjected to embarrassment at their places of employment.

LEB:tdp (9)
100-3-104-34-909, 935

Counterintelligence Programs

In 1964 a fraudulent FBI informant report which implicated William Albertson, member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), as an FBI informant was purposely misdirected to the CPUSA office in New York. The report was read and believed by the CPUSA.

Albertson was subsequently expelled from the CPUSA causing a major disruption in the CPUSA leadership.

LEB:cah (9)
100-3-104-34-690

Counterintelligence Programs

The San Francisco Office placed an anonymous telephone call to Mrs. Thelma Seale, mother of Bobby Seale, National Black Panther Party (BPP) leader. Seale, after a speech in Connecticut on May 19, 1969, was to make speeches in Eugene, Corvallis and Portland, Oregon. Telephone call was ostensibly from a "brother" in Oregon telling Mrs. Seale it would be dangerous for Bobby to make the Oregon appearances. Mrs. Seale told BPP Headquarters about the call and it was decided that Seale should not go.

Results, as reported in San Francisco letter May 26, 1969, were that Seale passed up $1, 130 in Eugene and $600 in Corvallis and possibly caused rift with affiliates of the Students for a Democratic Society who were to appear with him.

JTA:lfj
(9)

100-448006-967

Counterintelligence Programs

An anonymous letter was prepared and sent by the Pittsburgh Office on April 24, 1969, to 35 individuals and leaders of Pittsburgh area peace organizations alleging that Walter and Kay Tillow, leaders of the Pittsburgh Peace and Freedom Center, were being unduly influenced by members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). The publication of the Center was likened to that of the "Guardian" and "Daily World" in content. The letter also alluded to the Tillows' association with Art and Beth Edelman, who in turn were alleged to be associated with CPUSA leader Gus Hall.

The letter resulted in controversy. An informant advised that Walter Tillow believed that the letter was written by the FBI in an attempt to harass him.

TCD:cah (9)
100-449698-39-9, 10

Counterintelligence Programs

Information was developed through informants that Albert Taylor, a member of the United Klans of America (UKA), Lawrence Lodge #610, Montgomery, Alabama, was suspected by George Harris, another member of that lodge, of being an FBI informant. Taylor was not an informant of the FBI. On March 17, 1971, a letter, designed to confirm Harris' suspicions, was mailed by the Mobile Office to Harris. Additionally, an FBI automobile was driven through an area near Taylor's place of employment in a further attempt to convince Harris of Taylor's alleged cooperation with the FBI.

According to informants, since the time of the mailing of the letter, Taylor has not been seen at meetings of Lodge #610.

HWP:hp
(9)

157-9-61,59,61

Counterintelligence Programs

Headquarters sent to Southern offices having substantial Klan activity a supply of three different post cards to be mailed anonymously to a selected number of known Klan members. These post cards contained a caricature of a member of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in his hood and robe and two attacked the Klan's secrecy of membership and the other inferred the Klan leaders are using Klan money for high living, both sensitive points in the Klan.

Numerous mailings were made, some of which received newspaper publicity thereby causing disruption in the Klan membership. Specific individuals to whom mailings were made are not identified in Headquarters files.

TED:lfj
(9)

157-9-30, 33, 34, 29

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

In order to increase the friction between the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Black Panther Party (BPP), the New York Office, in August, 1968, made pretext telephone calls to the SNCC office in an attempt to convey the impression to SNCC that the BPP was "out to get them." Purpose was to increase existing friction between SNCC and BPP.

This was effected and subsequently our New York Office received information indicating that James Forman, SNCC leader, was recently threatened by the BPP who said they would "get him." Forman was making himself scarce with his location known only to his wife and SNCC officials.

VRT:dsh
(9)

SECRET

100-448006-229, 271

34

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 18, 1960, the San Francisco Office directed a letter to the San Francisco Branch Headquarters of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) inviting attendance at an address to be given by Daniel Rubin, National Youth Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), on October 19, 1960, at the Peter Wright School of Dance in San Francisco.

Trotskyist SWP members attended meeting, as did a reporter. Trotskyists caused considerable disruption and exposed Rubin as being a communist, which he was attempting to conceal by claiming to be merely the editor of "New Horizons." The SWP Trotskyists identified "New Horizons" as a communist paper being published by the Communist Party attempting to influence youth.

JDP: vb
(9)

100-3-104-2031

Counterintelligence Programs

Anonymous letters were mailed by the Chicago Division on September 11, 1961, to Board members and on September 14, 1961, to rank-and-file members of the Chicago Council of American-Soviet Friendship (CCASF) relative to a Board meeting of the CCASF held September 13, 1961, to discuss a policy statement on the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear testing.

The CCASF released a statement which incorporated a critical approach to the Soviet Union resuming nuclear retesting. The First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Dmitri D. Muraviev, appeared at the Offices of the CCASF and reprimanded Hedda Basker, a member of the Board of Directors.

JDM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-2885, 2934

2

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 21, 1966, Jim Felder, UPI reporter at Montgomery, Alabama, was confidentially contacted and furnished information about the resignation, for financial reasons, of United Klans of America (UKA) Grand Dragon William Brassell. Prior to that date, there had been no local publicity in Montgomery papers and Bureau efforts were directed toward discrediting Brassell.

On May 23, 1966, a UPI story by Felder regarding Brassell's ouster from the UKA appeared in the Montgomery Advertiser Journal, resulting in adverse publicity to the UKA.

HWP: vb
(9)

157-9-61, 14, 15, 20

Counterintelligence Programs

Miami Division advised Isadon Nochman, Bureau Chief, "Palm Beach Post-Times," Belle Glock, Florida, of a severe beating of a white male teenager following which a Klansman placed a card on the victim stating, "You have just served a proud Klansman, United Klan of America, Incorporated, Palm Beach County. Yours to good health, in God we trust." Newspaper article resulted in unfavorable publicity regarding the Klan.

As a result of the publicity, one of the Klansmen involved in the beating resigned from the Klan and was discharged from his employment due to his public identification as a Klansman. This individual's identity was not shown. Publicity also caused a great deal of internal criticism in the Klan of Klan leader Lee Granims.

TED:dsh
(9)

157-9-29-77, 83

Counterintelligence Programs

In early 1966, the Miami Office determined that a building located at 232 Southwest 30th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, was being used as a United Klans of America, Incorporated, (UKA) operation. This information was disclosed to Milton J. Kelly, Managing Editor of the "Ft. Lauderdale News," and J. Lester Holt, Chief of Police, Ft. Lauderdale Police Department, was notified after a joint meeting of all klaverns commenced in the Klan building that this was the opportune time to set up roadblocks.

The April 19, 1966, edition of the "Ft. Lauderdale News" contained an article captioned "Check Follows Meeting Here - Klan Says Police Violate Rights" reported that a group of suspected Ku Klux Klansmen returning from a secret meeting April 18, 1966, ran into a police checkpoint. Newspaper photographers took pictures and numerous Klansmen were identified. Among those stopped by police were: David J. Zbin, 2600 Southwest Second Avenue; Richard Harley, 4600 Southwest 32nd Drive, West Hollywood; Drew Eugene Johnson, 1429 Southwest 33rd Court; Frederick Paul Attix, 1625 Northwest 15th Place; Sam Richard McBroom, 1420 Northwest First Avenue; Jessie Gay Taylor, 1425 Northwest First Avenue; Conda Lewis Mc Connaughay, 612 Southwest Eighth Avenue, and Harold Carlstedt, 3205 Northwest Third Street. Chaos and confusion was created among the Klansmen and the affair was given extensive publicity.

TJS:tdp (9)
157-9-29-30, 38, 44.

Counterintelligence Programs

Miami Division alerted "Fort Lauderdale News" of Klan and National States Rights Party rally at Vero Beach-Winter Park, Florida, August 29, 1966, and participation of Charles Baker Riddlehoover. Newspaper articles of a negative nature were written regarding the Klan and Riddlehoover.

As a result of unfavorable publicity in newspaper articles, Riddlehoover's organization failed to gain a following and rally at Winter Beach was a failure.

TED: vb
(9)

157-9-29-75, 76

Counterintelligence Programs

Public source information which exposes the Communist Party affiliation of Hunter Pitts O'Dell, a consultant to the field staff of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), was furnished October 19, 1962, to contacts in the news media field in Augusta, Savannah, Charleston, and Atlanta.

The exposure of O'Dell's communist background in newspapers resulted in his resignation from SCLC.

DML:tdp (9)
100-3-104-34-295, 314

Counterintelligence Programs

The Portland Office contacted Richard Ross, News Director, Station KGW-TV, Portland, Oregon, concerning planned arrival in Portland of Hyman Lumer, National Committee member, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), on February 25, 1964. Lumer was to conduct a class in Marxism for CP youth and intended CP members. Ross arranged coverage of Lumer's arrival in Portland.

Lumer was incensed at the attempted interview and photographing of his arrival at the Portland airport. He cursed Richard Ross and swung his briefcase at the photographer. The film clip of Lumer's conduct was shown locally in Portland and subsequently on February 27, 1964, by NBC on the nationally televised Huntley-Brinkley news broadcast.

HPB:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-40-12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

Counterintelligence Programs

The Cleveland Office furnished questions relating to the background and activities of Frank Wilkinson, Executive Director, National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, and Richard Criley, member of the District Committee, Communist Party of Illinois, for the use on May 18, 1962, when the two were to appear on the Mike Douglas Show on KYW-TV in Cleveland.

Wilkinson was evasive and on the defensive during his appearance. Criley did not appear due to a change in plans.

TJD:cah (9)
100-3-104-11-22

Counterintelligence Programs

FBI contacted Morris Litman of the "Philadelphia Inquirer" to alert him to the background and plans of the Philadelphia branch of the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) and specifically its plans to picket the Democratic National Convention. The point to the contact was to uncover the DCA effort to conceal its Communist Party association. Articles appeared in the July 27 and August 23, 1964, issues of the "Inquirer."

The DCA members admitted "Inquirer" articles hindered their organization efforts and that the articles reduced the number of persons who ultimately traveled to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to picket the convention.

RHR:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-37-146, 163 p. 2

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 14, 1964, Milford Sutherland held a press conference in Seattle, Washington, where he announced his intention to run for Governor of Washington. One hundred nominating signatures were required to be placed in nomination.

On August 5, 1964, Lyle Burt, Reporter, Seattle Times, contacted the Seattle Office for background information regarding Sutherland, which Burt said he would publish in the August 9, 1964, issue of the newspaper. Material relating to Sutherland's Communist Party background was given to Burt. Such an article was published documenting this background information, and on September 4, 1964, Sutherland withdrew his candidacy for Governor. Sutherland blamed the Attorney General's Office, the Secretary of State (California), and the Washington State Supreme Court for dilatory tactics in not making a decision regarding his refusal to sign a loyalty oath.

JWM:dsh
HWP:hp
(9)

100-3-104-50,136,137,141

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 28-30, 1966, a convention of the Northwest District, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) was held at Seattle. The CPUSA intended this convention to be secret.

Confidential sources of the Seattle Office were made aware of this "secret" convention which resulted in considerable newspaper and television publicity given to the event. Additionally, anti-CPUSA leftists and members of the Socialist Worker's Party were invited via an FBI produced invitation. Upon appearing at the convention these people were denied admittance or expelled from the convention, thus bringing the convention into disarray.

Reporter Jack Eddy, KIRO-TV, one of the newsmen confidentially advised of the convention, and his cameraman, were recommended for a raise as a result of their outstanding news coverage of the CPUSA convention and the general manager of the station indicated that he was interested in nominating Eddy's coverage for a Sigma Delta Chi award for excellence in television reporting the next time such awards were to be granted.

JWM:cah (9)
100-3-104-50-199, 200, 201, 202

Counterintelligence Programs

St. Louis Office of FBI furnished to Richard Amberg, Publisher, St. Louis "Globe Democrat," a copy of Law Enforcement Bulletin plus 19 newspaper articles relating to W. E. B. DuBois Club of America (DCA). Information was used to publicize appearance of Herbert Aptheker, theoretician of Communist Party (CP) and member of National Committee CP, before DCA group in St. Louis on February 14, 1965. Publicity in newspapers resulted.

Adverse publicity resulting was assessed by St. Louis Office as having dealt DCA in St. Louis a severe blow.

HPB:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-42-71, 72

Counterintelligence Programs

In November or December, 1965, information regarding a replevin suit filed by Almoreen R. Woods against three Klansmen who took his Klan robes and book from his car after he was thrown out of the Lake Wales Klavern of the United Florida Ku Klux Klan was furnished "anonymously" (method of transmittal unknown) to the "Lakeland Ledger Daily" newspaper.

Klan received bad publicity.

WDF:lfj
(9)

157-9-64-37

Counterintelligence Programs

On April 2, 1969, the Pittsburgh Office furnished information regarding David Owens to Sherley Uhl of the "Pittsburgh Press" newspaper. Owens, a candidate for Pittsburgh City Council and an employee of the Urban League, was arrested March 30, 1969, following a gun battle between Detroit police and members of the Republic of New Africa (RNA). Since Owens was on bond in Pittsburgh following involvement in a shooting incident with Pittsburgh police, it was hoped Uhl's disclosure would cause Owens' bond to be revoked. Also, the Pittsburgh Office furnished this same information to an informant of that office.

Information furnished to Mr. Uhl resulted in unfavorable publicity for Owens as a City Council candidate. The information furnished to the informant resulted in Owens' losing his Urban League job.

JTA:vb
(9)

100-448006-820, 846

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1960, an anonymous letter was mailed to the publisher of the Chicago neighborhood weekly newspaper "Southwest News Herald," which enclosed a copy of a "Chicago Daily Tribune" article dated December 5, 1956, which names Vicki Starr and her husband Ed Starr as communists. Vicki Starr was a candidate for the President of the Parent Teacher Association (PTA) of the Mark Twain Public School in Chicago. The "Southwest News Herald" was a conservative neighborhood newspaper which regularly reported the activities of this PTA. The December 3, 1959, issue carried a photograph of Vicki Starr and described her as vice president of this PTA group.

It was learned from an informant that Vicki Starr was no longer considered a candidate for the position of PTA President.

PWC: vb
(9)

100-3-104-1485, 1497

Counterintelligence Programs

Public source information was furnished to Dennis M. Higgins, special features reporter, "The Philadelphia Inquirer," to expose activities, programs, officers, and true nature of the Philadelphia Social Science Forum Committee (PSSFC), a Communist Party, USA front group. Two articles were prepared to be published about January 17, 1965, and January 24, 1965, in the newspaper. The publications were to bracket a scheduled PSSFC meeting on January 22, 1965.

One article was printed on January 10, 1965. The meeting on January 22, 1965, where Dirk J. Struik spoke attracted 125 persons. Prior meetings with other speakers had attracted 200 persons. A follow-up article appeared on January 23, 1965. Elease Sullivan, a member of the Independent Citizen's Committee, a communist front group, was blamed for furnishing the information to the "Inquirer," which was included in the "Inquirer" article of January 23, 1965.

RHR:vb/jmn
(9)

100-3-104-37-179, 199, 200

Counterintelligence Programs

The National States Rights Party (NSRP), Jackson, Mississippi, intended to use a building located at 188 Longino Street, Jackson, as a meeting hall and in an attempt to organize a new NSRP unit and recruit new members. In May 1970, a letter, purportedly a complaint from a neighbor on Longino Street that Number 188 was being used in violation of residential zoning laws, was mailed by the Jackson Office to the "Jackson Daily News 'Jack Sunn'" column. The letter pointed out that Number 188 had been used for a meeting on April 26, 1970.

On June 1, 1970, the letter appeared in the "Jackson Daily News." Although the precise results were unknown, no further public meetings were held by the NSRP at 188 Longino Street.

The NSRP was organized in 1957 in Knoxville, Tennessee, and through propaganda promotes hatred of Jews, Negroes, Communists, and certain law enforcement agencies.

HWP:hp
(9)

157-9-54, 66, 67, 69

Counterintelligence Programs

An article prepared at FBI Headquarters concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., being the keynote speaker at a fund-raising activity sponsored by the Communist Party-controlled Freedomways Associates, publishers of the magazine "Freedomways," on February 23, 1968, was released to the mass media prior to the date of the speech.

Article appeared in "The Birmingham News," Birmingham, Alabama, on March 7, 1968, and March 10, 1968, which set forth King's Communist Party connections in the past and updated his connections with the "Freedomways" magazine.

KAM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-34-1661, 1662, 1671

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia Office furnished public source information to Ivan Scott, announcer for radio station WIP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, prior to March 31, 1962, depicting the true facts in regard to Morton Sobell's trial and conviction for Conspiracy to Commit Espionage in effort to counteract propaganda being spread by the communists. Scott interviewed several pickets during a demonstration on March 31, 1962, sponsored by the Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell at Philadelphia and asked if they were communists.

Tapes made during interviews were played on news broadcast March 31, 1962, and portion used was to the disadvantage of the National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell and the Philadelphia Sobell Committee. It was felt questions by Scott may have the effect of curtailing future picket activities of the Sobell Committee.

KAM:tdp (9)
100-3-104-37-21
100-387835-2877

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1968, the St. Louis Office confidentially advised Mr. George Killenkey, Associate Editor of the "St. Louis Globe-Democrat," that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in St. Louis announced an intention to make inroads into area high schools. Newspaper articles concerning SDS appeared in the "St. Louis Globe-Democrat."

As a result of the newspaper articles, Lindbergh High School cancelled an SDS speaking engagement. It also resulted in countering further SDS attempts to make inroads into that school.

TCD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-42-5

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 13, 1964, Henry Winston, Vice Chairman, Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA), was scheduled to appear on radio station WBZ in Boston. Prior thereto, the Boston Office contacted WBZ officials in an effort to have Winston's appearance cancelled.

The June 13, 1964, radio appearance of Winston's was cancelled.

LEB:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-34-776 and 808

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

In June, 1966, Los Angeles Division made anonymous telephone calls to major newspapers in the Los Angeles area to alert them to an upcoming Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA) District Convention to be held in the Los Angeles area.

Because of resultant press coverage, some sessions of the Convention were cancelled.

JPM:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-26-249

Counterintelligence Programs

During August, 1963, a Cleveland informant advised that Frank Wilkinson, Executive Director of the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee (NCAHUAC), was scheduled to speak at the Unitarian Society in Cleveland, Ohio, on October 13, 1963. The Cleveland Office recommended furnishing "The Plain Dealer" newspaper, Cleveland, Ohio, and "The Youngstown Vindicator" newspaper, Youngstown, Ohio, with the following public source information regarding Frank Wilkinson and the NCAHUAC:

1. Citizens for Constitutional Rights (CCR) letter dated August 1, 1963, which announced Wilkinson's appearance October 13, 1963, at above meeting.

2. News article "House Quiz Opposed by Visitor Here" from the May 19, 1962, issue of "The Plain Dealer."

3. Citation of the NCAHUAC contained in the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" prepared by the HUAC.

The October 11, 1963, issue of "The Youngstown Vindicator" carried an article announcing two Wilkinson appearances.

The October 14, 1963, issue of "The Plain Dealer" contained an article captioned "Racism Charged to House Unit" concerning the above-noted Wilkinson appearance. The article noted that a 20-second scuffle occurred when Mrs. Leta M. Wood of the Organization to Fight Communism demanded to know why Wilkinson had not mentioned that he had served time in Federal prison in a contempt of Congress case. Mrs. Wood and three supporters then left the meeting which apparently continued.

TEB:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-11-108, 117

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1961, a note with a photostat copy of an article appearing in the May 5, 1954, issue of the Detroit Free Press was sent to Mr. James C. McGahey, President of the United Plant Guard Workers of America. This article alluded that Ann Sargent Crowe, an employee of Mr. McGahey, had communist affiliations.

On April 22, 1963, Ann Crowe resigned as Secretary for the United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 13722 Linwood, Detroit, Michigan. On May 13, 1963, Mr. James C. McGahey advised that because of information he had obtained concerning Ann Crowe's subversive background, he had instituted an investigation of this individual. He further advised that he felt that as a result of this investigation, somewhere along the line word got back to Ann Crowe that she would be dismissed and that he was going to take the matter up with the Executive Board of the Union and this precipitated her voluntary resignation. Mr. McGahey stated that Ann Crowe's last day of employment at the Union was Friday, May 3, 1963.

PWC:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-15-2
100-372282-34

SECRET

Counterintelligence Program

In February, 1964, the New York Office discreetly informed particular newspaper representatives that Bayard Rustin, civil rights leader who was in the forefront of a boycott of New York City schools, was to attend a cocktail party at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations on February 4, 1964.

Considerable unfavorable publicity concerning Rustin resulted.

RDS:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-34-599

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

The Atlanta Division furnished written material intended to expose and ridicule the Klans in the South to Ralph McGill, of "The Atlanta Constitution" who in turn passed on this material, without disclosing source, to Hal Martin for utilization in article to appear in the "Saturday Evening Post."

This information was also utilized in part by Ralph McGill who published two articles containing unfavorable publicity regarding Klan activities. Articles appeared in "The Atlanta Constitution."

TED:ekw
(9)
157-9-2-4, 7, 12

Counterintelligence Programs

Herbert Aptheker, member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, was invited to speak at Ohio State University on May 21, 1965, by a newly formed student group to challenge an earlier ruling by the University denying an earlier scheduled appearance by the communist leader. Public source data on Aptheker was furnished local news sources and college officials were given a letter from the National Economic Council, Incorporated, which argued against campus appearances by communists.

Aptheker appeared, but sat silently while other persons read selections of his writings.

TJD:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-10-11, 12, 13

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1966, the "Chicago Daily News" newspaper was furnished information regarding the ownership of an apartment building in a slum area by Claude Lightfoot, Chairman of the Illinois Communist Party. The building was in the area of Martin Luther King's headquarters for a slum clearance drive.

Newspaper articles about Lightfoot's ownership of a "rat-infested slum" appeared in Chicago on May 2-3, 1966, and the Party official was ordered to appear before the Compliance Board of Building Commissioners in Chicago.

TJD: vb
(9)

100-3-104-9-560, 561, 562

Counterintelligence Programs

Richard Henry, one of the leaders of The Republic of New Africa (RNA) appeared in Jackson, Mississippi, during early July, 1970, and proposed that a conference of the RNA be held in Jackson, Mississippi, during the period July 31 to August 1, 1970. Henry made several contacts with legitimate Negro figures regarding a possible site for the conference.

The Jackson Office made available to Jimmy Ward, Editor, Jackson Daily News, Jackson, Mississippi, public-type information available regarding the RNA, showing involvement of its members in violence or in situations showing them in an unfavorable light.

The evening before the scheduled RNA conference in Jackson, Mississippi, the Jackson Daily News printed articles exposing the RNA's violent objectives. The articles caused local black leaders to withdraw their support of the RNA conference, the scheduled agenda for the conference had to be shelved and the conference dealt entirely with criticism of the RNA's violent objectives. One local black group denied the RNA the use of its facilities to hold meetings due to their history of violence as exposed in the newspaper.

EFG:dsh
(9)

100-448006-1893
157-9079-980

Counterintelligence Programs

On August 14, 1970, the Pittsburgh Office confidentially advised Sherley Uhl, "Pittsburgh Press," Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that the Peace and Freedom Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in cooperation with both legitimate and subversive organizations, was sponsoring an Ohio Valley Regional Coalition Conference. It was emphasized to him that certain sponsoring organizations were subversive and/or extremist in nature.

Mr. Uhl prepared an article on the conference which appeared in the August 14, 1970, issue of the "Pittsburgh Press." Two follow-up articles also appeared in the "Pittsburgh Press." The conference received unfavorable publicity and some disruption occurred during the conference.

TCD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-39-18, 19

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 16, 1960, the Chicago Office was authorized to advise reporters of the "Chicago Tribune" of forthcoming meeting of the Communist Party, USA, to be held September 17-18, 1960, to be attended by well-known communist figures Carl Winter, Sam Kushner and others.

On September 18, 1960, "Chicago Tribune" reporter "Sandy" Smith and two photographers caused extensive consternation when they tried to interview the attendees. The September 19, 1960, "Chicago Tribune" had article captioned "20 Top Reds Hold Secret Talks Here," subcaptioned "Parley is Linked to Nikita Visit."

JDP:tdp (9)
100-3-104-1920, 1929

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

Detroit Office called the "Detroit Times," "Detroit News," and the "Detroit Free Press," local newspaper publications, advising them the Global Books Forum was sponsoring a lecture with Harvey O'Connor as the featured speaker to be held October 21, 1960, at Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan. They were asked whether the newspapers could comment in view of their interest and Wayne State University's policy of not allowing communist organizations the use of any of its campus buildings. They all replied they had no knowledge of this situation, whereupon the telephone calls were immediately terminated.

Shortly after the placing of the anonymous telephone calls, Mr. Homer Strong, Director of McGregor Conference Center, Wayne State University, and Director of Alumni Relations, Wayne State University, telephonically contacted the Detroit Office. He advised the University had been approached by the "Detroit Times" newspaper and asked if the scheduled lecture for October 21, 1960, was a communist meeting. Mr. Strong pointed out that a check of "Who's Who in America" determined that Harvey O'Connor was listed as an author and to have been connected with a number of "anti-organizations" and "civil rights groups."

The speech appearance was cancelled by officers of Wayne State University. The cancellation caused consternation amongst the Communist Party (CP), which was sponsoring the meeting, and Helen Winter, CP Headquarters, sought an injunction. Wayne Circuit Judge George E. Bowles granted the injunction and ordered Wayne State University to permit the meeting. The meeting was held October 21, 1960, at Wayne State University and about 100 persons attended.

Helen Winter, supra, subsequently quit her job at the Weldwire Company, 3341 Puritan, Detroit, Michigan, reportedly because the adverse newspaper publicity was too much for her and she felt she would be fired anyway.

JDM:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-2036, 2037

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 3, 1969, FBIHQ furnished Miami Office copies of the Director's testimony on the Nation of Islam (NOI) group given before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on February 10, 1966, February 16, 1967, and February 23, 1968, and a copy of a statement by the Director before the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, September 18, 1969, which sets out information on the NOI on page 9. These items were to be furnished Gene Strul, News Director of WCK-TV, Miami, Florida, for use of that station's expose of the NOI.

The documentary expose was shown at 9:30 p.m., October 9, 1969, to an audience rating of in excess of 200,000 persons. It showed the NOI leaders to be of questionable character and living in luxury through the large amount of money taken as contributions from their membership. The extreme nature of NOI teachings was underscored. As a result, NOI leaders displayed concern and attempted to rebut the program at each opening meeting of the NOI (per Bureau source).

Attendance by visitors at weekly NOI meetings reportedly dropped 50 percent subsequent to this expose.

PEN: vb
(9)

100-448006-1256, 1381, 1382, 1650

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1967, the Miami Office furnished newspaper articles to television station WCKT-TV regarding bombings and firebombings. Some individuals involved in the firebombings and bombings were Klansmen and were identified as such in the newspaper articles.

The articles were used in an expose concerning the Klan aired October 22, 1967, by WCKT-TV, Miami, Florida, entitled "KKK - A Change of Linen."

The expose resulted in disruption in the Florida Klan and lack of success in Klan recruiting.

WDF: vb
(9)

157-9-29-166, 170, 171

Counterintelligence Programs

Between February and April, 1969, the Miami Office furnished a number of items or topics which could be explored by Managing Editor, Mr. Milt Kelly, "Ft. Lauderdale News" in a follow-up news article concerning Klan activity in Broward County, Florida.

A two-article series was published in the "Ft. Lauderdale News" which ridiculed Klan secrecy. Two Klansmen, Robert Quarterman and Jack Mavro, resigned as a result of the articles being published. Dissension and suspicion were created within the Klan.

WDF:tdp (9)
157-9-29-206, 210

Counterintelligence Programs

Anonymous letters were mailed to Marion L. Huit, Dean of the Office of Student Affairs, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, and the "Daily Iowan," student newspaper at the State University of Iowa on October 19, 1962, indicating Frank Wilkinson, who was described as having been identified as a Communist Party member in California during House Committee on Un-American Activities hearings in 1958 and had served a prison sentence for contempt of Congress, was to speak at the college on October 22, 1962.

The "Daily Iowan" published an article subsequent to Wilkinson's appearance on the campus in which it was pointed out he had served a prison sentence for contempt of Congress, which information, according to the article, had been determined during an interview of Wilkinson by the paper.

KAM:bmf/lm
(9)

100-3-104-36-1, 2, 3, 4

Counterintelligence Programs

In October, 1967, Boston Office furnished to confidential sources at WBZ-TV, Boston, Massachusetts, public source data regarding communist background and/or connection with the communist movement of the following organizations: Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), Communist Party (CP), and the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA). WBZ-TV made a television documentary which presented an in-depth television study of campus radicalism in the metropolitan Boston area. The public source data was used by WBZ-TV to show the connection between the SWP and the YSA, the CP and the DCA and other groups, showing that the preparations for "Vietnam Week" were formulated with the connivance and aid of representatives from these groups.

WBZ-TV received numerous favorable comments concerning the television documentary, and the image of the aforementioned groups was damaged.

RDS:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-5-228, 229

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 20, 1969, the Jackson Office prepared a fictitious signature letter exposing the Nation of Islam (NOI) as an organization bleeding its members of money and preaching segregation of races. This letter was sent to the "Jackson Daily News" for use in the "Jack Sunn" column. Immediately after mailing the letter, Jackson Office Agents contacted Editor Jimmy Ward to advise him that Agents had learned a relative of a Muslim had sent some type of letter to the newspaper critical of the NOI, and Ward was requested to contact the Jackson Office when the letter was received so Agents could prepare an appropriate response to be published with the letter in Ward's regular column which aired complaints and gave advice. There is no indication Ward was aware that the fictitious letter originated with the Jackson Office.

On receipt of the letter, Ward notified the Jackson Office and the response was printed in the "Jack Sunn" column, following preparation of same by the Jackson Office. The article was then mailed by the Jackson Office to Elijah Muhammad, "Muhammad Speaks" newspaper, and Muhammad's Mosque Number Two, all in Chicago. Shortly after the article appeared in the "Jackson Daily News," the Jackson NOI group was told by persons responsible for allowing NOI use of a particular building for meetings that the building could no longer be used for weekly NOI meetings. The persons responsible for allowing building use are not identified.

JPG:HWP:tdp (9)
100-448006, 1354, 1380, 1486

Counterintelligence Programs

Warden Woodland, Editor of the "Los Angeles Examiner" was furnished a list of possible questions to be used for the purpose of interviewing Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, National Chairman of the Communist Party, USA during a press interview on May 4, 1961.

Questions asked of Flynn during the press conference succeeded in frustrating her and seemed to embarrass her, keeping her from using the conference to propagandize.

JDM:cah (9)
100-3-104-2571

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1970, the Miami Office furnished information to Milt Kelly, Managing Editor, "Fort Lauderdale News," regarding the arrest of Reverend Armand James Chandonnet, a local klansman. He was furnished information regarding Chandonnet's being charged with forgery and misappropriating church funds.

As a result of this information, articles appeared in the "Fort Lauderdale News" on May 27, 1970, and on June 1, 1970, exposing the situation, and thereafter, dissension between two klan chapters was intensified; at least five klan members resigned and Klavern (Chapter) #108 was dissolved.

WDF:lfj
(9)

157-9-29-222, 223

3

Counterintelligence Programs

Three informants of the Cleveland Office associated with the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (WEBDCA) were approved November 10, 1965, for use in an attempt to discredit Ted Cohen, Midwest Organizer of the communist youth group. The effort was to bring to the attention of Phil Bart, Ohio Communist Party Chairman, Cohen's questionable management of funds and his personal insults toward Bart. The aforementioned informants then commenced to bring Cohen's shortcomings to Bart's attention.

Subsequently on December 3, 1965, Bart advised one of the informants that Cohen had been removed from his position as Midwest Organizer of the WEBDCA because of his questionable financial manipulations, his inefficient methods of operation and his promiscuity.

TEB:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-11-241, 248

Counterintelligence Programs

In order to cause an increase in factionalism among the Communist Party (CP) membership in Philadelphia, in March, 1965, an informant was directed to suggest to Aaron Libson, youth leader of the CP in Philadelphia, that Francis (sic) Gabow, District CP Board member, be forced to take a six-month leave of absence for health reasons. Gabow was critical of Libson (and vice-versa) but had been previously ordered by her doctor to have bed rest because of a nervous condition. It was hoped that Gabow would be forced from CP work because of this and/or resent Libson's effort.

Gabow tendered her resignation from all positions of leadership in the CP Eastern Pennsylvania District on May 4, 1965.

RHR:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-37-207, PH airtel, 5/12/65 (original filed in 100-3-69-10441)

Counterintelligence Programs

During January, 1965, Communist Party (CP) informants of the FBI in Seattle, Washington, area were instructed to contact Henry Huff, an influential CP member and former Smith Act subject, to express dissatisfaction with Fred Sandborg, a member of the CP in Seattle. Sandborg was known to criticize his CP club leadership and to be disliked by Huff. Sandborg was a strong financial supporter of the CP and it was hoped to oust him from the CP.

Formal CP criticism of Sandborg was made by the leadership, but he was not ousted. He complained about his being criticized. Huff was also criticized by the leadership. Huff and Sandborg continued hostility toward each other which caused tension within their CP club.

HPB: vb
(9)

100-3-104-50-162, 171

Counterintelligence Programs

The Tampa Office, during 1969, directed an informant to oppose the klan activities of Norman Bennett Carter, a newly reactivated member of the Melbourne, Florida, Klavern of the Knights of the Invisible Empire.

As a result of the informant's efforts, Carter left the klavern and joined another group.

RLL:bmf
(9)

157-9-64-141

Counterintelligence Programs

During 1968, the Students For a Democratic Society (SDS) Chapter at California State College was factionalized. The Los Angeles Office directed informants to attempt to widen the breech between the groups by implying that Robert Ray, head of the SDS Chapter, was using SDS funds to support his drug habit and that Delfin Lugo, an active SDS member, had used SDS funds for his own use while he had been treasurer of the Chapter. Although Ray, according to one informant, was a heavy drug user, we are unable to verify whether he or Lugo actually misappropriated SDS funds.

At subsequent SDS meetings, there were fist fights between the groups, thus disrupting the meetings. Additionally, members of one faction made threatening early morning phone calls to members of the other faction if they showed up at the meetings. Robert Ray was eventually discredited and replaced as Chairman of the SDS Unit.

RLL: vb
(9)

100-449698-26-17, 27

Counterintelligence Programs

In June, 1968, an informant in the San Diego, California, area, who was a Communist Party (CP) member, claimed to have been offended by Ben Dobbs, Executive Secretary of Southern California CP, who was running for state-wide office. The informant, a black, claimed to have been ignored by Dobbs and raised the issue that he engaged in discrimination against blacks in Southern California District CP. The claim was made at a Southern California District CP Negro Commission meeting, and a tape recording made of the meeting.

Dobbs apologized to the informant. The above tape recording was played to the CP District Board members and caused internal dissension between Board members. Some maintained the taped meeting was designed to discredit Dobbs and was staged by Board member Bill Taylor. Taylor, in turn, was angry at the other Board members.

HPB:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-4, 5, 6, 7

Counterintelligence Programs

In October or November, 1966, the Miami Office made it known to the Ku Klux Klan in Okeechobee, Florida, through an informant, that James W. Crawford had a felony conviction. Crawford was thereafter voted out of the Klan for this reason on November 30, 1966.

WDF:tdp (9)
157-9-29-95-106

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 26, 1968, FBIHQ approved plan by Tampa Office to have informants attend a State Officers' meeting of the Knights of the Invisible Empire (KOIE) on August 2, 1968, to vote for removal of Bill Richardson, Grand Dragon, KOIE. Action suggested following a recent arrest of Richardson for arson.

This action isolated Richardson's influence and reduced his effectiveness.

JTA: vb
(9)

157-9-64-128, 130

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 25, 1967, FBI Headquarters approved recommendation that an informant of the Tampa Office attempt to buildup antagonism toward Edward R. Jones, Exalted Cyclops of the Orlando, Florida, Klavern, United Klans of America, Incorporated, (UKA), Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in efforts to have him removed from that position. This action followed an unsuccessful Klan rally held May 13, 1967, which Jones organized.

On May 10, 1967, it was reported that Jones resigned from the Klan as a result of antagonism within the Orlando Klavern.

JTA:tdp (9)
157-9-64-97, 106

Counterintelligence Programs

In September, 1966, George Judd, Director of Safety and Security, Great Lakes Steel Corporation, Ecorse, Michigan, advised that Joseph Kransdorf was on sick leave from August 26, 1966, to September 13, 1966, and that he had presented a certificate from a doctor in New York when he returned to work. Joseph Kransdorf was a member of the Youth Group of the Michigan District Communist Party and son of a leading national functionary of the Communist Party, USA. The sick leave was during the same period as a Communist Party, USA Youth School at Camp Webatuck, New York. Judd was furnished newspaper articles concerning the camp. A letter was sent by Great Lakes Steel Corporation to the doctor who responded that he did not examine Kransdorf.

In October, 1966, Kransdorf was given a ten day suspension from his employment for fraudulently obtaining sick leave. His address at that time was 12963 Woodward, Highland Park, Michigan.

JCF:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-15-274, 282, 286, 299

Counterintelligence Programs

The Little Rock Office directed anonymous letters to the employers of members of the Forrest City Klavern of the United Klans of America in which were enclosed copies of an article dated September 24, 1970, which appeared in "The Arkansas Gazette," a Little Rock daily newspaper, concerning the arrest of klavern members at Parkin, Arkansas. Thirteen individuals were arrested for nightriding and other charges.

Amos and Leonard Holland were discharged from their employment with Tom's Peanut Company. Sam Littlejohn was discharged from his employment with the DX Oil Company. The employer of Steven Golden advised Forrest City Resident Agency he was curtailing the activities of Steve Golden which would cause embarrassment to the employer.

TED:lfj
(9)

157-9-25-47, 49, 51
157-370-25-66

Counterintelligence Programs

Memphis Division forwarded anonymous letter to headquarters of Kimberly-Clark Company concerning efforts of Clinton Eugene Daniel, an employee of Kimberly-Clark in Memphis, to recruit Klan members at the company's Memphis operation.

Daniel was placed on a predominantly night shift shortly after anonymous letter was sent. This prevented Daniel from attending local Klan meetings which were held in the evenings and Daniel was expelled from Klan for nonattendance of Klavern meetings.

TED:dsh
(9)

157-9-28-22, 28

Counterintelligence Programs

During the Summer of 1967, William Virgil Fowler, State Chairman and Honorary State Cyclops of the California Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (KKKK), departed the Los Angeles area leaving behind unpaid debts. Fowler moved to Stone Mountain, Georgia. The Los Angeles Office subsequently arranged to have letters, purportedly over the signature of Fowler, sent to his creditors instructing them to forward unpaid bills to James R. Venable, a Klan leader, for payment.

As a result of the above letters, a split developed between Fowler and Venable, and Venable reported that Fowler was no longer affiliated with the KKK, but had moved to Florida.

TJS:dsh
(9)

157-9-26-31, 32, 33, 36

Counterintelligence Program.

Authority granted November 18, 1960, for Los Angeles Office to advise Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) official at Burbank, California, by anonymous telephone call that YMCA part-time assistant instructor Richard Lund is a communist, as is his wife Nancy Rosenfeld Lund, citing testimony before House Committee on Un-American Activities as source.

On January 9, 1961, it was determined Lund's employment had been terminated at the request of the YMCA Personnel Committee.

JDM:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-2029
100-3-104-2154
100-3-104-2209

Counterintelligence Programs

The Cincinnati Office advised on March 19, 1969, that Reverend Augustus Taylor, Steubenville, Ohio, had visited Huey Newton, Black Panther Party (BPP) leader, and as a result wrote an article favorable to Newton published in the "National Catholic Reporter." Since Taylor had a regular television show on WSTV-TV, Steubenville, Ohio, to air his black nationalist views, FBI Headquarters approved on March 28, 1969, that an anonymous letter be mailed to WSTV-TV criticizing Taylor and revealing that his article had been reprinted in the BPP newspaper.

On May 15, 1969, Cincinnati advised that Father Mitchell Wilamoski, Principal of Catholic Central High School, Steubenville, Ohio, disclosed on April 9, 1969, that at a meeting at the Bishop's Office it was decided Reverend Taylor could no longer continue his Sunday television program. The Bishop had given Reverend Taylor a job requiring constant travel and was considering a transfer for Taylor.

JTA:lfj
(9)

100-448006-785, 876, 923

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 25, 1969, the Washington Field Office confidentially advised a source at First Virginia Finance Plan, Inc., 2924 Columbia Pike, Arlington, Virginia, of the location of the car of Dorothy Jean McQueen Hughes, secretary to Stokely Carmichael, a well-known black extremist. Hughes was three months in arrears on her car payments.

The car was repossessed on March 2, 1969.

VRT: vb
(9)

100-448006-686, 737

Counterintelligence Programs

On March 13, 1969, the Miami Office mailed an anonymous letter, containing true facts, to Elijah Muhammad, national leader of the Nation of Islam (NOI), Chicago, Illinois, advising him of extramarital activities of Earl King, Minister of Mosque 29, Miami, Florida.

The Minister was removed from his position, but remained in Miami as a rank-and-file member of the NOI.

VRT: vb
(9)

100-448006-681, 824

Counterintelligence Programs

During June, 1969, Mr. Patrick Poulte, Poulte Realty Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan, was contacted by the Detroit FBI Office and confidentially furnished public source information concerning the Radical Education Project (REP), which is the educational arm of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), in that REP had office space in a building owned by Mr. Poulte.

REP offices were vacated on about July 1, 1969, when they were unable to secure extensions on their lease.

ELS:bmf/lfj
(9)

100-449698-26, 28

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 11, 1964, Kenneth S. Smith, Treasurer of the University Circle Development Foundation, Incorporated, Cleveland, Ohio, advised that Michael Cooperman was employed as a Community Relations Coordinator with the above organization. This information was developed apparently during the course of FBI investigation concerning Cooperman's subversive background. Mr. Smith advised he was concerned about Cooperman's background.

FBIHQ approved Cleveland's recommendation to confidentially furnish Mr. Smith "lead" information for his assistance in verifying Cooperman's background.

On July 27, 1964, Cooperman appeared at the Cleveland FBI Office and stated he wished "to set record straight." He stated that in the past he had been contacted by FBI Agents at which time he had not been fully cooperative. He wanted to now advise the FBI that he no longer believed in communism or the Communist Party (CP) and had nothing to do with communists for the past five years. When asked what prompted his visit at this time, he stated that Oliver Brooks, Vice President of the University Circle Development Foundation, had requested his resignation effective October 1, 1964. Cooperman added the reason given by Brooks was that it had come to their attention that Cooperman, in the past, had used an assumed name. Cooperman admitted to Brooks that this was so and Brooks then went on to explain that the Foundation, which was attempting to raise a large sum of money, could not risk unfavorable publicity as the result of the activities of employees.

Cooperman said he was considering accepting one of several other employments available to him and in this connection he was attempting to make it known in appropriate circles that he had been disassociated from the CP for many years.

TEB: vb
(9)

100-3-104-11-156, 157, 168

Counterintelligence Programs

On December 5, 1966, W. G. O'Neal, Chief Investigator, North Carolina State Insurance Department, was confidentially contacted by the Charlotte Office about an insurance program, the Widows Benevolent Fund, being administered by J. R. Jones, Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in North Carolina. The insurance program was set up in February, 1966, and certain apparent discrepancies in management were noted. The FBI action was an attempt to deny the KKK a source of funds.

On October 29, 1967, the N.C. Insurance Commission, following examination of Jones' books and procedures in handling the fund, decided the fund would be terminated. At termination, there was reportedly $3,800 in the treasury, with $1,000 to be paid to each of three widows.

HWP:hp
(9)

157-9-8, 55, 57, 59, 64, 70, 73, 116, 122, 135

Counterintelligence Programs

In August, 1964, Mrs. C. P. Kandahl, Seattle Ski Club, was contacted in order to have her deny use of Seattle Ski Club site at Snoqualmie Pass, Washington, to members of the Young Political Explorers League (YPEL), a Communist Party (CP) front, for use as a summer camp. YPEL had arranged camp rental under guise of using camp for underprivileged children. Mary Sutherland, wife of District CP Organizational Secretary, Milford Sutherland, was advised that camp's water system had broken down; therefore, the camp could not be held.

JWM:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-50, 134, 135, 138

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 14, 1966, the Richmond Office of the FBI mailed anonymous letters to six individuals who were financial contributors to the American Nazi Party (ANP), telling them to discontinue contributing to the ANP because the Federal Government would probably obtain their names and harass the contributors in the same manner the Government is harassing the ANP.

Subsequent to the above mailing, George Lincoln Rockwell, national leader of the ANP, claimed that Karl Allen of the White Party of America was trying to force him out of business by writing the above-mentioned letters. Rockwell considered suing Allen in this matter. Allen formerly worked for Rockwell in the ANP office and left to form his own group.

LEB:lfj
(9)

157-9-41-19X, 42

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 16, 1970, the San Francisco Office contacted Fred Green, manager, Hunters Point Housing Project, concerning activities of the Black Panther Party (BPP) within the project. During this contact with Green it was mentioned that Apartment 304 in the housing project rented for occupancy by a woman on welfare and her two children had become a BPP Community Center. It was further noted that the windows of the apartment were covered with large BPP posters and that several Housing Authority rules regarding occupancy of this apartment were being violated.

On October 21, 1970, Green advised that he had been able to evict the members of the BPP from Apartment 304 and that all BPP posters had been removed. The woman and children were not evicted since their name was on the lease.

EFG:ekw
(9)
100-448006-1835, 2020

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 27, 1966, the Richmond Office sent an anonymous letter to businessmen in Amelia, Virginia, critical of the Ku Klux Klan and its disagreements with the Amelia Dress Company, a new dress manufacturing plant which was having to lay off a small number of employees. Several Klan "throw aways" entitled "The Ku Klux Klan is watching you" had been sent to the plant superintendent and had caused concern in the town that the plant might move away from Amelia.

The anonymous letter sent to the businessmen by the Richmond Office united businessmen against the Klan and subsequently caused disruption within the Klan.

WDF:lek (9)
157-9-41-57, 72, 81

Counterintelligence Programs

The Indianapolis Division determined in late 1969 that the Indianapolis Black Panther Party (BPP) Chapter owed the Indiana Bell Telephone Company for several months of telephone service.

Unknown representative of the Indiana Bell Telephone Company was encouraged to remove the telephone service from BPP headquarters. Telephone service was cut off at the BPP office on or about September 15, 1969.

PEN

PEN:tdp (9)
100-448006-1116, 1271, 1310

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 2, 1962, the Cleveland Office alerted the Ohio Savings Bank to the fact that Jack Kling, Chicago editor of the Jewish-language communist newspaper, "Morning Freiheit," was to speak at the bank's auditorium on May 4, 1962.

Permission to use the auditorium was withdrawn on May 3, 1962, necessitating finding an alternate site on one day's notice.

TJD: vb
(9)

100-3-104-11-20, 21

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 30, 1965, Joseph Corley, Manager, Seth Boyden Terrace, a public housing project, Newark, New Jersey, was furnished public source material concerning the communist background of Harry Bloksberg, a resident of Seth Boyden Terrace, who had requested permission from Corley to organize a club among the teen-agers of the Terrace. It was believed the purpose of the club was to indoctrinate youth in Marxism.

Corley, when furnished the public source information, advised he would not permit Bloksberg to organize the club.

DML: vb
(9)

100-3-104-31-345, 341

Counterintelligence Programs

On August 29, 1969, FBIHQ authorized the Milwaukee Division to anonymously mail copies of articles, furnished that office previously, from issues of the Black Panther Party's (BPP) newspaper, showing hatred of the white man by the black community as advocated by the BPP, to various churches and main offices of grocery stores which were involved or might become involved in contributing to the BPP's Breakfast For Children Program.

In subsequent interview with Kenneth Berry of the Godfrey Company, Waukesha, Wisconsin, which handled Sentry Food Stores in the Milwaukee area, it was learned he had been approached by members of the BPP regarding contributions to the Breakfast program. The request was turned down as a result of the above mailings. Berry indicated that other chain stores had done the same thing.

PEN: vb
(9)

100-448006-1244, 1499

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 9, 1969, the New York Office contacted United Air Lines (UAL)-Air Freight Division, New York, International Airport, Jamaica, New York, and advised that the Black Panther Party (BPP) was shipping its newspapers via air on a weekly basis. UAL was charging BPP the general rate for printed matter. However, after UAL officials were alerted to the contents of the BPP shipments, the UAL began charging the BPP newspaper freight rates.

The additional shipping costs to the BPP, New York, amounted to between $225 to $300 per week. UAL also advised they were considering a suit for recovery of the difference in freight tariff collected for the past six to eight months from the New York BPP. It was estimated that this difference would be in excess of $10,000.

EFG:cah (9)
100-448006-1376, 1377

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1965, a mimeographed leaflet was circulated exposing the "Labor Press Spring Bazaar" to be held at the Jewish Music Center, 14868 Schafer, Detroit, Michigan, on March 20-21, 1965, as a front effort by the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), in Michigan to raise funds for a financially beleaguered communist newspaper. Also in February, 1965, an anonymous letter enclosing newspaper advertisement on the spring bazaar was sent to patriotic veterans organizations in Detroit area, protesting this communist endeavor and calling for these groups to stop this function.

This bazaar was cancelled by owners of the building where it was to be held as a result of floods of protests.

PWC:dew
(9)

100-3-104-15-158, 162, 164

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 21, 1965, the Dalsemer Real Estate Company, specifically Ben Powdermaker and Dick Dalsemer, were contacted regarding recent vandalism damage, i.e., two windows broken by unknown persons, incurred by a building owned by them at 3260 North Broad Street, Philadelphia, and rented by the Philadelphia Chapter of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA). They were advised that such damage might continue because of friction in the neighborhood if the DCA continued to rent the building. The desired result was to have the month-by-month lease terminated.

The owners required DCA to pay $85.00 for the broken windows which was done in November, 1965. DCA was notified by Dick Dalsemer of eviction to be effective December 30, 1965. DCA was evicted on December 31, 1965.

RHR: vb
(9)

100-3-104-37-264, 267, 269, 294, 304

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1964, an anonymous letter was sent to Mary Urbant, operator of Beechnut Grove Picnic Grounds, 6166 Middlebelt Road, Romulus Township, Michigan, indicating that it was well known among neighbors that she rents grounds to Communist Party (CP) members. This was an effort to disrupt the communist picnic scheduled to be held on May 30, 1964.

Mrs. Urbant refused to allow the planned communist picnic.

PWC:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-15-118

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 14, 1965, the Charlotte Office confidentially alerted W. G. O'Neal, Chief Investigator, North Carolina State Insurance Department, that the United Klans of America (UKA), Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, through Marshall Kornegay, a member, was promoting a group health insurance plan for members of the UKA. O'Neal agreed to have his Department investigate the plan to determine if it met state requirements.

On June 3, 1965, Mr. O'Neal contacted the FBI to advise the above insurance plan, issued by the International Life and Accident Insurance Company, Wilmington, North Carolina, had been transferred to the Life Insurance Company of Florida, Miami, Florida, as this company had bought the former insurer. Following inquiries at the new company, which learned of the UKA association with the health plan, the health program was cancelled.

HWP:ekw
(9)
157-9-8, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 19

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 24, 1969, San Diego Office placed a fictitious name phone call to Norman Kay of the Cabrillo Realty Company, San Diego, California, the personal representative of Henry E. Jackson, Jr., owner of the building at 6181 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, California, which was being used by the black extremist US organization as its meeting place. The caller, using the name T. E. Ellis, complained of activities being conducted at the above address and expressed fear for the safety of himself and his family. Caller also demanded something be done to control the US group or to effect its eviction.

Mr. Kay appeared surprised and disturbed over receipt of the complaint and the activities at the Imperial Avenue address.

The following day, July 25, 1969, US was evicted from the address at 6181 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, California.

PEN:cah (9)
100-448006-1174, 1179

Counterintelligence Programs

On July 19, 1968, Mr. L. B. Egenberger, Supervisor of Security, Illinois Bell Telephone Company (IBT), Chicago, Illinois, was contacted by the Chicago FBI Office for the purpose of ascertaining if all telephone service to the Chicago Office of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) could be discontinued in view of telephone charges that were unpaid by NMC.

On July 19, 1968, Mr. Egenberger was contacted and, at this time, he advised that the NMC had made a deposit of $850.00 for use of the Wide Area Telecommunications System (WATS), which would not be returned and in addition, there were charges outstanding in the amount of $2,167.00 for WATS service. Mr. Egenberger stated the NMC's WATS service was being terminated in view of excessive, outstanding charges. NMC's regular telephone service was not discontinued.

ELS:vb
(9)

100-449698-9-7, 11

Counterintelligence Programs

On 1/27/65 the Birmingham Office made anonymous mailings to fifteen Negro churches identifying Carl Ridout, Manager of Ensley Finance Company, Inc., Birmingham, as a member of the National Executive Committee of the National States Rights Party. Ridout was then transferred to the Fairfield Finance Company, 5011 Gary Avenue, Birmingham, which was under same ownership as Ensley Finance Company. Fifteen letters were then anonymously mailed to Negro churches identifying Ridout as Manager of the Fairfield Finance Company and also a member of the National Executive Committee of the National States Rights Party.

Ridout was subsequently fired but we are unable to determine if this was a direct result of the Counterintelligence Program activities.

The National States Rights Party is a white hate group that has been involved in violent activities directed toward minority groups.

TED:cah/lm
(9)

157-9-4-12, 16, 17, 20

Counterintelligence Programs

In May, 1959, an anonymous letter was sent to Mr. Theodore A. Jones, President of the Chicago branch National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), advising him that a "left caucus" slate called Coordinating Committee of NAACP comprised of members of the Communist Party (CP), Socialist Workers Party (SWP), socialists and other Negro nationalist-type individuals, had been formed and its objective was to oust him from leadership.

The "left caucus" slate was defeated at the membership meeting.

PWC:dew
(9)

100-3-104-1077, 1078, 1080

Counterintelligence Programs

The Philadelphia Office was authorized to contact prominent Jewish organizations, such as the American Jewish Congress, and Morris Litman, City Editor of the "Philadelphia Inquirer," in an effort to have them contact Harry Beichman and David S. Landes, Office Secretary of Boslover Hall and President of Boslover Ahavas Achim Belzer Association, respectively, in an effort to have an appearance of Gus Hall cancelled at Boslover Hall before the Philadelphia Social Science Forum Committee on January 24, 1964. Contact was to indicate bad publicity received and advise of riot which ensued following a previous appearance of Hall before the same committee during 1962.

Boslover Hall cancelled the meeting which had been scheduled for January 24, 1964, and Gus Hall did not appear in the Philadelphia area.

KAM: vb
(9)

100-3-104-37-97, 98, 101

Counterintelligence Programs

In September, 1969, a series of three anonymous telephone calls were made by Agent personnel of the San Diego Office to Bishop John Quinn, Auxiliary Bishop of the San Diego, California, Archdiocese, in protest of activity on the part of Catholic priest Reverend Frank Curran, Christ the King Roman Catholic Church, 32nd and Imperial, San Diego, California. Reverend Curran had indicated an open advocacy of the Black Panther Party's Breakfast for Children Program and had used his church as a sanctuary for Black Panther Party (BPP) members.

An anonymous letter for mailing to the Bishop was also approved by FBIHQ on September 11, 1969, outlining objections to Father Curran's activities. This letter was to be signed T. E. Ellis, a fictitious name, and was to indicate its writer was a member of Father Curran's parish.

Father Curran subsequently transferred from the San Diego archdiocese and the BPP Breakfast for Children Program collapsed.

PEN:lfj
(9)

100-448006-1264, 1269, 1282, 1388, 1648

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1962, the Seattle FBI Office contacted Lawrence Timbers, former Chairman of the Anti-Subversive Committee of the Washington State American Legion, to make arrangements for a group of anticommunist citizens to attend a public meeting at Washington Hall, Seattle, on April 27, 1962. Herbert Eugene Aptheker, member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), was a scheduled speaker at this meeting.

Mr. Timbers, a commercial printer by trade, obtained a $1.50 ticket in advance of the meeting and printed and distributed several hundred tickets. These were distributed to persons known for their anticommunist sentiments.

As a result the Communist Party did not receive revenue for over 100 persons who attended the meeting. Aptheker completed his speech, but was intermittently heckled and booed by the anticommunist attendees. This group later marched through the aisles singing patriotic songs.

CPUSA leadership was displeased at the way the Seattle CP group organized and handled the affair.

RPF:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-50-25, 30

Counterintelligence Programs

The Communist Party of Illinois scheduled a bazaar to raise money for the Party newspaper, "The Worker." Party members received letters allowing each recipient to receive, on behalf of the bazaar, $3 in goods, money, or trading stamps from the Jewel Tea Company, which had 101 stores in the area. Each store to donate $3 as noted. Chicago Office alerted the Jewel Tea Company to the nature of the bazaar.

A former FBI Special Agent employed by the Jewel Tea Company made arrangements to insure no donations were made by the company.

TJD:ekw/cah (9)
100-3-104-9-627, 648

Counterintelligence Programs

In December, 1967, an anonymous letter was mailed to officials of Carrsville Community Center, Carrsville, Isle of Wright County, Virginia, stating that the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) was using the community center for holding dances. The Klan was using the cover of Southhampton Activities Club. The group was part of United Klans of America, Inc., KKK, and was raising funds through the dances.

After February, 1968, the lease to the Klan was terminated. The officials considered the dances had become rowdy and they did not know previously that the Klan was involved.

HPB:lfj
(9)

157-9-56-34, 35

Counterintelligence Programs

In July, 1968, the Pittsburgh Office confidentially alerted a staff worker for the Mellon Foundation of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that Unity Incorporated, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, has a store which is utilized as a black power center, and one of the leaders of Unity Incorporated said the basement of the store would be remodeled as a target range. The leader of the group was in possession of a suitcase containing several pistols and ammunition. The purpose of this contact was to prevent Unity Incorporated from receiving a grant of $150, 000 which that organization had requested from the Mellon Foundation.

Unity Incorporated did not get the $150, 000 grant.

VRT:dsh/lfj
(9)

100-448006-171, 255, 280

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1965, an anonymous mailing was sent to three ministers (Dr. James H. Laird, Reverend Charles B. Lutton, and Reverend Norman E. Dewise) associated with the Methodist Church, 23 E. Adams Street, Detroit, Michigan. This mailing enclosed a newspaper clipping depicting Nikita Khruschev and Herbert Aptheker, a high Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) official, at bier of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, late CPUSA Chairman, in Moscow. The purpose of this mailing was to alert church officials of Aptheker's CPUSA affiliation and his appearance at this church would be discouraged or cancelled.

Herbert Aptheker speakers' appearance at this church was not advertised in weekly church bulletin as is customary. As a result, attendance at talk was poor and collection taken was insufficient to meet expenses of the affair.

PWC:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-15-149

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1959, a flyer, revealing Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), as true sponsors of May First Celebration scheduled to be held at the United Plant Guard Workers of America Local 114 Hall at 13722 Linwood, Detroit, Michigan, was sent Mr. James C. McGahey, president of the union.

The CPUSA was locked out of the union hall and they had to hold the affair elsewhere. Mr. McGahey refunded the rental fee to the CPUSA.

PWC:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-1054

Counterintelligence Programs

During late 1967 an anonymous letter was mailed to the National Rifle Association by the Jackson Office advising that the Concordia Pistol and Rifle Club at Ferriday, Louisiana, was actually a club organized to disguise a unit of the Minuteman organization. The club was organized by James Lee Scarborough, an active Klansman, who had applied for club membership in the National Rifle Association.

During January, 1968, Scarborough advised the members of the club that the National Rifle Association had turned down their application for charter membership.

RLL:dsh
(9)

157-9-54-51, 53, 54, 55, 58

Counterintelligence Programs

In November, 1968, the Detroit Office mailed several anonymous letters to expose the extremist nature of the "South End," the student newspaper at Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, which is a state-supported university. This newspaper has a black extremist viewpoint and is self-described as "revolutionary." The anonymous letters were supposedly from a concerned parent and a concerned student and were directed to state and university authorities responsible for funding this newspaper, including Governor Romney of Michigan. A letter was also sent to the Archbishop of Detroit concerning a Catholic group funding W. E. B. DuBois Institute of Black Studies at Wayne State University, which funding was publicized in the "South End."

These anonymous mailings played a part in the reduction of yearly funds granted to the newspaper by $10,000.

VRT:lfj
(9)

100-448006-354, 631

Counterintelligence Programs

Two anonymous letters were sent between April and July, 1965, to nine responsible officials of the Hartford Avenue Baptist Church, Detroit, Michigan, protesting the action by Reverend Charles A. Hill, the pastor, in allowing Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) functionaries to openly speak at his church and in allowing communists use of the church for secret meetings. In August, 1965, a follow-up letter was sent to individuals residing in the neighborhood of the church complaining about the communist use of the church.

During September, 1965, information was received that Reverend Hill was forced to cancel a communist bazaar at the church due to the letter distributed in the area which was critical of the use of church premises for communist meetings and related affairs.

JCF:cah (9)
100-3-104-15-179, 180, 181, 195

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 15, 1969, Jack Noble, Assistant State Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, contacted the Santa Fe Resident Agency of the FBI and requested that he be furnished public source information regarding Peter Gunn Montague to assist Governor David F. Cargo in deciding whether or not to appoint Montague to the Governor's Technical Advisory Committee on Air and Water Pollution. Montague had been affiliated with the Albuquerque Movement for a Democratic Society which was affiliated with Students for a Democratic Society.

On November 18, 1969, Mr. Noble advised public source information regarding Montague enabled the Governor to make the correct decision in deciding against appointing Montague.

JWD:cah (9)
100-449698-15, 17

Counterintelligence Programs

In July, 1968, the Pittsburgh Office casually suggested to a member of the Beverly Heights Presbyterian Church, in Pittsburgh, that Reverend William R. Taylor, of that church, might be interested in her information about Carl Nicholas Flournoy, a militant black nationalist. Flournoy had been receiving finances from the Presbyterian and Catholic Churches jointly.

It was subsequently determined that this action was apparently instrumental in part in influencing three churches in refusing to provide supporting funds to racial groups unless sound reasons exist for doing so.

VRT:dsh
(9)

100-448006-173, 225

Counterintelligence Programs

On December 1, 1964, James Farmer, National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), was furnished information about Eugene Joseph Tournour, employed as an organizer of CORE, 317 Evergreen Street, Chicago, Illinois. Tournour had been active in Communist Party organizations since 1957 and in 1964 was considered a Communist Party member by leaders of the Party in Chicago. An FBI Headquarters official furnished this information to Mr. Farmer.

On January 25, 1965, Tournour advised an informant that he received a letter from CORE's National Office firing him.

TJD:ekw
(9)
100-3-104-9-430, 480

Counterintelligence Programs

In February and March, 1967, informants disclosed that certain members of the security guard, Belmont, North Carolina, Klavern of the United Klans of America (UKA), had joined or were joining the National Rifle Association (NRA). An informant advised that, under certain circumstances, the Director of Civilian Marksmanship, U. S. Army, would supply NRA-affiliated clubs with rifles and ammunition, and that the UKA was joining for this purpose. An anonymous letter was mailed to the NRA on May 2, 1967.

On June 20, 1967, an informant advised that the NRA had not accepted the Belmont Rifle and Pistol Club (of the UKA) application for a charter. The informant stated that, for all practical purposes, the club was at an end, had met on only a few occasions, had never constructed a desired range, and had not undertaken real target practice.

HWP: vb
(9)

157-9-8, 82, 95, 104, 112

Counterintelligence Programs

In November, 1959, information was made available by a source to Mr. Theodore A. Jones, President of the Chicago Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), that the "left caucus," comprised of Milton Cohen and Lester Davis, members of the Illinois State Communist Party (CP) Committee, Fritzie Englestein, Illinois CP member, Barney Taylor, Socialist Workers Party (SWP) member, Saul Mendelson, former member of Independent Socialist League National Committee and the Bullock-Abner Coalition, planned to elect nine leftist delegates to the NAACP National Convention.

No one from the "left caucus" candidate slate was elected.

PWC: vb
(9)

100-3-104-1342

Counterintelligence Programs

On April 1, 1970, the Pittsburgh Office confidentially advised Mr. Richard M. Larry, Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation, Pittsburgh, concerning a conference at Carnegie-Mellon University (CMU), scheduled for the next weekend by the Gulf Action Project (GAP), to plan for the disruption of a Gulf Oil stockholders meeting scheduled for April 28, 1970, at Pittsburgh. Mr. Larry advised the CMU Administration.

CMU officials contacted representatives of GAP cancelling the conference. GAP protested the cancellation and ultimately CMU allowed the conference to take place provided same did not include planning for the disruption of the stockholders meeting.

TCD:vb
(9)

100-449698-39-15, 17

Counterintelligence Programs

Between July 1, 1968, and October 1, 1968, the Miami Office sent an anonymous letter to Mayor Dunham, Okeechobee, Florida, advising him that city employee Charles Franklin Smith has been seen at Ku Klux Klan (KKK) meetings.

It is not known what action was taken; however, the employee was noted to not be in attendance at Klan meetings thereafter.

WDF:tdp (9)
157-9-29-196
157-9-29-201

Counterintelligence Programs

The Albany Office on April 1, 1969, confidentially alerted the President of the Council of Churches, Syracuse, New York, of the extremist nature of the United Black Brothers (UBB), Syracuse, and of the criminal backgrounds of UBB leaders and membership. The Council of Churches was funding the UBB.

Council of Churches President advised he would recommend no further funding for UBB.

VRT: vb
(9)

100-448006-758, 972

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

It was learned the National Episcopal Church (NEC), New York City, furnished the Afro-American Society of Greater Atlanta (AASGA) funds totaling $34,000 ostensibly to improve race relations in Atlanta. NEC then retrieved the money to check status of the AASGA. Since AASGA was actually a front name for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), FBI Headquarters authorized Atlanta Office on March 11, 1969, to furnish information to this effect to Jack Tarver, President of Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia. It is unknown if anything furnished to Tarver was published.

NEC subsequently recalled this $34,000 grant from Charles E. Jenkins, leader of SNCC in Atlanta.

JTA:cah/lfj
(9)

100-448006-751, 771, 836

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

Decedent Walter Stochmal died in Ohio during 1964 and bequeathed $1,000 to "Glos Ludowy," and the remainder of his estate, after payment of just debts and other bequests, to "The Worker." "Glos Ludowy" is a pro-Polish Government foreign language newspaper published at Detroit, Michigan. "The Worker" was an east coast communist newspaper, now defunct.

On July 22, 1964, FBI Headquarters authorized anonymous communication to decedent's son-in-law John Henninger containing public source data relating to the communist backgrounds of the executor, attorney and witnesses to the will of Stochmal in effort to persuade Stochmal's surviving relatives to contest the will, thereby thwarting bequests to "Glos Ludowy" and "The Worker."

Subsequently, Mr. Henninger advised FBI he had received certain anonymous material concerning communist connections of executor, etc. On October 6, 1964, Henninger advised that the family was contesting the Stochmal will.

An entry in the Cuyahoga County Probate Court records (Ohio), dated August 16, 1965, revealed the court authorized executor to pay the surviving spouse the widow's allowance (one-third of estate). The estate at such time was valued at $12,000.

TEB:vb
(9)

100-3-104-11, 163, 165, 166, 167, 172, 176, 258

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 17, 1970, the St. Louis Office sent an anonymous letter to Richard Simon, the husband of Jane Simon. She is an officer in ACTION, a biracial black extremist group. The letter accused her of infidelity. This letter, sent to Richard Simon, was designed to confirm his suspicions about the relationship between his wife, white, and black males associated with ACTION.

It was learned that shortly after the receipt of this letter, the couple involved separated following a series of marital arguments.

EEG:lfj
(9)

100-448006-1603, 1863

Counterintelligence Programs

Between June and October, 1967, the U. S. Commissioner, Palm Beach, Florida, Edgar G. Hamilton, was advised that his son, Jan Hamilton, was active in the Klan at Okeechobee, Florida. He was also told that the Klan was holding meetings at a restaurant where the son was employed as a manager and which was partly owned by the Commissioner.

The Klan was banned from further meetings in the restaurant, the son resigned as manager of the restaurant, and a heated argument ensued between the Commissioner and his son.

WDF:dsh
(9)

157-9-29-138, 160

Counterintelligence Programs

The Chicago Division recommended in May, 1962, that Mrs. Sam Kushner, wife of Sam Kushner, Illinois Editor of "The Worker," be anonymously advised by telephone that her husband was planning to drive to Mexico with Flo Hall, Illinois Communist Party district functionary, to get a Mexican divorce without his wife's knowledge so he would be free to marry Hall. The Chicago Division advised Kushner had been trying to divorce his wife, a long-time communist and head of a local Communist Party club, but she had been fighting the divorce because of a disagreement over the property settlement.

On September 5, 1962, an informant advised Mrs. Kushner was suing Flo Hall for "depriving her and her son of livelihood" and was attempting to discredit Sam Kushner with the "People's World" where he was then employed.

RWH:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-43, 77

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 13, 1970, the Baltimore Office placed a telephone call to the Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters, San Francisco, California, during which a complaint was lodged against John Clark, Defense Captain, Baltimore, BPP. The caller complained that several of the BPP members in Baltimore had been run out of the BPP headquarters so that Clark could live alone with a white woman Malika Aigroz. The unknown woman at Panther Headquarters advised that the BPP would check this complaint out and take whatever action was necessary.

Clark was subsequently ordered by the BPP Headquarters to leave the Baltimore BPP and travel to the "coast."

ELG: vb
(9)

100-448006-1601, 1632, 1751

Counterintelligence Programs

The Boston FBI Office, on a confidential basis, furnished information to Robert Tonis, Security Officer and Chief of the Harvard University Police, Cambridge, Massachusetts, to the effect that Jared Michael Israel, whowas employed by the Harkness Commons, a Harvard University Restaurant, was involved in Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) activities.

On December 29, 1969, Mr. Tonis advised that Israel's employment was to be terminated on December 31, 1969.

ELS:ekw
(9)
100-449698-5-24

Counterintelligence Programs

On October 20, 1969, the Boston FBI Office, on a confidential basis, furnished information to Robert Tonis, Security Officer and Chief of the Harvard University Police, Cambridge, Massachusetts, to the effect that Nancy Schwarzman, Secretary, has been identified as the mistress of Michael Kazin, a Harvard Senior and Students For a Democratic Society (SDS) Committee member of the Harvard-Radcliffe Chapter.

On November 3, 1969, Mr. Tonis advised that Miss Schwarzman was no longer employed by Harvard University as of close of business October 31, 1969.

ELS:tdp (9)
100-449698-5-21

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1964, Professor Francis E. Barkman, Department of Law, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio, advised that Leon Letwin had applied for a position at the University. Barkman stated he had heard rumors that Letwin had been connected with various communist organizations. Public source material was furnished to Professor Barkman which reported Communist Party (CP) associations of Letwin.

On June 17, 1964, Professor Barkman advised that the school's Board of Trustees had decided to reject Letwin's application. The Board announced no reason for its refusal; however, Barkman attributed the rejection to public source information concerning Letwin's CP associations.

TEB: vb
(9)

100-3-104-11-145, 148, 151, 158

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 24, 1965, the Cleveland Office made available copies of Socialist Workers Party (SWP) literature relating to Rod Holt to Mr. George Dobrea, member, Cleveland Board of Education, to alert him to the association of Holt's wife, Marilyn Holt, a Cleveland schoolteacher with the SWP.

On July 2, 1965, Dobrea advised the Cleveland Office that based on this information, it did not appear that Marilyn Holt's contract would be renewed. Subsequently, her contract was not renewed.

DML:dew
(9)

100-3-104-11-202, 213, 220

Counterintelligence Programs

Public source material concerning Robert Ehrlich and his wife Cornelia Ehrlich and Victor Pasche, who were active in the Parent Teachers Association (PTA) in the Ringwood, New Jersey, public school system and allegedly were considered to have Communist Party (CP) leanings, was furnished to Chief of Police Ray Van Tassel, Ringwood, New Jersey, on April 18, 1961 and May 4, 1961.

Robert Ehrlich was not re-elected to his position with the Ringwood Library Association. Bernice Pasche, wife of Victor Pasche, was discharged from her position as a teacher in a high school in Pompton Lakes, New Jersey. Public source material concerning Victor Pasche was read at PTA meeting. Victor Pasche was vice president of the PTA.

JDM:cah (9)
100-3-104-2574
100-3-104-2991
100-3-104-31-25
100-3-104-31-23

Counterintelligence Programs

On February 28, 1968, the Miami Office confidentially alerted John Tyler, Chief, Security Section, Dade County Department of Public Instruction, Miami, Florida, that Edwin Franklin Dean, a teacher at Hays Senior High School, Miami, and an assistant minister of the Nation of Islam, Miami, was arrested and convicted for molesting women at Knoxville, Tennessee, in March, 1958.

On March 7, 1968, Mr. Tyler advised he had verified Deans' arrest and conviction in Knoxville for molesting women and that Dean has been eliminated from the Dade County School System.

VRT:ekw
(9)
100-448006-16-23

Counterintelligence Programs

In March 3, 1964, contact was made with Father James Orford, Regent of the Law School at Marquette Law School, Milwaukee, to preclude Mary's Bookshop, a communist bookshop, from placing advertising in "The Marquette Tribune," a college newspaper.

The advertisement for Mary's Bookshop was located and not published in the school newspaper.

JPM: vb
(9)

100-3-104-30-69

Counterintelligence Programs

The FBI anonymously mailed to high school and college officials newspaper articles which had been printed in "The Philadelphia Inquirer." The articles exposed the nature of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA). Articles were mailed October 13, 1964, to four high schools and two colleges in the Philadelphia area.

As of October, 1964, the principal of Germantown High School, Philadelphia, had called in members of DCA unit at the school and advised their parents of the true nature of the club. This DCA unit was considered defunct and the DCA dropped plans to grant them a charter.

RHR:vb
(9)

100-3-104-37-165
100-3-104-37-174

Counterintelligence Programs

On September 5, 1963, the Newark Office confidentially furnished Dr. R. T. Jacobsen, Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Union County High School System, Berkeley Heights, New Jersey, public source information concerning a school teacher, Joseph Edelman. This information revealed Edelman's association with the People's Rights Party, a communist influenced group.

On December 10, 1963, Dr. Jacobsen informed Newark Office that Edelman's teaching contract would not be renewed next year.

DML: vb
(9)

100-3-104-31-186, 194, 196, 223

Counterintelligence Programs

The New York FBI Office was authorized to furnish to the St. Brendan Forensic Society of St. Brendan's High School, New York, New York, appropriate public source data regarding Pete Seeger, who has been publicly identified as "the best known of all the Communist Party entertainers," in an attempt to cause his cancellation or prevent his appearance at Catholic-sponsored affairs in Brooklyn. Seeger was scheduled to appear at Brooklyn College under the sponsorship of the above high school.

On February 20, 1968, background data regarding Seeger was furnished to the Right Reverend Monsignor Raymond Rigney, Superintendent of Schools, Archdiocese of New York, 30 East 50th Street, New York City. On March 15, 1968, Monsignor Rigney stated that due to pressure of business, he was unable to inform Brooklyn Diocesan officials of Seeger's appearance at Brooklyn College, prior to his appearance. Monsignor Rigney further advised that he had prepared a memorandum for his assistants concerning Seeger's subversive background. This memorandum, according to the Monsignor, would serve to answer inquiries which may be received from any high schools or colleges in this Archdiocese of New York. This memorandum also stated that all schools should be discouraged with respect to the possible booking of Seeger to perform.

ELS:bmf
(9)

100-3-104-34-1659, 1669

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 22, 1964, the Boston Office made available to a confidential source at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, public source material regarding the communist background of Leon Letwin who was at that time a teaching fellow (law) at Harvard. At that time there was no indication that Letwin's appointment at Harvard would be extended. However, at that time he indicated a desire to obtain a position at the University of Toledo Law School. Source at Harvard University was of the opinion that the Harvard Corporation would in all probability reject any application by Letwin on the strength of the public source data furnished to Harvard. Letwin's fellowship was not reactivated at Harvard. It is noted, however, that prior to disclosure of the public source information Letwin expressed a desire to move on.

In view of this, the Cleveland Office made available to a source at the University of Toledo Law School public source data compiled by them as well as additional public source data compiled by the Boston Office regarding Letwin's communist background. Cleveland Office advised that the Board of Trustees, University of Toledo Law School, had rejected Letwin's application for employment on the strength of the public source data.

RDS:cah (9)
100-3-104-5-120-123, 137, 138

Counterintelligence Programs

On January 18, 1971, an anonymous letter was mailed by the Mobile FBI Office to Mr. Wilson M. Hawkins, Director of Operations, University of South Alabama, Mobile, Alabama, setting forth information regarding two instructors at the University of South Alabama, Larry Eugene Holmes and Lloyd Dendinger, who were supporting and giving finansial assistance to "Rearguard," an underground newspaper.

On February 3, 1971, Dr. Frederick Whiddon, President, University of South Alabama, confidentially advised that the University staff had received complaints concerning Holmes and Dendinger and, in view of this and other information he had received about these individuals, he had placed them in a probationary status, which would prevent them from getting any annual increments until he removes them from their probationary status.

JWD:tdp (9)
100-449698-61-14, 13

Counterintelligence Programs

On January 28, 1971, the Charlotte FBI Office discussed with Oscar Petty, Director of Financial Aid, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, the New Left activities of Stanley Theodore Gutman, also known as Huck, a faculty member who had made application for financial aid.

On February 2, 1971, Mr. Petty advised Gutman's request for aid had been denied, as a result of which Gutman told Mr. Petty he was withdrawing from Duke University.

ELS:dsh
(9)

100-449698-8-16

Counterintelligence Programs

On August 18, 1969, Mr. Malcom Kispert, Vice President for Academic Administration, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, Massachusetts, advised he had confidentially received from the Boston FBI Office public source material relating to Vernon Grizzard and Nicholas Egleson, who were instructors at MIT and active in New Left activities.

Mr. Kispert advised that he was able to have Grizzard's and Egleson's reappointments to the Staff of MIT cancelled.

ELS:tdp (9)
100-449698-5-17

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 25, 1970, the Charlotte FBI Office contacted Angus A. McKellar, Attorney, Northhampton County School Board, Jackson, North Carolina, and at that time information relating to the New Left activities of Joseph Holt Woodside, a faculty member, was furnished to Mr. McKellar.

On June 15, 1970, Mr. McKellar advised that Woodside had elected not to renew his teaching contract for the forthcoming year.

ELS:cah (9)
100-449698-8-14

Counterintelligence Programs

On March 23, 1965, the Newark Office was authorized to send an anonymous letter to Joseph Caviello, Principal, North Bergen High School, North Bergen, New Jersey, outlining the communist background of Elizabeth Nagy, a Communist Party member and teacher at North Bergen High School.

Dr. Herman G. Kline, Superintendent of Schools, Board of Education, North Bergen, and Caviello contacted the Newark Office, showed the anonymous letter received and asked for advice. When told no advice of this nature could be given, Dr. Kline volunteered the fact that Mrs. Nagy had tenure and could not be removed except for specific reasons. Kline advised that Mrs. Nagy would be confronted with the contents of this letter and if she admits the allegations, she would be asked to resign. Mrs. Nagy was subsequently interviewed by school authorities and agreed to resign.

DML:tdp (9)
100-3-104-31-310, 340, 349

Counterintelligence Programs

On March 6, 1970, the Albuquerque Office confidentially furnished Mr. Daryl Harrell, a former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and then Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent of the Albuquerque Public Schools, public source material setting forth Michael Otis Colvin's activities in Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at the University of New Mexico. Colvin was an applicant for a part-time position as a teacher with the Albuquerque Public School System.

On April 1, 1970, Mr. Harrell advised that primarily based on the information furnished, the Albuquerque Public School System was no longer considering Colvin's application for a part-time position as a teacher.

JWD:lfj
(9)

100-449698-62-19

Counterintelligence Program

During the Presidential Inauguration activities in Washington, D. C., January, 1969, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC), was utilizing walkie-talkies on the "citizen band" to coordinate movements and activities.

NMC communications were disrupted and confusing orders were issued when the Washington Field Office of the FBI, utilizing similar communications methods, identified with the NMC network and countermanded orders or supplied misinformation to NMC marshals.

HWP:ekw
(9)
100-449698-53, 23

Counterintelligence Programs

The "East Village Other," a bimonthly newspaper, planned to hire a pilot to "bomb" the Pentagon with flowers on October 20, 1967, the day before the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam was to hold its march in Washington, D. C. The New York Office made a number of pretext calls to the "East Village Other" wherein the caller, posing as a pilot for this venture, made inquiries regarding this venture and eventually agreed to fly the plane. It was decided to "bomb" the Pentagon on October 21, 1967. The caller arranged with Allan Katzman of the newspaper to have the Publishing-Editor-In-Chief of the "East Village Other," Walter Bowart, accompany him on this mission. The caller was to meet Bowart at the Eastern Airlines terminal at Dulles Airport at 1:45 p.m. on October 21, 1967, with 100 to 200 pounds of flowers.

Bowart and other individuals apparently connected with the "East Village Other" arrived at Eastern Airlines ticket counter at 1:00 p.m. on October 21, 1967, in a Volkswagen bus loaded with four cartons of flowers. The group waited until approximately 3:30 p.m. and finally left in disgust.

LEB:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-34-1645, 1659, 1669

Counterintelligence Programs

In January, 1967, a confidential source in the Tax Assessor's Office, Brevard County, Florida, was contacted by the FBI to cause an early tax assessment to be scheduled for properties owned by Richland Agency, a Communist Party (CP) investment group. The assessment rate on the local parcel owned by Richland Agency rose a total of $191,560 between 1966 and 1967, which should have resulted in an increased tax of $4,997 from 1966 to 1967. It is unknown whether these taxes exactly amounted to $4,997 or whether they were, in fact, paid.

JWM:bmf/cah (9)
100-3-104-64-8, 10, 11, 12

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

Robert E. Scoggins, South Carolina Grand Dragon, United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, had been receiving a veteran's pension from U. S. Government on a 100 percent disability. Despite this, he had been self-employed in the plumbing, electrical and contracting business. This information was furnished to the Veterans' Administration (VA).

VA conducted an investigation which resulted in Scoggins disability payments being discontinued.

TED: vb
(9)

157-9-18
157-1530

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

In April, 1969, the New York Office sent spurious postcards, which duplicated the type used by Rochell Kendrick, 792 Columbus Avenue, New York, New York, Chief of the New York Consulate of the Republic of New Africa (RNA), a black extremist organization, to advise members of RNA meetings. The spurious postcards were sent on short notice to reschedule or cancel RNA meetings.

The above-mentioned postcards caused disruption and suspicion among RNA members in the New York City area.

VRT: vb
(9)

100-448006-703, 903

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

The San Francisco Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office learned through an informant that Dolores Berg, common-law wife of Delmar Berg, nominal head of the Stanislaus County, California, Communist Party (CP), had made a complaint to the County Sheriff's Office that Howard Keylor, head of the CP in San Joaquin County, had committed two acts of sexual intercourse with her 16-year-old daughter, Antoinette Marie Romo, in April, 1962. Although the matter had been referred to the Stockton, California, Police Department, no action had been taken as Dolores Berg had not signed a complaint at the Police Department. The daughter did admit to the Sheriff's Office that the intercourse occurred. In May, 1962, the San Francisco FBI Office contacted Sheriff Dan Kelsay, Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office, to have his office attempt to convince Dolores Berg to sign a formal complaint with the Stockton Police Department.

Dolores Berg signed a complaint, as a result of which on May 28, 1962, Howard Keylor was arrested on a charge of Statutory Rape and was incarcerated. The arrest notice was published on May 29, 1962, in the "Stockton Daily Record," a local newspaper.

The victim failed to appear in court on May 29, 1962, and the charge was dismissed for reason of lack of direct evidence. Keylor was released.

As a result of the above action and/or attendant publicity, Howard Keylor was suspended from the Communist Party.

SECRET

RPF:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-47-43, 44, 45

Counterintelligence Programs

On May 26, 1970, the Philadelphia Office sent a letter to the national headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP) bearing an excellent facsimile of the signature of Jonathan Pinkett, a former BPP official in Philadelphia who was expelled on May 19, 1970, after falling out with the BPP leadership in Philadelphia. The letter accused the members of the BPP in Philadelphia of stealing clothing, food and drugs collected for poor children. All of the accusations in the letter were true.

Subsequent to the letter being sent to the headquarters of the organization, several chapter members were given disciplinary transfers. Headquarters had to send other members to the chapter in Philadelphia to straighten out the local situation.

EFG:tdp (9)
100-448006-1805, 1836, 1856

Counterintelligence Programs

In February, 1965, a mailing of a leaflet prepared by the FBI was made to residents, businesses and organizations in the neighborhood where the Philadelphia Clubhouse of the W. E. B. DuBois Club of America (DCA) was relocating (3260 N. Broad Street, Philadelphia). The leaflet was an announcement of the opening of the DCA and set out a disclaimer of its being a communist group. Its intent was to put anticommunist groups on notice of the DCA's presence.

The minister of a church in the area gave a sermon denouncing communism and announced that the DCA was opening an office in the neighborhood. Businesses in the area refused to publicize the opening of the DCA. Only nine persons attended the DCA open house.

RHR:bmf/jmn
(9)

100-3-104-37-190, 201, 212

Counterintelligence Programs

The Boston Office in October, 1966, furnished to a confidential source public source information relating to the communist plans to open a new bookstore in Boston known as the "Frederick Douglass Books" and the fact that Edward Teixiera, Communist Party (CP) District Organizer, will be directing the activities of the store.

As a result, the October 23, 1966, issue of the "Boston Sunday Herald" contained a photograph showing the store being picketed by members of the American Veterans Committee protesting the use of the name of the 19th Century Negro abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, for the store where Marxist books are being sold.

The "Boston Herald" issue of October 22, 1966, contained an article captioned "Red Bookstore Opens." The article featured a photograph of Edward Teixiera. The article describes Teixiera as a member of the CP by his own admission. Teixiera denied any connection between the store itself and the Party.

As a result of the notoriety achieved regarding the opening of the bookstore, Teixiera was furious and expressed great displeasure. Teixiera subsequently advised a source that the failure of the store to be the success envisioned by the CP of New England can be blamed on the adverse publicity given to the store at its opening.

RDS: vb
(9)

100-3-104-5-216, 217, 225

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

The San Francisco Office advised on September 12, 1960, that through its continuing informant coverage of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), it was aware of new subscribers to the CPUSA newspaper, "Peoples World" (PW). San Francisco instituted policy of interviewing each new subscriber to PW.

Archie Brown, a Northern California CPUSA leader, complained that a major problem in trying to increase the membership of the CPUSA is that new subscribers to the PW are interviewed by the FBI. This has caused these subscribers to drop their subscriptions and to disassociate themselves from CP members.

JDP:dsh
(9)

100-3-104-1901

SECRET

Counterintelligence Programs

Sometime prior to January 3, 1966, a talk show appearance scheduled for December, 1965, by Otis Archer Hood, Chairman, District Committee, Communist Party, USA, was cancelled by Radio Station WNAC, Boston, Massachusetts. The cancellation followed the Boston Division's providing public source information concerning Hood's Communist Party background to a confidential source.

RWH:lfj
(9)

100-3-104-5-188, 189

Counterintelligence Programs

On June 6, 1968, FBI Headquarters reminded the Detroit FBI Office to be alert to take advantage of all possible disruptive activities during the forthcoming National Convention of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which was to be held at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan.

A press release by the SAC, Detroit FBI Office, in June, 1968, of the Director's testimony concerning the New Left was made at the time of the SDS National Convention. This release was well received and several State Legislators, after visiting the SDS Convention site at Michigan State, severely criticized University officials for allowing SDS to utilize the campus. As a further result, the Michigan State Legislature, in late June, 1968, passed a resolution to the effect that state universities which permitted disruption (which occurred during the National SDS Convention) will suffer appropriation cuts in proportion to the number of students permitted to disrupt state university campuses.

ELS: vb
(9)

100-449698-15-2

146

~~SECRET~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

CONFIDENTIAL

122

The Attorney General

August 25, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. T. D. J. Brooks

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

MDR-16
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/kP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

On August 13, 1975, a former Special Agent of the FBI advised that he was interviewed by a representative of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations (SSCIO) concerning allegations by Samuel Adason Jaffe that vindictive actions taken by the FBI have prevented him from obtaining or keeping a job in the news media field. According to the SSCIO representative, Jaffe reported that he had a pleasant relationship with Special Agents of the FBI during the time he had furnished information regarding Soviet intelligence matters; however, he detected a coolness of these FBI Agents towards him after his return from Hong Kong in 1968. He attributed this coolness to his being "fingered" by Soviet defector Oleg V. Penkovskiy, who allegedly reported that he saw Jaffe's name on a piece of paper on the desk of a Soviet intelligence officer. Upon learning this, the FBI felt that Jaffe was a double agent. Since his return from Hong Kong he cannot hold a job and believes the FBI is the cause of his predicament. The former Special Agent of the FBI advised that the SSCIO representative told him he is looking into this matter to determine if Jaffe's statements are true and to determine if some controls could be created so that the FBI could not be vindictive in similar situations. (C)

Oleg V. Penkovskiy is a former Colonel in the Soviet intelligence services (SIS) who had cooperated with the West. He was arrested and tried in the Soviet Union in 1963 and reportedly was executed. (C)

CLASS. & EXT. ~~BY~~ 19320 Pwel/Kus 9-3-81
REASON - FCIM 11 ~~1-2. 4. 2~~ 2
DATE OF REVIEW ~~8-25-95~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
AUG 29 1975

105-28333

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)

TDJB:sjm/yi
(11)

~~SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

~~Classified by 4091~~
~~Exempt from GDS,~~ Categories 2 and 3
~~Date~~ of Declassification ~~Indefinite~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

DUPLICATE YELLOW

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 SEP 8 1975

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General

Jaffe, a former correspondent for ABC and CBS television networks, was an informant of our New York Office from 1958 to 1961. During this period he furnished extensive information on his numerous contacts with Soviet nationals whom he met through his assignment as a CBS correspondent at the United Nations, New York, New York. In 1961 he was assigned to Moscow, USSR, as a correspondent for ABC and served there until he was expelled in 1965 following his reporting of information unfavorable to the Soviet Union. He thereafter was transferred to Hong Kong where he served until 1968. According to information from a former SIS officer currently residing in the West, Jaffe in about 1961, while in Moscow, was recruited by the Committee for State Security (KGB). Our investigation regarding this allegation has failed to either substantiate or refute this allegation. Jaffe, however, in 1963 reported to our New York Office that while in Moscow, he was approached in what he considered an attempt at recruitment by the SIS. During interviews with Jaffe he denied any overt acts helpful to the KGB, although he admitted a continuing relationship with several KGB officers.

[No information is contained in the files of the FBI indicating Jaffe was ever reported on by Colonel Penkovskiy.] With regard to his employment difficulties, this matter was the subject of discussion with Jaffe on several occasions after his return from Hong Kong in 1968, when he explained to Special Agents in contact with him that he was experiencing difficulty in finding a job and his concern that his association with the FBI was the reason for this difficulty. On every occasion he was assured that the FBI had not disclosed his confidential relationship with the FBI. Jaffe in 1969 advised that he had learned from a British intelligence service contact in Hong Kong that his recall from that city by ABC was caused by his refusal to cooperate with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He related that he later mentioned this to a CIA contact in Washington who indicated that the British intelligence service representative had no right to relate to Jaffe this information.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General

The files of the FBI were reviewed to determine if Jaffe's allegations had any foundation in fact and no information was contained therein supporting this allegation. His observations concerning the change of attitude of FBI personnel in dealing with him to one of coolness can be accounted for on the basis of information received from the Soviet intelligence officer alleging his recruitment by the KGB. Our relationship with him thereafter was circumspect and undoubtedly he detected a change in the Agents' attitude.

Whatever employment difficulties may have been encountered by Jaffe did not arise out of any action taken by the FBI.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
        Special Counsel for
        Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

See memorandum W. A. Branigan to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated August 14, 1975, captioned "Samuel Adason Jaffe, Information Concerning."

Classified "Secret" since it discloses FBI interest in Soviet nationals and in order to protect sensitive sources of information.

Regarding W. A. Branigan to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum dated August 14, 1975, Mr. Wannall commented "Suggest memorandum to AG."

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 28 [illegible]

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

NR001 MM CODE

10:13PM IMMEDIATE AUGUST 28, 1975

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL AUGUST 26, 1975.

FORMER MIAMI ASAC FREDERICK F. FOX CONTACTED AUGUST 27, 1975 PER INSTRUCTION.

FOX'S RESIDENCE ADDRESS SHOULD BE CORRECTED IN BUREAU ~~RECORES~~ RECORDS TO 11450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI 33161.

END

VLN FBIHQ CLR

REC 5 62-116395-618

RECORDED
12 SEP 2 1975

cc. 67-120166 (Fox)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALMKP

84 SEP 4 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 8/6/75

Transmit the following in ____________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714) (P)

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Re Bureau teletypes dated 7/30/75 and 7/31/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM reflecting interview of SA EARL M. PETERSEN by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member LESTER SEIDEL on 7/31/75.

Extra cc destroyed

REC-56

(2) - Bureau (Encls. 8) (RM)
2 - San Diego

EX 104

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-616

EMP:bk
(4)

16 AUG 11 1975

1-9063

Records
cc - Personnel file

62-116395

PERSONNEL RECORDS

29 SEP 17 1975

Approved: ____________________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ____________ M Per ____________

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY 5L2AUKP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Special Agent (SA) Earl M. Petersen was interviewed at the San Diego office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on July 31, 1975, by U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel. The interview began at 10:05 A.M. and ended at 11:35 A.M. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger was available nearby for consultation. He was not consulted during the interview.

Prior to the interview, SA Petersen had been advised by San Diego FBI officials that FBI Headquarters had waived the employee agreement not to furnish information for the purpose of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

SA Petersen was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source; that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques; or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

SA Petersen was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see appendix).

ENCLOSURE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-616

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Lester Seidel identified himself to SA Petersen and stated that he was not warning SA Petersen of his rights as the interview was such that such a warning was not required. He advised SA Petersen that he did not have to talk to him and that any information furnished was on a voluntary basis. He stated that information furnished to him would be handled with discretion.

Mr. Seidel: Were you in charge of the COINTELPRO in San Diego from March, 1968 through October, 1968?

SA Petersen: This was possible but the dates the program was assigned to me are not recalled.

Mr. Seidel: What was the name of the squad to which you were assigned at that time?

SA Petersen: The Security Squad.

Mr. Seidel: Who did the squad investigate? Was it groups such as US, Inc. (see appendix) and the BPP?

SA Petersen: Yes, such groups as US, Inc., the BPP, and the Nation of Islam (NOI) (see appendix).

Mr. Seidel: And possibly splinter groups?

SA Petersen: Yes, groups that would form and disband and which could possibly be called splinter groups.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel:	How long have you been in the Bureau?
SA Petersen:	Twenty-four years as of June 25, 1975.
Mr. Seidel:	Where have you been assigned?
SA Petersen:	In Boston, Baltimore, New York, Tampa, and San Diego.
Mr. Seidel:	The Bureau has indicated that you were a coordinator of the COINTELPRO in San Diego. As such, what were your duties?
SA Petersen:	The duties for the most part consisted of preparing letters to the Bureau asking for authority to take some specific action in the program; awaiting the reply from the Bureau; and then, if any action was taken, to advise the Bureau of the results of such action. It is noted that many of the requests to take specific action were turned down by the Bureau.
Mr. Seidel:	Were you the focal point of the program?
SA Petersen:	Yes, in the sense that any idea for action to be taken in the program was transmitted to the Bureau for approval by me and if approval was received, it would be related to whomever had suggested the activity. I would then report any results to the Bureau.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel:	Did you get heavy pressure from Bureau officials to take action in this program?
SA Petersen:	Not any more than any other case, and I had a number of other cases assigned to me at the time the COINTELPRO was assigned to me.
Mr. Seidel:	What type of things did you do?
SA Petersen:	I do not recall at this time any specific action taken in the program. I do recall that a Black Panther leader, Walter Wallace, was removed as leader of the party in San Diego. I believe it was suspected that he might have cooperated with the FBI. This could have been accomplished by interviewing him where the interview could be seen by other party members. If the Agents shook his hand, smiled, and acted like he was a friend, it might plant the seed of suspicion in the minds of other BPP members. I do not recall specifically whether this happened but at any rate, Wallace was not trusted and was removed as leader of the party.
Mr. Seidel:	Could such a thing get Wallace killed or injured?

SA Petersen: I do not see how it would because there would be no way anyone could determine whether or not Wallace was, in fact, cooperating with the FBI. He was probably removed by the BPP as a precautionary measure. I cannot recall whether or not Wallace was removed while I was coordinator of the program.

Mr. Seidel: Was COINTELPRO successful?

SA Petersen: I was not too impressed with its success in San Diego while I had it assigned to me because it was a new program and it took some time to get it established and working. Most of the success was probably due to information obtained regarding criminal violations, mostly local in nature, which was furnished to local law enforcement officers, causing the arrest of BPP members. This would have been done whether or not we had a COINTELPRO. It was necessary to prepare a letter to the Bureau asking authority to take action and then wait for a reply authorizing the activity. Many times suggested COINTELPRO activity suggestions would be turned down.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel made available Xerox copies of Bureau letters captioned, "Counter-Intelligence Program; Black Nationalist - Hate Groups," dated August 25, 1967 and March 4, 1968. These were read by SA Petersen, who said he could not specifically recall reading the letters.

Mr. Seidel:	Was contact with the police formal or informal?
SA Petersen:	Contact was personal or telephonic contact and at one time, information furnished to individual officers was confirmed by letter to the Chief of Police. It is not recalled if this was the policy during the time COINTELPRO was assigned to me.
Mr. Seidel:	What happened to SA Roy Burns?
SA Petersen:	He was transferred to the Butte, Montana Field Office.
Mr. Seidel:	Did he do anything wrong? I understand Agents were sometimes transferred to Butte as a disciplinary measure.
SA Petersen:	SA Burns wanted to be transferred to Butte and requested the transfer. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Mr. Evans, was transferred there and may have helped SA Burns get moved there.
Mr. Seidel:	How old is Bob Baker:
SA Petersen:	Probably 51 or 52 years old.

Mr. Seidel: Did he retire early?

SA Petersen: No. He was in a position to retire and retired because he wanted to take advantage of a cost of living increase by retiring prior to a certain date, such as June 30.

Mr. Seidel: Were the BPP and US, Inc. both violence oriented groups?

SA Petersen: Very definitely. There was extreme friction between the BPP and US, Inc. at all times.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some caricatures used in connection with COINTELPRO?

SA Petersen: Yes.

Mr. Seidel: Who had the program at that time?

SA Petersen: I believe SA Burns had it then.

Mr. Seidel: What were the cartoons?

SA Petersen: I recall seeing them but do not recall any specific cartoon.

Mr. Seidel: Do you think anything done in COINTELPRO could have had a reaction causing someone to kill an individual in the other group?

SA Petersen: Because of the extreme antagonism between the two groups, anything we did would have had about the same effect as a gnat biting an elephant. I do not think COINTELPRO had that kind of impact.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Did you ever supervise any technical installation or electronic surveillance of the BPP in San Diego?

SA Petersen: No. I don't recall anything like that being done here.

Mr. Seidel: How would you feel about writing a letter to a wife saying her husband was sleeping with various other women if the husband was a BPP leader?

SA Petersen: I would hesitate to do this because it might break up a family. If the facts were true and this might cause the BPP leader to be less effective, it would probably be a good counterintelligence move.

Mr. Seidel: I am referring to Page 91 of a BPP COINTELPRO summary which indicates that a BPP leader was living with a white girl and an anonymous letter was written to others in the BPP saying that this individual was living with a white girl. Do you recall anything about that?

SA Petersen: I believe that leader could have been Kenneth Denmon in San Diego. I recall that he was living with a white woman and that others in the BPP were made aware of this in some manner. The BPP in San

SA Petersen (continued): Diego was teaching children to hate and kill police officers. They planned violent criminal acts and were making plans to take over the established government at the first opportunity. If a leader of such a group could be discredited and removed, it would help to keep the group from becoming stronger, as they would have to select a new leader, and he would have to get the group reorganized. Denmon had many additional weaknesses which could be used in a counter-intelligence program.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall a letter being sent to BPP Headquarters saying a leader of the BPP was cooperating with the police in Los Angeles?

SA Petersen: I do not recall such a letter.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some cards being sent to San Diego from Los Angeles saying, "Ron Karenga is impotent"?

SA Petersen: No, I do not recall such cards. Ron Karenga was a leader of US, Inc., not the BPP.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall that cartoons were to be sent to BPP members to discredit the leaders?

SA Petersen: I recall the cartoons but do not recall whether they were sent to BPP members.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall an anonymous letter being sent to the Catholic Church to have the priest of the church where the BPP breakfast program was operated removed from his office?

SA Petersen: I do not recall such an anonymous letter; however, I do recall that the priest was transferred by the church.

Mr. Seidel: Knowing that the BPP paper was a paper that taught and advocated violence and had cartoons in it that encouraged the killing of police officers by blacks and was a violence oriented paper, how would you feel about putting a corrosive liquid on the paper to keep it from being distributed?

SA Petersen: I would not do it as I would feel that it was a violation of the law and too drastic. I would not do it personally or personally approve of it.

Mr. Seidel: You have been very helpful and the information you have provided will be used in considering new legislation at some time in the future.

SA Petersen: In these tranquil times, it disturbs me greatly to read in the papers and to hear news broadcasts containing all kinds of allegations against the FBI and the CIA and

SA Petersen (continued):	other intelligence agencies. I like to work within the law and to be guided by legislation in my work. I would, however, hate to see such restrictive legislation passed that at some time in the future when we might be faced with violence-prone organizations trying to take control of the government, we would be unable to properly handle our responsibility for the internal security of the United States.
Mr. Seidel:	Thank you for your cooperation.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Formerly Known As
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

The Black Panther Party (BPP), organized in December, 1966, at Oakland, California, by Huey P. Newton and Bobby George Seale, has the publicly-stated purpose of organizing black people to take control of the life, politics and destiny of the black community. The Party, operating the Black Panther Intercommunal News Service, publishes a newspaper called "The Black Panther," which at one time openly advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in a revolutionary program to end the oppression of the black people but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival program pending revolution. BPP national headquarters, aka Black Panther Intercommunal Headquarters, is located in Oakland, California.

While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order. Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 1973, issue of "Playboy" magazine, stated the Panthers' chief ambition is to change the American Government by any means necessary but that ultimately such change will be through armed violence.

Despite its claimed dedication to community service, indicators of the BPP's continued attraction to violence persist. Since July, 1974, Newton and other BPP members have been arrested in Oakland, California, for threatening police officers, murder of a 17-year-old female and the pistol whipping of Newton's tailor. Newton failed to appear on these charges and is now a local fugitive. Additionally, one died and three were wounded as a result of a shooting at a BPP-sponsored dance in Oakland, California, in October, 1974.

APPENDIX

"US"
Also Known As
"US", Incorporated

"US" was chartered by the State of California as a non-profit corporation in September, 1966, with offices at 8211 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California. The corporation alleges that "US" is primarily an Afro-American cultural organization.

During the spring of 1968, however, a source advised that MAULANA RON KARENGA, true name RONIE MC KINLEY EVERETT, Founder-Chairman of "US", published a booklet entitled "The Quotable Karenga", in which he talked of revolution, black power, and condemned Christianity for the plight of the black man.

In this booklet, KARENGA stated "...You must have a cultural revolution before the violent revolution. The cultural revolution gives identity, purpose, and direction. ...The revolution being fought now is a revolution to win the minds of our people. If we fail to win this, we cannot wage the violent one. ...When the word is given, we'll see how tough you are. When it's 'burn', let's see how much you blow up. And when it's 'take that white girl's head too', we'll see how tough you are..."

The above source advised that "US" members are required to study and memorize this booklet. "US" members are also assigned Swahili names which they use in lieu of their given names.

A second source advised that KARENGA had spoken at various meetings in Los Angeles at which time he talked of creating an "US" army of 1,000 men, obtaining weapons and ammunition, guerrilla warfare tactics, and revolution. KARENGA also stated "The only way to get life is to take a life and as we get stronger, we will take what we want from the white man's United States." He also stated that if the police killed any "US" members, the "US" organization would kill some of them.

APPENDIX CONTINUED

The first source above advised that KARENGA also stated that race riots throughout the country were not riots but were actually revolts or revolutions and that the black people were going to win their freedom by violence, if necessary.

A third source advised that KARENGA stated that a revolution would take place in the future and that no one can believe in black revolution without believing in armed conflict because the two go hand in hand.

A fourth source advised in August, 1974, that the US Organization has been evicted from its headquarters at 4302 South Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles, and because of lack of funds, has been unable to locate a new meeting place. The organization has terminated all public meetings.

APPENDIX

Revised 5/22/75

NATION OF ISLAM (NOI)
CHARACTERIZATION OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION
EXTREMIST MATTER

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is a black nationwife organization headquartered at Muhammad's Temple #2, 7351 South Stony Island Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Elijah Muhammad, self-styled "Messenger of Allah" and divinely appointed leader of the black race in America, was leader of the NOI until his death on February 25, 1975, at which time his son, Wallace D. Muhammad, became Supreme Minister of the NOI. The NOI seeks a separate black nation, espouses its own version of the Islamic Religion, and has considered all "whites" to be devils; however, Wallace D. Muhammad in an interview published in "Muhammad Speaks", March 21, 1975, same being a weekly and the official NOI newspaper, stated there would no longer be stress put on the white people's status as "devils"; that whites have "begun to reform" and "The past is the past until it is dug up. We will not dig it up." NOI official policy instructs members to obey laws of the United States that do not conflict with NOI laws; to defend NOI officials, property, women, and themselves at all costs, if attacked; and to disarm any attacker and use the attacker's weapon against him.

The NOI body is broken down into: 1) the Fruit of Islam (FOI), an all male military-type group, to which instruction in judo and karate is given, and which has as its mmission security of officials, membership, and property of the NOI, and enforcing discipline in the NOI; and 2) the Muslim Girls Training (MGT), an all female quasi military-type group which has as its mission homemaking and child guidance in accordance with NOI teachings.

NOI activity is widespread among black inmates in many prisons in the United States. In recent years internal dissidence and difficulties with rival Muslim groups and other adversaries have produced considerable violence, some involving physical confrontations and acts of violence with law enforcement agencies.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

2

FBI

Date: 8/5/75

Transmit the following in ________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
(ATT: INTD-W.O. CREGAR)

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714) (P)

SUBJECT: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA LAWRENCE F. WIRICK
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

ReButeletype to LA dated 7/31/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and seven copies of an LHM regarding captioned titles.

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Extra cc's destroyed 1-4063

ENCLOSURE

Appendix [illegible] all refs to appendix deleted [illegible] [illegible] 8

2-Bureau (Encls. 8) (RM)
2-San Diego

LFW/asc
(4)

Typo corrections made on pp 1 & 6 (SD) telephonically 8/13/75 ASAC Barker

REC-56

62-116395-615

62-116395

EX 104

AUG 11 1975

Return to Personnel files

79 SEP 1 1975

W. O. Cregar

FILE

8/18/75

Approved: ________________
Special Agen[illegible]arge

Sent ________________ M Per ________________

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 5, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

By communication dated July 30, 1975, Clarence M. Kelley, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, advised as follows concerning an interview by representative of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) of ~~and~~ Special Agent (SA) Lawrence F. Wirick, concerning Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and Bureau investigation of the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see Appendix page). Director Kelley stated as follows:

"I have waived your employment agreements for purposes of these interviews. Each should note that he has the right to counsel; however, the FBI is unable to provide private counsel. There are certain privileged areas concerning which SAs would not be required to answer questions. Areas concern information which might divulge identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect on-going FBI investigations; and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-615

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

On July 31, 1975, at 11:45 a.m. Mr. Lester Seidel of the United States Senate Select Committee (SSC) interviewed SA Lawrence F. Wirick at the San Diego Office of the FBI. No Advice of Rights was furnished SA Wirick and it was not necessary for the interviewee to consult with an FBI representative. The interview was terminated at 12:50 p.m. and as best recalled included the following discussion in the form of questions and answers:

Seidel: You understand that this is an informal interview and is in connection with the Bureau's COINTELPRO as it relates to the FBI investigation of the BPP?

Wirick: Yes, but for what purpose is the Senate conducting this survey?

Seidel: To aid in formation of new legislation so that the FBI and other Government agencies will have more definite guidelines to follow.

Wirick: I believe the Congress already through lack of information, isolated instances and some hysteria has enacted too many restrictive laws that prevent the FBI and other Government agencies from protecting the law abiding element of our society from the "bad guys".

Seidel: (He was in general agreement) Did you handle the COINTELPRO from 1970 through March, 1971?

Wirick: Yes, but I believe the BPP ceased to function locally about November or December, 1970. As I recall my function was to write a progress type letter regarding progress which described the illegal activities of members of the BPP and to report that this information had been furnished local police agencies but information generally emanated from confidential informants.

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Seidel: What type of illegal activities and did your program in any way instigate illegal activities on the part of the BPP?

Wirick: Criminal acts committed by local members of the BPP are what I was referring to. I don't believe it was ever necessary to instigate any illegal acts or in any way entrap BPP members in criminal acts. The majority of local BPP members were thieves, narcotics addicts, lazy, unemployed and were hero worshipers of the BPP in Oakland, California. They wanted to emulate the Oakland organization, but their own dishonesty, et cetera, was a constant source of turmoil amongst the local group.

I recall, date unknown, information was received regarding Kenny Denmon (Kenneth Lee Denmon), one time head of the local BPP, that he was using stolen credit cards.

Information was received that Walter Wallace (Walter Carl Wallace, Jr.) was on narcotics and that he and his wife, Velma, were stealing to get money for narcotics and that Velma's mother was also involved in local thefts.

All above information was furnished local law agencies and local arrests were made. Furnishing the above type of information is a function and responsibility of the FBI.

The BPP in San Diego was very effective in causing their own problems and their own extinction and their criminal activities were not restricted to the examples I've given.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO try to disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program?

Wirick: No, not to my knowledge. I recall that soon after the Breakfast Program was started that other members of the BPP accused Ken Denmon of stealing money from contributions made to the Program.

On second thought I believe we did disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program in that we received complaints from several dairys and bread companies, et cetera, that they had been approached by BPP members with veiled threats of extortion if they did not donate quantities of food, et cetera, to the BPP Breakfast Program. The FBI and local police investigated and I believe as a result their practices were discontinued, but the investigation failed to establish a prosecutable offense of extortion.

Seidel: Did you have any connection with distribution of "cartoons" depicting BPP members as compromising each other, et cetera?

Wirick: No, but I have seen "cartoons" in the BPP newspaper. Have you ever seen or read copies of the BPP newspaper?

Seidel: No

Wirick: They featured "cartoons" showing the "pigs" (police) being killed, stabbed, et cetera. I believe I recall seeing some "cartoons" showing how the BPP would kill the "honkies" (white people). They were similar to the propaganda leaflets used by the Nazis against American troops before an attack. The articles in the BPP newspaper were even more foul.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO promote dissen~~t~~sion between the BPP and the US Group (see Appendix page)?

Wirick: Not to my knowledge. As I recall there was never any need to. They were constantly at odds with each other and on a gang type basis were trying to eliminate each other. I believe Sylvester Bell, a San Diego BPP member was killed by an US Group member and John Savage, another local BPP member was killed by an US Group member.

In Los Angeles two other BPP members, names not recalled, were allegedly killed by US Group members. I believe this led to the popular saying in Southeast San Diego section where most blacks live that the score (game) was, "US 4 - BPP 0".

Seidel: What do you think of the merits of a proposal to spray shipments of the BPP newspaper with a noxious acid so that readers would be confronted with a vile odor when attempting to read the paper?

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Wirick: After thought, no. Because the paper itself was so vile and anti-white that the odor would never stop BPP members from reading same. I've always hoped that a large segment of the population, especially the "do-gooders" could or would experience the nauseous reaction I have felt after reading the illiterate, foul-mouthed, anti-white, anti-Government, BPP paper. I think everybody should read a copy of the BPP paper so that they will know the type and character of BPP members.

Seidel: What do you think about anonymous letters sent to spouses of BPP members saying the husband was sleeping with a white girl, et cetera?

Wirick: Most wives of the members I recall were also BPP members and/or common-law-wives. Many BPP members did have liaison with white girls but I doubt if such a letter would bother most spouses of BPP members. However, such a letter might be of value under certain circumstances, example: the stories that were spread during World War II which were not necessarily all true regarding Hitler, Mussolini, General Patton and others.

Seidel: In your opinion was the COINTELPRO of any value? Should it be changed? Do you have any suggestions for changes, or should it be eliminated completely?

Wirick: Yes, as I recall, it acted as a progress letter of the BPP, its direction, its dissen~~t~~sion, its change in leadership, and indications of its slow local demise because of the character of the local BPP members, and as a summary of its activities for FBIHQ. I recall that

we made certain requests to conduct some types of counterintelligence against the BPP, but I do not recall that the Bureau ever authorized any counterintelligence act which might be productive.

Change? COINTELPRO is not being utilized to the best of my knowledge and has not been for some time.

I believe that in about two or three years Congress will be frantically asking the FBI why we did not furnish them intelligence, advance knowledge of a demonstration, a riot and other civil unrest and elimination of the COINTELPRO has been another step in the direction of placing the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in a position where we cannot react to the activities of groups such as the BPP which have been formed with the main purpose of overthrowing the United States.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Formerly Known As
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

The Black Panther Party (BPP), organized in December, 1966, at Oakland, California, by Huey P. Newton and Bobby George Seale, has the publicly-stated purpose of organizing black people to take control of the life, politics and destiny of the black community. The Party, operating the Black Panther Intercommunal News Service, publishes a newspaper called "The Black Panther," which at one time openly advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in a revolutionary program to end the oppression of the black people but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival program pending revolution. BPP national headquarters, aka Black Panther Intercommunal Headquarters, is located in Oakland, California.

While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order. Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 1973, issue of "Playboy" magazine, stated the Panthers' chief ambition is to change the American Government by any means necessary but that ultimately such change will be through armed violence.

Despite its claimed dedication to community service, indicators of the BPP's continued attraction to violence persist. Since July, 1974, Newton and other BPP members have been arrested in Oakland, California, for threatening police officers, murder of a 17-year-old female and the pistol whipping of Newton's tailor. Newton failed to appear on these charges and is now a local fugitive. Additionally, one died and three were wounded as a result of a shooting at a BPP-sponsored dance in Oakland, California, in October, 1974.

APPENDIX

"US"
Also Known As
"US", Incorporated

"US" was chartered by the State of California as a non-profit corporation in September, 1966, with offices at 8211 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California. The corporation alleges that "US" is primarily an Afro-American cultural organization.

During the spring of 1968, however, a source advised that MAULANA RON KARENGA, true name RONIE MC KINLEY EVERETT, Founder-Chairman of "US", published a booklet entitled "The Quotable Karenga", in which he talked of revolution, black power, and condemned Christianity for the plight of the black man.

In this booklet, KARENGA stated "...You must have a cultural revolution before the violent revolution. The cultural revolution gives identity, purpose, and direction. ...The revolution being fought now is a revolution to win the minds of our people. If we fail to win this, we cannot wage the violent one. ...When the word is given, we'll see how tough you are. When it's 'burn', let's see how much you blow up. And when it's 'take that white girl's head too', we'll see how tough you are..."

The above source advised that "US" members are required to study and memorize this booklet. "US" members are also assigned Swahili names which they use in lieu of their given names.

A second source advised that KARENGA had spoken at various meetings in Los Angeles at which time he talked of creating an "US" army of 1,000 men, obtaining weapons and ammunition, guerrilla warfare tactics, and revolution. KARENGA also stated "The only way to get life is to take a life and as we get stronger, we will take what we want from the white man's United States." He also stated that if the police killed any "US" members, the "US" organization would kill some of them.

APPENDIX CONTINUED

The first source above advised that KARENGA also stated that race riots throughout the country were not riots but were actually revolts or revolutions and that the black people were going to win their freedom by violence, if necessary.

A third source advised that KARENGA stated that a revolution would take place in the future and that no one can believe in black revolution without believing in armed conflict because the two go hand in hand.

A fourth source advised in August, 1974, that the US Organization has been evicted from its headquarters at 4302 South Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles, and because of lack of funds, has been unable to locate a new meeting place. The organization has terminated all public meetings.

FD-[illegible] v. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 8/6/75

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KLP

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714) (C)

SUBJECT: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Re Bureau teletypes 7/30/75 and 7/31/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM reflecting the interview of former SA ROBERT S. BAKER by SSC Staff Member LESTER SEIDEL.

The information in the enclosed LHM was voluntarily furnished to SA EARL M. PETERSEN by former SA BAKER.

ASAC Barger SD, telephonically advised that SD inadvertently failed to send the 7 copies.
8/13/75 B

Appendix ltr & all refs to appendix deleted prior to dissem. B

62-116395-614

Extra cc's destroyed 1-4063

REC-56

EX 104

18 AUG 1975

62-116395

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Enc. 8

ENCLOSURE

Ref: cc - Personnel file

(2) - Bureau (Enc. 8) (RM)
1 - San Diego
EMP:sp
(3)

79 SEP 17 1975

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Former Special Agent Robert S. Baker was interviewed at his home at 4268 Hortensia, San Diego, California, by U.S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel on August 1, 1975. The interview began at 10:30 AM and lasted until 12:30 PM. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), San Diego, California, was telephonically available for consultation. Former Special Agent Baker did not consult with anyone during the course of the interview.

Prior to the interview, Former Special Agent Baker had been advised that FBI Headquarters had waived the agreement as a former employee not to furnish information received during the period of his employment, for purposes of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source, that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques, or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see appendix).

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-611

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Seidel identified himself to Mr. Baker, stating that the interview would be in the form of an informal discussion and that information furnished by Mr. Baker would be placed in a memorandum for the SSC. Mr. Seidel stated that he did not intend to use the names of individuals interviewed in his memorandum. He stated that Mr. Baker did not have to talk to him, and that any information he furnished would be furnished voluntarily.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker was a supervisor with the San Diego Office of the FBI from sometime in 1968 through April, 1971.

Mr. Baker advised that he was a supervisor of the security squad but could not recall if the dates mentioned by Mr. Seidel were correct.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to the nature of matters supervised by him, to which Mr. Baker replied that matters such as investigation of the Communist Party (see appendix), the Socialist Workers Party (see appendix), the Black Panther Party, US, Incorporated (see appendix), the Nation of Islam (see appendix), Espionage, Sabotage matters, and other investigations were conducted on the squad supervised by him, which consisted of from 12 to 15 Special Agents.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker supervised the COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker advised that he did supervise this program which was initiated by FBI Headquarters and not on the field office level. He stated that as he recalled, a letter was submitted either monthly, quarterly or semi-annually. The letter was submitted by a Special Agent whose case load was such that he could take the time to prepare the letter.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Special Agent Roy Burns was more of a young, eager, type Agent.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Baker replied that this was not true but that Special Agent Burns had been assigned the COINTELPRO case because his case load was such that he was able to handle the program.

Mr. Seidel inquired whether Special Agent Roy Burns was transferred to the Butte Office of the FBI for disciplinary reasons.

Mr. Baker replied that Special Agent Burns was originally from Washington State and had wanted to be transferred to that area.

Mr. Seidel asked if the Bureau encouraged Agents to participate in disruptive programs and then rewarded them financially for their efforts.

Mr. Baker replied that the Bureau had an incentive award program, and if an Agent did a good job in any field, he could get recognition through an incentive award. Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall any award being given as a result of COINTELPRO activity.

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he could recall any information concerning the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that the operation of the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP was followed through sources. They advised that some of the BPP officials were stealing money from funds which were to be spent on the breakfast program. The breakfast program was served at a local Catholic church. Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that an official of the Catholic church in San Diego was contacted regarding the priest in charge of the church where the breakfast program was being held, who was reportedly an alcoholic. Mr. Seidel was advised that the priest was transferred from the church.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked what Mr. Baker's definition of the COINTELPRO was.

Mr. Baker replied that the COINTELPRO was a disruptive type program.

Mr. Seidel stated that the FBI had apparently written a letter regarding a white girl friend of Kenneth Denman, a BPP leader in San Diego. He inquired as to why this letter was written.

Mr. Baker stated that Denman was considered one of the stronger leaders of the San Diego Branch of the BPP, and if it was possible to keep him from becoming a strong leader, it would be disruptive to the party. The fact that Denman was living with a white girl was considered derogatory toward him by BPP members in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether such activity would have been taken against a leader in an organization such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) (see description) if the leader of such a group had been living with a white woman. Would such a letter be appropriate?

Mr. Baker replied that he did not feel that such a letter would be appropriate in this case because this organization involved a religious leader and our program was not directed at religious groups but was directed toward black militant and extremist groups.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker recalled individuals in the BPP named Tate, Wallace, Denman and Bell.

Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall anything specific about any of these individuals, except what he had previously stated concerning Denman. He said he could recall the names but nothing more concerning these individuals.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then mentioned an incident wherein the San Diego Office of the FBI had furnished information to the Los Angeles Office of the FBI for transmission to local authorities concerning a group of BPP members from San Diego who were traveling to Los Angeles to attend a funeral.

Mr. Baker stated that he could recall that such an incident occurred and that information was furnished stating that BPP members from San Diego would be carrying concealed weapons. He said he thought the furnishing of this information resulted in some of the BPP members being arrested in Los Angeles.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker could recall someone from the FBI in San Diego visiting the mother of a girl who was an alleged member of the BPP in San Diego, and whether the FBI went to the mother to put pressure on another member of the family.

Mr. Baker stated that he vaguely recalled such a case but could not recall the details and could not be certain this had occurred.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether the FBI had any technical surveillances on the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker stated that he knew of none and added that such coverage was not needed in San Diego because there were good sources in the BPP who could furnish excellent coverage. Mr. Baker stated that he believes he would have known of any such installations covering the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker knew of San Francisco using any such techniques against the BPP.

Mr. Baker replied that he believed that San Francisco had used such techniques.

Mr. Seidel then asked why such techniques were not used in San Diego if they were used in San Francisco.

Mr. Baker replied that such techniques were not needed in San Diego due to the good source coverage of party activity.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether there was a conflict between US, Incorporated, and the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that US, Incorporated, headquarters were in Los Angeles. There was a power struggle between the two groups for membership of blacks and much travel occurred by US, Incorporated, leaders from Los Angeles to San Diego and Mexico, and from San Diego to Los Angeles. There were considerable conflict between the two groups.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled Ron Karenga.

Mr. Baker replied that he did recall Ron Karenga as being the Los Angeles leader of US, Incorporated.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled some cards stating "Ron Karenga is impotent" which were printed in Los Angeles and some of which might have been sent to San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that he does not recall these cards but this could have been correct.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker recalled some cartoons being drawn concerning the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that there were two or three cartoons prepared depicting strife between US, Incorporated, and the BPP.

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then stated that these cartoons were prepared by the Bureau Laboratory.

Mr. Baker stated that he did not recall.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that US, Incorporated, and the BPP were led by and made up of people with extensive criminal records, and because of this and their general demeanor, the FBI did not really have to provoke or disrupt them because they kept themselves in a constant state of turmoil. He stated that Special Agents connected with the COINTELPRO did not devote much time to the program because of heavy case loads of other matters and because they assisted in working criminal matters such as bank robberies and other criminal violations.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that a great deal of time was spent by the Special Agents working with their sources because they had to be extremely careful that they were protected. If a crime was planned and a source had knowledge of it, the source would try to keep the crime from being committed. If it was not possible to prevent the crime, the source might be forced to participate, and if arrested, a problem would be created in attempting to get the source out of jail and still conceal his identity as a source.

Mr. Seidel inquired of Mr. Baker as to the names of the Agents he dealt with in Los Angeles and San Francisco in connection with COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that Supervisor Albert Clark had something to do with the program in San Francisco, and in Los Angeles he dealt with Supervisor Richard Bloeser and Bill Knowland.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he was acquainted with Richard Held.

Mr. Baker stated that Richard Held was assigned as Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego, and he knew him at that time. He stated that he is aware that Richard Held is now the Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Office of the FBI.

Mr. Seidel stated to Mr. Baker that he was going to interview Assistant Director Robert Gebhardt and Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates.

This concluded the interview of former Special Agent Robert S. Baker by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was an organization founded by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., with the theme of new life for poor people. Dr. King, a leader in civil rights, was assassinated on April 4, 1969.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Formerly Known As
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

The Black Panther Party (BPP), organized in December, 1966, at Oakland, California, by Huey P. Newton and Bobby George Seale, has the publicly-stated purpose of organizing black people to take control of the life, politics and destiny of the black community. The Party, operating the Black Panther Intercommunal News Service, publishes a newspaper called "The Black Panther," which at one time openly advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in a revolutionary program to end the oppression of the black people but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival program pending revolution. BPP national headquarters, aka Black Panther Intercommunal Headquarters, is located in Oakland, California.

While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order. Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 1973, issue of "Playboy" magazine, stated the Panthers' chief ambition is to change the American Government by any means necessary but that ultimately such change will be through armed violence.

Despite its claimed dedication to community service, indicators of the BPP's continued attraction to violence persist. Since July, 1974, Newton and other BPP members have been arrested in Oakland, California, for threatening police officers, murder of a 17-year-old female and the pistol whipping of Newton's tailor. Newton failed to appear on these charges and is now a local fugitive. Additionally, one died and three were wounded as a result of a shooting at a BPP-sponsored dance in Oakland, California, in October, 1974.

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

Title 50, U. S. Code, Section 781 (Internal Security Act of 1950) stated that, as a result of evidence adduced before various committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, Congress found the existence of a world communist revolutionary movement, whose purpose is to establish a communist totalitarian dictatorship in the world's countries through the medium of a world-wide communist organization. Communist action organizations in various countries endeavor to carry out the objectives of the world communist movement by bringing about the overthrow of existing governments by any means. The communist organization in the United States - the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) - pursuing its stated objectives, presents "a clear and present danger to the security of the United States." The Subversive Activities Control Board, established by Section 791 of the above Act, found the CPUSA to be a communist action organization. This finding was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in June, 1961. The CPUSA has continued to be an arm of the international communist movement dominated by the Soviet Union. The CPUSA, in its dependence on the Soviet Union, has never knowingly adopted a position contrary to Soviet policy. Its leaders frequently confer with Soviet leaders to receive guidance and direction on the policies the CPUSA is to follow. There has been no evidence that the primary aims of the CPUSA, as they conform to Soviet objectives, have changed over the years.

/

APPENDIX

Revised 5/22/75

NATION OF ISLAM (NOI)
CHARACTERIZATION OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION
EXTREMIST MATTER

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is a black nationwife organization headquartered at Muhammad's Temple #2, 7351 South Stony Island Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Elijah Muhammad, self-styled "Messenger of Allah" and divinely appointed leader of the black race in America, was leader of the NOI until his death on February 25, 1975, at which time his son, Wallace D. Muhammad, became Supreme Minister of the NOI. The NOI seeks a separate black nation, espouses its own version of the Islamic Religion, and has considered all "whites" to be devils; however, Wallace D. Muhammad in an interview published in "Muhammad Speaks", March 21, 1975, same being a weekly and the official NOI newspaper, stated there would no longer be stress put on the white people's status as "devils"; that whites have "begun to reform" and "The past is the past until it is dug up. We will not dig it up." NOI official policy instructs members to obey laws of the United States that do not conflict with NOI laws; to defend NOI officials, property, women, and themselves at all costs, if attacked; and to disarm any attacker and use the attacker's weapon against him.

The NOI body is broken down into: 1) the Fruit of Islam (FOI), an all male military-type group, to which instruction in judo and karate is given, and which has as its mmission security of officials, membership, and property of the NOI, and enforcing discipline in the NOI; and 2) the Muslim Girls Training (MGT), an all female quasi military-type group which has as its mission homemaking and child guidance in accordance with NOI teachings.

NOI activity is widespread among black inmates in many prisons in the United States. In recent years internal dissidence and difficulties with rival Muslim groups and other adversaries have produced considerable violence, some involving physical confrontations and acts of violence with law enforcement agencies.

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is a revolutionary, Trotskyist-communist organization, which is headquartered in New York City. Its purpose, as stated in its Declaration of Principles, is the overthrow of the U. S. Government and the institution of a dictatorship of the working class and the eventual achievement of a communist society. It was founded in 1938 and maintains close association with international Trotskyist organizations as a "sympathizing" group, but it denies formal membership in any foreign group to escape application of the Voorhis Act, which regulates certain types of organizations subject to foreign control. While the SWP does not openly advocate the use of violence at the present time to overthrow the U. S. Government, it believes that eventual violent revolution in the U. S. is inevitable. Its objection to the current use of violence is based on the ground that it believes violence is premature at this time. The SWP seeks to precipitate a revolution when conditions are ripe and to seize control of the revolution and to direct it when it occurs.

APPENDIX

"US"
Also Known As
"US", Incorporated

"US" was chartered by the State of California as a non-profit corporation in September, 1966, with offices at 8211 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California. The corporation alleges that "US" is primarily an Afro-American cultural organization.

During the spring of 1968, however, a source advised that MAULANA RON KARENGA, true name RONIE MC KINLEY EVERETT, Founder-Chairman of "US", published a booklet entitled "The Quotable Karenga", in which he talked of revolution, black power, and condemned Christianity for the plight of the black man.

In this booklet, KARENGA stated "...You must have a cultural revolution before the violent revolution. The cultural revolution gives identity, purpose, and direction. ...The revolution being fought now is a revolution to win the minds of our people. If we fail to win this, we cannot wage the violent one. ...When the word is given, we'll see how tough you are. When it's 'burn', let's see how much you blow up. And when it's 'take that white girl's head too', we'll see how tough you are..."

The above source advised that "US" members are required to study and memorize this booklet. "US" members are also assigned Swahili names which they use in lieu of their given names.

A second source advised that KARENGA had spoken at various meetings in Los Angeles at which time he talked of creating an "US" army of 1,000 men, obtaining weapons and ammunition, guerrilla warfare tactics, and revolution. KARENGA also stated "The only way to get life is to take a life and as we get stronger, we will take what we want from the white man's United States." He also stated that if the police killed any "US" members, the "US" organization would kill some of them.

APPENDIX CONTINUED

The first source above advised that KARENGA also stated that race riots throughout the country were not riots but were actually revolts or revolutions and that the black people were going to win their freedom by violence, if necessary.

A third source advised that KARENGA stated that a revolution would take place in the future and that no one can believe in black revolution without believing in armed conflict because the two go hand in hand.

A fourth source advised in August, 1974, that the US Organization has been evicted from its headquarters at 4302 South Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles, and because of lack of funds, has been unable to locate a new meeting place. The organization has terminated all public meetings.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

SECRET

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 8/14/75

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

FROM : W. A. Branigan

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

CLASS. & EXT. BY 3820 Rev/KWS 9-3-81
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2 2
DATE OF REVIEW 8-14-95

Attached New York teletype advises of information from former Bureau Agent, who is a current informative asset, that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations (SSCIO) has become aware of Jaffe's allegations that the FBI has taken actions which have prevented him from obtaining or keeping a job in the news media field. Jaffe claims that his association with Bureau Agents with regard to Soviet intelligence matters cooled off after he was identified by a Soviet defector as cooperating with Soviet Intelligence and that the FBI has since deprived him from making a living in his profession. The SSCIO is looking into Jaffe's situation to determine if his allegations are true and if the FBI can be prevented from taking such actions in other similar situations. C

BACKGROUND:

Jaffe is a former correspondent for ABC and CBS who was a symbol number informant of the New York Office from 1958 to 1961. During this period, he furnished information on his numerous contacts with Soviet nationals whom he met through his assignment as a CBS correspondent at the United Nations. In 1961, he joined ABC as its correspondent in Moscow where he served until he was expelled in 1965 following the publication of an article unfavorable to the Soviet Union. He was then transferred to Hong Kong where he remained until 1968. Since 1968, he has worked for various news media and has acted as a free lance journalist. Following his return from Hong Kong, he took up residence in Washington, D. C., and was in contact with the Washington Field Office, furnishing information on Soviets and Chinese nationals whom he met in the course of his employment. U

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REC-16

1ST-110

Enclosure
105-28333

SECRET

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

CONTINUED - OVER

~~Classified by 4091~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

AUG 20 1975

RGK:yjl
(4)

NOT RECORDED
SEP 17 1975

Records
62-116395

ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 SEP 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Samuel Adason Jaffe
105-28333

Soviet defector ["Sammy"]X(U) has advised that Jaffe was recruited by the KGB, in about 1962 while he was in Moscow, through his relationship with a Soviet female. [Soviet defector "Shamrock" has confirmed that Jaffe was approached but does not believe the approach was successful.]c Jaffe reported to the New York Office in 1963 what he interpreted as a recruitment effort, and he was extensively reinterviewed in 1969 concerning his association with KGB officers in Moscow. [There is no information in Jaffe's file that he was ever reported on by Col. Penkovskiy, as Jaffe reportedly has claimed.]c During the interviews with Jaffe, he denied any overt acts helpful to the KGB, although he admitted a continuing relationship with several KGB officers. Both the New York and Washington Field Offices came to the conclusion that Jaffe was a KGB agent while in Moscow, but that there was doubt as to whether he continued in that role after he was expelled.

Our relations with Jaffe were tempered by ["Sammy's"]X(U) allegation, and Bureau Agents in contact with him were circumspect in any dealings with him thereafter. Jaffe very likely detected a change in the Agents' attitude which accounts for his statement that he felt his relationship with them had cooled off.

There is no evidence contained in Jaffe's file that either New York or Washington Field or the Bureau has ever taken any action which would affect Jaffe's livelihood. Following his return from Hong Kong, Jaffe told his handling Agents that he was experiencing difficulty in finding a job. He several times mentioned his concern that his association with the FBI might be the reason. On each occasion, he was assured that the FBI had never divulged his confidential relationship and would not do so any time in the future.u

Jaffe's file does disclose that during an interview with Washington Field Agents in 1969, he said that he had learned from a British Intelligence contact in Hong Kong that his recall from that city was caused by his refusal to cooperate with CIA. He also related that he later mentioned this to a CIA contact in Washington who responded that the British

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Samuel Adason Jaffe
105-28333

Intelligence representative "had no right to tell you this." [CIA has informed us that they did have contacts with Jaffe while he was in Hong Kong and that he reported on Communist Chinese of interest to the Agency.]S His file also records that Jaffe told New York Agents in 1969 that a recently published book on the Council of Foreign Relations described him as having a subversive background. He was also described in the book as being a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy. Jaffe connected the appearance of this book with his then recent recall fron Hong Kong by ABC.

ACTION:

That this memorandum be referred to the SENSTUDY project in view of probable inquiries from SSCIO.

JGN

WRW

Memo to I.C.
8/25/75
TI·JK/[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 13 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 024 NY CODE

7:35 P.M. NITEL 8-13-75 PLQ

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-14660)

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTN: INTD

Cregar

SENSTUDY, 1975.

NEW YORK 6811-IA TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED SPECIAL AGENT JOSEPH J. PALGUTA ON AUGUST 13, 1975, AND FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: C

ON AUGUST 11, 1975, MR. PATRICK A. SHEA, A MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (SSCIO), TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED NEW YORK 6811-IA, AND THEY MADE AN APPOINTMENT TO MEET IN NYC AT 2:00 PM ON AUGUST 13, 1975. SOURCE MET WITH SHEY AS ARRANGED ON AUGUST 13, 1975. SHEY TOLD SOURCE THAT SAM JAFFE (FORMER NEW YORK 2524-S) VISITED A FRIEND OF HIS, MR. MILLER, WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE SSCIO. WHILE IN MILLER'S OFFICE, JAFFE WAS RELATING TO MILLER THAT HE HAD A C

MDR-16
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

~~CLASS. & EXT. BY 10320 RWK/KWS 9-3-81~~
~~REASON - FCIM II, 1-2. 4.2 2~~
~~DATE OF REVIEW 8-13-95~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE
CONFIDENTIAL

145

PLEASANT RELATIONSHIP WITH FORMER SPECIAL AGENTS (SAS) JOHN G. WALLIS AND EDWARD F. GAMBER WITH REGARD TO SOVIET INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. C

DURING THE TIME THAT JAFFE WAS RELATING ABOVE DATA TO MILLER, SENATOR CHURCH, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SSCIA, ENTERED MILLER'S OFFICE AND BECAME VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN JAFFE'S STATEMENTS. JAFFE RELATED TO MILLER THAT AS A REPORTER FOR THE COLUMBIA BROADCASTING COMPANY, HE COVERED THE STORY INVOLVING THE RELEASE OF FRANCIS G. POWERS BY THE SOVIETS (POWERS WAS THE FORMER U-2 PILOT WHO WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE USSR IN 1960). JAFFE RELATED TO MILLER THAT THEREAFTER HE WENT TO HONG KONG. JAFFE ALSO TOLD MILLER THAT WHEN HE RETURNED FROM HONG KONG (SOURCE BELIEVES THIS TO BE IN 1966-1968), HE LEARNED THAT HE WAS "FINGERED" BY A SOVIET DEFECTOR BY THE NAME OF PENKOVSKIY. THIS DEFECTOR ALLEGEDLY REPORTED THAT HE SAW JAFFE'S NAME ON A PIECE OF PAPER ON THE DESK OF A SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. JAFFE TOLD MILLER THAT THE FBI, UPON LEARNING THAT INFORMATION FELT THAT JAFFE WAS A "DOUBLE AGENT" BECAUSE OF THE COOLNESS OF BUREAU PERSONNEL TOWARD HIM WHEN HE RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES FROM HONG KONG. JAFFE C

CONFIDENTIAL

TOLD MILLER THAT EVER SINCE HIS RETURN FROM HONG KONG, HE CANNOT HOLD A JOB, AND BELIEVES THE FBI IS THE CAUSE OF HIS PREDICAMENT. JAFFE IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE FBI IS BEING VINDICTIVE TOWARD HIM IN PURSUING THIS MATTER AND DEPRIVING HIM OF MAKING A LIVELIHOOD. c

MR. SHEY TOLD THE SOURCE THAT THE SSCIO IS LOOKING INTO THE ABOVE MATTER TO DETERMINE IF JAFFE'S STATEMENTS ARE TRUE, AND TO DETERMINE IF SOME CONTROLS COULD BE CREATED SO THAT THE FBI COULD NOT BE VINDICTIVE IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS. c

SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE TOLD SHEY THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE FBI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JAFFE AFTER 1964, SINCE HE RETIRED FROM THE BUREAU THAT YEAR. SOURCE ADVISED THAT SHEY TOLD HIM THAT AS YET HE HAS NOT TALKED TO FORMER SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, BUT MAY INTERVIEW HIM IN THE FUTURE. c

SOURCE ADVISED THAT SHEY TOLD HIM THAT JAFFE IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS A FREE-LANCE REPORTER WORKING IN WASHINGTON, DC. SOURCE STATED THE HE INFORMED SHEY OF FORMER SA GAMBER'S CURRENT EMPLOYMENT. c

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE MET WITH SHEY ON AUGUST 13, 1975 FROM 2:00 PM UNTIL 3:30 PM.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM THE SOURCE IN A GUARDED MANNER, AND ONLY THE PERTINENT FACTS WERE OBTAINED.

THE NYO WILL PERSONALLY REINTERVIEW THE SOURCE REGARDING THE ABOVE AND OBTAIN COMPLETE DETAILS CONCERNING THE MATTER.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 2649, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

END.

LRF FBIHQ CLR

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
August 18, 1975
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Enclosed for your information are two copies each of four memoranda concerning interviews by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of an FBI Assistant Director and two current and one former FBI Special Agents. One set of these memoranda is for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 8

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-613

SFP:lhb lhb
(10)

MAILED 20
AUG 20 1975
FBI

REC-56

EX 104

SEP 4 1975

NOTE:

LHMs ~~being~~ furnished to the Attorney General were received by airtels from Los Angeles, 8/7/75, and from San Diego (three), one dated 8/5/75 and two dated 8/6/75, all in connection with Senstudy 75. Copies of the airtels and the LHMs will be designated for the respective personnel files of the personnel who were interviewed.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

4 ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 SEP 8 1975

GPO 951-546

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT	☐ BRIEFING	☒ INTERVIEWS	☐ TESTIMONY	☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of interviews by SSC Staff Member of incumbent FBI Special Agents Earl M. Petersen, Lawrence F. Wirick, Assistant Director in Charge Robert E. Gebhardt and former Special Agent Robert S. Baker.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Counterintelligence
Surveillance, electronic
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

COINTELPRO of the FBI as it related to the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALMKP

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/gP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE ROBERT E. GEBHARDT BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 7, 1975, Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt, Los Angeles Division, was interviewed in the Los Angeles FBI Office by Mr. Lester Seidel, Staff Member of the Senate Select Committee, United States Senate.

Gebhardt's rights were not explained to him by Seidel although Seidel did explain the purpose of the interview, that is, the Cointel Program of the FBI as it related to the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party when Gebhardt was the Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco Division from 1970 to 1972.

The interview lasted from 9:05 AM until 10:30 AM, and it was not necessary for Gebhardt to consult with any Bureau representative.

Gebhardt had previously been advised by a Bureau representative of his right to counsel, the privileged areas of information, consultation privileges, and the parameters of interview.

Seidel inquired at the outset as to whether Gebhardt was aware of the Cointel Program relative to the Black Panther Party investigation on a day to day basis being specifically advised details of the investigation as it relates to the Cointel Program. It was explained to Seidel that as Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco FBI Office wherein over 500 employees were located at the time, Gebhardt had many responsibilities in the operation of that division and

PROPERTY OF THE FBI
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-615

therefore, relied upon the experience, expertise, and judgment of the various supervisors assigned to the office for the day to day direction of the various matters under investigation, including the investigation of the Black Panther Party.

It was further explained that if a problem was encountered or a particularly unusual situation developed, Gebhardt was, of course, consulted and was available for such consultation to resolve any particular problem areas.

Gebhardt was next asked if he recalled being SAC when the electronic coverage of the Black Panther Party and the various officials at BBP was instituted and eventually terminated. Seidel was advised that the electronic coverage was already in effect upon Gebhardt's arrival, however, he does recall receiving a phone call after the "Keith Decision" was handed down instructing that all electronic coverage of the BPP and the various members of the BPP be discontinued. The call was received from Bureau Headquarters and the discontinuance was effected immediately.

Seidel inquired as to whether Gebhardt felt the intelligence type investigations should be completely removed from the criminal investigations which investigations would be looking toward eventual prosecution.

Seidel was informed by Gebhardt that even in criminal investigations looking toward prosecutions, much intelligence information is obtained from time to time which really has no value from a prosecutive standpoint, but does have possible value with respect to the direction of the investigation. In some criminal investigations a great deal of intelligence information may be obtained and in other types, very little. Insofar as the FBI is concerned, however, every effort is made to make certain there is some Federal law which would be a basis for an investigation which procedures would include matters commonly referred to as security investigations.

In some instances, in such security investigations a great deal of intelligence information would be obtained therefore, it was Gebhardt's opinion that so-called intelligence type investigations should not be removed from or differentiated from criminal type investigations looking toward prosecutions since intelligence information is an outgrowth of the basic investigation.

Gebhardt was asked if he felt the Cointelpro was a separate entity distinguished from the basic investigation and it was explained that the Cointelpro was a phase of the overall investigation in any particular organization or individual.

Gebhardt was asked if he felt Congress should enact legislation which would set forth specific investigative techniques that could or could not be utilized by the FBI or other Federal investigative agencies. He was advised in Gebhardt's opinion, such legislation should not be enacted, and in reply to the question as to why such legislation should not be enacted, it was pointed out that as an investigative agency, there must of necessity be allowed a certain flexibility because no two investigations are exactly alike and the circumstances of such investigations could possibly not be related to such Federal law.

In answer to the question as to how Congress should assure the American public that questionable activity such as the Cointelpro, was not being engaged in by an investigative agency such as the FBI, Seidel was informed that the Congress and the American people must rely upon the integrity and honesty of the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General.

It was pointed out that both the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General are nominated by the President, hearings are held before the various Congressional Committees and finally approved by the Senate. It was further pointed out that Director Kelley has recently stated in connection with the publicity relative to Cointelpro, that he has no intention of permitting this program to be reinstituted in the FBI and if circumstances ever arose which circumstances he could not contemplate at this time, wherein it was thought such activities should be embarked upon, he would obtain the personal approval of the Attorney General prior to such instituting. Seidel was informed that Gebhardt was in total agreement with this statement of Mr. Kelley.

Gebhardt was asked as to what his feelings were relative to what the relationship should be between the FBI and Congress. He was informed that a Senate Oversight Committee was recently established and it was felt that this was a good start and that this Committee should formalize and

standardize their oversight responsibilities and make regular inquiries of the Director and other officials of the FBI as to our activities. He was informed that there should be either a joint oversight committee between the House and Senate or if the Congress decided on two oversight Committees in both the House and Senate, these committees should be the entities through which all information relative to the activities of the FBI should flow.

It was emphasized however, that there should be regular consultation between these representatives and the FBI.

Inquiry was made as to Gebhardt's opinion relative to the relationship between the Department of Justice and the FBI and Seidel was informed the relationship, in Gebhardt's opinion, is excellent, should continue, and there should be a free flow of information between the FBI and the Department of Justice.

At the conclusion of the interview, Gebhardt summed up his comments by stating that Congress should definitely set up a structured oversight procedure of the activities of the FBI with due regard to the confidentiality of many of the FBI operations and investigations and must assure itself that the members of the Committee and its staff will maintain the confidentiality where necessary.

Secondly, in the areas of investigative matters usually referred to as national defense, national security or intelligence operations, all of the FBI investigations must be based on the application of the facts toward a particular Federal statute and if the facts are so oblique that they cannot be clearly applied to a particular Federal statute, consultation with the Department of Justice should be had in all instances.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Former Special Agent Robert S. Baker was interviewed at his home at 4268 Hortensia, San Diego, California, by U.S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel on August 1, 1975. The interview began at 10:30 AM and lasted until 12:30 PM. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), San Diego, California, was telephonically available for consultation. Former Special Agent Baker did not consult with anyone during the course of the interview.

Prior to the interview, Former Special Agent Baker had been advised that FBI Headquarters had waived the agreement as a former employee not to furnish information received during the period of his employment, for purposes of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source, that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques, or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

Former Special Agent Baker was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) ~~(see appendix)~~. destroyed

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-615

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Seidel identified himself to Mr. Baker, stating that the interview would be in the form of an informal discussion and that information furnished by Mr. Baker would be placed in a memorandum for the SSC. Mr. Seidel stated that he did not intend to use the names of individuals interviewed in his memorandum. He stated that Mr. Baker did not have to talk to him, and that any information he furnished would be furnished voluntarily.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker was a supervisor with the San Diego Office of the FBI from sometime in 1968 through April, 1971.

Mr. Baker advised that he was a supervisor of the security squad but could not recall if the dates mentioned by Mr. Seidel were correct.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to the nature of matters supervised by him, to which Mr. Baker replied that matters such as investigation of the Communist Party (see appendix), the Socialist Workers Party (see appendix), the Black Panther Party, US, Incorporated (see appendix), the Nation of Islam (see appendix), Espionage, Sabotage matters, and other investigations were conducted on the squad supervised by him, which consisted of from 12 to 15 Special Agents.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker supervised the COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker advised that he did supervise this program which was initiated by FBI Headquarters and not on the field office level. He stated that as he recalled, a letter was submitted either monthly, quarterly or semi-annually. The letter was submitted by a Special Agent whose case load was such that he could take the time to prepare the letter.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Special Agent Roy Burns was more of a young, eager, type Agent.

Mr. Baker replied that this was not true but that Special Agent Burns had been assigned the COINTELPRO case because his case load was such that he was able to handle the program.

Mr. Seidel inquired whether Special Agent Roy Burns was transferred to the Butte Office of the FBI for disciplinary reasons.

Mr. Baker replied that Special Agent Burns was originally from Washington State and had wanted to be transferred to that area.

Mr. Seidel asked if the Bureau encouraged Agents to participate in disruptive programs and then rewarded them financially for their efforts.

Mr. Baker replied that the Bureau had an incentive award program, and if an Agent did a good job in any field, he could get recognition through an incentive award. Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall any award being given as a result of COINTELPRO activity.

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he could recall any information concerning the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that the operation of the Free Breakfast Program of the BPP was followed through sources. They advised that some of the BPP officials were stealing money from funds which were to be spent on the breakfast program. The breakfast program was served at a local Catholic church. Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that an official of the Catholic church in San Diego was contacted regarding the priest in charge of the church where the breakfast program was being held, who was reportedly an alcoholic. Mr. Seidel was advised that the priest was transferred from the church.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked what Mr. Baker's definition of the COINTELPRO was.

Mr. Baker replied that the COINTELPRO was a disruptive type program.

Mr. Seidel stated that the FBI had apparently written a letter regarding a white girl friend of Kenneth Denman, a BPP leader in San Diego. He inquired as to why this letter was written.

Mr. Baker stated that Denman was considered one of the stronger leaders of the San Diego Branch of the BPP, and if it was possible to keep him from becoming a strong leader, it would be disruptive to the party. The fact that Denman was living with a white girl was considered derogatory toward him by BPP members in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether such activity would have been taken against a leader in an organization such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) (see description) if the leader of such a group had been living with a white woman. Would such a letter be appropriate?

Mr. Baker replied that he did not feel that such a letter would be appropriate in this case because this organization involved a religious leader and our program was not directed at religious groups but was directed toward black militant and extremist groups.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker recalled individuals in the BPP named Tate, Wallace, Denman and Bell.

Mr. Baker stated that he could not recall anything specific about any of these individuals, except what he had previously stated concerning Denman. He said he could recall the names but nothing more concerning these individuals.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then mentioned an incident wherein the San Diego Office of the FBI had furnished information to the Los Angeles Office of the FBI for transmission to local authorities concerning a group of BPP members from San Diego who were traveling to Los Angeles to attend a funeral.

Mr. Baker stated that he could recall that such an incident occurred and that information was furnished stating that BPP members from San Diego would be carrying concealed weapons. He said he thought the furnishing of this information resulted in some of the BPP members being arrested in Los Angeles.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Mr. Baker could recall someone from the FBI in San Diego visiting the mother of a girl who was an alleged member of the BPP in San Diego, and whether the FBI went to the mother to put pressure on another member of the family.

Mr. Baker stated that he vaguely recalled such a case but could not recall the details and could not be certain this had occurred.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether the FBI had any technical surveillances on the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker stated that he knew of none and added that such coverage was not needed in San Diego because there were good sources in the BPP who could furnish excellent coverage. Mr. Baker stated that he believes he would have known of any such installations covering the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker knew of San Francisco using any such techniques against the BPP.

Mr. Baker replied that he believed that San Francisco had used such techniques.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then asked why such techniques were not used in San Diego if they were used in San Francisco.

Mr. Baker replied that such techniques were not needed in San Diego due to the good source coverage of party activity.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether there was a conflict between US, Incorporated, and the BPP in San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that US, Incorporated, headquarters were in Los Angeles. There was a power struggle between the two groups for membership of blacks and much travel occurred by US, Incorporated, leaders from Los Angeles to San Diego and Mexico, and from San Diego to Los Angeles. There were considerable conflict between the two groups.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled Ron Karenga.

Mr. Baker replied that he did recall Ron Karenga as being the Los Angeles leader of US, Incorporated.

Mr. Seidel asked whether Mr. Baker recalled some cards stating "Ron Karenga is impotent" which were printed in Los Angeles and some of which might have been sent to San Diego.

Mr. Baker replied that he does not recall these cards but this could have been correct.

Mr. Seidel asked if Mr. Baker recalled some cartoons being drawn concerning the BPP.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that there were two or three cartoons prepared depicting strife between US, Incorporated, and the BPP.

Mr. Seidel then stated that these cartoons were prepared by the Bureau Laboratory.

Mr. Baker stated that he did not recall.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that US, Incorporated, and the BPP were led by and made up of people with extensive criminal records, and because of this and their general demeanor, the FBI did not really have to provoke or disrupt them because they kept themselves in a constant state of turmoil. He stated that Special Agents connected with the COINTELPRO did not devote much time to the program because of heavy case loads of other matters and because they assisted in working criminal matters such as bank robberies and other criminal violations.

Mr. Baker advised Mr. Seidel that a great deal of time was spent by the Special Agents working with their sources because they had to be extremely careful that they were protected. If a crime was planned and a source had knowledge of it, the source would try to keep the crime from being committed. If it was not possible to prevent the crime, the source might be forced to participate, and if arrested, a problem would be created in attempting to get the source out of jail and still conceal his identity as a source.

Mr. Seidel inquired of Mr. Baker as to the names of the Agents he dealt with in Los Angeles and San Francisco in connection with COINTELPRO.

Mr. Baker stated that he recalled that Supervisor Albert Clark had something to do with the program in San Francisco, and in Los Angeles he dealt with Supervisor Richard Bloeser and Bill Knowland.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT S. BAKER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel asked Mr. Baker if he was acquainted with Richard Held.

Mr. Baker stated that Richard Held was assigned as Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego, and he knew him at that time. He stated that he is aware that Richard Held is now the Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Office of the FBI.

Mr. Seidel stated to Mr. Baker that he was going to interview Assistant Director Robert Gebhardt and Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates.

This concluded the interview of former Special Agent Robert S. Baker by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was an organization founded by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., with the theme of new life for poor people. Dr. King, a leader in civil rights, was assassinated on April 4, 1969.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 5, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/VP

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

By communication dated July 30, 1975, Clarence M. Kelley, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, advised as follows concerning an interview by representative of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) of Special Agent (SA) Lawrence F. Wirick, concerning Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and Bureau investigation of the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see Appendix page). Director Kelley stated as follows:

"I have waived your employment agreements for purposes of these interviews. Each should note that he has the right to counsel; however, the FBI is unable to provide private counsel. There are certain privileged areas concerning which SAS would not be required to answer questions. Areas concern information which might divulge identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect on-going FBI investigations; and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-613

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

On July 31, 1975, at 11:45 a.m. Mr. Lester Seidel of the United States Senate Select Committee (SSC) interviewed SA Lawrence F. Wirick at the San Diego Office of the FBI. No Advice of Rights was furnished SA Wirick and it was not necessary for the interviewee to consult with an FBI representative. The interview was terminated at 12:50 p.m. and as best recalled included the following discussion in the form of questions and answers:

Seidel: You understand that this is an informal interview and is in connection with the Bureau's COINTELPRO as it relates to the FBI investigation of the BPP?

Wirick: Yes, but for what purpose is the Senate conducting this survey?

Seidel: To aid in formation of new legislation so that the FBI and other Government agencies will have more definite guidelines to follow.

Wirick: I believe the Congress already through lack of information, isolated instances and some hysteria have enacted too many restrictive laws that prevent the FBI and other Government agencies from protecting the law abiding element of our society from the "bad guys".

Seidel: (He was in general agreement) Did you handle the COINTELPRO from 1970 through March, 1971?

Wirick: Yes, but I believe the BPP ceased to function locally about November or December, 1970. As I recall my function was to write a progress type letter regarding progress which described the illegal activities of members of the BPP and to report that this information had been furnished local police agencies but information generally emanated from confidential informants.

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Seidel: What type of illegal activities and did your program in any way instigate illegal activities on the part of the BPP?

Wirick: Criminal acts committed by local members of the BPP is what I was referring to. I don't believe it was ever necessary to instigate any illegal acts or in any way entrap BPP members in criminal acts. The majority of local BPP members were thieves, narcotics addicts, lazy, unemployed and were hero worshipers of the BPP in Oakland, California. They wanted to emulate the Oakland organization, but their own dishonesty, et cetera, was a constant source of turmoil amongst the local group.

I recall, date unknown, information was received regarding Kenny Denmon (Kenneth Lee Denmon), one time head of the local BPP, that he was using stolen credit cards.

/ Information was received that Walter Wallace (Walter Carl Wallace, Jr.) was on narcotics and that he and his wife, Velma, were stealing to get money for narcotics and that Velma's mother was also involved in local thefts.

All above information was furnished local law agencies and local arrests were made. Furnishing the above type of information is a function and responsibility of the FBI.

The BPP in San Diego was very effective in causing their own problems and their own extinction and their criminal activities were not restricted to the examples I've given.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO try to disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program?

Wirick: No, not to my knowledge. I recall that soon after the Breakfast Program was started that other members of the BPP accused Ken Denmon of stealing money from contributions made to the Program.

On second thought I believe we did disrupt the BPP Breakfast Program in that we received complaints from several dairys and bread companies, et cetera, that they had been approached by BPP members with veiled threats of extortion if they did not donate quantities of food et cetera to the BPP Breakfast Program. The FBI and local police investigated and I believe as a result their practices were discontinued, but the investigation failed to establish a prosecutable offense of extortion.

Seidel: Did you have any connection with distribution of "cartoons" depicting BPP members as compromising each other et cetera?

Wirick: No, but I have seen "cartoons" in the BPP newspaper. Have you ever seen or read copies of the BPP newspaper?

Seidel: No

Wirick: They featured "cartoons" showing the "pigs" (police) being killed, stabbed, et cetera. I believe I recall seeing some "cartoons" showing how the BPP would kill the "honkies" (white people). They were similar to the propaganda leaflets used by the Nazis against American troops before an attack. The articles in the BPP newspaper were even more foul.

Seidel: Did the COINTELPRO promote dissension between the BPP and the US Group (see Appendix page)?

Wirick: Not to my knowledge. As I recall there was never any need to. They were constantly at odds with each other and on a gang type basis were trying to eliminate each other. I believe Sylvester Bell, a San Diego BPP member was killed by an US Group member and John Savage, another local BPP member was killed by an US Group member.

In Los Angeles two other BPP members, names not recalled, were allegedly killed by US Group members. I believe this led to the popular saying in Southeast San Diego section where most blacks live that the score (game) was, "US 4 - BPP 0".

Seidel: What do you think of the merits of a proposal to spray shipments of the BPP newspaper with a noxious acid so that readers would be confronted with a vile odor when attempting to read the paper?

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) LAWRENCE F. WIRICK BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Wirick: After thought, no. Because the paper itself was so vile and anti-white that the odor would never stop BPP members from reading same. I've always hoped that a large segment of the population, especially the "do-gooders" could or would experience the nauseous reaction I have felt after reading the illiterate, foul-mouthed, anti-white, anti-Government, BPP paper. I think everybody should read a copy of the BPP paper so that they will know the type and character of BPP members.

Seidel: What do you think about anonymous letters sent to spouses of BPP members saying the husband was sleeping with a white girl, et cetera?

Wirick: Most wives of the members I recall were also BPP members and/or common-law-wives. Many BPP members did have liaison with white girls but I doubt if such a letter would bother most spouses of BPP members. However, such a letter might be of value under certain circumstances, example: the stories that were spread during World War II which were not necessarily all true regarding Hitler, Mussolini, General Patton and others.

Seidel: In your opinion was the COINTELPRO of any value? Should it be changed? Do you have any suggestions for changes, or should it be eliminated completely?

Wirick: Yes, as I recall, it acted as a progress letter of the BPP, its direction, its dissension, its change in leadership, and indications of its slow local demise because of the character of the local BPP members, and as a summary of its activities for FBIHQ. I recall that

we made certain requests to conduct some types of counterintelligence against the BPP, but I do not recall that the Bureau ever authorized any counterintelligence act which might be productive.

Change? COINTELPRO is not being utilized to the best of my knowledge and has not been for some time.

I believe that in about two or three years Congress will be frantically asking the FBI why we did not furnish them intelligence, advance knowledge of a demonstration, a riot and other civil unrest and elimination of the COINTELPRO has been another step in the direction of placing the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in a position where we cannot react to the activities of groups such as the BPP which have been formed with the main purpose of overthrowing the United States.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
August 6, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SBALMKP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Special Agent (SA) Earl M. Petersen was interviewed at the San Diego office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on July 31, 1975, by U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member Lester Seidel. The interview began at 10:05 A.M. and ended at 11:35 A.M. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arthur G. Barger was available nearby for consultation. He was not consulted during the interview.

Prior to the interview, SA Petersen had been advised by San Diego FBI officials that FBI Headquarters had waived the employee agreement not to furnish information for the purpose of this interview. He was advised that he had a right to counsel but that the FBI was unable to provide private counsel for him.

SA Petersen was advised that he would not be required to answer questions that might divulge the identity of any FBI source; that would reveal information relative to sensitive methods and techniques; or information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

SA Petersen was advised that the interview was to involve only the COINTELPRO as it applied to the Black Panther Party (BPP) (see appendix).

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-616

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Staff Member Lester Seidel identified himself to SA Petersen and stated that he was not warning SA Petersen of his rights as the interview was such that such a warning was not required. He advised SA Petersen that he did not have to talk to him and that any information furnished was on a voluntary basis. He stated that information furnished to him would be handled with discretion.

Mr. Seidel: Were you in charge of the COINTELPRO in San Diego from March, 1968 through October, 1968?

SA Petersen: This was possible but the dates the program was assigned to me are not recalled.

Mr. Seidel: What was the name of the squad to which you were assigned at that time?

SA Petersen. The Security Squad.

Mr. Seidel: Who did the squad investigate? Was it groups such as US, Inc. (see appendix) and the BPP?

SA Petersen: Yes, such groups as US, Inc., the BPP, and the Nation of Islam (NOI) (see appendix).

Mr. Seidel: And possibly splinter groups?

SA Petersen: Yes, groups that would form and disband and which could possibly be called splinter groups.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: How long have you been in the Bureau?

SA Petersen: Twenty-four years as of June 25, 1975.

Mr. Seidel: Where have you been assigned?

SA Petersen: In Boston, Baltimore, New York, Tampa, and San Diego.

Mr. Seidel: The Bureau has indicated that you were a coordinator of the COINTELPRO in San Diego. As such, what were your duties?

SA Petersen: The duties for the most part consisted of preparing letters to the Bureau asking for authority to take some specific action in the program; awaiting the reply from the Bureau; and then, if any action was taken, to advise the Bureau of the results of such action. It is noted that many of the requests to take specific action were turned down by the Bureau.

Mr. Seidel: Were you the focal point of the program?

SA Petersen: Yes, in the sense that any idea for action to be taken in the program was transmitted to the Bureau for approval by me and if approval was received, it would be related to whomever had suggested the activity. I would then report any results to the Bureau.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel:	Did you get heavy pressure from Bureau officials to take action in this program?
SA Petersen:	Not any more than any other case, and I had a number of other cases assigned to me at the time the COINTELPRO was assigned to me.
Mr. Seidel:	What type of things did you do?
SA Petersen:	I do not recall at this time any specific action taken in the program. I do recall that a Black Panther leader, Walter Wallace, was removed as leader of the party in San Diego. I believe it was suspected that he might have cooperated with the FBI. This could have been accomplished by interviewing him where the interview could be seen by other party members. If the Agents shook his hand, smiled, and acted like he was a friend, it might plant the seed of suspicion in the minds of other BPP members. I do not recall specifically whether this happened but at any rate, Wallace was not trusted and was removed as leader of the party.
Mr. Seidel:	Could such a thing get Wallace killed or injured?

SA Petersen: I do not see how it would because there would be no way anyone could determine whether or not Wallace was, in fact, cooperating with the FBI. He was probably removed by the BPP as a precautionary measure. I cannot recall whether or not Wallace was removed while I was coordinator of the program.

Mr. Seidel: Was COINTELPRO successful?

SA Petersen: I was not too impressed with its success in San Diego while I had it assigned to me because it was a new program and it took some time to get it established and working. Most of the success was probably due to information obtained regarding criminal violations, mostly local in nature, which was furnished to local law enforcement officers, causing the arrest of BPP members. This would have been done whether or not we had a COINTELPRO. It was necessary to prepare a letter to the Bureau asking authority to take action and then wait for a reply authorizing the activity. Many times suggested COINTELPRO activity suggestions would be turned down.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel made available Xerox copies of Bureau letters captioned, "Counter-Intelligence Program; Black Nationalist - Hate Groups," dated August 25, 1967 and March 4, 1968. These were read by SA Petersen, who said he could not specifically recall reading the letters.

Mr. Seidel: Was contact with the police formal or informal?

SA Petersen: Contact was personal or telephonic contact and at one time, information furnished to individual officers was confirmed by letter to the Chief of Police. It is not recalled if this was the policy during the time COINTELPRO was assigned to me.

Mr. Seidel: What happened to SA Roy Burns?

SA Petersen: He was transferred to the Butte, Montana Field Office.

Mr. Seidel: Did he do anything wrong? I understand Agents were sometimes transferred to Butte as a disciplinary measure.

SA Petersen: SA Burns wanted to be transferred to Butte and requested the transfer. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Mr. Evans, was transferred there and may have helped SA Burns get moved there.

Mr. Seidel: How old is Bob Baker:

SA Petersen: Probably 51 or 52 years old.

Mr. Seidel: Did he retire early?

SA Petersen: No. He was in a position to retire and retired because he wanted to take advantage of a cost of living increase by retiring prior to a certain date, such as June 30.

Mr. Seidel: Were the BPP and US, Inc. both violence oriented groups?

SA Petersen: Very definitely. There was extreme friction between the BPP and US, Inc. at all times.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some caricatures used in connection with COINTELPRO?

SA Petersen: Yes.

Mr. Seidel: Who had the program at that time?

SA Petersen: I believe SA Burns had it then.

Mr. Seidel: What were the cartoons?

SA Petersen: I recall seeing them but do not recall any specific cartoon.

Mr. Seidel: Do you think anything done in COINTELPRO could have had a reaction causing someone to kill an individual in the other group?

SA Petersen: Because of the extreme antagonism between the two groups, anything we did would have had about the same effect as a gnat biting an elephant. I do not think COINTELPRO had that kind of impact.

/

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Did you ever supervise any technical installation or electronic surveillance of the BPP in San Diego?

SA Petersen: No. I don't recall anything like that being done here.

Mr. Seidel: How would you feel about writing a letter to a wife saying her husband was sleeping with various other women if the husband was a BPP leader?

SA Petersen: I would hesitate to do this because it might break up a family. If the facts were true and this might cause the BPP leader to be less effective, it would probably be a good counterintelligence move.

Mr. Seidel: I am referring to Page 91 of a BPP COINTELPRO summary which indicates that a BPP leader was living with a white girl and an anonymous letter was written to others in the BPP saying that this individual was living with a white girl. Do you recall anything about that?

SA Petersen: I believe that leader could have been Kenneth Denmon in San Diego. I recall that he was living with a white woman and that others in the BPP were made aware of this in some manner. The BPP in San

SA Petersen (continued): Diego was teaching children to hate and kill police officers. They planned violent criminal acts and were making plans to take over the established government at the first opportunity. If a leader of such a group could be discredited and removed, it would help to keep the group from becoming stronger, as they would have to select a new leader, and he would have to get the group reorganized. Denmon had many additional weaknesses which could be used in a counter-intelligence program.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall a letter being sent to BPP Headquarters saying a leader of the BPP was cooperating with the police in Los Angeles?

SA Petersen: I do not recall such a letter.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall some cards being sent to San Diego from Los Angeles saying, "Ron Karenga is impotent"?

SA Petersen: No, I do not recall such cards. Ron Karenga was a leader of US, Inc., not the BPP.

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall that cartoons were to be sent to BPP members to discredit the leaders?

SA Petersen: I recall the cartoons but do not recall whether they were sent to BPP members.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SA EARL M. PETERSEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel: Do you recall an anonymous letter being sent to the Catholic Church to have the priest of the church where the BPP breakfast program was operated removed from his office?

SA Petersen: I do not recall such an anonymous letter; however, I do recall that the priest was transferred by the church.

Mr. Seidel: Knowing that the BPP paper was a paper that taught and advocated violence and had cartoons in it that encouraged the killing of police officers by blacks and was a violence oriented paper, how would you feel about putting a corrosive liquid on the paper to keep it from being distributed?

SA Petersen: I would not do it as I would feel that it was a violation of the law and too drastic. I would not do it personally or personally approve of it.

Mr. Seidel: You have been very helpful and the information you have provided will be used in considering new legislation at some time in the future.

SA Petersen: In these tranquil times, it disturbs me greatly to read in the papers and to hear news broadcasts containing all kinds of allegations against the FBI and the CIA and

SA Petersen (continued):	other intelligence agencies. I like to work within the law and to be guided by legislation in my work. I would, however, hate to see such restrictive legislation passed that at some time in the future when we might be faced with violence-prone organizations trying to take control of the government, we would be unable to properly handle our responsibility for the internal security of the United States.
Mr. Seidel:	Thank you for your cooperation.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF[illegible] OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENE[illegible]
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

W

TO: John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: WCL K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Attached for your information is a letter regarding the "proposed procedures" to the Attorney General from Senate Select Committee. I am attaching two extra copies of it, as I am sure that Mr. Adams and the Director may also wish to see it.

B

REC-56 62-116395-612

EX 104

7 AUG 6 1975

B

6 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

84 SEP 8 1975

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 18, 1975

Proposed procedure

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

62-116395-642

ENCLOSURE

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 13 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-6

ENCLOSURE

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

or the Senior Staff

(b) If the Task Force Leader/has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Proposed [illegible]

July 18, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader/or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 15 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

or the Senior Staff

(b) If the Task Force Leader/has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Comittee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 18, 1975

Proposed procedures

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader/ or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 13 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader/or the Senior Staff has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

TO: Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

Senstudy '75

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Responses to Request for Comments on Proposed Procedures

1. The Deputy Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, and Civil Rights Division register no objections to the proposed procedures on access. OLA suggests inclusion of a preamble referencing security agreements and the need for proper security assurances from the Committee to the Attorney General.

2. Both the Criminal Division and Office of Legal Counsel address the short response time frames imposed upon the Attorney General, and OLC suggests certain language changes for purposes of clarity and focus.

3. The Attorney General is troubled by Item 9 and its need for modification as to categories of material not treatable by these proposed procedures or as to a later discovered need to make presently unanticipated changes to effect a smoother operation of the procedures.

4. The Bureau's comments on the proposed procedures are attached and should be read. This Office does not agree with the Bureau that the proposed procedures should be presented to the President and the President's Counsel.

5. No response has been received from the Solicitor General.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

EX 104 REC-56 62-116395-611

AUG 6 1975

14 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 SEP 8 1975

6. This Office recommends that Item 9 be modified as suggested by the Attorney General and that the language modifications suggested by OLC for Items 3 and 6 be adopted.

7. It is further suggested that the Attorney General convene a meeting of the senior Bureau officials for the purpose of informing them of his policy decision in this matter.

Copies to:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: K. William O'Connor

DATE: July 18, 1975

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FILES

In response to your memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned as above, we observe that the "substantial negotiations" which produced the proposed procedures did not include participation by a representative of the FBI and that the request for our views concerning disclosure of highly sensitive FBI material was first received at 11:14 a.m. today with a reply expected by 2:00 p.m. today. We respectfully suggest that not only should you afford greater opportunity for an expression of our views on this matter, but that any such proposed procedures should be presented to the President's Counsel for concurrence and for an expression of the President's views as to the general policy of the Executive Branch in this regard. Further, you may want to consider addressing the problem of the impact such general disclosure of files would have on pending criminal investigations.

A preliminary review in the time available revealed that certain items require considerable modification. For example, Item (3)(c) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for information that would tend to identify sources to whom the FBI has an obligation of confidentiality as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity already has been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identity to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman."

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975
KWO'C

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/VP

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Item (6)(b) should be reconsidered with the following language:

"If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the FBI will furnish a written statement of the grounds for its position to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation within 24 hours."

Item (8) should be reconsidered with the following language:

"The Staff and the Members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the Staff is given access as extensively as necessary between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, in the FBI J. Edgar Hoover Building at Room 4171."

In light of the difficulties described, it is my strong recommendation that such procedures should not be hastily agreed upon with the Committee and that full discussion should be had concerning this matter by representatives of the FBI, the Attorney General, the Committee and the Counsel to the President.

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. 48 hour lead time is very short and may create problems; 24 hour reaction time may be unreasonable for Attorney General.

2. The provision seems a little odd, out of context of negotiations.

3. Suggest that in 3(a), last line, word and should be or and "peculiarly sensitive" read to modify both foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

4. No comment

5. No comment

6. Time frames are very restrictive; there should be a stated opportunity for TFL to work out any objections with FBI, before raising to Special Counsel - "...if the issue is not promptly resolved between the TFL and the FBI, the materials in issue will be conveyed..."

7. Define "screened" by reference to 6(a) above

8. No comment

9. No comment

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. No problem with this procedure, but feels that the time limits are too tight

2. No central policy objection

3. Suggest incorporate a preamble phrase that makes reference to security agreements; a specific means for assurance to the AG by the Chairman and Vice Chairman of proper security measures

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

Views of Thornburg and Kevin Maroney

1. Time frames a bit skimpy
2. looks as though we're giving up a lot, but that's probably what's required

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

No objection to proposed procedures on access

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

TO: Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Responses: Congressional Access to Personal Files Maintained by the FBI

With the exception of the Solicitor General's Office, all Departmental components whose views were solicited have provided their views on the question of Congressional Access to Personal FBI Files.

OLC, OLA, and Criminal Division favor a combination of options 1 and 3. Civil Rights Division favors option 1. The Bureau chooses option 3.

This office recommends the adoption of the position articulated by OLC and concurred in by OLA and Criminal.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/lp

2

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

Suggest combine option 1 and option 3; make deletion per option 1, but make oral explanation of the deletion; entire paragraph or document should be withheld to protect source.

Feels there is a serious, if not constitutional, issue as to the prospective trespass upon a citizen's rights to give information in confidence to his government.

Option 4 is absolutely unacceptable; would fight it in the courts.

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

Opts for 1 & 3 consolidation
Same gist as Scalia

FBI

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

FBI would choose 3, but say "portion of papers" instead of "papers"

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

1 TO *(Name, office symbol or location)*	INITIALS	ACTION
		CIRCULATE
	DATE	COORDINATION
2 Mr. Thornburgh	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

I agree with your recommendations on this, except "sensitive sources" should be read to include identity of any person who has furnished info or opinion re the Senator, as, e.g., in a background investigation.

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM *(Name, office symbol or location)* KEVIN T. MARONEY	DATE 1/1/74
	PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41 048—16—81594-1 532-103 GPO 5041-101
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

My view is that item 9 goes too far in that there must be some provision which allows the Department or the Committee to abrogate the arrangement. I should think the agreement could provide that at any time the Chairman of the Committee or the Attorney General could give a notification that the (1)agreement was not suitable for a particular category of material or(2)that for some reason the agreement was not operating suitably and that as to either one or two there would then be an endeavor to work out a suitable modification or different arrangement (but I think it has to be said that the arrangement can be cancelled by either party)

OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

7/18/75

To: Bill O'Connor

From: Doug Marvin

Attached is the Attorney General's comment on the procedures for dealing with the Senate Select Committee

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

COMMENTS ON PERSONAL FILES

Approves Option 1. (memo to follow)

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY 5K2ALM KP

TO: See Distribution

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Congressional Access to Personal Files Maintained by the FBI

Certain members of the Senate Select Committee have requested access to their personal files. The preferred mode of access is the subject of pending consideration by the Attorney General. As you know, under the mandate of the Senate Select Committee, access to the personal file of a member of the Senate Select Committee may be had without any consideration of Freedom of Information Act issues.

The Attorney General has considered several options, and has asked that you consider them and indicate hereon your view; he has asked that these views be delivered to me not later than 1:00 p.m., this afternoon so that he may promptly consider them. The options considered are not exclusive. If you have any suggestions other than the options indicated, please attach it to your response. Responses should be delivered to me in Room 4213, Main Justice, by the time indicated. Thank you for your cooperation.

OPTIONS

Option 1: Departmental staff examine the documents in the file and delete any references to sensitive sources or ongoing criminal investigation; thereafter, the file is made accessible to the Senator under controlled circumstances at the Department of Justice.

✓ Approved ______ Disapproved

Comment:

EITHER THIS OR 3 IS PREFERABLE BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW WHAT "PERSONAL FILES" LOOK LIKE, HARD TO CHOOSE

Option 2: Same as Option 1, except that a xerox of the documents as excised is delivered to the Senator.

______ Approved   __X__ Disapproved

Comment: PERHAPS SOME CONSIDERATION TO XEROX COPIES OF SPECIFIED DOCS AFTER REVIEW. EVEN THIS IS QUESTIONABLE, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF "LEAK" PROBLEM.

Option 3: The file is assembled and the Senator given access to it, with certain papers withheld and the Senator is orally advised of the reasons for withholding of the documents.

__✓__ Approved   ______ Disapproved

Comment:

SEE COMMENT TO #2

Option 4: The Senator is furnished his entire individual file without any excisions or deletions, for review at the Department of Justice.

______ Approved   __X__ Disapproved

Comment:

Distribution:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. Thornburgh, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

July 18, 1975

TO: Bill O'Connor

FROM: Stan Pottinger

SUBJECT: July 18 memo--congressional access to personal files maintained by the FBI

Without knowing how these files were compiled (public sources? wiretap? confidential informant?), or what is in them (personal matter of derogatory nature? national security information?), or why they exist, (I have read in newspapers that they exist, but that's all), I would probably choose in the absence of knowing something about these Option #1, with the understanding that copies of releaseable information can then be made available to the Senator according to criteria spelled out in the Freedom of Information Act. I assume, however, that whoever is advising the AG about this has actually read the files in question, at least sufficient to know in a generic sense the answers to the questions raised above.

Despite the fact that I am operating in a vacuum on this, I do appreciate being consulted.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 16, 1975

RECEIVED
JUL 16 1975
KWO'C

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

I have received your letter of July 15 regarding access/delivery of documents requested in the Committee's letter of July 9, 1975. The following relates specifically to the procedure suggested for handling documents on the so called "Kissinger 17" surveillance, which is also applied in your letter to materials relating to electronic surveillance of the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City in August 1964, materials relating to the electronic surveillance of Dr. King, and possibly the O & C files.

I regard this suggested procedure as a major step forward and a recognition that previous arrangements were too cumbersome and time-consuming. Nevertheless, there are certain practical problems with the procedure which may be resolved by interpretation. For example, I assume that application of the procedure to the Atlantic City convention matters does not foreclose the Committee from receiving for use at its offices actual documents or portions of documents, as well as summaries. I understand that the FBI has no objection to providing such documents on this matter to the Committee for use at its offices.

Therefore, in order that the procedure you suggest may be applicable to all areas of Committee inquiry claimed by the Department to involve particularly sensitive matters, it should be interpreted as follows: the Committee staff will have direct access to all files and materials at FBIHQ; the Committee staff shall select certain documents from the files which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiry and necessary for the examination of witnesses or the establishment of certain facts during the course of the

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2 ALM/KP

Recd O'C
1245 7/16
R

inquiry; the FBI shall at that time designate specific portions of such documents which might jeopardize particularly sensitive sources or methods; with respect to such specifically designated portions of documents, the Committee staff will prepare appropriate excisions or summaries of the information; the summaries will be checked at that time with senior Bureau executives to ensure the protection of particularly sensitive FBI sources or methods; thereafter, the excised documents and summaries will be removed to the Committee's offices; the Committee staff may check back to the original documents as extensively as necessary; staff notes on the designated specific portions of documents will not be removed from FBIHQ; and Committee members may, of course, at any time see the documents which the staff has seen.

I believe this interpretation can serve as a workable framework for Committee access to particularly sensitive FBI materials. You may be assured that the Task Force shares your concern for the need to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials, as indicated in the Outline for Inquiry Procedures. We hope this interpretation will facilitate the mutual effort by the Committee and the Department of Justice to accomplish this purpose.

I would appreciate receiving your immediate advice to me as to whether any further interpretation of this matter is required. Any public discussion of these arrangements and interpretations should be cast in such terms as will not jeopardize particularly sensitive FBI sources.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 1 5 1975

Mr. John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Re: Access/Delivery of Documents Requested in Senate Select Committee Letter of July 9, 1975

Dear Mr. Elliff:

Pursuant to our conversation of July 11, and confirming it, the following arrangements are approved for access to materials and delivery of materials to the Senate Select Committee staff, in addition to that which has already been made available.

All the provisions of this letter, hereinafter stated, are, of course, subject to the agreements embodied in the Outline for Inquiry Procedures referenced in the Committee's letter of June 27, 1975. Particular reference will periodically be made to the second sentence of paragraph B, page 2, of that document which specifies:

> "...The agency will also specifically indicate any of such materials which are extraordinarily sensitive in order to facilitate the mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate..."

Special handling techniques in addition to those indicated herein may be required in order to protect the security of sensitive materials covered herein.

cc: Paul Wallach

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/00 BY SP2ALM/VP

Please refer to the attachments to the July 9, letter:

Page 3, Paragraph 2, Subsection A. All of the FBI files on the so called "Kissinger 17" surveillance will be made available to you and specific appropriately cleared staff in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building. These documents may be reviewed and studied there, and you and such staff may take such notes as you deem appropriate; we have agreed that the notes are to be left in the secure room of the Hoover Building during your study. When your study is completed, you may prepare a summary of the information which you consider to be appropriate for Committee use. The summary must be checked with senior Bureau executives to ensure the protection of national security matters, protection of confidential sources of information, and observation of privacy considerations. Thereafter, the approved summary may be removed to the Committee's office and all the staff notes will be destroyed. You may check the summary back to the original documents as extensively as necessary, in Room 4171.

Page 3, Paragraph 2, Subsection B. Materials have already been transmitted regarding the Kraft matter and the agreement between his attorney and the Attorney General. When you have reviewed those materials, and have contacted Mr. Kraft's attorney, should you deem that appropriate, I understand you will contact me if further information is requested.

Page 5, Paragraph 3, A & B. As you may know, representatives of the King family, including Mr. Harry H. Wachtel, attorney, have formally expressed to the Department a special concern regarding any public disclosure of any derogatory information regarding Dr. King which may be contained in Bureau files. Subject to your reaching an agreement with such representatives of the King family, and the acceptance by the Department of such a written agreement, all of the materials related to the electronic surveillance of Dr. King, in the custody of the FBI, will be made available to you and specific appropriately cleared staff under the same conditions and with the same agreements as specified above with regard to the "Kissinger 17" surveillance.

Page 6, Paragraph 4. Those materials in the custody of the FBI which reflect and relate to electronic surveillance of the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City in August 1964, will be provided under the same conditions as articulated above with regard to the "Kissinger 17" surveillance.

Page 9, Paragraph C. A summary of procedures for mail covers has been provided by my recent letter to you. In addition to that, a ~~statistical~~ summary of mail covers on closed matters will be made available to you in Room 4171, together with access to the underlying documentation requesting the individual mail covers.

Documentation relating to the opening of mail will be withheld at present, due to ongoing investigations.

After your review of the mail cover summaries and any underlying documents you wish to review, we will discuss any further access which you may request to mail cover information.

Page 10, Paragraph E. I understand and accept your explanation that the word "implementation" in line 2 of paragraph E(1) does not seek access to the "raw" files of COINTELPRO programs. All of the memoranda originating the several COINTELPRO programs will be made available to you and specific appropriately cleared staff for review in Room 4171.

We will furnish to you, for your study at Senate Select Committee offices, a complete set of the excised exhibits A-E to the Petersen Report; as previously agreed, your staff may have access to any unexcised pages of Exhibits A-E which you may wish to see, and which will be maintained at Room 4171. The back up materials underlying any particular summary in A-E will be extracted from the "raw" files upon your request and made available to you for your study in Room 4171. General access to the "raw" files is not required, as I understand it, for your purposes under this agreement. General disclosure of information derived from documents other than the excised pages of Exhibits A-E will be made available subject to limitations to be determined, dependent upon the sensitivity of such information, in conference with appropriate Bureau officials and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph B of the Outline for Inquiry Procedures, to protect the considerations outlined above.

Page 14, Item I. This will confirm your understanding that certain Huston Plan documents prepared by the Bureau in response to your request under this heading have been delivered to the White House for "third agency clearance". This statement formally confirms my previous discussions with you of this fact when we met with Mr. Schwarz and Mr. Smothers on July 2. Be advised that the documents which have been transmitted to the White House for clearance will be forwarded to you, or made available for access, if appropriate, upon our receipt of the White House directions.

Page 16, Paragraph J. This will confirm our understanding that on July 14, there will be available for your review in Room 4171, a 160 page summary document reflecting an analysis of the O & C files.

After you have reviewed that analysis, I will discuss with you an appropriate further step with regard to the O & C files if such is indicated; such an agreement would be generally similar in terms to the foregoing arrangements.

I trust that this letter accurately reflects our understanding as reached in our discussion on July 11. If it does not, your immediate advice to me of any particulars in which we disagree in our understanding will be appreciated. In the meantime, I have furnished a copy of this letter to the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General and have requested the Bureau's cooperation in promptly making available the information indicated.

I would appreciate meeting with you and Mr. Schwarz and Mr. Smothers around July 18, for the purpose of discussing any problems which you may have identified and to clarify any outstanding documentary request which you may have, and to agree upon an appropriate schedule. Since we have received several additional requests from you, since the July 9, letter was delivered, it would seem appropriate to re-analyze your requirements in light of the agreements reached on July 11, reflected herein.

Sincerely,

K. William O'Connor

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

cc: Attorney General
Deputy Attorney General

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

7/22/75

TO : The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: K. William O'Connor

DATE: July 18, 1975

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FILES

62-116395-610

In response to your memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned as above, we observe that the "substantial negotiations" which produced the proposed procedures did not include participation by a representative of the FBI and that the request for our views concerning disclosure of highly sensitive FBI material was first received at 11:14 a.m. today with a reply expected by 2:00 p.m. today. We respectfully suggest that not only should you afford greater opportunity for an expression of our views on this matter, but that any such proposed procedures should be presented to the President's Counsel for concurrence and for an expression of the President's views as to the general policy of the Executive Branch in this regard. Further, you may want to consider addressing the problem of the impact such general disclosure of files would have on pending criminal investigations.

A preliminary review in the time available revealed that certain items require considerable modification. For example, Item (3)(c) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for information that would tend to identify sources to whom the FBI has an obligation of confidentiality as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity already has been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identity to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman."

Liaison cc 62-116395-610

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975
KWO'C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Item (6)(b) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the FBI will furnish a written statement of the grounds for its position to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation within 24 hours."

Item (8) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "The Staff and the Members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the Staff is given access as extensively as necessary between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, in the FBI J. Edgar Hoover Building at Room 4171."

In light of the difficulties described, it is my strong recommendation that such procedures should not be hastily agreed upon with the Committee and that full discussion should be had concerning this matter by representatives of the FBI, the Attorney General, the Committee and the Counsel to the President.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM KP.

TO: See Distribution

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Proposed Procedures for Access to Department of Justice Files

Attached hereto is a sequence of proposed procedures which are being considered by the Attorney General for dealing with the Senate Select Committee, in regard to its desire for access to materials in the Departmental/FBI files.

This document is the result of substantial negotiations; it represents what we understand to be the ultimate scope of access desired by the Senate Select Committee.

The Attorney General wishes to be advised this afternoon of the views of the addressees; accordingly, he has asked that each of you call me before 2:00 p.m., and advise me of your general approval, disapproval, or view. Please excuse the urgency of the requested response; it is necessary to react on a very short fuse because of the extreme pressures which have been generated in this matter. Please call me on 739-5211, by the time indicated above. Your cooperation is appreciated.

Distribution:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
✓Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

5

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

non-delegable

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY SP2ALM/60

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader, chief counsel, c Minority cou requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential inf has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

[illegible]

JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 5T2ALMKP

TO: Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Responses to Request for Comments on Proposed Procedures

1. The Deputy Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, and Civil Rights Division register no objections to the proposed procedures on access. OLA suggests inclusion of a preamble referencing security agreements and the need for proper security assurances from the Committee to the Attorney General.

2. Both the Criminal Division and Office of Legal Counsel address the short response time frames imposed upon the Attorney General, and OLC suggests certain language changes for purposes of clarity and focus.

3. The Attorney General is troubled by Item 9 and its need for modification as to categories of material not treatable by these proposed procedures or as to a later discovered need to make presently unanticipated changes to effect a smoother operation of the procedures.

4. The Bureau's comments on the proposed procedures are attached and should be read. This Office does not agree with the Bureau that the proposed procedures should be presented to the President and the President's Counsel.

5. No response has been received from the Solicitor General.

6. This Office recommends that Item 9 be modified as suggested by the Attorney General and that the language modifications suggested by OLC for Items 3 and 6 be adopted.

7. It is further suggested that the Attorney General convene a meeting of the senior Bureau officials for the purpose of informing them of his policy decision in this matter.

Copies to:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

My view is that item 9 goes too far in that there must be some provision which allows the Department or the Committee to abrogate the arrangement. I should think the agreement could provid that at any time the Chairman of the Committee or the Attorney General could give a notification that the (1) agreement was not suitable for a particular category of material or (2) that for some reason the agreement was not operating suitably and that as to either one or two there would then be an endeavor to work out a suitable modification or different arrangement (but I think it has to be said that the arrangement can be cancelled by either party)

OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

7/18/75

To: Bill O'Connor

From: Doug Marvin

Attached is the Attorney General's comment on the procedures for dealing with the Senate Select Committee

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Proposed procedures

July 18, 1975

Daly

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 5P2 ALM/al

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader/or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 13 1975

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

or the Senior Staff
(b) If the Task Force Leader/has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. No problem with this procedure, but feels that the time limits are too tight

2. No central policy objection

3. Suggest incorporate a preamble phrase that makes reference to security agreements; a specific means for assurance to the AG by the Chairman and Vice Chairman of proper security measures

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

1. 48 hour lead time is very short and may create problems; 24 hour reaction time may be unreasonable for Attorney General.

2. The provision seems a little odd, out of context of negotiations.

3. Suggest that in 3(a), last line, word and should be or and "peculiarly sensitive" read to modify both foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

4. No comment

5. No comment

6. Time frames are very restrictive; there should be a stated opportunity for TFL to work out any objections with FBI, before raising to Special Counsel "...if the issue is not promptly resolved between the TFL and the FBI, the materials in issue will be conveyed..."

7. Define "screened" by reference to 6(a) above

8. No comment

9. No comment

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

Views of Thornburg and Kevin Maroney

1. Time frames a bit skimpy
2. looks as though we're giving up a lot, but that's probably what's required

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCEDURES

No objection to proposed procedures on access

OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTM[illegible] OF JUSTICE
QUI PRO DOMINA JUSTITIA SEQUITUR

7/18

TO: Director, FBI

FROM: Bill O'Connor

ATTN: James Adams

FYI

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY 322AUM VP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SPBALM/KP

The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: K. William O'Connor

July 18, 1975

Director, FBI

EX 104 REC-56 62-116395-618

PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS
TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FILES

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Daly

In response to your memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned as above, we observe that the "substantial negotiations" which produced the proposed procedures did not include participation by a representative of the FBI and that the request for our views concerning disclosure of highly sensitive FBI material was first received at 11:14 a.m. today with a reply expected by 2:00 p.m. today. We respectfully suggest that not only should you afford greater opportunity for an expression of our views on this matter, but that any such proposed procedures should be presented to the President's Counsel for concurrence and for an expression of the President's views as to the general policy of the Executive Branch in this regard. Further, you may want to consider addressing the problem of the impact such general disclosure of files would have on pending criminal investigations.

A preliminary review in the time available revealed that certain items require considerable modification. For example, Item (3)(c) should be reconsidered with the following language:

> "An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for information that would tend to identify sources to whom the FBI has an obligation of confidentiality as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity already has been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identity to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JAM:mfd

1 XEROX
SEP 4 1975
JFK

Delivered to K William O'Connor at 1:55 pm 6/18/75 pv

84 SEP 8 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Item (6)(b) should be reconsidered with the following language:

"If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the FBI will furnish a written statement of the grounds for its position to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation within 24 hours."

Item (8) should be reconsidered with the following language:

"The Staff and the Members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the Staff is given access as extensively as necessary between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, in the FBI J. Edgar Hoover Building at Room 4171."

In light of the difficulties described, it is my strong recommendation that such procedures should not be hastily agreed upon with the Committee and that full discussion should be had concerning this matter by representatives of the FBI, the Attorney General, the Committee and the Counsel to the President.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

TO: See Distribution

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM KP

SUBJECT: Proposed Procedures for Access to Department of Justice Files

Attached hereto is a sequence of proposed procedures which are being considered by the Attorney General for dealing with the Senate Select Committee, in regard to its desire for access to materials in the Departmental/FBI files.

This document is the result of substantial negotiations; it represents what we understand to be the ultimate scope of access desired by the Senate Select Committee.

The Attorney General wishes to be advised this afternoon of the views of the addressees; accordingly, he has asked that each of you call me before 2:00 p.m., and advise me of your general approval, disapproval, or view. Please excuse the urgency of the requested response; it is necessary to react on a very short fuse because of the extreme pressures which have been generated in this matter. Please call me on 739-5211, by the time indicated above. Your cooperation is appreciated.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-610

REC-56

Distribution:

7 AUG 6 1975

EX 104

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
✓ Director, FBI
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

LEGAL COUNSEL

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

non-delegable

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-610

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader, chief counsel, or Minority coun requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential inform has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only if such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

The Attorney General

August 27, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/00 BY SP2ALM KP

Enclosed for your information are two copies each of two memoranda concerning interviews by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of two FBI Special Agents. One set of these memoranda is for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SFP:lhb lhb
(10)

REC-56 62-116395-609

EX 104

12 SEP 4 1975

NOTE: 2 ENCLOSURE

LHMs being furnished to the Attorney General ~~were~~ received by airtels from Los Angeles 8/15/75 (Ward interview), and 8/7/75 (Bloeser interview), both in connection with Senstudy 75. Copies of the airtels and the LHMs will be designated for the respective personnel files of the personnel who were interviewed.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAILED 7
AUG 28 1975
FBI

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 SEP 8 1975

GPO 954-546

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY 5P2ALM/KP

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 5, 1975, Supervisor Richard H. Bloeser was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel at the Los Angeles FBI Office regarding the COINTELPRO/Black Panther Party (BPP).

Mr. Seidel advised Supervisor Bloeser that the interview was voluntary, but did not advise Supervisor Bloeser of his rights in this matter.

Mr. Seidel inquired of Supervisor Bloeser as to how many offices he had served in, his length of service in the Bureau, and how long had been spent on intelligence investigations. Supervisor Bloeser replied that he had served in Philadelphia, El Paso and Los Angeles, had been in the Bureau approximately 24½ years, and had been assigned to intelligence work for 22 years.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Supervisor Bloeser believed that the Bureau had placed undue pressure on the field to come up with counter intelligence proposals concerning the BPP and was it difficult to come up with a proposal. Supervisor Bloeser responded that there was no undue pressure placed on the field by the Bureau, that the COINTELPRO/BPP was merely another case assigned to an agent and that agent, as in any other case, had the responsibility of handling the matter whether it concerned the solving of a case or the submission of proposals. Mr. Seidel was also informed that it was not unduly difficult to come up with a proposal and that a number of proposals were rejected at the field level and never submitted to the Bureau.

Mr. Seidel inquired specifically as to counter intelligence proposals involving cartoons ridiculing the BPP.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-609

Supervisor Bloeser responded that he vaguely remembered such proposals but without reviewing the file had no definite recollection. Mr. Seidel did not request that the file be reviewed.

Mr. Seidel inquired specifically about a business card which allegedly had been prepared by the Bureau bearing the phrase "Karenga is impotent." Mr. Seidel requested Supervisor Bloeser's views on the distribution of this card by the FBI. Supervisor Bloeser responded that he vaguely remembered the card, that he thought it was humorous, and that the word impotent had various meanings.

Mr. Seidel then inquired about the blood feud which existed in the past between the US Organization and the BPP and the efforts of the Bureau to keep this feud alive and thus promote violence. He specifically inquired as to the personal feelings of Supervisor Bloeser concerning any counter intelligence proposals which, if placed in operation, could lead to violence between the two groups.

Supervisor Bloeser responded first that personally he had no apologies for the counter intelligence program as a whole, that proposals submitted six or seven years ago were believed necessary at that time due to the circumstances, specifically that at that time the BPP and the US Organization were involved in violent activity against the community as a whole. Mr. Seidel was informed that the feud between the US Organization and the BPP occurred long before the FBI COINTELPRO became involved in the feud and that any proposals approved by the Bureau had relatively little effect on the violence committed by either group. Mr. Seidel was also reminded that six or seven years ago the Congress of the United States fully supported the war in Vietnam in which thousands of people were killed but that under today's circumstances no support has been given to South Vietnam.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);
INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Seidel then posed a hypothetical question involving the following factors: Would Supervisor Bloeser now or in the past approve a counter intelligence proposal whereby one extremist with a criminal record of violence be anonymously informed that another extremist with a record of criminal violence was an informant for the FBI, knowing that the alleged informant might be injured or killed. Supervisor Bloeser replied that under the present conditions such a proposal would not be approved, but that he could not give an answer as to what his feelings might have been six or seven years ago under any given situation. Mr. Seidel was again reminded that Congress in the past has not hesitated to support wars which kill thousands of people but that recently they have criti~~zed~~cized the CIA for allegedly plotting to assassinate one individual whose death might prevent a war. Mr. Seidel was also informed that it was ironic that Congress was investigating another agency of the Federal Government which was attempting to prevent revolutionary violence in this country.

Mr. Seidel then inquired into the counter intelligence proposals approved by the Bureau in relation to the actress Jean Seberg and Raymond Hewitt, a leader of the BPP. This proposal concerned the fact that Seberg, who was then married to a French producer, admitted being pregnant by Hewitt who was also married at the time. The Bureau approved anonymously leaking this information to a Hollywood columnist. Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Supervisor Bloeser did or did not believe that this was an invasion of privacy. Supervisor Bloeser responded that the item was newsworthy and that it would have been any fair game for any newsmen had they come across it in the course of their business which they could have probably easily done, and that certainly Congress would not have criti~~zed~~cized a newspaper for printing such an item or claim it to be an invasion of privacy. Mr. Seidel inquired as to the purpose of this particular operation and he was informed that Miss Seberg was giving support to the BPP and that it was hoped that such publicity would prevent any future support by her of the BPP.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);
INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

He was further advised that it was the responsibility of the FBI to determine who was funding revolutionary groups in this country.

Mr. Seidel then inquired as to whether or not it was difficult to conduct intelligence investigations under present statutes and under the Criminal Rules of Procedure. He was informed that it was somewhat difficult to conduct an effective intelligence operation under present circumstances and that perhaps new legislative or executive orders would be helpful to the FBI in order to allow the FBI to continue its investigations in the Domestic Intelligence field. Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether it would be helpful to have specific legislation which might completely separate criminal and intelligence operations so one would not taint the other. He was informed that if such legislation could be enacted that it would undoubtedly help the FBI.

The interview lasted approximately two hours and it was not necessary to consult with another Bureau representative during this time.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
August 15, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF SA WALLACE E. WARD BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 5, 1975, Special Agent (SA) Wallace E. Ward was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel at Los Angeles Field Office regarding Cointelpro/Black Panther Party. The interview lasted from 9:12 a.m. to 9:22 a.m.

SA Ward was advised by Mr. Seidel that the interview was voluntary but SA Ward was not advised of his rights in this matter.

Seidel asked how long SA Ward had been a Special Agent with the FBI, and SA Ward responded nine years. He further requested previous offices SA Ward had been assigned to, and SA Ward responded Cincinnati, Ohio. Seidel advised the Bureau informed him that SA Ward had been assigned Cointelpro/Black Panther Party in June 1969. Seidel requested to know what work SA Ward had been assigned before this, to which SA Ward responded he could not remember, but believed general criminal work.

Seidel requested to know what specific instructions were issued with regard to operating Cointelpro/Black Panther Party. SA Ward advised that due to his employment agreement, the sensitive nature of the Bureau work, and the possible overlap of Bureau investigation, he did not feel he could respond to any further questions. Seidel advised he understood SA Ward's position as he, Seidel, had worked criminal matters himself and knew the need for secrecy. The official interview was terminated at this point.

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-609

In a friendly conversation that followed for approximately ten to fifteen minutes, SA Ward advised Seidel that he had only been assigned the Cointelpro/Black Panther Party matter for three months and had no knowledge that would be of value to Seidel. The Cointelpro/Black Panther Party matter was not further discussed. The rest of the time was involved in discussing points of interest in the Los Angeles basin of tourist value, such as Marineland, Palos Verdes, and Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles.

SA Ward advises that he is aware that the Director waived his employment agreement with certain exceptions regarding privileged areas. With this in mind, SA Ward reviewed his employment agreement and concluded, after noting the following quotation, that he could not disclose any information without following the prescribed procedure:

"The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed, and in this regard, I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure".

With this in mind, SA Ward answered Mr. Seidel as noted heretofore.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING	X	INTERVIEWs		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/27/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of interviews by SSC Staff Member of Supervisor Richard H. Bloeser andSpecial Agent Wallace E. Ward.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Counterintelligence

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

COINTELPRO of the FBI as it related to the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WOC/8

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 8/20/75

1 - Personnel File - Richard H. Ross
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY -75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Lester B. Seidel, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, requested on 8/19/75 that SA Richard H. Ross be made available for Staff interview concerning the Bureau's investigation of the Black Panther Party and COINTELPRO as it applies to the Black Panther Party. Seidel stated that he would prefer handling this particular interview in conjunction with his interview of SA Richard W. Held. He requested he be advised when the appropriate clearance procedures have been completed and SA Ross is available for interview. SA Ross is currently assigned to the Intelligence Division. SA Held was previously cleared for interview by memorandum dated 8/1/75.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That SA Ross be released from existing employment agreement for purposes of an interview concerning the Bureau's investigation of the Black Panther Party and COINTELPRO as it relates to the Black Panther Party.

(2) That an Intelligence Division representative be available but not present during the interview of SA Ross to assist in making a determination whether a question may be properly responded to.

EX 104

REC-56

62-116395-607

ENCLOSURE

SEP 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/00 BY SP2ANVP

PVD:lad
(8)

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 SEP 8 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

Right to Counsel

(1) You have the right to counsel during interview and/or testimony.

(2) The FBI cannot provide you with private counsel.

(3) If you are unable to secure private counsel, you may so state and request assistance in securing counsel.

Secrecy Agreements

(1) You must request a waiver by the Director, FBI of any applicable employment or secrecy agreement prior to interview or testimony in order that you may be authorized to furnish the information requested.

(2) If your testimony is pursuant to a subpoena, order, or other demand, you must obtain the approval of the Department of Justice prior to furnishing testimony.

Representative from FBI

(1) A representative from the FBI will be available during interview and/or testimony for consultation.

(2) The FBI is concerned with possible impairment of FBI's current and future efforts to discharge its reponsibilities.

(3) You are not to discuss the following matters without prior authorization from the FBI"

A. Information provided by sources (or any other

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-607

information), which might tend to identify a confidential source.

B. Information concerning sensitive investigative techniques.

C. Information derived from other Government agencies, including information from foreign intelligence sources.

D. Any information the disclosure of which could adversely affect ongoing investigations.

AUG 20 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Seymor Phillips

Sensitivity - 1/5

The attached letter is self-explanatory and, though mentioning no name, concerns Seymor Phillips.

On Friday, August 15, 1975, I orally advised Messrs. Callahan and Wannall that the Deputy Attorney General thought that Senator Church's letter had some merit and that for the sake of appearances it was the Deputy's suggestion that Mr. Phillips be removed from such conspicuous and open involvement with the SSC's requests and agent interviews as they may relate to Martin Luther King matters.

REC-56 62-116395-605

EX 104

12 SEP 4 1975

cc: ✓Mr. Callahan
Mr. Wannall

File 5

[illegible]

[illegible]

Treat as original

LEGAL COUNSEL

ENCLOSURE

79 SEP 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALMKP

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 14, 1975

Recd 8/14/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I am writing to call your attention to a matter which may be a cause of concern to you and to the Select Committee at some time in the future.

As you may know, a special unit has been established in the FBI Intelligence Division to handle this Committee's requests for materials and to handle certain arrangements for the Committee staff's interviews. The Special Agents assigned to this unit accompany Bureau witnesses to the Committee offices, travel to out-of-town locations where Committee staff interviews are conducted, and apparently "de-brief" interview subjects after the interviews.

One possible problem has arisen with this arrangement. As you are aware, one of the alleged abuses which the Committee is examining pursuant to S. Res. 21 involves the FBI's activities with respect to the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. As the inquiry has proceeded, information has been developed to indicate that one of the Special Agents who has been handling Committee staff interviews, "de-briefing" witnesses, and, presumably, compiling materials with respect to the King matter was also the supervisory case agent during the time that some of the alleged FBI improprieties regarding Dr. King took place. Moreover, as a logical step in our investigation, it was

RECEIVED
15 1975

62-116395-605

ENCLOSURE

recently necessary to interview this Special Agent to determine the nature and extent of his involvement in and knowledge of the alleged abuses at the time when he served as supervisory case agent with respect to the King case. During the interview he did provide detailed information concerning his substantial participation in this matter.

The Committee in no way intends at this juncture to pre-judge the propriety of the FBI's activities with respect to Dr. King, and it would be inappropriate to characterize the conduct of any of the Bureau's personnel regarding this case until all the facts are in. Nevertheless, I am concerned that in this kind of situation, the interests of the FBI and the Department of Justice might best be served, from the standpoint of appearances, by reconsidering the assignment of this Special Agent to the King matters. It is possible that some may conclude that there is a conflict between the Special Agent's personal interest, and the interests of the FBI and the Justice Department in ensuring that full disclosure to the Committee is made with respect to this case.

Finally, let me assure you that the Committee has no evidence that the present arrangement has prevented the Committee from obtaining the full disclosures sought; but it seems to me that it would be mutually beneficial for appropriate steps to be taken so that we will both be able to assure the American people and the Congress that our oversight responsibilities were fulfilled in an objective and impartial way.

I hope you will share my view that this course will best serve our respective interests and, of course, the interests of the country.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman

The Attorney General **August 27, 1975**

Director, FBI 62-1

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
~~1 - Mr. Daly~~

**LETTER FROM SENATOR CHURCH
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DATED
AUGUST 14, 1975**

Senstudy-75

Attached for your information are the original and a copy of a letter I addressed to Senator Church in response to his letter to you dated August 14, 1975, which was brought to my attention by referral by Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination.

If you concur in my response, please forward the original of the letter to Senator Church.

Enclosures (2)

**1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.**

Mr Michael Shaheen advised 9/12/75
that instead of letter not sent. DAG Tyler Jr
sent letter to Senator Church dated 9/10/75
copy of which placed in file
WOG
9/15/75

62-116395-604

EX 104 REC-56

12 SEP 4 1975

JAM:mfd
(7)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Approved by Director 8/26
Hand delivered to Shaheen 8/26 by Mr. Wannall and Mintz

84 SEP 8 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

August 27, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

Honorable Frank Church
Chairman, Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your thoughtful letter of August 14, 1975, to the Attorney General was referred to me and it has been carefully considered. I certainly agree with the view expressed therein that it is important the Committee's oversight responsibilities be fulfilled in an objective and impartial way. To that end, I have required employees with experience to assist in locating the full documentation called for in Committee requests. The voluminous files and variety of indices entries would have been much more difficult to sort for your benefit without the assistance of persons having such expertise.

I appreciate your assurance that the Committee has no evidence that our arrangements have prevented the Committee from obtaining the full disclosure sought. I have absolute confidence that those FBI employees participating in our current efforts to assist your Committee are working in good faith and have not inhibited full disclosure. Further, I have required close supervision of this work by superiors and thereby avoided the possibility of an improper decision by any one individual affecting the responses.

ENCLOSURE

EX 104

REC-56 62-116395-604

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

NOTE: Based on incoming memorandum from Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., 8/20/75, enclosing copy of letter from Senator ~~Church to the~~ Attorney General.

SEP 4 1975

JAM:mfd
(7)

JBA
PVM

Approved by the Director 8/26
Hand delivered to Shaheen 8/26 by Mr. Wannall and Mintz

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Honorable Frank Church

As to the availability of an FBI representative during Committee staff interviews of present or former FBI employees concerning alleged "abuses," I have determined that such no longer will be generally afforded. The subject matters requiring consultation with such witnesses are essentially four: (1) information which identifies or may identify FBI confidential sources; (2) information which may adversely affect on-going FBI investigations; (3) information concerning sensitive methods and techniques; and (4) information obtained from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Witnesses may be cautioned prior to interview concerning such problem areas and refrain from furnishing the information pending consultation with FBI Headquarters. This modification is effective immediately.

I hope that you will bring this matter to the attention of your staff and that in so doing you also will review the standards of objectivity and impartiality being followed in their interviews to assure protection of individual rights.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

August 29, 1975

1 Hotchkiss

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

8/29

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated August 28, 1975. The letter is self-explanatory.

I would appreciate it if you would treat this request with the highest priority.

I have discussed with Mike Epstein (in Elliff's absence) of the SSC and with Elmer Larson of the Bureau the demands this request will pose for the Bureau, and we have agreed to defer responding to Elliff's requests of August 20, 1975, for Parts IV and V, from September 4 to September 9, in an effort to meet the response date (September 3) of the attached request.

/3

62-116395-603

REC-56

ENCLOSURE

EX 104

12 SEP 4 1975

MDR-16 FBI 10/17/00

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KSR

1cc to Ad Hoc
8-29-75

5-Enl

79 SEP 17 1975

August 29, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated August 28, 1975. The letter is self-explanatory.

I would appreciate it if you would treat this request with the highest priority.

I have discussed with Mike Epstein (in Elliff's absence) of the SSC and with Elmer Larson of the Bureau the demands this request will pose for the Bureau, and we have agreed to defer responding to Elliff's requests of August 20, 1975, for Parts IV and V, from September 4 to September 9, in an effort to meet the response date (September 3) of the attached request.

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/KG

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR.,
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 28, 1975

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I would like to bring to your personal attention a situation which has severely restricted our efforts to establish the relevant facts with respect to one of the areas of alleged abuse which is the subject of inquiry pursuant to S. Res. 21.

I have been informed by the staff that numerous materials which have been requested during the past several weeks which pertain to the FBI's activities with respect to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., have been withheld from the Committee by the Department because of concern expressed by Mr. Harry Wachtel, the attorney for the King family and estate, as to the appropriateness of the Department's "disseminating" to the Committee contents of conversations monitored during electronic surveillances of Dr. King.

Upon reviewing the lists of materials requested, I am at a loss to understand how most of those items could conceivably be encompassed by the issues raised by Mr. Wachtel, especially in view of the fact that our letters of request have specifically pointed out that tape recordings and transcripts should not be supplied.

Accordingly, I want to take this opportunity to place the Committee formally on record as reaffirming all of the outstanding requests for materials relating to the King matters, with the limited exception of (1) Mr. DeLoach's August 24 - 27, 1964 memoranda which pertain to the 1964 Democratic National Convention, and (2) those portions of any other requested materials which actually summarize or quote from conversations monitored during any electronic surveillance of Dr. King.

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

3 4 5 6 7 8
RECEIVED
AUG 28 1975

62-116395-603

Delivery is requested by Wednesday, September 3, 1975, pursuant to the provisions of the general procedural agreement between the Department and the Committee which governs all Committee requests. I understand that the Bureau has been collecting the King-related materials upon receipt of each of our requests, and therefore I presume that there will be no substantial burden in meeting the September 3 date.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

I am taking the liberty of sending Mr. Wachtel a copy of this request.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

CC: Harry Wachtel

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ✓
Files & Com. ✓
Gen. Inv. ✓
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 07 OM PLAIN

10:20 PM CST NITEL JUNE 19, 1975 IJS

TO DIRECTOR
MINNEAPOLIS

FROM OMAHA 62-3439 (P)

Sept. 4 - 75

Mr. [illegible]

ATTENTION: JOHN C. GORDON, ~~GID~~.

SENATOR CHURCH'S COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES.

SENSTUDY 75. INFORMATION CONCERNING.

RE OMAHA TELCALLS TO BUREAU AND MINNEAPOLIS, JUNE 19, 1975.

IN THE JUNE 19, 1975 AFTERNOON ISSUE OF THE OMAHA WORLD HERALD, A DAILY NEWSPAPER, OMAHA, NEBRASKA, APPEARED THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE CAPTIONED "SENATE COMMITTEE SENDING INVESTIGATIOR TO GORDON, NEBRASKA". THE ARTICLE APPEARED UNDER A WORLD HERALD WASHINGTON BUREAU DATELINE.

CONTACT WITH OMAHA WORLD HERALD AUTHORITIES AT OMAHA FAILED TO DEVELOP THE NATURE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION AT GORDON, NEBRASKA. WORLD HERALD AUTHORITIES

END PAGE ONE

62-116395-608

EX 104 REC-56

12 SEP 4 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/5/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Bowers

84 SEP 8 1975

EXPLAIN THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP THIS INFORMATION IN WASHINGTON.

THE ARTICLE REFERRED TO ABOVE IS SET FORTH BELOW VERBATIM:

"AN INVESTIGATOR IS BEING SENT TO GORDON, NEB., BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE THAT IS INVESTIGATING THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OTHER GOVERNEMTN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, A SOURCE SAID.

"A COMMITTEE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE INVESTIGATION HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT TAKEOVER OF WOUNDED KNEE, S. D. HE SAID HE COULD NOT DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER.

"WE HAVEN'T BEEN IN THE CUSTOM OF IDENTIFYING DIFFERENT INTERROGATIONS THAT ARE GOING ON, A COMMITTEE SPOKESMAN SAID. TO DO SO, HE SAID, 'COULD DRY UP SOURCES.'

" MUCH THE SAME REPLY CAME FROM AN AIDE TO SEN. JOHN TOWER OF TEXAS, THE RANKING REPUBLICAN ON THE COMMITTEE THAT IS HEADED BY SEN. FRANK CHURCH, D-IDA. 'WE HAVEN'T BEEN

"TALKING AT ALL ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES', HE SAID.

"WHILE THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS ATTRACTED THE MOST ATTENTION, IT ALSO IS LOOKING INTO THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES, SUCH AS THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION."

OMAHA UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION.

INASMUCH AS SIX SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI ARE NOW USING GORDON, NEBRASKA, AS LIVING QUARTERS WHILE HANDLING CIR INVESTIGATIONS ON PINE RIDGE RESERVATION UNDER DIRECTION OF MINNEAPOLIS OFFICE, MINNEAPOLIS BEING FURNISH THIS INFORMATION.

END LSG FBIHQ CLR FOR ONE AND TKS

ac-5

Assoc. Dir. ______
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ______
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ______
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ______
Comp. Syst. ______
Ext. Affairs ______
Files & Com. ______
Gen. Inv. ______
Ident. ______
Inspection ______
Intell. ______
Laboratory ______
Plan. & Eval. ______
Spec. Inv. ______
Training ______
Legal Coun. ______
Telephone Rm. ______
Director Sec'y ______

NR007 MP CODE

6:47 PM NITEL JUNE 20, 1975 LSB

TO DIRECTOR

WFO

OMAHA (62-3439)

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (66-3610) Senstudy 75

ATTENTION: JOHN C. GORDON, ROOM 5078, GENERAL CRIMES UNIT, Mr. Gordon Rm 5078

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

SENATOR CHURCH'S COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES, SENSTAD 75, INFORMATION CONCERNING.

RE OMAHA NITEL TO DIRECTOR JUNE 19, 1975.

INFORMATION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATOR'S TRAVEL TO GORDON, NEBRASKA, IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTACTING AND INTERVIEWING A FORMER MEMBER OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. THIS INDIVIDUAL WHO OWNS A BUSINESS IN GORDON, NEBRASKA, IS BELIEVED TO BE JERRY BORMAN, WHO OPERATES A CHEVROLET DEALERSHIP IN GORDON AND PRESUMABLY WAS A MEMBER OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVING OVERSEAS. 62-116395-601

EX 104 REC-56

END

NBLD

MDR-16 10/5/00
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/5/00 BY SP3ALM/KP

4509

5-End

Bowers

GRB

84 SEP 8 1975

File #:

62-117290 — SECTION 6

Serial Scope:

353, 356, 361, 362, 366, 368, 369, 371, 372, 375, 376,

378
380
382X
385
390 THRU 395
397
400
404 THRU 409
413 THRU 415
418
420
421
424
426
428 THRU 431
433
437

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 2/10/78

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT,
RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, ST. LOUIS (62-5097)(C)

SUBJECT: O HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Re Bureau teletype to St. Louis, 2/10/78, 433 captioned as above.

Enclosed under separate cover for Headquarters is a Xerox copy of each serial in SL 170-1767 and SL 170-1767 Sub A as was requested in retel. Also enclosed is destruction memoranda concerning SL 1495-E (former) substantive file. Case closed in St. Louis.

24582
12/30/78 - [illegible] Macpalle

③ Bureau
(1 - via package) (Enc. 1)
2 - St. Louis
(1- 62-5097)
(1- 170-1767)
JLV:jtc
(5)

2cc - Congressional Inquiry Unit w/ encl

REC 58 62-117290-437

FEB 15 1978

EX-124

4 - [illegible] +12CR (info)

AUG 28 1978 CB

Approved: HC

Transmitted ________ ________ Per ________
(Number) (Time)

~~56 FEB 22 1979~~ [illegible]

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

wfk

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1 - Criminal Investigative Division
(Attn: J. E. McHale)
1 - Mr. G. J. Foster
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer
2/~~10~~ 9/78 per GJF

FM DIRECTOR (62-117290)

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

BT

EFTO

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF Classification
DATE 2/4/78 bab/[illegible]

Cw

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ST. LOUIS DATED JANUARY 25, 1978; ST. LOUIS TELETYPES TO BUREAU JANUARY 27, 1978, AND JANUARY 31, 1978.

421 429 443

ON FEBRUARY 8, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED HIS STAFF HAD CONTACTED FORMER SL 1495-E, WHO HAS AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH THE HSCA. ON FEBRUARY 9, 1978, STAFF ATTORNEY MICHAEL EBERHARDT, HSCA, ADVISED THAT SL 1495-E HAS EXECUTED A SIGNED WAIVER AUTHORIZING HSCA ACCESS TO ALL FBI INFORMATION CONCERNING HIM, INCLUDING THAT PERTAINING TO HIS INFORMANT ACTIVITIES.

REC-65 62-117290-433

EX-110

22 FEB 13 1978

134-19686 -

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

[illegible]

1 - 134-19686

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

JTA:lfj
(6)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

[illegible]

2 FEB 13 55

HB/DRJS

58 FEB 27 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

CONFIDENTIAL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 09 1978
TELETYPE

FBI/DOJ

CONFIDENTIAL

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN INFORMANT'S MAIN FILE AND SUB A FILE (170-1767) AND ONE COPY OF ANY VOUCHER OR DOCUMENT WHICH CONCERNS ANY ASPECT OF SOURCE'S OPERATION AND ANY PAYMENT WHICH WAS MADE TO HIM. ADDITIONALLY, PROVIDE FBIHQ WITH ONE COPY OF ANY MAIN FILE OR REFERENCE IN YOUR OFFICE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH INFORMANT.(~~S~~) u

THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBI HEADQUARTERS, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ, THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS OF STAFF MEMBERS OF HSCA, PROVIDED THE WAIVER DESCRIBED AS ABOVE IS RECEIVED.

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: SL 1495-E (former) (Bureau file 134-19686) was operated from January, 1970, to approximately September, 1971, primarily targeted against White Hate Groups. In 1971, he traveled to Savannah, Georgia, at which time he reported on activities of the National States Rights Party office and that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, stated he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. This is the apparent HSCA interest in informant.

Referenced communications concern previous informal requests by the HSCA that we contact SL 1495-E to determine if he would be willing to be interviewed by the Committee. St. Louis contacted informant on 1/27/78 and he agreed, but two days later submitted a letter to St. Louis declining to be interviewed by the HSCA. Subsequently, the HSCA determined informant's identity through its investigation and contacted him, at which time, according to the HSCA, he agreed to interview. By letter to the Attorney General dated 1/26/78, the HSCA has asked for all information at FBI Headquarters and in the field concerning informant.

This matter has been coordinated with SA D. O. Coulson, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:	PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:
☐ Teletype	☐ Immediate	☐ TOP SECRET
☐ Facsimile	☐ Priority	☐ SECRET
☒ Airtel	☐ Routine	☐ CONFIDENTIAL
		☐ E F T O
		☐ CLEAR

Date 2/1/78

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(Attention: Congressional Inquiry Unit, Records Management Division)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (62-7385) (C)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

ReButelcall to Chicago 2/1/78.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies each of ten letters from JERRY RAY to MARJORIE LOUISE FETTERS.

All of the above letters were originally received from the Newark Division in a Xeroxed condition thus the quality of the above enclosures is not entirely satisfactory. However, per referenced Bureau telephone call, Chicago will maintain the original Xerox copy in its file 44-1114.

2 cc RETAINED → RETAINED RM 8988 JEH w/ encls.

③ - Bureau (Encls. 20) ENCLOSURE
1 - Chicago

WLD:jeo
(4)

EX-140

4-Off 62-117290-431

REC-33

4 FEB 3 1978

245882

ALL I[illegible]D
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/85 BY [illegible]

Approved: WEB/WLD Transmitted ________ (Number) (Time) Per ________

FEB 24 1978

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 5 4 52 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

N00140 0052135Z

RR HI

DE NO

R 052125Z JAN 78

FM NEW ORLEANS (66-2878) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED: JAN. 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DEC. 27, 1977. 351

I) SA STEPHEN M. CALLENDER OF THE NEW ORLEANS DIVISION WAS THE NEW ORLEANS FIELD OFFICE CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION. AT THE TIME SA CALLENDER WAS ASSIGNED THE "MURKIN" CASE, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE NUMBER SIX SQUAD IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE. THIS SQUAD HANDLED CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS. "MURKIN" WAS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF FORMER ASAC JOSEPH T. SYLVESTER, JR. THE NATURE OF CALLENDER'S ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY

EX-105 REC-56 62-117290-430

23 JAN 26 1978

[illegible]

4 - Gebhardt

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:na

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc [illegible]

42

58FEB [illegible]

PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION WAS IN THE FIELDS OF CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS.

II) THE FILES OF THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE FAIL TO REVEAL THAT THIS OFFICE EITHER CONSIDERED OR ENGAGED IN ANY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COIN TEL PRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC).

NEW ORLEANS FILES WHICH INVOLVE THE SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF KING (NO 100-16800) AND THE SCLC (NO 100-16849) HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY REVIEWED. NEW ORLEANS WAS MERELY AN AUXILIARY OFFICE IN THESE INVESTIGATIONS, WITH ATLANTA BEING THE OO. THE EXTENT OF INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY NEW ORLEANS WAS THE COVERING OF LEADS IN LA., SET FORTH BY ATLANTA OR OTHER OFFICES. THESE TWO FILES WERE REVIEWED SERIAL BY SERIAL AND NOWHERE IS THERE ANY INDICATION WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SCLC BY THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE.

DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 - 1968, THE KING FILE IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AND THEN RUC'D AT LEAST SEVEN TIMES AND THE SCLC FILE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AT LEAST FIVE TIMES DURING THIS SAME PERIOD.

PAGE THREE NO 66-2878 E F T O

AIR MAIL COPY SENT ATLANTA DIVISION.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

SL0018 0272150

RR HQ

DE SL

R 272145Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (C)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

JAN 27 4 58 PM '78
DLS
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

BT

E F T O

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, ~~RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION.~~

~~Rm Sec&Spec Inq Section 3823 JEH TL #233~~

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

RE BUREAU TEL TO ST. LOUIS, JANUARY 25, 1978, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

SL 1495-E (FORMER) CONTACTED THIS DATE. HE WAS ADVISED OF HSCA'S EXISTENCE AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM CONCERNING CONTENTS OF LHM DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM - NSRP".

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS ADVISED THAT HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS. INITIAL REACTION OF SOURCE WAS THAT HE HAD NO STRONG OBJECTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY HSCA.

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS THEN ADVISED THAT CONFERENCES WITH HSCA

REC-56 62-117290-429

6 JAN 31 1978

Cox

4-a

54 FEB 22 1978

AND DOJ WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT DETAILS RE PROTECTION, CONFIDENTIALITY, LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

IT IS NOTED THAT SOURCE (FORMER) UNDERWENT MAJOR HEART AND ABDOMINAL SURGERY DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1977, IS CURRENTLY RECOVERING AND UNDER DOCTOR'S CARE. HE RESIDES 12350 OLD HALLS FERRY ROAD, FLORISSANT, MO., (314) 355-1500 AND IS UNEMPLOYED.

BT

#

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB778

JAN 31 5 20 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

PAGE 01 LONDON 01641 311209Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00 INR-07
L-03 /025 W

FOSTER

------------------099858 312209Z /41

R 311204Z JAN 78

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2604

[illegible] L COVERED

4 - J. T. Conner

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LONDON 01641

5 - L&O

DC

EX-140

REC- 13

DE-3

V-29

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINR PDIP UK

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

62-117290-428

FEB 7 1978

REF: STATE 10886

~~56 FEB 22 1978~~

AUG 28 1978

FOR H (ASST SEC BENNET) AND EUR/NE

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFTEL, WE PASSED ON TO THE HOME OFFICE THE REQUEST OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS FOR ACCESS TO BRITISH POLICE RECORDS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS CONCERNED WITH THE ARREST OF JAMES EARL RAY WITHOUT THE COMMITTEE RESPONDING FIRST TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED PREVIOUSLY BY BRITISH OFFICIALS.

2. THE HOME OFFICE INFORMED THE EMBASSY ON JANUARY 26 THAT IT IS CONSULTING THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S REQUEST AND WILL LET US KNOW THE OUTCOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BREWSTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEV[illegible]. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHA[illegible]HONE, NEBR.
HAR[illegible] SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

O House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

[illegible]

January 30, 1978

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Cw

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

337

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a request was made by letter dated November 30, 1977, for FBI files relating to Dr. King. These files included the following:

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.
2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.
3. The file on the Memphis Sanitation Strike for the period January 1, 1968 through May 1, 1968.
4. The file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr./Poor People's March for the period December 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.

EX-311 REC-6 62-117290-426

5. All materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the SCLC in the COINTELPRO file.

21 FEB 6 1978

We have been advised that all of the above files are now available for review by the Committee.

It is now requested, however, that the foregoing files, except for the Memphis Sanitation Strike, be prepared for Committee review for the following extended dates:

62-117290

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

58 FEB 14 1978

42

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:
    - a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    - b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the periods:
    - a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    - b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
3. The COMINFIL and COINTELPRO files as such relate to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:
    - ~~a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966~~
    - b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
4. The files on the Poor Peoples' March from May 1, 1968 to the closing date of this file.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:med

✓cc: Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRM[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible]INE, OHIO
STEWART [illegible] KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES TH[illegible]E, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

2 House

Received
CIU
2/3/78

FEB 3 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the FBI provide the Committee with photographs of all Atlanta agents assigned to the security investigation of Dr. King during the period 1967-68. To the extent possible, these photographs should depict the agents involved as they appeared in 1967-1968 or as close thereto as possible.

R

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mej
✓cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson FBI

63-117290

EX-124
REC-76 62-117290-424

FEB 7 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

PW

57 FEB 15 1978

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1/25/78

FM DIRECTOR

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

BT

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Criminal Intelligence Div.
(Attn: Mr. J. E. McHale, Jr.)

EFTO

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE ST. LOUIS AIRTEL AND LHM TO BUREAU DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED, "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM-NSRP."

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN THAT CONNECTION, VARIOUS DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE FOR HSCA REVIEW.

ON JANUARY 23, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED THAT THE HSCA DESIRES TO INTERVIEW THE FBI INFORMANT WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION IN REFERENCED LHM. BLAKEY REQUESTED THAT INFORMANT BE CONTACTED AND ADVISED OF THE HSCA'S INTEREST IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT INFORMANT HAD ANY OBJECTIONS TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY

EX-124

REC-54 62-117290-421

134-19686
105-66233

JTA:sas (7)

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

6 FEB 1 1978

1 - 134-19686
1 - 62-117290

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JAN 25 1978
2212 SJJ
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ALL [illegible] CONTAINED
I[illegible]
D[illegible] 1-10-86

42
58 FEB 14 1978

HB/DR
AJQ

Foster
Rm 8988

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA.

INFORMANT IS SL 1495-E (FORMER), WHO WAS OPERATED FROM JANUARY, 1970, TO APPROXIMATELY SEPTEMBER 1971. INFORMANT WAS PRIMARILY TARGETED AGAINST WHITE-HATE GROUPS AND WAS SUBJECT OF BUREAU FILE 134-19686 AND ST. LOUIS FILE 170-1767.

ON JANUARY 24, 1978, SUPERVISOR JAMES HAGGERTY DETERMINED THAT INFORMANT IS LISTED IN THE CURRENT ST. LOUIS TELEPHONE DIRECTORY AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CONTACT WITH INFORMANT SINCE HE WAS CLOSED IN 1971.

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY CONTACT FORMER SL 1495-E. ADVISE HIM OF THE HSCA'S EXISTENCE, AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM APPARENTLY CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF REFERENCED LHM. ADVISE HIM THE HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCED LHM AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER. DETERMINE AT THIS POINT ONLY HIS INITIAL REACTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA. IF HE HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO AN INTERVIEW, HE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT CONFERENCES WITH THE HSCA AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS

REGARDING THE EXTENT OF PROTECTION AND CONFIDENTIALITY THE HSCA IS WILLING TO EXTEND AS WELL AS DETAILS REGARDING THE LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

SUTEL RESULTS TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION.

BT

#

NOTE The HSCA plans to submit a formal request regarding this matter, but requested informant be contacted for his initial reaction to interview. The Congressional Inquiry Unit, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, agree this approach is best prior to continuing discussions to resolve legal and other issues.

The apparent interest of the HSCA involves informant's travel to Savannah, Georgia, in 1971 at which time he reported on activities at the NSRP Office in Savannah, as set forth in referenced communication. Informant reported that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, and J. B. Stoner, National Chairman, NSRP, were in the office when Jerry said that the FBI and he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. The HSCA has requested FBI information on the NSRP, Stoner, Jerry Ray and other individuals identified as being in attendance in the NSRP Office in Savannah during that time. One of the individuals present, Richard Geppert, was later developed as an informant of the Springfield Office. Geppert has been interviewed by the HSCA and has furnished a signed statement in which he gives authority for HSCA review of all FBI information concerning him, including that pertaining to his confidential relationship with the FBI.

This matter has been coordinated with Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Organized Crime Section, Criminal Investigative Division

ME0013 0140930Z

RR HQ

DE ME

R 14 0930Z JAN 78

FM MEMPHIS (66-2197) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290)

BT

EFTO

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JAN. 13, 1978.

THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOE C. HESTER, NOW RETIRED, ON APRIL 4, 1968, AND WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON AUG. 1, 1977. THE MEMPHIS OFFICE DID NOT HAVE A SQUAD BREAKDOWN AT THE TIME THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA HESTER. SA HESTER WAS ASSIGNED GENERAL CRIMINAL WORK IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION. SA JOHNSON WAS ASSIGNED DOMESTIC SECURITY AND CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE TIME THE MURKIN CASE WAS REASSIGNED TO HIM.

JAN 14 4 52 AM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

R

EX-124 REC-54 62-117290-420

22 JAN 31 1978

4

12/30/85

Rm 89/85

2 copies made pgs 1-6
1/24/78 JTA: ma

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc Rm 8988

42

58 FEB 14 1978

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4542 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS, RACIAL MATTERS," WAS FIRST OPENED ON AUG. 28, 1967, AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., NOW RETIRED, UNTIL IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON MARCH 7, 1968. IT REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. MEMPHIS OFFICE HAD NO SQUAD BREAKDOWN DURING THE PERIOD 1965-68. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, AND SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4704 ENTITLED "NEW LEFT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM", WAS OPENED ON MAY 15, 1968, AND ASSIGNED TO LAWRENCE J. OLSON. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON FEB. 29, 1971, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 12, 1971. SA'S OLSON AND JOHNSON WERE INVOLVED IN SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE A100-4046 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM" WAS ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, NOW RETIRED, ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

OPENED JULY 23, 1964, PLACED IN RUC STATUS APRIL 29, 1966; REOPENED AUG. 24, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS AUG. 30, 1966; REOPENED MARCH 31, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JUNE 13, 1967; REOPENED OCT. 18, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS DEC. 20, 1967. IT REMAINED IN RUC STATUS UNTIL DEC. 26, 1974.

SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE ON EACH OCCASION.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-576 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS" WAS FIRST OPENED ON SEPT. 4, 1964, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND SWAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON JUNE 15, 1965. THIS CASE WAS REOPENED JUNE 18, 1965, AND PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON SEPT. 9, 1965. IT WAS REOPENED JAN. 2, 1966, AND ASSIGNED TO SA LAWRENCE. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA MERRILL F. MC CLOUGHAN ON JUNE 3, 1966. SA MC CLOUGHAN IS NOW RETIRED. IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA ROBERT F. FITZPATRICK ON MAY 10, 1968, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTEC INVESTIGATIONS, SA HILLIN WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, SA MC CLOUGHAN WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATION, AND SA FITZPATRICK WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4105 ENTITLED MMARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS OPENED ON JAN. 2, 1965, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND WAS SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 11, 1968. SA LAWRENCE WAS ASSIGNED SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-166 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE" (COMINFIL SCLS) IS - C, WAS FIRST OPENED IN THE MEMPHIS OFFICE ON SEPT. 26, 1961. IT WAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS AND RE-OPENED A NUMBER OF

TIMES PRIOR TO PERIOD 1965-68. IT WAS OPENED AND ASSIGNED DURING THIS PERIOD AS FOLLOWS:

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., ON FOLLOWING OCCASIONS.

REOPENED JULY 12, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS NOV. 17, 1965; REOPENED NOV. 17, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JAN. 31, 1966, REOPENED APRIL 29, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS MAY 20, 1966.

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

REOPENED DEC. 19, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JULY 17, 1972.

SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE. SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE.

A REVIEW OF MEMPHIS COINTELPRO FILES AND FILES ON THE SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC REVEALED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND THE SCLC.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

CG0014 0052317

JAN 5 6 25 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

RR HQ

DE CG

R 052317Z JAN 78

FM CHICAGO (62-7385)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DECEMBER 27, 1977. 351

(1)A) MURKIN INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER, CHICAGO 44-1114.

B) CHICAGO CASE AGENT RENE J. DU MAINE ASSIGNED TO ASAC SQUAD AS RELIEF SUPERVISOR - BANK ROBBERY COORDINATOR.

(2)A)(1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-35356.

(2) TITLE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM - C.

62-117290-418

EX-111 REC-

22 JAN 31 1978

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION ON THE DATES INDICATED:

JANUARY 7, 1965, CLAY M. BRADY, RUC JANUARY 24, 1965,

12/30/85

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA: ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

42

58 FEB 14 1978

REOPENED JANUARY 25, 1965 TO ROBERT F. BARRY, CLOSED MARCH 16, 1965, REOPENED MARCH 25, 1965 TO WILLIAM J. WHITE, RUC JULY 16, 1965, REOPENED JULY 19, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, RUC AUGUST 2, 1965, REOPENED AUGUST 11, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY, CLOSED AUGUST 27, 1965, REOPENED SEPTEMBER 13, 1965 TO R. L. STROMBERG, RUC SEPTEMBER 24, 1965, REOPENED OCTOBER 7, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, REASSIGNED NOVEMBER 22, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY WHO CONTINUED AS CASE AGENT UNTIL AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN 1968. THIS CASE WAS MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE CASE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR, SM - C INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY, WHO WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (B) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 105-16238.

(2) TITLE: COMINFILE, SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC), IS - C.

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOHN P. O'BRIEN, UNTIL OCTOBER 12, 1965, WHEN IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY THROUGH 1968. SA STANLEY WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5 UNTIL FEBRUARY, 1968 WHEN HE WAS DELETED. THE EXACT NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (C) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-32864.

(2) TITLE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, IS - C.

(3) A REVIEWW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION:

HERBERT K. STALLINGS UNTIL APRIL 22, 1965, REASSIGNED TO GENE E. ARNOLD UNTIL APRIL 27, 1967, REASSIGNED TO ROBERT O. MURPHY THROUGH 1968. ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WERE MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 2. THE SECTION, SQUAD OF ASSIGNMENT, AND THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THIS INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (D) A REVIEW OF ALL OTHER COINTELPRO INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY CHICAGO FAILS TO INDICATE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. OR THE SCLC WERE EVER MENTIONED IN THESE FILES OR TARGETS UNDER THESE PROGRAMS.

BT

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. [illegible]KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES T[illegible], NEBR.
HAROLD S. [illegible]R, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Received C14
1/31/78

January 26, 1978

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with this Committee's investigation of the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we would appreciate your assistance in obtaining access to any files or records in the possession of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, relating to the individuals and organizations noted below:

A. With respect to the Drug Enforcement Administration:

1) Charles Joseph Stein
Date of Birth: 5/11/29
FBI Number: 881-534-B

2) Anthony Charles DeCarvelho
Born: 1921
Residence: New Orleans

B. With respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

1) Jack Brown
Chattanooga, Tennessee

62-117290

2) Lester Lee [illegible]
Date of Birth: 2/23/45
S.S.N.: 410-78-8096
2165 or 2155 Clarksdale
Memphis, Tennessee

3) Hunter Pitts O'Dell
New Orleans, Louisiana

EX-111 REC- 13 62-117290 - 415

23 FEB 2 1978

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

5 7 FEB 14 1978

4) Earnest Donnell
Denham Springs, Louisiana

5) Robert DePugh, Norborne, Missouri
Head of the Minutemen organization

6) Sidney Barnes
1378 East Riviera Drive
Mobile, Alabama (1968)

7) "Maxey Ted"
New Orleans, Louisiana

8) Eddie Sopcjack
Date of Birth: 8/14/29
FBI Number: 186-485A

9) Thomas Tarrants

10) Samuel Caccamechi
Memphis, Tennessee

11) Robert Hood Strader
Lexington, Illinois

12) Raymond Starns
King David Apartments, Apt. 1
2816 David Drive
Metairie, Louisiana (1968)

13) Jerome Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana

14) Joseph Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana (now deceased)

15) Leonard Scott DelMonte
1229 North Bronson Street
Los Angeles, California

16) Allan O. Thompson
Date of Birth: 12/25/13

17) Dr. Russell C. Hadley
Date of Birth: 8/18/09
96 Moscow Road
Monte Rio, California

18) James E. Morrison
Los Angeles, California

19) Dr. Mark O. Freeman
Beverly Hills, California

20) Charles Calvin Bookman
Date of Birth: 9/6/13
FBI Number: 892-355

21) Rodney Arvidson
Date of Birth: 1/19/23
Post Office Box 2820
Long Beach, California

22) Tomas Reyes Lau
Date of Birth: 10/5/23
2047 Lemoyne
Los Angeles, California

23) Roy Emory Hargraves
El Monte, California

24) Raymond M. Murphy, aka "Fido"
Los Angeles, California

25) Lee Wilkinson
Los Angeles, California

26) Roman Kohnke
Los Angeles, California

27) Paul Lyon
Los Angeles, California

28) Jeri Salkin
Los Angeles, California

29) Ronald G. Hewitson
Garden Grove, California

30) Pat Olson
Date of Birth: 7/21/42
Quantico, Virginia

31) Robert Taylor, aka Bob Taylor
Los Angeles, California

32) Ronald Dennino
aka Ronald Gerald Dennino
Inmate at California State Prison
at San Quentin (1967 - 1968)

33) Richard Gonzales
Los Angeles, California

34) Roderic Burns Duff
Monrovia, California
1968 President of Los Angeles Chapter
of Citizens Council of America

35) R. J. Weiler
Los Angeles, California

36) Elizabeth Ann De Rouen
Date of Birth: 2/17/43
SSN: 453-62-1064
Los Angeles, California

37) Debbie Gold
Los Angeles, California

38) David Gregory
Buena Park, California

39) Rev. Xavier Von Koss
Hermora Beach, California

40) Robert Harold Gray
Los Angeles, California

41) Robert Keeley
Los Angeles, California

42) William K. Shearer
aka Bill Shearer
3166 Palm
Lemmon Grove, California

43) Robert Walters
Los Angeles, California

44) George Manum
Los Angeles, California

45) Robert J. Roe
Beverly Hills, California

46) Pamela Dillon
Los Angeles, California

47) Frank Marullo
New Orleans, Louisiana

48) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on Ku Klux Klan for the cities of Jacksonville and Miami, Florida for the period 1966 through 1968.

49) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on the following organizations for the period 1966 through 1968 for the cities of New Orleans, Louisiana; Birmingham, Alabama; Memphis, Tennessee; Chicago, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia; Los Angeles, California; and the State of Mississippi:

   a) Black Panthers
   b) Black Muslims
   c) American Nazi Party
   d) Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

50) Subfiles and/or investigative reports for the period 1966 - 1968 for the following organizations:

   a) Liberty Lobby
   b) The Sword
   c) The Fiery Cross
   d) The White Camelia
   e) The Silver Dollar Group

Your prompt cooperation will be most appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:msd
cc: Danny Coulson

1/18/78

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)

FROM : ACTING LEGAT, LONDON (62-604)(P)

O HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

SUBJECT: JAMES EARL RAY, aka;
ET AL
CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE UNLAWFUL
FLIGHT TO AVOID CONFINEMENT - ESCAPE

ReLONlet 11/16/77.

Enclosed for information is a copy of an incoming telegram the American Embassy, London, received from Department of State on 1/14/78, and copy of Legat, London letter to the British Home Office dated 1/18/78.

Further pertinent information will be furnished when available.

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encs. 2)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
1 - London
RAK:ejg
(4)

62-117290-

NOT RECORDED
FEB 7 1978

14

56 FEB 10 1978

12/31/85

Original Filed In

UNITED STATES DEPARTME[illegible] OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Office of Legal Attache
American Embassy
Grosvenor Square
London, W1A 1AE

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 62-604

Your Ref.:

January 18, 1978

Mr. G. L. Angel
British Home Office
G-4 Division
Queen Anne's Gate
London, S.W. 1

Re: Request from House Select Committee on Assassinations to Meet with British Police Authorities

Dear Mr. Angel:

By way of background, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as authorized by the U. S. House of Representatives, is investigating the circumstances surrounding the murders of President J. F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The Chief Counsel and Staff Director requested contact be made with appropriate officials in the British Government to obtain authority to interview appropriate police officials who were involved in the arrest of James Earl Ray in London on June 8, 1968.

Assistant Legal Attache Dennis Dickson had contact with you on December 6, 1977 regarding this matter. At that time you requested the following:

A) Purpose or scope of inquiry;

B) Names of individuals to be interviewed and reasons therefor;

12/31/85

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

C) Intended use of results of inquiry, i.e., public hearings, etc., it being noted that any records maintained by the British police would be as the result of an official inquiry and this would normally be available for police use only, unless otherwise exempted by the British Government.

The Select Committee responded that due to the brevity of the 95th Congress, it was most important that representatives of the Select Committee be allowed to meet with appropriate members of New Scotland Yard who are knowledgeable about the KING-RAY investigation. The Committee advised they would be happy to meet personally with British Government officials in London to provide answers to the issues forwarded to them for clarification and elucidation.

I would be most appreciative if you would advise if this situation is agreeable to you.

Sincerely,

Dennis R. Dickson
Acting Legal Attache

AMEMBASSY LONDON

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION/[illegible]

02349

AMB	✓
MIN	✓
AMB/EX	✓
PAO	✓
POL	
POL/L	✓
POLAD	✓
E/MIN	✓
ECON	✓
COMCL	
E/SCI	
E/TRANS	
AGRI	
CUSTOMS	
DAO	✓
D.E.A.	
F.A.A.	
FBIS	
I.R.S.	
LEGATT	
MARITIME	
SUSLO	✓
TRADE	
TREAS	✓
USCG	
A/COUNS	
A/ATO	
A/B&M	
A/COMM	
A/GS	
A/PERS	
A/RFO	
A/SY	
A/VIS	
CCA	2
CG/CS	
CG/V	
R.F.	✓
CHRON	✓
LOG	
D.O.	✓
POUCH	
C/S	
USSS	

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ ~~JAN~~ 14 10 46

FROM: STATE

NO: 10886

NNNNVV FHG083EHV219
RR RUDTC
DE RUEHC #0886 0140951
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 140226Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON 7802
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS PINR, PDIP, UK

SUBJECT REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

RE: LONDON 20003

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENNET HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

OTAL:

PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL[illegible] WHO PARTICIPATED IN T.E INVEST[illegible]ION MENTIONED IN BLA[illegible] LETTER AND ADVISE US [illegible]VANCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

January 25, 1978

Director, FBI

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

0

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

C

336
356

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

15

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

MAILED 17
JAN 25 1978
FBI

EX-111 REC-13 62-117290-414

20 FEB 2 1978

56 FEB 10 1978

14

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL [illegible] CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05

PMS

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By teletype dated 12/27/77, field offices designated by the HSCA were advised of the contents of the HSCA letter of 12/13/77. Responses have been received. Rather than incorporate the voluminous results into a letter to the Committee, it is more practical to make available for HSCA access at FBIHQ incoming field office teletypes.

It should be noted that, under current operating procedures existing between the Department of Justice and the HSCA, disclosure of these agents' identities to the HSCA cannot be prevented. However, G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, has advised SA D. O. Coulson of Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, that, in absence of an overriding need to do otherwise, the HSCA will not publish the names of any agent personnel below the position of section chief. This policy would follow precedent of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which issued its report in 1976.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 25, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

In response to the above request, the following information is submitted:

On December 19, 1977, Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised that the Department of Justice would respond to Part A, Items 1 and 2 and Part B, Items 1 and 2, of the above request.

Regarding Part A, Item 3 and Part B, Item 3, the FBI field offices designated by the HSCA were requested to provide the information desired by the HSCA. Responses from these field offices have been received and copies of these documents are available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters.

With respect to Part A, Item 4, a review of FBI Headquarters indices disclosed no memoranda, records, documents and news releases generated by the FBI in connection with the MURKIN investigation, other than that contained in the MURKIN file, which has already been made available to the HSCA.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

OJTA
JTA:sas
(6) sas

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFIARS.

PMS

[illegible] UNCLASSIFIED
[illegible] 12/30/03 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE
62-117290-411

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

In response to Part B, Item 4, it should be noted that HSCA request of November 30, 1977, asked for all FBI material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in the FBI's Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) file. By letter dated January 11, 1978, you were advised that representatives of the HSCA agreed to limit its request to COINTELPRO files involving the Communist Party USA and Black Nationalist-Hate Groups and to limit the period of HSCA interest from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968. On January 23, 1978, Staff Attorney Michael Eberhardt reiterated that the HSCA's interest is that period rather than the years 1965-1968 as set forth in the request of December 13, 1977. The above-mentioned COINTELPRO files and files of the King and SCLC security investigations from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, have been prepared for HSCA access. Therefore, based on knowledge of personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit processing HSCA requests regarding King, all material at FBI Headquarters, which may contain COINTELPRO-type activities against King and SCLC during the period January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, has been made available to the HSCA.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/25/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC[illegible]EY, CONN.
CHARLES THO[illegible]R.
HAROLD S. SAW[illegible]ICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee o[illegible]ssassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Executive Office of
Congressional Affairs
Dec. 14 - 2:41 pm. 1977

DEC 13 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation provide the following:

A. MURKIN Investigation

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who participated in any way in the direction or management of the MURKIN investigation and the Division and Section within the Department of Justice where these attorneys were then assigned;

2. Copies of all memoranda, records, documents, and news releases generated by the Department of Justice in connection with MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee;

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the MURKIN investigation for the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham

Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

Ltr to AAG/CD
1/25/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:sas

62-117290-414

ENCLOSURE

4. Copies of all memoranda, records, documents and news releases generated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with the MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee.

B. COINTELPRO

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who were in receipt of any information concerning the COINTELPRO activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

2. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the Department of Justice in connection with the COINTELPRO activities of the FBI as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during 1965 to 1968 from the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's actual assignment during that period:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham
Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami
Louisville

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

4. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the FBI in connection with the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 to 1968 which are not contained in the files requested by Committee letter dated November 30, 1977.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIR[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUE[illegible]E, OHIO
STEW[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHAR[illegible]ONE, NEBR.
HAROL[illegible]SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

O House

Rec. CWD
3:45 PM
1/27/78

January 17, 1978

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

C

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff access to the following:

1. All files, materials and information including, but not limited to, intelligence and security materials relating to the following organizations active in California for 1967-1969:
   a) John Birch Society
   b) American Independent Party
   c) George Wallace Campaign
2. All files, materials and information, including, but not limited to, intelligence, surveillance and security materials for 1967-1968 pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his activities in California.

TM

Your prompt attention to the request will be greatly appreciated.

REC-65 62-117290-413

RECORDED
6 JAN 31 1978

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

GRB:mkd
cc: Danny O. Coulson

57 FEB 7 1978
118

FEB 01 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 31, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl ✓
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

NR CG

Reference is made to a letter dated October 20, 1977, to Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in possession of the FBI to include the current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Enclosed are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

JTM:sas (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

EX-115

REC-65 62 - 112290 - 469

30 JAN 26 1978

2-ENCLOSURE

Delivered 11/2/77

Signed and sent to SA Coulson for delivery to Dept. 11-1-77

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/83 BY [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

42 EB

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request by HSCA for information contained in the Bureau's files relative to William Herman Jackson. This matter has been coordinated with the Legal. Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files, which are identifiable with Jackson, have been organized into folders for the Committee's access and are maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's space, Room 8988.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files include Jackson's current ident record, the results of an FBI investigation wherein Jackson was one of four subjects - captioned "Leslie Atkisons, aka, Et Al; Miscellaneous - Falsely Making or Forging Naval, Military or Official Pass," two references re a Foreign Police Cooperation Matter and two references re a Perjury Matter.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

October 31, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 20, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI TO INCLUDE A CURRENT FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION RECORD RELATIVE TO WILLIAM HERMAN JACKSON.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 20, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Utilizing identifying data for Jackson furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

JTM:sas Dal (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/31/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA). 409

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. m
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

62-117290-409

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI/DOJ

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

October 20, 1977

Robert L. Keuch, Esq.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

The Select Committee on Assassinations would appreciate any and all information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record check relative to William Herman Jackson, FBI #801-218-G, D.O.B. 11/24/26.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB/EME/mae

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room 3659
Washington, D. C. 20530

Let to AAG/CD
10-31-77
JTM:aws (Enc-3)

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-409

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

CJ

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on November 16, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
    Criminal Division
    Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - William F. Kusch - Enclosure

ST-120 REC-63 62-117290-408

23 JAN 31 1978

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

signed & sent 1/6/77 McDonald

DOC:ldr

59 FEB 6 1978

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY

FBI/DOJ

62-117290-408	COPY 63	DOC:ldr 12/29/77

The Deputy Attorney General HSCA
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney Generel Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on 11/16/77. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

COPY OF ABSTRACT FOR THIS SERIAL IS PLACED IN FILE IN LIEU OF THE MAIL WHICH HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/03 BY

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

DATE: 12/19/77

FROM : SAC, PORTLAND (62-3144)

JGP/RR

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Enclosed herewith are five copies of an LHM relative to the interview of SA WILLIAM F. KUSCH, Portland Division, by staff members of the HSCA in Washington, D.C., on 11/16/77.

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (Encs. 5)
2 - Portland
WFK:ja
(4)

ST-120

REC-63 62-117290-407

1-31-78

3651

12/30/78

12-29-77

MAR 20 1978

5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Portland, Oregon

December 19, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

On November 16, 1977, SA William F. Kusch of the Portland Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was interviewed at House Annex #2 in Washington, D.C., by Mr. Mark Speiser and Mr. Peter Beeson, members of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The interview with SA Kusch dealt with a period of time SA Kusch was assigned to the New Orleans Division of the FBI, specifically April, 1968. During April of 1968, SA Kusch, along with numerous other Special Agents assigned to the New Orleans Division, conducted many interviews with persons who had, or who might have had, knowledge of the activities or contacts of James Earl Ray during the period of time Ray, using the name Eric Galt, was in New Orleans.

Specifically, SA Kusch was questioned regarding his squad assignments in New Orleans, the identities of other squad members, the identity of his supervisor, his Agent in charge and his assistant Agent in charge at the time.

Further, SA Kusch was questioned relative to the content of several interview report forms (FD 302s) concerning interviews that he conducted and prepared appropriate FD 302s in connection therewith, or FD 302s covering interviews that he was a party to. House Select Committee on Assassinations members exhibited said FD 302s to SA Kusch to refresh his memory.

House Select Committee members in essence apparently desired SA Kusch to amplify or further expand on these interviews.

ALL I[illegible]
[illegible]
12/30/[illegible]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-107

SA Kusch pointed out that as a result of the passage of nine and one-half years, for the most part he could not specifically recall the persons interviewed. To specific questions regarding the interviews, SA Kusch could only point out that if additional questions had been asked of these persons interviewed at the time, resulting in the receipt of any positive or pertinent information regarding Galt, that information would have been duly recorded on said FD 302s.

Both Mr. Speiser and Mr. Beeson were cordial and SA Kusch responded to their questions in a candid manner.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

January 26, 1978

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

(C)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which, in connection with HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested information pertaining to FBI electronic suveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2 (Secret Material Enclosed)

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure) (Secret Material Enclosed)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120

ENCLOSURE

REC-63 62-117290-406

23 JAN 31 1978

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAILED 17
JAN 26 1978
FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY

58 FEB 6 1978

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Dates and places of electronic surveillance of King were compiled through file reviews conducted in connection with previous law suits filed against the FBI by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and a former SCLC officer and aide to King, Bernard S. Lee. Although names of specific SCLC affiliates were not provided by the HSCA in its request, all names are readily available to the Committee, which has received access to our files concerning King and SCLC.

SECRET

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which requested information in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. This letter requested that the FBI determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The Committee indicated it only desired written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved, with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

In response to the above request, appropriate records at FBI Headquarters were reviewed with the following results:

Microphone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
January 5-7, 1964	Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C.
January 27, 1964	Shroeder Hotel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
February 18-20, 1964	Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii
February 20-21, 1964	Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, California
February 22-24, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
March 19-20, 1964	Statler Hotel, Detroit, Michigan

8

JTA:sas (6) SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR
DoD

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, & ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

SECRET

Classified by 6437
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DECLASSIFIED BY
ON 12/31/[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-106

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI/DOJ

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Dates of Surveillance	Location
April 23-24, 1964	Senator Hotel, Sacramento, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
September 28, 1964 - October 2, 1964	Manager Hotel, Savannah, Georgia
January 8-11, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
January 28-31, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
March 29-31, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
May 12-13, 1965	Sheraton Atlantic Hotel, New York City
October 14-15, 1965	Astor Hotel, New York City
October 28-30, 1965	New York Hilton Hotel, New York City
November 29-30, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
January 22, 1966	Americana Hotel, New York City

Telephone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
August 22-27, 1964	Claridge Hotel, Atlantic City, New Jersey
November 8, 1963 - April 30, 1965	Martin Luther King's residence
April 24-26, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
August 14, 1964 - September 6, 1964	Apartment 2B, 125 H. 72nd Street, New York City

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Telephone Surveillances of SCLC

Dates of Surveillance	Location
October 23, 1963 - January 24, 1964 July 13-31, 1964	SCLC Office, New York City Room 1202, 14 E. 40th Street, New York City
November 8, 1963 - June 21, 1966	SCLC Office, Atlanta, Georgia

In an effort to respond to that portion of the HSCA's request concerning existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance of individuals directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC, personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit, FBI Headquarters, familiar with certain aspects of the King, SCLC and related files, compiled a list of individuals with the SCLC for the approximate period January, 1962, through 1968. Although this list is not all inclusive due to the large number of persons affiliated with the SCLC, an effort was made to include those individuals in key positions and who were most active in the organization. Most of the individuals listed were identified with the SCLC Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. Based on review of appropriate records at FBI Headquarters, none of the below-listed individuals has been subject of electronic surveillance by the FBI:

Ralph Abernathy
Jessie Jackson
Bernard S. Lee
Hosea Williams
James Orange
James Bevel
Andrew Young
Walter Fauntroy
Coretta Scott King
John Rutherford
William Rutherford
Bernard Lafayette
Dorothy Cotton
J. T. Johnson
Joseph E. Lowery
Fred L. Shuttlesworth
Cordy T. Vivian
Adele Kanter
Thomas C. Kilgore
Dora McDonald
James Harrison
Wyatt Walker
Logan Kearse
Stoney Cooks
Fred C. Bennett
Booker T. Bonner
Henry Brownlee
Golden Frinks
Joseph Lester Hankerson
Samuel B. Wells
Benjamin Johnson
Herbert V. Coulton
Thomas Offenburger
New Soong-Li
James Lawson
Lillian Hunter
Gloria Fraction
David Wallace
Jess Gill
Carole Hoover
Albert Turner
Frank Ditto
C. K. Steel
Samuel Williams
Curtis Harris
Cirillo A. McSween
Major Jones
Lawrence D. Reddick
I. M. Augustine
Septima Clark
T. Y. Rogers, Jr.

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Records at FBI Headquarters disclosed that the following individuals, formerly associated with the SCLC, were subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI (Secret).

Stanley David Levison
Clarence B. Jones
Hunter Pitts O'Dell
Bayard Rustin

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible] OHIO
STEWA[illegible]CY, CONN.
CHARLES [illegible]HONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Received Office of
Congressional Affairs
Dec. 15 3:54PM 1977

DEC 15 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance and determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of Dr. King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC.

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

let to AAG/CD
1/26/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:aws
1-OLA (enc)

GRB:mek

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

62-117290-406

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 1/23/78

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: Records Management Division,
Congressional Inquiry Unit

FROM: SAC, SPRINGFIELD (62-2567) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Reurtel to SI, 1/19/78. 395

1-10-86

Enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of each serial in the following Springfield Division main files:

(1) 157-1792, serials 1-85 (189 pages);

(2) 44-1120, serials 1-5 (10 pages);

(3) 170-445, serials 1-23 (48 pages);

(4) 170-445A, serials 1-6 (11 pages).

Also enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of the following serial in the following Springfield Division file, reference identifiable with RICHARD GEPPERT:

(5) 157-1791, serial 23 (8 pages).

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:

Numerous serials contained in these files have been classified "Confidential".

ST-120

Springfield file 157-1792, serial 82, is a correlation memo showing GEPPERT was the subject of Springfield main

REC 65 62-117290-405

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (62-117290) (Encl 5)
1 - Springfield (62-2567)

JAN 26 1978

DJC/pme
(3)

DETACHED FILED for RM 5988 JFK + HSCA processing access JTO 1/30/78

8988

54 FEB 6 1978

Approved: 42 Transmitted (Number) (Time) Per

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

file 100-10245. This main file has been destroyed in accordance with the File Destruction Program.

BH0043 0131931

PP HQ

DE BH

P 131931Z JAN 78

FM BIRMINGHAM (66-2280) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) (PRIORITY)

BT

CLEAR

ATTENTION OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES, DECEMBER 27, 1977. 351

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. ONE: MURKIN INVESTIGATION ASSIGNED TO HENRY S. SNOW (DECEASED). PRIOR TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION SA SNOW WAS ASSIGNED TO GENERAL CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION.

JAN 13 2 36 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

~~Enp.Sec&Spec.~~
~~Inq.Section~~
~~3825 JEH TL #231~~

EX-101
REC-36

62-117290-404

23 JAN 26 1978

12/30/05 Spmac/mla

4-[illegible]

1c pu 8108

2 copies made pg1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

124

70 FE[illegible] 1978 ~~418~~

IN ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. TWO: THERE WERE NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFORTS BY BIRMINGHAM AGENTS AGAINST MARTIN LUTHER KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 THROUGH 1968.

THE FOLLOWING WERE CASE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING: LAWRENCE GETTINGS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY AND CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED THAT TYPE OF INVESTIGATION; MARVIN M. EUBANKS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATION.

THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO INVESTIGATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE:

WILLIAM PERRY (DECEASED), PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO CRIMINAL SQUAD AND WORK; COLEMAN D. GEARY, III, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO BOMBING MATTERS; LAWRENCE GETTINGS (SUPRA); MARVIN M. EUBANKS (SUPRA) AND C. B. STANBERRY, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED AFTER A REVIEW OF BIRMINGHAM INDICES AND SUBSEQUENT FILE REVIEW.

BT

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible]EVI[illegible], OHIO
STEWA[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARL[illegible]NE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4524

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

House

Rec
CTU
2:15PM
1/25/78

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

JAN 20 1978

HAND DELIVER

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

By letter dated January 4, -375 197~~7~~8, this Committee requested access to materials, files, memoranda and miscellaneous items pertaining to Gerold Frank in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. These materials (94-63917) have been reviewed by the staff, and it would be appreciated, if the materials could be prepared for delivery, along with copies of the following additional items:

1) Section 78
   44-38861 - 5655
   " 5654
   5653

2) Section 84
   44-38861 - 5942
   " 5943
   " 5944
   " 5945
   " 5946

3) The MURKIN Legat tickler files for
   a) London
   b) Ottawa
   c) Mexico City
   d) Paris

EX-124 REC-79

62-117290-400

62-117290
20 JAN 27 1978

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

57 FEB 2 1978

JAN 20 1978

Additionally, it is requested that the Bureau begin to prepare for delivery all files, memoranda and miscellaneous items on William Bradford Huie for the years 1968 to the present.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:ghj
cc: Danny O. Coulson

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division ~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~ January 26, 1978
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

56
Cx
0

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-139

2 - ENCLOSURE

REC-7

62-117290-397

MAILED 5
JAN 26 1978
FBI

JAN 27 1978

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ______
Intell. ______
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. __
Rec. Mgnt. HB/DR
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. __
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director's Sec'y __

57 FEB 2 1978

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

HB/DR

12/30/85

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Former SA Nichols works and resides in Atlanta. The Atlanta Office has been in touch with him regarding the interview and he is awaiting further contact for final interview arrangements. These arrangements are handled informally by representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBIHQ.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

This memorandum is to confirm that former agent Nichols has been cleared from his employment agreement and is available for interview as needed by the HSCA. Arrangements for interview can be made through contact with representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBI Headquarters.

JTA
JTA:sas (6)
RDS

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78. captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

HB
HRC

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

12/30/98

62-117290-391

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 9 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that ex-FBI agent Robert Nichols, formerly of the Atlanta field office, be made available to the Committee for interview on a priority basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

let to AAG/CD
1126177 (Enc-2)
JTA:sus
1-OLA (Enc) 62-117290-397

ENCLOSURE

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1/19/78

1 - Mr. Foster

#245852 [illegible] 12/30/85

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/11/82 BY SP-1GSK/PSR
225984

FM DIRECTOR

TO SPRINGFIELD (ROUTINE)

BT

E F T O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. BY LETTER DATED DECEMBER 30, 1977, TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE HSCA REQUESTED THE FBI PROVIDE ALL FILES, DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS CONCERNING RICHARD GEPPERT, BORN JULY 31, 1941, RESIDING AT 1340 NIEDRINGHAUS AVENUE, GRANITE CITY, ILLINOIS.

NR 8/25/78

BY LETTER DATED JANUARY 16, 1978, THE HSCA EXTENDED ITS REQUEST TO INCLUDE FIELD OFFICE FILES. THE HSCA ALSO FURNISHED A SIGNED STATEMENT OF GEPPERT, DATED DECEMBER 28, 1977, AUTHORIZING HSCA REVIEW OF ALL MATERIAL CONCERNING HIM IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI. IN THIS STATEMENT GEPPERT ALSO DISCLOSED THAT HE VOLUNTEERED TO HSCA STAFF MEMBERS THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF HIS INFORMANT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FBI.

170-5569-
157-26213-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

JTA:sas (6)

1 - 157-26213
1 - 170-5569

EX-130

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

62-117290-395

REC-46

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 19 1978
0405

TELETYPE

JAN 23 1978

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

118

56 JAN 3 1979

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

FBI/DOJ

FBIHQ FILES DISCLOSED GEPPERT WAS SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD EXTREMIST MATTER INVESTIGATION (157-1792) IN 1972 AND SPRINGFIELD FILE 44-1120 FOLLOWING ALLEGED HARASSMENT BY OFFICERS OF THE GRANITE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IN 1975. HE WAS ALSO SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD FILE 170-445.

SPRINGFIELD PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN THE ABOVE THREE INVESTIGATIONS AND ONE COPY OF ANY OTHER MAIN FILE OR FILE REFERENCE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEPPERT. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS BY STAFF MEMBERS OF THE HSCA.

BT

#

NOTE: This teletype confirms telephonic communication with Supervisor Joseph Ondula of the Springfield Office on 1/19/78. This matter has been coordinated with SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 1/4/78

Foster
Lawn

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (~~62-117296~~)
Attn: Congressional Inquiry Unit,
Special Investigative Division

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (66-2242) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)
BUREAU DEADLINE - 1/13/78

Re FBIHQ teletype to numerous offices, including Atlanta, 12/27/77.

Referenced Bureau teletype indicated that the HSCA was currently conducting investigation into the assassination of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (MURKIN); and in connection with this investigation, the HSCA had requested the FBI provide the following:

(1) The identification of field office case agent(s) assigned to the MURKIN investigation in recipient offices and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation.

(2) Identification of the field office case agent(s) assigned to counterintelligence program (Cointelpro), efforts directed against KING and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) during the period 1965 - 1968 in recipient offices, and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the Cointelpro, KING, and SCLC investigations.

REC-36 62-117290-394

EX-130

In addition, recipients were to identify the case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of KING and SCLC, as well as the Cointelpro.

1 JAN 2 1978

2-Bureau
2-Atlanta (1-66-2242)
(1-44-2386) (MURKIN)
EAS/ljg
(4)

2 copies made pgs 1-5
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

Approved: ____ Transmitted ____ (Number) (Time) Per ____

JAN 30 1978

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

Atlanta has reviewed pertinent files as requested by FBIHQ, and the information sought by the HSCA is set forth below in chart form:

1. MURKIN
(Atlanta file 44-2386)

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/8/68 - 4/29/68	Atlanta - #3, Security/extremist Squad	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. PERRY	4/29/68 - 7/30/68	Atlanta #4 Fugitives	Fugitive investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/30/68 - 7/31/69	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	5/30/70 - 7/13/70	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	2/8/71 - 3/16/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/31/71 - 4/7/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/13/73 - 8/31/73	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	6/19/74 - 6/27/74	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	8/13/74 - 9/24/74	Atlanta - #8 Civil rights, thefts from interstate shipment (TFIS) Etc.	Civil rights matters

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
THOMAS J. WILSON	8/26/75 - 9/8/75	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights, TFIS
THOMAS J. WILSON	1/7/78 - 3/23/76	Atlanta - #8	"
JOHN J. HAYMAN	10/12/77 - 11/8/77	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights matters

2. Atlanta Agents assigned to/or who handled the Atlanta Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) during the period 1965 - 1968 in which efforts were directed against KING and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
CPUSA Cointelpro			
ALDEN F. MILLER	4/14/64 - 8/13/65	Atlanta - #3	Security Investigations
Cointelpro Black Nationalist-Hate Groups			
EDWARD U. CRIM	8/29/67 - 7/30/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist Investigations
CPUSA Negro Question; Communist Influence in Racial Matters (CIRM)-Cointelpro			

No case agent assigned - matters handled by:

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/1/64 - 8/20/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	2/4/64 - 8/21/64	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	7/22/65 - 4/15/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations

3. Identity of case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SM-C			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	3/7/61 - 5/12/61	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	2/28/62 - 10/16/62	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/9/63 - 7/31/63	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	11/6/63 - 5/21/65	Atlanta - #3	"
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	5/21/65 - 6/5/68	Atlanta - #3	"

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
Communist infiltration of the SCLC			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	4/17/62 - 12/1/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	12/1/64 - 4/26/66	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/26/66 - 3/12/71	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/12/71 - 5/23/73	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/10/73 - 10/20/73	Atlanta - #3	"

LS0003 0102106Z

RR HQ

DE LS

R 102106Z JAN 78

M LOUISVILLE (66-2612)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

JAN 10 4 19 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
~~Plan. & Insp.~~
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

~~Emp Sec&Spec Inq Section 3823 JEH TH~~#231

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA, DATED DECEMBER 27, 1977.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, APPROPRIATE REVIEW OF FILES MAINTAINED BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION REVEALED FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY HSCA.

(1) NOT APPLICABLE TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

(2) NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COINTELPRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST EITHER MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., OR SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND (SCEF), DURING PERIOD 1965-1968, COULD BE LOCATED IN REVIEW OF COINTELPRO AND SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-393

20 JAN 25 1978

24 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1CC Rm 8988

70 JAN 30 1978 42

12/30/88

OF KING AND SCLC. NO COINTELPRO ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND SCLC BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., ASSIGNED SA GEORGE W. HUTCHINSON, JR. (RETIRED) MAY 14, 1965 - AUGUST 13, 1966, AND SA RICHARD B. VIVIAN JULY 30, 1976 - OCTOBER 20, 1976. LATTER ASSIGNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC ASSIGNED SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) SEPTEMBER 29, 1961 - OCTOBER 30, 1961; OCTOBER 17, 1963 - NOVEMBER 18, 1963; DECEMBER 14, 1963- JANUARY 22, 1964; JUNE 5, 1964 - JULY 8, 1964; SEPTEMBER 21, 1964 - OCTOBER 12, 1964; JUNE 2, 1965 - JULY 20, 1965; NOVEMBER 17, 1965 - JANUARY 20, 1966; JULY 13, 1966 - AUGUST 12, 1966; FEBRUARY 10, 1967 - MARCH 24, 1967; SA GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED) AUGUST 12, 1968 - JUNE 5, 1969; SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) JUNE 5, 1969 - JULY 29, 1969. SCLC (BUFILE 100-438794) (LS 157-90) INVESTIGATED BY LOUISVILLE AS "RACIAL MATTER" AND "INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST".

SPECIAL AGENTS GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED), WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) AND RICHARD B. VIVIAN ALL ASSIGNED LOUISVILLE SECURITY - CIVIL RIGHTS SQUAD PRIOR TO AND DURING ABOVE LISTED CASE ASSIGNMENTS.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 10 3 05 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SL C[illegible]05 010195Ø

RR HQ

DE SL

P 101924Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

CLEAR

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE ~~Inq Section~~ ~~#231~~ DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JULY 27, 1977.

(1) FORMER SPECIAL AGENT HAROLD R. DOBSON WAS CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION, ST. LOUIS FILE 44-775, BUREAU FILE 44-38861, IN ST. LOUIS DIVISION. FORMER SPECIAL AGENT DOBSON WAS ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND HANDLED SECURITY TYPE CASES PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN MURKIN INVESTIGATION.

(2) ST. LOUIS FILE 157-5818 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS, BLACK NATIONALISTS, HATE GROUPS, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE" WAS OPENED AS A PENDING INACTIVE STATUS CONTROL FILE ON AUGUST 29, 1967.

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-592

20 JAN 25 1978

Aldhizer

4-J

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc Km 8988

42

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

12/30/98

ON FEBRUARY 27, 1968, THROUGH JANUARY 8, 1969, WAS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH OF SECURITY SQUAD AT ST. LOUIS DIVISION. HIS ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THIS CASE ASSIGNMENT WAS TO HANDLE SECURITY TYPE CASES.

ST. LOUIS FILE 100-17801, BUREAU FILE 100-106670, ENTITLED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER SPECIAL AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, JANUARY 15, 1965, THROUGH JANUARY 19, 1965, FEBRUARY 3, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 10, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. STEWART, APRIL 28, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 28, 1965; FORMER SPECIAL AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, NOVEMBER 11, 1965, THROUGH NOVEMBER 12, 1965, AND JUNE 14, 1966, THROUGH JUNE 17, 1966; FORMER AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, OPENING DATE UNKNOWN THROUGH JULY 6, 1966, AND MARCH 25, 1967, THROUGH MARCH 27, 1967.

ST. LOUIS FILE 105-4027, BUREAU FILE 100-438794, ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE; RM; IS - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, SEPTEMBER 23, 1964, THROUGH DECEMBER 10, 1964, AND MARCH 21, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 19, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 3, 1965, THROUGH JUNE 16, 1965; FORMER AGENT WALTER A.

PAGE THREE SL 62-5097 [illegible]EAR

HIL[illegible]NDORF, FEBRUARY 24, 1966, THROUGH DATE UNKNOWN; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 6, 1969, THROUGH JULY 23, 1969. THE ABOVE AGENTS AND FORMER AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO ST. LOUIS DIVISION SECURITY SQUAD DURING PERTINENT PERIOD.

A REVIEW OF ABOVE FILES DISCLOSED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE.

BT

#

LA0373 0431807Z

RR PP HQ

DE LA

P 131807Z JAN 78

FM LOS ANGELES (62-7841) (P) (1)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) PRIORITY

BT

EFTO

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977, TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES.

FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS COMMUNICATION AND RETEL THE TERM CASE AGENT(S) WAS DEFINED AS THE SINGLE AGENT TO WHOM THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED AND WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIRECTION AND FLOW OF THE INVESTIGATION.

IT IS NOTED THAT UNDER CAPTION "BERNARD S. LEE V. CLARENCE M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1185) BUFILE 62-117194, LA FILE 100-57229" AND "SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) V. CLARENCE

JAN 13 1 31 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NRB

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

✓ Cmp Sec&Spec Inq Section
5823 JEH TL# 231

George Foster

EX-138

REC-36 62-117290-391

20 JAN 25 1978

[illegible]
DATE 12/30/85 [illegible]

4 - 9/FD/H120

2 copies made pgs 1-4
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1 cc AmB 9988

42

1978

M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1186) BUFILE 62-117193, LA FILE 100-57229," LOS ANGELES HAS PERMANENTLY CHARGED OUT TO THE BUREAU SEVERAL SERIALS WHICH THEREFORE ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW. SERIALS WERE FROM FILES CAPTIONED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR; SECURITY MATTER-COMMUNIST; BUFILE 100-106670; LA FILE 100-57229"; "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SCLS; IS - C; BUFILE 100-438794 AND 100-442349; LA FILE 100-65141"; "CP-USA NEGRO QUESTION, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN RACIAL MATTERS; IS-C; BUFILE 100-3-116, LA FILE 157-859."

A REVIEW OF PERTINENT FILES WITHIN THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION BETWEEN THE YEARS 1965 - 1968 DETERMINED THE FOLLOWING:

. THE ABOVE FILE REGARDING COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SCLC WAS HANDLED ON THE SUBSTANTATIVE DESK SUPERVISED BY SA JOHN S. TEMPLE WHICH WAS DESIGNATED AS SQUAD NUMBER TWO. THIS SQUAD HANDLED INVESTIGATIONS OF RACIAL AND BLACK EXTREMIST MATTERS. THIS INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA LOUIS K. DE GEUS IN FEBRUARY 1965; SA R. ANDREWS PETERS IN

SEPTEMBER 1965; SA W. JAMES WOOD IN APRIL 1967; SA WALTER M. BRADY IN JANUARY 1968; AND SA E. RHEAD RICHARDS, JR. IN MAY 1968.

THE MAIN FILE ON KING WAS ASSIGNED TO SQUAD TWO AS ABOVE AND WAS ASSIGNED TO SA DE GEUS IN JANUARY 1965; SA PETERS IN MARCH 1965; SA WOOD IN JANUARY 1967; SA BRADY IN JUNE 1967: AND SA GEORGE E. AIKEN, JR. IN FEBRUARY 1968.

THE FILE REGARDING THE CP-USA INFILTRATION OF RACIAL MATTERS IS ONLY PERIPHERALLY CONCERNED WITH KING OR THE SCLC AND CONTAINS NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS AND OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN OTHER SUBSTANTATIVE FILES. WHILE NOT CLEAR, THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONTROLLED BY SA TEMPLE.

THE ENTIRE SUBSTANTATIVE FILE CAPTIONED "MURKIN; BUFILE 44-38861; LA FILE 44-1574" WAS COPIED AND SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU UNDER INSTANT CAPTION. THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED ON SQUAD NUMBER ONE WHICH WAS SUPERVISED BY SA WILLIAM JOHN NOLAN BUT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUPERVISED BY

SA TEMPLE. SQUAD NUMBER ONE HANDLED SECURITY TYPE INVESTIGATION INVOLVING THE CP-USA, SWP, ET CETERA. THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AS ASSIGNED JOINTLY TO SA'S LEROY W. SHEETS AND THEODORE J. A'HEARN ALTHOUGH SHEETS WAS APPARENTLY INVOLVED AS CASE AGENT ONLY DURING THE INITIAL STAGES IN APRIL 1968.

ALL OF THE ABOVE INDIVIDUALS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA'S BRADY, RICHARDS AND AIKEN ARE NO LONGER EMPLOYEES OF THE FBI.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MM0730 0132335
RR HQ
DE MM
R 132335Z JAN 78
FM MIAMI (62-6603)RUC
TO DIRECTOR (62-117290)ROUTINE
BT
E F T O

JAN 13 6 42 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

~~Emp Sec&Spec~~
~~Inv~~ Section
~~3835 JEH~~ TL# 231

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977.

FOLLOWING IS NUMBERED PARAGRAPH REPLY TO REQUEST OF MIAMI SET OUT IN RE BUTEL:

1. "MURKIN". SA DAVID N. JELLISON, ASSIGNED APRIL 8, 1968: NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATE PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS. SA LEON E. FISH; ASSIGNED AUGUST 10, 1972 (RUC AUGUST 28, 1972); NUMBER 2 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS MAINLY CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS; SA JOSEPH T. O'LEARY; ASSIGNED JULY 30, 1976 (RUC AUGUST 3, 1976), FBIHQ ADMINISTRATIVE REQUEST; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNED APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS. SRA JOHN S. ATWATER; ASSIGNED JUNE 3, 1977 (RUC JUNE 6, 1977), SINGLE INTERVIEW; WEST PALM BEACH RA;

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-390

20 JAN 25 1978

12/30/88

1cc Am 8988

42

30 1978

2 copies made pgs 1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

PAGE TWO MM 62-6603 EFTO

IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS GENERAL CRIMINAL AND SECURITY.

2. A. "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SM-C. "SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 THROUGH 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE NATURE, INCLUDING LOCAL CPUSA GROUP.

B. "COMINFIL OF SCLC; IS - C." SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 TO MAY 2, 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS, SEE PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

SA JOHN C. MENTON, ASSIGNED MAY 2, 1968 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS.

C. "COINTELPRO; BLACK EXTREMISTS; RACIAL MATTERS." FILE OPENED MARCH 7, 1968, ASSIGNED SA JOHN C. MENTON, STILL PENDING TO MENTON DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENT SET OUT IN PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

BT

#

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMA

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JAN 16 1978

[illegible]

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

372

By letter dated December 30, 1977, this Committee requested material pertaining to Richard Geppert in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In view of the fact that the Committee has since delivered to the FBI the written consent of Mr. Geppert to view all materials relating to his informant relationship with the FBI, it is intended that our December 30th request for materials and documents concerning Mr. Geppert include those found in any field office files.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

REC-56 62-117290-385

EX-130

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

7 JAN 23 1978

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

GRB:mej
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

70 JAN [illegible] 1978

[illegible]

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

December 1, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files regarding the National States Rights Party (Item #2) and Jesse B. Stoner (Item #3). By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, modification of these items was made, details of which are outlined in the enclosed memorandum.

EU

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum in response to the above mentioned requests. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

62-117290-382X

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120 REC-42 ~~62-117290-3?96~~

22 FEB 22 1978

12/7/77

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

EU
3 - ENCLOSURE

MAY 2 1978

PMS

JSC

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

YCF

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED [illegible]
[illegible]
DATE 12/30/85

PMS

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Since there were no National States Rights Party (NSRP) subfiles for offices requested by the HSCA, the entire NSRP file for 1967 through 1968 was processed for access. All information retrievable in FBI Headquarters files regarding Stoner was processed.

Names of knowledgeable case agents provided in attached memorandum were obtained through review of FBIHQ files and confirmed by Supervisor Jack Byrd of the Savannah Office. The HSCA can advise which agent(s) it desires to interview regarding the NSRP and Stoner.

[illegible] - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY

December 1, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. Under Item #2 of this letter information concerning the National States Rights Party (NSRP), Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to areas covered by offices in Savannah, Georgia; Atlanta, Georgia; Memphis, Tennessee; Birmingham, Alabama; St. Louis, Missouri, and Springfield, Illinois, was requested. Under Item #3 information was requested concerning Jesse B. Stoner.

By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, the above requests were modified. Under Item (c) this letter requested the FBI's complete file on Stoner and that the agent(s) in the Office of Origin assigned to the Stoner investigation for the period 1966 through 1968 be made available for interview by the HSCA. Concerning the NSRP, under Item (d) this letter asked the FBI to provide information in its files to cover the period 1967 through 1968. In addition, the case agent(s) in the Office of Origin for the same period would be made available for interview.

In response to the above requests, information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the NSRP (period 1967 through 1968) and Jesse B. Stoner have been processed and are available for review at FBI Headquarters by the HSCA. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from FBI Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 12/1/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)." 62-117290-382x

~~62-117290-3816~~

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

PMS

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ

House Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

The Savannah Office of the FBI was Office of Origin in both the NSRP and Stoner investigation during the period of HSCA interest. The following agents of that office were case agents in the Stoner investigation: Carlton Dillard, January, 1966 - April 1967; William P. Friday, April, 1967 - October, 1967; John H. Murphy, October 1967 - September, 1969. With variation of only a few days, these same Agents were case agents in the investigation of the NSRP. Dillard is now retired. Friday and Murphy are currently assigned to the Savannah Office and are scheduled to retire December 31, 1977.

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv.	Legal Coun.
Director	Crim. Inv.	Plan. & Insp.
Assoc. Dir.	Fin. & Pers.	Rec. Mgnt.
Dep. AD Adm.	Ident.	Spec. Inv.
Dep. AD Inv.	Intell.	Tech. Servs.
	Laboratory	Training
		Public Affs. Off.

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4024

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF
CONGRESSIONAL
AFFAIRS
NOV 15 11 PM 1977

NOV 3 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals and organizations be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Lawrence J. Callanan (deceased) Steamfitters Union (AFL) Local 562, St. Louis, Mo. for the Period 1967 through 1971.

2. ✓ National States Rights Party, 591 Cherokee, Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, but limited to reports and information in areas covered by offices in Savannah, Ga.; Atlanta, Ga.; Memphis, Tn.; Birmingham, Al.; St. Louis, Mo.; and Springfield, Ill.

3. Jesse B. Stoner, 591 Cherokee, N.W., Marietta, Ga.

4. Conservative Society of America for the period 1967 through 1968. (Headquarters in New Orleans, La.

ltr to AAG/CD (Enc-2)
12/1/77
JTA:aas

5. Kent Courtney, 1413 Texas Avenue, Alexandria, La. for the period 1967 through 1968.

62-117290-382X

62-117290-382X ENCLOSURE ~~62-117290-382X~~

6. KKK (limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in Birmingham, Alabama, Los Angeles, California, Atlanta, Georgia and Louisville, Kentucky during the period 1967 through 1968).

7. Morris Davis, RFD, Hoover, Shelby County, Ala.

8. White Citizens Council (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in New Orleans, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

9. Forever White, (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in New Orleans, La; Baton Rouge, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

10. Charles Joseph Stein, dob 5/11/29.

11. Percy Belcher, ex-deputy Sheriff, Birmingham, Alabama, for the period 1967 through 1968.

12. Robert Powers, Powers Junction, Intersection Highways 11 and 90, Orleans Parrish, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

13. Sam DiPiazza, Pamela Place, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

14. Dr. Lucas DiLeo - (office) 8603 St. Bernard Highway, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

15. Salvadore L. Licciardi (Liccardi), New Orleans, Louisiana for the period 1967 through 1968.

16. Gus Joseph Prosch, dob 11/17/30, 3122 Callecita, Sacremento, California. (Arrested in Birmingham, Alabama in December, 1971 and convicted of violating Gun Control Act in 1972.)

17. Quentin B. Davis, owner of Gun Rack, Birmingham, Alabama for the period 1967 through 1968.

18. Clifford Andrews (aka, R. L. Warren), Box 75, Toronto 14, Ontario, Canada.

19. Walter Jack Youngblood, Monticello Street, Dallas, Texas.

20. Johnny Benelli, #303, 175 North Orange Drive, Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

21. Claude Cockrell, dob 5/10/36, FBI # 389804E, for the period 1967 through 1968.

22. Gene Pearson Crawford, dob 10/2/27 for the period 1967 through 1968.

23. Fleet Edwards, dob 2/4/21 for the period 1967 through 1968.

24. Raoul Esquivel - (Raul Victor Esquibel), dob 11/17/26, 4524 Parsimmon, Metairie, La. (This request includes, but is not limited to, Bureau File 44-26940.)

25. Southern Christian Leadership Conference

    a. General file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

    b. Cointelpro file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

26. James Bevel, for the period 1965 through 1968.

27. Rev. Jessie Jackson, Chicago, Ill., for the period 1965 through 1968.

28. Vincent DePaul Stelly, 4434 5th Ave., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

29. Jerome Wallis Vernon, Home Service Laundry and Dry Cleaning, 5280 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

30. Rev. James Orange, South Carolina for the period 1965 through 1968.

31. Rev. Bernard Lee, Atlanta, Ga., for the period 1965 through 1968.

32. Allan Lee Stoddard, "Vegas Club", 5510 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

33. Robert Byron Watson, SS# 253-85-2220, Atlanta, Ga.

34. Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1962 through 1968. (This request pertains to material exclusive of the Murkin File and the SCLC files and should include all information regarding threats to Dr. King.

35. Herman A. Thompson, 10454 Goodwood Blvd., Baton Rouge, La., (former deputy sheriff in Baton Rouge).

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

NOV 8 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a conference was held on November 7, 1977 between employees of the FBI and members of the Committee staff to discuss the Committee's November 3, 1977 letter of request for FBI materials on thirty-five individuals or organizations. As a result of this meeting, the following was resolved:

(a) The FBI would process the following numbered requests as they were originally stated in the November 3rd letter: 1, 4, 5, 7, 9-11, 13-24, 26, 28-33 and 35.

(b) The Committee would provide dates of births on the individuals in requests nos. 12 and 27 before the FBI would process these names. The dob on Robert J. Powers (request no. 12) is 6/5/24. The dob on Reverend Jesse Jackson (request no. 27) is 10/8/41.

(c) Besides providing the complete file on request no. 3 (Jesse B. Stoner), the FBI would also make available the most appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin assigned to Stoner for the period 1965 through 1968.

(d) With respect to request no. 2, the FBI would provide [illegible] 1957 [illegible] as well as make available the appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin for the same period.

~~62-117290-3896~~

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-382X

(e) With respect to request no. 6, the Committee would hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI provides a list of the most appropriate case agent(s) in the offices of origin for the several Klan organizations in existence in 1967 and 1968. (While such was not part of the understanding reached at the time of the meeting with FBI officials, the Committee would request however that all materials related to the United Klan of America LS for the period 1965 and 1966 be made ready for inspection by November 20, 1977.)

(f) With respect to request no. 8, the FBI would first advise the Committee as to the identity of other cities reporting on the White Citizens Council before a determination be made as to the final content of this request.

(g) With respect to request no. 25, the Committee will hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s) for the period in question.

(h) With respect to request no. 34, the Committee requests that only the thirteen "death threat" files on Dr. King be processed at this time, while a request for all other materials is held in abeyance until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s).

In Addition, the Committee would also request that the following agents be notified and made available by the FBI:

(1) Special Agent William F. Kusch - New Orleans
Special Agent Thomas E. Duhadway - New Orleans

(2) Special Agent Jack B. Simpson - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Richard H. Davis - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Jack T. Beverstein - Memphis ATLANTA

As a priority item, it is also requested that the FBI provide the Committee with the work or personnel records of the following three Louisville FBI agents for the month of September 1965:

(1) Robert Peters

(2) William Duncan

(3) Bernard Brown

We are primarily interested in those records reflecting their [illegible] records should be provided by November 15, 1977. The Committee would also ask that all three of the above-mentioned Louisville agents be made available for interview by the same date.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB605

PAGE 01 STATE 010886

JAN 14 7 04 AM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ORIGIN EUR-12 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 L-03 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00
INR-07 /025 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/NE: JPSHUMATE

APPROVED BY EUR/NE: RLFUNSETH

H - ASCHNEE (BY PHONE)

------------------015192 141012Z /10

R 140226Z JAN 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

4 - Foster

EX-136

(info)

E.O. 11652:N/A

REC-6 62-117290-380

TAGS:PINR, PDIP, UK

18 1978

SUBJECT:REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

FLO. SUP.

RE: LONDON 20003

58 JAN 26 1978

98

MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH

THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVESTIGATION MENTIONED IN BLAKEY'S LETTER AND ADVISE US. VANCE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENN[illegible] HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWI[illegible] LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CH[redacted]
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C. [redacted]IE, OHIO
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C. KINNEY, CONN.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF. C ES THONE, NEBR.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN. HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

(202) 225-4624

House [redacted]

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 9, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

51

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff, access to the following:

1. All files, materials, and information relating to William Hugh Morris, the alleged leader of the Federated KKK in Alabama.
   - a) Address (late 1950's)
     2128 East Fifth Street
     Oak Park
     Montgomery, Alabama
   - b) Jefferson County Alabama
     Sheriff's Office Number 52811

Your prompt attention to this request will be greatly appreciated.

REC-30 62-117290-378

EX-130

Respectfully

14 JAN 18 1978

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

62-117290

GRB:ghk

cc: Danny Coulson

218 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, [illegible]AIRM[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

[illegible]EL L.[illegible]INE, OHIO
[illegible]ART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

O. [illegible]

January 5, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

(C)

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available for interview, on a priority basis, the following agents:

1. Theodore A'Hearn - Los Angeles } 10/7 LET cleared
2. Leroy W. Sheets - Los Angeles
3. Thomas J. Wilson - Atlanta
4. Gerald Galbreath - El Paso

The Committee is ready to interview these agents on an immediate basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

✓CC: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:wwd

EX-130

REC-30

62-112290

62-112290-376

14 JAN 18 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

[illegible] 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CH[redacted]AN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SA , OHIO
STE INNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

O House

[redacted]

January 4, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

HAND DELIVER

Cu

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available to the Committee access to all F.B.I. materials, files, memoranda, airtels, and miscellaneous items, including but not limited to any contained in the MURKIN File (44-38861), on or referring to the following individual:

Gerold Frank - author
d.o.b. 8/2/1907
current address: 930 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10021

It is requested that access to these materials be provided on a priority basis so that our initial review can be completed by January 16, 1978.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey
G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

EX-130

REC 28

62-117290-3[illegible]

JAN 17 1978

GRB:ghd

cc: Danny Coulson

58 JAN 24 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JAN 3 11 23 AM '78
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
[illegible] MAIL ROOM

DEC 30 1977

RECEIVED
JAN 4 1978
O.L.A

Cd

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it has been determined from a review of the Chicago field office file (No. 44-1114) of the MURKIN investigation that the FBI is in possession of several letters of correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters. (See, for example, serials 271, 335, 496, 560, 574, 621, and 637 in the Chicago field office file.) It is requested that the FBI furnish this Committee with copies of all correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

ST-125 REC-55 62-117290-372

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

23 JAN 10 1978

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
10
JAN 3 1978
O.R.O.M.
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

79 JAN - 1978

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

WASHINGTON,
PM
DEC 30
1977
200

ALWAYS USE ZIP CODE

Louis Stokes
M.C.

Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th & Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention; Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 3, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

ST

Director, FBI

C O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to the letter from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, to the Attorney General, dated August 9, 1977, requesting availability of all FBI reports relative to robbery of the Bank of Alton, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967. Reference is also made to the letter from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, dated September 13, 1977, requesting a copy of all FBI reports in this bank robbery investigation.

NEC

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above HSCA request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2 ST-120 REC-45 62-117290-371

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

20 JAN 9 1978

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

10/4/77

3 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

79 JAN 20 1978

ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

DATE 12/3/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: The Alton bank robbery occurred at the time James Earl Ray was a fugitive, prior to King's assassination. Ray was considered a suspect in this robbery subsequent to being identified as King's killer. No evidence was produced to link Ray with the robbery. The case was closed unsolved in 1972.

In its request of 8/9/77, the HSCA asked for access to our investigation into this bank robbery and the file was prepared. Later, the HSCA submitted a second request which requested "a copy of any and all materials or reports" in the Alton bank robbery. Mr. Keuch advised on 9/19/77, that delivery should be limited only to investigative reports in the case. The requested material was picked up at FBIHQ on 9/19/77 by Oliver Champion, HSCA messenger. Purpose of enclosed memorandum is to confirm delivery of this material.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

October 3, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

This will respond to letter dated August 9, 1977, to the Attorney General from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, and letter dated September 13, 1977, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA.

This letter is to confirm that, pursuant to the above request dated September 13, 1977, a copy of each investigative report of the FBI in the Alton bank robbery, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967, was delivered to a representative of the HSCA on September 19, 1977.

JTA:sas (9)
sas

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Direcotr, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/3/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

1 - 12/31/85 [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. M JK
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. M/cav
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

JBA

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-371

FBI/DOJ

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

August 9, 1977

RECEIVED
AUG 19 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20430

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we request that you make available to us all investigative reports relative to the robbery of the Bank of Alton, Illinois, on July 13, 1967.

Best wishes and kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

EME:ek

Ack to AAG/CD
10-3-77
JTA:aas
1-OLA

144-72-662
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
11
AUG 19 1977
O.R.O.M.
RE
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

62-117290-37

CIV. RIGHTS DIV.

ENCLOSURE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVIN[illegible]IO
STEWART B. MC[illegible], CONN.
CHARLES THONE, [illegible].
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 13, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and our conversation with your office on Monday, September 12, 1977, we are hereby requesting a copy of any and all materials or reports the Federal Bureau of Investigation has regarding the Alton Bank Robbery in Alton, Illinois on July 13, 1967; as well as a copy of any other materials the Department of Justice may have in its possession relevant to this matter.

I appreciate your cooperation and assistance in this request, and I look forward hearing from you.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

SJL/GRB/drj

9 -

62-117290-371

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 10, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

C

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, ~~Chief~~ Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertinent to seven listed individuals.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request and advises that material on six of these individuals is available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters. Information on the seventh individual, Randolph Erwin Rosenson, was previously furnished the HSCA by FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120

11/17/77

62-117290-369

REC-55

23 JAN 10 1978

2 - ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

79 JAN 16 1978

APPROVED:

Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.

Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory

Legal Coun. m/DF
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/98 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By request dated 9/20/77, the HSCA asked for information concerning Rosenson. By letter to the Attorney General and its enclosures, both dated 10/13/77, information concerning Rosenson was delivered. The HSCA request dated 10/18/77, (attached) desired information on seven individuals, including a repeat on Rosenson's name.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 10, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertaining to:

Harvey Gene Love
George G. Pittman
Stephanie Helene Sheehan
Jonathon Henry Shea
Keith Albert Wright
Frank Quenqui
Randolph Erwin Rosenson

Retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the above individuals, with the exception of Rosenson, has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions or deletions. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

By FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977, documents containing information concerning Rosenson were provided the HSCA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/05

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/10/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA).

62-117290-369

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED ENCLOSURE
Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

FBI/DOJ

ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDI[illegible]ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Aid.

October 18, 1977

King Investigation

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attn: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the Select Committee's investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Martin Luther King, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff materials in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation relating to the following individuals for the period of time from January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968: 6/1/69

[illegible] 1/1/67 - 6/1/69
10/25

NAME	Date of Birth	FBI Number
✓Love, Harvey Gene	4/1/35	592-813A
✓Pittman, George G.	6/20/38	919-933C
✓Sheehan, Stephanie Helene	7/26/53	951-133N4
✓Shea, Jonathon Henry	6/12/47	688-958J2
✓Wright, Keith Albert	7/27/44	122-750H
✓Quenqui, Frank	12/9/08	160-8374
Rosenson, Randolph Erwin	3/20/34	34-711E

In addition, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the staff the criminal records for these individuals. This written request confirms an oral request made by myself to Mr. Dan Coulson on October 18, 1977 in the offices of the Committee.

Thank you.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:DM
copy to: Dan Coulson

ENCLOSURE

let to AAG/CD
11/10/77 (Enc. 2)
JTA:das

62-117290-369

Assistant Attorney General FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 11, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

O

C

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

309

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance regarding certain individuals and a business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

Delvd 11/17/77

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

APPROVED:

Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.

Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory

Legal Coun. M
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

ST-120 REC-55 62-117290-368

23 JAN 10 1978

2- ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

79 JAN 16 1978 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/21/83 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By memorandum dated 5/13/68, the Department was asked for authority to place technical surveillance on the telephones of James Earl Ray's brother-in-law and sister, Albert and Carol Pepper and the Grapevine Tavern, all located in St. Louis, Missouri. This memorandum also requested microphone surveillance be installed at the residence of Albert and Carol Pepper, the residence of Ray's brother, John Larry Ray, and at the Grapevine Tavern. FBIHQ files contain no information to indicate the Department of Justice took any action on this request. Following Ray's apprehension the Department, in memorandum dated 6/11/68, was advised that the FBI's request for electornic surveillance was withdrawn. The above information is contained in the King Assassination June file and has been processed for access of the HSCA.

The HSCA's request of 11/7/77, desired only written confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance on the above individuals and business during the period 1/1/67 to 12/31/68.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 11, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance against the following individuals and business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper.
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri.

This memorandum is to confirm that, based on a review of appropriate files at FBI Headquarters, the above were not subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI during the period January 1, 1967, to December 31, 1968, or at any other time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/95 BY

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/11/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

APPROVED:
Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-36

FBI/DOJ

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHA[redacted]MAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SA VINE, OHIO
ST CKINNEY, CONN.
CHA ONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

[redacted]

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

NOV 7 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance to determine whether any of the following individuals and places were the subject of such surveillance during the period of January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence or non-existence of such electronic surveillance with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Let to AAG/CD
JTA:dws
11/11/77 (Enc-2)

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-368

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

C O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that former Special Agent Joe C. Hester was interviewed on November 21, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Hester's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
Criminal Division
Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - Joe C. Hester - Enclosure

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

ST-120
REC-55 62-117290-366

23 JAN 10 1978

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

DOC:ldr
(10)

ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

signed & sent 1/6/77

12/31/83

79 JAN 16 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Memphis, Tennessee
December 5, 1977

JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM;
CIVIL RIGHTS - CONSPIRACY

On November 21, 1977, retired Special Agent Joe C. Hester appeared at Washington, D. C., at the request of the House Committee on Assassinations.

Mr. Hester met with the Committee staff in their offices at Washington, D. C., and was interviewed for a total of four hours by two different groups of five persons each. Both groups were affable and were not in any way critical of the investigation conducted in this case.

The first group of five interviewers asked a variety of questions but seemed to be particularly preoccupied with the investigation conducted by Legats in Mexico. Mr. Hester was able to answer many of the general questions regarding the activities of Legats but referred them to Assistant Director Richard Long when they began to ask more specific questions regarding the investigations by Legats and the manner of transmittal of this information to FBI Headquarters.(U)

The second group of five interviewers asked more general questions regarding the Bureau's investigation of the King murder. They seemed to be greatly concerned with the allegation of conspiracy. Mr. Hester advised them that he believed the conspiracy theory was an invention by the Department of Justice to be used to justify the FBI's investigation of Dr. King's murder. Mr. Hester advised them that he had never personally believed there was a conspiracy and he did not believe that any of his FBI superiors had ever believed in the conspiracy theory. Mr. Hester further advised that it was his personal opinion that James Earl Ray, acting alone, had murdered Dr. King and that his subsequent travels were probably financed by armed robbery.

#345883 [illegible]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Memo to DAG, 12-29-77

62-117290-366

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

This group was concerned with how the subject Ray had known how to obtain false documents following his arrival in Canada. Mr. Hester pointed out that a "Top Ten" criminal had been arrested in Canada and had been returned to the Missouri State Penitentiary and had served time there with James Earl Ray prior to Ray's escape. Mr. Hester indicated it was his belief that this "Top Ten" fugitive had been responsible for instructing Ray on how to proceed in obtaining false documents in Canada.

This group touched on such diverse elements as the information furnished by John McFerren regarding Frank Liberto, and one of the interviewers agreed that they had not believed McFerren to be a very reliable witness. They also discussed Ray's purchase of the rifle in Birmingham; the fact that Officer Redditt was moved from the firehouse near the Lorraine Motel just prior to the murder; what motive did Ray have for killing Dr. King; whether or not there was any evidence to indicate a conspiracy; whether or not there were any wiretaps and whether or not there had been any surreptitious entries made against King and his followers at Memphis prior to the assassination; and when, following his escape, did Ray appear to have made up his mind to assassinate Dr. King.

In addition, they asked numerous questions about the political climate in Memphis just prior to the assassination and inquired as to what investigation was being conducted by the FBI in regard to the Sanitation Workers Strike and the first march conducted by Dr. King. Mr. Hester was forced to admit that he had had nothing to do with the investigation of Dr. King prior to the murder and he suggested that they talk to current Special Agent Howell S. Lowe who would be in a position to furnish information in this regard.

They inquired about the interview of James Earl Ray conducted by former Special Agent in Charge Robert G. Jensen, former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle, and Mr. Hester at the state prison in Nashville, Tennessee, following Ray's plea of guilty. Mr. Hester recounted as best he could recall the events that transpired in connection with this attempted interview and advised the interviewers that former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle has suffered a cerebral hemmorrhage and possibly might not be competent to furnish information regarding this investigation.

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

The Committee indicated that they might desire to interview Mr. Hester again, either personally or telephonically, and they were assured that he would be available and agreeable to assisting them in any way possible.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
~~Fin. & Pers.~~ ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____ JAM
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's S

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Robert L. Keuch FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

5?

Cd

ack. KI

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

DEC 8 1977

cc: ✓Mr. Aldhizer

#17
1-4-78

ACF
BD

✓Danny O. Coulson
SSA - Div 11
NSOM
67-623562

Drew J. Clark
SSA - Div 9
NSOM
67-572700

ST-120

REC-54 62-117290-362

John T. Aldhizer, III
SSA - Div 5
NSOM
67-606490

memo to Robert L. Keuch Special Council to the AG — Foster 8981

12-22-77
CAM:JMR

NITE-8981

79 JAN 12 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Robert L. Keuch
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

cc: Mr. Aldhizer

CARBON COPY

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 14, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn;
Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

51

C

0

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

NR cc

Reference is made to a letter dated October 5, 1977, addressed to Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in the possession of the FBI pertaining to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material, as well as limited material pertaining to Hardin, previously prepared for the Committee's access, is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Enclosed are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

ST-120

JTM:sas (8)

sas

REC-54

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-117290-36

11/17/77

20 JAN 6 1978

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

79 JAN 12 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY Sp/macpne

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request dated 10/5/77, from HSCA for all information contained in Bureau files relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair. This request has been coordinated with the Legal Counsel Division.

A review of Bureau files has revealed that a limited number of documents relating to an attempted bombing of Brent Hardin's automobile had been prepared for the Committee's access pursuant to receipt of their request dated 4/27/77. The Committee was advised of the availability of these documents on 5/18/77. The remaining retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair have been prepared for the Committee's access and are being maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's Room 8988 for their review.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files pursuant to the Committee's request dated 10/5/77, include Baird's ident record, the results of a civil rights investigation involving Baird as the subject, and references to Blair appearing in the MURKIN file, numerous references to Hardin and the results of a civil rights investigation involving Blair as the subject.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12\31\85 BY

November 14, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 5, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI RELATIVE TO CLIFTON BAIRD, BRENT HARDIN AND ARLIE BLAIR.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 5, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Utilizing identifying data for Baird, Hardin and Blair furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

Also available for the Committee's access are documents relating to Brent Hardin which were previously prepared on May 18, 1977, pursuant to the receipt of the Committee's request dated April 27, 1977, for these documents.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTM:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/14/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-117290-361

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

McGuil

October 5, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Clifton Baird, 7813 Edsel Lane, Louisville, Kentucky.

2. Brent Hardin, 9102 Bristle Ave., Louisville, Kentucky.

3. Arlie Blair, 4025 Franklin Ave., Louisville, Kentucky, dob 9/3/32.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

Ltr to AAG/CD
JTM:sas
11/14/77

ENCLOS.

62-117290-361

Rec 10/25
JTM

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L[illegible]
STEWART [illegible], CONN.
CHARLES [illegible], NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 13 1977

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

DEC 14 11 29 AM '77
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL ROOM
OROM

RECEIVED

RECEIVED
DEC 15 1977
O.L.A.

CJ

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

2 House

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin ~~Luther King, Jr., it would~~ be appreciated if our staff could have access to the following files:

a) Any and all materials or files pertaining to the organization known as the MINUTEMEN for the period 1966-1968 active in the states of Mississippi and Louisiana.

ST-114 REC-33 62-117290-356

c) Any records and files, excluding D.E.A. records ~~requested in our letter of November 8, 1977 on:~~

Reynard J. Rochon
2200 Oriole Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

(1967 address)
7018 Dreux Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

21 JAN 4 1978

Your cooperation and prompt attention to this matter is greatly appreciated.

62-117290

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

GRB:ghe

cc: Danny O. Coulson

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
3
DEC 14 1977
D.A.O.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

57 JAN 12 1978
1-190

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO : The Associate Director

DATE: 12/22/77

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that the Director release from their secrecy agreements, SAs Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

-389

DETAILS: By letter dated 12/20/77 HSAC requested to interview SAs Harry L. Lee (former), SA Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen. By letter dated 11/8/77 32 the Committee requested permission to interview SA John B. Simpson, Richard A. Davis (former) and SA Jack T. Beverstein (former).

8

By letter dated 11/3/77 captioned Committee requested the identity of the case Agent most familiar with white hate activities in the period from 1965 to 1966. By letter dated 11/17/77 the Committee was advised that this Agent is SA Warren L. Walsh (former). By letter dated 12/9/77 the Committee requested permission to interview SA Robert Nichols (former). 332

RECOMMENDATION:

T 114 REC-46 62-117290-353

That the Director release from their employment agreement for purpose of interview by the captioned Committee the following individuals: Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

JAN

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Long
1 - Mr. Foster
2 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Coulson

DOC:dfj (8)

Coulson 365

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

#24 5882

12/30/78

JAN 12 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

File #:

62-117290 - SECTION 6

Serial Scope:

353, 356, 361, 362, 366, 368, 369, 371, 372, 375, 376,

378
380
382X
385
390 THRU 395
397
400
404 THRU 409
413 THRU 415
418
420
421

424
426
428 THRU 431
433
437

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 2/10/78

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT,
RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, ST. LOUIS (62-5097)(c)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Re Bureau teletype to St. Louis, 2/10/78, captioned as above.

Enclosed under separate cover for Headquarters is a Xerox copy of each serial in SL 170-1767 and SL 170-1767 Sub A as was requested in retel. Also enclosed is destruction memoranda concerning SL 1495-E (former) substantive file. Case closed in St. Louis.

245852
12/30/78

③ Bureau
(1 - via package) (Enc. 1)
2- St. Louis
(1- 62-5097)
(1- 170-1767)
JLV:jtc
(5)

2cc - Congressional Inquiry Unit w/o Encl

REC 58 62-117290-437

EX-124

FEB 15 1978

4 - JFK [illegible] +12cc (info)

AUG 28 1978 CB

Approved: ________ Transmitted ________ (Number) ________ (Time) Per ________

~~56 FEB 22 1979~~

wtk

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1 - Criminal Investigative Division
(Attn: J. E. McHale)
1 - Mr. G. J. Foster
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer
2/~~10~~ 9/78 per GJF

FM DIRECTOR (62-117290)

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

BT

EFTO

CW

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF Classification
DATE 2/4/78 bab/ [illegible]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ST. LOUIS DATED JANUARY 25, 1978; 421 ST. LOUIS TELETYPES TO BUREAU JANUARY 27, 429 1978, AND JANUARY 31, 1978. 443

ON FEBRUARY 8, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED HIS STAFF HAD CONTACTED FORMER SL 1495-E, WHO HAS AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH THE HSCA. ON FEBRUARY 9, 1978, STAFF ATTORNEY MICHAEL EBERHARDT, HSCA, ADVISED THAT SL 1495-E HAS EXECUTED A SIGNED WAIVER AUTHORIZING HSCA ACCESS TO ALL FBI INFORMATION CONCERNING HIM, INCLUDING THAT PERTAINING TO HIS INFORMANT ACTIVITIES.

REC-65 62-117290-433

134-19686

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

EX-110

22 FEB 13 1978

1 - 134-19686

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

JTA:lfj
(6)

CON[illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

HB/DRIS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 09 1978
TELETYPE

58 FEB 27 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN INFORMANT'S MAIN FILE AND SUB A FILE (170-1767) AND ONE COPY OF ANY VOUCHER OR DOCUMENT WHICH CONCERNS ANY ASPECT OF SOURCE'S OPERATION AND ANY PAYMENT WHICH WAS MADE TO HIM. ADDITIONALLY, PROVIDE FBIHQ WITH ONE COPY OF ANY MAIN FILE OR REFERENCE IN YOUR OFFICE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH INFORMANT.(~~S~~) u

THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBI HEADQUARTERS, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ, THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS OF STAFF MEMBERS OF HSCA, PROVIDED THE WAIVER DESCRIBED AS ABOVE IS RECEIVED.

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: SL 1495-E (former) (Bureau file 134-19686) was operated from January, 1970, to approximately September, 1971, primarily targeted against White Hate Groups. In 1971, he traveled to Savannah, Georgia, at which time he reported on activities of the National States Rights Party office and that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, stated he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. This is the apparent HSCA interest in informant.

Referenced communications concern previous informal requests by the HSCA that we contact SL 1495-E to determine if he would be willing to be interviewed by the Committee. St. Louis contacted informant on 1/27/78 and he agreed, but two days later submitted a letter to St. Louis declining to be interviewed by the HSCA. Subsequently, the HSCA determined informant's identity through its investigation and contacted him, at which time, according to the HSCA, he agreed to interview. By letter to the Attorney General dated 1/26/78, the HSCA has asked for all information at FBI Headquarters and in the field concerning informant.

This matter has been coordinated with SA D. O. Coulson, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 2/1/78

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(Attention: Congressional Inquiry Unit,
Records Management Division)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (62-7385) (C)

SUBJECT: O HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS

ReButelcall to Chicago 2/1/78.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies each of ten letters from JERRY RAY to MARJORIE LOUISE FETTERS.

All of the above letters were originally received from the Newark Division in a Xeroxed condition thus the quality of the above enclosures is not entirely satisfactory. However, per referenced Bureau telephone call, Chicago will maintain the original Xerox copy in its file 44-1114.

2cc RETAINED → RETAINED rm 8988 JEH w/ encls.

ENCLOSURE

③ - Bureau (Encls. 20)
1 - Chicago

WLD:jeo
(4)

EX-140

62-117290-431

REC-33

4 FEB 3 1978

245882

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/88 BY SP/mac/mvg

Approved: WEB/WLD Transmitted ______ (Number) (Time) Per ______

FEB 24 1978

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 5 4 52 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

N00140 0052135Z

RR HI

DE NO

R 052125Z JAN 78

FM NEW ORLEANS (66-2878) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED: JAN. 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DEC. 27, 1977. 351

I) SA STEPHEN M. CALLENDER OF THE NEW ORLEANS DIVISION WAS THE NEW ORLEANS FIELD OFFICE CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION. AT THE TIME SA CALLENDER WAS ASSIGNED THE "MURKIN" CASE, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE NUMBER SIX SQUAD IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE. THIS SQUAD HANDLED CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS. "MURKIN" WAS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF FORMER ASAC JOSEPH T. SYLVESTER, JR. THE NATURE OF CALLENDER'S ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY

EX-105 REC-56 62-117290-430

23 JAN 26 1978

4 - Gallinger

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:na
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc [illegible]

42

58 FEB [illegible]

PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION WAS IN THE FIELDS OF CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS.

II) THE FILES OF THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE FAIL TO REVEAL THAT THIS OFFICE EITHER CONSIDERED OR ENGAGED IN ANY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COIN TEL PRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC).

NEW ORLEANS FILES WHICH INVOLVE THE SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF KING (NO 100-16800) AND THE SCLC (NO 100-16849) HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY REVIEWED. NEW ORLEANS WAS MERELY AN AUXILIARY OFFICE IN THESE INVESTIGATIONS, WITH ATLANTA BEING THE OO. THE EXTENT OF INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY NEW ORLEANS WAS THE COVERING OF LEADS IN LA., SET FORTH BY ATLANTA OR OTHER OFFICES. THESE TWO FILES WERE REVIEWED SERIAL BY SERIAL AND NOWHERE IS THERE ANY INDICATION WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SCLC BY THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE.

DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 - 1968, THE KING FILE IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AND THEN RUC'D AT LEAST SEVEN TIMES AND THE SCLC FILE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AT LEAST FIVE TIMES DURING THIS SAME PERIOD.

PAGE THREE NO 66-2878 E F T O

AIR MAIL COPY SENT ATLANTA DIVISION.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

SL0018 0272150

RR HQ

DE SL

R 272145Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (C)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

BT

JAN 27 4 58 PM '78
DLS
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

E F T O

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, ~~RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION~~

~~Rm~~ Sec&Spec
~~Inq Section~~
3823 JEH TL#233

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

RE BUREAU TEL TO ST. LOUIS, JANUARY 25, 1978, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

SL 1495-E (FORMER) CONTACTED THIS DATE. HE WAS ADVISED OF HSCA'S EXISTENCE AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM CONCERNING CONTENTS OF LHM DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM - NSRP".

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS ADVISED THAT HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS. INITIAL REACTION OF SOURCE WAS THAT HE HAD NO STRONG OBJECTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY HSCA.

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS THEN ADVISED THAT CONFERENCES WITH HSCA

REC-56 62-117290-429

6 JAN 31 1978

A Cox

4 - al Hagin

54 FEB 23 1978

AND DOJ WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT DETAILS RE PROTECTION, CONFIDENTIALITY, LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

IT IS NOTED THAT SOURCE (FORMER) UNDERWENT MAJOR HEART AND ABDOMINAL SURGERY DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1977, IS CURRENTLY RECOVERING AND UNDER DOCTOR'S CARE. HE RESIDES 12350 OLD HALLS FERRY ROAD, FLORISSANT, MO., (314) 355-1500 AND IS UNEMPLOYED.

BT

#

Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Pers.____
Ident.____
Intell.____
Laboratory____
Legal Coun.____
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt.____
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____
Telephone Rm.____
Director's Sec'y____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB778

JAN 31 5 20 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

PAGE 01 LONDON 01641 311209Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00 INR-07
L-03 /025 W

FOSTER

------------------099858 312209Z /41

R 311204Z JAN 78

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2604

4 - [illegible]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LONDON 01641

5 - [illegible]

DC

EX-140

DE-3

REC- 13

V-29

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINR PDIP UK

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

62-117290-428

17 FEB 7 1978

REF: STATE 10886

~~56 FEB 22 1978~~

AUG 28 1978

FOR H (ASST SEC BENNET) AND EUR/NE

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFTEL, WE PASSED ON TO THE HOME OFFICE THE REQUEST OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS FOR ACCESS TO BRITISH POLICE RECORDS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS CONCERNED WITH THE ARREST OF JAMES EARL RAY WITHOUT THE COMMITTEE RESPONDING FIRST TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED PREVIOUSLY BY BRITISH OFFICIALS.

2. THE HOME OFFICE INFORMED THE EMBASSY ON JANUARY 26 THAT IT IS CONSULTING THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S REQUEST AND WILL LET US KNOW THE OUTCOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BREWSTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEV[illegible]. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHA[illegible]HONE, NEBR.
HAR[illegible] SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

O House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

[illegible]

January 30, 1978

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Cu

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

337

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a request was made by letter dated November 30, 1977, for FBI files relating to Dr. King. These files included the following:

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.
2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.
3. The file on the Memphis Sanitation Strike for the period January 1, 1968 through May 1, 1968.
4. The file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr./Poor People's March for the period December 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.
5. All materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the SCLC in the COINTELPRO file.

EX-311 REC-6 62-117290-426

21 FEB 6 1978

We have been advised that all of the above files are now available for review by the Committee.

It is now requested, however, that the foregoing files, except for the Memphis Sanitation Strike, be prepared for Committee review for the following extended dates:

62-117290

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

58 FEB 14 1978

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:
    a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the periods:
    a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
3. The COMINFIL and COINTELPRO files as such relate to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:
    a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
4. The files on the Poor Peoples' March from May 1, 1968 to the closing date of this file.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:med

✓cc: Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRM[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible]INE, OHIO
STEWART [illegible] KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES TH[illegible]E, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

2 House

Received
CIU
2/3/78

FEB 3 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the FBI provide the Committee with photographs of all Atlanta agents assigned to the security investigation of Dr. King during the period 1967-68. To the extent possible, these photographs should depict the agents involved as they appeared in 1967-1968 or as close thereto as possible.

R

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mej
✓cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson FBI

63-117290

EX-124
REC-76 62-117290-424

FEB 7 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

57 FEB 15 1978

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1/25/78

FM DIRECTOR

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

BT

EFTO

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Criminal Intelligence Div.
(Attn: Mr. J. E. McHale, Jr.)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE ST. LOUIS AIRTEL AND LHM TO BUREAU DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED, "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM-NSRP."

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN THAT CONNECTION, VARIOUS DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE FOR HSCA REVIEW.

ON JANUARY 23, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED THAT THE HSCA DESIRES TO INTERVIEW THE FBI INFORMANT WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION IN REFERENCED LHM. BLAKEY REQUESTED THAT INFORMANT BE CONTACTED AND ADVISED OF THE HSCA'S INTEREST IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT INFORMANT HAD ANY OBJECTIONS TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY

EX-124

REC-54 62-117290-421

134-19686-
105-6623-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

JTA:sas (7)

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

6 FEB 1 1978

1 - 134-19686
1 - 62-117290

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 25 1978
2212 SJ7
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ALL I[illegible] C[illegible]
I[illegible]
D[illegible] 1-10-86

HB/DR

42

58 FEB 14 1978

Foster
Rm 8988

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☒

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA.

INFORMANT IS SL 1495-E (FORMER), WHO WAS OPERATED FROM JANUARY, 1970, TO APPROXIMATELY SEPTEMBER 1971. INFORMANT WAS PRIMARILY TARGETED AGAINST WHITE-HATE GROUPS AND WAS SUBJECT OF BUREAU FILE 134-19686 AND ST. LOUIS FILE 170-1767.

ON JANUARY 24, 1978, SUPERVISOR JAMES HAGGERTY DETERMINED THAT INFORMANT IS LISTED IN THE CURRENT ST. LOUIS TELEPHONE DIRECTORY AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CONTACT WITH INFORMANT SINCE HE WAS CLOSED IN 1971.

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY CONTACT FORMER SL 1495-E. ADVISE HIM OF THE HSCA'S EXISTENCE, AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM APPARENTLY CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF REFERENCED LHM. ADVISE HIM THE HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCED LHM AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER. DETERMINE AT THIS POINT ONLY HIS INITIAL REACTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA. IF HE HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO AN INTERVIEW, HE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT CONFERENCES WITH THE HSCA AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS

REGARDING THE EXTENT OF PROTECTION AND CONFIDENTIALITY THE HSCA IS WILLING TO EXTEND AS WELL AS DETAILS REGARDING THE LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

SUTEL RESULTS TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION.

BT

#

NOTE The HSCA plans to submit a formal request regarding this matter, but requested informant be contacted for his initial reaction to interview. The Congressional Inquiry Unit, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, agree this approach is best prior to continuing discussions to resolve legal and other issues.

The apparent interest of the HSCA involves informant's travel to Savannah, Georgia, in 1971 at which time he reported on activities at the NSRP Office in Savannah, as set forth in referenced communication. Informant reported that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, and J. B. Stoner, National Chairman, NSRP, were in the office when Jerry said that the FBI and he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. The HSCA has requested FBI information on the NSRP, Stoner, Jerry Ray and other individuals identified as being in attendance in the NSRP Office in Savannah during that time. One of the individuals present, Richard Geppert, was later developed as an informant of the Springfield Office. Geppert has been interviewed by the HSCA and has furnished a signed statement in which he gives authority for HSCA review of all FBI information concerning him, including that pertaining to his confidential relationship with the FBI.

This matter has been coordinated with Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Organized Crime Section, Criminal Investigative ~~Unit~~ Division

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 14 4 52 AM '78

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ME0013 0140930Z

RR HQ

DE ME

C R 14 0930Z JAN 78

FM MEMPHIS (66-2197) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290)

BT

EFTO

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JAN. 13, 1978.

THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOE C. HESTER, NOW RETIRED, ON APRIL 4, 1968, AND WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON AUG. 1, 1977. THE MEMPHIS OFFICE DID NOT HAVE A SQUAD BREAKDOWN AT THE TIME THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA HESTER. SA HESTER WAS ASSIGNED GENERAL CRIMINAL WORK IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION. SA JOHNSON WAS ASSIGNED DOMESTIC SECURITY AND CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE TIME THE MURKIN CASE WAS REASSIGNED TO HIM.

R

EX-124 REC-54 62-117290-420

22 JAN 31 1978

4

12/30/85

Rm 89/85

2 copies made pgs 1-6
1/24/78 JTA:na

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc Rm 8988

42

58 FEB 14 1978

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4542 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS, RACIAL MATTERS," WAS FIRST OPENED ON AUG. 28, 1967, AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., NOW RETIRED, UNTIL IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON MARCH 7, 1968. IT REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. MEMPHIS OFFICE HAD NO SQUAD BREAKDOWN DURING THE PERIOD 1965-68. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, AND SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4704 ENTITLED "NEW LEFT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM", WAS OPENED ON MAY 15, 1968, AND ASSIGNED TO LAWRENCE J. OLSON. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON FEB. 29, 1971, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 12, 1971. SA'S OLSON AND JOHNSON WERE INVOLVED IN SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE A100-4046 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM" WAS ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, NOW RETIRED, ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

OPENED JULY 23, 1964, PLACED IN RUC STATUS APRIL 29, 1966; REOPENED AUG. 24, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS AUG. 30, 1966; REOPENED MARCH 31, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JUNE 13, 1967; REOPENED OCT. 18, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS DEC. 20, 1967. IT REMAINED IN RUC STATUS UNTIL DEC. 26, 1974.

SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE ON EACH OCCASION.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-576 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS" WAS FIRST OPENED ON SEPT. 4, 1964, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND SWAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON JUNE 15, 1965. THIS CASE WAS REOPENED JUNE 18, 1965, AND PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON SEPT. 9, 1965. IT WAS REOPENED JAN. 2, 1966, AND ASSIGNED TO SA LAWRENCE. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA MERRILL F. MC CLOUGHAN ON JUNE 3, 1966. SA MC CLOUGHAN IS NOW RETIRED. IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA ROBERT F. FITZPATRICK ON MAY 10, 1968, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTEC INVESTIGATIONS, SA HILLIN WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, SA MC CLOUGHAN WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATION, AND SA FITZPATRICK WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4105 ENTITLED MMARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS OPENED ON JAN. 2, 1965, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND WAS SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 11, 1968. SA LAWRENCE WAS ASSIGNED SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-166 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE" (COMINFIL SCLS) IS - C, WAS FIRST OPENED IN THE MEMPHIS OFFICE ON SEPT. 26, 1961. IT WAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS AND RE-OPENED A NUMBER OF

TIMES PRIOR TO PERIOD 1965-68. IT WAS OPENED AND ASSIGNED DURING THIS PERIOD AS FOLLOWS:

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., ON FOLLOWING OCCASIONS.

REOPENED JULY 12, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS NOV. 17, 1965; REOPENED NOV. 17, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JAN. 31, 1966, REOPENED APRIL 29, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS MAY 20, 1966.

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

REOPENED DEC. 19, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JULY 17, 1972.

SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE. SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE.

A REVIEW OF MEMPHIS COINTELPRO FILES AND FILES ON THE SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC REVEALED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND THE SCLC.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt. ✓
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 5 6 25 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

CG0014 0052317

RR HQ

DE CG

R 052317Z JAN 78

FM CHICAGO (62-7385)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

E F T O

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DECEMBER 27, 1977. 351

(1)A) MURKIN INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER, CHICAGO 44-1114.

B) CHICAGO CASE AGENT RENE J. DU MAINE ASSIGNED TO ASAC SQUAD AS RELIEF SUPERVISOR - BANK ROBBERY COORDINATOR.

(2)A)(1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-35356.

(2) TITLE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM - C. 62-117290-418

EX-111 REC-

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION ON THE DATES INDICATED:

22 JAN 31 1978

JANUARY 7, 1965, CLAY M. BRADY, RUC JANUARY 24, 1965, [redacted]

12/30/85

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA: mac
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

42

58 FEB 14 1978

REOPENED JANUARY 25, 1965 TO ROBERT F. BARRY, CLOSED MARCH 16, 1965, REOPENED MARCH 25, 1965 TO WILLIAM J. WHITE, RUC JULY 16, 1965, REOPENED JULY 19, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, RUC AUGUST 2, 1965, REOPENED AUGUST 11, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY, CLOSED AUGUST 27, 1965, REOPENED SEPTEMBER 13, 1965 TO R. L. STROMBERG, RUC SEPTEMBER 24, 1965, REOPENED OCTOBER 7, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, REASSIGNED NOVEMBER 22, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY WHO CONTINUED AS CASE AGENT UNTIL AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN 1968. THIS CASE WAS MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE CASE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR, SM - C INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY, WHO WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (B) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 105-16238.

(2) TITLE: COMINFILE, SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC), IS - C.

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOHN P. O'BRIEN, UNTIL OCTOBER 12, 1965, WHEN IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY THROUGH 1968. SA STANLEY WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5 UNTIL FEBRUARY, 1968 WHEN HE WAS DELETED. THE EXACT NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (C) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-32864.

(2) TITLE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, IS - C.

(3) A REVIEWW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION:

HERBERT K. STALLINGS UNTIL APRIL 22, 1965, REASSIGNED TO GENE E. ARNOLD UNTIL APRIL 27, 1967, REASSIGNED TO ROBERT O. MURPHY THROUGH 1968. ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WERE MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 2. THE SECTION, SQUAD OF ASSIGNMENT, AND THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THIS INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (D) A REVIEW OF ALL OTHER COINTELPRO INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY CHICAGO FAILS TO INDICATE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. OR THE SCLC WERE EVER MENTIONED IN THESE FILES OR TARGETS UNDER THESE PROGRAMS.

BT

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. [illegible]KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES T[illegible], NEBR.
HAROLD S. [illegible]R, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

D. Jones

Received C14
1/31/78

January 26, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with this Committee's investigation of the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we would appreciate your assistance in obtaining access to any files or records in the possession of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, relating to the individuals and organizations noted below:

A. With respect to the Drug Enforcement Administration:

1) Charles Joseph Stein
Date of Birth: 5/11/29
FBI Number: 881-534-B

2) Anthony Charles DeCarvelho
Born: 1921
Residence: New Orleans

B. With respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

1) Jack Brown
Chattanooga, Tennessee

2) Lester Lee [illegible]
Date of Birth: 2/23/45
S.S.N.: 410-78-8096
2165 or 2155 Clarksdale
Memphis, Tennessee

3) Hunter Pitts O'Dell
New Orleans, Louisiana

62-117290

EX-111 REC-13

62-117290-415

23 FEB 2 1978

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

57 FEB 14 1978

4) Earnest Donnell
Denham Springs, Louisiana

5) Robert DePugh, Norborne, Missouri
Head of the Minutemen organization

6) Sidney Barnes
1378 East Riviera Drive
Mobile, Alabama (1968)

7) "Maxey Ted"
New Orleans, Louisiana

8) Eddie Sopcjack
Date of Birth: 8/14/29
FBI Number: 186-485A

9) Thomas Tarrants

10) Samuel Caccamechi
Memphis, Tennessee

11) Robert Hood Strader
Lexington, Illinois

12) Raymond Starns
King David Apartments, Apt. 1
2816 David Drive
Metairie, Louisiana (1968)

13) Jerome Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana

14) Joseph Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana (now deceased)

15) Leonard Scott DelMonte
1229 North Bronson Street
Los Angeles, California

16) Allan O. Thompson
Date of Birth: 12/25/13

17) Dr. Russell C. Hadley
Date of Birth: 8/18/09
96 Moscow Road
Monte Rio, California

18) James E. Morrison
Los Angeles, California

19) Dr. Mark O. Freeman
Beverly Hills, California

20) Charles Calvin Bookman
Date of Birth: 9/6/13
FBI Number: 892-355

21) Rodney Arvidson
Date of Birth: 1/19/23
Post Office Box 2820
Long Beach, California

22) Tomas Reyes Lau
Date of Birth: 10/5/23
2047 Lemoyne
Los Angeles, California

23) Roy Emory Hargraves
El Monte, California

24) Raymond M. Murphy, aka "Fido"
Los Angeles, California

25) Lee Wilkinson
Los Angeles, California

26) Roman Kohnke
Los Angeles, California

27) Paul Lyon
Los Angeles, California

28) Jeri Salkin
Los Angeles, California

29) Ronald G. Hewitson
Garden Grove, California

30) Pat Olson
Date of Birth: 7/21/42
Quantico, Virginia

31) Robert Taylor, aka Bob Taylor
Los Angeles, California

32) Ronald Dennino
aka Ronald Gerald Dennino
Inmate at California State Prison
at San Quentin (1967 - 1968)

33) Richard Gonzales
Los Angeles, California

34) Roderic Burns Duff
Monrovia, California
1968 President of Los Angeles Chapter
of Citizens Council of America

35) R. J. Weiler
Los Angeles, California

36) Elizabeth Ann De Rouen
Date of Birth: 2/17/43
SSN: 453-62-1064
Los Angeles, California

37) Debbie Gold
~~Los Angeles, California~~

38) David Gregory
Buena Park, California

39) Rev. Xavier Von Koss
Hermora Beach, California

40) Robert Harold Gray
Los Angeles, California

41) Robert Keeley
Los Angeles, California

42) William K. Shearer
aka Bill Shearer
3166 Palm
Lemmon Grove, California

43) Robert Walters
Los Angeles, California

44) George Manum
Los Angeles, California

45) Robert J. Roe
Beverly Hills, California

46) Pamela Dillon
Los Angeles, California

47) Frank Marullo
New Orleans, Louisiana

48) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on Ku Klux Klan for the cities of Jacksonville and Miami, Florida for the period 1966 through 1968.

49) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on the following organizations for the period 1966 through 1968 for the cities of New Orleans, Louisiana; Birmingham, Alabama; Memphis, Tennessee; Chicago, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia; Los Angeles, California; and the State of Mississippi:

   a) Black Panthers
   b) Black Muslims
   c) American Nazi Party
   d) Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

50) Subfiles and/or investigative reports for the period 1966 - 1968 for the following organizations:

   a) Liberty Lobby
   b) The Sword
   c) The Fiery Cross
   d) The White Camelia
   e) The Silver Dollar Group

Your prompt cooperation will be most appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:msd
cc: Danny Coulson

1/18/78

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)

FROM : ACTING LEGAT, LONDON (62-604)(P)

House Select Committee on Assassinations

SUBJECT: JAMES EARL RAY, aka;
ET AL
CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE UNLAWFUL
FLIGHT TO AVOID CONFINEMENT - ESCAPE

ReLONlet 11/16/77.

Enclosed for information is a copy of an incoming telegram the American Embassy, London, received from Department of State on 1/14/78, and copy of Legat, London letter to the British Home Office dated 1/18/78.

Further pertinent information will be furnished when available.

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encs. 2)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
1 - London
RAK:ejg
(4)

62-117290-

NOT RECORDED
FEB 7 1978

Original Filed In [illegible]

56 FEB 14 10 1978

12/31/85

UNITED STATES DEPARTME[illegible] OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Office of Legal Attache
American Embassy
Grosvenor Square
London, W1A 1AE

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 62-604

Your Ref.:

January 18, 1978

Mr. G. L. Angel
British Home Office
G-4 Division
Queen Anne's Gate
London, S.W. 1

Re: Request from House Select Committee on Assassinations to Meet with British Police Authorities

Dear Mr. Angel:

By way of background, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as authorized by the U. S. House of Representatives, is investigating the circumstances surrounding the murders of President J. F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The Chief Counsel and Staff Director requested contact be made with appropriate officials in the British Government to obtain authority to interview appropriate police officials who were involved in the arrest of James Earl Ray in London on June 8, 1968.

Assistant Legal Attache Dennis Dickson had contact with you on December 6, 1977 regarding this matter. At that time you requested the following:

A) Purpose or scope of inquiry;

B) Names of individuals to be interviewed and reasons therefor;

12/31/85

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

C) Intended use of results of inquiry, i.e., public hearings, etc., it being noted that any records maintained by the British police would be as the result of an official inquiry and this would normally be available for police use only, unless otherwise exempted by the British Government.

The Select Committee responded that due to the brevity of the 95th Congress, it was most important that representatives of the Select Committee be allowed to meet with appropriate members of New Scotland Yard who are knowledgeable about the KING-RAY investigation. The Committee advised they would be happy to meet personally with British Government officials in London to provide answers to the issues forwarded to them for clarification and elucidation.

I would be most appreciative if you would advise if this situation is agreeable to you.

Sincerely,

Dennis R. Dickson
Acting Legal Attache

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION/

[illegible]

AMB	✓
MIN	✓
AMB/EX	✓
PAO	✓
POL	
POL/L	✓
POLAD	✓
E/MIN	✓
ECON	✓
COMCL	
E/SCI	
E/TRANS	
AGRI	
CUSTOMS	
DAO	✓
D.E.A.	
F.A.A.	
FBIS	
I.R.S.	
LEGATT	
MARITIME	
SUSLO	✓
TRADE	
TREAS	✓
USCG	
A/COUNS	
A/ATO	
A/B&M	
A/COMM	
A/GS	
A/PERS	
A/RFO	
A/SY	
A/VIS	
CCA	2
CG/CS	
CG/V	
S.F.	✓
CHRON	✓
LOG	
D.O.	✓
POUCH	
E/S	
USSS	

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ ~~JAN~~ 14 10 46

FROM: STATE

NO: 10886

NNNNVV FHG083EHV219
RR RUDTC
DE RUEHC #0886 0140951
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 140226Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON 7802
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

E.O. 11652 :N/A

TAGS :PINR, PDIP, UK

SUBJECT :REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

RE : LONDON 20003

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENNET HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

OTAL:

PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL[illegible] WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVEST[illegible]ION MENTIONED IN BLA[illegible] LETTER AND ADVISE US [illegible]VANCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

January 25, 1978

Director, FBI

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

0

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

C

336
356

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

MAILED 17
JAN 25 1978
FBI

EX-111 REC- 13 62-117290-414

20 FEB 2 1978

56 FEB 10 1978

14

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DATE 12/30/85

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By teletype dated 12/27/77, field offices designated by the HSCA were advised of the contents of the HSCA letter of 12/13/77. Responses have been received. Rather than incorporate the voluminous results into a letter to the Committee, it is more practical to make available for HSCA access at FBIHQ incoming field office teletypes.

It should be noted that, under current operating procedures existing between the Department of Justice and the HSCA, disclosure of these agents' identities to the HSCA cannot be prevented. However, G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, has advised SA D. O. Coulson of Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, that, in absence of an overriding need to do otherwise, the HSCA will not publish the names of any agent personnel below the position of section chief. This policy would follow precedent of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which issued its report in 1976.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 25, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

In response to the above request, the following information is submitted:

On December 19, 1977, Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised that the Department of Justice would respond to Part A, Items 1 and 2 and Part B, Items 1 and 2, of the above request.

Regarding Part A, Item 3 and Part B, Item 3, the FBI field offices designated by the HSCA were requested to provide the information desired by the HSCA. Responses from these field offices have been received and copies of these documents are available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters.

With respect to Part A, Item 4, a review of FBI Headquarters indices disclosed no memoranda, records, documents and news releases generated by the FBI in connection with the MURKIN investigation, other than that contained in the MURKIN file, which has already been made available to the HSCA.

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFIARS.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

PMS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE
62-117290-411

FBI/DOJ

In response to Part B, Item 4, it should be noted that HSCA request of November 30, 1977, asked for all FBI material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in the FBI's Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) file. By letter dated January 11, 1978, you were advised that representatives of the HSCA agreed to limit its request to COINTELPRO files involving the Communist Party USA and Black Nationalist-Hate Groups and to limit the period of HSCA interest from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968. On January 23, 1978, Staff Attorney Michael Eberhardt reiterated that the HSCA's interest is that period rather than the years 1965-1968 as set forth in the request of December 13, 1977. The above-mentioned COINTELPRO files and files of the King and SCLC security investigations from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, have been prepared for HSCA access. Therefore, based on knowledge of personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit processing HSCA requests regarding King, all material at FBI Headquarters, which may contain COINTELPRO-type activities against King and SCLC during the period January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, has been made available to the HSCA.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/25/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC[illegible]EY, CONN.
CHARLES THO[illegible]R.
HAROLD S. SAW[illegible]ICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee o[illegible]ssassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Aldhizer

Executive Office of
Congressional Affairs
Dec. 14 - 2nd Flr. 1977

DEC 13 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation provide the following:

A. MURKIN Investigation

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who participated in any way in the direction or management of the MURKIN investigation and the Division and Section within the Department of Justice where these attorneys were then assigned;

2. Copies of all memoranda, records, documents, and news releases generated by the Department of Justice in connection with MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee;

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the MURKIN investigation for the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham

Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

Let to AAG/CD
1/25/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:sas

62-117290-414

ENCLOSURE

4. Copies of all memoranda, records, documents and news releases generated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with the MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee.

B. COINTELPRO

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who were in receipt of any information concerning the COINTELPRO activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

2. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the Department of Justice in connection with the COINTELPRO activities of the FBI as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during 1965 to 1968 from the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's actual assignment during that period:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham
Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami
Louisville

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

4. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the FBI in connection with the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 to 1968 which are not contained in the files requested by Committee letter dated November 30, 1977.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIR[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUE[illegible]E, OHIO
STEW[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARL[illegible]ONE, NEBR.
HAROL[illegible]SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

O House

Rec. [illegible]
3:45 PM
1/27/78

January 17, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff access to the following:

1. All files, materials and information including, but not limited to, intelligence and security materials relating to the following organizations active in California for 1967-1969:
    a) John Birch Society
    b) American Independent Party
    c) George Wallace Campaign

2. All files, materials and information, including, but not limited to, intelligence, surveillance and security materials for 1967-1968 pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his activities in California.

Your prompt attention to the request will be greatly appreciated.

REC-65

62-117290-413

RECORDED

6 JAN 31 1978

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

GRB:mkd
cc: Danny O. Coulson

57 FEB 7 1978
118

FEB 01 1978

DERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 31, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl ✓
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

6

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

NR CG

Reference is made to a letter dated October 20, 1977, to Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in possession of the FBI to include the current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Enclosures are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

JTM:sas (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

EX-115

REC-65 62-112290-409

30
7 JAN ~~26~~ 1978

2-ENCLOSURE

Delivered 11/2/77

Signed and sent for to SA Coulson for delivery to Dept. 11-1-77

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/83 BY

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

42 EB

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:

Director ____	Adm. Serv. ____	Legal Coun. ____
Assoc. Dir. ____	Crim. Inv. ____	Plan. & Insp. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____	Fin. & Pers. ____	Rec. Mgnt. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____	Ident. ____	Spec. Inv. ____
	Intell. ____	Tech. Servs. ____
	Laboratory ____	Training ____
		Public Affs. Off. ____

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request by HSCA for information contained in the Bureau's files relative to William Herman Jackson. This matter has been coordinated with the Legal. Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files, which are identifiable with Jackson, have been organized into folders for the Committee's access and are maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's space, Room 8988.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files include Jackson's current ident record, the results of an FBI investigation wherein Jackson was one of four subjects - captioned "Leslie Atkisons, aka, Et Al; Miscellaneous - Falsely Making or Forging Naval, Military or Official Pass," two references re a Foreign Police Cooperation Matter and two references re a Perjury Matter.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

October 31, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 20, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI TO INCLUDE A CURRENT FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION RECORD RELATIVE TO WILLIAM HERMAN JACKSON.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 20, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Utilizing identifying data for Jackson furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

JTM:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/31/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA).

409

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____	Adm. Serv. ____	Legal Coun. M
Assoc. Dir. ____	Crim. Inv. ____	Plan. & Insp. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____	Fin. & Pers. ____	Rec. Mgnt. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____	Ident. ____	Spec. Inv. M
	Intell. ____	Tech. Servs. ____
	Laboratory ____	Training ____
		Public Affs. Off. ____

62-117290-409

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI/DOJ

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

October 20, 1977

Robert L. Keuch, Esq.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

The Select Committee on Assassinations would appreciate any and all information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record check relative to William Herman Jackson, FBI #801-218-G, D.O.B. 11/24/26.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB/EME/mae

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room 3659
Washington, D. C. 20530

let to AAG/CO
10-31-77
JTM:aws (Enc-3)

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-409

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

CJ

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on November 16, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
Criminal Division
Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - William F. Kusch - Enclosure

ST-120 REC-63 62-117290-408

23 JAN 31 1978

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.

Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory

Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

HNB/R

DOC:ldr

signed & sent 1/6/77

59 FEB 6 1978

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/85

FBI/DOJ

62-117290-408	COPY 63	DOC:ldr 12/29/77

The Deputy Attorney General HSCA
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney Generel Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on 11/16/77. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

COPY OF ABSTRACT FOR THIS SERIAL IS PLACED IN FILE IN LIEU OF THE MAIL WHICH HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED.

C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/03 BY

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

DATE: 12/19/77

FROM : SAC, PORTLAND (62-3144)

JGP/RR

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Enclosed herewith are five copies of an LHM relative to the interview of SA WILLIAM F. KUSCH, Portland Division, by staff members of the HSCA in Washington, D.C., on 11/16/77.

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (Encs. 5)
2 - Portland
WFK:ja
(4)

ST-120

REC-63 62-117290-407

1-31-78

✓ Cou

Memo to [illegible] AG 12-29-77

MAR 20 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-02

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Portland, Oregon

December 19, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

On November 16, 1977, SA William F. Kusch of the Portland Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was interviewed at House Annex #2 in Washington, D.C., by Mr. Mark Speiser and Mr. Peter Beeson, members of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The interview with SA Kusch dealt with a period of time SA Kusch was assigned to the New Orleans Division of the FBI, specifically April, 1968. During April of 1968, SA Kusch, along with numerous other Special Agents assigned to the New Orleans Division, conducted many interviews with persons who had, or who might have had, knowledge of the activities or contacts of James Earl Ray during the period of time Ray, using the name Eric Galt, was in New Orleans.

Specifically, SA Kusch was questioned regarding his squad assignments in New Orleans, the identities of other squad members, the identity of his supervisor, his Agent in charge and his assistant Agent in charge at the time.

Further, SA Kusch was questioned relative to the content of several interview report forms (FD 302s) concerning interviews that he conducted and prepared appropriate FD 302s in connection therewith, or FD 302s covering interviews that he was a party to. House Select Committee on Assassinations members exhibited said FD 302s to SA Kusch to refresh his memory.

House Select Committee members in essence apparently desired SA Kusch to amplify or further expand on these interviews.

ALL I[illegible]
I[illegible]
[illegible] 12/30/15 [illegible]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-107

SA Kusch pointed out that as a result of the passage of nine and one-half years, for the most part he could not specifically recall the persons interviewed. To specific questions regarding the interviews, SA Kusch could only point out that if additional questions had been asked of these persons interviewed at the time, resulting in the receipt of any positive or pertinent information regarding Galt, that information would have been duly recorded on said FD 302s.

Both Mr. Speiser and Mr. Beeson were cordial and SA Kusch responded to their questions in a candid manner.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

January 26, 1978

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

(C) HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which, in connection with HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested information pertaining to FBI electronic suveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2 (Secret Material Enclosed)

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure) (Secret Material Enclosed)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCLOSURE

ST-120

REC-63 62-117290-406

23 JAN 31 1978

MAILED 17
JAN 26 1978
FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/98 BY

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

42 HWB

58 FEB 6 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Dates and places of electronic surveillance of King were compiled through file reviews conducted in connection with previous law suits filed against the FBI by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and a former SCLC officer and aide to King, Bernard S. Lee. Although names of specific SCLC affiliates were not provided by the HSCA in its request, all names are readily available to the Committee, which has received access to our files concerning King and SCLC.

SECRET

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which requested information in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. This letter requested that the FBI determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The Committee indicated it only desired written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved, with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

In response to the above request, appropriate records at FBI Headquarters were reviewed with the following results:

Microphone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
January 5-7, 1964	Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C.
January 27, 1964	Shroeder Hotel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
February 18-20, 1964	Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii
February 20-21, 1964	Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, California
February 22-24, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
March 19-20, 1964	Statler Hotel, Detroit, Michigan

Assoc. Dir. ___ 8
Dep. AD Adm. ___ JTA:sas (6)   SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR
Dep. AD Inv. ___ DOD
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, & ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

SECRET

Classified by 6437
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DECLASSIFIED BY
ON 12/31/85

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-106

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Dates of Surveillance	Location
April 23-24, 1964	Senator Hotel, Sacramento, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
September 28, 1964 - October 2, 1964	Manager Hotel, Savannah, Georgia
January 8-11, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
January 28-31, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
March 29-31, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
May 12-13, 1965	Sheraton Atlantic Hotel, New York City
October 14-15, 1965	Astor Hotel, New York City
October 28-30, 1965	New York Hilton Hotel, New York City
November 29-30, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
January 22, 1966	Americana Hotel, New York City

Telephone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
August 22-27, 1964	Claridge Hotel, Atlantic City, New Jersey
November 8, 1963 - April 30, 1965	Martin Luther King's residence
April 24-26, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
August 14, 1964 - September 6, 1964	Apartment 2B, 125 H. 72nd Street, New York City

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Telephone Surveillances of SCLC

Dates of Surveillance	Location
October 23, 1963 - January 24, 1964 July 13-31, 1964	SCLC Office, New York City Room 1202, 14 E. 40th Street, New York City
November 8, 1963 - June 21, 1966	SCLC Office, Atlanta, Georgia

In an effort to respond to that portion of the HSCA's request concerning existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance of individuals directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC, personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit, FBI Headquarters, familiar with certain aspects of the King, SCLC and related files, compiled a list of individuals with the SCLC for the approximate period January, 1962, through 1968. Although this list is not all inclusive due to the large number of persons affiliated with the SCLC, an effort was made to include those individuals in key positions and who were most active in the organization. Most of the individuals listed were identified with the SCLC Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. Based on review of appropriate records at FBI Headquarters, none of the below-listed individuals has been subject of electronic surveillance by the FBI:

Ralph Abernathy
Jessie Jackson
Bernard S. Lee
Hosea Williams
James Orange
James Bevel
Andrew Young
Walter Fauntroy
Coretta Scott King
John Rutherford
William Rutherford
Bernard Lafayette
Dorothy Cotton
J. T. Johnson
Joseph E. Lowery
Fred L. Shuttlesworth
Cordy T. Vivian
Adele Kanter
Thomas C. Kilgore
Dora McDonald
James Harrison
Wyatt Walker
Logan Kearse
Stoney Cooks
Fred C. Bennett
Booker T. Bonner
Henry Brownlee
Golden Frinks
Joseph Lester Hankerson
Samuel B. Wells
Benjamin Johnson
Herbert V. Coulton
Thomas Offenburger
Mew Soong-Li
James Lawson
Lillian Hunter
Gloria Fraction
David Wallace
Jess Gill
Carole Hoover
Albert Turner
Frank Ditto
C. K. Steel
Samuel Williams
Curtis Harris
Cirillo A. McSween
Major Jones
Lawrence D. Reddick
I. M. Augustine
Septima Clark
T. Y. Rogers, Jr.

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Records at FBI Headquarters disclosed that the following individuals, formerly associated with the SCLC, were subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI (Secret).

Stanley David Levison
Clarence B. Jones
Hunter Pitts O'Dell
Bayard Rustin

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL [illegible] OHIO
STEWA[illegible]CY, CONN.
CHARLES [illegible]ONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Received Office of
Congressional Affairs
Dec. 15 3:54PM 1977

DEC 15 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance and determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of Dr. King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC.

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

let to AAG/CD
1/26/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:AWS
1-OLA (enc)

GRB:mek

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

62-117290-406

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:	PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:
☐ Teletype	☐ Immediate	☐ TOP SECRET
☐ Facsimile	☐ Priority	☐ SECRET
☒ Airtel	☐ Routine	☐ CONFIDENTIAL
		☐ E F T O
		☐ CLEAR

Date 1/23/78

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: Records Management Division,
Congressional Inquiry Unit

# Hed
FROM: SAC, SPRINGFIELD (62-2567) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Reurtel to SI, 1/19/78. 395 1-10-86 Spmacpanc

Enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of each serial in the following Springfield Division main files:

(1) 157-1792, serials 1-85 (189 pages);

(2) 44-1120, serials 1-5 (10 pages);

(3) 170-445, serials 1-23 (48 pages);

(4) 170-445A, serials 1-6 (11 pages).

Also enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of the following serial in the following Springfield Division file, reference identifiable with RICHARD GEPPERT:

(5) 157-1791, serial 23 (8 pages).

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:

Numerous serials contained in these files have been classified "Confidential".

ST-120

Springfield file 157-1792, serial 82, is a correlation memo showing GEPPERT was the subject of Springfield main

REC 65 62-117290-405

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (62-117290) (Encl 5)
1 - Springfield (62-2567)

DETACHED FILED for 5988 JFK + HSCA
RM processing access 9TO-1/30/78

9 JAN 26 1978

DJC/pme
(3)

54 FEB 6 1978

Approved: 42 Transmitted (Number) (Time) Per

8988

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

file 100-10245. This main file has been destroyed in accordance with the File Destruction Program.

BH0043 0131931

PP HQ

DE BH

JAN 13 2 36 PM '78

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

P 131931Z JAN 78

FM BIRMINGHAM (66-2280) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) (PRIORITY)

BT

CLEAR

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTENTION OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

Exp.Sec.Spec.
Inq.Section
382S JEH Bl#234

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES, DECEMBER 27, 1977.351

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. ONE: MURKIN INVESTIGATION ASSIGNED TO HENRY S. SNOW (DECEASED). PRIOR TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION SA SNOW WAS ASSIGNED TO GENERAL CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION.

EX-101
REC-36

62-117290-404

23 JAN 26 1978

12/30/05

2 copies made pg 1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

124

IN ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. TWO: THERE WERE NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFORTS BY BIRMINGHAM AGENTS AGAINST MARTIN LUTHER KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 THROUGH 1968.

THE FOLLOWING WERE CASE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING: LAWRENCE GETTINGS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY AND CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED THAT TYPE OF INVESTIGATION; MARVIN M. EUBANKS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATION.

THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO INVESTIGATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE:

WILLIAM PERRY (DECEASED), PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO CRIMINAL SQUAD AND WORK; COLEMAN D. GEARY, III, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO BOMBING MATTERS; LAWRENCE GETTINGS (SUPRA); MARVIN M. EUBANKS (SUPRA) AND C. B. STANBERRY, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED AFTER A REVIEW OF BIRMINGHAM INDICES AND SUBSEQUENT FILE REVIEW.

BT

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible], OHIO
STEWA[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARL[illegible]NE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4524

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

0 House

Rec
CTU
2:15PM
1/25/78

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

JAN 20 1978

HAND DELIVER

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

C

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

-376

By letter dated January 4, 1977 8, this Committee requested access to materials, files, memoranda and miscellaneous items pertaining to Gerold Frank in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. These materials (94-63917) have been reviewed by the staff, and it would be appreciated, if the materials could be prepared for delivery, along with copies of the following additional items:

1) Section 78
44-38861 - 5655
" 5654
5653

2) Section 84
44-38861 - 5942
" 5943
" 5944
" 5945
" 5946

3) The MURKIN Legat tickler files for
a) London
b) Ottawa
c) Mexico City
d) Paris

EX-124 REC-79

62-117290-400

62-117290
20 JAN 27 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

57 FEB 2 1978

JAN 20 1978

Additionally, it is requested that the Bureau begin to prepare for delivery all files, memoranda and miscellaneous items on William Bradford Huie for the years 1968 to the present.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:ghj
cc: Danny O. Coulson

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

January 26, 1978

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

56

Cx

0

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-139

2 - ENCLOSURE

REC-7

62-117290-397

JAN 27 1978

MAILED 5
JAN 26 1978
FBI

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

HB/DR/
124

HB/DR

57 FEB 2 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

12/30/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Former SA Nichols works and resides in Atlanta. The Atlanta Office has been in touch with him regarding the interview and he is awaiting further contact for final interview arrangements. These arrangements are handled informally by representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBIHQ.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

This memorandum is to confirm that former agent Nichols has been cleared from his employment agreement and is available for interview as needed by the HSCA. Arrangements for interview can be made through contact with representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBI Headquarters.

JTA:sas (6)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78. captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

[illegible] 12/30/85 [illegible]

62-117290-391

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 9 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that ex-FBI agent Robert Nichols, formerly of the Atlanta field office, be made available to the Committee for interview on a priority basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

let to AAG/CD
1/26/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:sas
1-OLA (Enc) 62-117290-397

ENCLOSURE

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1/19/78

1 - Mr. Foster

#245852 Spmacknee 12/30/95

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/11/82 BY SP-1GSK/PSR
225984

FM DIRECTOR

TO SPRINGFIELD (ROUTINE)

BT

E F T O

C

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. BY LETTER DATED DECEMBER 30, 1977, TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE HSCA REQUESTED THE FBI PROVIDE ALL FILES, DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS CONCERNING RICHARD GEPPERT, BORN JULY 31, 1941, RESIDING AT 1340 NIEDRINGHAUS AVENUE, GRANITE CITY, ILLINOIS.

372

NR 8/25/78

BY LETTER DATED JANUARY 16, 1978, THE HSCA EXTENDED ITS REQUEST TO INCLUDE FIELD OFFICE FILES. THE HSCA ALSO FURNISHED A SIGNED STATEMENT OF GEPPERT, DATED DECEMBER 28, 1977, AUTHORIZING HSCA REVIEW OF ALL MATERIAL CONCERNING HIM IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI. IN THIS STATEMENT GEPPERT ALSO DISCLOSED THAT HE VOLUNTEERED TO HSCA STAFF MEMBERS THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF HIS INFORMANT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FBI.

170-5569-

157-26213

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

JTA:sas (6)

1 - 157-26213
1 - 170-5569

EX-130

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

62-117290-395

REC-46

JAN 23 1978

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 19 1978
0405Z 3 22 PM '78
TELETYPE

118

56 JAN 3 1979

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

FBI/DOJ

FBIHQ FILES DISCLOSED GEPPERT WAS SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD EXTREMIST MATTER INVESTIGATION (157-1792) IN 1972 AND SPRINGFIELD FILE 44-1120 FOLLOWING ALLEGED HARASSMENT BY OFFICERS OF THE GRANITE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IN 1975. HE WAS ALSO SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD FILE 170-445.

SPRINGFIELD PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN THE ABOVE THREE INVESTIGATIONS AND ONE COPY OF ANY OTHER MAIN FILE OR FILE REFERENCE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEPPERT. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS BY STAFF MEMBERS OF THE HSCA.

BT

#

NOTE: This teletype confirms telephonic communication with Supervisor Joseph Ondula of the Springfield Office on 1/19/78. This matter has been coordinated with SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 1/4/78

Foster
Lawn

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (~~62-117296~~)
Attn: Congressional Inquiry Unit,
Special Investigative Division

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (66-2242) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)
BUREAU DEADLINE - 1/13/78

Re FBIHQ teletype to numerous offices, including Atlanta, 12/27/77.

Referenced Bureau teletype indicated that the HSCA was currently conducting investigation into the assassination of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (MURKIN); and in connection with this investigation, the HSCA had requested the FBI provide the following:

(1) The identification of field office case agent(s) assigned to the MURKIN investigation in recipient offices and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation.

(2) Identification of the field office case agent(s) assigned to counterintelligence program (Cointelpro), efforts directed against KING and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) during the period 1965 - 1968 in recipient offices, and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the Cointelpro, KING, and SCLC investigations.

REC-36 62-117290-394

EX-130

In addition, recipients were to identify the case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of KING and SCLC, as well as the Cointelpro.

1 JAN 7 1978

2-Bureau
2-Atlanta (1-66-2242)
(1-44-2386) (MURKIN)
EAS/ljg
(4)

2 copies made pgs 1-5
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

Approved: ____________ Transmitted ____________ (Number) (Time) Per ____________

JAN 30 1978

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

Atlanta has reviewed pertinent files as requested by FBIHQ, and the information sought by the HSCA is set forth below in chart form:

1. MURKIN
(Atlanta file 44-2386)

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/8/68 - 4/29/68	Atlanta - #3, Security/extremist Squad	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. PERRY	4/29/68 - 7/30/68	Atlanta #4 Fugitives	Fugitive investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/30/68 - 7/31/69	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	5/30/70 - 7/13/70	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	2/8/71 - 3/16/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/31/71 - 4/7/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/13/73 - 8/31/73	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	6/19/74 - 6/27/74	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	8/13/74 - 9/24/74	Atlanta - #8 Civil rights, thefts from interstate shipment (TFIS) Etc.	Civil rights matters

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
THOMAS J. WILSON	8/26/75 - 9/8/75	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights, TFIS
THOMAS J. WILSON	1/7/78 - 3/23/76	Atlanta - #8	"
JOHN J. HAYMAN	10/12/77 - 11/8/77	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights matters

2. Atlanta Agents assigned to/or who handled the Atlanta Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) during the period 1965 - 1968 in which efforts were directed against KING and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
CPUSA Cointelpro			
ALDEN F. MILLER	4/14/64 - 8/13/65	Atlanta - #3	Security Investigations
Cointelpro Black Nationalist-Hate Groups			
EDWARD U. CRIM	8/29/67 - 7/30/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist Investigations
CPUSA Negro Question; Communist Influence in Racial Matters (CIRM)-Cointelpro			
No case agent assigned - matters handled by:			

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/1/64 - 8/20/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	2/4/64 - 8/21/64	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	7/22/65 - 4/15/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations

3. Identity of case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SM-C			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	3/7/61 - 5/12/61	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	2/28/62 - 10/16/62	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/9/63 - 7/31/63	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	11/6/63 - 5/21/65	Atlanta - #3	"
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	5/21/65 - 6/5/68	Atlanta - #3	"

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
Communist infiltration of the SCLC			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	4/17/62 - 12/1/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	12/1/64 - 4/26/66	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/26/66 - 3/12/71	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/12/71 - 5/23/73	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/10/73 - 10/20/73	Atlanta - #3	"

LS0003 0102106Z

RR HQ

DE LS

R 102106Z JAN 78

M LOUISVILLE (66-2612)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

JAN 10 4 19 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

E F T O

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

~~Emp Sec&Spec Inq Section 5823 JEH~~ 231

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA, DATED DECEMBER 27, 1977.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, APPROPRIATE REVIEW OF FILES MAINTAINED BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION REVEALED FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY HSCA.

(1) NOT APPLICABLE TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

(2) NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COINTELPRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST EITHER MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., OR SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND (SCEF), DURING PERIOD 1965-1968, COULD BE LOCATED IN REVIEW OF COINTELPRO AND SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-393

20 JAN 25 1978

24 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

ICCRM 8988

70 JAN 3 0 1978 42

12/30/88

OF KING AND SCLC. NO COINTELPRO ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND SCLC BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., ASSIGNED SA GEORGE W. HUTCHINSON, JR. (RETIRED) MAY 14, 1965 - AUGUST 13, 1966, AND SA RICHARD B. VIVIAN JULY 30, 1976 - OCTOBER 20, 1976. LATTER ASSIGNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC ASSIGNED SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) SEPTEMBER 29, 1961 - OCTOBER 30, 1961; OCTOBER 17, 1963 - NOVEMBER 18, 1963; DECEMBER 14, 1963- JANUARY 22, 1964; JUNE 5, 1964 - JULY 8, 1964; SEPTEMBER 21, 1964 - OCTOBER 12, 1964; JUNE 2, 1965 - JULY 20, 1965; NOVEMBER 17, 1965 - JANUARY 20, 1966; JULY 13, 1966 - AUGUST 12, 1966; FEBRUARY 10, 1967 - MARCH 24, 1967; SA GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED) AUGUST 12, 1968 - JUNE 5, 1969; SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) JUNE 5, 1969 - JULY 29, 1969. SCLC (BUFILE 100-438794) (LS 157-90) INVESTIGATED BY LOUISVILLE AS "RACIAL MATTER" AND "INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST".

SPECIAL AGENTS GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED), WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) AND RICHARD B. VIVIAN ALL ASSIGNED LOUISVILLE SECURITY - CIVIL RIGHTS SQUAD PRIOR TO AND DURING ABOVE LISTED CASE ASSIGNMENTS.

BT

SL C[illegible]05 0101950

RR [illegible]

DE SL

P 101924Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

CLEAR

JAN 10 3 05 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE ~~Section~~ ~~#251~~ DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JULY 27, 1977.

(1) FORMER SPECIAL AGENT HAROLD R. DOBSON WAS CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION, ST. LOUIS FILE 44-775, BUREAU FILE 44-38861, IN ST. LOUIS DIVISION. FORMER SPECIAL AGENT DOBSON WAS ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND HANDLED SECURITY TYPE CASES PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN MURKIN INVESTIGATION.

(2) ST. LOUIS FILE 157-5818 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS, BLACK NATIONALISTS, HATE GROUPS, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE" WAS OPENED AS A PENDING INACTIVE STATUS CONTROL FILE ON AUGUST 29, 1967.

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-392

20 JAN 25 1978

4-J Aldhizer

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:me
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1ccKm8988

42

ON FEBRUARY 27, 1968, THROUGH JANUARY 8, 1969, WAS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH OF SECURITY SQUAD AT ST. LOUIS DIVISION. HIS ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THIS CASE ASSIGNMENT WAS TO HANDLE SECURITY TYPE CASES.

ST. LOUIS FILE 100-17801, BUREAU FILE 100-106670, ENTITLED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER SPECIAL AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, JANUARY 15, 1965, THROUGH JANUARY 19, 1965, FEBRUARY 3, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 10, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. STEWART, APRIL 28, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 28, 1965; FORMER SPECIAL AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, NOVEMBER 11, 1965, THROUGH NOVEMBER 12, 1965, AND JUNE 14, 1966, THROUGH JUNE 17, 1966; FORMER AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, OPENING DATE UNKNOWN THROUGH JULY 6, 1966, AND MARCH 25, 1967, THROUGH MARCH 27, 1967.

ST. LOUIS FILE 105-4027, BUREAU FILE 100-438794, ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE; RM; IS - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, SEPTEMBER 23, 1964, THROUGH DECEMBER 10, 1964, AND MARCH 21, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 19, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 3, 1965, THROUGH JUNE 16, 1965; FORMER AGENT WALTER A.

HIL[illegible]NDORF, FEBRUARY 24, 1966, THROUGH DATE UNKNOWN; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 6, 1969, THROUGH JULY 23, 1969. THE ABOVE AGENTS AND FORMER AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO ST. LOUIS DIVISION SECURITY SQUAD DURING PERTINENT PERIOD.

A REVIEW OF ABOVE FILES DISCLOSED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE.

BT

#

Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____
Asst. Dir.:____
Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Pers.____
Ident.____
Intell.____
Laboratory____
Legal Coun.____
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt.____
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____
Telephone Rm.____
Director's Sec'y____

LA0373 0431807Z

PP HQ

DE LA

P 131807Z JAN 78

FM LOS ANGELES (62-7841) (P) (1)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) PRIORITY

BT

E F T O

JAN 13 1 31 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Cmp Sec&Spec
Inq Section
5823 JEH TL# 231

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977, TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES.

FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS COMMUNICATION AND RETEL THE TERM CASE AGENT(S) WAS DEFINED AS THE SINGLE AGENT TO WHOM THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED AND WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIRECTION AND FLOW OF THE INVESTIGATION.

EX-138 REC-36 62-117290-391

George Foster

IT IS NOTED THAT UNDER CAPTION "BERNARD S. LEE V. CLARENCE M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1185) BUFILE 62-117194, LA FILE 100-57229" AND "SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) V. CLARENCE

20 JAN 25 1978

12/30/85

4

2 copies made pgs 1-4
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc 8988

42

1978

M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1186) BUFILE 62-117193, LA FILE 100-57229," LOS ANGELES HAS PERMANENTLY CHARGED OUT TO THE BUREAU SEVERAL SERIALS WHICH THEREFORE ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW. SERIALS WERE FROM FILES CAPTIONED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR; SECURITY MATTER-COMMUNIST; BUFILE 100-106670; LA FILE 100-57229"; "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SCLS; IS - C; BUFILE 100-438794 AND 100-442349; LA FILE 100-65141"; "CP-USA NEGRO QUESTION, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN RACIAL MATTERS; IS-C; BUFILE 100-3-116, LA FILE 157-859."

A REVIEW OF PERTINENT FILES WITHIN THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION BETWEEN THE YEARS 1965 - 1968 DETERMINED THE FOLLOWING:

. THE ABOVE FILE REGARDING COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SCLC WAS HANDLED ON THE SUBSTANTATIVE DESK SUPERVISED BY SA JOHN S. TEMPLE WHICH WAS DESIGNATED AS SQUAD NUMBER TWO. THIS SQUAD HANDLED INVESTIGATIONS OF RACIAL AND BLACK EXTREMIST MATTERS. THIS INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA LOUIS K. DE GEUS IN FEBRUARY 1965; SA R. ANDREWS PETERS IN

SEPTEMBER 1965; SA W. JAMES WOOD IN APRIL 1967; SA WALTER M. BRADY IN JANUARY 1968; AND SA E. RHEAD RICHARDS, JR. IN MAY 1968.

THE MAIN FILE ON KING WAS ASSIGNED TO SQUAD TWO AS ABOVE AND WAS ASSIGNED TO SA DE GEUS IN JANUARY 1965; SA PETERS IN MARCH 1965; SA WOOD IN JANUARY 1967; SA BRADY IN JUNE 1967: AND SA GEORGE E. AIKEN, JR. IN FEBRUARY 1968.

THE FILE REGARDING THE CP-USA INFILTRATION OF RACIAL MATTERS IS ONLY PERIPHERALLY CONCERNED WITH KING OR THE SCLC AND CONTAINS NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS AND OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN OTHER SUBSTANTATIVE FILES. WHILE NOT CLEAR, THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONTROLLED BY SA TEMPLE.

THE ENTIRE SUBSTANTATIVE FILE CAPTIONED "MURKIN; BUFILE 44-38861; LA FILE 44-1574" WAS COPIED AND SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU UNDER INSTANT CAPTION. THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED ON SQUAD NUMBER ONE WHICH WAS SUPERVISED BY SA WILLIAM JOHN NOLAN BUT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUPERVISED BY

SA TEMPLE. SQUAD NUMBER ONE HANDLED SECURITY TYPE INVESTIGATION INVOLVING THE CP-USA, SWP, ET CETERA. THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AS ASSIGNED JOINTLY TO SA'S LEROY W. SHEETS AND THEODORE J. A'HEARN ALTHOUGH SHEETS WAS APPARENTLY INVOLVED AS CASE AGENT ONLY DURING THE INITIAL STAGES IN APRIL 1968.

ALL OF THE ABOVE INDIVIDUALS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA'S BRADY, RICHARDS AND AIKEN ARE NO LONGER EMPLOYEES OF THE FBI.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MM0730 0132335

RR HQ

DE MM

R 132335Z JAN 78

FM MIAMI (62-6603) RUC

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

JAN 13 6 42 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977.

~~Emp Sec&Spec~~
~~[illegible]~~ ection
~~[illegible]~~ TL# 231

FOLLOWING IS NUMBERED PARAGRAPH REPLY TO REQUEST OF MIAMI SET OUT IN RE BUTEL:

1. "MURKIN". SA DAVID N. JELLISON, ASSIGNED APRIL 8, 1968: NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATE PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS. SA LEON E. FISH; ASSIGNED AUGUST 10, 1972 (RUC AUGUST 28, 1972); NUMBER 2 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS MAINLY CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS; SA JOSEPH T. O'LEARY; ASSIGNED JULY 30, 1976 (RUC AUGUST 3, 1976), FBIHQ ADMINISTRATIVE REQUEST; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNED APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS. SRA JOHN S. ATWATER; ASSIGNED JUNE 3, 1977 (RUC JUNE 6, 1977), SINGLE INTERVIEW; WEST PALM BEACH RA;

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-390

20 JAN 25 1978

4-AFDH12C

JAN 13 1 04 PM '78

12/30/00

1cc fm 8988

42

70 ... 30 1978

2 copies made pgs 1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

PAGE TWO MM 62-6603 E F T O

IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS GENERAL CRIMINAL AND SECURITY.

2. A. "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SM-C. "SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 THROUGH 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE NATURE, INCLUDING LOCAL CPUSA GROUP.

B. "COMINFIL OF SCLC; IS - C." SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 TO MAY 2, 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS, SEE PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

SA JOHN C. MENTON, ASSIGNED MAY 2, 1968 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS.

C. "COINTELPRO; BLACK EXTREMISTS; RACIAL MATTERS." FILE OPENED MARCH 7, 1968, ASSIGNED SA JOHN C. MENTON, STILL PENDING TO MENTON DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENT SET OUT IN PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

BT

#

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JAN 16 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CJ

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

372

By letter dated December 30, 1977, this Committee requested material pertaining to Richard Geppert in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In view of the fact that the Committee has since delivered to the FBI the written consent of Mr. Geppert to view all materials relating to his informant relationship with the FBI, it is intended that our December 30th request for materials and documents concerning Mr. Geppert include those found in any field office files.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

REC-56 62-117290-385

EX-130

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

7 JAN 23 1978

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

GRB:mej
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

70 JAN [illegible] 1978

[illegible]

EDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

December 1, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files regarding the National States Rights Party (Item #2) and Jesse B. Stoner (Item #3). By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, modification of these items was made, details of which are outlined in the enclosed memorandum.

EU

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum in response to the above mentioned requests. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

62-117290-382X

ST-120 REC-42 ~~62-117290-3916~~

22 FEB 22 1978

12/7/77

EU 3 - ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAY 2 1978

PAS

JSC

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

YCF

PAS

[illegible] 12/30/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Since there were no National States Rights Party (NSRP) subfiles for offices requested by the HSCA, the entire NSRP file for 1967 through 1968 was processed for access. All information retrievable in FBI Headquarters files regarding Stoner was processed.

Names of knowledgeable case agents provided in attached memorandum were obtained through review of FBIHQ files and confirmed by Supervisor Jack Byrd of the Savannah Office. The HSCA can advise which agent(s) it desires to interview regarding the NSRP and Stoner.

- Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/03 BY

December 1, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. Under Item #2 of this letter information concerning the National States Rights Party (NSRP), Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to areas covered by offices in Savannah, Georgia; Atlanta, Georgia; Memphis, Tennessee; Birmingham, Alabama; St. Louis, Missouri, and Springfield, Illinois, was requested. Under Item #3 information was requested concerning Jesse B. Stoner.

By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, the above requests were modified. Under Item (c) this letter requested the FBI's complete file on Stoner and that the agent(s) in the Office of Origin assigned to the Stoner investigation for the period 1966 through 1968 be made available for interview by the HSCA. Concerning the NSRP, under Item (d) this letter asked the FBI to provide information in its files to cover the period 1967 through 1968. In addition, the case agent(s) in the Office of Origin for the same period would be made available for interview.

In response to the above requests, information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the NSRP (period 1967 through 1968) and Jesse B. Stoner have been processed and are available for review at FBI Headquarters by the HSCA. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from FBI Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 12/1/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)." 62-117290-382x

~~62-117290-3396~~

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

PMS

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ

House Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

The Savannah Office of the FBI was Office of Origin in both the NSRP and Stoner investigation during the period of HSCA interest. The following agents of that office were case agents in the Stoner investigation: Carlton Dillard, January, 1966 - April 1967; William P. Friday, April, 1967 - October, 1967; John H. Murphy, October 1967 - September, 1969. With variation of only a few days, these same Agents were case agents in the investigation of the NSRP. Dillard is now retired. Friday and Murphy are currently assigned to the Savannah Office and are scheduled to retire December 31, 1977.

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4024

Select Committee o[illegible]ssassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFF[illegible]UILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF
CONGRESSIONAL
AFFAIRS
NOV 15 11 PM 1977

NOV 3 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals and organizations be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Lawrence J. Callanan (deceased) Steamfitters Union (AFL) Local 562, St. Louis, Mo. for the Period 1967 through 1971.

2. National States Rights Party, 591 Cherokee, Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, but limited to reports and information in areas covered by offices in Savannah, Ga.; Atlanta, Ga.; Memphis, Tn.; Birmingham, Al.; St. Louis, Mo.; and Springfield, Ill.

3. Jesse B. Stoner, 591 Cherokee, N.W., Marietta, Ga.

4. Conservative Society of America for the period 1967 through 1968. (Headquarters in New Orleans, La.

Ltr to AAG/CD
12/1/77 (Enc-2)
JTA:sdo

5. Kent Courtney, 1413 Texas Avenue, Alexandria, La. for the period 1967 through 1968.

62-117290-382X

62-117290-382X ENCLOSURE ~~62-117290-[illegible]~~

6. KKK (limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in Birmingham, Alabama, Los Angeles, California, Atlanta, Georgia and Louisville, Kentucky during the period 1967 through 1968).

7. Morris Davis, RFD, Hoover, Shelby County, Ala.

8. White Citizens Council (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in New Orleans, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

9. Forever White, (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas-covered by offices in New Orleans, La; Baton Rouge, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

10. Charles Joseph Stein, dob 5/11/29.

11. Percy Belcher, ex-deputy Sheriff, Birmingham, Alabama, for the period 1967 through 1968.

12. Robert Powers, Powers Junction, Intersection Highways 11 and 90, Orleans Parrish, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

13. Sam DiPiazza, Pamela Place, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

14. Dr. Lucas DiLeo - (office) 8603 St. Bernard Highway, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

15. Salvadore L. Licciardi (Liccardi), New Orleans, Louisiana for the period 1967 through 1968.

16. Gus Joseph Prosch, dob 11/17/30, 3122 Callecita, Sacremento, California. (Arrested in Birmingham, Alabama in December, 1971 and convicted of violating Gun Control Act in 1972.)

17. Quentin B. Davis, owner of Gun Rack, Birmingham, Alabama for the period 1967 through 1968.

18. Clifford Andrews (aka, R. L. Warren), Box 75, Toronto 14, Ontario, Canada.

19. Walter Jack Youngblood, Monticello Street, Dallas, Texas.

20. Johnny Benelli, #303, 175 North Orange Drive, Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

21. Claude Cockrell, dob 5/10/36, FBI # 389804E, for the period 1967 through 1968.

22. Gene Pearson Crawford, dob 10/2/27 for the period 1967 through 1968.

23. Fleet Edwards, dob 2/4/21 for the period 1967 through 1968.

24. Raoul Esquivel - (Raul Victor Esquibel), dob 11/17/26, 4524 Parsimmon, Metairie, La. (This request includes, but is not limited to, Bureau File 44-26940.)

25. Southern Christian Leadership Conference

    a. General file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

    b. Cointelpro file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

26. James Bevel, for the period 1965 through 1968.

27. Rev. Jessie Jackson, Chicago, Ill., for the period 1965 through 1968.

28. Vincent DePaul Stelly, 4434 5th Ave., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

29. Jerome Wallis Vernon, Home Service Laundry and Dry Cleaning, 5280 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

30. Rev. James Orange, South Carolina for the period 1965 through 1968.

31. Rev. Bernard Lee, Atlanta, Ga., for the period 1965 through 1968.

32. Allan Lee Stoddard, "Vegas Club", 5510 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

33. Robert Byron Watson, SS# 253-85-2220, Atlanta, Ga.

34. Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1962 through 1968. (This request pertains to material exclusive of the Murkin File and the SCLC files and should include all information regarding threats to Dr. King.

35. Herman A. Thompson, 10454 Goodwood Blvd., Baton Rouge, La., (former deputy sheriff in Baton Rouge).

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

NOV 8 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a conference was held on November 7, 1977 between employees of the FBI and members of the Committee staff to discuss the Committee's November 3, 1977 letter of request for FBI materials on thirty-five individuals or organizations. As a result of this meeting, the following was resolved:

(a) The FBI would process the following numbered requests as they were originally stated in the November 3rd letter: 1, 4, 5, 7, 9-11, 13-24, 26, 28-33 and 35.

(b) The Committee would provide dates of births on the individuals in requests nos. 12 and 27 before the FBI would process these names. The dob on Robert J. Powers (request no. 12) is 6/5/24. The dob on Reverend Jesse Jackson (request no. 27) is 10/8/41.

(c) Besides providing the complete file on request no. 3 (Jesse B. Stoner), the FBI would also make available the most appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin assigned to Stoner for the period 1965 through 1968.

(d) With respect to request no. 2, the FBI would prov[illegible] all [illegible] for 1957 [illegible] as well as make available the appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin for the same period.

~~62-117290-38[illegible]~~

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-382X

(e) With respect to request no. 6, the Committee would hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI provides a list of the most appropriate case agent(s) in the offices of origin for the several Klan organizations in existence in 1967 and 1968. (While such was not part of the understanding reached at the time of the meeting with FBI officials, the Committee would request however that all materials related to the United Klan of America LS for the period 1965 and 1966 be made ready for inspection by November 20, 1977.)

(f) With respect to request no. 8, the FBI would first advise the Committee as to the identity of other cities reporting on the White Citizens Council before a determination be made as to the final content of this request.

(g) With respect to request no. 25, the Committee will hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s) for the period in question.

(h) With respect to request no. 34, the Committee requests that only the thirteen "death threat" files on Dr. King be processed at this time, while a request for all other materials is held in abeyance until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s).

In Addition, the Committee would also request that the following agents be notified and made available by the FBI:

(1) Special Agent William F. Kusch - New Orleans
Special Agent Thomas E. Duhadway - New Orleans

(2) Special Agent Jack B. Simpson - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Richard H. Davis - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Jack T. Beverstein - Memphis ATLANTA

As a priority item, it is also requested that the FBI provide the Committee with the work or personnel records of the following three Louisville FBI agents for the month of September 1965:

(1) Robert Peters

(2) William Duncan

(3) Bernard Brown

We are primarily interested in those records reflecting their [illegible] records should be provided by November 15, 1977. The Committee would also ask that all three of the above-mentioned Louisville agents be made available for interview by the same date.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB605

PAGE 01 STATE 010886

JAN 14 7 04 AM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ORIGIN EUR-12 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 L-03 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00
INR-07 /025 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/NE: JPSHUMATE
APPROVED BY EUR/NE: RLFUNSETH
H - ASCHNEE (BY PHONE)

------------------015192 141012Z /10

R 140226Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

4 - Foster
(info)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

EX-136

E.O. 11652:N/A

REC-6 62-117290-380

TAGS:PINR, PDIP, UK

18 1978

SUBJECT:REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

FUG. SUP.

RE: LONDON 20003

58 JAN 26 1978

MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH

THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVESTIGATION MENTIONED IN BLAKEY'S LETTER AND ADVISE US. VANCE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENN[illegible] HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWI[illegible] LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CH[illegible]
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

[illegible]IE, OHIO
[illegible]KINNEY, CONN.
C[illegible]ES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 9, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

51

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff, access to the following:

1. All files, materials, and information relating to William Hugh Morris, the alleged leader of the Federated KKK in Alabama.

   a) Address (late 1950's)
      2128 East Fifth Street
      Oak Park
      Montgomery, Alabama

   b) Jefferson County Alabama
      Sheriff's Office Number 52811

Your prompt attention to this request will be greatly appreciated.

REC-30 62-117290-578

EX-130

Respectfully

14 JAN 18 1978

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

62-117290

GRB:ghk

cc: Danny Coulson

218
1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, [illegible]AIRM[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

[illegible]EL L.[illegible]INE, OHIO
[illegible]ART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

O.
Inform

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 5, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

(C)

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available for interview, on a priority basis, the following agents:

1. Theodore A'Hearn - Los Angeles } 10/7 LET cleared
2. Leroy W. Sheets - Los Angeles
3. Thomas J. Wilson - Atlanta
4. Gerald Galbreath - El Paso

The Committee is ready to interview these agents on an immediate basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

✓CC: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:wwd

EX-130

REC-30

62-112290

62-112290-376

14 JAN 18 1978

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

[illegible] 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CH[illegible]AN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SA[illegible]L. D[illegible]E, OHIO
STE[illegible] B. [illegible]INNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 4, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

HAND DELIVER

Cu

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available to the Committee access to all F.B.I. materials, files, memoranda, airtels, and miscellaneous items, including but not limited to any contained in the MURKIN File (44-38861), on or referring to the following individual:

Gerold Frank - author
d.o.b. 8/2/1907
current address: 930 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10021

It is requested that access to these materials be provided on a priority basis so that our initial review can be completed by January 16, 1978.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

EX-130

REC 28

62-117290-3[illegible]

JAN 17 1978

GRB:ghd

cc: Danny Coulson

58 JAN 24 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JAN 3 11 23 AM '78
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
MAIL ROOM

S ✓
Cd

DEC 30 1977

RECEIVED
JAN 4 1978
O.L.A

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it has been determined from a review of the Chicago field office file (No. 44-1114) of the MURKIN investigation that the FBI is in possession of several letters of correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters. (See, for example, serials 271, 335, 496, 560, 574, 621, and 637 in the Chicago field office file.) It is requested that the FBI furnish this Committee with copies of all correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

ST-125 REC-55 62-117290-372

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

23 JAN 10 1978

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
10
JAN 3 1978
O.R.O.M.
R.C.P.H.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

24

79 JAN - 1978 FCC

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

WASHINGTON,
PM
DEC 30
1977
200

ALWAYS USE ZIP CODE

Louis Stokes
M.C.

Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th & Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention; Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 3, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

ST

C O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to the letter from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, to the Attorney General, dated August 9, 1977, requesting availability of all FBI reports relative to robbery of the Bank of Alton, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967. Reference is also made to the letter from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, dated September 13, 1977, requesting a copy of all FBI reports in this bank robbery investigation.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above HSCA request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2 ST-120 REC-45 62-117290-371

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

20 JAN 9 1978

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

10/4/77

3 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

79 JAN 20 1978 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DATE 12/3/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: The Alton bank robbery occurred at the time James Earl Ray was a fugitive, prior to King's assassination. Ray was considered a suspect in this robbery subsequent to being identified as King's killer. No evidence was produced to link Ray with the robbery. The case was closed unsolved in 1972.

In its request of 8/9/77, the HSCA asked for access to our investigation into this bank robbery and the file was prepared. Later, the HSCA submitted a second request which requested "a copy of any and all materials or reports" in the Alton bank robbery. Mr. Keuch advised on 9/19/77, that delivery should be limited only to investigative reports in the case. The requested material was picked up at FBIHQ on 9/19/77 by Oliver Champion, HSCA messenger. Purpose of enclosed memorandum is to confirm delivery of this material.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

October 3, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

This will respond to letter dated August 9, 1977, to the Attorney General from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, and letter dated September 13, 1977, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA.

This letter is to confirm that, pursuant to the above request dated September 13, 1977, a copy of each investigative report of the FBI in the Alton bank robbery, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967, was delivered to a representative of the HSCA on September 19, 1977.

JTA:sas (9)
sas

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Direcotr, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/3/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

1 - 12/31/85 [illegible]

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OBA

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-371

FBI/DOJ

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

August 9, 1977

RECEIVED

AUG 19 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20430

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we request that you make available to us all investigative reports relative to the robbery of the Bank of Alton, Illinois, on July 13, 1967.

Best wishes and kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

EME:ek

Ack to AAG/CD
10-3-77
JTA:aas
1 - OLA

144-72-662
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
11 AUG 19 1977
O.R.O.M.
RECEIVED
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

62-117290-37

CIV. RIGHTS DIV.

ENCLOSURE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVIN[illegible]IO
STEWART B. MC[illegible], CONN.
CHARLES THONE, [illegible]
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 13, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and our conversation with your office on Monday, September 12, 1977, we are hereby requesting a copy of any and all materials or reports the Federal Bureau of Investigation has regarding the Alton Bank Robbery in Alton, Illinois on July 13, 1967; as well as a copy of any other materials the Department of Justice may have in its possession relevant to this matter.

I appreciate your cooperation and assistance in this request, and I look forward hearing from you.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

SJL/GRB/dnj

9-[illegible]

62-117290-371

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 10, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

C

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertinent to seven listed individuals.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request and advises that material on six of these individuals is available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters. Information on the seventh individual, Randolph Erwin Rosenson, was previously furnished the HSCA by FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120

11/17/77

62-117290-369

REC-55

23 JAN 30 1978

2 - ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. M/DEF
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

79 JAN 16 1978 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/98 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By request dated 9/20/77, the HSCA asked for information concerning Rosenson. By letter to the Attorney General and its enclosures, both dated 10/13/77, information concerning Rosenson was delivered. The HSCA request dated 10/18/77, (attached) desired information on seven individuals, including a repeat on Rosenson's name.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 10, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertaining to:

Harvey Gene Love
George G. Pittman
Stephanie Helene Sheehan
Jonathon Henry Shea
Keith Albert Wright
Frank Quenqui
Randolph Erwin Rosenson

Retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the above individuals, with the exception of Rosenson, has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions or deletions. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

By FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977, documents containing information concerning Rosenson were provided the HSCA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/05

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/10/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA).

62-117290-369

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:

	Adm. Serv. ___	Legal Coun. ___
	Crim. Inv. ___	Plan. & Insp. ___
Director ___	Fin. & Pers. ___	Rec. Mgnt. ___
Assoc. Dir. ___	Ident. ___	Spec. Inv. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___	Intell. ___	Tech. Servs. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___	Laboratory ___	Training ___
		Public Affs. Off. ___

FBI/DOJ

ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Repre[illegible]ntatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDI[illegible]ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Ald.

October 18, 1977

King Investigation

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attn: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the Select Committee's investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Martin Luther King, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff materials in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation relating to the following individuals for the period of time from January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968: 6/1/69

[illegible] 1/1/67 - 6/1/69
10/25

NAME	Date of Birth	FBI Number
✓Love, Harvey Gene	4/1/35	592-813A
✓Pittman, George G.	6/20/38	919-933C
✓Sheehan, Stephanie Helene	7/26/53	951-133N4
✓Shea, Jonathon Henry	6/12/47	688-958J2
✓Wright, Keith Albert	7/27/44	122-750H
✓Quenqui, Frank	12/9/08	160-8374
Rosenson, Randolph Erwin	3/20/34	34-711E

In addition, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the staff the criminal records for these individuals. This written request confirms an oral request made by myself to Mr. Dan Coulson on October 18, 1977 in the offices of the Committee.

Thank you.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:DM
copy to: Dan Coulson

let to AAG/CD
11/10/77 (Enc-2)
JTA:dus

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-369

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 11, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance regarding certain individuals and a business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

Delvd 11/17/77

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. M/Dir
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt. M
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

ST-120

REC-55 62-117290-368

23 JAN 10 1978

2-ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

79 JAN 16 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/21/83 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By memorandum dated 5/13/68, the Department was asked for authority to place technical surveillance on the telephones of James Earl Ray's brother-in-law and sister, Albert and Carol Pepper and the Grapevine Tavern, all located in St. Louis, Missouri. This memorandum also requested microphone surveillance be installed at the residence of Albert and Carol Pepper, the residence of Ray's brother, John Larry Ray, and at the Grapevine Tavern. FBIHQ files contain no information to indicate the Department of Justice took any action on this request. Following Ray's apprehension the Department, in memorandum dated 6/11/68, was advised that the FBI's request for electornic surveillance was withdrawn. The above information is contained in the King Assassination June file and has been processed for access of the HSCA.

The HSCA's request of 11/7/77, desired only written confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance on the above individuals and business during the period 1/1/67 to 12/31/68.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 11, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance against the following individuals and business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper.
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri.

This memorandum is to confirm that, based on a review of appropriate files at FBI Headquarters, the above were not subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI during the period January 1, 1967, to December 31, 1968, or at any other time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/11/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

APPROVED:

Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___

Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___

Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-368

FBI/DOJ

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SA[illegible]VINE, OHIO
ST[illegible]CKINNEY, CONN.
CHA[illegible]ONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

NOV 7 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance to determine whether any of the following individuals and places were the subject of such surveillance during the period of January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence or non-existence of such electronic surveillance with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Let to AAG/CD
JTA:dws
11/11/77 (Enc-2)

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-368

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

C O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that former Special Agent Joe C. Hester was interviewed on November 21, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Hester's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
Criminal Division
Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - Joe C. Hester - Enclosure

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

ST-120
REC-55 62-117290-366

23 JAN 10 1978

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

APPROVED:
Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Adm. Serv. ___
C.im. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

ENCLOSURE

DOC:ldr
(10)

signed & sent 1/6/77

12/31/83

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

79 JAN 16 1978

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Memphis, Tennessee
December 5, 1977

JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM;
CIVIL RIGHTS - CONSPIRACY

On November 21, 1977, retired Special Agent Joe C. Hester appeared at Washington, D. C., at the request of the House Committee on Assassinations.

Mr. Hester met with the Committee staff in their offices at Washington, D. C., and was interviewed for a total of four hours by two different groups of five persons each. Both groups were affable and were not in any way critical of the investigation conducted in this case.

The first group of five interviewers asked a variety of questions but seemed to be particularly preoccupied with the investigation conducted by Legats in Mexico. Mr. Hester was able to answer many of the general questions regarding the activities of Legats but referred them to Assistant Director Richard Long when they began to ask more specific questions regarding the investigations by Legats and the manner of transmittal of this information to FBI Headquarters.(U)

The second group of five interviewers asked more general questions regarding the Bureau's investigation of the King murder. They seemed to be greatly concerned with the allegation of conspiracy. Mr. Hester advised them that he believed the conspiracy theory was an invention by the Department of Justice to be used to justify the FBI's investigation of Dr. King's murder. Mr. Hester advised them that he had never personally believed there was a conspiracy and he did not believe that any of his FBI superiors had ever believed in the conspiracy theory. Mr. Hester further advised that it was his personal opinion that James Earl Ray, acting alone, had murdered Dr. King and that his subsequent travels were probably financed by armed robbery.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[illegible]

#345882

memo to DAG, 12-29-77

62-117290-366

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

This group was concerned with how the subject Ray had known how to obtain false documents following his arrival in Canada. Mr. Hester pointed out that a "Top Ten" criminal had been arrested in Canada and had been returned to the Missouri State Penitentiary and had served time there with James Earl Ray prior to Ray's escape. Mr. Hester indicated it was his belief that this "Top Ten" fugitive had been responsible for instructing Ray on how to proceed in obtaining false documents in Canada.

This group touched on such diverse elements as the information furnished by John McFerren regarding Frank Liberto, and one of the interviewers agreed that they had not believed McFerren to be a very reliable witness. They also discussed Ray's purchase of the rifle in Birmingham; the fact that Officer Redditt was moved from the firehouse near the Lorraine Motel just prior to the murder; what motive did Ray have for killing Dr. King; whether or not there was any evidence to indicate a conspiracy; whether or not there were any wiretaps and whether or not there had been any surreptitious entries made against King and his followers at Memphis prior to the assassination; and when, following his escape, did Ray appear to have made up his mind to assassinate Dr. King.

In addition, they asked numerous questions about the political climate in Memphis just prior to the assassination and inquired as to what investigation was being conducted by the FBI in regard to the Sanitation Workers Strike and the first march conducted by Dr. King. Mr. Hester was forced to admit that he had had nothing to do with the investigation of Dr. King prior to the murder and he suggested that they talk to current Special Agent Howell S. Lowe who would be in a position to furnish information in this regard.

They inquired about the interview of James Earl Ray conducted by former Special Agent in Charge Robert G. Jensen, former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle, and Mr. Hester at the state prison in Nashville, Tennessee, following Ray's plea of guilty. Mr. Hester recounted as best he could recall the events that transpired in connection with this attempted interview and advised the interviewers that former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle has suffered a cerebral hemmorrhage and possibly might not be competent to furnish information regarding this investigation.

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

The Committee indicated that they might desire to interview Mr. Hester again, either personally or telephonically, and they were assured that he would be available and agreeable to assisting them in any way possible.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
~~Fin. & Pers.~~ ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's S

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Robert L. Keuch ~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

cc: ✓Mr. Aldhizer

ack. KI

Cd

DEC 8 1977

#17
1-4-78

ACF
BD

✓Danny O. Coulson
SSA - Div 11
NSOM
67-623562

Drew J. Clark
SSA - Div 9
NSOM
67-592700

ST-120

REC-54 62-117290-362

John T. Aldhizer, III
SSA - Div 5
NSOM
67-606490

memo to Robert L. Keuch Special Counsel to the AG — Foster 8981

12-22-77
CAM:jmr

NW -8981

79 JAN 12 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Robert L. Keuch
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

cc: Mr. Aldhizer

CARBON COPY

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 14, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn;
Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

51

C
O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

NR cc

Reference is made to a letter dated October 5, 1977, addressed to Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in the possession of the FBI pertaining to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material, as well as limited material pertaining to Hardin, previously prepared for the Committee's access, is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Enclosed are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

ST-120

JTM:sas (8)

sas

REC-54

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-117290-36

11/17/77

20 JAN 6 1978

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

79 JAN 12 1978

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY SP/macpme

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request dated 10/5/77, from HSCA for all information contained in Bureau files relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair. This request has been coordinated with the Legal Counsel Division.

A review of Bureau files has revealed that a limited number of documents relating to an attempted bombing of Brent Hardin's automobile had been prepared for the Committee's access pursuant to receipt of their request dated 4/27/77. The Committee was advised of the availability of these documents on 5/18/77. The remaining retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair have been prepared for the Committee's access and are being maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's Room 8988 for their review.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files pursuant to the Committee's request dated 10/5/77, include Baird's ident record, the results of a civil rights investigation involving Baird as the subject, and references to Blair appearing in the MURKIN file, numerous references to Hardin and the results of a civil rights investigation involving Blair as the subject.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn:
November 14, 1977
Mr. Coulson)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 5, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI RELATIVE TO CLIFTON BAIRD, BRENT HARDIN AND ARLIE BLAIR.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 5, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Utilizing identifying data for Baird, Hardin and Blair furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

Also available for the Committee's access are documents relating to Brent Hardin which were previously prepared on May 18, 1977, pursuant to the receipt of the Committee's request dated April 27, 1977, for these documents.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTM:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/14/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. __
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. __
Crim. Inv. __
Fin. & Pers. __
Ident. __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Insp. __
Rec. Mgnt. __
Spec. Inv. __
Tech. Servs. __
Training __
Public Affs. Off. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director's Sec'y __

APPROVED:

Director __
Assoc. Dir. __
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __

Adm. Serv. __
Crim. Inv. __
Fin. & Pers. __
Ident. __
Intell. __
Laboratory __

Legal Coun. m/Jef
Plan. & Insp. __
Rec. Mgnt. __
Spec. Inv. __
Tech. Servs. __
Training __
Public Affs. Off. __

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-117290-361

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assa[illegible]ations
U.S. House of Represe[illegible]es
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

McNeil

October 5, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Clifton Baird, 7813 Edsel Lane, Louisville, Kentucky.
2. Brent Hardin, 9102 Bristle Ave., Louisville, Kentucky.
3. Arlie Blair, 4025 Franklin Ave., Louisville, Kentucky, dob 9/3/32.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

lit to AAG/CD
JTM:sas
11/14/77

ENCLOS.

62-117290-361

Rec 10/5

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. [illegible]
STEWART [illegible], CONN.
CHARLES [illegible], NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 13 1977

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

DEC 14 11 29 AM '77
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL ROOM

RECEIVED

RECEIVED
DEC 15 1977
O.L.A.

CJ

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

2 House

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if our staff could have access to the following files:

a) Any and all materials or files pertaining to the organization known as the MINUTEMEN for the period 1966-1968 active in the states of Mississippi and Louisiana.

ST-114 REC-33 62-117290-356

c) Any records and files, excluding D.E.A. records requested in our letter of November 8, 1977 on:

Reynard J. Rochon
2200 Oriole Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

(1967 address)
7018 Dreux Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

21 JAN 4 1978

Your cooperation and prompt attention to this matter is greatly appreciated.

62-117290

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

GRB:ghe

cc: Danny O. Coulson

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
3 DEC 14 1977
D.A.O.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

57 JAN 12 1978
J-190

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

TO : The Associate Director

DATE: 12/22/77

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that the Director release from their secrecy agreements, SAs Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

DETAILS: By letter dated 12/20/77 -389 HSAC requested to interview SAs Harry L. Lee (former), SA Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen. By letter dated 11/8/77 326 the Committee requested permission to interview SA John B. Simpson, Richard A. Davis (former) and SA Jack T. Beverstein (former).

By letter dated 11/3/77 captioned Committee requested the identity of the case Agent most familiar with white hate activities in the period from 1965 to 1966. By letter dated 11/17/77 the Committee was advised that this Agent is SA Warren L. Walsh (former). By letter dated 12/9/77 the Committee requested permission to interview SA Robert Nichols (former). 332

8

RECOMMENDATION:

T 114 REC-46 62-117290-353

That the Director release from their employment agreement for purpose of interview by the captioned Committee the following individuals: Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

JAN

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Long
1 - Mr. Foster
2 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Coulson

DOC:dfj (8)

365

SCR

APPROVED:
Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

#245852

12/30/77

JAN 12 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10180-10295
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 105-93072-4TH NR 101, 102, 1ST NR 102

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, PA
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 12/03/1963
PAGES: 5
SUBJECT: LHO, POST-RP, ASSOC, LIAISON WITH CIA, CONTACT, GIBSON, RICHARD, FPCC
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 10/23/1998
UPDATE DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INC CABLRGRAM, 2 MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-03

UNITED STATES [illegible]RNMENT

RA

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Director, FBI (105-93072)

DATE: 12/17/63

FROM : Legat, Bern (105-248) (RUC)

SUBJECT: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
IS - CUBA

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED.
JM 7/1/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ReBulet to CIA dated 9/30/63 and Paris cable dated 12/3/63, latter captioned LEE HARVEY OSWALD, IS - CUBA.

JOHN DIMMER, [Office of Special Adviser] (S) (covert CIA), [the Embassy] (S) Bern, informed that GIBSON had been located in Paris. In view of this, this case is being RUC'D in this office. (X)

FBI
RECEIVED

(JFK) 8/17/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

7-13-94
Classified by ~~SA8 MBC~~/KSR
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~
(JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

617RB

C 52

105-93072-102

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

3/16/98

14 DEC 26 1963

NAT. ~~INT. SEC.~~

③ - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
1 - Legat, Paris (sent direct)
1 - Bern
HDG/hcs
(5)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

361
61 JAN 6 1964

180-10052

File #:

62-117290 - SECTION 6

Serial Scope:

353, 356, 361, 362, 366, 368, 369, 371, 372, 375, 376,

378
380
382X
385
390 THRU 395
397
400
404 THRU 409
413 THRU 415
418
420
421

424
426
428 THRU 431
433
437

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:	PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:
☐ Teletype	☐ Immediate	☐ TOP SECRET
☐ Facsimile	☐ Priority	☐ SECRET
☒ Airtel	☐ Routine	☐ CONFIDENTIAL
		☐ E F T O
		☐ CLEAR

Date 2/10/78

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT,
RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (c)

SUBJECT: 0 HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Re Bureau teletype to St. Louis, 2/10/78, 433 captioned as above.

Enclosed under separate cover for Headquarters is a Xerox copy of each serial in SL 170-1767 and SL 170-1767 Sub A as was requested in retel. Also enclosed is destruction memoranda concerning SL 1495-E (former) substantive file. Case closed in St. Louis.

24582

12/30/88

③ Bureau
(1 - via package) (Enc. 1)
2 - St. Louis
(1 - 62-5097)
(1 - 170-1767)
JLV:jtc
(5)

2cc - Congressional Inquiry Unit w/ encl

REC 58 62-117290-437

24 FEB 15 1978

EX-124

4 - [illegible] (info)

AUG 28 1978 CB

Approved: HC

Transmitted (Number) (Time)

Per

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

56 FEB 22 1979

wfk

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1 - Criminal Investigative Division
(Attn: J. E. McHale)
1 - Mr. G. J. Foster
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer
2/~~10~~ 9/78 per GJF

FM DIRECTOR (62-117290)

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

BT

E F T O

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF Classification
DATE 2/4/78 6ABJ

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ST. LOUIS DATED JANUARY 25, 1978; 421 ST. LOUIS TELETYPES TO BUREAU JANUARY 27, 429 1978, AND JANUARY 31, 1978. 443

ON FEBRUARY 8, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED HIS STAFF HAD CONTACTED FORMER SL 1495-E, WHO HAS AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH THE HSCA. ON FEBRUARY 9, 1978, STAFF ATTORNEY MICHAEL EBERHARDT, HSCA, ADVISED THAT SL 1495-E HAS EXECUTED A SIGNED WAIVER AUTHORIZING HSCA ACCESS TO ALL FBI INFORMATION CONCERNING HIM, INCLUDING THAT PERTAINING TO HIS INFORMANT ACTIVITIES.

REC-65 62-117290-433

134-19686-

EX-110

22 FEB 13 1978

1 - 134-19686

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

JTA:lfj
(6)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

58 FEB 27 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

HB/DRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 09 1978
TELETYPE

FBI/DOJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO E F T O 62-117290

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN INFORMANT'S MAIN FILE AND SUB A FILE (170-1767) AND ONE COPY OF ANY VOUCHER OR DOCUMENT WHICH CONCERNS ANY ASPECT OF SOURCE'S OPERATION AND ANY PAYMENT WHICH WAS MADE TO HIM. ADDITIONALLY, PROVIDE FBIHQ WITH ONE COPY OF ANY MAIN FILE OR REFERENCE IN YOUR OFFICE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH INFORMANT. ~~(S)~~ u

THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBI HEADQUARTERS, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ, THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS OF STAFF MEMBERS OF HSCA, PROVIDED THE WAIVER DESCRIBED AS ABOVE IS RECEIVED.

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE: SL 1495-E (former) (Bureau file 134-19686) was operated from January, 1970, to approximately September, 1971, primarily targeted against White Hate Groups. In 1971, he traveled to Savannah, Georgia, at which time he reported on activities of the National States Rights Party office and that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, stated he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. This is the apparent HSCA interest in informant.

Referenced communications concern previous informal requests by the HSCA that we contact SL 1495-E to determine if he would be willing to be interviewed by the Committee. St. Louis contacted informant on 1/27/78 and he agreed, but two days later submitted a letter to St. Louis declining to be interviewed by the HSCA. Subsequently, the HSCA determined informant's identity through its investigation and contacted him, at which time, according to the HSCA, he agreed to interview. By letter to the Attorney General dated 1/26/78, the HSCA has asked for all information at FBI Headquarters and in the field concerning informant.

This matter has been coordinated with SA D. O. Coulson, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 2/1/78

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(Attention: Congressional Inquiry Unit,
Records Management Division)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (62-7385) (C)

SUBJECT: O HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS

ReButelcall to Chicago 2/1/78.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies each of ten letters from JERRY RAY to MARJORIE LOUISE FETTERS.

All of the above letters were originally received from the Newark Division in a Xeroxed condition thus the quality of the above enclosures is not entirely satisfactory. However, per referenced Bureau telephone call, Chicago will maintain the original Xerox copy in its file 44-1114.

2cc RETAINED → RETAINED RM 8988 JEH w/ encls.

③ - Bureau (Encls. 20) ENCLOSURE
1 - Chicago

WLD:jeo
(4)

EX-140

62-117290-431

REC-33

4 FEB 3 1978

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/95 BY [illegible]

245882

Approved: WEB/WLD   Transmitted ______ (Number) (Time)   Per ______

FEB 24 1978

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

N00140 0052135Z

RR HI

DE NO

R 052125Z JAN 78

FM NEW ORLEANS (66-2878) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

JAN 5 4 52 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

AMB

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED: JAN. 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DEC. 27, 1977. 351

I) SA STEPHEN M. CALLENDER OF THE NEW ORLEANS DIVISION WAS THE NEW ORLEANS FIELD OFFICE CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION. AT THE TIME SA CALLENDER WAS ASSIGNED THE "MURKIN" CASE, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE NUMBER SIX SQUAD IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE. THIS SQUAD HANDLED CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS. "MURKIN" WAS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF FORMER ASAC JOSEPH T. SYLVESTER, JR. THE NATURE OF CALLENDER'S ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY

EX-105 REC-56 62-117290-430

23 JAN 26 1978

4 - Gallinger

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:na

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc [illegible]

42

58 FEB [illegible]

PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION WAS IN THE FIELDS OF CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS.

II) THE FILES OF THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE FAIL TO REVEAL THAT THIS OFFICE EITHER CONSIDERED OR ENGAGED IN ANY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COIN TEL PRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC).

NEW ORLEANS FILES WHICH INVOLVE THE SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF KING (NO 100-16800) AND THE SCLC (NO 100-16849) HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY REVIEWED. NEW ORLEANS WAS MERELY AN AUXILIARY OFFICE IN THESE INVESTIGATIONS, WITH ATLANTA BEING THE OO. THE EXTENT OF INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY NEW ORLEANS WAS THE COVERING OF LEADS IN LA., SET FORTH BY ATLANTA OR OTHER OFFICES. THESE TWO FILES WERE REVIEWED SERIAL BY SERIAL AND NOWHERE IS THERE ANY INDICATION WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SCLC BY THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE.

DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 - 1968, THE KING FILE IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AND THEN RUC'D AT LEAST SEVEN TIMES AND THE SCLC FILE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AT LEAST FIVE TIMES DURING THIS SAME PERIOD.

PAGE THREE NO 66-2878 E F T O

AIR MAIL COPY SENT ATLANTA DIVISION.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

SL0018 0272150

RR HQ

DE SL

R 272145Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (C)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

JAN 27 4 58 PM '78
DLS
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

BT

E F T O

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, ~~RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION.~~

Sec&Spec
~~Inq Section~~
~~3823 JEH TL#233~~

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

RE BUREAU TEL TO ST. LOUIS, JANUARY 25, 1978, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

SL 1495-E (FORMER) CONTACTED THIS DATE. HE WAS ADVISED OF HSCA'S EXISTENCE AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM CONCERNING CONTENTS OF LHM DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM - NSRP".

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS ADVISED THAT HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS. INITIAL REACTION OF SOURCE WAS THAT HE HAD NO STRONG OBJECTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY HSCA.

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS THEN ADVISED THAT CONFERENCES WITH HSCA

REC-56 62-117290-429

6 JAN 31 1978

Cox

4

54 FEB 23 1978

AND DOJ WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT DETAILS RE PROTECTION, CONFIDENTIALITY, LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

IT IS NOTED THAT SOURCE (FORMER) UNDERWENT MAJOR HEART AND ABDOMINAL SURGERY DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1977, IS CURRENTLY RECOVERING AND UNDER DOCTOR'S CARE. HE RESIDES 12350 OLD HALLS FERRY ROAD, FLORISSANT, MO., (314) 355-1500 AND IS UNEMPLOYED.

BT

#

Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____
Asst. Dir.:____
Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Per.____
Ident.____
Intell.____
Laboratory____
Legal Coun.____
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt.____
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____
Telephone Rm.____
Director's Sec'y____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB778

JAN 31 5 20 PM '78

PAGE 01 LONDON 01641 311209Z

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00 INR-07
L-03 /025 W

FOSTER

------------------099858 312209Z /41

R 311204Z JAN 78

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

L COVERNMENT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2604

4 - [illegible]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LONDON 01641

5 - [illegible]

DC

EX-140

REC- 13

DE-3

V-29

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINR PDIP UK

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

62-117290-428

17 FEB 7 1978

REF: STATE 10886

~~56 FEB 22 1978~~

AUG 28 1978

FOR H (ASST SEC BENNET) AND EUR/NE

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFTEL, WE PASSED ON TO THE HOME OFFICE THE REQUEST OF THE [illegible]USE SELECT COMMITTEE ON AS[illegible]ASSINATIONS FOR ACCESS TO BRITISH POLICE RECORDS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS CONCERNED WITH THE ARREST OF JAMES EARL RAY WITHOUT THE COMMITTEE RESPONDING FIRST TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED PREVIOUSLY BY BRITISH OFFICIALS.

2. THE HOME OFFICE INFORMED THE EMBASSY ON JANUARY 26 THAT IT IS CONSULTING THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S REQUEST AND WILL LET US KNOW THE OUTCOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BREWSTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMU[illegible] L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEV[illegible] B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHA[illegible]HONE, NEBR.
HAR[illegible] SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 30, 1978

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Cu

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

337

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a request was made by letter dated November 30, 1977, for FBI files relating to Dr. King. These files included the following:

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.

2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.

3. The file on the Memphis Sanitation Strike for the period January 1, 1968 through May 1, 1968.

4. The file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr./Poor People's March for the period December 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.

5. All materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the SCLC in the COINTELPRO file.

EX-311 REC-6 62-117290-426

21 FEB 6 1978

We have been advised that all of the above files are now available for review by the Committee.

It is now requested, however, that the foregoing files, except for the Memphis Sanitation Strike, be prepared for Committee review for the following extended dates:

62-117290

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

58 FEB 14 1978

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:
    a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the periods:
    a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
3. The COMINFIL and COINTELPRO files as such relate to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:
    a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
4. The files on the Poor Peoples' March from May 1, 1968 to the closing date of this file.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:med

✓cc: Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRM[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible]INE, OHIO
STEWART [illegible] KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES TH[illegible]E, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

2
House

Received
CIU
2/3/78

FEB 3 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the FBI provide the Committee with photographs of all Atlanta agents assigned to the security investigation of Dr. King during the period 1967-68. To the extent possible, these photographs should depict the agents involved as they appeared in 1967-1968 or as close thereto as possible.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

R

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mej
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson FBI

62-117290

EX-124
REC-76
62-117290-424

FEB 7 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

PN

57 FEB 15 1978

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1/25/78

FM DIRECTOR

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

BT

EFTO

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Criminal Intelligence Div.
(Attn: Mr. J. E. McHale, Jr.)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE ST. LOUIS AIRTEL AND LHM TO BUREAU DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED, "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM-NSRP."

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN THAT CONNECTION, VARIOUS DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE FOR HSCA REVIEW.

ON JANUARY 23, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED THAT THE HSCA DESIRES TO INTERVIEW THE FBI INFORMANT WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION IN REFERENCED LHM. BLAKEY REQUESTED THAT INFORMANT BE CONTACTED AND ADVISED OF THE HSCA'S INTEREST IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT INFORMANT HAD ANY OBJECTIONS TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY [redacted]

EX-124

REC-54 62-117290-421

134-19686-
105-6233-

JTA:sas (7)
SOO

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

6 FEB 1 1978

1 - 134-19686
1 - 62-117290

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 25 1978
2212 SJT
TELETYPE

Foster
Rm 8988

ALL [illegible]
[illegible]
D... 1-10-86 Spmacmra

HB/DR
AJQ

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

42
58 FEB 14 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

FBI/DOJ

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA.

INFORMANT IS SL 1495-E (FORMER), WHO WAS OPERATED FROM JANUARY, 1970, TO APPROXIMATELY SEPTEMBER 1971. INFORMANT WAS PRIMARILY TARGETED AGAINST WHITE-HATE GROUPS AND WAS SUBJECT OF BUREAU FILE 134-19686 AND ST. LOUIS FILE 170-1767.

ON JANUARY 24, 1978, SUPERVISOR JAMES HAGGERTY DETERMINED THAT INFORMANT IS LISTED IN THE CURRENT ST. LOUIS TELEPHONE DIRECTORY AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CONTACT WITH INFORMANT SINCE HE WAS CLOSED IN 1971.

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY CONTACT FORMER SL 1495-E. ADVISE HIM OF THE HSCA'S EXISTENCE, AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM APPARENTLY CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF REFERENCED LHM. ADVISE HIM THE HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCED LHM AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER. DETERMINE AT THIS POINT ONLY HIS INITIAL REACTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA. IF HE HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO AN INTERVIEW, HE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT CONFERENCES WITH THE HSCA AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS

REGARDING THE EXTENT OF PROTECTION AND CONFIDENTIALITY THE HSCA IS WILLING TO EXTEND AS WELL AS DETAILS REGARDING THE LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

SUTEL RESULTS TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION.

BT

#

NOTE The HSCA plans to submit a formal request regarding this matter, but requested informant be contacted for his initial reaction to interview. The Congressional Inquiry Unit, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, agree this approach is best prior to continuing discussions to resolve legal and other issues.

The apparent interest of the HSCA involves informant's travel to Savannah, Georgia, in 1971 at which time he reported on activities at the NSRP Office in Savannah, as set forth in referenced communication. Informant reported that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, and J. B. Stoner, National Chairman, NSRP, were in the office when Jerry said that the FBI and he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. The HSCA has requested FBI information on the NSRP, Stoner, Jerry Ray and other individuals identified as being in attendance in the NSRP Office in Savannah during that time. One of the individuals present, Richard Geppert, was later developed as an informant of the Springfield Office. Geppert has been interviewed by the HSCA and has furnished a signed statement in which he gives authority for HSCA review of all FBI information concerning him, including that pertaining to his confidential relationship with the FBI.

This matter has been coordinated with Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Organized Crime Section, Criminal Investigative Division

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 14 4 52 AM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ME0013 0140930Z

RR HQ

DE ME

R 14 0930Z JAN 78

FM MEMPHIS (66-2197) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290)

BT

EFTO

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JAN. 13, 1978.

THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOE C. HESTER, NOW RETIRED, ON APRIL 4, 1968, AND WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON AUG. 1, 1977. THE MEMPHIS OFFICE DID NOT HAVE A SQUAD BREAKDOWN AT THE TIME THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA HESTER. SA HESTER WAS ASSIGNED GENERAL CRIMINAL WORK IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION. SA JOHNSON WAS ASSIGNED DOMESTIC SECURITY AND CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE TIME THE MURKIN CASE WAS REASSIGNED TO HIM.

EX-124 REC-54 62-117290-420

22 JAN 31 1978

Rm 89 85

2 copies made pgs 1-6
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc Rm 8988

42

58 FEB 14 1978

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4542 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS, RACIAL MATTERS," WAS FIRST OPENED ON AUG. 28, 1967, AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., NOW RETIRED, UNTIL IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON MARCH 7, 1968. IT REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. MEMPHIS OFFICE HAD NO SQUAD BREAKDOWN DURING THE PERIOD 1965-68. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, AND SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4704 ENTITLED "NEW LEFT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM", WAS OPENED ON MAY 15, 1968, AND ASSIGNED TO LAWRENCE J. OLSON. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON FEB. 29, 1971, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 12, 1971. SA'S OLSON AND JOHNSON WERE INVOLVED IN SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE A100-4046 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM" WAS ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, NOW RETIRED, ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

OPENED JULY 23, 1964, PLACED IN RUC STATUS APRIL 29, 1966; REOPENED AUG. 24, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS AUG. 30, 1966; REOPENED MARCH 31, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JUNE 13, 1967; REOPENED OCT. 18, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS DEC. 20, 1967. IT REMAINED IN RUC STATUS UNTIL DEC. 26, 1974.

SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE ON EACH OCCASION.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-576 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS" WAS FIRST OPENED ON SEPT. 4, 1964, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND SWAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON JUNE 15, 1965. THIS CASE WAS REOPENED JUNE 18, 1965, AND PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON SEPT. 9, 1965. IT WAS REOPENED JAN. 2, 1966, AND ASSIGNED TO SA LAWRENCE. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA MERRILL F. MC CLOUGHAN ON JUNE 3, 1966. SA MC CLOUGHAN IS NOW RETIRED. IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA ROBERT F. FITZPATRICK ON MAY 10, 1968, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTEC INVESTIGATIONS, SA HILLIN WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, SA MC CLOUGHAN WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATION, AND SA FITZPATRICK WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4105 ENTITLED MMARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS OPENED ON JAN. 2, 1965, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND WAS SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 11, 1968. SA LAWRENCE WAS ASSIGNED SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-166 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE" (COMINFIL SCLS) IS - C, WAS FIRST OPENED IN THE MEMPHIS OFFICE ON SEPT. 26, 1961. IT WAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS AND RE-OPENED A NUMBER OF

TIMES PRIOR TO PERIOD 1965-68. IT WAS OPENED AND ASSIGNED DURING THIS PERIOD AS FOLLOWS:

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., ON FOLLOWING OCCASIONS.

REOPENED JULY 12, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS NOV. 17, 1965; REOPENED NOV. 17, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JAN. 31, 1966, REOPENED APRIL 29, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS MAY 20, 1966.

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

REOPENED DEC. 19, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JULY 17, 1972.

SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE. SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE.

A REVIEW OF MEMPHIS COINTELPRO FILES AND FILES ON THE SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC REVEALED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND THE SCLC.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt. ✓
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

CG0014 0052317

JAN 5 6 25 PM '78

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

RR HQ

DE CG

R 052317Z JAN 78

FM CHICAGO (62-7385)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DECEMBER 27, 1977. 351

(1)A) MURKIN INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER, CHICAGO 44-1114.

B) CHICAGO CASE AGENT RENE J. DU MAINE ASSIGNED TO ASAC SQUAD AS RELIEF SUPERVISOR - BANK ROBBERY COORDINATOR.

(2)A)(1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-35356.

(2) TITLE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM - C.

EX-111 REC- 62-117290-418

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION ON THE DATES INDICATED:

22 JAN 31 1978

JANUARY 7, 1965, CLAY M. BRADY, RUC JANUARY 24, 1965, [redacted]

12/30/85

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA: ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

4-

42

58 FEB 14 1978

REOPENED JANUARY 25, 1965 TO ROBERT F. BARRY, CLOSED MARCH 16, 1965, REOPENED MARCH 25, 1965 TO WILLIAM J. WHITE, RUC JULY 16, 1965, REOPENED JULY 19, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, RUC AUGUST 2, 1965, REOPENED AUGUST 11, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY, CLOSED AUGUST 27, 1965, REOPENED SEPTEMBER 13, 1965 TO R. L. STROMBERG, RUC SEPTEMBER 24, 1965, REOPENED OCTOBER 7, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, REASSIGNED NOVEMBER 22, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY WHO CONTINUED AS CASE AGENT UNTIL AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN 1968. THIS CASE WAS MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE CASE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR, SM - C INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY, WHO WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (B) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 105-16238.

(2) TITLE: COMINFILE, SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC), IS - C.

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOHN P. O'BRIEN, UNTIL OCTOBER 12, 1965, WHEN IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY THROUGH 1968. SA STANLEY WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5 UNTIL FEBRUARY, 1968 WHEN HE WAS DELETED. THE EXACT NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (C) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-32864.

(2) TITLE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, IS - C.

(3) A REVIEWW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION:

HERBERT K. STALLINGS UNTIL APRIL 22, 1965, REASSIGNED TO GENE E. ARNOLD UNTIL APRIL 27, 1967, REASSIGNED TO ROBERT O. MURPHY THROUGH 1968. ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WERE MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 2. THE SECTION, SQUAD OF ASSIGNMENT, AND THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THIS INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (D) A REVIEW OF ALL OTHER COINTELPRO INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY CHICAGO FAILS TO INDICATE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. OR THE SCLC WERE EVER MENTIONED IN THESE FILES OR TARGETS UNDER THESE PROGRAMS.

BT

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. McKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES T[illegible] NEBR.
HAROLD S. [illegible]R, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

O Jones

Received C14
1/31/78

January 26, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with this Committee's investigation of the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we would appreciate your assistance in obtaining access to any files or records in the possession of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, relating to the individuals and organizations noted below:

A. With respect to the Drug Enforcement Administration:

1) Charles Joseph Stein
Date of Birth: 5/11/29
FBI Number: 881-534-B

2) Anthony Charles DeCarvelho
Born: 1921
Residence: New Orleans

B. With respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

1) Jack Brown
Chattanooga, Tennessee

62-117290

2) Lester Lee [illegible]
Date of Birth: 2/23/45
S.S.N.: 410-78-8096
2165 or 2155 Clarksdale
Memphis, Tennessee

EX-111 REC- 13 62-117290-415

23 FEB 2 1978

3) Hunter Pitts O'Dell
New Orleans, Louisiana

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

57 FEB 14 1978

4) Earnest Donnell
Denham Springs, Louisiana

5) Robert DePugh, Norborne, Missouri
Head of the Minutemen organization

6) Sidney Barnes
1378 East Riviera Drive
Mobile, Alabama (1968)

7) "Maxey Ted"
New Orleans, Louisiana

8) Eddie Sopcjack
Date of Birth: 8/14/29
FBI Number: 186-485A

9) Thomas Tarrants

10) Samuel Caccamechi
Memphis, Tennessee

11) Robert Hood Strader
Lexington, Illinois

12) Raymond Starns
King David Apartments, Apt. 1
2816 David Drive
Metairie, Louisiana (1968)

13) Jerome Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana

14) Joseph Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana (now deceased)

15) Leonard Scott DelMonte
1229 North Bronson Street
Los Angeles, California

16) Allan O. Thompson
Date of Birth: 12/25/13

17) Dr. Russell C. Hadley
Date of Birth: 8/18/09
96 Moscow Road
Monte Rio, California

18) James E. Morrison
Los Angeles, California

19) Dr. Mark O. Freeman
Beverly Hills, California

20) Charles Calvin Bookman
Date of Birth: 9/6/13
FBI Number: 892-355

21) Rodney Arvidson
Date of Birth: 1/19/23
Post Office Box 2820
Long Beach, California

22) Tomas Reyes Lau
Date of Birth: 10/5/23
2047 Lemoyne
Los Angeles, California

23) Roy Emory Hargraves
El Monte, California

24) Raymond M. Murphy, aka "Fido"
Los Angeles, California

25) Lee Wilkinson
Los Angeles, California

26) Roman Kohnke
Los Angeles, California

27) Paul Lyon
Los Angeles, California

28) Jeri Salkin
Los Angeles, California

29) Ronald G. Hewitson
Garden Grove, California

30) Pat Olson
Date of Birth: 7/21/42
Quantico, Virginia

31) Robert Taylor, aka Bob Taylor
Los Angeles, California

32) Ronald Dennino
aka Ronald Gerald Dennino
Inmate at California State Prison
at San Quentin (1967 - 1968)

33) Richard Gonzales
Los Angeles, California

34) Roderic Burns Duff
Monrovia, California
1968 President of Los Angeles Chapter
of Citizens Council of America

35) R. J. Weiler
Los Angeles, California

36) Elizabeth Ann De Rouen
Date of Birth: 2/17/43
SSN: 453-62-1064
Los Angeles, California

37) Debbie Gold
Los Angeles, California

38) David Gregory
Buena Park, California

39) Rev. Xavier Von Koss
Hermora Beach, California

40) Robert Harold Gray
Los Angeles, California

41) Robert Keeley
Los Angeles, California

42) William K. Shearer
aka Bill Shearer
3166 Palm
Lemmon Grove, California

43) Robert Walters
Los Angeles, California

44) George Manum
Los Angeles, California

45) Robert J. Roe
Beverly Hills, California

46) Pamela Dillon
Los Angeles, California

47) Frank Marullo
New Orleans, Louisiana

48) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on Ku Klux Klan for the cities of Jacksonville and Miami, Florida for the period 1966 through 1968.

49) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on the following organizations for the period 1966 through 1968 for the cities of New Orleans, Louisiana; Birmingham, Alabama; Memphis, Tennessee; Chicago, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia; Los Angeles, California; and the State of Mississippi:

   a) Black Panthers
   b) Black Muslims
   c) American Nazi Party
   d) Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

50) Subfiles and/or investigative reports for the period 1966 - 1968 for the following organizations:

   a) Liberty Lobby
   b) The Sword
   c) The Fiery Cross
   d) The White Camelia
   e) The Silver Dollar Group

Your prompt cooperation will be most appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:msd
cc: Danny Coulson

1/18/78

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)

FROM : ACTING LEGAT, LONDON (62-604)(P)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

SUBJECT: JAMES EARL RAY, aka;
ET AL
CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE UNLAWFUL
FLIGHT TO AVOID CONFINEMENT - ESCAPE

ReLONlet 11/16/77.

Enclosed for information is a copy of an incoming telegram the American Embassy, London, received from Department of State on 1/14/78, and copy of Legat, London letter to the British Home Office dated 1/18/78.

Further pertinent information will be furnished when available.

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encs. 2)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
1 - London
RAK:ejg
(4)

62-117290-

NOT RECORDED
FEB 7 1978

Original Filed In

14

56 FEB 10 1978

12/31/85

UNITED STATES DEPARTME[illegible] OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Office of Legal Attache
American Embassy
Grosvenor Square
London, W1A 1AE

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 62-604

Your Ref.:

January 18, 1978

Mr. G. L. Angel
British Home Office
G-4 Division
Queen Anne's Gate
London, S.W. 1

Re: Request from House Select Committee on Assassinations to Meet with British Police Authorities

Dear Mr. Angel:

By way of background, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as authorized by the U. S. House of Representatives, is investigating the circumstances surrounding the murders of President J. F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The Chief Counsel and Staff Director requested contact be made with appropriate officials in the British Government to obtain authority to interview appropriate police officials who were involved in the arrest of James Earl Ray in London on June 8, 1968.

Assistant Legal Attache Dennis Dickson had contact with you on December 6, 1977 regarding this matter. At that time you requested the following:

A) Purpose or scope of inquiry;

B) Names of individuals to be interviewed and reasons therefor;

12/31/85

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

C) Intended use of results of inquiry, i.e., public hearings, etc., it being noted that any records maintained by the British police would be as the result of an official inquiry and this would normally be available for police use only, unless otherwise exempted by the British Government.

The Select Committee responded that due to the brevity of the 95th Congress, it was most important that representatives of the Select Committee be allowed to meet with appropriate members of New Scotland Yard who are knowledgeable about the KING-RAY investigation. The Committee advised they would be happy to meet personally with British Government officials in London to provide answers to the issues forwarded to them for clarification and elucidation.

I would be most appreciative if you would advise if this situation is agreeable to you.

Sincerely,

Dennis R. Dickson
Acting Legal Attache

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION/

01229

AMB
MIN
AMB/EX
PAO
POL
POL/L
POLAD
E/MIN
ECON
COMCL
E/SCI
E/TRANS
AGRI
CUSTOMS
DAO
D.E.A.
F.A.A.
FBIS
I.R.S.
LEGATT
MARITIME
SUSLO
TRADE
TREAS
USCG
A/COUNS
A/ATO
A/B&M
A/COMM
A/GS
A/PERS
A/RFO
A/SY
A/VIS
CCA 2
CG/CS
CG/V
S.F.
CHRON
LOG
D.O.
POUCH
C/S
USSS

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ JAN 14 10 46

FROM: 9772

NO: 10886

NNNNVV FHG083EHV219
RR RUDTC
DE RUEHC #0886 0140951
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 140226Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON 7802
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS PINR, PDIP, UK

SUBJECT REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

RE: LONDON 20003

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENNET HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

OTAL:

PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVEST[illegible]ION MENTIONED IN BLA[illegible] LETTER AND ADVISE US [illegible]VANCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

January 25, 1978

Director, FBI

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

336
356

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

15

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAILED 17
JAN 25 1978
FBI

EX-111 REC-13 62-117290-414

20 FEB 2 1978

56 FEB 10 1978

14

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

[illegible]
D[illegible]12/30/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By teletype dated 12/27/77, field offices designated by the HSCA were advised of the contents of the HSCA letter of 12/13/77. Responses have been received. Rather than incorporate the voluminous results into a letter to the Committee, it is more practical to make available for HSCA access at FBIHQ incoming field office teletypes.

It should be noted that, under current operating procedures existing between the Department of Justice and the HSCA, disclosure of these agents' identities to the HSCA cannot be prevented. However, G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, has advised SA D. O. Coulson of Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, that, in absence of an overriding need to do otherwise, the HSCA will not publish the names of any agent personnel below the position of section chief. This policy would follow precedent of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which issued its report in 1976.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 25, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

In response to the above request, the following information is submitted:

On December 19, 1977, Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised that the Department of Justice would respond to Part A, Items 1 and 2 and Part B, Items 1 and 2, of the above request.

Regarding Part A, Item 3 and Part B, Item 3, the FBI field offices designated by the HSCA were requested to provide the information desired by the HSCA. Responses from these field offices have been received and copies of these documents are available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters.

With respect to Part A, Item 4, a review of FBI Headquarters indices disclosed no memoranda, records, documents and news releases generated by the FBI in connection with the MURKIN investigation, other than that contained in the MURKIN file, which has already been made available to the HSCA.

QTA
JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFIARS.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

PMS

[illegible] 12/30/05

ENCLOSURE
62-117290-411

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

In response to Part B, Item 4, it should be noted that HSCA request of November 30, 1977, asked for all FBI material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in the FBI's Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) file. By letter dated January 11, 1978, you were advised that representatives of the HSCA agreed to limit its request to COINTELPRO files involving the Communist Party USA and Black Nationalist-Hate Groups and to limit the period of HSCA interest from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968. On January 23, 1978, Staff Attorney Michael Eberhardt reiterated that the HSCA's interest is that period rather than the years 1965-1968 as set forth in the request of December 13, 1977. The above-mentioned COINTELPRO files and files of the King and SCLC security investigations from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, have been prepared for HSCA access. Therefore, based on knowledge of personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit processing HSCA requests regarding King, all material at FBI Headquarters, which may contain COINTELPRO-type activities against King and SCLC during the period January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, has been made available to the HSCA.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/25/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC[illegible]EY, CONN.
CHARLES THO[illegible]R.
HAROLD S. SAW[illegible]ICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee o[illegible]ssassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Aldhizer

Executive Office of
Congressional Affairs
Dec. 14 - 2:41 Pm. 1977

DEC 13 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation provide the following:

A. MURKIN Investigation

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who participated in any way in the direction or management of the MURKIN investigation and the Division and Section within the Department of Justice where these attorneys were then assigned;

2. Copies of all memoranda, records, documents, and news releases generated by the Department of Justice in connection with MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee;

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the MURKIN investigation for the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham

Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

Ack to AAG/CD
1/25/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:sas

62-117290-414

ENCLOSURE

4. Cop[illegible]s of all memoranda, reco[illegible]s, documents and news releases generated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with the MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee.

B. COINTELPRO

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who were in receipt of any information concerning the COINTELPRO activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

2. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the Department of Justice in connection with the COINTELPRO activities of the FBI as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during 1965 to 1968 from the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's actual assignment during that period:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham
Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami
Louisville

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

4. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the FBI in connection with the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 to 1968 which are not contained in the files requested by Committee letter dated November 30, 1977.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIR[illegible]
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUE[illegible]E, OHIO
STEW[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHAR[illegible]ONE, NEBR.
HAROL[illegible]SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

House

Rec. CWD
3:45 PM
1/27/78

January 17, 1978

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff access to the following:

1. All files, materials and information including, but not limited to, intelligence and security materials relating to the following organizations active in California for 1967-1969:

   a) John Birch Society
   b) American Independent Party
   c) George Wallace Campaign

TA

2. All files, materials and information, including, but not limited to, intelligence, surveillance and security materials for 1967-1968 pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his activities in California.

Your prompt attention to the request will be greatly appreciated.

62-117290-413

REC-65

RECORDED
6 JAN 31 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

GRB:mkd
cc: Danny O. Coulson

57 FEB 7 1978
118

FEB 0 1 19[illegible]

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 31, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl ✓
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

0

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

NR CG

Reference is made to a letter dated October 20, 1977, to Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in possession of the FBI to include the current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Enclosed are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

JTM:sas (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

EX-115

REC-65 62-112290-469

2-ENCLOSURE

30 JAN ~~26~~ 1978

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/83 BY

Delivered 11/2/77

Signed and sent to SA Coulson for delivery to Dept. 11-1-77

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

42 EB

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request by HSCA for information contained in the Bureau's files relative to William Herman Jackson. This matter has been coordinated with the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files, which are identifiable with Jackson, have been organized into folders for the Committee's access and are maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's space, Room 8988.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files include Jackson's current ident record, the results of an FBI investigation wherein Jackson was one of four subjects - captioned "Leslie Atkisons, aka, Et Al; Miscellaneous - Falsely Making or Forging Naval, Military or Official Pass," two references re a Foreign Police Cooperation Matter and two references re a Perjury Matter.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

October 31, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 20, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI TO INCLUDE A CURRENT FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION RECORD RELATIVE TO WILLIAM HERMAN JACKSON.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 20, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Utilizing identifying data for Jackson furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

JTM:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/31/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA).

ALL I[illegible]
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/98 BY [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. M
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

62-117290-409

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI/DOJ

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

October 20, 1977

Robert L. Keuch, Esq.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

The Select Committee on Assassinations would appreciate any and all information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record check relative to William Herman Jackson, FBI #801-218-G, D.O.B. 11/24/26.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB/EME/mae

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room 3659
Washington, D. C. 20530

let to AAG/CD
10-31-77
JTM:aws (Enc-3)

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-409

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

CJ

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on November 16, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
    Criminal Division
    Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - William F. Kusch - Enclosure

ST-120 REC-63 62-117290-408

23 JAN 31 1978

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

APPROVED:

Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.

Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory

Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

signed & sent
1/6/77

DOC:ldr

59 FEB 6 1978

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY

FBI/DOJ

62-117290-408	COPY 63	DOC:ldr 12/29/77

The Deputy Attorney General HSCA
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney Generel Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on 11/16/77. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

COPY OF ABSTRACT FOR THIS SERIAL IS PLACED IN FILE IN LIEU OF THE MAIL WHICH HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED.

C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/03 BY [illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

DATE: 12/19/77

FROM : SAC, PORTLAND (62-3144)

JGP/RR

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

C

Enclosed herewith are five copies of an LHM relative to the interview of SA WILLIAM F. KUSCH, Portland Division, by staff members of the HSCA in Washington, D.C., on 11/16/77.

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (Encs. 5)
2 - Portland
WFK:ja
(4)

ST-120

REC-63 62-117290-407

1-31-78

✓ Copy 3651

12/30/78 [illegible]

12-29-77

MAR 20 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-02

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Portland, Oregon

December 19, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

On November 16, 1977, SA William F. Kusch of the Portland Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was interviewed at House Annex #2 in Washington, D.C., by Mr. Mark Speiser and Mr. Peter Beeson, members of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The interview with SA Kusch dealt with a period of time SA Kusch was assigned to the New Orleans Division of the FBI, specifically April, 1968. During April of 1968, SA Kusch, along with numerous other Special Agents assigned to the New Orleans Division, conducted many interviews with persons who had, or who might have had, knowledge of the activities or contacts of James Earl Ray during the period of time Ray, using the name Eric Galt, was in New Orleans.

Specifically, SA Kusch was questioned regarding his squad assignments in New Orleans, the identities of other squad members, the identity of his supervisor, his Agent in charge and his assistant Agent in charge at the time.

Further, SA Kusch was questioned relative to the content of several interview report forms (FD 302s) concerning interviews that he conducted and prepared appropriate FD 302s in connection therewith, or FD 302s covering interviews that he was a party to. House Select Committee on Assassinations members exhibited said FD 302s to SA Kusch to refresh his memory.

House Select Committee members in essence apparently desired SA Kusch to amplify or further expand on these interviews.

ALL I[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 12/30/85

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE
62-117290-107

SA Kusch pointed out that as a result of the passage of nine and one-half years, for the most part he could not specifically recall the persons interviewed. To specific questions regarding the interviews, SA Kusch could only point out that if additional questions had been asked of these persons interviewed at the time, resulting in the receipt of any positive or pertinent information regarding Galt, that information would have been duly recorded on said FD 302s.

Both Mr. Speiser and Mr. Beeson were cordial and SA Kusch responded to their questions in a candid manner.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

Director, FBI

January 26, 1978

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

C

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which, in connection with HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested information pertaining to FBI electronic suveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2 (Secret Material Enclosed)

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure) (Secret Material Enclosed)

JTA:sas
(6) sas

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120

ENCLOSURE

REC-63 62-117290-406

23 JAN 31 1978

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAILED 12
JAN 26 1978
FBI

42

HWB

58 FEB 6 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

AL[illegible]D
[illegible]IN IS UNC[illegible]
DATE 12/30/98 BY [illegible]

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Dates and places of electronic surveillance of King were compiled through file reviews conducted in connection with previous law suits filed against the FBI by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and a former SCLC officer and aide to King, Bernard S. Lee. Although names of specific SCLC affiliates were not provided by the HSCA in its request, all names are readily available to the Committee, which has received access to our files concerning King and SCLC.

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which requested information in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. This letter requested that the FBI determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The Committee indicated it only desired written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved, with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

In response to the above request, appropriate records at FBI Headquarters were reviewed with the following results:

Microphone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
January 5-7, 1964	Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C.
January 27, 1964	Shroeder Hotel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
February 18-20, 1964	Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii
February 20-21, 1964	Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, California
February 22-24, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
March 19-20, 1964	Statler Hotel, Detroit, Michigan

fg

JTA:sas (6) SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR
DOD

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, & ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 6437
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
ON 12/31/85

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-106

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Dates of Surveillance	Location
April 23-24, 1964	Senator Hotel, Sacramento, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
September 28, 1964 - October 2, 1964	Manager Hotel, Savannah, Georgia
January 8-11, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
January 28-31, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
March 29-31, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
May 12-13, 1965	Sheraton Atlantic Hotel, New York City
October 14-15, 1965	Astor Hotel, New York City
October 28-30, 1965	New York Hilton Hotel, New York City
November 29-30, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
January 22, 1966	Americana Hotel, New York City

Telephone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
August 22-27, 1964	Claridge Hotel, Atlantic City, New Jersey
November 8, 1963 - April 30, 1965	Martin Luther King's residence
April 24-26, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
August 14, 1964 - September 6, 1964	Apartment 2B, 125 N. 72nd Street, New York City

Telephone Surveillances of SCLC

Dates of Surveillance	Location
October 23, 1963 - January 24, 1964 July 13-31, 1964	SCLC Office, New York City Room 1202, 14 E. 40th Street, New York City
November 8, 1963 - June 21, 1966	SCLC Office, Atlanta, Georgia

In an effort to respond to that portion of the HSCA's request concerning existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance of individuals directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC, personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit, FBI Headquarters, familiar with certain aspects of the King, SCLC and related files, compiled a list of individuals with the SCLC for the approximate period January, 1962, through 1968. Although this list is not all inclusive due to the large number of persons affiliated with the SCLC, an effort was made to include those individuals in key positions and who were most active in the organization. Most of the individuals listed were identified with the SCLC Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. Based on review of appropriate records at FBI Headquarters, none of the below-listed individuals has been subject of electronic surveillance by the FBI:

Ralph Abernathy
Jessie Jackson
Bernard S. Lee
Hosea Williams
James Orange
James Bevel
Andrew Young
Walter Fauntroy
Coretta Scott King
John Rutherford
William Rutherford
Bernard Lafayette
Dorothy Cotton
J. T. Johnson
Joseph E. Lowery
Fred L. Shuttlesworth
Cordy T. Vivian
Adele Kanter
Thomas C. Kilgore
Dora McDonald
James Harrison
Wyatt Walker
Logan Kearse
Stoney Cooks
Fred C. Bennett
Booker T. Bonner
Henry Brownlee
Golden Frinks
Joseph Lester Hankerson
Samuel B. Wells
Benjamin Johnson
Herbert V. Coulton
Thomas Offenburger
New Soong-Li
James Lawson
Lillian Hunter
Gloria Fraction
David Wallace
Jess Gill
Carole Hoover
Albert Turner
Frank Ditto
C. K. Steel
Samuel Williams
Curtis Harris
Cirillo A. McSween
Major Jones
Lawrence D. Reddick
I. M. Augustine
Septima Clark
T. Y. Rogers, Jr.

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Records at FBI Headquarters disclosed that the following individuals, formerly associated with the SCLC, were subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI (Secret).

Stanley David Levison
Clarence B. Jones
Hunter Pitts O'Dell
Bayard Rustin

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible] OHIO
STEWA [illegible] CY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Received Office of
Congressional Affairs
Dec. 15 3:54PM 1977

DEC 15 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance and determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of Dr. King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC.

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

let to AAG/CD
1/26/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:avs
1-OLA (enc)

GRB:mek

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

62-117290-406

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:	PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:
☐ Teletype	☐ Immediate	☐ TOP SECRET
☐ Facsimile	☐ Priority	☐ SECRET
☒ Airtel	☐ Routine	☐ CONFIDENTIAL
		☐ E F T O
		☐ CLEAR

Date 1/23/78

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: Records Management Division,
Congressional Inquiry Unit

# Hed
FROM: SAC, SPRINGFIELD (62-2567) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Reurtel to SI, 1/19/78. 395 1-10-86 [illegible]

Enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of each serial in the following Springfield Division main files:

(1) 157-1792, serials 1-85 (189 pages);

(2) 44-1120, serials 1-5 (10 pages);

(3) 170-445, serials 1-23 (48 pages);

(4) 170-445A, serials 1-6 (11 pages).

Also enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of the following serial in the following Springfield Division file, reference identifiable with RICHARD GEPPERT:

(5) 157-1791, serial 23 (8 pages).

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:

Numerous serials contained in these files have been classified "Confidential". ST-120

Springfield file 157-1792, serial 82, is a correlation memo showing GEPPERT was the subject of Springfield main

REC 65 62-117290-405
ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (62-117290) (Encl 5)
1 - Springfield (62-2567)

JAN 26 1978

DJC/pme
(3)

DETACHED FILED for RM & 8988 JFK + HSCA PROCESSING access 9To 1/30/78

54 FEB 6 1978

Approved: 42 Transmitted ______ (Number) (Time) Per ______

8988

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

file 100-10245. This main file has been destroyed in accordance with the File Destruction Program.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

BH0043 0131931

PP HQ

DE BH

JAN 13 2 36 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

P 131931Z JAN 78

FM BIRMINGHAM (66-2280) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) (PRIORITY)

BT

CLEAR

ATTENTION OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

~~Cmp Sec & Spec. Inq Section~~

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES, DECEMBER 27, 1977.351

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. ONE: MURKIN INVESTIGATION ASSIGNED TO HENRY S. SNOW (DECEASED). PRIOR TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION SA SNOW WAS ASSIGNED TO GENERAL CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION.

EX-101
REC-36

62-117290-404

23 JAN 26 1978

12/30/78

2 copies made pg 1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

124

70 FEB 1978

IN ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. TWO: THERE WERE NO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS BY BIRMINGHAM AGENTS AGAINST MARTIN LUTHER KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 THROUGH 1968.

THE FOLLOWING WERE CASE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING: LAWRENCE GETTINGS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY AND CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED THAT TYPE OF INVESTIGATION; MARVIN M. EUBANKS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATION.

THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO INVESTIGATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE:

WILLIAM PERRY (DECEASED), PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO CRIMINAL SQUAD AND WORK; COLEMAN D. GEARY, III, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO BOMBING MATTERS; LAWRENCE GETTINGS (SUPRA); MARVIN M. EUBANKS (SUPRA) AND C. B. STANBERRY, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED AFTER A REVIEW OF BIRMINGHAM INDICES AND SUBSEQUENT FILE REVIEW.

BT

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible], OHIO
STEWA[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARL[illegible]NE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4524

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

House

Rec
CTU
2:15PM
1/25/78

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

JAN 20 1978

HAND DELIVER

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

C

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

-375

By letter dated January 4, 197~~7~~8, this Committee requested access to materials, files, memoranda and miscellaneous items pertaining to Gerold Frank in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. These materials (94-63917) have been reviewed by the staff, and it would be appreciated, if the materials could be prepared for delivery, along with copies of the following additional items:

1) Section 78
   44-38861 - 5655
   " 5654
   5653

2) Section 84
   44-38861 - 5942
   " 5943
   " 5944
   " 5945
   " 5946

3) The MURKIN Legat tickler files for
   a) London
   b) Ottawa
   c) Mexico City
   d) Paris

62-117290-400

EX-124 REC-79

~~62-117290~~

20 JAN 27 1978

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

57 FEB 2 1978

JAN 20 1978

Additionally, it is requested that the Bureau begin to prepare for delivery all files, memoranda and miscellaneous items on William Bradford Huie for the years 1968 to the present.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:ghj
cc: Danny O. Coulson

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

January 26, 1978

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

0

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-139

2 - ENCLOSURE

REC-7

62-117290-397

MAILED 5
JAN 26 1978
FBI

JAN 27 1978

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. HB/DR
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

HB/DR

5 2 FEB 2 1978

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

12/30/85

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Former SA Nichols works and resides in Atlanta. The Atlanta Office has been in touch with him regarding the interview and he is awaiting further contact for final interview arrangements. These arrangements are handled informally by representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBIHQ.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

This memorandum is to confirm that former agent Nichols has been cleared from his employment agreement and is available for interview as needed by the HSCA. Arrangements for interview can be made through contact with representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBI Headquarters.

JTA:sas (6)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78. captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

[illegible] 12/30/98 [illegible]

62-117290-391

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 9 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that ex-FBI agent Robert Nichols, formerly of the Atlanta field office, be made available to the Committee for interview on a priority basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

let to AAG/CD
1/26/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:sas
1-OLA (Enc) (62-117290-397

ENCLOSURE

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1/19/78

1 - Mr. Foster

FM DIRECTOR

TO SPRINGFIELD (ROUTINE)

BT

EFTO

#245852 [illegible] 12/30/85

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/11/82 BY SP-1GSK/PSR
225984

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. BY LETTER DATED DECEMBER 30, 1977, TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE HSCA REQUESTED THE FBI PROVIDE ALL FILES, DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS CONCERNING RICHARD GEPPERT, BORN JULY 31, 1941, RESIDING AT 1340 NIEDRINGHAUS AVENUE, GRANITE CITY, ILLINOIS.

NR 8/25/78

BY LETTER DATED JANUARY 16, 1978, THE HSCA EXTENDED ITS REQUEST TO INCLUDE FIELD OFFICE FILES. THE HSCA ALSO FURNISHED A SIGNED STATEMENT OF GEPPERT, DATED DECEMBER 28, 1977, AUTHORIZING HSCA REVIEW OF ALL MATERIAL CONCERNING HIM IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI. IN THIS STATEMENT GEPPERT ALSO DISCLOSED THAT HE VOLUNTEERED TO HSCA STAFF MEMBERS THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF HIS INFORMANT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FBI.

170-5569-

157-26213

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

JTA:sas (6)

1 - 157-26213
1 - 170-5569

EX-130

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

62-117290-395

REC-46

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 19 1978
0405 3 22 PM '78

TELETYPE

JAN 23 1978

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

118

56 JAN 3 1979

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

PAGE TWO EFTO

FBIHQ FILES DISCLOSED GEPPERT WAS SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD EXTREMIST MATTER INVESTIGATION (157-1792) IN 1972 AND SPRINGFIELD FILE 44-1120 FOLLOWING ALLEGED HARASSMENT BY OFFICERS OF THE GRANITE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IN 1975. HE WAS ALSO SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD FILE 170-445.

SPRINGFIELD PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN THE ABOVE THREE INVESTIGATIONS AND ONE COPY OF ANY OTHER MAIN FILE OR FILE REFERENCE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEPPERT. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS BY STAFF MEMBERS OF THE HSCA.

BT

#

NOTE: This teletype confirms telephonic communication with Supervisor Joseph Ondula of the Springfield Office on 1/19/78. This matter has been coordinated with SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 1/4/78

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (~~62-117296~~)
Attn: Congressional Inquiry Unit,
Special Investigative Division

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (66-2242) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)
BUREAU DEADLINE - 1/13/78

Re FBIHQ teletype to numerous offices, including Atlanta, 12/27/77.

Referenced Bureau teletype indicated that the HSCA was currently conducting investigation into the assassination of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (MURKIN); and in connection with this investigation, the HSCA had requested the FBI provide the following:

(1) The identification of field office case agent(s) assigned to the MURKIN investigation in recipient offices and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation.

(2) Identification of the field office case agent(s) assigned to counterintelligence program (Cointelpro), efforts directed against KING and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) during the period 1965 - 1968 in recipient offices, and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the Cointelpro, KING, and SCLC investigations.

REC-36 62-117290-394

EX-130

In addition, recipients were to identify the case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of KING and SCLC, as well as the Cointelpro.

1 JAN 7 1978

2-Bureau
2-Atlanta (1-66-2242)
(1-44-2386) (MURKIN)
EAS/ljg
(4)

2 copies made pgs 1-5
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

Approved: ________ Transmitted ________ (Number) (Time) Per ________

JAN 30 1978

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

Atlanta has reviewed pertinent files as requested by FBIHQ, and the information sought by the HSCA is set forth below in chart form:

1. MURKIN
(Atlanta file 44-2386)

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/8/68 - 4/29/68	Atlanta - #3, Security/extremist Squad	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. PERRY	4/29/68 - 7/30/68	Atlanta #4 Fugitives	Fugitive investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/30/68 - 7/31/69	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	5/30/70 - 7/13/70	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	2/8/71 - 3/16/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/31/71 - 4/7/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/13/73 - 8/31/73	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	6/19/74 - 6/27/74	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	8/13/74 - 9/24/74	Atlanta - #8 Civil rights, thefts from interstate shipment (TFIS) Etc.	Civil rights matters

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
THOMAS J. WILSON	8/26/75 - 9/8/75	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights, TFIS
THOMAS J. WILSON	1/7/78 - 3/23/76	Atlanta - #8	"
JOHN J. HAYMAN	10/12/77 - 11/8/77	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights matters

2. Atlanta Agents assigned to/or who handled the Atlanta Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) during the period 1965 - 1968 in which efforts were directed against KING and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
CPUSA Cointelpro			
ALDEN F. MILLER	4/14/64 - 8/13/65	Atlanta - #3	Security Investigations
Cointelpro Black Nationalist-Hate Groups			
EDWARD U. CRIM	8/29/67 - 7/30/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist Investigations
CPUSA Negro Question; Communist Influence in Racial Matters (CIRM)-Cointelpro			
No case agent assigned - matters handled by:			

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/1/64 - 8/20/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	2/4/64 - 8/21/64	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	7/22/65 - 4/15/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations

3. Identity of case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SM-C			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	3/7/61 - 5/12/61	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	2/28/62 - 10/16/62	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/9/63 - 7/31/63	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	11/6/63 - 5/21/65	Atlanta - #3	"
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	5/21/65 - 6/5/68	Atlanta - #3	"

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
Communist infiltration of the SCLC			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	4/17/62 - 12/1/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	12/1/64 - 4/26/66	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/26/66 - 3/12/71	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/12/71 - 5/23/73	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/10/73 - 10/20/73	Atlanta - #3	"

LS0003 0102106Z

RR HQ

DE LS

R 102106Z JAN 78

M LOUISVILLE (66-2612)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

JAN 10 4 19 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

~~Emp Sec&Spec Inq Section 3823 JEH TH~~ #231

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA, DATED DECEMBER 27, 1977.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, APPROPRIATE REVIEW OF FILES MAINTAINED BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION REVEALED FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY HSCA.

(1) NOT APPLICABLE TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

(2) NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COINTELPRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST EITHER MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., OR SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND (SCEF), DURING PERIOD 1965-1968, COULD BE LOCATED IN REVIEW OF COINTELPRO AND SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-393

JAN 10 4 22 PM '78

20 JAN 25 1978

24 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1CC Rm 8988

70 JAN 3 1978

12/30/88

OF KING AND SCLC. NO COINTELPRO ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND SCLC BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., ASSIGNED SA GEORGE W. HUTCHINSON, JR. (RETIRED) MAY 14, 1965 - AUGUST 13, 1966, AND SA RICHARD B. VIVIAN JULY 30, 1976 - OCTOBER 20, 1976. LATTER ASSIGNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC ASSIGNED SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) SEPTEMBER 29, 1961 - OCTOBER 30, 1961; OCTOBER 17, 1963 - NOVEMBER 18, 1963; DECEMBER 14, 1963- JANUARY 22, 1964; JUNE 5, 1964 - JULY 8, 1964; SEPTEMBER 21, 1964 - OCTOBER 12, 1964; JUNE 2, 1965 - JULY 20, 1965; NOVEMBER 17, 1965 - JANUARY 20, 1966; JULY 13, 1966 - AUGUST 12, 1966; FEBRUARY 10, 1967 - MARCH 24, 1967; SA GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED) AUGUST 12, 1968 - JUNE 5, 1969; SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) JUNE 5, 1969 - JULY 29, 1969. SCLC (BUFILE 100-438794) (LS 157-90) INVESTIGATED BY LOUISVILLE AS "RACIAL MATTER" AND "INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST".

SPECIAL AGENTS GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED), WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) AND RICHARD B. VIVIAN ALL ASSIGNED LOUISVILLE SECURITY - CIVIL RIGHTS SQUAD PRIOR TO AND DURING ABOVE LISTED CASE ASSIGNMENTS.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 10 3 05 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SL C[illegible]05 0101950

RR HQ

DE SL

P 101924Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

CLEAR

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

~~[illegible] #231~~

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JULY 27, 1977.

(1) FORMER SPECIAL AGENT HAROLD R. DOBSON WAS CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION, ST. LOUIS FILE 44-775, BUREAU FILE 44-38861, IN ST. LOUIS DIVISION. FORMER SPECIAL AGENT DOBSON WAS ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND HANDLED SECURITY TYPE CASES PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN MURKIN INVESTIGATION.

(2) ST. LOUIS FILE 157-5818 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS, BLACK NATIONALISTS, HATE GROUPS, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE" WAS OPENED AS A PENDING INACTIVE STATUS CONTROL FILE ON AUGUST 29, 1967.

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-592

20 JAN 25 1978

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1ccKm8988

42

12/30/88

ON FEBRUARY 27, 1968, THROUGH JANUARY 8, 1969, WAS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH OF SECURITY SQUAD AT ST. LOUIS DIVISION. HIS ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THIS CASE ASSIGNMENT WAS TO HANDLE SECURITY TYPE CASES.

ST. LOUIS FILE 100-17801, BUREAU FILE 100-106670, ENTITLED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER SPECIAL AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, JANUARY 15, 1965, THROUGH JANUARY 19, 1965, FEBRUARY 3, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 10, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. STEWART, APRIL 28, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 28, 1965; FORMER SPECIAL AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, NOVEMBER 11, 1965, THROUGH NOVEMBER 12, 1965, AND JUNE 14, 1966, THROUGH JUNE 17, 1966; FORMER AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, OPENING DATE UNKNOWN THROUGH JULY 6, 1966, AND MARCH 25, 1967, THROUGH MARCH 27, 1967.

ST. LOUIS FILE 105-4027, BUREAU FILE 100-438794, ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE; RM; IS - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, SEPTEMBER 23, 1964, THROUGH DECEMBER 10, 1964, AND MARCH 21, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 19, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 3, 1965, THROUGH JUNE 16, 1965; FORMER AGENT WALTER A.

HIL[illegible]NDORF, FEBRUARY 24, 1966, THROUGH DATE UNKNOWN; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 6, 1969, THROUGH JULY 23, 1969. THE ABOVE AGENTS AND FORMER AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO ST. LOUIS DIVISION SECURITY SQUAD DURING PERTINENT PERIOD.

A REVIEW OF ABOVE FILES DISCLOSED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE.

BT

#

LA0373 0431807Z

PP HQ

DE LA

P 131807Z JAN 78

FM LOS ANGELES (62-7841) (P) (1)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) PRIORITY

BT

EFTO

JAN 13 1 31 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

~~Cmp Sec&Spec~~
Inq Section
~~3823 JEH TL#~~ 231

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977, TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES.

George Foster

FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS COMMUNICATION AND RETEL THE TERM CASE AGENT(S) WAS DEFINED AS THE SINGLE AGENT TO WHOM THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED AND WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIRECTION AND FLOW OF THE INVESTIGATION.

EX-138

REC-36 62-117290-391

IT IS NOTED THAT UNDER CAPTION "BERNARD S. LEE V. CLARENCE M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1185) BUFILE 62-117194, LA FILE 100-57229" AND "SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) V. CLARENCE

20 JAN 25 1978

ALL [illegible]
[illegible]
D... 12/30/88

4 DH12R

2 copies made pgs 1-4
1/24/78 JTA:ma

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc 8988

42

1978

M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1186) BUFILE 62-117193, LA FILE 100-57229," LOS ANGELES HAS PERMANENTLY CHARGED OUT TO THE BUREAU SEVERAL SERIALS WHICH THEREFORE ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW. SERIALS WERE FROM FILES CAPTIONED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR; SECURITY MATTER-COMMUNIST; BUFILE 100-106670; LA FILE 100-57229"; "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SCLS; IS -C; BUFILE 100-438794 AND 100-442349; LA FILE 100-65141"; "CP-USA NEGRO QUESTION, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN RACIAL MATTERS; IS-C; BUFILE 100-3-116, LA FILE 157-859."

A REVIEW OF PERTINENT FILES WITHIN THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION BETWEEN THE YEARS 1965 - 1968 DETERMINED THE FOLLOWING:

. THE ABOVE FILE REGARDING COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SCLC WAS HANDLED ON THE SUBSTANTATIVE DESK SUPERVISED BY SA JOHN S. TEMPLE WHICH WAS DESIGNATED AS SQUAD NUMBER TWO. THIS SQUAD HANDLED INVESTIGATIONS OF RACIAL AND BLACK EXTREMIST MATTERS. THIS INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA LOUIS K. DE GEUS IN FEBRUARY 1965; SA R. ANDREWS PETERS IN

SEPTEMBER 1965; SA W. JAMES WOOD IN APRIL 1967; SA WALTER M. BRADY IN JANUARY 1968; AND SA E. RHEAD RICHARDS, JR. IN MAY 1968.

THE MAIN FILE ON KING WAS ASSIGNED TO SQUAD TWO AS ABOVE AND WAS ASSIGNED TO SA DE GEUS IN JANUARY 1965; SA PETERS IN MARCH 1965; SA WOOD IN JANUARY 1967; SA BRADY IN JUNE 1967: AND SA GEORGE E. AIKEN, JR. IN FEBRUARY 1968.

THE FILE REGARDING THE CP-USA INFILTRATION OF RACIAL MATTERS IS ONLY PERIPHERALLY CONCERNED WITH KING OR THE SCLC AND CONTAINS NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS AND OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN OTHER SUBSTANTATIVE FILES. WHILE NOT CLEAR, THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONTROLLED BY SA TEMPLE.

THE ENTIRE SUBSTANTATIVE FILE CAPTIONED "MURKIN; BUFILE 44-38861; LA FILE 44-1574" WAS COPIED AND SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU UNDER INSTANT CAPTION. THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED ON SQUAD NUMBER ONE WHICH WAS SUPERVISED BY SA WILLIAM JOHN NOLAN BUT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUPERVISED BY

SA TEMPLE. SQUAD NUMBER ONE HANDLED SECURITY TYPE INVESTIGATION INVOLVING THE CP-USA, SWP, ET CETERA. THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AS ASSIGNED JOINTLY TO SA'S LEROY W. SHEETS AND THEODORE J. A'HEARN ALTHOUGH SHEETS WAS APPARENTLY INVOLVED AS CASE AGENT ONLY DURING THE INITIAL STAGES IN APRIL 1968.

ALL OF THE ABOVE INDIVIDUALS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA'S BRADY, RICHARDS AND AIKEN ARE NO LONGER EMPLOYEES OF THE FBI.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MM0730 0132335

RR HQ

DE MM

R 132335Z JAN 78

FM MIAMI (62-6603)RUC

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290)ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

JAN 13 6 42 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977.

FOLLOWING IS NUMBERED PARAGRAPH REPLY TO REQUEST OF MIAMI SET OUT IN RE BUTEL:

1. "MURKIN". SA DAVID N. JELLISON, ASSIGNED APRIL 8, 1968: NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATE PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS. SA LEON E. FISH; ASSIGNED AUGUST 10, 1972 (RUC AUGUST 28, 1972); NUMBER 2 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS MAINLY CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS; SA JOSEPH T. O'LEARY; ASSIGNED JULY 30, 1976 (RUC AUGUST 3, 1976), FBIHQ ADMINISTRATIVE REQUEST; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNED APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS. SRA JOHN S. ATWATER; ASSIGNED JUNE 3, 1977 (RUC JUNE 6, 1977), SINGLE INTERVIEW; WEST PALM BEACH RA;

~~Emp Sec&Spec~~
~~Inv Section~~
~~3835 JEH~~ TL# 231

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-390

20 JAN 25 1978

4-Ag FD HI 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/83 BY Sp

2 copies made pgs 1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc fm 8987

42

70 JAN 30 1978

IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS GENERAL CRIMINAL AND SECURITY.

2. A. "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SM-C. "SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 THROUGH 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE NATURE, INCLUDING LOCAL CPUSA GROUP.

B. "COMINFIL OF SCLC; IS - C." SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 TO MAY 2, 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS, SEE PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

SA JOHN C. MENTON, ASSIGNED MAY 2, 1968 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS.

C. "COINTELPRO; BLACK EXTREMISTS; RACIAL MATTERS." FILE OPENED MARCH 7, 1968, ASSIGNED SA JOHN C. MENTON, STILL PENDING TO MENTON DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENT SET OUT IN PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

BT

#

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JAN 16 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

372

By letter dated December 30, 1977, this Committee requested material pertaining to Richard Geppert in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In view of the fact that the Committee has since delivered to the FBI the written consent of Mr. Geppert to view all materials relating to his informant relationship with the FBI, it is intended that our December 30th request for materials and documents concerning Mr. Geppert include those found in any field office files.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

REC-56 62-117290-385

EX-130

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

7 JAN 23 1978

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

GRB:mej
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

70 JAN [illegible] 1978

EDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

December 1, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

O
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

C

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files regarding the National States Rights Party (Item #2) and Jesse B. Stoner (Item #3). By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, modification of these items was made, details of which are outlined in the enclosed memorandum.

EU

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum in response to the above mentioned requests. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

62-117290-382X

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120 REC-42 ~~62-117290~~ - 3916

22 FEB 22 1978

12/7/77

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. __
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. __
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. __
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director's Sec'y __

EU
3 - ENCLOSURE

MAY 2 1978

1970 PMS

JSC

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv. ____	Legal Coun. ____
	Crim. Inv. ____	Plan. & Insp. ____
Director ____	Fin. & Pers. ____	Rec. Mgnt. ____
Assoc. Dir. ____	Ident. ____	Spec. Inv. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____	Intell. ____	Tech. Servs. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____	Laboratory ____	Training ____
		Public Affs. Off. ____

YCF
GCD

[illegible] D
[illegible]
12/30/85

PMS

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Since there were no National States Rights Party (NSRP) subfiles for offices requested by the HSCA, the entire NSRP file for 1967 through 1968 was processed for access. All information retrievable in FBI Headquarters files regarding Stoner was processed.

Names of knowledgeable case agents provided in attached memorandum were obtained through review of FBIHQ files and confirmed by Supervisor Jack Byrd of the Savannah Office. The HSCA can advise which agent(s) it desires to interview regarding the NSRP and Stoner.

[illegible] - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY Sp[illegible]

December 1, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. Under Item #2 of this letter information concerning the National States Rights Party (NSRP), Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to areas covered by offices in Savannah, Georgia; Atlanta, Georgia; Memphis, Tennessee; Birmingham, Alabama; St. Louis, Missouri, and Springfield, Illinois, was requested. Under Item #3 information was requested concerning Jesse B. Stoner.

By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, the above requests were modified. Under Item (c) this letter requested the FBI's complete file on Stoner and that the agent(s) in the Office of Origin assigned to the Stoner investigation for the period 1966 through 1968 be made available for interview by the HSCA. Concerning the NSRP, under Item (d) this letter asked the FBI to provide information in its files to cover the period 1967 through 1968. In addition, the case agent(s) in the Office of Origin for the same period would be made available for interview.

In response to the above requests, information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the NSRP (period 1967 through 1968) and Jesse B. Stoner have been processed and are available for review at FBI Headquarters by the HSCA. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from FBI Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 12/1/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

62-117290-382x

~~62-117290-3796~~

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

PMS

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ

House Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

The Savannah Office of the FBI was Office of Origin in both the NSRP and Stoner investigation during the period of HSCA interest. The following agents of that office were case agents in the Stoner investigation: Carlton Dillard, January, 1966 - April 1967; William P. Friday, April, 1967 - October, 1967; John H. Murphy, October 1967 - September, 1969. With variation of only a few days, these same Agents were case agents in the investigation of the NSRP. Dillard is now retired. Friday and Murphy are currently assigned to the Savannah Office and are scheduled to retire December 31, 1977.

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.

Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory

Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv. M[illegible]
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee o[illegible]ssassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFF[illegible]UILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF
CONGRESSIONAL
AFFAIRS
NOV 15 11 PM 1977

NOV 3 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals and organizations be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Lawrence J. Callanan (deceased) Steamfitters Union (AFL) Local 562, St. Louis, Mo. for the Period 1967 through 1971.

2. ✓ National States Rights Party, 591 Cherokee, Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, but limited to reports and information in areas covered by offices in Savannah, Ga.; Atlanta, Ga.; Memphis, Tn.; Birmingham, Al.; St. Louis, Mo.; and Springfield, Ill.

3. Jesse B. Stoner, 591 Cherokee, N.W., Marietta, Ga.

4. Conservative Society of America for the period 1967 through 1968. (Headquarters in New Orleans, La.

lt to AAG/CD
12/1/77 (Enc-2)
JTA:ads

5. Kent Courtney, 1413 Texas Avenue, Alexandria, La. for the period 1967 through 1968.

62-117290-382X

62-117290-382X ENCLOSURE ~~62-117290-37?X~~

6. KKK (limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in Birmingham, Alabama, Los Angeles, California, Atlanta, Georgia and Louisville, Kentucky during the period 1967 through 1968).

7. Morris Davis, RFD, Hoover, Shelby County, Ala.

8. White Citizens Council (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in New Orleans, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

9. Forever White, (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in New Orleans, La; Baton Rouge, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

10. Charles Joseph Stein, dob 5/11/29.

11. Percy Belcher, ex-deputy Sheriff, Birmingham, Alabama, for the period 1967 through 1968.

12. Robert Powers, Powers Junction, Intersection Highways 11 and 90, Orleans Parrish, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

13. Sam DiPiazza, Pamela Place, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

14. Dr. Lucas DiLeo - (office) 8603 St. Bernard Highway, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

15. Salvadore L. Licciardi (Liccardi), New Orleans, Louisiana for the period 1967 through 1968.

16. Gus Joseph Prosch, dob 11/17/30, 3122 Callecita, Sacremento, California. (Arrested in Birmingham, Alabama in December, 1971 and convicted of violating Gun Control Act in 1972.)

17. Quentin B. Davis, owner of Gun Rack, Birmingham, Alabama for the period 1967 through 1968.

18. Clifford Andrews (aka, R. L. Warren), Box 75, Toronto 14, Ontario, Canada.

19. Walter Jack Youngblood, Monticello Street, Dallas, Texas.

20. Johnny Benelli, #303, 175 North Orange Drive, Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

21. Claude Cockrell, dob 5/10/36, FBI # 389804E, for the period 1967 through 1968.

22. Gene Pearson Crawford, dob 10/2/27 for the period 1967 through 1968.

23. Fleet Edwards, dob 2/4/21 for the period 1967 through 1968.

24. Raoul Esquivel - (Raul Victor Esquibel), dob 11/17/26, 4524 Parsimmon, Metairie, La. (This request includes, but is not limited to, Bureau File 44-26940.)

25. Southern Christian Leadership Conference

    a. General file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

    b. Cointelpro file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

26. James Bevel, for the period 1965 through 1968.

27. Rev. Jessie Jackson, Chicago, Ill., for the period 1965 through 1968.

28. Vincent DePaul Stelly, 4434 5th Ave., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

29. Jerome Wallis Vernon, Home Service Laundry and Dry Cleaning, 5280 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

30. Rev. James Orange, South Carolina for the period 1965 through 1968.

31. Rev. Bernard Lee, Atlanta, Ga., for the period 1965 through 1968.

32. Allan Lee Stoddard, "Vegas Club", 5510 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

33. Robert Byron Watson, SS# 253-85-2220, Atlanta, Ga.

34. Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1962 through 1968. (This request pertains to material exclusive of the Murkin File and the SCLC files and should include all information regarding threats to Dr. King.

35. Herman A. Thompson, 10454 Goodwood Blvd.,
Baton Rouge, La., (former deputy sheriff in
Baton Rouge).

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

NOV 8 - 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a conference was held on November 7, 1977 between employees of the FBI and members of the Committee staff to discuss the Committee's November 3, 1977 letter of request for FBI materials on thirty-five individuals or organizations. As a result of this meeting, the following was resolved:

(a) The FBI would process the following numbered requests as they were originally stated in the November 3rd letter: 1, 4, 5, 7, 9-11, 13-24, 26, 28-33 and 35.

(b) The Committee would provide dates of births on the individuals in requests nos. 12 and 27 before the FBI would process these names. The dob on Robert J. Powers (request no. 12) is 6/5/24. The dob on Reverend Jesse Jackson (request no. 27) is 10/8/41.

(c) Besides providing the complete file on request no. 3 (Jesse B. Stoner), the FBI would also make available the most appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin assigned to Stoner for the period 1965 through 1968.

(d) With respect to request no. 2, the FBI would provide all [illegible] files [illegible] for 1957 [illegible] as well as make available the appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin for the same period.

~~62-117290-3896~~

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-382X

(e) With respect to request no. 6, the Committee would hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI provides a list of the most appropriate case agent(s) in the offices of origin for the several Klan organizations in existence in 1967 and 1968. (While such was not part of the understanding reached at the time of the meeting with FBI officials, the Committee would request however that all materials related to the United Klan of America LS for the period 1965 and 1966 be made ready for inspection by November 20, 1977.)

(f) With respect to request no. 8, the FBI would first advise the Committee as to the identity of other cities reporting on the White Citizens Council before a determination be made as to the final content of this request.

(g) With respect to request no. 25, the Committee will hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s) for the period in question.

(h) With respect to request no. 34, the Committee requests that only the thirteen "death threat" files on Dr. King be processed at this time, while a request for all other materials is held in abeyance until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s).

In Addition, the Committee would also request that the following agents be notified and made available by the FBI:

(1) Special Agent William F. Kusch - New Orleans
Special Agent Thomas E. Duhadway - New Orleans

(2) Special Agent Jack B. Simpson - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Richard H. Davis - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Jack T. Beverstein - Memphis ATLANTA

As a priority item, it is also requested that the FBI provide the Committee with the work or personnel records of the following three Louisville FBI agents for the month of September 1965:

(1) Robert Peters

(2) William Duncan

(3) Bernard Brown

We are primarily interested in those records reflecting their [illegible] records should be provided by November 15, 1977. The Committee would also ask that all three of the above-mentioned Louisville agents be made available for interview by the same date.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____
Asst. Dir.:____
Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Pers.____
Ident____
Intell____
Laboratory____
Legal Coun.____
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt.____
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____
Telephone Rm.____
Director's Sec'y____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB605

PAGE 01 STATE 010886

JAN 14 7 04 AM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JTC

ORIGIN EUR-12 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 L-03 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00
INR-07 /025 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/NE: JPSHUMATE
APPROVED BY EUR/NE: RLFUNSETH
H - ASCHNEE (BY PHONE)

------------------015192 141012Z /10

R 140226Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

4 - Foster

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

EX-136

(info)

E.O. 11652:N/A

REC-6 62-117290-380

TAGS:PINR, PDIP, UK

JAN 18 1978

SUBJECT:REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

FLG. SUP.

RE: LONDON 20003

58 JAN 26 1978

MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH

THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVESTIGATION MENTIONED IN BLAKEY'S LETTER AND ADVISE US. VANCE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENN[illegible] HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWI[illegible] LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CH [redacted]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

IE, OHIO
KINNEY, CONN.
LES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Home

January 9, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

51

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff, access to the following:

1. All files, materials, and information relating to William Hugh Morris, the alleged leader of the Federated KKK in Alabama.

   a) Address (late 1950's)
   2128 East Fifth Street
   Oak Park
   Montgomery, Alabama

   b) Jefferson County Alabama
   Sheriff's Office Number 52811

Your prompt attention to this request will be greatly appreciated.

REC-30 62-117290-378

EX-130

Respectfully

14 JAN 18 1978

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

GRB:ghk

cc: Danny Coulson

218 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, [illegible]AIRM[illegible]
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

[illegible]EL L[illegible]INE, OHIO
[illegible]ART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 5, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

(C)

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available for interview, on a priority basis, the following agents:

1. Theodore A'Hearn - Los Angeles } 10/7 LET cleared
2. Leroy W. Sheets - Los Angeles
3. Thomas J. Wilson - Atlanta
4. Gerald Galbreath - El Paso

The Committee is ready to interview these agents on an immediate basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

✓CC: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:wwd

EX-130

REC-30

62-112290

62-112290-376

14 JAN 18 1978

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

[illegible] 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CH[illegible]AN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.	SA[illegible], OHIO
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.	STE[illegible] B.[illegible]INNEY, CONN.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.	CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.	HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.	
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.	
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.	

(202) 225-4624

0 House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 4, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

HAND DELIVER

Cu

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available to the Committee access to all F.B.I. materials, files, memoranda, airtels, and miscellaneous items, including but not limited to any contained in the MURKIN File (44-38861), on or referring to the following individual:

Gerold Frank - author
d.o.b. 8/2/1907
current address: 930 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10021

It is requested that access to these materials be provided on a priority basis so that our initial review can be completed by January 16, 1978.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

EX-130

REC 28

62-117290-31

JAN 17 1978

GRB:ghd

cc: Danny Coulson

58 JAN 24 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JAN 3 11 23 AM '78
MAIL ROOM

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

DEC 30 1977

RECEIVED
JAN 4 1978
O.L.A

Cc

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it has been determined from a review of the Chicago field office file (No. 44-1114) of the MURKIN investigation that the FBI is in possession of several letters of correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters. (See, for example, serials 271, 335, 496, 560, 574, 621, and 637 in the Chicago field office file.) It is requested that the FBI furnish this Committee with copies of all correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

ST-125 REC-55 62-117290-372

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

23 JAN 10 1978

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
10
JAN 3 1978
O.R.O.M.

FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

24

79 JAN - 1978

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

WASHINGTON PM DEC 30 1977 200

ALWAYS USE ZIP CODE

Louis Stokes
M.C.

Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th & Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention; Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 3, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

ST

Director, FBI

C O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to the letter from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, to the Attorney General, dated August 9, 1977, requesting availability of all FBI reports relative to robbery of the Bank of Alton, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967. Reference is also made to the letter from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, dated September 13, 1977, requesting a copy of all FBI reports in this bank robbery investigation.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above HSCA request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

ST-120

REC-45 62-117290-371

20 JAN 9 1978

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

10/4/77

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. __
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. __
Rec. Mgnt. __
Spec. Inv. __
Tech. Servs. __
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director's Sec'y __

3 ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

79 JAN 20 1978 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

D 12/3/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: The Alton bank robbery occurred at the time James Earl Ray was a fugitive, prior to King's assassination. Ray was considered a suspect in this robbery subsequent to being identified as King's killer. No evidence was produced to link Ray with the robbery. The case was closed unsolved in 1972.

In its request of 8/9/77, the HSCA asked for access to our investigation into this bank robbery and the file was prepared. Later, the HSCA submitted a second request which requested "a copy of any and all materials or reports" in the Alton bank robbery. Mr. Keuch advised on 9/19/77, that delivery should be limited only to investigative reports in the case. The requested material was picked up at FBIHQ on 9/19/77 by Oliver Champion, HSCA messenger. Purpose of enclosed memorandum is to confirm delivery of this material.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

October 3, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

This will respond to letter dated August 9, 1977, to the Attorney General from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, and letter dated September 13, 1977, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA.

This letter is to confirm that, pursuant to the above request dated September 13, 1977, a copy of each investigative report of the FBI in the Alton bank robbery, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967, was delivered to a representative of the HSCA on September 19, 1977.

JTA:sas (9)
sas

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Direcotr, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/3/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. M/JK
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. M/cwr
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

JBA

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-371

FBI/DOJ

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

August 9, 1977

RECEIVED

AUG 19 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20430

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we request that you make available to us all investigative reports relative to the robbery of the Bank of Alton, Illinois, on July 13, 1967.

Best wishes and kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

9-

EME:ek

Ret to AAG/CD
10-3-77
JTA:
1 - OLA

144-72-662
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
11
AUG 19 1977
O.R.O.M.
RECD
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

CIV. RIGHTS DIV.

62-117290-37

ENCLOSURE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVIN[illegible]IO
STEWART B. MC[illegible], CONN.
CHARLES THONE, [illegible].
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 13, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and our conversation with your office on Monday, September 12, 1977, we are hereby requesting a copy of any and all materials or reports the Federal Bureau of Investigation has regarding the Alton Bank Robbery in Alton, Illinois on July 13, 1967; as well as a copy of any other materials the Department of Justice may have in its possession relevant to this matter.

I appreciate your cooperation and assistance in this request, and I look forward hearing from you.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

SJL/GRB/drj

9-

62-117290-371

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 10, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertinent to seven listed individuals.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request and advises that material on six of these individuals is available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters. Information on the seventh individual, Randolph Erwin Rosenson, was previously furnished the HSCA by FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120

11/17/77

62-117290-369

REC-55

23 JAN 10 1978

2 - ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. M/DEF
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/98 BY

79 JAN 16 1978

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By request dated 9/20/77, the HSCA asked for information concerning Rosenson. By letter to the Attorney General and its enclosures, both dated 10/13/77, information concerning Rosenson was delivered. The HSCA request dated 10/18/77, (attached) desired information on seven individuals, including a repeat on Rosenson's name.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 10, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertaining to:

Harvey Gene Love
George G. Pittman
Stephanie Helene Sheehan
Jonathon Henry Shea
Keith Albert Wright
Frank Quenqui
Randolph Erwin Rosenson

Retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the above individuals, with the exception of Rosenson, has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions or deletions. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

By FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977, documents containing information concerning Rosenson were provided the HSCA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/05 BY

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/10/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA).

62-117290-369

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

FBI/DOJ

ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Repre[illegible]ntatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDI[illegible] ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Aid.

October 18, 1977

King Investig

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attn: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the Select Committee's investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Martin Luther King, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff materials in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation relating to the following individuals for the period of time from January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968: 6/1/69

Cut re file Search 1/1/67 - 6/1/69 10/25

NAME	Date of Birth	FBI Number
✓Love, Harvey Gene	4/1/35	592-813A
✓Pittman, George G.	6/20/38	919-933C
✓Sheehan, Stephanie Helene	7/26/53	951-133N4
✓Shea, Jonathon Henry	6/12/47	688-958J2
✓Wright, Keith Albert	7/27/44	122-750H
✓Quenqui, Frank	12/9/08	160-8374
Rosenson, Randolph Erwin	3/20/34	34-711E

In addition, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the staff the criminal records for these individuals. This written request confirms an oral request made by myself to Mr. Dan Coulson on October 18, 1977 in the offices of the Committee.

Thank you.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:DM
copy to: Dan Coulson

Let to AAG/CD
11/10/77 (Enc-2)
JTA:aas

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-369

Assistant Attorney General FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 11, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance regarding certain individuals and a business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Deliv 11/17/77

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. M/Dir
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

ST-120

REC-55 62-117290-368

23 JAN 10 1978

2 - ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

79 JAN 16 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/21/83 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By memorandum dated 5/13/68, the Department was asked for authority to place technical surveillance on the telephones of James Earl Ray's brother-in-law and sister, Albert and Carol Pepper and the Grapevine Tavern, all located in St. Louis, Missouri. This memorandum also requested microphone surveillance be installed at the residence of Albert and Carol Pepper, the residence of Ray's brother, John Larry Ray, and at the Grapevine Tavern. FBIHQ files contain no information to indicate the Department of Justice took any action on this request. Following Ray's apprehension the Department, in memorandum dated 6/11/68, was advised that the FBI's request for electornic surveillance was withdrawn. The above information is contained in the King Assassination June file and has been processed for access of the HSCA.

The HSCA's request of 11/7/77, desired only written confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance on the above individuals and business during the period 1/1/67 to 12/31/68.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 11, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance against the following individuals and business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper.
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri.

This memorandum is to confirm that, based on a review of appropriate files at FBI Headquarters, the above were not subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI during the period January 1, 1967, to December 31, 1968, or at any other time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/95 BY

JTA:sas (69)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/11/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

APPROVED:
Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-36

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SA[illegible]VINE, OHIO
ST[illegible]CKINNEY, CONN.
CHA[illegible]ONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

NOV 7 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance to determine whether any of the following individuals and places were the subject of such surveillance during the period of January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence or non-existence of such electronic surveillance with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Ltr to AAG/CD
JTA:sas
11/11/77 (Enc-2)

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-368

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

C O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that former Special Agent Joe C. Hester was interviewed on November 21, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Hester's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
Criminal Division
Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - Joe C. Hester - Enclosure

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

ST-120
REC-55 62-117290-366

23 JAN 10 1978

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

ENCLOSURE

DOC:ldr
(10)

signed & sent 1/6/77

12/31/83

79 JAN 16 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Memphis, Tennessee
December 5, 1977

JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM;
CIVIL RIGHTS - CONSPIRACY

On November 21, 1977, retired Special Agent Joe C. Hester appeared at Washington, D. C., at the request of the House Committee on Assassinations.

Mr. Hester met with the Committee staff in their offices at Washington, D. C., and was interviewed for a total of four hours by two different groups of five persons each. Both groups were affable and were not in any way critical of the investigation conducted in this case.

The first group of five interviewers asked a variety of questions but seemed to be particularly preoccupied with the investigation conducted by Legats in Mexico. Mr. Hester was able to answer many of the general questions regarding the activities of Legats but referred them to Assistant Director Richard Long when they began to ask more specific questions regarding the investigations by Legats and the manner of transmittal of this information to FBI Headquarters.(u)

The second group of five interviewers asked more general questions regarding the Bureau's investigation of the King murder. They seemed to be greatly concerned with the allegation of conspiracy. Mr. Hester advised them that he believed the conspiracy theory was an invention by the Department of Justice to be used to justify the FBI's investigation of Dr. King's murder. Mr. Hester advised them that he had never personally believed there was a conspiracy and he did not believe that any of his FBI superiors had ever believed in the conspiracy theory. Mr. Hester further advised that it was his personal opinion that James Earl Ray, acting alone, had murdered Dr. King and that his subsequent travels were probably financed by armed robbery.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[illegible] 12/31/85

#345832

memo to DAG, 12-29-77

62-117290-3666

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

This group was concerned with how the subject Ray had known how to obtain false documents following his arrival in Canada. Mr. Hester pointed out that a "Top Ten" criminal had been arrested in Canada and had been returned to the Missouri State Penitentiary and had served time there with James Earl Ray prior to Ray's escape. Mr. Hester indicated it was his belief that this "Top Ten" fugitive had been responsible for instructing Ray on how to proceed in obtaining false documents in Canada.

This group touched on such diverse elements as the information furnished by John McFerren regarding Frank Liberto, and one of the interviewers agreed that they had not believed McFerren to be a very reliable witness. They also discussed Ray's purchase of the rifle in Birmingham; the fact that Officer Redditt was moved from the firehouse near the Lorraine Motel just prior to the murder; what motive did Ray have for killing Dr. King; whether or not there was any evidence to indicate a conspiracy; whether or not there were any wiretaps and whether or not there had been any surreptitious entries made against King and his followers at Memphis prior to the assassination; and when, following his escape, did Ray appear to have made up his mind to assassinate Dr. King.

In addition, they asked numerous questions about the political climate in Memphis just prior to the assassination and inquired as to what investigation was being conducted by the FBI in regard to the Sanitation Workers Strike and the first march conducted by Dr. King. Mr. Hester was forced to admit that he had had nothing to do with the investigation of Dr. King prior to the murder and he suggested that they talk to current Special Agent Howell S. Lowe who would be in a position to furnish information in this regard.

They inquired about the interview of James Earl Ray conducted by former Special Agent in Charge Robert G. Jensen, former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle, and Mr. Hester at the state prison in Nashville, Tennessee, following Ray's plea of guilty. Mr. Hester recounted as best he could recall the events that transpired in connection with this attempted interview and advised the interviewers that former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle has suffered a cerebral hemmorrhage and possibly might not be competent to furnish information regarding this investigation.

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

The Committee indicated that they might desire to interview Mr. Hester again, either personally or telephonically, and they were assured that he would be available and agreeable to assisting them in any way possible.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
~~Fin. & Pers.~~ ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's S

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
# memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Robert L. Keuch FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ack.
Kl

ST
Cd

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

DEC 8 1977

cc: ✓Mr. Aldhizer

#17
1-4-78

ACF
BD

✓Danny O. Coulson
SSA - Div 11
NSOM
67-623562

Drew J. Clark
SSA - Div 9
NSOM
67-592700

ST-120

REC-54 62-117290-362

John T. Aldhizer, III
SSA - Div 5
NSOM
67-606490

memo to Robert L. Keuch Special Council to the AG — Foster 8981

12-22-77
CAM:jmr

NW-8988

79 JAN 12 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: RLK Robert L. Keuch
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

cc: Mr. Aldhizer

CARBON COPY

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 14, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn; Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to a letter dated October 5, 1977, addressed to Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in the possession of the FBI pertaining to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material, as well as limited material pertaining to Hardin, previously prepared for the Committee's access, is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Enclosed are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

ST-120

JTM:sas (8)

REC-54

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-117290-36

11/17/77

20 JAN 6 1978

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

79 JAN 12 1978

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request dated 10/5/77, from HSCA for all information contained in Bureau files relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair. This request has been coordinated with the Legal Counsel Division.

A review of Bureau files has revealed that a limited number of documents relating to an attempted bombing of Brent Hardin's automobile had been prepared for the Committee's access pursuant to receipt of their request dated 4/27/77. The Committee was advised of the availability of these documents on 5/18/77. The remaining retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair have been prepared for the Committee's access and are being maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's Room 8988 for their review.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files pursuant to the Committee's request dated 10/5/77, include Baird's ident record, the results of a civil rights investigation involving Baird as the subject, and references to Blair appearing in the MURKIN file, numerous references to Hardin and the results of a civil rights investigation involving Blair as the subject.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY

November 14, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 5, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI RELATIVE TO CLIFTON BAIRD, BRENT HARDIN AND ARLIE BLAIR.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 5, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Utilizing identifying data for Baird, Hardin and Blair furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

Also available for the Committee's access are documents relating to Brent Hardin which were previously prepared on May 18, 1977, pursuant to the receipt of the Committee's request dated April 27, 1977, for these documents.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTM:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/14/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:

Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___

Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___

Legal Coun. m/jef
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

62-117290-361

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

McGuil

October 5, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Clifton Baird, 7813 Edsel Lane, Louisville, Kentucky.

2. Brent Hardin, 9102 Bristle Ave., Louisville, Kentucky.

3. Arlie Blair, 4025 Franklin Ave., Louisville, Kentucky, dob 9/3/32.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

Ltr to AAG/CD
JTM:sao
11/14/77

ENCLOS.

62-117290-361

Rec 10/5 JTW

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. [illegible]
STEWART [illegible], CONN.
CHARLES [illegible], NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 13 1977

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

DEC 14 11 29 AM '77
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL ROOM

RECEIVED

RECEIVED
DEC 15 1977
O.L.A.

Cd

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

2 House

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if our staff could have access to the following files:

a) Any and all materials or files pertaining to the organization known as the MINUTEMEN for the period 1966-1968 active in the states of Mississippi and Louisiana.

ST-114 REC-33 62-117290-356

c) Any records and files, excluding D.E.A. records requested in our letter of November 8, 1977 on:

Reynard J. Rochon
2200 Oriole Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

(1967 address)
7018 Dreux Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

21 JAN 4 1978

Your cooperation and prompt attention to this matter is greatly appreciated.

62-117290

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

GRB:ghe

cc: Danny O. Coulson

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
3 DEC 14 1977
D.A.O.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

57 JAN 12 1978

1-190

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO : The Associate Director

DATE: 12/22/77

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that the Director release from their secrecy agreements, SAs Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

DETAILS: By letter dated 12/20/77 -389 HSAC requested to interview SAs Harry L. Lee (former), SA Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen. By letter dated 11/8/77 320 the Committee requested permission to interview SA John B. Simpson, Richard A. Davis (former) and SA Jack T. Beverstein (former).

8

By letter dated 11/3/77 captioned Committee requested the identity of the case Agent most familiar with white hate activities in the period from 1965 to 1966. By letter dated 11/17/77 the Committee was advised that this Agent is SA Warren L. Walsh (former). By letter dated 12/9/77 the Committee requested permission to interview SA Robert Nichols (former). 332

RECOMMENDATION:

T 114 REC-46 62-117290-353

That the Director release from their employment agreement for purpose of interview by the captioned Committee the following individuals: Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

JAN

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Long
1 - Mr. Foster
2 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Coulson

DOC:dfj (8)

✓ Coulson 365

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

#245882

12/30/78

79 JAN 1 2 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

File #:

62-117290 - SECTION 6

Serial Scope:

353, 356, 361, 362, 366, 368, 369, 371, 372, 375, 376,

378
380
382X
385
390 THRU 395
397
400
404 THRU 409
413 THRU 415
418
420
421
424
426
428 THRU 431
433
437

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 2/10/78

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT,
RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, ST. LOUIS (62-5097)(C)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Re Bureau teletype to St. Louis, 2/10/78, captioned as above.

433

Enclosed under separate cover for Headquarters is a Xerox copy of each serial in SL 170-1767 and SL 170-1767 Sub A as was requested in retel. Also enclosed is destruction memoranda concerning SL 1495-E (former) substantive file. Case closed in St. Louis.

245852
12/30/78 Macpalle

③ Bureau
(1 - via package) (Enc. 1)
2- St. Louis
(1- 62-5097)
(1- 170-1767)
JLV:jtc
(5)

2cc - Congressional Inquiry Unit w/o Encl

REC 58 62-117290-437

EX-124

FEB 15 1978

4 - JFK 1+12cc (info)

AUG 28 1978 CB

Approved: HC ____ Transmitted ____ (Number) ____ (Time) Per ____

56 FEB 22 1979

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1 - Criminal Investigative Division
(Attn: J. E. McHale)
1 - Mr. G. J. Foster
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer
2/~~10~~9/78 per GJF

FM DIRECTOR (62-117290)

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

BT

E F T O

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF Classification
DATE 2/4/78 GAB/[illegible]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ST. LOUIS DATED JANUARY 25, 1978; 421 ST. LOUIS TELETYPES TO BUREAU JANUARY 27, 429 1978, AND JANUARY 31, 1978. 413

ON FEBRUARY 8, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED HIS STAFF HAD CONTACTED FORMER SL 1495-E, WHO HAS AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH THE HSCA. ON FEBRUARY 9, 1978, STAFF ATTORNEY MICHAEL EBERHARDT, HSCA, ADVISED THAT SL 1495-E HAS EXECUTED A SIGNED WAIVER AUTHORIZING HSCA ACCESS TO ALL FBI INFORMATION CONCERNING HIM, INCLUDING THAT PERTAINING TO HIS INFORMANT ACTIVITIES.

REC-65 62-117290-433

EX-110

22 FEB 13 1978

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 134-19686-

1 - 134-19686

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

JTA:lfj
(6)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

58 FEB 27 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

HB/DRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 09 1978
TELETYPE

FBI/DOJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO E F T O 62-117290

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN INFORMANT'S MAIN FILE AND SUB A FILE (170-1767) AND ONE COPY OF ANY VOUCHER OR DOCUMENT WHICH CONCERNS ANY ASPECT OF SOURCE'S OPERATION AND ANY PAYMENT WHICH WAS MADE TO HIM. ADDITIONALLY, PROVIDE FBIHQ WITH ONE COPY OF ANY MAIN FILE OR REFERENCE IN YOUR OFFICE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH INFORMANT.(~~S~~) U

THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBI HEADQUARTERS, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ, THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS OF STAFF MEMBERS OF HSCA, PROVIDED THE WAIVER DESCRIBED AS ABOVE IS RECEIVED.

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE: SL 1495-E (former) (Bureau file 134-19686) was operated from January, 1970, to approximately September, 1971, primarily targeted against White Hate Groups. In 1971, he traveled to Savannah, Georgia, at which time he reported on activities of the National States Rights Party office and that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, stated he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. This is the apparent HSCA interest in informant.

Referenced communications concern previous informal requests by the HSCA that we contact SL 1495-E to determine if he would be willing to be interviewed by the Committee. St. Louis contacted informant on 1/27/78 and he agreed, but two days later submitted a letter to St. Louis declining to be interviewed by the HSCA. Subsequently, the HSCA determined informant's identity through its investigation and contacted him, at which time, according to the HSCA, he agreed to interview. By letter to the Attorney General dated 1/26/78, the HSCA has asked for all information at FBI Headquarters and in the field concerning informant.

This matter has been coordinated with SA D. O. Coulson, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 2/1/78

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(Attention: Congressional Inquiry Unit,
Records Management Division)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (62-7385) (C)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS

ReButelcall to Chicago 2/1/78.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies each of ten letters from JERRY RAY to MARJORIE LOUISE FETTERS.

All of the above letters were originally received from the Newark Division in a Xeroxed condition thus the quality of the above enclosures is not entirely satisfactory. However, per referenced Bureau telephone call, Chicago will maintain the original Xerox copy in its file 44-1114.

2cc RETAINED → RETAINED RM 8988 JEH w/ encls.

③ - Bureau (Encls. 20) ENCLOSURE
1 - Chicago

WLD:jeo
(4)

EX-140

62-117290-431

REC-33

4 FEB 3 1978

245852

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/85 BY [illegible]

Approved: WFB/WLD Transmitted ______ (Number) (Time) Per ______

FEB 24 1978

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____
Asst. Dir.:____
Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Pers.____
Ident.____
Intell.____
Laboratory____
Legal Coun.____
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt.____
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____
Telephone Rm.____
Director's Sec'y____

JAN 5 4 52 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

N00140 0052135Z

RR HI

DE NO

R 052125Z JAN 78

FM NEW ORLEANS (66-2878) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED: JAN. 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DEC. 27, 1977. 351

I) SA STEPHEN M. CALLENDER OF THE NEW ORLEANS DIVISION WAS THE NEW ORLEANS FIELD OFFICE CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION. AT THE TIME SA CALLENDER WAS ASSIGNED THE "MURKIN" CASE, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE NUMBER SIX SQUAD IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE. THIS SQUAD HANDLED CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS. "MURKIN" WAS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF FORMER ASAC JOSEPH T. SYLVESTER, JR. THE NATURE OF CALLENDER'S ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY

EX-105 REC-56 62-117290-430

23 JAN 26 1978

4 - Gallinger

[illegible] 12/30/78 [illegible]

1cc [illegible]

42

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:na

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

58 FEB [illegible]

PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION WAS IN THE FIELDS OF CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS.

II) THE FILES OF THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE FAIL TO REVEAL THAT THIS OFFICE EITHER CONSIDERED OR ENGAGED IN ANY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COIN TEL PRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC).

NEW ORLEANS FILES WHICH INVOLVE THE SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF KING (NO 100-16800) AND THE SCLC (NO 100-16849) HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY REVIEWED. NEW ORLEANS WAS MERELY AN AUXILIARY OFFICE IN THESE INVESTIGATIONS, WITH ATLANTA BEING THE OO. THE EXTENT OF INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY NEW ORLEANS WAS THE COVERING OF LEADS IN LA., SET FORTH BY ATLANTA OR OTHER OFFICES. THESE TWO FILES WERE REVIEWED SERIAL BY SERIAL AND NOWHERE IS THERE ANY INDICATION WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SCLC BY THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE.

DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 - 1968, THE KING FILE IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AND THEN RUC'D AT LEAST SEVEN TIMES AND THE SCLC FILE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AT LEAST FIVE TIMES DURING THIS SAME PERIOD.

PAGE THREE NO 66-2878 E F T O

AIR MAIL COPY SENT ATLANTA DIVISION.

BT

SL0018 0272150

RR HQ

DE SL

R 272145Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (C)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

BT

E F T O

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 27 4 58 PM '78
DLS
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, ~~RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION~~

~~Rm Sec&Spec~~
~~Inq Section~~
~~3823 JEH TL#233~~

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

RE BUREAU TEL TO ST. LOUIS, JANUARY 25, 1978, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

SL 1495-E (FORMER) CONTACTED THIS DATE. HE WAS ADVISED OF HSCA'S EXISTENCE AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM CONCERNING CONTENTS OF LHM DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM - NSRP".

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS ADVISED THAT HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS. INITIAL REACTION OF SOURCE WAS THAT HE HAD NO STRONG OBJECTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY HSCA.

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS THEN ADVISED THAT CONFERENCES WITH HSCA

REC-56 62-117290-429

6 JAN 31 1978

Cotton

4-

54 FEB 23 1978

AND DOJ WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT DETAILS RE PROTECTION, CONFIDENTIALITY, LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

IT IS NOTED THAT SOURCE (FORMER) UNDERWENT MAJOR HEART AND ABDOMINAL SURGERY DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1977, IS CURRENTLY RECOVERING AND UNDER DOCTOR'S CARE. HE RESIDES 12350 OLD HALLS FERRY ROAD, FLORISSANT, MO., (314) 355-1500 AND IS UNEMPLOYED.

BT

#

Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____
Asst. Dir.:____
Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Pers.____
Ident.____
Intell.____
Laboratory____
Legal Coun.____
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt.____
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____
Telephone Rm.____
Director's Sec'y____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB778

JAN 31 5 20 PH '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

PAGE 01 LONDON 01641 311209Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00 INR-07
L-03 /025 W

FOSTER

------------------099858 312209Z /41

R 311204Z JAN 78

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2604

4 - [illegible]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LONDON 01641

5 - [illegible]

DC

EX-140

REC- 13

DE-3

V-29

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINR PDIP UK

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

62-117290-428

17 FEB 7 1978

REF: STATE 10886

~~56 FEB 22 1978~~

AUG 28 1978

FOR H (ASST SEC BENNET) AND EUR/NE

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFTEL, WE PASSED ON TO THE HOME OFFICE THE REQUEST OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS FOR ACCESS TO BRITISH POLICE RECORDS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS CONCERNED WITH THE ARREST OF JAMES EARL RAY WITHOUT THE COMMITTEE RESPONDING FIRST TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED PREVIOUSLY BY BRITISH OFFICIALS.

2. THE HOME OFFICE INFORMED THE EMBASSY ON JANUARY 26 THAT IT IS CONSULTING THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S REQUEST AND WILL LET US KNOW THE OUTCOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BREWSTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMU[illegible] L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEV[illegible]. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHA[illegible]HONE, NEBR.
HAR[illegible] SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

[illegible]

January 30, 1978

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

C

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

337

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a request was made by letter dated November 30, 1977, for FBI files relating to Dr. King. These files included the following:

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.
2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.
3. The file on the Memphis Sanitation Strike for the period January 1, 1968 through May 1, 1968.
4. The file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr./Poor People's March for the period December 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.
5. All materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the SCLC in the COINTELPRO file.

EX-111 REC-6 62-117290-426

21 FEB 6 1978

We have been advised that all of the above files are now available for review by the Committee.

It is now requested, however, that the foregoing files, except for the Memphis Sanitation Strike, be prepared for Committee review for the following extended dates:

62-117290

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

58 FEB 14 1978

42

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:
    - a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    - b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969

2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the periods:
    - a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    - b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969

3. The COMINFIL and COINTELPRO files as such relate to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:
    - a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    - b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969

4. The files on the Poor Peoples' March from May 1, 1968 to the closing date of this file.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:med

✓cc: Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRM[illegible]
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL [illegible]INE, OHIO
STEWART [illegible] KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES TH[illegible]E, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

2 Horse

Received
CIU
2/3/78

FEB 3 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the FBI provide the Committee with photographs of all Atlanta agents assigned to the security investigation of Dr. King during the period 1967-68. To the extent possible, these photographs should depict the agents involved as they appeared in 1967-1968 or as close thereto as possible.

R

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mej
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson FBI

62-117290

EX-124
REC-76
62-117290-424

FEB 7 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

57 FEB 15 1978

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1/25/78

FM DIRECTOR

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

BT

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Criminal Intelligence Div.
(Attn: Mr. J. E. McHale, Jr.)

EFTO

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE ST. LOUIS AIRTEL AND LHM TO BUREAU DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED, "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM-NSRP."

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN THAT CONNECTION, VARIOUS DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE FOR HSCA REVIEW.

ON JANUARY 23, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED THAT THE HSCA DESIRES TO INTERVIEW THE FBI INFORMANT WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION IN REFERENCED LHM. BLAKEY REQUESTED THAT INFORMANT BE CONTACTED AND ADVISED OF THE HSCA'S INTEREST IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT INFORMANT HAD ANY OBJECTIONS TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY

134-19686-
105-6233-

EX-124

REC-54 62-117290-421

JTA:sas (7)
1 - 134-19686
1 - 62-117290

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

6 FEB 1 1978

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JAN 25 1978
2212 SJT
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-10-86

HB/DR

58 FEB 14 1978

Foster
Rm 8988

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☒

FBI/DOJ

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA.

INFORMANT IS SL 1495-E (FORMER), WHO WAS OPERATED FROM JANUARY, 1970, TO APPROXIMATELY SEPTEMBER 1971. INFORMANT WAS PRIMARILY TARGETED AGAINST WHITE-HATE GROUPS AND WAS SUBJECT OF BUREAU FILE 134-19686 AND ST. LOUIS FILE 170-1767.

ON JANUARY 24, 1978, SUPERVISOR JAMES HAGGERTY DETERMINED THAT INFORMANT IS LISTED IN THE CURRENT ST. LOUIS TELEPHONE DIRECTORY AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CONTACT WITH INFORMANT SINCE HE WAS CLOSED IN 1971.

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY CONTACT FORMER SL 1495-E. ADVISE HIM OF THE HSCA'S EXISTENCE, AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM APPARENTLY CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF REFERENCED LHM. ADVISE HIM THE HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCED LHM AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER. DETERMINE AT THIS POINT ONLY HIS INITIAL REACTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA. IF HE HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO AN INTERVIEW, HE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT CONFERENCES WITH THE HSCA AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS

REGARDING THE EXTENT OF PROTECTION AND CONFIDENTIALITY THE HSCA IS WILLING TO EXTEND AS WELL AS DETAILS REGARDING THE LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

SUTEL RESULTS TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION.

BT

#

NOTE The HSCA plans to submit a formal request regarding this matter, but requested informant be contacted for his initial reaction to interview. The Congressional Inquiry Unit, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, agree this approach is best prior to continuing discussions to resolve legal and other issues.

The apparent interest of the HSCA involves informant's travel to Savannah, Georgia, in 1971 at which time he reported on activities at the NSRP Office in Savannah, as set forth in referenced communication. Informant reported that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, and J. B. Stoner, National Chairman, NSRP, were in the office when Jerry said that the FBI and he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. The HSCA has requested FBI information on the NSRP, Stoner, Jerry Ray and other individuals identified as being in attendance in the NSRP Office in Savannah during that time. One of the individuals present, Richard Geppert, was later developed as an informant of the Springfield Office. Geppert has been interviewed by the HSCA and has furnished a signed statement in which he gives authority for HSCA review of all FBI information concerning him, including that pertaining to his confidential relationship with the FBI.

This matter has been coordinated with Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Organized Crime Section, Criminal Investigative Division

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 14 4 52 AM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ME0013 0140930Z

RR HQ

DE ME

R 14 0930Z JAN 78

FM MEMPHIS (66-2197) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290)

BT

EFTO

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JAN. 13, 1978.

THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOE C. HESTER, NOW RETIRED, ON APRIL 4, 1968, AND WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON AUG. 1, 1977. THE MEMPHIS OFFICE DID NOT HAVE A SQUAD BREAKDOWN AT THE TIME THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA HESTER. SA HESTER WAS ASSIGNED GENERAL CRIMINAL WORK IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION. SA JOHNSON WAS ASSIGNED DOMESTIC SECURITY AND CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE TIME THE MURKIN CASE WAS REASSIGNED TO HIM.

EX-124 REC-54 62-117290-420

22 JAN 31 1978

R

4

Rm 89/85

2 copies made pgs 1-6
1/24/78 JTA: ma

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

12/30/85

1cc Rm 8988

42

58 FEB 14 1978

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4542 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS, RACIAL MATTERS," WAS FIRST OPENED ON AUG. 28, 1967, AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., NOW RETIRED, UNTIL IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON MARCH 7, 1968. IT REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. MEMPHIS OFFICE HAD NO SQUAD BREAKDOWN DURING THE PERIOD 1965-68. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, AND SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4704 ENTITLED "NEW LEFT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM", WAS OPENED ON MAY 15, 1968, AND ASSIGNED TO LAWRENCE J. OLSON. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON FEB. 29, 1971, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 12, 1971. SA'S OLSON AND JOHNSON WERE INVOLVED IN SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE A100-4046 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM" WAS ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, NOW RETIRED, ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

OPENED JULY 23, 1964, PLACED IN RUC STATUS APRIL 29, 1966; REOPENED AUG. 24, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS AUG. 30, 1966; REOPENED MARCH 31, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JUNE 13, 1967; REOPENED OCT. 18, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS DEC. 20, 1967. IT REMAINED IN RUC STATUS UNTIL DEC. 26, 1974.

SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE ON EACH OCCASION.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-576 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS" WAS FIRST OPENED ON SEPT. 4, 1964, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND SWAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON JUNE 15, 1965. THIS CASE WAS REOPENED JUNE 18, 1965, AND PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON SEPT. 9, 1965. IT WAS REOPENED JAN. 2, 1966, AND ASSIGNED TO SA LAWRENCE. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA MERRILL F. MC CLOUGHAN ON JUNE 3, 1966. SA MC CLOUGHAN IS NOW RETIRED. IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA ROBERT F. FITZPATRICK ON MAY 10, 1968, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTEC INVESTIGATIONS, SA HILLIN WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, SA MC CLOUGHAN WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATION, AND SA FITZPATRICK WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4105 ENTITLED MMARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS OPENED ON JAN. 2, 1965, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND WAS SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 11, 1968. SA LAWRENCE WAS ASSIGNED SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-166 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE" (COMINFIL SCLS) IS - C, WAS FIRST OPENED IN THE MEMPHIS OFFICE ON SEPT. 26, 1961. IT WAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS AND RE-OPENED A NUMBER OF

TIMES PRIOR TO PERIOD 1965-68. IT WAS OPENED AND ASSIGNED DURING THIS PERIOD AS FOLLOWS:

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., ON FOLLOWING OCCASIONS.

REOPENED JULY 12, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS NOV. 17, 1965; REOPENED NOV. 17, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JAN. 31, 1966, REOPENED APRIL 29, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS MAY 20, 1966.

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

REOPENED DEC. 19, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JULY 17, 1972.

SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE. SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE.

A REVIEW OF MEMPHIS COINTELPRO FILES AND FILES ON THE SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC REVEALED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND THE SCLC.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt. ✓
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 5 6 25 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

CG0014 0052317

RR HQ

DE CG

R 052317Z JAN 78

FM CHICAGO (62-7385)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DECEMBER 27, 1977. 351

(1)A) MURKIN INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER, CHICAGO 44-1114.

B) CHICAGO CASE AGENT RENE J. DU MAINE ASSIGNED TO ASAC SQUAD AS RELIEF SUPERVISOR - BANK ROBBERY COORDINATOR.

(2)A)(1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-35356.

(2) TITLE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM - C.

62-117290-418

EX-111 REC-

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION ON THE DATES INDICATED:

22 JAN 31 1978

JANUARY 7, 1965, CLAY M. BRADY, RUC JANUARY 24, 1965, [redacted]

12/30/85

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA: ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

4-

42

58 FEB 14 1978

REOPENED JANUARY 25, 1965 TO ROBERT F. BARRY, CLOSED MARCH 16, 1965, REOPENED MARCH 25, 1965 TO WILLIAM J. WHITE, RUC JULY 16, 1965, REOPENED JULY 19, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, RUC AUGUST 2, 1965, REOPENED AUGUST 11, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY, CLOSED AUGUST 27, 1965, REOPENED SEPTEMBER 13, 1965 TO R. L. STROMBERG, RUC SEPTEMBER 24, 1965, REOPENED OCTOBER 7, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, REASSIGNED NOVEMBER 22, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY WHO CONTINUED AS CASE AGENT UNTIL AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN 1968. THIS CASE WAS MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE CASE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR, SM - C INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY, WHO WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (B) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 105-16238.

(2) TITLE: COMINFILE, SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC), IS - C.

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOHN P. O'BRIEN, UNTIL OCTOBER 12, 1965, WHEN IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY THROUGH 1968. SA STANLEY WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5 UNTIL FEBRUARY, 1968 WHEN HE WAS DELETED. THE EXACT NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (C) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-32864.

(2) TITLE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, IS - C.

(3) A REVIEWW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION:

HERBERT K. STALLINGS UNTIL APRIL 22, 1965, REASSIGNED TO GENE E. ARNOLD UNTIL APRIL 27, 1967, REASSIGNED TO ROBERT O. MURPHY THROUGH 1968. ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WERE MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 2. THE SECTION, SQUAD OF ASSIGNMENT, AND THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THIS INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (D) A REVIEW OF ALL OTHER COINTELPRO INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY CHICAGO FAILS TO INDICATE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. OR THE SCLC WERE EVER MENTIONED IN THESE FILES OR TARGETS UNDER THESE PROGRAMS.

BT

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. [illegible]KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES T[illegible] NEBR.
HAROLD S. [illegible]R, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Received C14
1/31/78

January 26, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with this Committee's investigation of the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we would appreciate your assistance in obtaining access to any files or records in the possession of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, relating to the individuals and organizations noted below:

A. With respect to the Drug Enforcement Administration:

1) Charles Joseph Stein
Date of Birth: 5/11/29
FBI Number: 881-534-B

2) Anthony Charles DeCarvelho
Born: 1921
Residence: New Orleans

B. With respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

1) Jack Brown
Chattanooga, Tennessee

2) Lester Lee Andoss
Date of Birth: 2/23/45
S.S.N.: 410-78-8096
2165 or 2155 Clarksdale
Memphis, Tennessee

3) Hunter Pitts O'Dell
New Orleans, Louisiana

62-117290

EX-111 REC-13 62-117290-415

23 FEB 2 1978

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

57 FEB 14 1978

4) Earnest Donnell
Denham Springs, Louisiana

5) Robert DePugh, Norborne, Missouri
Head of the Minutemen organization

6) Sidney Barnes
1378 East Riviera Drive
Mobile, Alabama (1968)

7) "Maxey Ted"
New Orleans, Louisiana

8) Eddie Sopcjack
Date of Birth: 8/14/29
FBI Number: 186-485A

9) Thomas Tarrants

10) Samuel Caccamechi
Memphis, Tennessee

11) Robert Hood Strader
Lexington, Illinois

12) Raymond Starns
King David Apartments, Apt. 1
2816 David Drive
Metairie, Louisiana (1968)

13) Jerome Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana

14) Joseph Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana (now deceased)

15) Leonard Scott DelMonte
1229 North Bronson Street
Los Angeles, California

16) Allan O. Thompson
Date of Birth: 12/25/13

17) Dr. Russell C. Hadley
Date of Birth: 8/18/09
96 Moscow Road
Monte Rio, California

18) James E. Morrison
Los Angeles, California

19) Dr. Mark O. Freeman
Beverly Hills, California

20) Charles Calvin Bookman
Date of Birth: 9/6/13
FBI Number: 892-355

21) Rodney Arvidson
Date of Birth: 1/19/23
Post Office Box 2820
Long Beach, California

22) Tomas Reyes Lau
Date of Birth: 10/5/23
2047 Lemoyne
Los Angeles, California

23) Roy Emory Hargraves
El Monte, California

24) Raymond M. Murphy, aka "Fido"
Los Angeles, California

25) Lee Wilkinson
Los Angeles, California

26) Roman Kohnke
Los Angeles, California

27) Paul Lyon
Los Angeles, California

28) Jeri Salkin
Los Angeles, California

29) Ronald G. Hewitson
Garden Grove, California

30) Pat Olson
Date of Birth: 7/21/42
Quantico, Virginia

31) Robert Taylor, aka Bob Taylor
Los Angeles, California

32) Ronald Dennino
aka Ronald Gerald Dennino
Inmate at California State Prison
at San Quentin (1967 - 1968)

33) Richard Gonzales
Los Angeles, California

34) Roderic Burns Duff
Monrovia, California
1968 President of Los Angeles Chapter
of Citizens Council of America

35) R. J. Weiler
Los Angeles, California

36) Elizabeth Ann De Rouen
Date of Birth: 2/17/43
SSN: 453-62-1064
Los Angeles, California

37) Debbie Gold
Los Angeles, California

38) David Gregory
Buena Park, California

39) Rev. Xavier Von Koss
Hermora Beach, California

40) Robert Harold Gray
Los Angeles, California

41) Robert Keeley
Los Angeles, California

42) William K. Shearer
aka Bill Shearer
3166 Palm
Lemmon Grove, California

43) Robert Walters
Los Angeles, California

44) George Manum
Los Angeles, California

45) Robert J. Roe
Beverly Hills, California

46) Pamela Dillon
Los Angeles, California

47) Frank Marullo
New Orleans, Louisiana

48) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on Ku Klux Klan for the cities of Jacksonville and Miami, Florida for the period 1966 through 1968.

49) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on the following organizations for the period 1966 through 1968 for the cities of New Orleans, Louisiana; Birmingham, Alabama; Memphis, Tennessee; Chicago, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia; Los Angeles, California; and the State of Mississippi:

- a) Black Panthers
- b) Black Muslims
- c) American Nazi Party
- d) Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

50) Subfiles and/or investigative reports for the period 1966 - 1968 for the following organizations:

- a) Liberty Lobby
- b) The Sword
- c) The Fiery Cross
- d) The White Camelia
- e) The Silver Dollar Group

Your prompt cooperation will be most appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:msd
cc: Danny Coulson

1/18/78

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)

FROM : ACTING LEGAT, LONDON (62-604)(P)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

SUBJECT: JAMES EARL RAY, aka;
ET AL
CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE UNLAWFUL
FLIGHT TO AVOID CONFINEMENT - ESCAPE

ReLONlet 11/16/77.

Enclosed for information is a copy of an incoming telegram the American Embassy, London, received from Department of State on 1/14/78, and copy of Legat, London letter to the British Home Office dated 1/18/78.

Further pertinent information will be furnished when available.

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encs. 2)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
1 - London
RAK:ejg
(4)

62-117290-

NOT RECORDED
FEB 7 1978

Original Filed In

14
56 FEB 10 1978

12/31/85

UNITED STATES DEPARTME[illegible] OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Office of Legal Attache
American Embassy
Grosvenor Square
London, W1A 1AE

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 62-604

Your Ref.:

January 18, 1978

Mr. G. L. Angel
British Home Office
G-4 Division
Queen Anne's Gate
London, S.W. 1

Re: Request from House Select Committee on Assassinations to Meet with British Police Authorities

Dear Mr. Angel:

By way of background, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as authorized by the U. S. House of Representatives, is investigating the circumstances surrounding the murders of President J. F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The Chief Counsel and Staff Director requested contact be made with appropriate officials in the British Government to obtain authority to interview appropriate police officials who were involved in the arrest of James Earl Ray in London on June 8, 1968.

Assistant Legal Attache Dennis Dickson had contact with you on December 6, 1977 regarding this matter. At that time you requested the following:

A) Purpose or scope of inquiry;

B) Names of individuals to be interviewed and reasons therefor;

12/31/85

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

C) Intended use of results of inquiry, i.e., public hearings, etc., it being noted that any records maintained by the British police would be as the result of an official inquiry and this would normally be available for police use only, unless otherwise exempted by the British Government.

The Select Committee responded that due to the brevity of the 95th Congress, it was most important that representatives of the Select Committee be allowed to meet with appropriate members of New Scotland Yard who are knowledgeable about the KING-RAY investigation. The Committee advised they would be happy to meet personally with British Government officials in London to provide answers to the issues forwarded to them for clarification and elucidation.

I would be most appreciative if you would advise if this situation is agreeable to you.

Sincerely,

Dennis R. Dickson
Acting Legal Attache

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION/[illegible]	
[illegible]	
AMB	✓
MIN	✓
AMB/EX	✓
PAO	✓
POL	
POL/L	✓
POLAD	✓
E/MIN	✓
ECON	✓
COMCL	
E/SCI	
E/TRANS	
AGRI	
CUSTOMS	
DAO	✓
D.E.A.	
F.A.A.	
FBIS	
I.R.S.	
LEGATT	
MARITIME	
SUSLO	✓
TRADE	
TREAS	✓
USCG	
A/COUNS	
A/ATO	
A/B&M	
A/COMM	
A/GS	
A/PERS	
A/RFO	
A/SY	
A/VIS	
CCA	2
CG/CS	
CG/V	
R.F.	✓
CHRON	✓
LOG	
D.O.	✓
POUCH	
C/S	
USSS	

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ ~~JAN~~ 14 10 46

FROM: STATE

NO: 10886

NNNNVV FHG083EHV219
RR RUDTC
DE RUEHC #0886 0140951
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 140226Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON 7802
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS:PINR, PDIP, UK

SUBJECT:REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

RE: LONDON 20003

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENNET HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

OTAL:

PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL[illegible] WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVEST[illegible]ION MENTIONED IN BLA[illegible] LETTER AND ADVISE US [illegible]VANCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

January 25, 1978

Director, FBI

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

0

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

C

336
356

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

15

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAILED 17
JAN 25 1978
FBI

EX-111 REC-13 62-117290-414

20 FEB 2 1978

56 FEB 1 0 1978

14

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

[illegible]
DATE 12/30/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By teletype dated 12/27/77, field offices designated by the HSCA were advised of the contents of the HSCA letter of 12/13/77. Responses have been received. Rather than incorporate the voluminous results into a letter to the Committee, it is more practical to make available for HSCA access at FBIHQ incoming field office teletypes.

It should be noted that, under current operating procedures existing between the Department of Justice and the HSCA, disclosure of these agents' identities to the HSCA cannot be prevented. However, G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, has advised SA D. O. Coulson of Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, that, in absence of an overriding need to do otherwise, the HSCA will not publish the names of any agent personnel below the position of section chief. This policy would follow precedent of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which issued its report in 1976.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 25, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

In response to the above request, the following information is submitted:

On December 19, 1977, Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised that the Department of Justice would respond to Part A, Items 1 and 2 and Part B, Items 1 and 2, of the above request.

Regarding Part A, Item 3 and Part B, Item 3, the FBI field offices designated by the HSCA were requested to provide the information desired by the HSCA. Responses from these field offices have been received and copies of these documents are available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters.

With respect to Part A, Item 4, a review of FBI Headquarters indices disclosed no memoranda, records, documents and news releases generated by the FBI in connection with the MURKIN investigation, other than that contained in the MURKIN file, which has already been made available to the HSCA.

OTR
UTA:sas
(6) pas

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFIARS.

Assoc. Dir. __
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. __
Crim. Inv. __
Fin. & Pers. __
Ident. __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Insp. __
Rec. Mgnt. __
Spec. Inv. __
Tech. Servs. __
Training __
Public Affs. Off. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director's Sec'y __

PMS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE
62-117290-411

FBI/DOJ

In response to Part B, Item 4, it should be noted that HSCA request of November 30, 1977, asked for all FBI material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in the FBI's Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) file. By letter dated January 11, 1978, you were advised that representatives of the HSCA agreed to limit its request to COINTELPRO files involving the Communist Party USA and Black Nationalist-Hate Groups and to limit the period of HSCA interest from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968. On January 23, 1978, Staff Attorney Michael Eberhardt reiterated that the HSCA's interest is that period rather than the years 1965-1968 as set forth in the request of December 13, 1977. The above-mentioned COINTELPRO files and files of the King and SCLC security investigations from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, have been prepared for HSCA access. Therefore, based on knowledge of personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit processing HSCA requests regarding King, all material at FBI Headquarters, which may contain COINTELPRO-type activities against King and SCLC during the period January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, has been made available to the HSCA.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/25/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC[illegible]EY, CONN.
CHARLES THO[illegible]R.
HAROLD S. SAW[illegible]ICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee o[illegible]ssassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Executive Office of
Congressional Affairs
Dec. 14 – 2:41 pm. 1977

DEC 13 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation provide the following:

A. MURKIN Investigation

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who participated in any way in the direction or management of the MURKIN investigation and the Division and Section within the Department of Justice where these attorneys were then assigned;

2. Copies of all memoranda, records, documents, and news releases generated by the Department of Justice in connection with MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee;

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the MURKIN investigation for the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham

Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

ltr to AAG/CD
1/25/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:eas

62-117290-414

ENCLOSURE

4. Cop[illegible]s of all memoranda, reco[illegible]s, documents and news releases generated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with the MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee.

B. COINTELPRO

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who were in receipt of any information concerning the COINTELPRO activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

2. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the Department of Justice in connection with the COINTELPRO activities of the FBI as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during 1965 to 1968 from the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's actual assignment during that period:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham
Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami
Louisville

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

4. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the FBI in connection with the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 to 1968 which are not contained in the files requested by Committee letter dated November 30, 1977.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIR[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUE[illegible]E, OHIO
STEW[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHAR[illegible]ONE, NEBR.
HAROL[illegible]SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

House

Rec. CRD
3:45 PM
1/27/78.

January 17, 1978

~~[illegible] GOVERNMENT~~

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff access to the following:

1. All files, materials and information including, but not limited to, intelligence and security materials relating to the following organizations active in California for 1967-1969:
   - a) John Birch Society
   - b) American Independent Party
   - c) George Wallace Campaign
2. All files, materials and information, including, but not limited to, intelligence, surveillance and security materials for 1967-1968 pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his activities in California.

Your prompt attention to the request will be greatly appreciated.

62-117290-413

REC-65

RECORDED
6 JAN 31 1978

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

GRB:mkd
cc: Danny O. Coulson

57 FEB 7 1978

118

FEB 01 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 31, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl ✓
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

6

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

NR CG

Reference is made to a letter dated October 20, 1977, to Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in possession of the FBI to include the current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Enclosed are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

JTM:sas (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

EX-115

REC-65 62-112290-469

7 JAN 26 1978

2-ENCLOSURE

Delivered 11/2/77 JL

Signed and sent to SA Coulson for delivery to Dept. 11-1-77

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/83 BY [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

42

EB

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request by HSCA for information contained in the Bureau's files relative to William Herman Jackson. This matter has been coordinated with the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files, which are identifiable with Jackson, have been organized into folders for the Committee's access and are maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's space, Room 8988.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files include Jackson's current ident record, the results of an FBI investigation wherein Jackson was one of four subjects - captioned "Leslie Atkisons, aka, Et Al; Miscellaneous - Falsely Making or Forging Naval, Military or Official Pass," two references re a Foreign Police Cooperation Matter and two references re a Perjury Matter.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

October 31, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 20, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI TO INCLUDE A CURRENT FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION RECORD RELATIVE TO WILLIAM HERMAN JACKSON.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 20, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Utilizing identifying data for Jackson furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

JTM:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/31/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA).

409

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/98 BY [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. M
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

62-117290-409

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI/DOJ

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

October 20, 1977

Robert L. Keuch, Esq.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

The Select Committee on Assassinations would appreciate any and all information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record check relative to William Herman Jackson, FBI #801-218-G, D.O.B. 11/24/26.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB/EME/mae

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room 3659
Washington, D. C. 20530

Let to AAG/CD
10-31-77
JTM:aws (Enc-3)

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-409

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

CJ

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on November 16, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
Criminal Division
Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - William F. Kusch - Enclosure

ST-120 REC-63 62-117290-408

23 JAN 31 1978

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt. HNB/R
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

signed + sent 1/6/77

DOC:ldr

59 FEB 6 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/98

62-117290-408	COPY 63	DOC:ldr 12/29/77

The Deputy Attorney General HSCA
°HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney Generel Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on 11/16/77. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

COPY OF ABSTRACT FOR THIS SERIAL IS PLACED IN FILE
IN LIEU OF THE MAIL WHICH HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/03 BY

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

DATE: 12/19/77

FROM : SAC, PORTLAND (62-3144)

JGP/RR

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Enclosed herewith are five copies of an LHM relative to the interview of SA WILLIAM F. KUSCH, Portland Division, by staff members of the HSCA in Washington, D.C., on 11/16/77.

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (Encs. 5)
2 - Portland
WFK:ja
(4)

ST-120

REC-63 62-117290-407

1-31-78

Memo to AG 12-29-77

7 MAR 20 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-02

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Portland, Oregon

December 19, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

On November 16, 1977, SA William F. Kusch of the Portland Division of ~~the Federal~~ Bureau ~~of Investigation~~ (FBI) was interviewed at House Annex #2 in Washington, D.C., by Mr. Mark Speiser and Mr. Peter Beeson, members of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The interview with SA Kusch dealt with a period of time SA Kusch was assigned to the New Orleans Division of the FBI, specifically April, 1968. During April of 1968, SA Kusch, along with numerous other Special Agents assigned to the New Orleans Division, conducted many interviews with persons who had, or who might have had, knowledge of the activities or contacts of James Earl Ray during the period of time Ray, using the name Eric Galt, was in New Orleans.

Specifically, SA Kusch was questioned regarding his squad assignments in New Orleans, the identities of other squad members, the identity of his supervisor, his Agent in charge and his assistant Agent in charge at the time.

Further, SA Kusch was questioned relative to the content of several interview report forms (FD 302s) concerning interviews that he conducted and prepared appropriate FD 302s in connection therewith, or FD 302s covering interviews that he was a party to. House Select Committee on Assassinations members exhibited said FD 302s to SA Kusch to refresh his memory.

House Select Committee members in essence apparently desired SA Kusch to amplify or further expand on these interviews.

ALL I[illegible]
I[illegible] IS U[illegible]
[illegible] 12/30/75 [illegible]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE
62-117290-107

SA Kusch pointed out that as a result of the passage of nine and one-half years, for the most part he could not specifically recall the persons interviewed. To specific questions regarding the interviews, SA Kusch could only point out that if additional questions had been asked of these persons interviewed at the time, resulting in the receipt of any positive or pertinent information regarding Galt, that information would have been duly recorded on said FD 302s.

Both Mr. Speiser and Mr. Beeson were cordial and SA Kusch responded to their questions in a candid manner.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

January 26, 1978

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

(C) HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference ~~is~~ was made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which, in connection with HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested information pertaining to FBI electronic suveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2 (Secret Material Enclosed)

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure) (Secret Material Enclosed)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120

ENCLOSURE

REC-63 62-117290-406

23 JAN 31 1978

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MAILED 12
JAN 26 1978
FBI

ALL I[illegible] [illegible]D
H[illegible]EIN IS UNCL[illegible]
DATE 12/30/[illegible] BY [illegible]

58 FEB 6 1978

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Dates and places of electronic surveillance of King were compiled through file reviews conducted in connection with previous law suits filed against the FBI by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and a former SCLC officer and aide to King, Bernard S. Lee. Although names of specific SCLC affiliates were not provided by the HSCA in its request, all names are readily available to the Committee, which has received access to our files concerning King and SCLC.

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which requested information in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. This letter requested that the FBI determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The Committee indicated it only desired written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved, with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

In response to the above request, appropriate records at FBI Headquarters were reviewed with the following results:

Microphone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
January 5-7, 1964	Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C.
January 27, 1964	Shroeder Hotel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
February 18-20, 1964	Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii
February 20-21, 1964	Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, California
February 22-24, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
March 19-20, 1964	Statler Hotel, Detroit, Michigan

JTA:sas (6) SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR

DoD

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, & ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified by 6437~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

DECLASSIFIED BY
ON 12/31/98

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-106

FBI/DOJ

Dates of Surveillance	Location
April 23-24, 1964	Senator Hotel, Sacramento, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
September 28, 1964 - October 2, 1964	Manager Hotel, Savannah, Georgia
January 8-11, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
January 28-31, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
March 29-31, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
May 12-13, 1965	Sheraton Atlantic Hotel, New York City
October 14-15, 1965	Astor Hotel, New York City
October 28-30, 1965	New York Hilton Hotel, New York City
November 29-30, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
January 22, 1966	Americana Hotel, New York City

Telephone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
August 22-27, 1964	Claridge Hotel, Atlantic City, New Jersey
November 8, 1963 - April 30, 1965	Martin Luther King's residence
April 24-26, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
August 14, 1964 - September 6, 1964	Apartment 2B, 125 H. 72nd Street, New York City

SECRET

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Telephone Surveillances of SCLC

Dates of Surveillance	Location
October 23, 1963 - January 24, 1964 July 13-31, 1964	SCLC Office, New York City Room 1202, 14 E. 40th Street, New York City
November 8, 1963 - June 21, 1966	SCLC Office, Atlanta, Georgia

In an effort to respond to that portion of the HSCA's request concerning existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance of individuals directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC, personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit, FBI Headquarters, familiar with certain aspects of the King, SCLC and related files, compiled a list of individuals with the SCLC for the approximate period January, 1962, through 1968. Although this list is not all inclusive due to the large number of persons affiliated with the SCLC, an effort was made to include those individuals in key positions and who were most active in the organization. Most of the individuals listed were identified with the SCLC Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. Based on review of appropriate records at FBI Headquarters, none of the below-listed individuals has been subject of electronic surveillance by the FBI:

Ralph Abernathy
Jessie Jackson
Bernard S. Lee
Hosea Williams
James Orange
James Bevel
Andrew Young
Walter Fauntroy
Coretta Scott King
John Rutherford
William Rutherford
Bernard Lafayette
Dorothy Cotton
J. T. Johnson
Joseph E. Lowery
Fred L. Shuttlesworth
Cordy T. Vivian
Adele Kanter
Thomas C. Kilgore
Dora McDonald
James Harrison
Wyatt Walker
Logan Kearse
Stoney Cooks
Fred C. Bennett
Booker T. Bonner
Henry Brownlee
Golden Frinks
Joseph Lester Hankerson
Samuel B. Wells
Benjamin Johnson
Herbert V. Coulton
Thomas Offenburger
Mew Soong-Li
James Lawson
Lillian Hunter
Gloria Fraction
David Wallace
Jess Gill
Carole Hoover
Albert Turner
Frank Ditto
C. K. Steel
Samuel Williams
Curtis Harris
Cirillo A. McSween
Major Jones
Lawrence D. Reddick
I. M. Augustine
Septima Clark
T. Y. Rogers, Jr.

SECRET

Records at FBI Headquarters disclosed that the following individuals, formerly associated with the SCLC, were subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI (Secret).

Stanley David Levison
Clarence B. Jones
Hunter Pitts O'Dell
Bayard Rustin

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL [illegible] OHIO
STEWA[illegible]CY, CONN.
CHARLES [illegible]ONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Received Office of
Congressional Affairs
Dec. 15 3:54PM 1977

DEC 15 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance and determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of Dr. King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC.

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

let to AAG/CD
1/26/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:aws
1-OLA (enc)

GRB:mek

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

62-117290-406

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:	PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:
☐ Teletype	☐ Immediate	☐ TOP SECRET
☐ Facsimile	☐ Priority	☐ SECRET
☒ Airtel	☐ Routine	☐ CONFIDENTIAL
		☐ E F T O
		☐ CLEAR

Date 1/23/78

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: Records Management Division,
Congressional Inquiry Unit

FROM: SAC, SPRINGFIELD (62-2567) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Reurtel to SI, 1/19/78.

Enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of each serial in the following Springfield Division main files:

(1) 157-1792, serials 1-85 (189 pages);

(2) 44-1120, serials 1-5 (10 pages);

(3) 170-445, serials 1-23 (48 pages);

(4) 170-445A, serials 1-6 (11 pages).

Also enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of the following serial in the following Springfield Division file, reference identifiable with RICHARD GEPPERT:

(5) 157-1791, serial 23 (8 pages).

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:

Numerous serials contained in these files have been classified "Confidential".

ST-120

Springfield file 157-1792, serial 82, is a correlation memo showing GEPPERT was the subject of Springfield main

REC 65 62-117290-405

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (62-117290) (Encl 5)
1 - Springfield (62-2567)

9 JAN 26 1978

DJC/pme
(3)

DETACHED FILED for RM 5988 JEH for processing + HSCA access JTO 1/30/78

54 FEB 6 1978

Approved: ____ Transmitted ____ (Number) (Time) Per ____

8988

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

file 100-10245. This main file has been destroyed in accordance with the File Destruction Program.

BH0043 0131931

PP HQ

DE BH

P 131931Z JAN 78

FM BIRMINGHAM (66-2280) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) (PRIORITY)

BT

CLEAR

JAN 13 2 36 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTENTION OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

~~Sup. Sec. Spec.~~
~~Inq. Section~~
~~3825 JEH Bldg #23~~

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES, DECEMBER 27, 1977. 351

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. ONE: MURKIN INVESTIGATION ASSIGNED TO HENRY S. SNOW (DECEASED). PRIOR TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION SA SNOW WAS ASSIGNED TO GENERAL CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION.

EX-101
REC-36

62-117290-404

23 JAN 26 1978

12/30/05 Spmacmla

4-

1cc pu 8108

2 copies made pg 1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

124

IN ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. TWO: THERE WERE NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFORTS BY BIRMINGHAM AGENTS AGAINST MARTIN LUTHER KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 THROUGH 1968.

THE FOLLOWING WERE CASE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING: LAWRENCE GETTINGS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY AND CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED THAT TYPE OF INVESTIGATION; MARVIN M. EUBANKS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATION.

THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO INVESTIGATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE:

WILLIAM PERRY (DECEASED), PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO CRIMINAL SQUAD AND WORK; COLEMAN D. GEARY, III, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO BOMBING MATTERS; LAWRENCE GETTINGS (SUPRA); MARVIN M. EUBANKS (SUPRA) AND C. B. STANBERRY, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED AFTER A REVIEW OF BIRMINGHAM INDICES AND SUBSEQUENT FILE REVIEW.

BT

o House

Rec CTU 2:15PM 1/25/78

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUE[illegible]VI[illegible], OHIO
STEWA[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARL[illegible]NE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4524

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

JAN 20 1978

HAND DELIVER

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

C

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

By letter dated January 4, -375 197~~7~~8, this Committee requested access to materials, files, memoranda and miscellaneous items pertaining to Gerold Frank in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. These materials (94-63917) have been reviewed by the staff, and it would be appreciated, if the materials could be prepared for delivery, along with copies of the following additional items:

1) Section 78
   44-38861 - 5655
   " 5654
   5653

2) Section 84
   44-38861 - 5942
   " 5943
   " 5944
   " 5945
   " 5946

3) The MURKIN Legat tickler files for
   a) London
   b) Ottawa
   c) Mexico City
   d) Paris

EX-124 REC-79

62-117290-400

62-117290
20 JAN 27 1978

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

57 FEB 2 1978

JAN 20 1978

Additionally, it is requested that the Bureau begin to prepare for delivery all files, memoranda and miscellaneous items on William Bradford Huie for the years 1968 to the present.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:ghj
cc: Danny O. Coulson

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

January 26, 1978

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

Cx 0

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference ~~is~~ made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-139

2 - ENCLOSURE

REC-7

62-117290-397

MAILED 5
JAN 26 1978
FBI

JAN 27 1978

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

HB/DR

HB/DR

5 FEB 2 1978

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

12/30/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Former SA Nichols works and resides in Atlanta. The Atlanta Office has been in touch with him regarding the interview and he is awaiting further contact for final interview arrangements. These arrangements are handled informally by representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBIHQ.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

This memorandum is to confirm that former agent Nichols has been cleared from his employment agreement and is available for interview as needed by the HSCA. Arrangements for interview can be made through contact with representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBI Headquarters.

JTA:sas (6)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78. captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ✓
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

62-117290-391

12/30/85

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 9 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that ex-FBI agent Robert Nichols, formerly of the Atlanta field office, be made available to the Committee for interview on a priority basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

let to AAG/CD
1/26/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:sas
1-OLA (Enc)

62-117290-397

ENCLOSURE

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO 1/19/78

1 - Mr. Foster

#245852 Sprmacknee 12/30/85

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/11/82 BY SP-1GSK/PSR
225984

FM DIRECTOR

TO SPRINGFIELD (ROUTINE)

BT

E F T O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. BY LETTER DATED DECEMBER 30, 1977, TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE HSCA REQUESTED THE FBI PROVIDE ALL FILES, DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS CONCERNING RICHARD GEPPERT, BORN JULY 31, 1941, RESIDING AT 1340 NIEDRINGHAUS AVENUE, GRANITE CITY, ILLINOIS.

NR 8/25/78

BY LETTER DATED JANUARY 16, 1978, THE HSCA EXTENDED ITS REQUEST TO INCLUDE FIELD OFFICE FILES. THE HSCA ALSO FURNISHED A SIGNED STATEMENT OF GEPPERT, DATED DECEMBER 28, 1977, AUTHORIZING HSCA REVIEW OF ALL MATERIAL CONCERNING HIM IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI. IN THIS STATEMENT GEPPERT ALSO DISCLOSED THAT HE VOLUNTEERED TO HSCA STAFF MEMBERS THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF HIS INFORMANT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FBI.

170-5569-1

157-26213-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

JTA:sas (6)

1 - 157-26213

1 - 170-5569

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

EX-130

REC-46

62-117290-395

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 19 1978

JAN 23 1978

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

118

56 JAN 31 1979

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

FBI/DOJ

FBIHQ FILES DISCLOSED GEPPERT WAS SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD EXTREMIST MATTER INVESTIGATION (157-1792) IN 1972 AND SPRINGFIELD FILE 44-1120 FOLLOWING ALLEGED HARASSMENT BY OFFICERS OF THE GRANITE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IN 1975. HE WAS ALSO SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD FILE 170-445.

SPRINGFIELD PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN THE ABOVE THREE INVESTIGATIONS AND ONE COPY OF ANY OTHER MAIN FILE OR FILE REFERENCE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEPPERT. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS BY STAFF MEMBERS OF THE HSCA.

BT

#

NOTE: This teletype confirms telephonic communication with Supervisor Joseph Ondula of the Springfield Office on 1/19/78. This matter has been coordinated with SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 1/4/78

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (~~62-117296~~)
Attn: Congressional Inquiry Unit,
Special Investigative Division

Foster
Lawn

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (66-2242) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)
BUREAU DEADLINE - 1/13/78

Re FBIHQ teletype to numerous offices, including Atlanta, 12/27/77.

Referenced Bureau teletype indicated that the HSCA was currently conducting investigation into the assassination of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (MURKIN); and in connection with this investigation, the HSCA had requested the FBI provide the following:

(1) The identification of field office case agent(s) assigned to the MURKIN investigation in recipient offices and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation.

(2) Identification of the field office case agent(s) assigned to counterintelligence program (Cointelpro), efforts directed against KING and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) during the period 1965 - 1968 in recipient offices, and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the Cointelpro, KING, and SCLC investigations.

REC-36 62-117290-394

EX-130

In addition, recipients were to identify the case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of KING and SCLC, as well as the Cointelpro.

1 JAN 2 1978

2-Bureau
2-Atlanta (1-66-2242)
(1-44-2386) (MURKIN)

EAS/ljg
(4)

2 copies made pgs 1-5
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

Approved: Transmitted (Number) (Time) Per

JAN 30 1978 42

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

Atlanta has reviewed pertinent files as requested by FBIHQ, and the information sought by the HSCA is set forth below in chart form:

1. MURKIN
(Atlanta file 44-2386)

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/8/68 - 4/29/68	Atlanta - #3, Security/extremist Squad	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. PERRY	4/29/68 - 7/30/68	Atlanta #4 Fugitives	Fugitive investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/30/68 - 7/31/69	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	5/30/70 - 7/13/70	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	2/8/71 - 3/16/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/31/71 - 4/7/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/13/73 - 8/31/73	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	6/19/74 - 6/27/74	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	8/13/74 - 9/24/74	Atlanta - #8 Civil rights, thefts from interstate shipment (TFIS) Etc.	Civil rights matters

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
THOMAS J. WILSON	8/26/75 - 9/8/75	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights, TFIS
THOMAS J. WILSON	1/7/78 - 3/23/76	Atlanta - #8	"
JOHN J. HAYMAN	10/12/77 - 11/8/77	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights matters

2. Atlanta Agents assigned to/or who handled the Atlanta Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) during the period 1965 - 1968 in which efforts were directed against KING and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
CPUSA Cointelpro			
ALDEN F. MILLER	4/14/64 - 8/13/65	Atlanta - #3	Security Investigations
Cointelpro Black Nationalist-Hate Groups			
EDWARD U. CRIM	8/29/67 - 7/30/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist Investigations
CPUSA Negro Question; Communist Influence in Racial Matters (CIRM)-Cointelpro			

No case agent assigned - matters handled by:

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/1/64 - 8/20/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	2/4/64 - 8/21/64	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	7/22/65 - 4/15/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations

3. Identity of case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SM-C			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	3/7/61 - 5/12/61	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	2/28/62 - 10/16/62	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/9/63 - 7/31/63	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	11/6/63 - 5/21/65	Atlanta - #3	"
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	5/21/65 - 6/5/68	Atlanta - #3	"

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
Communist infiltration of the SCLC			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	4/17/62 - 12/1/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	12/1/64 - 4/26/66	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/26/66 - 3/12/71	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/12/71 - 5/23/73	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/10/73 - 10/20/73	Atlanta - #3	"

LS0003 0102106Z

RR HQ

DE LS

R 102106Z JAN 78

M LOUISVILLE (66-2612)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

JAN 10 4 19 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

~~Emp Sec&Spec Inq Section 5823 JEH TH#231~~

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA, DATED DECEMBER 27, 1977.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, APPROPRIATE REVIEW OF FILES MAINTAINED BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION REVEALED FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY HSCA.

(1) NOT APPLICABLE TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

(2) NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COINTELPRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST EITHER MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., OR SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND (SCEF), DURING PERIOD 1965-1968, COULD BE LOCATED IN REVIEW OF COINTELPRO AND SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-393

20 JAN 25 1978

JAN 10 4 22 PM '78

1CCRm8988

70 JAN 3 0 1978 42

12/30/88 SpMacphee

24 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA: ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

OF KING AND SCLC. NO COINTELPRO ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND SCLC BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., ASSIGNED SA GEORGE W. HUTCHINSON, JR. (RETIRED) MAY 14, 1965 - AUGUST 13, 1966, AND SA RICHARD B. VIVIAN JULY 30, 1976 - OCTOBER 20, 1976. LATTER ASSIGNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC ASSIGNED SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) SEPTEMBER 29, 1961 - OCTOBER 30, 1961; OCTOBER 17, 1963 - NOVEMBER 18, 1963; DECEMBER 14, 1963- JANUARY 22, 1964; JUNE 5, 1964 - JULY 8, 1964; SEPTEMBER 21, 1964 - OCTOBER 12, 1964; JUNE 2, 1965 - JULY 20, 1965; NOVEMBER 17, 1965 - JANUARY 20, 1966; JULY 13, 1966 - AUGUST 12, 1966; FEBRUARY 10, 1967 - MARCH 24, 1967; SA GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED) AUGUST 12, 1968 - JUNE 5, 1969; SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) JUNE 5, 1969 - JULY 29, 1969. SCLC (BUFILE 100-438794) (LS 157-90) INVESTIGATED BY LOUISVILLE AS "RACIAL MATTER" AND "INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST".

SPECIAL AGENTS GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED), WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) AND RICHARD B. VIVIAN ALL ASSIGNED LOUISVILLE SECURITY - CIVIL RIGHTS SQUAD PRIOR TO AND DURING ABOVE LISTED CASE ASSIGNMENTS.

BT

SL C[illegible]05 010195O

RR HQ

DE SL

P 101924Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

CLEAR

JAN 10 3 05 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

~~[illegible] #231~~

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JULY 27, 1977.

(1) FORMER SPECIAL AGENT HAROLD R. DOBSON WAS CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION, ST. LOUIS FILE 44-775, BUREAU FILE 44-38861, IN ST. LOUIS DIVISION. FORMER SPECIAL AGENT DOBSON WAS ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND HANDLED SECURITY TYPE CASES PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN MURKIN INVESTIGATION.

(2) ST. LOUIS FILE 157-5818 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS, BLACK NATIONALISTS, HATE GROUPS, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE" WAS OPENED AS A PENDING INACTIVE STATUS CONTROL FILE ON AUGUST 29, 1967.

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-392

20 JAN 25 1978

Aldhizer

4-J 2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:me
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1ccRm8988

42

12/30/98

ON FEBRUARY 27, 1968, THROUGH JANUARY 8, 1969, WAS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH OF SECURITY SQUAD AT ST. LOUIS DIVISION. HIS ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THIS CASE ASSIGNMENT WAS TO HANDLE SECURITY TYPE CASES.

ST. LOUIS FILE 100-17801, BUREAU FILE 100-106670, ENTITLED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER SPECIAL AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, JANUARY 15, 1965, THROUGH JANUARY 19, 1965, FEBRUARY 3, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 10, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. STEWART, APRIL 28, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 28, 1965; FORMER SPECIAL AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, NOVEMBER 11, 1965, THROUGH NOVEMBER 12, 1965, AND JUNE 14, 1966, THROUGH JUNE 17, 1966; FORMER AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, OPENING DATE UNKNOWN THROUGH JULY 6, 1966, AND MARCH 25, 1967, THROUGH MARCH 27, 1967.

ST. LOUIS FILE 105-4027, BUREAU FILE 100-438794, ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE; RM; IS - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, SEPTEMBER 23, 1964, THROUGH DECEMBER 10, 1964, AND MARCH 21, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 19, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 3, 1965, THROUGH JUNE 16, 1965; FORMER AGENT WALTER A.

PAGE THREE SL 62-5097 [illegible]EAR

HILG[illegible]NDORF, FEBRUARY 24, 1966, THROUGH DATE UNKNOWN; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 6, 1969, THROUGH JULY 23, 1969. THE ABOVE AGENTS AND FORMER AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO ST. LOUIS DIVISION SECURITY SQUAD DURING PERTINENT PERIOD.

A REVIEW OF ABOVE FILES DISCLOSED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE.

BT

#

LA0373 0431807Z

RR PP HQ

DE LA

P 131807Z JAN 78

FM LOS ANGELES (62-7841) (P) (1)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) PRIORITY

BT

EFTO

JAN 13 1 31 PM '78
NBB
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

✓ Cmp Sec&Spec Inq Section 3823 JEH TL# 231

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977, TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES.

George Foster

FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS COMMUNICATION AND RETEL THE TERM CASE AGENT(S) WAS DEFINED AS THE SINGLE AGENT TO WHOM THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED AND WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIRECTION AND FLOW OF THE INVESTIGATION.

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-391

IT IS NOTED THAT UNDER CAPTION "BERNARD S. LEE V. CLARENCE M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1185) BUFILE 62-117194, LA FILE 100-57229" AND "SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) V. CLARENCE

20 JAN 25 1978

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 12/30/85 [illegible]

4 [illegible] DH 120

2 copies made pgs 1-4
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc [illegible] 8988

42

[illegible] 1978

M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1186) BUFILE 62-117193, LA FILE 100-57229," LOS ANGELES HAS PERMANENTLY CHARGED OUT TO THE BUREAU SEVERAL SERIALS WHICH THEREFORE ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW. SERIALS WERE FROM FILES CAPTIONED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR; SECURITY MATTER-COMMUNIST; BUFILE 100-106670; LA FILE 100-57229"; "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SCLS; IS - C; BUFILE 100-438794 AND 100-442349; LA FILE 100-65141"; "CP-USA NEGRO QUESTION, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN RACIAL MATTERS; IS-C; BUFILE 100-3-116, LA FILE 157-859."

A REVIEW OF PERTINENT FILES WITHIN THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION BETWEEN THE YEARS 1965 - 1968 DETERMINED THE FOLLOWING:

. THE ABOVE FILE REGARDING COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SCLC WAS HANDLED ON THE SUBSTANTATIVE DESK SUPERVISED BY SA JOHN S. TEMPLE WHICH WAS DESIGNATED AS SQUAD NUMBER TWO. THIS SQUAD HANDLED INVESTIGATIONS OF RACIAL AND BLACK EXTREMIST MATTERS. THIS INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA LOUIS K. DE GEUS IN FEBRUARY 1965; SA R. ANDREWS PETERS IN

SEPTEMBER 1965; SA W. JAMES WOOD IN APRIL 1967; SA WALTER M. BRADY IN JANUARY 1968; AND SA E. RHEAD RICHARDS, JR. IN MAY 1968.

THE MAIN FILE ON KING WAS ASSIGNED TO SQUAD TWO AS ABOVE AND WAS ASSIGNED TO SA DE GEUS IN JANUARY 1965; SA PETERS IN MARCH 1965; SA WOOD IN JANUARY 1967; SA BRADY IN JUNE 1967: AND SA GEORGE E. AIKEN, JR. IN FEBRUARY 1968.

THE FILE REGARDING THE CP-USA INFILTRATION OF RACIAL MATTERS IS ONLY PERIPHERALLY CONCERNED WITH KING OR THE SCLC AND CONTAINS NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS AND OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN OTHER SUBSTANTATIVE FILES. WHILE NOT CLEAR, THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONTROLLED BY SA TEMPLE.

THE ENTIRE SUBSTANTATIVE FILE CAPTIONED "MURKIN; BUFILE 44-38861; LA FILE 44-1574" WAS COPIED AND SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU UNDER INSTANT CAPTION. THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED ON SQUAD NUMBER ONE WHICH WAS SUPERVISED BY SA WILLIAM JOHN NOLAN BUT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUPERVISED BY

SA TEMPLE. SQUAD NUMBER ONE HANDLED SECURITY TYPE INVESTIGATION INVOLVING THE CP-USA, SWP, ET CETERA. THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AS ASSIGNED JOINTLY TO SA'S LEROY W. SHEETS AND THEODORE J. A'HEARN ALTHOUGH SHEETS WAS APPARENTLY INVOLVED AS CASE AGENT ONLY DURING THE INITIAL STAGES IN APRIL 1968.

ALL OF THE ABOVE INDIVIDUALS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA'S BRADY, RICHARDS AND AIKEN ARE NO LONGER EMPLOYEES OF THE FBI.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MM0730 0132335
RR HQ
DE MM
R 132335Z JAN 78
FM MIAMI (62-6603)RUC
TO DIRECTOR (62-117290)ROUTINE
BT
E F T O

JAN 13 6 42 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977.

FOLLOWING IS NUMBERED PARAGRAPH REPLY TO REQUEST OF MIAMI SET OUT IN RE BUTEL:

1. "MURKIN". SA DAVID N. JELLISON, ASSIGNED APRIL 8, 1968: NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATE PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS. SA LEON E. FISH; ASSIGNED AUGUST 10, 1972 (RUC AUGUST 28, 1972); NUMBER 2 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS MAINLY CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS; SA JOSEPH T. O'LEARY; ASSIGNED JULY 30, 1976 (RUC AUGUST 3, 1976), FBIHQ ADMINISTRATIVE REQUEST; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNED APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS. SRA JOHN S. ATWATER; ASSIGNED JUNE 3, 1977 (RUC JUNE 6, 1977), SINGLE INTERVIEW; WEST PALM BEACH RA;

~~Emp Sec&Spec~~
Section
TL#231

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-390

20 JAN 25 1978

4-AFDH12

12/30/98 Spmacpnre

1cc fm 8988

42

2 copies made pgs 1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 12/13/77 request. (See Bufile #62-117290)

IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS GENERAL CRIMINAL AND SECURITY.

2. A. "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SM-C. "SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 THROUGH 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE NATURE, INCLUDING LOCAL CPUSA GROUP.

B. "COMINFIL OF SCLC; IS - C." SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 TO MAY 2, 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS, SEE PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

SA JOHN C. MENTON, ASSIGNED MAY 2, 1968 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS.

C. "COINTELPRO; BLACK EXTREMISTS; RACIAL MATTERS." FILE OPENED MARCH 7, 1968, ASSIGNED SA JOHN C. MENTON, STILL PENDING TO MENTON DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENT SET OUT IN PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

BT

#

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JAN 16 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

372

By letter dated December 30, 1977, this Committee requested material pertaining to Richard Geppert in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In view of the fact that the Committee has since delivered to the FBI the written consent of Mr. Geppert to view all materials relating to his informant relationship with the FBI, it is intended that our December 30th request for materials and documents concerning Mr. Geppert include those found in any field office files.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

REC-56 62-117290-385

EX-130

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

7 JAN 23 1978

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

GRB:mej
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

70 JAN [illegible] 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

December 1, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files regarding the National States Rights Party (Item #2) and Jesse B. Stoner (Item #3). By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, modification of these items was made, details of which are outlined in the enclosed memorandum.

EW

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum in response to the above mentioned requests. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

62-117290-382X

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120 REC-42 ~~62-117290-3916~~

22 FEB 22 1978

12/7/77

EW

3 - ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

APPROVED:

Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___

Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___

Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

YCF

JSC

PMS

MAY 2 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DATE 12/30/85

PMS

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Since there were no National States Rights Party (NSRP) subfiles for offices requested by the HSCA, the entire NSRP file for 1967 through 1968 was processed for access. All information retrievable in FBI Headquarters files regarding Stoner was processed.

Names of knowledgeable case agents provided in attached memorandum were obtained through review of FBIHQ files and confirmed by Supervisor Jack Byrd of the Savannah Office. The HSCA can advise which agent(s) it desires to interview regarding the NSRP and Stoner.

[illegible] - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/03 BY

December 1, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. Under Item #2 of this letter information concerning the National States Rights Party (NSRP), Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to areas covered by offices in Savannah, Georgia; Atlanta, Georgia; Memphis, Tennessee; Birmingham, Alabama; St. Louis, Missouri, and Springfield, Illinois, was requested. Under Item #3 information was requested concerning Jesse B. Stoner.

By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, the above requests were modified. Under Item (c) this letter requested the FBI's complete file on Stoner and that the agent(s) in the Office of Origin assigned to the Stoner investigation for the period 1966 through 1968 be made available for interview by the HSCA. Concerning the NSRP, under Item (d) this letter asked the FBI to provide information in its files to cover the period 1967 through 1968. In addition, the case agent(s) in the Office of Origin for the same period would be made available for interview.

In response to the above requests, information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the NSRP (period 1967 through 1968) and Jesse B. Stoner have been processed and are available for review at FBI Headquarters by the HSCA. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from FBI Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 12/1/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

62-117290-382x

~~62-117290-3796~~

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

PMS

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ

The Savannah Office of the FBI was Office of Origin in both the NSRP and Stoner investigation during the period of HSCA interest. The following agents of that office were case agents in the Stoner investigation: Carlton Dillard, January, 1966 - April 1967; William P. Friday, April, 1967 - October, 1967; John H. Murphy, October 1967 - September, 1969. With variation of only a few days, these same Agents were case agents in the investigation of the NSRP. Dillard is now retired. Friday and Murphy are currently assigned to the Savannah Office and are scheduled to retire December 31, 1977.

APPROVED:

Director_____
Assoc. Dir._____
Dep. AD Adm._____
Dep. AD Inv._____

Adm. Serv._____
Crim. Inv._____
Fin. & Pers._____
Ident._____
Intell._____
Laboratory_____

Legal Coun._____
Plan. & Insp._____
Rec. Mgnt._____
Spec. Inv._____
Tech. Servs._____
Training_____
Public Affs. Off._____

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee o[illegible]ssassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFF[illegible]BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF
CONGRESSIONAL
AFFAIRS
NOV 15 11 PM 1977

NOV 3 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals and organizations be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Lawrence J. Callanan (deceased) Steamfitters Union (AFL) Local 562, St. Louis, Mo. for the Period 1967 through 1971.

2. National States Rights Party, 591 Cherokee, Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, but limited to reports and information in areas covered by offices in Savannah, Ga.; Atlanta, Ga.; Memphis, Tn.; Birmingham, Al.; St. Louis, Mo.; and Springfield, Ill.

3. Jesse B. Stoner, 591 Cherokee, N.W., Marietta, Ga.

4. Conservative Society of America for the period 1967 through 1968. (Headquarters in New Orleans, La.

ltr to AAG/CD (Enc-2)
12/1/77
JTA:aas

5. Kent Courtney, 1413 Texas Avenue, Alexandria, La. for the period 1967 through 1968.

62-117290-382X

62-117290-382X ENCLOSURE ~~62-117290-~~

6. KKK (limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in Birmingham, Alabama, Los Angeles, California, Atlanta, Georgia and Louisville, Kentucky during the period 1967 through 1968).

7. Morris Davis, RFD, Hoover, Shelby County, Ala.

8. White Citizens Council (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in New Orleans, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

9. Forever White, (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in New Orleans, La; Baton Rouge, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

10. Charles Joseph Stein, dob 5/11/29.

11. Percy Belcher, ex-deputy Sheriff, Birmingham, Alabama, for the period 1967 through 1968.

12. Robert Powers, Powers Junction, Intersection Highways 11 and 90, Orleans Parrish, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

13. Sam DiPiazza, Pamela Place, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

14. Dr. Lucas DiLeo - (office) 8603 St. Bernard Highway, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

15. Salvadore L. Licciardi (Liccardi), New Orleans, Louisiana for the period 1967 through 1968.

16. Gus Joseph Prosch, dob 11/17/30, 3122 Callecita, Sacremento, California. (Arrested in Birmingham, Alabama in December, 1971 and convicted of violating Gun Control Act in 1972.)

17. Quentin B. Davis, owner of Gun Rack, Birmingham, Alabama for the period 1967 through 1968.

18. Clifford Andrews (aka, R. L. Warren), Box 75, Toronto 14, Ontario, Canada.

19. Walter Jack Youngblood, Monticello Street, Dallas, Texas.

20. Johnny Benelli, #303, 175 North Orange Drive, Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

21. Claude Cockrell, dob 5/10/36, FBI # 389804E, for the period 1967 through 1968.

22. Gene Pearson Crawford, dob 10/2/27 for the period 1967 through 1968.

23. Fleet Edwards, dob 2/4/21 for the period 1967 through 1968.

24. Raoul Esquivel - (Raul Victor Esquibel), dob 11/17/26, 4524 Parsimmon, Metairie, La. (This request includes, but is not limited to, Bureau File 44-26940.)

25. Southern Christian Leadership Conference

    a. General file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

    b. Cointelpro file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

26. James Bevel, for the period 1965 through 1968.

27. Rev. Jessie Jackson, Chicago, Ill., for the period 1965 through 1968.

28. Vincent DePaul Stelly, 4434 5th Ave., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

29. Jerome Wallis Vernon, Home Service Laundry and Dry Cleaning, 5280 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

30. Rev. James Orange, South Carolina for the period 1965 through 1968.

31. Rev. Bernard Lee, Atlanta, Ga., for the period 1965 through 1968.

32. Allan Lee Stoddard, "Vegas Club", 5510 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

33. Robert Byron Watson, SS# 253-85-2220, Atlanta, Ga..

34. Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1962 through 1968. (This request pertains to material exclusive of the Murkin File and the SCLC files and should include all information regarding threats to Dr. King.

35. Herman A. Thompson, 10454 Goodwood Blvd.,
Baton Rouge, La., (former deputy sheriff in
Baton Rouge).

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

NOV 8 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a conference was held on November 7, 1977 between employees of the FBI and members of the Committee staff to discuss the Committee's November 3, 1977 letter of request for FBI materials on thirty-five individuals or organizations. As a result of this meeting, the following was resolved:

(a) The FBI would process the following numbered requests as they were originally stated in the November 3rd letter: 1, 4, 5, 7, 9-11, 13-24, 26, 28-33 and 35.

(b) The Committee would provide dates of births on the individuals in requests nos. 12 and 27 before the FBI would process these names. The dob on Robert J. Powers (request no. 12) is 6/5/24. The dob on Reverend Jesse Jackson (request no. 27) is 10/8/41.

(c) Besides prodiding the complete file on request no. 3 (Jesse B. Stoner), the FBI would also make available the most appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin assigned to Stoner for the period 1965 through 1968.

(d) With respect to request no. 2, the FBI would provide all [illegible] 1957 [illegible] as well as make available the appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin for the same period.

~~62-117290-3896~~

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-382X

(e) With respect to request no. 6, the Committee would hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI provides a list of the most appropriate case agent(s) in the offices of origin for the several Klan organizations in existence in 1967 and 1968. (While such was not part of the understanding reached at the time of the meeting with FBI officials, the Committee would request however that all materials related to the United Klan of America LS for the period 1965 and 1966 be made ready for inspection by November 20, 1977.)

(f) With respect to request no. 8, the FBI would first advise the Committee as to the identity of other cities reporting on the White Citizens Council before a determination be made as to the final content of this request.

(g) With respect to request no. 25, the Committee will hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s) for the period in question.

(h) With respect to request no. 34, the Committee requests that only the thirteen "death threat" files on Dr. King be processed at this time, while a request for all other materials is held in abeyance until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s).

In Addition, the Committee would also request that the following agents be notified and made available by the FBI:

(1) Special Agent William F. Kusch - New Orleans
Special Agent Thomas E. Duhadway - New Orleans

(2) Special Agent Jack B. Simpson - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Richard H. Davis - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Jack T. Beverstein - Memphis ATLANTA

As a priority item, it is also requested that the FBI provide the Committee with the work or personnel records of the following three Louisville FBI agents for the month of September 1965:

(1) Robert Peters

(2) William Duncan

(3) Bernard Brown

We are primarily interested in those records reflecting their [illegible] records should be provided by November 15, 1977. The Committee would also ask that all three of the above-mentioned Louisville agents be made available for interview by the same date.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB605

Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____
Asst. Dir.:____
Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Pers.____
Ident.____
Intell.____
Laboratory____
Legal Coun.____
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt.____
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____
Telephone Rm.____
Director's Sec'y____

PAGE 01 STATE 010886

JAN 14 7 04 AM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ORIGIN EUR-12 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 L-03 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00
INR-07 /025 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/NE: JPSHUMATE

APPROVED BY EUR/NE: RLFUNSETH

H - ASCHNEE (BY PHONE)

------------------015192 141012Z /10

R 140226Z JAN 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

EX-136

4 - Foster
(info)

E.O. 11652:N/A

REC-6 62-117290-380

TAGS:PINR, PDIP, UK

JAN 18 1978

SUBJECT:REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

FWD. SUP.

RE: LONDON 20003

58 JAN 26 1978

MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH

THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVESTIGATION MENTIONED IN BLAKEY'S LETTER AND ADVISE US. VANCE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENN[illegible] HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWI[illegible] LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CH[redacted]
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

[redacted]IE, OHIO
[redacted]KINNEY, CONN.
C[redacted]ES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House [redacted]

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 9, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

51

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff, access to the following:

1. All files, materials, and information relating to William Hugh Morris, the alleged leader of the Federated KKK in Alabama.
   a) Address (late 1950's)
      2128 East Fifth Street
      Oak Park
      Montgomery, Alabama
   b) Jefferson County Alabama
      Sheriff's Office Number 52811

Your prompt attention to this request will be greatly appreciated.

REC-30 62-117290-578

EX-130

Respectfully

14 JAN 18 1978

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

62-117290

GRB:ghk

cc: Danny Coulson

218 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, [illegible]AIRM[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

[illegible]EL L.[illegible]INE, OHIO
[illegible]ART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 5, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

(C)

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available for interview, on a priority basis, the following agents:

1. Theodore A'Hearn - Los Angeles
2. Leroy W. Sheets - Los Angeles
3. Thomas J. Wilson - Atlanta
4. Gerald Galbreath - El Paso

} 10/7 LET cleared

The Committee is ready to interview these agents on an immediate basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

✓CC: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:wwd

EX-130

REC-30

62-112290

62-112290-376

14 JAN 18 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

[illegible] 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SA[illegible], OHIO
STE[illegible]INNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 4, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

HAND DELIVER

Cu

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available to the Committee access to all F.B.I. materials, files, memoranda, airtels, and miscellaneous items, including but not limited to any contained in the MURKIN File (44-38861), on or referring to the following individual:

Gerold Frank - author
d.o.b. 8/2/1907
current address: 930 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10021

It is requested that access to these materials be provided on a priority basis so that our initial review can be completed by January 16, 1978.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

EX-130

REC 28

62-117290-37

GRB:ghd

cc: Danny Coulson

JAN 17 1978

58 JAN 24 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JAN 3 11 23 AM '78
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
MAIL ROOM

DEC 30 1977

RECEIVED
JAN 4 1978
O.L.A

Cd

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it has been determined from a review of the Chicago field office file (No. 44-1114) of the MURKIN investigation that the FBI is in possession of several letters of correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters. (See, for example, serials 271, 335, 496, 560, 574, 621, and 637 in the Chicago field office file.) It is requested that the FBI furnish this Committee with copies of all correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

ST-125 REC-55 62-117290-372

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

23 JAN 10 1978

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
10
JAN 3 1978
O.R.O.M.
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

24

79 JAN - 1978

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

WASHINGTON, D.C.
PM
DEC 30
1977
200

ALWAYS USE ZIP CODE

Louis Stokes
M.C.

Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th & Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 3, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

ST

Director, FBI

C 0

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

NR CC

Reference is made to the letter from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, to the Attorney General, dated August 9, 1977, requesting availability of all FBI reports relative to robbery of the Bank of Alton, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967. Reference is also made to the letter from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, dated September 13, 1977, requesting a copy of all FBI reports in this bank robbery investigation.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above HSCA request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

ST-120 REC-45 62-117290-371

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

20 JAN 9 1978

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

10/4/77

3 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

79 JAN 20 1978 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DATE 12/3/85

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: The Alton bank robbery occurred at the time James Earl Ray was a fugitive, prior to King's assassination. Ray was considered a suspect in this robbery subsequent to being identified as King's killer. No evidence was produced to link Ray with the robbery. The case was closed unsolved in 1972.

In its request of 8/9/77, the HSCA asked for access to our investigation into this bank robbery and the file was prepared. Later, the HSCA submitted a second request which requested "a copy of any and all materials or reports" in the Alton bank robbery. Mr. Keuch advised on 9/19/77, that delivery should be limited only to investigative reports in the case. The requested material was picked up at FBIHQ on 9/19/77 by Oliver Champion, HSCA messenger. Purpose of enclosed memorandum is to confirm delivery of this material.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

October 3, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

This will respond to letter dated August 9, 1977, to the Attorney General from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, and letter dated September 13, 1977, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA.

This letter is to confirm that, pursuant to the above request dated September 13, 1977, a copy of each investigative report of the FBI in the Alton bank robbery, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967, was delivered to a representative of the HSCA on September 19, 1977.

JTA:sas (9)
sas

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Direcotr, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/3/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. M/JF
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. M/cur
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-371

FBI/DOJ

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE-BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

August 9, 1977

RECEIVED
AUG 19 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20430

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we request that you make available to us all investigative reports relative to the robbery of the Bank of Alton, Illinois, on July 13, 1967.

Best wishes and kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

EME:ek

Ltr to AAG/CD
10-3-77
JTA:aas
1-OLA

144-72-662
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
11
AUG 19 1977
O.R.O.M.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

62-117290-3

CIV. RIGHTS DIV.

ENCLOSURE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVIN[illegible]IO
STEWART B. MC[illegible], CONN.
CHARLES THONE, [illegible].
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 13, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and our conversation with your office on Monday, September 12, 1977, we are hereby requesting a copy of any and all materials or reports the Federal Bureau of Investigation has regarding the Alton Bank Robbery in Alton, Illinois on July 13, 1967; as well as a copy of any other materials the Department of Justice may have in its possession relevant to this matter.

I appreciate your cooperation and assistance in this request, and I look forward hearing from you.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

SJL/GRB/drj

9-

62-117290-371

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 10, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

C

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertinent to seven listed individuals.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request and advises that material on six of these individuals is available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters. Information on the seventh individual, Randolph Erwin Rosenson, was previously furnished the HSCA by FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120

11/17/77

62-117290-369

REC-55

23 JAN 30 1978

2 - ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

79 JAN 16 1978

APPROVED:		
	Adm. Serv. ____	Legal Coun. M/DEF
	Crim. Inv. ____	Plan. & Insp. ____
Director ____	Fin. & Pers. ____	Rec. Mgnt. ____
Assoc. Dir. ____	Ident. ____	Spec. Inv. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____	Intell. ____	Tech. Servs. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____	Laboratory ____	Training ____
		Public Affs. Off. ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By request dated 9/20/77, the HSCA asked for information concerning Rosenson. By letter to the Attorney General and its enclosures, both dated 10/13/77, information concerning Rosenson was delivered. The HSCA request dated 10/18/77, (attached) desired information on seven individuals, including a repeat on Rosenson's name.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 10, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertaining to:

Harvey Gene Love
George G. Pittman
Stephanie Helene Sheehan
Jonathon Henry Shea
Keith Albert Wright
Frank Quenqui
Randolph Erwin Rosenson

Retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the above individuals, with the exception of Rosenson, has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions or deletions. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

By FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977, documents containing information concerning Rosenson were provided the HSCA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/05

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/10/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA).

62-117290-369

Assoc. Dir. __
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. __
Crim. Inv. __
Fin. & Pers. __
Ident. __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Insp. __
Rec. Mgnt. __
Spec. Inv. __
Tech. Servs. __
Training __
Public Affs. Off. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director's Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED: ENCLOSURE

Director __
Assoc. Dir. __
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __

Adm. Serv. __
Crim. Inv. __
Fin. & Pers. __
Ident. __
Intell. __
Laboratory __

Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Insp. __
Rec. Mgnt. __
Spec. Inv. __
Tech. Servs. __
Training __
Public Affs. Off. __

FBI/DOJ

ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Aid.

October 18, 1977

King Investigation

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attn: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the Select Committee's investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Martin Luther King, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff materials in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation relating to the following individuals for the period of time from January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968: 6/1/69

Put in for Search 1/1/67 - 6/1/69 10/25

NAME	Date of Birth	FBI Number
✓Love, Harvey Gene	4/1/35	592-813A
✓Pittman, George G.	6/20/38	919-933C
✓Sheehan, Stephanie Helene	7/26/53	951-133N4
✓Shea, Jonathon Henry	6/12/47	688-958J2
✓Wright, Keith Albert	7/27/44	122-750H
✓Quenqui, Frank	12/9/08	160-8374
Rosenson, Randolph Erwin	3/20/34	34-711E

In addition, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the staff the criminal records for these individuals. This written request confirms an oral request made by myself to Mr. Dan Coulson on October 18, 1977 in the offices of the Committee.

Thank you.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:DM
copy to: Dan Coulson

Ltr to AAG/CD
11/10/77 (Enc-2)
JTA:aas

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-369

Assistant Attorney General FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 11, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

309

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance regarding certain individuals and a business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

Del'd 11/17/77

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

APPROVED:

Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.

Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory

Legal Coun. M/D
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

ST-120

REC-55 62-117290-368

23 JAN 10 1978

2- ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
~~Spec. Inv.~~
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

79 JAN 16 1978 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/21/83 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By memorandum dated 5/13/68, the Department was asked for authority to place technical surveillance on the telephones of James Earl Ray's brother-in-law and sister, Albert and Carol Pepper and the Grapevine Tavern, all located in St. Louis, Missouri. This memorandum also requested microphone surveillance be installed at the residence of Albert and Carol Pepper, the residence of Ray's brother, John Larry Ray, and at the Grapevine Tavern. FBIHQ files contain no information to indicate the Department of Justice took any action on this request. Following Ray's apprehension the Department, in memorandum dated 6/11/68, was advised that the FBI's request for electornic surveillance was withdrawn. The above information is contained in the King Assassination June file and has been processed for access of the HSCA.

The HSCA's request of 11/7/77, desired only written confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance on the above individuals and business during the period 1/1/67 to 12/31/68.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 11, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance against the following individuals and business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper.
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri.

This memorandum is to confirm that, based on a review of appropriate files at FBI Headquarters, the above were not subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI during the period January 1, 1967, to December 31, 1968, or at any other time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/95 BY

JTA JTA:sas su (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/11/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

APPROVED:
Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-368

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHA[redacted]MAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SA VINE, OHIO
ST CKINNEY, CONN.
CHA NE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

[redacted]

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

NOV 7 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance to determine whether any of the following individuals and places were the subject of such surveillance during the period of January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence or non-existence of such electronic surveillance with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Ack to AAG/CD
JTA:aus
11/11/77 (Enc-2)

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-368

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

C O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that former Special Agent Joe C. Hester was interviewed on November 21, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Hester's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
Criminal Division
Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - Joe C. Hester - Enclosure

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

ST-120
REC-55 62-117290-366

23 JAN 10 1978

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

DOC:ldr
(10)

ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

signed & sent 1/6/77

12/31/83

79 JAN 16 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Memphis, Tennessee
December 5, 1977

JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM;
CIVIL RIGHTS - CONSPIRACY

On November 21, 1977, retired Special Agent Joe C. Hester appeared at Washington, D. C., at the request of the House Committee on Assassinations.

Mr. Hester met with the Committee staff in their offices at Washington, D. C., and was interviewed for a total of four hours by two different groups of five persons each. Both groups were affable and were not in any way critical of the investigation conducted in this case.

The first group of five interviewers asked a variety of questions but seemed to be particularly preoccupied with the investigation conducted by Legats in Mexico. Mr. Hester was able to answer many of the general questions regarding the activities of Legats but referred them to Assistant Director Richard Long when they began to ask more specific questions regarding the investigations by Legats and the manner of transmittal of this information to FBI Headquarters.(U)

The second group of five interviewers asked more general questions regarding the Bureau's investigation of the King murder. They seemed to be greatly concerned with the allegation of conspiracy. Mr. Hester advised them that he believed the conspiracy theory was an invention by the Department of Justice to be used to justify the FBI's investigation of Dr. King's murder. Mr. Hester advised them that he had never personally believed there was a conspiracy and he did not believe that any of his FBI superiors had ever believed in the conspiracy theory. Mr. Hester further advised that it was his personal opinion that James Earl Ray, acting alone, had murdered Dr. King and that his subsequent travels were probably financed by armed robbery.

12/12/85
#345832

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Memo to DAG, 12-29-77

62-117290-366

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

This group was concerned with how the subject Ray had known how to obtain false documents following his arrival in Canada. Mr. Hester pointed out that a "Top Ten" criminal had been arrested in Canada and had been returned to the Missouri State Penitentiary and had served time there with James Earl Ray prior to Ray's escape. Mr. Hester indicated it was his belief that this "Top Ten" fugitive had been responsible for instructing Ray on how to proceed in obtaining false documents in Canada.

This group touched on such diverse elements as the information furnished by John McFerren regarding Frank Liberto, and one of the interviewers agreed that they had not believed McFerren to be a very reliable witness. They also discussed Ray's purchase of the rifle in Birmingham; the fact that Officer Redditt was moved from the firehouse near the Lorraine Motel just prior to the murder; what motive did Ray have for killing Dr. King; whether or not there was any evidence to indicate a conspiracy; whether or not there were any wiretaps and whether or not there had been any surreptitious entries made against King and his followers at Memphis prior to the assassination; and when, following his escape, did Ray appear to have made up his mind to assassinate Dr. King.

In addition, they asked numerous questions about the political climate in Memphis just prior to the assassination and inquired as to what investigation was being conducted by the FBI in regard to the Sanitation Workers Strike and the first march conducted by Dr. King. Mr. Hester was forced to admit that he had had nothing to do with the investigation of Dr. King prior to the murder and he suggested that they talk to current Special Agent Howell S. Lowe who would be in a position to furnish information in this regard.

They inquired about the interview of James Earl Ray conducted by former Special Agent in Charge Robert G. Jensen, former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle, and Mr. Hester at the state prison in Nashville, Tennessee, following Ray's plea of guilty. Mr. Hester recounted as best he could recall the events that transpired in connection with this attempted interview and advised the interviewers that former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle has suffered a cerebral hemmorrhage and possibly might not be competent to furnish information regarding this investigation.

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

The Committee indicated that they might desire to interview Mr. Hester again, either personally or telephonically, and they were assured that he would be available and agreeable to assisting them in any way possible.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
~~Fin. & Pers.~~ ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____ JAM
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's S

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Robert L. Keuch ~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ack.
KI

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

cc: ✓Mr. Aldhizer

ST
Cd

DEC 8 1977

#17
1-4-78

ACF
BD

✓Danny O. Coulson
SSA - Div 11
NSOM
67-623562

Drew J. Clark
SSA - Div 9
NSOM
67-592700

ST-120

REC-54 62-117290-362

John T. Aldhizer, III
SSA - Div 5
NSOM
67-606490

memo to Robert L. Keuch Special Council to the AG — Foster 8981

12-22-77
CAM:jmR

NI-8981

7 9 JAN 12 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Robert L. Keuch
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

cc: Mr. Aldhizer

CARBON COPY

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 14, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn; Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to a letter dated October 5, 1977, addressed to Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in the possession of the FBI pertaining to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material, as well as limited material pertaining to Hardin, previously prepared for the Committee's access, is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Enclosed are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

ST-120

JTM:sas (8)

REC-54

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-117290-36

11/17/77

20 JAN 6 1978

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

79 JAN 12 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY Sp|macpwe

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request dated 10/5/77, from HSCA for all information contained in Bureau files relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair. This request has been coordinated with the Legal Counsel Division.

A review of Bureau files has revealed that a limited number of documents relating to an attempted bombing of Brent Hardin's automobile had been prepared for the Committee's access pursuant to receipt of their request dated 4/27/77. The Committee was advised of the availability of these documents on 5/18/77. The remaining retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair have been prepared for the Committee's access and are being maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's Room 8988 for their review.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files pursuant to the Committee's request dated 10/5/77, include Baird's ident record, the results of a civil rights investigation involving Baird as the subject, and references to Blair appearing in the MURKIN file, numerous references to Hardin and the results of a civil rights investigation involving Blair as the subject.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn:
November 14, 1977
Mr. Coulson)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 5, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI RELATIVE TO CLIFTON BAIRD, BRENT HARDIN AND ARLIE BLAIR.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 5, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Utilizing identifying data for Baird, Hardin and Blair furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

Also available for the Committee's access are documents relating to Brent Hardin which were previously prepared on May 18, 1977, pursuant to the receipt of the Committee's request dated April 27, 1977, for these documents.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTM:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/14/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:

Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___

Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___

Legal Coun. m|Jcf
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

62-117290-361

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assa[illegible]ations
U.S. House of Represe[illegible]ves
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

McGeil

October 5, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Clifton Baird, 7813 Edsel Lane, Louisville, Kentucky.
2. Brent Hardin, 9102 Bristle Ave., Louisville, Kentucky.
3. Arlie Blair, 4025 Franklin Ave., Louisville, Kentucky, dob 9/3/32.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

Ltr to AAG/CD
JTM:sas
11/14/77

ENCLOS.

62-117290-361

Rec 10-5
JTM

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. [illegible]
STEWART [illegible], CONN.
CHARLES [illegible], NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 13 1977

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

DEC 14 11 29 AM '77
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL ROOM

RECEIVED

RECEIVED
DEC 15 1977
O.L.A.

CJ

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

2 House

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if our staff could have access to the following files:

a) Any and all materials or files pertaining to the organization known as the MINUTEMEN for the period 1966-1968 active in the states of Mississippi and Louisiana.

ST-114 REC-33 62-117290-356

c) Any records and files, excluding D.E.A. records requested in our letter of November 8, 1977 on:

Reynard J. Rochon
2200 Oriole Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

(1967 address)
7018 Dreux Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

21 JAN 4 1978

Your cooperation and prompt attention to this matter is greatly appreciated.

62-117290

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

GRB:ghe

cc: Danny O. Coulson

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
3 DEC 14 1977
D.A.O.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

57 JAN 12 1978

1-190

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

TO : The Associate Director   DATE: 12/22/77

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that the Director release from their secrecy agreements, SAs Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

DETAILS: By letter dated 12/20/77 -389 HSAC requested to interview SAs Harry L. Lee (former), SA Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen. By letter dated 11/8/77 326 the Committee requested permission to interview SA John B. Simpson, Richard A. Davis (former) and SA Jack T. Beverstein (former).

By letter dated 11/3/77 captioned Committee requested the identity of the case Agent most familiar with white hate activities in the period from 1965 to 1966. By letter dated 11/17/77 the Committee was advised that this Agent is SA Warren L. Walsh (former). By letter dated 12/9/77 the Committee requested permission to interview SA Robert Nichols (former).

332

8

RECOMMENDATION: T 114   REC-46   62-117290-353

That the Director release from their employment agreement for purpose of interview by the captioned Committee the following individuals: Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

JAN

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Monahan
- 1 - Mr. Long
- 1 - Mr. Foster
- 2 - Mr. Hotis
- 1 - Mr. Coulson

DOC:dfj (8)

3651

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. #245852
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

12/30/77

JAN 12 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

File #:

62-117290 - SECTION 6

Serial Scope:

353, 356, 361, 362, 366, 368, 369, 371, 372, 375, 376,

378
380
382X
385
390 THRU 395
397
400
404 THRU 409
413 THRU 415
418
420
421
424
426
428 THRU 431
433
437

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 2/10/78

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT,
RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, ST. LOUIS (62-5097)(c)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Re Bureau teletype to St. Louis, 2/10/78, captioned as above.

433

Enclosed under separate cover for Headquarters is a Xerox copy of each serial in SL 170-1767 and SL 170-1767 Sub A as was requested in retel. Also enclosed is destruction memoranda concerning SL 1495-E (former) substantive file. Case closed in St. Louis.

24582

12/30/78 RJ Macpolie

③ Bureau
(1 - via package)(Enc. 1)
2- St. Louis
(1- 62-5097)
(1- 170-1767)
JLV:jtc
(5)

2cc - Congressional Inquiry Unit w/o Encl

REC 58

62-117290-437

EX-124

FEB 15 1978

4 - JFK 1+12cc (info)

AUG 28 1978 CB

Approved: HC

Transmitted ________ ________ Per ________
(Number) (Time)

56 FEB 22 1979

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

wfk

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1 - Criminal Investigative Division
(Attn: J. E. McHale)
1 - Mr. G. J. Foster
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer
2/~~10~~9/78 per GJF

FM DIRECTOR (62-117290)

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

BT

E F T O

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF Classification
DATE 2/14/78 GAB/RLB

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ST. LOUIS DATED JANUARY 25, 1978; [421] ST. LOUIS TELETYPES TO BUREAU JANUARY 27, [429] 1978, AND JANUARY 31, 1978. [413]

ON FEBRUARY 8, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED HIS STAFF HAD CONTACTED FORMER SL 1495-E, WHO HAS AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH THE HSCA. ON FEBRUARY 9, 1978, STAFF ATTORNEY MICHAEL EBERHARDT, HSCA, ADVISED THAT SL 1495-E HAS EXECUTED A SIGNED WAIVER AUTHORIZING HSCA ACCESS TO ALL FBI INFORMATION CONCERNING HIM, INCLUDING THAT PERTAINING TO HIS INFORMANT ACTIVITIES.

REC-65 62-117290-433

134-19686-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

EX-110

22 FEB 13 1978

1 - 134-19686

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

JTA:lfj
(6)

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
ENCLOSED

2 FEB 10 55

HB/DRJS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 09 1978
TELETYPE

58 FEB 27 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI/DOJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO E F T O 62-117290

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN INFORMANT'S MAIN FILE AND SUB A FILE (170-1767) AND ONE COPY OF ANY VOUCHER OR DOCUMENT WHICH CONCERNS ANY ASPECT OF SOURCE'S OPERATION AND ANY PAYMENT WHICH WAS MADE TO HIM. ADDITIONALLY, PROVIDE FBIHQ WITH ONE COPY OF ANY MAIN FILE OR REFERENCE IN YOUR OFFICE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH INFORMANT.~~(S)~~ U

THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBI HEADQUARTERS, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ, THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS OF STAFF MEMBERS OF HSCA, PROVIDED THE WAIVER DESCRIBED AS ABOVE IS RECEIVED.

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE: SL 1495-E (former) (Bureau file 134-19686) was operated from January, 1970, to approximately September, 1971, primarily targeted against White Hate Groups. In 1971, he traveled to Savannah, Georgia, at which time he reported on activities of the National States Rights Party office and that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, stated he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. This is the apparent HSCA interest in informant.

Referenced communications concern previous informal requests by the HSCA that we contact SL 1495-E to determine if he would be willing to be interviewed by the Committee. St. Louis contacted informant on 1/27/78 and he agreed, but two days later submitted a letter to St. Louis declining to be interviewed by the HSCA. Subsequently, the HSCA determined informant's identity through its investigation and contacted him, at which time, according to the HSCA, he agreed to interview. By letter to the Attorney General dated 1/26/78, the HSCA has asked for all information at FBI Headquarters and in the field concerning informant.

This matter has been coordinated with SA D. O. Coulson, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 2/1/78

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(Attention: Congressional Inquiry Unit,
Records Management Division)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (62-7385) (C)

SUBJECT: 0 HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS

ReButelcall to Chicago 2/1/78.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies each of ten letters from JERRY RAY to MARJORIE LOUISE FETTERS.

All of the above letters were originally received from the Newark Division in a Xeroxed condition thus the quality of the above enclosures is not entirely satisfactory. However, per referenced Bureau telephone call, Chicago will maintain the original Xerox copy in its file 44-1114.

2 cc RETAINED → RETAINED RM 8988 JEH w/ encls.

③ - Bureau (Encls. 20) ENCLOSURE
1 - Chicago

WLD:jeo
(4)

EX-140

4-0

62-117290-431

REC-33

4 FEB 3 1978

245852

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/88 BY SP1 mac/mro

Approved: WFB/WLD

Transmitted ________ (Number) (Time) Per ________

FEB 24 1978

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

N00140 0052135Z

RR HI

DE NO

R 052125Z JAN 78

JAN 5 4 52 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FM NEW ORLEANS (66-2878) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED: JAN. 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DEC. 27, 1977. 351

I) SA STEPHEN M. CALLENDER OF THE NEW ORLEANS DIVISION WAS THE NEW ORLEANS FIELD OFFICE CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION. AT THE TIME SA CALLENDER WAS ASSIGNED THE "MURKIN" CASE, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE NUMBER SIX SQUAD IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE. THIS SQUAD HANDLED CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS. "MURKIN" WAS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF FORMER ASAC JOSEPH T. SYLVESTER, JR. THE NATURE OF CALLENDER'S ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY

EX-105 REC-56 62-117290-430

23 JAN 26 1978

4 - Gitelinger

245888

12/30/78

1cc [illegible] 7688

42

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:na

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

58 FEB [illegible]

PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION WAS IN THE FIELDS OF CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS.

II) THE FILES OF THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE FAIL TO REVEAL THAT THIS OFFICE EITHER CONSIDERED OR ENGAGED IN ANY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COIN TEL PRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC).

NEW ORLEANS FILES WHICH INVOLVE THE SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF KING (NO 100-16800) AND THE SCLC (NO 100-16849) HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY REVIEWED. NEW ORLEANS WAS MERELY AN AUXILIARY OFFICE IN THESE INVESTIGATIONS, WITH ATLANTA BEING THE OO. THE EXTENT OF INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY NEW ORLEANS WAS THE COVERING OF LEADS IN LA., SET FORTH BY ATLANTA OR OTHER OFFICES. THESE TWO FILES WERE REVIEWED SERIAL BY SERIAL AND NOWHERE IS THERE ANY INDICATION WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SCLC BY THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE.

DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 - 1968, THE KING FILE IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AND THEN RUC'D AT LEAST SEVEN TIMES AND THE SCLC FILE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AT LEAST FIVE TIMES DURING THIS SAME PERIOD.

PAGE THREE NO 66-2878 E F T O

AIR MAIL COPY SENT ATLANTA DIVISION.

BT

SL0018 0272150

RR HQ

DE SL

R 272145Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (C)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

BT

E F T O

JAN 27 4 58 PM '78
DLS
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, ~~RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION.~~

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

~~Sec&Spec Inq Section 3823 JEH TL#231~~

RE BUREAU TEL TO ST. LOUIS, JANUARY 25, 1978, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

SL 1495-E (FORMER) CONTACTED THIS DATE. HE WAS ADVISED OF HSCA'S EXISTENCE AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM CONCERNING CONTENTS OF LHM DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM - NSRP".

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS ADVISED THAT HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS. INITIAL REACTION OF SOURCE WAS THAT HE HAD NO STRONG OBJECTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY HSCA.

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS THEN ADVISED THAT CONFERENCES WITH HSCA

REC-56 62-117290-429

6 JAN 31 1978

4

54 FEB 23 1978

AND DOJ WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT DETAILS RE PROTECTION, CONFIDENTIALITY, LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

IT IS NOTED THAT SOURCE (FORMER) UNDERWENT MAJOR HEART AND ABDOMINAL SURGERY DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1977, IS CURRENTLY RECOVERING AND UNDER DOCTOR'S CARE. HE RESIDES 12350 OLD HALLS FERRY ROAD, FLORISSANT, MO., (314) 355-1500 AND IS UNEMPLOYED.

BT

#

Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Pers.____
Ident.____
Intell.____
Laboratory____
Legal Coun.____
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt. B
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____
Telephone Rm.____
Director's Sec'y____

①

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB778

JAN 31 5 20 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

PAGE 01 LONDON 01641 311209Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00 INR-07
L-03 /025 W

FOSTER

------------------099858 312209Z /41

R 311204Z JAN 78

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2604

L COVERNMENT

4 - J.T. Aldhizer

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LONDON 01641

5 - Legat

DC

EX-140

REC- 13

DE-3

V-29

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINR PDIP UK

⓪

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

62-117290-428

FEB 7 1978

REF: STATE 10886

~~56 FEB 22 1978~~

AUG 28 1978

FOR H (ASST SEC BENNET) AND EUR/NE

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFTEL, WE PASSED ON TO THE HOME OFFICE THE REQUEST OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS FOR ACCESS TO BRITISH POLICE RECORDS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS CONCERNED WITH THE ARREST OF JAMES EARL RAY WITHOUT THE COMMITTEE RESPONDING FIRST TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED PREVIOUSLY BY BRITISH OFFICIALS.

2. THE HOME OFFICE INFORMED THE EMBASSY ON JANUARY 26 THAT IT IS CONSULTING THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S REQUEST AND WILL LET US KNOW THE OUTCOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BREWSTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMU[illegible] L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEV[illegible]. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHA[illegible] HONE, NEBR.
HAR[illegible] SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

O House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

[redacted]

January 30, 1978

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

C

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

337

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a request was made by letter dated November 30, 1977, for FBI files relating to Dr. King. These files included the following:

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.
2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.
3. The file on the Memphis Sanitation Strike for the period January 1, 1968 through May 1, 1968.
4. The file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr./Poor People's March for the period December 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.
5. All materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the SCLC in the COINTELPRO file.

EX-111 REC-6 62-117290-426

21 FEB 6 1978

We have been advised that all of the above files are now available for review by the Committee.

It is now requested, however, that the foregoing files, except for the Memphis Sanitation Strike, be prepared for Committee review for the following extended dates:

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

62-117290

58 FEB 14 1978

42

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:
   a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
   b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the periods:
   a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
   b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
3. The COMINFIL and COINTELPRO files as such relate to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:
   a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
   b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969
4. The files on the Poor Peoples' March from May 1, 1968 to the closing date of this file.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:med

✓cc: Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRM[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible]INE, OHIO
STEWART [illegible] KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES TH[illegible]E, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

2
House

Received
CIU
2/3/78

FEB 3 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the FBI provide the Committee with photographs of all Atlanta agents assigned to the security investigation of Dr. King during the period 1967-68. To the extent possible, these photographs should depict the agents involved as they appeared in 1967-1968 or as close thereto as possible.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

R

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mej
✓cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson FBI

62-117290

EX-124
REC-76
62-117290-424

FEB 7 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

PW

57 FEB 15 1978

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1/25/78

FM DIRECTOR

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Criminal Intelligence Div.
(Attn: Mr. J. E. McHale, Jr.)

BT

EFTO

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE ST. LOUIS AIRTEL AND LHM TO BUREAU DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED, "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM-NSRP."

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN THAT CONNECTION, VARIOUS DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE FOR HSCA REVIEW.

ON JANUARY 23, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED THAT THE HSCA DESIRES TO INTERVIEW THE FBI INFORMANT WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION IN REFERENCED LHM. BLAKEY REQUESTED THAT INFORMANT BE CONTACTED AND ADVISED OF THE HSCA'S INTEREST IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT INFORMANT HAD ANY OBJECTIONS TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY

EX-124

REC-54 62-117290-421

134-19686-
105-66233-

[illegible] COPY FILED [illegible]

JTA:sas (7)
soo

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

6 FEB 1 1978

1 - 134-19686
1 - 62-117290

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 25 1978
2212 SJT
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-10-86 Spmacpmea

42
58 FEB 14 1978

HB/DR
AJQ

Foster
Rm 8988

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

FBI/DOJ

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA.

INFORMANT IS SL 1495-E (FORMER), WHO WAS OPERATED FROM JANUARY, 1970, TO APPROXIMATELY SEPTEMBER 1971. INFORMANT WAS PRIMARILY TARGETED AGAINST WHITE-HATE GROUPS AND WAS SUBJECT OF BUREAU FILE 134-19686 AND ST. LOUIS FILE 170-1767.

ON JANUARY 24, 1978, SUPERVISOR JAMES HAGGERTY DETERMINED THAT INFORMANT IS LISTED IN THE CURRENT ST. LOUIS TELEPHONE DIRECTORY AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CONTACT WITH INFORMANT SINCE HE WAS CLOSED IN 1971.

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY CONTACT FORMER SL 1495-E. ADVISE HIM OF THE HSCA'S EXISTENCE, AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM APPARENTLY CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF REFERENCED LHM. ADVISE HIM THE HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCED LHM AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER. DETERMINE AT THIS POINT ONLY HIS INITIAL REACTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA. IF HE HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO AN INTERVIEW, HE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT CONFERENCES WITH THE HSCA AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS

REGARDING THE EXTENT OF PROTECTION AND CONFIDENTIALITY THE HSCA IS WILLING TO EXTEND AS WELL AS DETAILS REGARDING THE LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

SUTEL RESULTS TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION.

BT

#

NOTE The HSCA plans to submit a formal request regarding this matter, but requested informant be contacted for his initial reaction to interview. The Congressional Inquiry Unit, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, agree this approach is best prior to continuing discussions to resolve legal and other issues.

The apparent interest of the HSCA involves informant's travel to Savannah, Georgia, in 1971 at which time he reported on activities at the NSRP Office in Savannah, as set forth in referenced communication. Informant reported that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, and J. B. Stoner, National Chairman, NSRP, were in the office when Jerry said that the FBI and he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. The HSCA has requested FBI information on the NSRP, Stoner, Jerry Ray and other individuals identified as being in attendance in the NSRP Office in Savannah during that time. One of the individuals present, Richard Geppert, was later developed as an informant of the Springfield Office. Geppert has been interviewed by the HSCA and has furnished a signed statement in which he gives authority for HSCA review of all FBI information concerning him, including that pertaining to his confidential relationship with the FBI.

This matter has been coordinated with Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Organized Crime Section, Criminal Investigative Division

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 14 4 52 AM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ME0013 0140930Z

RR HQ

DE ME

R 14 0930Z JAN 78

FM MEMPHIS (66-2197) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290)

BT

EFTO

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JAN. 13, 1978.

THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOE C. HESTER, NOW RETIRED, ON APRIL 4, 1968, AND WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON AUG. 1, 1977. THE MEMPHIS OFFICE DID NOT HAVE A SQUAD BREAKDOWN AT THE TIME THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA HESTER. SA HESTER WAS ASSIGNED GENERAL CRIMINAL WORK IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION. SA JOHNSON WAS ASSIGNED DOMESTIC SECURITY AND CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE TIME THE MURKIN CASE WAS REASSIGNED TO HIM.

R

EX-124 REC-54 62-117290-420

22 JAN 31 1978

4

12/30/85

Rm 89/85

2 copies made pgs 1-6
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc Rm 8988

42

58 FEB 14 1978

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4542 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS, RACIAL MATTERS," WAS FIRST OPENED ON AUG. 28, 1967, AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., NOW RETIRED, UNTIL IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON MARCH 7, 1968. IT REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. MEMPHIS OFFICE HAD NO SQUAD BREAKDOWN DURING THE PERIOD 1965-68. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, AND SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4704 ENTITLED "NEW LEFT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM", WAS OPENED ON MAY 15, 1968, AND ASSIGNED TO LAWRENCE J. OLSON. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON FEB. 29, 1971, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 12, 1971. SA'S OLSON AND JOHNSON WERE INVOLVED IN SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE A100-4046 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM" WAS ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, NOW RETIRED, ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

OPENED JULY 23, 1964, PLACED IN RUC STATUS APRIL 29, 1966; REOPENED AUG. 24, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS AUG. 30, 1966; REOPENED MARCH 31, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JUNE 13, 1967; REOPENED OCT. 18, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS DEC. 20, 1967. IT REMAINED IN RUC STATUS UNTIL DEC. 26, 1974.

SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE ON EACH OCCASION.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-576 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS" WAS FIRST OPENED ON SEPT. 4, 1964, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND SWAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON JUNE 15, 1965. THIS CASE WAS REOPENED JUNE 18, 1965, AND PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON SEPT. 9, 1965. IT WAS REOPENED JAN. 2, 1966, AND ASSIGNED TO SA LAWRENCE. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA MERRILL F. MC CLOUGHAN ON JUNE 3, 1966. SA MC CLOUGHAN IS NOW RETIRED. IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA ROBERT F. FITZPATRICK ON MAY 10, 1968, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTEC INVESTIGATIONS, SA HILLIN WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, SA MC CLOUGHAN WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATION, AND SA FITZPATRICK WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4105 ENTITLED MMARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS OPENED ON JAN. 2, 1965, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND WAS SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 11, 1968. SA LAWRENCE WAS ASSIGNED SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-166 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE" (COMINFIL SCLS) IS - C, WAS FIRST OPENED IN THE MEMPHIS OFFICE ON SEPT. 26, 1961. IT WAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS AND RE-OPENED A NUMBER OF

TIMES PRIOR TO PERIOD 1965-68. IT WAS OPENED AND ASSIGNED DURING THIS PERIOD AS FOLLOWS:

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., ON FOLLOWING OCCASIONS.

REOPENED JULY 12, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS NOV. 17, 1965; REOPENED NOV. 17, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JAN. 31, 1966, REOPENED APRIL 29, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS MAY 20, 1966.

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

REOPENED DEC. 19, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JULY 17, 1972.

SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE. SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE.

A REVIEW OF MEMPHIS COINTELPRO FILES AND FILES ON THE SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC REVEALED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND THE SCLC.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt. ✓
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

CG0014 0052317

JAN 5 6 25 PM '78

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

RR HQ

DE CG

R 052317Z JAN 78

FM CHICAGO (62-7385)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DECEMBER 27, 1977. 351

(1)A) MURKIN INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER, CHICAGO 44-1114.

B) CHICAGO CASE AGENT RENE J. DU MAINE ASSIGNED TO ASAC SQUAD AS RELIEF SUPERVISOR - BANK ROBBERY COORDINATOR.

(2)A)(1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-35356.

(2) TITLE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM - C.

EX-111 REC- 62-117290-418

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION ON THE DATES INDICATED:

22 JAN 31 1978

JANUARY 7, 1965, CLAY M. BRADY, RUC JANUARY 24, 1965,

12/30/85

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA: ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

42

58 FEB 14 1978

REOPENED JANUARY 25, 1965 TO ROBERT F. BARRY, CLOSED MARCH 16, 1965, REOPENED MARCH 25, 1965 TO WILLIAM J. WHITE, RUC JULY 16, 1965, REOPENED JULY 19, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, RUC AUGUST 2, 1965, REOPENED AUGUST 11, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY, CLOSED AUGUST 27, 1965, REOPENED SEPTEMBER 13, 1965 TO R. L. STROMBERG, RUC SEPTEMBER 24, 1965, REOPENED OCTOBER 7, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, REASSIGNED NOVEMBER 22, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY WHO CONTINUED AS CASE AGENT UNTIL AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN 1968. THIS CASE WAS MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE CASE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR, SM - C INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY, WHO WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (B) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 105-16238.

(2) TITLE: COMINFILE, SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC), IS - C.

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOHN P. O'BRIEN, UNTIL OCTOBER 12, 1965, WHEN IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY THROUGH 1968. SA STANLEY WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5 UNTIL FEBRUARY, 1968 WHEN HE WAS DELETED. THE EXACT NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (C) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-32864.

(2) TITLE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, IS - C.

(3) A REVIEWW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION:

HERBERT K. STALLINGS UNTIL APRIL 22, 1965, REASSIGNED TO GENE E. ARNOLD UNTIL APRIL 27, 1967, REASSIGNED TO ROBERT O. MURPHY THROUGH 1968. ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WERE MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 2. THE SECTION, SQUAD OF ASSIGNMENT, AND THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THIS INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (D) A REVIEW OF ALL OTHER COINTELPRO INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY CHICAGO FAILS TO INDICATE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. OR THE SCLC WERE EVER MENTIONED IN THESE FILES OR TARGETS UNDER THESE PROGRAMS.

BT

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. [illegible]KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES T[illegible] NEBR.
HAROLD S. [illegible]R, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Received C14
1/31/78

January 26, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with this Committee's investigation of the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we would appreciate your assistance in obtaining access to any files or records in the possession of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, relating to the individuals and organizations noted below:

A. With respect to the Drug Enforcement Administration:

1) Charles Joseph Stein
Date of Birth: 5/11/29
FBI Number: 881-534-B

2) Anthony Charles DeCarvelho
Born: 1921
Residence: New Orleans

B. With respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

1) Jack Brown
Chattanooga, Tennessee

62-117290

2) Lester Lee [illegible]
Date of Birth: 2/23/45
S.S.N.: 410-78-8096
2165 or 2155 Clarksdale
Memphis, Tennessee

EX-111 REC- 13

62-117290 - 415

23 FEB 2 1978

3) Hunter Pitts O'Dell
New Orleans, Louisiana

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

5 7 FEB 1978

14

4) Earnest Donnell
Denham Springs, Louisiana

5) Robert DePugh, Norborne, Missouri
Head of the Minutemen organization

6) Sidney Barnes
1378 East Riviera Drive
Mobile, Alabama (1968)

7) "Maxey Ted"
New Orleans, Louisiana

8) Eddie Sopcjack
Date of Birth: 8/14/29
FBI Number: 186-485A

9) Thomas Tarrants

10) Samuel Caccamechi
Memphis, Tennessee

11) Robert Hood Strader
Lexington, Illinois

12) Raymond Starns
King David Apartments, Apt. 1
2816 David Drive
Metairie, Louisiana (1968)

13) Jerome Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana

14) Joseph Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana (now deceased)

15) Leonard Scott DelMonte
1229 North Bronson Street
Los Angeles, California

16) Allan O. Thompson
Date of Birth: 12/25/13

17) Dr. Russell C. Hadley
Date of Birth: 8/18/09
96 Moscow Road
Monte Rio, California

18) James E. Morrison
Los Angeles, California

19) Dr. Mark O. Freeman
Beverly Hills, California

20) Charles Calvin Bookman
Date of Birth: 9/6/13
FBI Number: 892-355

21) Rodney Arvidson
Date of Birth: 1/19/23
Post Office Box 2820
Long Beach, California

22) Tomas Reyes Lau
Date of Birth: 10/5/23
2047 Lemoyne
Los Angeles, California

23) Roy Emory Hargraves
El Monte, California

24) Raymond M. Murphy, aka "Fido"
Los Angeles, California

25) Lee Wilkinson
Los Angeles, California

26) Roman Kohnke
Los Angeles, California

27) Paul Lyon
Los Angeles, California

28) Jeri Salkin
Los Angeles, California

29) Ronald G. Hewitson
Garden Grove, California

30) Pat Olson
Date of Birth: 7/21/42
Quantico, Virginia

31) Robert Taylor, aka Bob Taylor
Los Angeles, California

32) Ronald Dennino
aka Ronald Gerald Dennino
Inmate at California State Prison
at San Quentin (1967 - 1968)

33) Richard Gonzales
Los Angeles, California

34) Roderic Burns Duff
Monrovia, California
1968 President of Los Angeles Chapter
of Citizens Council of America

35) R. J. Weiler
Los Angeles, California

36) Elizabeth Ann De Rouen
Date of Birth: 2/17/43
SSN: 453-62-1064
Los Angeles, California

37) Debbie Gold
Los Angeles, California

38) David Gregory
Buena Park, California

39) Rev. Xavier Von Koss
Hermora Beach, California

40) Robert Harold Gray
Los Angeles, California

41) Robert Keeley
Los Angeles, California

42) William K. Shearer
aka Bill Shearer
3166 Palm
Lemmon Grove, California

43) Robert Walters
Los Angeles, California

44) George Manum
Los Angeles, California

45) Robert J. Roe
Beverly Hills, California

46) Pamela Dillon
Los Angeles, California

47) Frank Marullo
New Orleans, Louisiana

48) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on Ku Klux Klan for the cities of Jacksonville and Miami, Florida for the period 1966 through 1968.

49) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on the following organizations for the period 1966 through 1968 for the cities of New Orleans, Louisiana; Birmingham, Alabama; Memphis, Tennessee; Chicago, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia; Los Angeles, California; and the State of Mississippi:

    a) Black Panthers
    b) Black Muslims
    c) American Nazi Party
    d) Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

50) Subfiles and/or investigative reports for the period 1966 - 1968 for the following organizations:

    a) Liberty Lobby
    b) The Sword
    c) The Fiery Cross
    d) The White Camelia
    e) The Silver Dollar Group

Your prompt cooperation will be most appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:msd
cc: Danny Coulson

1/18/78

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)

FROM : ACTING LEGAT, LONDON (62-604)(P)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

SUBJECT: JAMES EARL RAY, aka;
ET AL
CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE UNLAWFUL
FLIGHT TO AVOID CONFINEMENT - ESCAPE

ReLONlet 11/16/77.

Enclosed for information is a copy of an incoming telegram the American Embassy, London, received from Department of State on 1/14/78, and copy of Legat, London letter to the British Home Office dated 1/18/78.

Further pertinent information will be furnished when available.

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encs. 2)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
1 - London
RAK:ejg
(4)

62-117290-

NOT RECORDED
FEB 7 1978

14

56 FEB 10 1978

12/31/85

Original Filed In

UNITED STATES DEPARTME[illegible] OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Office of Legal Attache
American Embassy
Grosvenor Square
London, W1A 1AE

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 62-604

Your Ref.:

January 18, 1978

Mr. G. L. Angel
British Home Office
G-4 Division
Queen Anne's Gate
London, S.W. 1

Re: Request from House Select Committee on Assassinations to Meet with British Police Authorities

Dear Mr. Angel:

By way of background, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as authorized by the U. S. House of Representatives, is investigating the circumstances surrounding the murders of President J. F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The Chief Counsel and Staff Director requested contact be made with appropriate officials in the British Government to obtain authority to interview appropriate police officials who were involved in the arrest of James Earl Ray in London on June 8, 1968.

Assistant Legal Attache Dennis Dickson had contact with you on December 6, 1977 regarding this matter. At that time you requested the following:

A) Purpose or scope of inquiry;

B) Names of individuals to be interviewed and reasons therefor;

12/31/85 Sp/macpne

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

C) Intended use of results of inquiry, i.e., public hearings, etc., it being noted that any records maintained by the British police would be as the result of an official inquiry and this would normally be available for police use only, unless otherwise exempted by the British Government.

The Select Committee responded that due to the brevity of the 95th Congress, it was most important that representatives of the Select Committee be allowed to meet with appropriate members of New Scotland Yard who are knowledgeable about the KING-RAY investigation. The Committee advised they would be happy to meet personally with British Government officials in London to provide answers to the issues forwarded to them for clarification and elucidation.

I would be most appreciative if you would advise if this situation is agreeable to you.

Sincerely,

Dennis R. Dickson
Acting Legal Attache

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION/[redacted]	
[illegible]	
AMB	✓
MIN	✓
AMB/EX	✓
PAO	✓
POL	
POL/L	✓
POLAD	✓
E/MIN	✓
ECON	✓
COMCL	
E/SCI	
E/TRANS	
AGRI	
CUSTOMS	
DAO	✓
D.E.A.	
F.A.A.	
FBIS	
I.R.S.	
LEGATT	
MARITIME	
SUSLO	✓
TRADE	
TREAS	✓
USCG	
A/COUNS	
A/ATO	
A/B&M	
A/COMM	
A/GS	
A/PERS	
A/RFO	
A/SY	
A/VIS	
CCA	2
CG/CS	
CG/V	
S.F.	✓
CHRON	✓
LOG	
D.O.	✓
POUCH	
C/S	
USSS	

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ ~~JAN~~ 14 10 46

FROM: STATE

NO: 10886

NNNNVV FHG083EHV219
RR RUDTC
DE RUEHC #0886 0140951
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 140226Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON 7802
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS:PINR, PDIP, UK

SUBJECT:REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

RE: LONDON 20003

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENNET HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

OTAL:

PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL[illegible] WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVEST[illegible]ION MENTIONED IN BLA[illegible] LETTER AND ADVISE US [illegible]VANCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

January 25, 1978

Director, FBI

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

C

336
356

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

15

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAILED 17
JAN 25 1978
FBI

EX-111 REC-13 62-117290-414

20 FEB 2 1978

56 FEB 10 1978

14

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DATE 12/30/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By teletype dated 12/27/77, field offices designated by the HSCA were advised of the contents of the HSCA letter of 12/13/77. Responses have been received. Rather than incorporate the voluminous results into a letter to the Committee, it is more practical to make available for HSCA access at FBIHQ incoming field office teletypes.

It should be noted that, under current operating procedures existing between the Department of Justice and the HSCA, disclosure of these agents' identities to the HSCA cannot be prevented. However, G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, has advised SA D. O. Coulson of Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, that, in absence of an overriding need to do otherwise, the HSCA will not publish the names of any agent personnel below the position of section chief. This policy would follow precedent of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which issued its report in 1976.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 25, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

In response to the above request, the following information is submitted:

On December 19, 1977, Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised that the Department of Justice would respond to Part A, Items 1 and 2 and Part B, Items 1 and 2, of the above request.

Regarding Part A, Item 3 and Part B, Item 3, the FBI field offices designated by the HSCA were requested to provide the information desired by the HSCA. Responses from these field offices have been received and copies of these documents are available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters.

With respect to Part A, Item 4, a review of FBI Headquarters indices disclosed no memoranda, records, documents and news releases generated by the FBI in connection with the MURKIN investigation, other than that contained in the MURKIN file, which has already been made available to the HSCA.

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFIARS.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

PMS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE
62-117290-411

FBI/DOJ

In response to Part B, Item 4, it should be noted that HSCA request of November 30, 1977, asked for all FBI material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in the FBI's Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) file. By letter dated January 11, 1978, you were advised that representatives of the HSCA agreed to limit its request to COINTELPRO files involving the Communist Party USA and Black Nationalist-Hate Groups and to limit the period of HSCA interest from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968. On January 23, 1978, Staff Attorney Michael Eberhardt reiterated that the HSCA's interest is that period rather than the years 1965-1968 as set forth in the request of December 13, 1977. The above-mentioned COINTELPRO files and files of the King and SCLC security investigations from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, have been prepared for HSCA access. Therefore, based on knowledge of personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit processing HSCA requests regarding King, all material at FBI Headquarters, which may contain COINTELPRO-type activities against King and SCLC during the period January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, has been made available to the HSCA.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/25/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC[illegible]EY, CONN.
CHARLES THO[illegible]R.
HAROLD S. SAW[illegible]ICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee o[illegible]ssassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Executive Office of
Congressional Affairs
Dec. 14 - 2nd pm. 1977

DEC 13 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation provide the following:

A. MURKIN Investigation

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who participated in any way in the direction or management of the MURKIN investigation and the Division and Section within the Department of Justice where these attorneys were then assigned;

2. Copies of all memoranda, records, documents, and news releases generated by the Department of Justice in connection with MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee;

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the MURKIN investigation for the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham

Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

Ltr to AAG/CD
1/25/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:sas

62-117290-414

ENCLOSURE

4. Copies of all memoranda, records, documents and news releases generated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with the MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee.

B. COINTELPRO

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who were in receipt of any information concerning the COINTELPRO activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

2. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the Department of Justice in connection with the COINTELPRO activities of the FBI as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during 1965 to 1968 from the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's actual assignment during that period:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham
Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami
Louisville

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

4. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the FBI in connection with the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 to 1968 which are not contained in the files requested by Committee letter dated November 30, 1977.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIR[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMU[illegible]E, OHIO
STEW[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHAR[illegible]ONE, NEBR.
HAROL[illegible]SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

O House

Rec. [illegible]
3:45 PM
1/27/78

January 17, 1978

[illegible] GOVERNMENT

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff access to the following:

1. All files, materials and information including, but not limited to, intelligence and security materials relating to the following organizations active in California for 1967-1969:
   a) John Birch Society
   b) American Independent Party
   c) George Wallace Campaign
2. All files, materials and information, including, but not limited to, intelligence, surveillance and security materials for 1967-1968 pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his activities in California.

TA

Your prompt attention to the request will be greatly appreciated.

REC-65 62-117290-413

RECORDED
6 JAN 31 1978

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

GRB:mkd
cc: Danny O. Coulson

57 FEB 7 1978
118

FEB 01 1978

DERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 31, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl ✓
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

NR CG

Reference is made to a letter dated October 20, 1977, to Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in possession of the FBI to include the current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Enclosed are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

JTM:sas (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

EX-115

REC-65 62-112290-469

30 JAN 26 1978

2-ENCLOSURE

Delivered 11/2/77

Signed and sent to SA Coulson for delivery to Dept. 11-1-77

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/83 BY

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

42 40

EB MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request by HSCA for information contained in the Bureau's files relative to William Herman Jackson. This matter has been coordinated with the Legal. Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files, which are identifiable with Jackson, have been organized into folders for the Committee's access and are maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's space, Room 8988.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files include Jackson's current ident record, the results of an FBI investigation wherein Jackson was one of four subjects - captioned "Leslie Atkisons, aka, Et Al; Miscellaneous - Falsely Making or Forging Naval, Military or Official Pass," two references re a Foreign Police Cooperation Matter and two references re a Perjury Matter.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

October 31, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 20, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI TO INCLUDE A CURRENT FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION RECORD RELATIVE TO WILLIAM HERMAN JACKSON.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 20, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Utilizing identifying data for Jackson furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

JTM:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/31/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA).

409

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/[illegible] BY [illegible]

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

APPROVED:

Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.

Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory

Legal Coun. M
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

62-117290-409

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI/DOJ

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

October 20, 1977

Robert L. Keuch, Esq.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

The Select Committee on Assassinations would appreciate any and all information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record check relative to William Herman Jackson, FBI #801-218-G, D.O.B. 11/24/26.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB/EME/mae

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room 3659
Washington, D. C. 20530

Let to AAG/CD
10-31-77
JTM:aws (Enc-3)

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-409

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

CJ

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on November 16, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
Criminal Division
Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - William F. Kusch - Enclosure

ST-120 REC-63 62-117290-408

23 JAN 31 1978

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

APPROVED:
Director
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt. HNB/R
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

signed + sent 1/6/77 McDford

DOC:ldr

59 FEB 6 1978

42

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY

FBI/DOJ

62-117290-408	COPY 63	DOC:ldr 12/29/77

The Deputy Attorney General HSCA
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney Generel Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on 11/16/77. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

COPY OF ABSTRACT FOR THIS SERIAL IS PLACED IN FILE IN LIEU OF THE MAIL WHICH HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/03 BY

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

DATE: 12/19/77

FROM : SAC, PORTLAND (62-3144)

JGP/RR

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Enclosed herewith are five copies of an LHM relative to the interview of SA WILLIAM F. KUSCH, Portland Division, by staff members of the HSCA in Washington, D.C., on 11/16/77.

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (Encs. 5)
2 - Portland
WFK:ja
(4)

ST-120

REC-63 62-117290-407

1-31-78

3651

12/30/77

Memo to AG 12-29-77

MAR 2 0 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-02

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Portland, Oregon

December 19, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

On November 16, 1977, SA William F. Kusch of the Portland Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was interviewed at House Annex #2 in Washington, D.C., by Mr. Mark Speiser and Mr. Peter Beeson, members of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The interview with SA Kusch dealt with a period of time SA Kusch was assigned to the New Orleans Division of the FBI, specifically April, 1968. During April of 1968, SA Kusch, along with numerous other Special Agents assigned to the New Orleans Division, conducted many interviews with persons who had, or who might have had, knowledge of the activities or contacts of James Earl Ray during the period of time Ray, using the name Eric Galt, was in New Orleans.

Specifically, SA Kusch was questioned regarding his squad assignments in New Orleans, the identities of other squad members, the identity of his supervisor, his Agent in charge and his assistant Agent in charge at the time.

Further, SA Kusch was questioned relative to the content of several interview report forms (FD 302s) concerning interviews that he conducted and prepared appropriate FD 302s in connection therewith, or FD 302s covering interviews that he was a party to. House Select Committee on Assassinations members exhibited said FD 302s to SA Kusch to refresh his memory.

House Select Committee members in essence apparently desired SA Kusch to amplify or further expand on these interviews.

12/30/75

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE
62-117290-107

SA Kusch pointed out that as a result of the passage of nine and one-half years, for the most part he could not specifically recall the persons interviewed. To specific questions regarding the interviews, SA Kusch could only point out that if additional questions had been asked of these persons interviewed at the time, resulting in the receipt of any positive or pertinent information regarding Galt, that information would have been duly recorded on said FD 302s.

Both Mr. Speiser and Mr. Beeson were cordial and SA Kusch responded to their questions in a candid manner.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

January 26, 1978

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

C

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference ~~is~~ was made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which, in connection with HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested information pertaining to FBI electronic suveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2 (Secret Material Enclosed)

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure) (Secret Material Enclosed)

19

JTA:sas
(6) sas

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120

ENCLOSURE

REC-63 62-117290-406

23 JAN 31 1978

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAILED 17
JAN 26 1978
FBI

ALL [illegible] D
[illegible] IS UNC[illegible]
DATE [illegible] BY [illegible]

42

58 FEB 6 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Dates and places of electronic surveillance of King were compiled through file reviews conducted in connection with previous law suits filed against the FBI by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and a former SCLC officer and aide to King, Bernard S. Lee. Although names of specific SCLC affiliates were not provided by the HSCA in its request, all names are readily available to the Committee, which has received access to our files concerning King and SCLC.

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which requested information in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. This letter requested that the FBI determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The Committee indicated it only desired written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved, with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

In response to the above request, appropriate records at FBI Headquarters were reviewed with the following results:

Microphone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
January 5-7, 1964	Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C.
January 27, 1964	Shroeder Hotel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
February 18-20, 1964	Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii
February 20-21, 1964	Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, California
February 22-24, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
March 19-20, 1964	Statler Hotel, Detroit, Michigan

8

JTA:sas (6) DoD

SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, & ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified by 6437~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

DECLASSIFIED BY
ON 12/31/03

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-106

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Dates of Surveillance	Location
April 23-24, 1964	Senator Hotel, Sacramento, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
September 28, 1964 - October 2, 1964	Manager Hotel, Savannah, Georgia
January 8-11, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
January 28-31, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
March 29-31, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
May 12-13, 1965	Sheraton Atlantic Hotel, New York City
October 14-15, 1965	Astor Hotel, New York City
October 28-30, 1965	New York Hilton Hotel, New York City
November 29-30, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
January 22, 1966	Americana Hotel, New York City

Telephone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
August 22-27, 1964	Claridge Hotel, Atlantic City, New Jersey
November 8, 1963 - April 30, 1965	Martin Luther King's residence
April 24-26, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
August 14, 1964 - September 6, 1964	Apartment 2B, 125 N. 72nd Street, New York City

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Telephone Surveillances of SCLC

Dates of Surveillance	Location
October 23, 1963 - January 24, 1964 July 13-31, 1964	SCLC Office, New York City Room 1202, 14 E. 40th Street, New York City
November 8, 1963 - June 21, 1966	SCLC Office, Atlanta, Georgia

In an effort to respond to that portion of the HSCA's request concerning existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance of individuals directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC, personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit, FBI Headquarters, familiar with certain aspects of the King, SCLC and related files, compiled a list of individuals with the SCLC for the approximate period January, 1962, through 1968. Although this list is not all inclusive due to the large number of persons affiliated with the SCLC, an effort was made to include those individuals in key positions and who were most active in the organization. Most of the individuals listed were identified with the SCLC Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. Based on review of appropriate records at FBI Headquarters, none of the below-listed individuals has been subject of electronic surveillance by the FBI:

Ralph Abernathy
Jessie Jackson
Bernard S. Lee
Hosea Williams
James Orange
James Bevel
Andrew Young
Walter Fauntroy
Coretta Scott King
John Rutherford
William Rutherford
Bernard Lafayette
Dorothy Cotton
J. T. Johnson
Joseph E. Lowery
Fred L. Shuttlesworth
Cordy T. Vivian
Adele Kanter
Thomas C. Kilgore
Dora McDonald
James Harrison
Wyatt Walker
Logan Kearse
Stoney Cooks
Fred C. Bennett
Booker T. Bonner
Henry Brownlee
Golden Frinks
Joseph Lester Hankerson
Samuel B. Wells
Benjamin Johnson
Herbert V. Coulton
Thomas Offenburger
New Soong-Li
James Lawson
Lillian Hunter
Gloria Fraction
David Wallace
Jess Gill
Carole Hoover
Albert Turner
Frank Ditto
C. K. Steel
Samuel Williams
Curtis Harris
Cirillo A. McSween
Major Jones
Lawrence D. Reddick
I. M. Augustine
Septima Clark
T. Y. Rogers, Jr.

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Records at FBI Headquarters disclosed that the following individuals, formerly associated with the SCLC, were subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI (Secret).

Stanley David Levison
Clarence B. Jones
Hunter Pitts O'Dell
Bayard Rustin

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible] OHIO
STEWA[illegible]CY, CONN.
CHARLES [illegible]HONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Received Office of
Congressional Affairs
Dec. 15 3:54PM 1977

DEC 15 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance and determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of Dr. King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC.

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

let to AAG/CD
1/26/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:AWS
1-OLA (enc)

GRB:mek

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

62-117290-406

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:	PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:
☐ Teletype	☐ Immediate	☐ TOP SECRET
☐ Facsimile	☐ Priority	☐ SECRET
☒ Airtel	☐ Routine	☐ CONFIDENTIAL
		☐ E F T O
		☐ CLEAR

Date 1/23/78

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: Records Management Division,
Congressional Inquiry Unit

FROM: SAC, SPRINGFIELD (62-2567) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Reurtel to SI, 1/19/78.

395 1-10-86

Enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of each serial in the following Springfield Division main files:

(1) 157-1792, serials 1-85 (189 pages);

(2) 44-1120, serials 1-5 (10 pages);

(3) 170-445, serials 1-23 (48 pages);

(4) 170-445A, serials 1-6 (11 pages).

Also enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of the following serial in the following Springfield Division file, reference identifiable with RICHARD GEPPERT:

(5) 157-1791, serial 23 (8 pages).

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:

Numerous serials contained in these files have been classified "Confidential".

ST-120

Springfield file 157-1792, serial 82, is a correlation memo showing GEPPERT was the subject of Springfield main

REC 63 62-117290-405

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (62-117290) (Encl 5)
1 - Springfield (62-2567)

JAN 26 1978

DJC/pme
(3)

DETACHED FILED for RM (9988 JFK + HSCA processing access 1/30/78

54 FEB 6 1978

Approved: ____ Transmitted ____ (Number) (Time) Per ____

8988

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

file 100-10245. This main file has been destroyed in accordance with the File Destruction Program.

BH0043 0131931

PP HQ

DE BH

P 131931Z JAN 78

FM BIRMINGHAM (66-2280) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) (PRIORITY)

BT

CLEAR

ATTENTION OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES, DECEMBER 27, 1977.351

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. ONE: MURKIN INVESTIGATION ASSIGNED TO HENRY S. SNOW (DECEASED). PRIOR TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION SA SNOW WAS ASSIGNED TO GENERAL CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION.

JAN 13 2 36 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

~~Exp.Sec&Spec.~~
~~Inq.Section~~
~~3825 JEH BL#234~~

EX-101
REC-36

62-117290-404

23 JAN 26 1978

12/30/78 Spmacmla 4-Agley

1cc Pub8108

124

2 copies made pg 1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

IN ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. TWO: THERE WERE NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFORTS BY BIRMINGHAM AGENTS AGAINST MARTIN LUTHER KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 THROUGH 1968.

THE FOLLOWING WERE CASE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING: LAWRENCE GETTINGS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY AND CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED THAT TYPE OF INVESTIGATION; MARVIN M. EUBANKS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATION.

THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO INVESTIGATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE:

WILLIAM PERRY (DECEASED), PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO CRIMINAL SQUAD AND WORK; COLEMAN D. GEARY, III, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO BOMBING MATTERS; LAWRENCE GETTINGS (SUPRA); MARVIN M. EUBANKS (SUPRA) AND C. B. STANBERRY, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED AFTER A REVIEW OF BIRMINGHAM INDICES AND SUBSEQUENT FILE REVIEW.

BT

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL [illegible], OHIO
STEWA[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARL[illegible]NE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4524

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

House

Rec
CTU
2:15PM
1/25/78

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

JAN 20 1978

HAND DELIVER

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

C

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

-375

By letter dated January 4, 197~~7~~8, this Committee requested access to materials, files, memoranda and miscellaneous items pertaining to Gerold Frank in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. These materials (94-63917) have been reviewed by the staff, and it would be appreciated, if the materials could be prepared for delivery, along with copies of the following additional items:

1) Section 78
   44-38861 - 5655
   " 5654
   5653

2) Section 84
   44-38861 - 5942
   " 5943
   " 5944
   " 5945
   " 5946

3) The MURKIN Legat tickler files for
   a) London
   b) Ottawa
   c) Mexico City
   d) Paris

EX-124 REC-79

62-117290-400

62-117290

20 JAN 27 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

57 FEB 2 1978

JAN 20 1978

Additionally, it is requested that the Bureau begin to prepare for delivery all files, memoranda and miscellaneous items on William Bradford Huie for the years 1968 to the present.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:ghj
cc: Danny O. Coulson

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

January 26, 1978

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference ~~is~~ made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-139

2 - ENCLOSURE

REC-7

62-117290-397

JAN 27 1978

MAILED 5
JAN 26 1978
FBI

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. HB/DR/
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

124

HB/DR

5 7 FEB 2 1978

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

12/30/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Former SA Nichols works and resides in Atlanta. The Atlanta Office has been in touch with him regarding the interview and he is awaiting further contact for final interview arrangements. These arrangements are handled informally by representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBIHQ.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

This memorandum is to confirm that former agent Nichols has been cleared from his employment agreement and is available for interview as needed by the HSCA. Arrangements for interview can be made through contact with representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBI Headquarters.

JTA:sas (6)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78. captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

HB

12/30/85

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

62-117290-391

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 9 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that ex-FBI agent Robert Nichols, formerly of the Atlanta field office, be made available to the Committee for interview on a priority basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

let to AAG/CD
1/26/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:sus
1-OLA (Enc) 62-117290-397.

ENCLOSURE

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO 1/19/78

1 - Mr. Foster

FM DIRECTOR

TO SPRINGFIELD (ROUTINE)

BT

EFTO

#245852 [illegible] 12/30/95

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/11/82 BY SP-1GSK/PSR
225984

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. BY LETTER DATED DECEMBER 30, 1977, TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE HSCA REQUESTED THE FBI PROVIDE ALL FILES, DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS CONCERNING RICHARD GEPPERT, BORN JULY 31, 1941, RESIDING AT 1340 NIEDRINGHAUS AVENUE, GRANITE CITY, ILLINOIS.

NR 8/25/78

BY LETTER DATED JANUARY 16, 1978, THE HSCA EXTENDED ITS REQUEST TO INCLUDE FIELD OFFICE FILES. THE HSCA ALSO FURNISHED A SIGNED STATEMENT OF GEPPERT, DATED DECEMBER 28, 1977, AUTHORIZING HSCA REVIEW OF ALL MATERIAL CONCERNING HIM IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI. IN THIS STATEMENT GEPPERT ALSO DISCLOSED THAT HE VOLUNTEERED TO HSCA STAFF MEMBERS THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF HIS INFORMANT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FBI.

170-5569-

157-26213

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

JTA:sas (6)

1 - 157-26213
1 - 170-5569

EX-130 SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

62-117290-395

REC-46

JAN 23 1978

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 19 1978
0405

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

118

56 JAN 3 1979

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

FBI/DOJ

PAGE TWO EFTO

FBIHQ FILES DISCLOSED GEPPERT WAS SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD EXTREMIST MATTER INVESTIGATION (157-1792) IN 1972 AND SPRINGFIELD FILE 44-1120 FOLLOWING ALLEGED HARASSMENT BY OFFICERS OF THE GRANITE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IN 1975. HE WAS ALSO SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD FILE 170-445.

SPRINGFIELD PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN THE ABOVE THREE INVESTIGATIONS AND ONE COPY OF ANY OTHER MAIN FILE OR FILE REFERENCE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEPPERT. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS BY STAFF MEMBERS OF THE HSCA.

BT

#

NOTE: This teletype confirms telephonic communication with Supervisor Joseph Ondula of the Springfield Office on 1/19/78. This matter has been coordinated with SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 1/4/78

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (~~62-117296~~)
Attn: Congressional Inquiry Unit,
Special Investigative Division

Foster
Lawn

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (66-2242) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)
BUREAU DEADLINE - 1/13/78

Re FBIHQ teletype to numerous offices, including Atlanta, 12/27/77.

Referenced Bureau teletype indicated that the HSCA was currently conducting investigation into the assassination of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (MURKIN); and in connection with this investigation, the HSCA had requested the FBI provide the following:

(1) The identification of field office case agent(s) assigned to the MURKIN investigation in recipient offices and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation.

(2) Identification of the field office case agent(s) assigned to counterintelligence program (Cointelpro), efforts directed against KING and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) during the period 1965 - 1968 in recipient offices, and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the Cointelpro, KING, and SCLC investigations.

REC-36 62-117290-394

EX-130

In addition, recipients were to identify the case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of KING and SCLC, as well as the Cointelpro.

1 JAN 7 1978

2-Bureau
2-Atlanta (1-66-2242)
(1-44-2386) (MURKIN)

2 copies made pgs 1-5
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

EAS/ljg
(4)

Approved: Transmitted ______ (Number) (Time) Per ______

JAN 30 1978

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

Atlanta has reviewed pertinent files as requested by FBIHQ, and the information sought by the HSCA is set forth below in chart form:

1. MURKIN
(Atlanta file 44-2386)

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/8/68 - 4/29/68	Atlanta - #3, Security/extremist Squad	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. PERRY	4/29/68 - 7/30/68	Atlanta #4 Fugitives	Fugitive investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/30/68 - 7/31/69	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	5/30/70 - 7/13/70	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	2/8/71 - 3/16/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/31/71 - 4/7/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/13/73 - 8/31/73	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	6/19/74 - 6/27/74	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	8/13/74 - 9/24/74	Atlanta - #8 Civil rights, thefts from interstate shipment (TFIS) Etc.	Civil rights matters

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
THOMAS J. WILSON	8/26/75 - 9/8/75	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights, TFIS
THOMAS J. WILSON	1/7/78 - 3/23/76	Atlanta - #8	"
JOHN J. HAYMAN	10/12/77 - 11/8/77	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights matters

2. Atlanta Agents assigned to/or who handled the Atlanta Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) during the period 1965 - 1968 in which efforts were directed against KING and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
CPUSA Cointelpro			
ALDEN F. MILLER	4/14/64 - 8/13/65	Atlanta - #3	Security Investigations
Cointelpro Black Nationalist-Hate Groups			
EDWARD U. CRIM	8/29/67 - 7/30/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist Investigations
CPUSA Negro Question; Communist Influence in Racial Matters (CIRM)-Cointelpro			
No case agent assigned - matters handled by:			

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/1/64 - 8/20/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	2/4/64 - 8/21/64	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	7/22/65 - 4/15/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations

3. Identity of case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SM-C			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	3/7/61 - 5/12/61	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	2/28/62 - 10/16/62	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/9/63 - 7/31/63	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	11/6/63 - 5/21/65	Atlanta - #3	"
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	5/21/65 - 6/5/68	Atlanta - #3	"

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
Communist infiltration of the SCLC			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	4/17/62 - 12/1/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	12/1/64 - 4/26/66	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/26/66 - 3/12/71	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/12/71 - 5/23/73	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/10/73 - 10/20/73	Atlanta - #3	"

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Fin. & Pers. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
~~Plan. & Insp.~~ _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

JAN 10 4 19 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

LS0003 0102106Z

RR HQ

DE LS

R 102106Z JAN 78

M LOUISVILLE (66-2612)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

~~Emp Sec&Spec Inq Section~~
~~5823 JEH TH~~ #231

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA, DATED DECEMBER 27, 1977.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, APPROPRIATE REVIEW OF FILES MAINTAINED BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION REVEALED FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY HSCA.

(1) NOT APPLICABLE TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

(2) NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COINTELPRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST EITHER MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., OR SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND (SCEF), DURING PERIOD 1965-1968, COULD BE LOCATED IN REVIEW OF COINTELPRO AND SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-393

20 JAN 25 1978

JAN 10 4 20 PM '78

1CCRm8988

70 JAN [illegible] 1978 42

12/30/88 Spmaepma

24 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA: ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

OF KING AND SCLC. NO COINTELPRO ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND SCLC BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., ASSIGNED SA GEORGE W. HUTCHINSON, JR. (RETIRED) MAY 14, 1965 - AUGUST 13, 1966, AND SA RICHARD B. VIVIAN JULY 30, 1976 - OCTOBER 20, 1976. LATTER ASSIGNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC ASSIGNED SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) SEPTEMBER 29, 1961 - OCTOBER 30, 1961; OCTOBER 17, 1963 - NOVEMBER 18, 1963; DECEMBER 14, 1963- JANUARY 22, 1964; JUNE 5, 1964 - JULY 8, 1964; SEPTEMBER 21, 1964 - OCTOBER 12, 1964; JUNE 2, 1965 - JULY 20, 1965; NOVEMBER 17, 1965 - JANUARY 20, 1966; JULY 13, 1966 - AUGUST 12, 1966; FEBRUARY 10, 1967 - MARCH 24, 1967; SA GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED) AUGUST 12, 1968 - JUNE 5, 1969; SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) JUNE 5, 1969 - JULY 29, 1969. SCLC (BUFILE 100-438794) (LS 157-90) INVESTIGATED BY LOUISVILLE AS "RACIAL MATTER" AND "INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST".

SPECIAL AGENTS GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED), WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) AND RICHARD B. VIVIAN ALL ASSIGNED LOUISVILLE SECURITY - CIVIL RIGHTS SQUAD PRIOR TO AND DURING ABOVE LISTED CASE ASSIGNMENTS.

BT

SL C[illegible]05 010195O

RR [illegible]

DE SL

P 101924Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

CLEAR

JAN 10 3 05 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE ~~[illegible] Section~~ ~~[illegible] #231~~ DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JULY 27, 1977.

(1) FORMER SPECIAL AGENT HAROLD R. DOBSON WAS CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION, ST. LOUIS FILE 44-775, BUREAU FILE 44-38861, IN ST. LOUIS DIVISION. FORMER SPECIAL AGENT DOBSON WAS ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND HANDLED SECURITY TYPE CASES PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN MURKIN INVESTIGATION.

(2) ST. LOUIS FILE 157-5818 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS, BLACK NATIONALISTS, HATE GROUPS, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE" WAS OPENED AS A PENDING INACTIVE STATUS CONTROL FILE ON AUGUST 29, 1967.

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-392

20 JAN 25 1978

4-J Aldhizer

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1ccKm 8988

42

ALL I[illegible]

12/30/98

ON FEBRUARY 27, 1968, THROUGH JANUARY 8, 1969, WAS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH OF SECURITY SQUAD AT ST. LOUIS DIVISION. HIS ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THIS CASE ASSIGNMENT WAS TO HANDLE SECURITY TYPE CASES.

ST. LOUIS FILE 100-17801, BUREAU FILE 100-106670, ENTITLED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER SPECIAL AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, JANUARY 15, 1965, THROUGH JANUARY 19, 1965, FEBRUARY 3, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 10, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. STEWART, APRIL 28, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 28, 1965; FORMER SPECIAL AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, NOVEMBER 11, 1965, THROUGH NOVEMBER 12, 1965, AND JUNE 14, 1966, THROUGH JUNE 17, 1966; FORMER AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, OPENING DATE UNKNOWN THROUGH JULY 6, 1966, AND MARCH 25, 1967, THROUGH MARCH 27, 1967.

ST. LOUIS FILE 105-4027, BUREAU FILE 100-438794, ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE; RM; IS - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, SEPTEMBER 23, 1964, THROUGH DECEMBER 10, 1964, AND MARCH 21, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 19, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 3, 1965, THROUGH JUNE 16, 1965; FORMER AGENT WALTER A.

PAGE THREE SL 62-5097[illegible]EAR

HILG[illegible]NDORF, FEBRUARY 24, 1966, THROUGH DATE UNKNOWN; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 6, 1969, THROUGH JULY 23, 1969. THE ABOVE AGENTS AND FORMER AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO ST. LOUIS DIVISION SECURITY SQUAD DURING PERTINENT PERIOD.

A REVIEW OF ABOVE FILES DISCLOSED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE.

BT

#

LA0373 0431807Z

PP HQ

DE LA

P 131807Z JAN 78

FM LOS ANGELES (62-7841) (P) (1)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) PRIORITY

BT

EFTO

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977, TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES.

FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS COMMUNICATION AND RETEL THE TERM CASE AGENT(S) WAS DEFINED AS THE SINGLE AGENT TO WHOM THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED AND WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIRECTION AND FLOW OF THE INVESTIGATION.

IT IS NOTED THAT UNDER CAPTION "BERNARD S. LEE V. CLARENCE M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1185) BUFILE 62-117194, LA FILE 100-57229" AND "SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) V. CLARENCE

JAN 13 1 31 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

~~Cmp Sec&Spec~~
Inq Section
~~5823 JEH TL#~~ 231

George Foster

EX-130

REC-36

62-117290-391

20 JAN 25 1978

[illegible]
12/30/88

4 DH 120

2 copies made pgs 1-4
1/24/78 JTA:ma

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc Am 8988

42

JAN 30 1978

M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1186) BUFILE 62-117193, LA FILE 100-57229," LOS ANGELES HAS PERMANENTLY CHARGED OUT TO THE BUREAU SEVERAL SERIALS WHICH THEREFORE ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW. SERIALS WERE FROM FILES CAPTIONED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR; SECURITY MATTER-COMMUNIST; BUFILE 100-106670; LA FILE 100-57229"; "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SCLS; IS - C; BUFILE 100-438794 AND 100-442349; LA FILE 100-65141"; "CP-USA NEGRO QUESTION, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN RACIAL MATTERS; IS-C; BUFILE 100-3-116, LA FILE 157-859."

A REVIEW OF PERTINENT FILES WITHIN THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION BETWEEN THE YEARS 1965 - 1968 DETERMINED THE FOLLOWING:

. THE ABOVE FILE REGARDING COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SCLC WAS HANDLED ON THE SUBSTANTATIVE DESK SUPERVISED BY SA JOHN S. TEMPLE WHICH WAS DESIGNATED AS SQUAD NUMBER TWO. THIS SQUAD HANDLED INVESTIGATIONS OF RACIAL AND BLACK EXTREMIST MATTERS. THIS INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA LOUIS K. DE GEUS IN FEBRUARY 1965; SA R. ANDREWS PETERS IN

SEPTEMBER 1965; SA W. JAMES WOOD IN APRIL 1967; SA WALTER M. BRADY IN JANUARY 1968; AND SA E. RHEAD RICHARDS, JR. IN MAY 1968.

THE MAIN FILE ON KING WAS ASSIGNED TO SQUAD TWO AS ABOVE AND WAS ASSIGNED TO SA DE GEUS IN JANUARY 1965; SA PETERS IN MARCH 1965; SA WOOD IN JANUARY 1967; SA BRADY IN JUNE 1967: AND SA GEORGE E. AIKEN, JR. IN FEBRUARY 1968.

THE FILE REGARDING THE CP-USA INFILTRATION OF RACIAL MATTERS IS ONLY PERIPHERALLY CONCERNED WITH KING OR THE SCLC AND CONTAINS NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS AND OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN OTHER SUBSTANTATIVE FILES. WHILE NOT CLEAR, THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONTROLLED BY SA TEMPLE.

THE ENTIRE SUBSTANTATIVE FILE CAPTIONED "MURKIN; BUFILE 44-38861; LA FILE 44-1574" WAS COPIED AND SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU UNDER INSTANT CAPTION. THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED ON SQUAD NUMBER ONE WHICH WAS SUPERVISED BY SA WILLIAM JOHN NOLAN BUT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUPERVISED BY

SA TEMPLE. SQUAD NUMBER ONE HANDLED SECURITY TYPE INVESTIGATION INVOLVING THE CP-USA, SWP, ET CETERA. THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AS ASSIGNED JOINTLY TO SA'S LEROY W. SHEETS AND THEODORE J. A'HEARN ALTHOUGH SHEETS WAS APPARENTLY INVOLVED AS CASE AGENT ONLY DURING THE INITIAL STAGES IN APRIL 1968.

ALL OF THE ABOVE INDIVIDUALS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA'S BRADY, RICHARDS AND AIKEN ARE NO LONGER EMPLOYEES OF THE FBI.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MM0730 0132335
RR HQ
DE MM
R 132335Z JAN 78
FM MIAMI (62-6603)RUC
TO DIRECTOR (62-117290)ROUTINE
BT
E F T O

JAN 13 6 42 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977.

FOLLOWING IS NUMBERED PARAGRAPH REPLY TO REQUEST OF MIAMI SET OUT IN RE BUTEL:

1. "MURKIN". SA DAVID N. JELLISON, ASSIGNED APRIL 8, 1968: NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATE PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS. SA LEON E. FISH; ASSIGNED AUGUST 10, 1972 (RUC AUGUST 28, 1972); NUMBER 2 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS MAINLY CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS; SA JOSEPH T. O'LEARY; ASSIGNED JULY 30, 1976 (RUC AUGUST 3, 1976), FBIHQ ADMINISTRATIVE REQUEST; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNED APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS. SRA JOHN S. ATWATER; ASSIGNED JUNE 3, 1977 (RUC JUNE 6, 1977), SINGLE INTERVIEW; WEST PALM BEACH RA;

~~Emp Sec&Spec~~
~~Inv Section~~
~~3633 JEH~~ TL# 231

EX-130
REC-36
62-117290-390

20 JAN 25 1978

4-AFDA12Ce

12/30/88 Spmaepme

1cc fm 8988

2 copies made pgs 1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

42

1978

IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS GENERAL CRIMINAL AND SECURITY.

2. A. "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SM-C. "SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 THROUGH 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE NATURE, INCLUDING LOCAL CPUSA GROUP.

B. "COMINFIL OF SCLC; IS - C." SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 TO MAY 2, 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS, SEE PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

SA JOHN C. MENTON, ASSIGNED MAY 2, 1968 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS.

C. "COINTELPRO; BLACK EXTREMISTS; RACIAL MATTERS." FILE OPENED MARCH 7, 1968, ASSIGNED SA JOHN C. MENTON, STILL PENDING TO MENTON DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENT SET OUT IN PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

BT

#

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMA

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JAN 16 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CJ

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

372

By letter dated December 30, 1977, this Committee requested material pertaining to Richard Geppert in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In view of the fact that the Committee has since delivered to the FBI the written consent of Mr. Geppert to view all materials relating to his informant relationship with the FBI, it is intended that our December 30th request for materials and documents concerning Mr. Geppert include those found in any field office files.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

REC-56 62-117290-385

EX-130

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

7 JAN 23 1978

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

GRB:mej
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

70 JAN [illegible] 1978

EDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

December 1, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files regarding the National States Rights Party (Item #2) and Jesse B. Stoner (Item #3). By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, modification of these items was made, details of which are outlined in the enclosed memorandum.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum in response to the above mentioned requests. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

62 - 117290 - 382X

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120 REC-42 ~~62-117290~~ - 3996

22 FEB 22 1978

12/7/77

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

3 - ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:

Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___

Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___

Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

YCF

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MAY 2 1978

DATE 12/30/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Since there were no National States Rights Party (NSRP) subfiles for offices requested by the HSCA, the entire NSRP file for 1967 through 1968 was processed for access. All information retrievable in FBI Headquarters files regarding Stoner was processed.

Names of knowledgeable case agents provided in attached memorandum were obtained through review of FBIHQ files and confirmed by Supervisor Jack Byrd of the Savannah Office. The HSCA can advise which agent(s) it desires to interview regarding the NSRP and Stoner.

- Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY Sp

December 1, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. Under Item #2 of this letter information concerning the National States Rights Party (NSRP), Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to areas covered by offices in Savannah, Georgia; Atlanta, Georgia; Memphis, Tennessee; Birmingham, Alabama; St. Louis, Missouri, and Springfield, Illinois, was requested. Under Item #3 information was requested concerning Jesse B. Stoner.

By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, the above requests were modified. Under Item (c) this letter requested the FBI's complete file on Stoner and that the agent(s) in the Office of Origin assigned to the Stoner investigation for the period 1966 through 1968 be made available for interview by the HSCA. Concerning the NSRP, under Item (d) this letter asked the FBI to provide information in its files to cover the period 1967 through 1968. In addition, the case agent(s) in the Office of Origin for the same period would be made available for interview.

In response to the above requests, information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the NSRP (period 1967 through 1968) and Jesse B. Stoner have been processed and are available for review at FBI Headquarters by the HSCA. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from FBI Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 12/1/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

62-117290-382x
~~62-117290-3396~~

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

PMS

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ

The Savannah Office of the FBI was Office of Origin in both the NSRP and Stoner investigation during the period of HSCA interest. The following agents of that office were case agents in the Stoner investigation: Carlton Dillard, January, 1966 - April 1967; William P. Friday, April, 1967 - October, 1967; John H. Murphy, October 1967 - September, 1969. With variation of only a few days, these same Agents were case agents in the investigation of the NSRP. Dillard is now retired. Friday and Murphy are currently assigned to the Savannah Office and are scheduled to retire December 31, 1977.

APPROVED:

Director______
Assoc. Dir.______
Dep. AD Adm.______
Dep. AD Inv.______

Adm. Serv.______
Crim. Inv.______
Fin. & Pers.______
Ident.______
Intell.______
Laboratory______

Legal Coun.______
Plan. & Insp.______
Rec. Mgnt.______
Spec. Inv.______
Tech. Servs.______
Training______
Public Affs. Off.______

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4024

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF
CONGRESSIONAL
AFFAIRS
NOV 15 11 PM 1977

NOV 3 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals and organizations be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Lawrence J. Callanan (deceased) Steamfitters Union (AFL) Local 562, St. Louis, Mo. for the Period 1967 through 1971.

2. National States Rights Party, 591 Cherokee, Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, but limited to reports and information in areas covered by offices in Savannah, Ga.; Atlanta, Ga.; Memphis, Tn.; Birmingham, Al.; St. Louis, Mo.; and Springfield, Ill.

3. Jesse B. Stoner, 591 Cherokee, N.W., Marietta, Ga.

4. Conservative Society of America for the period 1967 through 1968. (Headquarters in New Orleans, La.

ltr to AAG/CD
12/1/77 (Enc-2)
JTA:aao

5. Kent Courtney, 1413 Texas Avenue, Alexandria, La. for the period 1967 through 1968.

~~62-117290-382X~~
62-117290-382X
ENCLOSURE ~~62-117290-382X~~

6. KKK (limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in Birmingham, Alabama, Los Angeles, California, Atlanta, Georgia and Louisville, Kentucky during the period 1967 through 1968).

7. Morris Davis, RFD, Hoover, Shelby County, Ala.

8. White Citizens Council (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in New Orleans, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

9. Forever White, (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in New Orleans, La; Baton Rouge, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

10. Charles Joseph Stein, dob 5/11/29.

11. Percy Belcher, ex-deputy Sheriff, Birmingham, Alabama, for the period 1967 through 1968.

12. Robert Powers, Powers Junction, Intersection Highways 11 and 90, Orleans Parrish, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

13. Sam DiPiazza, Pamela Place, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

14. Dr. Lucas DiLeo - (office) 8603 St. Bernard Highway, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

15. Salvadore L. Licciardi (Liccardi), New Orleans, Louisiana for the period 1967 through 1968.

16. Gus Joseph Prosch, dob 11/17/30, 3122 Callecita, Sacremento, California. (Arrested in Birmingham, Alabama in December, 1971 and convicted of violating Gun Control Act in 1972.)

17. Quentin B. Davis, owner of Gun Rack, Birmingham, Alabama for the period 1967 through 1968.

18. Clifford Andrews (aka, R. L. Warren), Box 75, Toronto 14, Ontario, Canada.

19. Walter Jack Youngblood, Monticello Street, Dallas, Texas.

20. Johnny Benelli, #303, 175 North Orange Drive, Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

21. Claude Cockrell, dob 5/10/36, FBI # 389804E, for the period 1967 through 1968.

22. Gene Pearson Crawford, dob 10/2/27 for the period 1967 through 1968.

23. Fleet Edwards, dob 2/4/21 for the period 1967 through 1968.

24. Raoul Esquivel - (Raul Victor Esquibel), dob 11/17/26, 4524 Parsimmon, Metairie, La. (This request includes, but is not limited to, Bureau File 44-26940.)

25. Southern Christian Leadership Conference

    a. General file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

    b. Cointelpro file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

26. James Bevel, for the period 1965 through 1968.

27. Rev. Jessie Jackson, Chicago, Ill., for the period 1965 through 1968.

28. Vincent DePaul Stelly, 4434 5th Ave., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

29. Jerome Wallis Vernon, Home Service Laundry and Dry Cleaning, 5280 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

30. Rev. James Orange, South Carolina for the period 1965 through 1968.

31. Rev. Bernard Lee, Atlanta, Ga., for the period 1965 through 1968.

32. Allan Lee Stoddard, "Vegas Club", 5510 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

33. Robert Byron Watson, SS# 253-85-2220, Atlanta, Ga.

34. Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1962 through 1968. (This request pertains to material exclusive of the Murkin File and the SCLC files and should include all information regarding threats to Dr. King.

35. Herman A. Thompson, 10454 Goodwood Blvd.,
Baton Rouge, La., (former deputy sheriff in
Baton Rouge).

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

NOV 8 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a conference was held on November 7, 1977 between employees of the FBI and members of the Committee staff to discuss the Committee's November 3, 1977 letter of request for FBI materials on thirty-five individuals or organizations. As a result of this meeting, the following was resolved:

(a) The FBI would process the following numbered requests as they were originally stated in the November 3rd letter: 1, 4, 5, 7, 9-11, 13-24, 26, 28-33 and 35.

(b) The Committee would provide dates of births on the individuals in requests nos. 12 and 27 before the FBI would process these names. The dob on Robert J. Powers (request no. 12) is 6/5/24. The dob on Reverend Jesse Jackson (request no. 27) is 10/8/41.

(c) Besides providing the complete file on request no. 3 (Jesse B. Stoner), the FBI would also make available the most appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin assigned to Stoner for the period 1965 through 1968.

(d) With respect to request no. 2, the FBI would prov[illegible] all the material in [illegible] files [illegible] 1957 [illegible] as well as make available the appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin for the same period.

~~62-117290-3896~~

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-382X

(e) With respect to request no. 6, the Committee would hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI provides a list of the most appropriate case agent(s) in the offices of origin for the several Klan organizations in existence in 1967 and 1968. (While such was not part of the understanding reached at the time of the meeting with FBI officials, the Committee would request however that all materials related to the United Klan of America LS for the period 1965 and 1966 be made ready for inspection by November 20, 1977.)

(f) With respect to request no. 8, the FBI would first advise the Committee as to the identity of other cities reporting on the White Citizens Council before a determination be made as to the final content of this request.

(g) With respect to request no. 25, the Committee will hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s) for the period in question.

(h) With respect to request no. 34, the Committee requests that only the thirteen "death threat" files on Dr. King be processed at this time, while a request for all other materials is held in abeyance until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s).

In Addition, the Committee would also request that the following agents be notified and made available by the FBI:

(1) Special Agent William F. Kusch - New Orleans
Special Agent Thomas E. Duhadway - New Orleans

(2) Special Agent Jack B. Simpson - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Richard H. Davis - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Jack T. Beverstein - Memphis ATLANTA

As a priority item, it is also requested that the FBI provide the Committee with the work or personnel records of the following three Louisville FBI agents for the month of September 1965:

(1) Robert Peters

(2) William Duncan

(3) Bernard Brown

We are primarily interested in those records reflecting their [illegible] records should be provided by November 15, 1977. The Committee would also ask that all three of the above-mentioned Louisville agents be made available for interview by the same date.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB605

PAGE 01 STATE 010886

JAN 14 7 04 AM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ORIGIN EUR-12 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 L-03 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00
INR-07 /025 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/NE: JPSHUMATE

APPROVED BY EUR/NE: RLFUNSETH

H - ASCHNEE (BY PHONE)

------------------015192 141012Z /10

R 140226Z JAN 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

EX-136

4 - Foster

(info)

E.O. 11652:N/A

REC-6 62-117290-380

TAGS:PINR, PDIP, UK

18 1978

SUBJECT:REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

FLG. SUP.

RE: LONDON 20003

58 JAN 26 1978

MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH

THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVESTIGATION MENTIONED IN BLAKEY'S LETTER AND ADVISE US. VANCE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENN[illegible] HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWI[illegible] LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CH[redacted]IE, OHIO
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

KINNEY, CONN.
C ES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

House [redacted]

January 9, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

51

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff, access to the following:

1. All files, materials, and information relating to William Hugh Morris, the alleged leader of the Federated KKK in Alabama.

    a) Address (late 1950's)
    2128 East Fifth Street
    Oak Park
    Montgomery, Alabama

    b) Jefferson County Alabama
    Sheriff's Office Number 52811

Your prompt attention to this request will be greatly appreciated.

62-117290-378

REC-30

EX-130

Respectfully

14 JAN 18 1978

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

GRB:ghk

cc: Danny Coulson

1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, [illegible]AIRM[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

[illegible]EL L.[illegible]INE, OHIO
[illegible]ART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 5, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

(C)

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available for interview, on a priority basis, the following agents:

1. Theodore A'Hearn - Los Angeles } 10/7 LET cleared
2. Leroy W. Sheets - Los Angeles
3. Thomas J. Wilson - Atlanta
4. Gerald Galbreath - El Paso

The Committee is ready to interview these agents on an immediate basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

✓CC: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:wwd

EX-130

REC-30 62-117290
62-117290-376

14 JAN 18 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

[illegible] 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CH[illegible]AN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SA[illegible] L. [illegible]E, OHIO
STE[illegible] B. [illegible]INNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

0 House

January 4, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

HAND DELIVER

Cu

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available to the Committee access to all F.B.I. materials, files, memoranda, airtels, and miscellaneous items, including but not limited to any contained in the MURKIN File (44-38861), on or referring to the following individual:

Gerold Frank - author
d.o.b. 8/2/1907
current address: 930 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10021

It is requested that access to these materials be provided on a priority basis so that our initial review can be completed by January 16, 1978.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

EX-130

REC 28

62-117290-[illegible]

JAN 17 1978

GRB:ghd

cc: Danny Coulson

58 JAN 24 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

JAN 3 11 23 AM '78

MAIL ROOM

DEC 30 1977

SK

Cd

RECEIVED
JAN 4 1978
O.L.A

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it has been determined from a review of the Chicago field office file (No. 44-1114) of the MURKIN investigation that the FBI is in possession of several letters of correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters. (See, for example, serials 271, 335, 496, 560, 574, 621, and 637 in the Chicago field office file.) It is requested that the FBI furnish this Committee with copies of all correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

ST-125 REC-55 62-117290-372

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

23 JAN 10 1978

62-117290

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
10
JAN 3 1978
O.R.O.M.

FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

24

79 JAN - 1978

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

WASHINGTON, PM DEC 30 1977 200

ALWAYS USE ZIP CODE

Louis Stokes
M.C.

Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th & Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention; Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 3, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

ST

Director, FBI

C O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to the letter from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, to the Attorney General, dated August 9, 1977, requesting availability of all FBI reports relative to robbery of the Bank of Alton, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967. Reference is also made to the letter from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, dated September 13, 1977, requesting a copy of all FBI reports in this bank robbery investigation.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above HSCA request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

ST-120 REC-45 62-117290-371

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

20 JAN 9 1978

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

10/4/77

3 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

79 JAN 20 1978

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

DATE 12/3/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: The Alton bank robbery occurred at the time James Earl Ray was a fugitive, prior to King's assassination. Ray was considered a suspect in this robbery subsequent to being identified as King's killer. No evidence was produced to link Ray with the robbery. The case was closed unsolved in 1972.

In its request of 8/9/77, the HSCA asked for access to our investigation into this bank robbery and the file was prepared. Later, the HSCA submitted a second request which requested "a copy of any and all materials or reports" in the Alton bank robbery. Mr. Keuch advised on 9/19/77, that delivery should be limited only to investigative reports in the case. The requested material was picked up at FBIHQ on 9/19/77 by Oliver Champion, HSCA messenger. Purpose of enclosed memorandum is to confirm delivery of this material.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

October 3, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

This will respond to letter dated August 9, 1977, to the Attorney General from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, and letter dated September 13, 1977, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA.

This letter is to confirm that, pursuant to the above request dated September 13, 1977, a copy of each investigative report of the FBI in the Alton bank robbery, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967, was delivered to a representative of the HSCA on September 19, 1977.

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Direcotr, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/3/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

12/31/85

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-371

FBI/DOJ

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE-BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

August 9, 1977

RECEIVED

AUG 19 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20430

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we request that you make available to us all investigative reports relative to the robbery of the Bank of Alton, Illinois, on July 13, 1967.

Best wishes and kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

EME:ek

Ack to AAG/CD
10-3-77
JTA:aos
1 - OLA

144-72-662
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
11
AUG 19 1977
O.R.O.M.
RECEIVED
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

62-117290-37

CIV. RIGHTS DIV.

ENCLOSURE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVIN[illegible]IO
STEWART B. MC[illegible]Y, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, [illegible]
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 13, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and our conversation with your office on Monday, September 12, 1977, we are hereby requesting a copy of any and all materials or reports the Federal Bureau of Investigation has regarding the Alton Bank Robbery in Alton, Illinois on July 13, 1967; as well as a copy of any other materials the Department of Justice may have in its possession relevant to this matter.

I appreciate your cooperation and assistance in this request, and I look forward hearing from you.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

SJL/GRB/drj

9-

62-117290-371

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 10, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, ~~Chief~~ Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertinent to seven listed individuals.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request and advises that material on six of these individuals is available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters. Information on the seventh individual, Randolph Erwin Rosenson, was previously furnished the HSCA by FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120

11/17/77

62-117290-369

REC-55

23 JAN 10 1978

2 - ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

79 JAN 16 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. M/DEF
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/75 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By request dated 9/20/77, the HSCA asked for information concerning Rosenson. By letter to the Attorney General and its enclosures, both dated 10/13/77, information concerning Rosenson was delivered. The HSCA request dated 10/18/77, (attached) desired information on seven individuals, including a repeat on Rosenson's name.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 10, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertaining to:

Harvey Gene Love
George G. Pittman
Stephanie Helene Sheehan
Jonathon Henry Shea
Keith Albert Wright
Frank Quenqui
Randolph Erwin Rosenson

Retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the above individuals, with the exception of Rosenson, has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions or deletions. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

By FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977, documents containing information concerning Rosenson were provided the HSCA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/05 BY

JTA:sas (9)
sas

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/10/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA).

62-117290-369

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. JBA PLM
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILD[illegible] ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

A.id.

October 18, 1977

King Invest

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attn: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the Select Committee's investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Martin Luther King, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff materials in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation relating to the following individuals for the period of time from January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968: 6/1/69

[illegible] 1/1/67 - 6/1/69 10/25

NAME	Date of Birth	FBI Number
✓Love, Harvey Gene	4/1/35	592-813A
✓Pittman, George G.	6/20/38	919-933C
✓Sheehan, Stephanie Helene	7/26/53	951-133N4
✓Shea, Jonathon Henry	~~6/12/47~~	688-958J2
✓Wright, Keith Albert	7/27/44	122-750H
✓Quenqui, Frank	12/9/08	160-8374
Rosenson, Randolph Erwin	3/20/34	34-711E

In addition, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the staff the criminal records for these individuals. This written request confirms an oral request made by myself to Mr. Dan Coulson on October 18, 1977 in the offices of the Committee.

Thank you.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:DM
copy to: Dan Coulson

let to AAG/CD
11/10/77 (Enc-2)
JTA:aas

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-369

Assistant Attorney General FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 11, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance regarding certain individuals and a business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

APPROVED:

Director____
Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____
Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Pers.____
Ident.____
Intell.____
Laboratory____
Legal Coun. M/Dif
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt.____
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____

ST-120

REC-55 62-117290-368

23 JAN 10 1978

2- ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Pers.____
Ident.____
Intell.____
Laboratory____
Legal Coun.____
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt.____
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____
Telephone Rm.____
Director Sec'y____

79 JAN 16 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/21/83 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By memorandum dated 5/13/68, the Department was asked for authority to place technical surveillance on the telephones of James Earl Ray's brother-in-law and sister, Albert and Carol Pepper and the Grapevine Tavern, all located in St. Louis, Missouri. This memorandum also requested microphone surveillance be installed at the residence of Albert and Carol Pepper, the residence of Ray's brother, John Larry Ray, and at the Grapevine Tavern. FBIHQ files contain no information to indicate the Department of Justice took any action on this request. Following Ray's apprehension the Department, in memorandum dated 6/11/68, was advised that the FBI's request for electornic surveillance was withdrawn. The above information is contained in the King Assassination June file and has been processed for access of the HSCA.

The HSCA's request of 11/7/77, desired only written confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance on the above individuals and business during the period 1/1/67 to 12/31/68.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 11, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance against the following individuals and business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper.
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri.

This memorandum is to confirm that, based on a review of appropriate files at FBI Headquarters, the above were not subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI during the period January 1, 1967, to December 31, 1968, or at any other time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/95 BY

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/11/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

APPROVED:
Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-36

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SA[redacted]VINE, OHIO
ST CKINNEY, CONN.
CHA ONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

[redacted]

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

NOV 7 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance to determine whether any of the following individuals and places were the subject of such surveillance during the period of January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence or non-existence of such electronic surveillance with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Ict to AAG/CD
JTA:dws
11/11/77 (Enc-2)

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-368

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

C O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that former Special Agent Joe C. Hester was interviewed on November 21, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Hester's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
    Criminal Division
    Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - Joe C. Hester - Enclosure

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

ST-120
REC-55 62-117290-366

23 JAN 10 1978

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

APPROVED:
Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

ENCLOSURE

DOC:ldr
(10)

signed & sent 1/6/77

12/31/83

79 JAN 16 1978 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Memphis, Tennessee

December 5, 1977

JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM;
CIVIL RIGHTS - CONSPIRACY

On November 21, 1977, retired Special Agent Joe C. Hester appeared at Washington, D. C., at the request of the House Committee on Assassinations.

Mr. Hester met with the Committee staff in their offices at Washington, D. C., and was interviewed for a total of four hours by two different groups of five persons each. Both groups were affable and were not in any way critical of the investigation conducted in this case.

The first group of five interviewers asked a variety of questions but seemed to be particularly preoccupied with the investigation conducted by Legats in Mexico. Mr. Hester was able to answer many of the general questions regarding the activities of Legats but referred them to Assistant Director Richard Long when they began to ask more specific questions regarding the investigations by Legats and the manner of transmittal of this information to FBI Headquarters.(e)

The second group of five interviewers asked more general questions regarding the Bureau's investigation of the King murder. They seemed to be greatly concerned with the allegation of conspiracy. Mr. Hester advised them that he believed the conspiracy theory was an invention by the Department of Justice to be used to justify the FBI's investigation of Dr. King's murder. Mr. Hester advised them that he had never personally believed there was a conspiracy and he did not believe that any of his FBI superiors had ever believed in the conspiracy theory. Mr. Hester further advised that it was his personal opinion that James Earl Ray, acting alone, had murdered Dr. King and that his subsequent travels were probably financed by armed robbery.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

5/21/81 #345889

Memo to DAG, 12-29-77

62-117290-366

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

This group was concerned with how the subject Ray had known how to obtain false documents following his arrival in Canada. Mr. Hester pointed out that a "Top Ten" criminal had been arrested in Canada and had been returned to the Missouri State Penitentiary and had served time there with James Earl Ray prior to Ray's escape. Mr. Hester indicated it was his belief that this "Top Ten" fugitive had been responsible for instructing Ray on how to proceed in obtaining false documents in Canada.

This group touched on such diverse elements as the information furnished by John McFerren regarding Frank Liberto, and one of the interviewers agreed that they had not believed McFerren to be a very reliable witness. They also discussed Ray's purchase of the rifle in Birmingham; the fact that Officer Redditt was moved from the firehouse near the Lorraine Motel just prior to the murder; what motive did Ray have for killing Dr. King; whether or not there was any evidence to indicate a conspiracy; whether or not there were any wiretaps and whether or not there had been any surreptitious entries made against King and his followers at Memphis prior to the assassination; and when, following his escape, did Ray appear to have made up his mind to assassinate Dr. King.

In addition, they asked numerous questions about the political climate in Memphis just prior to the assassination and inquired as to what investigation was being conducted by the FBI in regard to the Sanitation Workers Strike and the first march conducted by Dr. King. Mr. Hester was forced to admit that he had had nothing to do with the investigation of Dr. King prior to the murder and he suggested that they talk to current Special Agent Howell S. Lowe who would be in a position to furnish information in this regard.

They inquired about the interview of James Earl Ray conducted by former Special Agent in Charge Robert G. Jensen, former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle, and Mr. Hester at the state prison in Nashville, Tennessee, following Ray's plea of guilty. Mr. Hester recounted as best he could recall the events that transpired in connection with this attempted interview and advised the interviewers that former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle has suffered a cerebral hemmorrhage and possibly might not be competent to furnish information regarding this investigation.

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

The Committee indicated that they might desire to interview Mr. Hester again, either personally or telephonically, and they were assured that he would be available and agreeable to assisting them in any way possible.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's S

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Robert L. Keuch FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ack. K

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

cc: ✓Mr. Aldhizer

DEC 8 1977

#17
1-4-78

ACF
BD

✓Danny D. Coulson
SSA - Div 11
NSOM
67-623562

Drew J. Clark
SSA - Div 9
NSOM
67-572700

ST-120

REC-54 62-117290-362

John T. Aldhizer, III
SSA - Div 5
NSOM
67-606490

memo to Robert L. Keuch Special Council to the AG — Foster 8981

12-22-77
CAM:jmr

NPD-8988

79 JAN 12 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Robert L. Keuch
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

cc: Mr. Aldhizer

CARBON COPY

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 14, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn; Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

51
0
C

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to a letter dated October 5, 1977, addressed to Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in the possession of the FBI pertaining to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material, as well as limited material pertaining to Hardin, previously prepared for the Committee's access, is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Enclosed are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

ST-120

JTM:sas (8)
sas

REC-54 SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-117290-36

11/17/77

20 JAN 6 1978

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

79 JAN 12 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY Sp maeme

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request dated 10/5/77, from HSCA for all information contained in Bureau files relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair. This request has been coordinated with the Legal Counsel Division.

A review of Bureau files has revealed that a limited number of documents relating to an attempted bombing of Brent Hardin's automobile had been prepared for the Committee's access pursuant to receipt of their request dated 4/27/77. The Committee was advised of the availability of these documents on 5/18/77. The remaining retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair have been prepared for the Committee's access and are being maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's Room 8988 for their review.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files pursuant to the Committee's request dated 10/5/77, include Baird's ident record, the results of a civil rights investigation involving Baird as the subject, and references to Blair appearing in the MURKIN file, numerous references to Hardin and the results of a civil rights investigation involving Blair as the subject.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY

November 14, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 5, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI RELATIVE TO CLIFTON BAIRD, BRENT HARDIN AND ARLIE BLAIR.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 5, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Utilizing identifying data for Baird, Hardin and Blair furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

Also available for the Committee's access are documents relating to Brent Hardin which were previously prepared on May 18, 1977, pursuant to the receipt of the Committee's request dated April 27, 1977, for these documents.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTM:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/14/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-117290-361

FBI/DOJ

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

McGil

October 5, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Clifton Baird, 7813 Edsel Lane, Louisville, Kentucky.
2. Brent Hardin, 9102 Bristle Ave., Louisville, Kentucky.
3. Arlie Blair, 4025 Franklin Ave., Louisville, Kentucky, dob 9/3/32.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

Ltr to AAG/CD
JTM:sas
11/14/77

ENCLOS.

62-117290-361

Rec 10/5 JTW

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. [illegible]
STEWART [illegible], CONN.
CHARLES [illegible], NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 13 1977

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

DEC 14 11 29 AM '77
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL ROOM

RECEIVED

RECEIVED
DEC 15 1977
O.L.A.

CJ

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

2 House

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if our staff could have access to the following files:

a) Any and all materials or files pertaining to the organization known as the MINUTEMEN for the period 1966-1968 active in the states of Mississippi and Louisiana.

ST. 114 REC-33 62-117290 - 356

c) Any records and files, excluding D.E.A. records requested in our letter of November 8, 1977 on:

Reynard J. Rochon
2200 Oriole Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

(1967 address)
7018 Dreux Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

21 JAN 4 1978

Your cooperation and prompt attention to this matter is greatly appreciated.

62-117290

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

GRB:ghe

cc: Danny O. Coulson

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
3 DEC 14 1977
D.A.O.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

57 JAN 12 1978

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO : The Associate Director DATE: 12/22/77

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that the Director release from their secrecy agreements, SAs Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

DETAILS: By letter dated 12/20/77 -389 HSAC requested to interview SAs Harry L. Lee (former), SA Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen. By letter dated 11/8/77 320 the Committee requested permission to interview SA John B. Simpson, Richard A. Davis (former) and SA Jack T. Beverstein (former).

8

By letter dated 11/3/77 captioned Committee requested the identity of the case Agent most familiar with white hate activities in the period from 1965 to 1966. By letter dated 11/17/77 the Committee was advised that this Agent is SA Warren L. Walsh (former). By letter dated 12/9/77 the Committee requested permission to interview SA Robert Nichols (former). 332

RECOMMENDATION: T 114 REC-46 62-117290-353

That the Director release from their employment agreement for purpose of interview by the captioned Committee the following individuals: Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

JAN

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Long
1 - Mr. Foster
2 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Coulson

DOC:dfj(8)

3651

JCK

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. D. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____ #245852
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

12/30/77

JAN 12 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

File #:

62-117290 - SECTION 6

Serial Scope:

353, 356, 361, 362, 366, 368, 369, 371, 372, 375, 376,

378
380
382X
385
390 THRU 395
397
400
404 THRU 409
413 THRU 415
418
420
421
424
426
428 THRU 431
433
437

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 2/10/78

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT,
RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, ST. LOUIS (62-5097)(C)

SUBJECT: (U) HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Re Bureau teletype to St. Louis, 2/10/78, 433 captioned as above.

Enclosed under separate cover for Headquarters is a Xerox copy of each serial in SL 170-1767 and SL 170-1767 Sub A as was requested in retel. Also enclosed is destruction memoranda concerning SL 1495-E (former) substantive file. Case closed in St. Louis.

245852
12/30/88 [illegible]

③ Bureau
(1 - via package) (Enc. 1)
2- St. Louis
(1- 62-5097)
(1- 170-1767)
JLV:jtc
(5)

2cc - Congressional Inquiry Unit w/o Encl

REC 58 62-117290-437

EX-124

FEB 15 1978

4 - [illegible] (info)

AUG 28 1978 CB

Approved: HC Approved: _______ Transmitted _______ (Number) (Time) Per _______

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

56 FEB 22 1978

wdK

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1 - Criminal Investigative Division
(Attn: J. E. McHale)
1 - Mr. G. J. Foster
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer
2/~~10~~9/78 per GJF

FM DIRECTOR (62-117290)

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

BT

E F T O

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF Classification
DATE 2/4/78 6AB/[illegible]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ST. LOUIS DATED JANUARY 25, 1978; 421 ST. LOUIS TELETYPES TO BUREAU JANUARY 27, 429 1978, AND JANUARY 31, 1978. 443

ON FEBRUARY 8, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED HIS STAFF HAD CONTACTED FORMER SL 1495-E, WHO HAS AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH THE HSCA. ON FEBRUARY 9, 1978, STAFF ATTORNEY MICHAEL EBERHARDT, HSCA, ADVISED THAT SL 1495-E HAS EXECUTED A SIGNED WAIVER AUTHORIZING HSCA ACCESS TO ALL FBI INFORMATION CONCERNING HIM, INCLUDING THAT PERTAINING TO HIS INFORMANT ACTIVITIES.

REC-65 62-117290-433

EX-110

22 FEB 13 1978

134-19686-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

1 - 134-19686

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

JTA:lfj
(6)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. __
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. __
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. __
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director's Sec'y __

FEB 13 55

HB/DRS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 09 1978
TELETYPE

58 FEB 27 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI/DOJ

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO E F T O 62-117290

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN INFORMANT'S MAIN FILE AND SUB A FILE (170-1767) AND ONE COPY OF ANY VOUCHER OR DOCUMENT WHICH CONCERNS ANY ASPECT OF SOURCE'S OPERATION AND ANY PAYMENT WHICH WAS MADE TO HIM. ADDITIONALLY, PROVIDE FBIHQ WITH ONE COPY OF ANY MAIN FILE OR REFERENCE IN YOUR OFFICE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH INFORMANT. (S) u

THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBI HEADQUARTERS, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ, THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS OF STAFF MEMBERS OF HSCA, PROVIDED THE WAIVER DESCRIBED AS ABOVE IS RECEIVED.

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: SL 1495-E (former) (Bureau file 134-19686) was operated from January, 1970, to approximately September, 1971, primarily targeted against White Hate Groups. In 1971, he traveled to Savannah, Georgia, at which time he reported on activities of the National States Rights Party office and that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, stated he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. This is the apparent HSCA interest in informant.

Referenced communications concern previous informal requests by the HSCA that we contact SL 1495-E to determine if he would be willing to be interviewed by the Committee. St. Louis contacted informant on 1/27/78 and he agreed, but two days later submitted a letter to St. Louis declining to be interviewed by the HSCA. Subsequently, the HSCA determined informant's identity through its investigation and contacted him, at which time, according to the HSCA, he agreed to interview. By letter to the Attorney General dated 1/26/78, the HSCA has asked for all information at FBI Headquarters and in the field concerning informant.

This matter has been coordinated with SA D. O. Coulson, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 2/1/78

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
(Attention: Congressional Inquiry Unit,
Records Management Division)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (62-7385) (C)

SUBJECT: O HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS

ReButelcall to Chicago 2/1/78.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies each of ten letters from JERRY RAY to MARJORIE LOUISE FETTERS.

All of the above letters were originally received from the Newark Division in a Xeroxed condition thus the quality of the above enclosures is not entirely satisfactory. However, per referenced Bureau telephone call, Chicago will maintain the original Xerox copy in its file 44-1114.

2cc RETAINED → RETAINED RM 8988 JEH w/ encls.

③ - Bureau (Encls. 20) ENCLOSURE
1 - Chicago

WLD:jeo
(4)

EX-140

62-117290-431

REC-33

4 FEB 3 1978

4-O

245852

ALL [illegible] D
[illegible] IN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/85 BY [illegible]

Approved: WEB/WLD

Transmitted ________ (Number) (Time)

Per ________

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

FEB 24 1978

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 5 4 52 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

N00140 0052135Z

RR HI

DE NO

R 052125Z JAN 78

FM NEW ORLEANS (66-2878) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED: JAN. 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DEC. 27, 1977. 351

I) SA STEPHEN M. CALLENDER OF THE NEW ORLEANS DIVISION WAS THE NEW ORLEANS FIELD OFFICE CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION. AT THE TIME SA CALLENDER WAS ASSIGNED THE "MURKIN" CASE, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE NUMBER SIX SQUAD IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE. THIS SQUAD HANDLED CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS. "MURKIN" WAS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF FORMER ASAC JOSEPH T. SYLVESTER, JR. THE NATURE OF CALLENDER'S ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY

EX-105 REC-56 62-117290-430

23 JAN 26 1978

4 -

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:na

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc

42

58FEB [illegible]

PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE "MURKIN" INVESTIGATION WAS IN THE FIELDS OF CR, RACIAL AND RELATED MATTERS.

II) THE FILES OF THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE FAIL TO REVEAL THAT THIS OFFICE EITHER CONSIDERED OR ENGAGED IN ANY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COIN TEL PRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC).

NEW ORLEANS FILES WHICH INVOLVE THE SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF KING (NO 100-16800) AND THE SCLC (NO 100-16849) HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY REVIEWED. NEW ORLEANS WAS MERELY AN AUXILIARY OFFICE IN THESE INVESTIGATIONS, WITH ATLANTA BEING THE OO. THE EXTENT OF INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY NEW ORLEANS WAS THE COVERING OF LEADS IN LA., SET FORTH BY ATLANTA OR OTHER OFFICES. THESE TWO FILES WERE REVIEWED SERIAL BY SERIAL AND NOWHERE IS THERE ANY INDICATION WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SCLC BY THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE.

DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 - 1968, THE KING FILE IN THE NEW ORLEANS OFFICE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AND THEN RUC'D AT LEAST SEVEN TIMES AND THE SCLC FILE WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED AT LEAST FIVE TIMES DURING THIS SAME PERIOD.

PAGE THREE NO 66-2878 E F T O

AIR MAIL COPY SENT ATLANTA DIVISION.

BT

SL0018 0272150

RR HQ

DE SL

R 272145Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (C)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

BT

E F T O

JAN 27 4 58 PM '78
DLS
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, ~~RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION.~~

~~Emp Sec&Spec Inq Section 3823 JEH TL#231~~

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

RE BUREAU TEL TO ST. LOUIS, JANUARY 25, 1978, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

SL 1495-E (FORMER) CONTACTED THIS DATE. HE WAS ADVISED OF HSCA'S EXISTENCE AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM CONCERNING CONTENTS OF LHM DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM - NSRP".

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS ADVISED THAT HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS. INITIAL REACTION OF SOURCE WAS THAT HE HAD NO STRONG OBJECTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY HSCA.

SOURCE (FORMER) WAS THEN ADVISED THAT CONFERENCES WITH HSCA

REC-56 62-117290-429

6 JAN 31 1978

54 FEB 23 1978

AND DOJ WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT DETAILS RE PROTECTION, CONFIDENTIALITY, LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

IT IS NOTED THAT SOURCE (FORMER) UNDERWENT MAJOR HEART AND ABDOMINAL SURGERY DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1977, IS CURRENTLY RECOVERING AND UNDER DOCTOR'S CARE. HE RESIDES 12350 OLD HALLS FERRY ROAD, FLORISSANT, MO., (314) 355-1500 AND IS UNEMPLOYED.

BT

#

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB778

JAN 31 5 20 PM '78

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

PAGE 01 LONDON 01641 311209Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00 INR-07
L-03 /025 W

FOSTER

------------------099858 312209Z /41

R 311204Z JAN 78

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2604

4 - J. Tonzer

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LONDON 01641

5 - L[illegible]

DC

EX-140

REC- 13

DE-3

V-29

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINR PDIP UK

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

62-117290-428

FEB 7 1978

REF: STATE 10886

~~56 FEB 22 1978~~

AUG 28 1978

FOR H (ASST SEC BENNET) AND EUR/NE

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFTEL, WE PASSED ON TO THE HOME OFFICE THE REQUEST OF THE [illegible]USE SELECT COMMITTEE ON AS[illegible]ASSINATIONS FOR ACCESS TO BRITISH POLICE RECORDS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS CONCERNED WITH THE ARREST OF JAMES EARL RAY WITHOUT THE COMMITTEE RESPONDING FIRST TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED PREVIOUSLY BY BRITISH OFFICIALS.

2. THE HOME OFFICE INFORMED THE EMBASSY ON JANUARY 26 THAT IT IS CONSULTING THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S REQUEST AND WILL LET US KNOW THE OUTCOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BREWSTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMU[redacted] L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEV . MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHA HONE, NEBR.
HAR SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

O House

[redacted]

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

[redacted]

January 30, 1978

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

C

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

337

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a request was made by letter dated November 30, 1977, for FBI files relating to Dr. King. These files included the following:

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.

2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the period January 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.

3. The file on the Memphis Sanitation Strike for the period January 1, 1968 through May 1, 1968.

4. The file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr./Poor People's March for the period December 1, 1967 through May 1, 1968.

EX-311 REC-6 62-117290-426

5. All materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the SCLC in the COINTELPRO file.

21 FEB 6 1978

We have been advised that all of the above files are now available for review by the Committee.

It is now requested, however, that the foregoing files, except for the Memphis Sanitation Strike, be prepared for Committee review for the following extended dates:

62-117290

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

58 FEB 14 1978

42

1. The main security file on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:

    a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969

2. The main file on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the periods:

    a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969

3. The COMINFIL and COINTELPRO files as such relate to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for the periods:

    a. October 1, 1962 - December 31, 1966
    b. May 1, 1968 - April 1, 1969

4. The files on the Poor Peoples' March from May 1, 1968 to the closing date of this file.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:med

✓cc: Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRM[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible]INE, OHIO
STEWART [illegible] KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES TH[illegible]E, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

2 House

Received
CIU
2/3/78

FEB 3 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the FBI provide the Committee with photographs of all Atlanta agents assigned to the security investigation of Dr. King during the period 1967-68. To the extent possible, these photographs should depict the agents involved as they appeared in 1967-1968 or as close thereto as possible.

R

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mej
✓cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson FBI

62-117290

EX-124
REC-76 62-117290-424

FEB 7 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

PW

57 FEB 15 1978

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO 1/25/78

FM DIRECTOR

TO ST. LOUIS (ROUTINE)

BT

E F T O

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Criminal Intelligence Div.
(Attn: Mr. J. E. McHale, Jr.)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

REFERENCE ST. LOUIS AIRTEL AND LHM TO BUREAU DATED MAY 28, 1971, CAPTIONED, "NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, RM-NSRP."

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN THAT CONNECTION, VARIOUS DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE FOR HSCA REVIEW.

ON JANUARY 23, 1978, G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, HSCA, ADVISED THAT THE HSCA DESIRES TO INTERVIEW THE FBI INFORMANT WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION IN REFERENCED LHM. BLAKEY REQUESTED THAT INFORMANT BE CONTACTED AND ADVISED OF THE HSCA'S INTEREST IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT INFORMANT HAD ANY OBJECTIONS TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY

2

134-19686
105-66233

EX-124

REC-54 62-117290-421

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

JTA:sas (7)
soo

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

6 FEB 1 1978

1 - 134-19686
1 - 62-117290

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JAN 25 1978
2212 EST
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-10-86

42
58 FEB 14 1978

HB/DRK

Foster
Rm 8988

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☒

FBI/DOJ

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA.

INFORMANT IS SL 1495-E (FORMER), WHO WAS OPERATED FROM JANUARY, 1970, TO APPROXIMATELY SEPTEMBER 1971. INFORMANT WAS PRIMARILY TARGETED AGAINST WHITE-HATE GROUPS AND WAS SUBJECT OF BUREAU FILE 134-19686 AND ST. LOUIS FILE 170-1767.

ON JANUARY 24, 1978, SUPERVISOR JAMES HAGGERTY DETERMINED THAT INFORMANT IS LISTED IN THE CURRENT ST. LOUIS TELEPHONE DIRECTORY AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CONTACT WITH INFORMANT SINCE HE WAS CLOSED IN 1971.

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY CONTACT FORMER SL 1495-E. ADVISE HIM OF THE HSCA'S EXISTENCE, AND ITS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM APPARENTLY CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF REFERENCED LHM. ADVISE HIM THE HSCA HAS INTERVIEWED OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCED LHM AND WILL BE ISSUING SUBPOENAS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER. DETERMINE AT THIS POINT ONLY HIS INITIAL REACTION TO BEING INTERVIEWED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HSCA. IF HE HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO AN INTERVIEW, HE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT CONFERENCES WITH THE HSCA AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS

REGARDING THE EXTENT OF PROTECTION AND CONFIDENTIALITY THE HSCA IS WILLING TO EXTEND AS WELL AS DETAILS REGARDING THE LOCATION AND SCOPE OF INTERVIEW.

SUTEL RESULTS TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION.

BT

#

PAGE FOUR   EFTO

NOTE The HSCA plans to submit a formal request regarding this matter, but requested informant be contacted for his initial reaction to interview. The Congressional Inquiry Unit, Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, agree this approach is best prior to continuing discussions to resolve legal and other issues.

The apparent interest of the HSCA involves informant's travel to Savannah, Georgia, in 1971 at which time he reported on activities at the NSRP Office in Savannah, as set forth in referenced communication. Informant reported that Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray, and J. B. Stoner, National Chairman, NSRP, were in the office when Jerry said that the FBI and he knew there was another party involved in the killing of King and that his brother was the one who pulled the trigger. The HSCA has requested FBI information on the NSRP, Stoner, Jerry Ray and other individuals identified as being in attendance in the NSRP Office in Savannah during that time. One of the individuals present, Richard Geppert, was later developed as an informant of the Springfield Office. Geppert has been interviewed by the HSCA and has furnished a signed statement in which he gives authority for HSCA review of all FBI information concerning him, including that pertaining to his confidential relationship with the FBI.

This matter has been coordinated with Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Organized Crime Section, Criminal Investigative ~~Unit~~ Division

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 14 4 52 AM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ME0013 0140930Z

RR HQ

DE ME

C R 14 0930Z JAN 78

FM MEMPHIS (66-2197) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290)

BT

EFTO

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JAN. 13, 1978.

THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOE C. HESTER, NOW RETIRED, ON APRIL 4, 1968, AND WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON AUG. 1, 1977. THE MEMPHIS OFFICE DID NOT HAVE A SQUAD BREAKDOWN AT THE TIME THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA HESTER. SA HESTER WAS ASSIGNED GENERAL CRIMINAL WORK IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE MURKIN INVESTIGATION. SA JOHNSON WAS ASSIGNED DOMESTIC SECURITY AND CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE TIME THE MURKIN CASE WAS REASSIGNED TO HIM.

R

EX-124 REC-54 62-117290-420

22 JAN 31 1978

4

Rm 89/85

2 copies made pgs 1-6
1/24/78 JTA:ma

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc Rm 8988

42

58 FEB 14 1978

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4542 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS, RACIAL MATTERS," WAS FIRST OPENED ON AUG. 28, 1967, AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., NOW RETIRED, UNTIL IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON MARCH 7, 1968. IT REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. MEMPHIS OFFICE HAD NO SQUAD BREAKDOWN DURING THE PERIOD 1965-68. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, AND SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4704 ENTITLED "NEW LEFT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM", WAS OPENED ON MAY 15, 1968, AND ASSIGNED TO LAWRENCE J. OLSON. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA BURL F. JOHNSON ON FEB. 29, 1971, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 12, 1971. SA'S OLSON AND JOHNSON WERE INVOLVED IN SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE A100-4046 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM" WAS ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, NOW RETIRED, ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

OPENED JULY 23, 1964, PLACED IN RUC STATUS APRIL 29, 1966; REOPENED AUG. 24, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS AUG. 30, 1966; REOPENED MARCH 31, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JUNE 13, 1967; REOPENED OCT. 18, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS DEC. 20, 1967. IT REMAINED IN RUC STATUS UNTIL DEC. 26, 1974.

SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE ON EACH OCCASION.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-576 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS" WAS FIRST OPENED ON SEPT. 4, 1964, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND SWAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON JUNE 15, 1965. THIS CASE WAS REOPENED JUNE 18, 1965, AND PLACED IN RUC STATUS ON SEPT. 9, 1965. IT WAS REOPENED JAN. 2, 1966, AND ASSIGNED TO SA LAWRENCE. IT WAS REASSIGNED TO SA MERRILL F. MC CLOUGHAN ON JUNE 3, 1966. SA MC CLOUGHAN IS NOW RETIRED. IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA ROBERT F. FITZPATRICK ON MAY 10, 1968, AND REMAINED SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE, SA LAWRENCE WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTEC INVESTIGATIONS, SA HILLIN WAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS, SA MC CLOUGHAN WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATION, AND SA FITZPATRICK WAS INVOLVED IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.

MEMPHIS FILE 100-4105 ENTITLED MMARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS OPENED ON JAN. 2, 1965, AND ASSIGNED TO SA WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, AND WAS SO ASSIGNED UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED ON APRIL 11, 1968. SA LAWRENCE WAS ASSIGNED SECURITY AND RACIAL MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CASE.

MEMPHIS FILE 157-166 ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE" (COMINFIL SCLS) IS - C, WAS FIRST OPENED IN THE MEMPHIS OFFICE ON SEPT. 26, 1961. IT WAS PLACED IN RUC STATUS AND RE-OPENED A NUMBER OF

TIMES PRIOR TO PERIOD 1965-68. IT WAS OPENED AND ASSIGNED DURING THIS PERIOD AS FOLLOWS:

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH H. KEARNEY, JR., ON FOLLOWING OCCASIONS.

REOPENED JULY 12, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS NOV. 17, 1965; REOPENED NOV. 17, 1965, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JAN. 31, 1966, REOPENED APRIL 29, 1966, PLACED IN RUC STATUS MAY 20, 1966.

IT WAS REOPENED AND ASSIGNED TO SA HOWELL S. LOWE ON THE FOLLOWING OCCASIONS:

REOPENED DEC. 19, 1967, PLACED IN RUC STATUS JULY 17, 1972.

SA KEARNEY WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE. SA LOWE WAS INVOLVED IN RACIAL AND SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THIS CASE.

A REVIEW OF MEMPHIS COINTELPRO FILES AND FILES ON THE SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC REVEALED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND THE SCLC.

BT

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Fin. & Pers. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. ✓
Spec. Inv. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

JAN 5 6 25 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

CG0014 0052317

RR HQ

SC

DE CG

CW

R 052317Z JAN 78

FM CHICAGO (62-7385)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA). BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REBUTEL, DECEMBER 27, 1977. 351

(1)A) MURKIN INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER, CHICAGO 44-1114.

B) CHICAGO CASE AGENT RENE J. DU MAINE ASSIGNED TO ASAC SQUAD AS RELIEF SUPERVISOR - BANK ROBBERY COORDINATOR.

(2)A)(1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-35356.

(2) TITLE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM - C.

62-117290-418

EX-111 REC-

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION ON THE DATES INDICATED:

22 JAN 31 1978

JANUARY 7, 1965, CLAY M. BRADY, RUC JANUARY 24, 1965, [redacted]

12/30/85

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:mac
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

4-

42

58 FEB 14 1978

REOPENED JANUARY 25, 1965 TO ROBERT F. BARRY, CLOSED MARCH 16, 1965, REOPENED MARCH 25, 1965 TO WILLIAM J. WHITE, RUC JULY 16, 1965, REOPENED JULY 19, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, RUC AUGUST 2, 1965, REOPENED AUGUST 11, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY, CLOSED AUGUST 27, 1965, REOPENED SEPTEMBER 13, 1965 TO R. L. STROMBERG, RUC SEPTEMBER 24, 1965, REOPENED OCTOBER 7, 1965 TO CLAY M. BRADY, REASSIGNED NOVEMBER 22, 1965 TO JOSEPH C. STANLEY WHO CONTINUED AS CASE AGENT UNTIL AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN 1968. THIS CASE WAS MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE CASE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR, SM - C INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY, WHO WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5. THE NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (B) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 105-16238.

(2) TITLE: COMINFILE, SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC), IS - C.

(3) A REVIEW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA JOHN P. O'BRIEN, UNTIL OCTOBER 12, 1965, WHEN IT WAS

REASSIGNED TO SA JOSEPH C. STANLEY THROUGH 1968. SA STANLEY WAS CARRIED AS A RELIEF SUPERVISOR FOR SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 5 UNTIL FEBRUARY, 1968 WHEN HE WAS DELETED. THE EXACT NATURE OF SA STANLEY'S WORK IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (C) (1) FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER CHICAGO 100-32864.

(2) TITLE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, IS - C.

(3) A REVIEWW OF THIS FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE CASE AGENTS IN THIS INVESTIGATION:

HERBERT K. STALLINGS UNTIL APRIL 22, 1965, REASSIGNED TO GENE E. ARNOLD UNTIL APRIL 27, 1967, REASSIGNED TO ROBERT O. MURPHY THROUGH 1968. ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WERE MAINTAINED ON SECURITY SQUAD NUMBER 2. THE SECTION, SQUAD OF ASSIGNMENT, AND THE NATURE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS' ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THIS INVESTIGATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN CHICAGO.

(2) (D) A REVIEW OF ALL OTHER COINTELPRO INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY CHICAGO FAILS TO INDICATE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. OR THE SCLC WERE EVER MENTIONED IN THESE FILES OR TARGETS UNDER THESE PROGRAMS.

BT

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. McKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES T[illegible], NEBR.
HAROLD S. [illegible]R, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Received C14
1/31/78

January 26, 1978

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with this Committee's investigation of the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we would appreciate your assistance in obtaining access to any files or records in the possession of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, relating to the individuals and organizations noted below:

A. With respect to the Drug Enforcement Administration:

1) Charles Joseph Stein
Date of Birth: 5/11/29
FBI Number: 881-534-B

2) Anthony Charles DeCarvelho
Born: 1921
Residence: New Orleans

B. With respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

1) Jack Brown
Chattanooga, Tennessee

62-117290

2) Lester Lee [illegible]
Date of Birth: 2/23/45
S.S.N.: 410-78-8096
2165 or 2155 Clarksdale
Memphis, Tennessee

EX-111 REC- 13

62-117290 - 415

23 FEB 2 1978

3) Hunter Pitts O'Dell
New Orleans, Louisiana

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

57 FEB 14 1978

4) Earnest Donnell
Denham Springs, Louisiana

5) Robert DePugh, Norborne, Missouri
Head of the Minutemen organization

6) Sidney Barnes
1378 East Riviera Drive
Mobile, Alabama (1968)

7) "Maxey Ted"
New Orleans, Louisiana

8) Eddie Sopcjack
Date of Birth: 8/14/29
FBI Number: 186-485A

9) Thomas Tarrants

10) Samuel Caccamechi
Memphis, Tennessee

11) Robert Hood Strader
Lexington, Illinois

12) Raymond Starns
King David Apartments, Apt. 1
2816 David Drive
Metairie, Louisiana (1968)

13) Jerome Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana

14) Joseph Conforto
New Orleans, Louisiana (now deceased)

15) Leonard Scott DelMonte
1229 North Bronson Street
Los Angeles, California

16) Allan O. Thompson
Date of Birth: 12/25/13

17) Dr. Russell C. Hadley
Date of Birth: 8/18/09
96 Moscow Road
Monte Rio, California

18) James E. Morrison
Los Angeles, California

19) Dr. Mark O. Freeman
Beverly Hills, California

20) Charles Calvin Bookman
Date of Birth: 9/6/13
FBI Number: 892-355

21) Rodney Arvidson
Date of Birth: 1/19/23
Post Office Box 2820
Long Beach, California

22) Tomas Reyes Lau
Date of Birth: 10/5/23
2047 Lemoyne
Los Angeles, California

23) Roy Emory Hargraves
El Monte, California

24) Raymond M. Murphy, aka "Fido"
Los Angeles, California

25) Lee Wilkinson
Los Angeles, California

26) Roman Kohnke
Los Angeles, California

27) Paul Lyon
Los Angeles, California

28) Jeri Salkin
Los Angeles, California

29) Ronald G. Hewitson
Garden Grove, California

30) Pat Olson
Date of Birth: 7/21/42
Quantico, Virginia

31) Robert Taylor, aka Bob Taylor
Los Angeles, California

32) Ronald Dennino
aka Ronald Gerald Dennino
Inmate at California State Prison
at San Quentin (1967 - 1968)

33) Richard Gonzales
Los Angeles, California

34) Roderic Burns Duff
Monrovia, California
1968 President of Los Angeles Chapter
of Citizens Council of America

35) R. J. Weiler
Los Angeles, California

36) Elizabeth Ann De Rouen
Date of Birth: 2/17/43
SSN: 453-62-1064
Los Angeles, California

37) Debbie Gold
Los Angeles, California

38) David Gregory
Buena Park, California

39) Rev. Xavier Von Koss
Hermora Beach, California

40) Robert Harold Gray
Los Angeles, California

41) Robert Keeley
Los Angeles, California

42) William K. Shearer
aka Bill Shearer
3166 Palm
Lemmon Grove, California

43) Robert Walters
Los Angeles, California

44) George Manum
Los Angeles, California

45) Robert J. Roe
Beverly Hills, California

46) Pamela Dillon
Los Angeles, California

47) Frank Marullo
New Orleans, Louisiana

48) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on Ku Klux Klan for the cities of Jacksonville and Miami, Florida for the period 1966 through 1968.

49) Subfiles and/or investigative reports on the following organizations for the period 1966 through 1968 for the cities of New Orleans, Louisiana; Birmingham, Alabama; Memphis, Tennessee; Chicago, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia; Los Angeles, California; and the State of Mississippi:

a) Black Panthers
b) Black Muslims
c) American Nazi Party
d) Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

50) Subfiles and/or investigative reports for the period 1966 - 1968 for the following organizations:

a) Liberty Lobby
b) The Sword
c) The Fiery Cross
d) The White Camelia
e) The Silver Dollar Group

Your prompt cooperation will be most appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:msd
cc: Danny Coulson

1/18/78

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)

FROM : ACTING LEGAT, LONDON (62-604)(P)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

SUBJECT: JAMES EARL RAY, aka;
ET AL
CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE UNLAWFUL
FLIGHT TO AVOID CONFINEMENT - ESCAPE

ReLONlet 11/16/77.

Enclosed for information is a copy of an incoming telegram the American Embassy, London, received from Department of State on 1/14/78, and copy of Legat, London letter to the British Home Office dated 1/18/78.

Further pertinent information will be furnished when available.

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encs. 2)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
1 - London
RAK:ejg
(4)

62-117290-

NOT RECORDED
FEB 7 1978

Original Filed In

56 FEB 10 1978
14

12/31/85

UNITED STATES DEPARTME[illegible] OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Office of Legal Attache
American Embassy
Grosvenor Square
London, W1A 1AE

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 62-604

Your Ref.:

January 18, 1978

Mr. G. L. Angel
British Home Office
G-4 Division
Queen Anne's Gate
London, S.W. 1

Re: Request from House Select Committee on Assassinations to Meet with British Police Authorities

Dear Mr. Angel:

By way of background, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as authorized by the U. S. House of Representatives, is investigating the circumstances surrounding the murders of President J. F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The Chief Counsel and Staff Director requested contact be made with appropriate officials in the British Government to obtain authority to interview appropriate police officials who were involved in the arrest of James Earl Ray in London on June 8, 1968.

Assistant Legal Attache Dennis Dickson had contact with you on December 6, 1977 regarding this matter. At that time you requested the following:

A) Purpose or scope of inquiry;

B) Names of individuals to be interviewed and reasons therefor;

12/31/85

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

C) Intended use of results of inquiry, i.e., public hearings, etc., it being noted that any records maintained by the British police would be as the result of an official inquiry and this would normally be available for police use only, unless otherwise exempted by the British Government.

The Select Committee responded that due to the brevity of the 95th Congress, it was most important that representatives of the Select Committee be allowed to meet with appropriate members of New Scotland Yard who are knowledgeable about the KING-RAY investigation. The Committee advised they would be happy to meet personally with British Government officials in London to provide answers to the issues forwarded to them for clarification and elucidation.

I would be most appreciative if you would advise if this situation is agreeable to you.

Sincerely,

Dennis R. Dickson
Acting Legal Attache

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION/[redacted]

[illegible]

AMB	✓
MIN	✓
AMB/EX	✓
PAO	✓
POL	
POL/L	✓
POLAD	✓
E/MIN	✓
ECON	✓
COMCL	
E/SCI	
E/TRANS	
AGRI	
CUSTOMS	
DAO	✓
D.E.A.	
F.A.A.	
FBIS	
I.R.S.	
LEGATT	
MARITIME	
SUSLO	✓
TRADE	
TREAS	✓
USCG	
A/COUNS	
A/ATO	
A/B&M	
A/COMM	
A/GS	
A/PERS	
A/RFO	
A/SY	
A/VIS	
CCA	2
CG/CS	
CG/V	
R.F.	✓
CHRON	✓
LOG	
D.O.	✓
POUCH	
E/S	
USSS	

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ ~~JAN~~ 14 10 46

FROM: STATE

NO: 10886

NNNNVV FHG083EHV219
RR RUDTC
DE RUEHC #0886 0140951
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 140226Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON 7802
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS:PINR, PDIP, UK

SUBJECT:REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

RE: LONDON 20003

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENNET HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-

TOTAL:

PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL[illegible] WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVEST[illegible]ION MENTIONED IN BLA[illegible] LETTER AND ADVISE US [illegible]VANCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

January 25, 1978

Director, FBI

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

0

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

C

336
356

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

15

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

2 ENCLOSURE

EX-111 REC-13 62-117290-414

MAILED 17
JAN 25 1978
FBI

20 FEB 2 1978

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

56 FEB 10 1978

14

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

[illegible]
D[illegible] 12/30/85 [illegible]

PMS

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By teletype dated 12/27/77, field offices designated by the HSCA were advised of the contents of the HSCA letter of 12/13/77. Responses have been received. Rather than incorporate the voluminous results into a letter to the Committee, it is more practical to make available for HSCA access at FBIHQ incoming field office teletypes.

It should be noted that, under current operating procedures existing between the Department of Justice and the HSCA, disclosure of these agents' identities to the HSCA cannot be prevented. However, G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, has advised SA D. O. Coulson of Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, that, in absence of an overriding need to do otherwise, the HSCA will not publish the names of any agent personnel below the position of section chief. This policy would follow precedent of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which issued its report in 1976.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 25, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 13, 1977, which requested, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., certain information concerning identities of FBI agents assigned to the FBI's assassination investigation and to counterintelligence efforts against King.

In response to the above request, the following information is submitted:

On December 19, 1977, Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised that the Department of Justice would respond to Part A, Items 1 and 2 and Part B, Items 1 and 2, of the above request.

Regarding Part A, Item 3 and Part B, Item 3, the FBI field offices designated by the HSCA were requested to provide the information desired by the HSCA. Responses from these field offices have been received and copies of these documents are available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters.

With respect to Part A, Item 4, a review of FBI Headquarters indices disclosed no memoranda, records, documents and news releases generated by the FBI in connection with the MURKIN investigation, other than that contained in the MURKIN file, which has already been made available to the HSCA.

JTA:sas
(6) pas

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFIARS.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

PMS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE
62-117290-411

In response to Part B, Item 4, it should be noted that HSCA request of November 30, 1977, asked for all FBI material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in the FBI's Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) file. By letter dated January 11, 1978, you were advised that representatives of the HSCA agreed to limit its request to COINTELPRO files involving the Communist Party USA and Black Nationalist-Hate Groups and to limit the period of HSCA interest from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968. On January 23, 1978, Staff Attorney Michael Eberhardt reiterated that the HSCA's interest is that period rather than the years 1965-1968 as set forth in the request of December 13, 1977. The above-mentioned COINTELPRO files and files of the King and SCLC security investigations from January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, have been prepared for HSCA access. Therefore, based on knowledge of personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit processing HSCA requests regarding King, all material at FBI Headquarters, which may contain COINTELPRO-type activities against King and SCLC during the period January 1, 1967, to May 1, 1968, has been made available to the HSCA.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/25/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC[illegible]EY, CONN.
CHARLES THO[illegible]R.
HAROLD S. SAW[illegible]ICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee o[illegible]ssassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Received Office of
Congressional Affairs
Dec. 14 — 2:41 P.M. 1977

DEC 13 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation provide the following:

A. MURKIN Investigation

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who participated in any way in the direction or management of the MURKIN investigation and the Division and Section within the Department of Justice where these attorneys were then assigned;

2. Copies of all memoranda, records, documents, and news releases generated by the Department of Justice in connection with MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee;

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the MURKIN investigation for the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham

Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

let to AAG/CD
1/25/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:sas

62-117290-414

ENCLOSURE

4. Cop[illegible]s of all memoranda, rec[illegible]s, documents and news releases generated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with the MURKIN investigation exclusive of what is contained in the MURKIN file already provided to the Committee.

B. COINTELPRO

1. A list of all Department of Justice attorneys who were in receipt of any information concerning the COINTELPRO activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

2. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the Department of Justice in connection with the COINTELPRO activities of the FBI as such were directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 through 1968.

3. A list of the field office case agents assigned to the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during 1965 to 1968 from the following cities, with a designation as to the nature of each agent's actual assignment during that period:

Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Birmingham
Memphis
New Orleans
Los Angeles
Miami
Louisville

This information should include the type of division, section and squad to which each case agent was assigned.

4. Copies of all memoranda, records and documents generated by the FBI in connection with the COINTELPRO efforts directed at Dr. King or the SCLC during the period 1965 to 1968 which are not contained in the files requested by Committee letter dated November 30, 1977.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIR[illegible]N

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUE[illegible]E, OHIO
STEW[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHAR[illegible]ONE, NEBR.
HAROL[illegible]SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

0 House

Rec. CNU
3:45 PM
1/27/78.

January 17, 1978

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

C

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff access to the following:

1. All files, materials and information including, but not limited to, intelligence and security materials relating to the following organizations active in California for 1967-1969:
    - a) John Birch Society
    - b) American Independent Party
    - c) George Wallace Campaign
2. All files, materials and information, including, but not limited to, intelligence, surveillance and security materials for 1967-1968 pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his activities in California.

TA

Your prompt attention to the request will be greatly appreciated.

REC-65

62-117290-413

RECORDED
6 JAN 31 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

GRB:mkd
cc: Danny O. Coulson

57 FEB 7 1978
118

FEB 01 19[illegible]

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 31, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl ✓
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

NR CG

Reference is made to a letter dated October 20, 1977, to Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in possession of the FBI to include the current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Enclosures are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

JTM:sas (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

EX-115

REC-65 62-112290-469

30
JAN 26 1978

2-ENCLOSURE

Delivered 11/2/77

Signed and sent for to SA Coulson to Dept. delivery 11-1-77

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/83 BY

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

42

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request by HSCA for information contained in the Bureau's files relative to William Herman Jackson. This matter has been coordinated with the Legal. Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit, Legal Counsel Division, and retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files, which are identifiable with Jackson, have been organized into folders for the Committee's access and are maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's space, Room 8988.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files include Jackson's current ident record, the results of an FBI investigation wherein Jackson was one of four subjects - captioned "Leslie Atkisons, aka, Et Al; Miscellaneous - Falsely Making or Forging Naval, Military or Official Pass," two references re a Foreign Police Cooperation Matter and two references re a Perjury Matter.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

October 31, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 20, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI TO INCLUDE A CURRENT FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION RECORD RELATIVE TO WILLIAM HERMAN JACKSON.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 20, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record relative to William Herman Jackson.

Utilizing identifying data for Jackson furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Jackson has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

JTM:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/31/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA).

409

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. M ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

62-117290 - 409

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI/DOJ

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

October 20, 1977

Robert L. Keuch, Esq.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

The Select Committee on Assassinations would appreciate any and all information as well as a current FBI Identification Division record check relative to William Herman Jackson, FBI #801-218-G, D.O.B. 11/24/26.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB/EME/mae

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room 3659
Washington, D. C. 20530

Ltr to AAG/CD
10-31-77
JTM:aws (Enc-3)

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-409

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

CJ

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on November 16, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
    Criminal Division
    Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - William F. Kusch - Enclosure

ST-120 REC-63 62-117290-408

23 JAN 31 1978

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. HNB/R
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

DOC:ldr

signed & sent 1/6/77

59 FEB 6 1978

42 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY [illegible]

62-117290-408	COPY 63	DOC: ldr 12/29/77

The Deputy Attorney General — HSCA
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney Generel Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that Special Agent William F. Kusch was interviewed on 11/16/77. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Kusch's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

COPY OF ABSTRACT FOR THIS SERIAL IS PLACED IN FILE IN LIEU OF THE MAIL WHICH HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED.

C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/03 BY

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

DATE: 12/19/77

FROM : SAC, PORTLAND (62-3144)

JGP/RR

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Enclosed herewith are five copies of an LHM relative to the interview of SA WILLIAM F. KUSCH, Portland Division, by staff members of the HSCA in Washington, D.C., on 11/16/77.

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (Encs. 5)
2 - Portland
WFK:ja
(4)

ST-120

REC-63 62-117290-407

1-31-78

✓ Conf -3651

Memo to 12-29-77

MAR 20 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-02

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Portland, Oregon

December 19, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

On November 16, 1977, SA William F. Kusch of the Portland Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was interviewed at House Annex #2 in Washington, D.C., by Mr. Mark Speiser and Mr. Peter Beeson, members of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The interview with SA Kusch dealt with a period of time SA Kusch was assigned to the New Orleans Division of the FBI, specifically April, 1968. During April of 1968, SA Kusch, along with numerous other Special Agents assigned to the New Orleans Division, conducted many interviews with persons who had, or who might have had, knowledge of the activities or contacts of James Earl Ray during the period of time Ray, using the name Eric Galt, was in New Orleans.

Specifically, SA Kusch was questioned regarding his squad assignments in New Orleans, the identities of other squad members, the identity of his supervisor, his Agent in charge and his assistant Agent in charge at the time.

Further, SA Kusch was questioned relative to the content of several interview report forms (FD 302s) concerning interviews that he conducted and prepared appropriate FD 302s in connection therewith, or FD 302s covering interviews that he was a party to. House Select Committee on Assassinations members exhibited said FD 302s to SA Kusch to refresh his memory.

House Select Committee members in essence apparently desired SA Kusch to amplify or further expand on these interviews.

ALL I[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 12/30/98 [illegible]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-107

SA Kusch pointed out that as a result of the passage of nine and one-half years, for the most part he could not specifically recall the persons interviewed. To specific questions regarding the interviews, SA Kusch could only point out that if additional questions had been asked of these persons interviewed at the time, resulting in the receipt of any positive or pertinent information regarding Galt, that information would have been duly recorded on said FD 302s.

Both Mr. Speiser and Mr. Beeson were cordial and SA Kusch responded to their questions in a candid manner.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

January 26, 1978

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

C

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which, in connection with HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested information pertaining to FBI electronic suveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2 (Secret Material Enclosed)

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure) (Secret Material Enclosed)

15

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120

ENCLOSURE

REC-63 62-117290-406

23 JAN 31 1978

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MAILED 17
JAN 26 1978
FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/98 BY

42

HNB

58 FEB 6 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Dates and places of electronic surveillance of King were compiled through file reviews conducted in connection with previous law suits filed against the FBI by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and a former SCLC officer and aide to King, Bernard S. Lee. Although names of specific SCLC affiliates were not provided by the HSCA in its request, all names are readily available to the Committee, which has received access to our files concerning King and SCLC.

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 15, 1977, which requested information in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. This letter requested that the FBI determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The Committee indicated it only desired written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved, with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

In response to the above request, appropriate records at FBI Headquarters were reviewed with the following results:

Microphone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
January 5-7, 1964	Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C.
January 27, 1964	Shroeder Hotel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
February 18-20, 1964	Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii
February 20-21, 1964	Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, California
February 22-24, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
March 19-20, 1964	Statler Hotel, Detroit, Michigan

8

JTA:sas (6)   SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR
DoD

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, & ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 6437
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DECLASSIFIED BY Spmagmie
ON 12/31/88

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐   TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-106

FBI/DOJ

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Dates of Surveillance	Location
April 23-24, 1964	Senator Hotel, Sacramento, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
September 28, 1964 - October 2, 1964	Manager Hotel, Savannah, Georgia
January 8-11, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
January 28-31, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
March 29-31, 1965	Park Sheraton Hotel, New York City
May 12-13, 1965	Sheraton Atlantic Hotel, New York City
October 14-15, 1965	Astor Hotel, New York City
October 28-30, 1965	New York Hilton Hotel, New York City
November 29-30, 1965	Americana Hotel, New York City
January 22, 1966	Americana Hotel, New York City

Telephone Surveillances of King

Dates of Surveillance	Location
August 22-27, 1964	Claridge Hotel, Atlantic City, New Jersey
November 8, 1963 - April 30, 1965	Martin Luther King's residence
April 24-26, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
July 7-9, 1964	Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles, California
August 14, 1964 - September 6, 1964	Apartment 2B, 125 W. 72nd Street, New York City

Telephone Surveillances of SCLC

Dates of Surveillance	Location
October 23, 1963 - January 24, 1964 July 13-31, 1964	SCLC Office, New York City Room 1202, 14 E. 40th Street, New York City
November 8, 1963 - June 21, 1966	SCLC Office, Atlanta, Georgia

In an effort to respond to that portion of the HSCA's request concerning existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance of individuals directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC, personnel of the Congressional Inquiry Unit, FBI Headquarters, familiar with certain aspects of the King, SCLC and related files, compiled a list of individuals with the SCLC for the approximate period January, 1962, through 1968. Although this list is not all inclusive due to the large number of persons affiliated with the SCLC, an effort was made to include those individuals in key positions and who were most active in the organization. Most of the individuals listed were identified with the SCLC Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. Based on review of appropriate records at FBI Headquarters, none of the below-listed individuals has been subject of electronic surveillance by the FBI:

Ralph Abernathy
Jessie Jackson
Bernard S. Lee
Hosea Williams
James Orange
James Bevel
Andrew Young
Walter Fauntroy
Coretta Scott King
John Rutherford
William Rutherford
Bernard Lafayette
Dorothy Cotton
J. T. Johnson
Joseph E. Lowery
Fred L. Shuttlesworth
Cordy T. Vivian
Adele Kanter
Thomas C. Kilgore
Dora McDonald
James Harrison
Wyatt Walker
Logan Kearse
Stoney Cooks
Fred C. Bennett
Booker T. Bonner
Henry Brownlee
Golden Frinks
Joseph Lester Hankerson
Samuel B. Wells
Benjamin Johnson
Herbert V. Coulton
Thomas Offenburger
Mew Soong-Li
James Lawson
Lillian Hunter
Gloria Fraction
David Wallace
Jess Gill
Carole Hoover
Albert Turner
Frank Ditto
C. K. Steel
Samuel Williams
Curtis Harris
Cirillo A. McSween
Major Jones
Lawrence D. Reddick
I. M. Augustine
Septima Clark
T. Y. Rogers, Jr.

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Records at FBI Headquarters disclosed that the following individuals, formerly associated with the SCLC, were subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI (Secret).

Stanley David Levison
Clarence B. Jones
Hunter Pitts O'Dell
Bayard Rustin

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible] HIO
STEWA [illegible] CY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Received Office of Congressional Affairs
Dec. 15 3:54PM 1977

DEC 15 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance and determine the dates and places of any and all electronic surveillance of Dr. King and any other individual directly or indirectly associated with the SCLC.

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence of such electronic surveillance and the dates and places involved with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

let to AAG/CD
1/26/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:AWS
1-OLA (enc)

GRB:mek

cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

62-117290-406

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:	PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:
☐ Teletype	☐ Immediate	☐ TOP SECRET
☐ Facsimile	☐ Priority	☐ SECRET
☒ Airtel	☐ Routine	☐ CONFIDENTIAL
		☐ E F T O
		☐ CLEAR

Date 1/23/78

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-117290)
ATTN: Records Management Division,
Congressional Inquiry Unit

FROM: SAC, SPRINGFIELD (62-2567) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

Reurtel to SI, 1/19/78. 395

1-10-86

Enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of each serial in the following Springfield Division main files:

(1) 157-1792, serials 1-85 (189 pages);

(2) 44-1120, serials 1-5 (10 pages);

(3) 170-445, serials 1-23 (48 pages);

(4) 170-445A, serials 1-6 (11 pages).

Also enclosed for the Bureau is one photocopy of the following serial in the following Springfield Division file, reference identifiable with RICHARD GEPPERT:

(5) 157-1791, serial 23 (8 pages).

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:

Numerous serials contained in these files have been classified "Confidential".

ST-120

Springfield file 157-1792, serial 82, is a correlation memo showing GEPPERT was the subject of Springfield main

REC 63 62-117290-405

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (62-117290) (Encl 5)
1 - Springfield (62-2567)

9 JAN 26 1978

DJC/pme
(3)

DETACHED FILED for RM processing 5988 JEH for HSCA access 1/30/78

8988

54 FEB 6 1978

Approved: ______ Transmitted ______ (Number) ______ (Time) ______ Per ______

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

file 100-10245. This main file has been destroyed in accordance with the File Destruction Program.

BH0043 0131931

PP HQ

DE BH

P 131931Z JAN 78

FM BIRMINGHAM (66-2280) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) (PRIORITY)

BT

CLEAR

JAN 13 2 36 PM '78

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

~~Emp.Sec&Spec.~~
~~Inq.Section~~
~~[illegible]~~

ATTENTION OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES, DECEMBER 27, 1977.351

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. ONE: MURKIN INVESTIGATION ASSIGNED TO HENRY S. SNOW (DECEASED). PRIOR TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION SA SNOW WAS ASSIGNED TO GENERAL CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION.

EX-101
REC-36

62-117290-404

23 JAN 26 1978

12/30/78 Spmacmla 4-

1cc pur 8/08

2 copies made pg 1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

124

70 FEB ~~478~~

IN ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. TWO: THERE WERE NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFORTS BY BIRMINGHAM AGENTS AGAINST MARTIN LUTHER KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE DURING THE PERIOD OF 1965 THROUGH 1968.

THE FOLLOWING WERE CASE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING: LAWRENCE GETTINGS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY AND CRIMINAL SQUAD AND CONDUCTED THAT TYPE OF INVESTIGATION; MARVIN M. EUBANKS, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATION.

THE FOLLOWING AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO INVESTIGATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE:

WILLIAM PERRY (DECEASED), PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO CRIMINAL SQUAD AND WORK; COLEMAN D. GEARY, III, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO BOMBING MATTERS; LAWRENCE GETTINGS (SUPRA); MARVIN M. EUBANKS (SUPRA) AND C. B. STANBERRY, PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED AFTER A REVIEW OF BIRMINGHAM INDICES AND SUBSEQUENT FILE REVIEW.

BT

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible], OHIO
STEWA[illegible] MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARL[illegible]NE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4524

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

0 House

Rec CTU
2:15PM
1/25/78

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

JAN 20 1978

HAND DELIVER

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

C

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

-376

By letter dated January 4, 197~~7~~8, this Committee requested access to materials, files, memoranda and miscellaneous items pertaining to Gerold Frank in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. These materials (94-63917) have been reviewed by the staff, and it would be appreciated, if the materials could be prepared for delivery, along with copies of the following additional items:

1) Section 78
   44-38861 - 5655
   " 5654
   5653

2) Section 84
   44-38861 - 5942
   " 5943
   " 5944
   " 5945
   " 5946

3) The MURKIN Legat tickler files for
   a) London
   b) Ottawa
   c) Mexico City
   d) Paris

62-117290-400

EX-124 REC-79

62-[illegible]7290

20 JAN 27 1978

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

57 FEB 2 1978

124

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Page Two

JAN 20 1978

Additionally, it is requested that the Bureau begin to prepare for delivery all files, memoranda and miscellaneous items on William Bradford Huie for the years 1968 to the present.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:ghj
cc: Danny O. Coulson

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

January 26, 1978

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference ~~is~~ made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

Enclosed are an original and one copy of a memorandum in response to the above request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-139

2 - ENCLOSURE

REC-7

62-117290-397

JAN 27 1978

MAILED 5
JAN 26 1978
FBI

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. HB/DR
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

5 FEB 2 1978

HB/DR

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Former SA Nichols works and resides in Atlanta. The Atlanta Office has been in touch with him regarding the interview and he is awaiting further contact for final interview arrangements. These arrangements are handled informally by representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBIHQ.

1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Legal Counsel Div.
(Attn: Mr. Coulson)

January 26, 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated December 9, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested that former agent Robert Nichols be made available for interview by the HSCA.

This memorandum is to confirm that former agent Nichols has been cleared from his employment agreement and is available for interview as needed by the HSCA. Arrangements for interview can be made through contact with representatives of the Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs Unit and the Congressional Inquiry Unit of FBI Headquarters.

JTA:sas (6)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 1/26/78. captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

12/30/88

62-117290-391

FBI/DOJ

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 9 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that ex-FBI agent Robert Nichols, formerly of the Atlanta field office, be made available to the Committee for interview on a priority basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

let to AAG/CD
1/26/78 (Enc-2)
JTA:sas
1-OLA (Enc) (62-117290-397

ENCLOSURE

TELETYPE

ROUTINE

EFTO

1/19/78

1 - Mr. Foster

#245852 Spmachmie 12/30/85

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/11/82 BY SP-1GSK/PSR
225984

FM DIRECTOR

TO SPRINGFIELD (ROUTINE)

BT

E F T O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

THE HSCA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. BY LETTER DATED DECEMBER 30, 1977, TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE HSCA REQUESTED THE FBI PROVIDE ALL FILES, DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS CONCERNING RICHARD GEPPERT, BORN JULY 31, 1941, RESIDING AT 1340 NIEDRINGHAUS AVENUE, GRANITE CITY, ILLINOIS.

NR 8/25/78

BY LETTER DATED JANUARY 16, 1978, THE HSCA EXTENDED ITS REQUEST TO INCLUDE FIELD OFFICE FILES. THE HSCA ALSO FURNISHED A SIGNED STATEMENT OF GEPPERT, DATED DECEMBER 28, 1977, AUTHORIZING HSCA REVIEW OF ALL MATERIAL CONCERNING HIM IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI. IN THIS STATEMENT GEPPERT ALSO DISCLOSED THAT HE VOLUNTEERED TO HSCA STAFF MEMBERS THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF HIS INFORMANT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FBI.

170-5569-
157-26213-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

JTA:sas (6)

1 - 157-26213
1 - 170-5569

EX-130

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

62-117290-395

REC-46

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 19 1978
0405
TELETYPE

JAN 23 1978

118

56 JAN 3 1979

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

FBI/DOJ

PAGE TWO EFTO

FBIHQ FILES DISCLOSED GEPPERT WAS SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD EXTREMIST MATTER INVESTIGATION (157-1792) IN 1972 AND SPRINGFIELD FILE 44-1120 FOLLOWING ALLEGED HARASSMENT BY OFFICERS OF THE GRANITE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IN 1975. HE WAS ALSO SUBJECT OF SPRINGFIELD FILE 170-445.

SPRINGFIELD PROMPTLY FURNISH FBIHQ ONE XEROX COPY OF EACH SERIAL IN THE ABOVE THREE INVESTIGATIONS AND ONE COPY OF ANY OTHER MAIN FILE OR FILE REFERENCE WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEPPERT. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED BY COVER AIRTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION. UPON RECEIPT AT FBIHQ THE MATERIAL WILL BE PROCESSED FOR ACCESS BY STAFF MEMBERS OF THE HSCA.

BT

#

NOTE: This teletype confirms telephonic communication with Supervisor Joseph Ondula of the Springfield Office on 1/19/78. This matter has been coordinated with SA M. V. Hale, Top Echelon and Criminal Informant Unit, Criminal Investigative Division.

FD-36 (Rev. 7-27-76)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ E F T O
☐ CLEAR

Date 1/4/78

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (~~62-117296~~)
Attn: Congressional Inquiry Unit,
Special Investigative Division

Foster
Lawn

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (66-2242) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)
BUREAU DEADLINE - 1/13/78

Re FBIHQ teletype to numerous offices, including Atlanta, 12/27/77.

Referenced Bureau teletype indicated that the HSCA was currently conducting investigation into the assassination of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (MURKIN); and in connection with this investigation, the HSCA had requested the FBI provide the following:

(1) The identification of field office case agent(s) assigned to the MURKIN investigation in recipient offices and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the MURKIN investigation.

(2) Identification of the field office case agent(s) assigned to counterintelligence program (Cointelpro), efforts directed against KING and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) during the period 1965 - 1968 in recipient offices, and this was to include the division, section or squad assignment, and the nature of the agent's assignment immediately prior to his involvement in the Cointelpro, KING, and SCLC investigations.

REC-36 62-117290-394

EX-130

In addition, recipients were to identify the case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of KING and SCLC, as well as the Cointelpro.

1 JAN 27 1978

2-Bureau
2-Atlanta (1-66-2242)
(1-44-2386) (MURKIN)

EAS/ljg
(4)

2 copies made pgs 1-5
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

Approved: ______ Transmitted ______ (Number) (Time) Per ______

JAN 30 1978

GPO : 1977 O - 225-539

Atlanta has reviewed pertinent files as requested by FBIHQ, and the information sought by the HSCA is set forth below in chart form:

1. MURKIN
(Atlanta file 44-2386)

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/8/68 - 4/29/68	Atlanta - #3, Security/extremist Squad	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. PERRY	4/29/68 - 7/30/68	Atlanta #4 Fugitives	Fugitive investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/30/68 - 7/31/69	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	5/30/70 - 7/13/70	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	2/8/71 - 3/16/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/31/71 - 4/7/71	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/13/73 - 8/31/73	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	6/19/74 - 6/27/74	Atlanta - #3	"
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	8/13/74 - 9/24/74	Atlanta - #8 Civil rights, thefts from interstate shipment (TFIS) Etc.	Civil rights matters

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in MURKIN investigation
THOMAS J. WILSON	8/26/75 - 9/8/75	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights, TFIS
THOMAS J. WILSON	1/7/78 - 3/23/76	Atlanta - #8	"
JOHN J. HAYMAN	10/12/77 - 11/8/77	Atlanta - #8	Civil Rights matters

2. Atlanta Agents assigned to/or who handled the Atlanta Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) during the period 1965 - 1968 in which efforts were directed against KING and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
CPUSA Cointelpro			
ALDEN F. MILLER	4/14/64 - 8/13/65	Atlanta - #3	Security Investigations
Cointelpro Black Nationalist-Hate Groups			
EDWARD U. CRIM	8/29/67 - 7/30/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist Investigations
CPUSA Negro Question; Communist Influence in Racial Matters (CIRM)-Cointelpro			
No case agent assigned - matters handled by:			

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in Cointelpro
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/1/64 - 8/20/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	2/4/64 - 8/21/64	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	7/22/65 - 4/15/69	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations

3. Identity of case agent(s) involved in the security investigation of MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., and the SCLC

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SM-C			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	3/7/61 - 5/12/61	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	2/28/62 - 10/16/62	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	1/9/63 - 7/31/63	Atlanta - #3	"
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	11/6/63 - 5/21/65	Atlanta - #3	"
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	5/21/65 - 6/5/68	Atlanta - #3	"

Case Agent	Period assigned	Division, Section, or Squad of Assignment	Nature of Agent's Assignment prior to involvement in KING and SCLC investigations
Communist infiltration of the SCLC			
ROBERT R. NICHOLS	4/17/62 - 12/1/64	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
ALDEN F. MILLER	12/1/64 - 4/26/66	Atlanta - #3	Security investigations
ALAN G. SENTINELLA	4/26/66 - 3/12/71	Atlanta - #3	Security/extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	3/12/71 - 5/23/73	Atlanta - #3	Extremist investigations
O. RICHARD HAMILTON	7/10/73 - 10/20/73	Atlanta - #3	"

LS0003 0102106Z

RR HQ

DE LS

R 102106Z JAN 78

M LOUISVILLE (66-2612)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

EFTO

JAN 10 4 19 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

~~Emp Sec&Spec~~
~~Inq Section~~
3823 JEH TH #231

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA, DATED DECEMBER 27, 1977.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, APPROPRIATE REVIEW OF FILES MAINTAINED BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION REVEALED FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY HSCA.

(1) NOT APPLICABLE TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

(2) NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (COINTELPRO) EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST EITHER MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., OR SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND (SCEF), DURING PERIOD 1965-1968, COULD BE LOCATED IN REVIEW OF COINTELPRO AND SUBSTANTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-393

JAN 10 4 23 PM '78

20 JAN 25 1978

24 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1CCRM8988

70 JAN 3 1978 42

12/30/88

OF KING AND SCLC. NO COINTELPRO ACTIVITIES WERE EITHER CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING AND SCLC BY LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., ASSIGNED SA GEORGE W. HUTCHINSON, JR. (RETIRED) MAY 14, 1965 - AUGUST 13, 1966, AND SA RICHARD B. VIVIAN JULY 30, 1976 - OCTOBER 20, 1976. LATTER ASSIGNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW.

SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF SCLC ASSIGNED SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) SEPTEMBER 29, 1961 - OCTOBER 30, 1961; OCTOBER 17, 1963 - NOVEMBER 18, 1963; DECEMBER 14, 1963- JANUARY 22, 1964; JUNE 5, 1964 - JULY 8, 1964; SEPTEMBER 21, 1964 - OCTOBER 12, 1964; JUNE 2, 1965 - JULY 20, 1965; NOVEMBER 17, 1965 - JANUARY 20, 1966; JULY 13, 1966 - AUGUST 12, 1966; FEBRUARY 10, 1967 - MARCH 24, 1967; SA GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED) AUGUST 12, 1968 - JUNE 5, 1969; SA WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) JUNE 5, 1969 - JULY 29, 1969. SCLC (BUFILE 100-438794) (LS 157-90) INVESTIGATED BY LOUISVILLE AS "RACIAL MATTER" AND "INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST".

SPECIAL AGENTS GEORGE W. HUTCHISON, JR. (RETIRED), WARREN L. WALSH (RETIRED) AND RICHARD B. VIVIAN ALL ASSIGNED LOUISVILLE SECURITY - CIVIL RIGHTS SQUAD PRIOR TO AND DURING ABOVE LISTED CASE ASSIGNMENTS.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

JAN 10 3 05 PM '78
MEB
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SL C[illegible]05 0101950

RR HQ

DE SL

P 101924Z JAN 78

FM ST. LOUIS (62-5097) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE

BT

CLEAR

ATTENTION: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE ~~Sec SIS Inq Section #251~~ DIVISION

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA); BUDED JANUARY 13, 1978.

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JULY 27, 1977.

(1) FORMER SPECIAL AGENT HAROLD R. DOBSON WAS CASE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MURKIN INVESTIGATION, ST. LOUIS FILE 44-775, BUREAU FILE 44-38861, IN ST. LOUIS DIVISION. FORMER SPECIAL AGENT DOBSON WAS ASSIGNED TO SECURITY SQUAD AND HANDLED SECURITY TYPE CASES PRIOR TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN MURKIN INVESTIGATION.

(2) ST. LOUIS FILE 157-5818 ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS, BLACK NATIONALISTS, HATE GROUPS, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE" WAS OPENED AS A PENDING INACTIVE STATUS CONTROL FILE ON AUGUST 29, 1967.

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-592

20 JAN 25 1978

4-J Aldhizer

2 copies made pgs 1-3
1/24/78 JTA:me
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cckm8988

42 [illegible]
12/30/88

ON FEBRUARY 27, 1968, THROUGH JANUARY 8, 1969, WAS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH OF SECURITY SQUAD AT ST. LOUIS DIVISION. HIS ASSIGNMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THIS CASE ASSIGNMENT WAS TO HANDLE SECURITY TYPE CASES.

ST. LOUIS FILE 100-17801, BUREAU FILE 100-106670, ENTITLED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER SPECIAL AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, JANUARY 15, 1965, THROUGH JANUARY 19, 1965, FEBRUARY 3, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 10, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. STEWART, APRIL 28, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 28, 1965; FORMER SPECIAL AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, NOVEMBER 11, 1965, THROUGH NOVEMBER 12, 1965, AND JUNE 14, 1966, THROUGH JUNE 17, 1966; FORMER AGENT RICHARD B. SMITH, OPENING DATE UNKNOWN THROUGH JULY 6, 1966, AND MARCH 25, 1967, THROUGH MARCH 27, 1967.

ST. LOUIS FILE 105-4027, BUREAU FILE 100-438794, ENTITLED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE; RM; IS - C" WAS ASSIGNED TO FOLLOWING AGENTS: FORMER AGENT WALTER A. HILGENDORF, SEPTEMBER 23, 1964, THROUGH DECEMBER 10, 1964, AND MARCH 21, 1965, THROUGH APRIL 19, 1965; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 3, 1965, THROUGH JUNE 16, 1965; FORMER AGENT WALTER A.

HIL[illegible]NDORF, FEBRUARY 24, 1966, THROUGH DATE UNKNOWN; SPECIAL AGENT JACK A. FRENCH, JUNE 6, 1969, THROUGH JULY 23, 1969. THE ABOVE AGENTS AND FORMER AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED TO ST. LOUIS DIVISION SECURITY SQUAD DURING PERTINENT PERIOD.

A REVIEW OF ABOVE FILES DISCLOSED NO INSTANCES WHERE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT AGAINST KING OR THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE.

BT

#

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

LA0373 0431807Z

PP HQ

DE LA

P 131807Z JAN 78

JAN 13 1 31 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FM LOS ANGELES (62-7841) (P) (1)

TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) PRIORITY

BT

EFTO

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

~~Cmp Sec&Spec~~
Inq Section
~~5823 JEH~~ TL# 231

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977, TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES.

George Foster

FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS COMMUNICATION AND RETEL THE TERM CASE AGENT(S) WAS DEFINED AS THE SINGLE AGENT TO WHOM THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED AND WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIRECTION AND FLOW OF THE INVESTIGATION.

EX-130 REC-36 62-117290-391

IT IS NOTED THAT UNDER CAPTION "BERNARD S. LEE V. CLARENCE M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1185) BUFILE 62-117194, LA FILE 100-57229" AND "SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) V. CLARENCE

20 JAN 25 1978

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 12/30/85 [illegible]

4 DH12

2 copies made pgs 1-4
1/24/78 JTA:ma

for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc [illegible] 8988

42

[illegible] 1978

M. KELLEY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.C.) (CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 76-1186) BUFILE 62-117193, LA FILE 100-57229," LOS ANGELES HAS PERMANENTLY CHARGED OUT TO THE BUREAU SEVERAL SERIALS WHICH THEREFORE ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW. SERIALS WERE FROM FILES CAPTIONED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR; SECURITY MATTER-COMMUNIST; BUFILE 100-106670; LA FILE 100-57229"; "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SCLS; IS - C; BUFILE 100-438794 AND 100-442349; LA FILE 100-65141"; "CP-USA NEGRO QUESTION, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN RACIAL MATTERS; IS-C; BUFILE 100-3-116, LA FILE 157-859."

A REVIEW OF PERTINENT FILES WITHIN THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION BETWEEN THE YEARS 1965 - 1968 DETERMINED THE FOLLOWING:

. THE ABOVE FILE REGARDING COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SCLC WAS HANDLED ON THE SUBSTANTATIVE DESK SUPERVISED BY SA JOHN S. TEMPLE WHICH WAS DESIGNATED AS SQUAD NUMBER TWO. THIS SQUAD HANDLED INVESTIGATIONS OF RACIAL AND BLACK EXTREMIST MATTERS. THIS INVESTIGATION WAS ASSIGNED TO SA LOUIS K. DE GEUS IN FEBRUARY 1965; SA R. ANDREWS PETERS IN

SEPTEMBER 1965; SA W. JAMES WOOD IN APRIL 1967; SA WALTER M. BRADY IN JANUARY 1968; AND SA E. RHEAD RICHARDS, JR. IN MAY 1968.

THE MAIN FILE ON KING WAS ASSIGNED TO SQUAD TWO AS ABOVE AND WAS ASSIGNED TO SA DE GEUS IN JANUARY 1965; SA PETERS IN MARCH 1965; SA WOOD IN JANUARY 1967; SA BRADY IN JUNE 1967: AND SA GEORGE E. AIKEN, JR. IN FEBRUARY 1968.

THE FILE REGARDING THE CP-USA INFILTRATION OF RACIAL MATTERS IS ONLY PERIPHERALLY CONCERNED WITH KING OR THE SCLC AND CONTAINS NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS AND OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN OTHER SUBSTANTATIVE FILES. WHILE NOT CLEAR, THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONTROLLED BY SA TEMPLE.

THE ENTIRE SUBSTANTATIVE FILE CAPTIONED "MURKIN; BUFILE 44-38861; LA FILE 44-1574" WAS COPIED AND SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU UNDER INSTANT CAPTION. THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED ON SQUAD NUMBER ONE WHICH WAS SUPERVISED BY SA WILLIAM JOHN NOLAN BUT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUPERVISED BY

SA TEMPLE. SQUAD NUMBER ONE HANDLED SECURITY TYPE INVESTIGATION INVOLVING THE CP-USA, SWP, ET CETERA. THE CASE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AS ASSIGNED JOINTLY TO SA'S LEROY W. SHEETS AND THEODORE J. A'HEARN ALTHOUGH SHEETS WAS APPARENTLY INVOLVED AS CASE AGENT ONLY DURING THE INITIAL STAGES IN APRIL 1968.

ALL OF THE ABOVE INDIVIDUALS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SA'S BRADY, RICHARDS AND AIKEN ARE NO LONGER EMPLOYEES OF THE FBI.

BT

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MM0730 0132335
RR HQ
DE MM
R 132335Z JAN 78
FM MIAMI (62-6603) RUC
TO DIRECTOR (62-117290) ROUTINE
BT

JAN 13 6 42 PM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

E F T O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA), BUREAU DEADLINE JANUARY 13, 1978.

RE BUTEL DECEMBER 27, 1977.

FOLLOWING IS NUMBERED PARAGRAPH REPLY TO REQUEST OF MIAMI SET OUT IN RE BUTEL:

1. "MURKIN". SA DAVID N. JELLISON, ASSIGNED APRIL 8, 1968: NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATE PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS. SA LEON E. FISH; ASSIGNED AUGUST 10, 1972 (RUC AUGUST 28, 1972); NUMBER 2 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS MAINLY CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS; SA JOSEPH T. O'LEARY; ASSIGNED JULY 30, 1976 (RUC AUGUST 3, 1976), FBIHQ ADMINISTRATIVE REQUEST; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNED APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS. SRA JOHN S. ATWATER; ASSIGNED JUNE 3, 1977 (RUC JUNE 6, 1977), SINGLE INTERVIEW; WEST PALM BEACH RA;

~~Emp Sec&Spec~~
~~Inv Section~~
~~3833~~ TL# 231

EX-130
REC-36 62-117290-390

20 JAN 25 1978

4-AFDH12C

I 12/30/88 Spmacpna

2 copies made pgs 1-2
1/24/78 JTA:ma
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/13/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1cc fm 8988

42

70 JAN 30 1978

IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS GENERAL CRIMINAL AND SECURITY.

2. A. "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.; SM-C. "SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 THROUGH 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE NATURE, INCLUDING LOCAL CPUSA GROUP.

B. "COMINFIL OF SCLC; IS - C." SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY, ASSIGNED 1965 TO MAY 2, 1968; NUMBER 3 SQUAD; PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS, SEE PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

SA JOHN C. MENTON, ASSIGNED MAY 2, 1968 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVED BLACK AND WHITE EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS.

C. "COINTELPRO; BLACK EXTREMISTS; RACIAL MATTERS." FILE OPENED MARCH 7, 1968, ASSIGNED SA JOHN C. MENTON, STILL PENDING TO MENTON DECEMBER 31, 1968; NUMBER 5 SQUAD; IMMEDIATELY PRIOR ASSIGNMENT SET OUT IN PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH.

BT

#

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JAN 16 1978

CJ

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

372

By letter dated December 30, 1977, this Committee requested material pertaining to Richard Geppert in connection with the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In view of the fact that the Committee has since delivered to the FBI the written consent of Mr. Geppert to view all materials relating to his informant relationship with the FBI, it is intended that our December 30th request for materials and documents concerning Mr. Geppert include those found in any field office files.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

REC-56 62-117290-385

EX-130

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

7 JAN 23 1978

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

GRB:mej
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

70 JAN [illegible] 1978

[illegible]

EDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

December 1, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

C

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which, in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files regarding the National States Rights Party (Item #2) and Jesse B. Stoner (Item #3). By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, modification of these items was made, details of which are outlined in the enclosed memorandum.

EU

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum in response to the above mentioned requests. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

62-117290-382X

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120 REC-42 ~~62-117290-3196~~

22 FEB 22 1978

12/7/77

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

EU
3 - ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:

Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___

Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___

Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

YCF

JSG

PMS

MAY 2 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

12/30/85

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: Since there were no National States Rights Party (NSRP) subfiles for offices requested by the HSCA, the entire NSRP file for 1967 through 1968 was processed for access. All information retrievable in FBI Headquarters files regarding Stoner was processed.

Names of knowledgeable case agents provided in attached memorandum were obtained through review of FBIHQ files and confirmed by Supervisor Jack Byrd of the Savannah Office. The HSCA can advise which agent(s) it desires to interview regarding the NSRP and Stoner.

- Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/30/05 BY Splmacjsane

December 1, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 3, 1977, which requested certain information from FBI Headquarters files in connection with the HSCA's investigation into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. Under Item #2 of this letter information concerning the National States Rights Party (NSRP), Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to areas covered by offices in Savannah, Georgia; Atlanta, Georgia; Memphis, Tennessee; Birmingham, Alabama; St. Louis, Missouri, and Springfield, Illinois, was requested. Under Item #3 information was requested concerning Jesse B. Stoner.

By letter from Mr. Blakey to the Attorney General dated November 8, 1977, the above requests were modified. Under Item (c) this letter requested the FBI's complete file on Stoner and that the agent(s) in the Office of Origin assigned to the Stoner investigation for the period 1966 through 1968 be made available for interview by the HSCA. Concerning the NSRP, under Item (d) this letter asked the FBI to provide information in its files to cover the period 1967 through 1968. In addition, the case agent(s) in the Office of Origin for the same period would be made available for interview.

In response to the above requests, information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the NSRP (period 1967 through 1968) and Jesse B. Stoner have been processed and are available for review at FBI Headquarters by the HSCA. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from FBI Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 12/1/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

62-117290-382x

~~62-117290-3396~~

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

PMS

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ

House Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

The Savannah Office of the FBI was Office of Origin in both the NSRP and Stoner investigation during the period of HSCA interest. The following agents of that office were case agents in the Stoner investigation: Carlton Dillard, January, 1966 - April 1967; William P. Friday, April, 1967 - October, 1967; John H. Murphy, October 1967 - September, 1969. With variation of only a few days, these same Agents were case agents in the investigation of the NSRP. Dillard is now retired. Friday and Murphy are currently assigned to the Savannah Office and are scheduled to retire December 31, 1977.

APPROVED:

Director________
Assoc. Dir.________
Dep. AD Adm.________
Dep. AD Inv.________

Adm. Serv.________
Crim. Inv.________
Fin. & Pers.________
Ident.________
Intell.________
Laboratory________

Legal Coun.________
Plan. & Insp.________
Rec. Mgnt.________
Spec. Inv.________
Tech. Servs.________
Training________
Public Affs. Off.________

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4024

Select Committee o[illegible]ssassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFF[illegible]UILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF
CONGRESSIONAL
AFFAIRS
NOV 15 11 PM 1977

NOV 3 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals and organizations be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Lawrence J. Callanan (deceased) Steamfitters Union (AFL) Local 562, St. Louis, Mo. for the Period 1967 through 1971.

2. National States Rights Party, 591 Cherokee, Marietta, Georgia, for the period 1967 through 1968, but limited to reports and information in areas covered by offices in Savannah, Ga.; Atlanta, Ga.; Memphis, Tn.; Birmingham, Al.; St. Louis, Mo.; and Springfield, Ill.

3. Jesse B. Stoner, 591 Cherokee, N.W., Marietta, Ga.

4. Conservative Society of America for the period 1967 through 1968. (Headquarters in New Orleans, La.

ltr to AAG/CD
12/1/77 (Enc-2)
JTA:sds

5. Kent Courtney, 1413 Texas Avenue, Alexandria, La. for the period 1967 through 1968.

62-117290-382X

62-117290-382X ENCLOSURE ~~62-117290-[illegible]~~

6. KKK (limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in Birmingham, Alabama, Los Angeles, California, Atlanta, Georgia and Louisville, Kentucky during the period 1967 through 1968).

7. Morris Davis, RFD, Hoover, Shelby County, Ala.

8. White Citizens Council (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in New Orleans, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

9. Forever White, (racist organization) for the period 1967 through 1968, limited to reports or information in areas covered by offices in New Orleans, La; Baton Rouge, La.; Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn.

10. Charles Joseph Stein, dob 5/11/29.

11. Percy Belcher, ex-deputy Sheriff, Birmingham, Alabama, for the period 1967 through 1968.

12. Robert Powers, Powers Junction, Intersection Highways 11 and 90, Orleans Parrish, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

13. Sam DiPiazza, Pamela Place, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

14. Dr. Lucas DiLeo - (office) 8603 St. Bernard Highway, Chalmette, Louisiana, for the period 1967 through 1968.

15. Salvadore L. Licciardi (Liccardi), New Orleans, Louisiana for the period 1967 through 1968.

16. Gus Joseph Prosch, dob 11/17/30, 3122 Callecita, Sacremento, California. (Arrested in Birmingham, Alabama in December, 1971 and convicted of violating Gun Control Act in 1972.)

17. Quentin B. Davis, owner of Gun Rack, Birmingham, Alabama for the period 1967 through 1968.

18. Clifford Andrews (aka, R. L. Warren), Box 75, Toronto 14, Ontario, Canada.

19. Walter Jack Youngblood, Monticello Street, Dallas, Texas.

20. Johnny Benelli, #303, 175 North Orange Drive, Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

21. Claude Cockrell, dob 5/10/36, FBI # 389804E, for the period 1967 through 1968.

22. Gene Pearson Crawford, dob 10/2/27 for the period 1967 through 1968.

23. Fleet Edwards, dob 2/4/21 for the period 1967 through 1968.

24. Raoul Esquivel - (Raul Victor Esquibel), dob 11/17/26, 4524 Parsimmon, Metairie, La. (This request includes, but is not limited to, Bureau File 44-26940.)

25. Southern Christian Leadership Conference

    a. General file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

    b. Cointelpro file, for the period 1962 through 1968.

26. James Bevel, for the period 1965 through 1968.

27. Rev. Jessie Jackson, Chicago, Ill., for the period 1965 through 1968.

28. Vincent DePaul Stelly, 4434 5th Ave., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

29. Jerome Wallis Vernon, Home Service Laundry and Dry Cleaning, 5280 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California for the period 1967 through 1968.

30. Rev. James Orange, South Carolina for the period 1965 through 1968.

31. Rev. Bernard Lee, Atlanta, Ga., for the period 1965 through 1968.

32. Allan Lee Stoddard, "Vegas Club", 5510 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California, for the period 1967 through 1968.

33. Robert Byron Watson, SS# 253-85-2220, Atlanta, Ga.

34. Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1962 through 1968. (This request pertains to material exclusive of the Murkin File and the SCLC files and should include all information regarding threats to Dr. King.

35. Herman A. Thompson, 10454 Goodwood Blvd.,
Baton Rouge, La., (former deputy sheriff in
Baton Rouge).

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

NOV 8 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a conference was held on November 7, 1977 between employees of the FBI and members of the Committee staff to discuss the Committee's November 3, 1977 letter of request for FBI materials on thirty-five individuals or organizations. As a result of this meeting, the following was resolved:

(a) The FBI would process the following numbered requests as they were originally stated in the November 3rd letter: 1, 4, 5, 7, 9-11, 13-24, 26, 28-33 and 35.

(b) The Committee would provide dates of births on the individuals in requests nos. 12 and 27 before the FBI would process these names. The dob on Robert J. Powers (request no. 12) is 6/5/24. The dob on Reverend Jesse Jackson (request no. 27) is 10/8/41.

(c) Besides providing the complete file on request no. 3 (Jesse B. Stoner), the FBI would also make available the most appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin assigned to Stoner for the period 1965 through 1968.

(d) With respect to request no. 2, the FBI would provide all [illegible] files [illegible] headquarters for 1957 [illegible] as well as make available the appropriate case agent(s) in the office of origin for the same period.

~~62-117290-3816~~

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-382X

(e) With respect to request no. 6, the Committee would hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI provides a list of the most appropriate case agent(s) in the offices of origin for the several Klan organizations in existence in 1967 and 1968. (While such was not part of the understanding reached at the time of the meeting with FBI officials, the Committee would request however that all materials related to the United Klan of America LS for the period 1965 and 1966 be made ready for inspection by November 20, 1977.)

(f) With respect to request no. 8, the FBI would first advise the Committee as to the identity of other cities reporting on the White Citizens Council before a determination be made as to the final content of this request.

(g) With respect to request no. 25, the Committee will hold in abeyance such a request until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s) for the period in question.

(h) With respect to request no. 34, the Committee requests that only the thirteen "death threat" files on Dr. King be processed at this time, while a request for all other materials is held in abeyance until the FBI makes available the most appropriate case agent(s).

In Addition, the Committee would also request that the following agents be notified and made available by the FBI:

(1) Special Agent William F. Kusch - New Orleans
Special Agent Thomas E. Duhadway - New Orleans

(2) Special Agent Jack B. Simpson - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Richard H. Davis - Memphis ATLANTA
Special Agent Jack T. Beverstein - Memphis ATLANTA

As a priority item, it is also requested that the FBI provide the Committee with the work or personnel records of the following three Louisville FBI agents for the month of September 1965:

(1) Robert Peters

(2) William Duncan

(3) Bernard Brown

We are primarily interested in those records reflecting their [illegible] records should be provided by November 15, 1977. The Committee would also ask that all three of the above-mentioned Louisville agents be made available for interview by the same date.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FBB605

PAGE 01 STATE 010886

JAN 14 7 04 AM '78
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ORIGIN EUR-12 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-01 L-03 MCT-01 JUSE-00 FBIE-00
INR-07 /025 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/NE: JPSHUMATE
APPROVED BY EUR/NE: RLFUNSETH
H - ASCHNEE (BY PHONE)

------------------015192 141012Z /10

R 140226Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 010886

EX-136

4 - Foster
(info)

E.O. 11652:N/A

REC-6 62-117290-380

TAGS:PINR, PDIP, UK

JAN 18 1978

SUBJECT:REQUEST FROM HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TO MEET WITH BRITISH POLICE AUTHORITIES

FUG. SUP.

RE: LONDON 20003

58 JAN 26 1978

MEET, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WITH RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NEW SCOTLAND YARD WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RESULTING CAPTURE OF JAMES EARL RAY IN LONDON ON JUNE 8, 1968 AND ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOLLOWING HIS CAPTURE. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH

THOSE REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S TELEGRAM.

AGAIN, WE EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VERY TRULY YOURS, G. ROBERT BLAKEY." END QUOTE.

CAN EMBASSY ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL PERMIT AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVESTIGATION MENTIONED IN BLAKEY'S LETTER AND ADVISE US. VANCE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENN[illegible] HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWI[illegible] LETTER FROM G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: QUOTE: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 9, 1977 ENCLOSING A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR BREWSTER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE LIFE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE IS LIMITED TO THE LIFE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE BE ALLOWED TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CH[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

[illegible]IE, OHIO
[illegible]KINNEY, CONN.
C[illegible]ES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 9, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

51

C

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff, access to the following:

1. All files, materials, and information relating to William Hugh Morris, the alleged leader of the Federated KKK in Alabama.
    a) Address (late 1950's)
       2128 East Fifth Street
       Oak Park
       Montgomery, Alabama
    b) Jefferson County Alabama
       Sheriff's Office Number 52811

Your prompt attention to this request will be greatly appreciated.

REC-30 62-117290-578

EX-130

Respectfully

14 JAN 18 1978

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

62-117290

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

GRB:ghk

cc: Danny Coulson

[illegible] 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, [illegible]AIRM[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

[illegible]EL L.[illegible]INE, OHIO
[illegible]ART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 5, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

(C)

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available for interview, on a priority basis, the following agents:

1. Theodore A'Hearn - Los Angeles } 10/7 LET cleared
2. Leroy W. Sheets - Los Angeles
3. Thomas J. Wilson - Atlanta
4. Gerald Galbreath - El Paso

The Committee is ready to interview these agents on an immediate basis.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

✓CC: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:wwd

EX-130

REC-30 62-117290

62-117290-376

14 JAN 18 1978

TREAT AS
ORIGINAL

[illegible] 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SA[illegible], OHIO
STE[illegible] B. [illegible]INNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 4, 1978

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

HAND DELIVER

Cu

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the F.B.I. make available to the Committee access to all F.B.I. materials, files, memoranda, airtels, and miscellaneous items, including but not limited to any contained in the MURKIN File (44-38861), on or referring to the following individual:

Gerold Frank - author
d.o.b. 8/2/1907
current address: 930 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10021

It is requested that access to these materials be provided on a priority basis so that our initial review can be completed by January 16, 1978.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

EX-130

REC 28

62-117290

62-117290-3[illegible]

GRB:ghd

cc: Danny Coulson

JAN 17 1978

58 JAN 24 1978

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

House

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JAN 3 11 23 AM '78
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
MAIL ROOM

DEC 30 1977

RECEIVE
JAN 4 1978
O.L.A

Cd

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by this Committee into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it has been determined from a review of the Chicago field office file (No. 44-1114) of the MURKIN investigation that the FBI is in possession of several letters of correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters. (See, for example, serials 271, 335, 496, 560, 574, 621, and 637 in the Chicago field office file.) It is requested that the FBI furnish this Committee with copies of all correspondence from Jerry Ray to Marjorie Fetters.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

ST-125 REC-55 62-117290-372

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

23 JAN 10 1978

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

~~62-117290~~

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
10
JAN 3 1978
O.R.O.M.
R.O.E.F.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

cc: Danny O. Coulson

GRB:mek

24

79 JAN - 1978

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

WASHINGTON, D.C.
PM
DEC 30
1977
200

ALWAYS USE ZIP CODE

Louis Stokes
M.C.

Mr. Danny O. Coulson
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th & Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention; Mr. Robert L. Keuch

October 3, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

5X

Director, FBI

C O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to the letter from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, to the Attorney General, dated August 9, 1977, requesting availability of all FBI reports relative to robbery of the Bank of Alton, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967. Reference is also made to the letter from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, dated September 13, 1977, requesting a copy of all FBI reports in this bank robbery investigation.

NR cc

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above HSCA request. It is requested that you furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 2

ST-120 REC-45 62-117290-371

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

20 JAN 9 1978

JTA:sas (9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Sent 10/4/77

3 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

79 JAN 20 1978 ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

D[illegible] 12/3/85

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: The Alton bank robbery occurred at the time James Earl Ray was a fugitive, prior to King's assassination. Ray was considered a suspect in this robbery subsequent to being identified as King's killer. No evidence was produced to link Ray with the robbery. The case was closed unsolved in 1972.

In its request of 8/9/77, the HSCA asked for access to our investigation into this bank robbery and the file was prepared. Later, the HSCA submitted a second request which requested "a copy of any and all materials or reports" in the Alton bank robbery. Mr. Keuch advised on 9/19/77, that delivery should be limited only to investigative reports in the case. The requested material was picked up at FBIHQ on 9/19/77 by Oliver Champion, HSCA messenger. Purpose of enclosed memorandum is to confirm delivery of this material.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer

October 3, 1977

1 - Legal Counsel

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

This will respond to letter dated August 9, 1977, to the Attorney General from U. S. Congressman Louis Stokes, Chairman, HSCA, and letter dated September 13, 1977, to Mr. Robert Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, HSCA.

This letter is to confirm that, pursuant to the above request dated September 13, 1977, a copy of each investigative report of the FBI in the Alton bank robbery, Alton, Illinois, July 13, 1967, was delivered to a representative of the HSCA on September 19, 1977.

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Direcotr, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 10/3/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. M/JH
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. M/cavr
Tech. Servs. /
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

ENCLOSURE 62-117290-371

FBI/DOJ

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE-BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

August 9, 1977

RECEIVED

AUG 19 1977

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20430

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we request that you make available to us all investigative reports relative to the robbery of the Bank of Alton, Illinois, on July 13, 1967.

Best wishes and kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

9-[illegible]

EME:ek

144-72-662
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
11
AUG 19 1977
O.R.O.M.
RECEIVED
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

Ack to AAG/CD
10-3-77
JTA:aos
1-OLA

62-117290-37
CIV. RIGHTS DIV.

ENCLOSURE

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVIN[illegible]IO
STEWART B. MC[illegible]Y, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, [illegible].
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 13, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to the investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and our conversation with your office on Monday, September 12, 1977, we are hereby requesting a copy of any and all materials or reports the Federal Bureau of Investigation has regarding the Alton Bank Robbery in Alton, Illinois on July 13, 1967; as well as a copy of any other materials the Department of Justice may have in its possession relevant to this matter.

I appreciate your cooperation and assistance in this request, and I look forward hearing from you.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

SJL/GRB/drj

62-117290-371

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 10, 1977

- 1 - Mr. Monahan
- 1 - Mr. Peelman
- 1 - Mr. Foster
- 1 - Mr. Aldhizer
- 1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertinent to seven listed individuals.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request and advises that material on six of these individuals is available for HSCA access at FBI Headquarters. Information on the seventh individual, Randolph Erwin Rosenson, was previously furnished the HSCA by FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ST-120

11/17/77

62-117290-369

REC-55

23 JAN 10 1978

2 - ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

79 JAN 16 1978

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. m/DEF
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/75 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By request dated 9/20/77, the HSCA asked for information concerning Rosenson. By letter to the Attorney General and its enclosures, both dated 10/13/77, information concerning Rosenson was delivered. The HSCA request dated 10/18/77, (attached) desired information on seven individuals, including a repeat on Rosenson's name.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 10, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated October 18, 1977, requesting access to material in the files of the FBI pertaining to:

Harvey Gene Love
George G. Pittman
Stephanie Helene Sheehan
Jonathon Henry Shea
Keith Albert Wright
Frank Quenqui
Randolph Erwin Rosenson

Retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files concerning the above individuals, with the exception of Rosenson, has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions or deletions. Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

By FBI memorandum dated October 13, 1977, documents containing information concerning Rosenson were provided the HSCA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/05

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/10/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA).

62-117290-369

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:
Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

FBI/DOJ

ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Aid.

October 18, 1977

King Investigation

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attn: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the Select Committee's investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Martin Luther King, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the Committee staff materials in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation relating to the following individuals for the period of time from January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968: 6/1/69

[illegible] [illegible] 1/1/67 - 6/1/69 10/25

NAME	Date of Birth	FBI Number
✓Love, Harvey Gene	4/1/35	592-813A
✓Pittman, George G.	6/20/38	919-933C
✓Sheehan, Stephanie Helene	7/26/53	951-133N4
✓Shea, Jonathon Henry	6/12/47	688-958J2
✓Wright, Keith Albert	7/27/44	122-750H
✓Quenqui, Frank	12/9/08	160-8374
Rosenson, Randolph Erwin	3/20/34	34-711E

In addition, it would be appreciated if you could make available to the staff the criminal records for these individuals. This written request confirms an oral request made by myself to Mr. Dan Coulson on October 18, 1977 in the offices of the Committee.

Thank you.

Respectfully,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:DM
copy to: Dan Coulson

Ltr To AAG/CD
11/10/77 (Enc-2)
JTA:aas

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-369

Assistant Attorney General FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 11, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

309

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance regarding certain individuals and a business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed are two copies of a memorandum which responds to the above request.

Enclosures - 2

1 - Office of Legislative Affairs (Enclosure)

Deliv 11/17/77

JTA:sas
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

APPROVED:

Director____
Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____

Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Pers.____
Ident.____
Intell.____
Laboratory____

Legal Coun. M/Dif
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt.____
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____

ST-120 REC-55 62-117290-368

23 JAN 10 1978

2- ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.____
Dep. AD Adm.____
Dep. AD Inv.____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.____
Crim. Inv.____
Fin. & Pers.____
Ident.____
Intell.____
Laboratory____
Legal Coun.____
Plan. & Insp.____
Rec. Mgnt.____
Spec. Inv.____
Tech. Servs.____
Training____
Public Affs. Off.____
Telephone Rm.____
Director's Sec'y____

79 JAN 16 1978 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/21/83 BY

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: By memorandum dated 5/13/68, the Department was asked for authority to place technical surveillance on the telephones of James Earl Ray's brother-in-law and sister, Albert and Carol Pepper and the Grapevine Tavern, all located in St. Louis, Missouri. This memorandum also requested microphone surveillance be installed at the residence of Albert and Carol Pepper, the residence of Ray's brother, John Larry Ray, and at the Grapevine Tavern. FBIHQ files contain no information to indicate the Department of Justice took any action on this request. Following Ray's apprehension the Department, in memorandum dated 6/11/68, was advised that the FBI's request for electornic surveillance was withdrawn. The above information is contained in the King Assassination June file and has been processed for access of the HSCA.

The HSCA's request of 11/7/77, desired only written confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance on the above individuals and business during the period 1/1/67 to 12/31/68.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. Aldhizer
1 - Legal Counsel

November 11, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to letter to the Attorney General from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, dated November 7, 1977, requesting confirmation as to the existence or nonexistence of electronic surveillance against the following individuals and business in connection with the FBI's investigation into the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray.
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper.
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri.

This memorandum is to confirm that, based on a review of appropriate files at FBI Headquarters, the above were not subjects of electronic surveillance by the FBI during the period January 1, 1967, to December 31, 1968, or at any other time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/95 BY

JTA:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE SENT TO ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH AND ONE SENT TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/11/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

APPROVED:

Director ___
Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___

Adm. Serv. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Fin. & Pers. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___

Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-362

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHA[redacted]MAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SA VINE, OHIO
ST CKINNEY, CONN.
CHA NE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

[redacted]

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

NOV 7 1977

The Honorable Griffin R. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation review its files on electronic surveillance to determine whether any of the following individuals and places were the subject of such surveillance during the period of January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1968:

1. Jerry Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
2. John Ray, brother of James Earl Ray
3. Carol Pepper, sister of James Earl Ray, and her husband Albert Pepper
4. Grapevine Tavern (also known as Jack's Place), 1982 Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri

At this time the Committee only desires a written confirmation as to the existence or non-existence of such electronic surveillance with no reference to the results of such surveillance.

Ack to AAG/CD
JTA:des
11/11/77 (Enc-2)

ENCLOSURE

62-117290-368

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mea
cc Mr. Danny O. Coulson

1 - Mr. Long - Enc.
1 - Mr. Foster - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
2 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Deputy Attorney General

December 29, 1977

Director, FBI

C O

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

In accordance with Attorney General Order 116-56, this memorandum advises that former Special Agent Joe C. Hester was interviewed on November 21, 1977. A memorandum setting forth Mr. Hester's account of this interview is enclosed for your information.

Enclosure

1 - Assistant Attorney General - Enclosure
Criminal Division
Attn: Robert Keuch

1 - Personnel file - Joe C. Hester - Enclosure

MAILED 3
JAN 9 1978
FBI

ST-120
REC-55 62-117290-366

23 JAN 10 1978

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
C.im. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

ENCLOSURE

DOC:ldr
(10)

signed & sent 1/6/77

12/31/85

79 JAN 16 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Memphis, Tennessee
December 5, 1977

JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM;
CIVIL RIGHTS - CONSPIRACY

On November 21, 1977, retired Special Agent Joe C. Hester appeared at Washington, D. C., at the request of the House Committee on Assassinations.

Mr. Hester met with the Committee staff in their offices at Washington, D. C., and was interviewed for a total of four hours by two different groups of five persons each. Both groups were affable and were not in any way critical of the investigation conducted in this case.

The first group of five interviewers asked a variety of questions but seemed to be particularly preoccupied with the investigation conducted by Legats in Mexico. Mr. Hester was able to answer many of the general questions regarding the activities of Legats but referred them to Assistant Director Richard Long when they began to ask more specific questions regarding the investigations by Legats and the manner of transmittal of this information to FBI Headquarters.(U)

The second group of five interviewers asked more general questions regarding the Bureau's investigation of the King murder. They seemed to be greatly concerned with the allegation of conspiracy. Mr. Hester advised them that he believed the conspiracy theory was an invention by the Department of Justice to be used to justify the FBI's investigation of Dr. King's murder. Mr. Hester advised them that he had never personally believed there was a conspiracy and he did not believe that any of his FBI superiors had ever believed in the conspiracy theory. Mr. Hester further advised that it was his personal opinion that James Earl Ray, acting alone, had murdered Dr. King and that his subsequent travels were probably financed by armed robbery.

12/31/85

#345832

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Memo to DAG, 12-29-77

62-117290-366

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

This group was concerned with how the subject Ray had known how to obtain false documents following his arrival in Canada. Mr. Hester pointed out that a "Top Ten" criminal had been arrested in Canada and had been returned to the Missouri State Penitentiary and had served time there with James Earl Ray prior to Ray's escape. Mr. Hester indicated it was his belief that this "Top Ten" fugitive had been responsible for instructing Ray on how to proceed in obtaining false documents in Canada.

This group touched on such diverse elements as the information furnished by John McFerren regarding Frank Liberto, and one of the interviewers agreed that they had not believed McFerren to be a very reliable witness. They also discussed Ray's purchase of the rifle in Birmingham; the fact that Officer Redditt was moved from the firehouse near the Lorraine Motel just prior to the murder; what motive did Ray have for killing Dr. King; whether or not there was any evidence to indicate a conspiracy; whether or not there were any wiretaps and whether or not there had been any surreptitious entries made against King and his followers at Memphis prior to the assassination; and when, following his escape, did Ray appear to have made up his mind to assassinate Dr. King.

In addition, they asked numerous questions about the political climate in Memphis just prior to the assassination and inquired as to what investigation was being conducted by the FBI in regard to the Sanitation Workers Strike and the first march conducted by Dr. King. Mr. Hester was forced to admit that he had had nothing to do with the investigation of Dr. King prior to the murder and he suggested that they talk to current Special Agent Howell S. Lowe who would be in a position to furnish information in this regard.

They inquired about the interview of James Earl Ray conducted by former Special Agent in Charge Robert G. Jensen, former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle, and Mr. Hester at the state prison in Nashville, Tennessee, following Ray's plea of guilty. Mr. Hester recounted as best he could recall the events that transpired in connection with this attempted interview and advised the interviewers that former Special Agent Robert F. Boyle has suffered a cerebral hemmorrhage and possibly might not be competent to furnish information regarding this investigation.

RE: JAMES EARL RAY;
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. - VICTIM

The Committee indicated that they might desire to interview Mr. Hester again, either personally or telephonically, and they were assured that he would be available and agreeable to assisting them in any way possible.

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. __
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's S

FBI/DOJ

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Robert L. Keuch ~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

ack.
KI

ST
Cd

DEC 8 1977

#17
1-4-78

cc: ✓Mr. Aldhizer

ACF
BD

✓Danny O. Coulson
SSA - Div 11
NSOM
67-623562

Drew J. Clark
SSA - Div 9
NSOM
67-572700

ST-120

REC-54 62-117290-362

John T. Aldhizer, III
SSA - Div 5
NSOM
67-606490

memo to Robert L. Keuch Special Council to the AG — Foster 8981

12-22-77
CAM;jmr

NW-8988

79 JAN 12 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: DEC 2 1977

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Robert L. Keuch
Special Counsel to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

I have received a copy of the Select Committee's letter of October 27, 1977, to you commending the work of Mr. Danny Coulson and Mr. Drew Clark. I enthusiastically join the Chairman of the Committee in such commendation but I also feel that any such recognition should specifically include Mr. Jay Aldhizer, who has also been outstanding in his cooperation and willingness to perform the tasks assigned in his dealings with me in exercising my responsibilities towards the Committee on behalf of the Attorney General.

cc: Mr. Aldhizer

CARBON COPY

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

November 14, 1977

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn;
Mr. Coulson)

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

Reference is made to a letter dated October 5, 1977, addressed to Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA. This letter requests all information in the possession of the FBI pertaining to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Based on information furnished by the Committee, retrievable information identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for Committee access subject to the usual excisions and deletions. This material, as well as limited material pertaining to Hardin, previously prepared for the Committee's access, is available to the Committee in Room 8988 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Enclosed are original and two copies of a memorandum which responds to this HSCA request. You are requested to furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to the HSCA.

Enclosures - 3

JTM:sas (8)

sas

ST-120

REC-54

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-117290-36

11/17/77

20 JAN 6 1978

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

79 JAN 12 1978

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY Spmacgne

FBI/DOJ

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch

NOTE: This responds to a request dated 10/5/77, from HSCA for all information contained in Bureau files relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair. This request has been coordinated with the Legal Counsel Division.

A review of Bureau files has revealed that a limited number of documents relating to an attempted bombing of Brent Hardin's automobile had been prepared for the Committee's access pursuant to receipt of their request dated 4/27/77. The Committee was advised of the availability of these documents on 5/18/77. The remaining retrievable documents in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair have been prepared for the Committee's access and are being maintained in the Congressional Inquiry Unit's Room 8988 for their review.

Documents retrieved from FBI Headquarters files pursuant to the Committee's request dated 10/5/77, include Baird's ident record, the results of a civil rights investigation involving Baird as the subject, and references to Blair appearing in the MURKIN file, numerous references to Hardin and the results of a civil rights investigation involving Blair as the subject.

1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Peelman
1 - Mr. Foster
1 - Mr. McGirl
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Coulson)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/31/85 BY

November 14, 1977

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

RE: OCTOBER 5, 1977, REQUEST OF HSCA FOR INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI RELATIVE TO CLIFTON BAIRD, BRENT HARDIN AND ARLIE BLAIR.

This constitutes a complete response to the October 5, 1977, letter of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

Chief Counsel Blakey requested all FBI information relative to Clifton Baird, Brent Hardin and Arlie Blair.

Utilizing identifying data for Baird, Hardin and Blair furnished by the HSCA, retrievable information in FBI Headquarters files identifiable with Baird, Hardin and Blair has been prepared for the Committee's access subject to the usual excisions and deletions.

Also available for the Committee's access are documents relating to Brent Hardin which were previously prepared on May 18, 1977, pursuant to the receipt of the Committee's request dated April 27, 1977, for these documents.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from Headquarters files or is not being produced pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.

JTM:sas (9)

ORIGINAL AND TWO SENT TO MR. ROBERT L. KEUCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION.

NOTE: See Director, FBI, letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch, dated 11/14/77, captioned, "House Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

APPROVED:

Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____

Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____

Legal Coun. ____ m/Jef
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

62-117290-361

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assa[illegible]ations
U.S. House of Represe[illegible]tives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

McGill

October 5, 1977

Mr. Robert Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Keuch:

Pursuant to our investigation into the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., we hereby request that all reports, materials and files in the possession of the F.B.I. pertaining to the following individuals be made available to the Committee and its staff:

1. Clifton Baird, 7813 Edsel Lane, Louisville, Kentucky.
2. Brent Hardin, 9102 Bristle Ave., Louisville, Kentucky.
3. Arlie Blair, 4025 Franklin Ave., Louisville, Kentucky, dob 9/3/32.

Your prompt attention to these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

MCE:ek
cc: Mr. Danny O. Coulson

ltr to AAG/CD
JTM:sas
11/14/77

ENCLOS.

62-117290-361

Rec 10/5 JTW

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. [illegible]
STEWART [illegible], CONN.
CHARLES [illegible], NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DEC 13 1977

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

DEC 14 11 29 AM '77
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL ROOM
OROM

RECEIVED

RECEIVED
DEC 15 1977
O.L.A.

CJ

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

2 House

In connection with the investigation by the Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it would be appreciated if our staff could have access to the following files:

a) Any and all materials or files pertaining to the organization known as the MINUTEMEN for the period 1966-1968 active in the states of Mississippi and Louisiana.

8T-114 REC-33 62-117290-356

c) Any records and files, excluding D.E.A. records requested in our letter of November 8, 1977 on:

Reynard J. Rochon
2200 Oriole Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

(1967 address)
7018 Dreux Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

21 JAN 4 1978

Your cooperation and prompt attention to this matter is greatly appreciated.

62-117290

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

TREAT AS ORIGINAL

GRB:ghe

cc: Danny O. Coulson

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
3 DEC 14 1977
D.A.O.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

57 JAN 12 1978
1-190

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

TO : The Associate Director

DATE: 12/22/77

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that the Director release from their secrecy agreements, SAs Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

-389

DETAILS: By letter dated 12/20/77 HSAC requested to interview SAs Harry L. Lee (former), SA Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen. By letter dated 11/8/77 the Committee requested permission to interview SA John B. Simpson, Richard A. Davis (former) and SA Jack T. Beverstein (former).

8

By letter dated 11/3/77 captioned Committee requested the identity of the case Agent most familiar with white hate activities in the period from 1965 to 1966. By letter dated 11/17/77 the Committee was advised that this Agent is SA Warren L. Walsh (former). By letter dated 12/9/77 the Committee requested permission to interview SA Robert Nichols (former).

332

RECOMMENDATION:

T 114   REC-46   62-117290-353

That the Director release from their employment agreement for purpose of interview by the captioned Committee the following individuals: Harry L. Lee, Richard D. Rackleff, James R. Riorden, Warren L. Walsh, John B. Simpson, Richard H. Davis, Jack T. Beverstein, Robert Nichols and former Assistant Director Alex Rosen.

JAN

SCK

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Monahan
1 - Mr. Long
1 - Mr. Foster
2 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Coulson

Coulson 365

DOC:dlj(8)

APPROVED:
Director ____
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Adm. Serv. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Public Affs. Off. ____

#245852

12/30/77

JAN 12 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-110

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/25/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10181-10009

RECORD SERIES : LO

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-358-42

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
SEE FBI 62-109060-3385

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/24/1994

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

SECRET 6/23/64

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT, As Brockstad JOH 10/20/93

AIRTEL

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (62-109060)

FROM LEGAT, LONDON (62-358) (RUC)

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY 11/22/63,
DALLAS, TEXAS
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

10/25/93
Classified by 9803 RQD/EH
Declassify on: OADR

On 6/22/64 [Mr. R. E. CARTER, CIA, London,] (S) on a highly confidential basis, furnished the following information [which comes from a tisur on the Cuban Embassy, London, operated by British Security Service, MI-5 and British Secret Intelligence Service, MI-6. This] (S) conversation occurred on 5/8/64 and was between MARIO RIVA PATTERSON, Counselor, Cuban Embassy, London and an unidentified male visitor, possibly a Colombian. [The conversation was in Spanish and indistinct at times.] (S) Information is as follows:

> "The visitor (S) [after a question half of which is not heard] asks if in the case of the assassination of KENNEDY if (?) FOSTER [(ph and indistinct)] (S) was ever in Cuba. RIVA replies in the negative. He says that this man applied for a visa to go to Cuba at the Consulate in Tampico. He was refused a visa. Had he been to Cuba he would have had his passport.
>
> VISITOR: "A typical F.B.I. job.
>
> RIVA: "A thing (una cosa) of the Imperialists - to kill him in the end - really disgusting -"

It is possible that the individual referred to above as FOSTER may have been OSWALD. Above furnished for the Bureau's information.

3 - Bureau
1 - Liaison (sent direct)
1 - London
CWB:rn
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

SECRET

62-358-42

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1306, 1308 - 1st NR 1315, 1317, 1319, 1320 1322-1324, 1326, 1329, 1330, 1332, 1335

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

January 19, 1976

1 - Mr. S. J. Miller

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the October 7, 1975, and January 7, 1976, SSC requests pertaining to certain documents relating to mail intercept programs. These documents, submitted with the October 7, 1975, request, were excised, declassified and returned to the SSC by memorandum dated October 15, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum responsive to the January 7, 1976, request that FBI personnel review the sanitization of the documents relating to mail opening operations in terms of their public release in published form. Copies of the documents to be used as exhibits to the public hearings on FBI mail opening operations, delivered to the FBI on January 7, 1976, were reviewed and marked for further excising, and were returned to the SSC on January 9, 1976, for whatever use the Committee deems appropriate.

REC-100 62-116395-1335

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum responsive to the January 7, 1976, request.

MDR 16

Enclosures (2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2 ALM/KHL

FEB 6 1976

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JAM

SJM:lhb
(9)

4 - ENCL.

WRW/TJL

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 FEB 9 1976

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The documents relating to the Hunter Project; Z Coverage; CHIPROP Survey; SAM Survey; GUS Survey; CHICAN Survey; JOE Survey; and the CHICLET Survey were reviewed by personnel of the Intelligence Division.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller

62-116395

January 19, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the SSC request dated January 7, 1976.

On January 7, 1976, copies of the documents to be used as exhibits to the public hearings on FBI mail openings were delivered to the FBI for review of their sanitization in terms of their public release in published form.

These documents were reviewed, marked for some additional excisions and returned to the SSC on January 9, 1976, for whatever use the Committee deems appropriate.

MDR
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

1 - The Attorney General

SJM:lhb/hb
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

WRW/TWL

JAM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

62-116395-1335

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

T-~~555~~
-Reg. (Ward)

JAN 8 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter dated January 7, 1976, and received on January 8, 1976, from the Senate Select Committee requesting Bureau review of certain mail opening documents delivered, I assume, to the Bureau on January 7, "for clearance and/or declassification". The request seeks Bureau clearance "on or before January 9, 1976". I would appreciate your earliest attention to this request.

FBI
MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

cc: Paul Daly

1-Ad Hoc
1-9-76

62-116395-1335
ENCLOSURE

ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.　　RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER,
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNS
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States enate
SELECT COMMITTE
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPER IONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

January 7, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

On January 7, 1976, the Committee delivered copies of the documents to be used as exhibits to the public hearings on FBI mail opening operations.

We request that Bureau personnel review the sanitization of these documents in terms of their public release in published form and that a formal response to this request for clearance and/or declassification be received by the Committee on or before Friday, January 9, 1976.

Your cooperation, on a priority basis, is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
JAN 8 1976
9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

62-116395-1335

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/19/76

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC).
(SSC Request 1/7/76)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dan O. Cauh Date: 1/27/76

Received by: Lynsey Oster

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP 2 ALM /EHC

62-116375-1335

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

1/19/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 1/7/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Sanitization of documents to be used as exhibits to the public hearings on FBI mail openings.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

62-116395

FMK:fmk

(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-gd

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

January 21, 1976

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. Klein

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the December 18, 1975, SSC letter forwarded from the Department of Justice by letter dated December 22, 1975, containing requests for information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum which is responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

REC-100 62-116395-1332

FEB 6 1976

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

MDR 16

SK:klm KLM
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

5 - WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 FEB 9 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The material prepared for delivery to the SSC represents a portion of that requested in SSC letter dated 12/18/75. The SSC desired the material at an early date, and we were expediting our review of files with regard to additional requests contained in the December 18, 1975, letter.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. Klein

62-116395

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

January 21, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the December 18, 1975, letter of the SSC as modified at a conference on December 30, 1975, between Messrs. W. O. Cregar and P. V. Daly of this Bureau and Committee Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mark Gitenstein.

This memorandum effects delivery of material in response to Items 1, 1(a), 1(b), and 1(e). The matters referred to are four FBI investigations about which the SSC was previously furnished materials relating to FBI preventive actions.

Concerning Item 1, which requested reports or letterhead memoranda (LHMs) disseminated outside the Bureau by FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), for the six-month period preceding the act of violence prevented, the following is noted. In regard to the incidents involving the proposed assassination of a narcotics agent in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and the planned racial violence in Cleveland, Ohio, there were no reports or LHMs submitted by either the Minneapolis Field Office or Cleveland Field Office during the six-month period preceding the incident.

SK:klm
(9)

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-1332

ENCLOSURE

U. S. Senate Select Committee

Concerning Item 1(a), which requested predications for each investigation, it should be noted that in the incident involving the proposed assassination of a narcotics agent, there was no predication submitted by the Minneapolis Field Office. This was due to the fact that there was no FBI jurisdiction concerning this matter and consequently no investigation by the FBI.

Concerning Item 1(b), which requested the first investigative report or LHM disseminated by FBIHQ outside the FBI in each case, and a list of recipients of that report or LHM, the following should be noted. Regarding the incident involving the proposed assassination of a narcotics agent, no report or LHM was submitted by the Minneapolis Field Office as there was no FBI investigation. On the administrative pages accompanying reports or LHM's involving the other incidents, there are notations which identify those agencies which received copies of these documents.

Item 1(e), requested annual reports or LHM's from the Office of Origin to FBIHQ for the last five years during which each case was an open (pending) investigation. Regarding the incidents involving the Hanafi Muslim sect in Washington, D. C., the proposed assassination of a narcotics agent in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and the planned racial violence in Cleveland, Ohio, no annual reports or LHMs were submitted by either the Washington, Cleveland, or Minneapolis Field Office.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/21/76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
12/18/75 request Items 1,1(a),1(b)
and 1(e)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: J. O. Stassinos Date: 1/23/76

Received by: Joan T. Wilson

Title: Receptionist

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-1332

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

1/21/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒	SSC
☐	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclos8ures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 12/18/75, items 1,1a,1b,1e

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

C

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials relating to the four investigations regarding preventive actions, one involving the proposed assassination of a narcotics agent in Minneapolis, Minn., the planned racial violence in Cleveland, Ohio and Hanafi Muslim sect in Washington, D.C.

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. [redacted] A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

The Attorney General

October 21, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Reference is made to the oral request of Special Assistant to the Attorney General Jack W. Fuller, October 20, 1975, for information concerning six individuals whose names were placed on the National Security Agency (NSA) Watch List because of FBI investigative interest in them.

In response to that request, enclosed are the original and one copy each of six memoranda relating to the following individuals:

1. Kathie Boudin
2. Stokely Carmichael
3. Howard Lamar Fuller
4. Leonard Handelsman
5. Naomi Esther Jaffe
6. Saifeldine Ahmed Abdenabi Wadi-Ramahi.

EX 103
REC-14 62-116395-1330

The memoranda include information as to the reasons why these individuals were investigated by the FBI, included on the Watch List and the use made of the product received from NSA concerning them, if any. Regarding those individuals on whom there is no record of receipt of information of a positive nature from NSA, it should be noted that it was our practice to destroy upon receipt any Watch List "product" which did not appear to be of significance in our investigations and to retain neither copies nor record of receipt.

6 ENCLOSURE

FEB 4 1976

Enclosures (12)

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JPT:lhb
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 FEB 6 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE:

On 10/20/75, Mr. Jack Marsh of the White House contacted Jack Fuller, supra, concerning this matter and Mr. Fuller requested that we select six individuals who had been included on the Watch List and furnish the requested information for possible use at an Executive Session of the SSC. On 10/20/75, Mr. Dave Lohman, NSA, advised Supervisor J. P. Thomas, INTD, that NSA was aware that we were going to receive this request; that there was no need, from NSA's standpoint, for classification of response merely because it stated that certain persons were on the Watch List. He stated NSA intended to tell the SSC the number of requests it had received from other agencies, including FBI, to put names on the Watch List but that NSA had told Jack Marsh, supra, that specific names would have to be furnished by the agencies interested in the particular subjects.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

October 20, 1975

KATHIE BOUDIN

Kathie Boudin is being sought by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a fugitive in connection with her unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, for mob action and for violation of Federal Anti-Riot Laws, the National Firearms Act, and Bombing Matters. She is being sought as a Weatherman fugitive. Weatherman is a violence-prone organization of Marxist ideology which operates an underground movement for the purpose of committing acts of terrorism. Weatherman members have been known to travel abroad and were suspected of maintaining a system of international communications.

Boudin's name was furnished the National Security Agency by communication dated April 16, 1973, along with names of other individuals affiliated with the Weatherman organization. During 1973, a source who had furnished reliable information in the past advised he observed in Havana, Cuba, an individual whom he believed to be identical with Boudin. A second source who had furnished reliable information in the past advised Leonard Boudin, Kathie's father, had made a statement that Kathie Boudin was in Cuba.

There was no indication any information of a positive nature was received from the National Security Agency concerning Boudin.

KAM:dew dew
(9) ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/4/00 BY SP2 ALM/JEHL

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer

October 20, 1975

HOWARD LAMAR FULLER, ALSO KNOWN AS OWUSU SADAUKAI

Howard Lamar Fuller, also known as Owusu Sadaukai has been under investigation by the FBI since 1967 for involvement in black extremist activities, which have included foreign travel and efforts to organize blacks in the United States to destroy capitalism through use of violence if necessary. Following travel to Africa in 1971, Fuller, as National Chairman of the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC), was instrumental in organizing national demonstrations and activities in support of liberation movements on the African continent.

By letter dated August 4, 1972, the FBI requested the National Security Agency (NSA) to furnish any information regarding Fuller in view of his involvement in subversive activities, as outlined above.

A search of logical Bureau records failed to locate any information furnished to the FBI by the NSA in response to the above request.

JTA:lek lek
(9) ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

October 20, 1975

1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

STOKELY CARMICHAEL

Stokely Carmichael is a well-known and publicly identified black extremist. Carmichael, during the approximate period 1967 to present, has openly called for revolution by blacks and the destruction of capitalism in America through violent action.

Carmichael was among individuals of investigative interest who were placed on the National Security Agency's (NSA) Watchlist because of his extremist activities and contacts which include both domestic and foreign personalities of similar persuasion.

In addition to maintaining his residence in Guinea and frequent trips to the United States, Carmichael has also traveled to North Vietnam, Cuba and People's Republic of China. Information furnished the Federal Bureau of Investigation by NSA included data concerning his foreign travel, his visits to the United States, travel of associates to visit him in Guinea and invitations to attend various international conferences.

This information received from NSA, in some instances, was furnished appropriate FBI Field Offices to assist this Bureau's investigation in following the travel and extremist activities of Carmichael.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

PEN:adn/eks
(9)

JAH

WOC

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

October 20, 1975

1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

LEONARD HANDELSMAN

1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

Handelsman was sought by the FBI as a fugitive in connection with Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution for Mob Action, Aggravated Battery, and Aiding Escape. He had also been charged with Conspiracy for Possession of Unregistered Firearms and Interstate Transportation of Explosives and Incendiary Devices. Handelsman was sought as a Weatherman fugitive. Weatherman is violence-prone organization of Marxist ideology which operates an underground movement for the purpose of committing acts of terrorism. Weatherman members have been known to travel abroad and they were suspected of maintaining a system of international communication.

Handelsman's name was furnished to the National Security Agency (NSA) by communication dated April 16, 1973, along with the identities of other Weatherman fugitives. Handelsman had studied in South America during the mid-1960s and it was believed at the time of furnishing his name to the NSA he was outside the United States, possibly in a Latin American country.

There is no indication any information was received from the NSA of a positive nature concerning Handelsman.

KAM:lm
(9)

Original and one to Attorney General.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

JAM

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
(1 - J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J.P. Thomas
1 - Mr. K.A. Mendenhall

October 20, 1975

NAOMI ESTHER JAFFE

Naomi Jaffe was a Weatherman fugitive who was indicted for conspiracy to bomb various police and military installations. Weatherman is a violence-prone organization of Marxist ideology which operates an underground movement for the purpose of committing acts of terrorism. Weatherman members have been known to travel abroad and were suspected of maintaining a system of international communications.

Jaffe's name was furnished to the National Security Agency by communication dated April 16, 1973, along with the identity of other Weatherman fugitives. Jaffe had relatives who resided in Canada, and her parents resided in the United States. Investigation revealed Jaffe had been in Canada and utilizing Canadian relatives as intermediaries to maintain contact with her family in the United States. Jaffe's father was known to have rented a light plane and traveled to Canada.

There is no indication any information of a positive nature was received from the National Security Agency concerning Jaffe.

KAM:meg meg
(9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

JAM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

SECRET

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

October 20, 1975

1 - Mr. T. H. George

SAIFELDINE AHMED ABDENABI WADI-RAMAHI
Also Known As Dr. Abu Ayman Wadi, Sayf Ramahi

Subject, commonly known as Dr. Abu Ayman Wadi and Sayf Ramahi, was reported by a source who has furnished reliable information in the past as being head of Al Fatah in the United States during 1971 and 1972. (S)

Following the massacre of Israeli athletes at Munich, September, 1972, his name was furnished to the National Security Agency (NSA) as being of interest to this Bureau. He departed the United States during the latter part of July or early August, 1972, and a return visa was denied by U. S. Department of State. He reentered in early December, 1972, in possession of a passport in a variation of his true name and was subsequently located. Subject thereafter voluntarily departed the United States and has not returned. However, sources have reported subject interested in returning to the United States.

Information from NSA has assisted this Bureau in following subject's location and activities since his departure.

THG:med
(9)

MDR 16

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" as it contains information from CIA which was so classified.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Original and one to the Attorney General

SECRET

Classified by 7005
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

WOC
JPT

JAM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 23 1976

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR008 SA CODE

4:40 PM NITEL JANUARY 23, 1976 DLE

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN ANTONIO

ATTENTION: INTD, MR. W. O. CREGAR.

SENSTUDY, 1975.

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM

4063 JLF

RETELCALL OF MR. SEYMOUR PHILLIPS TO SAC, SAN ANTONIO, JANUARY 22, 1976, CONCERNING FORMER SPECIAL AGENT EDWIN DALRYMPALE.

ON JANUARY 22, 1976, I NOTIFIED MR. EDWIN DALRYMPALE, 4211 PRICKLEY PEAR DRIVE, AUSTIN, TEXAS, 78731, TELEPHONE 512-345-1479, THAT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE HAD REQUESTED THE FBI IDENTIFY A RED HEADED AGENT ASSIGNED TO THE HOUSTON FBI OFFICE AROUND 1963 OR 1964. THE BUREAU HAS ADVIED TWO AGENTS ASSIGEND TO THAT OFFICE DURING THIS PERIOD WITH RED HAIR, ONE BEING FORMER SPECIAL AGENT EDWIN DALRYMPALE.

5- Phillips (Class)

EX 104

MR. DALRYMPALE WAS ADVISED OF THE INQUIRY BY THIS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THAT THE FBI WAS COOPERATING WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WAS

REC-51 62-116395-1329

FEB 4 1976

END PAGE ONE

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

c 67-

(Edwin DALRYMPLE)

84 FEB 9 1976

WAS FURNISHING THE COMMITTEE WITH MR. DALRYMPALE'S NAME AND ADDRESS.

MR. DALRYMPALE WAS REQUESTED TO CONTACT THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT PHONE CALL IN THE EVENT HE RECEIVES AN INQUIRY FROM A MEMBER OF THIS COMMITTEE. HE WAS REQUESTED TO DETERMINE THE SUBJECT MATTER ABOUT WHICH THE COMMITTEE WISHED TO INTERVIEW HIM, FURNISH THIS INFORMATION TO THE FBI OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL IN ORDER THAT AN APPROPRIATE WAIVER COULD BE FURNISHED HIM BY THE FBI THEREBY PERMITTING HIM TO SUBMIT TO INTERVIEW AND POSSIBLE SUBSEQUENT TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE.

MR. DALRYMPALE WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THIS INFORMATION AND STATED HE WOULD KEEP THE FBI ADVISED OF ANY CONTACT AND REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW BY THE COMMITTEE.

ABOVE FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU.

END

TKR FBIHQ

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/SSM

DATE: 1/29/76

FROM : S. S. Mignosa SSM

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

TJM

Reference is made to memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, entitled "Senstudy 75," dated 1/29/76.

Referenced memorandum requested Section CI-3, Intelligence Division, to deliver to the Senstudy Unit for referral to the Senate Select Committee (SSC) statistical information concerning the number of bombings in this country for as many years as such information is readily available but not to exceed ten years.

This is to advise you that the bombing statistics previously made available to the SSC, covering the years 1972 through the present, are the only years which the FBI has maintained statistics regarding bombings in the United States.

ACTION:

That the SSC be advised of the above.

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. S. S. Mignosa
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff
1 - Mr. D. J. McGorty

DJM:med
(5)

med DJM

1/30/76
Mark Gitenstein, SSC,
advised of above TJM

REC-51 62-116395-1326

EX 104

FEB 4 1976

5 -

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

9 1 FEB 6 1976

2 - M J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

January 13, 1976

1 - Mr. C. G. McWright
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the SSC request dated November 21, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum, with enclosure, responding fully to that request.

A copy of that memorandum is also furnished for your records.

Enclosures (3)

62-116395

EX 104

REC-51

62-116395-1324

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

FEB 4 1976

JPT:lhb lhb
(11)

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

Plan

5 - WOC/JPT

JPT

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

FEB 6 1976

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. C. G. McWright
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

62-116395

January 13, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/13/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Reference is made to the SSC request dated November 21, 1975.

Our files contained no reference to "Project CHATTER" prior to November 6, 1975. On that date, on invitation of the Department of the Navy, a representative of this Bureau reviewed Navy records which the Navy planned to release to the SSC, to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures and to the press on November 7, 1975. Those Navy records dealt with "Project CHATTER" and other topics pertinent to Items 1 through 8 in the referenced SSC request. Reviews of logical FBI files and inquiries of current FBI personnel, who might possibly have knowledge of the topics discussed in the Navy records, were made.

The only pertinent item developed through the file reviews and aforementioned inquiries was a memorandum dated August 4, 1950, recording an invitation from the Office of Naval Intelligence to the FBI to attend a conference and be informed about a "truth serum" being developed by the Navy. A copy of that memorandum, which relates to Item 2 in the referenced request, is attached (inked notations thereon appear on the original). (62-2699-75)

No other record was located of any memorandum or other communication prepared by FBI personnel relating to the August 11, 1950, meeting mentioned in Item 2 of the referenced request. Accordingly, our response to Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in that request is negative.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

JPT:lhb lhb
(10)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-116395-1324

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

A review of FBI files for information relating to drugs designed to modify behavior indicates an interest dating back to 1922. However, this interest has not extended to the point where the FBI has conducted programs involving research, experimentation or use of drugs for interrogation purposes. Neither has it funded such programs. We have maintained liaison with other U. S. Government agencies and industrial organizations in order to be aware of developments in this area. However, we have not implemented any programs to apply the results of research conducted by such organizations.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The FBI representative who reviewed the Navy records was Supervisor J. P. Thomas, Intelligence Division; results reported in memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, 11/6/75, entitled "Senstudy 75." The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee has previously been advised that available Bureau records and interview with current knowledgeable employee indicate that the FBI has never engaged in or funded anyone's efforts in research and/or development programs in the use or effect of drugs on human behavior. This information is recorded in memorandum from Mr. J. Cochran, Jr., to Mr. T. J. Jenkins, dated 11/28/75, entitled "Request by Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure for Information Concerning Use of Drugs for Interrogation." A copy of the communication being furnished herewith is being maintained in the Senstudy Unit, Intelligence Division. A copy of the 11/21/75 SSC request is attached to the file copy of this LHM.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, AR[illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MATHI[illegible], MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, [illegible]

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 21, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHK

Dear Mike:

I would appreciate your asking the Bureau to provide to the Committee by the end of next week all memoranda and any other materials pertaining to:

1. Project CHATTER and any other programs involving research, experimentation, or use of drugs for interrogation purposes.

2. An August 11, 1950, meeting at the Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI), Bethesda, Maryland, attended by Cartha DeLoach and/or Donald J. Parsons, which pertained to a CIA project on narco-hypnosis and an NMRI project on the surreptitious administration of speech-inducing drugs.

3. Information about speech-inducing drugs which was made available to NMRI and CIA following the meeting described in item 2 above.

4. A study by ONR on a projected research contract designed to improve the performance and reliability of the KEELER polygraph which was transmitted to the FBI following the meeting described in item 2 above.

5. The FBI's comments and recommendations on the study described in item 3 above which were transmitted to ONR.

6. The results of any investigations or inquiries conducted by Mr. Parsons pertaining to the possibility of securing volunteer federal prisoners for drug testing by NMRI following the meeting described in item 2 above.

RECEIVED
NOV 1975

1st to AG 1-DAG 1/8/76 Enc. 4
JPT:hhb
3

62-116395-1324

7. The supplying of NMRI by the FBI of any quantities of CANABIS or HEROIN following the meeting described in item 2 above.

8. A project undertaken by the University of Rochester which was underway in 1950 pertaining to a study of drugs and psychological pressure methods to induce cooperativeness and truthfulness in subjects under interrogation.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/13/76

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). (SSC req 11/21/75, Items 1-8)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 1/15/76

Received by: Joan L Wilson

Title: Receptionist

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/3/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

62-116395-1324

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : Mr. V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: "TRUTH SERUM" DEVELOPED BY U. S. NAVY

DATE: August 4, 1950

Tolson____
Ladd____
Clegg____
Glavin____
Nichols____
Rosen____
Tracy____
Harbo____
Mohr____
Tele. Room____
Nease____
Gandy____

Mr. Alberti, ONI, has contacted Liaison relative to a conference between Naval Medical Research men and FBI representatives in order to discuss the usage of truth serum in Intelligence circles. [redacted] Alberti indicated the Navy had made considerable advances in developing a new drug which he felt could be utilized to a great advantage in the questioning of espionage suspects. He added the Navy was willing to turn such information over to the FBI and that the Navy would also appreciate any knowledge possessed by the Bureau with respect to our advancement in this field.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is suggested this memorandum be forwarded to the FBI Laboratory for consideration. The Liaison Section should be advised of any decision in this matter so that Mr. [redacted] Alberti can be in turn advised accordingly.

CDD:ilw

Per instruction, conference set up between Parsons & Navy men 9:30 A.M. 8/11/50 -

63-2677-70

RECORDED - 14

AUG 14 1950

5

69 AUG 22 1950

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

62-116395-1324

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 84
Series 1947

July 3, 1947

SAC

ALBANY
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
DALLAS
DENVER
DETROIT
EL PASO
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE
MEMPHIS
MIAMI
MILWAUKEE
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
NORFOLK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH
PORTLAND
RICHMOND
ST. LOUIS
ST. PAUL
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
QUANTICO

RE: TRUTH SERUMS

The Bureau has received inquiries recently concerning the reliability of the so-called truth serums. The Bureau is not in possession of any information concerning the use of drugs or chemicals which will compel a person to speak only the truth. The Bureau, however, will not tolerate any experiments or participation on the part of its personnel in the utilization of the so-called truth serums or other chemicals alleged to have a similar effect. All employees are accordingly cautioned against any participation whatsoever in the utilization of truth serums or similar drugs in connection with any cases.

Obviously, great criticism would be directed at the Bureau if it utilized any element of this kind in connection with its investigations. The Bureau cannot jeopardize its good reputation by even considering the utilization of such an investigative procedure and, consequently, in the event any Bureau agent violates these instructions, drastic administrative action will be taken.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 9
JUL 3 - 1947 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

RECORDED 66-04-5[illegible]
JUL 2[illegible]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(typed July 1, 1947)

STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~BUREAU BULLETIN NO.~~
~~SERIES 194~~

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
ON 11/3/00

Letter to all SACs:-
~~TO ALL INVESTIGATIVE EMPLOYEES:~~

Dear Sir:

The Bureau has received inquiries recently concerning the reliability of the so-called truth serums. The Bureau is not in possession of any information concerning the use of drugs or chemicals which will compel a person to speak only the truth. The Bureau, however, will not tolerate any experiments or participation on the part of its personnel in the utilization of the so-called truth serums or other chemicals alleged to have a similar effect. All employees are accordingly cautioned against any participation whatsoever in the utilization of truth serums or similar drugs in connection with any cases.

Obviously, great criticism would be directed at the Bureau if it utilized any element of this kind in connection with its investigations. ~~Obviously,~~ the Bureau cannot jeopardize its good reputation by even considering the utilization of such an investigative procedure and, consequently, in the event any Bureau agent violates these instructions, drastic administrative action will be taken.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

DIRECTOR
JUL 2 11 27 AM '47
RECEIVED READING RM.

DEPT. OF JUSTICE
12 07 PM '47

F.B.I.
JUL 2 1947

EAT:ml

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
. Room
ease
ndy

approved by Executive Conference 7-2
Tolson - Mohr - Callahan - Ladd
Rosen - Harbo - E. A. Tamm -
Letter sent to all Bu. Off. ✓ H
C.
Sent 7-3-47 [illegible]

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

(typed July 1, 1947)

Personal Attention
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~BUREAU BULLETIN NO.~~
~~SERIES 194~~

Letter to all Sacs:

~~TO ALL INVESTIGATIVE EMPLOYEES:~~ Re: Truth Serums

Dear Sir:

The Bureau has received inquiries recently concerning the reliability of the so-called truth serums. The Bureau is not in possession of any information concerning the use of drugs or chemicals which will compel a person to speak only the truth. The Bureau, however, will not tolerate any experiments or participation on the part of its personnel in the utilization of the so-called truth serums or other chemicals alleged to have a similar effect. All employees are accordingly cautioned against any participation whatsoever in the utilization of truth serums or similar drugs in connection with any cases.

Obviously, great criticism would be directed at the Bureau if it utilized any element of this kind in connection with its investigations. ~~Obvious~~ly, the Bureau cannot jeopardize its good reputation by even considering the utilization of such an investigative procedure and, consequently, in the event any Bureau agent violates these instructions, drastic administrative action will be taken.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES DEFENSE BONDS AND STAMPS

Letter sent to all Bu.off. & Sac's

OK
KBM
July 2-47

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: **FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED **1/13/76**

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 11/21/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

No materials located FBIHQ relating to "Project Chatter". 8/4/50 letter made available relating to an invitation from the office of Naval Intelligence to the FBI to attend a conference and be informed about a "truth serum" being developed by the Navy.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) **ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75**

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395-1324

5-md

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. Cochran
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

January 13, 1976

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by an SSC Staff Member of former FBI Special Agent Joseph William Magee. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Attention is invited to the information in the memorandum indicating that Magee was contacted by the SSC Staff Member, first in September, 1975, and again in late December, 1975, without any prenotification to this Bureau, and thus contrary to agreed upon procedures between the SSC and this Bureau concerning such interviews.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-51 62-116395-1323

EX 104

FEB 4 1976

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

SFP:mjg
(10)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

84 FEB 6 1976

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. Cochran
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

January 13, 1976

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) JOSEPH WILLIAM MAGEE
BY AN SSC STAFF MEMBER

The following concerns an interview of Dr. Joseph William Magee, a former FBI SA who retired in 1965, by an SSC Staff Member.

On January 2, 1976, Magee advised this Bureau that on a Friday, about September 18, 1975, he was telephonically contacted by a Mike Epstein of the SSC who indicated a desire to talk to him immediately. Magee told Epstein that he was quite busy and would not be able to see him immediately. The only information Epstein gave as to the reason for wanting to interview Magee was to get information about the early organization of the FBI Laboratory. There followed some further telephone calls between the two but they never got together for an interview at that time. However, on December 29 or 30, 1975, Epstein again called Magee and asked Magee to appear at the SSC office for interview on January 6, 1976. The only information Epstein gave on this occasion as the subject matter of the interview was that it would be about the operations of the Bureau.

On January 2, 1976, the Legal Counsel Division of this Bureau determined from Epstein that the topic of interview of Magee would be FBI Laboratory procedures and practices and, in general, background information concerning FBI Laboratory operations. On the same date Magee was advised by this Bureau of Epstein's advice concerning the subject matter of the interview.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SFP:mjg
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

62-116395

ENCL

JAN 23

WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Special Agent (SA)
Joseph William Magee by an SSC Staff Member

Magee was released by this Bureau from his confidentiality agreement for purposes of the interview.

On January 7, 1976, Magee voluntarily furnished this Bureau the results of the interview which are as follows, not necessarily in chronological order.

Interview took place on January 6, 1976, and Epstein was the sole interrogator. The interview was very informal, most of which took place in a coffee shop in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, and it lasted little more than a half hour. Magee was not advised of his rights. The following subject matters were covered. Epstein inquired as to whether the FBI had had a drug program. Magee responded by asking if Epstein meant a program relating to the use of truth serum and Epstein responded in the affirmative. Magee told him that the FBI did not have such a program but that during the 25 years he had been with the Bureau, there may have been some very selected occasions when truth serum may have been used, but that he had no specific knowledge of such use. Magee further advised that he never knew of any FBI SA also being a medical doctor and that he did not believe that an SA would ever have injected anyone with a truth serum. Epstein voiced surprise that the FBI was not aggressive enough to have a truth serum program in connection with its use of the polygraph.

Epstein next inquired as to what the FBI did relative to vulnerability studies. Magee told him that he did not know what Epstein was talking about. Epstein elaborated by stating that in the 1960s, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allegedly conducted surveys such as spraying chemicals in a subway station to see if it could be sabotaged in this manner. Magee answered that he knew of no such type of activity by the FBI and did not think the FBI would ever engage in such activity.

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Special Agent (SA)
Joseph William Magee by an SSC Staff Member

Epstein inquired concerning the relationship between the FBI and CIA. Magee told him that he knew at one time the FBI had one man who was the liaison link with CIA, that person being former SA Sam Papich. Epstein wanted to know if meetings between Papich and the CIA were primarily for the FBI's benefit. Magee responded that he did not know much about the liaison arrangements and meetings but it was his belief that such meetings, as may have been held between FBI and CIA personnel, were designed for the mutual benefit of all parties and that he did not know of any meetings which were designed solely for the FBI's benefit.

Epstein inquired as to what the FBI did relative to certain gases, the exact type unrecalled by Magee in his report on this interview. Magee responded that some FBI SAs possess gas masks to be used for obvious reasons but that the FBI had no programs for use of gas.

Epstein asked Magee what he knew about Martin Luther King, Jr. and whether he, Magee, had ever heard any recordings concerning King. Magee said that he had not but that he understood that the FBI had recordings of King which were bona fide. Magee then told Epstein of his recollection of an obscure news story of an event in North Carolina a number of years ago when it was developed that some of King's associates had illegally sold a number of rental automobiles and that the news account indicated that no prosecution was authorized by the Department of Justice, possibly on the basis that the Department of Justice did not then want to disrupt the civil rights activities of King's associates.

NOTE:

Magee's report of the interview was telephonically furnished to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. Additional data herein taken from W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall memorandum 1/2/76, and Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memoranda 1/2,5/76.

[redacted] CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NO[redacted] SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
1/13/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting the results of an interview by SSC Staff Member of former SA Joseph William Magee.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating procedures
Information handing

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/3/00 BY SP2 AAM/EHC

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interviewed regarding the FBI Laboratory procedures and practices and about the FBI's use of truth serum.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-1323

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

January 13, 1976

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. R. G. Kinsey

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC, dated December 23, 1975, requesting all records, files, documents or other materials relating to Sam A. Jaffe.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum responding to the above request.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-4-81 BY 10320 PWK/KWS

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-51 62-116395-1322

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN 105-28333-
Delivered to Dept 1-12-76

EX 104

FEB 4 1976

3 ENCLOSURE

~~TOP~~ SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

1 - 105-28333 (Jaffe)

RGK:dmt
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 FEB 6 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. R. G. Kinsey

~~SECRET~~

62-116395

January 13, 1976

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL
ON 11/3/00

Reference is made to letter dated December 23, 1975, to the Department of Justice from Mr. John Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force for the Committee, requesting all records, files, documents or other materials relating to Sam A. Jaffe. (U)

This memorandum effects delivery of material in response to the December 23, 1975, request. Excepted from material being delivered is that furnished to the FBI by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State Office of Security, and certain foreign intelligence agencies. Information from CIA and the Department of State Office of Security has not been included under the third agency rule and a request for this information should be directed to them separately. (U)

References to Mr. Jaffe contained in other FBI files of which he is not the subject are not included in the above material, in accordance with the procedure agreed to by the House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (HSC) on October 22, 1975, when it requested similar material on Mr. Jaffe. On December 31, 1975, Mr. Robert Kelley, Staff Member, SSC, advised a representative of the FBI that receipt of copies of only that material furnished to the HSC would satisfy the SSC's request. (U)

Assoc. Dir. — 1 - The Attorney General

~~TOP~~ SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.: 1 - 105-28333 (Jaffe)

CL[illegible] 10320 RWK/KWS 9-4-81
[illegible] 2
DA[illegible] 1-13-96

Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs — File copy of material being delivered
Files & Com. — is contained in HSC file 62-116464
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection — RGK:dmt
Intell. — (10)
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

WPW/TM

WOC

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

PLM

JAM

RGK

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395 - 1322

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSC) ~~SECRET~~

NOTE: SECRET

Samuel Adason Jaffe was a symbol number informant of the New York Office from 1958 to 1961 and was later in contact with the Washington Field Office. During these periods of contact, Jaffe furnished information on his numerous contacts with Soviet and People's Republic of China officials, which were occasioned by his employment with ABC and CBS and with other news media. ~~S~~(U)

~~S~~(U) Following his identification by Soviet defector ["Sammy"] as having been recruited by the KGB while assigned to Moscow, Jaffe was extensively interviewed and advised that he believed he had been the subject of a recruitment approach but denied being a KGB agent. Our relations thereafter were conducted with caution in view of ["Sammy's"] allegations and he is not currently being contacted. ~~S~~(U)

Jaffe filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act in March, 1975, and subsequently appealed our denial of access to information concerning him as contained in our files. Jaffe has alleged that the FBI, or his association with the FBI, has prevented him from obtaining work in the news media field. This allegation is not supported by any material contained in his file. ~~S~~(U)

The material being furnished the Senate Committee represents all information contained in Jaffe's main file, with certain exceptions which are explained in the memorandum to the Committee. There are also some 200 to 250 references which are not being furnished following an agreement between Special Agent Paul V. Daly of the Legal Counsel Division and Mr. Robert Kelley of the SSC that it would be agreeable if we furnished the SSC the same material which was furnished to the HSC. ~~Classified by 4091, XGDS 2 and 3, Indefinite.~~ ~~S~~(U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/13/76

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC).
(SSC letter 12/23/75)
(Sam Jaffe)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: D. O. Cowden Date: 1/15/76

Received by: Joan T. Wilson

Title: Receptionist

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-8-82 BY 10320 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-1322 2

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
1/13/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/23/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

TS

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials furnished relating to Sam Jaffe.

[illegible]

1-8-82 10320 Pwk/fm

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395-1322

180-10226

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

January 13, 1976

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. Klein

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the December 18, 1975, SSC letter forwarded from the Department of Justice by letter dated December 22, 1975, containing requests for information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum which is responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

REC-51 62-116395-1320

62-116395

EX 104

FEB 4 1976

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

MDR 16

"ENCL [illegible] ROOM"

SK:klm
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-11-00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

5-

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

5-WDC

WRW/TAL

JAM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 FEB 6 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE:

The material prepared for delivery to the SSC represents a portion of that requested in SSC letter dated 12/18/75. The SSC desired the material at an early date, and we were expediting our review of files with regard to additional requests contained in the December 18, 1975, letter.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. Klein

62-116395

January 13, 1976

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the December 18, 1975, letter of the SSC as modified at a conference on December 30, 1975, between Messrs. W. O. Cregar and P. V. Daly of this Bureau and Committee Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mark Gitenstein.

This memorandum effects delivery of material in response to Items 1 (a), 1 (b), and 1 (e). The matters referred to are six FBI investigations about which the SSC was previously furnished materials relating to FBI preventive actions.

Concerning Item 1 (b), which requested the first investigative report or letterhead memorandum (LHM) disseminated by FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) outside the FBI in each case, and a list of recipients of that report or LHM, the following should be noted. On the administrative pages accompanying each of these reports or LHMs there are notations which identify those agencies which received copies of these documents.

Item 1 (e) requested annual reports or LHMs from the office of origin to FBIHQ for the last five years during which each case was an open (pending) investigation. In lieu of annual reports from San Francisco Field Office, which is office of origin for the over all investigation of the Black Panther Party (BPP) nationally, reports are being furnished from our Detroit Field Office in whose territory the activity of interest actually took place. It is also noted that during the early 1970s,

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

SK:klm
(9)

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED
ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

JAM
WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-1320

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

auxiliary offices (of which Detroit was one) were required to submit 90-day summary reports on BPP activities. In those cases no annual reports were submitted. It is for this reason that more than five reports are being furnished concerning Black Panther Party activities in Detroit.

Regarding information pertaining to the Richmond, Virginia, Chapter of the Black Panther Party, no annual reports are being furnished as the Richmond Field Office did not submit any reports or LHMs.

Regarding information pertaining to the discovery of a dynamite bomb in the United Nations Building in New York City, no annual reports are being furnished as none were submitted by the New York Field Office.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/13/76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
12/18/75 request Items 1a,b,e.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 1/13/76

Received by:

Title: Chief Mail Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-1320

2

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
1/13/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 12/18/75, items 1a,1b and 1e

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

C

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Reports and/or letterhead memoranda furnished relationg to six FBI investigations about which the SSC was previously furnished materials relatingto FBI preventive actions.

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00 BY SP2 ALM/TEH

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1320

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller

The Attorney General January 13, 1976

Director, FBI 62-116395-1319

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview of former FBI Special Agent J. Brooke Blake by an SSC Staff Member. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former SA J. Brooke Blake)

SJM:lhb lhb
(10)

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

JAM

2 ENCLOSURE

JAN 13 5 PM '76
RECEIVED

WRW/TUL

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

5 - WAP

84 FEB 27 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller

62-116395 January 13, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SPECIAL
AGENT (SA) J. BROOKE BLAKE BY AN
SSC STAFF MEMBER

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-11-00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

The following concerns an interview on November 21, 1975, of former FBI SA J. Brooke Blake by an SSC Staff Member.

The FBI released Mr. Blake from his confidentiality agreement for the purpose of the interview.

Mr. Blake's account of the interview follows:

"On November 21, 1975, I met Committee attorney-investigator Robert K. Kelley at Room G-308, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

"Kelley took me to Room 155 of the Russell Building, where he introduced a Committee contract court reporter, Fred Ward. The room contained many empty conference tables and chairs and is one used by senators' wives for some program they have with the Red Cross.

"Ward and Kelley were the only persons present throughout the deposition which was tape-recorded by Ward using the court reporter's transcribing equipment. The official deposition started at 2:07 p.m., and ended at 2:52 p.m. There was an approximate 4-minute interruption by a telephone call for Kelley, which I had to answer, and

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former SA J. Brooke Blake)

SJM:lhb lhb
(9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 6

JAM

WOC/TAL WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1319

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

then he politely asked me to leave the room. The informal way the deposition was taken surprised but didn't bother me. It could catch someone off guard if strong cross examination developed.

"Kelley informed me of my constitutional rights, the right to have a senator present and the right to request a senator and/or attorney at any time throughout the deposition. He had hinted while walking to the room of an interest in how Klan informants are developed and Bureau policy. He did not have a form on my rights or any form for me to sign. After his advisement, I advised him I had been briefed by the FBI only on procedure and the limitation of the waiver of oath as pertained to information only on Tom Rowe. He was informed I would not answer policy questions because I had been out eleven years and of the availability of the Bureau executives to answer those questions. He explained a notary would be waiting to notarize my deposition when we returned to Room G-308. I stated that I would only allow the oath she gave me to apply to the fact I was the person who gave the deposition. He agreed. The preliminary conversation and advisement of my rights was not recorded to my knowledge. Apparently he predicated the inquiry as the result of Rowe's testimony and to corroborate same. He made it clear Rowe was most complimentary to the Bureau and all Agents he knew.

"Set forth below are briefs of his questions and my answers: (He was using a statement or memo of about six pages which recorded testimony from Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA J. BROOKE BLAKE BY SSC

"Q - Manner of reporting from Informant Rowe?
A - He reported in person, in writing and by telephone depending on the urgency of the information. All information received from him was recorded in FBI files and disseminated to local, state and federal authorities on a need-to-know basis.

"Q - Instructions by me to Rowe as to what information he should report?
A - All information, with main interest in intelligence activities discussed by action groups.

"Q - My knowledge of any interest regarding an arrest record for Rowe?
A - None recalled nor did I ever recall seeing a rap sheet on him.

"Q - Any actions of violence which were planned which he reported to me and what was done with the information?
A - None recalled, only evidence recalled was a report of another Klansman carrying blasting caps on his person while at a Klan convention. This information was disseminated to fellow Agents on the scene with me surveilling the convention.

"Q - Rowe claimed that I had told him about the Bureau's activities in Cointel.
A - His statement had to be false because I had never heard of the code word until used recently in newspaper reports covering the Church Senate Subcommittee on Intelligence Activities.

"Q - Any directions I had given to Rowe to attend political campaigns and/or disrupt them?
A - Did not recall such.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA J. BROOKE BLAKE BY SSC

"Q - Knowledge of any Klan violence in which Rowe participated?
A - None recalled but explained that due to his personality he could not look like an angel.

"Q - Did I ever tell Rowe that the FBI had declared war on the Klan?
A - No, but elaborated he was well aware of the FBI's interest in solving the various bombings throughout Alabama.

"Q - My reaction to the fact that Rowe was a member of the Klan's Security Detail and one of Bobby Shelton's bodyguards?
A - Explained that the fact that he was elevated in the Klan's ranks was a concern of mine and the FBI's. We wanted him put where he would be able to furnish valuable information, but restrained him from rising to any executive position in the Klan.

"Q - Testimony that Rowe had given the Committee that there were certain Birmingham police officers who were involved with the Klan?
A - Because of the general possibilities, any information he furnished was disseminated only to certain known reliable police contacts. I pointed out to them the delicate nature of most of Rowe's information and the fact that it could not be disseminated by memorandum form to all department employees of any agency.

"Q - Another question regarding attendance at political meetings with the direction that Rowe persuade the Klan to take a certain position for candidates?
A - No such directions ever made.

"Q - What was the scope of Rowe's assignment as a Klan informant?
A - To obtain and report any or all intelligence information he could determine.

"Q - Any directions given Rowe about Matt Murphy, a candidate for police commissioner in Birmingham?
A - Was not at all familiar with Murphy other than hearing the name by Kelley who commented from his memorandum that the question pertained to something that occurred after I left the FBI.

"Q - When I was assigned to handle Rowe, what was my recollection of his reputation and value to the FBI?
A - That he was known to the Department of Justice and the FBI as the top Klan informant and that he was in the position to furnish vital information to the Government.

"Q - Any special instructions I recalled on how I was to handle him?
A - I was to maintain control over him and recognize that by his personality that if his control was not maintained that he was the type that would run off because of his enthusiasm and put his safety in jeopardy. He was also the type who would try to run the show if you let him.

"Q - Any recollections I had to the Mother's Day incident?
A - I had only heard of the incident, but was not with the Bureau in Birmingham.

"Q - Did I ever direct Rowe while he was in the homes of Klansmen to attempt to steer them to certain rooms in the house while they engaged in conversation?
A - No, and I commented that they rarely discussed anything of value in homes or Klan meeting halls, but did so in small action groups.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA J. BROOKE BLAKE BY SSC

"Q - A general question on the problem of handling a Klan informant as opposed to a criminal informant with Kelley setting an example of an informant in a bank robbery?

A - I did not see any particular difference from his example and that of a Klansman planning to bomb a building.

"These were the only questions I recorded in note form as he asked them. There may have been a few others, but none of any significance and Kelley appeared very cooperative and matter of fact throughout the deposition. Ward and Kelley escorted me back to Room G-308 where I was asked to swear to the deposition by a notary public, Audrey Hatry."

NOTE:

W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum 11/11/75 captioned "Senstudy 75" recommended releasing Blake from his confidentiality agreement for purposes of the interview, which was to be confined to Blake's handling of former informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. Mr. Blake's account of the interview was set out in his personal letter to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The letter was edited to omit comments irrelevant to the interview or of a personal nature.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	X	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

1/13/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former SA J. Brooke Blake

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHC

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interviewed regarding the handling of the informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.and Rowes participation in the Klan

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-md

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-1319

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Trust Company Bank

Bank Security

November 25, 1975

Special Agent Seymour Phillips
Federal Bureau of Investigation
506 Old Post Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20535

Senstudy

RE: Testimony before Senate Select
Committee on Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities
by J. Brooke Blake, November 21, 1975

Dear Mr. Phillips:

On November 21, 1975, I met Committee attorney-investigator, Robert K. Kelly at Room G-308, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. He suggested we have lunch in the building cafeteria. During those thirty minutes he spoke in generalities about the Committee's work and I was able to keep the conversation on a theme of my asking about his background and current activities. He did ask if I knew Roy Moore. He was informed I knew Roy in Birmingham and that he was one of a very few "trouble shooting" inspectors who traveled throughout the United States as agent in charge of major case investigations. He asked my opinion on why Roy and I answered my guess was his experience and ability to rally agents. I explained the latter as Roy Moore being the type boss for whom most agents enjoyed working.

~~Throughout lunch and~~ the deposition ~~Kelly~~ seemed infactuated ~~with informant~~, Tom Rowe.

EX-104 REC-51 62-116395-1319

Kelly took me to Room 155 of the Russell Building, where he introduced a Committee contract court reporter, Fred Ward. The room contained many empty conference tables and chairs and is one used by Senators' wives for some program they have with ~~the Red~~ Cross.

FEB 4 1976

Ward and Kelly were the only persons present throughout the deposition which was taperecorded, and by Ward using the ~~court~~ reporter's transcribing equipment. The official deposition started at 2:07 p.m. and ended at 2:52 p.m. (Kelly gave me the attached subpoena before being questioned.) There was an approximate 4 minute interruption by a telephone call for Kelly, which I had to answer, and then he politely asked me to leave the room. The informal way

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-11-00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

Trust Company of Georgia / P. O. Box 4418 / Atlanta, Georgia 30302 / (404) 588-8216

the deposition was taken surprised, but didn't bother me. It could catch someone off guard if strong cross examination developed.

"Kelly informed me of my constitutional rights, the right to have a senator present and the right to request a senator and/or attorney at any time throughout the deposition. He had hinted while walking to the room of an interest in how Klan informants are developed and Bureau policy. He did not have a form on my rights or any form for me to sign. After his advisement, I advised him I had been briefed by the FBI only on procedure and the limitation of the waiver of oath as pertained to information only on Tom Rowe. He was informed I would not answer policy questions because I had been out eleven years, and of the availability of the Bureau executives to answer those questions. He explained a notary would be waiting to notarize my deposition when we returned to Room G-308. I stated that I would only allow the oath she gave me to apply to the fact I was the person who gave the deposition. He agreed. The preliminary conversation and advisement of my rights was not recorded to my knowledge. Apparently he predicated the inquiry as the result of Rowe's testimony and to corroborate same. He made it clear Rowe was most complimentary to the Bureau and all agents he knew.

"Set forth below are briefs of his questions and my answers: (He was using a statement or memo of about six pages which recorded testimony from Rowe.)
Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.

Q - Manner of reporting from Informant Rowe?
A - He reported in person, in writing, and by telephone depending on the urgency of the information. All information received from him was recorded in FBI files and disseminated to local, state and federal authorities on a "need to know" basis.

Q - Instructions by me to Rowe as to what information he should report?
A - All information, with main interest in intelligence activities discussed by action groups.

Q - My knowledge of any interest regarding an arrest record for Rowe?
A - None recalled nor did I ever recall seeing a rap sheet on him.

Q - Any actions of violence which were planned which he reported to me and what was done with the information?
A - None recalled, only evidence recalled was a report of another Klansman carrying blasting caps on his person while at a Klan convention. This information was disseminated to fellow agents on the scene with me surveilling the convention.

Q - Rowe claimed that I had told him about the Bureau's activities in "Cointel"/
A - His statement had to be false because I had never heard of the code word until used recently in newspaper reports covering the Church Senate Subcommittee on intelligence activities.

Q - Any directions I had given to Rowe to attend political campaigns and/or disrupt them?
A - Did not recall such.

Q - Knowledge of any Klan violence in which Rowe participated?
A - None recalled but explained that due to his personality he could not look like an angel.

Q - Did I ever tell Rowe that the FBI had declared war on the Klan?
A - No, but elaborated he was well aware of the FBI's interest in solving the various bombings throughout Alabama.

Q - My reaction to the fact that Rowe was a member of the Klan's Security Detail and one of Bobby Shelton's bodyguards?
A - Explained that the fact that he was elevated in the Klan's ranks was a concern of mine and the FBI's. We wanted him put where he would be able to furnish valuable information, but restrained him from rising to any executive position in the Klan.

Q - Testimony that Rowe had given the Committee that there were certain Birmingham police officers who were involved with the Klan?
A - Because of the general possibilities, any information he furnished was disseminated only to certain known reliable police contacts. I pointed out to them the delicate nature of most of Rowe's information and the fact that it could not be disseminated by memo form to all department employees of any agency.

Q - Another question regarding attendance at political meetings with the direction that Rowe persuade the Klan to take a certain position for candidates?
A - No such directions ever made.

Q - What was the scope of Rowe's assignment as a Klan informant?
A - To obtain and report any or all intelligence information he could determine.

Q - Any directions given Rowe about Matt Murphy, a candidate for police commissioner in Birmingham?
A - Was not at all familiar with Murphy other than hearing the name by Kelly who commented from his memo that the question pertained to something that occurred after I left the FBI.

Q - When I was assigned to handle Rowe what was my recollection of his reputation and value to the FBI?
A - That he was known to the Department of Justice and the FBI as the top Klan informant and that he was in the position to furnish vital information to the government.

Q - Any special instructions I recalled on how I was to handle him?
A - I was to maintain control over him and recognize that by his personality that if his control was not maintained that he was the type that would run off because of his enthusiasm and put his safety in jeopardy. He was also the type who would try to run the show if you let him.

Q - Any recollections I had to the "Mother's Day" incident?
A - I had only heard of the incident, but was not with the Bureau in Birmingham.

Q - Did I ever direct Rowe while he was in the homes of Klansmen to attempt to steer them to certain rooms in the house while they engaged in conversation?
A - No and commented that they rarely discussed anything of value in homes or Klan meeting halls, but did so in small action groups.

Q - A general question on the problem of handling a Klan informant as opposed to a criminal informant with Kelly setting an example of an informant in a bank robbery?
A - I did not see any particular difference from his example and that of a Klansman planning to bomb a building.

These were the only questions I recorded in note form as he asked them. There may have been a few others, but none of any significance and Kelly appeared very cooperative and matter of fact throughout the deposition. Ward and Kelly escorted me back to Room G-308 where I was asked to swear to the deposition by a Notary Public, Audrey Hatry. I informed Kelly that I hoped this would be the last time I would see him on this matter and he responded he was "pretty sure it was".

Please express my appreciation of the manner in which the FBI helped me after I secured assistance, particularly the people in the Congressional Affairs and the staff in your division.

Yours very truly,

J. Brooke Blake

J. Brooke Blake
Second Vice President and
Director of Security

JBB:mcp

Copies to: Special Agent In Charge, James Dunn
A-5.1

2 - r. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General January 12, 1976

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 18, 1975, as modified during a conference on December 30, 1975, between Messrs. William O. Cregar and Paul V. Daly of this Bureau and SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mark Gitenstein.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which constitutes this Bureau's response to Item 4 of referenced letter.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

KAM:pal pal
(9)

REC-51 62-116395-1317

Delivered to Dept 1-13-76

FEB 4 1976

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00 BY SP2 ALM JHL

6 ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

5 - WO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 FEB 6 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - [redacted] J. A. Mintz
([redacted]- J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

62-116395

January 12, 1976

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00 BY SP2ALM/CHC

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 18, 1975, as modified during a conference on December 30, 1975, between Messrs. William O. Cregar and Paul V. Daly of this Bureau and SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mark Gitenstein.

Following modification, Item 4 requested the annual reports or letterhead memoranda from the office of origin to FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) submitted on those organizations which had been set forth under Item 4 of SSC letter dated October 28, 1975. The October 28, 1975, request listed 31 organizations under Item 4, numbered a through ee. Documents requested therein were submitted with this Bureau's response dated November 18, 1975.

During a conversation on January 2, 1976, between Special Agent Seymor Fred Phillips of the FBI and SSC Staff Member John Elliff, Mr. Elliff indicated documents requested under Item 4 of the modified December 18, 1975, letter need cover only the period 1960 to present.

A review of FBIHQ files pertaining to the 31 organizations of interest, along with a review of the documents furnished with our November 18, 1975, memorandum concerning these same organizations, reveals all pertinent documents were previously furnished with our November 18, 1975, memorandum with the exception of material pertaining to the following: Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs (ELF); Communist Infiltration of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (COMINFIL, NAACP); Black Student Union, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Nevada; and Greensboro Association of Poor People.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

KAM:pal
(9)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

5 AM KAM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Reports were submitted by various FBI field offices regarding the activities of the ELF and COMINFIL, NAACP, within the territory covered by each of these offices. In some instances, some of these offices listed themselves as office of origin. However, inasmuch as the national headquarters of these two organizations were located in New York City, FBIHQ considered the New York Office as the office of origin in the investigation of these organizations and documents submitted by the New York Office were utilized in response to your request.

Material concerning these four organizations has been prepared and is being delivered with this memorandum.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Material regarding ELF and COMINFIL, NAACP, reviewed in IS - 2 Section. Material regarding other two organizations reviewed by SA James Graham, IS - 1 Section. List of 31 organizations of interest attached for information.

extremist activity with respect to the following organizations whose names and FBIHQ file numbers were provided to the Select Committee on October 9, 1975:

a.	Communist Infiltration Council of Jewish Women	100-432543 ✓ OK 1
b.	East Bay Community Forum	100-432848 ✓ OK 1
c.	Knoxville Area Human Relations Council	100-433348 ✓ OK 1
d.	George Orwell Forum Yale University	100-434048 ✓ OK 1
e.	Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs	100-400394 ✓ OK 1-45
f.	Saugus Unitarian-Universalist Church Forum	100-440365 ✓ OK 1
g.	San Diego Peace Action	100-440530 ✓ OK 1
h.	Universities Committee on the Problems of War and Peace	100-440833 ✓ OK 1-2
		157-972
i.	Communist Infiltration of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	61-3176
		157-1074
j.	The Free University at Ann Arbor	100-445323 ✓ OK 1
k.	Champaign-Urbana Council for Discussion on Vietnam	100-446029 ✓ OK 1
l.	Wellsprings Ecumenical Renewal Association	100-453618 ✓ OK 1
m.	Black Student Union University of Nevada Las Vegas, Nevada	157-13994

- 2 -

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/1/00 BY SP2 AKM/EHL

- 3 -

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1317

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

m.	Northern Virginia Coalition of Citizens Concerned About the ABM-Sponsored Town Meeting at Alexandria, Virginia, June 3, 1969	100-454103 ✓ ok 1 [illegible]
n.	Reservists Against the War	100-469726 ✓ ok 1
o.	Bald Hill Farm Commune	100-472039 ✓ ok 1
p.	Anti-Crosstown Coalition	100-472814 ✓ ok 1
q.	Washington Area Committee for Soviet Jewry	100-480590 ✓ ok 1
r.	Committee for Chilean Democracy	100-481206 ✓ ok 1
s.	National Conference on Amnesty; Information Concerning	100-481516 ✓ ok 1
t.	National Conference on Amnesty; Information Concerning	100-481899 ✓ ok 1
u.	Council for United Civil Rights Leadership	157-972
v.	Canadian Youth Corps	157-1074
w.	Ormondsville Fellowship Club, Inc.	157-5281
x.	Black Student Union, Brevard Junior College, Cocoa, Florida	157-13416
y.	Martin Luther King, Jr., Memorial Center, Inc.	157-13791
z.	Black Student Union University of Nevada Las Vegas, Nevada	157-13994

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

aa.	Greensboro Association of Poor People (GAPP)	157-15692
bb.	American Christian Action Council	157-24293
cc.	National Tenants Organization	157-26335
dd.	South Carolina Council of Human Relations	157-27014
ee.	California Rehabilition Center, Norco, California	157-32882

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/12/76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

12/18/75 request, item 4

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: D. J. Coule Date: 1/15/76

Received by: Joan L Wilson

Title: Receptionist

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

...LOSURE

62-111-395-1317

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
1/12/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 12/18/75, items 4

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

C

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00 BY SP2AFM/EHC

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials furnished concerning Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs; Communist Infiltration of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Black Student Union, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Nevada; and Greensboro Association of Poor People.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-1317

182-10221

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

January 12, 1976

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. P. Finzel

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the SSC letter dated December 18, 1975, and to my memorandum and letterhead memorandum of December 24, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum responsive to Items 2 and 3 of the SSC letter of December 18. A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

REC-51

62-116395-1315

62-116395

FEB 4 1976

UNREC. COPY FILED IN

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-56866 (General Accounting Office (GAO) File)

RPF: vb
(12)

5 MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

NOTE:

The attached LHM is a response to that portion of the SSC request of 12/18/75, dealing with the GAO review and the 9/24/75, GAO interim report on FBI domestic intelligence investigations. GAO's final report expected originally late in 1975 will probably be issued in January, 1976.

Item 2 of the SSC letter asked for "any information which you have refuting the suggestion...of the General Accounting Office's September 24 report to the House Judiciary Committee, that cases in which violence can be predicted probably represent less than 2 percent of all FBI domestic intelligence investigations."

NOTE CONTINUED - OVER

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 FEB 6 1976

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

Item 3 asked the FBI to "provide all memoranda or analyses prepared for the Justice Department, Director Kelley, or Assistant Director Wannall on the findings of the General Accounting Office as presented to the House Judiciary Committee on September 24."

Referenced memorandum and LHM dated 12/24/75, were prepared as an initial response to the SSC. In this letter, the Bureau pointed out that extensive file reviews would be necessary to respond to most of the SSC requests: however, in it we stated a response to Items 2 and 3 would be forthcoming as soon as possible.

Copy of the 12/18/75 request attached.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHU

62-116395

January 12, 1976

1 - Mr. R. P. Finzel

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM SENATORS
MONDALE AND BAKER

On December 22, 1975, the FBI received a copy of a letter dated December 18, 1975, which Senators Mondale and Baker sent to the Attorney General levying certain requirements on the FBI with a request that the responses be provided the SSC during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

Item 2 contained a request for any information refuting the suggestion made on page 34 of the General Accounting Office's September 24 report to the House Judiciary Committee, that cases in which violence can be predicted probably represent less than two percent of all FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

Page 34 of the September 24, 1975, report of the Comptroller General before the House Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights concerning FBI domestic intelligence operations contains the following statement: "There were only 12 instances--or less than 2 percent--in which the FBI obtained advanced (sic) knowledge of planned activities on the part of a subversive or extremist group or individual." This statement appears, both in form and content, to be somewhat different from that contained in your letter of December 18. One can predict violence when leaders of an organization express an intention to resort to violent means to attain some end, when they further that intention by obtaining weapons and ammunition, and train and exhort their members and followers to take violent action. That, however, is not analogous to the situation where an informant or source is in a position to furnish the FBI advance information with regard to some specific violent action to be taken by members of an extremist or subversive group.

1 - 62-56866 (General Accounting Office (GAO) file)

RPF:vb (11)

ENCLOSURE 62-116395 - 1315

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

The FBI is very reluctant to draw any conclusions from these General Accounting Office's statistics, and we maintain no records or statistics which would either refute or substantiate the inferences which you apparently draw from their interim report. The two percent may represent hundreds of citizens' lives and thousands of dollars in potential property damage. It may only represent one life - a policeman, a citizen, perhaps a President or public official. How does one measure the value of this type of information? Surely not solely in terms of percentages.

You should perhaps consider the base from which the General Accounting Office apparently drew their statistics. Their interim report was based on their review of 676 FBI domestic intelligence cases under investigation during Calendar Year 1974, in ten varied U. S. cities. Over 50 percent of these 676 cases were admittedly only preliminary inquiries. These were limited investigations designed primarily to fully identify the subject through established sources and to ascertain whether that subject was in fact associated with an extremist group or organization, or was likely to engage in violence himself. That little advance information of planned violence evolved from these limited investigations is not surprising. Most of the information concerning planned violence would normally come from well-established informants in groups and would not likely show up in these individual case files.

Also, had the General Accounting Office used as its base the years of greater incidence of domestic violence, such as 1967-72, the figures might have been appreciably different.

Item 3 was a request for any analyses of the General Accounting Office's September 24, 1975, report.

The FBI has not prepared any analytical memoranda or any analyses of the preliminary findings of the General Accounting Office as presented to the House Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights on September 24, 1975.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

The General Accounting Office report of September 24 was an interim report hurriedly prepared to respond to a congressional request. Neither the FBI nor the Department of Justice was afforded the opportunity to review this report for substance or to have comments included prior to its delivery to the Congressional Committee.

The General Accounting Office originally planned to submit its final report in November or December, 1975; it is now expected in January, 1976. The final General Accounting Office report will include findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on a review of the full 900 domestic intelligence case sampling and a voluminous amount of additional material. The FBI and the Department of Justice have been assured of the right to review this report prior to its issuance and to have comments included where appropriate. Any FBI analyses will be conducted after receipt of the General Accounting Office's final report.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/12/76

Caption of Document: Re let 12/18/75 from Senators Mondale and Baker. Response to Items 2 & 3.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 1/15/76

Received by: Joan L. Wilson

Title: Receptionist

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/11/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-1315

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

DEC 22 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M.G

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committe Request

Attached is a letter dated December 18, 1975, from the Senate Select Committee requesting certain information from the Bureau. The Attorney General has personally expressed to me his interest in the need that the requested materials be furnished on a priority basis. Please prepare an appropriate and prompt response.

LHM to SSC
1-AG
RPF:vb ~~12/31/75~~ 1/6/76

Received 3:45pm
12/22/75
wob.

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

cc: Paul Daly

Ltr to AG (Encl 3-2)
1-Deputy AG
RPF:vb ~~12/31/75~~ 1/6/76

1-AG Hbc
12-22-75

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1315

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. [illegible]EIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United Sta[illegible]s Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 18, 1975

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/00 BY SP8 ALM/EHL

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain to both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

SECRET

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1315

provided during the last week of December and the first week of January:

1. With respect to each of the examples of effective prevention of violence provided the Committee pursuant to John Elliff's letter of November 26 to Mr. Shaheen, please provide access to materials in the investigative file for the 6-month period preceding the act of violence prevented. Please deliver:

Deegan

(a) All materials relating to the legal and factual predicate for each investigation;

(b) The first investigative report disseminated outside the FBI in each such case, and a list of recipients of that report;

(c) The total number of individuals whose names were referred to the FBI's general name index in the course of each investigation;

(d) The total number of individuals about whom information was obtained through informants, confidential sources, physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and other sensitive techniques; and

(e) The annual report from the office of origin for each such investigation to FBI headquarters for the last five years during which the case in question was an open investigation.

[illegible]

2. Please provide any information which you have refuting the suggestion made on page 34 of the General Accounting Office's September 24 report to the House Judiciary Committee, that cases in which violence can be predicted probably represent less than 2% of all FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

[illegible]

3. Please provide all memoranda or analyses prepared for the Justice Department, Director Kelley, or Assistant Director Wannall on the findings of the General Accounting Office as presented to the House Judiciary Committee on September 24.

4. Please provide the annual report from the office of origin to FBI headquarters for the investigation of

SECRET

Adam

Dr. Martin Luther King in 1963 through 1968, and for the investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that that organization was under investigation, and the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28.

Ryan

5. Please provide specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV on "preventive action" of the draft Department of Justice's guidelines on "domestic security investigations."

6. Access to all FBI materials pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor People's Campaign, and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1 through April 4, 1968.

7. All materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this request. We look forward to continuing cooperation on this area of joint concern.

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale
Walter F. Mondale
Chairman

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Vice-Chairman

SECRET

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

1/12/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/18/75, items 2 and 3

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/4/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Information furnished relating to the General Accounting Office's 9/24/75 report to the House Judiciary Committee relating to cases in which violence can be predicted and for any analyses of the report.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1315

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 9/18/75

1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. R. P. Finzel

FROM : F. J. Cassidy

SUBJECT: GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO)
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

Attached is one draft copy of testimony to be delivered on Wednesday morning, 9/24/75, by the Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats, before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights, chaired by Congressman Don Edwards of California. Attachment consists of a 16-page opening statement, supplemented by appendixes, containing: 1) a statement setting forth GAO's verification proposal; 2) correspondence among GAO, House Judiciary Chairman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., and Attorney General Levi, concerning GAO's verification proposal; 3) a statement entitled, "FBI's Domestic Operations--A Perspective," outlining the fundamental authority for FBI operations, Bureau administrative structure and procedures, as well as statistical data on security investigations between 1965 and 1975; and 4) a 33-page analysis of the legal authority for FBI domestic intelligence operations.

GAO offered us an advance copy of Mr. Staats' testimony with the proviso that it would accept FBI suggestions and minor corrections but would not make any substantive alterations in the draft. We have reviewed the draft, and GAO has made some technical changes at our suggestion. From a substantive viewpoint, while we take exception to GAO's phraseology in certain instances, as well as to certain factual conclusions and inferences, our overall reading of this material is that it represents an effort on GAO's part to present an objective picture of FBI operations.

In his prepared statement, Mr. Staats will offer the following conclusions and observations:

EX-105 REC-6

1. GAO's sampling of FBI cases "...provide a good overall picture of what the FBI is doing in the domestic intelligence area."

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/11/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

Enclosure
62-56866
AFW: vb (19)

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5

70 OCT 22 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

ENCLOSURE

2. GAO's staff which reviewed FBI-prepared case summaries concluded that the use of summaries, supplemented by follow-up interviews with FBI Special Agents, provided "...a good understanding of what occurred in each investigation."

3. Because GAO's verification proposal was not adopted, it was unable to provide Congress with full assurance of the accuracy and completeness of summary information that the FBI provided.

4. The legal authority upon which FBI domestic intelligence operations are based is ambiguous, and it would be appropriate for Congress to specify such authority.

5. Legislation specifying FBI authority in the domestic security area should address the issue of what role GAO should play in assisting the Congress to carry out its oversight function.

The material described above comprises GAO's opening testimony for the morning of 9/24/75. GAO has indicated that it will furnish the FBI material prepared for delivery in the afternoon on that date when it is completed. We expect that GAO's afternoon testimony will be considerably more detailed and that the draft submitted to us will be more critical of FBI domestic intelligence policies and practices. We will evaluate this material upon receipt.

ACTION:

None. For information of the Director.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 9/19/75

1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. R. P. Finzel

FROM : F. J. Cassidy

SUBJECT: GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-1-00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Reference INTD memo, dated 9/18/75, captioned as above, concerning congressional testimony on FBI domestic security intelligence investigations to be delivered on Wednesday morning, 9/24/75, by Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats.

Attached is draft copy of testimony prepared by GAO's staff for delivery by Mr. Staats on Wednesday afternoon, 9/24/75. As was the case with the draft of Mr. Staats' morning testimony, GAO has furnished this document with the understanding that it would entertain suggestions for minor corrections but would not make substantive alterations. We have been informed that the attachment was prepared under an exceedingly short deadline. Hasty preparation is evident from our preliminary evaluation, and, although the draft is critical of certain aspects of our domestic security intelligence investigations, we do not consider this document to be an articulate or incisive statement.

Nevertheless, the draft does raise issues which may be the subject of follow-up inquiry, particularly with reference to investigative sources and techniques. Under the subheading "Sources and Techniques Used During an Investigation," on pages 8, 9, and 10, reference is made to the use of school and telephone company employees as confidential sources, access to postal and passport records, pretext interviews, COINTELPRO-type activity, and surreptitious entries in cases reviewed by GAO. In addition, reference is made at the bottom of page 9 to information derived from electronic surveillance coverage which appeared in cases reviewed by GAO. However, GAO's testimony fails to indicate that the information referred to was completely derived from overhears. Consequently, the testimony may create an erroneous impression with respect to the use of electronic surveillances in these cases. We are working with GAO to have the draft altered to avoid misinterpretation with respect to the use of electronic surveillances.

1 - ENCLOSURE

62-56866-5

REC-57

Enclosure
62-56866
AFW: vb (19)

15 OCT 2 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. ~~Its use is limited to~~ official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

In his afternoon testimony, Mr. Staats will make the following observations and recommendations:

1. Few would deny the necessity for the FBI to conduct domestic security intelligence investigations, but there should be clearer guidelines governing their purpose and scope.

2. The Office of the Deputy Attorney General should be charged with the responsibility for ensuring that the FBI complies with guidelines which might be issued by the Attorney General rather than diffusing this responsibility among various divisions of the Department of Justice.

3. As suggested by the Rockefeller Commission, there should be a mechanism created either in the FBI or in the Department of Justice to evaluate and analyze the results of the FBI's domestic security intelligence investigations.

4. Although only 16 of the 676 cases reviewed by GAO (3 percent) were referred to a United States Attorney for prosecutive opinion, in 43 percent of the cases (291), the FBI was able to establish that the subject was a leader or a member of a subversive organization or was prone to violence.

5. FBI field offices are not fully consistent in the manner in which they conduct preliminary inquiries and frequently do not conclude the inquiry within the allotted 90 days.

FBIHQ personnel are continuing to review the attachment, and we anticipate consulting with GAO's staff on Monday morning, 9/22/75, to discuss any changes deemed necessary.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-AD Adm.
Dep.-AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 9/25/75

FROM : F. J. Cassidy

SUBJECT: GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. R. P. Finzel

On Wednesday, 9/24/75, Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats testified in public session before the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights of House Committee on the Judiciary. His testimony, and that of several assisting GAO officials, was based on their preliminary review of the FBI's domestic intelligence operations.

A copy of Mr. Staats' revised prepared testimony is attached.

The Committee convened in Room 2141 of the House Office Building (Rayburn Building) at 9:23 a.m. Mr. Staats read his prepared testimony and answered some questions until approximately 12:25 p.m. The Committee reconvened for questioning at 1:52 p.m., and adjourned at 3:03 p.m.

Subcommittee members present were:

Don Edwards, California, Presiding
Robert F. Drinan, Massachusetts
Herman Badillo, New York
M. Caldwell Butler, Virginia
Thomas N. Kindness, Ohio
Christopher J. Dodd, Connecticut

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ST 109
REC 12 62-56866-596

Congressman John F. Seiberling of Ohio was absent and Congressman Kindness was present only until 11:00 a.m., and did not return for the afternoon session.

OCT 3 1975

In addition to Mr. Staats, approximately ten other GAO representatives were present, some of whom responded to Congressional questions on specific points of the GAO audit. Aside from the rather large GAO contingent, their wives and friends, there was sparse public attendance and most of the seats in the hearing room were empty. There was limited coverage by press and TV news cameramen, half of whom departed after the morning session.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure
62-56866
RPF:vb (23)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-105

Verification

The Comptroller General read from his prepared testimony and was interrupted occasionally for questions. The initial pertinent comments and questions by Chairman Don Edwards were directed at eliciting a statement from Staats that the denial of direct access to FBI files for the purpose of independent verification was unique in GAO's audit history and that, because of this, GAO was unable to completely assure Congress as to the accuracy of their survey. GAO indicated they still felt that they had valid audit. They were afforded the opportunity to interview FBI officials and case Agents and had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the summaries. They were not impuning the motives of the FBI or the Attorney General in denying access; they understood the principle involved, but insisted that verification was necessary. Mr. Edwards mentioned the House may subpoena the necessary FBI files to permit verification. Mr. Fogel of GAO replied that GAO would prefer the files on which summaries were prepared be shipped to FBI Headquarters where the GAO could conduct their random verification proposal.

GAO strenuously disagreed with Attorney General's opinion that GAO's audit authority was limited to access for the purposes of conducting financial audits and Congressman Edwards was critical of the Attorney General's failure to correspond with Congress subsequent to 6/25/75.

FBI-Prepared File Summaries

Mr. Staats stated that GAO's testimony and preliminary review was based on 676 FBI case summaries in the Subversive and/or Extremist field out of a projected 899 from 10 FBI field offices. In response to specific questions from Mr. Drinan, he and Mr. Richard Fogel, GAO, indicated that GAO had received more than the 676 summaries (they had received as of 9/24, 852 out of 899), but that in order to prepare for testimony, their analysis was based on the 676. Drinan attempted to establish that the FBI was delaying or dragging its feet in providing the other summaries. GAO replied that most FBI field offices have been extremely cooperative in the time-consuming job of preparing summaries. (GAO did not identify publicly the FBI office which they did not consider completely cooperative--Springfield. Because of manpower limitations and other case demands on Springfield, this

CONTINUED - OVER

office has completed only 68 out of a projected 90 summaries. Springfield has indicated they will make every effort to complete all 90 summaries not later than mid-October.)

Legal Authority

GAO testified that the FBI did have legal authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations, but that this authority was in definite need of clarification, as its basis is in some instances shrouded in ambiguity.

Miss Geraldine Rubar of the GAO Legal Office discussed with precision the Presidential Directives, the 1936 Hoover memoranda and the various statutes conferring authority. Mr. Drinan loudly stated his opinion that the FBI was operating for forty years in this field without legal authority and asked to be shown where the term "extremists" appeared in any Presidential Directives or statutes. Miss Rubar replied that the term was not in vogue at the time but that it was used by Attorney General Ramsey Clark in a 1967 memorandum to the FBI when he ordered intensified investigation and coverage in the area of black nationalist groups and extremists.

Mr. Drinan repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, attempted to get Miss Rubar to state the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction in the Subversive and Extremist field even to the point of inquiring if even one of GAO's staff attorneys had perhaps reached that minority opinion. Miss Rubar replied that there was agreement among GAO's legal staff that the jurisdiction was there but was in need of clarification and updating.

Initiating Investigations

Mr. Staats testified that, from GAO's reading of the FBI Manual, there was a degree of vagueness as to the type and amount of evidence needed to open an FBI investigation in the Extremist and Subversive field. GAO arbitrarily categorized cases into those opened on the basis of hard, medium or a soft degree of evidence and said 36 percent of the 676 cases reviewed were opened on a "soft degree" of evidence.

CONTINUED - OVER

Congressmen Dodd, Drinan and Badello expressed specific interest in the "soft" area. In response to their queries, GAO Auditor Fogel listed several instances where, based on summaries, GAO believed the opening of preliminary inquiries by the FBI field offices was subject to question. Among these were:

1. An instance where cases were opened on two individuals on information provided the FBI by local police that two high school youths were present in the courtroom at a trial of an extremist. (There was no indication by GAO in their testimony as to whether the police had identified these individuals as high school youths, or whether the preliminary inquiries conducted by the FBI so identified them.)

2. An instance where the FBI opened a case on a husband and wife on the basis of having seen their license plate outside the home of a New Left functionary where a social party was in progress. (Again, there was no indication by GAO in the testimony as to whether the FBI knew it was a social party at the time the preliminaries were opened or determined this subsequently.)

3. A case was opened on an individual who expressed an interest in applying for membership in a group considered extremist or subversive by the FBI.

4. A case was opened on an individual who telephoned a member of an extremist group.

5. A case was opened on a person who parked his car outside a convention of a subversive/extremist organization.

6. A case was opened as a result of a mail cover on an individual who corresponded with a national officer of a black extremist organization.

7. A case was opened on an individual who attended a meeting of the press committee of a subversive organization.

CONTINUED - OVER

All of the above were enumerated as examples of FBI field office exercising judgment and discretion in opening cases based on "soft" evidence. Congressman Badillo took loud exception to this and said he saw no basis for opening cases in any of these instances and referred to them as "no basis" cases rather than soft.

GAO advised they were not prepared to make a positive recommendation on these cases (36 percent) at this time but, in their final report, they would address this issue. GAO indicated it could be an area where the FBI might review and more carefully define criteria.

Organizations

Congressman Drinan took exception to the use of terms in the FBI Manuals, such as extremists and black and white hate groups. He stated these are basically people pursuing their goal of racial justice. He then asked for GAO to list some of these organizations which the FBI characterized as "Extremist." Mr. Fogel then named the following:

The Ku Klux Klan
The Minuteman
The American Nazi Party
The Black Panther Party
The Nation of Islam

Mr. Drinan made no further comment on this subject.

Preliminary Inquiries

GAO pointed out that 73 percent of the preliminary inquiries received went beyond the 90-day FBI Manual limitation and that in 68 percent of these cases, FBIHQ was not advised and had no opportunity to review or possibly terminate the investigation. Congressmen Dodd and Drinan claimed the FBI was, therefore, not following its own rules. GAO offered no explanations as to why field offices might go over the 90-day limit, such as matters requiring special investigative effort and attention, such as the bombing cases, Hearst case, Pine Ridge Indian case, which affected offices under audit.

CONTINUED - OVER

Programs, Sources and Techniques

GAO enumerated the programs, investigative aids, sources, and the techniques utilized in FBI investigations. For the most part, these elicited no abnormal interest, but it was apparent the Committee will follow this subject in GAO's final report and in the event any FBI officials are invited to testify, they will be subject to intensive questioning on COINTELPRO, surreptitious entry, and mail openings.

Regarding sources, Drinan critically referred to "the Army of informants" and wanted numbers and payment figures which GAO could not supply. Drinan also expressed interest in Counterintelligence (Espionage) Matters which GAO declined to discuss and stated it was not a part of their mandate to review those matters.

Miscellaneous

The Committee inquired as to why the FBI was unable to provide more precise accounting figures on time and resources devoted to specific areas. Mr. Staats advised that in his experience with other agencies, the FBI's position was unusual; but that it was an organization which required flexibility and SACs had to be able to shift resources on a short notice. He indicated there apparently had been no prior need in the FBI for the modern management accounting system, but that one was now under development.

GAO witnesses followed the prepared text with respect to Departmental guidance, Attorney General's guidelines, dissemination of information, file maintenance and destruction, the Rockefeller Commission's recommendation for the development of an analytical capability for domestic intelligence matters.

In the opinion of the writer, the tone of questions and statements of Messrs. Drinan and Badillo were very critical of the FBI, and on occasion that of Mr. Dodd's. These Congressmen repeatedly attempted to put words in the Comptroller General's mouth and to twist his statements to their own liking. Basically, Mr. Staats and the GAO witnesses stuck to their prepared statement and their amplification was in basic support of this statement.

CONTINUED - OVER

In particular, these critics attempted to get Mr. Staats to state that, in view of the few statistics pointing toward prosecution and conviction, that the FBI's investigative effort in the domestic intelligence field was a waste of taxpayers' money. Mr. Staats refused to so state and indicated that the cost effectiveness of FBI coverage and penetration of subversive and extremist groups was very difficult to measure. He said one could not tell how much violence was deterred by FBI coverage or the knowledge on the part of subversives and extremist leaders that their identities were known and activities were under FBI scrutiny.

News media coverage diminished by more than half after the noon recess. The writer overheard one media reporter state to a TV technician they had the option of returning to cover the afternoon session, but they were not because "it was another Drinan circus."

The Committee thanked Mr. Staats and GAO for their "excellent" report and indicated they anticipated receipt of the completed written report in November, 1975.

ACTION:

None. For information.

RPK

January 12, 1976

Honorable Mike Mansfield
Majority Leader of the Senate
Room S-208
The Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20510

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/30/82 BY SP4 ELW/RTC

Dear Senator Mansfield:

You will recall that by letter dated January 27, 1975, you and Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott requested that the FBI not destroy or otherwise dispose of material relevant to the subjects of inquiry by the Senate Select Committee.

Please find enclosed a copy of a letter which I have addressed to Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, suggesting what, I hope, is a reasonable modification of our total moratorium on file destruction.

Please accept my assurance of continued cooperation in all matters of mutual interest.

Sincerely yours,

~~JAN 30 1976~~

Clarence L. Kelley
Director

Enclosure

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Wannall

JJMcD:jmr
(7)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-3286-1161

1/14/76 Delivered. RJ

JEM

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
191

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

62-116395

January 12, 1976

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the testimony of FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley before the SSC on December 10, 1975. During this testimony, certain questions arose on which answers were deferred. Set forth hereinafter are the unanswered questions along with the responses thereto.

Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., inquired as to Director Kelley's feeling concerning an Inspector General concept extending Governmentwide. Senator Baker asked the Director to think about the question and furnish his thoughts at a later date. Upon reflection and consideration of the question, Director Kelley has decided it would be inappropriate for him, as Director of the FBI, to comment concerning the need for a national Inspector General as it would affect any agency other than the FBI.

Senator Gary Hart stated that although higher authorities had been alerted to the existence of Counterintelligence Programs (COINTELPROS) in one or two instances, in terms of the bulk of the Programs there was no systematic information flowing upward through the chain of command to former Director Hoover's superiors. Specifically, Senator Hart indicated the SSC had received testimony that the existence of the COINTELPRO effort against the New Left had not been made known to higher authorities and asked if Director Kelley had any information in this regard. Director Kelley asked for an opportunity to substantiate the notification provided by former Director Hoover to higher authorities.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

AJD:mjg mjg
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE NINE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395 - 1314

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

While no systematic report was made on a regular basis by former Director Hoover regarding COINTELPRO activities, information regarding the COINTELPROS was periodically provided to his superiors in the Executive and Legislative Branches. FBI files contain considerable documentation clearly establishing no effort was made by Director Hoover to conceal from superior authorities the fact the FBI was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against revolutionary and violence-prone groups. This documentation is as follows:

1. Briefing of the President. On November 6, 1958, Director Hoover presented to President Dwight Eisenhower and the Cabinet an oral briefing entitled "Current Communist Subversion and Espionage in the United States, 1958." Included in the presentation material was a description of the Bureau's effort to "intensify any confusion and dissatisfaction among its (Communist Party, USA) members." Use of informants was cited as a technique to further this goal. This particular effort was referred to as one of several programs to counteract resurgence of Communist Party influence in the United States. In November, 1974, former Assistant to the Director Cartha D. DeLoach advised he recalled very clearly briefing President Lyndon B. Johnson regarding the Bureau's activities against black militants.

2. Notification of White House. In 1958, a letter was sent to Presidential Aide Robert Cutler at the White House specifically advising that our COINTELPRO directed against the Communist Party had been initiated in August, 1956, and citing examples of techniques utilized. In 1965, a letter was directed to Presidential Aide Marvin Watson at the White House advising him this Bureau was seizing every opportunity to disrupt the Klan.

3. Notification of Secretary of State. In 1961, a letter enclosing a memorandum setting forth examples of COINTELPRO actions directed against the Communist Party was sent to Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

4. Notification of Attorneys General. A letter was directed to Attorney General William Rogers in 1958 specifically advising him our COINTELPRO had been initiated against the Communist Party in August, 1956, and citing examples of techniques utilized. In 1961, a letter was directed to Attorney General Robert Kennedy enclosing a memorandum citing examples of COINTELPRO actions directed against the Communist Party. In 1965, a letter was sent to Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach advising him the FBI was seizing every opportunity to disrupt the Ku Klux Klan. Attorney General Ramsey Clark was furnished, in 1967, a letter which enclosed a detailed memorandum outlining our efforts to neutralize and disrupt the Ku Klux Klan. In September, 1969, Attorney General John Mitchell was advised of our efforts to disrupt the Klan. Additionally, former Assistant to the Director DeLoach advised in November, 1974, he had briefed former Attorney General Ramsey Clark regarding the various COINTELPROS and he also expressed the opinion that former Assistant to the Director Alan H. Belmont or former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had briefed Attorney General Katzenbach.

5. Notification of Congress. Bureau files reveal that detailed information concerning the COINTELPROS was prepared for off-the-record use by former Director Hoover in connection with several appearances before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations. Material concerning the COINTELPROS was prepared for the Director's use in connection with Appropriations testimony for the fiscal years 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1963, 1966 and 1967. All this material was clearly marked for off-the-record discussion. Published transcripts of hearings by the House Subcommittee on Appropriations contain notations that on at least six occasions between 1958 and 1966, off-the-record discussions took place at those points in Mr. Hoover's prepared remarks dealing with the COINTELPROS. Former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr advised in November, 1974, he recalled the Director on several occasions had furnished details to the House Subcommittee on Appropriations relating to FBI COINTELPROS. In November, 1974, Assistant to the Director Nicholas P. Callahan advised he, too, recalled several instances involving off-the-record discussion

by the Director with members of the House Subcommittee regarding this Bureau's efforts to neutralize groups and organizations involved and that there was no critical comment made in regard thereto.

An FBI Headquarters supervisor who was assigned responsibility for COINTELPRO matters during the period 1964 to 1967 recalls that on a number of occasions he was required to prepare informal memoranda and summaries relating to COINTELPRO actions. It was his understanding this material was to be utilized by Director Hoover in connection with briefings of various Government officials.

A review of FBI files has not located any document indicating higher authority was formally advised of the existence of the COINTELPRO effort directed against revolutionary New Left elements. It should be pointed out the program that targeted the New Left was only in existence during the period 1968 to 1971 (35 months) and only 285 actions were approved, which represent approximately 12 percent of all actions approved in the basic COINTELPROS. Additionally, during the time period of the New Left program this Bureau was engaged in extensive reporting and dissemination of information relating to activities and violence perpetrated by revolutionary elements, including the so-called New Left.

The Chairman, Senator Frank Church, inquired as to how much time and money is being spent by the FBI in conducting investigations on possible Presidential appointments to Federal offices, plus any other information which would indicate what proportion of the FBI's time and effort was absorbed in this kind of activity. Senator Church also asked the Director to supply the number of such investigations conducted each year beginning with 1970 and also information as to what offices are now covered by such investigations.

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

The FBI conducts investigations under the Federal Employee Security Program pursuant to Executive Orders 10450 and 10422. Executive Order 10450 became effective May 28, 1953, and sets forth security requirements for employment in the Executive Branch. The purpose of the Federal Employee Security Program is to insure that the employment and retention in employment of any civilian in the Executive Branch is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

At the request of the White House, investigations are conducted concerning Presidential appointees and White House personnel. At the request of Cabinet officers, investigations are conducted concerning certain personnel.

Upon request, investigations are conducted concerning staff personnel of seven Congressional Committees. These are handled by agreement with the Department of Justice and include:

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Senate Committee on Judiciary
House Committee on Judiciary
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Senate Appropriations Committee
House Appropriations Committee
Senate Armed Services Committee

At the request of the Department of Justice, investigations are conducted concerning Departmental Applicants for Presidential appointments and professional positions such as Federal Judges, United States Attorneys, and other legal positions. In addition, investigations are conducted for the Administrative Office of the United States Courts concerning applicants for the positions of United States Magistrate, Federal Public Defender, Referee in Bankruptcy, Federal Court Executive, and Probation Officer. Also investigations are conducted concerning persons who have applied for pardons after completion of sentences upon being convicted of felonies in the United States District Courts.

Investigations are also conducted of personnel who have sensitive positions with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission).

In connection with all of these investigations, we report the facts developed and furnish the results to the requesting agency without any comment or recommendation or any evaluation of the facts developed.

The costs involved concerning investigations on behalf of the White House, Congressional Staff Committees, Department of Justice, and Applications for Pardon After Completion of Sentence, as well as cases referred to the FBI under various public laws, are included in the overall FBI budget. In all other investigations charges are made. The current rates for these charges, which became effective on October 12, 1975, are listed below. For Fiscal Year 1975, expenditures for these investigations amounted to approximately $6,760,000 of which slightly over $3,000,000 was reimbursed from other agencies. It is to be noted the costs of these investigations fluctuate from year to year dependent upon changes in salary, travel, and other expenses.

Atomic Energy Commission Investigation:* *Name changed eff. 1/20/75	New rates eff. 10/12/75 $ 834.00
Energy Research and Development Administration Nuclear Regulatory Commission Library of Congress	
Full-Field Loyalty Investigations:	2,117.00
Civil Service Commission (United Nations Personnel) State Department (Ambassadorial and Ministerial Appointees) All Agencies (Administration Appointees)	

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Preliminary Inquiries: 410.00

Civil Service Commission (CSC)
(United Nations Personnel)

There follows a tabulation listing the number of investigations conducted by the FBI for other Government agencies for the period from Fiscal Year 1970 through Fiscal Year 1975.

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Federal Employees Security Program-Executive Order 10450	1235	1296	993	985	943	591
United Nations Loyalty Program-Executive Order 10422	36	31	31	31	8	14
Referrals from CSC under various public laws	339	242	196	160	95	68
Energy Research and Development Administration/Nuclear Regulatory Commission (ERDA/NRC) (formerly Atomic Energy Commission)	1648	1529	1615	2083	1982	2346
Reinvestigation Program of ERDA/NRC	348	553	485	467	381	203
Departmental Applicant/U. S. Courts Applicant	4737	4964	5835	3576	1492	1224

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Special Inquiry						
a. White House and Executive Branch	892	888	1218	979	1127	1163
b. Congressional Committees	87	110	76	98	84	259
Maintenance Employees	724	775	500	767	996	947
Total	10046	10388	10949	9146	7108	6815

In early 1975, at the request of the SSC and the House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (HSC), we began conducting applicant-type investigations of personnel assigned to these committees and also of applicants for positions with these committees. Through January 6, 1976, we have conducted 160 such investigations received from the SSC and 39 received from the HSC. Although no charges have been made, the costs involved at the current rate would be $338,720 for the SSC and $82,563 for the HSC, for a total of $421,283.

Pursuant to Constitutional Amendment 25, approved in 1967, the President requested an investigation in October of 1973, concerning Gerald R. Ford for the appointment to Vice President. Then in August, 1974, an investigation was conducted at the request of the President concerning Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller, Vice President-Designate. Thus, for the first time in the history of the United States Government, an applicant-type investigation was conducted concerning the President and Vice President. These were the most extensive investigations ever conducted by the FBI. of an applicant-type nature.

The investigations handled by the FBI are limited to existing law, executive order, or by special agreement with the President and/or the Attorney General. They are not routine and it is not believed they should be or could be eliminated.

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Where possible, steps have been taken to insure that these cases are kept to an absolute minimum. It is noted prior to July, 1973, the FBI conducted investigations concerning nonprofessional positions in connection with Departmental applicant/U. S. Court applicant investigations, such as general clerical personnel. It was determined and agreed upon that these investigations could be handled by the Civil Service Commission and, therefore, they were transferred to that agency.

A manpower utilization survey conducted during March, 1975, disclosed that 2.3% of field investigative time by FBI personnel was being devoted to these applicant-type investigations conducted for other Government agencies. This low percentage is indicative of the Bureau's efforts to hold down applicant-type work to that essential and necessary to meet our various commitments in this field. We have and will continue to oppose legislation seeking to involve the FBI in routine applicant-type investigations.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Senator Baker's question re Inspector General appears on pages 2473 and 2474 of the galley draft of Director Kelley's testimony. It is felt the answer given is proper in that any comment made re Inspector General concept governing other agencies would, in fact, be a comment on behalf of the Director regarding conditions existing in and/or needs of oversight, etc., of other agencies which could be misconstrued. Senator Hart's questions concerning COINTELPRO are contained on pages 2498 and 2499 of the proof and Senator Church's questions appear on pages 2506, 2507 and 2508 of the proof. This matter has been coordinated by the Senstudy Project with Legal Counsel Division, Section IS-2 of INTD and the Employee Security and Special Inquiry Section of the Special Investigative Division.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/12/76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

Regarding Testimony of Dir. Kelley before SSC 12/10/75.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 1/15/76

Received by: Joan L. Wilson

Title: Receptionist

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/02 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1314

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☒ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

1/12/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

Oral request 12/10/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Setting forthe the unanswered questions, which arose during the testimony of Director Kelly, along with the responses thereto.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-1314

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. R. G. Kinsey

Mr. W. R. Wannall 1/23/76

W. A. Branigan

SAM A. JAFFE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Jaffe is a former New York Office informant who was a correspondent for CBS and ABC. While with ABC, he was stationed in Moscow from 1961 to 1965. During this assignment he was compromised by the KGB through a relationship he had with a Soviet female and because of a car accident. Jaffe reported the subsequent recruitment effort by the KGB to both the U. S. Embassy and to New York. He admitted to New York that he had a continuing relationship in Moscow with several KGB officers, but denied that he furnished them anything. In 1964, a Soviet defector reported that Jaffe had been recruited by the KGB in about 1961 and thereafter furnished the KGB with information about other Americans in Moscow. Our investigation, including two intensive interviews of Jaffe, neither substantiated or refuted the defector's allegation.

Our evaluation of Jaffe's relationship with the KGB is that after his admitted compromise he undoubtedly cooperated to a degree, simply to avoid being expelled from Moscow because of the damage it would have caused to his then advancing career. He was eventually expelled in 1965, ostensibly because of an unfavorable article written by ABC Correspondent John Scali about the Soviet leadership. We have never uncovered any evidence that Jaffe assisted the KGB after he left Moscow.

105-28333

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)

RGK:mod
(6)

~~SECRET~~

NOT RECORDED
202 FEB 3 1976

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~Classified by 4091~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories~~ 2 and 3
~~Date~~ of Declassification ~~Indefinite~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 10820 RWK/KWS
ON 9-4-81

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 FEB 6 1976

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Sam A. Jaffe
105-23333

Jaffe filed a Freedom of Information Act request in 1975 for all information in our files, claiming that the FBI or CIA had leaked an allegation that he was a KGB agent, which has prevented him from obtaining employment in the media field. His claim is not substantiated by anything contained in our files. Both the Senate and House Committees on Intelligence Operations have taken an interest in his case and we have furnished both Committees with excised copies of Jaffe's file.

The "Washington Star News" issue of 1/22/76, carried an article reporting an interview of Jaffe by a "New York Times" reporter in which Jaffe related he had been an unpaid FBI informant during the 1950s and 1960s, reporting on his contacts with Soviet nationals. *The article is generally factual and does not touch on Jaffe's allegation as to a leak. On 1/21/76, Jaffe telephoned SA Richard Kinsey of the Intelligence Division (SA Kinsey had participated in an interview of Jaffe on 11/24/75, on Deputy Associate Director Adams' instructions to hear out Jaffe's allegations). Jaffe was concerned because an unnamed "New York Times" reporter had interviewed him on the same day and inferred he had information that Jaffe was a paid FBI informant. Jaffe wanted to know if we had so advised either the Senate or House Committees since the reporter claimed to have seen documentation that Jaffe had received money from the FBI. Jaffe was advised that he could not be furnished information as to what we had furnished the Committees but that he knew whether or not he had received money from us. Jaffe said that he was concerned that we had leaked additional derogatory information concerning him.

While it is possible that the "New York Times" reporter has had access to Jaffe's file as furnished to the Senate or House Committees, it is not believed that we have sufficient evidence of this in order to make a complaint to either Committee, based only on what Jaffe reported as to the reporter's background for his inquiry of Jaffe.

* Our records disclose that Jaffe was never paid, either for services or expenses during the period he was operated as a symbol number informant.

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: [illegible]
10[illegible]

ACTION:

None. For information.

[redacted]

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

January 12, 1976

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to my testimony before the SSC on December 10, 1975, during which testimony certain questions arose on which answers were deferred.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum for your approval and forwarding to the SSC which supplies answers to these questions for inclusion in the official record. Also enclosed for your records is a copy of this memorandum.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395 - 1314

AJD:mjg
(11)

REC-51

FEB 4 1976

EX 104

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE

ENCL BEHIND FILE

WVC

5 - W. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

84 FEB 6 1976

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

RECEIVED
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE DIV.
JAN 9 12 43 PM 1976

JAN 12 2 26 PM '76

REC'D
CORRESPONDENCE REVIEW
F B I
JAN 9 1 28 PM '76

RECEIVED
ASST. DIRECTOR
SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE

[illegible]
RECEIVED
F.B.I.
JAN 12 3 36 PM '76

RECEIVED
JAN 9 1 57 PM '76
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

RECEIVED
JAN 9 1 40 PM 1976
LEGAL COUNSEL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1-Mr. Adams-Enc.
1-Mr. Wannall-Enc.
1-Mr. Cregar-Enc.

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: January 14, 1976

1-Mr. Mintz-Enc.
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-Mr. Miller

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Hotis

Late on the afternoon on January 14, 1976, Pat Shea, staff member, Senate Select Committee, made available the attached, which is a draft bill captioned Intelligence Oversight Act of 1976.

This draft is the product of the Senate Select Committee staff.

Mark Gitenstein, Martha Talley, and Pat Shea, all of whom are Senate Select Committee staff members, are scheduled to meet with Bureau representatives at 2 P.M., tomorrow, January 15, 1976. This meeting will afford us the opportunity to discuss in detail the draft bill.

The bill would create a Committee on Intelligence Activities to which all proposed legislation pertaining to the intelligence community would be referred. It would be granted broad, sweeping powers of access to and disclosure of intelligence community information.

Also received late on the afternoon of January 14, 1976, was a letter from Chairman Ribicoff of the Government Operations Committee. Attached to that letter is a copy of S.189 introduced by Senator Nelson on January 16, 1975, S.317 introduced by Senator Baker on January 23, 1975, and S. CON. RES.4 introduced by Senator Hathaway on January 23, 1975.

ST 109

RECOMMENDATIONS:

REC-7 62-116395-1313

1. Legal Counsel and Intelligence Division representatives will meet with Senate Select Committee staff members at 2 P.M. on January 15, 1976, and discuss the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1976.

Enclosure
JDM:mcz mcz
(9)

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHU

RECOMMENDATION CONTINUED OVER

84 FEB 4 1976

RECEIVED
JAN 19 2 18 PM 1976
LEGAL COUNSEL

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
F. B. I.
JAN 15 3 56 PM 1976

RECEIVED
JAN 14 6 31 PM '76
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

RECEIVED
JAN 19 10 40 AM '76
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

FEB 2 1976

RECEIVED
JAN 30 10 34 AM '76
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
Re: SENSTUDY

2. The draft bill and the other proposals provided by Senator Ribicoff be reviewed by Legal Counsel Division for the information of the Director by the close of business January 16, 1976.

CONGRESS

SESSION

S.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

[illegible] those provided for the [illegible] number, and reference of bill)

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Mr.

introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

A BILL

(Insert title of bill here)

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Oversight Act of 1976."

SEC 2. It is the purpose of this Act to establish a new Standing Committee of the Senate to oversee and to make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government. In carrying out this purpose, the Committee on Intelligence Activities shall make every effort to assure that the appropriate agencies and departments of the United States provide informed and timely intelligence necessary for the Executive and Legislative Branches to make sound decisions affecting the security of the Nation. It is further the purpose of this Act to provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

SEC. 3. Sections 4 through 12 of this Act are enacted --

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate, and as such they shall be considered as part of the Standing Rules of the Senate, and such rules shall supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

(2) with full recognition of the Constitutional right of the Senate to change such rules at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the Senate.

SEC. 4. Rule XXIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end thereof a new paragraph as follows:

"3. (a) Five members of the Committee on Intelligence Activities shall be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate and four shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.

"(b) No Senator may serve on the Committee on Intelligence Activities for more than six years, exclusive of service by any Senator on such committee during the ninety-fourth Congress. To the greatest extent practicable, the requirements of this section shall be met by selecting three new Senators to serve on the Committee at the beginning of the ninety-sixth Congress and each Congress thereafter.

"(c) At the beginning of each Congress, the members of the Committee on Intelligence Activities appointed by the majority leader shall select a chairman and the members of such committee appointed by the minority leader shall select a vice chairman. The vice chairman shall act in the place and stead of the chairman in the absence of the chairman."

SEC. 5. (a) Subparagraph (d)1 of paragraph 1 of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by striking out the period at the end of such subparagraph and inserting in lieu thereof a comma and the following: "except matters described in subparagraphs (s)(1) and (2)."

(b) Subparagraph (i)1 of paragraph 1 of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by striking out the period at the end of such paragraph and inserting in lieu thereof a comma and the following: "(except matters described in subparagraphs (s)(1)) ~~and (2))~~."

(c) Subparagraph (1)9 of paragraph 1 of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by striking out the comma after the word "espionage" and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "(except matters described in subparagraphs (s)(1) ~~and (2),~~".

SEC. 6. (a) Paragraph 1 of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subparagraph:

"(s)(1) Committee on Intelligence Activities, to which committee shall be referred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the following:

"(A) The Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence.

"(B) Intelligence activities of all other departments and agencies of the Government, including, but not limited to, the intelligence activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other agencies of the Department of Defense; the Department of Justice; the Department of State; and the Department of the Treasury.

"(C) The organization or reorganization of any department or agency of the Government to the extent that the organization or reorganization relates to a function or activity involving national intelligence or domestic intelligence.

"(D) Authorizations for appropriations for the following:

"(i) The Central Intelligence Agency.

"(ii) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

"(iii) The National Security Agency.

"(iv) The national intelligence activities carried out by the Department of Defense.

"(v) Intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"(vi) The intelligence activities of any successor departments or agencies to those departments and agencies named in this subclause.".

(b) Paragraph 3 of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by inserting

"Intelligence Activities ---------------------- 9"

immediately below

"District of Columbia ------------------------ 7".

(c) Paragraph 6 of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subparagraph:

"(i) For the purposes of this paragraph, service of a Senator as a member of the Committee on Intelligence Activities shall not be taken into account.".

SEC. 7. The Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate, for the purposes of accountability to the Senate, shall make regular and periodic reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies of the United States, and shall promptly call to the attention of the Senate any matters deemed to raise significant questions under the Constitution or laws of the United States or to otherwise require the immediate attention of the Senate.

SEC. 8. (a) No member of the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate and no member of the staff of such committee shall disclose outside such committee any information in the possession of or obtained by such committee relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the United States engaged in intelligence activities unless authorized by such committee. No member of the Senate shall disclose outside the Senate any information conveyed to the Senate in closed session by the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate unless authorized by the Senate.

(b) The Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate may refer to the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct of the Senate for investigation and other action: (1) any disclosure outside the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate, not authorized by such committee, of any information in the possession of or obtained by such committee relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the United States engaged in intelligence activities; and (2) any disclosure outside the Senate, not authorized by the Senate, of any information conveyed to the Senate in closed session by the Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Select Committee on Standards and Conduct of the Senate shall investigate any breach of confidentiality referred to it pursuant to this subsection and shall recommend appropriate action, such as censure or removal from office.

SEC. 9. (a) No person may be employed as a professional staff member of the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate or be engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services for such committee for a period totaling more than nine years.

(b) No employee of such committee or any person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services for or at the request of such committee shall be given access to any classified information by such committee unless such employee or person has received an appropriate security clearance as determined by such committee in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence. The type of security clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall, within the determination of such committee, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such employee or person will be given access by such committee.

SEC. 10. The Committee on Intelligence of the Senate shall formulate and carry out such rules and procedures as it deems necessary to prevent the disclosure, without the consent of the person or persons concerned, of information in the possession of such committee which infringes upon the privacy or Constitutional rights of such person or persons. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent such committee from publicly disclosing any such information in any case in which such committee determines the public interest in the disclosure of such information clearly outweighs any infringement on the privacy of any person or persons.

SEC. 11. (a) The Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate may, after full and considered consultation with appropriate officials of the Executive Branch, disclose to the public any information received by it from the President or Vice President or any department or agency of the United States upon the committee's determination that the national interest would be served by such disclosure. In any case in which such committee decides to ~~make~~ release public any information requested to be kept confidential by the President, Vice President, or the head of a department or agency, as the case may be, such committee shall notify the President to that effect. Such committee may publicly disclose such information after the expiration of ten days following the day on which notice is transmitted to the President unless prior to the expiration of such ten-day period the President submits a written certification to such committee stating that the national interest in the disclosure of such information is clearly outweighted by the probability of grave harm to the national security.

(b) If after timely receipt of a certification by the President made pursuant to subsection (a), the Committee on Intelligence Activities determines that such information should be publicly disclosed, such committee shall refer the question of disclosure of such information to the Senate for such action as the Senate deems appropriate.

(c) Any question referred to the Senate by the Committee on Intelligence Activities pursuant to subsection (b) shall be disposed by the Senate within three calendar days following the day on which the question is reported to the Senate, excluding days on which the Senate is not in session.

SEC. 12. The Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate is authorized to permit any personal representative of the President, designated by the President to serve as a liaison to such committee, to attend any closed meeting of such committee.

SEC. 13. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be the duty of the head of each department and agency of the United States to keep the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate fully and currently informed with respect to all intelligence activities which in any respect are the responsibility of or are planned, supervised, financed, or engaged in by such department or agency.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall also be the duty of the head of any department or agency of the United States involved in any intelligence activities to furnish any information or document in its possession, custody, or control, or witness in its employ, whenever requested by the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate with respect to any matter within such committee's jurisdiction.

(c) In order that the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate may have sufficient time to consult with and advise any department or agency of the United States regarding certain kinds of intelligence activities proposed to be carried out by such department or agency, before such department or agency initiates such activities, such committee is authorized to specify any type or kind of intelligence activity as to which in its judgment such committee should be given notice prior to any executive decision to carry out any such activity. No department or agency of the United States may engage in, directly or indirectly, and no agency head may authorize or direct any type or kind of intelligence activity specified in writing to the President as especially sensitive by the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate unless such committee has been fully informed of the proposed activity by the head of the department or agency concerned prior to the time such activity is initiated.

SEC. 14. No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year beginning after September 30, 1976, to or for the use of any department or agency of the United States to carry out any of the following activities unless such funds have been previously authorized to carry out such activity for such fiscal year;

(A) The activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(B) The activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

(C) The activities of the National Security Agency.

(D) The national intelligence activities carried out by the Department of Defense.

(E) The intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(F) The intelligence activities of any successor departments and agencies to those departments and agencies listed in clauses (A) through (E).

SEC. 15. The Comptroller General of the United States shall from time to time, at the request of the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate, conduct financial audits and reviews of the intelligence activities of any department or agency of the United States. For the purpose of conducting any such audit or review, the Comptroller General, or any of his duly authorized representatives, shall be given access to and the opportunity to examine all books, accounts, records, reports, files, and all other materials within the possession, custody, or control of any such department or agency.

SEC. 16. Upon expiration of the Select Committee on Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by Senate Resolution 21, 94th Congress, all records, files, documents, and other materials of such committee shall be transferred to the Committee on Intelligence Activities.

SEC. 17. As used in this Act --

(1) The term "national intelligence" means the collection, analysis, production, dissemination, and use of political, military, and economic information affecting the relations of the United States with foreign governments, and other activity which is in support of, or supported by the collection, analysis, production, dissemination, and use of such information. Such term also includes, but is not limited to, counterintelligence and clandestine activities.

(2) The term "domestic intelligence" means (a) the collection within the United States, its territories and possessions, of information about foreign intelligence services within the United States and the analysis, production, dissemination, and use of such information; (b) information about those activities of persons within the United States, its territories and possessions which is, or may be, considered by any department, agency, bureau, office, division, instrumentality, or employee of the United States to pose a threat to the internal security of the United States; and (c) any activity which is in support of such information described in clause (a) or (b) of this paragraph. Such term also includes, but is not limited to, counterintelligence and clandestine activities.

(3) The term "intelligence activities" means the sphere of action and function of national intelligence and domestic intelligence.

SEC. 18. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as constituting an authorization for the conduct of any activity not otherwise authorized by law.

SEC. 19. If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the validity of the remaining provisions and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

January 12, 1976

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

Honorable Frank Church
Chairman
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

You will recall that by letter to me of January 27, 1975, from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Minority Leader Hugh Scott, we were advised of the Senate's plan to conduct an investigation and study of intelligence activities by Government agencies. The scope of the study was defined in Senate Resolution 21 of the 94th Congress. The letter specifically requested that we not destroy or otherwise dispose of any records or documents which might have a bearing on the subjects under investigation or relating to the matters specified in Section 2 of Senate Resolution 21. That Section of the Resolution described the Senate's extensive interest in the domestic intelligence, as well as foreign counterintelligence, activities of Executive Branch agencies, including the FBI.

In accommodation of that request of the leadership of the United States Senate, I immediately issued instructions to all offices and divisions of this Bureau establishing a moratorium on the destruction of all records of whatever description. In retrospect, I now feel that the moratorium need not have been as all-encompassing as that, but this was done to assure that there could be no question of my intention for the FBI to comply fully with the request with regard to the preservation of relevant records in which the Senate might develop an interest.

ST 109

REC-7 62-116395-1812

1/14/76 C

(Letter should be delivered to Mr. Elliff of the Senate Select Committee Staff by representatives of the Office of Congressional Affairs and Records Section. The above letter is being submitted as the result of preliminary conversations had with Senate Select Committee Staff members.)

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Wannall

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 FEB 4 1976

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JJMcD:imr (9)

JAN

It is now almost one year since the inception of the moratorium on our regular records destruction program. For your information, our regular destruction program, as approved by the National Archives and Records Service, is designed to prevent retention of masses of records well beyond the period during which they may serve a useful purpose. Further, our records destruction program, as approved by the National Archivist, permits the destruction of those records which are deemed to no longer possess evidentiary, intelligence, or historical value. The moratorium, which was not expected to last as long as it has, has created substantial administrative burdens not only at FBI Headquarters but throughout our 59 field offices. The suspension of sound records management and file destruction practices in many areas is causing very substantial space and storage problems.

I, therefore, now propose, with your concurrence, to resume that portion of our records destruction program which, in reality, could not have been contemplated by the Senate leadership's request in the first instance. We would continue the destruction moratorium on all classifications of files which would fall within the general description of "security files." These would encompass all files on domestic intelligence matters, extremist matters, racial matters, as well as foreign counterintelligence subject matters. We would, with regard to such "security matters," destroy duplicative material only.

The matters that we propose to resume routine destruction of, in accordance with our previously established Records Retention Plan, are the following: files relating to criminal investigations, suitability or applicant-type investigations, correspondence files, and files of an administrative nature generally. Should you or any members of your Committee express an interest for our continued retention of any record material other than as specified herein, you may be assured that such a request would receive every consideration.

Honorable Frank Church

I do hope that you are able to express concurrence in the proposals herein since the file destruction moratorium has produced substantial administrative burdens for us. Please also accept my assurance of our continued full cooperation with you and your Committee.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

1 - Honorable Mike Mansfield (sent under separate cover)
Majority Leader of the Senate
Room S-208
The Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20510

1 - Honorable Hugh Scott (sent under separate cover)
Minority Leader of the Senate
Room 250 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 1/7/76

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 1/7/76, John T. Elliff, Head of the Domestic Task Force for the Senate Select Committee, advised that the counterintelligence hearing which had previously been scheduled and had been cancelled before that Committee is being rescheduled for 1/22/76. Elliff stated the hearing would be held in executive session on the morning of that day and that CIA and other intelligence agencies would appear in the afternoon. Elliff requested the Bureau to designate the appropriate official or officials to appear before that Committee and suggested that the number of witnesses be restricted as much as possible.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division designate the appropriate officials to appear before captioned Committee in executive session on 1/22/76.

JBA/PVD

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 1/9/76 TWL:mjg

Appearance will be handled by Inspector T. W. Leavitt, Section Chiefs W. A. Branigan, W. O. Cregar and S. S. Mignosa as well as Legal Counsel Assistant Director J. A. Mintz or whomever he may wish to designate.

REC 27 62-116395-1311

ST 112

PVD:lad
(9)

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

84 FEB 9 1976

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JAN 28 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mike

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Senstudy

SUBJECT: SSC Request Dated January 23, 1976

Attached is a letter from the SSC dated January 23, 1976, requesting in part additional FBI materials concerning Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Please arrange for an appropriate response to these requests. Access to the materials requested in Item 3 should be limited to those staff persons who actually attended the briefing with Senator Church. If you have any questions concerning appropriate responses to the various requests please call me.

ST-111
REC-31 62-116395-1310

5 JAN 30 1976

Assigned to Aldhizer 1/28/76

ENCLOSURE

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

5-8

cc: Paul Daly

84 FEB 3 1976

JAN 28 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Request Dated January 23, 1976

Attached is a letter from the SSC dated January 23, 1976, requesting in part additional FBI materials concerning Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Please arrange for an appropriate response to these requests. Access to the materials requested in Item 3 should be limited to those staff persons who actually attended the briefing with Senator Church. If you have any questions concerning appropriate responses to the various requests please call me.

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

January 23, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coorindation
U. S. Deaprtment of Justice
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a list of additional items we need in connection with our investigation of the King case.

Next Tuesday there will be an Executive Session of the Domestic Intelligence Subcommittee on the subject of the usefulness of FBI domestic intelligence reports. In connection therewith, I would appreciate your supplying the Committee with a representative sample of (a) daily morning reports, (b) daily evening reports, and (c) summation weekly reports which were prepared by the IDIU during 1970.[1] In order that we may have a random cross-section of these reports, please forward one such report for the third day and/or the second week of each month of 1970.

Finally, please also forward ten sample "hourly summaries" prepared by the IDIU during the summer of 1968.[2]

Your continued cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

John T Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

---

[1] See memorandum of James T. Devine, entitled "Interdivisional Information Unit, Civil Disturbance Group." dated September 10, 1970, p. 1, attached.

[2] See memorandum of J. Walter Yeagley, entitled "Operations of Intelligence Unit," dated April 10, 1968, pp.2-3, attached.

RECEIVED
JAN [illegible] 1976

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1318

1/29/76

King Materials

1. Documents and materials reflecting the decision to include Stanley David Levison on the Security Index and the reasons for and date of such decision.

2. All materials reflecting the receipt at FBI Headquarters of the Information contained in the Director's January 8, 1962 memorandum to the Attorney General captioned "Stanley David Levison, Security Matter-C", and all materials pertaining to the decision to transmit such information to the Attorney General.

3. Access to the briefing paper or memorandum utilized by personnel of the Domestic Intelligence Division in the briefing of Committee Chairman Frank Church and certain Committee staff members concerning Stanley David Levison.

4. The original record of the informant's assertion contained in the Director's September 4, 1963 memorandum to the Attorney General captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter-C", to wit:

> "A source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised in July 1963, that Stanley Levison is a secret member of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and contributes funds to the CPUSA on a regular basis."

5. The original record of the informant's assertion contained in the August 30, 1962 memorandum from SA Francis T. Leonard to the SAC, New York, to wit:

> "NY T..who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on August 25, 1962, that STANLEY LEVISON is a secret member of the Communist Party, United States of America (excised) and (excised)"

6. All materials reflecting the initiation and termination of the microphone surveillance of the office of Stanley David Levison.

With respect to items 4 and 5, the informant's identity, if "live", may be deleted.

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHU

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1310

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JAN 28 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Mike
by SB

SUBJECT: SSC Request Dated January 27, 1976

Attached is a letter from the SSC dated January 27, 1976. Please arrange for an appropriate response.

Sensitivity

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE

ST-111

REC-51 62-116395-1309

5 JAN 30 1976

cc: Paul Daly

Request handled in oral briefing with John Elliff of SSC by W. O. Cregar and J. P. Thomas on 1-30-76. Steve Blackhurst of Dept. advised 2-4-76

5-B

84 FEB 3 1976

JAN 28 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Request Dated January 27, 1976

Attached is a letter from the SSC dated January 27, 1976. Please arrange for an appropriate response.

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., T
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

January 27, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Information has come to the attention of the Committee which indicates the possibility that the FBI conducted heretofore undisclosed electronic surveillance of personnel of the executive office of the President (possibly a Deputy Director of the Budget Bureau) and that this information was included on a list of names of persons subject to FBI electronic surveillance prepared for Attorney General Elliot Richardson in or about July 1973.

Therefore, the Committee requests all material in the possession of the Justice Department or the FBI which may bear on the above. Please notify me by phone when any such material may be available.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
JAN 28 1976

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

ENCLO...

62-116395-1309

1 - Mr. J. [illegible]. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
(Attn: Mr. J. C. Gordon)

The Attorney General

January 19, 1976

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. W. Held

CO# 368-88

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-6-89 BY SPS [illegible]

On December 3, 1975, Douglas Frank Durham, who confidentially furnished information to the FBI concerning extremist activities of the American Indian Movement (AIM) until publicly identified as an FBI informant in March, 1975, contacted our Minneapolis Division and furnished information which should be brought to your attention.

He said on May 7, 1975, he was interviewed by Patrick Shea and Mary DeOreo, investigators for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, who indicated a strong desire to discredit the FBI and asked if he, Durham, could "come up with some dirt" on the FBI because there was strong support to "nail the FBI to the cross." This interview took place in the Washington, D. C., office of Reverend John Adams of the United Methodist Church. Adams, who was present during the interview, paid Durham transportation and other expenses, plus $125 in testimony fees. Adams appeared to be very anxious to "personally smear the FBI."

REC-31 62-116395-1308

Adams has previously been described by ~~Durham as~~ a nonmember advisor to AIM.

ST-111

5 JAN 30 1976

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Delivered to [illegible]

Durham said during the initial interview he got the impression that Don Rothberg, 2021 "K" Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., a reporter for the Associated Press, was very close to the investigative Staff of Senator Frank Church's Committee. He said Rothberg later traveled to Des Moines, Iowa, and reviewed Durham's conversation with the Senate investigators, at which time Rothberg informed Durham that "I feel as they do. We have to control these police departments and the FBI."

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep. AD Adm. ——
Dep. AD Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

62-116395

1 - 137-33264

RWH/JPG:eks (13)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

157-[illegible]-1053

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 FEB 9 1976

Durham further advised that Patrick Shea had informed him that Senate investigators maintained direct contact with AIM Attorney Kenneth Tilsen and talked to Tilsen prior to Durham's interview in Washington, D. C., on May 7, 1975.

The "Minneapolis Tribune" on December 14, 1975, published an article captioned "Local FBI Accused of Meddling in Trial," which in part stated that in 1969 the Minneapolis office of the FBI sent an anonymous letter to the Hennepin County Attorney concerning a defendant in a criminal case and her attorney. The letter alleged that the defendant had "some pretty good connections" and her lawyer held a "Communist Party membership." The article stated that a Minneapolis radio station reporter said on Friday, December 12, 1975, that he was given by Kenneth Tilsen a copy of the anonymous letter. The article further stated that Tilsen had said on December 13, 1975, that he got a copy of the letter from Lock Johnson, an investigator for the U. S. Senate Committee investigating the FBI. The article stated Tilsen said Johnson came to the twin cities (Minneapolis - St. Paul, Minnesota) about three weeks ago to interview him and Rosemary Freeman (the defendant in the aforementioned case). Tilsen stated he was not shown the alleged correspondence between the Minneapolis FBI Office and FBI Headquarters, in Washington, D. C., but was given a summary of the information. The article further stated that "last night" Johnson confirmed that he had interviewed Tilsen and Miss Freeman and that he had summarized for Tilsen the contents of the alleged exchange between the Minneapolis FBI and FBI, Washington, D. C.

Durham stated he has also been contacted by Ellen Miller, 13316 Rayburn House, 202-225-9751, Washington, D. C., who is affiliated with Congressman Otis Pike's Committee. She asked Durham to provide her with anything he could offer which would reveal how the FBI and police utilized informants and how they "conned" these informants into providing information.

Durham stated he eventually received a subpoena to testify before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, but refused to comply with this subpoena, threatening to hold a press conference concerning his experience with this Committee's investigators if they forced him to appear. Durham said he expressed his feelings to an Assistant United States Attorney in Des Moines, Iowa, and in a few days he was told to forget the subpoena.

Please advise what action should be taken in this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

The above information was contained in Minneapolis teletype to the Bureau, 1/2/76, entitled "American Indian Movement; EM." While Durham, the former MP 4115-E, is no longer being operated as an informant, he periodically contacts the Minneapolis Division. Durham is currently traveling around the country under the sponsorship of the John Birch Society speaking about his knowledge of extremist activity.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

January 8, 1976

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. T. J. Seabaugh

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the December 18, 1975, SSC letter forwarded from the Department of Justice by letter dated December 22, 1975, containing requests for information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum which is responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your records.

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/08 BY SP2 ALM

Enclosures (2)

ST-111

62-116395

REC-31 62-116395-1306

EHL

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

5 JAN 30 1976

3 ENCLOSURE

TJS:klm
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

See 1/5/76 let
for material
Serial 1304

JCD

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

JB7
PLN

JAM

5-WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 FEB 2 1976

NOTE:

The material prepared for delivery to the SSC represents a portion of that requested in SSC letter dated 12/18/75. The SSC desired the material at an early date, and we were expediting our review of files with regard to additional requests contained in the December 18, 1975, letter.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. T. J. Seabaugh

62-116395

January 8, 1976

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/06 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the December 18, 1975, letter of the SSC as modified at a conference on December 30, 1975, between Messrs. W. O. Cregar and Paul V. Daly of this Bureau and Committee Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mark Gitenstein.

The SSC was advised by FBI memorandum dated January 5, 1976, that certain of the materials relating to Item 1 were available for SSC Staff review. On January 6, 1976, Mr. F. A. O. Schwarz, Jr., SSC General Counsel, requested the FBI deliver the material to which access had been granted.

This memorandum effects delivery of material in response to Item 1. Because of your desire for a very early review of this material, the available data is only a portion of that requested. We are expediting our review of files, and you will be furnished additional material pursuant to your request as soon as possible.

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. ___ TJS:klm KLM
Dep. AD Adm. ___ (9)
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

JBS/PLM

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

TJS

10 DEC 8

62-116395-1306

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/8/76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re 12/18/75 request Item 1 - Delivery

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 1-12-76

Received by: Patrick D Shea

Title: Staff

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1306

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: **FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

1/8/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/18/75, item 1

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

C

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Effecting delivery of materials that access had previously been requested, namely examples of effective prevention of violence.

62-116395

FMK:fmk

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-9

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-1306

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

1ST NR 1441
2ND NR 1444, 3RD NR 1444
1ST NR 1445 THRU 1447
1449 THRU 1452
1457
1459 THRU 1463
1465 THRU 1467
1469, 1470
1472 THRU 1474
1475

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 03-18-2025

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 10 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SB

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request
dated February 9, 1976

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated February 9, 1976. Please arrange for an appropriate response.

S

EX-115

S

2 | ENCLOSURE

ENCL BEHIND FILE

EC-38

62-116395-1475

cc: Paul Daly

7 MAR 19

Let to AG cc DAG Encls
3/2/76
TJM:eks

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/16/01 BY SP2ALM/CP

TJM
S. McNiff

T

Executive Order 10450

Security Requirements For Government Employment

WHEREAS the interests of the national security require that all persons privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government, shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States; and

WHEREAS the American tradition that all persons should receive fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at the hands of the Government requires that all persons seeking the privilege of employment or privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government be adjudged by mutually consistent and no less than minimum standards and procedures among the departments and agencies governing the employment and retention in employment of persons in the Federal service:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including section 1753 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (5 U. S. C. 631); the Civil Service Act of 1883 (22 Stat. 403; 5 U. S. C. 632, et seq.); section 9A of the act of August 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 1148 (5 U. S. C. 118 j); and the act of August 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476 (5 U. S. C. 22-1, et seq.), and as President of the United States, and deeming such action necessary in the best interests of the national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. In addition to the departments and agencies specified in the said act of August 26, 1950, and Executive Order No. 10237 of April 26, 1951, the provisions of that act shall apply to all other departments and agencies of the Government.

SEC. 2. The head of each department and agency of the Government shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining within his department or agency an effective program to insure that the employment and retention in employment of any civilian officer or employee within the department or agency is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

SEC. 3. (a) The appointment of each civilian officer or employee in any department or agency of the Government shall be made subject to investigation. The scope of the investigation shall be determined in the first instance according to the degree of adverse effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national security, but in no event shall the investigation include less than a national agency check (including a check of the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and written inquiries to appropriate local law-enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools attended by the person under investigation: *Provided*, that upon request of the head of the department or agency concerned, the Civil Service Commission may, in its discretion, authorize such less investigation as may meet the requirements of the national security with respect to per-diem, intermittent, temporary, or seasonal employees, or aliens employed outside the United States. Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any such person may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, there shall be conducted with respect to such person a full field investi-

62-116395-1475

ENCLOSURE

gation, or such less investigation as shall be sufficient to enable the head of the department or agency concerned to determine whether retention of such person is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

(b) The head of any department or agency shall designate, or cause to be designated, any position within his department or agency the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security as a sensitive position. Any position so designated shall be filled or occupied only by a person with respect to whom a full field investigation has been conducted: *Provided*, that a person occupying a sensitive position at the time it is designated as such may continue to occupy such position pending the completion of a full field investigation, subject to the other provisions of this order: *And provided further*, that in case of emergency a sensitive position may be filled for a limited period by a person with respect to whom a full field preappointment investigation has not been completed if the head of the department or agency concerned finds that such action is necessary in the national interest, which finding shall be made a part of the records of such department or agency.

SEC. 4. The head of each department and agency shall review, or cause to be reviewed, the cases of all civilian officers and employees with respect to whom there has been conducted a full field investigation under Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, and, after such further investigation as may be appropriate, shall readjudicate, or cause to be readjudicated, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, such of those cases as have not been adjudicated under a security standard commensurate with that established under this order.

SEC. 5. Whenever there is developed or received by any department or agency information indicating that the retention in employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, such information shall be forwarded to the head of the employing department or agency or his representative, who, after such investigation as may be appropriate, shall review, or cause to be reviewed, and, where necessary, readjudicate, or cause to be readjudicated, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, the case of such officer or employee.

SEC. 6. Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, the head of the department or agency concerned or his representative shall immediately suspend the employment of the person involved if he deems such suspension necessary in the interests of the national security and, following such investigation and review as he deems necessary, the head of the department or agency concerned shall terminate the employment of such suspended officer or employee whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the national security, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950.

SEC. 7. Any person whose employment is suspended or terminated under the authority granted to heads of departments and agencies by or in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, or pursuant to the said Executive Order No. 9835 or any other security or loyalty program relating to officers or employees of the Government, shall not be reinstated or restored to duty or reemployed in the same department or agency and shall not be reemployed in any other department or agency, unless the head of the department or agency concerned finds that such reinstatement, restoration, or reemployment is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, which finding shall be made a part of the records of such department or agency: *Provided*, that no person whose employment has been terminated under such authority thereafter may be employed by any other department or agency except after a determination by the Civil Service Commission that such person is eligible for such employment.

SEC. 8. (a) The investigations conducted pursuant to this order shall be designed to develop information as to whether the employment or retention in employment in the Federal service of the person being investigated is clearly

gation, or such less investigation as shall be be appropriate, shall review, or cause to be

consistent with th[illegible]nterests of the national security. Such information shall relate, but shall not be limited, to the following:

(1) Depending on the relation of the Government employment to the national security:

(i) Any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy.

(ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material facts.

(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion.

(iv) Any illness, including any mental condition, of a nature which in the opinion of competent medical authority may cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the employee, with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case.[1]

(v) Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security.

(2) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.

(3) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

(4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States, or of the [illegible]ration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

(5) →Knowing membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organization) which is totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or which has adopted a policy of unlawfully advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.[3]←

(6) Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of security information, or of other information disclosure of which is prohibited by law, or willful violation or disregard of security regulations.

(7) Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

(8) Refusal by the individual, upon the ground of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, to testify before a congressional committee regarding charges of his alleged disloyalty or other misconduct.[2]

(b) The investigation of persons entering or employed in the competitive service shall primarily be the responsibility of the Civil Service Commission, except in cases in which the head of a department or agency assumes that responsibility pursuant to law or by agreement with the Commission. The Commission shall furnish a full investigative report to the department or agency concerned.

(c) The investigation of persons (including consultants, however employed), entering employment of, or employed by, the Government other than in the competitive service shall primarily be the responsibility of the employing department or agency. Departments and agencies without investigative facilities may use the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission and other departments and agencies may use such facilities under agreement with the Commission.

---

[1] As amended by Executive Order 10548 of August 2, 1954.

[2] As amended by Executive Order 10491 of October 13, 1953.

[3] As amended by Executive Order 11605 of July 2, 1971.

(d) There shall be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation all investigations being conducted by any other agencies which develop information indicating that an individual may have been subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information relating to any of the matters described in subdivisions (2) through (8)[4] of subsection (a) of this section. In cases so referred to it, the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make a full field investigation.

SEC. 9. (a) There shall be established and maintained in the Civil Service Commission a security-investigations index covering all persons as to whom security investigations have been conducted by any department or agency of the Government under this order. The central index established and maintained by the Commission under Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, shall be made a part of the security-investigations index. The security-investigations index shall contain the name of each person investigated, adequate identifying information concerning each such person, and a reference to each department and agency which has conducted an investigation concerning the person involved or has suspended or terminated the employment of such person under the authority granted to heads of departments and agencies by or in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950.

(b) The heads of all departments and agencies shall furnish promptly to the Civil Service Commission information appropriate for the establishment and maintenance of the security-investigations index.

(c) The reports and other investigative material and information developed by investigations conducted pursuant to any statute, order, or program described in section 7 of this order shall remain the property of the investigative agencies conducting the investigations, but may, subject to considerations of the national security, be retained by the department or agency concerned. Such reports and other investigative material and information shall be maintained in confidence, and no access shall be given thereto except, with the consent of the investigative agency concerned, to other departments and agencies conducting security programs under the authority granted by or in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, as may be required for the efficient conduct of Government business.

SEC. 10. Nothing in this order shall be construed as eliminating or modifying in any way the requirement for any investigation or any determination as to security which may be required by law.

SEC. 11. On and after the effective date of this order the Loyalty Review Board established by Executive Order No 9835 of March 21, 1947, shall not accept agency findings for review, upon appeal or otherwise. Appeals pending before the Loyalty Review Board on such date shall be heard to final determination in accordance with the provisions of the said Executive Order No. 9835, as amended. Agency determinations favorable to the officer or employee concerned pending before the Loyalty Review Board on such date shall be acted upon by such Board, and whenever the Board is not in agreement with such favorable determination the case shall be remanded to the department or agency concerned for determination in accordance with the standards and procedures established pursuant to this order. Cases pending before the regional loyalty boards of the Civil Service Commission on which hearings have not been initiated on such date shall be referred to the department or agency concerned. Cases being heard by regional loyalty boards on such date shall be heard to conclusion, and the determination of the board shall be forwarded to the head of the department or agency concerned: *Provided*, that if no specific department or agency is involved, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to the applicant. Investigations pending in the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Civil Service Commission on such date shall be completed, and the reports thereon shall be made to the appropriate department or agency.

---

[4] As amended by Executive Order 10531 of May 27, 1954.

SEC. 12. (a) E[illegible]utive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended is hereby revoked.

→(b) The head of each department and agency shall be furnished by the Attorney General with the name of each organization which shall be or has been heretofore designated under this order. Except as specifically provided hereafter, nothing contained herein shall be construed in any way to affect previous designations made pursuant to Executive Order No. 10450, as amended.

(c) The Subversive Activities Control Board shall, upon petition of the Attorney General, conduct appropriate hearings to determine whether any organization is totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or whether it has adopted a policy of unlawfully advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.

(d) The Board may determine that an organization has adopted a policy of unlawfully advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their constitutional or statutory rights or that an organization seeks to overthrow the government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means if it is found that such group engages in, unlawfully advocates, or has among its purposes or objectives, or adopts as a means of obtaining any of its purposes or objectives.—

(1) The commission of acts of force or violence or other unlawful acts to deny others their rights or benefits guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the several States or political subdivisions thereof; or

(2) The unlawful damage or destruction of property; or injury to persons: or

(3) The overthrow or destruction of the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by unlawful means; or

(4) T[illegible] commission of acts which violate laws pertaining to treason, rebellion or insurrection, riots or civil disorders, seditious conspiracy, sabotage, trading with the enemy, obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, impeding officers of the United States, or related crimes or offenses.

(e) The Board may determine an organization to be "totalitarian" if it is found that such organization engages in activities which seek by unlawful means the establishment of a system of government in the United States which is autocratic and in which control is centered in a single individual, group, or political party, allowing no effective representation to opposing individuals, groups, or parties and providing no practical opportunity for dissent.

(f) The Board may determine an organization to be "fascist" if it is found that organization engages in activities which seek by unlawful means the establishment of a system of government in the United States which is characterized by rigid one-party dictatorship, forcible suppression of the opposition, ownership of the means of production under centralized governmental control and which fosters racism.

(g) The Board may determine an organization to be "communist" if it is found that such organization engages in activities which seek by unlawful means the establishment of a government in the United States which is based upon the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism, which interprets history as a relentless class war aimed at the destruction of the existing society and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the government ownership of the means of production and distribution of property, and the establishment of a single authoritarian party.

(h) The Board may determine an organization to be "subversive" if it is found that such organization engages in activities which seek the abolition or destruction by unlawful means of the government of the United States or any State, or subdivision thereof.

(i) The Board may further determine, after consideration of the evidence, that an organization has ceased to exist. Upon petition of the Attorney General or upon petition of any organization which has been designated pursuant to this section the Board after appropriate hearings may determine that such organization does not currently meet the standards for designation. The Attorney General shall appropriately revise or modify the information furnished to departments and agencies consistant with the determinations of the Board.

(j) The Board shall issue appropriate regulations for the implementation of this section.[5]

Sec. 13. The Attorney General is requested to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish and maintain an appropriate employee-security program.

Sec. 14. (a) The Civil Service Commission, with the continuing advice and collaboration of representatives of such departments and agencies as the National Security Council may designate, shall make a continuing study of the manner in which this order is being implemented by the departments and agencies of the Government for the purpose of determining:

(1) Deficiencies in the department and agency security programs established under this order which are inconsistent with the interests of, or directly or indirectly weaken the national security.

(2) Tendencies in such programs to deny to individual employees fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at the hands of the Government, or rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States or this order.

Information affecting any department or agency developed or received during the course of such continuing study shall be furnished immediately to the head of the department or agency concerned. The Civil Service Commission shall report to the National Security Council, at least semiannually, on the results of such study, shall recommend means to correct any such deficiencies or tendencies, and shall inform the National Security Council immediately of any deficiency which is deemed to be of major importance.[5]

(b) All departments and agencies of the Government are directed to cooperate with the Civil Service Commission to facilitate the accomplishment of the responsibilities assigned to it by subsection (a) of this section.

(c) To assist the Civil Service Commission in discharging its responsibilities under this order, the head of each department and agency shall, as soon as possible and in no event later than ninety days after receipt of the final investigative report on a civilian officer or employee subject to a full field investigation under the provisions of this order, advise the Commission as to the action taken with respect to such officer or employee. The information furnished by the heads of departments and agencies pursuant to this section shall be included in the reports which the Civil Service Commission is required to submit to the National Security Council in accordance with subsection (a) of this section. Such reports shall set forth any deficiencies on the part of the heads of departments and agencies in taking timely action under this order, and shall mention specifically any instances of noncompliance with this subsection.[6]

Sec. 15. This order shall become effective thirty days after the date hereof.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

The White House,
April 27, 1953.

---

[5] As amended by Executive Order 11605 of July 2, 1971. nb. Section 706 of the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1973, approved October 25, 1972, Public Law 92-544, provides as follows:

"Sec. 706. No part of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be available to the Department of Justice or the Subversive Activities Control Board to carry out, execute or implement the provisions of Executive Order 11605 of July 2, 1971."

[6] As amended by Executive Order 10550 of August 5, 1954.

Security Requirements for Government Employment

Executive Order 11785. June 4, 1974

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10450, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including 5 U.S.C. 1101 *et seq.*, 3301, 3571, 7301, 7313, 7501(c), 7512, 7532, and 7533; and as President of the United States, and finding such action necessary in the best interests of national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. Section 12 of Executive Order No. 10450 of April 27, 1953, as amended, is revised to read in its entirety as follows:

"Sec. 12. Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended, is hereby revoked."

SEC. 2. Neither the Attorney General, nor the Subversive Activities Control Board, nor any other agency shall designate organizations pursuant to section 12 of Executive Order No. 10450, as amended, nor circulate nor publish a list of organizations previously so designated. The list of organizations previously designated is hereby abolished and shall not be used for any purpose.

SEC. 3. Subparagraph (5) of paragraph (a) of section 8 of Executive Order No. 10450, as amended, is revised to read as follows:

"Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means."

SEC. 4. Executive Order No. 11605 of July 2, 1971, is revoked.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House,
June 4, 1974.

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 3:05 p.m., June 4, 1974]

"Presidential Documents"
Volume 10 Number 23
Pages 572 and 573
June 10, 1974

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

December 5, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER,
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

This will refer to your memorandum of November 22 with reference to the Marquis Childs column appearing in The Washington Post on November 18, 1947 and to your letters of November 21, the one addressed to Mr. Childs and the other addressed to Mr. Paul A. Walker, Acting Chairman, Federal Communications Commission.

It is my view that the Bureau's practice of passing along to the various Government departments and agencies information which comes to its attention in connection with the conduct of investigations normally and regularly within the Bureau's jurisdiction is entirely appropriate and correct. Indeed, it would appear that the Bureau would be remiss in its duty if it failed to pass along information coming to it which might prove to be in the interest of the general welfare. It is not the Bureau's responsibility to determine whether the information is or is not of importance to the particular agency in the carrying out of its current activities and responsibilities and whether or not any action is taken by the department or agency is not, of course, a principal concern of the Bureau.

I believe, therefore, that the Bureau should continue its practice of passing along information which it is believed might be of interest to the various departments and agencies. At the same time I believe that it would be appropriate either (a) to prepare a circular to the various departments and agencies explaining the Bureau's purpose in furnishing information from time to time, or (b) to make a particular effort for a time when transmitting individual items of information to explain in the transmittal memorandum the Bureau's purpose in making such transmittal.

Attorney General

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. ______

November 21, 1947

Mr. Paul A. Walker
Acting Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Walker:

Under date of November 18, 1947, there appeared in the column of Mr. Marquis Childs in the Washington Post the following statement attributed to Mr. Clifford J. Durr of the Federal Communications Commission: "Already the FBI is furnishing to the commission unsolicited reports on individuals connected with radio, and I can assure you that if you should be told the kind of things contained in many of these reports you would dismiss the information as baseless gossip."

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has referred to the Federal Communications Commission from time to time information which it has received in the course of its regular investigations which appeared pertinent or material to matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission. It is the policy and practice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to avoid any attempts to evaluate the significance of information relating to matters without its jurisdiction or the effect of such information upon the contemporary policies and programs of other agencies. As a result, the Bureau furnishes to the various Government departments such information as it receives which appears pertinent to the operations of those Government departments. In so far as is practicable, the Bureau attempts to evaluate the reliability of the source of this information without attempting to make any suggestions as to the use which should or should not be made of the information itself.

Mr. Childs, in his column quoting Mr. Durr's statement, adds the following observation upon Mr. Durr's statement: "Note the word 'unsolicited'. It indicates that the FBI initiated investigations and sought to influence FCC decisions by sending reports on certain individuals to the commission. If this is happening, it is something Congress should know about."

I desire to advise you that this Bureau has not at any time attempted in any manner or degree to influence FCC decisions. The material which has been transmitted to the Commission was sent solely for the purpose of affording the Commission information which came to the Bureau from various sources, which information, it was believed, might be of interest to the official activities of the Commission.

In the light of the statements made by Mr. Durr and since these statements have not been repudiated by any other members of the Federal Communications Commsssion, I must assume that the material which the Bureau has been furnishing to the Commission is not desired by the Commission. I am consequently discontinuing the transmittal of such data to the Commission upon the assumption that the material is of no interest to the Commission.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

April 7, 1948

TO THE HEADS OF ALL DEPARTMENTS AND
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

In memorandum of October 7, 1947, I called attention to the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has primary investigative jurisdiction of Section 9-A (61-1, Title 18, USC) of the Hatch Act. It is also pointed out that under the provisions of a presidential interpretation dated 30 October 1947 the Federal Bureau of Investigation has the responsibility of investigating all charges of disloyalty on the part of Federal employees within the Executive Branch of the Government.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has sufficient investigative personnel under its direct supervision to carry out this responsibility in the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. However, it does not have personnel stationed in other areas of the world. Therefore, it has been necessary, in order that the Bureau may be enabled to carry out its responsibility, to arrange by agreement with the Departments and Agencies principally concerned for the delegation of the actual investigative work to certain other Departments of the Executive Branch in those areas where it has no investigative personnel.

It is recognized that there are two major classes of loyalty investigation. The first is the routine loyalty check of applicants for classified positions or of incumbents of such positions initiated in accord with Executive Order 9835. The second type is that in which doubt of loyalty of incumbents arises independently of the routine check. Procedures in regard to these two types must necessarily vary.

I. Routine loyalty checks of employees stationed overseas.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation will direct specific requests for the assistance of other agencies in handling the actual investigative work in accordance with the following principles:

A. The Department of the Army, Navy or Air Force shall be requested to utilize its own facilities for the necessary investigation of any of its own civilian personnel stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will continue to have the sole responsibility of conducting such investigation as is necessary within the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

involving civilian personnel of the Army, Navy or Air Force. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will refer to the appropriate agency all available material and will request investigation, and upon completion thereof, the reports should be furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation as provided hereafter.

B. With respect to the necessary investigation of any of the personnel of other Departments and Agencies stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands--

1. Requests for such investigation of Federal civilian employees stationed in occupied areas or areas under military investigative jurisdiction shall be directed to the Department of the Army, Navy, or Air Force for transmission to the Theater Commander or Area Commanding Officer, who will utilize for this purpose any appropriate investigative facility of the United States available in his area of command.

2. Requests for such investigation of any Federal civilian employees stationed in unoccupied areas shall be directed to the State Department for transmittal to its appropriate foreign office, which will utilize for this purpose any investigative authority of the United States available in that country, or, in case no competent investigative facilities are available in that country, the principal diplomatic officer shall refer the matter for investigation to the principal diplomatic officer stationed in a nearby country where investigative facilities are available.

The reports of completed investigations shall be returned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to its original request for assistance through the same channels utilized in transmitting the request for investigation, for consolidation with such material as the Bureau may have available in its files, or may have developed by investigation, and for further processing in line with the procedures which have been developed for carrying out the Loyalty Program.

II. "Complaint Type" loyalty checks of employees stationed overseas.

Such inquiries normally originate in the field and must be handled with the utmost possible dispatch. The agency in which the case originates will notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation as soon as a preliminary inquiry in the field has established grounds for a full investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will immediately check its files and inform the field agency of any derogatory information which it may have on file. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will at once open a full field investigation within the continental limits of the United States, etc., when such investigation is required by the availability of information within those areas. Completion of such investigation will be reported to the originating agency through normal channels.

A. The Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force will utilize their own facilities for the necessary investigation of any of their own civilian personnel stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

B. With respect to the necessary investigation under Class II of any of the personnel of other Departments and Agencies stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands:

1. In occupied areas the Theater Commander will have full responsibility to utilize any appropriate investigative facility of the United States available in his area of command.

2. In unoccupied areas the principal diplomatic officer will be responsible for utilizing any investigative facility of the United States which is available in the country of his jurisdiction, or, if there is no such investigative facility available within the country of his jurisdiction, he shall refer the matter to the principal diplomatic officer stationed in a nearby country in which investigative facilities are available.

The reports of completed investigation shall be forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation through normal channels.

It is understood that the declaration of emergency, or the establishment of martial law within areas of the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands will have the effect of making those areas "occupied territory," with the consequent application of procedures described in sections IA and BI and IIA above.

The agreement which this memorandum serves to record has to do only with the establishing of a method of handling actual investigations in areas where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has no investigative facilities. Furthermore, the procedures herein prescribed do not purport to limit in any way, or delay the exercise of, the authority possessed by certain Department and Agency heads summarily to dismiss employees where necessary in the interest of National Defense.

These loyalty investigations should be given preferential attention and prompt handling in all instances.

TOM C. CLARK
Attorney General

Inclos
FBI

[illegible]

[illegible] 1953

Honorable Philip Young
Chairman
Civil Service Commission
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Young:

As you know, subsection (d) of section 8 of Executive Order No. 10450 requires that there be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigations conducted by all agencies under the order which develop information of the type described in the subsection. The subsection further requires the FBI to make a full field investigation in cases so referred to it. However, except as indicated below, the FBI is not equipped to conduct investigations outside this country. In view of this limitation on its investigative facilities, an arrangement was worked out in connection with administration of Executive Order No. 9835 with respect to investigations in foreign areas. It is suggested that the procedures be continued in connection with investigations to be carried out by the FBI under Executive Order No. 10450. These are as follows:

(1) The FBI will conduct all necessary investigations in the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

(2) The Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force will each use its own facilities to conduct investigations in connection with its own civilian personnel outside the areas listed in (1) above.

(3) With respect to the investigation of civilian personnel, other than personnel of departments named in (2), above:

(a) The Theatre Commander or Post Commanding Officer will utilize any appropriate investigative facilities of the United States available to him in an occupied area or in areas under military investigative jurisdiction;

(b) In other areas the Department of State will utilize any investigative authority of the United States available in the country concerned. If no competent investigative facilities are available in that country the investigative facilities of the United States in a nearby country will be utilized by the Department of State.

To repeat, the foregoing represents the arrangement between agencies with respect to investigations abroad worked out in the administration of Executive Order No. 9835, and accordingly the procedures outlined will merely involve continuing present practices. In the absence of any indication of disagreement with the practices outlined above, this Department will conduct itself on the theory that they remain in effect.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Deputy Attorney General

Identical letters to:

Honorable John Foster Dulles,
Secretary of State

Honorable Charles E. Wilson,
Secretary of Defense

Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

April 14, 1953

Director, FBI

EXECUTIVE ORDER PROVIDING SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

Pursuant to your requests, memoranda dated February 4, 1953, February 26, 1953, April 6, 1953, and April 10, 1953, have been submitted to you containing observations regarding proposed drafts of the above Executive Order. Pursuant to the request of Mr. Edward S. Lazowska of the Department, who delivered a copy of a new draft of this proposed Order on the evening of April 13, 1953, the following observations are set forth for your information and consideration:

In connection with the provision in paragraph 3 (a) which allows the Civil Service Commission, in certain cases, to authorize less than the minimum amount of investigation stated in this paragraph but which meets the requirements of the national security, it is felt the Civil Service Commission must exercise extreme care to insure that any investigation authorized, particularly with respect to individuals who may have access to confidential information, does, in fact, meet the requirements of the national security.

In connection with Section 4 of the draft, your attention is invited to my previous observation that this Bureau feels it should conduct the additional investigation that may be appropriate only in those cases in which the purpose of the additional investigation is to develop information of a loyalty or subversive nature. In this connection it is observed that the provisions of Sections 8 (b) and 8 (c) may be intended to accomplish this purpose; however, it is suggested that you may desire to have the Order state more clearly regarding what agencies have the responsibilities to conduct the additional investigation requested in Section 4.

66-[illegible]-29

In connection with Section 5 of the draft, the thought occurs that its provisions as to what agency is required to conduct "such investigation as may be appropriate" may not be entirely clear. It is believed that the intent of this section is to provide that upon receipt by an agency of information necessitating investigation by the Civil Service Commission or the employing agency, such information should be forwarded to the Civil Service Commission or the employing agency; that upon the receipt of information necessitating investigation by this Bureau, such information should be forwarded to this Bureau for a full field investigation. You may wish to give consideration to possible further clarification of this section.

Regarding the phrase "following such investigation and review as he deems necessary" set forth in Section 6, it is believed that "as he deems necessary" refers to the word "review." If, however, it might also refer to the word "investigation," the thought occurs that it might be in conflict with other provisions in the draft which prescribe that in certain instances full field investigations must be conducted.

In connection with Section 8 (5) it is noted that this section does not specifically provide for sympathetic association with individu members of the organizations referred to in this section. In this connection, you will recall that the attachment to my memorandum of April 1 1953, set forth observations of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference regarding the draft, one of which concerned a suggestion along this line.

It is observed that Section 14 (a) authorizes the National Security Council to designate representatives of other Departments and agencies to furnish advice and to collaborate with the Civil Service Commission in connection with the Commission's study of the manner in which the Order is implemented. We would appreciate any information regarding the extent representatives of this Bureau might be expected to render advice and collaborate with the Civil Service Commission.

It would be appreciated if you could furnish the advice requested in my memorandum of February 26, 1953, regarding your desires as to this Bureau following the policy of channeling its investigative reports through the Civil Service Commission to the departments and agencies concerned.

It is noted that my previous memoranda raised the point as to what effect the abolishing of the Loyalty Review Board might have on Executive Order 10422. For your information, funds have been appropriated for the implementation of Executive Order 10422 and this Bureau is proceeding with investigations under this Order and submitting reports to the Civil Service Commission for appropriate adjudication.

Regarding what agencies will have investigative responsibilities abroad under this Order, as mentioned in my previous memoranda, you may wish to give consideration to, if possible, continuing the arrangements which have been perfected under Executive Order 9835.

My memorandum of April 6, 1953, commented regarding paragraph 8 (b) (4) of the draft received April 2, 1953. It was stated that it was felt investigations regarding individuals who might be subjected to coercion, influence or pressure because of the presence of a close relative in a nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States which develop a subversive aspect should be done by this Bureau rather than the Civil Service Commission or the employing agency. It is observed that Section 8 (d) of the draft received April 13, 1953, requires this Bureau to conduct all investigations which develop information indicating that an individual may have been subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security. It is suggested you might desire to clarify this provision further to specifically provide that investigations under this category will be conducted by this Bureau only where there is information indicating a question of loyalty or subversive activity.

As previously mentioned, it will be necessary that the rules and regulations to be issued in connection with the implementation of this Order, such as those governing the establishing and operation of hearing boards, be as complete as possible in order to maintain uniformity.

It will, of course, be necessary for this Bureau to receive sufficient funds in order to discharge its responsibilities under this Order.

Deputy Attorney General
William P. Rogers

May 1, 1953

Director, FBI

XEXECUTIVE ORDER 10450
XSECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

In connection with the implementation of Executive Order 10450, the following suggestions, which were previously furnished to you in connection with the drafts of the Order, are being set forth for your consideration for inclusion in the Security Regulations drawn up in connection with this Order:

There should be no abuse of the privilege granted to fill sensitive positions in emergency cases prior to the completion of full field pre-appointment investigations.

In order that there be no misunderstanding, it might be well to specify in the regulations that the Order covers only the Executive Branch of the Government.

It is the understanding of this Bureau that the Civil Service Commission maintains a register of persons eligible for Government employment. In connection with this register, under Executive Order 9835 these names have been processed in a manner similar to those of employees, and the adjudication made by the Civil Service Commission. Section 11 of the Order states that cases being heard by regional loyalty boards on the effective date of this Order in which no specific department or agency is involved shall be dismissed without prejudice to the applicant. This section, unless clarified in the regulations, may affect the Civil Service Commission's register of eligibles.

Information should be included advising what agencies have investigative responsibility abroad in connection with this Order. You may desire to continue the arrangements perfected under Executive Order 9835 regarding this matter.

There may be some question as to what agencies have investigative responsibilities in connection with the additional investigation that may be necessary in the readjudication of full field investigations under Executive Order 9835, as called for in Section 4 of the Order. As you were previously advised, this Bureau feels it should conduct such investigations only when the purpose is to develop information of a nature described in Section 8(d) of the Order. Unless specific information to this effect is included in the regulations, it can be anticipated that this Bureau will receive a large number of requests for investigations solely for the purpose of bringing the investigation up to date, or to develop some information of a nonsubversive nature.

Under Executive Order 9835, this Bureau, through agreement with the Civil Service Commission, followed the policy of sending all its reports to the Civil Service Commission for dissemination to the appropriate departments and agencies. As you know, the current Order requires that the Civil Service Commission maintain a security-investigations index, which is to include the index maintained by the Civil Service Commission in conjunction with Executive Order 9835. This Bureau believes the policy previously followed of sending these reports to the Civil Service Commission should be continued.

It will be necessary that a standard form containing sufficient identifying data be utilized in checking individuals' names through this Bureau's files and in connection with investigations conducted under this Order.

With reference to per-diem, intermittent, temporary, etc., employees, the Civil Service Commission should utilize extreme care in permitting, at the request of a department or agency head, less than the minimum investigation required in other cases.

Regarding Section 5 of the Order, this Bureau, on receipt of information of a nature necessitating investigation by it, contemplates following the policy of immediately initiating the investigation rather than awaiting a request for such an investigation by the department or agency concerned. The agency head, however, will be notified that information of a nature requiring investigation by this Bureau has been received and an investigation is being conducted and that upon request he will be furnished with the basis for the investigation. If it is felt that such a policy is in conflict with the provisions of the Order, it would be appreciated if consideration could be given to clarifying this in the regulations.

9 Apart from the above suggestions regarding the security regulations, it is noted that the abolition of the Civil Service Commission's regional loyalty boards and the Loyalty Review Board will affect the adjudication procedure required by Executive Order 10422. This is being called to your attention so that the necessary action may be taken to insure that there is no undue delay in connection with the adjudication of cases being investigated under Executive Order 10422.

10 Your attention is called to Section 9(k) of the Sample Security Regulations dated April 23, 1953. As you will observe, this section concerns the determinations made by hearing boards, and in part states: "One copy of the decision of the board, together with the complete record of the case, including investigative reports, shall be sent to the (head of department or agency) and one copy shall be sent to the employee." This Bureau is strongly opposed to making copies of its reports, in whole or in part, available to individuals investigated under this Order, and considers it absolutely necessary that its reports be maintained in confidence. Of course, this Bureau does not object to the employee's being advised, insofar as security considerations permit, of that information in the reports which is considered necessary in connection with the charges against the employee.

As you will observe, under Section 9(k) the employee could be furnished a copy of the complete record of the case. Such record might include confidential information in the possession of the board which security considerations do not permit making available to the employee. In this connection, it is noted that Section 5(a)(3) of the regulations states: "The decision of the hearing board shall be in writing and shall be signed by all members of the board. One copy of the decision shall be sent to the (head of department or agency) and one copy shall be sent to the suspended employee."

In addition, it is noted that the above provisions of Section 9(k) are contradictory to the provisions of Section 9(c) of the Order proper, which states that reports and other investigative material and information are to be maintained in confidence and no access given thereto, except, with the consent of the investigative agency concerned, to other departments and agencies conducting security programs under the authority of the act of August 26, 1950.

It is strongly urged that you amend the provisions in Section 9(k) of the Sample Security Regulations, because, unless such is done, some departments and agencies may furnish to the employee a copy of the complete record of the case, which would include this Bureau's investigative reports.

Your attention is called to Section 4(b) of the regulations setting forth provisions covering the scope of the investigation to be conducted. The provisions, as set forth, do not include a check of the fingerprint files of this Bureau. As Section 3(a) of the Order, itself, calls for a check of such files, it is suggested you may wish to include this also in the regulations.

Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

May 14, 1953

Director, FBI

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

Reference is made to this Bureau's memoranda dated February 6 and 26, 1953; April 6, 10, and 14, 1953, and May 1, 1953, regarding the captioned Executive Order.

Your immediate advice as to what agencies have the responsibility of conducting investigations abroad under this Order will be appreciated. It can be anticipated that this problem will immediately present itself upon the effective date of the Order. For example, this Bureau may receive a request to conduct a full field investigation regarding an employee who in the past has spent considerable time in foreign countries. Upon the receipt of such a request, it will be necessary to know to what agency a request to conduct the investigation abroad should be directed. As previously suggested, you may wish to continue the arrangements perfected for handling this problem under Executive Order 9835. For your information, these arrangements are set forth in a memorandum dated April 7, 1948, from the Attorney General to the heads of all departments and independent agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government. The thought occurs that you may desire to issue similar advice to all departments and agencies in connection with Executive Order 10450. (~~66-6200-121-290 & Part I, Section 2, Serial~~ 87 ~~of the Loyalty Policy File~~)

Another matter that may cause some difficulty after Executive Order 10450 becomes effective is the question of what agencies have investigative responsibility with respect to the conduct of the further investigation that may be considered appropriate in connection with the re-adjudication of cases of those employees concerning whom a full field investigation was conducted under Executive Order 9835; however, their cases have not heretofore been adjudicated under a security standard commensurate with that established under Executive Order 10450. As previously stated, this Bureau feels it should conduct such investigations only when the purpose is to develop information of a nature described in Section 8 (a) of the Order. It would ~~be~~ appreciated if you would advise whether you are in agreement with this. Should you agree with this policy, you may wish to so advise the heads of all departments and agencies as unless such is done, this Bureau may receive a large number of requests for investigations solely for the purpose of bringing the previous investigations up to date or to develop some allegation of a nonsubversive nature.

Your attention is invited to my memorandum of May 1, 1953, wherein I urged that the provisions in Section 9 (k) of the "Sample Security Regulations" be amended to preclude the possibility of any department or agency furnishing a copy of this Bureau's reports to the individuals investigated under the Order. It is believed this should be done prior to the effective date of Executive Order 10450, and I would appreciate being advised of what action is contemplated in this regard. It is observed that in connection with Executive Order 9835 the Attorney General under date of December 11, 1947, directed a confidential memorandum to all department and agency heads of the Executive Branch of the Government wherein he included information regarding the use of this Bureau's reports under Executive Order 9835. The Attorney General's memorandum stated, "The information appearing in Federal Bureau of Investigation reports is available for the consideration of the employing agency in preparing charges against the employee and for appropriate use by the hearing boards. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is opposed to making copies of its reports, in whole or in part, available to individuals as such, and particularly to persons investigated under the Program." Part III, Section I, Serial 31, of Loyalty Policy file)

It was noted in previous memoranda to you that this Bureau under Executive Order 9835, through agreement with the Civil Service Commission, followed the policy of sending all its reports to the Civil Service Commission for dissemination to the appropriate departments and agencies. It was suggested that as Executive Order 10450 requires the Civil Service Commission to maintain a security-investigations index regarding persons investigated under the Order, the policy of this Bureau sending all its reports to the Civil Service Commission be continued. Unless advice to the contrary is received from you, this Bureau contemplates following this policy.

The "Sample Security Regulations" prepared by the Department contains information regarding the manner in which hearings are to be conducted by the Security Hearing Boards under Executive Order 10450. These regulations, however, do not state whether these hearings are to be opened or closed to the public. For your information, the Loyalty Review Board in connection with the matter of hearings held under Executive Order 9835, issued a directive to all departments and agencies advising that such hearings should be in private and attendance limited to representatives of the agency who are directly connected with the adjudication of the case, representatives of the Loyalty Review Board, and the employee or applicant concerned, his counsel or representative, and the witness who is testifying. You may wish to issue appropriate advice to all departments and agencies regarding who shall be permitted to be present during hearings held under Executive Order 10450.

It is also noted that the "Sample Security Regulations" state that the employee shall be permitted to cross-examine any witness offered in support of the charges against him. This raises the question as to whether Security Hearing Boards may be allowed, upon the request of a witness, to hear such witness in the absence of the employee or his counsel. In connection with this problem under Executive Order 9835, the Loyalty Review Board issued a directive to all Executive departments and agencies permitting Loyalty Hearing Boards to hear witnesses in the absence of the employee and his counsel if the witnesses so requested. In this regard, this Bureau under Executive Order 9835, at the request of Mr. Hiram Bingham, Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, ascertains from individuals who permit their names to be used, who give pertinent information adverse to the employee and who do not expressly indicate an unwillingness to testify, their desires regarding the following questions:

1. Whether they will testify before a Loyalty Hearing Board in the presence of the individual under investigation and his counsel, which would subject them to cross-examination;

2. If not, whether they will testify before a Loyalty Hearing Board not in the presence of the individual under investigation and his counsel;

3. If they are unwilling to appear at a scheduled hearing or unable to be present, whether they are willing to have their statements read verbatim to the individual under investigation and his counsel;

4. If they do not appear, whether they are willing to have their names disclosed at the hearing.

This Bureau will continue the above policy under Executive Order 10450; however, should you determine that Security Hearing Boards may hear witnesses only in the presence of the employee and his counsel, it will be appreciated if you will immediately advise this Bureau so that all individuals interviewed who may later be requested to testify before a Security Hearing Board will clearly understand that such testimony must be in the presence of the employee and his counsel and they may be cross-examined by the employee or his counsel.

It can be anticipated that, in connection with some hearings held under Executive Order 10450, the hearing board may request agents of this Bureau to appear and testify. In this connection, this Bureau would appreciate it if the policy followed in this respect under Executive Order 9835 could be continued. This policy was set forth in a confidential memorandum from the Attorney General dated December 11, 1947, to all department and agency heads of the Executive Branch of the Government, which stated that Special Agents of this Bureau will testify before hearing boards where they are in a position to furnish competent evidence. They will not, however, participate otherwise in the proceedings nor will they be made available merely to interpret information appearing in their investigative reports. It is suggested you may wish to furnish such information to all departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government.

Previous memoranda to you observed that as Executive Order 10450 is an Executive Order, it is assumed its coverage is limited to the Executive Branch of the Government. In this connection, the question may arise as to whether the General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, and the Library of Congress might be permitted to participate in the procedures effected under Executive Order 10450. You may recall that they have participated in the procedures of Executive Order 9835. You may therefore desire to ascertain from the General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, and the Library of Congress whether they wish to participate in the procedures prescribed by Executive Order 10450, and if they do desire to participate, determine whether the provisions of Executive Order 10450 authorize such participation. It would be appreciated if you would immediately advise this Bureau what action it should take if the names and fingerprints of such employees are submitted to this Bureau for checking through its files or if requests for full field investigations are received concerning such employees prior to a final determination as to whether they are to participate in the procedures under Executive Order 10450.

It would be appreciated if you could furnish an early reply to the questions posed in this memorandum.

DC 709(1)

U[illegible]ED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMI[illegible]ON

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 18, 1953

DEPARTMENTAL CIRCULAR NO. 709

TO HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT ESTABLISHMENTS

SUBJECT: Designation of Officials to Whom Reports of Full Field Investigation Under Executive Order 10450 Should be Delivered

1. Forms requesting investigations under Executive Order 10450 should bear the address of the Personnel Security Officer to whom the reports of investigation should be sent. Forms for this purpose will be provided with a space for the address of the Personnel Security Officer.

2. Reports of investigation will be forwarded to the Personnel Security Officer except when a full field investigation is conducted by the Commission or by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Commission will deliver these reports of full field investigation to a designated official in the central office of your department or agency.

3. In order that the reports may be delivered properly, please furnish the Commission with the names and addresses of central-office officials of your department or agency to whom reports of full field investigation should be delivered. You should name one or more alternates to receive these reports in the absence of the first official. These names should be submitted to the Chief, Investigations Division, U. S. Civil Service Commission, Washington 25, D. C., within ten days of receipt of this letter.

4. Since some of the reports of full field investigation will contain security information, you should show with respect to each official designated the highest category of classified security information he has been cleared to receive.

5. Inquiries concerning this circular may be made by telephone to Code 171, extension 3111 or 3112.

By direction of the Commission:

C. L. Edwards

C. L. Edwards
Executive Director

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, FBI

DATE: June 25, 1953

FROM : William P. Rogers,
Deputy Attorney General

SUBJECT: Executive Order 10450
Security Requirements for Government Employment

This is with reference to your memoranda of May 1 and May 14, 1953, relating to the administration of Executive Order 10450.

1. Your opinion that there should be no abuse of the privilege granted by section 3(b) of the order in filling sensitive positions in emergency cases prior to the completion of full field pre-appointment investigations is well taken. So, also, is your suggestion that the Civil Service Commission, in respect to section 3(a), should utilize extreme care in permitting less than the minimum investigation with respect to per diem, intermittent, temporary, or seasonable employees and aliens employed outside the United States.

2. I agree with your assumption that the coverage of the order is limited to the Executive Branch of the Government. However, I do not believe it will be necessary to make specific provision in the regulations to that effect. Inasmuch as they are to be issued separately by and in the name of each executive branch, department or agency, it will be made clear that they relate only to the administration of the particular department or agency concerned.

You also make reference to the fact that certain of the non-executive branch agencies, such as the General Accounting Office and the Government Printing Office, participated in the procedures prescribed by Executive Order 9835. I understand this resulted, not because that order was necessarily applicable to those agencies, but because they voluntarily adopted procedures similar to those prescribed by the order. Executive Order 10450 does not prevent them from adopting a similar policy in relation to it. The main question is whether the appropriations of the FBI are sufficient to pay for the investigations required by such agencies. I understand that the appropriations are sufficient with respect to some of the agencies whose employees are part of the classified civil service, such as the General Accounting Office, but not for others, such as the Library of Congress. In the past a system of reimbursement was worked out with respect to investigations for agencies not covered by existing appropriations. I would suggest that the Bureau work out similar procedures with the Civil Service Commission and other interested agencies with respect to Executive Order 10450.

3. In reference to the problem of the responsibility of conducting investigations abroad, the Departments of State and Army were requested by letter dated June 5, 1953, to continue the same arrangement under Executive Order No. 10450 for investigations abroad as existed under Executive Order No. 9835. The letter stated that in the absence of any indication of disagreement with this plan, it would be assumed that the existing arrangement would remain in effect. To date no expressions of disagreement have come from either Department.

4. In respect to the re-adjudication question arising under section 4, I agree that the Bureau should conduct additional investigations only when their purpose is to develop information of the type described in section 8(d). However, I believe the Civil Service Commission, rather than this Department, should issue direct instructions to all departments and agencies as to proper procedures in connection with requests for investigation. I would accordingly recommend that you work out a plan with the Civil Service Commission to so advise the interested departments and agencies.

5. As you point out, the last sentence of section 9(k) of the sample security regulations is subject to possible interpretation requiring the employee to be given a copy of the investigative reports in connection with his case. In order to preclude this possibility, an appropriate amendment has been transmitted to all departments and agencies. Many of them have also been informally advised of the matter. In addition, since they are supposed to submit their regulations to this Department before issuance, proper precautions will be taken at that time.

✓ 6. I agree that your existing policy of sending all Bureau reports to the Commission for dissemination to the appropriate departments and agencies should be continued.

7. You note that the sample security regulations do not state whether the hearings are to be open or closed and that under Executive Order 9835 the Loyalty Review Board issued a directive to all departments and agencies requiring hearings under that order to be private. In accordance with your suggestion, an amendment to that effect has been transmitted to all executive departments and agencies.

8. You point out that the sample security regulations provide in section 9(c)(4) that each employee shall have the right "to cross-examine any witness offered in support of the charges", whereas under Executive Order 9835 the Loyalty Review Board issued

a directive permitting Loyalty Hearing Boards to hear witnesses in the absence of the employee and his counsel, if the witness so requested.

I understand the provision of section 9(c)(4) to be a deliberate policy judgment that witnesses, other than confidential informants, shall be subject to cross-examination. Accordingly, persons giving testimony will not have the choices set forth in your memorandum. I therefore suggest that you advise prospective witnesses that their testimony will have to be in the presence of the employee and his counsel and will be subject to cross-examination.

9. I consider the Bureau's policy of permitting Special Agents to testify at the hearings only "where they are in a position to furnish competent evidence," to be sound and suggest that you undertake through the Civil Service Commission to advise the agencies concerned that this policy will be continued.

10. Serious consideration has been given to your suggestion that dismissals without prejudice to applicants in cases before the Regional Loyalty Boards may effect the Civil Service Commission's register of eligibles. The Commission has already advised that it believes that, under the basic Civil Service Act, it can establish criteria with respect to the register of eligibles similar to those set out in the order. The Department has advised the Commission that the order does not preclude it from so acting under the authority of the Civil Service Act if it is satsified as to the existence of such authority.

11. I also go along with your view that it will be necessary that agencies use a standard form containing sufficient identifying data in checking individuals' names through the Bureau's files and in connection with investigations conducted under the Executive Order, and suggest that you work out a procedure for establishing such a form with the Civil Service Commission.

12. With relation to section 5 of the order you state that the Bureau, on receipt of information of a nature necessitating investigation by it, intends to follow the policy of immediately initiating the investigation rather than awaiting a request from the department or agency concerned, but notifying the head of the department or agency that information of a nature requiring investigation by the Bureau has been received and an investigation is being conducted. You also mention that upon request the interested agency will be furnished with the basis for the investigation. I do not believe this policy to be in conflict with any provision of the order and see no reason why you should not follow the policy you suggest.

13. You point out that section 3(a) of the order requires "a check of the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation", but that section 4(b) of the sample security regulations dealing with the same subject matter omits the quoted language. In accordance with your suggestion, an amendment to the regulations along the lines you suggest has been transmitted to all executive departments and agencies.

14. You note that the abolition of Regional Loyalty Boards and the Loyalty Review Board will affect procedures pursuant to Executive Order 10422 relating to United States citizens who are United Nations employees. As you suggested, amendments to cover this situation have been promulgated to all executive departments and agencies.

Date: July 2, 1953

To: Mr. James E. Hatcher
Chief, Investigations Division
U. S. Civil Service Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450
- SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

With the inception of the captioned Executive Order it became evident to this Bureau that certain problems would arise which have been encountered in the past in this Bureau's operations under the provisions of Executive Order 9835. Several of these have been posed to the Department of Justice and the latter has now furnished this Bureau its advice regarding them.

One consideration is just what agencies in the Federal Government are to be included in the operations of Executive Order 10450. As your files will reflect, by letter dated August 21, 1947, the Honorable Arthur S. Flemming, then the Acting President of the Commission, furnished this Bureau a list of all such agencies to be included within the provisions of Executive Order 9835. Numbered among these were the General Accounting Office and the Government Printing Office, neither of which were agencies of the Executive Branch. The thought occurred as to whether these agencies are to be included under the new program and if so whether your estimates of cases to be handled for these agencies in the current and succeeding fiscal years which you have furnished this Bureau include the General Accounting Office and the Government Printing Office.

It is understood that the Commission considers employees of these agencies within the provisions of Executive Order 9835 since they are competitive employees as are the bulk of [illegible]

JUL 6

employees of several executive agencies. It would be appreciated if you would furnish this Bureau a list of the agencies to be included within the provisions of Executive Order 10450 at your earliest convenience. In addition, would you advise whether the General Accounting Office and the Government Printing Office and their employees will be considered as subject to the provisions of the captioned order. If such is the case we would appreciate your advice as to whether your estimate of the volume of work to be handled for these agencies was included in the budgetary estimates furnished this Bureau.

As you are aware, employees of the Library of Congress have been processed under Executive Order 9835 through agreement with officials of the Library and the results of name checks and investigations handled for the Library were compensated for on a reimbursable basis. Would you advise whether the agreement had with the Library of Congress for processing its employees under the old Loyalty Order has been renewed for Executive Order 10450. If such is the case is the Library of Congress agreeable to continue the procedure of reimbursement for each matter handled?

With regard to the question as to what agencies have investigative responsibilities in connection with the additional investigation that may be necessary in the readjudication of full field investigations conducted under Executive Order 9835 as called for in Section 4 of the captioned order, this Bureau feels it should conduct such investigations only when the purpose is to develop information of a nature described in Section 8(d) of this order. The Department of Justice advised that it concurs in this opinion and stated that it feels the Civil Service Commission should issue direct instructions to all departments and agencies as to the proper procedures to be followed in connection with requests for further investigation. It is felt that if such instructions are issued it will preclude the receipt of a large number of requests by the FBI for investigation solely to bring the previous investigation up to date or to develop some allegations of a nonsubversive nature. For your further information, the Department of Justice has advised that it agrees this Bureau should continue the procedure established under the Loyalty Order of channeling its investigative reports through the Civil Service Commission for dissemination to the appropriate departments or agencies.

Your attention is invited to the letter from Mr. Peter Campbell Brown, then the Acting Assistant to the Attorney General, to the Honorable Seth W. Richardson, then the Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, dated May 5, 1949. Therein Mr. Brown requested Mr. Richardson to clarify Review Board instructions to the various departments and agencies to the effect that "Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will testify before Hearing Boards where they are in a position to furnish competent evidence. They will not, however, participate otherwise in the proceedings or will they be made available merely to interpret information appearing in their investigative reports." This policy will continue to be the policy of this Bureau under Executive Order 10450 and it has been concurred in by the Department of Justice. The Department has further suggested that the Commission so advise the various departments and agencies that this policy will be continued.

These points are being called to your attention in order that you may furnish this Bureau the information requested above, as well as give consideration to the necessity for furnishing instructions as outlined above to the various agencies for their information and guidance in the operations of Executive Order 10450.

COPY

Egan

File: I:LK:hh

July 16, 1953

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Attached is a list of agencies in the Federal government which are to be included in the operations of Executive Order 10450. This information was requested by your letter of July 2, 1953, addressed to Mr. James E. Hatcher, Chief, Investigations Division.

The subject of investigations for the General Accounting Office, Government Printing Office, and Library of Congress is being covered in a separate letter.

The Commission will issue instructions to all departments and agencies as to the proper procedures to be followed in connection with requests for further investigation under Section 4 of Executive Order 10450. Instructions will also be issued regarding testimony by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before security hearing boards.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Joseph E. Winslow

Joseph E. Winslow
Acting Executive Director

Attachment

COPY

COPY

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES INCLUDED IN THE OPERATIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT:

White House Office
Bureau of the Budget
Council of Economic Advisers
Executive Mansion and Grounds
National Security Council
National Security Resources Board
Office of Defense Mobilization
Office of the Director for Mutual Security
President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS:

- State
- Treasury
- Department of Defense
  - Office of the Secretary of Defense
  - Department of the Army
  - Department of the Navy
  - Department of the Air Force
- Justice
- Post Office
- Interior
- Agriculture
- Commerce
- Labor
- Health, Education and Welfare

INDEPENDENT AGENCIES:

- American Battle Comuments Commission
- Atomic Energy Commission
- Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System
- Canal Zone Government
- Central Intelligence Agency
- Civil Aeronautics Board
- Civil Service Commission
  - Federal Personnel Council
- Committee on Government Contract Compliance
- Committee on Retirement Policy for Federal Personnel

COPY

INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: (Continued)

Defense Materials Procurement Agency
Defense Transport Administration
Economic Stabilization Agency
Export-Import Bank
Federal Civil Defense Administration
Federal Coal Mine Safety Board of Review
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
Federal Power Commission
Federal Trade Commission
General Accounting Office
General Services Administration
Government Printing Office
Housing and Home Finance Agency
Indian Claims Commission
International Boundary and Water Commission
Interstate Commerce Commission
Mutual Security Agency
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
National Capital Housing Authority
National Capital Planning Commission
National Labor Relations Board
National Mediation Board
National Science Foundation
National Security Training Commission
Panama Canal Company
Railroad Retirement Board
Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Renegotiation Board
Securities and Exchange Commission
Selective Service System
Small Defense Plants Administration
Smithsonian Institution
    National Gallery of Art
Soldiers Home
Subversive Activities Control Board
Tariff Commission
Tax Court of the United States
Tennessee Valley Authority
Veterans Administration
War Claims Commission

UN D STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ADDRESS ONLY
"CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION"
IN YOUR REPLY REFER TO
FILE
AND DATE OF THIS LETTER

July 21, 1953

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

You will recall that several agencies of the Legislative Branch of the Government participated in the loyalty program prescribed in Executive Order 9835. These same agencies have made requests of the Commission that they be permitted to participate in a similar manner under the program prescribed in Executive Order 10450. By letter dated June 29, 1953, the Deputy Attorney General advised the Commission that if these agencies are of the view that they can adopt procedures which would make it possible for them to participate in the program by virtue of authority conferred under the acts under which they operate, it would be entirely appropriate for them to participate in the program on a voluntary basis. It was suggested in this letter that the Commission work out with your Bureau the question relating to reimbursement by the agencies involved.

Because of the above opinion I have attached for your consideration proposed undated drafts of letters to the Librarian of Congress, The Public Printer, and the Director of Personnel of the General Accounting Office advising that subject to their meeting the above conditions they may participate in this program. The budget estimates of the Commission for some time have included work items which would result from making national agency checks and inquiries and limited personal investigations, when necessary, for the Government Printing Office and the General Accounting Office. It is our understanding that this is true with respect to the budget estimates of your Bureau insofar as they pertain to searching fingerprint records and Standard Forms 87 for employees of these agencies and making full field investigations when necessary under Section 8(d) of Executive Order 10450. For this reason no feature of reimbursement has been mentioned in our proposed letters to these agencies.

The Commission is willing to conduct for the Library of Congress on a reimbursable basis activities which it would perform for an agency in the Executive Branch under Executive Order 10450. I have taken the liberty of including in the draft to the Librarian of Congress the basis for reimbursing your Bureau for its part in this program. This was done for discussion purposes. It is not the Commission's intent to imply commitments on the part of the FBI.

After your review I would appreciate your returning the enclosures to me together with any comments or suggestions you may wish to make.

Sincerely yours,

Jos. E. Winslow

Joseph E. Winslow
Acting Executive Director

Enclosure 28952

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20415

IN REPLY PLEASE REFER TO

YOUR REFERENCE

December 2, 1965

Honorable Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RECEIVED
DEC 3 1965

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The President has directed the Civil Service Commission, after consulting with the major users of personnel investigations, to formulate and issue minimum standards of acceptable investigative coverage for Federal civilian employment.

I should appreciate your comments and suggestions relative to the following proposed minimum standards for acceptable full field coverage:

Scope of Full Field Investigations

Full field investigations on Federal employees and applicants are personally conducted investigations which cover the life of the individual with special emphasis on the person's background and activities during the most recent fifteen years, or since his eighteenth birthday, whichever is the shorter period. In addition, a thorough personal investigation is made of any materially derogatory matters developed, requiring investigation before the fifteen-year period.

The basic elements of investigation are:

- a national agency check, as described on page 736-3 of the Federal Personnel Manual.
- personal interviews with present and former employers, supervisors, fellow workers, references, neighbors, school authorities and other associates.
- checks of police, credit, [illegible] field office and other pertinent records as appropriate, such as Immigration and Naturalization, Passport Division of the State Department, vital statistics, military service, and the like.

[illegible]-100-[illegible]-0[illegible]
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
1965
R.A.C.
INTERNAL SECURITY
Criminal Section

INDEXED

ENCLOSURE

Personal interviews are scheduled with employers, supervisors, and work associates to verify and obtain pertinent details for all employments in the investigative period. Particular care is taken also to verify the fact of unemployment or self-employment claimed by the subject of investigation.

The last period of education at a college level is always verified by a check of the school records. Secondary education is investigated when the subject is young and has had no subsequent schooling. Personal interviews are conducted with witnesses such as professors and former students who were associated with the subject during recent schooling.

Neighborhood investigation is regularly conducted to cover residence during the most recent three years. Testimony of neighbors before that period may be sought to verify periods of unemployment or self-employment, or to resolve questionable matters which have been raised from other sources.

The number of witnesses interviewed cannot be reduced to a formula but in each case depends upon the diversity of the subject's experience and places of residence, as well as upon the depth of knowledge shown by witnesses concerning the subject's character, habits, and background. The objective of the investigation is to obtain a comprehensive and well-rounded picture of the individual's background and activities.

Matters Covered in Full Field Investigations

Basically, full field investigations are designed to develop sufficient information to enable agency security officials to determine the fitness of persons entering critical-sensitive positions. Fitness includes both security and suitability elements.

Character, habits, morals, and reputation are investigated generally. Loyalty is particularly stressed and if a question is raised concerning the subject's loyalty the case is referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with Section 8 (d) of Executive Order 10450. Particular attention is directed to such matters as immorality, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, lack of integrity, dismissals from employment, arrests, financial responsibility, and health.

The affirmative qualities and qualifications of the subject are fully reported.

Over and above the minimum standards, the full field investigation may be tailored to obtain information in depth concerning special attributes and qualifications required for proper performance in the particular kind of position involved.

To facilitate early completion of this study, I should like to receive your comments by December 31, 1965. Mr. Kimbell Johnson, Director, Bureau of Personnel Investigations, is available to discuss any aspect of the proposed standards with members of your staff. He may be reached on Code 183, Extension 7205.

Sincerely yours,

John W Macy Jr

John W. Macy, Jr.
Chairman

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

December 15, 1965

Director, FBI

SCOPE OF FULL FIELD INVESTIGATIONS

Reference is made to your letter of December 9, 1965, forwarding a copy of Chairman Macy's letter of December 2, 1965, concerning minimum standards for acceptable full field coverage.

As you are aware, this Bureau conducts our own personnel investigations. The scope of these and other full field investigations conducted by this Bureau under various programs, such as the Federal Employee Security Program and the United Nations Loyalty Program, exceeds the minimum standards set forth in Chairman Macy's letter. The letter of December 2, 1965, does not change the investigative responsibilities of this Bureau.

In view of the above, this Bureau has no comments to make concerning the proposed minimum standards of acceptable investigative coverage for Federal civilian employment. This Bureau took a similar position in connection with this matter in a letter to Mr. Kimball Johnson dated April 22, 1959.

The Attorney General

March 20, 1973

Acting Director, FBI

EXECUTIVE ORDERS 9835,
10450, AND 11605

Executive Order 9835, Part III, paragraph 3, provided that the Attorney General "after appropriate investigation and determination" would furnish to the Loyalty Review Board the name of each foreign or domestic organization which the Attorney General had designated "as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."

Executive Order 10450, Section 12, revoked Executive Order 9835, as amended; however, it provided that the Department of Justice "shall continue to furnish the information described in paragraph 3 of Part III" of Executive Order 9835, "but directly to the head of each department or agency."

Executive Order 11605, paragraph 2, amended Section 12 of Executive Order 10450 by, among other provisions, providing that "the head of each department and agency shall be furnished by the Attorney General with the name of each organization which shall be or has been heretofore designated under this order" and that "nothing. . . herein shall. . . affect previous designations made pursuant to Executive Order 10450, as amended." (Subparagraph (b)) Executive Order 11605 further provided that "the Subversive Activities Control Board shall, upon petition of the Attorney General, conduct appropriate hearings to determine whether any organization is totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or whether it has adopted a policy of unlawfully advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means." (Subparagraph (c))

JFM:glw
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

To date, Congress has refused to appropriate funds for the operation of the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB).

During a current study of FBI jurisdiction by this Bureau, the questions have arisen: has the authority to designate organizations been taken from the Attorney General and given to the SACB by Executive Order 11605, or is this authority concurrent; and at this time, what are the responsibilities and authority of the FBI under Executive Order 10450, as amended, and Executive Order 11605?

Would you please provide me with a statement of the Department's current position on these questions.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : L. Patrick Gray
Acting Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: April 3, 1973

FROM : Henry E. Petersen
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

SUBJECT: Executive Orders 9835, 10450, and 11605

This is in reference to your memorandum dated March 20, 1973 in which you requested to be advised regarding the Department's position relating to the above executive orders.

In the event the Subversive Activities Control Board ceases to function after July 1, 1973, the designation program as authorized by E. O. 10450, as amended, will continue to remain in effect. The Board's demise will, however, eliminate it as the body which at this time has the exclusive authority to conduct, upon petition of the Attorney General, the evidentiary hearings and make the determinations as to whether an organization should be designated within the criteria and standards specified by E. O. 10450, as amended by E. O. 11605.

The question of revising E. O. 10450 to overcome any deficiency which arises as a result of the demise of the Board is currently under study in the Department. There is also legislation pending to afford Congressional approval to E. O. 11605. Until such time as these matters are resolved, it is requested that the Bureau continue to conduct the investigations which it has carried out under E. O. 10450 which is, of course, still in effect.

May 8, 1974

Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

Director, FBI

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

Executive Order (EO) 10450 is currently being amended by the Department and representatives of this Bureau have participated in a task force headed by Mr. Oran Waterman, Director, Department Security Staff, which is recommending certain changes be made in EO 10450.

During the course of discussions within the task force, it was pointed out to Mr. Waterman the Bureau's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic subversion field has come under considerable scrutiny. This Bureau is now conducting investigations of domestic subversion on the basis of existing Federal statutes. This investigative policy may not adequately meet the needs of an effective security of Government employees program under EO 10450.

The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, previously solicited our views on abolition of the Attorney General's List. In our response captioned "Abolition of the Attorney General's List," dated April 11, 1974, our comments included advice that under our current statutory basis for domestic subversion investigations may not adequately meet the needs of EO 10450 and the observation the FBI has never received specific instructions from the Attorney General to conduct intelligence-type investigations to identify and determine the activities of organizations described in Section 8 (a) (5) of EO 10450. We also requested to be advised as to the instructions of the Attorney General relating to the FBI conducting intelligence-type investigations under EO 10450, as well as the scope and parameters within which such investigations should be conducted.

Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

Our current practice of conducting subversive-type investigations based on Federal statutes may tend to restrict our intelligence gathering concerning organizations, associations, movements, groups and combinations of persons as defined in Section 8 (a) (5) of EO 10450. In responding to our above-referred-to memorandum of April 11, 1974, it is recommended the Attorney General consider issuance of some form of Departmental instructions or order establishing firm guidelines for intelligence-type investigations which would define our authority in this regard. It is believed this would put the FBI on a firm foundation to conduct intelligence-type investigations involving groups defined in Section 8 (a) (5) to adequately support EO 10450. We have previously recommended that the Department seek a comprehensive Executive Order, and furnished suggested language, which would provide a firm basis for FBI intelligence-type investigations in the security field. This recommendation is still under study by the Department.

We would be glad to meet with representatives of the Department to discuss this matter in more detail.

1 - Director
Department Security Staff

Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

August 19, 1974

Director, FBI

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

Since the issuance of Executive Order 11785 on June 4, 1974, abolishing the Attorney General's list of designated organizations, one of the standards used by the FBI in initiating investigations of individuals pursuant to Executive Order 10450 has been eliminated. This is true with regard to investigations under captioned matter of individuals which may be initiated by the FBI based on information contained in our files as well as in evaluating requests for investigations of individuals received from other agencies and departments pursuant to Section 8(d) of Executive Order 10450.

In this connection it is noted that the Criminal Division of the Department in its letter of July 11, 1974, advised that continued investigation by the FBI of the Nation of Islam is warranted because, among other things, "its reported activities appear to come within the criteria of Executive Order 10450."

In view of the issuance of Executive Order 11785, it will be appreciated if you will furnish guidelines to be used by the FBI in initiating investigations of individuals under captione matter pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and specifically criteri to be utilized in determining whether available information is sufficient basis for an investigation.

1 - Director
    Department Security Staff

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: AUG 23 1974

FROM : Glen E. Pommerening
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

SUBJECT: Federal Employee Security Program
Executive Order 10450

The practice as set forth in your subject memorandum of August 14, 1974, for furnishing to the Office of Management and Finance copies of investigative reports satisfies the needs of the Department.

Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

August 14, 1974

Director, FBI

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

This will confirm the request on August 6, 1974, of Mr. Oran H. Waterman, Director, Department Security Staff, advising he was acting on a request from your office, that copies of reports containing the results of investigations of individuals conducted under captioned matter pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 10450 be furnished, where pertinent, to his office directly rather than through your office. This procedure was instituted on August 6, 1974. After review by the Department Security Staff it is understood that the reports are forwarded to the Criminal Division.

As in the past, these reports are furnished to the Department in order that consideration may be given as to whether any Federal laws have been violated and for information concerning possible subversive infiltration into the Executive Branch of the Government.

With regard to a determination as to whether any Federal laws have been violated, it is noted the violations generally involve Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1001, and a response is received from the Criminal Division.

Information concerning subversive infiltration into the Executive Branch of the Government is furnished for the Department's assistance in discharging its responsibilities under Section 13 of Executive Order 10450 which reads: "The Attorney General is requested to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish and maintain an appropriate employee security program."

It will be appreciated if you will advise if the practice set forth above is responsive to the needs of the Department.

MAILED 20
AUG 14 1974

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1
1
A

TO : Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: NOV 1 1974

FROM : Glen E. Pommerening
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

SUBJECT: Federal Employee Security Program
Executive Order 10450

This is in response to your memoranda, entitled as above, dated May 8, 1974 and August 19, 1974, directed to the Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division, and referring to problems which have arisen as a result of the promulgation of Executive Order 11785 which amends Executive Order 10450. In view of the involvement of my staff in these matters, I will undertake to answer your questions with the concurrence of the Criminal Division.

As you know this matter has been under continuing review both in the Task Force, chaired by a representative of this office, of working level representatives of various agencies in the security field and is now under study to a lesser degree in Project #10 of the "Domestic Council on Privacy".

You ask that the Department; (a) provide specific instructions to the Bureau to conduct intelligence-type investigations to identify and determine the activities of organizations now described in the amended Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450; (b) furnish guidelines to be used by the Bureau in initiating investigations of individuals under the captioned matter pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and specifically, criteria to be utilized in determining whether available information is a sufficient basis for investigation.

Under the amendment to Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450, we now have only two types of organizations; (1) those which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the constitution or laws of the United States or

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

any State, (2) or which seek to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof, by unlawful means. (Emphasis added).

Of course, the key words which are underlined indicate that the investigation should be initially based on a possible violation of a federal (such as the Smith Act) or state statute prohibiting unlawful advocacy or the commission of any unlawful act of force or violence. However, in order for the Bureau to detect organizations with a potential of the above nature, it is important that the investigation proceed on the basis of information indicating that the organization may be of the nature mentioned. It is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated, but only that a reasonable evaluation of the available information suggests that the activities of the organization may fall within the proscription of the Order. The most recent example of the type of organization, that you have advised is becoming more prevalent, is the small but dedicated to violence, Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). Organizations of this nature would clearly fall within the Order and should be investigated as soon as information is available indicating their potentiality for violence and of course, if possible, prior to the fulfillment of their purposes.

It is true that Executive Order 11785 eliminated the prior communist, totalitarian, fascist, and subversive characterizations and definitions, but there was no intention of restricting the investigations of such organizations if their programs call for acts of force or violence or the unlawful advocacy of the commission of acts of force or violence in furtherance of these programs.

It is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order but once the investigation reaches a stage that offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the investigation suggests a determination that the organization is engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it should continue.

It follows in answer to your second question that individuals who are active either as members of or as affiliates of

organizations described above should be investigated when information is received indicating their involvement. The same yardstick indicated above for organizations in determining whether the investigation should continue, should apply concerning individuals and when a determination can reasonably be made that the individuals activities, either within the organization or as an individual, do not appear to be in violation of any law, then the investigation should cease.

December 11, 1974

Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

Director, FBI

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

Reference is made to your memorandum dated November 1, 1974, in answer to our previous inquiries requesting advice concerning the effect of Executive Order (EO) 11785 on our investigations of organizations and individuals engaged in subversive activities.

While referenced memorandum advises we should use the same yardstick for investigation of subversive organizations and subversive individuals, the comments following that advice, concerning individuals, are believed subject to interpretation as being more restrictive in scope. Specifically, concerning organizations, you essentially advised that when investigation determines the activities are legal in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the activities are illegal or potentially illegal, the investigation should continue. Concerning individuals, the memorandum advises essentially that the same yardstick be used but adds when the activities do not appear to be in violation of any law, then the investigation should cease.

Further, the tenor of your memorandum, particularly comments contained in page two, paragraph one, follow the concept of investigative scope consistent with the advice as to investigation of subversive organizations but does appear to conflict with the latter comments concerning investigation of individuals where the phrase "not in violation of any law" is used. We would appreciate clarification concerning this matter.

CWT/RHE:djr
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

Your memorandum of November 1, 1974, in part, responded to this Bureau's memorandum of August 19, 1974, which asked for guidelines to be used by the FBI in initiating investigations of applicants and employees in the Executive Branch of the Government pursuant to Section 8(d) of EO 10450. This Section specifically instructs other agencies to promptly refer to the FBI for investigation those cases which develop information indicating that an individual may have been subjected to coercion, influence or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information relating to any of the other matters described therein.

Since the guidelines furnished by you are concerned primarily with possible violation of law, a decision to be made by the Department, it will be appreciated if you will furnish additional guidelines to cover "sympathetic association" and other standards mentioned in Section 8(a) (2) through (8) when the investigation concerns an applicant or employee in the Executive Branch of the Government.

In considering the foregoing, it should be noted the FBI has another responsibility under EO 10450 which is set forth in Section 5. This Section provides that whenever there is developed or received by any department or agency information indicating that the retention in employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, such information shall be forwarded to the head of the employing department or agency or his representative.

Your attention is also invited to Chapter 736 of the Federal Personnel Manual, which instructs agencies to promptly refer to the FBI for investigation cases "which develop information indicating that a person may have been subject to coercion, influence or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information on possible disloyalty to the United States."

Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

Chapter 732 of the Federal Personnel Manual instructs that before an agency issues a letter of charges under EO 10450, the Department of Justice shall be consulted to assure that the rights of the employees are fully considered. Section 13 of EO 10450 requests the Attorney General to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish and maintain an appropriate employee security program.

Available information indicates that difficulties of proof imposed by the courts in loyalty and security cases have proved almost insurmountable and as a result no removals or other adverse actions have been taken on these grounds for several years and the adjudicative basis has apparently shifted from loyalty and security to suitability.

An early response in this matter will be appreciated.

NOTE:

We have corresponded with the Department concerning amendments to EO 10450 by EO 11785 and requested guidelines as to our investigations of subversive matters defined in EO 10450 as amended by EO 11785 as none have been previously furnished by the Department. This is necessary because the Federal Employee Security Program depends on subversive information originating with our subversive investigations. The foregoing requests clarification in conflicting language in the Department's response as to subversive investigations and response to questions concerning the FBI's investigative role in the above Program.

Although our original inquiry was directed to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, the Department memorandum notes Assistant Attorney General, Administrative Division, answered with concurrence of the Criminal Division. We are, therefore, directing our request for clarification to Assistant Attorney General for Administration.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
3 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
(1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar)
(1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff)

1 - Mr. Fehl
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - Mr. Stoops

March 3, 1976 #MDR-6 2/6/01

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP3ALM/RP

62-116395

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 9, 1976, requesting appropriate FBI materials describing the policy and procedures of the Bureau for investigations carried out pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 10450, (enclosed), as amended, including, but not limited to, the standards for checking the names for Federal employees or prospective employees in FBI files (a National Agency Check) the standards for determining whether or not there is "derogatory information" in the FBI files, the policies for dissemination of such information, and the circumstances under which the FBI will conduct its own investigation of a prospective Federal employee. Set forth below is this Bureau's response to the requests mentioned in referenced letter. Also enclosed are materials responsive to the requests mentioned in referenced letter.

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE FBI FOR INVESTIGATIONS PURSUANT TO EO 10450, AS AMENDED

Executive Order (EO) 10450, as amended, came into existence on April 27, 1953, and serves as the basic authority under which most personnel investigations are conducted at the present time involving applicants and employees in the Executive Branch.

EO 10450, in its preamble, states that the interests of the national security require all persons privileged to be employed by the Government shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States.

Section 2 requires the agency head to maintain an effective program to insure that the employment or retention of applicants and employees is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

Original and one copy to AG.
GLS:pln/kkk
-14-

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
pec. Inv. ___
aining ___
Coun. ___
ne Rm. ___
ec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Section 8 lists the conditions for developing information which is of investigative and, by inference, adjudicative interest.

Section 13 states: "The Attorney General is requested to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish and maintain an appropriate employee security program."

Chapter 732 of the Federal Personnel Manual instructs that before an agency issues a letter of charges under EO 10450, the Department of Justice shall be consulted to assure that the rights of the employees are fully considered.

The Government Printing Office, General Accounting Office, and Library of Congress, all in the Legislative Branch, voluntarily participated in the loyalty program prescribed by EO 9835. The same agencies desired to participate in the program set up by EO 10450. These agencies again, with the approval of the Department of Justice, worked out with the Department and with the Civil Service Commission procedures for their participation in EO 10450. The results of FBI investigations under EO 10450 concerning applicants and employees of these agencies in the Legislative Branch are furnished to the Civil Service Commission, which in turn furnishes the results to the designated officials in the specific agency.

Available information indicates that difficulties of proof imposed by the courts in loyalty and security cases are considered almost insurmountable and as a result no removal or other adverse actions have been taken on these grounds for several years and the adjudicative basis has shifted from loyalty and security to suitability. Thus, favorable determinations are said to be based on EO 10450 while unfavorable decisions almost always rely on the suitability provisions of Civil Service Regulations.

It is noted that you have previously reviewed Section 19, "Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Government Agencies," FBI Manual of Instructions, Volume II, which contains instructions to be followed for investigations carried out pursuant to EO 10450, as amended. This should be referred to for an understanding of the FBI's policy and procedures.

Section 8(d) reads as follows:

> There shall be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation all investigations being conducted by any other agencies which develop information indicating that an individual may have been subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information relating to any of the matters described in subdivisions (2) through (8) of subsection (a) of this section. In cases so referred to it, the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make a full field investigation.

Chapter 736 of the Federal Personnel Manual instructs agencies to promptly refer to the FBI for investigation cases "which develop information indicating that a person may have been subject to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information on possible disloyalty to the United States." This Chapter also requires that "information as to subversive activity on the part of employees in the Executive Branch....is referred by the employing agency.... to the Federal Bureau of Investigation" so that necessary investigation is conducted by the FBI.

In a memorandum dated August 19, 1974, (enclosed), to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, with a copy for the Director, Department Security Staff, Department of Justice, reference was made to EO 11785 dated June 4, 1974, (enclosed), which abolished the Attorney General's list of designated organizations, one of the standards used by the FBI in initiating investigations of individuals pursuant to EO 10450. It was pointed out this standard was eliminated with regard to investigations of applicants and employees in the Executive Branch which may be initiated by the FBI based on information in our files as well as in evaluating requests for investigations of individuals received from other agencies and departments pursuant to Section 8(d) of EO 10450. Guidelines were requested for the use of the FBI in initiating investigations of individuals pursuant to EO 10450 and specifically criteria to be utilized in determining whether available information is sufficient basis for investigation under EO 10450.

A response to these inquiries was made by the Assistant Attorney General for Administration on November 1, 1974, (enclosed), advising that the FBI should continue to conduct investigations to identify organizations coming within the purview of Section 8(a)(5) of EO 10450, i.e., organizations which: (1)unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or any State; or (2)which seek to overthrow the Government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means. The Department advised that if the investigation of an organization "suggests a determination that the organization is engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities, it should continue.

Regarding the investigation of individuals, the Department advised that members or affiliates of organizations described above should be investigated and the same yardstick should be utilized as was indicated for organizations in determining whether the investigation should continue. The Department added, however, that "when a determination can reasonably be made that the individual's activities, either within the organization or as an individual, do not appear to be in violation of any law, then the investigation should cease."

In a memorandum dated December 11, 1974, (enclosed), to the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, clarification was requested of the guidelines for investigations by the FBI of applicants and employees in the Executive Branch under EO 10450 since the Department's statement that the same yardstick should be utilized in the case of organizations and individuals appears to be at variance with that used concerning organizations.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

STANDARDS FOR CHECKING FBI FILES FOR A NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

Section 3(a) provides that the appointment of each civilian employee shall be made subject to investigation but in no event shall the investigation include less than a national agency check including a check of the fingerprint files of the FBI.

Although the scope of a national agency check is not defined in EO 10450, Chapter 736 of the Federal Personnel Manual defines a national agency check as including a check of the fingerprint files, Identification Division, FBI, and of the investigative files of the FBI.

STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS "DEROGATORY INFORMATION" IN THE FBI FILES

The standards for determining what is derogatory information is such information that shall relate, but shall not be limited to, those facts described in subdivisions (1-8) of Section 8(a).

POLICIES FOR DISSEMINATION OF SUCH DEROGATORY INFORMATION

Section 5 of EO 10450 provides:

> Whenever there is developed by any department or agency information indicating that the retention in employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, such information shall be forwarded to the head of the employing department or agency or his representatives....

If the FBI receives information coming within the provisions of this section, the FBI has the responsibility to disseminate it whether it be of a suitability or loyalty nature. Chapter 735 of the Federal Personnel Manual contains language similar to that in Section 5. The conditions for the types of derogatory information involved are set forth in Section 8(a) of the Order.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Supplement Number 4 (revised) of Departmental Order 3464, signed by the Attorney General on January 13, 1953, provides that all files, documents, records and reports in the Department of Justice shall be regarded as of a confidential nature.

The Attorney General by memorandum dated December 5, 1947, advised the Bureau that the practice in passing along to the various government departments and agencies information which comes to its attention in connection with the conducting of investigations, normally and regularly within the Bureau's jurisdiction, is entirely appropriate and correct. The Attorney General added that it would appear that the Bureau would be remiss in its duty if it failed to pass along information coming to it which might prove in the interest of the general welfare. He added that it is not the Bureau's responsibility to determine whether the information is or is not of importance to the particular agency in the carrying out of its current activities and responsibility, and whether or not any action is taken by the department or agency is not, of course, a principal concern of the Bureau. The Attorney General advised, therefore, that in his opinion the Bureau should continue to pass along information, which it is believed might be of interest to the various departments and agencies.

It should be noted that our FBI reports distributed to outside agencies are stamped as the property of the FBI with this additional notation," This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency."

FBI memorandum dated August 14, 1974, (enclosed), to the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, copies for the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, and for the Director, Department Security Staff, confirmed the results of investigations of individuals pursuant to EO 10450 be furnished, where pertinent, to the Director, Department Security Staff.

The memorandum pointed out that, as in the past, these reports are furnished to the Department in order that consideration may be given as to whether any Federal laws have been violated and for information concerning possible subversive infiltration into the Executive Branch of the Government.

With regard to a determination as to whether any Federal laws have been violated, it was noted the violations generally involve Title 18, U.S. Code 1001, and a response is received from the Criminal Division.

Information concerning subversive infiltration into the Executive Branch is furnished for the Department's assistance in discharging its responsibilities under Section 13 of EO 10450.

The Assistant Attorney General for Administration, by memorandum dated August 26, 1974, (enclosed), advised that the practice as outlined in the memorandum of August 14, 1974, satisfies the needs of the Department.

As the result of reorganization in the Department, these reports are now sent to the Director, Security and Administrative Services Staff.

CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE FBI WILL CONDUCT ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF A PROSPECTIVE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE

With regard to Sections 5 and 8(d), supra, the FBI sent a memorandum dated May 1, 1953, (enclosed), to the Deputy Attorney General pointing out that the FBI contemplated following the policy in existence under EO 9835 (Federal Employee Loyalty Program) of initiating an investigation based on available information rather than awaiting a request for such an investigation under EO 10450 from the interested department or agency. It was stated that if this practice was in conflict with the provisions of EO 10450, consideration could be given to clarification in subsequent regulations.

In reply the Deputy Attorney General on June 25, 1953, (enclosed), advised he did not believe the policy outlined in the memorandum dated May 1, 1953, to be in conflict with any provision of EO 10450 and saw no reason why the FBI should not continue this policy.

The FBI has continued the practice approved in the Department's memorandum of June 25, 1953, and by memorandum dated January 23, 1976, to the Deputy Attorney General, the Department was advised that this policy still continues under the provisions of EO 10450.

Enclosures (23)

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM KP

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 3/3/76

Caption of Document: SSC let 2/9/76 requesting FBI materials describinggthe policy & procedures of the Bureau.

Originating Office: FBI
Delivered by: Date: 3/8/76
Received by: Frederick Baron
Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

3/3/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 2/9/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Information regarding FBI policy and procedure for investigations carried out pursuant to Executive Order 10450, as amended.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - M[illegible] J. A. Mintz
([illegible] Mr. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General

February 3, 1976

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP3ALM/GP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 7, 1976, requesting certain materials from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which constitutes this Bureau's response to the request for material set forth in paragraph two of referenced letter.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records, along with a set of the materials which is to be delivered to the SSC with the memorandum.

Attention is invited to a number of references in the materials to Mr. John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC. Because of these references, it is our intention that when the materials are to be delivered to the SSC, we will invite Mr. Elliff to review the materials at FBI Headquarters and respect his desires as to whether or not any of the references should be excised prior to actual delivery of the materials. This procedure will thus insure the privacy considerations relative to Mr. Elliff.

EX-115 REC-38 62-116395-1474
7 MAR 18 1976

On January 29, 1976, the foregoing was discussed by a representative of this Bureau with Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, who agreed with our proposal.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

KAM:pal
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

WOC

ENCLOSURE
ENCL BEHIND FILE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 2[illegible] 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Proposal discussed with Shaheen by S. F. Phillips of Senstudy 75 Project after checking with Assistant Director Mintz. For ready reference by approving Bureau officials, attached below the yellow of the LHM is a set of the materials which will be retained by Bureau and we have flagged by paper clips those paragraphs which contain the pertinent references to Elliff.

2 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz
(1 [illegible]r. Hotis)
1 - Mr. [illegible]. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

62-116395 February 3, 1976

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 7, 1976, requesting certain materials from the FBI.

The material requested in paragraph two of referenced letter is being delivered with this memorandum. With respect to the material being delivered, it should be noted there are several instances wherein the documents provided refer to previous communications, exhibits, and attachments. Extensive file reviews were conducted and some of these communications could not be located. In other instances when such communications were located, they were reviewed and found to not pertain to changes being made to Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions. Additionally, the final approved version of Section 87 and the Position Paper by Thomas J. Smith captioned "Domestic Intelligence Division-Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility In Domestic Intelligence Investigations" are not being submitted with this memorandum inasmuch as these items have previously been furnished the SSC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

1 - The Attorney General

KAM:pal pal ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
(8)

NOTE:

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

SSC requested material reflecting process by which Section 87 was changed during 1973, from inception to final approval. A review of pertinent files reveals questions were raised during 1971 about the FBI's jurisdiction in the security field by Senator S. J. Ervin and John T. Elliff. Former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, requested, during early 1972,

WRW TJS

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

WOC KAM

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1474

GPO 1975 O - 569-920

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE CONTINUED

preparation of in-depth position papers for an Executive Conference which led to the above-mentioned paper by Thomas J. Smith. Thereafter Section 87 was revamped and security investigations were to be based on Federal statutes.

As indicated above, extensive file reviews were conducted to locate various communications referred to in documents being provided SSC and these efforts were negative. Additionally, some documents being provided SSC contain information of interest regarding the manual change; however, enclosures and attached letters with these documents did not pertain to the manual change and therefore these items were not furnished SSC.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2/3/76

Caption of Document: Re SSC let 1/7/76 request for Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: JD Stassinos Date: 2/5/76

Received by: F L Cooke

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
2/3/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 1/7/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating procedures
Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Material reflecting process by which Section 87 of Manual of Instructions was changed during 1973, from inception to final approval.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

AJD:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-AJD

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

MAR 8 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven Blackhurst SB
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Letter Dated March 3, 1976

The attached letter from the SSC was discussed with Mr. Tom McNiff of the Bureau on March 8, 1976. It requires no response unless the FBI has objections to the draft SSC report on the Huston Plan.

Cregar (info)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

REC-104 62-116395-1473

7 MAR 15 1976

Inspector William O. Cregar advised 3/8/76 of Blackhurst call + contents of attached SSC letter.
TJM

3/11/76
Steve Blackhurst, DOJ, advised that Elliff has agreed to amend letter to indicate request applies only to narrative reviewed by Bu personnel and not to documents footnoted in the report and which were not made available to Bu personnel.
TJM

cc: Paul Daly

ENCLOSURE

84 MAR 17 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

MAR 5 11 49 AM '76
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL UNIT

March 3, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Office of Professional Responsibility
U. S. Department of Justice (Room 4313)
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

On February 23, 24, and March 3, 1976, Mr. William Cregar of the FBI reviewed the Select Committee's draft report entitled "National Security, Civil Liberties, and the Collection of Intelligence: A Report on the Huston Plan" for security problems. Loch Johnson, of the Committee staff, revised the draft to meet all security problems which were raised and discussed the revisions with Mr. Cregar to make certain that their concerns were met.

This letter is intended to confirm the fact that, unless I receive word to the contrary from you, the Department of Justice has no objection, on security grounds, to the publication of this report.

Thanks very much for your help throughout the inquiry into this subject.

Sincerely,

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Chief Counsel

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

cc: Paul Daly, FBI

RECEIVED
MAR 3 1976

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-1473

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/8/76

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Attached is a letter dated 3/5/76 addressed to Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esquire, Office of Professional Responsibility, U.S. Department of Justice, from Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel of captioned Committee, confirming the fact that the FBI has reviewed the captioned Committee's draft report titled "CIA and FBI Mail Opening." The FBI's review, according to this letter, was to insure the draft report met all security problems. It is noted that the FBI's review of this report is not for purposes of accuracy but rather to insure that there are no problems relating to classification of material or similar problems.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division review attached letter to determine if it accurately reports our review of the report in question and whether there may be additional changes desired in the draft report.

Jim Johnson [illegible]

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Leavitt - Enc.
1 - Mr. Phillips - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

REC-110 62-116395-1472

7 MAR 12 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/VP

PVD:lad
(6)

5 - S. Miller (Encl)

84 MAR 17 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 5, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esquire
Office of Professional Responsibility
Room 4313
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

On March 4, 1976, Mr. James Johnson of the FBI reviewed the Select Committee's draft titled "CIA and FBI Mail Opening." James Dick and Thomas Dawson of the Committee staff revised the draft to meet all security problems previously raised by Mr. James Lee of the Bureau, and discussed the revisions with Mr. Johnson to make certain that their concerns were met.

This letter is to confirm the fact that, unless I receive word to the contrary from you, the Department of Justice has no objection to the publication of this report.

Thanks again for your help throughout the inquiry into this subject.

Sincerely,

Frederick A. O. Schwarz Jr.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Chief Counsel

Copy to Paul Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP3ALM/KP

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1472

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

February 26, 1976

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 19, 1976, requesting access to certain FBI materials.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 6 of referenced SSC letter.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

62-116395-1470

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

~~62-116395-14~~

VRT:adn
(10)

7 MAR 9 1976

5-ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SBALMKP

5/27/76 SSC has not reviewed material. SSM/ds

woc

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ✓ SSM

1470

84 MAR 15 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

62-116395

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

February 26, 1976

1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 19, 1976, Item 6 of which requests access to copies of memoranda or letters between the FBI and IRS regarding the finances of: Fred Hampton, Bobby Rush, the Chicago Black Panther Party, Rev. John Fry and Charles La Paglia.

With respect to Item 6 a review of pertinent FBI files discloses there was only correspondence between the FBI and IRS regarding Bobby Rush. Material responsive to Item 6 has been assembled and is available for review in Room 4171, J. Edgar Hoover Building, by SSC Staff Members.

1 - The Attorney General

VRT:adn adn
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SPBALMKP

WOC/B

ORIGINAL AND ONE CC TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395-1470

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

ENCLOSURE ~~62-116395-1~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2/26/76

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC). (SSC Letter 1/19/76, Item 6) Black Panther Party.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 3/2/76

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title: Security Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

62 - 116395 - 1470 1470

ENCLOSURE ~~62-116395-14~~

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

2/26/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 1/19/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Access to material regarding correspondence between FBI and IRS concerning Bobby Rush.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395-1470 1470

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

~~62-116395-145~~

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 1-19-76

Item 6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY 5P2ALM/KP

SSC has never
reviewed material.
5-27-76
SJm/ds.

62-116395-1470

ENCLOSURE

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 3/9/71

FROM : G. C. Moore

5-32

SUBJECT: BOBBY LEE RUSH
RACIAL MATTERS - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

A request to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for uncertified copies of the subject's income tax returns is attached. This information desired for investigative leads.

Rush is presently the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Chicago, Illinois, chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP). He travels extensively to other mid-western cities, as well as the East Coast in connection with organizational activities. He has frequented national headquarters at Oakland, California, and is known to be a courier of funds to the national office. He has instigated rallies and demonstrations in support of Party causes. He has been convicted on unlawful use and illegal possession of firearms in state courts in Champaign and Cook County, Illinois.

As a key black extremist, we need to develop all information of subject's financial sources including his listed property, stocks, bonds, assets and all employments. If you approve, attached memorandum should be returned to Domestic Intelligence Division in order that income tax returns can be obtained and reviewed.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached memorandum be approved requesting Rush's income tax returns for 1968 and 1969.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. G. A. Day
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

DAB:pjc/cal
(6)

OK

REC-

157-

304-59

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY

3 MAR 17 1971

ENCLOSURE

Request Fwd to IRS 3-15-71

MAR 29 1971

REC-127 157-9301-54

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
March 9, 1971

1 - Mr. G. A. Day
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

BOBBY LEE RUSH

Uncertified copies of income tax returns for 1968 and 1969 are requested for the following individual:

Name:	Bobby Lee Rush
Birth:	11/23/46, Sylvester, Georgia
Residence:	3145 West 16th Street, Chicago, Illinois (as of 12/8/70). 2330 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois (as of 3/69).
Employment:	Part-time writer of articles published Esquire Magazine (as of 3/69). Deputy Minister of Defense, Chicago, Illinois, chapter of Black Panther Party (1970).
Social Security Number:	348-36-3088

It is requested that no active investigation be conducted based solely upon this request.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/1/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

DAB:pjc/cal
(8)

NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan, captioned "Bobby Lee Rush, Racial Matters - Black Panther Party," dated 3/9/71, prepared by DAB:pjc/cal.

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY FURNISHED INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE.

3/15/71

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

52 MAR 22 1971

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9304) DATE: 2/25/71

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (157-2832) (P)

CWB

SUBJECT: BOBBY LEE RUSH
RM - BPP (KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

(OO: Chicago)

Memo C.D. Brennan from GC Moore 3-5-71 DMB:pfc/cal

Re Bureau airtel to Albany, 12/23/70.

The above referenced airtel instructed investigation of a key black extremist to include a check of the subject's Federal Income Tax return. The Bureau is requested to obtain a copy of the 1969 Federal Income Tax return of BOBBY LEE RUSH for review.

RUSH's Social Security Number is 348-36-3088. His wife's name is SANDRA CAROL RUSH. His residences from 1968 to date have been located at 2330 South State Street, Chicago, and 3145 West 16th Street, Chicago.

RUSH was discharged from the United States Army on April 20, 1968. He was employed by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad before becoming Deputy Minister of Information for the Black Panther Party in Chicago on a full-time basis.

Memo to IRS DMB:pfc/cal

Enclosed 3/8/71

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/LP

EX 105 157-9304-57

REC-1

8 MAR 1 1971

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Chicago

JPM:nss
(3)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

SAC, Chicago (157-2832)
REC 98
5/6/71

Director, FBI (157-9304) 62

BOBBY LEE RUSH
RACIAL MATTERS - BPP

Enclosed for the Chicago Division is one copy of subject's U. S. individual income tax return for the calendar year 1968.

Enclosure is being forwarded to your division in response to your prior request for such information. You are to insure that this information is used for lead purposes only. Under no circumstances is the information set forth to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

As soon as additional copy of subject's income tax return is received for 1969, same will be forwarded to you.

Enclosure

DAB:dw dw
(4)

NOTE:

Bobby Lee Rush is Minister of Defense, Illinois Chapter, BPP and a Key Black Extremist. Department forwarded Rush's income tax form for 1968 in compliance with request made of them March 11, 1971.

MAILED 6
MAY - 5 1971
FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

3 MAY 12 1971

MAIL ROOM☐ TELETYPE UNIT☐

US Treasury Department

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: APR 20 [illegible]

In reply refer to: CP:C:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Mardian:

Bobby Rush

In re: Bobby Lee Rush
3145 West 16th Street
Chicago, Illinois
SSN: 348-36-3088

In response to your request of March 11, 1971, we are enclosing a copy of the 1968 income tax return of Bobby L. Rush.

This copy is being furnished for the purpose specified in your letter and with the understanding that it will be treated as confidential in keeping with the disclosure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

We will write you further concerning the 1969 return.

Sincerely,

(Signed) D. W. Bacon

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Enclosure

REC 98

159-930462

MCT-24

MAY 6 1971

RACIAL INT. SECT.

ENCLOSURE

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

SAC, Chicago (157-2832) 8/31/71

Director, FBI (157-9304) - 79
ST-102 REC- 66

1 - Chicago Guidance
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

BOBBY LEE RUSH
EM - BPP
(KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

Compliance Division, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), U. S. Department of Treasury, Washington, D. C., has advised their master files show no record of tax returns filed by subject for 1969. They have initiated an investigation to secure any returns which may be due and the Bureau will be advised upon completion of the investigation. Upon receipt of same by the Bureau, Chicago will be advised.

Under no circumstances is the information set forth above to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

DAB:mcm
(5)

NOTE:

Rush is a top leader and national functionary in the Black Panther Party (BPP). As Minister of Defense, Chicago Chapter of BPP, he administrates Midwestern U.S. BPP activities which in the past included attacks on police, bombings, and stockpiling of weapons. Bureau has previously furnished IRS with his complete background. Information from IRS was in response to a request made of them by the Bureau March 9, 1971, through the Attorney General.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

MAILED 3
AUG 30 1971
FBI

Tolson
Felt
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Gale
Ponder
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SEP 3 1971

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Department of the Treasury

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: AUG 12 1971
In reply refer to: CP:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Mardian:

In re: Bobby Lee Rush

Year: 1969

In response to your letter of March 11, 1971, a search of our individual master files shows no record of returns filed by the above for the year indicated. Accordingly, we have asked our field official concerned to initiate an appropriate investigation to secure any returns which may be due.

We will write you further upon completion of the investigation.

Sincerely,

W

D. W. Bacon

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP6ALM/KP

ST-102

5. [illegible]

REC- 66 157-9307-79

2 AUG 31 1971

1 cc
804
9[illegible]D

1 - Mr. D A. Brumble

SAC, Chicago (157-2832) 3/1/72

REC- 45

Director, FBI (157-9304) - 89

BOBBY LEE RUSH 57-105
EM - BPP
(KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

Compliance Division, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), U. S. Department of Treasury, Washington, D. C., has advised an investigation by them did not reveal subject had income in 1969 which would require him to file a tax return.

Under no circumstances is the information set forth above to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

DAB:pag
(4)

NOTE:

Rush is national functionary of Black Panther Party (BPP), directing their Midwestern operations. Information from IRS was in response to a request made of them by the Bureau March 9, 1971, through the Attorney General.

MRR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKO

MAILED 6
FEB 29 1972
FBI

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes

DAB

MAR 6 1972

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Department of the Treasury

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: FEB 11 1972

In reply refer to: CP:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

GCM

Dear Mr. Mardian:

In re: Bobby Lee Rush

Year: 1969

This is in further response to your request of March 11, 1971, and supplements our letter of August 12, 1971. Our investigation did not reveal that Bobby Lee Rush had income in 1969 which would require him to file a tax return.

If we can be of further assistance, please let us know.

W

Sincerely,

(Signed) John F. Hanlon

John F. Hanlon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

ST-105

157-9304-89

REC- 45

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM KP

5- B

MAR 1 1972

1 cst to Chicago
DHB; pap 3/1/72

SSC REQUEST 1-19-76

Item 6

FOR ACCESS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/16/01 BY 5P2ALM14P

62-116395-1470

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 3/9/71

FROM : G. C. Moore

5-32

SUBJECT: BOBBY LEE RUSH
RACIAL MATTERS - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

A request to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for uncertified copies of the subject's income tax returns is attached. This information desired for investigative leads.

Rush is presently the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Chicago, Illinois, chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP). He travels extensively to other mid-western cities, as well as the East Coast in connection with organizational activities. He has frequented national headquarters at Oakland, California, and is known to be a courier of funds to the national office. He has instigated rallies and demonstrations in support of Party causes. He has been convicted on unlawful use and illegal possession of firearms in state courts in Champaign and Cook County, Illinois.

As a key black extremist, we need to develop all information of subject's financial sources including his listed property, stocks, bonds, assets and all employments. If you approve, attached memorandum should be returned to Domestic Intelligence Division in order that income tax returns can be obtained and reviewed.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached memorandum be approved requesting Rush's income tax returns for 1968 and 1969.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. G. A. Day
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

DAB:pjc/cal
(6)

OK

REC-

157-9304-59

Request Fwd TO IRS 3-15-71

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

MAR 17 1971

MAR 29 1971

REC-127 157-9301-59

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
March 9, 1971

1 - Mr. G. A. Day
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

BOBBY LEE RUSH

Uncertified copies of income tax returns for 1968 and 1969 are requested for the following individual:

Name:	Bobby Lee Rush
Birth:	11/23/46, Sylvester, Georgia
Residence:	3145 West 16th Street, Chicago, Illinois (as of 12/8/70). 2330 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois (as of 3/69).
Employment:	Part-time writer of articles published Esquire Magazine (as of 3/69). Deputy Minister of Defense, Chicago, Illinois, chapter of Black Panther Party (1970).
Social Security Number:	348-36-3088

It is requested that no active investigation be conducted based solely upon this request.

DAB:pjc/cal
(8)

✓

NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan, captioned "Bobby Lee Rush, Racial Matters - Black Panther Party," dated 3/9/71, prepared by DAB:pjc/cal.

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY FURNISHED INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM

3/15/71

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAR 22 1971

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9304) DATE: 2/25/71

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (157-2832) (P)

SUBJECT: BOBBY LEE RUSH
RM - BPP (KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

(OO: Chicago)

Re Bureau airtel to Albany, 12/23/70.

The above referenced airtel instructed investigation of a key black extremist to include a check of the subject's Federal Income Tax return. The Bureau is requested to obtain a copy of the 1969 Federal Income Tax return of BOBBY LEE RUSH for review.

RUSH's Social Security Number is 348-36-3088. His wife's name is SANDRA CAROL RUSH. His residences from 1968 to date have been located at 2330 South State Street, Chicago, and 3145 West 16th Street, Chicago.

RUSH was discharged from the United States Army on April 20, 1968. He was employed by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad before becoming Deputy Minister of Information for the Black Panther Party in Chicago on a full-time basis.

Memo C.D. Brennan from [illegible] 3-5-71 DAB:pf/ec

Enc. Memo to IRS 3/8/71 DAB:pf/ec

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY [illegible]

EX 105 157-9304-57

REC-1

8 MAR 1 1971

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Chicago

JPM:nss
(3)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

SAC, Chicago (157-2832) 5/6/71

REC 98

Director, FBI (157-9304) 62

BOBBY LEE RUSH
RACIAL MATTERS - BPP

Enclosed for the Chicago Division is one copy of subject's U. S. individual income tax return for the calendar year 1968.

Enclosure is being forwarded to your division in response to your prior request for such information. You are to insure that this information is used for lead purposes only. Under no circumstances is the information set forth to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

As soon as additional copy of subject's income tax return is received for 1969, same will be forwarded to you.

Enclosure

DAB:dw dw
(4)

NOTE:

Bobby Lee Rush is Minister of Defense, Illinois Chapter, BPP and a Key Black Extremist. Department forwarded Rush's income tax form for 1968 in compliance with request made of them March 11, 1971.

MAILED 6
MAY - 5 1971
FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

63 MAY 12 1971

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

US Treasury Department

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: APR 20 1971
In reply refer to: CP:C:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Mardian:

Bobby Rush

In re: Bobby Lee Rush
3143 West 16th Street
Chicago, Illinois
SSN: 348-36-3088

In response to your request of March 11, 1971, we are enclosing a copy of the 1968 income tax return of Bobby L. Rush.

This copy is being furnished for the purpose specified in your letter and with the understanding that it will be treated as confidential in keeping with the disclosure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

We will write you further concerning the 1969 return.

Sincerely,

(Signed) D. W. Bacon

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

Enclosure

REC 98

157-9304 62

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY [illegible]

MCT-24

MAY 6 1971

ENCLOSURE

RACIAL INT. SECT.

Let SAC CG
5-6-71
[illegible]

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

SAC, Chicago (157-2832)

8/31/71

Director, FBI (157-9304) - 79
ST-102 REC- 66

1 - Chicago Guidance
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

BOBBY LEE RUSH
EM - BPP
(KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

Compliance Division, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), U. S. Department of Treasury, Washington, D. C., has advised their master files show no record of tax returns filed by subject for 1969. They have initiated an investigation to secure any returns which may be due and the Bureau will be advised upon completion of the investigation. Upon receipt of same by the Bureau, Chicago will be advised.

Under no circumstances is the information set forth above to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

DAB:mcm
(5) mcm

NOTE:

Rush is a top leader and national functionary in the Black Panther Party (BPP). As Minister of Defense, Chicago Chapter of BPP, he administrates Midwestern U.S. BPP activities which in the past included attacks on police, bombings, and stockpiling of weapons. Bureau has previously furnished IRS with his complete background. Information from IRS was in response to a request made of them by the Bureau March 9, 1971, through the Attorney General.

MAILED 3
AUG 30 1971
FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

93

Tolson ____
Felt ____
Sullivan ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Brennan, C.D. ____
Callahan ____
Casper ____
Conrad ____
Dalbey ____
Gale ____
Ponder ____
Rosen ____
Tavel ____
Walters ____
Soyars ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

SEP 3 1971

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Department of the Treasury

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: AUG 12 1971 | In reply refer to: CP:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Mardian:

o

In re: Bobby Lee Rush

Year: 1969

In response to your letter of March 11, 1971, a search of our individual master files shows no record of returns filed by the above for the year indicated. Accordingly, we have asked our field official concerned to initiate an appropriate investigation to secure any returns which may be due.

We will write you further upon completion of the investigation.

Sincerely,

W

D. W. Bacon

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

ST-102

5. [illegible]

REC- 66 157-9304-79

1 cc
804
[illegible]

2 AUG 31 1971

1 - Mr. D A. Brumble

SAC, Chicago (157-2832) 3/1/72

REC- 45

Director, FBI (157-9304) - 81

BOBBY LEE RUSH ST-105
EM - BPP
(KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

Compliance Division, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), U. S. Department of Treasury, Washington, D. C., has advised an investigation by them did not reveal subject had income in 1969 which would require him to file a tax return.

Under no circumstances is the information set forth above to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

DAB:pag pag
(4)

NOTE:

Rush is national functionary of Black Panther Party (BPP), directing their Midwestern operations. Information from IRS was in response to a request made of them by the Bureau March 9, 1971, through the Attorney General.

MRR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY 5P2ALMKP

MAILED 6
FEB 29 1972
FBI

DAB

Mr. Tolson ____
Mr. Felt ____
Mr. Rosen ____
Mr. Mohr ____
Mr. Bishop ____
Mr. Miller, E.S. ____
Mr. Callahan ____
Mr. Casper ____
Mr. Conrad ____
Mr. Dalbey ____
Mr. Cleveland ____
Mr. Ponder ____
Mr. Bates ____
Mr. Waikart ____
Mr. Walters ____
Mr. Soyars ____
Tele. Room ____
Miss Holmes ____

57 MAR 6 1972

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Department of the Treasury

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: FEB 11 1972
In reply refer to:
CP:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Mardian:

In re: Bobby Lee Rush

Year: 1969

GCM

This is in further response to your request of March 11, 1971, and supplements our letter of August 12, 1971. Our investigation did not reveal that Bobby Lee Rush had income in 1969 which would require him to file a tax return.

If we can be of further assistance, please let us know.

Sincerely,

(Signed) John F. Hanlon

John F. Hanlon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

ST-105

REC- 45

157-9304-89

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/CP

1-cc to Chicago
DHB;pgr 3/1/72

5-

MAR 1 1972

Interspec, Inc.
SUITE 310
1120 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
202-347-1958

ROBERT L. SHORTLEY
PRESIDENT

March 3, 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

Honorable Clarence M. Kelley
Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

Senstudy

Dear Mr. Kelley:

I previously forwarded a copy of my letter of December 9, 1975 to Senator Frank Church regarding the work of the Select Committee on Intelligence activites.

I thought you might be interested in his undated reply I received last week.

Kindest regards,

R. L. Shortley

RLS:js
Encl.

62-116395-1469

[illegible]
170 [illegible] 10 1976

9 MAR ~~9~~ 11 1976

67-223447

ORIGINAL [illegible]

File 67-223447

EIGHT

THREE

SIX

FIVE

84 MAR 1 1 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

Dear Concerned Citizen:

Thank you for sharing your thoughts with me regarding the work of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. I am sorry to learn that you are unable to endorse the Committee's investigation and the efforts which have been undertaken to strengthen the Nation's intelligence agencies through closer definitions of their legal authority and areas of legitimate operation.

One of the possible abuses under investigation is the violation of the First and Fourth Amendment rights of Americans under the Constitution and Bill of Rights. The American system of government is unique in that it not only permits, but encourages, its citizens to voice their views on important issues. One of the rights we are trying to protect is your right to express your thoughts to me, either over the telephone or through the mails, without having your message intercepted or recorded by unauthorized persons. Highly sophisticated equipment now makes it possible to turn our surveillance techniques, which were originally designed to intercept foreign transmissions, inward against ourselves. It is important that provision be made for the lawful use of this capability, and that protection be assured our own citizens who could become the unwitting victims of this unconstitutional but nevertheless powerful surveillance technology.

I want to take this opportunity to assure you that the Committee's purpose is not, as some have suggested, to destroy, degrade, or even disrupt the legitimate functions of the intelligence gathering and law enforcement agencies of the United States. On the contrary, its purpose is to fortify these valid and vital areas of operation. However, we do intend to identify abuses or patterns of abuses which are clearly unlawful and take action to prevent their recurrence, whether they involve individuals or nations. We as individuals must live within the law; so must our Government and its agencies.

I appreciate your taking the time to write to me, and trust that the ultimate outcome of this investigation will strengthen the faith of our people in the integrity of their Government.

With all kind wishes.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1469

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General February 23, 1976

Director, FBI -1467

REC-104

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 5, 1976, as modified during a meeting on February 12, 1976, between John T. Elliff, SSC Staff Member, and Steven K. Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which constitutes this Bureau's response to the above request.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (5)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

KAM:en
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

WRW/TWL

PLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

"TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS."

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MAR 15 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - M[illegible] J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

62-116395 February 23, 1976

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 5, 1976, as modified during a meeting on February 12, 1976, between John T. Elliff, SSC Staff Member, and Steven K. Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice.

In accordance with the agreement between Messrs. Elliff and Blackhurst, the SSC request of February 5, 1976, has been limited only to documents pertaining to Attorney General authorization for electronic surveillance directed toward organizations engaged in preparations for the fall of 1969 "March on Washington."

A review of Bureau files indicated three organizations were targeted for such coverage. These organizations were the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC), the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC), and the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC).

Attached are unexcised copies of the Attorney General authorizations, with the exception of the authorization dated November 7, 1969, for these electronic surveillances. Page two of the November 7, 1969, communication contains a deletion pertaining to the identity of targets of electronic surveillance not concerned with this subject matter. This deletion was approved during the meeting February 12, 1976, mentioned above.

Enclosures (3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

1 - The Attorney General

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

KAM:en
(8)

62-116395-1467

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE:

Copies of SSC request and Attorney General authorizations attached for information. SSC requested copies of documents in form suitable for public release as part of SSC report.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2-23-76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
(SSC letter 2-5-76)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 2/27/76

Received by:

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

62-116395-1467

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

2/23/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 2/5/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence Collection
Information Handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Material regarding Attorney General authorization for electronic surveillance directed at organizations engaged in preparations for 1969 "March on Washington."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1467

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 6 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mike

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Sensitivity

SUBJECT: SSC Request Dated February 5, 1976

Attached is a letter from the SSC dated February 5, 1976. Please arrange for an appropriate response.

REC-104 62-116395-1467

4 ENCLOSURE

7 MAR 10 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

COUNSEL

FILE

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]NN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, [illegible]
CHARLES McC. MAT[illegible]R., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible]A.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 5, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Select Committee requests delivery in unexcised form of the materials pertaining to the authorization of and recommendation for electronic surveillance directed in the fall of 1969 at organizations engaged in preparations for the "March on Washington" to protest the Vietnam War. The Select Committee also desires that this material be provided in a form suitable for public release as part of the Committee's report.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS DECLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

RECEIVED
FEB 5 1976

62-116395-1467

ENCLOSURE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Walters
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale ✓
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

5/5

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1969

TO: J. Edgar Hoover

FROM: John N. Mitchell

RE: Fall Offensive Against the War in Vietnam
November 12-16, 1969
Internal Security - Miscellaneous

With respect to the attached approval, I request that you follow prior directions concerning conversations relating to the attorney-client relationship of the parties involved in the Chicago conspiracy trial.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1467

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 5, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: FALL OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM
NOVEMBER 12-16, 1969
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

The New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) is coordinating efforts for a massive antiwar manifestation to take place in Washington, D. C., November 12-16, 1969. This group maintains a Washington, D. C., office at 1029 Vermont Avenue, Northwest, where the planning takes place.

This demonstration could possibly attract the largest number of demonstrators ever to assemble in Washington, D. C. The large number is cause for major concern should violence of any type break out. It is necessary for this Bureau to keep abreast of events as they occur, and we feel that in this instance advance knowledge of plans and possible areas of confrontation would be most advantageous to our coverage and to the safety of individuals and property. Accordingly, we are requesting authorization to install a telephone surveillance on the Washington office of the NMC.

Interception will be made without trespass and maximum security will be guaranteed. Because of extensive contacts of the organization involved, it cannot be anticipated whether individuals who are or may be placed under an active investigation for possible criminal violations will be overheard by this coverage.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/16/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

APPROVED

DATE 11/6/69

62-116395

1467

TS ~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 7, 1969

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKO

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: FALL OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM
NOVEMBER 12-16, 1969
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

The New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) is sponsoring a massive antiwar manifestation to take place in Washington, D. C., on November 12-16, 1969. The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) and the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC) are closely coordinating their efforts with NMC in organizing the demonstration. NMC, SMC and VMC occupy adjoining office space at 1029 Vermont Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

SMC is completely dominated and controlled by the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). The VMC has recently endorsed fully the activities of NMC concerning the upcoming antiwar demonstration.

This demonstration could possibly attract the largest number of demonstrators ever to assemble in Washington, D. C., which is cause for major concern should violence of any type break out. It is necessary for this Bureau to keep abreast of events as they occur, and we feel advance knowledge of plans and possible areas of confrontation during the demonstration would be most advantageous to our coverage and to the safety of individuals and property.

We have separately requested authorization to install a telephone surveillance on the office of NMC. To further implement our coverage, we are requesting authorization to install telephone surveillances on the offices of SMC and VMC.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1467

~~GROUP~~ 1
~~Excluded from~~ automatic
[illegible]

Memorandum for the Attorney General

Interception will be made without trespass and maximum security will be guaranteed. Because of extensive contacts of the organizations involved, it cannot be anticipated whether individuals who are or may be placed under an active investigation for possible criminal violations will be overheard by this coverage.

In accordance with my policy of keeping to an absolute minimum the number of such installations, I am ordering the discontinuance of this coverage on (Progressive Labor Party functionaries Fred Jerome, San Francisco, California, and Walter Linder, New York, New York.) Separate communications will be forwarded to you in this regard.

deleted!
✓.
organizations and individuals not of interest to this subject matter

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John Mitchell

DATE 4/11/69

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General
REC-104

February 27, 1976

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

1st

Director, FBI 62-116395-1466

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Mr. Fred H. Hall of Plantation, Florida, formerly employed by the FBI and subsequently by the Central Intelligence Agency, from which Agency he retired about six years ago, has made available to this Bureau a copy of a letter he wrote a short while ago to Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the SSC. Hall also sent a copy of his letter to Congressman Otis G. Pike, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

I thought you would be interested in Mr. Hall's observations and am therefore enclosing a copy of his letter.

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116464 (Houstudy)
1 - 67- (Personnel file former SA Fred H. Hall)

SFP:mjg
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NOTE:

Hall furnished the copy of his letter to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. Phillips and Hall have been close friends for many years and Hall made the letter available on a recent visit of Phillips to Florida. Hall indicated that Phillips could feel free to show it to anyone who may want to see it. The letter is very critical of the activities of both the Senate and House Select Committees.

woc/8

TO BE HAND DELIVERED BY OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 11 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

Dear Seymour:
Attached is sent per your request. Feel free to show it to anyone you may want to see it. I wrote it and am not ashamed of it.

I enjoyed the golf game. I just hope that the next time you come to our area I can have you out to dinner.

Sincerely
Fred Hall

yellow

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116464-

REC- 104

62-116395-1406

7 MAR 8 1976

ENCLOSURE

C_O_P_Y

Hon. Frank Church
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sen. Church:

By way of background, I served honorably with both the Federal Bureau of Inve igation and the Central Intelligence Agency for a combined total of over 33 years. I am proud of my service with each agency and I feel that my activities were quite worthwhile and in the national interest. I am a graduate of George Washington University Law School and a member of the bar. I am now retired.

As an interested and intellectually curious citizen, I have been reading accounts in the public press concerning the activities of the committee which you happen to chair and of the House Committee which Rep. Otis Pike happens to chair, both dealing with the U.S. investigative and intelligence programs. Briefly stated, I am totally nauseated by the irresponsible way in which both of you demand highly sensitive and classified data which seems to be publicized soon after you get it. It is my opinion and that of many friends that your committees are effectively destroying the credibility of these agencies and making impossible their effective performance in the future.

Before going further, let me state that I do not condone irregularities, improprieties or illegalities by either agency in their normal, routine activities but I do see the justification, in serious security or Mafia like criminal activities, for certain "extracurricular" activities to achieve needed ends and I think that the Congress should quietly recognize such, with reasonable controls. You should be proud and complimentary, for instance in my opinion, about the highly publicized and often misrepresented mail intercept program when you stop to realize that it was confined to mail to and from Russia and, insofar as I read, the results were given appropriate safeguards.

I have no objection to having some type of scrutiny and supervision of these agencies by some well qualified and impartial panel and I do not object to having appropriate administrative action taken against offending employees and officials, if their rights are protected. What I do strongly object to is the pathetically inept and horrendously damaging procedures whereby your inquiries on sensitive matters are regularly reported, sometimes incompletely and for apparent political reasons. It just seems to me that someone connected with your committees is afflicted with political "diarrhea of the mouth" which impels them to babble without regard to common sense or the welfare of our intelligence programs and, as I read the press, you two gentlemen both have this weakness.

I am sure that the intelligence organizations of all major nations make some mistakes. But have you ever seen the British, the French, the Russians, the Germans, the Israeli or the Japanese governments conduct such a "three ring circus" on sensitive matters as you men are doing to your everlasting discredit? I am sure also that we are the laughing stock of all the above enumerated nations. What foreign official will entrust sensitive and confidential data to U.S. intelligence agents in the foreseeable future when he knows that he may soon see his data publicized because of some misguided Congressional activity? I very sincerely feel that strong administrative and/or criminal action should be taken in any cases where either or both of your committees and/or their personnel have been the vehicle for embarrassing or damaging the U.S. by actions which resulted in confidential data being reported.

In order that there be no misunderstanding, this letter represents nothing more than my very sincere conviction of great personal contempt and disgust with the way in which you and your committees have done a great disservice to the United States by sadly mishandling your responsibilities to these agencies and to our nation.

Sincerely,

FRED H. HALL
6903 Cypress Road, C-21
Plantation, Fla. 33317

cc: Rep. Otis G. Pike
House Intelligence Committee
Washington, D.C.

Ltr to AG
5FP/mjs

cc DAK
2/27/76
Encl.

5' Phillips

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Daly

March 3, 1976
1 - Mr. Leavitt
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division

Director, FBI

0 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed is a letter from Special Agent Seymor Fred Phillips to the Attorney General, dated March 1, 1976, in which Mr. Phillips requests the Department of Justice to provide him with legal counsel in connection with a request from the Senate Select Committee for an interview under oath concerning the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., and related matters.

Since Special Agent Phillips' involvement in the subject matter of the interview arose out of his duties as a Special Agent of the FBI, I recommend his request be granted.

Enclosure

JDM:clh
(8) clh

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

REC 104 62-116395-1465

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM/lp

5 MAR 4 1976

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 176

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

To be hand-delivered by the Office of Congressional Affairs.

RLM

XEROX
MAR 9 1976

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

PERS. REC. UNIT

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 MAR 15 1976

March 1, 1976

Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities has requested that I voluntarily appear before its representatives for an interview under oath concerning the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., and related matters.

In connection with the interview, I respectfully request that the Department of Justice provide me with legal counsel.

Respectfully,

Seymor Fred Phillips
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/20/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

1 XEROX
MAR 9 1976

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATI
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 21 1976
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR 010 SE PLAIN

11:10 PM NITEL FEBRUARY 20, 1976 GJW

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

110 FROM SEATTLE (66-2894) 1P

0
SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL FEBRUARY 19, 1976.

FORMER SA LEROY W. SHEETS CONTACTED TELEPHONICALLY BY ASAC J.D. PRINGLE, FEBRUARY 20, 1976 AND ADVISED OF CONTENTS OF RETEL.

SHEETS STATED HE WILL CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL FIRST PART OF WEEK BEGINNING FEBRUARY 23, 1976 TO OBTAIN DETAILS OF INTERVIEW BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBERS.

E N D

HOLD

REC-110 62-116395-1463

7 MAR 9 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM

84 MAR 11 1976

1 - Mr. [illegible]. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
February 20, 1976
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
(Attn: Mr. J. W. Dalseg)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP3ALM/KP

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 9, 1975, requesting material relating to electronic surveillance of the so-called "Kissinger-17," and Department letter to the SSC dated July 15, 1975, captioned "Access/Delivery of Documents Requested in Senate Select Committee Letter of July 9, 1975."

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum with enclosed summary, which is responsive to referenced SSC request. A copy of this memorandum, with enclosure, is being furnished for your records.

It is being left to the decision of the Department as to whether approval of the White House and/or the Judiciary should be obtained prior to enclosed summary being referred to the SSC.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1462

7 MAR 9 1976

This is also to confirm a telephone conversation on February 18, 1976, between Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff of this Bureau and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, whereby Mr. Shaheen stated that excisions from the summary, for reasons of privacy, should be the responsibility of the SSC.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

TJM:dmt/lhb/hb
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Delivered
Dept 2/24/76

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

84 MAR 11 1976

1 - Mr. J[illegible]B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
(Attn: Mr. J. W. Dalseg)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

February 20, 1976

1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR MATERIAL RELATING TO
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF
"KISSINGER-17"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM/

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 9, 1975, page three, paragraph two, subsection A, requesting materials in Bureau files relating to electronic surveillance of the so-called "Kissinger-17," and Department letter to the SSC dated July 15, 1975, captioned "Access/Delivery of Documents Requested in Senate Select Committee Letter of July 9, 1975," which letter sets forth arrangements that had been agreed upon on July 11, 1975, by representatives of the Department of Justice and the SSC concerning the manner in which the Bureau will respond to the above.

In accordance with the above agreement, SSC Staff Member James Dick on February 18, 1976, appeared at FBI Headquarters and prepared a longhand summary based on his review of material relating to the so-called "Kissinger-17." Mr. Dick requested that his summary be approved by appropriate officials and forwarded to the SSC on an expedite basis.

Attached is the original of the above summary prepared by Mr. Dick in his handwriting. In accordance with prior request of the SSC, excisions from the summary, for reasons of privacy, have not been made by this Bureau, but are being considered the responsibility of the SSC.

Enclosure ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

1 - The Attorney General

TJM:dmt/lhb lhb (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-[illegible]

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR MATERIAL RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF "KISSINGER-17"

NOTE:

The above agreement referred to in referenced Department letter states that material in FBI files relating to the "Kissinger-17" surveillance would be made available for review to SSC personnel at FBIHQ. These personnel may take such notes as deemed appropriate which notes were to be left in secure location at FBIHQ during the time the SSC study was in progress. When the study was completed, the SSC was to prepare a summary of the information considered appropriate for Committee use. The summary would be checked to ensure the protection of national security matters, protection of confidential sources of information and observation of privacy considerations. Thereafter, the approved summary would be furnished to the Committee and Staff notes destroyed. Mr. Dick on July 16 and 17, 1975, reviewed the material relating to the "Kissinger-17" and left his notes in possession of Bureau personnel. On 2/17/76, Mr. Dick requested permission to return to FBIHQ to review the above notes and prepare his summary which he did on 2/18/76. The summary prepared by Mr. Dick can be placed into two categories: (a) Political or personal information obtained from the tesurs which was disseminated to individuals at the White House and (b) a list of the targets and the dates the coverage was in operation for each target comprising the "Kissinger-17." Review of this summary indicates that no confidential sources of this Bureau are jeopardized, and there appears to be no jeopardy to national security matters. Regarding the latter, however, it is felt that the White House would be in the best position to pass final judgement in this matter.

It is to be noted that the matter of tesur coverage of some members of the "Kissinger-17" is currently in litigation.

The following notes were taken by James Dick, Senate Select Committee Staff, on February 18, 1976, based on a review of the file on the seventeen wiretaps which occurred between May 1969 and February 1971. These notes contain two types of summaries: (a) essentially political or personal information which was ~~[illegible]~~ obtained from the wiretaps and disseminated to Henry Kissinger, John Ehrlichman, H. R. Haldeman, and/or President Nixon, and (b) a list of the targets and the dates the coverage was in operation for each.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY

62-116395-1442
ENCLOSURE

~~Bu~~
~~Lengths of each tap~~
~~Pers. / Pol.~~
~~SG overhear~~

Nixon dissem - 7/18/69

Brandon told friend "is clear the Admin. will win on the ABM by a two vote margin. He [B] said, 'they've got Williams & they've got Magnuson.'" ~~Friend~~ Friend told B. that Sen. Kennedy "planned to spend the weekend w/ Robt Packwood ...." But B uncertain, when asked, as to how Kenn. wld vote on ABM

Ehrlich dissem ~~[illegible]~~ 7/25/69

One target contacted a stewardess "and ~~apologz~~ apologized for drinking too much the previous evening. She concurred that he drinks too much & also suggested he cut his hair."

Ehrl. dissem 7/28/69

Friend told one target that "much of what is being said now about what the Pres has done in the WH or looking ahead to do is based on the conviction that Mitchell has a strategic view of Nixon's role that involves the South."

Ehrl. dissem. 7/31/69

"Display of affection bet. woman (not his wife) & one target

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-146

Ehrl. - 9/18/69

Sears' intent to write an art. for Harper's + his possibly managing a pol. campaign for a Repub. gubernatorial candidate in mid-west

Kiss - 10/10/69

Kalb's wife said he told her Time + Newsweek were fed up w/ current admin. + are "jumping on the Pres." ..."She further stated that the 'big news' is that the Republicans are acknowledging the President's failures + that journalists are becoming open in their criticism of him."

Nixon 10/9/69

"Halp. recently ~~stated~~ that he ~~h~~ was to spend an hour w/ Kennedy's Vietnam man, as Kennedy is giving a speech on the 15th"

Nixon - 10/24/69

Re: Brandon preparing an art. entitled "How the Gilt Came Off Nixon's Gingerbread" for London Sunday Times

Kiss 12/2/69

Bran. talked w/ [redacted] b7-C, who said Birch Bayh is in trouble bec. of Haynsworth confirmation

Kiss 12/3/69

Bran. said Sen Fulbright postponed hearings on Vietnam bec felt they wldn't be popular

Kiss 12/29/69

Clifford's art. in Life

Nixon - 2/2/70

Bran. re: ~~A~~ contact w/ NYT reporter discussed Arthur Burns + his plans to ease credit restrictions

Kiss. 2/17/70

Bran. re: contact w/ friend who said McGeo. Bundy "was in 'hot water' "bec he let it be known that Ford Foundation is supporting 'washed up' Democrats"

Kiss 2/26/70

Bran. - Brinkley (NBC) told B "was very depressed over having been 'singled out' by the Vice Pres."

Nixon - 5/11/70

Mrs. Bran. said Hickel had only gotten to see Nixon twice + K. wldn't be welcomed back to Harvard

Hald. - 5/18/70

Halp. said he'd rec'd a copy of Muskie's resolution on the war + agrees to lobby for it

Friend told Pursley he was going to see if Sen JS Cooper will "buy 'a new amendment' + that "they" are going to meet w/Sen Mansfield

Hald 6/2/70.
Halp said Sen Mathias had talked to Mansfield concerning a meeting + Halp sent an art to friend at Brookings Instit described as "the Muskie thing."
Friend of Lake's said Star planned to do an art. crit. of Kissinger

Hald 6/23/70
Halp agreed to talk to Sen Cotton + Sen Pearson on Cambodia — friend describ Sen Cotton as 'marginal' on the Church-Cooper amendment but said H's talk cld make Pearson favor it

Hald 6/25/70
Bran. tells Potter Stewart is doing an art on whether black rads can get fair trial + makes arrangements to discuss it w/ him

Hald 7/7/70
Friend tells Lake "that ~~the~~ Admin. of NYC needs help..."
Lakes tells friend Shriver is going to do a lot of fund raising for ~~Dems~~. cong. candidates"

Hald 7/10/70
Bran. talked to author of a bk on "southern strategy" abt bk.

Hald 9/4/70
Lake tells friend he ~~tells~~ helped Shriver

re ~~speech~~ press release crit. a recent speech by
Nixon attacking certain congressmen

Hald - 9/23/70
Wife of one target tells her mother
that target had been drinking a lot
lately

Kiss - 11/3/70
Sonnen. called Kiss. "stupid"
Lake discussed Nixon's 1970
campaign strat. w/ a friend

Hald 11/13/70
Friend of Halp's tells him Kennedy
will prob. run in '72

Hald 11/24/70
Lake re Mondale in a dilemma re
trade bill

Hald 12/11/70
Lake ~ Mondale thinks Nixon beatable
~ said friend of his is writing
an art. blasting Mayor Lindsay

Hald 12/17/70
Plans of McLanes over Christmas

Hald 12/18/70
WH aid target tells brother he didn't
understand appt. of Bush to UN

Hald 12/22/70
Harriman tells Bean he'd talked
to LBJ & "that Johnson wld not
back Sen. Muskie for the Presidency
as he intended to stay out of politics."

Held 12/28/70
Re: Muskie's trip to USSR
Held 1/22/71
Mrs Bean disc'd Kennedy's defeat as Whip to Byrd

~~Pursley discon'd — 5/27/69~~ ~~[illegible]/69~~
~~Moose " — 6/20/69~~
~~Sneider " — "~~
~~Sonner " — "~~
~~Smith " — 8/31/69~~
~~Davidson " — 9/15/69~~
~~Safire " — "~~
~~Sears " — 10/2/69~~
~~McLane " — 1/27/71~~

Source: Memo from TJ Smith to ES Miller 5/25/73

Beecher	5/4/70 – 2/10/71	✓
Brandon	5/29/69 – 2/10/71	✓
Davidson	5/12/69 – 9/15/69	✓
Halb	5/9/69 – 2/10/71	✓
Kalb	9/10/69 – 11/4/69	–
Lake	5/13/70 – 2/10/71	✓
Lord	5/13/70 – 2/10/71	✓
McLane	12/14/70 – 1/27/71	⊖
Moose	5/20/69 – 6/20/69	⊖
Pederson	5/4/70 – 2/10/71	✓
Pursley	5/12/69 – 5/27/69 and 5/4/70 – 2/10/71	
Smith	6/4/69 – 9/1/69	⊖
Safire	8/4/69 – 9/15/69	⊖
Sneider	5/20/69 – 6/20/69	⊖

Sears - 7/23/69 - 10/2/69
Sonnen - 5/12/69 - 6/20/69 and 10/19/70 - 2/10/71
Sell - 5/4/70 - 2/10/71 ✓

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2/20/76

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). (SSC Letter 7/9/76, page 3, pargraph 2, subsection A; Dept letter 7/15/76)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 2/27/76

Received by:

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/20/01 BY SP2ALM/RP

62-116395-1461

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

2/20/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosure

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 7/9/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information Handling
Surveillance

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Original of handwritten notes of SSC Staff Member James Dick relating to so-called "Kissinger 17."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SPBALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb (4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Ajd

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1463

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

15

The Attorney General

February 27, 1976

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated November 7, 1975, the SSC submitted 19 Questions concerning the disappearance of Mr. Thomas Riha for response by the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which is in response to the Committee's questions as contained in referenced communication.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

62-116395-1461

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

4 ENCLOSURE

7 MAR 9 1976

RLM:emj
(9)

"TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS"

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/CP

RLM

WOC/8

84 MAR 11 1976

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

62-116395

February 27, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter to the U. S. Department of Justice dated November 7, 1975, submitting 19 questions concerning the disappearance of Mr. Thomas Riha to be answered by the FBI.

The SSC requested that answers to these questions be provided in both classified and nonclassified forms. Pursuant to this request the FBI has prepared nonclassified answers to all questions. There was no need to prepare answers in a classified form.

It is to be noted that on June 13, 1975, and November 21, 1975, the SSC was furnished with documents relating to various questions proposed by the SSC concerning the disappearance of Thomas Riha. With the submission on November 21, 1975, the enclosures represented the entire information available at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), including the Identification Division, with reference to this matter. Any document now being furnished to you was obtained from the Denver Office of the FBI and was not previously available at FBIHQ.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

"TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS"

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

SEE NOTE, PAGE ELEVEN

RLM:emj
(8)

NDR-16 1/17/01
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/ALM/1LR 602367-AAG WRW/TL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

JPT
RLM.
WOC
62-116395
ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1. Question: Does the FBI know the whereabouts of Riha--whether he is alive or dead? Where?

Answer: The FBI does not know the whereabouts of Riha or whether he is alive or dead.

2. Question: Was Riha known to the Agency? If so, when first known and why?

Answer: All information relating to the FBI's knowledge of Riha has been previously furnished to the SSC. The first communication pertaining to Riha was a memorandum from CIA dated October 27, 1958. This memorandum was furnished the SSC on June 13, 1975.

3. Question: Was Riha employed by FBI? If so, in what capacity? Dates of employment?

Answer: Riha was not employed by the FBI.

4. Question: In March or April 1969 or thereafter, did Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum of Denver and Boulder, Colorado, contact the FBI in Colorado or Washington to assure the FBI that missing University of Colorado Professor Thomas Riha was alive and well and had left his home for personal reasons on March 15, 1969? If so, who in the FBI received this information and to whom was this information passed on in the FBI and the CIA? When was this done?

Answer: Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum did not contact the FBI in March or April, 1969, for any reason. On May 14, 1969, she was contacted by Special Agents of the FBI at her residence in Denver, Colorado, in connection with an investigation involving charges that she had impersonated an officer of the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. There is no record that Riha was discussed during this contact. A letter from the Denver Office of the FBI dated February 12, 1970, reported that on January 28, 1970, she was interviewed by Special Agents of the FBI at Boulder City Jail, Boulder, Colorado, at which time she offered the opinion that Riha had decided to leave Boulder due to marital difficulties and personal clashes with other members of the faculty at the University of Colorado. She listed a number of telephonic and personal contacts she had had with him subsequent to March, 1969.

The communication reporting the May 14, 1969, contact does not list the names of the Special Agents who contacted her, however, the communication was prepared by Special Agent Merrill R. Smith. At that time Special Agent Smith and Special Agent J. Hale McMenamin were the only Agents assigned at Boulder, Colorado. As the SSC was previously advised on November 21, 1975, the January 22, 1970, communication from Denver FBI to FBIHQ could not be located and therefore it cannot be determined who at FBIHQ received it or if the information was passed to CIA.

The letter from the Denver Office to FBIHQ on February 12, 1970, was initialed by a case supervisor in the General Investigative Division and a case supervisor in the Intelligence Division. Other than the information following in response to question number 5, there is no indication that the information was passed to CIA.

5. Question: Was this or other information passed on by the FBI to the CIA or to other agencies and the Denver and Boulder police? What was the information conveyed? When was this done?

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Answer: The report of the interview of Tannenbaum on January 28, 1970, was included in a memorandum which was furnished to FBIHQ by communication from Denver dated February 12, 1970, captioned "Galya Tannenbaum, aka, Impersonation." The memorandum was disseminated at FBIHQ to CIA, Secret Service, State Department, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Defense Intelligence Agency. The memorandum was furnished to the U. S. Attorney, Denver, Colorado, by the Denver FBI Office. There is no indication that the information was passed to the Denver or Boulder police.

6. Question: Why did FBI say in 1969 and 1970--and continues to say now--that it conducted no investigation of Riha's disappearance when it is known that FBI agents talked in 1969 and 1970 with friends of Riha about his disappearance?

Answer: The FBI said in 1969 and 1970 and continues to say now that it conducted no investigation of Riha's disappearance because from the outset of his disappearance to now, the FBI has never conducted any investigation into the disappearance of Thomas Riha. Reference is made to the third, fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of Denver FBI letter to the Director dated February 12, 1970, supra, previously furnished to the SSC on November 21, 1975, which read as follows: "All persons interviewed in this investigation were specifically advised by interviewing Agents that the purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether Galya Tannenbaum had in any way violated Federal statutes concerning impersonation. Interviewees were specifically advised investigation was not in any way connected with the dissapearance of Thomas Riha, a currently missing Assistant Professor of History at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.

"This statement was made to interviewees because the Denver Office has received inquiries by news media concerning Riha's disappearance and they have been specifically advised there is no evidence relating to his disappearance showing any violation of Federal law over which this Bureau has jurisdiction. The circumstances of his disappearance suggest a missing person situation and that investigation is being handled by the Boulder Police Department.

"Because of the close personal relationship between Tannenbaum and Riha, it would be possible, without the above statement by interviewing Agents, that interviewees could gain the impression the FBI is investigating the disappearance instead of the impersonation of a Federal officer by Tannenbaum.

"Pursuant to current Bureau instructions, this office is not and has not conducted any investigation concerning Riha."

7. Question: Why, in January or February 1970, did an FBI agent at the Denver office refuse to accompany CIA Agent Michael Todorovich from Boulder to see then Denver District Attorney Mike McKevitt? Was it made known by the CIA agent that the purpose of the visit was to ease the pressure on issuance of a subpoena to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former president of the University of Colorado? (Under such a subpoena, Smiley might have been required to reveal the agency that had given him the April 1969 report that Riha was alive and well at that time.)

Answer: The only information with reference to the contact between former Special Agent in Charge Scott J. Werner and CIA agent Mike Todorovich is contained in Denver FBI letter to Director dated February 12, 1970, captioned "Thomas Riha," previously furnished to the SSC on June 13, 1975.

8. Question: In December 1969, when Riha's dying mother, Dr. Ruth Ann Cook of Taunus, West Germany, contacted the FBI in Washington about her missing son, she was very anxious to "do anything" to determine where he was and what had happened to him. Yet the FBI (J. Edgar Hoover) said in December 1969, that Mrs. Cook declined the FBI's offer to place a missing persons notice on Riha in the FBI bulletin. What information did the FBI furnish Mrs. Cook to lead her to make this unlikely decision not to pursue all possible ways to find out what happened to her son?

Answer: All reports of communications between Dr. Ruth Ann Cook, mother of Thomas Riha, and the FBI, were furnished to the SSC on November 21, 1975.

9. Question: Was Dr. Cook connected with the FBI in any way at any time? In what capacity? When?

Answer: Dr. Cook was not connected with the FBI in any way at any time.

10. Question: Was Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum ever employed by the FBI? For what purpose or purposes? Was she hired to check on Leonard Carlin, Chicago attorney who was active in defending antiwar activists in the 1960s?

Answer: Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum was never employed by the FBI. She was not hired to check on Leonard Carlin, Chicago attorney.

11. Question: Was Mrs. Tannenbaum sent by the FBI from Chicago to the Boulder-Denver, Colorado, area in 1968 to check on Riha or on Boulder attorney Dennis Blewitt, who later became Riha's attorney and confidant?

Answer: Mrs. Tannenbaum was not sent by the FBI from Chicago to the Boulder-Denver, Colorado, area in 1968 for any reason.

12. Question: What knowledge does the FBI have on Riha's translations of Czechoslovakian tapes for Mrs. Tannenbaum in March 1969, before he disappeared?

Answer: The FBI does not have any knowledge regarding Riha's translations of Czechoslovakian tapes for Mrs. Tannenbaum.

13. Question: What knowledge does the FBI have on Tannenbaum's reported suicide at the Colorado State Hospital in March 1971? Is the FBI acquainted directly or indirectly with Henry Madrid, a technician at the hospital?

Answer: The only knowledge the FBI has concerning Tannenbaum's reported suicide at the Colorado State Hospital in March, 1971, was obtained from newspaper clippings previously furnished to the SSC on November 21, 1975. The FBI is not acquainted directly or indirectly with Henry Madrid, a technician at the hospital, other than through his mention in the above newspaper clippings.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

14. Question: Did the FBI contact the Colorado Bureau of Investigation at any time on the Riha disappearance, Mrs. Tannenbaum's death or any other aspect of the Riha-Tannenbaum case? If so, when were these contacts and what was their extent?

Answer: There is no record that the FBI contacted the Colorado Bureau of Investigation at any time on these matters.

15. Question: Did the FBI have any contacts with Riha when he was working as an interpreter in the Army in the early 1950s?

Answer: There is no record that the FBI had any contact with Riha while he was in the Army in the early 1950s.

16. Question: Does the FBI have files on any of the following persons, or were any of them at any time employed by the FBI directly or indirectly or contacted by the FBI, and for what reason?

Mrs. Jan (Kenneth) Sorensen - Boulder, Colorado
Zdenek Cerveny - Boulder, Colorado
Mrs. Carol Word - Littleton, Colorado
George and Francesca Stein - Lyons, Colorado
Professor Donald Fanger - Cambridge, Massachusetts
Henry Madrid - Pueblo, Colorado
Professor Stephen Fischer-Galati - Boulder, Colorado
Harvey Bevier - Denver, Colorado
Professor Oldrich Leska - Prague, Czechoslovakia
Jaroslav Riha - San Antonio, Texas
Professor Joyce Lebra - Boulder, Colorado

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Answer:

(a) The FBI does not have files on any of the following persons nor is there any indication that any of them were ever employed by the FBI directly or indirectly or contacted by the FBI: Mrs. Jan (Kenneth) Sorensen, Boulder, Colorado; Mrs. Carol Word, Littleton, Colorado; George Stein, Lyons, Colorado; Henry Madrid, Pueblo, Colorado; Harvey Bevier, Denver, Colorado; and Jaroslav Riha, San Antonio, Texas.

(b) The FBI does not have files on any of the following persons nor is there any indication that any of them were ever employed by the FBI, however, they were contacted by the FBI as indicated on separate reports of interview which are being furnished to the SSC: Zdenek Cerveny, Boulder, Colorado; Francesca Stein, Lyons, Colorado; and Professor Joyce Lebra, Boulder, Colorado.

(c) The FBI does have files on Professor Donald Fanger, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Professor Stephen Fischer-Galati, Boulder, Colorado; and Professor Oldrich Leska, Prague, Czechoslovakia. These files are not related to the disappearance of Thomas Riha. Professors Fanger and Leska were never employed by the FBI directly or indirectly nor is there any indication they have ever been contacted by the FBI. Professor Fischer-Galati has never been employed by the FBI directly or indirectly. Correspondence between Fischer-Galati and the FBI and other Government officials regarding the disappearance of Thomas Riha was previously furnished to the SSC on November 21, 1975. The FBI is now furnishing a copy of a report of interview of Fischer-Galati by the FBI on January 26, 1970.

Zdenek Cerveny, Francesca Stein, Professor Joyce Lebra and Professor Stephen Fischer-Galati were contacted by the FBI in the matter involving the alleged impersonation of a Federal officer by Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum.

17. Question: Does the FBI have knowledge about Riha's connections with the Treasure Tours International Travel Agency in Montreal Canada, and what is the significance of this connection?

Answer: The FBI does not have any knowledge about Riha's connections with the Treasure Tours International Travel Agency in Montreal, Canada.

18. Question: Does the FBI have knowledge of Riha's connections with the World University Service in Chicago and with Susan Kresge, one of the officials of this organization?

Answer: The FBI does not have any knowledge of Riha's connections with the World University Service in Chicago or with Susan Kresge.

19. Question: Were FBI agents trailing Riha early in 1969, especially in late February and early March? If so, why?

Answer: FBI Agents were not trailing Riha at any time.

1 - The Attorney General

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE:

Zdenek Cerveny and Francesca Stein were interviewed at Lyons, Colorado, 1/21/70, by Special Agents Merrill R. Smith and J. Hale McMenamin. Joyce Lebra was interviewed by the same Agents on 1/21/70 at Boulder, Colorado.

Professor Donald Fanger is the subject of Security Matter - C, Bureau file 100-408465, opened in January, 1954, when there was indication he supported Communist Party policies and closed 1964 when investigation indicated he did not qualify under Bureau's criteria for inclusion on the Security Index and his activities did not appear to warrant investigation. The only known connection between Fanger and Riha is that they were both included in a group of American graduate students selected to attend Moscow or Lenigrad University in 1958-1959 in exchange for twenty Soviet graduate students.

Professor Oldrich Leska is the subject of Internal Security - Czechoslovakia, Bureau file 105-19779. Leska, born 6/16/27 Czechoslovakia, was in the U. S. from 7/17/68 to 9/5/68 and again from 10/15/68 until 6/8/70 when he returned to Czechoslovakia. He was in the U. S. under the East-West Exchange Program. During the earlier visit and from October, 1968, until the Summer of 1969, he was at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, and from the Summer of 1969 until June, 1970, he was at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. The file was opened on the basis of an unusual telephone call received by a third party from Ljubo Majhanovich. Apparently Majhanovich, then living in Toronto, Canada, had attended the University of Colorado from 1966-69 where he had become friendly with Leska. Majhanovich was born in Yugoslavia,(S)

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWELVE

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE CONTINUED:

attended Moscow University 1963-64. He entered Canada 1954 and was granted Canadian citizenship in 1957. FBI and RCMP investigation did not uncover any intelligence activities on the part of either Leska or Majhanovich. There was no indication that either man had any contact with Riha while they were at the University of Colorado. (S) ~~(Secret)~~

Professor Stephen Fischer-Galati is the subject of Special Inquiry - State Department, Bureau file 123-8971 and Internal Security - Romania, Bureau file 105-98294. There are numerous other references to Fischer-Galati in Bureau files. [He has been in periodic routine contact with the Romanian Embassy and contacts were not of known security significance.] (S) He communicated with the Justice Department 4/7/69 concerning the disappearance of Riha and also wrote to the Vice President of the U. S. concerning Riha's disappearance. (Confidential)

This note has been classified "Secret" in accordance with the classification given to communications received from the RCMP. (S)

~~Classified by 6283, XGDS 1 and 3, date of declassification indefinite.~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2-27-76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
(SSC letter 11-7-75) Re Thomas Riha

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: J. D. Cerl Date: 3/2/74

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title: Security Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1461

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

2/27/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 11/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Information relating to disappearance of Mr. Thomas Riha. Response to 19 questions posed by SSC request.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1441

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
11/7/75

CONCERNING DISAPPEARANCE OF
THOMAS RIHA

RETAIN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALMKP

62-116395-1161

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/GP

Date: January 27, 1970

1

ZDENEK CERVENY, care of Black Bear Inn, Lyons, Colorado, was interviewed at this establishment and advised he was born December 5, 1938, in Jihlava, Czechoslovakia, and holds a Master's degree in Mechanical Engineering from the Czechoslovakia Technical University, Prague, Czechoslovakia. He stated he is the nephew of THOMAS RIHA, a Professor of Russian History at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. He is currently employed as a plant engineer with the Martin-Marietta Cement Company in Lyons, Colorado.

According to CERVENY, he came to the United States on November 8, 1968, from Vienna, Austria, destined for the residence of his uncle in Boulder, Colorado. He stated that upon arrival in New York City, he spent several days at the residence of Mr. and Mrs. R. V. GROSSMAN in Brooklyn, New York, who are the aunt and uncle of HANA RIHA, the former wife of THOMAS RIHA.

CERVENY continued that he arrived in Denver, Colorado, via Greyhound Bus on November 16, 1968, and immediately called THOMAS RIHA at his residence in Boulder. He was advised by RIHA that he would be unable to come to Denver to drive him back to Boulder, but that he would have a friend meet him at the bus station. He stated that approximately one hour later a woman who introduced herself as GALYA TANNENBAUM approached him at the bus station and thereafter drove him to the residence of THOMAS RIHA at 1655 - 6th Street, Boulder, Colorado. He advised that after TANNENBAUM departed the RIHA residence, his uncle told him that she was a very important person, and the one who had been influential in getting him into the United States.

CERVENY stated he resided with RIHA from November 16, 1968, until January 8, 1969, when he moved to 918 South Logan Street, Denver, Colorado, in order to be closer to the Samsonite Company where he had secured employment in the Research and Development Laboratory. During the period he resided with his uncle, TANNENBAUM visited this residence on several occasions, and on almost every instance reminded him that she was an officer in Military Intelligence; very influential with authorities of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; and that if he did not behave himself in the United States, she would have him sent back to Czechoslovakia. CERVENY stated he never was certain

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 1/21/70 at Lyons, Colorado File # Denver 47-3190

SA'S MERRILL R. SMITH and
by [illegible] Date dictated 1/2[illegible]/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

what, if anything, TANNENBAUM actually did in connection with his being admitted to the United States, as the matter, to his knowledge, was handled by a Czechoslovakian Refugee Committee in New York City.

CERVENY went on to state that after he moved to Denver he did not see TANNENBAUM again until March 13, 1969, when she called him on the telephone and suggested he come to her residence at 248 Logan Street, where his uncle was also visiting her. He stated when he arrived at her house, his uncle seemed depressed and upset over the fact that he was having marital difficulties with HANA, and that the marriage would probably terminate in divorce. He stated the purpose of his being invited to TANNENBAUM's residence appeared to emanate from a desire of his uncle to see him, but that nothing of importance occurred during the visit.

Following the disappearance of his uncle on March 15, 1969, he stated TANNENBAUM commenced asking him over to her house on the pretense of checking up on his immigrant status; however, it became immediately apparent that the principal purpose of these invitations was an attempt on the part of TANNENBAUM to have sexual relations with him. He pointed out there were times when he entered her residence when she would be partially unclothed, would attempt to sit on his lap, sit close to him while watching television, or would openly suggest that they go to her bedroom for the purpose of having sexual intercourse. CERVENY stated TANNENBAUM was physically repulsive to him, and that he would find an immediate excuse to leave when she commenced making sexual advances to him.

During the period when he was visiting the TANNENBAUM residence, CERVENY advised she suggested that she adopt him, and actually started adoption proceedings through an attorney in Denver, STEPHEN L. R. MC NICHOLS, JR.; however, he stated he had no desire whatsoever to go through with this, and told TANNENBAUM so. He stated it was about this time that he began to suspect that TANNENBAUM had no connection with Military Intelligence or had any influence over his immigration status.

He stated that in May, 1969, he desired to go to Toronto, Canada, to attent a wedding of some Czechoslovakian friends, and he inquired of TANNENBAUM if such would be legal for him to do. He stated she told him there was nothing for him to worry about; however, she suggested he consult with Immigration authorities in Denver regarding this trip. According to CERVENY, TANNENBAUM accompanied him to the Federal Building in Denver, but refused to enter Immigration offices with him, giving some excuse that she did not want them to [illegible] his case. He [illegible] the United States for Canada, he would not be able to return. When he informed TANNENBAUM of this, she told him that she had more authority than the Immigration officials, and advised him to go to Canada regardless, as she outranked the officials in Denver. CERVENY then made the trip to Canada without incident, and learned later that he was actually just fortunate that he was not required to produce citizenship papers at any time.

In addition, CERVENY stated that in May, 1969, he met a Czechoslovakian girl in Colorado Springs by the name of MICHEL BDLIKOVA, who was working at the Broadmoor Hotel, and whom he eventually introduced to TANNENBAUM. He stated that TANNENBAUM immediately told the girl of her Military Intelligence and Immigration connections, and advised her that she could arrange to get her a passport to visit relatives in Czechoslovakia. He stated that in October, 1969, BDLIKOVA told him that TANNENBAUM had recently approached her with a letter written in English purportedly from THOMAS RIHA to CERVENY. He stated BDLIKOVA was asked by TANNENBAUM to rewrite the letter in Czechoslovakian, and that he eventually received this letter postmarked from somewhere in Canada. He felt at the time he received the letter that it had not been written by his uncle, and when he was advised by BDLIKOVA that the letter was a hoax, he began to feel that TANNENBAUM was a fraud and that his uncle's disappearance could have been for reasons other than marital discord. He stated that immeidately after being told of the letter by BDLIKOVA in October, 1969, he filed a missing persons notice with the Boulder, Colorado Police Department the following day. He stated the last time he saw TANNENBAUM was just before or after he made this report to the Boulder Police Department.

With regard to CERVENY's association with GALYA TANNENBAUM, he recalled that on several occasions she told him that she would like to recruit him into Military Intelligence, as his engineering background and language ability would be "extremely useful to us." She also told him that if he were in the United States "working for the other side," she would shoot him. TANNENBAUM also told CERVENY that she had originally met THOMAS RIHA in Chicago, and that after she came to Colorado, he followed her for the purpose of marrying her; however, the marriage did not take place as RIHA was unable to get along with her children. He stated that upon reflection, he feels that his uncle actually believed that TANNENBAUM was connected in some official capacity with the United States Government, and that there was something in their relationship which he feels gave TANNENBAUM some type of influence over the actions of his uncle; however, in conversation with both his uncle and TANNENBAUM, he can recall nothing of a concrete nature, and that this feeling is probably a result of intuition more than any [illegible].

CERVENY also recalled that in December, 1968, his father visited him, and during the visit, showed him a diamond bracelet which he had smuggled into the United States for the purpose of selling for a relative in Czechoslovakia. He stated his father had previously corresponded with another individual by the name of RIHA in San Antonio, Texas, who was no relation to his uncle, but whom his father had known in Czechoslovakia. According to CERVENY, his father made a trip to San Antonio to leave this bracelet with the RIHA in San Antonio for him to attempt to sell; however, the bracelet was eventually returned to CERVENY from the RIHA in San Antonio, who advised him he could locate no buyer. Thereafter, he showed the bracelet to TANNENBAUM, who indicated a desire to buy it. Both went to a jeweler in the Denver Hilton Hotel, who appriased the bracelet at $350. TANNENBAUM, however, offered him $500 for the bracelet, and actually paid him $400 in cash with a promise to pay him an additional $100 later, which he never received.

CERVENY recalled another incident which furthered his suspicions of TANNENBAUM in regard to a will which he witnessed at her insistence. By way of background, he explained that in the spring of 1969, TANNENBAUM introduced him to an elderly man by the name of GUSTAV FREDERICH INGWERSEN, a plastics engineer and a native of Germany, who owned some type of plastics plant in Denver, Colorado. He stated he had formerly done some work in plastics, and TANNENBAUM suggested that INGWERSEN might help him get established in this field. As a result of this meeting, CERVENY became friendly with INGWERSEN, and in the company of TANNENBAUM and her two children, made two vacation trips to New Mexico with him. He stated these trips were in either April or May, 1969, and in June, 1969, TANNENBAUM advised him that INGWERSEN had died. Then on July 5, 1969, TANNENBAUM had him visit her residence where she told him that INGWERSEN had drawn up a will and signed it prior to his death, but had neglected to have two witnesses sign it in accordance with Colorado law. She said that INGWERSEN liked CERVENY and had intended to ask him to witness the will, but had died before this could be accomplished. She then coaxed him for over an hour to witness this document, and still believing she was a bona fide official in some Governmental capacity, he affixed his signature to the will.

CERVENY concluded by stating that TANNENBAUM had never obtained anything of value from him as a result of her representations as an officer in Military Intelligence, and the longer he remained in the United States and became acquainted with life in this country, the more suspicious he became that TANNENBAUM was in some way attempting to eventually try to capitalize in some way on his immigrant status. He again pointed out, however, that to his knowledge, TANNENBAUM was never able to materially obtain anything of value from him.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Date January 27, 1970

Mrs. FRANCESCA STEIN, nee Friedel, owner of the Black Bear Inn, Lyons, Colorado, advised she is a citizen of Czechoslovakia, and has been in the United States for approximately four years. She stated that in about October, 1967, a Mr. STABEN, a visiting Professor from France at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, and a frequent customer at the Black Bear Inn, introduced her to a Professor of History at the University of Colorado by the name of THOMAS RIHA, also a native of Czechoslovakia, and that thereafter she and her husband became friendly with RIHA.

Mrs. STEIN advised that in April, 1968, RIHA visited the restaurant in the company of a Czechoslovakian citizen by the name of JIRI CERVENY, who advised her that he had a son, ZDENEK CERVENY, who had recently escaped from Czechoslovakia into Vienna, Austria. She stated JIRI CERVENY was from Prague and that ZDENEK CERVENY is a nephew of RIHA. They inquired if Mrs. STEIN would be able to assist his son in coming to the United States, particularly with regard to obtaining employment for him. Mrs. STEIN advised both RIHA and CERVENY that she would attempt to assist in this endeavor through her attorney, PAUL MORRIS, in Boulder, Colorado.

Mrs. STEIN recalled that in September, 1968, MORRIS and RIHA visited her residence in Lyons concerning ZDENEK CERVENY, at which time MORRIS told her that he knew a woman from Denver, Colorado, by the name of GALYA TANNENBAUM who had a great deal of influence in the Government, and who was referred to by RIHA as "Colonel." She stated that MORRIS and RIHA advised her that TANNENBAUM would be able to assist them in getting ZDENEK CERVENY into the United States.

According to Mrs. STEIN, shortly after this meeting with MORRIS and RIHA, TANNENBAUM visited the restaurant in Lyons to discuss the bringing of ZDENEK CERVENY to the United States. She told Mrs. STEIN it would be necessary to first check out Mrs. STEIN and RIHA for security purposes before bringing CERVENY into this country. She told her that she was a "Colonel in the Immigration," and showed her a small hand gun which she had in her purse. During this conversation, TANNENBAUM told Mrs. STEIN that she belonged to an extermination group which killed people after the second World War. Mrs. STEIN stated she considered TANNENBAUM to be a "nut" and did not pursue the matter any further with her, pointing out that

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On [illegible] at Lyons, Colorado File # Denver 47-[illegible]

by [illegible] Date dictated [illegible]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

as far as she was concerned, the immigration matter concerning CERVENY would be handled by her attorney, PAUL MORRIS.

Mrs. STEIN continued that in October, 1968, RIHA married a young Czechoslovakian girl by the name of HANA HRUSKOVA, and that subsequent to the marriage, a reception was held at the Black Bear Inn. She stated that while the reception was in progress, TANNENBAUM appeared, uninvited, and immediately sought out RIHA, took him to the bar section of the restaurant, and commenced a long, serious conversation with him which lasted for approximately one hour. She stated that RIHA's bride became extremely upset over this, as TANNENBAUM would not allow anyone to interrupt their conversation. Mrs. STEIN advised that on one occasion she went into the bar to tell RIHA that his bride was becoming very upset, and was answered in an angry manner by TANNENBAUM to "leave them alone." Following this conversation, the content of which is unknown to Mrs. STEIN, she stated RIHA appeared to be extremely upset, and although TANNENBAUM left immediately, RIHA seemed to have lost all interest in the reception.

Following the incident during the wedding reception, Mrs. STEIN advised that TANNENBAUM again visited her at the Black Bear Inn concerning the immigration case of ZDENEK CERVENY, during which she mentioned to TANNENBAUM that she owned some property in Lyons on which she desired to build an apartment house. At this time TANNENBAUM told her that she was a Colonel in Military Intelligence, and was soon to be promoted to the rank of General. She told Mrs. STEIN that she could utilize some influence in securing an FHA loan for her; that she had the authority to deport her at any time; and intimated to Mrs. STEIN that for a percentage of the loan obtained, she would obtain same; and if Mrs. STEIN did not agree to this arangement, she would have her deported. Mrs. STEIN again pointed out that she considered TANNENBAUM a "nut," and told her that all of immigration and business dealings were handled through her attorney.

Mrs. STEIN stated that to the best of her recollection, the above was the last time she saw TANNENBAUM, and in February, 1969, she made a trip to Columbia, South America, where she had resided for approximately ten years before coming to the United States, and did not again return to Lyons until March 18, 1969, following the disappearance of RIHA from Boulder, Colorado, on March 15, 1969.

Mrs. STEIN stated she did not believe the representations made by TANNENBAUM that she was connected with the United States Immigration Service, or with Military Intelligence, and that she obtained nothing of value from her.

Mrs. STEIN advised that ZDENEK CERVENY eventually came to the United States in November, 1968, and to the best of her knowledge, TANNENBAUM had nothing to do with his entry into this country.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date February 3, 1970

Miss JOYCE LEBRA, Associate Professor of History, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, 1590 Hillside Drive, Boulder, advised she is a colleague of THOMAS RIHA in the Department of History and considers herself a close personal friend.

At the outset of the interview, it was explained to LEBRA that the purpose of the interview was to ascertain any available information from her concerning Mrs. GALYA TANNENBAUM on whom this Bureau is conducting an investigation under the Federal Impersonation Statute.

Miss LEBRA advised that to the best of her recollection RIHA never did mention anyone to her by the name of TANNENBAUM or any individual connected with Military Intelligence or the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. She stated that if TANNENBAUM had been a close friend of RIHA's, this fact would probably have been known to her, as she and RIHA generally associated with the same circle of friends in the University community.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 1/21/70 at Boulder, Colorado File # Denver 47-3195

by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1

Date January 28, 1970

STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI, Professor, Department of History, University of Colorado, advised that he had just returned from a European trip. He recalled first meeting Professor THOMAS RIHA sometime in 1966 at a meeting of the American Historical Society in San Francisco. He advised he also had heard of RIHA prior to their meeting. He advised that after RIHA came to the University of Colorado he knew him as a fellow faculty member of the Department of History and had dinner with him on two or three occasions. He advised their relationship was casual and could not have been considered a profound relationship.

FISCHER-GALATI advised he first met GALYA TANNENBAUM sometime in May, 1969, after the disappearance of Professor RIHA. He advised his object in meeting TANNENBAUM was to determine if she were a "colonel" as described in hearsay. He advised he was convinced she was not connected with any kind of intelligence work and knew nothing of Eastern European history. He recalled that TANNENBAUM stated she had known RIHA for many years and indicated she had helped RIHA come to the United States but gave no further explanation. He also recalled that TANNENBAUM displayed a "Power of Attorney" document which was contained in a letter allegedly signed by TOM RIHA. He advised the most significant part of the document to him was the date of same, which he easily recalled as January 5. 1968. FISCHER-GALATI pointed out that January 5, 1968, is the date of the overthrow of the Czechoslovakian Government, at which time NOVOTONY was replaced by DUBCEK, and at this same time the official who was in control of passports disappeared and subsequently showed up in Montreal, Canada. He recalled that TANNENBAUM indicated she carried a gun in her purse and that her car had some special equipment, but TANNENBAUM did not elaborate further. He advised that TANNENBAUM was extremely careful in her conversations with him and made no allegations.

FISCHER-GALATI advised his second meeting with TANNENBAUM occured on October 1, 1969, at 2:15 p.m., same obtained from his notebook. He recalled that TANNENBAUM called him on the telephone and arranged to meet him in front of the Colorado Book Store in Boulder. He recalled that her car was parked legally at the aforementioned location. He recalled that she was anxious to determine why a check had "bounced" in RIHA's bank account. He recalled she wanted to know if the University was continuing to deposit RIHA's salary to his bank account, as all University faculty

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/CP

On 1/26/70 at Boulder, Colorado File # Denver 87-3190

by [illegible] Date dictated 1/28/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

are paid, and she also wanted to see the receipt for the deposit of his salary per University records. He advised he had determined a discrepancy existed between what the University claimed to put into the account and what they actually put into RIHA's account. He advised at this meeting TANNENBAUM did not discuss RIHA's whereabouts.

He recalled his third meeting with TANNENBAUM occurred about five days later at the same location, although this time TANNENBAUM was accompanied by a small female child about three years of age. He advised her of the amount the University had deposited to RIHA's account. At this time TANNENBAUM told him her real name was not GALYA TANNENBAUM, but something else which she did not disclose, and added that she was about ready to leave town. He advised of no contact with TANNENBAUM since their last meeting.

STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI advised that the date of the document mentioned above of January 5, 1968, and its historical significance disturbs him. He stated if RIHA was not "bumped off" by TANNENBAUM, then he assumes that RIHA's disappearance may have been connected with an unknown intelligence matter, which is pure conjecture on his part. FISCHER-GALATI also recalled that in September, 1968, Professor RIHA requested that an advertisement for a travel bureau be run in the "Eastern European Quarterly," which GALATI described as an international journal to promote cultural contact with Eastern European Countries. He advised RIHA did not indicate if the advertisement was run for a friend or if RIHA had any financial interest in the travel agency named Treasure Tours, 1010 St. Catherine Way, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. FISCHER-GALATI advised that because of the reasons mentioned, he sometimes believes that RIHA could be in Canada.

Professor FISCHER-GALATI advised that in April, 1969, he contacted a Mr. FRITZ of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Denver, Colorado, regarding the sudden leaving of Professor THOMAS RIHA of the University of Colorado. Mr. FRITZ advised him that he had no knowledge of the matter but would check into same. Professor FISCHER-GALATI stated he was later recontacted by FRITZ, who stated the disappearance had nothing to do with the CIA and that RIHA's leaving was a personal matter connected with personal problems.

Professor FISCHER-GALATI explained that in the absence of a complete denial by Mr. FRITZ that the CIA had any dealings with RIHA at any time, he, therefore, concluded and was convinced the information furnished by Mr. FRITZ did not represent a personal opinion but must have come from within the CIA. He added that inasmuch as it then appeared to him that RIHA had left voluntarily, he also concluded he had no reason to fear for the safety of RIHA. Professor FISCHER-GALATI said that if he had been subsequently quoted in the "Colorado Daily" or any other newspaper as saying that RIHA had left voluntarily and was safe, such quotation would have been correct.

Professor FISCHER-GALATI continued that he did not feel, however, that the explanation about RIHA was adequate and for that reason subsequently directed a letter to the Chief of the Foreign Agents Registration section within the Justice Department, whom he knew well. He thereafter received a reply that the Chief to whom he directed the letter was deceased.

He stated he thereafter directed a second letter to the same section mentioned above within the Justice Department in mid-December, 1969, again inquiring about RIHA, but as yet has received no reply.

He stated he did not know of anything of value ever received by TANNENBAUM as a result of any representation.

2 - M[redacted] J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

February 26, 1976

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 19, 1976, requesting certain FBI materials.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum responsive to that request.

A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for your records.

Enclosures (2) ENCLOSURE

62-116395

REC-112 62-116395-1460X

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

7 MAR 30 1976

SJM:lhb/hh
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 APR 2 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

[redacted]

2 - Mr.[redacted]. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller

62-116395

February 26, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 19, 1976, requesting delivery of certain materials pertaining to the Secret Army Organization and the role of an FBI informant therein.

This is to effect delivery of the requested materials.

1 - The Attorney General

SJM:lhb lhb
(9)   ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

NOTE:

In response to a 1/20/76 SSC request, access was given to materials pertaining to Howard Barry Godfrey and the Secret Army Organization. SSC Staff Member Sam Bouchard, upon completion of his review of these materials, identified certain serials therefrom and subsequently made the request for delivery set out in the LHM.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALMKP

prd

62-116395-1160X

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2/26/76

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). (SSC Letter 2/19/76)
Secret Army Organization.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 3/2/76

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title: Security Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/VP

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
2/26/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosure

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 2/19/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*
U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Material regarding Secret Army Organization and the role of an FBI informant therein.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
~~SECRET~~

FEB 23 1976

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. WRW ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR 002 SD CODED

4:55 PM, FEBRUARY 23, 1976 IMMEDIATE BMW

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAN DIEGO (66-1714)(P)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#NDR-16 2/7/01
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/ALM/KP 60267AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

SENSTUDY.

REBUTEL, FEBRUARY 23, 1976.

REVIEW OF SAN DIEGO FILES FITTING CRITERIA SET FORTH IN REBUTEL INDICATE FOLLOWING CASE MST CLOSELY FIT.

CAPTIONED "OVERCAST", BUFILE 65-68052, SD FILES 65-2164 AND 134-761. THIS WAS A HIGHLY SENSITIVE JOINT OPERATION INVOLVING BOTH CIA AND FBI AND WAS HANDLE BY FORMER SA ARNOLD D. ORRANTIA. ~~(S)~~

FOLLOWING CASES LIKEWISE FIT CRITERIA TO SOME EXTENT:

(1) HARACIO SANDOVAL AMADOR, IS - MEXICO, BUFILE 100-394608, SD FILE 134-7. THIS INVOLVES FORMER SD 852-S, OPERATIONAL 1952 TO 1958, HANDLED BY SA ARNOLD D. ORRANTIA.

62-116395-1460

REC-110

(2) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - BORDER COVERAGE PROGRAM BUFILE 100-434445-46, SD FILE 100-12363, ASSIGNED FORMER SA ORRANTIA, 1/9/61 TO 5/6/71, WHEN IT WAS CLOSED. THIS

7 MAR 9 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Re SSC request dated 2/19/76 for access.
Response discussed w/ SSC representative P. Wallach
3/2/76 by SA J.W. Johnson; no further interest
JWS

~~SECRET~~

8 4 MAR 1 1 1976

~~[illegible] SECRET~~

SD 66-1714 PAGE TWO ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

PRIMARILY INVOLVED COINTELPRO MATTERS DIRECTED AGAINST COMMUNIST PARTY OF MEXICO AND NATIONAL LIBRATION MOVEMENT (MLN) IN MEXICO.

(3) BOCOV, BUFILE 100-356015, SDFILE 100-6923, ASSIGNED FORMER SA ORRANTIA, 6/18/58 TO 6/10/65.

ALL ABOVE MENTIONED CASES INVOLVED SENSITIVE SOURCES AND TECHNIQUES AND SHOULD BE AFFORDED APPROPRIATE HANDLING.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3392, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE~~.

END..

CBL FBIHQ

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. J. [illegible] Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

February 20, 1976

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SPALNKP

1 - Mr. J. P. Graham

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 11, 1976, requesting the names of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel responsible for the preparation of certain Bureau memoranda and requesting that arrangements be made for interview of these persons by SSC Staff Members. Reference is also made to SSC telephone call February 18, 1976, in which the identity of the person responsible for preparation of Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Los Angeles, airtel to Director, FBI, dated May 26, 1970, under the same caption as above memoranda was requested.

All San Diego communications cited in referenced letter were authored by Special Agent (SA) Roy L. Burns, who is currently assigned to the Billings, Montana, Resident Agency in the territory covered by our Butte Field Office.

All Los Angeles communications cited in referenced letter were authored by former SA Leroy W. Sheets. Mr. Sheets is now retired and he may possibly be residing at 5725 - 72nd Street, N. E., Marysville, Washington.

Memorandum Director, FBI, to SAC, Los Angeles, October 31, 1968, was authored by SA William D. Neumann, who is now assigned as Assistant SAC in our Minneapolis Field Office.

SAC, Los Angeles airtel to Director, FBI, May 26, 1970, was authored by SA Richard W. Held, who is currently assigned to FBI Headquarters.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JPG:eks
(11)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395-1415

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Messrs. Neumann, Held and Burns will be notified of the SSC's desire to interview them in connection with these memoranda. Mr. Held is currently in an official travel status and will remain in such status until the first week of March.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2-20-76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
(SSC let 2-11-76)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 2/27/76

Received by:

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1459

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED 2/20/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 2/11/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Operating Procedures
Information Handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Names of FBI personnel responsible for preparation of certain memoranda and arrangements for SSC interviews.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1457

183-10277

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

February 20, 1976

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff
1 - Mr. J. P. Graham

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 11, 1976, requesting the names of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel responsible for the preparation of certain Bureau memoranda and requesting that arrangements be made for these persons to be interviewed by SSC Staff Members. Reference is also made to SSC telephone call February 18, 1976, in which the identity of the person responsible for preparing Special Agent in Charge, Los Angeles, airtel to Director, FBI, dated May 26, 1970, under the same caption as above memoranda was requested.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to the request contained in referenced SSC letter and telephone call.

A copy of the above memorandum is being furnished for your records.

62-116395-1459

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

7 MAR 9 1976

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep. AD Adm. —
Dep. AD Inv. —
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/rp

JPG:eks
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

84 MAR 11 1976

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Delivered to Dept
2/24/76 bs

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Referenced SSC letter indicated that certain portions of Bureau memoranda and airtels may be quoted in the SSC's final report on FBI intelligence operations and that the SSC was seeking to take the testimony of persons whose memoranda and statements might be quoted in that report. The memoranda referred to in referenced SSC letter and telephone call pertain to the FBI's role in the "gang war" between the Black Panther Party and the US Organization.

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Leavitt
1 - Mr. Cregar

The Attorney General

March 3, 1976

1 - Mr. Blunt
1 - Mr. Thornton
1 - Mr. Coulson

Director, FBI

10

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to memorandum of Steven K. Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, to John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division, FBI, dated February 20, 1976, enclosing SSC letter dated February 18, 1976.

Referenced letter requests interviews with FBI Agents of the Chicago Office who prepared memoranda concerning the Black Panther Party.

In view of current civil litigation involving members of the Black Panther Party, and Agents of the FBI, it is felt that it would not be proper to make these Agents available for interview by the SSC at this time.

The FBI is in agreement with the Department's view that a proper response would be to allow the SSC to review transcripts of the Agents' testimony at the trial, concerning these memoranda.

REC-110 62-116395-1457

7 MAR 9 1976

Delivered to Dept 3-4-76 JCS/4D

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

NOTE: SAs Stanley, McCabe, and Mitchell are all to be called as witnesses in civil trial in Chicago. Chicago letters to the Director dated 12/16/68, and 1/13/69, were written by SA Stanley. The author of the letter of 3/14/69, has not been determined.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

DOC:mcz
(11) mcz

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/19/01 BY

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

[illegible]FICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY [illegible]ERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 20 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
SB Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Letter Dated February 18, 1976

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated February 18, 1976, which requests interviews with FBI agents who wrote various memoranda concerning the Black Panther Party in Chicago. Because such interviews might impair the Department's ability to conduct a defense in the Hampton trial, in Chicago, I have asked the Department attorneys handling that case to give us their views on an appropriate response to Senator Church's letter. One possible response would be to provide the SSC with the transcripts of the FBI agents testimony at the trial concerning these memoranda, instead of allowing the SSC to interview these agents. We would appreciate it if the FBI would also consider what response would be appropriate to this letter.

Memo ~~Let~~ to AG cc DAG
3-2-76
DOC:mcz

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALMKP

cc: Paul Daly

[illegible] by Legal [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1457

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., T[illegible]N.
BARRY GOLDWATER, AR[illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MATH[illegible]., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible]

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States [illegible]enate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 18, 1976

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the United States
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As a part of the Select Committee on Intelligence's preparation of a final report on FBI domestic intelligence operations, we will be seeking to take the testimony of persons whose memoranda and statements might be quoted in that report.

In our investigation into the FBI's counterintelligence activities against the Black Panther Party in Chicago certain Bureau memoranda and Airtels may be quoted. The following is a list of these documents. Actual copies, received by the Select Committee from the FBI, are also enclosed.

Memorandum SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI 12/16/68
Memorandum SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI 1/13/69
Memorandum SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI 3/14/69

The Select Committee staff believes that Special Agents Joseph Stanley, Joseph McCabe, and Roy Martin Mitchell were responsible for these memoranda and we would appreciate your forwarding to us the names of other FBI personnel responsible for their preparation. We would also like you to make the necessary arrangements for Select Committee staff to be able to interview these persons.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Yours very truly,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

RECEIVED
FEB 19 1976

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1451

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

February 26, 1976

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott (Route
(Attn: J. M. Powers) Through
for Review)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

On February 13, 1976, the SSC held an Executive Session concerning "Domestic Intelligence Investigations." During the course of that Executive Session, one of the SSC Staff Members present made a request for this Bureau to furnish the SSC with copies of instructions sent by Headquarters to Bureau field divisions relative to the effect that the Privacy Act of 1974 would have upon Bureau investigations in the domestic intelligence area.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum, with enclosures, which is responsive to the request made at the above Executive Session. A copy of this memorandum, also with enclosures, is being furnished for your records.

Delivered to Dept 2-27-76 JSS/AD

Delivered to Committee 2-27-76.

Enclosures (10)

REC-104 62-116395-1452

62-116395

7 MAR 10 1976

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

TJM:lij
(11)

1 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KG

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

WOC

TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 11 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams [illegible] - Mr. W. R. Wannall
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz [illegible] - Mr. W. O. Cregar
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly [illegible] - Mr. T. J. McNiff
1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott (Route Through
(Attn: J. M. Powers) for Review)

62-116395

February 26, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

At the SSC Executive Session held February 13, 1976, concerning "Domestic Intelligence Investigations," a discussion ensued between Bureau representatives and SSC Staff Members as to what effect the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974 had on investigations conducted by the FBI relative to domestic subversive groups. On this occasion, one of the Staff Members present requested that this Bureau furnish the SSC with a copy of all instructions sent to Bureau field divisions by FBI Headquarters, which instructions would have a bearing on the conduct of this Bureau's "Domestic Intelligence Investigations."

Attached, in response to the above request, are copies of three Headquarters communications sent to Bureau field divisions containing instructions responsive to the above request. Also attached is one copy of a communication from our Richmond Division which prompted one of the above Headquarters communications.

Enclosures (4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY

1 - The Attorney General

TJM:lij
(10)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

NOTE:

See memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 2/17/76, captioned "Senstudy 75," which reported the results of the above-mentioned Executive Session and which recommended that the Senstudy Project Unit respond to the request made by an SSC Staff Member at the Executive Session. Materials being furnished the SSC as being responsive to their request was prepared by SA Stephen P. Riggin, Files and Communications Division.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

WOC
TJM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

2 - [illegible]. J. A. Mintz
(1 -Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

February 27, 1976

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. J. Duffin
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the request of the SSC dated February 19, 1976, for access to FBI materials.

Attached is a memorandum which is a partial response to referenced request. Enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JWJ:emg emg
(10)

TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS.

Delivered to Dept 2-20-76 JDS/AD
Delivered to Committee 2-27-76

REC-104 62-116395-1451

3 ENCLOSURE

MAR 10 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

FEB 28 10 30 AM 1976

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1A - Duffin

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

84 MAR 11 1976

2- Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. A. J. Duffin
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

62-116395

February 27, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the February 19, 1976, request by the SSC for access to FBI materials.

Item 2 of referenced SSC letter requested the following:

> 2. Access to all material pertaining to a Bureau "operation" against the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City run out of the San Diego Field Office in the early 1960's and involving SA Rinaldo Orrantina.

Materials considered to be responsive to the request of the SSC have been assembled and are available for review by SSC staff members in Room 4171, J. Edgar Hoover Building.

1 - The Attorney General

JWJ:emg emg
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL AND ONE FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62.116395-

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

RE: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE:

It is believed the materials responsive to the SSC request pertains to the Overcast, Espionage - Russia case, Bureau file 65-68052 which consists of two sections. This material will be available to respond to questions posed by the SSC members and will preclude the Xeroxing of every serial in the file.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2-27-76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
(SSC request 2-19-76) Item v

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 2/27/76

Received by: Lynsey Oster

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1171

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: **FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

2-27-76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 2-19-76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Access to material relating to Soviet Embassy, Mexico City.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALMKP

62-116395

SJM:ds ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Mjd

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-141

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

MAR 8 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven Blackhurst
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SB

SUBJECT: SSC Letter Dated March 5, 1976

Sensitivity

The attached letter from the Senate Select Committee was discussed with Mr. Sam Miller of the Bureau on March 5, 1976. It requires no response unless the FBI has objections to the draft SSC report on mail opening.

REC-104 62-116395-1450

7 MAR 10 1976

ENCLOSURE

Phillips ✓

cc: Paul Daly

58

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP2ALM

84 MAR 18 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER[illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MA[illegible] JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKE[illegible], PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 5, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esquire
Office of Professional Responsibility
Room 4313
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

On March 4, 1976, Mr. James Johnson of the FBI reviewed the Select Committee's draft titled "CIA and FBI Mail Opening." James Dick and Thomas Dawson of the Committee staff revised the draft to meet all security problems previously raised by Mr. James Lee of the Bureau, and discussed the revisions with Mr. Johnson to make certain that their concerns were met.

This letter is to confirm the fact that, unless I receive word to the contrary from you, the Department of Justice has no objection to the publication of this report.

Thanks again for your help throughout the inquiry into this subject.

Sincerely,

Frederick A. O. Schwarz Jr.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Chief Counsel

Copy to Paul Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALMKP

RECEIVED
MAR 5 1976

62-116395-14

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/4/76

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

It was brought to the attention of the Legal Counsel Division that in the Senate Select Committee report concerning COINTELPRO the identities of Agents were contained which are below the level of Section Chief. The prior procedure and policy of the Senate Select Committee was not to include anybody below a policymaking position which it equated with Section Chief or above.

F. A. O. Schwartz, Counsel to captioned Committee, was contacted concerning this matter and Schwartz stated that he wanted to assure the Bureau that there would be no names of Agent personnel included in the report under the title of Section Chief. He indicated that their procedures and policies concerning utilization of the identity of Agent personnel will be consistent with the policies established by their Bureau mail opening report. This report was written by James Dick of the Committee and contains the identity of only one Section Chief and that is William A. Branigan. No one below the rank of Section Chief was identified. In fact, Dick did not identify SACs involved in this operation.

REC-104 62-116395-1449

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

7 MAR 10 1976

PVD

per

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Leavitt
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

11 - LEGAL COUNSEL

PVD:lad LAD
(6)

84 MAR 15 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - Mr. J.B. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh

February 27, 1976

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Shackelford
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Newman

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

On February 19, 1976, at the invitation of Staff Member Robert Kelley of the SSC, Supervisors Edward P. Grigalus and Homer A. Newman, Jr., reviewed the proposed draft of the Committee as it pertains to informants in the domestic security field. This review was for the purpose of determining if any information was contained therein which would expose informants or jeopardize any ongoing investigative activities in the internal security field as it pertains to informants.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum setting forth the results of our review of this proposed draft.

A copy of the above memorandum is being furnished for your records.

REC-104 62-116395-1447

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

MAR 10 1976

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ENCLOSURE

HAN:tdp (12)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALMKP

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
egal Coun. ____
elephone Rm. ____
irector Sec'y ____

TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 11 1976

GPO 921-546

The Attorney General

NOTE:

This is the first instance wherein the SSC has made available for review a proposed rough draft of a segment of the upcoming SSC report. It is expected that other segments will be made available by the Committee Staff Members. It was necessary to review this proposed draft in the offices of the SSC since they do not contemplate permitting proposed drafts to leave their premises. The approval for the use of information from the 2 classified documents has been coordinated with the IS-2 Section of the Intelligence Division and with the Budget and Accounting Section of the Administrative Division. The handling of the budget figure as set forth has been approved by Asst. Director E.W. Walsh.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

62-116395

February 27, 1976

1 - Mr. Shackelford
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Newman

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On February 19, 1976, at the invitation of Staff Member Robert Kelley of the SSC, Supervisors Edward P. Grigalus and Homer A. Newman, Jr., reviewed the proposed draft of the Committee's report as it pertains to informants in the domestic security field. This review was conducted for the purpose of determining if the report contained any information which would expose our informants or jeopardize any ongoing investigations or investigative techniques in the domestic internal security field as it pertains to informants. This review did not detect any such instances.

Two instances were noted, however, where information was set forth taken from classified documents.

(1) In connection with internal security - intelligence program supports, through the use of informants, a figure of $7,401,000 was used in the Committee's draft. This figure was taken from material captioned "Federal Bureau of Investigation Overall Intelligence Program, FY 77 Budget Compared to FY 76 (Dollars in Thousands)," classified "Secret," which was made available to the SSC by the Department. Although the document described above cannot be declassified, the FBI interposes no objection to the use of the above figure in the SSC report providing the report so reflects that this figure not only includes payments made to domestic internal security informants for services and expenses but also includes the cost of our

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

HAN:tdp (11)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

62-116395-1449

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

personnel, support costs and overhead.

(2) The Committee's draft under "Case No. 5" sets forth information regarding "Public Meeting Opposing U. S. Involvement in Vietnam War (1966)." This information was taken from a classified document captioned "Universities Committee on Problems of War and Peace" dated March 2, 1966.

The FBI cannot declassify this document since it contains information warranting its continued classification; however, the information as set forth in the Committee's draft would be unclassifiable as it appears. Therefore, the FBI does not interpose any objection to the use of this material.

1 - The Attorney General

6012

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 12 1976
DOJ

~~SECRET~~

R2330
pt. 4 of 4.

60

62-116395-1447

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Overall Intelligence Program
FY 77 Budget Compared to FY 76
(Dollars in Thousands)

Program Element	FY 1976 Workyears	FY 1976 Dollars	FY 1977 Workyears	FY 1977 Dollars	Change Workyears	Change Dollars
Internal Security Investigations	1133	$28,286	1117	$27,879	-16	$-407
Counterintelligence Investigations	1523	37,237	1503	36,698	-20	-539
Internal Security Intelligence	207	7,401	204	7,294	-3	-107
Counterintelligence Intelligence	183	4,979	180	4,907	-3	-72
Organized Crime Intelligence	130	3,709	128	3,656	-2	-53
General Crimes Intelligence	294	8,419	290	8,295	-4	-124
Total Intelligence Program	3470	$90,031	3422	$88,729	-48	$-1,302

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS

- Internal Security - Investigations. The program focuses on identifying organizations and individuals engaged in activities relating to (1) subversion, overthrow and distruction of governments within the United States; (2) the deprivation of constitutional and civil rights; (3) and foreign terrorism and their supporters whose activity is detrimental to the conduct of United States foreign affairs.

- Counterintelligence - Investigations. Through this program, investigations are conducted to thwart intelligence operations of foreign intelligence services in the United States.

- Internal Security - Intelligence. This program supports, through the use of informants, the internal security investigative program.

- Counterintelligence - Intelligence. Through the use of informants and other techniques, this program attempts to develop assets to identify foreign intelligence officers, penetrate foreign intelligence services in the United States, and neutralize the effectiveness of foreign intelligence services in the United States.

- Organized Crime - Intelligence. This program focuses on the development and use of a corps of carefully selected, high-level informants familiar with the leadership, structure, operations, associates and revenue sources of organized crime.

- General Crimes - Intelligence. This program supports, through the use of informants, the investigation of general crimes within the FBI's jurisdiction. This program is the FBI's tactical criminal intelligence program.

Case No. 5--Public Meeting Opposing U.S. Involvement in Vietnam War (1966)

Informers were used extensively in FBI investigations of possible Communist links to the antiwar movement. An example is the FBI's coverage of various antiwar teach-ins and conferences sponsored by the Universities Committee on Problems of War and Peace. A forty-one page report from the Philadelphia office--based on coverage by thirteen informants and confidential sources--described in complete detail a "public hearing on Vietnam." A Communist Party official had "urged all CP members" in the area to attend, and one of the organizers was alleged to have been a Communist in the early 1950's. Upon receipt from an informant of a list of the speakers, the FBI culled its files for data on their backgrounds. One was described by a source as a Young Socialist Alliance "sympathizer."

Another was a conscientious objector to military service. A third had contributed $5.000 to the National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities. A speaker representing the W.E.B. DuBois Club was identified as a Communist. The FBI covered the meeting with an informant who reported practically verbatim the remarks of all the speakers, including the following:

The Chairman of the Philadelphia Ethical Society
A representative of the American Civil Liberties Union
A representative of the United Electrical Workers
A spokesman for the Young Americans for Freedom
A member of the staff of the "Catholic Worker"
A minister of the African Methodist Episcopal Church
A minister of the Episcopal Church
A representative of the Philadelphia Area Committee to End the War in Vietnam
A Professor of Industrial Economics at Columbia University
A representative of the Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy
A member of Women's Strike for Peace who had traveled to North Vietnam
A member of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom who had visited South Vietnam
A chaplin from Rutgers University
A professor of political science from Villanova University
Another member of Young Americans for Freedom
The former Charge d'Affaires in the South Vietnamese Embassy

This informant's report was so extensive as to be the equivalent of a tape recording, although the FBI report does not indicate that the informant was "wired." Another informant reported the remarks of additional participants.

An official of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
A minister of the church of the Brethren
A Unitarian minister
A representative of United World Federalists
A member of Students for a Democratic Society
A member of the Socialist Workers Party
A spokesman for the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs

The report was prepared as a Letterhead Memorandum with fourteen copies for possible dissemination by the FBI to other Executive Branch agencies. Copies were disseminated to military intelligence agencies, the State Department, and the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions of the Justice Department. SAC, Philadelphia to the FBI Director, Re: Universities Committee on Problems of War and Peace, March 2, 1966 (classified)

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2-~~26~~ 24-76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) (2/19/76 review of report) concerning informants

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 3/3/76

Received by: R Kelley

Title: Attorny - SSC

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1447

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
2/27/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒	SSC
☐	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Operating procedures
Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Information regarding review of portion of proposed draft of SSC report pertaining to informants in domestic security field.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1111

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

T-SSC
GEN ✓

94TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1073

8

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 4, 1976

Mr. EDGAR submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on House Administration

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence filed on January 29, 1976, and entitled "Report of the Investigations of the United States Intelligence Agencies and Activities" shall be printed as a House document.

V

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

File
5-Tm

94TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1073

RESOLUTION

Ordering the printing of the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence.

By Mr. EDGAR

MARCH 4, 1976

Referred to the Committee on House Administration

94th CONGRESS
2d Session

H. RES. 1074

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

March 4, 1976

Mrs. Fenwick (for herself, Mr. Frenzel, Mr. Anderson of Illinois, Mr. Edgar, Mr. Conable, Mr. McKinney, Mr. Jeffords, and Mr. Findley) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules

---

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, filed on January 29, 1976, and entitled "Report of the Investigation of the United States Intelligence Agencies and Activities" shall be referred to the Committee on House Administration, and such committee shall follow the procedures agreed to between the Select Committee on Intelligence and the President (a summary of which appears beginning at page H 289 of the daily edition of the Congressional Record for January 26, 1976) with respect to the disclosure of classified information transmitted to such select committee. After such procedures have been complied with, such report, as may be altered in accordance with such procedures, shall be printed as a House document.

V

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

94TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1074

RESOLUTION

To provide for the speedy printing and publication of the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence.

By Mrs. FENWICK, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois, Mr. EDGAR, Mr. CONABLE, Mr. McKINNEY, Mr. JEFFORDS, and Mr. FINDLEY

MARCH 4, 1976

Referred to the Committee on Rules

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

(copy 2/26/76 memo attached)

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt TWL

FROM : E. C. Peterson

DATE: 3/5/76

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT ON MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAMS

Memorandum sets forth the results of a review of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) report dealing with mail intercept programs.

On 3/4/76, the report prepared by Mr. James Dick of the SSC Staff concerning the mail intercept programs operated by the CIA and the FBI was reviewed by SA James W. Johnson. The report was reviewed to determine if the changes set forth in the memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 2/26/76, had been done. The review indicated the revisions agreed to between Mr. James Dick, SSC, and Mr. James P. Lee, had been done.

ACTION:

For information.

62-116395
1 - 105-288406

JWJ:emg emg
(7)

JWJ

TWL

5-

105-288406

T-GEN SSC
Review of SSC

REC-104 62-116395 - 1446

MAR 10 1976

COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM KP

84 MAR 11 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : J.J. McDermott / JJM

DATE: 3-11-76

FROM : W.L. Bailey / WLB

SUBJECT: Senstudy

H. Res 1073 94th Congress 2nd session 3-4-76

The attached H. Res 1073 has been received in the Records Section, appropriately initialed, and indicated for file. By use of instant transmittal memorandum, all necessary recording and indexing will be accomplished. It is to be noted this form is for internal use only within the Records Section, principally by the Routing Unit where bulky material not accompanied by memorandum is usually received.

The enclosure, if bulky and not usually filed with other papers in file, may be detached but this action should be clearly noted under the word "Enclosure."

Enc.

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
MAR 11 1976

ENCLOSURE

5 - TJm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

84 MAR 11 1976

1 - Mr. J. [illegible] iams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
(Attn: S. S. Peelman)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
2/10/76
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Mr. W. R. Wannall

J. G. Deegan

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This informative memorandum to advise of status of Departmental review of FBI files concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and related matters.

You will recall that, commencing 12/6/75, personnel of the Civil Rights Division reviewed portions of our files concerning King and related matters. The last date such review was conducted in 1975 was on 12/19/75. On 2/9/76, Criminal Section Chief Robert A. Murphy resumed review of the King file. He worked on this for less than four hours on that day and was to return the morning of 2/10/76 but had not returned as of the dictation of this memorandum at 3:00 p.m., 2/10/76.

Murphy had been reviewing the King file to the exclusion of other files of interest. The King file is 94 sections in size and, as of 2/9/76, only about 25 sections had been reviewed. On that date, Murphy told Supervisor J. T. Aldhizer that, when he resumed the review the next day, he wanted to start with the portion of the file commencing 1/1/68. This would be Section 77, and thus Murphy would be skipping approximately 50 sections or a little over half of the file.

Murphy has given no indication, and neither has there been an indication from any other Departmental source, as to the true status of the Department's overall review

#MDR-16 1/19/01
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED

MAR 19 1976

100-106670

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy 75)

SFP:lhb
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

57 MAR 25 1976

of this matter which reportedly was to lead to a judgement by the Department as to whether or not the investigation of King's assassination should be reopened.

ACTION:

None. For information.

1 - Mr. [illegible]allahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Gallagher
1 - Mr. Cooke
1 - Mr. Long
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

PLAINTEXT TELETYPE NITEL

2/27/76

TO SACS SAN FRANCISCO
WFO

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI 62-116395

CHANGED, UNSUB, AKA, ROBERT LEE LEWIS; IMPERSONATION; OO: SF.

TITLE CHANGED FROM SENSTUDY 75 TO DESIGNATE ROBERT LEE LEWIS AS THE SUBJECT AND IMPERSONATION AS THE CHARACTER.

RE SF NITEL TO THE DIRECTOR, FEBRUARY 23, 1976, CAPTIONED, "SENSTUDY 75."

INQUIRY MADE BY FBIHQ HAS DETERMINED THAT THERE IS NO ONE BY NAME OF ROBERT LEE LEWIS EMPLOYED AS AN INVESTIGATOR FOR THE CHURCH COMMITTEE. IN VIEW THAT LEWIS HAS IMPERSONATED A GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATOR AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN INFORMATION THROUGH THIS IMPERSONATION, YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO IMMEDIATELY CONDUCT APPROPRIATE IMPERSONATION INVESTIGATION, POSITIVELY IDENTIFY LEWIS, OBTAIN TELEPHONE NUMBER OF LEWIS FROM ED MONTGOMERY, AND SET FORTH LEADS FOR WFO TO HANDLE INTERVIEW OF SUBJECT. COPY OF REFERENCED TELETYPE HAS BEEN FURNISHED WFO.

END.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

CAL:mer (9)

TKR 6:20PM
TELETYPE

NOTE: SAC, SF advised by teletype 2/23/76, that a Robert Lee Lewis, alleged investigator of the Church Committee, had attempted to get someone to testify before the committee concerning the mishandling of the Hearst case. Inquiry has determined that Lewis is not employed by the Church Committee. This instructs LA to conduct appropriate impersonation investigation.

Records
cc 62-116395

ORIGINAL FILED IN 47-56592

BHC
JC/DP

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO : 1975 O - 569-020

84 MAR 9 1976

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

SF 476

NR 016 SF PLAIN

4:20 PM NITEL 2/23/76 HCC

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM SAN FRANCISCO (62-6867)

ATTN LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

SENSTUDY 75

ON FEBRUARY 23, 1976, A SOURCE OF THE OAKLAND RESIDENT AGENCY REPORTED THAT ROBERT LEE LEWIS, INVESTIGATOR FOR THE CHURCH COMMITTEE, HAD BEEN TRYING TO GET SOMEONE TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE MISHANDLING OF THE HEARST CASE. HE WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ED MONTGOMERY, A RETIRED EXAMINER REPORTER, AND POSSIBLY THE HEARSTS.

SAC BATES HAS BEEN PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH MONTGOMERY FOR MANY YEARS. HE CALLED MONTGOMERY AND ASKED HIM CONCERNING THE ABOVE. MONTGOMERY SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A THIRD PARTY ASKING HIM TO CALL LEWIS IN WASHINGTON AS HE WANTED ADVERSE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE FBI. MONTGOMERY CALLED AND WHEN UNABLE TO SPEAK WITH LEWIS AND AFTER BEING ADVISED OF WHAT LEWIS WANTED, HE HUNG UP. ON SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1976, LEWIS CALLED MONTGOMERY. HE TOLD MONTGOMERY HE WANTED SOMEONE TO TESTIFY AS TO HOW THE FBI HAD MESSED UP THINGS ON THE WEST COAST. MONTGOMERY IS NOT SURE IF HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED

9 MAR 1976

ORIGINAL FILED IN 47-56592

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 4 1976
6

Recorded
File 62-116395

1cc LCD

FIVE

THE HEARST CASE. MONTGOMERY TOLD LEWIS HE HAD NOTHING IN THIS REGARD HE COULD TESTIFY TO, THAT THE FBI WAS DOING A FINE JOB, THAT HE, MONTGOMERY, DID NOT APPROVE OF THE WAY THE CHURCH COMMITTEE HAD HANDLED ITSELF IN THE PAST AND THAT THEY SHOULD GET OFF OF THE BACKS OF THE CIA AND THE FBI AND LET THEM GET ON WITH THE JOB AND THEN HUNG UP.

MONTGOMERY MADE THE COMMENT THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A TERRIBLE WAY TO ATTEMPT TO GET FACTS. SAC BATES SUGGESTED TO HIM IF HE FELT SO STRONGLY ABOUT IT, HE SHOULD CONSIDER WRITING AN ARTICLE FOR THE EXAMINER AS TO THE APPROACH MADE TO HIM BY THE COMMITTEE. MONTGOMERY RETIRED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, BUT IS STILL CLOSE TO THE EXAMINER.

ABOVE BEING SUBMITTED FOR BUREAU'S INFORMATION.

END

2/23/76 Lewis per Elliff SSC
is not a staff member
prd

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

1ST NR 1441

2ND NR 1444, 3RD NR 1444

1ST NR 1445 THRU 1447

1449 THRU 1452

1457

1459 THRU 1463

1465 THRU 1467

1469, 1470

1472 THRU 1474

1475

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 03-18-2025

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 10 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SB

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request
dated February 9, 1976

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated February 9, 1976. Please arrange for an appropriate response.

S

S

EX-115

REC-38 62-116395-1475

24 ENCLOSURE

ENCL BEHIND FILE

cc: Paul Daly

7 MAR 19

Let to AG cc DAG encl's
2/26/76
TJM:eks

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/16/01 BY SP2ALM/CP

TJM
S. McNiff

T

Executive Order 10450

Security Requirements For Government Employment

WHEREAS the interests of the national security require that all persons privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government, shall be reliable. trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States; and

WHEREAS the American tradition that all persons should receive fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at the hands of the Government requires that all persons seeking the privilege of employment or privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government be adjudged by mutually consistent and no less than minimum standards and procedures among the departments and agencies governing the employment and retention in employment of persons in the Federal service:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including section 1753 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (5 U. S. C. 631); the Civil Service Act of 1883 (22 Stat. 403; 5 U. S. C. 632, et seq.); section 9A of the act of August 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 1148 (5 U. S. C. 118 j); and the act of August 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476 (5 U. S. C. 22-1, et seq.), and as President of the United States, and deeming such action necessary in the best interests of the national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. In addition to the departments and agencies specified in the said act of August 26, 1950, and Executive Order No. 10237 of April 26, 1951, the provisions of that act shall apply to all other departments and agencies of the Government.

SEC. 2. The head of each department and agency of the Government shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining within his department or agency an effective program to insure that the employment and retention in employment of any civilian officer or employee within the department or agency is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

SEC. 3. (a) The appointment of each civilian officer or employee in any department or agency of the Government shall be made subject to investigation. The scope of the investigation shall be determined in the first instance according to the degree of adverse effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national security, but in no event shall the investigation include less than a national agency check (including a check of the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and written inquiries to appropriate local law-enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools attended by the person under investigation: *Provided*, that upon request of the head of the department or agency concerned, the Civil Service Commission may, in its discretion, authorize such less investigation as may meet the requirements of the national security with respect to per-diem, intermittent, temporary, or seasonal employees, or aliens employed outside the United States. Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any such person may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, there shall be conducted with respect to such person a full field investi-

62-116395-1475

ENCLOSURE

gation, or such less investigation as shall be sufficient to enable the head of the department or agency concerned to determine whether retention of such person is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

(b) The head of any department or agency shall designate, or cause to be designated, any position within his department or agency the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security as a sensitive position. Any position so designated shall be filled or occupied only by a person with respect to whom a full field investigation has been conducted: *Provided*, that a person occupying a sensitive position at the time it is designated as such may continue to occupy such position pending the completion of a full field investigation, subject to the other provisions of this order: *And provided further*, that in case of emergency a sensitive position may be filled for a limited period by a person with respect to whom a full field preappointment investigation has not been completed if the head of the department or agency concerned finds that such action is necessary in the national interest, which finding shall be made a part of the records of such department or agency.

Sec. 4. The head of each department and agency shall review, or cause to be reviewed, the cases of all civilian officers and employees with respect to whom there has been conducted a full field investigation under Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, and, after such further investigation as may be appropriate, shall readjudicate, or cause to be readjudicated, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, such of those cases as have not been adjudicated under a security standard commensurate with that established under this order.

Sec. 5. Whenever there is developed or received by any department or agency information indicating that the retention in employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, such information shall be forwarded to the head of the employing department or agency or his representative, who, after such investigation as may be appropriate, shall review, or cause to be reviewed, and, where necessary, readjudicate, or cause to be readjudicated, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, the case of such officer or employee.

Sec. 6. Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, the head of the department or agency concerned or his representative shall immediately suspend the employment of the person involved if he deems such suspension necessary in the interests of the national security and, following such investigation and review as he deems necessary, the head of the department or agency concerned shall terminate the employment of such suspended officer or employee whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the national security, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950.

Sec. 7. Any person whose employment is suspended or terminated under the authority granted to heads of departments and agencies by or in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, or pursuant to the said Executive Order No. 9835 or any other security or loyalty program relating to officers or employees of the Government, shall not be reinstated or restored to duty or reemployed in the same department or agency and shall not be reemployed in any other department or agency, unless the head of the department or agency concerned finds that such reinstatement, restoration, or reemployment is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, which finding shall be made a part of the records of such department or agency: *Provided*, that no person whose employment has been terminated under such authority thereafter may be employed by any other department or agency except after a determination by the Civil Service Commission that such person is eligible for such employment.

Sec. 8. (a) The investigations conducted pursuant to this order shall be designed to develop information as to whether the employment or retention in employment in the Federal service of the person being investigated is clearly consistent with th[illegible]nterests of the national security. Such information shall relate, but shall not be limited, to the following:

(1) Depending on the relation of the Government employment to the national security:

(i) Any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy.

(ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material facts.

(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion.

(iv) Any illness, including any mental condition, of a nature which in the opinion of competent medical authority may cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the employee, with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case.[1]

(v) Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security.

(2) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.

(3) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

(4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States, or of the [illegible]ration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

(5) →Knowing membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organization) which is totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or which has adopted a policy of unlawfully advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.[3]←

(6) Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of security information, or of other information disclosure of which is prohibited by law, or willful violation or disregard of security regulations.

(7) Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

(8) Refusal by the individual, upon the ground of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, to testify before a congressional committee regarding charges of his alleged disloyalty or other misconduct.[2]

(b) The investigation of persons entering or employed in the competitive service shall primarily be the responsibility of the Civil Service Commission, except in cases in which the head of a department or agency assumes that responsibility pursuant to law or by agreement with the Commission. The Commission shall furnish a full investigative report to the department or agency concerned.

(c) The investigation of persons (including consultants, however employed), entering employment of, or employed by, the Government other than in the competitive service shall primarily be the responsibility of the employing department or agency. Departments and agencies without investigative facilities may use the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission and other departments and agencies may use such facilities under agreement with the Commission.

---

[1] As amended by Executive Order 10548 of August 2, 1954.

[2] As amended by Executive Order 10491 of October 13, 1953.

[3] As amended by Executive Order 11605 of July 2, 1971.

(d) There shall be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation all investigations being conducted by any other agencies which develop information indicating that an individual may have been subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information relating to any of the matters described in subdivisions (2) through (8)[4] of subsection (a) of this section. In cases so referred to it, the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make a full field investigation.

Sec. 9. (a) There shall be established and maintained in the Civil Service Commission a security-investigations index covering all persons as to whom security investigations have been conducted by any department or agency of the Government under this order. The central index established and maintained by the Commission under Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, shall be made a part of the security-investigations index. The security-investigations index shall contain the name of each person investigated, adequate identifying information concerning each such person, and a reference to each department and agency which has conducted an investigation concerning the person involved or has suspended or terminated the employment of such person under the authority granted to heads of departments and agencies by or in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950.

(b) The heads of all departments and agencies shall furnish promptly to the Civil Service Commission information appropriate for the establishment and maintenance of the security-investigations index.

(c) The reports and other investigative material and information developed by investigations conducted pursuant to any statute, order, or program described in section 7 of this order shall remain the property of the investigative agencies conducting the investigations, but may, subject to considerations of the national security, be retained by the department or agency concerned. Such reports and other investigative material and information shall be maintained in confidence, and no access shall be given thereto except, with the consent of the investigative agency concerned, to other departments and agencies conducting security programs under the authority granted by or in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, as may be required for the efficient conduct of Government business.

Sec. 10. Nothing in this order shall be construed as eliminating or modifying in any way the requirement for any investigation or any determination as to security which may be required by law.

Sec. 11. On and after the effective date of this order the Loyalty Review Board established by Executive Order No 9835 of March 21, 1947, shall not accept agency findings for review, upon appeal or otherwise. Appeals pending before the Loyalty Review Board on such date shall be heard to final determination in accordance with the provisions of the said Executive Order No. 9835, as amended. Agency determinations favorable to the officer or employee concerned pending before the Loyalty Review Board on such date shall be acted upon by such Board, and whenever the Board is not in agreement with such favorable determination the case shall be remanded to the department or agency concerned for determination in accordance with the standards and procedures established pursuant to this order. Cases pending before the regional loyalty boards of the Civil Service Commission on which hearings have not been initiated on such date shall be referred to the department or agency concerned. Cases being heard by regional loyalty boards on such date shall be heard to conclusion, and the determination of the board shall be forwarded to the head of the department or agency concerned: *Provided*, that if no specific department or agency is involved, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to the applicant. Investigations pending in the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Civil Service Commission on such date shall be completed, and the reports thereon shall be made to the appropriate department or agency.

---

[4] As amended by Executive Order 10531 of May 27, 1954.

SEC. 12. (a) Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended is hereby revoked.

(b) The head of each department and agency shall be furnished by the Attorney General with the name of each organization which shall be or has been heretofore designated under this order. Except as specifically provided hereafter, nothing contained herein shall be construed in any way to affect previous designations made pursuant to Executive Order No. 10450, as amended.

(c) The Subversive Activities Control Board shall, upon petition of the Attorney General, conduct appropriate hearings to determine whether any organization is totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or whether it has adopted a policy of unlawfully advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.

(d) The Board may determine that an organization has adopted a policy of unlawfully advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their constitutional or statutory rights or that an organization seeks to overthrow the government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means if it is found that such group engages in, unlawfully advocates, or has among its purposes or objectives, or adopts as a means of obtaining any of its purposes or objectives.—

(1) The commission of acts of force or violence or other unlawful acts to deny others their rights or benefits guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the several States or political subdivisions thereof; or

(2) The unlawful damage or destruction of property; or injury to persons: or

(3) The overthrow or destruction of the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by unlawful means; or

(4) The commission of acts which violate laws pertaining to treason, rebellion or insurrection, riots or civil disorders, seditious conspiracy, sabotage, trading with the enemy, obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, impeding officers of the United States, or related crimes or offenses.

(e) The Board may determine an organization to be "totalitarian" if it is found that such organization engages in activities which seek by unlawful means the establishment of a system of government in the United States which is autocratic and in which control is centered in a single individual, group, or political party, allowing no effective representation to opposing individuals, groups, or parties and providing no practical opportunity for dissent.

(f) The Board may determine an organization to be "fascist" if it is found that organization engages in activities which seek by unlawful means the establishment of a system of government in the United States which is characterized by rigid one-party dictatorship, forcible suppression of the opposition, ownership of the means of production under centralized governmental control and which fosters racism.

(g) The Board may determine an organization to be "communist" if it is found that such organization engages in activities which seek by unlawful means the establishment of a government in the United States which is based upon the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism, which interprets history as a relentless class war aimed at the destruction of the existing society and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the government ownership of the means of production and distribution of property, and the establishment of a single authoritarian party.

(h) The Board may determine an organization to be "subversive" if it is found that such organization engages in activities which seek the abolition or destruction by unlawful means of the government of the United States or any State, or subdivision thereof.

(i) The Board may further determine, after consideration of the evidence, that an organization has ceased to exist. Upon petition of the Attorney General or upon petition of any organization which has been designated pursuant to this section the Board after appropriate hearings may determine that such organization does not currently meet the standards for designation. The Attorney General shall appropriately revise or modify the information furnished to departments and agencies consistant with the determinations of the Board.

(j) The Board shall issue appropriate regulations for the implementation of this section.[5] ←

Sec. 13. The Attorney General is requested to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish and maintain an appropriate employee-security program.

Sec. 14. (a) The Civil Service Commission, with the continuing advice and collaboration of representatives of such departments and agencies as the National Security Council may designate, shall make a continuing study of the manner in which this order is being implemented by the departments and agencies of the Government for the purpose of determining:

(1) Deficiencies in the department and agency security programs established under this order which are inconsistent with the interests of, or directly or indirectly weaken the national security.

(2) Tendencies in such programs to deny to individual employees fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at the hands of the Government, or rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States or this order.

Information affecting any department or agency developed or received during the course of such continuing study shall be furnished immediately to the head of the department or agency concerned. The Civil Service Commission shall report to the National Security Council, at least semiannually, on the results of such study, shall recommend means to correct any such deficiencies or tendencies, and shall inform the National Security Council immediately of any deficiency which is deemed to be of major importance.[5]

(b) All departments and agencies of the Government are directed to cooperate with the Civil Service Commission to facilitate the accomplishment of the responsibilities assigned to it by subsection (a) of this section.

(c) To assist the Civil Service Commission in discharging its responsibilities under this order, the head of each department and agency shall, as soon as possible and in no event later than ninety days after receipt of the final investigative report on a civilian officer or employee subject to a full field investigation under the provisions of this order, advise the Commission as to the action taken with respect to such officer or employee. The information furnished by the heads of departments and agencies pursuant to this section shall be included in the reports which the Civil Service Commission is required to submit to the National Security Council in accordance with subsection (a) of this section. Such reports shall set forth any deficiencies on the part of the heads of departments and agencies in taking timely action under this order, and shall mention specifically any instances of noncompliance with this subsection.[6]

Sec. 15. This order shall become effective thirty days after the date hereof.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

The White House,
April 27, 1953.

---

[5] As amended by Executive Order 11605 of July 2, 1971. nb. Section 706 of the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1973, approved October 25, 1972, Public Law 92–544, provides as follows:

"Sec. 706. No part of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be available to the Department of Justice or the Subversive Activities Control Board to carry out, execute or implement the provisions of Executive Order 11605 of July 2, 1971."

[6] As amended by Executive Order 10550 of August 5, 1954.

Security Requirements for Government Employment

Executive Order 11785. June 4, 1974

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10450, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including 5 U.S.C. 1101 *et seq.*, 3301, 3571, 7301, 7313, 7501(c), 7512, 7532, and 7533; and as President of the United States, and finding such action necessary in the best interests of national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. Section 12 of Executive Order No. 10450 of April 27, 1953, as amended, is revised to read in its entirety as follows:

"Sec. 12. Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended, is hereby revoked."

SEC. 2. Neither the Attorney General, nor the Subversive Activities Control Board, nor any other agency shall designate organizations pursuant to section 12 of Executive Order No. 10450, as amended, nor circulate nor publish a list of organizations previously so designated. The list of organizations previously designated is hereby abolished and shall not be used for any purpose.

SEC. 3. Subparagraph (5) of paragraph (a) of section 8 of Executive Order No. 10450, as amended, is revised to read as follows:

"Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means."

SEC. 4. Executive Order No. 11605 of July 2, 1971, is revoked.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House,
June 4, 1974.

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 3:05 p.m., June 4, 1974]

"Presidential Documents"
Volume 10 Number 23
Pages 572 and 573
June 10, 1974

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

December 5, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER,
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

This will refer to your memorandum of November 22 with reference to the Marquis Childs column appearing in The Washington Post on November 18, 1947 and to your letters of November 21, the one addressed to Mr. Childs and the other addressed to Mr. Paul A. Walker, Acting Chairman, Federal Communications Commission.

It is my view that the Bureau's practice of passing along to the various Government departments and agencies information which comes to its attention in connection with the conduct of investigations normally and regularly within the Bureau's jurisdiction is entirely appropriate and correct. Indeed, it would appear that the Bureau would be remiss in its duty if it failed to pass along information coming to it which might prove to be in the interest of the general welfare. It is not the Bureau's responsibility to determine whether the information is or is not of importance to the particular agency in the carrying out of its current activities and responsibilities and whether or not any action is taken by the department or agency is not, of course, a principal concern of the Bureau.

I believe, therefore, that the Bureau should continue its practice of passing along information which it is believed might be of interest to the various departments and agencies. At the same time I believe that it would be appropriate either (a) to prepare a circular to the various departments and agencies explaining the Bureau's purpose in furnishing information from time to time, or (b) to make a particular effort for a time when transmitting individual items of information to explain in the transmittal memorandum the Bureau's purpose in making such transmittal.

Attorney General

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No.

November 21, 1947

Mr. Paul A. Walker
Acting Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Walker:

Under date of November 18, 1947, there appeared in the column of Mr. Marquis Childs in the Washington Post the following statement attributed to Mr. Clifford J. Durr of the Federal Communications Commission: "Already the FBI is furnishing to the commission unsolicited reports on individuals connected with radio, and I can assure you that if you should be told the kind of things contained in many of these reports you would dismiss the information as baseless gossip."

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has referred to the Federal Communications Commission from time to time information which it has received in the course of its regular investigations which appeared pertinent or material to matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission. It is the policy and practice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to avoid any attempts to evaluate the significance of information relating to matters without its jurisdiction or the effect of such information upon the contemporary policies and programs of other agencies. As a result, the Bureau furnishes to the various Government departments such information as it receives which appears pertinent to the operations of those Government departments. In so far as is practicable, the Bureau attempts to evaluate the reliability of the source of this information without attempting to make any suggestions as to the use which should or should not be made of the information itself.

Mr. Childs, in his column quoting Mr. Durr's statement, adds the following observation upon Mr. Durr's statement: "Note the word 'unsolicited'. It indicates that the FBI initiated investigations and sought to influence FCC decisions by sending reports on certain individuals to the commission. If this is happening, it is something Congress should know about."

I desire to advise you that this Bureau has not at any time attempted in any manner or degree to influence FCC decisions. The material which has been transmitted to the Commission was sent solely for the purpose of affording the Commission information which came to the Bureau from various sources, which information, it was believed, might be of interest to the official activities of the Commission.

In the light of the statements made by Mr. Durr and since these statements have not been repudiated by any other members of the Federal Communications Commsssion, I must assume that the material which the Bureau has been furnishing to the Commission is not desired by the Commission. I am consequently discontinuing the transmittal of such data to the Commission upon the assumption that the material is of no interest to the Commission.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

April 7, 1948

TO THE HEADS OF ALL DEPARTMENTS AND
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH:

In memorandum of October 7, 1947, I called attention to the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has primary investigative jurisdiction of Section 9-A (61-1, Title 18, USC) of the Hatch Act. It is also pointed out that under the provisions of a presidential interpretation dated 30 October 1947 the Federal Bureau of Investigation has the responsibility of investigating all charges of disloyalty on the part of Federal employees within the Executive Branch of the Government.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has sufficient investigative personnel under its direct supervision to carry out this responsibility in the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. However, it does not have personnel stationed in other areas of the world. Therefore, it has been necessary, in order that the Bureau may be enabled to carry out its responsibility, to arrange by agreement with the Departments and Agencies principally concerned for the delegation of the actual investigative work to certain other Departments of the Executive Branch in those areas where it has no investigative personnel.

It is recognized that there are two major classes of loyalty investigation. The first is the routine loyalty check of applicants for classified positions or of incumbents of such positions initiated in accord with Executive Order 9835. The second type is that in which doubt of loyalty of incumbents arises independently of the routine check. Procedures in regard to these two types must necessarily vary.

I. Routine loyalty checks of employees stationed overseas.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation will direct specific requests for the assistance of other agencies in handling the actual investigative work in accordance with the following principles:

A. The Department of the Army, Navy or Air Force shall be requested to utilize its own facilities for the necessary investigation of any of its own civilian personnel stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will continue to have the sole responsibility of conducting such investigation as is necessary within the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

31

involving civilian personnel of the Army, Navy or Air Force. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will refer to the appropriate agency all available material and will request investigation, and upon completion thereof, the reports should be furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation as provided hereafter.

B. With respect to the necessary investigation of any of the personnel of other Departments and Agencies stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands--

1. Requests for such investigation of Federal civilian employees stationed in occupied areas or areas under military investigative jurisdiction shall be directed to the Department of the Army, Navy, or Air Force for transmission to the Theater Commander or Area Commanding Officer, who will utilize for this purpose any appropriate investigative facility of the United States available in his area of command.

2. Requests for such investigation of any Federal civilian employees stationed in unoccupied areas shall be directed to the State Department for transmittal to its appropriate foreign office, which will utilize for this purpose any investigative authority of the United States available in that country, or, in case no competent investigative facilities are available in that country, the principal diplomatic officer shall refer the matter for investigation to the principal diplomatic officer stationed in a nearby country where investigative facilities are available.

The reports of completed investigations shall be returned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to its original request for assistance through the same channels utilized in transmitting the request for investigation, for consolidation with such material as the Bureau may have available in its files, or may have developed by investigation, and for further processing in line with the procedures which have been developed for carrying out the Loyalty Program.

II. "Complaint Type" loyalty checks of employees stationed overseas.

Such inquiries normally originate in the field and must be handled with the utmost possible dispatch. The agency in which the case originates will notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation as soon as a preliminary inquiry in the field has established grounds for a full investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will immediately check its files and inform the field agency of any derogatory information which it may have on file. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will at once open a full field investigation within the continental limits of the United States, etc., when such investigation is required by the availability of information within those areas. Completion of such investigation will be reported to the originating agency through normal channels.

A. The Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force will utilize their own facilities for the necessary investigation of any of their own civilian personnel stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

B. With respect to the necessary investigation under Class II of any of the personnel of other Departments and Agencies stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands:

1. In occupied areas the Theater Commander will have full responsibility to utilize any appropriate investigative facility of the United States available in his area of command.

2. In unoccupied areas the principal diplomatic officer will be responsible for utilizing any investigative facility of the United States which is available in the country of his jurisdiction, or, if there is no such investigative facility available within the country of his jurisdiction, he shall refer the matter to the principal diplomatic officer stationed in a nearby country in which investigative facilities are available.

The reports of completed investigation shall be forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation through normal channels.

It is understood that the declaration of emergency, or the establishment of martial law within areas of the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands will have the effect of making those areas "occupied territory," with the consequent application of procedures described in sections IA and BI and IIA above.

The agreement which this memorandum serves to record has to do only with the establishing of a method of handling actual investigations in areas where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has no investigative facilities. Furthermore, the procedures herein prescribed do not purport to limit in any way, or delay the exercise of, the authority possessed by certain Department and Agency needs summarily to dismiss employees where necessary in the interest of National Defense.

These loyalty investigations should be given preferential attention and prompt handling in all instances.

TOM C. CLARK
Attorney General

[illegible] FBI

JIE:MR:mdg

[illegible]

Honorable Philip Young
Chairman
Civil Service Commission
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Young:

As you know, subsection (d) of section 8 of Executive Order No. 10450 requires that there be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigations conducted by all agencies under the order which develop information of the type described in the subsection. The subsection further requires the FBI to make a full field investigation in cases so referred to it. However, except as indicated below, the FBI is not equipped to conduct investigations outside this country. In view of this limitation on its investigative facilities, an arrangement was worked out in connection with administration of Executive Order No. 9835 with respect to investigations in foreign areas. It is suggested that the procedures be continued in connection with investigations to be carried out by the FBI under Executive Order No. 10450. These are as follows:

(1) The FBI will conduct all necessary investigations in the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

(2) The Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force will each use its own facilities to conduct investigations in connection with its own civilian personnel outside the areas listed in (1) above.

(3) With respect to the investigation of civilian personnel, other than personnel of departments named in (2), above:

(a) The Theatre Commander or Post Commanding Officer will utilize any appropriate investigative facilities of the United States available to him in an occupied area or in areas under military investigative jurisdiction;

(b) In other areas the Department of State will utilize any investigative authority of the United States available in the country concerned. If no competent investigative facilities are available in that country the investigative facilities of the United States in a nearby country will be utilized by the Department of State.

To repeat, the foregoing represents the arrangement between agencies with respect to investigations abroad worked out in the administration of Executive Order No. 9835, and accordingly the procedures outlined will merely involve continuing present practices. In the absence of any indication of disagreement with the practices outlined above, this Department will conduct itself on the theory that they remain in effect.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Deputy Attorney General

Identical letters to:

Honorable John Foster Dulles,
Secretary of State

Honorable Charles E. Wilson,
Secretary of Defense

Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

April 14, 1953

Director, FBI

EXECUTIVE ORDER PROVIDING SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

Pursuant to your requests, memoranda dated February 4, 1953, February 26, 1953, April 6, 1953, and April 10, 1953, have been submitted to you containing observations regarding proposed drafts of the above Executive Order. Pursuant to the request of Mr. Edward S. Lazowska of the Department, who delivered a copy of a new draft of this proposed Order on the evening of April 13, 1953, the following observations are set forth for your information and consideration:

In connection with the provision in paragraph 3 (a) which allows the Civil Service Commission, in certain cases, to authorize less than the minimum amount of investigation stated in this paragraph but which meets the requirements of the national security, it is felt the Civil Service Commission must exercise extreme care to insure that any investigation authorized, particularly with respect to individuals who may have access to confidential information, does, in fact, meet the requirements of the national security.

In connection with Section 4 of the draft, your attention is invited to my previous observation that this Bureau feels it should conduct the additional investigation that may be appropriate only in those cases in which the purpose of the additional investigation is to develop information of a loyalty or subversive nature. In this connection it is observed that the provisions of Sections 8 (b) and 8 (d) may be intended to accomplish this purpose; however, it is suggested that you may desire to have the Order state more clearly regarding what agencies have the responsibilities to conduct the additional investigation requested in Section 4.

66-1[illegible]-29

In connection with Section 5 of the draft, the thought occurs that its provisions as to what agency is required to conduct "such investigation as may be appropriate" may not be entirely clear. It is believed that the intent of this section is to provide that upon receipt by an agency of information necessitating investigation by the Civil Service Commission or the employing agency, such information should be forwarded to the Civil Service Commission or the employing agency; that upon the receipt of information necessitating investigation by this Bureau, such information should be forwarded to this Bureau for a full field investigation. You may wish to give consideration to possible further clarification of this section.

Regarding the phrase "following such investigation and review as he deems necessary" set forth in Section 6, it is believed that "as he deems necessary" refers to the word "review." If, however, it might also refer to the word "investigation," the thought occurs that it might be in conflict with other provisions in the draft which prescribe that in certain instances full field investigations must be conducted.

In connection with Section 8 (5) it is noted that this section does not specifically provide for sympathetic association with individual members of the organizations referred to in this section. In this connection, you will recall that the attachment to my memorandum of April 1 1953, set forth observations of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference regarding the draft, one of which concerned a suggestion along this line.

It is observed that Section 14 (a) authorizes the National Security Council to designate representatives of other Departments and agencies to furnish advice and to collaborate with the Civil Service Commission in connection with the Commission's study of the manner in which the Order is implemented. We would appreciate any information regarding the extent representatives of this Bureau might be expected to render advice and collaborate with the Civil Service Commission.

It would be appreciated if you could furnish the advice requested in my memorandum of February 26, 1953, regarding your desires as to this Bureau following the policy of channeling its investigative reports through the Civil Service Commission to the departments and agencies concerned.

It is noted that my previous memoranda raised the point as to what effect the abolishing of the Loyalty Review Board might have on Executive Order 10422. For your information, funds have been appropriated for the implementation of Executive Order 10422 and this Bureau is proceeding with investigations under this Order and submitting reports to the Civil Service Commission for appropriate adjudication.

Regarding what agencies will have investigative responsibilities abroad under this Order, as mentioned in my previous memoranda, you may wish to give consideration to, if possible, continuing the arrangements which have been perfected under Executive Order 9835.

My memorandum of April 6, 1953, commented regarding paragraph 8 (b) (4) of the draft received April 2, 1953. It was stated that it was felt investigations regarding individuals who might be subjected to coercion, influence or pressure because of the presence of a close relative in a nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States which develop a subversive aspect should be done by this Bureau rather than the Civil Service Commission or the employing agency. It is observed that Section 8 (d) of the draft received April 13, 1953, requires this Bureau to conduct all investigations which develop information indicating that an individual may have been subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security. It is suggested you might desire to clarify this provision further to specifically provide that investigations under this category will be conducted by this Bureau only where there is information indicating a question of loyalty or subversive activity.

As previously mentioned, it will be necessary that the rules and regulations to be issued in connection with the implementation of this Order, such as those governing the establishing and operation of hearing boards, be as complete as possible in order to maintain uniformity.

It will, of course, be necessary for this Bureau to receive sufficient funds in order to discharge its responsibilities under this Order.

Deputy Attorney General
William P. Rogers

May 1, 1953

Director, FBI

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

In connection with the implementation of Executive Order 10450, the following suggestions, which were previously furnished to you in connection with the drafts of the Order, are being set forth for your consideration for inclusion in the Security Regulations drawn up in connection with this Order:

There should be no abuse of the privilege granted to fill sensitive positions in emergency cases prior to the completion of full field pre-appointment investigations.

In order that there be no misunderstanding, it might be well to specify in the regulations that the Order covers only the Executive Branch of the Government.

It is the understanding of this Bureau that the Civil Service Commission maintains a register of persons eligible for Government employment. In connection with this register, under Executive Order 9835 these names have been processed in a manner similar to those of employees, and the adjudication made by the Civil Service Commission. Section 11 of the Order states that cases being heard by regional loyalty boards on the effective date of this Order in which no specific department or agency is involved shall be dismissed without prejudice to the applicant. This section, unless clarified in the regulations, may affect the Civil Service Commission's register of eligibles.

Information should be included advising what agencies have investigative responsibility abroad in connection with this Order. You may desire to continue the arrangements perfected under Executive Order 9835 regarding this matter.

There may be some question as to what agencies have investigative responsibilities in connection with the additional investigation that may be necessary in the readjudication of full field investigations under Executive Order 9835, as called for in Section 4 of the Order. As you were previously advised, this Bureau feels it should conduct such investigations only when the purpose is to develop information of a nature described in Section 8(d) of the Order. Unless specific information to this effect is included in the regulations, it can be anticipated that this Bureau will receive a large number of requests for investigations solely for the purpose of bringing the investigation up to date, or to develop some information of a nonsubversive nature.

Under Executive Order 9835, this Bureau, through agreement with the Civil Service Commission, followed the policy of sending all its reports to the Civil Service Commission for dissemination to the appropriate departments and agencies. As you know, the current Order requires that the Civil Service Commission maintain a security-investigations index, which is to include the index maintained by the Civil Service Commission in conjunction with Executive Order 9835. This Bureau believes the policy previously followed of sending these reports to the Civil Service Commission should be continued.

It will be necessary that a standard form containing sufficient identifying data be utilized in checking individuals' names through this Bureau's files and in connection with investigations conducted under this Order.

With reference to per-diem, intermittent, temporary, etc., employees, the Civil Service Commission should utilize extreme care in permitting, at the request of a department or agency head, less than the minimum investigation required in other cases.

Regarding Section 5 of the Order, this Bureau, on receipt of information of a nature necessitating investigation by it, contemplates following the policy of immediately initiating the investigation rather than awaiting a request for such an investigation by the department or agency concerned. The agency head, however, will be notified that information of a nature requiring investigation by this Bureau has been received and an investigation is being conducted and that upon request he will be furnished with the basis for the investigation. If it is felt that such a policy is in conflict with the provisions of the Order, it would be appreciated if consideration could be given to clarifying this in the regulations.

9 Apart from the above suggestions regarding the security regulations, it is noted that the abolition of the Civil Service Commission's regional loyalty boards and the Loyalty Review Board will affect the adjudication procedure required by Executive Order 10422. This is being called to your attention so that the necessary action may be taken to insure that there is no undue delay in connection with the adjudication of cases being investigated under Executive Order 10422.

10 Your attention is called to Section 9(k) of the Sample Security Regulations dated April 23, 1953. As you will observe, this section concerns the determinations made by hearing boards, and in part states: "One copy of the decision of the board, together with the complete record of the case, including investigative reports, shall be sent to the (head of department or agency) and one copy shall be sent to the employee." This Bureau is strongly opposed to making copies of its reports, in whole or in part, available to individuals investigated under this Order, and considers it absolutely necessary that its reports be maintained in confidence. Of course, this Bureau does not object to the employee's being advised, insofar as security considerations permit, of that information in the reports which is considered necessary in connection with the charges against the employee.

As you will observe, under Section 9(k) the employee could be furnished a copy of the complete record of the case. Such record might include confidential information in the possession of the board which security considerations do not permit making available to the employee. In this connection, it is noted that Section 5(a)(3) of the regulations states: "The decision of the hearing board shall be in writing and shall be signed by all members of the board. One copy of the decision shall be sent to the (head of department or agency) and one copy shall be sent to the suspended employee."

In addition, it is noted that the above provisions of Section 9(k) are contradictory to the provisions of Section 9(c) of the Order proper, which states that reports and other investigative material and information are to be maintained in confidence and no access given thereto, except, with the consent of the investigative agency concerned, to other departments and agencies conducting security programs under the authority of the act of August 26, 1950.

It is strongly urged that you amend the provisions in Section 9(k) of the Sample Security Regulations, because, unless such is done, some departments and agencies may furnish to the employee a copy of the complete record of the case, which would include this Bureau's investigative reports.

Your attention is called to Section 4(b) of the regulations setting forth provisions covering the scope of the investigation to be conducted. The provisions, as set forth, do not include a check of the fingerprint files of this Bureau. As Section 3(a) of the Order, itself, calls for a check of such files, it is suggested you may wish to include this also in the regulations.

Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

May 14, 1953

Director, FBI

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

Reference is made to this Bureau's memoranda dated February 6 and 26, 1953; April 6, 10, and 14, 1953, and May 1, 1953, regarding the captioned Executive Order.

Your immediate advice as to what agencies have the responsibility of conducting investigations abroad under this Order will be appreciated. It can be anticipated that this problem will immediately present itself upon the effective date of the Order. For example, this Bureau may receive a request to conduct a full field investigation regarding an employee who in the past has spent considerable time in foreign countries. Upon the receipt of such a request, it will be necessary to know to what agency a request to conduct the investigation abroad should be directed. As previously suggested, you may wish to continue the arrangements perfected for handling this problem under Executive Order 9835. For your information, these arrangements are set forth in a memorandum dated April 7, 1948, from the Attorney General to the heads of all departments and independent agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government. The thought occurs that you may desire to issue similar advice to all departments and agencies in connection with Executive Order 10450. (~~66-6200-121-290 & Part I, Section 2, Serial~~ 87 ~~of the Loyalty Policy File~~)

Another matter that may cause some difficulty after Executive Order 10450 becomes effective is the question of what agencies have investigative responsibility with respect to the conduct of the further investigation that may be considered appropriate in connection with the re-adjudication of cases of those employees concerning whom a full field investigation was conducted under Executive Order 9835; however, their cases have not heretofore been adjudicated under a security standard commensurate with that established under Executive Order 10450. As previously stated, this Bureau feels it should conduct such investigations only when the purpose is to develop information of a nature described in Section 8 (a) of the Order. It would be appreciated if you would advise whether you are in agreement with this. Should you agree with this policy, you may wish to so advise the heads of all departments and agencies as unless such is done, this Bureau may receive a large number of requests for investigations solely for the purpose of bringing the previous investigations up to date or to develop some allegation of a nonsubversive nature.

Your attention is invited to my memorandum of May 1, 1953, wherein I urged that the provisions in Section 9 (k) of the "Sample Security Regulations" be amended to preclude the possibility of any department or agency furnishing a copy of this Bureau's reports to the individuals investigated under the Order. It is believed this should be done prior to the effective date of Executive Order 10450, and I would appreciate being advised of what action is contemplated in this regard. It is observed that in connection with Executive Order 9835 the Attorney General under date of December 11, 1947, directed a confidential memorandum to all department and agency heads of the Executive Branch of the Government wherein he included information regarding the use of this Bureau's reports under Executive Order 9835. The Attorney General's memorandum stated, "The information appearing in Federal Bureau of Investigation reports is available for the consideration of the employing agency in preparing charges against the employee and for appropriate use by the hearing boards. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is opposed to making copies of its reports, in whole or in part, available to individuals as such, and particularly to persons investigated under the Program." Part III, Section 1, Serial 31, of Loyalty Policy file)

It was noted in previous memoranda to you that this Bureau under Executive Order 9835, through agreement with the Civil Service Commission, followed the policy of sending all its reports to the Civil Service Commission for dissemination to the appropriate departments and agencies. It was suggested that as Executive Order 10450 requires the Civil Service Commission to maintain a security-investigations index regarding persons investigated under the Order, the policy of this Bureau sending all its reports to the Civil Service Commission be continued. Unless advice to the contrary is received from you, this Bureau contemplates following this policy.

The "Sample Security Regulations" prepared by the Department contains information regarding the manner in which hearings are to be conducted by the Security Hearing Boards under Executive Order 10450. These regulations, however, do not state whether these hearings are to be opened or closed to the public. For your information, the Loyalty Review Board in connection with the matter of hearings held under Executive Order 9835, issued a directive to all departments and agencies advising that such hearings should be in private and attendance limited to representatives of the agency who are directly connected with the adjudication of the case, representatives of the Loyalty Review Board, and the employee or applicant concerned, his counsel or representative, and the witness who is testifying. You may wish to issue appropriate advice to all departments and agencies regarding who shall be permitted to be present during hearings held under Executive Order 10450.

It is also noted that the "Sample Security Regulations" state that the employee shall be permitted to cross-examine any witness offered in support of the charges against him. This raises the question as to whether Security Hearing Boards may be allowed, upon the request of a witness, to hear such witness in the absence of the employee or his counsel. In connection with this problem under Executive Order 9835, the Loyalty Review Board issued a directive to all Executive departments and agencies permitting Loyalty Hearing Boards to hear witnesses in the absence of the employee and his counsel if the witnesses so requested. In this regard, this Bureau under Executive Order 9835, at the request of Mr. Hiram Bingham, Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, ascertains from individuals who permit their names to be used, who give pertinent information adverse to the employee and who do not expressly indicate an unwillingness to testify, their desires regarding the following questions:

1. Whether they will testify before a Loyalty Hearing Board in the presence of the individual under investigation and his counsel, which would subject them to cross-examination;

2. If not, whether they will testify before a Loyalty Hearing Board not in the presence of the individual under investigation and his counsel;

3. If they are unwilling to appear at a scheduled hearing or unable to be present, whether they are willing to have their statements read verbatim to the individual under investigation and his counsel;

4. If they do not appear, whether they are willing to have their names disclosed at the hearing.

This Bureau will continue the above policy under Executive Order 10450; however, should you determine that Security Hearing Boards may hear witnesses only in the presence of the employee and his counsel, it will be appreciated if you will immediately advise this Bureau so that all individuals interviewed who may later be requested to testify before a Security Hearing Board will clearly understand that such testimony must be in the presence of the employee and his counsel and they may be cross-examined by the employee or his counsel.

It can be anticipated that, in connection with some hearings held under Executive Order 10450, the hearing board may request agents of this Bureau to appear and testify. In this connection, this Bureau would appreciate it if the policy followed in this respect under Executive Order 9835 could be continued. This policy was set forth in a confidential memorandum from the Attorney General dated December 11, 1947, to all department and agency heads of the Executive Branch of the Government, which stated that Special Agents of this Bureau will testify before hearing boards where they are in a position to furnish competent evidence. They will not, however, participate otherwise in the proceedings nor will they be made available merely to interpret information appearing in their investigative reports. It is suggested you may wish to furnish such information to all departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government.

Previous memoranda to you observed that as Executive Order 10450 is an Executive Order, it is assumed its coverage is limited to the Executive Branch of the Government. In this connection, the question may arise as to whether the General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, and the Library of Congress might be permitted to participate in the procedures effected under Executive Order 10450. You may recall that they have participated in the procedures of Executive Order 9835. You may therefore desire to ascertain from the General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, and the Library of Congress whether they wish to participate in the procedures prescribed by Executive Order 10450, and if they do desire to participate, determine whether the provisions of Executive Order 10450 authorize such participation. It would be appreciated if you would immediately advise this Bureau what action it should take if the names and fingerprints of such employees are submitted to this Bureau for checking through its files or if requests for full field investigations are received concerning such employees prior to a final determination as to whether they are to participate in the procedures under Executive Order 10450.

It would be appreciated if you could furnish an early reply to the questions posed in this memorandum.

DC 709(1)

U[illegible]ED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMI[illegible]ON

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 18, 1953

DEPARTMENTAL CIRCULAR NO. 709

TO HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT ESTABLISHMENTS

SUBJECT: Designation of Officials to Whom Reports of Full Field Investigation Under Executive Order 10450 Should be Delivered

1. Forms requesting investigations under Executive Order 10450 should bear the address of the Personnel Security Officer to whom the reports of investigation should be sent. Forms for this purpose will be provided with a space for the address of the Personnel Security Officer.

2. Reports of investigation will be forwarded to the Personnel Security Officer except when a full field investigation is conducted by the Commission or by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Commission will deliver these reports of full field investigation to a designated official in the central office of your department or agency.

3. In order that the reports may be delivered properly, please furnish the Commission with the names and addresses of central-office officials of your department or agency to whom reports of full field investigation should be delivered. You should name one or more alternates to receive these reports in the absence of the first official. These names should be submitted to the Chief, Investigations Division, U. S. Civil Service Commission, Washington 25, D. C., within ten days of receipt of this letter.

4. Since some of the reports of full field investigation will contain security information, you should show with respect to each official designated the highest category of classified security information he has been cleared to receive.

5. Inquiries concerning this circular may be made by telephone to Code 171, extension 3111 or 3112.

By direction of the Commission:

C. L. Edwards

C. L. Edwards
Executive Director

IN D C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, FBI

DATE: June 25, 1953

FROM : William P. Rogers,
Deputy Attorney General

SUBJECT: Executive Order 10450
Security Requirements for Government Employment

This is with reference to your memoranda of May 1 and May 14, 1953, relating to the administration of Executive Order 10450.

1. Your opinion that there should be no abuse of the privilege granted by section 3(b) of the order in filling sensitive positions in emergency cases prior to the completion of full field pre-appointment investigations is well taken. So, also, is your suggestion that the Civil Service Commission, in respect to section 3(a), should utilize extreme care in permitting less than the minimum investigation with respect to per diem, intermittent, temporary, or seasonable employees and aliens employed outside the United States.

2. I agree with your assumption that the coverage of the order is limited to the Executive Branch of the Government. However, I do not believe it will be necessary to make specific provision in the regulations to that effect. Inasmuch as they are to be issued separately by and in the name of each executive branch, department or agency, it will be made clear that they relate only to the administration of the particular department or agency concerned.

You also make reference to the fact that certain of the non-executive branch agencies, such as the General Accounting Office and the Government Printing Office, participated in the procedures prescribed by Executive Order 9835. I understand this resulted, not because that order was necessarily applicable to those agencies, but because they voluntarily adopted procedures similar to those prescribed by the order. Executive Order 10450 does not prevent them from adopting a similar policy in relation to it. The main question is whether the appropriations of the FBI are sufficient to pay for the investigations required by such agencies. I understand that the appropriations are sufficient with respect to some of the agencies whose employees are part of the classified civil service, such as the General Accounting Office, but not for others, such as the Library of Congress. In the past a system of reimbursement was worked out with respect to investigations for agencies not covered by existing appropriations. I would suggest that the Bureau work out similar procedures with the Civil Service Commission and other interested agencies with respect to Executive Order 10450.

3. In reference to the problem of the responsibility of conducting investigations abroad, the Departments of State and Army were requested by letter dated June 5, 1953, to continue the same arrangement under Executive Order No. 10450 for investigations abroad as existed under Executive Order No. 9835. The letter stated that in the absence of any indication of disagreement with this plan, it would be assumed that the existing arrangement would remain in effect. To date no expressions of disagreement have come from either Department.

4. In respect to the re-adjudication question arising under section 4, I agree that the Bureau should conduct additional investigations only when their purpose is to develop information of the type described in section 8(d). However, I believe the Civil Service Commission, rather than this Department, should issue direct instructions to all departments and agencies as to proper procedures in connection with requests for investigation. I would accordingly recommend that you work out a plan with the Civil Service Commission to so advise the interested departments and agencies.

5. As you point out, the last sentence of section 9(k) of the sample security regulations is subject to possible interpretation requiring the employee to be given a copy of the investigative reports in connection with his case. In order to preclude this possibility, an appropriate amendment has been transmitted to all departments and agencies. Many of them have also been informally advised of the matter. In addition, since they are supposed to submit their regulations to this Department before issuance, proper precautions will be taken at that time.

✓

6. I agree that your existing policy of sending all Bureau reports to the Commission for dissemination to the appropriate departments and agencies should be continued.

✓

7. You note that the sample security regulations do not state whether the hearings are to be open or closed and that under Executive Order 9835 the Loyalty Review Board issued a directive to all departments and agencies requiring hearings under that order to be private. In accordance with your suggestion, an amendment to that effect has been transmitted to all executive departments and agencies.

8. You point out that the sample security regulations provide in section 9(c)(4) that each employee shall have the right "to cross-examine any witness offered in support of the charges", whereas under Executive Order 9835 the Loyalty Review Board issued

a directive permitting Loyalty Hearing Boards to hear witnesses in the absence of the employee and his counsel, if the witness so requested.

I understand the provision of section 9(c)(4) to be a deliberate policy judgment that witnesses, other than confidential informants, shall be subject to cross-examination. Accordingly, persons giving testimony will not have the choices set forth in your memorandum. I therefore suggest that you advise prospective witnesses that their testimony will have to be in the presence of the employee and his counsel and will be subject to cross-examination.

9. I consider the Bureau's policy of permitting Special Agents to testify at the hearings only "where they are in a position to furnish competent evidence," to be sound and suggest that you undertake through the Civil Service Commission to advise the agencies concerned that this policy will be continued.

10. Serious consideration has been given to your suggestion that dismissals without prejudice to applicants in cases before the Regional Loyalty Boards may effect the Civil Service Commission's register of eligibles. The Commission has already advised that it believes that, under the basic Civil Service Act, it can establish criteria with respect to the register of eligibles similar to those set out in the order. The Department has advised the Commission that the order does not preclude it from so acting under the authority of the Civil Service Act if it is satsified as to the existence of such authority.

11. I also go along with your view that it will be necessary that agencies use a standard form containing sufficient identifying data in checking individuals' names through the Bureau's files and in connection with investigations conducted under the Executive Order, and suggest that you work out a procedure for establishing such a form with the Civil Service Commission.

12. With relation to section 5 of the order you state that the Bureau, on receipt of information of a nature necessitating investigation by it, intends to follow the policy of immediately initiating the investigation rather than awaiting a request from the department or agency concerned, but notifying the head of the department or agency that information of a nature requiring investigation by the Bureau has been received and an investigation is being conducted. You also mention that upon request the interested agency will be furnished with the basis for the investigation. I do not believe this policy to be in conflict with any provision of the order and see no reason why you should not follow the policy you suggest.

13. You point out that section 3(a) of the order requires "a check of the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation", but that section 4(b) of the sample security regulations dealing with the same subject matter omits the quoted language. In accordance with your suggestion, an amendment to the regulations along the lines you suggest has been transmitted to all executive departments and agencies.

14. You note that the abolition of Regional Loyalty Boards and the Loyalty Review Board will affect procedures pursuant to Executive Order 10422 relating to United States citizens who are United Nations employees. As you suggested, amendments to cover this situation have been promulgated to all executive departments and agencies.

Date: July 2, 1953

To: Mr. James E. Hatcher
Chief, Investigations Division
U. S. Civil Service Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450
- SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

With the inception of the captioned Executive Order it became evident to this Bureau that certain problems would arise which have been encountered in the past in this Bureau's operations under the provisions of Executive Order 9835. Several of these have been posed to the Department of Justice and the latter has now furnished this Bureau its advice regarding them.

One consideration is just what agencies in the Federal Government are to be included in the operations of Executive Order 10450. As your files will reflect, by letter dated August 21, 1947, the Honorable Arthur S. Flemming, then the Acting President of the Commission, furnished this Bureau a list of all such agencies to be included within the provisions of Executive Order 9835. Numbered among these were the General Accounting Office and the Government Printing Office, neither of which were agencies of the Executive Branch. The thought occurred as to whether these agencies are to be included under the new program and if so whether your estimates of cases to be handled for these agencies in the current and succeeding fiscal years which you have furnished this Bureau include the General Accounting Office and the Government Printing Office.

It is understood that the Commission considers employees of these agencies within the provisions of Executive Order 9835 since they are competitive employees as are the bulk of [illegible] employees of several executive agencies. It would be appreciated if you would furnish this Bureau a list of the agencies to be included within the provisions of Executive Order 10450 at your earliest convenience. In addition, would you advise whether the General Accounting Office and the Government Printing Office and their employees will be considered as subject to the provisions of the captioned order. If such is the case we would appreciate your advice as to whether your estimate of the volume of work to be handled for these agencies was included in the budgetary estimates furnished this Bureau.

As you are aware, employees of the Library of Congress have been processed under Executive Order 9835 through agreement with officials of the Library and the results of name checks and investigations handled for the Library were compensated for on a reimbursable basis. Would you advise whether the agreement had with the Library of Congress for processing its employees under the old Loyalty Order has been renewed for Executive Order 10450. If such is the case is the Library of Congress agreeable to continue the procedure of reimbursement for each matter handled?

With regard to the question as to what agencies have investigative responsibilities in connection with the additional investigation that may be necessary in the readjudication of full field investigations conducted under Executive Order 9835 as called for in Section 4 of the captioned order, this Bureau feels it should conduct such investigations only when the purpose is to develop information of a nature described in Section 8(d) of this order. The Department of Justice advised that it concurs in this opinion and stated that it feels the Civil Service Commission should issue direct instructions to all departments and agencies as to the proper procedures to be followed in connection with requests for further investigation. It is felt that if such instructions are issued it will preclude the receipt of a large number of requests by the FBI for investigation solely to bring the previous investigation up to date or to develop some allegations of a nonsubversive nature. For your further information, the Department of Justice has advised that it agrees this Bureau should continue the procedure established under the Loyalty Order of channeling its investigative reports through the Civil Service Commission for dissemination to the appropriate departments or agencies.

Your attention is invited to the letter from Mr. Peter Campbell Brown, then the Acting Assistant to the Attorney General, to the Honorable Seth W. Richardson, then the Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, dated May 5, 1949. Therein Mr. Brown requested Mr. Richardson to clarify Review Board instructions to the various departments and agencies to the effect that "Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will testify before Hearing Boards where they are in a position to furnish competent evidence. They will not, however, participate otherwise in the proceedings or will they be made available merely to interpret information appearing in their investigative reports." This policy will continue to be the policy of this Bureau under Executive Order 10450 and it has been concurred in by the Department of Justice. The Department has further suggested that the Commission so advise the various departments and agencies that this policy will be continued.

These points are being called to your attention in order that you may furnish this Bureau the information requested above, as well as give consideration to the necessity for furnishing instructions as outlined above to the various agencies for their information and guidance in the operations of Executive Order 10450.

COPY

Egan

File: I:LK:hh

July 16, 1953

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Attached is a list of agencies in the Federal government which are to be included in the operations of Executive Order 10450. This information was requested by your letter of July 2, 1953, addressed to Mr. James E. Hatcher, Chief, Investigations Division.

The subject of investigations for the General Accounting Office, Government Printing Office, and Library of Congress is being covered in a separate letter.

The Commission will issue instructions to all departments and agencies as to the proper procedures to be followed in connection with requests for further investigation under Section 4 of Executive Order 10450. Instructions will also be issued regarding testimony by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before security hearing boards.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Joseph E. Winslow

Joseph E. Winslow
Acting Executive Director

Attachment

COPY

COPY

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES INCLUDED IN THE OPERATIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT:

- White House Office
- Bureau of the Budget
- Council of Economic Advisers
- Executive Mansion and Grounds
- National Security Council
- National Security Resources Board
- Office of Defense Mobilization
- Office of the Director for Mutual Security
- President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS:

- State
- Treasury
- Department of Defense
  - Office of the Secretary of Defense
  - Department of the Army
  - Department of the Navy
  - Department of the Air Force
- Justice
- Post Office
- Interior
- Agriculture
- Commerce
- Labor
- Health, Education and Welfare

INDEPENDENT AGENCIES:

- American Battle Monuments Commission
- Atomic Energy Commission
- Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System
- Canal Zone Government
- Central Intelligence Agency
- Civil Aeronautics Board
- Civil Service Commission
  - Federal Personnel Council
- Committee on Government Contract Compliance
- Committee on Retirement Policy for Federal Personnel

INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: (Continued)

Defense Materials Procurement Agency
Defense Transport Administration
Economic Stabilization Agency
Export-Import Bank
Federal Civil Defense Administration
Federal Coal Mine Safety Board of Review
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
Federal Power Commission
Federal Trade Commission
General Accounting Office
General Services Administration
Government Printing Office
Housing and Home Finance Agency
Indian Claims Commission
International Boundary and Water Commission
Interstate Commerce Commission
Mutual Security Agency
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
National Capital Housing Authority
National Capital Planning Commission
National Labor Relations Board
National Mediation Board
National Science Foundation
National Security Training Commission
Panama Canal Company
Railroad Retirement Board
Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Renegotiation Board
Securities and Exchange Commission
Selective Service System
Small Defense Plants Administration
Smithsonian Institution
    National Gallery of Art
Soldiers Home
Subversive Activities Control Board
Tariff Commission
Tax Court of the United States
Tennessee Valley Authority
Veterans Administration
War Claims Commission

UN D STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ADDRESS ONLY
"CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION"
IN YOUR REPLY REFER TO
FILE
AND DATE OF THIS LETTER

July 21, 1953

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

You will recall that several agencies of the Legislative Branch of the Government participated in the loyalty program prescribed in Executive Order 9835. These same agencies have made requests of the Commission that they be permitted to participate in a similar manner under the program prescribed in Executive Order 10450. By letter dated June 29, 1953, the Deputy Attorney General advised the Commission that if these agencies are of the view that they can adopt procedures which would make it possible for them to participate in the program by virtue of authority conferred under the acts under which they operate, it would be entirely appropriate for them to participate in the program on a voluntary basis. It was suggested in this letter that the Commission work out with your Bureau the question relating to reimbursement by the agencies involved.

Because of the above opinion I have attached for your consideration proposed undated drafts of letters to the Librarian of Congress, The Public Printer, and the Director of Personnel of the General Accounting Office advising that subject to their meeting the above conditions they may participate in this program. The budget estimates of the Commission for some time have included work items which would result from making national agency checks and inquiries and limited personal investigations, when necessary, for the Government Printing Office and the General Accounting Office. It is our understanding that this is true with respect to the budget estimates of your Bureau insofar as they pertain to searching fingerprint records and Standard Forms 87 for employees of these agencies and making full field investigations when necessary under Section 8(d) of Executive Order 10450. For this reason no feature of reimbursement has been mentioned in our proposed letters to these agencies.

The Commission is willing to conduct for the Library of Congress on a reimbursable basis activities which it would perform for an agency in the Executive Branch under Executive Order 10450. I have taken the liberty of including in the draft to the Librarian of Congress the basis for reimbursing your Bureau for its part in this program. This was done for discussion purposes. It is not the Commission's intent to imply commitments on the part of the FBI.

After your review I would appreciate your returning the enclosures to me together with any comments or suggestions you may wish to make.

Sincerely yours,

Jos E. Winslow

Joseph E. Winslow
Acting Executive Director

Enclosure 28952

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20415

IN REPLY PLEASE REFER TO

YOUR REFERENCE

December 2, 1965

Honorable Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RECEIVED
DEC 3 1965

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The President has directed the Civil Service Commission, after consulting with the major users of personnel investigations, to formulate and issue minimum standards of acceptable investigative coverage for Federal civilian employment.

I should appreciate your comments and suggestions relative to the following proposed minimum standards for acceptable full field coverage:

Scope of Full Field Investigations

Full field investigations on Federal employees and applicants are personally conducted investigations which cover the life of the individual with special emphasis on the person's background and activities during the most recent fifteen years, or since his eighteenth birthday, whichever is the shorter period. In addition, a thorough personal investigation is made of any materially derogatory matters developed, requiring investigation before the fifteen-year period.

The basic elements of investigation are:

- a national agency check, as described on page 736-3 of the Federal Personnel Manual.
- personal interviews with present and former employers, supervisors, fellow workers, references, neighbors, school authorities, and other associates.
- checks of police, credit, [illegible] field office and other pertinent records as appropriate, such as Immigration and Naturalization, Passport Division of the State Department, vital statistics, military service, and the like.

77-200-[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
1965
R.A.O.
INTERNAL SECURITY
Criminal Section

INDEXED

ENCLOSURE

Personal interviews are scheduled with employers, supervisors, and work associates to verify and obtain pertinent details for all employments in the investigative period. Particular care is taken also to verify the fact of unemployment or self-employment claimed by the subject of investigation.

The last period of education at a college level is always verified by a check of the school records. Secondary education is investigated when the subject is young and has had no subsequent schooling. Personal interviews are conducted with witnesses such as professors and former students who were associated with the subject during recent schooling.

Neighborhood investigation is regularly conducted to cover residence during the most recent three years. Testimony of neighbors before that period may be sought to verify periods of unemployment or self-employment, or to resolve questionable matters which have been raised from other sources.

The number of witnesses interviewed cannot be reduced to a formula but in each case depends upon the diversity of the subject's experience and places of residence, as well as upon the depth of knowledge shown by witnesses concerning the subject's character, habits, and background. The objective of the investigation is to obtain a comprehensive and well-rounded picture of the individual's background and activities.

Matters Covered in Full Field Investigations

Basically, full field investigations are designed to develop sufficient information to enable agency security officials to determine the fitness of persons entering critical-sensitive positions. Fitness includes both security and suitability elements.

Character, habits, morals, and reputation are investigated generally. Loyalty is particularly stressed and if a question is raised concerning the subject's loyalty the case is referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with Section 8 (d) of Executive Order 10450. Particular attention is directed to such matters as immorality, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, lack of integrity, dismissals from employment, arrests, financial responsibility, and health.

The affirmative qualities and qualifications of the subject are fully reported.

Over and above the minimum standards, the full field investigation may be tailored to obtain information in depth concerning special attributes and qualifications required for proper performance in the particular kind of position involved.

To facilitate early completion of this study, I should like to receive your comments by December 31, 1965. Mr. Kimbell Johnson, Director, Bureau of Personnel Investigations, is available to discuss any aspect of the proposed standards with members of your staff. He may be reached on Code 183, Extension 7205.

Sincerely yours,

John W Macy Jr

John W. Macy, Jr.
Chairman

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

December 15, 1965

Director, FBI

SCOPE OF FULL FIELD INVESTIGATIONS

Reference is made to your letter of December 9, 1965, forwarding a copy of Chairman Macy's letter of December 2, 1965, concerning minimum standards for acceptable full field coverage.

As you are aware, this Bureau conducts our own personnel investigations. The scope of these and other full field investigations conducted by this Bureau under various programs, such as the Federal Employee Security Program and the United Nations Loyalty Program, exceeds the minimum standards set forth in Chairman Macy's letter. The letter of December 2, 1965, does not change the investigative responsibilities of this Bureau.

In view of the above, this Bureau has no comments to make concerning the proposed minimum standards of acceptable investigative coverage for Federal civilian employment. This Bureau took a similar position in connection with this matter in a letter to Mr. Kimball Johnson dated April 22, 1959.

The Attorney General

March 20, 1973

Acting Director, FBI

EXECUTIVE ORDERS 9835,
10450, AND 11605

Executive Order 9835, Part III, paragraph 3, provided that the Attorney General "after appropriate investigation and determination" would furnish to the Loyalty Review Board the name of each foreign or domestic organization which the Attorney General had designated "as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."

Executive Order 10450, Section 12, revoked Executive Order 9835, as amended; however, it provided that the Department of Justice "shall continue to furnish the information described in paragraph 3 of Part III" of Executive Order 9835, "but directly to the head of each department or agency."

Executive Order 11605, paragraph 2, amended Section 12 of Executive Order 10450 by, among other provisions, providing that "the head of each department and agency shall be furnished by the Attorney General with the name of each organization which shall be or has been heretofore designated under this order" and that "nothing. . . herein shall. . . affect previous designations made pursuant to Executive Order 10450, as amended." (Subparagraph (b)) Executive Order 11605 further provided that "the Subversive Activities Control Board shall, upon petition of the Attorney General, conduct appropriate hearings to determine whether any organization is totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or whether it has adopted a policy of unlawfully advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means." (Subparagraph (c))

JFM:glw
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

To date, Congress has refused to appropriate funds for the operation of the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB).

During a current study of FBI jurisdiction by this Bureau, the questions have arisen: has the authority to designate organizations been taken from the Attorney General and given to the SACB by Executive Order 11605, or is this authority concurrent; and at this time, what are the responsibilities and authority of the FBI under Executive Order 10450, as amended, and Executive Order 11605?

Would you please provide me with a statement of the Department's current position on these questions.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : L. Patrick Gray
Acting Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: April 3, 1973

FROM : Henry E. Petersen
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

SUBJECT: Executive Orders 9835, 10450, and 11605

This is in reference to your memorandum dated March 20, 1973 in which you requested to be advised regarding the Department's position relating to the above executive orders.

In the event the Subversive Activities Control Board ceases to function after July 1, 1973, the designation program as authorized by E. O. 10450, as amended, will continue to remain in effect. The Board's demise will, however, eliminate it as the body which at this time has the exclusive authority to conduct, upon petition of the Attorney General, the evidentiary hearings and make the determinations as to whether an organization should be designated within the criteria and standards specified by E. O. 10450, as amended by E. O. 11605.

The question of revising E. O. 10450 to overcome any deficiency which arises as a result of the demise of the Board is currently under study in the Department. There is also legislation pending to afford Congressional approval to E. O. 11605. Until such time as these matters are resolved, it is requested that the Bureau continue to conduct the investigations which it has carried out under E. O. 10450 which is, of course, still in effect.

May 8, 1974

Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

Director, FBI

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

Executive Order (EO) 10450 is currently being amended by the Department and representatives of this Bureau have participated in a task force headed by Mr. Oran Waterman, Director, Department Security Staff, which is recommending certain changes be made in EO 10450.

During the course of discussions within the task force, it was pointed out to Mr. Waterman the Bureau's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic subversion field has come under considerable scrutiny. The Bureau is now conducting investigations of domestic subversion on the basis of existing Federal statutes. This investigative policy may not adequately meet the needs of an effective security of Government employees program under EO 10450.

The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, previously solicited our views on abolition of the Attorney General's List. In our response captioned "Abolition of the Attorney General's List," dated April 11, 1974, our comments included advice that under our current statutory basis for domestic subversion investigations may not adequately meet the needs of EO 10450 and the observation the FBI has never received specific instructions from the Attorney General to conduct intelligence-type investigations to identify and determine the activities of organizations described in Section 8 (a) (5) of EO 10450. We also requested to be advised as to the instructions of the Attorney General relating to the FBI conducting intelligence-type investigations under EO10450, as well as the scope and parameters within which such investigations should be conducted.

Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

Our current practice of conducting subversive-type investigations based on Federal statutes may tend to restrict our intelligence gathering concerning organizations, associations, movements, groups and combinations of persons as defined in Section 8 (a) (5) of EO 10450. In responding to our above-referred-to memorandum of April 11, 1974, it is recommended the Attorney General consider issuance of some form of Departmental instructions or order establishing firm guidelines for intelligence-type investigations which would define our authority in this regard. It is believed this would put the FBI on a firm foundation to conduct intelligence-type investigations involving groups defined in Section 8 (a) (5) to adequately support EO 10450. We have previously recommended that the Department seek a comprehensive Executive Order, and furnished suggested language, which would provide a firm basis for FBI intelligence-type investigations in the security field. This recommendation is still under study by the Department.

We would be glad to meet with representatives of the Department to discuss this matter in more detail.

1 - Director
Department Security Staff

Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

August 19, 1974

Director, FBI

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

Since the issuance of Executive Order 11785 on June 4, 1974, abolishing the Attorney General's list of designated organizations, one of the standards used by the FBI in initiating investigations of individuals pursuant to Executive Order 10450 has been eliminated. This is true with regard to investigations under captioned matter of individuals which may be initiated by the FBI based on information contained in our files as well as in evaluating requests for investigations of individuals received from other agencies and departments pursuant to Section 8(d) of Executive Order 10450.

In this connection it is noted that the Criminal Division of the Department in its letter of July 11, 1974, advised that continued investigation by the FBI of the Nation of Islam is warranted because, among other things, "its reported activities appear to come within the criteria of Executive Order 10450."

In view of the issuance of Executive Order 11785, it will be appreciated if you will furnish guidelines to be used by the FBI in initiating investigations of individuals under captione matter pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and specifically criteri to be utilized in determining whether available information is sufficient basis for an investigation.

1 - Director
Department Security Staff

m DJ-150

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: AUG 23 1974

FROM : Glen E. Pommerening
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

SUBJECT: Federal Employee Security Program
Executive Order 10450

The practice as set forth in your subject memorandum of August 14, 1974, for furnishing to the Office of Management and Finance copies of investigative reports satisfies the needs of the Department.

Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

August 14, 1974

Director, FBI

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

This will confirm the request on August 6, 1974, of Mr. Oran H. Waterman, Director, Department Security Staff, advising he was acting on a request from your office, that copies of reports containing the results of investigations of individuals conducted under captioned matter pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 10450 be furnished, where pertinent, to his office directly rather than through your office. This procedure was instituted on August 6, 1974. After review by the Department Security Staff it is understood that the reports are forwarded to the Criminal Division.

As in the past, these reports are furnished to the Department in order that consideration may be given as to whether any Federal laws have been violated and for information concerning possible subversive infiltration into the Executive Branch of the Government.

With regard to a determination as to whether any Federal laws have been violated, it is noted the violations generally involve Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1001, and a response is received from the Criminal Division.

Information concerning subversive infiltration into the Executive Branch of the Government is furnished for the Department's assistance in discharging its responsibilities under Section 13 of Executive Order 10450 which reads: "The Attorney General is requested to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish and maintain an appropriate employee security program."

It will [illegible] appreciated if you will advise if the practice set forth above is responsive to the needs of the Department.

MAILED 20
AUG 14 1974

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: NOV 1 1974

FROM : Glen E. Pommerening
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

SUBJECT: Federal Employee Security Program
Executive Order 10450

This is in response to your memoranda, entitled as above, dated May 8, 1974 and August 19, 1974, directed to the Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division, and referring to problems which have arisen as a result of the promulgation of Executive Order 11785 which amends Executive Order 10450. In view of the involvement of my staff in these matters, I will undertake to answer your questions with the concurrence of the Criminal Division.

As you know this matter has been under continuing review both in the Task Force, chaired by a representative of this office, of working level representatives of various agencies in the security field and is now under study to a lesser degree in Project #10 of the "Domestic Council on Privacy".

You ask that the Department; (a) provide specific instructions to the Bureau to conduct intelligence-type investigations to identify and determine the activities of organizations now described in the amended Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450; (b) furnish guidelines to be used by the Bureau in initiating investigations of individuals under the captioned matter pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and specifically, criteria to be utilized in determining whether available information is a sufficient basis for investigation.

Under the amendment to Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450, we now have only two types of organizations; (1) those which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the constitution or laws of the United States or

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

any State, (2) or which seek to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof, by unlawful means. (Emphasis added).

Of course, the key words which are underlined indicate that the investigation should be initially based on a possible violation of a federal (such as the Smith Act) or state statute prohibiting unlawful advocacy or the commission of any unlawful act of force or violence. However, in order for the Bureau to detect organizations with a potential of the above nature, it is important that the investigation proceed on the basis of information indicating that the organization may be of the nature mentioned. It is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated, but only that a reasonable evaluation of the available information suggests that the activities of the organization may fall within the proscription of the Order. The most recent example of the type of organization, that you have advised is becoming more prevalent, is the small but dedicated to violence, Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). Organizations of this nature would clearly fall within the Order and should be investigated as soon as information is available indicating their potentiality for violence and of course, if possible, prior to the fulfillment of their purposes.

It is true that Executive Order 11785 eliminated the prior communist, totalitarian, fascist, and subversive characterizations and definitions, but there was no intention of restricting the investigations of such organizations if their programs call for acts of force or violence or the unlawful advocacy of the commission of acts of force or violence in furtherance of these programs.

It is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order but once the investigation reaches a stage that offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the investigation suggests a determination that the organization is engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it should continue.

It follows in answer to your second question that individuals who are active either as members of or as affiliates of

organizations described above should be investigated when information is received indicating their involvement. The same yardstick indicated above for organizations in determining whether the investigation should continue, should apply concerning individuals and when a determination can reasonably be made that the individuals activities, either within the organization or as an individual, do not appear to be in violation of any law, then the investigation should cease.

December 11, 1974

Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

Director, FBI

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

Reference is made to your memorandum dated November 1, 1974, in answer to our previous inquiries requesting advice concerning the effect of Executive Order (EO) 11785 on our investigations of organizations and individuals engaged in subversive activities.

While referenced memorandum advises we should use the same yardstick for investigation of subversive organizations and subversive individuals, the comments following that advice, concerning individuals, are believed subject to interpretation as being more restrictive in scope. Specifically, concerning organizations, you essentially advised that when investigation determines the activities are legal in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the activities are illegal or potentially illegal, the investigation should continue. Concerning individuals, the memorandum advises essentially that the same yardstick be used but adds when the activities do not appear to be in violation of any law, then the investigation should cease.

Further, the tenor of your memorandum, particularly comments contained in page two, paragraph one, follow the concept of investigative scope consistent with the advice as to investigation of subversive organizations but does appear to conflict with the latter comments concerning investigation of individuals where the phrase "not in violation of any law" is used. We would appreciate clarification concerning this matter.

CWT/RHE:djr
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

Your memorandum of November 1, 1974, in part, responded to this Bureau's memorandum of August 19, 1974, which asked for guidelines to be used by the FBI in initiating investigations of applicants and employees in the Executive Branch of the Government pursuant to Section 8(d) of EO 10450. This Section specifically instructs other agencies to promptly refer to the FBI for investigation those cases which develop information indicating that an individual may have been subjected to coercion, influence or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information relating to any of the other matters described therein.

Since the guidelines furnished by you are concerned primarily with possible violation of law, a decision to be made by the Department, it will be appreciated if you will furnish additional guidelines to cover "sympathetic association" and other standards mentioned in Section 8(a) (2) through (8) when the investigation concerns an applicant or employee in the Executive Branch of the Government.

In considering the foregoing, it should be noted the FBI has another responsibility under EO 10450 which is set forth in Section 5. This Section provides that whenever there is developed or received by any department or agency information indicating that the retention in employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, such information shall be forwarded to the head of the employing department or agency or his representative.

Your attention is also invited to Chapter 736 of the Federal Personnel Manual, which instructs agencies to promptly refer to the FBI for investigation cases "which develop information indicating that a person may have been subject to coercion, influence or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information on possible disloyalty to the United States."

Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

Chapter 732 of the Federal Personnel Manual instructs that before an agency issues a letter of charges under EO 10450, the Department of Justice shall be consulted to assure that the rights of the employees are fully considered. Section 13 of EO 10450 requests the Attorney General to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish and maintain an appropriate employee security program.

Available information indicates that difficulties of proof imposed by the courts in loyalty and security cases have proved almost insurmountable and as a result no removals or other adverse actions have been taken on these grounds for several years and the adjudicative basis has apparently shifted from loyalty and security to suitability.

An early response in this matter will be appreciated.

NOTE:

We have corresponded with the Department concerning amendments to EO 10450 by EO 11785 and requested guidelines as to our investigations of subversive matters defined in EO 10450 as amended by EO 11785 as none have been previously furnished by the Department. This is necessary because the Federal Employee Security Program depends on subversive information originating with our subversive investigations. The foregoing requests clarification in conflicting language in the Department's response as to subversive investigations and response to questions concerning the FBI's investigative role in the above Program.

Although our original inquiry was directed to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, the Department memorandum notes Assistant Attorney General, Administrative Division, answered with concurrence of the Criminal Division. We are, therefore, directing our request for clarification to Assistant Attorney General for Administration.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
    (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
3 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
    (1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar)
    (1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff)

1 - Mr. Fehl
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - Mr. Stoops

March 3, 1976 #MDR-6 2/6/01

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP3ALM/RP

62-116395

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 9, 1976, requesting appropriate FBI materials describing the policy and procedures of the Bureau for investigations carried out pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 10450, (enclosed), as amended, including, but not limited to, the standards for checking the names for Federal employees or prospective employees in FBI files (a National Agency Check) the standards for determining whether or not there is "derogatory information" in the FBI files, the policies for dissemination of such information, and the circumstances under which the FBI will conduct its own investigation of a prospective Federal employee. Set forth below is this Bureau's response to the requests mentioned in referenced letter. Also enclosed are materials responsive to the requests mentioned in referenced letter.

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE FBI FOR INVESTIGATIONS PURSUANT TO EO 10450, AS AMENDED

Executive Order (EO) 10450, as amended, came into existence on April 27, 1953, and serves as the basic authority under which most personnel investigations are conducted at the present time involving applicants and employees in the Executive Branch.

EO 10450, in its preamble, states that the interests of the national security require all persons privileged to be employed by the Government shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States.

Section 2 requires the agency head to maintain an effective program to insure that the employment or retention of applicants and employees is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

Original and one copy to AG.
GLS:pln/kkk
-14-

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Coun. ____
Phone Rm. ____
Sec'y ____
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Section 8 lists the conditions for developing information which is of investigative and, by inference, adjudicative interest.

Section 13 states: "The Attorney General is requested to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish and maintain an appropriate employee security program."

Chapter 732 of the Federal Personnel Manual instructs that before an agency issues a letter of charges under EO 10450, the Department of Justice shall be consulted to assure that the rights of the employees are fully considered.

The Government Printing Office, General Accounting Office, and Library of Congress, all in the Legislative Branch, voluntarily participated in the loyalty program prescribed by EO 9835. The same agencies desired to participate in the program set up by EO 10450. These agencies again, with the approval of the Department of Justice, worked out with the Department and with the Civil Service Commission procedures for their participation in EO 10450. The results of FBI investigations under EO 10450 concerning applicants and employees of these agencies in the Legislative Branch are furnished to the Civil Service Commission, which in turn furnishes the results to the designated officials in the specific agency.

Available information indicates that difficulties of proof imposed by the courts in loyalty and security cases are considered almost insurmountable and as a result no removal or other adverse actions have been taken on these grounds for several years and the adjudicative basis has shifted from loyalty and security to suitability. Thus, favorable determinations are said to be based on EO 10450 while unfavorable decisions almost always rely on the suitability provisions of Civil Service Regulations.

It is noted that you have previously reviewed Section 19, "Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Government Agencies," FBI Manual of Instructions, Volume II, which contains instructions to be followed for investigations carried out pursuant to EO 10450, as amended. This should be referred to for an understanding of the FBI's policy and procedures.

Section 8(d) reads as follows:

> There shall be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation all investigations being conducted by any other agencies which develop information indicating that an individual may have been subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information relating to any of the matters described in subdivisions (2) through (8) of subsection (a) of this section. In cases so referred to it, the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make a full field investigation.

Chapter 736 of the Federal Personnel Manual instructs agencies to promptly refer to the FBI for investigation cases "which develop information indicating that a person may have been subject to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information on possible disloyalty to the United States." This Chapter also requires that "information as to subversive activity on the part of employees in the Executive Branch....is referred by the employing agency.... to the Federal Bureau of Investigation" so that necessary investigation is conducted by the FBI.

In a memorandum dated August 19, 1974, (enclosed), to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, with a copy for the Director, Department Security Staff, Department of Justice, reference was made to EO 11785 dated June 4, 1974, (enclosed), which abolished the Attorney General's list of designated organizations, one of the standards used by the FBI in initiating investigations of individuals pursuant to EO 10450. It was pointed out this standard was eliminated with regard to investigations of applicants and employees in the Executive Branch which may be initiated by the FBI based on information in our files as well as in evaluating requests for investigations of individuals received from other agencies and departments pursuant to Section 8(d) of EO 10450. Guidelines were requested for the use of the FBI in initiating investigations of individuals pursuant to EO 10450 and specifically criteria to be utilized in determining whether available information is sufficient basis for investigation under EO 10450.

A response to these inquiries was made by the Assistant Attorney General for Administration on November 1, 1974, (enclosed), advising that the FBI should continue to conduct investigations to identify organizations coming within the purview of Section 8(a)(5) of EO 10450, i.e., organizations which: (1)unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or any State; or (2)which seek to overthrow the Government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means. The Department advised that if the investigation of an organization "suggests a determination that the organization is engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities, it should continue.

Regarding the investigation of individuals, the Department advised that members or affiliates of organizations described above should be investigated and the same yardstick should be utilized as was indicated for organizations in determining whether the investigation should continue. The Department added, however, that "when a determination can reasonably be made that the individual's activities, either within the organization or as an individual, do not appear to be in violation of any law, then the investigation should cease."

In a memorandum dated December 11, 1974, (enclosed), to the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, clarification was requested of the guidelines for investigations by the FBI of applicants and employees in the Executive Branch under EO 10450 since the Department's statement that the same yardstick should be utilized in the case of organizations and individuals appears to be at variance with that used concerning organizations.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

STANDARDS FOR CHECKING FBI FILES FOR A NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

Section 3(a) provides that the appointment of each civilian employee shall be made subject to investigation but in no event shall the investigation include less than a national agency check including a check of the fingerprint files of the FBI.

Although the scope of a national agency check is not defined in EO 10450, Chapter 736 of the Federal Personnel Manual defines a national agency check as including a check of the fingerprint files, Identification Division, FBI, and of the investigative files of the FBI.

STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS "DEROGATORY INFORMATION" IN THE FBI FILES

The standards for determining what is derogatory information is such information that shall relate, but shall not be limited to, those facts described in subdivisions (1-8) of Section 8(a).

POLICIES FOR DISSEMINATION OF SUCH DEROGATORY INFORMATION

Section 5 of EO 10450 provides:

> Whenever there is developed by any department or agency information indicating that the retention in employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, such information shall be forwarded to the head of the employing department or agency or his representatives....

If the FBI receives information coming within the provisions of this section, the FBI has the responsibility to disseminate it whether it be of a suitability or loyalty nature. Chapter 735 of the Federal Personnel Manual contains language similar to that in Section 5. The conditions for the types of derogatory information involved are set forth in Section 8(a) of the Order.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Supplement Number 4 (revised) of Departmental Order 3464, signed by the Attorney General on January 13, 1953, provides that all files, documents, records and reports in the Department of Justice shall be regarded as of a confidential nature.

The Attorney General by memorandum dated December 5, 1947, advised the Bureau that the practice in passing along to the various government departments and agencies information which comes to its attention in connection with the conducting of investigations, normally and regularly within the Bureau's jurisdiction, is entirely appropriate and correct. The Attorney General added that it would appear that the Bureau would be remiss in its duty if it failed to pass along information coming to it which might prove in the interest of the general welfare. He added that it is not the Bureau's responsibility to determine whether the information is or is not of importance to the particular agency in the carrying out of its current activities and responsibility, and whether or not any action is taken by the department or agency is not, of course, a principal concern of the Bureau. The Attorney General advised, therefore, that in his opinion the Bureau should continue to pass along information, which it is believed might be of interest to the various departments and agencies.

It should be noted that our FBI reports distributed to outside agencies are stamped as the property of the FBI with this additional notation," This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency."

FBI memorandum dated August 14, 1974, (enclosed), to the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, copies for the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, and for the Director, Department Security Staff, confirmed the results of investigations of individuals pursuant to EO 10450 be furnished, where pertinent, to the Director, Department Security Staff.

The memorandum pointed out that, as in the past, these reports are furnished to the Department in order that consideration may be given as to whether any Federal laws have been violated and for information concerning possible subversive infiltration into the Executive Branch of the Government.

With regard to a determination as to whether any Federal laws have been violated, it was noted the violations generally involve Title 18, U.S. Code 1001, and a response is received from the Criminal Division.

Information concerning subversive infiltration into the Executive Branch is furnished for the Department's assistance in discharging its responsibilities under Section 13 of EO 10450.

The Assistant Attorney General for Administration, by memorandum dated August 26, 1974, (enclosed), advised that the practice as outlined in the memorandum of August 14, 1974, satisfies the needs of the Department.

As the result of reorganization in the Department, these reports are now sent to the Director, Security and Administrative Services Staff.

CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE FBI WILL CONDUCT ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF A PROSPECTIVE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE

With regard to Sections 5 and 8(d), supra, the FBI sent a memorandum dated May 1, 1953, (enclosed), to the Deputy Attorney General pointing out that the FBI contemplated following the policy in existence under EO 9835 (Federal Employee Loyalty Program) of initiating an investigation based on available information rather than awaiting a request for such an investigation under EO 10450 from the interested department or agency. It was stated that if this practice was in conflict with the provisions of EO 10450, consideration could be given to clarification in subsequent regulations.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

In reply the Deputy Attorney General on June 25, 1953, (enclosed), advised he did not believe the policy outlined in the memorandum dated May 1, 1953, to be in conflict with any provision of EO 10450 and saw no reason why the FBI should not continue this policy.

The FBI has continued the practice approved in the Department's memorandum of June 25, 1953, and by memorandum dated January 23, 1976, to the Deputy Attorney General, the Department was advised that this policy still continues under the provisions of EO 10450.

Enclosures (23)

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM KP

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 3/3/76

Caption of Document: SSC let 2/9/76 requesting FBI materials describing the policy & procedures of the Bureau.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: J Stassinos Date: 3/8/76

Received by: Frederick Baron

Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: **FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

3/3/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 2/9/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Information regarding FBI policy and procedure for investigations carried out pursuant to Executive Order 10450, as amended.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP3ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb **ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX**
(4) **IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.**

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - M[illegible] J. A. Mintz
([illegible] - Mr. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General

February 3, 1976

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP3ALM KSP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 7, 1976, requesting certain materials from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which constitutes this Bureau's response to the request for material set forth in paragraph two of referenced letter.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records, along with a set of the materials which is to be delivered to the SSC with the memorandum.

Attention is invited to a number of references in the materials to Mr. John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC. Because of these references, it is our intention that when the materials are to be delivered to the SSC, we will invite Mr. Elliff to review the materials at FBI Headquarters and respect his desires as to whether or not any of the references should be excised prior to actual delivery of the materials. This procedure will thus insure the privacy considerations relative to Mr. Elliff.

EX-115 REC-38 62-116395-1474
7 MAR 18 1976

On January 29, 1976, the foregoing was discussed by a representative of this Bureau with Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, who agreed with our proposal.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

KAM:pal
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ENCLOSURE
ENCL BEHIND FILE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 2? 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE:

Proposal discussed with Shaheen by S. F. Phillips of Senstudy 75 Project after checking with Assistant Director Mintz. For ready reference by approving Bureau officials, attached below the yellow of the LHM is a set of the materials which will be retained by Bureau and we have flagged by paper clips those paragraphs which contain the pertinent references to Elliff.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 [illegible]r. Hotis)
1 - Mr. [illegible]. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

62-116395 February 3, 1976

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 7, 1976, requesting certain materials from the FBI.

The material requested in paragraph two of referenced letter is being delivered with this memorandum. With respect to the material being delivered, it should be noted there are several instances wherein the documents provided refer to previous communications, exhibits, and attachments. Extensive file reviews were conducted and some of these communications could not be located. In other instances when such communications were located, they were reviewed and found to not pertain to changes being made to Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions. Additionally, the final approved version of Section 87 and the Position Paper by Thomas J. Smith captioned "Domestic Intelligence Division-Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility In Domestic Intelligence Investigations" are not being submitted with this memorandum inasmuch as these items have previously been furnished the SSC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP3ALM/KP

1 - The Attorney General

KAM:pal pal
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTE:

SSC requested material reflecting process by which Section 87 was changed during 1973, from inception to final approval. A review of pertinent files reveals questions were raised during 1971 about the FBI's jurisdiction in the security field by Senator S. J. Ervin and John T. Elliff. Former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, requested, during early 1972,

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

WRW

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1474

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE CONTINUED

preparation of in-depth position papers for an Executive Conference which led to the above-mentioned paper by Thomas J. Smith. Thereafter Section 87 was revamped and security investigations were to be based on Federal statutes.

As indicated above, extensive file reviews were conducted to locate various communications referred to in documents being provided SSC and these efforts were negative. Additionally, some documents being provided SSC contain information of interest regarding the manual change; however, enclosures and attached letters with these documents did not pertain to the manual change and therefore these items were not furnished SSC.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR. ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2/3/76

Caption of Document: Re SSC let 1/7/76 request for Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: J D Stassinos Date: 2/5/76

Received by: F L Cooke

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
2/3/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 1/7/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating procedures
Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Material reflecting process by which Section 87 of Manual of Instructions was changed during 1973, from inception to final approval.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP3ALMKP

62-116395

AJD:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

MAR 8 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven Blackhurst SB
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination Security

SUBJECT: SSC Letter Dated March 3, 1976

The attached letter from the SSC was discussed with Mr. Tom McNiff of the Bureau on March 8, 1976. It requires no response unless the FBI has objections to the draft SSC report on the Huston Plan.

Cregar (info)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

REC-104 62-116395-1473

7 MAR 15 1976

Inspector William O. Cregar advised 3/8/76 of Blackhurst call + contents of attached SSC letter. TJM

3/11/76 Steve Blackhurst, DOJ, advised that Elliff has agreed to proof letter pertaining request applies only to narrative reviewed by Bu personnel and not to documents footnoted in the report and which were not made available to Bu personnel. TJM

cc: Paul Daly

ENCLOSURE

84 MAR 17 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, J[illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

MAR 5 11 49 AM '76
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL UNIT

March 3, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Office of Professional Responsibility
U. S. Department of Justice (Room 4313)
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

On February 23, 24, and March 3, 1976, Mr. William Cregar of the FBI reviewed the Select Committee's draft report entitled "National Security, Civil Liberties, and the Collection of Intelligence: A Report on the Huston Plan" for security problems. Loch Johnson, of the Committee staff, revised the draft to meet all security problems which were raised and discussed the revisions with Mr. Cregar to make certain that their concerns were met.

This letter is intended to confirm the fact that, unless I receive word to the contrary from you, the Department of Justice has no objection, on security grounds, to the publication of this report.

Thanks very much for your help throughout the inquiry into this subject.

Sincerely,

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Chief Counsel

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

cc: Paul Daly, FBI

RECEIVED
MAR 3 1976

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-1473

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/8/76

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Attached is a letter dated 3/5/76 addressed to Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esquire, Office of Professional Responsibility, U.S. Department of Justice, from Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel of captioned Committee, confirming the fact that the FBI has reviewed the captioned Committee's draft report titled "CIA and FBI Mail Opening." The FBI's review, according to this letter, was to insure the draft report met all security problems. It is noted that the FBI's review of this report is not for purposes of accuracy but rather to insure that there are no problems relating to classification of material or similar problems.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division review attached letter to determine if it accurately reports our review of the report in question and whether there may be additional changes desired in the draft report.

\ Jim Johnson [illegible]
[illegible]

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Leavitt - Enc.
1 - Mr. Phillips - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

REC-110

62-116395-1472

7 MAR 12 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/VP

PVD:lad
(6)

5. S. Miller

84 MAR 17 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 5, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esquire
Office of Professional Responsibility
Room 4313
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

On March 4, 1976, Mr. James Johnson of the FBI reviewed the Select Committee's draft titled "CIA and FBI Mail Opening." James Dick and Thomas Dawson of the Committee staff revised the draft to meet all security problems previously raised by Mr. James Lee of the Bureau, and discussed the revisions with Mr. Johnson to make certain that their concerns were met.

This letter is to confirm the fact that, unless I receive word to the contrary from you, the Department of Justice has no objection to the publication of this report.

Thanks again for your help throughout the inquiry into this subject.

Sincerely,

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Chief Counsel

Copy to Paul Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP3ALM KP

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1472

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller

February 26, 1976

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 19, 1976, requesting access to certain FBI materials.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 6 of referenced SSC letter.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

62-116395-1470

2-20-76

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

~~62-116395-14~~

VRT:adn
(10)

7 MAR 9 1976

5-ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SBALMKP

woc

5/27/76 - SSC has not reviewed material.
SJM/ds

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ✓ SJM

1470

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

84 MAR 15 1976

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

February 26, 1976

1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 19, 1976, Item 6 of which requests access to copies of memoranda or letters between the FBI and IRS regarding the finances of: Fred Hampton, Bobby Rush, the Chicago Black Panther Party, Rev. John Fry and Charles La Paglia.

With respect to Item 6 a review of pertinent FBI files discloses there was only correspondence between the FBI and IRS regarding Bobby Rush. Material responsive to Item 6 has been assembled and is available for review in Room 4171, J. Edgar Hoover Building, by SSC Staff Members.

1 - The Attorney General

VRT:adn
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

WOC

ORIGINAL AND ONE CC TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395-1470

1470

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

ENCLOSURE ~~62-116395-1~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2/26/76

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC). (SSC Letter 1/19/76, Item 6) Black Panther Party.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 3/2/76

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title: Security Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

62 - 116395 - 1470 1470

ENCLOSURE ~~62-116395-14~~

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
2/26/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 1/19/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Access to material regarding correspondence between FBI and IRS concerning Bobby Rush.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/lP

62-116395

SJM:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-18

62-116395-1470

1470

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

~~62-116395-145~~

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 1-19-76

Item 6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

SSC has never reviewed material.
5-27-76
STM/ds.

62-116395-1470

ENCLOSURE

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 3/9/71

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: BOBBY LEE RUSH
RACIAL MATTERS - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

A request to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for uncertified copies of the subject's income tax returns is attached. This information desired for investigative leads.

Rush is presently the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Chicago, Illinois, chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP). He travels extensively to other mid-western cities, as well as the East Coast in connection with organizational activities. He has frequented national headquarters at Oakland, California, and is known to be a courier of funds to the national office. He has instigated rallies and demonstrations in support of Party causes. He has been convicted on unlawful use and illegal possession of firearms in state courts in Champaign and Cook County, Illinois.

As a key black extremist, we need to develop all information of subject's financial sources including his listed property, stocks, bonds, assets and all employments. If you approve, attached memorandum should be returned to Domestic Intelligence Division in order that income tax returns can be obtained and reviewed.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached memorandum be approved requesting Rush's income tax returns for 1968 and 1969.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. G. A. Day
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

DAB:pjc/cal
(6)

OK

REC-10

3-15-71

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY [illegible]

157-

MAR 17 1971

MAR 29 1971

REC-127 157-9301-54

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
March 9, 1971

1 - Mr. G. A. Day
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

BOBBY LEE RUSH

Uncertified copies of income tax returns for 1968 and 1969 are requested for the following individual:

Name:	Bobby Lee Rush
Birth:	11/23/46, Sylvester, Georgia
Residence:	3145 West 16th Street, Chicago, Illinois (as of 12/8/70). 2330 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois (as of 3/69).
Employment:	Part-time writer of articles published Esquire Magazine (as of 3/69). Deputy Minister of Defense, Chicago, Illinois, chapter of Black Panther Party (1970).
Social Security Number:	348-36-3088

It is requested that no active investigation be conducted based solely upon this request.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/1/01 BY SP2ALM/GP

DAB:pjc/cal
(8)

NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan, captioned "Bobby Lee Rush, Racial Matters - Black Panther Party," dated 3/9/71, prepared by DAB:pjc/cal.

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY FURNISHED INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE.

3/15/71

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

52 MAR 22 1971

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOV NMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9304) DATE: 2/25/71

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (157-2832) (P)

SUBJECT: BOBBY LEE RUSH
RM - BPP (KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

(OO: Chicago)

Memo C.D. Brennan from GC Moore 3-5-71 DBB:pfe/lrc

Memo to IRS DBB:pfe/lrc

Enclosed 3/8/71

Re Bureau airtel to Albany, 12/23/70.

The above referenced airtel instructed investigation of a key black extremist to include a check of the subject's Federal Income Tax return. The Bureau is requested to obtain a copy of the 1969 Federal Income Tax return of BOBBY LEE RUSH for review.

RUSH's Social Security Number is 348-36-3088. His wife's name is SANDRA CAROL RUSH. His residences from 1968 to date have been located at 2330 South State Street, Chicago, and 3145 West 16th Street, Chicago.

RUSH was discharged from the United States Army on April 20, 1968. He was employed by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad before becoming Deputy Minister of Information for the Black Panther Party in Chicago on a full-time basis.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

EX 105 157-9304-57

REC-1

8 MAR 1 1971

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Chicago

JPM:nss
(3)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

SAC, Chicago (157-2832) 5/6/71

REC 98

Director, FBI (157-9304) 62

BOBBY LEE RUSH
RACIAL MATTERS - BPP

Enclosed for the Chicago Division is one copy of subject's U. S. individual income tax return for the calendar year 1968.

Enclosure is being forwarded to your division in response to your prior request for such information. You are to insure that this information is used for lead purposes only. Under no circumstances is the information set forth to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

As soon as additional copy of subject's income tax return is received for 1969, same will be forwarded to you.

Enclosure

DAB:dw dw
(4)

NOTE:

Bobby Lee Rush is Minister of Defense, Illinois Chapter, BPP and a Key Black Extremist. Department forwarded Rush's income tax form for 1968 in compliance with request made of them March 11, 1971.

MAILED 6
MAY - 5 1971
FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAY 12 1971

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

US Treasury Department

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: APR 20 [illegible]

In reply refer to: CP:C:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Mardian:

Bobby Rush

In re: Bobby Lee Rush
3145 West 16th Street
Chicago, Illinois
SSN: 348-36-3088

In response to your request of March 11, 1971, we are enclosing a copy of the 1968 income tax return of Bobby L. Rush.

This copy is being furnished for the purpose specified in your letter and with the understanding that it will be treated as confidential in keeping with the disclosure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

We will write you further concerning the 1969 return.

Sincerely,

(Signed) D. W. Bacon

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SD2ALMKP

Enclosure

REC 98

157-9304-62

MCT-24

MAY 6 1971

ENCLOSURE

RACIAL INT. SECT.

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

SAC, Chicago (157-2832)

8/31/71

Director, FBI (157-9304) - 79
ST-102 REC- 66

1 - Chicago Guidance
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

BOBBY LEE RUSH
EM - BPP
(KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

Compliance Division, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), U. S. Department of Treasury, Washington, D. C., has advised their master files show no record of tax returns filed by subject for 1969. They have initiated an investigation to secure any returns which may be due and the Bureau will be advised upon completion of the investigation. Upon receipt of same by the Bureau, Chicago will be advised.

Under no circumstances is the information set forth above to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

DAB:mcm
(5)

NOTE:

Rush is a top leader and national functionary in the Black Panther Party (BPP). As Minister of Defense, Chicago Chapter of BPP, he administrates Midwestern U.S. BPP activities which in the past included attacks on police, bombings, and stockpiling of weapons. Bureau has previously furnished IRS with his complete background. Information from IRS was in response to a request made of them by the Bureau March 9, 1971, through the Attorney General.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

MAILED 3
AUG 30 1971
FBI

Tolson
Felt
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Gale
Ponder
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SEP 3 1971

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Department of the Treasury

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: AUG 12 1971 | In reply refer to: CP:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Mardian:

In re: Bobby Lee Rush 0

Year: 1969

In response to your letter of March 11, 1971, a search of our individual master files shows no record of returns filed by the above for the year indicated. Accordingly, we have asked our field official concerned to initiate an appropriate investigation to secure any returns which may be due.

We will write you further upon completion of the investigation.

Sincerely,

W

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP6ALM/LP

ST-102

5. [illegible]

REC- 66. 157-9307-79

1 cc
804
9 [illegible]

2 AUG 31 1971

1 - Mr. D A. Brumble

X

SAC, Chicago (157-2832) 3/1/72

REC- 45

Director, FBI (157-9304) - 89

BOBBY LEE RUSH 57-105
EM - BPP
(KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

Compliance Division, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), U. S. Department of Treasury, Washington, D. C., has advised an investigation by them did not reveal subject had income in 1969 which would require him to file a tax return.

Under no circumstances is the information set forth above to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

DAB:pag
(4)

NOTE:

Rush is national functionary of Black Panther Party (BPP), directing their Midwestern operations. Information from IRS was in response to a request made of them by the Bureau March 9, 1971, through the Attorney General.

MRR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

MAILED 6
FEB 29 1972
FBI

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes

54 MAR 6 1972

DAB

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Department of the Treasury

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224
Date: FEB 11 1972
In reply refer to:
CP:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

GCM

Dear Mr. Mardian:

In re: Bobby Lee Rush

Year: 1969

This is in further response to your request of March 11, 1971, and supplements our letter of August 12, 1971. Our investigation did not reveal that Bobby Lee Rush had income in 1969 which would require him to file a tax return.

If we can be of further assistance, please let us know.

Sincerely,

(Signed) John F. Hanlon

John F. Hanlon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

ST-105

REC- 45

157-9304-89

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

MAR 1 1972

1-sent to Chicago 45a
DHB; pag 3/1/72

SSC REQUEST 1-19-76

Item 6

FOR ACCESS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/16/01 BY 5P2ALM14

62-116395-1470

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 3/9/71

FROM : G. C. Moore

5-32

SUBJECT: BOBBY LEE RUSH
RACIAL MATTERS - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

A request to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for uncertified copies of the subject's income tax returns is attached. This information desired for investigative leads.

Rush is presently the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Chicago, Illinois, chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP). He travels extensively to other mid-western cities, as well as the East Coast in connection with organizational activities. He has frequented national headquarters at Oakland, California, and is known to be a courier of funds to the national office. He has instigated rallies and demonstrations in support of Party causes. He has been convicted on unlawful use and illegal possession of firearms in state courts in Champaign and Cook County, Illinois.

As a key black extremist, we need to develop all information of subject's financial sources including his listed property, stocks, bonds, assets and all employments. If you approve, attached memorandum should be returned to Domestic Intelligence Division in order that income tax returns can be obtained and reviewed.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached memorandum be approved requesting Rush's income tax returns for 1968 and 1969.

OK

Enclosure

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. G. A. Day
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

REC-10

157-[illegible]304-59

DAB:pjc/cal
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

MAR 17 1971

3-15-71

MAR 29 1971

REC-127 157-9301-57

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
March 9, 1971

1 - Mr. G. A. Day
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

BOBBY LEE RUSH

Uncertified copies of income tax returns for 1968 and 1969 are requested for the following individual:

Name:	Bobby Lee Rush
Birth:	11/23/46, Sylvester, Georgia
Residence:	3145 West 16th Street, Chicago, Illinois (as of 12/8/70). 2330 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois (as of 3/69).
Employment:	Part-time writer of articles published Esquire Magazine (as of 3/69). Deputy Minister of Defense, Chicago, Illinois, chapter of Black Panther Party (1970).
Social Security Number:	348-36-3088

It is requested that no active investigation be conducted based solely upon this request.

DAB:pjc/cal
(8)

NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan, captioned "Bobby Lee Rush, Racial Matters - Black Panther Party," dated 3/9/71, prepared by DAB:pjc/cal.

MAR 22 1971

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY FURNISHED INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/...

3/15/71

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAR 23 1971

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9304) DATE: 2/25/71

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (157-2832) (P)

SUBJECT: BOBBY LEE RUSH
RM - BPP (KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

(OO: Chicago)

Re Bureau airtel to Albany, 12/23/70.

The above referenced airtel instructed investigation of a key black extremist to include a check of the subject's Federal Income Tax return. The Bureau is requested to obtain a copy of the 1969 Federal Income Tax return of BOBBY LEE RUSH for review.

RUSH's Social Security Number is 348-36-3088. His wife's name is SANDRA CAROL RUSH. His residences from 1968 to date have been located at 2330 South State Street, Chicago, and 3145 West 16th Street, Chicago.

RUSH was discharged from the United States Army on April 20, 1968. He was employed by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad before becoming Deputy Minister of Information for the Black Panther Party in Chicago on a full-time basis.

Memo C.D. Brennan from GC Moore 3-5-71 DAB:pf/ca C

Memo to IRS DAB:pf/ca C 3/8/71

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

EX 105 157-9304-57

REC-1

8 MAR 1 1971

② - Bureau (RM)
1 - Chicago

JPM:nss
(3)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

SAC, Chicago (157-2832) 5/6/71

REC 98

Director, FBI (157-9304) 62

BOBBY LEE RUSH
RACIAL MATTERS - BPP

Enclosed for the Chicago Division is one copy of subject's U. S. individual income tax return for the calendar year 1968.

Enclosure is being forwarded to your division in response to your prior request for such information. You are to insure that this information is used for lead purposes only. Under no circumstances is the information set forth to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

As soon as additional copy of subject's income tax return is received for 1969, same will be forwarded to you.

Enclosure

DAB:dw dw
(4)

NOTE:

Bobby Lee Rush is Minister of Defense, Illinois Chapter, BPP and a Key Black Extremist. Department forwarded Rush's income tax form for 1968 in compliance with request made of them March 11, 1971.

MAILED 6
MAY - 5 1971
FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAY 12 1971

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

US Treasury Department

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: APR 20 1971
In reply refer to: CP:C:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Mardian:

Bobby Rush

In re: Bobby Lee Rush
3143 West 16th Street
Chicago, Illinois
SSN: 348-36-3088

In response to your request of March 11, 1971, we are enclosing a copy of the 1968 income tax return of Bobby L. Rush.

This copy is being furnished for the purpose specified in your letter and with the understanding that it will be treated as confidential in keeping with the disclosure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

We will write you further concerning the 1969 return.

Sincerely,

(Signed) D. W. Bacon

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

Enclosure

REC 98

157-9304 62

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY 5?BAUMKP

MCT-24

MAY 6 1971

Let SAC CG
5-6-71
Dec'd

ENCLOSURE

RACIAL INT. SECT.

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

SAC, Chicago (157-2832) 8/31/71

Director, FBI (157-9304) - 79
ST-102 REC- 66

1 - Chicago Guidance
1 - Mr. D. A. Brumble

BOBBY LEE RUSH
EM - BPP
(KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

Compliance Division, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), U. S. Department of Treasury, Washington, D. C., has advised their master files show no record of tax returns filed by subject for 1969. They have initiated an investigation to secure any returns which may be due and the Bureau will be advised upon completion of the investigation. Upon receipt of same by the Bureau, Chicago will be advised.

Under no circumstances is the information set forth above to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

DAB:mcm
(5) mcm

NOTE:

Rush is a top leader and national functionary in the Black Panther Party (BPP). As Minister of Defense, Chicago Chapter of BPP, he administrates Midwestern U.S. BPP activities which in the past included attacks on police, bombings, and stockpiling of weapons. Bureau has previously furnished IRS with his complete background. Information from IRS was in response to a request made of them by the Bureau March 9, 1971, through the Attorney General.

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAILED 3
AUG 30 1971
FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

SEP 3 1971

93

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Department of the Treasury

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: AUG 12 1971
In reply refer to: CP:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Mardian:

In re: Bobby Lee Rush

Year: 1969

In response to your letter of March 11, 1971, a search of our individual master files shows no record of returns filed by the above for the year indicated. Accordingly, we have asked our field official concerned to initiate an appropriate investigation to secure any returns which may be due.

We will write you further upon completion of the investigation.

Sincerely,

D. W. Bacon

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM KP

ST-102

REC- 66 157-9304-79

1 cc 80J 6xID

2 AUG 31 1971

1 - Mr. D A. Brumble

SAC, Chicago (157-2832) 3/1/72

REC- 45

Director, FBI (157-9304) - 89

BOBBY LEE RUSH ST-105
EM - BPP
(KEY BLACK EXTREMIST)

Compliance Division, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), U. S. Department of Treasury, Washington, D. C., has advised an investigation by them did not reveal subject had income in 1969 which would require him to file a tax return.

Under no circumstances is the information set forth above to be disseminated outside the Bureau and is not to be included in any item to be disseminated at a future date.

DAB:pag
(4)

NOTE:

Rush is national functionary of Black Panther Party (BPP), directing their Midwestern operations. Information from IRS was in response to a request made of them by the Bureau March 9, 1971, through the Attorney General.

MRR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/16/01 BY 5/30/MVP

MAILED 6
FEB 29 1972
FBI

Mr. Tolson ____
Mr. Felt ____
Mr. Rosen ____
Mr. Mohr ____
Mr. Bishop ____
Mr. Miller, E.S. ____
Mr. Callahan ____
Mr. Casper ____
Mr. Conrad ____
Mr. Dalbey ____
Mr. Cleveland ____
Mr. Ponder ____
Mr. Bates ____
Mr. Waikart ____
Mr. Walters ____
Mr. Soyars ____
Tele. Room ____
Miss Holmes ____

MAR 6 1972

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DAB

Department of the Treasury

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: FEB 11 1972

In reply refer to:

CP:D

Honorable Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Mardian:

In re: Bobby Lee Rush

Year: 1969

GCM

This is in further response to your request of March 11, 1971, and supplements our letter of August 12, 1971. Our investigation did not reveal that Bobby Lee Rush had income in 1969 which would require him to file a tax return.

If we can be of further assistance, please let us know.

W

Sincerely,

(Signed) John F. Hanlon

John F. Hanlon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

ST-105

157-9304-89

REC- 45

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/CP

5-

MAR 1 1972

1-cc to Chicago
DHB:pap 3/1/72

Interspec, Inc.
SUITE 310
1120 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

202-347-1958

ROBERT L. SHORTLEY
PRESIDENT

March 3, 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

16

Honorable Clarence M. Kelley
Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

°Senstudy

Dear Mr. Kelley:

I previously forwarded a copy of my letter of December 9, 1975 to Senator Frank Church regarding the work of the Select Committee on Intelligence activites.

I thought you might be interested in his undated reply I received last week.

Kindest regards,

R. L. Shortley

RLS:js
Encl.

MAR 9 1976

30

67-223447-

62-116395-1469

[illegible] RECORDED
170 MAR 10 1976

11
9 MAR ~~9~~ 1976

File 67-223447

8 4 MAR 1 1 1976

EIGHT

THREE

SIX

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

Dear Concerned Citizen:

Thank you for sharing your thoughts with me regarding the work of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. I am sorry to learn that you are unable to endorse the Committee's investigation and the efforts which have been undertaken to strengthen the Nation's intelligence agencies through closer definitions of their legal authority and areas of legitimate operation.

One of the possible abuses under investigation is the violation of the First and Fourth Amendment rights of Americans under the Constitution and Bill of Rights. The American system of government is unique in that it not only permits, but encourages, its citizens to voice their views on important issues. One of the rights we are trying to protect is your right to express your thoughts to me, either over the telephone or through the mails, without having your message intercepted or recorded by unauthorized persons. Highly sophisticated equipment now makes it possible to turn our surveillance techniques, which were originally designed to intercept foreign transmissions, inward against ourselves. It is important that provision be made for the lawful use of this capability, and that protection be assured our own citizens who could become the unwitting victims of this unconstitutional but nevertheless powerful surveillance technology.

I want to take this opportunity to assure you that the Committee's purpose is not, as some have suggested, to destroy, degrade, or even disrupt the legitimate functions of the intelligence gathering and law enforcement agencies of the United States. On the contrary, its purpose is to fortify these valid and vital areas of operation. However, we do intend to identify abuses or patterns of abuses which are clearly unlawful and take action to prevent their recurrence, whether they involve individuals or nations. We as individuals must live within the law; so must our Government and its agencies.

I appreciate your taking the time to write to me, and trust that the ultimate outcome of this investigation will strengthen the faith of our people in the integrity of their Government.

With all kind wishes.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1469

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General February 23, 1976

Director, FBI 62-116395-1467

REC-104

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 5, 1976, as modified during a meeting on February 12, 1976, between John T. Elliff, SSC Staff Member, and Steven K. Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which constitutes this Bureau's response to the above request.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (5)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

KAM:en
(9)

3 ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

WRW/TWL

PLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

"TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS."

Delivered [illegible] 2/24/76

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

MAR 15 1976

2 - M[illegible] J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

62-116395 February 23, 1976

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 5, 1976, as modified during a meeting on February 12, 1976, between John T. Elliff, SSC Staff Member, and Steven K. Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice.

In accordance with the agreement between Messrs. Elliff and Blackhurst, the SSC request of February 5, 1976, has been limited only to documents pertaining to Attorney General authorization for electronic surveillance directed toward organizations engaged in preparations for the fall of 1969 "March on Washington."

A review of Bureau files indicated three organizations were targeted for such coverage. These organizations were the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC), the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC), and the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC).

Attached are unexcised copies of the Attorney General authorizations, with the exception of the authorization dated November 7, 1969, for these electronic surveillances. Page two of the November 7, 1969, communication contains a deletion pertaining to the identity of targets of electronic surveillance not concerned with this subject matter. This deletion was approved during the meeting February 12, 1976, mentioned above.

Enclosures (3)

1 - The Attorney General

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

KAM:en
(8)

62-116395-1467

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE:

Copies of SSC request and Attorney General authorizations attached for information. SSC requested copies of documents in form suitable for public release as part of SSC report.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2-23-76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
(SSC letter 2-5-76)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 2/27/76

Received by:

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1467

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

2/23/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒	SSC
☐	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 2/5/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence Collection
Information Handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Material regarding Attorney General authorization for electronic surveillance directed at organizations engaged in preparations for 1969 "March on Washington."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1467

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 6 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mike

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

O Sensitivity

SUBJECT: SSC Request Dated February 5, 1976

Attached is a letter from the SSC dated February 5, 1976. Please arrange for an appropriate response.

REC-104 62-116395-1467

7 MAR 10 1976

4 ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

COUNSEL

cc: Paul Daly

FILE

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]NN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, [illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MAT[illegible]R., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible]A.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. [illegible]. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 5, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Select Committee requests delivery in unexcised form of the materials pertaining to the authorization of and recommendation for electronic surveillance directed in the fall of 1969 at organizations engaged in preparations for the "March on Washington" to protest the Vietnam War. The Select Committee also desires that this material be provided in a form suitable for public release as part of the Committee's report.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS DECLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

RECEIVED
FEB 5 1976

62-116395-1467

ENCLOSURE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Walters
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1969

TO: J. Edgar Hoover

FROM: John N. Mitchell

RE: Fall Offensive Against the War in Vietnam
November 12-16, 1969
Internal Security - Miscellaneous

With respect to the attached approval, I request that you follow prior directions concerning conversations relating to the attorney-client relationship of the parties involved in the Chicago conspiracy trial.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALM/CP

62-116395-1467

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 5, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

**RE: FALL OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM
NOVEMBER 12-16, 1969
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS**

The New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) is coordinating efforts for a massive antiwar manifestation to take place in Washington, D. C., November 12-16, 1969. This group maintains a Washington, D. C., office at 1029 Vermont Avenue, Northwest, where the planning takes place.

This demonstration could possibly attract the largest number of demonstrators ever to assemble in Washington, D. C. The large number is cause for major concern should violence of any type break out. It is necessary for this Bureau to keep abreast of events as they occur, and we feel that in this instance advance knowledge of plans and possible areas of confrontation would be most advantageous to our coverage and to the safety of individuals and property. Accordingly, we are requesting authorization to install a telephone surveillance on the Washington office of the NMC.

Interception will be made without trespass and maximum security will be guaranteed. Because of extensive contacts of the organization involved, it cannot be anticipated whether individuals who are or may be placed under an active investigation for possible criminal violations will be overheard by this coverage.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/16/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

APPROVED

DATE 11/6/69

1467

62-116395

XGDS ~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automat~~ic
~~downgrading and~~
d~~eclassification~~

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 7, 1969

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/6/01 BY SP2ALMKP

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: FALL OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM
NOVEMBER 12-16, 1969
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

The New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) is sponsoring a massive antiwar manifestation to take place in Washington, D. C., on November 12-16, 1969. The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) and the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC) are closely coordinating their efforts with NMC in organizing the demonstration. NMC, SMC and VMC occupy adjoining office space at 1029 Vermont Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

SMC is completely dominated and controlled by the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). The VMC has recently endorsed fully the activities of NMC concerning the upcoming antiwar demonstration.

This demonstration could possibly attract the largest number of demonstrators ever to assemble in Washington, D. C., which is cause for major concern should violence of any type break out. It is necessary for this Bureau to keep abreast of events as they occur, and we feel advance knowledge of plans and possible areas of confrontation during the demonstration would be most advantageous to our coverage and to the safety of individuals and property.

We have separately requested authorization to install a telephone surveillance on the office of NMC. To further implement our coverage, we are requesting authorization to install telephone surveillances on the offices of SMC and VMC.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1467

~~GROUP~~ 1
~~Excluded from~~ automatic
~~[illegible]~~d

Memorandum for the Attorney General

Interception will be made without trespass and maximum security will be guaranteed. Because of extensive contacts of the organizations involved, it cannot be anticipated whether individuals who are or may be placed under an active investigation for possible criminal violations will be overheard by this coverage.

In accordance with my policy of keeping to an absolute minimum the number of such installations, I am ordering the discontinuance of this coverage on (Progressive Labor Party functionaries Fred Jerome, San Francisco, California, and Walter Linder, New York, New York.) Separate communications will be forwarded to you in this regard.

Deleted ✓. organizations and individuals not of interest to this subject matter

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 4/11/69

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

REC-104

February 27, 1976

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI 62-116395-1466

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Mr. Fred H. Hall of Plantation, Florida, formerly employed by the FBI and subsequently by the Central Intelligence Agency, from which Agency he retired about six years ago, has made available to this Bureau a copy of a letter he wrote a short while ago to Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the SSC. Hall also sent a copy of his letter to Congressman Otis G. Pike, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

I thought you would be interested in Mr. Hall's observations and am therefore enclosing a copy of his letter.

Enclosure

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM/

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116464 (Houstudy)
1 - 67- (Personnel file former SA Fred H. Hall)

SFP:mjg
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NOTE:

Hall furnished the copy of his letter to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. Phillips and Hall have been close friends for many years and Hall made the letter available on a recent visit of Phillips to Florida. Hall indicated that Phillips could feel free to show it to anyone who may want to see it. The letter is very critical of the activities of both the Senate and House Select Committees.

TO BE HAND DELIVERED BY OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

woc/8

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 11 1976

✓ SF Phillips 4063 JEH

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

Dear Seymour:
Attached is sent per your request. Feel free to show it to anyone you may want to see it. I wrote it and am not ashamed of it.

I enjoyed the golf game. I just hope that the next time you come to our area I can have you out to dinner.

Sincerely
Fred Hall

yellow

62-116464-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM

REC-104 62-116395-1406

7 MAR 8 1976

NOT RECORDED COPY FILED IN

ENCLOSURE

C_O_P_Y

Hon. Frank Church
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sen. Church:

By way of background, I served honorably with both the Federal Bureau of Inve igation and the Central Intelligence Agency for a combined total of over 33 years. I am proud of my service with each agency and I feel that my activities were quite worthwhile and in the national interest. I am a graduate of George Washington University Law School and a member of the bar. I am now retired.

As an interested and intellectually curious citizen, I have been reading accounts in the public press concerning the activities of the committee which you happen to chair and of the House Committee which Rep. Otis Pike happens to chair, both dealing with the U.S. investigative and intelligence programs. Briefly stated, I am totally nauseated by the irresponsible way in which both of you demand highly sensitive and classified data which seems to be publicized soon after you get it. It is my opinion and that of many friends that your committee are effectively destroying the credibility of these agencies and making impossible their effective performance in the future.

Before going further, let me state that I do not condone irregularities, improprieties or illegalities by either agency in their normal, routine activities but I do see the justification, in serious security or Mafia like criminal activities, for certain "extracurricular" activities to achieve needed ends and I think that the Congress should quietly recognize such, with reasonable controls. You should be proud and complimentary, for instance in my opinion, about the highly publicized and often misrepresented mail intercept program when you stop to realize that it was confined to mail to and from Russia and, insofar as I read, the results were given appropriate safeguards.

I have no objection to having some type of scrutiny and supervision of these agencies by some well qualified and impartial panel and I do not object to having appropriate administrative action taken against offending employees and officials, if their rights are protected. What I do strongly object to is the pathetically inept and horrendously damaging procedures whereby your inquiries on sensitive matters are regularly reported, sometimes incompletely and for apparent political reasons. It just seems to me that someone connected with your committees is afflicted with political "diarrhea of the mouth" which impels them to babble without regard to common sense or the welfare of our intelligence programs and, as I read the press, you two gentlemen both have this weakness.

I am sure that the intelligence organizations of all major nations make some mistakes. But have you ever seen the British, the French, the Russians, the Germans, the Israeli or the Japanese governments conduct such a "three ring circus" on sensitive matters as you men are doing to your everlasting discredit? I am sure also that we are the laughing stock of all the above enumerated nations. What foreign official will entrust sensitive and confidential data to U.S. intelligence agents in the foreseeable future when he knows that he may soo see his data publicized because of some misguided Congressional activity? I very sincerely feel that strong administrative and/or criminal action should be taken in any cases where either or both of your committees and/or their personnel have been the vehicle for embarrassing or damaging the U.S. by actions which resulted in confidential data being reported.

In order that there be no misunderstanding, this letter represents nothing more than my very sincere conviction of great personal contempt and disgust with the way in which you and your committees have done a great disservice to the United States by sadly mishandling your responsibilities to these agencies and to our nation.

Sincerely,

cc: Rep. Otis G. Pike
House Intelligence Committee
Washington, D.C.

FRED H. HALL
6903 Cypress Road, C-21
Plantation, Fla. 333[illegible]7

cc DAK

Ltr to AG 2/27/76
SFP/mjs
encl.

5' Phillips

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Daly
March 3, 1976
1 - Mr. Leavitt
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division

Director, FBI

0 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed is a letter from Special Agent Seymor Fred Phillips to the Attorney General, dated March 1, 1976, in which Mr. Phillips requests the Department of Justice to provide him with legal counsel in connection with a request from the Senate Select Committee for an interview under oath concerning the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., and related matters.

Since Special Agent Phillips' involvement in the subject matter of the interview arose out of his duties as a Special Agent of the FBI, I recommend his request be granted.

Enclosure

JDM:clh
(8) clh

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

REC 104 62-116395-1465

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM/CP

5 MAR 4 1976

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

To be hand-delivered by the Office of Congressional Affairs.

PCM

XEROX
MAR 9 1976

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

PERS. REC. UNIT

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 MAR 15 1976

March 1, 1976

Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities has requested that I voluntarily appear before its representatives for an interview under oath concerning the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., and related matters.

In connection with the interview, I respectfully request that the Department of Justice provide me with legal counsel.

Respectfully,

Seymor Fred Phillips
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

1 XEROX

MAR 9 1976

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATI
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 21 1976

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓ ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 010 SE PLAIN

11:10 PM NITEL FEBRUARY 20, 1976 GW

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

110 FROM SEATTLE (66-2894) 1P

0

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL FEBRUARY 19, 1976.

FORMER SA LEROY W. SHEETS CONTACTED TELEPHONICALLY BY ASAC J.D. PRINGLE, FEBRUARY 20, 1976 AND ADVISED OF CONTENTS OF RETEL.

SHEETS STATED HE WILL CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL FIRST PART OF WEEK BEGINNING FEBRUARY 23, 1976 TO OBTAIN DETAILS OF INTERVIEW BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBERS.

E N D

HOLD

REC-110 62-116395-1463

7 MAR 9 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM/

84 MAR 11 1976

1 - Mr. [illegible]. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

February 20, 1976

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
(Attn: Mr. J. W. Dalseg)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 9, 1975, requesting material relating to electronic surveillance of the so-called "Kissinger-17," and Department letter to the SSC dated July 15, 1975, captioned "Access/Delivery of Documents Requested in Senate Select Committee Letter of July 9, 1975."

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum with enclosed summary, which is responsive to referenced SSC request. A copy of this memorandum, with enclosure, is being furnished for your records.

It is being left to the decision of the Department as to whether approval of the White House and/or the Judiciary should be obtained prior to enclosed summary being referred to the SSC.

ENCLOSURE

REC-110 62-116395-1462

7 MAR 9 1976

This is also to confirm a telephone conversation on February 18, 1976, between Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff of this Bureau and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, whereby Mr. Shaheen stated that excisions from the summary, for reasons of privacy, should be the responsibility of the SSC.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

TJM:dmt/lhb/hb
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Delivered
Dept 2/24/76

84 MAR 11 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
(Attn: Mr. J. W. Dalseg)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

62-116395

February 20, 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR MATERIAL RELATING TO
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF
"KISSINGER-17"

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 9, 1975, page three, paragraph two, subsection A, requesting materials in Bureau files relating to electronic surveillance of the so-called "Kissinger-17," and Department letter to the SSC dated July 15, 1975, captioned "Access/Delivery of Documents Requested in Senate Select Committee Letter of July 9, 1975," which letter sets forth arrangements that had been agreed upon on July 11, 1975, by representatives of the Department of Justice and the SSC concerning the manner in which the Bureau will respond to the above.

In accordance with the above agreement, SSC Staff Member James Dick on February 18, 1976, appeared at FBI Headquarters and prepared a longhand summary based on his review of material relating to the so-called "Kissinger-17." Mr. Dick requested that his summary be approved by appropriate officials and forwarded to the SSC on an expedite basis.

Attached is the original of the above summary prepared by Mr. Dick in his handwriting. In accordance with prior request of the SSC, excisions from the summary, for reasons of privacy, have not been made by this Bureau, but are being considered the responsibility of the SSC.

Enclosure   ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

1 - The Attorney General

TJM:dmt/1hb 1hb (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-116

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR MATERIAL RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF "KISSINGER-17"

NOTE:

The above agreement referred to in referenced Department letter states that material in FBI files relating to the "Kissinger-17" surveillance would be made available for review to SSC personnel at FBIHQ. These personnel may take such notes as deemed appropriate which notes were to be left in secure location at FBIHQ during the time the SSC study was in progress. When the study was completed, the SSC was to prepare a summary of the information considered appropriate for Committee use. The summary would be checked to ensure the protection of national security matters, protection of confidential sources of information and observation of privacy considerations. Thereafter, the approved summary would be furnished to the Committee and Staff notes destroyed. Mr. Dick on July 16 and 17, 1975, reviewed the material relating to the "Kissinger-17" and left his notes in possession of Bureau personnel. On 2/17/76, Mr. Dick requested permission to return to FBIHQ to review the above notes and prepare his summary which he did on 2/18/76. The summary prepared by Mr. Dick can be placed into two categories: (a) Political or personal information obtained from the tesurs which was disseminated to individuals at the White House and (b) a list of the targets and the dates the coverage was in operation for each target comprising the "Kissinger-17." Review of this summary indicates that no confidential sources of this Bureau are jeopardized, and there appears to be no jeopardy to national security matters. Regarding the latter, however, it is felt that the White House would be in the best position to pass final judgement in this matter.

It is to be noted that the matter of tesur coverage of some members of the "Kissinger-17" is currently in litigation.

The following notes were taken by James Dick, Senate Select Committee Staff, on February 18, 1976, based on a review of the file on the seventeen wiretaps which occurred between May 1969 and February 1971. These notes contain two types of summaries: (a) essentially political or personal information which was ~~o[illegible]~~ obtained from the wiretaps and disseminated to Henry Kissinger, John Ehrlichman, H. R. Haldeman, and/or President Nixon, and (b) a list of the targets and the dates the coverage was in operation for each.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY [illegible]

62-116395-1442
ENCLOSURE

①

~~Bur~~
~~Lengths of each tap~~
~~Pers. / Pol.~~
~~SG overhear~~

Nixon dissem — 7/18/69

Brandon told friend "is clear the Admin. will win on the ABM by a two vote margin. He [B] said, 'they've got Williams + they've got Magnuson.'" ~~Friend~~ Friend told B. that Sen. Kennedy "planned to spend the weekend w/ Robt Packwood ..." But B uncertain, when asked, ~~as to~~ how Kenn. wld vote on ABM

Ehrlich dissem ~~7/25/69~~ 7/25/69

One target contacted a stewardess "and ~~apologiz~~ apologized for drinking too much the previous evening. She concurred that he drinks too much + also suggested he cut his hair."

Ehrl. dissem 7/28/69

Friend told one target that "much of what is being said now about what the Pres has done in the WH or looking ahead to do is based on the conviction that Mitchell has a strategic view of Nixon's role that involves the South."

Ehrl. dissem. 7/31/69

"Display of affection bet. woman (not his wife) + one target

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-146

Ehrl. - 9/18/69

Sears' intent to write an art. for Harper's & his possibly managing a pol. campaign for a Repub. gubernatorial candidate in mid-west

Kiss - 10/10/69

Kalb's wife said he told her Time & Newsweek were fed up w/ current admin. & are "jumping on the Pres." ..."She further stated that the 'big news' is that the Republicans are acknowledging the President's failures & that journalists are becoming open in their criticism of him."

Nixon 10/9/69

"Halp. recently ~~stated~~ that he ~~is~~ was to spend an hour w/ Kennedy's Vietnam man, as Kennedy is giving a speech on the 15th."

Nixon - 10/24/69

Re: Brandon preparing an art. entitled "How the Gilt Came Off Nixon's Gingerbread" for London Sunday Times

Kiss 12/2/69

Bran. talked w/ [redacted], who said Birch Bayh is in trouble bec. of Haynsworth confirmation

Kiss 12/3/69

Bran. said Sen Fulbright postponed hearings on Vietnam bec felt they wldn't be popular

Kiss 12/29/69

Clifford's art. in Life

Nixon - 2/2/70

Bran. re: ~~At~~ contact w/ NYT reporter discussed Arthur Burns & his plans to ease credit restrictions

Kis. 2/17/70

Bran. re: contact w/ friend who said McGeo. Bundy "was in 'hot water' "bec he let it be known that Ford Foundation is supporting 'washed up' Democrats"

Kis 2/26/70

Bran. - Brinkley (NBC) tld B "was very depressed over having been 'singled out' by the Vice Pres."

Nixon - 5/11/70

Mrs. Bran. said Hickel had only gotten to see Nixon twice & K. wldn't be welcomed back to Harvard

Hald. - 5/18/70

Halp. said he'd rec'd a copy of Muskie's resolution on the war & agrees to lobby for it

Friend told Pursley he was going to see if Sen JS Cooper will "buy 'a new amendment' & ~~that~~ "they" are going to meet w/ Sen Mansfield

Hald 6/2/70.
Halp said Sen Mathias had talked to Mansfield concerning a meeting + Halp sent an art to friend at Brookings Instit described as "the Muskie thing."
Friend of Lake's said Star planned to do an art. crit. of Kissinger

Hald 6/23/70
Halp agreed to talk to Sen Cotton + Sen Pearson on Cambodia — friend describ Sen Cotton as 'marginal' on the Church-Cooper amendment but said H's talk cld make Pearson favor it

Hald 6/25/70
Bran. tells Potter Stewart is doing an art on whether black rads can get fair trial + makes arrangements to discuss it w/ him

Hald 7/7/70
Friend tells Lake "that the Admin. of NYC needs help..."
Lakes tells friend Shriver is going to do a lot of fund raising for ~~[illegible]~~. cong. candidates"

Hald 7/10/70
Bran. talked to author of a bk on "southern strategy" abt bk.

Hald 9/4/70
Lake tells friend he ~~[illegible]~~ helped Shriver

re ~~speech~~ press release crit. a recent speech by Nixon attacking certain congressmen

Hald - 9/23/70

Wife of ~~one target~~ tells her mother ~~that~~ target had been drinking a lot ~~lately~~

Kiss - 11/3/70

Sonnen. called Kiss. "stupid"

Lake discussed Nixon's. 1970 campaign strat. w/. a friend

Hald 11/13/70

Friend of Halp's tells him Kennedy will prob. run in '72

Hald 11/24/70

Lake re Mondale in a dilemma over trade bill

Hald 12/11/70

Lake ~ Mondale thinks Nixon beatable ~ said friend of his is writing an art. blasting Mayor Lindsay

Hald 12/17/70

Plans of McLanes over Christmas

Hald 12/18/70

WH aid target tells brother he didn't understand appt. of Bush to UN

Hald 12/22/70

Harriman tells Bean he'd talked to LBJ + "that Johnson wld not back Sen. Muskie for the Presidency as he intended to stay out of politics."

Held 12/28/70
Re: Muskie's trip to USSR
Held 1/22/71
Mrs Bran disc'd Kennedy's defeat as Whip to Byrd

~~Pursley discon'd – 5/27/69~~ ~~[illegible]~~
~~Moose " – 6/20/69~~
~~Sneider " – "~~
~~Sonnen " – "~~
~~Smith " – 8/31/69~~
~~Davidson " – 9/15/69~~
~~Safire " – "~~
~~Sears " – 10/2/69~~
~~McLane " – 1/27/71~~

Source: Memo from TJ Smith to ES Miller 5/25/73

Beecher	5/4/70 – 2/10/71	✓
Brandon	5/29/69 – 2/10/71	✓
Davidson	5/12/69 – 9/15/69	✓
Halb	5/9/69 – 2/10/71	✓
Kalb	9/10/69 – 11/4/69	–
Lake	5/13/70 – 2/10/71	✓
Lord	5/13/70 – 2/10/71	✓
McLane	12/14/70 – 1/27/71	⊖
Moose	5/20/69 – 6/20/69	⊖
Pederson	5/4/70 – 2/10/71	✓
Pursley	5/12/69 – 5/27/69 and 5/4/70 – 2/10/71	
Smith	6/4/69 – 9/1/69	⊖
Safire	8/4/69 – 9/15/69	⊖
Sneider	5/20/69 – 6/20/69	⊖

Sears - 7/23/69 - 10/2/69

Sonnen - 5/12/69 - 6/20/69 and 10/19/70 - 2/10/71

Sell - 5/4/70 - 2/10/71 ✓

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2/20/76

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). (SSC Letter 7/9/76, page 3, pargraph 2, subsection A; Dept letter 7/15/76)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 2/27/76

Received by:

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/20/01 BY SP2ALM/BP

62-116395-146

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

2/20/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosure

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 7/9/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information Handling
Surveillance

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Original of handwritten notes of SSC Staff Member James Dick relating to so-called "Kissinger 17."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb (4) **ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.**

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1463

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

The Attorney General

February 27, 1976

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated November 7, 1975, the SSC submitted 19 Questions concerning the disappearance of Mr. Thomas Riha for response by the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which is in response to the Committee's questions as contained in referenced communication.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

62-116395-1461

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

4 ENCLOSURE

7 MAR 9 1976

RLM:emj
(9)

"TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS"

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 11 1976

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/CP

RLM

WOC/8

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

62-116395

February 27, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter to the U. S. Department of Justice dated November 7, 1975, submitting 19 questions concerning the disappearance of Mr. Thomas Riha to be answered by the FBI.

The SSC requested that answers to these questions be provided in both classified and nonclassified forms. Pursuant to this request the FBI has prepared nonclassified answers to all questions. There was no need to prepare answers in a classified form.

It is to be noted that on June 13, 1975, and November 21, 1975, the SSC was furnished with documents relating to various questions proposed by the SSC concerning the disappearance of Thomas Riha. With the submission on November 21, 1975, the enclosures represented the entire information available at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), including the Identification Division, with reference to this matter. Any document now being furnished to you was obtained from the Denver Office of the FBI and was not previously available at FBIHQ.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

"TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS"

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

SEE NOTE, PAGE ELEVEN

RLM:emj
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NDR-16 1/17/01
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/ALM/KP 60267-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

WRW/

JPT

RLM.

WOC/

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1401

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1. Question: Does the FBI know the whereabouts of Riha--whether he is alive or dead? Where?

Answer: The FBI does not know the whereabouts of Riha or whether he is alive or dead.

2. Question: Was Riha known to the Agency? If so, when first known and why?

Answer: All information relating to the FBI's knowledge of Riha has been previously furnished to the SSC. The first communication pertaining to Riha was a memorandum from CIA dated October 27, 1958. This memorandum was furnished the SSC on June 13, 1975.

3. Question: Was Riha employed by FBI? If so, in what capacity? Dates of employment?

Answer: Riha was not employed by the FBI.

4. Question: In March or April 1969 or thereafter, did Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum of Denver and Boulder, Colorado, contact the FBI in Colorado or Washington to assure the FBI that missing University of Colorado Professor Thomas Riha was alive and well and had left his home for personal reasons on March 15, 1969? If so, who in the FBI received this information and to whom was this information passed on in the FBI and the CIA? When was this done?

Answer: Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum did not contact the FBI in March or April, 1969, for any reason. On May 14, 1969, she was contacted by Special Agents of the FBI at her residence in Denver, Colorado, in connection with an investigation involving charges that she had impersonated an officer of the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. There is no record that Riha was discussed during this contact. A letter from the Denver Office of the FBI dated February 12, 1970, reported that on January 28, 1970, she was interviewed by Special Agents of the FBI at Boulder City Jail, Boulder, Colorado, at which time she offered the opinion that Riha had decided to leave Boulder due to marital difficulties and personal clashes with other members of the faculty at the University of Colorado. She listed a number of telephonic and personal contacts she had had with him subsequent to March, 1969.

The communication reporting the May 14, 1969, contact does not list the names of the Special Agents who contacted her, however, the communication was prepared by Special Agent Merrill R. Smith. At that time Special Agent Smith and Special Agent J. Hale McMenamin were the only Agents assigned at Boulder, Colorado. As the SSC was previously advised on November 21, 1975, the January 22, 1970, communication from Denver FBI to FBIHQ could not be located and therefore it cannot be determined who at FBIHQ received it or if the information was passed to CIA.

The letter from the Denver Office to FBIHQ on February 12, 1970, was initialed by a case supervisor in the General Investigative Division and a case supervisor in the Intelligence Division. Other than the information following in response to question number 5, there is no indication that the information was passed to CIA.

5. Question: Was this or other information passed on by the FBI to the CIA or to other agencies and the Denver and Boulder police? What was the information conveyed? When was this done?

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Answer: The report of the interview of Tannenbaum on January 28, 1970, was included in a memorandum which was furnished to FBIHQ by communication from Denver dated February 12, 1970, captioned "Galya Tannenbaum, aka, Impersonation." The memorandum was disseminated at FBIHQ to CIA, Secret Service, State Department, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Defense Intelligence Agency. The memorandum was furnished to the U. S. Attorney, Denver, Colorado, by the Denver FBI Office. There is no indication that the information was passed to the Denver or Boulder police.

6. Question: Why did FBI say in 1969 and 1970--and continues to say now--that it conducted no investigation of Riha's disappearance when it is known that FBI agents talked in 1969 and 1970 with friends of Riha about his disappearance?

Answer: The FBI said in 1969 and 1970 and continues to say now that it conducted no investigation of Riha's disappearance because from the outset of his disappearance to now, the FBI has never conducted any investigation into the disappearance of Thomas Riha. Reference is made to the third, fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of Denver FBI letter to the Director dated February 12, 1970, supra, previously furnished to the SSC on November 21, 1975, which read as follows: "All persons interviewed in this investigation were specifically advised by interviewing Agents that the purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether Galya Tannenbaum had in any way violated Federal statutes concerning impersonation. Interviewees were specifically advised investigation was not in any way connected with the dissapearance of Thomas Riha, a currently missing Assistant Professor of History at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.

"This statement was made to interviewees because the Denver Office has received inquiries by news media concerning Riha's disappearance and they have been specifically advised there is no evidence relating to his disappearance showing any violation of Federal law over which this Bureau has jurisdiction. The circumstances of his disappearance suggest a missing person situation and that investigation is being handled by the Boulder Police Department.

"Because of the close personal relationship between Tannenbaum and Riha, it would be possible, without the above statement by interviewing Agents, that interviewees could gain the impression the FBI is investigating the disappearance instead of the impersonation of a Federal officer by Tannenbaum.

"Pursuant to current Bureau instructions, this office is not and has not conducted any investigation concerning Riha."

7. Question: Why, in January or February 1970, did an FBI agent at the Denver office refuse to accompany CIA Agent Michael Todorovich from Boulder to see then Denver District Attorney Mike McKevitt? Was it made known by the CIA agent that the purpose of the visit was to ease the pressure on issuance of a subpoena to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former president of the University of Colorado? (Under such a subpoena, Smiley might have been required to reveal the agency that had given him the April 1969 report that Riha was alive and well at that time.)

Answer: The only information with reference to the contact between former Special Agent in Charge Scott J. Werner and CIA agent Mike Todorovich is contained in Denver FBI letter to Director dated February 12, 1970, captioned "Thomas Riha," previously furnished to the SSC on June 13, 1975.

8. Question: In December 1969, when Riha's dying mother, Dr. Ruth Ann Cook of Taunus, West Germany, contacted the FBI in Washington about her missing son, she was very anxious to "do anything" to determine where he was and what had happened to him. Yet the FBI (J. Edgar Hoover) said in December 1969, that Mrs. Cook declined the FBI's offer to place a missing persons notice on Riha in the FBI bulletin. What information did the FBI furnish Mrs. Cook to lead her to make this unlikely decision not to pursue all possible ways to find out what happened to her son?

Answer: All reports of communications between Dr. Ruth Ann Cook, mother of Thomas Riha, and the FBI, were furnished to the SSC on November 21, 1975.

9. Question: Was Dr. Cook connected with the FBI in any way at any time? In what capacity? When?

Answer: Dr. Cook was not connected with the FBI in any way at any time.

10. Question: Was Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum ever employed by the FBI? For what purpose or purposes? Was she hired to check on Leonard Carlin, Chicago attorney who was active in defending antiwar activists in the 1960s?

Answer: Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum was never employed by the FBI. She was not hired to check on Leonard Carlin, Chicago attorney.

11. Question: Was Mrs. Tannenbaum sent by the FBI from Chicago to the Boulder-Denver, Colorado, area in 1968 to check on Riha or on Boulder attorney Dennis Blewitt, who later became Riha's attorney and confidant?

Answer: Mrs. Tannenbaum was not sent by the FBI from Chicago to the Boulder-Denver, Colorado, area in 1968 for any reason.

12. Question: What knowledge does the FBI have on Riha's translations of Czechoslovakian tapes for Mrs. Tannenbaum in March 1969, before he disappeared?

Answer: The FBI does not have any knowledge regarding Riha's translations of Czechoslovakian tapes for Mrs. Tannenbaum.

13. Question: What knowledge does the FBI have on Tannenbaum's reported suicide at the Colorado State Hospital in March 1971? Is the FBI acquainted directly or indirectly with Henry Madrid, a technician at the hospital?

Answer: The only knowledge the FBI has concerning Tannenbaum's reported suicide at the Colorado State Hospital in March, 1971, was obtained from newspaper clippings previously furnished to the SSC on November 21, 1975. The FBI is not acquainted directly or indirectly with Henry Madrid, a technician at the hospital, other than through his mention in the above newspaper clippings.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

14. Question: Did the FBI contact the Colorado Bureau of Investigation at any time on the Riha disappearance, Mrs. Tannenbaum's death or any other aspect of the Riha-Tannenbaum case? If so, when were these contacts and what was their extent?

Answer: There is no record that the FBI contacted the Colorado Bureau of Investigation at any time on these matters.

15. Question: Did the FBI have any contacts with Riha when he was working as an interpreter in the Army in the early 1950s?

Answer: There is no record that the FBI had any contact with Riha while he was in the Army in the early 1950s.

16. Question: Does the FBI have files on any of the following persons, or were any of them at any time employed by the FBI directly or indirectly or contacted by the FBI, and for what reason?

Mrs. Jan (Kenneth) Sorensen - Boulder, Colorado
Zdenek Cerveny - Boulder, Colorado
Mrs. Carol Word - Littleton, Colorado
George and Francesca Stein - Lyons, Colorado
Professor Donald Fanger - Cambridge, Massachusetts
Henry Madrid - Pueblo, Colorado
Professor Stephen Fischer-Galati - Boulder, Colorado
Harvey Bevier - Denver, Colorado
Professor Oldrich Leska - Prague, Czechoslovakia
Jaroslav Riha - San Antonio, Texas
Professor Joyce Lebra - Boulder, Colorado

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Answer:

(a) The FBI does not have files on any of the following persons nor is there any indication that any of them were ever employed by the FBI directly or indirectly or contacted by the FBI: Mrs. Jan (Kenneth) Sorensen, Boulder, Colorado; Mrs. Carol Word, Littleton, Colorado; George Stein, Lyons, Colorado; Henry Madrid, Pueblo, Colorado; Harvey Bevier, Denver, Colorado; and Jaroslav Riha, San Antonio, Texas.

(b) The FBI does not have files on any of the following persons nor is there any indication that any of them were ever employed by the FBI, however, they were contacted by the FBI as indicated on separate reports of interview which are being furnished to the SSC: Zdenek Cerveny, Boulder, Colorado; Francesca Stein, Lyons, Colorado; and Professor Joyce Lebra, Boulder, Colorado.

(c) The FBI does have files on Professor Donald Fanger, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Professor Stephen Fischer-Galati, Boulder, Colorado; and Professor Oldrich Leska, Prague, Czechoslovakia. These files are not related to the disappearance of Thomas Riha. Professors Fanger and Leska were never employed by the FBI directly or indirectly nor is there any indication they have ever been contacted by the FBI. Professor Fischer-Galati has never been employed by the FBI directly or indirectly. Correspondence between Fischer-Galati and the FBI and other Government officials regarding the disappearance of Thomas Riha was previously furnished to the SSC on November 21, 1975. The FBI is now furnishing a copy of a report of interview of Fischer-Galati by the FBI on January 26, 1970.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Zdenek Cerveny, Francesca Stein, Professor Joyce Lebra and Professor Stephen Fischer-Galati were contacted by the FBI in the matter involving the alleged impersonation of a Federal officer by Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum.

17. Question: Does the FBI have knowledge about Riha's connections with the Treasure Tours International Travel Agency in Montreal Canada, and what is the significance of this connection?

Answer: The FBI does not have any knowledge about Riha's connections with the Treasure Tours International Travel Agency in Montreal, Canada.

18. Question: Does the FBI have knowledge of Riha's connections with the World University Service in Chicago and with Susan Kresge, one of the officials of this organization?

Answer: The FBI does not have any knowledge of Riha's connections with the World University Service in Chicago or with Susan Kresge.

19. Question: Were FBI agents trailing Riha early in 1969, especially in late February and early March? If so, why?

Answer: FBI Agents were not trailing Riha at any time.

1 - The Attorney General

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE:

Zdenek Cerveny and Francesca Stein were interviewed at Lyons, Colorado, 1/21/70, by Special Agents Merrill R. Smith and J. Hale McMenamin. Joyce Lebra was interviewed by the same Agents on 1/21/70 at Boulder, Colorado.

Professor Donald Fanger is the subject of Security Matter - C, Bureau file 100-408465, opened in January, 1954, when there was indication he supported Communist Party policies and closed 1964 when investigation indicated he did not qualify under Bureau's criteria for inclusion on the Security Index and his activities did not appear to warrant investigation. The only known connection between Fanger and Riha is that they were both included in a group of American graduate students selected to attend Moscow or Lenigrad University in 1958-1959 in exchange for twenty Soviet graduate students.

Professor Oldrich Leska is the subject of Internal Security - Czechoslovakia, Bureau file 105-19779. Leska, born 6/16/27 Czechoslovakia, was in the U. S. from 7/17/68 to 9/5/68 and again from 10/15/68 until 6/8/70 when he returned to Czechoslovakia. He was in the U. S. under the East-West Exchange Program. During the earlier visit and from October, 1968, until the Summer of 1969, he was at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, and from the Summer of 1969 until June, 1970, he was at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. The file was opened on the basis of an unusual telephone call received by a third party from Ljubo Majhanovich. Apparently Majhanovich, then living in Toronto, Canada, had attended the University of Colorado from 1966-69 where he had become friendly with Leska. Majhanovich was born in Yugoslavia, (S)

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWELVE

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE CONTINUED:

attended Moscow University 1963-64. He entered Canada 1954 and was granted Canadian citizenship in 1957. FBI and RCMP investigation did not uncover any intelligence activities on the part of either Leska or Majhanovich. There was no indication that either man had any contact with Riha while they were at the University of Colorado. (S) ~~(Secret)~~

Professor Stephen Fischer-Galati is the subject of Special Inquiry - State Department, Bureau file 123-8971 and Internal Security - Romania, Bureau file 105-98294. There are numerous other references to Fischer-Galati in Bureau files. [He has been in periodic routine contact with the Romanian Embassy and contacts were not of known security significance.] (S) He communicated with the Justice Department 4/7/69 concerning the disappearance of Riha and also wrote to the Vice President of the U. S. concerning Riha's disappearance. (Confidential)

This note has been classified "Secret" in accordance with the classification given to communications received from the RCMP. (S)

~~Classified by 6283, XGDS 1 and 3, date of declassification indefinite.~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2-27-76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
(SSC letter 11-7-75) Re Thomas Riha

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: J. W. Cerl Date: 3/2/74

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title: Security Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1461

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
2/27/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Information relating to disappearance of Mr. Thomas Riha.
Response to 19 questions posed by SSC request.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb **ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX**
(4) **IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.**

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1441

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
11/7/75

CONCERNING DISAPPEARANCE OF
THOMAS RIHA

RETAIN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALMKP

62-116395-1161

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/GP

Date: January 27, 1970

1

ZDENEK CERVENY, care of Black Bear Inn, Lyons, Colorado, was interviewed at this establishment and advised he was born December 5, 1938, in Jihlava, Czechoslovakia, and holds a Master's degree in Mechanical Engineering from the Czechoslovakia Technical University, Prague, Czechoslovakia. He stated he is the nephew of THOMAS RIHA, a Professor of Russian History at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. He is currently employed as a plant engineer with the Martin-Marietta Cement Company in Lyons, Colorado.

According to CERVENY, he came to the United States on November 8, 1968, from Vienna, Austria, destined for the residence of his uncle in Boulder, Colorado. He stated that upon arrival in New York City, he spent several days at the residence of Mr. and Mrs. R. V. GROSSMAN in Brooklyn, New York, who are the aunt and uncle of HANA RIHA, the former wife of THOMAS RIHA.

CERVENY continued that he arrived in Denver, Colorado, via Greyhound Bus on November 16, 1968, and immediately called THOMAS RIHA at his residence in Boulder. He was advised by RIHA that he would be unable to come to Denver to drive him back to Boulder, but that he would have a friend meet him at the bus station. He stated that approximately one hour later a woman who introduced herself as GALYA TANNENBAUM approached him at the bus station and thereafter drove him to the residence of THOMAS RIHA at 1655 - 6th Street, Boulder, Colorado. He advised that after TANNENBAUM departed the RIHA residence, his uncle told him that she was a very important person, and the one who had been influential in getting him into the United States.

CERVENY stated he resided with RIHA from November 16, 1968, until January 8, 1969, when he moved to 918 South Logan Street, Denver, Colorado, in order to be closer to the Samsonite Company where he had secured employment in the Research and Development Laboratory. During the period he resided with his uncle, TANNENBAUM visited this residence on several occasions, and on almost every instance reminded him that she was an officer in Military Intelligence; very influential with authorities of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; and that if he did not behave himself in the United States, she would have him sent back to Czechoslovakia. CERVENY stated he never was certain

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 1/21/70 at Lyons, Colorado File # Denver 47-3190

by SA'S MERRILL R. SMITH and [illegible] Date dictated 1/21/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

what, if anything, TANNENBAUM actually did in connection with his being admitted to the United States, as the matter, to his knowledge, was handled by a Czechoslovakian Refugee Committee in New York City.

CERVENY went on to state that after he moved to Denver he did not see TANNENBAUM again until March 13, 1969, when she called him on the telephone and suggested he come to her residence at 248 Logan Street, where his uncle was also visiting her. He stated when he arrived at her house, his uncle seemed depressed and upset over the fact that he was having marital difficulties with HANA, and that the marriage would probably terminate in divorce. He stated the purpose of his being invited to TANNENBAUM's residence appeared to emanate from a desire of his uncle to see him, but that nothing of importance occurred during the visit.

Following the disappearance of his uncle on March 15, 1969, he stated TANNENBAUM commenced asking him over to her house on the pretense of checking up on his immigrant status; however, it became immediately apparent that the principal purpose of these invitations was an attempt on the part of TANNENBAUM to have sexual relations with him. He pointed out there were times when he entered her residence when she would be partially unclothed, would attempt to sit on his lap, sit close to him while watching television, or would openly suggest that they go to her bedroom for the purpose of having sexual intercourse. CERVENY stated TANNENBAUM was physically repulsive to him, and that he would find an immediate excuse to leave when she commenced making sexual advances to him.

During the period when he was visiting the TANNENBAUM residence, CERVENY advised she suggested that she adopt him, and actually started adoption proceedings through an attorney in Denver, STEPHEN L. R. MC NICHOLS, JR.; however, he stated he had no desire whatsoever to go through with this, and told TANNENBAUM so. He stated it was about this time that he began to suspect that TANNENBAUM had no connection with Military Intelligence or had any influence over his immigration status.

He stated that in May, 1969, he desired to go to Toronto, Canada, to attent a wedding of some Czechoslovakian friends, and he inquired of TANNENBAUM if such would be legal for him to do. He stated she told him there was nothing for him to worry about; however, she suggested he consult with Immigration authorities in Denver regarding this trip. According to CERVENY, TANNENBAUM accompanied him to the Federal Building in Denver, but refused to enter Immigration offices with him, giving some excuse that she did not want them to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] his case. He [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] he had the United States for Canada, he would not be able to return. When he informed TANNENBAUM of this, she told him that she had more authority than the Immigration officials, and advised him to go to Canada regardless, as she outranked the officials in Denver. CERVENY then made the trip to Canada without incident, and learned later that he was actually just fortunate that he was not required to produce citizenship papers at any time.

In addition, CERVENY stated that in May, 1969, he met a Czechoslovakian girl in Colorado Springs by the name of MICHEL BDLIKOVA, who was working at the Broadmoor Hotel, and whom he eventually introduced to TANNENBAUM. He stated that TANNENBAUM immediately told the girl of her Military Intelligence and Immigration connections, and advised her that she could arrange to get her a passport to visit relatives in Czechoslovakia. He stated that in October, 1969, BDLIKOVA told him that TANNENBAUM had recently approached her with a letter written in English purportedly from THOMAS RIHA to CERVENY. He stated BDLIKOVA was asked by TANNENBAUM to rewrite the letter in Czechoslovakian, and that he eventually received this letter postmarked from somewhere in Canada. He felt at the time he received the letter that it had not been written by his uncle, and when he was advised by BDLIKOVA that the letter was a hoax, he began to feel that TANNENBAUM was a fraud and that his uncle's disappearance could have been for reasons other than marital discord. He stated that immeidately after being told of the letter by BDLIKOVA in October, 1969, he filed a missing persons notice with the Boulder, Colorado Police Department the following day. He stated the last time he saw TANNENBAUM was just before or after he made this report to the Boulder Police Department.

With regard to CERVENY's association with GALYA TANNENBAUM, he recalled that on several occasions she told him that she would like to recruit him into Military Intelligence, as his engineering background and language ability would be "extremely useful to us." She also told him that if he were in the United States "working for the other side," she would shoot him. TANNENBAUM also told CERVENY that she had originally met THOMAS RIHA in Chicago, and that after she came to Colorado, he followed her for the purpose of marrying her; however, the marriage did not take place as RIHA was unable to get along with her children. He stated that upon reflection, he feels that his uncle actually believed that TANNENBAUM was connected in some official capacity with the United States Government, and that there was something in their relationship which he feels gave TANNENBAUM some type of influence over the actions of his uncle; however, in conversation with both his uncle and TANNENBAUM, he can recall nothing of a concrete nature, and that this feeling is probably a result of intuition more than anything else.

CERVENY also recalled that in December, 1968, his father visited him, and during the visit, showed him a diamond bracelet which he had smuggled into the United States for the purpose of selling for a relative in Czechoslovakia. He stated his father had previously corresponded with another individual by the name of RIHA in San Antonio, Texas, who was no relation to his uncle, but whom his father had known in Czechoslovakia. According to CERVENY, his father made a trip to San Antonio to leave this bracelet with the RIHA in San Antonio for him to attempt to sell; however, the bracelet was eventually returned to CERVENY from the RIHA in San Antonio, who advised him he could locate no buyer. Thereafter, he showed the bracelet to TANNENBAUM, who indicated a desire to buy it. Both went to a jeweler in the Denver Hilton Hotel, who appriased the bracelet at $350. TANNENBAUM, however, offered him $500 for the bracelet, and actually paid him $400 in cash with a promise to pay him an additional $100 later, which he never received.

CERVENY recalled another incident which furthered his suspicions of TANNENBAUM in regard to a will which he witnessed at her insistence. By way of background, he explained that in the spring of 1969, TANNENBAUM introduced him to an elderly man by the name of GUSTAV FREDERICH INGWERSEN, a plastics engineer and a native of Germany, who owned some type of plastics plant in Denver, Colorado. He stated he had formerly done some work in plastics, and TANNENBAUM suggested that INGWERSEN might help him get established in this field. As a result of this meeting, CERVENY became friendly with INGWERSEN, and in the company of TANNENBAUM and her two children, made two vacation trips to New Mexico with him. He stated these trips were in either April or May, 1969, and in June, 1969, TANNENBAUM advised him that INGWERSEN had died. Then on July 5, 1969, TANNENBAUM had him visit her residence where she told him that INGWERSEN had drawn up a will and signed it prior to his death, but had neglected to have two witnesses sign it in accordance with Colorado law. She said that INGWERSEN liked CERVENY and had intended to ask him to witness the will, but had died before this could be accomplished. She then coaxed him for over an hour to witness this document, and still believing she was a bona fide official in some Governmental capacity, he affixed his signature to the will.

CERVENY concluded by stating that TANNENBAUM had never obtained anything of value from him as a result of her representations as an officer in Military Intelligence, and the longer he remained in the United States and became acquainted with life in this country, the more suspicious he became that TANNENBAUM was in some way attempting to eventually try to capitalize in some way on his immigrant status. He again pointed out, however, that to his knowledge, TANNENBAUM was never able to materially obtain anything of value from him.

1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Date January 27, 1970

Mrs. FRANCESCA STEIN, nee Friedel, owner of the Black Bear Inn, Lyons, Colorado, advised she is a citizen of Czechoslovakia, and has been in the United States for approximately four years. She stated that in about October, 1967, a Mr. STABEN, a visiting Professor from France at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, and a frequent customer at the Black Bear Inn, introduced her to a Professor of History at the University of Colorado by the name of THOMAS RIHA, also a native of Czechoslovakia, and that thereafter she and her husband became friendly with RIHA.

Mrs. STEIN advised that in April, 1968, RIHA visited the restaurant in the company of a Czechoslovakian citizen by the name of JIRI CERVENY, who advised her that he had a son, ZDENEK CERVENY, who had recently escaped from Czechoslovakia into Vienna, Austria. She stated JIRI CERVENY was from Prague and that ZDENEK CERVENY is a nephew of RIHA. They inquired if Mrs. STEIN would be able to assist his son in coming to the United States, particularly with regard to obtaining employment for him. Mrs. STEIN advised both RIHA and CERVENY that she would attempt to assist in this endeavor through her attorney, PAUL MORRIS, in Boulder, Colorado.

Mrs. STEIN recalled that in September, 1968, MORRIS and RIHA visited her residence in Lyons concerning ZDENEK CERVENY, at which time MORRIS told her that he knew a woman from Denver, Colorado, by the name of GALYA TANNENBAUM who had a great deal of influence in the Government, and who was referred to by RIHA as "Colonel." She stated that MORRIS and RIHA advised her that TANNENBAUM would be able to assist them in getting ZDENEK CERVENY into the United States.

According to Mrs. STEIN, shortly after this meeting with MORRIS and RIHA, TANNENBAUM visited the restaurant in Lyons to discuss the bringing of ZDENEK CERVENY to the United States. She told Mrs. STEIN it would be necessary to first check out Mrs. STEIN and RIHA for security purposes before bringing CERVENY into this country. She told her that she was a "Colonel in the Immigration," and showed her a small hand gun which she had in her purse. During this conversation, TANNENBAUM told Mrs. STEIN that she belonged to an extermination group which killed people after the second World War. Mrs. STEIN stated she considered TANNENBAUM to be a "nut" and did not pursue the matter any further with her, pointing out that

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 1/22/70 at Lyons, Colorado File # Denver 47-[illegible]

by [illegible] Date dictated 1/2[illegible]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

as far as she was concerned, the immigration matter concerning CERVENY would be handled by her attorney, PAUL MORRIS.

Mrs. STEIN continued that in October, 1968, RIHA married a young Czechoslovakian girl by the name of HANA HRUSKOVA, and that subsequent to the marriage, a reception was held at the Black Bear Inn. She stated that while the reception was in progress, TANNENBAUM appeared, uninvited, and immediately sought out RIHA, took him to the bar section of the restaurant, and commenced a long, serious conversation with him which lasted for approximately one hour. She stated that RIHA's bride became extremely upset over this, as TANNENBAUM would not allow anyone to interrupt their conversation. Mrs. STEIN advised that on one occasion she went into the bar to tell RIHA that his bride was becoming very upset, and was answered in an angry manner by TANNENBAUM to "leave them alone." Following this conversation, the content of which is unknown to Mrs. STEIN, she stated RIHA appeared to be extremely upset, and although TANNENBAUM left immediately, RIHA seemed to have lost all interest in the reception.

Following the incident during the wedding reception, Mrs. STEIN advised that TANNENBAUM again visited her at the Black Bear Inn concerning the immigration case of ZDENEK CERVENY, during which she mentioned to TANNENBAUM that she owned some property in Lyons on which she desired to build an apartment house. At this time TANNENBAUM told her that she was a Colonel in Military Intelligence, and was soon to be promoted to the rank of General. She told Mrs. STEIN that she could utilize some influence in securing an FHA loan for her; that she had the authority to deport her at any time; and intimated to Mrs. STEIN that for a percentage of the loan obtained, she would obtain same; and if Mrs. STEIN did not agree to this arangement, she would have her deported. Mrs. STEIN again pointed out that she considered TANNENBAUM a "nut," and told her that all of immigration and business dealings were handled through her attorney.

Mrs. STEIN stated that to the best of her recollection, the above was the last time she saw TANNENBAUM, and in February, 1969, she made a trip to Columbia, South America, where she had resided for approximately ten years before coming to the United States, and did not again return to Lyons until March 18, 1969, following the disappearance of RIHA from Boulder, Colorado, on March 15, 1969.

Mrs. STEIN stated she did not believe the representations made by TANNENBAUM that she was connected with the United States Immigration Service, or with Military Intelligence, and that she obtained nothing of value from her.

Mrs. STEIN advised that ZDENEK CERVENY eventually came to the United States in November, 1968, and to the best of her knowledge, TANNENBAUM had nothing to do with his entry into this country.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date February 3, 1970

Miss JOYCE LEBRA, Associate Professor of History, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, 1590 Hillside Drive, Boulder, advised she is a colleague of THOMAS RIHA in the Department of History and considers herself a close personal friend.

At the outset of the interview, it was explained to LEBRA that the purpose of the interview was to ascertain any available information from her concerning Mrs. GALYA TANNENBAUM on whom this Bureau is conducting an investigation under the Federal Impersonation Statute.

Miss LEBRA advised that to the best of her recollection RIHA never did mention anyone to her by the name of TANNENBAUM or any individual connected with Military Intelligence or the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. She stated that if TANNENBAUM had been a close friend of RIHA's, this fact would probably have been known to her, as she and RIHA generally associated with the same circle of friends in the University community.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/YP

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 1/27/70 at Boulder, Colorado File # Denver 47-3190

by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Date January 28, 1970

STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI, Professor, Department of History, University of Colorado, advised that he had just returned from a European trip. He recalled first meeting Professor THOMAS RIHA sometime in 1966 at a meeting of the American Historical Society in San Francisco. He advised he also had heard of RIHA prior to their meeting. He advised that after RIHA came to the University of Colorado he knew him as a fellow faculty member of the Department of History and had dinner with him on two or three occasions. He advised their relationship was casual and could not have been considered a profound relationship.

FISCHER-GALATI advised he first met GALYA TANNENBAUM sometime in May, 1969, after the disappearance of Professor RIHA. He advised his object in meeting TANNENBAUM was to determine if she were a "colonel" as described in hearsay. He advised he was convinced she was not connected with any kind of intelligence work and knew nothing of Eastern European history. He recalled that TANNENBAUM stated she had known RIHA for many years and indicated she had helped RIHA come to the United States but gave no further explanation. He also recalled that TANNENBAUM displayed a "Power of Attorney" document which was contained in a letter allegedly signed by TOM RIHA. He advised the most significant part of the document to him was the date of same, which he easily recalled as January 5. 1968. FISCHER-GALATI pointed out that January 5, 1968, is the date of the overthrow of the Czechoslovakian Government, at which time NOVOTONY was replaced by DUBCEK, and at this same time the official who was in control of passports disappeared and subsequently showed up in Montreal, Canada. He recalled that TANNENBAUM indicated she carried a gun in her purse and that her car had some special equipment, but TANNENBAUM did not elaborate further. He advised that TANNENBAUM was extremely careful in her conversations with him and made no allegations.

FISCHER-GALATI advised his second meeting with TANNENBAUM occured on October 1, 1969, at 2:15 p.m., same obtained from his notebook. He recalled that TANNENBAUM called him on the telephone and arranged to meet him in front of the Colorado Book Store in Boulder. He recalled that her car was parked legally at the aforementioned location. He recalled that she was anxious to determine why a check had "bounced" in RIHA's bank account. He recalled she wanted to know if the University was continuing to deposit RIHA's salary to his bank account, as all University faculty

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/GP

On 1/26/70 at Boulder, Colorado File # Denver 87-3190

by [illegible] Date dictated 1/28/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

are paid, and she also wanted to see the receipt for the deposit of his salary per University records. He advised he had determined a discrepancy existed between what the University claimed to put into the account and what they actually put into RIHA's account. He advised at this meeting TANNENBAUM did not discuss RIHA's whereabouts.

He recalled his third meeting with TANNENBAUM occured about five days later at the same location, although this time TANNENBAUM was accompanied by a small female child about three years of age. He advised her of the amount the University had deposited to RIHA's account. At this time TANNENBAUM told him her real name was not GALYA TANNENBAUM, but something else which she did not disclose, and added that she was about ready to leave town. He advised of no contact with TANNENBAUM since their last meeting.

STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI advised that the date of the document mentioned above of January 5, 1968, and its historical significance disturbs him. He stated if RIHA was not "bumped off" by TANNENBAUM, then he assumes that RIHA's disappearance may have been connected with an unknown intelligence matter, which is pure conjecture on his part. FISCHER-GALATI also recalled that in September, 1968, Professor RIHA requested that an advertisement for a travel bureau be run in the "Eastern European Quarterly," which GALATI described as an international journal to promote cultural contact with Eastern European Countries. He advised RIHA did not indicate if the advertisement was run for a friend or if RIHA had any financial interest in the travel agency named Treasure Tours, 1010 St. Catherine Way, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. FISCHER-GALATI advised that because of the reasons mentioned, he sometimes believes that RIHA could be in Canada.

Professor FISCHER-GALATI advised that in April, 1969, he contacted a Mr. FRITZ of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Denver, Colorado, regarding the sudden leaving of Professor THOMAS RIHA of the University of Colorado. Mr. FRITZ advised him that he had no knowledge of the matter but would check into same. Professor FISCHER-GALATI stated he was later recontacted by FRITZ, who stated the disappearance had nothing to do with the CIA and that RIHA's leaving was a personal matter connected with personal problems.

Professor FISCHER-GALATI explained that in the absence of a complete denial by Mr. FRITZ that the CIA had any dealings with RIHA at any time, he, therefore, concluded and was convinced the information furnished by Mr. FRITZ did not represent a personal opinion but must have come from within the CIA. He added that inasmuch as it then appeared to him that RIHA had left voluntarily, he also concluded he had no reason to fear for the safety of RIHA. Professor FISCHER-GALATI said that if he had been subsequently quoted in the "Colorado Daily" or any other newspaper as saying that RIHA had left voluntarily and was safe, such quotation would have been correct.

Professor FISCHER-GALATI continued that he did not feel, however, that the explanation about RIHA was adequate and for that reason subsequently directed a letter to the Chief of the Foreign Agents Registration section within the Justice Department, whom he knew well. He thereafter received a reply that the Chief to whom he directed the letter was deceased.

He stated he thereafter directed a second letter to the same section mentioned above within the Justice Department in mid-December, 1969, again inquiring about RIHA, but as yet has received no reply.

He stated he did not know of anything of value ever received by TANNENBAUM as a result of any representation.

2 - [redacted] J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

February 26, 1976

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 19, 1976, requesting certain FBI materials.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum responsive to that request.

A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for your records.

Enclosures (2) ENCLOSURE

62-116395

REC-112 62-116395-1460X

7 MAR 30 1976

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SJM:lhb/hb
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALMKP

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WOC

TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 APR 2 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

2 - Mr.[illegible] A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller

62-116395

February 26, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 19, 1976, requesting delivery of certain materials pertaining to the Secret Army Organization and the role of an FBI informant therein.

This is to effect delivery of the requested materials.

1 - The Attorney General

SJM:lhb lhb
(9) ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

NOTE:

In response to a 1/20/76 SSC request, access was given to materials pertaining to Howard Barry Godfrey and the Secret Army Organization. SSC Staff Member Sam Bouchard, upon completion of his review of these materials, identified certain serials therefrom and subsequently made the request for delivery set out in the LHM.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALMKP

prd

w/ work

WOC-13

62-116395-1160X

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2/26/76

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). (SSC Letter 2/19/76)

Secret Army Organization.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 3/2/76

Received by:

Title: Security Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALMVP

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

2/26/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒	SSC
☐	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosure

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 2/19/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Material regarding Secret Army Organization and the role of an FBI informant therein.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/24/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

~~SECRET~~

FEB 23 1976

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. WRW
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 002 SD CODED

4:55 PM FEBRUARY 23, 1976 IMMEDIATE BMW

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAN DIEGO (66-1714)(P)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#NDR-16 2/7/01
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/ALM/KP 60267AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

SENSTUDY.

REBUTEL, FEBRUARY 23, 1976.

REVIEW OF SAN DIEGO FILES FITTING CRITERIA SET FORTH IN REBUTEL INDICATE FOLLOWING CASE MST CLOSELY FIT.

CAPTIONED "OVERCAST", BUFILE 65-68052, SD FILES 65-2164 AND 134-761. THIS WAS A HIGHLY SENSITIVE JOINT OPERATION INVOLVING BOTH CIA AND FBI AND WAS HANDLE BY FORMER SA ARNOLD D. ORRANTIA. ~~(S)~~

FOLLOWING CASES LIKEWISE FIT CRITERIA TO SOME EXTENT:

(1) HARACIO SANDOVAL AMADOR, IS - MEXICO, BUFILE 100-394608, SD FILE 134-7. THIS INVOLVES FORMER SD 852-S, OPERATIONAL 1952 TO 1958, HANDLED BY SA ARNOLD D. ORRANTIA.

62-116395-1460

REC-110

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

(2) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - BORDER COVERAGE PROGRAM

7 MAR 9 1976

BUFILE 100-434445-46, SD FILE 100-12363, ASSIGNED FORMER SA ORRANTIA, 1/9/61 TO 5/6/71, WHEN IT WAS CLOSED. THIS

Re SSC request dated 2/19/76 for access. Response discussed w/ SSC representative P. Wallach 3/2/76 by SA J.W. Johnson: no further interest JWS

~~SECRET~~

84 MAR 11 1976

~~SECRET~~

PRIMARILY INVOLVED COINTELPRO MATTERS DIRECTED AGAINST COMMUNIST PARTY OF MEXICO AND NATIONAL LIBRATION MOVEMENT (MLN) IN MEXICO.

(3) BOCOV, BUFILE 100-356015, SDFILE 100-6923, ASSIGNED FORMER SA ORRANTIA, 6/18/58 TO 6/10/65.

ALL ABOVE MENTIONED CASES INVOLVED SENSITIVE SOURCES AND TECHNIQUES AND SHOULD BE AFFORDED APPROPRIATE HANDLING.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3892, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE~~.

END..

CBL FBIHQ

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

February 20, 1976

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SPAL NLP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1 - Mr. J. P. Graham

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 11, 1976, requesting the names of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel responsible for the preparation of certain Bureau memoranda and requesting that arrangements be made for interview of these persons by SSC Staff Members. Reference is also made to SSC telephone call February 18, 1976, in which the identity of the person responsible for preparation of Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Los Angeles, airtel to Director, FBI, dated May 26, 1970, under the same caption as above memoranda was requested.

All San Diego communications cited in referenced letter were authored by Special Agent (SA) Roy L. Burns, who is currently assigned to the Billings, Montana, Resident Agency in the territory covered by our Butte Field Office.

All Los Angeles communications cited in referenced letter were authored by former SA Leroy W. Sheets. Mr. Sheets is now retired and he may possibly be residing at 5725 - 72nd Street, N. E., Marysville, Washington.

Memorandum Director, FBI, to SAC, Los Angeles, October 31, 1968, was authored by SA William D. Neumann, who is now assigned as Assistant SAC in our Minneapolis Field Office.

SAC, Los Angeles airtel to Director, FBI, May 26, 1970, was authored by SA Richard W. Held, who is currently assigned to FBI Headquarters.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JPG:eks
(11)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395-145 [illegible]

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Messrs. Neumann, Held and Burns will be notified of the SSC's desire to interview them in connection with these memoranda. Mr. Held is currently in an official travel status and will remain in such status until the first week of March.

1 - The Attorney General

5-240 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2-20-76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
(SSC let 2-11-76)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 2/27/76

Received by:

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1459

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
2/20/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 2/11/76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Operating Procedures
Information Handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Names of FBI personnel responsible for preparation of certain memoranda and arrangements for SSC interviews.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1457

183-10277

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

February 20, 1976

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff
1 - Mr. J. P. Graham

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 11, 1976, requesting the names of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel responsible for the preparation of certain Bureau memoranda and requesting that arrangements be made for these persons to be interviewed by SSC Staff Members. Reference is also made to SSC telephone call February 18, 1976, in which the identity of the person responsible for preparing Special Agent in Charge, Los Angeles, airtel to Director, FBI, dated May 26, 1970, under the same caption as above memoranda was requested.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to the request contained in referenced SSC letter and telephone call.

A copy of the above memorandum is being furnished for your records.

62-116395-1459

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

7 MAR 9 1976

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JPG:eks
(12)

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep. AD Adm. —
Dep. AD Inv. —
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. —
Ext. Affairs —
Files & Com. —
Gen. Inv. —
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. —
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. —
Director Sec'y —

84 MAR 11 1976

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Delivered to Dept
2/24/76

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Referenced SSC letter indicated that certain portions of Bureau memoranda and airtels may be quoted in the SSC's final report on FBI intelligence operations and that the SSC was seeking to take the testimony of persons whose memoranda and statements might be quoted in that report. The memoranda referred to in referenced SSC letter and telephone call pertain to the FBI's role in the "gang war" between the Black Panther Party and the US Organization.

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Leavitt
1 - Mr. Cregar

The Attorney General

March 3, 1976

1 - Mr. Blunt
1 - Mr. Thornton
1 - Mr. Coulson

Director, FBI

10

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to memorandum of Steven K. Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, to John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division, FBI, dated February 20, 1976, enclosing SSC letter dated February 18, 1976.

Referenced letter requests interviews with FBI Agents of the Chicago Office who prepared memoranda concerning the Black Panther Party.

In view of current civil litigation involving members of the Black Panther Party, and Agents of the FBI, it is felt that it would not be proper to make these Agents available for interview by the SSC at this time.

The FBI is in agreement with the Department's view that a proper response would be to allow the SSC to review transcripts of the Agents' testimony at the trial, concerning these memoranda.

REC-110 62-116395-1457

7 MAR 9 1976

Delivered to Dept 3-4-76 JES/4D

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

NOTE: SAs Stanley, McCabe, and Mitchell are all to be called as witnesses in civil trial in Chicago. Chicago letters to the Director dated 12/16/68, and 1/13/69, were written by SA Stanley. The author of the letter of 3/14/69, has not been determined.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

DOC:mcz
(11) mcz

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/19/01 BY SP2ALM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

[illegible]FICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY G[illegible]ERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 20 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
SB Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Letter Dated February 18, 1976

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated February 18, 1976, which requests interviews with FBI agents who wrote various memoranda concerning the Black Panther Party in Chicago. Because such interviews might impair the Department's ability to conduct a defense in the Hampton trial, in Chicago, I have asked the Department attorneys handling that case to give us their views on an appropriate response to Senator Church's letter. One possible response would be to provide the SSC with the transcripts of the FBI agents testimony at the trial concerning these memoranda, instead of allowing the SSC to interview these agents. We would appreciate it if the FBI would also consider what response would be appropriate to this letter.

MEMO ~~Let~~ to AG cc DAG
3-2-76
DOC:MCZ

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALMKP

cc: Paul Daly

[illegible]

5B

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1457

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., T[illegible]N.
BARRY GOLDWATER, AR[illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MATH[illegible]., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible]

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States [illegible]enate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 18, 1976

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the United States
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As a part of the Select Committee on Intelligence's preparation of a final report on FBI domestic intelligence operations, we will be seeking to take the testimony of persons whose memoranda and statements might be quoted in that report.

In our investigation into the FBI's counterintelligence activities against the Black Panther Party in Chicago certain Bureau memoranda and Airtels may be quoted. The following is a list of these documents. Actual copies, received by the Select Committee from the FBI, are also enclosed.

Memorandum SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI 12/16/68
Memorandum SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI 1/13/69
Memorandum SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI 3/14/69

The Select Committee staff believes that Special Agents Joseph Stanley, Joseph McCabe, and Roy Martin Mitchell were responsible for these memoranda and we would appreciate your forwarding to us the names of other FBI personnel responsible for their preparation. We would also like you to make the necessary arrangements for Select Committee staff to be able to interview these persons.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Yours very truly,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

RECEIVED
FEB 19 1976
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1451

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

February 26, 1976

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott (Route
(Attn: J. M. Powers) Through
for Review)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

On February 13, 1976, the SSC held an Executive Session concerning "Domestic Intelligence Investigations." During the course of that Executive Session, one of the SSC Staff Members present made a request for this Bureau to furnish the SSC with copies of instructions sent by Headquarters to Bureau field divisions relative to the effect that the Privacy Act of 1974 would have upon Bureau investigations in the domestic intelligence area.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum, with enclosures, which is responsive to the request made at the above Executive Session. A copy of this memorandum, also with enclosures, is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (10)

REC-104 62-116395-1452

62-116395

7 MAR 10 1976

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Delivered to Dept 2-27-76 JDS/AD

Delivered to Committee 2-27-76.

TJM:lij
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/kg

woc
TJM

TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

84 MAR 11 1976

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams [illegible] - Mr. W. R. Wannall
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz [illegible] - Mr. W. O. Cregar
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly [illegible] - Mr. T. J. McNiff
1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott (Route Through
(Attn: J. M. Powers) for Review)

62-116395 February 26, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

At the SSC Executive Session held February 13, 1976, concerning "Domestic Intelligence Investigations," a discussion ensued between Bureau representatives and SSC Staff Members as to what effect the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974 had on investigations conducted by the FBI relative to domestic subversive groups. On this occasion, one of the Staff Members present requested that this Bureau furnish the SSC with a copy of all instructions sent to Bureau field divisions by FBI Headquarters, which instructions would have a bearing on the conduct of this Bureau's "Domestic Intelligence Investigations."

Attached, in response to the above request, are copies of three Headquarters communications sent to Bureau field divisions containing instructions responsive to the above request. Also attached is one copy of a communication from our Richmond Division which prompted one of the above Headquarters communications.

Enclosures (4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY

1 - The Attorney General

TJM:lij
(10)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

NOTE:

See memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 2/17/76, captioned "Senstudy 75," which reported the results of the above-mentioned Executive Session and which recommended that the Senstudy Project Unit respond to the request made by an SSC Staff Member at the Executive Session. Materials being furnished the SSC as being responsive to their request was prepared by SA Stephen P. Riggin, Files and Communications Division.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

2 - [illegible]. J. A. Mintz
(1 -Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

February 27, 1976

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. J. Duffin
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the request of the SSC dated February 19, 1976, for access to FBI materials.

Attached is a memorandum which is a partial response to referenced request. Enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
    Special Counsel for
    Intelligence Coordination

JWJ:emg emg
(10)

TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS.

Delivered to Dept 2-27-76 JDS/AD
Delivered to Committee 2-27-76

REC- 104 62-116395-1451

MAR 10 1976

3 ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

FEB 28 10 30 AM 1976

1 A Duffin 063

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

8.4 MAR 11 1976

2- Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. A. J. Duffin
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

62-116395

February 27, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the February 19, 1976, request by the SSC for access to FBI materials.

Item 2 of referenced SSC letter requested the following:

2. Access to all material pertaining to a Bureau "operation" against the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City run out of the San Diego Field Office in the early 1960's and involving SA Rinaldo Orrantina.

Materials considered to be responsive to the request of the SSC have been assembled and are available for review by SSC staff members in Room 4171, J. Edgar Hoover Building.

1 - The Attorney General

JWJ:emg emg
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL AND ONE FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM KP

62-116395-PM 1

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

RE: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE:

It is believed the materials responsive to the SSC request pertains to the Overcast, Espionage - Russia case, Bureau file 65-68052 which consists of two sections. This material will be available to respond to questions posed by the SSC members and will preclude the Xeroxing of every serial in the file.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2-27-76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
(SSC request 2-19-76) Item v

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 2/27/76

Received by: Lynsey Oster

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2AUMKP

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1111

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: **FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

X DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

2-27-76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

X SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 2-19-76

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Access to material relating to Soviet Embassy, Mexico City.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2AMKP

62-116395

SJM:ds ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Mjd

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-111

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

MAR 8 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven Blackhurst
SB
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Letter Dated March 5, 1976

(Sensitively

The attached letter from the Senate Select Committee was discussed with Mr. Sam Miller of the Bureau on March 5, 1976. It requires no response unless the FBI has objections to the draft SSC report on mail opening.

Daly

REC-104 62-116395-1450

7 MAR 10 1976

ENCLOSURE

Phillips ✓

58

cc: Paul Daly

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP2ALM/

84 MAR 18 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER[illegible]
CHARLES MCC. MA[illegible] JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 5, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esquire
Office of Professional Responsibility
Room 4313
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

On March 4, 1976, Mr. James Johnson of the FBI reviewed the Select Committee's draft titled "CIA and FBI Mail Opening." James Dick and Thomas Dawson of the Committee staff revised the draft to meet all security problems previously raised by Mr. James Lee of the Bureau, and discussed the revisions with Mr. Johnson to make certain that their concerns were met.

This letter is to confirm the fact that, unless I receive word to the contrary from you, the Department of Justice has no objection to the publication of this report.

Thanks again for your help throughout the inquiry into this subject.

Sincerely,

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Chief Counsel

Copy to Paul Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALMKP

RECEIVED
MAR 5 1976

62-116395-14

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/4/76

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

It was brought to the attention of the Legal Counsel Division that in the Senate Select Committee report concerning COINTELPRO the identities of Agents were contained which are below the level of Section Chief. The prior procedure and policy of the Senate Select Committee was not to include anybody below a policymaking position which it equated with Section Chief or above.

F. A. O. Schwartz, Counsel to captioned Committee, was contacted concerning this matter and Schwartz stated that he wanted to assure the Bureau that there would be no names of Agent personnel included in the report under the title of Section Chief. He indicated that their procedures and policies concerning utilization of the identity of Agent personnel will be consistent with the policies established by their Bureau mail opening report. This report was written by James Dick of the Committee and contains the identity of only one Section Chief and that is William A. Branigan. No one below the rank of Section Chief was identified. In fact, Dick did not identify SACs involved in this operation.

REC-104 62-116395-1449

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

7 MAR 10 1976

per

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Leavitt
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/

11 - LEGAL COUNSEL

PVD:lad
(6)

84 MAR 15 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - Mr. J.B. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh

February 27, 1976

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Shackelford
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Newman

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

On February 19, 1976, at the invitation of Staff Member Robert Kelley of the SSC, Supervisors Edward P. Grigalus and Homer A. Newman, Jr., reviewed the proposed draft of the Committee as it pertains to informants in the domestic security field. This review was for the purpose of determining if any information was contained therein which would expose informants or jeopardize any ongoing investigative activities in the internal security field as it pertains to informants.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum setting forth the results of our review of this proposed draft.

A copy of the above memorandum is being furnished for your records.

REC-104 62-116395-1447

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

MAR 10 1976

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ENCLOSURE

HAN:tdp (12)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

EW/RGH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

837 PM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO BE HAND-DELIVERED BY THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 11 1976

The Attorney General

NOTE:

This is the first instance wherein the SSC has made available for review a proposed rough draft of a segment of the upcoming SSC report. It is expected that other segments will be made available by the Committee Staff Members. It was necessary to review this proposed draft in the offices of the SSC since they do not contemplate permitting proposed drafts to leave their premises. The approval for the use of information from the 2 classified documents has been coordinated with the IS-2 Section of the Intelligence Division and with the Budget and Accounting Section of the Administrative Division. The handling of the budget figure as set forth has been approved by Asst. Director E.W. Walsh.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

62-116395

February 27, 1976

1 - Mr. Shackelford
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Newman

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP8ALM

On February 19, 1976, at the invitation of Staff Member Robert Kelley of the SSC, Supervisors Edward P. Grigalus and Homer A. Newman, Jr., reviewed the proposed draft of the Committee's report as it pertains to informants in the domestic security field. This review was conducted for the purpose of determining if the report contained any information which would expose our informants or jeopardize any ongoing investigations or investigative techniques in the domestic internal security field as it pertains to informants. This review did not detect any such instances.

Two instances were noted, however, where information was set forth taken from classified documents.

(1) In connection with internal security - intelligence program supports, through the use of informants, a figure of $7,401,000 was used in the Committee's draft. This figure was taken from material captioned "Federal Bureau of Investigation Overall Intelligence Program, FY 77 Budget Compared to FY 76 (Dollars in Thousands)," classified "Secret," which was made available to the SSC by the Department. Although the document described above cannot be declassified, the FBI interposes no objection to the use of the above figure in the SSC report providing the report so reflects that this figure not only includes payments made to domestic internal security informants for services and expenses but also includes the cost of our

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

HAN:tdp (11)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

woc

62-116395-1449

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

personnel, support costs and overhead.

(2) The Committee's draft under "Case No. 5" sets forth information regarding "Public Meeting Opposing U. S. Involvement in Vietnam War (1966)." This information was taken from a classified document captioned "Universities Committee on Problems of War and Peace" dated March 2, 1966.

The FBI cannot declassify this document since it contains information warranting its continued classification; however, the information as set forth in the Committee's draft would be unclassifiable as it appears. Therefore, the FBI does not interpose any objection to the use of this material.

1 - The Attorney General

6012

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 12 1976
DOJ

~~SECRET~~

R2330
pt. 4 of 4.

601

62-116395-1441

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Overall Intelligence Program
FY 77 Budget Compared to FY 76
(Dollars in Thousands)

Program Element	FY 1976 Workyears	FY 1976 Dollars	FY 1977 Workyears	FY 1977 Dollars	Change Workyears	Change Dollars
Internal Security Investigations	1133	$28,286	1117	$27,879	-16	$-407
Counterintelligence Investigations	1523	37,237	1503	36,698	-20	-539
Internal Security Intelligence	207	7,401	204	7,294	-3	-107
Counterintelligence Intelligence	183	4,979	180	4,907	-3	-72
Organized Crime Intelligence	130	3,709	128	3,656	-2	-53
General Crimes Intelligence	294	8,419	290	8,295	-4	-124
Total Intelligence Program	3470	$90,031	3422	$88,729	-48	$-1,302

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS

- Internal Security - Investigations. The program focuses on identifying organizations and individuals engaged in activities relating to (1) subversion, overthrow and distruction of governments within the United States; (2) the deprivation of constitutional and civil rights; (3) and foreign terrorism and their supporters whose activity is detrimental to the conduct of United States foreign affairs.

- Counterintelligence - Investigations. Through this program, investigations are conducted to thwart intelligence operations of foreign intelligence services in the United States.

- Internal Security - Intelligence. This program supports, through the use of informants, the internal security investigative program.

- Counterintelligence - Intelligence. Through the use of informants and other techniques, this program attempts to develop assets to identify foreign intelligence officers, penetrate foreign intelligence services in the United States, and neutralize the effectiveness of foreign intelligence services in the United States.

- Organized Crime - Intelligence. This program focuses on the development and use of a corps of carefully selected, high-level informants familiar with the leadership, structure, operations, associates and revenue sources of organized crime.

- General Crimes - Intelligence. This program supports, through the use of informants, the investigation of general crimes within the FBI's jurisdiction. This program is the FBI's tactical criminal intelligence program.

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 12 1976
DOJ

Case No. 5--Public Meeting Opposing U.S. Involvement in Vietnam War (1966)

Informers were used extensively in FBI investigations of possible Communist links to the antiwar movement. An example is the FBI's coverage of various antiwar teach-ins and conferences sponsored by the Universities Committee on Problems of War and Peace. A forty-one page report from the Philadelphia office--based on coverage by thirteen informants and confidential sources--described in complete detail a "public hearing on Vietnam." A Communist Party official had "urged all CP members" in the area to attend, and one of the organizers was alleged to have been a Communist in the early 1950's. Upon receipt from an informant of a list of the speakers, the FBI culled its files for data on their backgrounds. One was described by a source as a Young Socialist Alliance "sympathizer."

[redacted]

Another was a conscientious objector to military service. A third had contributed $5.000 to the National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities. A speaker representing the W.E.B. DuBois Club was identified as a Communist. The FBI covered the meeting with an informant who reported practically verbatim the remarks of all the speakers, including the following:

The Chairman of the Philadelphia Ethical Society
A representative of the American Civil Liberties Union
A representative of the United Electrical Workers
A spokesman for the Young Americans for Freedom
A member of the staff of the "Catholic Worker"
A minister of the African Methodist Episcopal Church
A minister of the Episcopal Church
A representative of the Philadelphia Area Committee to End the War in Vietnam
A Professor of Industrial Economics at Columbia University
A representative of the Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy
A member of Women's Strike for Peace who had traveled to North Vietnam
A member of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom who had visited South Vietnam
A chaplin from Rutgers University
A professor of political science from Villanova University
Another member of Young Americans for Freedom
The former Charge d'Affaires in the South Vietnamese Embassy

This informant's report was so extensive as to be the equivalent of a tape recording, although the FBI report does not indicate that the informant was "wired." Another informant reported the remarks of additional participants.

An official of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
A minister of the church of the Brethren
A Unitarian minister
A representative of United World Federalists
A member of Students for a Democratic Society
A member of the Socialist Workers Party
A spokesman for the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs

The report was prepared as a Letterhead Memorandum with fourteen copies for possible dissemination by the FBI to other Executive Branch agencies. Copies were disseminated to military intelligence agencies, the State Department, and the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions of the Justice Department. SAC, Philadelphia to the FBI Director, Re: Universities Committee on Problems of War and Peace, March 2, 1966 (classified)

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 2-~~26~~ 24-76

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) (2/19/76 review of report) concerning informants

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 3/3/76

Received by: R Kelley

Title: ATTORNy - SSC

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1447

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
2/27/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*
U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Operating procedures
Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Information regarding review of portion of proposed draft of SSC report pertaining to informants in domestic security field.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395

SJM:lhb **ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX**
(4) **IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.**

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1111

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

T-SSC
GEN ✓

94TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1073

8

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 4, 1976

Mr. EDGAR submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on House Administration

---

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence filed on January 29, 1976, and entitled "Report of the Investigations of the United States Intelligence Agencies and Activities" shall be printed as a House document.

V

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

File
5-TM

94TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1073

RESOLUTION

Ordering the printing of the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence.

By Mr. EDGAR

MARCH 4, 1976

Referred to the Committee on House Administration

94TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1074

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 4, 1976

Mrs. FENWICK (for herself, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois, Mr. EDGAR, Mr. CONABLE, Mr. MCKINNEY, Mr. JEFFORDS, and Mr. FINDLEY) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules

---

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, filed on January 29, 1976, and entitled "Report of the Investigation of the United States Intelligence Agencies and Activities" shall be referred to the Committee on House Administration, and such committee shall follow the procedures agreed to between the Select Committee on Intelligence and the President (a summary of which appears beginning at page H289 of the daily edition of the Congressional Record for January 26, 1976) with respect to the disclosure of classified information transmitted to such select committee. After such procedures have been complied with, such report, as may be altered in accordance with such procedures, shall be printed as a House document.

V

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

94TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1074

RESOLUTION

To provide for the speedy printing and publication of the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence.

By Mrs. FENWICK, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois, Mr. EDGAR, Mr. CONABLE, Mr. McKINNEY, Mr. JEFFORDS, and Mr. FINDLEY

MARCH 4, 1976

Referred to the Committee on Rules

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

(copy 2/26/76 memo attached)

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt TWL

FROM : E. C. Peterson

DATE: 3/5/76

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT ON MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAMS

Memorandum sets forth the results of a review of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) report dealing with mail intercept programs.

On 3/4/76, the report prepared by Mr. James Dick of the SSC Staff concerning the mail intercept programs operated by the CIA and the FBI was reviewed by SA James W. Johnson. The report was reviewed to determine if the changes set forth in the memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 2/26/76, had been done. The review indicated the revisions agreed to between Mr. James Dick, SSC, and Mr. James P. Lee, had been done.

ACTION:

For information.

62-116395
1 - 105-288406

JWJ:emg emg
(7)

JWJ

TWL

5-

105-288406

T-GEN SSC
Review of SSC

REC- 104 62-116395 - 1446

MAR 10 1976

COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM KP

84 MAR 11 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : J.J. McDermott / JJM

DATE: 3-11-76

FROM : W.L. Bailey / WLB

SUBJECT: Senstudy

H. Res 1073 3-4-76 94th Congress 2nd session

The attached H. Res 1073 has been received in the Records Section, appropriately initialed, and indicated for file. By use of instant transmittal memorandum, all necessary recording and indexing will be accomplished. It is to be noted this form is for internal use only within the Records Section, principally by the Routing Unit where bulky material not accompanied by memorandum is usually received.

The enclosure, if bulky and not usually filed with other papers in file, may be detached but this action should be clearly noted under the word "Enclosure."

Enc.

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
MAR 11 1976

5 - TJm

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM KP

1 - Mr. J. B. [illegible]dams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
(Attn: S. S. Peelman)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
2/10/76
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Mr. W. R. Wannall

J. G. Deegan

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This informative memorandum to advise of status of Departmental review of FBI files concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and related matters.

You will recall that, commencing 12/6/75, personnel of the Civil Rights Division reviewed portions of our files concerning King and related matters. The last date such review was conducted in 1975 was on 12/19/75. On 2/9/76, Criminal Section Chief Robert A. Murphy resumed review of the King file. He worked on this for less than four hours on that day and was to return the morning of 2/10/76 but had not returned as of the dictation of this memorandum at 3:00 p.m., 2/10/76.

Murphy had been reviewing the King file to the exclusion of other files of interest. The King file is 94 sections in size and, as of 2/9/76, only about 25 sections had been reviewed. On that date, Murphy told Supervisor J. T. Aldhizer that, when he resumed the review the next day, he wanted to start with the portion of the file commencing 1/1/68. This would be Section 77, and thus Murphy would be skipping approximately 50 sections or a little over half of the file.

Murphy has given no indication, and neither has there been an indication from any other Departmental source, as to the true status of the Department's overall review

ORIGINAL FILED IN

#NDR-16 1/19/01
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-106670

① 62-116395 (Senstudy 75)

62-116-[illegible]
NOT RECORDED
MAR 19 1976

SFP:lhb
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

57 MAR 25 1976

of this matter which reportedly was to lead to a judgement by the Department as to whether or not the investigation of King's assassination should be reopened.

ACTION:

None. For information.

1 - Mr. [illegible]allahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Gallagher
1 - Mr. Cooke
1 - Mr. Long
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

PLAINTEXT TELETYPE NITEL

TO SACS SAN FRANCISCO
WFO

2/27/76

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI 62-116395-

CHANGED, UNSUB, AKA, ROBERT LEE LEWIS; IMPERSONATION; OO: SF.

TITLE CHANGED FROM SENSTUDY 75 TO DESIGNATE ROBERT LEE LEWIS AS THE SUBJECT AND IMPERSONATION AS THE CHARACTER.

RE SF NITEL TO THE DIRECTOR, FEBRUARY 23, 1976, CAPTIONED, "SENSTUDY 75."

INQUIRY MADE BY FBIHQ HAS DETERMINED THAT THERE IS NO ONE BY NAME OF ROBERT LEE LEWIS EMPLOYED AS AN INVESTIGATOR FOR THE CHURCH COMMITTEE. IN VIEW THAT LEWIS HAS IMPERSONATED A GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATOR AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN INFORMATION THROUGH THIS IMPERSONATION, YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO IMMEDIATELY CONDUCT APPROPRIATE IMPERSONATION INVESTIGATION, POSITIVELY IDENTIFY LEWIS, OBTAIN TELEPHONE NUMBER OF LEWIS FROM ED MONTGOMERY, AND SET FORTH LEADS FOR WFO TO HANDLE INTERVIEW OF SUBJECT. COPY OF REFERENCED TELETYPE HAS BEEN FURNISHED WFO.

END.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TKR 6:20PM
TELETYPE

CAL:mer (9)
mer

NOTE: SAC, SF advised by teletype 2/23/76, that a Robert Lee Lewis, alleged investigator of the Church Committee, had attempted to get someone to testify before the committee concerning the mishandling of the Hearst case. Inquiry has determined that Lewis is not employed by the Church Committee. This instructs LA to conduct appropriate impersonation investigation.

CL

BHC

JC/DP

ORIGINAL FILED IN 47-55592

Records
cc 62-116395

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 MAR 9 1976

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

SF 476

NR 010 SF PLAIN

4:20 PM NITEL 2/23/76 MCC

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM SAN FRANCISCO (62-5887)

ATTN LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

SENSTUDY 75

~~ON FEB~~RUARY 23, 1976, A SOURCE OF THE OAKLAND RESIDENT AGENCY REPORTED THAT ROBERT LEE LEWIS, INVESTIGATOR FOR THE CHURCH COMMITTEE, HAD BEEN TRYING TO GET SOMEONE TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE MISHANDLING OF THE HEARST CASE. HE WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ED MONTGOMERY, A RETIRED EXAMINER REPORTER, AND POSSIBLY THE HEARSTS.

SAC BATES HAS BEEN PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH MONTGOMERY FOR MANY YEARS. HE CALLED MONTGOMERY AND ASKED HIM CONCERNING THE ABOVE. MONTGOMERY SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A THIRD PARTY ASKING HIM TO CALL LEWIS IN WASHINGTON AS HE WANTED ADVERSE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE FBI. MONTGOMERY CALLED AND WHEN UNABLE TO SPEAK WITH LEWIS AND AFTER BEING ADVISED OF WHAT LEWIS WANTED, HE HUNG UP. ON SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1976, LEWIS CALLED MONTGOMERY. HE TOLD MONTGOMERY HE WANTED SOMEONE TO TESTIFY AS TO HOW THE FBI HAD MESSED UP THINGS ON THE WEST COAST. MONTGOMERY IS NOT SURE IF HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED

46 MAR 4 1976

6

Recorded
File 62-116395

1cc LCD

FIVE

ORIGINAL FILED IN 47-56592

THE HEARST CASE. MONTGOMERY TOLD LEWIS HE HAD NOTHING IN THIS REGARD HE COULD TESTIFY TO, THAT THE FBI WAS DOING A FINE JOB, THAT HE, MONTGOMERY, DID NOT APPROVE OF THE WAY THE CHURCH COMMITTEE HAD HANDLED ITSELF IN THE PAST AND THAT THEY SHOULD GET OFF OF THE BACKS OF THE CIA AND THE FBI AND LET THEM GET ON WITH THE JOB AND THEN HUNG UP.

MONTGOMERY MADE THE COMMENT THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A TERRIBLE WAY TO ATTEMPT TO GET FACTS. SAC BATES SUGGESTED TO HIM IF HE FELT SO STRONGLY ABOUT IT, HE SHOULD CONSIDER WRITING AN ARTICLE FOR THE EXAMINER AS TO THE APPROACH MADE TO HIM BY THE COMMITTEE. MONTGOMERY RETIRED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, BUT IS STILL CLOSE TO THE EXAMINER.

ABOVE BEING SUBMITTED FOR BUREAU'S INFORMATION.

END

2/23/76 Lewis per Elliff SSC
is not a staff member
prd

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

401 THRU 403

406 THRU 421

408

423, 424

425X THRU 428

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams   DATE: 7/3/75

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

At 9:55 a.m. on July 3, 1975, former Assistant Director Ivan Conrad telephonically advised me that he has been contacted and requested to appear for interview by the Senate Select Committee during the week of July 7, 1975, concerning Martin Luther King. Mr. Conrad expressed great concern about his appearance for such an interview and requested guidance.

I told him that the Director was cooperating with the Committee in their inquiry, but that in regard to matters that would identify informants, affect current operations, or compromise very sensitive techniques any testimony may require limitation to members of the Committee or to the Chairman rather than staff interviewers.

Mr. Conrad then asked whether he should respond in the event questions were raised concerning sensitive matters regarding the U.S. mails. I told him that in the event questions were asked which appeared to be beyond the scope of the subject matter indicated for the interview, or which in his judgment would involve the three areas of concern expressed above, it would be appropriate for him to request a recess for the purpose of consulting with the Bureau.

Mr. Conrad inquired as to his possible criminal liability and whether the FBI would furnish him counsel. I explained to him the difficulties imposed by conflicts of interest in that regard and that the FBI could not furnish him personal counsel. I told him that if he felt the need for advice as to his personal status, he should consider obtaining the services of a personal counsel. He said that he would consider that and that although he was specifically not making a request at this time, he would consider in the future requesting that the Bureau pay for his private counsel.

428

REC-88

JUL 15 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis (Attn: Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (5)

84 JUL 31 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Conrad was cordial and said he understood fully that I was not in a position to furnish him legal advice. I suggested that he contact the Bureau prior to his appearance for the interview in order to be advised formally as to his release from the Bureau employment agreement concerning secrecy and he agreed.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall WRW JPT

FROM : W.O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J.B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
DATE: 7/24/75
1 - Mr. W.R.Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J.P. Thomas

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

This is to record inquiry received from Mr. Leon Ulman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and recommend response to him.

On 7/22/75, Mr. Ulman called Assistant Director - Legal Counsel J.A. Mintz to request assistance concerning an assignment he had been given by the Attorney General (AG) relating to the current investigation being conducted by the Senate Select Committee (SSC). In accordance with Mr. Mintz' referral to our Senstudy project group, Mr. Ulman was contacted 7/22/75 by Supervisor J. P. Thomas. Mr. Ulman said that the AG had requested his office to prepare, by 7/25/75, the fullest possible response to the question, "To what extent has the AG been involved in consideration or approval of policies and activities of U.S. foreign and military intelligence agencies?" Mr. Ulman said that he had requested the Criminal Division of the Department to conduct research on this matter but, being unfamiliar with foreign intelligence matters, desired to know whether we could in any way assist him. He was informed that the FBI is basically not a U.S. foreign intelligence agency. He responded that some of our operations involve foreign intelligence and again asked if we could assist. He was told that we certainly could not furnish any full answer, but would attempt to see if we could contribute something to his assignment. It was also suggested to Mr. Ulman that he consider contacting Mr. K. William O'Connor, who is coordinating many aspects of the SSC investigation for the Department, and might be able to clarify the request or contribute to the response and that he consider contacting CIA. He indicated he did not feel that contact with CIA would be productive. It was agreed that the inquiry appears to relate to the AG institutionally rather than to any involvement of the incumbent, Mr. Levi.

REC-102 62-116395-427

JUL 28 1975

MDR 16

62-116395

JPT:bkb/lhb lhb
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/02 BY SP2ALM/EHL

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUL 29 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

Inquiry of Intelligence Division personnel, who might have pertinent information, developed the following information which might be offered to Mr. Ulman: (1) The only specific instance in which we are aware that the AG is involved in consideration or approval of activities of the FBI regarding foreign intelligence is that when we desire to effect electronic coverage, for ourselves or on request of another agency, for the purpose of obtaining positive foreign intelligence information or foreign counterintelligence purposes, we seek the approval of the AG. Other agencies might do likewise. (2) The National Security Act of 1947, approved by the President 7/26/47, created the National Security Council (NSC). NSC Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 1 was revised on 7/7/49 and added the FBI as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). By a subsequent revision of NSCID No. 1 on 9/15/58, IAC became the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), with the FBI still a member. USIB concerns itself with foreign intelligence matters. However, inasmuch as the FBI itself is a member of USIB, and historically the FBI has not coordinated USIB matters with the AG,* the Bureau's role in USIB is not considered pertinent to the inquiry regarding the involvement of the AG in foreign intelligence matters. (3) Our records indicate that prior to the establishment of the NSC, former FBI Director Hoover recommended that the AG be a member of the committee which later became the NSC. Apparently the National Security Act of 1947 did provide for the AG to attend NSC meetings as a member if the President so desired. Our records indicate the AG did attend some NSC meetings as a member during the 1947-48 period. However, by memorandum 8/19/49, AAG Peyton Ford informed Mr. Hoover that the AG could no longer attend NSC meetings as a member because of the amendment to the National Security Act made by Section 3 of Public Law 216, 81st Congress, approved 8/10/49. (4) On 11/5/71, the White House announced the establishment of the

*except in important policy matters such as the recent revision of NSCID No. 9.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) with the AG as a member. The President's 11/5/71 memorandum stated the NSCIC "will give direction and guidance on national substantive intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence consumer." Assistant AG Robert Mardian attended a meeting of NSCIC on 12/14/71 as the AG's representative. We cannot document it, but the recollection of FBI personnel involved in NSCIC affairs is that Mr. Mardian reported thereafter to the AG that NSCIC activities did not concern the Department and that neither the AG nor Mardian were subsequently involved in NSCIC affairs. On 4/24/74, the AG was still listed as a member of NSCIC. However, in August, 1974, FBI inquiry of a member of the U. S. intelligence committee staff elicited the opinion that the AG was no longer considered to be a member of NSCIC because the AG's office had not been participating in NSCIC affairs or attending its meetings; further, the AG was not among the addressees of papers being sent out in preparation for the next NSCIC meeting. However, it appears that the AG may still be nominally listed as a member of NSCIC. (5) It might also be useful for Mr. Ulman to consult Mr. Kevin Maroney of the Internal Security Section of the Department inasmuch as Mr. Maroney has long been involved in matters relating to internal security and foreign intelligence, and may be aware of the extent of the AG's involvement.

ACTION:

With your approval, Office of Legal Counsel will convey the information in the preceding paragraph to Mr. Ulman, who said he can be contacted by telephone on 187-2051. He requested an expeditious response.

Delivered to Ullman 7/24/75 JPM

JPT

JPM

PLM

WRW

WOB

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General July 18, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated July 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is a letter from Director, FBI, to Chairman Frank Church, SSC, dated July 18, 1975.

A copy of the letter involved is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JWJ:cjm
(7)

REC- 102

62-116395-426

5 JUL 25 1975

7/23/75

ENCLOSURE

MDR 16

PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SECRET

July 18, 1975

Honorable Frank Church
Chairman, Select Committee to
  Study Governmental Operations
  With Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Reference is made to a letter of Mr. John T. Elliff of the Senate Select Committee Staff to Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of Justice dated July 14, 1975, wherein one of the requests dealt with Operation ORKID. (S)

Due to the extreme sensitivity of that operation, I will discuss it with you at a mutually agreeable time.

11/15/00 MDR 16

Respectfully,

CLASSIFIED BY: SP2 ALM/EHL
REASON: 1.5 (c d)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1,6

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

ENCLOSURE

1 - The Attorney General

REC- 102

426

5 JUL 25 1975

JWJ:sjm sjm
(7)

~~TOP~~ SECRET

NOTE:

ORKID is code name for our program to technically penetrate the new Soviet Embassy complex at Mount Alto, Wisconsin Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C. (S)

Classified by 3676, ~~X~~GDS 2 and 3, Indefinite.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 7/14/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

TS

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence activities, foreign

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Operation ORKID (S) extremely sensitive operation and requested Senator Church discuss with Director FBI at mutually agreeable time.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

11/15/00 MDR 16

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 AM/EHL

REASON: 1.5 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

July 18, 1975

+ - ~~general~~ - request

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated July 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is a letter from Director, FBI, to Chairman Frank Church, SSC, dated July 18, 1975.

A copy of the letter involved is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

426

JWJ:sjm
(7)

Delivered to
Sherry Towell Office
mgr. 7/23/75
RTT

7/14

426

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General 6/25/75

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to some of the requests. A copy of the memorandum and a copy of each of the 8 documents responsive to the Committee's request are being furnished for your records.

In accordance with the request of Mr. K. William O'Connor, we are deferring to him any action necessary to obtain appropriate clearance from the White House, prior to giving the Committee Staff access to the above six documents.

The documents involved and which are being furnished, herewith, are not for forwarding to the SSC inasmuch as only access for review at FBIHQ is being afforded the Committee Staff.

REC-102

62-116395-425X

Enclosures (10)

62-116395

9 AUG 8 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ENCLOSURE

JWJ:dan
(8)

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

~~TOP~~ SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 AUG 1 1 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

√ W.O C [illegible] - H063[illegible]

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 25, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON PLAN,"
COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, and appendices thereto, which requested certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part 1, Item 2, requested the following:

A letter dated June 20, 1969, from Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, to the Director of the FBI concerning resources being targeted toward the monitoring of foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States, effectiveness of such resources, gaps in intelligence, and steps which should be taken to provide maximum coverage.

Item 3 requested the following:

The response by the FBI to the letter set out in Item 2 and all other FBI memoranda and other materials pertaining to the correspondence.

Documents responsive to the Committee's request have been assembled and are available for review at FBIHQ by appropriately cleared SSC personnel.

JWJ:dan
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

WOC

TJM

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

NOTE:

Unexcised copy of FBI report entitled "Foreign Support For Revolutionary Protest Movements in the United States," dated 6/30/69 is enclosed. Per telephone conversation of SA William O. Cregar with Special Counsel K. William O'Connor on 6/11/75, it was agreed copy of letter dated 6/20/69, from Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President to the Director should be included in our response to SSC's request and that Special Counsel O'Connor would obtain appropriate clearance from White House to give access to SSC staff. A review of the file indicates there is no documented copy as to the sourcing of paragraphs in the 38 page report entitled "Foreign Support For Revolutionary Protest Movement in the United States" dated 6/30/69, classified "Top Secret." To locate the source of each statement in the report would necessitate an extensive search and review of Bureau files.

On 6/18/75, Walt Elder, CIA; Benson Buffham, NSA; and Kenneth R. Bailey, DIA, were contacted by SA W. O. Cregar and advised of the SSC request for material responsive to request of Tom Charles Huston, White House, dated 6/20/69, which was also forwarded to those agencies, and that the above report would be made available for SSC personnel to review at FBIHQ. This report was disseminated to Tom Huston, White House, and when prepared consideration was given to concealment and protection of original source. The report was reviewed by Senstudy 75 representatives and appropriate deletions were made relating to privacy considerations and/or protection of sensitive sources or methods, or any adverse effect on ongoing operations. An excised copy of report is being forwarded to the Attorney General. The review indicates that some material undoubtedly came from third agencies and/or foreign sources but is set forth in a manner not to pinpoint any specific agency or foreign source. It is recommended the report be made available for review of SSC representative at FBIHQ in its present excised form.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

dressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 25

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/[illegible]/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Documents pertaining to "Huston Plan," COINTELPRO, & other practices & programs; Huston Plan & related developments. Appendix C, Part 1, Item 2.

Originating Office: FBI 310 PM

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec Sec

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP3ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-425X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/25/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix C, Part 1, Item 2+3

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

TS

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

For review at FBIHQ. A letter dated 6/20/69 from Huston to Director of FBI concerning resources being targeted toward the monitoring of foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in U.S., effectiveness of such resources, gaps in intelligence, and steps which should be taken to provide maximum coverage. All FBI memoranda and other materials pertaining to the correspondence. MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

July 1, 1969

BY LIAISON

Mr. Tom Charles Huston
Staff Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Huston:

Pursuant to your request of June 20, 1969, there is enclosed a report concerning foreign communist support of revolutionary protest groups in the United States.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure
FBG:pab/djb

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

~~TOP SECRE~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Excised

SUBJECT: FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2 ALM/EHL
ON 11/14/00

DATE: June 30, 1969

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRE~~

FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION Page

I. FOREIGN COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1

- A. Influence of Domestic Communist Left 1
  - 1. Communist Party, USA 1
  - 2. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups 3
    - a. Progressive Labor Party 3
    - b. Revolutionary Union 5
    - c. Miscellaneous Pro-Chinese Groups 6
      - Communist Party, USA (Marxist-Leninist) 6
      - Committee of Correspondence 7
  - 3. Trotskyite Groups 7
- B. Role of Communist-Bloc Intelligence 9
- C. Cuban Intelligence Service 10
- D. Chinese Support 12
- E. International Conferences 13
  - 1. International Conference on Vietnam 14
  - 2. Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) Conference 14
  - 3. Bratislava Conference 14
  - 4. International Cultural Congress 15
  - 5. Japanese Conference on Vietnam 15
  - 6. International Assembly 16
  - 7. Budapest Conference 16
  - 8. Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam 16
  - 9. Stockholm Conference on Vietnam 17
  - 10. World Congress of Women and World Peace Council Conferences 19
- F. Visits to the United States by Foreign Revolutionaries 19

G. Contact Between Leaders of United States Protest Groups and Representatives of Foreign Communist Groups 21
    1. New Left Movement 21
    2. Black Extremist Movement 23

II. RESOURCES NOW TARGETED TOWARD MONITORING FOREIGN COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 29

A. Domestic Communist Groups 29
    1. Communist Party, USA 29
    2. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups 29
        a. Progressive Labor Party (PLP) 29
        b. Revolutionary Union (RU) 29
    3. Trotskyite Groups 29
        a. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) 29

B. Diplomatic Establishments and Intelligence Operations 30
    1. Soviet and Satellite 30
    2. Chinese 30
    3. Cuban Intelligence Service 31

C. International Conferences 31

D. Contacts Between Revolutionary Leaders and Leaders of Foreign Communist Governments 31

E. Travel of Foreign Leaders to the United States 31

III. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 32

ORGANIZATION APPENDIX 35

    Black Panther Party (BPP) 35
    Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV) 35
    National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) 35
    Republic of New Africa (RNA) 36
    Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 36
    Student Mobilization Committee (SMC) 37
    Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 37
    Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) 37
    Women Strike for Peace (WSP) 38

INTRODUCTION

Although the term "revolutionary protest movement" cannot be precisely defined because of the amorphous nature of such movements, it can be said that revolutionary protest movements existing within the United States fall into two broad categories, i.e. the New Left movement and the black extremist movement.

The New Left movement, which grew out of the civil rights struggle of the 1950s, is a loose-knit, undisciplined group of individuals who view our system of government as irredeemably corrupt and oppressive. Their stated aims and objectives are simple; they are dedicated to the total destruction of our traditional values and democratic system of government.

The New Left movement in this country is clearly an integral part of a world-wide revolutionary movement of students and young intellectuals. There is a definite similarity of goals, a uniformity of action from country to country, and a rapport among leftist organizations and individuals in this and foreign countries.

Like the New Left movement, the black extremist movement in the United States can be traced to the civil rights movement of the early 1960s and the violent response to civil rights agitation. This is best seen in the history of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), formed in 1960 in Atlanta, Georgia. SNCC was one of the moving forces behind the Freedom Riders of the early 1960s and was the target of Ku Klux Klan violence. In May, [redacted], [redacted] [redacted] was elected chairman of SNCC. The lack of progress toward integration since the 1954 school desegregation decision helped [redacted] to change SNCC from a nonviolent group to a full-blown black revolutionary organization. Other black nationalists took up [redacted] cry for a "bloody revolution" and a proliferation of black extremist groups seized the initiative for change from established civil rights organizations and now advocate outright revolution and destruction of our form of government.

Foreign communist support of revolutionary protest movements in the United States can be manifested in a number of ways. Since the Communist Party, USA, is under the domination and control of the Soviet Union, it can be used more and more as a vehicle to support these movements. Similarly, the Progressive Labor Party and other pro-Chinese Communist groups can be utilized by Communist China as a channel for rendering support to protest movements in the United States. Other traditional channels which can be used more are the communist-bloc diplomatic establishments and the clandestine intelligence services operated by the communists within the United States.

In addition to the channels of communication open to foreign communists within the confines of the United States, leaders of United States-based protest movements have in recent years begun to reach out beyond the continental limits of the United States to solicit support of foreign communists and revolutionary protest movements abroad. New Leftists and black extremists travel abroad extensively and participate freely in various international conferences which are invariably attended by and sometimes even sponsored by communists. New Left and black extremist leaders frequently confer with representatives of foreign communist governments. At the same time, revolutionaries frequently travel to the United States and confer with leaders of protest movements in this country.

All of these "channels of communication" are treated in this study which is designed to show the extent to which revolutionary protest movements in the United States are receiving foreign communist support.

I. FOREIGN COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Influence of Domestic Communist Left

1. Communist Party, USA

Since it was founded in September, 1919, the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) has been unswerving in its allegiance to the Soviet Union. Over the years the Soviets have utilized the CPUSA as a trusted vehicle to influence revolutionary activity within the United States. Accordingly, FBI investigations of CPUSA activities have included the objective of determining the extent to which the Soviets may have been using the CPUSA as a possible channel for Soviet support of the current revolutionary protest movements in this country. All available information derived from these investigations to date indicates that while the CPUSA has made overtures to the revolutionary protest groups there has been limited acceptance of the CPUSA by such groups.

In recognition of its lack of support among youthful activists on college campuses, the CPUSA is currently making plans to establish a new youth group directed toward youth in industry. Party leaders, on the other hand, have criticized New Left groups such as the Students for a Democratic Society as petty bourgeois radicals. Party youth who have attempted to have the CPUSA relate more clearly with such groups have been isolated and silenced. The CPUSA theoretical organ, "Political Affairs," in its March and April, 1969, issues, contained a two-part article entitled "The Student Rebellion," which clearly set out CPUSA opposition to the anti-Soviet, anti-CPUSA line of student protest groups.

Within the past year leaders of the CPUSA in the Midwest met with leaders of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) to discuss closer cooperation or possible recruitment of these individuals into the CPUSA. These overtures were completely rebuffed by the SDS people who stated that while there were no disagreements with CPUSA philosophy it is most doubtful the CPUSA is relevant today. When it was proposed that there be some form of collectivity between the SDS and the CPUSA, the SDS leaders replied that the CPUSA is not involved in SDS collectives because the CPUSA has nothing to contribute.

Subsequently, a leader of the SDS in conversation with leaders of the CP of Illinois stated that the "Establishment" as it exists today must be changed, even if this change must be through force. He added that the "Establishment" must be replaced by a communist government. He further stated that there has to be a communist party and there has to be a communist revolution and that SDS is the only group to organize the youth, thus rejecting the CPUSA as a possible vehicle for bringing about this revolution.

Available information discloses Soviet theoreticians now recognize their lack of status in the revolutionary student movement in the United States and the need to become influential in the current ideological struggle in order to orient it to Soviet style communism.

With regard to the activists in black extremist groups, the CPUSA is under a severe strain in attempting to develop a program to attract these individuals while at the same time adhering to its pro-Soviet and Marxist-Leninist ideology. The fight within the CPUSA on the way in which to handle the black question is a bitter one and no clear-cut policy has been established. An attempt by black nationalists within the CPUSA to pass a resolution recommending that Negroes arm themselves for self-defense was overwhelmingly defeated at the recent 19th National Convention. In addition, the pro-Maoist stance of the extremist Black Panther Party (BPP) is anathema to the pro-Soviet CPUSA.

CPUSA leaders have stated that the Black Panther Party may be a vehicle to stimulate revolutionary ferment among Negro youth if the Panthers can be taught a true Marxist-Leninist approach. Leaders of the CPUSA in California have been in contact with the Black Panther Party and have assisted in the setting up of a defense committee for Panthers who have been arrested. However, CPUSA leaders admit that it is not possible to talk to Black Panthers as communists. One CPUSA member was instructed to penetrate the Black Panther Party and to try to put over the CPUSA program. He did join the Black Panther Party but when he was exposed as a CPUSA member as a result of attempting to advance CPUSA policies he was expelled from the Black Panther Party.

This does not mean that the CPUSA is not striving to play a more effective role in its relationship with activists of both New Left and black extremist groups. Individual Party members do play a role in demonstrations, activities, and workings of these groups. Party publications trumpet in support of all demonstrations which stir up discord in the United States whether it be economic, social, or against the war in Vietnam.

2. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups

a. Progressive Labor Party

Recent years have witnessed the formation of a myriad of extremist organizations enunciating the tenets of Communist China and Mao Tse-tung. The majority have been ineffectual paper organizations and not viable operations. However, one group, the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), is making significant organizational strides in major American cities and on a number of college campuses.

The PLP was founded in 1962, by extremist elements of the CPUSA who were dissatisfied with CPUSA's "revisionism" and who advocated the following of the Chinese communist line in all areas of policy. It is headed by such devoted revolutionaries as [redacted], [redacted] of the [redacted] Communist Party, who was expelled from the CPUSA for extremist views; and [redacted], who, [redacted] was found guilty of conspiracy to riot, conspiracy to advocate criminal anarchy, and advocating criminal anarchy.

Headquartered in New York City, the PLP has established active branches in a number of major metropolitan areas including Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Newark, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. During recent months, it has made a concerted effort to establish PLP branches throughout the United States. Spearheading this drive has been [redacted],

[redacted] of the PLP and an expert on organization. The PLP is particularly interested in expanding its membership on the West Coast as evidenced by the recent assignment of [redacted], [redacted], to Los Angeles, for that purpose.

The PLP maintains close contact with pro-Chinese Communist groups abroad and its publications consistently follow the Chinese Communist line. For example, during early 1968 the PLP issued a pamphlet in which it proclaimed that the PLP is among groups which "proudly make common cause with each other and with the Chinese for world revolution" and boasted of its support of the Viet Cong in defeat of our "common enemy, the United States ruling class."

Apropos of the strong rapport existing between the PLP and the Communist Party of China, the latter informed top-level PLP members in 1967 that it considered the PLP to be the only revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party in the United States.

As evidence of Chinese Communist support of the PLP, information has been developed which revealed that during 1967 and 1968 the PLP received a total of more than $13,000 from a European bank where an organ of the Chinese Communist Government maintains an account. During 1968, the PLP received more than $2,000 from Hong Kong, believed to have emanated from Chinese Communist sources.

PLP leaders have been in periodic contact with Chinese Communist agencies and have on occasion visited the Chinese mainland. [redacted] and [redacted], members of PLP [redacted], travelled to the Red Chinese mainland in March, 1969.

Of equal significance is the PLP's stepped-up efforts to extend its influence on college campuses. The PLP's ability to seize upon situations ripe for violence was revealed by its role within Students for a Democratic Society

(SDS) during the Columbia University riots, the turmoil at San Francisco State College, and participation in the student unrest at the University of California at Berkeley California.

The PLP has been particularly successful in its attempts to play a major role in the activities of SDS. During the SDS National Convention, which ended on June 22, 1969, at Chicago, the PLP element succeeded in splitting the organization into two separate groups, each electing national officers and claiming their respective groups to be in control of SDS.

b. Revolutionary Union

The Revolutionary Union (RU) was formed in the San Francisco area in early 1968 as the nucleus of a proposed new militant national Marxist-Leninist organization with allegiance to the thought of Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party of China. After operating for over a year in an underground fashion, the RU partially surfaced in April, 1969.

Since its formation, the RU has organized into a number of "collectives" in the San Francisco area. Its members are old-time militant renegades from the CPUSA, former leaders of the PLP, and young high school and college militants who have gained some notoriety as activists in local campus and related disorders. RU members reportedly are accumulating weapons and engaging in firearms and guerrilla warfare training. They have played a prominent role in disorders at Stanford; at the University of California at Berkeley; at San Francisco State College; and in connection with the strike of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union, which has resulted in violence in the Richmond, California, area.

At the present time, RU leaders are seeking to establish rapport with other militant "collectives" and increase their influence in the SDS. The RU is in competition with the PLP and is seeking to discredit PLP in the eyes of the Chinese Communists and neutralize PLP influence in SDS.

One of the [redacted] founders of the RU is [redacted], a long-time communist who turned first against the CPUSA and then dropped out of his leadership role in the PLP. In 1965, [redacted] clandestinely travelled to Communist China where he resided for approximately two years utilizing a pseudonym.

Shortly after his return to the United States in August, 1967, he advised reliable sources that he had returned "to do a job" for the Chinese communists. He outlined a three-fold mission: (1) to form a national coalition of domestic Marxist-Leninists sympathetic to Mao Tse-tung thought and the Communist Party of China; (2) to develop and forward information of interest to the Chinese communists; and (3) to recruit politically trusted youth who would travel to Communist China for an indeterminable period of cadre training after which they would return to this country and operate in behalf of Communist China in a nonpublic or submerged fashion. There is a strong presumption these latter individuals would be utilized as recruited intelligence agents operating clandestinely in behalf of China.

In late 1967, [redacted] indicated a desire to obtain intelligence relating to the Soviet Union which he would forward to China. He provided funds for this intelligence-gathering effort and also to support the operations of a domestic pro-Communist China organization. He claimed to have a secret line of communication with Communist China. After completing diversionary travel to Los Angeles, [redacted] flew to London in early 1969 and while there contacted the Communist Chinese diplomatic establishment on two occasions. Thereafter, he flew to Paris and contacted the Chinese Embassy in Paris on two occasions. While in Paris, he dispatched a letter to an address in China. Significantly, the letter was directed to the name he used as a pseudonym while residing in China. He has stated he is able to communicate with them, but he is unable to receive adequate responses. [redacted] also indicates he is suffering from a lack of funds.

c. Miscellaneous Pro-Chinese Groups

Since the development of the Sino-Soviet ideological split, many factions have evolved from the American communist movement which to various degrees have lent allegiance to the Communist Party of China. Two are worthy of mention.

Communist Party, USA (Marxist-Leninist)

The Communist Party, USA (Marxist-Leninist) (CPUSA-ML) was created in late 1965 primarily as a vehicle for anti-United States propaganda and activity of its leader [redacted], a former member of the [redacted] The CPUSA-ML in its initial stage proposed to conduct guerrilla warfare training, including the use of firearms; to organize cells in the South to exploit the racial situation; to agitate the population and to create situations which would require the use of Federal troops.

For a time the CPUSA-ML operated in California the Workers International Bookstore, an outlet for propaganda material originating in Communist China. The organization has been plagued by factionalism based upon the egotism of its leadership. [redacted] and a key aide, [redacted], split into two separate groups. In November, 1967, [redacted] and another member of the CPUSA-ML traveled to England where they made contact and sought liaison with a number of British pro-Communist China groups. Thereafter, they traveled to Paris where [redacted] was in contact with the Albanian Legation and the Chinese Embassy seeking funds, literature for his organization and extension of his travel to Communist China. Available information indicates [redacted] was rebuffed by both the Chinese and Albanians.

Committee of Correspondence

The Committee of Correspondence was organized in 1967 by [redacted] of Seattle, a former leader of [redacted] This Committee, which has ties in California, publishes "The Voice," an anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese periodical. [redacted] group is in contact with other pro-Chinese groups and is seeking to establish influence and contacts within the domestic Negro nationalist and New Left movements. [redacted] was in attendance at the recent SDS National Convention as an observer and he has engaged in teaching informal classes in Marxism-Leninism. He is a frequent author of articles in "New Left Notes," a publication of the National Office of the SDS.

3. Trotskyite Groups

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP), founded in 1938, is a militant revolutionary group based on the theories of Marx, Engels, and Lenin as interpreted by Leon Trotsky rather than Joseph Stalin.

In addition to its avowed aim to eventually overthrow our form of Government, the SWP's most immediate aim and objective is to hold together the coalition of antiwar groups prevalent in the country today. It also seeks public acceptability by running candidates for political office on local, state and national levels. SWP candidates for President and Vice President of the United States were successful in having their names placed on some 19 state ballots during the 1968 elections. They also traveled to South Vietnam where they engaged in discussions with United States servicemen.

The Trotskyite Fourth International (FI), self-styled as the World Party of the Socialist Revolution, is headquartered in Paris, France, and claims to be fighting for the realization of Leon Trotsky's ideas. The SWP was forced by the limitations of the Voorhis Act of 1940 to withdraw its official affiliation with the FI. Nevertheless, the SWP maintains "fraternal ties" with the FI and continually has "observers" in attendance at its international meetings.

The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), SWP youth affiliate, also headquartered in New York City, was originally formed in 1957 by former members of socialist and communist youth organizations. One of its primary purposes is to recruit youth into the socialist camp who ultimately will become members of the SWP. The entire National Executive Committee of the YSA is composed of individuals who are also members of the SWP. Most of the YSA chapters are located on or near college campuses.

In addition to acting as a recruiting mechanism for ultimate SWP membership, the YSA's current main objective is to organize, dominate, control and perpetuate the antiwar movement in the country. The YSA, together with the SWP, credit themselves with organizing a number of massive antiwar demonstrations.

The YSA National Convention, held in Chicago, Illinois, from November 28 to December 1, 1968, was attended by 791 registered individuals, including 405 current active members representing 29 states and 128 cities. Guests came from Canada, Mexico, France and Germany. During the four days of the Convention, the YSA recruited approximately 60 new members.

Because the YSA is a youth group consisting in the main of college students, most of its activities take place on or near college campuses. Its members have participated in many of the campus disorders which have recently swept the country. For the past several years, [redacted], [redacted] member and former national officer of the YSA, has been the dominant leader of the campus disorders and police confrontations on the campus of the University of California at Berkeley.

The foreign affiliations of the YSA are the same as those of the SWP.

After the French student uprising in the Spring of 1968, a leader of the SWP stated that for years the SWP has afforded financial and theoretical assistance and material to maintain the Trotskyist cadre in France and that this assistance was paying off.

In 1968, a leader of the SWP noted that the role of the student youth in France was a new element injected into the spring uprising in that country and that the young militants of the Trotskyite Jeunesse Communiste Revolutionnaire played a key role in spite of its small force. He related that the role that American youth will play in the building of the American revolution must be similar.

In December, 1968, fourteen YSA and/or SWP members traveled to Cuba as guests of the Cuban Government to join in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. Since returning from their one-month stay in Cuba, these individuals have participated in numerous lectures and discussions on college campuses throughout the United States supporting Fidel Castro's revolutionary views.

B. Role of Communist-Bloc Intelligence

Undoubtedly, as the number one target of communist intelligence agencies throughout the world, the United States is faced with the reality of skilled communist agents acting against the interests of our Nation. For years, the communist bloc of nations, including the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia, have had diplomatic, official and quasi-official representatives stationed in their establishments in this country.

Currently, these establishments exist in New York City; Washington, D. C.; Pittsburgh; and Chicago with a total complement of over 1,000 communist nationals and about 1,400 dependents. Our investigations have disclosed there are over 350 known or highly suspected intelligence officers or agents among them, of whom about 220 are Soviet nationals.

In addition to this open or "legal" channel of intelligence operations, the communist-bloc nations utilize highly clandestine "illegal" networks which have no observable contact with the communist official establishments. The members of these networks who are sent here from abroad with fraudulent documents and fictitious cover stories perform intelligence collection tasks as do the communist intelligence agents operating under diplomatic or official cover. In time of emergency or war involving the United States and communist countries, the "illegal" networks would assume the primary collection role for communist countries whose diplomats and officials would be interned or expelled.

In spite of the extensive nature of communist-bloc intelligence operations to penetrate and subvert the United States, there is little evidence that these intelligence-gathering services are acting as channels for communist support of the revolutionary protest movements here. A significant exception to this statement is the known activity of certain Cuban intelligence agents acting under the cover of official assignment to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) in New York City.

C. Cuban Intelligence Service

Export of the Cuban revolution is the fundamental principle of Cuba's foreign policy. We have determined that in the United States such policy is manifested by clandestine support of Puerto Rican independence groups and the fomenting of racial strife and student disorders throughout the United States.

In September, 1967, two officers of the Cuban Intelligence Service (CIS) assigned to the CMUN told a representative of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico (NPPR) in New York City that Cuba was prepared to offer Puerto Rican independentists weapons and material. In April, 1968, a CIS officer at the CMUN delivered to a representative of the

Puerto Rican Independence Movement (Movimiento Pro-Independencia de Puerto Rico - MPIPR) a message from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC). The message expressed CPC solidarity with and support of the MPIPR in the latter's struggle for independence. Cuban support has included guerrilla training for some leaders of current violence in Puerto Rico.

With reference to the fomenting of racial strife and student disorders in the United States by Cuba, our investigation of [redacted] is a case in point. He arrived in the United States in August, 1967, to assume duties [redacted] at the CMUN. He left the United States on February 20, 1969, at the State Department's request based upon the results of our investigation of him. At the time of his departure, he held the rank of Counselor, second in order of diplomatic precedence at the CMUN.

Our investigation of [redacted] determined that he was a principal link between the Cuban Government and leaders of black extremist and New Left student groups in the United States. He gave advice and counsel to such leaders, including [redacted] and [redacted], then affiliated with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC); furnished Cuban propaganda materials to them; and arranged visits to Cuba for unknown purposes by many of them.

During early May, 1968, while in Washington, D. C., ostensibly as a representative of the Cuban Government to the Pan American Health Organization, [redacted] instructed [redacted] to "continue to follow Plan A-5." [redacted] was then agitating in Washington, D. C., following the serious racial disorders here of the preceding month. The significance of [redacted]' instructions to [redacted] is unknown; however, an SDS plan of similar terminology resulted in an undisciplined mass protest and violence at Columbia University, also during April, 1968.

The intelligence functions of [redacted] at the CMUN appear to have been taken over by [redacted], lower in diplomatic rank ([redacted]) but superior to [redacted] in the CIS hierarchy ([redacted].

[redacted] arrived in the United States on September 6, 1968. Our investigation of him has determined that he acts as a clearing agent for American citizens of various backgrounds who travel to Cuba, associates with individuals who are affiliated with black extremist and New Left groups, and has been operationally associated in New York City with Soviet intelligence personnel. He acted as interpreter for [redacted] during a visit of the latter in Cuba.

D. Chinese Support

Communist China, while having no diplomatic or official establishments in the United States, is posing an intelligence threat constantly through individuals residing in or visiting this country. Various residents or citizens of our Nation who have Chinese origins or background have come to occupy prominent or significant positions in fields of science, education, industry, defense, and government. Some of these individuals in the past have acted in a manner hostile to our national interests, apparently motivated by fear or sympathy with the communist regime in mainland China.

The Chinese Communists have in the past mounted a propaganda attack against the United States Government with the intention of aggravating the racial situation in this country. On April 16, 1968, for instance, the New China News Agency (NCNA) broadcasted a statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung in support of the Afro-American struggle "against" violence. Mao described this struggle as "waged by the exploited and oppressed black people for freedom and emancipation. . ." and stated it represented a call for the "oppressed people of the United States to fight against the barbarous rule of the monopoly capitalist class." This was Mao's first major statement on this subject subsequent to 1963.

Hong Kong newspapers, on April 18, 1968, reported that Peking was transformed on the previous day into a camp of militant support for American Negroes whose "certain victory" over imperialism was proclaimed by hundreds of thousands of marching Chinese. A parade supporting Mao's message was reported to have lasted from seven in the morning until eight-thirty in the evening.

For several years, the NCNA has been forwarding large quantities of anti-United States propaganda material to Negro publications and pro-Chinese communist groups in the United States. Information was received in May, 1968, which disclosed the NCNA had commenced circulating photographs in this country depicting racial riots, arsonist activity, and other civil disorders participated in by the American Negro.

Data was received on May 3, 1968, revealing a news release had been sent from China Features, Peking, China, to the Black Organization of Students, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey. The news release contained a statement by Mao Tse-tung in which mention was made of support of the Afro-American struggle against violent repression.

The BPP makes widespread use of the "Red Book" in instructing its members. The "Red Book" is a collection of quotations by Mao Tse-tung. Sections of it have been incorporated into the BPP "Political Education Kit." One such section advocates the abolition of war through war and states that in order to get rid of the gun it "is necessary to pick up the gun."

During January, 1969, a BPP leader in Los Angeles had a poster in his possession which had been published by the Peoples Fine Arts Press, Shanghai, China. It was captioned "Support the Peoples of the World in Their Anti-Imperialist Struggle."

E. International Conferences

Numerous conferences throughout the world during the past few years have evidenced both the international character of the revolutionary protest movement and the desire of foreign elements to influence the conduct of that movement within the United States. The majority of these meetings have focused on opposition to the United States position in Vietnam. As active participants in these gatherings, representatives of militant groups within the United States have joined with their foreign counterparts in efforts to undermine the United States. A representative sampling of such conferences will illustrate this point, and, in addition, give some indication as to the disruptive, anti-United States proposals made at them.

1. International Conference on Vietnam

Stockholm was the scene of the International Conference on Vietnam held from July 6 through July 9, 1967. The World Peace Council, an international communist front organization, was one of the principal organizers of this conference. Among the 452 persons who attended the conference were delegates from communist countries. Among those present from the United States were [redacted]; CPUSA National Committee member [redacted]; the [redacted]; [redacted], of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; and [redacted], then an official of the National Conference of New Politics.

The conference made plans for a world "Peace in Vietnam Day" to coincide with the antiwar demonstration in Washington, D. C., on October 21-22, 1967. Our investigation of this matter disclosed that a massive demonstration of approximately 35,000 people demonstrated in Washington, D. C., which demonstration culminated with an assault on the Pentagon. Demonstrations were also held in various other cities, both inside and outside of the United States.

2. Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) Conference

In July and early August, 1967, [redacted], of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, was a guest of the Cuban Government and an "honorary delegate" to the conference of the LASO held in Cuba. He sought to tie in the Negro extremist activities in the United States with the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle which was the basic theme of the conference. With headquarters in Havana, Cuba, LASO was formed by communist, revolutionary and terrorist groups from various Latin American countries dedicated to the violent overthrow of imperialism, particularly United States imperialism.

3. Bratislava Conference

Another so-called peace conference was held at Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, from September 6 through September 13, 1967. Among the 41 persons from the United States who attended the conference were: [redacted] who led the delegation from the United States; SDS leaders [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted], who headed an SDS delegation of nine; [redacted] and [redacted], both of SNCC; [redacted], of the Student Mobilization Committee; [redacted], a writer for the "New Republic" magazine; [redacted] and [redacted], both of the American Friends Service Committee; [redacted], a professor at [redacted] University; and [redacted], an editor of [redacted] magazine.

Both North Vietnam and the NLF sent delegations to the conference.

The delegates from the United States to the Bratislava conference were furnished free lodging and meals while at the conference but were required to pay their own transportation expenses. They were thoroughly briefed by [redacted] well in advance of their departure and were instructed to be prepared to give reports and participate in discussions on various topics, including the antiwar, student and civil rights movements and an analysis of the current American political situation. [redacted] told the delegates that the purpose of the conference was to create solidarity and mutual understanding between revolutionaries from Vietnam and their supporters in the United States and that the delegates were chosen on the basis of their experience in radical activity.

4. International Cultural Congress

In January, 1968, an International Cultural Congress, attended by more than 500 delegates and observers from all over the world, was held in Cuba. Some 25 individuals from the United States were present, including [redacted] and SDS leaders [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted]. Five members of SNCC reportedly traveled to Havana to attend this conference. This travel was handled through the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN). The announced purpose of this conference was to obtain unity of action in Cuban anti-imperialism fights.

5. Japanese Conference on Vietnam

An international meeting sponsored by Beheiren, a Japanese peace group, was held in Kyoto, Japan, August 11-14, 1968. Approximately 250 antiwar activists including 23 from the United States were in attendance at this conference. Discussion centered on such subjects as how to wage a campaign against war and for social change throughout the world, how to deal with the Okinawa issue and the United States - Japan Security Pact, how to assist United States deserters and draft evaders and how to coordinate antiwar movements around the world.

6. International Assembly

Columbia University was the site of an International Assembly held in September, 1968. This Assembly was sponsored by the Columbia University chapter of SDS and representatives from many foreign countries were in attendance. Much of the activity of the Assembly centered around revolutionary tactics to be employed by students.

7. Budapest Conference

A group of 20 American antiwar activists including SDS members traveled to Budapest, Hungary, in September, 1968, to meet with representatives of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. Nine of the group from the United States had taken part in the demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago a few weeks before this trip. The meetings were arranged by [redacted] and centered on the Paris Peace Talks, on prospects for further student unrest in the United States and on furthering unrest among American servicemen.

8. Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam

From November 28 to December 1, 1968, the Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam was held in Montreal, Canada, hosted by the Communist Party of Canada. It was attended by approximately 1,700 delegates and observers, including a 5-man delegation from North Vietnam, headed by Hoang Minh Giam, Minister of Culture, and a 2-man delegation from the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Others in attendance included extremists, communists, pacifists and student radicals from North and South America.

The approximately 25 BPP members in attendance, with the aid of white radicals, took over control of the conference following a series of fights and scuffles. Together with other extremists they attacked the "solidarity with the

Vietnamese" theme, wanted to assist North Vietnam and the Viet Cong and wanted to denounce American imperialism. A participant at the conference described the BPP members as "black storm troopers" and said that no decision was made at the conference without consideration of the Panthers' reactions.

BPP leader [redacted] addressed the conference on December 1, 1968, and called for the overthrow of colonial powers. [redacted] also had a series of conferences with the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front delegations.

9. Stockholm Conference on Vietnam

The Stockholm Conference on Vietnam was held May 16 through 18, 1969. Approximately 350 to 400 individuals from 52 countries representing a myriad of peace and antiwar groups were present. About 25 individuals from the United States attended.

This conference was requested jointly by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) delegations to the Paris Peace Conference. The basic theme was to promote acceptance among the world's intellectuals of the 10-Point Program advanced by the NLF and DRV at the Paris Peace Conference. They felt that if they could convince the conference participants that this program was the only legitimate answer to the Vietnam situation, the influence these individuals had in their respective countries would be sufficient to build world opinion in support of the 10-Point Program.

A report of the Working Group on Action of this conference set forth seven proposals to be used to undermine support of the United States position in Vietnam. These were:

a. Collection of signatures of prominent people to be publicized in newspapers.

b. National and international demonstrations on July 4 in the form best suited to the organizations and the movement in each country. Specific suggestions called for vigils outside United States Embassies on July 4 and the reading aloud of names of Americans killed in Vietnam.

c. Boycott of United States firms providing goods for the war in Vietnam or engaged in the transporting of such goods.

d. Increased international support for draft resistance in the United States and by Americans abroad; encouragement of defection from the United States armed forces; and, opposition within the Army.

e. Increased support of the 10-Point Program of the NLF and exposure of "the weaknesses" of President Nixon's Eight-Point Program.

f. A campaign for recognition of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by more world governments.

g. The issues of the war in Vietnam, particularly the unconditional withdrawal of United States troops and the 10-Point Program of the NLF, should be stressed as widely as possible at all national and international conferences.

With regard to proposal number one enumerated above, the June 25, 1969, edition of "The Washington Post" carried a three-quarter page advertisement calling for the President to end the war in Vietnam now. Specifically, the signers of this advertisement, many of whom have had communist affiliation, called for a halt to offensive military operations and the withdrawal of all United States troops within one year to begin immediately.

10. World Congress of Women and World Peace Council Conferences

In June, 1969, delegations from the United States attended conferences of the World Congress of Women in Helsinki, Finland, and the World Peace Council in East Berlin, Germany. Both of these are international front groups controlled by the Soviet Union. These conferences served as forums for propaganda against the United States' position in Vietnam.

We have determined that the World Peace Council Conference in East Berlin, June 21-23, 1969, was concerned with the following points:

a. Unceasing denouncement of United States imperialism.

b. Recognition of the government of the German Democratic Republic by the United States and other countries within its sphere of influence.

c. Encouragement to the Vietnamese to continue fighting inasmuch as they are fighting the battle of all emerging nations and this will give the latter the courage to fight their own wars of liberation.

d. Support of provisional revolutionary governments wherever they occur.

The American delegation to this conference included communists, members of SNCC, and the various peace groups.

F. Visits to the United States by Foreign Revolutionaries

The virtual lack of travel restrictions by the United States, coupled with the comparative ease in obtaining a United States visa, practically eliminates any problems foreign leftists have in travelling to the United States. There have been numerous such individuals who have travelled here in the past for varying reasons. Notable among these are [redacted] from Belgium and [redacted] from Germany.

[redacted] is a leading member of the Trotskyite Secretariat of the Fourth International. He is also an activist in the New Left movement throughout Western Europe. His wife, [redacted], was active in founding the anarchistic Socialist German Students Federation (German SDS) in Berlin, Germany, and is friendly with leaders of various radical youth groups in Western Europe. [redacted] trip was arranged by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) while the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) organized the tour of [redacted] These two individuals, during September and October, 1968, made separate tours which took them to some 50 college and university campuses from coast to coast and border to border. Each appearance made by these two individuals was marked by their espousing the revolutionary doctrine of the New Left before United States college students.

[redacted], a former national chairman of the German SDS, entered the United States on February 25, 1969, reportedly to engage in a speaking and fund raising tour arranged for him by SDS. He appeared at some 16 colleges throughout the country and did not miss any opportunity to spread seeds of discontent and anarchy. He cited examples of harrassment and disruption and announced the need to build an international revolutionary alliance adding that a victory for the movement in one country is a victory for the movement in another.

[redacted] was subpoeaned to appear before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and during his testimony expressed support for the regimes in Cuba and North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

A BPP rally in Los Angeles, California, on November 6, 1968, was addressed by a Mexican student who was reportedly associated with the Student Strike Committee of Mexico City, Mexico, which organization had been involved in violent clashes with Mexican police and military units. During a subsequent meeting, it was agreed that Mexican student leaders would come to Los Angeles to instruct the BPP in disruptive tactics and that BPP members would go to Mexico for training.

G. Contact Between Leaders of United States Protest Groups and Representatives of Foreign Communist Groups

1. New Left Movement

Cuba and North Vietnam have been particularly strong magnets for New Left protest groups. Much of the strength of these organizations derives from their ability to maintain close relationships and dialogues with foreign establishments. For instance, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) maintains a foreign contact list of over 300 individuals and organizations throughout the world. Its [redacted], [redacted], has travelled to the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Sweden in furtherance of opposition to the war in Vietnam. The NMC and [redacted] maintain almost constant contact with the Governments of Cuba and North Vietnam and representatives of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. [redacted] feels such contacts give the NMC and himself notoriety and build their image in the movement.

One of the most highly publicized visits to North Vietnam was a ten-day trip made in December, 1965, by [redacted], a former member of the American Youth for Democracy, a defunct communist youth group; [redacted], a member [redacted] of the CPUSA and [redacted] [redacted], one of the founders of SDS. Their trip was not authorized by the State Department. It was described by the three travellers as a "fact-finding" mission.

Following the Bratislava Conference held in September, 1967, [redacted] and two other SDS members travelled to North Vietnam.

In February, 1968, 20 SDS members visited Cuba and, while there, held conferences with representatives of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Viet Cong, and with individuals from North Korea.

In March, 1968, [redacted], an SDS national office visited Cuba where he met with representatives of Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. [redacted], another SDS activist, visited North Vietnam in April, 1968.

A group of 34 SDS members travelled to Cuba by way of Mexico in late August, 1968. Part of this group met with a representative of the National Liberation Front who stated that the New Left in the United States should conduct more and more demonstrations against the war in Vietnam.

In November, 1968, four women representing the Women Strike for Peace travelled to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Women's Committee. En route, they met with Madame Phan Thi Binh, head of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in Paris, France. In the Soviet Union, the delegation was hosted by various women in influential positions throughout the Soviet Union. A representative of the group planned to return via Prague, Czechoslovakia, and made contacts there.

On June 20, 1969, a delegation of 20 individuals under the sponsorship of the Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV) travelled to Cuba by way of Mexico City. This trip was organized with the full knowledge that it is contrary to State Department regulations; however, a statement adopted by the group indicates that the travel would be made without such approval as a further demonstration of the CRV opposition to United States policies. Available information indicated that all expenses over and above transportation was to be borne by the Cuban Government. In addition, the CRV is currently planning a similar trip to Cuba in July, 1969.

Also, in July, 1969, a group of women affiliated with the WSP plans to travel to Cuba at the invitation of the Federation of Cuban Women.

An example of the ability of the subversive New Left movement to reach a wide audience is probably best illustrated by "Ramparts" magazine and its [redacted].

"Ramparts" magazine espouses a line of opposition to United States domestic and foreign policy from a left-oriented position, utilizing sensationalist muckraking to draw the reader's attention to its attacks on various Government agencies.

The political orientation of "Ramparts" magazine is a reflection of the activities and ideology of its [redacted]. [redacted] has been extremely active in this country in a leadership capacity in a broad range of New Left protest activities and openly espouses support of Fidel Castro and the Vietnam National Liberation Front. His foreign travels include a trip to Cambodia, Thailand and South Vietnam in February, 1966. In January, 1968, he attended the Cultural Congress held in Havana, Cuba, traveling to Cuba via Mexico City as an accredited correspondent. He stated he traveled with the approval of the State Department. He was again in Cuba from April 23, 1968, to May 10, 1968, and from December 31, 1968, to January 13, 1969, during which time he attended the celebration on January 2, 1969, of the 10th anniversary of the Cuban revolution.

Demonstrative of [redacted] political ideology is the following statement made by [redacted] in 1965, "The Viet Cong is a party of peace, and if I was in Vietnam, I would be on the side of the Viet Cong."

2. Black Extremist Movement

The obvious objective of communist incursions into the black extremist movement is to bring about a Negro revolution in the United States. The presence of trained intelligence agents in Cuban Embassies and Missions together with the interest expressed by Cuban officers in the black extremist movement in this country accentuate the possibility of involvement of Cubans in this movement.

Travel by numerous black extremists to Cuba has been extensive. As previously indicated, [redacted] and such SNCC members as [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted] traveled to Cuba in July, 1967, where [redacted] was successful in extracting a promise from Fidel Castro to support the black extremist movement.

From Cuba [redacted] traveled extensively to other countries in search of support for his militant movement in the United States. His itinerary included North Vietnam, Algeria and Egypt. As a SNCC representative, he attended portions of the second session of the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in late November, 1967.

During 1967, [redacted] traveled to Hanoi, North Vietnam, as a member of the International Affairs Department of SNCC. His trip was sponsored and paid for by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, London, England.

[redacted], who resides in Denmark, was designated as the Northern European Field Secretary for SNCC as of January 1, 1968. His functions include fund raising, public relations and coordination with other groups in northern Europe.

A group known as the Friends of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee is active in Paris, France. The leader of this group is [redacted], who is aided by a female group of American SNCC adherents. They are attached to the International Office of SNCC in New York City. This group has been engaged in raising funds for SNCC. [redacted]. [redacted], an employee of the French Press Agency in Paris, France, resided until 1951 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he was actively associated with the Philadelphia branch of the Socialist Workers Party.

[redacted], [redacted] of SNCC, has had many contacts with representatives of foreign countries. On December 27, 1967, [redacted] was advised the Cuban United Nations Mission was holding money for his organization and arrangements were made on that date for him to visit a Cuban intelligence agent, [redacted]. On January 18, 1968, [redacted] and an unidentified Negro were observed entering the Mission empty-handed. A few minutes later each departed the Mission carrying a package wrapped in plain brown paper.

While he was in Sweden during 1968, [redacted] was part of a group which met with individuals representing the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

In June, 1968, [redacted] Republic of New Africa (RNA) leaders, including [redacted], [redacted], visited Africa to determine what kind of assistance RNA could obtain from Tanzania and what type of assistance they could render Tanzania in return. Prior to their visit it was believed that hundreds of acres had been set aside in Tanzania for the RNA to set up a commune and that Red China had land-clearing equipment and farm machinery to be utilized on this property.

After their visit they indicated that the president of the country would make some agreements with [redacted] [redacted] concerning commitments and foreign aid to the RNA; however, these commitments would not be made public. The [redacted] stated that as a contribution and to show good faith, RNA would obtain medicine and books and send them to Tanzania. In addition, the RNA would assist in organizing the United Liberation Front in Africa which would attempt to unite all black African nations.

[redacted], the RNA's [redacted] in exile, is a black extremist who fled the United States in 1961 following his indictment on a kidnaping charge in North Carolina. He resided in Cuba until 1966 at which time he went to Peking, China, where he has since resided.

[redacted] has indicated that he wants to send Negro militants to Tanzania to establish a cadre for the proposed RNA commune. The purpose of this cadre will be to begin training blacks of the African continent in guerrilla warfare.

In October, 1968, a group of American Negroes were in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where they were allegedly recruiting an army to eventually fight against the United States and take over RNA's rightful title to portions of the United States. These troops allegedly would be equipped with Chinese weapons. [redacted] and [redacted] are actively recruiting for this army, and 17 American Negroes are reportedly now active in the affairs of RNA in Tanzania.

In September, 1968, [redacted] discussed the negotiations to establish a Chinese Consulate in Quebec. If it is established, [redacted] states, RNA will be able to legally purchase equipment through the consulate. [redacted] [redacted], speaking before the National Black Economic Conference in Detroit, Michigan, in April, 1969, stated that the black nation of RNA means developing relations with friendly powers, namely, Red China and Cuba.

[redacted], [redacted] of the RNA [redacted] [redacted], returned to New Orleans, Louisiana, on [redacted] 1969, from New York City. [redacted] advised a source of this Bureau that she had traveled to Cuba through Mexico City this Spring with the flight to Cuba being paid for by the Cuban Government.

[redacted] attended a rally in Cuba which was addressed by Fidel Castro and following the rally met with Castro. In the conversation with him, he said that he was unhappy with the dissension among black extremist organizations in Los Angeles, California. Castro added that when the black people in the United States move forward in their revolution, they will receive assistance from Cuba and other countries.

Castro presented [redacted] with literature which he stated concerned the revolution and which would be applicable to the black man's struggle in the United States. He promised to send [redacted] revolutionary literature in the near future which would be of assistance.

In December, 1968, two leaders of SNCC departed from the United States for Cuba, via Mexico, allegedly to attend a Cultural Congress. When they returned to the United States, they were intercepted at the Canadian border by Customs and Immigration officials. They had in their possession a large quantity of North Korean, Soviet and Cuban propaganda and souvenirs. Included in their personal effects were a five-band portable radio of Soviet manufacture, adaptable for receiving intelligence communications and a revealing notebook and diary.

Analysis of the notes and diary indicates the two Negro nationalists were on a "mission" on behalf of SNCC and that this mission had been well planned in advance. Their effects also indicated they were placed in contact with the North Koreans in Havana by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba; on February 24, 1969, they flew from Moscow for Korea under the cover of pseudonyms; in March, 1969, in North Korea they received detailed training in revolutionary theory and political and military intelligence; and they spent considerable time in the Soviet Union and Cuba prior to their return. Among their notes were instructions for organizing a committee which would propagandize for the withdrawal of allied forces from Korea and seek the support of the New Left and domestic Negro nationalist movements, as well as domestic

Koreans, to discredit the United States position in Korea. It was indicated this proposed committee would be supported by the North Koreans through contacts in Cuba.

Additionally, it was indicated the subjects had received training in a likely assignment to accumulate intelligence in behalf of the North Koreans relating to "latest plans, newest weapons, blueprints, actual weapons, if possible." According to the notes, these should be secretly transmitted to the North Koreans through the Soviet Union, the Tanzanian Embassy, Cuban consulates in Mexico or France, or the Korean Embassy in Prague. One of the individuals described the assignment as "We will be their (North Koreans) eyes and ears as we wage armed struggle."

On August 19, 1968, [redacted], BPP national official, and [redacted], then the BPP leader in [redacted], arrived in Havana, Cuba. Assistance for their trip was rendered by an official of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations.

Following his return to the United States, [redacted] talked of his trip during a BPP rally in Oakland, California, on September 5, 1968. He indicated that on their arrival in Havana they were met by representatives of the Communist Party of Cuba and revolutionary guerrilla organizations from Asia and Africa. In a subsequent speech on December 23, 1968, [redacted] stated that during his trip to Cuba he had been personally assured by Fidel Castro that the Cuban Government would give all-out support to Negroes in the United States.

While in Cuba on August 24, 1968, [redacted] voiced his appreciation to the "Revolutionary Government of Cuba" in a radio broadcast made from Havana.

On September 11, 1968, a Havana, Cuba, radio station broadcasted telephone interviews with BPP leaders [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] stated that Oakland, California, was under military occupation following the voluntary manslaughter conviction of BPP leader [redacted]. [redacted] stated that "they" will answer counterrevolutionary violence with revolutionary violence.

In September, 1968, [redacted], a SNCC leader in New York City, traveled to Cuba via France. On October 2, 1968, an interview with [redacted] was broadcast on Radio Havana. In answering a question regarding urban guerrilla warfare, [redacted] said it is going to become more and more a method that will have to be employed by people not only in America but also throughout the world as they struggle for liberation. In answering a question about the full independence of Afro-American people, [redacted] stated that the Afro-American people cannot achieve their liberation without the liquidation of United States imperialism.

When [redacted] was in Atlanta, Georgia, during December, 1968, he mentioned that he had received limited training while in Cuba in firing automatic and semiautomatic weapons.

Representatives of the Cuban Government allegedly told [redacted] that Cuba was ready to assist SNCC with financial and other means of support in its struggle in the United States. Before aid was to be given, however, SNCC was to give concrete evidence of revolutionary activity in the next six months. [redacted] claimed Cuban officials told him Cuba would grant asylum to any black political refugee from the United States. [redacted] also claimed his trip to Cuba was financed by money provided him by the Cuban Government through its United Nations Mission in New York City.

During November, 1968, two BPP members traveled to Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, to attempt to organize a BPP group in that area. During a news conference, one of the BPP members stated that the only thing whites could give to the BPP was money or guns.

During the period from March 9 to March 24, 1969, BPP leaders [redacted] and [redacted] traveled to Sweden, Denmark and Norway to obtain financial backing for the BPP. The visit was sponsored by the Socialist Workers Party of Denmark and the Solidarity Committee for Black Liberation, which reportedly has offices in Copenhagen, Denmark, and Stockholm, Sweden. Prior to departing on the trip, [redacted] stated that the Socialist Workers Party of Denmark had sent two round-trip tickets for the trip in addition to a total of four thousand dollars for bail and defense funds of the BPP.

While traveling through the Scandinavian countries, [redacted] made a number of speeches and held several press conferences in which he claimed that the BPP was the "political proletariat" and that it was engaged in a class struggle and not in a racial struggle.

II RESOURCES NOW TARGETED TOWARD MONITORING FOREIGN COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Domestic Communist Groups

1. Communist Party, USA (CPUSA)

Coverage of foreign support of the CPUSA is very effectively achieved at present through live informant coverage at a high level, supplemented by selective electronic and physical surveillances.

2. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups

a. Progressive Labor Party (PLP)

PLP investigations utilize live informants, the monitoring of bank accounts, selective electronic surveillances and, where necessary, physical surveillances.

b. Revolutionary Union (RU)

RU is covered with high-level informants. We also utilize selective electronic surveillances on RU leaders and physical surveillances to identify contacts. Physical surveillances are also conducted on RU activities and on individual leaders.

3. Trotskyite Groups

a. Socialist Workers Party (SWP)

The SWP and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), have been actively penetrated by informants. We also utilize physical surveillances and [redacted] to supplement this coverage.

B. Diplomatic Establishments and Intelligence Operations

1. Soviet and Satellite

Our coverage aimed at penetration of Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities in the United States includes a wide variety of techniques. We use fixed lookouts on certain communist-bloc establishments which lookouts in most cases are equipped with photographic surveillance equipment. We also conduct physical surveillances on selected individual intelligence officers and maintain electronic surveillances on communist-bloc official establishments.

We operate a program to identify individuals in contact with communist-bloc officials and establishments to determine the purpose of the contact and to assess the potential risk to internal security posed by the contact. At the same time, we explore the informant potential of the individual concerned.

Sources and informants regularly in contact with communist-bloc intelligence personnel perform an important role in our coverage as do the double agents we operate against them.

We have conducted selected operations in the past aimed at the direct defection of communist-bloc intelligence agents.

2. Chinese

Current resources directed against Chinese intelligence activities include the use of informants and electronic surveillances on selected subjects. We also have devised and operated programs aimed at specific problem areas such as Chinese scientists in the United States, Chinese aliens entering the United States and Chinese seamen who may have a port of call in this country.

Excised as information deals with sensitive technique.

3. Cuban Intelligence Service

We also use physical surveillances on a selected basis and periodically review pertinent bank records. Through the use of informants and double agents we have been successful in penetrating Cuban Intelligence Service operations in the United States.

C. International Conferences

Whenever possible, we attempt to have informants or sources under our control participate in international conferences as representatives of the particular groups with which they are affiliated. We have been successful in penetrating several of these conferences in this fashion and have materially benefited from on-the-scene coverage.

D. Contacts Between Revolutionary Leaders and Leaders of Foreign Communist Governments

This is a difficult area to cover as we do not always have informants in a position to accompany individual revolutionary leaders on their official and private trips to foreign countries. We rely on other established informants whom we have targeted against those revolutionary leaders and who have access to them upon their return. In some cases, we are able to determine the result of foreign contacts through our domestic electronic surveillances.

E. Travel of Foreign Leaders to the United States

Coverage of foreign leaders to the United States is effected through the coordination of our informant coverage of the organization sponsoring the trip and physical and selective electronic surveillances, where applicable.

III. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Historically, the United States has been the target for subversive activities emanating from and directed by the international communist movement in regard to efforts to foment disorder and disruption in a revolutionary vein. The change from the monolithic nature of the movement to polycentrism only served to magnify the problem in that it diversified the subversive attack.

Regardless of the diversification, the basic nature of the attack remained the same. It emanated from communist forces abroad and was channeled into this country through communist-bloc diplomatic establishments and old-line communist groups and organizations working to advance international communist objectives.

From the standpoint of the FBI's responsibilities in regard to countering these subversive thrusts, there were two significant factors which enabled us to mount effective counterintelligence operations.

The first factor was that the activities themselves, took place for the most part within our borders. It was a situation which lent itself to effective utilization of manpower for coverage and counterintelligence purposes.

The second factor was that the activities were engaged in by organizations, such as the CPUSA, which were tightly structured organizationally in the traditional pattern of communist parties throughout the world. As such, they presented clear-cut targets for informant penetration.

Because these old-line organizations also followed the traditional pattern of operating under the concept of democratic centralism with an insistence on rigid discipline throughout party ranks, high-level informant penetration provided an insight into strategy and tactics being considered at all levels. Here, too, it was possible to effectively negate their thrusts.

The emergence of the New Left and black-extremist movements in our society drastically altered the situation They evolved mostly out of social reform movements which increasingly have been transformed into hard-core revolutionary movements dedicated to the total destruction of our democratic traditions and our society.

They produced a new breed of revolutionaries whose main preoccupation with communism is that it has produced men like Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Che Guevarra, whom they hope to emulate in the overthrow of a system they deem oppressive.

From the inception of these movements, the FBI has been aware of the fact that their increasingly revolutionary communist imprint posed new and unique problems for the internal security of this nation.

As these forces of revolutionary protest hardened in their resolve to accomplish their purpose, more and more they reached out to join hands with and seek support from old-line communists not only inside our country but also communists and anarchists abroad.

In effect, the picture has changed from one in which international communist forces sought out supporters within our country to carry out their objectives to one in which domestic revolutionaries are reaching our seeking the support of anyone, including communists, throughout the world who will help and support them in their own destructive aims.

Since the objectives of both so clearly coincide, it is inevitable that they will join forces in common cause. The willingness of the Soviets, Chinese communists, and Cubans to support the efforts of domestic revolutionaries here already has been demonstrated. In addition, the movement of the New Left and black extremist revolutionary protestors toward increasingly centralized, more tightly disciplined organizations will facilitate the inevitable linkings.

It is essential that we bring together and intensify the intelligence capabilities of our country to meet this growing threat. It is imperative that we penetrate all the channels of communication between foreign communist forces and domestic revolutionaries; that we take all possible additional investigative steps to safeguard the security of this Nation in a time of multiplying and expanding crises. This has become mandatory because of increasing problems which may be anticipated in the future by reason of the growing alliances with foreign communist elements.

ORGANIZATION APPENDIX

Black Panther Party (BPP)

The Black Panther Party was formed in 1966 at Oakland, California. Its stated purpose is to organize black people so they can "take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of black communities." The BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program and encourages Negroes to arm themselves against the police. Its publications contain quotations from the writings of the leader of Communist China and feature his statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." It is headquartered at Berkeley, California.

Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV)

The Committee of Returned Volunteers was established in 1966 at New York City and is composed of individuals who have worked abroad in such programs as the American Friends Service Committee and Peace Corps. It has a membership of approximately 3,000 individuals and 12 chapters throughout the United States. It has been active in demonstrations protesting United States policy, particularly the draft and the war in Vietnam. Its leaders have discussed establishing contact with revolutionary groups, aiding guerrillas, destruction of existing governments and the transmission of information to Soviet-bloc countries. The CRV has declared that it seeks radical changes in United States policy towards Asia, Africa, Latin America and emerging communities in the United States.

National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC)

The NMC was founded in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1966. It is a coalition of over 100 antiwar, antidraft, black extremist and pacifist groups. Among the organizations which participated in NMC activities are the CPUSA, SWP, SNCC and the American Friends Service Committee. The NMC has organized major protest demonstrations including the march on the Pentagon in October, 1967; the disruptive demonstrations during the Democratic National Convention at Chicago in August, 1968; and the demonstrations during the Presidential Inauguration ceremonies in January, 1969. Its officers include [redacted], who has travelled to the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Sweden in furtherance of opposition to the war in Vietnam.

Republic of New Africa (RNA)

The Republic of New Africa is headquartered at Detroit, Michigan. It is a black extremist separatist organization whose stated purpose is the formation of a black nation within the United States. It advocates the formation of a black army to defend this black nation and to attack its enemies.

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

SDS, which is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, was formed in 1962 and is an outgrowth of the Student League for Industrial Democracy, the youth affiliate of the League for Industrial Democracy, an old-line labor-oriented Fabian Socialist organization.

The founding convention of SDS held at Port Huron, Michigan, in 1962, produced the "Port Huron Statement" which in effect provided the ideological framework for SDS, established the line of "participatory democracy," and set the direction for much of the subsequent activity of the organization.

In the ensuing years SDS has increasingly entered into the mainstream of revolutionary politics particularly with regard to its opposition to the American form of government. At its National Council meeting held in Austin, Texas, in March, 1969, SDS [redacted] stated, "Our primary task is to build a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement." The central appeal of SDS has been to the student. It currently has approximately 250 chapters located mainly on college campuses.

Student Mobilization Committee (SMC)

The SMC is headquartered at New York City. It is dominated by members of the SWP and/or members of the YSA. The SMC has been active in demonstrations against United States policy. Its aims are to bring about the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, to end university "complicity" with the war, and to establish self-determination for Vietnam and "black America." It currently publishes the "Student Mobilizer."

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

SNCC was formed in 1960 at Atlanta, Georgia, as a nonmembership civil rights organization. It took part in voter registration work in the South and was one of the moving forces behind the Freedom Riders of the early 1960s. In 1966 [redacted] was elected [redacted] of SNCC. He moved this group from the civil rights field to a full-blown revolutionary group. [redacted] urged Negroes to prepare for a "bloody revolution."

[redacted] was succeeded as [redacted] in 1967 by [redacted], who continued [redacted] policy of denouncing United States' intervention in Vietnam, calling for rebellion by any means, and massive civil disobedience.

SNCC is a nonmembership organization which is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. It is composed of 50 staff members and a 15-member Central Committee.

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

WILPF, an international pacifist group, has its United States headquarters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and has a current membership of 11,000 in 154 branches in the United States.

The WILPF advocates the right to self-determination, support of the United Nations, enforcement of civil rights laws and new approaches to the entire social welfare system. The organization is currently urging abolition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System, withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam, and the elimination of racial discrimination.

Women Strike for Peace (WSP)

WSP is a national nonmembership women's pacifist group which maintains a national office at Washington, D. C. It has engaged in numerous protests against the draft, the war in Vietnam, nuclear tests, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile System. Representatives of WSP have been in contact with the National Liberation Front and have travelled to various countries including Cuba.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNEXCISED

SUBJECT: FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

MDR 16

DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2 ALM/EHL
ON 11/14/00

DATE: June 30, 1969

FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION — Page

I. FOREIGN COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES — 1

- A. Influence of Domestic Communist Left — 1
  - 1. Communist Party, USA — 1
  - 2. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups — 3
    - a. Progressive Labor Party — 3
    - b. Revolutionary Union — 5
    - c. Miscellaneous Pro-Chinese Groups — 6
      - Communist Party, USA (Marxist-Leninist) — 6
      - Committee of Correspondence — 7
  - 3. Trotskyite Groups — 7
- B. Role of Communist-Bloc Intelligence — 9
- C. Cuban Intelligence Service — 10
- D. Chinese Support — 12
- E. International Conferences — 13
  - 1. International Conference on Vietnam — 14
  - 2. Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) Conference — 14
  - 3. Bratislava Conference — 14
  - 4. International Cultural Congress — 15
  - 5. Japanese Conference on Vietnam — 15
  - 6. International Assembly — 16
  - 7. Budapest Conference — 16
  - 8. Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam — 16
  - 9. Stockholm Conference on Vietnam — 17
  - 10. World Congress of Women and World Peace Council Conferences — 19
- F. Visits to the United States by Foreign Revolutionaries — 19

G. Contact Between Leaders of United States Protest Groups and Representatives of Foreign Communist Groups 21
  1. New Left Movement 21
  2. Black Extremist Movement 23

II. RESOURCES NOW TARGETED TOWARD MONITORING FOREIGN COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 29

A. Domestic Communist Groups 29
  1. Communist Party, USA 29
  2. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups 29
    a. Progressive Labor Party (PLP) 29
    b. Revolutionary Union (RU) 29
  3. Trotskyite Groups 29
    a. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) 29

B. Diplomatic Establishments and Intelligence Operations 30
  1. Soviet and Satellite 30
  2. Chinese 30
  3. Cuban Intelligence Service 31

C. International Conferences 31

D. Contacts Between Revolutionary Leaders and Leaders of Foreign Communist Governments 31

E. Travel of Foreign Leaders to the United States 31

III. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 32

ORGANIZATION APPENDIX 35

Black Panther Party (BPP) 35
Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV) 35
National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) 35
Republic of New Africa (RNA) 36
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 36
Student Mobilization Committee (SMC) 37
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 37
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) 37
Women Strike for Peace (WSP) 38

INTRODUCTION

Although the term "revolutionary protest movement" cannot be precisely defined because of the amorphous nature of such movements, it can be said that revolutionary protest movements existing within the United States fall into two broad categories, i.e. the New Left movement and the black extremist movement.

The New Left movement, which grew out of the civil rights struggle of the 1950s, is a loose-knit, undisciplined group of individuals who view our system of government as irredeemably corrupt and oppressive. Their stated aims and objectives are simple; they are dedicated to the total destruction of our traditional values and democratic system of government.

The New Left movement in this country is clearly an integral part of a world-wide revolutionary movement of students and young intellectuals. There is a definite similarity of goals, a uniformity of action from country to country, and a rapport among leftist organizations and individuals in this and foreign countries.

Like the New Left movement, the black extremist movement in the United States can be traced to the civil rights movement of the early 1960s and the violent response to civil rights agitation. This is best seen in the history of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), formed in 1960 in Atlanta, Georgia. SNCC was one of the moving forces behind the Freedom Riders of the early 1960s and was the target of Ku Klux Klan violence. In May, 1966, Stokely Carmichael was elected chairman of SNCC. The lack of progress toward integration since the 1954 school desegregation decision helped Carmichael to change SNCC from a nonviolent group to a full-blown black revolutionary organization. Other black nationalists took up Carmichael's cry for a "bloody revolution" and a proliferation of black extremist groups seized the initiative for change from established civil rights organizations and now advocate outright revolution and destruction of our form of government.

Foreign communist support of revolutionary protest movements in the United States can be manifested in a number of ways. Since the Communist Party, USA, is under the domination and control of the Soviet Union, it can be used more and more as a vehicle to support these movements. Similarly, the Progressive Labor Party and other pro-Chinese Communist groups can be utilized by Communist China as a channel for rendering support to protest movements in the United States. Other traditional channels which can be used more are the communist-bloc diplomatic establishments and the clandestine intelligence services operated by the communists within the United States.

In addition to the channels of communication open to foreign communists within the confines of the United States, leaders of United States-based protest movements have in recent years begun to reach out beyond the continental limits of the United States to solicit support of foreign communists and revolutionary protest movements abroad. New Leftists and black extremists travel abroad extensively and participate freely in various international conferences which are invariably attended by and sometimes even sponsored by communists. New Left and black extremist leaders frequently confer with representatives of foreign communist governments. At the same time, revolutionaries frequently travel to the United States and confer with leaders of protest movements in this country.

All of these "channels of communication" are treated in this study which is designed to show the extent to which revolutionary protest movements in the United States are receiving foreign communist support.

I. FOREIGN COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Influence of Domestic Communist Left

1. Communist Party, USA

Since it was founded in September, 1919, the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) has been unswerving in its allegiance to the Soviet Union. Over the years the Soviets have utilized the CPUSA as a trusted vehicle to influence revolutionary activity within the United States. Accordingly, FBI investigations of CPUSA activities have included the objective of determining the extent to which the Soviets may have been using the CPUSA as a possible channel for Soviet support of the current revolutionary protest movements in this country. All available information derived from these investigations to date indicates that while the CPUSA has made overtures to the revolutionary protest groups there has been limited acceptance of the CPUSA by such groups.

In recognition of its lack of support among youthful activists on college campuses, the CPUSA is currently making plans to establish a new youth group directed toward youth in industry. Party leaders, on the other hand, have criticized New Left groups such as the Students for a Democratic Society as petty bourgeois radicals. Party youth who have attempted to have the CPUSA relate more clearly with such groups have been isolated and silenced. The CPUSA theoretical organ, "Political Affairs," in its March and April, 1969, issues, contained a two-part article entitled "The Student Rebellion," which clearly set out CPUSA opposition to the anti-Soviet, anti-CPUSA line of student protest groups.

Within the past year leaders of the CPUSA in the Midwest met with leaders of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) to discuss closer cooperation or possible recruitment of these individuals into the CPUSA. These overtures were completely rebuffed by the SDS people who stated that while there were no disagreements with CPUSA philosophy it is most doubtful the CPUSA is relevant today. When it was proposed that there be some form of collectivity between the SDS and the CPUSA, the SDS leaders replied that the CPUSA is not involved in SDS collectives because the CPUSA has nothing to contribute.

Subsequently, a leader of the SDS in conversation with leaders of the CP of Illinois stated that the "Establishment" as it exists today must be changed, even if this change must be through force. He added that the "Establishment" must be replaced by a communist government. He further stated that there has to be a communist party and there has to be a communist revolution and that SDS is the only group to organize the youth, thus rejecting the CPUSA as a possible vehicle for bringing about this revolution.

Available information discloses Soviet theoreticians now recognize their lack of status in the revolutionary student movement in the United States and the need to become influential in the current ideological struggle in order to orient it to Soviet style communism.

With regard to the activists in black extremist groups, the CPUSA is under a severe strain in attempting to develop a program to attract these individuals while at the same time adhering to its pro-Soviet and Marxist-Leninist ideology. The fight within the CPUSA on the way in which to handle the black question is a bitter one and no clear-cut policy has been established. An attempt by black nationalists within the CPUSA to pass a resolution recommending that Negroes arm themselves for self-defense was overwhelmingly defeated at the recent 19th National Convention. In addition, the pro-Maoist stance of the extremist Black Panther Party (BPP) is anathema to the pro-Soviet CPUSA.

CPUSA leaders have stated that the Black Panther Party may be a vehicle to stimulate revolutionary ferment among Negro youth if the Panthers can be taught a true Marxist-Leninist approach. Leaders of the CPUSA in California have been in contact with the Black Panther Party and have assisted in the setting up of a defense committee for Panthers who have been arrested. However, CPUSA leaders admit that it is not possible to talk to Black Panthers as communists. One CPUSA member was instructed to penetrate the Black Panther Party and to try to put over the CPUSA program. He did join the Black Panther Party but when he was exposed as a CPUSA member as a result of attempting to advance CPUSA policies he was expelled from the Black Panther Party.

This does not mean that the CPUSA is not striving to play a more effective role in its relationship with activists of both New Left and black extremist groups. Individual Party members do play a role in demonstrations, activities, and workings of these groups. Party publications trumpet in support of all demonstrations which stir up discord in the United States whether it be economic, social, or against the war in Vietnam.

2. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups

a. Progressive Labor Party

Recent years have witnessed the formation of a myriad of extremist organizations enunciating the tenets of Communist China and Mao Tse-tung. The majority have been ineffectual paper organizations and not viable operations. However, one group, the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), is making significant organizational strides in major American cities and on a number of college campuses.

The PLP was founded in 1962, by extremist elements of the CPUSA who were dissatisfied with CPUSA's "revisionism" and who advocated the following of the Chinese communist line in all areas of policy. It is headed by such devoted revolutionaries as Milton Rosen, one-time Labor Secretary of the New York State Communist Party, who was expelled from the CPUSA for extremist views; and William Epton, who, following his participation in the Harlem race riot of 1964, was found guilty of conspiracy to riot, conspiracy to advocate criminal anarchy, and advocating criminal anarchy.

Headquartered in New York City, the PLP has established active branches in a number of major metropolitan areas including Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Newark, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. During recent months, it has made a concerted effort to establish PLP branches throughout the United States. Spearheading this drive has been Walter Linder, National Director of the Trade Union Commission of the PLP and an expert on organization. The PLP is particularly interested in expanding its membership on the West Coast as evidenced by the recent assignment of Levi Laub, a member of the PLP's National Committee, to Los Angeles, for that purpose.

The PLP maintains close contact with pro-Chinese Communist groups abroad and its publications consistently follow the Chinese Communist line. For example, during early 1968 the PLP issued a pamphlet in which it proclaimed that the PLP is among groups which "proudly make common cause with each other and with the Chinese for world revolution" and boasted of its support of the Viet Cong in defeat of our "common enemy, the United States ruling class."

Apropos of the strong rapport existing between the PLP and the Communist Party of China, the latter informed top-level PLP members in 1967 that it considered the PLP to be the only revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party in the United States.

As evidence of Chinese Communist support of the PLP, information has been developed which revealed that during 1967 and 1968 the PLP received a total of more than $13,000 from a European bank where an organ of the Chinese Communist Government maintains an account. During 1968, the PLP received more than $2,000 from Hong Kong, believed to have emanated from Chinese Communist sources.

PLP leaders have been in periodic contact with Chinese Communist agencies and have on occasion visited the Chinese mainland. Jacob Rosen and Frederick Jerome, members of PLP National Committee, travelled to the Red Chinese mainland in March, 1969.

Of equal significance is the PLP's stepped-up efforts to extend its influence on college campuses. The PLP's ability to seize upon situations ripe for violence was revealed by its role within Students for a Democratic Society.

(SDS) during the Columbia University riots, the turmoil at San Francisco State College, and participation in the student unrest at the University of California at Berkeley California.

The PLP has been particularly successful in its attempts to play a major role in the activities of SDS. During the SDS National Convention, which ended on June 22, 1969, at Chicago, the PLP element succeeded in splitting the organization into two separate groups, each electing national officers and claiming their respective groups to be in control of SDS.

b. Revolutionary Union

The Revolutionary Union (RU) was formed in the San Francisco area in early 1968 as the nucleus of a proposed new militant national Marxist-Leninist organization with allegiance to the thought of Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party of China. After operating for over a year in an underground fashion, the RU partially surfaced in April, 1969.

Since its formation, the RU has organized into a number of "collectives" in the San Francisco area. Its members are old-time militant renegades from the CPUSA, former leaders of the PLP, and young high school and college militants who have gained some notoriety as activists in local campus and related disorders. RU members reportedly are accumulating weapons and engaging in firearms and guerrilla warfare training. They have played a prominent role in disorders at Stanford; at the University of California at Berkeley; at San Francisco State College; and in connection with the strike of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union, which has resulted in violence in the Richmond, California, area.

At the present time, RU leaders are seeking to establish rapport with other militant "collectives" and increase their influence in the SDS. The RU is in competition with the PLP and is seeking to discredit PLP in the eyes of the Chinese Communists and neutralize PLP influence in SDS.

One of the two founders of the RU is Leibel Bergman, a long-time communist who turned first against the CPUSA and then dropped out of his leadership role in the PLP. In 1965, Bergman clandestinely travelled to Communist China where he resided for approximately two years utilizing a pseudonym.

Shortly after his return to the United States in August, 1967, he advised reliable sources that he had returned "to do a job" for the Chinese communists. He outlined a three-fold mission: (1) to form a national coalition of domestic Marxist-Leninists sympathetic to Mao Tse-tung thought and the Communist Party of China; (2) to develop and forward infofmation of interest to the Chinese communists; and (3) to recruit politically trusted youth who would travel to Communist China for an indeterminable period of cadre training after which they would return to this country and operate in behalf of Communist China in a nonpublic or submerged fashion. There is a strong presumption these latter individuals would be utilized as recruited intelligence agents operating clandestinely in behalf of China.

In late 1967, Bergman indicated a desire to obtain intelligence relating to the Soviet Union which he would forward to China. He provided funds for this intelligence-gathering effort and also to support the operations of a domestic pro-Communist China organization. He claimed to have a secret line of communication with Communist China. After conducting diversionary travel to Los Angeles, Bergman flew to London in early 1969 and while there contacted the Communist Chinese diplomatic establishment on two occasions. Thereafter, he flew to Paris and contacted the Chinese Embassy in Paris on two occasions. While in Paris, he dispatched a letter to an address in China. Significantly, the letter was directed to the name he used as a pseudonym while residing in China. He has stated he is able to communicate with them, but he is unable to receive adequate responses. Monitoring of his activities also indicates he is suffering from a lack of funds.

c. Miscellaneous Pro-Chinese Groups

Since the development of the Sino-Soviet ideological split, many factions have evolved from the American communist movement which to various degrees have lent allegiance to the Communist Party of China. Two are worthy of mention.

Communist Party, USA (Marxist-Leninist)

The Communist Party, USA (Marxist-Leninist) (CPUSA-ML) was created in late 1965 primarily as a vehicle for anti-United States propaganda and activity of its leader

Michael Lasky, a former member of the Provisional Organizing Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party. The CPUSA-ML in its initial stage proposed to conduct guerrilla warfare training, including the use of firearms; to organize cells in the South to exploit the racial situation; to agitate the population and to create situations which would require the use of Federal troops.

For a time the CPUSA-ML operated in California the Workers International Bookstore, an outlet for propaganda material originating in Communist China. The organization has been plagued by factionalism based upon the egotism of its leadership. Lasky and a key aide, Arnold Hoffman, split into two separate groups. In November, 1967, Lasky and another member of the CPUSA-ML traveled to England where they made contact and sought liaison with a number of British pro-Communist China groups. Thereafter, they traveled to Paris where Lasky was in contact with the Albanian Legation and the Chinese Embassy seeking funds, literature for his organization and extension of his travel to Communist China. Available information indicates Lasky was rebuffed by both the Chinese and Albanians.

Committee of Correspondence

The Committee of Correspondence was organized in 1967 by Clayton Van Lydegraf of Seattle, a former leader of the PLP. This Committee, which has ties in California, publishes "The Voice," an anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese periodical. Van Lydegraf's group is in contact with other pro-Chinese groups and is seeking to establish influence and contacts within the domestic Negro nationalist and New Left movements. Van Lydegraf was in attendance at the recent SDS National Convention as an observer and he has engaged in teaching informal classes in Marxism-Leninism. He is a frequent author of articles in "New Left Notes," a publication of the National Office of the SDS.

3. Trotskyite Groups

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP), founded in 1938, is a militant revolutionary group based on the theories of Marx, Engels, and Lenin as interpreted by Leon Trotsky rather than Joseph Stalin.

In addition to its avowed aim to eventually overthrow our form of Government, the SWP's most immediate aim and objective is to hold together the coalition of antiwar groups prevalent in the country today. It also seeks public acceptability by running candidates for political office on local, state and national levels. SWP candidates for President and Vice President of the United States were successful in having their names placed on some 19 state ballots during the 1968 elections. They also traveled to South Vietnam where they engaged in discussions with United States servicemen.

The Trotskyite Fourth International (FI), self-styled as the World Party of the Socialist Revolution, is headquartered in Paris, France, and claims to be fighting for the realization of Leon Trotsky's ideas. The SWP was forced by the limitations of the Voorhis Act of 1940 to withdraw its official affiliation with the FI. Nevertheless, the SWP maintains "fraternal ties" with the FI and continually has "observers" in attendance at its international meetings.

The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), SWP youth affiliate, also headquartered in New York City, was originally formed in 1957 by former members of socialist and communist youth organizations. One of its primary purposes is to recruit youth into the socialist camp who ultimately will become members of the SWP. The entire National Executive Committee of the YSA is composed of individuals who are also members of the SWP. Most of the YSA chapters are located on or near college campuses.

In addition to acting as a recruiting mechanism for ultimate SWP membership, the YSA's current main objective is to organize, dominate, control and perpetuate the antiwar movement in the country. The YSA, together with the SWP, credit themselves with organizing a number of massive antiwar demonstrations.

The YSA National Convention, held in Chicago, Illinois, from November 28 to December 1, 1968, was attended by 791 registered individuals, including 405 current active members representing 29 states and 128 cities. Guests came from Canada, Mexico, France and Germany. During the four days of the Convention, the YSA recruited approximately 60 new members.

Because the YSA is a youth group consisting in the main of college students, most of its activities take place on or near college campuses. Its members have participated in many of the campus disorders which have recently swept the country. For the past several years, Peter Camejo, SWP National Committee member and former national officer of the YSA, has been the dominant leader of the campus disorders and police confrontations on the campus of the University of California at Berkeley.

The foreign affiliations of the YSA are the same as those of the SWP.

After the French student uprising in the Spring of 1968, a leader of the SWP stated that for years the SWP has afforded financial and theoretical assistance and material to maintain the Trotskyist cadre in France and that this assistance was paying off.

In 1968, a leader of the SWP noted that the role of the student youth in France was a new element injected into the spring uprising in that country and that the young militants of the Trotskyite Jeunesse Communiste Revolutionnaire played a key role in spite of its small force. He related that the role that American youth will play in the building of the American revolution must be similar.

In December, 1968, fourteen YSA and/or SWP members traveled to Cuba as guests of the Cuban Government to join in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. Since returning from their one-month stay in Cuba, these individuals have participated in numerous lectures and discussions on college campuses throughout the United States supporting Fidel Castro's revolutionary views.

B. Role of Communist-Bloc Intelligence

Undoubtedly, as the number one target of communist intelligence agencies throughout the world, the United States is faced with the reality of skilled communist agents acting against the interests of our Nation. For years, the communist bloc of nations, including the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia, have had diplomatic, official and quasi-official representatives stationed in their establishments in this country.

Currently, these establishments exist in New York City; Washington, D. C.; Pittsburgh; and Chicago with a total complement of over 1,000 communist nationals and about 1,400 dependents. Our investigations have disclosed there are over 350 known or highly suspected intelligence officers or agents among them, of whom about 220 are Soviet nationals.

In addition to this open or "legal" channel of intelligence operations, the communist-bloc nations utilize highly clandestine "illegal" networks which have no observable contact with the communist official establishments. The members of these networks who are sent here from abroad with fraudulent documents and fictitious cover stories perform intelligence collection tasks as do the communist intelligence agents operating under diplomatic or official cover. In time of emergency or war involving the United States and communist countries, the "illegal" networks would assume the primary collection role for communist countries whose diplomats and officials would be interned or expelled.

In spite of the extensive nature of communist-bloc intelligence operations to penetrate and subvert the United States, there is little evidence that these intelligence-gathering services are acting as channels for communist support of the revolutionary protest movements here. A significant exception to this statement is the known activity of certain Cuban intelligence agents acting under the cover of official assignment to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) in New York City.

C. Cuban Intelligence Service

Export of the Cuban revolution is the fundamental principle of Cuba's foreign policy. We have determined that in the United States such policy is manifested by clandestine support of Puerto Rican independence groups and the fomenting of racial strife and student disorders throughout the United States.

In September, 1967, two officers of the Cuban Intelligence Service (CIS) assigned to the CMUN told a representative of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico (NPPR) in New York City that Cuba was prepared to offer Puerto Rican independentists weapons and material. In April, 1968, a CIS officer at the CMUN delivered to a representative of the

Puerto Rican Independence Movement (Movimiento Pro-Independencia de Puerto Rico - MPIPR) a message from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC). The message expressed CPC solidarity with and support of the MPIPR in the latter's struggle for independence. Cuban support has included guerrilla training for some leaders of current violence in Puerto Rico.

With reference to the fomenting of racial strife and student disorders in the United States by Cuba, our investigation of Jesus Jimenez Escobar is a case in point. He arrived in the United States in August, 1967, to assume duties as a First Secretary at the CMUN. He left the United States on February 20, 1969, at the State Department's request based upon the results of our investigation of him. At the time of his departure, he held the rank of Counselor, second in order of diplomatic precedence at the CMUN.

Our investigation of Jimenez determined that he was a principal link between the Cuban Government and leaders of black extremist and New Left student groups in the United States. He gave advice and counsel to such leaders, including H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael, then affiliated with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC); furnished Cuban propaganda materials to them; and arranged visits to Cuba for unknown purposes by many of them.

During early May, 1968, while in Washington, D. C., ostensibly as a representative of the Cuban Government to the Pan American Health Organization, Jimenez instructed Stokely Carmichael to "continue to follow Plan A-5." Carmichael was then agitating in Washington, D. C., following the serious racial disorders here of the preceding month. The significance of Jimenez' instructions to Carmichael is unknown; however, an SDS plan of similar terminology resulted in an undisciplined mass protest and violence at Columbia University, also during April, 1968.

The intelligence functions of Jimenez at the CMUN appear to have been taken over by Alberto Boza Hidalgo-Gato, lower in diplomatic rank (First Secretary), but superior to Jimenez in the CIS hierarchy (deputy head of CIS activities at the CMUN).

Boza arrived in the United States on September 6, 1968. Our investigation of him has determined that he acts as a clearing agent for American citizens of various backgrounds who travel to Cuba, associates with individuals who are affiliated with black extremist and New Left groups, and has been operationally associated in New York City with Soviet intelligence personnel. He acted as interpreter for Stokely Carmichael during a visit of the latter in Cuba.

D. Chinese Support

Communist China, while having no diplomatic or official establishments in the United States, is posing an intelligence threat constantly through individuals residing in or visiting this country. Various residents or citizens of our Nation who have Chinese origins or background have come to occupy prominent or significant positions in fields of science, education, industry, defense, and government. Some of these individuals in the past have acted in a manner hostile to our national interests, apparently motivated by fear or sympathy with the communist regime in mainland China.

The Chinese Communists have in the past mounted a propaganda attack against the United States Government with the intention of aggravating the racial situation in this country. On April 16, 1968, for instance, the New China News Agency (NCNA) broadcasted a statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung in support of the Afro-American struggle "against" violence. Mao described this struggle as "waged by the exploited and oppressed black people for freedom and emancipation. . ." and stated it represented a call for the "oppressed people of the United States to fight against the barbarous rule of the monopoly capitalist class." This was Mao's first major statement on this subject subsequent to 1963.

Hong Kong newspapers, on April 18, 1968, reported that Peking was transformed on the previous day into a camp of militant support for American Negroes whose "certain victory" over imperialism was proclaimed by hundreds of thousands of marching Chinese. A parade supporting Mao's message was reported to have lasted from seven in the morning until eight-thirty in the evening.

For several years, the NCNA has been forwarding large quantities of anti-United States propaganda material to Negro publications and pro-Chinese communist groups in the United States. Information was received in May, 1968, which disclosed the NCNA had commenced circulating photographs in this country depicting racial riots, arsonist activity, and other civil disorders participated in by the American Negro.

Data was received on May 3, 1968, revealing a news release had been sent from China Features, Peking, China, to the Black Organization of Students, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey. The news release contained a statement by Mao Tse-tung in which mention was made of support of the Afro-American struggle against violent repression.

The BPP makes widespread use of the "Red Book" in instructing its members. The "Red Book" is a collection of quotations by Mao Tse-tung. Sections of it have been incorporated into the BPP "Political Education Kit." One such section advocates the abolition of war through war and states that in order to get rid of the gun it "is necessary to pick up the gun."

During January, 1969, a BPP leader in Los Angeles had a poster in his possession which had been published by the Peoples Fine Arts Press, Shanghai, China. It was captioned "Support the Peoples of the World in Their Anti-Imperialist Struggle."

E. International Conferences

Numerous conferences throughout the world during the past few years have evidenced both the international character of the revolutionary protest movement and the desire of foreign elements to influence the conduct of that movement within the United States. The majority of these meetings have focused on opposition to the United States position in Vietnam. As active participants in these gatherings, representatives of militant groups within the United States have joined with their foreign counterparts in efforts to undermine the United States. A representative sampling of such conferences will illustrate this point, and, in addition, give some indication as to the disruptive, anti-United States proposals made at them.

1. International Conference on Vietnam

Stockholm was the scene of the International Conference on Vietnam held from July 6 through July 9, 1967. The World Peace Council, an international communist front organization, was one of the principal organizers of this conference. Among the 452 persons who attended the conference were delegates from communist countries. Among those present from the United States were Dr. Benjamin Spock; CPUSA National Committee member Herbert Aptheker; the Reverend James Bevel; Amy Swerdlow, of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; and Simon Casady, then an official of the National Conference of New Politics.

The conference made plans for a world "Peace in Vietnam Day" to coincide with the antiwar demonstration in Washington, D. C., on October 21-22, 1967. Our investigation of this matter disclosed that a massive demonstration of approximately 35,000 people demonstrated in Washington, D. C., which demonstration culminated with an assault on the Pentagon. Demonstrations were also held in various other cities, both inside and outside of the United States.

2. Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) Conference

In July and early August, 1967, Stokely Carmichael, of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, was a guest of the Cuban Government and an "honorary delegate" to the conference of the LASO held in Cuba. He sought to tie in the Negro extremist activities in the United States with the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle which was the basic theme of the conference. With headquarters in Havana, Cuba, LASO was formed by communist, revolutionary and terrorist groups from various Latin American countries dedicated to the violent overthrow of imperialism, particularly United States imperialism.

3. Bratislava Conference

Another so-called peace conference was held at Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, from September 6 through September 13, 1967. Among the 41 persons from the United States who attended the conference were: David Dellinger, who led the delegation from the United States; SDS leaders Nicholas Egleson, Thomas Hayden, and Steven Halliwell, who headed an SDS delegation of nine; John Wilson and John Tillman, both of SNCC; Linda Morse, of the Student Mobilization Committee; Christopher Jencks, a writer for the "New Republic" magazine; Bronson Clark and Russell Johnson, both of the American Friends Service Committee; Robert Cook, a professor at Yale University; and Sol Stern, an editor of "Ramparts" magazine.

Both North Vietnam and the NLF sent delegations to the conference.

The delegates from the United States to the Bratislava conference were furnished free lodging and meals while at the conference but were required to pay their own transportation expenses. They were thoroughly briefed by Dellinger well in advance of their departure and were instructed to be prepared to give reports and participate in discussions on various topics, including the antiwar, student and civil rights movements and an analysis of the current American political situation. Dellinger told the delegates that the purpose of the conference was to create solidarity and mutual understanding between revolutionaries from Vietnam and their supporters in the United States and that the delegates were chosen on the basis of their experience in radical activity.

4. International Cultural Congress

In January, 1968, an International Cultural Congress, attended by more than 500 delegates and observers from all over the world, was held in Cuba. Some 25 individuals from the United States were present, including David Dellinger and SDS leaders Thomas Hayden, Carl Davidson and Todd Gitlin. Five members of SNCC reportedly traveled to Havana to attend this conference. This travel was handled through the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN). The announced purpose of this conference was to obtain unity of action in Cuban anti-imperialism fights.

5. Japanese Conference on Vietnam

An international meeting sponsored by Beheiren, a Japanese peace group, was held in Kyoto, Japan, August 11-14, 1968. Approximately 450 antiwar activists including 23 from the United States were in attendance at this conference. Discussion centered on such subjects as how to wage a campaign against war and for social change throughout the world, how to deal with the Okinawa issue and the United States - Japan Security Pact, how to assist United States deserters and draft evaders and how to coordinate antiwar movements around the world.

6. International Assembly

Columbia University was the site of an International Assembly held in September, 1968. This Assembly was sponsored by the Columbia University chapter of SDS and representatives from many foreign countries were in attendance. Much of the activity of the Assembly centered around revolutionary tactics to be employed by students.

7. Budapest Conference

A group of 20 American antiwar activists including SDS members traveled to Budapest, Hungary, in September, 1968, to meet with representatives of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. Nine of the group from the United States had taken part in the demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago a few weeks before this trip. The meetings were arranged by David Dellinger and centered on the Paris Peace Talks, on prospects for further student unrest in the United States and on furthering unrest among American servicemen.

8. Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam

From November 28 to December 1, 1968, the Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam was held in Montreal, Canada, hosted by the Communist Party of Canada. It was attended by approximately 1,700 delegates and observers, including a 5-man delegation from North Vietnam, headed by Hoang Minh Giam, Minister of Culture, and a 2-man delegation from the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Others in attendance included extremists, communists, pacifists and student radicals from North and South America.

The approximately 25 BPP members in attendance, with the aid of white radicals, took over control of the conference following a series of fights and scuffles. Together with other extremists they attacked the "solidarity with the

Vietnamese" theme, wanted to assist North Vietnam and the Viet Cong and wanted to denounce American imperialism. A participant at the conference described the BPP members as "black storm troopers" and said that no decision was made at the conference without consideration of the Panthers' reactions.

BPP leader Bobby Seale addressed the conference on December 1, 1968, and called for the overthrow of colonial powers. Seale also had a series of conferences with the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front delegations.

9. Stockholm Conference on Vietnam

The Stockholm Conference on Vietnam was held May 16 through 18, 1969. Approximately 350 to 400 individuals from 52 countries representing a myriad of peace and antiwar groups were present. About 25 individuals from the United States attended.

This conference was requested jointly by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) delegations to the Paris Peace Conference. The basic theme was to promote acceptance among the world's intellectuals of the 10-Point Program advanced by the NLF and DRV at the Paris Peace Conference. They felt that if they could convince the conference participants that this program was the only legitimate answer to the Vietnam situation, the influence these individuals had in their respective countries would be sufficient to build world opinion in support of the 10-Point Program.

A report of the Working Group on Action of this conference set forth seven proposals to be used to undermine support of the United States position in Vietnam. These were:

a. Collection of signatures of prominent people to be publicized in newspapers.

b. National and international demonstrations on July 4 in the form best suited to the organizations and the movement in each country. Specific suggestions called for vigils outside United States Embassies on July 4 and the reading aloud of names of Americans killed in Vietnam.

c. Boycott of United States firms providing goods for the war in Vietnam or engaged in the transporting of such goods.

d. Increased international support for draft resistance in the United States and by Americans abroad; encouragement of defection from the United States armed forces; and, opposition within the Army.

e. Increased support of the 10-Point Program of the NLF and exposure of "the weaknesses" of President Nixon's Eight-Point Program.

f. A campaign for recognition of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by more world governments.

g. The issues of the war in Vietnam, particularly the unconditional withdrawal of United States troops and the 10-Point Program of the NLF, should be stressed as widely as possible at all national and international conferences.

With regard to proposal number one enumerated above, the June 25, 1969, edition of "The Washington Post" carried a three-quarter page advertisement calling for the President to end the war in Vietnam now. Specifically, the signers of this advertisement, many of whom have had communist affiliation, called for a halt to offensive military operations and the withdrawal of all United States troops within one year to begin immediately.

10. World Congress of Women and World Peace Council Conferences

In June, 1969, delegations from the United States attended conferences of the World Congress of Women in Helsinki, Finland, and the World Peace Council in East Berlin, Germany. Both of these are international front groups controlled by the Soviet Union. These conferences served as forums for propaganda against the United States' position in Vietnam

We have determined that the World Peace Council Conference in East Berlin, June 21-23, 1969, was concerned with the following points:

a. Unceasing denouncement of United States imperialism.

b. Recognition of the government of the German Democratic Republic by the United States and other countries within its sphere of influence.

c. Encouragement to the Vietnamese to continue fighting inasmuch as they are fighting the battle of all emerging nations and this will give the latter the courage to fight their own wars of liberation.

d. Support of provisional revolutionary governments wherever they occur.

The American delegation to this conference included communists, members of SNCC, and the various peace groups.

F. Visits to the United States by Foreign Revolutionaries

The virtual lack of travel restrictions by the United States, coupled with the comparative ease in obtaining a United States visa, practically eliminates any problems foreign leftists have in travelling to the United States. There have been numerous such individuals who have travelled here in the past for varying reasons. Notable among these are Ernest and Gisela Mandel from Belgium and Karl Deitrich Wolff from Germany.

Ernest Mandel is a leading member of the Trotskyite Secretariat of the Fourth International. He is also an activist in the New Left movement throughout Western Europe. His wife, Gisela, was active in founding the anarchistic Socialist German Students Federation (German SDS) in Berlin, Germany, and is friendly with leaders of various radical youth groups in Western Europe. Ernest Mandel's trip was arranged by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) while the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) organized the tour of Gisela Mandel. These two individuals, during September and October, 1968, made separate tours which took them to some 50 college and university campuses from coast to coast and border to border. Each appearance made by these two individuals was marked by their espousing the revolutionary doctrine of the New Left before United States college students.

Karl Deitrich Wolff, a former national chairman of the German SDS, entered the United States on February 25, 1969, reportedly to engage in a speaking and fund raising tour arranged for him by SDS. He appeared at some 16 colleges throughout the country and did not miss any opportunity to spread seeds of discontent and anarchy. He cited examples of 6 harrassment and disruption and announced the need to build an international revolutionary alliance adding that a victory for the movement in one country is a victory for the movement in another.

Wolff was subpoeaned to appear before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and during his testimony expressed support for the regimes in Cuba and North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

A BPP rally in Los Angeles, California, on November 6, 1968, was addressed by a Mexican student who was reportedly associated with the Student Strike Committee of Mexico City, Mexico, which organization had been involved in violent clashes with Mexican police and military units. During a subsequent meeting, it was agreed that Mexican student leaders would come to Los Angeles to instruct the BPP in disruptive tactics and that BPP members would go to Mexico for training.

G. Contact Between Leaders of United States Protest Groups and Representatives of Foreign Communist Groups

1. New Left Movement

Cuba and North Vietnam have been particularly strong magnets for New Left protest groups. Much of the strength of these organizations derives from their ability to maintain close relationships and dialogues with foreign establishments. For instance, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) maintains a foreign contact list of over 300 individuals and organizations throughout the world. Its chairman, David Dellinger, has travelled to the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Sweden in furtherance of opposition to the war in Vietnam. The NMC and Dellinger maintain almost constant contact with the Governments of Cuba and North Vietnam and representatives of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Dellinger feels such contacts give the NMC and himself notoriety and build their image in the movement.

One of the most highly publicized visits to North Vietnam was a ten-day trip made in December, 1965, by Staughton Lynd, a former member of the American Youth for Democracy, a defunct communist youth group; Herbert Aptheker, a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA and Thomas Hayden, one of the founders of SDS. Their trip was not authorized by the State Department. It was described by the three travellers as a "fact-finding" mission.

Following the Bratislava Conference held in September, 1967, Hayden and two other SDS members travelled to North Vietnam.

In February, 1968, 20 SDS members visited Cuba and, while there, held conferences with representatives of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Viet Cong, and with individuals from North Korea.

In March, 1968, Carl Davidson, an SDS national officer, visited Cuba where he met with representatives of Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. Steve Halliwell, another SDS activist, visited North Vietnam in April, 1968.

A group of 34 SDS members travelled to Cuba by way of Mexico in late August, 1968. Part of this group met with a representative of the National Liberation Front who stated that the New Left in the United States should conduct more and more demonstrations against the war in Vietnam.

In November, 1968, four women representing the Women Strike for Peace travelled to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Women's Committee. En route, they met with Madame Phan Thi Binh, head of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in Paris, France. In the Soviet Union, the delegation was hosted by various women in influential positions throughout the Soviet Union. A representative of the group planned to return via Prague, Czechoslovakia, and made contacts there.

On June 20, 1969, a delegation of 20 individuals under the sponsorship of the Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV) travelled to Cuba by way of Mexico City. This trip was organized with the full knowledge that it is contrary to State Department regulations; however, a statement adopted by the group indicates that the travel would be made without such approval as a further demonstration of the CRV opposition to United States policies. Available information indicated that all expenses over and above transportation was to be borne by the Cuban Government. In addition, the CRV is currently planning a similar trip to Cuba in July, 1969.

Also, in July, 1969, a group of women affiliated with the WSP plans to travel to Cuba at the invitation of the Federation of Cuban Women.

An example of the ability of the subversive New Left movement to reach a wide audience is probably best illustrated by "Ramparts" magazine and its Managing Editor Robert Scheer.

"Ramparts" magazine espouses a line of opposition to United States domestic and foreign policy from a left-oriented position, utilizing sensationalist muckraking to draw the reader's attention to its attacks on various Government agencies.

The political orientation of "Ramparts" magazine is a reflection of the activities and ideology of its Managing Editor. Scheer has been extremely active in this country in a leadership capacity in a broad range of New Left protest activities and openly espouses support of Fidel Castro and the Vietnam National Liberation Front. His foreign travels include a trip to Cambodia, Thailand and South Vietnam in February, 1966. In January, 1968, he attended the Cultural Congress held in Havana, Cuba, traveling to Cuba via Mexico City as an accredited correspondent. He stated he traveled with the approval of the State Department. He was again in Cuba from April 23, 1968, to May 10, 1968, and from December 31, 1968, to January 13, 1969, during which time he attended the celebration on January 2, 1969, of the 10th anniversary of the Cuban revolution.

Demonstrative of Scheer's political ideology is the following statement made by Scheer in 1965, "The Viet Cong is a party of peace, and if I was in Vietnam, I would be on the side of the Viet Cong."

2. Black Extremist Movement

The obvious objective of communist incursions into the black extremist movement is to bring about a Negro revolution in the United States. The presence of trained intelligence agents in Cuban Embassies and Missions together with the interest expressed by Cuban officers in the black extremist movement in this country accentuate the possibility of involvement of Cubans in this movement.

Travel by numerous black extremists to Cuba has been extensive. As previously indicated, Stokoly Carmichael and such SNCC members as George Ware, Julius Bernard Lester and Elizabeth Sutherland traveled to Cuba in July, 1967, where Carmichael was successful in extracting a promise from Fidel Castro to support the black extremist movement.

From Cuba Carmichael traveled extensively to other countries in search of support for his militant movement in the United States. His itinerary included North Vietnam, Algeria and Egypt. As a SNCC representative, he attended portions of the second session of the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in late November, 1967.

During 1967, Julius Lester traveled to Hanoi, North Vietnam, as a member of the International Affairs Department of SNCC. His trip was sponsored and paid for by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, London, England.

Dale A. Smith, who resides in Denmark, was designated as the Northern European Field Secretary for SNCC as of January 1, 1968. His functions include fund raising, public relations and coordination with other groups in northern Europe.

A group known as the Friends of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee is active in Paris, France. The leader of this group is William Gardner Smith, who is aided by a female group of American SNCC adherents. They are attached to the International Office of SNCC in New York City. This group has been engaged in raising funds for SNCC.

Smith, an employee of the French Press Agency in Paris, France, resided until 1951 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he was actively associated with the Philadelphia branch of the Socialist Workers Party.

James Rufus Forman, International Director of SNCC, has had many contacts with representatives of foreign countries. On December 27, 1967,

While he was in Sweden during 1968, Forman was part of a group which met with individuals representing the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

In June, 1968, three Republic of New Africa (RNA) leaders, including Milton Henry and his brother, Richard, visited Africa to determine what kind of assistance RNA could obtain from Tanzania and what type of assistance they could render Tanzania in return. Prior to their visit it was believed that hundreds of acres had been set aside in Tanzania for the RNA to set up a commune and that Red China had land-clearing equipment and farm machinery to be utilized on this property.

After their visit they indicated that the president of the country would make some agreements with Robert F. Williams concerning commitments and foreign aid to the RNA; however, these commitments would not be made public. The Henrys stated that as a contribution and to show good faith, RNA would obtain medicine and books and send them to Tanzania. In addition, the RNA would assist in organizing the United Liberation Front in Africa which would attempt to unite all black African nations.

Williams, the RNA's president in exile, is a black extremist who fled the United States in 1961 following his indictment on a kidnaping charge in North Carolina. He resided in Cuba until 1966 at which time he went to Peking, China, where he has since resided.

Richard Henry has indicated that he wants to send Negro militants to Tanzania to establish a cadre for the proposed RNA commune. The purpose of this cadre will be to begin training blacks of the African continent in guerrilla warfare.

In October, 1968, a group of American Negroes were in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where they were allegedly recruiting an army to eventually fight against the United States and take over RNA's rightful title to portions of the United States. These troops allegedly would be equipped with Chinese weapons. Richard Henry and Williams are actively recruiting for this army, and 17 American Negroes are reportedly now active in the affairs of RNA in Tanzania.

In September, 1968, Richard Henry discussed the negotiations to establish a Chinese Consulate in Quebec. If it is established, Henry states, RNA will be able to legally purchase equipment through the consulate. Milton Henry, speaking before the National Black Economic Conference in Detroit, Michigan, in April, 1969, stated that the black nation of RNA means developing relations with friendly powers, namely, Red China and Cuba.

In December, 1968, two leaders of SNCC departed from the United States for Cuba, via Mexico, allegedly to attend a Cultural Congress. When they returned to the United States, they were intercepted at the Canadian border by Customs and Immigration officials. They had in their possession a large quantity of North Korean, Soviet and Cuban propaganda and souvenirs. Included in their personal effects were a five-band portable radio of Soviet manufacture, adaptable for receiving intelligence communications and a revealing notebook and diary.

Analysis of the notes and diary indicates the two Negro nationalists were on a "mission" on behalf of SNCC and that this mission had been well planned in advance. Their effects also indicated they were placed in contact with the North Koreans in Havana by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba; on February 24, 1969, they flew from Moscow for Korea under the cover of pseudonyms; in March, 1969, in North Korea they received detailed training in revolutionary theory and political and military intelligence; and they spent considerable time in the Soviet Union and Cuba prior to their return. Among their notes were instructions for organizing a committee which would propagandize for the withdrawal of allied forces from Korea and seek the support of the New Left and domestic Negro nationalist movements, as well as domestic

Koreans, to discredit the United States position in Korea. It was indicated this proposed committee would be supported by the North Koreans through contacts in Cuba.

Additionally, it was indicated the subjects had received training in a likely assignment to accumulate intelligence in behalf of the North Koreans relating to "latest plans, newest weapons, blueprints, actual weapons, if possible." According to the notes, these should be secretly transmitted to the North Koreans through the Soviet Union, the Tanzanian Embassy, Cuban consulates in Mexico or France, or the Korean Embassy in Prague. One of the individuals described the assignment as "We will be their (North Koreans) eyes and ears as we wage armed struggle."

On August 19, 1968, George Mason Murray, BPP national official, and Joudan Ford, then the BPP leader in New York City, arrived in Havana, Cuba. Assistance for their trip was rendered by an official of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations.

Following his return to the United States, Murray talked of his trip during a BPP rally in Oakland, California, on September 5, 1968. He indicated that on their arrival in Havana they were met by representatives of the Communist Party of Cuba and revolutionary guerrilla organizations from Asia and Africa. In a subsequent speech on December 23, 1968, Murray stated that during his trip to Cuba he had been personally assured by Fidel Castro that the Cuban Government would give all-out support to Negroes in the United States.

While in Cuba on August 24, 1968, Murray voiced his appreciation to the "Revolutionary Government of Cuba" in a radio broadcast made from Havana.

On September 11, 1968, a Havana, Cuba, radio station broadcasted telephone interviews with BPP leaders Bobby Seale and Eldridge Cleaver. Seale stated that Oakland, California, was under military occupation following the voluntary manslaughter conviction of BPP leader Huey Newton. Cleaver stated that "they" will answer counterrevolutionary violence with revolutionary violence.

In September, 1968, Irving Davis, a SNCC leader in New York City, traveled to Cuba via France. On October 2, 1968, an interview with Davis was broadcast on Radio Havana. In answering a question regarding urban guerrilla warfare, Davis said it is going to become more and more a method that will have to be employed by people not only in America but also throughout the world as they struggle for liberation. In answering a question about the full independence of Afro-American people, Davis stated that the Afro-American people cannot achieve their liberation without the liquidation of United States imperialism.

When Davis was in Atlanta, Georgia, during December, 1968, he mentioned that he had received limited training while in Cuba in firing automatic and semiautomatic weapons.

Representatives of the Cuban Government allegedly told Davis that Cuba was ready to assist SNCC with financial and other means of support in its struggle in the United States. Before aid was to be given, however, SNCC was to give concrete evidence of revolutionary activity in the next six months. Davis claimed Cuban officials told him Cuba would grant asylum to any black political refugee from the United States. Davis also claimed his trip to Cuba was financed by money provided him by the Cuban Government through its United Nations Mission in New York City.

During November, 1968, two BPP members traveled to Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, to attempt to organize a BPP group in that area. During a news conference, one of the BPP members stated that the only thing whites could give to the BPP was money or guns.

During the period from March 9 to March 24, 1969, BPP leaders Bobby Seale and Raymond Hewitt traveled to Sweden, Denmark and Norway to obtain financial backing for the BPP. The visit was sponsored by the Socialist Workers Party of Denmark and the Solidarity Committee for Black Liberation, which reportedly has offices in Copenhagen, Denmark, and Stockholm, Sweden. Prior to departing on the trip, Seale stated that the Socialist Workers Party of Denmark had sent two round-trip tickets for the trip in addition to a total of four thousand dollars for bail and defense funds of the BPP.

While traveling through the Scandinavian countries, Seale made a number of speeches and held several press conferences in which he claimed that the BPP was the "political proletariat" and that it was engaged in a class struggle and not in a racial struggle.

II RESOURCES NOW TARGETED TOWARD MONITORING FOREIGN COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Domestic Communist Groups

1. Communist Party, USA (CPUSA)

Coverage of foreign support of the CPUSA is very effectively achieved at present through live informant coverage at a high level, supplemented by selective electronic and physical surveillances.

2. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups

a. Progressive Labor Party (PLP)

PLP investigations utilize live informants, the monitoring of bank accounts, selective electronic surveillances and, where necessary, physical surveillances.

b. Revolutionary Union (RU)

RU is covered with high-level informants. We also utilize selective electronic surveillances on RU leaders and physical surveillances to identify contacts. Physical surveillances are also conducted on RU activities and on individual leaders.

3. Trotskyite Groups

a. Socialist Workers Party (SWP)

The SWP and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), have been actively penetrated by informants. We also utilize physical surveillances and monitor bank records to supplement this coverage.

B. Diplomatic Establishments and Intelligence Operations

1. Soviet and Satellite

Our coverage aimed at penetration of Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities in the United States includes a wide variety of techniques. We use fixed lookouts on certain communist-bloc establishments which lookouts in most cases are equipped with photographic surveillance equipment. We also conduct physical surveillances on selected individual intelligence officers and maintain electronic surveillances on communist-bloc official establishments.

We operate a program to identify individuals in contact with communist-bloc officials and establishments to determine the purpose of the contact and to assess the potential risk to internal security posed by the contact. At the same time, we explore the informant potential of the individual concerned.

Sources and informants regularly in contact with communist-bloc intelligence personnel perform an important role in our coverage as do the double agents we operate against them.

We have conducted selected operations in the past aimed at the direct defection of communist-bloc intelligence agents.

2. Chinese

Current resources directed against Chinese intelligence activities include the use of informants and electronic surveillances on selected subjects. We also have devised and operated programs aimed at specific problem areas such as Chinese scientists in the United States, Chinese aliens entering the United States and Chinese seamen who may have a port of call in this country.

We also operate a national pro-Chinese Communist organization in the United States staffed and controlled through informants under our direction. This organization is projected to penetrate Chinese Communist intelligence and political activities directed toward the United States.

3. Cuban Intelligence Service

We also use physical surveillances on a selected basis and periodically review pertinent bank records. Through the use of informants and double agents we have been successful in penetrating Cuban Intelligence Service operations in the United States.

C. International Conferences

Whenever possible, we attempt to have informants or sources under our control participate in international conferences as representatives of the particular groups with which they are affiliated. We have been successful in penetrating several of these conferences in this fashion and have materially benefited from on-the-scene coverage.

D. Contacts Between Revolutionary Leaders and Leaders of Foreign Communist Governments

This is a difficult area to cover as we do not always have informants in a position to accompany individual revolutionary leaders on their official and private trips to foreign countries. We rely on other established informants whom we have targeted against these revolutionary leaders and who have access to them upon their return. In some cases, we are able to determine the result of foreign contacts through our domestic electronic surveillances.

E.- Travel of Foreign Leaders to the United States

Coverage of foreign leaders to the United States is effected through the coordination of our informant coverage of the organization sponsoring the trip and physical and selective electronic surveillances, where applicable.

III. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Historically, the United States has been the target for subversive activities emanating from and directed by the international communist movement in regard to efforts to foment disorder and disruption in a revolutionary vein. The change from the monolithic nature of the movement to polycentrism only served to magnify the problem in that it diversified the subversive attack.

Regardless of the diversification, the basic nature of the attack remained the same. It emanated from communist forces abroad and was channeled into this country through communist-bloc diplomatic establishments and old-line communist groups and organizations working to advance international communist objectives.

From the standpoint of the FBI's responsibilities in regard to countering these subversive thrusts, there were two significant factors which enabled us to mount effective counterintelligence operations.

The first factor was that the activities themselves, took place for the most part within our borders. It was a situation which lent itself to effective utilization of manpower for coverage and counterintelligence purposes.

The second factor was that the activities were engaged in by organizations, such as the CPUSA, which were tightly structured organizationally in the traditional pattern of communist parties throughout the world. As such, they presented clear-cut targets for informant penetration.

Because these old-line organizations also followed the traditional pattern of operating under the concept of democratic centralism with an insistence on rigid discipline throughout party ranks, high-level informant penetration provided an insight into strategy and tactics being considered at all levels. Here, too, it was possible to effectively negate their thrusts.

The emergence of the New Left and black-extremist movements in our society drastically altered the situation. They evolved mostly out of social reform movements which increasingly have been transformed into hard-core revolutionary movements dedicated to the total destruction of our democratic traditions and our society.

They produced a new breed of revolutionaries whose main preoccupation with communism is that it has produced men like Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Che Guevarra, whom they hope to emulate in the overthrow of a system they deem oppressive.

From the inception of these movements, the FBI has been aware of the fact that their increasingly revolutionary communist imprint posed new and unique problems for the internal security of this nation.

As these forces of revolutionary protest hardened in their resolve to accomplish their purpose, more and more they reached out to join hands with and seek support from old-line communists not only inside our country but also communists and anarchists abroad.

In effect, the picture has changed from one in which international communist forces sought out supporters within our country to carry out their objectives to one in which domestic revolutionaries are reaching our seeking the support of anyone, including communists, throughout the world who will help and support them in their own destructive aims.

Since the objectives of both so clearly coincide, it is inevitable that they will join forces in common cause. The willingness of the Soviets, Chinese communists, and Cubans to support the efforts of domestic revolutionaries here already has been demonstrated. In addition, the movement of the New Left and black extremist revolutionary protestors toward increasingly centralized, more tightly disciplined organizations will facilitate the inevitable linkings.

It is essential that we bring together and intensify the intelligence capabilities of our country to meet this growing threat. It is imperative that we penetrate all the channels of communication between foreign communist forces and domestic revolutionaries; that we take all possible additional investigative steps to safeguard the security of this Nation in a time of multiplying and expanding crises. This has become mandatory because of increasing problems which may be anticipated in the future by reason of the growing alliances with foreign communist elements.

ORGANIZATION APPENDIX

Black Panther Party (BPP)

The Black Panther Party was formed in 1966 at Oakland, California. Its stated purpose is to organize black people so they can "take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of black communities." The BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program and encourages Negroes to arm themselves against the police. Its publications contain quotations from the writings of the leader of Communist China and feature his statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." It is headquartered at Berkeley, California.

Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV)

The Committee of Returned Volunteers was established in 1966 at New York City and is composed of individuals who have worked abroad in such programs as the American Friends Service Committee and Peace Corps. It has a membership of approximately 3,000 individuals and 12 chapters throughout the United States. It has been active in demonstrations protesting United States policy, particularly the draft and the war in Vietnam. Its leaders have discussed establishing contact with revolutionary groups, aiding guerrillas, destruction of existing governments and the transmission of information to Soviet-bloc countries. The CRV has declared that it seeks radical changes in United States policy towards Asia, Africa, Latin America and emerging communities in the United States.

National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC)

The NMC was founded in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1966. It is a coalition of over 100 antiwar, antidraft, black extremist and pacifist groups. Among the organizations which participated in NMC activities are the CPUSA, SWP, SNCC and the American Friends Service Committee. The NMC has organized major protest demonstrations including the march on the Pentagon in October, 1967; the disruptive demonstrations during the Democratic National Convention at Chicago in August, 1968; and the demonstrations during the Presidential Inauguration ceremonies in January, 1969. Its officers include David Dellinger, who has travelled to the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Sweden in furtherance of opposition to the war in Vietnam.

Republic of New Africa (RNA)

The Republic of New Africa is headquartered at Detroit, Michigan. It is a black extremist separatist organization whose stated purpose is the formation of a black nation within the United States. It advocates the formation of a black army to defend this black nation and to attack its enemies.

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

SDS, which is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, was formed in 1962 and is an outgrowth of the Student League for Industrial Democracy, the youth affiliate of the League for Industrial Democracy, an old-line labor-oriented Fabian Socialist organization.

The founding convention of SDS held at Port Huron, Michigan, in 1962, produced the "Port Huron Statement" which in effect provided the ideological framework for SDS, established the line of "participatory democracy," and set the direction for much of the subsequent activity of the organization.

In the ensuing years SDS has increasingly entered into the mainstream of revolutionary politics particularly with regard to its opposition to the American form of government. At its National Council meeting held in Austin, Texas, in March, 1969, SDS National Secretary Michael Klonsky stated, "Our primary task is to build a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement." The central appeal of SDS has been to the student. It currently has approximately 250 chapters located mainly on college campuses.

Student Mobilization Committee (SMC)

The SMC is headquartered at New York City. It is dominated by members of the SWP and/or members of the YSA. The SMC has been active in demonstrations against United States policy. Its aims are to bring about the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, to end university "complicity" with the war, and to establish self-determination for Vietnam and "black America." It currently publishes the "Student Mobilizer."

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

SNCC was formed in 1960 at Atlanta, Georgia, as a nonmembership civil rights organization. It took part in voter registration work in the South and was one of the moving forces behind the Freedom Riders of the early 1960s. In 1966 Stokely Carmichael was elected National Chairman of SNCC. He moved this group from the civil rights field to a full-blown revolutionary group. Carmichael urged Negroes to prepare for a "bloody revolution."

Carmichael was succeeded as National Chairman in 1967 by H. Rap Brown, who continued Carmichael's policy of denouncing United States' intervention in Vietnam, calling for rebellion by any means, and massive civil disobedience.

SNCC is a nonmembership organization which is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. It is composed of 50 staff members and a 15-member Central Committee.

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

WILPF, an international pacifist group, has its United States headquarters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and has a current membership of 11,000 in 154 branches in the United States.

The WILPF advocates the right to self-determination, support of the United Nations, enforcement of civil rights laws and new approaches to the entire social welfare system. The organization is currently urging abolition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System, withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam, and the elimination of racial discrimination.

Women Strike for Peace (WSP)

WSP is a national nonmembership women's pacifist group which maintains a national office at Washington, D. C. It has engaged in numerous protests against the draft, the war in Vietnam, nuclear tests, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile System. Representatives of WSP have been in contact with the National Liberation Front and have travelled to various countries including Cuba.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 30, 1969

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Director approved my memorandum of 6/23/69 which advised we were preparing a report for Mr. Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, at his request regarding our coverage of foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States to reach him by 6/30/69. We advised Mr. Huston such a report would be forthcoming.

Our report sets forth the traditional channel for communist support of revolutionary activity in this country by the established basic revolutionary groups under foreign domination such as the Communist Party, USA, and the Socialist Workers Party. We also cover the capabilities of hostile intelligence operations directed at the United States by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Communist China.

Next we show the newer, bolder avenues of support and direction being utilized by revolutionaries, often without any attempt to conceal their purpose. These include international conferences which in this period of history are ostensibly for peace in Vietnam but which also have the usual underlying goal of destroying United States prestige in world affairs. The ease of international travel and communication with revolutionary intent by New Left and black extremist adherents from the United States and abroad is then set forth.

The section dealing with our coverage of the above threats to our internal security clearly shows our strong reliance upon the use of live informants and physical surveillance techniques contrasted by the highly selective and limited use of electronic coverage.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP 2 ALM/EHL

Enclosures (2)

FRG:pab
(11)

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST
MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Our report shows that the FBI has been aware from the inception of the New Left and black extremist movements that they pose new and unique threats to our internal security. It shows we have readjusted our investigative intelligence efforts to cope with the new problems created. It stresses the fact that these movements are developing increasingly into hard-core revolutionary elements which will demand still greater attention in the form of increased coverage as it appears there will be increasingly closer links between these movements and foreign communists in the future.

We have prepared a transmittal letter to Mr. Huston submitting our report. Inasmuch as this document is not going directly to the President, no copy is being forwarded to the Attorney General at this time.

ACTION:

With your approval, the attached report and letter will be forwarded to Mr. Huston.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: ~~June~~ 20, 1969

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: MR. TOM CHARLES HUSTON
STAFF ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

Reference is made to the enclosed memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach dated June 18, 1969.

Mr. Huston did come in yesterday. The first thing he said was that he had made a mistake in going to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley as Yeagley did not seem to know anything about the New Left. Mr. Huston then went on to say that President Nixon called him in and discussed with him in some detail the need for the President to know in greater depth the details concerning the revolutionary activities stemming from the New Left. In particular, said Mr. Huston, President Nixon is interested in all information possible relating to foreign influences and the financing of the New Left. He said he was requested by the President to also go to other members of the intelligence community to develop whatever materials they may have within their jurisdiction.

Mr. Huston said that on completing his work, it will be presented to the President for his use.

I told Mr. Huston that I was not in any position to make commitments in this matter, that if he had such a request to make it would be necessary for him to put it in writing and address his letter to the Director who made the decisions in such areas. Mr. Huston said that he would do this.

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-71

For the information of the Director.

MDR 16

Enclosure

WCS:lml (5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/25/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach DATE: June 18, 1969

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
IS - SDS

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division of the Department, called me late this afternoon and said he had received an inquiry from Mr. Thomas Huston, a White House Staff Assistant. In that capacity Huston is interested in developing information for the President concerning the New Left movement. Huston said he wanted to talk to Yeagley about the New Left.

Yeagley told me he told Huston he felt he would be better off and would get more accurate information if he talked to FBI representatives in the Domestic Intelligence Division. Yeagley said Huston was coming over tomorrow, June 19th, at 3:00 p.m. to this Division to discuss the matter.

We will talk to him, of course, and see what he wants without making any commitments to him and advise you promptly as to the nature of his interest.

RECOMMENDATION:
For information.

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

WCS:pcn/chs
(4)
[illegible]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

[redacted]

June 24, 1969

BY LIAISON

Mr. Tom Charles Huston
Staff Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

[redacted]

Dear Mr. Huston:

I have received your memorandum of June 20, 1969, requesting a report on foreign communist support of revolutionary protest movements in the United States.

In compliance with your request, a comprehensive, in-depth review of our coverage in this field is presently being conducted and you will be furnished the results on June 30, 1969. This analysis will cover foreign support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States emanating from all strata of international communism, whether they be pro-Russian, pro-Chinese or pro-Cuban oriented.

When you have had sufficient opportunity to evaluate this material, I will be happy to make a member of my staff available to you for further discussion at your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6/23/69

FROM : C. D. Brennan

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

SUBJECT: FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, the White House, has submitted the attached memorandum requesting us to set forth our coverage of foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States, its effectiveness and what steps can be taken to provide maximum possible coverage of these activities. He has also made the same request of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The United States is the ultimate target of all revolutionary movements and support of revolutionary activities in this country comes from all strata of international communism whether they be pro-Russian, pro-Chinese or pro-Cuban oriented. This request by Mr. Huston requires a comprehensive, in-depth review of our coverage of all subversive groups in which we have an interest. We have started a division-wide research and analysis project and a detailed report to the White House will be prepared as requested to be submitted to the White House on June 30, 1969.

Mr. Huston has also indicated a desire to discuss this matter with us after evaluating our report. This will be coordinated by the Domestic Intelligence Division and, of course, no commitments will be made without securing the specific approval of the Director.

ACTION:

Attached for your approval is a letter to Mr. Huston acknowledging his memorandum and advising him our report will be forthcoming as requested.

Enclosures - 2

100-446997-84

FBG:djb

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1969

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVE

FROM: Tom Charles Huston
Staff Assistant to the President

The President has directed that a report on foreign Communist support of revolutionary protest movements in this country be prepared for his study. He has specifically requested that the report draw upon all the resources available to the intelligence community and that it be as detailed as possible.

"Support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign Communists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protest movements in the United States.

On the basis of earlier reports submitted to the President on a more limited aspect of this problem, it appears that our present intelligence collection capabilities in this area may be inadequate. The President would like to know what resources we presently have targeted toward monitoring foreign Communist support of revolutionary youth activities in this country, how effective they are, what gaps in our intelligence exist because of either inadequate resources or a low priority of attention, and what steps could be taken, if he directed, to provide the maximum possible coverage of these activities.

I have asked CIA, NSA, and DIA to submit their contributions to me by Monday, June 30th. I would appreciate it if the Bureau would provide their response to the President's request by that date.

Since the Bureau has primary responsibility in this area, I would like to discuss the matter further with your staff after I have had an opportunity to evaluate the initial contributions. The President has assigned a high priority to this project, and I want to insure that he receives the most complete report that it is possible to assemble.

TCH

Tom Charles Huston

MDR 16

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 6/24/75

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
(Attn: SA W. O. CREGAR)

MDR 16

FROM: SAC, DETROIT (66-9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

RE: SENSTUDY 1975;
~~BUDED 6/24/75~~

Re Detroit teletype to Bureau, 6/24/75, captioned as above.

There are enclosed herewith the following pertinent serials referred to in referenced teletype:

1. Detroit letter to Bureau, 9/27/61, captioned "GUS SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

2. Bureau letter to Detroit, 10/4/61, captioned "GUS SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

3. Detroit letter to Bureau, 11/8/61, captioned "GUS SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

4. Detroit letter to Bureau, 12/21/61, captioned "GUS SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

5. Detroit letter to Bureau, 1/31/62, captioned "GUS SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

6. Detroit letter to Bureau, 2/28/62, captioned "GUS SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

7. Bureau letter to Detroit, 4/12/62, captioned "GUS SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

ENCLOSURE

ENCL BEHIND FILE

62-116395-424

② - Bureau (Enc. 15) (RM)
1 - Detroit
CRO/KAB
(3)

REC- 102

7-25

5 JUN 26 1975

cc 4063 JEH

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge   Sent ______ M   Per ______

84 JUL 29 1975

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

8. Bureau letter to Boston, 5/31/61, captioned "SAM SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

9. Detroit letter to Bureau, 6/15/61, captioned "SAM SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

10. Bureau letter to Boston, 8/14/61, captioned "SAM SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

11. Detroit letter to Bureau, 4/4/62, captioned "SAM SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

12. New York letter to Bureau, 8/29/61, captioned "SAM SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

13. Bureau letter to Detroit, 4/13/62, captioned "SAM SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

14. Detroit letter to Bureau, 5/31/62, captioned "SAM SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

15. Detroit letter to Bureau, 9/27/62, captioned "SAM SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R"

SECRET

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MDR 16

CLASSIFIED BY: SP2ALM/EHC
REASON: 1.5 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: X 1,6
11/15/00

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 009 SF CODED

4:20 PM URGENT 6/24/75 CJC

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

TOP SECRET

ATTENTION: SA W. O. ~~G~~REGAR C

SENSTUDY 1975, BUDED JUNE 24, 1975.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE CAPTIONED AS ABOVE DATED JUNE 18, 1975.

Mr. Cregar JPL

FOR THE INFORMATION OF FBI HEADQUARTERS IT HAS NOT BEEN THE PRACTICE TO UTILIZE A CONTROL FILE FOR MAIL COVERS. RATHER, THEY ARE WORKED FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE FILE. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO PRACTICAL METHOD TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF MAIL COVERS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN PLACED IN YEARS PAST. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT AVAILABLE AS AN INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUE BETWEEN 1964 AND 1973, THE TOTAL NUMBER SINCE 1960 WOULD NOT BE LARGE. THERE FOLLOWS SPECIFIC RESPONSE FROM SAN FRANCISCO FILES TO REQUESTS IN REFERENCED TELETYPE.

GUS SURVEY (BUFILE 65-67003, SF 105-11581)

REC- 102 62-11 423

THE GUS SURVEY WAS INSTITUTED BY THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF FBI ON OCTOBER 30, 1961, AND WAS DISCONTINUED ON FEBRUARY 9, 1962. THE SURVEY TOOK PLACE AT THE RINCON ANNEX POST OFFICE IN SAN FRANCISCO.

12 JUL 25 1975

SECRET

5

84 JUL 29 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE GUS SURVEY WAS TO ATTEMPT TO LOCATE AND UNCOVER SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS. THE SURVEY INVOLVED THE EXAMINATION OF ALL FIRST CLASS MAIL ENVELOPES ARRIVING AT THE RINCON ANNEX POST OFFICE WHICH ORIGINATED FROM WASHINGTON, D.C., OR NEW YORK CITY. THE ENVELOPES ONLY WERE SCANNED FOR CHARACTERISTICS WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT THEY COULD HAVE ORIGINATED FROM A SOVIET ILLEGAL SUPPORT AGENT AND POSSIBLY BE DIRECTED TO AN ILLEGAL SOVIET AGENT IN THE SAN FRANCISCO AREA.

THE SURVEY WAS BASED ON INFORMATION DEVELOPED CONCERNING COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTED FROM KNOWN ILLEGAL SUPPORT AGENTS ATTACHED TO SOVIET ESTABLISHMENTS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, D.C., TO SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES. PREVIOUS ANALYSIS OF MAIL COMMUNICATIONS FROM SOVIET ILLEGAL SUPPORT AGENTS TO SOVIET ILLEGALS OPERATIONG IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1960'S REVEALED THAT PRIMARY CHARACTERISTICS ON SUSPECT ENVELOPES WERE:

1. LACK OF RETURN ADDRESS.
2. TYPEWRITTEN ADDRESS IN BLOCK FORM.
3. USE OF LINCOLN $.04 STAMPS.
4. USE OF "BUSINESS SIZE" WHITE OR BROWN ENVELOPES.
5. ADDRESS OCCASIONALLY TYPEWRITTEN ON A "STICKER" GLUED

SECRET

TO ENVELOPE.

WHEN AN ENVELOPE WITH MANY OR ALL OF THE ABOVE CHARACTERISTICS WAS OBSERVED, AN INVESTIGATION WAS INSTITUTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING IF THE ADDRESSEE COULD POSSIBLY BE A SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENT.

THIS SURVEY WAS AUTHORIZED FOR A 60 DAY PERIOD AND WAS TERMINATED AT ONE POINT DURING 1961 CHRISTMAS RUSH ONLY TO BE RE-INSTITUTED IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE 60 DAY AUTHORIZATION PERIOD.

SINCE ALL FIRST CLASS MAIL ENVELOPES WERE SCANNED, IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT APPROXIMATELY 130,000 ENVELOPES A DAY WOULD BE SCANNED FOR THE ABOVE CHARACTERISTIC.

DURING THE SURVEY PERIOD, MORE THAN 1,101,880 ENVELOPES WERE SCANNED AND 83 INVESTIGATIONS WERE INITIATED. ALL 83 INVESTIGATIONS WERE EVENTUALLY CLOSED INASMUCH AS NO INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR ILLEGAL AGENTS APPEARED TO BE INVOLVED IN ANY OF THE SUSPECT MAIL.

PERTINENT COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE GUS SURVEY AND INCLUDED IN BOTH SAN FRANCISCO AND BUREAU FILES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO THE BUREAU DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 1961, CAPTIONED "SAM SURVEY," BUREAU FILE 65-65884.

SECRET

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE GUS SURVEY AND LOCATED IN BUREAU FILE 65-67003 AND SAN FRANCISCO FILE 105-11581, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

BUREAU LETTER TO SAN FRANCISCO DATED OCTOBER 4, 1961.

SAN FRANCISCO AIRTEL TO THE BUREAU DATED OCTOBER 13, 1961.

BUREAU LETTER TO SAN FRANCISCO DATED OCTOBER 18, 1961.

SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO BUREAU DATED NOVEMBER L, 1961, CONFIRMING THAT THE GUS SURVEY WAS INSTITUTED AT 12:01 AM, OCTOBER 30, 1961, AND THAT SYMBOL NUMBER CSSF 2536-S WAS ASSIGNED.

SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO BUREAU DATED NOVEMBER 21, 1961.

SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO BUREAU DATED JANUARY 11, 1962.

SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO BUREAU DATED MARCH 21, 1962, CONFIRMING THAT THE GUS SURVEY WAS DISCONTINUED ON FEBRUARY 9, 1962.

IN VIEW OF THE AMOUNT OF ENVELOPES WHICH HAD TO BE SCANNED NUMEROUS AGENTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF THE FBI WERE UTILIZED INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

RICHARD E. STEPHENS

JOHN T. KERLER

DOUGLAS G. ALLEN

STANLEY J. EAGER

WILLIAM F. MC LAUGHLIN

FRED ELLEDGE

WILLIAM A. COHENDET

DONALD L. COFFIN

JOSEPH M. WUSLICH

HARRY L. MC NEILL

KEITH G. TEETER

WAYNE K. WELCH

DAVID C. SPENCER

STANLEY F. FEWSTER

DANIEL A. GROVE

JOHN P. MC HUGH

JAMES E. SHERRIFF

CLIFFORD J. CARMODY

JAMES WEIL

CHIPROP (BUFILE 105-121706, SF 105-2563)

CHIPROP WAS OPENED AT SAN FRANCISCO BY SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO BUREAU DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 1954, AND WAS OPERATED AS A MAIL COVER UNTIL JULY, 1956, WHEN CONTENTS OF A LETTER RECEIVED FROM CHINA BY COMMUNIST PARTY FUNCTIONARY, ELIZABETH GURLEY FLYNN, WERE

SET OUT IN SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO BUREAU DATED JULY 25, 1956. THEREAFTER CONTENTS OF LETTERS FROM CHINA WERE REGULARLY EXAMINED, ITEMS IN CHINESE WERE REGULARLY FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU FOR TRANSLATION ON A SELECTIVE BASIS. APPROXIMATELY 40,000 ITEMS OF CORRESPONDENCE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN EXAMINED UNDER THE CHIPROP PROGRAM. THE CASE WAS ORIGINALLY OPENED IN CONNECTION WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY OF INTERCEPTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA FROM ABROAD, AND EXAMINATION OF MAIL WAS HANDLED THROUGH THE RESTRICTED MERCHANDISE SECTION OF THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS OFFICE AT SAN FRANCISCO. SAN FRANCISCO AIRTEL DATED APRIL 6, 1961, DIRECTED TO BUREAU FILE 134-5108, INDICATED COVERAGE DISCONTINUED SINCE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA DISCONTINUED BY PRESIDENTIAL ORDER ON MARCH 17, 1961. BUREAU RADIOGRAM DATED APRIL 11, 1961, REQUESTED COMMENTS REGARDING RESUMPTION OF COVERAGE AND SAME WAS REINSTITUTED JULY 14, 1961, WITH SAN FRANCISCO AIRTEL THAT DATE. BY SAN FRANCISCO AIRTEL DATED APRIL 23, 1962, CHIPROP COVERAGE WAS DISCONTINUED SINCE RESTRICTED MERCHANDISE UNIT MOVED FROM CUSTOMS HOUSE TO RINCON ANNEX OF UNITED STATES POST OFFICE. BUREAU LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 1963, REQUESTED SAN FRANCISCO DETERMINE IF CHIPROP COVERAGE COULD BE RESUMED. SAN FRANCISCO

LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 21, 1962, ADVISED CSSF 2279-S COULD NOT BE RE-ACTIVATED BUT POSSIBILITY OF RESUMPTION OF CHIPROP COVERAGE THROUGH THAT SOURCE WOULD BE FOLLOWED. SAN FRANCISCO AIRTEL DATED JUNE 12, 1963, ADVISED THAT CHIPROP COVERAGE WAS BEING RE-INSTITUTED THROUGH THE FOREIGN PROPAGANDA UNIT AT THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS HOUSE, THAT SOURCE BEING DESIGNATED AS CSSF 2641-S. WHEN THE FOREIGN PROPAGANDA UNIT MOVED TO RINCON ANNEX, MAIL COVERAGE CONTINUED TO BE SECURED THROUGH IT AND STILL LATER, COVERAGE WAS SECURED THROUGH THE HEAD OF THE AIR MAIL FACILITY OF THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE. IN ALL CASES, MAIL SELECTED FOR EXAMINATION WAS OPENED ONLY IN THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF THE FBI DURING EARLY MORNING HOURS JUST AFTER MIDNIGHT AND WAS RETURNED TO THE POSTAL FACILITY SAME DATE.

CHICLET (BUFILE 105-121706, SF 105-14767)

CHICLET WAS INITIATED IN COMPLIANCE WITH BUREAU LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 9, 1963. SAN FRANCISCO LETTER DATED OCTOBER 28, 1963, INDICATED CHICLET COVERAGE WOULD BE COVERED THROUGH THE SUPERINTENDANT OF THE AIR MAIL FACILITY OF THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE AND INITIAL EXAMINATION WOULD BE MADE IN HIS OFFICE. HOWEVER, AS IN THE CASE OF CHIPROP, ALL ITEMS SELECTED FOR INTERNAL EXAMINATION

WERE TAKEN TO THE FBI OFFICE TO BE OPENED AND XEROXED. CHIPROP COVERAGE WAS DESIGNATED AS FURNISHED BY CSSF 2670-S. MORE THAN 4,000 ITEMS WERE EXAMINED UNDER THE CHICLET PROGRAM.

CHICLET AND CHIPROP COVERAGE BOTH WERE DISCONTINUED IN 1966 AFTER LIM P. LEE WAS APPOINTED AS POSTMASTER OF SAN FRANCISCO, JANUARY 24, 1966, IT BEING POINTED OUT TO THE BUREAU THAT LEE HAD BEEN ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT OF CONGRESSMAN PHILLIP BURTON AND THAT IT WAS FELT NO CHANCE SHOULD BE TAKEN THAT BURTON MIGHT BECOME AWARE OF THE COVERAGE BY THE FBI.

CHIPROP AND CHICLET COVERAGE WERE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF FORMER SUPERVISOR RICHARD G. FLETCHER, WHO IS NOW RETIRED AND RESIDING IN SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA. THE CHIPROP CASE WAS FIRST ASSIGNED TO SA PATRICK J. HAGGERTY AND WAS HANDLED DURING 1964 BY FORMER SA PAUL J. TSCHIDA. THE CHIPROP CASE AWAS REASSIGNED ON JANUARY 15, 1965, TO SA BERTRAM WORTHINGTON, WHO CONTINUED TO HANDLE THE CASE UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED IN 1966. THE CHICLET CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO SA PATRICK J. HAGGERTY AT ITS INCEPTION AND WAS REASSIGNED ON JANUARY 27, 1964, TO SA BERTRAM WORTHINGTON, WHO CONTINUED TO HANDLE IT UNTIL IT WAS CLOSED IN 1966. NO EXACT RECORD IS AVAILABLE OF THE IDENTITIES OF THE

SECRET

SPECIAL AGENTS WHO ACTUALLY OPENED THE MAIL UNDER THE CHIPROP AND CHICLET PROGRAMS. HOWEVER, SAN FRANCISCO FILE 105-2563, SERIAL 99 IS A MEMORANDUM DATED DECEMBER 20, 1963, WHICH LISTS SPECIAL AGENTS WHO SHOULD RECEIVE SMALLPOX VACCINATIONS BECAUSE OF THE VOLUME OF MAIL FROM CHINA AND HONG KONG WHICH THEY WERE HANDLING. THE SPECIAL AGENTS LISTED WERE THE FOLLOWING:

DOUGLAS G. ALLEN
THOMAS D. MC GOLDRICK
WILLIAM A. COHENDET (SINCE RETIRED)
DAVID N. NUNN
DANIEL A. GROVE
WILLIAM F. MC LAUGHLIN
PAUL J. TSCHIDA (SINCE RESIGNED)
JOSEPH M. WUSHLICH
ALBERT G. HIGGINS
BERTRAM WORTHINGTON
RICHARD E. STEPHENS (SINCE RETIRED)
STANLEY F. FEWSTER (SINCE RETIRED)
VAJA KOLOMBATOVIC
G. STEWART THATFORD (SINCE RETIRED)

SECRET

PATRICK J. HAGGERTY, JR.

HARRY L. MC NEILL (SINCE RETIRED)

[SF 5592-S] (S)

SINCE AUGUST 15, 1972, SAN FRANCISCO HAS MAINTAINED A MAIL COVER ON THE SOVIET CONSULATE, 2790 GREEN STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSISTING THE BUREAU IN FULFILLING ITS INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES PERTAINING TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. THE MATTER IS ENTITLED SOVIET CONSUL GENERAL, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, IS - R, BUREAU FILE 105-210032. (S)

THIS MAIL COVER WHICH OCCURS AT THE MARINA STATION, UNITED STATES POST OFFICE, LOCATED AT 3225 FILLMORE STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, IS PRESENTLY HANDLED STRICTLY BY UNITED STATES POST OFFICE EMPLOYEES THROUGH THE COOPERATION OF POSTAL INSPECTOR J. W. WINEGAR FOR FIRST CLASS MAIL [IN EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE IDENTITY OF PERSONS IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE CONSULATE. BUREAU EMPLOYEES DO NOT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE PHYSICAL REVIEW OF MAIL. MAIL IS NOT OPENED OR INTERCEPTED AND FBI IS ONLY PROVIDED WITH RETURN ADDRESS ON ENVELOPES ADDRESSED TO SAN FRANCISCO SOVIET CONSULATE. THE MAIL COVER OF THE SOVIET CONSULATE WAS INITIATED BY A LETTER] (S)

SECRET

SECRET

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR L. PATRICK GRAY, III, TO THE ASSISTANT POSTMASTER GENERAL, INSPECTION SERVICE, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, WASHINGTON, D.C., DATED JULY 13, 1972, FOR A PERIOD OF 120 DAYS. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR SAME COVER HAS BEEN RENEWED AT 120 DAY INTERVALS SINCE THAT DATE AND IS CURRENTLY JUSTIFIED UNTIL JULY 13, 1975.

CLASSIFIED BY 5478, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

END.

HOLD PLS

SECRET

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 6/23/75

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE
(Priority)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (62-10744)

CLASSIFIED BY: SP2 ALM/EH
REASON: 1.3 (d)
DECLASSIFY ON: X 6

~~TOP~~ SECRET

9 SEN STUDY, 1975 (BUDED JUNE 24, 1975)

RE BUREAU TELETYPE JUNE 18, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED THROUGH A THOROUGH REVIEW OF WFO INDICES.

I. Z COVERAGE (WFO FILE 66-2091)

THIS PROJECT CONCERNED THE OPENING OF MAIL ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET AND SOVIET SATELLITE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN WDC.

Z

BASED ON THE RECOLLECTION OF SA JAMES T. FEILD, WFO, EMPLOYEES OF THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT SEPARATED THE MAIL WHICH WAS THEN PICKED UP AT THE MAIN POST OFFICE, WDC, BY FBI SPECIAL AGENTS BETWEEN TWO AND FOUR AM ON A DAILY BASIS. THE MAIL WAS TAKEN TO AN UNIDENTIFIED ROOM IN THE FBI HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, LABORATORY DIVISION.

REC-102 62-116395-421

12 JUL 25 1975

5-

PAP:th
(2)

ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

cc 4603

SECRET

Approved: ______________________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

WFO 62-10744

PAGE TWO

~~TOP~~ SECRET

IN THE LABORATORY DIVISION THE MAIL CONSIDERED PERTINENT WAS OPENED, PHOTOGRAPHED, RESEALED, AND THE MAIL RETURNED TO THE POST OFFICE.

THE FILM OF THIS MAIL WAS DEVELOPED IN THE FBI PHOTOGRAPHY LABORATORY, AND TAKEN TO WFO WHERE IT WAS REVIEWED, AND TRANSLATED IF NECESSARY, BY EMPLOYEES OF THE WFO. PERTINENT INFORMATION FROM THESE LETTERS WAS DISSEMINATED TO THE APPROPRIATE CASE AGENT FOR WHATEVER ACTION DEEMED NECESSARY. THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION WAS ALWAYS GIVEN AS AN "ANONYMOUS SOURCE."

INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN PICKING UP THE MAIL, OPENING IT, PHOTOGRAPHING IT AND TRANSFERRING IT TO WFO IN THE EARLY 1960'S INCLUDED SAS JAMES DUKES (RETIRED), JOHN DE BETTENCOURT (DECEASED) AND DENSIL E. MOORE (RETIRED). NO RECORD EXISTS AS TO IDENTITY OF SAS WHO HANDLED THIS PROJECT.

SECRET

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

~~TOP~~ SECRET

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROJECT WAS TO DETERMINE THOSE PERSONS WHO WERE COOPERATING WITH THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, AS WELL AS IDENTIFYING DIPLOMATS INVOLVED IN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES.

COVERAGE WAS INAUGURATED IN WDC IN 1940 (WFO LETTER TO BUREAU DATED JANUARY 31, 1948) AND CONTINUED UNTIL EARLY 1964. (ALL SERIALS NOT LOCATED IN 66-2091 WERE DESTROYED PER MRR ON JUNE 24, 1964). NO OTHER MATERIAL HAS BEEN PLACED IN THIS FILE SINCE THAT PERIOD AND NO MORE RECENT REFERENCE TO THE OPERATION COULD BE LOCATED IN WFO FILES. COPIES OF ALL DOCUMENTS IN THIS FILE ARE ATTACHED FOR FBIHQ.

SAM SURVEY (WFO FILE 65-8300)

SAM SURVEY WAS A PROGRAM INITIATED BY WFO ON AUGUST 20, 1961 FOR FBI PERSONNEL TO EXAMINE U. S. MAIL, SENT PER AIR MAIL, TO SPECIFIC FOREIGN LOCATIONS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN USED BY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND

SECRET

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

WFO 62-10744

PAGE FOUR

T~~O~~P SECRET

AND LETTERS WITH UNIQUE MARKINGS, ALSO KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN USED BY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

ORIGINALLY THE PROCESSING AND RESEALING OF THE MAIL WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN A STORAGE ROOM FURNISHED BY THE U. S. POST OFFICE AT THEIR WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT BRANCH. ON APPROXIMATELY JUNE 14, 1962, THE OPERATION WAS MOVED TO ROOM 74-C AT NATIONAL AIRPORT. SUBSEQUENT TO THE OPENING OF DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, THE OPERATION WAS MOVED THERE ON MARCH 18, 1963 AFTER ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTINUATION OF THE PROGRAM WERE MADE THROUGH MR. L. J. CARRICO, ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT OF MAILS AT DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

THE BELOW LISTED SPECIAL AGENTS SUBMITTED SHIFT REPORTS OR INITIATED PERTINENT INFORMATIVE TYPE MEMORANDA:

SECRET

Approved: ______________ Sent __________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

WFO 62-10744

PAGE FIVE

~~TO~~P SECRET

ORVIS J. AUERSWALD

ORVILLE G. AUSEN

ROBERT H. BATES

CLAUDE W. BOGLEY

CHARLES T. COUNTS

WILLIAM DESONIA

PETER R. DURLAND

JAMES T. FEILD

HARVEY FENSTERMACHER

CHARLES A. FERGUSON

ROBERT W. FEUER

CARL E. GRAHAM

DARWIN M. GREGORY

ROBERT S. KENNEMUR

ROBERT KLEINSCHMIDT

WILLIAM O. LANDER

ERNEST J. LANDREVILLE

SECRET

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ______________________
(Priority)

WFO 62-10744

PAGE SIX

~~TOP~~ SECRET

CARLTON D. LEAF

NORMAN A. LEONARD

GEORGE LEX

THOMAS A. MENDENHALL

DENSIL E. MOORE

JAMES MORRISEY

MASON B. NOAH, JR.

GEORGE A. NORTHUP

THOMAS O'LOUGHLIN

ROBERT L. OLSEN

H. DUDLEY PAYNE

EUGENE P. PITTMAN

EARL G. POLESKI, JR.

PATRICK M. RICE

SECRET

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via ________ ________________ (Priority)

WFO 62-10744

PAGE SEVEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

THE PURPOSE OF THE PROGRAM WAS TO IDENTIFY PERSONS CORRESPONDING WITH KNOWN SOVIET MAIL DROPS IN EUROPE, AND TO IDENTIFY AND LOCATE INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES SENDING AIR MAIL LETTERS TO EUROPE WHO MAY BE PART OF A SOVIET ILLEGAL NETWORK.

THE PROGRAM WAS TERMINATED ON AUGUST 8, 1966, UPON INSTRUCTION FROM INSPECTOR D. E. MOORE, ACCORDING TO A FILE NOTATION MADE BY SECURITY COORDINATING SUPERVISOR COURTLAND JONES.

ATTACHED FOR THE BUREAU ARE THE INTERNAL WFO MEMORANDA PERTAINING TO THE SAM SURVEY. THE BUREAU IS IN POSSESSION OF ALL OTHER INTER-OFFICE COMMUNICATIONS PERTAINING TO THE SAM SURVEY.

II. AS OF JANUARY 1, 1960, MAIL COVERS, PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WERE BEING CARRIED OUT ON VARIOUS SOVIET AND SOVIET-BLOC ESTABLISHMENTS IN WDC. ALL THESE MAIL COVERS WERE DISCONTINUED ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1964, PER

SECRET

Approved: ________________ Sent ________ M Per ________

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

WFO 62-10744

PAGE EIGHT

~~TOP~~ SECRET

INSTRUCTIONS OF FBIHQ. [THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THESE ESTABLISHMENTS,] ITS ADDRESS, FOLLOWED BY THE ADDRESS WHERE (S) THE MAIL COVER WAS CONDUCTED:

[POLISH EMBASSY, 2640 16TH STREET, N. W.,] (S) MAIL COVER CONDUCTED AT COLUMBIA HEIGHTS POST OFFICE, 1423 IRVING STREET, N. W., WDC.

[POLISH EMBASSY ANNEX, 2224 WYOMING STREET, N. W.,] (S) MAIL COVER CONDUCTED AT CLEVELAND PARK POST OFFICE, 3430 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W., WDC.

[HUNGARIAN EMBASSY, 2437 15TH STREET, N. W.,] MAIL (S) COVER CONDUCTED AT COLUMBIA HEIGHTS POST OFFICE.

[ROMANIAN EMBASSY, 1601-07 23RD STREET, N. W.,] MAIL (S) COVER CONDUCTED AT CLEVELAND PARK POST OFFICE.

[CZECHOSLOVAKIAN EMBASSY, 2349 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., (S) N. W.,] MAIL COVER CONDUCTED AT CLEVELAND PARK POST OFFICE.

[SOVIET EMBASSY, 1115 16TH STREET, N. W.,] MAIL COVER (S) CONDUCTED AT CLEVELAND PARK POST OFFICE.

SECRET

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

WFO 62-10744

PAGE NINE

~~TOP~~ SECRET

[SOVIET MILITARY OFFICE, 2552 BELMONT ROAD, N. W.,] (S) MAIL COVER CONDUCTED AT CLEVELAND PARK POST OFFICE.

[SOVIET COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR, 1706 18TH STREET, N. W.,] (S) MAIL COVER CONDUCTED AT CLEVELAND PARK POST OFFICE.

[SOVIET INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, 1706 18TH STREET, N.W.,] (S) MAIL COVER CONDUCTED AT CLEVELAND PARK POST OFFICE

[SOVIET CONSULAR OFFICE, 1609 DECATUR STREET, N. W.,] (S) MAIL COVER CONDUCTED AT CLEVELAND PARK POST OFFICE.

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF THE FBI EMPLOYEES WHO PARTICIPATED IN CONDUCTING MAIL COVER, NOTING THAT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE EMPLOYEES WAS MADE THROUGH INITIALS AND MAY NOT CONSTITUTE THE COMPLETE LIST INASMUCH AS SOME INITIALS WERE ILLEGIBLE AND OTHERS WERE UNIDENTIFIABLE:

JAMES W. RYAN

JAMES A. SCHMITZ

RICHARD E. COFFMAN

SECRET

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ______________________
(Priority)

WFO 62-10744

PAGE TEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

HERBERT O. THOMPSON

ROBERT L. OLSEN

ROBERT J. COLLINS

GUY T. TUNSTALL

NORMAN A. LEONARD

ROBERT F. OLMERT

GERALD P. GRIMALDI

LEE MASON EIDSEN

JEROME E. VEIGLE

PAUL E. FENZEL

EUGENE D. THOMPSON

WENZEL F. NEIDIG

CARL THACKSTON

ROBERT TAYLOR

CLAUDE BOGLEY

THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED INCLUDED ALL INCOMING MAIL.

SECRET

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

WFO 62-10744

PAGE ELEVEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER WAS TO IDENTIFY THE CONTACTS OF THE VARIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE OBVIOUS CONCOMITANT BENEFITS.

FBIHQ IS IN POSSESSION OF ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS INVOLVING THESE MAIL COVERS.

III. ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA REQUESTED IN RE TELETYPE WHICH ARE NOT ALREADY IN THE POSSESSION OF FBIHQ ARE ATTACHED AS NOTED.

CLASSIFIED BY 349, XGDS CATEGORY 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

SECRET

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

ENCLOSURES TO BUREAU

SEN STUDY, 1975
WFO 62-10744

nclosed are communications pertaining to above study.

By teletype 6/23/75.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

THIS TITLE
WAS CLASSIFIED
IN 65-67235
(NOSENKO
FILES)

CONFIDENTIAL

10/6/64

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

TO: SAC, WFO (65-8517)

FROM: SA JOHN L. STANLEY

UNSUB; KGB AGENT KNOWN AS "SASHA"
ESPIONAGE - R
(OO: WFO)

The principal suspect for the unsub, "SASHA" in this case is IGOR ORLOV who resides with his wife, ELEONORE ORLOV, and their two small sons at 112 South Pitt Street, Alexandria, Virginia. They also operate the "Gallery Orlov" from which they sell reproductions of paintings, and which is located in their residence. (C)

The ORLOVs are known to correspond with the following relatives of Mrs. ORLOV, and WFO is interested in mail which is addressed to these individuals:

ALBERT STIRNER (brother)
Eichendorff Str. 31
83 Landshut / Bayern
West Germany

Mrs. ROSA STIRNER (mother)
20/b Froettmaningor St.
Munich 23/b, Germany (C)

11/14/00 MDR 16
CLASSIFIED BY SP 2 ALM/EHL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

It is requested that the above two names be placed on the SAM SURVEY Watch List.

Mail to these relatives and others, bearing the ORLOV return address of 112 South Pitt Street, Alexandria, Virginia, particularly mail directed to Germany, should be covered if possible. (C)

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 3/20/78
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2+3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

CC: 65-8300

CONFIDENTIAL

Cimmerack
D. Moore
Bagley
Nash
Olsen
Northup
Harring

See me

65-8300-106

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ad. FILED ad.
OCT 7 1964
FBI — WASH. D.C.

Cds placed - 10/20/64

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO (~~105-70556~~) 65-8300

DATE: 2/24/66

FROM : SA W. SCOTT JARRETT, JR.

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
ON 11/14/00

SUBJECT: KORKBAL
IS - EG

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 S 3/28/78
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2-3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

ILSE RUTH LAUER is a permanent resident alien born in Germany who entered the U.S. in 1961 an resides in Chicago. In 9/65 and 10/65 she visited her parents in East Germany. While there she met on Fritz Bellstedt who showed her around East Germany. Shortly before her departure from East Germany Bellstedt requested Lauer to foreward a letter for him on her return to U.S. This lette would be mailed to her in the US and she in turn was to foreward the letter. She agreed to do this. (X)(u)

On 1/7/66 she received a letter from Mrs Muechlaus Marga 2200 Falrama Rd. NW, WDC. Enclosed in this letter was a sealed enve addressed to Mr. Schlak Wilhelm, 13-A Alf-Fermersleben, Magdeburg, East Germany. This letter bore a return address of Mr. Becker Oslar, 3241 West Diversey, Chicago, Illinois. (X)(u)

One Margaret N. Muehlhausx resides 3105 Patterson St. NW, WDC and is employed as Secretary to the Chairman of the Board Federal Reserve Board. 2200 Kalerama Rd. NW is the Offices of the Cultnnal Attache and Education Bureau of the UAR.

On 2/8/66 Lauer received a letter with return address of Mrs Horwitz Rose, 78 Fifth Ave. New York City postmarked NY. This letter contained an envelope addressed xx as was the 1/7/66 letter. (X)(u)

On 3/7/66 Lauer received another letter with return address of Meuhlhaus Margaret as above. This letter contained an envelope addressed as the first letter received 1/7/66. (X)(u)

BcAllletters received XKNN KKK bear Cyrillic handwriti characteristics.

It is requested that the address of "Mr. Schlak Wilhelm (or Wilhelm Schlak), 13-a Alf-Fermersleben, Magdeburg, East Germany" be added to the Sam survey watch list. Examination of pertinent items should be restricted to observation of the exterior of the envelopes. (X)(u)

WSJ/

CONFIDENTIAL

65-8300-132

SEARCHED .... INDEXED ....
SERIALIZED .... FILED ....
FBI — WASH. F. O.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 3010-107

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO (65-8300)

DATE: 1-21-66

FROM : SA CARL E. GRAHAM

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY
ESP - R

For information of the captioned case. This is to note that "ICEBOAT" is a double agent operation of which Baltimore is origin. It is noted one of the accommodation addresses in that case utilized by the double agent on instructions of his Soviet principal was:

PROFESSOR DR. SIMEON
Sternwartestr. 75, Vienna XVIII (S)(u)

The above address should be added to the watch list in instant case.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 1482 8 3/20/78
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2+3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE~~

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP3 ALM/EHC
ON 11/14/00

Placed on Watch list
1/21/66

3 Secs
CALLED
FILE
ON
ICEBOAT
105-12764

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65-8300-128

SEARCHED ______ INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
JAN 21 1966
FBI — WASH. F.O.

2 - WFO
(1 - 105-69140)

CEG:ctw
(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR, FBI (65-65884) 7/19/66

SAC, WFO (65-8300) (P)

SAM SURVEY
ESP - R

RePHairtel 7/8/66 captioned COWSLIP, ESP - R.

Re airtel indicated that the subject in the COWSLIP case had received a letter from ERNEST HAFNER, Berlin, Germany. ~~(S)~~ (U)

WFO has added HAFNER's name and address to SAM SURVEY watch list. ~~(S)~~ (U)

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2 ALM/EHL
ON 11/14/00

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 8
3/20/78
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2 + 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

CONFIDENTIAL

65-8300-136

2 - Bureau
1 - New York (65-18045) (RM)
(2) - WFO
(1 - 65-8300 Sub B)

HDP:egj
(5)

Searched
Serialized
Indexed
Filed

FILE STRIPPED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : SAC, WFO (65-8300)

DATE: May 21, 1962

FROM : L. W. R. OBERNDORF, SCS

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY

In examining communications which may be Soviet intelligence communications or writings, the manner in which a particular communication may be folded and placed in an envelope can be of significant importance. (X)(U)

Special Agents handling matters in the SAM SURVEY, and any other Special Agents handling matters which may pertain to Soviet intelligence communications, are instructed to take careful note of the exact manner in which questioned documents are folded and placed in envelopes for mailing. Specific comments on the results of such examinations are to be placed in case memoranda and such comments shall be in addition to those presently required in the SAM SURVEY with regard to the envelope itself and with regard to handwriting or typewriting characteristics of the message. (X)(U)

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY CSP 2 ALM/EHL
ON 11/14/00

3 - WFO
(1 - 65-7973 - METHODS OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS)
(1 - 100-16597 - SODAC)
LWRO/pcn
(3) pcn

This was routed to all agents in Section 8 by CFR & all initialed on attached slip since removed.
1 p.m.

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 8 3/20/98
EXEMPT FROM ~~GDS~~ CATEGORY 2 & 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65-8300-11

SEARCHED ______ INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
MAY 21 1962
FBI — WASH. F.O.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : SAC, Washington, D. C.
DATE: January 8, 1948

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: Z COVERAGE
INTERNAL SECURITY - C and R

The Bureau realizes that the confidential Z coverage is a most lucrative source of information concerning Communist, Russian and satellite activities. In order to insure that the utmost results are being obtained from this source it is desired that your office outline to the Bureau the procedure now being handled with regard to the dissemination of this information to the Seat of Government and the interested Field Offices. This letter should clearly reflect the steps taken by your office in the handling of this material concerning individuals, organizations, corporations, schools, and so forth. It should also reflect the disposition of material received which is of interest to other Field Offices, that is, whether or not this information is furnished to them and what instructions are issued to the interested Field Offices, in order that the Bureau may be in a position to follow the future handling and investigation of these matters. (U)

It is requested that this matter be given your immediate consideration and a reply furnished to the Bureau within the next ten days.

66 2041 1

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 4 3/20/75
EXEMPT FROM GDS, CATEGORY 2-3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
ON 11/14/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

SAC, WFO (65-8479)   October 30, 196

JAMES F. MORRISSEY, SA

MDR 16

JARO
ESP - R

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL
ON 11/14/00

In airtel dated 10/5/62, Baltimore reported BA 1229-S* as stating in part that on 10/2/62 male subject was reading to female subject what sounded like a message. In this message he was instructed, "In your letters, don't forget to answer all questions". (X)(U)

To date subject's mail drop is not known.

It will be recalled that subjects possess an Olympia typewriter. Copies of typing samples obtained from this machine, which has a distinctive foreign-type appearance, are available to SAM SURVEY agents. Copies of the distinctive typing used by female subject in connection with a cosmetology application are likewise available.

In an attempt to determine the mail drop possibly being used by the subject, it is recommended that in addition to the standards normally used in selections under the SAM SURVEY program, a card record be made of all letters using Olympia typing which emanate from the Baltimore and Washington, D. C., area. Letters which are patently commercial in nature can be disregarded; however, any doubt should be resolved in favor of recording the information. In the interest of security, where a selection is made for JARO purposes, no further action is to be taken at this time, other than to record the information.

Pertinent addresses of the subjects and others of possible use are available to SAM SURVEY agents.

discontinued

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 S 3/20/78
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2+3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

2 - WFO
(1 - 65-8300 SAM SURVEY)
JFM/pcn
(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

65-8300 - 71

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
OCT 30 1962
FBI — WASH. F.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL

AIRPORT MAIL FACILITY,
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

August 19, 1961

MDR 16

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
ON 11/14/00

From: Superintendent,
Airport Mail Facility,
Washington 1, D. C.

To: All Supervisors,
All Acting Supervisors.

Effective 8:30 P.M. Sunday, August 20, 1961 the following instructions will be in effect:

1 2 3

4 No mail for the countries of: Austria; Belgium; France; Denmark; Germany; Netherlands; Norway; Switzerland and Sweden will be worked through the cases until such mail has been cleared by the Supervisor. (X)(U)

As mails for these countries are received, keep them cut up and placed in trays.

It will no longer be necessary to hold out mails for France postmarked by the City.

See that the above mails are placed in the Area between the Supply Room door and door leading to platform. Deliver this mail in Utility Carts, marked (IN) and remove any from this area marked (OUT). That marked (OUT) is cleared for working in case.

Suggest the Countries in this catagory that you have dispatches on your tour be taken care of first. On each Country that you have a dispatch for, decide a time limit that you need the mail to complete distribution on in order to make your dispatch. At this cut off time any mail for a Country that you have a dispatch on is to be collected and worked through case for dispatch.

Make up a list of the Countries you have dispatches on your tour showing the time limit for each Country. Make up this list on your first delivery after this effective date, this list to be in effect until a change is made in a dispatch, then place a new time limit in the Country tray on which a change has been made.

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 SP 3/20/78
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

cc: Files

P. A. Sheri, Supt.

CONFIDENTIAL

Read [illegible]
Mr. Sh[illegible]
8/10/61

65-[illegible]-6

SEARCHED........ INDEXED........
SERIALIZED........ FILED........
AUG 21 1961
FBI - WASH. F. O.

File - Serial Charge Out
FD-5 (Rev. 1[illegible] 60)

File 66-2091 Date 6/24/64
Class. Case No. Last Serial

☐ Pending ☐ Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
	ALL SERIALS NOT FOUND IN THIS	
	FILE DESTROYED PER M.R.R.	
	PERMANENT CHARGE OUT	

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Employee

RECHARGE Date

To From

Date charged

Employee

Location

Washington Field Division
Room 1706
Washington, D.C.
January 31, 1948

REN:HS

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
ON 11/14/00

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: Z COVERAGE
INTERNAL SECURITY - C and R

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your Personal and Confidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1948, requesting to be advised what steps are taken by this office in the handling of material received from Confidential Informant Z.

Please be advised that this coverage was inaugurated in 1940 and since then it has been the practise to furnish copies of material believed to be of interest to other offices with a cover letter indicating the source of the material and that under no circumstances could this source be disclosed. In cases where the material examined appeared to be of interest to the Bureau photostatic copies of same were transmitted by letter.

The confidential character of Informant Z is generally understood throughout the Field. In cases where the material does not appear to be of any value it is destroyed and disposed of through the regular channels at the Seat of Government.

Very truly yours,

GUY HOTTEL
Special Agent in Charge

66-2091-2

~~100-0-10955-4~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-107

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO (65-8300)

DATE: 11/22/65

FROM : SA H. DUDLEY PAYNE

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY
ESP - R

On 11/9/65, the writer obtained from the Chief of Police at Dulles International Airport, 9 visitors parking permits. These permits authorized unrestricted parking in Area 5 (Post Office parking lot). All agents when working in SAM SURVEY will use these permits exclusively. They should be promptly displayed in the vicinity of the front building. The permits are numbered 1 through 9 and are charged to the writer who is being held responsible for the care and return of them when they are no longer needed. They have been assigned as follows:

1. MASON B. NOAH
2. DENSIL E. MOORE
3. CLAUDE W. BOGLEY
4. ROBERT KLEINSCHMIDT
5. CHARLES T. COUNTS
6. JAMES THOMAS FEILD
7. NORMAN A. LEONARD
8. Special Schedule Folder ___
9. H. DUDLEY PAYNE

Number 8 is to be maintained in the surveillance folder for use of agents not regularly assigned to the SAM SURVEY Program.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/14/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
NOV 22 65
FBI — WASH. F. O.

① - WFO

HDP:cal cal
(1)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, WFO (65-8300)

DATE: November 14, 196

FROM : L. W. R. OBERNDORF, SCS

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP 2 ALM/EHL

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY

The following procedures will be observed in handling matters under this program.

(1) A record shall be maintained by each shift of the volume of mail handled ~~by counting~~, as well as of any mail received which could not be handled. A rough draft is satisfactory.

(2) A memorandum shall be submitted by each shift at the end of the shift specifically noting items which have been removed for processing. This will list the addressee, addressor if any, details re postmark, postage, type of envelope, whether typed, handwritten or printed, and any other distinguishing or noteworthy characteristics. No memorandum is necessary if no items are removed for processing. These memoranda are to be designated for the Sub A section of this file.

(3) When photographs are received from the Bureau of processed material, the following action will be taken:

(a) Film will be maintained as a bulky exhibit, until no longer needed.

(b) Material in English, requiring no further action, is to be destroyed. An appropriate notation will be made on the memorandum in the Sub A reflecting the removal of this piece for processing.

(c) Material in foreign languages will be submitted to the Staff Supervisor, Squad 6, for expedite translation, if the language can be handled in WFO. If not, such items will be submitted promptly to the FBI Laboratory for translation. All correspondence for this purpose will be maintained in the Sub A file.

1 - WFO
LWRO/pcn
(1)

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
NOV 14 1961
FBI — WASH. F. O.

(4) If material in English requires action or investigation involving more than a check of office records, a separate memorandum shall be dictated promptly setting forth the pertinent facts and requesting that a new case be opened. A copy of this memorandum, title of which will be based on the item processed, shall be designated for the Sub B section of this file. Concurrently, an appropriate notation shall appear on the memorandum in the Sub A initially recording receipt of the item. The title (SAM SURVEY) shall appear after the subject name in each case.

(5) The same procedure shall be followed with regard to material translated by the FBI Laboratory or Squad #6. In these instances, the translations should be submitted as attachments with the initial memorandum opening the case. Photographs and film strips in cases under points 4 and 5 shall be made appropriate exhibits in the pertinent case file.

All other photographs, film and translations should be destroyed if no active investigation is initiated.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO (65-8300)

DATE: June 23, 1964

FROM : H. DUDLEY PAYNE, SA

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY

On 6/22/64 P. A. SHORB, Superintendent of National and Dulles Airports Post Office Substations, advised that TWA has instituted daily, nonstop flights from Dulles to London departing Dulles at 7:30 p.m. Also, that Pan American has instituted a direct flight leaving Dulles at 9:00 p.m. on Mondays, Wednesdays and Saturdays; it goes to Paris and the remaining days of the week it goes to London.

Mail trucks carrying mail for the above flights arrive at Dulles 3:15 p.m., 4:50 p.m., 5:30 p.m. and 7:10 p.m.

In view of the above, it will be necessary to have an agent at Dulles until 8:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. Accordingly, one agent should be scheduled to work 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. and one scheduled 12:00 noon to 8:00 p.m.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

1 - WFO
HDP/pcn
(1)
pcn

65-8300-103

SEARCHED ______ INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
JUN 2[illegible] 1964
FBI — WASH. F.O.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO (65-8300)

DATE: 3/7/63

FROM : SA H. DUDLEY PAYNE

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP2ALM/EH/L

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY
ESP-R

On 3/5/63, SA H. DUDLEY PAYNE contacted L. J. CARRICO, Assistant Superintendent of Mails, regarding permitting us to continue the Sam Survey Program at Dulles Airport. Mr. CARRICO advised that the unofficial date for the transfer from National to Dulles is expected to be 3/18/63. He said he would appreciate a note addressed to the Postmaster requesting the same courtesies be extended to us at Dulles as we had enjoyed at National. Such a note was personally delivered to him.

On 3/7/63, Mr. CARRICO advised that our request had been approved. He also advised that if we should have any difficulties regarding access to the grounds, the building, or parking facilities, he would have Substitute ~~instituted~~ postal clerk passes issued to the appropriate agents

CARRICO was advised that we would like to inspect the premises which we were to occupy. He suggested we contact SHORB at National and arrange with him for either he or LARUE to visit Dulles with us for such a purpose.

On 3/5/63, SA PAYNE contacted SA ROLAND COKER, Resident Agency, Alexandria, Virginia, to ascertain if they had any contacts at Dulles. COKER advised that Chief of Police BANARIK has been very cooperative, but he would suggest for our purpose we contact HERBERT FLETCHER who is in charge of Operations and Safety, and felt that he would be cooperative in arranging parking facilities for agents.

1-WFO
HDP:mlb
(1)

65-8300-85

SEARCHED ______ INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
MAR 7 1963
FBI — WASH. FO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO (65-8300) DATE: 10/11/62

FROM : SA H. DUDLEY PAYNE

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY
ESPIONAGE - R

On 9/26/62, the writer contacted Mr. P. A. SHORB, Superintendent of National Airport Post Office, to ascertain if our present schedules were adequate to promptly handle our responsibilities at that location. Mr. SHORB advised at the present the mail was being handled in a very satisfactory manner, and it was not anticipated that any schedules would be changed until Day Light Saving Time goes off the end of October, and he would advise us of any changes to be made at that time.

He was asked concerning the proceedure for handling mail when the Dulles Airport opens. He stated that at this time it was anticipated that the processing of mail insofar as our operation is concerned will be handled at National.

1 - WFO

HDP:mbl
(1)

Dulles Opened 11/17/62
No change — TAM

Daylight Saving — NO
chan
in ou

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

72 mg

65-8300-4

SEARCHED .... INDEXED ....
SERIALIZED .... FILED ....
OCT 11 1962
FBI — WASH. F. O.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO DATE: June 14, 1962

FROM : THOMAS A. MENDENHALL, SA

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY
ESP - R

ATTN: PROPERTY CLERK

In connection with the efficient operation of the above-captioned case, it became desirable to utilize a room on the lower level of the Washington National Airport. Room 74-C at the airport has been turned over to the exclusive use of WFO Special Agent personnel and no other individuals have access to this space.

To facilitate the handling of work at this SAM Plant, it is, of course, necessary that a limited amount of Bureau property be maintained and utilized at this plant.

The purpose of this memorandum is to itemize all of the Bureau property presently being maintained and used at this location. All of this property is to be properly charged on a permanent basis to the plant, rather than to individual Special Agents:

1. One document camera in fitted custom case with built-in lighting and stage, suitable for 110 volt or 12 volt use. The camera is a 35 mm. Alpa Alnea, Swiss made, Model 5, No. 31026. The lens is No. 211-2058 Kamerabau-Anstalt-Vaduz, Kilfitt-Makro, D, 1:3.5/4 Cm.

2. One typewriter - Royal Portable, Serial No. 562, with case.

3. One Art Metal, 5 ft., 4 drawer, metal file cabinet with locking bar (external).

1 - 65-8300
1 - Property Clerk
TAM/pcn
(2)

65-8300-51

SEARCHED ______ INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
JUN 14 1962
FBI — WASH. F.O.

4. One Master Padlock No. X 22813 (used to lock above-listed file cabinet).

5. One 3' x 2' wood table with one drawer.

6. One florescent desk lamp, Model U1-P-2324-16, made by the Dazor Mfg. Corp., St. Louis, Mo.

7. Two wood swivel chairs.

8. One grey-colored folding metal chair.

9. One grey-colored, metal, cloth-upholstered, stenographic swivel chair

10. One pencil sharpener (APSCO - Giant)

11. One grey metal wastebasket.

12. One GE Table Model 875, radio, Serial No. 5701.

13. One aluminum folding picnic table, with handle, approximately 60" x 30".

14. Two 2-panel wood-framed screens, approximately 5½' tall and 7' wide.

15. One 5" diameter Bausch and Lombe magnifying glass.

All Moved
to Dulles
Airport after
3/18/63 TDM

See Serial 89

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO (65-8300)   DATE: 2/13/62

FROM : SA THOMAS A. MENDENHALL

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY
ESP - R

Bulet to NY, dated 1/30/62, captioned "TRANSLATION MATTERS" (WFOfile 66-2384 in 666) stated in part as follows:

> Whenever submitting written material to the Bureau for translation in connection with SAM SURVEY, the submitting office should retain copies of the written material until the requested translation is received. The Bureau letter also stated that a photographic negative of a document could be considered as a copy of the documentation.

> The Bureau further requested that the letter of transmittal include the fact that a copy of the foreign language material submitted was being retained until the receipt of the requested translation.

This is being incorporated into this file so that these instructions are readily available to agents handling this material.

1-WFO
TAM:pmk
(1)
TAM.

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP 2ALM/EH/C

65-8300-41
SEARCHED .... INDEXED ....
SERIALIZED .... FILED ....
FEB 13 1962
FBI — WASH. F. O.

[illegible]
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 23 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 001 SE CODE

12:12 PM NITEL 6/23/75 SLA

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SEATTLE (66-2894) (RUC)

ATTENTION: SA W. O. CREGAR, DIVISION FIVE

TOP SECRET

SENSTUDY 1975.

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY 5P2 ALM/EHL
ON 11/15/00

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO NEW YORK, JUNE 18, 1975.

SAM SURVEY, INSTITUTED AT SEATTLE, SEPTEMBER 8, 1961, AND DISCONTINUED FEBRUARY 8, 1963. DURING ENTIRE PERIOD SURVEY CONDUCTED AT AIRMAIL FACILITY, SEATTLE- TACOMA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. ANY MAIL MEETING CRITERIA WAS TRANSPORTED TO THE SEATTLE OFFICE FOR PROCESSING.

THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL AGENTS INVOLVED IN SURVEY, ALTHOUGH A REVIEW OF FILE DOES NOT INDICATE EXACT DATES OF INVOLVEMENT, SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS, OR SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY:

JOHN J. WACHTER, REESE H. CHIPMAN, LAMBERT G. ZANDER, ROBERT H. MC CARTHY, LYLE J. THEISEN, JOHN CARL NETTER, W. H. WILLIAMS, II, CARLES W. PEASINGER, DWIGHT M. WELLS AND OLIVER W. LEHTINEN.

REC-102 62-116395-420

ALL MAIL INTERCEPTED WAS AIRMAIL ADDRESSED TO VARIOUS ADDRESSES IN JAPAN. THESE ADDRESSES WERE KNOWN TO BE MAIL DROPS USED BY SOVIET

JUL 25 1975

END PAGE ONE

84 JUL 29 1975

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (SIS). IN OTHER CASES THE ENVELOPES CONTAINED CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS USED BY SIS FOR ILLEGAL SUPPORT MAIL. THE PURPOSE WAS TO PROVIDE MAIL COVER ON ALL KNOWN MAIL DROPS USED BY SIS AND TO LOCATE ADDITIONAL DROPS.

SEATTLE HAS NO CONTROL FILE FOR MAIL COVERS CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD AND THERE IS NO WAY OF REVIEWING ANY THAT MAY HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED AT SEATTLE.

A REVIEW OF SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, CAPTIONED SAM SURVEY REFLECTED BUREAU IS IN POSSESSION OF ALL SERIALS REGARDING AUTHORITY, POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR THE SURVEY. A REVIEW SHOWED THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC INCIDENTS OF ADDITIONAL ACTIVITY AND INVESTIGATION CONCERNING LETTERS LOCATED DURING SURVEY:

LETTER ADDRESSED TO MR. B. COHEN, TOKYO, JAPAN FROM JERRY OBERLIN OF TOLEDO, OHIO, SENT TO BUREAU BY LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 23, 1962, TRANSLATION IN SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, SERIAL 43.

LETTER ADDRESSED TO C. TROUTSCHEFF, HONSCHU, JAPAN, FROM N. LOGUNOW, SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS, ORIGINAL SENT TO BUREAU BY SEATTLE LETTER DATED MARCH 23, 1962, TRANSLATION IN SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, SERIAL 44.

END PAGE TWO

LETTER FROM VERS POKROVSK, SOUTH LINCOLN, MASSACHUSETTS TO S. TOIDZUMI, TOKYO, JAPAN, ORIGINAL SENT TO BUREAU BY SEATTLE LETTER DATED MARCH 1, 1962, TRANSLATION IN SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, SERIAL 47.

LETTER FROM N. L., 633 12TH AVENUE EAST, SEATTLE, TO MRS. SHIFZBLATT, TOKYO, JAPAN, SENT TO BUREAU BY SEATTLE LETTER DATED APRIL 30, 1962, SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, SERIAL 60, TRANSLATION IN SEATTLE FILE.

LETTER FROM INDIVIDUAL IN SEATTLE TO ADDRESS IN JAPAN, SENT TO BUREAU BY SEATTLE LETTER DATED OCTOBER 2, 1962, FOR TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN, SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, SERIAL 104.

LETTER FROM V. SHANNON, LEVITTOWN, NEW JERSEY, TO ADDRESS NOT CLEARLY LEGIBLE, SENT TO BUREAU BY SEATTLE LETTER DATED OCTOBER 2, 1962, FOR TRANSLATION, SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, SERIAL 105.

LETTER FROM LINA KLEIN, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, TO UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL IN USSR, SENT TO BUREAU BY SEATTLE LETTER DATED DECEMBER 7, 1962, TRANSLATION IN SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, SERIAL 120.

FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU, ALL ORIGINAL EXHIBITS WERE DESTROYED AT SEATTLE JULY 6, 1971.

CLASSIFIED BY 1493, EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2 & 3, AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDEFINITE.

END

cc - Cregan

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 22 1975

TELETYPE

REC 102

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR003 AT CODED

11:14 PM NITEL JULY 22, 1975 WCG

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTN: INTD (W. O. CREGAR)

SENSTUDY 75

To Mr. W. O. Cregar
Rm 6242

ON JULY 15, 1975, MISS JESSIE ABERCROMBIE, MANAGER, PEACHTREE TOWERS APARTMENTS, 300 WEST PEACHTREE STREET, N. W., ATLANTA, GEORGIA, CONTACTED THE ATLANTA OFFICE AND VOLUNTEERED INFORMATION SHE WAS CONTACTED THE PRECEDING DAY (JULY 14, 1975) BY A MR. EPSTEIN, WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS AN INVESTIGATOR FROM WASHINGTON, D. C. EPSTEIN SAID HE WANTED TO SEE HER RECORDS OF TENANTS FOR THE YEARS 1961, 1962, AND 1963. SHE TOLD HIM SHE DID NOT MAINTAIN RECORDS BY YEARS, BUT BY NAME OF TENANT OR FIRM WHO RENTED APARTMENTS. EPSTEIN THEN ASKED IF THE FBI RENTED AN APARTMENT ON A PERMANENT BASIS OR IF THE FBI HAD RENTED AN APARTMENT PAST OR PRESENT. MISS ABERCROMBIE TOLD HIM SHE HAD NEVER RENTED AN APARTMENT TO THE FBI, BUT HAD RENTED APARTMENTS TO INDIVIDUAL AGENTS OF THE FBI OVER THE YEARS WHO WERE ON TRANSFER, TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT ASSIGNMENTS, AND THAT RECORDS

5-C

REC- 102 62-116395-419

12 JUL 25 1975

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

84 JUL 29 1975

WOULD BE UNDER THEIR RESPECTIVE NAMES IN WHICH APARTMENT WAS RENTED.

EPSTEIN THEN ASKED IF GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION HAD RENTED AN APARTMENT TO WHICH MISS ABERCROMBIE REPLIED THAT TO HER KNOWLEDGE THEY HAVE NEVER RENTED AN APARTMENT. EPSTEIN TOLD HER HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO SECURE A NAME AND CALL HER FROM WASHINGTON, D. C.

IT IS NOTED THAT MISS ABERCROMBIE HAS BEEN CONNECTED WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF PEACHTREE TOWERS APARTMENTS, A HIGH-RISE APARTMENT BUILDING, SINCE IT WAS OPENED IN JULY, 1962.

MISS ABERCROMBIE ADVISED SHE WILL CONTACT THE ATLANTA OFFICE IF SHE IS CONTACTED BY EPSTEIN OR ANYONE ELSE MAKING INQUIRY RELATIVE TO THE FBI.

IT IS NOTED MICHAEL EPSTEIN OF SSC INTERVIEWED FORMER SA'S RICHARD H. DAVIS AND JERRY D. ROSEBERRY IN ATLANTA ON JULY 14, 1975.

IT IS ALSO NOTED SPACE WAS SECURED IN THE PEACHTREE TOWERS APARTMENTS IN ATLANTA WHERE THE PLANT WAS MAINTAINED IN CONNECTION WITH THE KING TECHNICAL COVERAGE.

END

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

11/16/00

CLASSIFIED BY: SP2 ALM/EHC
REASON: 1.5 (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X6
MPR 16

NR 020 LA CODE

1024PM URGENT 6/20/75 ANR

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: W. O. CREGAR INTD

FROM LOS ANGELES (100-24345C)

TOP SECRET

July-75

Mr Cregar
Rm. 4133 JEH

SENSTUDY 1975, BUDED JUNE 24, 1975.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

RE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JUNE 18, 1975.

FROM A REVIEW OF FILES, LOS ANGELES OFFICE, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE WERE THREE SEPARATE CASES IN WHICH MAIL WAS EITHER INTERCEPTED OR OPENED. THESE CASES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

SAM SURVEY, ESP - R, BUREAU FILE 65-65884, LOS ANGELES FILE 65-6984.

WALTER HENRYK DUDA, IS - PO, OO: LOS ANGELES, BUREAU FILE 105-111366, LOS ANGELES FILE 105-13068.

REC- 102

62-116395-418

VICTOR JAMES KORDELL; MARGRET KORDELL, ESP - R, BUREAU FILE 65-67719, LOS ANGELES FILE 65-7236.

12 JUL 25 1975

5-

SECRET

SAM SUREVEY

(1)

A. PURPOSE OF OPENING OR INTERCEPT

(BUREAU LETTER TO BOSTON MAY 31, 1961)

1. TO IDENTIFY PERSONS CORRESPONDING WITH KNOWN SOVIET MAIL DROPS IN EUROPE.

2. TO IDENTIFY AND LOCATE INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES SENDING LETTERS TO EUROPE WHICH MAY BE PART OF A SOVIET ILLEGAL NETWORK.

B. TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED

(BUREAU LETTERS TO BOSTON DATED MAY 31, 1961, AND AUGUST 14, 1961)

1. SAME AS "A" ABOVE.

2. SPECIFICALLY MAIL GOING TO COPENHAGEN, DENMARK; OSLO, NORWAY; STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN; FRANKFURT, BERLIN AND HAMBURG, GERMANY; TOKYO, JAPAN.

C. ORIGIN AND TERMINATION

1. (BUREAU LETTER TO BOSTON DATED AUGUST 14, 1961, AND LOS ANGELES RADIOGRAM DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 1961)

THIS OPERATION COMMENCED SEPTEMBER 28, 1961, ENDED NOVEMBER 9, 1961. IT WAS REINSTITUTED JANUARY 27, 1962, AND TERMINATED NOVEMBER 17, 1962. SOURCE OF TERMINATION: BUREAU LETTER TO LOS ANGELES JANUARY 21, 1963.

SECRET

T~~O~~P SECRET

D. PHYSICAL LOCATION

1. UNITED STATES POST OFFICE (USPO) AIRMAIL FACILITY, FOREIGN UNIT, 5741 WEST 98TH STREET, LOS ANGELES. (LOS ANGELES LETTER TO DIRECTOR DATED APRIL 10, 1961, MARKED "JUNE")

USPO AIRMAIL FACILITY, LAX. (LOS ANGELES LETTER TO DIRECTOR DECEMBER 19, 1961)

E. NAMES OF AGENTS PARTICIPATING IN OPENING OR INTERCEPT

THIS WORK WAS PERFORMED BY AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE ESPIONAGE SQUAD. THE SCHEDULES RELATING TO THE IDENTITY OF THESE AGENTS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED.

WALTER HENRYK DUDA

(1)

A. PURPOSE OF OPENING OR INTERCEPT

1. SUBJECT WAS IDENTIFIED BY RELIABLE SOURCE AS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL TO A KNOWN AGENT OF THE POLISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (PIS). (BUREAU LETTER TO SAN DIEGO DATED JUNE 19, 1962) (S)

2. SUBJECT CONSIDERED IDENTICAL WITH PIS AGENT. (BUREAU LETTER TO LOS ANGELES DATED NOVEMBER 29, 1962) (S)

3. IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY SUBJECT'S CONTACTS AND ACTIVITIES THE INTERCEPTION AND OPENING WAS DEEMED ADVISABLE.

SECRET

B. TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED

ANY CORRESPONDENCE FROM OR TO THE SUBJECT ORIGINATING IN AND OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. (LOS ANGELES AIRTEL TO BUREAU DATED MARCH 16, 1964)

C. ORIGIN AND TREMINATION

1. LOS ANGELES AIRTEL TO BUREAU DATED MARCH 16, 1964, REQUESTED AUTHORIITY TO ENGAGE IN INTERCEPTION AND OPENING OF SUBJECT'S CORRESPONDENCE. (BUREAU LETTER TO LOS ANGELE DATED MARCH 26, 1964, AUTHORIZED SAME)

THE OPERATION BEGAN ON MARCH 26, 1964, AND TERMINATED ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1964. (LOS ANGELES LETTER FROM SAC WESLEY G. GRAPP TO J.D. HUDSON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE, USPO, SEPTEMBER 30, 1964)

D. PHYSICAL LOCATION

1. USPO, RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA. (MEMORANDUM FROM SA HOMER A. PORTER, JR., TO SAC, LOS ANGELES, DATED APRIL 16, 1964)

E. NAMES OF AGENTS PARTICIAPTING IN OPENING OR INTERCEPT

THIS OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED BY AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE ESPIONAGE SQUAD ON A SCHEDULED BASIS. SCHEDULES PERTAINING THERETO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED.

SECRET

VICTOR JAMES KORDELL/MARGARET KORDELL

(1)

A. PUURPOSE OF OPENING OR INTERCEPT

1. (LOS ANGELES LETTER TO DIRECTOR DATED AUGUST 7, 1962)

THE SUBJECTS WERE SUSPECTED OF HAVING ENGAGED IN A COVERT CONTACT WITH TWO NAVAL ATTACHES IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C., ON JULY 26, 1962, IN LOS ANGELES. (S)

B. TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED

1. (LOS ANGELES LETTER TO DIRECTOR AUGUST 7, 1962)

MAIL WHICH WOULD AID MATERIALLY IN DETERMINING CONTACTS, EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL DATA OF THE KORDELLS. (S)

C. ORIGIN AND TERMINATION

1. LOS ANGELES AIRTEL TO BUREAU DATED OCTOBER 3, 1962, REQUESTING AUTHORIZATION TO CONDUCT A GUS AND SAM TYPE SURVEY ON KORDELS' CORRESPONDENCE.

2. MEMORANDUM FROM ASAC H.A. UNSGARD (DECEASED) TO SAC OCTOBER 12, 1962. (INSPECTOR DON MOORE, SOG, GAVE VERBAL APPROVAL TELEPHONICALLY ON OCUTBER 15, 1962)

ACTUAL OPERATION COMMENCED OCTOBER 26, 1962, AND TERMINATED DECEMBER 10, 1962. (MEMORANDUM OF CHARLES J. NAGLE, JR., TO SAC DECEMBER 12, 1962)

SECRET

D. PHYSICAL LOCATION

1. BALDWIN PARK POST OFFICE, BALDWIN PARK, CALIFORNIA. (MEMORANDUM OF SA NAGLE ABOVE)

E. NAMES OF PARTICIAPTING IN OPENING OR INTERCEPT

SAS STANLEY E. COUPE (RETIRED), FRNAK E. CHOVANEC, RICHARD L. CROMWELL, CHARLES J. NAGLE, JR., AND HARRY H. WHIDBEE.

(2) A REVIEW OF READILY AVAILABLE RECORDS FOR PERTINIENT PERIOD FAILS TO REFLECT ANY INSTANCE WHERE MAIL COVERS WERE PHYXICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES EITHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES.

(3) DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA PERTAINING TO (1) WILL BE SUBMITTED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

CLASSIFIED BY 2182 XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

END

MPM FBIHQ AKC FOR NO NINE

SECRET

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

TOP SECRET

Date: 6/20/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________ AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTENTION: W. O. CREGAR)

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-24345C)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975

Re Bureau teletype to Los Angeles, 6/18/75, and Los Angeles teletype dated 6/20/75.

Enclosed herewith are pertinent serials pertaining to instant matter. These serials are as follows:

SAM SURVEY
ESP - R
(Bufile 65-65884)
(LAfile 65-6984)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/EHL
ON 11/14/00

1. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 4/10/61 captioned "Proposal to Detect Soviet Illegal Agents in Los Angeles Area, Espionage - R".

2. Bureau letter to Los Angeles dated 3/24/61 captioned "Proposal to Detect Soviet Illegal Agents in Los Angeles Area, Espionage - R".

3. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 3/16/61 captioned "Proposal to Detect Soviet Illegal Agents in Los Angeles Area, Espionage - R".

REC-102 62-116395-417

The following communications are all captioned "SAM SURVEY, Esp - R":

12 JUL 25 1975

4. Los Angeles letter dated 12/28/61 ~~to Director~~

5. Bureau letter to Los Angeles dated 1/3/62

5

TOP SECRET

3 - Bureau (Encls. 40) (RM)
2 - Los Angeles
WLM/mlh
(5)

ENCL BEHIND FILE

ENCLOSURE

603

CLASSIFIED BY 2182
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2 and 3
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Indefinite

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

84 JUL 29 1975

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

6. Bureau letter to Los Angeles dated 1/12/62.
7. Bureau letter to Boston dated 5/31/61.
8. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 6/12/61.
9. Bureau letter to Boston dated 8/14/61.
10. Bureau letter to New York dated 8/28/61.
11. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 9/20/61.
12. Los Angeles radiogram dated 9/28/61.
13. Bureau letter to Seattle dated 9/25/61.
14. Bureau letter to Los Angeles dated 10/9/61.
15. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 10/11/61.
16. Bureau letter to Los Angeles dated 10/24/61.
17. Bureau airtel to Los Angeles dated 10/20/61.
18. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 11/8/61.
19. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 12/19/61.
20. Los Angeles teletype to Director dated 1/8/62.
21. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 1/30/62.
22. Bureau letter to Los Angeles, 2/13/62.
23. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 3/30/62.
24. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 5/9/62.
25. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 9/11/62.
26. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 9/27/62.
27. Bureau letter to Los Angeles dated 11/23/62.

28. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 1/11/63.

29. Bureau letter to Los Angeles dated 1/21/63.

WALTER HENRYK DUDA
IS - PO
(Bufile 105-111366)
(LAfile 105-13068)

The following serials are all captioned "WALTER HENRYK DUDA":

1. Bureau letter to San Diego dated 6/19/62.

2. Bureau letter to Los Angeles dated 11/29/62.

3. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 3/16/64.

4. Bureau letter to Los Angeles dated 3/26/64.

5. Memorandum from SA HOMER A. PORTER, Jr., to SAC, Los Angeles, dated 4/16/64.

6. Letter from SAC WESLEY G. GRAPP to Assistant Inspector in Charge, U. S. Post Office, 9/30/64.

VICTOR JAMES KORDELL
ESP - R
MARGARET KORDELL
ESP - R
(Bufile 65-67719)
(LAfile 65-7236)

The following communications are all captioned "VICTOR JAMES KORDELL; MARGARET KORDELL":

1. Los Angeles letter to Director dated 8/7/62.

2. Los Angeles airtel to Director dated 10/3/62.

3. Memorandum from ASAC H. A. ONSGARD to SAC, Los Angeles, dated 10/12/62.

LA 100-24345C

4. Memorandum from SA EWING G. LAYHEW to SAC, Los Angeles, dated 11/26/62.

5. Memorandum from SA CHARLES J. NAGLE, Jr., to SAC, Los Angeles, dated 12/12/62.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR004 BS CODE

4:45 PM URGENT 6/20/75 RCM

TO: DIRECTOR (ATTN: INTD, SA W. O. CREGAR)

FROM: BOSTON (66-4177)

TOP SECRET

W.O. Cregar
4123 JEH

SENSTUDY, 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975

RE HEADQUATERS TELETYPE, JUNE 18, 1975, WHICH SET OUT REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ADDRESSED TO ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

A REVIEW OF ALL AVAILABLE FILES IN THE BOSTON OFFICE AND CONTACT WITH APPROPRIATE SUPERVISORS AND SPECIAL AGENT PERSONNEL DID NOT DISCLOSE ANY INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF FBI FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, TO PRESENT.

FURTHER, NO INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH EMPLOYEES OF THE U. S. POSTAL SERVICE WERE DISCLOSED FROM REVIEW OF FILES AND CONTACT WITH APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL OF THE BOSTON OFFICE, FBI.

REC- 102 62-116395-410

J.P.L.
Summary sent
Consistent with
La Tel 6/20
Ent

MDR 16

12 JUL 25 1975

DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2 ALM/EHL
ON 11/14/00

5-J

4 JUL 29 1975

PAGE TWO, BS 66-4117, ~~TOP~~ ~~SECRET~~

FOR INFORMATION OF FBIHQ, BOSTON FILE 65-4447, CAPTIONED SAM SURVEY, WAS DESTROYED IN 1973. BUFILE IN THIS MATTER IS 65-65884.

CLASSIFIED BY 6320, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

END.

VLJ FBIHQ CLR

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN [illegible]
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR009 DE CODE

11:59 AM IMMEDIATE JUNE 24, 1975 MAZ

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DETROIT (66-9)

~~TOP SECRET~~

ATTENTION: SA W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

RE BUTEL TO NEW YORK, ET AL, JUNE 18, 1975.

PURSUANT TO BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, THERE IS SET FORTH BELOW THE RESULTS OF A SURVEY OF ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPTED BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FBI FROM JANUARY 1, 1960 UNTIL THE PRESENT WITH THE DETAILED INFORMATION PERTAINING TO SAME WHEN THEY ARE KNOWN:

RE: GUS SURVEY

THIS SURVEY WAS INITIATED AT DETROIT BY LETTER TO THE BUREAU DATED SEPTEMBER 27, 1961 CAPTIONED, "GUS SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - R". PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY WAS TO DETECT ILLEGAL AGENT ACTIVITY IN THE 31ST POSTAL ZONE AND IN HAMTRAMCK, MI. BUREAU LETTER TO DETROIT, OCTOBER 4, 1961 SIMILARLY CAPTIONED.

REC- 102 [illegible] 415

12 JUL 25 1975

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ETH L
ON 9/29/00

5

84 JUL 29 1975

AUTHORIZED DETROIT TO INSTITUTE THE GUS SURVEY IN HAMTRAMCK AREA AND THE 31ST POSTAL ZONE ON A TRIAL BASIS DURING WHICH TIME THE NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICES WERE INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE TEST LETTERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SENDING THEM THROUGH TO DETERMINE IF THE POSTAL EMPLOYEES PERFORMED THEIR EXAMINATIONS PROPERLY. DETROIT LETTER TO BUREAU, DATED NOV. 8, 1961 REVEALS THAT AN OFFICIAL OF THE POST OFFICE ADVISED DETROIT AGENTS ON NOV. 3, 1961 THAT THE PROJECT WAS IN OPERATION.

THE SURVEY WAS DISCONTINUED OVER THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS, 1961/62 AND RESUMED ON JAN. 9, 1962 AND WAS AGAIN SUSPENDED DUE TO TECHNICAL PROBLEMS BROUGHT ABOUT BY AUTOMATIC SCANNING DEVICES BEING INSTITUTED BY THE POSTAL SERVICE. UP TO THIS TIME THE SCANNING OF MAIL FOR THE HAMTRAMCK AND 31ST POSTAL ZONE WAS BEING HANDLED AT THE ROOSEVELT PARK ANNEX. BY LETTER DATED APRIL 12, 1962 THE BUREAU DENIED AUTHORIZATION TO INSTITUTE THE GUS SURVEY ON A 60 DAY TRIAL BASIS AND THE GUS SURVEY WAS TERMINATED AT DETROIT.

IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT DURING THE OPERATION OF THIS SURVEY, ONLY POST OFFICE PERSONNEL WERE UTILIZED IN SCANNING THE MAIL.

NO MAIL COVER WAS INSTITUTED ON ANY INDIVIDUAL'S MAIL AND NO MAIL WAS OPENED. THIS SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING IF POSTAL PERSONNEL COULD DETECT CERTAIN TYPES OF "SUSPECT" MAIL TEST EXAMPLES OF WHICH HAD BEEN PREPARED BY VARIOUS BUREAU OFFICES AND MAILED TO POSTAL ZONE 31 AND THE HAMTRAMCK AREA. THE SURVEY WAS EVALUATED AS NOT HAVING BEEN SUCCESSFUL.

THE FOLLOWING NAMED PERSONNEL WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE GUS SURVEY: SA EMIL J. ROTHFUSS AND SA WILLIAM R. BILLING.

RE: SAM SURVEY

THE SAM SURVEY WAS CONCERNED WITH THE EXAMINATION BY BUAGENTS OF AIRMAIL DESTINED FOR CERTAIN EUROPEAN CITIES OR COUNTRIES PRIOR TO ITS BEING PLACED IN BAGS AND PLACED ABOARD THE PLANES FOR THE PURPOSE OF IDENTIFYING PERSONS CORRESPONDING WITH KNOWN SOVIET MAIL DROPS IN EUROPE AND TO IDENTIFY AND LOCATE INDIVIDUALS IN THE U.S. SENDING LETTERS TO EUROPE WHICH MAY BE PART OF A SOVIET ILLEGAL NETWORK.

THE BUREAU BY LETTER DATED MAY 31, 1961 AUTHORIZED CERTAIN OFFICES, INCLUDING DETROIT, TO SUBMIT THEIR EVALUATION AS TO

WHETHER A REQUEST COULD BE MADE LOCALLY TO PERMIT BUREAU AGENTS TO INSTITUTE A MONITORING OPERATION OF AIRMAIL. BY LETTER DATED JUNE 15, 1961 THE DETROIT OFFICE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU RESULTS OF ITS SURVEY. BY LETTER DATED APRIL 13, 1962, THE BUREAU AUTHORIZED DETROIT TO INSTITUTE THE SAM SURVEY FOR A PERIOD OF 60 DAYS. THE PROGRAM WAS INITIATED AT DETROIT ON MAY 14, 1962 AND TERMINATED SEPTEMBER 21, 1962. THE INTERCEPTS OF THE MAIL WERE CONDUCTED IN THE POSTAL INSPECTOR'S INTERROGATION ROOM LOCATED AT THE NEW POST OFFICE, DETROIT, MI.

WHILE THIS SURVEY WAS IN OPERATION, THERE WAS A TOTAL OF 78 INTERCEPTS. OF THESE THERE WERE 76 INSTANCES IN WHICH THE INTERCEPTED MAIL WAS OPENED; AND TWO INSTANCES WHERE MAIL WAS NOT OPENED.

THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL PARTICIPATED IN THE SAM SURVEY, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FROM REVIEW OF PERTINENT FILES TO DETERMINE WHAT INDIVIDUAL AGENT INTERCEPTED AND/OR OPENED WHAT SPECIFIC ITEMS OF MAIL: SAS LAWRENCE M. COOPER, JR.; T.S. KLIMASZEWSKI; EMIL J. ROTHFUSS; WILLIAM J. GILCHRIST; HOMER J. ST. JOHN; JAMES R. MC CANCE; ROBERT A. MOFFAT; LEONARD F.

~~SECRET~~

KURTZ; JOHN M. FEENEY; REX O. PLOEN; B. PERKOWSKI, JR.; LLOYD J. MC CARTHY; PAUL EDWARD EIDEN; ANKER B. HARBO, ASAC PALMER M. BAKEN, JR.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE INFORMATION SET FORTH ABOVE FOR GUS AND SAM SURVEYS, DETROIT DID NOT LOCATE ANY OTHER INCIDENT OF MAIL OPENING, MAIL INTERCEPT OR MAIL COVER PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES FROM JAN. 1, 1960 TO THE PRESENT.

REVIEW OF DETROIT FILES DID NOT INCLUDE EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL CASE FILES. SEARCH FOR THE REQUESTED INFORMATION INCLUDED CHECK OF INDICES; REVIEW OF ALL CONTROL FILES PERTINING TO MAIL COVERS, MAIL OPENINGS AND MAIL INTERCEPTS; AND CONSULTATION WITH THE CC, ASSISTANT CC, AS WELL AS WITH SOME KNOWLEDGEABLE LONG TIME EMPLOYEES OF THE DETROIT OFFICE.

DETROIT IS SUBMITTING PERTINENT SERIALS WHICH REFER, RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, POLICES AND PROCEDURES FOR MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS AND COVERS BY SEPARATE COVER.

CLASSIFIED BY 6048, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

END

VLJ FBIHQ CLR

SECRET

unclassified material Enclosed

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
9/29/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

Name	Assignment May, 1972	Current Assignment	Address (Former Employees)
Adams, A. D., Jr.	Director's Office	Out of Service	3280th Student Squadron, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas
Baker, Betty, Mrs.		Messenger - Courier Unit Supervisor	
Battle, Joseph E., SA	Washington Field	Washington Field	
Bear, Gloria L.		Supply Supervisor	
Bracksieck, Louis, E., SA	Director's Office (Clerk)	Chicago Ill.	
Brandt, Earl T.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	1109 Logan Avenue, Tyrone, Pennsylvania
Brennan, Daniel J.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	501 Brooklyn Boulevard, Sea Girt, New Jersey
Brown, Louis, Jr.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Campbell, Wason G.	Director's Office	Out of Service	206 East Broad Street, Greenfield, Tennessee
Canday, Tommie R.	Security Patrol	Security Patrol	
Carey, Charles L.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Carey, Clyde C.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	4254 East Capitol Street, Apt. 204 Washington, D. C.
Cassidy, Edward, Jr.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Cheshier, Jerry Wayne	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Corbin, Donald F.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Special Clerk (Washington Field)	
Codi, Anthony A.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Cox, Fred	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	

62-116395-414X

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/29/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Crawford, James E.	Chauffeur	Out of Service	9727 Mt. Piscah, Apt. 604 Silver Spring, Maryland
Crookston, James	Messenger Unit	Service Unit	
Cundy, Wanda M., Mrs.	Secretary	Out of Service	3051 Brinkley Road, Apt. 101 Temple Hills, Maryland
Dembnicki, Paul E., SA	Director's Office (Clerk)	Boston MASS.	
Dowling, Joseph E., SA	Special Agent (Washington Field)	Washington Field	
Downing, Phyllis, Miss	Secretary	Director's Office	
Dudney, Thomas Barden	Washington Field (Chief Clerk)	Chief Clerk (Washington Field)	
Dunphy, John P.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section (Section Chief)	
Durrer, Virginia, Miss	File Locate Unit	General Index Unit	
Felt, W. Mark	Director's Office	Out of Service	3216 Wynford Drive, Fairfax, Virginia
Fields, Annie	Housekeeper	Out of Service	4936 30th Place, N.W. Washington, D. C.
Gandy, Helen W., Miss	Director's Office	Out of Service	4801 Connecticut Ave., N. W., Apt. 915 Washington, D. C.
Gerrity, Edward J., SA	Director's Office (Clerk)	Boston MASS	
Gregory, Darwin M.	Mechanical Section (Section Chief)	Out of Service	5714 Belfast Lane, Springfield, Virginia
Gunsser, Albert P.		Out of Service	401 Sligo Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland
Haisten, James A.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Clerk	
Hereford, Douglas	Security Patrol	Out of Service	6201 Cheryl Drive, Falls Church, Virginia
Holmes, Edna M., Miss	Director's Office	Out of Service	2600 North Fillmore Street, Arlington, Virginia

Hughes, Brent H.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section	
Isner, James D.	Messenger Unit	Correlation Unit	
Jones, Robert B.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Director's Office (Clerk)	
Koerner, Julian A.	Security Patrol Clerk	New York (Special Agent)	
Kuhn, Daniel F.		Supervisor	
Kunkel, Robert G., SAC	SAC (Washington Field)	SAC (Alexandria)	Va.
Lockhart, Lois W.	Supply Supervisor	Contract Specialist	
Lovelace, James	Security Patrol Clerk	Philadelphia (Special Agent)	Pa.
Lovelace, Melvian	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section	
Lyles, Everett A.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	4561 North Capitol Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.
Marsden, Robert B.	Mechanical Section (Supervisor)	Mechanical Section (Supervisor)	
McCord, Ruth, Miss	Director's Office	Director's Office	
McMichael, G. Speights	Procurement Section	Procurement Section	
Metcalf, Erma, Mrs.	Director's Office	Director's Office	
Mohr, John P.	Director's Office	Out of Service	3427 North Edison, Arlington, Virginia
Mooney, Nancy A., Miss	Director's Office	Director's Office	
Moten, Thomas E., SA	Chauffeur	Chauffeur	
Ness, Ronald H.	File Delivery Unit	Out of Service	3410 Manis Road, Clinton, Maryland
Norfolk, Beverly, Mrs.	Filing Unit	Mail Room	

D.C.

3

O'Haver, Robert R.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section		
Page, Thomas L., SA	Clerk	Indianapolis (Special Agent)		
Peffer, Kenneth Lee	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section		
Peterson, Jesse T., Jr.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section		
Peyton, F. Thomas	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section		
Pickering, Michael Wilmer	Mechanical Section	Out of Service		Rt. 1, Box 85, Clatskanie, Oregon
Powell, Excell		Out of Service		1454 Montana Ave., N.E. Washington, D. C.
Randolph, George W.	Security Patrol	Security Patrol		
Riddles, Richard E.	Security Patrol	Philadelphia (Special Agent)	Pa	
Ruegsegger, Hugh D.	Security Patrol	Quantico (Special Agent)	Va	
Ryan, Edward F.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section		
Sabol, Robert J.	Security Patrol	Indianapolis (Special Agent)	Ind	
Schaeffer, Raymond H.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section		
Shaffer, Kenneth	Washington Field (Clerk)	Washington Field (Clerk)		
Shields, Carolyn	Messenger Unit	Records Unit		
Shoaff, Clark S., SA		Quantico (Special Agent)	Va	
Singleton, Robert	File Unit	File Unit		
Skillman, Dorothy S., Mrs.	Director's Office	Out of Service		429 N. Street, S.W., Apt S700 Washington, D. C.
Smith, Raymond	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section-Quantico		

DC

4

Smith, Thomas J.	Research Section	Out of Service	3410 Memphis Lane, Bowie, Maryland
Smith, Ursula, Miss	Director's Office	Out of Service	11 North Garfield, Arlington, Virginia
Soyars, William B.	Assistant Director	Out of Service	12 Green Winged Teal Road, Amelia Island Plantation, Amelia, Florida
Stewart, Alfred LaFornia	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	Rt. 2, Box 164, Statesboro, Georgia
ullivan, Cornelius G.		ASAC (Washington Field)	
Thompson, Ronald E.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Director's Office (Clerk)	
Thrun, Robert W.	Security Patrol	Quantico Vac. (Special Agent)	
Tice, Alvin L.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Tietgen, Gladys M.		Director's Office	
Tschudy, Carol, Miss	Director's Office	Administrative Assistant	
Underwood, Thomas E.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	12019 Center Hill Street, Wheaton, Maryland
Vega, Helen, Miss	Director's Office	Administrative Assistant	
Walp, Shirley, Miss	Messenger Unit	Teletype Unit	
Washington, William H.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Windear, Ralph A.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Winters, Lawrence E.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Director's Office (Clerk)	
Banwarth, Robert F.		Exhibits Section	

5

Benedict, James P.		Filing Unit
Booch, James D.		Exhibits Section
Brady, Lawrence W.		Filing Unit
Dalton, Terry A.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Doxzen, Mildred, Mrs.		Filing Unit
Fox, Wayne M.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Greene, Edgar G.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Hewett, Bernice R.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Larson, Fredrick A.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Massie, Laurence M.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Nash, William H.	Exhibits Section	

DC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. CALLAHAN NPC DATE: 7/17/75

FROM : H. N. BASSETT HNB

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to Bureau's memorandum to the Attorney General dated 7/16/75 concerning interviews conducted regarding "Official and Confidential Files."

Attached hereto is a list of persons interviewed in connection with the "Official and Confidential Files." The Attorney General and captioned Committee have been advised by referenced letter that this list would be made available for review.

ACTION:

This memorandum be furnished to the Intelligence Division for handling.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/29/02 BY SP2ALM/EHL

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Cregar (With Enc.)

Enclosure

JCM:wmj
(7)

REC-117 62-116395-414X

12 JUL 25 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ENCLOSURE

file 62-116395

67 MAR 2 1976

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/17/75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/29/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

This informative memorandum records information telephonically furnished the morning of 7/17/75 to Supervisor S. F. Phillips, INTD, by former FBI Inspector Donald E. Moore.

At about 11:00 p.m., 7/16/75, Moore received a telephone call at his residence from a Dave Martin (PH), who identified himself with the AP (Associated Press), who asked Moore if Moore was acquainted with the press accounts of Director Kelley's press conference on 7/14/75, particularly as Mr. Kelley's remarks pertained to surreptitious entries, principally at embassies. Moore told Martin that he had read about the matter in the newspapers. Martin asked specifically about the "New York Daily News" of 7/16/75, and Moore said he was not familiar with that account, Martin then referred to the 7/16/75 "Washington Post" article and referred Moore specifically to the newspaper referring to an unnamed source. Martin wanted some comment from Moore which the latter declined to give, Moore advising that any comment should more properly come from the FBI.

Martin attempted to convince him he should make some comment by stating that information about this matter would eventually come out, and Martin was now offering Moore a change to put the matter in a better light. Martin then asked Moore if Mr. Kelley was correct in his statement and Moore again declined to comment. Martin said he thought that the "unnamed source" referred to in the newspaper was Bill Sullivan (obviously referring to former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan). Martin asked Moore if he ~~agreed and~~ again Moore gave him a no comment reply.

62-116395

REC-102 62-116395-4114

3 JUL 24 1975

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former Inspector Donald E. Moore)

FIVE

SFP:lhb/hb
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUL 23 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

Martin then asked whether Joe Purvis was at one time the SAC in WFO. This being a matter of public record, Moore said that Purvis had been SAC in WFO. Martin attempted to determine Purvis' current whereabouts and Moore could be of no assistance as he actually does not know. Moore was asked whether Bob Kunkel had replaced Purvis and Moore said that he thought he had. Martin then wanted to know who Purvis' predecessor was in WFO. Moore referred Martin to the FBI. According to Moore, their conversation was cordial but he sensed that Martin hung up rather abruptly. Moore indicated that he thought that the Bureau would be interested in the foregoing and he said that any similar further inquiries made of him would be similarly reported to us. Moore was thanked for bringing this matter to our attention.

ACTION:

None. For information.

wRW

PLM

Jm

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

WRW

TO: John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: KWOC K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Senstudy-'75

Attached for your information is a letter regarding the "proposed procedures" to the Attorney General from Senate Select Committee. I am attaching two extra copies of it, as I am sure that Mr. Adams and the Director may also wish to see it.

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

"no agreement yet reached per WRW.
7/22/75
WRW

REC-102 62-116395-413

3 JUL 24 1975

2 - ENCLOSURE

Records please
file 62-116395

SWWO

Copies sent to Dir. 7/18/75. jm

84 JUL 29 1975 1063 JGH

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 18, 1975

Proposed procedures

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

MRD-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/29/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Select Committee, we wish to express our appreciation to you for meeting with us on Wednesday afternoon. We recognize the need for the Committee to have a complete understanding of the concerns of the Department of Justice so that our inquiry can proceed in the most responsible manner. Our meeting was extremely valuable in that respect, and you may be sure that we have given full consideration to your views.

The Committee has been informed that Mr. John T. Elliff, leader of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, and members of his staff met yesterday with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence coordination, and members of his staff to agree upon procedures for delivery of and access to FBI materials requested by the Committee. The proposed procedures which resulted from that meeting are satisfactory to the Committee.

We are pleased that your staff was able to meet promptly with our representatives and that they reached agreement without delay. The Committee expects that the proposed procedures will, if implemented, expedite its work during the coming weeks. As you know, one of our major concerns was that all of the problems with the Committee's outstanding requests for materials . .

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1975

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-413

be resolved before the August recess so that the staff can fully prepare the materials for our use when we return. We believe the procedures are an appropriate and practical accommodation of our mutual interests. Indeed, we have instructed our staff to make every effort to accomplish the work of the Committee within this framework.

The prompt resolution of this matter demonstrates a spirit of cooperation which we hope will prevail in all our future relations. The Committee looks forward to working with you personally on issues of common concern during the months ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader/or the Senior Staff will submit periodically a list of materials to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within 48 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond 48 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader or the Senior Staff requests access to materials, rather than delivery of materials to the Committee.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources and ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the names of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such names to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

RECEIVED
JUL 13 1975

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/29/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-413

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources and ongoing operations.

or the Senior Staff
(b) If the Task Force Leader/has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the Office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of screened material without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only is such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171.

(9) Where accepted by Attorney General and the Committee, these procedures may be modified only by their joint decision.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 16 1975

WOG

TO: John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Senstudy - 75

SUBJECT: Elliff Response to my Letter of July 15, 1975

The attached is self-explanatory; I should like to discuss it with you soon, so that a substantive response can be prepared which properly reflects Bureau views. I understand that the Attorney General may be called upon to discuss this matter today.

MDR-16

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

REC- 102

62-116395-412

3 JUL 24 1975

ENCLOSURE

Handled 7/16/75 - matter discussed in conf. with the Committee. JAM

Records - please
file in 62-116395

84 JUL 29 1975

TO: John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Elliff Response to my Letter of
July 15, 1975

The attached is self-explanatory; I should like to discuss it with you soon, so that a substantive response can be prepared which properly reflects Bureau views. I understand that the Attorney General may be called upon to discuss this matter today.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn:Mr. Cregar)
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

July 16, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI [illegible]

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, and subsequent oral request from Committee staff member Mark Gitenstein on June 5, 1975, we were requested for certain information concerning the "official and confidential" files.

In a conversation with Special Agent Paul V. Daly of this Bureau on June 16, 1975, Douglas Marvin of your staff authorized this Bureau to make available a copy of the Inspection Division inquiry into the "official and confidential" files matter. In accordance with this authorization, there is attached to the enclosed letterhead memorandum a copy of the aforementioned document.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which is in response to the aforementioned Committee requests.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

REC-114 62 116395-412X

12-29-77

3 JUL 31 1975

Enclosures (2) 3 - ENCLOSURE

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PVD:kjs (11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

MDR-16

J3½LM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

84 JAN 26 1976

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

NOTE: Memorandum, Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, 6-6-75, set forth the request of Mr. Gitenstein. The Inspection Division is preparing the necessary list which will be available for review by the Committee. The Department is in possession of the enclosed Inspection Division document. This matter has been coordinated with the Inspection Division.

July 16, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: "OFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL" FILES

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated May 14, 1975, and the request of staff member Mark Citenstein on June 5, 1975, requesting certain information pertaining to the "official and confidential" files.

In response to the aforementioned request, we are attaching a copy of the results of an FBI Inspection Division inquiry into the "official and confidential" files matter entitled, "Inquiry Into Disposition of Files Maintained in the Office of Former Director J. Edgar Hoover," dated July 3, 1975.

A list of individuals who were contacted during this inquiry and have some knowledge relating to this matter has been prepared and is available for review by staff members of the Senate Select Committee in FBI space.

Enclosure
1 - The Attorney General

PVD:kjs (12)

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-4

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7/16/75

Caption of Document: US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities Re OEC Files

Originating Office: FBI

1:40 p

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 7/22/75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-412

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
7/16/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosure

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75 and Mark Gitenstein on 6/5/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was furnished results of an FBI Inspection Division inquiry into the "official and confidential" files matter. A list of individuals who were contacted during this inquiry has been prepared and available for review at FBI Headquarters.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WOC/18

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-41

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn:Mr. Cregar)
1 - Mr. Mintz
July 16, 1975
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, and subsequent oral request from Committee staff member Mark Gitenstein on June 5, 1975, we were requested for certain information concerning the "official and confidential" files.

In a conversation with Special Agent Paul V. Daly of this Bureau on June 16, 1975, Douglas Marvin of your staff authorized this Bureau to make available a copy of the Inspection Division inquiry into the "official and confidential" files matter. In accordance with this authorization, there is attached to the enclosed letterhead memorandum a copy of the aforementioned document.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which is in response to the aforementioned Committee requests.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

REC-114 62 116395 41
12.29.77
3 JUL 31 1975

Enclosures (2) ENCLOSURE

62-116395

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

PVD:kjs (11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

34 JAN 26 1978

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

NOTE: Memorandum, Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, 6-6-75, set forth the request of Mr. Gitenstein. The Inspection Division is preparing the necessary list which will be available for review by the Committee. The Department is in possession of the enclosed Inspection Division document. This matter has been coordinated with the Inspection Division.

July 16, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: "OFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL" FILES

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated May 14, 1975, and the request of staff member Mark Gitenstein on June 5, 1975, requesting certain information pertaining to the "official and confidential" files.

In response to the aforementioned request, we are attaching a copy of the results of an FBI Inspection Division inquiry into the "official and confidential" files matter entitled, "Inquiry Into Disposition of Files Maintained in the Office of Former Director J. Edgar Hoover," dated July 3, 1975.

A list of individuals who were contacted during this inquiry and have some knowledge relating to this matter has been prepared and is available for review by staff members of the Senate Select Committee in FBI space.

Enclosure
1 - The Attorney General

PVD:kjs (12)

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

JBA/PLM

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-41

GPO [illegible]

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7/16/75

Caption of Document: US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: UE C Files

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: [illegible] Date: 7/21/75

Received by:

Title. Office Aide

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116 . ?

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
7/16/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosure

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75 and Mark Gitenstein on 6/5/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was furnished results of an FBI Inspection Division inquiry into the "official and confidential" files matter. A list of individuals who were contacted during this inquiry has been prepared and available for review at FBI Headquarters.

MDR - 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2ALM/CHL

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 - WOC / 18

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62 116395 -

JUL 16 1975

TO: Harold R. Tyler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Elliff Response to My Letter of July 15, 1975

The attached response to the July 15, letter may indicate some intention to amplify access by interpretation.

Elliff told me that this letter was prepared and sent before the SSC considered it. He has discussed my July 15, letter with Schwarz and Smothers and believes that this letter closely reflects their, and SSC members, view as to how to proceed.

I told Elliff we would study the letter and be back in touch; in the meanwhile, I said that the provision of access of the 7/15 letter stood as written. I will consult with the Bureau before preparing a substantive response.

cc: Doug Marvin
✓John Hintz

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-412

C-1-

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 16, 1975

RECEIVED
JUL 16 1975
KWO'C

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

I have received your letter of July 15 regarding access/delivery of documents requested in the Committee's letter of July 9, 1975. The following relates specifically to the procedure suggested for handling documents on the so called "Kissinger 17" surveillance, which is also applied in your letter to materials relating to electronic surveillance of the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City in August 1964, materials relating to the electronic surveillance of Dr. King, and possibly the O & C files.

I regard this suggested procedure as a major step forward and a recognition that previous arrangements were too cumbersome and time-consuming. Nevertheless, there are certain practical problems with the procedure which may be resolved by interpretation. For example, I assume that application of the procedure to the Atlantic City convention matters does not foreclose the Committee from receiving for use at its offices actual documents or portions of documents, as well as summaries. I understand that the FBI has no objection to providing such documents on this matter to the Committee for use at its offices.

Therefore, in order that the procedure you suggest may be applicable to all areas of Committee inquiry claimed by the Department to involve particularly sensitive matters, it should be interpreted as follows: the Committee staff will have direct access to all files and materials at FBIHQ; the Committee staff shall select certain documents from the files which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiry and necessary for the examination of witnesses or the establishment of certain facts during the course of the

MDR-16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-412

Recd O'C
1245 P 7/16/75

inquiry; the FBI shall at that time designate specific portions of such documents which might jeopardize particularly sensitive sources or methods; with respect to such specifically designated portions of documents, the Committee staff will prepare appropriate excisions or summaries of the information; the summaries will be checked at that time with senior Bureau executives to ensure the protection of particularly sensitive FBI sources or methods; thereafter, the excised documents and summaries will be removed to the Committee's offices; the Committee staff may check back to the original documents as extensively as necessary; staff notes on the designated specific portions of documents will not be removed from FBIHQ; and Committee members may, of course, at any time see the documents which the staff has seen.

I believe this interpretation can serve as a workable framework for Committee access to particularly sensitive FBI materials. You may be assured that the Task Force shares your concern for the need to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials, as indicated in the Outline for Inquiry Procedures. We hope this interpretation will facilitate the mutual effort by the Committee and the Department of Justice to accomplish this purpose.

I would appreciate receiving your immediate advice to me as to whether any further interpretation of this matter is required. Any public discussion of these arrangements and interpretations should be cast in such terms as will not jeopardize particularly sensitive FBI sources.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott
(Attn: Mr. J. C. Farrington)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/8/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

FROM : A. B. Fulton

SUBJECT: CIA DIRECTOR W. E. COLBY'S 12/24/74 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT; FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST TO CIA BY MORTON HALPERIN
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Senstudy - '75

Memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated 7/7/75, captioned "Colby Report to the President," advised of a contact of Legal Counsel by Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, during which Wilderotter advised that the report submitted by Director Colby of the CIA to the President dated 12/24/74 which dealt mainly with the issues discussed in a "New York Times" article of 12/22/74 by Seymour Hersh has been the subject of an FOIA request by Morton Halperin. Wilderotter advised that attorneys for CIA had prepared the material for release and that the material was now in the possession of The White House for their review. He suggested that inasmuch as the FBI was mentioned in some of the material that it would be desirable for the FBI to review the material prior to its release.

SA Fred J. Cassidy of the Intelligence Division reviewed this material in Room 110 of the Old Executive Office Building on 7/7/75. This review determined that the FBI is mentioned throughout the material being made available to Halperin and that most of the references to the FBI included in the material appear in the Rockefeller Commission Report, which Report has been made available to the general public. No FBI sensitive sources or techniques are disclosed in the material to be furnished Halperin.

In reviewing the material, SA Cassidy noted a misstatement in Mr. Colby's letter to the President which relates to the CIA mail intercept project which was in existence from 1953 to 1973. In the Colby letter to the President he stated that the intercept program was initiated in 1953 and from its inception was fully coordinated with the FBI which received much of its product. The facts are that we were not advised of the project until 1958

62-116395-

FJC:fb
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

JUL 25 1975

NOT RECORDED

46 JUL 25 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395-

84 JUL 29 1975

when we became aware of such a project through postal authorities, which fact is substantiated in the Rockefeller Commission Report.

The only other item in the material to be furnished Halperin which could possibly present future concern pertains to a memorandum captioned "Restrictions on Operational Lists on Americans" which was issued to CIA employees sometime subsequent to the CIA retrenchment in activities brought about by allegations concerning CIA's involvement in domestic activities. This memorandum concerned the discontinuance of lists maintained on individuals who were of possible operational interest to CIA such as doctors who studied abroad. The memorandum noted that if such listings could not be made by CIA in a non-misunderstandable manner arrangements should be made for the service to be performed by the FBI or other service which can legitimately do this function. We maintain no such list and have not been requested by CIA to perform such a service. Under present day circumstances whether we could legitimately perform such function is open to question.

ACTION:

None. For information.

WRW

PLM

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Asso. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 7/7/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: COLBY REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Senstudy-75

At 9:24 a.m. on July 7, 1975, James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, telephonically advised me that the Colby Report to the President has been the subject of an FOIA request by Morton Halperin, and attorneys for CIA have been preparing the material for release. Mr. Wilderotter identified the Colby report as a 7 or 8 page letter addressed to the President dealing with the issues discussed in a news article by Seymour Hersh. Included with the letter were nine enclosures all of which were classified. This material has been reviewed and appropriate deletions made.

Mr. Wilderotter said that the material refers to FBI - CIA liaison and the Bureau's Legats abroad. He said that he feels that the FBI should review the material prior to its release. He said that the review should be done today and that a Bureau representative should call Jay French, at 145-2845, to arrange for the review which must be done in the Old Executive Office Building.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division designate a representative to meet with Mr. French and review the material today.

Handling

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Herington
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Moore

JAM:mfd
(4)

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUL 25 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN

JUL 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

84 JUL 29 1975

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

July 7, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Hotis

Honorable Frank Church
Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Senstudy '75

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my understanding that you have in your possession certain materials which were compiled by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States for the preparation of its report to the President.

While we have not had access to these files nor has there been any interagency coordination concerning materials over which this Bureau has a proprietary interest, it is likely that the files contain information regarding FBI operations of the utmost sensitivity. The disclosure of such material could endanger ongoing investigations and place in jeopardy the security and welfare of FBI sources.

In order to avoid any inadvertent compromise of these materials, we would like to meet with you and Senator Tower at your earliest convenience for a discussion of those areas of the Bureau's activities which might warrant special consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

7/8/75 Delivered to Wm. Miller. RTT
WRW

The
1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

REC- 102

62-116395-41

JBH:lgp/mfd
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

3 JUL 24 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman

NOTE: On July 1, 1975, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination advised the Rockefeller Commission files have been furnished to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities by the White House. We have not reviewed these documents nor have we been advised of their contents, but it is likely that they contain information regarding sensitive Bureau operations. In an effort to avoid any inadvertent compromise of sources or ongoing investigations by the Bureau, this letter requests an opportunity for us to brief Senators Church and Tower on those areas of our activities which might warrant special consideration.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 17 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR007 SE CODE

11:25 PM NITEL JULY 16, 1975 GJW

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SEATTLE (66-2894)

ATTENTION: INTD, SA W. CREGAR.

SENSTUDY 1975.

REC-88

RE SEATTLE TEL, JULY 8, 1975.

ON JULY 16, 1975, USA STAN PITKIN, WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, ADVISED HE RECENTLY RECEIVED LETTER FROM BARBARA ANN BANOFF ON U.S. SENATE LETTERHEAD WITH THE CAPTION "SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FRANK CHURCH CHAIRMAN". IN THE LETTER BANOFF REQUESTED PITKIN TO FURNISH THE FOLLOWING:

1. ANY AVAILABLE INFORMATION OF COUNTY GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION REGARDING LARRY WARD SHOOTING INCLUDING IDENTITY OF WITNESSES. ALSO INFORMATION REGARDING INQUEST AND CIVIL TRIAL IN WARD MATTER.

2. INFO ON FEDERAL GRAND JURY WHICH INDICTED "SEATTLE 7". WANTED COPY OF INDICTMENT AND IF AVAILABLE COPY OF TRANSCRIPT OF TRAIL. ALSO NAMES OF FOUR FBI INFORMANTS IN THIS CASE. IN ADDITION ANY INFORMATION ON DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE WHO WAS OVERHEARD ON A TELEPHONE TAP. DESIRE TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS WHICH

END PAGE ONE

REC-19

62-116395-410

EX 103

3 JUL 22 1975

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

84 JUL 31 1975

WOULD SHOW THIS OVERHEARD.

3. ANY INFORMATION REGARDING JEFFREY PAUL DESMOND INCLUDING A CITATION TO THE COUNTY GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS WHERE DESMOND TESTIFIED.

PITKIN ADVISED HE WOULD ANSWER QUESTIONS BY WORKING THROUGH A LIAISON MAN AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

E N D

EJF FBIHQ 1.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-27-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee (SSC), dated 6-23-75, addressed to the Honorable Edward H. Levi. This letter announces the SSC's intent to conduct interviews relating to Douglas Durham, a former Bureau informant. The request obviously relates to our investigation at "Wounded Knee" and our investigation of the American Indian Movement (AIM). This request was received 6-27-75, by Legal Division.

On 6-27-75, Patrick Shea, staff member of the SSC requested we hold in abeyance any action on the request in view of the killing of the Agents at Pine Ridge Reservation, South Dakota.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
1 - Mr. Deegan - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis- Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

PVD:eek
(9)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 137-3... 176-2...

EX 103
REC-19
62-116395-409

7 JUL 9 1975

ENCLOSURE

CD#368-88 SPS w/abr 1-6-89

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-27-79 BY SP-2 TAP/eg/sl

84 JUL 24 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, C[illegible]MAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VIC[illegible]IRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 23, 1975

#MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The Select Committee proposes to interview the following employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice with respect to the case of Douglas Durham, an informant employed by the Bureau prior to March 1975:

Joseph L. Hearsley F.B.I.	Des Moines, Iowa
John McFee F.B.I.	Omaha, Nebraska
Larry L. Astoki F.B.I.	Des Moines, Iowa
David Hedgecock F.B.I.	Des Moines, Iowa
Robert Taubert F.B.I.	St. Paul, Minnesota
Ray Williams F.B.I.	St. Paul, Minnesota
Douglas Hofer F.B.I.	St. Paul, Minnesota
R. D. Hurd U. S. Attorney	

62-116395-409

ENCLOSURE

The Committee has authorized the staff to conduct an investigation of matters pertaining to the above-named informant. Preparations will be made to interview the above-named employees in St. Paul and Des Moines. Liaison officials at the Bureau and the Department of Justice will be contacted shortly by Patrick Shea of the Select Committee staff with regard to the details of these interviews.

This investigation may involve specific allegations of abuse or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. It is not anticipated that these interviews will be monitored by the Bureau or the Department of Justice, as they will relate to alleged abuses falling within the mandate of the Committee pursuant to Senate Resolution 21.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman

cc: William O'Connor
Paul Daley

Date 2/19/91

Classification of Mail:

☒ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☐ Secret
☐ Top Secret*
☐ SCI*
☐ Other

Mail Category:

Letter ______
LHM ______
Report ______
Teletype ______
Airtel ______
Memo ✓
Other ✓ with enclosures

FD-501 Number ______
FD-502 Number ______

Subject Senstudy 75

Date of Mail 6/4/75

Description of Material memo from Cregar to Wannall
(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☒ Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ #MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/28/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

☐ ______
(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☒ Field Office Manager — 62-116395-408
File and Serial number

______
(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

______
Date

*requires special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FBI/DOJ

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Bassett
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz

The Deputy Attorney General

July 10, 1975

1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly

Director, FBI REC-88 62-116395-407

#MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116606

Delivered to O'Connor 7/11/75 pvd

Reference is made to memorandum dated June 30, 1975, from K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, captioned "O & C Files." You requested this Bureau advise you of its views concerning the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC) request that they be allowed to conduct interviews of current Bureau employees concerning the "Official and Confidential" files prior to the conclusion of the Department's inquiry concerning that matter.

Our inquiry into this matter has been completed and the results have been furnished the Office of the Attorney General. It would appear in view of this our response or observations concerning this particular problem are moot. However, it is possible similar situations might arise in the future. With that in mind, we would suggest that in those areas where we are conducting an ongoing investigation or inquiry it would be proper for the Department to request the SSC to refrain from interviews if it would impair ongoing operations.

1-K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

PVD:lgp
(11)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NOTE: The Inspection Division conducted an inquiry concerning this matter at the request of Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General. This response has been coordinated with the Inspection Division.

PLM

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 3 0 1975

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

Memo to Dir 7/9/75 [illegible] LGP

TO: John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: O & C Files

Senstudy 75

Attached hereto is a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General regarding the O&C files. Please review the letter and provide me with your views regarding the interview procedure suggested on page 2.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

5 - ENCLOSURE

REC-88

62-116395-407

3 JUL 22 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

#C315

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMA
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRM

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 27, 1975

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/29/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

JUN 27 1975
O.L.A.

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On April 28 I wrote to you concerning certain allegations contained in Newsweek magazine pertaining to the removal from the FBI of certain "personal and confidential" or "official and confidential" files belonging to former Director J. Edgar Hoover. The Select Committee did not receive any acknowledgment or response to the letter until one month later on May 20, at which time we received a memorandum from the FBI. That memorandum was unsigned and stated, in essence, that the FBI had no knowledge of the matter although a former employee might. A copy of my letter of April 28, the FBI memorandum and a letter of transmittal are attached.

As a result of conversations between members of my staff and representatives of the Department of Justice and the FBI, the Select Committee understood that the May 20 memorandum ended the matter and that neither the Department nor the Bureau intended to investigate further. We made it clear that we would proceed with our investigation. In its May 14 comprehensive request of your Department, the Committee had already specified several items (items 21-23 of Appendix C) related to the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which you had described in your testimony of February 27, before the House Judiciary Committee. Furthermore, members of our staff have interviewed a number of persons knowledgeable about the files maintained by Miss Helen Gandy, Executive Assistant to Mr. Hoover, part of which apparently were the "Official and Confidential" files which you had described in your testimony.

On June 8 an article appeared in the New York Times indicating that the Department of Justice was undertaking an investi-

RECEIVED
JUN 27 1975

62-116395-407

ENCLOSURE

gation of the transfer of the files maintained in Miss Gandy's office. The fact that the Department is conducting such an investigation has been confirmed by representatives of the Department and the Bureau.

We are pleased that you are investigating the matter and trust that you now will be able to answer the questions posed in my April 28 letter. In addition, we would appreciate your supplying any other information which comes to your attention on the matter, including, of course, the results of your investigation. In the meantime, however, our investigation must continue. In that connection, representatives of the Department have suggested that we should not interview current Bureau employees during the course of the Department's investigation. I am sure that you will agree that our investigation should not be delayed by the pendency of the Department's investigation. My hope is that we can work together on this matter and, if you agree, would appreciate your indicating that restrictions on our proceeding have been lifted.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

SEL COMM

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

April 28, 1975

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Last week's issue of Newsweek, on page 15, states:

Hoover's Secrets

Following the death last week of Clyde Tolson, J. Edgar Hoover's close friend and No. 2 man at the FBI, two FBI agents reportedly removed some documents from the late director's house in Washington, where Tolson had been living. Officially, the FBI denies taking any such action, and a friend of Tolson's says the only Hoover documents Tolson had were old canceled checks and tax returns. But Newsweek had reported earlier that some of Hoover's private dossiers, including information "very, very damaging" to persons in the Nixon White House, were left in Tolson's custody, and a source told Newsweek this week that the materials were carted away in a truck.

Assuming that the files in question may be part of the so-called "Official and Confidential" files, your testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on February 27, 1975, is instructive. You said that the number of files which you reviewed contained matters relating to "Presidential directives regarding the role of the FBI in the security field" and to the matters related to "domestic

MG/jm

62-116395-407

ENCLOSURE

violence", "intelligence activities by hostile nations", "domestic extremist activities", and use of the FBI to gather political intelligence.

Furthermore, at the same time, Director Kelley suggested that materials from the "Official and Confidential" files were taken to Director Hoover's home. He stated:

> Immediately after his death /Mr. Hoover's/ some of his employees, including his personal secretary, went through his files and completed the destruction of the remainder of the files that were purely personal. These were destroyed by shredding. Some I understand were taken out to his home and placed in his home, they being historical I presume to some extent. There is no indication that they were other than personal files.

Please determine for the Select Committee whether any documents were removed from Mr. Tolson's or Mr. Hoover's residence by FBI agents or former FBI agents after Mr. Tolson's death. If agents of the FBI did go to Mr. Hoover's or Mr. Tolson's residence to remove files, please provide the Select Committee with a complete description of the documents taken into custody by the FBI. Were any such documents copies or originals of documents relating to the business of the FBI? If so, please describe the subject matter of each such document. Also indicate the individual within the FBI who has custody over these files. Furthermore, I respectfully request on behalf of the Select Committee that such files not be destroyed or removed from the FBI's custody until further notice.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman

MG/jm

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

MAY 20 1975

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Attached are responses prepared pursuant to requests received from the respective Committees. The response to each Committee is slightly different as was the request. In order to assure clarity for both Committees, a copy of the response to the other Committee is provided with the response to the requesting Committee.

Sincerely,

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR
Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General

MDR - 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/29/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

RECEIVED FROM
MAY 21 1975
DO.J

62-116395-407

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 8, 1975

REQUEST OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

This is in response to letter dated April 25, 1975, addressed to Honorable Edward H. Levi, Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, signed Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.

There were no documents or material removed from the home of the late Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, by or at the direction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation after the death of Mr. Clyde Tolson.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

RECEIVED FRO
MAY 21 1975
DOJ

62-116395-401

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UN[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT O[illegible]USTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REQUEST PERTAINING TO DOCUMENTS REMOVED FROM
RESIDENCE OF FORMER DIRECTOR
J. EDGAR HOOVER

Reference is made to letter dated April 28, 1975, to the Attorney General from Chairman of captioned Committee which contained a request for certain information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has not removed, nor caused to be removed, documents from the residence of former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover, subsequent to the death of Mr. Clyde A. Tolson, former Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It is our understanding, however, that former Assistant to the Director, John P. Mohr, may have some knowledge as to what material may have been removed from the residence after Mr. Tolson's death.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

RECEIVED F
MAY 21 1975
DOJ

62-116395-407

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MDR-16

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/23/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO OFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FILES OF FORMER DIRECTOR HOOVER

During a conference with the Deputy Attorney General at 1:45 p.m. on 6/23/75, the Deputy Attorney General requested the Bureau to prepare summaries of summaries previously prepared concerning the official and confidential files retrieved from the office suite following Mr. Hoover's death. The Deputy described a notebook containing 164 summaries that had been made available to the Attorney General. He requested that the 164 summaries be used as the basis for preparation of summaries that may be made available for review by representatives of the Senate Select Committee in lieu of direct Committee access to the original files. He said that names and identifying data should be deleted from the file summaries in order to protect personal privacy, but that the material prepared should serve to explain the statement made by Attorney General Levi concerning his review of the official and confidential files.

Mr. Adams instructed that this request should be conveyed to Mr. Bassett and that the summaries should be prepared by the Inspection Division. I telephonically advised Mr. Bassett and during a subsequent conference between Mr. Adams, Mr. Bassett and me, procedures for preparation of the summaries were agreed upon.

RECOMMENDATION:

The summaries prepared by the Inspection Division should be furnished to Legal Counsel for transmission to the Deputy Attorney General.

Memo to Wl
7/1/75
PVD:eal

62-116395-406

OK REC-88

JUL 22 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(6)

INSPECTION DIVISION ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

84 [illegible] 24 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

INSPECTION DIVISION ADDENDUM F.B. GRIFFITH:wmj 6/26/75

In response to Legal Counsel's request there are attached three excised sets of inventory sheets totaling 164 pages each pertaining to the official and confidential files of former Director Hoover. The excisions were by Special Agent Fred B. Griffith, Inspection Division, with review and concurrence by Special Agent Joseph L. Tierney, FOIA Section, Files and Communications Division. Only names of individuals were deleted from the captions. Items number 36 ("Black Bag" Jobs) and 142 (Specialized Mail Coverage) were specifically brought to the attention of Mr. Mintz in view of the issues involved. He noted no excisions could be made.

Briefed [illegible]
6/27/75

PLM WRW

K

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/ETH

JUL 9 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

KWOC/MS

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Senstudy - 75

SUBJECT: Additional Requests, SSC (Amplification of May 14, and June 27, Requests)

Transmitted herewith are three additional requests from the Senate Select Committee, two under date of July 8, and one dated June 30, which I received yesterday.

The four-page, 21 item, statement of additional documentation requested in one of the July 8, letters, and the June 30, letter raise a problem which pertains to "abuse" areas of the "notification" letter of June 27. This issue is the subject of my previous memo to you, and the considerations which are entailed, insofar as witness testimony, should be, I think, observed here.

The second July 8, request is simply for Manual pages to be made available.

Please arrange for the preparation of appropriate documentary responses to the requests attached. In the event that there is a serious problem with response to any of the itemized requests, early advice to me of that fact would be appreciated, so that I can advise the Committee and attempt to resolve the problem.

Please alert me to any third agency problems which may arise with regard to any of these requests; in a cursory examination, no such problem was patent to me. However, I realize that there may be latent third agency issues, and I will appreciate your advice to this effect.

62-116395-403

REC-88

3 JUL 22 1975

ENCLOSURE

84 JUL 22 1975

FBI

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

JUL 1 10 19 AM '75
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL ROOM
OROM

Copy To Mr Mintz
Via Paul Daly
Today 7/7
ASAP,
B

June 30, 1975

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

MDR-16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

One of the COINTELPRO case studies that the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities is examining concerns measures directed against the Black Panther Party in the late 1960's and early 1970's, in SanFrancisco-Oakland, Los Angeles, and San Diego, California, by the Field Offices of the FBI. Prior to the time that the Petersen Report case summaries became available for our review, on June 12, 1975, two members of our staff, Lester B. Seidel and John L. Smith, met with members of the FBI for an informal briefing concerning this case study.

Please consider this letter a further notification pursuant to the Committee's letter of June 27, 1975, part III, item E. In order to pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents relevant to this COINTELPRO:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the response thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (e.g., field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO with explanation of the dispositions thereof;

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
FED. BU. OF INV.
DEPT OF JUSTICE
1975
R.A.D.
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
FED. BU. OF INV.

RECEIVED
JUL 7 1975
KWO'C

cc: John Mintz

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-407

6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and the media affiliation;

8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;

9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to their whereabouts and current relationship to the FBI:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. Primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field.
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

Please note that the above listed nine (9) categories of documents and six (6) categories of witnesses were furnished to the FBI on June 12, 1975, at the noted briefing, so that progress on this request should be well underway.

I would appreciate it if you would contact me to let me know when this information will be available.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

JTE:mb

JUL 9 1975

Mr. John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

Dear Mr. Elliff:

Your letter of July 8, 1975, requesting, in a four page addendum, additional materials for the Senate Select Committee's inquiry, has been received. I have today referred it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a request for the assembly of appropriate documentary responses.

Your letter contains a reference, in paragraph 2, to "the agreement to come forward...". I feel that it is important for me to remind you that this "agreement to come forward..." was the subject of a discussion between us on July 2, 1975, at which time I informed you that the Attorney General was considering a reply to the reference to such "agreement to come forward..." set forth in the letter of June 27, 1975, by the Senate Select Committee.

It is our continued intention to be cooperative with the Senate Select Committee, and we will, of course, move as expeditiously as possible to prepare documents responsive to the requests of the Committee. However, as I advised you on July 2, the FBI follows, quite properly, a careful clearance procedure as to intelligence materials which are to be assembled for transmission to the Committee, or for Committee access. This clearance procedure takes time, and requires the undivided attention of Senior Bureau Executives. These Executives are working at full capacity in attempts to meet the existing requests from the Committee and to carry out their other duties at the same time. As you have suggested, in your letter of July 8, your

bcc: John Mintz

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-407

four page additional request will be so handled as to impose no more delay on the previously requested items than is inevitable. The request will be accorded an appropriate priority to ensure that responsive items are supplied as they become ready for transmission to the Senate Select Committee.

Sincerely,

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRM[illegible]
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHA[illegible]

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAK[illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATE[illegible]Z.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 8, 1975

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Pursuant to Section III. A. of the notification attached to the Committee's letter of June 27, 1975, I am forwarding herewith an additional request for materials which relate to this matter.

The specificity of this request is not, of course, intended to limit in any way the agreement to come forward with all relevant information and materials, including documents, whether or not they have been brought to the Committee's attention or have been specifically requested by the Committee.

As Mr. Schwarz and I indicated in our meeting with you a few days ago, there are still outstanding several items relating to this matter which the Committee requested some time ago. This request should in no way delay further the availability of the previously requested items, and we would expect that individual items will be supplied whenever they become separately ready for submission.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
JUL 8 1975
KWO'C
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

62-116395-46

1. Access to all memoranda, airtels, teletypes, and any other materials which relate in any way to:

   a. The dissemination to any person or organization outside the executive branch of the federal government of information relating to Martin Luther King, Jr.

   b. Contacts between FBI personnel and persons outside the executive branch of the federal government concerning Dr. King.

2. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to meetings or proposed meetings between FBI headquarters and Dr. King, including, but not limited to:

   a. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting such proposals.

   b. All correspondence and any other materials reflecting invitations extended for such meetings.

   c. All correspondence and any other materials reflecting replies to any such invitations.

   d. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting briefings or preparations for such meetings.

   e. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting what occurred at such meetings.

   f. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting actions recommended or taken following such meetings.

3. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a meeting between the FBI Director and reporters on November 18, 1964, including, but not limited to:

   a. Proposals, invitations, and replies for such meeting.

   b. Arrangements, briefings, and preparations for such meeting.

   c. Summaries or other evidence of what occurred at such meeting.

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLO 62-116395-407

4. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a meeting between the President and Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph, Whitney Young, Mrs. Dorothy Haight, James Farmer, and Jack Greenberg on November 19, 1964.

5. A copy of a November 19, 1964, telegram from Dr. King to Director Hoover, and all notes, memoranda, and any other materials reflecting the disposition of, or actions taken as a result of the receipt of, said telegram.

6. All memoranda and any other materials relating to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Dr. King on or about December 10, 1964.

7. All memoranda and any other materials relating to a banquet held in honor of Dr. King in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 25, 1965.

8. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a meeting between the President and Dr. King on February 9, 1965.

9. All materials which formed the basis for the FBI's response dated June 12, 1975, captioned "Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance", which pertained to the travel of certain former agents of the FBI.

10. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to mail openings, and mail covers, with respect to Dr. King.

11. Access to all memoranda and any other materials which relate to electronic surveillance of Dr. King by state or local agencies or governments.

12. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to the transfer of former Special Agent Robert R. Nichols to the Oklahoma City office of the FBI in June 1969.

13. All Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") from 1959 until retirement for:

a. Former Special Agent Robert R. Nichols.

b. Former Special Agent Alan Sentinella.

14. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a letter from former Associate Director Clyde A. Tolson to newspaper columnist Carl T. Rowan concerning Dr. King, as reported in the Washington Evening Star on June 18, 1969.

15. All memoranda and any other materials relating to arrangements, briefings, and preparations for an interview of the FBI Director by any reporters for the Washington Evening Star on June 19, 1969; all memoranda and any other materials referred to, quoted from, or displayed during such interview; and all memoranda and any other materials reflecting what occurred at such interview.

16. Access to all materials upon which "Black Extremist" COINTELPRO summaries 16, 23, 63, and 156 were based.

17. An August 17, 1964, memorandum from former Assistant Attorney General John Doar to the FBI Director requesting a name check on certain individuals connected with the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

18. All memoranda and any other materials indicating or reflecting the inception of (a) all headquarters files and (b) all Atlanta, Georgia, field office files concerning Dr. King and concerning the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, together with the basis and authority for opening such files.

19. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting or relating to a 1963 meeting at FBI headquarters which was attended by former Special Agents Robert R. Nichols, Henry Rouse, William Sullivan, and other FBI personnel, and which related to Dr. King.

20. All memoranda prepared by the Internal Security Section and by former Assistant Director William Sullivan concerning the August 1963 March on Washington.

21. All memoranda and any other materials which reflect or relate to communications between the FBI Director or FBI headquarters personnel and the President or the President's staff in June 1969 concerning electronic surveillance of Dr. King.

N.B.: The Bureau's search for the above-requested materials should include a check of pertinent field office files as well as headquarters files.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 8 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Bill

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Notification of June 27; COINTELPRO

Attached is a request for further detailed information from Senate Select Committee, regarding COINTELPRO, from Mr. Elliff dated July 1, 1975.

Please note that this matter is considered and characterized as an "abuse" (see page 21 of enclosures to SSC letter of June 27, previously forwarded); accordingly, any Agent interview would be an "abuse interview" subject to the strictures set forth in the "Outline for Inquiry Procedures" referenced in the SSC letter of June 27. Because of this, I feel we should discuss the procedures for interview which may be sought under page 2, paragraph "Interviews" of Mr. Elliff's attached letter. It may be that the matter should be discussed with the Deputy Attorney General as well, after Mr. Levi has responded to the SSC letter of June 27. A significant legal problem may be presented by the compulsion of Agents' appearance. Please also note the attached Departmental decision on the interpretation of "demand" in 28 C.F.R., 16.21 et. seq. This decision will bear on our resolution of the pending legal problem.

In the meantime, please arrange for the preparation of an approriate reply enclosing a collection of appropriate documentary material responsive to this letter; I have acknowledged Mr. Elliff's letter today (a copy of my letter is attached).

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/26/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

rec'd 7/10/75

cc prepared for AD Hoc group 7/10/75

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-403

Mr. John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Subject: COINTELPRO (June 27, Notification Letter)

Dear Mr. Elliff:

Your letter dated July 1, 1975, was delivered to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General on July 8, 1975, and reached me at 10 a.m., that day. I have forwarded your letter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a request that an appropriate response be prepared.

We will, of course, attempt to cooperate respectively with the Senate Select Committee's continuing requests for data and for interviews. You should be aware, however, that the characterization of an area of Senate Select Committee inquiry as an abuse may significantly alter arrangements for access to witnesses who are present employees of this Department. We are studying the legal problem presented, and will, in due course, advise you of our conclusions in this regard.

Sincerely,

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

bcc: John Mintz

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-403

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
JUL 8 9 00 AM '75
DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL

JUL 2 11 43 AM '75
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL ROOM

July 1, 1975

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

JUL 7 1975

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Please consider this letter a further notification, pursuant to the Committee's letter of June 27, 1975, part III, item E, of COINTELPRO and alleged COINTELPRO case studies.

COINTELPRO

1. Morris Starsky, former professor, Arizona State University
2. Evelyn Rose Sell, former teacher, Austin Independent School District, Austin, Texas
3. Maude Adams White, former teacher, District of Columbia public schools

Alleged COINTELPRO-Type Activities

4. Martha L. Shockey, former employee, United Parcel Service, Columbus, Georgia

In order to pursue these case studies, the Committee requests the following documents and the names and locations of the following persons to be interviewed for 1 to 4 above, respectively.

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
JUL 8 9 00 AM '75
RECEIVED OFFICE OF THE

RECEIVED
JUL 8 1975
KWO'C

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
JUL 8 1975
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-405

Documents

A. All documentary materials of the FBI pertaining to the authorization and implementation of operations concerning the targets in 1 to 4 above.

B. A list of all investigations, criminal or other type, related directly or indirectly to these targets in 1 to 4 above, and an explanation of the disposition of each investigation.

C. A list of all persons outside the FBI (including, but not limited to, employers, relatives, friends, media personnel, members of clergy, federal, state, and local law enforcement and other officials, etc.) contacted in relation to the targets in 1 to 4 above, and the purpose of the contact.

Note:

1. If revelation of a contact would jeopardize the safety of an informant, please designate the informant with a symbol and explain the rationale of said jeopardy.

2. Please designate all contacts of an anonymous nature as such.

D. A list of all FBI personnel connected with the operations relating to the targets in 1 to 4 above, their specific connection, and their present location.

Interviews

All FBI personnel connected with the operations relating to the targets in 1 to 4 above.

Please note that the fact that Morris Starsky would be a case study was made known to the FBI on June 12, 1975, so that progress on our request should be well underway. I would appreciate it if you would contact Lester B. Seidel, a member of my staff, to inform him of when this information will be available.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 23 1975

To Bill O'C.

TO: Harold R. Tyler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/26/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

SUBJECT: Interpretation of "Demand",
28 C.F.R., § 16.21, et. seq. - Action Memorandum

The meaning of "demand" is not indicated, beyond subpoena, in the C.F.R. sections indicated. This omission creates a need for an interpretation, for purposes of uniform Department of Justice reaction.

Outlines for inquiry proceedings were agreed upon between the White House and the Senate Select Committee on June 13, 1975, and a copy of those procedures was furnished to the Department on June 16, 1975. Under those guidelines, there is a general undertaking by the Committee to identify witnesses to the Agency a reasonable time before the interviews occur. This general rule includes current and former employees; certain exceptions (not clearly defined) are indicated in the guidelines. The Committee is required to provide the witness with a copy of the procedures, and "relevant waivers of secrecy oaths or agreements for the purpose of this inquiry". The Committee is required to give prior notice of an interview, generally, specifying: (a) subject area; (b) periods of employment; (c) the date set for the interview.

Since these structured procedures, taken with the rules of the Subcommittee, may create a requirement of testimony upon witnesses, it seems to me clear that the paragraphs of 28 C.F.R., § 16.21, et. seq., which refer to "demand" should be interpreted to include any request by any Committee staff member to interview any employee, former employee or other person connected with the Department of Justice.

This interpretation requires certain action: (1) that the witness be authorized to speak under § 16.23 by an appropriate Department Official; and, (2) that an appropriate Department Official be designated I would think that the appropriate Department Official for the FBI shou be the Director of the FBI or the FBI General Counsel, in coordination with this office.

358-3

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-403

As a matter of current practice, the FBI and other components of the Department are presently coordinating with me on agreements for disclosure under § 16.23, as a system for ensuring that they are receiving treatment consistent with the outlines of inquiry procedure and the agreements between the Committee and the Department.

If you approve, I will advise the involved components of the Department of Justice that the word "demand" will be interpreted as indicated for each witness.

__________ Approve

__________ Disapprove

__________ Let's Discuss

JUL 9 1975

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Mr. John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Senstudy-75

Dear Mr. Elliff:

Your letter of July 8, 1975, requesting, in a four page addendum, additional materials for the Senate Select Committee's inquiry, has been received. I have today referred it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a request for the assembly of appropriate documentary responses.

Your letter contains a reference, in paragraph 2, to "the agreement to come forward...". I feel that it is important for me to remind you that this "agreement to come forward..." was the subject of a discussion between us on July 2, 1975, at which time I informed you that the Attorney General was considering a reply to the reference to such "agreement to come forward..." set forth in the letter of June 27, 1975, by the Senate Select Committee.

It is our continued intention to be cooperative with the Senate Select Committee, and we will, of course, move as expeditiously as possible to prepare documents responsive to the requests of the Committee. However, as I advised you on July 2, the FBI follows, quite properly, a careful clearance procedure as to intelligence materials which are to be assembled for transmission to the Committee, or for Committee access. This clearance procedure takes time, and requires the undivided attention of Senior Bureau Executives. These Executives are working at full capacity in attempts to meet the existing requests from the Committee and to carry out their other duties at the same time. As you have suggested, in your letter of July 8, your

bcc: ✓John Mintz

REC-88 62-116395-402

3 JUL 22 1975

file
62-116395

four page additional request will be so handled as to impose no more delay on the previously requested items than is inevitable. The request will be accorded an appropriate priority to ensure that responsive items are supplied as they become ready for transmission to the Senate Select Committee.

Sincerely,

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a letter to the Attorney General from Chairman Frank Church and Vice Chairman John Tower, Senate Select Committee dated July 9, 1975, with a copy to Mr. Kelley, responding to the Director's letter of July 7, 1975, which requested a meeting to discuss materials pertaining to the FBI compiled by the Rockefeller Commission in the possession of the Committee.

The Chairman has invited the Attorney General and Director to meet with the Committee in executive session during the week of July 14, 1975. The purpose is to discuss matters relating to the Rockefeller Commission report and the status of certain requests for documents. The letter expresses a concern about the failure of the Justice Department and FBI to report fully to the Committee requests. Thus, we should be prepared to discuss in detail each of the requests received to date from the Committee and their dispositions.

Inspector John B. Hotis and Special Agent Paul V. Daly have been asked to attend a meeting with the Deputy Attorney General on Thursday, July 10, 1975, at 11:30 a.m. to discuss this matter.

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

REC-88

62-116395-401

1-Mr. Adams - Enclosure
1-Mr. Wannall - Enclosure
1-Mr. Cregar - Enclosure
1-Mrs. Metcalf - Enclosure
1-Mr. Mintz - Enclosure
1-Mr. Daly - Enclosure
1-Mr. Hotis - Enclosure

3 JUL 22 1975

JBH:lgp
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

5-W06

84 JUL 23 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Intelligence Division review all requests made by the Senate Select Committee for the production of documents or other information concerning the Bureau and prepare a detailed report showing the status of those requests.

Done
WOG

2. The Intelligence Division should also insure the appropriate materials are prepared for the Director regarding sensitive materials compiled for the Rockefeller Commission which are in possession of the Committee.

Done
WOG

WRW

PLM

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRM[illegible]
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAI[illegible]

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 9, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

We have received a letter from Clarence M. Kelley, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated July 7, 1975, requesting to meet with us for a discussion of certain materials pertaining to the FBI which were compiled by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States and may now be in the possession of the Select Committee. The Committee welcomes this opportunity for discussion with Mr. Kelley of these and other matters of concern both to the FBI and to the Committee. Our reply to Mr. Kelley is addressed to you because we believe it is essential that you participate in this meeting in order to arrive at a mutual understanding among the Justice Department, the FBI, and the Committee.

Prompt discussion is especially important because of the Committee's concern about the status of certain requests for documents. On May 14, 1975, the Committee wrote to you requesting documents pertaining to a number of areas of inquiry. The status of the May 14 request was considered by the full Committee on July 8, 1975. The Committee's review of the responses to this request indicates that, although certain documents have been supplied, others in areas of the most vital concern to the Committee are still outstanding. A summary of the outstanding items from the May 14 request is attached.

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

62-116395-401
ENCLOSURE

As has already been made clear to members of your staff, the failure of the Justice Department and the FBI to respond fully to the Committee's request has severely hampered our investigative work. Since the Committee is now receiving excellent cooperation from the White House and other agencies on highly sensitive matters, and indeed from the Justice Department and the FBI on assassination matters, we are at a loss to understand what special difficulties are presented by the May 14 request.

The Committee has concluded that these issues cannot adequately be resolved by further staff discussions and, accordingly, that the only responsible way to proceed is for the Committee itself to take up the problem with you and the Director of the FBI. Therefore, we are pleased that FBI Director Kelley's request for a meeting gives us an opportunity to invite you and Mr. Kelley to appear before the Committee in executive session during the week of July 14, 1975. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the matters of concern to Mr. Kelley and the steps which might be taken to expedite response to requests for documents essential to the Committee's inquiry.

The members of the Committee look forward to this meeting as a way to resolve issues of common concern in a spirit of comity between the Executive and Legislative Branches.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
John Tower
Vice Chairman

cc: The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley

Outstanding FBI Documents

On May 14, 1975, the Select Committee advised the Attorney General and the FBI of its request for certain documents which the Committee believed were necessary to begin an effective investigation of FBI intelligence activities. The following is a review of the responses of the Justice Department and the FBI to this request as of July 8, 1975. The topics in this outline are based on the case studies included in the notifications submitted to the Attorney General and the FBI on June 27, 1975. (The numerous additional requests addressed to the Attorney General and the FBI since May 14, 1975, are not included in this summary.)

A. Electronic Surveillance

1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance

Outstanding

a. All memoranda and other materials relating to maintenance and operation of the so-called "ELSUR" electronic surveillance index. (D.1.)*

b. Committee staff access to a list of all warrantless electronic surveillances, identified by subject and target, which were instituted or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request of, the FBI from January 1, 1960, until the present. (D.1.)

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

---

* Item as designated in request of May 14, 1975.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-101

Partial Response

c. All memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use the following techniques to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence activities: all forms of electronic surveillance, including consensual electronic surveillance. (A.5.a.) (A selection of memoranda compiled in a notebook has been supplied by the Justice Department. It does not include internal FBI documents. The staff has specifically requested additional documents from the Justice Department's policy file on interception of communications; these have not been provided. The staff also believes there are FBI internal documents which should have been provided.)

d. For all forms of electronic surveillance, including consensual electronic surveillance, all memoranda and other materials relating to:

   (1) The original decision to utilize the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

   (2) The policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. (B.4.)

   (Letters from the Attorney General dated June 24 and 25, 1975, have supplied some information on current Justice Department procedures for warrantless electronic surveillance. Substantial additional information on decisions, policies, and procedures is essential.)

Full Response

e. FBI "Manual for the Conduct of Electronic Surveillance". (D.1) (This manual only deals with court-ordered electronic surveillance, not with warrantless "national security" surveillance.)

f. With respect to each occasion on which the Director of the FBI testified before the House Appropriateions Committee from 1965 until the present, please provide the number of warrantless electronic surveillances in operation:

   (1) on the date of such testimony;

   (2) thirty days prior to such testimony; and

   (3) thirty days subsequent to such testimony. (D.21)

2. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and "Leaks"

Outstanding

a. With respect to all electronic surveillances of the so-called "Kissinger 17", please provice a list of all memoranda and other materials reflecting dissemination outside the FBI of information from each surveillance, stating author, addressee, and dates, together with the purpose of such dissemination. (D.6.d.) (This information is of critical importance for an evaluation of the possible misuse of electronic surveillance for partisan purposes. It has been promised but has not been supplied.)

b. All memoranda and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization and re-authorization by the Attorney General and/or the Director of the FBI for electronic surveillance of Joseph Kraft.

Partial Response

c. A list of all electronic surveillances, identified by subject and target, of the so-called "Kissinger 17". (D.4.)

d. With respect to all electronic surveillances of the so-called "Kissinger 17", please provide:

    (1) the address of the premises surveilled and the number of the telephone surveilled;

    (2) a generic description of the surveillance technique employed; and

    (3) all memoranda and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization and reauthorization by the President, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, White House officials, or National Security Council officials. (D.6.a.b.c.)

(Committee staff members have initially deferred the request for c. and d. above in view of the substantial material made public in 1974 by the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Justice Department has provided the text of its motion in a civil suit involving one of the targets.)

Full Response

e. The current office assignment or last known address of the following persons who, in 1969-1970, were employed at the Washington, D. C., office of the FBI:

    (1) Robert Kunkel

    (2) Courtland Jones

    (3) Ernest Belter

    (4) James Gaffney. (D.18.)

f. The current office assignment of last known address of the following persons who, in 1969-1970, were employed at FBI headquarters:

   (1) Joseph A. Sizoo

   (2) Michael Joseph Rozamus

   (3) Sterling Donahue

   (4) Bernard A. Wells

   (5) Robert Haynes. (D.19.)

3. Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King

Outstanding

a. A list of all electronic surveillances, identified by subject and target, which were instituted or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request of, the FBI, and which intercepted and/or monitored any conversations of Martin Luther King, Jr. at any time between January 1, 1960, and April 5, 1968. (D.5.)

b. With respect to each surveillance listed above, please provide:

   (1) the address fo the premises surveilled, and the number of the telephone surveilled;

   (2) a generic description of the surveillance technique employed;

   (3) all memoranda and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization and reauthorization by the President, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, White House officials, or National Security Council officials;

   (4) a list of all memoranda and other materials reflecting dissemination outside the FBI of information from each surveillance, stating author, address(es), and

dates, together with the purpose of such dissemination. (D.6.a.b.c.d.)

c. All records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, government travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

  (1) former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D. C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

  (2) former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964. (D.10.a.c.)

  (The FBI says these records cannot be found.)

Full Response

d. Copies of all memoranda and other materials relating to the preparation, dissemination, and/or withdrawal of all monographs concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., not to include the monographs themselves. (D.9.) (A substantial response to this request was received on July 8, 1975. Analysis of the materials may indicate the need for additional documents.)

e. The names and current office assignments or last known addresses of all FBI employees assigned to the U. S. Embassy in Rome, Italy, in 1964. (D.13.)

f. The current office assignment or last known address of Al or Alan Miller who, in 1964, was employed at the Atlanta, Georgia, office of the FBI. (D.20.)

4. Electronic Surveillance and the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964

Outstanding

a. All memoranda and other materials which:

  (1) relate to intelligence activities at or in connection with the Democratic National

Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in August 1964;

(2) relate to electronic surveillances of telephones and/or premises at 2414 Atlantic Avenue and/or the Clairidge Hotel in Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August 1964. (D.7.a.b.)

b. Committee staff access to all memoranda and other materials reflecting the identities of persons monitored, the contents of conversations monitored, and/or any information obtained from conversations monitored on the surveillances described. (D.8.)

c. All records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, government travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D.C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August 1964. (D.10.b.) (The FBI says these records cannot be found.)

d. All July and August memoranda from former Special Agent Leo T. Clark to the Assistant Special Agent in Charge or the Special Agent in Charge of the Newark, New Jersey, office of the FBI captioned "Protection of the President -- White House Inquiry". (D.15) (The FBI says these memoranda cannot be located.)

e. All memoranda and other materials containing the results of any administrative or other inquiry undertaken by the FBI as a result of and/or relating to the allegations contained in the January 26, 1975, issue of The Washington Post concerning activities of the FBI in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in August 1964. (D.16.)

Full Response

f. The current office of assignment or last known address of the following persons who, in 1964, were employed at the Newark, New Jersey, office of the FBI:

(1) Robert L. Tagg

(2) John B. Meade

(3) Billie D. Williams

(4) John J. Creamer, Jr.

(5) John J. Connolly

(6) Marjorie Ann Miermejewski

(7) Mary Ann Mass. (D.11.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.)

g. The last known address of the following former Special Agents of the FBI:

(1) Harold Linebaugh, who in 1964 was employed at FBI headquarters;

(2) Elmer Todd, who in 1964 was employed at the Washington Field Office. (D.12.a.b.)

h. SAC letter 64-11 captioned "Protection of the President" and February 28, 1964, communication from FBI headquarters to FBI field offices supplementing and/or relating to the same subject. (D.14.)

B. Surreptitious Entry

Outstanding

1. With respect to surreptitious entry, all memoranda and other materials relating to:

a. The original decision to utilize the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

b. The policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. (B.4.a.b.)

2. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966 of the investigation techniques referred to in President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973 (Presidential Dosc. 693-94). (C.1.)

Partial Response

3. All memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use the following technique: surreptitious entry. (A.5.c.) (The Justice Department has provided selected documents in a notebook primarily dealing with electronic surveillance. One or two of these mention surreptitious entry indirectly. No internal FBI documents have been provided.)

C. Mail Covers and Mail Openings

Outstanding

1. All memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use the following technique: all forms of mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail.

2. With respect to all forms of mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail, all memoranda and other materials relating to:

   a. The original decision to utilize the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

   b. The policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. (B.4.a.b.)

3. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966 of the investigative techniques referred to in President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973 (Presidential Docs. 693-94). (C.1.)

D. Other Specific Techniques

Outstanding

1. All memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use the following techniques to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence activities: all forms of physical surveillance, obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information, and incommunicado interrogation. (A.5.)

2. With respect to all forms of physical surveillance, the obtaining of bank, credit, or other personal information, and incommunicado interrogation, all memoranda and other materials relating to:

   a. The original decision to utilize the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

   b. The policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. (B.4.a.b.)

   (An initial response relating to physical surveillance was received on July 8, 1975. Analysis of the material may indicate the need for additional documents.)

E. COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities

Outstanding

1. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origin and implementation of all COINTELPRO programs, including, but not limited to, the seven

programs set out in the airtel from the FBI Director to SAC, Albany, dated April 28, 1971, entitled "Counterintelligence Programs (COINTELPROs), Internal Security - Racial Matters". (C.17.)

2. Committee staff access to a list of all FBI headquarters supervisory personnel involved in the origination, implementation, and termination of each COINTELPRO program. (C.18.)

Partial Response

3. The original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. (A.7.) (The staff has been given access to the report, but it should be supplied to the Committee. Appendices to the report evaluating origins, consequences, propriety, and legality should be supplied to the Committee with authors' names deleted.)

4. Summaries of COINTELPRO case files prepared by the FBI for the committee chaired by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen (see prepared statement of Attorney General William Saxbe before the House Judiciary Committee on November 20, 1974). (C.16.) (Committee staff members have been given access to the summaries at the Department of Justice. Substantial portions of the summaries have been excised. The Committee should be supplied with unexcised copies of the summaries for use at the Committee offices.)

5. A list of any COINTELPRO-type activities, as defined in the prepared statement of Attorney General Saxbe before the House Judiciary Committee on November 20, 1974, which were engaged in by the FBI subsequent to April 28, 1971. (C.20.) (The Justice Department and the FBI state that they have found no such domestic activities and that activities directed at foreign targets are highly sensitive. Additional information is required pertaining to certain allegations that such domestic activities have occurred and to foreign counterintelligence activities.)

Substantial Response

6. All memoranda or other materials reflecting approval or knowledge of any COINTELPRO program by any government official outside the FBI, including, but not limited to, any Attorney General, Member of Congress, or President. (C.19.) (A substantial response to this request was received on July 8, 1975. Analysis of the materials may indicate the need for additional documents.)

F. Clandestine Informant Activities

Outstanding

1. All memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use the following techniques to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence activities: informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems. (A.5.)

Partial Response

2. With respect to informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems, all memoranda and other materials relating to:

   a. The original decision to utilize the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

   b. The policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. (B.4.a.b.)

   (Committee staff members have been given access at FBI headquarters to manual sections relating to informants. These documents should be supplied to the Committee, as have other manual sections. Additional materials are required pertaining to informant problems.)

G. "Notional Organizations"

Partial Response

1. All memoranda and other materials reflecting activities of any agents, employees, or informants of the FBI in connection with:

   a. The establishment, creation, or financing of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States.

   b. The establishment, creation, or financing of:

      (1) the Red Star Cadre, or Red Star Swap Shop;

      (2) the Red Collective. (C.25.)

   (An initial response was received on July 8, 1975. It is a four-page summary memorandum. Preliminary analysis indicates that substantial original documentation is required.)

2. All memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts, or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States. (C.24.) (Only one has been provided thus far. The FBI should continue its search for further documents bearing on this matter.)

H. Joint FBI-Police Operations

Outstanding

1. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins, contents, and implementation of the June 1964 memorandum from Attorney General Robert Kennedy to President Johnson recommending new FBI procedures for gathering intelligence about the Ku Klux Klan and related activities. (B.11.) (The FBI has been advised that this request pertains to the implementation of any directives from President Johnson to the FBI regarding procedures for gathering intelligence about the Ku Klux Klan.)

Partial Response

2. The June 1964 memorandum from Attorney General Robert Kennedy to President Johnson recommending new FBI procedures for gathering intelligence about the Ku Klux Klan and related activities. (B.10.) (The Justice Department has not found this document among its records, but instead has referred the Committee to the text appearing in a book about Attorney General Kennedy.)

3. All memoranda prepared by former Special Agent James Gale relating to the FBI internal assignment of jurisdiction or responsibility with respect to matters involving the Ku Klux Klan in 1964. (B.12.) (One lengthy memorandum has been provided. The Committee staff believes this is an area where the FBI should be forthcoming as regards any related materials which may illuminate decisions made at that time on the subject of FBI intelligence activities directed at the Ku Klux Klan.)

I. The "Huston Plan"

Outstanding

1. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966 of the investigative techniques referred to in President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973 (Presidential Docs. 693-94). (C.1.)

2. A letter dated June 20, 1969, from Tom Charles Huston, staff assistant to the President, to the Director of the FBI concerning resources being targeted toward the monitoring of foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States, effectiveness of such resources, gaps in intelligence, and steps which should be taken to provide maximum coverage. (C.2.)

3. The response by the FBI to the letter set out in item 2 and all other FBI memoranda and other materials pertaining to the correspondence. (C.3.)

4. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to a request from Tom Charles Huston for an FBI investigation of the involvement of the New Mobilization Committee in violent demonstrations in November 1969. (C.5.)

5. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to FBI policies, practices, and procedures for liaison with the CIA from 1960 to May 1970. (C.6.)

6. All memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to:

    a. efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and

    b. inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then-president of the University of Colorado. (C.7.)

7. All memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. (C.8.)

8. All memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations or communications, during 1970, between agents of the FBI and the FBI Director on the subject of liaison or contact between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency, including, but not limited to, all memoranda and other materials written by former Special Agent Sam Papich. (C.9.)

9. All memoranda and other materials prepared or compiled by FBI personnel assigned to the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) working group from June 5, 1970, to June 25, 1970.

10. Letter from FBI Director Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell dated July 27, 1970, regarding the "Huston Plan". (C.12.)

11. All memoranda or other materials pertaining to meetings or conversations between FBI Director Hoover and Attorney General Mitchell from July 23, 1970, through July 28, 1970, concerning the "Huston Plan". (C.13.)

12. The Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), dated June 1970. (A.6.)

Substantial Response

13. The interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances, dated April 1, 1969, and all memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins and implementation of that Plan. (C.4.) (Substantial materials have been supplied, but additional documents bearing on origins and implementation are requested.)

14. All memoranda or other materials relating to the elimination of the Liaison Section of the FBI Intelligence Division in 1970 and relating to the re-establishment of the Liaison Section in late 1972 or early 1973. (C.10.) (Substantial materials have been supplied. However, this is an area where the FBI should be more forthcoming as regards the current functions of the Liaison Section.)

15. All memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. (C.14.)

J. Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI

Outstanding

1. An itemized description of the contents of each file folder in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files of the FBI (see testimony of Attorney General Levi before the House Judiciary Committee, February 27, 1975). (C.21.)

2. All memoranda and other materials contained in the "Official and Confidential" files pertaining to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities, including, but not limited to, the following documents mentioned by the Attorney General:

    a. "Policy Matters" -- "Presidential directives regarding the role of the FBI in the security field; conversations between Mr. Hoover and a President-elect regarding the role of the FBI in his forthcoming Administration; letters to and from the White House regarding expansion of FBI legal attache posts abroad".

    b. "Administrative Matters" -- "Memoranda regarding an Attorney General's decision with respect to supervision of the FBI by an Assistant Attorney General; a memorandum concerning the briefing of the President by Mr. Hoover and the Attorney General with respect to certain intelligence activities by hostile nations within the United States".

    c. "Reference Material" -- "A compilation of data concerning the 1964 riots".

    d. "Protection of sources or sensitive information" -- "Materials on FBI counterintelligence activities; technical devices and techniques; the telephone surveillance involving sensitive coverage in the national security area". (C.22.)

3. All memoranda, files, or other materials, including inspection reports or related surveys, which pertain to the following statement by Attorney General Levi in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, February 27, 1975:

    ". . . In order to consider what measures may be appropriate, we have endeavored to characterize the types of abuse to which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past.

a. "Use of the resources of the FBI to gather political intelligence. Our review disclosed a few documented instances in which the Bureau at times during the course of an election campaign was requested to provide -- and did indeed provide -- information which could be used as political intelligence information. In one instance, this involved a check of FBI files on the staff of a campaign opponent.

b. "Improper use of the FBI in connection with the political process. In a few instances recorded in Bureau files, an incumbent President caused the FBI to gather intelligence relating to a political convention under circumstances that although cast in legitimate law enforcement terms could-- and some would say should -- have been suspected of being politically motivated.

c. "Use of the FBI to report on certain activities of critics of an Administration's policies. The FBI files document a few instances in which an incumbent President caused the Bureau to report on certain activities of Members of Congress who were opposed to and critical of his policies.

d. "Use of information in the FBI files to respond to or discredit critics. Again, the Bureau files document a very small number of instances in which derogatory information legitimately obtained by the Bureau was disseminated to other members of the Executive Branch to enable them to discredit their critics.

e. "Use of the FBI in connection with other legitimate law enforcement activities. There was one documented instance where the FBI was used to conduct an inquiry for what might be described as political purposes, relating to an investigation properly conducted by other Executive Branch officials." (C.23.)

4. Response to the letter from the Chairman to the Attorney General dated April 28, 1975, regarding the so-called "Official and Confidential" files. (A.9.) (The Justice Department's answer has not been responsive. With respect to any so-called "secret files" maintained within the FBI, including the "official and confidential" and "personal and confidential" files maintained by the executive assistant to the FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on his behalf until the time of his death, the Committee seeks to establish the contents of such files, the circumstances surrounding the transfer of a portion of such files within the Bureau at the time of Director Hoover's death, the transfer of a portion of such files to Mr. Hoover's residence, the destruction of any such files, the transfer of any such files from Mr. Hoover's residence, the use of information within such files, and their relationship to the official investigative files of the FBI. The Committee desires all information bearing on these matters, including the results of any inquiries conducted within the FBI and the Department of Justice.)

Partial Response

5. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins, implementation, and termination of Project INLET involving preparation of an Intelligence Letter for the President. (C.29.) (Documents have been supplied with regard to the origins and termination of the Project. However, the Committee should be provided with the INLET letters so that it may have sufficient information on implementation.)

Full Response

6. The current office assignment or last known address of the following persons who in 1970 were employed at the Portland, Oregon, office of the FBI:

   a. Leo B. App

   b. Edgar O. Ingles, Jr. (C.30.)

Areas of General Inquiry

In addition to the case studies outlined above, the Committee is examining certain general areas relating to the legal authority, organization, and procedures for FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The FBI has provided a considerable amount of information to the Committee staff on its regular procedures. However, there has been no response to a number of requests for documents on specific matters identified in the May 14, 1975, request.

Outstanding

1. Committee staff access to annual inspection reports and related surveys for the past ten years with respect to the following FBI field offices: New York City; Chicago; San Francisco; Los Angeles; San Diego; Sacramento; Springfield, Illinois; Buffalo; Atlanta; and Columbia, South Carolina. (B.5.) (The Committee staff has limited this request initially to the San Francisco field office.)

2. The annual inspection reports and related surveys for the past ten years pertaining to the FBI Intelligence Division. (B.6.) (The Committee staff has limited this request initially to the two reports prepared in 1971.)

3. All memoranda and other materials reflecting meetings and contacts between the President and the Director of the FBI during 1971 on the subject of "legal attaches". (B.13.)

4. All memoranda and other materials reflecting meetings and contacts during 1971 between officials of the FBI and officials of the Department of State on the subject of "legal attaches". (B.14.)

5. Committee staff access to the following indices for the period 1960 to the present:

   a. "agitator" index;

   b. "rabble rouser" index;

   c. "key activist" list;

d. list of "action groups";

e. "security" index;

f. "administrative" index;

g. all similar indices, lists, or computer printouts. (B.16.)

6. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origin, implementation, operation, or termination of any of the indices set out in item 5 above. (B.17.)

7. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins and conduct of the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic in 1965. (C.28.)

FBI

[illegible]

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2613
29 July 1975

[illegible] 75

7/31/75

Rec'd from Cia

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

#MOR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-22-00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

D

JFK(1)(B)

[Harriett Mowitt] for
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment

REC-88 62-116395-469

9 AUG 5 1975

1 ENCLOSURE

treat as original

100-Div 9

62-116395

5-8

84 AUG 5 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

29 JUL 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
B[illegible]der, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara	*	B 6/26	12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Betts, Richard K.	*	B 7/1	8-15-47	Pa.	016-38-2619	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Bloomfield, Susan	*	B 7/14	12-23-51	Ohio	256-92-0341	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Brown, Maxine	*	B 6/26	8-8-28	Ida.	568-40-3123	

62-116395-469

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/22/00 BY SP2 ALM/Z16
#mde16

29 JUL 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Bushong, David	*	B 71/4	8-10-47	Ohio	289-40-1203	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
[illegible]esnick, Barbara	*	B 7/14	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
Culbreth, Elizabeth	*	B 7/2	6-23-42	NC	240-64-9040	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17(Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Dawson, Thomas	*	B 6/26	9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeMarco, James	*	B 6/26	3-12-43	W. Va.	286-36-9097	
Dennin, Joseph Francis	*	B 6/23	6-9-43	NY	567-62-5353	
DeOreo, Mary	*	B 6/26	6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
[illegible]Genova, Joseph E.	*	B 6/26	2-22-45	Del.	222-28-5430	
Dick, James	*	B 6/26	7-25-47	Mass.	029-36-6745	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel	*	B 7/14	8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor	*	B 6/26	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
Erno, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	

29 JUL 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	 Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Ford, Harold	*	B 6/26	3-23-21	Cal.	550-16-4630	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
Grant, Bruce	*	B 7/2	6-16-16	Neb.	507-20-1311	
Greissing, Edward	*	B 7/14	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF Badge
Iverson, Portia	*	B 7/14	10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	
Jefferson, Arthur M.	*	B 6/26	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
K[illegible]ralekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kayden, Jeffrey	*	B 7/14	3-22-51	NY	065-40-7277	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge
Kirchheimer, Joseph			6-3-17	Ill.	359-03-7843	

29 JUL 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Koppal, Diane	*	B 6/26	6-24-48	NC	219-48-0018	
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mascioli, Cynthia	*	B 6/26	1-4-51	NY	112-44-7636	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mayo, Betty	*	B 6/26	2-13-22	Ohio	277-14-4062	
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	

29 JUL 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
Murphy, Michael	*		10-13-54	Tex.	231-86-8829	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan	*	B 6/26	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.	*	B 6/26	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Postal, Andrew	*	B 7/23	5-11-48	NY	128-40-4695	
Pyle, Christopher	*	B 6/26	11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Ralston, Theodore	*	B 7/23	8-25-48	Wash.	538-48-4673	
Rhea, Gordon	*	B 6/26	3-10-45	Va.	412-74-7901	
R[illegible]ard, Eric	*	B 7/10	12-27-49	NY	128-40-7430	
Ricks, Walter	*	B 6/26	12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester	*	B 6/26	7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	29 JUL 1975
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.	*	B 6/26	3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha	*	B 6/26	9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Turner, James	*	B 7/14	6-29-53	Cal.	215-64-7255	
Tschirgi, James	*	B 6/26	2-23-25	Wyo.	520-16-7290	
Vance, James	*	B 7/23	4-6-36	Ohio	078-28-3950	
Wallach, Paul	*	B 6/26	5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

29 JUL 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
White, William	*	B 7/10	8-8-39	Pa.	168-30-9147	
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

File

cc USSS -

23 JUN 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) for National Democratic (10-14 July 1972) and National Republican (21-24 August 1972) Conventions

1. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive Director/Comptroller.

2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.S. Secret Service for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions is contained in a memorandum of 7 April 1972 from Chief, CI Staff to the DCI which was concurred in by the ADDP and approved by the DCI on 10 April 1972 (copy attached).

JFK (1)(B)

3. On 13 April 1972 the [COS, WH/Miami] met with the Miami USSS representative and Mr. Mastrovito of USSS Headquarters to discuss preliminary planning for [Station WH/Miami] support to the USSS prior to and during subject conventions. On 17 April 1972 the [C/WH/COG and C/CI/LSN] met with Mr. Mastrovito at Headquarters to implement the preliminary planning agreed upon in Miami and to determine the extent of Headquarters support required by the USSS. JFK (1)(B) JFK (1)(B)

4. The basic agreement mutually concurred in by the USSS and Headquarters representatives provided that:

JFK (1)(B) a. [Station WH/Miami] would conduct name traces on all Cubans of interest to the USSS.

b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.

c. CIA would keep the USSS informed of any events in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that would have any bearing on the USSS protective mission during the convention periods. This would include briefings on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States and on activities of Cuban intelligence operations which could affect the security of the conventions.

d. Coverage of Latin American exile groups in the United States would be the responsibility of the FBI since CIA had ceased the extensive coverage formerly targeted against these groups since it was now considered an internal security function.

JFK (1)(B) 5. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffer office of [Station WH/Miami] with the USSS Chief of Communications, Station personnel and a Headquarters representative. It was agreed that name traces would be handled by Miami security field office courier from the USSS to buffer office until the USSS established communications links from their command post in convention center, at which time trace requests would be sent from the command post to USSS headquarters and relayed to CIA Headquarters. Cuban name traces are relayed to [Station WH/Miami] JFK (1)(B) by the Signal Center and non-Cuban traces are conducted [by WH/COG.] JFK (1)(B) Replies to USSS requests on non-Cubans are coordinated with [CI/SO.] JFK (1)(B)

JFK (1)(B) 6. [Station WH/Miami] has arranged the rental of a safehouse [about five minutes from convention center] which will provide a secure and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency personnel. This safehouse will be available just prior to and during both conventions. A Headquarters officer will TDY [to Miami] JFK (1)(B) prior to the conventions and remain until the conventions adjourn to assist the Station in providing the support described in paragraph four above.

JFK (1)(B)

7. [Station WH/Miami] is in daily contact with the USSS in Miami, utilizing buffer office as a meeting site when necessary. The location of [Station WH/Miami] has not been revealed to the USSS. (Station is located some distance from buffer office.) JFK (1)(B) Additionally, the [Miami Security Field Office] maintains normal liaison with the local USSS Miami unit. JFK (1)(B)

8. The Station understands that no personnel will be present at the convention hall, that they will not provide any equipment unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any other facilities other than the safehouse described in paragraph six.

SECRET

May 1973

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities

You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972, I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI. These funds may still be possibly held in a special account for that use. This is one of the areas where TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would have the details as this was handled through the Executive Director's office and of course Angleton would have additional information.

Signed
[illegible]

Chief
Missions and Programs Staff

67

E2 IMPDET CL BY 357737

EYES ONLY
SECRET

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Areas of Possible Embarrassment to the Agency

1. Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.

2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the Agency on this subject:

a. Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director Helms.

b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI, General Cushman (see attached telephone conversation). Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and

c. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.

3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since it gives the flavor of White House concern. It took several days to uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involvement of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity. The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this subject died down and we did not pursue it further.

4. Please return the attachments when they have served your purpose.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 054517

SECRET

5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff prepared by [Richard Ober.] The original meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr. Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and it is always possible that he might draw in the Agency. JFK (1)(B)

6. Before appointing [Ober] JFK(1)(B) to the IES Staff as the Agency representative, I had attended various inter-agency meetings presided over by Mardian. I expressed the view to Director Helms that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inexperience. Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. On a confidential basis one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from the Bureau.

for [ ] JFK (1)(B)
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachments (5)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group Activities JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B) JFK(1)(B)

1. Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group (CI/PG) is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations for activities and programs involving assistance to foreign police/security forces for the purpose of exploiting such activities and programs for intelligence purposes. JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B)

2. CI/PG maintains liaison with the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development (OPS/AID) and its training facility, the International Police Academy (IPA). JFK(1)(B) CI/PG also administers and supervises Project IDEN-171 and its training proprietary facility, IDEN-172. IDEN-168 In addition, CI/PG coordinates a joint OPS/AID Technical Services Division, Central Intelligence Agency (TSD/CIA) Technical Investigations Course. JFK(1)(B) JFK(1)(B) CI/PG provides guidance and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters pertaining JFK(1)(B) to police/security functions and activities. Specific details of these functions are as follows:

LIAISON WITH OPS/AID

JFK(1)(B) CI/PG liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a daily basis and consists principally of:

A. exchange of information on IPA participants, some of whom later attend IDEN-172 courses and who are of interest to Agency components,

B. arranging for inclusion of Agency sponsored participants in IPA/OPS/AID training programs,

C. arranging for IPA/OPS/AID briefings and tours for foreign police/security representatives sponsored by CIA Area Divisions, JFK(1)(B)

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

D. obtaining biographic and assessment data on IPA/OPS/AID trainees,

E. providing general information pertaining to police/security organizations, activities, equipment, and personalities requested by Agency operating components,

F. coordinating the Agency's participation in the Technical Investigations Course designed to familiarize the trainees with the technique required to properly investigate terrorist activities wherein explosives have been utilized, JFK (1)(B)

G. obtaining OPS/AID cover for CIA personnel to serve abroad. At one time as many as 50 CIA employees were covered in Latin America, the Far East and Africa. This total has been reduced during the past several years to 10 serving in Thailand, * JFK (1)(B)

H. arranging contact between Desk officers and OPS/AID sponsored participants.

PROJECT IDEN-171 - PROPRIETARY IDEN-172 - training function of IDEN-168

IDEN-172 Training Academy is a commercial interprise. It was incorporated under the laws of the State of Maryland in 1952 and conducts its business in the District of Colombia. It is engaged principally in training foreign police/security personnel under an overt contract with OPS/AID, and selling police/security equipment to foreign police/security personnel and organizations. IDEN-172 also provides special training programs and briefings to foreign police/security personnel of interest to Agency operating divisions. It provides biographic and assessment data on trainees to country desks. Recently IDEN-172 has acquired the capability of providing training to foreign police/security personnel in VIP protective security for Chiefs of State.

Sells police equip. O'seas consult. service

JFK (1)(B)

JFK (1)(B)

* CIA personnel under this cover will not be replaced as such and all will be phased out by June 1974. JFK (1)(B)

COMMENT

CI[PG does not maintain direct contact or liaison with any law enforcement organization, local or federal, at home or abroad.] When the need arises, such contact is sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or IDEN-172 [without divulging Agency interest.] OPS/AID has such contacts at home and abroad because of the nature of its activities (training of foreign police/security personnel at home and abroad), and its Public Safety programs around the world. IDEN-172 has such contacts at home - local and federal level - because its personnel are personally acquainted with law enforcement officers throughout the United States. Members of the IDEN-172 staff (not identified as CIA) have appeared as guest lecturers at such federal institutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division.

JFK (1)(B)
JFK(1)(B)
JFK(1)(B)
JFK(1)(B)

3. In addition to the liaison mentioned in the previous paragraph, [the Agency maintains liaison in varying degrees with foreign police/security organizations through its field stations.] The existence and extent thereof, however, is a decision to be made by the Area Division, and is not the responsibility of CI/PG. JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B)

4. The CIA station as a member of the Country Team in Montevideo, Uruguay, may have had some contact with Dan Mitrione, who was murdered by the Tupamaros. Dan Mitrione, an experienced and respected law enforcement officer, was a bona fide OPS/AID officer assigned to the AID mission in Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or agent.

JFK(1)(B)

[ ] JFK(1)(B)
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

SECRET

May 73

SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program

1. The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the Arab fedayeen.

2. The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conducting efforts domestically for internal domestic collection purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented activity in the United States has been of two types:

a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel abroad in connection with their extremist activity and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters officers. The briefing has included appropriate operational guidance, including defensive advice.

b. Americans with existing extremist credentials have been assessed, recruited, tested and dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract agents, primarily sources offered for such use by the FBI. When abroad they collect information responsive to MHCHAOS program requirements, as well as other Agency requirements. They are thus used primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Communists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their background and their particular access permits. It should be noted that the MPTROIKA aspect of the MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.

.S. citizens
[illegible]
[illegible]

3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign program, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity described above. The program is and has been managed so as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E-2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

CORPORATE COVER

JFK (1)(B)

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover of bona fide U.S. companies abroad and in the U.S. This process involves the selection of companies; research on their locations and key personnel; clearances; contacts with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency; arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the companies, including letters of understanding; funding of salaries, allowances and expenses; and, continuous monitoring of each integrated case throughout the course of the cover use. The overall objective is to match the individual being placed, the company, and the location, in a manner that will ensure achievement of the Agency purpose and protection of the company integrity.

2. Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover is provided by 140 companies; 179 integrees are located in 47 foreign countries and 12 are located in the United States. To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel are researching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companies at any given time.

3. To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating company, and to preserve the Agency's operational equity in the event of exposure of an individual under cover, it has been established policy that no more than two individuals would be furnished cover by the same company. At the present time this ratio is confined to approximately 25% of the total number of companies now being used and efforts are underway to effect further reductions toward the goal of one individual per company.

4. In addition to the primary corporate cover function described in paragraph 1. above, CCS maintains continuing contact with two U.S. car rental firms and two U.S. credit card firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit cards in alias for operational use in the United States and abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being used by 34 individuals.

JFK (1)(4)

[illegible]

DEVISED FACILITIES COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 backstopped notional facilities which were created to provide cover for Agency personnel in the United States and abroad and to provide an attributable source for Agency funds used in operations and requiring concealment of Agency or U.S. Government interest. The facilities comprise 43 corporations providing personal status cover, payrolling and tax attribution sources, and other miscellaneous support such as title to property, funding, etc.; 61 sole-proprietorships providing status and operational cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207 non-registered companies providing support for high risk operational requirements, agents abroad, corporate reimbursements, and proprietary funding.

2. 224 Agency personnel engaged in operational activities are payrolled by the facilities, an essential procedure permitting the reporting of Agency salaries without documenting the Agency as the source.

JFK (1)(B)

3. The facilities provide a capability for passing Agency funds to 30 Agency proprietaries and 97 bona fide companies on a continuing basis. 225 bank accounts located in 36 banks throughout the United States provide the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.

JFK(1)(A)

005[illegible]

[illegible]T CL BY [illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL Wal

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

DATE: July 24, 1975

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman
1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JFK(6)

My memorandum dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 190 pages [illegible] extracted from a 693-page document prepared by CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities cited in this document include references to Bureau operations of an extremely sensitive nature, and it was also noted that the Senate Select Committee has had access to this document. It was recommended that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation is involved.

This is to advise that the following pages from the document were furnished to the following Divisions and/or Sections of the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any:

General Investigative Division - Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, 155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180, 181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354

Laboratory Division - Pages 65-67, 113, 118, 119, 182, 202, 221, 222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248 were furnished for information purposes as these pages contained information concerning techniques used and/or developed by CIA which may be of interest). JFK(b)(6)

Intelligence Division
Section CI-1
Pages 23, 24, 28, 29, 70, 72, 73, 77, 136, 140-142, 298, 329, 582, 615, and 628.

REC-88

62-116395-441

3 JUL 31 1975

62-116395

TJM:ekw (12)
ekw

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUL 31 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

Section CI-2
Pages 30 and 329

Section CI-3
Pages 26, 59-61, 282, 290, 292, 295, 310, 334, 361-363, 368, 371, 373, 376-379, 384, 385, 458, 468-470, 591-593, and 615.

Section IS-1
Pages 188, 189, 283, 330

Section IS-2
Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203, 330, and 482.

Section IS-3
Pages 521 and 549

Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the Senstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75.

ACTION: None. You will be advised of results of above requested assessment.

JFK
(1)(b)

Existence of the 693-page [CIA] document and the information contained therein should be closely guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know basis.

TJM

[PROJECT ~~MOCKINGBIRD~~]

[Project ~~Mockingbird~~] a telephone intercept activity, was conducted between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.

JFK(1A)

Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections were established with the assistance of a telephone company official who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy), the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel. (Mr. Lawrence Houston).

JFK(1B)

The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying contacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members, of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span of the activity precluded positive identification. It was observed that through these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

JFK(1B)

Since the termination of [Project ~~Mockingbird~~,] those materials related to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access of two Office of Security professionals.

62-116395-475 00022

ENCLOSURE

SECRET EYES ONLY

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Soviet Defector

JFK(1)(A)

A Soviet defector, defected to a representative of this Agency in 1964. The responsibility for his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country After initial interrogation by representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safehouse in Maryland, where he was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when he was moved to a specially constructed "jail" in a remote wooded area at ~~ISOLATION~~. The SR Division was convinced that he was a dispatched agent but even after a long period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their contention and he was confined at ~~ISOLATION~~ in an effort to convince him to "confess."

JFK(1)(C)

This Office together with the Office of General Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality of the Agency's position in handling a defector under these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms) by this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 1967, the responsibility for his further handling was transferred to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.

JFK(1)(A)

The Soviet defector was moved to a comfortable safehouse in the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly, sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr. Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent that the Soviet defector was bona fide and he was moved to more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom of independent movement and has continued to cooperate fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Office since that time. He has proven to be the most

JFK (1)(A)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 000988

JFK (1)(A)

SECRET

EYES ONLY

valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were explored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution of Soviet recruited agents -in several countries throughout the world. He currently is living under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife and remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed, and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states "while I regret my years of incarceration, I have no bitterness and now understand how it could happen."

I. SURVEILLANCES

A. ~~SIESTA~~

JFK(1)(A)

During the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May, and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of Miss Deborah Fitzgerald, a former staff employee, and Orlando Toro Nunez, a Cuban national with whom Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emotionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from employees information in Information Processing Division files, and that employees were visiting a photographic studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance, one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez was aborted because of a door lock problem.

B. ~~PARAGON~~

JFK(1)(B)

Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69 and her associates at various times from May to September 1971. Iden 69 , an acknowledged Latin American revolutionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and had given information regarding a plot to assassinate or kidnap ~~Vice President~~ Agnew and the ~~DCI~~. [Surveillances] included coverage of the activities of Iden 69 during two visits to the United States, technical coverage of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives in New York City, and surveillance, including mail coverage, of several American citizens alleged to be part of the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.

C. ~~CELOTEX I~~

JFK(1)(C)

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted of Iden 180 of the Washington Post during

JFK(1)(D)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 000988

the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971 and on 3 January 1972. In addition to physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be maintained of the building housing his office. The surveillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources of classified information of interest to the Agency which had appeared in a number of his columns.

D. MUDHEN

At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was conducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear, from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for highly classified Agency information appearing in his syndicated columns.

E. ~~BUTANE~~

JFK(1)(B)

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to 20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was to determine his activities and contacts both with Agency employees and other individuals in regard to his proposed book and published magazine articles exposing Agency operations.

II. POLICE SUPPORT

JFK (1)(C)

A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions, the Intelligence Division of the Metropo~~litan~~ Police Department was provided a communications system to monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the ~~Washi~~ngton area. This system consisted of a radio receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency Field Office equipped with radio receivers and transmitters and manned by two Agency employees, as well as a representative of the Intelligence Division, ~~Metropolitan~~ Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that the communications over this system were monitored at the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of possible actions by the dissidents against Agency installations.

B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several items of positive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the ~~Metropolitan~~ Police Department, Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department, Montgomer~~y County, Maryland,~~ Police Department, ~~New York City Pol~~ice Department, and the ~~San Francisco, Californi~~a, Police Department.

III. GENERAL SUPPORT

JFK(1C)

A. ~~SRPOINTER~~

Since 1953, this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. This operation included not only the photographing of envelopes but also surreptitious opening and photographing of selected items of mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of internal security interest which was disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether the operation will be continued or abolished.

JFK(1C)

B. ~~AELADLE~~

For several years the Office of Security has provided support to a Russian defector of interest to the CI Staff. This support has consisted of numerous things, including documentation for a change of identity on three occasions.

JFK(1C)

C. ~~REDFACE I~~

In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occupied by a former defector working under contract for the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and

JFK (1C)

sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering a safe within the vault. The purpose of the operation was to determine whether the individual had any unauthorized classified information in his possession.

D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

JFK(1)(B)

In January 1971, the Director approved a request from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of Security operating in Falls Church, Virginia. Support includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph, medical clearance, and training. It has been divided into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place individuals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal activities of other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3) Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD. In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reimbursable basis.

E. KITTENS PROJECT

JFK(1)(A)

As a result of a request from the Department of State, approved by the DCI, this office has, since October 1972, provided protection on a 24-hour basis to two sons of a foreign leader who are attending school in the United States. This support includes the financing of the protection and the detail to the Department of State of six armed Agents of this office who are documented as State Department Office of Security employees.

F. ~~MERRIMAC~~

JFK(1)(B)

From February 1967 to November 1971, an Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring

JFK(1)(C)

dissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents so successfully penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during this period, the Office of Security field offices were tasked with collecting available intelligence on dissident groups. All such information was included in a periodic report distributed to appropriate parts of the Agency and to certain outside Government agencies.

G. F. ~~ANTLERS~~

JFK(1)(C)

Several months ago, at the request of CI Staff, and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this office arranged to move a sensitive defector out of a European country via commercial transportation and gain entry into the United States without leaving any trace of his true identity.

11 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey

1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current interest.

2. The principal object of Security's interest through this informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at the time of her resignation.

3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also subsequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.

4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.

5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive, but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-Castro organizations [illegible] this country. There are al[illegible] reports that his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.

6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the principal informant.

7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent contact with her friend, the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees except social contacts.

JFK(1)(C)

8. [The Office of Security has been running this operation for over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelligence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take responsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security.] As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the actions it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of compromising the operation.]

9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed the course of watchful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues

to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he continues to see them[illegible]ocially. Thus, there is sli[illegible]eason to believe that further waiting will produce a break in the case.

10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now. It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's operation.

11. One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly. The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing information on [CIA's Soviet operations] is too great to warrant further delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban has current productive penetrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any possible gains from continuing this CI effort.

JFK(1)(A)

John O. Lawrence

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services

SUBJECT : Press Allegations re Use of Agency Polygraph

1. This memorandum is for your information only and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier today.

2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on American proposals relative to the SALT talks in The New York Times over the by-line of Iden 181. It was devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized disclosure of classified information and directed a sweeping investigation within the United States Government to determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehrlichman, Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.

JFK(1)(C)

3. On the basis of investigations conducted by State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--one individual in the Department of Defense and three individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect in the Department of Defense.

4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time in matters involving the national security the Agency had detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State Security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for his use in polygraphing State Department employees who were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty. I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's approval and that State clearly understood that the examination was their total responsibility. I further informed him that this was the only way we could undertake to entertain his request and that even then it would require the specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with Mr. Gentile.

5. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile and inquired as to whether the arrangements had been made. Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect. Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph examination.

6. The four individuals were Iden 182 of the Department of Defense and Iden 183, Iden 184, and Iden 185 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering memorandum is attached.

7. Iden 186, a staff writer for The Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1971, stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a letter to The Washington Post and said that the polygraph examinations had been conducted by another agency. Speculation centered around the Agency, but after a day or so, press speculation in this regard died away.

8. Iden 186 apparently has never been satisfied and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr. Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State Department Security officials utilizing an operator and a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to Iden 186 but I suspect that it is and that this is the reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was the source.

JFK (1)(A)

Howard J. Osborn

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Attachment

5 [illegible]une 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Items in John Clarke Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 9 May 1973

JFK(1A)

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S."

2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of buying an apartment building. There was also Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political action influence activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

00070

SECRET-EYES ONLY

CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), (3). [illegible]
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

funds used. He felt that only Colonel White could supply additional detai[illegible] He said Senator Russell a[illegible] Representative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but asked not to be briefed in detail.

JFK(1)

John G. Richards
John G. Richards
Inspector

Attachment

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Per your instructions

1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment should be a matter of record.

2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill Colby is fully conversant are:

JFK(1)(A) -- CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/P.

-- ~~WH~~BRINEY and ~~MHMUTUAL~~ investments and accumulation of Government capital.

JFK(1)(C)

[illegible] 1/15/[illegible]

-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U. S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U. S.

-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J. trip to SEA.

JFK(1)(C)

- Red White
- DCI ~~Files~~

Curr[illegible]

John M. Clarke

JFK(1)(A)

00073

EYES ONLY
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

5 [illegible]ne 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT JFK (1)(A) : Items in John Clarke Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 9 May 1973

JFK(1)(B)

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S."

2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of buying an apartment building

There was also Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political/action influence activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

SECRET-EYES ONLY

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652
[illegible]
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FBI referred to in para 1 is not shown in other documents in the Agency. It has been kept very close with Mr. Yale, Mr. Magnusson, and possibly Mr. Colby. All files have been purged.

00076

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

07 MAY 1973

JFK1(b)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Management and Services

FROM : Director of Finance

SUBJECT : Special Other Government Agency Activities

1. Project ~~MHDOZEN~~ - Colonel White, Executive Director-Comptroller, acting for the Director, authorized the Director of Finance in a memorandum dated 17 November 1971 to obligate $2,700,000 for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be determined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by the Chief, CI Staff, DDP. This authorization was reaffirmed by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still active.

2. ~~LPMEDLEY~~ - Rental of office space in New York City for National Security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella, Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans.

3. Detailees - The Agency has reimbursable and non-reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

4. Project TWOFOLD - Reimbursement from Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by a domestic Agency Security proprietary.

5. Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the Executive Director-Comptroller authorized a payment of $858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated sensitive services. Details were kept in the Office of the Deputy Director for Plans.

E2 IMPDET JFK(1)(A)
CL BY: 006567

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET EYES ONLY

15 [illegible] 197[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Special Report

1. This memorandum is in response to a request to provide information on situations or associations that might appear to be irregular on the surface.

JFK(B)

2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies - Background: For many years the Central Intelligence Agency has detailed employees to the immediate office of the White House per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate office of the President such as the Council on International Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. We have furnished secretaries, clerical employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time, we have no clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP. I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed invitations for State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds were apparently available to run the White House and most of our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees. CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and others on Defense and State and other Government entities whose employees have Top Secret clearances.

JFK(B)

Professional officers have been and are at the present time assigned to the National Security Council and we have seven clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.

In addition to the above, we have technical specialists detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and security officers detailed to the Department of State to

JFK(A)

CONFIDENTIAL E 2 IMPDET Cl By 003935

JFK(1)(A)

protect foreign visitors. Recently, [John Ha[illegible]] was detailed to the Secretary of the Treasury along with four other Agency employees. We have even, in rare instances, detailed our people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.

3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies - Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the National War College are probably quite defensible. On the other hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and Mr. Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made a trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for a new detail sometime this month. Iden 112 served for over ten years as Director of the Office of Public Safety for AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire automatically at the expiration of this leave.

Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or other Government agency has been carefully considered and approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were involved.

4. Project TWOFOLD: I believe the support we are providing to Project TWOFOLD is an activity that should be reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.

5. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities: In a more general sense, Contract Personnel Division prepares and executes contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.

6. Arrangements with American Firms: In the interest of reporting "too much," I would remind you that Contract Personnel Division writes "agreements" with domestically based American firms to provide cover for Agency assets. The actual assignments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped, in the main, in the United States.

J4(2b)

4 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

1. This memorandum contains information for the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May that Office Directors report on activities, either under their cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed within the statutory responsibility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the request of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief description of each action involved and then have included the name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for the requests for action by this Office will have to be determined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.

3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the initiative of this Office are as follows:

a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedicated to the acquisition of firearms, ammunition, and related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore, Maryland. It was organized in 1969. This proprietary is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to obtain such materiel without associating the procurement action with the United States Government. It is legally necessary that the proprietary be licensed by both the State and Federal jurisdictions. Since it is located in Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

EYES ONLY
SECRET OL 3-2758

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 001777

The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's association with this proprietary and have assisted us in obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a Federal license has been obtained for the proprietary through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury. They, too, have been briefed on the Agency's association with this proprietary.

b. Under Title 18, Chapter 2512 of the U. S. Code (1968), the sale of electronic intelligence equipment is prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local law enforcement agencies. In essence, this law makes it almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence equipment in a covert manner so that no tie or relationship to the United States Government is made. In order for the Agency to covertly obtain such equipment and hide any Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff of the Procurement Division has relied on an established working relationship with a U.S. firm. This firm, a prominent supplier located in Maryland, deals in a wide range of law enforcement, police supplies, and equipment. The Covert Procurement Staff has had a relationship with an officer in the firm for over 15 years. The officer agreed to allow us to place orders through his corporation to major suppliers of this equipment with a billing to an Agency national proprietary. There is an understanding that if any inquiry is raised by the Department of Justice, the firm's officer would immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact the Department of Justice, identify the Agency's interest in the procurement action, and clear the officer of any responsibility. On 10 September 1971, there was an inquiry about the proprietary from an FBI agent making a routine investigation of the officer's books. Through Office of Security liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI, the agent was informed that it is an Agency notional proprietary. This disclosure closed the inquiry and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry. Most of the DD/O area divisions from time to time submit requisitions to us to acquire [surveillance] equipment. The majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelligence service with whom liaison is conducted in various foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and

JFK (1)(b)

EYES ONLY
SECRET

7. Contractual Relationship - USJPRS: The Agency organization, USJPRS, has a contractual association with approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 45 contract employees. These individuals are unwitting of the fact that they really work for CIA in the performance of their domestic activities. USJPRS (United States Joint Publications Research Service) is a part of FBIS. They perform a translation service of unclassified documents for the Government. The independent contractors work in their own homes and are given assignments as the need arises. The contract employees are "integrated" into the Bureau of Standards and are located in Washington, D. C. They are paid and administered by the Bureau. CIA reimburses the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employment are prepared in Contract Personnel Division.

8. Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is a record of External Employment Assistance Branch's action on a request from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or resigning from the Agency.

Sometime in the spring of 1972, Iden 38 of EEAB received a call from Howard Hunt who asked Iden 38 if he had a retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks. Iden 38 sent him a resume on Thomas Amato who retired 31 July 1971. Iden 38 did not document his EEAB record to show the date of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between March and May 1972.

JFK
1(A)

All of the above information was reported to the Office of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.

9. Resume Sent to McCord: Ross Lambert, a contract employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job after retirement. One of the leads given to Lambert was James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to McCord, but Lambert was not hired.

In mid-summer 1972, Mr. Lambert telephoned EEAB from Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co., a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from the D.C. area.) He said he had been visited by a Special Agent of the FBI who told Lambert that his resume had been found among McCord's papers. The Agent wanted to know if Lambert had any connection with McCord. Lambert explained how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him, Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Kennedy of OP and Iden 29 OS were notified immediately.

JFK(1)(A)

Harry B. Fisher
Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 61

1. Information has been received from WH Division which indicates that there was a break-in at Identity 61 on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972. The Iden 76 Desk of WH Division has no knowledge of Bureau coverage at that time.

2. I discussed the Iden 76 matter with Iden 66 of CI Staff (Red 1731), who advised that the FBI did have coverage of Identity 61, and the Agency supported this operation. He indicated that this was identified as Operation WUDCOR and he would be able to provide additional details on this if Mr. Colby requests it.

JFK
(1)(B)

/s/ Identity 10

Acting Executive Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 008246

00371

JFK(1)(B)

DD/O [illegible]

8 MAR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: WH Comments on Jack Anderson Column

REFERENCE: Jack Anderson's Washington Merry-Go-Round Column of 8 March 1973: "Chilean Break-ins Reflect Watergate"

1. WH Division has reviewed the referenced column (copy attached) by Jack Anderson and finds that it contains no new information. To the best knowledge of the Division, there is no foundation to the allegation that E. Howard Hunt was engaged on behalf of ITT in breaking into Chilean diplomatic installations in Washington and New York.

2. Any connection between ITT and these break-ins is purely conjectural and the column takes care to point this out.

3. Harold Hendrix, ITT Latin American representative, has told us that he had no relationship with Hunt on this or any ITT matter. He had anticipated that Anderson might imply such a relationship in his column and had assured us that this was not true.

/s/ Identity 81

Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment: As Stated

DECLASSIFIED BY 9803 RAD/gcl
ON 3/12/94 ... per GMB ... (JFK)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
GMB 3/3/94
(9803 RAD/gcl 3/17/94 JFK)

JFK (1)(A)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 001304

00373

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

USSS-EPS FORM 101
6/70

EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE
INCIDENT REPORT

1. SERIAL (CASE) NUMBER FM-72-398
2. DATE OCCUR. 5-13-72 05-15-72
3. HOUR OCCUR. Unknown

4. LOCATION (NATION) Chile
(STREET ADDRESS) 1736 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
5. NATURE OF INCIDENT Burglary II

6. REPORTED BY: Hernan Navarro
7. ADDRESS 1706 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Va.
8. HOME PHONE 321-7121
9. OFFICE PHONE 785-1746

10. OFFICE ASSIGNED Sergeant Stevens E. Butler
Sergeant Riley M. Richardson
11. DATE 05-15-72
12. HOUR 1330 hrs.
13. DAY OF WEEK (1) S (2) M 3 T 4 W 5 T 6 F (7) S

14. WITNESS N/A
15. ADDRESS N/A
16. HOME PHONE N/A
17. OFFICE PHONE N/A

18. WITNESS N/A
19. ADDRESS N/A
20. HOME PHONE N/A
21. OFFICE PHONE N/A

22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT (BRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT. CONTINUE ABOVE ITEMS AS NECESSARY INDICATING ITEM)

At approximately 1330 hours, Monday, May 13, 1972, Foreign Missions Division-Control Center was advised by M.P.D.C., 3D, that a burglary had taken place at the Chancery of Chile, 1736 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., sometime between 1600 hours on Friday, May 13, 1972, and on 0855 hours this date.

Sergeant Riley M. Richardson and the undersigned were dispatched at approximately 1335 hours in Cruiser # 23.

The undersigned was advised by Mr. Hernan (NMI) Navarro, Administrative Counselor of the Embassy of Chile, that the Chancery of Chile was entered and all the offices were ransacked. At this time the method of entry or items taken is unknown. Mr. Navarro advises that he will contact the Foreign Missions Division-Watch Commander when determination of missing articles is made. (continued)

jam

(USE EPS FORM 102 - SUPPLEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS)

23. PHOTOS ☐ YES
FS#

24. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC. N/A

LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS					
(1) RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY
LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS					
(2) RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

25. ARREST PD
26. ARREST NO.
27. ARREST OFFICER (NAME AND BADGE NO.)
28. DATE OF ARREST
29. HOUR

30. INCIDENT STATUS A. ☒ OPEN B. ☒ CLOSED C. ☐ UNFOUNDED D. ☐ CLEARED BY ARREST

31. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE), HOUR Sgt. Stevens E. Butler
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler
DATE 05-15-72
HOUR 1500 hrs.

32. APPROVING OFFICIAL (SIGNATURE) Pete N Manthos
Captain Pete N. Manthos
DATE 05-15-72
HOUR 1500

33. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL NOTIFIED N/A
DATE:
HOUR:

34. USSS-ID CASE NO. N/A

00376

INCIDENT REPORT - SUPPLEM

1. SERIAL (CASE) NUMBER
F[illegible]-72-393

2. NATURE OF INCIDENT
Burglary II

3. REPORTED BY:
Hernan (NMI) Navarro

4. ADDRESS
7605 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Va

5. HOME PHONE
321-7727

6. OFFICE PHONE
765-1716

7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:

The following were previously on the scene: Sergeant Clifton O. Gill, Badge # 147, M.P.D.C.,3D, and Officer Michael S. Kurdilla, Badge # 3770, M.P.D.C.,3D, also M.P.D.C Print Cruiser # 735.

S/A Michael F. Murphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.

jam

8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.
N/A

	LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS
(1)				

RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

	LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS
(2)				

RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

9. ARREST PD	10. ARREST NO.	11. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE NO.)	12. DATE	13. HOUR

14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSTION
A. ☒ OPEN B. ☒ CLOSED C. ☐ UNFOUNDED D. ☐ CLEARED BY ARREST

15. USSS-ID CASE NO.
N/A

16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION
OPEN

00377

17. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE)
Sgt. Stevens E. Butler
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler

18. DATE
05-15-72

19. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE)
Pete N Manthos
Captain Pete N. Manthos

20. DATE
05-

2. NATURE OF INCIDENT
Burglary II

3. REPORTED BY:
Herman (IPT) Navarro

4. ADDRESS
7605 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Va

5. HOME PHONE
321-7721

6. OFFICE PHONE
785-1746

7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:

At approximately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May 16, 1972, Mr. Navarro contacted Officer Adrian Roman-Gonzalez at 1310 L. Street, N.W. and stated the following items missing: (4 Portable Radios), one (1) Sanyo AM/FM Portable Radio, two (2) Panasonic AM/FM Radi and one (1) Westinghouse AM/FM/SW Radio. Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric Shaver, one (1) Womens pullover sweater, and an unknown number of books.

jam

8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC. N/A

	LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS
(1)				

RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

	LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS
(2)				

RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

9. ARREST PD	10. ARREST NO.	11. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE NO.)	12. DATE	13. HOUR

14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSTION
A. ☒ OPEN B. ☒ CLOSED C. ☐ UNFOUNDED D. ☐ CLEARED BY ARREST

15. USSS-ID CASE NO.
N/A

16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION
OPEN

00378

17. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE)
Sgt. Stevens E. Butler
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler

18. DATE
05-15-72

19. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE)
Pete N. Manthos
Captain Pete N. Manthos

20. DATE
05-1

PERSON OR PROPER

Embassy OF Chile

248-42

14. EX. COPIES 1

15. DIST. 3D

16. BEAT

17. R.A.

3. STREET ADDRESS 1736 MASS. Ave N.W.

4. HOME PHONE N/A

18. COMPLAINANT'S OCCUPATION AND HRS EMPLOYED N/A

5. WHERE EMPLOYED OR SCHOOL ATTENDING N/A

6. BUS. PHONE 785-174

19. DESCRIBE LOCATION OR TYPE OF PREMISE Chile Embassy

7. SEX

RACE

DOB

8. CRIME Burg. II

20. VEHICLE USED - TAG NO. AND STATE N/A

9. LOCATION OF CRIME (Address) 1736 MASS. Ave N.W.

10. DATE, DAY, TIME See Item 3

S-M-T-W-T-F-S

21. YEAR MAKE MODEL COLOR(S)

11. WEAPON, TOOL, FORCE OR MEANS USED UNK

PHOTOS ☐ YES ☐ NO FS #

CODE: O—OWNER R - REPORTING PERSON C—COMPLAINANT P - PARENT/GUAR

12. METHOD USED UNK

13. CLASSIFICATION

22. NAME (Last, First, Middle)	CODE	RES. ADDRESS	HOME PHONE	BUS. PHONE
NAVARRO, Hernan	R	7605 Hamlet St. Springfield VA	321-7121	785-17
23. Administrative Counselor				
24.				

25. IDENTIFY SUSPECTS BY NUMBER (Include Name, Address, Sex, Race, Age, Height, Weight, Eyes, Hair, Clothing etc.) IF ARRESTED GIVE ARREST NUMBER AND CHARGE (Omit description if arrested)

(1) N/A

(2)

26. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATION ON BODY N/A

27. HOSPITALIZED - WHERE? N/A

☐ ADMIT

☐ RELEA

28. TRANSPORTED BY N/A

29. TREATED BY N/A

30. TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN UNK.

31. LOSS VALUE UNK

32. TRADEMARKS, ACTIONS OR CONVERSATION OF SUSPECT N/A

33. EXACT LOCATION OF PROPERTY Inside Embassy

34. POINT OF ENTRY UNK

35. VEHICLE FROM WHICH THEFT OCCURRED TAG NO. STATE YEAR AND MAKE N/A

36. NARRATIVE: (1) CONTINUATIONS OF ABOVE ITEMS (QUOTE ITEM NUMBER) INCLUDE ADDITIONAL SUSPECTS AS OUTLINED ABOVE. (2) BRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT AND ACTION TAKEN. (3) DESCRIBE EVIDENCE AND PROPERTY INDICATE DISPOSITION AND DESCRIBE ALL PROPERTY INVOLVED. USE CONTINUATION REPORT IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED. RECORD VALUE OF LOSS ESTIMATED BY VICTIM.

ITEM NO.

R-1 Reports Between The hours of 1600, 5-15-72 and 0855,
5-15-72 The Embassy of Chile was entered and all The
offices Ransaked. Unknown what was Taken at This
Full Report To Follow Later.
CRU 244 Sgt Gill on Scene.
Print CRU 735 on Scene
Off Leitz of E.P.S. Notified at 1330 hrs.

OFFICE USE ONLY

9591	T.T. NUMBER	DATE & TIME THIS REPORT 5-15-72 1500	37. DATE/TIME TYPE NO.	38. REPRODUCED

39. REPORTING OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO. M.S. Kurdilla 3D 3770

40. STATUS (Check One) ☐ UNFOUNDED ☒ OPEN ☐ CLOSED ☐ SUSPENDED

41. UNIT REFERRED TO

42. UCR DISPOSITION

43. SECOND OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO. B.L. Dunning

44. SUPERVISOR APPROVING UNIT & BADGE NO. Sgt C.O. Gill 147

45. REVIEWER

NO. 00379

PD 251 REVISED 3/71

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

OGC 73-0930
25 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Identity 61 Break In on 15 May 1972

1. On 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson, General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if he had any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved in a break in at Identity 61 in Washington, D.C. on 15 May 1972. Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, and the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identified two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated 15 May 1972, Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest of the Iden 76 Government presented to the American Embassy, and the State Department reply to Santiago, No. 084655, dated 15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service. I then called Mr. Tom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.

2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry about prosecution. Mr. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61 between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972.

Reported loss at tha[illegible]me consisted of four am/fm[illegible]adios and one electric razor. The police investigation identified some latent fingerprints but no identification of those prints was made. Since the reported loss was under $5,000 and there was no evidence of a crossing of state boundries, the FBI did not make an investigation of the incident. The MPD reported that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified.

John K Greaney
JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

cc: Legislative Counsel
Inspector General
OGC:JKG:cav
Orig - Subject: Watergate Case
1 - JKG Signer
1 - Chrono

SECRET/SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

1 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby

SUBJECT: Special Activities

1. Following our recent conversation, I have searched my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples of activities which to hostile observers or to someone without complete knowledge and with a special kind of motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities exceeding CIA's charter. JFK 1(B)

2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962, DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify their sources for classified information which was appearing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA, orally, which I did. I understand more complete information on this operation is available from the Director of Security. I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of what precise actions were taken, what information was gained, what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.

3. As a result of a developing relationship with IDEN-122 the IDEN-123 representative in Washington, and also as a result of certain information conveyed by IDEN-124 , James Angleton, with the approval of Dick Helms, agreed to mount a counterespionage operation against the IDEN-95 in Washington. This involved breaking and entering and the removal of documents from

✓

JFK 1(A)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

2.3 IMPDET CL BY 007789

EYES ONLY

the IDEN-126 On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally on the operation without going into operational details. Later on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed. Actual breaking and entering occurred somewhat later, and on 15 April 1963, DCI McCone met with President Kennedy alone and briefed the President on the details of this new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney General was briefed and he agreed that he would not mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed. On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secretary of State Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed reservations about the propriety of such an operation. He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations with McCone on 17 April 1964, 28 May 1964, and 14 June 1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the IDEN-95 be informed directly that we knew about their espionage operations in the United States and ask them to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and President John F. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara was also present, and there is no record that he had previously been made aware of this operation.

4. Although certain activities never got beyond the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation. One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear installations. Outside the United States Government, General Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign installations in this country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected

JFK (1)(B)

exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy, and generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting taking place in the presence of the Attorney General. It is clear that the FBI was opposed to any such proposal then, as now, and the plan never went forward.

5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured the cooperation of several prominent US business firms in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but knowledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.

6. On 17 April 1964, Mr. Robert B. Anderson came to DCI McCone on behalf of American business interests, offering to insert some $300,000 to try to secure a favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly after this approach, IDEN-128 of IDEN-129 made a similar proposal to McCone in connection with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of American business could not be accepted, it being neither a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business. This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations and private business.

JFK (1)(A)

7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy, McCone injected the Agency, and particularly IDEN-36

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There is little new evidence of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San Diego, 21 to 23 August 1972. The Students for a Democratic Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in a demonstration in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targetting on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity from the North Vietnamese. The letter is of interest as an indication of North Vietnamese contact with the SDCC; such contact will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-reported plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the Convention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris.

DEVELOPMENTS:

At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts, held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) adopted a proposal to hold demonstrations at the San Diego-Tijuana border during the Republican National Convention. The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be entertained.

The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972, expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SDCC, and conveys the Committee's "best wishes of militant solidarity and friendship." The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC write often and "send us materials you have."

23 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. A member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Republican Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be hectic right until the elections in the U.S."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:

August 21-23	Republican Convention, San Diego. Demonstrations organized by the San Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267, San Diego, Ca. 92103.

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.

14 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972, is an expression of interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

28 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no additional indications of any substantial foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

00560

Excluded [illegible]

CONTROLLED DISSEM

26 JUL 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A leader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to take place at United States and allied military installations abroad during the period immediately before and during the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will participate in activities in connection with the Convention. The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic organization which has been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the Republican National Convention, has sent a delegation to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed at these meetings.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In an early July 1972 meeting with prominent members of foreign antiwar organizations, a representative of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an important position within that organization, discussed the plans of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that during the period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities involved in the manufacture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and that similar actions will be organized at United States and allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representative further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest

00551

CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to determi
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

WARNING NOTICE
NSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

of the bombing in Vietnam are being organized by the "Republican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on 21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will speak on the subject of the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. (Comment: We have no present information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to travel to the United States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to participate in activities connected with the Republican Convention.)

The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic group engaged in organizing counter-activities at the Republican National Convention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). An advance party has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss the agenda for meetings with the full AWU delegation. Although no information is presently available indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are scheduled to be discussed at meetings between the AWU delegation and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the AWU advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials regarding the stance the AWU should take on certain questions relating to the presidential elections. It is also known that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party about the political mood in the United States. One of the AWU delegation members has stated that upon their return to the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television, to "educate the American people about the consequences of voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat Nixon." The delegation member added that the demonstrations at the Republican Convention will be "unique."

CONTROLLED DISSEM

2 AUG 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire American delegation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG officials; at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private exchanges. A second group of activists, considered more important than the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972 for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American delegation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to discussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnamese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Republican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen Van TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention." TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part, refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demonstrators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.

CLASSIFIED BY ______
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
impossible to determine

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation, the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation. Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there is no information available concerning the substance of these private exchanges.

A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972 for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second group is scheduled to be led by Rennie DAVIS, founder and leader of the AWU. This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within recent months for discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon his return from his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's chief target would be the Republican Convention.

CONTROLLED DISSEM

9 AUG. 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

00565

CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) [illegible]
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
impossible to determine

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

CONTROLLED DISSEM

06 MAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt Or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

There are no direct indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

> "In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly,

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FOREIGN [illegible] DISSEM ABROAD

under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."

CONTROLLED DISSEM

09 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-13 July 1972, are limited to a reiteration by a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam of a statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international support to a campaign of anti-Vietnam War activities in the United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican Conventions, but made no specific call for support of disruptive actions at the conventions themselves.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In early April 1972 an influential and well-informed staff member of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed, in private, the international anti-Vietnam War activities conducted on 1, 15, and 22 April. The Stockholm Conference member stated that these actions were part of an international campaign in support of domestic American antiwar efforts during the period 1 April to 15 May 1972, and "will culminate at the election conventions in July and August."

The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was a major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's "Action Commission." The appendix called for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

SECRET

23 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972. A member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Democratic Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be hectic right until the elections in the U.S."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:

July 9 - 12	Democratic Convention, Miami Beach. Demonstrations organised by Florida People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa, Florida 33612.

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.

7 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972, is an expression of interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and National Conventions.

21 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972.

into the US labor situation, and particularly to try to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and Walter Reuther. IDEN-36 steered a very skillful course in this connection, but the Agency could be vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back, or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's wishes.

JFK 1B

8. There are three examples of using Agency funds which I know to be controversial. One was the expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike Miskovsky IDEN-131, and James Smith. Second, as you well know, when Lou Conein received his summons to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on 1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him. My impression is that the accounting for this and its use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at one of the early Special Group meetings attended by McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His general position was that such expenditures were not within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow such spending only on the direct personal request of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or the White House.

9. I raise these issues of funding because I remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000 for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.

JFK (B)

10. Under the heading of old business, I know that any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried about the fact that conversations within the offices and over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's

tenure, there were microphones in his regular office, his inner office, his dining room, his office in East Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven Street. I do not know who would be willing to raise such an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this score.

11. Also under the heading of old business, I well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet Union. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs, and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced with surprisingly little excitement at the time.

12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was a special arrangement with the Office of Communications whereby the Director's office gained access to non-CIA traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball, Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did. Ben Read in the Secretary of State's office and I spent several weeks putting this one to rest.

13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know, operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of his activities could be misunderstood. One example was his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and Maria Callas flown from Rome to Athens on Air Force KC 135. Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John

Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety of this action.

14. The use of IDEN-132 aircraft has been remarkably secure, but DCI McCone himself forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the San Francisco airport for the Republican National Convention in 1964 aboard the IDEN-133 with the highly visible tail number IDEN-134. This was, I explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate charter, but he didn't like it.

15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift and a luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps indicative of the press's relations with him. However, in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher and the authors to change things. They did not change a comma, and I doubt that this old saw will ever sing again.

16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI, would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters.

17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that allegations from any quarter which cast these things in the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention, and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight. If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point

out that I was very much in the position of the enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers were aware of these activities and better able to judge their propriety and possible impact or misinterpretation.

WElder
WALTER ELDER

SUBJECT: PLMPLODESTAR

JFK-(1)(C)

Project MPLODESTAR is a Headquarters initiated program which has as its fundamental objective the long term manipulations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist, and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwing, radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embarrassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each case is cleared with the FBI and through CI/SO the Bureau is kept informed on a regular basis.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 061090

6. As a means of sharing more fully our operational experience we have invited three FBI officers to be students in our Soviet Operations Course from 14 to 25 May 1973.

7. A Soviet defector was confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to September 1967 while efforts were being made to establish whether he was a bona fide defector. Although his present attitude toward the Agency is quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the press could cause undesirable publicity if it were to uncover the story.

JFK(1)(B)

David H. Blee

David H. Blee
Chief
Soviet Bloc Division

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

JFK (1)(B)

Attached is the material we requested of Dick Ober:

A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to Secret Service for Democratic and Republican Conventions

Ober advises that the only American we reported on to the IEC is Rennie Davis.

BE (14 May 73)
(DATE)

00546

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Inspector General		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Mr. Broe:

[Dick Ober] has been advised that this package is being sent to you. Since knowledge of the existence of this Committee has been strictly limited, I've asked that it be delivered to you unopened. Although it has an ER number on it, it has not been sent through that office -- I gave them only the day, subject, and originator.

JFK(1)(B)

Barbara

00547

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
O/ES/MC/Barbara Pindar	15 May 73

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

(40)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: [Richard Ober] [illegible]	EXTENSION 1465	NO.	DATE 14 May 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. IDEN-73 O/DCI		[illegible]	[illegible]
2. Mr Colby			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached are:

1. Background note on [illegible] Committee per your request of this morning.

2. Copies of memoranda concerning Agency support to Secret Service (7 April and 23 June 1972).

EYES ONLY

[illegible]

[illegible]

00548

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY

14 MAY 1973

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

1. Background: Formed December 1970 to produce fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies, including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremism and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice (Chairman); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of other Departments or Agencies (following have participated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later William Olson. IES has received requirements directly from and delivered reports directly to John Dean of the White House. The White House has insisted that the existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness of its existence within this Agency has been limited to DCI, DDO (DDP), C/CI and four officers of this office.

JFK

2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or attribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representative on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff and as the alternate to the Agency representative on the Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).

3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, November 1971. This study was initiated in July 1971 by the White House as a consequence of the President's concern about the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation was editorial review.

EYES ONLY
SENSITIVE
SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

4. Republican National Convention (21-24 August 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from February through August 1972 periodic contributions for these estimates concerning foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention (copies attached).

5. Democratic National Convention (10-13 July 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided between March and July 1972 contributions on foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention (copies attached).

Attachments: a/s

O FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
CONTROLLED DISSEM

23 FEB 1972

SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

1. There are only limited indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972.

2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held 11-13 February 1972 in Paris/Versailles, attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican National Convention. A representative of the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Convention, requested the American Delegations' Steering Committee at the World Assembly to include a specific call for international support of activities against the Republican convention in their proposal to the Action Commission of the World Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indications that the proposal would be taken to the floor of the Assembly.

3. John LENNON, a British subject, has provided financial support to Project "YES", which in turn paid the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representative of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS' representative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.) Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNON-supported project, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC), of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to direct New Left protest activities at the Republican National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' representative to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; it is not known if the Republican National Convention was discussed.

4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its harassment of the Republican convention. A working draft plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations.

21 MAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

Indications remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

> "In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."

DEVELOPMENTS:

The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Convention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a "large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72, which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles of people all over the world." Plans for activities at Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations. In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to "outflank NIXON domestically and internationally," international opposition can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demonstrations."

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy in 1971 and 1972

1. A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in Washington, D. C. was mounted by the FBI with the support of this Agency in April-May 1971. This operation, which used Agency equipment and technical expertise but was managed operationally by the FBI, was initiated only after then-Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was discontinued at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and identify this operation as CIA instigated.

2. The operation consisted of the following three technical devices:

a. An AC-powered, masked transmitter and two switches in the office occupied by the Deputy Chief of Mission.

b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in the office of the Ambassador's secretary which was

[illegible]
SECRET

JFK(1)(B)

designed to pick up high quality audio of typing in the office. It was hoped to break these audio signals into clear text using advanced computer techniques developed by Division D. No useful product, however, was ever obtained.

c. A battery-powered, masked transmitter and switch concealed in the door of the Embassy, which would supply crytographic information for NSA. (Produced excellent quality signals until it became inoperative in early 1972 because of battery failure.)

JFK(1)(B)

3. In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations of only moderate interest). Reactivation was requested because of strong interest in the special IDEN-76 government mission arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level talks with U.S. State Department officials concerning debt renegotiation and other major items outstanding between the two countries. The operation was reinitiated on 21 December 1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February 1973 by Acting

SECRET

JFK1(B)

Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of this operation did not justify the risks involved in continuing to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the mounting disclosures about CIA involvement in LDEN-76 This was especially so because of our reservations about maintaining proper security for the listening post which, as with other operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.

JFK (1)(B)

e. Alias Social Security Cards. 171 backstopped accounts have been established for contract personnel whose relationship with the Agency cannot be revealed but who are entitled to Social Security coverage. Following expiration of the contractual relationship, at an appropriate time the alias and true name accounts are merged permitting the individual to receive complete benefits upon reaching the age of eligibility.

f. Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 54 Social Security numbers have been registered for the purpose of opening 54 new bank accounts since 1 July 1972. 87 individual tax accounts have been established with IRS on an unwitting basis in 14 cities in the United States.

g. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities (43 corporations; 61 sole-proprietorships; 207 lawyers and 61 telephone answering service addresses are maintained by CCS in 58 cities in the United States.

h. Alias Signatories on Bank Accounts. 24 aliases for signatures on 25 proprietary entity and one notional company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1 proprietary-hire as follows:

JFK (1)(B)

CCS/Hqs - 5 officers (12 aliases) on 8 proprietary entities and 1 notional company.

CCS/NY PMC* - 3 officers (9 aliases) on 13 proprietary entities.

CCS/NY PMC* - 1 proprietary-hire (1 alias) on 3 proprietary entities.

CCS/MD PMC* - 1 officer (2 aliases) on 2 proprietary entities.

---

*Proprietary Management Company

sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise of normal commercial annuities. Backstopping for this arrangement is provided through CCS-procured bank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retirees are currently being handled.

k. Credit Union Arrangements for Selected Nonofficial Cover Personnel. Dividends (interest) earned on Credit Union accounts by individuals under cover are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service based on 50 U.S. Code 403g or Internal Revenue Code Section 6041.

Individuals under cover may borrow money from the Credit Union for the purchase of real estate; however, the mortgage is recorded in the name of a cleared lawyer and not the actual lendor (Credit Union).

Paragraph l. deleted because it contains sensitive Agency operational methods and techniques.

JFK(1)(B) JFK(1)(B)

PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains three domestic proprietary management companies which provide funding and operational support for 49 Agency entities, including 13 controlled and directed by CCS.

2. The three proprietary management companies are staffed by 9 employees; they furnish assistance in the commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of entities supporting operations, and provide cover and funding channels for operational activities as required. Most importantly, professional services are furnished in a manner responsive to required security standards and at a cost considerably less than would be charged by bona fide management firms.

3. The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS provide cover for ten individuals in the United States and three overseas. Operationally, the companies provide commercial funding channels on a world-wide basis and serve as corporate owners of equipment, inventory and aircraft and as collection mechanisms for outstanding notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government affiliation or interest.

[illegible] CL BY [illegible]

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing the DCI

1. This Memorandum is submitted in order to identify to you for possible briefing of the Director activities which in certain contexts could be construed as delicate or inappropriate.

JFK (1)(B)

2. At the request of the Director of Security, from approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January 1973 safesite number 583 was made available to the U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was under threat of assassination by organized criminal elements.

3. SB Division over the past three months has interviewed four graduate students as prospective candidates for assignments under American business cover in the USSR. They were encouraged to locate cover jobs on their own.

4. For approximately two years the SB Division has had the cooperation of the Commander of the Morals Division of the District of Columbia Police Department in training officers scheduled for assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The arrangement was made through the Office of Security.

JFK (1)(B)

5. Since late 1972 CIA has taken part in seven FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in response to requests from the FBI. We have shared with them through lectures and discussions lessons we have learned which are relevant to their counter-espionage responsibilities.

JFK (1)(A)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059952

6X

have been recuited and run exclusively for the MHCHAOS program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product capability or a concurrent capability for provision of information responsive to the program's requirements. This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. This collection program is viewed as an integral part of the recruitment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division operations and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an American "Movement" background or who have known connections with the American "Movement" are useful as access agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to discern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, and to develop operationally exploitable relationships with recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets are of interest to our targets because of their connections with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement." Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been approximately 20 important areas of operational interest, which at the present time have been reduced to about ten: Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers, Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.

4. The MHCHAOS program also utilizes audio operations, two of which have been implemented to cover targets of special interest.

Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitive foreign operation.

Paragraph b. deleted because it reveals a sensitive Agency foreign operation.

5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and who appear to have extremist connections, interests or background are reported upon. Other individuals are reported upon in response to specific Headquarters requirements received from the FBI because such individuals are of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.

6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the MHCHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. It is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division. The control and retrievability of information obtained, including information received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Special Operations Group.

7. Information responsive to specific FBI requirements is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled dissemination channels, i.e., by restricted handling cable traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind memoranda.

8. Information of particular significance, when collected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.

FR 73-183

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential

REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, 73-180, dated 7 May 1973, same subject

1. The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. Question: Do we recruit Americans?

Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be used as academic support assets and access agents. These Americans are used for spotting and assessment purposes only and do not perform any recruitments.

Paragraph 1. b. and 1. c. are deleted because they contain sensitive agency operational methods and techniques.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057223

d. Question: What is the arrangement re recruiting out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?

Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specifically requires approval by the ADDO or DDO for any recruitment attempt made in the United States against an American member of the academic community or a foreign target attending an American academic institution. This regulation is presently in the process of revision in that this approval authority for academic recruitments in the United States is to be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority for recruitment attempts against American students outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief of the appropriate area division. The only prohibitions at the present time are those precluding recruitment attempts against foreign students here in the United States on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockefeller or Fulbright.

2. If you have further questions, please let me know.

signed/IDEN-173

Acting Chief
Foreign Resources Division

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FR 73-180

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential

1. At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency. We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which FR Division has participated and/or is participating that contain somewhat greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:

JFK(1)(B)

a. [The New York Base] provides a fairly considerable amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the Chinese. This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other than the inordinate amount of time spent by [New York Base] personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of money that has been expended in support of these efforts. JFK(1)(B)

b. A CIA Officer is to be assigned to FR Division. The CIA Officer is presently assigned overseas under deep cover; [his cover is the Mullen Corporation.] [This is the corporation that employed E. Howard Hunt.] In discussions between NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would be pulled out and reassigned in the United States. FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment. JFK(1)(B)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057223

00611

SECRET/SENSITIVE

We have concluded that the best solution is to have this officer attend a university in the Midwest for at least a year, working towards an advanced degree until there has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan to make no operational use of the CIA Officer whatsoever during the period of time that he is attending the university. Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the situation and decide the next course of action at that time.

Paragraph 1. c. is deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency operational methods and techniques.

d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the existence of an audio operation done by the FBI [but with close TSD support] in San Francisco. This operation is directed against IDEN-62. I understand the operation has been exceptionally well done. However, the responsibility for this activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction with SB Division.

JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B)

e. Three microphones were planted in various locations in the IDEN-61 by the FBI. [The equipment was produced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no CIA personnel have entered the premises.] The operation was deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however, are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is unlikely the finger would point to CIA.

JFK(1)(B)

action would be more economical and eliminate the need for one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities readily available from another. A typical example of this procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In connection with the current reporting requirement, however, I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be relevant to the subject of this memorandum.

d. In connection with the disclosures during the summer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87 _. to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy himself that classified material furnished them by the Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for. His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior Security Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.

JFK (1)(b)

> This memorandum reports that FBIS regularly disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation but that instructions had been issued to cease distribution of classified reports. While no other direct dissemination went to Rand, other USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing "many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as authorized under USIB regulations. The memorandum also states that Rand personnel had requested searches and document retrieval from the CRS facility.

JFK (1)(b)

5. In connection with action taken for the Office of Security, there are three relevant items:

a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested by the Office of Security to print a book written by ~~Harry J. Murphy~~, Office of Security. The book was prepared by ~~Mr. Murphy~~ under a Brookings Institution Federal

JFK (4)

EYES ONLY
SECRET

JFK(1)(A)

the [DD/O,] we will not honor any requisition for surveillance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI Staff of the [DD/O.] JFK(1)(A)

4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the following items are pertinent:

JFK(1)(A)

a. In February 1971, [Colonel L. K. White,] the then Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby. Colonel White explained that the Technical Services Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance to the FBI for a sensitive project JFK(1)(A) . [Colonel White] did not disclose the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information concerning the mission or purpose of Project sub-stantive questions concerning the subject should be addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made, however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, approximately $1 million, and the complex technical equipment that has been involved in the undertaking.

b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reimbursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the amount of $36,900 is for two Westinghouse television cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200 is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of these requirements pending further instructions which will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management and Services.

JFK(1)(B)

c. Over the years, this [Agency] has often supported other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved request, supported by a transfer of funds, [the Agency] JFK(1)(B) would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or provide a service for, another Government agency when such

Executive Fellowship. The book is entitled "Where's What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators." It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of information that may be useful to an investigator. The book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967. Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made in September 1968. The title page of the book gives attribution to [redacted] Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential, and it is our understanding that the distribution was made to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if desired.

JFK (1)(A)

Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It was the intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly determined that the LEAA request should not be honored because the Agency should not put itself in the position of publishing law enforcement material for general and unclassified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our printing facilities.

JFK (1)(B)

b. On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security requested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor vehicles for use in connection with a special support operation which would last approximately 3 months. The Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memorandum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director and has his personal approval." The request was approved.

c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.

JFK (1)(B)

EYES ONLY
SECRET

6. In connection with the responsibility held by this Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all Agency operating components, the following information is relevant.

a. A safe site, identified as "Safehouse 562" which is Iden 88 was made available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971.

The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970 as a replacement for a terminated OL standby safe site and in keeping with the approved requirement for a complement of five standby safehouses for all Agency use. The apartment has one bedroom and is located in an older high-rise building along Iden 89. The nominal lessee is Iden 90 a security-cleared attorney with offices located at Iden 91 The cover story utilized is that Iden 90, rents the apartment for business conferences, meetings, and occasional overnight stays by his staff and/or his out-of-town clients. The original lease term was for a 1-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971, with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby safe site, the apartment has been used by various Agency components to meet their short-term or crash requirements. Control of the standby safe site and its security is the responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of each user, component, and date of use; however, no record is made of those persons being met at the site nor for what purpose the site is being used (meetings, training, etc.). Such information is maintained by the operating component requesting the safe site. Records maintained by this Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971 in answer to a telephonic request.

JFK(c)(c)

b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as a meeting place for officers of the Miami Station who were in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering

EYES ONLY
SECRET

assistance in connection with the political conventions that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant operating component on this matter.

7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.

John F. Blake
Director of Logistics

2 Atts

cc: DD/M&S

EYES ONLY
SECRET

SECRET

EYES ONLY

Requesting Office	Date of Request	Item	Quantity	Unit Cost	Receiving U.S. Department or Agen
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,350	BNDD
TSD	5/16/72	Transmitters, Radio Beacon	8	313	BNDD
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,350	White House Communicatio Agency
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	13	1,400	Air Force
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	10	1,350	State
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	2	1,375	AEC
TSD	11/16/72	Camera Sets	20	656	FBI
TSD	4/17/72	Camera Sets	10	700	FBI
TSD	11/18/71	Actuators, Recorders	50	488	FBI
TSD	4/19/72	Tessina Cameras	3	700	BNDD
TSD	12/ 7/72	Camera, Video	1	18,045	FBI
TSD	10/13/72	Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent of W L 30691	1	4,639	FBI
TSD	3/26/71	Tubes, Image, W L 30691	2	4,607	FBI
TSD	4/20/73	Cameras, Television	2	18,300	FBI

00113

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

EYES ONLY

SECRET

JFK(A)

2 [illegible] 001777

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Requesting Office	Date of Request	Item	Quantity	Unit Cost	Receiving U.S. Depart- ment or Agenc
TSD	12/14/72	Transmitters, Radio	3	313	BNDD
TSD	10/20/72	Actuators, Recorder	25	591	FBI
TSD	10/13/72	Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent of W L 30691	1	4,639	FBI
TSD	5/26/71	Tube, Image, W L 30691	2	4,639	FBI
TSD	4/22/71	Transmitters	3	1,372	FBI
TSD	4/22/71	Module, Plug-In	1	1,247	FBI
TSD	4/22/71	Power Supply - UWP-39A	1	568	FBI
OL	2/25/71	Telephone Analyzers	2	1,350	Treasury
OS	1/30/71	Telephone Analyzers	22	1,350	Treasury
OL	8/12/70	Cable, Special-Purpose Electrical	5,000 ft.	.42	White House Communication Agency
TSD	1/10/73	Ink, Special Formula	1 lot	1,825	Immigration a Naturalizatio Service
TSD	6/28/72	Ink, Special Formula	1 lot	3,700	Immigration a Naturalizatio Service
TSD	7/26/71	Transmitter, Radio Beacon	1	728	U.S. Forestry

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY

JFK(1A) OJCS-594-73
11 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Activities which might be considered sensitive issues.

I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which might be considered sensitive issues.

Most Sensitive Projects

OJCS Project Identification	Project Officer Organization, & Telephone	Nature of Project	OJCS Reason for Listing
~~HYDRA~~	Richard Ober CI Staff Red 1465	A special project initiated by DCI	Type of data being collected.
~~SANCA~~	Iden 48 OS Red 9298	Machine index to security files	Type of data in index.
~~ORDSTAT~~	~~John Hutchings~~ ORD 3061	Information storage & retrieval of drug related data (~~ORD~~'s project ~~OFTEN~~)	Type of data in files.

JFK 1(b)

JFK (1B)

Sensitive Projects

~~DRUGGS~~	Iden 18 OMS 7792	Computer file of drug data.	Type of data in file.

00135

EYES ONLY
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 036490

JFK (1)(b)

Sensitive Projects (Continued)

OJCS Project Identifica[illegible]n	Project Officer Organization, & Telephone	Nature of Proj[illegible]t	OJCS Reason for Listing
~~PROFILES~~	~~John Winnie~~ TSD 362-1922 (sterile)	Statistical analysis of psychological data.	Source of data. Contractors are involved with project.

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern

~~TILAQ~~	~~Robert Hahn~~ SB Red 1185/1251	Pattern analysis of surveillance data from foreign liaison service	Nature of data. Techniques of system discussed with FBI.
~~SPYDER~~	~~George Swegman~~ OS 5071	Data on radio frequencies used for support of ~~In-Place~~ Monitoring System, a system to identify unauthorized transmitters.	Project originated by James McCord.
~~DMVREC~~	Iden 48 OS Red 9298	File of automobile license numbers.	Nature of data.
~~APREGIN~~	~~Walter-Kowalski~~ CI Staff Red 9338	File of Agency applicants who were not hired.	Nature of data.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued)

OJCS Project Identification	Project Officer Organization, & Telephone	Nature of Project	OJCS Reason for Listing
--	Iden 187 ISD/DDO Red 1442	Cooperative program with Iden 188 in name grouping techniques.	Association with the named organization.

for

JOHN D. IAMS
Director of Joint Computer Support

23 3551/1

29 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Mr. Colby's Request to Inspector General to Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes in a PP/B Memo to DD/M&S

REFERENCE : D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973, Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or Indirect Involvement

JFK(1)(B)

1. The two notes of 13 and 20 January 1972 refer to approval by the DCI (at that time Mr. Helms) for the expenditure of $30-32K for a sensitive CS project. No further details were given, Mr. Colby asked that DDO records be checked.

2. DDO records show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a project called Iden 99. This is a joint operation with the Iden 100 service for the collection of ~~ELINT~~ intelligence. The activity is handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff.

3. The funds cited in the notes was transferred to CI on 13 January 1972. It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff that the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount, i.e., $30 to 32K and not to two separate allocations.

JFK(1)(A) John C. Richards

John C. Richards

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 056113

Executive Registry

73-3...

2581

[illegible] May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Watergate Principals - Direct or Indirect Involvement

1. This memorandum responds to the Director's request for a report of any involvement in any capacity since 1 January 1969 with Messrs. Hunt, McCord, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.

2. I have had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.

3. My McCord contact was indirect and occurred sometime during the late 1960's when I was Director, Office of Computer Services. I opposed plans for Technical Division, Office of Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a separate computer for Iden 101. Ted Hines of DD/S&T (then ORD) was the computer individual working with TD and, I think, would have details.

JFK (1)(B)

4. The Krogh contact also was indirect and involved his request, first through OMB, that CIA fund foreign travel on behalf of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. Individual phone discussions are noted in the attached. The Agency focal points were Iden 32 and Iden 3; I understand Iden 3 has forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, Iden 3 and Colby are attached also.

5. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to all OPPB employees. One officer who was attending a funeral will not be available until tomorrow.

/s/ Charles A. Briggs

Charles A. Briggs
Director of Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting

JFK (1)(A)

Attachment
As stated

00149

SECRET

JFK

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

A[illegible]chment
23 May 1973

4 Feb 72	Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud" Krogh and his deputy, Walter Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan foreign travel in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was alerting us to their intention to ask us for funds for the travel.
7 Feb 72	Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3-5 trips for 3 individuals--all in FY 72. Cost probably $10K. Minnick ready to make first trip. Iden 32 is plugged in. ExDir said OK re Tehran visit.
7 Feb 72	See attached memo from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and follow-on memos from Seymour Bolton (21 Jul 72) and Colby (2 Aug 72).
12(?) May 72	John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/Minnick attendance at a Latin American Iden 102 conference on narcotics. He also said Jeff Shepherd, White House, was laying on a [illegible] with Iden 32 for himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Europe.
23 Jun 72	Iden 3 commented on Krogh/Minnick interest in getting CA activities, including large-scale PM, on narcotics front. Iden 3 pushing small-scale PP.
6 Jul 72	Iden 3 called. Notes say only: "Minnick-Hurley film. We will send."
2 Aug 72	Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel orders ready; need money this PM (No record in my notes as to who was traveling when, but have faint recollection of its being to Mexico City). Sam Hines and, Iden 73 contacted by Iden 3.
1 Nov 72	Related? Iden 3 call. Again notes are cryptic: WH/GAO-Grace (Iden 32): Survey BNDD problems/Mexico."

SECRET

On Mr. Colby's copy only:

JFK
(1)(B)

13 Jan 72	ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved $30K for sensitive CS project - no details.
20 Jan 72	Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.

SECRET

19 Jul[illegible]972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Jack Bauman JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(A)

1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I dropped in to see Jack Bauman who lives in Winterhaven, Florida. Jack retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due to a serious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for about 20 years prior to his retirement.

JFK(1)(A)

2. During a private conversation Jack told me that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the McCord-Hunt affair. I asked him why he had been interviewed, and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security Officer for the Republican Party. Jack visited Washington in January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. Jack furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him. Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in such activity.

JFK(1)(A)

3. According to Jack during the meeting with Mr. Hunt they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program and a need for a good security system both before and during the National Convention. Jack indicated that he sincerely believed that the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a problem.

CLASSIFIED BY 0376-16

00153

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Det
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY

JFK(1)(A)

4. When [Jack] declined, he indicated that Mr. Hunt asked for any other recommendations he might have. According to [Jack] he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the [Agency,] but he did furnish the name of IDEN-108 who might be possibly ready to retire from the [Agency.]

JFK(1)(A)

5. [Jack] informed me that he assumed that the Bureau obtained his name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt. He said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCord, [Jack] said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability.

6. Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew nothing of the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impression from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as originally reported.

JFK(1)(A)

7. All of the above information was volunteered by Mr. [Bauman,] and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the matter other than to comment that I hated to see the [Agency's] name connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record and for information of the Director of Security.

JFK(1)(A) [Charles W. Kane
Charles W. Kane]

CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY

DD/M&S 73-1809

1 cts

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter

JFK(A)

1. I am addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central Intelligence since I doubt that the information contained herein is of such significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with the Agency since July 1972. However, if you feel that the information is of such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the proper format to do so.

JFK(A)

2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the Watergate and related matters was through Mr. Jack Bauman a former Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In December 1971 Mr. Bauman called me from Florida and advised that he wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give Mr. Bauman a call. I had only met Hunt once about 10 years before but I agreed to relay the message. I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that Mr. Bauman did not have his home phone and requested he call Mr. Bauman. Mr. Hunt thanked me for relaying the message and said that he would call Mr. Bauman. This seemed of little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17 of the Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 of the telephone call from Mr. Bauman in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the Record prepared by Iden 17 as a result of our conversation.

JFK(A)

3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida and took that occasion to drop in to see Jack Bauman. Mr. Bauman told me in a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

EYES ONLY

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 011018

with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the memorandum is attached.

JFK (1)(B)

4. Other than knowing Mr. McCord through his employment with the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related matters now receiving attention in the press.

JFK (1)(A)

Charles W. Kane
Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director
for Management and Services

Atts

EYES ONLY SECRET

17 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Charles W. Kane - JFK (1)(A)
Iden 108

JFK (1)(B)

1. Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI contacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or not the Subjects worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests of this nature were followed up by the FBI with an interview of the subjects.

2. I briefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on the "Watergate" case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry. Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.

JFK (1)(B)

3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised of the Subjects' employment with the Agency, he indicated that the Bureau does not wish to interview them.

4. The office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108 in the same fashion as Mr. True was previously interviewed.

Already [illegible] in file [illegible] 7/2

JFK (1)(A)

5. I called Mr. Kane both at his office and his residence and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July. I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.

JFK (1)(A)

6. Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has seen Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned

JFK (1A)
JFK (1B)

by the fact that Mr[illegible]Kane accompanied a technic[illegible]sweep team to the Montevideo station. Mr. Kane stated further that around Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from Jack Bauman who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. Mr. Bauman asked Mr. Kane how he could get in touch with him. Mr. Kane obtained Mr. Hunt's telephone number through telephone information channels whereupon he passed the number on to Mr. Bauman.

JFK (1A) (1B)

7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that Jack Bauman has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may have obtained his name from him.

signed Iden 17

Deputy Director of Security

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities

1. As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:

JFK (1)(C)

a. CI Staff - Mr. Richard Ober's program for processing data of U.S. citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists, etc.

b. FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program for recording data on foreign and U.S. physicians from American Medical Association records.

c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern listing travel of U.S. citizens to and from Communist countries.

JFK (1)(B)

2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on data processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).

3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with possibly sensitive domestic overtones.

a. DDS&T/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103 for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction System."

b. DDS&T/ORD's Project which involved the collection of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms terminated this program last Fall.

JFK (1)(A)

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL E-2

1[illegible] May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Research Project on Robert Vesco

JFK (1)(A)

1. On 16 October 1972 [Messrs.] Breckinridge and [Heintzelman] in the course of a Survey, were briefed on activities of the Atlantic/Pacific Division of the Office of Economic Reports. One project cited was a query from the Director, apparently at the request of Secretary Shultz, to the effect, "What do we know about Vesco," the man then running IOS. Two of OER's analysts were assigned to the project and, working through the Domestic Contact Service, spent a day going over the files of the Securities and Exchange Commission. There apparently was some contact also with EUR Division of the Deputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current Intelligence.

2. The information above is based on rough notes and obviously is sketchy. It is cited now not to suggest any wrongdoing but because of the current publicity about Vesco and the probability of continuing probes into the subject by the press and the courts.

Scott D. Breckinridge

JFK (1)(A) [H. Henry Heintzelman]

22 May [illegible]973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

Bill--

Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:

1. Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0613/68, Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).

This document was produced in two versions--one with the chapter on radical students in America (pages 25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow, and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the other version without the references to the American scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the Agency. This document without the material on the US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger. A still more abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General in March 1969.

2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1969), No. 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).

3. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look (12 June 1970), No. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 98).

Please note that these are our record copies and should be returned.

I-A
4/16/77
S.S. 71.

Attachments

Edward W. Proctor
Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence

00171

JFK(A)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 013329

CJA

[redacted]

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activities Possibly Outside [CIA's Legislative Charter]

JFK (1)(b)

1. This memorandum responds to your instruction to report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's legislative charter.

2. All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate have reviewed the past and present activities of their components. I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any activities related to either the Watergate affair or the break into the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two improper activities:

Hunt:	Col. White, Richard Lehman, and I talked to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation of a recommendation in support of the Agency's nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National Civil Service League Award.
Mitchell:	While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General, an OCI officer was assigned the task of providing him with daily briefings on foreign developments.

D... 3/17/94 JFK ... 9803 RDD/gcl

DECLASSIFIED BY 9803 RDD/gcl (JFK)
ON 3/17/94
per GMB

00183

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
GMB 3/3/94
(9803 RDD/gcl 3/17/94 JFK)

Classified by UI3329

[redacted]

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

JFK 1(C)

Young: Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS had frequent contacts with Young during the summer of 1972 in connection with Executive Order 11652 and the implementing NSC directive. This involved visits by Young to CIA to discuss information storage and retrieval and several meetings of an inter-agency group dealing with the implementation of the Executive Order and directive.

3. In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders. Their responses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be viewed as borderline.

- DCS collects information on foreign students studying in the US.
- DCS collects information on physicians practicing in the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign nationals).
- DCS accepts information on possible foreign involvement in US dissident groups and on the narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal with the FBI and BNDD directly.
- DCS assesses the suitability and willingness of US citizens to cooperate with CIA.
- DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973, was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas calls.
- Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.
- NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify photography too "sensitive" for public release.

J-FK-4(DC)

- NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special purposes such as natural catastrophies and civil disturbances.

- OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence memoranda on possible foreign connections with the US anti-war movement and world-wide student dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of the White House.

- CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to the Soviet, and occasionally other foreign, embassies to acquire positive foreign intelligence.

- FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work directly for another agency, e.g., to the FBI to translate Arabic in Washington.

- FBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports covered by copyright. These are circulated within the Government and stamped "Official Use Only". This has gone on for three decades without problems.

- FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens such as those by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda, and Ramsey Clarke.

- FBIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service under Department of Commerce cover since 1957. JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of unclassified publications in foreign languages and contracts with private individuals to do this work. Most of these individuals are not witting of the CIA-JPRS relationship.

Edward W Proctor
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

JFK(1)(b)

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM : Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states. Two DDI memoranda were produced on the subject: "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look" (12 June 1970). In each a single paragraph was devoted to ties with the US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black power activists to the Caribbean and other overt contacts.

2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to write a memorandum with special attention to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in the US. The record is not clear where this request originated, but it came through channels from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially sensitive and was to include material provided by the Special Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful evidence of important links between militant blacks in the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of the conclusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced in typescript form and given to the DCI.

267

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652 exemption category:
5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

JFK(1B)

3. For several months in the first half of 1968 the Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad during a period when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only, although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

SECRET/SENSITIVE

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

JFK(1)(B)

To the best of my knowledge, DCS has not engaged in any activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as illegal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f (1) of providing operational support within the US to all elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if misinterpreted. For example:

1. Provide personality and assessment data on certain foreign students and visiting foreign scientists and officials.

2. Identify foreign students in the US through collection of foreign student lists from certain universities.

3. Provide personality and assessment data on US citizens to determine their suitability and willingness to cooperate with the Agency.

4. Introduce cooperative US businessmen and academicians to Agency personnel who are in alias but using CIA credentials.

5. Collect information on possible foreign involvement or penetration of US dissident groups, but only in a passive manner and only when the source has refused to pass the information directly to the FBI.

6. Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again only in a passive manner when the source has refused to pass the information directly to BNDD or the FBI.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

00187

E2 IMPDET CL BY 004176

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

JFK(1C)

7. Collect specific information and supply duplicate or master keys for foreign hotels.

8. Collect medical information from cooperative contacts on foreign leaders who have received medical treatment or examinations in the US.

9. Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing in the US who have studied abroad. Although most were foreign nationals, some were US. The taped information included school, present business address, date of birth, and specialty.

10. Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas telephone calls between persons in the US and persons overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points routed through US switchboards. This activity lasted for approximately six months but has ceased.

11.

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.

James R Murphy

JAMES R. MURPHY
Director, Domestic Contact Service

SECRET
EYES ONLY

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM : Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of worldwide student dissidence. Confronted by timult at campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Free University and elsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful dissidence was interconnected: spawned by the same causes; financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences hostile to the interests of the US and its allies; or likely to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests.

JFK

2. The paper was prepared by Paul Corscadden of OCI with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs. The DDI, D/OCI, and Corscadden met with Rostow to elicit the reasons for his or the President's concerns and to agree on the sources to be examined, the research methods to be followed, etc.

3. Written during the summer of 1968, the most sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two sections. The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest, its motivation, histor, and tactics. This section drew heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense, the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page) typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCI's request in December 1967. (We no longer have a copy.)

JFK

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. [illegible] exemption category:
[illegible] (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

4. Because of the paucity of information on foreign student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which then monopolized the field of student action here and abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters--ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself as a review of foreign student dissidence.

5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on world-wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be in the Johnson Library.

JFK (1A)

6. Following the paper's favorable reception by the President and Mr. Rostow, the DCI briefed the NSC on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.

7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in September 1968 and then updated and issued again in March 1969 and August 1970.

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

SC 03289/73

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD), Office of Communications, Operational Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies

JFK(1)(B)

1. Prior to 1969 the [OC COMINT intercept unit,] which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support to these activities in monitoring, identification and DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made through the [DDO's Chief, WH, Miami.]

JFK(1)(A)

2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division [D/DDO] requested that the Special Programs Division initiate a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America. The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of the availability of personnel and technical capabilities, the survey was conducted at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92 Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily intercepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the intercept was instituted. On 30 January 1973, all coverage was terminated by Division D because of possible legal complications.

3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal technical liaison with operating components of the FBI for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements for support of specific activities have been made by the Division [D/DDO.] Support has been provided in the form of

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

E2 IMPDET CL BY [061947]

~~TOP~~ SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

JFK(1)(A)

Downgraded to Secret
on 6/17/16 per Auto declass
[illegible] 713745780

JFK 10(b)

exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical assistance and training, and the loan of (Agency) equipment. In the past several years, support has been rendered to sensitive FBI projects ~~MOHAWK~~, ~~UNION~~ and ~~WUGRAVEL~~. Support has been and is presently being given to FBI projects ORKID and ROSE. These projects are described in the attached sealed envelope.

JFK 1

4. An operational test of an NSA-developed HF/DF system was jointly conducted by NSA, (Division D/DDO) and OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972. A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the tests because of similarity to the actual target site and environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DF site. A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the roof. A team member in effect told him that the group was an advance security segment for the Democratic National Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests were completed and the equipment was returned to the Washington area.

signed Iden 53

Chief, Special Programs Division, OC

Att.

Downgraded to secret
on 6/7/16 pursuant declass
guide J13J45780

SENSITIVE

9 May 1973

MOHAWK — - Electronic survey of Iden 63.
This operation was terminated approximately two months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for two days.

UNION - Iden 98 flooding of the cipher device employed by the Iden 94 . Embassy on their diplomatic communication link. SPD/SEO support terminated two years ago.

ORKID - Electronic surveillance of Iden 64
Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved only in planning at this time, (attendance at two meetings).

ROSE - Electronic surveillance of Iden 62
. SPD/CMT personnel performed an electronic search of the Iden 62 area and SPD/SEO personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording of the spectrum covering .1 to .6 GHz during the period 16 to 20 April 1973. Plans call for continued support by SPD in the future as requested.

WUGRAVEL - Division D operation involving a Iden 95 code clerk. SEO provided equipment, trained case officer in use of device and stood by in Iden 97, Washington, D.C., to back up case officer if needed. The operation took place in July 1972.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

SENSITIVE

00142

Downgraded to Secret
on 6/7/16 per auth [illegible]
~~[illegible]~~ TS 345780.

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM : Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

JFK (1)(A)

1. In late 1967 OCI participated in the preparation of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the foreign connections of US organizations and activists involved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of these reports, prepared at the request of the White House, was to determine whether any links existed between international Communist elements or foreign governments and the American peace movement. The conclusion reached was that there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between anti-war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of direction or formal coordination.

JFK (1)(B)

2. In October 1967 President Johnson expressed interest in this subject and ordered a high level interdepartmental survey. In response to his personal request to the DCI, Mr. Helms asked the CI Staff to collect whatever information was available through our own sources and through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the President.

3. A book message requirement was sent to all stations to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this subject. Although agent reports on Communist front operations overseas were of some value, the primary source of information on the activities of US activists--and that was quite limited--was sensitive intercepts produced by NSA, which had been similarly tasked by the White House.

JFK (1)(B)

Downgraded to Secret
on 4/7/16 per Auto declass
guide J13745780

JFK (1)(A)

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652 exemption category:
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

JFK

4. A draft memorandum was jointly prepared by OCI and CI Staff and forwarded to the DCI. He passed this typescript memo, dated 15 November 1967, to the President personally. The White House copy is now in the files of President Johnson's papers at the library in Austin.

5. Brief follow-up memoranda were prepared and forwarded to the White House on 21 December and 17 January 1968. According to our best recollection, no further finished intelligence reports on international connections of the peace movement were produced.

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

JFK(1)(C)

1. This memorandum responds to the DDI's request for a listing of any questionable involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable man could construe as improper.

2. CRS does, of course, have several programs to acquire still pictures, movies, videotapes and books either privately, secretly or without acknowledgement that CIA is the actual end user. CRS is regularly involved with Customs in looking at the content of film cans addressed to the Russian Embassy in Washington. Customs occasionally also provides access to other film from denied areas. It may be addressed to private citizens or organizations or other embassies. These efforts are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign information.

3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S. citizens or organizations. The biographic file-building criteria specifically excludes U.S. nationals unless the person has become of such major importance in the political life of a foreign country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge, only 2 persons so qualify. One is the wife of the opposition leader of Guyana and the other is Hope Lang. Our Cuban files probably include some persons who are now U.S. citizens but we have no way to separate them; we have files on U.S. defectors to Cuba.)

SECRET JFK(1)(A)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 004050

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

JFK (1B)

4. The CIA Library has several informal snag files intended to aid the librarians in answering the kinds of questions that they know they will get on a continuing basis. An appointments file is a collection of clippings on appointed federal officials: who holds what job when and what is his background? The extremist files are a collection of folders on a variety of organizations and a few people with intricate organizational links. Any sort of extremism is grist for these particular files. And a few persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver, have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of clippings from public media. These files are unclassified and consist mostly of clippings from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground, scholarly.

5. I am not aware of any other kind of involvement in domestic activities that is not related to development of techniques or logistics or legitimate training of CRS personnel.

H. C. EISENBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service

JFK (2A)

3 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities

JFK(1)(B)

1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg and Watergate cases.

2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of Communications components for special operations (usually abroad) involving close-support SIGINT work or translation of audio take. On one occasion recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short-term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg of the DDO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS participation was approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training of Chinese Nationalist cadets.

3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency transmissions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes some material which falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel, and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without specific addressees, e.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's NCNA, are monitored by FBIS and the material is disseminated without restriction. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house, correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private point-to-point transmissions. FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of material monitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official Use Only" caveat. The same caveat is used on material which we monitor from other press agencies which are protected by international copyright, e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (MENA), and the Iraqi Nes Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news

JFK (1)(A)

SECRET

JFK(1)(b)

agency material for nearly three decades without problems. Recently, however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use Only" caveat will not bar such material from the general public under the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into alternative measures, among which are: (1) the purchase of news services with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of those items vital to the government's business which we must continue to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weighed against the risk of present procedures.

4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American POW's in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnam. At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion submitted transcripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such cases, we have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved, presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses. (In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all this with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we rue attribution of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.

5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of their CIA employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and contains some risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public knowledge. The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently taking a second look.

EHKnoche
E. H. KNOCHE
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

SECRET
SENSITIVE

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology

SUBJECT : TSD Support to Other Agencies

JFK (1)(B)

1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for Operations.

2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency for International Development, and the White House.

3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these services have included training and materials, and in a few instances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance, secret writing and related communications, personal protection, disguise, concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detection, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.

4. In most instances requirements for this support are received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels. Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is required.

5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two.

JFK (1)(A)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059098

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.

JFK1(b)

8. Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters, whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs Staff.

9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded of the outstanding documentation.

Sidney Gottlieb
Chief
Technical Services Division

Attachment
Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee, w/att

ATTACHMENT

JFK (1)(C)

Department of Defense

Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing, flaps and seals; counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department of Defense and certain elements of the Special Forces. All requests are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters and with the Chief of Stations overseas. In turn these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -type cases.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreign targets in the United States.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

JFK (1)(B)

Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices, SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau. All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordination with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate. Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS or his designee before action by TSD is taken.

Immigration and Naturalization

CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in developing tamperproof alien registration cards, special fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service. Requests are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if operational.

JFK (1)(B)

Department of State

Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been supplied the State Department. In addition analyses and exposure of black letter operations against the United States abroad are made. All graphics requirements are forwarded to TSD for further coordination within the Division. The Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports, foreign visas and in the past passports on a priority basis.

Postal Service

JFK (1B)

The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has been furnished foreign postal information and has been the recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent ink, typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with the (DDO and DDO/EA.) The Post Office has furnished TSD with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.

Secret Service

JFK (1B)

Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the (DDO.)

U. S. Agency for International Development

We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation is under an approval of a CI-Police Group project. Courses are given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the

JFK 1(B)

request of CI/PG. Trainees represent internal security or national police from all countries participating in AID Police assistance programs.

White House

Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.

Police Respresenting Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria

JFK 1(B)

During the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio, locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry were given to selected members from the above mentioned cities. Overall training was approved by the Director of Centeral Intelligence and in turn validation was required for each course from the Director of Security.

☐ ☐ SE ONLY ☐ ☐

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) [illegible]

FROM:
Sidney Gottlieb
Chief, TSD
203 South Building

EXTENSION x-2831

NO.

DATE 8 May 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDS&T				Attached herewith are additional explanations of TSD support to other U.S. Government agencies.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				SECRET-EYES ONLY
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				00220
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

ATTACHMENT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were involved in operations:

(A) Identity 59 - Four masked transmitters were installed. Two have failed and two remain workable.

(B) Identity 60 - A TSD built masked transmitter was installed to collect emanations from a cryptographic machine. The system continues to function when samples of the emanations are needed.

(C) Identity 61 - Two transmitters have been installed and are operating. One is specifically designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the other is a straight audio transmitter to collect conversations. A FBI agent is manning the listening post. A third system is not operating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape made from this room was made by the National Security Agency before failure.

(D) Identity 62 - TSD furnished equipment and consultation covering Identity 62 First masked switched transmitters were used in two apartments used as temporary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters and microwave transmitters were installed in the permanent quarters along with mic and wire installations, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This installation is not fully operational because the full complement of personnel have not yet arrived.

JFK (1)(B)

(E) Iden [illegible]4 - This is an operation with additional participation by National Security Agency. It is designed in anticipation of the Identity 64 in Washington. The listening post was obtained by using [the Agency covert] mechanisms for procuring the property. New systems are being designed and produced by using TSD's covert contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.

(F) Identity 65 - Ten masked audio devices purchased from TSD were installed in Identity 65

by the FBI. Part of the equipment was installed in November and December 1971, the remaining equipment was installed 17 - 25 March 1972. Tests made by a TSD officer from a temporary FBI listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that the target equipment no longer functioned and was believed discovered by the occupants.

(G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute an on-the-shelf capability to engage in photo and audio surveillance operations which might not be known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a relatively unsophisticated device was used against a domestic target.

S E C R E T

TSD/SDB Memo #138-73

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD

ATTENTION: Executive Officer

SUBJECT: Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations

JFK (10)

1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the training came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.

2. On occasion during the past few years, under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiarization to police officers of several domestic police departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These techniques had been declassified and are currently available to the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center publishes periodic guidance in their uses.

3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB officers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB officers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete information on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.

/s/ Identity 120

C/TSD/OPS/SDB

SECRET

00223

E2 IMPDET/CL BY 0619

73-23[illegible]

JFK (1)(B)

ORD-2328-73
9 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Repeated Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities

JFK (1)(B)

JFK (1)(B)

The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined with respect to all ORD services or dealings with other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters. In addition, this report covers all our activities dealing with the research and development of intelligence equipment for foreign use which has been tested in the United States and might have collected domestic information. Again, each member of ORD available today was asked either directly or through his supervisor to provide the above requested information, whether he was directly involved or not. We have used all diligence to search our records available to us during this time period to ensure this is a complete and factual list.

for Sayre Stevens
Director of Research & Development

Attachments:
1 - Contacts with Other Government Agencies
2 - Domestic Tests

JFK (1)(A)

CLASSIFIED BY 357323
EX[illegible]
SCH[illegible]
§ 5B( ) [illegible]
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

JFK
1(B)

CONTACTS WITH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHICH COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED TECHNOLOGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

Executive Office of the President

JFK(1)(B)

[ORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committee of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control that is concerned with research support of the narcotics control problem.]

(Dr. Leonard Laster, OST) (Cianci/LS)

Office of Telecommunications Policy

Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information was exchanged with them.

(Noe/TA)

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)

Techniques and equipment for navigation and tracking was discussed with BNDD.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Van Dewerker/TA)
(Noe/TA)

Technical information was exchanged relating to the development of simple, portable sensor systems for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and narcotic laboratory effluents.

(Mr. John Gunn and
Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD) (Parker/DSP)

Audio tapes were processed to improve their intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Scott/An)

SECRET

ATTACHMENT 1

JFK (1)(B)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

BNDD (cont'd)

JFK (1)(B)

[BNDD was given permission in the fall of 1972 to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc., concerning a Radar People Detector developed for ORD.]

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) Identity 125 /LS)

A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed for the detection of narcotics for application in Southeast Asia. BNDD was given a demonstration of the instrument.

(Dr. Laster/OST) (Terek/LS)
(Mr. Stan Sobel, BNDD)

USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee

JFK (1)(B)

Continuing contacts were maintained with the intelligence community regarding technical surveillance countermeasurs and physical security. This exchange of information, reports, and equipment has been conducted under the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and Navy.

(Noe/TA)
(Noyes/PD)

State Department

Two contracts for development of countermeasures techniques were funded jointly with the State Department.

(Noe/TA)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

JFK (1)(b)

Some of the AEC Laboratories, e.g., Savannah River Laboratory, are supported by CIA to develop radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and devices. These Laboratories have used sampling techniques developed for CIA to measure CONUS nuclear plant releases.

(Mr. B. Benson, AEC) (Walker/DSP)

At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard Cowan, the walls of the office of the Chairman of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed. The operation occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies created by the use of the non-linear junction detector.

(Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC) (Noyes/PD)

Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA)

JFK (1)(b)

Reports and information about the ORD-developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System were made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control.

(Mr. Les Schubin, LEAA) Identity 125 /LS)

Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information were exchanged with LEAA.

(Noe/TA)

JFK (1)(B)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of [CIA-Developed] Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Treasury

JFK (1)(A)

[Dr. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department to assist in formulating their R&D program and organization in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug enforcement administration.] The request for his services was made by Identity 3, the Agency's Narcotics Coordinator. Identity 3 discussed the request and cleared the detailing through Mr. Colby.

(Leahy/LS)

Customs/Treasury Department

Technical discussions were held with Customs relating to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over the U.S.-Mexico border.

(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs) (Lawrence/DSP)

Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/IRS

JFK (1)(B)

[About five years ago, assistance was requested in domestic search of "moonshine" stills using CIA infrared scanners. This was turned down.]

(Lawrence/DSP)

Secret Service

We have had numerous discussions with the Secret Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques and equipment.

(Van Dewerker/TA)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems -

Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)

The results of our research work in the detection of metals (NOLIR) were reported to FAA for possible use in the detection of hijacker weapons.

(MacAnlis/RP)

National Institute of Health (NIH)

JFK (1)(b)

At the request of ORD, OCS assigned a staff technician to undertake to write a computer program for the Wisswesser Line Notation (WLN) chemical notation method. This work was done in cooperation with NIH.

(Ms. Coniver, NIH) Identity 125 /LS)

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

JFK (1)(b)

LS/ORD met frequently with ACDA personnel in order to structure ORD's BW/CW research programs to support ACDA needs.

Identity 125 /LS)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Technical information relating to detection of radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with them.

(Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA) (Walker/DSP)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

EPA (cont'd)

Technical discussions relating to using IR scanning equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary land fill have been conducted.

(Mr. Gene James, EPA) (Risinger/DSP)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement techniques germane to removing distortions from some photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down.

(Stephan/IPA)

Secret Service
FBI
U.S. Customs

Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs.

(Mr. Robert Burnell, SS) (Noyes/PD)
(Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI)
(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)

NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)

We have an on-going program, Project TAMPER, to develop automated systems for exploiting satellite-borne multispectral sensors for earth resources assessments.

(Mr. William Ruble, USDA) (Galinaitis/IPA)
(Mr. Leonard Jaffe, NASA)
(General Smart)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Proposed Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association would be SECRET)

JFK (1)(B)

The Agency is preparing a proposal for an experimental program to aid in estimating the Soviet wheat crop. A part of the information would be obtained from a satellite launched for other announced programs. Ground-truth data will be collected on North American crops.

(Briglia/PAS)

U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

JFK (1)(B)

CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre plot of opium poppies at a USDA research site in Washington state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium poppies.

(Mr. Quentin Jones, USDA) (Lawrence/DSP)
(Mr. Fred Garfield, BNDD) (Cianci/LS)

Army, Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force, Office of the Inspector General
Army, Office of Provost Marshall General

We have exchanged technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information with them.

(Noe/TA)

U.S. Army
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Toelle Ordnance Depot

JFK (1)(B)

LS/ORD tested environmental samples from testing, storage and production facilities in the U.S.

(Identity 125/LS)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

U.S. Army, Edgewood Arsenal

JFK(1)(B)

[LS/ORD] is sharing expenses with EA in field testing an IR remote detector of CW aerosols.

Identity 125 /LS)

U.S. Navy

JFK(1)(B)

[BSD/ORD] turned over about eight trained dolphins to the Navy in December 1969, because we discontinued our dolphin program.

(Lynch/LS)

U.S. Coast Guard

JFK (1)(B)

About six years ago [CIA infrared equipment was made available for USCG tests to evaluate IR as a means for night search of life boats.]

(then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG) (Lawrence/DSP)

Identity 174 Sheriff's Office

JFK (1)(B)

[ORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants. Polygraph security findings were compared with the Sheriff's own security findings.]

(Sheriff) Identity 125 /LS)

A study was made on con-men techniques and assessment methods in 1967-68.

(Sheriff) Identity 125 /LS)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Chief, San Francisco Police

For security reasons, the Chief was made aware of a study to evaluate attempts by non-Chiense to penetrate Chinese social groups. (1967)

(Police Chief) Identity 125/LS)

JFK (12B)

DOMESTIC TESTS FOR AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

1. As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the research and development of equipment and techniques for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we conduct experiments and tests in the United States. Clearly, the design and development of our intelligence equipments can be done more economically and more securely in this country. Although most of the tests of our R&D equipments are performed in closed laboratories or in secure areas simulating the foreign environment, some of the tests and experiments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.

2. A review of the surveillance equipment or techniques which have at some time or other been exposed to domestic testing is as follows:

a. Laser Probe - About 1967, the laser probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in San Francisco under very closely controlled conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed portions of the test. Recordings that were made of laser probe output were carefully controlled as classified material and it is believed that the tapes have long since been destroyed. (Wood/TA)

b. Microwave Intercept System - About 1968, this system was tested in a light aircraft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station in Identity 127, California. This system is designed to permit intercept of microwave telephone communication channels of systems such as Identity 130. It works equally well against the Bell Telephone TD-2, as they are generically the same. Recordings of these telephone intercepts were carefully controlled and were destroyed several years ago.

SECRET

ATTACHMENT 2

SUBJECT: Domestic Tests for Agency Research and
Development Efforts

JFK (1)(b)

c. Telephone Intrusion Study - The objective of this current program is to develop a means to utilize foreign telephone systems as a communication link without the knowledge of the host system. In order to carry out this objective, it is necessary to learn the complete supervisory signalling and sequencing control system hierarchy for the various foreign telephone systems. Many of these are patterned after the U.S. system and, for this reason, limited monitoring to test the operation of intercept equipment in the United States is planned. The data to be collected would be merely the signal tones from which supervisory codes can be extracted. Message content is of no interest and will not be recorded. Overseas testing is planned at a subsequent date. To date, some domestic testing of this concept has been carried out at the contractor's plant. No recordings have been made of such data. Extremely brief tests exercising U.S. and foreign telephone systems through supervisory tone signalling have been carried out to verify initial concepts. The duration of testing was less than one-half hour.

d. Other Sensor Testing - Examples of engineering development tests of special sensors within the United States include infrared and high-altitude photography, forward-looking IR (FLIR) flights, laser scanners, industrial effluent sampling for isotopes, and airborne magnetometer surveys for metal (rifles and trucks). In all these cases, the data output of such testing has been used for engineering development and the content has been restricted to dissemination to those in Government involved with the engineering design.

SUBJECT: Domestic Tests for Agency Research and Development Efforts

JFK (1B)

e. Remote Physiological Measurements - An ORD-developed cryogenic magnetometer is being tested at a contractor's site for use as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph). Some test subjects are witting, but most tests are on naive subjects (they do not know they are being tested). The magnetometer is completely harmless to the subject and the test results are closely held.

f. Personality Structure of Defectors Study - ORD undertook to determine the personality structure of defectors during the period 1966-69. The work primarily involved an analysis of the open literature on known defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned with a study of the phenomenon of defection itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another, or changing one set of political beliefs for another. The work was conducted at Stanford University. Identity 125/LS)

g. Trained Birds - Birds have been trained and tested in the United States to carry small intelligence collecting packages such as audio surveillance devices, small cameras, and current measuring devices. Any data collected from unwitting domestic sources would have been used only for engineering purposes and then destroyed.

h. Communications Link Loading Study - In the period from 1970 through 1972 various means were used to check out an intercept system designed to operate against Iden 93 communications links. Under carefully controlled conditions, some U. S. microwave communications were recorded and passed through the intercept system under test to prove quality of performance. All intercept material connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks of the time of intercept and the material was never checked for substantive content. NSA participated and controlled most elements of the U. S. material.

SECRET

JFK (1)(B)

[ORD-2274-73]

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities

At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief or his representative was instructed to query all of his people and report back by this afternoon whether or not they had provided any services or dealt with any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters. The attached list is an inventory of all items we were able to uncover. If additional information on any of these topics is desired, we can provide either a verbal or a written report on very short notice.

[Charles E. McGinnis

Charles E. McGinnis

Scientific Advisor

to

Director of Research & Development]

JFK (1)(A)

Attachment:
As stated

CLASSIFIED BY 387323

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY:

§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

Impossible to Determine

(unless impossible, insert date or event)

SECRET

JFK(1)(B)

[Project TAMPER, an on-going program which may be politically sensitive.]

A proposed OER wheat estimate program which may be politically sensitive.

JFK (1)(B)

[Narcotics--our foreign activities are well known in DDS&T.]

A negative report from the Support Staff.

JFK (1A)

[ORD's NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledge.]

Robert Scott - Performed intelligibility enhancement of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.

James M. Stephan - At the request of FBI, we described Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to removing distortions from some photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down.

7 May 197

C. V. NOYES

My total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Specifically, I participated in TSCC and R&D Subcommittee meetings which included technology exchanges and some equipment exchanges on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial. I also assisted in x-raying the office walls of the Chairman of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening (date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.

Other persons contacted over the years have been:

Mr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service
Mr. Martin Pera, U. S. Customs
Mr. Marvin Beasley, DASA
Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI
Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF
Major John Langager, ONI/USN
Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC

SECRET

Thomas P. Noe
5/7/73

1. Continuing contacts with intelligence community regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security. (This is an exchange of information and reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community.)

State
Air Force
Army
DIA
FBI
Navy
US Secret Service
NSA

2. Joint funding of two contracts with State Department (TRW/LLL). Two electret microphones were furnished to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD contract (Bureau of Standards).

3. Other DOD and Government contacts for information collection or exchange only.

ARPA
LEAA/Dept. of Justice
DNA/DOD
Office Telecommunications Policy
Office of Army/Provost Marshal General
Army/Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force/Office of the Inspector General
Air Force/Electronic Systems Division

7 May 1973

LS/ORD CONTACTS WITH DOMESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES

JFK(1)(B)

1. BNDD (Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Radar People Detector developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action was approved by D/ORD.

2. BSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the Navy. Time: December 1969

3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation System. Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control.

SECRET SENSITIVE

29 MAY 1973

JFK (1)(b)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT : Reported Identity 61 , Burglary

1. Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the reported break-in of Identity 61. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.

JFK (1)(b)

2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio operation conducted against Identity 61 by the FBI, at the Agency's behest and with its technical support. This presents a related question that should be noted. James McCord's testimony indicates that he placed telephone calls to the Identity 75 and Identity 61. He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping that if his phone was tapped his attorneys would be able to challenge the evidence as being tainted. Another witness, John Caulfield, says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he "was sure" they "were subjects of national security wiretaps."

JFK (1)(b)

3. In fact, there has been a long-standing telephone tap on the Identity 75 , run by the FBI, about which CI Staff believes McCord knew. It is possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation against Identity 61 , and assumed that it was also a telephone tap. One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping that both his telephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive operations. At this point, given the publicity of the Iden 61 break-in, and the testimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations may lead to exposure of the operations.

3)x4

William V. Broe
William V. Broe
Inspector General

00361

Attachment:
As Stated Above

SECRET SENSITIVE

CL[illegible]
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

24 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Reported Burglary of the Identity 61

1. The press reported a burglary of Identity 61 13-14 May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent fingerprints, but no identification was made. The FBI, which states that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it determined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61 registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expressed, Identity 61 making it clear that they suspected something other than ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject. There had been an earlier intelligence operation against the Identity 61 which is described below.

JFK (1B)

2. On 16 April 1971 the Agency proposed to the FBI the installation of technical coverage of Identity 61 The opportunity for such an installation came about when a domestic asset of Foreign Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid for a contract to renovate Identity 61 Upon securing the contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate or install material which would be provided him. The Agency proposed to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic support. The value of such an operation to the intelligence community was cited.

JFK (1B)

3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms sent a letter to Attorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. On 24 April the Attorney-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation.

00382

CL[illegible]

(unless impossible, insert date or event)

SECRET SENSITIVE

4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the technical equipment from the Agency to the FBI was delivered, installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency personnel were involved in any way with actual installation of equipment in Identity 61 From May to February Agency technicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did they enter Identity 61.

JFK 1(b)

5. The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 be stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover advised that he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and might have to advise them that the installation in Identity 61 was initiated at CIA's request. The operation and equipment, to the best of the Agency's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972 when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage. The request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76 delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on nationalization of foreign holdings. While the FBI was still in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of State on 20 December 1972 requested the FBI to institute all possible coverage of Identity 61 and on 22 December 1972 coverage was partially reinstituted with full coverage in effect by 26 December 1972.

JFK 1(b)

6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was not worth continuing. On 16 February 1973 CIA requested the FBI to discontinue the coverage. On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised that microphone surveillance of Iden 61 was discontinued.

John C. Richards
John C. Richards

ggi this
el sin our
ints in
files, but
it out of

Addendum

[illegible]ferred to in JCRichards' 24[illegible]v 73 memo to IG, paragraph 2, re Identity 61 Break-in

1. The Foreign Resources Division asset was Identity 77 who owned the Identity 78

JFK
(1)(b)

. The Agency had initially agreed to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to $2500. The final amount of remuneration turned out to be $4,828.53. Another FR asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79 plumber and elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972.

2. TSD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening post were: Identity 80, Identity 30 and Identity 45 of TSD and Harold Leith of Division D.

VIII. Coordination

A. Internal

In developing its cadre of general support assets and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact with the [Domestic Contact Service] of the Directorate for Intelligence, using their assets wherever and whenever possible to support FR's operational activities. To a more limited degree, FR Bases maintain contacts with Office of Security and Office of Personnel field representatives, pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by these officers and using their entre to specific individuals who can provide access to targets of operational interest.

JFK(1)(B)

B. External

FR officers in the field maintain coordination with their FBI counterparts. There is limited cooperation with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are of occasional help in operations involving other nationals. The local field offices of the FBI are made aware of the presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on occasion provided backstopping on cases where there was some flap potential.

Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between the Agency and the FBI dated 7 February 1966.

The Bases also have contact with local Immigration and Naturalization Service offices although these contacts are less frequent and less important than the contacts with the FBI offices.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

441 THRU 5th NR 474

475

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88296 Date: 2025

THE STATE LAW DEPARTMENT

1208 Munsey Building

Baltimore 2, Maryland

July 16, 1952

Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Post Office Box 2015
Baltimore 3, Maryland

Gentlemen:

I am enclosing for your information copy of letter dated June 8, 1950 from the Industrial Employment Review Board to Dr. Gurney; also copy of Mrs. Gurney's letter to Dr. Byrd, President of University of Maryland. I know that you will be interested in Mrs. Gurney's letter.

If you have any further information regarding Gurney I would certainly appreciate same. I am also interested to know something more about the Industrial Employment Review Board, especially whether or not your records are available to it and the importance of its findings.

Thanking you for your kindness and cooperation,

Very truly yours,

O. BOWIE DUCKETT,
Special Assistant Attorney General.

OBD:t

Encs.

ENCLOSURE 65-59841-

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

62-116395

July 25, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2ALM/JT

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number 1. b., of Part I, Appendix B of referenced communication requested Committee Staff access to all indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated by the Intelligence Division for 1960 to the present.

Attached to this memorandum is a list of all retrievable programs, projects, surveys and procedures employed in connection with domestic intelligence operations of the FBI which may be of interest to you. There were a number of other programs, projects, surveys and procedures employed in connection with foreign counterintelligence operations of the FBI which are not included. In the event you desire information concerning these latter items, which include extremely sensitive matters, we would be pleased to discuss them with SSC Staff Members at FBI Headquarters.

MAL

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:lek/lhb lhb
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Pur WRW WOG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-442X

GPO 954-546

11/21/00 #MDR16
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/ZTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

PRO[illegible]ED CLASSIFICATION.
I HAVE MOST FILES AT
MY DESK ON THESE
CODENAMES/CODEWORDS
FOR RESEARCH NEEDS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE: ~~T~~OP SECRET

The Programs, Projects, Surveys and Procedures List (PPSPL), enclosed, and the Counterintelligence PPSPL, infra, were generated by SA Thomas E. Burns, Jr. from a review of available INTD inspection reports and files.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PPSPL

1. Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries - Developing positive intelligence information regarding personnel in the United States from non-Soviet-bloc countries.
2. International Organization - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside the Soviet-bloc - Centralized compilation of potentially dangerous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom the U. S. State Department could initiate steps to deport or to lift diplomatic immunity in the event of a war emergency.
3. Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas - FBI maintaining results of name checks conducted by various members of U. S. intelligence community based on information provided to such intelligence organizations by INS regarding aliens meeting established criteria.
4. Special Support Group (Use of non-Agent surveillance personnel). U
5. [Alem - Uncovering of Soviet illegals entering the United States.] (S)
6. [Anagram - Penetration of foreign diplomatic establishments in the United States for procurement of cryptographic materials.] (S) (Mr. Buchen, Counsel to the President, has advised that sensitive information such as that regarding [Anagram] and electronic surveillances is to be handled in an oral briefing to be given to Senators Church and Tower). (S)

~~T~~OP SECRET

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED: ~~TOP~~ SECRET

7. Banpop - Identification of Soviet illegals through the transfer of funds through Swiss banks.

8. Chinese Aliens Entering the United States - Identification of ethnic Chinese legally entering the U.S. with intelligence assignments.

9. Chinese Communist Contacts with Scientists in the United States - Development of selected scientists of ethnic Chinese background as foreign counterintelligence assets to be targeted against People's Republic of China (PRC) personnel and establishments in the U.S. and Canada.

10. Chinese Entering the United States Claiming Citizenship - Identification of Chinese legally entering the U.S. with intelligence assignments.

11. Chinese University and Graduate School Index - List of Chinese aliens in the U.S. who have attended colleges or graduate schools on the Chinese mainland and who are considered potential candidates for development as U.S. assets.

12. [Cokma - Specialized physical surveillance directed against foreign intelligence officers.] (S) I HAVE FILE 65-73750

13. [Canil - Identification of Soviet illegals arriving in the United States from Europe through Canada.] (S)

14. Chicoin - Counterintelligence activities to thwart efforts of Chinese intelligence in this country. (U) DRC MINS

15. Forest - Screening of records of foreign students at New York University, other than those in authorized programs, to uncover Soviet illegals. (S)

~~TOP~~ SECRET

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED: T~~O~~P SECRET

16. Proho – [Program to detect homosexuals who have been compromised or recruited by Soviet intelligence.] (S) File 105-140972

17. Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U. S. Residents with Chinese Diplomatic Establishments – Investigations conducted regarding certain individuals meeting established criteria.

18. Visitors to Iron Curtain Countries – Interviews of selected U. S. tourists to determine possible contact by Soviet-bloc intelligence. U

19. [Orkid – Technical penetration of Soviet establishments in the United States.] (S) File 105-189368

20. [Cloverleaf – Technical penetration of new Soviet residential complex, Riverdale, New York City.] (S) File 105-231856

21. Sam Survey – Screening of mail to selected European cities. U

22. Gus Survey – Screening of mail originating in New York, New York, destined for specific postal zones. U

23. Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets – Recording of Soviet purchases in such areas--intelligence and counterintelligence purposes.

24. [Rega – Identification of Soviet illegals entering the U.S. as aliens during certain years.] (S) 65-73094

25. [Secomex – Expanded Mexican border coverage to include development of sources against the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.] (S) File 105-148076

T~~O~~P SECRET

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5

DCU POLICY MEMO
STATES MENTION OF
NAME ITSELF IS
NOT CLASSIFIED

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

76

NOTE CONTINUED: ~~TOP~~ SECRET

26. Sobir - [Investigation of certain Soviet-bloc immigrants and repatriates in an attempt to identify those previously recruited by Soviet-bloc intelligence.] (S)

27. Socap - Review of certain records to identify Soviet illegals who have applied for documentation as U.S. residents as part of their effort to establish a bona fide cover identity. FILE 65-66114

28. Vietnamese Refugee - Efforts to uncover possible infiltration of North Vietnamese agents in the refugee flow to the United States.

29. (Walklok - Screening of requests for birth certificates under an established criteria to identify such requests which may have originated with Soviet intelligence.] (S) FILE 65-75130

30. Technical and Microphone Surveillance - Survey of telephone and microphone installations functioning at certain times. U.

31. [Al Fatah Automatic Data Processing Project - means of identifying Al Fatah members and their contacts through use of ADP equipment.] (S)

32. Cuban Refugee - Detection of Cuban intelligence agents who might infiltrate into the U.S. through refugee channels. (S) ?

33. Deseco - Development of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc officials. U

34. East-West Exchange - Provided internal security safeguards regarding admission to the U.S. of Soviet and satellite nationals. U

35. Z Coverage - Screening of mail destined for the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. U

~~TOP~~ SECRET

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6

NOTE CONTINUED: T~~O~~P SECRET

36. Chiprop - Screening of mail to the United States from Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China (PRC). U

37. Chiclet - Screening of mail from the United States to Hong Kong and the PRC. U

38. [Alchemy - "notional" Pro-Marxist - Leninist - Maoist domestic revolutionary organization staffed by Bureau assets directed at uncovering PRC intelligence activities in the United States.] (S)

39. [Geology - Verification of individuals entering selected foreign countries claiming U.S. citizenship--to identify Soviet illegals.] (S) FILE 65-72903

40. Hilev - Collection of high level foreign political intelligence by FBI Legal Attaches abroad for the information of the White House. U FILE 64-41404 SEE REF

41. [Oarbit - Checking of U.S. Post Office Boxes utilized by U.S. military personnel in the vicinity of selected U.S. Military bases--to uncover possible Soviet agents.] (S) FILE 65-75385

42. [Phrenology - Efforts to identify Soviet illegals who formerly resided in a specific foreign country and whose present whereabouts are unknown.] (S) FILE 65-75008

~~Classified by 6283, XGDS 1, 2~~ and 3, Indefinite.

T~~O~~P SECRET

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED
7/25/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC request 5/14/75, Part I, Appendix B, Item 1b

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information Handling
Intelligence Collection
Operating Procedures

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Access to all available indices and control files regarding all programs operated by the Intelligence Division from 1960 to present.

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM 1276

62-116395

AJD:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-442X

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/25/75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC/TJM

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum records for the record my efforts to meet with Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, on 6/25/75.

On the late afternoon of 7/24/75, Mr. Benson Buffham, Deputy Director, National Security Agency (NSA), made available to Liaison Agent Brian Murphy a copy of a "Top Secret" memorandum dated 4/20/71, written by Louis W. Tordella, who was the then Deputy Director of NSA. This Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Shamrock, copy of which is attached, makes reference to a file entitled Shamrock available in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, United States Army.

Pursuant to your instructions on the evening of 7/24/75, I personally contacted Mr. Latimer at approximately 8:00 a.m., 7/25/75. In my conversation with Mr. Latimer, I noted that it was imperative that I see him as soon as possible regarding the contents of the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer was informed that the Bureau was attempting to establish the line of authority relative to the Bureau's procurement of foreign government's cable traffic sent through international cable companies in the United States.

REC-88 62-116395-442

Mr. Latimer indicated that he had received a call from Mr. Buffham on the late afternoon of 7/24/75 and was aware of the Bureau's interest in reviewing certain memoranda in the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer indicated that this was a matter of interest to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense and that he would have to consult with them.

Enclosure
62-116395

3 JUL 31 1975

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

WOC:lhb lhb
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

1-ENCLOSURE

84 JUL 31 1975

He advised me he would have somebody from the General Counsel's office, Department of Defense, promptly contact me regarding a review of this file by FBI personnel.

Not hearing from Mr. Latimer by the late morning of 7/25/75, I telephonically contacted his office. He was not available and I asked his secretary to have him return my call. Shortly before noon, Mr. Latimer returned my call and explained that he had discussed my request with Mr. "Marty" Hoffman (phonetic) of the Department of Defense. It was Latimer's understanding that Mr. Hoffman had gone to the White House to discuss my request with Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President. Latimer promised that he would telephonically recontact me as soon as he could establish contact with Hoffman. I again reiterated to Latimer that it was imperative the Bureau have access to the Shamrock file in order that we could advise the Attorney General as to its contents hoping to clearly demonstrate that both the then Attorney General Thomas Clark and, in fact, President Truman himself were aware of certain information contained in the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer said he understood clearly what was at issue here and that he would get back to me as soon as possible.

At 1:50 p.m., 7/25/75, I again called Mr. Latimer's office and his secretary informed me that Mr. Latimer had stepped out of his office and that she would give him a message to call me as soon as he returned. As of 4:00 p.m., 7/25/75, I had not received a return call from Mr. Latimer.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

~~TOP~~ SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

DISTRIBUTION LIMITED

20 April 1971

Copy 1 of 1.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: SHAMROCK

Mr. Buffham and I had an opportunity this morning to read the SHAMROCK file in ACSI. Major General Joe McChristian gave us permission to view it but, once we had read it, after careful consideration he decided that he would not feel free to give NSA either the file or a duplicate copy without personal permission from SecDef inasmuch as SecDef had entrusted the file to ACSI in 1949. All of us agreed that an approach to the Secretary would be unnecessary and perhaps would generate too many questions. He did agree after sealing the file again to limit access to the Secretary of Defense on demand, the Director or the Deputy Director, NSA, on demand, Chief of ACSI, and the Chief of the SSO, ACSI. This would be noted on the outside envelope.

The file contained memoranda for record, one prepared after a meeting in Forrestal's office attended by senior officials from ITT, Western Union, and RCA plus Mark~~s~~ Leva (then Defense General Counsel), Secretary Forrestal, and a representative from the Attorney General's office. Colonel Carter Clark from ACSI, who was present, prepared this memorandum. A subsequent meeting was held in Secretary Louis Johnson's office attended by representatives of the same three companies and I believe the Attorney General himself. In Mr. Johnson's own handwriting is a note to the effect that he showed the memorandum for record to President Truman and a note that TCC, apparently Attorney General Thomas Clark, either was present or had also discussed the matter with the President. Both memoranda indicated that the companies were informed that the work they were doing was of very great importance to the U.S. and every effort would be made to protect knowledge of its existence as well as to protect the companies in the event of exposure.

The material is filed under TS Control No. 516652-3-5 in the SSO ACSI files.

Louis W Tordella

LOUIS W. TORDELLA
Deputy Director

62-116395-4

Downgraded to Secret
on 6/7/76 per auth. classif.
guide CR 745780

~~TOP~~ SECRET

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL WRW

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR WOC

DATE: July 24, 1975

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman
1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

My memorandum dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 190 pages extracted from a 693-page document prepared by CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities cited in this document include references to Bureau operations of an extremely sensitive nature, and it was also noted that the Senate Select Committee has had access to this document. It was recommended that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation is involved.

This is to advise that the following pages from the document were furnished to the following Divisions and/or Sections of the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any:

General Investigative Division - Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, 155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180, 181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354

Laboratory Division - Pages 65-67, 113, 118, 119, 182, 202, 221, 222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248 were furnished for information purposes as these pages contained information concerning techniques used and/or developed by CIA which may be of interest).

Intelligence Division
Section CI-1
Pages 23, 24, 28, 29, 70, 72, 73, 77, 136, 140-142, 298, 329, 582, 615, and 628.

REC-88 62-116395-441

3 JUL 31 1975

62-116395

TJM:ekw (12)
ekw

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL [illegible] 10/6/00 BY SP2ALM/JTS

84 JUL 31 1975

Section CI-2
Pages 30 and 329

Section CI-3
Pages 26, 59-61, 282, 290, 292, 295, 310, 334, 361-363, 368, 371, 373, 376-379, 384, 385, 458, 468-470, 591-593, and 615.

Section IS-1
Pages 188, 189, 283, 330

Section IS-2
Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203, 330, and 482.

Section IS-3
Pages 521 and 549

Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the Senstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75.

ACTION: None. You will be advised of results of above requested assessment.

Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the information contained therein should be closely guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know basis.

EYES ONLY

PROJECT ~~MOCKINGBIRD~~

Project ~~Mockingbird~~, a telephone intercept activity, was conducted between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.

Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections were established with the assistance of a telephone company official who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy), the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel. (Mr. Lawrence Houston).

The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying contacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members, of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span of the activity precluded positive identification. It was observed that through these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

Since the termination of Project ~~Mockingbird~~, those materials related to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access of two Office of Security professionals.

62-116395-475 00022

ENCLOSURE

SECRET EYES ONLY

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Soviet Defector

A Soviet defector, defected to a representative of this Agency in 1964. The responsibility for his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country After initial interrogation by representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safehouse in Maryland, where he was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when he was moved to a specially constructed "jail" in a remote wooded area at ~~ISOLATION~~. The SR Division was convinced that he was a dispatched agent but even after a long period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their contention and he was confined at ~~ISOLATION~~ in an effort to convince him to "confess."

This Office together with the Office of General Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality of the Agency's position in handling a defector under these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms) by this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October ~~1967~~, the responsibility for his further handling was transferred to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.

The Soviet defector was moved to a comfortable safehouse in the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly, sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr. Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent that the Soviet defector was bona fide and he was moved to more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom of independent movement and has continued to cooperate fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Office since that time. He has proven to be the most

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 000988

SECRET

EYES ONLY

valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were explored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution of Soviet recruited agents -in several countries throughout the world. He currently is living under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife and remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed, and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states "while I regret my years of incarceration, I have no bitterness and now understand how it could happen."

I. SURVEILLANCES

A. ~~SIESTA~~

During the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May, and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of Miss Deborah Fitzgerald, a former staff employee, and Orlando Toro Nunez, a Cuban national with whom Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emotionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from employees information in Information Processing Division files, and that employees were visiting a photographic studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance, one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez was aborted because of a door lock problem.

B. ~~PARAGON~~

Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69 and her associates at various times from May to September 1971. Iden 69, an acknowledged Latin American revolutionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and had given information regarding a plot to assassinate or kidnap ~~Vice President Agnew~~ and the ~~DCI~~. Surveillances included coverage of the activities of Iden 69 during two visits to the United States, technical coverage of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives in New York City, and surveillance, including mail coverage, of several American citizens alleged to be part of the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.

C. ~~CELOTEX I~~

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted of Iden 180 of the Washington Post during

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 000988

the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971 and on 3 January 1972. In addition to physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be maintained of the building housing his office. The surveillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources of classified information of interest to the Agency which had appeared in a number of his columns.

D. MUDHEN

At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was conducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear, from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for highly classified Agency information appearing in his syndicated columns.

E. BUTANE

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to 20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was to determine his activities and contacts both with Agency employees and other individuals in regard to his proposed book and published magazine articles exposing Agency operations.

II. POLICE SUPPORT

A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions, the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan Police Department was provided a communications system to monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the Washington area. This system consisted of a radio receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency Field Office equipped with radio receivers and transmitters and manned by two Agency employees, as well as a representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that the communications over this system were monitored at the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of possible actions by the dissidents against Agency installations.

B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several items of positive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the ~~Metropolitan~~ Police Department, Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department, ~~Montgomery County, Maryland,~~ Police Department, ~~New York City Police~~ Department, and the ~~San Francisco, California~~, Police Department.

III. GENERAL SUPPORT

A. ~~SRPOINTER~~

Since 1953, this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. This operation included not only the photographing of envelopes but also surreptitious opening and photographing of selected items of mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of internal security interest which was disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether the operation will be continued or abolished.

B. ~~AELADLE~~

For several years the Office of Security has provided support to a Russian defector of interest to the CI Staff. This support has consisted of numerous things, including documentation for a change of identity on three occasions.

C. ~~REDFACE I~~

In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occupied by a former defector working under contract for the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering a safe within the vault. The purpose of the operation was to determine whether the individual had any unauthorized classified information in his possession.

D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

In January 1971, the Director approved a request from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of Security operating in Falls Church, Virginia. Support includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph, medical clearance, and training. It has been divided into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place individuals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal activities of other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3) Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD. In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reimbursable basis.

E. ~~KI~~TTENS PROJECT

As a result of a request from the Department of State, approved by the DCI, this office has, since October 1972, provided protection on a 24-hour basis to two sons of a foreign leader who are attending school in the United States. This support includes the financing of the protection and the detail to the Department of State of six armed Agents of this office who are documented as State Department Office of Security employees.

F. ~~MERRIMAC~~

From February 1967 to November 1971, an Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring dissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents so successfully penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during this period, the Office of Security field offices were tasked with collecting available intelligence on dissident groups. All such information was included in a periodic report distributed to appropriate parts of the Agency and to certain outside Government agencies.

G. F. ANTLERS

Several months ago, at the request of CI Staff, and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this office arranged to move a sensitive defector out of a European country via commercial transportation and gain entry into the United States without leaving any trace of his true identity.

11 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey

1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current interest.

2. The principal object of Security's interest through this informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at the time of her resignation.

3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also subsequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.

4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.

00053

E____IMPDET CL BY________

5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive, but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-Castro organizations [illegible] this country. There are also reports that his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.

6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the principal informant.

7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent contact with her friend, the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees except social contacts.

8. The Office of Security has been running this operation for over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelligence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take responsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security. As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the actions it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of compromising the operation.

9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed the course of watchful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues

to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he continues to see them [illegible]ocially. Thus, there is sli[illegible]eason to believe that further waiting will produce a break in the case.

10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now. It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's operation.

11. One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly. The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing information on CIA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban has current productive penetrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any possible gains from continuing this CI effort.

J~~ohn O.~~ Lawrence

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services

SUBJECT : Press Allegations re Use of Agency Polygraph

1. This memorandum is for your information only and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier today.

2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on American proposals relative to the SALT talks in The New York Times over the by-line of Iden 181. It was devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized disclosure of classified information and directed a sweeping investigation within the United States Government to determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehrlichman, Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.

3. On the basis of investigations conducted by State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--one individual in the Department of Defense and three individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect in the Department of Defense.

4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time in matters involving the national security the Agency had detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State Security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for his use in polygraphing State Department employees who were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty. I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's approval and that State clearly understood that the examination was their total responsibility. I further informed him that this was the only way we could undertake to entertain his request and that even then it would require the specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with Mr. Gentile.

5. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile and inquired as to whether the arrangements had been made. Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect. Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph examination.

6. The four individuals were Iden 182 of the Department of Defense and Iden 183, Iden 184, and Iden 185 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering memorandum is attached.

7. Iden 186, a staff writer for The Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1971, stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a letter to The Washington Post and said that the polygraph examinations had been conducted by another agency. Speculation centered around the Agency, but after a day or so, press speculation in this regard died away.

8. Iden 186 apparently has never been satisfied and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr. Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State Department Security officials utilizing an operator and a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to Iden 186 but I suspect that it is and that this is the reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was the source.

Howard J Osborn

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Attachment

5 [illegible]ne 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Items in John Clarke Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 9 May 1973

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S."

2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of buying an apartment building.

There was also Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political action influence activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

00070

SECRET-EYES ONLY

CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), (2), [illegible]
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

funds used. He felt that only Colonel White could supply additional detai[illegible] He said Senator Russell a[illegible] Representative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but asked not to be briefed in detail.

John G. Richards

John G. Richards
Inspector

Attachment

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Per your instructions

1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment should be a matter of record.

2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill Colby is fully conversant are:

-- CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/O.

-- WHBRINEY and MHMUTUAL investments and accumulation of Government capital.

-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U. S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U. S.

-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J. trip to SEA.

[illegible]

[illegible]

/ Red White Files

/ DCI

JMC

John M. Clarke

00072

EYES ONLY

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

5 [illegible]ne 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Items in John Clarke Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 9 May 1973

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S."

2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of buying an apartment building

There was also Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political action influence activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

00073

SECRET-EYES ONLY

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL [illegible]
SCHEDULE OF E. O. [illegible]
[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FBI referred to in para 1 is not shown in other documents in the Agency. It has been kept very close with Mr. Yale, Mr. Magnusson, and possibly Mr. Colby. All files have been purged.

00076

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

07 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Management and Services

FROM : Director of Finance

SUBJECT : Special Other Government Agency Activities

1. Project ~~MHDOZEN~~ - Colonel White, Executive Director-Comptroller, acting for the Director, authorized the Director of Finance in a memorandum dated 17 November 1971 to obligate $2,700,000 for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be determined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by the Chief, CI Staff, DDP. This authorization was reaffirmed by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still active.

2. ~~LPMEDLEY~~ - Rental of office space in New York City for National Security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella, Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans.

3. Detailees - The Agency has reimbursable and non-reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

4. Project TWOFOLD - Reimbursement from Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by a domestic Agency Security proprietary.

5. Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the Executive Director-Comptroller authorized a payment of $858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated sensitive services. Details were kept in the Office of the Deputy Director for Plans.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 006567

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Special Report

1. This memorandum is in response to a request to provide information on situations or associations that might appear to be irregular on the surface.

2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies - Background: For many years the Central Intelligence Agency has detailed employees to the immediate office of the White House per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate office of the President such as the Council on International Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. We have furnished secretaries, clerical employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time, we have no clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP. I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed invitations for State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds were apparently available to run the White House and most of our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees. CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and others on Defense and State and other Government entities whose employees have Top Secret clearances.

Professional officers have been and are at the present time assigned to the National Security Council and we have seven clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.

In addition to the above, we have technical specialists detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and security officers detailed to the Department of State to

CONFIDENTIAL E 2 IMPDET Cl By 003935

protect foreign visitors. Recently, John Ha[illegible] was detailed to the Secretary of the Treasury along with four other Agency employees. We have even, in rare instances, detailed our people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.

3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies - Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the National War College are probably quite defensible. On the other hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and Mr. Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made a trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for a new detail sometime this month. Iden 112 served for over ten years as Director of the Office of Public Safety for AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire automatically at the expiration of this leave.

Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or other Government agency has been carefully considered and approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were involved.

4. Project TWOFOLD: I believe the support we are providing to Project TWOFOLD is an activity that should be reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.

5. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities: In a more general sense, Contract Personnel Division prepares and executes contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.

6. Arrangements with American Firms: In the interest of reporting "too much," I would remind you that Contract Personnel Division writes "agreements" with domestically based American firms to provide cover for Agency assets. The actual assignments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped, in the main, in the United States.

7. Contractual Relationship - USJPRS: The Agency organization, USJPRS, has a contractual association with approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 45 contract employees. These individuals are unwitting of the fact that they really work for CIA in the performance of their domestic activities. USJPRS (United States Joint Publications Research Service) is a part of FBIS. They perform a translation service of unclassified documents for the Government. The independent contractors work in their own homes and are given assignments as the need arises. The contract employees are "integrated" into the Bureau of Standards and are located in Washington, D. C. They are paid and administered by the Bureau. CIA reimburses the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employment are prepared in Contract Personnel Division.

8. Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is a record of External Employment Assistance Branch's action on a request from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or resigning from the Agency.

Sometime in the spring of 1972, Iden 38 of EEAB received a call from Howard Hunt who asked Iden 38 if he had a retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks. Iden 38 sent him a resume on Thomas Amato who retired 31 July 1971. Iden 38 did not document his EEAB record to show the date of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between March and May 1972.

All of the above information was reported to the Office of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.

9. Resume Sent to McCord: Ross Lambert, a contract employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job after retirement. One of the leads given to Lambert was James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to McCord, but Lambert was not hired.

In mid-summer 1972, Mr. Lambert telephoned EEAB from Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co., a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from the D.C. area.) He said he had been visited by a Special Agent of the FBI who told Lambert that his resume had been found among McCord's papers. The Agent wanted to know if Lambert had any connection with McCord. Lambert explained how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him, Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Kennedy of OP and Iden 29 OS were notified immediately.

Harry B. Fisher

Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

24 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

1. This memorandum contains information for the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May that Office Directors report on activities, either under their cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed within the statutory responsibility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the request of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief description of each action involved and then have included the name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for the requests for action by this Office will have to be determined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.

3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the initiative of this Office are as follows:

a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedicated to the acquisition of firearms, ammunition, and related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore, Maryland. It was organized in 1969. This proprietary is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to obtain such materiel without associating the procurement action with the United States Government. It is legally necessary that the proprietary be licensed by both the State and Federal jurisdictions. Since it is located in Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.

00110

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

EYES ONLY
SECRET OL 3-2758

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 001777

The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's association with this proprietary and have assisted us in obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a Federal license has been obtained for the proprietary through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury. They, too, have been briefed on the Agency's association with this proprietary.

b. Under Title 18, Chapter 2512 of the U. S. Code (1968), the sale of electronic intelligence equipment is prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local law enforcement agencies. In essence, this law makes it almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence equipment in a covert manner so that no tie or relationship to the United States Government is made. In order for the Agency to covertly obtain such equipment and hide any Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff of the Procurement Division has relied on an established working relationship with a U.S. firm. This firm, a prominent supplier located in Maryland, deals in a wide range of law enforcement, police supplies, and equipment. The Covert Procurement Staff has had a relationship with an officer in the firm for over 15 years. The officer agreed to allow us to place orders through his corporation to major suppliers of this equipment with a billing to an Agency national proprietary.There is an understanding that if any inquiry is raised by the Department of Justice, the firm's officer would immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact the Department of Justice, identify the Agency's interest in the procurement action, and clear the officer of any responsibility. On 10 September 1971, there was an inquiry about the proprietary from an FBI agent making a routine investigation of the officer's books. Through Office of Security liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI, the agent was informed that it is an Agency notional proprietary. This disclosure closed the inquiry and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry. Most of the DD/O area divisions from time to time submit requisitions to us to acquire surveillance equipment. The majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelligence service with whom liaison is conducted in various foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and

EYES ONLY
SECRET

the DD/O, we will not honor any requisition for surveillance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI Staff of the DD/O.

4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the following items are pertinent:

a. In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby. Colonel White explained that the Technical Services Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance to the FBI for a sensitive project . Colonel White did not disclose the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information concerning the mission or purpose of Project substantive questions concerning the subject should be addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made, however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, approximately $1 million, and the complex technical equipment that has been involved in the undertaking.

b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reimbursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the amount of $36,900 is for two Westinghouse television cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200 is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of these requirements pending further instructions which will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management and Services.

c. Over the years, this Agency has often supported other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved request, supported by a transfer of funds, the Agency would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or provide a service for, another Government agency when such

EYES ONLY
SECRET

action would be more economical and eliminate the need for one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities readily available from another. A typical example of this procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In connection with the current reporting requirement, however, I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be relevant to the subject of this memorandum.

d. In connection with the disclosures during the summer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87 to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy himself that classified material furnished them by the Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for. His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior Security Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.

> This memorandum reports that FBIS regularly disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation but that instructions had been issued to cease distribution of classified reports. While no other direct dissemination went to Rand, other USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing "many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as authorized under USIB regulations. The memorandum also states that Rand personnel had requested searches and document retrieval from the CRS facility.

5. In connection with action taken for the Office of Security, there are three relevant items:

a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested by the Office of Security to print a book written by ~~Harry J. Murphy~~, Office of Security. The book was prepared by ~~Mr. Murphy~~ under a Brookings Institution Federal

Executive Fellowship. The book is entitled "Where's What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators." It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of information that may be useful to an investigator. The book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967. Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made in September 1968. The title page of the book gives attribution to ~~Mr. Murphy~~, Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential, and it is our understanding that the distribution was made to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if desired.

Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It was the intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly determined that the LEAA request should not be honored because the Agency should not put itself in the position of publishing law enforcement material for general and unclassified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our printing facilities.

b. On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security requested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor vehicles for use in connection with a special support operation which would last approximately 3 months. The Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memorandum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director and has his personal approval." The request was approved.

c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

6. In connection with the responsibility held by this Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all Agency operating components, the following information is relevant.

a. A safe site, identified as "Safehouse 562" which is Iden 88 was made available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971.

The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970 as a replacement for a terminated OL standby safe site and in keeping with the approved requirement for a complement of five standby safehouses for all Agency use. The apartment has one bedroom and is located in an older high-rise building along Iden 89. The nominal lessee is Iden 90 a security-cleared attorney with offices located at Iden 91 The cover story utilized is that Iden 90, rents the apartment for business conferences, meetings, and occasional overnight stays by his staff and/or his out-of-town clients. The original lease term was for a 1-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971, with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby safe site, the apartment has been used by various Agency components to meet their short-term or crash requirements. Control of the standby safe site and its security is the responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of each user, component, and date of use; however, no record is made of those persons being met at the site nor for what purpose the site is being used (meetings, training, etc.). Such information is maintained by the operating component requesting the safe site. Records maintained by this Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971 in answer to a telephonic request.

b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as a meeting place for officers of the Miami Station who were in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering assistance in connection with the political conventions that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant operating component on this matter.

7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.

John F. Blake
Director of Logistics

2 Atts

cc: DD/M&S

SECRET

EYES ONLY

Requesting Office	Date of Request	Item	Quantity	Unit Cost	Receiving U.S. Department or Agen
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,350	BNDD
TSD	5/16/72	Transmitters, Radio Beacon	8	313	BNDD
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,350	White House Communicatio Agency
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	13	1,400	Air Force
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	10	1,350	State
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	2	1,375	AEC
TSD	11/16/72	Camera Sets	20	656	FBI
TSD	4/17/72	Camera Sets	10	700	FBI
TSD	11/18/71	Actuators, Recorders	50	488	FBI
TSD	4/19/72	Tessina Cameras	3	700	BNDD
TSD	12/ 7/72	Camera, Video	1	18,045	FBI
TSD	10/13/72	Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent of W L 30691	1	4,639	FBI
TSD	3/26/71	Tubes, Image, W L 30691	2	4,607	FBI
TSD	4/20/73	Cameras, Television	2	18,300	FBI

00113

EYES ONLY

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE [illegible] SOURCES

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Requesting Office	Date of Request	Item	Quantity	Unit Cost	Receiving U.S. Department or Agenc
TSD	12/14/72	Transmitters, Radio	3	313	BNDD
TSD	10/20/72	Actuators, Recorder	25	591	FBI
TSD	10/13/72	Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent of W L 30691	1	4,639	FBI
TSD	5/26/71	Tube, Image, W L 30691	2	4,639	FBI
TSD	4/22/71	Transmitters	3	1,372	FBI
TSD	4/22/71	Module, Plug-In	1	1,247	FBI
TSD	4/22/71	Power Supply - UWP-39A	1	568	FBI
OL	2/25/71	Telephone Analyzers	2	1,350	Treasury
OS	1/30/71	Telephone Analyzers	22	1,350	Treasury
OL	8/12/70	Cable, Special-Purpose Electrical	5,000 ft.	.42	White House Communication Agency
TSD	1/10/73	Ink, Special Formula	1 lot	1,825	Immigration a Naturalizatio Service
TSD	6/28/72	Ink, Special Formula	1 lot	3,700	Immigration a Naturalizatio Service
TSD	7/26/71	Transmitter, Radio Beacon	1	728	U.S. Forestry

EYES ONLY
SECRET

OJCS-594-73
11 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Activities which might be considered sensitive issues.

I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which might be considered sensitive issues.

Most Sensitive Projects

OJCS Project Identification	Project Officer Organization, & Telephone	Nature of Project	OJCS Reason for Listing
~~HYDRA~~	Richard Ober CI Staff Red 1465	A special project initiated by DCI	Type of data being collected.
~~SANCA~~	Iden 48 OS Red 9298	Machine index to security files	Type of data in index.
~~ORDSTAT~~	~~John Hutchings~~ ORD 3061	Information storage & retrieval of drug related data (~~ORD~~'s project ~~OFTEN~~)	Type of data in files.

Sensitive Projects

~~DRUGGS~~	Iden 18 OMS 7792	Computer file of drug data.	Type of data in file.

00135

EYES ONLY

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 036490

Sensitive Projects (Continued)

OJCS Project Identification	Project Officer Organization, & Telephone	Nature of Project	OJCS Reason for Listing
~~PROFILES~~	~~John Winnie~~ TSD 362-1922 (sterile)	Statistical analysis of psychological data.	Source of data. Contractors are involved with project.

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern

OJCS Project Identification	Project Officer Organization, & Telephone	Nature of Project	OJCS Reason for Listing
~~TILAQ~~	~~Robert Hahn~~ SB Red 1185/1251	Pattern analysis of surveillance data from foreign liaison service	Nature of data. Techniques of system discussed with FBI.
~~SPYDER~~	~~George Swegman~~ OS 5071	Data on radio frequencies used for support of ~~In-Place~~ Monitoring System, a system to identify unauthorized transmitters.	Project originated by James McCord.
~~DMVREC~~	Iden 48 OS Red 9298	File of automobile license numbers.	Nature of data.
~~APREGIN~~	~~Walter~~ Kowalski CI Staff Red 9338	File of Agency applicants who were not hired.	Nature of data.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00136

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued)

OJCS Project Identification	Project Officer Organization, & Telephone	Nature of Project	OJCS Reason for Listing
--	Iden 187 ISD/DDO Red 1442	Cooperative program with Iden 188 in name grouping techniques.	Association with the named organization.

W. Doyle [illegible]
for
JOHN D. IAMS
Director of Joint Computer Support

SC 03289/73

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD), Office of Communications, Operational Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies

1. Prior to 1969 the OC COMINT intercept unit, which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support to these activities in monitoring, identification and DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made through the DDO's Chief, WH, Miami.

2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division D/DDO, requested that the Special Programs Division initiate a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America. The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of the availability of personnel and technical capabilities, the survey was conducted at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92 Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily intercepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the intercept was instituted. On 30 January 1973, all coverage was terminated by Division D because of possible legal complications.

3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal technical liaison with operating components of the FBI for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements for support of specific activities have been made by the Division D/DDO. Support has been provided in the form of

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061947

~~TOP~~ SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

00140

Downgraded to Secret on 6/17/16 per auto declines [illegible] 713745780

8 May 1973

exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipment. In the past several years, support has been rendered to sensitive FBI projects ~~MOHAWK~~, ~~UNION~~ and WUGRAVEL. Support has been and is presently being given to FBI projects ORKID and ROSE. These projects are described in the attached sealed envelope.

4. An operational test of an NSA-developed HF/DF system was jointly conducted by NSA, Division D/DDO and OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972. A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the tests because of similarity to the actual target site and environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DF site. A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the roof. A team member in effect told him that the group was an advance security segment for the Democratic National Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests were completed and the equipment was returned to the Washington area.

signed Iden 53

Chief, Special Programs Division, OC

Att.

Downgraded to secret on 6/7/16 pursuant declass guide J13745780

SENSITIVE

9 May 1973

~~MOHAWK~~ - Electronic survey of Iden 63. This operation was terminated approximately two months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for two days.

UNION - Iden 98 flooding of the cipher device employed by the Iden 94 . Embassy on their diplomatic communication link. SPD/SEO support terminated two years ago.

~~ORKID~~ - Electronic surveillance of Iden 64 Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved only in planning at this time, (attendance at two meetings).

~~ROSE~~ - Electronic surveillance of Iden 62 ___ . SPD/CMT personnel performed an electronic search of the Iden 62 area and SPD/SEO personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording of the spectrum covering .1 to .6 GHz during the period 16 to 20 April 1973. Plans call for continued support by SPD in the future as requested.

~~WU~~GRAVEL - Division D operation involving a Ider 95 code clerk. SEO provided equipment, trained case officer in use of device and stood by in Iden 97, Washington, D.C., to back up case officer if needed. The operation took place in July 1972.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

SENSITIVE

00142

Downgraded to Secret on 6/7/16 per auto declass

23 3551/1

29 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Mr. Colby's Request to Inspector General to Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes in a PP/B Memo to DD/M&S

REFERENCE : D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973, Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or Indirect Involvement

1. The two notes of 13 and 20 January 1972 refer to approval by the DCI (at that time Mr. Helms) for the expenditure of $30-32K for a sensitive CS project. No further details were given, Mr. Colby asked that DDO records be checked.

2. DDO records show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a project called Iden 99. This is a joint operation with the Iden 100 service for the collection of ~~ELINT~~ intelligence. The activity is handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff.

3. The funds cited in the notes was transferred to CI on 13 January 1972. It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff that the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount, i.e., $30 to 32K and not to two separate allocations.

John C. Richards
John C. Richards

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 056113

Executive Registry
73-3
2581

[illegible] May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Watergate Principals - Direct or Indirect Involvement

1. This memorandum responds to the Director's request for a report of any involvement in any capacity since 1 January 1969 with Messrs. Hunt, McCord, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.

2. I have had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.

3. My McCord contact was indirect and occurred sometime during the late 1960's when I was Director, Office of Computer Services. I opposed plans for Technical Division, Office of Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a separate computer for Iden 101. Ted Hines of DD/S&T (then ORD) was the computer individual working with TD and, I think, would have details.

4. The Krogh contact also was indirect and involved his request, first through OMB, that CIA fund foreign travel on behalf of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. Individual phone discussions are noted in the attached. The Agency focal points were Iden 32 and Iden 3; I understand Iden 3 has forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, Iden 3 and Colby are attached also.

5. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to all OPPB employees. One officer who was attending a funeral will not be available until tomorrow.

/s/ Charles A. Briggs

Charles A. Briggs
Director of Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - addressee
1 - W. E. Colby
1 - D/PPB Eyes Only File
O/PPB/CAB:[illegible]

Attachment
As stated

00149

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011[illegible]

A[illegible]chment
23 May 1973

4 Feb 72	Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud" Krogh and his deputy, Walter Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan foreign travel in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was alerting us to their intention to ask us for funds for the travel.
7 Feb 72	Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3-5 trips for 3 individuals--all in FY 72. Cost probably $10K. Minnick ready to make first trip. Iden 32 is plugged in. ExDir said OK re Tehran visit. --
7 Feb 72	See attached memo from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and follow-on memos from Seymour Bolton (21 Jul 72) and Colby (2 Aug 72).
12(?) May 72	John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/Minnick attendance at a Latin American Iden 102 conference on narcotics. He also said Jeff Shepherd. White House, was laying on a trip with Iden 32 for himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Europe.
23 Jun 72	Iden 3 commented on Krogh/Minnick interest in getting CA activities, including large-scale PM, on narcotics front. Iden 3 pushing small-scale PP.
6 Jul 72	Iden 3 called. Notes say only: "Minnick-Hurley film. We will send."
2 Aug 72	Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel orders ready; need money this PM (No record in my notes as to who was traveling when, but have faint recollection of its being to Mexico City). Sam Hines and, Iden 73 contacted by Iden 3.
1 Nov 72	Related? Iden 3 call. Again notes are cryptic: WH/GAO-Grace (Iden 32) : Survey BNDD problems/Mexico."

00150

SECRET

On Mr. Colby's copy only:

13 Jan 72	ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved $30K for sensitive CS project - no details.
20 Jan 72	Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.

19 Jul[illegible]972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Jack Bauman

1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I dropped in to see Jack Bauman who lives in Winterhaven, Florida. Jack retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due to a serious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for about 20 years prior to his retirement.

2. During a private conversation Jack told me that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the McCord-Hunt affair. I asked him why he had been interviewed, and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security Officer for the Republican Party. Jack visited Washington in January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. Jack furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him. Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in such activity.

3. According to Jack, during the meeting with Mr. Hunt they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program and a need for a good security system both before and during the National Convention. Jack indicated that he sincerely believed that the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a problem.

CLASSIFIED BY 0376-16

00153

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)] (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Det.
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY

4. When Jack declined, he indicated that Mr. Hunt asked for any other recommendations he might have. According to Jack he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the Agency, but he did furnish the name of IDEN-108 who might be possibly ready to retire from the Agency.

5. Jack informed me that he assumed that the Bureau obtained his name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt. He said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCord, Jack said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability.

6. Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew nothing of the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impression from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as originally reported.

7. All of the above information was volunteered by Mr. Bauman, and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the matter other than to comment that I hated to see the Agency's name connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record and for information of the Director of Security.

Charles W. Kane

CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY

00153

DD/M&S 73-1809

1075

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter

1. I am addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central Intelligence since I doubt that the information contained herein is of such significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with the Agency since July 1972. However, if you feel that the information is of such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the proper format to do so.

2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the Watergate and related matters was through Mr. Jack Bauman a former Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In December 1971 Mr. Bauman called me from Florida and advised that he wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give Mr. Bauman a call. I had only met Hunt once about 10 years before but I agreed to relay the message. I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that Mr. Bauman did not have his home phone and requested he call Mr. Bauman. Mr. Hunt thanked me for relaying the message and said that he would call Mr. Bauman. This seemed of little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17 of the Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 of the telephone call from Mr. Bauman in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the Record prepared by Iden 17 as a result of our conversation.

3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida and took that occasion to drop in to see Jack Bauman. Mr. Bauman told me in a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

EYES ONLY SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 011018

00155

with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the memorandum is attached.

4. Other than knowing Mr. McCord through his employment with the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related matters now receiving attention in the press.

Charles W. Kane
Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director
for Management and Services

Atts

EYES ONLY SECRET

00156

17 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Charles W. Kane
Iden 108

1. Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI contacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or not the Subjects worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests of this nature were followed up by the FBI with an interview of the subjects.

2. I briefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on the "Watergate" case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry. Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.

3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised of the Subjects' employment with the Agency, he indicated that the Bureau does not wish to interview them.

4. The office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108 in the same fashion as Mr. True was previously interviewed.

Already d
The file
7/2

5. I called Mr. Kane both at his office and his residence and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July. I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.

6. Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has seen Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned

by the fact that Mr. Kane accompanied a technic[illegible] sweep team to the Montevideo station. Mr. Kane stated further that around Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from Jack Bauman who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. Mr. Bauman asked Mr. Kane how he could get in touch with him. Mr. Kane obtained Mr. Hunt's telephone number through telephone information channels whereupon he passed the number on to Mr. Bauman.

7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that Jack Bauman has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may have obtained his name from him.

signed Iden 17

Deputy Director of Security

SECRET/SENSITIVE

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities

1. As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:

a. CI Staff - Mr. Richard Ober's program for processing data of U.S. citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists, etc.

b. FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program for recording data on foreign and U.S. physicians from American Medical Association records.

c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern listing travel of U.S. citizens to and from Communist countries.

2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on data processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).

3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with possibly sensitive domestic overtones.

a. DDS&T/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103 for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction System."

b. DDS&T/ORD's Project which involved the collection of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms terminated this program last Fall.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL E-2

1[illegible]ay 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Research Project on Robert Vesco

1. On 16 October 1972 Messrs. Breckinridge and Heintzelman, in the course of a Survey, were briefed on activities of the Atlantic/Pacific Division of the Office of Economic Reports. One project cited was a query from the Director, apparently at the request of Secretary Shultz, to the effect, "What do we know about Vesco," the man then running IOS. Two of OER's analysts were assigned to the project and, working through the Domestic Contact Service, spent a day going over the files of the Securities and Exchange Commission. There apparently was some contact also with EUR Division of the Deputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current Intelligence.

2. The information above is based on rough notes and obviously is sketchy. It is cited now not to suggest any wrongdoing but because of the current publicity about Vesco and the probability of continuing probes into the subject by the press and the courts.

Scott D. Breckinridge
H. Henry Heintzelman

22 May [illegible]973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

Bill--

Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:

1. Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0613/68, Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).

This document was produced in two versions--one with the chapter on radical students in America (pages 25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow, and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the other version without the references to the American scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the Agency. This document without the material on the US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger. A still more abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General in March 1969.

2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1969), No. 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).

3. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look (12 June 1970), No. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 98).

Please note that these are our record copies and should be returned.

Edward W. Proctor
Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence

I-A
4/16/75
S.S. 71.

Attachments

00171

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 013329

SECRET/SENSITIVE

CIA

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activities Possibly Outside CIA's Legislative Charter

1. This memorandum responds to your instruction to report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's legislative charter.

2. All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate have reviewed the past and present activities of their components. I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any activities related to either the Watergate affair or the break into the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two improper activities:

Hunt: Col. White, Richard Lehman, and I talked to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation of a recommendation in support of the Agency's nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National Civil Service League Award.

Mitchell: While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General, an OCI officer was assigned the task of providing him with daily briefings on foreign developments.

RID
D... 3/17/94 JFK ... 9803 RDD/gcl

DECLASSIFIED BY 9803 RDD/gcl 00183
ON 3/17/94 (JFK)
per GMB

Classified by UI3329

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
GMB 3/3/94
(9803 RDD/gcl 3/17/94 JFK)

Young: Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS had frequent contacts with Young during the summer of 1972 in connection with Executive Order 11652 and the implementing NSC directive. This involved visits by Young to CIA to discuss information storage and retrieval and several meetings of an inter-agency group dealing with the implementation of the Executive Order and directive.

3. In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders. Their responses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be viewed as borderline.

- DCS collects information on foreign students studying in the US.
- DCS collects information on physicians practicing in the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign nationals).
- DCS accepts information on possible foreign involvement in US dissident groups and on the narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal with the FBI and BNDD directly.
- DCS assesses the suitability and willingness of US citizens to cooperate with CIA.
- DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973, was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas calls.
- Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.
- NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify photography too "sensitive" for public release.

- NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special purposes such as natural catastrophies and civil disturbances.

- OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence memoranda on possible foreign connections with the US anti-war movement and world-wide student dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of the White House.

- CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to the Soviet, and occasionally other foreign, embassies to acquire positive foreign intelligence.

- FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work directly for another agency, e.g., to the FBI to translate Arabic in Washington.

- FBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports covered by copyright. These are circulated within the Government and stamped "Official Use Only". This has gone on for three decades without problems.

- FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens such as those by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda, and Ramsey Clarke.

- FBIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service under Department of Commerce cover since 1957. JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of unclassified publications in foreign languages and contracts with private individuals to do this work. Most of these individuals are not witting of the CIA-JPRS relationship.

Edward W Proctor
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM : Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states. Two DDI memoranda were produced on the subject: "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look" (12 June 1970). In each a single paragraph was devoted to ties with the US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black power activists to the Caribbean and other overt contacts.

2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to write a memorandum with special attention to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in the US. The record is not clear where this request originated, but it came through channels from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially sensitive and was to include material provided by the Special Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful evidence of important links between militant blacks in the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of the conclusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced in typescript form and given to the DCI.

867

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption category:
5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
Impossible to determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

3. For several months in the first half of 1968 the Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad during a period when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only, although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

SECRET/SENSITIVE

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

To the best of my knowledge, DCS has not engaged in any activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as illegal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f (i) of providing operational support within the US to all elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if misinterpreted. For example:

1. Provide personality and assessment data on certain foreign students and visiting foreign scientists and officials.
2. Identify foreign students in the US through collection of foreign student lists from certain universities.
3. Provide personality and assessment data on US citizens to determine their suitability and willingness to cooperate with the Agency.
4. Introduce cooperative US businessmen and academicians to Agency personnel who are in alias but using CIA credentials.
5. Collect information on possible foreign involvement or penetration of US dissident groups, but only in a passive manner and only when the source has refused to pass the information directly to the FBI.
6. Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again only in a passive manner when the source has refused to pass the information directly to BNDD or the FBI.

00387

SECRET/SENSITIVE

2 IMPDET CL BY 004176

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

7. Collect specific information and supply duplicate or master keys for foreign hotels.

8. Collect medical information from cooperative contacts on foreign leaders who have received medical treatment or examinations in the US.

9. Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing in the US who have studied abroad. Although most were foreign nationals, some were US. The taped information included school, present business address, date of birth, and specialty.

10. Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas telephone calls between persons in the US and persons overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points routed through US switchboards. This activity lasted for approximately six months but has ceased.

11.

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.

James R. Murphy
JAMES R. MURPHY
Director, Domestic Contact Service

SECRET
EYES ONLY

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM : Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of worldwide student dissidence. Confronted by timult at campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Free University and elsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful dissidence was interconnected: spawned by the same causes; financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences hostil to the interests of the US and its allies; or likely to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests.

2. The paper was prepared by Paul Corscadden of OCI with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs. The DDI, D/OCI, and Corscadden met with Rostow to elicit the reasons for his or the President's concerns and to agree on the sources to be examined, the research methods to be followed, etc.

3. Written during the summer of 1968, the most sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two sections. The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest, its motivation, history, and tactics. This section drew heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense, the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page) typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCI's request in December 1967. (We no longer have a copy.)

00193

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652 exemption category:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
Impossible to determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

4. Because of the paucity of information on foreign student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which then monopolized the field of student action here and abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters--ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself as a review of foreign student dissidence.

5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on world-wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be in the Johnson Library.

6. Following the paper's favorable reception by the President and Mr. Rostow, the DCI briefed the NSC on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.

7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in September 1968 and then updated and issued again in March 1969 and August 1970.

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM : Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. In late 1967 OCI participated in the preparation of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the foreign connections of US organizations and activists involved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of these reports, prepared at the request of the White House, was to determine whether any links existed between international Communist elements or foreign governments and the American peace movement. The conclusion reached was that there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between anti-war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of direction or formal coordination.

2. In October 1967 President Johnson expressed interest in this subject and ordered a high level interdepartmental survey. In response to his personal request to the DCI, Mr. Helms asked the CI Staff to collect whatever information was available through our own sources and through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the President.

3. A book message requirement was sent to all stations to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this subject. Although agent reports on Communist front operations overseas were of some value, the primary source of information on the activities of US activists--and that was quite limited--was sensitive intercepts produced by NSA, which had been similarly tasked by the White House.

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652 exemption category:
[illegible]
[illegible] on
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

Downgraded to Secret
on 6/7/16 per auto declass
guide J13T45T80

4. A draft memorandum was jointly prepared by OCI and CI Staff and forwarded to the DCI. He passed this typescript memo, dated 15 November 1967, to the President personally. The White House copy is now in the files of President Johnson's papers at the library in Austin.

5. Brief follow-up memoranda were prepared and forwarded to the White House on 21 December and 17 January 1968. According to our best recollection, no further finished intelligence reports on international connections of the peace movement were produced.

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

1. This memorandum responds to the DDI's request for a listing of any questionable involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable man could construe as improper.

2. CRS does, of course, have several programs to acquire still pictures, movies, videotapes and books either privately, secretly or without acknowledgement that CIA is the actual end user. CRS is regularly involved with Customs in looking at the content of film cans addressed to the Russian Embassy in Washington. Customs occasionally also provides access to other film from denied areas. It may be addressed to private citizens or organizations or other embassies. These efforts are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign information.

3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S. citizens or organizations. The biographic file-building criteria specifically excludes U.S. nationals unless the person has become of such major importance in the political life of a foreign country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge, only 2 persons so qualify. One is the wife of the opposition leader of Guyana and the other is Hope Lang. Our Cuban files probably include some persons who are now U.S. citizens but we have no way to separate them; we have files on U.S. defectors to Cuba.)

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 004050

00197

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

4. The CIA Library has several informal snag files intended to aid the librarians in answering the kinds of questions that they know they will get on a continuing basis. An appointments file is a collection of clippings on appointed federal officials: who holds what job when and what is his background? The extremist files are a collection of folders on a variety of organizations and a few people with intricate organizational links. Any sort of extremism is grist for these particular files. And a few persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver, have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of clippings from public media. These files are unclassified and consist mostly of clippings from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground, scholarly.

5. I am not aware of any other kind of involvement in domestic activities that is not related to development of techniques or logistics or legitimate training of CRS personnel.

H. C. EISENBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service

3 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities

1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg and Watergate cases.

2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of Communications components for special operations (usually abroad) involving close-support SIGINT work or translation of audio take. On one occasion recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short-term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg of the DDO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS participation was approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training of Chinese Nationalist cadets.

3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency transmissions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes some material which falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel, and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without specific addressees, e.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's NCNA, are monitored by FBIS and the material is disseminated without restriction. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house, correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private point-to-point transmissions. FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of material monitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official Use Only" caveat. The same caveat is used on material which we monitor from other press agencies which are protected by international copyright, e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (MENA), and the Iraqi Nes Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news

00202

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 014

agency material for nearly three decades without problems. Recently, however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use Only" caveat will not bar such material from the general public under the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into alternative measures, among which are: (1) the purchase of news services with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of those items vital to the government's business which we must continue to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weighed against the risk of present procedures.

4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American POW's in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnam. At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion submitted transcripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such cases, we have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved, presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses. (In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all this with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we rue attribution of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.

5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of their CIA employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and contains some risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public knowledge. The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently taking a second look.

E. H. KNOCHE
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology

SUBJECT : TSD Support to Other Agencies

1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for Operations.

2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency for International Development, and the White House.

3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these services have included training and materials, and in a few instances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance, secret writing and related communications, personal protection, disguise, concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detection, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.

4. In most instances requirements for this support are received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels. Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is required.

5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059098

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.

8. Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters, whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs Staff.

9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded of the outstanding documentation.

Sidney Gottlieb
Chief
Technical Services Division

Attachment
Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee, w/att

ATTAC[illegible]MENT

Department of Defense

Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing, flaps and seals; counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department of Defense and certain elements of the Special Forces. All requests are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters and with the Chief of Stations overseas. In turn these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -type cases.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreign targets in the United States.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices, SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau. All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordination with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate. Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS or his designee before action by TSD is taken.

Immigration and Naturalization

CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in developing tamperproof alien registration cards, special fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service. Requests are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if operational.

Department of State

Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been supplied the State Department. In addition analyses and exposure of black letter operations against the United States abroad are made. All graphics requirements are forwarded to TSD for further coordination within the Division. The Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports, foreign visas and in the past passports on a priority basis.

Postal Service

The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has been furnished foreign postal information and has been the recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent ink, typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with the DDO and DDO/EA. The Post Office has furnished TSD with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.

Secret Service

Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO.

U. S. Agency for International Development

We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation is under an approval of a CI-Police Group project. Courses are given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the request of CI/PG. Trainees represent internal security or national police from all countries participating in AID Police assistance programs.

White House

Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.

Police Respresenting Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria

During the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio, locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry were given to selected members from the above mentioned cities. Overall training was approved by the Director of Centeral Intelligence and in turn validation was required for each course from the Director of Security.

☐ ☐ SE ONLY ☐ ☐

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) [illegible]

FROM: Sidney Gottlieb Chief, TSD 203 South Building	EXTENSION x-2831	NO. DATE 8 May 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDS&T				Attached herewith are additional explanations of TSD support to other U. S. Government agencies.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				SECRET-EYES ONLY
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				00220
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

ATTACHMENT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were involved in operations:

(A) Identity 59 - Four masked transmitters were installed. Two have failed and two remain workable.

(B) Identity 60 - A TSD built masked transmitter was installed to collect emanations from a cryptographic machine. The system continues to function when samples of the emanations are needed.

(C) Identity 61 - Two transmitters have been installed and are operating. One is specifically designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the other is a straight audio transmitter to collect conversations. A FBI agent is manning the listening post. A third system is not operating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape made from this room was made by the National Security Agency before failure.

(D) Identity 62 - TSD furnished equipment and consultation covering Identity 62 . First masked switched transmitters were used in two apartments used as temporary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters and microwave transmitters were installed in the permanent quarters along with mic and wire installations, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This installation is not fully operational because the full complement of personnel have not yet arrived.

SECRET

(E) Iden 64 - This is an operation with additional participation by National Security Agency. It is designed in anticipation of the Identity 64 in Washington. The listening post was obtained by using the Agency covert mechanisms for procuring the property. New systems are being designed and produced by using TSD's covert contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.

(F) Identity 65 - Ten masked audio devices purchased from TSD were installed in Identity 65

by the FBI. Part of the equipment was installed in November and December 1971, the remaining equipment was installed 17 - 25 March 1972. Tests made by a TSD officer from a temporary FBI listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that the target equipment no longer functioned and was believed discovered by the occupants.

(G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute an on-the-shelf capability to engage in photo and audio surveillance operations which might not be known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a relatively unsophisticated device was used against a domestic target.

S E C R E T

TSD/SDB Memo #138-73

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD

ATTENTION: Executive Officer

SUBJECT: Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations

1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the training came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.

2. On occasion during the past few years, under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiarization to police officers of several domestic police departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These techniques had been declassified and are currently available to the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center publishes periodic guidance in their uses.

3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB officers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB officers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete information on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.

/s/ Identity 120

C/TSD/OPS/SDB

SECRET

00223

E2 IMPDET/CL BY 061

73-2380

ORD-2328-73
9 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Repeated Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities

The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined with respect to all ORD services or dealings with other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters. In addition, this report covers all our activities dealing with the research and development of intelligence equipment for foreign use which has been tested in the United States and might have collected domestic information. Again, each member of ORD available today was asked either directly or through his supervisor to provide the above requested information, whether he was directly involved or not. We have used all diligence to search our records available to us during this time period to ensure this is a complete and factual list.

George [illegible]
for Sayre Stevens
Director of Research & Development

Attachments:
1 - Contacts with Other
Government Agencies
2 - Domestic Tests

CLASSIFIED BY 357323
EX[illegible]
SCH[illegible]
§ 5[illegible] (circle one or more)
Imp. det.
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

CONTACTS WITH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHICH COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED TECHNOLOGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

Executive Office of the President

ORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committee of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control that is concerned with research support of the narcotics control problem.

(Dr. Leonard Laster, OST) (Cianci/LS)

Office of Telecommunications Policy

Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information was exchanged with them.

(Noe/TA)

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)

Techniques and equipment for navigation and tracking was discussed with BNDD.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Van Dewerker/TA)
(Noe/TA)

Technical information was exchanged relating to the development of simple, portable sensor systems for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and narcotic laboratory effluents.

(Mr. John Gunn and
Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD) (Parker/DSP)

Audio tapes were processed to improve their intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Scott/An)

00229

SECRET

ATTACHMENT 1

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

BNDD (cont'd)

BNDD was given permission in the fall of 1972 to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc., concerning a Radar People Detector developed for ORD.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) Identity 125 /LS)

A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed for the detection of narcotics for application in Southeast Asia. BNDD was given a demonstration of the instrument.

(Dr. Laster/OST) (Terek/LS)
(Mr. Stan Sobel, BNDD)

USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee

Continuing contacts were maintained with the intelligence community regarding technical surveillance countermeasurs and physical security. This exchange of information, reports, and equipment has been conducted under the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and Navy.

(Noe/TA)
(Noyes/PD)

State Department

Two contracts for development of countermeasures techniques were funded jointly with the State Department.

(Noe/TA)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

Some of the AEC Laboratories, e.g., Savannah River Laboratory, are supported by CIA to develop radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and devices. These Laboratories have used sampling techniques developed for CIA to measure CONUS nuclear plant releases.

(Mr. B. Benson, AEC) (Walker/DSP)

At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard Cowan, the walls of the office of the Chairman of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed. The operation occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies created by the use of the non-linear junction detector.

(Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC) (Noyes/PD)

Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA)

Reports and information about the ORD-developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System were made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control.

(Mr. Les Schubin, LEAA) Identity 125 /LS)

Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information were exchanged with LEAA.

(Noe/TA)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Treasury

Dr. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department to assist in formulating their R&D program and organization in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug enforcement administration. The request for his services was made by Identity 3, the Agency's Narcotics Coordinator. Identity 3 discussed the request and cleared the detailing through Mr. Colby.

(Leahy/LS)

Customs/Treasury Department

Technical discussions were held with Customs relating to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over the U.S.-Mexico border.

(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs) (Lawrence/DSP)

Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/IRS

About five years ago, assistance was requested in domestic search of "moonshine" stills using CIA infrared scanners. This was turned down.

(Lawrence/DSP)

Secret Service

We have had numerous discussions with the Secret Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques and equipment.

(Van Dewerker/TA)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)

The results of our research work in the detection of metals (NOLIR) were reported to FAA for possible use in the detection of hijacker weapons.

(MacAnlis/RP)

National Institute of Health (NIH)

At the request of ORD, OCS assigned a staff technician to undertake to write a computer program for the Wisswesser Line Notation (WLN) chemical notation method. This work was done in cooperation with NIH.

(Ms. Coniver, NIH) Identity 125 /LS)

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

LS/ORD met frequently with ACDA personnel in order to structure ORD's BW/CW research programs to support ACDA needs.

Identity 125 /LS)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Technical information relating to detection of radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with them.

(Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA) (Walker/DSP)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

EPA (cont'd)

Technical discussions relating to using IR scanning equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary land fill have been conducted.

(Mr. Gene James, EPA) (Risinger/DSP)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement techniques germane to removing distortions from some photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down.

(Stephan/IPA)

Secret Service
FBI
U.S. Customs

Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs.

(Mr. Robert Burnell, SS) (Noyes/PD)
(Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI)
(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)

NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)

We have an on-going program, Project TAMPER, to develop automated systems for exploiting satellite-borne multispectral sensors for earth resources assessments.

(Mr. William Ruble, USDA) (Galinaitis/IPA)
(Mr. Leonard Jaffe, NASA)
(General Smart)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Proposed Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association would be SECRET)

The Agency is preparing a proposal for an experimental program to aid in estimating the Soviet wheat crop. A part of the information would be obtained from a satellite launched for other announced programs. Ground-truth data will be collected on North American crops.

(Briglia/PAS)

U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre plot of opium poppies at a USDA research site in Washington state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium poppies.

(Mr. Quentin Jones, USDA)	(Lawrence/DSP)
(Mr. Fred Garfield, BNDD)	(Cianci/LS)

Army, Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force, Office of the Inspector General
Army, Office of Provost Marshall General

We have exchanged technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information with them.

(Noe/TA)

U.S. Army
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Toelle Ordnance Depot

LS/ORD tested environmental samples from testing, storage and production facilities in the U.S.

(Identity 125/LS)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

U.S. Army, Edgewood Arsenal

LS/ORD is sharing expenses with EA in field testing an IR remote detector of CW aerosols.

Identity 125 /LS)

U.S. Navy

BSD/ORD turned over about eight trained dolphins to the Navy in December 1969, because we discontinued our dolphin program.

(Lynch/LS)

U.S. Coast Guard

About six years ago, CIA infrared equipment was made available for USCG tests to evaluate IR as a means for night search of life boats.

(then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG) (Lawrence/DSP)

Identity 174 Sheriff's Office

ORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants. Polygraph security findings were compared with the Sheriff's own security findings.

(Sheriff) Identity 125 /LS)

A study was made on con-men techniques and assessment methods in 1967-68.

(Sheriff) Identity 125 /LS)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Chief, San Francisco Police

For security reasons, the Chief was made aware of a study to evaluate attempts by non-Chiense to penetrate Chinese social groups. (1967)

(Police Chief) Identity 125/LS)

DOMESTIC TESTS FOR AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

1. As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the research and development of equipment and techniques for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we conduct experiments and tests in the United States. Clearly, the design and development of our intelligence equipments can be done more economically and more securely in this country. Although most of the tests of our R&D equipments are performed in closed laboratories or in secure areas simulating the foreign environment, some of the tests and experiments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.

2. A review of the surveillance equipment or techniques which have at some time or other been exposed to domestic testing is as follows:

a. Laser Probe - About 1967, the laser probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in San Francisco under very closely controlled conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed portions of the test. Recordings that were made of laser probe output were carefully controlled as classified material and it is believed that the tapes have long since been destroyed. (Wood/TA)

b. Microwave Intercept System - About 1968, this system was tested in a light aircraft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station in Identity 127, California. This system is designed to permit intercept of microwave telephone communication channels of systems such as Identity 130. It works equally well against the Bell Telephone TD-2, as they are generically the same. Recordings of these telephone intercepts were carefully controlled and were destroyed several years ago.

SECRET

ATTACHMENT 2

00238

SUBJECT: Domestic Tests for Agency Research and Development Efforts

c. Telephone Intrusion Study - The objective of this current program is to develop a means to utilize foreign telephone systems as a communication link without the knowledge of the host system. In order to carry out this objective, it is necessary to learn the complete supervisory signalling and sequencing control system hierarchy for the various foreign telephone systems. Many of these are patterned after the U.S. system and, for this reason, limited monitoring to test the operation of intercept equipment in the United States is planned. The data to be collected would be merely the signal tones from which supervisory codes can be extracted. Message content is of no interest and will not be recorded. Overseas testing is planned at a subsequent date. To date, some domestic testing of this concept has been carried out at the contractor's plant. No recordings have been made of such data. Extremely brief tests exercising U.S. and foreign telephone systems through supervisory tone signalling have been carried out to verify initial concepts. The duration of testing was less than one-half hour.

d. Other Sensor Testing - Examples of engineering development tests of special sensors within the United States include infrared and high-altitude photography, forward-looking IR (FLIR) flights, laser scanners, industrial effluent sampling for isotopes, and airborne magnetometer surveys for metal (rifles and trucks). In all these cases, the data output of such testing has been used for engineering development and the content has been restricted to dissemination to those in Government involved with the engineering design.

e. Remote Physiological Measurements - An ORD-developed cryogenic magnetometer is being tested at a contractor's site for use as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph). Some test subjects are witting, but most tests are on naive subjects (they do not know they are being tested). The magnetometer is completely harmless to the subject and the test results are closely held.

f. Personality Structure of Defectors Study - ORD undertook to determine the personality structure of defectors during the period 1966-69. The work primarily involved an analysis of the open literature on known defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned with a study of the phenomenon of defection itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another, or changing one set of political beliefs for another. The work was conducted at Stanford University. Identity 125/LS)

g. Trained Birds - Birds have been trained and tested in the United States to carry small intelligence collecting packages such as audio surveillance devices, small cameras, and current measuring devices. Any data collected from unwitting domestic sources would have been used only for engineering purposes and then destroyed.

h. Communications Link Loading Study - In the period from 1970 through 1972 various means were used to check out an intercept system designed to operate against Iden 93 communications links. Under carefully controlled conditions, some U. S. microwave communications were recorded and passed through the intercept system under test to prove quality of performance. All intercept material connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks of the time of intercept and the material was never checked for substantive content. NSA participated and controlled most elements of the U. S. material.

SECRET

ORD-2274-73

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities

At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief or his representative was instructed to query all of his people and report back by this afternoon whether or not they had provided any services or dealt with any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters. The attached list is an inventory of all items we were able to uncover. If additional information on any of these topics is desired, we can provide either a verbal or a written report on very short notice.

Charles E. McGinnis

Charles E. McGinnis
Scientific Advisor
to
Director of Research & Development

Attachment:
As stated

CLASSIFIED BY 387323
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

SECRET

Project TAMPER, an on-going program which may be politically sensitive.

A proposed OER wheat estimate program which may be politically sensitive.

Narcotics--our foreign activities are well known in DDS&T.

A negative report from the Support Staff.

ORD's NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledge.

Robert Scott - Performed intelligibility enhancement of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.

James M. Stephan - At the request of FBI, we described Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to removing distortions from some photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down.

7 May 197

C. V. NOYES

My total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Specifically, I participated in TSCC and R&D Subcommittee meetings which included technology exchanges and some equipment exchanges on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial. I also assisted in x-raying the office walls of the Chairman of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening (date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.

Other persons contacted over the years have been:

Mr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service
Mr. Martin Pera, U. S. Customs
Mr. Marvin Beasley, DASA
Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI
Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF
Major John Langager, ONI/USN
Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC

Thomas P. Noe
5/7/73

1. Continuing contacts with intelligence community regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security. This is an exchange of information and reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community.

State
Air Force
Army
DIA
FBI
Navy
US Secret Service
NSA

2. Joint funding of two contracts with State Department (TRW/LLL). Two electret microphones were furnished to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD contract (Bureau of Standards).

3. Other DOD and Government contacts for information collection or exchange only.

ARPA
LEAA/Dept. of Justice
DNA/DOD
Office Telecommunications Policy
Office of Army/Provost Marshal General
Army/Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force/Office of the Inspector General
Air Force/Electronic Systems Division

SECRET

00241

7 May 1973

LS/ORD CONTACTS WITH DOMESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES

1. BNDD(Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Radar People Detector developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action was approved by D/ORD.

2. BSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the Navy. Time: December 1969

3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation System. Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control.

00243

SECRET

29 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT : Reported Identity 61 , Burglary

1. Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the reported break-in of Identity 61. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.

2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio operation conducted against Identity 61 by the FBI, at the Agency's behest and with its technical support. This presents a related question that should be noted. James McCord's testimony indicates that he placed telephone calls to the Identity 75 and Identity 61. He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping that if his phone was tapped his attorneys would be able to challenge the evidence as being tainted. Another witness, John Caulfield, says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he "was sure" they "were subjects of national security wiretaps."

3. In fact, there has been a long-standing telephone tap on the Identity 75 , run by the FBI, about which CI Staff believes McCord knew. It is possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation against Identity 61 , and assumed that it was also a telephone tap. One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping that both his telephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive operations. At this point, given the publicity of the Iden 61 break-in, and the testimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations may lead to exposure of the operations.

3)X4

William V. Broe
Inspector General

00361

Attachment:
As Stated Above

SECRET SENSITIVE

[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

24 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Reported Burglary of the Identity 61

1. The press reported a burglary of Identity 61 13-14 May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent fingerprints, but no identification was made. The FBI, which states that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it determined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61 registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expressed, Identity 61 making it clear that they suspected something other than ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject. There had been an earlier intelligence operation against the Identity 61 which is described below.

2. On 16 April 1971 the Agency proposed to the FBI the installation of technical coverage of Identity 61 The opportunity for such an installation came about when a domestic asset of Foreign Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid for a contract to renovate Identity 61 Upon securing the contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate or install material which would be provided him. The Agency proposed to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic support. The value of such an operation to the intelligence community was cited.

3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms sent a letter to Attorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. On 24 April the Attorney-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation.

00382

[illegible] [illegible]

CL[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the technical equipment from the Agency to the FBI was delivered, installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency personnel were involved in any way with actual installation of equipment in Identity 61 From May to February Agency technicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did they enter Identity 61.

5. The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 be stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover advised that he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and might have to advise them that the installation in Identity 61 was initiated at CIA's request. The operation and equipment, to the best of the Agency's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972 when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage. The request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76 delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on nationalization of foreign holdings. While the FBI was still in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of State on 20 December 1972 requested the FBI to institute all possible coverage of Identity 61 and on 22 December 1972 coverage was partially reinstituted with full coverage in effect by 26 December 1972.

6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was not worth continuing. On 16 February 1973 CIA requested the FBI to discontinue the coverage. On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised that microphone surveillance of Iden 61 was discontinued.

John C. Richards
John C. Richards

ggest this
et sit on our
ints in
files, but
d out
…

Addendum [illegible]ferred to in JCRichards' 24[illegible]v 73 memo to IG, paragraph 2, re Identity 61 Break-in

1. The Foreign Resources Division asset was Identity 77 who owned the Identity 78 . The Agency had initially agreed to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to $2500. The final amount of remuneration turned out to be $4,828.53. Another FR asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79 plumber and elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972.

2. TSD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening post were: Identity 80, Identity 30 and Identity 45 of TSD and Harold Leith of Division D.

00368

CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 61

1. Information has been received from WH Division which indicates that there was a break-in at Identity 61 on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972. The Iden 76 Desk of WH Division has no knowledge of Bureau coverage at that time.

2. I discussed the Iden 76 matter with Iden 66 of CI Staff (Red 1731), who advised that the FBI did have coverage of Identity 61, and the Agency supported this operation. He indicated that this was identified as Operation WUDOOR and he would be able to provide additional details on this if Mr. Colby requests it.

/s/ Identity 10

Acting Executive Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 008246

00372

DDO/D[illegible]

8 MAR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: WH Comments on Jack Anderson Column

REFERENCE: Jack Anderson's Washington Merry-Go-Round Column of 8 March 1973: "Chilean Break-ins Reflect Watergate"

1. WH Division has reviewed the referenced column (copy attached) by Jack Anderson and finds that it contains no new information. To the best knowledge of the Division, there is no foundation to the allegation that E. Howard Hunt was engaged on behalf of ITT in breaking into Chilean diplomatic installations in Washington and New York.

2. Any connection between ITT and these break-ins is purely conjectural and the column takes care to point this out.

3. Harold Hendrix, ITT Latin American representative, has told us that he had no relationship with Hunt on this or any ITT matter. He had anticipated that Anderson might imply such a relationship in his column and had assured us that this was not true.

/s/ Identity 81

Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment: As Stated

DECLASSIFIED BY 9803 RDD/gcl
ON 3/12/94 ... per GMB ... (JFK)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
GMB 3/3/94
(9803 RDD/gcl 3/17/94 JFK)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 001804

00373

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

USSS-EPS FORM 101
6/70

EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE
INCIDENT REPORT

1. SERIAL (CASE) NUMBER FM-72-398

2. DATE OCCUR. 5-13-72&05-15-72

3. HOUR OCCUR. Unkn

4. LOCATION (NATION) Chile (STREET ADDRESS) 1736 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

5. NATURE OF INCIDENT Burglary II

6. REPORTED BY: Hernan Navarro

7. ADDRESS 1706 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Va.

8. HOME PHONE 321-7121

9. OFFICE PHONE 785-1746

10. OFFICE ASSIGNED
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler
Sergeant Riley M. Richardson

11. DATE 05-15-72

12. HOUR 1330 hrs.

13. DAY OF WEEK
(1) (2) 3 4 5 6 (7)
(S) (M) T W T F (S)

14. WITNESS N/A

15. ADDRESS N/A

16. HOME PHONE N/A

17. OFFICE PHONE N/A

18. WITNESS N/A

19. ADDRESS N/A

20. HOME PHONE N/A

21. OFFICE PHONE N/A

22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT (BRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT. CONTINUE ABOVE ITEMS AS NECESSARY INDICATING ITEM)

At approximately 1330 hours, Monday, May 13, 1972, Foreign Missions Division-Control Center was advised by M.P.D.C., 3D, that a burglary had taken place at the Chancery of Chile, 1736 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., sometime between 1600 hours on Friday, May 13, 1972, and on 0855 hours this date.

Sergeant Riley M. Richardson and the undersigned were dispatched at approximately 1335 hours in Cruiser # 23.

The undersigned was advised by Mr. Hernan (NMI) Navarro, Administrative Counselor of the Embassy of Chile, that the Chancery of Chile was entered and all the offices were ransacked. At this time the method of entry or items taken is unknown. Mr. Navarro advises that he will contact the Foreign Missions Division-Watch Commander when determination of missing articles is made. (continued)

jam

(USE EPS FORM 102 - SUPPLEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS)

23. PHOTOS ☐ YES
FS#

24. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC. N/A

(1) LAST NAME FIRST MIDDLE ADDRESS
RACE SEX HEIGHT WEIGHT HAIR EYES DATE OF BIRTH SOCIAL SECURITY NO. NATIONALITY

(2) LAST NAME FIRST MIDDLE ADDRESS
RACE SEX HEIGHT WEIGHT HAIR EYES DATE OF BIRTH SOCIAL SECURITY NO. NATIONALITY

25. ARREST PD

26. ARREST NO.

27. ARREST OFFICER (NAME AND BADGE NO.)

28. DATE OF ARREST

29. HO

30. INCIDENT STATUS A. ☒ OPEN B. ☒ CLOSED C. ☐ UNFOUNDED D. ☐ CLEARED BY ARRES

31. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE), HOUR
Sgt. Stevens E. Butler
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler
DATE 05-15-72
HOUR 1500 hrs.

32. APPROVING OFFICIAL (SIGNATURE)
Pete N Manthos
Captain Pete N. Manthos
DATE 05-1
HOUR 150

33. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL NOTIFIED N/A
DATE:
HOUR:

34. USSS-ID CASE NO. N/A

00376

INCIDENT REPORT - SUPPLEM

1. SERIAL (CASE) NUMBER: FW-72-393

2. NATURE OF INCIDENT: Burglary II

3. REPORTED BY: Herman (NMI) Navarro

4. ADDRESS: 7605 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Va

5. HOME PHONE: 321-7127

6. OFFICE PHONE: 765-1746

7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:

The following were previously on the scene: Sergeant Clifton O. Gill, Badge # 147, M.P.D.C.,3D, and Officer Michael S. Kurdilla, Badge # 3770, M.P.D.C.,3D, also M.P.D.C Print Cruiser # 735.

S/A Michael F. Murphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.

jam (D)

8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC. N/A

	LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS			
(1)							
RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY
(2) LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS					
RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

9. ARREST PD:

10. ARREST NO.:

11. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE NO.):

12. DATE:

13. HOUR:

14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSTION: A. ☒ OPEN B. ☒ CLOSED C. ☐ UNFOUNDED D. ☐ CLEARED BY ARREST

15. USSS-ID CASE NO.: N/A

16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION: OPEN

00377

17. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE): Sgt. Stevens E. Butler Sergeant Stevens E. Butler

18. DATE: 05-15-72

19. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE): Pete N Manthos Captain Pete N. Manthos

20. DATE: 05-

2. NATURE OF INCIDENT

Burglary II

3. REPORTED BY: Herman (IPT) Navarro	4. ADDRESS 7605 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Va	5. HOME PHONE 321-7121 6. OFFICE PHONE 785-3746

7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:

At approximately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May 16, 1972, Mr. Navarro contacted Officer Adrian Roman-Gonzalez at 1310 L. Street, N.W. and stated the following items missing: (4 Portable Radios), one (1) Sanyo AM/FM Portable Radio, two (2) Panasonic AM/FM Radi and one (1) Westinghouse AM/FM/SW Radio. Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric Shaver, one (1) Womens pullover sweater, and an unknown number of books.

jam

8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC. N/A

(1) LAST NAME		FIRST		MIDDLE		ADDRESS		
RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY
(2) LAST NAME		FIRST		MIDDLE		ADDRESS		
RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

9. ARREST PD	10. ARREST NO.	11. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE NO.)	12. DATE	13. HOUR

14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSTION

A. ☒ OPEN B. ☒ CLOSED C. ☐ UNFOUNDED D. ☐ CLEARED BY ARREST

15. USSS-ID CASE NO.

N/A

16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION

OPEN

00378

17. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE) Sgt. Steven E. Butler Sergeant Stevens E. Butler	18. DATE 05-15-72	19. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE) Pete N Manthos Captain Pete N. Manthos	20. DATE 05-15

PERSON OR PROPER

Embassy OF Chile

▷248-42

14. EX. COPIES 1	15. DIST. 3D	16. BEAT	17. R.A.	3. STREET ADDRESS 1736 MASS. Ave N.W.	4. HOME PHONE N/A	
18. COMPLAINANT'S OCCUPATION AND HRS EMPLOYED N/A				5. WHERE EMPLOYED OR SCHOOL ATTENDING N/A	6. BUS. PHONE 785-174	

19. DESCRIBE LOCATION OR TYPE OF PREMISE ▷ Chile Embassy

7. SEX ▷ RACE DOB

8. CRIME Burg. II

20. VEHICLE USED - TAG NO. AND STATE N/A

9. LOCATION OF CRIME (Address) 1736 MASS. Ave N.W.

10. DATE, DAY, TIME ▷ See Item 36 S-M-T-W-T-F-S

21. YEAR MAKE MODEL COLOR(S)

11. WEAPON, TOOL, FORCE OR MEANS USED ▷ UNK

PHOTOS ☐ YES ☐ NO FS #

CODE: O—OWNER R - REPORTING PERSON C—COMPLAINANT P - PARENT/GUAR

12. METHOD USED ▷ UNK

13. CLASSIFICATION ▷

22. NAME (Last, First, Middle)	CODE	RES. ADDRESS	HOME PHONE	BUS. PHONE
▷ NAVARRO, Hernan	R	7605 Hamlet St. Springfield VA	321-7121	785-17
23. ▷ Administrative Counselor				
24. ▷				

25. IDENTIFY SUSPECTS BY NUMBER (Include Name, Address, Sex, Race, Age, Height, Weight, Eyes, Hair, Clothing etc.) IF ARRESTED GIVE ARREST NUMBER AND CHARGE (Omit description if arrested)

(1) ▷ N/A

(2) ▷

26. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATION ON BODY ▷ N/A

27. HOSPITALIZED - WHERE? ▷ N/A ☐ ADMIT ☐ RELEA

28. TRANSPORTED BY N/A

29. TREATED BY ▷ N/A

30. TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN ▷ UNK.

31. LOSS VALUE ▷ UNK

32. TRADEMARKS, ACTIONS OR CONVERSATION OF SUSPECT N/A

33. EXACT LOCATION OF PROPERTY Inside Embassy

34. POINT OF ENTRY ▷ UNK

35. VEHICLE FROM WHICH THEFT OCCURRED TAG NO. STATE YEAR AND MAKE N/A

36. NARRATIVE: (1) CONTINUATIONS OF ABOVE ITEMS (NOTE ITEM NUMBER) INCLUDE ADDITIONAL SUSPECTS AS OUTLINED ABOVE. (2) BRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT AND ACTION TAKEN. (3) DESCRIBE EVIDENCE AND PROPERTY INDICATE DISPOSITION AND DESCRIBE ALL PROPERTY INVOLVED. USE CONTINUATION REPORT IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED. RECORD VALUE OF LOSS ESTIMATED BY VICTIM.

ITEM NO.

R-1 Reports Between The hours of 1600, 5-13-72 And 0855, 5-15-72 The Embassy of Chile was entered and all The offices Ransaked. Unknown what was taken at this

Full Report To Follow Later.

CRU 244 Sgt Gill on Scene,

Print CRU 735 on Scene

OFF Leitz of E.P.S. Notified AT 1330 hrs.

OFFICE USE ONLY

9591	T.T. NUMBER	DATE & TIME THIS REPORT 5-15-72 1500	37. DATE/TIME TYPE NO.	38. REPRODUCE NO
39. REPORTING OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO. M.S. Kurdilla 3D 3770	40. STATUS (Check One) ☐ UNFOUNDED ☒ OPEN ☐ CLOSED ☐ SUSPENDED		41. UNIT REFERRED TO	42. UCR DISPOSITION
43. SECOND OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO. B.L. Dunning	44. SUPERVISOR APPROVING UNIT & BADGE NO. Sgt C. O. Gill 147		45. REVIEWER	NO. 00379

PD 251 REVISED 3/71 METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

OGC 73-0930
25 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Identity 61 Break In on 15 May 1972

1. On 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson, General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if he had any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved in a break in at Identity 61 in Washington, D.C. on 15 May 1972. Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, and the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identified two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated 15 May 1972, Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest of the Iden 76 Government presented to the American Embassy, and the State Department reply to Santiago, No. 084655, dated 15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service. I then called Mr. Tom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.

2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry about prosecution. Mr. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61 between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972.

Reported loss at tha[illegible]me consisted of four am/fm[illegible]adios and one electric razor. The police investigation identified some latent fingerprints but no identification of those prints was made. Since the reported loss was under $5,000 and there was no evidence of a crossing of state boundries, the FBI did not make an investigation of the incident. The MPD reported that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified.

JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

cc: Legislative Counsel
Inspector General

OGC:JKG:cav
Orig - Subject: Watergate Case
1 - JKG Signer
1 - Chrono

1 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby

SUBJECT: Special Activities

1. Following our recent conversation, I have searched my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples of activities which to hostile observers or to someone without complete knowledge and with a special kind of motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities exceeding CIA's charter.

2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962, DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify their sources for classified information which was appearing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA, orally, which I did. I understand more complete information on this operation is available from the Director of Security. I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of what precise actions were taken, what information was gained, what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.

3. As a result of a developing relationship with IDEN-122 the IDEN-123 representative in Washington, and also as a result of certain information conveyed by ✓ IDEN-124 , James Angleton, with the approval of Dick Helms, agreed to mount a counterespionage operation against the IDEN-95 in Washington. This involved breaking and entering and the removal of documents from

the IDEN-126 On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally on the operation without going into operational details. Later on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed. Actual breaking and entering occurred somewhat later, and on 15 April 1963, DCI McCone met with President Kennedy alone and briefed the President on the details of this new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney General was briefed and he agreed that he would not mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed. On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secretary of State Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed reservations about the propriety of such an operation. He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations with McCone on 17 April 1964, 28 May 1964, and 14 June 1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the IDEN-95 be informed directly that we knew about their espionage operations in the United States and ask them to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and President John F. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara was also present, and there is no record that he had previously been made aware of this operation.

4. Although certain activities never got beyond the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation. One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear installations. Outside the United States Government, General Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign installations in this country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected

exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy, and generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting taking place in the presence of the Attorney General. It is clear that the FBI was opposed to any such proposal then, as now, and the plan never went forward.

5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured the cooperation of several prominent US business firms in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but knowledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.

6. On 17 April 1964, Mr. Robert B. Anderson came to DCI McCone on behalf of American business interests, offering to insert some $300,000 to try to secure a favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly after this approach, IDEN-128 of IDEN-129 made a similar proposal to McCone in connection with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of American business could not be accepted, it being neither a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business. This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations and private business.

7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy, McCone injected the Agency, and particularly IDEN-36

into the US labor situation, and particularly to try to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and Walter Reuther. IDEN-36 steered a very skillful course in this connection, but the Agency could be vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back, or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's wishes.

8. There are three examples of using Agency funds which I know to be controversial. One was the expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike Miskovsky IDEN-131 , and James Smith. Second, as you well know, when Lou Concin received his summons to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on 1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him. My impression is that the accounting for this and its use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at one of the early Special Group meetings attended by McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His general position was that such expenditures were not within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow such spending only on the direct personal request of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or the White House.

9. I raise these issues of funding because I remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000 for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.

10. Under the heading of old business, I know that any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried about the fact that conversations within the offices and over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's

tenure, there were microphones in his regular office, his inner office, his dining room, his office in East Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven Street. I do not know who would be willing to raise such an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this score.

11. Also under the heading of old business, I well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet Union. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs, and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced with surprisingly little excitement at the time.

12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was a special arrangement with the Office of Communications whereby the Director's office gained access to non-CIA traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball, Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did. Ben Read in the Secretary of State's office and I spent several weeks putting this one to rest.

13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know, operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of his activities could be misunderstood. One example was his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and Maria Callas flown from Rome to Athens on Air Force KC 135. Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John

Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety of this action.

14. The use of IDEN-132 aircraft has been remarkably secure, but DCI McCone himself forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the San Francisco airport for the Republican National Convention in 1964 aboard the IDEN-133 with the highly visible tail number IDEN-134. This was, I explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate charter, but he didn't like it.

15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift and a luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps indicative of the press's relations with him. However, in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher and the authors to change things. They did not change a comma, and I doubt that this old saw will ever sing again.

16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI, would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters.

17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that allegations from any quarter which cast these things in the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention, and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight. If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point

out that I was very much in the position of the enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers were aware of these activities and better able to judge their propriety and possible impact or misinterpretation.

WElder
WALTER ELDER

SUBJECT: PLMPLODESTAR

Project MPLODESTAR is a Headquarters initiated program which has as its fundamental objective the long term manipulations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist, and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwing, radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embarrassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each case is cleared with the FBI and through CI/SO the Bureau is kept informed on a regular basis.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 061090

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy in 1971 and 1972

1. A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in Washington, D. C. was mounted by the FBI with the support of this Agency in April-May 1971. This operation, which used Agency equipment and technical expertise but was managed operationally by the FBI, was initiated only after then-Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was discontinued at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and identify this operation as CIA instigated.

2. The operation consisted of the following three technical devices:

a. An AC-powered, masked transmitter and two switches in the office occupied by the Deputy Chief of Mission.

b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in the office of the Ambassador's secretary which was

[illegible]
SECRET

00468

designed to pick up high quality audio of typing in the office. It was hoped to break these audio signals into clear text using advanced computer techniques developed by Division D. No useful product, however, was ever obtained.

c. A battery-powered, masked transmitter and switch concealed in the door of the Embassy, which would supply crytographic information for NSA. (Produced excellent quality signals until it became inoperative in early 1972 because of battery failure.)

3. In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations of only moderate interest). Reactivation was requested because of strong interest in the special IDEN-76 government mission arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level talks with U.S. State Department officials concerning debt renegotiation and other major items outstanding between the two countries. The operation was reinitiated on 21 December 1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February 1973 by Acting

Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of this operation did not justify the risks involved in continuing to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the mounting disclosures about CIA involvement in IDEN-76 This was especially so because of our reservations about maintaining proper security for the listening post which, as with other operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.

SENSITIVE
SECRET

00420

e. Alias Social Security Cards. 171 backstopped accounts have been established for contract personnel whose relationship with the Agency cannot be revealed but who are entitled to Social Security coverage. Following expiration of the contractual relationship, at an appropriate time the alias and true name accounts are merged permitting the individual to receive complete benefits upon reaching the age of eligibility.

f. Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 54 Social Security numbers have been registered for the purpose of opening 54 new bank accounts since 1 July 1972. 87 individual tax accounts have been established with IRS on an unwitting basis in 14 cities in the United States.

g. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities (43 corporations; 61 sole-proprietorships; 207 lawyers and 61 telephone answering service addresses are maintained by CCS in 58 cities in the United States.

h. Alias Signatories on Bank Accounts. 24 aliases for signatures on 25 proprietary entity and one notional company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1 proprietary-hire as follows:

CCS/Hqs - 5 officers (12 aliases) on 8 proprietary entities and 1 notional company.

CCS/NY PMC* - 3 officers (9 aliases) on 13 proprietary entities.

CCS/NY PMC* - 1 proprietary-hire (1 alias) on 3 proprietary entities.

CCS/MD PMC* - 1 officer (2 aliases) on 2 proprietary entities.

*Proprietary Management Company

sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise of normal commercial annuities. Backstopping for this arrangement is provided through CCS-procured bank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retirees are currently being handled.

k. Credit Union Arrangements for Selected Non-official Cover Personnel. Dividends (interest) earned on Credit Union accounts by individuals under cover are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service based on 50 U.S. Code 403g or Internal Revenue Code Section 6041.

Individuals under cover may borrow money from the Credit Union for the purchase of real estate; however, the mortgage is recorded in the name of a cleared lawyer and not the actual lendor (Credit Union).

Paragraph l. deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency operational methods and techniques.

CORPORATE COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover of bona fide U.S. companies abroad and in the U.S. This process involves the selection of companies; research on their locations and key personnel; clearances; contacts with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency; arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the companies, including letters of understanding; funding of salaries, allowances and expenses; and, continuous monitoring of each integrated case throughout the course of the cover use. The overall objective is to match the individual being placed, the company, and the location, in a manner that will ensure achievement of the Agency purpose and protection of the company integrity.

2. Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover is provided by 140 companies; 179 integrees are located in 47 foreign countries and 12 are located in the United States. To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel are researching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companies at any given time.

3. To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating company, and to preserve the Agency's operational equity in the event of exposure of an individual under cover, it has been established policy that no more than two individuals would be furnished cover by the same company. At the present time this ratio is confined to approximately 25% of the total number of companies now being used and efforts are underway to effect further reductions toward the goal of one individual per company.

4. In addition to the primary corporate cover function described in paragraph 1. above, CCS maintains continuing contact with two U.S. car rental firms and two U.S. credit card firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit cards in alias for operational use in the United States and abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being used by 34 individuals.

[illegible]

DEVISED FACILITIES COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 backstopped notional facilities which were created to provide cover for Agency personnel in the United States and abroad and to provide an attributable source for Agency funds used in operations and requiring concealment of Agency or U.S. Government interest. The facilities comprise 43 corporations providing personal status cover, payrolling and tax attribution sources, and other miscellaneous support such as title to property, funding, etc.; 61 sole-proprietorships providing status and operational cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207 non-registered companies providing support for high risk operational requirements, agents abroad, corporate reimbursements, and proprietary funding.

2. 224 Agency personnel engaged in operational activities are payrolled by the facilities, an essential procedure permitting the reporting of Agency salaries without documenting the Agency as the source.

3. The facilities provide a capability for passing Agency funds to 30 Agency proprietaries and 97 bona fide companies on a continuing basis. 225 bank accounts located in 36 banks throughout the United States provide the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains three domestic proprietary management companies which provide funding and operational support for 49 Agency entities, including 13 controlled and directed by CCS.

2. The three proprietary management companies are staffed by 9 employees; they furnish assistance in the commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of entities supporting operations, and provide cover and funding channels for operational activities as required. Most importantly, professional services are furnished in a manner responsive to required security standards and at a cost considerably less than would be charged by bona fide management firms.

3. The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS provide cover for ten individuals in the United States and three overseas. Operationally, the companies provide commercial funding channels on a world-wide basis and serve as corporate owners of equipment, inventory and aircraft and as collection mechanisms for outstanding notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government affiliation or interest.

[illegible] CL BY [illegible]

SECRET

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing the DCI

1. This Memorandum is submitted in order to identify to you for possible briefing of the Director activities which in certain contexts could be construed as delicate or inappropriate.

2. At the request of the Director of Security, from approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January 1973 safesite number 583 was made available to the U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was under threat of assassination by organized criminal elements.

3. SB Division over the past three months has interviewed four graduate students as prospective candidates for assignments under American business cover in the USSR. They were encouraged to locate cover jobs on their own.

4. For approximately two years the SB Division has had the cooperation of the Commander of the Morals Division of the District of Columbia Police Department in training officers scheduled for assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The arrangement was made through the Office of Security.

5. Since late 1972 CIA has taken part in seven FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in response to requests from the FBI. We have shared with them through lectures and discussions lessons we have learned which are relevant to their counter-espionage responsibilities.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059952

6x

6. As a means of sharing more fully our operational experience we have invited three FBI officers to be students in our Soviet Operations Course from 14 to 25 May 1973.

7. A Soviet defector was confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to September 1967 while efforts were being made to establish whether he was a bona fide defector. Although his present attitude toward the Agency is quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the press could cause undesirable publicity if it were to uncover the story.

David H. Blee

David H. Blee
Chief
Soviet Bloc Division

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

Attached is the material we requested of Dick Ober:

A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to Secret Service for Democratic and Republican Conventions

Ober advises that the only American we reported on to the IEC is Rennie Davis.

BE (14 May 73)
(DATE)

00548

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Inspector General		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Mr. Broe:

Dick Ober has been advised that this package is being sent to you. Since knowledge of the existence of this Committee has been strictly limited, I've asked that it be delivered to you unopened. Although it has an ER number on it, it has not been sent through that office -- I gave them only the day, subject, and originator.

Barbara

00547

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
O/ES/MC/Barbara Pindar	15 May 73

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Richard Ober	EXTENSION 1465	NO. DATE 14 May 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. IDEN-73 O/DCI	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
2. Mr Colby				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

Attached are:

1. Background note on [illegible] Committee per your request of this morning.

2. Copies of memoranda concerning Agency support to Secret Service (7 April and 23 June 1972).

EYES ONLY

[illegible]

[illegible]

00548

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY

14 MAY 1973

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

1. Background: Formed December 1970 to produce fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies, including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremism and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice (Chairman); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of other Departments or Agencies (following have participated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later William Olson. IES has received requirements directly from and delivered reports directly to John Dean of the White House. The White House has insisted that the existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness of its existence within this Agency has been limited to DCI, DDO (DDP), C/CI and four officers of this office.

2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or attribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representative on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff and as the alternate to the Agency representative on the Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).

3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, November 1971. This study was initiated in July 1971 by the White House as a consequence of the President's concern about the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation was editorial review.

00549

EYES ONLY
SENSITIVE
SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

4. Republican National Convention (21-24 August 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from February through August 1972 periodic contributions for these estimates concerning foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention (copies attached).

5. Democratic National Convention (10-13 July 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided between March and July 1972 contributions on foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention (copies attached).

Attachments: a/s

23 FEB 1972

SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

1. There are only limited indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972.

2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held 11-13 February 1972 in Paris/Versailles, attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican National Convention. A representative of the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Convention, requested the American Delegations' Steering Committee at the World Assembly to include a specific call for international support of activities against the Republican convention in their proposal to the Action Commission of the World Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indications that the proposal would be taken to the floor of the Assembly.

3. John LENNON, a British subject, has provided financial support to Project "YES", which in turn paid the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representative of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS' representative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.) Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNON-supported project, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC), of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to direct New Left protest activities at the Republican National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' representative to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; it is not known if the Republican National Convention was discussed.

4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its harassment of the Republican convention. A working draft plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations.

00553

FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

CONTROLLED DISSEM

21 MAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

Indications remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

> "In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

DEVELOPMENTS:

The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Convention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a "large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72, which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles of people all over the world." Plans for activities at Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations. In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to "outflank NIXON domestically and internationally," international opposition can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demonstrations."

CONTROLLED DISSEM

24 APR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Plann[illegible] to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There is little new evidence of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San Diego, 21 to 23 August 1972. The Students for a Democratic Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in a demonstration in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targetting on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity from the North Vietnamese. The letter is of interest as an indication of North Vietnamese contact with the SDCC; such contact will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-reported plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the Convention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris.

DEVELOPMENTS:

At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts, held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) adopted a proposal to hold demonstrations at the San Diego-Tijuana border during the Republican National Convention. The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be entertained.

The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972, expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SDCC, and conveys the Committee's "best wishes of militant solidarity and friendship." The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC write often and "send us materials you have."

CONTROLLED DISSEM

00556

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

23 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. A member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Republican Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be hectic right until the elections in the U.S."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:

August 21-23	Republican Convention, San Diego. Demonstrations organized by the San Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267, San Diego, Ca. 92103.

00557

[illegible]

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.

00558

14 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972, is an expression of interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

00559

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
CONTROLLED DISSEM

28 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no additional indications of any substantial foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

00563

CONTROLLED DISSEM

26 JUL 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A leader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to take place at United States and allied military installations abroad during the period immediately before and during the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will participate in activities in connection with the Convention. The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic organization which has been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the Republican National Convention, has sent a delegation to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed at these meetings.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In an early July 1972 meeting with prominent members of foreign antiwar organizations, a representative of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an important position within that organization, discussed the plans of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that during the period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities involved in the manufacture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and that similar actions will be organized at United States and allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representative further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest

00581

CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to determi
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

WARNING NOTICE
NSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

of the bombing in Vietnam are being organized by the "Republican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on 21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will speak on the subject of the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. (Comment: We have no present information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to travel to the United States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to participate in activities connected with the Republican Convention.)

The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic group engaged in organizing counter-activities at the Republican National Convention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). An advance party has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss the agenda for meetings with the full AWU delegation. Although no information is presently available indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are scheduled to be discussed at meetings between the AWU delegation and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the AWU advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials regarding the stance the AWU should take on certain questions relating to the presidential elections. It is also known that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party about the political mood in the United States. One of the AWU delegation members has stated that upon their return to the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television, to "educate the American people about the consequences of voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat Nixon." The delegation member added that the demonstrations at the Republican Convention will be "unique."

CONTROLLED DISSEM

2 AUG 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire American delegation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG officials; at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private exchanges. A second group of activists, considered more important than the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972 for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American delegation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to discussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnamese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Republican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen Van TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention." TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part, refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demonstrators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.

00583

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

CLASSIFIED BY ______________
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
impossible to determine

Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation, the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation. Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there is no information available concerning the substance of these private exchanges.

A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972 for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second group is scheduled to be led by Rennie DAVIS, founder and leader of the AWU. This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within recent months for discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon his return from his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's chief target would be the Republican Convention.

9 AUG 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

00565

CLASSIFIED BY ______
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), (2), [illegible]
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
impossible to determine

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN [illegible] DISSEM ABROAD

CONTROLLED DISSEM

16 AUG 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

00566

CLASSIFIED BY ____________
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to determ
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

06 MAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt Or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

There are no direct indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

> "In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly,

under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."

09 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-13 July 1972, are limited to a reiteration by a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam of a statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international support to a campaign of anti-Vietnam War activities in the United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican Conventions, but made no specific call for support of disruptive actions at the conventions themselves.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In early April 1972 an influential and well-informed staff member of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed, in private, the international anti-Vietnam War activities conducted on 1, 15, and 22 April. The Stockholm Conference member stated that these actions were part of an international campaign in support of domestic American antiwar efforts during the period 1 April to 15 May 1972, and "will culminate at the election conventions in July and August."

The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was a major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's "Action Commission." The appendix called for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

23 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972. A member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Democratic Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be hectic right until the elections in the U.S."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:

July 9 - 12	Democratic Convention, Miami Beach. Demonstrations organised by Florida People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa, Florida 33612.

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.

7 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972, is an expression of interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and National Conventions.

21 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972.

00575

File [illegible]
cc USSS –

23 JUN 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) for National Democratic (10-14 July 1972) and National Republican (21-24 August 1972) Conventions

1. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive Director/Comptroller.

2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.S. Secret Service for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions is contained in a memorandum of 7 April 1972 from Chief, CI Staff to the DCI which was concurred in by the ADDP and approved by the DCI on 10 April 1972 (copy attached).

3. On 13 April 1972 the COS, WH/Miami met with the Miami USSS representative and Mr. Mastrovito of USSS Headquarters to discuss preliminary planning for Station WH/Miami support to the USSS prior to and during subject conventions. On 17 April 1972 the C/WH/COG and C/CI/LSN met with Mr. Mastrovito at Headquarters to implement the preliminary planning agreed upon in Miami and to determine the extent of Headquarters support required by the USSS.

4. The basic agreement mutually concurred in by the USSS and Headquarters representatives provided that:

a. Station WH/Miami would conduct name traces on all Cubans of interest to the USSS.

b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.

c. CIA would keep the USSS informed of any events in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that would have any bearing on the USSS protective mission during the convention periods. This would include briefings on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States and on activities of Cuban intelligence operations which could affect the security of the conventions.

00576

d. Coverage of Latin American exile groups in the United States would be the responsibility of the FBI since CIA had ceased the extensive coverage formerly targeted against these groups since it was now considered an internal security function.

5. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffer office of Station WH/Miami with the USSS Chief of Communications, Station personnel and a Headquarters representative. It was agreed that name traces would be handled by Miami security field office courier from the USSS to buffer office until the USSS established communications links from their command post in convention center, at which time trace requests would be sent from the command post to USSS headquarters and relayed to CIA Headquarters. Cuban name traces are relayed to Station WH/Miami by the Signal Center and non-Cuban traces are conducted by WH/COG. Replies to USSS requests on non-Cubans are coordinated with CI/SO.

6. Station WH/Miami has arranged the rental of a safehouse about five minutes from convention center which will provide a secure and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency personnel. This safehouse will be available just prior to and during both conventions. A Headquarters officer will TDY to Miami prior to the conventions and remain until the conventions adjourn to assist the Station in providing the support described in paragraph four above.

7. Station WH/Miami is in daily contact with the USSS in Miami, utilizing buffer office as a meeting site when necessary. The location of Station WH/Miami has not been revealed to the USSS. (Station is located some distance from buffer office.) Additionally, the Miami Security Field Office maintains normal liaison with the local USSS Miami unit.

8. The Station understands that no personnel will be present at the convention hall, that they will not provide any equipment unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any other facilities other than the safehouse described in paragraph six.

SECRET

May 1973

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities

You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972, I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI. These funds may still be possibly held in a special account for that use. This is one of the areas where TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would have the details as this was handled through the Executive Director's office and of course Angleton would have additional information.

Signed
[illegible]

Chief
Missions and Programs Staff

67

E2 IMPDET CL BY 357737

EYES ONLY
SECRET

00583

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Areas of Possible Embarrassment to the Agency

1. Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.

2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the Agency on this subject:

a. Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director Helms.

b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI, General Cushman (see attached telephone conversation). Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and

c. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.

3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since it gives the flavor of White House concern. It took several days to uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involvement of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity. The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this subject died down and we did not pursue it further.

4. Please return the attachments when they have served your purpose.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 05451

SECRET

00583

5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff prepared by Richard Ober. The original meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr. Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and it is always possible that he might draw in the Agency.

6. Before appointing Ober to the IES Staff as the Agency representative, I had attended various inter-agency meetings presided over by Mardian. I expressed the view to Director Helms that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inexperience. Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. On a confidential basis one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from the Bureau.

for
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachments (5)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group Activities

1. Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group (CI/PG) is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations for activities and programs involving assistance to foreign police/security forces for the purpose of exploiting such activities and programs for intelligence purposes.

2. CI/PG maintains liaison with the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development (OPS/AID) and its training facility, the International Police Academy (IPA). CI/PG also administers and supervises Project IDEN-171 and its training proprietary facility, IDEN-172. DEN-168 In addition, CI/PG coordinates a joint OPS/AID Technical Services Division, Central Intelligence Agency (TSD/CIA) Technical Investigations Course. CI/PG provides guidance and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters pertaining to police/security functions and activities. Specific details of these functions are as follows:

LIAISON WITH OPS/AID

CI/PG liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a daily basis and consists principally of:

A. exchange of information on IPA participants, some of whom later attend IDEN-172 courses and who are of interest to Agency components,

B. arranging for inclusion of Agency sponsored participants in IPA/OPS/AID training programs,

C. arranging for IPA/OPS/AID briefings and tours for foreign police/security representatives sponsored by CIA Area Divisions,

00597

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

D. obtaining biographic and assessment data on IPA/OPS/AID trainees,

E. providing general information pertaining to police/security organizations, activities, equipment, and personalities requested by Agency operating components,

F. coordinating the Agency's participation in the Technical Investigations Course designed to familiarize the trainees with the technique required to properly investigate terrorist activities wherein explosives have been utilized,

G. obtaining OPS/AID cover for CIA personnel to serve abroad. At one time as many as 50 CIA employees were covered in Latin America, the Far East and Africa. This total has been reduced during the past several years to 10 serving in Thailand, *

H. arranging contact between Desk officers and OPS/AID sponsored participants.

PROJECT IDEN-171 - PROPRIETARY IDEN-172 - training function of IDEN-168

Sells police equip. [illegible] consult service

IDEN-172 Training Academy is a commercial interprise. It was incorporated under the laws of the State of Maryland in 1952 and conducts its business in the District of Colombia. It is engaged principally in training foreign police/security personnel under an overt contract with OPS/AID, and selling police/security equipment to foreign police/security personnel and organizations. IDEN-172 also provides special training programs and briefings to foreign police/security personnel of interest to Agency operating divisions. It provides biographic and assessment data on trainees to country desks. Recently IDEN-172 has acquired the capability of providing training to foreign police/security personnel in VIP protective security for Chiefs of State.

* CIA personnel under this cover will not be replaced as such and all will be phased out by June 1974.

COMMENT

CI/PG does not maintain direct contact or liaison with any law enforcement organization, local or federal, at home or abroad. When the need arises, such contact is sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or IDEN-172 without divulging Agency interest. OPS/AID has such contacts at home and abroad because of the nature of its activities (training of foreign police/security personnel at home and abroad), and its Public Safety programs around the world. IDEN-172 has such contacts at home - local and federal level - because its personnel are personally acquainted with law enforcement officers throughout the United States. Members of the IDEN-172 staff (not identified) as CIA) have appeared as guest lecturers at such federal institutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division.

3. In addition to the liaison mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Agency maintains liaison in varying degrees with foreign police/security organizations through its field stations. The existence and extent thereof, however, is a decision to be made by the Area Division, and is not the responsibility of CI/PG.

4. The CIA station as a member of the Country Team in Montevideo, Uruguay, may have had some contact with Dan Mitrione, who was murdered by the Tupamaros. Dan Mitrione, an experienced and respected law enforcement officer, was a bona fide OPS/AID officer assigned to the AID mission in Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or agent.

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

00593

SECRET

May 73

SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program

1. The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the Arab fedayeen.

2. The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conducting efforts domestically for internal domestic collection purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented activity in the United States has been of two types:

a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel abroad in connection with their extremist activity and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters officers. The briefing has included appropriate operational guidance, including defensive advice.

b. Americans with existing extremist credentials have been assessed, recruited, tested and dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract agents, primarily sources offered for such use by the FBI. When abroad they collect information responsive to MHCHAOS program requirements, as well as other Agency requirements. They are thus used primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Communists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their background and their particular access permits. It should be noted that the MPTROIKA aspect of the MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.

.S. citizens [illegible] [illegible]

3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign program, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity described above. The program is and has been managed so as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets

00591

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SENSITIVE
SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

have been recuited and run exclusively for the MHCHAOS program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product capability or a concurrent capability for provision of information responsive to the program's requirements. This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. This collection program is viewed as an integral part of the recruitment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division operations and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an American "Movement" background or who have known connections with the American "Movement" are useful as access agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to discern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, and to develop operationally exploitable relationships with recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets are of interest to our targets because of their connections with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement." Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been approximately 20 important areas of operational interest, which at the present time have been reduced to about ten: Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers, Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.

4. The MHCHAOS program also utilizes audio operations, two of which have been implemented to cover targets of special interest.

Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitive foreign operation.

Paragraph b. deleted because it reveals a sensitive Agency foreign operation.

5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and who appear to have extremist connections, interests or background are reported upon. Other individuals are reported upon in response to specific Headquarters requirements received from the FBI because such individuals are of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.

6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the MHCHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. It is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division. The control and retrievability of information obtained, including information received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Special Operations Group.

7. Information responsive to specific FBI requirements is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled dissemination channels, i.e., by restricted handling cable traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind memoranda.

8. Information of particular significance, when collected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.

FR 73-183

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential

REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, 73-180, dated 7 May 1973, same subject

1. The answers to your questions are as follows:

   a. Question: Do we recruit Americans?

   Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be used as academic support assets and access agents. These Americans are used for spotting and assessment purposes only and do not perform any recruitments.

Paragraph 1. b. and 1. c. are deleted because they contain sensitive agency operational methods and techniques.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057223

d. Question: What is the arrangement re. recruiting out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?

Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specifically requires approval by the ADDO or DDO for any recruitment attempt made in the United States against an American member of the academic community or a foreign target attending an American academic institution. This regulation is presently in the process of revision in that this approval authority for academic recruitments in the United States is to be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority for recruitment attempts against American students outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief of the appropriate area division. The only prohibitions at the present time are those precluding recruitment attempts against foreign students here in the United States on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockefeller or Fulbright.

2. If you have further questions, please let me know.

signed/IDEN-173

Acting Chief
Foreign Resources Division

FR 73-180

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential

1. At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency. We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which FR Division has participated and/or is participating that contain somewhat greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:

a. The New York Base provides a fairly considerable amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the Chinese. This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other than the inordinate amount of time spent by New York Base personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of money that has been expended in support of these efforts.

b. A CIA Officer is to be assigned to FR Division. The CIA Officer is presently assigned overseas under deep cover; his cover is the Mullen Corporation. This is the corporation that employed E. Howard Hunt. In discussions between NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would be pulled out and reassigned in the United States. FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057223

We have concluded that the best solution is to have this officer attend a university in the Midwest for at least a year, working towards an advanced degree until there has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan to make no operational use of the CIA Officer whatsoever, during the period of time that he is attending the university. Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the situation and decide the next course of action at that time.

Paragraph 1. c. is deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency operational methods and techniques.

d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the existence of an audio operation done by the FBI but with close TSD support in San Francisco. This operation is directed against IDEN-62. I understand the operation has been exceptionally well done. However, the responsibility for this activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction with SB Division.

e. Three microphones were planted in various locations in the IDEN-61 by the FBI. The equipment was produced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no CIA personnel have entered the premises. The operation was deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however, are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is unlikely the finger would point to CIA.

VIII. Coordination

A. Internal

In developing its cadre of general support assets and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact with the Domestic Contact Service of the Directorate for Intelligence, using their assets wherever and whenever possible to support FR's operational activities. To a more limited degree, FR Bases maintain contacts with Office of Security and Office of Personnel field representatives, pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by these officers and using their entre to specific individuals who can provide access to targets of operational interest.

B. External

FR officers in the field maintain coordination with their FBI counterparts. There is limited cooperation with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are of occasional help in operations involving other nationals. The local field offices of the FBI are made aware of the presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on occasion provided backstopping on cases where there was some flap potential.

Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between the Agency and the FBI dated 7 February 1966.

The Bases also have contact with local Immigration and Naturalization Service offices although these contacts are less frequent and less important than the contacts with the FBI offices.

1 - Mr. Wannall (detached)
July 16, 1975
1 - Mr. Mintz (detached)
1 - Mr. Hotis (detached)
SENATOR GARY W. HART
1 - Mr. Daly (detached)
1 - Mr. Cregar (detached)
1 - Mr. Farrington (detached)

Reference is made to the letter to the Attorney General dated May 28, 1975, and signed by Senator Frank Church and Senator John C. Tower.

A review of the central files of the FBI revealed that a file pertaining to your application for employment with the Department of Justice and a file which lists you as the victim in a case involving the Congressional Assassination Statute are maintained by this Bureau.

Enclosed herewith are pertinent documents from the Departmental Applicant file. Certain data in this file is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to the provisions of Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(2), (b)(5), and (b)(7)(C) and (D). As I am sure you are aware, these exemptions allow for the withholding of information related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; inter-agency or intra-agency documents not available through discovery proceedings during litigation; information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of another individual; and information which would disclose the identity of a confidential source.

The other file pertains to an investigation concerning a threat against your life. Although your name is carried in the title throughout the file as the "victim," only a minimal amount of information refers to you. The file indicates that the Denver Police Department received information that a particular individual was in Denver to kill you if you were elected as United States Senator from Colorado on November 5, 1974; that the polls indicated you would be elected; that you and your Denver Office were aware of this threat; that the Denver Police Department afforded protection for you until you departed Denver the morning of November 6, 1974, for vacation in Mexico; and that an Agent of this Bureau attempted to see you to display a photograph of the suspect, but was advised by your assistant that the Denver Police Department had

ORIGINAL FILED IN

1 - The Attorney General
2 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attn: Susan M. Hauser
    Attn: K. William O'Connor
1 - Bufile 62-116395

62-116395

NOT RECORDED

SEE NOTE ON PAGE TWO

46 ... 19 1976

jdv:cdj (14)

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Senator Gary W. Hart

displayed the photograph to you and you did not recognize the suspect. For your information this is no longer an active investigation as the unknown subject was not identified and the original allegation was not corroborated. Other than the reasonably segregable portion of the references to you as set forth above, this file is exempt from disclosure under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(2), (b)(5) and (b)(7)(C) and (D).

Also, our records contain two documents from the United States Department of Justice concerning you which have been referred to the Attorney General.

If you wish to have any of the material reconsidered, it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the Attorney General.

Enclosures (12)
NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request For Information in FBI Files by Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias, Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." DRW:mlh.

Senator Hart is subject of favorable Department Applicant file 77-93050. He is the victim of a civil rights case under the "Congressional Assassination Statute," Bufile 44-62521. Airtel from Denver dated 3/3/75, sets forth info that Carbon County, Wyoming is in the process of filing First Degree Murder charges against Thomas Eugene Creech (Suspect of Bufile 44-62521) in connection with the murder of Ridgley Stewart McKenzie. Ascertained 6/11/75 from Supervisor John Brockton, Denver, case closed for reasons cited in instant letter. The 58 pages being furnished to Senator Hart are located in Bufile 77-93050.

#mori8 10/25/00 SP2ALM/JHG
CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

July 16, 1975
1 - Mr. Wannall (detached)
1 - Mr. Mintz (detached)
1 - Mr. Hotis (detached)
1 - Mr. Daly (detached)
1 - Mr. Cregar (detached)
1 - Mr. Farrington (detached)

SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE

Reference is made to the letter to the Attorney General signed by Senator Frank Church and Senator John Tower dated May 28, 1975.

A review of the central files of the FBI revealed the following records pertaining to you. It is noted that you have not been the subject of an FBI investigation; however, a correspondence file pertaining to you has been maintained since 1964.

Also, our records contain three investigative files in which you are shown to have been the victim of an attempted extortion. Copies of excised documents from two of these files are enclosed. The third file, comprised of one hundred and eighty-three documents, includes six extortion letters which you or one of your assistants furnished the FBI. In this regard, your office was advised of the final disposition of this matter by the FBI on February 10, 1971. Although some of the documents from this file are subject to disclosure, they are not being included since you would be aware of the contents of this data.

Additional information concerning you which is contained in our central records is exempt from disclosure as provided by Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (D). These exemptions protect, respectively matters that are specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy; information relating to the internal personnel rules and practices of this Bureau; inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available through discovery proceedings during litigation; information in personnel file the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; ~~Information~~ the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy of third parties; and the identity of and information furnished by sources pursuant to an assurance of confidentiality.

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
146 JAN 29 1976

ORIGINAL FILED IN

1 - The Attorney General
2 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M. Hauser
Attn: K. William O'Connor

1 - Bufile 62-116395
lam:dal (14) CONTINUED OVER

If you wish to have any of the material reconsidered, it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the Attorney General.

Our records also revealed a classified document from the Department of State pertaining to you. We have referred this document to them with the request that they communicate with you directly.

Enclosures (39)

NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General memorandum dated 7/16/75, captioned, "REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN FBI FILES BY SENATORS GARY HART, WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, CHARLES McC MATHIAS, WALTER F. MONDALE AND ROBERT MORGAN, MEMBERS OF THE U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES."
DRW:mlh

Senator Mondale is the subject of Bufile 94-60489 and is shown as a victim in Bufiles 9-44386; 9-52508; 9-54750. The original of excised documents released to the Senator are in Bufiles 1-11800-3;5; 9-52508-1;2; 9-54750- 1;2;3; 61-3176-4490; 62-89475-592; 62-108230-1; 92-0-3355; 94-60489-1;3;4; 5;6;7;8;9;10;11;12;13;14;15;16;17;19;20;21;22;100-435179-42; 100-454565-463; 105-25263-1047; 1246x; 1418; 105-74565-275; (S) 157-4-33-A-Washington Post and Times Herald 5-24-61; 157-7-6-43-25. See memorandum Mr. McDermott to Mr. Wannall dated 6/3/75, and 6/19/75 regarding classified material pertaining to Senator Mondale exempted from disclosure. Also see Mr. McDermott to Mr. Wannall memorandum dated 6/16/75 captioned "Congressman Donald W. Riegle" regarding classification review of Bufile 105-229897. Serials 81 p.6; 114; 117 p. 216; 113; 140 ep 248; 143 of Bufile 105-229897 refer to Senator Mondale.
(S)

By letter dated 5/14/75, CIA furnished 23 FBI documents concerning Senator Mondale which they had surfaced in a review of their files in connection with a FOIA request from Senator Mondale to Mr. Colby, Director of CIA. SA T. H. Bresson advised CIA by telephone of our pending request for information.

By letter dated 7/14/75 to Department of State reference 105-188989-8 was referred to them for action.
(S)

1 - Mr. Farrington (detached)
1 - Mr. Wannall (detached)
1 - Mr. Mintz (detached)
1 - Mr. Hotis (detached)
1 - Mr. Daly (detached)
July 16, 1975
1 - Mr. Cregar (detached)

Sen Study

SENATOR ROBERT MORGAN

Reference is made to the letter to the Attorney General dated May 28, 1975, signed by Senators Frank Church and John G. Tower.

A review of the central files of the FBI revealed the following records pertaining to you which we are authorized to release. Other information concerning you is exempt from disclosure pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(2), and (b)(7)(C) and (D). These exemptions allow the withholding of material which relates solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; exempts information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy of third parties; and exempts information which would disclose the identity of a confidential source, and information furnished under circumstances of confidentiality.

Other documents in our central records reveal that while in the official capacities of Attorney General for North Carolina and Judge for Harnett County, North Carolina, you were one of the subjects in three Civil Rights investigations conducted in 1958, 1971, and 1973. You were advised of the 1958 and 1973 investigations. The 1971 investigation was referred to the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, for adjudication. The only other references concerning you pertain to a Civil Rights complaint in 1974; an extortion letter received by you in 1970 threatening Governor Robert Scott; and information regarding your resignation from the Office of the Attorney General of North Carolina to run for the United States Senate.

#MORI6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/21/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JS

ORIGINAL FILED IN 94-6-filed-23

1 - The Attorney General
2 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M. Hauser
Attn: K. William O'Connor

62-116395 —
NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 19 1976

1 - Bufile 62-116395
Siw:mlh (14)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

7 MAR 1976

Senator Robert Morgan

If you wish to have any of the material reconsidered it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the Attorney General.

Enclosures (13)

NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in FBI files by Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias, Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." DRW:mlh

Morgan is subject of Bufiles 44-13052, 44-50587, 44-57418 and 94-68460. He is also mentioned in eleven other files. These files contain no derogatory information, and our relations with the Senator have been cordial.

July 16, 1975
1 - Mr. Wannall (Detached)
1 - Mr. Mintz (Detached)
1 - Mr. Motis (Detached)
1 - Mr. Daly (Detached)
1 - Mr. Cregar (Detached)
1 - Mr. Farrington (Detached)

SENATOR WALTER D. HUDDLESTON

Reference is made to the letter to the Attorney General dated May 28, 1975, signed by Senators Frank Church and John G. Tower.

A review of the central files of the FBI revealed the enclosed records pertaining to you. Those portions which have been deleted and the remainder of the files are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(2), (b)(5), and (b)(7)(C), (D) and (E).

Subsection (b)(2) exempts documents which relate solely to the internal rules and practices of our agency. Subsection (b)(5) exempts inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda the disclosure of which would have a detrimental effect upon the development of policy, guidance and administrative direction. Subsections (b)(7)(C), (D) and (E) allow withholding information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy of those individuals interviewed or mentioned during the course of an investigation; reveal the identity of and information furnished by confidential sources; and divulge investigative techniques and procedures.

If you wish to have any of the material reconsidered, it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the Attorney General.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The Attorney General

2 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Attention: Susan M. Hauser

1 - Bufile 62-116395

See Note Page 2.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 19 1976

ORIGINAL FILED IN

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/21/00 BY SP2 ALM/JB

61 MAR 2 3 1976

Senator Walter D. Huddleston

NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General memorandum dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in FBI Files By Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias, Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." DRW:mlh.

Senator Huddleston is identical with subject of Bufiles 166-5980, 94-67291, and 94-1-676-300. Huddleston was contacted by Bureau liaison to offer any assistance to the newly elected Senator, which is standard Bureau policy. Huddleston's Executive Assistant called the Congressional Service Office on 1/9/75, and requested a speaker from the FBI to address the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce Convention. Speaker granted. Huddleston was alleged to have taken a bribe of $15,000 while he was a State Senator in Kentucky. Several persons approached him to find out if they could establish a bank charter. His supposed reply was that this could be accomplished for a certain amount of money. The bank charter was eventually established and one of the individuals who originally approached him, hand-carried the $15,000 in cash to him at his office. On 9/5/73, the Department advised the FBI that it desired no more investigation in this case at that time. Senator Huddleston was never interviewed regarding this matter. Excised documents taken from 94-67291-3,2,1; 94-1-676-300; and 166-5980-9,7,5,4, and 1.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SECRET

1 - Mr. Wannall (detached)
1 - Mr. Mintz (detached)
1 - Mr. Hotis (detached)
1 - Mr. Daly (detached)
1 - Mr. Cregar (detached)
1 - Mr. Farrington (detached)

July 16, 1975

Senstudy

(S)
ST

#ADR16 11/21/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE~~

SENATOR CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR.

A review of the central files of the FBI has been conducted to locate records pertaining to you in accordance with the letter to the Attorney General dated May 28, 1975, signed by Senators Frank Church and John G. Tower.

Enclosed is one copy each of 52 documents from our files. The deletions which have been made were based on the Freedom of Information Act.

Additional information concerning you which is contained in our central records is exempt from disclosure as provided by Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(D). These exemptions allow withholding of information classified pursuant to Executive Order; information related solely to the internal rules and practices of this agency; information within the category of intra-agency memoranda not available through discovery proceedings during litigation; information the disclosure of which could constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of a third party; and the identity of and information furnished by individuals under circumstances of confidentiality.

Also, our records contain two documents from the United States Department of Justice concerning you which have been referred to the Attorney General.

If you wish to have any of the material reconsidered it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the Attorney General.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 94-54476-25

Enclosures (52)

1 - Attorney General
2 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Susan M. Hauser
    Attention: K. William O'Connor
① - Bufile 62-116395
hamn:rar (14)

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 19 1976

147
61 MAR 23 1976

SECRET

SECRET

SENATOR CHARLES MC CURDY MATHIAS

NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in FBI Files by Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles McCurdy Mathias, Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," DRW:mlh. Mathias is the subject of the following Bufiles: 9-45767 "Victim, Extortion" (3 serials); 9-47912 "Victim, Extortion" (4 serials); 94-49643 "Victim, Extortion-Racial Matters" (5 serials); 9-53432 "Victim, Extortion" (3 serials); 56-5105 "Possible Violation of Title 18, USC 602 and 603, Election Laws" (3 serials); 89-2560 "Possible Victim, Congressional Assassination" (5 serials); and 94-54474 "R-Maryland" (13 serials). He is being furnished excised copies of the following references: 9-53432; 9-45767; 9-47912; 56-5105; 94-54474; 62-96529-268; 5-0-1861; 7-16021-6; 47-52807-2; 62-116270-7; 65-74060-765; 94-1-32555-148; 174-3-6723; 94-37990-101; 100-443916-278; 89-2560; 64-29833-345-188; 65-74060-589, 1168, and 1276. U. S. Secret Service documents are being given per Robert Goff on 6/26/75, with "No objection from USSS," 9/49543-1 and 4. L. Miller, CIA Legal Office, contacted SA D. R. Williams 7/15/75 concerning [FBI LHMs (dated 12/13/67 re Kerekes, "IS-HU"; 2/6/69 re Bubnov, "IS-R"; 2/18/70 re Soviet Diplomatic Activities, "IS-R"; 4/17/70 re Romanian Diplomatic Activities in the United States, "IS-Romania"; and 6/8/72 re Peoples Republic of China Mission) maintained in their files,] (S) they are in general terms referring to documents in CIA response to Senator Mathias. He was advised our review will cover these documents. Mathias is also identified in the following references which are being denied: 73-15725-5, 100-429998-82 p.6, [105-36731-429, 134-22930-15,] (S) 100-434886-54, [105-18784-754, 105-124338-120, 105-229897-77 ep.136, 105-10828-1970,] (S) 89-2560, 65-74060-1205 p.49, and 95-45505-24. Justice Department documents contained in 56-5105-1 and 62-115695-4 are being referred. Per addendum to memo from Mr. McDermott to Mr. Wannall dated 6/19/75 the (b)(1) exemption is being utilized.

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

FBI

Assoc. Dir. ____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Deputy Attorney General
William O'Connor
Director Kelley

DATE: July 16, 1975

FROM : Douglas Marvin

SUBJECT: Senstudy -75

WOP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2ALM/JJG

Attached is a proposed ~~procedure~~ for dealing with the Senate Select Committee.

Please provide your comments to me by 11:00 a.m. on Thursday, July 17.

Done 7/17/75 by Mr. Adams. Procedure to be further considered. JM

Index Procedure for Review of Material

Attachment

Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

P

REC-88

62-116395-474

AUG 5 1975

62-116395

1 ENCLOSURE

5-WOB

1 Xerox made and given to Mr. Adams 7-17-75 adm

84 AUG 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI #MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2 ALM/176

PROPOSED PROCEDURE

(1) The Committee will request those documents to which it wishes access.

(2) The Department will furnish access to those matters requested to:

- (a) the members of the Committee where it is determined by the Attorney General that the matters are peculiarly sensitive;
- (b) in all other cases, the appropriately-cleared staff will have access to the materials.

(3) The Committee staff shall select those documents which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiry and necessary for the examination of witnesses or the establishment of certain facts during the course of the inquiry.

(4) These documents may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the staff.

(5) The notes will be left in the secure room of the Hoover Building during the study.

(6) Upon completion of the study, the staff can prepare a summary of the information which it considers appropriate for Committee use.

(7) The summary will be checked with senior Bureau executives to ensure the protection of national security matters, confidential sources of information and interests of

62-11[illegible]-474

OSURE

individuals in privacy. Thereafter, the summary may be removed to the Committee's office and all the staff notes will be destroyed. The original documents may be referred to as extensively as necessary to check the summary.

(8) The Committee staff shall designate those documents that it wishes to make copies of for transfer to the Committee's offices. Before the copies of the documents are taken to the Committee's offices, appropriate excisions of the documents will be made. If an agreement cannot be reached at the staff level with respect to the appropriate excisions, the matter shall be taken to the Attorney General and the Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 7/24/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY VARIOUS SENATORS ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THEIR FBI FILES

At the meeting between Mr. Kelley and the Attorney General, along with their respective staffs on 7/21/75, the Attorney General determined that there should be broad disclosure of material in the files of those Senators on the Senate Select Committee requesting access to same and that in the main the Bureau should only restrict access to revelation of live informants or information which would reveal the identity of live informants. In addition, he indicated that in his review of the file on Senator Hart he noted certain derogatory information on relatives which he felt Senator Hart should not see. Also, there may be criminal investigations against one of the Senators of such a nature that revelation should be restricted.

It was agreed that Deputy Assistant Attorney General O'Connor and I should review the files in order to determine problem areas and Mr. O'Connor would consult with Judge Tyler as needed.

REC-88 62-116395-473

Files have been reviewed and there is general agreement that almost all of the information can be revealed with certain limited excisions taking care of problem areas. Mr. O'Connor ~~advised on~~ 7/24/75 that he has been in touch with the Committee and they will make arrangements to come to my office and review their files in my presence along with Mr. O'Connor. Senator Goldwater has added his name to the list and Mr. McDermott has been advised in order to insure all pertinent material is accumulated.

9 AUG 5 1975

ACTION:

None. Information only.

1 - Mr. McDermott

JBA:ams
(3)

#mdr16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

84 AUG 5 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 7/29/75

FROM : H. N. BASSETT HNB

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/23/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

In compliance with instructions of Mr. J. B. Adams as relayed through SA S. F. Phillips, there are attached hereto Field Inspector's Manual #763 and Headquarters Inspector's Manual #225 for turn over to the Senate Select Committee. These manuals are currently charged to SA F. B. Griffith and should be removed from his property record.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That this memorandum be routed to the Intelligence Division to turn over the manuals to Senate Select Committee representatives.

2. That it also be routed to the Administrative Division for removal of the manuals from SA Griffith's property record.

62-116395-472

REC-88

9 AUG 5 1975

Enclosures

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

FBG:wmj
(6)

Del. to SSC

Manuals will not be charged to SA Griffith's record receipt has been destroyed 7-31-75

File 62-116395

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

84 AUG 6 1975

LBJ

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

Rec'd from CIA 7/31/75

DCI/IC 75-2675
28 July 1975

(Senstudy-75)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Select Committee Requests

Attached for your information are four requests, two of which are levied on the Central Intelligence Agency, one on the Department of Defense and one on the Internal Revenue Service. The Central Intelligence Agency requests are dated July 22 and 25. The request to the Department of Defense is July 22, and the Internal Revenue Service request is dated July 9.

REC-88 62-116395-471

9 AUG 5 1975

Harriett Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
on Congressional Review

Attachments: a/s

Treat as original

5-8

4 ENCLOSURE

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/ZTG

62-116395

8 4 AUG 5 1975

OTIS G. PIKE
FIRST DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEE:
WAYS AND MEANS

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

2428 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
AREA CODE 202
TELEPHONE: 225-3826
MRS. BETTY ORR
OFFICE MANAGER

DISTRICT OFFICE:
209 WEST MAIN STREET
RIVERHEAD, NEW YORK 11901
TELEPHONE: 727-2332

75-34

July 22, 1975

#mDR16

10/23/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

Mr. William E. Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Colby:

As Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, I am hereby requesting that the Committee be furnished with copies of all documents and materials provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

I would like to make a priority request for all documents and materials related to budgetary authority and procedures, all budget information for the past 15 years, and any General Counsel's opinions of the authority, mandate, or charter of the Central Intelligence Agency. Until such time as the materials can be delivered to the Committee, I request that arrangements be made for the Committee staff to review them at the Agency.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

Otis G. Pike

Otis G. Pike
Chairman

62-116395-471

ENCLOSURE

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

P A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
TER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
TER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
Y HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

DCI/IC 75-2663

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Mr. [illegible] —
Mr. Bolten
L. Moss —
J. [illegible] —

July 25, 1975

REVIEW STAFF
75-2027

Mr. Walter Elder,
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

Dear Walt:

This is to confirm our telephone conversation of July 25, 1975, in which I conveyed to you the requests of the Senate Select Committee for full and complete information on the following topics:

1. Any financing by CIA, direct or indirect, of U.S.-owned, including proprietaries, domestic or foreign media, including but not limited to books, articles, publishing houses, films, TV programs, scholarly journals, magazines and news services.

2. Full and complete information, direct or indirect CIA use of United States citizens who are newspaper men, journalists, movie, TV or any other persons connected with the media in any way.

3. Full and complete information on the direct or indirect involvement of the CIA with U.S. citizens who were connected directly with religious groups, including churches and missionaries, with activities or relationships in foreign countries.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Bill

William G. Miller

#MDR 16 SP2ALMVAG
10/23/00

62-116395-471

ENCLOSURE

EW YORK

OMMITTEE:
AYS AND MEANS

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

2428 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
AREA CODE 202
TELEPHONE: 225-3826
MRS. BETTY ORR
OFFICE MANAGER

DISTRICT OFFICE:
209 WEST MAIN STREET
RIVERHEAD, NEW YORK 11901
TELEPHONE: 727-2332

DCI/IC 75-2658

July 22, 1975

#mDE16

10/23/00 SP2 ALM/JK

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Schlesinger:

As Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, I am hereby requesting that the Committee be furnished with copies of all documents and materials provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, in relation to the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Armed Services intelligence components.

I would like to make a priority request for all documents and materials related to budgetary authority and procedures for the past 15 years, and any General Counsel's opinions of the authorities, mandates, or charters of the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or Armed Services intelligence components. Until such time as these materials can be delivered to the Committee, I request that arrangements be made for members of the Committee staff to review them at the respective agencies.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

Otis G. Pike

Otis G. Pike
Chairman

10968

62-116395-471

ENCLOSURE

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TE
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, J D.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

#MDR16

10/23/00 SP-2ALM/ZTG

July 9, 1975

DCI/IC 75-2608

1975

Mr. Thomas V. Glynn
Assistant to the Commissioner
Internal Revenue Service
Washington, D.C. 20224

Dear Tom:

We would appreciate your advising the Select Committee of the following regarding possible IRS participation in or furnishing information to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee: 1) whether the IRS had a representative on the IEC and, if so, who; 2) if there was such a representative, what duties he had; 3) what information, if any, IRS furnished to IEC. We request that the IRS identify for inspection and copying by the Select Committee staff all documents relating to or constituting information furnished by IRS either directly to IEC or furnished to persons in the Treasury Department or elsewhere which was ultimately provided to IEC.

The Committee has reason to believe that at a March 26, 1971, meeting of the IEC, Mr. Eugene T. Rossides, then Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, Enforcement and Operations Division, was introduced to the IEC as the person responsible for, inter alia, intelligence gathering by IRS, and that he would be called upon to make contributions from that source to the Committee's work.

Essentially, the Committee requests that the IRS come forward with all information it has regarding direct or indirect IRS participation in the work of the IEC.

62-116395-471

ENCLOSURE

Mr. Arthur Jefferson of the Select Committee staff is the individual primarily concerned with the investigation of IEC and will be in touch with you soon regarding the development of the requested information.

Sincerely,

Arthur W. Harrigan, Jr.

1 - Mr. Adams-Encs.
1 - Mr. Mintz-Encs.
1 - Mr. Cregar-Encs.
1 - Mr. Wannall-Encs.
July 21, 1975
1 - Mr. Hotis-Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly-Encs.

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MDR16
10/2/00 SP2ALM/[illegible]

During the executive session of captioned Committee on July 16, 1975, members of that Committee requested that they be furnished answers to the following questions:

(1) How are files established on Congressmen?
(2) How long are such files maintained?
(3) Who has access to the Congressional files and "official and confidential files"?

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum in response to the above-mentioned questions. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Delivered to Committee 7/24/75

3 ENC [illegible]

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

62-116395-470

9 AUG 5 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NOTE: The attachment to the enclosed letterhead memorandum entitled "FBI Information-Gathering Practices with Respect to Members of Congress" was prepared in conjunction with the appearance of the Attorney General and the Director before the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee. This statement is responsive to questions (1) and (2). Question (3) was answered in coordination with Files and Communications Division.

PVD:dkg (10)

BLM JBH

84 AUG 5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis

July 21, 1975

1 - Mr. Daly

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

During the appearance before the SSC on May 16, 1975, the following questions were asked by members of that Subcommittee:

(1) How are files established on Congressmen?
(2) How long are such files maintained?
(3) Who has access to the Congressional files and "official and confidential files"?

Attached is a response to questions one and two and, in part, question three. With regard to that portion of question three concerning access to the official and confidential files, be advised that these files are maintained in the Special File Room of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Files and Communications Division. Access to these files is strictly limited and those only having a necessity for access may review these files. A log is maintained as to who has access to the official and confidential files.

Enclosure
62-116395

1 - The Attorney General

#mDR 16

10/2/00 SP2ALM lsG

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

PVD:dkg (9)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

FBI INFORMATION-GATHERING PRACTICES WITH RESPECT TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

There is a total of more than 6,500,000 files at FBI Headquarters. Most of these contain information gathered during investigation of matters--including some 100 types of criminal, security, and applicant-employee cases--assigned to the FBI by laws of Congress, directives of the President, and orders of the Attorney General.

The remainder of these more than 6,500,000 files include:

(1) Personnel files regarding FBI applicants and employees;

(2) General files regarding FBI contacts and dealings with a variety of individuals and organizations concerning matters that do not require or involve FBI investigation; and

(3) Administrative-type files, such as those of a policy nature, those containing statistical reports, those detailing FBI cooperative services, and the like.

An unknown, but extremely small, percentage of these more than 6,500,000 FBI files contain information regarding present or former Congressmen and Senators which may have been accumulated prior to, during, or after their tenure in Congress.

WHAT FBI FILES CONTAIN ON CONGRESSMEN:

FBI Files contain substantially the same types of information regarding Senators and Congressmen as is contained in them about other citizens. Basically this information falls into the following categories:

Violations of Law

(1) Allegations that Congressmen or Senators have violated Federal laws within the FBI's jurisdiction.

#mpe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2ALM/JJG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-470

The FBI investigates such allegations whether they relate to Members of Congress or any other person. The results of these investigations are furnished to United States Attorneys and/or other prosecutive officials of the Department of Justice. The investigation may establish (a) that the Congressman or Senator has, in fact, violated a Federal law, (b) that a Federal law has been violated, but that the involvement of the Congressman or Senator in that violation cannot be established, (c) that a Federal law has been violated, but that the Congressman or Senator clearly had no involvement in its violation, or (d) that no violation of Federal law was committed.

Included among such allegations involving Congressmen and Senators have been the following types of violations within the FBI's jurisdiction: Bank Fraud and Embezzlement; Conflict of Interest; Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice; Election Laws; Fraud Against the Government; and Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering.

(2) Violations of Federal laws within the FBI's jurisdiction involving Congressmen and Senators as victims.

The results of FBI investigations of such violations are furnished to United States Attorneys and/or other prosecutive officials of the Department of Justice. In many instances, the original complaint in these cases is received from the lawmaker-victim himself; however, if the information originates elsewhere, the FBI promptly notifies the Congressman or Senator involved of the threat which has been made. In addition, other law enforcement agencies which have a legitimate interest in these cases are notified of the threat.

Violations of the Congressional Assassination, Kidnaping and Assault Statute, Bomb Threats, and Extortion are among the crimes within the FBI's jurisdiction which have involved lawmakers as victims.

(3) Allegations that members of the staffs of Congressmen or Senators have violated Federal laws within the FBI's jurisdiction, or that these staff members have been victims of such violations.

The FBI investigates such allegations and furnishes the results to United States Attorneys and/or other prosecutive officials of the Department of Justice. Where appropriate, the Congressman or Senator involved is also advised of the investigation.

Congressmen and Senators may be interviewed by the FBI in these cases involving Congressional aides--just as they may be interviewed in connection with other types of FBI investigations--and both the fact of, and the results of, such interviews are noted in the file reflecting the FBI investigation.

(4) Allegations that Senators or Congressmen have violated laws within the jurisdiction of other investigative agencies.

These allegations are brought to the attention of the agency concerned--Federal, state, or local. Such allegations are not investigated by the FBI. However, the cooperative services of the FBI Laboratory, Identification Division, and National Crime Information Center are available to other law enforcement agencies in the investigation of these, as well as other, crimes.

Applicant Investigations

(5) Present and former Congressmen and Senators often are considered for positions in the Executive or Judicial Branches of the Federal Government which require that the FBI conduct a thorough background investigation of them.

Dependent upon the nature of the position involved, the results of these investigations are furnished to the White House, the Department of Justice, and/or other appropriate Government agencies.

(6) Congressmen and Senators often are interviewed in the course of applicant-type investigations regarding other persons who are being considered for Executive or Judicial positions--as well as during applicant-type investigations conducted by the FBI (at the request of the Committee chairman involved) concerning staff members of a limited number of House and Senate Committees. Both the fact of, and the results of, the interview of the Congressman or Senator are noted in the file reflecting the FBI's investigation.

Security Cases

(7) Either prior to, during, or subsequent to their tenure in Congress, there may be files pertaining to security-type matters which relate to members of the House and Senate, or Congressmen may be identified in FBI files as actual or intended victims of acts by subjects of security-type cases.

The Statutes covering such matters are Title 18, Section 2383 (Rebellion and Insurrection), Title 18, Section 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy), and Title 18, Section 2385 (Smith Act - Advocating overthrow of Government by force).

Oral or Written Contact

(8) An unknown number of FBI files contain copies of correspondence between the FBI and Congressmen and Senators concerning a wide variety of matters which include bills pending in, or passed by, Congress; personnel matters; the Bureau's cooperative services; and FBI policies, procedures, and investigations. Many of these letters from Congressmen and Senators have been prompted by inquiries which these lawmakers have received from constituents or other interested citizens.

The FBI's files also contain memoranda regarding telephone calls and personal contacts the FBI has had with Congressmen and Senators regarding the above-cited variety of matters.

Miscellaneous Information About Congressmen

(9) An unknown number of FBI files contain information reflecting favorably or unfavorably upon the character, integrity, and loyalty of Senators and Congressmen--which information does not require investigative action at the time received on the part of the FBI or other law enforcement agencies. It consists of:

(a) Information contained in unsolicited letters received by the FBI from persons and organizations representing a variety of backgrounds, viewpoints, and walks of life.

(b) Information volunteered orally to FBI Agents by the same broad range of individuals and organizations as cited directly above.

(c) Newspaper clippings, as well as data from magazines and other news dissemination media.

(d) Miscellaneous information received from FBI confidential informants and/or other sensitive sources.

Fingerprints of Congressmen

(10) The files of the Identification Division contain the fingerprints of an unknown number of Senators and Congressmen. Some of these relate to their having been arrested for violations of Federal, state, or local laws. Others are noncriminal in origin and largely pertain to their having served in the Armed Forces or having been applicants for various positions. These fingerprint cards have been submitted to the FBI by Federal agencies, as well as by local, county, and state criminal justice agencies, throughout the United States.

Fingerprint records are maintained by the FBI's Identification Division, and they are kept entirely separate and apart from all other files and records of the FBI.

HOW INFORMATION ABOUT CONGRESSMEN REACHES FBI FILES:

There are two basic types of information regarding Congressmen and Senators in FBI files:

(1) Information which the FBI has solicited during investigations involving the Congressman or Senator as either a subject or a victim. This includes information of pertinence to the case which the lawmaker himself has furnished to the FBI.

(2) Unsolicited Information.

There are many sources of the unsolicited information that is included in FBI files:

(a) It is volunteered by citizens who are being interviewed during investigations of matters having no relationship to any of our Nation's lawmakers.

(b) It is volunteered in communications sent to the FBI by individuals and organizations.

(c) It is included in news articles and other reports publicly disseminated by our Nation's news media which come to the FBI's attention.

(d) It is received from FBI confidential informants and, very infrequently, from telephone taps not directed at a Congressman which have been installed with authority of a Federal Court and/or authority of the Attorney General.

(e) In the case of information contained on fingerprint cards, it is sent to the FBI's Identification Division by authorized contributors, including criminal justice agencies throughout the United States.

HOW AND WHERE INFORMATION ABOUT CONGRESSMEN IS MAINTAINED:

Information regarding Congressmen and Senators is included in the official FBI files--totaling more than 6,500,000 in number--that are maintained by the Files and Communications Division on an upper floor of the J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.

The area where these files are maintained is staffed and supervised 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to assure continuous security.

General Index

The essential key to the effective use of these FBI files is the Bureau's General Index which consists of 58 million index cards and which is located on a different floor from the files themselves in the J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building. To determine what files (if any at all) contain information regarding an individual Senator or Congressman, it is necessary to search the name of that lawmaker in the General Index.

The General Index is staffed and supervised 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to assure continuous security.

Rules Governing Use of Files

These official FBI files are available only to FBI personnel--and they are available on a "need-to-know" basis only.

The Files and Communications Division maintains a record of files that have been charged out by Headquarters personnel. Such files must be returned to the Files and Communications Division as soon as possible; and during the period that a file is charged out, it cannot be left even momentarily in an unlocked room. If retained overnight, the file must be kept in a locked cabinet inside a locked room.

The charge-out record is temporary in nature and is destroyed five days after the file has been returned to the Files and Communications Division.

WHY THE FBI RETAINS INFORMATION REGARDING CONGRESSMEN:

The information regarding Congressmen and Senators that is maintained in FBI files can be divided into three major categories:

(1) The results of investigations (criminal-, security-, and applicant-type) involving a Congressman or Senator as a subject or victim;

(2) Information regarding a Congressman or Senator--in addition to that gathered during investigation(s) of the lawmaker involved--which the FBI has disseminated to other Federal agencies (such as to the Internal Revenue Service if, for example, the information involves a tax-related matter) and/or to state and local law enforcement agencies (such as the police department covering the lawmaker's home community if, for example, the information involves an alleged threat against the lawmaker's house or other property); and

(3) Other information that the FBI receives from, or receives about, a Congressman or Senator that is included in the FBI's files--without having been either investigated or disseminated by the FBI.

The reasons this information is retained in FBI files can be explained in legal and administrative terms, as well as in practical terms.

Legal and Administrative Reasons

All investigative files and other records of the FBI involving Congressmen or Senators are within a class of records which--under the FBI Records Retention Plan developed in 1969 by the National Archives and Records Service of the General Services Administration--are considered of enduring archival value to ensure their preservation.

This FBI Records Retention Plan was prepared under the authority contained in the Federal Records Act of 1950, which is contained in Title 44 of the United States Code.

Included among the FBI records to be retained under the Records Retention Plan formulated by the National Archives and Records Service are those which would have historical value and would document policies, procedures, functions, legislative and budget matters, and the like--and reports of investigations of both civil and criminal activities, including "crimes involving, and other records, concerning, the Presidents and Vice Presidents of the United States, members of and delegates elected to the Congresses of the United States, cabinet heads, judges and other officials appointed by the President."

In establishing the FBI Records Retention Plan, the National Archives and Records Service noted, "Ordinarily the records of a Federal agency that are worthy of permanent retention amount to a rather small percentage of the total volume of records generated. Many of the records produced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, however, relate to a number of controversial if not important aspects of the history of the United States, particularly to the role of the Federal Government in its relation to its citizens. To be sure, many years will pass before these records can be made available to the public for historical and other serious research. Nevertheless, the archival value of these records will not decrease nor will interest in them dissipate."

In addition, the FBI is also required by the Federal Records Act to make records containing adequate and proper documentation of its administration and operations which, among other things, are designed to furnish information necessary to protect the legal and financial interest of the Government and of persons directly affected by FBI activities.

Practical Reasons for Retaining Information

Logic, reason, and lessons learned from more than six decades of law enforcement experience dictate that the FBI should maintain records of investigations it has conducted (category #1 cited at the top of page 7) and records of information it has disseminated to other agencies (category #2 on page 7).

Such records enable the FBI to answer questions or challenges (including those arising in judicial or administrative proceedings) involving investigations FBI Agents have conducted and/or information the FBI has disseminated to other agencies. Such records also enable the FBI to furnish additional copies of investigative reports or other information that has been disseminated--should additional copies be needed by the original recipients or by other official agencies. Furthermore, the information contained in these files often proves of assistance in future investigations.

Less obvious may be the reasons why the FBI retains the third category of information about Congressmen and Senators (data that has neither been investigated nor disseminated by the FBI) cited on page 7.

If such information is of an administrative nature--that is, if the information indicates the lawmaker is interested in a specific FBI investigation, a specific area of the FBI's jurisdiction, or specific FBI policies, practices and procedures--it is filed for:

(1) the information and advice of FBI employees in connection with future contacts or correspondence with that Congressman or Senator;

(2) consideration of FBI personnel in connection with possible future changes in FBI policies, practices, and procedures.

If the information is of a personal nature--that is, if it reflects upon the loyalty, character, or integrity of a lawmaker--it is included in FBI files for the following reasons:

(1) The information may prove of value when a present or former Congressman or Senator is considered for a position in the Executive or Judicial Branch of Government which requires that the FBI conduct a background investigation of him.

(2) The information could prove of value in solving future crimes committed against the Congressman or Senator--or against members of that lawmaker's family. (A person who berates and defames a lawmaker would be a logical suspect if that lawmaker--or another Congressman or Senator whose views coincide with his--becomes the target of actual or threatened violence.)

(3) The information could aid the FBI in solving crimes committed against other persons. (For example, the handwriting, typewriting, stationery, and/or distinctive

phraseology in a letter defaming a Congressman could assist the FBI in linking the writer of that letter to a subsequent extortion note or written bomb threat that does not involve any member of Congress.)

(4) The information frequently provides valuable insight into the character, stability, and reliability of the person who has furnished it to the FBI. Thereby, it is of value and assistance to the FBI in future contacts with, contacts by, or inquiries regarding, this individual.

(5) The information provides a useful administrative check on the performance of FBI field offices--particularly with regard to the important consideration of whether they are being fully responsive to the public needs. Supervisory personnel regularly review complaints or allegations received from the public to insure that the appropriate action was taken--if, in fact, action was called for.

WHAT IS REQUIRED TO DESTROY FILE INFORMATION:

Barring a new law of Congress and/or receipt of a revised FBI Records Retention Plan from the National Archives and Records Service, the FBI cannot unilaterally undertake the destruction of information regarding Congressmen and Senators in its files.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7-21-75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. Concerning 3 questions asked by that Subcommittee.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V. Daly Date: 7/24/75

Received by: Barbara Banoff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/DTG

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-470

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/21/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosure

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC oral request on 7/16/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

FBI information-gathering practices with respect to members of Congress

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2ALM/JTB

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WOC

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-470

185-10099

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FBI

Fitzgerald
[illegible]

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2613
29 July 1975

[illegible] 75

Rec'd from CIA 7/31/75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

#MOR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-22-00 BY SP2 ALM/JF16

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

D

Harriett Mowitt for
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment

REC-88 62-116395-469

9 AUG 5 1975

1 ENCLOSURE

treat as original

100-Div 9

62-116395

5-8

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

29 JUL 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

62-116395-469

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
B[illegible]er, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara	*	B 6/26	12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Betts, Richard K.	*	B 7/1	8-15-47	Pa.	016-38-2619	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Bloomfield, Susan	*	B 7/14	12-23-51	Ohio	256-92-0341	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Brown, Maxine	*	B 6/26	8-8-28	Ida.	568-40-3123	

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/ksb

#mde16

29 JUL 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Bushong, David	*	B 71/4	8-10-47	Ohio	289-40-1203	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
Chesnick, Barbara	*	B 7/14	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
Culbreth, Elizabeth	*	B 7/2	6-23-42	NC	240-64-9040	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17(Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Dawson, Thomas	*	B 6/26	9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeMarco, James	*	B 6/26	3-12-43	W. Va.	286-36-9097	
Dennin, Joseph Francis	*	B 6/23	6-9-43	NY	567-62-5353	
DeOreo, Mary	*	B 6/26	6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
DiGenova, Joseph E.	*	B 6/26	2-22-45	Del.	222-28-5430	
Dick, James	*	B 6/26	7-25-47	Mass.	029-36-6745	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel	*	B 7/14	8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor	*	B 6/26	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
Erno, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	

29 JUL 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Ford, Harold	*	B 6/26	3-23-21	Cal.	550-16-4630	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
Grant, Bruce	*	B 7/2	6-16-16	Neb.	507-20-1311	
Greissing, Edward	*	B 7/14	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF Badge
Iverson, Portia	*	B 7/14	10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	
Jefferson, Arthur M.	*	B 6/26	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
Karalekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kayden, Jeffrey	*	B 7/14	3-22-51	NY	065-40-7277	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge.
Kirchheimer, Joseph			6-3-17	Ill.	359-03-7843	

29 JUL 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Koppal, Diane	*	B 6/26	6-24-48	NC	219-48-0018	
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mascioli, Cynthia	*	B 6/26	1-4-51	NY	112-44-7636	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mayo, Betty	*	B 6/26	2-13-22	Ohio	277-14-4062	
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	

29 JUL 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
Murphy, Michael	*		10-13-54	Tex.	231-86-8829	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan	*	B 6/26	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.	*	B 6/26	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Postal, Andrew	*	B 7/23	5-11-48	NY	128-40-4695	
Pyle, Christopher	*	B 6/26	11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Ralston, Theodore	*	B 7/23	8-25-48	Wash.	538-48-4673	
Rhea, Gordon	*	B 6/26	3-10-45	Va.	412-74-7901	
R[illegible]ard, Eric	*	B 7/10	12-27-49	NY	128-40-7430	
Ricks, Walter	*	B 6/26	12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester	*	B 6/26	7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	

29 JUL 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.	*	B 6/26	3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha	*	B 6/26	9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert.			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Turner, James	*	B 7/14	6-29-53	Cal.	215-64-7255	
Tschirgi, James	*	B 6/26	2-23-25	Wyo.	520-16-7290	
Vance, James	*	B 7/23	4-6-36	Ohio	078-28-3950	
Wallach, Paul	*	B 6/26	5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

29 JUL 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI,TK,B)				
White, William	*	B 7/10	8-8-39	Pa.	168-30-9147	
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: July 16, 1975

#MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

FROM : Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

SUBJECT: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

The United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the "Church Committee") has recently requested certain information regarding the functions of the Attorney General with respect to the supervision of and policy-making for internal security and intelligence activities. I would appreciate it if you would prepare by July 25, 1975 the fullest possible response to the following questions:

1. What standards and procedures has the Attorney General adopted for the collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of organized crime intelligence?

2. To what extent have communications between the White House and the FBI or other agencies under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General bypassed the Attorney General? To what extent should such communications be channeled through the Attorney General?

EXP. PROC.
30 JUL 17 1975

REC-88

62-116395-468

62-116395
8-5

14 JUL 17 1975

2 Xeroxes to McHale, Div. 9, with deadline for their input, cob 7/22/75
9:30am 7/18/75 B

2 Xeroxes to Liaison Sect. - reply to be submitted by cob 7/23/75 on date 7/25.
7/18/75 B

2 Xeroxes to P.V. Daly 7/18/75 B

Xerox to Intell. Comm Staff (H. Mewatt) by LFS 7/22/75

84 AUG 5 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-110

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. __
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. __
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. __
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 30 1975

TELETYPE

NR 007 AT CODED

10:16 PM NITEL JULY 30, 1975 WCG

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

SENSTUDY '75, BUDED: JULY 31, 1975.

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ATLANTA, JULY 25, 1975.

IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST SET FORTH, EXTENSIVE FILE REVIEW AND RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE WILL ENTAIL TIME WHICH WILL NOT ALLOW ATLANTA TO MEET THE JULY 31, 1975, DEADLINE.

ATLANTA ANTICIPATES RECOVERY AND XEROXING OF MATERIAL REQUESTED AND SUBMISSION OF AIRTEL TRANSMITTING SAME BY THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS, JULY 31, 1975, WHICH SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY AUGUST 2, 1975.

END

PLS HOLD FOR ONE MORE

P

REC-88 62-116395- 467

9 AUG 5 1975

62-116395-

84 AUG 5 1975

[illegible] BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 004 SF CODE

1246 PM URGENT 7/14/75 MCC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887) 4P

REC-53

ATTN INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - MR. W. O. CREGAR

UNITED STATES SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IS EXAMINING "MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) IN THE LATE 1960S AND EARLY 1970S IN SAN FRANCISCO - OAKLAND, LOS ANGELES AND SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, BY THE FIELD OFFICES OF THE FBI."

RE BUREAU NITEL JULY 9, 1975. Senstudy 75

FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ALL LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS AND PERSONNEL CONTACTED BY THE SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION RELATIVE TO THIS COINTELPRO:

IN NOVEMBER 1968, UNKNOWN OFFICERS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT WERE CONTACTED IN ORDER TO GIVE WILFRED HOLIDAY, ALSO KNOWN AS CAPTAIN CRUTCH, SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AT CITY PRISON. SEE SAN FRANCISCO LETTER DECEMBER 2, 1968, ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUP, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE (BLACK PANTHER PARTY), BUFILE 100-448006.

EX-106

REC-53 62-116395-466

CA#75-6203
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/1/83 BY SP2 TAP/RBG

3 JUL 21 1975

84 AUG 6 1975

IN JANUARY 1969, UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICERS, BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT, WERE ADVISED THAT RICHARD AND SAM NAPIER WERE MEMBERS OF THE BPP. THIS INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO THE BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT AFTER AN ARMORED CAR WAS HELD UP AND A GUARD MURDERED AND THE GETAWAY CAR WAS FOUND TO BE REGISTERED TO RICHARD NAPIER. SEE SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO THE BUREAU JANUARY 13, 1969, ENTITLED "COINTELPRO, BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS (BLACK PANTHER PARTY).

IN EARLY 1969, AN UNKNOWN OFFICER, SHERIFF'S OFFICE, ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, AT OAKLAND, WAS ADVISED OF THE USE BY A FILM COMPANY (MGM) OF BLACK PANTHERS AS "PROPS" IN THEIR FILMING OF BERKELEY RIOT SCENES. THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE IN TURN FURNISHED THIS INFORMATION TO THE BERKELEY PRESS. SEE SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO THE BUREAU MARCH 10, 1969, ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUP, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE, BLACK PANTHER PARTY."

IN APRIL 1969, INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE BPP WAS PLANNING A MEETING BETWEEN SOME OF THEIR LEADERS AND SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAD LEFT THE PARTY IN AN EFFORT TO GET THEM BACK TOGETHER. THIS INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO RICHARD WAGNER, OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, ON APRIL 18, 1969, WHO, IN TURN, APPARENTLY FED THE INFORMATION TO THE BLACK PANTHER RENEGADES WHO CONSTRUED THIS APPARENTLY AS A "SET UP" AND DID NOT ATTEND. THIS INCIDENT IS RECORDED IN SAN FRANCISCO SERIAL 157-601-201.

ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1969, SERGEANT STAN WHITE, OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, INTELLIGENCE UNIT, WAS ADVISED THAT INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT THOMAS JOLLY, A BPP MEMBER, WAS PLANNING TO CONTACT PROBATION OFFICER IN OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, TO REPRESENT HIMSELF AS THE UNCLE OF BELVA NEWSON, ANOTHER BPP MEMBER WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED. JOLLY, WHO IS NOT NEWSON'S UNCLE, PLANNED TO ARRANGE FOR HER RELEASE TO THEM. THIS MATTER IS RECORDED IN SAN FRANCISCO FILE 157-601-356.

SAN FRANCISCO FILE DOES NOT REFLECT MEDIA PERSONNEL WERE CONTACTED IN RELATION TO THIS PROGRAM.

SA RAYMOND N. BYERS, LAST KNOWN BY SAN FRANCISCO TO BE ASSISTANT LEGAT, TOYKYO, WAS NAMED COORDINATOR OF THE COINTELPRO - BPP ON APRIL 3, 1968. THE CASE WAS REASSIGNED APRIL 18, 1968, TO FORMER SA WILLIAM COHENDET WHO PRESENTLY RESIDES AT 1557 BALBOA WAY, BURLINGAME, CALIFORNIA 94010. THIS MATTER WAS REASSIGNED TO SA LEO S. BRENNEISEN MAY 16, 1969. THE MATTER WAS CLOSED ON MAY 1, 1971.

~~PLS MAKE READ LAST PARAGRAPH 2ND LINE 3RD WORD READ TOKYO REPT TOKYO~~

THIS MATTER WAS SUPERVISED BY FORMER SA ALBERT P. CLARK FROM APRIL 3, 1968 TO MAY 9, 1970. CLARK PRESENTLY RESIDES 66 ELM AVENUE, LARKSPUR, CALIFORNIA 94939. COINTELPRO - BPP WAS SUPERVISED BY FORMER SA DAVID E. TODD FROM FEBRUARY 9, 1970 TO MAY 1, 1971. TODD RESIDES AT 20 COZZOLINO DRIVE, MILLBRA~~I~~E, CALIFORNIA 94030.

END

~~LER FWAUTXX WAIT A MINUTE ON 3RD PAGE 2, DXX 2, 2ND TOL~~

~~LAST LINE LAST 294~~

~~WORD READ MILLBRAE REPT MILLBRAE~~

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. WRW
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JUL 2 1975

REC-52

NR018 BS CODED

8:03PM NITEL JULY 24, 1975

TO: DIRECTOR 62-116395

FROM: BOSTON 66-4177

ATTN: INTD, (SA W. O. CREGAR)

SENSTUDY, 1975.

Mr. Cregar 4:12

Cregar

#MDR 16
10/2/00 SR2 ALM/JTG

DWB 4/09 JB

ON JULY 24, 1975, JOHN F. KEHOE, JR., (FORMER SA), COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., ADVISED THAT ON JULY 23, 1975, HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM PAUL WALLACH, WHO STATED HE WAS A STAFF MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. WALLACH GAVE HIS TELEPHONE NUMBER AS 202-224-1700. WALLACH ASKED KEHOE IF HE WAS A FORMER SPECIAL AGENT OF FBI AND KEHOE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. WALLACH THEN INQUIRED WHETHER KEHOE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OR OTHER COVERT INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK CITY IN THE 1960'S. KEHOE TOLD WALLACH THAT HE HAD BEEN AN SA ASSIGNED TO THE NEW YORK OFFICE IN 1946 AND 1947. WALLACH STATED "YOU DIDN'T GO BACK THERE TO DO SOME JOB DURING THE 60'S DID YOU?" KEHOE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE. WALLACH THEN

62-116395-465

EX 104 REC-52

5 JUL 2 1975

5 - Phillips (Claat)

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS

AUG 19 1975

RM AUG 15 1975

Records

(Pers. file former SA John F. Kehoe, Jr.)

PERS/REC. UNIT

ASKED IF KEHOE KNEW OF ANY OTHER SA'S NAMED KEHOE WHO WERE ASSIGNED TO NEW YORK OFFICE DURING THE 1960'S AND WHO WERE NOW RETIRED. KEHOE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE, AT WHICH TIME WALLACH CONCLUDED THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION.

THE ABOVE IS FOR INFORMATION OF FBIHQ.

END

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/11/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY '75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum recommends that the Director raise the question of privacy and source protection with Senators of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his anticipated meeting in Executive Session with the SSC tentatively scheduled for the week of 7/14/75.

By letter dated 7/9/75, Senators Frank Church and John Tower of SSC requested the Attorney General and the Director to appear before the Committee in Executive Session during the week of 7/14/75. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the matter of concern to Mr. Kelley and steps which might be taken to expedite the response to requests for documents essential to the Committee inquiry.

The Senstudy staff of the Intelligence Division is preparing for the Director's use copies of each of the written requests received from SSC annotated with the dates of our response to each request; the date it was delivered to the Department; and the date it was delivered to the SSC staff.

There remains, however, a serious problem precipitated by three recent written requests of the SSC dated 6/30/75 (received by the Bureau on 7/7/75); 7/1/75 (received by the Bureau on 7/8/75); and 7/8/75 (received by the FBI on 7/9/75). All three of these requests appear, in part, to disregard the privacy of certain individuals or requests the identity of sources cooperating with the FBI.

REC-88 62-116395-464

Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

WOC:emg/dsh
(9)

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTS

84 AUG 5 1975

In this regard, in an exchange of letters dated 3/11 and 12/75, William Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence, wrote to Senator Church stating that "I am particularly appreciative of your recognition that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence activities must receive special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee in the course of your work. As we discussed, such matters as the identities of our sensitive sources. . . . . should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from the risk of exposure. We should also work together to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of the individuals."

By letter dated 3/12/75, Senator Church stated as follows, "It is the Committee's understanding that the members of the Committee and designated staff will have access to any or all information which the Committee deems necessary for its inquiry. We recognize, however, that the Committee inquiry may touch on sensitive areas, such as the identities of CIA personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations whose disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the event that the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive areas, which matters we have already discussed in our meeting of February 27, we should discuss jointly, and as you suggested quickly, what procedures might be followed should the Committee decide it requires more information in these specific areas."

The 6/30/75 SSC letter requests among other things, a list of all police departments and personnel contacted relative to a particular COINTELPRO operation; a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and the media affiliation.

The 7/1/75 SSC letter requests a list of all persons outside the FBI (including, but not limited to, employees' relatives, friendly media personnel, members of clergy, federal, state and local law enforcement and other officials) contacted in relation to four persons who were subjects of

CONTINUED - OVER

COINTELPRO operations. This same letter also notes that one Morris Starsky, one of the four persons referred to above, was made known to the FBI during a conference on 6/12/75, as a person who would be the subject of a case study by the SSC. This is not so. Inquiry was made of those Bureau supervisors who attended the conference and a review of the memorandum written following the conference was made. Neither the memorandum nor the recollection of Bureau supervisors attending the conference indicates the name Morris Starsky was mentioned by SSC staff personnel.

The 7/8/75 SSC letter requests among other things: (1) all memoranda and other materials which relate to a meeting between the President and Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph, Whitney Young, Mrs. Dorothy Haight, James Farmer and Jack Greenberg on 11/19/64; (2) a copy of a November, 1964, telegram from Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to Director Hoover and all notes, memoranda, and any other materials reflecting the disposition of, or actions taken as a result of the receipt of, said telegram; (3) all memoranda and other materials which relate to a meeting between the President and Dr. King on 2/9/65; (4) all other materials which relate to the transfer of former Special Agent Robert C. Nichols to the Oklahoma Office of the FBI in June, 1969; (5) all forms and attachments including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide For Investigative Personnel," from 1959 until retirement for former Special Agents Robert C. Nichols and Alan Sentinella.

OBSERVATION:

It would appear the above-cited requests do, in fact, violate the privacy of individuals and possibly place in jeopardy the identity of persons who cooperated with the FBI. Consistent with the agreement in the exchange of letters between Colby and Church dated 3/11 and 12/75, it is believed the Director should raise these questions with the SSC and attempt to get relief from the requirement of revealing the names of FBI sources or violating the privacy of individuals. Certainly the request for information on former Special Agents Nichols and Sentinella goes to the heart of the privacy issue and appears to be a blatant disregard for their privacy.

ACTION CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY '75

ACTION:

If approved, the attached letter to the Attorney General will be sent advising him of the Director's intention to raise these issues with the SSC on the occasion of his appearance with the Attorney General during the week of 7/14/75.

not sent
[illegible] discussed with committee
7/16/75
Jma

Jma

PLM

JA

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Attorney General
DATE: July 15, 1975

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated July 9, 1975, Senators Frank Church and John Tower requested our appearance in Executive Session before the Senate Select Committee to discuss matters of concern to me and steps which might be taken to expedite responses to requests for documents essential to the Committee's inquiry.

It is my intention to raise the question of privacy as well as the protection of sources at this forthcoming meeting. In the most recent requests of the Senate Select Committee dated June 30 and July 8, 1975, copies of which are in the possession of Mr. O'Connor, the Committee appears to disregard the rights of certain individuals' privacy, going so far as to ask for copies of the annual performance ratings of certain former Special Agents of the FBI.

It is my intention to request the Committee to relieve the FBI from the obligation of violating the privacy rights of individuals or placing in jeopardy the identities of cooperating sources of this Bureau.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Not sent

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2ALM/TAG

File w/ T

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

July 15, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated July 9, 1975, Senators Frank Church and John Tower requested our appearance in Executive Session before the Senate Select Committee to discuss matters of concern to me and steps which might be taken to expedite responses to requests for documents essential to the Committee's inquiry.

It is my intention to raise the question of privacy as well as the protection of sources at this forthcoming meeting. In the most recent requests of the Senate Select Committee dated June 30 and July 8, 1975, copies of which are in the possession of Mr. O'Connor, the Committee appears to disregard the rights of certain individuals' privacy, going so far as to ask for copies of the annual performance ratings of certain former Special Agents of the FBI.

It is my intention to request the Committee to relieve the FBI from the obligation of violating the privacy rights of individuals or placing in jeopardy the identities of cooperating sources of this Bureau.

#MDR16
10/2/00 SP2ALM/JTG

Not Sent

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

WOC:emg/dsh dsh
(12)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NOTE:

See W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum dated 7/11/75, captioned "SENSTUDY '75," prepared by WOC:emg/dsh.

WOP

Filed

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/14/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

#MDE 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS FORM
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 AUG 4 1975

File Number 62-116395-463

Permanent Serial Charge Out

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 16 1975
DLJ
TELETYPE

NR 001 SF CODE

10:56 AM URGENT 6/16/75 MCC

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM SAN VRANCISCO (62-6887)

ATTN W. O. CREGAR, INTD

SENSTUDY 75.

RE SACRAMENTO TELETYPE INSTANT DATE.

REVIEW OF SAN FRANCISCO ELSUR INDICES SHOWS NO OVERHEARS ON MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

END

VLJ FBIHQ CLR

Pass

REC-88

62-116395-462

JUL 29 1975

FIVE

MDR16

10/2/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

8 4 AUG 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

NR 015 WF CODED

940 PM NITEL JUNE 16, 1975 WWC

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, WFO (62-10744)(P)

ATTENTION INTD. W. O. CREGAR.

SENSTUDY 75.

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JUNE 13, 1975.

BASED ON INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE WFO IS UNABLE TO LOCATE ANY INFORMATION REGARDING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. DURING PERIOD INDICATED IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATION.

END.

D

REC-98

62-116395-461

AUG 4 1975

#MDR 16

10/2/00 SP2 ALM 1776

84 AUG 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

[illegible] INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 16 1975
Rms
TELETYPE

NR001 SC CODE

10:30 AM URGENT 6/16/75 VLS

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)
SAN FRANCISCO

FROM SACRAMENTO (62-489)

ATTN: INTD (W. O. CREGAR)

SENSTUDY 75.

W O Cregar
9/23 JZH

RE BUREAU TEL TO DETROIT, JUNE 13, 1975.

REVIEW OF SACRAMENTO INDICES REFLECTS NO INFO RE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, APRIL 23-24, 1964, SENATOR HOTEL, SACRAMENTO, CALIF. SACRAMENTO DIVISION ESTABLISHED 1967.

FOR INFO SAN FRANCISCO, RETEL STATED IN CONNECTION WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST, FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY RETURN TELETYPE ATTN: INTD - W. O. CREGAR:

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INDICES AT FBIHQ DO NOT INDICATE OVERHEARS ON KNOWN TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS ON MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. FOR ABOVE DATE AND LOCATION.

SAN FRANCISCO REVIEW ELSURE INDICES AND FURNISH FBIHQ FIRST DATE KING OVERHEARD ON ABOVE TECHNICAL INSTALLATION. IF HE WAS NOT HEARD, SO ADVISE.

END

VLJ FBIHQ CLR

REC-88

62-116395-
460

7 JUL 30 1975

#MDR16

10/2/00 SP2 ALM/JKG

84 AUG 4 1975

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/16/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

#MDR16 ON THIS FORM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/JG

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 AUG 4 1975

File Number 62-116395-459

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: July 21, 1975

FROM : R. J. McCarthy

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to the Attorney General's letter, July 16, 1975, captioned as above, requesting information relating to the collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of organized crime intelligence.

On June 25, 1974, the Director testified before the FBI Oversight Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee that the Bureau has "no statutory authority to collect intelligence per se" but that it operates under the general umbrella of 28 U.S.C. 533 (3), which authorizes the Attorney General to appoint officials "to conduct...investigations regarding official matters...as may be directed by the Attorney General." A listing of any directives issued by the Department or the Attorney General with respect to organized crime should be available in the office of the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

P

With respect to the FBI, all our investigations in the organized crime field are aimed at one ultimate objective: prosecution.

REC-88 62-116395-458

During the course of our investigation of individual hoodlums and the various criminal syndicates operating throughout the United States, we naturally acquire considerable data regarding the structure of the organized underworld, the identities of its principal leaders, the extent of its influence, its primary sources of income, its payoffs to corrupt officials, and the operations of its vast communications networks.

9 AUG 4 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. McCarthy
1 - Mr. McHale

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTB

JEM:bkh
(6)

S. Phillips

84 AUG 5 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re: United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities

Most of this information is obtained from paid informants, from other law enforcement officers, from alert citizens, and from court-approved electronic surveillances installed under the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

None of it, however, is intelligence for intelligence's sake. The experience of the FBI over the years has shown that criminal syndicates exist for the sole purpose of conducting illegal operations and that anyone belonging to them may reasonably be presumed to be engaged in one or more of these activities. Therefore, our investigations of the organized underworld are not aimed at developing general nonspecific data but at establishing which criminal violations its members are engaged in and then proving these violations in a court of law.

Obviously, not every case opened, every lead followed, or every bit of information received is going to wind up in Federal court. On the contrary, much of this material relates to offenses outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI. When such is the case, we immediately disseminate the information to the appropriate Federal, state, or local agency. As a result, information uncovered by the FBI during the past five years alone has enabled the recipient agencies to make more than 17,000 organized crime arrests; confiscate over $151,000,000 worth of illicit drugs and narcotics, $9,000,000 worth of cash, property, weapons, and wagering paraphernalia, and $6,000,000 worth of counterfeit bills; and assess tax liens against $19,000,000 worth of property arising out of Federal gambling cases.

In addition, a considerable portion of the organized crime intelligence information developed by the FBI is forwarded to the various Federal Strike Forces coordinating racket investigations throughout the country and to the Criminal Division of the Department, which has entered this information in its computerized data bank called "Racketeer Profile."

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re: United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities

RECOMMENDATION:

That, upon approval, this memorandum be routed to Supervisor S. F. Phillips, of the Intelligence Division, who is coordinating the Bureau's reply to the Attorney General's inquiry.

WRW/TM

SFP/RLM

WJC

JEM

PLM

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 7/28/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS FORM
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/TG

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 AUG 4 1975

File Number 62-116395-457

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

PLAINTEXT **TELETYPE** **URGENT**

TO: SAC, LOUISVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI
SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

9/25/75

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
SEP 25 1975
1055 PM
TELETYPE

RE BUREAU TELEPHONE CALL TO LOUISVILLE, 9/24/75.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE STANLEY S. CZARNECKI OF THE LOUISVILLE OFFICE BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE BUREAU'S INVESTIGATION OF KEY ACTIVISTS - NEW LEFT. THIS WILL BE A STAFF INTERVIEW CONDUCTED BY STAFF MEMBER JOHN SMITH. SMITH REQUESTED THAT THE INTERVIEW TAKE PLACE IN LOUISVILLE ON FRIDAY, 9/26/75, IF POSSIBLE.

SAC CZARNECKI SHOULD TELEPHONICALLY CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION UPON RECEIPT OF THIS COMMUNICATION TO BE BRIEFED CONCERNING THE INTERVIEW AND ARRANGE FOR APPROPRIATE BRIEFING FROM THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

REC-4 62-116395-436X

OCT 1 1975

#m DE/6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2 ALM/LS/CS

1 - Personnel File - Stanley S. Czarnecki

NOTE: John Smith, Senate Select Committee staff member, requested the interview of SAC Czarnecki concerning the Bureau's investigation of Key Activists - New Left. This communication will serve as approval for the waiver of the existing employee agreement signed by SAC Czarnecki. Referenced telephone call alerted SAC Czarnecki.

PVD:kjs (9)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO 954

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7-24-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Pursuant to a request from SA Thomas J. McNiff SA Daly of this Division contacted Michael Shaheen, Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination for the Department, on 7-22-75 concerning the current policy regarding excisions which may properly be made on documents being furnished to the Senate Select Committee for their review in Bureau space and the policy concerning notes being taken during the Committee staffers review of such materials.

Shaheen stated that there is no agreement currently in operation concerning excisions, however, he felt that excisions should be properly restricted to the protection of sources, sensitive techniques or methods concerning sensitive ongoing operations. He noted that this is in general conformity with the proposed agreement concerning this matter which was being reviewed at the White House. Regarding the question raised concerning the taking of notes, Shaheen indicated that the proposed new agreement allowed for the taking of notes on these documents which notes may be taken to the Senate Select Committee offices. In fact, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, K. William O'Connor, who was present during this discussion pointed out it was the intent of the aforementioned proposed agreement that "screened documents" may be removed by the Committee staff members to the Senate Select Committee offices. With this in mind, Shaheen stated we should allow the staff members to take notes and remove same to their offices.

62-116395-456

REC-88

SA McNiff was orally advised of the results of this conversation.

AUG 4 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
PVD:dkg (7)

#more16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2ALM/STG

84 AUG 4 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. R.L. Shackelford

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: July 29, 1975

FROM : J.W. Redfield

1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
1 - Mr. J.W. Redfield
1 - Mr. J.F. McGuire

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PURPOSE:

To comment on items extracted from a 693-page document prepared by CIA citing certain instances wherein CIA believes its activities may have exceeded its legal mandate.

BACKGROUND:

Memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall, dated 7/24/75, captioned as above, described the above-mentioned CIA document and requested a review of certain items mentioned therein in order to fully identify the subject matter thereof and to assess whether same may involve any compromise of FBI counterintelligence operations.

CIA item captioned "Antlers," relates that CIA arranged to move a sensitive defector out of a European country by commercial transportation and gained entry into the U.S. without leaving any trace of the defector's true identity. FBIHQ COMMENT: Our files contain no information concerning the word "Antlers," in the context described by CIA. More than likely, "Antlers" is a CIA in-house code word used for the handling of a valuable and sensitive defector source. While we have no information relative to "Antlers," it is noted that we do have access currently to two CIA defector sources respectively code named TORTIS and TUMBLE, both of whom were Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) officers whose whereabouts have been carefully concealed as both of these defectors are targets of the RIS. Specifically, the RIS has indicated a desire to kidnap and/or kill the two defectors mentioned herein. It is possible the CIA item referred to as "Antlers" may relate to either TORTIS or TUMBLE. It is firmly believed that public disclosure of the CIA item mentioned beyond that described in the attachment to W.O. Cregar's memorandum of 7/24/75, could adversely affect the safety and security of TORTIS or TUMBLE, if in fact, either one is the defector described in the CIA item.

D

62-116395-455

REC-88

AUG 4 1975

62-116395

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

JFM:bcw
(7)

Classified by 2721
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2, 3 and 4
Date of Declassification Indefinite

5 AM

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 AUG 4 1975

CIA item described as Project WESTPOINTER apparently involved the examination of mail to the U.S. from Mainland China during certain specific months of 1969, 1970 and 1971. CIA indicated that Project WESTPOINTER was similar to Project SRPOINTER. FBIHQ COMMENT: Our files contain no information concerning Project WESTPOINTER. Memorandum from Acting Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, dated 4/1/75, captioned "Jane Fonda v. L. Patrick Gray, et al.; Civil Action No. 73-2442-MML (C.D. Cal.)," describes a CIA covert operation known as SRPOINTER which involved examination of mail to and from the Soviet Union which was discontinued in 2/73. Apparently, CIA had examined certain mail addressed to Jane Fonda in connection with its SRPOINTER activity. While we were not aware of CIA's Project WESTPOINTER, it is noted that this Bureau did periodically examine mail coming from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong to the U.S. and mail from the U.S. to the PRC and Hong Kong during the period 1956-1966. This activity, which was permanently discontinued 1/24/66, was carried under the code names CHIPROP and CHICLET. Public disclosure of the CIA item referred to above as Project WESTPOINTER might lead to a more detailed public examination of this Bureau's periodic control of mail in the CHIPROP and CHICLET operations.

ACTION:

For information in connection with Senstudy 75.

JFM TJM PLM wrw

File Tickler [illegible]

Rec'd from CIA 7/25/75

DCI/IC-75-0126
23 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT: Key Words for Central Indexing

Senstudy -75

Future key wording of information furnished to the Community Central Index should include names of Agencies. These will be helpful in identifying information in the material which relates to another Agency's activities.

Harriett Mowitt
Harriett Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

D

REC-88 62-116395-454

AUG 4 1975

File 62-116395

#MDR16

10/2/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

8 4 AUG 4 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. H. N. Bassett
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

July 22, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices A thru D requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to SSC is the original of a memorandum which responds in part to one of the requests contained in above SSC letter.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-88

62-116395-453

7/23/75

JPT:lhb lhb
(11)

9 AUG [illegible] 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/12/00 BY SP-2ALM/dfg
#mde16

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

3 ENCLOSURE

HNB

WOC
JPT

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 AUG 4 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. H. N. Bassett
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

July 22, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING
TO THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Reference is made to letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Appendix B, Item I, Number 5 of referenced appendices requested this Bureau to provide Committee Staff access to annual inspection reports and related surveys for the past ten years with respect to the following FBI field offices: New York City; Chicago; San Francisco; Los Angeles; San Diego; Sacramento; Springfield, Illinois; Buffalo; Atlanta; and Columbia, South Carolina; Number 6 requested this Bureau to provide the annual inspection reports and related surveys for the past ten years pertaining to the FBI Intelligence Division.

At a conference held on May 30, 1975, between Messrs. John T. Elliff and Mark Gitenstein of the Senate Select Committee; Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of Justice; and Messrs. William O. Cregar and Elmer W. Larson of the FBI, it was agreed, in response to above request, that this Bureau would make available to appropriate personnel of the SSC Staff, for review at FBIHQ, copies of the reports

JPT:lhb
(10)

PLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116[illegible] — 4

GPO 954-546

RE: Further Documents Pertaining to
the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

of the two inspections conducted of the Domestic Intelligence Division, FBI Headquarters, during 1971, and of the inspection of the San Francisco Field Office of the FBI during October, 1970.

Pertinent documents, believed responsive to above agreement, are now ready for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriate personnel of the SSC Staff. You will note that portions of the San Francisco inspection report which relate solely to investigations of criminal matters, with no security ramifications, have been eliminated from the report. Should the SSC deem such material pertinent to its mandate, however, it can be made available for review by the SSC Staff, upon written request.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7-22-75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committeeto Study Governm Operations. Re: Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Dept. of Justice. Policies and Procedures. 5-14-75 request Appendix B, Item I, #5.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V. Daly Date: 7/24/75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/TFG

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-453

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

FOR REVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/22/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix B, Item I, #5

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Operating procedures

#MOR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
[illegible]
[illegible] 10/2/00 SP2ALM/JTB

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Made available to appropriate personnel of the SSC Staff, for review at FBIHQ, copies of the reports of the two inspections conducted of the Domestic Intelligence Division, FBI Headquarters, during 1971, and of the inspection of the San Francisco Field Office of the FBI during October, 1970

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 [illegible]

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-453

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 21 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR006 SE CODED

4:50 PM NITEL 7/21/75 SLA

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM SEATTLE (66-2894)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUREAU NITEL, JULY 17, 1975.

FORMER EMPLOYEE, LEROY W. SHEETS NO LONGER MAINTAINS RESIDENCE AT MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON. HE HAS PURCHASED AN AIRSTREAM TRAILER AND ON JUNE 10, 1975, HE AND HIS WIFE LEFT THE AREA FOR AN EXTENDED FOUR-MONTHS CROSSCOUNTRY TRIP. PRIOR TO LEAVING, SHEETS ADVISED SRA JOHN E. CONNOR, EVERETT, WASHINGTON, THAT HE WOULD BE TRAVELING CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL MID-OCTOBER, 1975, WHEN HE WOULD RETURN TO THE MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON AREA. CURRENT LOCATION OF SHEETS IS UNKNOWN.

SHEETS IS BELIEVED TO STILL HAVE A MARRIED STEPDAUGHTER, NAME UNKNOWN, IN THE MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON AREA. SHE MAY HAVE AN ITINERARY FOR SHEETS THAT COULD LOCATE HIM FOR A POSSIBLE INTERVIEW. IF BUREAU DESIRES HER CONTACTED, A REVIEW OF PERSONNEL FILE OF SHEETS AT HEADQUARTERS SHOULD PROVIDE HER NAME AND ADDRESS.

END

HOLD

MSY FBIHQ

REC-88

62-116395-452

5 ~~JUL 28 1975~~ 8-4-75

(SHEETS)

cc: 67

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

84 AUG 4 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

JULY 30, 1975

TO SACS LOS ANGELES
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO

(1 - Mr. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF MEMBER LESTER SEIDEL HAS FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR INTERVIEWS IN YOUR OFFICE: SAN DIEGO 7-30-75 SAS EARL M. PETERSEN, LAWRENCE F. WIRICK; LOS ANGELES 8-5-75 WALLACE E. WARD, RICHARD A. BLOESER, 8-7-75 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT E. GEBHARDT; SAN FRANCISCO 8-11-75 LEO S. BRENNEISEN, 8/11-12/75 SAC CHARLES W. BATES. PURPOSE OF INTERVIEW IS TO BE COINTELPRO AND BUREAU INVESTIGATION OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. ADDITIONALLY SAC BATES WILL BE INTERVIEWED CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE OF "HOUSTON PLAN" BY SSC STAFF MEMBER LOCH JOHNSON.

I HAVE WAIVED YOUR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF THESE INTERVIEWS. EACH SHOULD NOTE THAT HE HAS THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL; HOWEVER, THE FBI IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE PRIVATE COUNSEL. THERE ARE CERTAIN PRIVILEGED AREAS CONCERNING WHICH SAS WOULD

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ASAC Benzin, SD, telephl. advis. 5:40 pm 7/29/75

#mor16
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/176

451

REC-88 62-116395-

AUG 4 1975

PVD/SFP:mjg
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 30 1975
943 p
TELETYPE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

84 AUG 4 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOT BE REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS. AREAS CONCERN INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT DIVULGE IDENTITIES OF FBI SOURCES; INFORMATION RELATING TO SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES; INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT ONGOING FBI INVESTIGATIONS; AND INFORMATION WHICH ORIGINATED WITH OTHER AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

SAN FRANCISCO NOTE RELEASE ALSO APPLIES TO FORMER SAS ALBERT P. CLARK AND WILLIAM A. COHENDET WHO, ALONG WITH OTHER EX-SAS ON WEST COAST, MAY ALSO BE INTERVIEWED. CLARK AND COHENDET HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED FOREGOING ADVICE REGARDING PRIVATE COUNSEL AND PRIVILEGED AREAS AND HAVE ASKED FOR CONSULTATION ASSISTANCE WHICH BUREAU IS APPROVING AS BELOW.

NORMALLY, FBIHQ WOULD SUPPLY REPRESENTATIVE TO BE ON-THE-SCENE FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES. HOWEVER, DISTANCE AND TIME SCOPE MAKES THIS NOT FEASIBLE IN THIS INSTANCE.

THE RANKING FBI OFFICIAL IN EACH OFFICE WILL SERVE FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES. IN HIS ABSENCE, AN SAC IN LOS ANGELES OR ASAC IN SAN DIEGO AND SAN FRANCISCO MAY SO SERVE. PURPOSE OF CONSULTANT, WHO WILL NOT BE PRESENT AT INTERVIEW BUT AVAILABLE NEARBY, WILL BE TO SUPPLY ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT PERSON BEING

INTERVIEWED IS ASKED QUESTIONS IN ONE OF THE PRIVILEGED AREAS OR QUESTIONS OUTSIDE THE SPECIFIED PARAMETERS OF THE INTERVIEW (COINTELPRO/BLACK PANTHER PARTY). SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE WHICH CONSULTANT REPRESENTATIVE CANNOT HANDLE, SUGGEST IMMEDIATE TELEPHONE CALL TO LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION.

SHOULD ADDITIONAL FORMER SAS CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR ASSISTANCE, COORDINATE WITH THEM WAIVER FROM EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT THROUGH LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION AND FURNISH CONSULTATION SERVICES AS REQUESTED.

NOTE THAN RANKING OFFICIAL SERVING IN CONSULTANT POSITION DOES NOT REPRESENT THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYEE AS PRIVATE COUNSEL.

NOTE:

The referenced 5/2/75 teletype apprised all offices of our cooperation with the SSC and furnished general background re Bureau's servicing of its requests. Because of time element relating to the first interview to take place in San Diego 7/30/75, we are telephoning necessary instructions to that office. We previously by teletype 7/9/75 advised current and former employees on West Coast of SSC's intentions regarding these interviews. We also previously released SAC Bates for purpose of interview re Cointelpro/BPP and are now extending release to include interview re "Houston Plan," as requested by SSC Staff Member Johnson 7/25/75.

Former SAs Clark and Cohendet previously given necessary advice by Legal Counsel Division as indicated above and offer made for consultation services which they requested.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ✓
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 6/9/75

FROM : H. N. BASSETT

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

In response to a Senate Select Committee request for guidelines utilized by the Inspection Division, memorandum H. N. Bassett to W. R. Wannall dated 6/2/75, captioned as above, noted there would be no objection to a review of the Handbooks for Headquarters and field office inspections by Committee Staff members provided the review was conducted in FBI space with an Inspection Division representative present.

On 7/8/75 Mr. Mark Gitenstein of the Select Committee Staff reviewed the FBIHQ Inspection Manual in the presence of SA Fred B. Griffith. Mr. Gitenstein was specifically advised these Manuals are used solely as guidelines for the Inspection Staff and are not binding on anyone but staff members. They cannot be used to document any deficiencies noted during an inspection. He was told such action would have to be based on applicable provisions in either the Manual of Instructions or the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

During the review it was noted Mr. Gitenstein made notes regarding the following Sections:

1. Section 2 (Recording the Inspection Findings), pages 5 and 6 which deal with the assembly and distribution of inspection reports and work papers.

2. Section 4 (Specific Division Operations), pages 4 and 5 which are concerned with surveys and audits.

REC-24 62-116395-450

3. Section 8 (Inspector's Summaries), pages 1, 2 and 4 which deal with the summary for the Director, the letter to the Division Head from the Director and personnel write-ups.

6 JUL 18 1975

Mr. Gitenstein stated he would return at a later date to review the field manual.

ACTION: None. . . . for information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG #MDR16

1 - Messrs. Adams, Wannall, Cregar

84 AUG 6 1975

FBG:wmj
(5)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7-7-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

By memorandum, 6-18-75, you were advised the Department was considering preparing summaries of existing summaries of the so-called "Kissinger 17" wiretaps to be furnished the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The Department was awaiting our approval of this mode of response to the Committee. The referenced memorandum recommended we advise the Department that we agreed on the preparation of the summaries with the provision that we be allowed to review same prior to the Department seeking Court approval for making them available to the Senate Select Committee. This recommendation was approved.

Michael Shaheen, Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, inquired of Special Agent Paul V. Daly as to when the aforementioned summaries would be completed. He was informed it was the Bureau's understanding the Department would prepare the summaries. Mr. Shaheen, after consulting with K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, stated it was the Department's desire that the Bureau prepare the summaries. He advised the Departmental attorneys concerned with the litigation arising from these wiretaps will review the summaries and seek Court approval prior to furnishing to the Committee.

REC-2 62-116395-449

14 JUL 18 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

Intelligence Division with the assistance of Legal Counsel prepare the necessary summaries for forwarding to the Committee.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2 ALM/TAB

#MDR 16

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Hotis
- 1 - Mr. Peterson
- 1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:kjs (8)

84 AUG 6 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CODE CABLEGRAM URGENT

9
7/28/75

1-Legal Counsel Office
(Attn: Mr. Daly)
1-Foreign Liaison
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Helgeson

TO LEGAT LONDON

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

MARK GITENSTEIN, SENIOR STAFF MEMBER, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, WHICH IS CURRENTLY EXAMINING PROCEDURES OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, HAS ADVISED THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN HOW OTHER COUNTRIES HANDLE THEIR DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS; THAT IS, THOSE INVESTIGATIONS ANALOGOUS TO OUR EXTREMIST AND SUBVERSIVE INVESTIGATIONS. GITENSTEIN IS LEAVING FOR LONDON AUGUST SIX NEXT AND HAS INDICATED A DESIRE TO MEET WITH APPROPRIATE BRITISH OFFICIALS ANY TIME AUGUST ELEVEN OR TWELVE NEXT FOR A GENERAL BRIEFING IF THIS IS POSSIBLE. HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO LEGAT SITTING IN ON SUCH BRIEFING.

GITENSTEIN'S REQUEST HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH [JOHN] (5)

#MDR16 SP-2 ALM/JTG 10/2/00

HEH:enm
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 29 1975
TELETYPE

REC-36 62-116395-448

EX-106

19 JUL 31 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

CABLEGRAM TO LONDON
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

[PARKER, COUNSELOR, MI-5, WASHINGTON, WHO SUGGESTS YOU CONTACT MI-5 LIAISON TO DETERMINE HOW THIS SHOULD BE HANDLED. BUREAU SUGGESTS THAT IN ADDITION YOU CONTACT SCOTLAND YARD IF YOU FEEL IT APPROPRIATE.] (S)

HANDLE AND SUCAB ARRANGEMENTS, ATTENTION: HELGESON, INTD.

NOTE: Gitenstein made the above oral request to Inspector Helgeson during a meeting 7/25/75. This is being coordinated with Supervisor Paul Daly with the Office of Legal Counsel.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7/18/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
ACCESS TO WITNESSES

At 11:40 a.m. on July 18, 1975, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel in the Deputy Attorney General's Office, telephonically advised me that his negotiations with the Committee concerning more restrictive limitations on Committee access to witnesses were not successful. He said that the Department has determined that the procedure in effect previously whereby the FBI Director would receive a request for the availability of FBI personnel for interview and would determine whether such personnel should be released from applicable secrecy agreements would be reinstituted.

I asked Mr. O'Connor whether this meant that the Department no longer regarded all requests for interview of present or former employees as "demand" situations requiring the specific authorization of the Department as if a subpoena had been issued. Mr. O'Connor said that the Department would not consider such requests in that manner and that the FBI should make all determinations necessary for the appearance of witnesses for interview.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/ETS

REC-36

RECOMMENDATION: EX-106

62-116395- 446

For information. We will continue to discuss requests for interview with individuals named by the Committee in their requests, and authorize waivers of the secrecy agreements on a case-by-case basis.

JUL 31 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

LEGAL COUNSEL

JAM:mfd

(5)

1330

51 AUG 04 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
(Attn: S.F. Phillips)
NITEL
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Nugent

CODE TELETYPE

JULY 25, 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 25 1975
TELETYPE

TO SAC, ATLANTA

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY '75, BUDED: 7/31/75.

FBIHQ IS PRESENTLY COMPILING PERTINENT DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO CAPTIONED MATTER AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC).

INCLUDED IN THE SSC'S REQUEST IS ONE CONCERNING ALL MEMORANDA AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS INDICATING OR REFLECTING THE INCEPTION OF (A) ALL HEADQUARTERS FILES AND (B) ALL ATLANTA DIVISION FILES CONCERNING MARTIN LUTHER KING AND ORGANIZATIONAL FILE CAPTIONED "COMINFIL OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE," (SCLC), TOGETHER WITH THE BASIS AND AUTHORITY FOR OPENING SUCH FILES.

SSC STAFF PERSONNEL HAVE ADVISED THE ABOVE REQUEST REFERS NOT ONLY TO COMMUNICATIONS WHICH INITIATED ACTIVE INVESTIGATION OF KING AND THE SCLC, BUT SHOULD INCLUDE SUCH ITEMS WHETHER THEY BE OFFICE MEMORANDA OR OTHER MATERIALS (I.E.,

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-21 62-116395-445

54688 80514 73518
10-24-80 SPV/Pmk

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PEN:adn/tdp
(9)

ST-103

JUL 29 1975
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

1 - 100-106670 (KING)
1 - 100-438794 (SCLC)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 25 1975
TELETYPE

HFH/sed

GD/wlc

W. WOG/LAP

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO 954-546

NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS) WHICH FORMED THE BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING THESE FILES PRIOR TO THE TIME ACTIVE INVESTIGATION WAS INITIATED.

ATLANTA DIVISION PROMPTLY REVIEW ABOVE MATTERS AND FURNISH FBIHQ WITH THREE CLEAR XEROXES OF ITEMS WHICH ARE RESPONSIVE TO THE SSC'S REQUEST. THESE ITEMS SHOULD BE XEROXED AS THEY APPEAR IN YOUR FILES. ANY EXCISIONS OF DATA APPEARING THEREIN WILL BE HANDLED BY FBIHQ PRIOR TO THE TIME THESE MATERIALS ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SSC.

IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO FURNISH HEADQUARTERS WITH COPIES OF ANY INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO INSTITUTING ACTIVE INVESTIGATION IN THESE CASES WHICH EMANATED FROM FBIHQ. WHERE SUCH IS THE CASE A SIMPLE STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT SHOULD BE MADE AND THE DATE AND CAPTION OF THE HEADQUARTERS COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED.

EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY COVER AIRTEL IN ABOVE CAPTION BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS 7/31/75.

NOTE:

Teletype being directed to the AT Division to obtain information which is responsive to a request by the Senate Select Committee. Bureau deadline deemed necessary in view of request by this Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7-18-75

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Hotis JBA

Attached is a memorandum from K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, dated 7-18-75 requesting our observations concerning the type of access certain Members of the Senate Select Committee would have to FBI files concerning those Senators. This memorandum was received at 11:14 a.m., 7-18-75, and we were requested to furnish our response no later than 1 p.m. on 7-18-75.

After consultation with Assistant Directors-Deputy Associate Directors Adams and Jenkins, Mr. O'Connor was telephonically advised by SA Paul V. Daly that it was this Bureau's position that Option 3 with certain modifications would be this Bureau's choice. Option 3, with modifications would read, "The file is assembled and the Senator given access to it, with certain portions or papers withheld and the Senator is orally advised of the reasons for withholding of the documents."

#MOR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2 ALM/LAG

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

REC-21

62-116395-444

ST-103

JUL 31 1975

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Adams - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Farrington - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Daly - Enclosure

PVD:kjs (9)

JAM

84 AUG 4 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975

#MOR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

TO: See Distribution

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Congressional Access to Personal Files Maintained by the FBI

Certain members of the Senate Select Committee have requested access to their personal files. The preferred mode of access is the subject of pending consideration by the Attorney General. As you know, under the mandate of the Senate Select Committee, access to the personal file of a member of the Senate Select Committee may be had without any consideration of Freedom of Information Act issues.

The Attorney General has considered several options, and has asked that you consider them and indicate hereon your view; he has asked that these views be delivered to me not later than 1:00 p.m., this afternoon so that he may promptly consider them. The options considered are not exclusive. If you have any suggestions other than the options indicated, please attach it to your response. Responses should be delivered to me in Room 4213, Main Justice, by the time indicated. Thank you for your cooperation.

OPTIONS

Option 1: Departmental staff examine the documents in the file and delete any references to sensitive sources or ongoing criminal investigation; thereafter, the file is made accessible to the Senator under controlled circumstances at the Department of Justice.

______ Approved ______ Disapproved

Comment:

62-116395-444

ENCLOSURE

1:45 K William O'Connor advised by PVD we are electing option 3 with modification

Option 2: Same as Option 1, except that a xerox of the documents as excised is delivered to the Senator.

_______ Approved _______ Disapproved

Comment:

Option 3: The file is assembled and the Senator given access to it, with certain papers withheld and the Senator is orally advised of the reasons for withholding of the documents.

_______ Approved _______ Disapproved

Comment: portions or

Option 4: The Senator is furnished his entire individual file without any excisions or deletions, for review at the Department of Justice.

_______ Approved _______ Disapproved

Comment:

Distribution:

Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/27/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Hotis

ALLEGATION BY JOHN ELLIFF CONCERNING
INTERFERENCE WITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

At 5:14 p.m., on 6/27/75, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, advised me that he had received a call from John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee complaining of what he described as an attempt to interfere with the Committee's investigation by supplying information to the press that the Committee had been furnished material which it had declined to use or to inquire into because of its sensitive nature. O'Connor said that Elliff claimed that a journalist who is friendly with the Committee had advised the Committee that he had information from a Justice Department official that the Committee had been furnished information originating in the FBI that Communist funds were used to finance Martin Luther King; that King had been related to the CP, USA, and that the Senate Select Committee had treated this matter as a "hot potato" and that the information also indicated that "King laughed all the way to the bank."

O'Connor said that Elliff protested the apparent disclosures by the Justice Department to the press and claimed that it appeared an effort was being made to interfere with the Committee's work. O'Connor told Elliff he had no knowledge of anyone in the Justice Department furnishing any such information to the press and further, he told him that he did not believe that information concerning CP funding of King had been furnished to the Committee.

ST-101 REC-18 62-116395-443

7 JUL 15 1975

O'Connor said that he did not believe that the FBI had furnished such information to the news media but he wanted ~~us to be aware of~~ Elliff's complaint. O'Connor said that it is possible that during interviews conducted by staff of the Committee, they have received statements indicating that Communist funds were used by King, but he does not believe that any documentation of that has been furnished to the Committee as yet.

RECOMMENDATION: For information.

LEGAL COUNSEL

SEE ADDENDUM, PAGE 2

1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2ALM/ATG #NDR16

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ADDENDUM - INTELLIGENCE DIVISION SFP:lhb 7/2/75

INTD has received no report nor has any information concerning the alleged leak referred to in this memorandum.

Concerning to the allegation in this memorandum that information originated with the FBI that communist funds were used to finance Martin Luther King, Jr., and that King had been "related" to the CPUSA, the following is noted. We have never had any information that communist funds, literally, were used to finance King. We did have reliable reports that King was helped in a financial way, particularly as to advice regarding fund raising, by a close advisor, Stanley David Levison, who was a secret member of the CPUSA. However, none of our reports are known to have claimed that "communist funds" were financing King. King was never known to have been a member of the CPUSA. It is true that he had a number of close associates such as Levison who at the time were either current or past CPUSA members.

INTD is unable to pinpoint the report that "King laughed all the way to the bank."

wRW

JBA
PLM

K

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General

July 25, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum with an enclosure which is in response to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of this memorandum with its enclosure is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (4)

ST 112

62-116395

REC-65

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

442X

TEB:lek/lhb lhb
(9)

#MDR16

10/2/00 SP2ALM/JG

20

3 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 FEB 25 1976

GPO 931-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

62-116395

July 25, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

#MDR16
ALL [illegible] CONTAINED
[illegible] ED
10/23/00 SP2ALM/JTG

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number 1. b., of Part I, Appendix B of referenced communication requested Committee Staff access to all indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated by the Intelligence Division for 1960 to the present.

Attached to this memorandum is a list of all retrievable programs, projects, surveys and procedures employed in connection with domestic intelligence operations of the FBI which may be of interest to you. There were a number of other programs, projects, surveys and procedures employed in connection with foreign counterintelligence operations of the FBI which are not included. In the event you desire information concerning these latter items, which include extremely sensitive matters, we would be pleased to discuss them with SSC Staff Members at FBI Headquarters.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:lek/lhb lhb
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-44

GPO 954-546

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE: TOP SECRET

The Programs, Projects, Surveys and Procedures List (PPSPL), enclosed, and the Counterintelligence PPSPL, infra, were generated by SA Thomas E. Burns, Jr. from a review of available INTD inspection reports and files.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PPSPL

1. Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries - Developing positive intelligence information regarding personnel in the United States from non-Soviet-bloc countries.

2. International Organization - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside the Soviet-bloc - Centralized compilation of potentially dangerous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom the U. S. State Department could initiate steps to deport or to lift diplomatic immunity in the event of a war emergency.

3. Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas - FBI maintaining results of name checks conducted by various members of U. S. intelligence community based on information provided to such intelligence organizations by INS regarding aliens meeting established criteria.

4. Special Support Group (Use of non-Agent surveillance personnel).

5. Alem - Uncovering of Soviet illegals entering the United States.

6. Anagram - Penetration of foreign diplomatic establishments in the United States for procurement of cryptographic materials. ([illegible]. Buchen, Counsel to the President, has advised that sensi-[illegible]e information such as that regarding Anagram and electronic [illegible]eillances is to be handled in an oral briefing to be given [illegible]enators Church and Tower).

TOP SECRET

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED: TOP SECRET

7. Banpop - Identification of Soviet illegals through the transfer of funds through Swiss banks.

8. Chinese Aliens Entering the United States - Identification of ethnic Chinese legally entering the U.S. with intelligence assignments.

9. Chinese Communist Contacts with Scientists in the United States - Development of selected scientists of ethnic Chinese background as foreign counterintelligence assets to be targeted against People's Republic of China (PRC) personnel and establishments in the U.S. and Canada.

10. Chinese Entering the United States Claiming Citizenship - Identification of Chinese legally entering the U.S. with intelligence assignments.

11. Chinese University and Graduate School Index - List of Chinese aliens in the U.S. who have attended colleges or graduate schools on the Chinese mainland and who are considered potential candidates for development as U.S. assets.

12. Cokma - Specialized physical surveillance directed against foreign intelligence officers.

13. Canil - Identification of Soviet illegals arriving in the United States from Europe through Canada.

14. Chicoin - Counterintelligence activities to thwart efforts of Chinese intelligence in this country.

15. Forest - Screening of records of foreign students at New York University, other than those in authorized programs, to uncover Soviet illegals.

TOP SECRET

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4

NOTE CONTINUED: TOP SECRET

16. Proho - Program to detect homosexuals who have been compromised or recruited by Soviet intelligence.

17. Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U. S. Residents with Chinese Diplomatic Establishments - Investigations conducted regarding certain individuals meeting established criteria.

18. Visitors to Iron Curtain Countries - Interviews of selected U. S. tourists to determine possible contact by Soviet-bloc intelligence.

19. Orkid - Technical penetration of Soviet establishments in the United States.

20. Cloverleaf - Technical penetration of new Soviet residential complex, Riverdale, New York City.

21. Sam Survey - Screening of mail to selected European cities.

22. Gus Survey - Screening of mail originating in New York, New York, destined for specific postal zones.

23. Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets - Recording of Soviet purchases in such areas--intelligence and counterintelligence purposes.

24. Rega - Identification of Soviet illegals entering the U.S. as aliens during certain years.

25. Secomex - Expanded Mexican border coverage to include development of sources against the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

TOP SECRET

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED: ~~TOP~~ SECRET

26. Sobir - Investigation of certain Soviet-bloc immigrants and repatriates in an attempt to identify those previously recruited by Soviet-bloc intelligence.

27. Socap - Review of certain records to identify Soviet illegals who have applied for documentation as U.S. residents as part of their effort to establish a bona fide cover identity.

28. Vietnamese Refugee - Efforts to uncover possible infiltration of North Vietnamese agents in the refugee flow to the United States.

29. Walklok - Screening of requests for birth certificates under an established criteria to identify such requests which may have originated with Soviet intelligence.

30. Technical and Microphone Surveillance - Survey of telephone and microphone installations functioning at certain times.

31. Al Fatah Automatic Data Processing Project - means of identifying Al Fatah members and their contacts through use of ADP equipment.

32. Cuban Refugee - Detection of Cuban intelligence agents who might infiltrate into the U.S. through refugee channels.

33. Deseco - Development of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc officials.

34. East-West Exchange - Provided internal security safeguards regarding admission to the U.S. of Soviet and satellite nationals.

35. Z Coverage - Screening of mail destined for the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6

NOTE CONTINUED: ~~TOP~~ SECRET

36. Chiprop - Screening of mail to the United States from Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

37. Chiclet - Screening of mail from the United States to Hong Kong and the PRC.

38. Alchemy - "notional" Pro-Marxist - Leninist - Maoist domestic revolutionary organization staffed by Bureau assets directed at uncovering PRC intelligence activities in the United States.

39. Geology - Verification of individuals entering selected foreign countries claiming U.S. citizenship--to identify Soviet illegals.

40. Hilev - Collection of high level foreign political intelligence by FBI Legal Attaches abroad for the information of the White House.

41. Oarbit - Checking of U.S. Post Office Boxes utilized by U.S. military personnel in the vicinity of selected U.S. Military bases--to uncover possible Soviet agents.

42. Phrenology - Efforts to identify Soviet illegals who formerly resided in a specific foreign country and whose present whereabouts are unknown.

Classified by 6283, XGDS 1, 2 and 3, Indefinite.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

PROGRAMS, PROJECTS, SURVEYS, and PROCEDURES

1. Administrative Index (Adex) - List of individuals who posed a realistic direct, and current danger to the national security of the United States.

2. Agitator Index - List of individuals who have demonstrated by their actions that they have a propensity for fomenting racial discord.

3. American Repatriate - Specific procedure to be followed concerning United States (U.S.) citizens who were issued Swiss protection passports to return to the U.S. from Cuba.

4. Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint File - Covers black extremists who have propensity for violence or who could be considered logical suspects in various crimes in which Bureau might have an interest.

5. Black Student Groups on College Campuses - Discreet preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources, on black student organizations and their leaders.

6. Bocov - Communist coverage along the Mexican border.

7. Characterization - Descriptive statements concerning certain organizations which have been subject to investigation.

8. Cointelpro - Counterintelligence programs directed against domestic subversive activities.

9. Communist Influence in Black Extremist Groups - Periodic reports relative to communist influence in black extremist groups.

10. Communist Influence in Racial Matters - Periodic reports relative to communist influence in racial matters.

11. Computerized Telephone Number File - Computerized programing of telephone numbers utilized by extremists and revolutionaries and other individuals suspected of involvement in interstate gambling activities.

12. Emergency Detention - Provided for apprehension and detention of persons considered potentially injurious to the national defense and public safety of the U.S. in time of national emergency.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/6/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

442X

13. Extremist Informant - Development of sources to provide intelligence and evidentiary information concerning extremist individuals and organizations.

14. Ghetto Informant - Development of individuals living or working in Ghetto areas who can furnish information with particular emphasis on situations which may create civil unrest.

15. Intensification of Investigation of Weatherman and Other Similar Terrorist Groups - Use of full resources of FBI and use of innovative methods to achieve a more comprehensive coverage of such groups.

16. Key Activist - Investigation of individuals who were extremely active and vocal in their statements denouncing the U.S. and calling for civil disobedience and other forms of unlawful and disruptive acts.

17. Key Extremist - Provided intensified coverage of selected extremists who were known to be active and who had previously evidenced the potential for fomenting violence or revolutionary activities.

18. Location of Non-Fugitive Weatherman Members - Intensified efforts to locate non-fugitive Weatherman members.

19. New Left Extremist - False Identity - Attempt to provide effective dissemination of voluminous data concerning false identities used by Weatherman personnel and other New Left extremists.

20. New Left Movement - Finances - Periodic information made available to the USDJ and the White House regarding income source of various revolutionary groups.

21. New Left Movement - Publications - Coverage of Publications being circulated by New Left Movement.

22. Potential for Racial Violence - Survey of localities having potential for racial violence based on current social conditions.

23. Potential for Violence and Civil Unrest - Periodic assessment of potential for violence and civil unrest throughout the U.S. with emphasis on situations involving racial factors.

24. Prisacts - Extremist, revolutionary, terrorist, and subversive activities in penal institutions.

25. Prosab - Protection of Strategic Air Command and intercontinental ballistic missile bases of the U.S. Air Force.

26. Revolutionary Activities - Violence - Periodic reports appraising potential dangerousness of the various revolutionary groups.

27. Security Index - List of individuals who were believed to be dangerous to the internal security of the U.S. during times of emergency.

28. Security Informant - Development of sources to provide intelligence and evidentiary information concerning security matters.

29. Security of Special Agent Personnel - Communication to all offices dated September 17, 1973, alerting field to information that revolutionary and extremist activists and organizations have instituted a program of collecting intelligence data against law enforcement personnel and agencies. It directed field to advise FBI Headquarters if information developed that such organizations and individuals are actively engaged in confrontation and harassment of FBI personnel.

30. Spectar - (Special Target for Informant Development) - Development of quality informants to penetrate revolutionary underground.

31. Stop Index Program on Administrative Index Subjects - Placing Adex Category 1 individuals in the "stop index" operated by the Computer Systems Division in order to promptly determine inquiries received from local police concerning such subjects.

32. Underground Newspapers - Collection of copies of various revolutionary newspapers.

33. Venceremos Brigade - Individuals subjected to background investigation with view toward determining possible Adex inclusion and analysis to determine whether or not subject could be targeted against hostile intelligence agencies.

34. Weatherman Fugitive (Weatherfug) Investigations - Efforts to locate Weatherfugs.

35. Weatherman Automobile Hot Sheet - Compilation of Weatherman vehicles for use by surveillance personnel.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10185-10100
RECORD_SERIES: HO
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 62-116395-475

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: CREGAR, W. O.
TO: WANNALL, W. R.
TITLE:

DATE: 07/23/1975
PAGES: 32
SUBJECT: CC, REQUEST, INSTR, AFFIL, LAW ENFORCEMENT

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 10/30/1998
UPDATE_DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INC MEMOS, 169 OF 201 PAGES NAR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/23/75

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. as sanitized R 4/30/98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(6)
(JFK) 5/19/98

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~Classified by SP8 Mw/jdc (JFK) Declassify on: OADR 10-11-94~~

SYNOPSIS:

On 6/20/75, we were advised that CIA had in 1973 prepared a 693-page document citing instances wherein CIA operations may have exceeded its mandate. This document, in sanitized form, was reviewed by Intelligence Division personnel and was found to contain many references to this Bureau, some of which dealt with operations of an extremely sensitive nature. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC) has had access to this document. At the specific request of this Bureau, CIA on 7/15/75 made available 190 pages of the document believed to be of interest to this Bureau. These pages are submitted as enclosures to this memorandum, which highlights some of the contents thereof. Items so highlighted include various technical support CIA has provided this Bureau [in the area of electronic coverage of embassies in the United States;] [X] handling of Iron Curtain country defectors; CIA notional and proprietary operations, [some of which were used to procure technical equipment for this Bureau;] [X] CIA-FBI cooperation in training matters relating to counter-espionage responsibilities; interception of mail from behind the Iron Curtain; CIA briefing and debriefing of FBI sources traveling abroad and CIA [involvement] and interest in domestic dissident [X] groups. Mention is made in this document that while McCone was CIA Director, conversations over his phone and in his office were recorded. As SSC has had access to this document attempts are being made to fully identify all references for purpose of possible damage assessment to this Bureau.

REC 88 62-116395-47

AUG 5 1975

ENCLOSURE Enclosures

~~TOP~~ SECRET

[redacted]

62-116395

[redacted]

TJM:lhb lhb
(7)

84 AUG 5 1975 ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

CONTINUED - OVER

Pages 70, 72, 73, 77 and 582 - [All refer to use of CIA funds ($2,700,000) during fiscal years 1971 and 1972 to acquire real estate for FBI use (S) against a common target in the United States. NSA is also involved in this project, which is referred to as "MHDOZEN" by CIA.] [S]

Pages 107, 108, 149-151, 155, 156, 158-161, 296, 353 and 354 - All relate to CIA and the Watergate incident, contacts with Watergate principals and inquiries made of CIA by FBI during Watergate investigation.

Page 111 - [Refers to CIA proprietary interest in a legitimate Maryland electronics firm for the purpose of obtaining electronic equipment in violation of Title 18, Section 2512, U. S. Code. On 9/10/71, FBI made inquiry at electronics firm and subsequently was briefed of CIA interest. Inquiry was then terminated.] [~~S~~](U)

Page 112 - In approximately February, 1971, FBI requested technical assistance of CIA in connection with sensitive project, not further described. Item also indicates that CIA, at the request of FBI, had procured electronic equipment costing approximately $48,000. Item indicates such purchases could be legally accomplished under Economy Act of 1925.

Pages 118-119 - Lists electronic and photographic equipment and material purchased by CIA for FBI, 1971 to 1972.

Page 136 - Indicates CIA-FBI project whereby analysis of surveillance data entered into a CIA computer was discussed with the FBI.

CONTINUED - OVER

Pages 140-142 - Refers to CIA assistance to FBI in projects utilizing code names [MOHAWK, UNION, WUGRAVEL, ORKID and ROSE.](S) Page 142 in general terms identifies the nature of these operations. ~~(S)~~

Page 163 - Makes reference to knowledge of CIA officials concerning CIA program for processing data relating to American citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists, etc.

Pages 171, 190, 191 and 330 - Refers to 1968 CIA-prepared document captioned "Restless Youth," which received extremely limited dissemination as some information contained therein pertains to U. S. student radicals and is indicative that CIA had exceeded its charter. Attorney General received copy, March, 1969, but no indication FBI had received copy.

Page 178 - Indicates that CIA had conducted research project on Robert Vesco.

Pages 180-182, 184, 185 and 202 - Refers to CIA's collection of information on individuals in the United States (mostly foreign), CIA accepting information relating to foreign involvement with United States dissident groups when such sources refuse to talk to FBI and relates that CIA had supplied linguist to FBI to translate Arabic.

Pages 188, 189 and 330 - Concerns information prepared by CIA relating to visits of Stokely Carmichael to Caribbean area and various ramifications connected therewith. Information was prepared for CIA use only, but one copy was "inadvertently" sent to FBI.

Pages 193-194 - Refers to CIA's preparation of document for President Johnson dealing with links between foreign elements and the U. S. peace movement.

CONTINUED - OVER

Page 197 - Indicates CIA maintains a library of information on some U. S. citizens and covertly looks at film cans addressed to some U. S. citizens.

Page 203 - Relates that CIA, through Foreign Broadcast Information Service and at the request of the Justice Department and the FBI, furnished Justice Department with transcript and broadcasts made by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and Ramsey Clark in Vietnam.

Pages 221, 222 and 330 - Refers to seven instances where CIA has furnished audio technical equipment and guidance to this Bureau, [believed to be directed mainly against foreign establishments in this country.] (~~S~~) (U)

Pages 234 and 242 - Indicates that CIA had described to this Bureau Imagery Enhancement techniques germane to removing distortion from photographs relating to an alleged bank robber.

Page 282 - Reports that the FBI desires to check for fingerprints on all cryptogram messages mailed to high government officials. Agency personnel were requested to arrange for transmittal of such messages to FBI.

Page 329 "WESTPOINTER" - Concerns project similar to "SPROINTER" (page 28). This project was conducted in the San Francisco, California, area and involved mail sent to the United States from Mainland China.

Page 329 ["SALVAGE"] (S) - From May to September, 1967, [CIA rented and maintained custodianship of an FBI monitoring post in New York City targeted against the United Nations.] (S) This was done at the request of a high official of the Bureau who] (~~S~~)

CONTINUED - OVER

[desired to maintain the capabilities, despite the fact that the FBI Director had ordered the operation terminated. In September, 1967, operational assets were returned to the FBI to reinitiate operational use.] (X)(U)

Pages 334, 362, 363, 371, 373, 376-379, 384, 385, 468-470 and 615 - [Refers to coverage of a foreign establishment in this country (later identified as [Chilean Embassy] (S) initiated by FBI at the request of CIA and which ran intermittently [during the period May, 1971, to February, 1973] (S) Reference is also made to a press-reported burglary of this establishment [in May, 1973] (S) and this Bureau's declination to investigate the burglary on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. CIA's code name for this operation is WUDOOR.] (X)

Pages 457 and 485 - [Refers to incident in 1962, wherein CIA was involved in breaking and entering and the removal of documents from an unknown location in Washington, D. C. The President and the Secretary of State had been informed of the operation. Attorney General Kennedy instructed that the FBI should not be advised unless the Bureau first initiated inquiry concerning the incident.] (X)(U)

Pages 458 and 459 - Refers to Bureau objection (when Mr. Belmont was Bureau official) to CIA proposal that CIA become involved in a [greatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign establishments in this country.] (X)(U)

Pages 446 and 461 - Indicates that while McCone was CIA Director, conversations over his phone and in his office were recorded.

Page 482 ["PLMP] (S) LODESTAR" - Refers to CIA project to target assets against the "leftist" and communist milieu in various parts of the world. These assets are often directed against similar targets in the United States, and each case was reportedly cleared with the FBI.] (X)

CONTINUED - OVER

File #:

66-MM-3346

Serial Scope:

1-17, 19-27, 30-32

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

Routing Slip
FD-4 (Rev. 4-20-81)

Date 6/8/83

To: ☐ Director
Att.:

☐ SAC
☐ ASAC
☑ Supv. Art Bivera
☐ Agent
☐ SSS
☐ Rotor #
☐ Steno
☐ Typist
☐ M •
Room

FILE #
Title

RE:

☐ Acknowledge
☐ Assign ☐ Reassign
☐ Bring file
☐ Call me
☐ Correct
☐ Deadline
☐ Delinquent
☐ Discontinue
☐ Expedite
☐ File

☐ For information
☐ Handle
☐ Initial & return
☐ Leads need attention
☐ Open case
☐ Prepare lead cards
☐ Prepare tickler
☐ Recharge file ☐ serial
☐ Send to

☐ Return assignment card
☐ Return file ☐ serial
☐ Return with action taken
☐ Return with explanation
☐ Search and return
☐ See me
☐ Type

The following file(s) have been retained in SAC Safe for some period of time; however, space is now at a premium. File(s) are being returned to appropriate supervisor for review and for determination as to whether file may be destroyed, placed in closed files, or in Supervisor's safe, if one available.

/ed

Per Nettles instructions & review, enclosed to be filed in FCI safe & ADMIN DESK & INDICES changed accordingly. Thanks Elaine

A SAC Nettles

See reverse side

Office

Fofanta Maintain in F.I safe.

GPO : 1982 O - 391-714

MAINTAINED AS TOP SERIAL

VZCZCHQ0166
RR PH MM
DE HQ #0166 2302222
ZNY EEEEE
R 172203Z AUG 84
FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO FBI MIAMI ROUTINE
PERSONAL ATTENTION
FBI PHILADELPHIA ROUTINE
ATTN: SSRA KLAUS ROHR
BT
UNCLAS E F T O

66-3317

ORGANIZED CRIME REGIONAL TRAINING CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 25-27, 1984, BETHLEHEM, PENNSYLVANIA.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALBANY, AUGUST 15, 1984.

185-10198

REBUTEL INVITED VARIOUS EAST COAST FIELD DIVISIONS TO SEND ORGANIZED CRIME SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO ORGANIZED CRIME MATTERS TO ABOVE TRAINING CONFERENCE. A PRIMARY THRUST OF THIS CONFERENCE WILL BE THE LCN AND NARCOTICS VIOLATIONS.

IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE MIAMI DIVISION HAS VARIOUS MEMBERS OF EAST COAST LCN FAMILIES RESIDING WITHIN THEIR DIVISION AND THE GEOGRAPHIC ROLE SOUTH FLORIDA PLAYS IN THE

92-A
66-3346-32

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
AUG 17 1984
FBI — MIAMI

NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AFFECTING THE EAST COAST, MIAMI IS REQUESTED TO DESIGNATE ATTENDEES TO ABOVE CONFERENCE. THE NUMBER OF AGENTS ATTENDING THIS CONFERENCE IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF SAC MIAMI.

SSRA KLAUS ROHR, ALLENTOWN RA, SHOULD BE ADVISED OF THE NAMES OF ATTENDEES TO THIS TRAINING CONFERENCE.

BT

#0166

File

Florida Journal

66-3317

NNNN

[illegible]222Z MM2/RM TKS

66-3346
Sub B

Routing Slip (Copies to Offices Checked)
0-7 ([illegible] 12-17-73)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu

☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk

☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:
☐ Beirut
☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☐ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Singapore
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

OK as Directors appearance before house sub-committee on appropriations fiscal year 1977.

Date 12/30/75

RE:
DIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

66-3346 3/75

(2/76)
66-3242

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ______

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ______ dated ______.

Remarks:

ReButel to all SACs and Legats, 12/10/75.

Enclosed for each Office and Legat is one copy of the transcript of questions which were asked Mr. Kelley during captioned appearance, along with Mr. Kelley's answers to those questions.

SEARCHED JW INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
JAN 2 1976
FBI—MIAMI

Enc. (1)
Bufile
Urfile

Copy 5

Vol. 20

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

~~66-3242~~
SEARCHED____INDEXED____
SERIALIZED____FILED____
JAN 2 1976
FBI—MIAMI

66-3346-31

CONTENT

STATEMENT OF: PAGE

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, Direcotor, Federal Bureau of Investigation 2451

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

- - -

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and Mathias.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederick Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea, Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is the Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified to lead the Bureau.

The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and their willingness to consider the need for legislation to clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.

It is important to remember from the outset that this Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic intelligence operations. We have consistently expressed our admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic intelligence has raised many difficult questions.

The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather than on present FBI activities. The abuses brought to light in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director

Kelley took charge.

The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse. The FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelligence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance. The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in developing policies and standards for intelligence. These are welcome developments.

Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved. Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress should take into account in thinking about the future of FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveillance should extend beyond the investigation of persons likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques; whether foreign related intelligence activities should be strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement functions, and what should be done to the information already in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in the future.

The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice Department in the next months as the Committee considers recommendations that will strengthen the American people's confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal law and for the security of the nation against foreign espionage.

Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off with, please proceed.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and gentlemen.

I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelligence and internal security fields.

I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my 35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insistence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with law.

I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in responding to your questions and complying with your requests.

I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have had unprecedented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type investigations and who are personally involved in every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with all major areas of our activities and operations in the national security and intelligence fields.

In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of necessity, forcused largely on certain errors and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's record of performance.

It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it found 3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370, less than three fourths, were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it did under the circumstances then existing would have been an abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..

What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence from New England to California.

The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women, and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their rights.

There were many calls for action from Members of Congress and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient demands, for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs, mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counterintelligence Programs, and there were some substantial ones, should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the future where the Government may well be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or property.

In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried out now, can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigatin only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt, the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such preventive action should be available to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed by a task force in the Justice Department, including the FBI, and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls ca be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible manner.

Probably the most important question here today is what assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some very substantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's methods of operations since I took the oath of office as Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness, openness both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion in the decision-making process which insures that no future program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a full and critical review of its propriety.

Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

The results of this program have been most beneficial, to me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which, considering the context of the request, I believed presented the appearances of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years as Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise, to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity can be assured only through institutional means.

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the character of the person who occupies the office of the Director and every member of the FBI under him.

I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism, their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee in particular have gained a great insight into the problems confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields, problems which all too often we have left to resolve without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum participation with the members of that Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step, a step that I believe is absolutely essential , a legislative charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence jurisdiction for the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role of the courts into the early stages of the investigative process and, thereby, would take over what historically have been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Congressional oversight or Executive decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a career police officer. In my police experience, the must frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is when demands are made of them to perform their traditional role as protector of life and property without clear and understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding task.

It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle the FBI's effectiveness in combating the growing incidence of crime and violence across the United States. That charter must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced the formulation of operational guidelines governing our intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility for conferring jurisdiction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that information needed for the prevention of violence can be acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there are some fundamental differences between these investigations that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is limited and fairly well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has enough information to meet any future crisis or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation,

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelligence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues. Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or its successors in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

That is the substance of my prepared statement.

I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate. I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the period these things occurred I was with the local police department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time, however, I was in the FBI.

During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I was with the police department, I continued throughout that period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for the FBI.

I only want to point out that based on those years, based on those observations, we have here a very fine and very sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there is much that can still be done. I know that we are not without fault. I know that from those experiences I have had. We will not be completely without fault in the future. But I assure you that we look upon this inquiry, we look upon any mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at -- this is good and proper, and we do not intend -- I only want to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a matchless organization, one which I continue to say was not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of the best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am only putting in your thinking my objective observations as a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this organization. It is too precious for us to have it in a condition of jeopardy.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.

I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one question he would like to ask.

end t. 1

Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30.

Iahve several questions, and I'm sure they'll be covered by others, but the ones that I have is a result of reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the top of 11.

There you are indicating that you caution us about extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations suggesting that this might take us beyound the role comtemplated for the courts under the Constutution.

Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions and concern has been on the possibility requiring court approval for the use of informants, informants directed to penetrate and report on some group.

And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen, pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device. It's really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He can ask me questions to get information the government would like to have.

Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval would violate the role envisaged for the courts.

And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to my feelings.

Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable. It has of course been approved, the concept of the informant, by numerous court decisions.

Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use of the informant.

I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance. You have only very few ways of solving crimes. You have basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protection of the right of the victim to be victimized. You have within the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and seizure, which, of course, can't be unreasonable, but nonetheless, you have the right.

I think that were we to lose the right of the informant, we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing our job.

Now I'm not arguing with you, Senator, that it is not an unusual procedure. I'm not even going to say that it is not an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one I think that is by virtue of the benefits must be counted.

We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that are attendant. We take great care.

Now you say about the court having possibility taking jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we could present the matter to the court but what are they going to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to have to follow it all the way through?

Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts. Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court given for each contact?

There are a great many problems insofar as administration of it.

I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my idea -- I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this is going to happen no matter what you do.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your reaction.

I was not suggesting that there is consideration here to prohibit informants. I was reflecting a view that I felt and hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is warranted by the particular circumstance. But I do understand your position.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

(Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have questions?

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your organization and I personally regret that the organization is in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that it is, along with other agencies and departments of the government.

I think you probably would agree with me that even though that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity, at least, to improve the level of competency and service of the government itself.

With that hopeful note, would you be agreeable then to volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government, to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on how you would provide the methods, the access, the documents, the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to see that these functions, these delicate functions are being undertaken properly?

And before you answer, let me tell you two or three things I am concerned about.

It hasn't been long ago that the FBI Director was not even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I think that is a movement in the right direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an additional importance that requires it to have closer supervision and scrutiny by us.

At the same time I rather doubt that we can become involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney General.

Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the FBI.

I would appreciate any comments on that.

Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

look at these decisions and the process by which they were made to decide that you are or you are not performing your services diligently.

I don't think you can have oversight unless you have access to records, and in many cases records don't exist and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now departed and in other cases you have conflicts.

How would you suggest then that you improve the quality of service of your agency? How would you propose that you increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that is required?

Mr. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed, one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very important is that the position of Director, the one to which great attention should be paid in choosing the man who will properly acquit himself.

I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency toward consulting with other members of the official family, that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very carefully.

I think further that he should be responsible for those matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.

Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a second? Who does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for the President of the United States, for the Attorney General, for the Justice Department, for the Executive Branch?

Who does the executive of the FBI, the Director of the FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to?

Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General, but I think this is such an important field of influence that it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the judiciary, the legislative, and of course, we are under the Attorney General.

Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea of the President of the United States calling the Director of the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?

Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that the relationship between the FBI Director and the President is such that that is desirable, or should it be conduited through the Attorney General?

Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority of the cases conduited through the Attorney General. There has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he may do so, call him directly.

It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter report to the Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this was revealed in full to them.

Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that says the President has to go through the Attorney General, although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous.

But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?

Do you think that these things need to be handled in a more formal way?

Mr. Kelley. Personally, it would be my practice in the event I receive such an order, to request that it be documented. This is a protection as well as a clarification as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation. I frankly would like to reserve that for some more consideration.

I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it can be worked very easily.

Senator Baker. Mr. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I believe, has already established some sort of agency or function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent, I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department, including the FBI.

Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of Professional Responsibility.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

Senator Baker. Do you have any comment on that? Will you give us any observations as to whether you think that will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or helpful, how it affects the FBI, how you visualize your relationship to it in the future?

Mr. Kelley. I don't object to this, which is to some extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the Attorney General.

Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely subscribe.

Senator Baker. How would you feel about extending that concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector General who is involved with an oversight of all of the agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionally protected rights of the individual citizen? Would you care to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while?

Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.

Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about it and let us know what you think about it?

Mr. Kelley. I will.

Senator Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and the people of the United States.

Does not this suggest that there has been a reaction there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the country because of certain circumstances rather than any clear and specific direct instructions that might have been received from proper authorities? And if that is the case, is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline, to provide for that kind of specific instruction?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can logically be incorporated and that --

Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the attitudes may be at a specific time in this country because --

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I don't contemplate it might be a continuing danger, but it certainly would be a very acceptable guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems to arise, know what we can do.

Senator Huddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether or not we can provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the court in determining what action might be proper and specifically in protecting individual's rights, can't we also provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various techniques that might be used?

For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as has already been done, that informants are necessary and desirable. How do we keep that informant operating within the proper limits so that he in fact is not violating individual rights?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure that there is no infringement of rights.

Senator Huddleston. But this is an aware we've gotten into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the particular action was necessary, that there was a present threat that some intelligence programs should be initiated, but in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been necessary to have addressed the original threat.

How do we keep within the proper balance there?

Mr. Kelley. Well, actually, it's just about like any other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer. There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.

This is one which I think might flow if he counsels the informant.

Now insofar as his inability to control the informant, I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is still supervisory control over that agent and over that informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing basis.

Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point as to whether or not a law enforcement agency ought to be very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone else.

If a White House official asks the FBI or someone to do something unlawful, the question seems to me to occur as to whether or not that is not a violation that should be reported by the FBI.

Mr. Kelley. I think that any violation which comes to our attention should either be handled by us or the proper authority.

gsh 13

Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the past.

Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't know what you're referring to but I would think your statement is proper.

Senator Huddleston. Well, we certainly have evidence of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies.

The question that I'm really concerned about is as we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide range of threats, how do we control what happens within each of those actions to keep them from going beyond what was intended to begin with?

End 2

Mr. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants.

Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever intelligence gathering techniques.

The original thrust of my question was, even though we may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do we control the techniques that might be used, that in themselves might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation of the rights.

Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed out that the association to, the relationship between the informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one, and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guidelines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship. Insofar as the activities of agents, informants or others which may be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of violations of the law on the part of informants, and either prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority. We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would pursue it to the point of prosecution.

Senator Huddleston. But it could be helped by periodic review.

Mr. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well as other matters.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed out the difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.

Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the departments, for instance, with not having a mixing of gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques definable and different?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible. I see no objection to the way that they are now being handled on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fact, it is a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.

Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes information to numerous government agencies.

Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for information, what kind of information they can ask for, and who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him to do specific things?

Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?

Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must come from Mr. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case, wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with a letter so requesting.

This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as I think it has been placed very vividly in our minds, in take care that you just don't follow the request of some underling who does not truly reflect the desire of the President.

Senator Huddleston. Just one more question about techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad projects undertaken.

Would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department, with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent with the very protections?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said to the oversight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put on the use of that information once it has been supplied by the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator.

Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictions now?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves judge in all cases whether or not there is good and sufficient reason for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules that at least to us we are satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment of the rights of any individuals.

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed on what the request, and what they can do with it after they get it.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just bound to gather a great deal of information about some individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelligence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarrassing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific purpose unrelated to this information.

Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to doing that?

Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objectionable.

Senator Huddleston. And how about the length of time that these files are kept in the agency?

Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework, too.

Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done.

Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the President of the United States from calling up the head of the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction to the agency.

But how about that? What about White House personnel informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our present activities. I think this is the only way that we can exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to accomplish and what I want to accomplish.

Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction and total permission to move in a certain direction and go beyond what is intended or what was authorized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.

The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI electronic surveillance of Dr. King, several tapes of specific conversations, and later a composite King tape were produced.

Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by any of your staff, to your knowledge?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed. I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of this particular section. There has been no review of them since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.

Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear them?

Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to be a discussion of this in an executive session.

The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and decided that it would compound the original error for the staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at what we needed to know about the King case.

So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information before the Senator.

Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if, and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase or whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am not advocating it, I am merely asking a question. They would be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and decided on it.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my jurisdiction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the Attorney General.

Senator Goldwater. I see.

Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a target of inquiry?

Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years.

Senator Goldwater. Ten years.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. What is the future value, if any, to the Bureau of retaining such information?

Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a destruction or erasure,we will abide by it. We will, on those occasions where we think that matters might come up within that period of time which may need the retention of them, we will express our opinion at that time, but other than that we would be guided by guidelines.

Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate law enforcement needs should outweigh privacy considerations with respect to retention of such information, or do we need the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials when the investigation purposes for which they were collected have been served?

Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close look at the retention of material, and we would of course like to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.

Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Director, it seems to me that the most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines, limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments, and the question is, where should that line be drawn?

As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we go beyond the authority imposed upon us to get into political ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.

Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather than to leave this very difficult to define and control area of political ideas?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based on statutes in the so-called security field, national or foreign.

These are criminal violations. I feel that they should be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have more personnel working together, covering the same fields. I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence matters, because it is a concomitant. It naturally flows from the investigation of the security matters and the criminal.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Kelley, what Mr. Stone said was this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. When the police system goes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of justice and human liberty.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Do you object to that definition?

Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's area of concern some matters which were probably not as important at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in touch with the security investigations and the gathering of intelligence is something which has proved to be at times troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable, productive procedure.

I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today.

Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that at that point it becomes so difficult to guarantee, and in fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of meaningful oversight on a function as nebulous as the one you've just defined.

If the FBI possesses the authority to investigate ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's security, particularly in the light of the record that we have seen how that definition can be stretched to include practically everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders, war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed that would provide any basis for oversight?

How can you, from among other things, be protected from criticism later on that you exceeded your authority or didn't do something that some politician tried to pressure you into doing?

Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be criticized for doing that which today is construed as very acceptable.

Senator Mondale. Correct. And I have great sympathy for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.

Mr. Kelley. And the Director.

Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured to do things, or when, after the fact, people with good 20/20 hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specifically say this, and that is your answer. We have to live by the law. If we don't define it specifically,it seems to me that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what you should have done.

Don't you fear that?

Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact that I think that we have a different type of spirit today in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in, that I think the Bureau is a matchless organization, and they are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.

We may not be able to project this on all occasions, because we must equate this with the need and with our experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those guidelines.

Senator Mondale. I think, as you know, I don't think there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been, from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that the great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get into trouble.

Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate from the normal course. I feel that within the Bureau there is less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working with you we can at least make some achievements that will be significant.

Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I think we've made a good start.

Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August 9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.

Which liberties did you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been misunderstood many, many times.

Senator Mondale. Well, I want you to have a chance to clear it up.

Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement of the approach which the courts historically have used in resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it does not prohibit searches and seizures. I mention, it only refers to those that are unreasonable.

I came from the police field. What is more restrictive to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be more chaotic is of you did not have traffic regulation. We do have to , in order to love in the complexities and intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our rights.

Some may construe this as an extravagant statement. If it is os, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there has to be a balance.

Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you mean -- let me ask. Let me scratch that and ask again, you have to give up some tights. Which rights would you have us give up?

Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would have the right for search and seizure.

Senator Mondale. You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amendment right.

Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right.

Senator Mondale. What right do you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure.

Senator Mondale. There's no such right in the Constitution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable, under court warrant.

Did you mean to go beyond that?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Mondale. That you should be able to go beyond that?

Mr. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.

Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, Mr. Kelley, that that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?

Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which -- yes, it was inartful.

Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were saying something different, that it was taken to mean something different than I think you intended.

What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.

That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual. I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.

Senator Mondale. What you are saying in effect is that in effect, the rights of the American people can be determined not by the Director of the FBI but by the courts and by the law.

You meant that.

Mr. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir.

Senator Mondale. All right.

end t. 3 Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Hart.

Senator of Colorado. Mr. Kelley, in response to a question by Senaotr Mondale, one of his first questions about laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was we could work together. That is to say the Bureau and the Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably hamper you from investigations of crime control in the country.

But I think implicit in his question was also an area that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political figures, particularly in the White House?

And we've had indications that at least two of your predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr. Gray was under great pressure from the White House to use the facilities of the Bureau and their capabilities to accomplish some plititcal end.

Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.

What kind of restrictions can we lay down to protect you from political pressures? I'd be interested in that sign of the coin, if you would.

Mr. Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would protect me or any successor from this type of thing. I think that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any consideration of such directives.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been a problem for the people that preceded you?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the Congress ought to address?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The Committee received a letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying out the investigation or their efforts to review the investigation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., in order to determine whether that investigation should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked for our transcripts, the testimony before the Committee, all material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Department asking this Committee for FBI files?

Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files. I think they're asking for what testimony was given by witnesses whose testimony has not been given up. I don't know.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department asking this Committee for material provided to us by the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I just ask --

(Pause)

Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one. Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did they have a copy also? Yes, they had a retained copy. I don't know why.

Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you provided us that's not available to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee for your records?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You released a statement on November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's counter-intelligence program and you said you made a detailed study of COINTELPRO activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote:

"The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against individuals, organizations and institutions both public and private across the United States."

Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of occasions he planned violent acts against black people in groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the FBI actually prevented violence from taking place.

How does his testimony square with your statement that I have quoted?

Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of his statements contrary to what we have said is the truth. We don't subscribe to what he said. We have checked into it and we know of no instances where, for example, 15 minutes and that type of thing has been substantiated.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony he gave us under oath was not accurate?

Mr. Kelley. Right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement, and I quote: "I want to assure you that Director Hoover did not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the FBI was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against revolutionary and violence-prone groups.

Now the Committee has received testimony that the New Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact told to higher authorities, the Attorney Gereral and Congress.

Do you have any information in this regard?

I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances, but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic information flowing upward through the chain of command to Director Hoover's superiors?

Mr. Kelley. May I ask that I be given the opportunity to substantiate that with documentation?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Sure.

Mr. Kelley. Or respond to it.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Dorector Kelley, just in passing, do you agree with the statement made by President Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy Dr. King should be brought to justice.

Mr. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon whcse orders the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said to do it and those who are responsible.

I took the responsibility for any such program and I don't expect that those under me would be not acting in accordance with what they think is proper and may even have some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that responsibility.

I think that it should rest on those who instructed that that be done.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people who give the orders should be brought to justice.

Mr. Kelley. I do.

The Chairman. Aren't they all dead?

Mr. Kelley. No.

The Chairman. Not quite?

Mr. Kelley. Not quite.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Director Kelley, in the Committee's review of the COINTELPRO program and other political involvements of the FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three basic questions.

Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for the future, what I would think would be our constructive legislative work, it is very important that we focus on what we learned in that investigation.

And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of the United States have from time to time ordered the FBI to obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the necessary surveillance to obtain and to have a purely political character, that they simply wanted to have for their own personal purposes.

I think that you would agree that that is not a proper function of the FBI, and you agree.

Yet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI, including the Director, to turn down a President of the United States if he receives a direct order from the President. It is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist, I will resign. But that puts a very hard burden on any man serving in your position, particularly if the President puts a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or even invents some excuse. It is always easy for him to say, you know, I am considering Senator White for an important position in my administration, and I need to know more about his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's been doing lately.

It's difficult for you to say back to the President, Mr. President, that's a very questionable activity for the FBI, and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition

sh 8

to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and you want to get something on him.

I mean, you know, the Director can hardly talk back that way, and I'm wondering what we could do in the way of protectin your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this basic charter that we write.

Now, I want your suggestions, but let's begin with one or two of mine. I would like your response.

If we were to write into the law that any order given you either by the President or by the Attorney General should be transmitted in writing and should clearly state the objective and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain those written orders and that furthermore they would be available to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the joint committee on intelligence is established, that committee would have access to such a file.

So that the committee itself would be satisfied that orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or unlawful.

What would you think of writing a provision of that kind into a charter for the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order issued by the President that is a request for action by the Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes or some that will say no, but I think we could define an area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could do that.

Now as to the availability to any oversight committee of Congress, I would say generally that I certainly would have no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request for something of high confidentiality that the President might put in writing such as some national or foreign security matter.

I would like to have such a consideration be given a great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would present a problem.

I have said previously that I feel I can discuss everything except the identity of the informants to the oversight committee. I welcome that.

The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we proceeded with this Committee. It has worked pretty well, I think.

Now Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the Martin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question.

If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and since Dr. King has long since been violently removed from the scene, why are they preserved? Why aren't they simply destroyed? Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information that is has collected that it is no longer needed or may never have connected the person with any criminal activity? And yet, all of that information just stays there in the files year after year.

What can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's not the problem, then what is? Why are these tapes still down there at the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, we do have the rule that they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is your question and why right now are they maintained? Since we do maintain everything since the inquiry has started and until that's lifted, we can't destroy anything.

I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines or legislation and again, as I have said, there should be some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there might be some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.

I think you have to deliberate this very carefully, but it can be done and we are willing to be guided by those rules.

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees to Federal positions. As a matter of fact, the only time I ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr. so and so, who's being considered for an executive office. And we have a very brief conversation in which I tell him that as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that is about the extent of it.

Then when this file is completed and the person involved is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.

What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?

Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. We have some archival rules which govern the retention of mateial and is developed in cases involving certain members of the Executive Branch of the government.

I see no reason why this would not be a proper area for consideration of legislation.

The Chairman. Can you give me any idea of how much -- do you have records that would tell us how much time and money is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands of routine investigations on possible Presidential appointments to Federal offices?

Mr. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. I do not have it now, but if you would like to have the annual cost for the investigation of Federal appointees --

The Chairman. Yes. Plus, you know, plus any other information that would indicate to us what proportion of the time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of activity.

Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, but I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the approximate expense.

The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is a matter we need more information about. And when you supply that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number of such investigations each year?

You know, I don't expect you to go back 20 or 25 years, but give us a good idea of the last few years. For example, enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the reach of these investigations may be.

Mr. Kelley. Through '70?

The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.

The other matter that is connected to this same subject that I would like your best judgment on is whether these investigations could not be limited to offices of sensitivity. That is to say where legitimate national security interest might be involved so that there is a reason to make a close check on past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.

I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate routine Federal offices that are not particularly sensitive in the national security sense from the reach of these FBI checks.

And so when you respond to the series of questions, I wish you would include the offices that are now covered by such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the Federal bureaucracy this extends.

Could you do that?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Fine.

Now there is a vote. The vote always comes just at the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional questions for the record, and there may be other questions, too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will ask Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going to be tied up on the floor with votes.

But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony, Mr. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the way you have cooperated with the Committee in the course of its investigation during the past months.

Mr. Kelley. Thank you.

The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result of the work of the Committee we can write a generic law for gs.. 14

the FBI that will help to remedy many of the problems we'll encounter in the future.

End Tape 4

Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.

On page 5 of your statement --

Mr. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then to question about what you said. "We must recognize that situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the future where the Government may well be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or property."

Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what kind of situation?

And can you give some concrete examples under your general principles statement?

Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent threat to human life or property.

Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the principle. You are saying the extremist has said he is going to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something, and he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.

Is that the presumption?

Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you can extent it.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.

Mr. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts, are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of human life or property?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act to buy the poison or to get in the car with the poison, there is not by definition any threat to life or property.

Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued, and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think -- take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times they have been acted upon.

I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to kill me, that just means one thing.

Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.

Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreeing with me. You're saying on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where we don't lose the capability of doing something. We don't say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that we should act independently because maybe we don't have the judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do think that we should report it and thereafter see what can be done.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of our discussion the standard on page 5.

On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible threat.

Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.

Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right.

Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or --

Mr. Kelley. I don't know what it would be.

Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion.

Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with a standard which said you would have to have an immediate threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.

Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from what you think would be an acceptable standard.

Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for you to, not with the presence or the possibility, not able to do anything except put him under arrest or anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.

And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.

Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening of an investigation into a domestic group.

Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving violence?

Mr.Kelley. To open a domestic security case.

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious federal crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and they have been well defined as to what is the possible opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances, but there are other criteria that are used, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be?

Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the most used of the basis, and then you have, of course, some intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of short duration. If there is no showing of this into action or a viable intent.

Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the intelligence investigation?

Mr. Kelley. By intelligence investigation, yes, you are looking to prevent.

Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined with an intent to take an issue?

Mr. Kelley. And the capability.

Mr. Schwarz. And the capability.

All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and I appreciate very much your time.

Mr. Kelley. That's all right.

Mr. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legitimate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the political views of a person on the other?

Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex lives, there might be something that is relevant. I would say ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or some view that advocates violence or the overthrow of the government.

Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two limits on political views?

Mr. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence or advocants of overthrow?

Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging, but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's a member of some other organization.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the standard you used on collection of sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's justifiable to collect that kind of information on American citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes?

Mr. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been included in some reports as a result of the requirement that that is what is required by our rules, that when a person reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later, I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether or not this is something we should retain, and we would not object to anything reasonable in that regard.

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

Taking the current manual and trying to understand its applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King case, under Section 87 there is a -- permission is granted to open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group or organization, an investigation can be opened."

Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the 1960s, so that investigation could still be open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.

Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infiltrated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the benefit of the country.

Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be opened today?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question.

Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investigation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals or people who come into contact with it?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely. If you mean that we go into the non-subversive group, that we then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation of them without any basis for doing so other than that they are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of inquiry, Mr. Kelley.

I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel was raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between intelligence gathering and law enforcement kinds of functions. Nevertheless, though, I think that you have made an effort, indeed, the Bureau's organizational scheme reflects an effort to distinguish some of this has been made.

Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's law enforcement position?

Mr. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which all counterintelligence people have is very helpful. It is helpful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding of the rights and privileges, and you don't have so much that spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type of an operation.

I subscribe to the present system heartily.

Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission if within the Bureau guidelines were established that effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question that there should be access to it.

Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing of lines there with the information legitimately needed for law enforcement?

Mr. Kelley. There is always a problem when there is wide dissemination, because that just numerically increases the possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of.

Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you.

We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the King case in particular.

As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel, I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.

What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved improperly?

Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it routinely referred to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the great majority of the cases turned over to our Investigative Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual occasion, be a designation of a special task force made up, perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is handled internally at present.

Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary step?

I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all, I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the Bureau police itself, and then secondly, is the Department of Justice involved in the police determinations?

For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered the action against King should be the subject of investigation and maybe prosecution?

How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?

Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those activities which we construe as improper or possibly illegal. There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own investigating, and this is something that we feel is a decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we have within our own organization sufficient capability to handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled independently of us.

Mr. Smothers. Thank you.

That is all I have.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

- - -

VZCZCHQ0041

PP MM

DE HQ 0041 0520935

ZNR UUUUU

P 211444Z FEB 80

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI MIAMI PRIORITY

LEGAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS 0 66-3346*(3/75)

0 VISIT OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) STAFF TO MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND LEGAT MEXICO CITY REGARDING DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (DEA). 0

THE SSCI IS CONDUCTING A STUDY OF THE DEA IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMITTEE'S ROLE IN OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF DEA BUDGET. PRIMARILY, THE COMMITTEE IS INTERESTED IN DETERMINING THE ROLE OF THE DEA IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. SSCI CHAIRMAN BIRCH BAYH HAS REQUESTED THE FBI TO ASSIST IN THE COMMITTEE'S STUDY BY PROVIDING BRIEFINGS TO STAFF MEMBERS REGARDING FBI/DEA RELATIONSHIPS. I HAVE AGREED TO ASSIST THE COMMITTEE IN ITS STUDY. AS SUCH, YOU ARE TO PROVIDE BRIEFINGS TO THE COMMITTEE STAFF REGARDING OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH DEA.

66-3346-30

SEARCHED TB INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
FEB 21 1980
FBI-MIAMI
SAL

ASAC
FREEMAN
COLLINS

THE COMMITTEE WOULD ALSO LIKE ITS STAFF MEMBERS TO BE GENERALLY BRIEFED ON THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE FCI PROGRAM. THEY ARE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN THE PRIORITIES AND FCI THREATS IN MIAMI. THE STAFF IS ALSO INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING INFORMATION REGARDING THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF OUR LEGAT IN MEXICO CITY. ACCORDINGLY, BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON THOSE MATTERS.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE STAFF MEMBERS WHO WILL BE TRAVELING TO YOUR FACILITIES ARE DENNIS P. SHARON AND THOMAS CONNOLLY. ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY HAVE BEEN MADE TO HAVE THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE BRIEF MESSRS. SHARON AND CONNOLLY ON FEBRUARY 27, 1980, AT 2:30 P.M. THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT WILLIAM E. NETTLES, ASAC MIAMI, WILL CONDUCT THE BRIEFING.

IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS CABLED THE U. S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO ADVISE THEM OF THE STAFF MEMBERS VISIT TO DEA AND FBI PERSONNEL. THE COMMITTEE INDICATED IT WOULD LIKE TO VISIT WITH OUR LEGAT ON THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 23, OR SOMETIME ON FEBRUARY 25, 1980. LEGAT MEXICO CITY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR BRIEFINGS ON ONE

PAGE THREE DE HQ 0041 UNCLAS

OF THOSE TWO DATES. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT LEGAT MEXICO CITY CONTACT EDWARD HEATH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEA, MEXICO CITY, WHO IS COORDINATING DEA'S MEETINGS WITH STAFF IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A DATE AND TIME FOR BRIEFING. FBI HEADQUARTERS WILL NOTIFY COMMITTEE THAT INFORMATION REGARDING FBI BRIEFING SHOULD BE OBTAINED BY THEM THROUGH DEA.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, STAFF MEMBERS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID MELOCIC, CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEA. MR. MELOCIC, HOWEVER, WILL NOT ATTEND FBI BRIEFINGS.

BOTH STAFF PERSONS ARE CLEARED TO RECEIVE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION UP TO TOP SECRET. WHILE YOU SHOULD RESPOND FULLY, YOU SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS OR PROVIDE INFORMATION WHICH WILL COMPROMISE INFORMANTS.D

SUTEL RESULTS OF BRIEFING TO REACH FBI HEADQUARTERS BY COB THE DAY AFTER SCHEDULED BRIEFING.

QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING THIS MATTER SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO SA CHRISTOPHER MAZZELLA! LEGAL LIAISON/ CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS UNIT, FBI HEADQUARTERS, EXTENSION 4510.

BT

0041

052043Z MM-1

☐ PINK COPY
☐ WHITE COPY
☐ GOLD COPY

VZCZCHQ0041

PP MM

DE HQ 0041 0522035

ZNR UUUUU

P 211444Z FEB 80

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI MIAMI PRIORITY

LEGAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

VISIT OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) STAFF TO MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND LEGAT MEXICO CITY REGARDING DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (DEA).

THE SSCI IS CONDUCTING A STUDY OF THE DEA IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMITTEE'S ROLE IN OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF DEA BUDGET. PRIMARILY, THE COMMITTEE IS INTERESTED IN DETERMINING THE ROLE OF THE DEA IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. SSCI CHAIRMAN BIRCH BAYH HAS REQUESTED THE FBI TO ASSIST IN THE COMMITTEE'S STUDY BY PROVIDING BRIEFINGS TO STAFF MEMBERS REGARDING FBI/DEA RELATIONSHIPS. I HAVE AGREED TO ASSIST THE COMMITTEE IN ITS STUDY. AS SUCH, YOU ARE TO PROVIDE BRIEFINGS TO THE COMMITTEE STAFF REGARDING OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH DEA.

66-3346-30

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
FEB 21 1980
FBI-MIAMI

THE COMMITTEE WOULD ALSO LIKE ITS STAFF MEMBERS TO BE GENERALLY BRIEFED ON THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE FCI PROGRAM. THEY ARE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN THE PRIORITIES AND FCI THREATS IN MIAMI. THE STAFF IS ALSO INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING INFORMATION REGARDING THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF OUR LEGAT IN MEXICO CITY. ACCORDINGLY, BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON THOSE MATTERS.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE STAFF MEMBERS WHO WILL BE TRAVELING TO YOUR FACILITIES ARE DENNIS P. SHARON AND THOMAS CONNOLLY. ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY HAVE BEEN MADE TO HAVE THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE BRIEF MESSRS. SHARON AND CONNOLLY ON FEBRUARY 27, 1980, AT 2:30 P.M. THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT WILLIAM E. NETTLES, ASAC MIAMI, WILL CONDUCT THE BRIEFING.

IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS CABLED THE U. S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO ADVISE THEM OF THE STAFF MEMBERS VISIT TO DEA AND FBI PERSONNEL. THE COMMITTEE INDICATED IT WOULD LIKE TO VISIT WITH OUR LEGAT ON THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 23, OR SOMETIME ON FEBRUARY 25, 1980. LEGAT MEXICO CITY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR BRIEFINGS ON ONE

PAGE THREE DE HQ 0041 UNCLAS

OF THOSE TWO DATES. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT LEGAT MEXICO CITY CONTACT EDWARD HEATH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEA, MEXICO CITY, WHO IS COORDINATING DEA'S MEETINGS WITH STAFF IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A DATE AND TIME FOR BRIEFING. FBI HEADQUARTERS WILL NOTIFY COMMITTEE THAT INFORMATION REGARDING FBI BRIEFING SHOULD BE OBTAINED BY THEM THROUGH DEA.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, STAFF MEMBERS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID MELOCIC, CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEA. MR. MELOCIC, HOWEVER, WILL NOT ATTEND FBI BRIEFINGS.

BOTH STAFF PERSONS ARE CLEARED TO RECEIVE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION UP TO TOP SECRET. WHILE YOU SHOULD RESPOND FULLY, YOU SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS OR PROVIDE INFORMATION WHICH WILL COMPROMISE INFORMANTS.D

SUTEL RESULTS OF BRIEFING TO REACH FBI HEADQUARTERS BY COB THE DAY AFTER SCHEDULED BRIEFING.

QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING THIS MATTER SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO SA CHRISTOPHER MAZZELLA, LEGAL LIAISON/ CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS UNIT, FBI HEADQUARTERS, EXTENSION 4510.

BT

0041

032043Z MM-1

NNNN

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

4 20/P

11

FBI

Date: JANUARY 9, 1976

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE NITEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395) —DLS

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE MIAMI NITEL 1/8/76.

FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY WAS RECONTACTED 1/9/76 REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF HIS CALLING LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. QUIGLEY AGREED TO CALL ME AND OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED.

END

JLM:mjs
(1)

66-3346-~~7~~ 27

Approved: ______________ Sent 4 32/P M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

NR011 MM CODE

4:32PM NITEL JANUARY 9, 1976 JWB

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI (66-3346)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE MIAMI NITEL JANUARY 8, 1976.

FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY WAS RECONTACTED JANUARY 9, 1976 REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF HIS CALLING LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. QUIGLEY AGREED TO CALL ME AND OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED.

END.

66-3346-~~96~~ 27

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

$\frac{2}{}$ $\frac{30}{P}$

6

FBI

Date: JANUARY 8, 1976

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE NITEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUTEL CALL TO DALLAS, 1/6/76, AND DALLAS TELCALL TO MIAMI, 1/7/76, RE FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY.

I CONTACTED QUIGLEY TELEPHINICALLY 1/8/76. HE STATED HE HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO GRANT INTERVIEWS TO TV, AUTHORS, PUBLISHERS, ETC., ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS REFUSED IN EVERY INSTANCE. HE SAID HE WILL COOPERATE WITH THE SENATE COMMITTEE AT LEAST TO THE INITIAL EXTENT OF DETERMINING WHAT INFORMATION IS DESIRED OF HIM IN ORDER THAT HE CAN DECIDE WHETHER HE WILL NEED PRIVATE LEGAL COUNSEL. QUIGLEY SAID HE IS RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE WHATSOEVER IN THIS MATTER AND SUGGESTED FBI OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL CONTACT HIM AS TO ANY DIRECTION OR ADVICE CONSIDERED NECESSARY. HIS OVER-ALL VIEW IS THAT THE SENATE COMMITTEE EFFORTS ARE DESTRUCTIVE AS PERTAIN TO FBI AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE A PARTY TO THE

66-3346
JLM:mjs
(1)

66-3346-26

Approved: ______ Sent 3 30 P M Per LB
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ____________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

COMMITTEE'S APPARENT OBJECTIVES. HE SAID HE WILL RECEIVE ANY COMMITTEE MEMBER WHO CONTACTS HIM, BUT HE WILL NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE.

2P

THE FOLLOWING IS QUIGLEY'S ADDRESS: JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY, THE FOUNTAIN, APT. 107, 4120 TIVOLI COURT, LAKE WORTH, FLORIDA, PHONE: (305) 967-7610.

ANY CONTACT BY PHONE SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN 8:30 AND 9:00 ANY MORNING IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS.

END

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

NR006 MM CODE

3:30PM NITEL JANUARY 8, 1976 JWB

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI (66-3346) 2P

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUTEL CALL TO DALLAS, JANUARY 6, 1976, AND DALLAS TELCALL TO MIAMI, JANUARY 7, 1976, RE FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY.

I CONTACTED QUIGELY TELEPHONICALLY JANUARY 8, 1976. HE STATED HE HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO GRANT INTERVIEWS TO TV, AUTHORS, PUBLISHERS, ETC., ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS REFUSED IN EVERY INSTANCE. HE SAID HE WILL COOPERATE WITH THE SENATE COMMITTEE AT LEAST TO THE INITIAL EXTENT OF DETERMINING WHAT INFORMATION IS DESIRED OF HIM IN ORDER THAT HE CAN DECIDE WHETHER HE WILL NEED PRIVAT LEGAL COUNSEL. QUIGLEY SAID HE IS RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE WHATSOEVER IN THIS MATTER AND SUGGESTED FBI OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL CONTACT HIM AS TO ANY DIRECTION OR ADVICE CONSIDERED NECESSARY. HIS OVER-ALL VIEW IS THAT THE SENATE COMMITTEE EFFORTS ARE DESTRUCTIVE AS PERTAIN TO FBI AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE A PARTY TO THE COMMITTEE'S APPARENT OBJECTIVES. HE SAID HE WILL RECEIVE ANY COMMITTEE MEMBER WHO CONTACTS HIM, BUT HE WILL NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE.

END PAGE ONE

66-3346-26

PAGE TWO (MM 66-3346)

THE FOLLOWING IS QUIGLEY'S ADDRESS: JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY, THE FOUNTAIN, APT. 107, 4120 TIVOLI COURT, LAKE WORTH, FLORIDA, PHONE: (305) 967-7610.

ANY CONTACT BY PHONE SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN 8:30 AND 9:00 ANY MORNING IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS.

END.

CBL FBIHQ TU

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 12-[illegible]3)

(Copies to Offices Checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☑ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Beirut
☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☐ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Singapore
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date 1/5/76

RE: DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE
BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
DECEMBER 10, 1975

66-3346-28

SEARCHED mjf INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED mjf
JAN 7 1976
FBI — MIAMI

☑ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA
dated

Remarks: By routing slip dated 12/30/75 and captioned as above, all SACs and Legats were furnished a copy of the transcript of Mr. Kelley's 12/10/75 appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Although the data contained in the transcript may be made available to news media representatives, used in answering questions received from citizens, and otherwise treated as being of a public-source nature, the transcript itself should not be reproduced for, or given to, anyone outside the FBI.

Enc.

Bufile

Urfile

NR050 WA PLAIN

830PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING THE AGENTS' WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

12/10/75

66-3346-24 ~~25~~

ARCHIVED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
DEC 10 1975
FBI-MIAMI
ASAC

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2 THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT; THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL, INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS, OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL AGENCY.

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

FBI MM SAK AACK OXX ACK FOR 1 TEL CLR AND TU

NR050 WA PLAIN

830PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING THE AGENTS' WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

66-3346-24

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
DEC 1 1975
FBI—MIAMI

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2 THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT; THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL, INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS, OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL AGENCY.

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

FBI MM SAK AACK OXX ACK FOR 1 TEL CLR AND TU

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 12-17-73)

(Copies to C[illegible]es Checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:
☐ Beirut
☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☐ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Singapore
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date 11/21/75

RE: ✓ SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(3/75) 66-3346

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ______

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ______ dated ______.

Remarks:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of an article by Mr. William Safire entitled "Mr. Church's Cover-Up" that appeared in the November 20, 1975, issue of "The New York Times."

#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8

66-3346- RW

#9 JB
#10

Enc. (1)
Bufile
Urfile

NOV [illegible] 1975
[illegible]
ASAC

Mr. Church's Cover-Up

By William Safire

WASHINGON, Nov. 19—On Oct. 10, 1963, the then-Attorney General of the United States put his personal signature on a document that launched and legitimatized one of the most horrendous abuses of Federal police power in this century.

In Senator Frank Church's subcommittee hearing room this week, the authorized wiretapping and subsequent unauthorized bugging and attempted blackmailing of Martin Luther King Jr. is being gingerly examined, with the "investigation" conducted in such a way as not to unduly embarrass officials of the Kennedy or Johnson Administrations.

With great care, the committee has focused on the F.B.I. Yesterday, when the committee counsel first set forth the result of shuffling through press clips, it seemed as if no Justice Department had existed in 1962; today, an F.B.I. witness pointed out that it was Robert Kennedy who authorized the wiretap of Dr. King, and that "the President of the United States and the Attorney General specifically discussed their concern of Communist influence with Dr. King."

But the Church committee showed no zest for getting further to the Kennedy root of this precedent to Watergate eavesdropping. If Senator Church were willing to let the chips fall where they may, he would call some knowledgeable witnesses into the glare of the camera lights and ask them some questions that have gone unasked for thirteen years.

For example, he could call Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General Kennedy's deputy and successor, and ask what he knows of the Kennedy decision to wiretap Dr. King. Who at Justice concurred in the recommendation? How does the F.B.I. know the President was consulted or informed?

After Mr. Katzenbach assumed office, and the wiretapping continued, he was told by angry newsmen that the F.B.I. was leaking scurrilous information about Dr. King. Why did he wait for four months, and for a thousand telephonic interceptions, to discontinue the officially approved rap?

Of course, this sort of testimony would erode Senator Church's political base. That is why we do not see former Assistant F.B.I. director Cartha (Deke) Deloach, Lyndon Johnson's personal contact with the F.B.I. in the witness chair. What did President Johnson know about the character-assassination plot and when did he know it? What conversations took place between Mr. Deloach and President Johnson on the tapping of Dr. King, or about the use of the F.B.I. in any other intrusions into the lives of political figures?

The committee is not asking embarrassing questions even when answers are readily available. A couple of weeks ago, at an open hearing, an F.B.I. man inadvertently started to blurt out an episode about newsmen who were weritapping in 1962 with the apparent knowledge of Attorney General Kennedy. The too-willing witness was promptly shooshed into silence, and told that such information would be developed only in executive session. Nobody raised an eyebrow.

That pattern of containment by the Church committee is vividly shown by the handling of the buggings at the 1964 Republican and Democratic conventions which were ordered by Lyndon Johnson. Such invasions of political headquarters were worse than the crime committed at Watergate, since they involved the use of the F.B.I., but the Church investigators seem to be determined not to probe too deeply.

ESSAY

If F.B.I. documents say that reports were made to specific Johnson aides, why are those men not given the same opportunity to publicly tell their story so avidly given the next President's men? If Lyndon Johnson committed this impeachable high crime of using the F.B.I. to spy on political opponents, who can be brought forward to tell us all about it?

But that would cause embarrassment to Democrats, and Senator Church wants to embarrass professional employees of investigatory agencies only. A new sense of Congressional decorum exists, far from the sense of outrage expressed in the Senate Watergate committee's hearing room. When it is revealed that the management of NBC News gave press credentials to L.B.J.'s spies at the 1964 convention, everybody blushes demurely—and nobody demands to know which network executive made what decision under what pressure.

I have been haranguing patient readers for years about the double standard applied to Democratic and Republican political crimes, and had hoped the day would come when the hardball precedents set by the Kennedy and Johnson men would be laid before the public in damning detail.

Obviously, Democrat Frank Church is not the man to do it. His jowl-shaking indignation is all too selective; the trail of high-level responsibility for the crimes committed against Dr. King and others is evidently going to be allowed to cool.

Pity. You'd think that after all the nation has been through in the past few years, our political leaders would have learned that the one thing that brings you down is the act of covering up.

66-3346-22

mf mf

NOV 2[illegible] 1975

THE NEW YORK TIMES
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20th, 1975
PAGE C-41

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 7-11-7

(Copies to Offices Checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☐ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date December 5, 1975

RE: TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR--
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
12/2/75

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ______

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ______ dated ______

Remarks:

Re Bureau R/S of 12/4/75 which provided excerpts of Mr. Adams' testimony.

Attached for your information and assistance, is the complete transcript of above-referenced testimony.

66-3346-22

UNEDITED TRANSCRIPTS

SEARCHED ______ INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
DEC 8 1975
FBI—MIAMI

Enc. (1)
Bufile
Urfile

Vol. 15

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Tuesday, December 2, 1975

Washington, D. C.

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

66-3346-21

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____

DEC 8 1975

FBI—MIAMI

Senator Tower. The next witnesses to appear before the Committee are Mr. James Adams, Assistant to the Director-Deputy Associate Director, Investigation, responsible for all investigative operations; Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, responsible for internal security and foreign counterintelligence investigations; Mr. John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division; Joseph G. Deegan, Section Chief, extremist investigations; Mr. Robert L. Schackelford, Section Chief, subversive investigations; Mr. Homer A. Newman, Jr., Assistant to Section Chief, supervises extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigalus, Unit Chief, supervises subversive informants; Joseph G. Kelley, Assistant Section Chief, Civil Rights Section, General Investigative Division.

Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Adams. I do.

Mr. Wannall. I do.

Mr. Mintz. I do.

Mr. Deegan. I do.

Mr. Schackelford. I do.

Mr. Newman. I do.

Mr. Grigalus. I do.

Mr. Kelley. I do.

Senator Tower. It is intended that Mr. Wannall will be the principal witness, and we will call on others as questioning might require, and I would direct each of you when you do respond, to identify yourselves, please, for the record.

I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow the members of the Committee to return from the floor.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Senator Tower. The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Wannall, according to data, informants provide 83 percent of your intelligence information.

Now, will you provide the Committee with some information on the criteria for the selection of informants?

TESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ACCOMPANIED BY: JAMES B. ADAMS, ASSISTANT TO THE
DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION);
JOHN A. MINTZ, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL
DIVISION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT L.
SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR.,
ASSISTANT TO SECTION CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT
CHIEF; AND JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEF,
CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Mr. Wannall. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you have quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting Office.

Senator Tower. That is GAO.

Mr. Wannall. Based on a sampling of about 93 cases.

Senator Tower. Would that appear to be a fairly accurate figure.

Mr. Wannall. I have not seen any survey which the FBI itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I think that we do get the principal portion of our information from live sources.

Senator Tower. It would be a relatively high percent
then?

Mr. Wannall. I would say yes. And your ques
criteria?

Senator Tower. What criteria do you use in the selection of informants?

Mr. Wannall. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. In our cases relating to extremist matters, surely in order to get an informant who can meld into a group which is engaged in a criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set of criteria. If you're talking about our internal security matters, I think we set rather high standards. We do require that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field office indices, checks with other informants who are operating in the same area, and in various established sources such as local police departments.

Following this, if it appears that the person is the type who has credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we would interview the individual in order to make a determination as to whether or not he will be willing to assist the FBI in discharging its responsibilities in that field.

Following that, assuming that the answer is positive, we would conduct a rather in depth investigation for the purpose of further attempting to establish credibility and reliability.

Senator Tower. How does the Bureau distinguish between the use of informants for law enforcement as opposed to intelligence collection?

Is the guidance different, or is it the same, or what?

Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address the use of informants on criminal matters since he is over the operational division on that.

Mr. Adams. You do have somewhat of a difference in the fact that a criminal informant in a law enforcement function, you are trying to develop evidence which will be admissible in court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be just for purposes of pure intelligence.

The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to, through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be used independently of the testimony of the informant so that he can continue operating as a criminal informant.

Senator Tower. Are these informants ever authorized to function as provocateurs?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, they're not. We have strict regulations against using informants as provocateurs. This gets into that delicate area of entrapment which has been addressed by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage in an activity, the government has the right to provide him the opportunity. This does not mean, of course, that mistakes don't occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to avoid this. Even the law has recognized that informants can engage in criminal activity, and the courts have held that, especially the Supreme Court in the Newark County Case, that the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that an informant himself can engage in criminal activity, but because there is lacking this criminal intent to violate a law, we stay away from that. Our regulations fall short of that.

If we have a situation where we felt that an informant has to become involved in some activity in order to protect or conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United States Attorney or to the Attorney General to try to make sure we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our informants.

Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that they are informing on, do you not?

Mr. Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs, which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one of the best examples of a situation where the law was in effect at the time. We heard the term States Rights used much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending in the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement, to use the troops only as a last resort.

And then you have a situation like this where you do try to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement. You have historical problems with the Klan coming along. We had situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some areas participating in Klan violence.

The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those, he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't see what action was taken with that information, as he pointed out in his testimony. Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments in every instance. We also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being received, was not being acted upon. We also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead memoranda to the Department of Justice the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI, in a position where we had no authority in the absence of instruction from the Department of Justice, to make an arrest.

Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in a situation where the Department called in United States Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So, historically, in those days, we were just as frustrated as anyone else was, and when we got information from someone like Mr. Rowe, good information, reliable information, and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to do something about it, it was not always acted upon, as he indicated.

Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act?

Mr. Adams. The Departmental rules at that time, and still require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy. Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. You can have a mob scene, and you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you have no violation.

Congress recognized this, and it wasn't until 1968 that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights statute, which added punitive measures against an individual that didn't have to be a conspiracy. But this was a problem that the whole country was grappling with: the President of the United States, Attorney General. We were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from a memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General. The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence, and in neutralizing the Klan -- and that was one of the reasons.

Senator Tower. What was the Bureau's purpose in continuing or urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam

Veterans Against the War?

Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the intent to halter political expression?

Mr. Adams. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans Against the War that indicated that there were subversive groups involved. They were going to North Vietnam and meeting with the Communist forces. They were going to Paris, attending meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the International Communist Party. We feel that we had a very valid basis to direct our attention to the VVAW.

It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was head of the Communist Party, USA, and the comments he made, and what it finally boiled down to was a situation where it split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maost group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and they closed those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow the national organization.

But we had a valid basis for investigating it, and we investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation and subservience to the national office.

Senator Tower. Mr. Hart?

Senator Hart of Michigan. But in the process of chasing after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of information that clearly has no relationship to any Federal criminal statute.

Mr. Adams. I agree, Senator.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Why don't you try to shut that stuff off by simply telling the agent, or your informant?

Mr. Adams. Here is the problem that you have with that. When you're looking at an organization, do you report only the violent statements made by the group or do you also show that you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have some of these church groups that were mentioned, and others, that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the statutes. You have to report the good, the favorable along with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with information in our files. We are accused of being vacuum cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the real purpose of an organization, do you only report the violent statements made and the fact that it is by a small minority, or do you also show the broad base of the organization and what it really is?

And within that is where we have to have the guidelines we have talked about before. We have to narrow down, because we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in our files.

Senator Hart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process, you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people who are, who have been engaged in basic First Amendment exercises, and this is what hangs some of us up.

Mr. Adams. It hangs me up. But in the same files I imagine every one of you has been interviewed by the FBI, either asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator being considered for a Presidential appointment, being interviewed concerning some friend who is applying for a job.

Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the FBI?

Now, someone can say, as reported at our last session, that this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our files has an onerous impression, a chilling effect. I agree. It can have, if someone wants to distort what we have in our files, but if they recognize that we interviewed you because of considering a man for the Supreme Court of the United States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't see where any harm is served by having that in our files.

Senator Hart of Michigan. But if I am Reverend Smith and the vacuum cleaner picked up the fact that I was helping the veterans, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and two years later a name check is asked on Reverend Smith and all your file shows is that he was associated two years ago with a group that was sufficient enough, held sufficient doubtful patriotism to justify turning loose a lot of your energy in pursuit on them --

Mr. Adams. This is a problem.

Senator Hart of Michigan. This is what should require us to rethink this whole business.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely.

And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well as the Congressional input are going to address themselves to.

Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range of groups which the Bureau can and has had informant penetration and report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition of when an extremist or security investigation may be undertaken refers to groups whose activity either involves violation of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation of such law, and when such an investigation is opened, then informants may be used.

Another guideline says that domestic intelligence investigations now must be predicated on criminal violations. The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation relevant to a potential violation. Even now, with an improved, upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back again in a world of possible violations or activities which may result in illegal acts.

Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of the right to demonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition, conceivably may result in violence or disruption of a local town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than those holding the meeting.

Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because they may result in violence, disruption?

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?

Mr. Adams. No, sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in, or where members of one of these groups are participating where there is a potential that they might change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.

But this is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the First Amendment rights of people, yet at the same time being aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the past than we do at the present time. But we have had periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe, and the courts have said that the FBI has a right, and indeed a duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention.

And that's a good statement if applied in a clearcut

Phone (Area 202) 544-5000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

case. Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities, and that's where I think most of our disagreements fall.

end 5

Senator Hart of Michigan. Let's assume that the rule for opening an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn. The Bureau manual states that informants investigating a subversive organization should not only report on what that group is doing but should look at and report on activities in which the group is participating.

There is a Section 87B3 dealing with reporting on connections with other groups. That section says that the field office shall "determine and report on any significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups." Any significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups.

Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of 1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the installation of the anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential sources reported on the plan's participants and activities of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM, particularly in open public debate in a high school auditorium, which included speakers from the Defense Department for the ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM.

The informants reported on the planning for the meeting, the distribution of materials to churches and schools, participation by local clergy, plans to seek resolution on the ABM from nearby town councils. There was also information on plans for a subsequent town meeting in Washington with the names of local political leaders who would attend.

Now the information, the informant information came as part of an investigation of an allegedly subversive group participating in that coalition. Yet the information dealt with all aspects and all participants. The reports on the plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated to the State Department, to military intelligence, and to the White House.

How do we get into all of that?

Mr. Adams. Well --

Senator Hart of Michigan. Or if you were to rerun it, would you do it again?

Mr. Adams. Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969 was. The problem we had at the time was where we had an informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was going to take place and it was going to be the Daily World, which was the east coast communist newspaper that made comments about it. They formed an organizational meeting. We took a quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May 28, 1969 and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this organization.

Now the problem we get into is if we take a quick look and get out, fine. We've had cases, though, where we have stayed in too long. When you're dealing with security [illegible] is like

Soviet espionage where they can put one person in this country and they supported him with total resources of the Soviet Union, false identification, all the money he needs, communications networks, satellite assistance, and everything, and you're working with a paucity of information.

The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic security. You don't have a lot of black and white situations. So someone reports something to you which you feel, you take a quick look at and there's nothing to it, and I think that's what they did.

Senator Hart of Michigan. You said that was '69. Let me bring you up to date, closer to current, a current place on the calendar.

This one is the fall of last year, 1975. President Ford announced his new program with respect to amnesty, as he described it, for draft resistors. Following that there were several national conferences involving all the groups and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty.

Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is not against -- while unconditional amnesty is not yet the law, we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either.

Mr. Adams. That's right.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Some of the sponsors were umbrella organizations involving about 50 diverse groups around the country. FBI informants provided advance information on plans for the meeting and apparently attended and reported on the conference. The Bureau's own reports described the participants as having represented diverse perspectives on the issue of amnesty, including civil liberties and human rights groups, G.I. rights spokesmen, parents of men killed in Vietnam, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues, delegates from student organizations, and aides of House and Senate members, drafting legislation on amnesty.

The informant apparently was attending in his role as a member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive and it described the topics of the workshop.

Ironically, the Bureau office report before them noted that in view of the location of the conference at a theological seminary, the FBI would use restraint and limit its coverage to informant reports.

Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last fall. And this is a conference of people who have the point of view that I share, that the sooner we have unconditional amnesty, the better for the soul of the country.

Now what reason is it for a vacuum cleaner approach on a thing like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad informant intelligence really is, that would cause these groups in that setting having contact with other groups, all and everybody is drawn into the vacuum and many names go into the

Bureau files.

Is this what we want?

Mr. Adams. I'll let Mr. Wannall address himself to this. He is particular knowledgeable as to this operation.

Mr. Wannall. Senator Hart, that was a case that was opened on November 14 and closed November 20, and the information which caused us to be interested in it were really two particular items. One was that a member of the steering committee there, was a three man steering committee, and one of those members of the national conference was in fact a national officer of the VVAW in whom we had suggested before we did have a legitimate investigative interest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I would almost say so what at that point.

Mr. Wannall. The second report we had was that the VVAW would actively participate in an attempt to pack the conference to take it over. And the third report we had --

Senator Hart of Michigan. And incidentally, all of the information that your Buffalo informant had given you with respect to the goals and aims of the VVAW gave you a list of goals which were completely within Constitutionally protected objectives. There wasn't a single item out of that VVAW that jeopardizes the security of this country at all.

Mr. Wannall. Well, of course, we did not rely entirely on the Buffalo informant, but even there we did recei from that informant information which I considered to be significant.

The Buffalo chapter of the VVAW was the regional office covering New York and northern New Jersey. It was one of the five most active VVAW chapters in the country and at a national conference, or at the regional conference, this informant reported information back to us that an attendee at the conference announced that he had run guns into Cuba prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he during the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour suveillance. There was also discussion at the conference of subjugating the VVAW to the revolutionary union. There were some individuals in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in agreement with us, but Mr. Adams has addressed himself to the interest of the revolutionary union.

So all of the information that we had on the VVAW did not come from that source but even that particular source did give us information which we considered to be of some significance in our appraisal of the need for continuing the investigation of that particular chapter of the VVAW.

Senator Hart of Michigan. But does it give you the right or does it create the need to go to a conference, even if it is a conference that might be taken over by the VVAW when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we seek to achieve unconditional amnesty? What threat?

Mr. Wannall. Our interest, of course, was the VVAW influence on a particular meeting, if you ever happened to be holding a meeting, or whatever subject it was.

Senator Hart of Michigan. What if it was a meeting to seek to make more effective the food stamp system in this country?

Mr. Wannall. Well, of course there had been some organizations.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Would the same logic follow?

Mr. Wannall. I think that if we found that if the Communist Party USA was going to take over the meeting and use it as a front for its own purposes, there would be a logic in doing that. You have a whole scope here and it's a matter of where you do and where you don't, and hopefully, as we've said before, we will have some guidance, not only from this committee but from the guidelines that are being developed. But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and not gathering everything there was about it.

In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us, and that was the person who had, who was not developed for this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other matters for some period of time.

And as soon as we got the report of the outcome of the meeting and the fact that in the period of some six days, we discontinued any further interest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, my time has expired but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we really want to control the dangers to our society of using informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investigations. And that gets us into what I would like to raise with you when my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants, obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before a full-fledged informant can be directed by the Bureau against a group or individuals.

I know you have objections to that and I would like to review that with you.

Senator Mondale. Pursue that question.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about an obligation to obtain a warrant before you turn loose a full-fledged informant. I'm not talking about tipsters that run into you or you run into, or who walk in as information sources. The Bureau has raised some objections in this memorandum to the Committee. The Bureau argues that such a warrant requirement might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their government.

Now that's a concern for First Amendment rights that ought to hearten all the civil libertarians.

But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement raise a serious constitutional question?

Mr. Adams. Well, for one thing it's the practicability of it or the impacticability of getting a warrant which ordinarily involves probable cause to show that a crime has been or is about to be committed.

In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily with an imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activities such as with the Socialist Workers Party, which we have discussed before, where they say publicly we're not to engage in any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the United States.

Well, now, you can't show probable cause if they're about to do it because they're telling you they're not going to do it and you know they're not going to do it at this particular moment.

It's just the mixture somewhat of trying to mix in a criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function, and we can't find any practical way of doing it. We have a particular organization. We may have an informant that not only belongs to the Communist Party, but belongs to several other organization and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist Party to try to infiltrate one of these clean organizations.

We don't have probable cause for him to target against that organization, but yet we should be able to receive information from him that he as a Communist Party member, even though in an informant status, is going to that organization and don't worry about it. We're making no headway on it. It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants, the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not violate the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. They have recognized the necessity that the government has to have individuals who will assist them in carrying out their governmental duties.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I'm not sure I've heard anything yet in response to the constitutional question, the very practical question that you addressed.

Quickly, you are right that the court has said that the use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutional rights of the subject under investigation. But Congress can prescribe some safeguards, some rules and some standards, just as we have with respect to your use of electronic surveillance, and could do it with respect to informants.

That's quite different from saying that the warrant procedure itself would be unconstitutional.

But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show probable cause, and therefore, you couldn't get a warrant, therefore you oppose the proposal to require you to get a

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

warrant. It seems to beg the question.

Assuming that you say that since we use informants and investigate groups which may only engage in lawful activities but which might engage in activities that can result in violence or illegal acts, and you can't use the warrant, but Congress could say that the use of informants is subject to such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity, including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss the anti-ballistic missile system, and we don't want you to use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or unless you present your request to a magistrate in the same fashion as you are required to do with respect to, in most cases, to wiretap.

This is an option available to Congress.

End Tape 6

Begin Tape 7

Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential security informant and a security informant?

Mr. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator Schweiker, that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on him before talking with him and then we do a further in-depth background check.

A potential security informant is someone who is under consideration before he is approved by headquarters for use as an informant. He is someone who is under current consideration.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

On some occasions that person will have been developed to a point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are engaged in checking upon his reliability.

In some instances he may be paid for information furnished, but it has not gotten to the point yet where we have satisfied ourselves that he meets all of our criteria. When he does, the field must submit its recommendations to headquarters, and headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an approved FBI informant.

Senator Schweiker. So it's really the first step of being an informant, I guess.

Mr. Wannall. It is a preliminary step, one of the preliminary steps.

Senator Schweiker. In the Rowe case, in the Rowe testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when violence was known?

I know we asked you several times but I'm still having trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was known.

Mr. Wannall. Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to answer that.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

Mr. Adams. The problem we had at the time, and it's the problem today, we are an investigative agency. We do not have police powers like the United States marshalls do. About 1795, I guess, or some period like that, marshalls have had the authority that almost borders on what a sheriff has. We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain the role of an investigative agency. We were to report on activities to furnish the information to the local police, who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice.

In those areas where the local police did not act, it resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 United States marshalls down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a time of civil righs versus federal rights, and yet there was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country.

This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies in itself at the time either because many of them did act upon the information that was furnished to them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we would not have had evidence that there was a conspiracy available. We can do absolutely nothing in that regard.

In Little Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and next to the Army, the United States marshalls should make them, not the FBI, even though we developed the violations. And over the years, as you know, at the time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it?

Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan as far as committing acts of violence, and of course we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

Senator Schweiker. What would be wrong, just following up your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it's obvious to me that a lot of informers are going to have pre-knowledge of violence of using U.S. marshalls on some kind of a long-range basis to prevent violence?

Mr. Adams. We do. We have them in Boston in connection with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations under the Civil Rights Act. But the marshalls are in Boston, they are in Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this is the approach, that the Federal government finally recognized, was the solution to the problem where you had to have added Federal import.

Senator Schweiker. But instead of waiting until it gets to a Boston state, which is obviously a pretty advanced confrontation, shouldn't we have somewhere a coordinated program that when you go up the ladder of command in the FBI, that on an immediate and fairly contemporary basis, that kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it gets to a Boston state?

I realize it's a departture from the past. I'm not saying it isn't. But it seems to me we need a better remedy than we have.

Mr. Adams. Well, fortunately, we're at a time where conditions have subsided in the country, even from the '60s and the '70s and periods -- or '50s and '60s. We report to the Department of Justice on potential troublespots around the country as we learn of them so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance with state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston?

I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the early '60s. But the government had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I'd like to go, if I may, to the Robert Hardy case. I know he is not a witness but he was a witness before the House. But since this affects my state, I'd like to ask Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned and organized a raid on the Camden draft board. And according to Mr. Hardy's testimony before our Committee, he said that in advance of the raid someone in the Department had even acknowledged the fact that they had all the information they needed to clamp down on the conspiracy and could arrest people at that point in time, and yet no arrests were made.

Why, Mr. Wannall, was this true?

Mr. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based only on the material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It was not a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your question.

There was, in fact, a representative of the Department of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously as that case progressed as to what point the arrest should be made and we were being guided by those to our mentors, the ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort.

So I think that Mr. Hardy's statement to the effect that there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true.

Senator Schweiker. That responsibility rests with who under your procedures?

Mr. Wannall. We investigate decisions on making arrests, when they should be made, and decisions with regard to prosecutions are made either by the United States attorneys or by Federals in the Department.

Mr. Adams. At this time that particular case did have a departmental attorney on the scene because there are questions of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a tough violation to prove and sometimes a question of do you have the added value of catching someone in the commission of the crime as further proof, rather than relying on one informant and some circumstantial evidence to prove the violation.

Senator Schweiker. Well, in this case, though, they even had a dry run. They could have arrested them on the dry run.

That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to me. They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on the dry run.

I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry run. Who was this Department of Justice official who made that decision?

Mr. Adams. Guy Goodwin was the Department official.

Senator Schweiker. Next I'd like to ask back in 1965, during the height of the effort to destroy the Klan, as you put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated membership.

I believe these are either FBI figures or estimates. That would mean that one out of every five members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the government.

And I believe the figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members of the Klan that year were FBI informants.

Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that you shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what's going on for violence, but it seems to me that this is the tail wagging the dog.

For example, today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants for both domestic informants and potential informants and that here we had 2,000 just in the Klan alone.

Mr. Adams. Well, this number 2,000 did include all racial matters, informants at that particular time, and I think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan informants in relation to Klan members was aroun 6 percent, I think, after we had read some of the testimony.

Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a group called the Action Group. This was the group that you remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony, that he was left after the meeting. He attended the open meetings and heard all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information, but he never knew what was going on because each one had an action group that went out and considered themselves in the missionary field.

Theirs was the violence.

In order to penetrate those, it takes, you have to direct as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress an everyone is concerned about the murder of the civil rights workers, the Linio Kent case, the Viola Liuzzo case, the bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one tremendous problem at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I acknowledge that.

Mr. Adams. Our only approach was through informants and through the use of informants we solved these cases, the ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have never solved. They are extremely difficult.

These informants, as we told the Attorney General, and as we told the President, that we had moved informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he could forewarn us of violence, could help us on cases that had transpired, and yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever unless we can create enough disruption that these members will realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers, even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if that were the case and with some of them it was the case, that I would be caught. And that's what we did and that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure and just like you say, 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately were Klan members and they didn't dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Senator Schweiker. My time is expired. I just have one quick question.

Is it correct that in 1971 we're using around 6500 informers for black ghetto situations?

Mr. Adams. I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have one year where we had a number like that which probably had been around 6000, and that was the time when the cities were being burned, Detroit, Washington, areas like this. We were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is violence going to break out, what next?

They weren't informants like an individual penetrating an organization. They were listening posts in the community that would help tell us that we have a group here that's getting ready to start another fire-fight or something.

Senator Tower. At this point, there are three more Senators remaining for questioning. If we can try to get everything in in the first round, we will not have a second round and I think we can finish around 1:00, and we can go on and terminate the proceedings.

However, If anyone feels that they have another question that they want to return to, we can come back here by 2:00.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the record is now fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the field of crime investigating, it may be the best professional

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

organization of its kind in the world. And when the FBI acts in the field of political ideas, it has bungled its job, it has interfered with the civil liberties, and finally, in the last month or two, through its public disclosures, heaped shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of the crucial public confidence in an essential law enforcement agency of this country.

In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the FBI in 1924.

In World War I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed from its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and protector of political ideas. And through the interference of civil liberties and Palmer Raids and the rest, the public became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department get involved in political ideas.

And yet here we are again looking at a record where with Martin Luther King, with anti-war resistors, with -- we even had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of Churches. Secretly we are investigating this vague, ill-defined, impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas.

It seems to be the basis of the strategy that people can't protect themselves, that you somehow need to use the tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive or dangerous ideas, which I find strange and quite profoundly at odds with the philosophy of American government.

I started in politics years ago and the first thing we had to do was to get the communists out of our parts and out of the union. We did a very fine job. As far as I know, and I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help from the FBI or the CIA. We just rammed them out of the meetings on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't good union leaders when we didn't want anything to do with them. And yet, we see time and time again that we're going to protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous, that we've going to protect veterans from whatever it is, and we're going to protect the Council of Churches from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so gummy and confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that precisely what is expected of the FBI is known by you, by the public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask you?

Mr. Adams. I agree with that, Senator, and I would like to point out that when the Attorney General made his statement Mr. Hoover subscribes to it, we followed that policy for about ten years until the President of the United States said that we should investigate the Nazi Party.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party. I feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in the fact that in World War II, as contrasted with World War I, there wasn't one single incident of foreign directed sabotage which took place in the United States.

Senator Mondale. And under the criminal law you could have investigated these issues of sabotage.

Isn't sabotage a crime?

Mr. Adams. Sabotage is a crime.

Senator Mondale. Could you have investigated that?

Mr. Adams. After it happened.

Senator Mondale. You see, every time we get involved in political ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of crimes that could have been committed. It's very interesting.

In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to continue what you're now doing and as I understand it, you still insist that you did the right thing with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of Churches, and this can still go on. This can still go on under your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activities in terms of criminal matters.

Mr. Adams. The law does not say we have to wait until we have been murdered before we can --

Senator Mondale. Absolutely, but that's the field of

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

law again. You're trying to defend apples with oranges. That's the law. You can do that.

Mr. Adams. That's right, but how do you find out which of the 20,000 Bund members might have been a saboteur. You don't have probable cause to investigate anyone, but you can direct an intelligence operation against the German-American Bund, the same thing we did after Congress said --

Senator Mondale. Couldn't you get a warrant for that? Why did you object to going to court for authority for that?

Mr. Adams. Because we don't have probable cause to go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for probable cause to investigate an organization.

There were activities which did take place, like one time they outlined the Communist Party --

Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it wouldn't be better for the FBI for us to define authority that you could use in the kind of Bonn situation where under court authority you can investigate where there is probable cause or reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest.

Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than just making these decisions on your own?

Mr. Adams. We have expressed complete concurrence in that. We feel that we're going to get beat to death in the next 100 years, you're damned if you do, and damned if you don't if we don't have a delineation of our responsibility in this area. But I won't agree with you, Senator, that we have bungled the intelligence operations in the United States. I agree with you that we have made some mistakes. Mr. Kelley has set a pattern of being as forthright as any Director of the FBI in acknowledging mistakes that had been made, but I think that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and Senator Church, that we have to watch these hearings because of the necessity that we must concentrate on these areas of abuse. We must not lose sight of the overall law enforcement and intelligence community, and I still feel that this is the freest country in the world. I've travelled much, as I'm sure you have, and I know we have made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they are by the fact that there are 20,000 murders a year in the United States and they can't walk out of their houses at night and feel safe.

Senator Mondale. That's correct, and isn't that an argument then, Mr. Adams, for strengthening our powers to go after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening or continuing a policy which we now see undermines the public confidence you need to do your job.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely. The mistakes we have made are what have brought on this embarrassment to us.

I'm not blaming the Committee. I'm saying we made some mistakes and in doing so this is what has hurt the FBI. But at the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes out, as you have said yourselves, because of the necessity of zeroing in on abuses.

I think that we have done one tremendous job. I think the accomplishments in the Klan was the finest hour of the FBI and yet, I'm sure in dealing with the Klan that we made some mistakes. But I just don't agree with bungling.

End Tape 7

Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble over it in the political idea trouble, and that that's where we need to have new legal standards.

Mr. Adams. Yes, I agree with that.

Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Adams, these two instances we have studied at some length seems to have been an inclination on the part of the Bureau to establish a notion about an individual or a group which seems to be very hard to ever change or dislodge. In the case of Dr. King, where the supposition was that he was being influenced by Communist individuals, extensive investigation was made, surveillance, reports came back indicating that this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go out to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to be a willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts.

Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar to that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, that every piece of information that she supplied to the Bureau seemed to indicate that the Bureau was not correct in its assumption that this organization planned to commit violence, or that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insist that this investigation go on, and this information was used against the individuals.

Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted that its first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their course?

Mr. Adams. We have admitted that. We have also shown from one of the cases that Senator Hart brought up, that after five days we closed the case. We were told something by an individual that there was a concern of an adverse influence in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther King situation there was no testimony to the effect that we just dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and on, ad infinitum. The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were all approved by the Attorney General. Microphones on Martin Luther King were approved by another Attorney General. This wasn't the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that there was a basis to continue the investigation up to a point.

What I testified to was that we were improper in discreditin Dr. King, but it's just like --

Senator Huddleston. The Committee has before it memoranda written by high officials of the Bureau indicating that the information they were receiving from the field, from these surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition was.

Mr. Adams. That memorandum was not on Dr. King. That was on another individual that I think somehow got mixed up in the discussion, one where the issue was can we make people prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to investigate them.

But the young lady appearing this morning making the comment that she never knew of anything she told us that she considers herself a true member of the VVAW-WSO inasmuch as she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and agreed to cooperate with the FBI in providing information regarding the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals from associating themselves with the VVAW-WSO. She is most concerned about efforts by the Revolutionary Union to take over the VVAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this..

I think that we have a basis for investigating the VVAW-WSO in certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped the investigation. They don't agree with these principles laid down by the --

Senator Huddleston. That report was the basis of your continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that information against members who certainly had not been involved in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job or whatever?

Mr. Adams. It all gets back to the fact that even in the criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to prevent crime, and you can't wait until something happens. The Attorney General has clearly spoken in that area, and even our statutory jurisdiction provides that we don't --

Senator Huddleston. Well, of course we've had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent crime, when you had information that it was going to occur. But I'm sure there are instances where you have.

Mr. Adams. We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

Senator Huddleston. To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to the crime.

Mr. Adams. Not necessarily.

Senator Huddleston. Your informant had told you that, hadn't he?

Mr. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level. We have other informants, and we have other information.

Senator Huddleston. Yes, but you were aware that he had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in order to --

Mr. Adams. Yes. He furnished many other instances also.

Senator Huddleston. So you weren't really doing a whole lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were already part of it.

Mr. Adams. We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so that when the Department, agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform certain law enforcement functions.

Senator Huddleston. Now, the Committee has received documents which indicated that in one situation the FBI assisted an informant who had been established in a white hate group to establish a rival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid his expenses in setting up this rival organization.

Now, does this not put the Bureau in a position of being responsible for what actions the rival white hate group might have undertaken?

Mr. Adams. I'd like to see if one of the other gentlemen knows that specific case, because I don't think we set up a specific group.

This is Joe Deegan.

Mr. Deegan. Senator, it's my understanding that the informant we're talking about decided to break off from the group he was with. He was with the Macon Klan group of the United Klans of America, and he decided to break off. This was in compliance with our regulations. His breaking off, we did not pay him to set up the organization. He did it on his own. We paid him for the information he furnished us concerning the operation. We did not sponsor the organization.

Senator Huddleston. Concerning the new organization that he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that organization?

Mr. Deegan. He continued to advise us of that organization and other organizations. He would advise us of planned activities.

Senator Huddleston. The new organization that he formed, did it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one?

Mr. Deegan. No, it did not, and it did not last that long.

Senator Huddleston. There's also evidence of an FBI informant in the Black Panther Party who had a position of responsibility within the Party with the knowledge of his FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing them in how to use those weapons. Presumably this was in the knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became -- came in contact with the group that was contracting for murder, and he participated in this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent, and this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later killed with the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably all in the knowledge of the FBI.

How does this square with your enforcement and crime prevention responsibilities.

Mr. Deegan. Senator, I'm not familiar with that particular case. It does not square with our policy in all respects, and I would have to look at that particular case you're talking about to give you an answer.

Senator Huddleston. I don't have the documentation on that particular case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind of an organization and to what extent an effort is made to prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing that you are supposedly trying to prevent.

Mr. Adams. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe, who became active in an action group, and we told him to get out or we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the information he had furnished in the past.

We have had cases, Senator, where we have had --

Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participate in violent activities.

Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

Senator Huddleston. That's what he said.

Mr. Adams. I know that's what he said. But that's what lawsuits are all about, is that there are two sides to the issue, and our agents handling this have advised us, and I believe have advised your staff, that at no time did they advise him to engage in violence.

Senator Huddleston. Just to do what was necessary to get the information, I believe maybe might have been his instructions.

Mr. Adams. I don't think they made any such statement to him along that line, and we have informants, we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law, and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the subject, and have prosecuted I would say, offhand, I can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws, once it came to our attention, and even to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence in this case, during the review of the matter, the agents told me that they found one case where their agent had been working 24 hours a day, and he was a little late in disseminating the information to the police department. No violence occurred, but it showed up in a file review, and he was censured for his delay in properly notifying local authorities.

So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all informant files.

Senator Huddleston. Well, Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with the acknowledgement by the agent in charge that if you're going to be a Klansman and you happen to be with someone and they decide to do something, that he couldn't be an angel. These were the words of the agent, and be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead, but the implication is that he would have to go along and would have to be involved if he was going to maintain his credibility.

Mr. Adams. There's no question but that an informant at times will have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights that take place, but I believe his statement was to the effect that -- and I was sitting in the back of the room and I don't recall it exactly, but some of them were beat with chains, and I didn't hear whether he said he beat someone with a chain or not, but I rather doubt that he did because it's one thing being present, and it's another thing taking an active part in criminal actions.

Senator Huddleston. He was close enough to get his throat cut.

How does the gathering of information --

Senator Tower. Senator Mathias is here, and I think that we probably should recess a few minutes.

Could we have Senator Mathias' questions and then should we convene this afternoon?

Senator Huddleston. I'm finished. I just had one more question.

Senator Tower. Go ahead.

Senator Huddleston. I wanted to ask how the selection of information about an individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

Mr. Adams. Our agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe, that they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge concerning it, and I can't see where it would be of any value whatsoever.

Senator Huddleston. You aren't aware of any case where these instructions were given to an agent or an informant?

Mr. Adams. To get involved in sexual activity? No, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tower. Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to come back very briefly to the Fourth Amendment considerations in connection with the use of informants and in posing these questions we're not thinking of the one time volunteer who walks in to an FBI office and says I have a story I want to tell you and that's the only time that you may see him. I'm thinking of the kind of situations in which there is a more extended relationship which could be of varying degrees. It might be in one case that the same individual will have some usefulness in a number of situations. But when the FBI orders a regular agent to engage in a search, the first test is a judicial warrant, and what I would like to explore with you is the difference between a one time search which requires a warrant, and which you get when you make that search, and a continuous search which uses an informant, or the case of a continuous search which uses a regular undercover agent, someone who is totally under your control, and is in a slightly different category than an informant.

Mr. Adams. Well, we get there into the fact that the Supreme Court has still held that the use of informants does not invade any of these constitutionally protected areas, and if a person wants to tell an informant something that isn't protected by the Supreme Court.

An actual search for legal evidence, that is a protected item, but information and the use of informants have been consistently held as not posing any constitutional problems.

Senator Mathias. I would agree, if you're talking about the fellow who walks in off the street, as I said earlier, but is it true that under existing procedures informants are given background checks?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Mathias. And they are subject to a testing period.

Mr. Adams. That's right, to verify and make sure they are providing to us reliable information.

Senator Mathias. And during the period that the relationship continues, they are rather closely controlled by the handling agents.

Mr. Adams. That's true.

Senator Mathias. So in effect they can come in a very practical way agents themselves to the FBI.

Mr. Adams. They can do nothing --

Senator Mathias. Certainly agents in the common law use of the word.

Mr. Adams. That's right, they can do nothing, and we instruct our agents that an informant can do nothing that the agent himself cannot do, and if the agent can work himself into an organization in an undercover capacity, he can sit there and glean all the information that he wants, and that is not in the Constitution as a protected area. But we do have this problem.

Senator Mathias. But if a regular agent who is a member of the FBI attempted to enter these premises, he would require a warrant?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, if a regular -- it depends on the purpose for which he is entering. If a regular agent by concealing his identity, by -- was admitted as a member of the Communist Party, he can attend Communist Party meetings, and he can enter the premises, he can enter the building, and there's no constitutionally invaded area there.

Senator Mathias. And so you feel that anyone who has a less formal relationship with the Bureau than a regular agent, who can undertake a continuous surveillance operation as an undercover agent or as an informant --

Mr. Adams. As long as he commits no illegal acts.

Senator Mathias. Let me ask you why you feel that it is impractical to require a warrant since, as I understand it, headquarters must approve the use of an informant. Is that degree of formal action required?

end

Mr. Adams. The main difficulty is the particularity which has to be shown in obtaining a search warrant. You have to go after particular evidence. You have to specify what you're going after, and an informant operates in an area that you just cannot specify. He doesn't know what's going to be discussed at that meeting. It may be a plot to blow up the Capitol again or it may be a plot to blow up the State Department building.

Senator Mathias. If it were a criminal investigation, you would have little difficulty with probable cause, wouldn't you?

Mr. Adams. We would have difficulty in a warrant to use someone as an informant in that area because the same difficulty of particularity exists. We can't specify.

Senator Mathias. I understand the problem because it's very similar to one that we discussed earlier in connection say wiretaps on a national security problem.

Mr. Adams. That's it, and there we face the problem of where the Soviet, an individual identified as a Soviet spy in a friendly country and they tell us he's been a Soviet spy there and now he's coming to the United States, and if we can't show under a probable cause warrant, if we couldn't show that he was actually engaging in espionage in the United States, we couldn't get a wiretap under the probable cause requirements which have been discussed. If the good fairy didn't drop the evidence in our hands that this individual is here conducting espionage, we again would fall short of this, and that's why we're still groping with it.

Senator Mathias. When you say fall short, you really, you would be falling short of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

Mr. Adams. That's right, except for the fact that the President, under this Constitutional powers, to protect this nation and make sure that it survives first, first of all national survival, and these are the areas that not only the President but the Attorney General are concerned in and we're all hoping that somehow we can reach a legislative middle ground in here.

Senator Mathias. Which we discussed in the other national security area as to curtailling a warrant to that particular need.

Mr. Adams. And if you could get away from probable cause and get some degree of reasonable cause and get some method of sealing indefinitely your interest, say, in an ongoing espionage case and can work out those difficulties, we may get their yet.

Senator Mathias. And you don't despair of finding that middle ground?

Mr. Adams. I don't because I think that today there's more of an open mind between Congress and the Executive Branch and the FBI and everyone concerning the need to get these areas resolved.

Senator Mathias. And you believe that the Department, if we could come together, would support, would agree to that kind of a warrant requirement if we could agree on the language?

Mr. Adams. If we can work out problems and the Attorney General is personally interested in that also.

Senator Mathias. Do you think that this agreement might extend to some of those other areas that we talked about?

Mr. Adams. I think that that would be a much greater difficulty in an area of domestic intelligence informant who reports on many different operations and different types of activities that might come up rather than say in a Soviet espionage or a foreign espionage case where you do have a little more degree of specificity to deal with.

Senator Mathias. I suggest that we arrange to get together and try out some drafts with each other, but in the meantime, of course, there's another alternative and that would be the use of wiretap procedure by which the Attorney General must approve a wiretap before it is placed, and the same general process could be used for informants, since you come to headquarters any way.

Mr. Adams. That could be an alternative. I think it would be a very burdensome alternative and I think at some point after we attack the major abuses, or what are considered major abuses of Congress and get over this hurdle, I think we're still going to have to recognize that heads of agencies have to accept the responsibility for managing that agency and we can't just keep pushing every operational problem up to the top because there just aren't enough hours in the day.

Senator Mathias. But the reason that parallel suggests itself is of course the fact that the wiretap deals generally with one level of information in one sense of gathering information. You hear what you hear from the tap.

Mr. Adams. But you're dealing in a much smaller number also.

Senator Mathias. Smaller number, but that's all the more reason. When an informant goes in, he has all of his senses. He's gathering all of the information a human being can acquire from a situation and has access to more information than the average wiretap.

And it would seem to me that for that reason a parallel process might be useful and in order.

Mr. Adams. Mr. Mintz pointed out one other main distinction to me which I had overlooked from our prior discussions, which is the fact that with an informant he is more in the position of being a concentral monitor in that one of the two parties to the conversation agrees, such as like concentral monitoring of telephones and microphones and anything else versus the wiretap itself where the individual

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

whose telephone is being tapped is not aware and there is, and neither of the two parties talking had agreed that their conversation could be monitored.

Senator Mathias. I find that one difficult to accept. If I'm the third party overhearing a conversation that is taking place in a room where I am, and my true character isn't perceived by the two people who are talking, in effect they haven't consented to my overhearing my conversation. Then they consent if they believe that I am their friend or their, a partisan of theirs.

But if they knew in fact that I was an informant for someone else, they wouldn't be consenting.

Mr. Adams. Well, that's like I believe Senator Hart raised earlier, that the courts thus far have made this distinction with no difficulty, but that doesn't mean that there may not be some legislative compromise which might be addressed.

Senator Mathias. Well, I particularly appreciate your attitude in being willing to work on these problems because I think that's the most important thing that can evolve from these hearings, so that we can actually look at the Fourth Amendment as the standard that we have to achieve. But the way we get there is obviously going to be a lot easier if we can work toward them together.

I just have one final question, Mr. Chairman, and that deals with whether we shouldn't impose a standard of probable cause that a crime has been committed as a means of controlling the use of informants and the kind of information that they collect.

Do you feel that this would be too restrictive?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, I do.

When I look at informants and I see that each year informants provide us, locate 5000 dangerous fugitives, they provide subjects in 2000 more cases, they recover $86 million in stolen property and contraband, and that's irrespective of what we give the local law enforcement and other Federal agencies, which is almost a comparable figure, we have almost reached a point in the criminal law where we don't have much left. And in the intelligence field we still, I think when we carve all of the problems away, we still have to make sure that we have the means to gather information which will permit us to be aware of the identity of individuals and organizations that are acting to overthrow the government of the United States. And I think we still have some areas to look hard at as we have discussed, but I think informants are here to stay. They are absolutely essential to law enforcement. Everyone uses informants. The press has informants, Congress has informants, you have individuals in your community that you rely on, not for ulterior purposes, but to let you know what's the feel of the people, am I serving them properly, am I carrying out this?

It's here to say. It's been here throughout history and there will always be informants. And the thing we want to avoid is abuses like provocateurs, criminal activities, and to ensure that we have safeguards that will prevent that. But we do need informants.

Senator Tower. Senator Hart, do you have any further questions?

Senator Hart of Michigan. Yes. I ask unanimous request perhaps with a view to giving balance to the record, the groups that we have discussed this morning into which the Bureau has put informants, in popular language, our liberal groups -- I would ask unanimous consent that be printed in the record, the summary of the opening of the headquarters file by the Bureau of Dr. Carl McIntyre when he announced that he was organizing a group to counter the American Civil Liberties Union and other "liberal and communist groups," is not a left only pre-occupation.

Senator Tower. Without objection, so ordered.

(The material referred to follows:)

Senator Tower. Any more questions?

Then the Committee will have an Executive Session this afternoon in Room 3110 in the Dirksen Building at 3:00, and I hope everyone will be in attendance.

Tomorrow morning we will hear from Courtney Evans, Cartha DeLoach. Tomorrow afternoon, former Attorneys General Ramsey Clark and Edward Katzenbach.

The Committee, the hearings are recessed until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above mentioned matter was concluded, to reconvene on Wednesday December 3rd, 1975, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.)

- - -

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 7-11-75)

(Copies to Offices Checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☒ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☐ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date December 4, 1975

RE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ______

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ______ dated ______

Remarks:

For your assistance in responding to local press inquiries, attached is a copy of unedited excerpted remarks by Assistant to the Director--Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams while testifying before the Senate Select Committee on 12/2/75, concerning anti-FBI allegations made by Gary Rowe, former FBI informant.

66-3346-20

[illegible]
SERIALIZED
1975
FBI—MIAMI

Enc. (1)
Bufile
Urfile

EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR --

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

TESTIFYING BEFORE THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN,

GARY ROWE, FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI

TO PREVENT VIOLENCE

DECEMBER 2, 1975

66-3346-19

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
DEC 8 1975
FBI—MIAMI

QUESTION: ....You do use informants and do instruct them to spread dissention among certain groups that they are informing on, do you not?

MR. ADAMS: We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one of the best examples of a situation where the law was ineffective at the time. We heard the term, State's Rights used much more than we hear today. We saw with the Little Rock situation the President of the United States sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement use the troops only as a last resort. When you have a situation like this where you do try to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical problems.

With the Klan coming along, we had situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action was taken with that information as he pointed out during his testimony. Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments in every instance.

We also know that in certain instances the information upon being received was not being acted upon. We also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem. And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no authority in the absence of an instruction from the Department of Justice to make an arrest. Section 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So historically, in those days, we were just as frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable information--and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to do something about it, it was not always acted upon as he indicated.

QUESTION: In none of these cases, then, there was adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act.

MR. ADAMS: The Departmental rules at that time, and still do, require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy. Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you have no violation.

Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968 that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an individual. There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This was a problem that the whole country was grappling with--the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing the Klan and that was one of the reasons.

QUESTION: ....A local town meeting on a controversial social issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such meetings because they may result in violent government disruption?

MR ADAMS: No sir, and we don't....

QUESTION: Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?

MR. ADAMS: No sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in, or where members of one of these groups are participating where there is a potential that they might change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.

This is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the 1st Amendment right, yet at the same time, being aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the past than we do at the present time. We have had periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe and the courts have said that the FBI has the right, and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention. Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut case.

Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities. That's where I think most of our disagreements fall.

QUESTION: In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when violence was known about. I know we have asked this several times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was known.

MR. WANNALL: Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to that and if you have no objections, I'll ask that he be the one to answer the question.

MR. ADAMS: The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have police powers even like the U. S. Marshals do. The Marshals since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice, and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain the role of an investigative agency.

We were to report on activities. We furnished the information to the local police who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those areas where the local police did not act. It resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies in the South at the time either, because many of them did act upon the information that was furnished to them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we would not have had evidence that was a conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed the violations. We have over the years as you know at the

Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

QUESTION: What would be wrong, just following up on your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence?

MR. ADAMS: We do. We have them in Boston in connection with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same time and this is the approach that the Federal Government finally recognized.

QUESTION: On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need a better remedy than we have.

MR ADAMS: Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or 50's and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

QUESTION: Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated membership.

MR. ADAMS: That's right.

QUESTION: I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. That would mean that 1 out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members in the Klan that year were FBI informants. Isn't that an awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what is going on to revert violence but it just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants, both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone.

MR. ADAMS: Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters and informants at that particular time and I think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan informants in relaton to Klan members was around 6 percent, I think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone, was concerned about the murder of the three civil rights workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one tremendous problem at that time.

QUESTION: I acknowledge that.

MR. ADAMS: Our only approach was through informants. Through the use of informants we solved these cases. The ones that were solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved. They're extremely difficult, but, these informants as we told the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he could see that this could continue forever unless we could create enough disruption that these members will realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately were Klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.

QUESTION: I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in 1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto situation?

MR ADAMS: I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington, areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an organization. They were listening posts in the community that would help tell us that we have another group here that is getting ready to start another fire fight or something.

QUESTION: ... Without going into that subject further of course we have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent crime when you had information that it was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where you have.

MR. ADAMS: We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

QUESTION: To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to the crime.

MR. ADAMS: Not necessarily knew.

QUESTION: Your informant told you that, hadn't he?

MR. ADAMS: The informant is on one level. We have other informants and we have other information.

QUESTION: You were aware that he had worked with certain members of the Birmingham Police in order...

MR. ADAMS: That's right. He furnished many other instances also.

QUESTION: So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were already a part of it.

MR. ADAMS: We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.S. Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions.

QUESTION: ...This brings up the point as to what kind of control you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing that you were supposedly trying to prevent.

MR. ADAMS: A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer using him as an informant in spite of the information he had furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had

QUESTION: But you also told him to participate in violent activities

MR. ADAMS: We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

QUESTION: That's what he said.

MR. ADAMS: I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage in violence.

QUESTION: Just to do what was necessary to get the information.

MR. ADAMS: I do not think they made any such statement to him along that line either and we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the subject and have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence in this case during the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a day and he was a little late in disseminating the information to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in properly notifying local authorities. So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all informant files.

QUESTION: Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going to be a Klansman and he happened to be with someone and they decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are words of the Agent. And be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead but the implication is that he would have to go along or would have to be involved if he was going to maintain his liability as a ---

MR. ADAMS: There is no question that an informant at times will have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights that take place but I believe his statement was to the effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is one thing being present, it is another thing taking an active part in a criminal action.

QUESTION: It's true. He was close enought to get his throat cut apparently.

QUESTION: How does the collection of information about an individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

MR. ADAMS: Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any value whatsoever.

QUESTION: You don't know of any such case where these instructions were given to an Agent or an informant?

MR. ADAMS: To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

4 37 P

18

FBI

Date: SEPTEMBER 12, 1975

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE NITEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395) MEB

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346)

SENSTUDY 75

REMYTEL SEPTEMBER 10, 1975.

THOMAS McANDREWS ADVISED THE MIAMI OFFICE HE IS DEPARTING THIS DATE FOR WASHINGTON, D. C., AS HE HAS BEEN CALLED TO TESTIFY. FURNISHED FOR INFO.

END

JLM:mjs
(1)

Filed

66-3346-17

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent 9 02 P M Per sah

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

NR018 MM CODE

9:02 PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 12, 1975 MRW

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI (66-3346) ONE PAGE

SENSTUDY 75

REMYTEL SEPTEMBER 10, 1975.

THOMAS MCANDREWS ADVISED THE MIAMI OFFICE HE IS DEPARTING THIS DATE FOR WASHINGTON, D.C., AS HE HAS BEEN CALLED TO TESTIFY. FURNISHED FOR INFO.

END

TMA ACK FOR ONE AND FBHQ CLR

TH

Searched mjs
Serialized
Indexed mjs
Filed

66-3346-17

[illegible] (Rev. 5-22-64)

4

FBI

Date: SEPTEMBER 10, 1975

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE NITEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395) – LSG

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346) 1P

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

THOMAS MC ANDREWS AND FREDERICK F. FOX WERE CONTACTED BY SAC SEPTEMBER 9, 1975. ADDRESSES SET FORTH IN RETEL FOR EACH ARE CORRECT.

MC ANDREWS STATED HIS KNOWLEDGE IS INDIRECT AND DIMMED BY APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN YEARS. THE AGENT HANDLING Z COVERAGE AT WFO WHILE MC ANDREWS WAS SAC IS NOW DEAD. MC ANDREWS PROTESTED THAT BUREAU FILES SHOULD BE BY FAR MORE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE THAN HIS KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY.

FOX STATED HE WOULD NOTIFY FBI, MIAMI, SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED.

END

JLM:mjs
(1)

Searched mg
Serialized
Indexed mg
Filed

66-3346-16

Approved: ______
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 6 01 P M Per ______

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

NR004 MM CODE

6:01 PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 10, 1975 MRW

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI (66-3346)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

THOMAS MC ANDREWS AND FREDERICK F. FOX WERE CONTACTED BY SAC SEPTEMBER 9, 1975. ADDRESSES SET FORTH IN RETEL FOR EACH ARE CORRECT.

MC ANDREWS STATED HIS KNOWLEDGE IS INDIRECT AND DIMMED BY APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN YEARS. THE AGENT HANDLING Z COVERAGE AT WFO WHILE MC ANDREWS WAS SAC IS NOW DEAD. MC ANDREWS PROTESTED THAT BUREAU FILES SHOULD BE BY FAR MORE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE THAN HIS KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY.

FOX STATED HE WOULD NOTIFY FBI, MIAMI, SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED.

END

PLS ACK FOR 4

LSG FBIHQ ACK FOR FOUR AND HOLD FOR TWO

Searched
Serialized
Indexed
Filed

66-3346-16

C

NR 030 WA CODE

5:53PM NITEL 9/5/75 PMJ

TO ALEXANDRIA BALTIMORE BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON CHICAGO CINCINNATI
DALLAS EL PASO INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON JACKSONVILLE LOUISVILLE
LOS ANGELES MEMPHIS MIAMI
NEW YORK OKLAHOMA CITY OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA PHOENIX ST. LOUIS
SAN DIEGO SAN FRANCISCO SAVANNAH
SEATTLE

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION ✓

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTELS MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED WHEREABOUTS OF A NUMBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES INDICATING THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC STAFF. LISTED BELOW, BY FIELD OFFICE TERRITORY, ARE THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES AS CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES.

66-3346-15

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
SEP 5 1975
FBI—MIAMI

NW

ASAC

INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SA'S LITRENTO AND STEWART DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA CONCERNING MAIL OPENING ACTIVITIES. ALL OTHERS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER SAC, ASAC, OR BOTH, DURING PERIOD 1959 - 1966 IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI, NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGTON FIELD. THEY PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING MAIL OPENINGS.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.

CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

ALEXANDRIA:

W. DONALD STEWART, CRYSTAL HOUSE I, APARTMENT 202, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA.

JAMES H. GALE, 3307 ROCKY MOUNT ROAD, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

THOMAS E BISHOP, 8820 STARK ROAD, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA

BALTIMORE:

ANTHONY P. LITRENTO, 2810 STONYBROOK DRIVE, BOWIE, MARYLAND

PAUL O'CONNELL, JR., 2417 STRATTON DRIVE, POTOMAC, MARYLAND

DONALD E. RONEY, 131 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE, WINDSOR HILLS, WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

VICTOR TURYN, 2645 TURF VALLEY ROAD, ELLICOTT CITY, MARYLAND

DONALD W. MORLEY, BOX 222, NEW MARKET, MARYLAND

BIRMINGHAM:

JOHN DAVID POPE, JR., 221 REMINGTON ROAD, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

BOSTON:

LEO L. LAUGHLIN, 9 EVERETT AVENUE, WINCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

EDWARD J. POWERS, 10 COLONIAL DRIVE, BEDFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

J.F. DESMOND, 185 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

CHICAGO:

MARLIN W. JOHNSON, CANTEEN CORPORATION, THE MERCHANDISE MART, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

HARVEY G. FOSTER, 1012 SOUTH HAMLIN, PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS

CINCINNATI:

PAUL FIELDS, 2677 CYCLORAMA DRIVE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMCREST LANE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

DALLAS:

PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014 CHATTERTON DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

EL PASO:

KARL W. DISSLY, POST OFFICE BOX 9762, EL PASO, TEXAS

INDIANAPOLIS:

DILLARD W. HOWELL, 6413 CARDINAL LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

ALLAN GILLIES , 8228 HOOVER LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

JACKSON:

WILLIAMS W. BURKE, JR., 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

JACKSONVILLE:

DONALD K. BROWN, 826 BROOKMONT AVENUE, EAST JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, 4857 WATER OAK LANE, JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

LOUISVILLE:

BERNARD C. BROWN, 2301 NEWMARKET DRIVE, N.E., LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

LOS ANGELES:

WILLIAM G. SIMON, 2075 LOMBARDY ROAD, SAN MARINO, CALIFORNIA

WESLEY G. GRAPP, 4240 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS, CALIFORNIA

ARNOLD C. LARSON, 4232 ABBINGTON COURT, WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH K. PONDER, 3719 CARRIAGE HOUSE COURT, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 3030 SOUTH RED HILL AVENUE, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

MEMPHIS:

E. HUGO WINTERROWD, 1550 NORTH PARKWAY, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

MIAMI:

(813) 261 2996

THOMAS MC ANDREWS, 324 NEAPOLITAN WAY, NAPLES, FLORIDA

FREDERICK F. FOX, 11450 W. BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA 893-7743

NEW YORK:

JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, 656 HUNT LANE, MANHASSET, NEW YORK

HENRY A. FITZGIBBON, 76 EASTON ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK

OKLAHOMA CITY:

JAMES T. MORELAND, 108 FERN DRIVE, POTEAU, OKLAHOMA

LEE O. TEAGUE, 2501 N.W. 121ST STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA

OMAHA:

JOHN F. CALLAGHAN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, CAMP DODGE, POST OFFICE BOX 130, JOHNSTON, IOWA

PHILADELPHIA:

RICHARD J. BAKER, 219 JEFFREY LANE, NEWTON SQUARE, PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN F. MALONE, 25 GARFIELD AVENUE, CARBONDALE, PENNSYLVANIA

PHOENIX:

PALMER M. BAKEN, JR., 3832 EAST YUCCA STREET, PHOENIX, ARIZONA

ST. LOUIS:

THOMAS J. GEARTY, 6630 CLAYTON ROAD NR. 105, RICHMOND HEIGHTS, MISSOURI

WESLEY T. WHALEY, 286 GREEN TRAILS DRIVE, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI

SAN DIEGO:

FRANK L. PRICE, 2705 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO:

CURTIS O. LYNUM, 644 EAST HILLSDALE BOULEVARD, SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA

HAROLD E. WELBORN, 13067 LA VISTA COURT, SARATOGA, CALIFORNIA

SAVANNAH:

TROY COLEMAN, 36 CROMWELL ROAD, WILMINGTON PARK, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

JOSEPH D. PURVIS, 721 DANCY AVENUE, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

SEATTLE:

LELAND V. BOARDMAN, ROUTE 3, BOX 268, SEQUIM, WASHINGTON

RICHARD D. AUERBACH, P.O. BOX 1768, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

JAMES E. MILNES, 4317 - 50TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

PAUL R. BIBLER, 15134 - 38TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

END

NR 030 WA CODE

5:53PM NITEL 9/5/75 PMJ

TO ALEXANDRIA BALTIMORE BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON CHICAGO CINCINNATI
DALLAS EL PASO INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON JACKSONVILLE LOUISVILLE
LOS ANGELES MEMPHIS MIAMI
NEW YORK OKLAHOMA CITY OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA PHOENIX ST. LOUIS
SAN DIEGO SAN FRANCISCO SAVANNAH
SEATTLE

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTELS MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED WHEREABOUTS OF A NUMBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES INDICATING THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC STAFF. LISTED BELOW, BY FIELD OFFICE TERRITORY, ARE THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES AS CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES.

66-3346-15

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
SEP 5 1975
FBI—MIAMI

INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SA'S LITRENTO AND STEWART DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA CONCERNING MAIL OPENING ACTIVITIES. ALL OTHERS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER SAC, ASAC, OR BOTH, DURING PERIOD 1959 - 1966 IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI, NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGTON FIELD. THEY PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING MAIL OPENINGS.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.

CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

ALEXANDRIA:

W. DONALD STEWART, CRYSTAL HOUSE I, APARTMENT 202, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA.

JAMES H. GALE, 3307 ROCKY MOUNT ROAD, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

THOMAS E BISHOP, 8820 STARK ROAD, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA

BALTIMORE:

ANTHONY P. LITRENTO, 2810 STONYBROOK DRIVE, BOWIE, MARYLAND

PAUL O'CONNELL, JR., 2417 STRATTON DRIVE, POTOMAC, MARYLAND

DONALD E. RONEY, 131 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE, WINDSOR HILLS, WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

VICTOR TURYN, 2645 TURF VALLEY ROAD, ELLICOTT CITY, MARYLAND

DONALD W. MORLEY, BOX 222, NEW MARKET, MARYLAND

PAGE FOUR

BIRMINGHAM:

JOHN DAVID POPE, JR., 221 REMINGTON ROAD, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

BOSTON:

LEO L. LAUGHLIN, 9 EVERETT AVENUE, WINCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

EDWARD J. POWERS, 10 COLONIAL DRIVE, BEDFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

J.F. DESMOND, 185 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

CHICAGO:

MARLIN W. JOHNSON, CANTEEN CORPORATION, THE MERCHANDISE MART, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

HARVEY G. FOSTER, 1012 SOUTH HAMLIN, PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS

CINCINNATI:

PAUL FIELDS, 2677 CYCLORAMA DRIVE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMCREST LANE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

DALLAS:

PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014 CHATTERTON DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

EL PASO:

KARL W. DISSLY, POST OFFICE BOX 9762, EL PASO, TEXAS

INDIANAPOLIS:

DILLARD W. HOWELL, 6413 CARDINAL LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

ALLAN GILLIES , 8228 HOOVER LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

JACKSON:

WILLIAMS W. BURKE, JR., 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

JACKSONVILLE:

DONALD K. BROWN, 826 BROOKMONT AVENUE, EAST JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, 4857 WATER OAK LANE, JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

LOUISVILLE:

BERNARD C. BROWN, 2301 NEWMARKET DRIVE, N.E., LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

LOS ANGELES:

WILLIAM G. SIMON, 2075 LOMBARDY ROAD, SAN MARINO, CALIFORNIA

WESLEY G. GRAPP, 4240 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS, CALIFORNIA

ARNOLD C. LARSON, 4232 ABBINGTON COURT, WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH K. PONDER, 3719 CARRIAGE HOUSE COURT, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 3030 SOUTH RED HILL AVENUE, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

MEMPHIS:

E. HUGO WINTERROWD, 1550 NORTH PARKWAY, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

MIAMI:

THOMAS MC ANDREWS, 324 NEAPOLITAN WAY, NAPLES, FLORIDA

FREDERICK F. FOX, 11450 W. BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA

NEW YORK:

JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, 656 HUNT LANE, MANHASSET, NEW YORK

HENRY A. FITZGIBBON, 76 EASTON ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK

OKLAHOMA CITY:

JAMES T. MORELAND, 108 FERN DRIVE, POTEAU, OKLAHOMA

LEE O. TEAGUE, 2501 N.W. 121ST STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA

OMAHA:

JOHN F. CALLAGHAN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, CAMP DODGE, POST OFFICE BOX 130, JOHNSTON, IOWA

PHILADELPHIA:

RICHARD J. BAKER, 219 JEFFREY LANE, NEWTON SQUARE, PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN F. MALONE, 25 GARFIELD AVENUE, CARBONDALE, PENNSYLVANIA

PHOENIX:

PALMER M. BAKEN, JR., 3832 EAST YUCCA STREET, PHOENIX, ARIZONA

ST. LOUIS:

THOMAS J. GEARTY, 6630 CLAYTON ROAD NR. 105, RICHMOND HEIGHTS, MISSOURI

WESLEY T. WHALEY, 286 GREEN TRAILS DRIVE, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI

PAGE SEVEN

SAN DIEGO:

FRANK L. PRICE, 2705 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO:

CURTIS O. LYNUM, 644 EAST HILLSDALE BOULEVARD, SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA

HAROLD E. WELBORN, 13067 LA VISTA COURT, SARATOGA, CALIFORNIA

SAVANNAH:

TROY COLEMAN, 36 CROMWELL ROAD, WILMINGTON PARK, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

JOSEPH D. PURVIS, 721 DANCY AVENUE, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

SEATTLE:

LELAND V. BOARDMAN, ROUTE 3, BOX 268, SEQUIM, WASHINGTON

RICHARD D. AUERBACH, P.O. BOX 1768, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

JAMES E. MILNES, 4317 - 50TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

PAUL R. BIBLER, 15134 - 38TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

END

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

11

2 00/P

FBI

Date: 9/8/75

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395) -VLW

ATTENTION: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM: MIAMI (66-3346) (RUC) 2P

SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975

RE BUREAU TELETYPE SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975, SUPERVISOR JOSEPH C. BALL AND SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY MET WITH WALTER J. LAUGHEED, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, AND ROBERT WENNERHOLM, LEGAL COUNSEL, DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT (DCPSD), AT THE DCPSD.

THESE TWO OFFICIALS WERE ADVISED OF THE REQUEST TO THE FBI BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC), FOR ACCESS TO ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES.

INFORMATION IN MIAMI AIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, CAPTIONED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS ORALLY

Filed

① - 66-3346
RLO RLO/kr
(1) kr

66-3346-14

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent 339p M Per

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

FURNISHED AND THEY WERE ASKED WHETHER THE DCPSD HAS ANY OBJECTION TO THE FBI RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL EMANATING FROM DCPSD AND CONTAINED IN THIS AIRTEL WHICH WOULD DISCLOSE THE DCPSD USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR COVERAGE OF KING.

LAUGHEED ADVISED THE DCPSD HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO THE FBI RELEASING THIS INFORMATION TO THE SSC. HE SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO SEARCH THEIR RECORDS TO DETERMINE WHAT INFORMATION THEY HAVE ON KING AND THAT ANY REQUEST FOR THIS INFORMATION BY SSC WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THE FORM OF A SUBPOENA.

E. WILSON PURDY, DIRECTOR, DCPSD, WHO IS ON VACATION, WAS INITIALLY CONTACTED IN THIS MATTER BY SAC JULIUS L. MATTSON AND MADE AWARE OF THE REQUEST BY SSC.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

NR011 MM CODE

3:39PM URGENT SEPTEMBER 8, 1975 JGS

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI (66-3346) (RUC)

ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975

RE BUREAU TELETYPE SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975, SUPERVISOR JOSEPH C. BALL AND SA RAYMOO'KELLY MET WITH WALTER J. LAUGHEED, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, AND ROBERT WENNERHOLM, LEGAL COUNSEL, DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT (DCPSD), AT THE DCPSD.

THESE TWO OFFICIALS WERE ADVISED OF THE REQUEST TO THE FBI BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC), FOR ACCESS TO ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES.

INFORMATION IN MIAMI AIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, CAPTIONED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER-C" WAS ORALLY FURNISTED AND THEY WERE ASKED WTETHER TTE DCPSD HAS ANY OBJECTION TO THE FBI RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL EMANATING FROO DCPSD AND CONTAINED IN THIS AIRTEL WHICH WOULD DISCLOSE THE DCPSD USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR COVERAGE OF KING.

END PAGE ONE

mJ

Filed mJ

66-3346-14

PAGE TWO MM.66-3346

LAUGHEED ADVISED THE DCPSD HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO THE FBI RELEASING THIS INFORMATION TO THE SSC. HE SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO SEARCH THEIR RECORDS TO DETERMINE WHAT INFORMATION THEY HAVE ON KING AND THAT ANY REQUEST FOR THIS INFORMATION BY SSC WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THE FORM OF A SUBPOENA.

E. WILSON PURDY, DIRECTOR, DCPSD, WHO IS ON VACATION, WAS INITIALLY CONTACTED IN THIS MATTER BY SAC JULIUS L. MATTSON AND MADE AWARE OF THE REQUEST BY SSC.

END

FBI WA VLN

NR012 WA CODE

258PM URGENT 9-5-75 VLN

TO MIAMI
NEW YORK

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)
66-3346*(5-75)

SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

REMMAIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, NYAIRTELS MAY 18, 1965, MAY 28, 1965, AND NYLET JULY 29, 1965, ALL CAPTIONED " MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C," MIAMI FILE 100-15079, NEW YORK FILE 100-136585.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED ACCESS TO ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES OR GOVERNMENTS.

REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS INDICATE THAT THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, AND THE THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT IN THEIR COVERAGE OF DR. KING.

IN ORDER FOR FBIHQ TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE SSC REQUEST IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR MIAMI AND NEW YORK TO CONTACT APPRO-

Homer Segerson
[illegible]
X 4646

66-3346-13

SEARCHED hlat INDEXED mg
SERIALIZED mg FILED mg
SEP 5 1975
FBI-MIAMI

PRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND ADVISE THEM OF THE SSC REQUEST. SECURE THEIR COMMENTS RELATIVE TO: WHETHER THEY HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO OUR RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL FROM THEM CONTAINED IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS, WHICH WOULD DISCLOSE THAT THEY USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR COVERAGE OF KING. THEY SHOULD BE APPRISED OF THE FACT EVEN IF FBIHQ DOES NOT VOLUNTARILY SUPPLY REQUESTED INFORMATION, SSC MAY SUBPOENA FBI RECORDS.

EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY TELETYPE IN THE ABOVE CAPTION, ATTENTION INTD, W. O. CREGAR, BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

END

FBI MM CLR MRO

NR012 WA CODE

258PM URGENT 9-5-75 VLN

TO MIAMI
NEW YORK

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

REMMAIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, NYAIRTELS MAY 18, 1965, MAY 28, 1965, AND NYLET JULY 29, 1965, ALL CAPTIONED " MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C," MIAMI FILE 100-15079, NEW YORK FILE 100-136585.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED ACCESS TO ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES OR GOVERNMENTS.

REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS INDICATE THAT THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, AND THE THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT IN THEIR COVERAGE OF DR. KING.

IN ORDER FOR FBIHQ TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE SSC REQUEST IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR MIAMI AND NEW YORK TO CONTACT APPRO-

66-3346-13

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED mf
SERIALIZED mf FILED mf
SEP 5 1975
FBI—MIAMI

PAGE TWO

PRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND ADVISE THEM OF THE SSC REQUEST. SECURE THEIR COMMENTS RELATIVE TO: WHETHER THEY HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO OUR RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL FROM THEM CONTAINED IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS, WHICH WOULD DISCLOSE THAT THEY USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR COVERAGE OF KING. THEY SHOULD BE APPRISED OF THE FACT EVEN IF FBIHQ DOES NOT VOLUNTARILY SUPPLY REQUESTED INFORMATION, SSC MAY SUBPOENA FBI RECORDS.

EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY TELETYPE IN THE ABOVE CAPTION, ATTENTION INTD, W. O. CREGAR, BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

END

FBI MM CLR MRO

NR033 WA CODE

4:47PM 9/4/75 NITEL AJN

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

PURPOSES OF INSTANT TELETYPE ARE TO (1) REITERATE THAT FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND WISHES TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI; AND (2) SET FORTH NEW PROCEDURE RELATING TO SSC STAFF INTERVIEWS OF CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

FOR INFORMATION OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY HAD CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITOY INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSC OR OTHERWISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYEES ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR INTERVIEW BY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED FOR THE FIELD OFFICE TO CONTACT THE FORMER EMPLOYEE TO ALERT HIM AS TO POSSIBLE INTERVIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT WITH THE BUREAU AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED FOR

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

66-3346-12

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED mj FILED mj
SEP 4 1975
FBI—MIAMI

INTERVIEW, HE MAY CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. IN THE USUAL CASE, AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLD(1) THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BUREAU CANNOT PROVIDE SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW WITHIN SPECIFIED PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION. THESE AREAS ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY (A) IDENTIFY BUREAU SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL IDENTITIES OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND (D) ADVERSELY AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS.

HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIEWEES CONSULTATION PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIEWEE MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS OF INTERVIEW OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULTANT DID NOT ACT AS A LEGAL ADVISOR.

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE

ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST EITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACT EITHER PERSONALLY (IF INTERVIEW IS IN WASHINGTON, D. C.) OR BY COLLECT CALL, THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. W. R. WANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF W. O. CREGAR.

THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION, WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD.

END

FBI MM CLR MRW

NR033 WA CODE

4:47PM 9/4/75 NITEL AJN

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

PURPOSES OF INSTANT TELETYPE ARE TO (1) REITERATE THAT FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND WISHES TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI; AND (2) SET FORTH NEW PROCEDURE RELATING TO SSC STAFF INTERVIEWS OF CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

FOR INFORMATION OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY HAD CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITOY INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSC OR OTHERWISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYEES ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR INTERVIEW BY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED FOR THE FIELD OFFICE TO CONTACT THE FORMER EMPLOYEE TO ALERT HIM AS TO POSSIBLE INTERVIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT WITH THE BUREAU AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED FOR

66-3346-12

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
SEP 4 1975
FBI-MIAMI

INTERVIEW, HE MAY CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. IN THE USUAL CASE, AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLD(1) THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BUREAU CANNOT PROVIDE SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW WITHIN SPECIFIED PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION. THESE AREAS ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY (A) IDENTIFY BUREAU SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL IDENTITIES OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND (D) ADVERSELY AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS.

HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIEWEES CONSULTATION PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIEWEE MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS OF INTERVIEW OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULTANT DID NOT ACT AS A LEGAL ADVISOR.

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE

ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST EITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACT EITHER PERSONALLY (IF INTERVIEW IS IN WASHINGTON, D. C.) OR BY COLLECT CALL, THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. W. R. WANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF W. O. CREGAR.

THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION, WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD.

END

FBI MM CLR MRW

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

1010

F B I

Date: AUGUST 28, 1975

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE IMMEDIATE
(Priority)

1

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL 8-26-75.

FORMER MIAMI ASAC FREDERICK F. FOX CONTACTED 8-27-75 PER INSTRUCTION.

FOX'S RESIDENCE ADDRESS SHOULD BE CORRECTED IN BUREAU RECORDS TO 11450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI 33161.

END

JLM:mjs
(1)

Filed

66-3346-11

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent 10 13 PM Per

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

NR001 MM CODE

10:13PM IMMEDIATE AUGUST 28, 1975 JWB

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL AUGUST 26, 1975.

FORMER MIAMI ASAC FREDERICK F. FOX CONTACTED AUGUST 27, 1975 PER INSTRUCTION.

FOX'S RESIDENCE ADDRESS SHOULD BE CORRECTED IN BUREAU RECORDS TO 11450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI 33161.

END.

VN FBIHQ CLR

Searched............
Serialized.....mf...........
Indexed............
Filed.....mf...........

66-3346-11

NR339 WA CODE

3:38PM NITEL 8-26-75 LXS

TO ALBANY
    BALTIMORE
    MIAMI
    PHILADELPHIA
    TAMPA

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

P 66-3346 * (5/75)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF. WHILE SUBJECT OF INTERVIEWS HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY SSC, INTERVIEWS WILL LIKELY PERTAIN TO THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES' DUTIES WHILE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND/OR SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTIONS AND MAY ALSO RELATE TO THE FORMER BUREAU'S INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS. SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU

66-3346-10

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
AUG 26 1975
FBI—MIAMI

EMPLOYEES.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES, ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, AND THIRD AGENCY RULE, INCLUDING IDENTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES), THEY MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALBANY: JOHN H. KLEINKAUF, 1153 CULLEN AVENUE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12309; EMPLOYED AS DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND SAFETY, UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12308.

BALTIMORE: JAMES F. BLAND, 4310 ROSEDALE AVENUE, BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20014.

MIAMI: FREDERICK F. FOX, 1450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33161.

PHILADELPHIA: MRS. KATHLEEN LOGAN, SPOUSE OF SA RICHARD E. LOGAN, ASSIGNED PHILADELPHIA OFFICE.

TAMPA: PAUL L. COX, U.S.N.A.T.O., P. O. BOX 1418, SARASOTA, FLORIDA 33578.

BEST INFORMATION BUREAU HAS CONCERNING COX'S WHEREABOUTS IS THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ON A LENGTHLY TRIP WITH A MOTOR TRAILER THROUGH CANADA AND THE MID-WEST. INDICATED ADDRESS BELIEVED TO BE A TRAILER COURT CONTACT POINT FOR MAILING PURPOSES. BUREAU DOES NOT DESIRE EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE COX AND

SUGGESTS FEASIBILITY OF LEAVING SOME MESSAGE THROUGH THE INDICATED ADDRESS OR SOME MEANS OF FORWARDING A COMMUNICATION TO COX SO HE MIGHT CONTACT YOUR OFFICE ON RETURN TO AREA OR SOONER. TAMPA'S REPLY TO BUREAU SHOULD SET OUT WHAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT HAVE BEEN PERFECTED.

END

FBI MM JWB CLR

NR009 WA CODE

3:30PM NITEL 8-26-75 LXS

TO ALBANY
BALTIMORE
MIAMI
PHILADELPHIA
TAMPA

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF. WHILE SUBJECT OF INTERVIEWS HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY SSC, INTERVIEWS WILL LIKELY PERTAIN TO THESE ORMER EMPLOYEES' DUTIES WHILE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND/OR SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTIONS AND MAY ALSO RELATE TO THE FORMER BUREAU'S INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS. SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU

66-3346-10

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED mj FILED mj
AUG 26 1975
FBI—MIAMI

EMPLOYEES.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES, ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, AND THIRD AGENCY RULE, INCLUDING IDENTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES), THEY MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALBANY: JOHN H. KLEINKAUF, 1153 CULLEN AVENUE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12309; EMPLOYED AS DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND SAFETY, UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12308.

BALTIMORE: JAMES F. BLAND, 4310 ROSEDALE AVENUE, BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20014.

MIAMI: FREDERICK F. FOX, 1450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33161.

PHILADELPHIA: MRS. KATHLEEN LOGAN, SPOUSE OF SA RICHARD E. LOGAN, ASSIGNED PHILADELPHIA OFFICE.

TAMPA: PAUL L. COX, U.S.N.A.T.O., P. O. BOX 1418, SARASOTA, FLORIDA 33578.

BEST INFORMATION BUREAU HAS CONCERNING COX'S WHEREABOUTS IS THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ON A LENGTHLY TRIP WITH A MOTOR TRAILER THROUGH CANADA AND THE MID-WEST. INDICATED ADDRESS BELIEVED TO BE A TRAILER COURT CONTACT POINT FOR MAILING PURPOSES. BUREAU DOES NOT DESIRE EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE COX AND

SUGGESTS FEASIBILITY OF LEAVING SOME MESSAGE THROUGH THE INDICATED ADDRESS OR SOME MEANS OF FORWARDING A COMMUNICATION TO COX SO HE MIGHT CONTACT YOUR OFFICE ON RETURN TO AREA OR SOONER. TAMPA'S REPLY TO BUREAU SHOULD SET OUT WHAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT HAVE BEEN PERFECTED.

END

FBI MM JWB CLR

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

245 P

10

FBI

Date: 6/24/75

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

ATTENTION: SA W.O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346) (RUC)

DOWNGRADED TO
SECRET
Per CG4657B22
Date 6/3/06

TOP SECRET

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED JUNE 24, 1975

RE BUREAU TELETYPE JUNE 18, 1975, AS ABOVE.

THE FILES OF THE MIAMI OFFICE CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON "MAIL SURVEILLANCE" BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FBI FROM JANUARY 1, 1960 TO THE PRESENT TIME.

(1) MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT.

ON JANUARY 2, 1963, MIAMI BEGAN SCREENING AIRMAIL TO CUBA EMANATING FROM PUERTO RICO IN CONNECTION WITH THE CASE CAPTIONED, "PENETRATE, ESPIONAGE - CUBA," BUFILE 65-67842, OFFICE OF ORIGIN SAN JUAN 65-398, MIAMI 65-2940.

Searched
Indexed
Serialized
Filed

①-66-3346
RLO/kr
(1)

6/75

Approved: M/JB
Special Agent in Charge

Sent PMJ-414 M Per

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

66-3346-9

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

TOP SECRET

ON FEBRUARY 11, 1963, MIAMI BEGAN SCREENING SUCH MAIL EMANATING FROM MIAMI IN CONNECTION WITH THE CASE CAPTIONED, "FOXTROT, ESPIONAGE - CUBA," BUFILE 65-67951, OFFICE OF ORIGIN MIAMI 65-2945.

IN ORDER TO FACILITATE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON THE SCREENING OF THIS MAIL, MIAMI OPENED A SEPARATE FILE CAPTIONED, "JOE SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - CUBA," MIAMI 65-2959, AND THIS SOURCE WAS ASSIGNED SYMBOL NUMBER CSMM 921-S.

2

THE PURPOSE OF THE JOE SURVEY WAS TO LOCATE CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH THE USE OF CERTAIN INDICATORS AND DROP ADDRESSES ON MAIL TO CUBA, AND TO IDENTIFY THE COMMUNICATION AS BEING ONE DIRECTED BY AN ILLEGAL AGENT THROUGH ITS CONTENTS AND WRITING CHRACTERISTICS.

THIS MAIL WAS INTERCEPTED IN A ROOM FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY THE POSTAL INSPECTORS AT THE BISCAYNE ANNEX POST OFFICE, MIAMI. POSTAL EMPLOYEES WOULD BRING THE APPROPRIATE MAIL BAGS TO THIS ROOM, WHERE MIAMI AGENTS WOULD REVIEW IT, LOOKING FOR SOME 50 DROP ADDRESSES IN CUBA, REBIND THE MAIL IN BUNDLES, AND PLACE IT BACK IN THE MAIL BAGS.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE THREE

TOP SECRET

THIS MAIL CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF LETTERS CONTAINING PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SOME 12,000 TO 20,000 LETTERS BEING REVIEWED DAILY.

THE JOE SURVEY ENDED ON JULY 21, 1966. THE NUMBER OF AGENTS UTILIZED RANGED FROM FOUR TO TWENTY DEPENDING ON THE AMOUNT OF MAIL AND WHETHER A SPECIAL SEARCH WAS NEEDED BASED ON INFORMATION FROM BUREAU SOURCE SIX. AGENT TIME SPENT WAS APPROXIMATELY 60 MAN HOURS A WEEK.

3 AGENTS REVIEWING THIS MAIL WERE FROM THE SECURITY SQUAD AND THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL AGENTS INTERCEPTED MAIL AT BISCAYNE ANNEX AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SURVEY:

JOHN BARRON; EDWARD J. DAHL; GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR.,; WILLIAM E. DOWLING; JAMES H. DOWNING; WILLIAM MAYO DREW, JR.; ARNOLD C. DUQUETTE; ROBERT JAMES DWYER; CHARLES W. EDMISTON; THOMAS ERRION; MAURICE F. FARABEE; LAWRENCE FELDHAUS; CLARENCE P. GRAHAM; ERNEST HARRISON; JAMES D.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE FOUR

TOP SECRET

HAYES; JAMES C. HOLMES; MELVIN C. JENSEN; SAMUEL W. JONES; JOSEPH P. MC CANN; JOHN E. MC HUGH; JOHN J. MATTIMORE; JOHN C. MENTON; PETER J. NERO; JAMES J. O'CONNOR; RAYMOND L. O'KELLY; EUGENE L. PAYNE; LEON PRIOR; LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.; WILLIAM W. STEVENS; ROBERT G. STRONG; EDWIN L. SWEET.

WHEN A DROP ADDRESS WAS NOTED ON AN ENVELOPE, THIS PIECE OF MAIL WAS HAND CARRIED AND LATER SENT BY MAIL, PURSUANT TO BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, TO THE FBI LABORATORY FOR EXAMINATION FOR SECRET WRITING AND MICRODOTS. IN EACH CASE, AFTER THE LETTER WAS EXAMINED, IT WAS THEN PLACED BACK IN THE NORMAL FLOW OF MAIL AT BISCAYNE ANNEX DESTINED FOR CUBA.

AUTHORITY TO HAND DELIVER LETTERS TO THE LABORATORY CAME FROM BUREAU SUPERVISORS WILLIAM A. BRANNIGAN, OTHO EZELL, AND INSPECTOR DON MOORE.

4

DURING THE PERIOD THE JOE SURVEY WAS IN EFFECT, APPROXIMATELY 4,00 LETTERS WERE OPENED EITHER BY THE FBI LABORATORY OR THE MIAMI OFFICE, RELATING TO CUBAN

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

~~TOP~~ SECRET

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. OF THIS AMOUNT, THERE WERE 50 LETTERS IN 1963 AND 10 LETTERS IN 1964, WHICH WERE DETERMINED TO CONTAIN SECRET INK MESSAGES, EITHER ON THE LETTER OR ON THE ENVELOPE.

THE MAIL INTERCEPTED AT BISCAYNE ANNEX WHICH WAS OPENED AT THE MIAMI OFFICE WAS OPENED IN A SPECIAL CHAMFERING ROOM BY THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL AGENTS:

JAMES D. HAYES, WILLIAM E. DOWLING, WILLIAM W. STEVENS, GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR., WILLIAM G. FRIEDEMANN.

THOSE LETTERS OPENED AT THE MIAMI OFFICE WHICH WERE IN THE SPANISH LANGUAGE WERE TRANSLATED BY MRS. SOPHIA Y. SALIBA AND MISS ELEANORE M. SCHOENBERGER.

(2) MAIL COVERS PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES.

THERE WERE NO KNOWN INSTANCES WHERE MIAMI FBI EMPLOYEES PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED A MAIL COVER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES OTHER THAN AS INCIDENTAL TO THE REVIEW OF MAIL IN THE JOE SURVEY.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE SIX

~~TOP~~ SECRET

5 (3) DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA ON MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE.

PENETRATE, ESPIONAGE - CUBA: P PENETRATE WAS THE BUREAU CODE NAME FOR A CUBAN INTELLIGENCE AGENT IN PUERTO RICO.

ALL OF THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS WERE DISSEMINATED UNDER THE ABOVE CAPTION:

BUREAU AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, OCTOBER 29, 1962, REQUESTING SAN JUAN CONSIDER FEASIBILITY OF CHECKING MAIL COMING FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, NOVEMBER 3, 1962, CONCERNING BUREAU DECISION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE CHECKING OF THIS MAIL.

SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 2, 1962, CONCERNING A WATCH LIST OF SUSPECTED MAIL GOING TO CUBA.

BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN, NOVEMBER 7, 1962, REQUESTING MIAMI TO CONTACT POST OFFICE ON FEASIBILITY OF CHECKING MAIL FROM PUERTO Rico TO CUBA VIA MIAMI.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE SEVEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 10, 1962, REQUESTING MIAMI TO DETERMINE FROM POST OFFICE THE NUMBER OF MAIL DISPATCHES FROM MIAMI TO CUBA.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI NOVEMBER 8, 1962, ON DESIRABILITY OF AGENTS RATHER THAN POSTAL EMPLOYEES CHECKING THIS MAIL.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 13, 1962, REQUESTING 10 BUREAU TO CONTACT CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR, WASHINGTON, D.C., ON CHECKING MAIL AT MIAMI.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, NOVEMBER 21, 1962, ADVISING FBI LABORATORY SHOULD PROCESS ANY LETTERS SENT BY PENETRATE FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.

SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 23, 1962, ON TRANSPORTING SUSPECTED MAIL VIA THE AIRLINES.

BUAIRTEL TO SAN JUAN DECEMBER 4, 1962, ON BUREAU CONTACT WITH CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR H.B. MONTAGUE.

BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI DECEMBER 10, 1962, ON MIAMI AGENTS PERSONALLY HANDLING SCREENING OF MAIL.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE EIGHT

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU, DECEMBER 13, 1962, ON CONTACT WITH POSTAL INSPECTOR E.M. CAMPBELL ON METHOD OF SCREENING THIS MAIL.

NEW YORK AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 12, 1962, ON SIGNIFICANT CLANDESTINE INDICATORS WHEN REVIEWING THIS MAIL.

SAN JUAN AIRTEL TO MIAMI DECEMBER 13, 1962, ON METHOD PENETRATE USED TO SIGNIFY INVISIBLE WRITING IN A LETTER.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI DECEMBER 21, 1962, AUTHORIZING MIAMI TO SCREEN MAIL FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA. ALSO AUTHORIZING SPECIAL AGENTS GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR., AND WILLIAM G. FRIEDEMANN TO HANDLE INITIAL INSPECTION OF COMMUNICATIONS BEFORE SENT TO FBI LABORATORY AND SETS OUT METHOD OF TRANSMITTAL TO LABORATORY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 28, 1962, ON MIAMI ARRANGEMENTS WITH LOCAL POSTAL AUTHORITIES TO IMPLEMENT SCREENING SURVEY.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE NINE

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI, JANUARY 3, 1963, REQUESTING NAMES OF MIAMI AGENTS WHO HAVE RECEIVED SPECIALIZED TRAINING IN PROCESSING MAIL.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 7, 1963, ON MIAMI AGENTS WHO HAVE RECEIVED CHAMFERING TRAINING.

SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU JANUARY 10, 1963, WITH NEW DROP ADDRESSES IN CUBA FOR MIAMI MAIL PROCESSING.

BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN JANUARY 24, 1963, ON FBI LABORATORY PROCESSING SUSPECTED LETTER RECEIVED FROM MIAMI MAIL SURVEY.

SAN JUAN RADIOGRAM TO MIAMI JANUARY 25, 1963, ON NEW LETTER DROP OF PENETRATE IN CUBA.

BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN JANUARY 30, 1963, AUTHORIZING 30 DAY MAIL COVER ON RIOS MORALES, HIMENEZ VEGA, AND MUJICA.

NEW YORK AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 30, 1963, SETTING OUT INDICATORS ON ENVELOPES TO ASSIST MIAMI IN IDENTIFYING MAIL FROM ILLEGAL AGENTS.

8

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE TEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN FEBRUARY 14, 1963, CONTAINING NEW CUBAN DROP ADDRESSES OF PENETRATE.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, FEBRUARY 28, 1963, ON FEASIBILITY OF OBTAINING ACCESS TO CUBAN COURIERS BAGGAGE OR DIPLOMATIC POUCHES TO DETERMINE CUBAN MAIL DROP IN NEW YORK CITY.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI MARCH 28, 1963, ADVISING NO SECRET WRITING OR MICRODOTS ON SUSPECTED LETTER SENT TO LABORATORY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU MAY 17, 1963, ADVISING THAT MIAMI IS NOT SCREENING ANY MAIL COMING FROM CUBA.

SAN JUAN LETTER TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 23, 1965, REQUESTING MIAMI TO EXTEND JOE SURVEY TO COVER INCOMING MAIL FROM CUBA TO PUERTO RICO AND OUTGOING MAIL PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU APRIL 2, 1965, ADVISING THAT MIAMI POSTAL INSPECTOR E.M. CAMPBELL BELIEVES THAT SCREENING INCOMING MAIL FROM CUBA FOR PUERTO RICO WOULD PRESENT SECURITY PROBLEM AND ADD APPROXIMATELY 17,000 PIECES OF MAIL TO THE SCREENING DAILY.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE ELEVEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BUREAU LETTER TO SAN JUAN APRIL 19, 1965, CONCURRING WITH MIAMI RECOMMENDATION THAT JOE SURVEY COVERAGE CANNOT BE SECURELY EXPANDED AT THIS TIME AND INSTRUCTING SAN JUAN TO SUPPLY MIAMI WITH LIST OF DROP ADDRESSES IN CUBA. 9

SAN JUAN LETTER TO MIAMI MAY 17, 1965, ADVISING WATCH LIST OF DROP NAMES AND ADDRESSES IN CUBA NOT BEING FURNISHED DUE TO LARGE NUMBER OF WATCH LIST.

FOXTROT, ESPIONAGE - CUBA:

FOXTROT WAS THE BUREAU CODE NAME FOR A CUBAN INTELLIGENCE AGENT IN MIAMI. INVESTIGATION WAS INITIATED ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION FROM BUREAU SOURCE 6. ALL OF THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS WERE DISSEMINATED UNDER THE ABOVE CAPTION:

BUREAU AIRTEL TO NEW YORK DECEMBER 12, 1962, ON NEW NAMES AND ADDRESSES IN CUBA IN THE EVENT MIAMI INSTRUCTED TO INSTITUTE COVERAGE OF MAIL FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWELVE

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 15, 1963, ADVISING INFORMATION IN BUREAU LET DECEMBER 12, 1962, INCLUDED IN MIAMI MAIL COVERAGE IN PENETRATE CASE.

MIAMI TELETYPES TO BUREAU JANUARY 25 AND JANUARY 31, 1963, REQUESTING AUTHORITY TO SCREEN MIAMI TO CUBA MAIL, AND ADVISING THAT MIAMI POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL ADVISED ADDITIONAL COVERAGE WOULD CAUSE NO BURDEN OR INTERRUPT POST OFFICE OPERATIONS.

BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI FEBRUARY 4, 1963, ADVISING TO CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR H.B. MONTAGUE, WASHINGTON, D.C., GAVE APPROVAL TO COVERAGE OF MAIL GOING FROM MIAMI TO CUBA.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 11, 1963, ADVISING JOE SURVEY COVERAGE BEGAN FEBRUARY 11, 1963.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 12, 1963, ESTIMATING 12,000 PIECES OF MAIL BEING REVIEWED DAILY IN FOXTROT AND PENETRATE CASES.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ____________________
(Priority)

PAGE THIRTEEN

TO~~P~~ SECRET

BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO MIAMI MARCH 12, 1963, ON FEASIBILITY OF JOE SURVEY SCREENING MAIL ARRIVING IN MIAMI FROM NEW YORK CITY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD IN EFFORT TO OBTAIN LETTER CONTANING PHOTOGRAPH AND MONEY TO BE SENT FOXTROT FROM CUBA, IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY FOXTROT.

MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU MARCH 13, 1963, ADVISING LOCAL POSTAL INSPECTOR APPROVED AND REQUESTING CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR MONTAGUE BE CONTACTED FOR OFFICIAL APPROVAL IN SCREENING NEW YORK MAIL.

BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI MARCH 14, 1963, ADVISING CLEARANCE OBTAINED FROM MONTAGUE FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD TO SCREEN THE NEW YORK MAIL.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO NEW YORK, MARCH 13, 1963, ON FEASIBILITY OF SCREENING MAIL FROM CUBAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY FOXTROT.

MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU MARCH 17, 1963, ADVISING THAT SLIGHTLY OVER ONE MILLION PIECES OF MAIL FROM NEW YORK AREA BEING REVIEWED DAILY.

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE FOURTEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU MARCH 15, 1963, ADVISING MAIL COVER TO BE PLACED ON FOXTROT, UACB; POSTAL INSPECTORS WILL PROVIDE THE RETURN ADDRESSES ON THIS MAIL.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI MARCH 28, 1963, ADVISING SECRET WRITING FOUND ON A LETTER SUBMITTED FROM JOE SURVEY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU MARCH 25, 1963, INDICATING MAIL COVER PLACED ON SON OF FOXTROT, POSTAL INSPECTORS WILL FURNISH RETURN ADDRESSES.

BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI MARCH 29, 1963, INDICATING THAT A LETTER CONTAINING SECRET WRITING FROM FOXTROT MAY HAVE BEEN PROCESSED PRIOR TO ITS RECEIPT BY LABORATORY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU APRIL 1, 1963, INDICATING MAIL COVERS ON FOXTROT AND SON OF FOXTROT WERE UNPRODUCTIVE.

MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU APRIL 3, 1963, ADVISING LETTERS OF FOXTROT WERE NOT MADE AVAILABLE TO ANY OTHER PERSON OR AGENCY ACCORDING TO POSTAL INSPECTORS.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE FIFTEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BUREAU TELETYPES APRIL 12 AND APRIL 23, 1963, ADVISING SECRET WRITING CONTAINED IN A LETTER AND TWO RELIGIOUS PAMPHLETS SENT BY FOXTROT.

12 MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU APRIL 29, 1963, CONTAINING THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF WEEKLY SUMMARIES ON THE FOXTROT INVESTIGATION.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI, MAY 2, 1963, ASKING FEASIBILITY OF USING MAILS RATHER THAN AGENT PERSONNEL IN SUBMITTING LETTERS OF FOXTROT TO LABORATORY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU MAY 6, 1963, ON ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH POST OFFICE IN SCREENING MAIL AND RECOMMENDING AGENT PERSONNEL BE USED IN TRANSMITTING THURSDAY INTERCEPTIONS.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI MAY 16, 1963, ADVISING MIAMI TO USE THE MAIL IN FORWARDING LETTERS OF FOXTROT TO FBI LABORATORY, EXCEPT FOR THURSDAY INTERCEPTIONS.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI JUNE 24, 1963, AUTHORIZING 30 DAY MAIL COVER ON FRANCISCO GUASCH, A SUSPECTED MAIL DROP OF FOXTROT.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE SIXTEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI JUNE 27, 1963, ADVISING THAT SECRET WRITING WAS FOUND ON THE ENVELOPE CONTAINING A LETTER OF FOXTROT.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JULY 1, 1963, ADVISING MAIL COVER PLACED ON SUSPECTED MAIL DROP OF FOXTROT IN MIAMI.

BUREAU LETTER TO MIAMI JULY 12, 1963, ADVISING IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR MIAMI TO INFORM BUREAU WHEN INTERCEPTED LETTERS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO NORMAL MAIL FLOW AT MIAMI.

13

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI AUGUST 15, 1963, SETTING OUT GUIDELINES IN DUSCUSSING FOXTROT CASE WITH MIAMI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

MIAMI LETTER TO BUREAU SEPTEMBER 9, 1963, REPORTING RESULTS OF MAIL COVER ON FRANCISCO GUASCH, WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI SEPTEMBER 19, 1963, ON FEASIBILITY OF CHECKING POST OFFICE BOXES FOR MAIL DROP OF FOXTROT IN MIAMI.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE SEVENTEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI SEPTEMBER 26, 1963, GIVING AUTHORITY FOR SIX MONTHS MAIL COVER ON FRANCISCO GUASCH.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI OCTOBER 3, 1963, POINTED OUT THAT SECRET WRITING WAS FOUND ON TWO SHEETS OF PAPER SUBMITTED WITH A BLANK LETTER OF FOXTROT.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU OCTOBER 10, 1963, ADVISING THAT THROUGH ARRANGEMENTS WITH POSTAL INSPECTOR R.G. WOLF, A LETTER FROM FOXTROT IN A POST OFFICE BOX USED AS A DROP, WAS OBTAINED AND FORWARDED TO LABORATORY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU OCTOBER 14, 1963, ADVISING POSTAL INSPECTOR MADE AVAILABLE ANOTHER LETTER OF FOXTROT FROM A MAIL DROP IN MIAMI.

14 MIAMI LETTER TO BUREAU OCTOBER 21, 1963, WITH RESULTS OF MAIL COVER ON A SUSPECTED INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHICH WERE PROVIDED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR SAL DRAGO.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI NOVEMBER 13, 1963, ON ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING OF INTERCEPTED MAIL SENT TO FBI LABORATORY.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ____________________
(Priority)

PAGE EIGHTEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 5, 1963, RECOMMENDING SCREENING OF MAIL FROM MIAMI TO MEXICO, APPROXIMATELY 5,000 LETTERS A DAY WOULD BE INVOLVED.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU NOVEMBER 21, 1963, ADVISING A MANILA ENVELOPE MAILED FROM NEW YORK CITY INTERCEPTED AND BELIEVED TO CONTAIN A BOOK AND MONEY FOR FOXTROT.

NEW YORK AIRTEL TO BUREAU NOVEMBER 26, 1963, INDICATING THAT A PORTION OF THE MONEY FURNISHED TO FOXTROT FOUND IN AFOREMENTIONED BOOK ORIGINATED FROM SOVIET FUNDS USED IN THEIR CLANDESTINE OPERATION.

MEMORANDUM OF SA WILLIAM E. DOWLING DATED DECEMBER 2, 1963, CONTAINING COMPILATION OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON FOXTROT CASE.

BUREAU LETTER TO MIAMI DECEMBER 5, 1963, REQUESTING APPROPRIATE COVERAGE BY MIAMI OF A POST OFFICE BOX USED AS A MAIL DROP BY FOXTROT.

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ____________________
(Priority)

PAGE NINETEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

15 MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 14, 1963, ADVISING OF A LETTER WHICH FOXTROT MAILED AT A MAIL BOX AND WHICH WAS FURNISHED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR E.M. CAMPBELL.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 18, 1963, ADVISING THREE LETTERS WHICH FOXTROT MAILED AT MAIN POST OFFICE FURNISHED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 27, 1964, RECOMMENDING THAT CIA AT MEXICO CITY, MEXICO CONTINUE SCREENING MAIL FOR MEXICO AS SOME OF THIS MAIL MAY BYPASS JOE SURVEY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 3, 1964, ADVISING OF ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL TO REVIEW MAIL GOING TO A SUSPECTED DROP ADDRESS OF FOXTROT IN MIAMI AREA.

MIAMI MEMORANDUM DATED JUNE 2, 1964, SUMMARIZING BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF FOXTROT THROUGH 1963, INCLUDING SECRET INK MESSAGES LOCATED IN HIS LETTERS.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JUNE 10, 1964, REINSTITUTING TEMPORARY SCREENING OF ALL MAIL FROM NEW YORK, NEW YORK AREA TO CUBA.

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWENTY

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MIAMI MEMORANDUM DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 1964, SUMMARIZING BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF FOXTROT IN 1964.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 13, 1965, FORWARDING A LETTER OF FOXTROT MAILED AT A MAIL BOX AND PROVIDED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL.

16

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI SEPTEMBER 3, 1965, REQUESTING INTERVIEW OF FOXTROT BE CONSIDERED IN VIEW OF LACK OF INFORMATION INDICATING HE IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY AND HOW INFORMATION FROM JOE SURVEY CAN BE USED DURING INTERVIEW.

MIAMI MEMORANDUM DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 1965, SUMMARIZING BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF FOXTROT IN 1965.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU OCTOBER 14, 1966, REFLECTING JOE SURVEY WAS DISCONTINUED ON JULY 21, 1966 AT THE DIRECTION OF THE BUREAU.

(4) BUREAU ASKED IF MM 890-S RESULTED FROM INTERCEPTION OF MAIL.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWENTY-ONE

TOP SECRET

MM 890-S WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE INTERCEPT OF MAIL.

THE BUREAU MAY HAVE REFERENCE TO CSMM 809-S ASTERISK, MIAMI FILE 134-769, A BUREAU AUTHORIZED ACTIVITY WHICH BEGAN ON MARCH 15, 1962, AND ENDED AUGUST 1, 1966. THIS OPERATION PHOTOGRAPHED MATERIAL FROM DIPLOMATIC POUCHES, HAVANA, CUBA TO NEW YORK, AND HAVANA TO THE CUBAN EMBASSY, OTTAWA, CANADA, WHICH PASSED THROUGH MIAMI VIA PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS.

INFORMATION FROM CSMM 809-S* ASTERISK WAS DISSEMINATED UNDER THE CAPTION, "FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA," BUFILE 109-12-210, MIAMI FILE 105-1747.

17

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CSMM 809-S* ASTERISK IS NOT BEING SUBMITTED AS IT DOES NOT INVOLVE MAIL EMANATING IN THE U.S. OR PUERTO RICO.

TOP SECRET, CLASSIFIED BY 7129, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

DOWNGRADED TO
SECRET
Per C98W57B22
Date 6/2/2016

NR048 WA CODE

4:38PM IMMEDIATE 6/18/75 GHS

TO NEW YORK MIAMI
BOSTON SAN FRANCISCO
DETROIT SEATTLE
LOS ANGELES WFO

FROM DIRECTOR

~~TOP~~ SECRET

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE

Maintain file on #9 rotor

Okrain A 6/18/75

66-3346-8

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
JUN 18 1975
FBI — MIAMI
O'Kelly RFO

Contact SA Stephens + Laundle

STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING GUS SURVEY. NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE.

PAGE THREE TO~~P~~ SECRET

SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

END

NR036 WA CODE

5:35PM NITEL 5-20-75 PAW

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY - 75.

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1973.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR, IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE. UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL INFORMATION FURNISHED.

END

JLB FBI MM

ACK CLR TKS

66-3346-7

D INDEXED
FILED
MAY 21 1975
FBI-MIAMI

All supv advised

ASAC

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Senate Committee Rejects Request By CIA, FBI to Monitor Inquiry

By SAUL FRIEDMAN
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Select Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities rejected Friday a rather unusual request by the CIA and FBI to monitor the committee's investigation into the spying operations of those agencies.

At the same time, committee chairman Frank Church (D., Idaho) announced that "the tempo of our investigation will now be stepped up" and that staff investigators will begin questioning witnesses, within a few days, about the CIA's "covert" operations here and abroad.

The committee was created by the Senate in January following charges and reports that government intelligence units and other agencies were illegally spying on American citizens. But the committee has been slow in getting off the ground.

FRIDAY, AT a closed meeting, committee members cleared away some obstacles to an investigation, Church reported, and "it was decided the serious investigative work should go forward."

Among the problems were requests, relayed to the committee by the White House and the Justice Department, that the CIA and the FBI be permitted to have monitors present when one of their agents or employes is questioned.

Church said the agencies suggested that "the monitors be called observers."

The committee has already agreed with CIA-FBI requests to take such unusual secrecy measures that committee and staff members will be required to withhold information from each other as well as from the public.

The committee balked at the latest request, however, because it would have opened the probe to the agencies under investigation and allowed them to possibly intimidate employes who may wish to give information about their superiors.

CHURCH SAID the committee had unanimously rejected the CIA-FBI proposal "believing there should be no inhibition" among those questioned by senators or staff personnel.

In another important procedural action, the committee gave Church the power to issue subpenas if the administration or the agencies are slow in volunteering documents and witnesses.

The first phase of the investigation. Church said, would go into the CIA's "covert intelligence operations" including reported plans and attempts to assassinate foreign leaders.

The committee investigators, with at least one senator present, will question witnesses informally or in sworn depositions in executive session, Church said.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

14-A

MIAMI HERALD

MIAMI, FLA.

Date: 5/10/75
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title: SENATE COMMITTEE REJECTS REQUEST BY FBI, CIA
Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: MIAMI, FLA.

☐ Being Investigated

66-3346-6

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
MAY 13 1975
FBI-MIAMI

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)



Senate unit bars CIA, FBI from probe

Associated Press

WASHINGTON — The Senate Intelligence Committee has rejected as "unacceptable" a Ford administration proposal that CIA and FBI monitors be allowed to observe the questioning of witnesses.

Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) said the committee voted unanimously to enter the active phase of the probe and to authorize him to issue subpoenas if they prove necessary.

"We decided that the serious investigative work should now go forward," Church said. "The tempo of the investigation will now be stepped up."

He told a news conference the committee will begin a wide-ranging review of past and present covert intelligence activities, including "issues raised as to assassinations."

Church said the request for monitors to sit in on executive interrogation sessions was made by the White House, but he thought it had been initiated by the CIA.

"The committee voted unanimously to reject the proposal because we thought there should be no inhibition or possible inhibition" of witnesses, Church said.

The initial phase of the investigation — interviews, the taking of sworn depositions and formal hearings — will be closed to the public, Church said.

"The committee will decide later what phases of its investigation will go public," he added.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

2-A

MIAMI NEWS

MIAMI, FLA.

Date: 5-10-75
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title: SENATE UNIT BARS CIA,FBI FROM PROBE.
Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: MIAMI, FLA.

☐ Being Investigated

66-3346-5

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___

MAY 13 1975

FBI-MIAMI

NR074 WA CODE

930PM NITEL 5-2-75 MSE

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK TO INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

5/2/75

66-3346-4

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
MAY - 2 1975
FBI-MIAMI

PROTECTED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL. YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

END

HOLD

FBI MM JGS

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

9 10
A
2

F B I

Date: MARCH ~~23~~ 27, 1975

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE ~~NITEL~~ URGENT
(Priority)

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MIAMI (66-ADM)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING ARE MIAMI OFFICE STATISTICS SHOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS BY SPECIAL AGENT PERSONNEL:

SACS - 0; ASACS - 0.

SUPERVISORS - CI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 90 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. SI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT.

SPECIAL AGENTS - CI MATTERS: 15 ASSIGNED FULL TIME; TWO ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 40 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. IS MATTERS: TWO ASSIGNED FULL TIME; THREE ASSIGNED 75 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 60 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 30 PERCENT; FIVE ASSIGNED 10 PERCENT.

JCB/al
(1)

Searched ____
Indexed ____
Serialized ____
Filed ____

Approved: ____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 925 A M Per ____

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

66-3346-3

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, MIAMI

DATE: 3/26/75

FROM : SUPERVISOR JOSEPH C. BALL

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Re Miami teletype to Bureau, 3/26/75.

For your information, Supervisor CLYDE GROOVER, Budget and Accounting Section, Administrative Division, FBIHQ, advised that for purposes of response to Bureau teletype of 3/24/75, the following categories should be included under Internal Security:

3, 14, 61, 98, 100, 117, 157, 163, 170, 174, 176

The following categories should included under Counterintelligence:

2, 64, 65, 97, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 134, 185

In arriving at the statistics set forth in referenced teletype, the following Agents were included:

Supervisors - CI Matters: SA BALL - Assigned 90%
SA WILSON - Assigned 5%

IS Matters: SA EDDY - Assigned 50%
SA BALL - Assigned 5%

Special Agents - CI Matters: Assigned full time - SA BURGINS
CERVANTES
COCHRANE
DAWSON
DWYER
FARABEE
GIBBONS
JONES
KISZYNSKI
MARSZALEK
MILLS
ROSS
STEVENS
STICKNEY
WARGER

JCB/al
(1) al

66-3346-2

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
1975
FBI—MIAMI

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-110

SAs - CI Matters (cont.) Assigned 50% -- FORRESTER and WALZER
Assigned 40% -- O'KELLY
Assigned 5% -- SITHER

IS Matters Assigned full time - HOMER MILLER
PETERSON
Assigned 75% - WINDLAND
MENTON
HEANEY
Assigned 60% - O'KELLY
Assigned 50% - CANNON
Assigned 30% - DOWLING
Assigned 10% - DOOHER
VAN RHEIN
GUTIERREZ
DREW
KELLOGG

NR046 WA CODE

8:30 PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

END

FBI MM JRS CLR AND TKU

ACK FOR (1)

THANKS

8:45 pm DB

pls give me necessary figures

66-3346-1

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED C
SERIALIZED JC FILED C

MAR 24 1975

FBI-MIAMI

BALL

EDDY

File #:

66-MM-3346

Serial Scope:

1-17, 19-27, 30-32

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

Routing Slip
FD-4 (Rev. 4-20-81)

Date 6/8/83

To: ☐ Director
Att.:

☐ SAC
☐ ASAC
☑ Supv. Art Bivens
☐ Agent
☐ SSS
☐ Rotor #
☐ Steno
☐ Typist
☐ M •
Room

FILE #
Title

RE:

☐ Acknowledge
☐ Assign ☐ Reassign
☐ Bring file
☐ Call me
☐ Correct
☐ Deadline
☐ Delinquent
☐ Discontinue
☐ Expedite
☐ File

☐ For information
☐ Handle
☐ Initial & return
☐ Leads need attention
☐ Open case
☐ Prepare lead cards
☐ Prepare tickler
☐ Recharge file ☐ serial
☐ Send to

☐ Return assignment card
☐ Return file ☐ serial
☐ Return with action taken
☐ Return with explanation
☐ Search and return
☐ See me
☐ Type

The following file(s) have been retained in SAC Safe for some period of time; however, space is now at a premium. File(s) are being returned to appropriate supervisor for review and for determination as to whether file may be destroyed, placed in closed files, or in Supervisor's safe, if one available.

/ed

Per Nettles instructions & review, enclosed to be filed in FCI safe & ADMIN DESK & INDICES changed accordingly. Thanks Elaine

A SAC Nettles

See reverse side Office

[illegible] Maintain in F.I safe.

GPO : 1982 O - 391-714

[redacted]

MAINTAINED AS TOP SERIAL

VZCZCHQ0166

RR PH MM

DE HQ #0166 2302222

ZNY EEEEE

R 172203Z AUG 84

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI MIAMI ROUTINE

PERSONAL ATTENTION

FBI PHILADELPHIA ROUTINE

ATTN: SSRA KLAUS ROHR

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

66-3317

ORGANIZED CRIME REGIONAL TRAINING CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 25-27, 1984, BETHLEHEM, PENNSYLVANIA.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALBANY, AUGUST 15, 1984. 185-10198

REBUTEL INVITED VARIOUS EAST COAST FIELD DIVISIONS TO SEND ORGANIZED CRIME SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO ORGANIZED CRIME MATTERS TO ABOVE TRAINING CONFERENCE. A PRIMARY THRUST OF THIS CONFERENCE WILL BE THE LCN AND NARCOTICS VIOLATIONS.

IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE MIAMI DIVISION HAS VARIOUS MEMBERS OF EAST COAST LCN FAMILIES RESIDING WITHIN THEIR DIVISION AND THE GEOGRAPHIC ROLE SOUTH FLORIDA PLAYS IN THE

66-
92-A-3346-32

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
AUG 17 1984
FBI — MIAMI

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0166 UNCLAS E F T O

NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AFFECTING THE EAST COAST, MIAMI IS REQUESTED TO DESIGNATE ATTENDEES TO ABOVE CONFERENCE. THE NUMBER OF AGENTS ATTENDING THIS CONFERENCE IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF SAC MIAMI.

SSRA KLAUS ROHR, ALLENTOWN RA, SHOULD BE ADVISED OF THE NAMES OF ATTENDEES TO THIS TRAINING CONFERENCE.

Re file

BT

#0166

Florida found

66-3317

183-1119

2

NNNN

[illegible]22Z MM2/RM TKS

2

66-3346 Sub B

Routing Slip
0-7 ([illegible] 12-17-73)

(Copies to Offices Checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:
☐ Beirut
☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☐ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Singapore
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

OK as Directors appearance before house sub-committee on appropriations fiscal year 1977.

Date 12/30/75

RE:

√66-3346 3/75

DIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

(2/76)
66-3242

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ______

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ______ dated ______.

Remarks:

ReButel to all SACs and Legats, 12/10/75.

Enclosed for each Office and Legat is one copy of the transcript of questions which were asked Mr. Kelley during captioned appearance, along with Mr. Kelley's answers to those questions.

SEARCHED JW INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
JAN 2 1976
FBI—MIAMI

Enc. (1)
Bufile
Urfile

Copy 5

Vol. 20

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

~~66-3242~~

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____

JAN 2 1976

FBI—MIAMI

66-3346-31

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

CONTENT

STATEMENT OF: PAGE

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, Direcotor, Federal Bureau of Investigation 2451

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

- - -

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and Mathias.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederick Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea, Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

the Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified to lead the Bureau.

The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and their willingness to consider the need for legislation to clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.

It is important to remember from the outset that this Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic intelligence operations. We have consistently expressed our admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic intelligence has raised many difficult questions.

The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather than on present FBI activities. The abuses brought to light in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director

Kelley took charge.

The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse. The FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelligence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance. The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in developing policies and standards for intelligence. These are welcome developments.

Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved. Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress should take into account in thinking about the future of FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveillance should extend beyond the investigation of persons likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques; whether foreign related intelligence activities should be strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement functions, and what should be done to the information already in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in the future.

The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney

General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice Department in the next months as the Committee considers recommendations that will strengthen the American people's confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal law and for the security of the nation against foreign espionage.

Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off with, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and gentlemen.

I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelligence and internal security fields.

I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my 35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insistence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with law.

I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in responding to your questions and complying with your requests.

I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have had unprecedented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type investigations and who are personally involved in every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with all major areas of our activities and operations in the national security and intelligence fields.

In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of necessity, forcused largely on certain errors and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's record of performance.

It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it found 3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370, less than three fourths, were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it did under the circumstances then existing would have been an abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..

What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence from New England to California.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women, and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their rights.

There were many calls for action from Members of Congress and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient demands, for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs, mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counterintelligence Programs, and there were some substantial ones, should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the future where the Government may well be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or property.

In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried out now, can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigating only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt, the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such preventive action should be available to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed by a task force in the Justice Department, including the FBI, and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible manner.

Probably the most important question here today is what assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some very substantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's methods of operations since I took the oath of office as Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness, openness both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion in the decision-making process which insures that no future program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a full and critical review of its propriety.

Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

The results of this program have been most beneficial, to me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which, considering the context of the request, I believed presented the appearances of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years as Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise, to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity can be assured only through institutional means.

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the character of the person who occupies the office of the Director and every member of the FBI under him.

I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism, their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee in particular have gained a great insight into the problems confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields, problems which all too often we have left to resolve without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum participation with the members of that Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step, a step that I believe is absolutely essential , a legislative charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence jurisdiction for the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role of the courts into the early stages of the investigative process and, thereby, would take over what historically have been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Congressional oversight or Executive decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a career police officer. In my police experience, the must frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is when demands are made of them to perform their traditional role as protector of life and property without clear and understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding task.

It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle the FBI's effectiveness in combating the growing incidence of crime and violence across the United States. That charter must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced the formulation of operational guidelines governing our intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility for conferring jurisdiction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that information needed for the prevention of violence can be acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there are some fundamental differences between these investigations that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is limited and fairly well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has enough information to meet any future crisis or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation, in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelligence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues. Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or its successors in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

That is the substance of my prepared statement.

I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate. I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the period these things occurred I was with the local police department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time, however, I was in the FBI.

During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I was with the police department, I continued throughout that period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for the FBI.

I only want to point out that based on those years, based on those observations, we have here a very fine and very sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there is much that can still be done. I know that we are not without fault. I know that from those experiences I have had. We will not be completely without fault in the future. But I assure you that we look upon this inquiry, we look upon any mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at -- this is good and proper, and we do not intend -- I only want to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a matchless organization, one which I continue to say was not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am only putting in your thinking my objective observations as a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this organization. It is too precious for us to have it in a condition of jeopardy.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.

I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one question he would like to ask.

end t. 1

Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30.

Iahve several questions, and I'm sure they'll be covered by others, but the ones that I have is a result of reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the top of 11.

There you are indicating that you caution us about extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations suggesting that this might take us beyound the rôle comtemplated for the courts under the Constutution.

Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions and concern has been on the possibility requiring court approval for the use of informants, informants directed to penetrate and report on some group.

And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen, pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device. It's really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He can ask me questions to get information the government would like to have.

Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval would violate the role envisaged for the courts.

And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to my feelings.

Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable. It has of course been approved, the concept of the informant, by numerous court decisions.

Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use of the informant.

I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance. You have only very few ways of solving crimes. You have basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protection of the right of the victim to be victimized. You have within the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and seizure, which, of course, can't be unreasonable, but nonetheless, you have the right.

I think that were we to lose the right of the informant, we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing our job.

Now I'm not arguing with you, Senator, that it is not an unusual procedure. I'm not even going to say that it is not an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one I think that is by virtue of the benefits must be counted.

We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that are attendant. We take great care.

Now you say about the court having possibility taking jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we could present the matter to the court but what are they going to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to have to follow it all the way through?

Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts. Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court given for each contact?

There are a great many problems insofar as administration of it.

I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my idea -- I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this is going to happen no matter what you do.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your reaction.

I was not suggesting that there is consideration here to prohibit informants. I was reflecting a view that I felt and hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is warranted by the particular circumstance. But I do understand your position.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

(Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have questions?

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your organization and I personally regret that the organization is in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that it is, along with other agencies and departments of the government.

I think you probably would agree with me that even though that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity, at least, to improve the level of competency and service of the government itself.

With that hopeful note, would you be agreeable then to volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government, to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on how you would provide the methods, the access, the documents, the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to see that these functions, these delicate functions are being undertaken properly?

And before you answer, let me tell you two or three things I am concerned about.

It hasn't been long ago that the FBI Director was not even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I think that is a movement in the right direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an additional importance that requires it to have closer supervision and scrutiny by us.

At the same time I rather doubt that we can become involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney General.

Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the FBI.

I would appreciate any comments on that.

Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a look at these decisions and the process by which they were made to decide that you are or you are not performing your services diligently.

I don't think you can have oversight unless you have access to records, and in many cases records don't exist and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now departed and in other cases you have conflicts.

How would you suggest then that you improve the quality of service of your agency? How would you propose that you increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that is required?

Mr. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed, one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very important is that the position of Director, the one to which great attention should be paid in choosing the man who will properly acquit himself.

I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency toward consulting with other members of the official family, that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very carefully.

I think further that he should be responsible for those matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.

Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a second? Who does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for the President of the United States, for the Attorney General, for the Justice Department, for the Executive Branch?

Who does the executive of the FBI, the Director of the FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to?

Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General, but I think this is such an important field of influence that it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the judiciary, the legislative, and of course, we are under the Attorney General.

Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea of the President of the United States calling the Director of the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?

Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that the relationship between the FBI Director and the President is such that that is desirable, or should it be conduited through the Attorney General?

Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority of the cases conduited through the Attorney General. There has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he may do so, call him directly.

It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter report to the Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this was revealed in full to them.

Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that says the President has to go through the Attorney General, although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous.

But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?

Do you think that these things need to be handled in a more formal way?

Mr. Kelley. Personally, it would be my practice in the event I receive such an order, to request that it be documented. This is a protection as well as a clarification as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation. I frankly would like to reserve that for some more consideration.

I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it can be worked very easily.

Senator Baker. Mr. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I believe, has already established some sort of agency or function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent, I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department, including the FBI.

Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of Professional Responsibility.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

Senator Baker. Do you have any comment on that? Will you give us any observations as to whether you think that will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or helpful, how it affects the FBI, how you visualize your relationship to it in the future?

Mr. Kelley. I don't object to this, which is to some extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the Attorney General.

Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely subscribe.

Senator Baker. How would you feel about extending that concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector General who is involved with an oversight of all of the agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionally protected rights of the individual citizen? Would you care to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while?

Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.

Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about it and let us know what you think about it?

Mr. Kelley. I will.

Senator Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and the people of the United States.

Does not this suggest that there has been a reaction there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the country because of certain circumstances rather than any clear and specific direct instructions that might have been received from proper authorities? And if that is the case, is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline, to provide for that kind of specific instruction?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can logically be incorporated and that --

Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the attitudes may be at a specific time in this country because --

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I don't contemplate it might be a continuing danger, but it certainly would be a very acceptable guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems to arise, know what we can do.

Senator Huddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether or not we can provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the court in determining what action might be proper and specifically in protecting individual's rights, can't we also provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various techniques that might be used?

For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as has already been done, that informants are necessary and desirable. How do we keep that informant operating within the proper limits so that he in fact is not violating individual rights?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure that there is no infringement of rights.

Senator Huddleston. But this is an aware we've gotten into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the particular action was necessary, that there was a present threat that some intelligence programs should be initiated, but in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been necessary to have addressed the original threat.

How do we keep within the proper balance there?

Mr. Kelley. Well, actually, it's just about like any other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer. There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.

This is one which I think might flow if he counsels the informant.

Now insofar as his inability to control the informant, I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is still supervisory control over that agent and over that informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing basis.

Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point as to whether or not a law enforcement agency ought to be very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone else.

If a White House official asks the FBI or someone to do something unlawful, the question seems to me to occur as to whether or not that is not a violation that should be reported by the FBI.

Mr. Kelley. I think that any violation which comes to our attention should either be handled by us or the proper authority.

gsh 13

Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the past.

Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't know what you're referring to but I would think your statement is proper.

Senator Huddleston. Well, we certainly have evidence of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies.

The question that I'm really concerned about is as we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide range of threats, how do we control what happens within each of those actions to keep them from going beyond what was intended to begin with?

End 2

Mr. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants.

Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever intelligence gathering techniques.

The original thrust of my question was, even though we may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do we control the techniques that might be used, that in themselves might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation of the rights.

Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed out that the association to, the relationship between the informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one, and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guidelines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship. Insofar as the activities of agents, informants or others which may be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of violations of the law on the part of informants, and either prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority. We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

pursue it to the point of prosecution.

Senator Huddleston. But it could be helped by periodic review.

Mr. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well as other matters.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed out the difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.

Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the departments, for instance, with not having a mixing of gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques definable and different?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible. I see no objection to the way that they are now being handled on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fact, it is a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.

Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes information to numerous government agencies.

Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for information, what kind of information they can ask for, and

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him to do specific things?

Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?

Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must come from Mr. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case, wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with a letter so requesting.

This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as I think it has been placed very vividly in our minds, in take care that you just don't follow the request of some underling who does not truly reflect the desire of the President.

Senator Huddleston. Just one more question about techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad projects undertaken.

Would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department, with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent with the very protections?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said to the oversight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put on the use of that information once it has been supplied by the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator.

Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictions now?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves judge in all cases whether or not there is good and sufficient reason for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules that at least to us we are satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment of the rights of any individuals.

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed on what the request, and what they can do with it after they get it.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

bound to gather a great deal of information about some individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelligence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarrassing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific purpose unrelated to this information.

Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to doing that?

Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objectionable.

Senator Huddleston. And how about the length of time that these files are kept in the agency?

Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework, too.

Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done.

Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the President of the United States from calling up the head of the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction to the agency.

But how about that? What about White House personnel

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our present activities. I think this is the only way that we can exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to accomplish and what I want to accomplish.

Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction and total permission to move in a certain direction and go beyond what is intended or what was authorized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.

The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI electronic surveillance of Dr. King, several tapes of specific conversations, and later a composite King tape were produced.

Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by any of your

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

staff, to your knowledge?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed. I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of this particular section. There has been no review of them since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.

Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear them?

Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to be a discussion of this in an executive session.

The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and decided that it would compound the original error for the staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at what we needed to know about the King case.

So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information before the Senator.

Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if, and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase or whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am not advocating it, I am merely asking a question. They would be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and decided on it.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my jurisdiction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the Attorney General.

Senator Goldwater. I see.

Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a target of inquiry?

Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years.

Senator Goldwater. Ten years.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. What is the future value, if any, to the Bureau of retaining such information?

Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a destruction or erasure,we will abide by it. We will, on those occasions where we think that matters might come up within that period of time which may need the retention of them, we will express our opinion at that time, but other than that we would be guided by guidelines.

Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate law enforcement needs should outweigh privacy considerations with respect to retention of such information, or do we need the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials when the investigation purposes for which they were collected have been served?

Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close look at the retention of material, and we would of course like to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.

Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Director, it seems to me that the most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines, limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments, and the question is, where should that line be drawn?

As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we go beyond the authority imposed upon us to get into political ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.

Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather than to leave this very difficult to define and control area of political ideas?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based on statutes in the so-called security field, national or foreign.

These are criminal violations. I feel that they should be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have more personnel working together, covering the same fields. I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence matters, because it is a concomitant. It naturally flows from the investigation of the security matters and the criminal.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Kelley, what Mr. Stone said was this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. When the police system goes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of justice and human liberty.

Do you object to that definition?

Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's area of concern some matters which were probably not as important at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in touch with the security investigations and the gathering of intelligence is something which has proved to be at times troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable, productive procedure.

I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today.

Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that at that point it becomes so difficult to guarantee, and in fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of meaningful oversight on a function as nebulous as the one you've just defined.

If the FBI possesses the authority to investigate ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's security, particularly in the light of the record that we have seen how that definition can be stretched to include practically everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders, war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed that would provide any basis for oversight?

How can you, from among other things, be protected from criticism later on that you exceeded your authority or didn't do something that some politician tried to pressure you into doing?

Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be criticized for doing that which today is construed as very acceptable.

Senator Mondale. Correct. And I have great sympathy for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.

Mr. Kelley. And the Director.

Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured to do things, or when, after the fact, people with good 20/20 hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specifically say this, and that is your answer. We have to live by the law. If we don't define it specifically,it seems to me that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what you should have done.

Don't you fear that?

Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact that I think that we have a different type of spirit today in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in, that I think the Bureau is a matchless organization, and they are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.

We may not be able to project this on all occasions, because we must equate this with the need and with our experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those guidelines.

Senator Mondale. I think, as you know, I don't think there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been, from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that the great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get into trouble.

Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate from the normal course. I feel that within the Bureau there is less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working with you we can at least make some achievements that will be significant.

Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I think we've made a good start.

Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August 9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.

Which liberties did you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been misunderstood many, many times.

Senator Mondale. Well, I want you to have a chance to clear it up.

Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement of the approach which the courts historically have used in resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it does not prohibit searches and seizures. I mention, it only refers to those that are unreasonable.

I came from the police field. What is more restrictive to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be more chaotic is of you did not have traffic regulation. We do have to , in order to love in the complexities and intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our rights.

Some may construe this as an extravagant statement. If it is os, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there has to be a balance.

Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you mean -- let me ask. Let me scratch that and ask again, you have to give up some tights. Which rights would you have us give up?

Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would have the right for search and seizure.

Senator Mondale. You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amendment right.

Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right.

Senator Mondale. What right do you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure.

Senator Mondale. There's no such right in the Constitution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable, under court warrant.

Did you mean to go beyond that?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Mondale. That you should be able to go beyond that?

Mr. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.

Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, Mr. Kelley, that that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?

Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which -- yes, it was inartful.

Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were saying something different, that it was taken to mean something different than I think you intended.

What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.

That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual. I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.

Senator Mondale. What you are saying in effect is that in effect, the rights of the American people can be determined not by the Director of the FBI but by the courts and by the law.

You meant that.

Mr. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir.

Senator Mondale. All right.

end t. 3

Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Hart.

Senator of Colorado. Mr. Kelley, in response to a question by Senaotr Mondale, one of his first questions about laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was we could work together. That is to say the Bureau and the Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably hamper you from investigations of crime control in the country.

But I think implicit in his question was also an area that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political figures, particularly in the White House?

And we've had indications that at least two of your predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr. Gray was under great pressure from the White House to use the facilities of the Bureau and their capabilities to accomplish some plititcal end.

Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.

What kind of restrictions can we lay down to protect you from political pressures? I'd be interested in that sign of the coin, if you would.

Mr. Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would protect me or any successor from this type of thing. I think that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any consideration of such directives.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been a problem for the people that preceded you?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the Congress ought to address?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The Committee received a letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying out the investigation or their efforts to review the investigation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., in order to determine whether that investigation should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked for our transcripts, the testimony before the Committee, all material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Department asking this Committee for FBI files?

Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files. I think they're asking for what testimony was given by witnesses whose testimony has not been given up. I don't know.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department asking this Committee for material provided to us by the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I just ask --

(Pause)

Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one. Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did they have a copy also? Yes, they had a retained copy. I don't know why.

Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you provided us that's not available to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee for your records?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You released a statement on November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's counter-intelligence program and you said you made a detailed study of COINTELPRO activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote:

"The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against individuals, organizations and institutions both public and private across the United States."

Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of occasions he planned violent acts against black people in groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the FBI actually prevented violence from taking place.

How does his testimony square with your statement that I have quoted?

Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of his statements contrary to what we have said is the truth. We don't subscribe to what he said. We have checked into it and we know of no instances where, for example, 15 minutes and that type of thing has been substantiated.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony he gave us under oath was not accurate?

Mr. Kelley. Right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement, and I quote: "I want to assure you that Director Hoover did not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the FBI was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against revolutionary and violence-prone groups.

Now the Committee has received testimony that the New Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact told to higher authorities, the Attorney Gereral and Congress.

Do you have any information in this regard?

I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances, but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic information flowing upward through the chain of command to Director Hoover's superiors?

Mr. Kelley. May I ask that I be given the opportunity to substantiate that with documentation?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Sure.

Mr. Kelley. Or respond to it.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Dorector Kelley, just in passing, do you agree with the statement made by President Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy Dr. King should be brought to justice.

Mr. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon whcse orders the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said to do it and those who are responsible.

I took the responsibility for any such program and I don't expect that those under me would be not acting in accordance with what they think is proper and may even have some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that responsibility.

I think that it should rest on those who instructed that that be done.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people who give the orders should be brought to justice.

Mr. Kelley. I do.

The Chairman. Aren't they all dead?

Mr. Kelley. No.

The Chairman. Not quite?

Mr. Kelley. Not quite.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Director Kelley, in the Committee's review of the COINTELPRO program and other political involvements of the FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three basic questions.

Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for the future, what I would think would be our constructive legislative work, it is very important that we focus on what we learned in that investigation.

And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of the United States have from time to time ordered the FBI to obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the necessary surveillance to obtain and to have a purely political character, that they simply wanted to have for their own personal purposes.

I think that you would agree that that is not a proper function of the FBI, and you agree.

Yet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI, including the Director, to turn down a President of the United States if he receives a direct order from the President. It is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist, I will resign. But that puts a very hard burden on any man serving in your position, particularly if the President puts a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or even invents some excuse. It is always easy for him to say, you know, I am considering Senator White for an important position in my administration, and I need to know more about his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's been doing lately.

It's difficult for you to say back to the President, Mr. President, that's a very questionable activity for the FBI, and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and you want to get something on him.

I mean, you know, the Director can hardly talk back that way, and I'm wondering what we could do in the way of protecting your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this basic charter that we write.

Now, I want your suggestions, but let's begin with one or two of mine. I would like your response.

If we were to write into the law that any order given you either by the President or by the Attorney General should be transmitted in writing and should clearly state the objective and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain those written orders and that furthermore they would be available to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the joint committee on intelligence is established, that committee would have access to such a file.

So that the committee itself would be satisfied that orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or unlawful.

What would you think of writing a provision of that kind into a charter for the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order issued by the President that is a request for action by the Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes or some that will say no, but I think we could define an area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could do that.

Now as to the availability to any oversight committee of Congress, I would say generally that I certainly would have no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request for something of high confidentiality that the President might put in writing such as some national or foreign security matter.

I would like to have such a consideration be given a great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would present a problem.

I have said previously that I feel I can discuss everything except the identity of the informants to the oversight committee. I welcome that.

The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we proceeded with this Committee. It has worked pretty well, I think.

Now Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the Martin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question.

If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and since Dr. King has long since been violently removed from the scene, why are they preserved? Why aren't they simply destroyed? Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information that is has collected that it is no longer needed or may never have connected the person with any criminal activity? And yet, all of that information just stays there in the files year after year.

What can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's not the problem, then what is? Why are these tapes still down there at the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, we do have the rule that they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is your question and why right now are they maintained? Since we do maintain everything since the inquiry has started and until that's lifted, we can't destroy anything.

I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines or legislation and again, as I have said, there should be some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there might be some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.

I think you have to deliberate this very carefully, but it can be done and we are willing to be guided by those rules.

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees to Federal positions. As a matter of fact, the only time I ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr. so and so, who's being considered for an executive office. And we have a very brief conversation in which I tell him that as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that is about the extent of it.

Then when this file is completed and the person involved is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.

What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?

Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. We have some archival rules which govern the retention of mateial and is developed in cases involving certain members of the Executive Branch of the government.

I see no reason why this would not be a proper area for consideration of legislation.

The Chairman. Can you give me any idea of how much -- do you have records that would tell us how much time and money is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands of routine investigations on possible Presidential appointments to Federal offices?

12

Mr. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. I do not have it now, but if you would like to have the annual cost for the investigation of Federal appointees --

The Chairman. Yes. Plus, you know, plus any other information that would indicate to us what proportion of the time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of activity.

Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, but I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the approximate expense.

The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is a matter we need more information about. And when you supply that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number of such investigations each year?

You know, I don't expect you to go back 20 or 25 years, but give us a good idea of the last few years. For example, enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the reach of these investigations may be.

Mr. Kelley. Through '70?

The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.

The other matter that is connected to this same subject that I would like your best judgment on is whether these investigations could not be limited to offices of sensitivity. That is to say where legitimate national security interest might be involved so that there is a reason to make a close check on past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.

I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate routine Federal offices that are not particularly sensitive in the national security sense from the reach of these FBI checks.

And so when you respond to the series of questions, I wish you would include the offices that are now covered by such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the Federal bureaucracy this extends.

Could you do that?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Fine.

Now there is a vote. The vote always comes just at the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional questions for the record, and there may be other questions, too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will ask Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going to be tied up on the floor with votes.

But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony, Mr. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the way you have cooperated with the Committee in the course of its investigation during the past months.

Mr. Kelley. Thank you.

The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result of the work of the Committee we can write a generic law for gs. 14

the FBI that will help to remedy many of the problems we'll encounter in the future.

End Tape 4

Thank you.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.

On page 5 of your statement --

Mr. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then to question about what you said. "We must recognize that situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the future where the Government may well be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or property."

Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what kind of situation?

And can you give some concrete examples under your general principles statement?

Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent threat to human life or property.

Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the principle. You are saying the extremist has said he is going

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something, and he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.

Is that the presumption?

Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you can extent it.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.

Mr. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts, are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of human life or property?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act to buy the poison or to get in the car with the poison, there is not by definition any threat to life or property.

Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued, and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think -- take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times they have been acted upon.

I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to kill me, that just means one thing.

Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.

Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreeing with me. You're saying on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where we don't lose the capability of doing something. We don't say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that we should act independently because maybe we don't have the judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do think that we should report it and thereafter see what can be done.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of our discussion the standard on page 5.

On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible threat.

Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.

Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right.

Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or --

Mr. Kelley. I don't know what it would be.

Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion.

Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with a standard which said you would have to have an immediate threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.

Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from what you think would be an acceptable standard.

Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for you to, not with the presence or the possibility, not able to do anything except put him under arrest or anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.

And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.

Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening of an investigation into a domestic group.

Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. To open a domestic security case.

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious federal crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and they have been well defined as to what is the possible opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances, but there are other criteria that are used, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be?

Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the most used of the basis, and then you have, of course, some intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of short duration. If there is no showing of this into action or a viable intent.

Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the intelligence investigation?

Mr. Kelley. By intelligence investigation, yes, you are looking to prevent.

Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined with an intent to take an issue?

Mr. Kelley. And the capability.

Mr. Schwarz. And the capability.

All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and I appreciate very much your time.

Mr. Kelley. That's all right.

Mr. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legitimate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the political views of a person on the other?

Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex lives, there might be something that is relevant. I would say ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or some view that advocates violence or the overthrow of the government.

Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two limits on political views?

Mr. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence or advocants of overthrow?

Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging, but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's a member of some other organization.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the standard you used on collection of sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's justifiable to collect that kind of information on American citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes?

Mr. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been included in some reports as a result of the requirement that that is what is required by our rules, that when a person reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later, I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether or not this is something we should retain, and we would not object to anything reasonable in that regard.

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

Taking the current manual and trying to understand its applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King case, under Section 87 there is a -- permission is granted to open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group or organization, an investigation can be opened."

Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the 1960s, so that investigation could still be open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.

Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infiltrated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the benefit of the country.

Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be opened today?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question.

Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investigation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals or people who come into contact with it?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely. If you mean that we go into the non-subversive group, that we then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation of them without any basis for doing so other than that they are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of inquiry, Mr. Kelley.

I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel was raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between intelligence gathering and law enforcement kinds of functions. Nevertheless, though, I think that you have made an effort, indeed, the Bureau's organizational scheme reflects an effort to distinguish some of this has been made.

Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's law enforcement position?

Mr. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which all counterintelligence people have is very helpful. It is helpful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding of the rights and privileges, and you don't have so much that spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type of an operation.

I subscribe to the present system heartily.

Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission if within the Bureau guidelines were established that effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question that there should be access to it.

Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing of lines there with the information legitimately needed for law enforcement?

Mr. Kelley. There is always a problem when there is wide dissemination, because that just numerically increases the possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of.

Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you.

We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the King case in particular.

As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel, I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.

What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved improperly?

Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it routinely referred to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the great majority of the cases turned over to our Investigative Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual occasion, be a designation of a special task force made up, perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is handled internally at present.

Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary step?

I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all, I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the Bureau police itself, and then secondly, is the Department of Justice involved in the police determinations?

For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered the action against King should be the subject of investigation and maybe prosecution?

How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?

Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those activities which we construe as improper or possibly illegal. There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own investigating, and this is something that we feel is a decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we have within our own organization sufficient capability to handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled independently of us.

Mr. Smothers. Thank you.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

That is all I have.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

- - -

VZCZCHQ0041

PP MM

DE HQ 0041 0520035

ZNR UUUUU

P 211444Z FEB 80

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI MIAMI PRIORITY

LEGAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS 066-3346*(3/75)

VISIT OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) STAFF TO MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND LEGAT MEXICO CITY REGARDING DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (DEA).

THE SSCI IS CONDUCTING A STUDY OF THE DEA IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMITTEE'S ROLE IN OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF DEA BUDGET. PRIMARILY, THE COMMITTEE IS INTERESTED IN DETERMINING THE ROLE OF THE DEA IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. SSCI CHAIRMAN BIRCH BAYH HAS REQUESTED THE FBI TO ASSIST IN THE COMMITTEE'S STUDY BY PROVIDING BRIEFINGS TO STAFF MEMBERS REGARDING FBI/DEA RELATIONSHIPS. I HAVE AGREED TO ASSIST THE COMMITTEE IN ITS STUDY. AS SUCH, YOU ARE TO PROVIDE BRIEFINGS TO THE COMMITTEE STAFF REGARDING OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH DEA.

66-3346-30

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
FEB 21 1980
FBI-MIAMI
SAL

ASAC
FREEMAN
COLLINS

THE COMMITTEE WOULD ALSO LIKE ITS STAFF MEMBERS TO BE GENERALLY BRIEFED ON THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE FCI PROGRAM. THEY ARE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN THE PRIORITIES AND FCI THREATS IN MIAMI. THE STAFF IS ALSO INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING INFORMATION REGARDING THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF OUR LEGAT IN MEXICO CITY. ACCORDINGLY, BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON THOSE MATTERS.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE STAFF MEMBERS WHO WILL BE TRAVELING TO YOUR FACILITIES ARE DENNIS P. SHARON AND THOMAS CONNOLLY. ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY HAVE BEEN MADE TO HAVE THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE BRIEF MESSRS. SHARON AND CONNOLLY ON FEBRUARY 27, 1980, AT 2:30 P.M. THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT WILLIAM E. NETTLES, ASAC MIAMI, WILL CONDUCT THE BRIEFING.

IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS CABLED THE U. S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO ADVISE THEM OF THE STAFF MEMBERS VISIT TO DEA AND FBI PERSONNEL. THE COMMITTEE INDICATED IT WOULD LIKE TO VISIT WITH OUR LEGAT ON THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 23, OR SOMETIME ON FEBRUARY 25, 1980. LEGAT MEXICO CITY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR BRIEFINGS ON ONE

PAGE THREE DE HQ 0041 UNCLAS

OF THOSE TWO DATES. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT LEGAT MEXICO CITY CONTACT EDWARD HEATH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEA, MEXICO CITY, WHO IS COORDINATING DEA'S MEETINGS WITH STAFF IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A DATE AND TIME FOR BRIEFING. FBI HEADQUARTERS WILL NOTIFY COMMITTEE THAT INFORMATION REGARDING FBI BRIEFING SHOULD BE OBTAINED BY THEM THROUGH DEA.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, STAFF MEMBERS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID MELOCIC, CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEA. MR. MELOCIC, HOWEVER, WILL NOT ATTEND FBI BRIEFINGS.

BOTH STAFF PERSONS ARE CLEARED TO RECEIVE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION UP TO TOP SECRET. WHILE YOU SHOULD RESPOND FULLY, YOU SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS OR PROVIDE INFORMATION WHICH WILL COMPROMISE INFORMANTS.D

SUTEL RESULTS OF BRIEFING TO REACH FBI HEADQUARTERS BY COB THE DAY AFTER SCHEDULED BRIEFING.

QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING THIS MATTER SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO SA CHRISTOPHER MAZZELLA! LEGAL LIAISON/ CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS UNIT, FBI HEADQUARTERS, EXTENSION 4510.

BT

0041

052043Z MM-1

☐ PINK COPY
☐ WHITE COPY
☐ GOLD COPY

VZCZCHQ0041

PP MM

DE HQ 0041 0522035

ZNR UUUUU

P 211444Z FEB 80

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI MIAMI PRIORITY

LEGAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

VISIT OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) STAFF TO MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND LEGAT MEXICO CITY REGARDING DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (DEA).

THE SSCI IS CONDUCTING A STUDY OF THE DEA IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMITTEE'S ROLE IN OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF DEA BUDGET. PRIMARILY, THE COMMITTEE IS INTERESTED IN DETERMINING THE ROLE OF THE DEA IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. SSCI CHAIRMAN BIRCH BAYH HAS REQUESTED THE FBI TO ASSIST IN THE COMMITTEE'S STUDY BY PROVIDING BRIEFINGS TO STAFF MEMBERS REGARDING FBI/DEA RELATIONSHIPS. I HAVE AGREED TO ASSIST THE COMMITTEE IN ITS STUDY. AS SUCH, YOU ARE TO PROVIDE BRIEFINGS TO THE COMMITTEE STAFF REGARDING OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH DEA.

66-3346-30

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
FEB 21 1980
FBI-MIAMI

THE COMMITTEE WOULD ALSO LIKE ITS STAFF MEMBERS TO BE GENERALLY BRIEFED ON THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE FCI PROGRAM. THEY ARE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN THE PRIORITIES AND FCI THREATS IN MIAMI. THE STAFF IS ALSO INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING INFORMATION REGARDING THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF OUR LEGAT IN MEXICO CITY. ACCORDINGLY, BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON THOSE MATTERS.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE STAFF MEMBERS WHO WILL BE TRAVELING TO YOUR FACILITIES ARE DENNIS P. SHARON AND THOMAS CONNOLLY. ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY HAVE BEEN MADE TO HAVE THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE BRIEF MESSRS. SHARON AND CONNOLLY ON FEBRUARY 27, 1980, AT 2:30 P.M. THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT WILLIAM E. NETTLES, ASAC MIAMI, WILL CONDUCT THE BRIEFING.

IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS CABLED THE U. S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO ADVISE THEM OF THE STAFF MEMBERS VISIT TO DEA AND FBI PERSONNEL. THE COMMITTEE INDICATED IT WOULD LIKE TO VISIT WITH OUR LEGAT ON THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 23, OR SOMETIME ON FEBRUARY 25, 1980. LEGAT MEXICO CITY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR BRIEFINGS ON ONE

OF THOSE TWO DATES. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT LEGAT MEXICO CITY CONTACT EDWARD HEATH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEA, MEXICO CITY, WHO IS COORDINATING DEA'S MEETINGS WITH STAFF IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A DATE AND TIME FOR BRIEFING. FBI HEADQUARTERS WILL NOTIFY COMMITTEE THAT INFORMATION REGARDING FBI BRIEFING SHOULD BE OBTAINED BY THEM THROUGH DEA.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, STAFF MEMBERS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID MELOCIC, CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEA. MR. MELOCIC, HOWEVER, WILL NOT ATTEND FBI BRIEFINGS.

BOTH STAFF PERSONS ARE CLEARED TO RECEIVE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION UP TO TOP SECRET. WHILE YOU SHOULD RESPOND FULLY, YOU SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS OR PROVIDE INFORMATION WHICH WILL COMPROMISE INFORMANTS.D

SUTEL RESULTS OF BRIEFING TO REACH FBI HEADQUARTERS BY COB THE DAY AFTER SCHEDULED BRIEFING.

QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING THIS MATTER SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO SA CHRISTOPHER MAZZELLA! LEGAL LIAISON/ CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS UNIT, FBI HEADQUARTERS, EXTENSION 4510.

BT

0041

032043Z MM-1

NNNN

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

4 20/P

11

FBI

Date: JANUARY 9, 1976

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE NITEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395) -DLS

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE MIAMI NITEL 1/8/76.

FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY WAS RECONTACTED 1/9/76 REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF HIS CALLING LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. QUIGLEY AGREED TO CALL ME AND OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED.

END

JLM:mjs
(1)

66-3346-27

Approved: ____________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 4 32 P M Per ____________

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

NR011 MM CODE

4:32PM NITEL JANUARY 9, 1976 JWB

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI (66-3346)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE MIAMI NITEL JANUARY 8, 1976.

FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY WAS RECONTACTED JANUARY 9, 1976 REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF HIS CALLING LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. QUIGLEY AGREED TO CALL ME AND OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED.

END.

66-3346-27

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

3 30
2 P

6

FBI

Date: JANUARY 8, 1976

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE NITEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUTEL CALL TO DALLAS, 1/6/76, AND DALLAS TELCALL TO MIAMI, 1/7/76, RE FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY.

I CONTACTED QUIGLEY TELEPHINICALLY 1/8/76. HE STATED HE HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO GRANT INTERVIEWS TO TV, AUTHORS, PUBLISHERS, ETC., ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS REFUSED IN EVERY INSTANCE. HE SAID HE WILL COOPERATE WITH THE SENATE COMMITTEE AT LEAST TO THE INITIAL EXTENT OF DETERMINING WHAT INFORMATION IS DESIRED OF HIM IN ORDER THAT HE CAN DECIDE WHETHER HE WILL NEED PRIVATE LEGAL COUNSEL. QUIGLEY SAID HE IS RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE WHATSOEVER IN THIS MATTER AND SUGGESTED FBI OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL CONTACT HIM AS TO ANY DIRECTION OR ADVICE CONSIDERED NECESSARY. HIS OVER-ALL VIEW IS THAT THE SENATE COMMITTEE EFFORTS ARE DESTRUCTIVE AS PERTAIN TO FBI AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE A PARTY TO THE

66-3346
JLM:mjs
(1)

66-3346-26

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent 3 30 P M Per LB

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

COMMITTEE'S APPARENT OBJECTIVES. HE SAID HE WILL RECEIVE ANY COMMITTEE MEMBER WHO CONTACTS HIM, BUT HE WILL NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE.

THE FOLLOWING IS QUIGLEY'S ADDRESS: JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY, THE FOUNTAIN, APT. 107, 4120 TIVOLI COURT, LAKE WORTH, FLORIDA, PHONE: (305) 967-7610.

ANY CONTACT BY PHONE SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN 8:30 AND 9:00 ANY MORNING IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS.

END

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

NR006 MM CODE

3:30PM NITEL JANUARY 8, 1976 JWB

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI (66-3346) 2P

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUTEL CALL TO DALLAS, JANUARY 6, 1976, AND DALLAS TELCALL TO MIAMI, JANUARY 7, 1976, RE FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY.

I CONTACTED QUIGELY TELEPHONICALLY JANUARY 8, 1976. HE STATED HE HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO GRANT INTERVIEWS TO TV, AUTHORS, PUBLISHERS, ETC., ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS REFUSED IN EVERY INSTANCE. HE SAID HE WILL COOPERATE WITH THE SENATE COMMITTEE AT LEAST TO THE INITIAL EXTENT OF DETERMINING WHAT INFORMATION IS DESIRED OF HIM IN ORDER THAT HE CAN DECIDE WHETHER HE WILL NEED PRIVAT LEGAL COUNSEL. QUIGLEY SAID HE IS RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE WHATSOEVER IN THIS MATTER AND SUGGESTED FBI OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL CONTACT HIM AS TO ANY DIRECTION OR ADVICE CONSIDERED NECESSARY. HIS OVER-ALL VIEW IS THAT THE SENATE COMMITTEE EFFORTS ARE DESTRUCTIVE AS PERTAIN TO FBI AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE A PARTY TO THE COMMITTEE'S APPARENT OBJECTIVES. HE SAID HE WILL RECEIVE ANY COMMITTEE MEMBER WHO CONTACTS HIM, BUT HE WILL NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE.

END PAGE ONE

66-3346-96

PAGE TWO (MM 66-3346)

THE FOLLOWING IS QUIGLEY'S ADDRESS: JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY, THE FOUNTAIN, APT. 107, 4120 TIVOLI COURT, LAKE WORTH, FLORIDA, PHONE: (305) 967-7610.

ANY CONTACT BY PHONE SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN 8:30 AND 9:00 ANY MORNING IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS.

END.

CBL FBIHQ TU

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 12-[illegible]3)

(Copies to Offices Checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☑ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Beirut
☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☐ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Singapore
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date 1/5/76

RE: DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE
BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
DECEMBER 10, 1975

66-3346-25

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED mjf FILED mjf
JAN 7 1976
FBI — MIAMI

☑ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA
dated

Remarks: By routing slip dated 12/30/75 and captioned as above, all SACs and Legats were furnished a copy of the transcript of Mr. Kelley's 12/10/75 appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Although the data contained in the transcript may be made available to news media representatives, used in answering questions received from citizens, and otherwise treated as being of a public-source nature, the transcript itself should not be reproduced for, or given to, anyone outside the FBI.

Enc.
Bufile
Urfile

NR050 WA PLAIN

830PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING THE AGENTS' WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

3 Gpg
4
5 Jno
6
7
8
9 JCS
10

JFW
12/10/75

66-3346-~~25~~ 24

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
DEC 10 1975
FBI-MIAMI

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2 THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT; THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL, INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS, OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL AGENCY.

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

FBI MM SAK AACK OXX ACK FOR 1 TEL CLR AND TU

NR050 WA PLAIN

830PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING THE AGENTS' WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

66-3346-24

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
DEC 1 1975
FBI—MIAMI

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2 THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT; THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL, INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS, OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL AGENCY.

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

FBI MM SAK AACK OXX ACK FOR 1 TEL CLR AND TU

Routing Slip (Copies to C[illegible]es Checked)
0-7 (Rev. 12-17-73)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Beirut
☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☐ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Singapore
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date 11/21/75

RE: ✓ SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(3/75) 66-3346

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ____________

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ____________ dated ____________.

Remarks:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of an article by Mr. William Safire entitled "Mr. Church's Cover-Up" that appeared in the November 20, 1975, issue of "The New York Times."

#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8

66-3346-RW

#9
#10

Enc. (1)
Bufile
Urfile

NOV 1975

ASAC

Mr. Church's Cover-Up

By William Safire

WASHINGON, Nov. 19—On Oct. 10, 1963, the then-Attorney General of the United States put his personal signature on a document that launched and legitimatized one of the most horrendous abuses of Federal police power in this century.

In Senator Frank Church's subcommittee hearing room this week, the authorized wiretapping and subsequent unauthorized bugging and attempted blackmailing of Martin Luther King Jr. is being gingerly examined, with the "investigation" conducted in such a way as not to unduly embarrass officials of the Kennedy or Johnson Administrations.

With great care, the committee has focused on the F.B.I. Yesterday, when the committee counsel first set forth the result of shuffling through press clips, it seemed as if no Justice Department had existed in 1962; today, an F.B.I. witness pointed out that it was Robert Kennedy who authorized the wiretap of Dr. King, and that "the President of the United States and the Attorney General specifically discussed their concern of Communist influence with Dr. King."

But the Church committee showed no zest for getting further to the Kennedy root of this precedent to Watergate eavesdropping. If Senator Church were willing to let the chips fall where they may, he would call some knowledgeable witnesses into the glare of the camera lights and ask them some questions that have gone unasked for thirteen years.

For example, he could call Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General Kennedy's deputy and successor, and ask what he knows of the Kennedy decision to wiretap Dr. King. Who at Justice concurred in the recommendation? How does the F.B.I. know the President was consulted or informed?

After Mr. Katzenbach assumed office, and the wiretapping continued, he was told by angry newsmen that the F.B.I. was leaking scurrilous information about Dr. King. Why did he wait for four months, and for a thousand telephonic interceptions, to discontinue the officially approved rap?

Of course, this sort of testimony would erode Senator Church's political base. That is why we do not see former Assistant F.B.I. director Cartha (Deke) Deloach, Lyndon Johnson's personal contact with the F.B.I. in the witness chair. What did President Johnson know about the character-assassination plot and when did he know it? What conversations took place between Mr. Deloach and President Johnson on the tapping of Dr. King, or about the use of the F.B.I. in any other intrusions into the lives of political figures?

The committee is not asking embarrassing questions even when answers are readily available. A couple of weeks ago, at an open hearing, an F.B.I. man inadvertently started to blurt out an episode about newsmen who were weritapping in 1962 with the apparent knowledge of Attorney General Kennedy. The too-willing witness was promptly shooshed into silence, and told that such information would be developed only in executive session. Nobody raised an eyebrow.

That pattern of containment by the Church committee is vividly shown by the handling of the buggings at the 1964 Republican and Democratic conventions which were ordered by Lyndon Johnson. Such invasions of political headquarters were worse than the crime committed at Watergate, since they involved the use of the F.B.I., but the Church investigators seem to be determined not to probe too deeply.

ESSAY

If F.B.I. documents say that reports were made to specific Johnson aides, why are those men not given the same opportunity to publicly tell their story so avidly given the next President's men? If Lyndon Johnson committed this impeachable high crime of using the F.B.I. to spy on political opponents, who can be brought forward to tell us all about it?

But that would cause embarrassment to Democrats, and Senator Church wants to embarrass professional employees of investigatory agencies only. A new sense of Congressional decorum exists, far from the sense of outrage expressed in the Senate Watergate committee's hearing room. When it is revealed that the management of NBC News gave press credentials to L.B.J.'s spies at the 1964 convention, everybody blushes demurely—and nobody demands to know which network executive made what decision under what pressure.

I have been haranguing patient readers for years about the double standard applied to Democratic and Republican political crimes, and had hoped the day would come when the hardball precedents set by the Kennedy and Johnson men would be laid before the public in damning detail.

Obviously, Democrat Frank Church is not the man to do it. His jowl-shaking indignation is all too selective; the trail of high-level responsibility for the crimes committed against Dr. King and others is evidently going to be allowed to cool.

Pity. You'd think that after all the nation has been through in the past few years, our political leaders would have learned that the one thing that brings you down is the act of covering up.

66-3346-22

mf mf

NOV 2[illegible] 1975

THE NEW YORK TIMES
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20th, 1975
PAGE C-41

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 7-11-7

(Copies to Offices Checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☐ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date December 5, 1975

RE: TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR--
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
12/2/75

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ____________

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ____________ dated ____________

Remarks:

Re Bureau R/S of 12/4/75 which provided excerpts of Mr. Adams' testimony.

Attached for your information and assistance, is the complete transcript of above-referenced testimony.

66-3346-22

UNEDITED TRANSCRIPTS

SEARCHED ______ INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
DEC 8 1975
FBI—MIAMI

Enc. (1)
Bufile
Urfile

Vol. 15

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Tuesday, December 2, 1975

Washington, D. C.

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

66-3346-21

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
DEC 8 1975
FBI—MIAMI

Senator Tower. The next witnesses to appear before the Committee are Mr. James Adams, Assistant to the Director-Deputy Associate Director, Investigation, responsible for all investigative operations; Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, responsible for internal security and foreign counterintelligence investigations; Mr. John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division; Joseph G. Deegan, Section Chief, extremist investigations; Mr. Robert L. Schackelford, Section Chief, subversive investigations; Mr. Homer A. Newman, Jr., Assistant to Section Chief, supervises extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigalus, Unit Chief, supervises subversive informants; Joseph G. Kelley, Assistant Section Chief, Civil Rights Section, General Investigative Division.

Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Adams. I do.

Mr. Wannall. I do.

Mr. Mintz. I do.

Mr. Deegan. I do.

Mr. Schackelford. I do.

Mr. Newman. I do.

Mr. Grigalus. I do.

Mr. Kelley. I do.

Senator Tower. It is intended that Mr. Wannall will be the principal witness, and we will call on others as questioning might require, and I would direct each of you when you do respond, to identify yourselves, please, for the record.

I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow the members of the Committee to return from the floor.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Senator Tower. The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Wannall, according to data, informants provide 83 percent of your intelligence information.

Now, will you provide the Committee with some information on the criteria for the selection of informants?

TESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ACCOMPANIED BY: JAMES B. ADAMS, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION); JOHN A. MINTZ, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT L. SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR., ASSISTANT TO SECTION CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT CHIEF; AND JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEF, CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Mr. Wannall. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you have quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting Office.

Senator Tower. That is GAO.

Mr. Wannall. Based on a sampling of about 93 cases.

Senator Tower. Would that appear to be a fairly accurate figure.

Mr. Wannall. I have not seen any survey which the FBI itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I think that we do get the principal portion of our information from live sources.

Senator Tower. It would be a relatively high percen

then?

Mr. Wannall. I would say yes. And your ques

criteria?

Senator Tower. What criteria do you use in the selection of informants?

Mr. Wannall. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. In our cases relating to extremist matters, surely in order to get an informant who can meld into a group which is engaged in a criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set of criteria. If you're talking about our internal security matters, I think we set rather high standards. We do require that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field office indices, checks with other informants who are operating in the same area, and in various established sources such as local police departments.

Following this, if it appears that the person is the type who has credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we would interview the individual in order to make a determination as to whether or not he will be willing to assist the FBI in discharging its responsibilities in that field.

Following that, assuming that the answer is positive, we would conduct a rather in depth investigation for the purpose of further attempting to establish credibility and reliability.

Senator Tower. How does the Bureau distinguish between the use of informants for law enforcement as opposed to intelligence collection?

Is the guidance different, or is it the same, or what?

Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address the use of informants on criminal matters since he is over the operational division on that.

Mr. Adams. You do have somewhat of a difference in the fact that a criminal informant in a law enforcement function, you are trying to develop evidence which will be admissible in court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be just for purposes of pure intelligence.

The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to, through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be used independently of the testimony of the informant so that he can continue operating as a criminal informant.

Senator Tower. Are these informants ever authorized to function as provocateurs?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, they're not. We have strict regulations against using informants as provocateurs. This gets into that delicate area of entrapment which has been addressed by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage in an activity, the government has the right to provide him the opportunity. This does not mean, of course, that mistakes don't occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to avoid this. Even the law has recognized that informants can engage in criminal activity, and the courts have held that, especially the Supreme Court in the Newark County Case, that the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that an informant himself can engage in criminal activity, but because there is lacking this criminal intent to violate a law, we stay away from that. Our regulations fall short of that.

If we have a situation where we felt that an informant has to become involved in some activity in order to protect or conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United States Attorney or to the Attorney General to try to make sure we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our informants.

Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that they are informing on, do you not?

Mr. Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs, which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one of the best examples of a situation where the law was in effect at the time. We heard the term States Rights used much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending in the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement, to use the troops only as a last resort.

And then you have a situation like this where you do try to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement. You have historical problems with the Klan coming along. We had situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some areas participating in Klan violence.

The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those, he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't see what action was taken with that information, as he pointed out in his testimony. Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments in every instance. We also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being received, was not being acted upon. We also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead memoranda to the Department of Justice the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI, in a position where we had no authority in the absence of instruction from the Department of Justice, to make an arrest.

Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in a situation where the Department called in United States Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So, historically, in those days, we were just as frustrated as anyone else was, and when we got information from someone like Mr. Rowe, good information, reliable information, and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to do something about it, it was not always acted upon, as he indicated.

Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act?

Mr. Adams. The Departmental rules at that time, and still require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy. Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. You can have a mob scene, and you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you have no violation.

Congress recognized this, and it wasn't until 1968 that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights statute, which added punitive measures against an individual that didn't have to be a conspiracy. But this was a problem that the whole country was grappling with: the President of the United States, Attorney General. We were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from a memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General. The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence, and in neutralizing the Klan -- and that was one of the reasons.

Senator Tower. What was the Bureau's purpose in continuing or urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam

Veterans Against the War?

Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the intent to halter political expression?

Mr. Adams. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans Against the War that indicated that there were subversive groups involved. They were going to North Vietnam and meeting with the Communist forces. They were going to Paris, attending meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the International Communist Party. We feel that we had a very valid basis to direct our attention to the VVAW.

It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was head of the Communist Party, USA, and the comments he made, and what it finally boiled down to was a situation where it split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maost group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and they closed those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow the national organization.

But we had a valid basis for investigating it, and we investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation and subservience to the national office.

Senator Tower. Mr. Hart?

Senator Hart of Michigan. But in the process of chasing after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of informatio that clearly has no relationship to any Federal criminal statute.

Mr. Adams. I agree, Senator.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Why don't you try to shut that stuff off by simply telling the agent, or your informant?

Mr. Adams. Here is the problem that you have with that. When you're looking at an organization, do you report only the violent statements made by the group or do you also show that you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have some of these church groups that were mentioned, and others, that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the statutes. You have to report the good, the favorable along with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with information in our files. We are accused of being vacuum cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the real purpose of an organization, do you only report the violent statements made and the fact that it is by a small minority, or do you also show the broad base of the organization and what it really is?

And within that is where we have to have the guidelines we have talked about before. We have to narrow down, because we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in our files.

Senator Hart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process, you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people who are, who have been engaged in basic First Amendment exercises, and this is what hangs some of us up.

Mr. Adams. It hangs me up. But in the same files I imagine every one of you has been interviewed by the FBI, either asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator being considered for a Presidential appointment, being interviewed concerning some friend who is applying for a job.

Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the FBI?

Now, someone can say, as reported at our last session, that this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our files has an onerous impression, a chilling effect. I agree. It can have, if someone wants to distort what we have in our files, but if they recognize that we interviewed you because of considering a man for the Supreme Court of the United States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't see where any harm is served by having that in our files.

Senator Hart of Michigan. But if I am Reverend Smith and the vacuum cleaner picked up the fact that I was helping the veterans, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and two years later a name check is asked on Reverend Smith and all your file shows is that he was associated two years ago with a group that was sufficient enough, held sufficient doubtful patriotism to justify turning loose a lot of your energy in pursuit on them --

Mr. Adams. This is a problem.

Senator Hart of Michigan. This is what should require us to rethink this whole business.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely.

And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well as the Congressional input are going to address themselves to.

Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range of groups which the Bureau can and has had informant penetratio and report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition of when an extremist or security investigation may be undertaken refers to groups whose activity either involves violation of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation of such law, and when such an investigation is opened, then informants may be used.

Another guideline says that domestic intelligence investigations now must be predicated on criminal violations. The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation relevant to a potential violation. Even now, with an improved, upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back again in a world of possible violations or activities which may result in illegal acts.

Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of the right to demonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition, conceivably may result in violence or disruption of a local town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than those holdin

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

the meeting.

Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because they may result in violence, disruption?

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?

Mr. Adams. No, sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in, or where members of one of these groups are participating where there is a potential that they might change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.

But this is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the First Amendment rights of people, yet at the same time being aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the past than we do at the present time. But we have had periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe, and the courts have said that the FBI has a right, and indeed a duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention.

And that's a good statement if applied in a clearcut

end 5

case. Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities, and that's where I think most of our disagreements fall.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Senator Hart of Michigan. Let's assume that the rule for opening an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn. The Bureau manual states that informants investigating a subversive organization should not only report on what that group is doing but should look at and report on activities in which the group is participating.

There is a Section 87B3 dealing with reporting on connections with other groups. That section says that the field office shall "determine and report on any significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups." Any significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups.

Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of 1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the installation of the anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential sources reported on the plan's participants and activities of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM, particularly in open public debate in a high school auditorium, which included speakers from the Defense Department for the ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM.

The informants reported on the planning for the meeting, the distribution of materials to churches and schools, participation by local clergy, plans to seek resolution on the ABM from nearby town councils. There was also information on plans for a subsequent town meeting in Washington with the names of local political leaders who would attend.

Now the information, the informant information came as part of an investigation of an allegedly subversive group participating in that coalition. Yet the information dealt with all aspects and all participants. The reports on the plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated to the State Department, to military intelligence, and to the White House.

How do we get into all of that?

Mr. Adams. Well --

Senator Hart of Michigan. Or if you were to rerun it, would you do it again?

Mr. Adams. Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969 was. The problem we had at the time was where we had an informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was going to take place and it was going to be the Daily World, which was the east coast communist newspaper that made comments about it. They formed an organizational meeting. We took a quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May 28, 1969 and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this organization.

Now the problem we get into is if we take a quick look and get out, fine. We've had cases, though, where we have stayed in too long. When you're dealing with security it is like

Soviet espionage where they can put one person in this country and they supported him with total resources of the Soviet Union, false identification, all the money he needs, communications networks, satellite assistance, and everything, and you're working with a paucity of information.

The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic security. You don't have a lot of black and white situations. So someone reports something to you which you feel, you take a quick look at and there's nothing to it, and I think that's what they did.

Senator Hart of Michigan. You said that was '69. Let me bring you up to date, closer to current, a current place on the calendar.

This one is the fall of last year, 1975. President Ford announced his new program with respect to amnesty, as he described it, for draft resistors. Following that there were several national conferences involving all the groups and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty.

Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is not against -- while unconditional amnesty is not yet the law, we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either.

Mr. Adams. That's right.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Some of the sponsors were umbrella organizations involving about 50 diverse groups around the country. FBI informants provided advance information on plans for the meeting and apparently attended and reported on the conference. The Bureau's own reports described the participants as having represented diverse perspectives on the issue of amnesty, including civil liberties and human rights groups, G.I. rights spokesmen, parents of men killed in Vietnam, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues, delegates from student organizations, and aides of House and Senate members, drafting legislation on amnesty.

The informant apparently was attending in his role as a member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive and it described the topics of the workshop.

Ironically, the Bureau office report before them noted that in view of the location of the conference at a theological seminary, the FBI would use restraint and limit its coverage to informant reports.

Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last fall. And this is a conference of people who have the point of view that I share, that the sooner we have unconditional amnesty, the better for the soul of the country.

Now what reason is it for a vacuum cleaner approach on a thing like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad informant intelligence really is, that would cause these groups in that setting having contact with other groups, all and everybody is drawn into the vacuum and many names go into the

Bureau files.

Is this what we want?

Mr. Adams. I'll let Mr. Wannall address himself to this. He is particular knowledgeable as to this operation.

Mr. Wannall. Senator Hart, that was a case that was opened on November 14 and closed November 20, and the information which caused us to be interested in it were really two particular items. One was that a member of the steering committee there, was a three man steering committee, and one of those members of the national conference was in fact a national officer of the VVAW in whom we had suggested before we did have a legitimate investigative interest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I would almost say so what at that point.

Mr. Wannall. The second report we had was that the VVAW would actively participate in an attempt to pack the conference to take it over. And the third report we had --

Senator Hart of Michigan. And incidentally, all of the information that your Buffalo informant had given you with respect to the goals and aims of the VVAW gave you a list of goals which were completely within Constitutionally protected objectives. There wasn't a single item out of that VVAW that jeopardizes the security of this country at all.

Mr. Wannall. Well, of course, we did not rely entirely on the Buffalo informant, but even there we did recei from that informant information which I considered to be significant.

The Buffalo chapter of the VVAW was the regional office covering New York and northern New Jersey. It was one of the five most active VVAW chapters in the country and at a national conference, or at the regional conference, this informant reported information back to us that an attendee at the conference announced that he had run guns into Cuba prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he during the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour suveillance. There was also discussion at the conference of subjugating the VVAW to the revolutionary union. There were some individuals in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in agreement with us, but Mr. Adams has addressed himself to the interest of the revolutionary union.

So all of the information that we had on the VVAW did not come from that source but even that particular source did give us information which we considered to be of some significance in our appraisal of the need for continuing the investigation of that particular chapter of the VVAW.

Senator Hart of Michigan. But does it give you the right or does it create the need to go to a conference, even if it is a conference that might be taken over by the VVAW when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we seek to achieve unconditional amnesty? What threat?

Mr. Wannall. Our interest, of course, was the VVAW influence on a particular meeting, if you ever happened to be holding a meeting, or whatever subject it was.

Senator Hart of Michigan. What if it was a meeting to seek to make more effective the food stamp system in this country?

Mr. Wannall. Well, of course there had been some organizations.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Would the same logic follow?

Mr. Wannall. I think that if we found that if the Communist Party USA was going to take over the meeting and use it as a front for its own purposes, there would be a logic in doing that. You have a whole scope here and it's a matter of where you do and where you don't, and hopefully, as we've said before, we will have some guidance, not only from this committee but from the guidelines that are being developed. But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and not gathering everything there was about it.

In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us, and that was the person who had, who was not developed for this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other matters for some period of time.

And as soon as we got the report of the outcome of the meeting and the fact that in the period of some six days, we discontinued any further interest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, my time has expired but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we really want to control the dangers to our society of using informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investigations. And that gets us into what I would like to raise with you when my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants, obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before a full-fledged informant can be directed by the Bureau against a group or individuals.

I know you have objections to that and I would like to review that with you.

Senator Mondale. Pursue that question.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about an obligation to obtain a warrant before you turn loose a full-fledged informant. I'm not talking about tipsters that run into you or you run into, or who walk in as information sources. The Bureau has raised some objections in this memorandum to the Committee. The Bureau argues that such a warrant requirement might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their government.

Now that's a concern for First Amendment rights that ought to hearten all the civil libertarians.

But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement raise a serious constitutional question?

Mr. Adams. Well, for one thing it's the practicability of it or the impacticability of getting a warrant which ordinarily involves probable cause to show that a crime has been or is about to be committed.

In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily with an imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activities such as with the Socialist Workers Party, which we have discussed before, where they say publicly we're not to engage in any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the United States.

Well, now, you can't show probable cause if they're about to do it because they're telling you they're not going to do it and you know they're not going to do it at this particular moment.

It's just the mixture somewhat of trying to mix in a criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function, and we can't find any practical way of doing it. We have a particular organization. We may have an informant that not only belongs to the Communist Party, but belongs to several other organizatio and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist Party to try to infiltrate one of these clean organizations.

We don't have probable cause for him to target against that organization, but yet we should be able to receive information from him that he as a Communist Party member, even though in an informant status, is going to that organization and don't worry about it. We're making no headway on it. It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants, the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not violate the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. They have recognized the necessity that the government has to have individuals who will assist them in carrying out their governmental duties.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I'm not sure I've heard anything yet in response to the constitutional question, the very practical question that you addressed.

Quickly, you are right that the court has said that the use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutional rights of the subject under investigation. But Congress can prescribe some safeguards, some rules and some standards, just as we have with respect to your use of electronic surveillance, and could do it with respect to informants.

That's quite different from saying that the warrant procedure itself would be unconstitutional.

But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show probable cause, and therefore, you couldn't get a warrant, therefore you oppose the proposal to require you to get a warrant. It seems to beg the question.

Assuming that you say that since we use informants and investigate groups which may only engage in lawful activities but which might engage in activities that can result in violence or illegal acts, and you can't use the warrant, but Congress could say that the use of informants is subject to such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity, including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss the anti-ballistic missile system, and we don't want you to use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or unless you present your request to a magistrate in the same fashion as you are required to do with respect to, in most cases, to wiretap.

End Tape 6

Begin Tape 7

This is an option available to Congress.

Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential security informant and a security informant?

Mr. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator Schweiker, that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on him before talking with him and then we do a further in-depth background check.

A potential security informant is someone who is under consideration before he is approved by headquarters for use as an informant. He is someone who is under current consideration.

On some occasions that person will have been developed to a point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are engaged in checking upon his reliability.

In some instances he may be paid for information furnished, but it has not gotten to the point yet where we have satisfied ourselves that he meets all of our criteria. When he does, the field must submit its recommendations to headquarters, and headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an approved FBI informant.

Senator Schweiker. So it's really the first step of being an informant, I guess.

Mr. Wannall. It is a preliminary step, one of the preliminary steps.

Senator Schweiker. In the Rowe case, in the Rowe testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when violence was known?

I know we asked you several times but I'm still having trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was known.

Mr. Wannall. Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to answer that.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

Mr. Adams. The problem we had at the time, and it's the problem today, we are an investigative agency. We do not have police powers like the United States marshalls do. About 1795, I guess, or some period like that, marshalls have had the authority that almost borders on what a sheriff has. We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain the role of an investigative agency. We were to report on activities to furnish the information to the local police, who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice.

In those areas where the local police did not act, it resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 United States marshalls down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a time of civil righs versus federal rights, and yet there was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country.

This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies in itself at the time either because many of them did act upon the information that was furnished to them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we would not have had evidence that there was a conspiracy available. We can do absolutely nothing in that regard.

In Little Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and next to the Army, the United States marshalls should make them, not the FBI, even though we developed the violations. And over the years, as you know, at the time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it?

Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan as far as committing acts of violence, and of course we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

Senator Schweiker. What would be wrong, just following up your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it's obvious to me that a lot of informers are going to have pre-knowledge of violence of using U.S. marshalls on some kind of a long-range basis to prevent violence?

Mr. Adams. We do. We have them in Boston in connection with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations under the Civil Rights Act. But the marshalls are in Boston, they are in Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this is the approach, that the Federal government finally recognized, was the solution to the problem where you had to have added Federal import.

Senator Schweiker. But instead of waiting until it gets to a Boston state, which is obviously a pretty advanced confrontation, shouldn't we have somewhere a coordinated program that when you go up the ladder of command in the FBI, that on an immediate and fairly contemporary basis, that kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it gets to a Boston state?

I realize it's a departture from the past. I'm not saying it isn't. But it seems to me we need a better remedy than we have.

Mr. Adams. Well, fortunately, we're at a time where conditions have subsided in the country, even from the '60s and the '70s and periods -- or '50s and '60s. We report to the Department of Justice on potential troublespots around the country as we learn of them so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance with state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston?

I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the early '60s. But the government had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I'd like to go, if I may, to the Robert Hardy case. I know he is not a witness but he was a witness before the House. But since this affects my state, I'd like to ask Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned and organized a raid on the Camden draft board. And according to Mr. Hardy's testimony before our Committee, he said that in advance of the raid someone in the Department had even acknowledged the fact that they had all the information they needed to clamp down on the conspiracy and could arrest people at that point in time, and yet no arrests were made.

Why, Mr. Wannall, was this true?

Mr. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based only on the material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It was not a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your question.

There was, in fact, a representative of the Department of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously as that case progressed as to what point the arrest should be made and we were being guided by those to our mentors, the ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort.

So I think that Mr. Hardy's statement to the effect that there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true.

Senator Schweiker. That responsibility rests with who under your procedures?

Mr. Wannall. We investigate decisions on making arrests, when they should be made, and decisions with regard to prosecutions are made either by the United States attorneys or by Federals in the Department.

Mr. Adams. At this time that particular case did have a departmental attorney on the scene because there are questions of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a tough violation to prove and sometimes a question of do you have the added value of catching someone in the commission of the crime as further proof, rather than relying on one informant and some circumstantial evidence to prove the violation.

Senator Schweiker. Well, in this case, though, they even had a dry run. They could have arrested them on the dry run.

That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to me. They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on the dry run.

I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry run. Who was this Department of Justice official who made that decision?

Mr. Adams. Guy Goodwin was the Department official.

Senator Schweiker. Next I'd like to ask back in 1965, during the height of the effort to destroy the Klan, as you put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated membership.

I believe these are either FBI figures or estimates. That would mean that one out of every five members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the government.

And I believe the figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members of the Klan that year were FBI informants.

Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that you shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what's going on for violence, but it seems to me that this is the tail wagging the dog.

For example, today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants for both domestic informants and potential informants and that here we had 2,000 just in the Klan alone.

Mr. Adams. Well, this number 2,000 did include all racial matters, informants at that particular time, and I think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan informants in relation to Klan members was around 6 percent, I think, after we had read some of the testimony.

Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a group called the Action Group. This was the group that you remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony, that he was left after the meeting. He attended the open meetings and heard all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information, but he never knew what was going on because each one had an action group that went out and considered themselves in the missionary field.

Theirs was the violence.

In order to penetrate those, it takes, you have to direct as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress and everyone is concerned about the murder of the civil rights workers, the Linio Kent case, the Viola Liuzzo case, the bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one tremendous problem at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I acknowledge that.

Mr. Adams. Our only approach was through informants and through the use of informants we solved these cases, the ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have never solved. They are extremely difficult.

These informants, as we told the Attorney General, and as we told the President, that we had moved informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he could forewarn us of violence, could help us on cases that had transpired, and yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever unless we can create enough disruption that these members will realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers, even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if that were the case and with some of them it was the case, that I would be caught. And that's what we did and that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure and just like you say, 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately were Klan members and they didn't dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.

WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Senator Schweiker. My time is expired. I just have one quick question.

Is it correct that in 1971 we're using around 6500 informers for black ghetto situations?

Mr. Adams. I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have one year where we had a number like that which probably had been around 6000, and that was the time when the cities were being burned, Detroit, Washington, areas like this. We were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is violence going to break out, what next?

They weren't informants like an individual penetrating an organization. They were listening posts in the community that would help tell us that we have a group here that's getting ready to start another fire-fight or something.

Senator Tower. At this point, there are three more Senators remaining for questioning. If we can try to get everything in in the first round, we will not have a second round and I think we can finish around 1:00, and we can go on and terminate the proceedings.

However, If anyone feels that they have another question that they want to return to, we can come back here by 2:00.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the record is now fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the field of crime investigating, it may be the best professional organization of its kind in the world. And when the FBI acts in the field of political ideas, it has bungled its job, it has interfered with the civil liberties, and finally, in the last month or two, through its public disclosures, heaped shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of the crucial public confidence in an essential law enforcement agency of this country.

In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the FBI in 1924.

In World War I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed from its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and protector of political ideas. And through the interference of civil liberties and Palmer Raids and the rest, the public became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department get involved in political ideas.

And yet here we are again looking at a record where with Martin Luther King, with anti-war resistors, with -- we even had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of Churches. Secretly we are investigating this vague, ill-defined, impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas.

It seems to be the basis of the strategy that people can't protect themselves, that you somehow need to use the tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive or dangerous ideas, which I find strange and quite profoundly at odds with the philosophy of American government.

I started in politics years ago and the first thing we had to do was to get the communists out of our parts and out of the union. We did a very fine job. As far as I know, and I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help from the FBI or the CIA. We just rammed them out of the meetings on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't good union leaders when we didn't want anything to do with them. And yet, we see time and time again that we're going to protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous, that we've going to protect veterans from whatever it is, and we're going to protect the Council of Churches from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so gummy and confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that precisely what is expected of the FBI is known by you, by the public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask you?

Mr. Adams. I agree with that, Senator, and I would like to point out that when the Attorney General made his statement Mr. Hoover subscribes to it, we followed that policy for about ten years until the President of the United States said that we should investigate the Nazi Party.

I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party. I feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in the fact that in World War II, as contrasted with World War I, there wasn't one single incident of foreign directed sabotage which took place in the United States.

Senator Mondale. And under the criminal law you could have investigated these issues of sabotage.

Isn't sabotage a crime?

Mr. Adams. Sabotage is a crime.

Senator Mondale. Could you have investigated that?

Mr. Adams. After it happened.

Senator Mondale. You see, every time we get involved in political ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of crimes that could have been committed. It's very interesting.

In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to continue what you're now doing and as I understand it, you still insist that you did the right thing with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of Churches, and this can still go on. This can still go on under your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activities in terms of criminal matters.

Mr. Adams. The law does not say we have to wait until we have been murdered before we can --

Senator Mondale. Absolutely, but that's the field of law again. You're trying to defend apples with oranges. That's the law. You can do that.

Mr. Adams. That's right, but how do you find out which of the 20,000 Bund members might have been a saboteur. You don't have probable cause to investigate anyone, but you can direct an intelligence operation against the German-American Bund, the same thing we did after Congress said --

Senator Mondale. Couldn't you get a warrant for that? Why did you object to going to court for authority for that?

Mr. Adams. Because we don't have probable cause to go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for probable cause to investigate an organization.

There were activities which did take place, like one time they outlined the Communist Party --

Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it wouldn't be better for the FBI for us to define authority that you could use in the kind of Bonn situation where under court authority you can investigate where there is probable cause or reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest.

Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than just making these decisions on your own?

Mr. Adams. We have expressed complete concurrence in that. We feel that we're going to get beat to death in the next 100 years, you're damned if you do, and damned if you don't if we don't have a delineation of our responsibility in this area. But I won't agree with you, Senator, that we have bungled the intelligence operations in the United States. I agree with you that we have made some mistakes. Mr. Kelley has set a pattern of being as forthright as any Director of the FBI in acknowledging mistakes that had been made, but I think that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and Senator Church, that we have to watch these hearings because of the necessity that we must concentrate on these areas of abuse. We must not lose sight of the overall law enforcement and intelligence community, and I still feel that this is the freest country in the world. I've travelled much, as I'm sure you have, and I know we have made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they are by the fact that there are 20,000 murders a year in the United States and they can't walk out of their houses at night and feel safe.

Senator Mondale. That's correct, and isn't that an argument then, Mr. Adams, for strengthening our powers to go after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening or continuing a policy which we now see undermines the public confidence you need to do your job.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely. The mistakes we have made are what have brought on this embarrassment to us.

I'm not blaming the Committee. I'm saying we made some

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

mistakes and in doing so this is what has hurt the FBI. But at the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes out, as you have said yourselves, because of the necessity of zeroing in on abuses.

I think that we have done one tremendous job. I think the accomplishments in the Klan was the finest hour of the FBI and yet, I'm sure in dealing with the Klan that we made some mistakes. But I just don't agree with bungling.

End Tape 7

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble over it in the political idea trouble, and that that's where we need to have new legal standards.

Mr. Adams. Yes, I agree with that.

Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Adams, these two instances we have studied at some length seems to have been an inclination on the part of the Bureau to establish a notion about an individual or a group which seems to be very hard to ever change or dislodge. In the case of Dr. King, where the supposition was that he was being influenced by Communist individuals, extensive investigation was made, surveillance, reports came back indicating that this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go out to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to be a willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts.

Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar to that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, that every piece of information that she supplied to the Bureau seemed to indicate that the Bureau was not correct in its assumption that this organization planned to commit violence, or that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insist that this investigation go on, and this information was used against the individuals.

Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted that its first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their course?

Mr. Adams. We have admitted that. We have also shown from one of the cases that Senator Hart brought up, that after five days we closed the case. We were told something by an individual that there was a concern of an adverse influence in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther King situation there was no testimony to the effect that we just dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and on, ad infinitum. The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were all approved by the Attorney General. Microphones on Martin Luther King were approved by another Attorney General. This wasn't the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that there was a basis to continue the investigation up to a point.

What I testified to was that we were improper in discreditin Dr. King, but it's just like --

Senator Huddleston. The Committee has before it memoranda written by high officials of the Bureau indicating that the information they were receiving from the field, from these surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition was.

Mr. Adams. That memorandum was not on Dr. King. That was on another individual that I think somehow got mixed up in the discussion, one where the issue was can we make people prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to investigate them.

But the young lady appearing this morning making the comment that she never knew of anything she told us that she considers herself a true member of the VVAW-WSO inasmuch as she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and agreed to cooperate with the FBI in providing information regarding the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals from associating themselves with the VVAW-WSO. She is most concerned about efforts by the Revolutionary Union to take over the VVAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this..

I think that we have a basis for investigating the VVAW-WSO in certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped the investigation. They don't agree with these principles laid down by the --

Senator Huddleston. That report was the basis of your continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that information against members who certainly had not been involved in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job or whatever?

Mr. Adams. It all gets back to the fact that even in the criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to prevent crime, and you can't wait until something happens. The Attorney General has clearly spoken in that area, and even our statutory jurisdiction provides that we don't --

Senator Huddleston. Well, of course we've had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent crime, when you had information that it was going to occur. But I'm sure there are instances where you have.

Mr. Adams. We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

Senator Huddleston. To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to the crime.

Mr. Adams. Not necessarily.

Senator Huddleston. Your informant had told you that, hadn't he?

Mr. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level. We have other informants, and we have other information.

Senator Huddleston. Yes, but you were aware that he had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in order to --

Mr. Adams. Yes. He furnished many other instances also.

Senator Huddleston. So you weren't really doing a whole lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were already part of it.

Mr. Adams. We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so that when the Department, agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform certain law enforcement functions.

Senator Huddleston. Now, the Committee has received documents which indicated that in one situation the FBI assisted an informant who had been established in a white hate group to establish a rival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid his expenses in setting up this rival organization.

Now, does this not put the Bureau in a position of being responsible for what actions the rival white hate group might have undertaken?

Mr. Adams. I'd like to see if one of the other gentlemen knows that specific case, because I don't think we set up a specific group.

This is Joe Deegan.

Mr. Deegan. Senator, it's my understanding that the informant we're talking about decided to break off from the group he was with. He was with the Macon Klan group of the United Klans of America, and he decided to break off. This was in compliance with our regulations. His breaking off, we did not pay him to set up the organization. He did it on his own. We paid him for the information he furnished us concerning the operation. We did not sponsor the organization.

Senator Huddleston. Concerning the new organization that he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that organization?

Mr. Deegan. He continued to advise us of that organizatio and other organizations. He would advise us of planned activities.

Senator Huddleston. The new organization that he formed, did it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one?

Mr. Deegan. No, it did not, and it did not last that long.

Senator Huddleston. There's also evidence of an FBI informant in the Black Panther Party who had a position of responsibility within the Party with the knowledge of his FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing them in how to use those weapons. Presumably this was in the knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became -- came in contact with the group that was contracting for murder, and he participated in this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent, and this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later killed with the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably all in the knowledge of the FBI.

How does this square with your enforcement and crime prevention responsibilities.

Mr. Deegan. Senator, I'm not familiar with that particular case. It does not square with our policy in all respects, and I would have to look at that particular case you're talking about to give you an answer.

Senator Huddleston. I don't have the documentation on that particular case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind of an organization and to what extent an effort is made to prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing that you are supposedly trying to prevent.

Mr. Adams. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe, who became active in an action group, and we told him to get out or we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the information he had furnished in the past.

We have had cases, Senator, where we have had --

Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participate in violent activities.

Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

Senator Huddleston. That's what he said.

Mr. Adams. I know that's what he said. But that's what lawsuits are all about, is that there are two sides to the issue, and our agents handling this have advised us, and I believe have advised your staff, that at no time did they advise him to engage in violence.

Senator Huddleston. Just to do what was necessary to get the information, I believe maybe might have been his instructions.

Mr. Adams. I don't think they made any such statement to him along that line, and we have informants, we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law, and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the subject, and have prosecuted I would say, offhand, I can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws, once it came to our attention, and even to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence in this case, during the review of the matter, the agents told me that they found one case where their agent had been working 24 hours a day, and he was a little late in disseminating the information to the police department. No violence occurred, but it showed up in a file review, and he was censured for his delay in properly notifying local authorities.

So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all informant files.

Senator Huddleston. Well, Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with the acknowledgement by the agent in charge that if you're going to be a Klansman and you happen to be with someone and they decide to do something, that he couldn't be an angel. These were the words of the agent, and be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead, but the implication is that he would have to go along and would have to be involved if he was going to maintain his credibility.

Mr. Adams. There's no question but that an informant at times will have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights that take place, but I believe his statement was to the effect that -- and I was sitting in the back of the room and I don't recall it exactly, but some of them were beat with chains, and I didn't hear whether he said he beat someone with a chain or not, but I rather doubt that he did because it's one thing being present, and it's another thing taking an active part in criminal actions.

Senator Huddleston. He was close enough to get his throat cut.

How does the gathering of information --

Senator Tower. Senator Mathias is here, and I think that we probably should recess a few minutes.

Could we have Senator Mathias' questions and then should we convene this afternoon?

Senator Huddleston. I'm finished. I just had one more question.

Senator Tower. Go ahead.

Senator Huddleston. I wanted to ask how the selection of information about an individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

Mr. Adams. Our agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe, that they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge concerning it, and I can't see where it would be of any value whatsoever.

Senator Huddleston. You aren't aware of any case where these instructions were given to an agent or an informant?

Mr. Adams. To get involved in sexual activity? No, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tower. Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to come back very briefly to the Fourth Amendment considerations in connection with the use of informants and in posing these questions we're not thinking of the one time volunteer who walks in to an FBI office and says I have a story I want to tell you and that's the only time that you may see him. I'm thinking of the kind of situations in which there is a more extended relationship which could be of varying degrees. It might be in one case that the same individual will have some usefulness in a number of situations. But when the FBI orders a regular agent to engage in a search, the first test is a judicial warrant, and what I would like to explore with you is the difference between a one time search which requires a warrant, and which you get when you make that search, and a continuous search which uses an informant, or the case of a continuous search which uses a regular undercover agent, someone who is totally under your control, and is in a slightly different category than an informant.

Mr. Adams. Well, we get there into the fact that the Supreme Court has still held that the use of informants does not invade any of these constitutionally protected areas, and if a person wants to tell an informant something that isn't protected by the Supreme Court.

An actual search for legal evidence, that is a protected item, but information and the use of informants have been consistently held as not posing any constitutional problems.

Senator Mathias. I would agree, if you're talking about the fellow who walks in off the street, as I said earlier, but is it true that under existing procedures informants are given background checks?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Mathias. And they are subject to a testing period.

Mr. Adams. That's right, to verify and make sure they are providing to us reliable information.

Senator Mathias. And during the period that the relationship continues, they are rather closely controlled by the handling agents.

Mr. Adams. That's true.

Senator Mathias. So in effect they can come in a very practical way agents themselves to the FBI.

Mr. Adams. They can do nothing --

Senator Mathias. Certainly agents in the common law use of the word.

Mr. Adams. That's right, they can do nothing, and we instruct our agents that an informant can do nothing that the agent himself cannot do, and if the agent can work himself into an organization in an undercover capacity, he can sit there and glean all the information that he wants, and that is not in the Constitution as a protected area. But we do have this problem.

Senator Mathias. But if a regular agent who is a member of the FBI attempted to enter these premises, he would require a warrant?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, if a regular -- it depends on the purpose for which he is entering. If a regular agent by concealing his identity, by -- was admitted as a member of the Communist Party, he can attend Communist Party meetings, and he can enter the premises, he can enter the building, and there's no constitutionally invaded area there.

Senator Mathias. And so you feel that anyone who has a less formal relationship with the Bureau than a regular agent, who can undertake a continuous surveillance operation as an undercover agent or as an informant --

Mr. Adams. As long as he commits no illegal acts.

Senator Mathias. Let me ask you why you feel that it is impractical to require a warrant since, as I understand it, headquarters must approve the use of an informant. Is that degree of formal action required?

end

Mr. Adams. The main difficulty is the particularity which has to be shown in obtaining a search warrant. You have to go after particular evidence. You have to specify what you're going after, and an informant operates in an area that you just cannot specify. He doesn't know what's going to be discussed at that meeting. It may be a plot to blow up the Capitol again or it may be a plot to blow up the State Department building.

Senator Mathias. If it were a criminal investigation, you would have little difficulty with probable cause, wouldn't you?

Mr. Adams. We would have difficulty in a warrant to use someone as an informant in that area because the same difficulty of particularity exists. We can't specify.

Senator Mathias. I understand the problem because it's very similar to one that we discussed earlier in connection say wiretaps on a national security problem.

Mr. Adams. That's it, and there we face the problem of where the Soviet, an individual identified as a Soviet spy in a friendly country and they tell us he's been a Soviet spy there and now he's coming to the United States, and if we can't show under a probable cause warrant, if we couldn't show that he was actually engaging in espionage in the United States, we couldn't get a wiretap under the probable cause requirements which have been discussed. If the good fairy didn't drop the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

evidence in our hands that this individual is here conducting espionage, we again would fall short of this, and that's why we're still groping with it.

Senator Mathias. When you say fall short, you really, you would be falling short of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

Mr. Adams. That's right, except for the fact that the President, under this Constitutional powers, to protect this nation and make sure that it survives first, first of all national survival, and these are the areas that not only the President but the Attorney General are concerned in and we're all hoping that somehow we can reach a legislative middle ground in here.

Senator Mathias. Which we discussed in the other nationa security area as to curtailling a warrant to that particular need.

Mr. Adams. And if you could get away from probable cause and get some degree of reasonable cause and get some method of sealing indefinitely your interest, say, in an ongoing espionage case and can work out those difficulties, we may get their yet.

Senator Mathias. And you don't despair of finding that middle ground?

Mr. Adams. I don't because I think that today there's more of an open mind between Congress and the Executive Branch

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

and the FBI and everyone concerning the need to get these areas resolved.

Senator Mathias. And you believe that the Department, if we could come together, would support, would agree to that kind of a warrant requirement if we could agree on the language?

Mr. Adams. If we can work out problems and the Attorney General is personally interested in that also.

Senator Mathias. Do you think that this agreement might extend to some of those other areas that we talked about?

Mr. Adams. I think that that would be a much greater difficulty in an area of domestic intelligence informant who reports on many different operations and different types of activities that might come up rather than say in a Soviet espionage or a foreign espionage case where you do have a little more degree of specificity to deal with.

Senator Mathias. I suggest that we arrange to get together and try out some drafts with each other, but in the meantime, of course, there's another alternative and that would be the use of wiretap procedure by which the Attorney General must approve a wiretap before it is placed, and the same general process could be used for informants, since you come to headquarters any way.

Mr. Adams. That could be an alternative. I think it would be a very burdensome alternative and I think at some point after we attack the major abuses, or what are considered

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

major abuses of Congress and get over this hurdle, I think we're still going to have to recognize that heads of agencies have to accept the responsibility for managing that agency and we can't just keep pushing every operational problem up to the top because there just aren't enough hours in the day.

Senator Mathias. But the reason that parallel suggests itself is of course the fact that the wiretap deals generally with one level of information in one sense of gathering information. You hear what you hear from the tap.

Mr. Adams. But you're dealing in a much smaller number also.

Senator Mathias. Smaller number, but that's all the more reason. When an informant goes in, he has all of his senses. He's gathering all of the information a human being can acquire from a situation and has access to more information than the average wiretap.

And it would seem to me that for that reason a parallel process might be useful and in order.

Mr. Adams. Mr. Mintz pointed out one other main distinction to me which I had overlooked from our prior discussions, which is the fact that with an informant he is more in the position of being a concentral monitor in that one of the two parties to the conversation agrees, such as like concentral monitoring of telephones and microphones and anything else versus the wiretap itself where the individual

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

whose telephone is being tapped is not aware and there is, and neither of the two parties talking had agreed that their conversation could be monitored.

Senator Mathias. I find that one difficult to accept. If I'm the third party overhearing a conversation that is taking place in a room where I am, and my true character isn't perceived by the two people who are talking, in effect they haven't consented to my overhearing my conversation. Then they consent if they believe that I am their friend or their, a partisan of theirs.

But if they knew in fact that I was an informant for someone else, they wouldn't be consenting.

Mr. Adams. Well, that's like I believe Senator Hart raised earlier, that the courts thus far have made this distinction with no difficulty, but that doesn't mean that there may not be some legislative compromise which might be addressed.

Senator Mathias. Well, I particularly appreciate your attitude in being willing to work on these problems because I think that's the most important thing that can evolve from these hearings, so that we can actually look at the Fourth Amendment as the standard that we have to achieve. But the way we get there is obviously going to be a lot easier if we can work toward them together.

I just have one final question, Mr. Chairman, and that deals with whether we shouldn't impose a standard of probable cause that a crime has been committed as a means of controlling the use of informants and the kind of information that they collect.

Do you feel that this would be too restrictive?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, I do.

When I look at informants and I see that each year informants provide us, locate 5000 dangerous fugitives, they provide subjects in 2000 more cases, they recover $86 million in stolen property and contraband, and that's irrespective of what we give the local law enforcement and other Federal agencies, which is almost a comparable figure, we have almost reached a point in the criminal law where we don't have much left. And in the intelligence field we still, I think when we carve all of the problems away, we still have to make sure that we have the means to gather information which will permit us to be aware of the identity of individuals and organizations that are acting to overthrow the government of the United States. And I think we still have some areas to look hard at as we have discussed, but I think informants are here to stay. They are absolutely essential to law enforcement. Everyone uses informants. The press has informants, Congress has informants, you have individuals in your community that you rely on, not for ulterior purposes, but to let you know what's the feel of the people, am I serving them properly, am I carrying out this?

It's here to say. It's been here throughout history and there will always be informants. And the thing we want to avoid is abuses like provocateurs, criminal activities, and to ensure that we have safeguards that will prevent that. But we do need informants.

Senator Tower. Senator Hart, do you have any further questions?

Senator Hart of Michigan. Yes. I ask unanimous request perhaps with a view to giving balance to the record, the groups that we have discussed this morning into which the Bureau has put informants, in popular language, our liberal groups -- I would ask unanimous consent that be printed in the record, the summary of the opening of the headquarters file by the Bureau of Dr. Carl McIntyre when he announced that he was organizing a group to counter the American Civil Liberties Union and other "liberal and communist groups," is not a left only pre-occupation.

Senator Tower. Without objection, so ordered.

(The material referred to follows:)

Senator Tower. Any more questions?

Then the Committee will have an Executive Session this afternoon in Room 3110 in the Dirksen Building at 3:00, and I hope everyone will be in attendance.

Tomorrow morning we will hear from Courtney Evans, Cartha DeLoach. Tomorrow afternoon, former Attorneys General Ramsey Clark and Edward Katzenbach.

The Committee, the hearings are recessed until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above mentioned matter was concluded, to reconvene on Wednesday December 3rd, 1975, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.)

- - -

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 7-11-75)

(Copies to Offices Checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☒ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☐ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date December 4, 1975

RE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ______

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ______ dated ______

Remarks:

For your assistance in responding to local press inquiries, attached is a copy of unedited excerpted remarks by Assistant to the Director--Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams while testifying before the Senate Select Committee on 12/2/75, concerning anti-FBI allegations made by Gary Rowe, former FBI informant.

66-3346-20

1975
FBI—MIAMI

Enc. (1)
Bufile
Urfile

EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR --

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

TESTIFYING BEFORE THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN,

GARY ROWE, FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI

TO PREVENT VIOLENCE

DECEMBER 2, 1975

66-3346-19

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
DEC 8 1975
FBI—MIAMI

QUESTION: ....You do use informants and do instruct them to spread dissention among certain groups that they are informing on, do you not?

MR. ADAMS: We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one of the best examples of a situation where the law was ineffective at the time. We heard the term, State's Rights used much more than we hear today. We saw with the Little Rock situation the President of the United States sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement use the troops only as a last resort. When you have a situation like this where you do try to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical problems.

With the Klan coming along, we had situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action was taken with that information as he pointed out during his testimony. Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments in every instance.

We also know that in certain instances the information upon being received was not being acted upon. We also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem. And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no authority in the absence of an instruction from the Department of Justice to make an arrest. Section 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So historically, in those days, we were just as frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable information--and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to do something about it, it was not always acted upon as he indicated.

QUESTION: In none of these cases, then, there was adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act.

MR. ADAMS: The Departmental rules at that time, and still do, require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy. Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you have no violation.

Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968 that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an individual. There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This was a problem that the whole country was grappling with--the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing the Klan and that was one of the reasons.

QUESTION: ....A local town meeting on a controversial social issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such meetings because they may result in violent government disruption?

MR ADAMS: No sir, and we don't....

QUESTION: Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?

MR. ADAMS: No sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in, or where members of one of these groups are participating where there is a potential that they might change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.

This is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the 1st Amendment right, yet at the same time, being aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the past than we do at the present time. We have had periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe and the courts have said that the FBI has the right, and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention. Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut case.

Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities. That's where I think most of our disagreements fall.

QUESTION: In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when violence was known about. I know we have asked this several times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was known.

MR. WANNALL: Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to that and if you have no objections, I'll ask that he be the one to answer the question.

MR. ADAMS: The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have police powers even like the U. S. Marshals do. The Marshals since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice, and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain the role of an investigative agency.

We were to report on activities. We furnished the information to the local police who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those areas where the local police did not act. It resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies in the South at the time either, because many of them did act upon the information that was furnished to them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we would not have had evidence that was a conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed the violations. We have over the years as you know at the

Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

QUESTION: What would be wrong, just following up on your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence?

MR. ADAMS: We do. We have them in Boston in connection with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same time and this is the approach that the Federal Government finally recognized.

QUESTION: On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need a better remedy than we have.

MR ADAMS: Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or 50's and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

QUESTION: Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated membership.

MR. ADAMS: That's right.

QUESTION: I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. That would mean that 1 out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members in the Klan that year were FBI informants. Isn't that an awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what is going on to revert violence but it just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants, both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone.

MR. ADAMS: Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters and informants at that particular time and I think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan informants in relaton to Klan members was around 6 percent, I think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone, was concerned about the murder of the three civil rights workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one tremendous problem at that time.

QUESTION: I acknowledge that.

MR. ADAMS: Our only approach was through informants. Through the use of informants we solved these cases. The ones that were solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved. They're extremely difficult, but, these informants as we told the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he could see that this could continue forever unless we could create enough disruption that these members will realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately were Klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.

QUESTION: I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in 1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto situation?

MR ADAMS: I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington, areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an organization. They were listening posts in the community that would help tell us that we have another group here that is getting ready to start another fire fight or something.

QUESTION: ... Without going into that subject further of course we have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent crime when you had information that it was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where you have.

MR. ADAMS: We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

QUESTION: To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to the crime.

MR. ADAMS: Not necessarily knew.

QUESTION: Your informant told you that, hadn't he?

MR. ADAMS: The informant is on one level. We have other informants and we have other information.

QUESTION: You were aware that he had worked with certain members of the Birmingham Police in order...

MR. ADAMS: That's right. He furnished many other instances also.

QUESTION: So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were already a part of it.

MR. ADAMS: We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.S. Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions.

QUESTION: ...This brings up the point as to what kind of control you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing that you were supposedly trying to prevent.

MR. ADAMS: A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer using him as an informant in spite of the information he had furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had

QUESTION: But you also told him to participate in violent activities

MR. ADAMS: We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

QUESTION: That's what he said.

MR. ADAMS: I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage in violence.

QUESTION: Just to do what was necessary to get the information.

MR. ADAMS: I do not think they made any such statement to him along that line either and we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the subject and have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence in this case during the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a day and he was a little late in disseminating the information to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in properly notifying local authorities. So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all informant files.

QUESTION: Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going to be a Klansman and he happened to be with someone and they decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are words of the Agent. And be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead but the implication is that he would have to go along or would have to be involved if he was going to maintain his liability as a ---

MR. ADAMS: There is no question that an informant at times will have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights that take place but I believe his statement was to the effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is one thing being present, it is another thing taking an active part in a criminal action.

QUESTION: It's true. He was close enought to get his throat cut apparently.

QUESTION: How does the collection of information about an individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

MR. ADAMS: Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any value whatsoever.

QUESTION: You don't know of any such case where these instructions were given to an Agent or an informant?

MR. ADAMS: To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

4 37 P

18

F B I

Date: SEPTEMBER 12, 1975

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE NITEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395) MEB

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346)

SENSTUDY 75

REMYTEL SEPTEMBER 10, 1975.

THOMAS McANDREWS ADVISED THE MIAMI OFFICE HE IS DEPARTING THIS DATE FOR WASHINGTON, D. C., AS HE HAS BEEN CALLED TO TESTIFY. FURNISHED FOR INFO.

END

JLM:mjs
(1)

[illegible] mjs
[illegible]
[illegible] mjs
Filed

66-3346-17

Approved: ______________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 9 02 P M Per sah

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

NR018 MM CODE

9:02 PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 12, 1975 MRW

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI (66-3346) ONE PAGE

SENSTUDY 75

REMYTEL SEPTEMBER 10, 1975.

THOMAS MCANDREWS ADVISED THE MIAMI OFFICE HE IS DEPARTING THIS DATE FOR WASHINGTON, D.C., AS HE HAS BEEN CALLED TO TESTIFY. FURNISHED FOR INFO.

END

TMA ACK FOR ONE AND FBHQ CLR

TH

Searched mjs
Serialized
Indexed mjs
Filed

66-3346-17

(Rev. 5-22-64)

4

FBI

Date: SEPTEMBER 10, 1975

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE NITEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395) – LSG

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346) 1P

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

THOMAS MC ANDREWS AND FREDERICK F. FOX WERE CONTACTED BY SAC SEPTEMBER 9, 1975. ADDRESSES SET FORTH IN RETEL FOR EACH ARE CORRECT.

MC ANDREWS STATED HIS KNOWLEDGE IS INDIRECT AND DIMMED BY APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN YEARS. THE AGENT HANDLING Z COVERAGE AT WFO WHILE MC ANDREWS WAS SAC IS NOW DEAD. MC ANDREWS PROTESTED THAT BUREAU FILES SHOULD BE BY FAR MORE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE THAN HIS KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY.

FOX STATED HE WOULD NOTIFY FBI, MIAMI, SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED.

END

JLM:mjs
(1)

Searched........ MJ
Serialized........
Indexed........ MJ
Filed........

23

66-3346-16

Approved: ____________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 601P M Per

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

NR004 MM CODE

6:01 PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 10, 1975 MRW

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI (66-3346)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

THOMAS MC ANDREWS AND FREDERICK F. FOX WERE CONTACTED BY SAC SEPTEMBER 9, 1975. ADDRESSES SET FORTH IN RETEL FOR EACH ARE CORRECT.

MC ANDREWS STATED HIS KNOWLEDGE IS INDIRECT AND DIMMED BY APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN YEARS. THE AGENT HANDLING Z COVERAGE AT WFO WHILE MC ANDREWS WAS SAC IS NOW DEAD. MC ANDREWS PROTESTED THAT BUREAU FILES SHOULD BE BY FAR MORE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE THAN HIS KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY.

FOX STATED HE WOULD NOTIFY FBI, MIAMI, SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED.

END

PLS ACK FOR 4

LSG FBIHQ ACK FOR FOUR AND HOLD FOR TWO

[illegible] mgf
[illegible]
Indexed mgf
Filed

66-3346-16

C

NR 030 WA CODE

5:53PM NITEL 9/5/75 PMJ

TO ALEXANDRIA BALTIMORE BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON CHICAGO CINCINNATI
DALLAS EL PASO INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON JACKSONVILLE LOUISVILLE
LOS ANGELES MEMPHIS MIAMI
NEW YORK OKLAHOMA CITY OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA PHOENIX ST. LOUIS
SAN DIEGO SAN FRANCISCO SAVANNAH
SEATTLE

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION ✓

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTELS MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED WHEREABOUTS OF A NUMBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES INDICATING THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC STAFF. LISTED BELOW, BY FIELD OFFICE TERRITORY, ARE THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES AS CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES.

66-3346-15

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
SEP 5 1975
FBI—MIAMI

HW

ASAC

INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SA'S LITRENTO AND STEWART DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA CONCERNING MAIL OPENING ACTIVITIES. ALL OTHERS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER SAC, ASAC, OR BOTH, DURING PERIOD 1959 - 1966 IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI, NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGTON FIELD. THEY PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING MAIL OPENINGS.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.

CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

ALEXANDRIA:

W. DONALD STEWART, CRYSTAL HOUSE I, APARTMENT 202, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA.

JAMES H. GALE, 3307 ROCKY MOUNT ROAD, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

THOMAS E BISHOP, 8820 STARK ROAD, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA

BALTIMORE:

ANTHONY P. LITRENTO, 2810 STONYBROOK DRIVE, BOWIE, MARYLAND

PAUL O'CONNELL, JR., 2417 STRATTON DRIVE, POTOMAC, MARYLAND

DONALD E. RONEY, 131 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE, WINDSOR HILLS, WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

VICTOR TURYN, 2645 TURF VALLEY ROAD, ELLICOTT CITY, MARYLAND

DONALD W. MORLEY, BOX 222, NEW MARKET, MARYLAND

BIRMINGHAM:

JOHN DAVID POPE, JR., 221 REMINGTON ROAD, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

BOSTON:

LEO L. LAUGHLIN, 9 EVERETT AVENUE, WINCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

EDWARD J. POWERS, 10 COLONIAL DRIVE, BEDFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

J.F. DESMOND, 185 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

CHICAGO:

MARLIN W. JOHNSON, CANTEEN CORPORATION, THE MERCHANDISE MART, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

HARVEY G. FOSTER, 1012 SOUTH HAMLIN, PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS

CINCINNATI:

PAUL FIELDS, 2677 CYCLORAMA DRIVE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMCREST LANE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

DALLAS:

PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014 CHATTERTON DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

EL PASO:

KARL W. DISSLY, POST OFFICE BOX 9762, EL PASO, TEXAS

INDIANAPOLIS:

DILLARD W. HOWELL, 6413 CARDINAL LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

ALLAN GILLIES , 8228 HOOVER LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

JACKSON:

WILLIAMS W. BURKE, JR., 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

JACKSONVILLE:

DONALD K. BROWN, 826 BROOKMONT AVENUE, EAST JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, 4857 WATER OAK LANE, JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

LOUISVILLE:

BERNARD C. BROWN, 2301 NEWMARKET DRIVE, N.E., LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

LOS ANGELES:

WILLIAM G. SIMON, 2075 LOMBARDY ROAD, SAN MARINO, CALIFORNIA

WESLEY G. GRAPP, 4240 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS, CALIFORNIA

ARNOLD C. LARSON, 4232 ABBINGTON COURT, WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH K. PONDER, 3719 CARRIAGE HOUSE COURT, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 3030 SOUTH RED HILL AVENUE, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

MEMPHIS:

E. HUGO WINTERROWD, 1550 NORTH PARKWAY, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

MIAMI:

(813) 261 2996

THOMAS MC ANDREWS, 324 NEAPOLITAN WAY, NAPLES, FLORIDA

FREDERICK F. FOX, 11450 W. BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA 893-7743

NEW YORK:

JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, 656 HUNT LANE, MANHASSET, NEW YORK

HENRY A. FITZGIBBON, 76 EASTON ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK

OKLAHOMA CITY:

JAMES T. MORELAND, 108 FERN DRIVE, POTEAU, OKLAHOMA

LEE O. TEAGUE, 2501 N.W. 121ST STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA

OMAHA:

JOHN F. CALLAGHAN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, CAMP DODGE, POST OFFICE BOX 130, JOHNSTON, IOWA

PHILADELPHIA:

RICHARD J. BAKER, 219 JEFFREY LANE, NEWTON SQUARE, PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN F. MALONE, 25 GARFIELD AVENUE, CARBONDALE, PENNSYLVANIA

PHOENIX:

PALMER M. BAKEN, JR., 3832 EAST YUCCA STREET, PHOENIX, ARIZONA

ST. LOUIS:

THOMAS J. GEARTY, 6630 CLAYTON ROAD NR. 105, RICHMOND HEIGHTS, MISSOURI

WESLEY T. WHALEY, 286 GREEN TRAILS DRIVE, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI

SAN DIEGO:

FRANK L. PRICE, 2705 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO:

CURTIS O. LYNUM, 644 EAST HILLSDALE BOULEVARD, SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA

HAROLD E. WELBORN, 13067 LA VISTA COURT, SARATOGA, CALIFORNIA

SAVANNAH:

TROY COLEMAN, 36 CROMWELL ROAD, WILMINGTON PARK, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

JOSEPH D. PURVIS, 721 DANCY AVENUE, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

SEATTLE:

LELAND V. BOARDMAN, ROUTE 3, BOX 268, SEQUIM, WASHINGTON

RICHARD D. AUERBACH, P.O. BOX 1768, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

JAMES E. MILNES, 4317 - 50TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

PAUL R. BIBLER, 15134 - 38TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

END

NR 030 WA CODE

5:53PM NITEL 9/5/75 PMJ

TO ALEXANDRIA BALTIMORE BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON CHICAGO CINCINNATI
DALLAS EL PASO INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON JACKSONVILLE LOUISVILLE
LOS ANGELES MEMPHIS MIAMI
NEW YORK OKLAHOMA CITY OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA PHOENIX ST. LOUIS
SAN DIEGO SAN FRANCISCO SAVANNAH
SEATTLE

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTELS MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED WHEREABOUTS OF A NUMBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES INDICATING THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC STAFF. LISTED BELOW, BY FIELD OFFICE TERRITORY, ARE THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES AS CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES.

66-3346-15

IALIZED INDEXED
FILED
SEP 5 1975
FBI—MIAMI

INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SA'S LITRENTO AND STEWART DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA CONCERNING MAIL OPENING ACTIVITIES. ALL OTHERS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER SAC, ASAC, OR BOTH, DURING PERIOD 1959 - 1966 IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI, NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGTON FIELD. THEY PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING MAIL OPENINGS.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.

CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

ALEXANDRIA:

W. DONALD STEWART, CRYSTAL HOUSE I, APARTMENT 202, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA.

JAMES H. GALE, 3307 ROCKY MOUNT ROAD, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

THOMAS E BISHOP, 8820 STARK ROAD, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA

BALTIMORE:

ANTHONY P. LITRENTO, 2810 STONYBROOK DRIVE, BOWIE, MARYLAND

PAUL O'CONNELL, JR., 2417 STRATTON DRIVE, POTOMAC, MARYLAND

DONALD E. RONEY, 131 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE, WINDSOR HILLS, WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

VICTOR TURYN, 2645 TURF VALLEY ROAD, ELLICOTT CITY, MARYLAND

DONALD W. MORLEY, BOX 222, NEW MARKET, MARYLAND

PAGE FOUR

BIRMINGHAM:

JOHN DAVID POPE, JR., 221 REMINGTON ROAD, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

BOSTON:

LEO L. LAUGHLIN, 9 EVERETT AVENUE, WINCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

EDWARD J. POWERS, 10 COLONIAL DRIVE, BEDFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

J.F. DESMOND, 185 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

CHICAGO:

MARLIN W. JOHNSON, CANTEEN CORPORATION, THE MERCHANDISE MART, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

HARVEY G. FOSTER, 1012 SOUTH HAMLIN, PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS

CINCINNATI:

PAUL FIELDS, 2677 CYCLORAMA DRIVE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMCREST LANE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

DALLAS:

PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014 CHATTERTON DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

EL PASO:

KARL W. DISSLY, POST OFFICE BOX 9762, EL PASO, TEXAS

INDIANAPOLIS:

DILLARD W. HOWELL, 6413 CARDINAL LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

ALLAN GILLIES , 8228 HOOVER LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

JACKSON:

WILLIAMS W. BURKE, JR., 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

JACKSONVILLE:

DONALD K. BROWN, 826 BROOKMONT AVENUE, EAST JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, 4857 WATER OAK LANE, JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

LOUISVILLE:

BERNARD C. BROWN, 2301 NEWMARKET DRIVE, N.E., LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

LOS ANGELES:

WILLIAM G. SIMON, 2075 LOMBARDY ROAD, SAN MARINO, CALIFORNIA

WESLEY G. GRAPP, 4240 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS, CALIFORNIA

ARNOLD C. LARSON, 4232 ABBINGTON COURT, WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH K. PONDER, 3719 CARRIAGE HOUSE COURT, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 3030 SOUTH RED HILL AVENUE, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

MEMPHIS:

E. HUGO WINTERROWD, 1550 NORTH PARKWAY, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

MIAMI:

THOMAS MC ANDREWS, 324 NEAPOLITAN WAY, NAPLES, FLORIDA

FREDERICK F. FOX, 11450 W. BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA

PAGE SIX

NEW YORK:

JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, 656 HUNT LANE, MANHASSET, NEW YORK

HENRY A. FITZGIBBON, 76 EASTON ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK

OKLAHOMA CITY:

JAMES T. MORELAND, 108 FERN DRIVE, POTEAU, OKLAHOMA

LEE O. TEAGUE, 2501 N.W. 121ST STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA

OMAHA:

JOHN F. CALLAGHAN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, CAMP DODGE, POST OFFICE BOX 130, JOHNSTON, IOWA

PHILADELPHIA:

RICHARD J. BAKER, 219 JEFFREY LANE, NEWTON SQUARE, PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN F. MALONE, 25 GARFIELD AVENUE, CARBONDALE, PENNSYLVANIA

PHOENIX:

PALMER M. BAKEN, JR., 3832 EAST YUCCA STREET, PHOENIX, ARIZONA

ST. LOUIS:

THOMAS J. GEARTY, 6630 CLAYTON ROAD NR. 105, RICHMOND HEIGHTS, MISSOURI

WESLEY T. WHALEY, 286 GREEN TRAILS DRIVE, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI

SAN DIEGO:

FRANK L. PRICE, 2705 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO:

CURTIS O. LYNUM, 644 EAST HILLSDALE BOULEVARD, SAN MATEO,
CALIFORNIA

HAROLD E. WELBORN, 13067 LA VISTA COURT, SARATOGA,
CALIFORNIA

SAVANNAH:

TROY COLEMAN, 36 CROMWELL ROAD, WILMINGTON PARK, SAVANNAH,
GEORGIA

JOSEPH D. PURVIS, 721 DANCY AVENUE, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

SEATTLE:

LELAND V. BOARDMAN, ROUTE 3, BOX 268, SEQUIM, WASHINGTON

RICHARD D. AUERBACH, P.O. BOX 1768, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

JAMES E. MILNES, 4317 - 50TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON

PAUL R. BIBLER, 15134 - 38TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON

END

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

11

2 00/P

FBI

Date: 9/8/75

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395) -VLN

ATTENTION: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM: MIAMI (66-3346) (RUC) 2P

SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975

RE BUREAU TELETYPE SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975, SUPERVISOR JOSEPH C. BALL AND SA RAYMOND L. O'KELLY MET WITH WALTER J. LAUGHEED, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, AND ROBERT WENNERHOLM, LEGAL COUNSEL, DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT (DCPSD), AT THE DCPSD.

THESE TWO OFFICIALS WERE ADVISED OF THE REQUEST TO THE FBI BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC), FOR ACCESS TO ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES.

INFORMATION IN MIAMI AIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, CAPTIONED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C" WAS ORALLY

mf
Filed mf

① - 66-3346
RLO RLO/kr
(1) kr

66-3346-14

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent 339p M Per

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

FURNISHED AND THEY WERE ASKED WHETHER THE DCPSD HAS ANY OBJECTION TO THE FBI RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL EMANATING FROM DCPSD AND CONTAINED IN THIS AIRTEL WHICH WOULD DISCLOSE THE DCPSD USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR COVERAGE OF KING.

LAUGHEED ADVISED THE DCPSD HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO THE FBI RELEASING THIS INFORMATION TO THE SSC. HE SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO SEARCH THEIR RECORDS TO DETERMINE WHAT INFORMATION THEY HAVE ON KING AND THAT ANY REQUEST FOR THIS INFORMATION BY SSC WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THE FORM OF A SUBPOENA.

E. WILSON PURDY, DIRECTOR, DCPSD, WHO IS ON VACATION, WAS INITIALLY CONTACTED IN THIS MATTER BY SAC JULIUS L. MATTSON AND MADE AWARE OF THE REQUEST BY SSC.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

NR011 MM CODE

3:39PM URGENT SEPTEMBER 8, 1975 JGS

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI (66-3346) (RUC)

ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975

RE BUREAU TELETYPE SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975, SUPERVISOR JOSEPH C. BALL AND SA RAYMOO'KELLY MET WITH WALTER J. LAUGHEED, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, AND ROBERT WENNERHOLM, LEGAL COUNSEL, DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT (DCPSD), AT THE DCPSD.

THESE TWO OFFICIALS WERE ADVISED OF THE REQUEST TO THE FBI BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC), FOR ACCESS TO ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES.

INFORMATION IN MIAMI AIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, CAPTIONED "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER-C" WAS ORALLY FURNISTED AND THEY WERE ASKED WTETHER TTE DCPSD HAS ANY OBJECTION TO THE FBI RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL EMANATING FROO DCPSD AND CONTAINED IN THIS AIRTEL WHICH WOULD DISCLOSE THE DCPSD USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR COVERAGE OF KING.

END PAGE ONE

mf
mf
Filed

66-3346-14

PAGE TWO MM.66-3346

LAUGHEED ADVISED THE DCPSD HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO THE FBI RELEASING THIS INFORMATION TO THE SSC. HE SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO SEARCH THEIR RECORDS TO DETERMINE WHAT INFORMATION THEY HAVE ON KING AND THAT ANY REQUEST FOR THIS INFORMATION BY SSC WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THE FORM OF A SUBPOENA.

E. WILSON PURDY, DIRECTOR, DCPSD, WHO IS ON VACATION, WAS INITIALLY CONTACTED IN THIS MATTER BY SAC JULIUS L. MATTSON AND MADE AWARE OF THE REQUEST BY SSC.

END

FBI WA VLN

NR012 WA CODE

258PM URGENT 9-5-75 VLN

TO MIAMI

NEW YORK

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

66-3346*(5-75)

SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

REMMAIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, NYAIRTELS MAY 18, 1965, MAY 28, 1965, AND NYLET JULY 29, 1965, ALL CAPTIONED " MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C," MIAMI FILE 100-15079, NEW YORK FILE 100-136585.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED ACCESS TO ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES OR GOVERNMENTS.

REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS INDICATE THAT THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, AND THE THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT IN THEIR COVERAGE OF DR. KING.

IN ORDER FOR FBIHQ TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE SSC REQUEST IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR MIAMI AND NEW YORK TO CONTACT APPRO-

66-3346-13

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED mg FILED mg
SEP 5 1975
FBI-MIAMI

Homer Segerson
[illegible]
X4646

PRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND ADVISE THEM OF THE SSC REQUEST. SECURE THEIR COMMENTS RELATIVE TO: WHETHER THEY HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO OUR RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL FROM THEM CONTAINED IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS, WHICH WOULD DISCLOSE THAT THEY USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR COVERAGE OF KING. THEY SHOULD BE APPRISED OF THE FACT EVEN IF FBIHQ DOES NOT VOLUNTARILY SUPPLY REQUESTED INFORMATION, SSC MAY SUBPOENA FBI RECORDS.

EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY TELETYPE IN THE ABOVE CAPTION, ATTENTION INTD, W. O. CREGAR, BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

END

FBI MM CLR MRO

NR012 WA CODE

258PM URGENT 9-5-75 VLN

TO MIAMI
NEW YORK

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

REMMAIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, NYAIRTELS MAY 18, 1965, MAY 28, 1965, AND NYLET JULY 29, 1965, ALL CAPTIONED " MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER - C," MIAMI FILE 100-15079, NEW YORK FILE 100-136585.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED ACCESS TO ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES OR GOVERNMENTS.

REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS INDICATE THAT THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, AND THE THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT IN THEIR COVERAGE OF DR. KING.

IN ORDER FOR FBIHQ TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE SSC REQUEST IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR MIAMI AND NEW YORK TO CONTACT APPRO-

66-3346-12

SEARCHED mj INDEXED mj
SERIALIZED mj FILED mj
SEP 5 1975
FBI—MIAMI

PRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND ADVISE THEM OF THE SSC REQUEST. SECURE THEIR COMMENTS RELATIVE TO: WHETHER THEY HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO OUR RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL FROM THEM CONTAINED IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS, WHICH WOULD DISCLOSE THAT THEY USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR COVERAGE OF KING. THEY SHOULD BE APPRISED OF THE FACT EVEN IF FBIHQ DOES NOT VOLUNTARILY SUPPLY REQUESTED INFORMATION, SSC MAY SUBPOENA FBI RECORDS.

EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY TELETYPE IN THE ABOVE CAPTION, ATTENTION INTD, W. O. CREGAR, BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

END

FBI MM CLR MRO

NR033 WA CODE

4:47PM 9/4/75 NITEL AJN

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

PURPOSES OF INSTANT TELETYPE ARE TO (1) REITERATE THAT FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND WISHES TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI; AND (2) SET FORTH NEW PROCEDURE RELATING TO SSC STAFF INTERVIEWS OF CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

FOR INFORMATION OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY HAD CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITOY INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSC OR OTHERWISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYEES ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR INTERVIEW BY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED FOR THE FIELD OFFICE TO CONTACT THE FORMER EMPLOYEE TO ALERT HIM AS TO POSSIBLE INTERVIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT WITH THE BUREAU AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED FOR

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

66-3346-12

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED mj FILED mj
SEP 4 1975
FBI-MIAMI

INTERVIEW, HE MAY CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. IN THE USUAL CASE, AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLD(1) THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BUREAU CANNOT PROVIDE SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW WITHIN SPECIFIED PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION. THESE AREAS ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY (A) IDENTIFY BUREAU SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL IDENTITIES OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND (D) ADVERSELY AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS.

HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIEWEES CONSULTATION PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIEWEE MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS OF INTERVIEW OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULTANT DID NOT ACT AS A LEGAL ADVISOR.

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE

ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST EITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACT EITHER PERSONALLY (IF INTERVIEW IS IN WASHINGTON, D. C.) OR BY COLLECT CALL, THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. W. R. WANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF W. O. CREGAR.

THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION, WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD.

END

FBI MM CLR MRW

NR033 WA CODE

4:47PM 9/4/75 NITEL AJN

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

PURPOSES OF INSTANT TELETYPE ARE TO (1) REITERATE THAT FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND WISHES TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI; AND (2) SET FORTH NEW PROCEDURE RELATING TO SSC STAFF INTERVIEWS OF CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

FOR INFORMATION OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY HAD CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITOY INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSC OR OTHERWISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYEES ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR INTERVIEW BY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED FOR THE FIELD OFFICE TO CONTACT THE FORMER EMPLOYEE TO ALERT HIM AS TO POSSIBLE INTERVIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT WITH THE BUREAU AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED FOR

66-3346-12

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
SEP 4 1975
FBI—MIAMI

INTERVIEW, HE MAY CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. IN THE USUAL CASE, AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLD(1) THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BUREAU CANNOT PROVIDE SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW WITHIN SPECIFIED PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION. THESE AREAS ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY (A) IDENTIFY BUREAU SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL IDENTITIES OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND (D) ADVERSELY AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS.

HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIEWEES CONSULTATION PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIEWEE MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS OF INTERVIEW OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULTANT DID NOT ACT AS A LEGAL ADVISOR.

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE

ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST EITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACT EITHER PERSONALLY (IF INTERVIEW IS IN WASHINGTON, D. C.) OR BY COLLECT CALL, THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. W. R. WANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF W. O. CREGAR.

THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION, WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD.

END

FBI MM CLR MRW

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

1010

FBI

Date: AUGUST 28, 1975

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE IMMEDIATE
(Priority)

1

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL 8-26-75.

FORMER MIAMI ASAC FREDERICK F. FOX CONTACTED 8-27-75 PER INSTRUCTION.

FOX'S RESIDENCE ADDRESS SHOULD BE CORRECTED IN BUREAU RECORDS TO 11450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI 33161.

END

JLM:mjs
(1)

Filed

66-3346-11

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent 10 13 PM Per

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

NR001 MM CODE

10:13PM IMMEDIATE AUGUST 28, 1975 JWB

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MIAMI

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL AUGUST 26, 1975.

FORMER MIAMI ASAC FREDERICK F. FOX CONTACTED AUGUST 27, 1975 PER INSTRUCTION.

FOX'S RESIDENCE ADDRESS SHOULD BE CORRECTED IN BUREAU RECORDS TO 11450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI 33161.

END.

VN FBIHQ CLR

Searched..........
Serialized....mg
Indexed.......mg
Filed..........

66-3346-11

NR259 WA CODE

3:32PM NITEL 8-26-75 LXS

TO ALBANY
BALTIMORE
MIAMI
PHILADELPHIA
TAMPA

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

P 66-3346 * (5/75)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF. WHILE SUBJECT OF INTERVIEWS HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY SSC, INTERVIEWS WILL LIKELY PERTAIN TO THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES' DUTIES WHILE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND/OR SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTIONS AND MAY ALSO RELATE TO THE FORMER BUREAU'S INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS. SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU

66-3346-10

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
AUG 26 1975
FBI—MIAMI

EMPLOYEES.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES, ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, AND THIRD AGENCY RULE, INCLUDING IDENTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES), THEY MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALBANY: JOHN H. KLEINKAUF, 1153 CULLEN AVENUE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12309; EMPLOYED AS DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND SAFETY, UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12308.

BALTIMORE: JAMES F. BLAND, 4310 ROSEDALE AVENUE, BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20014.

MIAMI: FREDERICK F. FOX, 1450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33161.

PHILADELPHIA: MRS. KATHLEEN LOGAN, SPOUSE OF SA RICHARD E. LOGAN, ASSIGNED PHILADELPHIA OFFICE.

TAMPA: PAUL L. COX, U.S.N.A.T.O., P. O. BOX 1418, SARASOTA, FLORIDA 33578.

BEST INFORMATION BUREAU HAS CONCERNING COX'S WHEREABOUTS IS THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ON A LENGTHLY TRIP WITH A MOTOR TRAILER THROUGH CANADA AND THE MID-WEST. INDICATED ADDRESS BELIEVED TO BE A TRAILER COURT CONTACT POINT FOR MAILING PURPOSES. BUREAU DOES NOT DESIRE EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE COX AND

SUGGESTS FEASIBILITY OF LEAVING SOME MESSAGE THROUGH THE INDICATED ADDRESS OR SOME MEANS OF FORWARDING A COMMUNICATION TO COX SO HE MIGHT CONTACT YOUR OFFICE ON RETURN TO AREA OR SOONER. TAMPA'S REPLY TO BUREAU SHOULD SET OUT WHAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT HAVE BEEN PERFECTED.

END

FBI MM JWB CLR

NR009 WA CODE

3:30PM NITEL 8-26-75 LXS

TO ALBANY
BALTIMORE
MIAMI
PHILADELPHIA
TAMPA

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF. WHILE SUBJECT OF INTERVIEWS HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY SSC, INTERVIEWS WILL LIKELY PERTAIN TO THESE ORMER EMPLOYEES' DUTIES WHILE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND/OR SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTIONS AND MAY ALSO RELATE TO THE FORMER BUREAU'S INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS. SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU

66-3346-10

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
AUG 26 1975
FBI—MIAMI

EMPLOYEES.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES, ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, AND THIRD AGENCY RULE, INCLUDING IDENTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES), THEY MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALBANY: JOHN H. KLEINKAUF, 1153 CULLEN AVENUE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12309; EMPLOYED AS DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND SAFETY, UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12308.

BALTIMORE: JAMES F. BLAND, 4310 ROSEDALE AVENUE, BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20014.

MIAMI: FREDERICK F. FOX, 1450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33161.

PHILADELPHIA: MRS. KATHLEEN LOGAN, SPOUSE OF SA RICHARD E. LOGAN, ASSIGNED PHILADELPHIA OFFICE.

TAMPA: PAUL L. COX, U.S.N.A.T.O., P. O. BOX 1418, SARASOTA, FLORIDA 33578.

BEST INFORMATION BUREAU HAS CONCERNING COX'S WHEREABOUTS IS THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ON A LENGTHLY TRIP WITH A MOTOR TRAILER THROUGH CANADA AND THE MID-WEST. INDICATED ADDRESS BELIEVED TO BE A TRAILER COURT CONTACT POINT FOR MAILING PURPOSES. BUREAU DOES NOT DESIRE EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE COX AND

SUGGESTS FEASIBILITY OF LEAVING SOME MESSAGE THROUGH THE INDICATED ADDRESS OR SOME MEANS OF FORWARDING A COMMUNICATION TO COX SO HE MIGHT CONTACT YOUR OFFICE ON RETURN TO AREA OR SOONER. TAMPA'S REPLY TO BUREAU SHOULD SET OUT WHAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT HAVE BEEN PERFECTED.

END

FBI MM JWB CLR

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

245
p

10

FBI

Date: 6/24/75

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

ATTENTION: SA W.O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346) (RUC)

TOP SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO
SECRET
Per CG4i57B22
Date 6/3/06

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED JUNE 24, 1975

RE BUREAU TELETYPE JUNE 18, 1975, AS ABOVE.

THE FILES OF THE MIAMI OFFICE CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON "MAIL SURVEILLANCE" BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FBI FROM JANUARY 1, 1960 TO THE PRESENT TIME.

(1) MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT.

ON JANUARY 2, 1963, MIAMI BEGAN SCREENING AIRMAIL TO CUBA EMANATING FROM PUERTO RICO IN CONNECTION WITH THE CASE CAPTIONED, "PENETRATE, ESPIONAGE - CUBA," BUFILE 65-67842, OFFICE OF ORIGIN SAN JUAN 65-398, MIAMI 65-2940.

Searched
Indexed
Serialized ew
Filed ew

1-66-3346
RLO/kr
(1)

ew
6/75

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent PMJ-414 M Per

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

TOP SECRET

ON FEBRUARY 11, 1963, MIAMI BEGAN SCREENING SUCH MAIL EMANATING FROM MIAMI IN CONNECTION WITH THE CASE CAPTIONED, "FOXTROT, ESPIONAGE - CUBA," BUFILE 65-67951, OFFICE OF ORIGIN MIAMI 65-2945.

IN ORDER TO FACILITATE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON THE SCREENING OF THIS MAIL, MIAMI OPENED A SEPARATE FILE

2 CAPTIONED, "JOE SURVEY, ESPIONAGE - CUBA," MIAMI 65-2959, AND THIS SOURCE WAS ASSIGNED SYMBOL NUMBER CSMM 921-S.

THE PURPOSE OF THE JOE SURVEY WAS TO LOCATE CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH THE USE OF CERTAIN INDICATORS AND DROP ADDRESSES ON MAIL TO CUBA, AND TO IDENTIFY THE COMMUNICATION AS BEING ONE DIRECTED BY AN ILLEGAL AGENT THROUGH ITS CONTENTS AND WRITING CHRACTERISTICS.

THIS MAIL WAS INTERCEPTED IN A ROOM FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY THE POSTAL INSPECTORS AT THE BISCAYNE ANNEX POST OFFICE, MIAMI. POSTAL EMPLOYEES WOULD BRING THE APPROPRIATE MAIL BAGS TO THIS ROOM, WHERE MIAMI AGENTS WOULD REVIEW IT, LOOKING FOR SOME 50 DROP ADDRESSES IN CUBA, REBIND THE MAIL IN BUNDLES, AND PLACE IT BACK IN THE MAIL BAGS.

Approved: ______________________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE THREE

~~TOP~~ SECRET

THIS MAIL CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF LETTERS CONTAINING PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SOME 12,000 TO 20,000 LETTERS BEING REVIEWED DAILY.

THE JOE SURVEY ENDED ON JULY 21, 1966. THE NUMBER OF AGENTS UTILIZED RANGED FROM FOUR TO TWENTY DEPENDING ON THE AMOUNT OF MAIL AND WHETHER A SPECIAL SEARCH WAS NEEDED BASED ON INFORMATION FROM BUREAU SOURCE SIX. AGENT TIME SPENT WAS APPROXIMATELY 60 MAN HOURS A WEEK.

3 AGENTS REVIEWING THIS MAIL WERE FROM THE SECURITY SQUAD AND THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL AGENTS INTERCEPTED MAIL AT BISCAYNE ANNEX AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SURVEY:

JOHN BARRON; EDWARD J. DAHL; GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR.,; WILLIAM E. DOWLING; JAMES H. DOWNING; WILLIAM MAYO DREW, JR.; ARNOLD C. DUQUETTE; ROBERT JAMES DWYER; CHARLES W. EDMISTON; THOMAS ERRION; MAURICE F. FARABEE; LAWRENCE FELDHAUS; CLARENCE P. GRAHAM; ERNEST HARRISON; JAMES D.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

HAYES; JAMES C. HOLMES; MELVIN C. JENSEN; SAMUEL W. JONES; JOSEPH P. MC CANN; JOHN E. MC HUGH; JOHN J. MATTIMORE; JOHN C. MENTON; PETER J. NERO; JAMES J. O'CONNOR; RAYMOND L. O'KELLY; EUGENE L. PAYNE; LEON PRIOR; LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.; WILLIAM W. STEVENS; ROBERT G. STRONG; EDWIN L. SWEET.

WHEN A DROP ADDRESS WAS NOTED ON AN ENVELOPE, THIS PIECE OF MAIL WAS HAND CARRIED AND LATER SENT BY MAIL, PURSUANT TO BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, TO THE FBI LABORATORY FOR EXAMINATION FOR SECRET WRITING AND MICRODOTS. IN EACH CASE, AFTER THE LETTER WAS EXAMINED, IT WAS THEN PLACED BACK IN THE NORMAL FLOW OF MAIL AT BISCAYNE ANNEX DESTINED FOR CUBA.

AUTHORITY TO HAND DELIVER LETTERS TO THE LABORATORY CAME FROM BUREAU SUPERVISORS WILLIAM A. BRANNIGAN, OTHO EZELL, AND INSPECTOR DON MOORE.

4

DURING THE PERIOD THE JOE SURVEY WAS IN EFFECT, APPROXIMATELY 4,00 LETTERS WERE OPENED EITHER BY THE FBI LABORATORY OR THE MIAMI OFFICE, RELATING TO CUBAN

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

~~TOP~~ SECRET

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. OF THIS AMOUNT, THERE WERE 50 LETTERS IN 1963 AND 10 LETTERS IN 1964, WHICH WERE DETERMINED TO CONTAIN SECRET INK MESSAGES, EITHER ON THE LETTER OR ON THE ENVELOPE.

THE MAIL INTERCEPTED AT BISCAYNE ANNEX WHICH WAS OPENED AT THE MIAMI OFFICE WAS OPENED IN A SPECIAL CHAMFERING ROOM BY THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL AGENTS:

JAMES D. HAYES, WILLIAM E. DOWLING, WILLIAM W. STEVENS, GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR., WILLIAM G. FRIEDEMANN.

THOSE LETTERS OPENED AT THE MIAMI OFFICE WHICH WERE IN THE SPANISH LANGUAGE WERE TRANSLATED BY MRS. SOPHIA Y. SALIBA AND MISS ELEANORE M. SCHOENBERGER.

(2) MAIL COVERS PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES.

THERE WERE NO KNOWN INSTANCES WHERE MIAMI FBI EMPLOYEES PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED A MAIL COVER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES OTHER THAN AS INCIDENTAL TO THE REVIEW OF MAIL IN THE JOE SURVEY.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE SIX

~~TOP~~ SECRET

(3) DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA ON MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE.

5

PENETRATE, ESPIONAGE - CUBA: P PENETRATE WAS THE BUREAU CODE NAME FOR A CUBAN INTELLIGENCE AGENT IN PUERTO RICO.

ALL OF THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS WERE DISSEMINATED UNDER THE ABOVE CAPTION:

BUREAU AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, OCTOBER 29, 1962, REQUESTING SAN JUAN CONSIDER FEASIBILITY OF CHECKING MAIL COMING FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, NOVEMBER 3, 1962, CONCERNING BUREAU DECISION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE CHECKING OF THIS MAIL.

SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 2, 1962, CONCERNING A WATCH LIST OF SUSPECTED MAIL GOING TO CUBA.

BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN, NOVEMBER 7, 1962, REQUESTING MIAMI TO CONTACT POST OFFICE ON FEASIBILITY OF CHECKING MAIL FROM PUERTO Rico TO CUBA VIA MIAMI.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________ (Priority)

PAGE SEVEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 10, 1962, REQUESTING MIAMI TO DETERMINE FROM POST OFFICE THE NUMBER OF MAIL DISPATCHES FROM MIAMI TO CUBA.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI NOVEMBER 8, 1962, ON DESIRABILITY OF AGENTS RATHER THAN POSTAL EMPLOYEES CHECKING THIS MAIL.

10

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 13, 1962, REQUESTING BUREAU TO CONTACT CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR, WASHINGTON, D.C., ON CHECKING MAIL AT MIAMI.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, NOVEMBER 21, 1962, ADVISING FBI LABORATORY SHOULD PROCESS ANY LETTERS SENT BY PENETRATE FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.

SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 23, 1962, ON TRANSPORTING SUSPECTED MAIL VIA THE AIRLINES.

BUAIRTEL TO SAN JUAN DECEMBER 4, 1962, ON BUREAU CONTACT WITH CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR H.B. MONTAGUE.

BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI DECEMBER 10, 1962, ON MIAMI AGENTS PERSONALLY HANDLING SCREENING OF MAIL.

Approved: ______________________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ____________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via __________ ____________________ (Priority)

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU, DECEMBER 13, 1962, ON CONTACT WITH POSTAL INSPECTOR E.M. CAMPBELL ON METHOD OF SCREENING THIS MAIL.

NEW YORK AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 12, 1962, ON SIGNIFICANT CLANDESTINE INDICATORS WHEN REVIEWING THIS MAIL.

SAN JUAN AIRTEL TO MIAMI DECEMBER 13, 1962, ON METHOD PENETRATE USED TO SIGNIFY INVISIBLE WRITING IN A LETTER.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI DECEMBER 21, 1962, AUTHORIZING MIAMI TO SCREEN MAIL FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA. ALSO AUTHORIZING SPECIAL AGENTS GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR., AND WILLIAM G. FRIEDEMANN TO HANDLE INITIAL INSPECTION OF COMMUNICATIONS BEFORE SENT TO FBI LABORATORY AND SETS OUT METHOD OF TRANSMITTAL TO LABORATORY.

7

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 28, 1962, ON MIAMI ARRANGEMENTS WITH LOCAL POSTAL AUTHORITIES TO IMPLEMENT SCREENING SURVEY.

Approved: ____________________ Sent __________ M Per ____________________

Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE NINE

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI, JANUARY 3, 1963, REQUESTING NAMES OF MIAMI AGENTS WHO HAVE RECEIVED SPECIALIZED TRAINING IN PROCESSING MAIL.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 7, 1963, ON MIAMI AGENTS WHO HAVE RECEIVED CHAMFERING TRAINING.

SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU JANUARY 10, 1963, WITH NEW DROP ADDRESSES IN CUBA FOR MIAMI MAIL PROCESSING.

BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN JANUARY 24, 1963, ON FBI LABORATORY PROCESSING SUSPECTED LETTER RECEIVED FROM MIAMI MAIL SURVEY.

SAN JUAN RADIOGRAM TO MIAMI JANUARY 25, 1963, ON NEW LETTER DROP OF PENETRATE IN CUBA.

BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN JANUARY 30, 1963, AUTHORIZING 30 DAY MAIL COVER ON RIOS MORALES, HIMENEZ VEGA, AND MUJICA.

NEW YORK AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 30, 1963, SETTING OUT INDICATORS ON ENVELOPES TO ASSIST MIAMI IN IDENTIFYING MAIL FROM ILLEGAL AGENTS.

8

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via
(Priority)

PAGE TEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN FEBRUARY 14, 1963, CONTAINING NEW CUBAN DROP ADDRESSES OF PENETRATE.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, FEBRUARY 28, 1963, ON FEASIBILITY OF OBTAINING ACCESS TO CUBAN COURIERS BAGGAGE OR DIPLOMATIC POUCHES TO DETERMINE CUBAN MAIL DROP IN NEW YORK CITY.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI MARCH 28, 1963, ADVISING NO SECRET WRITING OR MICRODOTS ON SUSPECTED LETTER SENT TO LABORATORY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU MAY 17, 1963, ADVISING THAT MIAMI IS NOT SCREENING ANY MAIL COMING FROM CUBA.

SAN JUAN LETTER TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 23, 1965, REQUESTING MIAMI TO EXTEND JOE SURVEY TO COVER INCOMING MAIL FROM CUBA TO PUERTO RICO AND OUTGOING MAIL PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU APRIL 2, 1965, ADVISING THAT MIAMI POSTAL INSPECTOR E.M. CAMPBELL BELIEVES THAT SCREENING INCOMING MAIL FROM CUBA FOR PUERTO RICO WOULD PRESENT SECURITY PROBLEM AND ADD APPROXIMATELY 17,000 PIECES OF MAIL TO THE SCREENING DAILY.

Approved: Special Agent in Charge Sent M Per

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE ELEVEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

9 BUREAU LETTER TO SAN JUAN APRIL 19, 1965, CONCURRING WITH MIAMI RECOMMENDATION THAT JOE SURVEY COVERAGE CANNOT BE SECURELY EXPANDED AT THIS TIME AND INSTRUCTING SAN JUAN TO SUPPLY MIAMI WITH LIST OF DROP ADDRESSES IN CUBA.

SAN JUAN LETTER TO MIAMI MAY 17, 1965, ADVISING WATCH LIST OF DROP NAMES AND ADDRESSES IN CUBA NOT BEING FURNISHED DUE TO LARGE NUMBER OF WATCH LIST.

FOXTROT, ESPIONAGE - CUBA:

FOXTROT WAS THE BUREAU CODE NAME FOR A CUBAN INTELLIGENCE AGENT IN MIAMI. INVESTIGATION WAS INITIATED ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION FROM BUREAU SOURCE 6. ALL OF THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS WERE DISSEMINATED UNDER THE ABOVE CAPTION:

BUREAU AIRTEL TO NEW YORK DECEMBER 12, 1962, ON NEW NAMES AND ADDRESSES IN CUBA IN THE EVENT MIAMI INSTRUCTED TO INSTITUTE COVERAGE OF MAIL FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ______________________ (Priority)

PAGE TWELVE

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 15, 1963, ADVISING INFORMATION IN BUREAU LET DECEMBER 12, 1962, INCLUDED IN MIAMI MAIL COVERAGE IN PENETRATE CASE.

MIAMI TELETYPES TO BUREAU JANUARY 25 AND JANUARY 31, 1963, REQUESTING AUTHORITY TO SCREEN MIAMI TO CUBA MAIL, AND ADVISING THAT MIAMI POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL ADVISED ADDITIONAL COVERAGE WOULD CAUSE NO BURDEN OR INTERRUPT POST OFFICE OPERATIONS.

BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI FEBRUARY 4, 1963, ADVISING TO CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR H.B. MONTAGUE, WASHINGTON, D.C., GAVE APPROVAL TO COVERAGE OF MAIL GOING FROM MIAMI TO CUBA.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 11, 1963, ADVISING JOE SURVEY COVERAGE BEGAN FEBRUARY 11, 1963.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 12, 1963, ESTIMATING 12,000 PIECES OF MAIL BEING REVIEWED DAILY IN FOXTROT AND PENETRATE CASES.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ____________

Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

TO~~P~~ SECRET

BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO MIAMI MARCH 12, 1963, ON FEASIBILITY OF JOE SURVEY SCREENING MAIL ARRIVING IN MIAMI FROM NEW YORK CITY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD IN EFFORT TO OBTAIN LETTER CONTANING PHOTOGRAPH AND MONEY TO BE SENT FOXTROT FROM CUBA, IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY FOXTROT.

MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU MARCH 13, 1963, ADVISING LOCAL POSTAL INSPECTOR APPROVED AND REQUESTING CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR MONTAGUE BE CONTACTED FOR OFFICIAL APPROVAL IN SCREENING NEW YORK MAIL.

BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI MARCH 14, 1963, ADVISING CLEARANCE OBTAINED FROM MONTAGUE FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD TO SCREEN THE NEW YORK MAIL.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO NEW YORK, MARCH 13, 1963, ON FEASIBILITY OF SCREENING MAIL FROM CUBAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY FOXTROT.

MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU MARCH 17, 1963, ADVISING THAT SLIGHTLY OVER ONE MILLION PIECES OF MAIL FROM NEW YORK AREA BEING REVIEWED DAILY.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE FOURTEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU MARCH 15, 1963, ADVISING MAIL COVER TO BE PLACED ON FOXTROT, UACB; POSTAL INSPECTORS WILL PROVIDE THE RETURN ADDRESSES ON THIS MAIL.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI MARCH 28, 1963, ADVISING SECRET WRITING FOUND ON A LETTER SUBMITTED FROM JOE SURVEY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU MARCH 25, 1963, INDICATING MAIL COVER PLACED ON SON OF FOXTROT, POSTAL INSPECTORS WILL FURNISH RETURN ADDRESSES.

BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI MARCH 29, 1963, INDICATING THAT A LETTER CONTAINING SECRET WRITING FROM FOXTROT MAY HAVE BEEN PROCESSED PRIOR TO ITS RECEIPT BY LABORATORY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU APRIL 1, 1963, INDICATING MAIL COVERS ON FOXTROT AND SON OF FOXTROT WERE UNPRODUCTIVE.

MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU APRIL 3, 1963, ADVISING LETTERS OF FOXTROT WERE NOT MADE AVAILABLE TO ANY OTHER PERSON OR AGENCY ACCORDING TO POSTAL INSPECTORS.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE FIFTEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BUREAU TELETYPES APRIL 12 AND APRIL 23, 1963, ADVISING SECRET WRITING CONTAINED IN A LETTER AND TWO RELIGIOUS PAMPHLETS SENT BY FOXTROT.

12 MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU APRIL 29, 1963, CONTAINING THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF WEEKLY SUMMARIES ON THE FOXTROT INVESTIGATION.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI, MAY 2, 1963, ASKING FEASIBILITY OF USING MAILS RATHER THAN AGENT PERSONNEL IN SUBMITTING LETTERS OF FOXTROT TO LABORATORY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU MAY 6, 1963, ON ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH POST OFFICE IN SCREENING MAIL AND RECOMMENDING AGENT PERSONNEL BE USED IN TRANSMITTING THURSDAY INTERCEPTIONS.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI MAY 16, 1963, ADVISING MIAMI TO USE THE MAIL IN FORWARDING LETTERS OF FOXTROT TO FBI LABORATORY, EXCEPT FOR THURSDAY INTERCEPTIONS.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI JUNE 24, 1963, AUTHORIZING 30 DAY MAIL COVER ON FRANCISCO GUASCH, A SUSPECTED MAIL DROP OF FOXTROT.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE SIXTEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI JUNE 27, 1963, ADVISING THAT SECRET WRITING WAS FOUND ON THE ENVELOPE CONTAINING A LETTER OF FOXTROT.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JULY 1, 1963, ADVISING MAIL COVER PLACED ON SUSPECTED MAIL DROP OF FOXTROT IN MIAMI.

BUREAU LETTER TO MIAMI JULY 12, 1963, ADVISING IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR MIAMI TO INFORM BUREAU WHEN INTERCEPTED LETTERS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO NORMAL MAIL FLOW AT MIAMI.

13

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI AUGUST 15, 1963, SETTING OUT GUIDELINES IN DUSCUSSING FOXTROT CASE WITH MIAMI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

MIAMI LETTER TO BUREAU SEPTEMBER 9, 1963, REPORTING RESULTS OF MAIL COVER ON FRANCISCO GUASCH, WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI SEPTEMBER 19, 1963, ON FEASIBILITY OF CHECKING POST OFFICE BOXES FOR MAIL DROP OF FOXTROT IN MIAMI.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE SEVENTEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI SEPTEMBER 26, 1963, GIVING AUTHORITY FOR SIX MONTHS MAIL COVER ON FRANCISCO GUASCH.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI OCTOBER 3, 1963, POINTED OUT THAT SECRET WRITING WAS FOUND ON TWO SHEETS OF PAPER SUBMITTED WITH A BLANK LETTER OF FOXTROT.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU OCTOBER 10, 1963, ADVISING THAT THROUGH ARRANGEMENTS WITH POSTAL INSPECTOR R.G. WOLF, A LETTER FROM FOXTROT IN A POST OFFICE BOX USED AS A DROP, WAS OBTAINED AND FORWARDED TO LABORATORY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU OCTOBER 14, 1963, ADVISING POSTAL INSPECTOR MADE AVAILABLE ANOTHER LETTER OF FOXTROT FROM A MAIL DROP IN MIAMI.

14 MIAMI LETTER TO BUREAU OCTOBER 21, 1963, WITH RESULTS OF MAIL COVER ON A SUSPECTED INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHICH WERE PROVIDED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR SAL DRAGO.

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI NOVEMBER 13, 1963, ON ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING OF INTERCEPTED MAIL SENT TO FBI LABORATORY.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________ (Priority)

PAGE EIGHTEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 5, 1963, RECOMMENDING SCREENING OF MAIL FROM MIAMI TO MEXICO, APPROXIMATELY 5,000 LETTERS A DAY WOULD BE INVOLVED.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU NOVEMBER 21, 1963, ADVISING A MANILA ENVELOPE MAILED FROM NEW YORK CITY INTERCEPTED AND BELIEVED TO CONTAIN A BOOK AND MONEY FOR FOXTROT.

NEW YORK AIRTEL TO BUREAU NOVEMBER 26, 1963, INDICATING THAT A PORTION OF THE MONEY FURNISHED TO FOXTROT FOUND IN AFOREMENTIONED BOOK ORIGINATED FROM SOVIET FUNDS USED IN THEIR CLANDESTINE OPERATION.

MEMORANDUM OF SA WILLIAM E. DOWLING DATED DECEMBER 2, 1963, CONTAINING COMPILATION OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON FOXTROT CASE.

BUREAU LETTER TO MIAMI DECEMBER 5, 1963, REQUESTING APPROPRIATE COVERAGE BY MIAMI OF A POST OFFICE BOX USED AS A MAIL DROP BY FOXTROT.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________

Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE NINETEEN

~~TOP~~ SECRET

15 MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 14, 1963, ADVISING OF A LETTER WHICH FOXTROT MAILED AT A MAIL BOX AND WHICH WAS FURNISHED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR E.M. CAMPBELL.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 18, 1963, ADVISING THREE LETTERS WHICH FOXTROT MAILED AT MAIN POST OFFICE FURNISHED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 27, 1964, RECOMMENDING THAT CIA AT MEXICO CITY, MEXICO CONTINUE SCREENING MAIL FOR MEXICO AS SOME OF THIS MAIL MAY BYPASS JOE SURVEY.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 3, 1964, ADVISING OF ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL TO REVIEW MAIL GOING TO A SUSPECTED DROP ADDRESS OF FOXTROT IN MIAMI AREA.

MIAMI MEMORANDUM DATED JUNE 2, 1964, SUMMARIZING BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF FOXTROT THROUGH 1963, INCLUDING SECRET INK MESSAGES LOCATED IN HIS LETTERS.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JUNE 10, 1964, REINSTITUTING TEMPORARY SCREENING OF ALL MAIL FROM NEW YORK, NEW YORK AREA TO CUBA.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWENTY

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MIAMI MEMORANDUM DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 1964, SUMMARIZING BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF FOXTROT IN 1964.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 13, 1965, FORWARDING A LETTER OF FOXTROT MAILED AT A MAIL BOX AND PROVIDED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL.

16

BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI SEPTEMBER 3, 1965, REQUESTING INTERVIEW OF FOXTROT BE CONSIDERED IN VIEW OF LACK OF INFORMATION INDICATING HE IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY AND HOW INFORMATION FROM JOE SURVEY CAN BE USED DURING INTERVIEW.

MIAMI MEMORANDUM DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 1965, SUMMARIZING BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF FOXTROT IN 1965.

MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU OCTOBER 14, 1966, REFLECTING JOE SURVEY WAS DISCONTINUED ON JULY 21, 1966 AT THE DIRECTION OF THE BUREAU.

(4) BUREAU ASKED IF MM 890-S RESULTED FROM INTERCEPTION OF MAIL.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ____________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWENTY-ONE

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MM 890-S WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE INTERCEPT OF MAIL.

THE BUREAU MAY HAVE REFERENCE TO CSMM 809-S ASTERISK, MIAMI FILE 134-769, A BUREAU AUTHORIZED ACTIVITY WHICH BEGAN ON MARCH 15, 1962, AND ENDED AUGUST 1, 1966. THIS OPERATION PHOTOGRAPHED MATERIAL FROM DIPLOMATIC POUCHES, HAVANA, CUBA TO NEW YORK, AND HAVANA TO THE CUBAN EMBASSY, OTTAWA, CANADA, WHICH PASSED THROUGH MIAMI VIA PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS.

INFORMATION FROM CSMM 809-S* ASTERISK WAS DISSEMINATED UNDER THE CAPTION, "FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA," BUFILE 109-12-210, MIAMI FILE 105-1747.

17

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CSMM 809-S* ASTERISK IS NOT BEING SUBMITTED AS IT DOES NOT INVOLVE MAIL EMANATING IN THE U.S. OR PUERTO RICO.

TOP SECRET, CLASSIFIED BY 7129, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

DOWNGRADED TO
SECRET
Per C98W57B22
Date 6/2/2016

NR048 WA CODE

4:38PM IMMEDIATE 6/18/75 GHS

TO NEW YORK MIAMI
BOSTON SAN FRANCISCO
DETROIT SEATTLE
LOS ANGELES WFO

FROM DIRECTOR

~~TOP~~ SECRET

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE

maintain file on #9 rotor

6/18/75

66-3346-8

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
JUN 18 1975
FBI — MIAMI
O'Kelly | RFO

Contact SA Stephens + handle

STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING GUS SURVEY. NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE.

PAGE THREE TOP SECRET

SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

END

NR036 WA CODE

5:35PM NITEL 5-20-75 PAW

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY - 75.

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1973.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR, IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE. UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL INFORMATION FURNISHED.

END

JLB FBI MM

AM CLR TKS

66-3346-7

D INDEXED

FILED

MAY 21 1975

FBI-MIAMI

All supvs advised

ASAC

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Senate Committee Rejects Request By CIA, FBI to Monitor Inquiry

By SAUL FRIEDMAN
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Select Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities rejected Friday a rather unusual request by the CIA and FBI to monitor the committee's investigation into the spying operations of those agencies.

At the same time, committee chairman Frank Church (D., Idaho) announced that "the tempo of our investigation will now be stepped up" and that staff investigators will begin questioning witnesses, within a few days, about the CIA's "covert" operations here and abroad.

The committee was created by the Senate in January following charges and reports that government intelligence units and other agencies were illegally spying on American citizens. But the committee has been slow in getting off the ground.

FRIDAY, AT a closed meeting, committee members cleared away some obstacles to an investigation, Church reported, and "it was decided the serious investigative work should go forward."

Among the problems were requests, relayed to the committee by the White House and the Justice Department, that the CIA and the FBI be permitted to have monitors present when one of their agents or employes is questioned.

Church said the agencies suggested that "the monitors be called observers."

The committee has already agreed with CIA-FBI requests to take such unusual secrecy measures that committee and staff members will be required to withhold information from each other as well as from the public.

The committee balked at the latest request, however, because it would have opened the probe to the agencies under investigation and allowed them *to possibly intimidate* employes who may wish to give information about their superiors.

CHURCH SAID the committee had unanimously rejected the CIA-FBI proposal "believing there should be no inhibition" among those questioned by senators or staff personnel.

In another important procedural action, the committee gave Church the power to issue subpenas if the administration or the agencies are slow in volunteering documents and witnesses.

The first phase of the investigation, Church said, would go into the CIA's "covert intelligence operations" including reported plans and attempts to assassinate foreign leaders.

The committee investigators, with at least one senator present, will question witnesses informally or in sworn depositions in executive session, Church said.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

14-A

MIAMI HERALD

MIAMI, FLA.

Date: 5/10/75
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title: SENATE COMMITTEE REJECTS REQUEST BY FBI, CIA
Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: MIAMI, FLA.

☐ Being Investigated

66-3346-6

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____

MAY 13 1975

FBI-MIAMI

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Senate unit bars CIA, FBI from probe

Associated Press

WASHINGTON — The Senate Intelligence Committee has rejected as "unacceptable" a Ford administration proposal that CIA and FBI monitors be allowed to observe the questioning of witnesses.

Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) said the committee voted unanimously to enter the active phase of the probe and to authorize him to issue subpoenas if they prove necessary.

"We decided that the serious investigative work should now go forward," Church said. "The tempo of the investigation will now be stepped up."

He told a news conference the committee will begin a wide-ranging review of past and present covert intelligence activities, including "issues raised as to assassinations."

Church said the request for monitors to sit in on executive interrogation sessions was made by the White House, but he thought it had been initiated by the CIA.

"The committee voted unanimously to reject the proposal because we thought there should be no inhibition or possible inhibition" of witnesses, Church said.

The initial phase of the investigation — interviews, the taking of sworn depositions and formal hearings — will be closed to the public, Church said.

"The committee will decide later what phases of its investigation will go public," he added.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

2-A

MIAMI NEWS

MIAMI, FLA.

Date: 5-10-75
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title: SENATE UNIT BARS CIA, FBI FROM PROBE.

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: MIAMI, FLA.

☐ Being Investigated

66-3346-5
SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
MAY 13 1975
FBI-MIAMI

NR074 WA CODE

930PM NITEL 5-2-75 MSE

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK TO INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

66-3346-4

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
MAY - 2 1975
FBI-MIAMI

5/2/75

PROTECTED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL. YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

END

HOLD

FBI MM JGS

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

9 10
A
2

FBI

Date: MARCH ~~23~~ 27, 1975

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE ~~NITEL~~ URGENT
(Priority)

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MIAMI (66-ADM)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING ARE MIAMI OFFICE STATISTICS SHOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS BY SPECIAL AGENT PERSONNEL:

SACS - 0; ASACS - 0.

SUPERVISORS - CI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 90 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. SI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT.

SPECIAL AGENTS - CI MATTERS: 15 ASSIGNED FULL TIME; TWO ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 40 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. IS MATTERS: TWO ASSIGNED FULL TIME; THREE ASSIGNED 75 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 60 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 30 PERCENT; FIVE ASSIGNED 10 PERCENT.

JCB/al
(1)

Searched
Indexed
Serialized
Filed

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent 925 A M Per

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

66-3346-3

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, MIAMI

DATE: 3/26/75

FROM : SUPERVISOR JOSEPH C. BALL

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Re Miami teletype to Bureau, 3/26/75.

For your information, Supervisor CLYDE GROOVER, Budget and Accounting Section, Administrative Division, FBIHQ, advised that for purposes of response to Bureau teletype of 3/24/75, the following categories should be included under Internal Security:

3, 14, 61, 98, 100, 117, 157, 163, 170, 174, 176

The following categories should included under Counterintelligence:

2, 64, 65, 97, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111,
112, 113, 134, 185

In arriving at the statistics set forth in referenced teletype, the following Agents were included:

Supervisors - CI Matters: SA BALL - Assigned 90%
SA WILSON - Assigned 5%

IS Matters: SA EDDY - Assigned 50%
SA BALL - Assigned 5%

Special Agents - CI Matters: Assigned full time - SA BURGINS
CERVANTES
COCHRANE
DAWSON
DWYER
FARABEE
GIBBONS
JONES
KISZYNSKI
MARSZALEK
MILLS
ROSS
STEVENS
STICKNEY
WARGER

JCB/al
(1) al

66-3346-2

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
1975
FBI—MIAMI

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SAs - CI Matters (cont.) Assigned 50% -- FORRESTER and WALZER
Assigned 40% -- O'KELLY
Assigned 5% -- SITHER

IS Matters Assigned full time - HOMER MILLER
PETERSON
Assigned 75% - WINDLAND
MENTON
HEANEY
Assigned 60% - O'KELLY
Assigned 50% - CANNON
Assigned 30% - DOWLING
Assigned 10% - DOOHER
VAN RHEIN
GUTIERREZ
DREW
KELLOGG

NR046 WA CODE

8:30PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

END

FBI MM JRS CLR AND TKU

ACK FOR (1)

THANKS

8:45 pm DA

pls give me necessary figures

66-3346-1

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED C
SERIALIZED JC FILED C
MAR 24 1975
FBI—MIAMI

BALL

EDDY

SECRET

DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA, CHAIRMAN
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMAN

SAM NUNN, GEORGIA	ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA	FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY	ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA	JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA
DENNIS DeCONCINI, ARIZONA	ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, NEW YORK
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO	JOHN C. DANFORTH, MISSOURI
JOHN H. GLENN, JR., OHIO	

GEORGE MITCHELL, MAINE, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

GEORGE J. TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
L. BRITT SNIDER, GENERAL COUNSEL
KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

9003893

February 17, 1990

'90 FEB-20 9:22 PM

SSCI #90-505

The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Baker:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S. counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We request that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Ivan Selin, Undersecretary of State for Management. Other witnesses invited to testify are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Mr. Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center; and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with the Committee the results of the Administration's review of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s, whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with you further on those matters.

We would like Mr. Selin to address in his written testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions: (1) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe affected their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the requirements for CI operations and security measures against that threat? (2) To what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention in the 1990s? (3) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (4) What new challenges do technological advances and transfers to criteria countries and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s? (5) What are the consequences of these changing threats for embassy security priorities and protection of diplomatic, military, and intelligence secrets?

62-116395-1739

SECRET

DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA, CHAIRMAN
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMAN

SAM NUNN, GEORGIA
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA
DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO
JOHN H. GLENN, JR., OHIO

ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA
ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, NEW YORK
JOHN C. DANFORTH, MISSOURI

GEORGE MITCHELL, MAINE, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

GEORGE J. TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
L. BRITT SNIDER, GENERAL COUNSEL
KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

February 7, 1990

SSCI #90-507

The Honorable William Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Director Sessions:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S. counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We invite you to testify at that hearing as FBI Director and as chairman of the DCI's Advisory Group on Counterintelligence. Other witnesses invited to testify are Undersecretary of State Ivan Selin, Mr. Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center, and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. *

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with the Committee the results of the Administration's review of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s, whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with you further on those matters.

We would like you to address in your written testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions: (1) What are the results of the Administration's review of counterintelligence and security programs to meet the needs of the 1990s? (2) How will the Administration coordinate national policy in these areas? (3) What national policy initiatives are required for the 1990s, i.e., personnel security standards, actions to deter leaks? (4) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe diminished their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the requirements for CI operations and security measures against that threat? (5) To what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention in the 1990s? (6) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and

62-116395-1739

SECRET

BOREN, OKLAHOMA, CHAIRMAN
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMAN

GEORGIA
HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA
DENNIS DeCONCINI, ARIZONA
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO
JOHN H. GLENN, JR., OHIO

ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA
ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, NEW YORK
JOHN C. DANFORTH, MISSOURI

GEORGE MITCHELL, MAINE, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

GEORGE J. TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
L. BRITT SNIDER, GENERAL COUNSEL
KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

February 7, 1990

SSCI #90-506

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Judge Webster:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S. counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We request that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Hathaway as Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center. Other witnesses invited to testify are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Undersecretary of State Ivan Selin, and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with the Committee the results of the Administration's review of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s, whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with you further on those matters. || postpone

We would like Mr. Price to address in his written testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions: (1) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe affected their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the requirements for CI operations and security measures against that threat? (2) To what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention in the 1990s? (3) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (4) What new challenges do technological advances and transfers to criteria countries and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s? (5) What are the consequences of these changing threats for operations and security at CIA stations, embassy security priorities, and protection of military, diplomatic, and intelligence secrets? (6) Are US computer and communications security efforts

62-116395-1739

SECRET

SAM NUNN, GEORGIA
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA
DENNIS DeCONCINI, ARIZONA
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO
JOHN H. GLENN, JR., OHIO

ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA
ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, NEW YORK
JOHN C. DANFORTH, MISSOURI

GEORGE MITCHELL, MAINE, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

GEORGE J. TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
L. BRITT SNIDER, GENERAL COUNSEL
KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
90 FEB 13 AM 11:29

February 7, 1990

SSCI #90-508

The Honorable Dick Cheney
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Cheney:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S. counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We request that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Other witnesses invited to testify at this hearing are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Mr. Ivan Selin, Undersecretary of State for Management, and Mr. Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with the Committee the results of the Administration's review of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s, whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider issues identified in the testimony from a group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with you further on those matters.

We would like Mr. Haver to address in his written testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions: (1) What are the results of his review of DoD counterintelligence which you stated was "an early and high priority" in your letter of May 31, 1989? (2) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe diminished their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the requirements for CI operations and security measures against that threat? (3) To what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention in the 1990s? (4) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (5) What new challenges do technological advances and transfers to criteria countries and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s? (6) What are the consequences of these changing threats for

90/51066

SECRET

Sec Def Cont Nr. X52444

62-116395-1739

ENCLOSURE

12. ISSUE: The Committee believes the FBI does not share all information contain in its files with other members of the intelligence community when asked and that a centralized file would ensure full information is available to all intelligence agencies.

QUESTION: What are the advantages and disadvantages of a single database for CIA, FBI, and DOD?

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the INTD, ASD, CID, and RMD prepare responses for the questions identified above and submit those questions to the Congressional Affairs Office by close of business April 5, 1989 in the format currently in use classified as approriate with a heading for issue, question, summary response, details, and approval signed by the appropriate Assistant Director or Deputy Assistant Director and date signed.

APPROVED:
Director
Exec. AD-Adm.
Exec. AD-Inv.
Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Off of Lia. & Intl Affs.
Rec. Mgmt. AFM
Tech. Servs.
Training

2. That the Congressional Affairs Office coordinate the preparation of briefing materials and prepare the Director's opening statement and briefing book.

APPROVED:
Director
Exec. AD-Adm.
Exec. AD-Inv.
Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Off of Lia. & Intl Affs.
Rec. Mgmt. AFM
Tech. Servs.
Training

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA, CHAIRMAN
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMAN

LLOYD BENTSEN, TEXAS
SAM NUNN, GEORGIA
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA
DENNIS DeCONCINI, ARIZONA
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO

WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DELAWARE
ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALAS
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLV
CHIC HECHT, NEVADA
JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

GEORGE TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

#88-3613

October 17, 1988

Honorable William Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Director Sessions:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. counterintelligence and security programs and capabilities. Included in this review will be Executive branch efforts to stem the flow of sensitive technology and equipment to foreign governments.

Recent press reporting has alleged that such transfers have been made by the military offices of Egypt and Israel. Accordingly, I request that the FBI brief the Committee staff on any unauthorized transfer of technology and equipment from the United States by the Egyptians and by the Israelis. For the latter, we are particularly interested in any role played in these transfers by the Israeli Defense Procurement Mission and Trade Center in New York.

Sincerely,

David L Boren

David L. Boren
Chairman

William S. Cohen
Vice Chairman

SECRET/SENSITIVE

62-116295-1779

MEMORANDUM

Exec AD Adm___
Exec AD Inv___
Exec AD LES___
Asst.Dir.:
Adm.Servs.___
Crim.Inv.___
Ident.___
Insp.___
Intell.___
Lab.___
Legal Couns.___
Off.Cong & Public Affs.___
OLIA___
Rec. Mgnt.___
Tech. Servs.___
Training___
Telephone Rm.___
Director's Sec'y___

SECRET

To : Mr. S. M. McWeeney   Date 4/20/88

From : M. V. Hale

Subject : SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) REQUEST TO DISCUSS THE OFFICE OF LIAISON AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (OLIA) AND THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN

This communication is classified SECRET.

Reference memorandum captioned as above dated 4/14/88.

PURPOSE:

To set forth results of briefing of John Eliff, Professional Staff, SSCI, conducted by Office of Congressional Public Affairs Supervisory Special Agent John S. Hooks, Jr., Unit Chief Roland O. L'Allier, Jr., Intelligence Division, and OLIA Deputy Chief Martin V. Hale on the issue of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) representation in Berlin.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information only.

APPROVED:		
	Adm. Servs. ___	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs ___
	Crim. Inv. ___	Off. of Lia. & Intl. Affs MVM
	Ident. ___	Rec. Mgmt ___
Director ___	Inspection ___	Tech. Servs. ___
Exec. AD-Adm. ___	Intell. ___	Training ___
Exec. AD-Inv. ___	Laboratory ___	
Exec. AD-LES ___	Legal Coun. ___	

(CONTINUED - OVER)

1 - S. M. McWeeney
1 - J. H. Geer
    Attn: J. E. Tomlinson
1 - J. K. O'Brien
    Attn: J. S. Hooks, Jr.
1 - S. A. Pimentel
1 - T. E. Crosson
1 - M. V. Hale

MVH:flm (7)

62-116395-1727

MAY 26 1988

SECRET
Classified by: 3642
Declassify on: OADR

18 DEC 22 1988

Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney
Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and
International Affairs (OLIA) and the
Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS:

Mr. Hale opened the session, advising Mr. Eliff that, on his recent trip to Western Europe to visit certain U. S. Embassies and establishments, including the U. S. Mission in West Berlin, where Legal Attaches were desired and needed, he had conferred with appropriate U. S. military, U. S. Department of State (USDS) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel in order to present the FBI's case for representation in West Berlin. During these discussions, Mr. Hale was advised that staff members of the SSCI had recently visited West Berlin concerning counterintelligence issues and Mr. Hale, in that context, wished to brief Mr. Eliff regarding the FBI's perspectives on opening a Legal Attache, particularly from a counterintelligence point of view.

Mr. Eliff stated that although he had not recently visited West Berlin, he was intimately familiar with the intricacies of the counterintelligence atmosphere in West Berlin and supported the FBI's presence there. He indicated he was well aware of the gap which existed in the counterintelligence coverage of U. S. civilians, both students and businessmen in that neither the U. S. military nor the U. S. civilian intelligence intelligence components were addressing the threat to these individuals and this for two reasons.

The first involved the basic functions of the U. S. intelligence components in West Berlin, a function he described as being the collection of positive intelligence as opposed to counterintelligence, the latter being at best a secondary requirement.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney
Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and
International Affairs (OLIA) and the
Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS CONTINUED:

The second reason for this gap involves the legal guidelines under which the U. S. military, by virtue of their authority of an occupying power in West Berlin, conducts technical surveillance and mail openings. Mr. Eliff stated that, as an occupying power, the U. S. military, much like the FBI domestically, is the entity which conducts telephone monitorings of criteria country establishments and personnel in the U. S. sector of West Berlin. It also opens certain mail of interest from the East which passes through this sector. However, whenever there is an overhear of a U. S. national or whenever there is mention made of a U. S. national in a piece of correspondence, that U. S. national's name is not disseminated to any other U. S. intelligence agency. This lack of dissemination is as a result of a lawsuit in the early 1970s against the U. S. Army which, at that time, had in fact been monitoring the activities of U. S. nationals. As a consequence of this lawsuit, very stringent guidelines were written which compelled the U. S. military to use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to monitor Americans including stringent guidelines for minimizing overhears of U. S. nationals when monitoring non U. S. nationals.

The net results of these restrictions is that, according to Mr. Eliff, 15 years worth of overhears of U. S. nationals as well as the like potential collection of names of U. S. persons via mail openings has been lost.

Mr. Eliff advised it was his belief these minimization restrictions were too stringent and should be amended to allow for dissemination. He however stated that he thought the issue should be brought up after the upcoming elections in that he did not believe a "lame duck" administration would be interested in undertaking the issue.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

DETAILS CONTINUED:

As an aside, Mr. Eliff indicated that Allan Kornblum, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Department of Justice, had visited West Berlin on two occasions and was conversant with this U. S. military monitoring issue.

Mr. Eliff also stated that he further supported an FBI presence in West Berlin in that his study of the counterintelligence venue in that city indicated to him that the many double agent cases run by the U. S. military there were run for parochial reasons with no strategic view of counterintelligence. He stated that even though the U. S. military services were professional and did coordinate the turnover of some of their many double agents to the FBI when these agents are rotated back to domestic assignment, he believed the FBI should have input at the outset of these double agent cases insofar as the double agent technique was a fundamental counterintelligence tool which demanded consultation with the principle counterintelligence service, the FBI, at their inception in order to better globally address counterintelligence issues.

He stated he believed FBI presence in West Berlin would therefore be necessary if the U. S. were to have a coherent national counterintelligence strategy.

Mr. Eliff concluded by reiterating his support for the FBI's presence in West Berlin, by indicating that he would be willing, were we to ask, to indicate his support of this position to the USDS, the U. S. military and the CIA as well as Mr. Jeff Smith, Chief Staffer for Senator Sam Nunn, the latter also well versed in counterintelligence issues and a potential strong supporter of the FBI's cause.

Messrs L'Allier, Hooks, and Hale thanked Mr. Eliff for his time and indicated that the FBI had designated a new assistant Legal Attache in Bonn whose function would largely be to travel weekly to West Berlin in order to prepare the FBI's case for a permanent presence there.

1} CURRENT FBI RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY {NSA} AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY {CIA} COMPONENTS [IN NEW YORK.] THE STAFF MEMBERS HAVE REQUESTED THAT THEY BE GIVEN A TOUR AND BRIEFING AT THE [MEGAHUT] FACILITY. ACCORDING TO SSCI STAFF MEMBER, NSA HAS POSED NO OBJECTIONS, AND INTD HAS NO OBJECTIONS EITHER. HOWEVER, TOUR AND BRIEFING SHOULD BE HANDLED BY THE SUPERVISOR, AND COMMENTARY SHOULD BE GUARDED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD TARGETS BE IDENTIFIED, AND NO DISCUSSION SHOULD ENSUE WITH REGARD TO COVERAGE OF OR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH COVERAGE OF NON-HOSTILE TARGETS.

JFK (1)(B)

JFK (1)

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FBI AND CIA SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS "EXCELLENT." SSCI STAFFER REQUESTED THAT INVITATION BE EXTENDED TO [NEW YORK CIA FOREIGN RESOURCE DIVISION {FRD}] REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSIONS. THIS REQUEST HAS BEEN DENIED, AND SSCI STAFFERS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO CONTACT CIA[/FRD] INDEPENDENTLY.

JFK (1)(B)

JKF (1)(B)

2} UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION BEFORE CONGRESS. SSCI STAFFERS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN KNOWING VIEWS OF FIELD ON UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS; PROBLEMS, VALUE, ETC.? INTD SUGGESTS DISCUSSION BE CONFINED TO DESCRIBING "SHOPRITE"

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

EBF 1109x

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

Copy 5

Vol. 14

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/29/02 BY 5022ALM/dj
MDR-16

Wednesday, November 19, 1975

Washington, D. C.

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

CONTENT

STATEMENT OF:	PAGE
Testimony of James B. Adams, Deputy Associate Director FBI Intelligence Division	1738

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/25/02 BY SP2ALM/dj
MDR-16

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

- - -

Wednesday, November 19, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D.C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/25/00 BY SP2ALM/dlj
MDR-16

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, the Honorable Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart (Michigan), Mondale, Huddleston, Hart (Colo) Baker, Tower, Gold, Mathias and Schweiker.

Also present: Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel and Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel.

- - -

The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.

Our witnesses today are Mr. James B. Adams, the Deputy Associate Director of the FBI, and Mr. Raymond Wannall, who is the Assistant Director in charge of the Intelligence Division of the FBI.

Before I swear the witnesses, Senator Mondale has asked if he might make an opening statement. And for that purpose the Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from Minnesota.

Senator Mondale. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have always supported the FBI. It is clearly the finest, most professional law enforcement agency in the nation and probably in the world. In apprehending robbers, foiling kidnappers, catching fugitives, the FBI has an outstanding record.

This is based on my own experience with the FBI in my own state where I served as Attorney General. The vast bulk of its work is devoted to law enforcement and legitimate counter-espionage.

In these fields the FBI deserves fully the admiration and respect which Americans traditionally held for the Bureau and its personnel. But in one area, domestic intelligence, the FBI, in my opinion, has clearly gone astray. It now appears that there was an underworld within the FBI which took the tools, techniques and zeal which was so effective against the real foreign threats and turned them in upon some of the American people.

Yesterday this Committee heard some of the most disturbing testimony that can be imagined in a free society. We heard evidence that for decades the institutions designed to enforce the laws and constitutions of our country itself has been engaging in conduct that violates the law and the Constitution. We heard that the FBI, which is a part of the Department of Justice, took justice into its own hands by seeking to punish those with unpopular ideas. We learned that the chief law enforcement agency in the Federal government decided that it did not need laws to investigate and suppress the peaceful and constitutional activities of those whom it disapproved. We heard testimony that the FBI, to protect the country against those it believed had totalitarian political views, employed the tactics of totalitarian societies against American citizens. We heard that the FBI attempted to destroy one of our greatest leaders in the field of civil rights, and then replace him with someone of the FBI's choosing.

From the evidence the Committee has obtained it is clear that the FBI for decades has conducted surveillance over the personal and political activities of millions of Americans. Evidently, no meeting was too small, no group too insignificant to escape their attention. It did not seem to matter whether the politics of these Americans were legal or radical or whether the participants were well known or obscure. It did not matter whether the information was intimate and personal. The FBI created indexes, more commonly called enemy lists, of thousands of Americans and targeted many of the Americans on these lists for special harassment. Hundreds of thousands of Americans were victims of this surveillance program. Most of this was done in secret. Much of it was kept from Congress and the Justice Department and all of it from the American people. No one outside the

FBI has ever had an opportunity to know and appreciate the full extent of the domestic surveillance program that was then being conducted.

Thus we see that just as in the case of the CIA the key issue was accountability: How we can assure that the secret instruments of government are accountable to the people, the Congress and the law.

It is clear that the FBI's authority for these programs is essentially non-existent. I am not persuaded that the secret Presidential orders of President Roosevelt support the Domestic Intelligence program, and even if it did, I do not believe that any President has the authority to order the FBI or anyone else to spy on Americans, to burgle their homes, to wiretap them, to open their mail or to blackmail them.

One of the most disturbing aspects of this affair is that the FBI never paid very much attention to whether their activities were authorized or not or whether they were legal and constitutional. One former senior intelligence officer has testified that he never once heard a discussion about legality or constitutionality. Most governments in history have relied on some form of police power to determine what views would prevail in their society. However, America was based on the revolutionary concept that the people should decide what is right and what is wrong, what is acceptable and what is not.

That is what we meant by a free government, and our forefathers were convinced that it can exist only through the greatest tolerance of speech and opinion. They placed their faith in the people to remain alert to encroachments on their liberty.

The founders of our country knew that the greatest danger to freedom comes from the efforts of government to suppress the opinions of its opponents. They set up a system which limited the powers of government, bound it in the constraints of the law, and prohibited it from infringing on the rights of people to free expression. And through the separation of power, the system of checks and balances, they tried to assure that the Executive would be accountable to the people through the Congress.

For the 200 years of our existence as a nation the preservation of liberty has been a constant struggle. Whether it has been the Alien and Sedition Acts during the French Revolution, the Red Scare and the Palmer Raids of World War I, or McCarthyism after World War II, or Army spying during the Vietnam War, the government has let a fear of unorthodox opinion lead it into the trap of infringing upon the Constitution in the name of internal security.

The issues we confront today are a part of a continuing drama of American democracy. It is proof, if we ever needed it, that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.

Revelations of abuse of power do not threaten domestic security. These hearings do not weaken the FBI. What weakens it is its failure to adhere to the proper role of law enforcement. Somehow it forgot that this was its job. It began to use its energy to spy on Americans whose only offense was an expressing opinions that some in the FBI did not like. It confused talk of violence with acts of violence, and all too often paid more attention to the talk than to the act.

The answer, of course, is that violence justifies prosecution, not surveillance. Our security is not improved by watching those who commit crimes. Security from violence lies in active and vigorous law enforcement of those who are committing crimes. Security fram dangerous ideas, if we need any security, should come not from the FBI but from the merit of better ideas, in the good sense of the American people.

Our liberty is best protected by scrupulous adherence to the law and the Constitution by the agencies of government.

No government agency likes to be the subject of public scrutiny. I know these have been difficult times for the present leadership of the FBI, many of whom were not involved in these programs at all. But if they had been spending a lot of time responding to Congressional investigations, they could not forget that this is the first time in 50 years that the FBI had been subjected to public scrutiny.

As painful as this process is, I hope the FBI itself would welcome the opportunity to let in some fresh air and come to grips with the problems in candor and not retreat into past patterns of stirring up public fears to distract our attention from the necessity of reform.

Mr. Chairman, may I say that yesterday I am told that following our hearing the FBI responded exactly in the spirit that I had hoped it would. If they can take this constructive approach, I have no doubt that the FBI will benefit from this attention. I want to see a strong FBI, an FBI strong in law enforcement, in the detection of crime, and in the gathering of legal evidence for prosecution and conviction, but an FBI without abuses.

As we proceed with these hearings today, we should also bear in mind the responsibility for the abuses we have uncovered does not rest on the FBI alone. We in the Congress have been derelict. It should not have taken until this date for us to discharge our responsibility for investigating FBI and other domestic intelligence.

We should also realize that the FBI has been performing a function which many Americans, and at times the vast majority of Americans, have wanted to see undertaken. When popular opinion brands a group unAmerican and subversive merely because of its political views, all too often the FBI has reponded to public expectations and from pressure from a higher authority in government.

While this does not excuse what happened, we should temper our criticism of the FBI's excesses by understanding that in large part it was only the instrument of our own intolerance. Indeed, I believe that is why our laws and the charter of the FBI must be carefully redrawn to protect the FBI's integrity from political pressures and hysteria.

Finally, it would be a mistake to regard the abuses of the FBI as those of evil men. The FBI has always been composed of dedicated and hard-working public servants who seek to do their jobs as best they can. The lesson we learn from this history is that we cannot keep our liberty secure by relying alone on the good faith of men with great power.

As Mr. Justice Brandeis once wrote:

"Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when government's purposes are beneficient. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment of men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."

It is my hope that the FBI witnesses we will hear today can enlighten us as to how it can conduct internal security surveillance programs which do not infringe on our constitutional liberties. I hope they can suggest iron-clad assurances that the abuses of the past will not be repeated.

We need more protection than promises of self-restraint by men of good will.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Mondale. That is an excellent statement with which I would like to be fully associated.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I would, Mr. Chairman, also, except that I want to make clear my family certainly did not support, encourage, or by its vocal position give any indication to the Bureau that they could do what they did. I don't want to go too far in suggesting that what we heard yesterday was simply responding by the Bureau to the mood of those years.

In those years if we had known what you were doing, I lay dough, most families would have said stop it.

Senator Mondale. That is true. I think one of the points that we might aver to is the Houston Plan and the tremendous pressure the FBI was placed under to again resume techniques that it had abandoned in 1966. There is no question that they were getting private pressure from higher authority to do things. In that instance they didn't want it.

The Chairman. Well, I was struck with the fact that the Houston Plan, as illegal as it was, was limited to techniques far more restrictive than the far-reaching methods that were

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

employed by the FBI during the years that we have reviewed in yesterday's hearings. They led beyond anything that was ever contained in any official document requesting from the President additional authority.

Now I think, Mr. Adams, Mr. Wannall, in addition to swearing you both, if you are going to have occasion to ask others who are with you to testify in response to certain questions, that it would be well at this time to swear them also.

So if that is the case, anyone who anticipates that he may be testifying in this morning's hearing in response to questions, if you will all stand and take the oath at this time.

Do you and each of you solemnly swear that all of the testimony that you will give in these proceedings will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Adams. I do.

Mr. Wannall. I do.

The Chairman. After yesterday's hearing I asked the staff to furnish me with the statutory authority that presently exists that could be said to relate to the FBI's intelligence activities, which was of course the subject of yesterday's hearings.

And I am furnished in response to that request Title XVIII, Section 533 of the United States Code, which

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

reads as follows: "The Attorney General may appoint officials: one, to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States; two, to assist in the protection of the person of the President; and three, to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as maybe directed by the Attorney General.

Now yesterday, Mr. Wannall, we were told about a series of activities that were undertaken by the FBI, and indeed, initiated within the FBI, the purpose of which was to harass and discredit Dr. Martin Luther King.

Now I am not referring to the results of any FBI investigative activity, but rather, I am referring to these kinds of initiatives that were undertaken for the purpose of either harassing or embarrassing or otherwise discrediting Mr. King himself.

My first question is was Dr. King, in his advocacy of equal rights for black citizens, advocating a course of action that in the opinion of the FBI constituted a crime?

TESTIMONY OF JAMES B. ADAMS, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI, AND RAYMOND WANNALL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FBI INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

The Chairman. So he was not then thought to be engaged in any criminal activity. In fact, he was preaching, as I remember those days, non-violence, was he not, as a method of achieving equal rights for black citizens?

Mr. Adams. That's right, his advocacy for civil rights.

The Chairman. His advocacy of civil rights was non-violent and therefore legal in character.

Mr. Adams. That was not the basis of our investigation of him.

The Chairman. But as you have said, he was not engaging in any unlawful activity in connection with his advocacy of equal rights for black citizens.

Is that correct?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Well, is it true that at one time the FBI undertook to discourage an American college from conferring an honorary degree on Dr. King?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. On what legal basis does the FBI have a right to interfere, in an effort to discourage a college from conferring an honorary degree upon a man like Dr. Martin Luther King, who was not engaging in or suspected of engaging in criminal activity?

Mr. Adams. I know of no basis.

The Chairman. Why did the FBI do it?

Mr. Adams. Well, we have to approach two parts, in my estimation, Senator Church. One, the basis for our investigation of Martin Luther King, which was to determine communist influence on him, my hands are tied in discussing that somewhat on the basis that there is certain information which today, from an ongoing operation is sensitive and which, of course, we have made known to you and certain staff members.

I would like to say on the basis that from our review we feel that we initially had a basis for investigating Martin Luther King.

Now as far as the activities which you are asking about, the discrediting, I know of no basis for that and I will not attempt to justify it.

The Chairman. You never made a finding, did you, that Martin Luther King was a communist?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, we did not. We were investigating communist influence and the possible effect on him. We never made such a determination.

The Chairman. Very well. Then there was no justification for the FBI to interfere?

Mr. Adams. To discredit him.

The Chairman. In conferring an honorary degree upon him.

Mr. Adams. I cannot find any justification for that.

The Chairman. Is it true that the FBI on another occasion intervened in an attempt to prevent Dr. Martin Luther King from seeing the Pope?

Mr. Adams. I believe that is correct, sir. There were approximately 25 incidents, I believe, of actions taken in this regard. I think Mr. Schwarz has those available, that I would lump basically all of them into the same situation of I see no statutory basis or no basis of justification for the activity.

The Chairman. But what was the motive, there being no statutory basis or other valid basis? What was the motive for attempting to prevent Dr. Martin Luther King from visiting with the Pope?

Mr. Adams. In looking at absolute motive, I don't think the files which we have reviewed and made available to the Committee, give me a clear picture of what the motive was. I think that there were, the motive was certainly known to Mr. Hoover. It was known to one top official who is no longer with the Bureau and maybe known to others, all of whom have been interviewed by the Committee. Matters bearing on what might have been the real motive or the possible motive, I again feel, because of reasons of privacy and delicacy, are not a proper subject of discussion at a public hearing.

I think we know what could have influenced this, but one, the primary individual, Mr. Hoover, is not with us. Individuals who were closest to him in this effort are not with us. And the Committee itself has interviewed him.

So I really am not in a position to discuss this motive issue.

The Chairman. Nevertheless, you would agree that whatever the motive, it was a very improper thing to do.

End Tape 1

Mr. Adams. I cannot find any justification, no, sir.

The Chairman. Is it true that after Dr. Martin Luther King had been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, that an anonymous letter was sent to Dr. Martin Luther King and to Mrs. King, Coretta King, his wife, which was sent 34 days before he was to receive the Nobel Peace Prize?

Mr. Adams. I do not think those dates are correct.

The Chairman. Well, it was sent --

Mr. Adams. It was before he was to receive it. I think 34 days -- upon reconstruction by one of the members of my staff, 34 days would have been Christmas Day, and whether that 34 days --

The Chairman. It is hard to believe that such a letter would be written on Christmas Day.

Mr. Adams. It was not written on Christmas Day, but 34 days -- the Nobel Peace Prize I think was on December 10, the letter [illegible] 34 days from the date of the mailing of the letter as has been reconstructed, as best as possible, would have been Christmas Day.

The Chairman. Was the letter written and sent by the FBI?

Mr. Adams. We have no information to that effect. All we know is that the draft, or original, of what may have been the letter was found in papers of the FBI left after a former official departed the FBI. We know that based upon inquiries that we have conducted and you have conducted, we know that the letter was not -- I mean it was in connection with other material. So I think we can assume --

The Chairman. Other materials which were sent.

Mr. Adams. That's right. So I can assume that the letter was sent. I have determined nothing from my review of the files, and neither has your staff, to my knowledge, or has been reported back to me which would indicate that this action was duly recorded in any file or was a part of any authorized program or anything else. This is a void that I do not think any of us has been satisfactorily able to resolve.

The Chairman. We know the letter appeared in the files. We know that the letter was received. We know it was associated with other matters that were sent by the FBI to Dr. Martin Luther King.

Mr. Adams. The letter was never in our files in the sense that it was entered into the official files of the FBI. It was among papers --

The Chairman. It was among papers...

Mr. Adams. Left by an individual who had departed.

The Chairman. That individual being Mr. Sullivan?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. The letter read, "King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is. You have just 34 days in which to do it, this exact number has been selected for a specific reason. It has definite practical significance.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

You are done. There is but one way out for you."

Now, if you had received such a letter, how would you have interpreted it? What would you have thought it meant?

Mr. Adams. I have read that statement. I have heard the conclusions of your staff that it was a suicide urging. I can't find any basis upon which they drew that conclusion. I think that, approaching it from an objective standpoint, as I read it, I don't know what it means.

I think rather than a conclusion it should be a speculation in a realm of possibilities as to what was intended, but I cannot -- I don't understand the basis for it. It is a possibility, but I certainly would not reach such a conclusion from my reading of that statement.

The Chairman. Now, if you had received a letter of this kind and it had been directed to you, if you were in Dr. King's position and you read, "King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is. You have just 34 days in which to do it." Now, that happened to correspond to the time before which he was to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. What would you think that meant?

Mr. Adams. I would have to consider what I was being accused of. I would have to consider what the facts were. I would have to consider what the intent of the person was writing such a note, coming just before Christmas. I don't know if it means, it is an urging to repent from something this person, whoever he was, that had sent it, I have no idea what it meant.

The Chairman. It is certainly no Christmas card, is it?

Mr. Adams. It is certainly no Christmas card.

The Chairman. It reads, "You are done. There is but one way out for you."

What does that mean?

Mr. Adams. I don't know. I don't know if it means confession. I don't know if it means suicide, as has been raised. I have no idea. You have the statement. I am not in a position to say. I haven't interviewed anyone that was with him at the time he received it.

The Chairman. Would you disown this statement and say that any connection the FBI had with it was utterly improper and grotesque?

Mr. Adams. I certainly would say it was improper, and I can't justify its being prepared or sent, yes, sir.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman, if I might just interrupt.

The Chairman. Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. What I asked yesterday of the staff was what Dr. King took it to mean. I have no knowledge of what those who framed this letter intended, and those who were with him at the time he read it, including Congressman Young who was one of his assistants at the time, said that they took it to mean a suggestion that he take his own life.

Mr. Adams. I am not in possession of that information. I am being put in a position, I don't know what the staff determined. They did not report back to me on their findings.

The Chairman. The letter will speak for itself. You personally have disowned it.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely.

The Chairman. As a highly improper thing for the FBI to be connected with in any way, do you agree with that?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, yes, sir.

The Chairman. Now, without going through the many different and specific undertakings that were intended to publicly discredit Dr. King, because my time will not permit that and others will want to question you on other specific matters, I have just one further question to put to you.

Yesterday there was a document of the FBI which suggested that in the opinion of the Bureau, Dr. King was an unsuitable leader for the civil rights movement, and that another man should be looked for, and indeed, another candidate was actually suggested to Mr. Hoover as one who should be promoted in various ways so that he might assume the leadership of this movement.

Now, can you tell me of anything in the law, or any other justification, given the mission of the FBI, that would entitle it to decide who should lead political movements in this country or to undertake to degrade a man who had fought and won such leadership and had the support of a great many black people in this country, and white people as well, and to substitute in his place someone of the FBI's selection or someone who stood in the FBI's favor?

Can you think of any justification for such activity on the part of a law enforcement agency?

Mr. Adams. I can't think of any offhand, no, sir.

The Chairman. Neither can I.

Senator Tower?

Senator Tower. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What is your understanding, if you have any understanding of the underlying causes of the feud between Mr. Hoover and Dr. King?

Mr. Adams. Senator Tower, I feel if we got into any discussion of that, I think we would have to take into consideration certain material which I feel should not be disclosed publicly, and I would respectfully ask that a question of motive of Mr. Hoover and the spat with Mr. King should be discussed in executive session, if at all.

Senator Tower. All right.

In 1965 Attorney General Katzenbach was informed by Mr. Hoover of the Bureau's surveillance of Dr. King.

What was the Attorney General's reaction? What was his position once he was informed by Mr. Hoover of this surveillance?

Mr. Adams. I don't recall having seen it.

Senator Tower. In other words, did the Attorney General give any direction to the Bureau in the matter that you know of?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. I know that, of course, on the wiretapping on Martin Luther King, it was approved by the Attorney General. I know that the President of the United States and the Attorney General specifically discussed their concern with Dr. King over Communist influence on him. I do know there was concern, but I don't tie in this date, 1965.

Senator Tower. Do you know whether or not Mr. Hoover ever sought direct authorization from Mr. Katzenbach for this very sensitive surveillance of Dr. King?

Mr. Adams. I don't know. Attorney General Kennedy approved the actual surveillance that was instituted on Dr. King. I don't know of any correspondence between Attorney General Katzenbach --

Senator Tower. Or any personal communication between them that would have indicated the level of the Attorney General's involvement?

Mr. Adams. No.

If my recollection serves me correct, as far as Attorney General Kennedy was concerned, he requested coverage on Dr. King. The Bureau responded with a request in writing, which is our normal procedure. He declined to approve that request, and then we came back later, a few months later and requested it again, at which time he did approve. That is my recollection of that.

Senator Tower. Why did the Attorney General change his mind? Do you have any idea, or is that again a matter of sensitivity?

Mr. Adams. I don't know why he actually changed his mind from originally requesting, then declining when it was submitted, and then approving it on the second go round.

It may be in the files. If it is, I would be glad to see what I could determine.

Senator Tower. If you could, we would like to have that.

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Tower. Mr. Adams, you have been familiar with the Bureau's domestic intelligence work for many years. How did the Bureau come to launch the COINTEL program and what in essence did COINTELPRO accomplish?

Mr. Adams. Well, the program as such, as I can reconstruct from the files, was indicated as concern over conspiratorial efforts of certain groups, and a decision made that perhaps more affirmative action should be taken to neutralize violence which was becoming of more concern to the FBI in that regard. I believe these are some of the basic considerations that went into the launching of the COINTELPRO.

Now, as far as the first one, which was the Communist Party, of course, there was the concern here to neutralize the effectiveness of the Communist Party in the United States. In fact, out of all of the COINTELPRO operations that were approved, 59 percent of them were directed at the Communist Party. The bulk of the concern initially was with the Communist Party and it was a desire to create factionalism within the Communist Party and try to neutralize its efforts.

The Communist Party, Congress itself, still has a determination on the record as to the threat of the Communist Party in a statute. The Supreme Court has held that the Communist Party is an instrument of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union certainly has not relinquished its interest in the United States as a target. All of these considerations went into should we do something not only to follow the activities of the Communist Party, but should we destroy its effectiveness in the United States.

That was the first program, I believe, that was initiated.

Senator Tower. Now, did the Bureau ever seek direction and counsel from the Attorney General on any of its COINTELPRO efforts or specific programs?

Mr. Adams. As best as I can reconstruct, Senator, there was no direct authority requested from any Attorney General for the initiation of these programs, and it is only a question, as your staff presented yesterday, that the Attorney Generals, Presidents, Congress, had been made available of certain aspects of programs after the fact and those were primarily concerned with the Communist Party and, oh, one other organization but not the New Left and these other types. So I cannot find any

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

evidence, and I have no reason to believe that there would be any evidence that the Bureau initiated these programs other than as an internal decision.

Senator Tower. Well, were reports on these programs made to the Attorney General? Was he informed of them? Was he kept informed on a continuing basis?

Mr. Adams. He was kept informed by letters, which again the staff has alluded to, letters reporting certain developments. For instance, one of them that went to one Attorney General, reading of that letter outlined almost in complete detail Klan activities, activities taken to disrupt the Klan. It used terms of neutralize, disrupt. There was a clear explanation of what we were doing against the Klan in that regard.

Senator Tower. How is it that you came to believe that you had the authority to neutralize or disrupt these organizations rather than proceed against them frontally through prosecuting them for law violations?

Mr. Adams. I guess you would have to say, in a position like this, that it is just like the Smith Act of 1940, which is designed to prevent revolutionary groups from advocating the overthrow of the Government, and then subsequent interpretations as to the constitutionality of it leaves us with a statute still on the books that proscribes certain actions, but yet the degree of proof necessary to operate under the few remaining areas is such that there was no satisfactory way to proceed,

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

and it was an area where --

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield at that point, please?

What you are saying, Mr. Wannall -- Mr. Adams, excuse me, is that you did not operate within the law because the law didn't give you sufficient latitude. Therefore you undertook direct action to disrupt and otherwise undermine these organizations.

Senator Tower. Did you proceed on the assumption that these organizations would eventually break the law, and therefore you sought to neutralize and disrupt them before they did?

Mr. Adams. I can't say that, sir. I think that the investigations of them were based on this belief, that they might break the law or they were breaking the law. The disruptive activities, I can't find where we were able to relate to that. What it boils down to is what we have gotten into a question before on: in our review of the situation we see men of the FBI recognizing or having a good faith belief that there was immediate danger to the United States --

Senator Tower. All right, but to repair to Senator Church's question, you don't say that you really had specific legal authority.

Mr. Adams. No. And this is the hangup with the whole program, and which we are not trying to justify, that there is some statutory basis. I would not make that effort whatsoever. All I'm trying to do is say that at the time it was initiated, we had men who felt that there was an immediate danger to the country. They felt they had a responsibility to act and having felt this responsibility, did act. And 1this is the whole problem we have at the present time, because we do have, one, we can see good evidence of their belief there was a threat. We had cities being burned, we had educational institutions being bombed. We had deaths occurring from all of these activities. We had a situation that we didn't know what the end was going to be. We never can look around the corner in intelligence operations. We don't know if ultimately this might bring the destruction of the country. All we know is we had an extremely violent time. So I don't find any basis in my mind to argue with their good faith belief they were faced with a danger.

Now, when they move over to the second area of responsibility, here is where we have the problem, and I think it is the whole purpose of this Committee, the Attorney General, Mr. Kelley, all of us realizing we can't operate in these areas where we feel responsibility but we don't have a mandate by Congress. So in that area, this feeling of responsibility I feel came from the fact that Presidents, as your staff said yesterday, Presidents, Congressmen, the Attorney General, no one really provided direction and guidance or instructions don't do this. Do this, don't do that, or what are you doing and how are you doing it.

For instance, there is some feeling on the part of some that our whole domestic intelligence operations were secret. The COINTELPRO operation was. I mean, I think we all agree that this was, to be effective, they felt it should be secret. But back in our -- this is printed appropriation testimony which went to the members of the Committee. It was mailed out to newspapers, friends, anyone that was interested in it, back in 1967 talking about Internal Security's operations, the New Left movement, Young Socialist Alliance, Chicago trial, nationwide demonstrations, student agitation, anti-war activities, the Committee of Returned Volunteers, Communist Party, U.S.A., Progressive Party, Socialist Party, extremist organizations, Black Panther Party. All of these items and statements about extremists, white extremists and hate type groups, the Republic of New Africa, Minutemen, our coverage of subversive organizations -- there are several groups, organizations and movements which I discussed showed the wide coverage we must maintain to follow on their activities and changing tactics, and in spite of the proliferation of these organizations, our informant coverage at all levels has been of great value and assistance, enabling us to keep abreast of our investigative responsibilities.

This is the same way through all of our public appropriation testimony. We have told the world we are investigating black hate groups, New Left groups.

So, I merely mention this to try to put in the frame of reference of these men feeling, they know we are investigating them. They didn't tell them, though, in sufficient detail other than scantily before the Appropriations Committee what we were doing to disrupt these activities, and my feeling is that the men recognized the danger, they pointed out the danger to the world. They said, we are investigating these organizations and they felt then that the comfortable climate of leave it-up to the FBI, we should do something more. And that is what we are looking for guidelines on, the Attorney General, Mr. Kelley, you, that give us the guidelines under which we should operate.

Now, there are certain guidelines that we don't need to be given, we shouldn't do this. We don't have such activities today, programs designed to disrupt and neutralize in the domestic intelligence field. But beyond that, we need guidelines on what does the whole of Congress, representative of the people, by passing of legislation say this is the FBI's role in domestic intelligence.

end 2
begin 3

Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, my time has long since expired.

I would like to note that I saw Mr. Kelley on the Today Show this morning indicating strong support for a response to Congressional oversight, and that is a healthy attitude.

The Chairman. Well, I think it must come because, as you have really conceded, you shouldn't have ever had to have had the guidelines that the Federal Government's chief law enforcement agency ought not to disobey the law, and really, you don't need explicit guidelines to tell you that, or you shouldn't have.

Wouldn't you agree?

Mr. Adams. I would say that looking at it today, we should have looked at it that way yesterday, but I do feel, I don't have any doubt about the good faith of people recognizing the danger, feeling they had a responsibility, no matter whose fault it was, ours internally or because we weren't given the supervision we should have been given, and taking what they considered to be appropriate action.

The Chairman. Senator Hart.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I should apologize both to witnesses and my colleagues on the Committee for scrambling around loosely, but in explanation to the witnesses, I have not been able to give attention to the evolution of the files that are now at hand until the last couple of days, and I am not sure what is in the files for the public record, and what of the materials I have been shown in the last couple of days since I got back are still under seal. So just out of memory I am going to summarize certain activities which have been acknowledged that the Bureau undertook, but without being specific with respect to location and names, and I do it for this reason. It is right that the Committee and the press be worried about the treatment of a Nobel Prize winner, Dr. King.

There are an awful lot of people who never got close to a

Nobel Prize whose names are Jones and Smith, that my review of the files show had violence done to their First Amendment rights. And Nobel Prize winners will always get protection, but Joe Potatoes doesn't, and this Committee should focus on him, too.

Now, included in this COINTEL were activities like this, anonymous letters, drafted by Bureau offices in the field, sent to headquarters in Washington, approved, and then put in the mail, intended to break up marriages, not of Dr. King but of Mary and John Jones because one or the other was thought to be a dissenter, might have dressed strangely or showed up at meetings in company of others who dressed strangely; anonymous letters to university officials and to the several newspapers in that city to prevent university facilities from being made available to a speaker of whom the Bureau disapproved, and it was not a top flight, big name speaker. In that case, an anonymous letter was sent to me making protest. Being an anonymous letter, it never occurred to me that it came from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The series of anonymous letters, one with the spelling very poor, the grammar sloppy, and another more sophisticated, protesting the employment by a city of a man alleging that he was a Communist or came from a Communist family, and there are loyal Americans out of work, what are you doing, Mayor. And to the press, isn't this an outrage. And again the letter, the anonymous letter sent to me saying what are you going to do about this. There are loyal Democrats in this town who need work. And in that case I happened to have known the man about whom the protest was made, and the Bureau's facts were wrong as hell on that man's loyalty. He was a loyal as you or I.

Now, yes or no, are those actions regarded now by the Bureau as within bounds?

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Why were they regarded as within bounds when they were approved by the Bureau?

Mr. Adams. Well, I think even under the guidelines of COINTELPRO, as established, the programs were not designed for the purpose of harrassment of an individual. The memoranda indicate they were designed to disrupt the organizations. Some of the turn downs were turned down on this specific wording. This is mere harrassment.

The rationale would have been -- and of course, here, I say some of these you mentioned wouldn't even appear to me to meet the criteria of the program and should have been disavowed, even under the existence of the program. However, in the total context of the program activities were to be directed towards the organization itself, but we do not do that at the present time.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Yes, but everything I have summarized, rather poorly, was approved by the Bureau at the time by headquarters, not by the field office agents.

Mr. Adams. I do think that there were improper actions taken under the program, even under the program as it existed. Mr. Kelley has so stated his recognition of that fact. The Attorney General certainly has. Yet the majority of the actions taken, even the Department concluded were lawful and legal, proper investigative activities, but the --

Senator Hart of Michigan. You see, my feeling is it isn't a question of techniques that are bad. The concept of the program seems to do violence to the First Amendment because everything you did sought to silence someone or threaten somebody to silence, or deny somebody a platform, or create an atmosphere in which people were in fact afraid to assemble.

Now, sometimes law enforcement, legitimate law enforcement has what we call this chilling effect, when it is legitimate law enforcement. Oftentimes that chilling effect is a necessary though regretable side effect. But what I am talking about, and what these files are full of are actions the only purpose of which is to chill. It isn't in pursuit of any crime at all. Indeed, when a court of general jurisdiction approved the use of that university premise for the use of the speaker the Bureau had stirred so much controversy with its anonymous letters, when that judge wrote an order, after the sponsoring group went to court, what was the Bureau's reaction from headquarters? Investigate the judge.

Now, that, you know, if --

Mr. Adams. I'm not familiar with that fact.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, neither was I until last night.

Mr. Adams. The instruction was to investigate the judge?

Senator Hart of Michigan. This is the kind of stuff that I came out of the hospital to find, and it is the sort of thing, as I said yesterday, that my children have been telling me for years you were busy doing, and I simply didn't believe them. And they were right and I am wrong.

Mr. Adams. Well, there were about 3200 activities, and about 2300 I believe or so were approved under the COINTELPRO, and over 59 percent were addressed to the Communist Party. That leaves 1000. And out of 1000, perhaps, I don't know what the actual figure was of ones that just clearly stand out as improprietous under the program, even as it existed at the time, but I do feel that -- well, it is a very difficult area.

Senator Hart of Michigan. My time is up, too, I am sure, but on this business of the Communist Party, if your theory continues to be that any socially active group of citizens who organize, whether Women's libbers or fight the bomb or anything else, might be a target for infiltration by the Communist Party and therefore you can move your agents in, that means, almost not as an overstatement, that any and every citizen activity could be made the target of the kind of business that

I have just described, because every individual is apt, during his lifetime, to engage in violence. If that is justification, then you are justified in running tails on everybody.

Mr. Adams. Well, that was not --

Senator Hart of Michigan. Everybody has got that privilege, and that clearly is a police state concept.

Mr. Adams. That is not our criteria.

Senator Hart of Michigan. All right, but if the criteria is three or four of us get together and we have a sort of nutty idea, just the kind of thing the Communists would like to exploit, and therefore you seek to justify shutting off the forum for that group or to surveille it, the potential for Communist intrusion, then, if that continues to be your theory, then I say you are, you are going to pursue the same wretched road that these files show you have been pursuing before. If that is the predicate, the fact that a Soviet or Marxist or Maoist Hottentot is liable to think there is an idea that we can exploit, then you people are going to be spending how many man hours, how many tax dollars doing the kind of things that I summarized so briefly here.

That in my book is the 20th century version of what the Founding Fathers intended to prevent when they wrote the First Amendment.

What is the position of the Bureau when a Communist may participate, associate with and promote an idea, this justifies you trying to figure out if you can bust up a marriage if two of the people are in the group?

Mr. Adams. It does not, and it is not our criteria, no sir.

Senator Hart of Michigan. What does it justify?

Mr. Adams. It justifies our doing nothing in the way of COINTELPRO activities. I still feel it has a justification, that you agree with, to investigate the Communist Party. It is when you get into the disruptive areas where the program goes beyond investigation that we have no statutory authority.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, we have been emphasizing COINTEL. Would it justify putting tails on the people?

Mr. Adams. What, just a --

Senator Hart of Michigan. Or putting an informant into the group.

Mr. Adams. If it is a Communist group?

Senator Hart of Michigan. No, if it's me and somebody else that thinks we oughtn't to have something that a majority of people think we should. We organize and you people say, well, there is something the Communists can take and run with.

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Does that justify putting a tail on them?

Mr. Adams. It does not, and we would not. Before we would even open for a preliminary inquiry, we should have an indication that the Communist Party has attempted to infiltrate or is infiltrating, in other words, where you have some evidence of a subversive group, participating in the functions of that organization, and there are grey areas here, in the spectrum of anything where I am sure we have opened investigations where we should not because there has been scant evidence of such infiltration. And this is a supervisory problem. It is a criteria problem. And it is also an oversight problem which we are responding to.

Senator Hart of Michigan. My time is up and I haven't gotten into some of the other material.

The Chairman. Well, Senator, you have not been with us --

Senator Hart of Michigan. No, no, I just --

The Chairman. If you want more time, you have a lot of time stored up. If you want to use it now, you go right ahead.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well let me ask the justification for this sort of business.

I have been talking about the things I have seen in the files that bear on direct, First Amendment denial, and again, this does not deal with the treatment of a distinguished American. Indeed, it involves groups that are generally viewed with very sharp disapproval. The ground rules for the treatment should be precisely the same, whether it is a good guy, a popular guy, or a dirty and smelly guy.

What was the purpose of the Bureau in trying to stir up strife -- perhaps I shouldn't say what was the purpose -- what possible justification for the Bureau trying to sick the Black Panthers on that outfit call the US out in California, or between the Black Panthers and the Blackstone Rangers in Chicago? Was it with the hope that by fomenting it they would kill each other off?

Mr. Adams. Absolutely not, and I think the Committee staff can inform you that during their review of all of these matters they haven't come up with one instance of violence resulting from any of these actions, and in that particular case there was a communication in the same file which I believe the staff had access to which showed that we did get information that one of these groups was going to put out a contract on one of the others, and we notified the police and the individuals of the fact that their life was in danger.

None of our programs have contemplated violence, and the instructions prohibited it, and the record of turndowns of recommended actions in some instances specifically say that we do not approve this action because if we take it it could result in harm to the individual.

So I think this is one charge -- and the staff did not make such a charge, I might add, when they presented the picture -- but I think any inference that we were trying to result in violence is wrong.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Let me explain for the record why I reached the conclusion I did.

Mr. Adams. The wording of that memorandum --

Senator Hart of Michigan. And why I continue to hold to that conclusion.

On January 30th, 1969, the Bureau headquarters in Washington approved sending an anonymous letter to the leader of the Blackstone Rangers, Jeff Forky, which indicated that the Black Panthers had put a contract out on his life as a result of conflicts between the two organizations. Now, you say that was to warn him.

I ask, wasn't the principal purpose of the letter to encourage the Rangers to shoot some or all of the leadership of the Panthers? Otherwise, what does this quote mean, and I will read it. It is from a memorandum from the Chicago office of the Bureau asking approval to undertake this. Here is the way it reads: "It is believed that the above" this anonymous tip that a contract is out on you, "It is believed that the above may intensify the degree of animosity between the two groups and occasion Forky to take retaliatory actions which could disrupt the BPP, the Black Panthers, or lead to reprisals against its leadership. Consideration has been given to a similar letter to the Panthers alleging a Ranger plot against Panther leadership. However, it is not felt that this will be productive, principally because the Panthers at present is not believed as violence prone as the Rangers, to whom violent type activity, shooting and the like, is second nature."

Now, how can you reach any conclusion other than a purpose was to generate the kind of friction that would induce the killing --

Mr. Adams. Well, if that purpose was for that rather than generating factionalism, disagreements, disrupting it, it would be contrary to the communication I referred to in the other file, the Black Panthers versus Ellis, where we notified the police of the contract, we notified the individuals of the contract and took every action at our command to prevent direct violence, and also the fact that the files showed that we turned down these situations where violence was involved.

end t. 3

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, we have differing views with respect to motives and the purpose of the Panther situation in Chicago. I still do not understand why the Panthers and this US group in California we sought to be set as they were but finally, and again, I don't know whether it is in the record, open or not, for what purpose other than to occasion violence moved the Bureau to approve of forged signatures of Communist Party personnel to letters addressed to Mafia-owned businesses attacking the employment practices of the Mafia-owned business?

Why would a Bureau, why would the Bureau think there was any value to be served in concocting a forged letter?

Let us assume Phil Hart is a local communist in this city. The Bureau forges Phil Hart's name to a racket-owned business, notorious for using muscle, protesting that fellow's business practices.

Now certainly it was not intended to improve the employment practices.

Mr. Adams. I think if the full communication were available, it did show a purpose unrelated to violence. I don't recall the exact wording now, but I think it was to create a lack of support or something like that.

This was part of that Hoodwink program, I believe, that was one of four actions that were involved in Hoodwink, and I think there have been some public descriptions of that program that indicate that it was not the greatest thing coming down the pike.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, that is the sort of thing I found that persuaded me to say very openly that I do not buy the idea that the American people ultimately are responsible for that kind of nonsense because I am certain that virtually every family in the country would have screamed in protest no much how much they disliked Dr. King or the Panthers or the Communists.

Mr. Adams. Sir --

Senator Hart of Michigan. If they had known that tax money and Federal personnel were busy, busy, busy around the country, notwithstanding bank robberies that were going on at the same time, pounding out that kind of correspondence and inciting that kind of conflict and curbing speech.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hart.

Senator Mondale is next.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, I realize that you were not a part of this particular event, but being an old, experienced FBI hand, I wonder if you could help us understand the psychology that led to this kind of memorandum.

Mr. Adams. I feel it coming, but go ahead.

Senator Mondale. This is a memorandum to the Director. It has been referred to before, which calls for removing

King from his pedestal and replacing him by someone else, dated January 8th, 1964, which memo was written a week following the time that King was named man of the year by Time magazine.

This memo, as you know, received the following comment from Mr. Hoover. "I am glad to see that light, though it has been delayed, has come to the Domestic Intelligence Division," and so on.

I would just quote part of the language and maybe you can help us understand the psychology that led to it.

The first part of the memo says: "We have got to remove King from his pedestal." Then it says, "the negroes will be left without a national leader of sufficiently compelling personality to steer it in a proper direction. This is what could happen but need not happen if the right kind of national negro leader could at this time be gradually developed so as to overthrow Dr. King and be in the position to assume the role of leadership of the negro people when King has been completely discredited.

"For some months I have been thinking about this matter. One day I had an opportunity to explore this from a philosophical and sociological standpoint with X" -- the name of the leader -- "whom I have known for some years. As I previously reported, he is a very able fellow and one on whom I can rely. I asked him to give the matter some attention, and if

gsh 4

he knew any negro of outstanding intelligence or ability, let me know and we would have a discussion.

"He has submitted to me the name of the above-named person. Enclosed with this memorandum is an outline of X's biography, which is truly remarkable. In scanning this biography, it will be seen that X does have all of the qualifications of the kind of a negro I have in mind to advance to positions of national leadership."

And skipping: "I want to make it clear at once that I don't propose that the FBI in any way become involved openly as the sponsor of a negro leader to overshadow Martin Luther King. If this thing can be set up properly without the Bureau in any way becoming directly involved, I think it would be not only a great help to the FBI, but would be a fine thing for the country at large.

"While I'm not specifying at this moment, there are various ways in which the FBI could give this entire matter the proper direction and development. There are highly placed contacts at the FBI who it might be very helpful to further such a step. This can be discussed at a later date when I have probed more fully into the possibilities and this recommendation is that approval be given for me to explore the whole matter as set forth above," and to that Mr. Hoover says, "I'm glad to see the light has finally come. I have struggled for months to get over the fact that the communists

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

were taking over the racial movements but our experts here couldn't or wouldn't see it."

Now I think you testified earlier that you do not accept this as proper FBI activity, but can you help us understand how at one point in American history someone thought it was proper, apparently including the Director?

Mr. Adams. I would have to say for one thing that this gets into the real motive of the discrediting of Martin Luther King, which I don't feel can be fully explored. I think that the people most directly involved in that are not available. because I don't know from my experience what they had in mind in this regard.

I have no doubt from this memorandum and other memorandum that the two individuals involved felt very strongly that Martin Luther King was a threat to the success of the negro movement and that steps should be taken to get him out of that -- what the reason for it was or the motivation, I am just not in a position to say.

I do say it is improper to inject yourself into that type of activity, but I don't know what the real motive was.

Senator Mondale. Now Dr. King was investigated, as I think you earlier testified, because of fears of communist influence upon him?

Mr. Adams. Yes.

Senator Mondale. Is that a proper basis for investigating

Dr. King or anyone else?

Mr. Adams. It is where you have information indicating that the Communist Party is and has made efforts to try to influence an individual.

I would say that that would normally be considered within the current criteria.

Senator Mondale. You would consider that to be a valid purpose for investigating today?

Mr. Adams. Excuse me, what?

Senator Mondale. You would consider that to be a valid basis for investigating today?

Mr. Adams. The movement itself, but not the individual.

Senator Mondale. How do you investigate a movement without investigating individuals?

Mr. Adams. You do get into a gray area. The main thing would be if we had an organization today that we saw the Communist Party gravitating to, trying to work in positions of leadership, we would be interested in opening an investigation on Communist infiltration of that organization to see if it was affecting it.

Senator Mondale. All right, now let's go back specifically.

I gather there never was any question raised about whether Dr. King was a Communist. That was never charged.

Mr. Adams. Not as a Communist Party member, no, sir.

Senator Mondale. That's right. Or that he was about to or had committed acts of violence?

Mr. Adams. No.

Senator Mondale. But the reason for investigating him apparently was that he was subject to Communist influence.

Now what makes that a justified reason for investigating him? Is it a crime to be approached by someone who is a Communist?

Mr. Adams. No.

Senator Mondale. What is the legal basis for that investigation?

Mr. Adams. The basis would be the Communist influence on him and the effect it would have on the organization. It would be in connection with our basic investigation of the Communist Party.

Senator Mondale. Well, as I understand the law to read, it is not a crime to be a member of a Communist Party.

Mr. Adams. That is correct.

Senator Mondale. How can it be a crime to know someone who is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Adams. It is not.

Senator Mondale. How do you investigate something as tenuous as that? What is the basis for it legally?

Mr. Adams. Well, it falls into the area of, one, the intelligence jurisdiction of the activities of the Communist

Party to have a situation where an individual in an organization, a leader of an organization, efforts are being made to influence him and to achieve control over the organization, and it is part of the overall investigation of the Party trying to exert this influence as to are they successful, are they taking over the black movement or the civil rights movement.

It is just like we tried to make clear in investigations that were more prevalent years ago but still occur on the Communist influence in labor unions. We tried to tell everybody we interview we are not interested in labor matters. We are not trying to inquire into that. We are interested in the effect of the Communist Party on this union.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, I am trying to get at the legal basis in this particular case in investigating Dr. King on the grounds that he might be subject to Communist influence.

Can you cite any legal basis for that or is it based entirely upon a generalized authority thought to exist in the FBI to investigate "internal security matters"?

Mr. Adams. It would fall also in the Presidential directives of investigating subversive activities.

Senator Mondale. And then the question would return to what authority the President had.

Mr. Adams. That's right.

Senator Mondale. Now Dr. King was investigated among other things for matters of, I think you call it delicacy.

Would that be a basis for investigating an American citizen by the FBI?

Mr. Adams. No.

Senator Mondale. Would you say then that those investigations were improper?

Mr. Adams. I don't believe that there is an allegation that we investigated him for that. I think there were certain by-products of information that developed and I think at a point you had a situation where the tail was wagging the dog, perhaps, but I don't see any basis for such investigation. And I find it very difficult to get into a discussion of this in view of the prohibitions that I think --

Senator Mondale. You answered my question. That for itself would not be a basis for investigation.

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Mondale. Would you agree with me, Mr. Adams, that this whole vague, generalized area of the assignment that the FBI has been tasked, which they thought they possessed or could use to investigate Americans, not where there were allegations of crime or suspicion that crimes were about to be committed, or that violence was about to be committed, but rather this whole generalized area, to investigate Americans in terms of ideas that they have or might be persuaded

sh 10

to have that might hold potential for danger to this country is an exceedingly vague, difficult, if not impossible to define area and an area which has got the FBI into an awful lot of trouble, including today's hearings.

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Mondale. And because of that there is a very important need to sit down and redefine it, have the guidelines known specifically by all so that the FBI can know precisely what it can do and what it cannot do.

Mr. Adams. I think this is why the country is fortunate in this particular time to have an Attorney General who is a legal scholar and a lawyer of unquestioned repute who has indicated a willingness to address these problems, which as the staff has determined, was not always the case over the years. But we have an Attorney General, we have a Director, who has offered his complete cooperation, just as he has to the Committee in this inquiry, that we are not trying to avoid embarrassment. The only thing we are trying to hold back are identities of informants and sensitive, ongoing operations that we have, a concern on the part of Congress that not only recognizes there have been abuses, but recognizes that there still always has to be some degree of flexibility.

We are going to have situations where you have a Weatherman working for the water works, and in college he was a scientific student, and he makes a comment to a fellow employee that there is going to be some spectacular event that is going to bring the attention of the world on this city.

Senator Mondale. Wouldn't you have probable cause then to investigate the commission of a crime?

End Tape 4

Mr. Adams. We might have to investigate, but to disrupt, we have the authority to tell the supervisor of the waterworks, you had better get him out of there before the city water is poisoned and 100,000 people die, and I think the Committee is going to find the same problems we do in coping with that situation, and even the Attorney General in his speech in Ottawa pointed out that there is still possibly a necessity for some flexibility to take appropriate action under extreme conditions. But it should be controlled. It is like Mr. Kelley says, go to the Attorney General, explore the legal issues, lay the problem up there. It should not be handled internally in the FBI.

Senator Mondale. But do you also agree that the Congress ought to redefine the rules legislatively?

Mr. Adams. Yes, because the problem I have with it is we talk about oversight, and Mr. Kelley and the Attorney General and I believe this Committee agree that we should have joint oversight which would avoid the proliferation of hearings and the sensitive knowledge among many people which always poses that inadvertent leak of information. But yet even with oversight, under the plan you discussed yesterday, or some of the observations that were discused yesterday, having people, conservative, liberal, black, and the other qualifications you put in, can a Committee speak for the will of Congress? At one time we had Congressmen making speeches all over the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

country, if we don't stop these bombings, if somebody doesn't do something about it this country is in trouble. Is that the will of Congress?

Until it is embodied in legislation where the whole will of Congress is expressed, we are going to have problems.

Senator Mondale. I am glad to hear that, because there is a way Congress speaks. It is not through the buddy system or a person. It speaks through the law.

Mr. Adams. That's right.

Senator Mondale. And now we have for the first time this whole issue, it is not denied by the FBI. The elements are known. What I hear you saying is you would like the Congress now to define and redefine specifically and carefully what it is we expect the FBI to do, and what it is we wish the FBI and will prohibit the FBI from doing.

Mr. Adams. Right. What is our role in society?

After World War II, if you'll remember, a Congressional Committee met and raised all sorts of storm over the fact that there was not enough in the way of intelligence investigations. Never again should it happen in the United States that we be caught with our pants down.

After the Kennedy assassination, if you recall, the FBI was properly criticized for having too restrictive dissemination policies in connection with Secret Service because they depend upon us for the intelligence necessary to provide protection.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

for the President against extremist groups. We did that but just before the recent incidents in California there was going to be Committee concern, not this Committee, over has there been too much dissemination.

So the FBI is in the position of at different times in our history being damned for doing too much and damned for doing too little. And it is because of reacting to what we try to judge is what they want us to do, and this is what we are not in a position to do. We need the will of Congress expressed in some definitive measure, yet providing the latitude, because as you have seen from these problems, there are many that there is no black and white answer to. There have to be occasions where when you are confronted with an extreme emergency, someone can act, and I don't think you or anyone else wants to tie the hands of law enforcement when today we have over 10 million serious crimes in the United States. We have 1 million crimes a year involving violence, and there has to be a capability to react. But we need to know in better terms what is our role in this, especially in domestic intelligence.

Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tower (presiding). Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Adams, in 1966 a letter written by the Bureau to Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President at the White House, and the gist of this letter was, in reference to his request, and I want to make it clear it was his request, not the Bureau's, authors of books that were critical of the Warren Commission Report, the assassination of President Kennedy, were requested to file any pertinent personal data information, dossiers, etc., on seven individuals whose names I will not discuss.

Do you have any knowledge as to why the White House requested this kind of material on the Warren Commission critics?

Mr. Adams. I don't recall. I am familiar with the material. I did review it some time ago when we were testifying before the House Committee in February, but I don't recall that I saw in there any specific motivation on the part of the White House group requesting this information.

Senator Schweiker. Now, in the same letter it also says a copy of this communication has not been sent to the Acting Attorney General.

Mr. Adams. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. Number one, is that a normal procedure when you get requests of this kind that the Acting Attorney General is bypassed, and why was the Attorney General bypassed in this instance?

Mr. Adams. This is not a normal procedure. It is not the procedure followed today. There was a period of time where, at the President's directions, Mr. Hoover reported more directly to him in certain areas, and it was apparently a feeling that he did not want the Attorney General to know certain things.

Senator Schweiker. One of the dossiers specifically included photographs of sexual activities.

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Schweiker. And my question is, how is that relevant to being a critic of the Warren Commission?

What standard do we use when we just pass photographs of sexual activities to the White House? Is this a normal -- again, is this a normal proceeding when a dossier is requested? Is this included, or did they specifically request photographs of this kind, or what light can you shed on this?

Mr. Adams. I can't shed much. I know they requested information on him. I think there was other material concerning that individual of a security nature that was included. Why the information in that respect was submitted I am unable to answer.

I do know at the time there was a lot of concern following the Warren Commission Report, had all the answers been explored, was the Soviet Union involved, was Cuba involved, and who were the critics who now are attacking this. But I have seen nothing which would explain the rationale for requesting the material.

Senator Schweiker. I think what concerns us on the Committee is that whenever you get to the nitty gritty of investigations, and it doesn't have to relate to the Warren Commission, I will leave that alone, or to some activity we are involved in, we get back to something like that, where a photograph or a tape recording or some letter referring to some kind of human weakness or failing that is really very irrelevant to the investigation is sandwiched in here, and it just seems to me that it was a tactic -- this just happens to be the Warren Commission I singled out -- but it was a tactic that was used rather frequently as a lever or for some reason which I am trying to find out as an instrument of investigative policy.

Would you differ with that or dispute that, or again, what rationale? Do we use sexual activities as a standard criterion for investigations?

Mr. Adams. We do not use sexual activities as a criterion, but during the course of our investigation -- we did have an investigation on that individual at one time -- and during the course of the investigation, in checking the records of a local police department or a district attorney's office, they had conducted an investigation for a criminal act involving these photographs, and they made that available to us.

So it went into our files.

Now, the request of the President, he is the Chief Executive of the United States. He in effect has custody of everything. There are problems involved when the man who is in charge of everything requests information. I would like to add, however, that following the cleansing effect of Watergate that I don't know of any such requests coming over to the FBI anymore.

There is a direct line between the Attorney General and the Director, and the Director certainly recognizes that in a case of extreme disagreement he would have the alternative to tell the Attorney General, I need to go directly to the President, or feel I should, but we do not have this line of communication at the present time.

Senator Schweiker. Well, it seems to me if they had just listed the other investigation and listed what was alleged in the other investigation, that certainly would have sufficed for whatever purpose it would have. But it seems to me when you in fact enclose living photographs, you are really getting very much, to my way of thinking, towards attempting to discredit their critics. What other purpose would a photograph have of this nature other than to discredit critics because they will not quarrel with listing whatever was charged in another state. That may well have been included. I cannot argue that.

Mr. Adams. I can't answer that.

Senator Schweiker. One area that I think this gets to which we really touched on in the assassination probe quite a bit, Mr. Adams, is where the Bureau stops when they get some of these requests, in other words, what kind of criteria, if any. You touched on it a moment ago. The President asked for something. I don't know in this case whether the President asked to see photographs of this nature or didn't ask, but the point is, nobody said no and he got them.

So the question is, where do you see the Bureau's responsibility here, and what can this Committee do to ensure that there is some kind of a test that we either put in the law or that the FBI invokes, or that we invoke on the White House in using police power in this way?

Mr. Adams. I don't think Congress can ever fill the responsibility of trying to draw up guidelines, even in conjunction with the Executive Branch, to guarantee that all abuses won't take place. The organization is made up of human beings, and these things occur.

Certain corrective actions are self-initiated, such as this. The President, for instance, you know we had an incident a few years ago about investigating a newsman, where we were requested, and if I recall from our information, we thought he was being considered for an appointed position which would have been a logical basis. As facts turned out, that was not the purpose that the information was requested.

To stem or stop abuses like that, the President, the current Administration has issued instructions that any requests for investigations under the special inquiry or White House investigation such as for appointment must clear through the office of his counsel, in other words, not let the lower line people come over and say we need this information or we need this request. They come through the office of Phil Buchen through an employee that is assigned to that office with responsibility.

Now, we do still make certain name check requests for the White House, and those, too, have to clear through his office. So we do have that. Then we have the responsibility, if we get something which on its face appears political or improper, then our responsibility under that would be to go to the Attorney General and ask him to intercede by finding out is this a proper request on the Bureau. And I can assure you that as Mr. Kelley has testified and has made it perfectly clear that he has not had any such improper requests and he would go right to the Attorney General if it was necessary. Otherwise he would reject the request.

Senator Schweiker. What steps are we taking, under your jurisdiction comes whatever internal investigation unit the FBI has. I just wondered very briefly, because I know my time is very limited, we have a vote on, what steps are you taking to make sure that we catch some of these things in the present that maybe we either overlooked or did not catch or somehow got sidetracked in the past?

Mr. Adams. We have been working with the Attorney General and his staff. It started even when Attorney General Saxbe was there, to look at all of our procedures, all of our investigative operations: are they proper, do they fit criteria, do we have a legal basis for them, and we have guidelines, committees which have been established in the Department that meet every day on questions of what is even an overwhelming problem of collection and maintenance of information. What do we get, why do we get it, what should we do with it.

I feel there is a very active program going on in that regard, and I feel certain that it will continue to make sure that we are aware of everything and take appropriate action.

-- Senator Schweiker. I wonder if you might share some of these with the staff so that we can have an advantage of taking a look at those, too. I am glad to see this being made.

Mr. Adams. I would have to secure the approval of the Attorney General on the guidelines. He did tell the House Committee which originally raised the question on maintenance of information, that once we get something and they are nearing completion in the Department, that he does intend to take it up with Congress. So I am sure there would be no problem at that point in bringing it to this Committee as well.

Senator Schweiker. Because it seems to me this is where the problems in the past have arisen, in not having clearly defined or maybe if you measure it -- you can measure it in terms of today's standards versus standards of before, but I think this is the crux of it.

Mr. Adams. That is true.

Senator Schweiker. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tower. Mr. Adams, what use does the Bureau presently make of its intelligence informants, and have they ever been used as provocateurs or as magnets for action?

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Well, you asked two questions.

Senator Tower. Yes.

Mr. Adams. Let me take the last one first, provocateurs. Our policy has not -- or our policy has been to discourage any activities which in any way might involve an informant doing something that an agent cannot do, which would be in the area of being a provocateur, which basically is entrapment. And we have had some allegations of entrapment come up. We feel we have satisfactorily answered them. This is a very technical legal field which boils down, of course, to the fact that if a person is willing to do something, and the government merely provides the opportunity, that is not legally entrapment. So if a person comes to us and says I have been asked to participate in a breakin of a Federal building, I would like to help you, then the law basically would indicate we have the authority to continue to let him operate.

The question comes up if he assumes the whole direction and causes people to do something which they would not otherwise have done. That is the entrapment issue. So we are very alert to this. We have instructions, clear guidelines, instructions to our field offices that they are not to use an informant for anything that an agent cannot legally do. I don't say there haven't been some mistakes in that regard, but I don't know of any at the present time.

Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston?

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First I think to keep this activity in proper perspective it might be well to remember that even though a great deal of the testimony and the questioning has been relating to the question of Dr. King, that this is by no means an isolated situation. Dr. King's case is indeed a classic example utilizing all of the various techniques of the Bureau in both intelligence-gathering an action against an individual in order to discredit him or embarrass him, or indeed destroy him.

But the record is replete, and indeed, here is an entire sheaf of similar targets who are certainly not as well known. Some of them are high school students, some of them are high school teachers, college students, college teachers, broadcasters and journalists, people whose names would be almost totally unfamiliar to the vast majority of Americans. So the activity was not confined to those that are immediately recognizable who were indeed public figures.

I want to just proceed along the question of informants that Senator Tower just raised for just a moment or two.

You say that your informants are not expected to do anything that an agent himself could not do, but in the gathering of the information for which you are securing him in the first place, do you have any safeguard at all, or any rule as to how he proceeds in order to gather the information you are looking for?

Mr. Adams. Only that he proceed through legal means.

Senator Huddleston. Is that specifically stated to him when he is employed?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Are most informers paid on the basis of a regular fee or regular salary, or are they paid on the basis of the information they gather?

Mr. Adams. Even those who are paid on what you could say a salary, that salary is determined on a COD basis as to the value of the information furnished. In other words, in the criminal case, for instance, you could have a person come in and give you the identity of three individuals who just robbed a bank. You might pay him a lump sum amount, and never go back to him.

In the security field where informants do finally manage to work into a revolutionary type organization, their continued activities in our behalf do set up more of a program for payment.

Senator Huddleston. Do you check on occasion on the basis of information that may be supplied to you if it happens to be of a sensational nature or of a surprising nature, do you ever question the informer on how he obtained it?

Mr. Adams. I am sure this takes place. In any handling of an informant over a sustained period of time, you do have a rapport which they don't just come in and say Joe Blow said this, Joe Blow did that. There is a conversation that goes through which I feel certain would, if something looked like, if it looked like he had something that came from some improper source, I think the agent would say where did you get this.

end 5

Senator Huddleston. If you found it had been taken improperly or if some improper action had been taken, would it be put in the files?

Mr. Adams. If he violated the law, we would have an open investigation if it were within our jurisdication.

Senator Huddleston. Now the Bureau disseminates this information on individuals that is collected in various ways in the various other agencies.

How many other agencies can request, for instance, an individual check that would result in your supplying to him information from these personal intelligence files?

Mr. Adams. Every agent in the Federal Government under the employee security program there is an obligation on the part of every government agency to check with the FBI doing name check search of our files to see if there is any subversive derrogatory information which might militate against appointing that individual to a Federal position.

Senator Huddleston. Do you take any precautions as to how they will use that information once it is supplied to them by your agents?

Mr. Adams. All we do is indicate to them on the report that it is the property of the FBI and is not to be disseminated outside their agency.

Senator Huddleston. You have no way of knowing whether or not indeed it is?

gsh 2

Mr. Adams. No, sir, we do not.

Senator Huddleston. What internal precautions do you have against the Bureau itself misusing information that it gains from other agencies?

Mr. Adams. Strong prohibitions. One, we don't allow access to files except on a need-to-know basis. Any employee of the FBI knows that if he improperly divulges information or leaks information out of the files, he will be subject to administrative action.

We had a case where an agent obtained an identification record and made it out improperly, and I think that agent was separated from the roles. But we had asked for, and of course we share in CIA's request to this extent, is that there be a criminal penalty attached to misuse of information and leaking it or making it available outside of an agency.

This is another issue before Congress.

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

Did this in fact happen to your knowledge?

Mr. Adams. I am not familiar with that case. I can easily say it would not be proper.

Senator Huddleston. But you don't know whether it happened or whether the act was carried out?

Mr. Adams. I do not know.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Adams, getting on to another subject, one of the techniques used very frequently by the Bureau in its attempt to discredit individuals was to utilize the press. It was customary to send anonymous letters on many occasions to editors, broadcasters, commentators and columnists around the country containing information or suggesting information about an individual that the Bureau wanted to discredit in some way.

There was also some evidence that the Bureau utilized within the press itself on a regular contact basis certain columnists or broadcasters for the purpose of disseminating information that the FBI wanted to get out about individuals.

How extensive was this custom utilized?

Mr. Adams. I don't believe it was very extensive. In fact, I think there were probably very few incidents where untrue information was put out.

That is my recollection.

On disseminating public source information there were a number of instances of that which is still proper to date under guidelines. I just don't know of many instances where untrue information was used, and I do not know of too many

gsh 4

instances overall where that was done.

Senator Huddleston. Do you know of any instances or how many actual journalists or practitioners or regular disseminators of FBI information?

Mr. Adams. I don't know of any today that are in that regard. I know there have been situations where, and people still do. They come to us and say, we would like to do an article on organized crime. Can you be of assistance?

And if we can be of assistance within the guidelines established by the Attorney General, we do assist. We have a pull and a tug over privacy acts and freedom of information and also the need to know, but we try to satisfy.

Senator Huddleston. Do you know of any at the present time or in the past who have been paid by the FBI for their services?

Mr. Adams. Not personally. I don't know of any.

Senator Huddleston. Not personally. Do you know of any evidence that indicates that?

Mr. Adams. That's what I mean. I don't have any evidence that indicates that.

Senator Huddleston. I think it would be helpful to our inquiry if we could review or you would review the files and make a determination as to whether or not that might be the case, that the FBI has paid journalists who are amenable to disseminating information supplied by the FBI.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Adams. I am told we have. I don't know what files we have reviewed, but we have reviewed them and we haven't found any.

Senator Huddleston. You haven't found any.

What is the mass media program of the FBI?

Mr. Adams. To try to get the truth out, to get a proper picture of the FBI's jurisdiction, its activities.

Senator Huddleston. Is it also to suppress other publications or other commentators or journalists who might be disseminating other views?

Mr. Adams. No.

Senator Huddleston. Did the FBI not take some action against a number of newspapers, most of them student newspapers that they felt should be suppressed?

Mr. Adams. We may have in the past. I don't recall any specific case.

You are talking about some of the Weatherman support papers or Black Panther paper. I don't know of any in that regard, but I'm not saying that such action was not taken.

Senator Huddleston. Are you familiar with the special correspondence list?

Mr. Adams. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. What is this list?

Mr. Adams. My recollection is that the special correspondence list was a list of individuals that had requested from time to time various Bureau publications and were kept on a continuing list and mailed such communications to them.

Senator Huddleston. It was a list that was considered to be friendly towards the FBI view?

Mr. Adams. Yes. I would say anyone on that list would normally be friendly.

Senator Huddleston. Do you have knowledge of a number of instances in which the Bureau carrying out its COINTEL program utilized the existing press in order to attempt to discredit some individual?

Mr. Adams. I don't have an idea of the number, but I don't think there were very many.

Senator Huddleston. Do you have a list of the instances in which the Bureau attempted to discredit other publications?

Mr. Adams. No, I don't know.

Senator Huddleston. Do you know that they did occur?

Mr. Adams. I can ask. I get a no as far as any knowledge in that regard.

Senator Huddleston. As far as knowledge.

Mr. Adams. That means knowledge of what we have come up with in our current review, I would assume.

Senator Huddleston. It seems to me that this is an area in which we are particularly troubled and should be. If there is any right that is specifically called for in our Constitution and has been upheld and reaffirmed in court decision after court decision, it is the right to publish in this country. The First Amendment speaks not only of freedom of speech, but also freedom of the press. And yet it seems that we have a pattern here of the chief law enforcement agency of the country attempting to suppress that very right.

Mr. Adams. I haven't seen -- I think any effort to manipulate the press of this country, I just don't see any possibility in that regard and I don't see the logic of anyone even attempting such.

Senator Huddleston. But it did happen.

Mr. Adams. It may have happened in --

Senator Huddleston. In a rather extensive field.

Mr. Adams. I disagree with that rather extensive field. I just don't know the extent that you are talking to here.

Senator Huddleston. We are talking about the cases where --

Mr. Adams. Are you lumping in cases where we disseminated public source information? Are you lumping in a case where we may have gone to a --

Senator Huddleston. I think disseminating public source information is somewhat different from furnishing a TV commentator with derrogatory information about a specific individual who has been targeted as one that apparently the Bureau thinks is dangerous or his ideas ought to be suppressed.

Mr. Adams. Is that manipulating the press, though? Here you have a situation where an individual is going around the country advocating off-the-pig or kill-the-police or something like that. And a newspaper man was furnished, say some background information on him which would have been in the area of public source material which he could use in an article.

Are we really, if the information is true, the final decision, it would seem to me, would be the newspaperman as to whether he would use any such information.

I think if we concealed our motives from the newspaper man, or furnished false information, which I think we did in one anonymous letter or something that I saw in all of this, I would say that was improper.

Senator Huddleston. Or --

Mr. Adams. I think newsmen have sources. I think --

Senator Huddleston. Or convincing a cartoonist, for instance, to draw a derrogatory cartoon about a college professor who certainly did not constitute a threat to the violent overthrow of the government.

Mr. Adams. If anyone accuses us of having any great success in trying to influence the press, I think that their objectivity stands pretty high.

Senator Huddleston. I think the point is whether there was success or not, there was an effort made. I'm glad to hear you acknowledge now that it is almost an impossibility.

But more than that it seems to me at the beginning when

gsh 9

these type of techniques were used, it seemed to indicate a lack of confidence or faith in the American people to believe that they could not hear ideas that might be contrary to their own without being serious damaged.

One of the great freedoms we have is the freedom of hearing other ideas whether we agree with them or not. I think this is an area that we are concerned with and one technique which I hope is being discontinued and one that will be by the time these hearings conclude and by the time proper legislation is drawn.

Mr. Adams. Well, I think you can be assured that any such techniques in that area died with COINTELPRO in 1971.

Senator Huddleston. That is comforting.

End 6

Mr. Adams. Yes.

Begin 7

The Chairman (presiding). Thank you, Senator.

I have been forced in and out by virtue of votes and other Committee business. I am not sure which Senators have had their opportunity to question and which have not.

Senator Goldwater, were you next?

Senator Goldwater. I will not take much time. I apologize for not having been here in the last two days. It is going good, I have heard.

We have heard testimony regarding the voluminous records, I believe 500,000, maintained by the Bureau.

How in your view have these records come to be kept?

For what purpose have they been kept and has the Bureau ever undertaken to destroy or prune down any of these records?

Mr. Adams. We have a number of records. We are a business-like organization. We record our activities. And as the staff knows, they had access to a lot of recorded material that is the product of what the FBI has done over the years.

When we conduct an investigation, we maintain the results. We do have destruction procedures where after the passage of certain time limits approved by the Archives authority, we are allowed to destroy certain files. Other information we are required to put on microfilm. There is a regular standard procedure for the destruction of FBI files. This has been suspended, of course, during the initiation of these hearings and our files probably have increased considerably during this period because we are not allowed to destroy anything since the Committee commenced its hearings.

But we do have procedures for destroying these that are approved by the Archives, and a problem inherent in that is maintaining information, what should we keep, what should we obtain during an investigation, what should we record?

In the past we have been pretty consistent in recording everything we thought was relevant to the investigation. The passage of the Privacy Act put certain restrictions in. We cannot collect or maintain anything unless it is relevant to an ongoing matter of which we have investigative jurisdiction.

But beyond even the Privacy Act, the Attorney General instituted a guidelines committee in this area that we have been meeting diligently with every day and hopefully have tried to avoid this idea that we are for no good reason maintaining a gossip, scandal, and unncessary, irrelevant material.

So once these guidelines are in some sort of final form, not to be adopted, then the Attorney General has indicated that he is going to take it up with the various Congressional committees to get their input into it, after which they will be published.

Senator Goldwater. Well, now these dossiers, I think you can call them that probably.

Mr. Adams. I prefer not to, but I accept the fact that that is how they are referred to.

Senator Goldwater. What do you call them?

Mr. Adams. I call them files. To me, I guess we all have our little hang-ups, but to me that is usually used in some sinister connotation. It is probably not to you. But I will use whatever terminology you want to use on this.

Senator Goldwater. I hope what you have on me is not called a dossier.

Mr. Adams. No, sir, it's a collection of material.

sh 12

(General laughter)

Mr. Adams. Of which you are aware.

Senator Goldwater. That's right.

Now let me ask you, the information you have would probably be on computer tape?

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Goldwater. It's not. Information that IRS would have, is that computerized?

Mr. Adams. It may be. I'm not familiar with the extent of theirs. We do have certain computer activities, such as the National Crime Information Center, or we have, I guess, 7 or 8 million records. This is not the usual file material. This is, it consists of individuals concerning whom a warrant is outstanding, stolen property, material such as this. And also some documented criminal history information in the nature of prior arrest history. But not what I think you are referring to in the way of file material, reports, intelligence, this type of information.

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Goldwater. There's no such list that you know of?

Mr. Adams. I don't know what other agencies have, but the FBI does not have such a list, does not have such a capability to interface with such a list if such a list exists.

Senator Goldwater. Do you feel rather safe in saying then that no agency of government has put together such a computerized total of all the information on the people that you have surveilled?

Mr. Adams. Oh, I think it is safe to say I don't know of any. Today I am not saying what does exist or doesn't exist elsewhere.

Senator Goldwater. In addition to the 500,000 records that you have, would I be correct in saying that you have 50 million data cards and that there's $82 million spent on intelligence in the Fiscal year 1975 in maintaining this library?

Mr. Adams. No, I don't think that is correct. I think the figure of $82 million is what our budget people have drawn up as being the total cost in a given year of our intelligence operations, security, criminal, organized crime, the whole intelligence field. But I don't relate it to the maintenance of any data cards.

Senator Goldwater. Now one other area, and I think it probably, according to the records, it does go back to '70.

How did the Bureau come to place the so-called women's lib movement under surveillance, and I say so-called because I think we discovered that there was no such organized movement.

Mr. Adams. There were a lot of movements. It is my recollection -- I have not reviewed the file in detail, but it is my recollection that the case was originally opened because of indications that certain groups were attempting to infiltrate or control the women's liberation movement.

The investigation was conducted and was terminted several years ago, as far as I know.

Senator Goldwater. Do you know of any actions that were taken by the Bureau as to the women's liberation movement except to monitor it?

Mr. Adams. No. And the monitoring was for the purpose of determining the infiltration, and I don't know of any actions taken against them.

Senator Goldwater. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Goldwater.

Senator Hart, have you had an opportunity to question?

Senator Hart of Colorado. No, I have not.

The Chairman. Senator Hart.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the testimony yesterday developed by the staff concerning the last few days of Martin Luther King's life, we learned that the Bureau in March of 1968 developed information to be given to the press criticizing Dr. King for staying in a white-owned and operated hotel, the Holiday Inn in Memphis, instead of the Lorraine.

At some point during Dr. King's stay in Memphis, he moved from the Holiday Inn to Lorraine.

To your knowledge, Mr. Adams, was that information ever given to the press?

Mr. Adams. I have been unable to determine that. This question was raised of me by the Civil Rights Division of the Department. Apparently, they had had some inquiry along the same lines several months ago. But my recollection of it at the time, we saw that this action had been proposed and the memorandum bore the initials, I believe it was the initials, statement handled, and the initials of the agent in the External Affairs Division who assumed the responsibility of saying handle it and initiated it.

They contacted him and he said that he had no recollection of the matter but the fact that he did say handled didn't mean that he was able to do anything with it. He was just clearing that memorandum so it would show action was taken, and he doesn't know if he gave it to anyone or not.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, suffice it to say that the facts are that subsequent to the time the Bureau developed this information to pass on to the press, it did appear in the local papers in Memphis.

Mr. Adams. There was some statement in the local papers, not according to the terminology of the proposed statement that was to be given to him. There was some comment made, if I recall, that Martin Luther King gave a press conference following the riots that followed one of his appearances, and that he gave that press conference in a hotel, the Holiday Inn Hotel. But it didn't have any, at least the newspaper article itself didn't have any direct relation to acts taken.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, according to some historians and people who have commented on the circumstances, they were fairly explicit in stating that the local press was critical of him during that period for staying in the white hotel, but I don't want to make a big issue out of that.

What was the name of the agent that you talked to?

Mr. Adams. I didn't talk to him personally. People in the Bureau that were working on this did and I believe his name was Linbaugh, L-i-n-b-a-u-g-h.

Senator Hart of Colorado. If you could provide that name to us, I would appreciate it.

Mr. Adams. I would be glad to.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Adams, was any effort made during this entire COINTELPRO period to objectively define what the New Left meant? What was your understanding

gsh 17

of the New Left?

End Tape 7

Mr. Adams. They did have a definition of the New Left distinguishing it from the Old Left. It was primarily to distinguish it from the, in the area that the New Left was trying to separate itself from the old hidebound policies of the Communist Party or some of its links to the Communist Party.

Perhaps Mr. Wannall has a better definition of that.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It very definitely included those who were opposed to the war, organized groups that opposed the war and felt strongly about racial injustice in this country, leaving the Communist Party aside.

Mr. Adams. People involved in the New Left movement were, of course, also involved in the Vietnam, anti-Vietnam was effort.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What do you mean also?

That's what I'm trying to get out. What was the New Left? If you didn't oppose the war and you weren't involved in civil rights groups, who else might you have been?

Mr. Adams. Well, the New Left was a -- did involve a revolutionary philosophy. It wasn't related solely to the anti-Vietnam effort.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Thomas Jefferson embodied a revolutionary philosophy.

Mr. Adams. That's right. And the New Left activity exceeded Thomas Jefferson's philosophy in that it did fit in with the basic Communist philosophy.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Every group that was placed under the efforts of the COINTELPRO supported the violent overthrow of this country?

Mr. Adams. The concept of COINTELPRO was directed toward those organizations. I would have to refresh my memory on each one of the organizations that were targets of it, but they were basically New Left, Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, New Left, black extremists, white hate groups, those were the five basics.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference?

Mr. Adams. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, I don't know if it was involved specifically in COINTELPRO.

Three minor actions were taken against the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, its leader, I think you could say, for eight years was subject to a lot more than three minor actions.

Mr. Adams. That's right, and that gets into the other area that the activities taken against him were primarily COINTELPRO type activities but weren't really under the control of --

Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying that basically every organization and individual that was swept into the net of the five COINTELPRO nets supported the violent overthrow of this country?

Mr. Adams. Well, not just the violent overthrow of the government. It would have been organizations that were threatening and fomenting violence. I don't believe it had to be related to the actual overthrow of the government.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Is a street demonstration violent?

Mr. Adams. It depends on where you are in relation to what is taking place. If there are a lot of activities in connection with street demonstrations that are not violent, and there are a lot of street demonstrations that have reported in deaths, so it just depends on activity taking place and the circumstances.

Our problem is we are given the responsibility by the Attorney General to monitor demonstrations which have the potential of violence. The question is, how do you find out, at what point do you get in and monitor demonstrations to determine if that has a potential violence?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, obviously what we're told was here is, we have received testimony to the effect that the FBI went out of its way to foment violence itself, to encourage disruptions internally, to encourage hostilities and conflict between and among these groups in the hope that violence would occur, and therefore you could, say, go back to the Director or the press or whomever and say look, this is a violent group.

Mr. Adams. I accept the allegation but I don't accept the fact, the conclusion that, from what I have seen in reviewing these files in connection with our investigations, we don't foment violence. We don't permit as a matter of policy our informants to act as provocateurs to engage in violence. I am not denying it may have happened, but the FBI does not foment violence, and the FBI, you know, has no --

Senator Hart of Colorado. You are using present tense verbs. I think --

Mr. Adams. We didn't then. I don't agree that our actions in any event were designed to foment violence.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I think there is plenty of documentation of the attempt to set the Black Panthers against the Blackstone Rangers in Chicago.

Mr. Adams. Well, I don't consider that plenty of evidence. I think the evidence to the contrary is that one of the organizations, when we got word that the Black Panther versus US, we notified the local police that this activity was going to take place, and the individual, so that we would prevent the killing which had come to our attention was going to take place, and then the turndowns of various COINTELPRO actions, there were specific statements made, that will not be approved because it might result in harm to an individual, physical harm, and we have no indication from any of these actions under COINTELPRO that any violent act occurred, and I have not been presented with any by the staff from their far more extensive inquiry.

Senator Hart of Colorado. June 3rd, 1968, a memorandum from the Special Agent in Charge of Cincinatti to the Director of the FBI, the title of which is Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of the New Left, a five page memorandum having to do with Antioch College in Ohio. It is a long description of the college and background. There is a recommendation on page 3, Cincinatti recommends that counterintelligence action be taken to expose the pseudo-intellectual image of Antioch, and it gives specific ways of doing that, and then the next page, page 4, the desired result of action, force Antioch to defend itself as an educational institution.

Where in the laws of this country or the charter of the Federal Bureau of Investigation does it say that that Agency should be forcing any educational institution to defend itself?

Mr. Adams. I know of none.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You would say this is stepping beyond the bounds of your authority?

Mr. Adams. I would say -- I'm not familiar with the total action of what was there, but just on the surface I don't see any basis for it.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It is my understanding that participating field officers of the counterintelligence, the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

COINTELPRO activities were required to send in status letters and report in annual results.

Is that correct?

Mr. Adams. Yes.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What kind of results generally were you looking for? What was considered success?

Mr. Adams. Well, it would be considered success, like in one instance where an action was taken to create factionalism in the highest level of the Communist Party, and the results were that we were advised that the Communisty Party influence declined appreciably as a direct result of factionalism created at that level. That to us was a concrete result.

We had other results where, well, you get in various degrees. That is an extremely favorable degree. We had others, I think one was alluded to yesterday or today where a letter went on setting up a marital strife on the part of someone. I don't see any basis or justification for that. I think that is the other extreme. I think in the middle there were ones that fell into a different degree.

The only thing that I feel is we had 3000 actions recommended. The Bureau -- just like this Antioch one. I don't know if the document shows whether that was approved or not. I doubt that it was approved.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I believe it was. We can document that.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Adams. Okay. Because there would be one. I would say the judgment in approving that is in question. But out of 3000 recommended, the fact that 2000 approved shows that there was some concern to try to keep these to a proper level, and I think the actual number of grossly improper activities fortunately is rather small. I think there are a lot in there.

Well, the whole program, we feel, should have been discontinued, and we don't have a program like it now, and we wouldn't institute a program like it now.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It would be helpful to us if now or in the future you could recommend what steps we should take, both as the Committee and this Congress, to make sure that doesn't happen, aside from just the assurances we are bein given here.

Mr. Adams. Well, the main recommendation I make is that we don't wind up on the point we have been on in the past years that one time in our history Congress is saying we ought to be doing something to stop violence in the streets, murders, blowing up of buildings, and at another time they are saying you shouldn't have done what you did, and that we make a mistake when we react and try to identify one area and say that is the voice of the people. What we need is a legislative mandate which is the will of Congress in order to tell us what our role should be in this area. I think that is the main thing that would come out of all of these, I hope, some more definitive guideline where we all know what the will of the people is as expressed by Congress.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I believe my time is up.

Senator Tower (presiding). Mr. Adams, to return to the business of informants which I initiated and was interrupted by a vote, who selects an informant?

Mr. Adams. The basic responsibility is on our special agent personnel who develop informants, the agent on the street.

Senator Tower. Does the Special Agent in Charge in a given area have control over the activities of an informant or a veto on the use of a particular informant?

Mr. Adams. Not only the Special Agent in Charge, but FBI headquarters. We maintain the tightest possible control of the utilization of informants. We require Bureau approval to utilize a person as an informant.

Senator Tower. The Special Agent in Charge has the power to veto the use of an informant?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Tower. Does headquarters know who all the informants are?

Mr. Adams. Absolutely. We do not allow hip pocket informants. We require --

Senator Tower. You don't have the agents informed by their own special informants?

Mr. Adams. Absolutely not.

Senator Tower. Are the criteria different for paid and for non-paid informers?

Mr. Adams. We have some informants over the years that have refused to accept payment, but generally the criteria for both, I mean for ones that are paid is that it must be on a COD basis, evaluated as to the value of the information.

Senator Tower. What protections are afforded to informants?

Mr. Adams. Protections afforded them individually?

Senator Tower. Yes.

Mr. Adams. The greatest protection in the world we can afford them is to maintain the confidential relationship which they have adopted with the FBI, and the fact that those citizens of the United States who, for whatever reason, decide to cooperate with the FBI and cooperate with their government in criminal and the security field, have that confidentiality maintained, and beyond that confidentiality we are unable to afford them any protection, any physical protection. We have had informants murdered through disclosure. We have had them subjected to other violence and criminal activities, and the only protection beyond maintaining the confidentiality is once we have used them or had to expose them for some purpose, we do have procedures for relocation and maintenance of them which is utilized quite frequently in the top hoodlum and the Cosa Nostra type investigations.

Senator Tower. It is my understanding now that 83 percent of all cases involve some use of informants, so that means that the use is pretty widespread and apparently very essential.

What kind of guidance does the FBI give to these informants to give them any special training? Could you describe that kind of relationship in terms of guidelines, control, authority, what have you?

Mr. Adams. Well, when an individual is being developed as an informant, our main concern is whether he provides reliable information and that the information he collects is collected by legal means. We don't permit an informant to engage in any activity that an agent couldn't do legally himself. In other words, you can't have an extension of the agent out here engaging in illegal acts, and the agent saying I abide by the law. This creates some problems, of course, in the criminal field where you don't recruit informants from Sunday schools. You recruit informants in areas where they do have knowledge of criminal activities. But we even had to open investigations and prosecute some of our informants, because we do not bend from this, that they are not going to enjoy favorite status as a result of their relationship with us. So the agent covers all of this with an informant during the discussions.

We secure background information on the informants. We do this to ensure, as best as possible, we are dealing with a reliable, stable individual even though he may be engaged in an unstable activity, and we go through this period and consider them more or less, in different terminology, probationary, potential, verifying information that he furnishes us, and everytime when they report on the status of an informant, they have to tell us what percentage of his information has been verified by other means, by other informants or sources.

So we do have a continuing indoctrination which is supervised at FBI headquarters.

Senator Tower. You said you don't recruit your informants from Sunday school class. Being an ex-Sunday school teacher, I resent that, but --

Mr. Adams. I am talking in the criminal field. Many of our security informants come from a very fine background.

Senator Tower. But this leads me into this. Sometimes, then, you might recruit people that you know have committed criminal acts.

Mr. Adams. That's true.

Senator Tower. Do you promise him immunity from future prosecution in many instances to secure their cooperation?

Mr. Adams. No. Now, the only exception to that would be we may have an ongoing, it is what you call an informant -- I believe your question is addressed to someone that we are actually considering in an informant status.

Senator Tower. Yes.

Mr. Adams. We do have situations where during an investigation we target on one individual, the lower rung, and the United States Attorney and the Department offer immunity. We don't. And say, you cooperate, and we go up the ladder to the next level, and in some of these cases we have gone up through successive stages until we get the main honcho who we feel is the proper target of our investigation.

Senator Tower. Getting on another subject, does the FBI still request bank audits?

Mr. Adams. Bank audits? Do you mean do we still have access to bank records?

Senator Tower. Yes.

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, we do.

Senator Tower. And do you obtain access with or without warrants?

Mr. Adams. We obtain access without warrants.

Senator Tower. Without warrants?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Tower. Is the subject notified in advance by the FBI when you obtain one without a warrant?

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Tower. Are they notified by the bank, or is he notified subsequently by the FBI?

Mr. Adams. No. We do get subpoenas in many cases, not warrants, but we do get subpoenas in many cases, but in some cases a bank will make available to us records without subpoena. When it comes time for utilizing that information we do issue a subpoena for the information.

Senator Tower. Do you have legal authority to gain access to these records?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, we do.

Senator Tower. Without a subpoena, without a court document?

Mr. Adams. There is no law that I know of that forbids us access. There have been several court decisions, including some circuit courts that disagree with each other, but I think the current finding is that the bank records are the records of the bank and this does not violate any First Amendment or other Amendments in connection with it.

Senator Tower. Do you make similar requests of S&Ls and other, and credit unions and other financial institutions?

end 8

Mr. Adams. I would assume the same would provide there.

begin 9

The Chairman (presiding). Thank you, Senator Tower.

I just have a question or two. We are going to try to conclude this morning because the Committee has a hearing, a business meeting at 2:00 o'clock this afternoon and for the information of the members, that meeting will take place in room 3110 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

And while I am making announcements, I think I should say that tomorrow between the hours of 9:00 o'clock in the morning and 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the Committee will report its findings and make its recommendations to the Senate in connection with our investigation into alleged involvement of the United States in certain assassination plots, and attempts directed against foreign leaders.

The Committee, as you know, has made an exhaustive investigation of this issue. It has taken some six months; 75 witnesses have been interrogated, over 8000 pages of testimony have been taken, mountains of documents have been analyzed and digested, and the report will be a detailed accounting to the American people of that evidence, together with the findings and recommendations of the Committee.

Initially these disclosures will be made to the Senate in secret session, after which the Committee has previously voted to make the report public. Therefore, it is anticipated that at 2:30 tomorrow afternoon in this room, the caucus room, following that secret session of the Senate, the Committee will meet with the press for the purpose of answering such questions as the press may wish to address to the Committee on the assassination report.

Now, the last few questions I would like to put to you, Mr. Adams, have to do with some confusion in my mind concerning the purpose of the FBI in monitoring the Women's Liberation movement, what was that? What was that surveillance done for? Why were you involved in monitoring that movement?

Mr. Adams. It was basically, as I recall, I have not reviewed the files, but from the information that I have acquired, it would indicate there were groups that were believed to be infiltrating and attempting to exert control over it. That investigation was based or initiated on this fact.

The Chairman. But you never found, did you, that the Women's Liberation movement was seriously infiltrated, influenced or controlled by Communists.

Mr. Adams. No, and the case was closed. I would put them in the position of comments we have made earlier about the press, that I don't think anyone is going to dominate or control. That is a very independent group.

The Chairman. Well, we are trying to keep the country that way.

Mr. Adams. That's right.

The Chairman. And the kind of thing that disturbs me is what the documents reveal. For example, if you will turn -- you have the document book there with you. If you will turn to Tab 5, 5-4, can you find that? Can you move your thumb through the pages to 5-4?

Have you found that? It's in the upper right hand corner, 5-4, under Tab 5.

Mr. Adams. Yes.

The Chairman. Then, if you will turn back beyond that, one, two, three, four pages where you find under the caption

Origin, Aims, and Purposes, a description of the Women's Liberation movement in Baltimore, Maryland.

Now, I call your attention to this because it seems to me to typify the whole problem of this generalized kind of surveillance over activities of American citizens. Here is the report, if you will read with me this paragraph, the report on the group reads as follows: "The Women's Liberation movement in Baltimore, Maryland began during the summer of 1968. There was no structure or a parent organization. There were no rules or plans to go by. It started out as a group therapy session with young women who were either lonely or confined to the home with small children, getting together to talk out their problems. Along with this they wanted a purpose and that was to be free women from the humdrum existence of being only a wife and mother. They wanted equal opportunities that men have in work and in society. They wanted their husbands to share in the housework and in rearing their children. They also wanted to go out and work in whatever kind of jobs they wanted, and not to be discriminated against as women."

Now, can you find anything in that report that in any way suggests that these women were engaged in improper or unlawful activity?

Mr. Adams. Not in that one. I believe there was another report, though, giving the origin of it, which went into a little more description of what our basic interest was.

The Chairman. Can you tell me, because this is the report I have --

Mr. Adams. Well, I am given here --

The Chairman. What other, if there was some sinister activity connected with this group that isn't laid out in the document --

Mr. Adams. I was given a work paper here which reads, "Women's Liberation Movement. Investigation of captioned movement was initiated by our New York Office in April 1969 as the Women's Libber movement was described as a loosely structured women's movement comprised of individuals with varying ideologies from liberal to New Left persuasion, some of whom had exhibited an affiliation with and/or sympathy for several organizations of investigative interest to this Bureau, namely, the Students for a Democratic Society, Black Panther Party, the Vietnam Peace Parade Committee, Venceremos Brigade, the Socialist Workers Party, with its youth group the Young Socialist Alliance."

The Chairman. May I stop you at this point?

Mr. Adams. Yes.

The Chairman. You are reading from a paper which has to do with the origination of an investigation coming out of New York, are you not?

Mr. Adams. Yes.

The Chairman. I am reading from a document that relates to the Women's Liberation Movement in Baltimore, and the findings concerning it in the summer of 1968. My question hasn't to do with whatever original purpose the FBI sought by initiating this kind of surveillance in New York, but with a finding made concerning the Women's Liberation movement in Baltimore which I have just read to you, and I think you would agree with me that women do have the right to get together to talk about humdrum existence and equal opportunities with men and equal opportunities for work in our society, don't they? That is not a subversive activity.

Mr. Adams. Well, but what you have here is the setup of our investigative activity. We had New York, which was the office of origin of the investigation. You have other offices that were checking to determine what influence there was. In addition, in New York, to the New York office, lay the fact that interwoven with the Women's Liberation movement goal for equal rights for women, there was an advocacy certainly of militancy and violence in achieving their goals.

Now, Baltimore is one office, and I believe that even there in one of the reports --

The Chairman. You keep taking me back to New York.

Mr. Adams. Right.

The Chairman. And I keep taking you back to Baltimore. And the reason I do that is because if you turn two pages back from this particular report, which has to do with the Baltimore organization, the question is whether based upon that finding the investigation should continue of the Baltimore group, and the decision is that you will continue to follow and report on the activities of the group.

And I just wondered why --

Mr. Adams. This is a problem that we have, that we do have organizations where sometimes the -- the Women's Liberation group is not a good example because that was washed out, but we do have organizations where --

The Chairman. What was washed out? Not the Women's Liberation movement?

Mr. Adams. No, the investigation indicated there was no concern or no reason to be concerned about it.

But where you do have an organization that has branches in many areas of the country, and you start with one place and it looks like you have a subversive organization, you do have to see, well, is this carried out throughout the organization or is it just one chapter or one group? In other words, not even an organizational problem.

The Chairman. But you see, in this -- the trouble with that is in this Baltimore organization you say in your own report that it was independent, there was no structure or a parent organization, no rules or plans, so it isn't a part of a national controlled and directed organization called by

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

your own admission --

Mr. Adams. I believe this report had some subsequent pages that aren't included in here that did show some additional activity or influence.

The Chairman. I am told by the staff that this summary is accurate, and the only other thing contained was that these women had affiliations with an organization that had protested the war in Baltimore.

Mr. Adams. I think there were some other items.

The Chairman. That is the only other association that we have been able to determine.

Now, in a case of this kind, do you still carry -- you say this has been closed. Apparently the Women's Liberation movement is no longer under suspicion by the FBI and the case has been closed. What happens when the case is closed? Are those women's names still left in the files?

Are they forever more contained?

Mr. Adams. Yes.

The Chairman. In the system? Yes. There is no -- yes.

Mr. Adams. Yes.

The Chairman. Pretty soon you will have us all in the system.

I mean, if there is no way, even after surveillance has been terminated to terminate the references of individuals through the files of the system, you will one day have us all, won't you?

Mr. Adams. Well, I would say as part of a normal business record, when we do make a judgment that an organization should be investigated and we investigate it, and then we find activities but we make a conclusion that there is no additional problem here, this is a record of our official action. Now, if we destroy it, at what point do we get into a situation of being accused of doing things and then destroying things to keep from showing what we do?

The critical thing on this is whether we are able, and we do set up safeguards, where information in our files is not misused at a later date, and that is what these guideline committees are all about.

end 9

The Chairman. Do you have any idea of how many names of Americans you keep in your files all as a result of the cumulative effect of all of these surveillances in all of these cases?

Mr. Adams. No, I don't.

The Chairman. It's in the millions, isn't it?

Mr. Adams. We have 6 1/2 million files.

The Chairman. You have 6 1/2 million files?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And there are surely names of more than one person typically in a file, aren't they?

Mr. Adams. But it is a rather large country.

The Chairman. That's a large number of files to start with, and if you have multiple names in them, you are quickly up in to the, you know, 20, 30, 40 million.

Mr. Adams. Right. But many of these files are applicant files. They are not all subversive files. They are not all criminal files. We have a million crimes of violence each year.

There is a million people.

The Chairman. Sure, and I wish you had more time to spend on those crimes of violence.

Mr. Adams. I do too.

The Chairman. There we agree.

Mr. Adams. Right.

The Chairman. What I worry about is this. You say there's no way to know when to close a file. These were surveillance files, or originally opened up to determine whether organizations might have subversive connections.

There are names in these files, so some demagogue comes along and says against some public figure that his name is contained in a certain file to be found in the subversive files of the FBI and there it is. He has not made a misstatement at all. But to the American people that man's name and reputation has been scarred.

Mr. Adams. And I hope this Committee recognizes that and recommends legislation that would enforce strong punitive or criminal violations against misuse of information in the files. We feel this way, CIA feels this way. We recognize we have a lot of sensitive information in it. We fire our employees if we find them misusing information. We feel we need additional sanctions in this area.

I don't think we can ever stop the accumulation of information. I don't know an investigative agency in the world, a law enforcement agency, that does not have to accumulate information. And we are working on guidelines as to how to get rid of the irrelevant information, how to eliminate material that really does not need to be kept, that we hope we will be able to come to Congress with these guidelines before too long, which will help address itself to just some of these problems.

The Chairman. Well, you may be assured that the Committee shares your objective in this regard and we will be working with you and the Department of Justice and others to try and change the laws to give a greater measure of protection to the First Amendment rights of the American people.

I have no further questions. Are there any other questions.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, earlier, in inquiring about the basis for investigating Dr. King, I thought I heard two basic justifications. One, suspicion and fear of Communist influence or infiltration. And secondly, "that he constituted a threat to the success of the Negro movement."

Did I understand that second basis?

Mr. Adams. No. The first I was talking about was not suspicion but information indicating Communist influence. The second was on this question of motivation that you raised, I don't know what their motive was to get to some of these other activities in order to discredit and remove him, but it was a question -- apparently, they must have felt that he was a threat to either as shown in the files the President and Attorney General expressed concern about the civil rights movement and his continued affiliation with some of these people.

So --

Senator Mondale. Would you agree that it would not be a proper basis for an investigation for the FBI or any other government official to be concerned about the success of the negro movement?

In other words, that is not a valid --

Mr. Adams. I have no problem.

Senator Mondale. All right. So let us take the one ground that appears to have justified the investigation of Dr. King and the investigation of the women's liberation movement -- the fear that "dangerous influences might infiltrate these organizations."

Suppose it is true. Suppose that a Communist did have influence over Dr. King, or suppose an SDS member infiltrated and became a dominant influence in a chapter of the women's liberation movement and you established it as a fact. What would you do?

Assuming that we can't get into this harassing and so on, you agree that that no longer has any validity. So what? What do you have?

Mr. Adams. We have potential violations which might arise, which rarely come to fruition and haven't for many years, but we do have an intelligence responsibility under the directives from the President and the Attorney General. That is, with a revolutionary group, like the Communist Party has taken over control of a domestic group and the Communist Party is operated by the Soviet Union. We would furnish that information as we do. Every copy of our reports goes to the Department of Justice.

Senator Mondale. Right. But I just want to get the King case because as I understood, he was being investigated for the reason that it was feared that a Communist or Communists who were suspected of being Communists, or known to be Communists, were gaining influence over him.

Suppose you established that. What present use or need is there for that information?

Mr. Adams. I feel that the President, the Attorney General, the Executive Branch, needs to know the extent of a foreign-directed Communist organization, its influence and effect on the United States of America.

Senator Mondale. All right. So if such information is valid and an investigation to seek it are necessary, is there any limit on the investigative authority of the FBI?

We have just heard about the women's liberation movement where we were fearful that New Left, SDS types might have an influence. That justified that investigation. We now have your statement that we were fearful that some Communists might have influence over Dr. King, and therefore, he was thoroughly investigated.

Are there any limits then on who can be investigated?

Mr. Adams. Well, the only limits are that we must relate it to a statutory basis of one of the Presidential guidelines we have or the criteria we have, which criteria are receiving scrutiny at the present time by Congress. They have in the past by the Department of Justice, and this is the area of guidelines. This whole area of domestic security is what we need guidelines in.

Senator Mondale. Right. And you would agree, we talked about this earlier, that being a Communist is not a crime.

Mr. Adams. No, it has not been a crime.

Senator Mondale. So that the whole basis for this has to apparently stem from a Presidential directive, you think has tasked you to do this.

Mr. Adams. Yes.

Senator Mondale. Just a few other points.

In 1970, 11/6/70, a telegram from Newark to the Director went forth proposing that the following telegram be sent:

"Word received. Food donated to party by anti-liberation white pigs contained poison. Symptoms: cramps, diarrhea, severe stomach pains. Destroy all food donated for convention suspected of poison.

"However, still required to meet your quota. Signed, Ministry of Information."

And this was a telegram that was to be sent from Oakland, California to the Jersey City, New Jersey headquarters. The

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

telegram went on further. It is suggested that the Bureau then consider having the laboratory treat fruit, such as oranges, with mild laxative type drug by hypodermic needle or other appropriate method and ship fruit as a donation from a fictitious person in Miami to the Jersey City headquarters.

The answer then from the Director of the FBI:

"The Bureau cannot authorize the treating of fruit to be shipped to Jersey City because of lack of control over the treated fruit in transit. However, Newarks's proposed telegram regarding food collected for the Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention has merit."

How did you ever get to a point like that?

Mr. Adams. I don't know. What was the response from Newark and then the final answer taken?

Senator Mondale. It was turned down because they couldn't control transit, but they thought it was a good idea.

Do you think that's a good idea?

Mr. Adams. No, I don't. I think that --

Senator Mondale. How did we ever get to the point that this kind of insane suggestion violating everyone's civil liberties based on government-sponsored fraud? How does anyone ever consider something like that?

Mr. Adams. I don't know.

Senator Mondale. One final point.

When we interviewed one of your former employees, he referred to something I never heard of before called a no-contact list. He did it jokingly because he said when the Pope agreed to see Martin Luther King, he was sure he would be put on the no-contact list thereafter.

Can you tell me what that list is?

Mr. Adams. Not in any specific detail. I know that at one time there was a, there would be a list that if an agent interviewed an individual and this individual created a storm or a ruckus and we didn't want some other agent stumbling out there and interviewing the same person, that we would make sure that they were aware of the fact that further contacts of this individual would result in a problem.

Senator Mondale. All right. Now on 6/24/71, in a memo to Clyde Tolson, it refers to a conference on 8/26/71 with certain -- it looks like about 10 members of the FBI. And this is what it says:

"Pursuant to your instruction, members of the conference were briefed concerning recent attempts by various newspapers and reporters to obtain information about or from FBI personnel. Members were specifically advised that there would be absolutely no conversations with or answers from any of the representatives of the Washington" -- something. Oh here, from the Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, CBS and NBC.

"The only acceptable answer to such inquiries is no comment."

Now Senator Huddleston earlier asked about efforts to influence newspapers and media outlet.

Does this trouble you, a decision not to answer questions from certain selected media outlets?

Mr. Adams. It is not the policy today. I think this has been aired in the past. There was a period of time wherein Mr. Hoover, in reacting to criticism from some of these newspaper men, where he felt he hadn't been given a fair shake, or for some other reason, that he felt that they should be told no comment, and he instructed they be told no comment.

The motivations I am not in a position to discuss, but I can tell you that there has been no such policy in the last several years that I know of.

Senator Mondale. If you could submit for us, if you can find it, the no-contact list, I would appreciate that.

I have some other questions I will submit for the record, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Very well. I just have one final follow-up question on Senator Mondale's interrogation.

I continue to be somewhat fascinated by how long these investigations go, and when, if ever, they are stopped. Apparently they never come out of the files, whatever is found. But Senator Mondale raised the point of a suspicion that in the Martin Luther King case, an advisor, he was getting advice from a person who had or was thought to have Communist leanings.

And so without using the name, because we are trying to protect privacy as we conduct this investigation --

Mr. Adams. I think we have a little more problem than that, too, Senator.

The Chairman. I am just using a Mister X in place of the name. What I am trying to get at is when the Bureau, what the criteria is for pursuing an investigation, for pursuing the matter, and this is the kind of a statement that leaves me so perplexed. This has to do with a reply to the New York office by the Bureau here in Washington.

The part I read to you is as follows:

"The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the New York office that Mr. X is not sympathetic to the Party cause. While there may not be any direct evidence that Mr. X is a Communist, neither is there any substantial evidence that he is anti-Communist."

And so the directions are to continue the investigation of this matter. And in cases of this kind, do you pursue the investigation until you prove the negative?

Mr. Adams. No. I believe in that particular case, if it is the one I am thinking about, that there was evidence that at one time he had been a Communist and that there was a question of whether the office felt -- well, it's like we have had some situations where a person comes out and publicly disavows their former leanings.

Do you take them at words right away after they have been engaged in violent activities, or do you wait until you determine that they really have carried through the disavowed practice?

That's a gray area. This one seems like on the wording itself, would seem like an extreme philosophy, leaning towards everyone has to prove in the United States they are not a Communist, and I can assure that is not a policy of the Bureau and does not fit into the criteria of our general investigative matters.

I just feel that there is more to it than just that brief paragraph.

The Chairman. That particular kind of philosophy has kept up in our life from time to time. I remember during the days of McCarthyism in this country, we came very close to the point where people had to prove that they were not now or had never been a Communist in order to establish themselves as patriotic citizens.

Mr. Adams. That's right. That's true.

The Chairman. And when I see standards of this kind or criteria of this kind emerging, it worries me very much.

I have no further questions. I want to thank you both. If there are no further questions, I want to thank you both for your testimony this morning. It has been very helpful to the Committee, and the Committee will stand adjourned until 2:00.

We will stand adjourned in public session. Our next public session will be 2:30 tomorrow afternoon for purposes of press questioning on the assassination report.

(Whereupon, at 1:07 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 o'clock p.m., Thursday, November 20, 1975.)

- - -

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1st NR 1203x, 1204x, 1st NR 1204x, 1206-1210x, 1212, 1214x, 1214x1, 1215, 1215x

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Adams - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs. (2)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Cregar - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs. (2)

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On 12/4/75, a meeting was held with the following representatives of captioned Committee: Chief Counsel F.A.O. Schwartz; Assistant Counsel Paul Michel; Staff Member Mark Gitenstein; Staff Director of the Domestic Task Force John T. Elliff; and Staff Member John Bayley. Representing the Bureau at this meeting were Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams, Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Inspector John B. Hotis, and SA Paul V. Daly.

The meeting discussed the forthcoming testimony on 12/9/75 of the Director before that Committee and Elliff furnished the Bureau two draft papers discussing the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction and issues the Committee Staff feels the Senate Select Committee must address from a legislative standpoint. Copies of these papers are attached.

The first paper which consists of six pages discusses in Part 1 what the Committee sees as problems arising out of the FBI's domestic intelligence investigations. This portion highlights the fact that these investigations may be overbroad in scope, collect irrelevant information, and continue the investigations beyond what the Committee sees as their normal investigative conclusion. This portion also addresses the investigative techniques used during these investigations and the resultant dissemination of information collected.

Under Part 2, the document discusses options available to the Committee. These options run the gamut from abolition of the Bureau's domestic intelligence functions to administrative oversight by the Attorney General or Congressional oversight or enacting legislation providing for domestic intelligence investigations with legislative limits imposed on such investigations. Included is the consideration of creating an independent Inspector General.

62-116395-1215X

REC-51

7 JAN 22 1976

Enclosures (2)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:lad
(9)

5-

84 JAN 26 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The second position paper which was prepared by John T. Elliff begins by a six-page statement and analysis of the Bureau's current authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. He then lists four options for the Committee.

Option 1 is for Congress to pass legislation ratifying the existing FBI authority as set forth by Presidential directives and Executive Orders.

Option 2 suggests Congress might give serious consideration to creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Department of Justice. In this Option, Elliff suggests that the FBI itself has considered this Option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from law enforcement functions of the Bureau.

Option 3 considers the elimination of FBI domestic intelligence. In his analysis of this position, it might be possible for the Bureau to develop the necessary intelligence information through its normal criminal investigations and thus remove the necessity for domestic intelligence investigations as presently conducted.

Option 4 considers setting standards for domestic intelligence investigations. In this Option, Elliff states that the FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only as Congress finds that regular criminal investigations would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of Federal law and that incidents of the use of violence in such violations are of a serious nature and threaten the security of the country.

For purposes of the Director's appearance on 12/9/75 before the Senate Select Committee, it is believed his response to questions concerning the aforementioned position papers should be that the Bureau has received copies and is reviewing the various proposals and that it would not be appropriate at this time for the Director to comment regarding the substance of the proposals.

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Elliff indicated during this meeting that the Director during his appearance may anticipate being asked a question by one of the Senators relating to his statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal concerning the necessity for the sacrifice of certain individual rights at the expense of investigations. He also anticipated the Director might be asked a question concerning his position on COINTELPRO. Regarding the question concerning the Director's statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal, the Legal Counsel Division will draft a proposed resonse. Concerning COINTELPRO, a response has been prepared and will be put together with the briefing material for the Director.

This memorandum in general highlights the Options presented in the attached papers. A more detailed analysis should be prepared by the Intelligence Division and existing documents addressing these proposals should be made available for the Director's briefing book for his testimony.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Director respond to questions concerning the attached position papers as set forth above.

Done.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division draft a proposed response concerning the Director's statement made in Montreal relating to the sacrifice of certain individual rights.

Done.

(3) That the Intelligence Division make a detailed review of the various Options set forth in the two attached position papers. (FOR SUBSEQUENT STAFF CONFERENCE - AFTER 12/9) Jma

See memo [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] 1/19/76

Jma

Ret. from SO 12/12/75 Jma

Issues and Options for Discussion with Former Attorneys General Rogers, Katzenbach, and Clark

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

I. Background

In the past few weeks the staff has presented the Committee with evidence suggesting the following about the FBI's internal security intelligence program:

A. The program is massive, involving the collection of information on the activities of thousands of innocent, law-abiding American citizens.

B. These individuals were not alleged espionage agents, but citizens who fall within the FBI's vague definitions of "subversion" and "extremism" -- purely homegrown "threats to the national security".

C. That FBI policy on "subversive" and "extremist" investigations was vague and subject to the following abuses:

1. overbreadth in scope in that groups were investigated whose threats to the national security were tenuous, if not non-existent.
2. collection of information on the personal life and political views of subjects unrelated to the national security.
3. the continuance of investigations well after it should have become obvious that there was no legitimate predicate.

D. Particularly invasive collection techniques were used, including electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entries. Although these have been terminated, the predominant and perhaps most insidious continues today through the FBI's huge informant/confidential source network.

E. Information collected in the course of these investigations is disseminated regularly throughout the federal government and to local law enforcement.

F. Until 1971, information collected through these investigations was disseminated as part of the COINTELPRO program to the subjects' friends, relatives, employers, and others in an effort to discredit or "neutralize" alleged "subversives" or "extremists".

62-116395- -1215X

ENCLOSURE

G. The FBI's internal security intelligence program was used by Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon to serve their political interests, usually by collecting information on critics or political opponents.

H. The program was conceived and implemented in secrecy, and although parts of the program were shared with outside authorities from time to time, until now no President, Attorney General, or Congressional committee has been exposed to the entire program in detail.

I. The program is not authorized by statute but is founded on a series of secret or ambiguous Presidential orders, which in turn are based upon a questionable assertion of "inherent constitutional authority".

J. The program continues today, albeit on a much more limited basis than in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and the basic machinery for the program -- the huge informant/confidential source network -- is still operating.

K. There is no statute or internal Bureau or Justice Department policy prohibiting a new Director, Attorney General, or President from ordering the Bureau to expand the program to its earlier dimensions.

II. Issues and Options

Among the issues and options which might be discussed with former Attorneys General in response to what the Committee has learned are the following:

A. Abolition. Elimination of the FBI internal security intelligence program as Attorney General Harlan Stone ordered in 1924 when confronted with abuses growing out of the FBI's first internal security intelligence program, such as the infamous Palmer raids.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether there are not some functions (e.g., protecting the President, preventing or at least predicting violence by terrorist organizations, or predicting civil disorders) which require intelligence collection.

2. Whether FBI intelligence reports are valuable in that respect, especially in light of a recent GAO report suggesting that such reports are rarely useful in predicting violent activity.

3. Whether such information, assuming it is valuable, could not be obtained through more traditional criminal investigations.

4. Whether the value of the information, marginal or otherwise, justifies the risk to civil liberties inherent in such intelligence collection.

5. Whether, given the way in which limited and ambiguous grants of authority have been expanded into major authorizations, any statute short of a total prohibition of all non-law enforcement intelligence activities in the domestic sector will be adequate to prevent the recurrences of the kinds of abuses uncovered by this Committee. (Or, conversely, whether it is possible to draft a law authorizing a limited civil disturbance and counter-terrorist intelligence mission that will not eventually evolve, like the National Security Act of 1947, into a charter for unanticipated and unwanted covert activities.)

6. Whether it would be sufficient to restrict the FBI to criminal investigations without also (a) placing limits upon the length of investigations, (b) the kinds of information which can be collected and disseminated on the subject irrelevant to the alleged criminal act, (c) the utilization of warrantless electronic surveillance and other particularly invasive collection techniques, and (d) the utilization of a huge informant/confidential source network without judicial or Justice Department supervision.

B. Authorizing Statute. Recognition of the value of internal security intelligence, but placing limits upon the program designed to minimize the infringement upon civil liberties, an option being actively considered by the present Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out under the first option and, in addition:

1. Whether meaningful and stringent guidelines can be written which do not so hamper the administration of an internal security intelligence program as to make the product not just marginal, as GAO suggests, but worthless.*

2. In light of the possibility that the present Attorney General may address this matter via internal Justice Department guidelines, whether this approach does not ignore the legal authority question which can only be resolved by statute.

3. Whether or not Congress could draft a statutory version of the guidelines which could be flexible enough to meet an evolving threat and at the same time place meaningful restrictions upon the program.

4. Even assuming there is no absence of legal authority, is it safe to leave these guidelines in the form of a departmental order which can be rescinded by the next Attorney General?

C. Delegation of Authority to Attorney General. Simply ratifying the present program via enactment of a statutory charter which grants the FBI authority to conduct an internal security intelligence program subject to its own internal guidelines or departmental guidelines as proposed by the Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and:

1. Whether such a statute would not be an unconstitutional delegation of powers to the Executive Branch.

2. Whether enactment of such a statute would not represent a failure by the Congress to confront the issues raised above.

---

*A preliminary staff analysis of the Attorney General's draft guidelines suggests that, despite months of conscientious and painstaking work by a departmental task force, the guidelines are not adequate. This analysis, which will be presented when Attorney General Levi testifies on December 10, indicates that several of the more questionable FBI investigations (e.g., of Dr. King and the women's liberation movement) would still be permissible under these proposed guidelines.

D. Legislative Inaction. Enact no new statute affecting the FBI's legal authority or the internal security intelligence program.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and, in addition:

1. Whether this failure to act might not leave the status of the program in doubt and subject to court challenge.

2. Whether this failure to act after full disclosure by the Bureau might not be taken by the FBI and the courts as a ratification of the program.

E. Administrative Oversight by the Attorney General. The Justice Department should be required to exercise greater administrative oversight over the FBI's internal security intelligence program by Attorney General Levi, regardless of whatever other options Congress accepts.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is practical for the Attorney General or his staff to review thousands of such investigations each year.

2. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should review all or just the so-called "full" investigations.

3. Whether, to facilitate the conduct of such reviews, the Attorney General or his staff should be given "complete" access to Bureau files, including information regarding the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.

4. Whether it is possible to develop a staff of career attorneys within the Department with both the access and independence essential to the conduct of searching reviews.

5. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should not also be required to review various informant and so-called "intensification" programs, and the establishment of specialized indices (which have a significant impact upon which cases are opened) instead of just reviewing individual investigations in a vacuum as provided by the Attorney General's draft guidelines.

F. An Inspector General. In addition to the above options, an independent Inspector General should be created to investigate improprieties by the FBI. This option is advanced by those concerned about the inadequacy of the FBI's investigation of the disappearance of former Director Hoover's personal files, its limited inquiry into the so-called Atlantic City convention case, and the absence of any internal investigation of the abuses in the King case.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to maintain the independence of an Inspector General within the Department of Justice when both the Inspector General and the Director of the FBI will be responsible to the same official, the Attorney General.

2. Whether the Inspector General should have "complete" access to Bureau files, including information pertaining to the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.

3. Whether an Inspector General with access to extremely sensitive information might not become a serious threat to the independence of the Bureau from political influence and to the civil liberties of American citizens.

G. Congressional Oversight. In addition to the above options, the creation of an oversight committee(s) in the Congress, to which the Bureau would be required to report and which would have the power to investigate abuses.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the kinds of problems posed by the Justice Department oversight and Inspector General options discussed above to the independence of the FBI and the confidentiality of its files.

H. Public Reporting and Disclosure to Subjects. In addition to the above options, the requirement that the FBI make frequent public reports on the details of its internal security intelligence programs and policies and reveal the details of improper intelligence investigations to the subjects of those investigations.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to reveal the essence of some programs and policies and the details of some investigations without jeopardizing the effectiveness of legitimate programs.

2. Whether such disclosure might not increase the number of law suits filed against the FBI alleging illegal activities.

DRAFT
MEMORANDUM

December 4, 1975

FBI LEGISLATION - PROPOSED OPTIONS

In preparation for the testimony of FBI Director Kelley and Attorney General Levi on December 9 and 10, the Domestic Intelligence Task Force is pulling together various proposals for legislation dealing with FBI intelligence. This paper sets forth some of the basic options.

A. Current Statutes and Executive Orders

The basic statute governing the FBI is 18 U.S.C. 533, which reads as follows:

> The Attorney General may appoint officials: (1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States, (2) to assist in the protection of the person of the President, and (3) to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General.

Clauses (2) and (3) are a possible statutory basis for intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Under (2), the FBI may "assist" the Secret Service in the protection of the President by providing

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1215X

ENCLOSURE

intelligence on persons or groups who may endanger the President's safety. A formal agreement between the FBI and the Secret Service sets forth the types of intelligence information provided by the Bureau. However, this agreement states that:

> The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction. (Tab A)

Clause (3) recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of Justice." This is a possible statutory basis for at least two broad areas of FBI intelligence investigations -- civil disturbance intelligence and intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program.

The most recent legal advice to the FBI from the Justice Department on the gathering and reporting of data regarding civil disturbances notes that on April 1, 1969, the President designated the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the government's response to civil disturbances. The FBI is instructed to gather and report on "all significant incidents of civil unrest" and on "all disturbances where there are indications that extremist organizations . . . are believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them." The

FBI is specifically advised to make reports "even when no specific violation of federal law is indicated." On the other hand, the FBI is instructed not to report "every relatively insignificant incident of a strictly local nature coming to its attention." (Tab B)

The Justice Department has given the following recent instructions to the FBI regarding intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program. Executive Order 10450, as amended by Executive Order 11785, is interpreted as requiring an FBI investigation of organizations "with a potential" of violating federal or state statutes prohibiting unlawful advocacy of violence or the commission of any unlawful act of violence. The FBI is advised that "it is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order." The FBI is instructed to apply "the same yardstick" to investigations of individuals who are affiliated with such organizations. The FBI is specifically advised that "it is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated." (Tab C)

Clause (3) also recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of State." This is a possible statutory basis for FBI intelligence investigation of foreign intelligence activities within the United States or to

collect positive foreign intelligence. The best example is the Attorney General's authorization of warrantless FBI electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. However, there is apparently no instruction from the Justice Department to the FBI directing the Bureau to initiate investigations of individuals or organizations which have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but about which there is no information indicating intelligence activity. (See Staff Report, "Counterintelligence/Counterespionage: The Law and the Philosophy", October 14, 1975.)

In his testimony before the Committee, Deputy Associate FBI Director James Adams made no reference to clauses (2) and (3) as a possible legal basis for FBI intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Instead, he placed sole reliance on a series of Presidential directives extending from 1936 until the 1960's which the FBI interprets as authorizing it to engage in "domestic security intelligence investigations". The Attorney General has codified these directives in a Justice Department regulation instructing the FBI to:

> Carry out the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15, 1953, designating the [FBI] to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters. 28 C.F.R., Section 0.85(d).

The FBI also cites directives of President Kennedy on June 9, 1962, and Attorney General Kennedy on March 5, 1964, which are the latest charter for the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, composed of the FBI Director and the chiefs of the military intelligence agencies. This group is authorized to coordinate "all investigation of domestic espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security." (Tab D)

The theory behind the FBI's position is that the President has inherent constitutional powers, at least in the absence of contrary legislation, to authorize FBI intelligence activities. The only judicial support for this theory is language in the Supreme Court's opinion in the Keith case, which declared warrantless wiretapping of domestic groups unconstitutional.

The Court acknowledged the importance of "national security in its domestic implications . . . especially at a time of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent periods of our history." Under such circumstances, the Court stated, the President has a "fundamental duty" under the Constitution to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." The Court added, "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means." Hence, the Court appeared to

recognize that the President's "domestic security role" has a "constitutional basis"; that the President through the Attorney General may need "to obtain intelligence information about those who plot unlawful acts against the Government"; and that "threats and acts of sabotage against the Government exist in sufficient number to justify investigative powers with respect to them." The Court applied the general principle that "unless the Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered." Nevertheless, the central holding of the Keith decision was that this power may not be exercised in such a way as to infringe constitutional rights. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

Even though the President may have the authority under the Constitution to direct the FBI to conduct intelligence investigations in the absence of legislation, Congress has the ultimate authority to substitute statutory authorization in place of the Presidential directives. As Justice Robert Jackson declared in the Steel Seizure Case, "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . ." 343 U.S. 579, 637.

B. Option One -- Ratifying Existing Powers

The first option for Congress is legislation ratifying the existing authority granted to the FBI by current Presidential directives and orders. Such legislation would be cast in extremely general terms. Its main advantage is that it would provide a basis for Congressional oversight. It could also reinforce the Attorney General's role as the immediate supervisor of FBI intelligence activities. The statute would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to conduct investigations of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities;
2. to gather and report information on civil disturbances;
3. to conduct investigations of other related intelligence matters affecting internal security; and
4. to conduct investigations of official matters relating to the Department of State.

In addition, the statute would require the Attorney General to report annually to the appropriate Congressional committees on the volume and type of investigations and reports, the investigative techniques used, and the policies and procedures adopted by the Justice Department and the FBI.

The weaknesses of this approach are obvious. Congress would have legislated a wholesale delegation of power without

standards or limitations other than the supervision of the Attorney General and oversight by Congress. In view of the Select Committee's findings as to the vast overbreadth of FBI domestic intelligence investigations and the abuses committed in the name of "counterintelligence", Congress would in effect be permitting future expansion of FBI operations to match past policies.

C. Option Two -- A Separate Security Intelligence Agency

Congress might give serious consideration to legislation creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Justice Department. It would perform the functions of the present Counterintelligence Branch of the FBI Intelligence Division, dealing with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence/counterespionage. The FBI itself has considered this option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from the law enforcement functions of the Bureau. (Tab E)

A separate agency would be justified only if it was authorized to conduct investigations of a wider scope and using different techniques than would otherwise be permitted. In other words, Congress could decide that foreign counterintelligence investigations should go beyond investigation of specific crimes, that techniques such as electronic surveillance should be used without a warrant or with a special type of warrant,

and that operations should be conducted to "counter" foreign intelligence activities by means other than arrest or "persona non grata" proceedings. On the other hand, if Congress treats the investigation of foreign intelligence activities the same as a criminal investigation, then the FBI should keep the job.

Any statute in this area must use general language for diplomatic reasons. For example, Congress should not explicitly authorize deception operations or efforts to compromise hostile intelligence officers, even though such techniques may be envisioned. Such techniques are dealt with best by establishing adequate procedures for authorization and oversight to ensure accountability.

The legislation should be more specific where it deals with investigations and other operations directed at American citizens rather than non-resident aliens in the service of a foreign power. If Congress believes Americans should be investigated if they have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but no information indicating intelligence activity yet exists, the legislation should say so.

The statute should also set out standards for determining whether a foreign-dominated domestic organization falls within the jurisdiction of the separate agency. There should at the very least be substantial information indicating that the organization is directed by, subsidized by, or in active

collaboration with a foreign government or organization. (The term "foreign organization" refers, for instance, to a group like the Palestine Liberation Organization.) If the group fits the criteria for foreign domination, there should be an additional finding that it may engage in intelligence activities or in activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law.

If the group meets all these standards, Congress may authorize the investigation of its activities going beyond regular criminal investigations. Such investigations could extend to all individuals who are members of, or express support for, the organization, as well as to the efforts of the organization to influence and control other groups. However, it may be sufficient to authorize only the investigation of active members and supporters. This would prevent a revival of the "Cominfil" policy of looking into all forms of lawful political and social activity where Communists might be involved.

The Petersen Committee report on COINTELPRO considered the need for special supervision of foreign counterintelligence operations in the United States. It recommended the creation of a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Commission to make decisions with regard to the necessity or acceptability of particular foreign counterintelligence techniques. (Tab F) This proposal

has merit in view of the limited amount of time the Attorney General can give to personal supervision and the after-the-fact role of legislative oversight regarding the separate agency.

Finally, legislation to create a separate foreign counterintelligence agency must deal with relationships to the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other foreign intelligence agencies. The current FBI-CIA agreement on their respective jurisdictions is only a "memorandum of understanding". It allows the CIA to undertake certain clandestine activities within the United States, in coordination with the FBI. (Tab G) Proposals are currently circulating in the Executive Branch for a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive to clarify this matter, as well as to regulate CIA electronic surveillance of American citizens abroad. (Tab H)

A full draft of a statutory charter for a separate foreign counterintelligence agency is not included here, since the focus is on domestic intelligence issues. However, one implication of such a statute would be that the remaining FBI functions should relate only to law enforcement and criminal investigations.

D. Option Three -- Elimination of FBI Domestic Intelligence

The basic assumption behind Attorney General Levi's effort to develop "guidelines" for FBI domestic intelligence is that regular criminal investigations are not adequate to

supply the information needed to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law. That assumption should be questioned. Regular criminal investigations are likely to produce a substantial amount of information which can be used to anticipate or prevent future crimes. For example, intensive criminal investigations of Ku Klux Klan violence in the South during the 1960's would have required the FBI to look into a wide variety of Klan activities. Another example is the search for Weatherman fugitives, a regular criminal investigation which involves broad inquiries across the country. The FBI has not yet demonstrated that the preventive information it has obtained came from intelligence investigations which would not have been conducted as regular criminal investigations.

The fact that an FBI investigation was supervised by its Intelligence Division does not necessarily mean that the investigation was, automatically, outside the regular criminal law enforcement jurisdiction of the Bureau. Any FBI investigation of activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law falls within that jurisdiction. Moreover, regular criminal investigations can also extend to plans, attempts, or conspiracies to engage in such activities.

One suggested difference between intelligence-type and regular criminal investigations is that the latter are terminated after a reasonable time, if sufficient evidence to

justify prosecution is not obtained. However, there is no legal reason why the prosecutor cannot request that the investigation continue indefinitely as long as there is information that violent activities and plans for violence are still underway. The degree of evidence needed to justify a prosecution is certainly greater than the degree of evidence needed to justify an investigation.

All this is not to say that no further standards are needed to guide regular criminal investigations when they may touch on sensitive First Amendment or other constitutional interests. This is especially true of criminal investigations of individuals or groups engaged both in lawful political or social activities and in unlawful violence or plans for violence. To what extent is the advocacy of violence a proper basis for initiating an investigation? Should an investigation be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual is a member of, or has expressed public support for, an organization which has as one of its objectives the use of violence? Should an investigation be started on all members and public supporters of an organization, some of whose members have acted in concert to use violence?

These questions are addressed in the draft Attorney General's guidelines for domestic intelligence investigations under the heading "preliminary investigations". (Tab I) Since

the guidelines assume that there should be intelligence investigations, they do not consider whether such investigations might be permitted as regular criminal investigations.

The Klan and Weatherman examples again illustrate the point. Once it has been established that a particular Klan group is engaged in or planning violence, it seems reasonable to conduct at least preliminary inquiries to determine whether the members and supporters of the group are involved in the violence or the plans for violence. Similarly, the search for Weatherman fugitives who committed bombings and other acts of violence would appear reasonably to include preliminary inquiries to determine whether other Weatherman members and supporters have harbored the fugitives.

On the other hand, it would seem unreasonable to investigate members and supporters of all Klan groups across the country on the ground that some Klan groups have used violence. And it appears equally unreasonable to investigate all members and supporters of SDS because the Weatherman faction engaged in violence. The scope of the investigation must be logically related to its specific purpose, and not an excuse for wide-ranging collection of intelligence.

There is one possible exception to the requirement that the FBI only conduct regular criminal investigations. The Attorney General (and the President) do require reports on

major civil disturbances which may not involve violations of federal law. The FBI should be authorized to gather such data and make appropriate reports as part of its law enforcement responsibilities. However, the data and reports should be limited to information provided by local or state law enforcement authorities or obtained in the course of a regular FBI criminal investigation. Where local authorities provide information about individuals and organizations which are not the subject of a regular FBI criminal investigation, the data and reports should not be included in the FBI's general files and name index.

In periods of widespread civil disturbances, the Attorney General may require a more systematic procedure for maintaining and retrieving civil disturbance information. This was the case in 1967, when Attorney General Clark created the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit in the Justice Department. The IDIU stored and indexed civil disturbance reports separately from the FBI. The data was used to help anticipate or ameliorate disorders. IDIU has been abolished, although the basic function of evaluating reports on civil disturbances is still performed by the Justice Department. This function should also be authorized by statute, and the intent of Congress should be that the Attorney General must obtain specific legislative authorization for any future IDIU.

IDIU was not perfect. Under Attorney General John Mitchell it supplied a list of names of American dissidents to the CIA. (Tab J) It also was used in conjunction with grand jury proceedings inquiring into terrorist bombings. Both of these activities should be forbidden by the statute authorizing the Justice Department to evaluate civil disturbance information.

Finally, legislation may be needed to make clear that the FBI is not authorized to conduct investigations of organizations or individuals for the specific purpose of compiling a body of data to be used in connection with name checks under the Federal Employee Security Program. The same principle applies to FBI "assistance" to the Secret Service, under the present FBI-Secret Service agreement.

A statute must also address the FBI's current practice of maintaining an Administrative Index (ADEX) of the prime subjects of current domestic intelligence investigations. The past history of the FBI's Security Index and other target lists (Key Activists, Agitator Index, Key Black Extremists) suggests the need to enact legislation banning the compiling of lists of persons by the FBI, unless such persons have been arrested or convicted for specific crimes and the list is used in connection with the investigation of such crimes.

These proposals to limit the FBI to regular criminal investigations and civil disturbance reporting must be tested against the actual past experience of the Justice Department and the FBI. General instructions from the Department to the Bureau may be overly vague, even within the framework of criminal investigation. Two examples are Attorney General Clark's memorandum on riots in 1967 and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley's memorandum of campus disorders in 1969. (Tab K) The Nation of Islam exchange between the Department and the FBI in 1973-74 is another illustration. (Tab L)

Thus, there is no automatic panacea in restricting the FBI to criminal investigations. The need for careful scrutiny of actual investigative policies and practices by Congress and the Attorney General is just as great as if the FBI were authorized to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. Legislation must focus on procedures for ensuring accountability by regular reports from the Attorney General to the appropriate Congressional committees.

The following are some of the basic elements which should go into a statute embodying this option. It would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to investigate violations of federal criminal laws, provided that the scope and duration of the investigation are logically related to its specific purpose;

2. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law;

3. to seek legal advice from the Attorney General or his designee whenever a proposed action may be perceived, with reason, to unfairly affect the rights of citizens, provided that this responsibility to seek legal advice is the duty of both the FBI as an institution and FBI agents as individuals;

4. to collect information from state and local law enforcement agencies regarding major civil disturbances, provided that such information is not entered into the FBI general files and name index;

5. to disseminate information obtained from criminal investigations for the following purposes, under regulations promulgated by the Attorney General and published in the Federal Register:

a. prosecution of violations of criminal laws;

b. prevention or anticipation of violations of criminal laws;

c. assistance to the Secret Service in the performance of its protective responsibilities;

d. determination of the suitability of individuals for employment by the federal government;

6. to report civil disturbance information obtained from state and local law enforcement agencies to the Attorney General for the purpose of determining the need to use federal military force under 10 U.S.C. 331 et seq.;

7. to compile such lists of persons arrested or convicted for specific crimes as may be necessary for use in connection with the investigation of such crimes;

8. to provide to the Attorney General or his designee full access to any information in the possession of the FBI which he may deem necessary for the performance of his responsibilities to supervise FBI activities and to submit reports to appropriate Congressional committees on FBI activities;

9. to follow such other procedures and standards consistent with this statute which the Attorney General may prescribe, provided that such procedures and standards shall be published in the Federal Register or, if publication would substantially interfere with the conduct of investigations, reported to appropriate Congressional committees.

E. Option Four -- Setting Standards for Domestic Intelligence

The FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only if Congress finds (1) that regular criminal investigations as described above would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law, and (2) that the incidents of the use of violence in violations of federal law are so numerous and so serious as to constitute a significant threat to the internal security or domestic tranquility of the United States.

The fact that there are individuals and groups who engage in violence, advocate violence, or believe in the desirability of the ultimate use of violence to advance their political or social objectives is not enough to justify FBI domestic intelligence authority. There must be additional findings that regular criminal investigations are inadequate and that the overall threat of violence constitutes a serious danger to the country.

Furthermore, if FBI domestic intelligence is authorized by statute, it should be an annual authorization which must be renewed each year upon reconsideration by Congress and the Attorney General of these factors. Past experience indicates that the annual appropriations process does not provide an appropriate forum for considering the FBI's basic authority.

Attorney General Levi's draft guidelines provide a basis for the consideration of a domestic intelligence authorization. They do not cover the investigation of foreign-related activities which may be directed by, subsidized by, or otherwise conducted in active collaboration with a foreign government, a foreign organization, or their agents. (See Option Two above.)

The guidelines deal with five different types of threats of violence which may constitute serious dangers to the country:

1. overthrow of the government (revolutionary violence);

2. interference in the U. S. with the activities of a foreign government (bombing a consulate, attempting to assassinate a visiting foreign leader);

3. interference with the functioning of the government or the flow of interstate commerce to influence federal policies (violent protest activities, terrorist bombings);

4. deprivation of civil rights (Klan violence, violent protest against busing);

5. incitement of violence which may require the use of federal military force (riots, major civil disturbances accompanying protest demonstrations).

The guidelines also refer to violence directed at state governments, either overthrow of a state government or interference with the functioning of a state government.

Authorizing legislation should indicate whether domestic intelligence is necessary for any or all of these specific problems. For example, revolutionary violence in an attempt to overthrow the government may be a remote and speculative danger, while terrorist bombings may be substantially interfering with the functioning of the government. Klan violence was unquestionably a serious danger to civil rights in the early and mid-1960's, but is it so today? Major riots and civil disturbances were equally serious in the late 1960's and early 1970's, but not in more recent years. Violent interference with the functioning of a state government should, under our federal system, normally be dealt with by state and local law enforcement.

Therefore, the definition of the purpose of FBI domestic intelligence can be simplified. The Attorney General's draft guidelines might be revised to authorize FBI domestic intelligence investigations:

1. to ascertain facts or information which serves to anticipate and prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law intended to

   a. interfere, in the United States, with the activities of a foreign government or its authorized representatives; and

b. interfere with the functioning of the government of the United States or the free flow of interstate commerce in order to influence policies or decisions of the federal government.

This formulation concentrates on the most likely current serious danger to the country, namely, politically motivated terrorist violence. FBI Director Kelley's recent public statements have stressed the increase in terrorist activity from 24 bombings in 1973 to 45 terrorist bombings in 1974 and 46 such bombings in the first six months of 1975.

However, this increasing threat is not the only factor to be considered. In the course of the FBI's regular criminal investigations of these bombings and other incidents of terrorist violence, can it obtain as a by-product substantial information which may serve to anticipate and prevent future violence? If so, the need for broader intelligence-type investigations is less evident.

The draft guidelines provide that the FBI would conduct full-scale intelligence investigations on the basis of "specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion" that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, may be engaged in activities which may involve the use of violence in violations of federal law. The two "mays" render the requirement of "specific and articulable facts" almost meaningless. Therefore, any legislation should authorize the FBI:

2. to conduct full domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above.

The draft guidelines also discuss the surveillance techniques to be used in full domestic intelligence investigations, including informants, mail covers, and electronic surveillance. The guidelines note that additional techniques may need to be covered, such as inquiries made under "pretext", photographic surveillance, "trash covers", etc. However, the legislation may deal with techniques more generally by providing that the FBI is authorized:

3. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law.

More detailed regulation of investigative techniques for full investigations will be considered elsewhere.

The scope of domestic intelligence investigations under the draft guidelines is broadened considerably under the provision for "preliminary investigations". They can be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have advocated activities which may involve violence, or are members of, or

have expressed public support for, an organization which has as its objective activities which may involve violence. The purpose of the preliminary investigation is to verify or refute the allegations or information. However, the vagueness of the standard is obvious. Therefore, to be consistent with the criteria for full investigations, the FBI should be authorized:

4. to conduct preliminary domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert,

   a. advocate the use of violence as described in 1 above;

   b. are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above;

   c. are members of or have expressed public support for an organization engaged in activities which involve, or are likely to involve, the use of violence as described in 1 above, provided that other members of the organization are currently the subject of a full domestic intelligence investigation or a regular criminal investigation.

Unless these changes are made in the guidelines, they would permit investigations similar to past investigations which have been seriously criticized. For instance, they would allow investigations of all SDS members or all Black Student Union leaders on the ground that their activities may involve violence,

even though there is no specific allegation of likely involvement in violence.

Another reason for the revision is to exclude those investigations which would be justified as regular criminal investigations. Thus, allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have engaged in or plan to engage in activities which involve the use of violence would fall within the FBI's regular criminal investigative jurisdiction. Intelligence investigations would extend further at the preliminary stage to cover advocacy of violence and membership in or public support for organizations involved in or likely to be involved in violence. Full investigations require a likelihood of violence, short of actual violence or plans for violence.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE;
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TESTIMONY,
DECEMBER 10, 1975

At 3:01 p.m. on December 5, 1975, Mark Wolf of the Attorney General's staff, called me at the instructions of the Attorney General and advised that the Attorney General requested:

(1) FBI manual sections on domestic intelligence investigations;

(2) A listing identifying all individuals and organizations now the subjects of FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

[illegible] called to AG

Wolf said that the Attorney General is currently en route to Chicago and will return to Washington on Sunday evening. Therefore, the requested materials should be delivered to the Attorney General no later than Monday morning, December 8, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division prepare an appropriate response to the Attorney General's instructions in time for delivery by 9:00 a.m. on December 8, 1975.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

EX-112

REC-9 62 - 116395 - 1215

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

15 DEC 17 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 DEC 31 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (SC) 62-7721

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: NATIONALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO
INTERNAL SECURITY - PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST

We presently maintain an authorized technical surveillance at the residence of Rosa Collazo and her daughter, Lydia Collazo Turner, 1755 Anthony Avenue, Bronx, New York. This surveillance was originally installed on April 13, 1962.

Rosa Collazo is the wife of Oscar Collazo who is serving a life sentence in connection with the killing of a White House guard during an attempt to assassinate former President Truman on November 1, 1950. Both Rosa and her daughter are active in the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico in New York City. During the past six months, this surveillance has continued to furnish valuable information regarding activities of Puerto Rican independence advocates in New York. Through this surveillance, we have obtained information concerning the movement of Puerto Rican nationalists between New York and Puerto Rico. Included in this information was advance notice that Rosa Collazo planned to attend the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico during February, 1966, in Puerto Rico. Upon her return, details were obtained concerning the proceedings of the General Assembly. In addition, we were able to obtain advance notice of demonstrations in New York City in which nationalists participated. This enabled us to inform police authorities and interested Government agencies in advance of the demonstrations.

Unless you instruct to the contrary, this technical surveillance will be continued for an additional six months.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: DOMINICAN SITUATION
INTERNAL SECURITY -
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Diego Emilio Bordas Hernandez and his brother, Luis Manuel Alfredo Bordas, have emerged in the current Dominican crisis as important financial, political and military advisors to the deposed Dominican President Juan Bosch in the latter's efforts to regain control of the Dominican Government. Diego Bordas is a wealthy shipping executive currently residing in exile in San Juan, Puerto Rico, having been born in the Dominican Republic on January 11, 1923. He served in various high posts under Juan Bosch during the latter's short occupancy of the position of President of the Dominican Republic in early 1963. Bordas spends much of his time at 868 Ashford Avenue in San Juan, using an apartment at that address as his residence during the absence of its owner, Jose Antonio Benitez Jiminez, from Puerto Rico. Jose Benitez is the cousin of Jaime Benitez, the latter the Director of the University of Puerto Rico and a close associate and advisor of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas also maintains a residence at 21 V, Florencia, Pueblo Viego, a suburb of San Juan, near the current residence and headquarters of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas and his brother jointly operate a shipping business known as Bordas and Company at Highway Number 2, Puerto Viejo, Puerto Rico, and his financial dealings in support of the Bosch efforts can reasonably be expected to be conducted from this commercial establishment.

The Bordas brothers have both been the subjects of numerous allegations indicating their cooperation with procommunist and pro-Trujillo factions in Dominican politics and are apparently opportunists who have seized the current situation to enhance their political and financial futures. Luis Bordas is currently in the Dominican Republic acting as the Director of Military Operations of the rebel forces supporting Bosch.

~~SECRET~~

109-12-211-1423

REC 4

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

4 JUN 15 1965

JGY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Luis Bordas is reportedly the Honorary Nicaraguan Consul in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and, as a result, Department of State clearance for technical coverage of the business he operates jointly with Diego Bordas was obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on June 1, 1965.

In view of the pressing nature of the international situation as it relates to the Dominican Republic, it is requested that you authorize technical coverage of the residences of Diego Bordas mentioned above and of the business address of the joint venture operated by the Bordas brothers. Authority is requested for similar coverage of any addresses to which the mentioned residences or business may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NdeK

DATE 6/4/65

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

December 19, 1975

1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/SP

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 2 in that letter.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a copy of the document in response to Item 2 which is being delivered to the SSC.

Delivered to Committee 12-23-75

to Shaheen's office 12/22/75

Enclosures (2) ST 115 REC-51

62-116395-1214X

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

7 JAN 22 1976

PEN:adn
(9)

ENCLOSURE

NOTE:

A copy of the SSC letter 12/4/75, is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copy of the memorandum being furnished is maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the document being provided to the SSC. As indicated in the enclosed memorandum, Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled separately. Items 1 and 3 requested in referenced SSC letter are being handled by the IS-3 and CI-3 Sections respectively. Item 4, a restatement of prior request submitted by the SSC is being handled separately by SA V. R. Thornton of the IS-1 Section.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JBH PEN WRW JPT WOC

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

62-116395

December 19, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of a copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, at the White House, Washington, D. C., dated October 27, 1964.

It is noted that in addition to requesting a copy of this letter the SSC requested materials reflecting this letter was hand-delivered to the White House by Mr. DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Attention is drawn to the upper right-hand corner of Mr. Hoover's letter to Mr. Moyers and to the notation appearing there reading "personally delivered 10/28/64, D." No additional materials are available in FBIHQ files reflecting delivery of this letter beyond the aforementioned notation which, it appears, bears the initial of Mr. DeLoach.

Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled in separate responses.

1 - The Attorney General

PEN:adn adn
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

JTT

62-116395-1214X 3R

PEN

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 8, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee request seeking delivery of certain Bureau materials. Please prepare an appropriate response.

I invite your attention to paragraph numbered 4 which amends an earlier request of the Committee (Elliff letter of November 25, 1975, Item 6c) which request was the subject of a telephone conversation on December 3, with Mr. Seymor Phillips of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

1-Ad Hoc
12-10-75

ENCLOSURE

62-116395--1214X

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]N.
BARRY GOLDWATER, AR[illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MATHIA[illegible], MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, [illegible]

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 4, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

Dear Mike:

The Senate Select Committee requests the following materials for delivery.

1. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the recommendation for, authorization of, and duration and termination of the electronic surveillance referred to in Items 1 and 22 of my letter of November 21, 1975 and in materials delivered to the Committee on December 1, 1975. [illegible]

2. Delivery of a copy of the letter to Mr. Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated October 27, 1964, and materials reflecting that this letter was hand delivered by Mr. Cartha DeLoach on October 28, 1964. Nugent

3. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the surveillances of Mrs. Anna Chennault in October and November, 1968. [illegible]

4. The Committee's request in my letter of November 27, 1975, item 6c should be revised to read as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memornadum, including a summary of the ~~recommendations~~ of relevant Bureau personnel pertaining thereto." Nugent

RECEIVED
DEC 4 1975

JTE

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

62-116395- 1214X
ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/19/75

Caption of Document:
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
12/4/75 request - Martin L. King.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 12/23/75

Received by:

Title: Research Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116 - 1214X

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/4/75, item 2

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr.: Copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers 10/27/64 along with notation that shows letter was hand delivered by Mr. DeLoach 10/28/64.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-99

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1214X

186-10051/

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER 12-4-75

ITEM 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SDALMKP

Retain

62-116395-1214X

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

#MDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/31/00

October 27, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

Honorable William D. Moyers
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Moyers:

A confidential source of this Bureau who has supplied reliable information in the past furnished the following information concerning a contact on October 23, 1964, between Martin Wigington and Randolph Blackwell. Wigington was described as a member of the Democratic Party Correlation Committee, Austin, Texas. Blackwell is an assistant to Martin Luther King, Jr., at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Georgia.

Wigington indicated to Blackwell a desire for King to write "an anti-Goldwater letter" which Wigington's Committee intends to distribute in Texas among labor groups. Blackwell stated that King may go to Texas prior to the forthcoming presidential election and Blackwell inquired as to whether King would be "in any danger." Wigington stated that he would contact one Larry Goodman concerning any possible danger to King in Texas. This Bureau's source had no information concerning the identity of Goodman.

During this contact Wigington complained to Blackwell that a group from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which Conference is headed by King, and a group from the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America had picketed in Fort Worth, Texas. Wigington stated that this was not a good thing at this time since all Negro and labor organizations should be working for the election of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

This information is also being furnished to officials in the Department of Justice.

Sincerely yours,

REC 14

100-106670 (King)
1-100-442529 (CIRM)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

SFP:kmj
(12)

ST-101

NOV 2 1964

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NOV 4 1964
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OCT 27 11 17 AM '64
READING ROOM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Honorable William D. Moyers

NOTE:

[illegible]

Classified "~~Secret~~" as information reported is from AT 1380-S*, a highly sensitive source with respect to the racial situation. This source is of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of this information could compromise its effectiveness and thus be detrimental to the national defense. Information obtained from Atlanta teletype 10/23/64.

1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs.
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Encs.
1 - Mr. Gallagher - Encs.
1 - Mr. McDermott - Encs.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Encs.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs.

December 3, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

5
10

TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On November 21, 1975 Inspector John B. Hotis of this Bureau met with Doug Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General; and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, concerning your forthcoming appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. At this meeting this Bureau was requested to provide write-ups on certain phases of this Bureau's operations which are to be used in the preparation of a briefing book for your testimony.

Attached are the following individual write-ups as requested on November 21, 1975: "Investigative Techniques"; "Organizational Structure and Functions of the FBI"; "Allegation of Misconduct Involving Special Agent in Charge, Miami Office"; "Director Hoover's 'Official and Confidential' (OC) Files"; "Allegations of Possible Misconduct by FBI Agents, Houston, Texas"; "Allegations of Personal and Official Misconduct of a Former Special Agent in Charge of the Baltimore Office"; "Allegation of Bribery by FBI Agent, New York"; "Allegation of Possible Misconduct by an FBI Agent, Detroit, Michigan"; "Allegations of Misconduct by FBI Agents, Richmond, Virginia, Field Office, in Connection with the Investigation of Illegal Wiretapping by the Richmond, Virginia, Police Department"; "Allegations of Violations of Gun Control Act by FBI Agent"; "Review of Appropriations Testimony for Fiscal Years 1955 thru 1976"; "Tenure of FBI Director"; "Transfer of Drug Enforcement Responsibilities to the FBI"; "Office of Special Review, Department of Justice"; and "Major Topics of Primary Concern to Congressional Committees."

Delivered to Mark Wolf's office 12-5-75

REC-9 62-116395-1212

With respect to the material requested by memorandum of Mark L. Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,

DEC 29 1975

PVD:dkg (13)

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2

62-116895-5-WOE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 31 1975

to Inspector John B. Hotis of this office dated November 26, 1975, which requested additional information, we are gathering the necessary material on an expeditious basis and the results will be furnished as soon as possible.

Enclosures (15)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. - Enclosures (15)
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

NOTE: See Legal Counsel Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11-24-75, captioned "Testimony By The Attorney General Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." On 12-1-75 Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, requested the attached information be furnished as soon as possible. No later than 12-2-75. This response was coordinated and incorporates material prepared by the Inspection, Special Investigative, General Investigative, Files and Communications, and Intelligence Divisions. Due to the time constraints we are furnishing interim response. As completed additional material will be furnished to the Department.

2 - Mr J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

January 14, 1976

1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

The Attorney General

Director, FBI 62-116395-1210X1

EX-110

REC-60

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Reference is made to SSC letters dated December 4, 1975, and November 25, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 4 in the December 4, 1975, request and Items 7c and 8c of the November 25, 1975, request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with the material which is being furnished to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

VRT:adn
(9)

NOTE:

Copies of SSC letters 11/25/75 and 12/4/75 are attached to the file copy of enclosed LHM. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as documents being provided to the SSC. Copies of material being furnished to SSC being retained with Senstudy 75 Project.

Delivered to Dept. 1-15-76

Delivered to Committee 1-15-76.

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 9 1976

WRW JBH JAM PMW

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 (1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

January 14, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, Item 4 of which requests materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.; and SSC letter dated November 25, 1975, Items 7c and 8c of which request materials concerning the Washington Spring Project and Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of materials in response to referenced requests.

In respect to Item 4 of the December 4, 1975, request, the only indication of any action taken concerning the recommendation contained in the pertinent memorandum dated March 29, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/3/68," appearing on page one and initials which are believed to be those of former Special Agent (SA) Harold P. Leinbaugh. Among the documents being furnished the SSC is a memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned, "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.," along with supporting documents, which were submitted to the Attorney General concerning background leading up to the proposed action recommended in the March 29, 1968, memorandum. It includes results of an interview of Leinbaugh.

In response to Item 7c, the only indication of any action taken concerning the suggestion (recommendation) contained in the memorandum dated March 26, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/4/68," appearing on page two of that memorandum and initials which are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

JBA

VRT:adn
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1210X

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

With respect to Item 8c which concerns a memorandum dated March 28, 1968, captioned, "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," the only indication of action taken concerning the recommendation contained therein is a pencilled notation appearing on page one, "Handled 3/28/68," and initials which again are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/JG

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/14/76

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
12/4/75 request Item 4
11/25/75 request Items 7c and 8C

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: D. V. Cox Date: 1/15/74

Received by: Florence Hoben

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1210X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
1/14/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/4/75, Item 4 and SSC letter 11/25/75, Items 7c and 8c

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating Procedures
Information Handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Delivery of materials regarding Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Washington Spring Project and the Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

62-116395

AJD:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-(?)

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395- 1210X

186-10019

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 12-4-75
ITEM 4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KGP

Retain

62-116395-1210X

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY 5168ALMKR

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

EX-102

TJD:ted
(7)
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

TJD

REC-20

GK 93

APR 11 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person nel without the express approval of the FBI.

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-44006 — 93

ENCLOSURE

1 - J. B. Adams
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - D. Ryan
1 - J. G. Deegan

REC-88

Ew 100-106670-3965

July 18, 1975

1 - H. A. Newman

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

The following information is submitted regarding the background leading up to the proposed action recommended in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence, (Martin Luther King)." (copy attached)

This memorandum recommended that information be furnished to a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showing King as a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on March 28, 1968, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel).

A notation on the above referred to memorandum indicated that the recommendation was "handled" on April 3, 1968, by Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh of the Crime Records Division. (see notation on memorandum dated March 29, 1968, attached)

By way of background it should be noted that at about 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968, while standing on second floor balcony outside room 306 of the Hotel Lorraine, Memphis, Tennessee, King was shot and killed.

Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, reflects that King and other Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) officials were due to arrive in Memphis at 10:15 a.m. on April 3, 1968, via Eastern Airlines from Atlanta. (copy of Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, attached)

After King's death, an interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy, a close associate of King, reflected that he and King registered into the Hotel Lorraine in Memphis,

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

cah
HAN:cah (8)

copy to CRO + CRIM DIV 12/1/75 by memo cap Martin Luther King Jr

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

ENCLOSURE

84 AUG 5 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Tennessee, at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968. (Information contained in report of SA Joe C. Hester dated April 17, 1968, Memphis, captioned "UNSUB, aka, Eric Starvo Galt, et al., Civil Rights" page 48. See attached FD-302 reflecting interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy).

For further background regarding the basis of this proposal Atlanta teletype dated March 28, 1968, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C" with second caption "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that on March 28, 1968, King and other SCLC people were in room 801, Holiday Inn, Memphis, Tennessee, at 4:30 p.m. (copy of Atlanta teletype attached)

A Memphis teletype dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that King participated in the march of sanitation workers on March 28, 1968. When violence erupted including the breaking of windows and looting by the marchers, King and a few associates ran to a nearby car and left the march proceeding to Rivermont Motel where they remained through the afternoon and evening. (copy of Memphis teletype attached)

On July 17, 1975, Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh, after having had all the facts set out above reviewed with him including the fact his notation of "handled" appeared on the March 29, 1968, memorandum, advised that he has absolutely no recollection of this memorandum and can unhesitantly state that he cannot now recall whether or not proposed information was ever disseminated to any news media source. He indicated that his notation "handled" would not necessarily mean that he did disseminate this information. In explaining this he stated that the notation could mean that he was merely clearing this document through Crime Records Division and at this late date there would be absolutely no way that he could make any positive statements as to whether or not the information recommended was ever disseminated to a news media source.

7/17

From the above recorded sequence of events as reflected in various communications identified above, it is evident that King returned to Memphis, Tennessee, from Atlanta

on April 3, 1968, and checked into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. The notation indicating that the proposed furnishing of information to the news media was "handled" on April 3, 1968, would, of course, preclude any such information from appearing in the press prior to King's checking into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968.

A review of appropriate files maintained at FBI Headquarters fails to reflect any newspaper article which could have been an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in the G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968.

A review of the "Memphis Commercial Appeal" for the period March 28 to April 4, 1968, maintained on microfilm in the Library of Congress failed to reflect any article which would appear to be an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968. References were noted indicating that King held a press conference at the Holiday Inn Rivermont Motel on March 29, 1968.

7/17 Held

Enclosures (5)

NOTE:

See memorandum J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 7/18/75, captioned as above, prepared by HAN/cah.

Memorandum

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

Tavel ______
Trotter ______
Tele. Room ______
Holmes ______
Gandy ______

OM : G. C. Moore

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

BJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

TJD:ted
(7)
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC-20

22 APR 11 1968

Deakin

Handled 4/3/68

100-106670-3?

100-448006-93

ENCLOSURE

5

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

100-106670-93

ENCLOSURE

Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

430PM URGENT 4-2-68 SAB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS 157-1092 3P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/rf

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENN., ~~RM~~ RACIAL MATTER

ON APRIL TWO, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, MEMPHIS ~~PD~~ Police Department, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, ADVISED THAT THE FUNERAL OF LARRY PAYNE, SEVENTEEN YEAR OLD NEGRO WHO WAS SHOT BY MEMPHIS PD OFFICER AFTER STORE LOOTING GROWING OUT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT RACIAL DISTURBANCE, MEMPHIS, WAS HELD, WITHOUT INCIDENT, AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, MEMPHIS. ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED IN ATTENDANCE DESPITE FACT CHURCH CAN SEAT TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED. BODY INTERRED IMMEDIATELY AFTER FUNERAL. ARKIN ADVISED THAT ANOTHER SANITATION WORKERS SYMPATHY MARCH IS SCHEDULED FOR DOWNTOWN MEMPHIS AFTERNOON OF APRIL TWO.

100-106670-

NOT RECORDED
185 APR 9 1968

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED ON APRIL TWO THAT REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) AIDES RALPH D. ABERNATHY, BERNARD LEE, AND ANDREW M. YOUNG DUE TO ARRIVE MEMPHIS TEN FIFTEEN A.M., APRIL THREE, FROM ATLANTA.

END PAGE ONE

Albert C. Hayden

APR 5 1968

Included --- letter to White House and Attorney General. Date 4/5/68

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ON APRIL TWO A SOURCE ADVISED THAT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, APRIL TWO, REV. JESSE JACKSON OF SCLC'S "OPERATION BREAD BASKET," REV. S. B. KYLES OF METROPOLITAN BAPTIST CHURCH, MEMPHIS, AND REV. EDWARD L. BROWN, MT. PISGAH CME CHURCH, ADVISED THAT WITH SCLC PERSONNEL IN MEMPHIS THAT NIGHTLY MASS STRIKE SUPPORT MEETINGS WILL BE RESUMED, THE FIRST AT MASON TEMPLE ON NIGHT OF APRIL THREE WITH KING AS FEATURED SPEAKER. THEY SAID MASS MARCH WILL BE HELD FRIDAY, APRIL FIVE, AND THAT THEY WILL HAVE SCHOOL CHILDREN PARTICIPATE SINCE MARCHING WITH "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE GREATEST LIVING AMERICAN," WOULD BE MORE EDUCATIONAL THAN BEING IN SCHOOL. WHEN ASKED BY PRESS IF KING WOULD PERSONALLY MARCH, JACKSON SAID KING MIGHT NOT MARCH. HE DID NOT ELABORATE. WHEN ASKED IF SCLC GROUP WOULD VIOLATE A POSSIBLE INJUNCTION AGAINST THEIR MARCHING, JACKSON SAID "THE WHITE MAN HAS ALREADY ENJOINED THE BLACK MAN TO THE GHETTO AND THE WHITE MAN DOESN'T NEED TO VALIDATE IT BY SENDING US A PIECE OF PAPER." KYLES SAID THE PROBLEM FACING MEMPHIS IS NOT MILITANT BLACK YOUTH BUT IS "WHITE RACISM." JACKSON DESCRIBED OPERATION BREAD BASKET AS MASSIVE

END PAGE TWO

DRIVE TO FORCE ALL GROCERS IN NEGRO AREA TO CEASE SELLING HART'S BREAD, WONDER BREAD, COCA COLA, AND SEALTEST DAIRY PRODUCTS AS THESE FIRMS DO NOT HIRE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF NEGROES.

ON APRIL TWO LT. ARKIN ADVISED THAT MEMPHIS CITY OFFICIALS ARE CONSIDERING SEEKING A COURT INJUNCTION PROHIBITING ANY MASS MARCH LED BY KING OR AN INJUNCTION SPECIFYING CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A MARCH COULD TAKE PLACE AND ALSO CONSIDERING RESUMPTION OF A CURFEW AND PLACING STRIKE SUPPORT LEADERS UNDER A PEACE AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY BOND.

ARKIN ADVISED THAT REMAINDER OF TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARD, WITH EXCEPTION OF ONE BATTERY CONSISTING OF TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY THREE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE MEMPHIS GUARD UNIT, HAVE LEFT MEMPHIS.

AT THREE ZERO FIVE PM, SIXTY SANITATION WORKERS AND SYMPATHIZERS DEPARTED CLAYBORN TEMPLE CARRYING PLACARDS FOLLOWING THEIR USUAL PARADE MARCH TO BEALE STREET NORTH ON MAIN TO CITY HALL. NO INCIDENTS REPORTED.

memo ~~LHM~~ FOLLOWS. P. END.

CAL

FBI WASH DC

F

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ralph B

Date April 8, 1968

Reverend RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, 690 La Verne Drive, N. W., Atlanta, Georgia, was interviewed at the Memphis Police Department at 10:55 p.m., April 4, 1968. Reverend ABERNATHY was advised of the Agent's identity and of the nature of the matter under investigation.

Reverend ABERNATHY, who described himself as Vice President at Large and Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, stated he was Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.'s closest associate and stated that he and Dr. KING always shared a room whenever they travelled together. He stated that at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968, he and Dr. KING registered at the Lorraine Motel, Memphis, Tennessee.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that on April 4, 1968, he and Dr. KING did not leave the motel and spent most of the day in their room, #306, which is located on the second floor of the motel. He stated that he and Dr. KING had been gone from their room for approximately one hour or less when they returned to the room at about 5:30 p.m. He said they got dressed as they were going to dinner at the home of Reverend BILLY KYLE and that at almost exactly 6 p.m. they started to leave the room. Reverend ABERNATHY stopped for a moment and Dr. KING walked out onto the balcony just outside the door to his room. Reverend ABERNATHY was still inside the motel room but could hear Dr. KING discussing the dinner engagement with other associates who Reverend ABERNATHY believes were standing in the parking area of the motel underneath and to the front of the balcony on which Dr. KING was standing.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated he heard what sounded like a firecracker and then heard the screams of persons to whom Dr. KING had been talking. Reverend ABERNATHY went then to the balcony and discovered Dr. KING lying there wounded in the right side of the face and neck. He said he believed Dr. KING attempted to speak to him but was unable to do so. Reverend ABERNATHY said he instructed someone to call an ambulance and then accompanied Dr. KING in the ambulance to the hospital where Dr. KING subsequently died.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 4/4/68 at Memphis, Tennessee File # Memphis 44-1987

by SA JOE C. HESTER: bn Date dictated 4/8/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that judging from the sound of the noise it appeared that the shot came from directly in front of the door and not from any great distance. He stated he did not observe anything that would indicate who fired the shot. Reverend ABERNATHY also stated that while they were in the motel room Dr. KING did not, to his knowledge, receive any telephone calls of a threatening nature or calls from persons who would not identify themselves. Reverend ABERNATHY said Dr. KING had not feared that any particular persons might harm him and Reverend ABERNATHY was unable to suggest any suspects or to provide any other information which might assist in identifying Dr. KING's killer.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

11:17PM URGENT 3-28-68 ARK

TO DIRECTOR (100-106670) AND MEMPHIS

FROM ATLANTA (100-5586)

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM-C.

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE. RM.

IN FORMANT

AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT FOUR THIRTY PM MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

INFORMANT'S INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM DISCUSSION SHORTLY BEFORE WITH HOSEA WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, SCLC, CURRENTLY IN ATLANTA, WHO DURING LATE AFTERNOON MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, CONFERRED TELEPHONICALLY WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., PRESIDENT, SCLC; RALPH D. ABERNATHY, VICE PRESIDENT AND TEASURER, SCLC; AND BERNARD LEE, SPECIAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, SCLC.

KING, ABERNATHY, AND LEE ARE CURRENTLY IN ROOM EIGHT ZERO ONE, HOLIDAY INN, MEMPHIS.

WITH REFERENCE TO RACIAL DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, KING IS EXTREMELY DEJECTED. HE AND ABERNATHY STRONGLY FEEL DISTURBANCE ON THIS DATE DELIBERATELY PLANNED

EX-115 REC-9 -3278

XEROX 1968

APR 5 1968

APR 15 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

BY NEGROES WHO ARE NEITHER SYMPATHETIC TO KING OR SCLC. IDENTITY OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS NOT KNOWN.

ABERNATHY, LEE AND WILLIAMS ARE GREATLY CONCERNED FOR WELFARE OF KING, PARTICULARLY ON NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, WHEN HE EXPECTS TO PARTICIPATE IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION WITH SANITATION WORKERS. AT PRESENT TIME KING DOES NOT FEEL HE SHOULD LEAVE MEMPHIS. DURATION OF STAY AND FURTHER DETAILS IN THIS CONNECTION NOT KNOWN.

ACCORDING TO WILLIAMS, HE, ABERNATHY, AND LEE STRONGLY FEEL SAME ELEMENTS WHICH CAUSED DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS EARLIER MARCH TWENTYEIGHT MAY CAUSE PERSONAL HARM TO KING EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

/ll Fo.2 [illegible]

INFORMATION FROM AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R MUST BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. MEMPHIS, HOWEVER, SHOULD ADVISE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF NOT ALREADY KNOWN THAT KING CONTEMPLATES PARTICIPATING IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT AND THAT IN VIEW OF EARLIER DISTURBANCES IN MEMPHIS ON THIS DATE, SEVERAL RANKING SCLC OFFICIALS APPREHENSIVE FOR PERSONAL WELFARE OF KING.

PAGE THREE

FOREGOING INFORMATION TELEPHONICALLY FURNISHED MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

RECEIVED: 11:39PM RM

MAR 29 1968

[illegible]
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

1256AM URGXENT 3-29-68 DGB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS (157-1094)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY [illegible]

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, ~~RM.~~ Racial Matter

RE MEMPHIS TELS, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT ACTIVITIES;

ON MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, MEMPHIS POLICE DEPT., ADVISED THAT THE MASS MARCH TO BE LED BY REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IN SUPPORT OF SANITATION WORKERS STARTED AT AROUND ELEVEN AM CST WITH ESTIMATED FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND WORKERS, MANY OF WHOM WERE NEGRO TEENAGERS. MARCH STARTED AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, LOCATED HEART OF NEGRO AREA, AND KING JOINED MARCH AFTER IT PROGRESSED ONE BLOCK. HE WALKED WITH MARCHERS TO VICINITY BEALE AND MAIN STREETS, MADE NO SPEECHES PRIOR TO MARCH, MADE NO KNOWN UTTERANCES DURING MARCH, AND BY TIME HE REACHED ABOVE POINT RAMPANT BREAKING OF STORE WINDOWS AND LOOTING WAS BEING PERPETRATED BY MARCHERS, WHEREUPON KING AND A FEW ASSOCIATES RAN TO A NEARBY CAR AND LEFT MARCH, PROCEEDED TO RIVERMONT MOTEL WHERE THEY REMAINED THROUGH AFTERNOON AND EVENING. BY NOON, POLICE HAD BROKEN UP CROWD, BEING FORCED TO USE TEARGAS, BUT SPORADIC LOOTING HAS CONTINUED THROUGH AFTERNOON

1cc 110
1cc

Included in letter to White House
and Attorney General. Date [illegible]

NOT RECORDED
162 APR 4 1968

70 APR 12 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

AND EVENING, PRIMARILY CONFINED TO SOUTH CENTRAL AREA OF MEMPHIS, A PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO AREA, PRIMARY TARGET OF LOOTERS BEING LIQUOR STORES AND SMALL GROCERIES.

TENNESSEE STATE LEGISLATURE TODAY PASSED CURFEW BILL, WHICH WAS INVOKED BY MEMPHIS MAYOR HENRY LOEB, EFFECTIVE SEVEN PM, AND THIRTY FIVE HUNDRED TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARDSMEN FROM MEMPHIS AND WEST TENNESSEE ARE CURRENTLY ON DUTY IN MEMPHIS OPERATING AS TACTICAL UNITS, BEING ACCOMPANIED ON THEIR PATROLS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMPHIS PD.

SCHEDULED MASS RALLY TO FEATURE KING NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT CANCELED. AT TWELVE MIDNIGHT, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, THREE HUNDRED ARRESTS, PRIMARILY RELATING TO LOOTING AND CURFEW VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY POLICE DEPT. FOUR INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN SHOT, ONE OF THESE, A SIXTEEN YEAR OLD BOY, WAS KILLED IN ACT OF LOOTING A STORE. THREE OTHERS WERE SHOT, TWO BY POLICE OFFICERS AND ONE BY A STOREKEEPER WHILE LOOTING, NONE SERIOUSLY INJURED.

AGE THREE

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED THAT KING, RALPH ABERNATHY, AND BERNARD LEE, FAILED TO LEAVE MEMPHIS ON EASTERN FLIGHT THREE NINE EIGHT, NINE ZERO FIVE CST, DUE TO ARRIVE ATLANTA ELEVEN ZERO THREE PM EST. THIS ALSO CANCELS KING'S AND LEE'S FLIGHT FROM ATLANTA SIX TWENTY AM MARCH TWENTY NINE DUE TO ARRIVE BALTIMORE SEVEN FORTY TWO AM. INSPECTOR G. P. TINES, MEMPHIS PD, ADVISED KING PLANNING TO STAY IN MEMPHIS AT RIVERMONT HOTEL TONIGHT, FUTURE PLANS UNKNOWN AT PRESENT TIME. P.

CORR PAGE TWO, PARA ONE, LINE ONE WORDS EIGHT, NINE, AND TEN SHLD BE "AREA OF MEMPHIS" AND LINE TWO, PARA ONE, WORD FIVE SHLD BE "PRIMARY"

PAGE TWO PARA THREE, LINE ONE WORD SIX SHLD BE "KING" AND LINE THREE WORD THREE SHLD BE "PRIMARILY" AND A PERIOD SHLD BE BETWEEN "DEPT. AND FOUR" ONEXXX ON LINE FOUR.

PAGE TWO PARA ONE LINE THREE WORD ONE SHLD BE "LIQUOR"

END.

HFL

FBI WASH DC cc- Mr. Trainor

P

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/18/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. A. Newman

SUBJECT: DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

During a conference on 7/16/75 between the Assistant Attorney General, J. Stanley Pottinger, and his staff and the Director of the FBI and his staff, a question arose concerning Martin Luther King's alleged moving from one hotel or motel to another hotel or motel in Memphis, Tennessee, prior to his murder on 4/4/68.

Attached is a letterhead memorandum (LHM) setting forth an inquiry including a review of all appropriate Bureau files regarding a proposal made in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 3/29/68 in connection with the counterintelligence program wherein it was recommended that information be made available to a cooperative news media source showing King to be a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on 3/28/68, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel). The LHM will reflect and document the fact that although a notation appears on the memorandum that it was "handled" there is no information available to reflect that it was ever actually given to a cooperative news source. Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh (retired), who placed the notation "handled" on the document, absolutely has no recollection of this matter nor can he state whether or not the information was disseminated.

REC-88 100-106670

The time elements as documented in this LHM would preclude the proposal contained in the 3/29/68 memorandum of having any affect upon King's cnoice of a motel in which to reside.

JUL 29 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached LHM along with attachments be disseminated to the Department.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Delivered 7/22/75 to Pottinger's office

cah
HAN:cah (6)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 26, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore GCM

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/

PURPOSE:

To recommend item be furnished cooperative national news media source by Crime Records, designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising for the Washington Spring Project.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has now scheduled the Washington Spring Project, his "poor people's march on Washington, D. C.," for the latter part of April, 1968. King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) has sent out a mailing to 70,000 potential financial contributors. King asked these 70,000 to contribute to the Washington Spring Project for the feeding and housing of the marchers.

At the same time, churches in the Washington, D. C., area have said they will feed and house King's marchers.

SUGGESTION:

That the above facts be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division so that a story could be

BEC-D 812405

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. M. Wells
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC 35

100-448006-

15 APR 9 1968

EX 106

55 Enclosure 234
TJD:df/dsm (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

given nation-wide circulation that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people he solicited. Since the churches have offered support, no more money is needed and any contributed would only be used by King for other purposes. This item would need nation-wide circulation in order to reach all the potential contributors and curtail their donations. A sample item is attached.

ACTION:

That the facts about King's solicitation of funds unnecessarily be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division.

Wie

Handled 4/4/68

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), today finds himself in the embarrassing position of having too much money, or at least the probability of too much money. The SCLC sent out a huge mailing to its contributors pleading for funds for the Washington Spring Project, the "poor people's march on Washington." Thousands of contributors were urged to support the march financially in order to feed and house the demonstrators. But the churches in the Washington, D. C., area have offered to house and feed the demonstrators.

Now the contributions are beginning to roll in from the mailing and King doesn't need the money. An embarrassment of riches has befallen King, who will only use the money for other purposes. The churches had better come through with all the housing and support the demonstrators need, because there will be little money left for the "poor people" by the time the march rolls around.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-448006 - 8

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 8C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Sullivan DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: ① SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
RACIAL MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

A sanitation workers strike has been going on in Memphis for some time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis. King was in an automobile preceding the marchers. As the march developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke out including the breaking of windows in stores and some looting.

This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called nonviolence advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience for Washington in April.

REC-19 EX-105 157-9146-38
5 APR 2 1968

ACTION:

Attached is a blind memorandum pointing ~~out the~~ above, which if you approve, should be made available by Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources. (Con strictly confidential)

Enclosure
ENCLOSURE

TDR:fhd (6)

W.C.S.

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Deakin

OK H

FBI

Deakin

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RACIAL INT. SECT.

5 APR 5 1968

AUG 30 1968

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, injected himself into the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and the result of King's famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism, looting, and riot.

Previously, King involved himself in this strike, called for a general strike, and called for a mass march. Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of the line. Negroes began shouting "black power" and trouble began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and looting broke out.

Police officers were forced to use gas to break up the march and to control the crowd. It was necessary to activate the National Guard. Martin Luther King claims his much-heralded march on Washington, scheduled for April 22, 1968, will also be "nonviolent." He says he has persuaded militant black nationalists to abandon violent extremism in Washington, D. C., during the march. Memphis may only be the prelude to civil strife in our Nation's Capitol.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KD

157-9146-38

ENCLOSURE

~~157 [illegible]~~

XEROX
APR 4 1968

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 25, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

I would appreciate your making available to the Committee the following items in connection with our investigation of the King matter:

1. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between one Val Coleman and Special Agent Harold Linebaugh or any other FBI Headquarters officials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

2. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between any FBI Headquarters officials and any representatives of the news media concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

3. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to a meeting between Ralph Abernathy and either FBI Director Hoover or Cartha DeLoach during December 1964 or January 1965 (other than the December 1, 1964 meeting which was attended by Dr. King and the January 11, 1965 meeting which was attended by Andrew Young).

4. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to the following statement which appears in the second paragraph of the September 11, 1964 memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - Communist":

RECEIVED
DEC 1 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1210X

On that occasion Assistant Director DeLoach's office was able to take appropriate action to forestall the publication of the article.

5. The 7/16/64 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan which is noted in handwriting at the bottom of the second page of the July 15, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

6. With respect to the March 29, 1968 memorandum, with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" please provide:

a. Access to original of this memorandum and its enclosure;

b. Access to all extant "tickler" and/any other copies of this memorandum and its attachment in their original form;

c. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memorandum. ~~(This should include any and all information adduced, collected, and/or prepared in connection with Mr. James Adams' testimony on this subject before the Senate Select Committee on November 18, 1975.)~~

d. All memoranda and any other materials received from FBI field offices or written at FBI Headquarters prior to and pertaining to the recommendation contained in the March 29, 1968 memorandum.

7. With respect to the memorandum with enclosure, from W. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 26, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)", please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

8. With respect to a memorandum with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan, dated 3/28/68, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

9. Responses to Items 6, 7, and 8 should include copies of all newspaper clippings or magazine articles contained in FBI files which contain information set forth in the memoranda and/or enclosures identified in Items 6, 7, and 8 above.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 1, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated November 25, 1975, requesting various information regarding the King matter. Please prepare an appropriate response to this request.

EX-110

cc: Paul Daly

REC-60

62-116395-1210X

7 MAR 5 1976

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CC

5-Ph

1-Ad Hoc
12-3-75

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 11/28/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KP

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY

Removed By 7 9 JAN 1 1976

File Number 62-116395-1210

Permanent Serial Charge Out

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

The Attorney General

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum, with attachment, concerning an interview of former FBI Assistant Director Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum, with attachment, for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Your specific attention is invited to certain information relating to the interview of Wick suggestive of improprieties on the part of an SSC Staff Member. The facts, as known to this Bureau, are as follows.

Wick first contacted this Bureau concerning the interview by telephone on November 5, 1975, to advise that he had been called on October 31, 1975, by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein representing the SSC. Epstein requested Wick to come to Washington, D. C., for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his "employment." Epstein did not further describe the subject matter of the interview and an appointment was arranged for November 7, 1975. Wick said that he was uncertain as to the probable subject matter of the interview because other matters coming within his responsibilities as Vice President of Pan American World Airways which were unrelated to the FBI, have been of recent interest to the SSC. Wick asked for advice of the FBI concerning this matter. Thereupon, the Legal Counsel Division of this Bureau contacted Epstein and determined that the subject matter of the interview of Wick would be Martin Luther King, Jr. A return call was made to Wick on November 5, 1975, to advise him that this Bureau had learned that the subject matter of the interview would be Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395-1209X

REC-51

3 JAN 13 1976

1 - 67 (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

SFP:mjg
(11)

2

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

✓ S. F. Phillips
4043 JEH

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JAN 20 1976

The Attorney General

On November 6, 1975, Wick again telephoned this Bureau and advised that he had been rather annoyed at Epstein's initial approach to him; particularly, because Wick had tried on more than one occasion during the telephone conversation with Epstein to pry from Epstein the subject matter of the interview but Epstein persisted in not advising him.

This Bureau's representative who had determined from Epstein on November 5, 1975, the subject matter of the interview has advised that when he made the inquiry of Epstein, he asked Epstein why he had not told Wick the subject matter. Epstein's reply was that Wick had not asked him, a statement directly contradictory to Wick's advice to this Bureau.

The second suggested impropriety is that Epstein contacted Wick prior to advising this Bureau of his intention to interview Wick, an action which is contrary to procedures which have been agreed upon between the SSC and this Bureau.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
               Special Counsel for
               Intelligence Coordination

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

62-116395

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S.F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (AD) ROBERT WICK
BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/SP

This memorandum concerns an interview of former FBI AD Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members.

On November 5, 1975, Wick advised this Bureau that on October 31, 1975, he had been contacted by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein of the SSC who requested Wick to come to Washington for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his employment. Epstein did not further describe the subject matter although Wick attempted to obtain such information from Epstein.

Upon receipt of the above information from Wick, this Bureau determined from Epstein that the subject matter was to be Martin Luther King, Jr., and that fact was relayed to Wick on November 5, 1975. Wick was also told that he was being released from his secrecy agreement with the FBI for the purpose of the interview, confined to the indicated subject matter. Wick was also advised by this Bureau that he was not required to answer questions falling within four privileged areas: matters pertaining to pending investigations; information from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies; information concerning sensitive methods and techniques; and information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources.

Attached hereto is a copy of a MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE dated November 12, 1975, which Wick voluntarily furnished this Bureau and which represents his report pertaining to the interview.

Enclosure

1 - 67- (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SFP:mjg (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

62-116395-1209

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Assistant Director (AD)
Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members

NOTE:

Information relating to contacts between Wick and this Bureau are reported in memoranda 11/5/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," and 11/7/75 from W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall "Senstudy 75." Wick's statement, MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE, was mailed to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The matter of improprieties was addressed specifically in the above 11/7/75 Cregar memorandum and it is believed that the Department should be made aware of this matter.

Let & LHM to AG Encl (2)

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former Assistant Director Robert Wick

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interviewed regarding his knowledge of the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Apil

3791 (6-75)

Rb-100/9

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
✓Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
✓Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
~~Telephone Rm.~~ ____
Director Sec'y ____

f-/

FBI

Date: 12/9/75

Transmit the following in ________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION & ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

FROM: ADIC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243)

RE: SENSTUDY; TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS, AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR W. RAYMOND WANNALL 12/2/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM lg

Re Los Angeles phone call to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS, 12/9/75.

On 12/3/75, the attached article appeared in the Los Angeles Times under the byline of reporter JACK NELSON. As indicated, the headline and lead paragraph which supposedly is based on ADAMS' testimony, clearly reflects that the FBI did nothing to prevent Klan violence although we knew of the contemplated violence. After discussing this matter with Mr. ADAMS and reviewing the actual testimony received in the Los Angeles Division on 12/8/75, SAC ELMER F. LINBERG and I met with Editor BILL THOMAS and National Editor ED GUTHMAN at the Los Angeles Times.

I advised these gentlemen that I was aghast when I read the headlines and the lead paragraph of this article and could not believe that JIM ADAMS did not refute informant ROWE's testimony that we took no action relative to contemplated violence since I knew that this was contrary to the rules, regulations, policy, and philosophy of the FBI in 1960. I then called Mr. ADAMS in Washington, D. C., and he likewise, was upset over the headline and lead paragraph,

ENCLOSURE

EX-112

2 - 3 - Bureau (1 Encl)
1 - Los Angeles
REG:mmb
(4)

C-38

62-116395-1209

17 DEC 12 1975

JAN 7 1976

Approved: ________________ Sent ________ M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

because, according to ADAMS, he completely refuted these statements in that we did disseminate the contemplated plans of violence to the Birmingham Police Department and to the Department of Justice in the form of a letterhead memorandum.

I continued that I waited until I received the actual transcript of testimony and told the gentlemen that upon my review of the testimony of Mr. ADAMS and Mr. WANNALL, I could not reconcile the headline and lead paragraph with such testimony. I then proceeded to read several excerpts from the testimony.

I advised Mr. THOMAS and Mr. GUTHMAN that my immediate reaction was to prepare a "Letter to the Editor" but felt after a re-analysis of the situation that this is not a judgment question on the part of the newspaper, but one of a slanted, inaccurate story either by design or through misunderstanding. I therefore felt that the Los Angeles Times, if it so desired, should be in a position to correct the situation itself based on the facts.

Mr. THOMAS expressed appreciation for my approach and stated that at the time he read the article, already printed, a question came to his mind as to why the FBI did not advise someone or take some action relative to contemplated violence. He, however, took no further action. He said in view of what I had read from excerpts of Mr. ADAMS' testimony and the now available complete transcript of the testimony, he intends to pursue this matter further and would prefer not to have a "letter to the Editor", but rather correct any inaccuracies on the part of the Los Angeles Times through their own pursuit of further inquiring concerning this story.

Mr. GUTHMAN concurred with Mr. THOMAS and they indicated that it appears the obvious question is based on Mr. ADAMS' testimony of who in the Department of Justice received this information relative to contemplated violence and what did such a responsible Department of Justice official do with the information. He agreed that based on the information furnished to them, the FBI has been done an injustice but that they, the Los Angeles Times, desired to pursue this matter further.

It should be noted the article of JACK NELSON is based on one specific situation, namely the testimony of former informant GARY ROWE that he had furnished advance information to the FBI to the effect that members of the Ku Klux Klan would be given the opportunity to beat members of the Freedom Riders without interference by law enforcement authorities for approximately 15 minutes after which the local law enforcement authorities would take action, and that the FBI was advised of this well in advance of such beatings and furthermore, the FBI took no action to prevent this violence.

Took No Action to Prevent Klan Violence, FBI Admits

BY JACK NELSON
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—An FBI official conceded Tuesday that the bureau had failed to use an undercover man's information to head off Ku Klux Klan violence in Alabama in the 1960s.

But, the official, James B. Adams, assistant to the director, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the FBI was "just as frustrated as anyone else" at "rank lawlessness" that existed in Alabama at that time. Also, he said, the FBI is an investigative agency and has no enforcement powers.

Adams' defense of the FBI came immediately after Gary Thomas Rowe Jr., wearing a hood to conceal his features, testified that on many occasions he had warned the bureau of the klan's plans for violence, but that the violence occurred without official interference.



WITNESS—Gary Thomas Rowe Jr. wears hood while testifying.
AP Wirephoto

Rowe served six years as an FBI undercover agent before surfacing in 1965 as the star witness against three klansmen accused of killing a white civil rights worker in Lowndes County, Ala. Since then he has been living in Southern California under an assumed name.

Please Turn to Page 6, Col. 1

KLAN VIOLENCE

Continued from First Page

Rowe was one of two former undercover operatives who testified before the committee Tuesday. The other, Mary Jo Cook of Buffalo, N.Y., told of supplying the FBI with information about 1,000 persons while serving as an informant against the Vietnam Veterans Against the War during 1973-74.

Testimony by both witnesses prompted committee members to criticize FBI tactics and to suggest that legal restraints be put on future FBI activities.

Sen. Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), commenting on testimony by Rowe that he engaged in klan violence with the knowledge and approval of the FBI, observed that the bureau's infiltration of the klan not only failed to prevent violence, "but indeed may have contributed to it."

Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-Mont.) told Adams that the FBI had bungled its job in investigating political activities and added:

"It has interfered with civil liberties and finally in the last month or two through its public disclosures has heaped shame upon itself and really led toward the undermining of crucial public confidence essential to law enforcement agencies in the country."

Mondale criticized the FBI for trying to "protect people from subversive and dangerous ideas," and he told Adams:

"Time and time again, we're going to protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous. We're going to protect veterans from whatever it is, we're going to protect the (National) Council of Churches from veterans and so on . . .

"Don't you agree with me that we've got to control this, restrain it, define it, so that precisely what's expected of the FBI is known by you and by the public and you can justify your actions when we ask you?"

Adams disagreed that the FBI had bungled in the political intelligence field but agreed that restraining legislation was in order.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Los Angeles Times

12/3/75

62-116395-1209

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 12-3-75

FROM : T. J. JENKINS

SUBJECT: GARY T. ROWE
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE

On 12-3-75 ~~an individual who identified~~ himself as Garland Reeves of the Birmingham, Alabama, News, called and he advised that he understood I was the Special Agent in Charge of the Birmingham Office at the time the bus was burned with the Freedom Riders in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1961. He stated that he would like to know if Rowe had furnished us information that the Birmingham Police were going to wait 15 or 30 minutes to go to the bus station in order to give the Klan an opportunity to work over the Freedom Riders. I informed Reeves that I recalled no such information being furnished to us at that time. I told him that all information we received concerning possible violence was furnished to the Birmingham Police Department. He wanted to know, if there had been such an agreement what action would I take. I told him that if I determined that the police department would not take any action for 15 or 30 minutes I would advise the Mayor ~~and~~ of the city and the Police Commissioner and if they felt the same as the police department, I would then advise the Governor of the State.

EX 104 REC 4 62-116395-1208

He wanted to know what would be the FBI's position at that time if the police department refused to take any action. I told him that we did not have jurisdiction in matters of this nature, that they were purely local and it was the responsibility of the local authorities to handle such matters. He desired to know if I would call out the Federal Marshals. I informed him that the FBI did not have any authority to call upon the Federal Marshals in a situation of this nature but if such a situation arose, I would have immediately notified our headquarters in Washington, who would have ~~notified the~~ Department of Justice, who would have such authority.

7 DEC 16 1975

I told him that while I was in Birmingham as Special Agent in Charge we kept the Bureau headquarters in Washington completely informed of all developments and they in turn, kept the Department of Justice informed.

ACTION: ✓ Submitted for information.

TJJ:pmd (5)
1 - Mr. Adams 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM K9

59 DEC 30 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

WRW/LAC

FBI

Date: 12/4/75

Transmit the following in ________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714)

SENSTUDY 75

Re San Diego telephone call to Bureau, 12/4/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of a letterhead memorandum reflecting information received in the San Diego Office concerning GARY THOMAS ROWE, Jr.

Deputy SCOTT BOIES of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office was contacted and advised that if he felt he recognized ROWE that he should not discuss the matter openly with anyone in that ROWE was obviously attempting to protect his identity. Deputy BOIES was not advised that ROWE was identical with THOMAS NEIL MOORE.

extra cc destroyed

2 - Bureau (Encs - 8)
1 - San Diego

DCS:pgh
(3)

1 - The Attorney General
1 - (1-[illegible])

Not sent

UNREC COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

REC-100

62-116395-1206X

~~DEC 8~~ 2-6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2 ALM/GP

WOC

Letter to [illegible] Memo
12/[illegible]

Approved: RLM/C
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ________ M Per ________

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
December 4, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: GARY THOMAS ROWE, JR.

At 11:30 p.m. on December 2, 1975, Deputy Sheriff Scott Boies of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office, Lemon Grove, California Sub-Station, telephonically contacted the San Diego FBI Office and advised as follows:

Deputy Boies stated that he recognized the voice of the man identified as Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who is testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on the Ku Klux Klan. He stated he heard Mr. Rowe talk on a news broadcast and recognized him as being an individual he knows as Thomas Neil Moore. Deputy Boies furnished Moore's date of birth as August 15, 1933, and an address of 580 "L" Street, Chula Vista, California, where Moore resided in 1971. Deputy Boies stated that Moore worked for Western Bureau of Investigation, headquartered in Los Angeles and worked as a security guard for the White Front Department Store, Chula Vista, California.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KP

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116375-1206X

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

December 12, 1975

Director, FBI

REC-100 62-116395-1206X

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. Klein

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to my November 26, 1975, letter to you enclosing among other material, a memorandum concerning former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is a copy of a memorandum dated December 4, 1975, regarding Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., received by FBI Headquarters from our San Diego field office.

Rowe, is a former informant who testified before the SSC on December 2, 1975, regarding his role in supplying information to the FBI regarding Ku Klux Klan activities in Alabama. He has been utilizing the cover name, Thomas Neil Moore.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 137-6295

No 1 SENT TO SSC PER STEVE BLACKHURST, USDS 3.23.76

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the December 4, 1975, memorandum.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 137-6295

SK:klm
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 FEB 12 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Above being furnished to the Attorney General and the SSC in order to apprise them of information reflecting that Rowe, who testified with a mask over his face, was identified by a San Diego Deputy Sheriff after hearing Rowe's voice on a news broadcast. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/4/75

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TESTIMONY BY THE DIRECTOR
DECEMBER 9, 1975

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO CHANGE
THE NAME OF THE J. EDGAR HOOVER
FBI BUILDING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/JP

In connection with the Director's appearance on December 9, 1975, to testify before captioned committee, it is possible that he may be asked concerning recent proposals in the Congress to change the name of the building. Three bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives on December 1, 1975, for that purpose. H.R. 10905, introduced by Congressman Gude of Maryland and H.R. 10918, introduced by Congresswoman Schroeder of Colorado, would change the name of the building to "FBI Building." H.R. 10916, introduced by Congressman Rangel of New York, would change the name to "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building." All three of the bills were referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House, the chairman of which is Congressman Jones of Alabama.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information of the Director in connection with his preparation for testimony.

EX 104 REC-9 62-116395-1206

DEC 16 1975

COPY FILED IN

Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

XEROX
DEC 19 1975

84 DEC 30 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

94th CONGRESS
1st Session

H. R. 10905

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

December 1, 1975

Mr. Gude introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" wherever it appears in such section and inserting in lieu thereof "F.B.I. Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

By Mr. GUDE

DECEMBER 1, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mrs. SCHROEDER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Public Law 92–520 is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 8. The Federal building in the block bounded by Ninth Street Northwest, Tenth Street Northeast, E Street Northwest, and Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest, in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter be known as the 'F.B.I. Building'. Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, record, or other paper of the United States to such

Federal building shall be held to be a reference to the 'F.B.I. Building'".

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

By Mrs. SCHROEDER

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

N.Y.

Mr. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" both times it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

By Mr. RANGEL

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Stack
1 - Mr. McWright

Mr. Jenkins 11/28/75

J. Cochran, Jr.

REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

Sensitivity

Re memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11/21/75, advising that representatives of captioned Senate Subcommittee desire to review any Bureau documents relating to the Bureau's interest in or use of drugs during interrogation.

It was pointed out in referenced memo that captioned Subcommittee staff members James F. Michie and Thomas M. Susman had obtained information from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning a program coordinated between DOD, CIA, and FBI to develop a truth serum. The program apparently began in early 1950 and D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory had knowledge of this activity.

The information that Michie and Susman have obtained apparently relates to a Navy drug experimentation project from 1947 to 1954. Navy files indicated that the FBI was aware of this program and Mr. C. D. DeLoach and D. J. Parsons were mentioned.

A review of Bureau files disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the Navy drug project. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-2699-

62-2699

Enclosure

① 62-116395 ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Adams
2 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Rotis)
(Attn: Mr. Miller)
3 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. W. O. Cregar)
(Attn: Mr. T. D. J. Brooks)
(Attn: Mr. V. H. Weimar)

CGM:bms
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

CONTINUED - OVER

NOT RECORDED
46 FEB 5 1976

84 FEB 9 1976

might be used to great advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50.

Memorandum dated 11/6/75 from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall is attached which sets forth details of our review of Navy files on this project, including a Bureau press release which was to have been made in the event that the Navy mentioned the FBI in their press release on this matter.

A review of Bureau files for information relating to drugs designed to modify behavior indicates an interest dating back to 1922. However, this interest has not extended to the point where the Bureau has conducted research on behavior modifying drugs nor has it funded such research. We have maintained liaison with other agencies, primarily the U. S. Army, and industrial organizations in order to be aware of developments in this area.

On 7/30/74, Laboratory and Training Division representatives met with representatives of the Biomedical and Chemical Laboratories of Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, to discuss the potential use of incapacitating chemical agents in hostage situations. Although we have developed an awareness of various agents which may be used in these situations, we have not conducted any research with these agents. Memoranda on this matter are located in Bufile 80-807.

A single instance occurred where "truth serum" was administered in a Bureau case. Truth serum was administered to Thurman Scruggs Wilkins at his own request while being interviewed in the Los Angeles Office, April 26, 1947. Wilkins was allegedly involved with one Ignacy Samuel Witczak, the subject of a Soviet espionage case (100-343077). The actual drug used was sodium amytal and the actual administration was done by a physician. Prior Bureau authority was not obtained by the Los Angeles Office in connection with this incident. SAC Hood submitted a letter of explanation to the Bureau on July 2, 1947. This incident resulted in the following information being set forth in SAC Letter 84-47 dated July 3, 1947:

"The Bureau will not tolerate any experiments or participation on the part of its personnel in the utilization of the so called truth serums or other chemicals alleged to have a similar effect. ---- consequently, in the event any Bureau agent violates these instructions, drastic administrative action will be taken."

There was nothing found in Bureau files that would indicate that we have received any documents from CIA concerning their drug research programs. The files do reflect that we were aware that CIA was conducting research with lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and that British Intelligence had successfully utilized LSD on several Russian espionage agents. The information concerning CIA and British activities is set out for the benefit of the Director only and cannot be released outside the Bureau.

There are two Bureau files which contain most of the information relating to the immediate area of interest of the captioned Senate Subcommittee. These files are 62-2699 (Truth Serums) and 80-645 (Chemical Munitions and Gases). Pertinent serials may also be found in 80-807 and 100-343077 as previously noted in this memorandum.

I see no reason why Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman should not be afforded an oral briefing regarding these matters, and if necessary make pertinent serials of Bufiles 62-2699, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077 available to them for review.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman be advised by Legal Counsel that available Bureau records and interview with current knowledgeable employee indicate the FBI has never engaged in nor funded anyone's efforts in research and/or development programs in the use or effect of drugs on human behavior. They should be advised our efforts in this regard as far as can be established from the available records consists of following through liaison contacts with other government agencies and the private sector sources the current developments in behavior modifying drugs.

Memorandum J. Cochran, Jr. to Mr. Jenkins
RE: REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

(2) That if they desire to pursue this matter further, SA McWright and myself be permitted to meet with Michie and Susman to (a) reaffirm the information in recommendation #1 and (b) if necessary, to produce for their inspection pertinent serials from 62-6299, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. J. Cochran

Mr. W. R. Wannall

11/6/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. C. G. McWright
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

W. O. Cregar

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALN/KP

This is to inform you that on 11/7/75 Defense Department will release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC), the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures (Senator Edward M. Kennedy's committee), and to the press, information concerning Navy projects from 1947 to 1954 involving drug experimentation; a Navy file indicates FBI was aware of programs but Laboratory has no knowledge of any active participation by Bureau personnel.

On 11/4/75, Clark McGruder, Assistant to Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Director of Naval Intelligence, informed me that on 11/7/75 the Navy was going to release to aforementioned committees and the press information on drug experimentation and that the FBI was mentioned in the pertinent files. Those files were reviewed at the Pentagon on 11/6/75 by Supervisor J. P. Thomas of INTD. They had been classified "Secret" and "Top Secret" but now have been completely declassified. FBI was mentioned in connection with three projects. There are no FBI documents in the files.

A memorandum dated 9/21/50 from Mr. Alberti to Mr. C. D. DeLoach was a receipt signed by Mr. DeLoach for one copy of "Drugs Stated To Have Been Used By Russians And Germans In Interrogation Techniques." Alberti is identified elsewhere in the file as Jack H. Alberti, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), who apparently coordinated the projects mentioned in the file. The purpose of one project was to develop a speech-inducing drug to obtain intelligence from interrogees and the project began in 1947.

Enclosures
62-116395

CONTINUED
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

A memorandum dated 8/15/~~75~~50 on letterhead of Office of Chief of Naval Operations concerned "Top Secret Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI) Project on Speech-Inducing Drugs," reported a meeting on 8/11/50 attended by personnel of NMRI, CIA, Office of Naval Research (ONR), a drug company representative and Mr. DeLoach and Mr. D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the FBI on a CIA project on narco-hypnosis and on the NMRI project. Parsons reportedly said the FBI had no such project, but had information on the experiences of various police departments in the United States with speech-inducing drugs. He agreed to make the FBI information available to NMRI and CIA. ONR agreed to give FBI, NMRI and CIA a study by ONR on projected research to improve polygraph reliability. Recipients were to give their comments and recommendations on the study to ONR. At the meeting NMRI gave DeLoach an 8/11/50 NMRI progress report on its project. Parsons agreed to look into the possibility of getting volunteers from prisoners in Federal institutions and to supply NMRI with canabis (marijuana) and heroin to the extent they might be available to the FBI. It is noted that no FBI representatives were listed in the memorandum reporting a 9/27/50 meeting of this group and there is no further record in the file of FBI participation. Neither is there any record that the FBI supplied any drugs for the project.

Material regarding project "CHATTER" included a carbon copy of a rough draft memorandum (no letterhead) bearing the penciled date "11/50?" which contained the following, "Since 1947 the Department of the Navy has carried on a project in coordination with the Departments of the Air Force and Army, CIA and FBI for the development of speech-inducing drugs.... The Directors of Intelligence of the three Services, of CIA and FBI consider this project

CONTINUED - OVER

of utmost important and urgency to... fulfillment of their missions for the security of the United States." The memorandum says that a project submitted to ONR by Professor Richard Wendt of the University of Rochester (NY) had been approved by all the agencies involved and recommended funding the project. The file indicates subsequently that this project did go forward and involve human experimentation.

Another ~~The second~~ file dealt with project "CALLING CARD," 1952-1953, designed "to render an individual subservient to imposed will or control." FBI was not mentioned.

80-5 (Polygraph file) relates only to instrumental detection of deception

A memorandum dated 9/5/50 for Mr. D. J. Parsons, FBI; C. Edwards, CIA; and Captain Wilbur E. Kellum of Naval Medical Research, from W. S. Post, Jr. (not further identified), informed them that a copy of the report on the "Ellson" project (University of Indiana, 1952) was being forwarded to them for information. The project involved research in the detection of deception. The addressees were to be briefed by Professor D. G. Ellson of Indiana University on the project at a future date. The file did not show that the briefing occurred. The project was terminated in June, 1952.

The two files reviewed contained many reports of research conducted concerning various drugs in various parts of the world, constituting a collection of papers on the subject by U. S. and foreign researchers.

A review of logical Bureau files by the Laboratory Division disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the above. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which might be used to great

CONTINUED - OVER

advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50. (Navy memorandum on this meeting set out above.)

We have received a memorandum dated 11/4/75 from Defense describing the proposed release of Navy information to the committees and to the press. Copy of that memorandum and of the press release are attached. The release says that "Liaison was maintained with... the FBI" concerning the drug research ~~release.~~

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

PRESS RELEASE
NOVEMBER 7, 1975

The press statement released by the Navy today relating to its drug research on human subjects for the period 1947 through 1954 indicates liaison concerning this project was maintained by the Navy with other Governmental agencies, including the FBI.

A thorough review of FBI files has disclosed one document relating to this Navy research: a short internal memorandum, dated August 4, 1950. This memorandum, prepared by a member of the Liaison staff at FBI Headquarters, recorded that a Navy official had invited FBI representatives to a conference in the Washington area to "discuss the usage of truth serum in Intelligence circles," and that the Navy had made advances in developing a new drug which "could be utilized to a great advantage in the questioning of espionage agents." A handwritten notation on this memorandum directed that a representative of the FBI Laboratory was to attend this conference on August 11, 1950.

No further identifiable reference to Navy drug development research is contained in FBI files. No record can be located that liaison was being maintained with the Navy regarding this program, or that the FBI had knowledge of this program prior to the date of the above memorandum.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/RO

ENCLOSURE

~~ENCLOSURE~~ 62-116395

The FBI was not involved in any way in this Navy drug research, and the FBI has never participated in research with drugs designed to modify human behavior, nor has it funded such research.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

December 24, 1975

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

ST 115

Director, FBI

REC-51

62-116395-1204X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is in response to the SSC letter dated December 18, 1975, wherein Senators Mondale and Baker requested rather detailed information to be made available during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

It is noted that most of the requests in this letter are so ambiguous that they require clarification from the SSC before the FBI can logically respond. In one instance, there is no way this Bureau could respond short of obtaining the recollections of Bureau Supervisors who worked in the Intelligence Division extending back almost 20 years. Because of this, we are attaching for your approval and forwarding to the SSC the original of a memorandum which delineates the problems attendant to the request of December 18, 1975, and, in most instances, requests a meeting between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, SSC, and representatives of this Bureau in the hope that some alternatives or clarifications can be developed. A copy of the memorandum is furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

WOC:lhb
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2AMK/DCL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JAN 20 1976

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The request of 12/18/75 was received in the Intelligence Division in the midafternoon of 12/22/75. A conference was held on the morning of 12/23/75 of pertinent Division personnel in an effort to identify the problems connected with responding to this request. It is believed that the only way the Bureau can logically respond to the request is by obtaining clarifications and, in some instances, alternatives to the requests set out.

We have already determined that both John Elliff and the SSC Counsel, F. A. O. Schwartz, are out of the city for the holidays. The Legal Counsel Division has left word with Mr. Schwartz and/or Mr. Elliff to call SA Paul Daly upon their return to the city.

Copy of 12/18/75 request attached.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J, G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

62-116395

December 24, 1975

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM SENATORS
MONDALE AND BAKER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On December 22, 1975, this Bureau received a copy of a letter dated December 18, 1975, which Senators Mondale and Baker sent to the Attorney General levying certain requirements on the FBI with a request that the responses be provided the SSC during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

Item 1 requested access to materials in the investigative files for a six-month period preceding acts of violence which were prevented by actions taken by the FBI. The specific preventive actions were set out in some detail in a memorandum prepared for the SSC by the FBI dated December 10, 1975.

Upon receipt of referenced letter, the Intelligence Division initiated efforts to isolate the files documenting these preventive actions. The Bureau's response of December 10, 1975, was predicated on a review of the pertinent inspection reports of the Intelligence Division. These reports do not document by file number the individual preventive actions. To locate specific files, it will be necessary to have knowledgeable Intelligence Division personnel queried in an effort to try to match the preventive action with a particular investigative file. In some instances,

WOC:lhb lhb
(11)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

WOB
pD
JAN

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-1204X

GPO : 1975 O - 569-92

there will be no investigative file but merely a communication from a field office reporting information furnished by a source of the FBI on which some preventive action was predicated. It is possible that the acts of violence reported by the source could involve a violation over which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction. In such cases, the local field office would have merely furnished the information to the appropriate law enforcement agency and no investigative file would exist.

We are continuing our efforts to attempt to isolate those files which document preventive actions. However, because of the problems attendant thereto, as well as those problems raised in the subparagraphs of Item 1, it is recommended that a meeting be arranged between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, and representatives of this Bureau to discuss possible alternatives to some of these requests.

Items 2 and 3 concern the September 24, 1975, report to the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office. The FBI is in the process of preparing a response and it will be made available to the Committee as soon as possible. However, it is noted that the FBI prepared no analysis at all on the findings of the General Accounting Office contained in their report of September 24, 1975.

Item 4 requests the annual reports from the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968, and the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that organization was under investigation. Item 4 also requests annual reports available on the investigations "about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28."

There were no annual reports submitted by the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968. With regard to the Women's Liberation Movement, the SSC has been provided copies of all pertinent reports for the years the organization was under investigation. In an effort to clarify what is meant by the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to Mr. John Elliff's request of October 28, 1975, it is again proposed that a meeting with Mr. Elliff be arranged to clarify this ambiguity.

Item 5 requests specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV of the Department of Justice's guidelines draft on "Domestic Security Investigations."

The indices of this Bureau are not organized to enable retrieval of information of a "preventive action" character or examples of FBI actions taken to prevent violence. The retrieval of such information from FBI files, other than that described in the response to Item 1, would require extensive review and/or dependence on the recollection of individuals of occurrences extending back almost 20 years. It is suggested that, during the proposed meeting with Mr. John Elliff, this request be discussed.

Item 6 requests access to all FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1, through April 4, 1968.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

It is this Bureau's belief that all pertinent material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, through April 4, 1968, has been made available to the SSC responsive to previous requests. With regard to the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, it is not clear whether the letter is requesting access to the entire FBI file on these two activities from the period January 1, through April 4, 1968. It is recommended that a clarification of this request can be accomplished during the previously proposed meeting between Mr. John Elliff and representatives of the FBI.

Item 7 requests all materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

A check of indices of the FBI regarding "Project Overshoe," as well as the word Overshoe, fails to contain any reference to either. Without additional information regarding "Project Overshoe," this Bureau cannot be responsive to this specific request. Again, it is suggested that, during the forthcoming meeting with John Elliff, clarification of "Project Overshoe" be obtained.

1 - The Attorney General

5-1[illegible]a (Rev. 3-21-73)

Intelligence Division

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

Attached is a request from Senators Mondale and Baker of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated 12/18/75. The Director has requested he be advised regarding the status of this request.

Attached is a copy of a letter to the AG and LHM for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb

CONTINUED - OVER

(Rev. 5-21- 3)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Intelligence Division

ED

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

ched is a request from Senators nd Baker of the Senate Select (SSC) dated 12/18/75. The has requested he be advised the status of this request.

ched is a copy of a letter to the M for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb CONTINUED - OVER

estimate when we will complete Item 4.

Item 5 has been reduced to the recollection of Bureau Supervisor David Ryan who handled the COINTELPRO matter and will not require research beyond what SA Ryan can recall. (Ryan is currently developing a response to this request.)

Item 6 has been reduced to all materials relating to the Poor People's Campaign, the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennesee, and Martin Luther King, Jr., contained in Headquarters files between the period 1/1-4/4/68. (We are currently working on this request.)

Item 7 - Epstein has agreed to obtain more identifying data regarding Project Overshoe and we are awaiting this information.

WOC

SECRET

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
Y GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall for Handle
Sensitivity

Sel T 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X
[illegible] JAN [illegible] 1976

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

RECEIVED

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

SECRET

SECRET

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall — Handle

Senstudy

Sel T 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X
5 JAN 26 1976

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

RECEIVED
ENCLOSURE

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

SECRET

provided during the last week of December and the first week of January:

1. With respect to each of the examples of effective prevention of violence provided the Committee pursuant to John Elliff's letter of November 26 to Mr. Shaheen, please provide access to materials in the investigative file for the 6-month period preceding the act of violence prevented. Please deliver:

(a) All materials relating to the legal and factual predicate for each investigation;

(b) The first investigative report disseminated outside the FBI in each such case, and a list of recipients of that report;

(c) The total number of individuals whose names were referred to the FBI's general name index in the course of each investigation;

(d) The total number of individuals about whom information was obtained through informants, confidential sources, physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and other sensitive techniques; and

(e) The annual report from the office of origin for each such investigation to FBI headquarters for the last five years during which the case in question was an open investigation.

2. Please provide any information which you have refuting the suggestion made on page 34 of the General Accounting Office's September 24 report to the House Judiciary Committee, that cases in which violence can be predicted probably represent less than 2% of all FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

3. Please provide all memoranda or analyses prepared for the Justice Department, Director Kelley, or Assistant Director Wannall on the findings of the General Accounting Office as presented to the House Judiciary Committee on September 24.

4. Please provide the annual report from the office of origin to FBI headquarters for the investigation of

Dr. Martin Luther King in 1963 through 1968, and for the investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that that organization was under investigation, and the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28.

5. Please provide specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV on "preventive action" of the draft Department of Justice's guidelines on "domestic security investigations."

6. Access to all FBI materials pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor People's Campaign, and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1 through April 4, 1968.

7. All materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this request. We look forward to continuing cooperation on this area of joint concern.

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale

Walter F. Mondale
Chairman

Howard Baker

Howard W. Baker, Jr.
Vice-Chairman

~~SECRET~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

[illegible]

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/24/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). (12/18/75 Letter to the Attorney General from Senators Mondale & Baker)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 12-30-75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KP

62-116395-1204X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/24/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/18/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Requesting clarification of items listed in request received from Senators Mondale and Bakerregarding preventive actions; 9/24/75 report of the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office; Annual reports from the office of origin to FBIHQs for investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; pertinent materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1/1 thru 4/4/68 previously made available. Clarification with regard to Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tenn; "Project Overshoe."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

62-116395-1204X

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
(Mr. G. S. McMichael)

12/17/75

1 - Mr. J. Cochran
(Mr. F. M. Devine)
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Mr. W. R. Wannall

J. G. Deegan

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This informative memorandum to record unsuccessful efforts to pinpoint the typewriter on which was typed an anonymous letter apparently directed to subject, the original of which was located in papers left behind on the retirement of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan.

Examination of the questioned document by the Laboratory established that the typing was done on a Royal typewriter with pica style type. We checked available inventory records maintained by the Administrative Division as well as our own in INTD to locate all Royal typewriters which were in the then Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) around 1964. This search was based on the suspicion that the note was typed by Sullivan on a typewriter accessible to him in 1964 when he was Assistant Director of the DID.

Our checks revealed that there are available only four typewriters of the type sought which were likely in the DID in 1964. All four are presently in INTD and three of them were readily eliminated as not identical to that which produced the questioned document on the basis that all three have closed "4s", whereas the questioned document has an open ended "4". The fourth typewriter, serial number KMG 13-4320913, is maintained in room 4410 and charged to the IS-2 Section. It was examined by Supervisor F. M. Devine of the Document Section of the Laboratory who advised that it is not identical to the typewriter which produced the questioned document.

100-106670

(1)- 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)

CONTINUED - OVER

SFP:blb
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/lp

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 DEC 29 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Martin Luther King, Jr.
100-106670

We are conducting no further inquiry at this time to establish the whereabouts of the typewriter which produced the anonymous letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information and record purposes.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1st NR 1203x, 1204x, 1st NR 1204x, 1206-1210x, 1212, 1214x, 1214x1, 1215, 1215x

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Adams - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs. (2)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Cregar - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs. (2)

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On 12/4/75, a meeting was held with the following representatives of captioned Committee: Chief Counsel F.A.O. Schwartz; Assistant Counsel Paul Michel; Staff Member Mark Gitenstein; Staff Director of the Domestic Task Force John T. Elliff; and Staff Member John Bayley. Representing the Bureau at this meeting were Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams, Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Inspector John B. Hotis, and SA Paul V. Daly.

The meeting discussed the forthcoming testimony on 12/9/75 of the Director before that Committee and Elliff furnished the Bureau two draft papers discussing the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction and issues the Committee Staff feels the Senate Select Committee must address from a legislative standpoint. Copies of these papers are attached.

The first paper which consists of six pages discusses in Part 1 what the Committee sees as problems arising out of the FBI's domestic intelligence investigations. This portion highlights the fact that these investigations may be overbroad in scope, collect irrelevant information, and continue the investigations beyond what the Committee sees as their normal investigative conclusion. This portion also addresses the investigative techniques used during these investigations and the resultant dissemination of information collected.

Under Part 2, the document discusses options available to the Committee. These options run the gamut from abolition of the Bureau's domestic intelligence functions to administrative oversight by the Attorney General or Congressional oversight or enacting legislation providing for domestic intelligence investigations with legislative limits imposed on such investigations. Included is the consideration of creating an independent Inspector General.

62-116395-1215X

REC-51

7 JAN 22 1976

Enclosures (2)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

↓ ↓

PVD:lad
(9)

5-

84 [illegible] 26 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The second position paper which was prepared by John T. Elliff begins by a six-page statement and analysis of the Bureau's current authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. He then lists four options for the Committee.

Option 1 is for Congress to pass legislation ratifying the existing FBI authority as set forth by Presidential directives and Executive Orders.

Option 2 suggests Congress might give serious consideration to creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Department of Justice. In this Option, Elliff suggests that the FBI itself has considered this Option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from law enforcement functions of the Bureau.

Option 3 considers the elimination of FBI domestic intelligence. In his analysis of this position, it might be possible for the Bureau to develop the necessary intelligence information through its normal criminal investigations and thus remove the necessity for domestic intelligence investigations as presently conducted.

Option 4 considers setting standards for domestic intelligence investigations. In this Option, Elliff states that the FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only as Congress finds that regular criminal investigations would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of Federal law and that incidents of the use of violence in such violations are of a serious nature and threaten the security of the country.

For purposes of the Director's appearance on 12/9/75 before the Senate Select Committee, it is believed his response to questions concerning the aforementioned position papers should be that the Bureau has received copies and is reviewing the various proposals and that it would not be appropriate at this time for the Director to comment regarding the substance of the proposals.

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Elliff indicated during this meeting that the Director during his appearance may anticipate being asked a question by one of the Senators relating to his statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal concerning the necessity for the sacrifice of certain individual rights at the expense of investigations. He also anticipated the Director might be asked a question concerning his position on COINTELPRO. Regarding the question concerning the Director's statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal, the Legal Counsel Division will draft a proposed resonse. Concerning COINTELPRO, a response has been prepared and will be put together with the briefing material for the Director.

This memorandum in general highlights the Options presented in the attached papers. A more detailed analysis should be prepared by the Intelligence Division and existing documents addressing these proposals should be made available for the Director's briefing book for his testimony.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Director respond to questions concerning the attached position papers as set forth above.

Done.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division draft a proposed response concerning the Director's statement made in Montreal relating to the sacrifice of certain individual rights.

Done.

(3) That the Intelligence Division make a detailed review of the various Options set forth in the two attached position papers. (FOR SUBSEQUENT STAFF CONFERENCE AFTER 12/9) Jma

See memo [illegible] w/ File Senstudy 1/19/76

Jma

Ret. from SO 12/12/75 Jma

Issues and Options for Discussion with Former Attorneys General Rogers, Katzenbach, and Clark

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

I. Background

In the past few weeks the staff has presented the Committee with evidence suggesting the following about the FBI's internal security intelligence program:

A. The program is massive, involving the collection of information on the activities of thousands of innocent, law-abiding American citizens.

B. These individuals were not alleged espionage agents, but citizens who fall within the FBI's vague definitions of "subversion" and "extremism" -- purely homegrown "threats to the national security".

C. That FBI policy on "subversive" and "extremist" investigations was vague and subject to the following abuses:

  1. overbreadth in scope in that groups were investigated whose threats to the national security were tenuous, if not non-existent.
  2. collection of information on the personal life and political views of subjects unrelated to the national security.
  3. the continuance of investigations well after it should have become obvious that there was no legitimate predicate.

D. Particularly invasive collection techniques were used, including electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entries. Although these have been terminated, the predominant and perhaps most insidious continues today through the FBI's huge informant/confidential source network.

E. Information collected in the course of these investigations is disseminated regularly throughout the federal government and to local law enforcement.

F. Until 1971, information collected through these investigations was disseminated as part of the COINTELPRO program to the subjects' friends, relatives, employers, and others in an effort to discredit or "neutralize" alleged "subversives" or "extremists".

62-116395 - 1215X

ENCLOSURE

G. The FBI's internal security intelligence program was used by Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon to serve their political interests, usually by collecting information on critics or political opponents.

H. The program was conceived and implemented in secrecy, and although parts of the program were shared with outside authorities from time to time, until now no President, Attorney General, or Congressional committee has been exposed to the entire program in detail.

I. The program is not authorized by statute but is founded on a series of secret or ambiguous Presidential orders, which in turn are based upon a questionable assertion of "inherent constitutional authority".

J. The program continues today, albeit on a much more limited basis than in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and the basic machinery for the program -- the huge informant/confidential source network -- is still operating.

K. There is no statute or internal Bureau or Justice Department policy prohibiting a new Director, Attorney General, or President from ordering the Bureau to expand the program to its earlier dimensions.

II. Issues and Options

Among the issues and options which might be discussed with former Attorneys General in response to what the Committee has learned are the following:

A. Abolition. Elimination of the FBI internal security intelligence program as Attorney General Harlan Stone ordered in 1924 when confronted with abuses growing out of the FBI's first internal security intelligence program, such as the infamous Palmer raids.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether there are not some functions (e.g., protecting the President, preventing or at least predicting violence by terrorist organizations, or predicting civil disorders) which require intelligence collection.

2. Whether FBI intelligence reports are valuable in that respect, especially in light of a recent GAO report suggesting that such reports are rarely useful in predicting violent activity.

3. Whether such information, assuming it is valuable, could not be obtained through more traditional criminal investigations.

4. Whether the value of the information, marginal or otherwise, justifies the risk to civil liberties inherent in such intelligence collection.

5. Whether, given the way in which limited and ambiguous grants of authority have been expanded into major authorizations, any statute short of a total prohibition of all non-law enforcement intelligence activities in the domestic sector will be adequate to prevent the recurrences of the kinds of abuses uncovered by this Committee. (Or, conversely, whether it is possible to draft a law authorizing a limited civil disturbance and counter-terrorist intelligence mission that will not eventually evolve, like the National Security Act of 1947, into a charter for unanticipated and unwanted covert activities.)

6. Whether it would be sufficient to restrict the FBI to criminal investigations without also (a) placing limits upon the length of investigations, (b) the kinds of information which can be collected and disseminated on the subject irrelevant to the alleged criminal act, (c) the utilization of warrantless electronic surveillance and other particularly invasive collection techniques, and (d) the utilization of a huge informant/confidential source network without judicial or Justice Department supervision.

B. Authorizing Statute. Recognition of the value of internal security intelligence, but placing limits upon the program designed to minimize the infringement upon civil liberties, an option being actively considered by the present Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out under the first option and, in addition:

1. Whether meaningful and stringent guidelines can be written which do not so hamper the administration of an internal security intelligence program as to make the product not just marginal, as GAO suggests, but worthless.*

2. In light of the possibility that the present Attorney General may address this matter via internal Justice Department guidelines, whether this approach does not ignore the legal authority question which can only be resolved by statute.

3. Whether or not Congress could draft a statutory version of the guidelines which could be flexible enough to meet an evolving threat and at the same time place meaningful restrictions upon the program.

4. Even assuming there is no absence of legal authority, is it safe to leave these guidelines in the form of a departmental order which can be rescinded by the next Attorney General?

C. Delegation of Authority to Attorney General. Simply ratifying the present program via enactment of a statutory charter which grants the FBI authority to conduct an internal security intelligence program subject to its own internal guidelines or departmental guidelines as proposed by the Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and:

1. Whether such a statute would not be an unconstitutional delegation of powers to the Executive Branch.

2. Whether enactment of such a statute would not represent a failure by the Congress to confront the issues raised above.

---

*A preliminary staff analysis of the Attorney General's draft guidelines suggests that, despite months of conscientious and painstaking work by a departmental task force, the guidelines are not adequate. This analysis, which will be presented when Attorney General Levi testifies on December 10, indicates that several of the more questionable FBI investigations (e.g., of Dr. King and the women's liberation movement) would still be permissible under these proposed guidelines.

D. Legislative Inaction. Enact no new statute affecting the FBI's legal authority or the internal security intelligence program.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and, in addition:

1. Whether this failure to act might not leave the status of the program in doubt and subject to court challenge.

2. Whether this failure to act after full disclosure by the Bureau might not be taken by the FBI and the courts as a ratification of the program.

E. Administrative Oversight by the Attorney General. The Justice Department should be required to exercise greater administrative oversight over the FBI's internal security intelligence program by Attorney General Levi, regardless of whatever other options Congress accepts.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is practical for the Attorney General or his staff to review thousands of such investigations each year.

2. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should review all or just the so-called "full" investigations.

3. Whether, to facilitate the conduct of such reviews, the Attorney General or his staff should be given "complete" access to Bureau files, including information regarding the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.

4. Whether it is possible to develop a staff of career attorneys within the Department with both the access and independence essential to the conduct of searching reviews.

5. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should not also be required to review various informant and so-called "intensification" programs, and the establishment of specialized indices (which have a significant impact upon which cases are opened) instead of just reviewing individual investigations in a vacuum as provided by the Attorney General's draft guidelines.

F. An Inspector General. In addition to the above options, an independent Inspector General should be created to investigate improprieties by the FBI. This option is advanced by those concerned about the inadequacy of the FBI's investigation of the disappearance of former Director Hoover's personal files, its limited inquiry into the so-called Atlantic City convention case, and the absence of any internal investigation of the abuses in the King case.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to maintain the independence of an Inspector General within the Department of Justice when both the Inspector General and the Director of the FBI will be responsible to the same official, the Attorney General.

2. Whether the Inspector General should have "complete" access to Bureau files, including information pertaining to the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.

3. Whether an Inspector General with access to extremely sensitive information might not become a serious threat to the independence of the Bureau from political influence and to the civil liberties of American citizens.

G. Congressional Oversight. In addition to the above options, the creation of an oversight committee(s) in the Congress, to which the Bureau would be required to report and which would have the power to investigate abuses.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the kinds of problems posed by the Justice Department oversight and Inspector General options discussed above to the independence of the FBI and the confidentiality of its files.

H. Public Reporting and Disclosure to Subjects. In addition to the above options, the requirement that the FBI make frequent public reports on the details of its internal security intelligence programs and policies and reveal the details of improper intelligence investigations to the subjects of those investigations.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to reveal the essence of some programs and policies and the details of some investigations without jeopardizing the effectiveness of legitimate programs.
2. Whether such disclosure might not increase the number of law suits filed against the FBI alleging illegal activities.

DRAFT
MEMORANDUM

December 4, 1975

FBI LEGISLATION - PROPOSED OPTIONS

In preparation for the testimony of FBI Director Kelley and Attorney General Levi on December 9 and 10, the Domestic Intelligence Task Force is pulling together various proposals for legislation dealing with FBI intelligence. This paper sets forth some of the basic options.

A. Current Statutes and Executive Orders

The basic statute governing the FBI is 18 U.S.C. 533, which reads as follows:

> The Attorney General may appoint officials: (1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States, (2) to assist in the protection of the person of the President, and (3) to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General.

Clauses (2) and (3) are a possible statutory basis for intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Under (2), the FBI may "assist" the Secret Service in the protection of the President by providing

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1215X

ENCLOSURE

intelligence on persons or groups who may endanger the President's safety. A formal agreement between the FBI and the Secret Service sets forth the types of intelligence information provided by the Bureau. However, this agreement states that:

> The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction. (Tab A)

Clause (3) recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of Justice." This is a possible statutory basis for at least two broad areas of FBI intelligence investigations -- civil disturbance intelligence and intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program.

The most recent legal advice to the FBI from the Justice Department on the gathering and reporting of data regarding civil disturbances notes that on April 1, 1969, the President designated the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the government's response to civil disturbances. The FBI is instructed to gather and report on "all significant incidents of civil unrest" and on "all disturbances where there are indications that extremist organizations . . . are believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them." The

FBI is specifically advised to make reports "even when no specific violation of federal law is indicated." On the other hand, the FBI is instructed not to report "every relatively insignificant incident of a strictly local nature coming to its attention." (Tab B)

The Justice Department has given the following recent instructions to the FBI regarding intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program. Executive Order 10450, as amended by Executive Order 11785, is interpreted as requiring an FBI investigation of organizations "with a potential" of violating federal or state statutes prohibiting unlawful advocacy of violence or the commission of any unlawful act of violence. The FBI is advised that "it is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order." The FBI is instructed to apply "the same yardstick" to investigations of individuals who are affiliated with such organizations. The FBI is specifically advised that "it is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated." (Tab C)

Clause (3) also recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of State." This is a possible statutory basis for FBI intelligence investigation of foreign intelligence activities within the United States or to

collect positive foreign intelligence. The best example is the Attorney General's authorization of warrantless FBI electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. However, there is apparently no instruction from the Justice Department to the FBI directing the Bureau to initiate investigations of individuals or organizations which have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but about which there is no information indicating intelligence activity. (See Staff Report, "Counterintelligence/Counterespionage: The Law and the Philosophy", October 14, 1975.)

In his testimony before the Committee, Deputy Associate FBI Director James Adams made no reference to clauses (2) and (3) as a possible legal basis for FBI intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Instead, he placed sole reliance on a series of Presidential directives extending from 1936 until the 1960's which the FBI interprets as authorizing it to engage in "domestic security intelligence investigations". The Attorney General has codified these directives in a Justice Department regulation instructing the FBI to:

> Carry out the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15, 1953, designating the [FBI] to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters. 28 C.F.R., Section 0.85(d).

The FBI also cites directives of President Kennedy on June 9, 1962, and Attorney General Kennedy on March 5, 1964, which are the latest charter for the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, composed of the FBI Director and the chiefs of the military intelligence agencies. This group is authorized to coordinate "all investigation of domestic espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security." (Tab D)

The theory behind the FBI's position is that the President has inherent constitutional powers, at least in the absence of contrary legislation, to authorize FBI intelligence activities. The only judicial support for this theory is language in the Supreme Court's opinion in the Keith case, which declared warrantless wiretapping of domestic groups unconstitutional.

The Court acknowledged the importance of "national security in its domestic implications . . . especially at a time of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent periods of our history." Under such circumstances, the Court stated, the President has a "fundamental duty" under the Constitution to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." The Court added, "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means." Hence, the Court appeared to

recognize that the President's "domestic security role" has a "constitutional basis"; that the President through the Attorney General may need "to obtain intelligence information about those who plot unlawful acts against the Government"; and that "threats and acts of sabotage against the Government exist in sufficient number to justify investigative powers with respect to them." The Court applied the general principle that "unless the Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered." Nevertheless, the central holding of the Keith decision was that this power may not be exercised in such a way as to infringe constitutional rights. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

Even though the President may have the authority under the Constitution to direct the FBI to conduct intelligence investigations in the absence of legislation, Congress has the ultimate authority to substitute statutory authorization in place of the Presidential directives. As Justice Robert Jackson declared in the Steel Seizure Case, "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . ." 343 U.S. 579, 637.

B. Option One -- Ratifying Existing Powers

The first option for Congress is legislation ratifying the existing authority granted to the FBI by current Presidential directives and orders. Such legislation would be cast in extremely general terms. Its main advantage is that it would provide a basis for Congressional oversight. It could also reinforce the Attorney General's role as the immediate supervisor of FBI intelligence activities. The statute would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to conduct investigations of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities;
2. to gather and report information on civil disturbances;
3. to conduct investigations of other related intelligence matters affecting internal security; and
4. to conduct investigations of official matters relating to the Department of State.

In addition, the statute would require the Attorney General to report annually to the appropriate Congressional committees on the volume and type of investigations and reports, the investigative techniques used, and the policies and procedures adopted by the Justice Department and the FBI.

The weaknesses of this approach are obvious. Congress would have legislated a wholesale delegation of power without

standards or limitations other than the supervision of the Attorney General and oversight by Congress. In view of the Select Committee's findings as to the vast overbreadth of FBI domestic intelligence investigations and the abuses committed in the name of "counterintelligence", Congress would in effect be permitting future expansion of FBI operations to match past policies.

C. Option Two -- A Separate Security Intelligence Agency

Congress might give serious consideration to legislation creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Justice Department. It would perform the functions of the present Counterintelligence Branch of the FBI Intelligence Division, dealing with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence/counterespionage. The FBI itself has considered this option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from the law enforcement functions of the Bureau. (Tab E)

A separate agency would be justified only if it was authorized to conduct investigations of a wider scope and using different techniques than would otherwise be permitted. In other words, Congress could decide that foreign counterintelligence investigations should go beyond investigation of specific crimes, that techniques such as electronic surveillance should be used without a warrant or with a special type of warrant,

and that operations should be conducted to "counter" foreign intelligence activities by means other than arrest or "persona non grata" proceedings. On the other hand, if Congress treats the investigation of foreign intelligence activities the same as a criminal investigation, then the FBI should keep the job.

Any statute in this area must use general language for diplomatic reasons. For example, Congress should not explicitly authorize deception operations or efforts to compromise hostile intelligence officers, even though such techniques may be envisioned. Such techniques are dealt with best by establishing adequate procedures for authorization and oversight to ensure accountability.

The legislation should be more specific where it deals with investigations and other operations directed at American citizens rather than non-resident aliens in the service of a foreign power. If Congress believes Americans should be investigated if they have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but no information indicating intelligence activity yet exists, the legislation should say so.

The statute should also set out standards for determining whether a foreign-dominated domestic organization falls within the jurisdiction of the separate agency. There should at the very least be substantial information indicating that the organization is directed by, subsidized by, or in active

collaboration with a foreign government or organization. (The term "foreign organization" refers, for instance, to a group like the Palestine Liberation Organization.) If the group fits the criteria for foreign domination, there should be an additional finding that it may engage in intelligence activities or in activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law.

If the group meets all these standards, Congress may authorize the investigation of its activities going beyond regular criminal investigations. Such investigations could extend to all individuals who are members of, or express support for, the organization, as well as to the efforts of the organization to influence and control other groups. However, it may be sufficient to authorize only the investigation of active members and supporters. This would prevent a revival of the "Cominfil" policy of looking into all forms of lawful political and social activity where Communists might be involved.

The Petersen Committee report on COINTELPRO considered the need for special supervision of foreign counterintelligence operations in the United States. It recommended the creation of a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Commission to make decisions with regard to the necessity or acceptability of particular foreign counterintelligence techniques. (Tab F) This proposal

has merit in view of the limited amount of time the Attorney General can give to personal supervision and the after-the-fact role of legislative oversight regarding the separate agency.

Finally, legislation to create a separate foreign counterintelligence agency must deal with relationships to the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other foreign intelligence agencies. The current FBI-CIA agreement on their respective jurisdictions is only a "memorandum of understanding". It allows the CIA to undertake certain clandestine activities within the United States, in coordination with the FBI. (Tab G) Proposals are currently circulating in the Executive Branch for a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive to clarify this matter, as well as to regulate CIA electronic surveillance of American citizens abroad. (Tab H)

A full draft of a statutory charter for a separate foreign counterintelligence agency is not included here, since the focus is on domestic intelligence issues. However, one implication of such a statute would be that the remaining FBI functions should relate only to law enforcement and criminal investigations.

D. Option Three -- Elimination of FBI Domestic Intelligence

The basic assumption behind Attorney General Levi's effort to develop "guidelines" for FBI domestic intelligence is that regular criminal investigations are not adequate to

supply the information needed to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law. That assumption should be questioned. Regular criminal investigations are likely to produce a substantial amount of information which can be used to anticipate or prevent future crimes. For example, intensive criminal investigations of Ku Klux Klan violence in the South during the 1960's would have required the FBI to look into a wide variety of Klan activities. Another example is the search for Weatherman fugitives, a regular criminal investigation which involves broad inquiries across the country. The FBI has not yet demonstrated that the preventive information it has obtained came from intelligence investigations which would not have been conducted as regular criminal investigations.

The fact that an FBI investigation was supervised by its Intelligence Division does not necessarily mean that the investigation was, automatically, outside the regular criminal law enforcement jurisdiction of the Bureau. Any FBI investigation of activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law falls within that jurisdiction. Moreover, regular criminal investigations can also extend to plans, attempts, or conspiracies to engage in such activities.

One suggested difference between intelligence-type and regular criminal investigations is that the latter are terminated after a reasonable time, if sufficient evidence to

justify prosecution is not obtained. However, there is no legal reason why the prosecutor cannot request that the investigation continue indefinitely as long as there is information that violent activities and plans for violence are still underway. The degree of evidence needed to justify a prosecution is certainly greater than the degree of evidence needed to justify an investigation.

All this is not to say that no further standards are needed to guide regular criminal investigations when they may touch on sensitive First Amendment or other constitutional interests. This is especially true of criminal investigations of individuals or groups engaged both in lawful political or social activities and in unlawful violence or plans for violence. To what extent is the advocacy of violence a proper basis for initiating an investigation? Should an investigation be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual is a member of, or has expressed public support for, an organization which has as one of its objectives the use of violence? Should an investigation be started on all members and public supporters of an organization, some of whose members have acted in concert to use violence?

These questions are addressed in the draft Attorney General's guidelines for domestic intelligence investigations under the heading "preliminary investigations". (Tab I) Since

the guidelines assume that there should be intelligence investigations, they do not consider whether such investigations might be permitted as regular criminal investigations.

The Klan and Weatherman examples again illustrate the point. Once it has been established that a particular Klan group is engaged in or planning violence, it seems reasonable to conduct at least preliminary inquiries to determine whether the members and supporters of the group are involved in the violence or the plans for violence. Similarly, the search for Weatherman fugitives who committed bombings and other acts of violence would appear reasonably to include preliminary inquiries to determine whether other Weatherman members and supporters have harbored the fugitives.

On the other hand, it would seem unreasonable to investigate members and supporters of all Klan groups across the country on the ground that some Klan groups have used violence. And it appears equally unreasonable to investigate all members and supporters of SDS because the Weatherman faction engaged in violence. The scope of the investigation must be logically related to its specific purpose, and not an excuse for wide-ranging collection of intelligence.

There is one possible exception to the requirement that the FBI only conduct regular criminal investigations. The Attorney General (and the President) do require reports on

major civil disturbances which may not involve violations of federal law. The FBI should be authorized to gather such data and make appropriate reports as part of its law enforcement responsibilities. However, the data and reports should be limited to information provided by local or state law enforcement authorities or obtained in the course of a regular FBI criminal investigation. Where local authorities provide information about individuals and organizations which are not the subject of a regular FBI criminal investigation, the data and reports should not be included in the FBI's general files and name index.

In periods of widespread civil disturbances, the Attorney General may require a more systematic procedure for maintaining and retrieving civil disturbance information. This was the case in 1967, when Attorney General Clark created the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit in the Justice Department. The IDIU stored and indexed civil disturbance reports separately from the FBI. The data was used to help anticipate or ameliorate disorders. IDIU has been abolished, although the basic function of evaluating reports on civil disturbances is still performed by the Justice Department. This function should also be authorized by statute, and the intent of Congress should be that the Attorney General must obtain specific legislative authorization for any future IDIU.

IDIU was not perfect. Under Attorney General John Mitchell it supplied a list of names of American dissidents to the CIA. (Tab J) It also was used in conjunction with grand jury proceedings inquiring into terrorist bombings. Both of these activities should be forbidden by the statute authorizing the Justice Department to evaluate civil disturbance information.

Finally, legislation may be needed to make clear that the FBI is not authorized to conduct investigations of organizations or individuals for the specific purpose of compiling a body of data to be used in connection with name checks under the Federal Employee Security Program. The same principle applies to FBI "assistance" to the Secret Service, under the present FBI-Secret Service agreement.

A statute must also address the FBI's current practice of maintaining an Administrative Index (ADEX) of the prime subjects of current domestic intelligence investigations. The past history of the FBI's Security Index and other target lists (Key Activists, Agitator Index, Key Black Extremists) suggests the need to enact legislation banning the compiling of lists of persons by the FBI, unless such persons have been arrested or convicted for specific crimes and the list is used in connection with the investigation of such crimes.

These proposals to limit the FBI to regular criminal investigations and civil disturbance reporting must be tested against the actual past experience of the Justice Department and the FBI. General instructions from the Department to the Bureau may be overly vague, even within the framework of criminal investigation. Two examples are Attorney General Clark's memorandum on riots in 1967 and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley's memorandum of campus disorders in 1969. (Tab K) The Nation of Islam exchange between the Department and the FBI in 1973-74 is another illustration. (Tab L)

Thus, there is no automatic panacea in restricting the FBI to criminal investigations. The need for careful scrutiny of actual investigative policies and practices by Congress and the Attorney General is just as great as if the FBI were authorized to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. Legislation must focus on procedures for ensuring accountability by regular reports from the Attorney General to the appropriate Congressional committees.

The following are some of the basic elements which should go into a statute embodying this option. It would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to investigate violations of federal criminal laws, provided that the scope and duration of the investigation are logically related to its specific purpose;

2. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law;

3. to seek legal advice from the Attorney General or his designee whenever a proposed action may be perceived, with reason, to unfairly affect the rights of citizens, provided that this responsibility to seek legal advice is the duty of both the FBI as an institution and FBI agents as individuals;

4. to collect information from state and local law enforcement agencies regarding major civil disturbances, provided that such information is not entered into the FBI general files and name index;

5. to disseminate information obtained from criminal investigations for the following purposes, under regulations promulgated by the Attorney General and published in the Federal Register:

a. prosecution of violations of criminal laws;

b. prevention or anticipation of violations of criminal laws;

c. assistance to the Secret Service in the performance of its protective responsibilities;

d. determination of the suitability of individuals for employment by the federal government;

6. to report civil disturbance information obtained from state and local law enforcement agencies to the Attorney General for the purpose of determining the need to use federal military force under 10 U.S.C. 331 et seq.;

7. to compile such lists of persons arrested or convicted for specific crimes as may be necessary for use in connection with the investigation of such crimes;

8. to provide to the Attorney General or his designee full access to any information in the possession of the FBI which he may deem necessary for the performance of his responsibilities to supervise FBI activities and to submit reports to appropriate Congressional committees on FBI activities;

9. to follow such other procedures and standards consistent with this statute which the Attorney General may prescribe, provided that such procedures and standards shall be published in the Federal Register or, if publication would substantially interfere with the conduct of investigations, reported to appropriate Congressional committees.

E. Option Four -- Setting Standards for Domestic Intelligence

The FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only if Congress finds (1) that regular criminal investigations as described above would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law, and (2) that the incidents of the use of violence in violations of federal law are so numerous and so serious as to constitute a significant threat to the internal security or domestic tranquility of the United States.

The fact that there are individuals and groups who engage in violence, advocate violence, or believe in the desirability of the ultimate use of violence to advance their political or social objectives is not enough to justify FBI domestic intelligence authority. There must be additional findings that regular criminal investigations are inadequate and that the overall threat of violence constitutes a serious danger to the country.

Furthermore, if FBI domestic intelligence is authorized by statute, it should be an annual authorization which must be renewed each year upon reconsideration by Congress and the Attorney General of these factors. Past experience indicates that the annual appropriations process does not provide an appropriate forum for considering the FBI's basic authority.

Attorney General Levi's draft guidelines provide a basis for the consideration of a domestic intelligence authorization. They do not cover the investigation of foreign-related activities which may be directed by, subsidized by, or otherwise conducted in active collaboration with a foreign government, a foreign organization, or their agents. (See Option Two above.)

The guidelines deal with five different types of threats of violence which may constitute serious dangers to the country:

1. overthrow of the government (revolutionary violence);
2. interference in the U. S. with the activities of a foreign government (bombing a consulate, attempting to assassinate a visiting foreign leader);
3. interference with the functioning of the government or the flow of interstate commerce to influence federal policies (violent protest activities, terrorist bombings);
4. deprivation of civil rights (Klan violence, violent protest against busing);
5. incitement of violence which may require the use of federal military force (riots, major civil disturbances accompanying protest demonstrations).

The guidelines also refer to violence directed at state governments, either overthrow of a state government or interference with the functioning of a state government.

Authorizing legislation should indicate whether domestic intelligence is necessary for any or all of these specific problems. For example, revolutionary violence in an attempt to overthrow the government may be a remote and speculative danger, while terrorist bombings may be substantially interfering with the functioning of the government. Klan violence was unquestionably a serious danger to civil rights in the early and mid-1960's, but is it so today? Major riots and civil disturbances were equally serious in the late 1960's and early 1970's, but not in more recent years. Violent interference with the functioning of a state government should, under our federal system, normally be dealt with by state and local law enforcement.

Therefore, the definition of the purpose of FBI domestic intelligence can be simplified. The Attorney General's draft guidelines might be revised to authorize FBI domestic intelligence investigations:

1. to ascertain facts or information which serves to anticipate and prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law intended to

    a. interfere, in the United States, with the activities of a foreign government or its authorized representatives; and

b. interfere with the functioning of the government of the United States or the free flow of interstate commerce in order to influence policies or decisions of the federal government.

This formulation concentrates on the most likely current serious danger to the country, namely, politically motivated terrorist violence. FBI Director Kelley's recent public statements have stressed the increase in terrorist activity from 24 bombings in 1973 to 45 terrorist bombings in 1974 and 46 such bombings in the first six months of 1975.

However, this increasing threat is not the only factor to be considered. In the course of the FBI's regular criminal investigations of these bombings and other incidents of terrorist violence, can it obtain as a by-product substantial information which may serve to anticipate and prevent future violence? If so, the need for broader intelligence-type investigations is less evident.

The draft guidelines provide that the FBI would conduct full-scale intelligence investigations on the basis of "specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion" that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, may be engaged in activities which may involve the use of violence in violations of federal law. The two "mays" render the requirement of "specific and articulable facts" almost meaningless. Therefore, any legislation should authorize the FBI:

2. to conduct full domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above.

The draft guidelines also discuss the surveillance techniques to be used in full domestic intelligence investigations, including informants, mail covers, and electronic surveillance. The guidelines note that additional techniques may need to be covered, such as inquiries made under "pretext", photographic surveillance, "trash covers", etc. However, the legislation may deal with techniques more generally by providing that the FBI is authorized:

3. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law.

More detailed regulation of investigative techniques for full investigations will be considered elsewhere.

The scope of domestic intelligence investigations under the draft guidelines is broadened considerably under the provision for "preliminary investigations". They can be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have advocated activities which may involve violence, or are members of, or

have expressed public support for, an organization which has as its objective activities which may involve violence. The purpose of the preliminary investigation is to verify or refute the allegations or information. However, the vagueness of the standard is obvious. Therefore, to be consistent with the criteria for full investigations, the FBI should be authorized:

4. to conduct preliminary domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert,

a. advocate the use of violence as described in 1 above;

b. are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above;

c. are members of or have expressed public support for an organization engaged in activities which involve, or are likely to involve, the use of violence as described in 1 above, provided that other members of the organization are currently the subject of a full domestic intelligence investigation or a regular criminal investigation.

Unless these changes are made in the guidelines, they would permit investigations similar to past investigations which have been seriously criticized. For instance, they would allow investigations of all SDS members or all Black Student Union leaders on the ground that their activities may involve violence,

even though there is no specific allegation of likely involvement in violence.

Another reason for the revision is to exclude those investigations which would be justified as regular criminal investigations. Thus, allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have engaged in or plan to engage in activities which involve the use of violence would fall within the FBI's regular criminal investigative jurisdiction. Intelligence investigations would extend further at the preliminary stage to cover advocacy of violence and membership in or public support for organizations involved in or likely to be involved in violence. Full investigations require a likelihood of violence, short of actual violence or plans for violence.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE;
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TESTIMONY,
DECEMBER 10, 1975

At 3:01 p.m. on December 5, 1975, Mark Wolf of the Attorney General's staff, called me at the instructions of the Attorney General and advised that the Attorney General requested:

(1) FBI manual sections on domestic intelligence investigations;

(2) A listing identifying all individuals and organizations now the subjects of FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

Modification called to AG

Wolf said that the Attorney General is currently en route to Chicago and will return to Washington on Sunday evening. Therefore, the requested materials should be delivered to the Attorney General no later than Monday morning, December 8, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division prepare an appropriate response to the Attorney General's instructions in time for delivery by 9:00 a.m. on December 8, 1975.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

EX-112

REC-962 - 116395 - 1215

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY 5P2ALMKP

15 DEC 17 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

8 4 DEC 3 1 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (SC) 62-7721

May 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: NATIONALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO
INTERNAL SECURITY - PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST

We presently maintain an authorized technical surveillance at the residence of Rosa Collazo and her daughter, Lydia Collazo Turner, 1755 Anthony Avenue, Bronx, New York. This surveillance was originally installed on April 13, 1962.

Rosa Collazo is the wife of Oscar Collazo who is serving a life sentence in connection with the killing of a White House guard during an attempt to assassinate former President Truman on November 1, 1950. Both Rosa and her daughter are active in the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico in New York City. During the past six months, this surveillance has continued to furnish valuable information regarding activities of Puerto Rican independence advocates in New York. Through this surveillance, we have obtained information concerning the movement of Puerto Rican nationalists between New York and Puerto Rico. Included in this information was advance notice that Rosa Collazo planned to attend the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico during February, 1966, in Puerto Rico. Upon her return, details were obtained concerning the proceedings of the General Assembly. In addition, we were able to obtain advance notice of demonstrations in New York City in which nationalists participated. This enabled us to inform police authorities and interested Government agencies in advance of the demonstrations.

Unless you instruct to the contrary, this technical surveillance will be continued for an additional six months.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: DOMINICAN SITUATION
INTERNAL SECURITY -
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Diego Emilio Bordas Hernandez and his brother, Luis Manuel Alfredo Bordas, have emerged in the current Dominican crisis as important financial, political and military advisors to the deposed Dominican President Juan Bosch in the latter's efforts to regain control of the Dominican Government. Diego Bordas is a wealthy shipping executive currently residing in exile in San Juan, Puerto Rico, having been born in the Dominican Republic on January 11, 1923. He served in various high posts under Juan Bosch during the latter's short occupancy of the position of President of the Dominican Republic in early 1963. Bordas spends much of his time at 868 Ashford Avenue in San Juan, using an apartment at that address as his residence during the absence of its owner, Jose Antonio Benitez Jiminez, from Puerto Rico. Jose Benitez is the cousin of Jaime Benitez, the latter the Director of the University of Puerto Rico and a close associate and advisor of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas also maintains a residence at 21 V, Florencia, Pueblo Viego, a suburb of San Juan, near the current residence and headquarters of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas and his brother jointly operate a shipping business known as Bordas and Company at Highway Number 2, Puerto Viejo, Puerto Rico, and his financial dealings in support of the Bosch efforts can reasonably be expected to be conducted from this commercial establishment.

The Bordas brothers have both been the subjects of numerous allegations indicating their cooperation with procommunist and pro-Trujillo factions in Dominican politics and are apparently opportunists who have seized the current situation to enhance their political and financial futures. Luis Bordas is currently in the Dominican Republic acting as the Director of Military Operations of the rebel forces supporting Bosch.

109-12-211-1423

REC 4

4 JUN 15 1965

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION ~~SECRET~~
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

JUN 22 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Luis Bordas is reportedly the Honorary Nicaraguan Consul in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and, as a result, Department of State clearance for technical coverage of the business he operates jointly with Diego Bordas was obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on June 1, 1965.

In view of the pressing nature of the international situation as it relates to the Dominican Republic, it is requested that you authorize technical coverage of the residences of Diego Bordas mentioned above and of the business address of the joint venture operated by the Bordas brothers. Authority is requested for similar coverage of any addresses to which the mentioned residences or business may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NdeBK

DATE 6/4/65

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

December 19, 1975

1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Delivered to Committee 12-23-75

to Shaheen office 12/22/75

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 2 in that letter.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a copy of the document in response to Item 2 which is being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

ST 115 REC-51

62-116395-1214X

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

7 JAN 22 1976

PEN:adn
(9)

ENCLOSURE

NOTE:

A copy of the SSC letter 12/4/75, is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copy of the memorandum being furnished is maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the document being provided to the SSC. As indicated in the enclosed memorandum, Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled separately. Items 1 and 3 requested in referenced SSC letter are being handled by the IS-3 and CI-3 Sections respectively. Item 4, a restatement of prior request submitted by the SSC is being handled separately by SA V. R. Thornton of the IS-1 Section.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JBH JPT WOC PEN

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JAN 26 1976

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

62-116395

December 19, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of a copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, at the White House, Washington, D. C., dated October 27, 1964.

It is noted that in addition to requesting a copy of this letter the SSC requested materials reflecting this letter was hand-delivered to the White House by Mr. DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Attention is drawn to the upper right-hand corner of Mr. Hoover's letter to Mr. Moyers and to the notation appearing there reading "personally delivered 10/28/64, D." No additional materials are available in FBIHQ files reflecting delivery of this letter beyond the aforementioned notation which, it appears, bears the initial of Mr. DeLoach.

Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled in separate responses.

1 - The Attorney General

PEN:adn adn
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

JTT

62-116395-1214X 3R

WOP PEN

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 8, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee request seeking delivery of certain Bureau materials. Please prepare an appropriate response.

I invite your attention to paragraph numbered 4 which amends an earlier request of the Committee (Elliff letter of November 25, 1975, Item 6c) which request was the subject of a telephone conversation on December 3, with Mr. Seymor Phillips of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1-Ad Hoc
12-10-75

ENCLOSURE

62-116395—1214X

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]N.
BARRY GOLDWATER, AR[illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MATHIA[illegible], MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, [illegible]

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 4, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

Dear Mike:

The Senate Select Committee requests the following materials for delivery.

1. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the recommendation for, authorization of, and duration and termination of the electronic surveillance referred to in Items 1 and 22 of my letter of November 21, 1975 and in materials delivered to the Committee on December 1, 1975.

[illegible]

2. Delivery of a copy of the letter to Mr. Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated October 27, 1964, and materials reflecting that this letter was hand delivered by Mr. Cartha DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Nugent

3. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the surveillances of Mrs. Anna Chennault in October and November, 1968.

Hamilton

4. The Committee's request in my letter of November 27, 1975, item 6c should be revised to read as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memornadum, including a summary of the ~~recommendations~~ of relevant Bureau personnel pertaining thereto."

Nugent

RECEIVED
DEC 4 1975

JTE

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

62-116395-1214X

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/19/75

Caption of Document:
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
12/4/75 request - Martin L. King.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 12/23/75

Received by:

Title: Research Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116- -1214X

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
12/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/4/75, item 2

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr.: Copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers 10/27/64 along with notation that shows letter was hand delivered by Mr. DeLoach 10/28/64.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-09

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1214X

186-10051

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER 12-4-75

ITEM 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SBALMKP

Retain

62-116395-1214X

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

#MDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/31/00

October 27, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

Honorable William D. Moyers
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Moyers:

A confidential source of this Bureau who has supplied reliable information in the past furnished the following information concerning a contact on October 23, 1964, between Martin Wigington and Randolph Blackwell. Wigington was described as a member of the Democratic Party Correlation Committee, Austin, Texas. Blackwell is an assistant to Martin Luther King, Jr., at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Georgia.

Wigington indicated to Blackwell a desire for King to write "an anti-Goldwater letter" which Wigington's Committee intends to distribute in Texas among labor groups. Blackwell stated that King may go to Texas prior to the forthcoming presidential election and Blackwell inquired as to whether King would be "in any danger." Wigington stated that he would contact one Larry Goodman concerning any possible danger to King in Texas. This Bureau's source had no information concerning the identity of Goodman.

During this contact Wigington complained to Blackwell that a group from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which Conference is headed by King, and a group from the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America had picketed in Fort Worth, Texas. Wigington stated that this was not a good thing at this time since all Negro and labor organizations should be working for the election of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

This information is also being furnished to officials in the Department of Justice.

Sincerely yours,

REC 14

100-106670 (King)
1-100-442529 (CIRM)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

SFP:kmj
(12)

~~SECRET~~
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ST-101

NOV 2 1964

OCT 27 11 17 AM '64

REC'D-READING ROOM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NOV 4 1964
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Honorable William D. Moyers

NOTE:

[illegible]

Classified "~~Secret~~" as information reported is from AT 1380-S*, a highly sensitive source with respect to the racial situation. This source is of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of this information could compromise its effectiveness and thus be detrimental to the national defense. Information obtained from Atlanta teletype 10/23/64.

1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs.
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Encs.
1 - Mr. Gallagher - Encs.
1 - Mr. McDermott - Encs.

December 3, 1975

1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Encs.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs.

5
10

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On November 21, 1975 Inspector John B. Hotis of this Bureau met with Doug Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General; and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, concerning your forthcoming appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. At this meeting this Bureau was requested to provide write-ups on certain phases of this Bureau's operations which are to be used in the preparation of a briefing book for your testimony.

Attached are the following individual write-ups as requested on November 21, 1975: "Investigative Techniques"; "Organizational Structure and Functions of the FBI"; "Allegation of Misconduct Involving Special Agent in Charge, Miami Office"; "Director Hoover's 'Official and Confidential' (OC) Files"; "Allegations of Possible Misconduct by FBI Agents, Houston, Texas"; "Allegations of Personal and Official Misconduct of a Former Special Agent in Charge of the Baltimore Office"; "Allegation of Bribery by FBI Agent, New York"; "Allegation of Possible Misconduct by an FBI Agent, Detroit, Michigan"; "Allegations of Misconduct by FBI Agents, Richmond, Virginia, Field Office, in Connection with the Investigation of Illegal Wiretapping by the Richmond, Virginia, Police Department"; "Allegations of Violations of Gun Control Act by FBI Agent"; "Review of Appropriations Testimony for Fiscal Years 1955 thru 1976"; "Tenure of FBI Director"; "Transfer of Drug Enforcement Responsibilities to the FBI"; "Office of Special Review, Department of Justice"; and "Major Topics of Primary Concern to Congressional Committees."

Delivered to Mark Wolf's office 12-5-75

REC-9 62-116395-1212

With respect to the material requested by memorandum of Mark L. Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,

DEC 29 1975

PVD:dkg (13)

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2

62-116395 - 5-WOE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 31 1975

to Inspector John B. Hotis of this office dated November 26, 1975, which requested additional information, we are gathering the necessary material on an expeditious basis and the results will be furnished as soon as possible.

Enclosures (15)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. - Enclosures (15)
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

NOTE: See Legal Counsel Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11-24-75, captioned "Testimony By The Attorney General Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." On 12-1-75 Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, requested the attached information be furnished as soon as possible. No later than 12-2-75. This response was coordinated and incorporates material prepared by the Inspection, Special Investigative, General Investigative, Files and Communications, and Intelligence Divisions. Due to the time constraints we are furnishing interim response. As completed additional material will be furnished to the Department.

2 - Mr J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

January 14, 1976

1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

The Attorney General

Director, FBI 62-116395-1210X1

EX-110

REC-60

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Reference is made to SSC letters dated December 4, 1975, and November 25, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 4 in the December 4, 1975, request and Items 7c and 8c of the November 25, 1975, request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with the material which is being furnished to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

VRT:adn
(9)

NOTE:

Copies of SSC letters 11/25/75 and 12/4/75 are attached to the file copy of enclosed LHM. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as documents being provided to the SSC. Copies of material being furnished to SSC being retained with Senstudy 75 Project.

Delivered to Dept. 1-15-76

Delivered to Committee 1-15-76

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 9 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 (1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

January 14, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, Item 4 of which requests materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.; and SSC letter dated November 25, 1975, Items 7c and 8c of which request materials concerning the Washington Spring Project and Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of materials in response to referenced requests.

In respect to Item 4 of the December 4, 1975, request, the only indication of any action taken concerning the recommendation contained in the pertinent memorandum dated March 29, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/3/68," appearing on page one and initials which are believed to be those of former Special Agent (SA) Harold P. Leinbaugh. Among the documents being furnished the SSC is a memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned, "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.," along with supporting documents, which were submitted to the Attorney General concerning background leading up to the proposed action recommended in the March 29, 1968, memorandum. It includes results of an interview of Leinbaugh.

In response to Item 7c, the only indication of any action taken concerning the suggestion (recommendation) contained in the memorandum dated March 26, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/4/68," appearing on page two of that memorandum and initials which are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

VRT:adn
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1210X

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

With respect to Item 8c which concerns a memorandum dated March 28, 1968, captioned, "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," the only indication of action taken concerning the recommendation contained therein is a pencilled notation appearing on page one, "Handled 3/28/68," and initials which again are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/lp

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/14/76

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
12/4/75 request Item 4
11/25/75 request Items 7c and 8C

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: D. V. Cook Date: 1/15/76

Received by: Florence Thoben

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1210X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

1/14/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 12/4/75, Item 4 and SSC letter 11/25/75, Items 7c and 8c

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Operating Procedures
Information Handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Delivery of materials regarding Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Washington Spring Project and the Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

62-116395

AJD:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5·

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1210X

186-10021/9

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence·Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 12-4-75
ITEM 4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Retain

62-116 [illegible]5-1210X

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY [illegible]

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

EX-102

TJD:ted
(7)

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC-20

22 APR 11 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person nel without the express approval of the FBI.

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-44-006 — 93

ENCLOSURE

1 - J. B. Adams
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - D. Ryan
1 - J. G. Deegan

REC-88

Gr. 100-106670-3965

July 18, 1975

1 - H. A. Newman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

The following information is submitted regarding the background leading up to the proposed action recommended in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence, (Martin Luther King)." (copy attached)

This memorandum recommended that information be furnished to a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showing King as a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on March 28, 1968, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel).

A notation on the above referred to memorandum indicated that the recommendation was "handled" on April 3, 1968, by Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh of the Crime Records Division. (see notation on memorandum dated March 29, 1968, attached)

By way of background it should be noted that at about 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968, while standing on second floor balcony outside room 306 of the Hotel Lorraine, Memphis, Tennessee, King was shot and killed.

Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, reflects that King and other Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) officials were due to arrive in Memphis at 10:15 a.m. on April 3, 1968, via Eastern Airlines from Atlanta. (copy of Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, attached)

After King's death, an interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy, a close associate of King, reflected that he and King registered into the Hotel Lorraine in Memphis,

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

cah
HAN:cah (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

ENCLOSURE

copy to CRD + CRIM DIV 12/1/75 by memo cap MARTIN LUTHER KING JR

HW

TCD

84 AUG 5 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 560-920

Tennessee, at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968. (Information contained in report of SA Joe C. Hester dated April 17, 1968, Memphis, captioned "UNSUB, aka, Eric Starvo Galt, et al., Civil Rights" page 48. See attached FD-302 reflecting interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy).

For further background regarding the basis of this proposal Atlanta teletype dated March 28, 1968, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C" with second caption "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that on March 28, 1968, King and other SCLC people were in room 801, Holiday Inn, Memphis, Tennessee, at 4:30 p.m. (copy of Atlanta teletype attached)

A Memphis teletype dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that King participated in the march of sanitation workers on March 28, 1968. When violence erupted including the breaking of windows and looting by the marchers, King and a few associates ran to a nearby car and left the march proceeding to Rivermont Motel where they remained through the afternoon and evening. (copy of Memphis teletype attached)

On July 17, 1975, Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh, after having had all the facts set out above reviewed with him including the fact his notation of "handled" appeared on the March 29, 1968, memorandum, advised that he has absolutely no recollection of this memorandum and can unhesitantly state that he cannot now recall whether or not proposed information was ever disseminated to any news media source. He indicated that his notation "handled" would not necessarily mean that he did disseminate this information. In explaining this he stated that the notation could mean that he was merely clearing this document through Crime Records Division and at this late date there would be absolutely no way that he could make any positive statements as to whether or not the information recommended was ever disseminated to a news media source.

7/17

From the above recorded sequence of events as reflected in various communications identified above, it is evident that King returned to Memphis, Tennessee, from Atlanta

on April 3, 1968, and checked into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. The notation indicating that the proposed furnishing of information to the news media was "handled" on April 3, 1968, would, of course, preclude any such information from appearing in the press prior to King's checking into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968.

A review of appropriate files maintained at FBI Headquarters fails to reflect any newspaper article which could have been an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in the G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968.

A review of the "Memphis Commercial Appeal" for the period March 28 to April 4, 1968, maintained on microfilm in the Library of Congress failed to reflect any article which would appear to be an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968. References were noted indicating that King held a press conference at the Holiday Inn Rivermont Motel on March 29, 1968.

7/17 Hell

Enclosures (5)

NOTE:

See memorandum J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 7/18/75, captioned as above, prepared by HAN/cah.

Memorandum

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

OM : G. C. Moore

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

BJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

TJD:ted
(7)
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

TJD

REC-20

100-106670-3

22 APR 11 1968

Deakin

Handled 4/3/68

100-448006-93

ENCLOSURE

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2AIM/KP

100-[illegible]-93

[illegible]LOSURE

Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

430PM URGENT 4-2-68 SAB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS 157-1092 3P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENN., ~~RM~~ Racial Matter

ON APRIL TWO, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, MEMPHIS ~~PD~~ Police Department, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, ADVISED THAT THE FUNERAL OF LARRY PAYNE, SEVENTEEN YEAR OLD NEGRO WHO WAS SHOT BY MEMPHIS PD OFFICER AFTER STORE LOOTING GROWING OUT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT RACIAL DISTURBANCE, MEMPHIS, WAS HELD, WITHOUT INCIDENT, AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, MEMPHIS. ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED IN ATTENDANCE DESPITE FACT CHURCH CAN SEAT TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED. BODY INTERRED IMMEDIATELY AFTER FUNERAL. ARKIN ADVISED THAT ANOTHER SANITATION WORKERS SYMPATHY MARCH IS SCHEDULED FOR DOWNTOWN MEMPHIS AFTERNOON OF APRIL TWO.

100-106670-

NOT RECORDED
183 APR 9 1968

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED ON APRIL TWO THAT REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) AIDES RALPH D. ABERNATHY, BERNARD LEE, AND ANDREW M. YOUNG DUE TO ARRIVE MEMPHIS TEN FIFTEEN A.M., APRIL THREE, FROM ATLANTA.

END PAGE ONE

Albert C. Hayden

APR 5 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person without the express approval of the FBI.

Included --- letter to White House and Attorney General. Date 4-4-68

ON APRIL TWO A SOURCE ADVISED THAT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, APRIL TWO, REV. JESSE JACKSON OF SCLC'S "OPERATION BREAD BASKET," REV. S. B. KYLES OF METROPOLITAN BAPTIST CHURCH, MEMPHIS, AND REV. EDWARD L. BROWN, MT. PISGAH CME CHURCH, ADVISED THAT WITH SCLC PERSONNEL IN MEMPHIS THAT NIGHTLY MASS STRIKE SUPPORT MEETINGS WILL BE RESUMED, THE FIRST AT MASON TEMPLE ON NIGHT OF APRIL THREE WITH KING AS FEATURED SPEAKER. THEY SAID MASS MARCH WILL BE HELD FRIDAY, APRIL FIVE, AND THAT THEY WILL HAVE SCHOOL CHILDREN PARTICIPATE SINCE MARCHING WITH "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE GREATEST LIVING AMERICAN," WOULD BE MORE EDUCATIONAL THAN BEING IN SCHOOL. WHEN ASKED BY PRESS IF KING WOULD PERSONALLY MARCH, JACKSON SAID KING MIGHT NOT MARCH. HE DID NOT ELABORATE. WHEN ASKED IF SCLC GROUP WOULD VIOLATE A POSSIBLE INJUNCTION AGAINST THEIR MARCHING, JACKSON SAID "THE WHITE MAN HAS ALREADY ENJOINED THE BLACK MAN TO THE GHETTO AND THE WHITE MAN DOESN'T NEED TO VALIDATE IT BY SENDING US A PIECE OF PAPER." KYLES SAID THE PROBLEM FACING MEMPHIS IS NOT MILITANT BLACK YOUTH BUT IS "WHITE RACISM." JACKSON DESCRIBED OPERATION BREAD BASKET AS MASSIVE

END PAGE TWO

DRIVE TO FORCE ALL GROCERS IN NEGRO AREA TO CEASE SELLING HART'S BREAD, WONDER BREAD, COCA COLA, AND SEALTEST DAIRY PRODUCTS AS THESE FIRMS DO NOT HIRE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF NEGROES.

ON APRIL TWO LT. ARKIN ADVISED THAT MEMPHIS CITY OFFICIALS ARE CONSIDERING SEEKING A COURT INJUNCTION PROHIBITING ANY MASS MARCH LED BY KING OR AN INJUNCTION SPECIFYING CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A MARCH COULD TAKE PLACE AND ALSO CONSIDERING RESUMPTION OF A CURFEW AND PLACING STRIKE SUPPORT LEADERS UNDER A PEACE AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY BOND.

ARKIN ADVISED THAT REMAINDER OF TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARD, WITH EXCEPTION OF ONE BATTERY CONSISTING OF TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY THREE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE MEMPHIS GUARD UNIT, HAVE LEFT MEMPHIS.

AT THREE ZERO FIVE PM, SIXTY SANITATION WORKERS AND SYMPATHIZERS DEPARTED CLAYBORN TEMPLE CARRYING PLACARDS FOLLOWING THEIR USUAL PARADE MARCH TO BEALE STREET NORTH ON MAIN TO CITY HALL. NO INCIDENTS REPORTED.

memo
~~LHM~~ FOLLOWS. P. END.

CAL

FBI WASH DC

P

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Ralph B

Date April 8, 1968

Reverend RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, 690 La Verne Drive, N. W., Atlanta, Georgia, was interviewed at the Memphis Police Department at 10:55 p.m., April 4, 1968. Reverend ABERNATHY was advised of the Agent's identity and of the nature of the matter under investigation.

Reverend ABERNATHY, who described himself as Vice President at Large and Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, stated he was Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.'s closest associate and stated that he and Dr. KING always shared a room whenever they travelled together. He stated that at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968, he and Dr. KING registered at the Lorraine Motel, Memphis, Tennessee.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that on April 4, 1968, he and Dr. KING did not leave the motel and spent most of the day in their room, #306, which is located on the second floor of the motel. He stated that he and Dr. KING had been gone from their room for approximately one hour or less when they returned to the room at about 5:30 p.m. He said they got dressed as they were going to dinner at the home of Reverend BILLY KYLE and that at almost exactly 6 p.m. they started to leave the room. Reverend ABERNATHY stopped for a moment and Dr. KING walked out onto the balcony just outside the door to his room. Reverend ABERNATHY was still inside the motel room but could hear Dr. KING discussing the dinner engagement with other associates who Reverend ABERNATHY believes were standing in the parking area of the motel underneath and to the front of the balcony on which Dr. KING was standing.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated he heard what sounded like a firecracker and then heard the screams of persons to whom Dr. KING had been talking. Reverend ABERNATHY went then to the balcony and discovered Dr. KING lying there wounded in the right side of the face and neck. He said he believed Dr. KING attempted to speak to him but was unable to do so. Reverend ABERNATHY said he instructed someone to call an ambulance and then accompanied Dr. KING in the ambulance to the hospital where Dr. KING subsequently died.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 4/4/68 at Memphis, Tennessee File # Memphis 44-1987

by SA JOE C. HESTER: bn Date dictated 4/8/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that judging from the sound of the noise it appeared that the shot came from directly in front of the door and not from any great distance. He stated he did not observe anything that would indicate who fired the shot. Reverend ABERNATHY also stated that while they were in the motel room Dr. KING did not, to his knowledge, receive any telephone calls of a threatening nature or calls from persons who would not identify themselves. Reverend ABERNATHY said Dr. KING had not feared that any particular persons might harm him and Reverend ABERNATHY was unable to suggest any suspects or to provide any other information which might assist in identifying Dr. KING's killer.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

11:17PM URGENT 3-28-68 ARK

TO DIRECTOR (100-106670) AND MEMPHIS

FROM ATLANTA (100-5586)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM-C.

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE. RM.

IN FORMANT

AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT FOUR THIRTY PM MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

INFORMANT'S INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM DISCUSSION SHORTLY BEFORE WITH HOSEA WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, SCLC, CURRENTLY IN ATLANTA, WHO DURING LATE AFTERNOON MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, CONFERRED TELEPHONICALLY WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., PRESIDENT, SCLC; RALPH D. ABERNATHY, VICE PRESIDENT AND TEASURER, SCLC; AND BERNARD LEE, SPECIAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, SCLC.

KING, ABERNATHY, AND LEE ARE CURRENTLY IN ROOM EIGHT ZERO ONE, HOLIDAY INN, MEMPHIS.

WITH REFERENCE TO RACIAL DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, KING IS EXTREMELY DEJECTED. HE AND ABERNATHY STRONGLY FEEL DISTURBANCE ON THIS DATE DELIBERATELY PLANNED

EX-115 REC-9 100-106670-3278

XEROX 1968

APR 5 1968

APR 15 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

BY NEGROES WHO ARE NEITHER SYMPATHETIC TO KING OR SCLC. IDENTITY OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS NOT KNOWN.

ABERNATHY, LEE AND WILLIAMS ARE GREATLY CONCERNED FOR WELFARE OF KING, PARTICULARLY ON NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, WHEN HE EXPECTS TO PARTICIPATE IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION WITH SANITATION WORKERS. AT PRESENT TIME KING DOES NOT FEEL HE SHOULD LEAVE MEMPHIS. DURATION OF STAY AND FURTHER DETAILS IN THIS CONNECTION NOT KNOWN.

ACCORDING TO WILLIAMS, HE, ABERNATHY, AND LEE STRONGLY FEEL SAME ELEMENTS WHICH CAUSED DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS EARLIER MARCH TWENTYEIGHT MAY CAUSE PERSONAL HARM TO KING EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

[illegible]

INFORMATION FROM AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R MUST BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. MEMPHIS, HOWEVER, SHOULD ADVISE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF NOT ALREADY KNOWN THAT KING CONTEMPLATES PARTICIPATING IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT AND THAT IN VIEW OF EARLIER DISTURBANCES IN MEMPHIS ON THIS DATE, SEVERAL RANKING SCLC OFFICIALS APPREHENSIVE FOR PERSONAL WELFARE OF KING.

PAGE THREE

FOREGOING INFORMATION TELEPHONICALLY FURNISHED MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

RECEIVED: 11:39PM RM

FBI WASH DC

Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI MEMPHIS

1256AM URGENT 3-29-68 DGB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS (157-1094)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KP

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, ~~RM.~~ Racial Matter

6

RE MEMPHIS TELS, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT ACTIVITIES;

ON MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, MEMPHIS POLICE DEPT., ADVISED THAT THE MASS MARCH TO BE LED BY REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IN SUPPORT OF SANITATION WORKERS STARTED AT AROUND ELEVEN AM CST WITH ESTIMATED FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND WORKERS, MANY OF WHOM WERE NEGRO TEENAGERS. MARCH STARTED AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, LOCATED HEART OF NEGRO AREA, AND KING JOINED MARCH AFTER IT PROGRESSED ONE BLOCK. HE WALKED WITH MARCHERS TO VICINITY BEALE AND MAIN STREETS, MADE NO SPEECHES PRIOR TO MARCH, MADE NO KNOWN UTTERANCES DURING MARCH, AND BY TIME HE REACHED ABOVE POINT RAMPANT BREAKING OF STORE WINDOWS AND LOOTING WAS BEING PERPETRATED BY MARCHERS, WHEREUPON KING AND A FEW ASSOCIATES RAN TO A NEARBY CAR AND LEFT MARCH, PROCEED TO RIVERMONT MOTEL WHERE THEY REMAINED THROUGH AFTERNOON AND EVENING. BY NOON, POLICE HAD BROKEN UP CROWD, BEING FORCED TO USE TEARGAS, BUT SPORADIC LOOTING HAS CONTINUED THROUGH AFTERNOON

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1cc 110
1cc

Included in letter to White House
and Attorney General. Date

NOT RECORDED
162 APR 4 1968

70 APR 1 1968

PAGE TWO

AND EVENING, PRIMARILY CONFINED TO SOUTH CENTRAL AREA OF MEMPHIS, A PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO AREA, PRIMARY TARGET OF LOOTERS BEING LIQUOR STORES AND SMALL GROCERIES.

TENNESSEE STATE LEGISLATURE TODAY PASSED CURFEW BILL, WHICH WAS INVOKED BY MEMPHIS MAYOR HENRY LOEB, EFFECTIVE SEVEN PM, AND THIRTY FIVE HUNDRED TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARDSMEN FROM MEMPHIS AND WEST TENNESSEE ARE CURRENTLY ON DUTY IN MEMPHIS OPERATING AS TACTICAL UNITS, BEING ACCOMPANIED ON THEIR PATROLS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMPHIS PD.

SCHEDULED MASS RALLY TO FEATURE KING NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT CANCELED. AT TWELVE MIDNIGHT, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, THREE HUNDRED ARRESTS, PRIMARILY RELATING TO LOOTING AND CURFEW VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY POLICE DEPT. FOUR INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN SHOT, ONE OF THESE, A SIXTEEN YEAR OLD BOY, WAS KILLED IN ACT OF LOOTING A STORE. THREE OTHERS WERE SHOT, TWO BY POLICE OFFICERS AND ONE BY A STOREKEEPER WHILE LOOTING, NONE SERIOUSLY INJURED.

AGE THREE

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED THAT KING, RALPH ABERNATHY, AND BERNARD LEE, FAILED TO LEAVE MEMPHIS ON EASTERN FLIGHT THREE NINE EIGHT, NINE ZERO FIVE CST, DUE TO ARRIVE ATLANTA ELEVEN ZERO THREE PM EST. THIS ALSO CANCELS KING'S AND LEE'S FLIGHT FROM ATLANTA SIX TWENTY AM MARCH TWENTY NINE DUE TO ARRIVE BALTIMORE SEVEN FORTY TWO AM. INSPECTOR G. P. TINES, MEMPHIS PD, ADVISED KING PLANNING TO STAY IN MEMPHIS AT RIVERMONT HOTEL TONIGHT, FUTURE PLANS UNKNOWN AT PRESENT TIME. P.

CORR ~~PAGE TWO, PARA ONE, LINE ONE WORDS EIGHT, NINE,~~ AND TEN SHLD BE "AREA OF MEMPHIS" AND ~~LINE TWO,~~ PARA ONE, WORD FIVE ~~SHLD BE "PRIMARY"~~

PAGE ~~TWO PARA THREE,~~ LINE ONE WORD SIX SHLD BE "KING" AND LINE THREE WORD ~~THREE SHLD BE "PRIMARILY" AND A PERIOD SHLD BE BETWEEN~~ "DEPT. AND FOUR" ONEXXX ON LINE FOUR.

PAGE ~~TWO PARA~~ ONE LINE THREE WORD ONE SHLD BE "LIQUOR"

END.

HFL

FBI WASH DC cc- Mr. Trainor

P

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/18/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. A. Newman

SUBJECT: DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

During a conference on 7/16/75 between the Assistant Attorney General, J. Stanley Pottinger, and his staff and the Director of the FBI and his staff, a question arose concerning Martin Luther King's alleged moving from one hotel or motel to another hotel or motel in Memphis, Tennessee, prior to his murder on 4/4/68.

Attached is a letterhead memorandum (LHM) setting forth an inquiry including a review of all appropriate Bureau files regarding a proposal made in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 3/29/68 in connection with the counterintelligence program wherein it was recommended that information be made available to a cooperative news media source showing King to be a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on 3/28/68, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel). The LHM will reflect and document the fact that although a notation appears on the memorandum that it was "handled" there is no information available to reflect that it was ever actually given to a cooperative news source. Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh (retired), who placed the notation "handled" on the document, absolutely has no recollection of this matter nor can he state whether or not the information was disseminated.

REC-88 100-106670

The time elements as documented in this LHM would preclude the proposal contained in the 3/29/68 memorandum of having any affect upon King's cnoice of a motel in which to reside.

JUL 29 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached LHM along with attachments be disseminated to the Department.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Delivered 7/22/75 to Pottinger's office

HAN:cah (6)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 26, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore GCM

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM

PURPOSE:

To recommend item be furnished cooperative national news media source by Crime Records, designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising for the Washington Spring Project.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has now scheduled the Washington Spring Project, his "poor people's march on Washington, D. C.," for the latter part of April, 1968. King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) has sent out a mailing to 70,000 potential financial contributors. King asked these 70,000 to contribute to the Washington Spring Project for the feeding and housing of the marchers.

At the same time, churches in the Washington, D. C., area have said they will feed and house King's marchers.

SUGGESTION:

REC-0 812405

That the above facts be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division so that a story could be

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. M. Wells
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC 35

100-44806-

EX 106

5 APR 9 1968

55 Enclosure
TJD:df/dsm (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

given nation-wide circulation that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people he solicited. Since the churches have offered support, no more money is needed and any contributed would only be used by King for other purposes. This item would need nation-wide circulation in order to reach all the potential contributors and curtail their donations. A sample item is attached.

ACTION:

That the facts about King's solicitation of funds unnecessarily be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division.

Handled 4/11/68

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), today finds himself in the embarrassing position of having too much money, or at least the probability of too much money. The SCLC sent out a huge mailing to its contributors pleading for funds for the Washington Spring Project, the "poor people's march on Washington." Thousands of contributors were urged to support the march financially in order to feed and house the demonstrators. But the churches in the Washington, D. C., area have offered to house and feed the demonstrators.

Now the contributions are beginning to roll in from the mailing and King doesn't need the money. An embarrassment of riches has befallen King, who will only use the money for other purposes. The churches had better come through with all the housing and support the demonstrators need, because there will be little money left for the "poor people" by the time the march rolls around.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-448006- 8 ?

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 8C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
[illegible]
[illegible]
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

B

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: ① SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
RACIAL MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

A sanitation workers strike has been going on in Memphis for some time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis. King was in an automobile preceding the marchers. As the march developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke out including the breaking of windows in stores and some looting.

This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called nonviolence advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience for Washington in April.

REC-19
EX-105
157-9146-38
5 APR 2 1968

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ACTION:

Attached is a blind memorandum pointing ~~out the~~ above, which if you approve, should be made available by Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources. (on a strictly confidential basis)

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

TDR:fhd (6)

W.C.S.

OK
H

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Deakin

REC-D
F B I

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Deakin

5 APR 1968

~~APR 11 1968~~

AUG 30 1968

RACIAL INT. SECT.

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, injected himself into the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and the result of King's famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism, looting, and riot.

Previously, King involved himself in this strike, called for a general strike, and called for a mass march. Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of the line. Negroes began shouting "black power" and trouble began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and looting broke out.

Police officers were forced to use gas to break up the march and to control the crowd. It was necessary to activate the National Guard. Martin Luther King claims his much-heralded march on Washington, scheduled for April 22, 1968, will also be "nonviolent." He says he has persuaded militant black nationalists to abandon violent extremism in Washington, D. C., during the march. Memphis may only be the prelude to civil strife in our Nation's Capitol.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

157-9146-38

ENCLOSURE

~~157-~~ [illegible]

XEROX
APR 4 1968

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
D HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
RT, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 25, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

I would appreciate your making available to the Committee the following items in connection with our investigation of the King matter:

1. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between one Val Coleman and Special Agent Harold Linebaugh or any other FBI Headquarters officials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

2. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between any FBI Headquarters officials and any representatives of the news media concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

3. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to a meeting between Ralph Abernathy and either FBI Director Hoover or Cartha DeLoach during December 1964 or January 1965 (other than the December 1, 1964 meeting which was attended by Dr. King and the January 11, 1965 meeting which was attended by Andrew Young).

4. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to the following statement which appears in the second paragraph of the September 11, 1964 memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - Communist":

RECEIVED
DEC 1 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1210X

On that occasion Assistant Director DeLoach's office was able to take appropriate action to forestall the publication of the article.

5. The 7/16/64 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan which is noted in handwriting at the bottom of the second page of the July 15, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

6. With respect to the March 29, 1968 memorandum, with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" please provide:

a. Access to original of this memorandum and its enclosure;

b. Access to all extant "tickler" and/any other copies of this memorandum and its attachment in their original form;

c. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memorandum. ~~(This should include any and all information adduced, collected, and/or prepared in connection with Mr. James Adams' testimony on this subject before the Senate Select Committee on November 18, 1975.)~~

d. All memoranda and any other materials received from FBI field offices or written at FBI Headquarters prior to and pertaining to the recommendation contained in the March 29, 1968 memorandum.

7. With respect to the memorandum with enclosure, from W. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 26, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)", please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

8. With respect to a memorandum with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan, dated 3/28/68, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

9. Responses to Items 6, 7, and 8 should include copies of all newspaper clippings or magazine articles contained in FBI files which contain information set forth in the memoranda and/or enclosures identified in Items 6, 7, and 8 above.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 1, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated November 25, 1975, requesting various information regarding the King matter. Please prepare an appropriate response to this request.

EX-110

cc: Paul Daly

REC-60

62-116395-1210X

7 MAR 5 1976

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CG

5-PM

1-Ad Hoc
12-3-75

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 11/28/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY

Removed By 7 9 JAN 1 1976

File Number 62-116395-1210

Permanent Serial Charge Out

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

The Attorney General

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP3ALMKP

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum, with attachment, concerning an interview of former FBI Assistant Director Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum, with attachment, for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Your specific attention is invited to certain information relating to the interview of Wick suggestive of improprieties on the part of an SSC Staff Member. The facts, as known to this Bureau, are as follows.

Wick first contacted this Bureau concerning the interview by telephone on November 5, 1975, to advise that he had been called on October 31, 1975, by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein representing the SSC. Epstein requested Wick to come to Washington, D. C., for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his "employment." Epstein did not further describe the subject matter of the interview and an appointment was arranged for November 7, 1975. Wick said that he was uncertain as to the probable subject matter of the interview because other matters coming within his responsibilities as Vice President of Pan American World Airways which were unrelated to the FBI, have been of recent interest to the SSC. Wick asked for advice of the FBI concerning this matter. Thereupon, the Legal Counsel Division of this Bureau contacted Epstein and determined that the subject matter of the interview of Wick would be Martin Luther King, Jr. A return call was made to Wick on November 5, 1975, to advise him that this Bureau had learned that the subject matter of the interview would be Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395-1209X

REC-51

3 JAN 13 1976

1 - 67 (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

SFP:mjg
(11)

2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

✓ S.F. Phillips
4043

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JAN 20 1976

On November 6, 1975, Wick again telephoned this Bureau and advised that he had been rather annoyed at Epstein's initial approach to him; particularly, because Wick had tried on more than one occasion during the telephone conversation with Epstein to pry from Epstein the subject matter of the interview but Epstein persisted in not advising him.

This Bureau's representative who had determined from Epstein on November 5, 1975, the subject matter of the interview has advised that when he made the inquiry of Epstein, he asked Epstein why he had not told Wick the subject matter. Epstein's reply was that Wick had not asked him, a statement directly contradictory to Wick's advice to this Bureau.

The second suggested impropriety is that Epstein contacted Wick prior to advising this Bureau of his intention to interview Wick, an action which is contrary to procedures which have been agreed upon between the SSC and this Bureau.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
               Special Counsel for
                 Intelligence Coordination

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

62-116395

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S.F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (AD) ROBERT WICK
BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KO

This memorandum concerns an interview of former FBI AD Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members.

On November 5, 1975, Wick advised this Bureau that on October 31, 1975, he had been contacted by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein of the SSC who requested Wick to come to Washington for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his employment. Epstein did not further describe the subject matter although Wick attempted to obtain such information from Epstein.

Upon receipt of the above information from Wick, this Bureau determined from Epstein that the subject matter was to be Martin Luther King, Jr., and that fact was relayed to Wick on November 5, 1975. Wick was also told that he was being released from his secrecy agreement with the FBI for the purpose of the interview, confined to the indicated subject matter. Wick was also advised by this Bureau that he was not required to answer questions falling within four privileged areas: matters pertaining to pending investigations; information from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies; information concerning sensitive methods and techniques; and information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources.

Attached hereto is a copy of a MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE dated November 12, 1975, which Wick voluntarily furnished this Bureau and which represents his report pertaining to the interview.

Enclosure

1 - 67- (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SFP:mjg (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-1209

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Assistant Director (AD)
Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members

NOTE:

Information relating to contacts between Wick and this Bureau are reported in memoranda 11/5/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," and 11/7/75 from W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall "Senstudy 75." Wick's statement, MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE, was mailed to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The matter of improprieties was addressed specifically in the above 11/7/75 Cregar memorandum and it is believed that the Department should be made aware of this matter.

Let & LHM to AG
[illegible] Encl

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	x	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former Assistant Director Robert Wick

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interviewed regarding his knowledge of the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Apl

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

76-10019

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
~~Telephone Rm.~~ ____
Director Sec'y ____

F B I

Date: 12/9/75

Transmit the following in ________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION & ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

FROM: ADIC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243)

RE: SENSTUDY; TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS, AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR W. RAYMOND WANNALL 12/2/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/(?)

Re Los Angeles phone call to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS, 12/9/75.

On 12/3/75, the attached article appeared in the Los Angeles Times under the byline of reporter JACK NELSON. As indicated, the headline and lead paragraph which supposedly is based on ADAMS' testimony, clearly reflects that the FBI did nothing to prevent Klan violence although we knew of the contemplated violence. After discussing this matter with Mr. ADAMS and reviewing the actual testimony received in the Los Angeles Division on 12/8/75, SAC ELMER F. LINBERG and I met with Editor BILL THOMAS and National Editor ED GUTHMAN at the Los Angeles Times.

I advised these gentlemen that I was aghast when I read the headlines and the lead paragraph of this article and could not believe that JIM ADAMS did not refute informant ROWE's testimony that we took no action relative to contemplated violence since I knew that this was contrary to the rules, regulations, policy, and philosophy of the FBI in 1960. I then called Mr. ADAMS in Washington, D. C., and he likewise, was upset over the headline and lead paragraph,

ENCLOSURE

EX-112

REC-38

62-116395-1209

2 - 3 - Bureau (1 Encl)
1 - Los Angeles
REG:mmb
(4)

17 DEC 12 1975

JAN 7 1976

Approved: ________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ________ M Per ________

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

because, according to ADAMS, he completely refuted these statements in that we did disseminate the contemplated plans of violence to the Birmingham Police Department and to the Department of Justice in the form of a letterhead memorandum.

I continued that I waited until I received the actual transcript of testimony and told the gentlemen that upon my review of the testimony of Mr. ADAMS and Mr. WANNALL, I could not reconcile the headline and lead paragraph with such testimony. I then proceeded to read several excerpts from the testimony.

I advised Mr. THOMAS and Mr. GUTHMAN that my immediate reaction was to prepare a "Letter to the Editor" but felt after a re-analysis of the situation that this is not a judgment question on the part of the newspaper, but one of a slanted, inaccurate story either by design or through misunderstanding. I therefore felt that the Los Angeles Times, if it so desired, should be in a position to correct the situation itself based on the facts.

Mr. THOMAS expressed appreciation for my approach and stated that at the time he read the article, already printed, a question came to his mind as to why the FBI did not advise someone or take some action relative to contemplated violence. He, however, took no further action. He said in view of what I had read from excerpts of Mr. ADAMS' testimony and the now available complete transcript of the testimony, he intends to pursue this matter further and would prefer not to have a "letter to the Editor", but rather correct any inaccuracies on the part of the Los Angeles Times through their own pursuit of further inquiring concerning this story.

Mr. GUTHMAN concurred with Mr. THOMAS and they indicated that it appears the obvious question is based on Mr. ADAMS' testimony of who in the Department of Justice received this information relative to contemplated violence and what did such a responsible Department of Justice official do with the information. He agreed that based on the information furnished to them, the FBI has been done an injustice but that they, the Los Angeles Times, desired to pursue this matter further.

It should be noted the article of JACK NELSON is based on one specific situation, namely the testimony of former informant GARY ROWE that he had furnished advance information to the FBI to the effect that members of the Ku Klux Klan would be given the opportunity to beat members of the Freedom Riders without interference by law enforcement authorities for approximately 15 minutes after which the local law enforcement authorities would take action, and that the FBI was advised of this well in advance of such beatings and furthermore, the FBI took no action to prevent this violence.

Took No Action to Prevent Klan Violence, FBI Admits

BY JACK NELSON
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—An FBI official conceded Tuesday that the bureau had failed to use an undercover man's information to head off Ku Klux Klan violence in Alabama in the 1960s.

But, the official, James B. Adams, assistant to the director, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the FBI was "just as frustrated as anyone else" at "rank lawlessness" that existed in Alabama at that time. Also, he said, the FBI is an investigative agency and has no enforcement powers.

Adams' defense of the FBI came immediately after Gary Thomas Rowe Jr., wearing a hood to conceal his features, testified that on many occasions he had warned the bureau of the klan's plans for violence, but that the violence occurred without official interference.



WITNESS—Gary Thomas Rowe Jr. wears hood while testifying.
AP Wirephoto

Rowe served six years as an FBI undercover agent before surfacing in 1965 as the star witness against three klansmen accused of killing a white civil rights worker in Lowndes County, Ala. Since then he has been living in Southern California under an assumed name.

Please Turn to Page 6, Col. 1

KLAN VIOLENCE

Continued from First Page

Rowe was one of two former undercover operatives who testified before the committee Tuesday. The other, Mary Jo Cook of Buffalo, N.Y., told of supplying the FBI with information about 1,000 persons while serving as an informant against the Vietnam Veterans Against the War during 1973-74.

Testimony by both witnesses prompted committee members to criticize FBI tactics and to suggest that legal restraints be put on future FBI activities.

Sen. Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), commenting on testimony by Rowe that he engaged in klan violence with the knowledge and approval of the FBI, observed that the bureau's infiltration of the klan not only failed to prevent violence, "but indeed may have contributed to it."

Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-Mont.) told Adams that the FBI had bungled its job in investigating political activities and added:

"It has interfered with civil liberties and finally in the last month or two through its public disclosures has heaped shame upon itself and really led toward the undermining of crucial public confidence essential to law enforcement agencies in the country."

Mondale criticized the FBI for trying to "protect people from subversive and dangerous ideas," and he told Adams:

"Time and time again, we're going to protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous. We're going to protect veterans from whatever it is, we're going to protect the (National) Council of Churches from veterans and so on . . .

"Don't you agree with me that we've got to control this, restrain it, define it, so that precisely what's expected of the FBI is known by you and by the public and you can justify your actions when we ask you?"

Adams disagreed that the FBI had bungled in the political intelligence field but agreed that restraining legislation was in order.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Los Angeles Times

12/3/75

62-116395-1209

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 12-3-75

FROM : T. J. JENKINS

SUBJECT: GARY T. ROWE
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE

On 12-3-75 an individual who identified himself as Garland Reeves of the Birmingham, Alabama, News, called and he advised that he understood I was the Special Agent in Charge of the Birmingham Office at the time the bus was burned with the Freedom Riders in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1961. He stated that he would like to know if Rowe had furnished us information that the Birmingham Police were going to wait 15 or 30 minutes to go to the bus station in order to give the Klan an opportunity to work over the Freedom Riders. I informed Reeves that I recalled no such information being furnished to us at that time. I told him that all information we received concerning possible violence was furnished to the Birmingham Police Department. He wanted to know, if there had been such an agreement what action would I take. I told him that if I determined that the police department would not take any action for 15 or 30 minutes I would advise the Mayor ~~and~~ of the city and the Police Commissioner and if they felt the same as the police department, I would then advise the Governor of the State.

EX 104 REC 4 62-116395-1208

He wanted to know what would be the FBI's position at that time if the police department refused to take any action. I told him that we did not have jurisdiction in matters of this nature, that they were purely local and it was the responsibility of the local authorities to handle such matters. He desired to know if I would call out the Federal Marshals. I informed him that the FBI did not have any authority to call upon the Federal Marshals in a situation of this nature but if such a situation arose, I would have immediately notified our headquarters in Washington, who would have ~~notified the~~ Department of Justice, who would have such authority.

7 DEC 16 1975

I told him that while I was in Birmingham as Special Agent in Charge we kept the Bureau headquarters in Washington completely informed of all developments and they in turn, kept the Department of Justice informed.

ACTION: Submitted for information.

TJJ:pmd (5)
1 - Mr. Adams 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMK9

59 DEC 30 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

WRW/LAC

FBI

Date: 12/4/75

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714)

SENSTUDY 75

Re San Diego telephone call to Bureau, 12/4/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of a letterhead memorandum reflecting information received in the San Diego Office concerning GARY THOMAS ROWE, Jr.

Deputy SCOTT BOIES of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office was contacted and advised that if he felt he recognized ROWE that he should not discuss the matter openly with anyone in that ROWE was obviously attempting to protect his identity. Deputy BOIES was not advised that ROWE was identical with THOMAS NEIL MOORE.

extra cc destroyed

(2) - Bureau (Encs - 8)
1 - San Diego

DCS:pgh
(3)

1 - The Attorney General
1 - (1 - Senate [illegible] C[illegible])
Not sent

REC-100

62-116395-1206X

DEC ~~5~~ 2-6 1975

UNREC COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Letter to [illegible] Memo
12/[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/gp

Approved: RLM/[illegible]
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
December 4, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: GARY THOMAS ROWE, JR.

At 11:30 p.m. on December 2, 1975, Deputy Sheriff Scott Boies of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office, Lemon Grove, California Sub-Station, telephonically contacted the San Diego FBI Office and advised as follows:

Deputy Boies stated that he recognized the voice of the man identified as Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who is testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on the Ku Klux Klan. He stated he heard Mr. Rowe talk on a news broadcast and recognized him as being an individual he knows as Thomas Neil Moore. Deputy Boies furnished Moore's date of birth as August 15, 1933, and an address of 580 "L" Street, Chula Vista, California, where Moore resided in 1971. Deputy Boies stated that Moore worked for Western Bureau of Investigation, headquartered in Los Angeles and worked as a security guard for the White Front Department Store, Chula Vista, California.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KP

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-1206X

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

December 12, 1975

Director, FBI

REC-100 62-116395-1206X

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. Klein

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to my November 26, 1975, letter to you enclosing among other material, a memorandum concerning former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is a copy of a memorandum dated December 4, 1975, regarding Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., received by FBI Headquarters from our San Diego field office.

Rowe, is a former informant who testified before the SSC on December 2, 1975, regarding his role in supplying information to the FBI regarding Ku Klux Klan activities in Alabama. He has been utilizing the cover name, Thomas Neil Moore.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the December 4, 1975, memorandum.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 137-6295

SK:klm
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 137-6295

No. 1 SENT TO SSC PER STEVE BLACKHURST, USDS 3-23-76

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 FEB 12 1976

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Above being furnished to the Attorney General and the SSC in order to apprise them of information reflecting that Rowe, who testified with a mask over his face, was identified by a San Diego Deputy Sheriff after hearing Rowe's voice on a news broadcast. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/4/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TESTIMONY BY THE DIRECTOR
DECEMBER 9, 1975

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO CHANGE
THE NAME OF THE J. EDGAR HOOVER
FBI BUILDING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY [illegible]

In connection with the Director's appearance on December 9, 1975, to testify before captioned committee, it is possible that he may be asked concerning recent proposals in the Congress to change the name of the building. Three bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives on December 1, 1975, for that purpose. H.R. 10905, introduced by Congressman Gude of Maryland and H.R. 10918, introduced by Congresswoman Schroeder of Colorado, would change the name of the building to "FBI Building." H.R. 10916, introduced by Congressman Rangel of New York, would change the name to "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building." All three of the bills were referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House, the chairman of which is Congressman Jones of Alabama.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information of the Director in connection with his preparation for testimony.

EX 104 REC-9 62-116395-1206

Enc.

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Mintz

DEC 16 1975

COPY FILED IN

JAM:mfd
(6)

XEROX
DEC 19 1975

84 DEC 3 0 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mr. GUDE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" wherever it appears in such section and inserting in lieu thereof "F.B.I. Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

By Mr. GUDE

DECEMBER 1, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mrs. SCHROEDER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Public Law 92–520 is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 8. The Federal building in the block bounded by Ninth Street Northwest, Tenth Street Northeast, E Street Northwest, and Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest, in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter be known as the 'F.B.I. Building'. Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, record, or other paper of the United States to such

Federal building shall be held to be a reference to the 'F.B.I. Building' ".

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

By Mrs. SCHROEDER

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mr. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" both times it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

By Mr. RANGEL

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Stack
1 - Mr. McWright

Mr. Jenkins 11/28/75

J. Cochran, Jr.

REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

Separately

Re memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11/21/75, advising that representatives of captioned Senate Subcommittee desire to review any Bureau documents relating to the Bureau's interest in or use of drugs during interrogation.

It was pointed out in referenced memo that captioned Subcommittee staff members James F. Michie and Thomas M. Susman had obtained information from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning a program coordinated between DOD, CIA, and FBI to develop a truth serum. The program apparently began in early 1950 and D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory had knowledge of this activity.

The information that Michie and Susman have obtained apparently relates to a Navy drug experimentation project from 1947 to 1954. Navy files indicated that the FBI was aware of this program and Mr. C. D. DeLoach and D. J. Parsons were mentioned.

A review of Bureau files disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the Navy drug project. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-2699-

62-2699

Enclosure

① 62-116395 ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Adams
2 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Hotis)
(Attn: Mr. Miller)
3 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. W. O. Cregar)
(Attn: Mr. T. D. J. Brooks)
(Attn: Mr. V. H. Weimar)

CGM:bms
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

CONTINUED - OVER

NOT RECORDED
46 FEB 5 1976

84 FEB 9 1976

might be used to great advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50.

Memorandum dated 11/6/75 from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall is attached which sets forth details of our review of Navy files on this project, including a Bureau press release which was to have been made in the event that the Navy mentioned the FBI in their press release on this matter.

A review of Bureau files for information relating to drugs designed to modify behavior indicates an interest dating back to 1922. However, this interest has not extended to the point where the Bureau has conducted research on behavior modifying drugs nor has it funded such research. We have maintained liaison with other agencies, primarily the U. S. Army, and industrial organizations in order to be aware of developments in this area.

On 7/30/74, Laboratory and Training Division representatives met with representatives of the Biomedical and Chemical Laboratories of Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, to discuss the potential use of incapacitating chemical agents in hostage situations. Although we have developed an awareness of various agents which may be used in these situations, we have not conducted any research with these agents. Memoranda on this matter are located in Bufile 80-807.

A single instance occurred where "truth serum" was administered in a Bureau case. Truth serum was administered to Thurman Scruggs Wilkins at his own request while being interviewed in the Los Angeles Office, April 26, 1947. Wilkins was allegedly involved with one Ignacy Samuel Witczak, the subject of a Soviet espionage case (100-343077). The actual drug used was sodium amytal and the actual administration was done by a physician. Prior Bureau authority was not obtained by the Los Angeles Office in connection with this incident. SAC Hood submitted a letter of explanation to the Bureau on July 2, 1947. This incident resulted in the following information being set forth in SAC Letter 84-47 dated July 3, 1947:

"The Bureau will not tolerate any experiments or participation on the part of its personnel in the utilization of the so called truth serums or other chemicals alleged to have a similar effect. ---- consequently, in the event any Bureau agent violates these instructions, drastic administrative action will be taken."

There was nothing found in Bureau files that would indicate that we have received any documents from CIA concerning their drug research programs. The files do reflect that we were aware that CIA was conducting research with lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and that British Intelligence had successfully utilized LSD on several Russian espionage agents. The information concerning CIA and British activities is set out for the benefit of the Director only and cannot be released outside the Bureau.

There are two Bureau files which contain most of the information relating to the immediate area of interest of the captioned Senate Subcommittee. These files are 62-2699 (Truth Serums) and 80-645 (Chemical Munitions and Gases). Pertinent serials may also be found in 80-807 and 100-343077 as previously noted in this memorandum.

I see no reason why Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman should not be afforded an oral briefing regarding these matters, and if necessary make pertinent serials of Bufiles 62-2699, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077 available to them for review.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman be advised by Legal Counsel that available Bureau records and interview with current knowledgeable employee indicate the FBI has never engaged in nor funded anyone's efforts in research and/or development programs in the use or effect of drugs on human behavior. They should be advised our efforts in this regard as far as can be established from the available records consists of following through liaison contacts with other government agencies and the private sector sources the current developments in behavior modifying drugs.

(2) That if they desire to pursue this matter further, SA McWright and myself be permitted to meet with Michie and Susman to (a) reaffirm the information in recommendation #1 and (b) if necessary, to produce for their inspection pertinent serials from 62-6299, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. J. Cochran

11/6/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. C. G. McWright
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

This is to inform you that on 11/7/75 Defense Department will release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC), the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures (Senator Edward M. Kennedy's committee), and to the press, information concerning Navy projects from 1947 to 1954 involving drug experimentation; a Navy file indicates FBI was aware of programs but Laboratory has no knowledge of any active participation by Bureau personnel.

On 11/4/75, Clark McGruder, Assistant to Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Director of Naval Intelligence, informed me that on 11/7/75 the Navy was going to release to aforementioned committees and the press information on drug experimentation and that the FBI was mentioned in the pertinent files. Those files were reviewed at the Pentagon on 11/6/75 by Supervisor J. P. Thomas of INTD. They had been classified "Secret" and "Top Secret" but now have been completely declassified. FBI was mentioned in connection with three projects. There are no FBI documents in the files.

A memorandum dated 9/21/50 from Mr. Alberti to Mr. C. D. DeLoach was a receipt signed by Mr. DeLoach for one copy of "Drugs Stated To Have Been Used By Russians And Germans In Interrogation Techniques." Alberti is identified elsewhere in the file as Jack H. Alberti, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), who apparently coordinated the projects mentioned in the file. The purpose of one project was to develop a speech-inducing drug to obtain intelligence from interrogees and the project began in 1947.

Enclosures
62-116395

CONTINUED
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

A memorandum dated 8/15/~~75~~ 50 on letterhead of Office of Chief of Naval Operations concerned "Top Secret Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI) Project on Speech-Inducing Drugs," reported a meeting on 8/11/50 attended by personnel of NMRI, CIA, Office of Naval Research (ONR), a drug company representative and Mr. DeLoach and Mr. D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the FBI on a CIA project on narco-hypnosis and on the NMRI project. Parsons reportedly said the FBI had no such project, but had information on the experiences of various police departments in the United States with speech-inducing drugs. He agreed to make the FBI information available to NMRI and CIA. ONR agreed to give FBI, NMRI and CIA a study by ONR on projected research to improve polygraph reliability. Recipients were to give their comments and recommendations on the study to ONR. At the meeting NMRI gave DeLoach an 8/11/50 NMRI progress report on its project. Parsons agreed to look into the possibility of getting volunteers from prisoners in Federal institutions and to supply NMRI with canabis (marijuana) and heroin to the extent they might be available to the FBI. It is noted that no FBI representatives were listed in the memorandum reporting a 9/27/50 meeting of this group and there is no further record in the file of FBI participation. Neither is there any record that the FBI supplied any drugs for the project.

Material regarding project "CHATTER" included a carbon copy of a rough draft memorandum (no letterhead) bearing the penciled date "11/50?" which contained the following, "Since 1947 the Department of the Navy has carried on a project in coordination with the Departments of the Air Force and Army, CIA and FBI for the development of speech-inducing drugs.... The Directors of Intelligence of the three Services, of CIA and FBI consider this project

CONTINUED - OVER

of utmost important and urgency to... fulfillment of their missions for the security of the United States." The memorandum says that a project submitted to ONR by Professor Richard Wendt of the University of Rochester (NY) had been approved by all the agencies involved and recommended funding the project. The file indicates subsequently that this project did go forward and involve human experimentation.

~~The second~~ Another file dealt with project "CALLING CARD," 1952-1953, designed "to render an individual subservient to impose(will or control." FBI was not mentioned.

80-5 (Polygraph file) relates only to instrumental detection of deception

A memorandum dated 9/5/50 for Mr. D. J. Parsons, FBI; C. Edwards, CIA; and Captain Wilbur E. Kellum of Naval Medical Research, from W. S. Post, Jr. (not further identified), informed them that a copy of the report on the "Ellson" project (University of Indiana, 1952) was being forwarded to them for information. The project involved research in the detection of deception. The addressees were to be briefed by Professor D. G. Ellson of Indiana University on the project at a future date. The file did not show that the briefing occurred. The project was terminated in June, 1952.

The two files reviewed contained many reports of research conducted concerning various drugs in various parts of the world, constituting a collection of papers on the subject by U. S. and foreign researchers.

A review of logical Bureau files by the Laboratory Division disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the above. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which might be used to great

CONTINUED - OVER

advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50. (Navy memorandum on this meeting set out above.)

We have received a memorandum dated 11/4/75 from Defense describing the proposed release of Navy information to the committees and to the press. Copy of that memorandum and of the press release are attached. The release says that "Liaison was maintained with... the FBI" concerning the drug research ~~release.~~

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

PRESS RELEASE
NOVEMBER 7, 1975

The press statement released by the Navy today relating to its drug research on human subjects for the period 1947 through 1954 indicates liaison concerning this project was maintained by the Navy with other Governmental agencies, including the FBI.

A thorough review of FBI files has disclosed one document relating to this Navy research: a short internal memorandum, dated August 4, 1950. This memorandum, prepared by a member of the Liaison staff at FBI Headquarters, recorded that a Navy official had invited FBI representatives to a conference in the Washington area to "discuss the usage of truth serum in Intelligence circles," and that the Navy had made advances in developing a new drug which "could be utilized to a great advantage in the questioning of espionage agents." A handwritten notation on this memorandum directed that a representative of the FBI Laboratory was to attend this conference on August 11, 1950.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KO

No further identifiable reference to Navy drug development research is contained in FBI files. No record can be located that liaison was being maintained with the Navy regarding this program, or that the FBI had knowledge of this program prior to the date of the above memorandum.

ENCLOSURE

~~ENCLOSURE~~ 62-116395

The FBI was not involved in any way in this Navy drug research, and the FBI has never participated in research with drugs designed to modify human behavior, nor has it funded such research.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

December 24, 1975

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

ST 115

Director, FBI

REC-51

62-116395-1204X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is in response to the SSC letter dated December 18, 1975, wherein Senators Mondale and Baker requested rather detailed information to be made available during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

It is noted that most of the requests in this letter are so ambiguous that they require clarification from the SSC before the FBI can logically respond. In one instance, there is no way this Bureau could respond short of obtaining the recollections of Bureau Supervisors who worked in the Intelligence Division extending back almost 20 years. Because of this, we are attaching for your approval and forwarding to the SSC the original of a memorandum which delineates the problems attendant to the request of December 18, 1975, and, in most instances, requests a meeting between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, SSC, and representatives of this Bureau in the hope that some alternatives or clarifications can be developed. A copy of the memorandum is furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

WOC:lhb
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2AMK

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JAN 28 1976

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The request of 12/18/75 was received in the Intelligence Division in the midafternoon of 12/22/75. A conference was held on the morning of 12/23/75 of pertinent Division personnel in an effort to identify the problems connected with responding to this request. It is believed that the only way the Bureau can logically respond to the request is by obtaining clarifications and, in some instances, alternatives to the requests set out.

We have already determined that both John Elliff and the SSC Counsel, F. A. O. Schwartz, are out of the city for the holidays. The Legal Counsel Division has left word with Mr. Schwartz and/or Mr. Elliff to call SA Paul Daly upon their return to the city.

Copy of 12/18/75 request attached.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J, G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

62-116395

December 24, 1975

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM SENATORS
MONDALE AND BAKER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On December 22, 1975, this Bureau received a copy of a letter dated December 18, 1975, which Senators Mondale and Baker sent to the Attorney General levying certain requirements on the FBI with a request that the responses be provided the SSC during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

Item 1 requested access to materials in the investigative files for a six-month period preceding acts of violence which were prevented by actions taken by the FBI. The specific preventive actions were set out in some detail in a memorandum prepared for the SSC by the FBI dated December 10, 1975.

Upon receipt of referenced letter, the Intelligence Division initiated efforts to isolate the files documenting these preventive actions. The Bureau's response of December 10, 1975, was predicated on a review of the pertinent inspection reports of the Intelligence Division. These reports do not document by file number the individual preventive actions. To locate specific files, it will be necessary to have knowledgeable Intelligence Division personnel queried in an effort to try to match the preventive action with a particular investigative file. In some instances,

WOC:lhb/lhb
(11)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-1204X

JAN

WOB

GPO : 1975 O - 569-9?

there will be no investigative file but merely a communication from a field office reporting information furnished by a source of the FBI on which some preventive action was predicated. It is possible that the acts of violence reported by the source could involve a violation over which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction. In such cases, the local field office would have merely furnished the information to the appropriate law enforcement agency and no investigative file would exist.

We are continuing our efforts to attempt to isolate those files which document preventive actions. However, because of the problems attendant thereto, as well as those problems raised in the subparagraphs of Item 1, it is recommended that a meeting be arranged between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, and representatives of this Bureau to discuss possible alternatives to some of these requests.

Items 2 and 3 concern the September 24, 1975, report to the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office. The FBI is in the process of preparing a response and it will be made available to the Committee as soon as possible. However, it is noted that the FBI prepared no analysis at all on the findings of the General Accounting Office contained in their report of September 24, 1975.

Item 4 requests the annual reports from the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968, and the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that organization was under investigation. Item 4 also requests annual reports available on the investigations "about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28."

There were no annual reports submitted by the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968. With regard to the Women's Liberation Movement, the SSC has been provided copies of all pertinent reports for the years the organization was under investigation. In an effort to clarify what is meant by the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to Mr. John Elliff's request of October 28, 1975, it is again proposed that a meeting with Mr. Elliff be arranged to clarify this ambiguity.

Item 5 requests specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV of the Department of Justice's guidelines draft on "Domestic Security Investigations."

The indices of this Bureau are not organized to enable retrieval of information of a "preventive action" character or examples of FBI actions taken to prevent violence. The retrieval of such information from FBI files, other than that described in the response to Item 1, would require extensive review and/or dependence on the recollection of individuals of occurrences extending back almost 20 years. It is suggested that, during the proposed meeting with Mr. John Elliff, this request be discussed.

Item 6 requests access to all FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1, through April 4, 1968.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

It is this Bureau's belief that all pertinent material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, through April 4, 1968, has been made available to the SSC responsive to previous requests. With regard to the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, it is not clear whether the letter is requesting access to the entire FBI file on these two activities from the period January 1, through April 4, 1968. It is recommended that a clarification of this request can be accomplished during the previously proposed meeting between Mr. John Elliff and representatives of the FBI.

Item 7 requests all materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

A check of indices of the FBI regarding "Project Overshoe," as well as the word Overshoe, fails to contain any reference to either. Without additional information regarding "Project Overshoe," this Bureau cannot be responsive to this specific request. Again, it is suggested that, during the forthcoming meeting with John Elliff, clarification of "Project Overshoe" be obtained.

1 - The Attorney General

5-1 (Rev. 3-21-73)

Intelligence Division

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

Attached is a request from Senators Mondale and Baker of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated 12/18/75. The Director has requested he be advised regarding the status of this request.

Attached is a copy of a letter to the AG and LHM for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb

CONTINUED - OVER

(Rev. 3)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ______
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. ______
Inspection ____
Intell. _____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y ___

Intelligence Division

ED

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

ched is a request from Senators nd Baker of the Senate Select (SSC) dated 12/18/75. The has requested he be advised the status of this request.

ched is a copy of a letter to the M for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb CONTINUED - OVER

estimate when we will complete Item 4.

Item 5 has been reduced to the recollection of Bureau Supervisor David Ryan who handled the COINTELPRO matter and will not require research beyond what SA Ryan can recall. (Ryan is currently developing a response to this request.)

Item 6 has been reduced to all materials relating to the Poor People's Campaign, the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennesee, and Martin Luther King, Jr., contained in Headquarters files between the period 1/1-4/4/68. (We are currently working on this request.)

Item 7 - Epstein has agreed to obtain more identifying data regarding Project Overshoe and we are awaiting this information.

WOC

~~SECRET~~

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall — for Handle
Sensitive
Sel T [illegible] 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X

8 JAN [illegible] 1976

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

RECEIVED

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall — Handle
Senstudy
Sel T fav 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X
5 JAN 26 1976
18

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

RECEIVED
ENCLOSURE

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

~~SECRET~~

provided during the last week of December and the first week of January:

1. With respect to each of the examples of effective prevention of violence provided the Committee pursuant to John Elliff's letter of November 26 to Mr. Shaheen, please provide access to materials in the investigative file for the 6-month period preceding the act of violence prevented. Please deliver:

(a) All materials relating to the legal and factual predicate for each investigation;

(b) The first investigative report disseminated outside the FBI in each such case, and a list of recipients of that report;

(c) The total number of individuals whose names were referred to the FBI's general name index in the course of each investigation;

(d) The total number of individuals about whom information was obtained through informants, confidential sources, physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and other sensitive techniques; and

(e) The annual report from the office of origin for each such investigation to FBI headquarters for the last five years during which the case in question was an open investigation.

2. Please provide any information which you have refuting the suggestion made on page 34 of the General Accounting Office's September 24 report to the House Judiciary Committee, that cases in which violence can be predicted probably represent less than 2% of all FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

3. Please provide all memoranda or analyses prepared for the Justice Department, Director Kelley, or Assistant Director Wannall on the findings of the General Accounting Office as presented to the House Judiciary Committee on September 24.

4. Please provide the annual report from the office of origin to FBI headquarters for the investigation of

~~SECRET~~

Dr. Martin Luther King in 1963 through 1968, and for the investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that that organization was under investigation, and the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28.

5. Please provide specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV on "preventive action" of the draft Department of Justice's guidelines on "domestic security investigations."

6. Access to all FBI materials pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor People's Campaign, and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1 through April 4, 1968.

7. All materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this request. We look forward to continuing cooperation on this area of joint concern.

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale

Walter F. Mondale
Chairman

Howard W. Baker, Jr.
Vice-Chairman

~~SECRET~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/24/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). (12/18/75 Letter to the Attorney General from Senators Mondale & Baker)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 12-30-75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KP

62-116395-1204X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/24/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/18/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Requesting clarification of items listed in request received from Senators Mondale and Bakerregarding preventive actions; 9/24/75 report of the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office; Annual reports from the office of origin to FBIHQs for investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; pertinent materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1/1 thru 4/4/68 previously made available. Clarification with regard to Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tenn; "Project Overshoe."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

62-116395-1204X

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
(Mr. G. S. McMichael)

12/17/75

1 - Mr. J. Cochran
(Mr. F. M. Devine)
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Mr. W. R. Wannall

J. G. Deegan

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This informative memorandum to record unsuccessful efforts to pinpoint the typewriter on which was typed an anonymous letter apparently directed to subject, the original of which was located in papers left behind on the retirement of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan.

Examination of the questioned document by the Laboratory established that the typing was done on a Royal typewriter with pica style type. We checked available inventory records maintained by the Administrative Division as well as our own in INTD to locate all Royal typewriters which were in the then Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) around 1964. This search was based on the suspicion that the note was typed by Sullivan on a typewriter accessible to him in 1964 when he was Assistant Director of the DID.

Our checks revealed that there are available only four typewriters of the type sought which were likely in the DID in 1964. All four are presently in INTD and three of them were readily eliminated as not identical to that which produced the questioned document on the basis that all three have closed "4s", whereas the questioned document has an open ended "4". The fourth typewriter, serial number KMG 13-4320918, is maintained in room 4410 and charged to the IS-2 Section. It was examined by Supervisor F. M. Devine of the Document Section of the Laboratory who advised that it is not identical to the typewriter which produced the questioned document.

100-106670

(1) - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75) 0

SFP:blb
(10)

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/YP

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 DEC 29 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Martin Luther King, Jr.
100-106670

We are conducting no further inquiry at this time to establish the whereabouts of the typewriter which produced the anonymous letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information and record purposes.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1st NR 1203x, 1204x, 1st NR 1204x, 1206-1210x, 1212, 1214x, 1214x1, 1215, 1215x

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Adams - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs. (2)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Cregar - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs. (2)

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On 12/4/75, a meeting was held with the following representatives of captioned Committee: Chief Counsel F.A.O. Schwartz; Assistant Counsel Paul Michel; Staff Member Mark Gitenstein; Staff Director of the Domestic Task Force John T. Elliff; and Staff Member John Bayley. Representing the Bureau at this meeting were Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams, Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Inspector John B. Hotis, and SA Paul V. Daly.

The meeting discussed the forthcoming testimony on 12/9/75 of the Director before that Committee and Elliff furnished the Bureau two draft papers discussing the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction and issues the Committee Staff feels the Senate Select Committee must address from a legislative standpoint. Copies of these papers are attached.

The first paper which consists of six pages discusses in Part 1 what the Committee sees as problems arising out of the FBI's domestic intelligence investigations. This portion highlights the fact that these investigations may be overbroad in scope, collect irrelevant information, and continue the investigations beyond what the Committee sees as their normal investigative conclusion. This portion also addresses the investigative techniques used during these investigations and the resultant dissemination of information collected.

Under Part 2, the document discusses options available to the Committee. These options run the gamut from abolition of the Bureau's domestic intelligence functions to administrative oversight by the Attorney General or Congressional oversight or enacting legislation providing for domestic intelligence investigations with legislative limits imposed on such investigations. Included is the consideration of creating an independent Inspector General.

62-116395-1215X

REC-51

7 JAN 22 1976

Enclosures (2)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:lad
(9)

8 4 [illegible] 26 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The second position paper which was prepared by John T. Elliff begins by a six-page statement and analysis of the Bureau's current authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. He then lists four options for the Committee.

Option 1 is for Congress to pass legislation ratifying the existing FBI authority as set forth by Presidential directives and Executive Orders.

Option 2 suggests Congress might give serious consideration to creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Department of Justice. In this Option, Elliff suggests that the FBI itself has considered this Option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from law enforcement functions of the Bureau.

Option 3 considers the elimination of FBI domestic intelligence. In his analysis of this position, it might be possible for the Bureau to develop the necessary intelligence information through its normal criminal investigations and thus remove the necessity for domestic intelligence investigations as presently conducted.

Option 4 considers setting standards for domestic intelligence investigations. In this Option, Elliff states that the FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only as Congress finds that regular criminal investigations would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of Federal law and that incidents of the use of violence in such violations are of a serious nature and threaten the security of the country.

For purposes of the Director's appearance on 12/9/75 before the Senate Select Committee, it is believed his response to questions concerning the aforementioned position papers should be that the Bureau has received copies and is reviewing the various proposals and that it would not be appropriate at this time for the Director to comment regarding the substance of the proposals.

CONTINUED - OVER

↓ ↓

Elliff indicated during this meeting that the Director during his appearance may anticipate being asked a question by one of the Senators relating to his statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal concerning the necessity for the sacrifice of certain individual rights at the expense of investigations. He also anticipated the Director might be asked a question concerning his position on COINTELPRO. Regarding the question concerning the Director's statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal, the Legal Counsel Division will draft a proposed resonse. Concerning COINTELPRO, a response has been prepared and will be put together with the briefing material for the Director.

This memorandum in general highlights the Options presented in the attached papers. A more detailed analysis should be prepared by the Intelligence Division and existing documents addressing these proposals should be made available for the Director's briefing book for his testimony.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Director respond to questions concerning the attached position papers as set forth above.

Done.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division draft a proposed response concerning the Director's statement made in Montreal relating to the sacrifice of certain individual rights.

Done.

(3) That the Intelligence Division make a detailed review of the various Options set forth in the two attached position papers. (FOR SUBSEQUENT STAFF CONFERENCE AFTER 12/9)
Jma

See memo re [illegible] w/ [illegible] Senstudy 1/19/76

Jma

Ret. from DO 12/12/75
Jma

Issues and Options for Discussion with Former Attorneys General Rogers, Katzenbach, and Clark

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALMK8

I. Background

In the past few weeks the staff has presented the Committee with evidence suggesting the following about the FBI's internal security intelligence program:

A. The program is massive, involving the collection of information on the activities of thousands of innocent, law-abiding American citizens.

B. These individuals were not alleged espionage agents, but citizens who fall within the FBI's vague definitions of "subversion" and "extremism" -- purely homegrown "threats to the national security".

C. That FBI policy on "subversive" and "extremist" investigations was vague and subject to the following abuses:

   1. overbreadth in scope in that groups were investigated whose threats to the national security were tenuous, if not non-existent.

   2. collection of information on the personal life and political views of subjects unrelated to the national security.

   3. the continuance of investigations well after it should have become obvious that there was no legitimate predicate.

D. Particularly invasive collection techniques were used, including electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entries. Although these have been terminated, the predominant and perhaps most insidious continues today through the FBI's huge informant/confidential source network.

E. Information collected in the course of these investigations is disseminated regularly throughout the federal government and to local law enforcement.

F. Until 1971, information collected through these investigations was disseminated as part of the COINTELPRO program to the subjects' friends, relatives, employers, and others in an effort to discredit or "neutralize" alleged "subversives" or "extremists".

62-116395 - 1215X

ENCLOSURE

G. The FBI's internal security intelligence program was used by Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon to serve their political interests, usually by collecting information on critics or political opponents.

H. The program was conceived and implemented in secrecy, and although parts of the program were shared with outside authorities from time to time, until now no President, Attorney General, or Congressional committee has been exposed to the entire program in detail.

I. The program is not authorized by statute but is founded on a series of secret or ambiguous Presidential orders, which in turn are based upon a questionable assertion of "inherent constitutional authority".

J. The program continues today, albeit on a much more limited basis than in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and the basic machinery for the program -- the huge informant/confidential source network -- is still operating.

K. There is no statute or internal Bureau or Justice Department policy prohibiting a new Director, Attorney General, or President from ordering the Bureau to expand the program to its earlier dimensions.

II. Issues and Options

Among the issues and options which might be discussed with former Attorneys General in response to what the Committee has learned are the following:

A. Abolition. Elimination of the FBI internal security intelligence program as Attorney General Harlan Stone ordered in 1924 when confronted with abuses growing out of the FBI's first internal security intelligence program, such as the infamous Palmer raids.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether there are not some functions (e.g., protecting the President, preventing or at least predicting violence by terrorist organizations, or predicting civil disorders) which require intelligence collection.

2. Whether FBI intelligence reports are valuable in that respect, especially in light of a recent GAO report suggesting that such reports are rarely useful in predicting violent activity.

3. Whether such information, assuming it is valuable, could not be obtained through more traditional criminal investigations.

4. Whether the value of the information, marginal or otherwise, justifies the risk to civil liberties inherent in such intelligence collection.

5. Whether, given the way in which limited and ambiguous grants of authority have been expanded into major authorizations, any statute short of a total prohibition of all non-law enforcement intelligence activities in the domestic sector will be adequate to prevent the recurrences of the kinds of abuses uncovered by this Committee. (Or, conversely, whether it is possible to draft a law authorizing a limited civil disturbance and counter-terrorist intelligence mission that will not eventually evolve, like the National Security Act of 1947, into a charter for unanticipated and unwanted covert activities.)

6. Whether it would be sufficient to restrict the FBI to criminal investigations without also (a) placing limits upon the length of investigations, (b) the kinds of information which can be collected and disseminated on the subject irrelevant to the alleged criminal act, (c) the utilization of warrantless electronic surveillance and other particularly invasive collection techniques, and (d) the utilization of a huge informant/confidential source network without judicial or Justice Department supervision.

B. Authorizing Statute. Recognition of the value of internal security intelligence, but placing limits upon the program designed to minimize the infringement upon civil liberties, an option being actively considered by the present Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out under the first option and, in addition:

1. Whether meaningful and stringent guidelines can be written which do not so hamper the administration of an internal security intelligence program as to make the product not just marginal, as GAO suggests, but worthless.*

2. In light of the possibility that the present Attorney General may address this matter via internal Justice Department guidelines, whether this approach does not ignore the legal authority question which can only be resolved by statute.

3. Whether or not Congress could draft a statutory version of the guidelines which could be flexible enough to meet an evolving threat and at the same time place meaningful restrictions upon the program.

4. Even assuming there is no absence of legal authority, is it safe to leave these guidelines in the form of a departmental order which can be rescinded by the next Attorney General?

C. Delegation of Authority to Attorney General. Simply ratifying the present program via enactment of a statutory charter which grants the FBI authority to conduct an internal security intelligence program subject to its own internal guidelines or departmental guidelines as proposed by the Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and:

1. Whether such a statute would not be an unconstitutional delegation of powers to the Executive Branch.

2. Whether enactment of such a statute would not represent a failure by the Congress to confront the issues raised above.

---

*A preliminary staff analysis of the Attorney General's draft guidelines suggests that, despite months of conscientious and painstaking work by a departmental task force, the guidelines are not adequate. This analysis, which will be presented when Attorney General Levi testifies on December 10, indicates that several of the more questionable FBI investigations (e.g., of Dr. King and the women's liberation movement) would still be permissible under these proposed guidelines.

D. Legislative Inaction. Enact no new statute affecting the FBI's legal authority or the internal security intelligence program.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and, in addition:

1. Whether this failure to act might not leave the status of the program in doubt and subject to court challenge.

2. Whether this failure to act after full disclosure by the Bureau might not be taken by the FBI and the courts as a ratification of the program.

E. Administrative Oversight by the Attorney General. The Justice Department should be required to exercise greater administrative oversight over the FBI's internal security intelligence program by Attorney General Levi, regardless of whatever other options Congress accepts.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is practical for the Attorney General or his staff to review thousands of such investigations each year.

2. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should review all or just the so-called "full" investigations.

3. Whether, to facilitate the conduct of such reviews, the Attorney General or his staff should be given "complete" access to Bureau files, including information regarding the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.

4. Whether it is possible to develop a staff of career attorneys within the Department with both the access and independence essential to the conduct of searching reviews.

5. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should not also be required to review various informant and so-called "intensification" programs, and the establishment of specialized indices (which have a significant impact upon which cases are opened) instead of just reviewing individual investigations in a vacuum as provided by the Attorney General's draft guidelines.

F. An Inspector General. In addition to the above options, an independent Inspector General should be created to investigate improprieties by the FBI. This option is advanced by those concerned about the inadequacy of the FBI's investigation of the disappearance of former Director Hoover's personal files, its limited inquiry into the so-called Atlantic City convention case, and the absence of any internal investigation of the abuses in the King case.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to maintain the independence of an Inspector General within the Department of Justice when both the Inspector General and the Director of the FBI will be responsible to the same official, the Attorney General.

2. Whether the Inspector General should have "complete" access to Bureau files, including information pertaining to the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.

3. Whether an Inspector General with access to extremely sensitive information might not become a serious threat to the independence of the Bureau from political influence and to the civil liberties of American citizens.

G. Congressional Oversight. In addition to the above options, the creation of an oversight committee(s) in the Congress, to which the Bureau would be required to report and which would have the power to investigate abuses.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the kinds of problems posed by the Justice Department oversight and Inspector General options discussed above to the independence of the FBI and the confidentiality of its files.

H. Public Reporting and Disclosure to Subjects. In addition to the above options, the requirement that the FBI make frequent public reports on the details of its internal security intelligence programs and policies and reveal the details of improper intelligence investigations to the subjects of those investigations.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to reveal the essence of some programs and policies and the details of some investigations without jeopardizing the effectiveness of legitimate programs.

2. Whether such disclosure might not increase the number of law suits filed against the FBI alleging illegal activities.

DRAFT
MEMORANDUM

December 4, 1975

FBI LEGISLATION - PROPOSED OPTIONS

In preparation for the testimony of FBI Director Kelley and Attorney General Levi on December 9 and 10, the Domestic Intelligence Task Force is pulling together various proposals for legislation dealing with FBI intelligence. This paper sets forth some of the basic options.

A. Current Statutes and Executive Orders

The basic statute governing the FBI is 18 U.S.C. 533, which reads as follows:

> The Attorney General may appoint officials: (1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States, (2) to assist in the protection of the person of the President, and (3) to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General.

Clauses (2) and (3) are a possible statutory basis for intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Under (2), the FBI may "assist" the Secret Service in the protection of the President by providing

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1215X

ENCLOSURE

intelligence on persons or groups who may endanger the President's safety. A formal agreement between the FBI and the Secret Service sets forth the types of intelligence information provided by the Bureau. However, this agreement states that:

> The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction. (Tab A)

Clause (3) recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of Justice." This is a possible statutory basis for at least two broad areas of FBI intelligence investigations -- civil disturbance intelligence and intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program.

The most recent legal advice to the FBI from the Justice Department on the gathering and reporting of data regarding civil disturbances notes that on April 1, 1969, the President designated the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the government's response to civil disturbances. The FBI is instructed to gather and report on "all significant incidents of civil unrest" and on "all disturbances where there are indications that extremist organizations . . . are believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them." The

FBI is specifically advised to make reports "even when no specific violation of federal law is indicated." On the other hand, the FBI is instructed not to report "every relatively insignificant incident of a strictly local nature coming to its attention." (Tab B)

The Justice Department has given the following recent instructions to the FBI regarding intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program. Executive Order 10450, as amended by Executive Order 11785, is interpreted as requiring an FBI investigation of organizations "with a potential" of violating federal or state statutes prohibiting unlawful advocacy of violence or the commission of any unlawful act of violence. The FBI is advised that "it is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order." The FBI is instructed to apply "the same yardstick" to investigations of individuals who are affiliated with such organizations. The FBI is specifically advised that "it is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated." (Tab C)

Clause (3) also recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of State." This is a possible statutory basis for FBI intelligence investigation of foreign intelligence activities within the United States or to

collect positive foreign intelligence. The best example is the Attorney General's authorization of warrantless FBI electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. However, there is apparently no instruction from the Justice Department to the FBI directing the Bureau to initiate investigations of individuals or organizations which have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but about which there is no information indicating intelligence activity. (See Staff Report, "Counterintelligence/Counterespionage: The Law and the Philosophy", October 14, 1975.)

In his testimony before the Committee, Deputy Associate FBI Director James Adams made no reference to clauses (2) and (3) as a possible legal basis for FBI intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Instead, he placed sole reliance on a series of Presidential directives extending from 1936 until the 1960's which the FBI interprets as authorizing it to engage in "domestic security intelligence investigations". The Attorney General has codified these directives in a Justice Department regulation instructing the FBI to:

> Carry out the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15, 1953, designating the [FBI] to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters. 28 C.F.R., Section 0.85(d).

The FBI also cites directives of President Kennedy on June 9, 1962, and Attorney General Kennedy on March 5, 1964, which are the latest charter for the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, composed of the FBI Director and the chiefs of the military intelligence agencies. This group is authorized to coordinate "all investigation of domestic espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security." (Tab D)

The theory behind the FBI's position is that the President has inherent constitutional powers, at least in the absence of contrary legislation, to authorize FBI intelligence activities. The only judicial support for this theory is language in the Supreme Court's opinion in the Keith case, which declared warrantless wiretapping of domestic groups unconstitutional.

The Court acknowledged the importance of "national security in its domestic implications . . . especially at a time of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent periods of our history." Under such circumstances, the Court stated, the President has a "fundamental duty" under the Constitution to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." The Court added, "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means." Hence, the Court appeared to

recognize that the President's "domestic security role" has a "constitutional basis"; that the President through the Attorney General may need "to obtain intelligence information about those who plot unlawful acts against the Government"; and that "threats and acts of sabotage against the Government exist in sufficient number to justify investigative powers with respect to them." The Court applied the general principle that "unless the Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered." Nevertheless, the central holding of the Keith decision was that this power may not be exercised in such a way as to infringe constitutional rights. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

Even though the President may have the authority under the Constitution to direct the FBI to conduct intelligence investigations in the absence of legislation, Congress has the ultimate authority to substitute statutory authorization in place of the Presidential directives. As Justice Robert Jackson declared in the Steel Seizure Case, "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . ." 343 U.S. 579, 637.

B. Option One -- Ratifying Existing Powers

The first option for Congress is legislation ratifying the existing authority granted to the FBI by current Presidential directives and orders. Such legislation would be cast in extremely general terms. Its main advantage is that it would provide a basis for Congressional oversight. It could also reinforce the Attorney General's role as the immediate supervisor of FBI intelligence activities. The statute would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to conduct investigations of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities;

2. to gather and report information on civil disturbances;

3. to conduct investigations of other related intelligence matters affecting internal security; and

4. to conduct investigations of official matters relating to the Department of State.

In addition, the statute would require the Attorney General to report annually to the appropriate Congressional committees on the volume and type of investigations and reports, the investigative techniques used, and the policies and procedures adopted by the Justice Department and the FBI.

The weaknesses of this approach are obvious. Congress would have legislated a wholesale delegation of power without

standards or limitations other than the supervision of the Attorney General and oversight by Congress. In view of the Select Committee's findings as to the vast overbreadth of FBI domestic intelligence investigations and the abuses committed in the name of "counterintelligence", Congress would in effect be permitting future expansion of FBI operations to match past policies.

C. Option Two -- A Separate Security Intelligence Agency

Congress might give serious consideration to legislation creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Justice Department. It would perform the functions of the present Counterintelligence Branch of the FBI Intelligence Division, dealing with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence/counterespionage. The FBI itself has considered this option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from the law enforcement functions of the Bureau. (Tab E)

A separate agency would be justified only if it was authorized to conduct investigations of a wider scope and using different techniques than would otherwise be permitted. In other words, Congress could decide that foreign counterintelligence investigations should go beyond investigation of specific crimes, that techniques such as electronic surveillance should be used without a warrant or with a special type of warrant,

and that operations should be conducted to "counter" foreign intelligence activities by means other than arrest or "persona non grata" proceedings. On the other hand, if Congress treats the investigation of foreign intelligence activities the same as a criminal investigation, then the FBI should keep the job.

Any statute in this area must use general language for diplomatic reasons. For example, Congress should not explicitly authorize deception operations or efforts to compromise hostile intelligence officers, even though such techniques may be envisioned. Such techniques are dealt with best by establishing adequate procedures for authorization and oversight to ensure accountability.

The legislation should be more specific where it deals with investigations and other operations directed at American citizens rather than non-resident aliens in the service of a foreign power. If Congress believes Americans should be investigated if they have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but no information indicating intelligence activity yet exists, the legislation should say so.

The statute should also set out standards for determining whether a foreign-dominated domestic organization falls within the jurisdiction of the separate agency. There should at the very least be substantial information indicating that the organization is directed by, subsidized by, or in active

collaboration with a foreign government or organization. (The term "foreign organization" refers, for instance, to a group like the Palestine Liberation Organization.) If the group fits the criteria for foreign domination, there should be an additional finding that it may engage in intelligence activities or in activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law.

If the group meets all these standards, Congress may authorize the investigation of its activities going beyond regular criminal investigations. Such investigations could extend to all individuals who are members of, or express support for, the organization, as well as to the efforts of the organization to influence and control other groups. However, it may be sufficient to authorize only the investigation of active members and supporters. This would prevent a revival of the "Cominfil" policy of looking into all forms of lawful political and social activity where Communists might be involved.

The Petersen Committee report on COINTELPRO considered the need for special supervision of foreign counterintelligence operations in the United States. It recommended the creation of a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Commission to make decisions with regard to the necessity or acceptability of particular foreign counterintelligence techniques. (Tab F) This proposal

has merit in view of the limited amount of time the Attorney General can give to personal supervision and the after-the-fact role of legislative oversight regarding the separate agency.

Finally, legislation to create a separate foreign counterintelligence agency must deal with relationships to the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other foreign intelligence agencies. The current FBI-CIA agreement on their respective jurisdictions is only a "memorandum of understanding". It allows the CIA to undertake certain clandestine activities within the United States, in coordination with the FBI. (Tab G) Proposals are currently circulating in the Executive Branch for a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive to clarify this matter, as well as to regulate CIA electronic surveillance of American citizens abroad. (Tab H)

A full draft of a statutory charter for a separate foreign counterintelligence agency is not included here, since the focus is on domestic intelligence issues. However, one implication of such a statute would be that the remaining FBI functions should relate only to law enforcement and criminal investigations.

D. Option Three -- Elimination of FBI Domestic Intelligence

The basic assumption behind Attorney General Levi's effort to develop "guidelines" for FBI domestic intelligence is that regular criminal investigations are not adequate to

supply the information needed to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law. That assumption should be questioned. Regular criminal investigations are likely to produce a substantial amount of information which can be used to anticipate or prevent future crimes. For example, intensive criminal investigations of Ku Klux Klan violence in the South during the 1960's would have required the FBI to look into a wide variety of Klan activities. Another example is the search for Weatherman fugitives, a regular criminal investigation which involves broad inquiries across the country. The FBI has not yet demonstrated that the preventive information it has obtained came from intelligence investigations which would not have been conducted as regular criminal investigations.

The fact that an FBI investigation was supervised by its Intelligence Division does not necessarily mean that the investigation was, automatically, outside the regular criminal law enforcement jurisdiction of the Bureau. Any FBI investigation of activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law falls within that jurisdiction. Moreover, regular criminal investigations can also extend to plans, attempts, or conspiracies to engage in such activities.

One suggested difference between intelligence-type and regular criminal investigations is that the latter are terminated after a reasonable time, if sufficient evidence to

justify prosecution is not obtained. However, there is no legal reason why the prosecutor cannot request that the investigation continue indefinitely as long as there is information that violent activities and plans for violence are still underway. The degree of evidence needed to justify a prosecution is certainly greater than the degree of evidence needed to justify an investigation.

All this is not to say that no further standards are needed to guide regular criminal investigations when they may touch on sensitive First Amendment or other constitutional interests. This is especially true of criminal investigations of individuals or groups engaged both in lawful political or social activities and in unlawful violence or plans for violence. To what extent is the advocacy of violence a proper basis for initiating an investigation? Should an investigation be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual is a member of, or has expressed public support for, an organization which has as one of its objectives the use of violence? Should an investigation be started on all members and public supporters of an organization, some of whose members have acted in concert to use violence?

These questions are addressed in the draft Attorney General's guidelines for domestic intelligence investigations under the heading "preliminary investigations". (Tab I) Since

the guidelines assume that there should be intelligence investigations, they do not consider whether such investigations might be permitted as regular criminal investigations.

The Klan and Weatherman examples again illustrate the point. Once it has been established that a particular Klan group is engaged in or planning violence, it seems reasonable to conduct at least preliminary inquiries to determine whether the members and supporters of the group are involved in the violence or the plans for violence. Similarly, the search for Weatherman fugitives who committed bombings and other acts of violence would appear reasonably to include preliminary inquiries to determine whether other Weatherman members and supporters have harbored the fugitives.

On the other hand, it would seem unreasonable to investigate members and supporters of all Klan groups across the country on the ground that some Klan groups have used violence. And it appears equally unreasonable to investigate all members and supporters of SDS because the Weatherman faction engaged in violence. The scope of the investigation must be logically related to its specific purpose, and not an excuse for wide-ranging collection of intelligence.

There is one possible exception to the requirement that the FBI only conduct regular criminal investigations. The Attorney General (and the President) do require reports on

major civil disturbances which may not involve violations of federal law. The FBI should be authorized to gather such data and make appropriate reports as part of its law enforcement responsibilities. However, the data and reports should be limited to information provided by local or state law enforcement authorities or obtained in the course of a regular FBI criminal investigation. Where local authorities provide information about individuals and organizations which are not the subject of a regular FBI criminal investigation, the data and reports should not be included in the FBI's general files and name index.

In periods of widespread civil disturbances, the Attorney General may require a more systematic procedure for maintaining and retrieving civil disturbance information. This was the case in 1967, when Attorney General Clark created the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit in the Justice Department. The IDIU stored and indexed civil disturbance reports separately from the FBI. The data was used to help anticipate or ameliorate disorders. IDIU has been abolished, although the basic function of evaluating reports on civil disturbances is still performed by the Justice Department. This function should also be authorized by statute, and the intent of Congress should be that the Attorney General must obtain specific legislative authorization for any future IDIU.

IDIU was not perfect. Under Attorney General John Mitchell it supplied a list of names of American dissidents to the CIA. (Tab J) It also was used in conjunction with grand jury proceedings inquiring into terrorist bombings. Both of these activities should be forbidden by the statute authorizing the Justice Department to evaluate civil disturbance information.

Finally, legislation may be needed to make clear that the FBI is not authorized to conduct investigations of organizations or individuals for the specific purpose of compiling a body of data to be used in connection with name checks under the Federal Employee Security Program. The same principle applies to FBI "assistance" to the Secret Service, under the present FBI-Secret Service agreement.

A statute must also address the FBI's current practice of maintaining an Administrative Index (ADEX) of the prime subjects of current domestic intelligence investigations. The past history of the FBI's Security Index and other target lists (Key Activists, Agitator Index, Key Black Extremists) suggests the need to enact legislation banning the compiling of lists of persons by the FBI, unless such persons have been arrested or convicted for specific crimes and the list is used in connection with the investigation of such crimes.

These proposals to limit the FBI to regular criminal investigations and civil disturbance reporting must be tested against the actual past experience of the Justice Department and the FBI. General instructions from the Department to the Bureau may be overly vague, even within the framework of criminal investigation. Two examples are Attorney General Clark's memorandum on riots in 1967 and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley's memorandum of campus disorders in 1969. (Tab K) The Nation of Islam exchange between the Department and the FBI in 1973-74 is another illustration. (Tab L)

Thus, there is no automatic panacea in restricting the FBI to criminal investigations. The need for careful scrutiny of actual investigative policies and practices by Congress and the Attorney General is just as great as if the FBI were authorized to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. Legislation must focus on procedures for ensuring accountability by regular reports from the Attorney General to the appropriate Congressional committees.

The following are some of the basic elements which should go into a statute embodying this option. It would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to investigate violations of federal criminal laws, provided that the scope and duration of the investigation are logically related to its specific purpose;

2. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law;

3. to seek legal advice from the Attorney General or his designee whenever a proposed action may be perceived, with reason, to unfairly affect the rights of citizens, provided that this responsibility to seek legal advice is the duty of both the FBI as an institution and FBI agents as individuals;

4. to collect information from state and local law enforcement agencies regarding major civil disturbances, provided that such information is not entered into the FBI general files and name index;

5. to disseminate information obtained from criminal investigations for the following purposes, under regulations promulgated by the Attorney General and published in the Federal Register:

a. prosecution of violations of criminal laws;

b. prevention or anticipation of violations of criminal laws;

c. assistance to the Secret Service in the performance of its protective responsibilities;

d. determination of the suitability of individuals for employment by the federal government;

6. to report civil disturbance information obtained from state and local law enforcement agencies to the Attorney General for the purpose of determining the need to use federal military force under 10 U.S.C. 331 et seq.;

7. to compile such lists of persons arrested or convicted for specific crimes as may be necessary for use in connection with the investigation of such crimes;

8. to provide to the Attorney General or his designee full access to any information in the possession of the FBI which he may deem necessary for the performance of his responsibilities to supervise FBI activities and to submit reports to appropriate Congressional committees on FBI activities;

9. to follow such other procedures and standards consistent with this statute which the Attorney General may prescribe, provided that such procedures and standards shall be published in the Federal Register or, if publication would substantially interfere with the conduct of investigations, reported to appropriate Congressional committees.

E. Option Four -- Setting Standards for Domestic Intelligence

The FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only if Congress finds (1) that regular criminal investigations as described above would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law, and (2) that the incidents of the use of violence in violations of federal law are so numerous and so serious as to constitute a significant threat to the internal security or domestic tranquility of the United States.

The fact that there are individuals and groups who engage in violence, advocate violence, or believe in the desirability of the ultimate use of violence to advance their political or social objectives is not enough to justify FBI domestic intelligence authority. There must be additional findings that regular criminal investigations are inadequate and that the overall threat of violence constitutes a serious danger to the country.

Furthermore, if FBI domestic intelligence is authorized by statute, it should be an annual authorization which must be renewed each year upon reconsideration by Congress and the Attorney General of these factors. Past experience indicates that the annual appropriations process does not provide an appropriate forum for considering the FBI's basic authority.

Attorney General Levi's draft guidelines provide a basis for the consideration of a domestic intelligence authorization. They do not cover the investigation of foreign-related activities which may be directed by, subsidized by, or otherwise conducted in active collaboration with a foreign government, a foreign organization, or their agents. (See Option Two above.)

The guidelines deal with five different types of threats of violence which may constitute serious dangers to the country:

1. overthrow of the government (revolutionary violence);
2. interference in the U. S. with the activities of a foreign government (bombing a consulate, attempting to assassinate a visiting foreign leader);
3. interference with the functioning of the government or the flow of interstate commerce to influence federal policies (violent protest activities, terrorist bombings);
4. deprivation of civil rights (Klan violence, violent protest against busing);
5. incitement of violence which may require the use of federal military force (riots, major civil disturbances accompanying protest demonstrations).

The guidelines also refer to violence directed at state governments, either overthrow of a state government or interference with the functioning of a state government.

Authorizing legislation should indicate whether domestic intelligence is necessary for any or all of these specific problems. For example, revolutionary violence in an attempt to overthrow the government may be a remote and speculative danger, while terrorist bombings may be substantially interfering with the functioning of the government. Klan violence was unquestionably a serious danger to civil rights in the early and mid-1960's, but is it so today? Major riots and civil disturbances were equally serious in the late 1960's and early 1970's, but not in more recent years. Violent interference with the functioning of a state government should, under our federal system, normally be dealt with by state and local law enforcement.

Therefore, the definition of the purpose of FBI domestic intelligence can be simplified. The Attorney General's draft guidelines might be revised to authorize FBI domestic intelligence investigations:

1. to ascertain facts or information which serves to anticipate and prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law intended to

   a. interfere, in the United States, with the activities of a foreign government or its authorized representatives; and

b. interfere with the functioning of the government of the United States or the free flow of interstate commerce in order to influence policies or decisions of the federal government.

This formulation concentrates on the most likely current serious danger to the country, namely, politically motivated terrorist violence. FBI Director Kelley's recent public statements have stressed the increase in terrorist activity from 24 bombings in 1973 to 45 terrorist bombings in 1974 and 46 such bombings in the first six months of 1975.

However, this increasing threat is not the only factor to be considered. In the course of the FBI's regular criminal investigations of these bombings and other incidents of terrorist violence, can it obtain as a by-product substantial information which may serve to anticipate and prevent future violence? If so, the need for broader intelligence-type investigations is less evident.

The draft guidelines provide that the FBI would conduct full-scale intelligence investigations on the basis of "specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion" that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, may be engaged in activities which may involve the use of violence in violations of federal law. The two "mays" render the requirement of "specific and articulable facts" almost meaningless. Therefore, any legislation should authorize the FBI:

2. to conduct full domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above.

The draft guidelines also discuss the surveillance techniques to be used in full domestic intelligence investigations, including informants, mail covers, and electronic surveillance. The guidelines note that additional techniques may need to be covered, such as inquiries made under "pretext", photographic surveillance, "trash covers", etc. However, the legislation may deal with techniques more generally by providing that the FBI is authorized:

3. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law.

More detailed regulation of investigative techniques for full investigations will be considered elsewhere.

The scope of domestic intelligence investigations under the draft guidelines is broadened considerably under the provision for "preliminary investigations". They can be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have advocated activities which may involve violence, or are members of, or

have expressed public support for, an organization which has as its objective activities which may involve violence. The purpose of the preliminary investigation is to verify or refute the allegations or information. However, the vagueness of the standard is obvious. Therefore, to be consistent with the criteria for full investigations, the FBI should be authorized:

4. to conduct preliminary domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert,

a. advocate the use of violence as described in 1 above;

b. are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above;

c. are members of or have expressed public support for an organization engaged in activities which involve, or are likely to involve, the use of violence as described in 1 above, provided that other members of the organization are currently the subject of a full domestic intelligence investigation or a regular criminal investigation.

Unless these changes are made in the guidelines, they would permit investigations similar to past investigations which have been seriously criticized. For instance, they would allow investigations of all SDS members or all Black Student Union leaders on the ground that their activities may involve violence,

even though there is no specific allegation of likely involvement in violence.

Another reason for the revision is to exclude those investigations which would be justified as regular criminal investigations. Thus, allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have engaged in or plan to engage in activities which involve the use of violence would fall within the FBI's regular criminal investigative jurisdiction. Intelligence investigations would extend further at the preliminary stage to cover advocacy of violence and membership in or public support for organizations involved in or likely to be involved in violence. Full investigations require a likelihood of violence, short of actual violence or plans for violence.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. __
Inspection __
Intell. ✓
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE;
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TESTIMONY,
DECEMBER 10, 1975

At 3:01 p.m. on December 5, 1975, Mark Wolf of the Attorney General's staff, called me at the instructions of the Attorney General and advised that the Attorney General requested:

(1) FBI manual sections on domestic intelligence investigations;

(2) A listing identifying all individuals and organizations now the subjects of FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

Modified per call to AG

Wolf said that the Attorney General is currently en route to Chicago and will return to Washington on Sunday evening. Therefore, the requested materials should be delivered to the Attorney General no later than Monday morning, December 8, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division prepare an appropriate response to the Attorney General's instructions in time for delivery by 9:00 a.m. on December 8, 1975.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

EX-112

REC-962 - 116395 - 1215

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

15 DEC 17 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 DEC 31 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WM

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (SC) 62-7721

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: NATIONALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO
INTERNAL SECURITY - PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST

We presently maintain an authorized technical surveillance at the residence of Rosa Collazo and her daughter, Lydia Collazo Turner, 1755 Anthony Avenue, Bronx, New York. This surveillance was originally installed on April 13, 1962.

Rosa Collazo is the wife of Oscar Collazo who is serving a life sentence in connection with the killing of a White House guard during an attempt to assassinate former President Truman on November 1, 1950. Both Rosa and her daughter are active in the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico in New York City. During the past six months, this surveillance has continued to furnish valuable information regarding activities of Puerto Rican independence advocates in New York. Through this surveillance, we have obtained information concerning the movement of Puerto Rican nationalists between New York and Puerto Rico. Included in this information was advance notice that Rosa Collazo planned to attend the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico during February, 1966, in Puerto Rico. Upon her return, details were obtained concerning the proceedings of the General Assembly. In addition, we were able to obtain advance notice of demonstrations in New York City in which nationalists participated. This enabled us to inform police authorities and interested Government agencies in advance of the demonstrations.

Unless you instruct to the contrary, this technical surveillance will be continued for an additional six months.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: DOMINICAN SITUATION
INTERNAL SECURITY -
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Diego Emilio Bordas Hernandez and his brother, Luis Manuel Alfredo Bordas, have emerged in the current Dominican crisis as important financial, political and military advisors to the deposed Dominican President Juan Bosch in the latter's efforts to regain control of the Dominican Government. Diego Bordas is a wealthy shipping executive currently residing in exile in San Juan, Puerto Rico, having been born in the Dominican Republic on January 11, 1923. He served in various high posts under Juan Bosch during the latter's short occupancy of the position of President of the Dominican Republic in early 1963. Bordas spends much of his time at 868 Ashford Avenue in San Juan, using an apartment at that address as his residence during the absence of its owner, Jose Antonio Benitez Jiminez, from Puerto Rico. Jose Benitez is the cousin of Jaime Benitez, the latter the Director of the University of Puerto Rico and a close associate and advisor of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas also maintains a residence at 21 V, Florencia, Pueblo Viego, a suburb of San Juan, near the current residence and headquarters of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas and his brother jointly operate a shipping business known as Bordas and Company at Highway Number 2, Puerto Viejo, Puerto Rico, and his financial dealings in support of the Bosch efforts can reasonably be expected to be conducted from this commercial establishment.

The Bordas brothers have both been the subjects of numerous allegations indicating their cooperation with procommunist and pro-Trujillo factions in Dominican politics and are apparently opportunists who have seized the current situation to enhance their political and financial futures. Luis Bordas is currently in the Dominican Republic acting as the Director of Military Operations of the rebel forces supporting Bosch.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION ~~SECRET~~
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

109-12-211-1423

REC 4

4 JUN 15 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Luis Bordas is reportedly the Honorary Nicaraguan Consul in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and, as a result, Department of State clearance for technical coverage of the business he operates jointly with Diego Bordas was obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on June 1, 1965.

In view of the pressing nature of the international situation as it relates to the Dominican Republic, it is requested that you authorize technical coverage of the residences of Diego Bordas mentioned above and of the business address of the joint venture operated by the Bordas brothers. Authority is requested for similar coverage of any addresses to which the mentioned residences or business may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NdeBK

DATE 6/4/65

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

December 19, 1975

1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 2 in that letter.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a copy of the document in response to Item 2 which is being delivered to the SSC.

Delivered to Committee [illegible]

to Shaheen office 12/23/75

Enclosures (2)

ST 115 REC-51

62-116395-1214X

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

7 JAN 22 1976

PEN:adn
(9)

6-ENCLOSURE

NOTE:

A copy of the SSC letter 12/4/75, is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copy of the memorandum being furnished is maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the document being provided to the SSC. As indicated in the enclosed memorandum, Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled separately. Items 1 and 3 requested in referenced SSC letter are being handled by the IS-3 and CI-3 Sections respectively. Item 4, a restatement of prior request submitted by the SSC is being handled separately by SA V. R. Thornton of the IS-1 Section.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JBH PEN WRW JPT WOC

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

JAN 26 1976

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

62-116395

December 19, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of a copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, at the White House, Washington, D. C., dated October 27, 1964.

It is noted that in addition to requesting a copy of this letter the SSC requested materials reflecting this letter was hand-delivered to the White House by Mr. DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Attention is drawn to the upper right-hand corner of Mr. Hoover's letter to Mr. Moyers and to the notation appearing there reading "personally delivered 10/28/64, D." No additional materials are available in FBIHQ files reflecting delivery of this letter beyond the aforementioned notation which, it appears, bears the initial of Mr. DeLoach.

Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled in separate responses.

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PEN:adn adn
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

62-116395-1214X 3A

WSP PEN

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 8, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee request seeking delivery of certain Bureau materials. Please prepare an appropriate response.

I invite your attention to paragraph numbered 4 which amends an earlier request of the Committee (Elliff letter of November 25, 1975, Item 6c) which request was the subject of a telephone conversation on December 3, with Mr. Seymor Phillips of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1-Ad Hoc
12-10-75

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1214X

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]N.
BARRY GOLDWATER, AR[illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MATHIA[illegible], MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, [illegible]

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 4, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Senate Select Committee requests the following materials for delivery.

1. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the recommendation for, authorization of, and duration and termination of the electronic surveillance referred to in Items 1 and 22 of my letter of November 21, 1975 and in materials delivered to the Committee on December 1, 1975. [illegible]

2. Delivery of a copy of the letter to Mr. Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated October 27, 1964, and materials reflecting that this letter was hand delivered by Mr. Cartha DeLoach on October 28, 1964. Nugent

3. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the surveillances of Mrs. Anna Chennault in October and November, 1968. Hamilton

4. The Committee's request in my letter of November 27, 1975, item 6c should be revised to read as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memornadum, including a summary of the ~~recommendations~~ of relevant Bureau personnel pertaining thereto." Nugent

RECEIVED
DEC 4 1975

JTE

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

62-116395- 1214X

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/19/75

Caption of Document:
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
12/4/75 request - Martin L. King.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 12/23/75

Received by:

Title: Research Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116- - 1214X

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/4/75, item 2

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr.: Copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers 10/27/64 along with notation that shows letter was hand delivered by Mr. DeLoach 10/28/64.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALMKSP

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-09

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395 — 1214X

186-10051

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER 12-4-75

ITEM 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SDALMKP

Retain

62-116395-1214X

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

#MDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/31/00

October 27, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

Honorable William D. Moyers
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Moyers:

A confidential source of this Bureau who has supplied reliable information in the past furnished the following information concerning a contact on October 23, 1964, between Martin Wigington and Randolph Blackwell. Wigington was described as a member of the Democratic Party Correlation Committee, Austin, Texas. Blackwell is an assistant to Martin Luther King, Jr., at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Georgia.

Wigington indicated to Blackwell a desire for King to write "an anti-Goldwater letter" which Wigington's Committee intends to distribute in Texas among labor groups. Blackwell stated that King may go to Texas prior to the forthcoming presidential election and Blackwell inquired as to whether King would be "in any danger." Wigington stated that he would contact one Larry Goodman concerning any possible danger to King in Texas. This Bureau's source had no information concerning the identity of Goodman.

During this contact Wigington complained to Blackwell that a group from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which Conference is headed by King, and a group from the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America had picketed in Fort Worth, Texas. Wigington stated that this was not a good thing at this time since all Negro and labor organizations should be working for the election of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

This information is also being furnished to officials in the Department of Justice.

Sincerely yours,

REC 14

100-106670 (King)
1-100-442529 (CIRM)

ST-101

NOV 2 1964

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

SFP:kmj
(12)

~~SECRET~~
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NOV 4 1964
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OCT 27 11 17 AM '64
READING ROOM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Honorable William D. Moyers

NOTE:

[illegible]

Classified "~~Secret~~" as information reported is from AT 1380-S*, a highly sensitive source with respect to the racial situation. This source is of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of this information could compromise its effectiveness and thus be detrimental to the national defense. Information obtained from Atlanta teletype 10/23/64.

1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs.
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Encs.
1 - Mr. Gallagher - Encs.
1 - Mr. McDermott - Encs.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Encs.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs.

December 3, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Delivered to Mark Wolf's office 12-5-75

On November 21, 1975 Inspector John B. Hotis of this Bureau met with Doug Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General; and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, concerning your forthcoming appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. At this meeting this Bureau was requested to provide write-ups on certain phases of this Bureau's operations which are to be used in the preparation of a briefing book for your testimony.

Attached are the following individual write-ups as requested on November 21, 1975: "Investigative Techniques"; "Organizational Structure and Functions of the FBI"; "Allegation of Misconduct Involving Special Agent in Charge, Miami Office"; "Director Hoover's 'Official and Confidential' (OC) Files"; "Allegations of Possible Misconduct by FBI Agents, Houston, Texas"; "Allegations of Personal and Official Misconduct of a Former Special Agent in Charge of the Baltimore Office"; "Allegation of Bribery by FBI Agent, New York"; "Allegation of Possible Misconduct by an FBI Agent, Detroit, Michigan"; "Allegations of Misconduct by FBI Agents, Richmond, Virginia, Field Office, in Connection with the Investigation of Illegal Wiretapping by the Richmond, Virginia, Police Department"; "Allegations of Violations of Gun Control Act by FBI Agent"; "Review of Appropriations Testimony for Fiscal Years 1955 thru 1976"; "Tenure of FBI Director"; "Transfer of Drug Enforcement Responsibilities to the FBI"; "Office of Special Review, Department of Justice"; and "Major Topics of Primary Concern to Congressional Committees."

REC-9 62-116395-1212

With respect to the material requested by memorandum of Mark L. Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,

DEC 29 1975

PVD:dkg (13)

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2

62-116395-5-WOE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 DEC 31 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

to Inspector John B. Hotis of this office dated November 26, 1975, which requested additional information, we are gathering the necessary material on an expeditious basis and the results will be furnished as soon as possible.

Enclosures (15)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. - Enclosures (15)
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

NOTE: See Legal Counsel Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11-24-75, captioned "Testimony By The Attorney General Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." On 12-1-75 Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, requested the attached information be furnished as soon as possible. No later than 12-2-75. This response was coordinated and incorporates material prepared by the Inspection, Special Investigative, General Investigative, Files and Communications, and Intelligence Divisions. Due to the time constraints we are furnishing interim response. As completed additional material will be furnished to the Department.

2 - Mr J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
January 14, 1976
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

The Attorney General

Director, FBI 62-116395-1210X1

EX-110
REC-60

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letters dated December 4, 1975, and November 25, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 4 in the December 4, 1975, request and Items 7c and 8c of the November 25, 1975, request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with the material which is being furnished to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

VRT:adn
(9)

NOTE:

Copies of SSC letters 11/25/75 and 12/4/75 are attached to the file copy of enclosed LHM. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as documents being provided to the SSC. Copies of material being furnished to SSC being retained with Senstudy 75 Project.

Delivered to Dept. 1-15-76

Delivered to Committee 1-15-76.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

4 ENCLOSURE

WRW HWL JBH Pcm JAM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 MAR 9 1976

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 (1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

January 14, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, Item 4 of which requests materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.; and SSC letter dated November 25, 1975, Items 7c and 8c of which request materials concerning the Washington Spring Project and Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of materials in response to referenced requests.

In respect to Item 4 of the December 4, 1975, request, the only indication of any action taken concerning the recommendation contained in the pertinent memorandum dated March 29, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/3/68," appearing on page one and initials which are believed to be those of former Special Agent (SA) Harold P. Leinbaugh. Among the documents being furnished the SSC is a memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned, "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.," along with supporting documents, which were submitted to the Attorney General concerning background leading up to the proposed action recommended in the March 29, 1968, memorandum. It includes results of an interview of Leinbaugh.

In response to Item 7c, the only indication of any action taken concerning the suggestion (recommendation) contained in the memorandum dated March 26, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/4/68," appearing on page two of that memorandum and initials which are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

JBA

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

VRT:adn
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1210X

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

With respect to Item 8c which concerns a memorandum dated March 28, 1968, captioned, "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," the only indication of action taken concerning the recommendation contained therein is a pencilled notation appearing on page one, "Handled 3/28/68," and initials which again are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/SP

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/14/76

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

12/4/75 request Item 4
11/25/75 request Items 7c and 8C

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: D. V. Cook Date: 1/15/76

Received by: Florence Hoben

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1210X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

1/14/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 12/4/75, Item 4 and SSC letter 11/25/75, Items 7c and 8c

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Operating Procedures
Information Handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Delivery of materials regarding Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Washington Spring Project and the Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

62-116395

AJD:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1210X

186-10029

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 12-4-75

ITEM 4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KSP

Retain

62-11[illegible]5-1210X

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop ✓
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY [illegible]

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

EX-102

TJD:ted
(7)

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC-20

22 APR 11 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY 5P2ALM/KP

100-441006-93

ENCLOSURE

1 - J. B. Adams
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - D. Ryan
1 - J. G. Deegan

REC-88

Sw 100-106670-3965 July 18, 1975

1 - H. A. Newman

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/SP

The following information is submitted regarding the background leading up to the proposed action recommended in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence, (Martin Luther King)." (copy attached)

This memorandum recommended that information be furnished to a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showing King as a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on March 28, 1968, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel).

A notation on the above referred to memorandum indicated that the recommendation was "handled" on April 3, 1968, by Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh of the Crime Records Division. (see notation on memorandum dated March 29, 1968, attached)

By way of background it should be noted that at about 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968, while standing on second floor balcony outside room 306 of the Hotel Lorraine, Memphis, Tennessee, King was shot and killed.

Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, reflects that King and other Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) officials were due to arrive in Memphis at 10:15 a.m. on April 3, 1968, via Eastern Airlines from Atlanta. (copy of Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, attached)

After King's death, an interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy, a close associate of King, reflected that he and King registered into the Hotel Lorraine in Memphis,

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

cah
HAN:cah (8)

copy to CRO + CRIM DIV 12/1/75 by memo cap MARTIN LUTHER KING JR

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

ENCLOSURE

whw

HW

TCD

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 AUG 5 1975

Tennessee, at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968. (Information contained in report of SA Joe C. Hester dated April 17, 1968, Memphis, captioned "UNSUB, aka, Eric Starvo Galt, et al., Civil Rights" page 48. See attached FD-302 reflecting interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy).

For further background regarding the basis of this proposal Atlanta teletype dated March 28, 1968, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C" with second caption "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that on March 28, 1968, King and other SCLC people were in room 801, Holiday Inn, Memphis, Tennessee, at 4:30 p.m. (copy of Atlanta teletype attached)

A Memphis teletype dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that King participated in the march of sanitation workers on March 28, 1968. When violence erupted including the breaking of windows and looting by the marchers, King and a few associates ran to a nearby car and left the march proceeding to Rivermont Motel where they remained through the afternoon and evening. (copy of Memphis teletype attached)

On July 17, 1975, Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh, after having had all the facts set out above reviewed with him including the fact his notation of "handled" appeared on the March 29, 1968, memorandum, advised that he has absolutely no recollection of this memorandum and can unhesitantly state that he cannot now recall whether or not proposed information was ever disseminated to any news media source. He indicated that his notation "handled" would not necessarily mean that he did disseminate this information. In explaining this he stated that the notation could mean that he was merely clearing this document through Crime Records Division and at this late date there would be absolutely no way that he could make any positive statements as to whether or not the information recommended was ever disseminated to a news media source.

7/17

From the above recorded sequence of events as reflected in various communications identified above, it is evident that King returned to Memphis, Tennessee, from Atlanta

on April 3, 1968, and checked into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. The notation indicating that the proposed furnishing of information to the news media was "handled" on April 3, 1968, would, of course, preclude any such information from appearing in the press prior to King's checking into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968.

A review of appropriate files maintained at FBI Headquarters fails to reflect any newspaper article which could have been an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in the G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968.

A review of the "Memphis Commercial Appeal" for the period March 28 to April 4, 1968, maintained on microfilm in the Library of Congress failed to reflect any article which would appear to be an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968. References were noted indicating that King held a press conference at the Holiday Inn Rivermont Motel on March 29, 1968.

7/17 Hell

Enclosures (5)

NOTE:

See memorandum J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 7/18/75, captioned as above, prepared by HAN/cah.

Memorandum

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

OM : G. C. Moore

Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

BJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

TJD:ted
(7)
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC-20

22 APR 11 1968

Deakin

Handled 4/3/68

100-106670-3160

100-448006-93

ENCLOSURE

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-106670-93

LOSURE

Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

430PM URGENT 4-2-68 SAB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS 157-1092 3P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENN., ~~RM~~ RACIAL MATTER

ON APRIL TWO, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, MEMPHIS ~~PD~~ Police Department, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, ADVISED THAT THE FUNERAL OF LARRY PAYNE, SEVENTEEN YEAR OLD NEGRO WHO WAS SHOT BY MEMPHIS PD OFFICER AFTER STORE LOOTING GROWING OUT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT RACIAL DISTURBANCE, MEMPHIS, WAS HELD, WITHOUT INCIDENT, AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, MEMPHIS. ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED IN ATTENDANCE DESPITE FACT CHURCH CAN SEAT TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED. BODY INTERRED IMMEDIATELY AFTER FUNERAL. ARKIN ADVISED THAT ANOTHER SANITATION WORKERS SYMPATHY MARCH IS SCHEDULED FOR DOWNTOWN MEMPHIS AFTERNOON OF APRIL TWO.

100-106670-

NOT RECORDED
185 APR 9 1968

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED ON APRIL TWO THAT REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) AIDES RALPH D. ABERNATHY, BERNARD LEE, AND ANDREW M. YOUNG DUE TO ARRIVE MEMPHIS TEN FIFTEEN A.M., APRIL THREE, FROM ATLANTA.

END PAGE ONE

Albert C. Hayden

APR 5 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Included --- letter to White House and Attorney General. Date 4/4/68

ON APRIL TWO A SOURCE ADVISED THAT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, APRIL TWO, REV. JESSE JACKSON OF SCLC'S "OPERATION BREAD BASKET," REV. S. B. KYLES OF METROPOLITAN BAPTIST CHURCH, MEMPHIS, AND REV. EDWARD L. BROWN, MT. PISGAH CME CHURCH, ADVISED THAT WITH SCLC PERSONNEL IN MEMPHIS THAT NIGHTLY MASS STRIKE SUPPORT MEETINGS WILL BE RESUMED, THE FIRST AT MASON TEMPLE ON NIGHT OF APRIL THREE WITH KING AS FEATURED SPEAKER. THEY SAID MASS MARCH WILL BE HELD FRIDAY, APRIL FIVE, AND THAT THEY WILL HAVE SCHOOL CHILDREN PARTICIPATE SINCE MARCHING WITH "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE GREATEST LIVING AMERICAN," WOULD BE MORE EDUCATIONAL THAN BEING IN SCHOOL. WHEN ASKED BY PRESS IF KING WOULD PERSONALLY MARCH, JACKSON SAID KING MIGHT NOT MARCH. HE DID NOT ELABORATE. WHEN ASKED IF SCLC GROUP WOULD VIOLATE A POSSIBLE INJUNCTION AGAINST THEIR MARCHING, JACKSON SAID "THE WHITE MAN HAS ALREADY ENJOINED THE BLACK MAN TO THE GHETTO AND THE WHITE MAN DOESN'T NEED TO VALIDATE IT BY SENDING US A PIECE OF PAPER." KYLES SAID THE PROBLEM FACING MEMPHIS IS NOT MILITANT BLACK YOUTH BUT IS "WHITE RACISM." JACKSON DESCRIBED OPERATION BREAD BASKET AS MASSIVE

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

DRIVE TO FORCE ALL GROCERS IN NEGRO AREA TO CEASE SELLING HART'S BREAD, WONDER BREAD, COCA COLA, AND SEALTEST DAIRY PRODUCTS AS THESE FIRMS DO NOT HIRE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF NEGROES.

ON APRIL TWO LT. ARKIN ADVISED THAT MEMPHIS CITY OFFICIALS ARE CONSIDERING SEEKING A COURT INJUNCTION PROHIBITING ANY MASS MARCH LED BY KING OR AN INJUNCTION SPECIFYING CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A MARCH COULD TAKE PLACE AND ALSO CONSIDERING RESUMPTION OF A CURFEW AND PLACING STRIKE SUPPORT LEADERS UNDER A PEACE AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY BOND.

ARKIN ADVISED THAT REMAINDER OF TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARD, WITH EXCEPTION OF ONE BATTERY CONSISTING OF TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY THREE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE MEMPHIS GUARD UNIT, HAVE LEFT MEMPHIS.

AT THREE ZERO FIVE PM, SIXTY SANITATION WORKERS AND SYMPATHIZERS DEPARTED CLAYBORN TEMPLE CARRYING PLACARDS FOLLOWING THEIR USUAL PARADE MARCH TO BEALE STREET NORTH ON MAIN TO CITY HALL. NO INCIDENTS REPORTED.

memo
~~LHM~~ FOLLOWS. P. END.

CAL

FBI WASH DC

F

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ralph B.

Date April 8, 1968

Reverend RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, 690 La Verne Drive, N. W., Atlanta, Georgia, was interviewed at the Memphis Police Department at 10:55 p.m., April 4, 1968. Reverend ABERNATHY was advised of the Agent's identity and of the nature of the matter under investigation.

Reverend ABERNATHY, who described himself as Vice President at Large and Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, stated he was Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.'s closest associate and stated that he and Dr. KING always shared a room whenever they travelled together. He stated that at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968, he and Dr. KING registered at the Lorraine Motel, Memphis, Tennessee.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that on April 4, 1968, he and Dr. KING did not leave the motel and spent most of the day in their room, #306, which is located on the second floor of the motel. He stated that he and Dr. KING had been gone from their room for approximately one hour or less when they returned to the room at about 5:30 p.m. He said they got dressed as they were going to dinner at the home of Reverend BILLY KYLE and that at almost exactly 6 p.m. they started to leave the room. Reverend ABERNATHY stopped for a moment and Dr. KING walked out onto the balcony just outside the door to his room. Reverend ABERNATHY was still inside the motel room but could hear Dr. KING discussing the dinner engagement with other associates who Reverend ABERNATHY believes were standing in the parking area of the motel underneath and to the front of the balcony on which Dr. KING was standing.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated he heard what sounded like a firecracker and then heard the screams of persons to whom Dr. KING had been talking. Reverend ABERNATHY went then to the balcony and discovered Dr. KING lying there wounded in the right side of the face and neck. He said he believed Dr. KING attempted to speak to him but was unable to do so. Reverend ABERNATHY said he instructed someone to call an ambulance and then accompanied Dr. KING in the ambulance to the hospital where Dr. KING subsequently died.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 4/4/68 at Memphis, Tennessee File # Memphis 44-1987

by SA JOE C. HESTER: bn Date dictated 4/8/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that judging from the sound of the noise it appeared that the shot came from directly in front of the door and not from any great distance. He stated he did not observe anything that would indicate who fired the shot. Reverend ABERNATHY also stated that while they were in the motel room Dr. KING did not, to his knowledge, receive any telephone calls of a threatening nature or calls from persons who would not identify themselves. Reverend ABERNATHY said Dr. KING had not feared that any particular persons might harm him and Reverend ABERNATHY was unable to suggest any suspects or to provide any other information which might assist in identifying Dr. KING's killer.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

11:17PM URGENT 3-28-68 ARK

TO DIRECTOR (100-106670) AND MEMPHIS

FROM ATLANTA (100-5586)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM-C.

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE. RM.

IN FORMANT

AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT FOUR THIRTY PM MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

INFORMANT'S INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM DISCUSSION SHORTLY BEFORE WITH HOSEA WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, SCLC, CURRENTLY IN ATLANTA, WHO DURING LATE AFTERNOON MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, CONFERRED TELEPHONICALLY WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., PRESIDENT, SCLC; RALPH D. ABERNATHY, VICE PRESIDENT AND TEASURER, SCLC; AND BERNARD LEE, SPECIAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, SCLC.

KING, ABERNATHY, AND LEE ARE CURRENTLY IN ROOM EIGHT ZERO ONE, HOLIDAY INN, MEMPHIS.

WITH REFERENCE TO RACIAL DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, KING IS EXTREMELY DEJECTED. HE AND ABERNATHY STRONGLY FEEL DISTURBANCE ON THIS DATE DELIBERATELY PLANNED

EX-115 REC-9 100-106670-3278

XEROX 1968

APR 15 1968

8 APR 5 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

BY NEGROES WHO ARE NEITHER SYMPATHETIC TO KING OR SCLC. IDENTITY OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS NOT KNOWN.

ABERNATHY, LEE AND WILLIAMS ARE GREATLY CONCERNED FOR WELFARE OF KING, PARTICULARLY ON NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, WHEN HE EXPECTS TO PARTICIPATE IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION WITH SANITATION WORKERS. AT PRESENT TIME KING DOES NOT FEEL HE SHOULD LEAVE MEMPHIS. DURATION OF STAY AND FURTHER DETAILS IN THIS CONNECTION NOT KNOWN.

ACCORDING TO WILLIAMS, HE, ABERNATHY, AND LEE STRONGLY FEEL SAME ELEMENTS WHICH CAUSED DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS EARLIER MARCH TWENTYEIGHT MAY CAUSE PERSONAL HARM TO KING EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

[illegible]

INFORMATION FROM AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R MUST BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. MEMPHIS, HOWEVER, SHOULD ADVISE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF NOT ALREADY KNOWN THAT KING CONTEMPLATES PARTICIPATING IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT AND THAT IN VIEW OF EARLIER DISTURBANCES IN MEMPHIS ON THIS DATE, SEVERAL RANKING SCLC OFFICIALS APPREHENSIVE FOR PERSONAL WELFARE OF KING.

PAGE THREE

FOREGOING INFORMATION TELEPHONICALLY FURNISHED MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

RECEIVED: 11:39PM RM

MAR 29 1968

Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

1256AM URGXENT 3-29-68 DGB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS (157-1094)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, ~~RM.~~ Racial Matter

RE MEMPHIS TELS, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT ACTIVITIES;

ON MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, MEMPHIS POLICE DEPT., ADVISED THAT THE MASS MARCH TO BE LED BY REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IN SUPPORT OF SANITATION WORKERS STARTED AT AROUND ELEVEN AM CST WITH ESTIMATED FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND WORKERS, MANY OF WHOM WERE NEGRO TEENAGERS. MARCH STARTED AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, LOCATED HEART OF NEGRO AREA, AND KING JOINED MARCH AFTER IT PROGRESSED ONE BLOCK. HE WALKED WITH MARCHERS TO VICINITY BEALE AND MAIN STREETS, MADE NO SPEECHES PRIOR TO MARCH, MADE NO KNOWN UTTERANCES DURING MARCH, AND BY TIME HE REACHED ABOVE POINT RAMPANT BREAKING OF STORE WINDOWS AND LOOTING WAS BEING PERPETRATED BY MARCHERS, WHEREUPON KING AND A FEW ASSOCIATES RAN TO A NEARBY CAR AND LEFT MARCH, PROCEED TO RIVERMONT MOTEL WHERE THEY REMAINED THROUGH AFTERNOON AND EVENING. BY NOON, POLICE HAD BROKEN UP CROWD, BEING FORCED TO USE TEARGAS, BUT SPORADIC LOOTING HAS CONTINUED THROUGH AFTERNOON

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Included in letter to White House
and Attorney General. Date

1CC 110
1CC

NOT RECORDED
162 APR 4 1968

70 APR 1 2 1968

PAGE TWO

AND EVENING, PRIMARILY CONFINED TO SOUTH CENTRAL AREA OF MEMPHIS, A PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO AREA, PRIMARY TARGET OF LOOTERS BEING LIQUOR STORES AND SMALL GROCERIES.

TENNESSEE STATE LEGISLATURE TODAY PASSED CURFEW BILL, WHICH WAS INVOKED BY MEMPHIS MAYOR HENRY LOEB, EFFECTIVE SEVEN PM, AND THIRTY FIVE HUNDRED TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARDSMEN FROM MEMPHIS AND WEST TENNESSEE ARE CURRENTLY ON DUTY IN MEMPHIS OPERATING AS TACTICAL UNITS, BEING ACCOMPANIED ON THEIR PATROLS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMPHIS PD.

SCHEDULED MASS RALLY TO FEATURE KING NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT CANCELED. AT TWELVE MIDNIGHT, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, THREE HUNDRED ARRESTS, PRIMARILY RELATING TO LOOTING AND CURFEW VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY POLICE DEPT. FOUR INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN SHOT, ONE OF THESE, A SIXTEEN YEAR OLD BOY, WAS KILLED IN ACT OF LOOTING A STORE. THREE OTHERS WERE SHOT, TWO BY POLICE OFFICERS AND ONE BY A STOREKEEPER WHILE LOOTING, NONE SERIOUSLY INJURED.

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED THAT KING, RALPH ABERNATHY, AND BERNARD LEE, FAILED TO LEAVE MEMPHIS ON EASTERN FLIGHT THREE NINE EIGHT, NINE ZERO FIVE CST, DUE TO ARRIVE ATLANTA ELEVEN ZERO THREE PM EST. THIS ALSO CANCELS KING'S AND LEE'S FLIGHT FROM ATLANTA SIX TWENTY AM MARCH TWENTY NINE DUE TO ARRIVE BALTIMORE SEVEN FORTY TWO AM. INSPECTOR G. P. TINES, MEMPHIS PD, ADVISED KING PLANNING TO STAY IN MEMPHIS AT RIVERMONT HOTEL TONIGHT, FUTURE PLANS UNKNOWN AT PRESENT TIME. P.

CORR ~~PAGE TWO, PARA ONE,~~ LINE ONE WORDS EIGHT, NINE, AND TEN SHLD BE "AREA OF MEMPHIS" AND LINE TWO, PARA ONE, WORD FIVE ~~SHLD BE "PRIMARY"~~

PAGE ~~TWO PARA THREE,~~ LINE ONE WORD SIX SHLD BE "KING" AND LINE THREE WORD ~~THREE SHLD BE "PRIMARILY" AND A PERIOD SHLD BE BETWEEN~~ "DEPT. AND FOUR" ONEXXX ON LINE FOUR.

PAGE ~~TWO PARA~~ ONE LINE THREE WORD ONE SHLD BE "LIQUOR"

END.

HFL

FBI WASH DC cc - Mr. Trainor

P

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/18/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. A. Newman

SUBJECT: DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

During a conference on 7/16/75 between the Assistant Attorney General, J. Stanley Pottinger, and his staff and the Director of the FBI and his staff, a question arose concerning Martin Luther King's alleged moving from one hotel or motel to another hotel or motel in Memphis, Tennessee, prior to his murder on 4/4/68.

Attached is a letterhead memorandum (LHM) setting forth an inquiry including a review of all appropriate Bureau files regarding a proposal made in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 3/29/68 in connection with the counterintelligence program wherein it was recommended that information be made available to a cooperative news media source showing King to be a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on 3/28/68, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel). The LHM will reflect and document the fact that although a notation appears on the memorandum that it was "handled" there is no information available to reflect that it was ever actually given to a cooperative news source. Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh (retired), who placed the notation "handled" on the document, absolutely has no recollection of this matter nor can he state whether or not the information was disseminated.

REC-88 100-106670

The time elements as documented in this LHM would preclude the proposal contained in the 3/29/68 memorandum of having any affect upon King's cnoice of a motel in which to reside.

JUL 29 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached LHM along with attachments be disseminated to the Department.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Delivered 7/22/75 to Pottinger's office

HAN:cah (6)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 26, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore GCM

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/

PURPOSE:

To recommend item be furnished cooperative national news media source by Crime Records, designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising for the Washington Spring Project.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has now scheduled the Washington Spring Project, his "poor people's march on Washington, D. C.," for the latter part of April, 1968. King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) has sent out a mailing to 70,000 potential financial contributors. King asked these 70,000 to contribute to the Washington Spring Project for the feeding and housing of the marchers.

At the same time, churches in the Washington, D. C., area have said they will feed and house King's marchers.

SUGGESTION:

REC-0 812405

That the above facts be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division so that a story could be

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. M. Wells
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC 35

100-448006-

EX 106

15 APR 9 1968

Enclosure
TJD:df/dsm (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

given nation-wide circulation that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people he solicited. Since the churches have offered support, no more money is needed and any contributed would only be used by King for other purposes. This item would need nation-wide circulation in order to reach all the potential contributors and curtail their donations. A sample item is attached.

ACTION:

That the facts about King's solicitation of funds unnecessarily be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division.

✓

Handled 4/4/68

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), today finds himself in the embarrassing position of having too much money, or at least the probability of too much money. The SCLC sent out a huge mailing to its contributors pleading for funds for the Washington Spring Project, the "poor people's march on Washington." Thousands of contributors were urged to support the march financially in order to feed and house the demonstrators. But the churches in the Washington, D. C., area have offered to house and feed the demonstrators.

Now the contributions are beginning to roll in from the mailing and King doesn't need the money. An embarrassment of riches has befallen King, who will only use the money for other purposes. The churches had better come through with all the housing and support the demonstrators need, because there will be little money left for the "poor people" by the time the march rolls around.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-448006-8

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 8C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
[illegible]
[illegible]
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Sullivan DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
RACIAL MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

A sanitation workers strike has been going on in Memphis for some time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis. King was in an automobile preceding the marchers. As the march developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke out including the breaking of windows in stores and some looting.

This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called nonviolence advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience for Washington in April.

REC-19
EX-105 157-9146-38
5 APR 2 1968

ACTION:

Attached is a blind memorandum pointing ~~out the~~ above, which if you approve, should be made available by Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources. (Com strictly confidential)

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

TDR:fhd (6)

FBI

Wed

OK H

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Deakin

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5 APR 1968

RACIAL INT. SECT.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

AUG 30 1968

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, injected himself into the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and the result of King's famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism, looting, and riot.

Previously, King involved himself in this strike, called for a general strike, and called for a mass march. Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of the line. Negroes began shouting "black power" and trouble began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and looting broke out.

Police officers were forced to use gas to break up the march and to control the crowd. It was necessary to activate the National Guard. Martin Luther King claims his much-heralded march on Washington, scheduled for April 22, 1968, will also be "nonviolent." He says he has persuaded militant black nationalists to abandon violent extremism in Washington, D. C., during the march. Memphis may only be the prelude to civil strife in our Nation's Capitol.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

157-9146-38

ENCLOSURE

~~157~~

XEROX
APR 4 1968

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
D HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
RT, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 25, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

I would appreciate your making available to the Committee the following items in connection with our investigation of the King matter:

1. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between one Val Coleman and Special Agent Harold Linebaugh or any other FBI Headquarters officials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

2. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between any FBI Headquarters officials and any representatives of the news media concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

3. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to a meeting between Ralph Abernathy and either FBI Director Hoover or Cartha DeLoach during December 1964 or January 1965 (other than the December 1, 1964 meeting which was attended by Dr. King and the January 11, 1965 meeting which was attended by Andrew Young).

4. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to the following statement which appears in the second paragraph of the September 11, 1964 memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - Communist":

RECEIVED
DEC 1 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1210X

On that occasion Assistant Director DeLoach's office was able to take appropriate action to forestall the publication of the article.

5. The 7/16/64 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan which is noted in handwriting at the bottom of the second page of the July 15, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

6. With respect to the March 29, 1968 memorandum, with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" please provide:

a. Access to original of this memorandum and its enclosure;

b. Access to all extant "tickler" and/any other copies of this memorandum and its attachment in their original form;

c. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memorandum. ~~(This should include any and all information adduced, collected, and/or prepared in connection with Mr. James Adams' testimony on this subject before the Senate Select Committee on November 18, 1975.)~~

d. All memoranda and any other materials received from FBI field offices or written at FBI Headquarters prior to and pertaining to the recommendation contained in the March 29, 1968 memorandum.

7. With respect to the memorandum with enclosure, from W. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 26, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)", please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

8. With respect to a memorandum with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan, dated 3/28/68, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

9. Responses to Items 6, 7, and 8 should include copies of all newspaper clippings or magazine articles contained in FBI files which contain information set forth in the memoranda and/or enclosures identified in Items 6, 7, and 8 above.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 1, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated November 25, 1975, requesting various information regarding the King matter. Please prepare an appropriate response to this request.

EX-110

cc: Paul Daly

REC-60

62-116395-1210X

7 MAR 5 1976

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

1-Ad Hoc
12-3-75

5-Ph/1/75

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 11/28/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY

Removed By 7 9 JAN 1 1976

File Number 62-116395-1210

Permanent Serial Charge Out

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

The Attorney General

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP3ALM KP

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum, with attachment, concerning an interview of former FBI Assistant Director Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum, with attachment, for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Your specific attention is invited to certain information relating to the interview of Wick suggestive of improprieties on the part of an SSC Staff Member. The facts, as known to this Bureau, are as follows.

Wick first contacted this Bureau concerning the interview by telephone on November 5, 1975, to advise that he had been called on October 31, 1975, by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein representing the SSC. Epstein requested Wick to come to Washington, D. C., for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his "employment." Epstein did not further describe the subject matter of the interview and an appointment was arranged for November 7, 1975. Wick said that he was uncertain as to the probable subject matter of the interview because other matters coming within his responsibilities as Vice President of Pan American World Airways which were unrelated to the FBI, have been of recent interest to the SSC. Wick asked for advice of the FBI concerning this matter. Thereupon, the Legal Counsel Division of this Bureau contacted Epstein and determined that the subject matter of the interview of Wick would be Martin Luther King, Jr. A return call was made to Wick on November 5, 1975, to advise him that this Bureau had learned that the subject matter of the interview would be Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395-1209X

REC-51

3 JAN 13 1976

1 - 67 (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

SFP:mjg
(11)

2

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

✓ S. F. Phillips
4043

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JAN 20 1976

On November 6, 1975, Wick again telephoned this Bureau and advised that he had been rather annoyed at Epstein's initial approach to him; particularly, because Wick had tried on more than one occasion during the telephone conversation with Epstein to pry from Epstein the subject matter of the interview but Epstein persisted in not advising him.

This Bureau's representative who had determined from Epstein on November 5, 1975, the subject matter of the interview has advised that when he made the inquiry of Epstein, he asked Epstein why he had not told Wick the subject matter. Epstein's reply was that Wick had not asked him, a statement directly contradictory to Wick's advice to this Bureau.

The second suggested impropriety is that Epstein contacted Wick prior to advising this Bureau of his intention to interview Wick, an action which is contrary to procedures which have been agreed upon between the SSC and this Bureau.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

62-116395

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S.F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (AD) ROBERT WICK
BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/SP

This memorandum concerns an interview of former FBI AD Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members.

On November 5, 1975, Wick advised this Bureau that on October 31, 1975, he had been contacted by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein of the SSC who requested Wick to come to Washington for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his employment. Epstein did not further describe the subject matter although Wick attempted to obtain such information from Epstein.

Upon receipt of the above information from Wick, this Bureau determined from Epstein that the subject matter was to be Martin Luther King, Jr., and that fact was relayed to Wick on November 5, 1975. Wick was also told that he was being released from his secrecy agreement with the FBI for the purpose of the interview, confined to the indicated subject matter. Wick was also advised by this Bureau that he was not required to answer questions falling within four privileged areas: matters pertaining to pending investigations; information from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies; information concerning sensitive methods and techniques; and information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources.

Attached hereto is a copy of a MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE dated November 12, 1975, which Wick voluntarily furnished this Bureau and which represents his report pertaining to the interview.

Enclosure

1 - 67- (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SFP:mjg (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

[illegible]

62-116395-1209

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Assistant Director (AD)
Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members

NOTE:

Information relating to contacts between Wick and this Bureau are reported in memoranda 11/5/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," and 11/7/75 from W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall "Senstudy 75." Wick's statement, MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE, was mailed to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The matter of improprieties was addressed specifically in the above 11/7/75 Cregar memorandum and it is believed that the Department should be made aware of this matter.

Let 4-4-NM to AG Encl (2)

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☒	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former Assistant Director Robert Wick

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interviewed regarding his knowledge of the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

76-1001/9

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
~~Telephone Rm.~~
Director Sec'y

F B I

Date: 12/9/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION & ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

FROM: ADIC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243)

RE: SENSTUDY, TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS, AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR W. RAYMOND WANNALL 12/2/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/ag

Re Los Angeles phone call to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS, 12/9/75.

On 12/3/75, the attached article appeared in the Los Angeles Times under the byline of reporter JACK NELSON. As indicated, the headline and lead paragraph which supposedly is based on ADAMS' testimony, clearly reflects that the FBI did nothing to prevent Klan violence although we knew of the contemplated violence. After discussing this matter with Mr. ADAMS and reviewing the actual testimony received in the Los Angeles Division on 12/8/75, SAC ELMER F. LINBERG and I met with Editor BILL THOMAS and National Editor ED GUTHMAN at the Los Angeles Times.

I advised these gentlemen that I was aghast when I read the headlines and the lead paragraph of this article and could not believe that JIM ADAMS did not refute informant ROWE's testimony that we took no action relative to contemplated violence since I knew that this was contrary to the rules, regulations, policy, and philosophy of the FBI in 1960. I then called Mr. ADAMS in Washington, D. C., and he likewise, was upset over the headline and lead paragraph,

ENCLOSURE

EX-112

REC-38

62-116395-1209

3 - Bureau (1 Encl)
1 - Los Angeles
REG:mmb
(4)

17 DEC 12 1975

Approved: JAN 7 1976
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

because, according to ADAMS, he completely refuted these statements in that we did disseminate the contemplated plans of violence to the Birmingham Police Department and to the Department of Justice in the form of a letterhead memorandum.

I continued that I waited until I received the actual transcript of testimony and told the gentlemen that upon my review of the testimony of Mr. ADAMS and Mr. WANNALL, I could not reconcile the headline and lead paragraph with such testimony. I then proceeded to read several excerpts from the testimony.

I advised Mr. THOMAS and Mr. GUTHMAN that my immediate reaction was to prepare a "Letter to the Editor" but felt after a re-analysis of the situation that this is not a judgment question on the part of the newspaper, but one of a slanted, inaccurate story either by design or through misunderstanding. I therefore felt that the Los Angeles Times, if it so desired, should be in a position to correct the situation itself based on the facts.

Mr. THOMAS expressed appreciation for my approach and stated that at the time he read the article, already printed, a question came to his mind as to why the FBI did not advise someone or take some action relative to contemplated violence. He, however, took no further action. He said in view of what I had read from excerpts of Mr. ADAMS' testimony and the now available complete transcript of the testimony, he intends to pursue this matter further and would prefer not to have a "letter to the Editor", but rather correct any inaccuracies on the part of the Los Angeles Times through their own pursuit of further inquiring concerning this story.

Mr. GUTHMAN concurred with Mr. THOMAS and they indicated that it appears the obvious question is based on Mr. ADAMS' testimony of who in the Department of Justice received this information relative to contemplated violence and what did such a responsible Department of Justice official do with the information. He agreed that based on the information furnished to them, the FBI has been done an injustice but that they, the Los Angeles Times, desired to pursue this matter further.

It should be noted the article of JACK NELSON is based on one specific situation, namely the testimony of former informant GARY ROWE that he had furnished advance information to the FBI to the effect that members of the Ku Klux Klan would be given the opportunity to beat members of the Freedom Riders without interference by law enforcement authorities for approximately 15 minutes after which the local law enforcement authorities would take action, and that the FBI was advised of this well in advance of such beatings and furthermore, the FBI took no action to prevent this violence.

Took No Action to Prevent Klan Violence, FBI Admits

BY JACK NELSON
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—An FBI official conceded Tuesday that the bureau had failed to use an undercover man's information to head off Ku Klux Klan violence in Alabama in the 1960s.

But, the official, James B. Adams, assistant to the director, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the FBI was "just as frustrated as anyone else" at "rank lawlessness" that existed in Alabama at that time. Also, he said, the FBI is an investigative agency and has no enforcement powers.

Adams' defense of the FBI came immediately after Gary Thomas Rowe Jr., wearing a hood to conceal his features, testified that on many occasions he had warned the bureau of the klan's plans for violence, but that the violence occurred without official interference.



WITNESS—Gary Thomas Rowe Jr. wears hood while testifying.

AP Wirephoto

Rowe served six years as an FBI undercover agent before surfacing in 1965 as the star witness against three klansmen accused of killing a white civil rights worker in Lowndes County, Ala. Since then he has been living in Southern California under an assumed name.

Please Turn to Page 6, Col. 1

KLAN VIOLENCE

Continued from First Page

Rowe was one of two former undercover operatives who testified before the committee Tuesday. The other, Mary Jo Cook of Buffalo, N.Y., told of supplying the FBI with information about 1,000 persons while serving as an informant against the Vietnam Veterans Against the War during 1973-74.

Testimony by both witnesses prompted committee members to criticize FBI tactics and to suggest that legal restraints be put on future FBI activities.

Sen. Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), commenting on testimony by Rowe that he engaged in klan violence with the knowledge and approval of the FBI, observed that the bureau's infiltration of the klan not only failed to prevent violence, "but indeed may have contributed to it."

Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-Mont.) told Adams that the FBI had bungled its job in investigating political activities and added:

"It has interfered with civil liberties and finally in the last month or two through its public disclosures has heaped shame upon itself and really led toward the undermining of crucial public confidence essential to law enforcement agencies in the country."

Mondale criticized the FBI for trying to "protect people from subversive and dangerous ideas," and he told Adams:

"Time and time again, we're going to protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous. We're going to protect veterans from whatever it is, we're going to protect the (National) Council of Churches from veterans and so on . . .

"Don't you agree with me that we've got to control this, restrain it, define it, so that precisely what's expected of the FBI is known by you and by the public and you can justify your actions when we ask you?"

Adams disagreed that the FBI had bungled in the political intelligence field but agreed that restraining legislation was in order.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Los Angeles Times

12/3/75

62-116395-1209

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN
DATE: 12-3-75

FROM : T. J. JENKINS

SUBJECT: GARY T. ROWE
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE

On 12-3-75 ~~an individual who identified~~ himself as Garland Reeves of the Birmingham, Alabama, News, called and he advised that he understood I was the Special Agent in Charge of the Birmingham Office at the time the bus was burned with the Freedom Riders in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1961. He stated that he would like to know if Rowe had furnished us information that the Birmingham Police were going to wait 15 or 30 minutes to go to the bus station in order to give the Klan an opportunity to work over the Freedom Riders. I informed Reeves that I recalled no such information being furnished to us at that time. I told him that all information we received concerning possible violence was furnished to the Birmingham Police Department. He wanted to know, if there had been such an agreement what action would I take. I told him that if I determined that the police department would not take any action for 15 or 30 minutes I would advise the Mayor ~~and~~ of the city and the Police Commissioner and if they felt the same as the police department, I would then advise the Governor of the State.

EX 100 REC 4 62-116395-1208

He wanted to know what would be the FBI's position at that time if the police department refused to take any action. I told him that we did not have jurisdiction in matters of this nature, that they were purely local and it was the responsibility of the local authorities to handle such matters. He desired to know if I would call out the Federal Marshals. I informed him that the FBI did not have any authority to call upon the Federal Marshals in a situation of this nature but if such a situation arose, I would have immediately notified our headquarters in Washington, who would have ~~notified the~~ Department of Justice, who would have such authority.

7 DEC 16 1975

I told him that while I was in Birmingham as Special Agent in Charge we kept the Bureau headquarters in Washington completely informed of all developments and they in turn, kept the Department of Justice informed.

ACTION: Submitted for information.

TJJ:pmd (5)
1 - Mr. Adams 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/K9

59 DEC 30 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

WRW/LAC

FBI

Date: 12/4/75

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714)

SENSTUDY 75

Re San Diego telephone call to Bureau, 12/4/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of a letterhead memorandum reflecting information received in the San Diego Office concerning GARY THOMAS ROWE, Jr.

Deputy SCOTT BOIES of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office was contacted and advised that if he felt he recognized ROWE that he should not discuss the matter openly with anyone in that ROWE was obviously attempting to protect his identity. Deputy BOIES was not advised that ROWE was identical with THOMAS NEIL MOORE.

extra cc destroyed

2 - Bureau (Encs - 8)
1 - San Diego

DCS:pgh
(3)

1 - The Attorney General
1 - (1 - Senate [illegible] Comm [illegible])
Not sent

Letter to U.S. Atty [illegible] Memo
12/[illegible]

UNREC COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

REC-100

62-116395-1206X

2-6 ~~DEC 9~~ 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

WOC

Approved: RLM/C
Special Agent in Charge

Sent __________ M Per __________

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
December 4, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: GARY THOMAS ROWE, JR.

At 11:30 p.m. on December 2, 1975, Deputy Sheriff Scott Boies of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office, Lemon Grove, California Sub-Station, telephonically contacted the San Diego FBI Office and advised as follows:

Deputy Boies stated that he recognized the voice of the man identified as Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who is testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on the Ku Klux Klan. He stated he heard Mr. Rowe talk on a news broadcast and recognized him as being an individual he knows as Thomas Neil Moore. Deputy Boies furnished Moore's date of birth as August 15, 1933, and an address of 580 "L" Street, Chula Vista, California, where Moore resided in 1971. Deputy Boies stated that Moore worked for Western Bureau of Investigation, headquartered in Los Angeles and worked as a security guard for the White Front Department Store, Chula Vista, California.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-1206X

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

December 12, 1975

Director, FBI

REC-100

62-116395-1206X

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. Klein

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to my November 26, 1975, letter to you enclosing among other material, a memorandum concerning former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is a copy of a memorandum dated December 4, 1975, regarding Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., received by FBI Headquarters from our San Diego field office.

Rowe, is a former informant who testified before the SSC on December 2, 1975, regarding his role in supplying information to the FBI regarding Ku Klux Klan activities in Alabama. He has been utilizing the cover name, Thomas Neil Moore.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the December 4, 1975, memorandum.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 137-6295

SK:klm
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 137-6295

No 1 Sent to SSC Per Steve Blackhurst, USDJ 3.23.76 ARB

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

84 FEB 12 1976

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE:

Above being furnished to the Attorney General and the SSC in order to apprise them of information reflecting that Rowe, who testified with a mask over his face, was identified by a San Diego Deputy Sheriff after hearing Rowe's voice on a news broadcast. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/4/75

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TESTIMONY BY THE DIRECTOR
DECEMBER 9, 1975

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO CHANGE
THE NAME OF THE J. EDGAR HOOVER
FBI BUILDING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/lp

In connection with the Director's appearance on December 9, 1975, to testify before captioned committee, it is possible that he may be asked concerning recent proposals in the Congress to change the name of the building. Three bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives on December 1, 1975, for that purpose. H.R. 10905, introduced by Congressman Gude of Maryland and H.R. 10918, introduced by Congresswoman Schroeder of Colorado, would change the name of the building to "FBI Building." H.R. 10916, introduced by Congressman Rangel of New York, would change the name to "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building." All three of the bills were referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House, the chairman of which is Congressman Jones of Alabama.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information of the Director in connection with his preparation for testimony.

EX 104 REC-9 62-116395-1206

JAM

Enc.

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Mintz

DEC 16 1975

JAM:mfd
(6)

XEROX
DEC 19 1975

COPY FILED IN

84 DEC 30 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mr. GUDE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" wherever it appears in such section and inserting in lieu thereof "F.B.I. Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

By Mr. GUDE

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE ______ BY ______

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mrs. SCHROEDER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP3ALM/KP

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Public Law 92–520 is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 8. The Federal building in the block bounded by Ninth Street Northwest, Tenth Street Northeast, E Street Northwest, and Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest, in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter be known as the 'F.B.I. Building'. Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, record, or other paper of the United States to such

Federal building shall be held to be a reference to the "F.B.I. Building'".

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

By Mrs. SCHROEDER

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mr. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" both times it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

By Mr. RANGEL

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Stack
1 - Mr. McWright

Mr. Jenkins 11/28/75

J. Cochran, Jr.

REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

Seriatim

Re memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11/21/75, advising that representatives of captioned Senate Subcommittee desire to review any Bureau documents relating to the Bureau's interest in or use of drugs during interrogation.

It was pointed out in referenced memo that captioned Subcommittee staff members James F. Michie and Thomas M. Susman had obtained information from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning a program coordinated between DOD, CIA, and FBI to develop a truth serum. The program apparently began in early 1950 and D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory had knowledge of this activity.

The information that Michie and Susman have obtained apparently relates to a Navy drug experimentation project from 1947 to 1954. Navy files indicated that the FBI was aware of this program and Mr. C. D. DeLoach and D. J. Parsons were mentioned.

A review of Bureau files disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the Navy drug project. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-2699-

62-2699

Enclosure

(1) 62-116395

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Adams
2 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Hotis)
(Attn: Mr. Miller)
3 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. W. O. Cregar)
(Attn: Mr. T. D. J. Brooks)
(Attn: Mr. V. H. Weimar)

CGM:bms
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

CONTINUED - OVER

NOT RECORDED
46 FEB 5 1976

84 FEB 9 1976

might be used to great advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50.

Memorandum dated 11/6/75 from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall is attached which sets forth details of our review of Navy files on this project, including a Bureau press release which was to have been made in the event that the Navy mentioned the FBI in their press release on this matter.

A review of Bureau files for information relating to drugs designed to modify behavior indicates an interest dating back to 1922. However, this interest has not extended to the point where the Bureau has conducted research on behavior modifying drugs nor has it funded such research. We have maintained liaison with other agencies, primarily the U. S. Army, and industrial organizations in order to be aware of developments in this area.

On 7/30/74, Laboratory and Training Division representatives met with representatives of the Biomedical and Chemical Laboratories of Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, to discuss the potential use of incapacitating chemical agents in hostage situations. Although we have developed an awareness of various agents which may be used in these situations, we have not conducted any research with these agents. Memoranda on this matter are located in Bufile 80-807.

A single instance occurred where "truth serum" was administered in a Bureau case. Truth serum was administered to Thurman Scruggs Wilkins at his own request while being interviewed in the Los Angeles Office, April 26, 1947. Wilkins was allegedly involved with one Ignacy Samuel Witczak, the subject of a Soviet espionage case (100-343077). The actual drug used was sodium amytal and the actual administration was done by a physician. Prior Bureau authority was not obtained by the Los Angeles Office in connection with this incident. SAC Hood submitted a letter of explanation to the Bureau on July 2, 1947. This incident resulted in the following information being set forth in SAC Letter 84-47 dated July 3, 1947:

Memorandum J. Cochran, Jr. to Mr. Jenkins
RE: REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

"The Bureau will not tolerate any experiments or participation on the part of its personnel in the utilization of the so called truth serums or other chemicals alleged to have a similar effect. ---- consequently, in the event any Bureau agent violates these instructions, drastic administrative action will be taken."

There was nothing found in Bureau files that would indicate that we have received any documents from CIA concerning their drug research programs. The files do reflect that we were aware that CIA was conducting research with lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and that British Intelligence had successfully utilized LSD on several Russian espionage agents. The information concerning CIA and British activities is set out for the benefit of the Director only and cannot be released outside the Bureau.

There are two Bureau files which contain most of the information relating to the immediate area of interest of the captioned Senate Subcommittee. These files are 62-2699 (Truth Serums) and 80-645 (Chemical Munitions and Gases). Pertinent serials may also be found in 80-807 and 100-343077 as previously noted in this memorandum.

I see no reason why Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman should not be afforded an oral briefing regarding these matters, and if necessary make pertinent serials of Bufiles 62-2699, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077 available to them for review.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman be advised by Legal Counsel that available Bureau records and interview with current knowledgeable employee indicate the FBI has never engaged in nor funded anyone's efforts in research and/or development programs in the use or effect of drugs on human behavior. They should be advised our efforts in this regard as far as can be established from the available records consists of following through liaison contacts with other government agencies and the private sector sources the current developments in behavior modifying drugs.

Memorandum J. Cochran, Jr. to Mr. Jenkins
RE: REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

(2) That if they desire to pursue this matter further, SA McWright and myself be permitted to meet with Michie and Susman to (a) reaffirm the information in recommendation #1 and (b) if necessary, to produce for their inspection pertinent serials from 62-6299, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. J. Cochran

Mr. W. R. Wannall

11/6/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. C. G. McWright
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

W. O. Cregar

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

This is to inform you that on 11/7/75 Defense Department will release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC), the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures (Senator Edward M. Kennedy's committee), and to the press, information concerning Navy projects from 1947 to 1954 involving drug experimentation; a Navy file indicates FBI was aware of programs but Laboratory has no knowledge of any active participation by Bureau personnel.

On 11/4/75, Clark McGruder, Assistant to Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Director of Naval Intelligence, informed me that on 11/7/75 the Navy was going to release to aforementioned committees and the press information on drug experimentation and that the FBI was mentioned in the pertinent files. Those files were reviewed at the Pentagon on 11/6/75 by Supervisor J. P. Thomas of INTD. They had been classified "Secret" and "Top Secret" but now have been completely declassified. FBI was mentioned in connection with three projects. There are no FBI documents in the files.

A memorandum dated 9/21/50 from Mr. Alberti to Mr. C. D. DeLoach was a receipt signed by Mr. DeLoach for one copy of "Drugs Stated To Have Been Used By Russians And Germans In Interrogation Techniques." Alberti is identified elsewhere in the file as Jack H. Alberti, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), who apparently coordinated the projects mentioned in the file. The purpose of one project was to develop a speech-inducing drug to obtain intelligence from interrogees and the project began in 1947.

Enclosures
62-116395

CONTINUED
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

A memorandum dated 8/15/~~75~~ 50 on letterhead of Office of Chief of Naval Operations concerned "Top Secret Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI) Project on Speech-Inducing Drugs," reported a meeting on 8/11/50 attended by personnel of NMRI, CIA, Office of Naval Research (ONR), a drug company representative and Mr. DeLoach and Mr. D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the FBI on a CIA project on narco-hypnosis and on the NMRI project. Parsons reportedly said the FBI had no such project, but had information on the experiences of various police departments in the United States with speech-inducing drugs. He agreed to make the FBI information available to NMRI and CIA. ONR agreed to give FBI, NMRI and CIA a study by ONR on projected research to improve polygraph reliability. Recipients were to give their comments and recommendations on the study to ONR. At the meeting NMRI gave DeLoach an 8/11/50 NMRI progress report on its project. Parsons agreed to look into the possibility of getting volunteers from prisoners in Federal institutions and to supply NMRI with canabis (marijuana) and heroin to the extent they might be available to the FBI. It is noted that no FBI representatives were listed in the memorandum reporting a 9/27/50 meeting of this group and there is no further record in the file of FBI participation. Neither is there any record that the FBI supplied any drugs for the project.

Material regarding project "CHATTER" included a carbon copy of a rough draft memorandum (no letterhead) bearing the penciled date "11/50?" which contained the following, "Since 1947 the Department of the Navy has carried on a project in coordination with the Departments of the Air Force and Army, CIA and FBI for the development of speech-inducing drugs.... The Directors of Intelligence of the three Services, of CIA and FBI consider this project

CONTINUED - OVER

of utmost important and urgency to... fulfillment of their missions for the security of the United States." The memorandum says that a project submitted to ONR by Professor Richard Wendt of the University of Rochester (NY) had been approved by all the agencies involved and recommended funding the project. The file indicates subsequently that this project did go forward and involve human experimentation.

~~The second~~ Another file dealt with project "CALLING CARD," 1952-1953, designed "to render an individual subservient to impose(will or control." FBI was not mentioned.

80-5 (Polygraph file) relates only to instrumental Detection of deception

A memorandum dated 9/5/50 for Mr. D. J. Parsons, FBI; C. Edwards, CIA; and Captain Wilbur E. Kellum of Naval Medical Research, from W. S. Post, Jr. (not further identified), informed them that a copy of the report on the "Ellson" project (University of Indiana, 1952) was being forwarded to them for information. The project involved research in the detection of deception. The addressees were to be briefed by Professor D. G. Ellson of Indiana University on the project at a future date. The file did not show that the briefing occurred. The project was terminated in June, 1952.

The two files reviewed contained many reports of research conducted concerning various drugs in various parts of the world, constituting a collection of papers on the subject by U. S. and foreign researchers.

A review of logical Bureau files by the Laboratory Division disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the above. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which might be used to great

CONTINUED - OVER

advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50. (Navy memorandum on this meeting set out above.)

We have received a memorandum dated 11/4/75 from Defense describing the proposed release of Navy information to the committees and to the press. Copy of that memorandum and of the press release are attached. The release says that "Liaison was maintained with... the FBI" concerning the drug research ~~release.~~

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

PRESS RELEASE
NOVEMBER 7, 1975

The press statement released by the Navy today relating to its drug research on human subjects for the period 1947 through 1954 indicates liaison concerning this project was maintained by the Navy with other Governmental agencies, including the FBI.

A thorough review of FBI files has disclosed one document relating to this Navy research: a short internal memorandum, dated August 4, 1950. This memorandum, prepared by a member of the Liaison staff at FBI Headquarters, recorded that a Navy official had invited FBI representatives to a conference in the Washington area to "discuss the usage of truth serum in Intelligence circles," and that the Navy had made advances in developing a new drug which "could be utilized to a great advantage in the questioning of espionage agents." A handwritten notation on this memorandum directed that a representative of the FBI Laboratory was to attend this conference on August 11, 1950.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/RO

No further identifiable reference to Navy drug development research is contained in FBI files. No record can be located that liaison was being maintained with the Navy regarding this program, or that the FBI had knowledge of this program prior to the date of the above memorandum.

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395

The FBI was not involved in any way in this Navy drug research, and the FBI has never participated in research with drugs designed to modify human behavior, nor has it funded such research.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

December 24, 1975

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

ST 115

Director, FBI

REC-51

62-116395-1204X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is in response to the SSC letter dated December 18, 1975, wherein Senators Mondale and Baker requested rather detailed information to be made available during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

It is noted that most of the requests in this letter are so ambiguous that they require clarification from the SSC before the FBI can logically respond. In one instance, there is no way this Bureau could respond short of obtaining the recollections of Bureau Supervisors who worked in the Intelligence Division extending back almost 20 years. Because of this, we are attaching for your approval and forwarding to the SSC the original of a memorandum which delineates the problems attendant to the request of December 18, 1975, and, in most instances, requests a meeting between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, SSC, and representatives of this Bureau in the hope that some alternatives or clarifications can be developed. A copy of the memorandum is furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

WOC:lhb
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2AMK

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JAN 28 1976

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The request of 12/18/75 was received in the Intelligence Division in the midafternoon of 12/22/75. A conference was held on the morning of 12/23/75 of pertinent Division personnel in an effort to identify the problems connected with responding to this request. It is believed that the only way the Bureau can logically respond to the request is by obtaining clarifications and, in some instances, alternatives to the requests set out.

We have already determined that both John Elliff and the SSC Counsel, F. A. O. Schwartz, are out of the city for the holidays. The Legal Counsel Division has left word with Mr. Schwartz and/or Mr. Elliff to call SA Paul Daly upon their return to the city.

Copy of 12/18/75 request attached.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J, G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

62-116395

December 24, 1975

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM SENATORS
MONDALE AND BAKER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On December 22, 1975, this Bureau received a copy of a letter dated December 18, 1975, which Senators Mondale and Baker sent to the Attorney General levying certain requirements on the FBI with a request that the responses be provided the SSC during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

Item 1 requested access to materials in the investigative files for a six-month period preceding acts of violence which were prevented by actions taken by the FBI. The specific preventive actions were set out in some detail in a memorandum prepared for the SSC by the FBI dated December 10, 1975.

Upon receipt of referenced letter, the Intelligence Division initiated efforts to isolate the files documenting these preventive actions. The Bureau's response of December 10, 1975, was predicated on a review of the pertinent inspection reports of the Intelligence Division. These reports do not document by file number the individual preventive actions. To locate specific files, it will be necessary to have knowledgeable Intelligence Division personnel queried in an effort to try to match the preventive action with a particular investigative file. In some instances,

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

WOC:lhb lhb
(11)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

WRW
JGD
WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-1204X

GPO : 1975 O - 569-92

there will be no investigative file but merely a communication from a field office reporting information furnished by a source of the FBI on which some preventive action was predicated. It is possible that the acts of violence reported by the source could involve a violation over which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction. In such cases, the local field office would have merely furnished the information to the appropriate law enforcement agency and no investigative file would exist.

We are continuing our efforts to attempt to isolate those files which document preventive actions. However, because of the problems attendant thereto, as well as those problems raised in the subparagraphs of Item 1, it is recommended that a meeting be arranged between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, and representatives of this Bureau to discuss possible alternatives to some of these requests.

Items 2 and 3 concern the September 24, 1975, report to the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office. The FBI is in the process of preparing a response and it will be made available to the Committee as soon as possible. However, it is noted that the FBI prepared no analysis at all on the findings of the General Accounting Office contained in their report of September 24, 1975.

Item 4 requests the annual reports from the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968, and the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that organization was under investigation. Item 4 also requests annual reports available on the investigations "about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28."

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

There were no annual reports submitted by the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968. With regard to the Women's Liberation Movement, the SSC has been provided copies of all pertinent reports for the years the organization was under investigation. In an effort to clarify what is meant by the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to Mr. John Elliff's request of October 28, 1975, it is again proposed that a meeting with Mr. Elliff be arranged to clarify this ambiguity.

Item 5 requests specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV of the Department of Justice's guidelines draft on "Domestic Security Investigations."

The indices of this Bureau are not organized to enable retrieval of information of a "preventive action" character or examples of FBI actions taken to prevent violence. The retrieval of such information from FBI files, other than that described in the response to Item 1, would require extensive review and/or dependence on the recollection of individuals of occurrences extending back almost 20 years. It is suggested that, during the proposed meeting with Mr. John Elliff, this request be discussed.

Item 6 requests access to all FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1, through April 4, 1968.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

It is this Bureau's belief that all pertinent material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, through April 4, 1968, has been made available to the SSC responsive to previous requests. With regard to the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, it is not clear whether the letter is requesting access to the entire FBI file on these two activities from the period January 1, through April 4, 1968. It is recommended that a clarification of this request can be accomplished during the previously proposed meeting between Mr. John Elliff and representatives of the FBI.

Item 7 requests all materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

A check of indices of the FBI regarding "Project Overshoe," as well as the word Overshoe, fails to contain any reference to either. Without additional information regarding "Project Overshoe," this Bureau cannot be responsive to this specific request. Again, it is suggested that, during the forthcoming meeting with John Elliff, clarification of "Project Overshoe" be obtained.

1 - The Attorney General

5-1~~1oa~~ (Rev. 3-21-73)

Intelligence Division

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

Attached is a request from Senators Mondale and Baker of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated 12/18/75. The Director has requested he be advised regarding the status of this request.

Attached is a copy of a letter to the AG and LHM for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb

CONTINUED - OVER

(Rev. -21-3)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

Intelligence Division

ED

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

ched is a request from Senators
nd Baker of the Senate Select
(SSC) dated 12/18/75. The
has requested he be advised
the status of this request.

ched is a copy of a letter to the
M for the SSC, dated 12/24/75,
advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb CONTINUED - OVER

estimate when we will complete Item 4.

Item 5 has been reduced to the recollection of Bureau Supervisor David Ryan who handled the COINTELPRO matter and will not require research beyond what SA Ryan can recall. (Ryan is currently developing a response to this request.)

Item 6 has been reduced to all materials relating to the Poor People's Campaign, the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennesee, and Martin Luther King, Jr., contained in Headquarters files between the period 1/1-4/4/68. (We are currently working on this request.)

Item 7 - Epstein has agreed to obtain more identifying data regarding Project Overshoe and we are awaiting this information.

WOC

~~SECRET~~

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
Y GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan – Info
Mr. Jenkins – "
Mr. Wannall – Handle
K

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Sensitively

Sel T 1-5-76

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X
5 JAN 23 1976

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

RECEIVED
ENCLOSURE

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall — Handle

Senstudy

Sel T fav 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115

REC-51

62-116395-1204

5 JAN 26 1976

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

RECEIVED

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

provided during the last week of December and the first week of January:

1. With respect to each of the examples of effective prevention of violence provided the Committee pursuant to John Elliff's letter of November 26 to Mr. Shaheen, please provide access to materials in the investigative file for the 6-month period preceding the act of violence prevented. Please deliver:

(a) All materials relating to the legal and factual predicate for each investigation;

(b) The first investigative report disseminated outside the FBI in each such case, and a list of recipients of that report;

(c) The total number of individuals whose names were referred to the FBI's general name index in the course of each investigation;

(d) The total number of individuals about whom information was obtained through informants, confidential sources, physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and other sensitive techniques; and

(e) The annual report from the office of origin for each such investigation to FBI headquarters for the last five years during which the case in question was an open investigation.

2. Please provide any information which you have refuting the suggestion made on page 34 of the General Accounting Office's September 24 report to the House Judiciary Committee, that cases in which violence can be predicted probably represent less than 2% of all FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

3. Please provide all memoranda or analyses prepared for the Justice Department, Director Kelley, or Assistant Director Wannall on the findings of the General Accounting Office as presented to the House Judiciary Committee on September 24.

4. Please provide the annual report from the office of origin to FBI headquarters for the investigation of

~~SECRET~~

Dr. Martin Luther King in 1963 through 1968, and for the investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that that organization was under investigation, and the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28.

5. Please provide specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV on "preventive action" of the draft Department of Justice's guidelines on "domestic security investigations."

6. Access to all FBI materials pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor People's Campaign, and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1 through April 4, 1968.

7. All materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this request. We look forward to continuing cooperation on this area of joint concern.

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale

Walter F. Mondale
Chairman

Howard W. Baker, Jr.
Vice-Chairman

~~SECRET~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/24/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). (12/18/75 Letter to the Attorney General from Senators Mondale & Baker)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 12-30-75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1204X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/24/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 12/18/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Requesting clarification of items listed in request received from Senators Mondale and Bakerregarding preventive actions; 9/24/75 report of the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office; Annual reports from the office of origin to FBIHQs for investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; pertinent materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1/1 thru 4/4/68 previously made available. Clarification with regard to Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tenn; "Project Overshoe."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395
FMK: fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

62-116395-1204X

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
(Mr. G. S. McMichael)
12/17/75
1 - Mr. J. Cochran
(Mr. F. M. Devine)
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Mr. W. R. Wannall

J. G. Deegan

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This informative memorandum to record unsuccessful efforts to pinpoint the typewriter on which was typed an anonymous letter apparently directed to subject, the original of which was located in papers left behind on the retirement of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan.

Examination of the questioned document by the Laboratory established that the typing was done on a Royal typewriter with pica style type. We checked available inventory records maintained by the Administrative Division as well as our own in INTD to locate all Royal typewriters which were in the then Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) around 1964. This search was based on the suspicion that the note was typed by Sullivan on a typewriter accessible to him in 1964 when he was Assistant Director of the DID.

Our checks revealed that there are available only four typewriters of the type sought which were likely in the DID in 1964. All four are presently in INTD and three of them were readily eliminated as not identical to that which produced the questioned document on the basis that all three have closed "4s", whereas the questioned document has an open ended "4". The fourth typewriter, serial number KMG 13-4320913, is maintained in room 4410 and charged to the IS-2 Section. It was examined by Supervisor F. M. Devine of the Document Section of the Laboratory who advised that it is not identical to the typewriter which produced the questioned document.

100-106670

6
(1) - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)

CONTINUED - OVER

SFP:blb
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP3ALM/VP

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 DEC 29 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Martin Luther King, Jr.
100-106670

We are conducting no further inquiry at this time to establish the whereabouts of the typewriter which produced the anonymous letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information and record purposes.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1st NR 1203x, 1204x, 1st NR 1204x, 1206-1210x, 1212, 1214x, 1214x1, 1215, 1215x

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Adams - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs. (2)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Cregar - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs. (2)

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On 12/4/75, a meeting was held with the following representatives of captioned Committee: Chief Counsel F.A.O. Schwartz; Assistant Counsel Paul Michel; Staff Member Mark Gitenstein; Staff Director of the Domestic Task Force John T. Elliff; and Staff Member John Bayley. Representing the Bureau at this meeting were Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams, Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Inspector John B. Hotis, and SA Paul V. Daly.

The meeting discussed the forthcoming testimony on 12/9/75 of the Director before that Committee and Elliff furnished the Bureau two draft papers discussing the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction and issues the Committee Staff feels the Senate Select Committee must address from a legislative standpoint. Copies of these papers are attached.

The first paper which consists of six pages discusses in Part 1 what the Committee sees as problems arising out of the FBI's domestic intelligence investigations. This portion highlights the fact that these investigations may be overbroad in scope, collect irrelevant information, and continue the investigations beyond what the Committee sees as their normal investigative conclusion. This portion also addresses the investigative techniques used during these investigations and the resultant dissemination of information collected.

Under Part 2, the document discusses options available to the Committee. These options run the gamut from abolition of the Bureau's domestic intelligence functions to administrative oversight by the Attorney General or Congressional oversight or enacting legislation providing for domestic intelligence investigations with legislative limits imposed on such investigations. Included is the consideration of creating an independent Inspector General.

62-116395-1215X

REC-51

7 JAN 22 1976

Enclosures (2)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:lad
(9)

84 JAN 26 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The second position paper which was prepared by John T. Elliff begins by a six-page statement and analysis of the Bureau's current authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. He then lists four options for the Committee.

Option 1 is for Congress to pass legislation ratifying the existing FBI authority as set forth by Presidential directives and Executive Orders.

Option 2 suggests Congress might give serious consideration to creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Department of Justice. In this Option, Elliff suggests that the FBI itself has considered this Option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from law enforcement functions of the Bureau.

Option 3 considers the elimination of FBI domestic intelligence. In his analysis of this position, it might be possible for the Bureau to develop the necessary intelligence information through its normal criminal investigations and thus remove the necessity for domestic intelligence investigations as presently conducted.

Option 4 considers setting standards for domestic intelligence investigations. In this Option, Elliff states that the FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only as Congress finds that regular criminal investigations would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of Federal law and that incidents of the use of violence in such violations are of a serious nature and threaten the security of the country.

For purposes of the Director's appearance on 12/9/75 before the Senate Select Committee, it is believed his response to questions concerning the aforementioned position papers should be that the Bureau has received copies and is reviewing the various proposals and that it would not be appropriate at this time for the Director to comment regarding the substance of the proposals.

CONTINUED - OVER

Elliff indicated during this meeting that the Director during his appearance may anticipate being asked a question by one of the Senators relating to his statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal concerning the necessity for the sacrifice of certain individual rights at the expense of investigations. He also anticipated the Director might be asked a question concerning his position on COINTELPRO. Regarding the question concerning the Director's statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal, the Legal Counsel Division will draft a proposed resonse. Concerning COINTELPRO, a response has been prepared and will be put together with the briefing material for the Director.

This memorandum in general highlights the Options presented in the attached papers. A more detailed analysis should be prepared by the Intelligence Division and existing documents addressing these proposals should be made available for the Director's briefing book for his testimony.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Director respond to questions concerning the attached position papers as set forth above.

Done.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division draft a proposed response concerning the Director's statement made in Montreal relating to the sacrifice of certain individual rights.

Done.

(3) That the Intelligence Division make a detailed review of the various Options set forth in the two attached position papers. (FOR SUBSEQUENT STAFF CONFERENCE AFTER 12/9)
Jma

See memo [illegible] w/ File [illegible] Senstudy 1/19/76 [illegible]

Jma

Ret. from 20 12/12/75
Jma

Issues and Options for Discussion with Former Attorneys General Rogers, Katzenbach, and Clark

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

I. Background

In the past few weeks the staff has presented the Committee with evidence suggesting the following about the FBI's internal security intelligence program:

A. The program is massive, involving the collection of information on the activities of thousands of innocent, law-abiding American citizens.

B. These individuals were not alleged espionage agents, but citizens who fall within the FBI's vague definitions of "subversion" and "extremism" -- purely homegrown "threats to the national security".

C. That FBI policy on "subversive" and "extremist" investigations was vague and subject to the following abuses:

   1. overbreadth in scope in that groups were investigated whose threats to the national security were tenuous, if not non-existent.

   2. collection of information on the personal life and political views of subjects unrelated to the national security.

   3. the continuance of investigations well after it should have become obvious that there was no legitimate predicate.

D. Particularly invasive collection techniques were used, including electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entries. Although these have been terminated, the predominant and perhaps most insidious continues today through the FBI's huge informant/confidential source network.

E. Information collected in the course of these investigations is disseminated regularly throughout the federal government and to local law enforcement.

F. Until 1971, information collected through these investigations was disseminated as part of the COINTELPRO program to the subjects' friends, relatives, employers, and others in an effort to discredit or "neutralize" alleged "subversives" or "extremists".

62-116395 - 1215X

ENCLOSURE

G. The FBI's internal security intelligence program was used by Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon to serve their political interests, usually by collecting information on critics or political opponents.

H. The program was conceived and implemented in secrecy, and although parts of the program were shared with outside authorities from time to time, until now no President, Attorney General, or Congressional committee has been exposed to the entire program in detail.

I. The program is not authorized by statute but is founded on a series of secret or ambiguous Presidential orders, which in turn are based upon a questionable assertion of "inherent constitutional authority".

J. The program continues today, albeit on a much more limited basis than in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and the basic machinery for the program -- the huge informant/confidential source network -- is still operating.

K. There is no statute or internal Bureau or Justice Department policy prohibiting a new Director, Attorney General, or President from ordering the Bureau to expand the program to its earlier dimensions.

II. Issues and Options

Among the issues and options which might be discussed with former Attorneys General in response to what the Committee has learned are the following:

A. Abolition. Elimination of the FBI internal security intelligence program as Attorney General Harlan Stone ordered in 1924 when confronted with abuses growing out of the FBI's first internal security intelligence program, such as the infamous Palmer raids.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether there are not some functions (e.g., protecting the President, preventing or at least predicting violence by terrorist organizations, or predicting civil disorders) which require intelligence collection.

2. Whether FBI intelligence reports are valuable in that respect, especially in light of a recent GAO report suggesting that such reports are rarely useful in predicting violent activity.

3. Whether such information, assuming it is valuable, could not be obtained through more traditional criminal investigations.

4. Whether the value of the information, marginal or otherwise, justifies the risk to civil liberties inherent in such intelligence collection.

5. Whether, given the way in which limited and ambiguous grants of authority have been expanded into major authorizations, any statute short of a total prohibition of all non-law enforcement intelligence activities in the domestic sector will be adequate to prevent the recurrences of the kinds of abuses uncovered by this Committee. (Or, conversely, whether it is possible to draft a law authorizing a limited civil disturbance and counter-terrorist intelligence mission that will not eventually evolve, like the National Security Act of 1947, into a charter for unanticipated and unwanted covert activities.)

6. Whether it would be sufficient to restrict the FBI to criminal investigations without also (a) placing limits upon the length of investigations, (b) the kinds of information which can be collected and disseminated on the subject irrelevant to the alleged criminal act, (c) the utilization of warrantless electronic surveillance and other particularly invasive collection techniques, and (d) the utilization of a huge informant/confidential source network without judicial or Justice Department supervision.

B. Authorizing Statute. Recognition of the value of internal security intelligence, but placing limits upon the program designed to minimize the infringement upon civil liberties, an option being actively considered by the present Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out under the first option and, in addition:

1. Whether meaningful and stringent guidelines can be written which do not so hamper the administration of an internal security intelligence program as to make the product not just marginal, as GAO suggests, but worthless.*

2. In light of the possibility that the present Attorney General may address this matter via internal Justice Department guidelines, whether this approach does not ignore the legal authority question which can only be resolved by statute.

3. Whether or not Congress could draft a statutory version of the guidelines which could be flexible enough to meet an evolving threat and at the same time place meaningful restrictions upon the program.

4. Even assuming there is no absence of legal authority, is it safe to leave these guidelines in the form of a departmental order which can be rescinded by the next Attorney General?

C. Delegation of Authority to Attorney General. Simply ratifying the present program via enactment of a statutory charter which grants the FBI authority to conduct an internal security intelligence program subject to its own internal guidelines or departmental guidelines as proposed by the Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and:

1. Whether such a statute would not be an unconstitutional delegation of powers to the Executive Branch.

2. Whether enactment of such a statute would not represent a failure by the Congress to confront the issues raised above.

---

*A preliminary staff analysis of the Attorney General's draft guidelines suggests that, despite months of conscientious and painstaking work by a departmental task force, the guidelines are not adequate. This analysis, which will be presented when Attorney General Levi testifies on December 10, indicates that several of the more questionable FBI investigations (e.g., of Dr. King and the women's liberation movement) would still be permissible under these proposed guidelines.

D. Legislative Inaction. Enact no new statute affecting the FBI's legal authority or the internal security intelligence program.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and, in addition:

1. Whether this failure to act might not leave the status of the program in doubt and subject to court challenge.

2. Whether this failure to act after full disclosure by the Bureau might not be taken by the FBI and the courts as a ratification of the program.

E. Administrative Oversight by the Attorney General. The Justice Department should be required to exercise greater administrative oversight over the FBI's internal security intelligence program by Attorney General Levi, regardless of whatever other options Congress accepts.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is practical for the Attorney General or his staff to review thousands of such investigations each year.

2. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should review all or just the so-called "full" investigations.

3. Whether, to facilitate the conduct of such reviews, the Attorney General or his staff should be given "complete" access to Bureau files, including information regarding the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.

4. Whether it is possible to develop a staff of career attorneys within the Department with both the access and independence essential to the conduct of searching reviews.

5. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should not also be required to review various informant and so-called "intensification" programs, and the establishment of specialized indices (which have a significant impact upon which cases are opened) instead of just reviewing individual investigations in a vacuum as provided by the Attorney General's draft guidelines.

F. An Inspector General. In addition to the above options, an independent Inspector General should be created to investigate improprieties by the FBI. This option is advanced by those concerned about the inadequacy of the FBI's investigation of the disappearance of former Director Hoover's personal files, its limited inquiry into the so-called Atlantic City convention case, and the absence of any internal investigation of the abuses in the King case.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to maintain the independence of an Inspector General within the Department of Justice when both the Inspector General and the Director of the FBI will be responsible to the same official, the Attorney General.
2. Whether the Inspector General should have "complete" access to Bureau files, including information pertaining to the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.
3. Whether an Inspector General with access to extremely sensitive information might not become a serious threat to the independence of the Bureau from political influence and to the civil liberties of American citizens.

G. Congressional Oversight. In addition to the above options, the creation of an oversight committee(s) in the Congress, to which the Bureau would be required to report and which would have the power to investigate abuses.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the kinds of problems posed by the Justice Department oversight and Inspector General options discussed above to the independence of the FBI and the confidentiality of its files.

H. Public Reporting and Disclosure to Subjects. In addition to the above options, the requirement that the FBI make frequent public reports on the details of its internal security intelligence programs and policies and reveal the details of improper intelligence investigations to the subjects of those investigations.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to reveal the essence of some programs and policies and the details of some investigations without jeopardizing the effectiveness of legitimate programs.

2. Whether such disclosure might not increase the number of law suits filed against the FBI alleging illegal activities.

DRAFT
MEMORANDUM

December 4, 1975

FBI LEGISLATION - PROPOSED OPTIONS

In preparation for the testimony of FBI Director Kelley and Attorney General Levi on December 9 and 10, the Domestic Intelligence Task Force is pulling together various proposals for legislation dealing with FBI intelligence. This paper sets forth some of the basic options.

A. Current Statutes and Executive Orders

The basic statute governing the FBI is 18 U.S.C. 533, which reads as follows:

> The Attorney General may appoint officials: (1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States, (2) to assist in the protection of the person of the President, and (3) to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General.

Clauses (2) and (3) are a possible statutory basis for intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Under (2), the FBI may "assist" the Secret Service in the protection of the President by providing

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1215X

ENCLOSURE

intelligence on persons or groups who may endanger the President's safety. A formal agreement between the FBI and the Secret Service sets forth the types of intelligence information provided by the Bureau. However, this agreement states that:

> The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction. (Tab A)

Clause (3) recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of Justice." This is a possible statutory basis for at least two broad areas of FBI intelligence investigations -- civil disturbance intelligence and intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program.

The most recent legal advice to the FBI from the Justice Department on the gathering and reporting of data regarding civil disturbances notes that on April 1, 1969, the President designated the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the government's response to civil disturbances. The FBI is instructed to gather and report on "all significant incidents of civil unrest" and on "all disturbances where there are indications that extremist organizations . . . are believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them." The

FBI is specifically advised to make reports "even when no specific violation of federal law is indicated." On the other hand, the FBI is instructed not to report "every relatively insignificant incident of a strictly local nature coming to its attention." (Tab B)

The Justice Department has given the following recent instructions to the FBI regarding intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program. Executive Order 10450, as amended by Executive Order 11785, is interpreted as requiring an FBI investigation of organizations "with a potential" of violating federal or state statutes prohibiting unlawful advocacy of violence or the commission of any unlawful act of violence. The FBI is advised that "it is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order." The FBI is instructed to apply "the same yardstick" to investigations of individuals who are affiliated with such organizations. The FBI is specifically advised that "it is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated." (Tab C)

Clause (3) also recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of State." This is a possible statutory basis for FBI intelligence investigation of foreign intelligence activities within the United States or to

collect positive foreign intelligence. The best example is the Attorney General's authorization of warrantless FBI electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. However, there is apparently no instruction from the Justice Department to the FBI directing the Bureau to initiate investigations of individuals or organizations which have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but about which there is no information indicating intelligence activity. (See Staff Report, "Counterintelligence/Counterespionage: The Law and the Philosophy", October 14, 1975.)

In his testimony before the Committee, Deputy Associate FBI Director James Adams made no reference to clauses (2) and (3) as a possible legal basis for FBI intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Instead, he placed sole reliance on a series of Presidential directives extending from 1936 until the 1960's which the FBI interprets as authorizing it to engage in "domestic security intelligence investigations". The Attorney General has codified these directives in a Justice Department regulation instructing the FBI to:

> Carry out the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15, 1953, designating the [FBI] to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters. 28 C.F.R., Section 0.85(d).

The FBI also cites directives of President Kennedy on June 9, 1962, and Attorney General Kennedy on March 5, 1964, which are the latest charter for the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, composed of the FBI Director and the chiefs of the military intelligence agencies. This group is authorized to coordinate "all investigation of domestic espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security." (Tab D)

The theory behind the FBI's position is that the President has inherent constitutional powers, at least in the absence of contrary legislation, to authorize FBI intelligence activities. The only judicial support for this theory is language in the Supreme Court's opinion in the Keith case, which declared warrantless wiretapping of domestic groups unconstitutional.

The Court acknowledged the importance of "national security in its domestic implications . . . especially at a time of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent periods of our history." Under such circumstances, the Court stated, the President has a "fundamental duty" under the Constitution to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." The Court added, "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means." Hence, the Court appeared to

recognize that the President's "domestic security role" has a "constitutional basis"; that the President through the Attorney General may need "to obtain intelligence information about those who plot unlawful acts against the Government"; and that "threats and acts of sabotage against the Government exist in sufficient number to justify investigative powers with respect to them." The Court applied the general principle that "unless the Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered." Nevertheless, the central holding of the Keith decision was that this power may not be exercised in such a way as to infringe constitutional rights. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

Even though the President may have the authority under the Constitution to direct the FBI to conduct intelligence investigations in the absence of legislation, Congress has the ultimate authority to substitute statutory authorization in place of the Presidential directives. As Justice Robert Jackson declared in the Steel Seizure Case, "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . ." 343 U.S. 579, 637.

B. Option One -- Ratifying Existing Powers

The first option for Congress is legislation ratifying the existing authority granted to the FBI by current Presidential directives and orders. Such legislation would be cast in extremely general terms. Its main advantage is that it would provide a basis for Congressional oversight. It could also reinforce the Attorney General's role as the immediate supervisor of FBI intelligence activities. The statute would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to conduct investigations of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities;

2. to gather and report information on civil disturbances;

3. to conduct investigations of other related intelligence matters affecting internal security; and

4. to conduct investigations of official matters relating to the Department of State.

In addition, the statute would require the Attorney General to report annually to the appropriate Congressional committees on the volume and type of investigations and reports, the investigative techniques used, and the policies and procedures adopted by the Justice Department and the FBI.

The weaknesses of this approach are obvious. Congress would have legislated a wholesale delegation of power without

standards or limitations other than the supervision of the Attorney General and oversight by Congress. In view of the Select Committee's findings as to the vast overbreadth of FBI domestic intelligence investigations and the abuses committed in the name of "counterintelligence", Congress would in effect be permitting future expansion of FBI operations to match past policies.

C. Option Two -- A Separate Security Intelligence Agency

Congress might give serious consideration to legislation creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Justice Department. It would perform the functions of the present Counterintelligence Branch of the FBI Intelligence Division, dealing with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence/counterespionage. The FBI itself has considered this option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from the law enforcement functions of the Bureau. (Tab E)

A separate agency would be justified only if it was authorized to conduct investigations of a wider scope and using different techniques than would otherwise be permitted. In other words, Congress could decide that foreign counterintelligence investigations should go beyond investigation of specific crimes, that techniques such as electronic surveillance should be used without a warrant or with a special type of warrant,

and that operations should be conducted to "counter" foreign intelligence activities by means other than arrest or "persona non grata" proceedings. On the other hand, if Congress treats the investigation of foreign intelligence activities the same as a criminal investigation, then the FBI should keep the job.

Any statute in this area must use general language for diplomatic reasons. For example, Congress should not explicitly authorize deception operations or efforts to compromise hostile intelligence officers, even though such techniques may be envisioned. Such techniques are dealt with best by establishing adequate procedures for authorization and oversight to ensure accountability.

The legislation should be more specific where it deals with investigations and other operations directed at American citizens rather than non-resident aliens in the service of a foreign power. If Congress believes Americans should be investigated if they have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but no information indicating intelligence activity yet exists, the legislation should say so.

The statute should also set out standards for determining whether a foreign-dominated domestic organization falls within the jurisdiction of the separate agency. There should at the very least be substantial information indicating that the organization is directed by, subsidized by, or in active

collaboration with a foreign government or organization. (The term "foreign organization" refers, for instance, to a group like the Palestine Liberation Organization.) If the group fits the criteria for foreign domination, there should be an additional finding that it may engage in intelligence activities or in activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law.

If the group meets all these standards, Congress may authorize the investigation of its activities going beyond regular criminal investigations. Such investigations could extend to all individuals who are members of, or express support for, the organization, as well as to the efforts of the organization to influence and control other groups. However, it may be sufficient to authorize only the investigation of active members and supporters. This would prevent a revival of the "Cominfil" policy of looking into all forms of lawful political and social activity where Communists might be involved.

The Petersen Committee report on COINTELPRO considered the need for special supervision of foreign counterintelligence operations in the United States. It recommended the creation of a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Commission to make decisions with regard to the necessity or acceptability of particular foreign counterintelligence techniques. (Tab F) This proposal

has merit in view of the limited amount of time the Attorney General can give to personal supervision and the after-the-fact role of legislative oversight regarding the separate agency.

Finally, legislation to create a separate foreign counterintelligence agency must deal with relationships to the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other foreign intelligence agencies. The current FBI-CIA agreement on their respective jurisdictions is only a "memorandum of understanding". It allows the CIA to undertake certain clandestine activities within the United States, in coordination with the FBI. (Tab G) Proposals are currently circulating in the Executive Branch for a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive to clarify this matter, as well as to regulate CIA electronic surveillance of American citizens abroad. (Tab H)

A full draft of a statutory charter for a separate foreign counterintelligence agency is not included here, since the focus is on domestic intelligence issues. However, one implication of such a statute would be that the remaining FBI functions should relate only to law enforcement and criminal investigations.

D. Option Three -- Elimination of FBI Domestic Intelligence

The basic assumption behind Attorney General Levi's effort to develop "guidelines" for FBI domestic intelligence is that regular criminal investigations are not adequate to

supply the information needed to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law. That assumption should be questioned. Regular criminal investigations are likely to produce a substantial amount of information which can be used to anticipate or prevent future crimes. For example, intensive criminal investigations of Ku Klux Klan violence in the South during the 1960's would have required the FBI to look into a wide variety of Klan activities. Another example is the search for Weatherman fugitives, a regular criminal investigation which involves broad inquiries across the country. The FBI has not yet demonstrated that the preventive information it has obtained came from intelligence investigations which would not have been conducted as regular criminal investigations.

The fact that an FBI investigation was supervised by its Intelligence Division does not necessarily mean that the investigation was, automatically, outside the regular criminal law enforcement jurisdiction of the Bureau. Any FBI investigation of activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law falls within that jurisdiction. Moreover, regular criminal investigations can also extend to plans, attempts, or conspiracies to engage in such activities.

One suggested difference between intelligence-type and regular criminal investigations is that the latter are terminated after a reasonable time, if sufficient evidence to

justify prosecution is not obtained. However, there is no legal reason why the prosecutor cannot request that the investigation continue indefinitely as long as there is information that violent activities and plans for violence are still underway. The degree of evidence needed to justify a prosecution is certainly greater than the degree of evidence needed to justify an investigation.

All this is not to say that no further standards are needed to guide regular criminal investigations when they may touch on sensitive First Amendment or other constitutional interests. This is especially true of criminal investigations of individuals or groups engaged both in lawful political or social activities and in unlawful violence or plans for violence. To what extent is the advocacy of violence a proper basis for initiating an investigation? Should an investigation be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual is a member of, or has expressed public support for, an organization which has as one of its objectives the use of violence? Should an investigation be started on all members and public supporters of an organization, some of whose members have acted in concert to use violence?

These questions are addressed in the draft Attorney General's guidelines for domestic intelligence investigations under the heading "preliminary investigations". (Tab I) Since

the guidelines assume that there should be intelligence investigations, they do not consider whether such investigations might be permitted as regular criminal investigations.

The Klan and Weatherman examples again illustrate the point. Once it has been established that a particular Klan group is engaged in or planning violence, it seems reasonable to conduct at least preliminary inquiries to determine whether the members and supporters of the group are involved in the violence or the plans for violence. Similarly, the search for Weatherman fugitives who committed bombings and other acts of violence would appear reasonably to include preliminary inquiries to determine whether other Weatherman members and supporters have harbored the fugitives.

On the other hand, it would seem unreasonable to investigate members and supporters of all Klan groups across the country on the ground that some Klan groups have used violence. And it appears equally unreasonable to investigate all members and supporters of SDS because the Weatherman faction engaged in violence. The scope of the investigation must be logically related to its specific purpose, and not an excuse for wide-ranging collection of intelligence.

There is one possible exception to the requirement that the FBI only conduct regular criminal investigations. The Attorney General (and the President) do require reports on

major civil disturbances which may not involve violations of federal law. The FBI should be authorized to gather such data and make appropriate reports as part of its law enforcement responsibilities. However, the data and reports should be limited to information provided by local or state law enforcement authorities or obtained in the course of a regular FBI criminal investigation. Where local authorities provide information about individuals and organizations which are not the subject of a regular FBI criminal investigation, the data and reports should not be included in the FBI's general files and name index.

In periods of widespread civil disturbances, the Attorney General may require a more systematic procedure for maintaining and retrieving civil disturbance information. This was the case in 1967, when Attorney General Clark created the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit in the Justice Department. The IDIU stored and indexed civil disturbance reports separately from the FBI. The data was used to help anticipate or ameliorate disorders. IDIU has been abolished, although the basic function of evaluating reports on civil disturbances is still performed by the Justice Department. This function should also be authorized by statute, and the intent of Congress should be that the Attorney General must obtain specific legislative authorization for any future IDIU.

IDIU was not perfect. Under Attorney General John Mitchell it supplied a list of names of American dissidents to the CIA. (Tab J) It also was used in conjunction with grand jury proceedings inquiring into terrorist bombings. Both of these activities should be forbidden by the statute authorizing the Justice Department to evaluate civil disturbance information.

Finally, legislation may be needed to make clear that the FBI is not authorized to conduct investigations of organizations or individuals for the specific purpose of compiling a body of data to be used in connection with name checks under the Federal Employee Security Program. The same principle applies to FBI "assistance" to the Secret Service, under the present FBI-Secret Service agreement.

A statute must also address the FBI's current practice of maintaining an Administrative Index (ADEX) of the prime subjects of current domestic intelligence investigations. The past history of the FBI's Security Index and other target lists (Key Activists, Agitator Index, Key Black Extremists) suggests the need to enact legislation banning the compiling of lists of persons by the FBI, unless such persons have been arrested or convicted for specific crimes and the list is used in connection with the investigation of such crimes.

These proposals to limit the FBI to regular criminal investigations and civil disturbance reporting must be tested against the actual past experience of the Justice Department and the FBI. General instructions from the Department to the Bureau may be overly vague, even within the framework of criminal investigation. Two examples are Attorney General Clark's memorandum on riots in 1967 and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley's memorandum of campus disorders in 1969. (Tab K) The Nation of Islam exchange between the Department and the FBI in 1973-74 is another illustration. (Tab L)

Thus, there is no automatic panacea in restricting the FBI to criminal investigations. The need for careful scrutiny of actual investigative policies and practices by Congress and the Attorney General is just as great as if the FBI were authorized to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. Legislation must focus on procedures for ensuring accountability by regular reports from the Attorney General to the appropriate Congressional committees.

The following are some of the basic elements which should go into a statute embodying this option. It would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to investigate violations of federal criminal laws, provided that the scope and duration of the investigation are logically related to its specific purpose;

2. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law;

3. to seek legal advice from the Attorney General or his designee whenever a proposed action may be perceived, with reason, to unfairly affect the rights of citizens, provided that this responsibility to seek legal advice is the duty of both the FBI as an institution and FBI agents as individuals;

4. to collect information from state and local law enforcement agencies regarding major civil disturbances, provided that such information is not entered into the FBI general files and name index;

5. to disseminate information obtained from criminal investigations for the following purposes, under regulations promulgated by the Attorney General and published in the Federal Register:

a. prosecution of violations of criminal laws;

b. prevention or anticipation of violations of criminal laws;

c. assistance to the Secret Service in the performance of its protective responsibilities;

d. determination of the suitability of individuals for employment by the federal government;

6. to report civil disturbance information obtained from state and local law enforcement agencies to the Attorney General for the purpose of determining the need to use federal military force under 10 U.S.C. 331 et seq.;

7. to compile such lists of persons arrested or convicted for specific crimes as may be necessary for use in connection with the investigation of such crimes;

8. to provide to the Attorney General or his designee full access to any information in the possession of the FBI which he may deem necessary for the performance of his responsibilities to supervise FBI activities and to submit reports to appropriate Congressional committees on FBI activities;

9. to follow such other procedures and standards consistent with this statute which the Attorney General may prescribe, provided that such procedures and standards shall be published in the Federal Register or, if publication would substantially interfere with the conduct of investigations, reported to appropriate Congressional committees.

E. Option Four -- Setting Standards for Domestic Intelligence

The FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only if Congress finds (1) that regular criminal investigations as described above would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law, and (2) that the incidents of the use of violence in violations of federal law are so numerous and so serious as to constitute a significant threat to the internal security or domestic tranquility of the United States.

The fact that there are individuals and groups who engage in violence, advocate violence, or believe in the desirability of the ultimate use of violence to advance their political or social objectives is not enough to justify FBI domestic intelligence authority. There must be additional findings that regular criminal investigations are inadequate and that the overall threat of violence constitutes a serious danger to the country.

Furthermore, if FBI domestic intelligence is authorized by statute, it should be an annual authorization which must be renewed each year upon reconsideration by Congress and the Attorney General of these factors. Past experience indicates that the annual appropriations process does not provide an appropriate forum for considering the FBI's basic authority.

Attorney General Levi's draft guidelines provide a basis for the consideration of a domestic intelligence authorization. They do not cover the investigation of foreign-related activities which may be directed by, subsidized by, or otherwise conducted in active collaboration with a foreign government, a foreign organization, or their agents. (See Option Two above.)

The guidelines deal with five different types of threats of violence which may constitute serious dangers to the country:

1. overthrow of the government (revolutionary violence);

2. interference in the U. S. with the activities of a foreign government (bombing a consulate, attempting to assassinate a visiting foreign leader);

3. interference with the functioning of the government or the flow of interstate commerce to influence federal policies (violent protest activities, terrorist bombings);

4. deprivation of civil rights (Klan violence, violent protest against busing);

5. incitement of violence which may require the use of federal military force (riots, major civil disturbances accompanying protest demonstrations).

The guidelines also refer to violence directed at state governments, either overthrow of a state government or interference with the functioning of a state government.

Authorizing legislation should indicate whether domestic intelligence is necessary for any or all of these specific problems. For example, revolutionary violence in an attempt to overthrow the government may be a remote and speculative danger, while terrorist bombings may be substantially interfering with the functioning of the government. Klan violence was unquestionably a serious danger to civil rights in the early and mid-1960's, but is it so today? Major riots and civil disturbances were equally serious in the late 1960's and early 1970's, but not in more recent years. Violent interference with the functioning of a state government should, under our federal system, normally be dealt with by state and local law enforcement.

Therefore, the definition of the purpose of FBI domestic intelligence can be simplified. The Attorney General's draft guidelines might be revised to authorize FBI domestic intelligence investigations:

1. to ascertain facts or information which serves to anticipate and prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law intended to

   a. interfere, in the United States, with the activities of a foreign government or its authorized representatives; and

b. interfere with the functioning of the government of the United States or the free flow of interstate commerce in order to influence policies or decisions of the federal government.

This formulation concentrates on the most likely current serious danger to the country, namely, politically motivated terrorist violence. FBI Director Kelley's recent public statements have stressed the increase in terrorist activity from 24 bombings in 1973 to 45 terrorist bombings in 1974 and 46 such bombings in the first six months of 1975.

However, this increasing threat is not the only factor to be considered. In the course of the FBI's regular criminal investigations of these bombings and other incidents of terrorist violence, can it obtain as a by-product substantial information which may serve to anticipate and prevent future violence? If so, the need for broader intelligence-type investigations is less evident.

The draft guidelines provide that the FBI would conduct full-scale intelligence investigations on the basis of "specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion" that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, may be engaged in activities which may involve the use of violence in violations of federal law. The two "mays" render the requirement of "specific and articulable facts" almost meaningless. Therefore, any legislation should authorize the FBI:

2. to conduct full domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above.

The draft guidelines also discuss the surveillance techniques to be used in full domestic intelligence investigations, including informants, mail covers, and electronic surveillance. The guidelines note that additional techniques may need to be covered, such as inquiries made under "pretext", photographic surveillance, "trash covers", etc. However, the legislation may deal with techniques more generally by providing that the FBI is authorized:

3. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law.

More detailed regulation of investigative techniques for full investigations will be considered elsewhere.

The scope of domestic intelligence investigations under the draft guidelines is broadened considerably under the provision for "preliminary investigations". They can be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have advocated activities which may involve violence, or are members of, or

have expressed public support for, an organization which has as its objective activities which may involve violence. The purpose of the preliminary investigation is to verify or refute the allegations or information. However, the vagueness of the standard is obvious. Therefore, to be consistent with the criteria for full investigations, the FBI should be authorized:

4. to conduct preliminary domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert,

a. advocate the use of violence as described in 1 above;

b. are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above;

c. are members of or have expressed public support for an organization engaged in activities which involve, or are likely to involve, the use of violence as described in 1 above, provided that other members of the organization are currently the subject of a full domestic intelligence investigation or a regular criminal investigation.

Unless these changes are made in the guidelines, they would permit investigations similar to past investigations which have been seriously criticized. For instance, they would allow investigations of all SDS members or all Black Student Union leaders on the ground that their activities may involve violence,

even though there is no specific allegation of likely involvement in violence.

Another reason for the revision is to exclude those investigations which would be justified as regular criminal investigations. Thus, allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have engaged in or plan to engage in activities which involve the use of violence would fall within the FBI's regular criminal investigative jurisdiction. Intelligence investigations would extend further at the preliminary stage to cover advocacy of violence and membership in or public support for organizations involved in or likely to be involved in violence. Full investigations require a likelihood of violence, short of actual violence or plans for violence.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 12/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE;
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TESTIMONY,
DECEMBER 10, 1975

At 3:01 p.m. on December 5, 1975, Mark Wolf of the Attorney General's staff, called me at the instructions of the Attorney General and advised that the Attorney General requested:

(1) FBI manual sections on domestic intelligence investigations;

(2) A listing identifying all individuals and organizations now the subjects of FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

[illegible]

Wolf said that the Attorney General is currently en route to Chicago and will return to Washington on Sunday evening. Therefore, the requested materials should be delivered to the Attorney General no later than Monday morning, December 8, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division prepare an appropriate response to the Attorney General's instructions in time for delivery by 9:00 a.m. on December 8, 1975.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

EX-112

REC-962 - 116395 - 1215

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

15 DEC 17 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 DEC 31 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (SC) 62-7721

May 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: NATIONALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO
INTERNAL SECURITY - PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST

We presently maintain an authorized technical surveillance at the residence of Rosa Collazo and her daughter, Lydia Collazo Turner, 1755 Anthony Avenue, Bronx, New York. This surveillance was originally installed on April 13, 1962.

Rosa Collazo is the wife of Oscar Collazo who is serving a life sentence in connection with the killing of a White House guard during an attempt to assassinate former President Truman on November 1, 1950. Both Rosa and her daughter are active in the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico in New York City. During the past six months, this surveillance has continued to furnish valuable information regarding activities of Puerto Rican independence advocates in New York. Through this surveillance, we have obtained information concerning the movement of Puerto Rican nationalists between New York and Puerto Rico. Included in this information was advance notice that Rosa Collazo planned to attend the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico during February, 1966, in Puerto Rico. Upon her return, details were obtained concerning the proceedings of the General Assembly. In addition, we were able to obtain advance notice of demonstrations in New York City in which nationalists participated. This enabled us to inform police authorities and interested Government agencies in advance of the demonstrations.

Unless you instruct to the contrary, this technical surveillance will be continued for an additional six months.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: DOMINICAN SITUATION
INTERNAL SECURITY -
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Diego Emilio Bordas Hernandez and his brother, Luis Manuel Alfredo Bordas, have emerged in the current Dominican crisis as important financial, political and military advisors to the deposed Dominican President Juan Bosch in the latter's efforts to regain control of the Dominican Government. Diego Bordas is a wealthy shipping executive currently residing in exile in San Juan, Puerto Rico, having been born in the Dominican Republic on January 11, 1923. He served in various high posts under Juan Bosch during the latter's short occupancy of the position of President of the Dominican Republic in early 1963. Bordas spends much of his time at 868 Ashford Avenue in San Juan, using an apartment at that address as his residence during the absence of its owner, Jose Antonio Benitez Jiminez, from Puerto Rico. Jose Benitez is the cousin of Jaime Benitez, the latter the Director of the University of Puerto Rico and a close associate and advisor of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas also maintains a residence at 21 V, Florencia, Pueblo Viego, a suburb of San Juan, near the current residence and headquarters of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas and his brother jointly operate a shipping business known as Bordas and Company at Highway Number 2, Puerto Viejo, Puerto Rico, and his financial dealings in support of the Bosch efforts can reasonably be expected to be conducted from this commercial establishment.

The Bordas brothers have both been the subjects of numerous allegations indicating their cooperation with procommunist and pro-Trujillo factions in Dominican politics and are apparently opportunists who have seized the current situation to enhance their political and financial futures. Luis Bordas is currently in the Dominican Republic acting as the Director of Military Operations of the rebel forces supporting Bosch.

109-12-211-4423

REC 4

4 JUN 15 1965

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION ~~SECRET~~
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Luis Bordas is reportedly the Honorary Nicaraguan Consul in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and, as a result, Department of State clearance for technical coverage of the business he operates jointly with Diego Bordas was obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on June 1, 1965.

In view of the pressing nature of the international situation as it relates to the Dominican Republic, it is requested that you authorize technical coverage of the residences of Diego Bordas mentioned above and of the business address of the joint venture operated by the Bordas brothers. Authority is requested for similar coverage of any addresses to which the mentioned residences or business may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NdeBK

DATE 6/4/65

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

December 19, 1975

1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 2 in that letter.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a copy of the document in response to Item 2 which is being delivered to the SSC.

Delivered to Committee 12-22-75
to Shaheen's office 12/22/75

Enclosures (2)   ST 115   REC-51

62-116395-1214X

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

7 JAN 22 1976

PEN:adn
(9)

ENCLOSURE

NOTE:

A copy of the SSC letter 12/4/75, is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copy of the memorandum being furnished is maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the document being provided to the SSC. As indicated in the enclosed memorandum, Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled separately. Items 1 and 3 requested in referenced SSC letter are being handled by the IS-3 and CI-3 Sections respectively. Item 4, a restatement of prior request submitted by the SSC is being handled separately by SA V. R. Thornton of the IS-1 Section.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JBH   JAN   PEN   WRW   JPT   WOC

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

MAIL ROOM ☐   TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JAN 26 1976

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

62-116395

December 19, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of a copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, at the White House, Washington, D. C., dated October 27, 1964.

It is noted that in addition to requesting a copy of this letter the SSC requested materials reflecting this letter was hand-delivered to the White House by Mr. DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Attention is drawn to the upper right-hand corner of Mr. Hoover's letter to Mr. Moyers and to the notation appearing there reading "personally delivered 10/28/64, D." No additional materials are available in FBIHQ files reflecting delivery of this letter beyond the aforementioned notation which, it appears, bears the initial of Mr. DeLoach.

Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled in separate responses.

1 - The Attorney General

PEN:adn adn
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

62-116395-1214X3

PEN

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 8, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee request seeking delivery of certain Bureau materials. Please prepare an appropriate response.

I invite your attention to paragraph numbered 4 which amends an earlier request of the Committee (Elliff letter of November 25, 1975, Item 6c) which request was the subject of a telephone conversation on December 3, with Mr. Seymor Phillips of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1-Ad Hoc
12-10-75

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1214X

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]N.
BARRY GOLDWATER, AR[illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MATHIA[illegible], MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, [illegible]

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
F. [illegible]DERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 4, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY [illegible]

Dear Mike:

The Senate Select Committee requests the following materials for delivery.

1. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the recommendation for, authorization of, and duration and termination of the electronic surveillance referred to in Items 1 and 22 of my letter of November 21, 1975 and in materials delivered to the Committee on December 1, 1975.

[illegible]

2. Delivery of a copy of the letter to Mr. Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated October 27, 1964, and materials reflecting that this letter was hand delivered by Mr. Cartha DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Nugent

3. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the surveillances of Mrs. Anna Chennault in October and November, 1968.

Hamilton

4. The Committee's request in my letter of November 27, 1975, item 6c should be revised to read as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memornadum, including a summary of the ~~recommendations~~ of relevant Bureau personnel pertaining thereto."

Nugent

RECEIVED
DEC 4 1975

JTE

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

62-116395-1214X

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/19/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
12/4/75 request - Martin L. King.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 12/23/75

Received by:

Title: Research Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116- - 1214X

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 12/4/75, item 2

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

S

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr.: Copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers 10/27/64 along with notation that shows letter was hand delivered by Mr. DeLoach 10/28/64.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1214X

186-10051

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER 12-4-75

ITEM 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SBALMKP

Retain

62-116395-1214X

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

#MDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/31/00

October 27, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

Honorable William D. Moyers
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Moyers:

A confidential source of this Bureau who has supplied reliable information in the past furnished the following information concerning a contact on October 23, 1964, between Martin Wigington and Randolph Blackwell. Wigington was described as a member of the Democratic Party Correlation Committee, Austin, Texas. Blackwell is an assistant to Martin Luther King, Jr., at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Georgia.

Wigington indicated to Blackwell a desire for King to write "an anti-Goldwater letter" which Wigington's Committee intends to distribute in Texas among labor groups. Blackwell stated that King may go to Texas prior to the forthcoming presidential election and Blackwell inquired as to whether King would be "in any danger." Wigington stated that he would contact one Larry Goodman concerning any possible danger to King in Texas. This Bureau's source had no information concerning the identity of Goodman.

During this contact Wigington complained to Blackwell that a group from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which Conference is headed by King, and a group from the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America had picketed in Fort Worth, Texas. Wigington stated that this was not a good thing at this time since all Negro and labor organizations should be working for the election of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

This information is also being furnished to officials in the Department of Justice.

REC 14

Sincerely yours,

100-106670 (King)
1-100-442529 (CIRM)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

SFP:kmj
(12)

ST-101

NOV 2 1964

~~SECRET~~
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NOV 4 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OCT 27 11 17 AM '64
READING ROOM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Honorable William D. Moyers

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" as information reported is from AT 1380-S*, a highly sensitive source with respect to the racial situation. This source is of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of this information could compromise its effectiveness and thus be detrimental to the national defense. Information obtained from Atlanta teletype 10/23/64.

SECRET

1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs.
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Encs.
1 - Mr. Gallagher - Encs.
1 - Mr. McDermott - Encs.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Encs.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs.

December 3, 1975

5
10

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On November 21, 1975 Inspector John B. Hotis of this Bureau met with Doug Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General; and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, concerning your forthcoming appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. At this meeting this Bureau was requested to provide write-ups on certain phases of this Bureau's operations which are to be used in the preparation of a briefing book for your testimony.

Attached are the following individual write-ups as requested on November 21, 1975: "Investigative Techniques"; "Organizational Structure and Functions of the FBI"; "Allegation of Misconduct Involving Special Agent in Charge, Miami Office"; "Director Hoover's 'Official and Confidential' (OC) Files"; "Allegations of Possible Misconduct by FBI Agents, Houston, Texas"; "Allegations of Personal and Official Misconduct of a Former Special Agent in Charge of the Baltimore Office"; "Allegation of Bribery by FBI Agent, New York"; "Allegation of Possible Misconduct by an FBI Agent, Detroit, Michigan"; "Allegations of Misconduct by FBI Agents, Richmond, Virginia, Field Office, in Connection with the Investigation of Illegal Wiretapping by the Richmond, Virginia, Police Department"; "Allegations of Violations of Gun Control Act by FBI Agent"; "Review of Appropriations Testimony for Fiscal Years 1955 thru 1976"; "Tenure of FBI Director"; "Transfer of Drug Enforcement Responsibilities to the FBI"; "Office of Special Review, Department of Justice"; and "Major Topics of Primary Concern to Congressional Committees."

Delivered to Mark Wolf's office 12-5-75

REC-9 62-116395-1212

With respect to the material requested by memorandum of Mark L. Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,

DEC 29 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PVD:dkg (13)

PLM

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2

62-116395-5-WOE

8 4 DEC 31 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

to Inspector John B. Hotis of this office dated November 26, 1975, which requested additional information, we are gathering the necessary material on an expeditious basis and the results will be furnished as soon as possible.

Enclosures (15)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. - Enclosures (15)
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

NOTE: See Legal Counsel Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11-24-75, captioned "Testimony By The Attorney General Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." On 12-1-75 Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, requested the attached information be furnished as soon as possible. No later than 12-2-75. This response was coordinated and incorporates material prepared by the Inspection, Special Investigative, General Investigative, Files and Communications, and Intelligence Divisions. Due to the time constraints we are furnishing interim response. As completed additional material will be furnished to the Department.

2 - Mr J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
January 14, 1976
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

The Attorney General

Director, FBI 62-116395-1210X1

EX-110

REC-60

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Reference is made to SSC letters dated December 4, 1975, and November 25, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 4 in the December 4, 1975, request and Items 7c and 8c of the November 25, 1975, request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with the material which is being furnished to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

VRT:adn
(9)

NOTE:

Copies of SSC letters 11/25/75 and 12/4/75 are attached to the file copy of enclosed LHM. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as documents being provided to the SSC. Copies of material being furnished to SSC being retained with Senstudy 75 Project.

Delivered to Dept. 1-15-76 3:14

Delivered to Committee 1-15-76.

ENCLOSURE

WRW

JAM

JBH

PCN

Phillipps

157

4063

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 9 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 (1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

January 14, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, Item 4 of which requests materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.; and SSC letter dated November 25, 1975, Items 7c and 8c of which request materials concerning the Washington Spring Project and Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of materials in response to referenced requests.

In respect to Item 4 of the December 4, 1975, request, the only indication of any action taken concerning the recommendation contained in the pertinent memorandum dated March 29, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/3/68," appearing on page one and initials which are believed to be those of former Special Agent (SA) Harold P. Leinbaugh. Among the documents being furnished the SSC is a memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned, "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.," along with supporting documents, which were submitted to the Attorney General concerning background leading up to the proposed action recommended in the March 29, 1968, memorandum. It includes results of an interview of Leinbaugh.

In response to Item 7c, the only indication of any action taken concerning the suggestion (recommendation) contained in the memorandum dated March 26, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/4/68," appearing on page two of that memorandum and initials which are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

JBA

VRT:adn
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1210X

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

With respect to Item 8c which concerns a memorandum dated March 28, 1968, captioned, "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," the only indication of action taken concerning the recommendation contained therein is a pencilled notation appearing on page one, "Handled 3/28/68," and initials which again are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/lg

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/14/76

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

12/4/75 request Item 4
11/25/75 request Items 7c and 8C

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 1/15/74

Received by: Florence Hoben

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1211 0X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
1/14/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/4/75, Item 4 and SSC letter 11/25/75, Items 7c and 8c

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating Procedures
Information Handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Delivery of materials regarding Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Washington Spring Project and the Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

62-116395

AJD:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5·[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1210X

186-10019

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 12-4-75
ITEM 4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Retain

62-116395-1210X

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop ✓
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY 5I8ALMKR

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy or the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

EX-102

TJD:ted
(7)
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC-20

GK 93

APR 11 1968

Deakin

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person- nel without the express approval of the FBI.

5-TJD

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-441006-93

ENCLOSURE

1 - J. B. Adams
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - D. Ryan
1 - J. G. Deegan

REC-88

Sw 100-106670-3965

July 18, 1975

1 - H. A. Newman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CF

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

The following information is submitted regarding the background leading up to the proposed action recommended in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence, (Martin Luther King)." (copy attached)

This memorandum recommended that information be furnished to a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showing King as a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on March 28, 1968, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel).

A notation on the above referred to memorandum indicated that the recommendation was "handled" on April 3, 1968, by Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh of the Crime Records Division. (see notation on memorandum dated March 29, 1968, attached)

By way of background it should be noted that at about 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968, while standing on second floor balcony outside room 306 of the Hotel Lorraine, Memphis, Tennessee, King was shot and killed.

Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, reflects that King and other Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) officials were due to arrive in Memphis at 10:15 a.m. on April 3, 1968, via Eastern Airlines from Atlanta. (copy of Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, attached)

After King's death, an interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy, a close associate of King, reflected that he and King registered into the Hotel Lorraine in Memphis,

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

cah
HAN:cah (8)

copy to CRD + CRIM DIV 12/1/75 by MEMO CAP MARTIN LUTHER KING JR

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

ENCLOSURE

TCD

HW

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 560-920

84 AUG 5 1975

Tennessee, at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968. (Information contained in report of SA Joe C. Hester dated April 17, 1968, Memphis, captioned "UNSUB, aka, Eric Starvo Galt, et al., Civil Rights" page 48. See attached FD-302 reflecting interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy).

For further background regarding the basis of this proposal Atlanta teletype dated March 28, 1968, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C" with second caption "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that on March 28, 1968, King and other SCLC people were in room 801, Holiday Inn, Memphis, Tennessee, at 4:30 p.m. (copy of Atlanta teletype attached)

A Memphis teletype dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that King participated in the march of sanitation workers on March 28, 1968. When violence erupted including the breaking of windows and looting by the marchers, King and a few associates ran to a nearby car and left the march proceeding to Rivermont Motel where they remained through the afternoon and evening. (copy of Memphis teletype attached)

On July 17, 1975, Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh, after having had all the facts set out above reviewed with him including the fact his notation of "handled" appeared on the March 29, 1968, memorandum, advised that he has absolutely no recollection of this memorandum and can unhesitantly state that he cannot now recall whether or not proposed information was ever disseminated to any news media source. He indicated that his notation "handled" would not necessarily mean that he did disseminate this information. In explaining this he stated that the notation could mean that he was merely clearing this document through Crime Records Division and at this late date there would be absolutely no way that he could make any positive statements as to whether or not the information recommended was ever disseminated to a news media source.

7/17

From the above recorded sequence of events as reflected in various communications identified above, it is evident that King returned to Memphis, Tennessee, from Atlanta

on April 3, 1968, and checked into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. The notation indicating that the proposed furnishing of information to the news media was "handled" on April 3, 1968, would, of course, preclude any such information from appearing in the press prior to King's checking into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968.

A review of appropriate files maintained at FBI Headquarters fails to reflect any newspaper article which could have been an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in the G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968.

7/17 Held

A review of the "Memphis Commercial Appeal" for the period March 28 to April 4, 1968, maintained on microfilm in the Library of Congress failed to reflect any article which would appear to be an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968. References were noted indicating that King held a press conference at the Holiday Inn Rivermont Motel on March 29, 1968.

Enclosures (5)

NOTE:

See memorandum J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 7/18/75, captioned as above, prepared by HAN/cah.

Memorandum

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

OM : G. C. Moore

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

BJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

TJD:ted
(7)
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

REC-20

22 APR 11 1968

Handled 4/3/68

100-106670-3765

100-448006-93

ENCLOSURE

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2 ALM

100-[illegible]-93

ENCLOSURE

Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

430PM URGENT 4-2-68 SAB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS 157-1092 3P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENN., ~~RM~~ RACIAL MATTER

ON APRIL TWO, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, MEMPHIS ~~PD~~ Police Department, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, ADVISED THAT THE FUNERAL OF LARRY PAYNE, SEVENTEEN YEAR OLD NEGRO WHO WAS SHOT BY MEMPHIS PD OFFICER AFTER STORE LOOTING GROWING OUT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT RACIAL DISTURBANCE, MEMPHIS, WAS HELD, WITHOUT INCIDENT, AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, MEMPHIS. ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED IN ATTENDANCE DESPITE FACT CHURCH CAN SEAT TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED. BODY INTERRED IMMEDIATELY AFTER FUNERAL. ARKIN ADVISED THAT ANOTHER SANITATION WORKERS SYMPATHY MARCH IS SCHEDULED FOR DOWNTOWN MEMPHIS AFTERNOON OF APRIL TWO.

100-106670-

NOT RECORDED
183 APR 9 1968

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED ON APRIL TWO THAT REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) AIDES RALPH D. ABERNATHY, BERNARD LEE, AND ANDREW M. YOUNG DUE TO ARRIVE MEMPHIS TEN FIFTEEN A.M., APRIL THREE, FROM ATLANTA.

END PAGE ONE Albert C. Hayden

APR 5 1968

Included --- letter to White House and Attorney General. Date 4/2/68

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person without the express approval of the FBI.

ON APRIL TWO A SOURCE ADVISED THAT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, APRIL TWO, REV. JESSE JACKSON OF SCLC'S "OPERATION BREAD BASKET," REV. S. B. KYLES OF METROPOLITAN BAPTIST CHURCH, MEMPHIS, AND REV. EDWARD L. BROWN, MT. PISGAH CME CHURCH, ADVISED THAT WITH SCLC PERSONNEL IN MEMPHIS THAT NIGHTLY MASS STRIKE SUPPORT MEETINGS WILL BE RESUMED, THE FIRST AT MASON TEMPLE ON NIGHT OF APRIL THREE WITH KING AS FEATURED SPEAKER. THEY SAID MASS MARCH WILL BE HELD FRIDAY, APRIL FIVE, AND THAT THEY WILL HAVE SCHOOL CHILDREN PARTICIPATE SINCE MARCHING WITH "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE GREATEST LIVING AMERICAN," WOULD BE MORE EDUCATIONAL THAN BEING IN SCHOOL. WHEN ASKED BY PRESS IF KING WOULD PERSONALLY MARCH, JACKSON SAID KING MIGHT NOT MARCH. HE DID NOT ELABORATE. WHEN ASKED IF SCLC GROUP WOULD VIOLATE A POSSIBLE INJUNCTION AGAINST THEIR MARCHING, JACKSON SAID "THE WHITE MAN HAS ALREADY ENJOINED THE BLACK MAN TO THE GHETTO AND THE WHITE MAN DOESN'T NEED TO VALIDATE IT BY SENDING US A PIECE OF PAPER." KYLES SAID THE PROBLEM FACING MEMPHIS IS NOT MILITANT BLACK YOUTH BUT IS "WHITE RACISM." JACKSON DESCRIBED OPERATION BREAD BASKET AS MASSIVE

END PAGE TWO

DRIVE TO FORCE ALL GROCERS IN NEGRO AREA TO CEASE SELLING HART'S BREAD, WONDER BREAD, COCA COLA, AND SEALTEST DAIRY PRODUCTS AS THESE FIRMS DO NOT HIRE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF NEGROES.

ON APRIL TWO LT. ARKIN ADVISED THAT MEMPHIS CITY OFFICIALS ARE CONSIDERING SEEKING A COURT INJUNCTION PROHIBITING ANY MASS MARCH LED BY KING OR AN INJUNCTION SPECIFYING CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A MARCH COULD TAKE PLACE AND ALSO CONSIDERING RESUMPTION OF A CURFEW AND PLACING STRIKE SUPPORT LEADERS UNDER A PEACE AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY BOND.

ARKIN ADVISED THAT REMAINDER OF TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARD, WITH EXCEPTION OF ONE BATTERY CONSISTING OF TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY THREE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE MEMPHIS GUARD UNIT, HAVE LEFT MEMPHIS.

AT THREE ZERO FIVE PM, SIXTY SANITATION WORKERS AND SYMPATHIZERS DEPARTED CLAYBORN TEMPLE CARRYING PLACARDS FOLLOWING THEIR USUAL PARADE MARCH TO BEALE STREET NORTH ON MAIN TO CITY HALL. NO INCIDENTS REPORTED.

memo
~~LHM~~ FOLLOWS. P. END.

CAL

FBI WASH DC

F

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ralph B

Date April 8, 1968

Reverend RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, 690 La Verne Drive, N. W., Atlanta, Georgia, was interviewed at the Memphis Police Department at 10:55 p.m., April 4, 1968. Reverend ABERNATHY was advised of the Agent's identity and of the nature of the matter under investigation.

Reverend ABERNATHY, who described himself as Vice President at Large and Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, stated he was Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.'s closest associate and stated that he and Dr. KING always shared a room whenever they travelled together. He stated that at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968, he and Dr. KING registered at the Lorraine Motel, Memphis, Tennessee.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that on April 4, 1968, he and Dr. KING did not leave the motel and spent most of the day in their room, #306, which is located on the second floor of the motel. He stated that he and Dr. KING had been gone from their room for approximately one hour or less when they returned to the room at about 5:30 p.m. He said they got dressed as they were going to dinner at the home of Reverend BILLY KYLE and that at almost exactly 6 p.m. they started to leave the room. Reverend ABERNATHY stopped for a moment and Dr. KING walked out onto the balcony just outside the door to his room. Reverend ABERNATHY was still inside the motel room but could hear Dr. KING discussing the dinner engagement with other associates who Reverend ABERNATHY believes were standing in the parking area of the motel underneath and to the front of the balcony on which Dr. KING was standing.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated he heard what sounded like a firecracker and then heard the screams of persons to whom Dr. KING had been talking. Reverend ABERNATHY went then to the balcony and discovered Dr. KING lying there wounded in the right side of the face and neck. He said he believed Dr. KING attempted to speak to him but was unable to do so. Reverend ABERNATHY said he instructed someone to call an ambulance and then accompanied Dr. KING in the ambulance to the hospital where Dr. KING subsequently died.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 4/4/68 at Memphis, Tennessee File # Memphis 44-1987

by SA JOE C. HESTER: bn Date dictated 4/8/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that judging from the sound of the noise it appeared that the shot came from directly in front of the door and not from any great distance. He stated he did not observe anything that would indicate who fired the shot. Reverend ABERNATHY also stated that while they were in the motel room Dr. KING did not, to his knowledge, receive any telephone calls of a threatening nature or calls from persons who would not identify themselves. Reverend ABERNATHY said Dr. KING had not feared that any particular persons might harm him and Reverend ABERNATHY was unable to suggest any suspects or to provide any other information which might assist in identifying Dr. KING's killer.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

11:17PM URGENT 3-28-68 ARK

TO DIRECTOR (100-106670) AND MEMPHIS

FROM ATLANTA (100-5586)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM-C.

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE. RM.

IN FORMANT

AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT FOUR THIRTY PM MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

INFORMANT'S INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM DISCUSSION SHORTLY BEFORE WITH HOSEA WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, SCLC, CURRENTLY IN ATLANTA, WHO DURING LATE AFTERNOON MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, CONFERRED TELEPHONICALLY WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., PRESIDENT, SCLC; RALPH D. ABERNATHY, VICE PRESIDENT AND TEASURER, SCLC; AND BERNARD LEE, SPECIAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, SCLC.

KING, ABERNATHY, AND LEE ARE CURRENTLY IN ROOM EIGHT ZERO ONE, HOLIDAY INN, MEMPHIS.

WITH REFERENCE TO RACIAL DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, KING IS EXTREMELY DEJECTED. HE AND ABERNATHY STRONGLY FEEL DISTURBANCE ON THIS DATE DELIBERATELY PLANNED

EX-115 REC-9 100-106670-3278

APR 15 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

PAGE TWO

BY NEGROES WHO ARE NEITHER SYMPATHETIC TO KING OR SCLC. IDENTITY OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS NOT KNOWN.

ABERNATHY, LEE AND WILLIAMS ARE GREATLY CONCERNED FOR WELFARE OF KING, PARTICULARLY ON NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, WHEN HE EXPECTS TO PARTICIPATE IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION WITH SANITATION WORKERS. AT PRESENT TIME KING DOES NOT FEEL HE SHOULD LEAVE MEMPHIS. DURATION OF STAY AND FURTHER DETAILS IN THIS CONNECTION NOT KNOWN.

ACCORDING TO WILLIAMS, HE, ABERNATHY, AND LEE STRONGLY FEEL SAME ELEMENTS WHICH CAUSED DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS EARLIER MARCH TWENTYEIGHT MAY CAUSE PERSONAL HARM TO KING EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

[illegible]

INFORMATION FROM AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R MUST BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. MEMPHIS, HOWEVER, SHOULD ADVISE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF NOT ALREADY KNOWN THAT KING CONTEMPLATES PARTICIPATING IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT AND THAT IN VIEW OF EARLIER DISTURBANCES IN MEMPHIS ON THIS DATE, SEVERAL RANKING SCLC OFFICIALS APPREHENSIVE FOR PERSONAL WELFARE OF KING.

PAGE THREE

FOREGOING INFORMATION TELEPHONICALLY FURNISHED MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

RECEIVED: 11:39PM RM

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

1256AM URGXENT 3-29-68 DGB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS (157-1094)

Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, ~~RM.~~ Racial Matter

RE MEMPHIS TELS, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT ACTIVITIES;

ON MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, MEMPHIS POLICE DEPT., ADVISED THAT THE MASS MARCH TO BE LED BY REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IN SUPPORT OF SANITATION WORKERS STARTED AT AROUND ELEVEN AM CST WITH ESTIMATED FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND WORKERS, MANY OF WHOM WERE NEGRO TEENAGERS. MARCH STARTED AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, LOCATED HEART OF NEGRO AREA, AND KING JOINED MARCH AFTER IT PROGRESSED ONE BLOCK. HE WALKED WITH MARCHERS TO VICINITY BEALE AND MAIN STREETS, MADE NO SPEECHES PRIOR TO MARCH, MADE NO KNOWN UTTERANCES DURING MARCH, AND BY TIME HE REACHED ABOVE POINT RAMPANT BREAKING OF STORE WINDOWS AND LOOTING WAS BEING PERPETRATED BY MARCHERS, WHEREUPON KING AND A FEW ASSOCIATES RAN TO A NEARBY CAR AND LEFT MARCH, PROCEED TO RIVERMONT MOTEL WHERE THEY REMAINED THROUGH AFTERNOON AND EVENING. BY NOON, POLICE HAD BROKEN UP CROWD, BEING FORCED TO USE TEARGAS, BUT SPORADIC LOOTING HAS CONTINUED THROUGH AFTERNOON

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1CC 110 /

1CC 1 [illegible]

Included in letter to White House and Attorney General. Date

NOT RECORDED
162 APR 4 1968

70 APR 1 2 1968

PAGE TWO

AND EVENING, PRIMARILY CONFINED TO SOUTH CENTRAL AREA OF MEMPHIS, A PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO AREA, PRIMARY TARGET OF LOOTERS BEING LIQUOR STORES AND SMALL GROCERIES.

TENNESSEE STATE LEGISLATURE TODAY PASSED CURFEW BILL, WHICH WAS INVOKED BY MEMPHIS MAYOR HENRY LOEB, EFFECTIVE SEVEN PM, AND THIRTY FIVE HUNDRED TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARDSMEN FROM MEMPHIS AND WEST TENNESSEE ARE CURRENTLY ON DUTY IN MEMPHIS OPERATING AS TACTICAL UNITS, BEING ACCOMPANIED ON THEIR PATROLS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMPHIS PD.

SCHEDULED MASS RALLY TO FEATURE KING NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT CANCELED. AT TWELVE MIDNIGHT, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, THREE HUNDRED ARRESTS, PRIMARILY RELATING TO LOOTING AND CURFEW VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY POLICE DEPT. FOUR INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN SHOT, ONE OF THESE, A SIXTEEN YEAR OLD BOY, WAS KILLED IN ACT OF LOOTING A STORE. THREE OTHERS WERE SHOT, TWO BY POLICE OFFICERS AND ONE BY A STOREKEEPER WHILE LOOTING, NONE SERIOUSLY INJURED.

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED THAT KING, RALPH ABERNATHY, AND BERNARD LEE, FAILED TO LEAVE MEMPHIS ON EASTERN FLIGHT THREE NINE EIGHT, NINE ZERO FIVE CST, DUE TO ARRIVE ATLANTA ELEVEN ZERO THREE PM EST. THIS ALSO CANCELS KING'S AND LEE'S FLIGHT FROM ATLANTA SIX TWENTY AM MARCH TWENTY NINE DUE TO ARRIVE BALTIMORE SEVEN FORTY TWO AM. INSPECTOR G. P. TINES, MEMPHIS PD, ADVISED KING PLANNING TO STAY IN MEMPHIS AT RIVERMONT HOTEL TONIGHT, FUTURE PLANS UNKNOWN AT PRESENT TIME. P.

CORR PAGE TWO, PARA ONE, LINE ONE WORDS EIGHT, NINE, AND TEN SHLD BE "AREA OF MEMPHIS" AND LINE TWO, PARA ONE, WORD FIVE SHLD BE "PRIMARY"

PAGE TWO PARA THREE, LINE ONE WORD SIX SHLD BE "KING" AND LINE THREE WORD THREE SHLD BE "PRIMARILY" AND A PERIOD SHLD BE BETWEEN "DEPT. AND FOUR" ONEXXX ON LINE FOUR.

PAGE TWO PARA ONE LINE THREE WORD ONE SHLD BE "LIQUOR"

END.

HFL

FBI WASH DC Cl- Mr Trainor

P

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/18/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. A. Newman

SUBJECT: DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

During a conference on 7/16/75 between the Assistant Attorney General, J. Stanley Pottinger, and his staff and the Director of the FBI and his staff, a question arose concerning Martin Luther King's alleged moving from one hotel or motel to another hotel or motel in Memphis, Tennessee, prior to his murder on 4/4/68.

Attached is a letterhead memorandum (LHM) setting forth an inquiry including a review of all appropriate Bureau files regarding a proposal made in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 3/29/68 in connection with the counterintelligence program wherein it was recommended that information be made available to a cooperative news media source showing King to be a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on 3/28/68, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel). The LHM will reflect and document the fact that although a notation appears on the memorandum that it was "handled" there is no information available to reflect that it was ever actually given to a cooperative news source. Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh (retired), who placed the notation "handled" on the document, absolutely has no recollection of this matter nor can he state whether or not the information was disseminated.

REC-88 100-106670-5

The time elements as documented in this LHM would preclude the proposal contained in the 3/29/68 memorandum of having any affect upon King's cnoice of a motel in which to reside.

JUL 29 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached LHM along with attachments be disseminated to the Department.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

w/ed

Delivered 7/22/75 to Pottinger's office

HAN:cah (6)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 26, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore GCM

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/

PURPOSE:

To recommend item be furnished cooperative national news media source by Crime Records, designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising for the Washington Spring Project.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has now scheduled the Washington Spring Project, his "poor people's march on Washington, D. C.," for the latter part of April, 1968. King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) has sent out a mailing to 70,000 potential financial contributors. King asked these 70,000 to contribute to the Washington Spring Project for the feeding and housing of the marchers.

At the same time, churches in the Washington, D. C., area have said they will feed and house King's marchers.

SUGGESTION:

REC-0 812405

That the above facts be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division so that a story could be

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. M. Wells
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC 35

100-448006

EX 106

APR 9 1968

55

Enclosure

TJD:df/dsm (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

given nation-wide circulation that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people he solicited. Since the churches have offered support, no more money is needed and any contributed would only be used by King for other purposes. This item would need nation-wide circulation in order to reach all the potential contributors and curtail their donations. A sample item is attached.

ACTION:

That the facts about King's solicitation of funds unnecessarily be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division.

✓

Handled 4/4/68

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), today finds himself in the embarrassing position of having too much money, or at least the probability of too much money. The SCLC sent out a huge mailing to its contributors pleading for funds for the Washington Spring Project, the "poor people's march on Washington." Thousands of contributors were urged to support the march financially in order to feed and house the demonstrators. But the churches in the Washington, D. C., area have offered to house and feed the demonstrators.

Now the contributions are beginning to roll in from the mailing and King doesn't need the money. An embarrassment of riches has befallen King, who will only use the money for other purposes. The churches had better come through with all the housing and support the demonstrators need, because there will be little money left for the "poor people" by the time the march rolls around.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-448006-83

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 8C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop ✓ B
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
[illegible]
[illegible]
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
RACIAL MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

A sanitation workers strike has been going on in Memphis for some time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis. King was in an automobile preceding the marchers. As the march developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke out including the breaking of windows in stores and some looting.

This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called nonviolence advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience for Washington in April.

REC-19
EX-105
157-9146-38
5 APR 2 1968

ACTION:

Attached is a blind memorandum pointing ~~out the~~ above, which if you approve, should be made available by Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources. (on a strictly confidential basis)

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

TDR:fhd (6)

Wed

OK
H

REC-D
FBI

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Deakin

Deakin

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

5 APR 1968

~~APR 11 1968~~

RACIAL INT. SECT.

AUG 30 1968

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, injected himself into the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and the result of King's famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism, looting, and riot.

Previously, King involved himself in this strike, called for a general strike, and called for a mass march. Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of the line. Negroes began shouting "black power" and trouble began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and looting broke out.

Police officers were forced to use gas to break up the march and to control the crowd. It was necessary to activate the National Guard. Martin Luther King claims his much-heralded march on Washington, scheduled for April 22, 1968, will also be "nonviolent." He says he has persuaded militant black nationalists to abandon violent extremism in Washington, D. C., during the march. Memphis may only be the prelude to civil strife in our Nation's Capitol.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

157-9146-38

ENCLOSURE

~~157 [illegible]~~

XEROX
APR 4 1968

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
D HUDDLESTON, JR., KY. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 25, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

I would appreciate your making available to the Committee the following items in connection with our investigation of the King matter:

1. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between one Val Coleman and Special Agent Harold Linebaugh or any other FBI Headquarters officials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

2. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between any FBI Headquarters officials and any representatives of the news media concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

3. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to a meeting between Ralph Abernathy and either FBI Director Hoover or Cartha DeLoach during December 1964 or January 1965 (other than the December 1, 1964 meeting which was attended by Dr. King and the January 11, 1965 meeting which was attended by Andrew Young).

4. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to the following statement which appears in the second paragraph of the September 11, 1964 memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - Communist":

RECEIVED
DEC 1 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1210X

On that occasion Assistant Director DeLoach's office was able to take appropriate action to forestall the publication of the article.

5. The 7/16/64 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan which is noted in handwriting at the bottom of the second page of the July 15, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

6. With respect to the March 29, 1968 memorandum, with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" please provide:

a. Access to original of this memorandum and its enclosure;

b. Access to all extant "tickler" and/any other copies of this memorandum and its attachment in their original form;

c. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memorandum. ~~(This should include any and all information adduced, collected, and/or prepared in connection with Mr. James Adams' testimony on this subject before the Senate Select Committee on November 18, 1975.)~~

d. All memoranda and any other materials received from FBI field offices or written at FBI Headquarters prior to and pertaining to the recommendation contained in the March 29, 1968 memorandum.

7. With respect to the memorandum with enclosure, from W. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 26, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)", please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

8. With respect to a memorandum with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan, dated 3/28/68, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

9. Responses to Items 6, 7, and 8 should include copies of all newspaper clippings or magazine articles contained in FBI files which contain information set forth in the memoranda and/or enclosures identified in Items 6, 7, and 8 above.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 1, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated November 25, 1975, requesting various information regarding the King matter. Please prepare an appropriate response to this request.

EX-110

REC-60

62-116395-1210X

7 MAR 5 1976

cc: Paul Daly

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

5-Phillips

1-Ad Hoc
12-3-75

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 11/28/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY

Removed By 7 9 JAN 1 1976

File Number 62-116395-1210

Permanent Serial Charge Out

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

The Attorney General

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP3ALMKP

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum, with attachment, concerning an interview of former FBI Assistant Director Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum, with attachment, for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Your specific attention is invited to certain information relating to the interview of Wick suggestive of improprieties on the part of an SSC Staff Member. The facts, as known to this Bureau, are as follows.

Wick first contacted this Bureau concerning the interview by telephone on November 5, 1975, to advise that he had been called on October 31, 1975, by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein representing the SSC. Epstein requested Wick to come to Washington, D. C., for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his "employment." Epstein did not further describe the subject matter of the interview and an appointment was arranged for November 7, 1975. Wick said that he was uncertain as to the probable subject matter of the interview because other matters coming within his responsibilities as Vice President of Pan American World Airways which were unrelated to the FBI, have been of recent interest to the SSC. Wick asked for advice of the FBI concerning this matter. Thereupon, the Legal Counsel Division of this Bureau contacted Epstein and determined that the subject matter of the interview of Wick would be Martin Luther King, Jr. A return call was made to Wick on November 5, 1975, to advise him that this Bureau had learned that the subject matter of the interview would be Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395-1209X

REC-51

3 JAN 13 1976

1 - 67 (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

SFP:mjg
(11)

2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

✓ S. F. Phillips
4043

84 JAN 20 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

On November 6, 1975, Wick again telephoned this Bureau and advised that he had been rather annoyed at Epstein's initial approach to him; particularly, because Wick had tried on more than one occasion during the telephone conversation with Epstein to pry from Epstein the subject matter of the interview but Epstein persisted in not advising him.

This Bureau's representative who had determined from Epstein on November 5, 1975, the subject matter of the interview has advised that when he made the inquiry of Epstein, he asked Epstein why he had not told Wick the subject matter. Epstein's reply was that Wick had not asked him, a statement directly contradictory to Wick's advice to this Bureau.

The second suggested impropriety is that Epstein contacted Wick prior to advising this Bureau of his intention to interview Wick, an action which is contrary to procedures which have been agreed upon between the SSC and this Bureau.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
                Special Counsel for
                 Intelligence Coordination

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

62-116395

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S.F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (AD) ROBERT WICK
BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

This memorandum concerns an interview of former FBI AD Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members.

On November 5, 1975, Wick advised this Bureau that on October 31, 1975, he had been contacted by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein of the SSC who requested Wick to come to Washington for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his employment. Epstein did not further describe the subject matter although Wick attempted to obtain such information from Epstein.

Upon receipt of the above information from Wick, this Bureau determined from Epstein that the subject matter was to be Martin Luther King, Jr., and that fact was relayed to Wick on November 5, 1975. Wick was also told that he was being released from his secrecy agreement with the FBI for the purpose of the interview, confined to the indicated subject matter. Wick was also advised by this Bureau that he was not required to answer questions falling within four privileged areas: matters pertaining to pending investigations; information from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies; information concerning sensitive methods and techniques; and information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources.

Attached hereto is a copy of a MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE dated November 12, 1975, which Wick voluntarily furnished this Bureau and which represents his report pertaining to the interview.

Enclosure

1 - 67- (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SFP:mjg (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

62-116395-1209

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Assistant Director (AD)
Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members

NOTE:

Information relating to contacts between Wick and this Bureau are reported in memoranda 11/5/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," and 11/7/75 from W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall "Senstudy 75." Wick's statement, MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE, was mailed to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The matter of improprieties was addressed specifically in the above 11/7/75 Cregar memorandum and it is believed that the Department should be made aware of this matter.

Let 4 4 NM to AG Encl (2)

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
12/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former Assistant Director Robert Wick

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Interviewed regarding his knowledge of the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Apil

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

76-1004/9

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
✓Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
~~Telephone Rm.~~ ____
Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 12/9/75

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION & ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

FROM: ADIC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243)

RE: SENSTUDY; TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS, AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR W. RAYMOND WANNALL 12/2/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/ag

Re Los Angeles phone call to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS, 12/9/75.

On 12/3/75, the attached article appeared in the Los Angeles Times under the byline of reporter JACK NELSON. As indicated, the headline and lead paragraph which supposedly is based on ADAMS' testimony, clearly reflects that the FBI did nothing to prevent Klan violence although we knew of the contemplated violence. After discussing this matter with Mr. ADAMS and reviewing the actual testimony received in the Los Angeles Division on 12/8/75, SAC ELMER F. LINBERG and I met with Editor BILL THOMAS and National Editor ED GUTHMAN at the Los Angeles Times.

I advised these gentlemen that I was aghast when I read the headlines and the lead paragraph of this article and could not believe that JIM ADAMS did not refute informant ROWE's testimony that we took no action relative to contemplated violence since I knew that this was contrary to the rules, regulations, policy, and philosophy of the FBI in 1960. I then called Mr. ADAMS in Washington, D. C., and he likewise, was upset over the headline and lead paragraph,

ENCLOSURE

EX-112

REC-38

62-116395-1209

3 - Bureau (1 Encl)
1 - Los Angeles
REG:mmb
(4)

17 DEC 12 1975

Approved: JAN 7 1976
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

because, according to ADAMS, he completely refuted these statements in that we did disseminate the contemplated plans of violence to the Birmingham Police Department and to the Department of Justice in the form of a letterhead memorandum.

I continued that I waited until I received the actual transcript of testimony and told the gentlemen that upon my review of the testimony of Mr. ADAMS and Mr. WANNALL, I could not reconcile the headline and lead paragraph with such testimony. I then proceeded to read several excerpts from the testimony.

I advised Mr. THOMAS and Mr. GUTHMAN that my immediate reaction was to prepare a "Letter to the Editor" but felt after a re-analysis of the situation that this is not a judgment question on the part of the newspaper, but one of a slanted, inaccurate story either by design or through misunderstanding. I therefore felt that the Los Angeles Times, if it so desired, should be in a position to correct the situation itself based on the facts.

Mr. THOMAS expressed appreciation for my approach and stated that at the time he read the article, already printed, a question came to his mind as to why the FBI did not advise someone or take some action relative to contemplated violence. He, however, took no further action. He said in view of what I had read from excerpts of Mr. ADAMS' testimony and the now available complete transcript of the testimony, he intends to pursue this matter further and would prefer not to have a "letter to the Editor", but rather correct any inaccuracies on the part of the Los Angeles Times through their own pursuit of further inquiring concerning this story.

Mr. GUTHMAN concurred with Mr. THOMAS and they indicated that it appears the obvious question is based on Mr. ADAMS' testimony of who in the Department of Justice received this information relative to contemplated violence and what did such a responsible Department of Justice official do with the information. He agreed that based on the information furnished to them, the FBI has been done an injustice but that they, the Los Angeles Times, desired to pursue this matter further.

It should be noted the article of JACK NELSON is based on one specific situation, namely the testimony of former informant GARY ROWE that he had furnished advance information to the FBI to the effect that members of the Ku Klux Klan would be given the opportunity to beat members of the Freedom Riders without interference by law enforcement authorities for approximately 15 minutes after which the local law enforcement authorities would take action, and that the FBI was advised of this well in advance of such beatings and furthermore, the FBI took no action to prevent this violence.

Took No Action to Prevent Klan Violence, FBI Admits

BY JACK NELSON
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—An FBI official conceded Tuesday that the bureau had failed to use an undercover man's information to head off Ku Klux Klan violence in Alabama in the 1960s.

But, the official, James B. Adams, assistant to the director, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the FBI was "just as frustrated as anyone else" at "rank lawlessness" that existed in Alabama at that time. Also, he said, the FBI is an investigative agency and has no enforcement powers.

Adams' defense of the FBI came immediately after Gary Thomas Rowe Jr., wearing a hood to conceal his features, testified that on many occasions he had warned the bureau of the klan's plans for violence, but that the violence occurred without official interference.



WITNESS—Gary Thomas Rowe Jr. wears hood while testifying.
AP Wirephoto

Rowe served six years as an FBI undercover agent before surfacing in 1965 as the star witness against three klansmen accused of killing a white civil rights worker in Lowndes County, Ala. Since then he has been living

Please Turn to Page 6, Col. 1

KLAN VIOLENCE

Continued from First Page

in Southern California under an assumed name.

Rowe was one of two former undercover operatives who testified before the committee Tuesday. The other, Mary Jo Cook of Buffalo, N.Y., told of supplying the FBI with information about 1,000 persons while serving as an informant against the Vietnam Veterans Against the War during 1973-74.

Testimony by both witnesses prompted committee members to criticize FBI tactics and to suggest that legal restraints be put on future FBI activities.

Sen. Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), commenting on testimony by Rowe that he engaged in klan violence with the knowledge and approval of the FBI, observed that the bureau's infiltration of the klan not only failed to prevent violence, "but indeed may have contributed to it."

Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-Mont.) told Adams that the FBI had bungled its job in investigating political activities and added:

"It has interfered with civil liberties and finally in the last month or two through its public disclosures has heaped shame upon itself and really led toward the undermining of crucial public confidence essential to law enforcement agencies in the country."

Mondale criticized the FBI for trying to "protect people from subversive and dangerous ideas," and he told Adams:

"Time and time again, we're going to protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous. We're going to protect veterans from whatever it is, we're going to protect the (National) Council of Churches from veterans and so on . . .

"Don't you agree with me that we've got to control this, restrain it, define it, so that precisely what's expected of the FBI is known by you and by the public and you can justify your actions when we ask you?"

Adams disagreed that the FBI had bungled in the political intelligence field but agreed that restraining legislation was in order.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Los Angeles Times

12/3/75

62-116395-1209

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 12-3-75

FROM : T. J. JENKINS

SUBJECT: GARY T. ROWE
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE

On 12-3-75 ~~an individual who identified~~ himself as Garland Reeves of the Birmingham, Alabama, News, called and he advised that he understood I was the Special Agent in Charge of the Birmingham Office at the time the bus was burned with the Freedom Riders in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1961. He stated that he would like to know if Rowe had furnished us information that the Birmingham Police were going to wait 15 or 30 minutes to go to the bus station in order to give the Klan an opportunity to work over the Freedom Riders. I informed Reeves that I recalled no such information being furnished to us at that time. I told him that all information we received concerning possible violence was furnished to the Birmingham Police Department. He wanted to know, if there had been such an agreement what action would I take. I told him that if I determined that the police department would not take any action for 15 or 30 minutes I would advise the Mayor ~~and~~ of the city and the Police Commissioner and if they felt the same as the police department, I would then advise the Governor of the State.

EX 104 REC 4 62-116395-1208

He wanted to know what would be the FBI's position at that time if the police department refused to take any action. I told him that we did not have jurisdiction in matters of this nature, that they were purely local and it was the responsibility of the local authorities to handle such matters. He desired to know if I would call out the Federal Marshals. I informed him that the FBI did not have any authority to call upon the Federal Marshals in a situation of this nature but if such a situation arose, I would have immediately notified our headquarters in Washington, who would have ~~notified the~~ Department of Justice, who would have such authority.

7 DEC 16 1975

I told him that while I was in Birmingham as Special Agent in Charge we kept the Bureau headquarters in Washington completely informed of all developments and they in turn, kept the Department of Justice informed.

ACTION: Submitted for information.

TJJ:pmd (5)
1 - Mr. Adams 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMK9

59 DEC 30 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

WRW/LAC

FBI

Date: 12/4/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714)

SENSTUDY 75

Re San Diego telephone call to Bureau, 12/4/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of a letterhead memorandum reflecting information received in the San Diego Office concerning GARY THOMAS ROWE, Jr.

Deputy SCOTT BOIES of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office was contacted and advised that if he felt he recognized ROWE that he should not discuss the matter openly with anyone in that ROWE was obviously attempting to protect his identity. Deputy BOIES was not advised that ROWE was identical with THOMAS NEIL MOORE.

extra cc destroyed [illegible]

2 - Bureau (Encs - 8)
1 - San Diego

DCS:pgh
(3)

1 - The Attorney General
~~1 - (1 - Senate [illegible] Comm [illegible])~~
Not sent [illegible]

UNREC COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

REC-100

62-116395-1206X

2-6 ~~DEC 3~~ 1975

Letter to [illegible] Hernando [illegible]
12/[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2 ALM/g

WOC

Approved: RLM/b ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ____________ M Per ____________

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
December 4, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: GARY THOMAS ROWE, JR.

At 11:30 p.m. on December 2, 1975, Deputy Sheriff Scott Boies of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office, Lemon Grove, California Sub-Station, telephonically contacted the San Diego FBI Office and advised as follows:

Deputy Boies stated that he recognized the voice of the man identified as Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who is testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on the Ku Klux Klan. He stated he heard Mr. Rowe talk on a news broadcast and recognized him as being an individual he knows as Thomas Neil Moore. Deputy Boies furnished Moore's date of birth as August 15, 1933, and an address of 580 "L" Street, Chula Vista, California, where Moore resided in 1971. Deputy Boies stated that Moore worked for Western Bureau of Investigation, headquartered in Los Angeles and worked as a security guard for the White Front Department Store, Chula Vista, California.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KP

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-1206X

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

December 12, 1975

Director, FBI

REC-100 62-116395-1206X

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. Klein

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to my November 26, 1975, letter to you enclosing among other material, a memorandum concerning former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is a copy of a memorandum dated December 4, 1975, regarding Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., received by FBI Headquarters from our San Diego field office.

Rowe, is a former informant who testified before the SSC on December 2, 1975, regarding his role in supplying information to the FBI regarding Ku Klux Klan activities in Alabama. He has been utilizing the cover name, Thomas Neil Moore.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 137-6

No 1 SENT TO SSC PER STEVE BLACKHURST, USDS 3.23.76 ABB

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the December 4, 1975, memorandum.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 137-6295

SK:klm
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 FEB 12 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Above being furnished to the Attorney General and the SSC in order to apprise them of information reflecting that Rowe, who testified with a mask over his face, was identified by a San Diego Deputy Sheriff after hearing Rowe's voice on a news broadcast. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/4/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TESTIMONY BY THE DIRECTOR
DECEMBER 9, 1975

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO CHANGE
THE NAME OF THE J. EDGAR HOOVER
FBI BUILDING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

In connection with the Director's appearance on December 9, 1975, to testify before captioned committee, it is possible that he may be asked concerning recent proposals in the Congress to change the name of the building. Three bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives on December 1, 1975, for that purpose. H.R. 10905, introduced by Congressman Gude of Maryland and H.R. 10918, introduced by Congresswoman Schroeder of Colorado, would change the name of the building to "FBI Building." H.R. 10916, introduced by Congressman Rangel of New York, would change the name to "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building." All three of the bills were referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House, the chairman of which is Congressman Jones of Alabama.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information of the Director in connection with his preparation for testimony.

Enc.

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

3

EX 104 REC-9 62-116395-1206

DEC 16 1975

XEROX
DEC 19 1975

COPY FILED IN

84 DEC 30 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mr. GUDE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" wherever it appears in such section and inserting in lieu thereof "F.B.I. Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

By Mr. GUDE

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE ___ BY ___

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mrs. SCHROEDER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Public Law 92–520 is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 8. The Federal building in the block bounded by Ninth Street Northwest, Tenth Street Northeast, E Street Northwest, and Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest, in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter be known as the 'F.B.I. Building'. Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, record, or other paper of the United States to such

Federal building shall be held to be a reference to the "F.B.I. Building"".

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

By Mrs. SCHROEDER

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

MR. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" both times it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

By Mr. RANGEL

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Stack
1 - Mr. McWright

Mr. Jenkins
11/28/75

J. Cochran, Jr.

REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

Senatorially

Re memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11/21/75, advising that representatives of captioned Senate Subcommittee desire to review any Bureau documents relating to the Bureau's interest in or use of drugs during interrogation.

It was pointed out in referenced memo that captioned Subcommittee staff members James F. Michie and Thomas M. Susman had obtained information from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning a program coordinated between DOD, CIA, and FBI to develop a truth serum. The program apparently began in early 1950 and D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory had knowledge of this activity.

The information that Michie and Susman have obtained apparently relates to a Navy drug experimentation project from 1947 to 1954. Navy files indicated that the FBI was aware of this program and Mr. C. D. DeLoach and D. J. Parsons were mentioned.

A review of Bureau files disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the Navy drug project. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395-

62-2699

Enclosure

① 62-116395

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Adams
2 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Rotis)
(Attn: Mr. Miller)
3 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. W. O. Cregar)
(Attn: Mr. T. D. J. Brooks)
(Attn: Mr. V. H. Weimar)

CGM:bms
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

CONTINUED - OVER

NOT RECORDED
46 FEB 5 1976

84 FEB 9 1976

might be used to great advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50.

Memorandum dated 11/6/75 from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall is attached which sets forth details of our review of Navy files on this project, including a Bureau press release which was to have been made in the event that the Navy mentioned the FBI in their press release on this matter.

A review of Bureau files for information relating to drugs designed to modify behavior indicates an interest dating back to 1922. However, this interest has not extended to the point where the Bureau has conducted research on behavior modifying drugs nor has it funded such research. We have maintained liaison with other agencies, primarily the U. S. Army, and industrial organizations in order to be aware of developments in this area.

On 7/30/74, Laboratory and Training Division representatives met with representatives of the Biomedical and Chemical Laboratories of Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, to discuss the potential use of incapacitating chemical agents in hostage situations. Although we have developed an awareness of various agents which may be used in these situations, we have not conducted any research with these agents. Memoranda on this matter are located in Bufile 80-807.

A single instance occurred where "truth serum" was administered in a Bureau case. Truth serum was administered to Thurman Scruggs Wilkins at his own request while being interviewed in the Los Angeles Office, April 26, 1947. Wilkins was allegedly involved with one Ignacy Samuel Witczak, the subject of a Soviet espionage case (100-343077). The actual drug used was sodium amytal and the actual administration was done by a physician. Prior Bureau authority was not obtained by the Los Angeles Office in connection with this incident. SAC Hood submitted a letter of explanation to the Bureau on July 2, 1947. This incident resulted in the following information being set forth in SAC Letter 84-47 dated July 3, 1947:

"The Bureau will not tolerate any experiments or participation on the part of its personnel in the utilization of the so called truth serums or other chemicals alleged to have a similar effect. ---- consequently, in the event any Bureau agent violates these instructions, drastic administrative action will be taken."

There was nothing found in Bureau files that would indicate that we have received any documents from CIA concerning their drug research programs. The files do reflect that we were aware that CIA was conducting research with lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and that British Intelligence had successfully utilized LSD on several Russian espionage agents. The information concerning CIA and British activities is set out for the benefit of the Director only and cannot be released outside the Bureau.

There are two Bureau files which contain most of the information relating to the immediate area of interest of the captioned Senate Subcommittee. These files are 62-2699 (Truth Serums) and 80-645 (Chemical Munitions and Gases). Pertinent serials may also be found in 80-807 and 100-343077 as previously noted in this memorandum.

I see no reason why Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman should not be afforded on oral briefing regarding these matters, and if necessary make pertinent serials of Bufiles 62-2699, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077 available to them for review.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman be advised by Legal Counsel that available Bureau records and interview with current knowledgeable employee indicate the FBI has never engaged in nor funded anyone's efforts in research and/or development programs in the use or effect of drugs on human behavior. They should be advised our efforts in this regard as far as can be established from the available records consists of following through liaison contacts with other government agencies and the private sector sources the current developments in behavior modifying drugs.

(2) That if they desire to pursue this matter further, SA McWright and myself be permitted to meet with Michie and Susman to (a) reaffirm the information in recommendation #1 and (b) if necessary, to produce for their inspection pertinent serials from 62-6299, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. J. Cochran

11/6/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
(1) - Mr. C. G. McWright
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

This is to inform you that on 11/7/75 Defense Department will release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC), the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures (Senator Edward M. Kennedy's committee), and to the press, information concerning Navy projects from 1947 to 1954 involving drug experimentation; a Navy file indicates FBI was aware of programs but Laboratory has no knowledge of any active participation by Bureau personnel.

On 11/4/75, Clark McGruder, Assistant to Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Director of Naval Intelligence, informed me that on 11/7/75 the Navy was going to release to aforementioned committees and the press information on drug experimentation and that the FBI was mentioned in the pertinent files. Those files were reviewed at the Pentagon on 11/6/75 by Supervisor J. P. Thomas of INTD. They had been classified "Secret" and "Top Secret" but now have been completely declassified. FBI was mentioned in connection with three projects. There are no FBI documents in the files.

A memorandum dated 9/21/50 from Mr. Alberti to Mr. C. D. DeLoach was a receipt signed by Mr. DeLoach for one copy of "Drugs Stated To Have Been Used By Russians And Germans In Interrogation Techniques." Alberti is identified elsewhere in the file as Jack H. Alberti, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), who apparently coordinated the projects mentioned in the file. The purpose of one project was to develop a speech-inducing drug to obtain intelligence from interrogees and the project began in 1947.

Enclosures

62-116395

[illegible]
(9)

[illegible] - [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

A memorandum dated 8/15/~~75~~ 50 on letterhead of Office of Chief of Naval Operations concerned "Top Secret Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI) Project on Speech-Inducing Drugs," reported a meeting on 8/11/50 attended by personnel of NMRI, CIA, Office of Naval Research (ONR), a drug company representative and Mr. DeLoach and Mr. D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the FBI on a CIA project on narco-hypnosis and on the NMRI project. Parsons reportedly said the FBI had no such project, but had information on the experiences of various police departments in the United States with speech-inducing drugs. He agreed to make the FBI information available to NMRI and CIA. ONR agreed to give FBI, NMRI and CIA a study by ONR on projected research to improve polygraph reliability. Recipients were to give their comments and recommendations on the study to ONR. At the meeting NMRI gave DeLoach an 8/11/50 NMRI progress report on its project. Parsons agreed to look into the possibility of getting volunteers from prisoners in Federal institutions and to supply NMRI with canabis (marijuana) and heroin to the extent they might be available to the FBI. It is noted that no FBI representatives were listed in the memorandum reporting a 9/27/50 meeting of this group and there is no further record in the file of FBI participation. Neither is there any record that the FBI supplied any drugs for the project.

Material regarding project "CHATTER" included a carbon copy of a rough draft memorandum (no letterhead) bearing the penciled date "11/50?" which contained the following, "Since 1947 the Department of the Navy has carried on a project in coordination with the Departments of the Air Force and Army, CIA and FBI for the development of speech-inducing drugs.... The Directors of Intelligence of the three Services, of CIA and FBI consider this project

CONTINUED - OVER

of utmost important and urgency to... fulfillment of their missions for the security of the United States." The memorandum says that a project submitted to ONR by Professor Richard Wendt of the University of Rochester (NY) had been approved by all the agencies involved and recommended funding the project. The file indicates subsequently that this project did go forward and involve human experimentation.

~~The second~~ Another file dealt with project "CALLING CARD," 1952-1953, designed "to render an individual subservient to imposed will or control." FBI was not mentioned.

80-5 (Polygraph file) relates only to instrumental detection of deception

A memorandum dated 9/5/50 for Mr. D. J. Parsons, FBI; C. Edwards, CIA; and Captain Wilbur E. Kellum of Naval Medical Research, from W. S. Post, Jr. (not further identified), informed them that a copy of the report on the "Ellson" project (University of Indiana, 1952) was being forwarded to them for information. The project involved research in the detection of deception. The addressees were to be briefed by Professor D. G. Ellson of Indiana University on the project at a future date. The file did not show that the briefing occurred. The project was terminated in June, 1952.

The two files reviewed contained many reports of research conducted concerning various drugs in various parts of the world, constituting a collection of papers on the subject by U. S. and foreign researchers.

A review of logical Bureau files by the Laboratory Division disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the above. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which might be used to great

CONTINUED - OVER

advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50. (Navy memorandum on this meeting set out above.)

We have received a memorandum dated 11/4/75 from Defense describing the proposed release of Navy information to the committees and to the press. Copy of that memorandum and of the press release are attached. The release says that "Liaison was maintained with... the FBI" concerning the drug research ~~release.~~

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

PRESS RELEASE
NOVEMBER 7, 1975

The press statement released by the Navy today relating to its drug research on human subjects for the period 1947 through 1954 indicates liaison concerning this project was maintained by the Navy with other Governmental agencies, including the FBI.

A thorough review of FBI files has disclosed one document relating to this Navy research: a short internal memorandum, dated August 4, 1950. This memorandum, prepared by a member of the Liaison staff at FBI Headquarters, recorded that a Navy official had invited FBI representatives to a conference in the Washington area to "discuss the usage of truth serum in Intelligence circles," and that the Navy had made advances in developing a new drug which "could be utilized to a great advantage in the questioning of espionage agents." A handwritten notation on this memorandum directed that a representative of the FBI Laboratory was to attend this conference on August 11, 1950.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/RO

No further identifiable reference to Navy drug development research is contained in FBI files. No record can be located that liaison was being maintained with the Navy regarding this program, or that the FBI had knowledge of this program prior to the date of the above memorandum.

ENCLOSURE

~~ENCLOSURE~~ 62-116395

The FBI was not involved in any way in this Navy drug research, and the FBI has never participated in research with drugs designed to modify human behavior, nor has it funded such research.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
December 24, 1975
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

ST 115

Director, FBI

REC-51 62-116395-1204X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is in response to the SSC letter dated December 18, 1975, wherein Senators Mondale and Baker requested rather detailed information to be made available during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

It is noted that most of the requests in this letter are so ambiguous that they require clarification from the SSC before the FBI can logically respond. In one instance, there is no way this Bureau could respond short of obtaining the recollections of Bureau Supervisors who worked in the Intelligence Division extending back almost 20 years. Because of this, we are attaching for your approval and forwarding to the SSC the original of a memorandum which delineates the problems attendant to the request of December 18, 1975, and, in most instances, requests a meeting between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, SSC, and representatives of this Bureau in the hope that some alternatives or clarifications can be developed. A copy of the memorandum is furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

WOC:lhb
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2AMK

84 JAN 20 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The request of 12/18/75 was received in the Intelligence Division in the midafternoon of 12/22/75. A conference was held on the morning of 12/23/75 of pertinent Division personnel in an effort to identify the problems connected with responding to this request. It is believed that the only way the Bureau can logically respond to the request is by obtaining clarifications and, in some instances, alternatives to the requests set out.

We have already determined that both John Elliff and the SSC Counsel, F. A. O. Schwartz, are out of the city for the holidays. The Legal Counsel Division has left word with Mr. Schwartz and/or Mr. Elliff to call SA Paul Daly upon their return to the city.

Copy of 12/18/75 request attached.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J, G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

62-116395

December 24, 1975

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM SENATORS
MONDALE AND BAKER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On December 22, 1975, this Bureau received a copy of a letter dated December 18, 1975, which Senators Mondale and Baker sent to the Attorney General levying certain requirements on the FBI with a request that the responses be provided the SSC during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

Item 1 requested access to materials in the investigative files for a six-month period preceding acts of violence which were prevented by actions taken by the FBI. The specific preventive actions were set out in some detail in a memorandum prepared for the SSC by the FBI dated December 10, 1975.

Upon receipt of referenced letter, the Intelligence Division initiated efforts to isolate the files documenting these preventive actions. The Bureau's response of December 10, 1975, was predicated on a review of the pertinent inspection reports of the Intelligence Division. These reports do not document by file number the individual preventive actions. To locate specific files, it will be necessary to have knowledgeable Intelligence Division personnel queried in an effort to try to match the preventive action with a particular investigative file. In some instances,

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

WOC:lhb/lhb
(11)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

PJD
WOB

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-1204X

there will be no investigative file but merely a communication from a field office reporting information furnished by a source of the FBI on which some preventive action was predicated. It is possible that the acts of violence reported by the source could involve a violation over which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction. In such cases, the local field office would have merely furnished the information to the appropriate law enforcement agency and no investigative file would exist.

We are continuing our efforts to attempt to isolate those files which document preventive actions. However, because of the problems attendant thereto, as well as those problems raised in the subparagraphs of Item 1, it is recommended that a meeting be arranged between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, and representatives of this Bureau to discuss possible alternatives to some of these requests.

Items 2 and 3 concern the September 24, 1975, report to the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office. The FBI is in the process of preparing a response and it will be made available to the Committee as soon as possible. However, it is noted that the FBI prepared no analysis at all on the findings of the General Accounting Office contained in their report of September 24, 1975.

Item 4 requests the annual reports from the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968, and the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that organization was under investigation. Item 4 also requests annual reports available on the investigations "about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28."

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

There were no annual reports submitted by the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968. With regard to the Women's Liberation Movement, the SSC has been provided copies of all pertinent reports for the years the organization was under investigation. In an effort to clarify what is meant by the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to Mr. John Elliff's request of October 28, 1975, it is again proposed that a meeting with Mr. Elliff be arranged to clarify this ambiguity.

Item 5 requests specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV of the Department of Justice's guidelines draft on "Domestic Security Investigations."

The indices of this Bureau are not organized to enable retrieval of information of a "preventive action" character or examples of FBI actions taken to prevent violence. The retrieval of such information from FBI files, other than that described in the response to Item 1, would require extensive review and/or dependence on the recollection of individuals of occurrences extending back almost 20 years. It is suggested that, during the proposed meeting with Mr. John Elliff, this request be discussed.

Item 6 requests access to all FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1, through April 4, 1968.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

It is this Bureau's belief that all pertinent material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, through April 4, 1968, has been made available to the SSC responsive to previous requests. With regard to the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, it is not clear whether the letter is requesting access to the entire FBI file on these two activities from the period January 1, through April 4, 1968. It is recommended that a clarification of this request can be accomplished during the previously proposed meeting between Mr. John Elliff and representatives of the FBI.

Item 7 requests all materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

A check of indices of the FBI regarding "Project Overshoe," as well as the word Overshoe, fails to contain any reference to either. Without additional information regarding "Project Overshoe," this Bureau cannot be responsive to this specific request. Again, it is suggested that, during the forthcoming meeting with John Elliff, clarification of "Project Overshoe" be obtained.

1 - The Attorney General

5-1[illegible]a (Rev. 3-21-73)

Intelligence Division

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

Attached is a request from Senators Mondale and Baker of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated 12/18/75. The Director has requested he be advised regarding the status of this request.

Attached is a copy of a letter to the AG and LHM for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb

CONTINUED - OVER

DOJ/FBI

(Rev. [illegible]-21-[illegible]3)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Intelligence Division

ED

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

ched is a request from Senators
nd Baker of the Senate Select
(SSC) dated 12/18/75. The
has requested he be advised
the status of this request.

ched is a copy of a letter to the
M for the SSC, dated 12/24/75,
advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb CONTINUED - OVER

estimate when we will complete Item 4.

Item 5 has been reduced to the recollection of Bureau Supervisor David Ryan who handled the COINTELPRO matter and will not require research beyond what SA Ryan can recall. (Ryan is currently developing a response to this request.)

Item 6 has been reduced to all materials relating to the Poor People's Campaign, the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennesee, and Martin Luther King, Jr., contained in Headquarters files between the period 1/1-4/4/68. (We are currently working on this request.)

Item 7 - Epstein has agreed to obtain more identifying data regarding Project Overshoe and we are awaiting this information.

WOC

SECRET

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall — for Handle

Sensitive

Sel T for 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

#MDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X
5 JAN 1976

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

RECEIVED

SECRET

SECRET

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall — for Handle

Senstudy

Sel T for 1-5-76

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X
5 JAN 26 1976
RECEIVED
ENCLOSURE

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

SECRET

provided during the last week of December and the first week of January:

1. With respect to each of the examples of effective prevention of violence provided the Committee pursuant to John Elliff's letter of November 26 to Mr. Shaheen, please provide access to materials in the investigative file for the 6-month period preceding the act of violence prevented. Please deliver:

(a) All materials relating to the legal and factual predicate for each investigation;

(b) The first investigative report disseminated outside the FBI in each such case, and a list of recipients of that report;

(c) The total number of individuals whose names were referred to the FBI's general name index in the course of each investigation;

(d) The total number of individuals about whom information was obtained through informants, confidential sources, physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and other sensitive techniques; and

(e) The annual report from the office of origin for each such investigation to FBI headquarters for the last five years during which the case in question was an open investigation.

2. Please provide any information which you have refuting the suggestion made on page 34 of the General Accounting Office's September 24 report to the House Judiciary Committee, that cases in which violence can be predicted probably represent less than 2% of all FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

3. Please provide all memoranda or analyses prepared for the Justice Department, Director Kelley, or Assistant Director Wannall on the findings of the General Accounting Office as presented to the House Judiciary Committee on September 24.

4. Please provide the annual report from the office of origin to FBI headquarters for the investigation of

~~SE~~

Attorney General Edward H. Levi

Page three December 18, 1975

Dr. Martin Luther King in 1963 through 1968, and for the investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that that organization was under investigation, and the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28.

5. Please provide specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV on "preventive action" of the draft Department of Justice's guidelines on "domestic security investigations."

6. Access to all FBI materials pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor People's Campaign, and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1 through April 4, 1968.

7. All materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this request. We look forward to continuing cooperation on this area of joint concern.

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale

Walter F. Mondale
Chairman

Howard W. Baker, Jr.
Vice-Chairman

~~SECRET~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/24/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). (12/18/75 Letter to the Attorney General from Senators Mondale & Baker)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 12-30-75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KP

62-116395-1204X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/24/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 12/18/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Requesting clarification of items listed in request received from Senators Mondale and Bakerregarding preventive actions; 9/24/75 report of the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office; Annual reports from the office of origin to FBIHQs for investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; pertinent materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1/1 thru 4/4/68 previously made available. Clarification with regard to Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tenn; "Project Overshoe."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

62-116395-1204X

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
(Mr. G. S. McMichael)

12/17/75

1 - Mr. J. Cochran
(Mr. F. M. Devine)
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Mr. W. R. Wannall

J. G. Deegan

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This informative memorandum to record unsuccessful efforts to pinpoint the typewriter on which was typed an anonymous letter apparently directed to subject, the original of which was located in papers left behind on the retirement of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan.

Examination of the questioned document by the Laboratory established that the typing was done on a Royal typewriter with pica style type. We checked available inventory records maintained by the Administrative Division as well as our own in INTD to locate all Royal typewriters which were in the then Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) around 1964. This search was based on the suspicion that the note was typed by Sullivan on a typewriter accessible to him in 1964 when he was Assistant Director of the DID.

Our checks revealed that there are available only four typewriters of the type sought which were likely in the DID in 1964. All four are presently in INTD and three of them were readily eliminated as not identical to that which produced the questioned document on the basis that all three have closed "4s", whereas the questioned document has an open ended "4". The fourth typewriter, serial number KMG 13-4320913, is maintained in room 4410 and charged to the IS-2 Section. It was examined by Supervisor F. M. Devine of the Document Section of the Laboratory who advised that it is not identical to the typewriter which produced the questioned document.

100-106670

(1)- 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75) 0

CONTINUED - OVER

SFP:blb
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP3ALM/lP

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 DEC 29 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Martin Luther King, Jr.
100-106670

We are conducting no further inquiry at this time to establish the whereabouts of the typewriter which produced the anonymous letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information and record purposes.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1st NR 1203x, 1204x, 1st NR 1204x, 1206-1210x, 1212, 1214x, 1214x1, 1215, 1215x

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Adams - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs. (2)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Cregar - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs. (2)

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On 12/4/75, a meeting was held with the following representatives of captioned Committee: Chief Counsel F.A.O. Schwartz; Assistant Counsel Paul Michel; Staff Member Mark Gitenstein; Staff Director of the Domestic Task Force John T. Elliff; and Staff Member John Bayley. Representing the Bureau at this meeting were Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams, Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Inspector John B. Hotis, and SA Paul V. Daly.

The meeting discussed the forthcoming testimony on 12/9/75 of the Director before that Committee and Elliff furnished the Bureau two draft papers discussing the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction and issues the Committee Staff feels the Senate Select Committee must address from a legislative standpoint. Copies of these papers are attached.

The first paper which consists of six pages discusses in Part 1 what the Committee sees as problems arising out of the FBI's domestic intelligence investigations. This portion highlights the fact that these investigations may be overbroad in scope, collect irrelevant information, and continue the investigations beyond what the Committee sees as their normal investigative conclusion. This portion also addresses the investigative techniques used during these investigations and the resultant dissemination of information collected.

Under Part 2, the document discusses options available to the Committee. These options run the gamut from abolition of the Bureau's domestic intelligence functions to administrative oversight by the Attorney General or Congressional oversight or enacting legislation providing for domestic intelligence investigations with legislative limits imposed on such investigations. Included is the consideration of creating an independent Inspector General.

62-116395-1215X

REC-51

Enclosures (2)

ENCLOSURE

7 JAN 22 1976

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:lad
(9)

84 JAN 26 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The second position paper which was prepared by John T. Elliff begins by a six-page statement and analysis of the Bureau's current authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. He then lists four options for the Committee.

Option 1 is for Congress to pass legislation ratifying the existing FBI authority as set forth by Presidential directives and Executive Orders.

Option 2 suggests Congress might give serious consideration to creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Department of Justice. In this Option, Elliff suggests that the FBI itself has considered this Option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from law enforcement functions of the Bureau.

Option 3 considers the elimination of FBI domestic intelligence. In his analysis of this position, it might be possible for the Bureau to develop the necessary intelligence information through its normal criminal investigations and thus remove the necessity for domestic intelligence investigations as presently conducted.

Option 4 considers setting standards for domestic intelligence investigations. In this Option, Elliff states that the FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only as Congress finds that regular criminal investigations would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of Federal law and that incidents of the use of violence in such violations are of a serious nature and threaten the security of the country.

For purposes of the Director's appearance on 12/9/75 before the Senate Select Committee, it is believed his response to questions concerning the aforementioned position papers should be that the Bureau has received copies and is reviewing the various proposals and that it would not be appropriate at this time for the Director to comment regarding the substance of the proposals.

CONTINUED - OVER

↓ ↓

Elliff indicated during this meeting that the Director during his appearance may anticipate being asked a question by one of the Senators relating to his statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal concerning the necessity for the sacrifice of certain individual rights at the expense of investigations. He also anticipated the Director might be asked a question concerning his position on COINTELPRO. Regarding the question concerning the Director's statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal, the Legal Counsel Division will draft a proposed resonse. Concerning COINTELPRO, a response has been prepared and will be put together with the briefing material for the Director.

This memorandum in general highlights the Options presented in the attached papers. A more detailed analysis should be prepared by the Intelligence Division and existing documents addressing these proposals should be made available for the Director's briefing book for his testimony.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Director respond to questions concerning the attached position papers as set forth above.

Done.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division draft a proposed response concerning the Director's statement made in Montreal relating to the sacrifice of certain individual rights.

Done.

(3) That the Intelligence Division make a detailed review of the various Options set forth in the two attached position papers. (FOR SUBSEQUENT STAFF CONFERENCE AFTER 12/9) Jma

See memo re: review w/ File Senstudy 1/19/76

Jma

Ret. from 20 12/12/75 Jma

Issues and Options for Discussion with Former Attorneys General Rogers, Katzenbach, and Clark

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALMKP

I. Background

In the past few weeks the staff has presented the Committee with evidence suggesting the following about the FBI's internal security intelligence program:

A. The program is massive, involving the collection of information on the activities of thousands of innocent, law-abiding American citizens.

B. These individuals were not alleged espionage agents, but citizens who fall within the FBI's vague definitions of "subversion" and "extremism" -- purely homegrown "threats to the national security".

C. That FBI policy on "subversive" and "extremist" investigations was vague and subject to the following abuses:

1. overbreadth in scope in that groups were investigated whose threats to the national security were tenuous, if not non-existent.
2. collection of information on the personal life and political views of subjects unrelated to the national security.
3. the continuance of investigations well after it should have become obvious that there was no legitimate predicate.

D. Particularly invasive collection techniques were used, including electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entries. Although these have been terminated, the predominant and perhaps most insidious continues today through the FBI's huge informant/confidential source network.

E. Information collected in the course of these investigations is disseminated regularly throughout the federal government and to local law enforcement.

F. Until 1971, information collected through these investigations was disseminated as part of the COINTELPRO program to the subjects' friends, relatives, employers, and others in an effort to discredit or "neutralize" alleged "subversives" or "extremists".

62-116395 - 1215X

ENCLOSURE

G. The FBI's internal security intelligence program was used by Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon to serve their political interests, usually by collecting information on critics or political opponents.

H. The program was conceived and implemented in secrecy, and although parts of the program were shared with outside authorities from time to time, until now no President, Attorney General, or Congressional committee has been exposed to the entire program in detail.

I. The program is not authorized by statute but is founded on a series of secret or ambiguous Presidential orders, which in turn are based upon a questionable assertion of "inherent constitutional authority".

J. The program continues today, albeit on a much more limited basis than in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and the basic machinery for the program -- the huge informant/confidential source network -- is still operating.

K. There is no statute or internal Bureau or Justice Department policy prohibiting a new Director, Attorney General, or President from ordering the Bureau to expand the program to its earlier dimensions.

II. Issues and Options

Among the issues and options which might be discussed with former Attorneys General in response to what the Committee has learned are the following:

A. Abolition. Elimination of the FBI internal security intelligence program as Attorney General Harlan Stone ordered in 1924 when confronted with abuses growing out of the FBI's first internal security intelligence program, such as the infamous Palmer raids.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether there are not some functions (e.g., protecting the President, preventing or at least predicting violence by terrorist organizations, or predicting civil disorders) which require intelligence collection.

2. Whether FBI intelligence reports are valuable in that respect, especially in light of a recent GAO report suggesting that such reports are rarely useful in predicting violent activity.

3. Whether such information, assuming it is valuable, could not be obtained through more traditional criminal investigations.

4. Whether the value of the information, marginal or otherwise, justifies the risk to civil liberties inherent in such intelligence collection.

5. Whether, given the way in which limited and ambiguous grants of authority have been expanded into major authorizations, any statute short of a total prohibition of all non-law enforcement intelligence activities in the domestic sector will be adequate to prevent the recurrences of the kinds of abuses uncovered by this Committee. (Or, conversely, whether it is possible to draft a law authorizing a limited civil disturbance and counter-terrorist intelligence mission that will not eventually evolve, like the National Security Act of 1947, into a charter for unanticipated and unwanted covert activities.)

6. Whether it would be sufficient to restrict the FBI to criminal investigations without also (a) placing limits upon the length of investigations, (b) the kinds of information which can be collected and disseminated on the subject irrelevant to the alleged criminal act, (c) the utilization of warrantless electronic surveillance and other particularly invasive collection techniques, and (d) the utilization of a huge informant/confidential source network without judicial or Justice Department supervision.

B. Authorizing Statute. Recognition of the value of internal security intelligence, but placing limits upon the program designed to minimize the infringement upon civil liberties, an option being actively considered by the present Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out under the first option and, in addition:

1. Whether meaningful and stringent guidelines can be written which do not so hamper the administration of an internal security intelligence program as to make the product not just marginal, as GAO suggests, but worthless.*

2. In light of the possibility that the present Attorney General may address this matter via internal Justice Department guidelines, whether this approach does not ignore the legal authority question which can only be resolved by statute.

3. Whether or not Congress could draft a statutory version of the guidelines which could be flexible enough to meet an evolving threat and at the same time place meaningful restrictions upon the program.

4. Even assuming there is no absence of legal authority, is it safe to leave these guidelines in the form of a departmental order which can be rescinded by the next Attorney General?

C. Delegation of Authority to Attorney General. Simply ratifying the present program via enactment of a statutory charter which grants the FBI authority to conduct an internal security intelligence program subject to its own internal guidelines or departmental guidelines as proposed by the Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and:

1. Whether such a statute would not be an unconstitutional delegation of powers to the Executive Branch.

2. Whether enactment of such a statute would not represent a failure by the Congress to confront the issues raised above.

---

*A preliminary staff analysis of the Attorney General's draft guidelines suggests that, despite months of conscientious and painstaking work by a departmental task force, the guidelines are not adequate. This analysis, which will be presented when Attorney General Levi testifies on December 10, indicates that several of the more questionable FBI investigations (e.g., of Dr. King and the women's liberation movement) would still be permissible under these proposed guidelines.

D. Legislative Inaction. Enact no new statute affecting the FBI's legal authority or the internal security intelligence program.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and, in addition:

1. Whether this failure to act might not leave the status of the program in doubt and subject to court challenge.

2. Whether this failure to act after full disclosure by the Bureau might not be taken by the FBI and the courts as a ratification of the program.

E. Administrative Oversight by the Attorney General. The Justice Department should be required to exercise greater administrative oversight over the FBI's internal security intelligence program by Attorney General Levi, regardless of whatever other options Congress accepts.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is practical for the Attorney General or his staff to review thousands of such investigations each year.

2. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should review all or just the so-called "full" investigations.

3. Whether, to facilitate the conduct of such reviews, the Attorney General or his staff should be given "complete" access to Bureau files, including information regarding the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.

4. Whether it is possible to develop a staff of career attorneys within the Department with both the access and independence essential to the conduct of searching reviews.

5. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should not also be required to review various informant and so-called "intensification" programs, and the establishment of specialized indices (which have a significant impact upon which cases are opened) instead of just reviewing individual investigations in a vacuum as provided by the Attorney General's draft guidelines.

F. An Inspector General. In addition to the above options, an independent Inspector General should be created to investigate improprieties by the FBI. This option is advanced by those concerned about the inadequacy of the FBI's investigation of the disappearance of former Director Hoover's personal files, its limited inquiry into the so-called Atlantic City convention case, and the absence of any internal investigation of the abuses in the King case.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to maintain the independence of an Inspector General within the Department of Justice when both the Inspector General and the Director of the FBI will be responsible to the same official, the Attorney General.
2. Whether the Inspector General should have "complete" access to Bureau files, including information pertaining to the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.
3. Whether an Inspector General with access to extremely sensitive information might not become a serious threat to the independence of the Bureau from political influence and to the civil liberties of American citizens.

G. Congressional Oversight. In addition to the above options, the creation of an oversight committee(s) in the Congress, to which the Bureau would be required to report and which would have the power to investigate abuses.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the kinds of problems posed by the Justice Department oversight and Inspector General options discussed above to the independence of the FBI and the confidentiality of its files.

H. Public Reporting and Disclosure to Subjects. In addition to the above options, the requirement that the FBI make frequent public reports on the details of its internal security intelligence programs and policies and reveal the details of improper intelligence investigations to the subjects of those investigations.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to reveal the essence of some programs and policies and the details of some investigations without jeopardizing the effectiveness of legitimate programs.

2. Whether such disclosure might not increase the number of law suits filed against the FBI alleging illegal activities.

DRAFT
MEMORANDUM

December 4, 1975

FBI LEGISLATION - PROPOSED OPTIONS

In preparation for the testimony of FBI Director Kelley and Attorney General Levi on December 9 and 10, the Domestic Intelligence Task Force is pulling together various proposals for legislation dealing with FBI intelligence. This paper sets forth some of the basic options.

A. Current Statutes and Executive Orders

The basic statute governing the FBI is 18 U.S.C. 533, which reads as follows:

> The Attorney General may appoint officials: (1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States, (2) to assist in the protection of the person of the President, and (3) to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General.

Clauses (2) and (3) are a possible statutory basis for intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Under (2), the FBI may "assist" the Secret Service in the protection of the President by providing

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1215X

ENCLOSURE

intelligence on persons or groups who may endanger the President's safety. A formal agreement between the FBI and the Secret Service sets forth the types of intelligence information provided by the Bureau. However, this agreement states that:

> The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction. (Tab A)

Clause (3) recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of Justice." This is a possible statutory basis for at least two broad areas of FBI intelligence investigations -- civil disturbance intelligence and intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program.

The most recent legal advice to the FBI from the Justice Department on the gathering and reporting of data regarding civil disturbances notes that on April 1, 1969, the President designated the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the government's response to civil disturbances. The FBI is instructed to gather and report on "all significant incidents of civil unrest" and on "all disturbances where there are indications that extremist organizations . . . are believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them." The

FBI is specifically advised to make reports "even when no specific violation of federal law is indicated." On the other hand, the FBI is instructed not to report "every relatively insignificant incident of a strictly local nature coming to its attention." (Tab B)

The Justice Department has given the following recent instructions to the FBI regarding intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program. Executive Order 10450, as amended by Executive Order 11785, is interpreted as requiring an FBI investigation of organizations "with a potential" of violating federal or state statutes prohibiting unlawful advocacy of violence or the commission of any unlawful act of violence. The FBI is advised that "it is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order." The FBI is instructed to apply "the same yardstick" to investigations of individuals who are affiliated with such organizations. The FBI is specifically advised that "it is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated." (Tab C)

Clause (3) also recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of State." This is a possible statutory basis for FBI intelligence investigation of foreign intelligence activities within the United States or to

collect positive foreign intelligence. The best example is the Attorney General's authorization of warrantless FBI electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. However, there is apparently no instruction from the Justice Department to the FBI directing the Bureau to initiate investigations of individuals or organizations which have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but about which there is no information indicating intelligence activity. (See Staff Report, "Counterintelligence/Counterespionage: The Law and the Philosophy", October 14, 1975.)

In his testimony before the Committee, Deputy Associate FBI Director James Adams made no reference to clauses (2) and (3) as a possible legal basis for FBI intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Instead, he placed sole reliance on a series of Presidential directives extending from 1936 until the 1960's which the FBI interprets as authorizing it to engage in "domestic security intelligence investigations". The Attorney General has codified these directives in a Justice Department regulation instructing the FBI to:

> Carry out the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15, 1953, designating the [FBI] to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters. 28 C.F.R., Section 0.85(d).

The FBI also cites directives of President Kennedy on June 9, 1962, and Attorney General Kennedy on March 5, 1964, which are the latest charter for the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, composed of the FBI Director and the chiefs of the military intelligence agencies. This group is authorized to coordinate "all investigation of domestic espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security." (Tab D)

The theory behind the FBI's position is that the President has inherent constitutional powers, at least in the absence of contrary legislation, to authorize FBI intelligence activities. The only judicial support for this theory is language in the Supreme Court's opinion in the Keith case, which declared warrantless wiretapping of domestic groups unconstitutional.

The Court acknowledged the importance of "national security in its domestic implications . . . especially at a time of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent periods of our history." Under such circumstances, the Court stated, the President has a "fundamental duty" under the Constitution to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." The Court added, "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means." Hence, the Court appeared to

recognize that the President's "domestic security role" has a "constitutional basis"; that the President through the Attorney General may need "to obtain intelligence information about those who plot unlawful acts against the Government"; and that "threats and acts of sabotage against the Government exist in sufficient number to justify investigative powers with respect to them." The Court applied the general principle that "unless the Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered." Nevertheless, the central holding of the Keith decision was that this power may not be exercised in such a way as to infringe constitutional rights. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

Even though the President may have the authority under the Constitution to direct the FBI to conduct intelligence investigations in the absence of legislation, Congress has the ultimate authority to substitute statutory authorization in place of the Presidential directives. As Justice Robert Jackson declared in the Steel Seizure Case, "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . ." 343 U.S. 579, 637.

B. Option One -- Ratifying Existing Powers

The first option for Congress is legislation ratifying the existing authority granted to the FBI by current Presidential directives and orders. Such legislation would be cast in extremely general terms. Its main advantage is that it would provide a basis for Congressional oversight. It could also reinforce the Attorney General's role as the immediate supervisor of FBI intelligence activities. The statute would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to conduct investigations of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities;
2. to gather and report information on civil disturbances;
3. to conduct investigations of other related intelligence matters affecting internal security; and
4. to conduct investigations of official matters relating to the Department of State.

In addition, the statute would require the Attorney General to report annually to the appropriate Congressional committees on the volume and type of investigations and reports, the investigative techniques used, and the policies and procedures adopted by the Justice Department and the FBI.

The weaknesses of this approach are obvious. Congress would have legislated a wholesale delegation of power without

standards or limitations other than the supervision of the Attorney General and oversight by Congress. In view of the Select Committee's findings as to the vast overbreadth of FBI domestic intelligence investigations and the abuses committed in the name of "counterintelligence", Congress would in effect be permitting future expansion of FBI operations to match past policies.

C. Option Two -- A Separate Security Intelligence Agency

Congress might give serious consideration to legislation creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Justice Department. It would perform the functions of the present Counterintelligence Branch of the FBI Intelligence Division, dealing with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence/counterespionage. The FBI itself has considered this option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from the law enforcement functions of the Bureau. (Tab E)

A separate agency would be justified only if it was authorized to conduct investigations of a wider scope and using different techniques than would otherwise be permitted. In other words, Congress could decide that foreign counterintelligence investigations should go beyond investigation of specific crimes, that techniques such as electronic surveillance should be used without a warrant or with a special type of warrant,

and that operations should be conducted to "counter" foreign intelligence activities by means other than arrest or "persona non grata" proceedings. On the other hand, if Congress treats the investigation of foreign intelligence activities the same as a criminal investigation, then the FBI should keep the job.

Any statute in this area must use general language for diplomatic reasons. For example, Congress should not explicitly authorize deception operations or efforts to compromise hostile intelligence officers, even though such techniques may be envisioned. Such techniques are dealt with best by establishing adequate procedures for authorization and oversight to ensure accountability.

The legislation should be more specific where it deals with investigations and other operations directed at American citizens rather than non-resident aliens in the service of a foreign power. If Congress believes Americans should be investigated if they have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but no information indicating intelligence activity yet exists, the legislation should say so.

The statute should also set out standards for determining whether a foreign-dominated domestic organization falls within the jurisdiction of the separate agency. There should at the very least be substantial information indicating that the organization is directed by, subsidized by, or in active

collaboration with a foreign government or organization. (The term "foreign organization" refers, for instance, to a group like the Palestine Liberation Organization.) If the group fits the criteria for foreign domination, there should be an additional finding that it may engage in intelligence activities or in activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law.

If the group meets all these standards, Congress may authorize the investigation of its activities going beyond regular criminal investigations. Such investigations could extend to all individuals who are members of, or express support for, the organization, as well as to the efforts of the organization to influence and control other groups. However, it may be sufficient to authorize only the investigation of active members and supporters. This would prevent a revival of the "Cominfil" policy of looking into all forms of lawful political and social activity where Communists might be involved.

The Petersen Committee report on COINTELPRO considered the need for special supervision of foreign counterintelligence operations in the United States. It recommended the creation of a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Commission to make decisions with regard to the necessity or acceptability of particular foreign counterintelligence techniques. (Tab F) This proposal

has merit in view of the limited amount of time the Attorney General can give to personal supervision and the after-the-fact role of legislative oversight regarding the separate agency.

Finally, legislation to create a separate foreign counterintelligence agency must deal with relationships to the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other foreign intelligence agencies. The current FBI-CIA agreement on their respective jurisdictions is only a "memorandum of understanding". It allows the CIA to undertake certain clandestine activities within the United States, in coordination with the FBI. (Tab G) Proposals are currently circulating in the Executive Branch for a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive to clarify this matter, as well as to regulate CIA electronic surveillance of American citizens abroad. (Tab H)

A full draft of a statutory charter for a separate foreign counterintelligence agency is not included here, since the focus is on domestic intelligence issues. However, one implication of such a statute would be that the remaining FBI functions should relate only to law enforcement and criminal investigations.

D. Option Three -- Elimination of FBI Domestic Intelligence

The basic assumption behind Attorney General Levi's effort to develop "guidelines" for FBI domestic intelligence is that regular criminal investigations are not adequate to

supply the information needed to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law. That assumption should be questioned. Regular criminal investigations are likely to produce a substantial amount of information which can be used to anticipate or prevent future crimes. For example, intensive criminal investigations of Ku Klux Klan violence in the South during the 1960's would have required the FBI to look into a wide variety of Klan activities. Another example is the search for Weatherman fugitives, a regular criminal investigation which involves broad inquiries across the country. The FBI has not yet demonstrated that the preventive information it has obtained came from intelligence investigations which would not have been conducted as regular criminal investigations.

The fact that an FBI investigation was supervised by its Intelligence Division does not necessarily mean that the investigation was, automatically, outside the regular criminal law enforcement jurisdiction of the Bureau. Any FBI investigation of activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law falls within that jurisdiction. Moreover, regular criminal investigations can also extend to plans, attempts, or conspiracies to engage in such activities.

One suggested difference between intelligence-type and regular criminal investigations is that the latter are terminated after a reasonable time, if sufficient evidence to

justify prosecution is not obtained. However, there is no legal reason why the prosecutor cannot request that the investigation continue indefinitely as long as there is information that violent activities and plans for violence are still underway. The degree of evidence needed to justify a prosecution is certainly greater than the degree of evidence needed to justify an investigation.

All this is not to say that no further standards are needed to guide regular criminal investigations when they may touch on sensitive First Amendment or other constitutional interests. This is especially true of criminal investigations of individuals or groups engaged both in lawful political or social activities and in unlawful violence or plans for violence. To what extent is the advocacy of violence a proper basis for initiating an investigation? Should an investigation be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual is a member of, or has expressed public support for, an organization which has as one of its objectives the use of violence? Should an investigation be started on all members and public supporters of an organization, some of whose members have acted in concert to use violence?

These questions are addressed in the draft Attorney General's guidelines for domestic intelligence investigations under the heading "preliminary investigations". (Tab I) Since

the guidelines assume that there should be intelligence investigations, they do not consider whether such investigations might be permitted as regular criminal investigations.

The Klan and Weatherman examples again illustrate the point. Once it has been established that a particular Klan group is engaged in or planning violence, it seems reasonable to conduct at least preliminary inquiries to determine whether the members and supporters of the group are involved in the violence or the plans for violence. Similarly, the search for Weatherman fugitives who committed bombings and other acts of violence would appear reasonably to include preliminary inquiries to determine whether other Weatherman members and supporters have harbored the fugitives.

On the other hand, it would seem unreasonable to investigate members and supporters of all Klan groups across the country on the ground that some Klan groups have used violence. And it appears equally unreasonable to investigate all members and supporters of SDS because the Weatherman faction engaged in violence. The scope of the investigation must be logically related to its specific purpose, and not an excuse for wide-ranging collection of intelligence.

There is one possible exception to the requirement that the FBI only conduct regular criminal investigations. The Attorney General (and the President) do require reports on

major civil disturbances which may not involve violations of federal law. The FBI should be authorized to gather such data and make appropriate reports as part of its law enforcement responsibilities. However, the data and reports should be limited to information provided by local or state law enforcement authorities or obtained in the course of a regular FBI criminal investigation. Where local authorities provide information about individuals and organizations which are not the subject of a regular FBI criminal investigation, the data and reports should not be included in the FBI's general files and name index.

In periods of widespread civil disturbances, the Attorney General may require a more systematic procedure for maintaining and retrieving civil disturbance information. This was the case in 1967, when Attorney General Clark created the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit in the Justice Department. The IDIU stored and indexed civil disturbance reports separately from the FBI. The data was used to help anticipate or ameliorate disorders. IDIU has been abolished, although the basic function of evaluating reports on civil disturbances is still performed by the Justice Department. This function should also be authorized by statute, and the intent of Congress should be that the Attorney General must obtain specific legislative authorization for any future IDIU.

IDIU was not perfect. Under Attorney General John Mitchell it supplied a list of names of American dissidents to the CIA. (Tab J) It also was used in conjunction with grand jury proceedings inquiring into terrorist bombings. Both of these activities should be forbidden by the statute authorizing the Justice Department to evaluate civil disturbance information.

Finally, legislation may be needed to make clear that the FBI is not authorized to conduct investigations of organizations or individuals for the specific purpose of compiling a body of data to be used in connection with name checks under the Federal Employee Security Program. The same principle applies to FBI "assistance" to the Secret Service, under the present FBI-Secret Service agreement.

A statute must also address the FBI's current practice of maintaining an Administrative Index (ADEX) of the prime subjects of current domestic intelligence investigations. The past history of the FBI's Security Index and other target lists (Key Activists, Agitator Index, Key Black Extremists) suggests the need to enact legislation banning the compiling of lists of persons by the FBI, unless such persons have been arrested or convicted for specific crimes and the list is used in connection with the investigation of such crimes.

These proposals to limit the FBI to regular criminal investigations and civil disturbance reporting must be tested against the actual past experience of the Justice Department and the FBI. General instructions from the Department to the Bureau may be overly vague, even within the framework of criminal investigation. Two examples are Attorney General Clark's memorandum on riots in 1967 and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley's memorandum of campus disorders in 1969. (Tab K) The Nation of Islam exchange between the Department and the FBI in 1973-74 is another illustration. (Tab L)

Thus, there is no automatic panacea in restricting the FBI to criminal investigations. The need for careful scrutiny of actual investigative policies and practices by Congress and the Attorney General is just as great as if the FBI were authorized to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. Legislation must focus on procedures for ensuring accountability by regular reports from the Attorney General to the appropriate Congressional committees.

The following are some of the basic elements which should go into a statute embodying this option. It would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to investigate violations of federal criminal laws, provided that the scope and duration of the investigation are logically related to its specific purpose;

2. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law;

3. to seek legal advice from the Attorney General or his designee whenever a proposed action may be perceived, with reason, to unfairly affect the rights of citizens, provided that this responsibility to seek legal advice is the duty of both the FBI as an institution and FBI agents as individuals;

4. to collect information from state and local law enforcement agencies regarding major civil disturbances, provided that such information is not entered into the FBI general files and name index;

5. to disseminate information obtained from criminal investigations for the following purposes, under regulations promulgated by the Attorney General and published in the Federal Register:

a. prosecution of violations of criminal laws;

b. prevention or anticipation of violations of criminal laws;

c. assistance to the Secret Service in the performance of its protective responsibilities;

d. determination of the suitability of individuals for employment by the federal government;

6. to report civil disturbance information obtained from state and local law enforcement agencies to the Attorney General for the purpose of determining the need to use federal military force under 10 U.S.C. 331 et seq.;

7. to compile such lists of persons arrested or convicted for specific crimes as may be necessary for use in connection with the investigation of such crimes;

8. to provide to the Attorney General or his designee full access to any information in the possession of the FBI which he may deem necessary for the performance of his responsibilities to supervise FBI activities and to submit reports to appropriate Congressional committees on FBI activities;

9. to follow such other procedures and standards consistent with this statute which the Attorney General may prescribe, provided that such procedures and standards shall be published in the Federal Register or, if publication would substantially interfere with the conduct of investigations, reported to appropriate Congressional committees.

E. Option Four -- Setting Standards for Domestic Intelligence

The FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only if Congress finds (1) that regular criminal investigations as described above would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law, and (2) that the incidents of the use of violence in violations of federal law are so numerous and so serious as to constitute a significant threat to the internal security or domestic tranquility of the United States.

The fact that there are individuals and groups who engage in violence, advocate violence, or believe in the desirability of the ultimate use of violence to advance their political or social objectives is not enough to justify FBI domestic intelligence authority. There must be additional findings that regular criminal investigations are inadequate and that the overall threat of violence constitutes a serious danger to the country.

Furthermore, if FBI domestic intelligence is authorized by statute, it should be an annual authorization which must be renewed each year upon reconsideration by Congress and the Attorney General of these factors. Past experience indicates that the annual appropriations process does not provide an appropriate forum for considering the FBI's basic authority.

Attorney General Levi's draft guidelines provide a basis for the consideration of a domestic intelligence authorization. They do not cover the investigation of foreign-related activities which may be directed by, subsidized by, or otherwise conducted in active collaboration with a foreign government, a foreign organization, or their agents. (See Option Two above.)

The guidelines deal with five different types of threats of violence which may constitute serious dangers to the country:

1. overthrow of the government (revolutionary violence);

2. interference in the U. S. with the activities of a foreign government (bombing a consulate, attempting to assassinate a visiting foreign leader);

3. interference with the functioning of the government or the flow of interstate commerce to influence federal policies (violent protest activities, terrorist bombings);

4. deprivation of civil rights (Klan violence, violent protest against busing);

5. incitement of violence which may require the use of federal military force (riots, major civil disturbances accompanying protest demonstrations).

The guidelines also refer to violence directed at state governments, either overthrow of a state government or interference with the functioning of a state government.

Authorizing legislation should indicate whether domestic intelligence is necessary for any or all of these specific problems. For example, revolutionary violence in an attempt to overthrow the government may be a remote and speculative danger, while terrorist bombings may be substantially interfering with the functioning of the government. Klan violence was unquestionably a serious danger to civil rights in the early and mid-1960's, but is it so today? Major riots and civil disturbances were equally serious in the late 1960's and early 1970's, but not in more recent years. Violent interference with the functioning of a state government should, under our federal system, normally be dealt with by state and local law enforcement.

Therefore, the definition of the purpose of FBI domestic intelligence can be simplified. The Attorney General's draft guidelines might be revised to authorize FBI domestic intelligence investigations:

1. to ascertain facts or information which serves to anticipate and prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law intended to

   a. interfere, in the United States, with the activities of a foreign government or its authorized representatives; and

b. interfere with the functioning of the government of the United States or the free flow of interstate commerce in order to influence policies or decisions of the federal government.

This formulation concentrates on the most likely current serious danger to the country, namely, politically motivated terrorist violence. FBI Director Kelley's recent public statements have stressed the increase in terrorist activity from 24 bombings in 1973 to 45 terrorist bombings in 1974 and 46 such bombings in the first six months of 1975.

However, this increasing threat is not the only factor to be considered. In the course of the FBI's regular criminal investigations of these bombings and other incidents of terrorist violence, can it obtain as a by-product substantial information which may serve to anticipate and prevent future violence? If so, the need for broader intelligence-type investigations is less evident.

The draft guidelines provide that the FBI would conduct full-scale intelligence investigations on the basis of "specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion" that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, may be engaged in activities which may involve the use of violence in violations of federal law. The two "mays" render the requirement of "specific and articulable facts" almost meaningless. Therefore, any legislation should authorize the FBI:

2. to conduct full domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above.

The draft guidelines also discuss the surveillance techniques to be used in full domestic intelligence investigations, including informants, mail covers, and electronic surveillance. The guidelines note that additional techniques may need to be covered, such as inquiries made under "pretext", photographic surveillance, "trash covers", etc. However, the legislation may deal with techniques more generally by providing that the FBI is authorized:

3. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law.

More detailed regulation of investigative techniques for full investigations will be considered elsewhere.

The scope of domestic intelligence investigations under the draft guidelines is broadened considerably under the provision for "preliminary investigations". They can be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have advocated activities which may involve violence, or are members of, or

have expressed public support for, an organization which has as its objective activities which may involve violence. The purpose of the preliminary investigation is to verify or refute the allegations or information. However, the vagueness of the standard is obvious. Therefore, to be consistent with the criteria for full investigations, the FBI should be authorized:

4. to conduct preliminary domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert,

a. advocate the use of violence as described in 1 above;

b. are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above;

c. are members of or have expressed public support for an organization engaged in activities which involve, or are likely to involve, the use of violence as described in 1 above, provided that other members of the organization are currently the subject of a full domestic intelligence investigation or a regular criminal investigation.

Unless these changes are made in the guidelines, they would permit investigations similar to past investigations which have been seriously criticized. For instance, they would allow investigations of all SDS members or all Black Student Union leaders on the ground that their activities may involve violence,

even though there is no specific allegation of likely involvement in violence.

Another reason for the revision is to exclude those investigations which would be justified as regular criminal investigations. Thus, allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have engaged in or plan to engage in activities which involve the use of violence would fall within the FBI's regular criminal investigative jurisdiction. Intelligence investigations would extend further at the preliminary stage to cover advocacy of violence and membership in or public support for organizations involved in or likely to be involved in violence. Full investigations require a likelihood of violence, short of actual violence or plans for violence.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE;
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TESTIMONY,
DECEMBER 10, 1975

At 3:01 p.m. on December 5, 1975, Mark Wolf of the Attorney General's staff, called me at the instructions of the Attorney General and advised that the Attorney General requested:

(1) FBI manual sections on domestic intelligence investigations;

(2) A listing identifying all individuals and organizations now the subjects of FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

Modified copy called to AG

Wolf said that the Attorney General is currently en route to Chicago and will return to Washington on Sunday evening. Therefore, the requested materials should be delivered to the Attorney General no later than Monday morning, December 8, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division prepare an appropriate response to the Attorney General's instructions in time for delivery by 9:00 a.m. on December 8, 1975.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

EX-112

REC-62 - 116395 - 1215

15 DEC 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

LEGAL COUNSEL

8 4 DEC 31 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

WM

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (SC) 62-7721

May 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: NATIONALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO
INTERNAL SECURITY - PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST

We presently maintain an authorized technical surveillance at the residence of Rosa Collazo and her daughter, Lydia Collazo Turner, 1755 Anthony Avenue, Bronx, New York. This surveillance was originally installed on April 13, 1962.

Rosa Collazo is the wife of Oscar Collazo who is serving a life sentence in connection with the killing of a White House guard during an attempt to assassinate former President Truman on November 1, 1950. Both Rosa and her daughter are active in the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico in New York City. During the past six months, this surveillance has continued to furnish valuable information regarding activities of Puerto Rican independence advocates in New York. Through this surveillance, we have obtained information concerning the movement of Puerto Rican nationalists between New York and Puerto Rico. Included in this information was advance notice that Rosa Collazo planned to attend the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico during February, 1966, in Puerto Rico. Upon her return, details were obtained concerning the proceedings of the General Assembly. In addition, we were able to obtain advance notice of demonstrations in New York City in which nationalists participated. This enabled us to inform police authorities and interested Government agencies in advance of the demonstrations.

Unless you instruct to the contrary, this technical surveillance will be continued for an additional six months.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: DOMINICAN SITUATION
INTERNAL SECURITY -
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Diego Emilio Bordas Hernandez and his brother, Luis Manuel Alfredo Bordas, have emerged in the current Dominican crisis as important financial, political and military advisors to the deposed Dominican President Juan Bosch in the latter's efforts to regain control of the Dominican Government. Diego Bordas is a wealthy shipping executive currently residing in exile in San Juan, Puerto Rico, having been born in the Dominican Republic on January 11, 1923. He served in various high posts under Juan Bosch during the latter's short occupancy of the position of President of the Dominican Republic in early 1963. Bordas spends much of his time at 868 Ashford Avenue in San Juan, using an apartment at that address as his residence during the absence of its owner, Jose Antonio Benitez Jiminez, from Puerto Rico. Jose Benitez is the cousin of Jaime Benitez, the latter the Director of the University of Puerto Rico and a close associate and advisor of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas also maintains a residence at 21 V, Florencia, Pueblo Viego, a suburb of San Juan, near the current residence and headquarters of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas and his brother jointly operate a shipping business known as Bordas and Company at Highway Number 2, Puerto Viejo, Puerto Rico, and his financial dealings in support of the Bosch efforts can reasonably be expected to be conducted from this commercial establishment.

The Bordas brothers have both been the subjects of numerous allegations indicating their cooperation with procommunist and pro-Trujillo factions in Dominican politics and are apparently opportunists who have seized the current situation to enhance their political and financial futures. Luis Bordas is currently in the Dominican Republic acting as the Director of Military Operations of the rebel forces supporting Bosch.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION ~~SECRET~~
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

109-12-211-1423

REC 4

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

4 JUN 15 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Luis Bordas is reportedly the Honorary Nicaraguan Consul in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and, as a result, Department of State clearance for technical coverage of the business he operates jointly with Diego Bordas was obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on June 1, 1965.

In view of the pressing nature of the international situation as it relates to the Dominican Republic, it is requested that you authorize technical coverage of the residences of Diego Bordas mentioned above and of the business address of the joint venture operated by the Bordas brothers. Authority is requested for similar coverage of any addresses to which the mentioned residences or business may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NdK

DATE 6/4/65

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

December 19, 1975

1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Delivered to Committee 12-23-75
to Shaheen's office 12/22/75

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 2 in that letter.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a copy of the document in response to Item 2 which is being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2) ST 115 REC-51

62-116395-1214X

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JAN 22 1976

PEN:adn
(9)

ENCLOSURE

NOTE:

A copy of the SSC letter 12/4/75, is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copy of the memorandum being furnished is maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the document being provided to the SSC. As indicated in the enclosed memorandum, Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled separately. Items 1 and 3 requested in referenced SSC letter are being handled by the IS-3 and CI-3 Sections respectively. Item 4, a restatement of prior request submitted by the SSC is being handled separately by SA V. R. Thornton of the IS-1 Section.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

JPT WOP

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

62-116395

December 19, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of a copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, at the White House, Washington, D. C., dated October 27, 1964.

It is noted that in addition to requesting a copy of this letter the SSC requested materials reflecting this letter was hand-delivered to the White House by Mr. DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Attention is drawn to the upper right-hand corner of Mr. Hoover's letter to Mr. Moyers and to the notation appearing there reading "personally delivered 10/28/64, D." No additional materials are available in FBIHQ files reflecting delivery of this letter beyond the aforementioned notation which, it appears, bears the initial of Mr. DeLoach.

Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled in separate responses.

1 - The Attorney General

PEN:adn adn
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

62-116395-1214X

PEN

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 8, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee request seeking delivery of certain Bureau materials. Please prepare an appropriate response.

I invite your attention to paragraph numbered 4 which amends an earlier request of the Committee (Elliff letter of November 25, 1975, Item 6c) which request was the subject of a telephone conversation on December 3, with Mr. Seymor Phillips of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1-Ad Hoc
12-10-75

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1214X

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, AR
CHARLES MCC. MATHIA , MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 4, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Senate Select Committee requests the following materials for delivery.

1. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the recommendation for, authorization of, and duration and termination of the electronic surveillance referred to in Items 1 and 22 of my letter of November 21, 1975 and in materials delivered to the Committee on December 1, 1975.

2. Delivery of a copy of the letter to Mr. Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated October 27, 1964, and materials reflecting that this letter was hand delivered by Mr. Cartha DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Nugent

3. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the surveillances of Mrs. Anna Chennault in October and November, 1968.

4. The Committee's request in my letter of November 27, 1975, item 6c should be revised to read as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memornadum, including a summary of the ~~recommendations~~ of relevant Bureau personnel pertaining thereto."

Nugent

RECEIVED
DEC 4 1975

JTE

Sincerely,

62-116395-1214X
ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/19/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
12/4/75 request - Martin L. King.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: [illegible] Date: 12/23/75

Received by: [illegible]

Title: Research [illegible]

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116- - 1214X

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/4/75, item 2

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr.: Copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers 10/27/64 along with notation that shows letter was hand delivered by Mr. DeLoach 10/28/64.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-98

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395 — 1214X

186-10051/

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER 12-4-75

ITEM 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SDALMKP

Retain

62-116395-1214X

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

#MDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/31/00

October 27, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

Honorable William D. Moyers
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Moyers:

A confidential source of this Bureau who has supplied reliable information in the past furnished the following information concerning a contact on October 23, 1964, between Martin Wigington and Randolph Blackwell. Wigington was described as a member of the Democratic Party Correlation Committee, Austin, Texas. Blackwell is an assistant to Martin Luther King, Jr., at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Georgia.

Wigington indicated to Blackwell a desire for King to write "an anti-Goldwater letter" which Wigington's Committee intends to distribute in Texas among labor groups. Blackwell stated that King may go to Texas prior to the forthcoming presidential election and Blackwell inquired as to whether King would be "in any danger." Wigington stated that he would contact one Larry Goodman concerning any possible danger to King in Texas. This Bureau's source had no information concerning the identity of Goodman.

During this contact Wigington complained to Blackwell that a group from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which Conference is headed by King, and a group from the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America had picketed in Fort Worth, Texas. Wigington stated that this was not a good thing at this time since all Negro and labor organizations should be working for the election of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

This information is also being furnished to officials in the Department of Justice.

Sincerely yours,

REC 14

100-106670 (King)
1-100-442529 (CIRM)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

SFP:kmj
(12)

ST-101

NOV 2 1964

~~SECRET~~
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

OCT 27 11 17 AM '64

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NOV 4 1964
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

Honorable William D. Moyers

NOTE:

[illegible]

Classified "~~Secret~~" as information reported is from AT 1380-S*, a highly sensitive source with respect to the racial situation. This source is of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of this information could compromise its effectiveness and thus be detrimental to the national defense. Information obtained from Atlanta teletype 10/23/64.

SECRET

1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs.
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Encs.
1 - Mr. Gallagher - Encs.
1 - Mr. McDermott - Encs.

December 3, 1975

1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Encs.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs.

5
10

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

On November 21, 1975 Inspector John B. Hotis of this Bureau met with Doug Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General; and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, concerning your forthcoming appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. At this meeting this Bureau was requested to provide write-ups on certain phases of this Bureau's operations which are to be used in the preparation of a briefing book for your testimony.

Attached are the following individual write-ups as requested on November 21, 1975: "Investigative Techniques"; "Organizational Structure and Functions of the FBI"; "Allegation of Misconduct Involving Special Agent in Charge, Miami Office"; "Director Hoover's 'Official and Confidential' (OC) Files"; "Allegations of Possible Misconduct by FBI Agents, Houston, Texas"; "Allegations of Personal and Official Misconduct of a Former Special Agent in Charge of the Baltimore Office"; "Allegation of Bribery by FBI Agent, New York"; "Allegation of Possible Misconduct by an FBI Agent, Detroit, Michigan"; "Allegations of Misconduct by FBI Agents, Richmond, Virginia, Field Office, in Connection with the Investigation of Illegal Wiretapping by the Richmond, Virginia, Police Department"; "Allegations of Violations of Gun Control Act by FBI Agent"; "Review of Appropriations Testimony for Fiscal Years 1955 thru 1976"; "Tenure of FBI Director"; "Transfer of Drug Enforcement Responsibilities to the FBI"; "Office of Special Review, Department of Justice"; and "Major Topics of Primary Concern to Congressional Committees."

Delivered to Mark Wolf's office 12-5-75

Mail

REC-9 62-116395-1212

With respect to the material requested by memorandum of Mark L. Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,

DEC 29 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PVD:dkg (13)

PLM

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2

62-116395-5-WOE

84 DEC 31 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

to Inspector John B. Hotis of this office dated November 26, 1975, which requested additional information, we are gathering the necessary material on an expeditious basis and the results will be furnished as soon as possible.

Enclosures (15)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. - Enclosures (15)
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

NOTE: See Legal Counsel Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11-24-75, captioned "Testimony By The Attorney General Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." On 12-1-75 Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, requested the attached information be furnished as soon as possible. No later than 12-2-75. This response was coordinated and incorporates material prepared by the Inspection, Special Investigative, General Investigative, Files and Communications, and Intelligence Divisions. Due to the time constraints we are furnishing interim response. As completed additional material will be furnished to the Department.

2 - Mr J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

January 14, 1976

1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

The Attorney General

Director, FBI 62-116395-1210X1

EX-110

REC-60

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Reference is made to SSC letters dated December 4, 1975, and November 25, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 4 in the December 4, 1975, request and Items 7c and 8c of the November 25, 1975, request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with the material which is being furnished to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
    Special Counsel for
    Intelligence Coordination

VRT:adn
(9)

NOTE:

Copies of SSC letters 11/25/75 and 12/4/75 are attached to the file copy of enclosed LHM. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as documents being provided to the SSC. Copies of material being furnished to SSC being retained with Senstudy 75 Project.

Delivered to Dept. 1-15-76 3/14AD

Delivered to Committee 1-15-76.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

WRW TWL JBH JAM PCM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 9 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 (1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

January 14, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, Item 4 of which requests materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.; and SSC letter dated November 25, 1975, Items 7c and 8c of which request materials concerning the Washington Spring Project and Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of materials in response to referenced requests.

In respect to Item 4 of the December 4, 1975, request, the only indication of any action taken concerning the recommendation contained in the pertinent memorandum dated March 29, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/3/68," appearing on page one and initials which are believed to be those of former Special Agent (SA) Harold P. Leinbaugh. Among the documents being furnished the SSC is a memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned, "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.," along with supporting documents, which were submitted to the Attorney General concerning background leading up to the proposed action recommended in the March 29, 1968, memorandum. It includes results of an interview of Leinbaugh.

In response to Item 7c, the only indication of any action taken concerning the suggestion (recommendation) contained in the memorandum dated March 26, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/4/68," appearing on page two of that memorandum and initials which are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

JBA JAM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

VRT:adn
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395 - 1210X

With respect to Item 8c which concerns a memorandum dated March 28, 1968, captioned, "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," the only indication of action taken concerning the recommendation contained therein is a pencilled notation appearing on page one, "Handled 3/28/68," and initials which again are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/JG

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/14/76

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
12/4/75 request Item 4
11/25/75 request Items 7c and 8C

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 1/15/74

Received by: Florence Hoben

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1210X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
1/14/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/4/75, Item 4 and SSC letter 11/25/75, Items 7c and 8c

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating Procedures
Information Handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Delivery of materials regarding Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Washington Spring Project and the Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/cp

62-116395

AJD:lhb (4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1210X

186-10021/9

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence·Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 12-4-75
ITEM 4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

Retain

62-116395-1210X

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY 5168ALMKP

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

EX-102

TJD:ted
(7)
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC-20

APR 11 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person nel without the express approval of the FBI.

5-TJD

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY 5P2ALM/KP

100-44006 — 93

ENCLOSURE

1 - J. B. Adams
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - D. Ryan
1 - J. G. Deegan

REC-88

Gr. 100-106670-3965 July 18, 1975

1 - H. A. Newman

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

The following information is submitted regarding the background leading up to the proposed action recommended in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence, (Martin Luther King)." (copy attached)

This memorandum recommended that information be furnished to a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showing King as a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on March 28, 1968, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel).

A notation on the above referred to memorandum indicated that the recommendation was "handled" on April 3, 1968, by Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh of the Crime Records Division. (see notation on memorandum dated March 29, 1968, attached)

By way of background it should be noted that at about 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968, while standing on second floor balcony outside room 306 of the Hotel Lorraine, Memphis, Tennessee, King was shot and killed.

Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, reflects that King and other Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) officials were due to arrive in Memphis at 10:15 a.m. on April 3, 1968, via Eastern Airlines from Atlanta. (copy of Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, attached)

After King's death, an interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy, a close associate of King, reflected that he and King registered into the Hotel Lorraine in Memphis,

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

cah
HAN:cah (8)

copy to CRO + CRIM DIV 12/1/75 by memo cap Martin Luther King Jr

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

ENCLOSURE

TCD

HW

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 560-920

84 AUG 5 1975

Tennessee, at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968. (Information contained in report of SA Joe C. Hester dated April 17, 1968, Memphis, captioned "UNSUB, aka, Eric Starvo Galt, et al., Civil Rights" page 48. See attached FD-302 reflecting interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy).

For further background regarding the basis of this proposal Atlanta teletype dated March 28, 1968, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C" with second caption "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that on March 28, 1968, King and other SCLC people were in room 801, Holiday Inn, Memphis, Tennessee, at 4:30 p.m. (copy of Atlanta teletype attached)

A Memphis teletype dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that King participated in the march of sanitation workers on March 28, 1968. When violence erupted including the breaking of windows and looting by the marchers, King and a few associates ran to a nearby car and left the march proceeding to Rivermont Motel where they remained through the afternoon and evening. (copy of Memphis teletype attached)

On July 17, 1975, Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh, after having had all the facts set out above reviewed with him including the fact his notation of "handled" appeared on the March 29, 1968, memorandum, advised that he has absolutely no recollection of this memorandum and can unhesitantly state that he cannot now recall whether or not proposed information was ever disseminated to any news media source. He indicated that his notation "handled" would not necessarily mean that he did disseminate this information. In explaining this he stated that the notation could mean that he was merely clearing this document through Crime Records Division and at this late date there would be absolutely no way that he could make any positive statements as to whether or not the information recommended was ever disseminated to a news media source.

7/17

From the above recorded sequence of events as reflected in various communications identified above, it is evident that King returned to Memphis, Tennessee, from Atlanta

on April 3, 1968, and checked into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. The notation indicating that the proposed furnishing of information to the news media was "handled" on April 3, 1968, would, of course, preclude any such information from appearing in the press prior to King's checking into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968.

A review of appropriate files maintained at FBI Headquarters fails to reflect any newspaper article which could have been an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in the G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968.

A review of the "Memphis Commercial Appeal" for the period March 28 to April 4, 1968, maintained on microfilm in the Library of Congress failed to reflect any article which would appear to be an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968. References were noted indicating that King held a press conference at the Holiday Inn Rivermont Motel on March 29, 1968.

7/17 Held

Enclosures (5)

NOTE:

See memorandum J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 7/18/75, captioned as above, prepared by HAN/cah.

Memorandum

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

OM : G. C. Moore

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

BJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

TJD:ted
(7)
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC-20

22 APR 11 1968

Handled 4/3/68

100-106670-3760

100-448006-93

ENCLOSURE

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-[illegible]-93

ENCLOSURE

Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

430PM URGENT 4-2-68 SAB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS 157-1092 3P

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENN., ~~RM~~ RACIAL MATTER

ON APRIL TWO, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, MEMPHIS ~~PD~~ Police Department, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, ADVISED THAT THE FUNERAL OF LARRY PAYNE, SEVENTEEN YEAR OLD NEGRO WHO WAS SHOT BY MEMPHIS PD OFFICER AFTER STORE LOOTING GROWING OUT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT RACIAL DISTURBANCE, MEMPHIS, WAS HELD, WITHOUT INCIDENT, AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, MEMPHIS. ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED IN ATTENDANCE DESPITE FACT CHURCH CAN SEAT TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED. BODY INTERRED IMMEDIATELY AFTER FUNERAL. ARKIN ADVISED THAT ANOTHER SANITATION WORKERS SYMPATHY MARCH IS SCHEDULED FOR DOWNTOWN MEMPHIS AFTERNOON OF APRIL TWO.

100-106670-

NOT RECORDED
183 APR 9 1968

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED ON APRIL TWO THAT REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) AIDES RALPH D. ABERNATHY, BERNARD LEE, AND ANDREW M. YOUNG DUE TO ARRIVE MEMPHIS TEN FIFTEEN A.M., APRIL THREE, FROM ATLANTA.

END PAGE ONE

Albert C. Hayden

APR 5 1968

Included --- letter to White House and Attorney General. Date 4-3-68

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person without the express approval of the FBI.

ON APRIL TWO A SOURCE ADVISED THAT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, APRIL TWO, REV. JESSE JACKSON OF SCLC'S "OPERATION BREAD BASKET," REV. S. B. KYLES OF METROPOLITAN BAPTIST CHURCH, MEMPHIS, AND REV. EDWARD L. BROWN, MT. PISGAH CME CHURCH, ADVISED THAT WITH SCLC PERSONNEL IN MEMPHIS THAT NIGHTLY MASS STRIKE SUPPORT MEETINGS WILL BE RESUMED, THE FIRST AT MASON TEMPLE ON NIGHT OF APRIL THREE WITH KING AS FEATURED SPEAKER. THEY SAID MASS MARCH WILL BE HELD FRIDAY, APRIL FIVE, AND THAT THEY WILL HAVE SCHOOL CHILDREN PARTICIPATE SINCE MARCHING WITH "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE GREATEST LIVING AMERICAN," WOULD BE MORE EDUCATIONAL THAN BEING IN SCHOOL. WHEN ASKED BY PRESS IF KING WOULD PERSONALLY MARCH, JACKSON SAID KING MIGHT NOT MARCH. HE DID NOT ELABORATE. WHEN ASKED IF SCLC GROUP WOULD VIOLATE A POSSIBLE INJUNCTION AGAINST THEIR MARCHING, JACKSON SAID "THE WHITE MAN HAS ALREADY ENJOINED THE BLACK MAN TO THE GHETTO AND THE WHITE MAN DOESN'T NEED TO VALIDATE IT BY SENDING US A PIECE OF PAPER." KYLES SAID THE PROBLEM FACING MEMPHIS IS NOT MILITANT BLACK YOUTH BUT IS "WHITE RACISM." JACKSON DESCRIBED OPERATION BREAD BASKET AS MASSIVE

END PAGE TWO

DRIVE TO FORCE ALL GROCERS IN NEGRO AREA TO CEASE SELLING HART'S BREAD, WONDER BREAD, COCA COLA, AND SEALTEST DAIRY PRODUCTS AS THESE FIRMS DO NOT HIRE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF NEGROES.

ON APRIL TWO LT. ARKIN ADVISED THAT MEMPHIS CITY OFFICIALS ARE CONSIDERING SEEKING A COURT INJUNCTION PROHIBITING ANY MASS MARCH LED BY KING OR AN INJUNCTION SPECIFYING CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A MARCH COULD TAKE PLACE AND ALSO CONSIDERING RESUMPTION OF A CURFEW AND PLACING STRIKE SUPPORT LEADERS UNDER A PEACE AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY BOND.

ARKIN ADVISED THAT REMAINDER OF TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARD, WITH EXCEPTION OF ONE BATTERY CONSISTING OF TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY THREE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE MEMPHIS GUARD UNIT, HAVE LEFT MEMPHIS.

AT THREE ZERO FIVE PM, SIXTY SANITATION WORKERS AND SYMPATHIZERS DEPARTED CLAYBORN TEMPLE CARRYING PLACARDS FOLLOWING THEIR USUAL PARADE MARCH TO BEALE STREET NORTH ON MAIN TO CITY HALL. NO INCIDENTS REPORTED.

memo
~~LHM~~ FOLLOWS. P. END.

CAL

FBI WASH DC

F

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ralph B

Date April 8, 1968

Reverend RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, 690 La Verne Drive, N. W., Atlanta, Georgia, was interviewed at the Memphis Police Department at 10:55 p.m., April 4, 1968. Reverend ABERNATHY was advised of the Agent's identity and of the nature of the matter under investigation.

Reverend ABERNATHY, who described himself as Vice President at Large and Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, stated he was Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.'s closest associate and stated that he and Dr. KING always shared a room whenever they travelled together. He stated that at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968, he and Dr. KING registered at the Lorraine Motel, Memphis, Tennessee.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that on April 4, 1968, he and Dr. KING did not leave the motel and spent most of the day in their room, #306, which is located on the second floor of the motel. He stated that he and Dr. KING had been gone from their room for approximately one hour or less when they returned to the room at about 5:30 p.m. He said they got dressed as they were going to dinner at the home of Reverend BILLY KYLE and that at almost exactly 6 p.m. they started to leave the room. Reverend ABERNATHY stopped for a moment and Dr. KING walked out onto the balcony just outside the door to his room. Reverend ABERNATHY was still inside the motel room but could hear Dr. KING discussing the dinner engagement with other associates who Reverend ABERNATHY believes were standing in the parking area of the motel underneath and to the front of the balcony on which Dr. KING was standing.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated he heard what sounded like a firecracker and then heard the screams of persons to whom Dr. KING had been talking. Reverend ABERNATHY went then to the balcony and discovered Dr. KING lying there wounded in the right side of the face and neck. He said he believed Dr. KING attempted to speak to him but was unable to do so. Reverend ABERNATHY said he instructed someone to call an ambulance and then accompanied Dr. KING in the ambulance to the hospital where Dr. KING subsequently died.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 4/4/68 at Memphis, Tennessee File # Memphis 44-1987

by SA JOE C. HESTER: bn Date dictated 4/8/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that judging from the sound of the noise it appeared that the shot came from directly in front of the door and not from any great distance. He stated he did not observe anything that would indicate who fired the shot. Reverend ABERNATHY also stated that while they were in the motel room Dr. KING did not, to his knowledge, receive any telephone calls of a threatening nature or calls from persons who would not identify themselves. Reverend ABERNATHY said Dr. KING had not feared that any particular persons might harm him and Reverend ABERNATHY was unable to suggest any suspects or to provide any other information which might assist in identifying Dr. KING's killer.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

11:17PM URGENT 3-28-68 ARK

TO DIRECTOR (100-106670) AND MEMPHIS

FROM ATLANTA (100-5586)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM-C.

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE. RM.

IN FORMANT

AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT FOUR THIRTY PM MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

INFORMANT'S INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM DISCUSSION SHORTLY BEFORE WITH HOSEA WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, SCLC, CURRENTLY IN ATLANTA, WHO DURING LATE AFTERNOON MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, CONFERRED TELEPHONICALLY WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., PRESIDENT, SCLC; RALPH D. ABERNATHY, VICE PRESIDENT AND TEASURER, SCLC; AND BERNARD LEE, SPECIAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, SCLC.

KING, ABERNATHY, AND LEE ARE CURRENTLY IN ROOM EIGHT ZERO ONE, HOLIDAY INN, MEMPHIS.

WITH REFERENCE TO RACIAL DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, KING IS EXTREMELY DEJECTED. HE AND ABERNATHY STRONGLY FEEL DISTURBANCE ON THIS DATE DELIBERATELY PLANNED

EX-115 REC-9 100-106670-3278

XEROX 1968

APR 15 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

BY NEGROES WHO ARE NEITHER SYMPATHETIC TO KING OR SCLC. IDENTITY OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS NOT KNOWN.

ABERNATHY, LEE AND WILLIAMS ARE GREATLY CONCERNED FOR WELFARE OF KING, PARTICULARLY ON NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, WHEN HE EXPECTS TO PARTICIPATE IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION WITH SANITATION WORKERS. AT PRESENT TIME KING DOES NOT FEEL HE SHOULD LEAVE MEMPHIS. DURATION OF STAY AND FURTHER DETAILS IN THIS CONNECTION NOT KNOWN.

ACCORDING TO WILLIAMS, HE, ABERNATHY, AND LEE STRONGLY FEEL SAME ELEMENTS WHICH CAUSED DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS EARLIER MARCH TWENTYEIGHT MAY CAUSE PERSONAL HARM TO KING EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

[illegible]

INFORMATION FROM AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R MUST BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. MEMPHIS, HOWEVER, SHOULD ADVISE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF NOT ALREADY KNOWN THAT KING CONTEMPLATES PARTICIPATING IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT AND THAT IN VIEW OF EARLIER DISTURBANCES IN MEMPHIS ON THIS DATE, SEVERAL RANKING SCLC OFFICIALS APPREHENSIVE FOR PERSONAL WELFARE OF KING.

PAGE THREE

FOREGOING INFORMATION TELEPHONICALLY FURNISHED MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

RECEIVED: 11:39PM RM

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

1256AM URGXENT 3-29-68 DGB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS (157-1094)

Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY 5P2ALM KP

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, ~~RM.~~ Racial Matter

RE MEMPHIS TELS, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT ACTIVITIES;

ON MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, MEMPHIS POLICE DEPT., ADVISED THAT THE MASS MARCH TO BE LED BY REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IN SUPPORT OF SANITATION WORKERS STARTED AT AROUND ELEVEN AM CST WITH ESTIMATED FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND WORKERS, MANY OF WHOM WERE NEGRO TEENAGERS. MARCH STARTED AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, LOCATED HEART OF NEGRO AREA, AND KING JOINED MARCH AFTER IT PROGRESSED ONE BLOCK. HE WALKED WITH MARCHERS TO VICINITY BEALE AND MAIN STREETS, MADE NO SPEECHES PRIOR TO MARCH, MADE NO KNOWN UTTERANCES DURING MARCH, AND BY TIME HE REACHED ABOVE POINT RAMPANT BREAKING OF STORE WINDOWS AND LOOTING WAS BEING PERPETRATED BY MARCHERS, WHEREUPON KING AND A FEW ASSOCIATES RAN TO A NEARBY CAR AND LEFT MARCH, PROCEEDED TO RIVERMONT MOTEL WHERE THEY REMAINED THROUGH AFTERNOON AND EVENING. BY NOON, POLICE HAD BROKEN UP CROWD, BEING FORCED TO USE TEARGAS, BUT SPORADIC LOOTING HAS CONTINUED THROUGH AFTERNOON

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1cc 110
1cc [illegible]

Included in letter to White House
and Attorney General. Date [illegible]

NOT RECORDED
162 APR 4 1968

70 APR 1 [illegible] 1968

PAGE TWO

AND EVENING, PRIMARILY CONFINED TO SOUTH CENTRAL AREA OF MEMPHIS, A PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO AREA, PRIMARY TARGET OF LOOTERS BEING LIQUOR STORES AND SMALL GROCERIES.

TENNESSEE STATE LEGISLATURE TODAY PASSED CURFEW BILL, WHICH WAS INVOKED BY MEMPHIS MAYOR HENRY LOEB, EFFECTIVE SEVEN PM, AND THIRTY FIVE HUNDRED TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARDSMEN FROM MEMPHIS AND WEST TENNESSEE ARE CURRENTLY ON DUTY IN MEMPHIS OPERATING AS TACTICAL UNITS, BEING ACCOMPANIED ON THEIR PATROLS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMPHIS PD.

SCHEDULED MASS RALLY TO FEATURE KING NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT CANCELED. AT TWELVE MIDNIGHT, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, THREE HUNDRED ARRESTS, PRIMARILY RELATING TO LOOTING AND CURFEW VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY POLICE DEPT. FOUR INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN SHOT, ONE OF THESE, A SIXTEEN YEAR OLD BOY, WAS KILLED IN ACT OF LOOTING A STORE. THREE OTHERS WERE SHOT, TWO BY POLICE OFFICERS AND ONE BY A STOREKEEPER WHILE LOOTING, NONE SERIOUSLY INJURED.

AGE THREE

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED THAT KING, RALPH ABERNATHY, AND BERNARD LEE, FAILED TO LEAVE MEMPHIS ON EASTERN FLIGHT THREE NINE EIGHT, NINE ZERO FIVE CST, DUE TO ARRIVE ATLANTA ELEVEN ZERO THREE PM EST. THIS ALSO CANCELS KING'S AND LEE'S FLIGHT FROM ATLANTA SIX TWENTY AM MARCH TWENTY NINE DUE TO ARRIVE BALTIMORE SEVEN FORTY TWO AM. INSPECTOR G. P. TINES, MEMPHIS PD, ADVISED KING PLANNING TO STAY IN MEMPHIS AT RIVERMONT HOTEL TONIGHT, FUTURE PLANS UNKNOWN AT PRESENT TIME. P.

CORR PAGE TWO, PARA ONE, LINE ONE WORDS EIGHT, NINE, AND TEN SHLD BE "AREA OF MEMPHIS" AND LINE TWO, PARA ONE, WORD FIVE SHLD BE "PRIMARY"

PAGE TWO PARA THREE, LINE ONE WORD SIX SHLD BE "KING" AND LINE THREE WORD THREE SHLD BE "PRIMARILY" AND A PERIOD SHLD BE BETWEEN "DEPT. AND FOUR" ONEXXX ON LINE FOUR.

PAGE TWO PARA ONE LINE THREE WORD ONE SHLD BE "LIQUOR"

END.

HFL

FBI WASH DC cc - Mr Trainor

P

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/18/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. A. Newman

6

SUBJECT: DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

During a conference on 7/16/75 between the Assistant Attorney General, J. Stanley Pottinger, and his staff and the Director of the FBI and his staff, a question arose concerning Martin Luther King's alleged moving from one hotel or motel to another hotel or motel in Memphis, Tennessee, prior to his murder on 4/4/68.

Attached is a letterhead memorandum (LHM) setting forth an inquiry including a review of all appropriate Bureau files regarding a proposal made in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 3/29/68 in connection with the counterintelligence program wherein it was recommended that information be made available to a cooperative news media source showing King to be a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on 3/28/68, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel). The LHM will reflect and document the fact that although a notation appears on the memorandum that it was "handled" there is no information available to reflect that it was ever actually given to a cooperative news source. Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh (retired), who placed the notation "handled" on the document, absolutely has no recollection of this matter nor can he state whether or not the information was disseminated.

REC-88 100-106670

The time elements as documented in this LHM would preclude the proposal contained in the 3/29/68 memorandum of having any affect upon King's choice of a motel in which to reside.

JUL 29 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached LHM along with attachments be disseminated to the Department.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Delivered 7/22/75 to Pottinger's office

HAN:cah (6) cah

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 26, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM

PURPOSE:

To recommend item be furnished cooperative national news media source by Crime Records, designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising for the Washington Spring Project.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has now scheduled the Washington Spring Project, his "poor people's march on Washington, D. C.," for the latter part of April, 1968. King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) has sent out a mailing to 70,000 potential financial contributors. King asked these 70,000 to contribute to the Washington Spring Project for the feeding and housing of the marchers.

At the same time, churches in the Washington, D. C., area have said they will feed and house King's marchers.

SUGGESTION:

REC-0 812405

That the above facts be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division so that a story could be

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. M. Wells
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC 35

100-448006-

15 APR 9 1968

EX 106

55

Enclosure

TJD:df/dsm (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person nel without the express approval of the FBI.

given nation-wide circulation that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people he solicited. Since the churches have offered support, no more money is needed and any contributed would only be used by King for other purposes. This item would need nation-wide circulation in order to reach all the potential contributors and curtail their donations. A sample item is attached.

ACTION:

That the facts about King's solicitation of funds unnecessarily be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division.

NW

WCS ✓

Handled 4/4/68

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), today finds himself in the embarrassing position of having too much money, or at least the probability of too much money. The SCLC sent out a huge mailing to its contributors pleading for funds for the Washington Spring Project, the "poor people's march on Washington." Thousands of contributors were urged to support the march financially in order to feed and house the demonstrators. But the churches in the Washington, D. C., area have offered to house and feed the demonstrators.

Now the contributions are beginning to roll in from the mailing and King doesn't need the money. An embarrassment of riches has befallen King, who will only use the money for other purposes. The churches had better come through with all the housing and support the demonstrators need, because there will be little money left for the "poor people" by the time the march rolls around.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-448006— 8 3

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 8C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
[illegible]
[illegible]
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Sullivan DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
RACIAL MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

A sanitation workers strike has been going on in Memphis for some time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis. King was in an automobile preceding the marchers. As the march developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke out including the breaking of windows in stores and some looting.

This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called nonviolence advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience for Washington in April.

REC-19
EX-105 157-9146-38
5 APR 2 1968

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ACTION:

Attached is a blind memorandum pointing ~~out the~~ above, which if you approve, should be made available by Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources.

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

TDR:fhd (6)

Wed

OK
H

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Deakin

Deakin

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5 APR 1968

RACIAL INT. SECT.

AUG 30 1968

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, injected himself into the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and the result of King's famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism, looting, and riot.

Previously, King involved himself in this strike, called for a general strike, and called for a mass march. Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of the line. Negroes began shouting "black power" and trouble began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and looting broke out.

Police officers were forced to use gas to break up the march and to control the crowd. It was necessary to activate the National Guard. Martin Luther King claims his much-heralded march on Washington, scheduled for April 22, 1968, will also be "nonviolent." He says he has persuaded militant black nationalists to abandon violent extremism in Washington, D. C., during the march. Memphis may only be the prelude to civil strife in our Nation's Capitol.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

157-9146-38

ENCLOSURE

~~157-[illegible]~~

XEROX
APR 4 1968

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 25, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

I would appreciate your making available to the Committee the following items in connection with our investigation of the King matter:

1. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between one Val Coleman and Special Agent Harold Linebaugh or any other FBI Headquarters officials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

2. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between any FBI Headquarters officials and any representatives of the news media concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

3. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to a meeting between Ralph Abernathy and either FBI Director Hoover or Cartha DeLoach during December 1964 or January 1965 (other than the December 1, 1964 meeting which was attended by Dr. King and the January 11, 1965 meeting which was attended by Andrew Young).

4. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to the following statement which appears in the second paragraph of the September 11, 1964 memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - Communist":

RECEIVED
DEC 1 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1210X

On that occasion Assistant Director DeLoach's office was able to take appropriate action to forestall the publication of the article.

5. The 7/16/64 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan which is noted in handwriting at the bottom of the second page of the July 15, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

6. With respect to the March 29, 1968 memorandum, with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" please provide:

a. Access to original of this memorandum and its enclosure;

b. Access to all extant "tickler" and/any other copies of this memorandum and its attachment in their original form;

c. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memorandum. ~~(This should include any and all information adduced, collected, and/or prepared in connection with Mr. James Adams' testimony on this subject before the Senate Select Committee on November 18, 1975.)~~

d. All memoranda and any other materials received from FBI field offices or written at FBI Headquarters prior to and pertaining to the recommendation contained in the March 29, 1968 memorandum.

7. With respect to the memorandum with enclosure, from W. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 26, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)", please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

8. With respect to a memorandum with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan, dated 3/28/68, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

9. Responses to Items 6, 7, and 8 should include copies of all newspaper clippings or magazine articles contained in FBI files which contain information set forth in the memoranda and/or enclosures identified in Items 6, 7, and 8 above.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 1, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated November 25, 1975, requesting various information regarding the King matter. Please prepare an appropriate response to this request.

EX-110

cc: Paul Daly

REC-60

62-116395-1210X

7 MAR 5 1976

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/lp

1-Ad Hoc
12-3-75

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 11/28/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY

Removed By 7 9 JAN 1 1976

File Number 62-116395-1210

Permanent Serial Charge Out

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

The Attorney General

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP3ALMKP

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum, with attachment, concerning an interview of former FBI Assistant Director Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum, with attachment, for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Your specific attention is invited to certain information relating to the interview of Wick suggestive of improprieties on the part of an SSC Staff Member. The facts, as known to this Bureau, are as follows.

Wick first contacted this Bureau concerning the interview by telephone on November 5, 1975, to advise that he had been called on October 31, 1975, by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein representing the SSC. Epstein requested Wick to come to Washington, D. C., for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his "employment." Epstein did not further describe the subject matter of the interview and an appointment was arranged for November 7, 1975. Wick said that he was uncertain as to the probable subject matter of the interview because other matters coming within his responsibilities as Vice President of Pan American World Airways which were unrelated to the FBI, have been of recent interest to the SSC. Wick asked for advice of the FBI concerning this matter. Thereupon, the Legal Counsel Division of this Bureau contacted Epstein and determined that the subject matter of the interview of Wick would be Martin Luther King, Jr. A return call was made to Wick on November 5, 1975, to advise him that this Bureau had learned that the subject matter of the interview would be Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395-1209X

REC-51

3 JAN 13 1976

1 - 67 (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

SFP:mjg
(11)

2

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

✓ S. F. Phillips

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JAN 20 1976

The Attorney General

On November 6, 1975, Wick again telephoned this Bureau and advised that he had been rather annoyed at Epstein's initial approach to him; particularly, because Wick had tried on more than one occasion during the telephone conversation with Epstein to pry from Epstein the subject matter of the interview but Epstein persisted in not advising him.

This Bureau's representative who had determined from Epstein on November 5, 1975, the subject matter of the interview has advised that when he made the inquiry of Epstein, he asked Epstein why he had not told Wick the subject matter. Epstein's reply was that Wick had not asked him, a statement directly contradictory to Wick's advice to this Bureau.

The second suggested impropriety is that Epstein contacted Wick prior to advising this Bureau of his intention to interview Wick, an action which is contrary to procedures which have been agreed upon between the SSC and this Bureau.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
               Special Counsel for
                 Intelligence Coordination

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

62-116395

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S.F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (AD) ROBERT WICK
BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

This memorandum concerns an interview of former FBI AD Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members.

On November 5, 1975, Wick advised this Bureau that on October 31, 1975, he had been contacted by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein of the SSC who requested Wick to come to Washington for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his employment. Epstein did not further describe the subject matter although Wick attempted to obtain such information from Epstein.

Upon receipt of the above information from Wick, this Bureau determined from Epstein that the subject matter was to be Martin Luther King, Jr., and that fact was relayed to Wick on November 5, 1975. Wick was also told that he was being released from his secrecy agreement with the FBI for the purpose of the interview, confined to the indicated subject matter. Wick was also advised by this Bureau that he was not required to answer questions falling within four privileged areas: matters pertaining to pending investigations; information from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies; information concerning sensitive methods and techniques; and information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources.

Attached hereto is a copy of a MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE dated November 12, 1975, which Wick voluntarily furnished this Bureau and which represents his report pertaining to the interview.

Enclosure

1 - 67- (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SFP:mjg (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

62-116395-1209

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Assistant Director (AD)
Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members

NOTE:

Information relating to contacts between Wick and this Bureau are reported in memoranda 11/5/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," and 11/7/75 from W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall "Senstudy 75." Wick's statement, MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE, was mailed to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The matter of improprieties was addressed specifically in the above 11/7/75 Cregar memorandum and it is believed that the Department should be made aware of this matter.

Let [illegible] to AG
[illegible] Encl (2)

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former Assistant Director Robert Wick

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interviewed regarding his knowledge of the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

Al-100/9

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

f-/

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
~~Telephone Rm.~~ ____
Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 12/9/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION & ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

FROM: ADIC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243)

RE: SENSTUDY; TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS, AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR W. RAYMOND WANNALL 12/2/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/60 BY SP2ALM/lg

Re Los Angeles phone call to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS, 12/9/75.

On 12/3/75, the attached article appeared in the Los Angeles Times under the byline of reporter JACK NELSON. As indicated, the headline and lead paragraph which supposedly is based on ADAMS' testimony, clearly reflects that the FBI did nothing to prevent Klan violence although we knew of the contemplated violence. After discussing this matter with Mr. ADAMS and reviewing the actual testimony received in the Los Angeles Division on 12/8/75, SAC ELMER F. LINBERG and I met with Editor BILL THOMAS and National Editor ED GUTHMAN at the Los Angeles Times.

I advised these gentlemen that I was aghast when I read the headlines and the lead paragraph of this article and could not believe that JIM ADAMS did not refute informant ROWE's testimony that we took no action relative to contemplated violence since I knew that this was contrary to the rules, regulations, policy, and philosophy of the FBI in 1960. I then called Mr. ADAMS in Washington, D. C., and he likewise, was upset over the headline and lead paragraph,

ENCLOSURE

EX-112

REC-38

62-116395-1209

3 - Bureau (1 Encl)
1 - Los Angeles
REG:mmb
(4)

17 DEC 12 1975

Approved: JAN 7 1976
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

PERSONNEL UNIT

FILE

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

because, according to ADAMS, he completely refuted these statements in that we did disseminate the contemplated plans of violence to the Birmingham Police Department and to the Department of Justice in the form of a letterhead memorandum.

I continued that I waited until I received the actual transcript of testimony and told the gentlemen that upon my review of the testimony of Mr. ADAMS and Mr. WANNALL, I could not reconcile the headline and lead paragraph with such testimony. I then proceeded to read several excerpts from the testimony.

I advised Mr. THOMAS and Mr. GUTHMAN that my immediate reaction was to prepare a "Letter to the Editor" but felt after a re-analysis of the situation that this is not a judgment question on the part of the newspaper, but one of a slanted, inaccurate story either by design or through misunderstanding. I therefore felt that the Los Angeles Times, if it so desired, should be in a position to correct the situation itself based on the facts.

Mr. THOMAS expressed appreciation for my approach and stated that at the time he read the article, already printed, a question came to his mind as to why the FBI did not advise someone or take some action relative to contemplated violence. He, however, took no further action. He said in view of what I had read from excerpts of Mr. ADAMS' testimony and the now available complete transcript of the testimony, he intends to pursue this matter further and would prefer not to have a "letter to the Editor", but rather correct any inaccuracies on the part of the Los Angeles Times through their own pursuit of further inquiring concerning this story.

Mr. GUTHMAN concurred with Mr. THOMAS and they indicated that it appears the obvious question is based on Mr. ADAMS' testimony of who in the Department of Justice received this information relative to contemplated violence and what did such a responsible Department of Justice official do with the information. He agreed that based on the information furnished to them, the FBI has been done an injustice but that they, the Los Angeles Times, desired to pursue this matter further.

It should be noted the article of JACK NELSON is based on one specific situation, namely the testimony of former informant GARY ROWE that he had furnished advance information to the FBI to the effect that members of the Ku Klux Klan would be given the opportunity to beat members of the Freedom Riders without interference by law enforcement authorities for approximately 15 minutes after which the local law enforcement authorities would take action, and that the FBI was advised of this well in advance of such beatings and furthermore, the FBI took no action to prevent this violence.

Took No Action to Prevent Klan Violence, FBI Admits

BY JACK NELSON
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—An FBI official conceded Tuesday that the bureau had failed to use an undercover man's information to head off Ku Klux Klan violence in Alabama in the 1960s.

But, the official, James B. Adams, assistant to the director, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the FBI was "just as frustrated as anyone else" at "rank lawlessness" that existed in Alabama at that time. Also, he said, the FBI is an investigative agency and has no enforcement powers.

Adams' defense of the FBI came immediately after Gary Thomas Rowe Jr., wearing a hood to conceal his features, testified that on many occasions he had warned the bureau of the klan's plans for violence, but that the violence occurred without official interference.

Rowe served six years as an FBI undercover agent before surfacing in 1965 as the star witness against three klansmen accused of killing a white civil rights worker in Lowndes County, Ala. Since then he has been living



WITNESS—Gary Thomas Rowe Jr. wears hood while testifying.
AP Wirephoto

Please Turn to Page 6, Col. 1

KLAN VIOLENCE

Continued from First Page

in Southern California under an assumed name.

Rowe was one of two former undercover operatives who testified before the committee Tuesday. The other, Mary Jo Cook of Buffalo, N.Y., told of supplying the FBI with information about 1,000 persons while serving as an informant against the Vietnam Veterans Against the War during 1973-74.

Testimony by both witnesses prompted committee members to criticize FBI tactics and to suggest that legal restraints be put on future FBI activities.

Sen. Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), commenting on testimony by Rowe that he engaged in klan violence with the knowledge and approval of the FBI, observed that the bureau's infiltration of the klan not only failed to prevent violence, "but indeed may have contributed to it."

Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-Mont.) told Adams that the FBI had bungled its job in investigating political activities and added:

"It has interfered with civil liberties and finally in the last month or two through its public disclosures has heaped shame upon itself and really led toward the undermining of crucial public confidence essential to law enforcement agencies in the country."

Mondale criticized the FBI for trying to "protect people from subversive and dangerous ideas," and he told Adams:

"Time and time again, we're going to protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous. We're going to protect veterans from whatever it is, we're going to protect the (National) Council of Churches from veterans and so on . . .

"Don't you agree with me that we've got to control this, restrain it, define it, so that precisely what's expected of the FBI is known by you and by the public and you can justify your actions when we ask you?"

Adams disagreed that the FBI had bungled in the political intelligence field but agreed that restraining legislation was in order.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Los Angeles Times

12/3/75

62-116395-1209

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ✓
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. __
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. __
Inspection __
Intell. ✓
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 12-3-75

FROM : T. J. JENKINS

SUBJECT: GARY T. ROWE Att of the
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE

On 12-3-75 ~~an individual who~~ identified himself as Garland Reeves of the Birmingham, Alabama, News, called and he advised that he understood I was the Special Agent in Charge of the Birmingham Office at the time the bus was burned with the Freedom Riders in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1961. He stated that he would like to know if Rowe had furnished us information that the Birmingham Police were going to wait 15 or 30 minutes to go to the bus station in order to give the Klan an opportunity to work over the Freedom Riders. I informed Reeves that I recalled no such information being furnished to us at that time. I told him that all information we received concerning possible violence was furnished to the Birmingham Police Department. He wanted to know, if there had been such an agreement what action would I take. I told him that if I determined that the police department would not take any action for 15 or 30 minutes I would advise the Mayor ~~and~~ of the city and the Police Commissioner and if they felt the same as the police department, I would then advise the Governor of the State.

EX 104
REC 4 62-116395-1208

He wanted to know what would be the FBI's position at that time if the police department refused to take any action. I told him that we did not have jurisdiction in matters of this nature, that they were purely local and it was the responsibility of the local authorities to handle such matters. He desired to know if I would call out the Federal Marshals. I informed him that the FBI did not have any authority to call upon the Federal Marshals in a situation of this nature but if such a situation arose, I would have immediately notified our headquarters in Washington, who would have ~~notified the~~ Department of Justice, who would have such authority.

7 DEC 16 1975

I told him that while I was in Birmingham as Special Agent in Charge we kept the Bureau headquarters in Washington completely informed of all developments and they in turn, kept the Department of Justice informed.

ACTION: ✓ Submitted for information.

TJJ:pmd (5)
1 - Mr. Adams 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/K9

59 DEC 30 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

WRW/LAC

FBI

Date: 12/4/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via A I R T E L ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714)

SENSTUDY 75

Re San Diego telephone call to Bureau, 12/4/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of a letterhead memorandum reflecting information received in the San Diego Office concerning GARY THOMAS ROWE, Jr.

Deputy SCOTT BOIES of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office was contacted and advised that if he felt he recognized ROWE that he should not discuss the matter openly with anyone in that ROWE was obviously attempting to protect his identity. Deputy BOIES was not advised that ROWE was identical with THOMAS NEIL MOORE.

extra cc destroyed

2 - Bureau (Encs - 8)
1 - San Diego

DCS:pgh
(3)

1 - The Attorney General
1 - (1 - Senate [illegible] Cmte [illegible])

Not sent

Letter to [illegible] 12/[illegible]

UNREC COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

REC-100

62-116395-1206X

~~DEC 8~~ 2-6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2 ALM/GP

WOC

Approved: RLM/C
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
December 4, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: GARY THOMAS ROWE, JR.

At 11:30 p.m. on December 2, 1975, Deputy Sheriff Scott Boies of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office, Lemon Grove, California Sub-Station, telephonically contacted the San Diego FBI Office and advised as follows:

Deputy Boies stated that he recognized the voice of the man identified as Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who is testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on the Ku Klux Klan. He stated he heard Mr. Rowe talk on a news broadcast and recognized him as being an individual he knows as Thomas Neil Moore. Deputy Boies furnished Moore's date of birth as August 15, 1933, and an address of 580 "L" Street, Chula Vista, California, where Moore resided in 1971. Deputy Boies stated that Moore worked for Western Bureau of Investigation, headquartered in Los Angeles and worked as a security guard for the White Front Department Store, Chula Vista, California.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KP

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-1206X

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

December 12, 1975

Director, FBI

REC-100

62-116395-1206X

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. Klein

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to my November 26, 1975, letter to you enclosing among other material, a memorandum concerning former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is a copy of a memorandum dated December 4, 1975, regarding Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., received by FBI Headquarters from our San Diego field office.

Rowe, is a former informant who testified before the SSC on December 2, 1975, regarding his role in supplying information to the FBI regarding Ku Klux Klan activities in Alabama. He has been utilizing the cover name, Thomas Neil Moore.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the December 4, 1975, memorandum.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 137-6295

SK:klm
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 137-6295

No1 SENT TO SSC PER STEVE BLACKHURST, USDS 3-23-76 APB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 FEB 12 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE:

Above being furnished to the Attorney General and the SSC in order to apprise them of information reflecting that Rowe, who testified with a mask over his face, was identified by a San Diego Deputy Sheriff after hearing Rowe's voice on a news broadcast. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/4/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TESTIMONY BY THE DIRECTOR
DECEMBER 9, 1975

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO CHANGE
THE NAME OF THE J. EDGAR HOOVER
FBI BUILDING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/lp

In connection with the Director's appearance on December 9, 1975, to testify before captioned committee, it is possible that he may be asked concerning recent proposals in the Congress to change the name of the building. Three bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives on December 1, 1975, for that purpose. H.R. 10905, introduced by Congressman Gude of Maryland and H.R. 10918, introduced by Congresswoman Schroeder of Colorado, would change the name of the building to "FBI Building." H.R. 10916, introduced by Congressman Rangel of New York, would change the name to "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building." All three of the bills were referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House, the chairman of which is Congressman Jones of Alabama.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information of the Director in connection with his preparation for testimony.

EX 104 REC-9 62-116395-1206

DEC 16 1975

Enc.

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

XEROX
DEC 19 1975

3

84 DEC 30 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mr. GUDE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" wherever it appears in such section and inserting in lieu thereof "F.B.I. Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

94th CONGRESS
1st Session

H. R. 10905

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

By Mr. Gude

December 1, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mrs. SCHROEDER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Public Law 92–520 is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 8. The Federal building in the block bounded by Ninth Street Northwest, Tenth Street Northeast, E Street Northwest, and Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest, in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter be known as the 'F.B.I. Building'. Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, record, or other paper of the United States to such

Federal building shall be held to be a reference to the "F.B.I. Building'".

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

By Mrs. SCHROEDER

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mr. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" both times it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

By Mr. RANGEL

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Stack
1 - Mr. McWright

Mr. Jenkins 11/28/75

J. Cochran, Jr.

REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

1/r

Senatorially

Re memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11/21/75, advising that representatives of captioned Senate Subcommittee desire to review any Bureau documents relating to the Bureau's interest in or use of drugs during interrogation.

It was pointed out in referenced memo that captioned Subcommittee staff members James F. Michie and Thomas M. Susman had obtained information from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning a program coordinated between DOD, CIA, and FBI to develop a truth serum. The program apparently began in early 1950 and D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory had knowledge of this activity.

The information that Michie and Susman have obtained apparently relates to a Navy drug experimentation project from 1947 to 1954. Navy files indicated that the FBI was aware of this program and Mr. C. D. DeLoach and D. J. Parsons were mentioned.

A review of Bureau files disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the Navy drug project. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-2699-

62-2699

Enclosure
① 62-116395 ENCLOSURE
1 - Mr. Adams
2 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Hotis)
(Attn: Mr. Miller)
3 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. W. O. Cregar)
(Attn: Mr. T. D. J. Brooks)
(Attn: Mr. V. H. Weimar)

CGM:bms
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

CONTINUED - OVER

NOT RECORDED
46 FEB 5 1976

84 FEB 9 1976

might be used to great advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50.

Memorandum dated 11/6/75 from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall is attached which sets forth details of our review of Navy files on this project, including a Bureau press release which was to have been made in the event that the Navy mentioned the FBI in their press release on this matter.

A review of Bureau files for information relating to drugs designed to modify behavior indicates an interest dating back to 1922. However, this interest has not extended to the point where the Bureau has conducted research on behavior modifying drugs nor has it funded such research. We have maintained liaison with other agencies, primarily the U. S. Army, and industrial organizations in order to be aware of developments in this area.

On 7/30/74, Laboratory and Training Division representatives met with representatives of the Biomedical and Chemical Laboratories of Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, to discuss the potential use of incapacitating chemical agents in hostage situations. Although we have developed an awareness of various agents which may be used in these situations, we have not conducted any research with these agents. Memoranda on this matter are located in Bufile 80-807.

A single instance occurred where "truth serum" was administered in a Bureau case. Truth serum was administered to Thurman Scruggs Wilkins at his own request while being interviewed in the Los Angeles Office, April 26, 1947. Wilkins was allegedly involved with one Ignacy Samuel Witczak, the subject of a Soviet espionage case (100-343077). The actual drug used was sodium amytal and the actual administration was done by a physician. Prior Bureau authority was not obtained by the Los Angeles Office in connection with this incident. SAC Hood submitted a letter of explanation to the Bureau on July 2, 1947. This incident resulted in the following information being set forth in SAC Letter 84-47 dated July 3, 1947:

Memorandum J. Cochran, Jr. to Mr. Jenkins
RE: REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

"The Bureau will not tolerate any experiments or participation on the part of its personnel in the utilization of the so called truth serums or other chemicals alleged to have a similar effect. ---- consequently, in the event any Bureau agent violates these instructions, drastic administrative action will be taken."

There was nothing found in Bureau files that would indicate that we have received any documents from CIA concerning their drug research programs. The files do reflect that we were aware that CIA was conducting research with lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and that British Intelligence had successfully utilized LSD on several Russian espionage agents. The information concerning CIA and British activities is set out for the benefit of the Director only and cannot be released outside the Bureau.

There are two Bureau files which contain most of the information relating to the immediate area of interest of the captioned Senate Subcommittee. These files are 62-2699 (Truth Serums) and 80-645 (Chemical Munitions and Gases). Pertinent serials may also be found in 80-807 and 100-343077 as previously noted in this memorandum.

I see no reason why Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman should not be afforded on oral briefing regarding these matters, and if necessary make pertinent serials of Bufiles 62-2699, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077 available to them for review.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman be advised by Legal Counsel that available Bureau records and interview with current knowledgeable employee indicate the FBI has never engaged in nor funded anyone's efforts in research and/or development programs in the use or effect of drugs on human behavior. They should be advised our efforts in this regard as far as can be established from the available records consists of following through liaison contacts with other government agencies and the private sector sources the current developments in behavior modifying drugs.

(2) That if they desire to pursue this matter further, SA McWright and myself be permitted to meet with Michie and Susman to (a) reaffirm the information in recommendation #1 and (b) if necessary, to produce for their inspection pertinent serials from 62-6299, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. J. Cochran

11/6/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
(1) - Mr. C. G. McWright
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALNKP

This is to inform you that on 11/7/75 Defense Department will release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC), the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures (Senator Edward M. Kennedy's committee), and to the press, information concerning Navy projects from 1947 to 1954 involving drug experimentation; a Navy file indicates FBI was aware of programs but Laboratory has no knowledge of any active participation by Bureau personnel.

On 11/4/75, Clark McGruder, Assistant to Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Director of Naval Intelligence, informed me that on 11/7/75 the Navy was going to release to aforementioned committees and the press information on drug experimentation and that the FBI was mentioned in the pertinent files. Those files were reviewed at the Pentagon on 11/6/75 by Supervisor J. P. Thomas of INTD. They had been classified "Secret" and "Top Secret" but now have been completely declassified. FBI was mentioned in connection with three projects. There are no FBI documents in the files.

A memorandum dated 9/21/50 from Mr. Alberti to Mr. C. D. DeLoach was a receipt signed by Mr. DeLoach for one copy of "Drugs Stated To Have Been Used By Russians And Germans In Interrogation Techniques." Alberti is identified elsewhere in the file as Jack H. Alberti, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), who apparently coordinated the projects mentioned in the file. The purpose of one project was to develop a speech-inducing drug to obtain intelligence from interrogees and the project began in 1947.

Enclosures
62-116395

CONTINUED
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

A memorandum dated 8/15/~~75~~ 50 on letterhead of Office of Chief of Naval Operations concerned "Top Secret Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI) Project on Speech-Inducing Drugs," reported a meeting on 8/11/50 attended by personnel of NMRI, CIA, Office of Naval Research (ONR), a drug company representative and Mr. DeLoach and Mr. D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the FBI on a CIA project on narco-hypnosis and on the NMRI project. Parsons reportedly said the FBI had no such project, but had information on the experiences of various police departments in the United States with speech-inducing drugs. He agreed to make the FBI information available to NMRI and CIA. ONR agreed to give FBI, NMRI and CIA a study by ONR on projected research to improve polygraph reliability. Recipients were to give their comments and recommendations on the study to ONR. At the meeting NMRI gave DeLoach an 8/11/50 NMRI progress report on its project. Parsons agreed to look into the possibility of getting volunteers from prisoners in Federal institutions and to supply NMRI with canabis (marijuana) and heroin to the extent they might be available to the FBI. It is noted that no FBI representatives were listed in the memorandum reporting a 9/27/50 meeting of this group and there is no further record in the file of FBI participation. Neither is there any record that the FBI supplied any drugs for the project.

Material regarding project "CHATTER" included a carbon copy of a rough draft memorandum (no letterhead) bearing the penciled date "11/50?" which contained the following, "Since 1947 the Department of the Navy has carried on a project in coordination with the Departments of the Air Force and Army, CIA and FBI for the development of speech-inducing drugs.... The Directors of Intelligence of the three Services, of CIA and FBI consider this project

CONTINUED - OVER

of utmost important and urgency to... fulfillment of their missions for the security of the United States." The memorandum says that a project submitted to ONR by Professor Richard Wendt of the University of Rochester (NY) had been approved by all the agencies involved and recommended funding the project. The file indicates subsequently that this project did go forward and involve human experimentation.

~~The second~~ Another file dealt with project "CALLING CARD," 1952-1953, designed "to render an individual subservient to impose will or control." FBI was not mentioned.

80-5 (Polygraph file) relates only to instrumental Detection of Deception

A memorandum dated 9/5/50 for Mr. D. J. Parsons, FBI; C. Edwards, CIA; and Captain Wilbur E. Kellum of Naval Medical Research, from W. S. Post, Jr. (not further identified), informed them that a copy of the report on the "Ellson" project (University of Indiana, 1952) was being forwarded to them for information. The project involved research in the detection of deception. The addressees were to be briefed by Professor D. G. Ellson of Indiana University on the project at a future date. The file did not show that the briefing occurred. The project was terminated in June, 1952.

The two files reviewed contained many reports of research conducted concerning various drugs in various parts of the world, constituting a collection of papers on the subject by U. S. and foreign researchers.

A review of logical Bureau files by the Laboratory Division disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the above. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which might be used to great

CONTINUED - OVER

advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50. (Navy memorandum on this meeting set out above.)

We have received a memorandum dated 11/4/75 from Defense describing the proposed release of Navy information to the committees and to the press. Copy of that memorandum and of the press release are attached. The release says that "Liaison was maintained with... the FBI" concerning the drug research ~~release.~~

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

PRESS RELEASE
NOVEMBER 7, 1975

The press statement released by the Navy today relating to its drug research on human subjects for the period 1947 through 1954 indicates liaison concerning this project was maintained by the Navy with other Governmental agencies, including the FBI.

A thorough review of FBI files has disclosed one document relating to this Navy research: a short internal memorandum, dated August 4, 1950. This memorandum, prepared by a member of the Liaison staff at FBI Headquarters, recorded that a Navy official had invited FBI representatives to a conference in the Washington area to "discuss the usage of truth serum in Intelligence circles," and that the Navy had made advances in developing a new drug which "could be utilized to a great advantage in the questioning of espionage agents." A handwritten notation on this memorandum directed that a representative of the FBI Laboratory was to attend this conference on August 11, 1950.

No further identifiable reference to Navy drug development research is contained in FBI files. No record can be located that liaison was being maintained with the Navy regarding this program, or that the FBI had knowledge of this program prior to the date of the above memorandum.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/RO

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395

The FBI was not involved in any way in this Navy drug research, and the FBI has never participated in research with drugs designed to modify human behavior, nor has it funded such research.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

December 24, 1975

The Attorney General

ST 115

Director, FBI

REC-51

62-116395-1204X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is in response to the SSC letter dated December 18, 1975, wherein Senators Mondale and Baker requested rather detailed information to be made available during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

It is noted that most of the requests in this letter are so ambiguous that they require clarification from the SSC before the FBI can logically respond. In one instance, there is no way this Bureau could respond short of obtaining the recollections of Bureau Supervisors who worked in the Intelligence Division extending back almost 20 years. Because of this, we are attaching for your approval and forwarding to the SSC the original of a memorandum which delineates the problems attendant to the request of December 18, 1975, and, in most instances, requests a meeting between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, SSC, and representatives of this Bureau in the hope that some alternatives or clarifications can be developed. A copy of the memorandum is furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

WOC:lhb
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2AMK

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JAN 23 1976

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The request of 12/18/75 was received in the Intelligence Division in the midafternoon of 12/22/75. A conference was held on the morning of 12/23/75 of pertinent Division personnel in an effort to identify the problems connected with responding to this request. It is believed that the only way the Bureau can logically respond to the request is by obtaining clarifications and, in some instances, alternatives to the requests set out.

We have already determined that both John Elliff and the SSC Counsel, F. A. O. Schwartz, are out of the city for the holidays. The Legal Counsel Division has left word with Mr. Schwartz and/or Mr. Elliff to call SA Paul Daly upon their return to the city.

Copy of 12/18/75 request attached.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J, G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

62-116395

December 24, 1975

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM SENATORS
MONDALE AND BAKER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

On December 22, 1975, this Bureau received a copy of a letter dated December 18, 1975, which Senators Mondale and Baker sent to the Attorney General levying certain requirements on the FBI with a request that the responses be provided the SSC during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

Item 1 requested access to materials in the investigative files for a six-month period preceding acts of violence which were prevented by actions taken by the FBI. The specific preventive actions were set out in some detail in a memorandum prepared for the SSC by the FBI dated December 10, 1975.

Upon receipt of referenced letter, the Intelligence Division initiated efforts to isolate the files documenting these preventive actions. The Bureau's response of December 10, 1975, was predicated on a review of the pertinent inspection reports of the Intelligence Division. These reports do not document by file number the individual preventive actions. To locate specific files, it will be necessary to have knowledgeable Intelligence Division personnel queried in an effort to try to match the preventive action with a particular investigative file. In some instances,

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

WOC:lhb lhb
(11)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

PJD
WOB
JAN

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-1204X

there will be no investigative file but merely a communication from a field office reporting information furnished by a source of the FBI on which some preventive action was predicated. It is possible that the acts of violence reported by the source could involve a violation over which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction. In such cases, the local field office would have merely furnished the information to the appropriate law enforcement agency and no investigative file would exist.

We are continuing our efforts to attempt to isolate those files which document preventive actions. However, because of the problems attendant thereto, as well as those problems raised in the subparagraphs of Item 1, it is recommended that a meeting be arranged between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, and representatives of this Bureau to discuss possible alternatives to some of these requests.

Items 2 and 3 concern the September 24, 1975, report to the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office. The FBI is in the process of preparing a response and it will be made available to the Committee as soon as possible. However, it is noted that the FBI prepared no analysis at all on the findings of the General Accounting Office contained in their report of September 24, 1975.

Item 4 requests the annual reports from the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968, and the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that organization was under investigation. Item 4 also requests annual reports available on the investigations "about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28."

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

There were no annual reports submitted by the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968. With regard to the Women's Liberation Movement, the SSC has been provided copies of all pertinent reports for the years the organization was under investigation. In an effort to clarify what is meant by the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to Mr. John Elliff's request of October 28, 1975, it is again proposed that a meeting with Mr. Elliff be arranged to clarify this ambiguity.

Item 5 requests specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV of the Department of Justice's guidelines draft on "Domestic Security Investigations."

The indices of this Bureau are not organized to enable retrieval of information of a "preventive action" character or examples of FBI actions taken to prevent violence. The retrieval of such information from FBI files, other than that described in the response to Item 1, would require extensive review and/or dependence on the recollection of individuals of occurrences extending back almost 20 years. It is suggested that, during the proposed meeting with Mr. John Elliff, this request be discussed.

Item 6 requests access to all FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1, through April 4, 1968.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

It is this Bureau's belief that all pertinent material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, through April 4, 1968, has been made available to the SSC responsive to previous requests. With regard to the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, it is not clear whether the letter is requesting access to the entire FBI file on these two activities from the period January 1, through April 4, 1968. It is recommended that a clarification of this request can be accomplished during the previously proposed meeting between Mr. John Elliff and representatives of the FBI.

Item 7 requests all materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

A check of indices of the FBI regarding "Project Overshoe," as well as the word Overshoe, fails to contain any reference to either. Without additional information regarding "Project Overshoe," this Bureau cannot be responsive to this specific request. Again, it is suggested that, during the forthcoming meeting with John Elliff, clarification of "Project Overshoe" be obtained.

1 - The Attorney General

Intelligence Division

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KG

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

Attached is a request from Senators Mondale and Baker of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated 12/18/75. The Director has requested he be advised regarding the status of this request.

Attached is a copy of a letter to the AG and LHM for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb

CONTINUED - OVER

(Rev. 5-21-73)
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓ ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Intelligence Division

ED

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

ched is a request from Senators
nd Baker of the Senate Select
(SSC) dated 12/18/75. The
has requested he be advised
the status of this request.

ched is a copy of a letter to the
M for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb CONTINUED - OVER

estimate when we will complete Item 4.

Item 5 has been reduced to the recollection of Bureau Supervisor David Ryan who handled the COINTELPRO matter and will not require research beyond what SA Ryan can recall. (Ryan is currently developing a response to this request.)

Item 6 has been reduced to all materials relating to the Poor People's Campaign, the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennesee, and Martin Luther King, Jr., contained in Headquarters files between the period 1/1-4/4/68. (We are currently working on this request.)

Item 7 - Epstein has agreed to obtain more identifying data regarding Project Overshoe and we are awaiting this information.

WOC

SECRET

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE [illegible] GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall — for Handle
Sensitivity
Sel T for 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X
5 JAN 1976

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

RECEIVED
ENCLOSURE

SECRET

SECRET

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall — for Handle
Senstudy
K
Sel T [illegible] 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X
18
5 JAN 26 1976

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

RECEIVED
ENCLOSURE

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

provided during the last week of December and the first week of January:

1. With respect to each of the examples of effective prevention of violence provided the Committee pursuant to John Elliff's letter of November 26 to Mr. Shaheen, please provide access to materials in the investigative file for the 6-month period preceding the act of violence prevented. Please deliver:

(a) All materials relating to the legal and factual predicate for each investigation;

(b) The first investigative report disseminated outside the FBI in each such case, and a list of recipients of that report;

(c) The total number of individuals whose names were referred to the FBI's general name index in the course of each investigation;

(d) The total number of individuals about whom information was obtained through informants, confidential sources, physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and other sensitive techniques; and

(e) The annual report from the office of origin for each such investigation to FBI headquarters for the last five years during which the case in question was an open investigation.

2. Please provide any information which you have refuting the suggestion made on page 34 of the General Accounting Office's September 24 report to the House Judiciary Committee, that cases in which violence can be predicted probably represent less than 2% of all FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

3. Please provide all memoranda or analyses prepared for the Justice Department, Director Kelley, or Assistant Director Wannall on the findings of the General Accounting Office as presented to the House Judiciary Committee on September 24.

4. Please provide the annual report from the office of origin to FBI headquarters for the investigation of

~~SECRET~~

~~SE~~

Attorney General Edward H. Levi

Page three December 18, 1975

Dr. Martin Luther King in 1963 through 1968, and for the investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that that organization was under investigation, and the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28.

5. Please provide specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV on "preventive action" of the draft Department of Justice's guidelines on "domestic security investigations."

6. Access to all FBI materials pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor People's Campaign, and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1 through April 4, 1968.

7. All materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this request. We look forward to continuing cooperation on this area of joint concern.

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale

Walter F. Mondale
Chairman

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Vice-Chairman

~~SECRET~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/24/75

U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC).
Caption of Document: (12/18/75 Letter to the Attorney General from Senators Mondale & Baker)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 12-30-75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KP

62-116395-1204X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

X DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/24/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

X SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 12/18/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Requesting clarification of items listed in request received from Senators Mondale and Bakerregarding preventive actions; 9/24/75 report of the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office; Annual reports from the office of origin to FBIHQs for investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; pertinent materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1/1 thru 4/4/68 previously made available. Clarification with regard to Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tenn; "Project Overshoe."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

62-116395-1204X

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
(Mr. G. S. McMichael)

12/17/75

1 - Mr. J. Cochran
(Mr. F. M. Devine)
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Mr. W. R. Wannall

J. G. Deegan

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This informative memorandum to record unsuccessful efforts to pinpoint the typewriter on which was typed an anonymous letter apparently directed to subject, the original of which was located in papers left behind on the retirement of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan.

Examination of the questioned document by the Laboratory established that the typing was done on a Royal typewriter with pica style type. We checked available inventory records maintained by the Administrative Division as well as our own in INTD to locate all Royal typewriters which were in the then Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) around 1964. This search was based on the suspicion that the note was typed by Sullivan on a typewriter accessible to him in 1964 when he was Assistant Director of the DID.

Our checks revealed that there are available only four typewriters of the type sought which were likely in the DID in 1964. All four are presently in INTD and three of them were readily eliminated as not identical to that which produced the questioned document on the basis that all three have closed "4s", whereas the questioned document has an open ended "4". The fourth typewriter, serial number KMG 13-4320913, is maintained in room 4410 and charged to the IS-2 Section. It was examined by Supervisor F. M. Devine of the Document Section of the Laboratory who advised that it is not identical to the typewriter which produced the questioned document.

100-106670

(1) - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)
6

CONTINUED - OVER

SFP:bkb
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP3ALM/ap

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 DEC 29 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Martin Luther King, Jr.
100-106670

We are conducting no further inquiry at this time to establish the whereabouts of the typewriter which produced the anonymous letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information and record purposes.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1st NR 1203x, 1204x, 1st NR 1204x, 1206-1210x, 1212, 1214x, 1214x1, 1215, 1215x

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Adams - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs. (2)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Cregar - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs. (2)

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On 12/4/75, a meeting was held with the following representatives of captioned Committee: Chief Counsel F.A.O. Schwartz; Assistant Counsel Paul Michel; Staff Member Mark Gitenstein; Staff Director of the Domestic Task Force John T. Elliff; and Staff Member John Bayley. Representing the Bureau at this meeting were Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams, Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Inspector John B. Hotis, and SA Paul V. Daly.

The meeting discussed the forthcoming testimony on 12/9/75 of the Director before that Committee and Elliff furnished the Bureau two draft papers discussing the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction and issues the Committee Staff feels the Senate Select Committee must address from a legislative standpoint. Copies of these papers are attached.

The first paper which consists of six pages discusses in Part 1 what the Committee sees as problems arising out of the FBI's domestic intelligence investigations. This portion highlights the fact that these investigations may be overbroad in scope, collect irrelevant information, and continue the investigations beyond what the Committee sees as their normal investigative conclusion. This portion also addresses the investigative techniques used during these investigations and the resultant dissemination of information collected.

Under Part 2, the document discusses options available to the Committee. These options run the gamut from abolition of the Bureau's domestic intelligence functions to administrative oversight by the Attorney General or Congressional oversight or enacting legislation providing for domestic intelligence investigations with legislative limits imposed on such investigations. Included is the consideration of creating an independent Inspector General.

62-116395-1215X

REC-51

7 JAN 22 1976

Enclosures (2)

ENCLOSURE

PVD:lad
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JAN 26 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The second position paper which was prepared by John T. Elliff begins by a six-page statement and analysis of the Bureau's current authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. He then lists four options for the Committee.

Option 1 is for Congress to pass legislation ratifying the existing FBI authority as set forth by Presidential directives and Executive Orders.

Option 2 suggests Congress might give serious consideration to creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Department of Justice. In this Option, Elliff suggests that the FBI itself has considered this Option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from law enforcement functions of the Bureau.

Option 3 considers the elimination of FBI domestic intelligence. In his analysis of this position, it might be possible for the Bureau to develop the necessary intelligence information through its normal criminal investigations and thus remove the necessity for domestic intelligence investigations as presently conducted.

Option 4 considers setting standards for domestic intelligence investigations. In this Option, Elliff states that the FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only as Congress finds that regular criminal investigations would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of Federal law and that incidents of the use of violence in such violations are of a serious nature and threaten the security of the country.

For purposes of the Director's appearance on 12/9/75 before the Senate Select Committee, it is believed his response to questions concerning the aforementioned position papers should be that the Bureau has received copies and is reviewing the various proposals and that it would not be appropriate at this time for the Director to comment regarding the substance of the proposals.

CONTINUED - OVER

Elliff indicated during this meeting that the Director during his appearance may anticipate being asked a question by one of the Senators relating to his statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal concerning the necessity for the sacrifice of certain individual rights at the expense of investigations. He also anticipated the Director might be asked a question concerning his position on COINTELPRO. Regarding the question concerning the Director's statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal, the Legal Counsel Division will draft a proposed resonse. Concerning COINTELPRO, a response has been prepared and will be put together with the briefing material for the Director.

This memorandum in general highlights the Options presented in the attached papers. A more detailed analysis should be prepared by the Intelligence Division and existing documents addressing these proposals should be made available for the Director's briefing book for his testimony.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Director respond to questions concerning the attached position papers as set forth above.

Done.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division draft a proposed response concerning the Director's statement made in Montreal relating to the sacrifice of certain individual rights.

Done.

(3) That the Intelligence Division make a detailed review of the various Options set forth in the two attached position papers. (FOR SUBSEQUENT STAFF CONFERENCE AFTER 12/9) Jm

See memo [illegible] File Senstudy 1/19/76

Jm

Ret. from SO 12/12/75 Jm

Issues and Options for Discussion with Former Attorneys General Rogers, Katzenbach, and Clark

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALMKP

I. Background

In the past few weeks the staff has presented the Committee with evidence suggesting the following about the FBI's internal security intelligence program:

A. The program is massive, involving the collection of information on the activities of thousands of innocent, law-abiding American citizens.

B. These individuals were not alleged espionage agents, but citizens who fall within the FBI's vague definitions of "subversion" and "extremism" -- purely homegrown "threats to the national security".

C. That FBI policy on "subversive" and "extremist" investigations was vague and subject to the following abuses:

   1. overbreadth in scope in that groups were investigated whose threats to the national security were tenuous, if not non-existent.

   2. collection of information on the personal life and political views of subjects unrelated to the national security.

   3. the continuance of investigations well after it should have become obvious that there was no legitimate predicate.

D. Particularly invasive collection techniques were used, including electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entries. Although these have been terminated, the predominant and perhaps most insidious continues today through the FBI's huge informant/confidential source network.

E. Information collected in the course of these investigations is disseminated regularly throughout the federal government and to local law enforcement.

F. Until 1971, information collected through these investigations was disseminated as part of the COINTELPRO program to the subjects' friends, relatives, employers, and others in an effort to discredit or "neutralize" alleged "subversives" or "extremists".

62-116395 - 1215X

ENCLOSURE

G. The FBI's internal security intelligence program was used by Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon to serve their political interests, usually by collecting information on critics or political opponents.

H. The program was conceived and implemented in secrecy, and although parts of the program were shared with outside authorities from time to time, until now no President, Attorney General, or Congressional committee has been exposed to the entire program in detail.

I. The program is not authorized by statute but is founded on a series of secret or ambiguous Presidential orders, which in turn are based upon a questionable assertion of "inherent constitutional authority".

J. The program continues today, albeit on a much more limited basis than in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and the basic machinery for the program -- the huge informant/confidential source network -- is still operating.

K. There is no statute or internal Bureau or Justice Department policy prohibiting a new Director, Attorney General, or President from ordering the Bureau to expand the program to its earlier dimensions.

II. Issues and Options

Among the issues and options which might be discussed with former Attorneys General in response to what the Committee has learned are the following:

A. Abolition. Elimination of the FBI internal security intelligence program as Attorney General Harlan Stone ordered in 1924 when confronted with abuses growing out of the FBI's first internal security intelligence program, such as the infamous Palmer raids.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether there are not some functions (e.g., protecting the President, preventing or at least predicting violence by terrorist organizations, or predicting civil disorders) which require intelligence collection.

2. Whether FBI intelligence reports are valuable in that respect, especially in light of a recent GAO report suggesting that such reports are rarely useful in predicting violent activity.

3. Whether such information, assuming it is valuable, could not be obtained through more traditional criminal investigations.

4. Whether the value of the information, marginal or otherwise, justifies the risk to civil liberties inherent in such intelligence collection.

5. Whether, given the way in which limited and ambiguous grants of authority have been expanded into major authorizations, any statute short of a total prohibition of all non-law enforcement intelligence activities in the domestic sector will be adequate to prevent the recurrences of the kinds of abuses uncovered by this Committee. (Or, conversely, whether it is possible to draft a law authorizing a limited civil disturbance and counter-terrorist intelligence mission that will not eventually evolve, like the National Security Act of 1947, into a charter for unanticipated and unwanted covert activities.)

6. Whether it would be sufficient to restrict the FBI to criminal investigations without also (a) placing limits upon the length of investigations, (b) the kinds of information which can be collected and disseminated on the subject irrelevant to the alleged criminal act, (c) the utilization of warrantless electronic surveillance and other particularly invasive collection techniques, and (d) the utilization of a huge informant/confidential source network without judicial or Justice Department supervision.

B. Authorizing Statute. Recognition of the value of internal security intelligence, but placing limits upon the program designed to minimize the infringement upon civil liberties, an option being actively considered by the present Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out under the first option and, in addition:

1. Whether meaningful and stringent guidelines can be written which do not so hamper the administration of an internal security intelligence program as to make the product not just marginal, as GAO suggests, but worthless.*

2. In light of the possibility that the present Attorney General may address this matter via internal Justice Department guidelines, whether this approach does not ignore the legal authority question which can only be resolved by statute.

3. Whether or not Congress could draft a statutory version of the guidelines which could be flexible enough to meet an evolving threat and at the same time place meaningful restrictions upon the program.

4. Even assuming there is no absence of legal authority, is it safe to leave these guidelines in the form of a departmental order which can be rescinded by the next Attorney General?

C. Delegation of Authority to Attorney General. Simply ratifying the present program via enactment of a statutory charter which grants the FBI authority to conduct an internal security intelligence program subject to its own internal guidelines or departmental guidelines as proposed by the Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and:

1. Whether such a statute would not be an unconstitutional delegation of powers to the Executive Branch.

2. Whether enactment of such a statute would not represent a failure by the Congress to confront the issues raised above.

---

*A preliminary staff analysis of the Attorney General's draft guidelines suggests that, despite months of conscientious and painstaking work by a departmental task force, the guidelines are not adequate. This analysis, which will be presented when Attorney General Levi testifies on December 10, indicates that several of the more questionable FBI investigations (e.g., of Dr. King and the women's liberation movement) would still be permissible under these proposed guidelines.

D. Legislative Inaction. Enact no new statute affecting the FBI's legal authority or the internal security intelligence program.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and, in addition:

1. Whether this failure to act might not leave the status of the program in doubt and subject to court challenge.

2. Whether this failure to act after full disclosure by the Bureau might not be taken by the FBI and the courts as a ratification of the program.

E. Administrative Oversight by the Attorney General. The Justice Department should be required to exercise greater administrative oversight over the FBI's internal security intelligence program by Attorney General Levi, regardless of whatever other options Congress accepts.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is practical for the Attorney General or his staff to review thousands of such investigations each year.

2. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should review all or just the so-called "full" investigations.

3. Whether, to facilitate the conduct of such reviews, the Attorney General or his staff should be given "complete" access to Bureau files, including information regarding the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.

4. Whether it is possible to develop a staff of career attorneys within the Department with both the access and independence essential to the conduct of searching reviews.

5. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should not also be required to review various informant and so-called "intensification" programs, and the establishment of specialized indices (which have a significant impact upon which cases are opened) instead of just reviewing individual investigations in a vacuum as provided by the Attorney General's draft guidelines.

F. An Inspector General. In addition to the above options, an independent Inspector General should be created to investigate improprieties by the FBI. This option is advanced by those concerned about the inadequacy of the FBI's investigation of the disappearance of former Director Hoover's personal files, its limited inquiry into the so-called Atlantic City convention case, and the absence of any internal investigation of the abuses in the King case.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to maintain the independence of an Inspector General within the Department of Justice when both the Inspector General and the Director of the FBI will be responsible to the same official, the Attorney General.
2. Whether the Inspector General should have "complete" access to Bureau files, including information pertaining to the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.
3. Whether an Inspector General with access to extremely sensitive information might not become a serious threat to the independence of the Bureau from political influence and to the civil liberties of American citizens.

G. Congressional Oversight. In addition to the above options, the creation of an oversight committee(s) in the Congress, to which the Bureau would be required to report and which would have the power to investigate abuses.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the kinds of problems posed by the Justice Department oversight and Inspector General options discussed above to the independence of the FBI and the confidentiality of its files.

H. Public Reporting and Disclosure to Subjects. In addition to the above options, the requirement that the FBI make frequent public reports on the details of its internal security intelligence programs and policies and reveal the details of improper intelligence investigations to the subjects of those investigations.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to reveal the essence of some programs and policies and the details of some investigations without jeopardizing the effectiveness of legitimate programs.

2. Whether such disclosure might not increase the number of law suits filed against the FBI alleging illegal activities.

DRAFT
MEMORANDUM

December 4, 1975

FBI LEGISLATION - PROPOSED OPTIONS

In preparation for the testimony of FBI Director Kelley and Attorney General Levi on December 9 and 10, the Domestic Intelligence Task Force is pulling together various proposals for legislation dealing with FBI intelligence. This paper sets forth some of the basic options.

A: Current Statutes and Executive Orders

The basic statute governing the FBI is 18 U.S.C. 533, which reads as follows:

> The Attorney General may appoint officials: (1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States, (2) to assist in the protection of the person of the President, and (3) to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General.

Clauses (2) and (3) are a possible statutory basis for intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Under (2), the FBI may "assist" the Secret Service in the protection of the President by providing

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1215X

ENCLOSURE

intelligence on persons or groups who may endanger the President's safety. A formal agreement between the FBI and the Secret Service sets forth the types of intelligence information provided by the Bureau. However, this agreement states that:

> The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction. (Tab A)

Clause (3) recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of Justice." This is a possible statutory basis for at least two broad areas of FBI intelligence investigations -- civil disturbance intelligence and intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program.

The most recent legal advice to the FBI from the Justice Department on the gathering and reporting of data regarding civil disturbances notes that on April 1, 1969, the President designated the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the government's response to civil disturbances. The FBI is instructed to gather and report on "all significant incidents of civil unrest" and on "all disturbances where there are indications that extremist organizations . . . are believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them." The

FBI is specifically advised to make reports "even when no specific violation of federal law is indicated." On the other hand, the FBI is instructed not to report "every relatively insignificant incident of a strictly local nature coming to its attention." (Tab B)

The Justice Department has given the following recent instructions to the FBI regarding intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program. Executive Order 10450, as amended by Executive Order 11785, is interpreted as requiring an FBI investigation of organizations "with a potential" of violating federal or state statutes prohibiting unlawful advocacy of violence or the commission of any unlawful act of violence. The FBI is advised that "it is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order." The FBI is instructed to apply "the same yardstick" to investigations of individuals who are affiliated with such organizations. The FBI is specifically advised that "it is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated." (Tab C)

Clause (3) also recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of State." This is a possible statutory basis for FBI intelligence investigation of foreign intelligence activities within the United States or to

collect positive foreign intelligence. The best example is the Attorney General's authorization of warrantless FBI electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. However, there is apparently no instruction from the Justice Department to the FBI directing the Bureau to initiate investigations of individuals or organizations which have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but about which there is no information indicating intelligence activity. (See Staff Report, "Counterintelligence/Counterespionage: The Law and the Philosophy", October 14, 1975.)

In his testimony before the Committee, Deputy Associate FBI Director James Adams made no reference to clauses (2) and (3) as a possible legal basis for FBI intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Instead, he placed sole reliance on a series of Presidential directives extending from 1936 until the 1960's which the FBI interprets as authorizing it to engage in "domestic security intelligence investigations". The Attorney General has codified these directives in a Justice Department regulation instructing the FBI to:

> Carry out the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15, 1953, designating the [FBI] to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters. 28 C.F.R., Section 0.85(d).

The FBI also cites directives of President Kennedy on June 9, 1962, and Attorney General Kennedy on March 5, 1964, which are the latest charter for the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, composed of the FBI Director and the chiefs of the military intelligence agencies. This group is authorized to coordinate "all investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security." (Tab D)

The theory behind the FBI's position is that the President has inherent constitutional powers, at least in the absence of contrary legislation, to authorize FBI intelligence activities. The only judicial support for this theory is language in the Supreme Court's opinion in the Keith case, which declared warrantless wiretapping of domestic groups unconstitutional.

The Court acknowledged the importance of "national security in its domestic implications . . . especially at a time of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent periods of our history." Under such circumstances, the Court stated, the President has a "fundamental duty" under the Constitution to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." The Court added, "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means." Hence, the Court appeared to

recognize that the President's "domestic security role" has a "constitutional basis"; that the President through the Attorney General may need "to obtain intelligence information about those who plot unlawful acts against the Government"; and that "threats and acts of sabotage against the Government exist in sufficient number to justify investigative powers with respect to them." The Court applied the general principle that "unless the Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered." Nevertheless, the central holding of the Keith decision was that this power may not be exercised in such a way as to infringe constitutional rights. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

Even though the President may have the authority under the Constitution to direct the FBI to conduct intelligence investigations in the absence of legislation, Congress has the ultimate authority to substitute statutory authorization in place of the Presidential directives. As Justice Robert Jackson declared in the Steel Seizure Case, "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . ." 343 U.S. 579, 637.

B. Option One -- Ratifying Existing Powers

The first option for Congress is legislation ratifying the existing authority granted to the FBI by current Presidential directives and orders. Such legislation would be cast in extremely general terms. Its main advantage is that it would provide a basis for Congressional oversight. It could also reinforce the Attorney General's role as the immediate supervisor of FBI intelligence activities. The statute would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to conduct investigations of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities;

2. to gather and report information on civil disturbances;

3. to conduct investigations of other related intelligence matters affecting internal security; and

4. to conduct investigations of official matters relating to the Department of State.

In addition, the statute would require the Attorney General to report annually to the appropriate Congressional committees on the volume and type of investigations and reports, the investigative techniques used, and the policies and procedures adopted by the Justice Department and the FBI.

The weaknesses of this approach are obvious. Congress would have legislated a wholesale delegation of power without

standards or limitations other than the supervision of the Attorney General and oversight by Congress. In view of the Select Committee's findings as to the vast overbreadth of FBI domestic intelligence investigations and the abuses committed in the name of "counterintelligence", Congress would in effect be permitting future expansion of FBI operations to match past policies.

C. Option Two -- A Separate Security Intelligence Agency

Congress might give serious consideration to legislation creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Justice Department. It would perform the functions of the present Counterintelligence Branch of the FBI Intelligence Division, dealing with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence/counterespionage. The FBI itself has considered this option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from the law enforcement functions of the Bureau. (Tab E)

A separate agency would be justified only if it was authorized to conduct investigations of a wider scope and using different techniques than would otherwise be permitted. In other words, Congress could decide that foreign counterintelligence investigations should go beyond investigation of specific crimes, that techniques such as electronic surveillance should be used without a warrant or with a special type of warrant,

and that operations should be conducted to "counter" foreign intelligence activities by means other than arrest or "persona non grata" proceedings. On the other hand, if Congress treats the investigation of foreign intelligence activities the same as a criminal investigation, then the FBI should keep the job.

Any statute in this area must use general language for diplomatic reasons. For example, Congress should not explicitly authorize deception operations or efforts to compromise hostile intelligence officers, even though such techniques may be envisioned. Such techniques are dealt with best by establishing adequate procedures for authorization and oversight to ensure accountability.

The legislation should be more specific where it deals with investigations and other operations directed at American citizens rather than non-resident aliens in the service of a foreign power. If Congress believes Americans should be investigated if they have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but no information indicating intelligence activity yet exists, the legislation should say so.

The statute should also set out standards for determining whether a foreign-dominated domestic organization falls within the jurisdiction of the separate agency. There should at the very least be substantial information indicating that the organization is directed by, subsidized by, or in active

collaboration with a foreign government or organization. (The term "foreign organization" refers, for instance, to a group like the Palestine Liberation Organization.) If the group fits the criteria for foreign domination, there should be an additional finding that it may engage in intelligence activities or in activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law.

If the group meets all these standards, Congress may authorize the investigation of its activities going beyond regular criminal investigations. Such investigations could extend to all individuals who are members of, or express support for, the organization, as well as to the efforts of the organization to influence and control other groups. However, it may be sufficient to authorize only the investigation of active members and supporters. This would prevent a revival of the "Cominfil" policy of looking into all forms of lawful political and social activity where Communists might be involved.

The Petersen Committee report on COINTELPRO considered the need for special supervision of foreign counterintelligence operations in the United States. It recommended the creation of a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Commission to make decisions with regard to the necessity or acceptability of particular foreign counterintelligence techniques. (Tab F) This proposal

has merit in view of the limited amount of time the Attorney General can give to personal supervision and the after-the-fact role of legislative oversight regarding the separate agency.

Finally, legislation to create a separate foreign counterintelligence agency must deal with relationships to the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other foreign intelligence agencies. The current FBI-CIA agreement on their respective jurisdictions is only a "memorandum of understanding". It allows the CIA to undertake certain clandestine activities within the United States, in coordination with the FBI. (Tab G) Proposals are currently circulating in the Executive Branch for a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive to clarify this matter, as well as to regulate CIA electronic surveillance of American citizens abroad. (Tab H)

A full draft of a statutory charter for a separate foreign counterintelligence agency is not included here, since the focus is on domestic intelligence issues. However, one implication of such a statute would be that the remaining FBI functions should relate only to law enforcement and criminal investigations.

D. Option Three -- Elimination of FBI Domestic Intelligence

The basic assumption behind Attorney General Levi's effort to develop "guidelines" for FBI domestic intelligence is that regular criminal investigations are not adequate to

supply the information needed to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law. That assumption should be questioned. Regular criminal investigations are likely to produce a substantial amount of information which can be used to anticipate or prevent future crimes. For example, intensive criminal investigations of Ku Klux Klan violence in the South during the 1960's would have required the FBI to look into a wide variety of Klan activities. Another example is the search for Weatherman fugitives, a regular criminal investigation which involves broad inquiries across the country. The FBI has not yet demonstrated that the preventive information it has obtained came from intelligence investigations which would not have been conducted as regular criminal investigations.

The fact that an FBI investigation was supervised by its Intelligence Division does not necessarily mean that the investigation was, automatically, outside the regular criminal law enforcement jurisdiction of the Bureau. Any FBI investigation of activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law falls within that jurisdiction. Moreover, regular criminal investigations can also extend to plans, attempts, or conspiracies to engage in such activities.

One suggested difference between intelligence-type and regular criminal investigations is that the latter are terminated after a reasonable time, if sufficient evidence to

justify prosecution is not obtained. However, there is no legal reason why the prosecutor cannot request that the investigation continue indefinitely as long as there is information that violent activities and plans for violence are still underway. The degree of evidence needed to justify a prosecution is certainly greater than the degree of evidence needed to justify an investigation.

All this is not to say that no further standards are needed to guide regular criminal investigations when they may touch on sensitive First Amendment or other constitutional interests. This is especially true of criminal investigations of individuals or groups engaged both in lawful political or social activities and in unlawful violence or plans for violence. To what extent is the advocacy of violence a proper basis for initiating an investigation? Should an investigation be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual is a member of, or has expressed public support for, an organization which has as one of its objectives the use of violence? Should an investigation be started on all members and public supporters of an organization, some of whose members have acted in concert to use violence?

These questions are addressed in the draft Attorney General's guidelines for domestic intelligence investigations under the heading "preliminary investigations". (Tab I) Since

the guidelines assume that there should be intelligence investigations, they do not consider whether such investigations might be permitted as regular criminal investigations.

The Klan and Weatherman examples again illustrate the point. Once it has been established that a particular Klan group is engaged in or planning violence, it seems reasonable to conduct at least preliminary inquiries to determine whether the members and supporters of the group are involved in the violence or the plans for violence. Similarly, the search for Weatherman fugitives who committed bombings and other acts of violence would appear reasonably to include preliminary inquiries to determine whether other Weatherman members and supporters have harbored the fugitives.

On the other hand, it would seem unreasonable to investigate members and supporters of all Klan groups across the country on the ground that some Klan groups have used violence. And it appears equally unreasonable to investigate all members and supporters of SDS because the Weatherman faction engaged in violence. The scope of the investigation must be logically related to its specific purpose, and not an excuse for wide-ranging collection of intelligence.

There is one possible exception to the requirement that the FBI only conduct regular criminal investigations. The Attorney General (and the President) do require reports on

major civil disturbances which may not involve violations of federal law. The FBI should be authorized to gather such data and make appropriate reports as part of its law enforcement responsibilities. However, the data and reports should be limited to information provided by local or state law enforcement authorities or obtained in the course of a regular FBI criminal investigation. Where local authorities provide information about individuals and organizations which are not the subject of a regular FBI criminal investigation, the data and reports should not be included in the FBI's general files and name index.

In periods of widespread civil disturbances, the Attorney General may require a more systematic procedure for maintaining and retrieving civil disturbance information. This was the case in 1967, when Attorney General Clark created the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit in the Justice Department. The IDIU stored and indexed civil disturbance reports separately from the FBI. The data was used to help anticipate or ameliorate disorders. IDIU has been abolished, although the basic function of evaluating reports on civil disturbances is still performed by the Justice Department. This function should also be authorized by statute, and the intent of Congress should be that the Attorney General must obtain specific legislative authorization for any future IDIU.

IDIU was not perfect. Under Attorney General John Mitchell it supplied a list of names of American dissidents to the CIA. (Tab J) It also was used in conjunction with grand jury proceedings inquiring into terrorist bombings. Both of these activities should be forbidden by the statute authorizing the Justice Department to evaluate civil disturbance information.

Finally, legislation may be needed to make clear that the FBI is not authorized to conduct investigations of organizations or individuals for the specific purpose of compiling a body of data to be used in connection with name checks under the Federal Employee Security Program. The same principle applies to FBI "assistance" to the Secret Service, under the present FBI-Secret Service agreement.

A statute must also address the FBI's current practice of maintaining an Administrative Index (ADEX) of the prime subjects of current domestic intelligence investigations. The past history of the FBI's Security Index and other target lists (Key Activists, Agitator Index, Key Black Extremists) suggests the need to enact legislation banning the compiling of lists of persons by the FBI, unless such persons have been arrested or convicted for specific crimes and the list is used in connection with the investigation of such crimes.

These proposals to limit the FBI to regular criminal investigations and civil disturbance reporting must be tested against the actual past experience of the Justice Department and the FBI. General instructions from the Department to the Bureau may be overly vague, even within the framework of criminal investigation. Two examples are Attorney General Clark's memorandum on riots in 1967 and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley's memorandum of campus disorders in 1969. (Tab K) The Nation of Islam exchange between the Department and the FBI in 1973-74 is another illustration. (Tab L)

Thus, there is no automatic panacea in restricting the FBI to criminal investigations. The need for careful scrutiny of actual investigative policies and practices by Congress and the Attorney General is just as great as if the FBI were authorized to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. Legislation must focus on procedures for ensuring accountability by regular reports from the Attorney General to the appropriate Congressional committees.

The following are some of the basic elements which should go into a statute embodying this option. It would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to investigate violations of federal criminal laws, provided that the scope and duration of the investigation are logically related to its specific purpose;

2. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law;

3. to seek legal advice from the Attorney General or his designee whenever a proposed action may be perceived, with reason, to unfairly affect the rights of citizens, provided that this responsibility to seek legal advice is the duty of both the FBI as an institution and FBI agents as individuals;

4. to collect information from state and local law enforcement agencies regarding major civil disturbances, provided that such information is not entered into the FBI general files and name index;

5. to disseminate information obtained from criminal investigations for the following purposes, under regulations promulgated by the Attorney General and published in the Federal Register:

a. prosecution of violations of criminal laws;

b. prevention or anticipation of violations of criminal laws;

c. assistance to the Secret Service in the performance of its protective responsibilities;

d. determination of the suitability of individuals for employment by the federal government;

6. to report civil disturbance information obtained from state and local law enforcement agencies to the Attorney General for the purpose of determining the need to use federal military force under 10 U.S.C. 331 et seq.;

7. to compile such lists of persons arrested or convicted for specific crimes as may be necessary for use in connection with the investigation of such crimes;

8. to provide to the Attorney General or his designee full access to any information in the possession of the FBI which he may deem necessary for the performance of his responsibilities to supervise FBI activities and to submit reports to appropriate Congressional committees on FBI activities;

9. to follow such other procedures and standards consistent with this statute which the Attorney General may prescribe, provided that such procedures and standards shall be published in the Federal Register or, if publication would substantially interfere with the conduct of investigations, reported to appropriate Congressional committees.

E. Option Four -- Setting Standards for Domestic Intelligence

The FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only if Congress finds (1) that regular criminal investigations as described above would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law, and (2) that the incidents of the use of violence in violations of federal law are so numerous and so serious as to constitute a significant threat to the internal security or domestic tranquility of the United States.

The fact that there are individuals and groups who engage in violence, advocate violence, or believe in the desirability of the ultimate use of violence to advance their political or social objectives is not enough to justify FBI domestic intelligence authority. There must be additional findings that regular criminal investigations are inadequate and that the overall threat of violence constitutes a serious danger to the country.

Furthermore, if FBI domestic intelligence is authorized by statute, it should be an annual authorization which must be renewed each year upon reconsideration by Congress and the Attorney General of these factors. Past experience indicates that the annual appropriations process does not provide an appropriate forum for considering the FBI's basic authority.

Attorney General Levi's draft guidelines provide a basis for the consideration of a domestic intelligence authorization. They do not cover the investigation of foreign-related activities which may be directed by, subsidized by, or otherwise conducted in active collaboration with a foreign government, a foreign organization, or their agents. (See Option Two above.)

The guidelines deal with five different types of threats of violence which may constitute serious dangers to the country:

1. overthrow of the government (revolutionary violence);
2. interference in the U. S. with the activities of a foreign government (bombing a consulate, attempting to assassinate a visiting foreign leader);
3. interference with the functioning of the government or the flow of interstate commerce to influence federal policies (violent protest activities, terrorist bombings);
4. deprivation of civil rights (Klan violence, violent protest against busing);
5. incitement of violence which may require the use of federal military force (riots, major civil disturbances accompanying protest demonstrations).

The guidelines also refer to violence directed at state governments, either overthrow of a state government or interference with the functioning of a state government.

Authorizing legislation should indicate whether domestic intelligence is necessary for any or all of these specific problems. For example, revolutionary violence in an attempt to overthrow the government may be a remote and speculative danger, while terrorist bombings may be substantially interfering with the functioning of the government. Klan violence was unquestionably a serious danger to civil rights in the early and mid-1960's, but is it so today? Major riots and civil disturbances were equally serious in the late 1960's and early 1970's, but not in more recent years. Violent interference with the functioning of a state government should, under our federal system, normally be dealt with by state and local law enforcement.

Therefore, the definition of the purpose of FBI domestic intelligence can be simplified. The Attorney General's draft guidelines might be revised to authorize FBI domestic intelligence investigations:

1. to ascertain facts or information which serves to anticipate and prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law intended to

   a. interfere, in the United States, with the activities of a foreign government or its authorized representatives; and

b. interfere with the functioning of the government of the United States or the free flow of interstate commerce in order to influence policies or decisions of the federal government.

This formulation concentrates on the most likely current serious danger to the country, namely, politically motivated terrorist violence. FBI Director Kelley's recent public statements have stressed the increase in terrorist activity from 24 bombings in 1973 to 45 terrorist bombings in 1974 and 46 such bombings in the first six months of 1975.

However, this increasing threat is not the only factor to be considered. In the course of the FBI's regular criminal investigations of these bombings and other incidents of terrorist violence, can it obtain as a by-product substantial information which may serve to anticipate and prevent future violence? If so, the need for broader intelligence-type investigations is less evident.

The draft guidelines provide that the FBI would conduct full-scale intelligence investigations on the basis of "specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion" that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, may be engaged in activities which may involve the use of violence in violations of federal law. The two "mays" render the requirement of "specific and articulable facts" almost meaningless. Therefore, any legislation should authorize the FBI:

2. to conduct full domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above.

The draft guidelines also discuss the surveillance techniques to be used in full domestic intelligence investigations, including informants, mail covers, and electronic surveillance. The guidelines note that additional techniques may need to be covered, such as inquiries made under "pretext", photographic surveillance, "trash covers", etc. However, the legislation may deal with techniques more generally by providing that the FBI is authorized:

3. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law.

More detailed regulation of investigative techniques for full investigations will be considered elsewhere.

The scope of domestic intelligence investigations under the draft guidelines is broadened considerably under the provision for "preliminary investigations". They can be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have advocated activities which may involve violence, or are members of, or

have expressed public support for, an organization which has as its objective activities which may involve violence. The purpose of the preliminary investigation is to verify or refute the allegations or information. However, the vagueness of the standard is obvious. Therefore, to be consistent with the criteria for full investigations, the FBI should be authorized:

4. to conduct preliminary domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert,

a. advocate the use of violence as described in 1 above;

b. are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above;

c. are members of or have expressed public support for an organization engaged in activities which involve, or are likely to involve, the use of violence as described in 1 above, provided that other members of the organization are currently the subject of a full domestic intelligence investigation or a regular criminal investigation.

Unless these changes are made in the guidelines, they would permit investigations similar to past investigations which have been seriously criticized. For instance, they would allow investigations of all SDS members or all Black Student Union leaders on the ground that their activities may involve violence,

even though there is no specific allegation of likely involvement in violence.

Another reason for the revision is to exclude those investigations which would be justified as regular criminal investigations. Thus, allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have engaged in or plan to engage in activities which involve the use of violence would fall within the FBI's regular criminal investigative jurisdiction. Intelligence investigations would extend further at the preliminary stage to cover advocacy of violence and membership in or public support for organizations involved in or likely to be involved in violence. Full investigations require a likelihood of violence, short of actual violence or plans for violence.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE;
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TESTIMONY,
DECEMBER 10, 1975

At 3:01 p.m. on December 5, 1975, Mark Wolf of the Attorney General's staff, called me at the instructions of the Attorney General and advised that the Attorney General requested:

(1) FBI manual sections on domestic intelligence investigations;

(2) A listing identifying all individuals and organizations now the subjects of FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

Modified by call to AG

Wolf said that the Attorney General is currently en route to Chicago and will return to Washington on Sunday evening. Therefore, the requested materials should be delivered to the Attorney General no later than Monday morning, December 8, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division prepare an appropriate response to the Attorney General's instructions in time for delivery by 9:00 a.m. on December 8, 1975.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

EX-112

REC-962 - 116395 - 1215

WRW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

15 DEC 17 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

84 DEC 31 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (SC) 62-7721

May 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: NATIONALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO
INTERNAL SECURITY - PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST

We presently maintain an authorized technical surveillance at the residence of Rosa Collazo and her daughter, Lydia Collazo Turner, 1755 Anthony Avenue, Bronx, New York. This surveillance was originally installed on April 13, 1962.

Rosa Collazo is the wife of Oscar Collazo who is serving a life sentence in connection with the killing of a White House guard during an attempt to assassinate former President Truman on November 1, 1950. Both Rosa and her daughter are active in the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico in New York City. During the past six months, this surveillance has continued to furnish valuable information regarding activities of Puerto Rican independence advocates in New York. Through this surveillance, we have obtained information concerning the movement of Puerto Rican nationalists between New York and Puerto Rico. Included in this information was advance notice that Rosa Collazo planned to attend the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico during February, 1966, in Puerto Rico. Upon her return, details were obtained concerning the proceedings of the General Assembly. In addition, we were able to obtain advance notice of demonstrations in New York City in which nationalists participated. This enabled us to inform police authorities and interested Government agencies in advance of the demonstrations.

Unless you instruct to the contrary, this technical surveillance will be continued for an additional six months.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: DOMINICAN SITUATION
INTERNAL SECURITY -
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Diego Emilio Bordas Hernandez and his brother, Luis Manuel Alfredo Bordas, have emerged in the current Dominican crisis as important financial, political and military advisors to the deposed Dominican President Juan Bosch in the latter's efforts to regain control of the Dominican Government. Diego Bordas is a wealthy shipping executive currently residing in exile in San Juan, Puerto Rico, having been born in the Dominican Republic on January 11, 1923. He served in various high posts under Juan Bosch during the latter's short occupancy of the position of President of the Dominican Republic in early 1963. Bordas spends much of his time at 868 Ashford Avenue in San Juan, using an apartment at that address as his residence during the absence of its owner, Jose Antonio Benitez Jiminez, from Puerto Rico. Jose Benitez is the cousin of Jaime Benitez, the latter the Director of the University of Puerto Rico and a close associate and advisor of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas also maintains a residence at 21 V, Florencia, Pueblo Viego, a suburb of San Juan, near the current residence and headquarters of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas and his brother jointly operate a shipping business known as Bordas and Company at Highway Number 2, Puerto Viejo, Puerto Rico, and his financial dealings in support of the Bosch efforts can reasonably be expected to be conducted from this commercial establishment.

The Bordas brothers have both been the subjects of numerous allegations indicating their cooperation with procommunist and pro-Trujillo factions in Dominican politics and are apparently opportunists who have seized the current situation to enhance their political and financial futures. Luis Bordas is currently in the Dominican Republic acting as the Director of Military Operations of the rebel forces supporting Bosch.

~~SECRET~~

109-12-211-4423

REC 4

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

4 JUN 15 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Luis Bordas is reportedly the Honorary Nicaraguan Consul in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and, as a result, Department of State clearance for technical coverage of the business he operates jointly with Diego Bordas was obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on June 1, 1965.

In view of the pressing nature of the international situation as it relates to the Dominican Republic, it is requested that you authorize technical coverage of the residences of Diego Bordas mentioned above and of the business address of the joint venture operated by the Bordas brothers. Authority is requested for similar coverage of any addresses to which the mentioned residences or business may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NK

DATE 6/4/65

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

December 19, 1975

1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 2 in that letter.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a copy of the document in response to Item 2 which is being delivered to the SSC.

Delivered to Committee
to Shaheen office 12/22/75

Enclosures (2) ST 115 REC-51

62-116395-1214X

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

7 JAN 22 1976

PEN:adn
(9)

6-ENCLOSURE

NOTE:

A copy of the SSC letter 12/4/75, is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copy of the memorandum being furnished is maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the document being provided to the SSC. As indicated in the enclosed memorandum, Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled separately. Items 1 and 3 requested in referenced SSC letter are being handled by the IS-3 and CI-3 Sections respectively. Item 4, a restatement of prior request submitted by the SSC is being handled separately by SA V. R. Thornton of the IS-1 Section.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JBH PEN WRW JPT WOC

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

62-116395

December 19, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of a copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, at the White House, Washington, D. C., dated October 27, 1964.

It is noted that in addition to requesting a copy of this letter the SSC requested materials reflecting this letter was hand-delivered to the White House by Mr. DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Attention is drawn to the upper right-hand corner of Mr. Hoover's letter to Mr. Moyers and to the notation appearing there reading "personally delivered 10/28/64, D." No additional materials are available in FBIHQ files reflecting delivery of this letter beyond the aforementioned notation which, it appears, bears the initial of Mr. DeLoach.

Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled in separate responses.

1 - The Attorney General

PEN:adn adn
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

62-116395-1214X38

WOP PEN

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 8, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee request seeking delivery of certain Bureau materials. Please prepare an appropriate response.

I invite your attention to paragraph numbered 4 which amends an earlier request of the Committee (Elliff letter of November 25, 1975, Item 6c) which request was the subject of a telephone conversation on December 3, with Mr. Seymor Phillips of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1-Ad Hoc
12-10-75

ENCLOSURE

62-116395 — 1214X

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, AR
CHARLES MC C. MATHIA , MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 4, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Dear Mike:

The Senate Select Committee requests the following materials for delivery.

1. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the recommendation for, authorization of, and duration and termination of the electronic surveillance referred to in Items 1 and 22 of my letter of November 21, 1975 and in materials delivered to the Committee on December 1, 1975.

[illegible]

2. Delivery of a copy of the letter to Mr. Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated October 27, 1964, and materials reflecting that this letter was hand delivered by Mr. Cartha DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Nugent

3. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the surveillances of Mrs. Anna Chennault in October and November, 1968.

Hamilton

4. The Committee's request in my letter of November 27, 1975, item 6c should be revised to read as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memornadum, including a summary of the ~~recommendations~~ of relevant Bureau personnel pertaining thereto."

Nugent

RECEIVED
DEC 4 1975

JTE

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

62-116395-1214X

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/19/75

Caption of Document:
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
12/4/75 request - Martin L. King.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 12/23/75

Received by:

Title: Research Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116- - 1214X

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/4/75, item 2

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr.: Copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers 10/27/64 along with notation that shows letter was hand delivered by Mr. DeLoach 10/28/64.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-9

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395 — 1214X

186-10051

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER 12-4-75

ITEM 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Retain

62-116395-1214X

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

#MDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/31/00

October 27, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

Honorable William D. Moyers
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Moyers:

A confidential source of this Bureau who has supplied reliable information in the past furnished the following information concerning a contact on October 23, 1964, between Martin Wigington and Randolph Blackwell. Wigington was described as a member of the Democratic Party Correlation Committee, Austin, Texas. Blackwell is an assistant to Martin Luther King, Jr., at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Georgia.

Wigington indicated to Blackwell a desire for King to write "an anti-Goldwater letter" which Wigington's Committee intends to distribute in Texas among labor groups. Blackwell stated that King may go to Texas prior to the forthcoming presidential election and Blackwell inquired as to whether King would be "in any danger." Wigington stated that he would contact one Larry Goodman concerning any possible danger to King in Texas. This Bureau's source had no information concerning the identity of Goodman.

During this contact Wigington complained to Blackwell that a group from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which Conference is headed by King, and a group from the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America had picketed in Fort Worth, Texas. Wigington stated that this was not a good thing at this time since all Negro and labor organizations should be working for the election of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

This information is also being furnished to officials in the Department of Justice.

Sincerely yours,

REC 14

100-106670 (King)
1-100-442529 (CIRM)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

SFP:kmj
(12)

ST-101

NOV 2 1964

~~SECRET~~
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NOV 4 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OCT 27 11 17 AM '64
READING ROOM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Honorable William D. Moyers

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" as information reported is from AT 1380-S*, a highly sensitive source with respect to the racial situation. This source is of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of this information could compromise its effectiveness and thus be detrimental to the national defense. Information obtained from Atlanta teletype 10/23/64.

1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs.
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Encs.
1 - Mr. Gallagher - Encs.
1 - Mr. McDermott - Encs.

December 3, 1975

1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Encs.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs.

5
100

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On November 21, 1975 Inspector John B. Hotis of this Bureau met with Doug Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General; and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, concerning your forthcoming appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. At this meeting this Bureau was requested to provide write-ups on certain phases of this Bureau's operations which are to be used in the preparation of a briefing book for your testimony.

Attached are the following individual write-ups as requested on November 21, 1975: "Investigative Techniques"; "Organizational Structure and Functions of the FBI"; "Allegation of Misconduct Involving Special Agent in Charge, Miami Office"; "Director Hoover's 'Official and Confidential' (OC) Files"; "Allegations of Possible Misconduct by FBI Agents, Houston, Texas"; "Allegations of Personal and Official Misconduct of a Former Special Agent in Charge of the Baltimore Office"; "Allegation of Bribery by FBI Agent, New York"; "Allegation of Possible Misconduct by an FBI Agent, Detroit, Michigan"; "Allegations of Misconduct by FBI Agents, Richmond, Virginia, Field Office, in Connection with the Investigation of Illegal Wiretapping by the Richmond, Virginia, Police Department"; "Allegations of Violations of Gun Control Act by FBI Agent"; "Review of Appropriations Testimony for Fiscal Years 1955 thru 1976"; "Tenure of FBI Director"; "Transfer of Drug Enforcement Responsibilities to the FBI"; "Office of Special Review, Department of Justice"; and "Major Topics of Primary Concern to Congressional Committees."

Delivered to Mark Wolf's office 12-5-75

REC-9 62-116395-1212

With respect to the material requested by memorandum of Mark L. Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,

DEC 29 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PVD:dkg (13)

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2
62-116895 5-WO

84 DEC 31 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

to Inspector John B. Hotis of this office dated November 26, 1975, which requested additional information, we are gathering the necessary material on an expeditious basis and the results will be furnished as soon as possible.

Enclosures (15)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. - Enclosures (15)
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

NOTE: See Legal Counsel Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11-24-75, captioned "Testimony By The Attorney General Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." On 12-1-75 Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, requested the attached information be furnished as soon as possible. No later than 12-2-75. This response was coordinated and incorporates material prepared by the Inspection, Special Investigative, General Investigative, Files and Communications, and Intelligence Divisions. Due to the time constraints we are furnishing interim response. As completed additional material will be furnished to the Department.

2 - Mr J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
January 14, 1976
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

The Attorney General

Director, FBI 62-116395-1210X1

EX-110

REC-60

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letters dated December 4, 1975, and November 25, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 4 in the December 4, 1975, request and Items 7c and 8c of the November 25, 1975, request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with the material which is being furnished to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

VRT:adn
(9)

NOTE:

Copies of SSC letters 11/25/75 and 12/4/75 are attached to the file copy of enclosed LHM. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as documents being provided to the SSC. Copies of material being furnished to SSC being retained with Senstudy 75 Project.

Delivered to Dept. 1-15-76

Delivered to Committee 1-15-76.

JAN 14 3 03 PM '76

ENCLOSURE

WRW

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 9 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 (1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

January 14, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, Item 4 of which requests materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.; and SSC letter dated November 25, 1975, Items 7c and 8c of which request materials concerning the Washington Spring Project and Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of materials in response to referenced requests.

In respect to Item 4 of the December 4, 1975, request, the only indication of any action taken concerning the recommendation contained in the pertinent memorandum dated March 29, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/3/68," appearing on page one and initials which are believed to be those of former Special Agent (SA) Harold P. Leinbaugh. Among the documents being furnished the SSC is a memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned, "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.," along with supporting documents, which were submitted to the Attorney General concerning background leading up to the proposed action recommended in the March 29, 1968, memorandum. It includes results of an interview of Leinbaugh.

In response to Item 7c, the only indication of any action taken concerning the suggestion (recommendation) contained in the memorandum dated March 26, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/4/68," appearing on page two of that memorandum and initials which are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

JBA Pvr JAM

VRT:adn
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

Woc

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1210X

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

With respect to Item 8c which concerns a memorandum dated March 28, 1968, captioned, "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," the only indication of action taken concerning the recommendation contained therein is a pencilled notation appearing on page one, "Handled 3/28/68," and initials which again are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/lg

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/14/76

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
12/4/75 request Item 4
11/25/75 request Items 7c and 8C

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 1/15/76

Received by: Florence Thoben

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1210X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
1/14/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/4/75, Item 4 and SSC letter 11/25/75, Items 7c and 8c

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating Procedures
Information Handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Delivery of materials regarding Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Washington Spring Project and the Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

62-116395

AJD:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 2-116395- 1210X

186-10019

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 12-4-75
ITEM 4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KSP

Retain

62-116[illegible]5-1210X

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY 5I6ALMKP

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

EX-102

REC-20

TJD:ted
(7)

TAO

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

22 APR 11 1968

GK 93

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5-TAO

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-448006—93

ENCLOSURE

1 - J. B. Adams
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - D. Ryan
1 - J. G. Deegan

REC-88

Ini. 100-106670-3965

July 18, 1975

1 - H. A. Newman

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

The following information is submitted regarding the background leading up to the proposed action recommended in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence, (Martin Luther King)." (copy attached)

This memorandum recommended that information be furnished to a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showing King as a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on March 28, 1968, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel).

A notation on the above referred to memorandum indicated that the recommendation was "handled" on April 3, 1968, by Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh of the Crime Records Division. (see notation on memorandum dated March 29, 1968, attached)

By way of background it should be noted that at about 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968, while standing on second floor balcony outside room 306 of the Hotel Lorraine, Memphis, Tennessee, King was shot and killed.

Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, reflects that King and other Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) officials were due to arrive in Memphis at 10:15 a.m. on April 3, 1968, via Eastern Airlines from Atlanta. (copy of Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, attached)

After King's death, an interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy, a close associate of King, reflected that he and King registered into the Hotel Lorraine in Memphis,

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

cah
HAN:cah (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

copy to CRO & CRM DIV 12/1/75 by MEMO cap MARTIN LUTHER KING JR

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 AUG 5 1975

Tennessee, at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968. (Information contained in report of SA Joe C. Hester dated April 17, 1968, Memphis, captioned "UNSUB, aka, Eric Starvo Galt, et al., Civil Rights" page 48. See attached FD-302 reflecting interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy).

For further background regarding the basis of this proposal Atlanta teletype dated March 28, 1968, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C" with second caption "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that on March 28, 1968, King and other SCLC people were in room 801, Holiday Inn, Memphis, Tennessee, at 4:30 p.m. (copy of Atlanta teletype attached)

A Memphis teletype dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that King participated in the march of sanitation workers on March 28, 1968. When violence erupted including the breaking of windows and looting by the marchers, King and a few associates ran to a nearby car and left the march proceeding to Rivermont Motel where they remained through the afternoon and evening. (copy of Memphis teletype attached)

On July 17, 1975, Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh, after having had all the facts set out above reviewed with him including the fact his notation of "handled" appeared on the March 29, 1968, memorandum, advised that he has absolutely no recollection of this memorandum and can unhesitantly state that he cannot now recall whether or not proposed information was ever disseminated to any news media source. He indicated that his notation "handled" would not necessarily mean that he did disseminate this information. In explaining this he stated that the notation could mean that he was merely clearing this document through Crime Records Division and at this late date there would be absolutely no way that he could make any positive statements as to whether or not the information recommended was ever disseminated to a news media source.

7/17

From the above recorded sequence of events as reflected in various communications identified above, it is evident that King returned to Memphis, Tennessee, from Atlanta

on April 3, 1968, and checked into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. The notation indicating that the proposed furnishing of information to the news media was "handled" on April 3, 1968, would, of course, preclude any such information from appearing in the press prior to King's checking into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968.

A review of appropriate files maintained at FBI Headquarters fails to reflect any newspaper article which could have been an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in the G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968.

A review of the "Memphis Commercial Appeal" for the period March 28 to April 4, 1968, maintained on microfilm in the Library of Congress failed to reflect any article which would appear to be an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968. References were noted indicating that King held a press conference at the Holiday Inn Rivermont Motel on March 29, 1968.

7/17

Enclosures (5)

NOTE:

See memorandum J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 7/18/75, captioned as above, prepared by HAN/cah.

Memorandum

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

OM : G. C. Moore

Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

BJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

TJD:ted
(7)
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC-20

22 APR 11 1968

Deakin

Handled 4/3/68

100-448006-93

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2AIMKP

100-[illegible]-93

ENCLOSURE

Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

430PM URGENT 4-2-68 SAB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS 157-1092 3P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KT

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENN., ~~RM~~ RACIAL MATTER

ON APRIL TWO, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, MEMPHIS ~~PD~~ Police Department, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, ADVISED THAT THE FUNERAL OF LARRY PAYNE, SEVENTEEN YEAR OLD NEGRO WHO WAS SHOT BY MEMPHIS PD OFFICER AFTER STORE LOOTING GROWING OUT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT RACIAL DISTURBANCE, MEMPHIS, WAS HELD, WITHOUT INCIDENT, AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, MEMPHIS. ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED IN ATTENDANCE DESPITE FACT CHURCH CAN SEAT TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED. BODY INTERRED IMMEDIATELY AFTER FUNERAL. ARKIN ADVISED THAT ANOTHER SANITATION WORKERS SYMPATHY MARCH IS SCHEDULED FOR DOWNTOWN MEMPHIS AFTERNOON OF APRIL TWO.

100-106670-

NOT RECORDED
183 APR 9 1968

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED ON APRIL TWO THAT REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) AIDES RALPH D. ABERNATHY, BERNARD LEE, AND ANDREW M. YOUNG DUE TO ARRIVE MEMPHIS TEN FIFTEEN A.M., APRIL THREE, FROM ATLANTA.

END PAGE ONE

Albert C. Hayden

APR 5 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Included -- letter to White House and Attorney General. Date 4/4/68

ON APRIL TWO A SOURCE ADVISED THAT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, APRIL TWO, REV. JESSE JACKSON OF SCLC'S "OPERATION BREAD BASKET," REV. S. B. KYLES OF METROPOLITAN BAPTIST CHURCH, MEMPHIS, AND REV. EDWARD L. BROWN, MT. PISGAH CME CHURCH, ADVISED THAT WITH SCLC PERSONNEL IN MEMPHIS THAT NIGHTLY MASS STRIKE SUPPORT MEETINGS WILL BE RESUMED, THE FIRST AT MASON TEMPLE ON NIGHT OF APRIL THREE WITH KING AS FEATURED SPEAKER. THEY SAID MASS MARCH WILL BE HELD FRIDAY, APRIL FIVE, AND THAT THEY WILL HAVE SCHOOL CHILDREN PARTICIPATE SINCE MARCHING WITH "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE GREATEST LIVING AMERICAN," WOULD BE MORE EDUCATIONAL THAN BEING IN SCHOOL. WHEN ASKED BY PRESS IF KING WOULD PERSONALLY MARCH, JACKSON SAID KING MIGHT NOT MARCH. HE DID NOT ELABORATE. WHEN ASKED IF SCLC GROUP WOULD VIOLATE A POSSIBLE INJUNCTION AGAINST THEIR MARCHING, JACKSON SAID "THE WHITE MAN HAS ALREADY ENJOINED THE BLACK MAN TO THE GHETTO AND THE WHITE MAN DOESN'T NEED TO VALIDATE IT BY SENDING US A PIECE OF PAPER." KYLES SAID THE PROBLEM FACING MEMPHIS IS NOT MILITANT BLACK YOUTH BUT IS "WHITE RACISM." JACKSON DESCRIBED OPERATION BREAD BASKET AS MASSIVE

END PAGE TWO

DRIVE TO FORCE ALL GROCERS IN NEGRO AREA TO CEASE SELLING HART'S BREAD, WONDER BREAD, COCA COLA, AND SEALTEST DAIRY PRODUCTS AS THESE FIRMS DO NOT HIRE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF NEGROES.

ON APRIL TWO LT. ARKIN ADVISED THAT MEMPHIS CITY OFFICIALS ARE CONSIDERING SEEKING A COURT INJUNCTION PROHIBITING ANY MASS MARCH LED BY KING OR AN INJUNCTION SPECIFYING CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A MARCH COULD TAKE PLACE AND ALSO CONSIDERING RESUMPTION OF A CURFEW AND PLACING STRIKE SUPPORT LEADERS UNDER A PEACE AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY BOND.

ARKIN ADVISED THAT REMAINDER OF TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARD, WITH EXCEPTION OF ONE BATTERY CONSISTING OF TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY THREE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE MEMPHIS GUARD UNIT, HAVE LEFT MEMPHIS.

AT THREE ZERO FIVE PM, SIXTY SANITATION WORKERS AND SYMPATHIZERS DEPARTED CLAYBORN TEMPLE CARRYING PLACARDS FOLLOWING THEIR USUAL PARADE MARCH TO BEALE STREET NORTH ON MAIN TO CITY HALL. NO INCIDENTS REPORTED.

memo
~~LHM~~ FOLLOWS. P. END.

CAL

FBI WASH DC

F

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ralph B

Date April 8, 1968

Reverend RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, 690 La Verne Drive, N. W., Atlanta, Georgia, was interviewed at the Memphis Police Department at 10:55 p.m., April 4, 1968. Reverend ABERNATHY was advised of the Agent's identity and of the nature of the matter under investigation.

Reverend ABERNATHY, who described himself as Vice President at Large and Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, stated he was Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.'s closest associate and stated that he and Dr. KING always shared a room whenever they travelled together. He stated that at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968, he and Dr. KING registered at the Lorraine Motel, Memphis, Tennessee.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that on April 4, 1968, he and Dr. KING did not leave the motel and spent most of the day in their room, #306, which is located on the second floor of the motel. He stated that he and Dr. KING had been gone from their room for approximately one hour or less when they returned to the room at about 5:30 p.m. He said they got dressed as they were going to dinner at the home of Reverend BILLY KYLE and that at almost exactly 6 p.m. they started to leave the room. Reverend ABERNATHY stopped for a moment and Dr. KING walked out onto the balcony just outside the door to his room. Reverend ABERNATHY was still inside the motel room but could hear Dr. KING discussing the dinner engagement with other associates who Reverend ABERNATHY believes were standing in the parking area of the motel underneath and to the front of the balcony on which Dr. KING was standing.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated he heard what sounded like a firecracker and then heard the screams of persons to whom Dr. KING had been talking. Reverend ABERNATHY went then to the balcony and discovered Dr. KING lying there wounded in the right side of the face and neck. He said he believed Dr. KING attempted to speak to him but was unable to do so. Reverend ABERNATHY said he instructed someone to call an ambulance and then accompanied Dr. KING in the ambulance to the hospital where Dr. KING subsequently died.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 4/4/68 at Memphis, Tennessee File # Memphis 44-1987

by SA JOE C. HESTER: bn Date dictated 4/8/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that judging from the sound of the noise it appeared that the shot came from directly in front of the door and not from any great distance. He stated he did not observe anything that would indicate who fired the shot. Reverend ABERNATHY also stated that while they were in the motel room Dr. KING did not, to his knowledge, receive any telephone calls of a threatening nature or calls from persons who would not identify themselves. Reverend ABERNATHY said Dr. KING had not feared that any particular persons might harm him and Reverend ABERNATHY was unable to suggest any suspects or to provide any other information which might assist in identifying Dr. KING's killer.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

11:17PM URGENT 3-28-68 ARK

TO DIRECTOR (100-106670) AND MEMPHIS

FROM ATLANTA (100-5586)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM-C.

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE. RM.

IN FORMANT

AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT FOUR THIRTY PM MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

INFORMANT'S INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM DISCUSSION SHORTLY BEFORE WITH HOSEA WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, SCLC, CURRENTLY IN ATLANTA, WHO DURING LATE AFTERNOON MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, CONFERRED TELEPHONICALLY WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., PRESIDENT, SCLC; RALPH D. ABERNATHY, VICE PRESIDENT AND TEASURER, SCLC; AND BERNARD LEE, SPECIAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, SCLC.

KING, ABERNATHY, AND LEE ARE CURRENTLY IN ROOM EIGHT ZERO ONE, HOLIDAY INN, MEMPHIS.

WITH REFERENCE TO RACIAL DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, KING IS EXTREMELY DEJECTED. HE AND ABERNATHY STRONGLY FEEL DISTURBANCE ON THIS DATE DELIBERATELY PLANNED

EX-115 REC-9 100-106670-3278

XEROX 1968

APR 5 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

BY NEGROES WHO ARE NEITHER SYMPATHETIC TO KING OR SCLC. IDENTITY OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS NOT KNOWN.

ABERNATHY, LEE AND WILLIAMS ARE GREATLY CONCERNED FOR WELFARE OF KING, PARTICULARLY ON NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, WHEN HE EXPECTS TO PARTICIPATE IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION WITH SANITATION WORKERS. AT PRESENT TIME KING DOES NOT FEEL HE SHOULD LEAVE MEMPHIS. DURATION OF STAY AND FURTHER DETAILS IN THIS CONNECTION NOT KNOWN.

ACCORDING TO WILLIAMS, HE, ABERNATHY, AND LEE STRONGLY FEEL SAME ELEMENTS WHICH CAUSED DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS EARLIER MARCH TWENTYEIGHT MAY CAUSE PERSONAL HARM TO KING EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

/ N Fo. 2 [illegible]

INFORMATION FROM AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R MUST BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. MEMPHIS, HOWEVER, SHOULD ADVISE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF NOT ALREADY KNOWN THAT KING CONTEMPLATES PARTICIPATING IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT AND THAT IN VIEW OF EARLIER DISTURBANCES IN MEMPHIS ON THIS DATE, SEVERAL RANKING SCLC OFFICIALS APPREHENSIVE FOR PERSONAL WELFARE OF KING.

PAGE THREE

FOREGOING INFORMATION TELEPHONICALLY FURNISHED MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

RECEIVED: 11:39PM RM

FBI WASH DC

Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI MEMPHIS

1256AM URGXENT 3-29-68 DGB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS (157-1094)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, ~~RM.~~ Racial Matter

6

RE MEMPHIS TELS, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT ACTIVITIES;

ON MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, MEMPHIS POLICE DEPT., ADVISED THAT THE MASS MARCH TO BE LED BY REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IN SUPPORT OF SANITATION WORKERS STARTED AT AROUND ELEVEN AM CST WITH ESTIMATED FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND WORKERS, MANY OF WHOM WERE NEGRO TEENAGERS. MARCH STARTED AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, LOCATED HEART OF NEGRO AREA, AND KING JOINED MARCH AFTER IT PROGRESSED ONE BLOCK. HE WALKED WITH MARCHERS TO VICINITY BEALE AND MAIN STREETS, MADE NO SPEECHES PRIOR TO MARCH, MADE NO KNOWN UTTERANCES DURING MARCH, AND BY TIME HE REACHED ABOVE POINT RAMPANT BREAKING OF STORE WINDOWS AND LOOTING WAS BEING PERPETRATED BY MARCHERS, WHEREUPON KING AND A FEW ASSOCIATES RAN TO A NEARBY CAR AND LEFT MARCH, PROCEED TO RIVERMONT MOTEL WHERE THEY REMAINED THROUGH AFTERNOON AND EVENING. BY NOON, POLICE HAD BROKEN UP CROWD, BEING FORCED TO USE TEARGAS, BUT SPORADIC LOOTING HAS CONTINUED THROUGH AFTERNOON

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1cc 110

1cc

Included in letter to White House
and Attorney General. Date [illegible]

NOT RECORDED
162 APR 4 1968

70 APR 1 1968

PAGE TWO

AND EVENING, PRIMARILY CONFINED TO SOUTH CENTRAL AREA OF MEMPHIS, A PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO AREA, PRIMARY TARGET OF LOOTERS BEING LIQUOR STORES AND SMALL GROCERIES.

TENNESSEE STATE LEGISLATURE TODAY PASSED CURFEW BILL, WHICH WAS INVOKED BY MEMPHIS MAYOR HENRY LOEB, EFFECTIVE SEVEN PM, AND THIRTY FIVE HUNDRED TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARDSMEN FROM MEMPHIS AND WEST TENNESSEE ARE CURRENTLY ON DUTY IN MEMPHIS OPERATING AS TACTICAL UNITS, BEING ACCOMPANIED ON THEIR PATROLS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMPHIS PD.

SCHEDULED MASS RALLY TO FEATURE KING NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT CANCELED. AT TWELVE MIDNIGHT, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, THREE HUNDRED ARRESTS, PRIMARILY RELATING TO LOOTING AND CURFEW VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY POLICE DEPT. FOUR INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN SHOT, ONE OF THESE, A SIXTEEN YEAR OLD BOY, WAS KILLED IN ACT OF LOOTING A STORE. THREE OTHERS WERE SHOT, TWO BY POLICE OFFICERS AND ONE BY A STOREKEEPER WHILE LOOTING, NONE SERIOUSLY INJURED.

AGE THREE

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED THAT KING, RALPH ABERNATHY, AND BERNARD LEE, FAILED TO LEAVE MEMPHIS ON EASTERN FLIGHT THREE NINE EIGHT, NINE ZERO FIVE CST, DUE TO ARRIVE ATLANTA ELEVEN ZERO THREE PM EST. THIS ALSO CANCELS KING'S AND LEE'S FLIGHT FROM ATLANTA SIX TWENTY AM MARCH TWENTY NINE DUE TO ARRIVE BALTIMORE SEVEN FORTY TWO AM. INSPECTOR G. P. TINES, MEMPHIS PD, ADVISED KING PLANNING TO STAY IN MEMPHIS AT RIVERMONT HOTEL TONIGHT, FUTURE PLANS UNKNOWN AT PRESENT TIME. P.

CORR PAGE TWO, PARA ONE, LINE ONE WORDS EIGHT, NINE, AND TEN SHLD BE "AREA OF MEMPHIS" AND LINE TWO, PARA ONE, WORD FIVE SHLD BE "PRIMARY"

PAGE TWO PARA THREE, LINE ONE WORD SIX SHLD BE "KING" AND LINE THREE WORD THREE SHLD BE "PRIMARILY" AND A PERIOD SHLD BE BETWEEN "DEPT. AND FOUR" ONEXXX ON LINE FOUR.

PAGE TWO PARA ONE LINE THREE WORD ONE SHLD BE "LIQUOR"

END.

HFL

FBI WASH DC cc- Mr Trainor

P

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/18/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. A. Newman

SUBJECT: DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

During a conference on 7/16/75 between the Assistant Attorney General, J. Stanley Pottinger, and his staff and the Director of the FBI and his staff, a question arose concerning Martin Luther King's alleged moving from one hotel or motel to another hotel or motel in Memphis, Tennessee, prior to his murder on 4/4/68.

Attached is a letterhead memorandum (LHM) setting forth an inquiry including a review of all appropriate Bureau files regarding a proposal made in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 3/29/68 in connection with the counterintelligence program wherein it was recommended that information be made available to a cooperative news media source showing King to be a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on 3/28/68, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel). The LHM will reflect and document the fact that although a notation appears on the memorandum that it was "handled" there is no information available to reflect that it was ever actually given to a cooperative news source. Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh (retired), who placed the notation "handled" on the document, absolutely has no recollection of this matter nor can he state whether or not the information was disseminated.

REC-88 100-106670

The time elements as documented in this LHM would preclude the proposal contained in the 3/29/68 memorandum of having any affect upon King's cnoice of a motel in which to reside.

JUL 29 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached LHM along with attachments be disseminated to the Department.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Delivered 7/22/75 to Pottinger's office

HAN:cah (6)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 26, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore GCM

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM

PURPOSE:

To recommend item be furnished cooperative national news media source by Crime Records, designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising for the Washington Spring Project.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has now scheduled the Washington Spring Project, his "poor people's march on Washington, D. C.," for the latter part of April, 1968. King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) has sent out a mailing to 70,000 potential financial contributors. King asked these 70,000 to contribute to the Washington Spring Project for the feeding and housing of the marchers.

At the same time, churches in the Washington, D. C., area have said they will feed and house King's marchers.

SUGGESTION:

REC-0 812405

That the above facts be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division so that a story could be

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. M. Wells
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC 35

100-443006-

EX 106

APR 9 1968

55 Enclosure
TJD:df/dsm (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

given nation-wide circulation that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people he solicited. Since the churches have offered support, no more money is needed and any contributed would only be used by King for other purposes. This item would need nation-wide circulation in order to reach all the potential contributors and curtail their donations. A sample item is attached.

ACTION:

That the facts about King's solicitation of funds unnecessarily be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division.

NW

R

W.C.

✓

Handled 4/4/68

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), today finds himself in the embarrassing position of having too much money, or at least the probability of too much money. The SCLC sent out a huge mailing to its contributors pleading for funds for the Washington Spring Project, the "poor people's march on Washington." Thousands of contributors were urged to support the march financially in order to feed and house the demonstrators. But the churches in the Washington, D. C., area have offered to house and feed the demonstrators.

Now the contributions are beginning to roll in from the mailing and King doesn't need the money. An embarrassment of riches has befallen King, who will only use the money for other purposes. The churches had better come through with all the housing and support the demonstrators need, because there will be little money left for the "poor people" by the time the march rolls around.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-448006 — 83

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 8C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

B

TO : Mr. Sullivan DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: ① SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
RACIAL MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

A sanitation workers strike has been going on in Memphis for some time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis. King was in an automobile preceding the marchers. As the march developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke out including the breaking of windows in stores and some looting.

This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called nonviolence advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience for Washington in April.

REC-19
EX-105 157-9146-38
5 APR 2 1968

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ACTION:

Attached is a blind memorandum pointing ~~out the~~ above, which if you approve, should be made available by Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources. (on a strictly confidential basis)

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

TDR:fhd (6)

W.C.S.

REC-D
FBI

OK
H

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Deakin

Deakin

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5 APR 1968

RACIAL INT. SECT.

AUG 30 1968

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, injected himself into the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and the result of King's famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism, looting, and riot.

Previously, King involved himself in this strike, called for a general strike, and called for a mass march. Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of the line. Negroes began shouting "black power" and trouble began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and looting broke out.

Police officers were forced to use gas to break up the march and to control the crowd. It was necessary to activate the National Guard. Martin Luther King claims his much-heralded march on Washington, scheduled for April 22, 1968, will also be "nonviolent." He says he has persuaded militant black nationalists to abandon violent extremism in Washington, D. C., during the march. Memphis may only be the prelude to civil strife in our Nation's Capitol.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KD

157-9146-38

ENCLOSURE

~~157~~

XEROX
APR 4 1968

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
D HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 25, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

I would appreciate your making available to the Committee the following items in connection with our investigation of the King matter:

1. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between one Val Coleman and Special Agent Harold Linebaugh or any other FBI Headquarters officials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

2. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between any FBI Headquarters officials and any representatives of the news media concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

3. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to a meeting between Ralph Abernathy and either FBI Director Hoover or Cartha DeLoach during December 1964 or January 1965 (other than the December 1, 1964 meeting which was attended by Dr. King and the January 11, 1965 meeting which was attended by Andrew Young).

4. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to the following statement which appears in the second paragraph of the September 11, 1964 memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - Communist":

RECEIVED
DEC 1 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1210X

On that occasion Assistant Director DeLoach's office was able to take appropriate action to forestall the publication of the article.

5. The 7/16/64 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan which is noted in handwriting at the bottom of the second page of the July 15, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

6. With respect to the March 29, 1968 memorandum, with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" please provide:

a. Access to original of this memorandum and its enclosure;

b. Access to all extant "tickler" and/any other copies of this memorandum and its attachment in their original form;

c. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memorandum. ~~(This should include any and all information adduced, collected, and/or prepared in connection with Mr. James Adams' testimony on this subject before the Senate Select Committee on November 18, 1975.)~~

d. All memoranda and any other materials received from FBI field offices or written at FBI Headquarters prior to and pertaining to the recommendation contained in the March 29, 1968 memorandum.

7. With respect to the memorandum with enclosure, from W. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 26, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)", please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

November 25, 1975

8. With respect to a memorandum with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan, dated 3/28/68, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

9. Responses to Items 6, 7, and 8 should include copies of all newspaper clippings or magazine articles contained in FBI files which contain information set forth in the memoranda and/or enclosures identified in Items 6, 7, and 8 above.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 1, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated November 25, 1975, requesting various information regarding the King matter. Please prepare an appropriate response to this request.

EX-110

cc: Paul Daly

REC-60

62-116395-1210X

7 MAR 5 1976

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/lp

1-Ad Hoc
12-3-75

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 11/28/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY

Removed By 7 9 JAN 1 1976

File Number 62-116395-1210

Permanent Serial Charge Out

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

The Attorney General

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP3ALM/KP

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum, with attachment, concerning an interview of former FBI Assistant Director Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum, with attachment, for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Your specific attention is invited to certain information relating to the interview of Wick suggestive of improprieties on the part of an SSC Staff Member. The facts, as known to this Bureau, are as follows.

Wick first contacted this Bureau concerning the interview by telephone on November 5, 1975, to advise that he had been called on October 31, 1975, by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein representing the SSC. Epstein requested Wick to come to Washington, D. C., for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his "employment." Epstein did not further describe the subject matter of the interview and an appointment was arranged for November 7, 1975. Wick said that he was uncertain as to the probable subject matter of the interview because other matters coming within his responsibilities as Vice President of Pan American World Airways which were unrelated to the FBI, have been of recent interest to the SSC. Wick asked for advice of the FBI concerning this matter. Thereupon, the Legal Counsel Division of this Bureau contacted Epstein and determined that the subject matter of the interview of Wick would be Martin Luther King, Jr. A return call was made to Wick on November 5, 1975, to advise him that this Bureau had learned that the subject matter of the interview would be Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395-1209X

REC-51

3 JAN 19 1976

1 - 67 (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

SFP:mjg
(11)

2

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

✓ S. F. Phillips
4043

84 JAN 20 1976

On November 6, 1975, Wick again telephoned this Bureau and advised that he had been rather annoyed at Epstein's initial approach to him; particularly, because Wick had tried on more than one occasion during the telephone conversation with Epstein to pry from Epstein the subject matter of the interview but Epstein persisted in not advising him.

This Bureau's representative who had determined from Epstein on November 5, 1975, the subject matter of the interview has advised that when he made the inquiry of Epstein, he asked Epstein why he had not told Wick the subject matter. Epstein's reply was that Wick had not asked him, a statement directly contradictory to Wick's advice to this Bureau.

The second suggested impropriety is that Epstein contacted Wick prior to advising this Bureau of his intention to interview Wick, an action which is contrary to procedures which have been agreed upon between the SSC and this Bureau.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
               Special Counsel for
                 Intelligence Coordination

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

62-116395

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S.F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (AD) ROBERT WICK
BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KSP

This memorandum concerns an interview of former FBI AD Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members.

On November 5, 1975, Wick advised this Bureau that on October 31, 1975, he had been contacted by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein of the SSC who requested Wick to come to Washington for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his employment. Epstein did not further describe the subject matter although Wick attempted to obtain such information from Epstein.

Upon receipt of the above information from Wick, this Bureau determined from Epstein that the subject matter was to be Martin Luther King, Jr., and that fact was relayed to Wick on November 5, 1975. Wick was also told that he was being released from his secrecy agreement with the FBI for the purpose of the interview, confined to the indicated subject matter. Wick was also advised by this Bureau that he was not required to answer questions falling within four privileged areas: matters pertaining to pending investigations; information from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies; information concerning sensitive methods and techniques; and information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources.

Attached hereto is a copy of a MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE dated November 12, 1975, which Wick voluntarily furnished this Bureau and which represents his report pertaining to the interview.

Enclosure

1 - 67- (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SFP:mjg (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

62-116395-1209

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Assistant Director (AD)
Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members

NOTE:

Information relating to contacts between Wick and this Bureau are reported in memoranda 11/5/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," and 11/7/75 from W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall "Senstudy 75." Wick's statement, MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE, was mailed to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The matter of improprieties was addressed specifically in the above 11/7/75 Cregar memorandum and it is believed that the Department should be made aware of this matter.

Let & LHM to AG
[illegible] Encl (2)

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former Assistant Director Robert Wick

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Interviewed regarding his knowledge of the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Agil

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

R6-10019

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
~~Telephone Rm.~~ ___
Director Sec'y ___

FBI

Date: 12/9/75

f-1

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION & ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

FROM: ADIC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243)

RE: SENSTUDY; TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS, AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR W. RAYMOND WANNALL 12/2/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/

Re Los Angeles phone call to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS, 12/9/75.

On 12/3/75, the attached article appeared in the Los Angeles Times under the byline of reporter JACK NELSON. As indicated, the headline and lead paragraph which supposedly is based on ADAMS' testimony, clearly reflects that the FBI did nothing to prevent Klan violence although we knew of the contemplated violence. After discussing this matter with Mr. ADAMS and reviewing the actual testimony received in the Los Angeles Division on 12/8/75, SAC ELMER F. LINBERG and I met with Editor BILL THOMAS and National Editor ED GUTHMAN at the Los Angeles Times.

I advised these gentlemen that I was aghast when I read the headlines and the lead paragraph of this article and could not believe that JIM ADAMS did not refute informant ROWE's testimony that we took no action relative to contemplated violence since I knew that this was contrary to the rules, regulations, policy, and philosophy of the FBI in 1960. I then called Mr. ADAMS in Washington, D. C., and he likewise, was upset over the headline and lead paragraph,

ENCLOSURE

EX-112

C-38

62-116395-1209

3 - Bureau (1 Encl)
1 - Los Angeles
REG:mmb
(4)

17 DEC 12 1975

Approved: 7 1976
Special Agent in Charge

Sent __________ M Per __________

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

because, according to ADAMS, he completely refuted these statements in that we did disseminate the contemplated plans of violence to the Birmingham Police Department and to the Department of Justice in the form of a letterhead memorandum.

I continued that I waited until I received the actual transcript of testimony and told the gentlemen that upon my review of the testimony of Mr. ADAMS and Mr. WANNALL, I could not reconcile the headline and lead paragraph with such testimony. I then proceeded to read several excerpts from the testimony.

I advised Mr. THOMAS and Mr. GUTHMAN that my immediate reaction was to prepare a "Letter to the Editor" but felt after a re-analysis of the situation that this is not a judgment question on the part of the newspaper, but one of a slanted, inaccurate story either by design or through misunderstanding. I therefore felt that the Los Angeles Times, if it so desired, should be in a position to correct the situation itself based on the facts.

Mr. THOMAS expressed appreciation for my approach and stated that at the time he read the article, already printed, a question came to his mind as to why the FBI did not advise someone or take some action relative to contemplated violence. He, however, took no further action. He said in view of what I had read from excerpts of Mr. ADAMS' testimony and the now available complete transcript of the testimony, he intends to pursue this matter further and would prefer not to have a "letter to the Editor", but rather correct any inaccuracies on the part of the Los Angeles Times through their own pursuit of further inquiring concerning this story.

Mr. GUTHMAN concurred with Mr. THOMAS and they indicated that it appears the obvious question is based on Mr. ADAMS' testimony of who in the Department of Justice received this information relative to contemplated violence and what did such a responsible Department of Justice official do with the information. He agreed that based on the information furnished to them, the FBI has been done an injustice but that they, the Los Angeles Times, desired to pursue this matter further.

It should be noted the article of JACK NELSON is based on one specific situation, namely the testimony of former informant GARY ROWE that he had furnished advance information to the FBI to the effect that members of the Ku Klux Klan would be given the opportunity to beat members of the Freedom Riders without interference by law enforcement authorities for approximately 15 minutes after which the local law enforcement authorities would take action, and that the FBI was advised of this well in advance of such beatings and furthermore, the FBI took no action to prevent this violence.

Took No Action to Prevent Klan Violence, FBI Admits

BY JACK NELSON

Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—An FBI official conceded Tuesday that the bureau had failed to use an undercover man's information to head off Ku Klux Klan violence in Alabama in the 1960s.

But, the official, James B. Adams, assistant to the director, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the FBI was "just as frustrated as anyone else" at "rank lawlessness" that existed in Alabama at that time. Also, he said, the FBI is an investigative agency and has no enforcement powers.

Adams' defense of the FBI came immediately after Gary Thomas Rowe Jr., wearing a hood to conceal his features, testified that on many occasions he had warned the bureau of the klan's plans for violence, but that the violence occurred without official interference.

Rowe served six years as an FBI undercover agent before surfacing in 1965 as the star witness against three klansmen accused of killing a white civil rights worker in Lowndes County, Ala. Since then he has been living



WITNESS—Gary Thomas Rowe Jr. wears hood while testifying.

AP Wirephoto

Please Turn to Page 6, Col. 1

KLAN VIOLENCE

Continued from First Page

in Southern California under an assumed name.

Rowe was one of two former undercover operatives who testified before the committee Tuesday. The other, Mary Jo Cook of Buffalo, N.Y., told of supplying the FBI with information about 1,000 persons while serving as an informant against the Vietnam Veterans Against the War during 1973-74.

Testimony by both witnesses prompted committee members to criticize FBI tactics and to suggest that legal restraints be put on future FBI activities.

Sen. Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), commenting on testimony by Rowe that he engaged in klan violence with the knowledge and approval of the FBI, observed that the bureau's infiltration of the klan not only failed to prevent violence, "but indeed may have contributed to it."

Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-Mont.) told Adams that the FBI had bungled its job in investigating political activities and added:

"It has interfered with civil liberties and finally in the last month or two through its public disclosures has heaped shame upon itself and really led toward the undermining of crucial public confidence essential to law enforcement agencies in the country."

Mondale criticized the FBI for trying to "protect people from subversive and dangerous ideas," and he told Adams:

"Time and time again, we're going to protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous. We're going to protect veterans from whatever it is, we're going to protect the (National) Council of Churches from veterans and so on . . .

"Don't you agree with me that we've got to control this, restrain it, define it, so that precisely what's expected of the FBI is known by you and by the public and you can justify your actions when we ask you?"

Adams disagreed that the FBI had bungled in the political intelligence field but agreed that restraining legislation was in order.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Los Angeles Times

12/3/75

62-116395-1209

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 12-3-75

FROM : T. J. JENKINS

SUBJECT: GARY T. ROWE
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE

On 12-3-75 an individual who identified himself as Garland Reeves of the Birmingham, Alabama, News, called and he advised that he understood I was the Special Agent in Charge of the Birmingham Office at the time the bus was burned with the Freedom Riders in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1961. He stated that he would like to know if Rowe had furnished us information that the Birmingham Police were going to wait 15 or 30 minutes to go to the bus station in order to give the Klan an opportunity to work over the Freedom Riders. I informed Reeves that I recalled no such information being furnished to us at that time. I told him that all information we received concerning possible violence was furnished to the Birmingham Police Department. He wanted to know, if there had been such an agreement what action would I take. I told him that if I determined that the police department would not take any action for 15 or 30 minutes I would advise the Mayor ~~and~~ of the city and the Police Commissioner and if they felt the same as the police department, I would then advise the Governor of the State.

EX 104 REC 4 62-116395-1208

He wanted to know what would be the FBI's position at that time if the police department refused to take any action. I told him that we did not have jurisdiction in matters of this nature, that they were purely local and it was the responsibility of the local authorities to handle such matters. He desired to know if I would call out the Federal Marshals. I informed him that the FBI did not have any authority to call upon the Federal Marshals in a situation of this nature but if such a situation arose, I would have immediately notified our headquarters in Washington, who would have ~~notified the~~ Department of Justice, who would have such authority.

7 DEC 16 1975

I told him that while I was in Birmingham as Special Agent in Charge we kept the Bureau headquarters in Washington completely informed of all developments and they in turn, kept the Department of Justice informed.

ACTION: Submitted for information.

TJJ:pmd (5)
1 - Mr. Adams 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/K9

59 DEC 30 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

WRW/LAC

FBI

Date: 12/4/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714)

SENSTUDY 75

Re San Diego telephone call to Bureau, 12/4/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of a letterhead memorandum reflecting information received in the San Diego Office concerning GARY THOMAS ROWE, Jr.

Deputy SCOTT BOIES of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office was contacted and advised that if he felt he recognized ROWE that he should not discuss the matter openly with anyone in that ROWE was obviously attempting to protect his identity. Deputy BOIES was not advised that ROWE was identical with THOMAS NEIL MOORE.

extra cc destroyed

2 - Bureau (Encs - 8)
1 - San Diego

DCS:pgh
(3)

1 - The Attorney General
1 - (1-[illegible])
Not sent

Letter to [illegible]
12/[illegible]

UNREC COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

REC-100

62-116395-1206X

2-6
~~DEC 8~~ 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2 ALM/gP

WOC

Approved: RLM/C ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
December 4, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: GARY THOMAS ROWE, JR.

At 11:30 p.m. on December 2, 1975, Deputy Sheriff Scott Boies of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office, Lemon Grove, California Sub-Station, telephonically contacted the San Diego FBI Office and advised as follows:

Deputy Boies stated that he recognized the voice of the man identified as Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who is testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on the Ku Klux Klan. He stated he heard Mr. Rowe talk on a news broadcast and recognized him as being an individual he knows as Thomas Neil Moore. Deputy Boies furnished Moore's date of birth as August 15, 1933, and an address of 580 "L" Street, Chula Vista, California, where Moore resided in 1971. Deputy Boies stated that Moore worked for Western Bureau of Investigation, headquartered in Los Angeles and worked as a security guard for the White Front Department Store, Chula Vista, California.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-1206X

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

December 12, 1975

Director, FBI

REC-100 1 - 137 - 1206X

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. Klein

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to my November 26, 1975, letter to you enclosing among other material, a memorandum concerning former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is a copy of a memorandum dated December 4, 1975, regarding Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., received by FBI Headquarters from our San Diego field office.

Rowe, is a former informant who testified before the SSC on December 2, 1975, regarding his role in supplying information to the FBI regarding Ku Klux Klan activities in Alabama. He has been utilizing the cover name, Thomas Neil Moore.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 137-6295

No 1 SENT TO SSC PER STEVE BLACKHURST, USDS 3-23-76 ARB

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the December 4, 1975, memorandum.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 137-6295

SK:klm
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

WRW | TJM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

84 FEB 12 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE:

Above being furnished to the Attorney General and the SSC in order to apprise them of information reflecting that Rowe, who testified with a mask over his face, was identified by a San Diego Deputy Sheriff after hearing Rowe's voice on a news broadcast. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/4/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TESTIMONY BY THE DIRECTOR
DECEMBER 9, 1975

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO CHANGE
THE NAME OF THE J. EDGAR HOOVER
FBI BUILDING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/gP

In connection with the Director's appearance on December 9, 1975, to testify before captioned committee, it is possible that he may be asked concerning recent proposals in the Congress to change the name of the building. Three bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives on December 1, 1975, for that purpose. H.R. 10905, introduced by Congressman Gude of Maryland and H.R. 10918, introduced by Congresswoman Schroeder of Colorado, would change the name of the building to "FBI Building." H.R. 10916, introduced by Congressman Rangel of New York, would change the name to "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building." All three of the bills were referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House, the chairman of which is Congressman Jones of Alabama.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information of the Director in connection with his preparation for testimony.

EX 104 REC-9 62-116395-1206

Enc.

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Mintz

DEC 16 1975

JAM:mfd
(6)

XEROX
DEC 19 1975

COPY FILED IN

84 DEC 30 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mr. GUDE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" wherever it appears in such section and inserting in lieu thereof "F.B.I. Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

By Mr. GUDE

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE ______ BY ______

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mrs. SCHROEDER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Public Law 92–520 is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 8. The Federal building in the block bounded by Ninth Street Northwest, Tenth Street Northeast, E Street Northwest, and Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest, in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter be known as the 'F.B.I. Building'. Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, record, or other paper of the United States to such

Federal building shall be held to be a reference to the "F.B.I. Building'".

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

By Mrs. SCHROEDER

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

94th CONGRESS
1st Session

H. R. 10916

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

December 1, 1975

Mr. Rangel introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" both times it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

By Mr. RANGEL

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Stack
1 - Mr. McWright

Mr. Jenkins
11/28/75

J. Cochran, Jr.

REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

Sensitively

Re memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11/21/75, advising that representatives of captioned Senate Subcommittee desire to review any Bureau documents relating to the Bureau's interest in or use of drugs during interrogation.

It was pointed out in referenced memo that captioned Subcommittee staff members James F. Michie and Thomas M. Susman had obtained information from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning a program coordinated between DOD, CIA, and FBI to develop a truth serum. The program apparently began in early 1950 and D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory had knowledge of this activity.

The information that Michie and Susman have obtained apparently relates to a Navy drug experimentation project from 1947 to 1954. Navy files indicated that the FBI was aware of this program and Mr. C. D. DeLoach and D. J. Parsons were mentioned.

A review of Bureau files disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the Navy drug project. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-2699-

62-2699

Enclosure

① 62-116395

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Adams
2 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Rotis)
(Attn: Mr. Miller)
3 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. W. O. Cregar)
(Attn: Mr. T. D. J. Brooks)
(Attn: Mr. V. H. Weimar)

CGM:bms
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

CONTINUED - OVER

NOT RECORDED
46 FEB 5 1976

84 FEB 9 1976

might be used to great advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50.

Memorandum dated 11/6/75 from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall is attached which sets forth details of our review of Navy files on this project, including a Bureau press release which was to have been made in the event that the Navy mentioned the FBI in their press release on this matter.

A review of Bureau files for information relating to drugs designed to modify behavior indicates an interest dating back to 1922. However, this interest has not extended to the point where the Bureau has conducted research on behavior modifying drugs nor has it funded such research. We have maintained liaison with other agencies, primarily the U. S. Army, and industrial organizations in order to be aware of developments in this area.

On 7/30/74, Laboratory and Training Division representatives met with representatives of the Biomedical and Chemical Laboratories of Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, to discuss the potential use of incapacitating chemical agents in hostage situations. Although we have developed an awareness of various agents which may be used in these situations, we have not conducted any research with these agents. Memoranda on this matter are located in Bufile 80-807.

A single instance occurred where "truth serum" was administered in a Bureau case. Truth serum was administered to Thurman Scruggs Wilkins at his own request while being interviewed in the Los Angeles Office, April 26, 1947. Wilkins was allegedly involved with one Ignacy Samuel Witczak, the subject of a Soviet espionage case (100-343077). The actual drug used was sodium amytal and the actual administration was done by a physician. Prior Bureau authority was not obtained by the Los Angeles Office in connection with this incident. SAC Hood submitted a letter of explanation to the Bureau on July 2, 1947. This incident resulted in the following information being set forth in SAC Letter 84-47 dated July 3, 1947:

Memorandum J. Cochran, Jr. to Mr. Jenkins
RE: REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

"The Bureau will not tolerate any experiments or participation on the part of its personnel in the utilization of the so called truth serums or other chemicals alleged to have a similar effect. ---- consequently, in the event any Bureau agent violates these instructions, drastic administrative action will be taken."

There was nothing found in Bureau files that would indicate that we have received any documents from CIA concerning their drug research programs. The files do reflect that we were aware that CIA was conducting research with lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and that British Intelligence had successfully utilized LSD on several Russian espionage agents. The information concerning CIA and British activities is set out for the benefit of the Director only and cannot be released outside the Bureau.

There are two Bureau files which contain most of the information relating to the immediate area of interest of the captioned Senate Subcommittee. These files are 62-2699 (Truth Serums) and 80-645 (Chemical Munitions and Gases). Pertinent serials may also be found in 80-807 and 100-343077 as previously noted in this memorandum.

I see no reason why Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman should not be afforded on oral briefing regarding these matters, and if necessary make pertinent serials of Bufiles 62-2699, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077 available to them for review.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman be advised by Legal Counsel that available Bureau records and interview with current knowledgeable employee indicate the FBI has never engaged in nor funded anyone's efforts in research and/or development programs in the use or effect of drugs on human behavior. They should be advised our efforts in this regard as far as can be established from the available records consists of following through liaison contacts with other government agencies and the private sector sources the current developments in behavior modifying drugs.

Memorandum J. Cochran, Jr. to Mr. Jenkins
RE: REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

(2) That if they desire to pursue this matter further, SA McWright and myself be permitted to meet with Michie and Susman to (a) reaffirm the information in recommendation #1 and (b) if necessary, to produce for their inspection pertinent serials from 62-6299, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. J. Cochran

11/6/75

Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. C. G. McWright
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALNKP

This is to inform you that on 11/7/75 Defense Department will release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC), the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures (Senator Edward M. Kennedy's committee), and to the press, information concerning Navy projects from 1947 to 1954 involving drug experimentation; a Navy file indicates FBI was aware of programs but Laboratory has no knowledge of any active participation by Bureau personnel.

On 11/4/75, Clark McGruder, Assistant to Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Director of Naval Intelligence, informed me that on 11/7/75 the Navy was going to release to aforementioned committees and the press information on drug experimentation and that the FBI was mentioned in the pertinent files. Those files were reviewed at the Pentagon on 11/6/75 by Supervisor J. P. Thomas of INTD. They had been classified "Secret" and "Top Secret" but now have been completely declassified. FBI was mentioned in connection with three projects. There are no FBI documents in the files.

A memorandum dated 9/21/50 from Mr. Alberti to Mr. C. D. DeLoach was a receipt signed by Mr. DeLoach for one copy of "Drugs Stated To Have Been Used By Russians And Germans In Interrogation Techniques." Alberti is identified elsewhere in the file as Jack H. Alberti, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), who apparently coordinated the projects mentioned in the file. The purpose of one project was to develop a speech-inducing drug to obtain intelligence from interrogees and the project began in 1947.

Enclosures
62-116395

[illegible]
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

A memorandum dated 8/15/~~75~~50 on letterhead of Office of Chief of Naval Operations concerned "Top Secret Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI) Project on Speech-Inducing Drugs," reported a meeting on 8/11/50 attended by personnel of NMRI, CIA, Office of Naval Research (ONR), a drug company representative and Mr. DeLoach and Mr. D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the FBI on a CIA project on narco-hypnosis and on the NMRI project. Parsons reportedly said the FBI had no such project, but had information on the experiences of various police departments in the United States with speech-inducing drugs. He agreed to make the FBI information available to NMRI and CIA. ONR agreed to give FBI, NMRI and CIA a study by ONR on projected research to improve polygraph reliability. Recipients were to give their comments and recommendations on the study to ONR. At the meeting NMRI gave DeLoach an 8/11/50 NMRI progress report on its project. Parsons agreed to look into the possibility of getting volunteers from prisoners in Federal institutions and to supply NMRI with canabis (marijuana) and heroin to the extent they might be available to the FBI. It is noted that no FBI representatives were listed in the memorandum reporting a 9/27/50 meeting of this group and there is no further record in the file of FBI participation. Neither is there any record that the FBI supplied any drugs for the project.

Material regarding project "CHATTER" included a carbon copy of a rough draft memorandum (no letterhead) bearing the penciled date "11/50?" which contained the following, "Since 1947 the Department of the Navy has carried on a project in coordination with the Departments of the Air Force and Army, CIA and FBI for the development of speech-inducing drugs.... The Directors of Intelligence of the three Services, of CIA and FBI consider this project

CONTINUED - OVER

of utmost important and urgency to... fulfillment of their missions for the security of the United States." The memorandum says that a project submitted to ONR by Professor Richard Wendt of the University of Rochester (NY) had been approved by all the agencies involved and recommended funding the project. The file indicates subsequently that this project did go forward and involve human experimentation.

~~The second~~ Another file dealt with project "CALLING CARD," 1952-1953, designed "to render an individual subservient to imposed will or control." FBI was not mentioned.

80-5 (Polygraph file) relates only to instrumental detection of deception

A memorandum dated 9/5/50 for Mr. D. J. Parsons, FBI; C. Edwards, CIA; and Captain Wilbur E. Kellum of Naval Medical Research, from W. S. Post, Jr. (not further identified), informed them that a copy of the report on the "Ellson" project (University of Indiana, 1952) was being forwarded to them for information. The project involved research in the detection of deception. The addressees were to be briefed by Professor D. G. Ellson of Indiana University on the project at a future date. The file did not show that the briefing occurred. The project was terminated in June, 1952.

The two files reviewed contained many reports of research conducted concerning various drugs in various parts of the world, constituting a collection of papers on the subject by U. S. and foreign researchers.

A review of logical Bureau files by the Laboratory Division disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the above. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which might be used to great

CONTINUED - OVER

advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50. (Navy memorandum on this meeting set out above.)

We have received a memorandum dated 11/4/75 from Defense describing the proposed release of Navy information to the committees and to the press. Copy of that memorandum and of the press release are attached. The release says that "Liaison was maintained with... the FBI" concerning the drug research ~~release.~~

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

PRESS RELEASE
NOVEMBER 7, 1975

The press statement released by the Navy today relating to its drug research on human subjects for the period 1947 through 1954 indicates liaison concerning this project was maintained by the Navy with other Governmental agencies, including the FBI.

A thorough review of FBI files has disclosed one document relating to this Navy research: a short internal memorandum, dated August 4, 1950. This memorandum, prepared by a member of the Liaison staff at FBI Headquarters, recorded that a Navy official had invited FBI representatives to a conference in the Washington area to "discuss the usage of truth serum in Intelligence circles," and that the Navy had made advances in developing a new drug which "could be utilized to a great advantage in the questioning of espionage agents." A handwritten notation on this memorandum directed that a representative of the FBI Laboratory was to attend this conference on August 11, 1950.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/RC

No further identifiable reference to Navy drug development research is contained in FBI files. No record can be located that liaison was being maintained with the Navy regarding this program, or that the FBI had knowledge of this program prior to the date of the above memorandum.

ENCLOSURE

~~ENCLOSURE~~ 62-116395

The FBI was not involved in any way in this Navy drug research, and the FBI has never participated in research with drugs designed to modify human behavior, nor has it funded such research.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

December 24, 1975

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

ST 115

Director, FBI

REC-51 62-116395-1204

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is in response to the SSC letter dated December 18, 1975, wherein Senators Mondale and Baker requested rather detailed information to be made available during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

It is noted that most of the requests in this letter are so ambiguous that they require clarification from the SSC before the FBI can logically respond. In one instance, there is no way this Bureau could respond short of obtaining the recollections of Bureau Supervisors who worked in the Intelligence Division extending back almost 20 years. Because of this, we are attaching for your approval and forwarding to the SSC the original of a memorandum which delineates the problems attendant to the request of December 18, 1975, and, in most instances, requests a meeting between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, SSC, and representatives of this Bureau in the hope that some alternatives or clarifications can be developed. A copy of the memorandum is furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

WOC:lhb
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKG

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The request of 12/18/75 was received in the Intelligence Division in the midafternoon of 12/22/75. A conference was held on the morning of 12/23/75 of pertinent Division personnel in an effort to identify the problems connected with responding to this request. It is believed that the only way the Bureau can logically respond to the request is by obtaining clarifications and, in some instances, alternatives to the requests set out.

We have already determined that both John Elliff and the SSC Counsel, F. A. O. Schwartz, are out of the city for the holidays. The Legal Counsel Division has left word with Mr. Schwartz and/or Mr. Elliff to call SA Paul Daly upon their return to the city.

Copy of 12/18/75 request attached.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J, G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

62-116395

December 24, 1975

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM SENATORS
MONDALE AND BAKER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On December 22, 1975, this Bureau received a copy of a letter dated December 18, 1975, which Senators Mondale and Baker sent to the Attorney General levying certain requirements on the FBI with a request that the responses be provided the SSC during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

Item 1 requested access to materials in the investigative files for a six-month period preceding acts of violence which were prevented by actions taken by the FBI. The specific preventive actions were set out in some detail in a memorandum prepared for the SSC by the FBI dated December 10, 1975.

Upon receipt of referenced letter, the Intelligence Division initiated efforts to isolate the files documenting these preventive actions. The Bureau's response of December 10, 1975, was predicated on a review of the pertinent inspection reports of the Intelligence Division. These reports do not document by file number the individual preventive actions. To locate specific files, it will be necessary to have knowledgeable Intelligence Division personnel queried in an effort to try to match the preventive action with a particular investigative file. In some instances,

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

WOC:lhb/lhb
(11)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

pld

WOB

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-1204X

JAN

GPO : 1975 O - 569-92

there will be no investigative file but merely a communication from a field office reporting information furnished by a source of the FBI on which some preventive action was predicated. It is possible that the acts of violence reported by the source could involve a violation over which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction. In such cases, the local field office would have merely furnished the information to the appropriate law enforcement agency and no investigative file would exist.

We are continuing our efforts to attempt to isolate those files which document preventive actions. However, because of the problems attendant thereto, as well as those problems raised in the subparagraphs of Item 1, it is recommended that a meeting be arranged between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, and representatives of this Bureau to discuss possible alternatives to some of these requests.

Items 2 and 3 concern the September 24, 1975, report to the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office. The FBI is in the process of preparing a response and it will be made available to the Committee as soon as possible. However, it is noted that the FBI prepared no analysis at all on the findings of the General Accounting Office contained in their report of September 24, 1975.

Item 4 requests the annual reports from the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968, and the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that organization was under investigation. Item 4 also requests annual reports available on the investigations "about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28."

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

There were no annual reports submitted by the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968. With regard to the Women's Liberation Movement, the SSC has been provided copies of all pertinent reports for the years the organization was under investigation. In an effort to clarify what is meant by the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to Mr. John Elliff's request of October 28, 1975, it is again proposed that a meeting with Mr. Elliff be arranged to clarify this ambiguity.

Item 5 requests specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV of the Department of Justice's guidelines draft on "Domestic Security Investigations."

The indices of this Bureau are not organized to enable retrieval of information of a "preventive action" character or examples of FBI actions taken to prevent violence. The retrieval of such information from FBI files, other than that described in the response to Item 1, would require extensive review and/or dependence on the recollection of individuals of occurrences extending back almost 20 years. It is suggested that, during the proposed meeting with Mr. John Elliff, this request be discussed.

Item 6 requests access to all FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1, through April 4, 1968.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

It is this Bureau's belief that all pertinent material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, through April 4, 1968, has been made available to the SSC responsive to previous requests. With regard to the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, it is not clear whether the letter is requesting access to the entire FBI file on these two activities from the period January 1, through April 4, 1968. It is recommended that a clarification of this request can be accomplished during the previously proposed meeting between Mr. John Elliff and representatives of the FBI.

Item 7 requests all materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

A check of indices of the FBI regarding "Project Overshoe," as well as the word Overshoe, fails to contain any reference to either. Without additional information regarding "Project Overshoe," this Bureau cannot be responsive to this specific request. Again, it is suggested that, during the forthcoming meeting with John Elliff, clarification of "Project Overshoe" be obtained.

1 - The Attorney General

5-110a (Rev. 3-21-73)

Intelligence Division

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

Attached is a request from Senators Mondale and Baker of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated 12/18/75. The Director has requested he be advised regarding the status of this request.

Attached is a copy of a letter to the AG and LHM for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb

CONTINUED - OVER

(Rev. 3)
Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓ ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Intelligence Division

ED

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

ched is a request from Senators
nd Baker of the Senate Select
(SSC) dated 12/18/75. The
has requested he be advised
the status of this request.

ched is a copy of a letter to the
M for the SSC, dated 12/24/75,
advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb

CONTINUED - OVER

estimate when we will complete Item 4.

Item 5 has been reduced to the recollection of Bureau Supervisor David Ryan who handled the COINTELPRO matter and will not require research beyond what SA Ryan can recall. (Ryan is currently developing a response to this request.)

Item 6 has been reduced to all materials relating to the Poor People's Campaign, the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennesee, and Martin Luther King, Jr., contained in Headquarters files between the period 1/1-4/4/68. (We are currently working on this request.)

Item 7 - Epstein has agreed to obtain more identifying data regarding Project Overshoe and we are awaiting this information.

Woc/

~~SECRET~~

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall for Handle
K

Sensitive

Sel T far 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

#MDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X
5 JAN 1976

RECEIVED

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall for Handle

Senstudy

Sel T fav 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain to both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204
5 JAN 26 1976

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

RECEIVED
ENCLOSURE

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

SECRET

provided during the last week of December and the first week of January:

1. With respect to each of the examples of effective prevention of violence provided the Committee pursuant to John Elliff's letter of November 26 to Mr. Shaheen, please provide access to materials in the investigative file for the 6-month period preceding the act of violence prevented. Please deliver:

(a) All materials relating to the legal and factual predicate for each investigation;

(b) The first investigative report disseminated outside the FBI in each such case, and a list of recipients of that report;

(c) The total number of individuals whose names were referred to the FBI's general name index in the course of each investigation;

(d) The total number of individuals about whom information was obtained through informants, confidential sources, physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and other sensitive techniques; and

(e) The annual report from the office of origin for each such investigation to FBI headquarters for the last five years during which the case in question was an open investigation.

2. Please provide any information which you have refuting the suggestion made on page 34 of the General Accounting Office's September 24 report to the House Judiciary Committee, that cases in which violence can be predicted probably represent less than 2% of all FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

3. Please provide all memoranda or analyses prepared for the Justice Department, Director Kelley, or Assistant Director Wannall on the findings of the General Accounting Office as presented to the House Judiciary Committee on September 24.

4. Please provide the annual report from the office of origin to FBI headquarters for the investigation of

~~SE~~

Attorney General Edward H. Levi

Page three December 18, 1975

Dr. Martin Luther King in 1963 through 1968, and for the investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that that organization was under investigation, and the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28.

5. Please provide specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV on "preventive action" of the draft Department of Justice's guidelines on "domestic security investigations."

6. Access to all FBI materials pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor People's Campaign, and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1 through April 4, 1968.

7. All materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this request. We look forward to continuing cooperation on this area of joint concern.

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale

Walter F. Mondale
Chairman

Howard W. Baker, Jr.
Vice-Chairman

~~SECRET~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/24/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). (12/18/75 Letter to the Attorney General from Senators Mondale & Baker)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 12-30-75

Received by: Mark Gitenstein

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KSP

62-116395-1204X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/24/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 12/18/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Requesting clarification of items listed in request received from Senators Mondale and Bakerregarding preventive actions; 9/24/75 report of the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office; Annual reports from the office of origin to FBIHQs for investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; pertinent materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1/1 thru 4/4/68 previously made available. Clarification with regard to Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tenn; "Project Overshoe."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

62-116395-1204X

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
(Mr. G. S. McMichael)

12/17/75

1 - Mr. J. Cochran
(Mr. F. M. Devine)
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Mr. W. R. Wannall

J. G. Deegan

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This informative memorandum to record unsuccessful efforts to pinpoint the typewriter on which was typed an anonymous letter apparently directed to subject, the original of which was located in papers left behind on the retirement of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan.

Examination of the questioned document by the Laboratory established that the typing was done on a Royal typewriter with pica style type. We checked available inventory records maintained by the Administrative Division as well as our own in INTD to locate all Royal typewriters which were in the then Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) around 1964. This search was based on the suspicion that the note was typed by Sullivan on a typewriter accessible to him in 1964 when he was Assistant Director of the DID.

Our checks revealed that there are available only four typewriters of the type sought which were likely in the DID in 1964. All four are presently in INTD and three of them were readily eliminated as not identical to that which produced the questioned document on the basis that all three have closed "4s", whereas the questioned document has an open ended "4". The fourth typewriter, serial number KMG 13-4320913, is maintained in room 4410 and charged to the IS-2 Section. It was examined by Supervisor F. M. Devine of the Document Section of the Laboratory who advised that it is not identical to the typewriter which produced the questioned document.

100-106670

① - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75) 6

CONTINUED - OVER

SFP:blb
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP3ALM/dP

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 DEC 29 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Martin Luther King, Jr.
100-106670

We are conducting no further inquiry at this time to establish the whereabouts of the typewriter which produced the anonymous letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information and record purposes.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1st NR 1203x, 1204x, 1st NR 1204x, 1206-1210x, 1212, 1214x, 1214x1, 1215, 1215x

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Adams - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs. (2)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Cregar - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs. (2)
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs. (2)

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On 12/4/75, a meeting was held with the following representatives of captioned Committee: Chief Counsel F.A.O. Schwartz; Assistant Counsel Paul Michel; Staff Member Mark Gitenstein; Staff Director of the Domestic Task Force John T. Elliff; and Staff Member John Bayley. Representing the Bureau at this meeting were Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams, Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Inspector John B. Hotis, and SA Paul V. Daly.

The meeting discussed the forthcoming testimony on 12/9/75 of the Director before that Committee and Elliff furnished the Bureau two draft papers discussing the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction and issues the Committee Staff feels the Senate Select Committee must address from a legislative standpoint. Copies of these papers are attached.

The first paper which consists of six pages discusses in Part 1 what the Committee sees as problems arising out of the FBI's domestic intelligence investigations. This portion highlights the fact that these investigations may be overbroad in scope, collect irrelevant information, and continue the investigations beyond what the Committee sees as their normal investigative conclusion. This portion also addresses the investigative techniques used during these investigations and the resultant dissemination of information collected.

Under Part 2, the document discusses options available to the Committee. These options run the gamut from abolition of the Bureau's domestic intelligence functions to administrative oversight by the Attorney General or Congressional oversight or enacting legislation providing for domestic intelligence investigations with legislative limits imposed on such investigations. Included is the consideration of creating an independent Inspector General.

62-116395-1215X

REC-51

7 JAN 22 1976

Enclosures (2)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:lad
(9)

84 JAN 26 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The second position paper which was prepared by John T. Elliff begins by a six-page statement and analysis of the Bureau's current authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. He then lists four options for the Committee.

Option 1 is for Congress to pass legislation ratifying the existing FBI authority as set forth by Presidential directives and Executive Orders.

Option 2 suggests Congress might give serious consideration to creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Department of Justice. In this Option, Elliff suggests that the FBI itself has considered this Option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from law enforcement functions of the Bureau.

Option 3 considers the elimination of FBI domestic intelligence. In his analysis of this position, it might be possible for the Bureau to develop the necessary intelligence information through its normal criminal investigations and thus remove the necessity for domestic intelligence investigations as presently conducted.

Option 4 considers setting standards for domestic intelligence investigations. In this Option, Elliff states that the FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only as Congress finds that regular criminal investigations would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of Federal law and that incidents of the use of violence in such violations are of a serious nature and threaten the security of the country.

For purposes of the Director's appearance on 12/9/75 before the Senate Select Committee, it is believed his response to questions concerning the aforementioned position papers should be that the Bureau has received copies and is reviewing the various proposals and that it would not be appropriate at this time for the Director to comment regarding the substance of the proposals.

CONTINUED - OVER

↓ ↓

Elliff indicated during this meeting that the Director during his appearance may anticipate being asked a question by one of the Senators relating to his statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal concerning the necessity for the sacrifice of certain individual rights at the expense of investigations. He also anticipated the Director might be asked a question concerning his position on COINTELPRO. Regarding the question concerning the Director's statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal, the Legal Counsel Division will draft a proposed resonse. Concerning COINTELPRO, a response has been prepared and will be put together with the briefing material for the Director.

This memorandum in general highlights the Options presented in the attached papers. A more detailed analysis should be prepared by the Intelligence Division and existing documents addressing these proposals should be made available for the Director's briefing book for his testimony.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Director respond to questions concerning the attached position papers as set forth above.

Done.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division draft a proposed response concerning the Director's statement made in Montreal relating to the sacrifice of certain individual rights.

Done.

(3) That the Intelligence Division make a detailed review of the various Options set forth in the two attached position papers. (FOR SUBSEQUENT STAFF CONFERENCE AFTER 12/9) Jma

See memo [illegible] w/ [illegible] to Senstudy 1/19/76 [illegible]

Jma

Ret. from 20 12/12/75 Jma

Issues and Options for Discussion with Former Attorneys General Rogers, Katzenbach, and Clark

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALMKP

I. Background

In the past few weeks the staff has presented the Committee with evidence suggesting the following about the FBI's internal security intelligence program:

A. The program is massive, involving the collection of information on the activities of thousands of innocent, law-abiding American citizens.

B. These individuals were not alleged espionage agents, but citizens who fall within the FBI's vague definitions of "subversion" and "extremism" -- purely homegrown "threats to the national security".

C. That FBI policy on "subversive" and "extremist" investigations was vague and subject to the following abuses:

  1. overbreadth in scope in that groups were investigated whose threats to the national security were tenuous, if not non-existent.

  2. collection of information on the personal life and political views of subjects unrelated to the national security.

  3. the continuance of investigations well after it should have become obvious that there was no legitimate predicate.

D. Particularly invasive collection techniques were used, including electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entries. Although these have been terminated, the predominant and perhaps most insidious continues today through the FBI's huge informant/confidential source network.

E. Information collected in the course of these investigations is disseminated regularly throughout the federal government and to local law enforcement.

F. Until 1971, information collected through these investigations was disseminated as part of the COINTELPRO program to the subjects' friends, relatives, employers, and others in an effort to discredit or "neutralize" alleged "subversives" or "extremists".

62-116395 - 1215X

ENCLOSURE

G. The FBI's internal security intelligence program was used by Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon to serve their political interests, usually by collecting information on critics or political opponents.

H. The program was conceived and implemented in secrecy, and although parts of the program were shared with outside authorities from time to time, until now no President, Attorney General, or Congressional committee has been exposed to the entire program in detail.

I. The program is not authorized by statute but is founded on a series of secret or ambiguous Presidential orders, which in turn are based upon a questionable assertion of "inherent constitutional authority".

J. The program continues today, albeit on a much more limited basis than in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and the basic machinery for the program -- the huge informant/confidential source network -- is still operating.

K. There is no statute or internal Bureau or Justice Department policy prohibiting a new Director, Attorney General, or President from ordering the Bureau to expand the program to its earlier dimensions.

II. Issues and Options

Among the issues and options which might be discussed with former Attorneys General in response to what the Committee has learned are the following:

A. Abolition. Elimination of the FBI internal security intelligence program as Attorney General Harlan Stone ordered in 1924 when confronted with abuses growing out of the FBI's first internal security intelligence program, such as the infamous Palmer raids.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether there are not some functions (e.g., protecting the President, preventing or at least predicting violence by terrorist organizations, or predicting civil disorders) which require intelligence collection.

2. Whether FBI intelligence reports are valuable in that respect, especially in light of a recent GAO report suggesting that such reports are rarely useful in predicting violent activity.

3. Whether such information, assuming it is valuable, could not be obtained through more traditional criminal investigations.

4. Whether the value of the information, marginal or otherwise, justifies the risk to civil liberties inherent in such intelligence collection.

5. Whether, given the way in which limited and ambiguous grants of authority have been expanded into major authorizations, any statute short of a total prohibition of all non-law enforcement intelligence activities in the domestic sector will be adequate to prevent the recurrences of the kinds of abuses uncovered by this Committee. (Or, conversely, whether it is possible to draft a law authorizing a limited civil disturbance and counter-terrorist intelligence mission that will not eventually evolve, like the National Security Act of 1947, into a charter for unanticipated and unwanted covert activities.)

6. Whether it would be sufficient to restrict the FBI to criminal investigations without also (a) placing limits upon the length of investigations, (b) the kinds of information which can be collected and disseminated on the subject irrelevant to the alleged criminal act, (c) the utilization of warrantless electronic surveillance and other particularly invasive collection techniques, and (d) the utilization of a huge informant/confidential source network without judicial or Justice Department supervision.

B. Authorizing Statute. Recognition of the value of internal security intelligence, but placing limits upon the program designed to minimize the infringement upon civil liberties, an option being actively considered by the present Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out under the first option and, in addition:

1. Whether meaningful and stringent guidelines can be written which do not so hamper the administration of an internal security intelligence program as to make the product not just marginal, as GAO suggests, but worthless.*

2. In light of the possibility that the present Attorney General may address this matter via internal Justice Department guidelines, whether this approach does not ignore the legal authority question which can only be resolved by statute.

3. Whether or not Congress could draft a statutory version of the guidelines which could be flexible enough to meet an evolving threat and at the same time place meaningful restrictions upon the program.

4. Even assuming there is no absence of legal authority, is it safe to leave these guidelines in the form of a departmental order which can be rescinded by the next Attorney General?

C. Delegation of Authority to Attorney General. Simply ratifying the present program via enactment of a statutory charter which grants the FBI authority to conduct an internal security intelligence program subject to its own internal guidelines or departmental guidelines as proposed by the Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and:

1. Whether such a statute would not be an unconstitutional delegation of powers to the Executive Branch.

2. Whether enactment of such a statute would not represent a failure by the Congress to confront the issues raised above.

---

*A preliminary staff analysis of the Attorney General's draft guidelines suggests that, despite months of conscientious and painstaking work by a departmental task force, the guidelines are not adequate. This analysis, which will be presented when Attorney General Levi testifies on December 10, indicates that several of the more questionable FBI investigations (e.g., of Dr. King and the women's liberation movement) would still be permissible under these proposed guidelines.

D. Legislative Inaction. Enact no new statute affecting the FBI's legal authority or the internal security intelligence program.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and, in addition:

1. Whether this failure to act might not leave the status of the program in doubt and subject to court challenge.

2. Whether this failure to act after full disclosure by the Bureau might not be taken by the FBI and the courts as a ratification of the program.

E. Administrative Oversight by the Attorney General. The Justice Department should be required to exercise greater administrative oversight over the FBI's internal security intelligence program by Attorney General Levi, regardless of whatever other options Congress accepts.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is practical for the Attorney General or his staff to review thousands of such investigations each year.

2. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should review all or just the so-called "full" investigations.

3. Whether, to facilitate the conduct of such reviews, the Attorney General or his staff should be given "complete" access to Bureau files, including information regarding the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.

4. Whether it is possible to develop a staff of career attorneys within the Department with both the access and independence essential to the conduct of searching reviews.

5. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should not also be required to review various informant and so-called "intensification" programs, and the establishment of specialized indices (which have a significant impact upon which cases are opened) instead of just reviewing individual investigations in a vacuum as provided by the Attorney General's draft guidelines.

F. An Inspector General. In addition to the above options, an independent Inspector General should be created to investigate improprieties by the FBI. This option is advanced by those concerned about the inadequacy of the FBI's investigation of the disappearance of former Director Hoover's personal files, its limited inquiry into the so-called Atlantic City convention case, and the absence of any internal investigation of the abuses in the King case.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to maintain the independence of an Inspector General within the Department of Justice when both the Inspector General and the Director of the FBI will be responsible to the same official, the Attorney General.

2. Whether the Inspector General should have "complete" access to Bureau files, including information pertaining to the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.

3. Whether an Inspector General with access to extremely sensitive information might not become a serious threat to the independence of the Bureau from political influence and to the civil liberties of American citizens.

G. Congressional Oversight. In addition to the above options, the creation of an oversight committee(s) in the Congress, to which the Bureau would be required to report and which would have the power to investigate abuses.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the kinds of problems posed by the Justice Department oversight and Inspector General options discussed above to the independence of the FBI and the confidentiality of its files.

H. Public Reporting and Disclosure to Subjects. In addition to the above options, the requirement that the FBI make frequent public reports on the details of its internal security intelligence programs and policies and reveal the details of improper intelligence investigations to the subjects of those investigations.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is possible to reveal the essence of some programs and policies and the details of some investigations without jeopardizing the effectiveness of legitimate programs.

2. Whether such disclosure might not increase the number of law suits filed against the FBI alleging illegal activities.

DRAFT
MEMORANDUM

December 4, 1975

FBI LEGISLATION - PROPOSED OPTIONS

In preparation for the testimony of FBI Director Kelley and Attorney General Levi on December 9 and 10, the Domestic Intelligence Task Force is pulling together various proposals for legislation dealing with FBI intelligence. This paper sets forth some of the basic options.

A: Current Statutes and Executive Orders

The basic statute governing the FBI is 18 U.S.C. 533, which reads as follows:

> The Attorney General may appoint officials: (1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States, (2) to assist in the protection of the person of the President, and (3) to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General.

Clauses (2) and (3) are a possible statutory basis for intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Under (2), the FBI may "assist" the Secret Service in the protection of the President by providing

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1215X

ENCLOSURE

intelligence on persons or groups who may endanger the President's safety. A formal agreement between the FBI and the Secret Service sets forth the types of intelligence information provided by the Bureau. However, this agreement states that:

> The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction. (Tab A)

Clause (3) recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of Justice." This is a possible statutory basis for at least two broad areas of FBI intelligence investigations -- civil disturbance intelligence and intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program.

The most recent legal advice to the FBI from the Justice Department on the gathering and reporting of data regarding civil disturbances notes that on April 1, 1969, the President designated the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the government's response to civil disturbances. The FBI is instructed to gather and report on "all significant incidents of civil unrest" and on "all disturbances where there are indications that extremist organizations . . . are believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them." The

FBI is specifically advised to make reports "even when no specific violation of federal law is indicated." On the other hand, the FBI is instructed not to report "every relatively insignificant incident of a strictly local nature coming to its attention." (Tab B)

The Justice Department has given the following recent instructions to the FBI regarding intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program. Executive Order 10450, as amended by Executive Order 11785, is interpreted as requiring an FBI investigation of organizations "with a potential" of violating federal or state statutes prohibiting unlawful advocacy of violence or the commission of any unlawful act of violence. The FBI is advised that "it is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order." The FBI is instructed to apply "the same yardstick" to investigations of individuals who are affiliated with such organizations. The FBI is specifically advised that "it is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated." (Tab C)

Clause (3) also recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of State." This is a possible statutory basis for FBI intelligence investigation of foreign intelligence activities within the United States or to

collect positive foreign intelligence. The best example is the Attorney General's authorization of warrantless FBI electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. However, there is apparently no instruction from the Justice Department to the FBI directing the Bureau to initiate investigations of individuals or organizations which have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but about which there is no information indicating intelligence activity. (See Staff Report, "Counterintelligence/Counterespionage: The Law and the Philosophy", October 14, 1975.)

In his testimony before the Committee, Deputy Associate FBI Director James Adams made no reference to clauses (2) and (3) as a possible legal basis for FBI intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Instead, he placed sole reliance on a series of Presidential directives extending from 1936 until the 1960's which the FBI interprets as authorizing it to engage in "domestic security intelligence investigations". The Attorney General has codified these directives in a Justice Department regulation instructing the FBI to:

> Carry out the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15, 1953, designating the [FBI] to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters. 28 C.F.R., Section 0.85(d).

The FBI also cites directives of President Kennedy on June 9, 1962, and Attorney General Kennedy on March 5, 1964, which are the latest charter for the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, composed of the FBI Director and the chiefs of the military intelligence agencies. This group is authorized to coordinate "all investigation of domestic espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security." (Tab D)

The theory behind the FBI's position is that the President has inherent constitutional powers, at least in the absence of contrary legislation, to authorize FBI intelligence activities. The only judicial support for this theory is language in the Supreme Court's opinion in the Keith case, which declared warrantless wiretapping of domestic groups unconstitutional.

The Court acknowledged the importance of "national security in its domestic implications . . . especially at a time of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent periods of our history." Under such circumstances, the Court stated, the President has a "fundamental duty" under the Constitution to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." The Court added, "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means." Hence, the Court appeared to

recognize that the President's "domestic security role" has a "constitutional basis"; that the President through the Attorney General may need "to obtain intelligence information about those who plot unlawful acts against the Government"; and that "threats and acts of sabotage against the Government exist in sufficient number to justify investigative powers with respect to them." The Court applied the general principle that "unless the Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered." Nevertheless, the central holding of the Keith decision was that this power may not be exercised in such a way as to infringe constitutional rights. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

Even though the President may have the authority under the Constitution to direct the FBI to conduct intelligence investigations in the absence of legislation, Congress has the ultimate authority to substitute statutory authorization in place of the Presidential directives. As Justice Robert Jackson declared in the Steel Seizure Case, "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . ." 343 U.S. 579, 637.

B. Option One -- Ratifying Existing Powers

The first option for Congress is legislation ratifying the existing authority granted to the FBI by current Presidential directives and orders. Such legislation would be cast in extremely general terms. Its main advantage is that it would provide a basis for Congressional oversight. It could also reinforce the Attorney General's role as the immediate supervisor of FBI intelligence activities. The statute would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to conduct investigations of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities;
2. to gather and report information on civil disturbances;
3. to conduct investigations of other related intelligence matters affecting internal security; and
4. to conduct investigations of official matters relating to the Department of State.

In addition, the statute would require the Attorney General to report annually to the appropriate Congressional committees on the volume and type of investigations and reports, the investigative techniques used, and the policies and procedures adopted by the Justice Department and the FBI.

The weaknesses of this approach are obvious. Congress would have legislated a wholesale delegation of power without

standards or limitations other than the supervision of the Attorney General and oversight by Congress. In view of the Select Committee's findings as to the vast overbreadth of FBI domestic intelligence investigations and the abuses committed in the name of "counterintelligence", Congress would in effect be permitting future expansion of FBI operations to match past policies.

C. Option Two -- A Separate Security Intelligence Agency

Congress might give serious consideration to legislation creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the Justice Department. It would perform the functions of the present Counterintelligence Branch of the FBI Intelligence Division, dealing with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence/counterespionage. The FBI itself has considered this option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from the law enforcement functions of the Bureau. (Tab E)

A separate agency would be justified only if it was authorized to conduct investigations of a wider scope and using different techniques than would otherwise be permitted. In other words, Congress could decide that foreign counterintelligence investigations should go beyond investigation of specific crimes, that techniques such as electronic surveillance should be used without a warrant or with a special type of warrant,

and that operations should be conducted to "counter" foreign intelligence activities by means other than arrest or "persona non grata" proceedings. On the other hand, if Congress treats the investigation of foreign intelligence activities the same as a criminal investigation, then the FBI should keep the job.

Any statute in this area must use general language for diplomatic reasons. For example, Congress should not explicitly authorize deception operations or efforts to compromise hostile intelligence officers, even though such techniques may be envisioned. Such techniques are dealt with best by establishing adequate procedures for authorization and oversight to ensure accountability.

The legislation should be more specific where it deals with investigations and other operations directed at American citizens rather than non-resident aliens in the service of a foreign power. If Congress believes Americans should be investigated if they have a marked potential for use by a foreign intelligence service, but no information indicating intelligence activity yet exists, the legislation should say so.

The statute should also set out standards for determining whether a foreign-dominated domestic organization falls within the jurisdiction of the separate agency. There should at the very least be substantial information indicating that the organization is directed by, subsidized by, or in active

collaboration with a foreign government or organization. (The term "foreign organization" refers, for instance, to a group like the Palestine Liberation Organization.) If the group fits the criteria for foreign domination, there should be an additional finding that it may engage in intelligence activities or in activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law.

If the group meets all these standards, Congress may authorize the investigation of its activities going beyond regular criminal investigations. Such investigations could extend to all individuals who are members of, or express support for, the organization, as well as to the efforts of the organization to influence and control other groups. However, it may be sufficient to authorize only the investigation of active members and supporters. This would prevent a revival of the "Cominfil" policy of looking into all forms of lawful political and social activity where Communists might be involved.

The Petersen Committee report on COINTELPRO considered the need for special supervision of foreign counterintelligence operations in the United States. It recommended the creation of a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Commission to make decisions with regard to the necessity or acceptability of particular foreign counterintelligence techniques. (Tab F) This proposal

has merit in view of the limited amount of time the Attorney General can give to personal supervision and the after-the-fact role of legislative oversight regarding the separate agency.

Finally, legislation to create a separate foreign counterintelligence agency must deal with relationships to the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other foreign intelligence agencies. The current FBI-CIA agreement on their respective jurisdictions is only a "memorandum of understanding". It allows the CIA to undertake certain clandestine activities within the United States, in coordination with the FBI. (Tab G) Proposals are currently circulating in the Executive Branch for a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive to clarify this matter, as well as to regulate CIA electronic surveillance of American citizens abroad. (Tab H)

A full draft of a statutory charter for a separate foreign counterintelligence agency is not included here, since the focus is on domestic intelligence issues. However, one implication of such a statute would be that the remaining FBI functions should relate only to law enforcement and criminal investigations.

D. Option Three -- Elimination of FBI Domestic Intelligence

The basic assumption behind Attorney General Levi's effort to develop "guidelines" for FBI domestic intelligence is that regular criminal investigations are not adequate to

supply the information needed to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law. That assumption should be questioned. Regular criminal investigations are likely to produce a substantial amount of information which can be used to anticipate or prevent future crimes. For example, intensive criminal investigations of Ku Klux Klan violence in the South during the 1960's would have required the FBI to look into a wide variety of Klan activities. Another example is the search for Weatherman fugitives, a regular criminal investigation which involves broad inquiries across the country. The FBI has not yet demonstrated that the preventive information it has obtained came from intelligence investigations which would not have been conducted as regular criminal investigations.

The fact that an FBI investigation was supervised by its Intelligence Division does not necessarily mean that the investigation was, automatically, outside the regular criminal law enforcement jurisdiction of the Bureau. Any FBI investigation of activities involving the use of violence in violations of federal law falls within that jurisdiction. Moreover, regular criminal investigations can also extend to plans, attempts, or conspiracies to engage in such activities.

One suggested difference between intelligence-type and regular criminal investigations is that the latter are terminated after a reasonable time, if sufficient evidence to

justify prosecution is not obtained. However, there is no legal reason why the prosecutor cannot request that the investigation continue indefinitely as long as there is information that violent activities and plans for violence are still underway. The degree of evidence needed to justify a prosecution is certainly greater than the degree of evidence needed to justify an investigation.

All this is not to say that no further standards are needed to guide regular criminal investigations when they may touch on sensitive First Amendment or other constitutional interests. This is especially true of criminal investigations of individuals or groups engaged both in lawful political or social activities and in unlawful violence or plans for violence. To what extent is the advocacy of violence a proper basis for initiating an investigation? Should an investigation be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual is a member of, or has expressed public support for, an organization which has as one of its objectives the use of violence? Should an investigation be started on all members and public supporters of an organization, some of whose members have acted in concert to use violence?

These questions are addressed in the draft Attorney General's guidelines for domestic intelligence investigations under the heading "preliminary investigations". (Tab I) Since

the guidelines assume that there should be intelligence investigations, they do not consider whether such investigations might be permitted as regular criminal investigations.

The Klan and Weatherman examples again illustrate the point. Once it has been established that a particular Klan group is engaged in or planning violence, it seems reasonable to conduct at least preliminary inquiries to determine whether the members and supporters of the group are involved in the violence or the plans for violence. Similarly, the search for Weatherman fugitives who committed bombings and other acts of violence would appear reasonably to include preliminary inquiries to determine whether other Weatherman members and supporters have harbored the fugitives.

On the other hand, it would seem unreasonable to investigate members and supporters of all Klan groups across the country on the ground that some Klan groups have used violence. And it appears equally unreasonable to investigate all members and supporters of SDS because the Weatherman faction engaged in violence. The scope of the investigation must be logically related to its specific purpose, and not an excuse for wide-ranging collection of intelligence.

There is one possible exception to the requirement that the FBI only conduct regular criminal investigations. The Attorney General (and the President) do require reports on

major civil disturbances which may not involve violations of federal law. The FBI should be authorized to gather such data and make appropriate reports as part of its law enforcement responsibilities. However, the data and reports should be limited to information provided by local or state law enforcement authorities or obtained in the course of a regular FBI criminal investigation. Where local authorities provide information about individuals and organizations which are not the subject of a regular FBI criminal investigation, the data and reports should not be included in the FBI's general files and name index.

In periods of widespread civil disturbances, the Attorney General may require a more systematic procedure for maintaining and retrieving civil disturbance information. This was the case in 1967, when Attorney General Clark created the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit in the Justice Department. The IDIU stored and indexed civil disturbance reports separately from the FBI. The data was used to help anticipate or ameliorate disorders. IDIU has been abolished, although the basic function of evaluating reports on civil disturbances is still performed by the Justice Department. This function should also be authorized by statute, and the intent of Congress should be that the Attorney General must obtain specific legislative authorization for any future IDIU.

IDIU was not perfect. Under Attorney General John Mitchell it supplied a list of names of American dissidents to the CIA. (Tab J) It also was used in conjunction with grand jury proceedings inquiring into terrorist bombings. Both of these activities should be forbidden by the statute authorizing the Justice Department to evaluate civil disturbance information.

Finally, legislation may be needed to make clear that the FBI is not authorized to conduct investigations of organizations or individuals for the specific purpose of compiling a body of data to be used in connection with name checks under the Federal Employee Security Program. The same principle applies to FBI "assistance" to the Secret Service, under the present FBI-Secret Service agreement.

A statute must also address the FBI's current practice of maintaining an Administrative Index (ADEX) of the prime subjects of current domestic intelligence investigations. The past history of the FBI's Security Index and other target lists (Key Activists, Agitator Index, Key Black Extremists) suggests the need to enact legislation banning the compiling of lists of persons by the FBI, unless such persons have been arrested or convicted for specific crimes and the list is used in connection with the investigation of such crimes.

These proposals to limit the FBI to regular criminal investigations and civil disturbance reporting must be tested against the actual past experience of the Justice Department and the FBI. General instructions from the Department to the Bureau may be overly vague, even within the framework of criminal investigation. Two examples are Attorney General Clark's memorandum on riots in 1967 and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley's memorandum of campus disorders in 1969. (Tab K) The Nation of Islam exchange between the Department and the FBI in 1973-74 is another illustration. (Tab L)

Thus, there is no automatic panacea in restricting the FBI to criminal investigations. The need for careful scrutiny of actual investigative policies and practices by Congress and the Attorney General is just as great as if the FBI were authorized to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. Legislation must focus on procedures for ensuring accountability by regular reports from the Attorney General to the appropriate Congressional committees.

The following are some of the basic elements which should go into a statute embodying this option. It would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to investigate violations of federal criminal laws, provided that the scope and duration of the investigation are logically related to its specific purpose;

2. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law;

3. to seek legal advice from the Attorney General or his designee whenever a proposed action may be perceived, with reason, to unfairly affect the rights of citizens, provided that this responsibility to seek legal advice is the duty of both the FBI as an institution and FBI agents as individuals;

4. to collect information from state and local law enforcement agencies regarding major civil disturbances, provided that such information is not entered into the FBI general files and name index;

5. to disseminate information obtained from criminal investigations for the following purposes, under regulations promulgated by the Attorney General and published in the Federal Register:

a. prosecution of violations of criminal laws;

b. prevention or anticipation of violations of criminal laws;

c. assistance to the Secret Service in the performance of its protective responsibilities;

d. determination of the suitability of individuals for employment by the federal government;

6. to report civil disturbance information obtained from state and local law enforcement agencies to the Attorney General for the purpose of determining the need to use federal military force under 10 U.S.C. 331 et seq.;

7. to compile such lists of persons arrested or convicted for specific crimes as may be necessary for use in connection with the investigation of such crimes;

8. to provide to the Attorney General or his designee full access to any information in the possession of the FBI which he may deem necessary for the performance of his responsibilities to supervise FBI activities and to submit reports to appropriate Congressional committees on FBI activities;

9. to follow such other procedures and standards consistent with this statute which the Attorney General may prescribe, provided that such procedures and standards shall be published in the Federal Register or, if publication would substantially interfere with the conduct of investigations, reported to appropriate Congressional committees.

E. Option Four -- Setting Standards for Domestic Intelligence

The FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only if Congress finds (1) that regular criminal investigations as described above would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law, and (2) that the incidents of the use of violence in violations of federal law are so numerous and so serious as to constitute a significant threat to the internal security or domestic tranquility of the United States.

The fact that there are individuals and groups who engage in violence, advocate violence, or believe in the desirability of the ultimate use of violence to advance their political or social objectives is not enough to justify FBI domestic intelligence authority. There must be additional findings that regular criminal investigations are inadequate and that the overall threat of violence constitutes a serious danger to the country.

Furthermore, if FBI domestic intelligence is authorized by statute, it should be an annual authorization which must be renewed each year upon reconsideration by Congress and the Attorney General of these factors. Past experience indicates that the annual appropriations process does not provide an appropriate forum for considering the FBI's basic authority.

Attorney General Levi's draft guidelines provide a basis for the consideration of a domestic intelligence authorization. They do not cover the investigation of foreign-related activities which may be directed by, subsidized by, or otherwise conducted in active collaboration with a foreign government, a foreign organization, or their agents. (See Option Two above.)

The guidelines deal with five different types of threats of violence which may constitute serious dangers to the country:

1. overthrow of the government (revolutionary violence);

2. interference in the U. S. with the activities of a foreign government (bombing a consulate, attempting to assassinate a visiting foreign leader);

3. interference with the functioning of the government or the flow of interstate commerce to influence federal policies (violent protest activities, terrorist bombings);

4. deprivation of civil rights (Klan violence, violent protest against busing);

5. incitement of violence which may require the use of federal military force (riots, major civil disturbances accompanying protest demonstrations).

The guidelines also refer to violence directed at state governments, either overthrow of a state government or interference with the functioning of a state government.

Authorizing legislation should indicate whether domestic intelligence is necessary for any or all of these specific problems. For example, revolutionary violence in an attempt to overthrow the government may be a remote and speculative danger, while terrorist bombings may be substantially interfering with the functioning of the government. Klan violence was unquestionably a serious danger to civil rights in the early and mid-1960's, but is it so today? Major riots and civil disturbances were equally serious in the late 1960's and early 1970's, but not in more recent years. Violent interference with the functioning of a state government should, under our federal system, normally be dealt with by state and local law enforcement.

Therefore, the definition of the purpose of FBI domestic intelligence can be simplified. The Attorney General's draft guidelines might be revised to authorize FBI domestic intelligence investigations:

1. to ascertain facts or information which serves to anticipate and prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law intended to

   a. interfere, in the United States, with the activities of a foreign government or its authorized representatives; and

b. interfere with the functioning of the government of the United States or the free flow of interstate commerce in order to influence policies or decisions of the federal government.

This formulation concentrates on the most likely current serious danger to the country, namely, politically motivated terrorist violence. FBI Director Kelley's recent public statements have stressed the increase in terrorist activity from 24 bombings in 1973 to 45 terrorist bombings in 1974 and 46 such bombings in the first six months of 1975.

However, this increasing threat is not the only factor to be considered. In the course of the FBI's regular criminal investigations of these bombings and other incidents of terrorist violence, can it obtain as a by-product substantial information which may serve to anticipate and prevent future violence? If so, the need for broader intelligence-type investigations is less evident.

The draft guidelines provide that the FBI would conduct full-scale intelligence investigations on the basis of "specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion" that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, may be engaged in activities which may involve the use of violence in violations of federal law. The two "mays" render the requirement of "specific and articulable facts" almost meaningless. Therefore, any legislation should authorize the FBI:

2. to conduct full domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above.

The draft guidelines also discuss the surveillance techniques to be used in full domestic intelligence investigations, including informants, mail covers, and electronic surveillance. The guidelines note that additional techniques may need to be covered, such as inquiries made under "pretext", photographic surveillance, "trash covers", etc. However, the legislation may deal with techniques more generally by providing that the FBI is authorized:

3. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law.

More detailed regulation of investigative techniques for full investigations will be considered elsewhere.

The scope of domestic intelligence investigations under the draft guidelines is broadened considerably under the provision for "preliminary investigations". They can be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have advocated activities which may involve violence, or are members of, or

have expressed public support for, an organization which has as its objective activities which may involve violence. The purpose of the preliminary investigation is to verify or refute the allegations or information. However, the vagueness of the standard is obvious. Therefore, to be consistent with the criteria for full investigations, the FBI should be authorized:

4. to conduct preliminary domestic intelligence investigations on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert,

a. advocate the use of violence as described in 1 above;

b. are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above;

c. are members of or have expressed public support for an organization engaged in activities which involve, or are likely to involve, the use of violence as described in 1 above, provided that other members of the organization are currently the subject of a full domestic intelligence investigation or a regular criminal investigation.

Unless these changes are made in the guidelines, they would permit investigations similar to past investigations which have been seriously criticized. For instance, they would allow investigations of all SDS members or all Black Student Union leaders on the ground that their activities may involve violence,

even though there is no specific allegation of likely involvement in violence.

Another reason for the revision is to exclude those investigations which would be justified as regular criminal investigations. Thus, allegations or other information that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have engaged in or plan to engage in activities which involve the use of violence would fall within the FBI's regular criminal investigative jurisdiction. Intelligence investigations would extend further at the preliminary stage to cover advocacy of violence and membership in or public support for organizations involved in or likely to be involved in violence. Full investigations require a likelihood of violence, short of actual violence or plans for violence.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE;
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TESTIMONY,
DECEMBER 10, 1975

At 3:01 p.m. on December 5, 1975, Mark Wolf of the Attorney General's staff, called me at the instructions of the Attorney General and advised that the Attorney General requested:

(1) FBI manual sections on domestic intelligence investigations;

(2) A listing identifying all individuals and organizations now the subjects of FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

modified by call to AG

Wolf said that the Attorney General is currently en route to Chicago and will return to Washington on Sunday evening. Therefore, the requested materials should be delivered to the Attorney General no later than Monday morning, December 8, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division prepare an appropriate response to the Attorney General's instructions in time for delivery by 9:00 a.m. on December 8, 1975.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

EX-112

REC-962 - 116395 - 1215

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALMKP

15 DEC 17 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

8 4 DEC 3 1 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

WM

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (SC) 62-7721

May 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: NATIONALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO
INTERNAL SECURITY - PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST

We presently maintain an authorized technical surveillance at the residence of Rosa Collazo and her daughter, Lydia Collazo Turner, 1755 Anthony Avenue, Bronx, New York. This surveillance was originally installed on April 13, 1962.

Rosa Collazo is the wife of Oscar Collazo who is serving a life sentence in connection with the killing of a White House guard during an attempt to assassinate former President Truman on November 1, 1950. Both Rosa and her daughter are active in the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico in New York City. During the past six months, this surveillance has continued to furnish valuable information regarding activities of Puerto Rican independence advocates in New York. Through this surveillance, we have obtained information concerning the movement of Puerto Rican nationalists between New York and Puerto Rico. Included in this information was advance notice that Rosa Collazo planned to attend the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico during February, 1966, in Puerto Rico. Upon her return, details were obtained concerning the proceedings of the General Assembly. In addition, we were able to obtain advance notice of demonstrations in New York City in which nationalists participated. This enabled us to inform police authorities and interested Government agencies in advance of the demonstrations.

Unless you instruct to the contrary, this technical surveillance will be continued for an additional six months.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: DOMINICAN SITUATION
INTERNAL SECURITY -
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Diego Emilio Bordas Hernandez and his brother, Luis Manuel Alfredo Bordas, have emerged in the current Dominican crisis as important financial, political and military advisors to the deposed Dominican President Juan Bosch in the latter's efforts to regain control of the Dominican Government. Diego Bordas is a wealthy shipping executive currently residing in exile in San Juan, Puerto Rico, having been born in the Dominican Republic on January 11, 1923. He served in various high posts under Juan Bosch during the latter's short occupancy of the position of President of the Dominican Republic in early 1963. Bordas spends much of his time at 868 Ashford Avenue in San Juan, using an apartment at that address as his residence during the absence of its owner, Jose Antonio Benitez Jiminez, from Puerto Rico. Jose Benitez is the cousin of Jaime Benitez, the latter the Director of the University of Puerto Rico and a close associate and advisor of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas also maintains a residence at 21 V, Florencia, Pueblo Viego, a suburb of San Juan, near the current residence and headquarters of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas and his brother jointly operate a shipping business known as Bordas and Company at Highway Number 2, Puerto Viejo, Puerto Rico, and his financial dealings in support of the Bosch efforts can reasonably be expected to be conducted from this commercial establishment.

The Bordas brothers have both been the subjects of numerous allegations indicating their cooperation with procommunist and pro-Trujillo factions in Dominican politics and are apparently opportunists who have seized the current situation to enhance their political and financial futures. Luis Bordas is currently in the Dominican Republic acting as the Director of Military Operations of the rebel forces supporting Bosch.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION ~~SECRET~~
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

109-12-211-1423

REC 4

4 JUN 15 1965

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Luis Bordas is reportedly the Honorary Nicaraguan Consul in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and, as a result, Department of State clearance for technical coverage of the business he operates jointly with Diego Bordas was obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on June 1, 1965.

In view of the pressing nature of the international situation as it relates to the Dominican Republic, it is requested that you authorize technical coverage of the residences of Diego Bordas mentioned above and of the business address of the joint venture operated by the Bordas brothers. Authority is requested for similar coverage of any addresses to which the mentioned residences or business may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NdeBK

DATE 6/4/65

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

December 19, 1975

1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 2 in that letter.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a copy of the document in response to Item 2 which is being delivered to the SSC.

Delivered to Committee 12/22/75
to Shaheen's office 12/22/75

Enclosures (2) ST 115 REC-51

62-116395-1214X

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

7 JAN 22 1976

PEN:adn
(9)

ENCLOSURE

NOTE:

A copy of the SSC letter 12/4/75, is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copy of the memorandum being furnished is maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the document being provided to the SSC. As indicated in the enclosed memorandum, Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled separately. Items 1 and 3 requested in referenced SSC letter are being handled by the IS-3 and CI-3 Sections respectively. Item 4, a restatement of prior request submitted by the SSC is being handled separately by SA V. R. Thornton of the IS-1 Section.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JBH PEN WRW JPT WOC

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

62-116395

December 19, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of a copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, at the White House, Washington, D. C., dated October 27, 1964.

It is noted that in addition to requesting a copy of this letter the SSC requested materials reflecting this letter was hand-delivered to the White House by Mr. DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Attention is drawn to the upper right-hand corner of Mr. Hoover's letter to Mr. Moyers and to the notation appearing there reading "personally delivered 10/28/64, D." No additional materials are available in FBIHQ files reflecting delivery of this letter beyond the aforementioned notation which, it appears, bears the initial of Mr. DeLoach.

Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled in separate responses.

1 - The Attorney General

PEN:adn adn
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

62-116395-1214X

PEN

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 8, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee request seeking delivery of certain Bureau materials. Please prepare an appropriate response.

I invite your attention to paragraph numbered 4 which amends an earlier request of the Committee (Elliff letter of November 25, 1975, Item 6c) which request was the subject of a telephone conversation on December 3, with Mr. Seymor Phillips of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/lp

1-Ad Hoc
12-10-75

ENCLOSURE

62-116395--1214X

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.,
BARRY GOLDWATER, AR
CHARLES MC C. MATHIA , MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER,

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 4, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/lsl

Dear Mike:

The Senate Select Committee requests the following materials for delivery.

1. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the recommendation for, authorization of, and duration and termination of the electronic surveillance referred to in Items 1 and 22 of my letter of November 21, 1975 and in materials delivered to the Committee on December 1, 1975.

[illegible]

2. Delivery of a copy of the letter to Mr. Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated October 27, 1964, and materials reflecting that this letter was hand delivered by Mr. Cartha DeLoach on October 28, 1964.

Nugent

3. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the surveillances of Mrs. Anna Chennault in October and November, 1968.

[illegible]

4. The Committee's request in my letter of November 27, 1975, item 6c should be revised to read as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memornadum, including a summary of the ~~recommendations~~ of relevant Bureau personnel pertaining thereto."

Nugent

RECEIVED
DEC 4 1975

JTE

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

62-116395- 1214X

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/19/75

Caption of Document:
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
12/4/75 request - Martin L. King.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 12/23/75

Received by:

Title: Research Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116- - 1214X

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/4/75, item 2

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr.: Copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers 10/27/64 along with notation that shows letter was hand delivered by Mr. DeLoach 10/28/64.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-98

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395 — 1214X

186-10051/

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER 12-4-75

ITEM 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SDALMKP

Retain

62-116395-1214X

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

#MDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/31/00

October 27, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

Honorable William D. Moyers
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Moyers:

A confidential source of this Bureau who has supplied reliable information in the past furnished the following information concerning a contact on October 23, 1964, between Martin Wigington and Randolph Blackwell. Wigington was described as a member of the Democratic Party Correlation Committee, Austin, Texas. Blackwell is an assistant to Martin Luther King, Jr., at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Georgia.

Wigington indicated to Blackwell a desire for King to write "an anti-Goldwater letter" which Wigington's Committee intends to distribute in Texas among labor groups. Blackwell stated that King may go to Texas prior to the forthcoming presidential election and Blackwell inquired as to whether King would be "in any danger." Wigington stated that he would contact one Larry Goodman concerning any possible danger to King in Texas. This Bureau's source had no information concerning the identity of Goodman.

During this contact Wigington complained to Blackwell that a group from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which Conference is headed by King, and a group from the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America had picketed in Fort Worth, Texas. Wigington stated that this was not a good thing at this time since all Negro and labor organizations should be working for the election of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

This information is also being furnished to officials in the Department of Justice.

Sincerely yours,

REC 14

100-106670 (King)
1-100-442529 (CIRM)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

SFP:kmj
(12)

~~SECRET~~
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ST-101

NOV 2 1964

OCT 27 11 17 AM '64
RECEIVED-READING ROOM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NOV 4 1964
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Honorable William D. Moyers

NOTE:

[illegible]

Classified "~~Secret~~" as information reported is from AT 1380-S*, a highly sensitive source with respect to the racial situation. This source is of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of this information could compromise its effectiveness and thus be detrimental to the national defense. Information obtained from Atlanta teletype 10/23/64.

1 - Mr. Bassett - Encs.
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Encs.
1 - Mr. Gallagher - Encs.
1 - Mr. McDermott - Encs.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Encs.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Encs.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Encs.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly - Encs.

December 3, 1975

5
10

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On November 21, 1975 Inspector John B. Hotis of this Bureau met with Doug Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General; and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, concerning your forthcoming appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. At this meeting this Bureau was requested to provide write-ups on certain phases of this Bureau's operations which are to be used in the preparation of a briefing book for your testimony.

Attached are the following individual write-ups as requested on November 21, 1975: "Investigative Techniques"; "Organizational Structure and Functions of the FBI"; "Allegation of Misconduct Involving Special Agent in Charge, Miami Office"; "Director Hoover's 'Official and Confidential' (OC) Files"; "Allegations of Possible Misconduct by FBI Agents, Houston, Texas"; "Allegations of Personal and Official Misconduct of a Former Special Agent in Charge of the Baltimore Office"; "Allegation of Bribery by FBI Agent, New York"; "Allegation of Possible Misconduct by an FBI Agent, Detroit, Michigan"; "Allegations of Misconduct by FBI Agents, Richmond, Virginia, Field Office, in Connection with the Investigation of Illegal Wiretapping by the Richmond, Virginia, Police Department"; "Allegations of Violations of Gun Control Act by FBI Agent"; "Review of Appropriations Testimony for Fiscal Years 1955 thru 1976"; "Tenure of FBI Director"; "Transfer of Drug Enforcement Responsibilities to the FBI"; "Office of Special Review, Department of Justice"; and "Major Topics of Primary Concern to Congressional Committees."

Delivered to Mark Wolf's office 12-5-75

ZII-XI REC-9 62-116395-1212

With respect to the material requested by memorandum of Mark L. Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,

DEC 29 1975

PVD:dkg (13)

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2

62-116395-5-WOE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 DEC 31 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

to Inspector John B. Hotis of this office dated November 26, 1975, which requested additional information, we are gathering the necessary material on an expeditious basis and the results will be furnished as soon as possible.

Enclosures (15)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. - Enclosures (15)
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

NOTE: See Legal Counsel Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11-24-75, captioned "Testimony By The Attorney General Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." On 12-1-75 Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, requested the attached information be furnished as soon as possible. No later than 12-2-75. This response was coordinated and incorporates material prepared by the Inspection, Special Investigative, General Investigative, Files and Communications, and Intelligence Divisions. Due to the time constraints we are furnishing interim response. As completed additional material will be furnished to the Department.

2 - Mr J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
January 14, 1976
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

The Attorney General

Director, FBI 62-116395-1210X1

EX-110

REC-60

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letters dated December 4, 1975, and November 25, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 4 in the December 4, 1975, request and Items 7c and 8c of the November 25, 1975, request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with the material which is being furnished to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

VRT:adn
(9)

NOTE:

Copies of SSC letters 11/25/75 and 12/4/75 are attached to the file copy of enclosed LHM. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as documents being provided to the SSC. Copies of material being furnished to SSC being retained with Senstudy 75 Project.

Delivered to Dept 1-15-76

Delivered to Committee 1-15-76

JAN 14 3 03 PM '76

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 9 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 (1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

January 14, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, Item 4 of which requests materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.; and SSC letter dated November 25, 1975, Items 7c and 8c of which request materials concerning the Washington Spring Project and Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of materials in response to referenced requests.

In respect to Item 4 of the December 4, 1975, request, the only indication of any action taken concerning the recommendation contained in the pertinent memorandum dated March 29, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/3/68," appearing on page one and initials which are believed to be those of former Special Agent (SA) Harold P. Leinbaugh. Among the documents being furnished the SSC is a memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned, "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.," along with supporting documents, which were submitted to the Attorney General concerning background leading up to the proposed action recommended in the March 29, 1968, memorandum. It includes results of an interview of Leinbaugh.

In response to Item 7c, the only indication of any action taken concerning the suggestion (recommendation) contained in the memorandum dated March 26, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/4/68," appearing on page two of that memorandum and initials which are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

JBA

VRT:adn
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1210X

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

With respect to Item 8c which concerns a memorandum dated March 28, 1968, captioned, "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," the only indication of action taken concerning the recommendation contained therein is a pencilled notation appearing on page one, "Handled 3/28/68," and initials which again are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/LP

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/14/76

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

12/4/75 request Item 4
11/25/75 request Items 7c and 8C

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: D. V. Cook Date: 1/15/76

Received by: Florence Hoben

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1210X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
1/14/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 12/4/75, Item 4 and SSC letter 11/25/75, Items 7c and 8c

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating Procedures
Information Handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Delivery of materials regarding Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Washington Spring Project and the Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, respectively.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

62-116395

AJD:lhb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1210X

186-10019

INSTRUCTIONS.

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence·Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 12-4-75
ITEM 4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KGP

Retain

62-116395-1210X

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY [illegible]

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

EX-102

TJD:ted
(7)
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass. Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC-20

APR 11 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-441006—93

ENCLOSURE

1 - J. B. Adams
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - D. Ryan
1 - J. G. Deegan

REC-88

62-100-106670-3965 July 18, 1975

1 - H. A. Newman

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/SP

The following information is submitted regarding the background leading up to the proposed action recommended in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence, (Martin Luther King)." (copy attached)

This memorandum recommended that information be furnished to a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showing King as a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on March 28, 1968, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel).

A notation on the above referred to memorandum indicated that the recommendation was "handled" on April 3, 1968, by Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh of the Crime Records Division. (see notation on memorandum dated March 29, 1968, attached)

By way of background it should be noted that at about 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968, while standing on second floor balcony outside room 306 of the Hotel Lorraine, Memphis, Tennessee, King was shot and killed.

Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, reflects that King and other Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) officials were due to arrive in Memphis at 10:15 a.m. on April 3, 1968, via Eastern Airlines from Atlanta. (copy of Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, attached)

After King's death, an interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy, a close associate of King, reflected that he and King registered into the Hotel Lorraine in Memphis,

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

cah
HAN:cah (8)

copy to CRO + CRIM DIV 12/1/75 by MEMO CAP MARTIN LUTHER KING JR

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

ENCLOSURE

wkd

HW

TCD

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 AUG 5 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 560-920

Tennessee, at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968. (Information contained in report of SA Joe C. Hester dated April 17, 1968, Memphis, captioned "UNSUB, aka, Eric Starvo Galt, et al., Civil Rights" page 48. See attached FD-302 reflecting interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy).

For further background regarding the basis of this proposal Atlanta teletype dated March 28, 1968, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C" with second caption "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that on March 28, 1968, King and other SCLC people were in room 801, Holiday Inn, Memphis, Tennessee, at 4:30 p.m. (copy of Atlanta teletype attached)

A Memphis teletype dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that King participated in the march of sanitation workers on March 28, 1968. When violence erupted including the breaking of windows and looting by the marchers, King and a few associates ran to a nearby car and left the march proceeding to Rivermont Motel where they remained through the afternoon and evening. (copy of Memphis teletype attached)

On July 17, 1975, Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh, after having had all the facts set out above reviewed with him including the fact his notation of "handled" appeared on the March 29, 1968, memorandum, advised that he has absolutely no recollection of this memorandum and can unhesitantly state that he cannot now recall whether or not proposed information was ever disseminated to any news media source. He indicated that his notation "handled" would not necessarily mean that he did disseminate this information. In explaining this he stated that the notation could mean that he was merely clearing this document through Crime Records Division and at this late date there would be absolutely no way that he could make any positive statements as to whether or not the information recommended was ever disseminated to a news media source.

7/17/75

From the above recorded sequence of events as reflected in various communications identified above, it is evident that King returned to Memphis, Tennessee, from Atlanta

on April 3, 1968, and checked into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. The notation indicating that the proposed furnishing of information to the news media was "handled" on April 3, 1968, would, of course, preclude any such information from appearing in the press prior to King's checking into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968.

A review of appropriate files maintained at FBI Headquarters fails to reflect any newspaper article which could have been an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in the G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968.

A review of the "Memphis Commercial Appeal" for the period March 28 to April 4, 1968, maintained on microfilm in the Library of Congress failed to reflect any article which would appear to be an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968. References were noted indicating that King held a press conference at the Holiday Inn Rivermont Motel on March 29, 1968.

7/17

Enclosures (5)

NOTE:

See memorandum J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 7/18/75, captioned as above, prepared by HAN/cah.

Memorandum

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

OM : G. C. Moore

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

BJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

TJD:ted
(7)
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

TJD

REC-20

22 APR 11 1968

Deakin

Handled 4/3/68

100-106670-3?

100-448006-93

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2AIMKP

100-106670-93

ENCLOSURE

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

~~430PM URGENT 4-2-68 SAB~~

~~TO~~ DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS 157-1092 3P

Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/TP

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENN., ~~RM~~ RACIAL MATTER

ON APRIL TWO, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, MEMPHIS ~~PD~~ Police Department, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, ADVISED THAT THE FUNERAL OF LARRY PAYNE, SEVENTEEN YEAR OLD NEGRO WHO WAS SHOT BY MEMPHIS PD OFFICER AFTER STORE LOOTING GROWING OUT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT RACIAL DISTURBANCE, MEMPHIS, WAS HELD, WITHOUT INCIDENT, AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, MEMPHIS. ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED IN ATTENDANCE DESPITE FACT CHURCH CAN SEAT TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED. BODY INTERRED IMMEDIATELY AFTER FUNERAL. ARKIN ADVISED THAT ANOTHER SANITATION WORKERS SYMPATHY MARCH IS SCHEDULED FOR DOWNTOWN MEMPHIS AFTERNOON OF APRIL TWO.

100-106670-

NOT RECORDED
183 APR 9 1968

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED ON APRIL TWO THAT REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) AIDES RALPH D. ABERNATHY, BERNARD LEE, AND ANDREW M. YOUNG DUE TO ARRIVE MEMPHIS TEN FIFTEEN A.M., APRIL THREE, FROM ATLANTA.

END PAGE ONE Albert C. Hayden

1 APR 5 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Included --- letter to White House
and Attorney General. Date 4/3/68
CRV:ljs

ON APRIL TWO A SOURCE ADVISED THAT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, APRIL TWO, REV. JESSE JACKSON OF SCLC'S "OPERATION BREAD BASKET," REV. S. B. KYLES OF METROPOLITAN BAPTIST CHURCH, MEMPHIS, AND REV. EDWARD L. BROWN, MT. PISGAH CME CHURCH, ADVISED THAT WITH SCLC PERSONNEL IN MEMPHIS THAT NIGHTLY MASS STRIKE SUPPORT MEETINGS WILL BE RESUMED, THE FIRST AT MASON TEMPLE ON NIGHT OF APRIL THREE WITH KING AS FEATURED SPEAKER. THEY SAID MASS MARCH WILL BE HELD FRIDAY, APRIL FIVE, AND THAT THEY WILL HAVE SCHOOL CHILDREN PARTICIPATE SINCE MARCHING WITH "MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE GREATEST LIVING AMERICAN," WOULD BE MORE EDUCATIONAL THAN BEING IN SCHOOL. WHEN ASKED BY PRESS IF KING WOULD PERSONALLY MARCH, JACKSON SAID KING MIGHT NOT MARCH. HE DID NOT ELABORATE. WHEN ASKED IF SCLC GROUP WOULD VIOLATE A POSSIBLE INJUNCTION AGAINST THEIR MARCHING, JACKSON SAID "THE WHITE MAN HAS ALREADY ENJOINED THE BLACK MAN TO THE GHETTO AND THE WHITE MAN DOESN'T NEED TO VALIDATE IT BY SENDING US A PIECE OF PAPER." KYLES SAID THE PROBLEM FACING MEMPHIS IS NOT MILITANT BLACK YOUTH BUT IS "WHITE RACISM." JACKSON DESCRIBED OPERATION BREAD BASKET AS MASSIVE

END PAGE TWO

DRIVE TO FORCE ALL GROCERS IN NEGRO AREA TO CEASE SELLING HART'S BREAD, WONDER BREAD, COCA COLA, AND SEALTEST DAIRY PRODUCTS AS THESE FIRMS DO NOT HIRE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF NEGROES.

ON APRIL TWO LT. ARKIN ADVISED THAT MEMPHIS CITY OFFICIALS ARE CONSIDERING SEEKING A COURT INJUNCTION PROHIBITING ANY MASS MARCH LED BY KING OR AN INJUNCTION SPECIFYING CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A MARCH COULD TAKE PLACE AND ALSO CONSIDERING RESUMPTION OF A CURFEW AND PLACING STRIKE SUPPORT LEADERS UNDER A PEACE AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY BOND.

ARKIN ADVISED THAT REMAINDER OF TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARD, WITH EXCEPTION OF ONE BATTERY CONSISTING OF TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY THREE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE MEMPHIS GUARD UNIT, HAVE LEFT MEMPHIS.

AT THREE ZERO FIVE PM, SIXTY SANITATION WORKERS AND SYMPATHIZERS DEPARTED CLAYBORN TEMPLE CARRYING PLACARDS FOLLOWING THEIR USUAL PARADE MARCH TO BEALE STREET NORTH ON MAIN TO CITY HALL. NO INCIDENTS REPORTED.

memo
~~LHM~~ FOLLOWS. P. END.

CAL

FBI WASH DC

F

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date April 8, 1968

Ralph B

Reverend RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, 690 La Verne Drive, N. W., Atlanta, Georgia, was interviewed at the Memphis Police Department at 10:55 p.m., April 4, 1968. Reverend ABERNATHY was advised of the Agent's identity and of the nature of the matter under investigation.

Reverend ABERNATHY, who described himself as Vice President at Large and Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, stated he was Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.'s closest associate and stated that he and Dr. KING always shared a room whenever they travelled together. He stated that at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968, he and Dr. KING registered at the Lorraine Motel, Memphis, Tennessee.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that on April 4, 1968, he and Dr. KING did not leave the motel and spent most of the day in their room, #306, which is located on the second floor of the motel. He stated that he and Dr. KING had been gone from their room for approximately one hour or less when they returned to the room at about 5:30 p.m. He said they got dressed as they were going to dinner at the home of Reverend BILLY KYLE and that at almost exactly 6 p.m. they started to leave the room. Reverend ABERNATHY stopped for a moment and Dr. KING walked out onto the balcony just outside the door to his room. Reverend ABERNATHY was still inside the motel room but could hear Dr. KING discussing the dinner engagement with other associates who Reverend ABERNATHY believes were standing in the parking area of the motel underneath and to the front of the balcony on which Dr. KING was standing.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated he heard what sounded like a firecracker and then heard the screams of persons to whom Dr. KING had been talking. Reverend ABERNATHY went then to the balcony and discovered Dr. KING lying there wounded in the right side of the face and neck. He said he believed Dr. KING attempted to speak to him but was unable to do so. Reverend ABERNATHY said he instructed someone to call an ambulance and then accompanied Dr. KING in the ambulance to the hospital where Dr. KING subsequently died.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 4/4/68 at Memphis, Tennessee File # Memphis 44-1987

by SA JOE C. HESTER: bn Date dictated 4/8/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that judging from the sound of the noise it appeared that the shot came from directly in front of the door and not from any great distance. He stated he did not observe anything that would indicate who fired the shot. Reverend ABERNATHY also stated that while they were in the motel room Dr. KING did not, to his knowledge, receive any telephone calls of a threatening nature or calls from persons who would not identify themselves. Reverend ABERNATHY said Dr. KING had not feared that any particular persons might harm him and Reverend ABERNATHY was unable to suggest any suspects or to provide any other information which might assist in identifying Dr. KING's killer.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

11:17PM URGENT 3-28-68 ARK

TO DIRECTOR (100-106670) AND MEMPHIS

FROM ATLANTA (100-5586)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SM-C.

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE. RM.

IN FORMANT

AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT FOUR THIRTY PM MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

INFORMANT'S INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM DISCUSSION SHORTLY BEFORE WITH HOSEA WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, SCLC, CURRENTLY IN ATLANTA, WHO DURING LATE AFTERNOON MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, CONFERRED TELEPHONICALLY WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., PRESIDENT, SCLC; RALPH D. ABERNATHY, VICE PRESIDENT AND TEASURER, SCLC; AND BERNARD LEE, SPECIAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, SCLC.

KING, ABERNATHY, AND LEE ARE CURRENTLY IN ROOM EIGHT ZERO ONE, HOLIDAY INN, MEMPHIS.

WITH REFERENCE TO RACIAL DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, KING IS EXTREMELY DEJECTED. HE AND ABERNATHY STRONGLY FEEL DISTURBANCE ON THIS DATE DELIBERATELY PLANNED

EX-115 REC-9 [illegible]-3278

XEROX 1968

APR 15 1968

5 APR 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

BY NEGROES WHO ARE NEITHER SYMPATHETIC TO KING OR SCLC. IDENTITY OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS NOT KNOWN.

ABERNATHY, LEE AND WILLIAMS ARE GREATLY CONCERNED FOR WELFARE OF KING, PARTICULARLY ON NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, WHEN HE EXPECTS TO PARTICIPATE IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION WITH SANITATION WORKERS. AT PRESENT TIME KING DOES NOT FEEL HE SHOULD LEAVE MEMPHIS. DURATION OF STAY AND FURTHER DETAILS IN THIS CONNECTION NOT KNOWN.

ACCORDING TO WILLIAMS, HE, ABERNATHY, AND LEE STRONGLY FEEL SAME ELEMENTS WHICH CAUSED DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS EARLIER MARCH TWENTYEIGHT MAY CAUSE PERSONAL HARM TO KING EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

[illegible]

INFORMATION FROM AT ONE THREE EIGHT SEVEN-R MUST BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. MEMPHIS, HOWEVER, SHOULD ADVISE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF NOT ALREADY KNOWN THAT KING CONTEMPLATES PARTICIPATING IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT AND THAT IN VIEW OF EARLIER DISTURBANCES IN MEMPHIS ON THIS DATE, SEVERAL RANKING SCLC OFFICIALS APPREHENSIVE FOR PERSONAL WELFARE OF KING.

PAGE THREE

FOREGOING INFORMATION TELEPHONICALLY FURNISHED MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.

RECEIVED: 11:39PM RM

MAR 29 1968

FBI WASH DC

FBI MEMPHIS

1256AM URGXENT 3-29-68 DGB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEMPHIS (157-1094)

Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, ~~RM.~~ Racial Matter

RE MEMPHIS TELS, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT ACTIVITIES;

ON MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU, MEMPHIS POLICE DEPT., ADVISED THAT THE MASS MARCH TO BE LED BY REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IN SUPPORT OF SANITATION WORKERS STARTED AT AROUND ELEVEN AM CST WITH ESTIMATED FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND WORKERS, MANY OF WHOM WERE NEGRO TEENAGERS. MARCH STARTED AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, LOCATED HEART OF NEGRO AREA, AND KING JOINED MARCH AFTER IT PROGRESSED ONE BLOCK. HE WALKED WITH MARCHERS TO VICINITY BEALE AND MAIN STREETS, MADE NO SPEECHES PRIOR TO MARCH, MADE NO KNOWN UTTERANCES DURING MARCH, AND BY TIME HE REACHED ABOVE POINT RAMPANT BREAKING OF STORE WINDOWS AND LOOTING WAS BEING PERPETRATED BY MARCHERS, WHEREUPON KING AND A FEW ASSOCIATES RAN TO A NEARBY CAR AND LEFT MARCH, PROCEED TO RIVERMONT MOTEL WHERE THEY REMAINED THROUGH AFTERNOON AND EVENING. BY NOON, POLICE HAD BROKEN UP CROWD, BEING FORCED TO USE TEARGAS, BUT SPORADIC LOOTING HAS CONTINUED THROUGH AFTERNOON

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Included in letter to White House
and Attorney General. Date

NOT RECORDED
162 APR 4 1968

1cc 110
1cc 1

70 APR 12 1968

PAGE TWO

AND EVENING, PRIMARILY CONFINED TO SOUTH CENTRAL AREA OF MEMPHIS, A PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO AREA, PRIMARY TARGET OF LOOTERS BEING LIQUOR STORES AND SMALL GROCERIES.

TENNESSEE STATE LEGISLATURE TODAY PASSED CURFEW BILL, WHICH WAS INVOKED BY MEMPHIS MAYOR HENRY LOEB, EFFECTIVE SEVEN PM, AND THIRTY FIVE HUNDRED TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARDSMEN FROM MEMPHIS AND WEST TENNESSEE ARE CURRENTLY ON DUTY IN MEMPHIS OPERATING AS TACTICAL UNITS, BEING ACCOMPANIED ON THEIR PATROLS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMPHIS PD.

SCHEDULED MASS RALLY TO FEATURE KING NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT CANCELED. AT TWELVE MIDNIGHT, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, THREE HUNDRED ARRESTS, PRIMARILY RELATING TO LOOTING AND CURFEW VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY POLICE DEPT. FOUR INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN SHOT, ONE OF THESE, A SIXTEEN YEAR OLD BOY, WAS KILLED IN ACT OF LOOTING A STORE. THREE OTHERS WERE SHOT, TWO BY POLICE OFFICERS AND ONE BY A STOREKEEPER WHILE LOOTING, NONE SERIOUSLY INJURED.

AGE THREE

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED THAT KING, RALPH ABERNATHY, AND BERNARD LEE, FAILED TO LEAVE MEMPHIS ON EASTERN FLIGHT THREE NINE EIGHT, NINE ZERO FIVE CST, DUE TO ARRIVE ATLANTA ELEVEN ZERO THREE PM EST. THIS ALSO CANCELS KING'S AND LEE'S FLIGHT FROM ATLANTA SIX TWENTY AM MARCH TWENTY NINE DUE TO ARRIVE BALTIMORE SEVEN FORTY TWO AM. INSPECTOR G. P. TINES, MEMPHIS PD, ADVISED KING PLANNING TO STAY IN MEMPHIS AT RIVERMONT HOTEL TONIGHT, FUTURE PLANS UNKNOWN AT PRESENT TIME. P.

CORR PAGE TWO, PARA ONE, LINE ONE WORDS EIGHT, NINE, AND TEN SHLD BE "AREA OF MEMPHIS" AND LINE TWO, PARA ONE, WORD FIVE SHLD BE "PRIMARY"

PAGE TWO PARA THREE, LINE ONE WORD SIX SHLD BE "KING" AND LINE THREE WORD THREE SHLD BE "PRIMARILY" AND A PERIOD SHLD BE BETWEEN "DEPT. AND FOUR" ONEXXX ON LINE FOUR.

PAGE TWO PARA ONE LINE THREE WORD ONE SHLD BE "LIQUOR"

END.

HFL

FBI WASH DC cc - Mr Trainor

P

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/18/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. A. Newman

SUBJECT: DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

During a conference on 7/16/75 between the Assistant Attorney General, J. Stanley Pottinger, and his staff and the Director of the FBI and his staff, a question arose concerning Martin Luther King's alleged moving from one hotel or motel to another hotel or motel in Memphis, Tennessee, prior to his murder on 4/4/68.

Attached is a letterhead memorandum (LHM) setting forth an inquiry including a review of all appropriate Bureau files regarding a proposal made in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 3/29/68 in connection with the counterintelligence program wherein it was recommended that information be made available to a cooperative news media source showing King to be a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on 3/28/68, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel). The LHM will reflect and document the fact that although a notation appears on the memorandum that it was "handled" there is no information available to reflect that it was ever actually given to a cooperative news source. Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh (retired), who placed the notation "handled" on the document, absolutely has no recollection of this matter nor can he state whether or not the information was disseminated.

REC-88 100-106670

The time elements as documented in this LHM would preclude the proposal contained in the 3/29/68 memorandum of having any affect upon King's cnoice of a motel in which to reside.

JUL 29 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached LHM along with attachments be disseminated to the Department.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Delivered 7/22/75 to Pottinger's office

HAN:cah (6)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 26, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM

PURPOSE:

To recommend item be furnished cooperative national news media source by Crime Records, designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising for the Washington Spring Project.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has now scheduled the Washington Spring Project, his "poor people's march on Washington, D. C.," for the latter part of April, 1968. King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) has sent out a mailing to 70,000 potential financial contributors. King asked these 70,000 to contribute to the Washington Spring Project for the feeding and housing of the marchers.

At the same time, churches in the Washington, D. C., area have said they will feed and house King's marchers.

SUGGESTION:

REC-D 812405

That the above facts be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division so that a story could be

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. M. Wells
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC 38

100-448006

EX 106

APR 9 1968

55 Enclosure
TJD:df/dsm (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

given nation-wide circulation that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people he solicited. Since the churches have offered support, no more money is needed and any contributed would only be used by King for other purposes. This item would need nation-wide circulation in order to reach all the potential contributors and curtail their donations. A sample item is attached.

ACTION:

That the facts about King's solicitation of funds unnecessarily be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division.

W.e.

✓

Handled 4/10/68

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), today finds himself in the embarrassing position of having too much money, or at least the probability of too much money. The SCLC sent out a huge mailing to its contributors pleading for funds for the Washington Spring Project, the "poor people's march on Washington." Thousands of contributors were urged to support the march financially in order to feed and house the demonstrators. But the churches in the Washington, D. C., area have offered to house and feed the demonstrators.

Now the contributions are beginning to roll in from the mailing and King doesn't need the money. An embarrassment of riches has befallen King, who will only use the money for other purposes. The churches had better come through with all the housing and support the demonstrators need, because there will be little money left for the "poor people" by the time the march rolls around.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

100-448006-8

SSC REQUEST 11-25-75

ITEM 8C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GP

Retain

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop ✓
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
RACIAL MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

A sanitation workers strike has been going on in Memphis for some time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis. King was in an automobile preceding the marchers. As the march developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke out including the breaking of windows in stores and some looting.

This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called nonviolence advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience for Washington in April.

REC-19
EX-105 157-9146-38
APR 2 1968

ACTION:

Attached is a blind memorandum pointing ~~out the~~ above, which if you approve, should be made available by Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources. (On a strictly confidential basis)

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

TDR:fhd (6)

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Deakin

W.e.S.

OK H

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RACIAL INT. SECT.

5 APR 1968

AUG 30 1968

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, injected himself into the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and the result of King's famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism, looting, and riot.

Previously, King involved himself in this strike, called for a general strike, and called for a mass march. Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of the line. Negroes began shouting "black power" and trouble began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and looting broke out.

Police officers were forced to use gas to break up the march and to control the crowd. It was necessary to activate the National Guard. Martin Luther King claims his much-heralded march on Washington, scheduled for April 22, 1968, will also be "nonviolent." He says he has persuaded militant black nationalists to abandon violent extremism in Washington, D. C., during the march. Memphis may only be the prelude to civil strife in our Nation's Capitol.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

157-9146-38

ENCLOSURE

~~157~~

XEROX
APR 4 1968

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MO.
MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 25, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

I would appreciate your making available to the Committee the following items in connection with our investigation of the King matter:

1. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between one Val Coleman and Special Agent Harold Linebaugh or any other FBI Headquarters officials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

2. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between any FBI Headquarters officials and any representatives of the news media concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.

3. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to a meeting between Ralph Abernathy and either FBI Director Hoover or Cartha DeLoach during December 1964 or January 1965 (other than the December 1, 1964 meeting which was attended by Dr. King and the January 11, 1965 meeting which was attended by Andrew Young).

4. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to the following statement which appears in the second paragraph of the September 11, 1964 memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - Communist":

RECEIVED
DEC 1 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

62-116395-1210X

On that occasion Assistant Director DeLoach's office was able to take appropriate action to forestall the publication of the article.

5. The 7/16/64 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan which is noted in handwriting at the bottom of the second page of the July 15, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

6. With respect to the March 29, 1968 memorandum, with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" please provide:

a. Access to original of this memorandum and its enclosure;

b. Access to all extant "tickler" and/any other copies of this memorandum and its attachment in their original form;

c. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memorandum. ~~(This should include any and all information adduced, collected, and/or prepared in connection with Mr. James Adams' testimony on this subject before the Senate Select Committee on November 18, 1975.)~~

d. All memoranda and any other materials received from FBI field offices or written at FBI Headquarters prior to and pertaining to the recommendation contained in the March 29, 1968 memorandum.

7. With respect to the memorandum with enclosure, from W. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 26, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project)", please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

8. With respect to a memorandum with enclosure, from G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan, dated 3/28/68, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

9. Responses to Items 6, 7, and 8 should include copies of all newspaper clippings or magazine articles contained in FBI files which contain information set forth in the memoranda and/or enclosures identified in Items 6, 7, and 8 above.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 1, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated November 25, 1975, requesting various information regarding the King matter. Please prepare an appropriate response to this request.

EX-110

cc: Paul Daly

REC-60

62-116395-1210X

7 MAR 5 1976

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CP

1-Ad Hoc
12-3-75

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 11/28/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY

Removed By 7 9 JAN 1 1976

File Number 62-116395-1210

Permanent Serial Charge Out

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

The Attorney General

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP3ALMKP

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum, with attachment, concerning an interview of former FBI Assistant Director Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum, with attachment, for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Your specific attention is invited to certain information relating to the interview of Wick suggestive of improprieties on the part of an SSC Staff Member. The facts, as known to this Bureau, are as follows.

Wick first contacted this Bureau concerning the interview by telephone on November 5, 1975, to advise that he had been called on October 31, 1975, by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein representing the SSC. Epstein requested Wick to come to Washington, D. C., for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his "employment." Epstein did not further describe the subject matter of the interview and an appointment was arranged for November 7, 1975. Wick said that he was uncertain as to the probable subject matter of the interview because other matters coming within his responsibilities as Vice President of Pan American World Airways which were unrelated to the FBI, have been of recent interest to the SSC. Wick asked for advice of the FBI concerning this matter. Thereupon, the Legal Counsel Division of this Bureau contacted Epstein and determined that the subject matter of the interview of Wick would be Martin Luther King, Jr. A return call was made to Wick on November 5, 1975, to advise him that this Bureau had learned that the subject matter of the interview would be Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395-1209X

REC-51

3 JAN 13 1976

1 - 67 (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

SFP:mjg
(11)

2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

✓ S.F. Phillips

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JAN 20 1976

On November 6, 1975, Wick again telephoned this Bureau and advised that he had been rather annoyed at Epstein's initial approach to him; particularly, because Wick had tried on more than one occasion during the telephone conversation with Epstein to pry from Epstein the subject matter of the interview but Epstein persisted in not advising him.

This Bureau's representative who had determined from Epstein on November 5, 1975, the subject matter of the interview has advised that when he made the inquiry of Epstein, he asked Epstein why he had not told Wick the subject matter. Epstein's reply was that Wick had not asked him, a statement directly contradictory to Wick's advice to this Bureau.

The second suggested impropriety is that Epstein contacted Wick prior to advising this Bureau of his intention to interview Wick, an action which is contrary to procedures which have been agreed upon between the SSC and this Bureau.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

62-116395

December 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S.F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (AD) ROBERT WICK
BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/GG

This memorandum concerns an interview of former FBI AD Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members.

On November 5, 1975, Wick advised this Bureau that on October 31, 1975, he had been contacted by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein of the SSC who requested Wick to come to Washington for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his employment. Epstein did not further describe the subject matter although Wick attempted to obtain such information from Epstein.

Upon receipt of the above information from Wick, this Bureau determined from Epstein that the subject matter was to be Martin Luther King, Jr., and that fact was relayed to Wick on November 5, 1975. Wick was also told that he was being released from his secrecy agreement with the FBI for the purpose of the interview, confined to the indicated subject matter. Wick was also advised by this Bureau that he was not required to answer questions falling within four privileged areas: matters pertaining to pending investigations; information from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies; information concerning sensitive methods and techniques; and information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources.

Attached hereto is a copy of a MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE dated November 12, 1975, which Wick voluntarily furnished this Bureau and which represents his report pertaining to the interview.

Enclosure

1 - 67- (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert Wick)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SFP:mjg (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

62-116395-1209

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Assistant Director (AD)
Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members

NOTE:

Information relating to contacts between Wick and this Bureau are reported in memoranda 11/5/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," and 11/7/75 from W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall "Senstudy 75." Wick's statement, MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE, was mailed to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The matter of improprieties was addressed specifically in the above 11/7/75 Cregar memorandum and it is believed that the Department should be made aware of this matter.

Let 4 ANM 40 AG
[illegible] Encl (2)

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former Assistant Director Robert Wick

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interviewed regarding his knowledge of the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Ayd

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

86-100/9

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
~~Telephone Rm.~~ ____
Director Sec'y ____

F B I

Date: 12/9/75

Transmit the following in ________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION & ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

FROM: ADIC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243)

RE: SENSTUDY, TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS, AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR W. RAYMOND WANNALL 12/2/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/CG

Re Los Angeles phone call to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS, 12/9/75.

On 12/3/75, the attached article appeared in the Los Angeles Times under the byline of reporter JACK NELSON. As indicated, the headline and lead paragraph which supposedly is based on ADAMS' testimony, clearly reflects that the FBI did nothing to prevent Klan violence although we knew of the contemplated violence. After discussing this matter with Mr. ADAMS and reviewing the actual testimony received in the Los Angeles Division on 12/8/75, SAC ELMER F. LINBERG and I met with Editor BILL THOMAS and National Editor ED GUTHMAN at the Los Angeles Times.

I advised these gentlemen that I was aghast when I read the headlines and the lead paragraph of this article and could not believe that JIM ADAMS did not refute informant ROWE's testimony that we took no action relative to contemplated violence since I knew that this was contrary to the rules, regulations, policy, and philosophy of the FBI in 1960. I then called Mr. ADAMS in Washington, D. C., and he likewise, was upset over the headline and lead paragraph,

ENCLOSURE

EX-112

REC-38

62-116395-1209

3 - Bureau (1 Encl)
1 - Los Angeles
REG:mmb
(4)

17 DEC 12 1975

JAN 7 1976

Approved: ________________ Sent ________ M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

PERS. UNIT

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

because, according to ADAMS, he completely refuted these statements in that we did disseminate the contemplated plans of violence to the Birmingham Police Department and to the Department of Justice in the form of a letterhead memorandum.

I continued that I waited until I received the actual transcript of testimony and told the gentlemen that upon my review of the testimony of Mr. ADAMS and Mr. WANNALL, I could not reconcile the headline and lead paragraph with such testimony. I then proceeded to read several excerpts from the testimony.

I advised Mr. THOMAS and Mr. GUTHMAN that my immediate reaction was to prepare a "Letter to the Editor" but felt after a re-analysis of the situation that this is not a judgment question on the part of the newspaper, but one of a slanted, inaccurate story either by design or through misunderstanding. I therefore felt that the Los Angeles Times, if it so desired, should be in a position to correct the situation itself based on the facts.

Mr. THOMAS expressed appreciation for my approach and stated that at the time he read the article, already printed, a question came to his mind as to why the FBI did not advise someone or take some action relative to contemplated violence. He, however, took no further action. He said in view of what I had read from excerpts of Mr. ADAMS' testimony and the now available complete transcript of the testimony, he intends to pursue this matter further and would prefer not to have a "letter to the Editor", but rather correct any inaccuracies on the part of the Los Angeles Times through their own pursuit of further inquiring concerning this story.

Mr. GUTHMAN concurred with Mr. THOMAS and they indicated that it appears the obvious question is based on Mr. ADAMS' testimony of who in the Department of Justice received this information relative to contemplated violence and what did such a responsible Department of Justice official do with the information. He agreed that based on the information furnished to them, the FBI has been done an injustice but that they, the Los Angeles Times, desired to pursue this matter further.

It should be noted the article of JACK NELSON is based on one specific situation, namely the testimony of former informant GARY ROWE that he had furnished advance information to the FBI to the effect that members of the Ku Klux Klan would be given the opportunity to beat members of the Freedom Riders without interference by law enforcement authorities for approximately 15 minutes after which the local law enforcement authorities would take action, and that the FBI was advised of this well in advance of such beatings and furthermore, the FBI took no action to prevent this violence.

Took No Action to Prevent Klan Violence, FBI Admits

BY JACK NELSON

Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—An FBI official conceded Tuesday that the bureau had failed to use an undercover man's information to head off Ku Klux Klan violence in Alabama in the 1960s.

But, the official, James B. Adams, assistant to the director, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the FBI was "just as frustrated as anyone else" at "rank lawlessness" that existed in Alabama at that time. Also, he said, the FBI is an investigative agency and has no enforcement powers.

Adams' defense of the FBI came immediately after Gary Thomas Rowe Jr., wearing a hood to conceal his features, testified that on many occasions he had warned the bureau of the klan's plans for violence, but that the violence occurred without official interference.



WITNESS—Gary Thomas Rowe Jr. wears hood while testifying.

AP Wirephoto

Rowe served six years as an FBI undercover agent before surfacing in 1965 as the star witness against three klansmen accused of killing a white civil rights worker in Lowndes County, Ala. Since then he has been living

Please Turn to Page 6, Col. 1

KLAN VIOLENCE

Continued from First Page

in Southern California under an assumed name.

Rowe was one of two former undercover operatives who testified before the committee Tuesday. The other, Mary Jo Cook of Buffalo, N.Y., told of supplying the FBI with information about 1,000 persons while serving as an informant against the Vietnam Veterans Against the War during 1973-74.

Testimony by both witnesses prompted committee members to criticize FBI tactics and to suggest that legal restraints be put on future FBI activities.

Sen. Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), commenting on testimony by Rowe that he engaged in klan violence with the knowledge and approval of the FBI, observed that the bureau's infiltration of the klan not only failed to prevent violence, "but indeed may have contributed to it."

Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-Mont.) told Adams that the FBI had bungled its job in investigating political activities and added:

"It has interfered with civil liberties and finally in the last month or two through its public disclosures has heaped shame upon itself and really led toward the undermining of crucial public confidence essential to law enforcement agencies in the country."

Mondale criticized the FBI for trying to "protect people from subversive and dangerous ideas," and he told Adams:

"Time and time again, we're going to protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous. We're going to protect veterans from whatever it is, we're going to protect the (National) Council of Churches from veterans and so on . . .

"Don't you agree with me that we've got to control this, restrain it, define it, so that precisely what's expected of the FBI is known by you and by the public and you can justify your actions when we ask you?"

Adams disagreed that the FBI had bungled in the political intelligence field but agreed that restraining legislation was in order.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM KP

Los Angeles Times

12/3/75

62-116395-1209

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: 12-3-75

FROM : T. J. JENKINS

SUBJECT: GARY T. ROWE
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE

On 12-3-75 an individual who identified himself as Garland Reeves of the Birmingham, Alabama, News, called and he advised that he understood I was the Special Agent in Charge of the Birmingham Office at the time the bus was burned with the Freedom Riders in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1961. He stated that he would like to know if Rowe had furnished us information that the Birmingham Police were going to wait 15 or 30 minutes to go to the bus station in order to give the Klan an opportunity to work over the Freedom Riders. I informed Reeves that I recalled no such information being furnished to us at that time. I told him that all information we received concerning possible violence was furnished to the Birmingham Police Department. He wanted to know, if there had been such an agreement what action would I take. I told him that if I determined that the police department would not take any action for 15 or 30 minutes I would advise the Mayor ~~and~~ of the city and the Police Commissioner and if they felt the same as the police department, I would then advise the Governor of the State.

EX 100 REC 4 62-116395-1208

He wanted to know what would be the FBI's position at that time if the police department refused to take any action. I told him that we did not have jurisdiction in matters of this nature, that they were purely local and it was the responsibility of the local authorities to handle such matters. He desired to know if I would call out the Federal Marshals. I informed him that the FBI did not have any authority to call upon the Federal Marshals in a situation of this nature but if such a situation arose, I would have immediately notified our headquarters in Washington, who would have ~~notified the~~ Department of Justice, who would have such authority.

7 DEC 16 1975

I told him that while I was in Birmingham as Special Agent in Charge we kept the Bureau headquarters in Washington completely informed of all developments and they in turn, kept the Department of Justice informed.

ACTION: ✓ Submitted for information.

TJJ:pmd (5)
1 - Mr. Adams 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMK9

59 DEC 30 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/4/75

WRW/LAC

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714)

SENSTUDY 75

Re San Diego telephone call to Bureau, 12/4/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of a letterhead memorandum reflecting information received in the San Diego Office concerning GARY THOMAS ROWE, Jr.

Deputy SCOTT BOIES of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office was contacted and advised that if he felt he recognized ROWE that he should not discuss the matter openly with anyone in that ROWE was obviously attempting to protect his identity. Deputy BOIES was not advised that ROWE was identical with THOMAS NEIL MOORE.

extra cc destroyed

2 - Bureau (Encs - 8)
1 - San Diego

DCS:pgh
(3)

1 - The Attorney General
~~1 - (1-Senate [illegible] Committee)~~
Not sent

UNREC COPY FILED IN

REC-100

62-116395-1206

2-6
~~DEC 8~~ 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2 ALM/lp

WOC

Letter to [illegible] Memo
12/[illegible]

Approved: RLM/C
Special Agent in Charge

Sent __________ M Per __________

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California
December 4, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: GARY THOMAS ROWE, JR.

At 11:30 p.m. on December 2, 1975, Deputy Sheriff Scott Boies of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office, Lemon Grove, California Sub-Station, telephonically contacted the San Diego FBI Office and advised as follows:

Deputy Boies stated that he recognized the voice of the man identified as Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who is testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on the Ku Klux Klan. He stated he heard Mr. Rowe talk on a news broadcast and recognized him as being an individual he knows as Thomas Neil Moore. Deputy Boies furnished Moore's date of birth as August 15, 1933, and an address of 580 "L" Street, Chula Vista, California, where Moore resided in 1971. Deputy Boies stated that Moore worked for Western Bureau of Investigation, headquartered in Los Angeles and worked as a security guard for the White Front Department Store, Chula Vista, California.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116375-1206X

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

December 12, 1975

Director, FBI

REC-100

62-116395-1206X

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. Klein

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to my November 26, 1975, letter to you enclosing among other material, a memorandum concerning former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is a copy of a memorandum dated December 4, 1975, regarding Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., received by FBI Headquarters from our San Diego field office.

Rowe, is a former informant who testified before the SSC on December 2, 1975, regarding his role in supplying information to the FBI regarding Ku Klux Klan activities in Alabama. He has been utilizing the cover name, Thomas Neil Moore.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the December 4, 1975, memorandum.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 137-6295

No 1 SENT TO SSC PER STEVE BLACKHURST, USDS 3.23.76

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 137-6295

SK:klm
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

84 FEB 12 1976

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Above being furnished to the Attorney General and the SSC in order to apprise them of information reflecting that Rowe, who testified with a mask over his face, was identified by a San Diego Deputy Sheriff after hearing Rowe's voice on a news broadcast. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/4/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TESTIMONY BY THE DIRECTOR
DECEMBER 9, 1975

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO CHANGE
THE NAME OF THE J. EDGAR HOOVER
FBI BUILDING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY

In connection with the Director's appearance on December 9, 1975, to testify before captioned committee, it is possible that he may be asked concerning recent proposals in the Congress to change the name of the building. Three bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives on December 1, 1975, for that purpose. H.R. 10905, introduced by Congressman Gude of Maryland and H.R. 10918, introduced by Congresswoman Schroeder of Colorado, would change the name of the building to "FBI Building." H.R. 10916, introduced by Congressman Rangel of New York, would change the name to "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building." All three of the bills were referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House, the chairman of which is Congressman Jones of Alabama.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information of the Director in connection with his preparation for testimony.

EX 104 REC-9 62-116395-1206

DEC 16 1975

COPY FILED IN

Enc.

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

XEROX
DEC 19 1975

84 DEC 30 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mr. GUDE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" wherever it appears in such section and inserting in lieu thereof "F.B.I. Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10905

A BILL

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act.

By Mr. GUDE

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mrs. SCHROEDER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SB.ALM/KP

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Public Law 92–520 is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 8. The Federal building in the block bounded by Ninth Street Northwest, Tenth Street Northeast, E Street Northwest, and Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest, in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter be known as the 'F.B.I. Building'. Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, record, or other paper of the United States to such

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10918

A BILL

To designate the name of the new Federal building in the District of Columbia which is erected to house the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

By Mrs. SCHROEDER

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

Federal building shall be held to be a reference to the "F.B.I. Building'".

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Mr. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

---

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" both times it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "Federal Bureau of Investigation Building".

I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/gp

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10916

A BILL

To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

By Mr. RANGEL

DECEMBER 1, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Stack
1 - Mr. McWright

Mr. Jenkins

11/28/75

J. Cochran, Jr.

REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

Sensitively

Re memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11/21/75, advising that representatives of captioned Senate Subcommittee desire to review any Bureau documents relating to the Bureau's interest in or use of drugs during interrogation.

It was pointed out in referenced memo that captioned Subcommittee staff members James F. Michie and Thomas M. Susman had obtained information from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning a program coordinated between DOD, CIA, and FBI to develop a truth serum. The program apparently began in early 1950 and D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory had knowledge of this activity.

The information that Michie and Susman have obtained apparently relates to a Navy drug experimentation project from 1947 to 1954. Navy files indicated that the FBI was aware of this program and Mr. C. D. DeLoach and D. J. Parsons were mentioned.

A review of Bureau files disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the Navy drug project. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-2699-

62-2699

Enclosure

① 62-116395

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Adams
2 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Rotis)
(Attn: Mr. Miller)
3 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. W. O. Cregar)
(Attn: Mr. T. D. J. Brooks)
(Attn: Mr. V. H. Weimar)

CGM:bms
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

CONTINUED - OVER

NOT RECORDED
46 FEB 5 1976

84 FEB 9 1976

might be used to great advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50.

Memorandum dated 11/6/75 from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall is attached which sets forth details of our review of Navy files on this project, including a Bureau press release which was to have been made in the event that the Navy mentioned the FBI in their press release on this matter.

A review of Bureau files for information relating to drugs designed to modify behavior indicates an interest dating back to 1922. However, this interest has not extended to the point where the Bureau has conducted research on behavior modifying drugs nor has it funded such research. We have maintained liaison with other agencies, primarily the U. S. Army, and industrial organizations in order to be aware of developments in this area.

On 7/30/74, Laboratory and Training Division representatives met with representatives of the Biomedical and Chemical Laboratories of Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, to discuss the potential use of incapacitating chemical agents in hostage situations. Although we have developed an awareness of various agents which may be used in these situations, we have not conducted any research with these agents. Memoranda on this matter are located in Bufile 80-807.

A single instance occurred where "truth serum" was administered in a Bureau case. Truth serum was administered to Thurman Scruggs Wilkins at his own request while being interviewed in the Los Angeles Office, April 26, 1947. Wilkins was allegedly involved with one Ignacy Samuel Witczak, the subject of a Soviet espionage case (100-343077). The actual drug used was sodium amytal and the actual administration was done by a physician. Prior Bureau authority was not obtained by the Los Angeles Office in connection with this incident. SAC Hood submitted a letter of explanation to the Bureau on July 2, 1947. This incident resulted in the following information being set forth in SAC Letter 84-47 dated July 3, 1947:

"The Bureau will not tolerate any experiments or participation on the part of its personnel in the utilization of the so called truth serums or other chemicals alleged to have a similar effect. ---- consequently, in the event any Bureau agent violates these instructions, drastic administrative action will be taken."

There was nothing found in Bureau files that would indicate that we have received any documents from CIA concerning their drug research programs. The files do reflect that we were aware that CIA was conducting research with lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and that British Intelligence had successfully utilized LSD on several Russian espionage agents. The information concerning CIA and British activities is set out for the benefit of the Director only and cannot be released outside the Bureau.

There are two Bureau files which contain most of the information relating to the immediate area of interest of the captioned Senate Subcommittee. These files are 62-2699 (Truth Serums) and 80-645 (Chemical Munitions and Gases). Pertinent serials may also be found in 80-807 and 100-343077 as previously noted in this memorandum.

I see no reason why Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman should not be afforded an oral briefing regarding these matters, and if necessary make pertinent serials of Bufiles 62-2699, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077 available to them for review.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Mr. Michie and Mr. Susman be advised by Legal Counsel that available Bureau records and interview with current knowledgeable employee indicate the FBI has never engaged in nor funded anyone's efforts in research and/or development programs in the use or effect of drugs on human behavior. They should be advised our efforts in this regard as far as can be established from the available records consists of following through liaison contacts with other government agencies and the private sector sources the current developments in behavior modifying drugs.

Memorandum J. Cochran, Jr. to Mr. Jenkins
RE: REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS
FOR INTERROGATION

(2) That if they desire to pursue this matter further, SA McWright and myself be permitted to meet with Michie and Susman to (a) reaffirm the information in recommendation #1 and (b) if necessary, to produce for their inspection pertinent serials from 62-6299, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. J. Cochran

11/6/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. C. G. McWright
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

This is to inform you that on 11/7/75 Defense Department will release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC), the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures (Senator Edward M. Kennedy's committee), and to the press, information concerning Navy projects from 1947 to 1954 involving drug experimentation; a Navy file indicates FBI was aware of programs but Laboratory has no knowledge of any active participation by Bureau personnel.

On 11/4/75, Clark McGruder, Assistant to Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Director of Naval Intelligence, informed me that on 11/7/75 the Navy was going to release to aforementioned committees and the press information on drug experimentation and that the FBI was mentioned in the pertinent files. Those files were reviewed at the Pentagon on 11/6/75 by Supervisor J. P. Thomas of INTD. They had been classified "Secret" and "Top Secret" but now have been completely declassified. FBI was mentioned in connection with three projects. There are no FBI documents in the files.

A memorandum dated 9/21/50 from Mr. Alberti to Mr. C. D. DeLoach was a receipt signed by Mr. DeLoach for one copy of "Drugs Stated To Have Been Used By Russians And Germans In Interrogation Techniques." Alberti is identified elsewhere in the file as Jack H. Alberti, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), who apparently coordinated the projects mentioned in the file. The purpose of one project was to develop a speech-inducing drug to obtain intelligence from interrogees and the project began in 1947.

Enclosures
62-116395

[illegible]
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

A memorandum dated 8/15/~~75~~ 50 on letterhead of Office of Chief of Naval Operations concerned "Top Secret Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI) Project on Speech-Inducing Drugs," reported a meeting on 8/11/50 attended by personnel of NMRI, CIA, Office of Naval Research (ONR), a drug company representative and Mr. DeLoach and Mr. D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the FBI on a CIA project on narco-hypnosis and on the NMRI project. Parsons reportedly said the FBI had no such project, but had information on the experiences of various police departments in the United States with speech-inducing drugs. He agreed to make the FBI information available to NMRI and CIA. ONR agreed to give FBI, NMRI and CIA a study by ONR on projected research to improve polygraph reliability. Recipients were to give their comments and recommendations on the study to ONR. At the meeting NMRI gave DeLoach an 8/11/50 NMRI progress report on its project. Parsons agreed to look into the possibility of getting volunteers from prisoners in Federal institutions and to supply NMRI with canabis (marijuana) and heroin to the extent they might be available to the FBI. It is noted that no FBI representatives were listed in the memorandum reporting a 9/27/50 meeting of this group and there is no further record in the file of FBI participation. Neither is there any record that the FBI supplied any drugs for the project.

Material regarding project "CHATTER" included a carbon copy of a rough draft memorandum (no letterhead) bearing the penciled date "11/50?" which contained the following, "Since 1947 the Department of the Navy has carried on a project in coordination with the Departments of the Air Force and Army, CIA and FBI for the development of speech-inducing drugs.... The Directors of Intelligence of the three Services, of CIA and FBI consider this project

CONTINUED - OVER

of utmost important and urgency to... fulfillment of their missions for the security of the United States." The memorandum says that a project submitted to ONR by Professor Richard Wendt of the University of Rochester (NY) had been approved by all the agencies involved and recommended funding the project. The file indicates subsequently that this project did go forward and involve human experimentation.

Another ~~The second~~ file dealt with project "CALLING CARD," 1952-1953, designed "to render an individual subservient to impose will or control." FBI was not mentioned.

80-5 (Polygraph file) relates only to instrumental detection of deception

A memorandum dated 9/5/50 for Mr. D. J. Parsons, FBI; C. Edwards, CIA; and Captain Wilbur E. Kellum of Naval Medical Research, from W. S. Post, Jr. (not further identified), informed them that a copy of the report on the "Ellson" project (University of Indiana, 1952) was being forwarded to them for information. The project involved research in the detection of deception. The addressees were to be briefed by Professor D. G. Ellson of Indiana University on the project at a future date. The file did not show that the briefing occurred. The project was terminated in June, 1952.

The two files reviewed contained many reports of research conducted concerning various drugs in various parts of the world, constituting a collection of papers on the subject by U. S. and foreign researchers.

A review of logical Bureau files by the Laboratory Division disclosed only one reference (62-2699-75) to the above. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that Mr. Alberti, ONI, had informed Liaison that the Navy had been developing a new drug which might be used to great

CONTINUED - OVER

advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 8/11/50. (Navy memorandum on this meeting set out above.)

We have received a memorandum dated 11/4/75 from Defense describing the proposed release of Navy information to the committees and to the press. Copy of that memorandum and of the press release are attached. The release says that "Liaison was maintained with... the FBI" concerning the drug research ~~release.~~

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

PRESS RELEASE
NOVEMBER 7, 1975

The press statement released by the Navy today relating to its drug research on human subjects for the period 1947 through 1954 indicates liaison concerning this project was maintained by the Navy with other Governmental agencies, including the FBI.

A thorough review of FBI files has disclosed one document relating to this Navy research: a short internal memorandum, dated August 4, 1950. This memorandum, prepared by a member of the Liaison staff at FBI Headquarters, recorded that a Navy official had invited FBI representatives to a conference in the Washington area to "discuss the usage of truth serum in Intelligence circles," and that the Navy had made advances in developing a new drug which "could be utilized to a great advantage in the questioning of espionage agents." A handwritten notation on this memorandum directed that a representative of the FBI Laboratory was to attend this conference on August 11, 1950.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KO

No further identifiable reference to Navy drug development research is contained in FBI files. No record can be located that liaison was being maintained with the Navy regarding this program, or that the FBI had knowledge of this program prior to the date of the above memorandum.

ENCLOSURE

~~ENCLOSURE~~ 62-116395

The FBI was not involved in any way in this Navy drug research, and the FBI has never participated in research with drugs designed to modify human behavior, nor has it funded such research.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
December 24, 1975
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

ST 115

Director, FBI

REC-51

62-116395-1204X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is in response to the SSC letter dated December 18, 1975, wherein Senators Mondale and Baker requested rather detailed information to be made available during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

It is noted that most of the requests in this letter are so ambiguous that they require clarification from the SSC before the FBI can logically respond. In one instance, there is no way this Bureau could respond short of obtaining the recollections of Bureau Supervisors who worked in the Intelligence Division extending back almost 20 years. Because of this, we are attaching for your approval and forwarding to the SSC the original of a memorandum which delineates the problems attendant to the request of December 18, 1975, and, in most instances, requests a meeting between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, SSC, and representatives of this Bureau in the hope that some alternatives or clarifications can be developed. A copy of the memorandum is furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

WOC:lhb
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2AMK/CAL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JAN 28 1976

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The request of 12/18/75 was received in the Intelligence Division in the midafternoon of 12/22/75. A conference was held on the morning of 12/23/75 of pertinent Division personnel in an effort to identify the problems connected with responding to this request. It is believed that the only way the Bureau can logically respond to the request is by obtaining clarifications and, in some instances, alternatives to the requests set out.

We have already determined that both John Elliff and the SSC Counsel, F. A. O. Schwartz, are out of the city for the holidays. The Legal Counsel Division has left word with Mr. Schwartz and/or Mr. Elliff to call SA Paul Daly upon their return to the city.

Copy of 12/18/75 request attached.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J, G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

62-116395

December 24, 1975

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM SENATORS
MONDALE AND BAKER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

On December 22, 1975, this Bureau received a copy of a letter dated December 18, 1975, which Senators Mondale and Baker sent to the Attorney General levying certain requirements on the FBI with a request that the responses be provided the SSC during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

Item 1 requested access to materials in the investigative files for a six-month period preceding acts of violence which were prevented by actions taken by the FBI. The specific preventive actions were set out in some detail in a memorandum prepared for the SSC by the FBI dated December 10, 1975.

Upon receipt of referenced letter, the Intelligence Division initiated efforts to isolate the files documenting these preventive actions. The Bureau's response of December 10, 1975, was predicated on a review of the pertinent inspection reports of the Intelligence Division. These reports do not document by file number the individual preventive actions. To locate specific files, it will be necessary to have knowledgeable Intelligence Division personnel queried in an effort to try to match the preventive action with a particular investigative file. In some instances,

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

WOC:lhb lhb
(11)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

WOB

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ 62-116395-1204X

GPO : 1975 O - 569-92

there will be no investigative file but merely a communication from a field office reporting information furnished by a source of the FBI on which some preventive action was predicated. It is possible that the acts of violence reported by the source could involve a violation over which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction. In such cases, the local field office would have merely furnished the information to the appropriate law enforcement agency and no investigative file would exist.

We are continuing our efforts to attempt to isolate those files which document preventive actions. However, because of the problems attendant thereto, as well as those problems raised in the subparagraphs of Item 1, it is recommended that a meeting be arranged between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, and representatives of this Bureau to discuss possible alternatives to some of these requests.

Items 2 and 3 concern the September 24, 1975, report to the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office. The FBI is in the process of preparing a response and it will be made available to the Committee as soon as possible. However, it is noted that the FBI prepared no analysis at all on the findings of the General Accounting Office contained in their report of September 24, 1975.

Item 4 requests the annual reports from the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968, and the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that organization was under investigation. Item 4 also requests annual reports available on the investigations "about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28."

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

There were no annual reports submitted by the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968. With regard to the Women's Liberation Movement, the SSC has been provided copies of all pertinent reports for the years the organization was under investigation. In an effort to clarify what is meant by the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to Mr. John Elliff's request of October 28, 1975, it is again proposed that a meeting with Mr. Elliff be arranged to clarify this ambiguity.

Item 5 requests specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV of the Department of Justice's guidelines draft on "Domestic Security Investigations."

The indices of this Bureau are not organized to enable retrieval of information of a "preventive action" character or examples of FBI actions taken to prevent violence. The retrieval of such information from FBI files, other than that described in the response to Item 1, would require extensive review and/or dependence on the recollection of individuals of occurrences extending back almost 20 years. It is suggested that, during the proposed meeting with Mr. John Elliff, this request be discussed.

Item 6 requests access to all FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1, through April 4, 1968.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

It is this Bureau's belief that all pertinent material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, through April 4, 1968, has been made available to the SSC responsive to previous requests. With regard to the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, it is not clear whether the letter is requesting access to the entire FBI file on these two activities from the period January 1, through April 4, 1968. It is recommended that a clarification of this request can be accomplished during the previously proposed meeting between Mr. John Elliff and representatives of the FBI.

Item 7 requests all materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

A check of indices of the FBI regarding "Project Overshoe," as well as the word Overshoe, fails to contain any reference to either. Without additional information regarding "Project Overshoe," this Bureau cannot be responsive to this specific request. Again, it is suggested that, during the forthcoming meeting with John Elliff, clarification of "Project Overshoe" be obtained.

1 - The Attorney General

Intelligence Division

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

Attached is a request from Senators Mondale and Baker of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated 12/18/75. The Director has requested he be advised regarding the status of this request.

Attached is a copy of a letter to the AG and LHM for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb

CONTINUED - OVER

(Rev. [illegible] 3)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓ ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Intelligence Division

ED

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

ched is a request from Senators nd Baker of the Senate Select (SSC) dated 12/18/75. The has requested he be advised the status of this request.

ched is a copy of a letter to the M for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb

CONTINUED - OVER

estimate when we will complete Item 4.

Item 5 has been reduced to the recollection of Bureau Supervisor David Ryan who handled the COINTELPRO matter and will not require research beyond what SA Ryan can recall. (Ryan is currently developing a response to this request.)

Item 6 has been reduced to all materials relating to the Poor People's Campaign, the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennesee, and Martin Luther King, Jr., contained in Headquarters files between the period 1/1-4/4/68. (We are currently working on this request.)

Item 7 - Epstein has agreed to obtain more identifying data regarding Project Overshoe and we are awaiting this information.

WOC

SECRET

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall — Handle
Sensitivity
Sel T 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X
5 JAN 1976

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

RECEIVED

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

SECRET

SECRET

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEC 19 1975

F.B.I.

December 18, 1975

Mr. Callahan — Info
Mr. Jenkins — "
Mr. Wannall — Handle
Senstudy
Sel T 1-5-76

Attorney General Edward H. Levi
Room 5111
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Levi:

We have been asked to chair a special subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence activities of the Federal government. Our mandate is to prepare for the full committee's consideration a draft report of findings of fact on alleged abuses or excesses by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered.

#NDR-16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/KP
ON 10/30/00

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain ~~to~~ both information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program.

ST 115
REC-51
62-116395-1204X
5 JAN 26 1976

RECEIVED
ENCLOSURE

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

SECRET

provided during the last week of December and the first week of January:

1. With respect to each of the examples of effective prevention of violence provided the Committee pursuant to John Elliff's letter of November 26 to Mr. Shaheen, please provide access to materials in the investigative file for the 6-month period preceding the act of violence prevented. Please deliver:

(a) All materials relating to the legal and factual predicate for each investigation;

(b) The first investigative report disseminated outside the FBI in each such case, and a list of recipients of that report;

(c) The total number of individuals whose names were referred to the FBI's general name index in the course of each investigation;

(d) The total number of individuals about whom information was obtained through informants, confidential sources, physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and other sensitive techniques; and

(e) The annual report from the office of origin for each such investigation to FBI headquarters for the last five years during which the case in question was an open investigation.

2. Please provide any information which you have refuting the suggestion made on page 34 of the General Accounting Office's September 24 report to the House Judiciary Committee, that cases in which violence can be predicted probably represent less than 2% of all FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

3. Please provide all memoranda or analyses prepared for the Justice Department, Director Kelley, or Assistant Director Wannall on the findings of the General Accounting Office as presented to the House Judiciary Committee on September 24.

4. Please provide the annual report from the office of origin to FBI headquarters for the investigation of

~~SECRET~~

Dr. Martin Luther King in 1963 through 1968, and for the investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that that organization was under investigation, and the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 28.

5. Please provide specific examples of cases where the FBI has taken action in the past similar to that which would be authorized by Section IV on "preventive action" of the draft Department of Justice's guidelines on "domestic security investigations."

6. Access to all FBI materials pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor People's Campaign, and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1 through April 4, 1968.

7. All materials pertaining to "Project Overshoe."

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this request. We look forward to continuing cooperation on this area of joint concern.

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale

Walter F. Mondale
Chairman

Howard W. Baker, Jr.
Vice-Chairman

~~SECRET~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/24/75

U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC).
Caption of Document: (12/18/75 Letter to the Attorney General from Senators Mondale & Baker)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V. Daly Date: 12-30-75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALMKP

62-116395-1204X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/24/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 12/18/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Requesting clarification of items listed in request received from Senators Mondale and Bakerregarding preventive actions; 9/24/75 report of the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office; Annual reports from the office of origin to FBIHQs for investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; pertinent materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. for the period 1/1 thru 4/4/68 previously made available. Clarification with regard to Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tenn; "Project Overshoe."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/KP

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

62-116395-1204X

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
(Mr. G. S. McMichael)

12/17/75

1 - Mr. J. Cochran
(Mr. F. M. Devine)
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Mr. W. R. Wannall

J. G. Deegan

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This informative memorandum to record unsuccessful efforts to pinpoint the typewriter on which was typed an anonymous letter apparently directed to subject, the original of which was located in papers left behind on the retirement of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan.

Examination of the questioned document by the Laboratory established that the typing was done on a Royal typewriter with pica style type. We checked available inventory records maintained by the Administrative Division as well as our own in INTD to locate all Royal typewriters which were in the then Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) around 1964. This search was based on the suspicion that the note was typed by Sullivan on a typewriter accessible to him in 1964 when he was Assistant Director of the DID.

Our checks revealed that there are available only four typewriters of the type sought which were likely in the DID in 1964. All four are presently in INTD and three of them were readily eliminated as not identical to that which produced the questioned document on the basis that all three have closed "4s", whereas the questioned document has an open ended "4". The fourth typewriter, serial number KMG 13-4320913, is maintained in room 4410 and charged to the IS-2 Section. It was examined by Supervisor F. M. Devine of the Document Section of the Laboratory who advised that it is not identical to the typewriter which produced the questioned document.

100-106670

(1) - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)

CONTINUED - OVER

SFP:bkb
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/ep

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 DEC 29 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Martin Luther King, Jr.
100-106670

We are conducting no further inquiry at this time to establish the whereabouts of the typewriter which produced the anonymous letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information and record purposes.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

1426- EBF

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706

March 20, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The Black Panther Party is a black extremist organization with national headquarters in Berkeley, California. It now has affiliated groups in over 25 cities throughout the United States and a membership exceeding 1,200.

The public statements of its leaders repeatedly stress that the organization's objective is an armed black revolution against the Government of the United States by means of guerrilla warfare. Information is regularly received showing that its members are required to possess guns and have been instructed in their use. They have been trained in the preparation of fire bombs and explosives. The organization strongly supports the Cuban and Chinese Communist revolutionaries.

Reviews of telephone toll call records and information supplied by informants show that the leaders of the organization use the telephone extensively.

The largest and most active Black Panther Party chapter outside of the San Francisco Bay area is in Los Angeles, California. The organization maintains several offices in the Los Angeles area and has a headquarters office at 4115 South Central Avenue, Los Angeles. The next most active Black Panther Party group is located in New York City which maintains its principal office at 2026 7th Avenue, New York City.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The telephone surveillance on the national headquarters of the Black Panther Party which was authorized on February 4, 1969, has proved to be most valuable. It has provided information concerning the planned establishment of Black Panther Party branches at Eugene, Oregon; Fresno, California; the Watts area of Los Angeles, California; Syracuse, New York; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and Columbus, Ohio. It provided information concerning the removal of Joudan Ford from his leadership position in the New York City branch and, most recently, has furnished details concerning the travel of National Chairman Bobby George Seale to the Scandinavian countries where Seale is at the present time.

Live informants are furnishing information indicating that the organization will increasingly use underground methods of operation which further emphasizes the desirability of obtaining additional coverage to supplement data being furnished by our live informants.

It is requested that authority be granted for telephone surveillances on the Black Panther Party headquarters at 4115 South Central Avenue, Los Angeles, and on the Black Panther Party office at 2026 7th Avenue, New York City, or on any other places to which they may move.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 3/20/69

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706-Sub 34

December 31, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: [BLACK PANTHER PARTY
NEW YORK DIVISION]

You have previously authorized this Bureau to initiate and continue a telephone surveillance on the office of the extremist [Black Panther Party (BPP) in New York City located at 2026 Seventh Avenue.] This installation continues to provide significant data on this group's plans and operations, and it is apparent the [BPP in New York City is second only to the national headquarters in Berkeley, California] from the standpoint of generating plans for racial violence.

This Bureau has developed information that the [BPP in New York recently opened an office at 1370 Boston Road, Bronx, New York.] This office is known as the [Black Community Information Center] and reportedly is to function as the [East Coast Information Center for the BPP.] It is, therefore, apparent that a telephone surveillance at this location will provide access to invaluable data regarding the [BPP's] plans and activities, not only on a local level [in New York City,] but on a national scale as well.

It is, therefore, requested that authority be granted for a telephone surveillance at the above location. The telephone, concerning which coverage is requested, is listed in the name of [Ronald Morris, a known BPP member in the New York area.]

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In view of the violence-prone nature of the [BPP,] it can reasonably be anticipated that subjects involved in past or future criminal violations may be monitored. The guidelines to be followed, as previously furnished by you, will be strictly complied with in such instances.

If you approve, a telephone surveillance will be placed on the above [BPP office at 1370 Boston Road, Bronx, New York.] If the coverage proves productive, it will be continued for an indefinite period. There will be no trespass involved in connection with the installation of this telephone surveillance.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 1/2/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706 Sub 34

March 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
NEW YORK DIVISION

On December 12, 1970, you authorized this Bureau to continue for an additional three months, effective December 28, 1970, a telephone surveillance on the office of the Black Panther Party (BPP) in New York City located at 1370 Boston Road. This office has recently been designated the East Coast Ministry of Information for the Eldridge Cleaver faction of the BPP. This installation provides extremely valuable and voluminous data regarding the BPP. It is an invaluable source for coverage concerning dissension within the Party and the interrelationship between the Cleaver faction in the United States, Cleaver, and other of his followers in Algeria. Examples of significant data produced by this source are the following:

On a daily basis since December, 1970, this source furnished details concerning local, national, and international operations of the BPP including information on the recent internal dissension within the BPP terminating in the factional split between BPP leaders Huey P. Newton and Eldridge Cleaver. On January 10, 1971, this source furnished data concerning the BPP's fortification of its office at 1370 Boston Road. On February 8, 1971, the source provided data on the disappearance and expulsion of BPP leaders Michael Tabor, his wife Connie Matthews Tabor, Richard Moore, and Edward Joseph. Michael Tabor, Moore, and Joseph are currently

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

being sought as fugitives for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution on charges of conspiracy to commit arson and murder. On February 26, 1971, this source furnished information concerning [Huey Newton's expulsion of Eldridge Cleaver from the BPP.] [Cleaver, a Bureau fugitive, is residing in and operating from Algiers, Algeria.] On March 5, 1971, this source advised that [Cleaver was moving the BPP's Central Headquarters from Oakland, California, to New York City.] On March 19, 1971, the source furnished data on apparent plans of [BPP] members in Newark, New Jersey, to obtain explosive materials.

The monitoring of this surveillance will be conducted in accordance with instructions contained in your letter of July 14, 1969, entitled "Electronic Surveillances."

Your authority is requested to continue this telephone surveillance at the present location for an additional three months effective March 28, 1971.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John Mitchell

DATE 3/25/71

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

#10

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 9, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY WEATHERMAN

New Left Oriented Campus Group

Reference is made to your letter dated May 6, 1969, concerning the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

Mark Rudd, national Weatherman leader, in a closed meeting in early February, 1970, stated the Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society would go underground, break into small groups and direct "strategic sabotage" against military and police installations by the use of bombs and confrontation with the police.

On March 6, 1970, a series of dynamite explosions occurred in a multiple residential dwelling in New York City in which Weatherman activists Theodore Gold and Diana Oughton were killed. Cathlyn Wilkerson, national Weatherman leader, was observed leaving the premises at the time of the explosions, and it is believed other Weatherman members were also in this building.

On March 18, 1970, a young Weatherman member in Washington, D. C., advised her father that one of the next things this group would become involved in was to bomb passenger airplanes, including the Boeing 747, the largest passenger plane in existence.

In late February, 1970, William Ayers was the leader of a group of Weatherman in Detroit which made plans to bomb the Detroit Police Officers Association Building. On March 6, 1970, bombs consisting of ten sticks of dynamite and thirty-four sticks of dynamite were located in an unexploded condition at this building and at the 13th Precinct of the Detroit Police Department, respectively.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

On March 30, 1970, the Chicago Police Department discovered a cache of fifty-nine sticks of dynamite in an apartment at 5433 North Kenmore Street, Chicago. This dynamite is identical in many respects to the dynamite found in the Detroit police buildings on March 6, 1970. Investigation has determined that this apartment was rented to Dianne Donghi, a Weatherman member who is presently in Buffalo, New York, on an unknown assignment. Also reported being seen at the North Kenmore Street address was Naomi Jaffe Safier, who is currently in Buffalo with Donghi. Jaffe, as she is most commonly called, was in contact with Ayers shortly prior to March 6, 1970, when the dynamite was found in the Detroit police installations.

Two Weatherman members were scheduled to appear in a local criminal court in Detroit in early March, 1970, and did not appear. Dr. Oliver Fein, 31 Pierrepont Street, Brooklyn, New York, representing himself as their physician, advised the court by telegram that these two individuals were ill and unable to attend. Fein has been identified as a possible doctor for many Weatherman members who are in an underground status in the New York City area. He is 30 years old and has been active in Students for a Democratic Society affairs since 1964. He reportedly treated individuals injured in Chicago in August, 1968, during the Democratic National Convention. In late 1968, he was reportedly contributing $1,400.00 monthly to Students for a Democratic Society. He was arrested in 1964 during a sit-in demonstration in Cleveland. Fein is currently connected with the Health Policy Advisory Center, 17 Murray Street, New York City, a radical medical organization. Fein is a conscientious objector and reportedly attempting to avoid the draft.

A source at Fein's residence, which is also his office, has observed photographs on his desk of Cathlyn Wilkerson and Kathie Boudin, Weatherman leaders who are currently wanted by the FBI in connection with demonstrations in Chicago on September 24, 1969, and October 9, 1969. Wilkerson is also wanted by the FBI as a fugitive in connection with the dynamite explosions at her father's residence in New York City on March 6, 1970. This source also advised there was a memorandum on Fein's desk indicating he is a doctor of a commune, not otherwise identified.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A telephone surveillance on the address at 31 Pierrepont Street, Brooklyn, would undoubtedly provide extremely valuable information concerning the possible whereabouts of Weatherman members, including those members presently being wanted by this Bureau as fugitives. Weatherman members live in unknown residences referred to as communes. Many have apparently moved to the New York City area. It is well known that these individuals have a continuing need for medical attention because of the filthy conditions under which they currently live. Many use drugs and many are known to be afflicted with venereal diseases.

Based on the information previously set forth, it can be expected that all of the individuals who have access to the phone at 31 Pierrepont Street, Brooklyn, either are or may become subjects of either local or Federal criminal violations. It is also anticipated, based on this information, that results from a telephone surveillance at 31 Pierrepont Street, Brooklyn, will be introduced as evidence in court or that leads to evidence may be obtained; therefore, this request is being made not only for the purpose of obtaining intelligence-type information, but also on the basis that evidence will be obtained that will be used in court. In line with instructions on page five of your referenced letter, the following information is set forth:

1. Some of the individuals who may utilize the phone at 31 Pierrepont Street, Brooklyn, are currently the subjects of Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution investigations. Oliver Fein has stated he is a conscientious objector and is trying to avoid the draft. It is further believed that individuals having access to the phone at this address will become involved in violations of the Destruction of Government Property statute, the Destruction of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles statute and the Antiriot Law.

2. At the present time, we are conducting both intelligence and criminal investigations on the individuals who may utilize this address and phone number. As previously noted, many of the Weatherman members we are now investigating are fugitives. We do not have sufficient live informant coverage of these individuals.

3. As set forth previously in this memorandum, Oliver Fein who has been extremely active in Students for Democratic Society affairs and who may be in contact with Weatherman members, will utilize the phone at 31 Pierrepont Street. It is anticipated other individuals in the Weatherman group will also use this phone; however, their identities are unknown at this time.

4. It can be expected that the interceptions on the phone at 31 Pierrepont Street will furnish us with information concerning the whereabouts of Weatherman members and possibly the whereabouts of Weatherman members who are fugitives. It could possibly furnish us with plans of this group to violate Federal statutes as noted above.

I, therefore, recommend the installation of a telephone surveillance at 31 Pierrepont Street, Brooklyn, New York, for a period of thirty days. If approved, you will be advised when this installation has been made.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED /s/ MITCHELL

DATE 4/9/70

~~SECRET~~

#10

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 25, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE STUDENTS
FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

New Left Oriented
Campus Group

The captioned organization is a socialist-oriented youth group which is self-described as an organization of "liberals and radicals." It claims to have a membership of 1,700 with chapters on 41 college campuses. The national headquarters of this organization is located at 1103 East 63rd Street, Chicago, Illinois.

This organization has recently been extremely active in staging protest demonstrations against United States action in Vietnam and sponsored a "Student March on Washington" in April, 1965, at which time approximately 15,000 demonstrators paraded in front of the White House. Information has recently been developed that within the Students for a Democratic Society there is a secret group known as the "Crisis Committee," the purpose of which is to organize resistance to the forces of the United States Government in the event of a crisis of a national or international scale. Members of this Committee would be called upon to block roads leading to missile bases, persuade troops to desert or lay down their arms, and blockade embarkation points.

An investigation of this organization is being conducted to determine the extent to which it is infiltrated by communists and other subversive elements.

In view of the potential threat the activities of this organization represent to the national defense interests

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum For the Attorney General

of the Nation, you are requested to authorize a technical surveillance at the office of the national headquarters of the Students for a Democratic Society, at 1103 East 63rd Street, Chicago, Illinois, or at any other premises it may occupy in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NdeBK

DATE 6/4/65

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
INTERNAL SECURITY - STUDENTS FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

New Left Oriented Campus Group

The Students for a Democratic Society is a part of the New Left movement which is currently organized into approximately 235 chapters throughout the United States. The national headquarters is at 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

The Students for a Democratic Society is a fiercely anarchistic group whose spokesmen boast of their determination to end our form of Government and destroy the traditions of democracy. Members of this organization have been in the forefront of the protest movement against United States policy in Vietnam and have called for an end to selective service as well as founding a number of antidraft unions.

During the past year drastic changes have occurred in the tactics employed by the Students for a Democratic Society to achieve their objectives. Students for a Democratic Society leaders who formerly advocated "nonviolence" and "passive dissent" are now urging the use of violence as a form of "active resistance" against the existing social order. Confrontation with school administrators now involves violence and heavy destruction of school property. Since April, 1968, major disorders precipitated by the revolutionary adherents of the Students for a Democratic Society have occurred on a number of college campuses.

At the Students for a Democratic Society National Convention held in June, 1968, one of the workshops dealt with explosives and sabotage techniques. The same militant mood was in evidence at a Students for a Democratic Society National Council meeting held in October, 1968, where pamphlets dealing with the making of various explosive devices were made available to the Students for a Democratic Society members.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

At a National Council meeting of this organization held in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in December, 1968, a manual captioned "Work-In, a National SDS Summer Project" was brought to the attention of delegates to the meeting. This manual which has received wide distribution in this country sets forth a program by Students for a Democratic Society to invade industrial plants and other business organizations this summer for the purpose of disrupting operations and conducting an intensive propaganda campaign among employees geared against the United States and particularly private industry.

At an Eastern Regional Conference of the Students for a Democratic Society held on February 1-2, 1969, at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, a five-page proposal entitled "Smash the Military Machine in the Schools" was distributed by the Columbia University Students for a Democratic Society chapter. This proposal called for fomenting student uprisings, agitational demonstrations and other disturbances and violence in universities and high schools this spring throughout the country. It strongly emphasized a nation-wide attack on Reserve Officers Training Corps on college campuses.

While this proposal has never been passed in the form of a resolution by the National Office of the Students for a Democratic Society it nevertheless has been implemented on a number of occasions this spring by Students for a Democratic Society members and sympathizers. The major attack against Harvard University in April, 1969, was to abolish the Reserve Officers Training Corps at the University. Such attacks have also occurred at Yale University, George Washington University, Dartmouth College, Cornell University, California State College, Michigan State University and at many other colleges and universities.

At the Students for a Democratic Society National Council meeting held in Austin, Texas, in March, 1969, Michael Klonsky, Students for a Democratic Society National Secretary, advocated that Students for a Democratic Society become a strong, centralized, Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary movement. Many of the national leaders of Students for a Democratic Society support Klonsky in this regard.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

During the six-month period from August, 1968, through January, 1969, 449 telephone calls were made from Students for a Democratic Society National Headquarters outside of the State of Illinois. During this same period of time an additional 86 telephone calls were made in Illinois outside of the metropolitan Chicago area.

A telephone surveillance on the national headquarters of the Students for a Democratic Society would provide extremely valuable information concerning the plans of this organization with respect to its efforts to implement its programs. Such a surveillance would supply valuable data concerning the advance planning of this group, its leaders and the source of its funds.

I, therefore, recommend the installation of a telephone surveillance on the national headquarters of the Students for a Democratic Society, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, or any other address to which this organization may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N. Mitchell

DATE 5/14/69

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 12, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

New Left
Oriented Campus
Group

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum dated November 13, 1969, captioned "Students for a Democratic Society." By your approval of that memorandum on November 13, 1969, you authorized the continuance of the telephone surveillance on the national headquarters of the captioned organization at 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

The telephone surveillance mentioned above has continued to be a source of extremely valuable, timely and pertinent information concerning the activities, strategy, plans, and operations of the Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society. The Weatherman faction has been in complete control of the national headquarters of the Students for a Democratic Society since the June, 1969, National Convention. The Weatherman faction is totally committed to violent revolution at this time and has made strategic plans to build an underground paramilitary organization designed to carry out guerrilla warfare in the cities of the United States.

Weatherman members have moved into collectives in the major cities of the country and in an effort to keep their whereabouts unknown to local and Federal authorities are continuously moving from one collective to another. Sensitive information from the telephone surveillance has enabled the Federal Bureau of Investigation to locate many of these individuals as well as ascertaining the location of their frequently changing collectives. Furthermore, the identities of persons who participated in the recent trip to Cuba sponsored by the Venceremos Brigade have been furnished by this source.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

It is believed this surveillance's potential for continuation of this high-level performance is excellent, especially in furnishing information concerning the leadership, policy, and activities of the Students for a Democratic Society.

There are a substantial number of individuals currently under Antiriot Laws investigation as a result of their activity in Chicago, October 8-11, 1969. It is likely that certain of these individuals may be overheard on this surveillance.

At the current time, the Weatherman group is being forced to leave the premises at 1608 West Madison Street. However, a new headquarters has not been located and the move has not been completed.

Your authority is requested to continue the telephone surveillance at 1608 West Madison Street or to whatever new location the leadership of the Weatherman faction moves, for an additional three months. When the move is effected and telephone service installed at the new location, you will be advised.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 7/17/70

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

#12

March 27, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: THE YOUNG LORDS ORGANIZATION
1678 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
INTERNAL SECURITY - YOUNG LORDS

Investigation by this Bureau has revealed that the Young Lords has its principal offices in Chicago and New York and is attempting to establish a nationwide organization based on Marxist-Leninist principles enunciated by Communist China and Cuba. The Young Lords has received political education from and has embraced the basic program of the Black Panther Party. It has accepted aid and direction from revolutionary Puerto Rican groups seeking independence for Puerto Rico. Its publication, "YLO," is replete with calls for revolutionary action.

The New York Young Lords in December, 1969, seized a neighborhood church and held it for ten days before being evicted by police action. On March 5, 1970, an officer of the Young Lords in New York stated before a college audience, "From now on when the fascist pigs point guns at us, we will retaliate." The same speaker continued that he and his brothers in the Young Lords would no longer remain calm but would be violent "from this day on."

Your authorization is requested to institute telephone surveillance coverage on the New York headquarters of the Young Lords located at 1678 Madison Avenue, New York, New York, for a period of three months. This installation will be made away from the premises and will not involve trespass.

It is expected that the requested telephone surveillance coverage will provide valuable intelligence information vital to the internal security concerning the Young Lords' efforts to establish a national organization, its connections with the Black Panther Party and Puerto Rican independence groups, as well as provide intelligence regarding potential violence by this group.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Memorandum for the Attorney General

The monitoring of this surveillance may result in the interception of conversations involving individuals who are or may be defendants or attorneys in pending Federal cases. Therefore, monitoring of this surveillance will be conducted in accordance with instructions contained in your letter of July 14, 1969, entitled "Electronic Surveillances."

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED: John N Mitchell
DATE: 3/30/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: YOUNG LORDS PARTY
FORMERLY THE YOUNG LORDS ORGANIZATION
1678 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
INTERNAL SECURITY - YOUNG LORDS PARTY

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum dated March 27, 1970, captioned "The Young Lords Organization, 1678 Madison Avenue, New York, New York, Internal Security - Young Lords," approved by you on March 30, 1970, seeking authority to institute a telephone surveillance on the New York headquarters of the Young Lords Organization.

On May 25, 1970, captioned New York group split from the Chicago group of the Young Lords Organization on the grounds that the Chicago group was not providing leadership to form a successful revolutionary party. The Young Lords Party has retained the same program, leadership, membership, and headquarters in New York as its predecessor.

Our coverage of the captioned organization has resulted in obtaining valuable data concerning the travels of the leaders and plans for a demonstration of the captioned organization. Coverage has also furnished valuable data concerning the organizational and financial structure of the group and has furnished data concerning the identity of at least 15 new members of the group. The installation enables this Bureau to gain valuable intelligence data concerning the activities and scope of this revolutionary group.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

The Attorney General

Your authority is requested to continue the telephone surveillance at the headquarters of [the Young Lords Party in New York] for an additional three-month period, effective June 30, 1970.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N. Mitchell

DATE 6/19/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

July 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: YOUNG LORDS PARTY (YLP)
INTERNAL SECURITY - YOUNG LORDS PARTY

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum dated June 19, 1970, and approved by you on the same date wherein you approved continuation of telephone surveillance at the headquarters of the YLP in New York for a three-month period, effective June 30, 1970.

It has been determined that telephone service at YLP headquarters has been terminated due to nonpayment of the telephone bill. Accordingly, the coverage previously approved by you is being discontinued, effective July 15, 1970.

The YLP continues to have telephone service at its Bronx, New York, chapter which is also the center for publication of its revolutionary paper, "Palante." It would appear that YLP activity in the New York area will now be centered at the YLP office, Bronx, New York. Previous technical surveillance coverage of YLP headquarters provided valuable intelligence data regarding the organizational and the financial structure of the YLP and also furnished information regarding the identities of at least 15 new YLP members.

The YLP continues to advocate revolution and violence, and recently applauded the actions of those Puerto Rican revolutionaries who attempted to assassinate President Truman in 1950 and who wounded several individuals in a shooting spree within the chambers of the U. S. House of Representatives in 1954.

The monitoring of this surveillance will be conducted in accordance with the instructions contained in your letter dated July 14, 1969, captioned "Electronic Surveillances."

SECRET
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

The Attorney General

Your authority is requested to institute telephone surveillance coverage on the [YLP office located at 949 Longwood Avenue, Bronx, New York] for a period of three months.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 7/15/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UN[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT O[illegible]USTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

October 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: YOUNG LORDS PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY - YOUNG LORDS PARTY

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum dated July 28, 1970, whereby you were advised that telephone surveillance at the Bronx office of the Young Lords Party (YLP), New York City, previously approved by you, had been installed on July 24, 1970.

Since installation, technical surveillance coverage of the Bronx office of the YLP has resulted in identifying 12 apparent members of the YLP; has furnished information regarding possible travel of YLP leaders to Cuba; has furnished information concerning a two-day conference of militants organized by the YLP in New York; has furnished details concerning a demonstration called by the YLP in New York before the United Nations Building; and additionally, has provided background information concerning individuals in the YLP. This coverage has provided valuable information regarding day-to-day operations of the YLP.

The YLP continues to be a revolutionary-oriented and violence-prone organization of Puerto Rican youths in New York City. On October 18, 1970, following the suicide of one of its members in a New York City jail, the YLP held a funeral procession after which members of the group carried the casket into a church and barricaded themselves inside. They were armed with 14 rifles and announced that they would resist all police efforts to evict them by use of the rifles.

SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Memorandum for the Attorney General

Your authority is requested to continue technical surveillance coverage on the [YLP office, 949 Longwood Avenue, Bronx, New York,] for an additional period of three months, effective October 24, 1970.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 10/22/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: YOUNG LORDS PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY - YOUNG LORDS PARTY

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum dated October 22, 1970, and approved by you on the same date, wherein you approved continuation of telephone surveillance at the Bronx office of the Young Lords Party (YLP) for an additional period of three months, effective October 24, 1970.

It has been determined that telephone service at the YLP office in the Bronx has been terminated due to nonpayment of the telephone bill. Accordingly, the coverage previously approved by you was discontinued on October 27, 1970.

Telephone service at the national office of the YLP, 1678 Madison Avenue, New York City, has been restored. Previous telephone surveillance coverage of the Bronx office of the YLP and the national headquarters of the YLP provided valuable intelligence data regarding the membership and the financial structure of the YLP. Twenty-seven new YLP members were identified.

The YLP continues to advocate revolution and violence, and supports independence for Puerto Rico through violent means. In October, 1970, the YLP seized a church and members barricaded themselves inside. They are armed with 14 rifles and announced they will resist all police efforts to evict them by use of these rifles.

SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Memorandum for the Attorney General

The monitoring of this surveillance will be conducted in accordance with instructions contained in your letter dated July 14, 1969, captioned "Electronic Surveillances."

Your authority is requested to institute telephone surveillance coverage at the national office of the [YLP] for a period of three months.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 11/6/70

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 4, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: YOUNG LORDS PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY - YOUNG LORDS PARTY

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum dated November 6, 1970, requesting authority to reinstitute telephone surveillance at the National Office of the Young Lords Party (YLP), 1678 Madison Avenue, New York City, for a period of three months. You granted such authority on the same date.

Construction in the vicinity of the YLP National Office prevented installation of the telephone surveillance due to an unforeseen effect upon telephone company facilities necessary for the installation. While awaiting solution of the technical problems, our New York Office determined relocation of the YLP National Office was imminent. The YLP National Office is now located at 202 East 117th Street, New York City.

YLP continues to espouse a doctrine of revolution. Past telephone surveillances of its national and Bronx, New York, offices enabled us to identify many members and provided advance information concerning demonstrations and other violence. It is expected reinstitution of telephone surveillance of the National Office, YLP, will again provide valuable data of this nature.

The monitoring of this surveillance will be conducted in accordance with instructions contained in your letter dated July 14, 1969, captioned "Electronic Surveillances."

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Your authority is requested to reinstitute telephone surveillance coverage at the [National Office of the YLP] for a period of three months.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 2/5/71

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request, that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on the [National Office of the Young Lords Party (YLP) at 202 East 117th Street, New York City.]

The YLP is a militant Puerto Rican youth group patterned after the Black Panther Party. In addition to several branches in New York City, there are YLP branches in Bridgeport, Connecticut; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Puerto Rico.

According to its 13-Point Program and Platform, the YLP is a revolutionary political party fighting for the liberation of all oppressed people, seeks self-determination for Puerto Ricans' liberation, and believes armed self-defense and armed struggle are the only means to liberation. It cites the Castro revolution in Cuba as an example of the right of the people to destroy a government which oppresses them and of the importance for all true revolutionaries to have definite plans.

Major confrontations with police authorities occurred in New York City during 1969 and 1970 when armed YLP members and sympathizers forcibly occupied a Harlem church for an extended period. During the current month agitational activity of YLP members and sympathizers precipitated serious civil disturbances in New York City and Bridgeport, Connecticut. One YLP leader, Rafael Viera, reportedly is an associate of various suspects in the Capitol bombing investigation.

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Past telephone surveillance of YLP enabled us to identify many members and provided advance information concerning demonstrations and other violence. Currently, YLP efforts are focused on recruiting and strengthening membership in Puerto Rico which it looks upon as a homeland. It is expected reinstitution of telephone surveillance of the National Office, YLP, will furnish us specific information as to identities and plans of YLP leaders traveling between New York City and Puerto Rico. Live sources have been unable to provide us this information.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States through the Attorney General, and in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested until September 28, 1971.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

July 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: [YOUNG LORDS PARTY]

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at [202 East 117th Street, New York City, which installation is listed under the name of Young Lords Party.]

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the United States Government against overthrow by force or unlawful means and against a clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until September 28, 1971.

JOHN N. MITCHELL
Attorney General of the United States

6/30/71
Date

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNI[illegible]D STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]USTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

#18

(RI) 105-165706 Sub 34 May 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
NEW YORK DIVISION

Reference is made to your letter dated May 6, 1969, concerning the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

The Black Panther Party (BPP) is a violence-prone black extremist group. Its national headquarters is located in Oakland, California. The organization is split into two violent factions, one of which is under the direction of BPP Supreme Commander Huey Newton. The Newton Faction of the Party in New York City is located at 402 East Tenth Street, the residence of Marie Depury, a white female supporter of the group's revolutionary programs. The group maintains close ties with BPP headquarters and with foreign extremist elements which support the Newton Faction in its programs to overthrow the United States Government. The BPP has been involved in numerous incidents of violence involving police officers.

On May 21, 1971, two New York City police officers were murdered by two unknown blacks while returning to their car after responding to a legitimate call for assistance in the Harlem section of New York City. Two days earlier, two additional New York City police officers were wounded by unidentified black assailants. In subsequent messages directed to news media outlets and to the New York City Police Department

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

those claiming responsibility for the May 19, 1971, shootings claimed they were an act of revolutionary justice for black people against "fascist pigs." Weapons of same caliber were used in both shooting incidents which may have been related.

In view of the BPP's advocacy of harassment and killing of police officers and in connection with this Bureau's all-out efforts to effect solution of the case involving the murder of the two police officers, a telephone surveillance at the BPP Newton Faction office in New York City is considered vital. A telephone surveillance at the above location may provide significant information concerning the murders, including the identities of those involved, as well as data of intelligence value concerning day-to-day activities of the revolutionary BPP. It is anticipated results of this telephone surveillance will be introduced in court or that leads to evidence may be obtained; therefore, this request is being made not only for the purpose of obtaining intelligence data but also on the basis that evidence may be obtained that will be used in court.

Your authority is therefore requested to place a telephone surveillance on the BPP office at 402 East Tenth Street, New York City for a period of 30 days. If approved, interception will be away from this address. There will be no trespass involved in the installation of this telephone surveillance.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John Mitchell

DATE 5/28/71

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 157-17393

May 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: RONALD LEE JACKSON

Reference is made to your letter dated May 6, 1969, concerning the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

Ronald Lee Jackson is an active member of the black extremist Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC) which organization advocates the use of violence to achieve its goal of black liberation. Jackson serves as editor of SNCC's revolutionary publication, has numerous contacts among black extremists and has reportedly prepared instructional tapes concerning the waging of guerrilla warfare.

In connection with our efforts to effect a solution of the case involving the murders of two police officers in New York City on May 21, 1971, it is felt a telephone surveillance at Jackson's residence could be of assistance in identifying the unknown black assailants. It is possible that conversations of Jackson and other leading SNCC officials would be intercepted by a telephone surveillance at Jackson's residence and it is possible that any of these individuals may become the subject of either local or Federal criminal violations. The existing live informant coverage of Jackson and the SNCC organization is limited and it is felt these informants are not in a position to develop the necessary data regarding these murders.

~~NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION~~
~~Unauthorized Disclosure~~
~~Subject to Criminal Sanctions~~

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

It is felt a telephone surveillance at Jackson's residence, 865 Amsterdam Avenue, New York City, will provide vital information in our efforts to effect a solution of this murder case as well as information of intelligence value regarding black extremist activities. It is anticipated results of this telephone surveillance will be introduced in court or that leads to evidence may be obtained; therefore, this request is being made not only for the purpose of obtaining intelligence information but also on the basis that evidence may be obtained which will be used in court. In line with instructions on page five of your referenced letter the following information is set forth:

It is believed that Jackson and other individuals having access to this location may become involved in discussions which could lead to the solution of these murders. At the present time we are conducting intelligence investigations of Jackson and other leading members of SNCC.

On May 21, 1971, two New York City police officers were shot from behind and killed by two unknown black male assailants while returning to their car after responding to a legitimate call in the Harlem section of New York City. Two days prior to these murders two other New York City police officers were wounded by black assailants and a letter to The New York Times said that the shooting was for revolutionary justice for black people against "fascist pigs." Weapons of the same caliber were used in both shooting incidents which may have been related. In this crime, with the type of motive involved, telephone surveillances of selected persons are most valuable and necessary since a remark during a conversation or a contact often results in leads to the solution of the crime which would not otherwise be available. Jackson has been selected as a person likely to lead to the solution of these murders.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Jackson is a male Negro who was born February 18, 1950, at New York, New York. He resides in Apartment 13H, 865 Amsterdam Avenue, New York City. He has prior arrest records for inciting to riot and for demonstration activity and has exhibited suicidal tendencies in the past.

It is, therefore, recommended authority be granted for a telephone surveillance at Apartment 13H, 865 Amsterdam Avenue, New York City, for a period of 30 days. Interception will be away from this address and no trespass is involved. If approved, you will be advised when this installation has been made.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John Mitchell

DATE 5/28/71

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on Denise Roberts Oliver at 248 West 102nd Street, New York City. The telephone, located at Oliver's residence, is listed in the name of William Crain, a New York attorney. Crain does not reside with Oliver nor is he known to utilize this telephone which is listed in his name for billing purposes only.

A characterization of Denise Roberts Oliver, including a description of her activities, is attached to this memorandum.

It is therefore requested that the President of the United States through the Attorney General, in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject, and that you authorize the surveillance requested until February 12, 1972.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 16, 1971

[DENISE ROBERTS OLIVER]

Denise Roberts Oliver is a black militant revolutionary who is recognized as the direct emissary in the United States of Eldridge Cleaver, Black Panther Party (BPP) leader currently in Algeria. In June, 1971, Oliver returned to the United States from Algeria with plans to totally restructure the Cleaver Faction of the BPP in New York City along Marxist - Leninist lines. Until recently, she remained in a leadership capacity in the BPP - Cleaver Faction and edited "Right On!", the official Cleaver Faction newspaper.

In October, 1971, Oliver became managing editor of a new publication, "Babylon," which is the official organ of the recently created Revolutionary Peoples Communications Network (RPCN). The RPCN was created by Eldridge Cleaver and the International Section of the BPP to serve as an international aboveground apparatus for dissemination of information among revolutionary forces. Oliver is also closely associated with another new group, the Afro-American Liberation Army, the underground counterpart of the RPCN, which will engage in urban guerrilla warfare activity in the United States. She is currently assisting Kathleen Cleaver, wife of Eldridge Cleaver, who is traveling through the United States on a fund-raising tour to support revolutionary activities.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic~~

~~downgrading and~~

~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

DENISE ROBERTS OLIVER

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at 248 West 102nd Street, New York City, which installation is listed under the name of William Crain, an associate of Denise Roberts Oliver.

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority vested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until February 12, 1972.

JOHN N. MITCHELL
Attorney General of the United States

11/17/71
Date

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

On behalf of the President of the United States, you have previously authorized a telephone surveillance on Denise Roberts Oliver at 248 West 102nd Street, New York City.

A characterization of Denise Roberts Oliver, including a description of her activities, is attached to this memorandum.

This surveillance has in the past provided and continues to provide reliable and significant intelligence information regarding the subject.

It is therefore requested that the President of the United States through the Attorney General, in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject, and that you authorize the surveillance requested until May 12, 1972.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 8, 1972

DENISE ROBERTS OLIVER

Denise Roberts Oliver is a black militant revolutionary who is recognized as the direct emissary in the United States of Eldridge Cleaver, Black Panther Party (BPP) leader currently in Algeria. In June, 1971, Oliver returned to the United States from Algeria with plans to totally restructure the Cleaver Faction of the BPP in New York City along Marxist - Leninist lines. She assumed a leadership capacity in the BPP - Cleaver Faction and edited "Right On!", the official Cleaver Faction newspaper.

In October, 1971, Oliver became managing editor of a new publication, "Babylon," which is the official organ of the recently created Revolutionary Peoples Communications Network (RPCN). Since that time, she has concentrated her full energies on creating new units of the RPCN which was created by Eldridge Cleaver and the International Section of the BPP to serve as an international aboveground apparatus - for dissemination of information among revolutionary forces. Oliver is also closely associated with another new group, the Afro-American Liberation Army, the underground counterpart of the RPCN, which will engage in urban guerrilla warfare activity in the United States. Oliver coordinated the recent speaking tour of Kathleen Cleaver, wife of Eldridge Cleaver, who traveled throughout the United States on a fund-raising tour to gain support for revolutionary activities.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic~~

~~downgrading and~~

~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

[DENISE ROBERTS OLIVER]

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at [248 West 102nd Street, New York City,] which installation is listed under the name of [William Crain, an associate of Denise Roberts Oliver.]

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority vested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance presently conducted until May 12, 1972.

JOHN N. MITCHELL
Attorney General of the United States

2/9/72
Date

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

#19

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 157-11339 May 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: FRANCES MARY BEAL

Reference is made to your letter dated May 6, 1969, concerning the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

In line with referenced letter, your authority under Presidential authorization is requested to install a telephone surveillance on the home of Frances Mary Beal, 163-19 130th Avenue, South Ozone Park, New York, for a period of 30 days.

This surveillance is in connection with our efforts to effect a solution to the murders of two police officers in New York City on May 21, 1971. Beal is employed by the Education Foundation of the National Council of Negro Women in New York City. She is involved in black extremist activities in New York City as communication officer and a leading functionary of the black extremist Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in New York City. The SNCC has advocated violence to achieve black liberation. Beal has had numerous contacts in the black nationalist movement and is known among black extremists in the New York City area. She is responsible for the distribution of funds for SNCC programs and reportedly has had contacts with black extremists who have visited Cuba and Canada.

It is felt a telephone surveillance at the above location will provide vital information in our efforts to

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~ATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION~~
~~Unauthorized Disclosure~~
~~Subject to Criminal Sanctions~~

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

effect a solution to the murders of the police officers by unknown black assailants as well as information of intelligence value regarding black extremist activities. It is also anticipated that results of this telephone surveillance may be introduced in court or that leads to evidence may be obtained; therefore, this request is being made not only for the purpose of obtaining intelligence information but also on the basis that evidence may be obtained that will be used in court. In line with instructions on page five of your referenced letter, the following information is set forth:

On May 21, 1971, two New York City police officers were shot from behind and killed by two unknown black male assailants while returning to their car after responding to a legitimate call in the Harlem section of New York City. Two days prior to these murders two other New York City police officers were wounded by black assailants and a letter to The New York Times said that the shooting was for revolutionary justice for black people against "fascist pigs." Weapons of the same caliber were used in both shooting incidents which may have been related. In this crime, with the type of motive involved, telephone surveillances of selected persons are most valuable and necessary since a remark during a conversation or a contact often results in leads to the solution of the crime which would not otherwise be available. [Beal] has been selected as a person likely to lead to the solution of these murders.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

It is requested that authority be granted for a telephone surveillance at [163-19 130th Avenue, South Ozone Park, New York,] for a period of 30 days. Interception will be away from this address and no trespass is involved.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 5/28/71

~~SECRET~~

#23

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 100-437041

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Marxist-Leninist Group Affiliate

The Progressive Labor Movement is an extreme left grouping of communists who have split from the Communist Party, USA in criticism of the Party's revisionistic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The Progressive Labor Movement supports the Red Chinese position against that of the Soviet Union and is an extremely militant organization. This organization is acting, by means of agitation and propaganda, to continue racial demonstrations in New York City. This activity is being directed from its Harlem headquarters at 336 Lenox Avenue, New York, New York. Technical coverage of this headquarters will materially assist in the investigation of the Progressive Labor Movement's part in the New York City racial situation and will be of value in determining impending trouble areas in time for preventive measures to be taken.

I recommend that authority be granted to install a technical surveillance at the Harlem Progressive Labor Movement headquarters, 336 Lenox Avenue, New York, New York, or at any address to which this organization may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED Nicholas deB Katzenbach

DATE 7/27/64

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 100-437041

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

January 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY
PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

Marxist-Leninist Group Affiliate

A technical surveillance on the Harlem Progressive Labor Party Club and the Harlem Defense Council has been in operation since July 24, 1964. This surveillance, which is operated in connection with the over-all investigation of the Progressive Labor Party has provided valuable intelligence data relating to the policies, plans, and objectives at the leadership level.

This surveillance continually provides valuable intelligence data. For example, detailed information has been received concerning the following matters: (1) Progressive Labor Party participation in various demonstrations in the New York City area; (2) contact between Progressive Labor Party members and foreign diplomatic representatives; (3) itineraries and activities of traveling Progressive Labor Party functionaries; (4) speaking engagements on college campuses; (5) Progressive Labor Party activities in the tense Harlem area; (6) identities of Progressive Labor Party contacts.

Unless you instruct to the contrary, this technical surveillance will be continued for six months.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

~~[illegible]~~
~~Exc[illegible]~~
down[illegible]
~~declassification~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY *Marxist-Leninist Group Affiliate*
INTERNAL SECURITY - PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

The Progressive Labor Party (PLP) is the second largest communist party in the United States and is recognized by the Chinese communists (Chicoms) as the only true Marxist-Leninist party in the U.S. It advocates violent revolution as taught by the leader of the Chicoms, MAO Tse-tung, and it is financially supported by the Chicoms.

The PLP membership has grown steadily and presently numbers more than 350 hard-core members and numerous sympathizers. Its membership is concentrated in trade union work and on college campuses. During recent months Walter Linder, National Trade Union Director, has traveled extensively in the U.S. for the purpose of establishing new PLP branches. A National Committee member was recently sent to Chicago to lead increased activity. A concentrated effort has been made to extend PLP influence on college campuses, where its members work within such organizations as the Students for a Democratic Society. Frederick Jerome and Jacob Rosen, both members of the National Committee, were in Communist China during March, 1969, undoubtedly to obtain financial assistance and instructions from the Chicoms.

Because of the stepped-up activities and expansion of the PLP, as well as its close ties with the Chicoms, it constitutes a severe threat to the national security. Authority is requested to institute telephone surveillances on the residences of two National Committee members; namely,

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Memorandum for the Attorney General

Walter Linder, 11 McKeever Place, Brooklyn, New York; and Frederick Jerome, 55 Western Shore Lane, San Francisco, California, or at any other addresses to which they may move.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 4/25/69

SECRET

#28

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 13, 1956

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA *Headquarters Basic*
INTERNAL SECURITY - C *Revolutionary Group*
FBI File 100-3

The Communist Party, USA national and New York State organizations moved their headquarters early this month from 268 Seventh Avenue, New York City, to the Jefferson School of Social Science Building located at 575 Sixth Avenue, New York City.

We formerly had technical surveillances on these two important segments of the Communist Party, USA at their former headquarters which were exceedingly productive and furnished highly important day-to-day information concerning the Communist movement that could not have been obtained from any other source.

It is recommended that you authorize technical surveillances on the Communist Party, USA, telephone Oregon 5-9250, and the New York State organization, telephone Watkins 9-0464, at the new headquarters or at any other address to which they may move.

The postal address of the Jefferson School of Social Science Building is 575 Sixth Avenue, however, the telephone company listing for the above telephones is 101 West 16th Street, New York City, which is the side entrance to the same building and which will probably be the address given for the Communist Party, USA national and New York State headquarters.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Approved: HB
Date: 2-13-56

SECRET

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.(IS) 100-3

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Headquarters Basic Revolutionary Group

In April, 1957, two technical installations were instituted on the building located at 23 West 26th Street, New York, New York, which is occupied by the Communist Party, USA. One installation covers the national headquarters of the Party and the other covers the office of the Party's New York District. These sources furnish extremely valuable and up-to-date coverage of the activities of top level national and state functionaries of the Communist Party, USA. These sources also provided information concerning Political Affairs Publishing, Incorporated, which publishes "Political Affairs," monthly theoretical organ of the Communist Party.

During the past six months, these sources have continued to provide timely and valuable data relating to the activities of the Communist Party. For example, valuable information has been received concerning the location of important Party meetings, the Party's plans for demonstrations while officials of the United States Government are in New York City, travel plans of Party leaders and planned public appearances of Party leaders on college campuses.

Unless you instruct to the contrary, these technical surveillances will be continued for an additional six months.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

REC 5

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REQUEST OF SSC

NOVEMBER 21, 1975

Retained

OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

October 19, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on the residence of Black Panther Party - Cleaver Faction (BPP-CF) member [John William Washington, 4844½ Mascot Street, Los Angeles, California,] for a three-month period to terminate January 19, 1973. At present, there is no telephone service at this residence; however, it is expected service will be installed in the near future and authority for the telephone surveillance is being requested so that it can be installed when the telephone service is established. [Washington recently moved to this address from 1136 West 93rd Street, Los Angeles.] On September 25, 1972, you authorized a telephone surveillance on [Washington's] former address. This telephone surveillance, which was installed October 10, 1972, was discontinued on October 15, 1972.

The above-requested telephone surveillance is believed necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or any other hostile action of a foreign power and is believed necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information essential to the security of the United States.

SECRET

Classified by Acting Director, FBI
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified on Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Memorandum for the Attorney General

Although the BPP-CF is not under the total control or direction of Al Fatah, the above-named member of the BPP-CF has been used by Al Fatah as an agent to support Al Fatah operations. The above-listed residence is one at which Al Fatah operatives can be reasonably expected to make contact with their BPP-CF agent, noting that Al Fatah is known to have operatives in the Los Angeles area.

A memorandum setting forth the circumstances upon which this request is based is attached to this memorandum.

It is therefore requested that the President of the United States through the Attorney General, in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject, and that you authorize the surveillance requested until January 19, 1973.

Respectfully,

L. Patrick Gray

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

Enclosure

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

October 19, 1972

AL FATAH

Over the past several years, Al Fatah, a leading Arab terrorist organization with headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, has had continuing interest in Black Panther Party (BPP) activities in the United States. Black Panther Party - Cleaver Faction (BPP-CF) leader Eldridge Cleaver, upon meeting with Yasser Arafat, Al Fatah leader, in 1969, vowed full support by the Panthers of Al Fatah activities. BPP-CF leaders from the United States and Algeria have reportedly traveled to the Middle East for indoctrination and tactical guerrilla training. In April, 1972, information was developed indicating that the BPP-CF is planning the recruitment of trainees to travel to Algeria where they would be instructed in sniper tactics. These terrorists would be specifically trained in use of ground fire to attack the Presidential helicopter and would be utilized if the decision is made by BPP-CF leadership to assassinate the President of the United States.

The BPP-CF was originated in February, 1971, following a split between Huey P. Newton and Leroy Eldridge Cleaver, leaders of the violence-oriented BPP. Cleaver is a fugitive from justice living in self-imposed exile in Algiers, Algeria, from which location he controls the International Section of the BPP-CF. Since its inception, the BPP-CF, with national headquarters at 2026 Seventh Avenue, New York City, has advocated increased disruption of and violence against existing order. It strongly

SECRET
Classified by Acting Director, FBI
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified on Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

advocates urban guerrilla warfare in the United States. Within the past year, individuals associated with the BPP-CF have been directly linked to murders, skyjackings, assaults on police officers, and armed robberies. Its scope of operation, however, has been limited due to lack of financial resources.

Recently, information was received that Al Fatah is now willing to support financially BPP-CF activities in the United States including purchase of weapons and explosives. In mid-August, 1972, an Al Fatah operative, at the direction of Eldridge Cleaver, contacted BPP-CF member Charles Emile Pratt, who resides at 19108 Northwood Avenue, Carson, California. According to the information, Pratt was to arrange for acquisition of weapons and ammunition and to make underground contacts needed by Al Fatah for an operation in the United States similar to that which occurred in May, 1972, at Lod Airport, Tel Aviv, Israel, in which 29 persons were killed as the result of an Arab-directed terrorist attack. Pratt introduced the Al Fatah operative to [John William Washington, a BPP-CF member, who then resided at 1136 West 93rd Street, Los Angeles, California, and who now resides at 4844½ Mascot Street, Los Angeles.] [Washington] reportedly received $500 from the Al Fatah operative and traveled to the East to obtain arms and weapons that were to be used in terrorist acts in the United States. Although aborted, these acts were to occur simultaneous to and in consort with the recent terrorist acts at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany.

Two confidential sources, who are knowledgeable concerning Al Fatah activities in the United States, have furnished additional information corroborative of the data set forth above. The first source advised in March, 1972, that an Al Fatah leader in Beirut indicated that Al Fatah has trained agents, not connected with Al Fatah, based in the United States who are members of black nationalist groups and who stand ready to carry out acts of sabotage in behalf of Al Fatah. A second source confirmed that Al Fatah, during 1972, has contacted members of the BPP in California concerning plans for acts of terrorism in the United States.

The disastrous events which occurred at the 1972 Olympic Games and at Lod Airport clearly demonstrate the foreign potential and capability of Arab terrorist organizations. The utilization by Al Fatah of BPP-CF members to assist in carrying out acts of terrorism would closely parallel the tactics employed at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv in which Japanese nationals were utilized by Al Fatah to carry out a terrorist attack.

Foreign intelligence information essential to the security of the United States, which information is necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or any other hostile action of a foreign power, may be reasonably expected to be obtained from a telephone surveillance on the residence of [John William Washington, BPP-CF member in the Los Angeles area] who is acting as an agent of Al Fatah in the United States.

All sources who furnished the information in this matter which is set forth above have furnished reliable information in the past.

SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

AL FATAH

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation at the residence of Black Panther Party - Cleaver Faction (BPP-CF) member [John William Washington, 4844½ Mascot Street, Los Angeles, California.] There is no telephone service at [4844½ Mascot Street, Los Angeles, California;] however, service is expected to be installed in the near future. Your request was based on the utilization of this BPP-CF member by Al Fatah, a leading Arab guerrilla organization with headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, as an agent to support terrorist operations in the United States. The location at which you requested a telephone surveillance is one at which Al Fatah operatives can be reasonably expected to make contact with their BPP-CF agent, noting that Al Fatah is known to have operatives in the Los Angeles area.

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or any other hostile action of a foreign power and is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

SECRET
Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified on Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Memorandum for the Acting Director, FBI

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority vested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until January 19, 1973.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

10/24/72.
Date

#8

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 100-442684

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

March 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT
INTERNAL SECURITY - RAM

The [founder and leader] of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) is [Donald Freeman who resides at 1218 Carlyon Street, East Cleveland, Ohio, telephone number 761-0716.] RAM is an all-Negro organization which advocates the violent overthrow of the United States Government to be replaced by a Marxist-oriented government. RAM follows the Chinese Communist Party line.

It is requested that you authorize installation of a technical surveillance on the above-described residence of [Donald Freeman] or at any other address to which [he] may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. E. Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NdeK

DATE 3/3/65

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RECEIVED
MAR 2 1965

auth to CV
DOJ/hd
3-8-65

EX-114

REC 12

~~100-442681~~
100-442684-11-31X1

25 MAR 19 1965

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6 MAR 26 1965

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706 Sub 26

October 7, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

On August 7, 1969, authority was granted by you for a telephone surveillance at the former residence of Evon Carter, 2010 Third Avenue, Apartment 2, Los Angeles, California.

You have been previously advised that Evon Carter had moved from the indicated address and consequently the authorized surveillance was not being instituted. You were further advised that in the event she established a permanent residence in the future and activity at the residence warranted such action we would resubmit a request for a telephone surveillance.

In connection with our previous request for a telephone surveillance you were advised that Black Panther Party leaders had been using Carter's apartment as an underground hide-out and as a meeting and planning site for making high-level policy. It was indicated that Carter was the widow of Alprentice Carter, former Los Angeles Black Panther Party Deputy Minister of Defense and head of the Los Angeles Black Panther Party underground.

Evon Carter is now residing at 2728 Ellendale Place, Apartment 3, Los Angeles, California. She has assumed the position of Communications Secretary for the Los Angeles Black Panther Party. Residing with her at this address are Elaine Brown, Deputy Minister of Information for the Los Angeles Black Panther Party; Gwen Goodloe, Chairman of the Los Angeles Black Panther Party Breakfast Program; and Joan Kelly, who is also an officer in the Los Angeles Black Panther Party. This address is also being used by other members of the Black Panther Party in Los Angeles. An informant has advised the Los Angeles Black

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

Panther Party may be evicted from its headquarters in the near future and, if so, [Carter's] residence would undoubtedly be used, at least temporarily, as a headquarters to conduct Los Angeles Black Panther Party business. As you are aware, the Black Panther Party is a black extremist violence-prone organization. The Los Angeles, California, chapter has been one of its most active chapters.

A surveillance of [Carter's] telephone would be a valuable supplement to the telephone surveillance on Los Angeles Black Panther Party headquarters which you initially approved on March 20, 1969, and renewed for a three-month period on September 8, 1969. This coverage has provided invaluable information not available through other sources.

A surveillance on [Carter's] telephone might furnish a valuable insight into the current power struggle between factions of the Los Angeles Black Panther Party in which the subject is prominently involved. In view of [her] current position, [she] will undoubtedly be contacted on matters of planning and policy. For the same reason [she] should be in contact with numerous individuals who are actively engaged in Black Panther Party activities in an underground capacity.

It is requested authority be granted for a surveillance on the telephone at [Evon Carter's apartment located at 2728 Ellendale Place, Apartment 3, Los Angeles, California.] Interception will be away from [her] residence and no trespass is involved. If the coverage proves productive, it will be continued for an indefinite period.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N. Mitchell

DATE 10/7/69

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706

November 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Leaders of the revolutionary Black Panther Party (BPP) have advocated killings and kidnapings of top United States Government officials. The policy maker and most influential spokesman for this black violence-prone group is Huey P. Newton who holds the titles of Supreme Commander and Minister of Defense. Newton was released from jail on August 5, 1970, following a reversal of a conviction for voluntary manslaughter of a police officer and promptly thereafter exhibited complete disdain for our Government by encouraging black people in this country to fight in Vietnam on the side of the Viet Cong.

The BPP recently secured Apartment 25A at 1200 Lakeshore, Oakland, California, to be utilized by Newton to write a book. The lease for this apartment was signed by David G. Lubell, BPP attorney from New York, New York, and the telephone in this apartment is also listed in his name. Lubell is believed to be identical with a former Communist Party organizer and National Lawyers Guild official. In addition to being Newton's attorney he reportedly is in the process of drawing up legal papers to form the BPP into a corporation which will place all property and holdings of the BPP under ownership of the corporation. It will have a Swiss bank account to deposit all foreign contributions and all BPP chapters will have checking accounts under the corporation's name.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

Excluded from automatic

do~~wngrading and~~

de~~classification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

This apartment is in the most exclusive building of its type in the city of Oakland and visitors can gain entrance only after having been cleared by an occupant. It is considered likely that high-level BPP conferences will be held at this location.

Existing telephone surveillances on certain BPP offices, all of which have been authorized by you, have provided extremely valuable information. Additional coverage of [Newton] and the BPP at this exclusive apartment could result in the receipt of information concerning BPP policies, BPP involvement in foreign matters and plans for violent acts against top officials of this country and foreign diplomatic personnel.

It is requested that authority be granted for a microphone surveillance and a telephone surveillance at [Apartment 25A, 1200 Lakeshore, Oakland] Trespass will be involved with respect to the microphone surveillance.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED (Microphone Surveillance) John N. Mitchell

DATE 11/20/70

APPROVED (Telephone Surveillance) John N. Mitchell

DATE 11/20/70

~~SECRET~~

#2

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

October 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS;
BOMBING OF SIXTEENTH STREET
BAPTIST CHURCH
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA
SEPTEMBER 15, 1963
BOMBING MATTERS

Jesse Benjamin Stoner also known as J. B. Stoner is a practicing attorney and a member of the Bar Association of the State of Georgia and currently utilizes office space in the suite of James R. Venable another practicing attorney at 100½ Hunter Street, Northwest, Atlanta, Georgia. Stoner is the attorney for the National States Rights Party, an anti-Semitic and anti-Negro group with headquarters in Birmingham, Alabama. He is presently under indictment along with other members of the National States Rights Party in the Northern District of Alabama for contempt of court in connection with the integration of Birmingham schools in September, 1963.

It should be noted that James R. Venable has recently undertaken a program to consolidate various Klan organizations under his chairmanship.

Information has been received by this Bureau in the past concerning Stoner which indicates that he has information concerning acts of violence on the part of others. Along this line he has frequently counseled others not to submit to an interview by FBI Agents unless the Agents possess a warrant for the arrest of the person.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and declassification~~

Memorandum for the Attorney General

In view of the tense racial situation in Birmingham, further inflamed by the bombings, it is believed that additional activity on the part of those who are responsible for the bombings could easily lead to more rioting, bloodshed and loss of life, materially affecting the security of the United States.

It is requested that you authorize the installation of a technical surveillance at the [office of Jesse Benjamin Stoner in Atlanta,] or at any address to which he may move.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATED 10/10/63

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (SC) 100-399321

April 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: [MALCOLM K. LITTLE]
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

[Malcolm K. Little who resides at 23-11 97th Street, East Elmhurst, Queens, New York, is the former minister of Muslim Mosque Number 7 of the Nation of Islam who was suspended by Elijah Muhammad, national leader of the all-Negro semireligious group which teaches Negro supremacy.] [Little has now completed his break with the Nation of Islam and is] forming a new group to be known as Muslim Mosque, Incorporated, in New York which [he] states will be more aggressive than the Nation of Islam and will participate in racial demonstrations and civil rights activities. [He] has recommended the possession of firearms by members for their self-protection.

Technical coverage of [Little's residence] will materially assist in the investigation of [Little] and his new organization.

I recommend that authority be granted to install a technical surveillance at the residence of [Malcolm K. Little, 23-11 97th Street, East Elmhurst, Queens, New York] or at any address to which [he] may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED RFK

DATE 4-21-64

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

September 28, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: UNITED FLORIDA
KU KLUX KLAN
RACIAL MATTERS

Milton A. Luke resides at 1500 Roscomare Avenue, Orlando, Florida and has been identified as an official in local, state and national Klan groups since 1957. He has been described as the "Number 2 Man" in the United Florida Ku Klux Klan and a "strong man" in this organization who makes major decisions and who is violent in his hatred of Negroes. Luke carries a sidearm and allegedly has access to explosives. He would possibly be deeply involved in any violence on the part of the Klan in the Orlando area.

The anarchistic tactics utilized by Klan members in furthering their objectives clearly constitute a threat to the internal security of the United States. In order to obtain further information concerning plans and activities of Klan members in racial matters and the identities of contacts of Luke including possible secret members of the Klan, I recommend that authority be granted to place a technical surveillance at the residence of Milton A. Luke, 1500 Roscomare Avenue, Orlando, Florida or at any address to which Luke may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NdeBK

DATE 9/28/64

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
declassification

~~SECRET~~

#9

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 100-439190

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF ~~STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE~~ Militant Black Extremist Organization
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee has been described by confidential informants as the principal target for Communist Party infiltration among the various civil rights organizations. John Lewis, Chairman, and James Forman, Executive Secretary, have made public appearances with leaders of communist-front groups. John Lewis has been reported by reliable informants as stating he will accept any individuals, including communists, into his organization. This and related investigations have identified individuals with subversive backgrounds who hold key positions in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee.

The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee maintains its headquarters at 8½ Raymond Street, Northwest, Atlanta, Georgia, and is in the process of moving to 360-362 Nelson Street, Southwest, Atlanta, Georgia.

Authority is requested for the installation of a technical surveillance on the above headquarters of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and at any new location to which it may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

REC- 28

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NdeK

DATE 6/18/65

This should not be continued unless we actually develop useful information of a subversive type -
NdeK

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

9

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (RI) 105-165706

January 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The Black Panther Party is the most active and violent black extremist organization in the United States. In less than eight months it has grown from a one-hundred-member local group to a nationwide organization with chapters in major cities across the country and a membership exceeding twelve hundred. It is directed by a Central Committee from its national headquarters in Berkeley, California. Its members have recently been instructed to operate secretly to avoid revealing their identities as Black Panther members.

The organization strongly supports the Cuban and Chinese communist revolutionaries whose intelligence agents have been in contact with Black Panther Party leaders.

The Black Panther Party openly advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in preparation for revolutionary activity against the Government. All members are under instructions to possess large caliber firearms. They have plotted to blow up police stations and have attempted to do so. They are known to possess dynamite and other explosives.

During November, 1968, Black Panther leaders from across the country gathered in the San Francisco, California, area for organizational discussions and briefings in the use of firearms, firebombs and explosives. The Chairman stated the organization had reached the point for nationwide simultaneous destructive action and said notice for such action would be given by telephone calls from the national headquarters to the chapters at some future unspecified time.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~
Excluded from automatic
do~~wngrading and~~
de~~classificati~~on

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The organization has declared war on the [police] who are looked upon as the tools of oppressive government, and for over a year there has been a series of [Black Panther] attacks on police, including snipings and gun battles.

It is requested that authority be granted for a telephone surveillance on the [Black Panther Party national headquarters at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California] or at any other place to which it may move.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

[John Edgar] Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 2/6/69

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706

April 2, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The Black Panther Party is a black extremist organization with national headquarters in Berkeley, California. It now has affiliated groups in over 25 cities throughout the United States and a membership exceeding 1,200.

The public statements of its leaders repeatedly stress that the organization's objective is an armed black revolution against the Government of the United States by means of guerrilla warfare. Information is regularly received showing that its members are required to possess guns and have been instructed in their use. They have been trained in the preparation of fire bombs and explosives. The organization strongly supports the Cuban and Chinese Communist revolutionaries.

Reviews of telephone toll call records and information supplied by informants show that the leaders of the organization use the telephone extensively.

The Detroit, Michigan, chapter of the Black Panther Party was established in the Fall of 1968. Although it originally used space provided by the Association of Black Students at Wayne State University, it has recently changed the focal point of its activities to the Black Arts Development Center, 9049 Oakland, Detroit, Michigan. The Black Arts Development Center is also the headquarters of

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

other black extremist organizations in Detroit, Michigan, including the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, a black extremist organization attempting to infiltrate and sabotage Detroit automobile factories and the United Automobile Workers Union; and the Denmark Vessey Society, the contact point between black extremists in Canada and the United States.

The telephone surveillance on the [national headquarters of the Black Panther Party] which was authorized on February 4, 1969, has proved to be most valuable. It has provided information concerning the planned establishment of [Black Panther Party branches at Eugene, Oregon; Fresno, California; the Watts area of Los Angeles, California; Syracuse, New York; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and Columbus, Ohio.] It provided information concerning the removal of Joudon Ford from his leadership position in the New York City branch and, most recently, has furnished details concerning the travel of National Chairman Bobby George Seale to the Scandinavian countries.

Live informants are furnishing information indicating that the organization will increasingly use underground methods of operation which further emphasizes the desirability of obtaining additional coverage to supplement data being furnished by our live informants.

It is requested that authority be granted for telephone surveillance on the [Black Panther Party headquarters at 9049 Oakland, Detroit, Michigan] or on any other places to which they may move.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 4/2/69

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706

April 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: [BLACK PANTHER PARTY]

The [Black Panther Party is a black extremist organization with national headquarters in Berkeley, California.] It now has affiliated groups in cities throughout the United States and a membership exceeding [1,200.]

The public statements of its leaders repeatedly stress that the organization's objective is an [armed black] revolution against the Government of the United States by means of [guerrilla warfare.] Information is regularly received showing that its members are required to possess guns and have been instructed in their use. They have been trained in the preparation of fire bombs and explosives. The organization strongly supports the Cuban and Chinese Communist revolutionaries.

Reviews of telephone toll call records and information supplied by informants show that the leaders of the organization use the telephone extensively.

The [San Francisco, California, chapter of the Black Panther Party is an extremely active chapter with headquarters at 1336½ Fillmore Street, San Francisco, California.] Its importance is enhanced by its close proximity to the [national headquarters in Berkeley, California,] and its close relationship to national leaders from whom it receives constant guidance and instructions. Members of the [San Francisco chapter] are known to have been in possession of dynamite and weapons and to have fired on police officers.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The [Chicago, Illinois, chapter of the Black Panther Party was established in August, 1968, and is a most active group with headquarters at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.] Recently information has been developed that changes will be made in the [Black Panther Party organizational structure and Chicago will be in charge of the entire East Coast organization.] One of its leaders has been involved in the direction of racial disturbances, has attempted to obtain dynamite to blow up public buildings, and has stated that if contact could be made with Negroes on the White House staff a plan might be formulated to poison people attending functions there.

It is requested that authority be granted for telephone surveillances on the [Black Panther Party headquarters at 1336½ Fillmore Street, San Francisco, California, and at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois,] or on any other places to which they may move.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 4/30/69

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RACIAL MATTERS

The Black Panther Party is a black extremist organization with national headquarters in Berkeley, California. It now has affiliated groups in cities throughout the United States and a membership exceeding 1,200.

Public statements by Black Panther Party leaders repeatedly stress the organization's objective is an armed black revolution against the Government of the United States by means of guerrilla warfare. Information is regularly received showing that its members are required to possess guns and have been instructed in their use. They have been trained in the preparation of fire bombs and explosives. The organization strongly supports the Cuban and Chinese Communist revolutionaries.

A review of telephone call records and information supplied by informants show that the leaders of the organization use the telephone extensively.

The Sacramento, California, chapter of the Black Panther Party has been active. Its headquarters is at 2941 35th Street, Sacramento, California. Since its formation, officials of the chapter have been in frequent contact with national headquarters. Sacramento chapter members are known to be in possession of firearms.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Recent information indicates [chapters are being formed in Vallejo and Fresno, California] and there is a strong likelihood that instructions obtained from national headquarters will be relayed by the [Sacramento chapter to the Vallejo and Fresno chapters] by telephone.

It is requested that authority be granted for a telephone surveillance on the [Black Panther Party headquarters at 2941 35th Street, Sacramento, California] or on any other place to which the headquarters may be moved.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 6/16/69

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706

October 20, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Approval was granted by you previously for a telephone surveillance on the Chicago office of the Black Panther Party (BPP) located at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, and on July 25, 1969, you authorized the continuation of this surveillance.

This installation is currently providing extremely valuable information relating to the operation and activities of the BPP in Chicago and its personnel. Examples of the voluminous amount of intelligence data being furnished by this installation include the following:

Information has been developed that instructions and directives from the BPP national headquarters in Berkeley, California, are adhered to by the Chicago chapter. In this regard, information has been developed that the staff of the Illinois BPP Central Committee which is the governing body of the Chicago chapter, will help the national headquarters in training, directing, and the general overall orientation of all BPP organizations on the East Coast. Information from this surveillance has revealed that the Chicago BPP office conducted an inspection of the operations of the Indianapolis, Indiana, chapter and thereafter the Chicago BPP was ordered by the national headquarters to reorganize the Indianapolis chapter.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Details were developed that the [BPP] would not participate with the radical element of the anarchistic Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in demonstration activities during October, 1969, because the SDS desired provocative tactics. Information was received concerning shoot-outs between [BPP members and the Chicago Police Department at the BPP office in Chicago during July and October, 1969.] Information revealed that the [Chicago BPP] was working closely with the Young Patriots (YP), a white youth gang consisting of poor "displaced Southerners." In this connection, information was developed concerning travel plans of leaders of the [BPP] and YP who toured several Southern states fulfilling speaking engagements.

Data has also been received from the installation indicating that the [BPP] had contacts in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The installation provided data concerning a proposed demonstration during October, 1969, sponsored by the [BPP to retaliate for a Chicago Police Department raid on its office.] Information has been developed indicating that the [Chicago BPP] office was sending approximately $250 a week to the national headquarters for 15,000 to 20,000 copies of the [weekly BPP newspaper "The Black Panther."]

Your authority is requested to continue this telephone surveillance at the present location for an additional three months effective October 24, 1969.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 10/20/69

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706 sub 32

November 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
NEW HAVEN CHAPTER

You were previously furnished information concerning the torture and murder of Alex Rackley, a Black Panther Party (BPP) member from New York whose body was found near New Haven, Connecticut, on May 21, 1969. To date 14 BPP members, including several national officers, most notable among whom is Bobby Seale, National Chairman of the BPP, have been charged with complicity in this crime. Twelve of these individuals have been indicted and are awaiting trial.

The New Haven BPP Chapter recently moved its headquarters to 35 Sylvan Avenue, New Haven. The new headquarters is being utilized for planning and directing BPP activities throughout the state. Since the arrests in connection with Rackley's murder there has been a steady influx of BPP members from throughout the United States to New Haven to participate in directing rallies, demonstrations, and other activity in an effort to influence the outcome of the trials.

The telephone, concerning which coverage is requested, is listed in the name of James E. Wilson, a known Panther member who reportedly obtained this telephone

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

on behalf of the BPP. A survey of this telephone number for the period from October 6, 1969, through October 28, 1969, disclosed over 150 long distance telephone calls ranging from New York to the West Coast.

Much of the BPP policy-making apparatus will be located at New Haven during the next several months and it is felt that instructions affecting the overall movement will possibly be issued through the New Haven BPP office.

In view of the violence-prone nature of the BPP, it can reasonably be anticipated that subjects involved in past or future criminal violations may be monitored. The guidelines to be followed, as previously furnished by you, will be strictly complied with in such instances.

If you approve, a telephone surveillance will be placed on the headquarters of the New Haven Chapter of the BPP at 35 Sylvan Avenue, New Haven, Connecticut. If the coverage proves productive, it will be continued for an indefinite period. There will be no trespass involved regarding the installation of this telephone surveillance.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N. Mitchell

DATE 11/26/69

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706 January 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: [BLACK PANTHER PARTY]

You have previously authorized this Bureau to initiate a telephone surveillance on the [San Francisco, California, office of the Black Panther Party (BPP) located at 1336½ Fillmore Street, San Francisco, California] and on October 17, 1969, you authorized the continuation of this surveillance for three months effective October 23, 1969. This installation currently provides extremely valuable information concerning the operations and activities of the [BPP in San Francisco] and around the country. Examples of the voluminous amount of intelligence data being furnished by this installation include the following:

During October, November, and December, 1969, this installation regularly furnished information regarding the handling and distribution of the [BPP newspaper, "The Black Panther,"] to cities throughout the United States and to [BPP] contacts in foreign countries. At the present time the [BPP] is printing over 100,000 copies of this newspaper each week. During this same period information was regularly received from this source furnishing details of travel plans by [BPP] leaders and functionaries. On November 1, 1969, this source advised of the location of an apartment being used by the [BPP in San Francisco.] On November 25, 1969, this source identified the individual in Canada who distributes the [BPP] newspaper there and the source also furnished details regarding the procedure used in mailing the newspaper to Canada in order to avoid its seizure by Canadian authorities.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Information was furnished by this source on November 29 and 30, 1969, concerning the purchase and use of two offset printing presses by the BPP. On December 3, 1969, this source furnished information regarding the whereabouts of BPP Chief of Staff David Hilliard which information aided the United States Secret Service in arresting Hilliard without incident for making a public threat against the President. On January 14, 1970, this source furnished information regarding over $2,500 owed to national headquarters by two BPP chapters for past editions of the newspaper and the source also furnished details regarding these two accounts.

Your authority is requested to continue this telephone surveillance at the present location for an additional three months.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 1/21/70

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706

January 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Approval was granted by you previously for a telephone surveillance on the Chicago office of the Black Panther Party (BPP) located at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, and on October 20, 1969, you authorized the continuance of this surveillance for an additional three months effective October 24, 1969.

This installation is currently providing extremely valuable information relating to the operation and activities of the BPP in Chicago and its personnel. Examples of the voluminous amount of intelligence data being furnished by this installation include the following:

Information has been developed that directives from the BPP national headquarters in Berkeley, California, continue to be adhered to by the Chicago chapter. In this regard, the fatal shooting of Deputy Chairman Frederick Hampton by police officers in Chicago on December 4, 1969, has resulted in increased activity between the national BPP headquarters and the Chicago chapter. Due to the shooting of Hampton, tension in Chicago ghettos has increased because of BPP activity calling for support of its programs by the Negro community. Information from this surveillance has revealed that Eldridge Cleaver, national BPP Minister of Information and a fugitive from justice outside the United States, commented on Hampton's death that BPP "vengeance is totally justified." However, this source was able to furnish information following the death of Hampton that the BPP planned no demonstrations.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Detailed information was developed regarding a [BPP] speaking tour in Canada during November, 1969, which would realize approximately $3,000 for the organization. Also, data was developed that two [BPP] members on the speaking tour were using false identification in Canada and were arrested by Canadian officials. Information revealed that the [Chicago BPP] was experiencing difficulty with the establishment of a health center because of harassment by a Chicago youth gang. The installation provided data concerning proposed weekly demonstrations in connection with the antiriot conspiracy trial which was being held in Chicago and of efforts on the part of the [BPP] to fill the courtroom with sympathizers.

Data has also been received from the installation indicating that until [BPP] members proved their loyalty, they were purged because of irresponsibility and lack of discipline. In addition, this source provided voluminous information regarding the leadership, membership, press releases, funds, formation of chapters, travel, and arrests of [BPP] members.

Your authority is requested to continue this telephone surveillance at the present location for an additional three months.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 1/22/70

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

January 26, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
LOS ANGELES DIVISION

Approval was granted by you on March 20, 1969, for a telephone surveillance on the office of the Black Panther Party, 4115 South Central Avenue, Los Angeles, California. On December 2, 1969, you granted approval to continue that telephone surveillance for an additional three months.

The above address is no longer being used as the Los Angeles Black Panther Party office. The office has been transferred to 9818 Anzac, Los Angeles, California.

The Black Panther Party continues to be the most violence-prone and dangerous black extremist organization in the United States. The Los Angeles Chapter, in turn, is one of its most active groups. The December 8, 1969, shooting encounter of members of this group with the Los Angeles Police Department, of which you are aware, attests to the group's violence, defiance of law and order, and internal security threat.

You are also aware that the installation described above furnished extremely valuable information concerning many facets of the operations of that organization. It is expected that an installation at the new location will also furnish extremely valuable information not otherwise obtainable.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SECRET

~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Accordingly, it is requested that authority be granted to transfer the telephone surveillance at [4115 South Central Avenue, Los Angeles, California, to 9818 Anzac, Los Angeles, California.]

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 1/26/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

March 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

You have previously authorized this Bureau to initiate a telephone surveillance on the office of the national headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California and on December 17, 1969, you authorized the continuance of this surveillance for an additional three months. This installation continues to provide extremely valuable information on the operation and activities of the BPP on a nationwide and international scale. Examples of the voluminous amount of intelligence data being furnished by this installation include the following:

On various dates in December, 1969, and in January, February, and March, 1970, this source has furnished detailed information regarding the extensive travel of BPP leaders throughout the country and overseas. On December 14, 1969, this source furnished data regarding the meeting between BPP representatives and Robert Williams in connection with the then considered merger of the BPP and the extremist Republic of New Africa. Williams is a black extremist and former fugitive from justice who lived in Cuba and China from 1961 to 1969 and who formerly was the president of the Republic of New Africa. Eldridge Cleaver, BPP official and fugitive from justice who resides in Algiers, Algeria, was considering returning to the United States and discussed plans in this regard with BPP officials on January 9, 1970, according to this source.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic~~

~~downgrading and~~

~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

This source also furnished information on January 20, 1970, which indicated that BPP official Kathleen Cleaver, wife of Eldridge Cleaver had left him and traveled to Sweden for medical treatment.

On February 22, 1970, this source advised of unsuccessful efforts by Eldridge Cleaver to obtain a "diplomatic passport" in order to travel to France. On February 23, 1970, this source advised that Eldridge Cleaver in Algiers ordered BPP official Elbert Howard to travel immediately to Algiers. Subsequently, this source furnished detailed information on Howard's travel on February 27, 1970. This source furnished detailed information on February 27, 1970, regarding the expelling by Eldridge Cleaver of two members of the BPP International Committee overseas. These individuals were soliciting funds in Europe and had instructed donors to contribute through them rather than through Cleaver.

The monitoring of this surveillance will be conducted in accordance with instructions contained in your letter of July 14, 1969, entitled "Electronic Surveillances."

Your authority is requested to continue this telephone surveillance at the present location for an additional three months effective March 17, 1970.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N. Mitchell

DATE 3/13/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706-Sub 15 April 14, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY - NATIONAL
COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
DETROIT DIVISION

You have previously authorized this Bureau to initiate a telephone surveillance on the office of the extremist Black Panther Party (BPP) in Detroit, Michigan. This surveillance was discontinued in June, 1969, when the Detroit BPP chapter was disbanded. The BPP group in Detroit has since been reactivated and is now known as the National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF).

The BPP is a black extremist organization with national headquarters in Berkeley, California. It has affiliated groups in 39 cities throughout the United States with a hard-core membership of approximately 900.

The public statements of its leaders repeatedly stress that the organization's objective is an armed black revolution against the Government of the United States by means of guerrilla warfare. Information is regularly received showing that its members are required to possess guns and have been instructed in their use. They have been trained in the preparation of fire bombs and explosives. The organization strongly supports the Cuban and Chinese Communist revolutionaries.

The Detroit NCCF is now operating under strict discipline of the national BPP with 11 hard-core members who

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-ation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by ur Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-l without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

reside at headquarters and a following of 20 to 50 additional individuals to run errands and perform various duties for the chapter. As of March 5, 1970, 46 weapons, including rifles, shotguns and handguns belonging to members, were stored on the second floor of headquarters, along with about 50,000 rounds of ammunition and four sticks of dynamite. Appropriate law enforcement officials in [Detroit, Michigan,] have been advised of this cache.

The telephone surveillance on the national headquarters which has been authorized by you has proved to be most valuable. Information so received indicates daily contact between the [Detroit chapter] and the national headquarters. It is felt that the installation of this telephone surveillance will not only furnish valuable information concerning the revolutionary activities of the [BPP] in the United States, but will also furnish information regarding their activities in Canada and other foreign countries. Live informants are furnishing information regarding activities of this group, but additional coverage is vital to insure awareness of all revolutionary activities of the organization.

It is requested that authority be granted for a telephone surveillance on the [NCCF located at 2219 Indiandale Street, Detroit, Michigan.] Interception will be away from this address and no trespass is involved. If this coverage proves productive, it will be continued for an indefinite period.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 4/14/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 12, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

You have previously authorized this Bureau to initiate a telephone surveillance on the national headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California and on March 13, 1970, you authorized the continuance of this surveillance for an additional three months effective March 17, 1970. By memorandum dated May 25, 1970, you were advised that one phase of the operations of BPP national headquarters moved from the Berkeley address to 1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California and that we would also cover that phase of BPP operations under your authorization for coverage of BPP national headquarters. This installation provides extremely valuable information on the operations and activities of the BPP on a nationwide and international scale. Examples of some of the voluminous amount of intelligence data obtained include the following.

On various dates in March, April, and May, 1970, this source furnished details concerning activities, speaking engagements, and extensive travels in the United States and abroad by BPP officials. On March 5, 1970, this source furnished data regarding the arrival in the United States of BPP Scandinavian representative Connie Matthews in company with Jean Genet, notorious French author, felon, and homosexual who planned a publicity tour on behalf of the BPP. Information from this source on March 16, 1970, revealed that BPP national headquarters had ordered its members not to take part in a

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

planned student strike at Columbia University, New York, New York. On April 28, 1970, the source advised of efforts by the BPP to get extremist Stokely Carmichael, a former BPP official, to testify for the defense and refute a witness in the forthcoming trial of BPP Chairman Bobby Seale. This source furnished information which identified a white female courier for the BPP between its national headquarters and Eldridge Cleaver, BPP official and fugitive from justice, in Algiers, Algeria. Details of trips by this female on May 7 and 20, 1970, were obtained. This source furnished complete details of the move of the Ministry of Information phase of BPP national headquarters operations to Oakland, California due to the lack of space at the national headquarters office in Berkeley, California.

The monitoring of this surveillance will be conducted in accordance with instructions contained in your letter of July 14, 1969, entitled "Electronic Surveillances."

Your authority is requested to continue this telephone surveillance on the national headquarters of the BPP at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, and at 1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California, for an additional three months effective June 17, 1970.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 6/15/70

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706 sub 37 June 25, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: [BLACK PANTHER PARTY
PHILADELPHIA CHAPTER]

On June 1, 1970, you authorized this Bureau to initiate a telephone surveillance on the office of the extremist [Black Panther Party in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, at 1928 West Columbia Avenue.]

The telephone surveillance was never activated at that address and the organization has since moved its headquarters from that address to office space located at [2935 West Columbia Avenue.]

Your authority is therefore requested to institute a telephone surveillance of the [Black Panther Party at the address of 2935 West Columbia Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.] Interception will be away from this address and no trespass is involved.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 6/25/70

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706 Sub 5

August 28, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
BOSTON CHAPTER

The activity of the extremist Black Panther Party (BPP) has increased at an alarming rate in the greater Boston, Massachusetts, area. The approximately 40 members of the Boston chapter of the BPP do not accurately reflect the strength and wide following the BPP has in the greater Boston area. It is supported by three affiliated BPP groups, two of which go under the name of the National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF), located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and New Bedford, Massachusetts and a group known as the Peoples Information Center, headquartered in Cambridge. Within recent weeks, BPP members in Boston were observed in a truck carrying dynamite and dynamite caps; gunfire aimed at passing motorists emanated from the NCCF office in New Bedford; a BPP official threatened the life of the President of the United States; another BPP official urged college students to engage in revolutionary violence; and BPP members have been acquiring and stockpiling a large arsenal of weapons and ammunition.

The telephone, concerning which coverage is requested, is located at the Boston BPP headquarters, 21-23 Winthrop Street, Roxbury, Massachusetts. Information has been developed that the numerous local and long distance telephone calls concerning high policy decisions of the BPP take place at the Boston BPP headquarters.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In view of the violence-prone nature of the [BPP] it can be reasonably anticipated that subjects involved in past or future criminal violations may be monitored. The guidelines to be followed, as previously furnished by you, will be strictly complied with in such instances.

If you approve, a telephone surveillance will be placed on the headquarters of the [Boston chapter of the BPP at 21-23 Winthrop Street, Roxbury, Massachusetts]. If the coverage proves productive, it will be continued for an indefinite period. There will be no trespass involved regarding the installation of this telephone surveillance.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 8/31/70

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706 Sub 3 August 31, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
BALTIMORE DIVISION

The Black Panther Party (BPP) is a black extremist organization with national headquarters in Oakland, California and has affiliated groups in approximately 40 cities throughout the United States with a hard-core membership of approximately 750.

The public statements of the leaders of the BPP repeatedly stress that the organization's objective is an armed black revolution against the Government of the United States by means of guerrilla warfare. Information is regularly received showing that its members are required to possess guns and have been instructed in their use. They have been trained in the preparation of fire bombs and explosives. The organization strongly supports the Cuban and Chinese Communist revolutionaries.

The BPP in Baltimore, Maryland has headquarters located at 1248 North Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland and has an active membership of 19.

Members of the BPP in Baltimore in July, 1969, were involved in the torture-murder of Eugene Leroy Anderson. They mistakenly believed Anderson to be a police informant. As a result of this murder seven BPP members have been arrested and six individuals have outstanding warrants for their arrest.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Members of the BPP in Baltimore sell BPP newspapers, appear as speakers at high schools, colleges and rallies and distribute inflammatory literature. Members of the Baltimore BPP have been arrested for interfering with police, assault and murder of police and carrying dangerous weapons. BPP members may seize the opportunity during the trial of the BPP members in the above-mentioned murder to cause violent demonstrations.

The telephone surveillance on the BPP national headquarters, which has been authorized by you, has proven to be most valuable. Information so received indicates almost daily contact between the Baltimore BPP and the national BPP headquarters. It is felt that the installation of a telephone surveillance at the BPP in Baltimore will furnish valuable information concerning revolutionary activities of the BPP in the United States and could furnish advance information regarding plans for violent actions against nearby top officials of this country. Live informants are furnishing information regarding activities of this group but additional coverage is vital to insure awareness of all revolutionary activities of the organization.

It is requested that authority be granted for a telephone surveillance on the BPP headquarters located at 1248 North Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland. Interception will be away from this address and no trespass will be involved.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 9/2/70

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

October 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
CLEVELAND DIVISION

The revolutionary Black Panther Party (BPP) is currently active in 40 cities throughout the U.S. with approximately 750 hard-core members. The BPP continues to call for the killing of police. Its leaders have advocated the killing and the kidnaping of top U.S. Government officials.

The BPP group in Cleveland, Ohio, is known as the National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF). Its membership totals 75. Most members are college students who participated in campus violence during the Spring of 1970. At the August 6, 1970, NCCF meeting in Cleveland there were frequent remarks made relative to the killing of police in retaliation "for killings in the black community." Those in attendance also studied an article by Huey P. Newton, Supreme Commander and Minister of Defense of the BPP, entitled "The Correct Handling of a Revolution." This article had been published in the January 3, 1970, edition of the BPP newspaper.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Existing telephone surveillances on certain BPP offices, all of which have been authorized by you, have provided extremely valuable information. The NCCF in Cleveland is the focal point of BPP activities in northern Ohio. Coverage of this office by telephone surveillance could result in the receipt of advance information regarding plans for violent actions and valuable information regarding revolutionary activities of the BPP.

It is requested that authority be granted for a telephone surveillance on the NCCF located at 2312 East Seventy-ninth Street, Cleveland, Ohio. Interception will be away from this address and no trespass is involved.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 10/21/70

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

January 18, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Approval was granted by you previously for a telephone surveillance on the Chicago office of the Black Panther Party (BPP) located at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, and on October 19, 1970, you authorized the continuance of this surveillance for an additional three months. By memorandum dated December 10, 1970, you were advised that a phase of the expanded Chicago BPP operation was moved to 4233 South Indiana Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, and that we would also cover that phase under your authorization for coverage on the office of the Chicago BPP.

The installation is currently providing extremely valuable information relating to the operation and activity of the BPP in Chicago its officials and members, its propensity for violence, its sources of funds, and distribution of the party newspaper and other propaganda.

For example, information was developed in October, 1970, that Resist, a nationwide group of adults who have declared their support of those who refuse to be drafted to fight in Vietnam, had furnished financial aid to the BPP in Chicago and the latter was attempting to obtain additional funds from this group.

This installation also provided information concerning the plans of the BPP to print their newspaper in Chicago and New York, as well as San Francisco in an effort to defray the high cost of shipping the papers throughout the U.S. from one location.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Information has also been obtained through this installation not only of the operations and plans of the Chicago BPP office, but of other BPP groups in numerous other cities, especially those throughout the State of Illinois.

Information obtained has disclosed the identities of members of these groups, the problems they are encountering, and any achievements they have attained.

Your authority is requested to continue this telephone surveillance at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, and 4233 South Indiana Avenue, Chicago, Illinois for an additional three months, effective January 22, 1971.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED ______

DATE 1/18/71

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

January 18, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: [BLACK PANTHER PARTY]

You have previously authorized this Bureau to initiate a telephone surveillance on the [San Francisco, California, office of the Black Panther Party (BPP) located at 1336½ Fillmore Street, San Francisco, California.] On October 19, 1970, you authorized the continuation of this surveillance for an additional three months, effective October 21, 1970. This installation currently provides extremely valuable information concerning the operations and activities of the [BPP in San Francisco] and around the country, particularly in regard to the [BPP] newspaper, ["The Black Panther."] The national distribution office of the [BPP] is located in the same building as the office of the [San Francisco BPP chapter.] This newspaper represents one of the most important activities of and a regular source of income for the [BPP.] Examples of the voluminous amount of intelligence data being furnished by this installation include the following:

From October through December, 1970, this source daily provided detailed information on the publication and finances of the newspaper. Approximately 100,000 copies of this paper are printed weekly and a high of 183,000 was reached in October, 1970. This source regularly furnishes details concerning the shipment and distribution of the paper thus aiding in identifying new

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

[BPP] branches and the extent of [BPP] activity. During the October to December, 1970, period, this source also furnished information on a regular basis pertaining to the daily operational activities and problems of the [BPP] including the daily movement of key personnel which information cannot be duplicated.

On October 12, 1970, this source provided details of the expenditure of $4,000 for [BPP] propaganda posters. On November 6, 1970, this source determined that a conference of black youth to be held in Minnesota was strictly a [BPP] affair. On December 20, 1970, this source determined that [BPP] officials were looking at property and considering moving the office of the [San Francisco chapter] and national distribution to a new location.

The monitoring of this surveillance will be conducted in accordance with instructions contained in your letter of July 14, 1969, entitled "Electronic Surveillances."

Your authority is requested to continue this telephone surveillance at the present location for an additional three months, effective January 21, 1971.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 1/18/71

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706 Sub 37 February 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION

On November 12, 1970, you authorized a telephone surveillance on the Philadelphia Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), 3625 Wallace Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This installation has provided extremely valuable information and the following is a summary of the more pertinent information which has been developed.

This source, during November and December, 1970, provided detailed information concerning income, expenditures and debts of the Philadelphia BPP Chapter. It also revealed during December, 1970, that efforts were being made by the BPP to obtain a site on the East Coast to be used for printing the BPP newspaper and that the BPP had formed Stronghold Consolidated Productions, Incorporated, for the purpose of controlling all BPP finances and contractual arrangements. The source also advised during this same month that Philadelphia BPP members were to be instructed to prepare detailed accountings of interviews conducted by Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents.

Considerable data concerning travel of BPP leadership, including attendance at a BPP "ideological institute" in San Francisco, California, was furnished by

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

the source during December, 1970, and January, 1971. During the latter month it was also ascertained that Philadelphia BPP members planned to apply for welfare funds and to thereafter furnish these funds to the BPP. Additionally, leadership changes within the Philadelphia BPP and the identities of members who have quit the Party were provided.

This source can be expected to continue to furnish valuable information concerning this violence-prone group. Your authority is therefore requested to continue this telephone surveillance for an additional three-month period effective February 12, 1971.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell
DATE 2/11/71

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 12, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
LOS ANGELES DIVISION

Approval was granted by you on December 4, 1970, authorizing continuation of the telephone surveillance on the offices of the Los Angeles Black Panther Party (BPP), Los Angeles, California for an additional three months, effective December 5, 1970. As you were previously advised, this authorization covers telephone surveillances of chapter operational phases at 2043 East Stockwell, 2136 East 113th Street and 731 East 78th Street.

Information has now been developed that the chapter is utilizing another location at 5321 Staunton, Number 257, Los Angeles particularly for night operations. According to our sources, this location has become a hub of evening activity with leaders congregating there. The location has also been the starting and termination points of a key Los Angeles BPP underground figure when acquiring weapons. It is also being used as an apparent clearing house for clandestine telephone calls.

This location is referred to as the BPP Day Care Center. Typical of Panthers deceit and treachery, they reason that with the child atmosphere the police would not recognize it as a serious BPP operation and would not take reprisal against it if they did.

The Panther office at 2136 East 113th Street was gutted by fire on February 6, 1971, making operational occupancy untenable and repair or replacement indefinite. Telephone surveillance has been discontinued due to fire.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

All the above locations make up the [Los Angeles BPP] chapter. As you were previously advised this chapter is one of the most active [BPP] groups with close ties to national headquarters. The chapter still has a national officer as its leader and it is deeply involved in developing a [BPP] underground complex. Since it is essential that we cover all operational phases of this chapter, we are proceeding with the installation of a telephone surveillance of the [BPP at 5321 Staunton, Number 257, Los Angeles, California] under your authorization for coverage on [2136 East 113th Street.] We are continuing the current surveillance of the [BPP at 2043 East Stockwell and 731 East 78th Street,] which last was installed February 4, 1971.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 2/12/71

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706 February 18, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

On November 20, 1970, you authorized this Bureau to initiate a telephone and a microphone surveillance on the apartment occupied by Black Panther Party (BPP) leader Huey P. Newton, 1200 Lakeshore Boulevard, Apartment 25-A, Oakland, California. This plush apartment was leased for Newton under the name of the BPP corporation, Stronghold Consolidated Productions, Inc. (SCPI). Both surveillances have provided extremely valuable information concerning the day-to-day activities of Newton who makes all BPP policy decisions and tightly controls its operation. Both surveillances have visibly revealed the erratic and irrational behavior of Newton. Examples of the intelligence data obtained from these two installations include the following.

On January 5, 1971, it was determined that no member of the BPP, including its chief theoretician Eldridge Cleaver, understood Newton's new Marxist-Leninist ideology called "intercommunalism" (microphone). Detailed plans for a large BPP rally on March 5, 1971, were determined on January 18, 1971 (microphone). On January 20, 1971, source advised that Newton was using the alias Don Penn (microphone). On January 24, 1971, it was determined Newton authorized his attorney to purchase a building in Atlanta, Georgia, for the BPP corporation (microphone). Details and itinerary of Newton's tour of eastern universities during February, 1971, were determined on January 27, 1971 (telephone).

On January 27, 1971, source determined that Newton expelled the "New York 21" (BPP members in New York City indicted for conspiracy to bomb) for criticizing the BPP (microphone).

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI

SECRET

~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

On January 27 and 28, 1971, source furnished detailed data on dissension within the BPP caused by Newton's erratic behavior, which included increasing tension between Newton and Cleaver (telephone). On January 29, 1971, information was received of Newton's departure for New York City on a speaking tour (telephone and microphone).

The monitoring of these surveillances will be conducted in accordance with instructions contained in your letter of July 14, 1969, entitled "Electronic Surveillances."

Your authority is requested to continue the telephone and the microphone surveillance on Newton's apartment leased by the BPP corporation, SCPI, located at 1200 Lakeshore Boulevard, Apartment 25-A, Oakland, California for an additional three months effective February 20, 1971.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED (microphone surveillance) John N Mitchell

DATE 2/20/71

APPROVED (telephone surveillance) John N Mitchell

DATE 2/20/71

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706 Sub 5

February 26, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
BOSTON DIVISION

You previously authorized a telephone surveillance on the Boston chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), 23 Winthrop Street, Roxbury, Massachusetts. This installation continues to furnish valuable intelligence data concerning the revolutionary activities and plans of the BPP. The following is a summary of the more pertinent information developed recently.

This source continues to furnish valuable information concerning finances of the BPP, sources of revenue and activities relating to fund raising. Information has been furnished concerning transfers of various BPP leaders, their travel plans, and speaking engagements. The source has provided data leading to the identification of various BPP members. Daily information has been furnished concerning the BPP Breakfast Program, including the origin and location of supplies, funds received, and identities of members providing assistance.

The source has furnished the location where the BPP newspaper is printed, data regarding the circulation and shipment of this paper, identities of members handling distribution, and funds obtained from sales. Intelligence data concerning political education classes and the location of three BPP pads has been furnished. This source has identified a number of doctors, dentists, laboratory technicians, and nurses who have volunteered their services to the Boston BPP Health Clinic.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

This source provided pertinent data on November 24, 1970, relating to bus departures for the Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention (RPCC) in Washington, D. C., and on November 27, 1970, advised RPCC was having trouble finding a place to hold the Convention due to difficulties with Howard University. On December 22, 1970, this source furnished names of several members who left the BPP. On January 14, 1971, the source furnished procedures for arranging speeches by BPP Supreme Commander Huey P. Newton.

On February 5, 1971, this source provided advance information regarding Newton's arrival in Boston, furnished names of those traveling with him, and the location at which they would be staying while in Boston. The source subsequently provided information concerning Newton's activities in Boston and provided advance information relating to Newton's departure for New York City February 7, 1971. This source can be expected to continue furnishing valuable information regarding the plans and activities of the BPP.

Your authority is requested to continue this telephone surveillance for an additional three-month period effective March 1, 1971.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N. Mitchell

DATE 3/1/71

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

You previously authorized a telephone surveillance of the Washington, D. C., chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP). The Washington, D. C., chapter is split into two operations with the Ministry of Information, 2327 18th Street, Northwest, and the Community Information Center, 1932 17th Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

On February 8, 1971, you were advised the telephone surveillance was discontinued since telephone service at the two BPP offices was terminated for nonpayment of telephone charges.

During March, 1971, the BPP was successful in restoring telephone service in Washington, D. C.

The previous telephone surveillance has furnished timely and significant intelligence data regarding the Washington, D. C., chapter of the BPP. In addition, information was furnished on a continuing basis regarding travel of BPP leaders, BPP financial transactions and propaganda efforts.

It is expected this telephone surveillance will develop significant information regarding the recent split

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for the Attorney General

between [Supreme Commander Huey P. Newton and Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver.] This split between two conflicting factions has the potential for violence, which presents a danger to the black communities. [The Washington, D. C., chapter of the BPP has aligned itself with Newton; however, some members have openly discussed their possible support of Cleaver.]

Your authority is requested to reinstitute the telephone surveillance at [2327 18th Street, Northwest, and 1932 17th Street, Northwest, both Washington, D. C.,] for a period of three months.

The monitoring will be conducted in accordance with instructions contained in your letter of July, 14, 1969, entitled "Electronic Surveillances."

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N. Mitchell

DATE 4/6/71

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installations located at 2350 West Madison Street and 4233 South Indiana Avenue, both Chicago, Illinois, which installations are listed under the name of "Ministry of Information" and fictitious name of Alphonso Massey respectively, and are, in fact, offices of the Chicago Black Panther Party.

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret" which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority vested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance presently conducted until April 22, 1972.

John N Mitchell
JOHN N. MITCHELL
Attorney General of the United States

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1/19/72
Date

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

[BLACK PANTHER PARTY]

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation at [1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California,] which installation is listed in the name of the [Black Panther Party.]

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance requested until June 17, 1972.

Richard G. Kleindienst
RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Acting Attorney General of the United States

3/15/72
Date

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR L. PATRICK GRAY, III May 24, 1972

INSTALLATION OF TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY HEADQUARTERS
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

In view of the urgency of this situation, I telephonically contacted Acting Attorney General Kleindienst at 6:00 p.m., May 24, 1972, who was in Cheyenne, Wyoming, to discuss captioned matter.

This requested coverage is located at the new national headquarters of the Black Panther Party at 8505 East 14th Street, Oakland, California.

The Black Panther Party is an extremist organization. The requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.

Accordingly, the Acting Attorney General authorized the Bureau to proceed with the installation of the requested coverage.

ACTION:

To record the authority granted by Acting Attorney General for above telephone surveillance.

LPG:aso (7)

~~SECRET~~

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

[BLACK PANTHER PARTY]

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at [8505 East 14th Street, Oakland, California] which installation is listed under the name of the [Black Panther Party]

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until August 11, 1972.

G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Acting Attorney General of the United States

5/30/72
Date

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

#9

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 100-439190

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee has been described by confidential informants as the principal target for Communist Party infiltration among the various civil rights organizations. John Lewis, Chairman, and James Forman, Executive Secretary have made public appearances with leaders of communist-front groups. John Lewis has been reported by reliable informants as stating he will accept any individuals, including communists, into his organization. This and related investigations have identified individuals with subversive backgrounds who hold key positions in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee.

The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee maintains its headquarters at 8½ Raymond Street, Northwest, Atlanta, Georgia, and is in the process of moving to 360-362 Nelson Street, Southwest, Atlanta, Georgia.

Authority is requested for the installation of a technical surveillance on the above headquarters of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and at any new location to which it may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

REC- 28

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED NdeBK

DATE 6/18/65

This should ~~not~~ be continued unless we actually develop useful information of a subversive type -

NdeBK

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

#12

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

August 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: WHITE PANTHER PARTY - YOUTH
INTERNATIONAL PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY - ANARCHIST

Reference is made to your letter May 6, 1969, concerning the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

The White Panther Party is a self-described revolutionary organization which is a strong support group for the Black Panther Party. The Youth International Party, which is also known as the Yippies, was organized in early 1968 by militant activists Jerry Rubin and Abbott Hoffman. These two organizations recently formed a coalition and the combination of the two groups indicates the development of the organization as a leading revolutionary white group in the United States. The headquarters of this organization is located at 1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Three officers of the White Panther Party have been indicted for the bombing of a Central Intelligence Agency office in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in September, 1968. One of these individuals, Lawrence Plamondon, was a recent Bureau fugitive and was apprehended on July 23, 1970. He is currently in custody in lieu of $100,000 bond.

At the time of his arrest in an automobile by the Michigan State Police, weapons and other incendiary devices were found. Also found was numerous written material which indicates Plamondon may have been using the same underground apparatus which has been serving Weatherman and other New Leftist fugitives. Plamondon noted in this material that conditions in this country must escalate to "revolutionary violence" where battles will not be on police level of law

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

and order but on war level which will force the calling out of the Army. Plamondon refers to this new level of violence as involving "bombs and sabotage." He further states that financial problems are severe and that "they" are going to have to get into "ripping off banks like our brothers in South America." He also suggested that the example of "the brothers in South America" who kidnap American ambassadors to trade off for prisoners should be followed.

Milton Taube, a White Panther Party national officer, was also arrested with Plamondon on July 23, 1970. Taube is known to have been a contemporary and extremely close associate of William Ayers, a Weatherman member who is currently a Bureau fugitive. Taube, at the time of his arrest, was a resident at White Panther Party headquarters and has resided at this address for several years. Furthermore, all business transactions of the White Panther Party are transmitted through this address. Investigation by this Bureau has indicated that only some half dozen top leaders in the White Panther Party are privy to sensitive White Panther Party information. We have one live informant who has access to some information in this organization.

A telephone surveillance on the headquarters of the White Panther Party - Youth International Party is expected to provide extremely valuable information concerning the whereabouts of Weatherman fugitives as well as to the New Leftists who are currently being sought by local or Federal authorities. It can also be expected that information concerning possible violent plans on the part of this organization will be obtained.

It can be expected that any individuals who have access to the White Panther Party headquarters may become subjects of either local or Federal criminal violations. It is also anticipated, based on the above information, that results of a telephone surveillance at this address will be introduced as evidence in court or that leads to evidence may be obtained; therefore, this request is being made not only for the purpose of obtaining intelligence-type information, but also on the basis that evidence will be obtained that will be used in court. In line with instructions on page 5 of your referenced letter, the following information is set forth:

Memorandum for the Attorney General

1. It is believed that Genie Plamondon, the wife of Lawrence Plamondon, and other individuals having access to this address may become involved in violations of the Harboring statute, the Antiriot Law, the Sabotage statute, the Kidnapping statute, the Bank Robbery statute and Federal Bombing and Gun Control statutes.

2. At the present time, we are conducting an intelligence investigation on Genie Plamondon and other leaders and members of the White Panther Party - Youth International Party. We have very little live security coverage of her or other individuals she may be in contact with.

3. As set forth previously in this memorandum, Genie Plamondon, a White Panther Party national officer, would undoubtedly use the phone at 1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. It is anticipated that other individuals who are members of this organization or who are New Left terrorists will use this phone. The identities of the individuals who may be in contact with Genie Plamondon and other individuals at this address are unknown at this time.

4. It can be expected that the interception on this phone will furnish us plans of the White Panther Party - Youth International Party to engage in terrorist activities or to violate Federal statutes as noted above.

I, therefore, recommend the installation of a telephone surveillance on the headquarters of the White Panther Party - Youth International Party located at 1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for a period of 30 days. If approved, you will be advised when this installation has been made.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 8/19/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: [WHITE PANTHER PARTY - YOUTH
INTERNATIONAL PARTY]
INTERNAL SECURITY - ANARCHIST

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum dated August 18, 1970, concerning captioned organizations. By your approval of that memorandum on August 19, 1970, you authorized the installation of a telephone surveillance on the headquarters of this group at [1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan] for a period of 30 days. This telephone surveillance was installed on September 9, 1970. Its installation was delayed because of unforeseen technical difficulties.

Since this surveillance has been established, it has furnished information concerning the location of planned conferences between the [White Panther Party] and other New Left organizations. It has also furnished information concerning the whereabouts of a [White Panther Party] leader and the fact that leaders of this organization were in contact with individuals residing elsewhere in the United States and in London, England.

You were previously advised that [White Panther Party] leaders and other individuals having access to [1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor,] may become involved in violations of the Harboring statute, the Antiriot Law, the Sabotage statute, the Kidnapping statute, the Bank Robbery statute and Federal Bombing and Gun Control statutes. You were also advised that the interceptions on the phone at this address

~~SECRET~~

~~Group~~ 1

[redacted]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for the Attorney General

could possibly furnish us plans of the [White Panther Party - Youth International Party] to engage in terrorist activities or to violate Federal statutes as noted above.

Your authority is requested to continue the telephone surveillance at [1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan,] for a period of 30 days.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 9/22/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNI[illegible]D STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]STICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

October 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: [WHITE PANTHER PARTY -
YOUTH INTERNATIONAL PARTY]

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum dated August 18, 1970, concerning captioned organizations. By approval of that memorandum on August 19, 1970, you authorized the installation of a telephone surveillance on the headquarters of this group at [1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan,] for a period of 30 days. Continuation of this surveillance was approved by you on September 22, 1970.

Since this surveillance has been established, it has furnished information concerning the location of a national conference of the [White Panther Party] as well as the time and location of meetings of other New Left groups in the Ann Arbor area. It has also furnished information concerning the travel plans of [White Panther Party] leaders and the location of several communes and future chapters of this organization throughout the United States. It further ascertained the [White Panther Party] is actively setting up narcotic buys for pushers who deal in the Ann Arbor area.

You were previously advised that [White Panther Party] leaders and other individuals having access to [1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor,] may become involved in violations of the Harboring statute, the Antiriot Law and Sabotage statutes, the Bank Robbery statute, the Kidnapping and Federal Bombing and Gun Control statutes. You were also advised that the interceptions on the telephone at this address could possibly furnish us plans of the [White Panther Party - Youth International Party] to engage in terrorist activities or to violate Federal statutes as noted above.

~~SECRET~~
~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for the Attorney General

Your authority is requested to continue the telephone surveillance at [1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan,] for a period of 30 days.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED ________________

DATE 10/21/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

[redacted]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: WHITE PANTHER PARTY - YOUTH
INTERNATIONAL PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY - ANARCHY

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum dated August 18, 1970, concerning captioned organizations. By approval of that memorandum on August 19, 1970, you authorized the installation of a telephone surveillance on the headquarters of the White Panther Party at 1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for a period of 30 days. Continuation of this surveillance was approved by you on October 21, 1970.

The White Panther Party is a self-described revolutionary organization which is a strong white support group for the Black Panther Party. Some of its current leadership presently advocates the use of violence to achieve revolutionary change in the United States. Recent communications from incarcerated White Panther Party leaders John Sinclair and Lawrence Plamondon indicate that the White Panther Party must strengthen its ties with all revolutionary peoples and nations throughout the "Third World" by participating fully in the new world liberation front. Furthermore, if the White Panther Party is moved against "in an unlawful violent manner by the forces of reaction or their pawns, we will defend ourselves with arms and force."

Since this surveillance has been established, it has furnished information concerning the location of a national conference of the White Panther Party as well as plans for a National Congress of the organization scheduled to be held

[redacted]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for the Attorney General

in December, 1970. It has also furnished information concerning membership figures of the [White Panther Party of Michigan] as well as the number of individuals who relate to [White Panther Party] ideas throughout this country. It further ascertained that this organization is in dire need of operating funds, that there is dissension within the organization and furnished the identities of new leaders and members in various [White Panther Party] chapters in the United States.

You were previously advised that [White Panther Party] leaders and other individuals having access to [1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor,] may become involved in violations of the Harboring statute, the Antiriot Law and Sabotage statutes, the Bank Robbery statute, the Kidnapping and Federal Bombing and Gun Control statutes. You were also advised that the interceptions on the telephone at this address could possibly furnish us plans of the [White Panther Party - Youth International Party] to engage in terrorist activities or to violate Federal statutes as noted above.

Your authority is requested to continue the telephone surveillance at [1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan,] for a period of 30 days.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John Mitchell

DATE 4/19/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 11, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: [WHITE PANTHER PARTY - YOUTH
INTERNATIONAL PARTY]
INTERNAL SECURITY - ANARCHY

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum dated August 18, 1970, concerning captioned organizations. By approval of that memorandum on August 19, 1970, you authorized the installation of a telephone surveillance on the headquarters of the [White Panther Party at 1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan,] for a period of thirty days. Continuation of this surveillance was approved by you on November 19, 1970.

The [White Panther Party] is a self-described revolutionary organization which is a strong white support group for the Black Panther Party. Some of its current leadership presently advocates the use of violence to achieve revolutionary change in the United States. Recent communications from incarcerated [White Panther Party] leaders John Sinclair and Lawrence Plamondon indicate that the [White Panther Party] must strengthen its ties with all revolutionary peoples and nations throughout the "Third World" by participating fully in the new world liberation front. Furthermore, if the [White Panther Party] is moved against "in an unlawful violent manner by the force of reaction or their pawns, we will defend ourselves with arms and force."

Since this surveillance has been established it has furnished information concerning identification of the leadership and membership of the [White Panther Party, both in the State of Michigan and nationally.] It further ascertained that this organization is in dire need of operating funds and what steps must be taken to obtain additional funds. This surveillance is also furnishing information concerning a possible national conference of the [White Panther Party] to be held in the near future.

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for the Attorney General

You were previously advised that [White Panther Party leaders and other individuals having access to [1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor,] may become involved in violations of the Harboring statute, the Antiriot Law and Sabotage statutes, the Bank Robbery statute, the Kidnaping and Federal Bombing and Gun Control statutes. You were also advised that the interceptions on the telephone at this address could possibly furnish us plans of the [White Panther Party - Youth International Party] to engage in terrorist activities or to violate Federal statutes as noted above.

Your authority is requested to continue the telephone surveillance at [1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan] for a period of thirty days, effective December 19, 1970.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 12/12/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

January 18, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: WHITE PANTHER PARTY - YOUTH
INTERNATIONAL PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY - ANARCHY

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum dated August 18, 1970, concerning captioned organizations. By approval of that memorandum on August 19, 1970, you authorized the installation of a telephone surveillance on the headquarters of the White Panther Party at 1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan for a period of thirty days. Continuation of this surveillance was approved by you on December 12, 1970, for a period of thirty days, effective December 19, 1970.

The White Panther Party is a self-described revolutionary organization which is a strong white support group for the Black Panther Party. Some of its current leadership presently advocates the use of violence to achieve revolutionary change in the United States. Recent communications from incarcerated White Panther Party leaders John Sinclair and Lawrence Plamondon indicate that the White Panther Party must strengthen its ties with all revolutionary peoples and nations throughout the "Third World" by participating fully in the new world liberation front. Furthermore, if the White Panther Party is moved against "in an unlawful violent manner by the force of reaction or their pawns, we will defend ourselves with arms and force."

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Since this surveillance has been established it has furnished information concerning identification of the leadership and membership of the White Panther Party, both nationally and in the State of Michigan. It has further developed information that a national conference of this organization will not be held until after a current trial involving John Sinclair, John W. Forrest and Lawrence Plamondon is finished in Ann Arbor. It has also furnished information that the White Panther Party is still in desperate need of funds and that this organization received the most current communication from the Weatherman underground entitled "New Morning - Changing Weather." It advised that a current White Panther Party leader has been placed in a semi-purged state because of suspicion he is a police informant. It should be noted that this individual is not an informant.

You were previously advised that White Panther Party leaders and other individuals having access to 1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, may become involved in violations of the Harboring statute, the Antiriot Law and Sabotage statutes, the Bank Robbery statute, the Kidnapping and Federal Bombing and Gun Control statutes. You were also advised that the interceptions on the telephone at this address could possibly furnish us plans of the White Panther Party - Youth International Party to engage in terrorist activities or to violate Federal statutes as noted above.

Your authority is requested to continue the telephone surveillance at 1520 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan for a period of thirty days, effective January 19, 1971.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N. Mitchell

DATE 1/18/71

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

#12

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on the [African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee headquarters, 2207 14th Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.]

[A characterization of the African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee, including a description of its activities, is attached to this memorandum.]

It is therefore requested that the President of the United States through the Acting Attorney General, in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject, and that you authorize the surveillance requested until August 15, 1972.

Respectfully,

L. Patrick Gray

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

Enclosure

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 16, 1972

AFRICAN LIBERATION DAY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

The African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee (ALDCC) is an ad hoc black coalition which is in the process of organizing an African Liberation Day demonstration in Washington, D. C., on May 27, 1972. The purpose of the demonstration is to protest United States involvement in South Africa and to show African-American solidarity with African liberation groups.

To carry out its objectives on a mass level, a large protest demonstration is being planned as the logical vehicle of expression. Broad-based local ALDCCs are being set up in major United States cities, Toronto, Canada, and in the Caribbean area. These committees are working with the ALDCC headquarters in Washington, D. C., to spearhead efforts to mobilize at least 10,000 black people to come together in Washington, D. C., on May 27, 1972. Corresponding demonstrations are also being organized in San Francisco, California; Toronto, Canada, and in the Caribbean area on May 25 and 27, 1972.

Plans are being formulated in Washington, D. C., to assemble at Meridian Hill Park, 16th and U Streets, N.W. The group will march to and conduct demonstrations at the Portuguese Embassy, Rhodesian Information Center, South African Embassy, the United States State Department, The White House, and finally, the dispersal area at the Sylvan Theater located on the Washington Monument grounds.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AFRICAN LIBERATION DAY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

The National Steering Committee of the ALDCC has designated Howard Lamar Fuller as Chairman. Members of the National Steering Committee include Huey P. Newton, LeRoi Jones, and Roosevelt Bernard Douglas. Statements of endorsement of the ALDCC have been received from Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown.

Fuller is President of the Malcolm X Liberation University in Greensboro, North Carolina, and during an address February 23, 1972, before a group of 200 people at Howard University, Washington, D. C., he stated there would be no change in this society without revolution and that basic changes should be in political and economic structures.

The April 1, 1972, issue of "Contrast," a Canadian newspaper self-identified as serving the black community, disclosed Fuller reportedly visited Africa during the Fall of 1971 and made contact with liberation army leaders. He spent approximately 45 days among fighters under battle conditions and was urged upon his return to the United States to mobilize "brothers and sisters" in demonstrations to protest United States and Canadian involvement in Southern Africa.

Huey P. Newton is the leader of the Black Panther Party and the March, 1972, issue of a national publication quotes Newton as saying, "Armed struggle is still my belief, and always will be. We have to get it to that point. We're building and organizing an army to finally get people to the point where we'll fight, because we believe that the only way we will resolve the final contradiction is through armed struggle."

In his book, "Raise, Race, Rays, Raze, Essays Since 1965" published in 1971, LeRoi Jones stated Newark "never seemed as beautiful as it did those nights when fire was eating up the sky." In the same book he said, "The cities must be Black ruled or they will not be ruled at all.... Unless we Black people can come into peaceful power and begin the benevolent rule of the just, the next phase of armed rebellion will burn Newark to the ground."

With regard to Roosevelt Bernard Douglas, a West Indian now residing in Canada, it is noted he was convicted in April, 1971, of charges in connection with a student riot in Montreal, Canada, during January and February, 1969.

A source, who has provided reliable information in the past, reported that during 1971 Roosevelt Douglas attempted to organize an uprising in the Caribbean.

During public speeches made in 1967 throughout the United States, H. Rap Brown has called for "rebellion by any means" and "massive civil disobedience."

In a speech at the University of Hawaii October 31, 1968, Stokely Carmichael declared, "I am stating affirmatively that we are for revolutionary violence as a way to crush racism and capitalism to change the status quo and to liberate black people."

SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

AFRICAN LIBERATION DAY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at [2207 14th Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.] which installation is listed under the name of the [African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee]

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority vested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until August 15, 1972.

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Acting Attorney General of the United States

Verbal approval given from

DATE

Cheyenne, Wyo. on 5/24/72;
Signed on 5/30/72

SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

August 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

On behalf of the President of the United States, you have previously authorized both a telephone and a microphone surveillance on the apartment of [Huey P. Newton, Black Panther Party leader, located at 1200 Lakeshore Boulevard, Apartment 25-A, Oakland, California.]

[A characterization of Huey P. Newton and his activities is attached to this memorandum.]

These surveillances have in the past provided and continue to provide reliable and significant intelligence information regarding the subject.

It is therefore requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General and in the interest of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all the intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the telephone and microphone surveillances requested until November 20, 1971.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UN ED STATES DEPARTMENT O USTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

August 13, 1971

[HUEY P. NEWTON
MINISTER OF DEFENSE]
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

According to the official newspaper of the Black Panther Party (BPP), the BPP was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby G. Seale, BPP Chairman, and [Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense.]

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," has regularly stated that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police, consistently referred to as "pigs," who should be killed.

The newspaper, in its issue of September 7, 1968, had an article by the then Minister of Education, George Murray. This article ended with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

The BPP newspaper, issue of October 5, 1968, had an article introduced with the following statement: "We will not dissent from American government. We will overthrow it."

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Huey P. Newton

David Hilliard, Chief of Staff, BPP, in a speech at the San Francisco Polo Field on November 15, 1969, said, "We will kill Richard Nixon."

David Hilliard, in "The New York Times," issue of December 13, 1969, was quoted as follows: "We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government by way of force and violence."

In the issue of April 25, 1970, the BPP newspaper had an article by Minister of Culture Emory Douglas as follows:

> "The only way to make this racist U. S. government administer justice to the people it is oppressing, is ... by taking up arms against this government, killing the officials, until the reactionary forces ... are dead, and those that are left turn their weapons on their superiors, thereby passing revolutionary judgement against the number one enemy of all mankind, the racist U. S. government."

The BPP headquarters is located at 1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California. Branches of the BPP and Committees to Combat Fascism, under control of the BPP, have been established in various locations in the United States.

Newton exercises autocratic control of BPP national headquarters and through national headquarters all of the BPP branches. He rules from his apartment at 1200 Lakeshore Boulevard, Oakland, California, issuing instructions by telephone and holding policy conferences in the apartment.

The BPP established an international section at Algiers, Algeria, in 1969, through which it maintained liaison with Algeria, Red China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and other communist-dominated governments. In February, 1971,

Huey P. Newton

Eldridge Cleaver, then BPP Minister of Information, in self-imposed exile in Algeria, and about 100 followers split from the Newton dominated BPP national headquarters. One member of each opposing faction has been murdered with each faction accusing the other of the murders.

At this time it has not been firmly established which of the two factions the various communist governments will support.

As recent as June 30, 1971, a BPP spokesman stated that the ultimate goal of the BPP is the complete destruction of the United States Government and its replacement with Marxist-Leninist socialism.

~~SECRET~~

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

HUEY P. NEWTON
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installed at 1200 Lakeshore Boulevard, Apartment 25-A, Oakland, California, which installation is listed under the name of David G. Lubell, and also for authority to maintain a microphone surveillance at the same address.

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, deemed that the requested electronic surveillances are necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority vested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillances requested until November 20, 1971.

John N Mitchell
JOHN N. MITCHELL
Attorney General of the United States

8/12/71
Date

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

HUEY P. NEWTON
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installed at 1200 Lakeshore Boulevard, Apartment 25-A, Oakland, California which installation is listed under the name of David G. Lubell and also for authority to maintain a microphone surveillance at the same address.

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, deemed that the requested electronic surveillances are necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means or against any other clear and present danger to the structure of the Government.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillances requested until August 20, 1972.

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Acting Attorney General of the United States

Verbal approval given from
Date
Cheyenne, Wyo. on 5/24/72:
expires on 5/30/72

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

#20

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

March 30, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: DEMONSTRATIONS SPONSORED BY PEOPLES COALITION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE (PCPJ), WASHINGTON, D. C., MAY, 1971
INTERNAL SECURITY

Domestic Protest Group

Reference is made to your letter May 6, 1969, concerning the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

The National Coalition Against War, Racism, and Repression (NCAWRR) evolved out of the Strategy Action Conferences (SAC) which took place during June and September, 1970, at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The SAC brought together organizations previously active in the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC), which had been the guiding force in the massive antiwar demonstrations which took place in Washington, D.C., during November, 1969, and May, 1970. The NCAWRR at a "Continuations Committee" meeting which took place at Detroit, Michigan, during January, 1971, changed its name to the "Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice." This organization has interjected issues such as poverty, racism, repression, and women's rights into the antiwar movement on the premise that the war in Vietnam has a definite effect upon these problems.

The PCPJ, infiltrated by members of the Communist Party, USA, and New Left extremists, is led by Rennard Cordon Davis, also known as Rennie Davis, convicted Chicago Seven Conspiracy trial defendant. During April and May, 1971, in Washington, D.C., PCPJ is planning massive antiwar demonstrations which currently call for civil disobedience, including blocking of major arteries into Washington. May Day Collective (MDC), a small hard-core faction of PCPJ personally led by Davis, is

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

shaping up as a focal point for planning of violent demonstration activities. Informant coverage of PCPJ and especially MDC which is made up of drug users who appear to suffer a paranoiac fear of police infiltration, has been practically impossible.

The existing live informant coverage of PCPJ and MDC continues to develop fragments of information indicating potential bombings, civil disobedience, guerrilla tactics, disruption of essential Government functions, and even the possibility of kidnapings of Government officials during the Spring of 1971. It appears that Davis intends to use the thousands of demonstrators who will be massed in Washington as a cover for hit-and-run tactics by well-trained cadres throughout Washington, possibly with coordinated or uncoordinated assistance from Weatherman. Davis has called for May, 1971, to be the "heaviest thing ever" and a "month of rage" as opposed to the so-called "days of rage" in 1969.

The four key locations involved in the plotting and planning for the PCPJ actions include PCPJ headquarters, 1029 Vermont Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.; MDC, 2226 M Street, NW, Washington, D.C.; a commune located at 1747 Lanier Place, NW, Washington, D.C., frequented by members of MDC and the apartment of Larry E. Canada, Jr., Apartment 3, 1736 Lanier Place, NW, Washington, D.C., the foremost financial supporter of MDC. It should be noted that the leading suspects, including Larry E. Canada, Jr. in the bombing of the United States Capitol on March 1, 1971, frequent all of these locations. Consequently, it is probable that conversations of these suspects, as well as those involving Rennie Davis, would be intercepted by telephone surveillances of these locations. It is possible that any individual whose conversation is intercepted at these locations may become the subject of either local or Federal criminal violations.

It is felt that telephone surveillances of the above-described locations will provide vital information regarding possible violence and destruction in Washington, D.C., during Spring, 1971. It is also anticipated that results of these telephone surveillances will be introduced as evidence in court or that leads to evidence may be obtained; therefore, this request is being made not only for the purpose of obtaining intelligence-type information but also on the basis that evidence will be obtained that will be used in court. In line with instructions on page five of your referenced letter, the following information is set forth:

1. It is believed that Rennie Davis, Larry E. Canada, Jr., and other individuals having access to these locations may become involved in violations of the Antiriot Law statute, the Destruction of Government Property statute and the Sabotage statute.

2. At the present time, we are conducting intelligence investigations of Davis, Canada, and other principal activists of the PCPJ and MDC. We have extremely limited live informant coverage of these individuals for the reasons previously described.

3. The following individuals will undoubtedly utilize telephones at the four locations in question:

Rennie Davis, who is currently residing in Apartment 3, 1736 Lanier Place, NW, Washington, D.C., with Larry E. Canada, Jr.

Larry E. Canada, Jr., who is a male Caucasian, born October 6, 1941, at Indianapolis, Indiana. He recently arrived in the Washington area from Bloomington, Indiana, where he was a local building contractor. He is reportedly quite wealthy and financially supports various New Left activities. Canada is very friendly with Davis and is heavily financing the MDC.

John Rankin Davis, who was born May 1, 1947, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He is not known to be related to Rennie Davis and currently resides at the MDC. During the 1968-69 school year, Davis, a student at American University, functioned as cochairman of the American University chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). He has participated in numerous New Left demonstrations in Washington, D.C., since 1968.

Jeffrey Ross Liebling, who was born November 29, 1949, and resides at the MDC. He is a member of SDS and was arrested at Chicago on October 11, 1969, for participating in violent SDS activities. Prior to arriving in Washington, D.C., Liebling resided in Baltimore, Maryland, at an address used as a meeting place commune for individuals affiliated with the Weatherman faction of SDS in the Baltimore area.

Raymond Lee Moser, who was born April 3, 1948, at Brownsville, Pennsylvania. He attended Pennsylvania State University from 1966 to 1969, and during the winter of 1969-70, he was affiliated with the Weatherman faction of SDS living at Cincinnati, Ohio. He traveled to Cuba with the second contingent of the Venceremos Brigade from February to April, 1970.

Natasha Dellinger Burd, who is the daughter of David Tyre Dellinger, convicted Chicago Seven Conspiracy trial defendant. She currently resides at a commune located at 2900 18th Street, NW, Washington, D.C.

Susan Hathaway, who is a female Caucasian and dedicated antiwar activist residing with Natasha Burd.

Susan G. Schultz, who resides at 1811 Wyoming Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. She is a close personal friend of Rennie Davis.

It is anticipated that other individuals who are extremely active in the New Left movement will also use these telephones. The identities of other individuals who may be in contact with the principal activists listed above are unknown at this time.

4. It can be expected that these telephone surveillances will furnish this Bureau plans of the PCPJ and MDC and other New Left activists regarding possible violence and destruction in Washington, D.C., during April and May, 1971, including details of criminal acts planned or already committed in violation of Federal statutes as noted above.

I, therefore, recommend the installation of telephone surveillances at 1029 Vermont Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.; 2226 M Street, NW, Washington, D.C.; 1747 Lanier Place, NW, Washington, D.C.; and 1736 Lanier Place, NW, Washington, D.C., for a period of thirty days. If approved, you will be advised when this installation has been made.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 3/30/71

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: DEMONSTRATIONS SPONSORED BY PEOPLES COALITION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE (PCPJ), WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY, 1971
INTERNAL SECURITY

Domestic Protest Group

Reference is made to memorandum of this Bureau dated March 30, 1971, concerning captioned demonstrations.

By approval of that memorandum on March 30, 1971, you authorized the installation of telephone surveillances at 1029 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.; 2226 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.; 1747 Lanier Place, N.W., Washington, D.C.; and 1736 Lanier Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., for a period of 30 days.

You were previously advised that the PCPJ, infiltrated by members of the Communist Party, USA, and New Left extremists, is led by Rennard Cordon Davis, also known as Rennie Davis, convicted Chicago Conspiracy trial defendant. During April and May, 1971, in Washington, D.C., PCPJ is planning massive antiwar demonstrations which currently call for civil disobedience, including blocking of major arteries into Washington, D.C. May Day Collective (MDC), a small hard-core faction of PCPJ personally led by Davis, is the focal point for planning of violent demonstration activities. Informant coverage of PCPJ and especially MDC, which is made up of drug users who appear to suffer a paranoiac fear of police infiltration, has been practically impossible. You were also advised that the addresses mentioned above, for which you authorized telephone surveillances, represent the four key locations involved in the planning and plotting for PCPJ actions.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Memorandum for the Attorney General

Since the installation of these surveillances, information has been developed, on a daily basis, regarding plans, movements and activities of individuals responsible for the massive demonstration in Washington, D.C., on April 24, 1971, and who plan violence and civil disobedience during May, 1971. For example, information was developed that a group planned to break away from the massive demonstration in Washington, D.C., on April 24, 1971, and attempt to take over the South Vietnamese Embassy by way of Dupont Circle. This information enabled the Metropolitan Police Department to effectively block Dupont Circle well in advance of the approaching demonstrators and thwart this plan. In addition, this coverage developed information regarding a schism which developed between the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) and the PCPJ, which cosponsored the demonstration on April 24, 1971, due to NPAC fears that PCPJ was planning violence. These surveillances also enabled this Bureau to follow closely the activities of many of the major suspects in the bombing of the U. S. Capitol on March 1, 1971, and other New Left extremists who might actively engage in violence and terrorism during May, 1971.

The period which offers the greatest potential for violence and civil disobedience in Washington, D.C., continues to be the first week in May, 1971. It is expected that these telephone surveillances will continue to furnish this Bureau detailed advance plans of PCPJ, MDC and other New Left activists to engage in such violence and civil disobedience. There is also the continued possibility that information will be developed regarding plans of these groups and individuals to violate the Antiriot Law statute, the Destruction of Government Property statute and the Sabotage statute.

Your authority is requested to continue the telephone surveillances at 1029 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.; 2226 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.; 1747 Lanier Place, N.W., Washington, D.C.; and 1736 Lanier Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., for a period of 30 days, effective April 30, 1971.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N. Mitchell

DATE 4/29/71

#21

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 157-9903 January 12, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: JUNTA OF MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS

The Junta of Militant Organizations is a black extremist organization with headquarters in St. Petersburg, Florida. It is the leading organization for all black militant groups in Florida. It was founded in St. Petersburg, Florida, during May, 1968, with eighty-five ghetto youths who believe liberation of black people will not come about through "normal channels." The organization has affiliated groups in Louisville, Kentucky, and Gainesville, Florida. During December, 1970, leaders of the organization decided to expand operations throughout the nation. Attempts are currently being made to create chapters in Boston, Massachusetts, and Miami, Florida. Joseph Waller, Jr., the articulate founder and present Chairman of the Junta of Militant Organizations, intends to have all black militant groups in Florida designated as organization chapters.

The organization's voice and propaganda arm are carried out through its publication, "The Burning Spear." The publication has urged blacks to buy arms and to be prepared to fight white America. In this connection, members have participated in racial demonstrations, used fire bombs and have been involved in attacks on police through use of firearms. Members reportedly blew up a radio station and recently participated in a plot to break out two black

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

political prisoners from a Florida prison. Also, members committed a murder to obtain money to pay a water bill for the headquarters. The organization is in the process of accumulating weapons and making plans for members to be taught guerrilla warfare. In this connection, leaders are interested in establishing contact with revolutionary African groups. The leader of the organization desires to create "Simba Warriors" who would act whenever violence might be necessary in order to "bring down the white man."

It is requested that authority be granted for a telephone surveillance on the Junta of Militant Organizations headquarters located at 1504 - 16th Street South, St. Petersburg, Florida. Interception will be away from this address and no trespass is involved. In view of the violence-prone nature of this organization, it can be reasonably anticipated that subjects involved in past or future criminal violations may be monitored. The guidelines to be followed, as previously furnished by you, will be strictly complied with in such instances.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 1/12/71

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
(IS) 100-437041

March 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY
PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

Marxist-Leninist Group
Affiliate

The Progressive Labor Party is an ultraleft Marxist-Leninist organization which follows the Chinese Communist Party line. Clayton Van Lydegraf is a member of the National Committee of the Progressive Labor Party and is the principal organizer of the Progressive Labor Party in the State of Washington. Technical coverage of the residence of Van Lydegraf could materially assist in the investigation of the Progressive Labor Party organization and its programs. In view of the demonstrated radical nature of the Progressive Labor Party and its open disdain of lawful authority, it is believed this coverage will be of value in the determination of impending trouble areas in time for preventive measures to be taken.

I recommend that authority be granted to install a technical surveillance at the residence of Clayton Van Lydegraf, 3058 Northeast Blakeley, Seattle, Washington or at any address to which Van Lydegraf may move in the future.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 3/6/66

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

#24

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
(IS) 100-437041

November 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT
INTERNAL SECURITY - PLM

Marxist-Leninist
Group Functionary

The Progressive Labor Movement is an ultraleft Marxist-Leninist organization which follows the Chinese Communist Party line. Mortimer Harvey Scheer is the National Vice Chairman of the Progressive Labor Movement. He has been sent by the Progressive Labor Movement to the west coast to organize the Progressive Labor Movement in that area. He is one of the two principal founders of the Progressive Labor Movement. Technical coverage of Scheer's residence could materially assist in the investigation of the Progressive Labor Movement, organization and its program. In view of the demonstrated radical nature of the Progressive Labor Movement and its open disdain of lawful authority, it is believed this coverage will be of value in the determination of impending trouble areas in time for preventive measures to be taken.

I recommend that authority be granted to install a technical surveillance at the residence of Mortimer Harvey Scheer, 2629 Acton Street, Berkeley, California, or at any address to which Scheer may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 12/1/64

SECRET

G[illegible] 1
[illegible]c
[illegible]d
[illegible]n

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

nlh

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 100-437041

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

January 26, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY
PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

Marxist-Leninist Group Functionary

A technical surveillance on the residence of Mortimer Harvey Scheer, Berkeley, California, the National Vice President of the Progressive Labor Party, has been in operation since December 7, 1964. This surveillance was installed in view of the radical nature of the Progressive Labor Party, a militant, aggressive, Marxist-Leninist group which adheres to the Chinese Communist Party principles and seeks to replace our system with a socialistic system of government.

This surveillance continually provides valuable intelligence data. For example, detailed information has been received concerning the following matters: (1) Progressive Labor Party plans and participation in various demonstrations in the San Francisco Bay Area; (2) itineraries and activities of traveling Progressive Labor Party functionaries; (3) identities of contacts of Mortimer Harvey Scheer and other leading Progressive Labor Party members; (4) information regarding Scheer's finances; (5) information supplementing current investigations of twenty-eight security subjects in the San Francisco area; (6) information regarding several possible new members of the Progressive Labor Party; (7) information relating to policies, plans and objectives at the leadership level of the Progressive Labor Party.

Unless you instruct to the contrary, this technical surveillance will be continued for six months.

6 FEB 8 1966

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~

1426 [illegible] | 2/1 [illegible] | [illegible]

The Attorney General

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Ref made to a let from SSC dtd 11/21/75, requesting delivery of materials pertaining to the surveillances. Enclosed for ur approval & forwarding to SSC is the original of memo which responds to 11/21 let. A copy of this memo is being furnished for ur records.

#130

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 28, 1967

JUNE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: O MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC OFFICIAL

FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT

PRO-ARAB GROUP

The Department of State has requested urgent action to institute telephone surveillance coverage on the residence of Mahmoud Riad, Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, Waldorf Towers, Suite 32-F, New York City; the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations, 14 East 79th Street, New York City; and the Office of Arab League, 757 Third Avenue, New York City. This coverage is desired because the current session of the United Nations General Assembly will undoubtedly take up the Middle East situation and it is expected this coverage will produce information of critical importance to the United States Government.

This Bureau is in a position to institute the requested coverage. In view of State Department's request for urgent action, it is requested that you advise of your decision as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

EX 106

REC- 57 105-53722-1385

APPROVED Ramsey Clark

OCT 9 1967

DATE 28 Sept 1967

62 OCT 16 1967

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

#13

May 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY -
[NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE]

The Black Panther Party (BPP) is a black extremist organization with national headquarters in Berkeley, California, and has affiliated groups in 39 cities throughout the United States with a hard-core membership of approximately 900. [The National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF), which is described as an organizing bureau of the BPP, has been formed in Washington, D. C.] It is actually a BPP Chapter under the strict discipline of the BPP national headquarters. [Its headquarters in Washington, D. C., is located at 2337 18th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.]

The public statements of the leaders of the BPP repeatedly stress that the organization's objective is an armed black revolution against the Government of the United States by means of guerrilla warfare. Information is regularly received showing that its members are required to possess guns and have been instructed in their use. They have been trained in the preparation of fire bombs and explosives. The organization strongly supports the Cuban and Chinese Communist revolutionaries.

[The NCCF in Washington, D. C., has a membership of from 10 to 20. It shares office space with the Patriot Party, a group of radical whites concerned with aiding the oppressed

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

whites and advocating the teachings of Marxism. The NCCF and the Patriot Party have combined to form the Rainbow Coalition, which allegedly is to combat fascism in America.

The NCCF, since its formation in November, 1969, by members of the BPP, has increased its activities considerably. Members now sell the Black Panther newspaper, speak at high schools, colleges and rallies, and distribute inflammatory literature. Information recently obtained indicates its members are interested in obtaining firearms and one source has reported seeing a shoulder weapon being taken into the NCCF headquarters.

The telephone surveillance on the BPP national headquarters, which has been authorized by you, has proven to be most valuable. Information so received indicates almost daily contact between the Washington, D. C., NCCF and the national BPP headquarters. It is felt that the installation of a telephone surveillance at the NCCF in Washington, D. C., will not only furnish valuable information concerning the revolutionary activities of the BPP in the United States, but will also furnish information regarding any violent actions that may be planned against top officials of this country. Live informants are furnishing information regarding activities of this group but additional coverage is vital to insure awareness of all revolutionary activities of the organization.

It is requested that authority be granted for a telephone surveillance on the NCCF located at 2387 18th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. Interception will be away from this address and no trespass is involved.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED ____________________

DATE [illegible]

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

#14

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

March 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE
New Left Oriented Campus Group Faction

During the June, 1969, Students for a Democratic Society National Convention held in Chicago, Illinois, the Worker Student Alliance group was expelled by forces representing the National Office group. The Worker Student Alliance faction, which claimed to be the "true SDS," subsequently elected its own group of national officers and set up its headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The headquarters of Worker Student Alliance is now located at 173A Massachusetts Avenue, Boston.

The Worker Student Alliance group is dominated and controlled by the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party. A number of the national leaders of Worker Student Alliance are members of the Progressive Labor Party. The Progressive Labor Party mainly intends to utilize Worker Student Alliance to build a strong campus worker student alliance base and as a recruiting ground for future Progressive Labor Party members. To the Progressive Labor Party, workers are the key class for revolution in the United States. Current Worker Student Alliance main strategy is, therefore, being directed through this campus worker student alliance to develop strong ties with the cafeteria, maintenance and other workers on the campus. According to Progressive Labor Party and Worker Student Alliance leaders, eventually these campus workers will go into industry and factories and will take the radical politics they learned on campus and spread them among factory workers.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In carrying out the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Progressive Labor Party, Worker Student Alliance members have repeatedly sought to become involved in labor disputes on the side of labor, join picket lines and engage in disruptive and sometimes violent tactics against industry recruiters on college campuses. For example, on February 18, 1970, several thousand demonstrators protested the presence of General Electric recruiters on the University of Michigan campus. Worker Student Alliance members were included in the leadership of this demonstration which snowballed into city-wide violence and extensive damage occurred to banks and police cars in the areas.

This faction is currently very active in many of the major demonstrations and student violence on college campuses. It is making all-out efforts to assume leadership in the anti-war movement and is in the forefront of organizations maintaining steady agitation to stop military recruitment and abolish the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. During the current academic year over five hundred campus demonstrations have taken place. Over two thousand arrests have been made and there have been forty-one cases of attempted arson and four cases of bombing. Nearly two million dollars in damages have been inflicted to college facilities.

Last summer Worker Student Alliance had a Summer Work-In project designed to infiltrate industry and it has made plans to rejuvenate this project this summer. Worker Student Alliance leaders have repeatedly encouraged action against industrial concerns, both off and on campus with General Electric being the main target. New Left advocates are believed to be responsible for the bombing of General Electric offices in New York City on February 7, 8, 1970. On March 11, 1970, powerful bombs also destroyed the offices of three major corporations in New York City.

The leadership of Worker Student Alliance is extremely security conscious at this time. Many of its leaders are traveling throughout the United States, especially the South, in an effort to promote the aims of the group, as well as directing agitation against universities and industry.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A telephone surveillance on the national headquarters of Worker Student Alliance faction would provide extremely valuable information concerning the plans of this organization with respect to its efforts to implement its programs. Such a surveillance would supply valuable data concerning the advance planning of this group, its leaders and the source of its funds.

I, therefore, recommend the installation of a telephone surveillance on the national headquarters of the Worker Student Alliance faction of the Students for a Democratic Society, 173A Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, or any other address to which this organization may move in the future.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 3/16/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE

New Left Oriented Campus Group Faction

Reference is made to my memorandum dated March 16, 1970, captioned "Students for a Democratic Society, Worker Student Alliance." By your approval of the memorandum on March 16, 1970, you authorized installation of telephone surveillance at the national headquarters of the Worker Student Alliance group of the Students for a Democratic Society, 173A Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts.

The Worker Student Alliance group is dominated and controlled by the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party. A number of the national leaders of the Worker Student Alliance group are members of the Progressive Labor Party. The Progressive Labor Party mainly intends to utilize the Worker Student Alliance to build a campus worker student alliance base, and to recruit future Progressive Labor Party members from the Worker Student Alliance. Current Worker Student Alliance strategy is directed at using the campus worker student alliance to develop strong ties with the cafeteria, maintenance and other workers on campuses. According to Progressive Labor Party and Worker Student Alliance leaders, these campus workers will go eventually into industry and factories to spread their radical politics among factory workers.

During the three months since authorization of this coverage, invaluable information on a daily basis has been obtained concerning the activities of the national headquarters of the Worker Student Alliance group. Information has been developed concerning the travels and contacts of John Pennington, National Secretary of the Worker Student Alliance, in April, May and June, 1970. Source has also furnished information in

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

advance concerning plans for Worker Student Alliance support and participation in demonstrations supporting antiwar groups and the Black Panther Party. The source has also revealed Worker Student Alliance contacts with Canadian student elements. The identities of over 600 persons either in touch with the national headquarters or associated with Worker Student Alliance activities throughout the country have been established through the source.

The coverage furnished high-quality intelligence information not otherwise available on a continuing basis.

It is requested this coverage be approved for an additional three-month period.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 6/17/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE

New Left Oriented Campus Group Faction

Reference is made to my memorandum dated June 16, 1970, captioned "Students for a Democratic Society, Worker Student Alliance." By your approval of the memorandum on June 16, 1970, you authorized continuance of the telephone surveillance for an additional three months effective June 16, 1970, at the national headquarters of the Worker Student Alliance group of the Students for a Democratic Society, 173A Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts.

The Worker Student Alliance group is dominated and controlled by the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party. A number of the national leaders of the Worker Student Alliance group are members of the Progressive Labor Party. The Progressive Labor Party mainly intends to utilize the Worker Student Alliance to build a campus worker student alliance base, and to recruit future Progressive Labor Party members from the Worker Student Alliance. Current Worker Student Alliance strategy is directed at using the campus worker student alliance to develop strong ties with the cafeteria, maintenance and other workers on campuses. According to Progressive Labor Party and Worker Student Alliance leaders, these campus workers will go eventually into industry and factories to spread their radical politics among factory workers.

During the past three months, this coverage has furnished invaluable information on a day-to-day basis concerning the activities of Worker Student Alliance headquarters as well as the plans and activities of the officers of the Worker Student Alliance. This coverage furnished information

SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

in advance about the plans for National Interim Committee (ruling body of Worker Student Alliance) meetings which took place in New York and Chicago. The coverage also furnished information, well in advance, of plans by Students for a Democratic Society, Worker Student Alliance group, for demonstrations at San Francisco, Detroit, Salt Lake City, Minneapolis and Chicago. This source also has furnished information concerning the identities of approximately 1,428 persons in touch with the national headquarters or associated with Worker Student Alliance activities.

The coverage furnished high quality information on a continuing basis which was not otherwise available.

Your authority is requested to continue this telephone surveillance at the present location for an additional three months effective September 16, 1970.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 9/16/70

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 11, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE

New Left Oriented
Campus Group
Faction

Reference is made to my memorandum dated September 16, 1970, captioned "Students for a Democratic Society, Worker Student Alliance." By your approval of the memorandum on September 16, 1970, you authorized continuance of the telephone surveillance for an additional three months effective September 16, 1970, at the national headquarters of the Worker Student Alliance group of the Students for a Democratic Society, 173A Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts.

The Worker Student Alliance group is dominated and controlled by the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party. The strategy of this group has been to build strong ties between workers and students and to spread radical politics both on the campus and in the factory.

During the past three months, this coverage has provided invaluable information on a day-to-day basis concerning the activities of the Worker Student Alliance headquarters, as well as the activities of national officers of the organization. This coverage made available information in advance about the plans of the National Interim Committee meetings which took place in New York, New York; Detroit, Michigan; and Chicago, Illinois. The National Interim Committee is the ruling body of the Worker Student Alliance. The coverage also furnished information in advance about the plans for the National Convention of the organization in Chicago, Illinois, scheduled for the end of December, 1970.

SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

This source also has provided advance information regarding plans of the Worker Student Alliance to hold demonstrations in various areas of the country which include Detroit, Michigan; Buffalo, New York; and College Park, Maryland. This coverage has also furnished information concerning foreign contacts of the Worker Student Alliance by individuals from Canada and Italy.

The coverage furnished high quality information on a continuing basis which was not otherwise available.

Your authority is requested to continue this telephone surveillance at the present location for an additional three months effective December 16, 1970.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED John N Mitchell

DATE 12/11/70

File #:

62- HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1216

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88608 Date: 03-18-2025

SECRET

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

121

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. 65-58190

June 29, 1954

PERSONAL AND CON~~F~~IDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

(S) [CONSULATE OF ISRAEL] NEW YORK CITY, N.Y.
[INTERNAL SECURITY - IS] (S)

In several communications to you during the past year concerning Israeli intelligence operations in the United States, information has been forwarded regarding an espionage ring operated by the [Israeli Government] in New York City. This ring was headed by Youval Tal who until March 29, 1954, when he departed from the United States, was an adviser to the [Israeli Delegation] to the United Nations. Also included in this ring were [Yigal Gilaad] and [Efraim Pillersdorf,] employees of the [Consulate of Israel,] New York City. (S)

The Department of State has informed this Bureau that on April 14, 1954, Assistant Secretary of State Henry A. Byroade conferred with [Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban] and expressed to him the disquiet of our Government at the activities of [Tal, Gilaad, and Pillersdorf.] Mr. Byroade noted the fact that Tal had recently left the United States and told the [Israeli Ambassador] that our Government considered it desirable that [Gilaad and Pillersdorf] also be withdrawn. (S)

It is anticipated that the departure of these three men from the United States probably will not result in the discontinuance of [Israeli intelligence] activities in the New York area. Since the activities have centered about the [Israeli Consulate] there in the past it is possible that they will continue to be conducted from that establishment. Accordingly, it is recommended that you authorize technical coverage at (S) (S)

1-25-01 mmo616
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-61692

RECORDED - 25 65-58190-
EX-125
13 JUL 8 1954

7/15/54

SECRET

188-10208

the Consulate of Israel, New York City, to assist this Bureau in its future investigation of Israeli intelligence activities. The Consulate is located at 11 East 70th Street, New York City. The telephone numbers are TRafalgar 9-7600 through 9-7618; TRafalgar 9-7880; TRafalgar 9-8270; TRafalgar 9-8580; TRafalgar 9-8550; and TRafalgar 9-8551. (S)

The approval of the Department of State for this technical installation was received on June 21, 1954. It is recommended that you authorize this coverage at the present address of the Consulate or at any address to which it may be moved in the future. (S)

Respectfully yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Approved: HB
Date: 7-6-54

SECRET

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D.C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. 65-58190

June 29, 1954

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

(S) [redacted] NEW YORK CITY 1.4c
INTERNAL SECURITY - IS (S)

In several communications to you during the past year concerning Israeli intelligence operations in the United States, information has been forwarded regarding an espionage ring operated by the [redacted] in New York City. This ring was headed by Youval Tal who until March 29, 1954, when he departed from the United States, was an adviser to the [redacted] to the United Nations. Also included in this ring were [redacted] and [redacted], employees of the [redacted] New York City. (S)

The Department of State has informed this Bureau that on April 14, 1954, Assistant Secretary of State Henry A. Byroade conferred with [redacted] and expressed to him the disquiet of our Government at the activities of [redacted] Mr. Byroade noted the fact that Tal had recently left the United States and told the [redacted] that our Government considered it desirable that [redacted] also be withdrawn. (S)

It is anticipated that the departure of these three men from the United States probably will not result in the discontinuance of [redacted] activities in the New York area. Since the activities have centered about the [redacted] there in the past it is possible that they will continue to be conducted from that establishment. Accordingly, it is recommended that you authorize technical coverage at (S) (S)

#NDR16 1-25-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-

RECORDED - 25 65-58190-
EX-125
JUL 8 1954

7-15-54

SECRET

188-10308

the [redacted], New York City, to assist this Bureau in its future investigation of [redacted] intelligence activities. The [redacted] is located at [redacted] The telephone numbers are [redacted] (S)

The approval of the Department of State for this technical installation was received on June 21, 1954. It is recommended that you authorize this coverage at the present address of the Consulate or at any address to which it may be moved in the future. (S)

Respectfully yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Approved: HB
Date: 7-6-54

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-341652

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 8, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: ISIDORE GIBBY NEEDLEMAN
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Isidore Gibby Needleman is a Russian-born naturalized citizen who has been described by an informant who has furnished reliable information in the past as a key man in Soviet espionage operations in the United States in 1948. He has been a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., and is known to have been in contact with Soviet officials on a number of occasions since 1953. Needleman was formerly employed as an attorney for the Amtorg Trading Corporation in New York and ~~is~~ currently engaged in the practice of law in New York.

In order to determine the extent of Needleman's current activities, it is requested that authorization be granted for a technical surveillance on Needleman's residence at 110-30 64th Road, Forest Hills, Long Island, New York, or any future address to which he might move. ~~(S)~~ (U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

4-13-94
~~Classified by 05-RMD/mde~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK)

Approved WPR

Date 1/9/58

Letter to New York
900/dm
1-13-58

RECORDED-24

EX 105

100-341652-715

18 JAN 15 1958

#MD216
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG
ON 1-25-01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

188-10308

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-341652

January 8, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: ISIDORE GIBBY NEEDLEMAN
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

AmOR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/jjb
ON 1-25-01

Isidore Gibby Needleman is a Russian-born naturalized citizen who has been described by an informant who has furnished reliable information in the past as a key man in Soviet espionage operations in the United States in 1948. He has been a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., and is known to have been in contact with Soviet officials on a number of occasions since 1953. Needleman was formerly employed as an attorney for the Amtorg Trading Corporation in New York and ~~is~~ currently engaged in the practice of law in New York.

In order to determine the extent of Needleman's current activities, it is requested that authorization be granted for a technical surveillance on Needleman's residence at 110-30 64th Road, Forest Hills, Long Island, New York, or any future address to which he might move. ~~(S)~~ (U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Approved WPR

Date 1/9/58

Letter to New York
9DD/dm
1-13-58

EX 105

RECORDED-24

100-341652-715

18 JAN 15 1958

4-13-94
~~Classified by~~ 05-RMB/mdc
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

188-10308

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-430172

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 21, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: WORKERS WORLD PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY - WWP

The Workers World Party (WWP) consists of former Socialist Workers Party (SWP) members who split from the SWP in February, 1959. The WWP favors a stricter interpretation of Marxism-Leninism based upon the writings of Leon Trotsky than does the SWP.

This Bureau is currently investigating the WWP and the SWP. The latter organization has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Milton Neidenberg was appointed organizer of the Buffalo Branch of the WWP on May 26, 1960, and it is anticipated that he will conduct WWP business in his home. Current informants reporting on the WWP are only able to report on weekly meetings. Technical coverage would materially aid the Buffalo Office in its investigation of Neidenberg and the WWP, and would provide immediate intelligence information regarding the organizational efforts of the WWP both locally and nationally. It is noted that most of the WWP membership is located in Buffalo, New York.

I recommend, therefore, authorization of a surveillance on the residence of Milton Neidenberg, 95 Busti Avenue, Buffalo, New York, or at any other residence to which Neidenberg might move.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFIED BY SP8 MacJonde
ON 4-13-94 (JFK)

UNRECORDED [illegible] 100-3-116-123

Approved: RW
Acting Attorney General

Date: 6/22/60

REC-9 100-430172-1623

EX-119

12 JUN 20 1960

Letter, Sac Buffalo
6-24-60
JDD/

SECRET

188-10308

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-430172

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 21, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: WORKERS WORLD PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY - WWP

The Workers World Party (WWP) consists of former Socialist Workers Party (SWP) members who split from the SWP in February, 1959. The WWP favors a stricter interpretation of Marxism-Leninism based upon the writings of Leon Trotsky than does the SWP.

This Bureau is currently investigating the WWP and the SWP. The latter organization has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Milton Neidenberg was appointed organizer of the Buffalo Branch of the WWP on May 26, 1960, and it is anticipated that he will conduct WWP business in his home. Current informants reporting on the WWP are only able to report on weekly meetings. Technical coverage would materially aid the Buffalo Office in its investigation of Neidenberg and the WWP, and would provide immediate intelligence information regarding the organizational efforts of the WWP both locally and nationally. It is noted that most of the WWP membership is located in Buffalo, New York.

I recommend, therefore, authorization of a surveillance on the residence of Milton Neidenberg, 95 Busti Avenue, Buffalo, New York, or at any other residence to which Neidenberg might move.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFIED BY SP8 Mac/mde
ON 4-13-94 (JFK)

Approved: RW
Acting Attorney General

Date: 6/22/60

REC- 9

100-430172-162

EX-113

12 JUN 20 1960

/30-376/23 —

UNRECORDED [illegible]

Letter, Sec Buffalo
6-24-6.
JDD

SECRET

188-10308

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-4861

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
January 30, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: CARL WINTER
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
SMITH ACT OF 1940

Carl Winter is a member of the National Committee and National Executive Committee of the Communist Party (CP), USA. In addition, he is state chairman of the Michigan District of the CP. In these capacities, he is in close touch with CP activities on state and national levels.

Winter is a convicted Smith Act subject who has served a prison term and is currently free on bail as a result of an indictment returned against him in 1948 charging violation of the membership clause of the Smith Act of 1940.

It is felt that a technical surveillance on the telephone located at the residence of Carl Winter would assist in developing extremely valuable intelligence data concerning CP activities on both a state and national level. Accordingly, authority is requested to institute technical surveillance coverage of Carl Winter, 9556 Burnette Street, Detroit, Michigan, or at any other address to which he might move.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFIED BY SP8 Mac/nedc
ON 3-25-94 (JFK)

Approved WPR
Date 1/31/58

REC- 18 100-4861-693

FEB 16 1958

Advs. Sec., Detroit JDD.
2-4-58

SECRET

188-10308

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-4861

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 30, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: CARL WINTER
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
SMITH ACT OF 1940

Carl Winter is a member of the National Committee and National Executive Committee of the Communist Party (CP), USA. In addition, he is state chairman of the Michigan District of the CP. In these capacities, he is in close touch with CP activities on state and national levels.

Winter is a convicted Smith Act subject who has served a prison term and is currently free on bail as a result of an indictment returned against him in 1948 charging violation of the membership clause of the Smith Act of 1940.

It is felt that a technical surveillance on the telephone located at the residence of Carl Winter would assist in developing extremely valuable intelligence data concerning CP activities on both a state and national level. Accordingly, authority is requested to institute technical surveillance coverage of Carl Winter, 9556 Burnette Street, Detroit, Michigan, or at any other address to which he might move.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFIED BY SP8 MacNeda
ON 3-25-94 (JFR)

Approved WPR
Date 1/31/58

REC- 18 100-4861-693

21 FEB 16 1958

Adv. Sec, Detroit JDD.
2-4-58

SECRET

188-10308

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: January 17, 1964

FROM : C. A. Evans

JUNE

SUBJECT: FRANK FERRARO
ANTI-RACKETEERING

SAC Marlin Johnson of the Chicago Division telephonically contacted the Bureau on the night of January 16, 1964, and requested authorization to survey and install a microphone surveillance covering the new residence of Frank Ferraro, Chicago top hoodlum, at 2303 Outer Drive East, Chicago, Illinois.

Ferraro is one of the major hoodlums in Chicago and is moving into this new apartment in the immediate future. SAC Johnson advised that he can make this installation with full security on January 17, 1964, and that this opportunity will be available only on that date.

ACTION

In view of the importance of covering this major hoodlum and in the light of the opportunity which exists for installation of this coverage, together with the assurance by SAC Johnson of complete security, Johnson was authorized to proceed with this installation.

1 - J. D. Donohue

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-20-94 BY SP8 MacInde (JFK)

McA:rap
(6)

92-455166/8

EX-114

REC- 16

22 JAN 24 1964

SPEC. MAIL RM.

JAN 28 1964

188-10308

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNME

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: January 17, 1964

FROM : C. A. Evans

JUNE

SUBJECT: FRANK FERRARO (6)
ANTI-RACKETEERING

McAndrews

SAC Marlin Johnson of the Chicago Division telephonically contacted the Bureau on the night of January 16, 1964, and requested authorization to survey and install a microphone surveillance covering the new residence of Frank Ferraro, Chicago top hoodlum, at 2303 Outer Drive East, Chicago, Illinois.

Ferraro is one of the major hoodlums in Chicago and is moving into this new apartment in the immediate future. SAC Johnson advised that he can make this installation with full security on January 17, 1964, and that this opportunity will be available only on that date.

ACTION

In view of the importance of covering this major hoodlum and in the light of the opportunity which exists for installation of this coverage, together with the assurance by SAC Johnson of complete security, Johnson was authorized to proceed with this installation.

1 - J. D. Donohue

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-20-94 BY SP8 Mac/... (JFK)

McA:rap
(6)

92-4551-668

EX-114 REC 16

22 JAN 24 1964

~~SPEC. MAIL RM.~~

6th JAN 28 1964

8/20/75

Part IV item 5

✓

Retain

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88321 Date: 2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO Mr. Sullivan

DATE July 7, 1971

FROM A. Rosen

SUBJECT MEDBURG

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Campbell
1 - Mr. Schutz
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. C.D.Brenna
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Dalbey
1 - Mr. Gale

In connection with our investigation into the burglary of the Media Resident Agency during the night of March 8, 1971, SAC Roy K. Moore, who is handling the special at Philadelphia, has advised 12 of the 25 Agents assigned to the Philadelphia Division on the special have returned to their field offices of assignment. Two more are scheduled to return this weekend, leaving a balance of 11, including SAC Moore.

We have discontinued the electronic surveillance of the cabin in the Pennsylvania mountains where it had been anticipated discussions would be had between break-in leaders and our Philadelphi source relative to future break-ins. John Peter Grady, who has been developed as the principal subject in Medburg and the instigator of the majority of draft board break-ins throughout the East Coast, never appeared at the cabin as he stated he would. There is no indication his failure to appear was due to anything else but irresponsibility on his part. Our informant continues to maintain contact with others of the Berrigan group, and it is hopeful information pertinent to this investigation will be obtained through this source.

19

Of primary interest is the fact our investigation in the Camden, New Jersey, area has resulted in the location of Grady, his hideout, and the insertion of another source into a group which is led by Grady and which is currently planning a "hit," presumably on a draft board and/or Army Intelligence office in the Camden, New Jersey, Federal Building. Our informant has established himself with the group and is in a position to be aware of detailed plans relative to this proposed hit.

The break-in has been tentatively set for the weekend of July 17 - 18, 1971. However, definite arrangements have not as yet been formulated. Appropriate safety measures have been instituted to protect our Camden Resident Agency, which is in the same building. As previously indicated in our memorandum of June 28, 1971, dealing with the latest phase of our investigation, it is imperative no dissemination be made of this information outside the FBI at this time. When full facts become known, consideration will be given to disseminating this information on a need-to-know basis. It is our

HAS:jyl
(12)

intention that by careful planning we may be in a position to apprehend those participating in this new break-in (15 to 25 individuals) during the actual attempt. We hope to link many of these individuals with the Media break-in.

By memorandum dated June 24, 1971, reference was made to the feasibility of conducting a grand jury hearing into Medburg. It was recommended and approved that no action be taken along these lines until the discontinuance of our electronic surveillance at the Pennsylvania cabin. In view of the fact our current inquiries have resulted in our being in a position to anticipate a hit by the Grady group within the next two weeks, any grand jury action would obviously adversely influence Grady's plans for his newest break-in.

ACTION: If approved, we will continue our efforts along the lines set forth above, and no discussion will be had at this time with the Internal Security Division relative to a possible grand jury hearing on Medburg.

OK
H

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

Tolson
Felt
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Gale
Ponder
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: July 19, 1971

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: BURGLARY OF FBI RESIDENT AGENCY, MEDIA, PA. 3-8-71

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Campbell
1 - Mr. Schutz
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Ponder
1 - Mr. Dalbey
1 - Mr. Gale

This is to summarize the current status of our investigation of captioned matter and to consider future plans in connection with the development of information indicating a planned break-in at the Post Office Building, Camden, New Jersey, scheduled for July 25, 1971.

John Peter Grady, a close associate of the Berrigan brothers, according to several sources, claims to have planned and participated in the Media burglary. He was allegedly assisted by Fathers Joseph O'Rourke, Peter Fordi, and Edward McGowan. In addition, at least three other alleged associates of the Berrigan group are believed to have participated. Through information recently developed, Grady has been pinpointed as the individual who masterminded at least 14 of the 18 break-ins of various Government facilities during the past two years. He currently heads up what is termed the "action group" and is reported reliably as being a staunch advocate of "hits" on Federal facilities as a means of embarrassing the Federal Government.

During the past several weeks, we have been successful in inserting a highly productive source into a group led by Grady which is presently planning a break-in of the draft board office with alternate targets being Military Intelligence and the FBI Resident Agency, all located in the Post Office Building at Camden, New Jersey, a Government reservation. The early morning hours of Sunday, July 18, 1971, was the original target date. However, Philadelphia has now reported that, in all probability, the hit would be delayed until July 25, 1971, in order to allow elements from the Newark, New Jersey, area to participate. Under the direction of SAC Roy K. Moore, on special Medburg assignment, with the cooperation of SACs, Philadelphia and Newark, arrangements have been perfected aimed at apprehending these individuals red-handed. Hopefully, O'Rourke, Fordi, and McGowan will participate in the Camden break-in as well as others involved in the Media burglary. Precautions have been taken to cover our Resident Agency at all times. In addition, personnel are on continual alert to swing into action should the hit date be unexpectedly advanced.

HAS:jyl
(12)

REC-11 — 2387

JUL 27 1971

CONTINUED OVER

Memo Sullivan to Tolson 7-21-71

67 AUG 2 1971

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

With respect to the proposed Camden break-in, it was recognized from the outset that secrecy was imperative--both from the standpoint of protecting our source who has successfully associated himself to a very close degree with Grady and, more important, insuring there be no leak which would scare off Grady and his group. By memoranda June 28 and July 7, 1971, we pointed out the importance of keeping these plans confidential, it being imperative that there be no dissemination outside the FBI at this time. It is SAC Moore's recommendation we not alert at this time any agencies having an interest and/or located in the Post Office Building. This would include General Services Administration, the military, Selective Service, and Postal authorities. To do so might result in activity which could very well alert the alleged perpetrators who are very sensitive to any unusual activity and who have the Post Office under surveillance.

It should be noted the Internal Security Division of the Department has requested it be advised of all matters having any possible connection with the Berrigan group. None of the individuals known to be planning participation in the Camden break-in are among those indicted with Berrigan in the Eastcon case. Nevertheless, it appears persons associated with the Berrigan group are involved in the planning of the Camden break-in and all seem to be inextricably intertwined in the Berrigan and Eastcon philosophies.

It is also noted that in a memorandum dated March 29, 1971, the Internal Security Division indicated, in view of the interest of that Division in those individuals associated with Eastcon and the Berrigan supporters, they desired the Media case be handled in its entirety by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division. They also requested that in addition to communications, all prosecutive presentations should be made to the Special Litigation Section.

ACTION: In view of the above developments indicating a tentative action date for July 25, 1971, it is recommended this matter be presented at this time to the Special Litigation Section well in advance of the target date in order that there can be no question concerning the propriety of our proposed action. The Bureau obviously must fulfill its responsibilities in this case which might involve the apprehension of from 15 to 25 individuals in the commission of the intended break-in of the Post Office Building. In order to preclude as much as possible any unforeseen difficulties,

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: Burglary of FBI Resident Agency
Media, Pennsylvania, 3-8-71

it is recommended that SAC Roy K. Moore, who has the responsibility for the overall direction of this situation, be immediately instructed to report to Bureau Headquarters for a full discussion of his proposed plans. If approved, SAC Roy Moore, representatives of the Special Investigative Division and General Investigative Division, and Mr. Dalbey will present this matter to the Special Litigation Section of the Department with reference to the contemplated prosecutive action in the event a break-in should occur.

In view of the sensitive nature of this material, tickler copies are being hand carried.

OK, but I agree reluctantly
in view of Mardian's propensity
for [illegible] leaks.

WBS

SAC R. K. MOORE
ADVISED 7-20-71.
HE WILL ARRIVE
WASH. D.C. AROUND
11:30 AM 7-21-71.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 26 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Gale
Mr. Ponder
[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Walters
[illegible]
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR001 PH CODE

0125AM URGENT 7-26-71 JEW

TO DIRECTOR

FROM PHILADELPHIA (52-7165)

MEDBURG (CAMDEN ACTION)

INFORMANT HAS BEEN ATTENDING NIGHTLY MEETINGS RE CAMDEN ACTION WITH JOHN PETER GRADY, THE PRIME MEDBURG SUSPECT. SOURCE DEBRIEFED AT LENGTH ON DAILY BASIS AND ADVISED AS FOLLOWS:

ON SEVEN TWENTY LAST SOURCE ADVISED IN DETAIL AS TO PRESENT PLANS UTILIZED IN FORTHCOMING CAMDEN "RIP OFF" OF DRAFT BOARD CAMDEN FEDERAL BUILDING. SOURCE FURNISHED POSITIONS OF LOOK-OUTS, OUT RIDERS, AND CUT OFF CARS AS WELL AS ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES. SOURCE FURNISHED A PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL TO BE UTILIZED BY GRADY.

DURING PERIOD SEVEN TWENTY- TWENTYFOUR LAST GRADY AND GROUP CONDUCTED NIGHTLY SURVIELLANCE OF CAMDEN FEDERAL BUILDING FOR PURPOSE OF GETTING ADDITIONAL INFO REGARDING POLICE PATROL PATTERN, NIGHT WATCHMEN'S ROUNDS AND GENERAL VEHICULAR AND PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC IN VICINITY OF CAMDEN FEDERAL BUILDING.

END PAGE ONE

[illegible]-2387

ENCLOSURE

PAGE TWO

PH 52-7165

ON SEVEN TWENTY THREE LAST GRADY GAVE SOURCE ONE HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS AND INSTRUCTED SOURCE TO PURCHASE THREE CITIZENS BAND WALKIE TALKIES. SOURCE PURCHASED WALKIE TALKIES ON SEVEN TWENTYFOUR SEVENTY ONE. ONE WALKIE TALKIE OBTAINED BY BUREAU TO MONITOR GRADY'S TRANSMISSIONS.

BY PREVIOUS AGGREEMENT, ROBERT GOOD, NEW YORK DEFENSE COMMITTE, MET WITH GRADY AT COLLINGSWOOD N.J. REGARDING CAMDEN ACTION AND THEN PROCEEDED TO NEW YORK CITY TO RECRUIT NEEDED ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL. ON SEVEN TWENTYFOUR LAST GOOD RETURNED FROM N.Y.C. New York City IN COMPANY OF ANN DUNHAM AND FATHER EDWARD J. MURPHY. ON SEVEN TWENTYFOUR LAST GOOD, DUNHAM, AND MURPHY ATTENDED MEETING WITH GRADY MICHAEL GIOCONDO, ANITA RICCI, KATHLEEN RIDOLFI, AND FATHER MICHAEL DOYLE AND SOURCE. GROUP PARTICIPATED IN SURVIELLANCE AT WHICH TIME A DRESS REHEARSAL WAS CONDUCTED UTILIZING PRE-ESTABLISHED PEDESTRIAN AND VEHICULAR LOOK-OUTS, CUT OFF CARS AND OBSERVATION POSTS. ALSO UTILIZED WERE PRE-ESTABLISHED CODED RADIO AND VISUAL SIGNALS.

(THIS DRESS REHERSAL OBSERVED AND MONITORED BY BU AGENTS)

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

PH 52-7165

SUBJECT MURPHY REVEALED TO SOURCE THAT JOE O'ROURKE, PETE FORDI AND ED MC GOWAN ARE POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS.

SOURCE ASCERTAINED FROM RICCI THAT TWELVE OTHER INDIVIDUALS (NAMES NOT KNOWN) FROM PHILADELPHIA WILL ALSO PARTICIPATE. MURPHY REVEALED TO SOURCE THAT THIS ACTION IS "MOST DETAILED AND BEST PLANNED THAT HE HAS SEEN." MURPHY EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND FBI RESIDENT AGENCY LOCATED ON FOURTH AND SECOND FLOORS OF FEDERAL BUILDING RESPECTIVELY.

MRUPHY AND DUNHAM WILL RETURN TO NEW YORK CITY THIS DATE (MONDAY) TO CONTACT O'ROURKE AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

GRADY ADVISED SOURCE THAT "RIP OFF" WILL TAKE PLACE ON SATURDAY OR SUNDAY NIGHT BETWEEN ELEVEN THIRTY PM AND TWELVE FIFTEEN AM (GRADY FEELS OPTIMUM CONDITIONS EXIST ON THESE NIGHTS). PLANNED EXIT FROM FEDERAL BUILDING WILL BE BETWEEN THREE AM AND FOUR FIFTEEN AM.

SOURCE FEELS A FULL DRESS REHEARSAL WILL BE NEEDED TO INCLUDE ALL PARTICIPANTS BEFORE ACTUAL HIT.

END FBI WA

NR 001 PH CODE

0 0605AM URGENT 8-8-71 JEW

TO DIRECTOR (52-94527)

NEWARK (52-6817)

FROM PHILADELPHIA (52-7165 SUB-S)

MEDBURG; CAMDEN ACTION. 00: PHILA.

PRINCIPAL SOURCE, CAMDEN, ACTION REPORTED MEETING HELD EIGHT ZERO ZERO P.M. SATURDAY AUGUST SEVEN LAST AT APT. OF MICHAEL GIOCONDO TWO TWO NINE COOPER ST., CAMDEN, N.J. JOHN PETER GRADY NOT PRESENT AS HE WAS VISITING FAMILY AT NEW JERSEY SEASHORE AREA. ACTIVE SURVIELLANCES FROM ROOF OF TOWN HOUSE APTS. AND ON-STREET SURVIELLANCES COMMENCED NINE FIVE FIVE P.M. SATURDAY AUGUST SEVEN LAST AND CONTINUED TO FOUR FIVE ZERO A.M. SUNDAY AUGUST EIGHT. FOLLOWING PERSONS PRESENT AND PARTICIPATED: FATHER EDWARD J. MC GOWAN, FATHER EDWARD J. MURPHY, FATHER MICHAEL J. DOYLE, ROBERT HARDY, ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON, KATHLEEN M. RODOLFI, ANITA A. RICCI, MICHAEL J. GIOCONDO ROBERT G. GOOD, ANN DUNHAM, UNIDENTIFIED WHITE FEMALE.

SAC MEDBURG INSTITUTED FULL COVERAGE OF POST OFFICE BLDG., AREA CAMDEN, N.J. ROOF TOP AND ON-STREET SURVIELLANCES OBSERVED, SUBJECTS COMMUNICATIONS MONITORED AND RECORDED NINE SUBJECTS PHOTOGRAPHED AT THEIR SURVIELLANCE POSTS. AT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE THREE ZERO A.M. MC GOWAN AND MURPHY TOLD SOURCE THE PLANS TO BREAK-IN APPEAR

END PAGE ONE

2510

EX-105 REC-1

6-HB

59 AUG [illegible] 1971

PAGE TWO

PH 52-7165 SUB - S

EXCELLENT-THAT THEY WOULD RETURN TO NEW YORK CITY AND BRING TWO MORE EXPERIENCED PEOPLE INTO CAMDEN NEXT WEEK- ALL WAS READY TO EXECUTE NEXT WEEKEND, AUGUST FOURTEEN DASH FIFTEEN NEXT. THEY TOLD SOURCE WILLIAMSON WAS GOOD MAN AND HAD EXPERIENCE IN PRIOR BREAKINS. SINCE SOURCE HAD WORKED ALL DAY SATURDAY AUGUST SEVEN LAST, HE WAS RELEASED FROM SURVIELLANCE DUTIES AT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE FORTY EIGHT A.M. SUNDAY AUGUST EIGHT BY MC GOWAN AND MURPHY AND TOLD TO GET SOME SLEEP - THAT THEY HAD SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO COMPLETE SURVIELLANCES DURING EARLY A.M. HOURS OF SUNDAY AUGUST EIGHT.

*SAC (MEDBURG CASE) CONFERRED WITH BUREAU SINCE GRADY NOT ON SCENE NO BREAKIN ATTEMPTS MADE AND IN VIEW OF PLANS FORMULATED FOR BREAKIN NEXT WEEKEND - DECISION MADE TO MAKE ARRESTS NEXT WEEKEND.

BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

END

WJM FBI WA

* SAC Roy Moore

CC-MR. POS

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE NEWARK	OFFICE OF ORIGIN NEWARK	DATE 5/9/72	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 1/27/72 - 5/4/72

TITLE OF CASE DALE SPEERS CUNNINGHAM; SA ROBERT H. WALLER-VICTIM	REPORT MADE BY ROBERT H. WALLER (A)	TYPED BY mjk
	CHARACTER OF CASE AFO and OOJ	

REFERENCES: Newark report of SA ROBERT H. WALLER dated 12/29/71
Philadelphia airtel to Newark dated 2/3/72
New York letters to Newark dated 3/9/72 and 4/29/72
Sacramento letter to Newark dated 4/13/72.

(P)

LEADS

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NY: Will continue efforts to locate and interview PHILIP TRACY as requested in referenced report.

NEWARK

AT CAMDEN, NJ: Will follow and report prosecutive action USDC, Camden, NJ.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE						ACQUITTALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES [✓ ☐ NO]
							PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES [✓ ☐ NO]

APPROVED | SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE | DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

7-Bureau
(5-52-94527)
1-USA, Newark
Attn: AUSA JOSEPH AUDINO
4-New York (89-185)
2-52-10018
2-Philadelphia (89-118)
1-52-7165-sub-5
3-Newark (89-56) (1-52-6817)

NOT RECORDED
162 MAY 15 1972

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency				
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.				
By				

54 MAY 22 1972

Notations

ORIGINAL FILED IN

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1-USA, Newark
ATTN: AUSA JOSEPH AUDINO

Report of: ROBERT H. WALLER (A) Office: Newark, New Jersey
Date: 5/9/72

Field Office File #: 89-56 Bureau File #:

Title: DALE SPEERS CUNNINGHAM;
SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT H. WALLER-VICTIM

Character: ASSAULTING A FEDERAL OFFICER and OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Synopsis: Unable to locate and interview PHILIP TRACY. Trial date pending.

(P)

DETAILS

On January 27, 1972, Investigative Clerk ROBERT C. KEARNEY contacted Sergeant JOHN DEVLIN, Philadelphia Police Department and was advised that arrest reports and related documents are destroyed after two years of storage. He advised that the only information available would be that of the subject's criminal record. It is noted that office of origin is in receipt of criminal record.

On February 9, 15, 23 and 25, 1972, attempts were made to contact PHILIP TRACY through the "Village Voice", 80 University Place, New York, New York, with negative results.

On March 8, 1972, inquiry at the "Village Voice," 80 University Place, New York, New York, revealed PHILIP TRACY was presently out of town and expected to return sometime next week. Attempts to determine his present location and/or some means of immediate contact were met with a negative response.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents

During the past two months numerous attempts have been made in person and telephonically to contact PHILIP TRACY, reporter, through the "Village Voice". On each occasion receptionist personnel of the "Village Voice" advised that TRACY was not there at the present time, that they had no idea as to how to contact him nor a telephone number where he could be reached, but they would take a message for him. On each occasion a message was left but never answered.

On March 31, 1972, Special Agent (Accountant) ROBERT H. WALLER and SA MARTIN J. GASS observed DALE SPEERS CUNNINGHAM driving a blue Ford convertible with California license 710-DOL.

The following investigation was conducted by SC ELIZABETH O'LAUGHLIN at Sacramento California:

On April 12, 1972, a check of vehicle registration records, through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), revealed that California license 710-DOL is registered for 1972 to KOREAKI OGATA, Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for a 1966 Ford convertible. No stolen stops on file.

A check of driver's license records, through CLETS, reflects the following description of OGATA:

Name	KOREAKI OGATA
Date of Birth	April 5, 1943
Sex	Male
Height	5' 6"
Weight	130 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Black
Marital Status	Single
California driver's license number	N722888
Mailing address	Department of Biology Stanford, California
Residence address	27261 Black Mountain Road Los Altos Hills, California

On May 4, 1972, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) JOSEPH AUDINO, Camden, New Jersey, advised that a trial date has not been set in this matter. He stated that he thinks it will be handled in the Fall of 1972.

Section 41

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
PHILADELPHIA	PHILADELPHIA	8/25/71	8/21-23/71

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
CAMDEN ACTION:	ELMER E. SUSSMAN	MPJ

TITLE OF CASE

CAMDEN ACTION:
DR. WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON-FUGITIVE;
REVEREND MILO MARION BILLMAN-FUGITIVE;
TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW-FUGITIVE;
PAUL BERNARD COUMING -FUGITIVE;
FATHER MICHAEL J. DOYLE-FUGITIVE;
ANN GRANT DUNHAM-FUGITIVE;
FATHER PETER DONALD FORDI-FUGITIVE; KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH-FUGITIVE;
MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO-FUGITIVE; ROBERT GLENN GOOD-FUGITIVE;
JOHN PETER GRADY-FUGITIVE; MARGARET MARY INNESS-FUGITIVE;
FRANCIS MEL MADDEN-FUGITIVE; LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA-FUGITIVE;
BARRY JAMES MUSI-FUGITIVE; JOAN MARY REILLY-FUGITIVE;
ROSEMARY REILLY-FUGITIVE; KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI-FUGITIVE;
JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH-FUGITIVE; SARAH JANE TOSI-FUGITIVE;
ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON-FUGITIVE

CHARACTER OF CASE

CGR-BURGLARY; TGP;DGP;MUTILATION OF PUBLIC RECORDS; INTERFERENCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION SSA OF 1967; CONSPIRACY

9-1-71

52-21 Aug

References

Philadelphia teletypes to the Bureau and Newark 8/22/71 and 8/23/71.

-P-

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE

CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES	ACQUIT-TALS
		21-PH				

CASE HAS BEEN:
PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO
PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

5-Bureau (52-94527)
3-Newark (52-6817)
1-USA, Newark, N.J.
1-Boston (52-6636) (Info)
1-New York (52-10018) (Info)
1-WFO (52-12554) (Info)
6-Philadelphia (52-7165)
1-Departmental Attorney GUY GOODWIN

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

2491

REC 83

AUG 30 1971

EX-100

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	KC TICKLER CAMDEN	KC	RAD Art	Guy Goodwin
Request Recd.			Chg [illegible]	9/9/71
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.				
By				

54 SEP 21 1971

Notations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1970 O 375-139

COVER PAGE

Leads

This case is receiving immediate preferred attention. The Bureau will be advised telephonically of pertinent developments. Leads to other divisions are being set forth by teletype or telephone as dictated by the urgency of the matter involved.

Philadelphia will follow and report prosecutive action.

Administrative Data

For the information of all offices, information was developed during the course of the MEDBURG investigation that subject JOHN PETER GRADY and others were planning a draft board break-in in Camden, N.J. A separate sub section of the MEDBURG file was opened to further develop that information. All correspondence concerning the "CAMDEN ACTION" should be directed to PH file 52-7165-SUB S.

Arrest warrants were obtained 8/21/71. Fugitive Form Letters, FD-65, are not being submitted since all subjects were in custody prior to completion of forms. Philadelphia is claiming 21 fugitives.

Departmental Attorney GUY GOODWIN is in Philadelphia handling legal matters involved in instant arrest. Copy of instant report will be furnished to him personally by the Philadelphia Division.

Two copies of instant report are being furnished the Newark Division since prosecution lies in the District of New Jersey. In addition, Doctor WILLIAM ANDERSON, Reverend MILO BILLMAN, Father MICHAEL J. DOYLE, MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, FRANCIS MEL MADDEN, and SARAH TOSI are subjects of separate investigations in that division.

One copy of instant report is being furnished to the Boston Division for information since PAUL BERNARD COUMING, MARGARET MARY INNESS, LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA, BARRY JAMES MUSI, and SARAH JANE TOSI are subjects of separate investigations in that division.

One copy of instant report is being furnished to the New York Division for information inasmuch as ANN GRANT DUNHAM, Father PETER DONALD FORDI, ROBERT GLENN GOOD, JOHN PETER GRADY, JOAN MARY REILLY, and ROSEMARY REILLY are subjects of separate investigations in that division.

One copy of instant report is being furnished to WFO for information inasmuch as JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH is the subject of a separate investigation in that division.

This report has been prepared to set forth the identities of the subjects arrested, the charges and the hearing before the U.S. Magistrate. A report containing all pertinent FD-302's concerning each arrest and disposition thereof will be promptly submitted.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

ITED STATES DEPARTMENT O JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1-USA, NEWARK, N.J.
1-DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEY GUY GOODWIN

Report of: ELMER E. SUSSMAN Office: PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
Date: AUGUST 25, 1971

Field Office File #: 52-7165 Bureau File #: 52-94527

Title: CAMDEN ACTION:
DOCTOR WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON; REVEREND MILO MARION BILLMAN; TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW; PAUL BERNARD COUMING; FATHER MICHAEL J. DOYLE; ANN GRANT DUNHAM; FATHER PETER DONALD FORDI; KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH; MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO; ROBERT GLENN GOOD; JOHN PETER GRADY; MARGARET MARY INNESS; FRANCIS MEL MADDEN; LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA; BARRY JAMES MUSI; JOAN MARY REILLY; ROSEMARY REILLY; KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI; JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH; SARAH JANE TOSI; ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON

Character: CRIME ON A GOVERNMENT RESERVATION - BURGLARY; THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; MUTILATION OF PUBLIC RECORDS; INTERFERENCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1967; CONSPIRACY

Synopsis: Subjects BILLMAN, BUCKALEW, COUMING, DOYLE, DUNHAM, FORDI, FORSYTH, GIOCONDO, GOOD, GRADY, INNESS, MADDEN, MOCCIA, MUSI, JOAN MARY REILLY, ROSEMARY REILLY, RIDOLFI, SWINGLISH, TOSI, and WILLIAMSON arrested by Special Agents of the FBI at Camden, N.J., on 8/22/71 and charged with CGR; TGP; DGP; MUTILATION OF PUBLIC RECORDS; INTERFERENCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1967; CONSPIRACY. Subject ANDERSON voluntarily surrendered to the FBI at Camden, N.J., on 8/23/71 and charged with same violations. All subjects afforded hearing before U.S. Magistrate in Camden, N.J. Results of those hearings set out.

-P-

DETAILS: At Camden, N.J.

On August 22, 1971, at approximately 4:35 a.m., Special Agents of the FBI apprehended the following individuals in the Post Office Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, N.J., and in the vicinity of the Post Office Building:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O - 406-840

REVEREND MILO MARION BILLMAN
TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW
PAUL BERNARD COUMING
FATHER MICHAEL J. DOYLE
ANN GRAND DUNHAM
FATHER PETER DONALD FORDI
KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH
MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO
ROBERT GLENN GOOD
JOHN PETER GRADY
MARGARET MARY INNESS
FRANCIS MEL MADDEN
LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA
BARRY JAMES MUSI
JOAN MARY REILLY
ROSEMARY REILLY
KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI
JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH
SARAH JANE TOSI
ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON

Each subject was charged with violations of Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 13 and 7 (New Jersey statutes annotated 2A; 94-1); Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 641; Title 18, U.S.

Code, Section 1361; Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2071 (a); Title 50, U.S. Code (appended), Section 462 (a); and Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 371.

Following their arrests, each subject was afforded a hearing before U.S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N.J. BILLMAN was released on $10,000 own recognizance bond. MADDEN was released on $5,000 own recognizance bond. JOAN REILLY was released on $10,000 own recognizance bond. All other subjects were remanded to the custody of the U.S. Marshal in lieu of following bonds:

BUCKALEW	$25,000 good bail
COUMING	$75,000 good bail
DOYLE	$10,000 good bail
DUNHAM	$20,000 good bail
FORDI	$50,000 good bail
FORSYTH	$25,000 good bail
GIOCONDO	$25,000 good bail
GOOD	$50,000 good bail
GRADY	$150,000 good bail
INNESS	$5,000 good bail
MOCCIA	$10,000 good bail
MUSI	$5,000 good bail
ROSEMARY REILLY	$25,000 good bail
RIDOLFI	$25,000 good bail
SWINGLISH	$50,000 good bail
TOSI	$5,000 good bail
WILLIAMSON	$25,000 good bail

On August 23, 1971, Doctor WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON voluntarily surrendered to the FBI at Camden, N.J. He was placed under arrest and was charged with the same violations as those set out above. He was afforded a hearing on the same date before U.S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N.J., and released on $10,000 cash bond. Further hearing was set forth August 30, 1971.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Felt
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Gale
Ponder
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: August 21, 1971

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Tolson
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Campbell
1 - Mr. Schutz

SUBJECT: BURGLARY OF MEDIA, PENNSYLVANIA, RESIDENT AGENCY (CAMDEN ACTION)

SAC Roy K. Moore in charge of captioned investigation indicated today information received from informant indicated strong possibility an attempt will be made by John Peter Grady and his group to break in the Federal Building at Camden, New Jersey, and thereafter destroy and carry off records of the draft board and military intelligence.

The Department has indicated that should the break-in be consummated, those involved should be arrested. In the event Grady and his group are on the scene with apparent intent to break in but stop short of such action, the Department has indicated they should be taken into custody.

SAC Moore advised Philadelphia and Newark Agents are being deployed in a position to take whatever action is appropriate.

ACTION: Information.

WCS:mcw
(7)

copy

Initialled by
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

EX-104
REC- 32

2479

6 AUG 26 1971

62 SEP 2 1971

Section 42

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
NEW YORK	PHILADELPHIA	8/31/71	8/27-30/71

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
FRANK RICHARD POMMERSHEIM aka Frank R. Pommersheim	ROBERT P. SADOWSKI	dmd

CHARACTER OF CASE

CGR-BURGLARY; DGP; TGP; MUTILATION OF PUBLIC RECORDS; INTERFERENCE WITH ADMINISTRATION OF SSS; CONSPIRACY
(MEDBURG-CAMDEN ACTION)

REFERENCE:

Philadelphia telephone call to New York, 8/27/71.

-P-

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Additional copies are being furnished Philadelphia and Newark for dissemination to appropriate United States Attorney(s).

E

LEADS:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK. Will follow and report results of prosecutive action in SDNY.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☒ NONE						ACQUITTALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☒ NO
							PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☒ NO

APPROVED JFN SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

5-Bureau (52-94527)
1-USA, SDNY
3-Newark
5-Philadelphia (52-7165)
3-New York (52-10018)(Sub G)
(1-62-14541)

200-902 D

25

REC 20 1 SEP 1971

EX-100

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency	1-TIC, Ext 5714			
Request Recd.	[illegible]	[illegible]		
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.	[illegible]	[illegible]		
By	[illegible]			

54 SEP 1 1971

9/8/71

Notations

NEW LEFT SECTION

-A-
COVER PAGE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1970 O-

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1-USA, SDNY
(ATT: AUSA BLAINE MICHAEL)

Report of: ROBERT P. SADOWSKI
Office: New York, New York
Date: 8/31/71

Field Office File #: 52-10018(Sub G)
Bureau File #: 52-94527

Title: FRANK RICHARD POMMERSHEIM

Character: CRIME ON A GOVERNMENT RESERVATION-BURGLARY; DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; MUTILATION OF PUBLIC RECORDS; INTERFERENCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM; CONSPIRACY

Synopsis:

Subject indicted by FGJ, Camden, NJ, 8/27/71, for CGR-Burglary, DGP, TGP, Mutilation of Public Records, Interference with Administration of SSS and Conspiracy to commit same. Bench Warrant issued. Subject, WMA, born 12/12/43, NYC, NY, 5'11", brown hair and eyes, arrested 8/27/71, at place of employment by SAS of the FBI without incident. Arraigned same date before US Magistrate, released on his own recognizance. Hearing set for 9/1/71. Description and background data set forth.

-P-

DETAILS:

Investigation in this matter was predicated upon receipt of a telephonic communication from the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Pa.) Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) advising that subject was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) convened in Camden, New Jersey (NJ), on August 27, 1971, for Crime on a Government Reservation-Burglary, Destruction of Government Property, Theft of Government Property, Mutilation of Public Records,

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Interference with the Administration of the Selective Service System and for Conspiracy to commit same. The Philadelphia Division also advised that a Bench Warrant was issued for his arrest.

POMMERSHEIM was arrested at his place of employment, the Harlem Consumers Complaint Center, 227 East 116th Street, New York City (NYC), NY, by Special Agents (SAS) of the FBI the same date without incident.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/31/71

FRANK RICHARD POMMERSHEIM, 4 West 101st Street, Apartment 42, New York City (NYC), NY, was advised of the identities of ROBERT P. SADOWSKI and ROBERT W. VERICKER as Special Agents (SAS) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at his place of employment, Harlem Consumers Complaint Center, 227 East 116th Street, NYC, NY. He was placed under arrest by SA SADOWSKI, who advised him of the charges against him:

Crime on a Government Reservation, Destruction of Government Property, Theft of Government Property, Mutilation of Public Records, Interference with the Administration of the Selective Service System and Conspiracy to commit all of the preceding.

SAS SADOWSKI and VERICKER advised him of his rights as they appear on the "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" form. POMMERSHEIM was also furnished with a copy of the form, which he read and returned to SA SADOWSKI, advising "I do not wish to sign or initial this and I have nothing to say".

The following description was obtained by descriptive interview and observation:

Name	FRANK RICHARD POMMERSHEIM
Sex	Male
Race	Caucasian
Date of Birth	December 12, 1943
Place of Birth	New York City, NY
Height	5 feet 11 inches
Weight	165 pounds
Hair	Brown, long in back
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Medium, clear, clean shaven
Characteristics	Wears glasses

On 8/27/71 at NYC, NY File # 52-10018-G

by SAS ROBERT W. VERICKER & ROBERT P. SADOWSKI/dmd Date dictated 8/30/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Scars	¼ to ½" under lower lip, heart-shaped
Residence	4 West 101st Street Apartment 42 NYC, NY
Telephone	Business-348-0600 Home-None
Parents	FRANK and GRACE POMMERSHEIM 3603 Woodward Avenue Seaford, NY 516-SU1-0695
Social Security Number	079-34-4305
Occupation	Senior Consumer Specialist
Employer	Department of Consumer Affairs of City of New York Identity Card Number 486
Former Employment	1.) Legal Services Unit, 320 East 3rd Street NYC, NY 2.) VISTA (1968-1969) Assigned to Alaska
New York State Motorist Identification Number	P1548923498127802-43 (Expires December 31, 1972)
Education	Colgate University (1965) Columbia Law School
American Red Cross Card Identification	Blood type A positive Address-Box 177 C.S. Hamilton, NY
Blue Cross-Blue Shield	City of New York Number 079344305 Suffix C08, Effective February 18, 1971
Board of Elections	Registrant Number 1236037 Nassau County
Alaska Liquor Permit	Box 193 Bethel, Alaska

On August 27, 1971, POMMERSHEIM was arraigned before United States Magistrate GERARD L. GOETTEL, United States Courthouse, Foley Square, New York City, and released in his own recognizance, with the provision that he return Monday, August 30, 1971, and present himself to the United States Marshal for fingerprinting. A hearing was set for 2:30 p.m. on Wednesday, September 1, 1971.

Section 44

3 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
PHILADELPHIA	PHILADELPHIA	SEP 13 1971	8/21/71 - 9/8/71

TITLE OF CASE

CHANGED
CAMDEN ACTION:
JAYMA ANN ABDOO, aka Janette;
Dr. WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON;
Reverend MILO MARION BILLMAN;
TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW;
PAUL BERNARD COUMING;
DALE S. CUNNINGHAM;
EUGENE F. DIXON; Father MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE;
ANNE GRANT DUNHAM, aka Ann;
Father PETER DONALD FORDI; KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH;
MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO; ROBERT GLENN GOOD;
JOHN PETER GRADY; MARGARET MARY INNESS;
FRANCIS MEL MADDEN, aka Francis Xavier Madden (TN),
Mel Madden; Reverend EDWARD J. MC GOWAN;
LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA; Reverend EDWARD J. MURPHY;
BARRY JAMES MUSI; FRANK RICHARD POMMERSHEIM;
JOAN MARY REILLY; ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY, aka Ro Ro;
ANITA L. RICCI; KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI; MARTHA SHEMELEY;
JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH; SARAH JANE TOSI; ROBERT WILLIAM
WILLIAMSON

REPORT MADE BY
ELMER E. SUSSMAN

TYPED BY
BT

CHARACTER OF CASE
CGR-BURGLARY; TGP; DGP; MUTILATION O
PUBLIC RECORDS; INTERFERENCE WITH TH
ADMINISTRATION OF SELECTIVE SERVICE
ACT OF 1967; CONSPIRACY; ASSAULTING
FEDERAL OFFICER; OBSTRUCTION OF JUS

Title of this case has been marked changed to reflect following changes in names of subjects: Father MICHAEL J. DOYLE to Father MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE; ANN GRANT DUNHAM to ANNE GRANT DUNHAM, aka Ann; FRANCIS MEL MADDEN to FRANCIS MEL MADDEN, aka

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE

CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS.	RECOVERIES	ACQUIT-TALS

CASE HAS BEEN:
PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO
PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED ____ SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

⑥-Bureau (52-94527)
  1-Departmental Attorney
   GUY GOODWIN
3-Newark (52-6817)
  1-USA, Newark, N. J.
1-Boston (52-6636)(Info)
1-New York (52-10018)(Info)
1-WFO (52-12554)(Info)
5-Philadelphia (52-7165 Sub S)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

52-[illegible] - MCT-27

2 SEP ~~15~~ 21 1971 2645

REC 32

ST-109

Notations

NINE
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	ICC AAT
Request Recd.	AT: Mr. Guy L. Goodwin
Date Fwd.	cc [illegible]
Fwd.	[illegible]
	9/16/71

55 SEP 27 1971

A

COVER PAGE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE . 1970 O—375-139

Francis Xavier Madden (True Name), Mel Madden; FRANK POMMERSHEIM to FRANK RICHARD POMMERSHEIM; ROSEMARY REILLY to ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY, aka Ro Ro. Fugitive has been deleted following Reverend EDWARD J. MC GOWAN's name since New York advised by teletype on 9/8/71 that MC GOWAN had voluntarily surrendered to the FBI at New York City on that date.

REFERENCES

Reports of SA ELMER E. SUSSMAN, dated 8/25, 8/31, 9/1, and 9/7/71 at Philadelphia;

Report of SA ROBERT P. SADOWSKI, dated 8/31/71 at New York captioned, "FRANK RICHARD POMMERSHEIM, aka."

-P-

LEADS

This case is receiving immediate preferred attention. The Bureau will be promptly advised of pertinent developments. Leads to other divisions are being set out by teletype or other expeditious means.

Voluminous evidentiary material was seized during the course of searches incidental to the arrest, searches of vehicles, and execution of search warrants at premises. Philadelphia is currently cataloging all seized material in preparation for transmittal to the FBI Laboratory.

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Two copies of instant report are being furnished the Newark Division since prosecution lies in the district of New Jersey. In addition, the Newark Division has a separate interest in Dr. WILLIAM ANDERSON, Rev. MILO BILLMAN, Fr. MICHAEL J. DOYLE, MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, FRANCIS MEL MADDEN, SARAH TOSI, JAYMA ANN ABDOO, EUGENE F. DIXON, and MARTHA SHEMELEY.

One copy of instant report is being furnished the Boston Division for information since that division has a special interest in PAUL BERNARD COUMING, MARGARET MARY INNESS, LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA, BARRY JAMES MUSI, and SARAH JANE TOSI.

One copy of instant report is being furnished the New York Division for information because that division has a special interest in ANN GRANT DUNHAM, Father PETER DONALD FORDI, ROBERT GLENN GOOD, JOHN PETER GRADY, JOAN MARY REILLY, ROSEMARY REILLY, Reverend EDWARD J. MURPHY, FRANK R. POMMERSHEIM, and Reverend EDWARD J. MC GOWAN.

One copy of instant report is being furnished the WFO for information inasmuch as that division has a special interest in JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH.

Where multiple arrests appear in one FD-302, the same FD-302 is used in this report to set out the individual arrest under that section containing details of the individual arrest.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1-DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEY GUY GOODWIN
1-USA, NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

Report of: ELMER E. SUSSMAN **Office:** Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Date: SEP 13 1971

Field Office File #: 52-7165 Sub S **Bureau File #:** 52-94527

Title: CAMDEN ACTION: JAYMA ANN ABDOO; DR. WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON; REV. MILO MARION BILLMAN; TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW; PAUL BERNARD COUMING; DALE S. CUNNINGHAM; EUGENE F. DIXON; FR. MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE; ANNE GRANT DUNHAM; Fr. PETER DONALD FORDI; KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH; MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO; ROBERT GLENN GOOD; JOHN PETER GRADY; MARGARET MARY INNESS; FRANCIS MEL MADDEN; REV. EDWARD J. MC GOWAN; LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA; REV. EDWARD J. MURPHY; BARRY JAMES MUSI; FRANK RICHARD POMMERSHEIM; JOAN MARY REILLY; ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY; ANITA L. RICCI; KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI; MARTHA SHEMELEY; JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH; SARAH JANE TOSI; ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON

~~Character~~

~~Synopsis~~

Character: CRIME ON GOVERNMENT RESERVATION - BURGLARY; THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; MUTILATION OF PUBLIC RECORDS; INTERFERENCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1967; CONSPIRACY; ASSAULTING FEDERAL OFFICER; OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Synopsis: Authorized complaint filed before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., on 8/21/71 charging 21 subjects with violations of T18, USC, Sections 13 and 7 (New Jersey Statutes annotated 2A; 94-1); Title 18, USC, Section 641; Title 18, USC, Section 1361; Title 18, USC, Section 2071 (a); Title 50, USC (Appended), Section 462 (a); Title 18, USC, Section 371. On 8/22/71, 20 subjects arrested in the Post Office Building, Camden, N. J., and in the vicinity of the Post Office Building. The 21st subject voluntarily surrendered to the FBI at Camden, N. J., on 8/23/71. Pertinent details concerning each arrest set out.

-P-

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 351-076

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Number

I. PROSECUTIVE ACTION 3

II. DETAILS OF EACH INDIVIDUAL ARREST 6 - 124

1. Dr. WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON 7
2. Rev. MILO MARION BILLMAN 7 - 14
3. TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW 15 - 18
4. PAUL BERNARD COUMING 19 - 22
5. Father MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE 23 - 28
6. ANNE GRANT DUNHAM 29 - 32
7. Father PETER DONALD FORDI 33 - 37
8. KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH 38 - 41
9. MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO 42 - 46
10. ROBERT GLENN GOOD 47 - 51
11. JOHN PETER GRADY 52 - 55
12. MARGARET MARY INNESS 56 - 61
13. FRANCIS MEL MADDEN 62 - 68
14. LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA 69 - 73
15. BARRY JAMES MUSI 74 - 79
16. JOAN MARY REILLY 80 - 94
17. ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY 95 - 100
18. KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI 101 - 107
19. JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH 108 - 113
20. SARAH JANE TOSI 114 - 118
21. ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON 119 - 124

DETAILS:

I. PROSECUTIVE ACTION

At Camden, N. J.

On August 21, 1971, facts of this case were discussed with Departmental Attorney GUY GOODWIN and Assistant U. S. Attorney JAMES FINNEGAN, Camden, N. J., who authorized issuance of complaint and warrant charging the following individuals with violation of Title 18, US. Code, Sections 13 and 7 (New Jersey Statutes annotated 2A; 94-1); Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 641; Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1361; Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 2071 (a); Title 50, U. S. Code (Appended); Section 462 (a); Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 371: Dr. WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON; Rev. MILO MARION BILLMAN; TERRY EDWARD BUCKLAEW; PAUL BERNARD COUMING; Father MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE; ANNE GRANT DUNHAM; Father PETER DONALD FORDI; KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH; MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO; ROBERT GLENN GOOD; JOHN PETER GRADY; MARGARET MARY INNESS; FRANCIS MEL MADDEN; LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA; BARRY JAMES MUSI; JOAN MARY REILLY; ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY; KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI; JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH; SARAH JANE TOSI; and ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON.

On August 21, 1971, an authorized complaint was filed before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., who issued arrest warrants for above-named 21 subjects.

On August 22, 1971, the following subjects were apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI at the locations indicated:

Inside Post Office Building,
401 Market Street, Camden, N. J.

PAUL BERNARD COUMING

Father MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE

Father PETER DONALD FORDI

MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO

ROBERT GLENN GOOD

ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY

KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI

ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON

St. Paul's Church Courtyard,
422 Market Street, Camden, N. J.

ANNE GRANT DUNHAM

MARGARET MARY INNESS

BARRY JAMES MUSI

JOAN MARY REILLY

21 North Fourth Street,
Camden, N. J.

TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW

Reverend MILO MARION BILLMAN

KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH

JOHN PETER GRADY

FRANCIS MEL MADDEN

LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA

JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH

SARAH JANE TOSI

Following their arrest, each subject was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J. Reverend MILO MARION BILLMAN was released on $10,000 own recognizance bond. FRANCIS MEL MADDEN was released on $5,000 own recognizance bond. JOAN MARY REILLY was released on $10,000 own recognizance bond. All other subjects were remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marahal in lieu of the following bonds:

TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW, $25,000 good bail;

PAUL BERNARD COUMING, $75,000 good bail;

Father MICHAEL J. DOYLE, $10,000 good bail;

ANNE GRANT DUNHAM, $20,000 good bail;

Father PETER DONALD FORDI, $50,000 good bail;

KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH, $25,000 good bail;

MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, $25,000 good bail;

ROBERT GLENN GOOD, $50,000 good bail;

JOHN PETER GRADY, $150,000 good bail;

MARGARET MARY INNESS, $5,000 good bail;

LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA, $10,000 good bail;

BARRY JAMES MUSI, $5,000 good bail;

ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY, $25,000 good bail;

KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI, $25,000 good bail;

JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH, $50,000 good bail;

SARAH JANE TOSI, $5,000 good bail;

ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON, $25,000 good bail.

On August 23, 1971, Doctor WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON voluntarily surrendered to the FBI at Camden, N. J. He was placed under arrest and was charged with the same violations as previously set out. He was afforded a hearing on the same date before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and released on $10,000 cash bond.

Additional details concerning each arrest will be set forth in a separate section following subject's name.

Information concerning the action taken by a Federal Grand Jury in Camden, N. J. on August 27, 1971, in this case has been previously reported.

II. DETAILS OF EACH INDIVIDUAL ARREST

Dr. WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON

Rev. MILO MARION BILLMAN

TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW

PAUL BERNARD COUMING

Father MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE

ANNE GRANT DUNHAM

Father PETER DONALD FORDI

KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH

MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO

ROBERT GLENN GOOD

JOHN PETER GRADY

MARGARET MARY INNESS

FRANCIS MEL MADDEN

LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA

BARRY JAMES MUSI

JOAN MARY REILLY

ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY

KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI

JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH

SARAH JANE TOSI

ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON

DOCTOR WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON

As previously noted, captioned individual voluntarily surrendered to the FBI at Camden, N. J., on August 23, 1971. He was placed under arrest and was afforded a hearing on the same date before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J. He was released on $10,000 cash bond.

REVEREND MILO MARION BILLMAN

As previously noted, BILLMAN was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, at 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was released on $10,000 own recognizance bond.

A search of the fingerprints of Reverend MILO MARION BILLMAN has failed to disclose prior arrest data in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 23, 1971

On August 22, 1971, at approximately 4:32 a.m., SA TERRENCE P. KEIST and SA LAWRENCE KARL YORK went to the door of the residence located at 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, New Jersey. SA KEIST displayed his credentials to the individual who came to the door. This man was later identified as MILO MARION BILLMAN. SA KEIST announced that he and the others were Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that they were there to execute arrest warrants.

SA YORK told BILLMAN to come down the steps of the residence.

At that time BILLMAN was arrested and searched by SA DONALD REX EGELSTON. SA EGELSTON advised BILLMAN of his identity and of the fact that he was under arrest on a charge of conspiracy.

MR. BILLMAN was then removed from his home and placed in a Bureau car, and from that point taken to the Post Office Building at Camden, New Jersey.

On August 22, 1971, Reverend MILO MARION BILLMAN of 21 North 4th Street, Camden, New Jersey, was searched in connection with his arrest by the FBI on the same date. The following items were removed from the person of Reverend BILLMAN for possible evidentiary purposes. Reverend BILLMAN signed a receipt for items taken:

1. 3¼" x 2½" 1971 pocket calendar with the following names and telephone numbers listed on the reverse side:

Pay Care 541-0661
Dr. Brimor Off. 964-2340
O.E.O. Main 964-6887 - North 966-4453, South 966-3157
B. Oberkahr 964-1602, 541-6665
Helen 963-0373

On 8/22/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # Philadelphia 62-5268

by SAS PHILIP E. BROWN, TERRENCE P. KEIST, LAWRENCE KARL YORK and DONALD REX EGELSTON PEB:rls Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Point 966-5454
K. [illegible] 964-4495
Mim. [illegible]
Janet H. 9[illegible]3-[illegible]

At the bottom of the calendar the following number appeared: 6395M-6124M.

2. 3½" x 2½" 1971 pocket calendar with the following names and telephone numbers on the reverse side:

Ruth 964-9482
M. Moore, 221 Vine, 365-0612
I. Robinson, 216 Ryson, 964-8194
C. Thompson, 913 Cedar, 963-0813
P. Gibson, 614 State, 964-6840, 964-8197
P. P. Keigh. 365-3824
Ed L. 365-3954
M. Rodriguez, 642 Erie, 365-9225
J. Syms, 612 York, 966-5447
John Rich, 931 Cedar, 365-5728
Marilyn Whitham, 315 State, 964-8799
Luke 541-1062, 541-2026

3. 3 3/4" x 2½" green card for "The Lost Sea Gulls," card owned by Reverend DONALD A. GREISMAN.

4. 4" x 2½" white card - "Camden Lutheran Youth Ministry."

5. Business card of PHILIP WOLF - Attorney, 426 Market Street, Camden, New Jersey, telephone number 964-8060, 964-9030. Also home telephone number listed as 609-667-2593.

6. Six pink colored cards for emergency food, etc. Coopers Point Neighborhood Action Group.

7. One card - Committee on Political Education AFL-CIO, for JOSEPH M. ROURKE, Deputy Director, 815 16th Street, Northwest Washington, D. C., telephone number 202-293-5105. Also on the reverse side of this card appeared a name, FANNIE REAL, 2662 Rutland Street, Montgomery, Alabama 36105, telephone number 263-7063, 262-6669, Field Director COPE, AFL-CIO.

PH 62-5268

8. One letter from WILLIAM [illegible], Director, Public Safety, Camden, New Jersey, dated August 21, 1971.

The following items were found on the person of Reverend [illegible] and were immediately returned to him after inspection:

1. $28.00 in cash.

2. Social Security Card Number 269-30-5010.

3. One New Jersey Driver's License Number B4372-55474-04324.

4. One receipt from Central Duplicating and Typewriter Company, in amount of $12.08.

5. Eight chance stubs from the Economic Development Corporation.

6. One bill from Pennsauken Animal Hospital.

7. One yellow admission card from the Bandbox Night Club.

8. One business size card from Mira, Inc., a real estate firm.

9. One card with name LYLE TATUM, an Urban Affairs Representative.

10. One automobile insurance card from Continental Insurance Company.

11. One Lutheran Church Supply Card, Number 10-010556.

12. One Baile de Coronacion advertising a dance.

13. One library card.

14. One Sears Credit Card Number 450057-01207-9.

15. One receipt from JOHN A. [illegible] for automobile insurance in the amount of $278 dated March 6, 1971.

16. One automobile registration from the State of New Jersey on a blue Volkswagen.

11

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

Reverend MILO MARION BILLMAN, white male American, born April 20, 1942 at Sharon Center, Ohio, residence 21 North 4th Street, Camden, N. J., was again advised of the identities of the arresting and interviewing agents and also again advised of the fact that he was being arrested for conspiracy in connection with the break-in of the Selective Service System Offices in the Post Office Building at Camden, N. J. Mr. BILLMAN was then presented an Interrogation; Advice of Rights form and asked if he was able to read and write the English language. Mr. BILLMAN advised he was able to read and write the English language and he advised he was a college graduate having completed four years of post-graduate work. Mr. BILLMAN then read the advice of rights and waiver of rights form as presented to him by SA DONALD REX EGELSTON. Mr. BILLMAN was asked if he thoroughly understood what his rights were and he advised, "I understand what my rights are." He was then asked, "Are you sure you understand," and Mr. BILLMAN advised that he did understand what his rights were.

Mr. BILLMAN was then asked by SA DONALD REX EGELSTON would he acknowledge that he had been advised of his rights by agents of the FBI and he advised, "Yes, I have been advised." Mr. BILLMAN advised that he did not wish to sign the advice of rights waiver form and he requested that he be able to make a telephone call to his attorney. Mr. BILLMAN was advised by SA EGELSTON that immediately upon receipt of information from Special Agent in Charge ROY K. MOORE that the building had been secured and that agents and suspects safety could be assured he would be allowed to make any number of telephone calls which he wished, including those calls to his family or to his attorney. Mr. BILLMAN advised that he understood this. BILLMAN stated he did not wish to discuss the break-in.

Mr. BILLMAN was then asked by SA EGELSTON if he had made prior arrangements with his wife as to what should be done in the event he was arrested. Mr. BILLMAN advised that he had expected that he might be arrested for either

---

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia [illegible]

by SA PHILIP E. BROWN (PEB) AND,
SA DONALD REX EGELSTON DRE/js Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

"this or the other one." During the conversation SA EGELSTON asked if he had a moral obligation to the people who he served in his community and Mr. BILLMAN advised, "Yes, I also have an obligation to the 17 year olds."

SA EGELSTON then asked Mr. BILLMAN why would anyone want to break-in to a draft board now in view of the fact that Congress is presently endeavoring to make changes within the Selective Service System and that at the present time no one is being drafted, and that it appears that any action against the draft board appears to be useless at the present time. Mr. BILLMAN stated, "The poor people can't wait for government to react. It reacts too slowly to the problems of the poor people, that something has to be done now."

Mr. BILLMAN was then given a copy of the Sunday "Philadelphia Inquirer," and he opened this copy and began to read it. He then pointed to a picture in the newspaper showing a fire in downtown Camden and stated, "Here is the real crime, people are dying. Why don't you do something about that, instead of draft board break-ins." SA EGELSTON advised him that the FBI had no jurisdiction in the matter in Camden. BILLMAN said, "Why don't you do something about the crooks, Mayor NARDI and Police Commissioner YEAGER." SA EGELSTON advised him that if he wished to present any information concerning irregularities in office concerning Mayor NARDI and Police Commissioner YEAGER he would take this information down. Mr. BILLMAN made no further comments concerning Mayor NARDI and Police Commissioner YEAGER.

Mr. BILLMAN provided the following descriptive data:

Name	Reverend MILO MARION BILLMAN
DOB	April 20, 1932
POB	Sharon Center, Ohio
Height	6'
Weight	230 pounds
Build	Stocky
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Blue
Residence	21 North 4th Street Camden, N. J.
Scars and Marks	1" cut scar on right thumb
Occupation	Lutheran Minister - Works in Community.
Employment (period)	Ordained June 1958
Previous arrests	Admits to none
Driver's License	B 4372 59474 04324
Vehicle Ownership	1965 blue Volkswagen, VIN 115940009

Social Security #	269-30-5010
Military Service	None
Draft Status	4-D - Ministerial Deferment
Local Address	Wadsworth, Ohio
Relatives:	
Father	PAUL E. BILLMAN, Seville, Ohio
DOB	July 31, 1899
POB	Ohio
Mother	MARY L. BILLMAN (YOUNG), Seville, Ohio
DOB	February 22, 1903
POB	Ohio
Brother	GEORGE M. BILLMAN
DOB	April 12, 1928
POB	Ohio
Sister	WANDA B. JACOBS, Creston, Ohio
DOB	1933
POB	Ohio
Wife	JEAN BILLMAN, nee BROWN, 21 North 4th Street, Camden, N. J.
DOB	June 21, 1937
POB	Springfield, Ohio
Children	AMY, age 10 JOEL, age 8

The Reverend BILLMAN refused to explain "this or the other one," or to make any statement concerning his involvement in the break-in of the draft board in Camden, N. J., on the morning of August 22, 1971.

TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW

As previously noted, BUCKALEW was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, at 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $25,000 good bail. He was released on September 7, 1971, after posting ten per cent cash or security of a $10,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/24/71

TERRY E. BUCKALEW was arrested in the early morning of August 22, 1971, at 21 North 4th Street, Camden, N.J., by Special Agents (SAs) RICHARD J. MARTIN and H. MARSHALL JUDD.

At the time of arrest, BUCKALEW refused to identify himself. However, a search of his person revealed a wallet containing a Pennsylvania and a New Jersey driver's license, both bearing the name "TERRY E. BUCKALEW." When shown this identification he agreed this was his correct name. Immediately after admitting his identity he said he would not furnish any other information.

BUCKALEW was taken in a Bureau car to the Federal Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, N.J., where he was taken to Room 318 to await his being fingerprinted, photographed, and his appearance before a magistrate.

BUCKALEW was informed by SA RICHARD J. MARTIN that he did not have to make a statement; that he was entitled to consult with an attorney before making any statement and that if he could not afford one, an attorney would be obtained for him. He was informed that any statement he did make could be used against him in a court of law. At this point BUCKALEW again stated he would not furnish any information. Further, he said he would not sign anything.

The following description of TERRY E. BUCKALEW was obtained from observation and from examination of the two driver's licenses in his possession:

Sex	Male
Race	White
Height	6'2"
Weight	225 pounds
Build	Large frame
Date of Birth	September 8, 1950
Hair	Brown (long and curly)
Eyes	Hazel (wears glasses)
Addresses	108 North 34th Street, Philadelphia, Pa.;

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N.J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165 Sub S

by SA RICHARD J. MARTIN
SA H. MARSHALL JUDD ... RJM/mjb Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

16

115 East Monterey Avenue,
Wildwood Crest, N.J.
(He refused to say which
of these addresses was current
or even if they were correct
addresses.)

BUCKALEW refused to furnish any information about his family or his marital status. In conversation he mentioned he once worked as an assistant to the law clerk of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals but refused to furnish additional information in this regard.

The following items were seized from the person of BUCKALEW:

1. New Jersey Driver's License number B 9060-73365-09504, issued January 6, 1971, expiration date of January 31, 1972, name TERRY E. BUCKALEW, address 115 East Monterey Avenue, Wildwood Crest, N.J., date of birth September 1950.

2. Pennsylvania Driver's License number 16-834-072, expiration date of September 30, 1972, validated August 17, 1971, name TERRY E. BUCKALEW, address 108 North 34th Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

3. Pink slip of paper with "Pylam Products Co., 95-10 218th St., Queens Village, N.Y. 11429; Pyla - Cool Dyes."

4. Two by three card containing "NEIL BENSON of Wasted Pictures Productions, 329-1551, Phil., Pa."

5. Three by five card containing "365-8911, 181-573."

6. Portion of pink card containing "Red 56 Green 61."

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

8-23-71 472 L

The following FBI record, NUMBER 999 101 H, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. WHERE FINAL DISPOSITION IS NOT SHOWN OR FURTHER EXPLANATION OF CHARGE IS DESIRED, COMMUNICATE WITH AGENCY CONTRIBUTING THOSE FINGERPRINTS.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
D.C. Jail Wash DC	Terry E. Buckalew 163644	6-18-69	unlawful entry	
FBI Newark NJ	Terry Edward Buckalew #--	8-22-71	conspiracy	

18

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

PAUL BERNARD COUMING

As previously noted, COUMING was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, inside the Post Office Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $25,000 good bail. He was released on September 7, 1971, after posting ten per cent cash or security of a $10,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 23, 1971

The following activity took place pursuant to the execution of an arrest warrant, dated August 21, 1971, authorized by U. S. Departmental Attorney GUY L. GOODWIN, and issued August 21, 1971, by U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD at Camden, N. J.:

PAUL B. COUMING was observed by SA's SNODGRASS and SHERWOOD at about 4:35 a.m., standing against the outside wall of the Selective Service Offices, Fifth Floor, U. S. Post Office building, behind a parapet, on the roof of the Fourth Floor. Couming was told, "FBI, don't move," by SA SNODGRASS, and was immediately placed under arrest by SA's SNODGRASS and SHERWOOD.

Following a preliminary search of his person for weapons or other dangerous materials by SA SHERWOOD, COUMING was handcuffed and then led through the window into the Selective Service Offices by SA SNODGRASS.

COUMING had in his possession at the time of arrest a Realistic TRC-100-B Transceiver, 5 watts, 6 channels with crystals, for transmitting and receiving on Channel 11. Serial Number 17329/5A1 appeared on the transceiver, as well as a Timex waterproof watch, number 21242568, which was taped to the outside of the transceiver.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 100-52128
Philadelphia 52-7165-Sub S

by SA'S GEORGE E. SHERWOOD
and PHILIP E. SNODGRASS · GLS:BSM Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/24/71

DONALD G. COX and PAUL L. BRINTON identified themselves as Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to PAUL BERNARD COUMING. He was furnished a Waiver of Rights form which he read and declined to sign.

COUMING was searched by the above agents and one pair of brown cotton gloves was taken from him and maintained as evidence. He was wearing the gloves when the interview began.

He was fingerprinted and photographed.

COUMING declined to furnish any information and the only information he would furnish was his name.

The following description of COUMING was obtained from personal observation:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Age	About 22
Height	5'4"
Weight	130 pounds
Hair	Brown, wavy over ears, long sideburns
Eyes	Hazel
Dress	Blue coverall pants and jacket; grey shirt, long sleeves, with white and red vertical stripes; white T-shirt and a green T-shirt

He also had in his possession a business card which reflected the name of a law firm "Segal, Appel, and Natali, Suite 200, 1427 Walnut St., Philadelphia, Pa., 19107, Telephone #665 0220." Hand printed on the card was the following: "Camden Carl Poplar, Office 966-2533 and Home 428-1813."

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165 SUB S

by SAs DONALD G. COX and PAUL L. BRINTON DGC/tac Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[illegible]
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

[illegible]

660 651 H

The following FBI record, NUMBER , is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. WHERE FINAL DISPOSITION IS NOT SHOWN OR FURTHER EXPLANATION OF CHARGE IS DESIRED, COMMUNICATE WITH AGENCY CONTRIBUTING THOSE FINGERPRINTS.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
PD Phila Pa	Paul [illegible] Coumings #435608	2-7-[illegible]	burg larc RSG consp larc of auto unl ent destruction of pub prop & records mal mischief	disch
USM Boston, Mass	Paul Bernard Couming #4307	FP 12-7-70	conscienious object form work prescribed by Selec ive Service System;	2-16-71 1 yr 3 yrs prob appeal fi
Norfolk County H of C Dedham Mass	Paul Bernard Couming #45650	2-10-71	Safekeep	Temp Cust
USM Scranton Pa	Paul Bernard Couming #3382-1581	4-23-71	Contempt of Lawful Order of the Court	
Dauphin Co Pr Harrisburg Pa	Paul Bernard Couming #D-23, 605	4-23-71	Contempt (Federal Court)	
CSC	Paul Bernard Couming #V691330	9-18-68		
FBI Newark NJ	Paul Bernard Couming	8-22-71	CGR-Burg	

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

FATHER MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE

As previously noted, DOYLE was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, inside the Post Office Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $10,000 good bail. He was released on September 1, 1971, on his own recognizance bond of $10,000.

A search of the fingerprints of Father MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE has failed to disclose prior arrest data in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 23, 1971

At approximately 4:35 a.m., entry was made into the Selective Service Board rooms, Fifth Floor, Federal Courthouse and Post Office, Camden. On entry, seven persons were seen standing in various positions. They were immediately advised that they were under arrest and that they were arrested by Special Agents of the FBI.

These persons were later identified as PETER DONALD FORDI, MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, ROBERT GLEN GOOD, MICHAEL J. DOYLE, ROSEMARY REILLY, KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI, and ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON. Each person arrested received a preliminary "pat down" search.

After the search, each person was handcuffed and designated for booking and further processing.

At the time of entry and thereafter, it was noted that cabinets had been ripped open; Selective Service documents removed from these; documents were observed to be strewn and torn on the floor of the Conference Room, in mailbags, on the floor of the main Selective Service Office, and strewn about in the gutter area of the ramparts on three sides of the fifth floor roof.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File # PHILADELPHIA 52-7165 Sub S
SA's W. B. ANDERSON, EUGENE S. DERBAULT, JOE R. GINGRICH,
DAVID A. MILLER, MASON P. SMITH, THOMAS E. TIERNEY, JOSEPH ZEEL,
by and ROBERT H. WALLER WBA/bsa/mlb Date dictated

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

24

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date August 27, 1971

At approximately 4:30 a.m., August 22, 1971, Selective Service space and surrounding area located on the fifth floor, U. S. Post Office, 401 Market Street, Camden, New Jersey, was entered by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. SAs EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT and THOMAS D. TIERNEY entered the immediate area and parapet surrounding the Selective Service office by way of the building fire escape. SAs ROBERT H. WALLER and JOE R. GINGERICH entered the Selective Service office through the front door, which entered onto the fifth floor corridor.

Upon entrance into this space SAs DEBBAUDT, TIERNEY, WALLER and GINGERICH announced the FBI's presence and instructed everyone to remain as they were until told to do otherwise.

SA JOE R. GINGERICH apprehended MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE on the parapet surrounding the fifth floor of the U. S. Post Office. DOYLE, at the time of apprehension, was located on the south side of the building at approximately the center of the building west of the Selective Service space proceeding in a westerly direction around the parapet. DOYLE was immediately returned to the Selective Service space via a window where he was frisked for weapons with negative results. DOYLE was not questioned other than for his name which he refused to give.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165-SUB

by SA JOE R. GINGERICH:[illegible] Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 27, 1971

MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE was presented an Interrogation - Advice of Rights form by SA JOE R. GINGERICH and advised by SA GINGERICH that an interview was desired regarding the burglary of the Selective Service Offices at the U. S. Courthouse and Post Office Building, 4th and Market Streets, Camden, N. J., the early morning of August 22, 1971. DOYLE read the Interrogation - Advice of Rights form, advised he fully understood the contents of the form, and thereby signed the form.

DOYLE advised he did not wish to answer any questions.

The following description was obtained from observation and interview:

Name	MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE
Aliases	None
Date of Birth	November 3, 1934
Place of Birth	Longford County, Ireland
Height	5'7"
Weight	136 pounds
Build	Slender
Hair	Auburn
Eyes	Blue
Scars and Marks	None
Address	2907 Federal Street, Camden, N. J.
Occupation	Catholic Priest - 12 years
Employment	Catholic Priest - St. Joseph's Pro-Cathedral, Camden, N.J.
Father	JOHN DOYLE, born May 14, 1898, at Longford County, Ireland (Deceased 1967)
Mother	ROSE CREEGAN DOYLE - Longford County, Ireland
Brothers	PATRICK DOYLE - Longford County, Ireland JOHN DOYLE - Catholic Priest, Brigantine, New Jersey

On 8/22/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # Philadelphia 52-7165-SUB S

by SAs KLAUS C. ROHR and JOE R. GINGERICH JRG:mmm Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Sisters	ANNA MAE DOYLE - Longford County, Ireland PHILOMENA O'REILLY - Longford County, Ireland
Spouse	None
Children	None
Previous Arrests	None
Driver's License	New Jersey (number unknown)
Vehicle Ownership	1968 Chevrolet Impala, rust-colored, four door, New Jersey license unknown.
Selective Service Number	None
Military Service	None
Draft Status	None
Social Security Number	Unknown
Local Address	2907 Federal Street, Camden, N. J.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 27, 1971

3.

A search of the person of MICHAEL JOSEPH DOYLE on August 22, 1971, reflected the location and obtaining of the following items:

One pad of white paper, 4"x3", with a pen and pencil drawing on top sheet.

One pair of brown cloth gloves.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # Philadelphia 52-7165 SUB S

by SAs KLAUS C. ROHR and JOE R. GINGERICH JRG:rmm Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ANNE GRANT DUNHAM

As previously noted, DUNHAM was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, in the courtyard of St. Paul's Church, 422 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date she was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $20,000 good bail. She was released on September 3, 1971, after posting ten per cent cash or security on a $7,500 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

A search of the fingerprints of ANNE GRAND DUNHAM has failed to disclose prior arrest data in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

At approximately 4:33 a.m. on August 22, 1971 Special Agents THIXTON, BABCOCK, DAVIS, and HARRISON observed a white male and three white females standing against the wall located in Alcove Driveway, east side of St. Paul's Episcopal Church, located across from the U.S. Post Office Building at Fourth and Market Streets, Camden, New Jersey. Unknown white male later identified as BARRY J. MUSI was observed holding a walkie-talkie, which was immediately taken from him by SA THIXTON. A pair of cheap binoculars bearing a strip of adhesive tape with the word "lawnside" written on the tape and a brown tote bag were located near the feet of these four individuals. SA THIXTON identified himself and the other agents present as being Special Agents of the FBI, and advised these four individuals that they were being placed under arrest for conspiracy. The three white females were subsequently identified as being MARGARET MARY INNESS, ANNE GRANT DUNHAM, and JOAN REILLY.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # Philadelphia 52-7165-SUB

SA RONALD G. THIXTON SA RICHARD G. HARRISON
SA ROGER E. BABCOCK
by ~~SA H. HAROLD DAVIS, JR.~~ RGT:mef Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

50

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT

Date 8/24/71

ANNE GRANT DUNHAM was apprehended at approximately 4:35 a.m., as she stood in the east courtyard of Saint Paul's Episcopal Church, 422 Market Street, by HAROLD H. DAVIS, JR., and RICHARD G. HARRISON, who identified themselves as Special Agents of the FBI. DUNHAM was orally advised of certain constitutional rights by SA RICHARD G. HARRISON. Incident to this arrest DUNHAM was given a limited pat down search and two keys were found in her trouser pocket.

DUNHAM was taken to the Federal Building, 401 Market Street by SA RICHARD G. HARRISON for processing. At this location she was again advised of her rights by SA HARRISON, who read to her the form entitled Interrogation; Advice of Rights. DUNHAM was then asked to read the form in the presence of SA LARRY KOPRIVICA, who identified himself as a Special Agent of the FBI. After reading the form, DUNHAM indicated that she understood the content and meaning of the form; however she did not wish to sign the Waiver of Rights section of the Interrogation; Advice of Rights Form, nor did she wish to answer any questions regarding the break-in of the Federal Building at 401 Market Street.

After completion of the interview, DUNHAM voluntarily furnished handwriting and handprinting samples.

DUNHAM was furnished a copy of the inventory, previously signed by her, of the items removed from her person at the time of her arrest.

The remainder of the processing consisted of a strip search, and the fingerprinting and photographing of DUNHAM. This processing was accomplished by various employees of the FBI.

DUNHAM was advised that she could make one telephone call if she so desired. She stated that at the present time she did not desire to make any telephone call.

DUNHAM was escorted to a hearing before U. S. Magistrate

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 100-53227

by SA RICHARD G. HARRISON
SA HAROLD H. DAVIS, JR.
SA LARRY KOPRIVICA RGH/ccc Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CHARLES L. RUDD, District of Camden, N. J., and was thereafter turned over to the U. S. Marshal's Office at Camden, N. J.

The following descriptive information was obtained from observation and furnished voluntarily by DUNHAM during interview:

Name	ANNE GRANT DUNHAM
Race	White
Sex	Female
Date of Birth	5/19/48
Place of Birth	New York City
Height	5'1"
Weight	120 pounds
Build	Stocky
Hair	Brown, length to shoulder blades
Eyes	Blue
Complexion	Medium
Scars and Marks	None noted
Residence	4 West 101st Street New York, N. Y.
Occupation	Unemployed
Father	ARTHUR W. DUNHAM
Age	Approximately 55
Place of Birth	Canada
Occupation	Accountant
Residence	92 First Street, Pelham, N. Y.
Mother	JEANNETTE E. DUNHAM, nee EDWARDS
Age	55
Place of Birth	Connecticut
Residence	Same as father
Brothers	ANTHONY W. DUNHAM, age 25 JOHN E. DUNHAM, age 21 PAUL S. DUNHAM, age 16
Marital Status	Single
Previous Arrests	Admitted, speeding ticket at New York City
Driver's License	In New York, number unknown, lost during mid July 1971
Social Security No.	Does not remember
Local Address	Does not desire to furnish

FATHER PETER DONALD FORDI

As previously noted, FORDI was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, inside the Post Office Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $50,000 good bail. He was released on September 1, 1971, on his own recognizance bond.

A search of the fingerprints of Father PETER DONALD FORDI has failed to disclose prior arrest data in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 23, 1971

At approximately 4:35 a.m., entry was made into the Selective Service Board rooms, Fifth Floor, Federal Courthouse and Post Office, Camden. On entry, seven persons were seen standing in various positions. They were immediately advised that they were under arrest and that they were arrested by Special Agents of the FBI.

Those persons were later identified as PETER DONALD FORDI, MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, ROBERT GLEN GOOD, MICHAEL J. DOYLE, ROSEMARY REILLY, KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI, and ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON. Each person arrested received a preliminary "pat down" search.

After the search, each person was handcuffed and designated for booking and further processing.

At the time of entry and thereafter, it was noted that cabinets had been ripped open; Selective Service documents removed from these; documents were observed to be strewn and torn on the floor of the Conference Room, in mailbags, on the floor of the main Selective Service Office, and strewn about in the gutter area of the ramparts on three sides of the fifth floor roof.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File #PHILADELPHIA 52-7165 Sub S

SA's E. B. ANDERSON, EUGENE S. DESBAULT, JOE R. GINGERICH, DAVID A. MILLER, MASON P. SMITH, THOMAS E. TIERNEY, JOSEPH ZIEL,

by and ROBERT H. WALLER EBA/hcm/klb Date dictated

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 27, 1971

1

At approximately 4:30 a.m., August 22, 1971, Selective Service space and surrounding area located on the fifth floor, U. S. Post Office, 401 Market Street, Camden, N. J., was entered by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. SAs EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT and THOMAS D. TIERNEY entered the immediate area and parapet surrounding the Selective Service office by way of the building fire escape. SAs ROBERT H. WALLER and JOE R. GINGERICH entered the Selective Service office through the front door, which entered onto the fifth floor corridor.

Upon entrance into this space, SAs DEBBAUDT, TIERNEY, WALLER and GINGERICH announced the FBI's presence and instructed everyone to remain as they were until told to do otherwise.

SA JOE R. GINGERICH apprehended PETER DONALD FORDI on the parapet surrounding the fifth floor of the U. S. Post Office. FORDI, at the time of apprehension, was located on the south side of the building approximately adjacent to the center of the Selective Service space proceeding in an easterly direction around the parapet. FORDI was immediately returned to the Selective Service space via a window where he was frisked for weapons with negative results. FORDI was not questioned other than for his name which he refused to give.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # Philadelphia 52-716[illegible]-SUB S

by SA JOE R. GINGERICH:[illegible] Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT

Date 8/24/71

PETER DONALD FORDI, after being placed under arrest by Special Agent JOE R. GINGERICH, while he was in the Selective Service Board, Camden, N.J., was taken into custody by Special Agent EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT. After being taken into custody, FORDI was taken to the fourth floor of the United States Post Office Building, and at that time, Special Agent MICHAEL V. DONOVAN, Jr., entered the room. FORDI was then searched by Special Agent EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT, and taken from FORDI's person were the following articles:

1) A package of Parodi cigars containing three cigars.

2) One pink 3 X 5 card bearing writing, "Poplar 966-2533 (o) 428-1813 (H) 966-1386."

3) One set of ten keys on chain and ring.

4) Four loose keys.

5) Two sticks of Spearmint Gum in package.

6) One blue brush tip pen.

7) One pair brown gloves.

Also found on FORDI's person was eleven cents, one dime and one penny.

FORDI was then presented with an inventory of the above items, which he returned and signed.

FORDI was then told by Special Agents EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT and MICHAEL V. DONOVAN, Jr., that they wished to question him concerning his participation in the theft of Selective Service records from the United States Post Office Building, Camden, N.J. Prior to any questioning, FORDI was advised of his rights as set out in "Interrogation; Advice of Rights Form," which he read but refused

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, N.J. File # NEWARK 52-6817

SA MICHAEL V. DONOVAN, JR., MVD

by SA EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT ESD/mav Date dictated 8/24/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

to sign without his attorney present. FORDI then stated that he did not wish to make any statements to the interviewing agents without his attorney present and the interview was then concluded.

The following background data was obtained through observation and interview:

Name	PETER DONALD FORDI
Address	131 Morning Side Drive New York City, N.Y.
Height	6' tall
Weight	175 pounds
Build	Medium
Hair	Black, balding
Eyes	Hazel, wears glasses
Scars and other identifying marks:	Mustache and long sideburns
Date of Birth	February 19, 1937
Place of Birth	Jersey City, N.J.
Occupation	Jesuit Priest since June of 1969
Military Service	None
Selective Service Board:	New York City

After the background data was obtained, FORDI was photographed by Special Agent MASON P. SMITH. FORDI was then taken to the second floor of the United States Post Office, where he was fingerprinted by Special Agent ALBERT WILLIAM CARROLL. FORDI was then taken to the third floor where he was photographed by WILLIAM J. ANDRIS. FORDI was then returned to the fourth floor of the United States Post Office where he awaited the United States Magistrate's hearing, and while waiting for this hearing, was allowed to make one telephone call. He called telephone number 212-836-8628. FORDI was then taken to the United States Marshall's Office, third floor, where he was allowed to confer with an attorney. Upon completion of the conference, FORDI was taken to the courtroom, located on the third floor for the United States Magistrate's hearing and turned over to the United States Marshall.

KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH

As previously noted, FORSYTH was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, at 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $25,000 good bail. He was released on September 7, 1971, after posting ten per cent cash or security on a $10,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

A search of the fingerprints of KEITH WILLIAM FORSUTH has failed to disclose prior arrest data contained in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

On August 22, 1971, at approximately 4:30 a.m., the below listed agents arrested KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH at the residence of 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J. FORSYTH was arrested in the living room area of that residence.

FORSYTH was advised by SA ROY J. LANE, JR., that he was being arrested for conspiracy in connection with the destruction of Government property. After being advised of the identities of the below listed agents, FORSYTH was orally advised of his Constitutional rights by SA LANE, after which he stated he understood his rights; however, wished to remain silent. Promptly following being advised of his rights, a preliminary search was conducted of his person.

After the preliminary search, FORSYTH was transported to the fourth floor of the Federal Building for booking procedures. Upon reaching the Federal Building, FORSYTH was strip-searched, fingerprinted and photographed.

Review of FORSYTH's personal effects revealed the following items:

1. Pennsylvania driver's license number 16662047.
2. Library card for the Philadelphia Free Library.
3. Membership card for the Recreational Equipment, Inc.
4. Provident National Bank card number 863-681-8.
5. First Pennsylvania Bank card number 372-623-9.
6. Allstate health insurance card number 82-226-488.
7. Selective Service System registration certificate number 33-113-50-229.
8. One tablet of white paper.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165 Sub

by SA ROGER D. CASTERLINE
SA ROY J. LANE, JR. RDC/mmn Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

9. Metal button with inscription "Free all Political Prisoners."

10. Key ring containing six keys.

11. Piece of paper with inscription "Official Challenger."

12. Brown wallet.

13. Six one-dollar bills.

14. Change, including six quarters, seven dimes, four nickels, and three pennies.

The above mentioned items were returned to FORSYTH after being reviewed by the below listed agents.

The two below listed items were held as evidence. FORSYTH was given a property receipt for the items and was advised that the items would not be returned to him, as they would be held as evidence:

1. A 1 1/2" x 2 1/2" white card with the name CARL POPLAR and phone numbers 966-2533 (d) and 428-1813 (N) written on one side.

2. A 3" x 3 1/2" piece of white paper with the handwritten words of "Fire Resistant," "Burgler Resistant," and "Fire Cabinents"; and on the other side, an unidentified drawing.

Upon completion of the booking procedure, FORSYTH was once again advised that he was arrested for conspiracy in connection with the destruction of Government property. After being re-advised of the charge, he was immediately furnished with an "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" form, which clearly set forth his Constitutional rights. After reviewing the "Advice of Rights" form, FORSYTH stated that he completely understood his rights; however, did not wish to sign the form and stated that he wished to remain silent. FORSYTH also stated that he did not wish to furnish handwriting or handprinting samples.

At approximately 12 noon, FORSYTH was turned over to the U. S. Marshal's Office, Federal District of New Jersey, to be held for arraignment by the U. S. Magistrate of that same district.

The following description of FORSYTH was taken through observation and review of his personal effects:

Name	KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH
Race	White
Sex	Male
Date of Birth	March 15, 1950
Place of Birth	Marion, Ohio
Height	6'
Weight	120 pounds
Build	Slender
Hair	Brownish-black (shoulder length)
Eyes	Brown (horn-rimmed glasses)
Selective Service No.	33-113-50-229
Selective Service Board	Local Board 113, 72 South High Street, Akron, Ohio
Draft Status	1-A
Driver's License	Pennsylvania license 16662047
Address	515 Carpenter Lane, Philadelphia, Pa.
Dress	Levi's, light blue short-sleeved sport shirt, brown work shoes
Possible Associate	First Pennsylvania Special Checking Account card dated June 4, 1971, listed in the name of ROBERT E. GROSSMAN, as also residing at 515 Carpenter Lane, Philadelphia, Pa.

MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO

As previously noted, GIOCONDO was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, inside the Post Office Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $25,000 good bail. He was released on September 7, 1971, after posting ten per cent cash or security on a $10,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

A search of the fingerprints of MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO has failed to disclose prior arrest data in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

Date August 24, 1971

At approximately 4:35 a.m., August 22, 1971, Selective Service space and surrounding area located on the fifth floor, U.S. Post Office, 401 Market Street, Camden, N.J., was entered by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Special Agents EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT and THOMAS E. TIERNEY entered the immediate area and parapet surrounding the Selective Service Office by way of the building fire escape. Special Agents ROBERT H. WALLER and JOE R. GINGERICH entered the Selective Service Office through the front door, which entered on to the fifth floor corridor.

Upon entrance into this space, Special Agents DEBBAUDT, TIERNEY, WALLER, and GINGERICH announced the FBI's presence and instructed everyone to remain as they were until told to do otherwise.

Special Agents DEBBAUDT and WALLER immediately placed under arrest three individuals that were located within Selective Service space. A male, later identified as ROBERT G. GOOD, was standing in the area of Local Board #9. A female, later identified as KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI, was standing next to GOOD. A male, later identified as MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, was in the area of Local Board #7. Special Agents DEBBAUDT and WALLER moved these persons to the center of the Selective Service space and had them lie on the floor. No questions were asked of these persons other than their names, which they refused to furnish.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, N.J. File # NEWARK 52-6817

by SA ROBERT H. WALLER(A)
SA EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT ESD/rav Date dictated 8/24/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

D. August 23, 1971

At approximately 4:35 a.m., entry was made into the Selective Service Board rooms, Fifth Floor, Federal Courthouse and Post Office, Camden. On entry, seven persons were seen standing in various positions. They were immediately advised that they were under arrest and that they were arrested by Special Agents of the FBI.

These persons were later identified as PETER DONALD FORDI, MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, ROBERT GLEN GOOD, MICHAEL J. DOYLE, ROSEMARY REILLY, KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI, and ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON. Each person arrested received a preliminary "pat down" search.

After the search, each person was handcuffed and designated for booking and further processing.

At the time of entry and thereafter, it was noted that cabinets had been ripped open; Selective Service documents removed from these; documents were observed to be strewn and torn on the floor of the Conference Room, in mailbags, on the floor of the main Selective Service Office, and strewn about in the gutter area of the ramparts on three sides of the fifth floor roof.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File #PHILADELPHIA 52-7165 Sub S

SA's W. B. ANDERSON, EUGENE S. DERBAULT, JOE R. GINGERICH, DAVID A. MILLER, MASON [illegible]. SMITH, THOMAS E. TIERNEY, JOSEPH ZIEL,

by and ROBERT H. MALLER REA/hma/mlb Date dictated

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

Subsequent to the arrest of MICHAEL J. GIOCONDO on August 22, 1971, in the U. S. Post Office, Camden, N. J., he was taken to a room on the fourth floor of the U. S. Post Office in Camden, N. J. GIOCONDO refused to speak and answer any questions in regards to his name, address, or physical description. During the period of time between the arrest at 4:35 a.m., August 22, 1971, and GIOCONDO's arraignment at 1:10 p.m., on August 22, 1971, he was photographed and fingerprinted by Special Agents of the FBI.

GIOCONDO was also searched by SA DAVID A. MILLER which yielded one pair of brown cloth gloves which GIOCONDO was wearing at the time of his arrest, one 3" x 5" white index card with the following notations:

"1 A, 1-A-O, 1 O, II-S, 1-Y, IV-B,

out, index cards, ledgers", and

one white card, approximately 2" x 3" with the following notations:

"CARL POPLAR, 966-2533, off., 428-1813 home".

The brown cloth gloves and the 3" x 5" index card were retained by SA MILLER and a copy of an Inventory of Items Removed signed by SA DIVID A. MILLER and witnessed by SA H. HAROLD DAVIS, JR., was tendered to GIOCONDO. GIOCONDO refused to sign the Inventory of Items Removed.

At 7:39 a.m., SA DAVID A. MILLER orally advised GIOCONDO of his rights as specified on an "Interrogation: Advice of Rights" form, and at 7:44 a.m., tendered that form to GIOCONDO, which he read, stated he understood, but declined to sign. The "Interrogation: Advice of Rights" form was witnessed by SA DAVID A. MILLER and SA H. HAROLD DAVIS.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165 Sub

by SA DAVID A. MILLER:ms Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

GIOCONDO declined to answer any questions or make any statements to SA MILLER.

At 12:05 p.m., GIOCONDO was taken to the office of the U. S. Marshal in the U. S. Post Office Building, Camden, N. J., where he was temporarily placed in the custody of the U. S. Marshal in order that GIOCONDO could consult with his attorney before arraignment.

At 1:10 p.m., GIOCONDO was taken by SA DAVID A. MILLER for arraignment before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES HUDD and subsequently placed in the custody of the U. S. Marshal.

ROBERT GLENN GOOD

As previously noted, GOOD was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, inside the Post Office Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $50,000 good bail. He was released on September 7, 1971, after posting ten per cent cash or security on a $15,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

A search of the fingerprints of ROBERT GLENN GOOD has failed to disclose prior arrest data in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 24, 1971

At approximately 4:35 a.m., August 22, 1971, Selective Service space and surrounding area located on the fifth floor, U.S. Post Office, 401 Market Street, Camden, N.J., was entered by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Special Agents EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT and THOMAS E. TIERNEY entered the immediate area and parapet surrounding the Selective Service Office by way of the building fire escape. Special Agents ROBERT H. WALLER and JOE R. GINGERICH entered the Selective Service Office through the front door, which entered on to the fifth floor corridor.

Upon entrance into this space, Special Agents DEBBAUDT, TIERNEY, WALLER, and GINGERICH announced the FBI's presence and instructed everyone to remain as they were until told to do otherwise.

Special Agents DEBBAUDT and WALLER immediately placed under arrest three individuals that were located within Selective Service space. A male, later identified as ROBERT G. GOOD, was standing in the area of Local Board #9. A female, later identified as KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI, was standing next to GOOD. A male, later identified as MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, was in the area of Local Board #7. Special Agents DEBBAUDT and WALLER moved these persons to the center of the Selective Service space and had them lie on the floor. No questions were asked of these persons other than their names, which they refused to furnish.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, N.J. File # NEWARK 52-6817

by SA ROBERT H. WALLER(A)
SA EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT ESD/rav Date dictated 8/24/71.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 23, 1971

At approximately 4:35 a.m., entry was made into the Selective Service Board rooms, Fifth Floor, Federal Courthouse and Post Office, Camden. On entry, seven persons were seen standing in various positions. They were immediately advised that they were under arrest and that they were arrested by Special Agents of the FBI.

These persons were later identified as PETER DONALD FORDI, MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, ROBERT GLEN GOOD, MICHAEL J. DOYLE, ROSEMARY REILLY, KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI, and ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON. Each person arrested received a preliminary "pat down" search.

After the search, each person was handcuffed and designated for booking and further processing.

At the time of entry and thereafter, it was noted that cabinets had been ripped open; Selective Service documents removed from these; documents were observed to be strewn and torn on the floor of the Conference Room, in mailbags, on the floor of the main Selective Service Office, and strewn about in the gutter area of the ramparts on three sides of the fifth floor roof.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File #PHILADELPHIA 52-7165 Sub S

A's W. B. ANDERSON, EUGENE S. DEBAULT, JOE R. GINGRICH,
AVID A. MILLER, MASON P. SMITH, THOMAS E. TIERNEY, JOSEPH ZIEL,
by and ROBERT R. MILLER WBA/bim/bib Date dictated

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 25, 1971

SA SHERWOOD, following the arrest of ROBERT GLEN GOOD inside the Selective Service Offices, Fifth Floor, U. S. Post Office Building, assumed custody of GOOD at approximately 4:35 a.m. GOOD was processed in connection with his arrest, which included fingerprinting, photographing, a strip search, and the securing of personal identification information from him.

At about 7:10 a.m., GOOD was furnished an Advice of Rights and Waiver form, which he read, which SA SHERWOOD orally explained to him, and which he declined to sign after stating that he understood his rights as set forth in this form. GOOD stated he did not desire to furnish any information whatsoever.

In connection with the strip search of GOOD and the search of the clothing he was wearing, three items were retained as evidence:

1. One pair of worn soiled brown gloves which GOOD was wearing.
2. One partial roll of black electrician's tape, which was found in the right-hand, front trousers pocket.
3. Two pieces of a knife blade, wrapped in black tape, which were found in GOOD's shirt pocket.

GOOD was furnished a copy of an inventory for these items.

At about 11:20 a.m., GOOD was taken by SA CHAMBERS to the U. S. Marshal's Office, Third Floor, U. S. Post Office Building, at which time he was turned over to the U. S. Marshal for an appearance before Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD. GOOD appeared before Magistrate RUDD at approximately 1:10 p.m.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 100-52641
Philadelphia 52-7165-Sub

by SA'S GEORGE E. SHERWOOD
and ROBERT G. CHAMBERS GES:BSM Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

The following descriptive information was obtained during observation and interview:

Name	ROBERT GLEN GOOD
Date of Birth	June 3, 1949
Place of Birth	Sharon, Pa.
Height	5' 11"
Weight	180 pounds
Build	Medium
Hair	Brown, long and curly
Eyes	Brown
Residence	Claims none.
Occupation	Claims none.
Parents	JOHN and ELIZABETH GOOD, R.D. #1, Sharpsville, Pa.
Brothers	2 - declined to furnish their identities.
Sisters	4 - declined to furnish their identities.
Marital Status	Single
Previous Arrests	Admits one, New York City, N. Y.; declined to furnish circumstances.
Social Security Number	Claimed did not recall.
Selective Service Number	Declined to furnish; however, stated currently classified 1-0.
Local Address	Declined to furnish.
Scars and Marks	Small scar outer corner, right eye.

JOHN PETER GRADY

As previously noted, GRADY was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, at 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $150,000 good bail. He was released on September 7, 1971, after posting a ten per cent cash or security on a $50,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

A search of the fingerprints of JOHN PETER GRADY has failed to disclose prior arrest date contained in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

FD 302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 23, 1971

On August 22, 1971, at approximately 4:32 a.m., SA TERRENCE P. NEIST and SA LAWRENCE KARL YORK went to the door of the residence located at 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J. SA NEIST displayed his credentials to the individual who came to the door. This man was later identified as MILO BILLMAN. SA NEIST announced that he and the others were Special Agents of the FBI and that they were there to execute arrest warrants.

SA JAMES J. FINLEY, SA RICHARD J. BERNES, followed by SA TERRENCE P. NEIST and SA LAWRENCE KARL YORK, then entered the residence, through the open front door and immediately SA FINLEY and SA BERNES entered the front living room located at the right of the hallway on the first floor and observed JOHN PETER GRADY lying on the floor at the west end of the room, near a couch. GRADY was wearing a white T-shirt and dark blue trousers and had no shoes or socks.

SA FINLEY immediately identified himself to GRADY as a Special Agent of the FBI and he informed GRADY that he was under arrest for a violation of Federal law. SA FINLEY and SA BERNES then pulled GRADY to his feet and searched him for weapons. He was then handcuffed by SA NEIST and removed to a Bureau automobile parked directly in front of 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J.

After GRADY was placed in the rear seat of the car, he was advised of the identities of SA LAWRENCE KARL YORK and SA TERRENCE P. NEIST and was again informed by SA YORK that he was under arrest. SA YORK advised GRADY that he was being charged with Conspiracy and was being arrested based on a warrant issued by U. S. Magistrate CHARLES RUDD, Camden, N. J. GRADY's shoes were then brought to him. He was then transported to the U. S. Post Office and Courthouse, 401 Market Street, Camden, N. J. During the ride to the courthouse, GRADY complained that his handcuffs were extremely tight. Upon arrival at the courthouse, the handcuffs were loosened somewhat. During the ride to the U. S. Post Office and Courthouse, GRADY made the statement, "I'm JPG." Upon arrival at the U. S. Post Office and

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7765

SAs RICHARD J. BERNES, JAMES J. FINLEY, TERRENCE P. NEIST, MASON P. SMITH, and LAWRENCE KARL YORK

by LKY/lcw/lsa Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[illegible], GRADY was taken to Room 304, where he was searched.

The following items were taken from GRADY:

1. One Gallet Decimal stopwatch.

2. One gold penknife.

3. One black key case containing four gold keys. The case had a piece of paper taped to the outside with the name "BILL" and an "A" with a circle around it.

4. Two loose keys, one bearing letters "GM."

Several times GRADY asked to be allowed to call his attorney, at which time he was told that he would be able to call his attorney once he was booked and the security of the other FBI personnel was assured. GRADY refused to identify himself and refused to provide any background information about himself whatsoever. GRADY refused to sign the property receipt.

SA NEIST provided GRADY with an "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" form, which GRADY read, and stated that he understood his rights, but declined to sign the waiver form because he wanted to talk to his lawyer. GRADY declined to provide handwriting samples.

At 7:01 a.m., SA MASON P. SMITH appeared at Room 304 and advised GRADY that he was going to take his photograph and asked GRADY, who was seated in a chair, to stand up. GRADY refused to stand up and refused to look up. At that point, SA SMITH again requested GRADY to stand up and he again refused. Agents SMITH and NEIST took GRADY by his arms and lifted him from the chair, at which time GRADY started to struggle. At that instant, SA YORK secured GRADY's right arm and placed a handcuff on his right wrist and then secured GRADY's left wrist and handcuffed him behind his back. As SA SMITH started taking photographs, GRADY started straining and pulling at the handcuffs behind his back and he was heard to grunt and breathe heavily.

Shortly thereafter, GRADY stated that his arm hurt and SA YORK removed the handcuffs, at which time GRADY displayed the inside of his right wrist which revealed a small abrasion or cut which was oozing a small amount of blood.

SA [illegible] got a clean handkerchief and it was applied to the abrasion and the bleeding stopped. SA YORK applied Zephiran-Chloride, from a first aid kit located in Room 3[illegible]. to the abrasion. The rest of the photographs were taken of GRADY without his cooperation.

GRADY was later taken to another room where he was fingerprinted and additional photographs were taken without incident.

At 10:11 a.m., and 11:12 a.m., GRADY made two telephone calls from a pay telephone booth on the third floor of the Post Office Building.

At 12:18 p.m., GRADY was taken before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES RUDD in the U. S. Post Office and Courthouse.

The following description is based upon observation of GRADY:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Age	Approximately 46
Height	Approximately 5'8"
Weight	Approximately 190 lbs.
Build	Heavy
Hair	Dark brown and gray, very curly.
Complexion	Medium
Scars and Marks	None noted.

MARGARET MARY INNESS

As previously noted, INNESS was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, in the courtyard of St. Paul's Church, 422 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date, she was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $5,000 good bail. She was released on September 3, 1971, after posting ten per cent cash or security on a $5,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

At approximately 4:33 a.m. on August 22, 1971 Special Agents THIXTON, BABCOCK, DAVIS, and HARRISON observed a white male and three white females standing against the wall located in Alcove Driveway, east side of St. Paul's Episcopal Church, located across from the U.S. Post Office Building at Fourth and Market Streets, Camden, New Jersey. Unknown white male later identified as BARRY J. MUSI was observed holding a walkie-talkie, which was immediately taken from him by SA THIXTON. A pair of cheap binoculars bearing a strip of adhesive tape with the word "lawnside" written on the tape and a brown tote bag were located near the feet of these four individuals. SA THIXTON identified himself and the other agents present as being Special Agents of the FBI, and advised these four individuals that they were being placed under arrest for conspiracy. The three white females were subsequently identified as being MARGARET MARY INNESS, ANNE GRANT DUNHAM, and JOAN REILLY.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # Philadelphia 52-7165-S

SA RONALD G. THIXTON SA RICHARD G. HARRISON
SA ROGER E. BABCOCK
by ~~SA J. HAROLD DAVIS~~, JR. RGT:mef Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

On August 22, 1971, three unknown females and one unknown male were observed standing, leaning against the east wall of the east alcove of St. Paul's Episcopal Church on Market Street between Fourth and Fifth Streets, Camden, N. J. The unknown male was standing on the extreme south end of said three females and was holding a walkie-talkie type radio. All of the above individuals were told the identity of the arresting officers (FBI) and that they were under arrest.

The unknown female standing next to the unknown male was wearing a blue T-shirt, levis and moccasins, weighing approximately 165 pounds, 5'8" to 5'9" tall, below shoulder length hair, wore glasses and appeared to be in her late 20s. She was shown the credentials of the arresting officer, Special Agent ROGER E. BABCOCK and told she was under arrest for conspiracy. Said unknown female was asked to identify herself, and she so identified herself as MARGARET INNESS, 565 Hyde Park Avenue, Roslindale, Mass. Subject INNESS was told she had the right to remain silent and did not have to answer any incriminating questions. Subject stated she would not answer any further questions without her lawyer. She was asked if counsel had been retained by her, and she answered, "yes" but stated she did not know his name.

In Room 506 of the U. S. Post Office, Fourth and Market Streets, Camden, N. J., subject was again orally explained the right of silence and counsel. The arresting Agent was joined by SA FLORILIS DAVIS and subject was asked to empty her pockets.

The following property was seized and a receipt given to subject, which she duly signed:

In subject's left pocket:

One cigarette pack holder, pale green containing one pack of Parliament cigarettes, eight single dollar bills

---

SUB S

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165

REB

by SA ROGER E. BABCOCK
SA FLORILIS DAVIS/W REB:klw Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

and a Commonwealth of Massachusetts driver's license number 017387913.

In subject's right pocket:

Four single dollar bills, five quarters. seven nickels. four dimes, and 12 pennies: one cylinder type cigarette lighter; one black comb; one Parliarment cigarette filter tip.

Around subject's neck a black metal cross on a black string.

Total monies seized $14.12.

The following items were immediately returned to INNESS:

One black comb and a pack of Parliarment cigarettes.

The pale green cigarette pack holder is designated #1 and is imprinted on the front with the letter "C" in silver. Inside on the front flap the following names were written in blue ink:

"LORETTA" with the number"893-6008"; "FLYM" with the number "492-5093"; the Massachusetts driver's license is designated #2 and contains the following information:

License number 017387913, expiration date November 6, 1974, name INNESS MARGARET M., 118 Alcott Road, East Falmouth, date of birth November 6, 1944, and contained the signature and picture of subject thereon.

The cigarette lighter is assigned #3 and is of the cylinder type with a red body, gold ends and named"Dispozalite"; the black metal cross with black string is designated #4 and the Parliarment filter tip is assigned #5.

The subject was stripped searched in the womens restroom, fifth floor by FBI Clerk TRUDY CROUTHARMEL. Miss CROUTHARMEL noted no weapons or evidence on the person or in the clothing of subject.

Subject was then read a copy of the "Advice of Rights" form and furnished a copy of said from to read herself. Subject stated she understood her rights and the charge against her but would not waive her rights and talk to the interviewing Agents. She stated she would not discuss either the charge or reason for her being in the east alcove along with three other individuals across from the Post Office at 4:20 a.m., on the 22nd of August 1971.

Subject was taken to Room 314. U. S. Post Office, for the U. S. Magistrate's hearing on bail and was turned over to the U. S. Marshal pending $5,000 bail. Subject is described as follows:

Name:	MARGARET MARY INNESS
Date of birth:	11/6/44
Address:	118 Alcott Road, East Falmouth, Mass., (former address) 565 Hyde Park Avenue, Roslindale, Mass. (present address)
Sex:	Female
Race:	White
Height:	5'8" to 5'9"
Weight:	Approximately 165 pounds
Build:	Heavy
Hair:	Brown - below shoulder length
Eyes:	Brown
Miscellaneous:	Wears thick glass lenses

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

The following FBI record, NUMBER 849 215 H, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. WHERE FINAL DISPOSITION IS NOT SHOWN OR FURTHER EXPLANATION OF CHARGE IS DESIRED, COMMUNICATE WITH AGENCY CONTRIBUTING THOSE FINGERPRINTS:

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
Metropolitan PD Wash DC	Margaret, Mary Inness #243859	4-25-71	Violation Police Lines	
FBI Newark NJ	Margaret Mary Inniss #----	8-22-71	Conspiracy	

61

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

FRANCIS MEL MADDEN

As previously noted, MADDEN was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, at 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was released on $5,000 own recognizance bond.

A search of the fingerprints of FRANCIS MEL MADDEN has failed to disclose prior arrest data contained in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA

As previously noted, MOCCIA was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, at 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date she was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $10,000 good bail. She was released on August 23, 1971, after posting $1,000 cash on a $10,000 bond.

A search of the fingerprints of LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA has failed to disclose prior arrest data contained in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

Subsequently, this female was transported to the Federal Building in Camden, N.J., for fingerprinting and photographing.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/24/71

LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA was advised of the identities of MICHAEL H. RYMAN and WALTER J. MC DONALD, JR., Special Agents of the FBI. She was advised of her rights and furnished the form "Your Rights" which she read, stated she understood, but refused to sign.

MOCCIA stated that she desired to make no statement but furnished the following information:

Name	LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA
Sex	Female
Race	White
Date of birth	June 5, 1950
Place of birth	Chelsea, Mass.
Height	5'5"
Weight	160 pounds
Build	Heavy
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Residence	2962 Decatur Avenue Bronx, N. Y.
Scars, marks, or other identifying characteristics	Four inch cut scar on underarm between left forearm and wrist

At the time of interview LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA was given a receipt for items seized from her at the time of her arrest. These items are the following:

1. 1 - business card of RICHARD HUGHES, Photographer, Thorofare, N. J.
2. 1 - 3" x 3" white card with various notations in ink on which appeared "MILO BILLMAN, 21 North Fourth Street" and "CARL POPLAR, 966-2533 and 428-1818 (N)."

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165 [illegible]

by SAs WALTER J. MC DONALD, JR., and
MICHAEL H. RYMAN, and MHR/tac
[illegible]

Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

3. 1 - one half of a business card with inked impressions on both sides, one of which is "ASHOK DAVAR, 311 South 22nd Street, Philadelphia, Pa. - 732-8589." (MOCCIA stated that she does not believe this item was on her possession at time of arrest.)

4. 1 - tan plastic keycase with taped piece of paper with the following printing: "VW white red" on outside and one Volkswagen key bearing number 66K072. The following number appeared inside the keycase: 749-8860.

LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA refused to sign the receipt for the above items. However, she was given a copy of the receipt.

BARRY JAMES MUSI

As previously noted, MUSI was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, in the courtyard of St. Paul's Church, 422 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $5,000 good bail. He was released on September 7, 1971, after posting ten per cent cash or security on a $5,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

At approximately 4:33 a.m. on August 22, 1971 Special Agents THIXTON, BABCOCK, DAVIS, and HARRISON observed a white male and three white females standing against the wall located in Alcove Driveway, east side of St. Paul's Episcopal Church, located across from the U.S. Post Office Building at Fourth and Market Streets, Camden, New Jersey. Unknown white male later identified as BARRY J. MUSI was observed holding a walkie-talkie, which was immediately taken from him by SA THIXTON. A pair of cheap binoculars bearing a strip of adhesive tape with the word "lawnside" written on the tape and a brown tote bag were located near the feet of these four individuals. SA THIXTON identified himself and the other agents present as being Special Agents of the FBI, and advised these four individuals that they were being placed under arrest for conspiracy. The three white females were subsequently identified as being MARGARET MARY INNESS, ANNE GRANT DUNHAM, and JOAN REILLY.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # Philadelphia 52-7165-SUB S

by SA RONALD G. THIXTON, SA RICHARD G. HARRISON
SA ROGER E. BABCOCK
~~SA H. HAROLD DAVIS, JR.~~ RGT:mef Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

75

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA[illegible]

Date 8/23/71

At approximately [illegible]:33 a.m. on August 22, 1971 Special Agents THIXTON, BABCOCK, DAVIS, and HARRISON observed a white male and three white females standing against the wall located in Alcove Driveway, east side of St. Paul's Episcopal Church, located across from the U.S. Post Office Building at Fourth and Market Streets, Camden, New Jersey. Unknown white male later identified as BARRY J. MUSI was observed holding a walkie-talkie, which was immediately taken from him by SA THIXTON. A pair of cheap binoculars bearing a strip of adhesive tape with the word "Lawnside" written on the tape and a brown tote bag were located near the feet of these four individuals. SA THIXTON identified himself and the other agents present as being Special Agents of the FBI, and advised these four individuals that they were being placed under arrest for conspiracy. The three white females were subsequently identified as being MARGARET MARY INNESS, ANNE GRANT DUNHAM, and JOAN REILLY.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # Philadelphia 52-7165-

SA RONALD G. THIXTON SA RICHARD G. HARRISON
SA ROGER E. BABCOCK
by ~~SA H. HAROLD DAVIS, JR.~~ RGT:mef Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

75

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/24/71

BARRY JAMES MUSI was apprehended at approximately 4:35 a.m., as he stood in the east courtyard of Saint Paul's Church, 422 Market Street. MUSI was orally advised of his constitutional rights as contained in the standard Advice of Rights Form (FD-395), by SA JOHN H. STODDARD, JR., who identified himself as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

MUSI was taken to the U. S. Federal Building, 401 Market Street, for processing. At this location, he was again apprised of his rights by SA STODDARD, and he was given the opportunity to read the form entitled, "Interrogation; Advice of Rights", (FD-395). MUSI was requested to read a portion of this form aloud, however he declined to do so. MUSI admitted that he understood the meaning and content of the form, and he said that he did not want to make a statement or answer any questions until he had the opportunity to consult an attorney.

It was acknowledged that MUSI had this right, and it was explained to him that he would not be questioned concerning any criminal activity in which he might be engaged, however it was further explained to him that he would be questioned concerning background information.

The following information was obtained from observation and interview:

Name	BARRY JAMES MUSI
Sex	Male
Race	White
Date of Birth	9/9/48
Place of Birth	Cambridge, Massachusetts
Height	5' 9"
Weight	150 pounds
Build	Slender
Hair	Dark Brown
Eyes	Hazel
Facial Features	Full beard and mustache

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File # PH 52-7165 SUB S

by SA JOHN H. STODDARD, JR. AND
SA [illegible] MARVIN [illegible] /adb Date dictated 8/22/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

76

Scars and Marks	½" diameter circular scar on left shoulderblade. Numerous large freckles on shoulders and upper back.
Address	703 Washington Street Dorchester, Massachusetts
Driver's License	Commonwealth of Massachusetts #032351434, in the name of BARRY J. MUSI, 25 Simmons Avenue, Belmont, Massachusetts
Marital Status	Married - Declined to identify spouse.

MUSI declined to volunteer any other information regarding previous arrests, Social Security Number, Selective Service Number or draft status. He was not in possession of a Selective Service Draft Card.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

Subsequent to the arrest of BARRY JAMES MUSI, he was taken to the U. S. Federal Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, New Jersey, for processing.

MUSI was fingerprinted by SA MICHAEL DONOVAN.

He was photographed by SA WILLIAM J. ANDRES.

MUSI was searched by SAS JOHN H. STODDARD, JR., and TOBY MARVIN HARDING, and the following items were confiscated:

1. One (1) Commonwealth of Massachusetts Driver's License #03236M434 in the name of BARRY J. MUSI.

2. One (1) Lark Cigarette package bearing a Massachusetts tax stamp.

3. One (1) Electrical connector.

The latter item was found in the trouser pocket of MUSI.

An inventory listing the above items was prepared, and MUSI was requested to sign the inventory as a certification that these were the only items taken. He declined to do so. A copy of the inventory was then given to MUSI.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File # PH 52-7165 SUB S

by SA JOHN H. STODDARD, JR. AND SA TOBY MARVIN HARDING /rdb Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[illegible] BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

The following FBI record, NUMBER 909 100 H , is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. WHERE FINAL DISPOSITION IS NOT SHOWN OR FURTHER EXPLANATION OF CHARGE IS DESIRED, COMMUNICATE WITH AGENCY CONTRIBUTING THOSE FINGERPRINTS.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
PD Belmont, Mass	Barry James Musi #—	3-28-66	Breaking, Entering Building and Larceny	4-7-66 gu of L in bld prob unti
FBI Newark NJ	Barry James Musi #—	8-22-71	conspiracy	

77

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JOAN MARIE REILLY

As previously noted, REILLY was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, in the courtyard of St. Paul's Church, 422 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date she was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was released on $10,000 own recognizance bond.

A search of the fingerprints of JOAN MARIE REILLY has failed to disclose prior arrest data contained in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

At approximately 4:33 a.m. on August 22, 1971 Special Agents THIXTON, BABCOCK, DAVIS, and HARRISON observed a white male and three white females standing against the wall located in Alcove Driveway, east side of St. Paul's Episcopal Church, located across from the U.S. Post Office Building at Fourth and Market Streets, Camden, New Jersey. Unknown white male later identified as [illegible] was observed holding a walkie-talkie, which was immediately taken from him by SA THIXTON. A pair of cheap binoculars bearing a strip of adhesive tape with the word "lawnside" written on the tape and a brown tote bag were located near the feet of these four individuals. SA THIXTON identified himself and the other agents present as being Special Agents of the FBI, and advised these four individuals that they were being placed under arrest for conspiracy. The three white females were subsequently identified as being MARGARET MARY INNESS, ANNE CRANE DUNHAM, and JOAN REILLY.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # Philadelphia 52-7165-SUB S

by SA RONALD G. THIXTON, SA RICHARD G. HARRISON
SA ROGER E. BABCOCK
~~SA [illegible] DAVIS, JR.~~ RGT:mef Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

8/23/71

At approximately 4:33 a.m. on August 22, 1971 Special Agents THIXTON, BABCOCK, DAVIS, and HARRISON observed a white male and three white females standing against the wall located in Alcove Driveway, east side of St. Paul's Episcopal Church, located across from the U.S. Post Office Building at Fourth and Market Streets, Camden, New Jersey. Unknown white male later identified as BARRY J. MUSI was observed holding a walkie-talkie, which was immediately taken from him by SA THIXTON. A pair of cheap binoculars bearing a strip of adhesive tape with the word "lawnside" written on the tape and a brown tote bag were located near the feet of these four individuals. SA THIXTON identified himself and the other agents present as being Special Agents of the FBI, and advised these four individuals that they were being placed under arrest for conspiracy. The three white females were subsequently identified as being MARGARET MARY INNESS, ANNE GRANT DUNHAM, and JOAN REILLY.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # Philadelphia 52-7165-SUB S

SA RONALD G. THIXTON SA RICHARD G. HARRISON
SA ROGER E. BABCOCK
by ~~SA H. HAROLD DAVIS, JR.~~ RGT:mef Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August [illegible], 1971

SA WILLIAM J. SKARBEK took custody of JOAN MARY REILLY inside the [illegible] leading to the courtyard of St. Paul's [illegible] on the [illegible] side of Market Street between [illegible] and [illegible], Camden, N. J. At the time of arrival at the scene, SA SKARBEK noted the presence of three additional [illegible] in addition to REILLY who were subsequently identified as [illegible], [illegible], and [illegible]. SA SKARBEK, upon taking custody of REILLY, advised her of his identity as a Special Agent of the FBI verbally and by a show of credentials. SA SKARBEK also advised her that she was under arrest on the charge of conspiracy. SA SKARBEK preliminarily searched REILLY and found a Social Security Card and a New York driver's license disclosing her identity as JOAN MARY REILLY. SA SKARBEK asked her identity and she responded JOAN MARY REILLY.

REILLY was then taken to the U. S. Post Office Building, Camden, N. J., for processing. SA RICHARD A. MAZZEO joined SA SKARBEK during processing. The following background information was obtained from REILLY:

Name	JOAN MARY REILLY
Address	335 Windsor Avenue, Brightwaters, N. Y.
Sex	Female
Race	White
Date of Birth	April 10, 1951
Place of Birth	Rockville Centre, N. Y.
Height	5'6"
Weight	120 pounds
Build	Slender
Hair	Light brown - long
Eyes	Blue
Scars	"V" shape scar inside left ring finger
Social Security No.	082-38-0042
Occupation	Student entering junior year, Marymount College, Tarrytown, N. Y. (attended since Sept. 1969)

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165 Sub

by SA WILLIAM J. SKARBEK and
SA RICHARD A. MAZZEO WJS/lsa Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Employment	Part-time (summers) Previous Summer, Town of Islip Recreation [illegible] [illegible] (last four years - [illegible])
Father	JOHN TEMPLE REILLY, 335 Windsor Avenue, Brightwaters, L. I., born August 21, 1919 (?) in New York.
Mother	ROSEMARY REILLY, nee MURPHY, same address, born October 14, 1922 (?) in New York.
Brother	JOHN TIMOTHY REILLY, same address, born April 11, 1956, at Bay Shore, N. Y.
Sisters	1. ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY (no permanent address known), born June 3, 1949, at Rockville Centre, N. Y. 2. ELIZABETH ANN REILLY, same address as parents, born July 8, 1953, at Rockville Centre, N. Y.
Marital Status	Single
Children	None
Previous Arrests	None admitted
Driver's License	N.Y. #R05321-84952-642733-51
Vehicle	None
Local Address	Did not know specific address and refused to identify owner of residence

A thorough search of REILLY's person was made and the following items were found in REILLY's pockets:

1. One 3" x 5" card with times 11:02 through 11:20 and writing.
2. One 3" x 5" card with writing beginning, "You've got to be taught..."

3. One 4" x 6" card with writing beginning, "I'm going to wash..."

4. One 4" x 6" card with writing beginning, "If I asked you...."

5. One 3" x 5" card with writing beginning, "[illegible] Syra[illegible]..."

6. One 3" x 5" card with writing beginning, "Hey U..."

7. One torn piece of 3" x 5" card with name CARL POPLAR with writing on back beginning, "Some enchanted...." .

8. One torn piece of 3" x 5" card with name "CARL POPLAR with writing in back beginning, "Across a crowded room..."

9. One plastic wallet ID folder containing:

   a. One blank ID card.
   b. One N.Y. driver's license #R05321-84952-642733-51 in name JOAN REILLY, 335 Windsor Avenue, Brightwaters, N. Y.
   c. One Social Security Card #082-38-0042 in name of JOAN MARY REILLY.
   d. One United Airlines 12-21 Club Card #A785203 in name of JOAN REILLY.

Xeroxed copies of the above listed items are attached hereto.

TRUDY A. CROUTHARMEL, FBI employee, strip searched REILLY and nothing of an evidentiary nature was found by CROUTHARMEL. REILLY signed a receipt for the items seized and a copy of this receipt was furnished to REILLY by SA SKARBEK. Each item seized was numbered and dated by SA SKARBEK and SA MAZZEO.

SA SKARBEK handed REILLY an "Interrogation; Advice of Rights Form" to read which she did. SA SKARBEK explained these rights to REILLY. REILLY advised she understood her

80A

rights, declined to execute the waiver portion of the form, and refused to furnish any information or statement related to this matter or any other [illegible] whatever.

REILLY was fingerprinted by SA MICHAEL V. DONOVAN and photographed by SA WILLIAM J. ANDRIS.

SA SHARBEK advised REILLY she was permitted one telephone call and she called CARL D. POPLAR at 428-1813, address 44 Treaty Lane, Haddonfield, N. J.

REILLY was then turned over to the U. S. Marshal, Camden, N. J.

When REILLY attempted to call CARL D. POPLAR at 428-1813, she stated on the telephone, "he doesn't know me, but tell him I'm trying to get in touch with him."

94

5

11:02} 2 West Market
11:05} 3 [illegible] W [illegible]
11:10} 3 2 West on Cooper
11:15 { 12 S 4th
} 12 W Cooper
11:20} 2 W Cooper
2 2 W broadway

#1
WGB
8/22/71

Youve
got
to
be
taught

to
hate
and
fear

You've
got to
be taught
from

year
to
year

#2
WGB
8/22/71

w/g 5/22/71

I'm going to wash that man right out of my hair

bali hai

may call you

I've been in my life going driving from the west down to the east.

If I asked you to dance with me would you?

Remember Cafe

do u want
do u want
do u want
do u want
do u want to dance

[illegible]

I think I love you

remember its code in

was it ever in my hands

w/g 5/22/71

51

1/5 TYn 4 80

Are you sure
you have this.

and
not this
particular one
but
when it was
out of your
hand & it wasn't
later than you
thought.

Words & words
are all I have
to steal your
heart away and

#5
WPB
8/22/71



key U.,
man killed
janis joplin



#6
WPB
8/22/71

(I think this was
missing in the
information
they sent, but
I've forgot [illegible]
to give it too.

Carl Poplar

966-2533 (D)

428-1813 (N)

#7
WGS
8/22/71

Carl Poplar

966-2533 (D)

428-1813 (N)

Some enchanted
evening, you
will see a
stranger ...

#50
WP
8/23/71

Across a crowded
room *
Too bad it's not
the South Pacific

91

#9a

w 98
8/20/71

Bond Street Ltd

50 EAST 53RD STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

MANUFACTURERS OF
STYLED PURSE ACCESSORIES AND LEATHER GOODS

[illegible] REQUIRED TO [illegible] THIS LICENSE TO [illegible]

TYPE OF MOTOR VEHICLE FOR WHICH CHAUFFEUR LICENSE REQUIRED	MAY BE DRIVEN LEGALLY BY CHAUFFEUR WITH THIS CLASS OF LICENSE
Truck - trailer combinations (truck MGW over 18,000 lbs. and trailer MGW over 6,000 lbs.)	1
Tractor - trailer combinations	1
Buses	1, 2
Trucks with MGW over 18,000 lbs.	1, 2, 3
Taxicabs	1, 2, 3, Unclassified

ADDRESS CHANGE

IF ADDRESS IS CHANGED YOU MUST CROSS OUT OLD ADDRESS AND ENTER NEW ADDRESS IN THIS SPACE. [illegible] NOTIFY THIS DEPARTMENT OF EACH ADDRESS CHANGE WITHIN 10 DAYS ON FORM MV-232.

CHAUFFEUR LICENSE

ATTACH PHOTOGRAPH HERE

Photograph must be taken within 30 days prior to date of filing and must be the same size as this space. Picture must be a true likeness and must show only neck, shoulders, and uncovered head.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE PERSON NAMED AND DESCRIBED [illegible]

VINCENT L. TOFANY
COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES

MV-2 C (2/70) PART 1

WHEN RENEWING THIS LICENSE APPLICANT MUST RECORD ALL CONVICTIONS FOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS [illegible]

Date of Violation	Court	Date of Conviction	[illegible]	Court and Location

#9b
w98
8/20/71

Identification Card

Name ______________________

Street ______________________

City ______________________

I.D. No. ______________________



R05321 64952 642733-51

4/30/51 F 5 5 BL

DATE OF BIRTH SEX HT EYES

CLASS 9/30/73 EXPIRES

OPERATOR
LICENSE

REILLY, JOAN
335 WINDSOR AV
BRIGHTWATERS NY

RESTRICTIONS:

Signature

STATE OF NEW YORK
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES

MV-2 (2.72) VOID IF ALTERED EXCEPT FOR CHANGE OF ADDRESS

PART 1, LICENSE

R05321 64952 642733-51

4/30/51 F 5 5 BL

DATE OF BIRTH SEX HT EYES

CLASS 9/30/73 EXPIRES

OP
NOT A LICENSE

REILLY, JOAN
335 WINDSOR AV
BRIGHTWATERS NY

RESTRICTIONS:

Signature Joan Reilly

STATE OF NEW YORK.
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES

MV-2 (2.72) VOID IF ALTERED EXCEPT FOR CHANGE OF ADDRES

PART 2, RECORD OF CONVICTIONS FOR RENEWAL, NOT A LICENSE.



092-30-0042

Joan Mary Reilly



United Air Lines

12 CLUB

VALID UNTIL

JAN [illegible]

Joan Reilly

[illegible]

United Air Lines

▷ Joan Reilly

YOUTH FARE CARD — A 785208

[illegible]

94.

ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY

As previously noted, REILLY was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, inside the Post Office Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date she was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $25,000 good bail. She was released on September 3, 1971, after posting ten per cent cash or security on a $10,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

A search of the fingerprints of ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY has failed to disclose prior arrest data contained in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/24/71

At approximately 4:35 a.m., August 22, 1971, the Selective Service space and surrounding area located on the 5th floor, U. S. Post Office, 401 Market Street, Camden, New Jersey, was entered by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. SAS EUGENE S. DERBAUDT and THOMAS E. TIERNEY entered the immediate area and parapet surrounding the Selective Service Office by way of the building fire escape. SAS ROBERT H. WALLER and JOE R. GINGERICH entered the Selective Service Office through the front door, which entered onto the 5th floor corridor.

Upon entrance into this space, SAS DERBAUDT and TIERNEY, WALLER and GINGERICH announced the FBI's presence and instructed everyone to remain as they were until told to do otherwise.

Two individuals who were later identified as ROSEMARY E. REILLY and ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON were observed by SA TIERNEY as they were sitting on the parapet on the north side of the building between the wall surrounding the parapet and an open window of the Selective Service Office. When observed, they were sitting among Selective Service records which had been piled on the parapet. SA TIERNEY placed them under arrest and assisted them in through a window into the Selective Service Office where they were told to lie on the floor. No questions were asked of them except their names.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File # PHILADELPHIA 52-7165 Sub

by SA THOMAS E. TIERNEY/mlb Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 23, 1971

At approximately 4:35 a.m., entry was made into the Selective Service Board rooms, Fifth Floor, Federal Courthouse and Post Office, Camden. On entry, seven persons were seen standing in various positions. They were immediately advised that they were under arrest and that they were arrested by Special Agents of the FBI.

These persons were later identified as PETER DONALD FORDI, MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, ROBERT GLEN GOOD, MICHAEL J. DOYLE, ROSEMARY REILLY, KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI, and ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON. Each person arrested received a preliminary "pat down" search.

After the search, each person was handcuffed and designated for booking and further processing.

At the time of entry and thereafter, it was noted that cabinets had been ripped open; Selective Service documents removed from these; documents were observed to be strewn and torn on the floor of the Conference Room, in mailbags, on the floor of the main Selective Service Office, and strewn about in the gutter area of the ramparts on three sides of the fifth floor roof.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File # PHILADELPHIA 52-7165 Sub S

SA's W. B. ANDERSON, EUGENE S. DEBBAULT, JOE R. GINGERICH, DAVID A. MILLER, MASON P. SMIT , THOMAS E. TIERNEY, JOSEPH ZILL,

by and ROBERT H. WALLER WBA/bsm/mlb Date dictated

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/24/71

During a preliminary search of ROSEMARY REILLY in the Selective Service Office, Camden, New Jersey, a 3 X 5 card bearing the following information was obtained from her pocket:

Side Number One

IA
IAO
10
II-S
I-Y
IV-B

Also the words "Index Cards", "Ledgers" and the word "out" which was written beside IV-B.

Side Number 2

The name "CARL POPLAR" and the numbers 966-2533 and 428-1813. Also the name "MILO" and the number 966-1386.

The above item is designated #1 and was obtained by SAS PHILIP F. SNODGRASS and THOMAS E. TIERNEY.

At the direction of SA THOMAS E. TIERNEY, Stenographer TRUDY CROUTHARMEL, FBI, Philadelphia, conducted a strip-search of ROSEMARY E. REILLY in Room 426, U. S. Post Office Building, Camden, New Jersey, and obtained the following described item, which is designated #2:

One prescription form bearing the imprinted names of Dr. HARRY BONIER and Dr. W. A. ANDERSON, 602-4 Broadway, Camden, New Jersey. The number 662-2603 was written on the face of this form in ink.

The reverse side of this form bore the name "CARL POPLAR" and the numbers 966-2533 and 428-1813 were written in red on the back of the form.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File # PHILADELPHIA 52-7165 Sub S

by SAS PHILIP F. SNODGRASS and THOMAS E. TIERNEY TET/clb Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

PH 52-7165 Sub S

2

At 5:21 a.m., ROSEMARY E. REILLY was orally advised of her rights by SA THOMAS E. TIERNEY in Room 426, U.S. Post Office Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, N.J.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/24/71

At 7:48 a.m., ROSEMARY E. REILLY was furnished with a form entitled "Interrogation; Advice of Rights", which she read and refused to sign. REILLY said that she would not answer questions concerning the incident at the Camden Draft Board without first consulting with an attorney. She did furnish the following descriptive data:

Name	ROSEMARY ELIZABETH REILLY
Date of birth	June 3, 1949
Place of birth	Long Island, New York
Height	5' 7" tall
Weight	145 pounds
Build	Medium to heavy
Hair	Dark brown
Eyes	Blue
Scars and marks	Pock marks on both sides of face
Residence	210 West 107th Street, New York, N. Y.
Occupation	None claimed
Parents	Not willing to furnish this informatio
Brothers & sisters	Not willing to furnish this informatio
Spouse	None claimed
Children	None claimed
Previous arrests	None claimed
Driver's license	None claimed
Social Security #	082-38-0044
Local address	Stays locally with MIKE GIOCONDO, Cooper Street, Camdn, N. J.
Education	1967-68, Newton College of the Sacred Heart, Newton, Mass. 1968-69, Maryville College of the Sacred Heart, St. Louis, Mo. 1969-70, Marymount College, Manhatten, New York

---

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File #PHILADELPHIA 52-7165 Sub

by SAS THOMAS E. TIERNEY and WILLIAM J. MC MULLIN TET/rlb Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI

As previously noted, RIDOLFI was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, inside the Post Office Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date she was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $25,000 good bail. She was released on September 3, 1971, after posting a ten per cent cash or security on a $10,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3,1971.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

August 24, 1971

At approximately 4:35 a.m., August 22, 1971, Selective Service space and surrounding area located on the fifth floor, U.S. Post Office, 401 Market Street, Camden, N.J., was entered by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Special Agents EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT and THOMAS E. TIERNEY entered the immediate area and parapet surrounding the Selective Service Office by way of the building fire escape. Special Agents ROBERT H. WALLER and JOE R. GINGERICH entered the Selective Service Office through the front door, which entered on to the fifth floor corridor.

Upon entrance into this space, Special Agents DEBBAUDT, TIERNEY, WALLER, and GINGERICH announced the FBI's presence and instructed everyone to remain as they were until told to do otherwise.

Special Agents DEBBAUDT and WALLER immediately placed under arrest three individuals that were located within Selective Service space. A male, later identified as ROBERT G. GOOD, was standing in the area of Local Board #9. A female, later identified as KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI, was standing next to GOOD. A male, later identified as MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, was in the area of Local Board #7. Special Agents DEBBAUDT and WALLER moved these persons to the center of the Selective Service space and had them lie on the floor. No questions were asked of these persons other than their names, which they refused to furnish.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, N.J. File # NEWARK 52-6817

SA ROBERT H. WALLER(A)

by SA EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT ESD/rav Date dictated 8/24/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 23, 1971

At approximately 4:35 a.m., entry was made into the Selective Service Board rooms, Fifth Floor, Federal Courthouse and Post Office, Camden. On entry, seven persons were seen standing in various positions. They were immediately advised that they were under arrest and that they were arrested by Special Agents of the FBI.

Those persons were later identified as PETER DONALD FORDI, MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, ROBERT GLEN GOOD, MICHAEL J. DOYLE, ROSEMARY REILLY, KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI, and ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON. Each person arrested received a preliminary "pat down" search.

After the search, each person was handcuffed and designated for booking and further processing.

At the time of entry and thereafter, it was noted that cabinets had been ripped open; Selective Service documents removed from these; documents were observed to be strewn and torn on the floor of the Conference Room, in mailbags, on the floor of the main Selective Service Office, and strewn about in the gutter area of the ramparts on three sides of the fifth floor roof.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File # PHILADELPHIA 52-7165 Sub S

SA's W. B. ANDERSON, EUGENE S. DeRBAULT, JOE R. GINGERICH,
DAVID A. MILLER, MASON P. SMITH, THOMAS E. TIERNEY, JOSEPH ZIEL,
by and ROBERT H. MILLER [illegible]/bcm/mlb Date dictated

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

KATHLEEN [illegible] RIDOLFI was arrested in the offices of Selective Service Local Boards 7, 8, 9, located on the 5th floor of the United States Post Office (USPO) Building at approximately [illegible] a.m., by Special Agents THOMAS E. TIERNEY and EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT. RIDOLFI was handcuffed by SA TIERNEY, and she remained in the custody of SA's DEBBAUDT and TIERNEY until approximately 4:55 a.m., at which time she was turned over to the custody of SA PHILIP F. SNODGRASS. At the time she was in the custody of SA's DEBBAUDT and TIERNEY, she was searched by SA DEBBAUDT, and three articles were removed from her person, including two 3" x 5" cards and one "Flair" pen.

Once she was in the custody of SA SNODGRASS, she was taken to Room #418, in the Post Office Building, and remained there in the custody of SA SNODGRASS. SA SNODGRASS orally advised RIDOLFI of her rights, as they appear on the "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" form. After reading the form to her, she advised that she understood her rights but did not wish to execute the form or furnish any information to SA SNODGRASS regarding her arrest or the circumstances surrounding it.

RIDOLFI remained in the custody of SA SNODGRASS until approximately 5:58 a.m., at which time SA's JAMES R. MOATS and ROBERT C. BLUNT entered Room #418 and replaced SA SNODGRASS for the purpose of interviewing RIDOLFI. She was fully advised of the SA's identities and of their official position and that the interview would concern her arrest in the Selective Service office and the circumstances surrounding it. She was orally advised of her rights as they are set forth on an "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" form by SA MOATS. After reading the form to her, she was offered the form to read, and she indicated that she fully understood her rights but did not wish to sign the form. She further indicated that she did not wish to discuss the matter with the Special Agents. RIDOLFI remained in the custody of SA's MOATS and BLUNT until approximately 6:15 a.m., when she was taken to the second floor of the Post Office, at which time she was fingerprinted and photographed. After this,

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165

by SA's EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT, THOMAS E. TIERNEY, PHILIP F. SNODGRASS, ROBERT C. BLUNT, and JAMES R. MOATS Date dictated 8/23/71

JJK:dmd

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

she was returned to Room 418 and, there, was strip-searched by Miss [illegible] A. CROUTHAMEL, Stenographer, Philadelphia Division, FBI. [illegible], RIDOLFI remained in Room 418 in the custody of SA's [illegible] and [illegible] until approximately 12:15 p.m., at which time she was taken to the United States Marshal's (USM) office on the [illegible] floor of the Post Office. During the time she was in the custody of SA's HOATS and BLUNT, she was requested to give handwriting samples to the SA's, after she had been advised of her right to refuse to do so. She advised the SA's that she did not wish to furnish the samples. Also, at various times throughout the morning, RIDOLFI requested to use the rest room and to get a drink of water. All of her requests were complied with, and she was always accompanied by Miss CROUTHAMEL. Also during the morning, at approximately 10:00 a.m., RIDOLFI was permitted to place a phone call, at which time she called her mother, CATHERINE RIDOLFI. This call was made in the presence of SA's HOATS and BLUNT, and, during this call, she requested that her mother contact her attorney and advise him of her arrest.

After RIDOLFI was taken to the USM's Office, at 12:15 p.m., she was given the opportunity to talk with her attorney, as were all of the other subjects. Following this, she was taken to the courtroom on the third floor for a hearing before United States Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD. After the hearing, her bail was set at $25,000 good bail. She was then removed from the courtroom in the custody of the United States Marshal.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI was arrested inside the offices of Selective Service Local Boards 7, 8, 9, located on the 5th floor of the United States Post Office (USPO) Building, at approximately [illegible]:35 a.m. She was arrested by Special Agents EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT and THOMAS E. [illegible]. After her arrest, she was searched by SA DEBBAUDT, and the following materials were removed from her person:

1. One 3" x 5" white card containing the following writing in black ink:

1-A 1-A-0 1-0 II-S 1-Y IV-B	MILO 966-1386 Out

CARL POPLAR
966-2533 Office
428-1813 Home

(This article is marked #1).

2. One torn white card, approximately 3" x 5", containing the names of various articles with numbers listed beside these articles. One side starts with the following:

"1-WT-#1."

The other side begins as follows:

"1-Duct Tape."

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7[illegible]65

by SA's EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT, PHILIP F. SNODGRASS, ROBERT C. BLUNT, and JAMES H. [illegible] Date dictated 8/22/71

[illegible]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

All of the writing on this particular card was in black ink.

(This article is marked #2).

3. One "Flair" pen, black in color, with black ink.

(This article is marked #3).

After the above articles were removed from RIDOLFI, they were retained by SA DEBBAUDT until RIDOLFI was turned over to the custody of SA PHILIP F. SNODGRASS, at which time the articles were also turned over to SA SNODGRASS. All of the articles were numbered and then marked by SA DEBBAUDT in the following fashion:

"ESD, Camden, August 22, 1971."

The articles were retained by SA SNODGRASS until RIDOLFI was turned over to the custody of SA's JAMES R. MOATS and ROBERT C. BLUNT, at which time the articles were likewise turned over to their custody.

After the articles were turned over to SA's MOATS and BLUNT, they remained in the custody of both of these Special Agents until the processing of RIDOLFI was completed, at which time they were retained solely in the custody of SA MOATS until August 23, 1971, when they were transported to the Philadelphia FBI Office by SA MOATS.

An inventory of the items removed from RIDOLFI was prepared by SA MOATS. This inventory was shown to RIDOLFI, but she refused to certify what was taken by signing it.

JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH

As previously noted, SWINGLISH was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, at 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $50,000 good bail. He was released on September 7, 1971, after posting ten per cent cash or security on a $15,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/24/71

JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH was arrested at 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J., at 4:39 a.m. He was in the living room at this address. At the time of arrest he identified himself as JOHN SWINGLISH. He was given a quick search, handcuffed, and then taken outside and placed in a Bureau car.

SWINGLISH was orally advised of his rights, that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him in court, that he had the right to talk to a lawyer before questioning, and that if he could not afford a lawyer one would be appointed for him before questioning. He was also advised that if he answered questions he could stop at any time until a lawyer was present. He was also advised of the charges against him.

At this time SWINGLISH stated that he did not want to answer any questions and that the only reason he gave his name was that he had a drivers license with his identification and picture in his pocket.

SWINGLISH was later taken into the Post Office at Camden, N. J., to a room on the third floor. The form titled "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" was read to SWINGLISH and he then read the form. SWINGLISH refused to sign this form. He was also advised of the charges against him.

SWINGLISH was strip searched and then questioned. The only questions he answered were those listed on his drivers license. He did not answer these questions directly but would nod an affirmation or say, "That's what it says on the license."

The only information volunteered by SWINGLISH occurred during the strip search. When he emptied his pockets SWINGLISH stated that after four years in the Navy he still was not used to Navy pants. When questioned about service in the Navy, SWINGLISH said, "I've already talked too much."

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165 SUB

by SAs EDWARD M. COLE and JERRY WAYNE WHEELER EMC/tac Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

The following items were taken from SWINGLISH after a search of his person:

(1) Greyhound bus ticket, number 1 49120676 12 dated "20 Aug. 71" for travel between Washington, D. C., and Philadelphia, Pa.

(2) White lined paper, 4 5/8" x 3 1/16"; on one side
"CARL POPLAR
0-966-2533
H-428-1813"
on the other side "966-1386
MILO BILLMAN"

(3) Blank white paper 2 15/16" x 4 15/16" with following writing on one side, "Graphic House, 3307 Conn. Ave. 362-4464" "Courtney Griffin, 2700 Conn. Ave." on the other side in black ink was number 833, in redink the following:
832 8695
832 0045
5512 Conn.
6:30 8:20

(4) Pink slip 4 1/4" x 2 5/8" with following printed on front: "Thank you for using CENTRAL DELIVERY, Driver No. 3037 (in ink); Refer to the above number when verifying deliveries; For pick-up with in the hour 589-8500." On the reverse side in writing was the following: "15.41
50
4.00
$ 19.91"
This was underlined and crossed out with $10.00 beside it. Below this was "EMMAUS."

(5) Pink slip from Central Delivery with printing on front; the same as that previously described except there is no writing after Driver No. On the reverse side is the following:

"JACKIE GUDE (CAXI)
Century Assoc.
7315 Wisconsin
#320
To:
TASI
Gelberg
Pesanelli
(TGP)
ROCHESTER - NORTHRUP FAMILY
(716) 637-6339"

(6) Identification card of MICHAEL L. FAYAD, Attorney at Law. Front of card had following printing: "MIKE, home 546-5443; ADDIE 546-6506, 624-8380" On reverse side in red ink: "Bust Center: 833-9480. In black ink: "MARY HELEN, 546-6506, Mautner, 547 5084, MIKE."

(7) Identification card - "FRED DASBACH, ACSW, Individual, Family, and Group Counseling." On reverse side is following in ink and crossed out in pencil: "Pa.
779-378
DC
DK GR. FD. CUS"
In ink not crossed out - "Defense Comm. - NY
(212) 691-7410
691-7411"

(8) Yellow lined paper torn at top and bottom 8 1/2" by approximately 6 3/8". On one side is the following: "Gros, Charles, 6703 Moly Dr. Falls Ch., Va. 532-0435 (Mc Kenzie)." On the other side "James, Chas. Habel, Phila. (609) or (LOG) 365-8911"

(9) District of Columbia Motor Vehicle Operator's Permit #2701146 issued to SWINGLISH, JOHN ROBERT, 3619 12th Street, N.E., Washington, D. C., 20017

(10) Keychain with four keys

All of the above that was taken from SWINGLISH was listed on a form. Everything taken was shown to SWINGLISH. He read the receipt, made no comment, and refused to sign the receipt.

SWINGLISH was later turned over to the United States Marshal for his hearing.

The following description of SWINGLISH was obtained from his Washington, D. C., driver's license and from observation by the interviewing agents. He refused to answer any questions concerning his background.

Name	JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH
Date of birth	March 25, 1944
Height	5'6"
Weight	145 pounds
Build	Medium
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Residence	3619 12th Street, N. E. Washington, D. C., 20017
Drivers license	District of Columbia, #2701146
Social Security Number	286-38-9577

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]		
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	conspiracy	

[illegible]

[illegible]

SARAH JANE TOSI

As previously noted, TOSI was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, at 21 North Fourth Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date she was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $5,000 bond. She was released on September 3, 1971, after posting a ten per cent cash for security on a $5,000 bond which had been set or the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

A search of the fingerprints of SARAH JANE TOSI has failed to disclose prior arrest data contained in the files of the Identification Division, FBI, Washington, D. C.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 23, 1971

At approximately 4:35 a.m., the residence at 21 North 4th Street, Camden, N. J.. was entered through the front door, which was open, and numerous other FBI agents were already in the house.

After assisting in conducting a brief search of the house, three individuals were located in the second room on the first floor as you enter the house. These individuals were two white females and one white male who would not identify themselves. They were verbally advised of the agents' identity by show of credentials, and of the charge of conspiracy to destroy government property. They were placed under arrest and were placed against the wall, where they were patted down for possible weapons. SAs PHILIP E. BROWN and KLAUS C. ROHR were specifically requested to observe the patting down for these weapons, and then the pockets of the individuals were emptied and the contents were placed at their feet.

One of the white females, who later identified herself as SARAH JANE TOSI, was handcuffed and taken to the Bureau car to await transportation to the U. S. Post Office in Camden, N. J., for processing. The items which had been taken out of TOSI's pockets were as follows: one one-dollar bill, three quarters, two dimes, one penny, and one mechanical light blue pencil with the following information on the pencil: "Vic's Cafe, 852 Ferry Avenue, Camden, N. J., Phone EM 5-0993."

As TOSI was being placed in the Bureau car, SA J. PATRICK CUNNINGHAM assisted and stayed with TOSI from that time on along with SA ALLAN E. MEYER.

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165-SUB-

by [illegible] MEYER, PHILIP E. BROWN, PEB
[illegible]ICK CUNNINGHAM & KLAUS C. ROHR AEM:EMR Date dictated 8/23/71

[illegible] recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it [illegible] to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 23, 1971

A white female who did not have any identifying information on her, identified herself as SARAH JANE TOSI. TOSI was placed in a Bureau car at approximately 4:47 a.m., directly across the street from the residence at 21 North 4th Street, Camden, N. J. When asked her name for the second time, she stated she did not have to make any statement or answer any questions. When she was told that this information was needed for identification purposes, she reconsidered and at approximately 5:11 a.m., she started to give some background information but was most hesitant whenever she gave it, and in some instances would not give the complete information.

The following information was received from observation and interview which took place in the Bureau vehicle and in an unmarked room on the fifth floor of the U. S. Post Office Building located at the intersection of 4th and Market Streets:

Name	SARAH JANE TOSI
Race	White
Sex	Female
Date of birth	November 16, 1951
Place of birth	Teaneck, N. J.
Height	5'1"
Weight	110
Build	Small - well
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Identification Characteristics	None noticeable - wears round steel rim glasses. Says she does not wear them all the time
Residence	80 Florida Street, Dorchester, Mass. (Bosto Would not give telephone number nor with whom she lives

---

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N. J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165-SUB-S

by SAs ALLAN E. MEYER
J. PATRICK CUNNINGHAM AEM:EMR Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Occupation	Said-"Never had an occupation, other than searching for freedom"
Father	CHARLES ALEXANDER TOSI, SR. - deceased 160 Blauvelt Avenue, Ho Ho Kus, N. J. Born November 23, 1910, New York City
Mother	BERNADETTE TOSI, nee Beasley, 160 Blauvelt Avenue, Ho Ho Kus, N. J. (would not give telephone number) Born July 30, 1913, Joliet, Ill.
Brother	CHARLES ALEXANDER TOSI, JR., age 31, marr (would give no further information)
Sisters	CAROL ANN TOSI ARNAUD, age 32, married (address unknown) MARY ELLEN TOSI, age 26, unmarried (lives with mother)
Marital Status	Single
Children	None
Previous arrests	None admitted to
Driver's license	None admitted to
Vehicle ownership	None admitted to
Selective Service No.	Admitted having one but could not remember number
Military service	None
Local address	Said she had no local address (When asked if she considered 21 North 4th Street, Camden, N. J., her local address, she would not answe
Education	High school graduate. Attended one year at Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., school year 1969-1970
Religion	Roman Catholic

TOSI was given an Interrogation; Advice of Rights form which she read and she was also verbally advised of what that rights form meant. She stated she understood what the form said, and her rights, but she did not wish to sign this form, nor would she give any information regarding her arrest or the charges against her.

She was again advised that the basic charge against her was for conspiracy in connection with the destruction of government property. She was photographed, fingerprinted and strip searched by Bureau employee TRUDY A. CROUTHARMEL. She was allowed to rest and walk around in the room where she was being interviewed and she used the women's rest room a few times and obtained drinks of water whenever she requested. She was asked continually if she was all right and if she wanted anything and each time she would either say "no" or "I am fine."

At approximately 10:26 a.m., she was allowed to place a collect call to a person she claimed as being a friend by the name of MARY ANN WOODWARD, area code 617-284-8301, which she stated was in Boston, Mass. TOSI stated that WOODWARD was divorced, and then she spoke to the party on the other end of the line. TOSI told the party that she was under arrest and requested the party to call her mother in care of a Mr. A. W. GEROSA and to call a lawyer, and "I am only being held on a conspiracy charge, no big thing." TOSI advised that A. W. GEROSA was a great-uncle by marriage and lived in East Marion, Long Island, N. Y.

At approximately 12:16 p.m., TOSI was taken to the U. S. Marshal's office and from there was transported to a courtroom and appeared before the U. S. Magistrate, CHARLES L. RUDD. TOSI was held on $5,000 good bail.

Prior to TOSI being taken to the U. S. Marshal's office, she was given a copy of an inventory of items removed from her person which consisted of one dollar, three quarters, two dimes, one penny and one mechanical light blue pencil with the following information on the pencil: "Vic's Cafe, 852 Ferry Avenue, Camden, N. J., Phone EM 5-0993."

TOSI stated that her mother was vacationing with GEROSA and was only there temporarily.

ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON

As previously noted, WILLIAMSON was apprehended by Special Agents of the FBI on August 22, 1971, inside the Post Office Building, 401 Market Street, Camden, N. J. On the same date he was afforded a hearing before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and was remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal in lieu of $25,000 good bail. He was released on September 7, 1971, after posting ten per cent cash or security on a $10,000 bond which had been set by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa., on September 3, 1971.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/24/71

At approximately 4:35 a.m., August 22, 1971, the Selective Service space and surrounding area located on the 5th floor, U. S. Post Office, 401 Market Street, Camden, New Jersey, was entered by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. SAS [illegible] S. DERBAUGH and THOMAS E. TIERNEY entered the immediate area and parapet surrounding the Selective Service Office by way of the building fire escape. SAS ROBERT H. WALLER and JOE R. GINGERICH entered the Selective Service Office through the front door, which entered onto the 5th floor corridor.

Upon entrance into this space, SAS DERBAUGH and TIERNEY, WALLER and GINGERICH announced the FBI's presence and instructed everyone to remain as they were until told to do otherwise.

Two individuals who were later identified as ROSEMARY E. REILLY and ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON were observed by SA TIERNEY as they were sitting on the parapet on the north side of the building between the wall surrounding the parapet and an open window of the Selective Service Office. When observed, they were sitting among Selective Service records which had been piled on the parapet. SA TIERNEY placed them under arrest and assisted them in through a window into the Selective Service Office where they were told to lie on the floor. No questions were asked of them except their names.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File # PHILADELPHIA 52-7165 Sub

by SA THOMAS E. TIERNEY/mlb Date dictated 8/23/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date August 23, 1971

At approximately 4:35 a.m., entry was made into the Selective Service Board Rooms, Fifth Floor, Federal Courthouse and Post Office, Camden. On entry, seven persons were seen standing in various positions. They were immediately advised that they were under arrest and that they were arrested by Special Agents of the FBI.

These persons were later identified as PETER DONALD FORDI, MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO, ROBERT GLEN GOOD, MICHAEL J. DOYLE, ROSEMARY REILLY, KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI, and ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON. Each person arrested received a preliminary "pat down" search.

After the search, each person was handcuffed and designated for booking and further processing.

At the time of entry and thereafter, it was noted that cabinets had been ripped open; Selective Service documents removed from these; documents were observed to be strewn and torn on the floor of the Conference Room, in mailbags, on the floor of the main Selective Service Office, and strewn about in the gutter area of the ramparts on three sides of the fifth floor roof.

On 8/22/71 at CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY File # PHILADELPHIA 52-[illegible]
SAs W. B. ANDERSON, EUGENE S. [illegible], JOE R. GINGERICH,
DAVID A. MILLER, MASON P. SMITH, THOMAS E. TIERNEY, JOSEPH [illegible],
by and ROBERT H. PALMER [illegible]/b.m/alb Date dictated

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/23/71

At 5:55 a.m., [illegible] N.J., [illegible] to SA [illegible] [illegible] rights as shown on an "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" [illegible] form to WILLIAMSON for [illegible]. WILLIAMSON indicated he had already read this as he had been presented it earlier by SA [illegible]. He indicated that he did not desire to sign it and wanted to talk to a lawyer.

Agents conducted a strip search of WILLIAMSON, at which time three items of evidence were taken, which were as follows:

1. One pair of brown cotton work gloves.

2. One green Army fatigue shirt with the name DUNHAM on the shirt flap.

3. One 3 by 5" card bearing a written number 966 1386.

After the search, WILLIAMSON executed a certification that Agents had taken the items described above.

WILLIAMSON was subsequently fingerprinted and photographed and furnished handwriting samples. The following description was obtained of WILLIAMSON through interview and observation during the course of the strip search. He refused to furnish any additional descriptive data, including address, employment, relatives, previous arrests, and any other personal data until such time as he was able to confer with his attorney:

Name	ROBERT WILLIAMSON
Alias	Robert William Williamson (Confirmation name)

On 8/22/71 at Camden, N.J. File # Philadelphia 52-7165-Sub S

by SA DAG SOHLBERG and SA HAROLD L. [illegible] JR. HLL/Je Date dictated 8/23/71

...nt contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
...ontents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Date of Birth	August 16, 1949
Height	5' 7"
Weight	110 lbs.
Build	Thin
Hair	Brown, long
Eyes	Blue
Identifying Characteristics	Acne-type scars on face, boils and other skin lesions all about the body.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 8-26-71 672
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

The following FBI record, NUMBER 521 616 G, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. WHERE FINAL DISPOSITION IS NOT SHOWN OR FURTHER EXPLANATION OF CHARGE IS DESIRED, COMMUNICATE WITH AGENCY CONTRIBUTING THOSE FINGERPRINTS.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
Warminster Twp Pol Warminster Pa	Robert William Williamson #3191	7-1-68	viol of Twp Ordinance #125 Soliciting without permit	Guilty pd Fine & Cos
Horsham Twp PD Horsham Pa	Robert Williamson #68-1747	7-18-68	Soliciting without a permit	$25 F & $9 Costs
PD Phila Pa	Robert W. Williams #137020	3-20-70	Res Arr St Br of Peace	$10 and C
FBI Newark NJ	Robert William Williamson #----	8-22-71	Conspiracy	

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Section #3

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
PHILADELPHIA	PHILADELPHIA	9/1/71	8/27 - 30/71

TITLE OF CASE
CHANGED
CAMDEN ACTION:
JAYMA ANN ABDOO, aka "Janette";
Dr. WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON;
Reverend MILO MARION BILLMAN;
TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW;
DALE S. CUNNINGHAM;
PAUL BERNARD COUMING;
EUGENE F. DIXON;
Father MICHAEL J. DOYLE;
ANN GRANT DUNHAM; Father PETER DONALD FORDI;
KEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH; MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO;
ROBERT GLENN GOOD; JOHN PETER GRADY;
MARGARET MARY INNESS; FRANCIS MEL MADDEN;
Reverend EDWARD J. MC GOWAN - FUGITIVE; LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA;
Reverend EDWARD J. MURPHY; BARRY JAMES MUSI;
FRANK POMMERSHEIM; JOAN MARY REILLY; ROSEMARY REILLY;
ANITA L. RICCI - FUGITIVE; KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI;
MARTHA SHEMELEY; JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH;
SARAH JANE TOSI; ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON

REPORT MADE BY 5-71-(21)
ELMER E. SUSSMAN

TYPED BY
mlb

CHARACTER OF CASE
CGR - BURGLARY; TGP; DGP; MUTILATIO
OF PUBLIC RECORDS; INTERFERENCE WIT
THE ADMINISTRATION OF SELECTIVE
SERVICE ACT OF 1967; CONSPIRACY;
ASSAULTING FEDERAL OFFICER;
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

9-2-71

Title of this case has been marked changed to include the name of subject DALE S. CUNNINGHAM, who was arrested on 8/27/71, and charged with assaulting a Federal officer and obstruction of justice. On 8/30/71, CUNNINGHAM appeared in U.S. District Court with other subjects in this case at a bail reduction hearing.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE

CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES	ACQUIT-TALS
		1				

CASE HAS BEEN:
PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO
PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED RKM SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:
6 - Bureau
(5) - 52-94527
1 - Departmental Attorney GUY GOODWIN
2 - Newark (52-6817)
1 - 89-
5 - Philadelphia (52-7165 Sub S)
1 - 89-118

2622

REC- 66

12 SEP 13 1971

EX-102

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	1-AAG; ISD			
Request Recd.	Attn: Guy Goodwin			
Date Fwd.	1-TC (Em) 5714			
How Fwd.	CB [illegible]			
By	9-10-71			

Notations FUG. SUP.

55 OCT 13 1971

COVER PAGE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE . 1970 O—375-139

REFERENCE

Report of SA ELMER E. SUSSMAN dated 8/31/71, at Philadelphia.

- P -

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Per instructions of SAC ROY K. MOORE, the name of DALE S. CUNNINGHAM has been included in the title of this case inasmuch as he appeared in the U. S. District Court, Camden, N. J., with other subjects in this case on 8/30/71, at a bail reduction hearing.

Newark is office of origin in the 89- case concerning DALE S. CUNNINGHAM and will follow prosecution on those charges.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - Departmental Attorney GUY GOODWIN

Report of: ELMER E. SUSSMAN
Office: PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
Date: SEPTEMBER 1, 1971

Field Office File #: 52-7165 Sub S
Bureau File #: 52-94527

Title: CAMDEN ACTION: JAYMA ANN ABDOO; DR. WILLIAM ALBERT JOSEPH ANDERSON; REVEREND MILO MARION BILLMAN; TERRY EDWARD BUCKALEW; DALE S. CUNNINGHAM; PAUL BERNARD COUMING; EUGENE F. DIXON; FATHER MICHAEL J. DOYLE; ANN GRANT DUNHAM; FATHER PETER DONALD FORDI; DEITH WILLIAM FORSYTH; MICHAEL JOHN GIOCONDO; ROBERT GLENN GOOD; JOHN PETER GRADY; MARGARET MARY INNESS; FRANCIS MEL MADDEN; REVEREND EDWARD J. MC GOWAN; LIANNE MARIE MOCCIA; REVEREND EDWARD J. MURPHY; BARRY JAMES MUSI; FRANK POMMERSHEIM; JOAN MARY REILLY; ROSEMARY REILLY; ANITA L. RICCI; KATHLEEN MARY RIDOLFI; MARTHA SHEMELEY; JOHN ROBERT SWINGLISH; SARAH JANE TOSI; ROBERT WILLIAM WILLIAMSON

~~Character:~~

~~Synopsis:~~

Character: CRIME ON A GOVERNMENT RESERVATION; THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; MUTILATION OF PUBLIC RECORDS; INTERFERENCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1967; CONSPIRACY; ASSAULTING FEDERAL OFFICER; OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Synopsis: SA ROBERT H. WALLER assaulted by DALE S. CUNNINGHAM on 8/27/71, while performing official duty. CUNNINGHAM arrested that date and authorized complaint and warrant filed charging CUNNINGHAM with violation Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 111 and 1505. CUNNINGHAM arraigned U. S. Magistrate, Camden, N. J., 8/27/71, and held in lieu of $50,000 bond. Bail reduced to $10,000 on 8/30/71, by U. S. District Judge, Camden, N. J. CUNNINGHAM failed to make bond and was remanded into the custody of the U. S. Marshal.

- P -

DETAILS:

On August 27, 1971, Special Agents of the FBI went to 126 North 4th Street, Camden, N. J., identified themselves to the occupant DALE S. CUNNINGHAM, advised him that reliable information indicated that Reverend EDWARD J. MC GOWAN, a Federal

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

fugitive, was on the premises and requested admission. CUNNINGHAM refused Special Agents entrance and blocked the doorway. While blocking the doorway, CUNNINGHAM struck SA ROBERT H. WALLER in the left side of the face with his elbow and then pushed his hand into the face of SA WALLER. CUNNINGHAM continued to block the doorway and continued his assault on SA WALLER.

CUNNINGHAM was subdued, placed under arrest and advised that he was being charged with assaulting a Federal officer and obstruction of justice.

On August 27, 1971, a complaint and warrant was authorized by Assistant U. S. Attorney D. WILLIAM RUBIN, Camden, N. J., charging CUNNINGHAM with violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 111 and 1505. Recommended bond was $50,000.

On August 27, 1971, CUNNINGHAM was arraigned before U. S. Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, N. J., and held in lieu of $50,000 bond.

On August 30, 1971, CUNNINGHAM appeared with other subjects in this case before U. S. District Judge MITCHELL H. COHEN, Camden, N. J., at a bail reduction hearing. Bail for CUNNINGHAM was reduced to $10,000. CUNNINGHAM failed to make bond and was remanded into the custody of the U. S. Marshal, Camden, N. J.

Section 45

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
NEW YORK	PHILADELPHIA	9/15/71	8/27/71 - 9/12/71

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED
REVEREND EDWARD J. MC GOWAN, S. J., aka Ed McGowan - FUGITIVE	ROBERT P. SADOWSKI	slr
	CHARACTER OF CASE CGR - BREAKING AND ENTERING; DGP; TGP; REMOVAL AND MUTILATION OF PUB RECORDS; UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WIT THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITARY SERVICE ACT OF 1967; CONSPIRACY (MEDBURG-CAMDEN ACTION)	

REFERENCE

PH telephone call to NY, 8/27/71.

- P -

ADMINISTRATIVE

This report is being submitted under the Medburg-Camden Action caption, Bufile 52-94527, Philadelphia 52-7165, inasmuch as the character relates to alleged criminal activity of subject in that matter. Philadelphia is, therefore, carried as Office of Origin (00) re this individual with respect to the Medburg-Camden Action, inasmuch as Philadelphia is in a position to more readily furnish complete information in the pre- and post-indictment areas relating to this investigation.

a

EX-PROC

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☒ N
		1-NY					PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☒ N

APPROVED JFM SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

25 2693

REC-106

TO SEP 20 1971

COPIES MADE:
8 - Bureau (52-94527)
(3 - 100-)(MC GOWAN)
1 - USA, SDNY
3 - Newark
7 - Philadelphia (52-7165)
(2 - 100-)(EDWARD J. MC GOWAN)
4 - New York (52-10018)(SUB G)
(2 - 100-171190)(MC GOWAN)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency	Q-TIC	RMW 5714		
Request Recd.	1-AAG, ISD, Attn:	[illegible]		
Date Fwd.	CBjsffa			
How Fwd.	9-21-71			
By	37b	[illegible]		

Notations

FUG. SUP.
SEX.
STAT. SECT.

54 OCT 21 1971

COVER PAGE

★ GPO : 1968 O 299-

ADMINISTRATIVE (cont'd)

Additional copies are being furnished PH and NK for dissemination to appropriate United States Attorney(s).

Major case fingerprints have been furnished the Identification Division by separate communication, as well as current arrest photographs. Photographs have also been furnished Philadelphia via the same communication.

LEAD

PHILADELPHIA

AT PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA. Will follow and report results of prosecution action relating to this matter, furnishing copies to both NYO 52-10018 Sub G and 100-171190 files.

FD-204 (Rev 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - USA, SDNY (ATTN: AUSA BLAINE MICHAEL)

Report of: ROBERT P. SADOWSKI Office: New York, New York
Date: 9/15/71

Field Office File #: 52-10018 Bureau File #: 52-94527

Title: REVEREND EDWARD J. MC GOWAN, SOCIETY OF JESUS

Character: CRIME ON A GOVERNMENT RESEVATION - BREAKING AND ENTERING;
DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, REMOVAL AND MUTILATIO
OF PUBLIC RECORDS. THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, UNLAWFUL
INTERFERENCE WITH THE ADMINISTARION OF THE MILITARY SERVI
ACT OF 1967; CONSPIRACY

~~Synopsis~~

Synopsis: Subject indicated by FGJ, Camden, NJ, for conspiracy relating to CGR - Band E; DGP, TGP, Removal and Mutilation of Public Records & Unlawful Interference with the Administration of the Military Service Act of 1967. Bench warrant issued. Subject, WMA; born 5/7/35 at NYC, NY; 6'; 180 lbs.; reddish-brown hair; blue eyes; placed under arrest 9/8/71 in NYC, by SAs of the FBI without incident. At a hearing same date, subject released in his own recognizance. Description set forth.

- P -

Fug credit
recorded on
Serial #2587, 79

DETAILS

Investigation in this matter was predicated upon receipt of a telephone call from the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on August 27, 1971, which advised in part that subject was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in Camden, New Jersey, that same date for Conspiracy relating to: Crime on a Government Reservation - Breaking and Entering, Destruction of Government Property (DGP), Theft of Government Property (TGP), Removal and Mutilation of Public Records and Unlawful Interference with the Administration of the Military Service Act of 1967. It was also advised that a bench warrant had been issued for his arrest and subject was classified in a fugitive status.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

On September 8, 1971, EDWARD J. MC GOWAN was placed under arrest in the lobby of 201 East 69th Street by Special Agents (SAS) of the FBI without incident.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 9/15/71

EDWARD J. MC GOWAN, 220 West 98th Street, New York City (NYC), New York, who identified himself as a Roman Catholic priest in the Society of Jesus, was advised of the identities of ROBERT P. SADOWSKI and ROGER J. CORKE as Special Agents (SAS) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by SA SADOWSKI in the lobby of 201 East 69th Street, NYC, in the presence of MARTIN R. STOLAR, who had introduced himself to SAS CORKE and SADOWSKI as the attorney representing MC GOWAN. MC GOWAN was then placed under arrest by SA SADOWSKI, who advised MC GOWAN of his rights as they appear on the "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" form. SA SADOWSKI then advised MC GOWAN of the charges against him, Conspiracy, relative to the following: Crime on a Government Reservation-Breaking and Entering; Theft of Government Property; Destruction of Government Property; Removal and Mutilation of Public Records and Unlawful Interference with the Military Service Act of 1967.

MC GOWAN was then furnished a copy of the "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" form and also a copy of the "Voluntary Appearance; Advice of Rights-Your Rights" form, which he read. A copy of each was also furnished his attorney simultaneously. MC GOWAN read both and answered "No" when asked the following three questions by SA SADOWSKI: 1) "Do you care to sign either or both of these forms? 2) Would you care to initial either of them? 3) Do you have any statement to make?". MC GOWAN then returned the forms to SA SADOWSKI, who gave MC GOWAN a second set for his (MC GOWAN's) retention.

The following description was obtained:

Name	EDWARD J. MC GOWAN
Alias	Ed McGowan
Race	White
Sex	Male
Date of Birth	May 7, 1935
Place of Birth	New York, New York
Height	Six feet
Weight	180 pounds
Hair	Reddish-brown

On 9/8/71 at New York City, NY File # NY 52-10018

by SAS ROGER J. CORKE and ROBERT P. SADOWSKI:sln Date dictated 9/10/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Eyes	Blue
Complexion	Light
Characteristics	Thick side burns, hair to nape of neck in back; wears glasses
Address	220 West 98th Street New York City
Occupation	Roman Catholic Priest in Society of Jesus
Former Address	3058 Godwin Terrace Bronx, New York
Social Security Number	089-28-6139
New York Operator Permit Number	MO 3248-67486-963292
Board of Elections Card	Number 1571292 Dated October 15, 1968 New York County address at time: 537 West 121st Street Apartment 4, New York City

On September 8, 1971, MC GOWAN was given a hearing before United States Magistrate GREGORY J. POTTER, United States Courthouse, New York City, New York. Mr. STOLAR, MC GOWAN's attorney, advised the Magistrate that MC GOWAN was indeed the same person named in the indictment (supra) and waived any right to any possible identity hearing. MC GOWAN was released in his own recognizance, with the provision that he appear in Camden, New Jersey, for arraignment on the date set for such arraignment.

Section 46

FD-[illegible] (Rev. 1-8-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
NEWARK	PHILADELPHIA	9/2/71	8/27/71 - 8/30/71

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
DALE SPEERS CUNNINGHAM; SA ROBERT H. WALLER - VICTIM	ROBERT H. WALLER (A)	ml
	CHARACTER OF CASE AFO and OOJ	

REFERENCE: Philadelphia teletype to Bureau, dated 8/27/71, entitled "MEDBURG - CAMDEN ACTION".

-P-

LEADS

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK:

1. Furnish Newark results of credit and arrest record regarding subject, formerly of 420 Riverside Drive.

2. Submit FD-302 regarding information concerning whereabouts of Rev. EDWARD J. MC GOWAN, on date

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED						ACQUITTALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

7-Bureau
(52-94527)
1-USA, Newark
3-New York
(1-52-10018)
4-Philadelphia (89-118)
(2-52-7165-Sub 5)
3-Newark (89-56)
(1-52-6817)

NOT RECORDED
42 SEP 8 1971

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency				
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.				
By				

Notations

of assault, 8/27/71.

PHILADELPHIA

AT PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA:

1. Conduct credit and arrest check regarding subject.

2. Furnish background and dispositions regarding subject's arrest under Philadelphia PD # 404493.

NEWARK

AT CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY: Will follow prosecutive action, USDC.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1-USA, Newark

Report of: ROBERT H. WALLER (A) Office: Newark, New Jersey
Date: September 2, 1971

Field Office File #: 89-56 Bureau File #:

Title: DALE SPEERS CUNNINGHAM;
SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT H. WALLER - VICTIM

Character: ASSAULT ON A FEDERAL OFFICER AND OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Synopsis: DALE SPEERS CUNNINGHAM, FBI # 49-200-G, arrested by Bureau Agents, Camden, NJ, 8/27/71. CUNNINGHAM charged in complaint authorized by AUSA D. WILLIAM SUBIN and filed before US Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, NJ, with violation of Title 18, USC, Sections 11, 1505. CUNNINGHAM afforded hearing before US Magistrate and remanded to custody of USM, Camden, NJ, in lieu of $50,000 bail. CUNNINGHAM appeared before US District Judge MITCHELL H. COHEN, Camden, NJ, 8/30/71, bail reduced to $10,000 and remanded to custody of US Marshal. FBI record reflects previous arrest at Philadelphia, Pa. 5/29/67 for Resisting Arrest - Disorderly Conduct.

-P-

DETAILS:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/2/71

On August 27, 1971, Special Agents MARTIN J. GASS, THOMAS E. TIERNEY and ROBERT H. WALLER went to the residence of 130 North 4th Street, Camden, New Jersey, in an effort to locate and apprehend Reverend EDWARD J. MC GOWAN, a federal fugitive. Information had been received that he was at the address of DALE S. CUNNINGHAM.

Special Agents (SAS) WALLER and TIERNEY went to the front of the residence and SA GASS went to the rear door.

In the act of going up the steps to the front door, which was open, a house number was not observed, Miss LIANNE MOCCIA, who had been arrested in the act of destroying Draft Board records in Camden, New Jersey, on August 22, 1971, was observed at the front entrance and when she saw the approaching agents, she ran quickly inside.

A white male, later identified as DALE S. CUNNINGHAM, met SAS TIERNEY and WALLER on the front steps and foyer.

SA WALLER identified himself and SA TIERNEY and explained the reason for their presence, namely, the existence of an arrest warrant for EDWARD J. MC GOWAN and there was information that MC GOWAN either was at this residence or had been there a short time ago, and would he produce MC GOWAN or permit a search of this property in order to locate MC GOWAN.

CUNNINGHAM became outraged and stated that no one was going to search this property and refused to confirm or deny the presence of MC GOWAN. The agents left the premises.

SA WALLER then telephonically verified that MC GOWAN was definitely believed to be at CUNNINGHAM's residence.

SA WALLER again proceeded to the CUNNINGHAM residence, 130 North 4th Street, Camden, New Jersey, with the following SAS:

ALBERT W. CARROLL
EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT
MARTIN J. GASS
DON G. OWENS
THOMAS E. TIERNEY

Interviewed on 8/27/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # NEWARK 89-56

by SAS ALBERT W. CARROLL; EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT; MARTIN J. GASS; DON G. OWENS; THOMAS E. TIERNEY; and ~~ROBERT H. WALLER (A) RHW/mlc~~ Date dictated 9/2/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Upon arrival, CUNNINGHAM was again in the foyer, as if expecting someone. SA WALLER again identified himself by displaying his credentials again, and identified the other men as SAS of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

CUNNINGHAM was advised that the information that MC GOWAN was at this residence was considered reliable and that the agents would like to search the residence. At this point CUNNINGHAM said, "No, you are not going to search my house", and proceeded to lash out at SA WALLER with his left forearm and elbow, striking SA WALLER in the left jaw. He then placed his open right hand on SA WALLER's face and struck out at SA WALLER with his hands and arms. With his left arm, he grabbed SA WALLER around the neck and lifted up.

With the help of SAS DEBBAUDT, OWENS, and TIERNEY, with SAS CARROLL and GASS attempting to get into the small foyer area, CUNNINGHAM was subdued and placed under arrest, being so advised by SAS OWENS and WALLER.

CUNNINGHAM was taken to the Camden, New Jersey, Office of the FBI by SAS DEBBAUDT and OWENS.

SAS CARROLL, GASS, TIERNEY and WALLER searched the premises at 130 North 4th Street, Camden, New Jersey, but MC GOWAN was not located on these premises.

At this residence were also two other males, LIANNE MOCCIA and two other females, all of whom refused to identify themselves except PHILIP TRACY.

TRACY stated to SAS WALLER and CARROLL that he was employed by the Village Voice, 80 Union Place, New York City. New York, telephone number 212-WA 4-4669. TRACY also volunteered that he could not understand nor explain why CUNNINGHAM had become so violent and acted the way he did in view of the gentlemanly conduct of agents and if he had been in charge here, this would not have hapened, since CUNNINGHAM's actions were unnecessary and unreasonable.

FD-302 (REV. 11-27-70)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 9/2/71

DALE S. CUNNINGHAM, 130 North 4th Street, Camden, New Jersey, after being arrested by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), was brought to the Camden, New Jersey, Resident Agency, for processing and interview by Special Agents EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT and DON G. OWENS. He was immediately shown the "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" form by Special Agent DEBBAUDT, which he read, advised he understood, but refused to sign. He would provide no information relating to his arrest. He would not provide any personal data.

The following description was obtained from observation:

Sex	Male
Race	White
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Dark brown, balding
Height	Approximately 6'1"
Weight	Approximately 200
Scars and Marks	None noted
Characteristics	Wears glasses

Interviewed on 8/27/71 at Camden, New Jersey File # NEWARK 89-56

by SAS DON G. OWENS and EUGENE S. DEBBAUDT Date dictated 8/31/71

DGO/mlc

4

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

On August 27, 1971, Assistant United States Attorney D. WILLIAM SUBIN, Camden, New Jersey, authorized the issuance of a complaint, charging DALE S. CUNNINGHAM with violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 111 and 1505, in that he did forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede and interfere with Special Agent ROBERT H. WALLER of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a person designated in Title 18, Section 1114, while the said Special Agent was engaged in the proformance of his official duties. Mr. SUBIN recommended $50,000 bail.

On August 27, 1971, Special Agent (SA) ROBERT H. WALLER filed a complaint with United States Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, New Jersey, charging DALE S. CUNNINGHAM with violation Title 18, United States Code, Sections 111 and 1505.

On August 27, 1971, CUNNINGHAM appeared before United States Magistrate CHARLES L. RUDD, Camden, New Jersey, and was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal in lieu of $50,000 bail.

On August 30, 1971, CUNNINGHAM appeared before United States District Judge MITCHELL H. COHEN, United States District Court, Camden, New Jersey, wherein his bail was reduced to $10,000 and he was again remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

On August 30, 1971, Deputy United States Marshal THOMAS HARKINS, Camden, New Jersey, advised that their records reflect the following:

Name	DALE SPEERS CUNNINGHAM
Address	130 North 4th Street Camden, New Jersey
Race	White
Sex	Male
Date of Birth	May 27, 1932 Elmira, New York

NK 89-56

Height	6'
Weight	190 pounds
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Brown
Former Employment	Professor, Rutgers University New Jersey
Current Employment	Translator - Spanish, French, Italian

Set forth below is an FBI Identification Record for DALE CUNNINGHAM, FBI number 49 200 G:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

J. Edgar Hoover
Director.
AUG 29 1971

1 The following FBI record, NUMBER 49 200 G , is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
PD Phila Pa	Dale Cunningham #404493	3-24-67	intox chauffeur	
PD Phila Pa	Dale Cunningham #404493	5-29-67	resist arrest DC	
PD Phila Pa	Dale Cunningham #404493	2-8-69	Oper on Rev License	

-7*-

Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. Where final disposition is not shown or further explanation of charge is desired, communicate with agency contributing those fingerprints.

[illegible] * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

APRIL 27, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 215

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 4 - Pages ~~13 and 14~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 8 - Page ~~1~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~ (Page 3a deleted)

Section 12 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 15 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~ (Page 4a deleted)
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages 9a and 10

Section 3 - Pages 7b and 8
Page 20a
Pages ~~29 and 30~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Pages ~~57a and 58~~
Pages ~~59 and 60~~
Pages ~~65 and 66~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~3b and 4~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages 4c and 4d
Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11~~ and 12

Index

Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (31)

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at time field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at Bureau upon receipt of field request. (Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on list.

(1) Quality of assistance addressee is in a position to give
(2) Cooperation which has been afforded
(3) Following must appear on list:

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) Following may appear on list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
Car Rental Agencies
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, U. S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

MAY 28, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 216

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 14 - Page ~~17~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Page ~~15~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~33 and 34~~
Pages ~~51 and 52~~

Section 5 - Pages ~~11 and 12~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~17 and 18~~

Index

Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~ (Page 24a deleted)
Page ~~26a~~
Pages 35 and 36
Pages 39 and 40
Pages 45 and 46

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
[Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section [130H,]item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Results of Identification Division check
   f. Derogatory information
   g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

JUNE 26, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 217

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Page 17
Pages ~~17a and 18~~

Section 13- Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages 9 and 10

Part II

Section 3 - Pages ~~11 and 11a~~
Page ~~11b~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~25a and 26~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Index

Pages ~~19 and 20~~ (Page 18a deleted)
Page ~~20a~~
Pages ~~28a and 28b~~
Pages 31 and 32
Page 34a
Pages ~~37 and 38~~
Pages 41 and 42

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.

[[10. In contacts with the press concerning a bank robbery, bank burglary, or
[bank larceny no information should be volunteered concerning the
[amount of loot obtained. Specific questions by members of the press
[concerning amount of loot may be answered only following the arrest of
[an individual or individuals for violation of the Federal bank robbery
[statute.]

[[11.] Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

[[12.] In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee. No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter, without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing Bureau policy.

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    - a. Foreword by the Director
    - b. Interesting case write-ups
    - c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
    - d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution

   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
    - a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.
    - b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
    - c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Human interest items from local police work
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television[appearance,]a manuscript of the[remarks]must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval[unless previously approved Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and time does not permit prior Bureau approval.] In some other cases involving important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
NOVEMBER 27, 1970
REVISION 222

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 12 - - Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 15 - - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Part II

Section I - - Pages ~~5a and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 3 - - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~

Section 4 - - Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~37 and 38~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~
Pages ~~41-46~~
Pages ~~47 and 48~~
Pages 49 and 50

Section 5 - - Pages ~~3 and 3a~~

Section 6 - - Pages 1b and 2

Section 7 - - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Index

Pages 17 and 18

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (15)

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. In contacts with the press concerning a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny no information should be volunteered concerning the amount of loot obtained. Specific questions by members of the press concerning amount of loot may be answered only following the arrest of an individual or individuals for violation of the Federal bank robbery statute.
11. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.
12. In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee. No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter, without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing Bureau policy.

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   [d. [Deleted]
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.
   b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
   c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

[d. [Deleted]

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Human interest items from local police work
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television appearance, a manuscript of the remarks must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval unless previously approved Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and time does not permit prior Bureau approval. In some other cases involving important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
JANUARY 27, 1971
REVISION 224

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - - Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 5 - - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 6 - - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~
Page ~~11~~ (new)

Section 11 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 14 - Page ~~17~~

Part II

Section 1 - - Pages ~~5a and 6~~

Section 2 - - Page ~~5~~
Pages ~~5a and 6~~

Section 4 - - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~

Section 6 - - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 7 - - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (17)

SECTI[illegible] 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND [illegible]LIC CONTACTS

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
    - a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
    - b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
    - c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
    - d. White Slave Traffic Act
    - e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
    - f. Illegal wearing of uniform
    - g. Impersonation
    - h. National Firearms Act
    - i. [State Firearms Control Assistance Act; unlawful possession or receipt of firearms]
    - j. Extortion
    - k. Red Cross Act
    - l. Theft from interstate shipment
    - m. May Act
    - n. Patent matters
    - o. Copyright matters
    - p. Federal Reserve Act
    - q. Mail fraud
    - r. Falsely claiming citizenship
    - s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
    - t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
    - u. Crimes on the high seas
    - v. National Bankruptcy Act
    - w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
    - x. Crimes on Indian reservation
    - y. Crimes on Government reservation
    - z. Bills of Lading Act
    - aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
    - ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
    - ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
    - ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
    - ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
    - af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
    - ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
    - ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised).
    - ai. Bank robbery
    - aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
    - ak. Migratory Game Bird Act

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

2. Requesting authority for release
   a. By teletype
      At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
   b. By telephone where time is of essence
      Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with the office of the division head of the Crime Records Division for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. In those instances in which a press release is issued at SOG, television and radio media should be merely provided with a written copy of the press release, and Bureau personnel should not submit to live, filmed, or tape-recorded interviews of any kind, including the reading of the release itself, without prior Bureau authority. Tact and diplomacy must be exercised in declining to participate in such interviews. With respect to local press releases, SACs may, when requested, make personal appearances on television and radio provided no interviews are conducted and there is absolutely no elaboration over and above the original press release. These conditions should be made known in advance to television and radio station representatives when such requests are received. [[Reading of these [local press releases on the telephone to the news media should be done by [the SAC or ASAC.]
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
AUGUST 27, 1971
REVISION 231

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Table of Contents
Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Part II

Section 3 - - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 3a~~
Page 3b
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages ~~15b and 15c~~
Pages ~~15d and 16~~
Page ~~19~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~

Section 4 - - Page 12a
Pages 15a and 16
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 22a and 22b
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Page 28a
Page 33
Pages ~~33a and 34~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~37 and 38~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~
Pages ~~41 and 42-46~~
Pages 47 and 48

Section 5 - - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Section 6 - - Pages 7 and 8

Section 7 - - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~25a and 26~~
Page ~~27~~
Pages 27a and 28

Section 8 - - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Section 9 - - Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages ~~15b and 15c~~
Page ~~15d~~
Pages ~~15e and 16~~
Page ~~17~~
Pages ~~17a and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~21 and 22~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (39)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and [extremist] sources of information
Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and [extremist] sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section 130H, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or [extremist] source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Results of Identification Division check
   f. Derogatory information
   g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
MARCH 28, 1972
REVISION 238

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 10 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Section 14 - Page ~~11b~~
Pages 11c and 12
Pages 13 and 14
Page 17

Part II

Section 3 - - Pages ~~11c and 12~~
Page 13b

Section 4 - - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages 25b and 26
Pages 37 and 38
Pages 39 and 40

Part II (continued)

Section 6 - - Pages 3b and 4

Section 7 - - Pages ~~17 and 17a~~

Section 9 - - Pages 21 and 22
Page 25

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (15)

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at time field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to field office mailing list.
   a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at Bureau upon receipt of field request. (Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.
   b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on list.
      (1) Quality of assistance addressee is in a position to give
      (2) Cooperation which has been afforded
      (3) Following must appear on list:
         Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division
         Bureau of Customs
         Cooperative Credit Bureaus
         Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
         FBINA Graduates
         Hotels
         Immigration and Naturalization Service
         Missions Providing Lodging
         [Postal Service]Inspectors
         Postmasters
         Salvation Army
         Secret Service
         U. S. Marshals
      (4) Following may appear on list:
         Automobile Clubs
         Banks
         Car Rental Agencies
         County Attorneys
         County Coroners
         Credit Companies
         Detective Agencies
         Enlistment Officers, U. S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps
         Employment Service
         Fire Departments
         Forest Service
         Gunsmiths
         Insurance Companies
         Movie Studios
         Navy Shore Patrol
         Oil Company Special Agents
         Parole and Probation Officers
         Plant Quarantine Officers
         Protective Associations
         Race Tracks
         Savings and Loan Associations
         Service Recruiting Officers
         State Employment Offices
         State Hospitals for Insane
         Steamship Companies
         Telegraph Companies
         U. S. Attorneys
         U. S.[Magistrates]
   c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.
   d. Give consideration to desirability of circularizing motels.
   e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
AUGUST 28, 1972
REVISION 243

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 6 - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 4c and 4d
Pages 5 and 6

Section 10 - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 5 and 6

Section 12 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 1b and 2
Pages 5 and 6
Pages 6a and 6b

Section 13 - Pages 1-1a and 2

Section 16 - Pages 3 and 3a
Pages 3b and 4
Pages 5 and 6

Part II

Section 3 - Page 12a

Section 5 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 9 and 10
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Page 13

Section 6 - Page 9

Section 9 - Pages 9 and 10

L. Patrick Gray, III

Acting Director

Enclosures (23)

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    a. Federal judges
    b. U. S. Attorneys
    c. Only outstanding state judges
    d. Governors
    e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    f. State attorneys general
    g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    i. In the principal cities:
        (1) Mayors
        (2) Chiefs of police
        (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        (9) Heads of larger universities
        (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        (11) Top representatives of airlines
        (12) Managers of leading airports
        (13) Top representatives of railroads
        (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        (19) Heads of leading banks
        [(20) Influential minority leaders]
14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.
15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. DELETED

N. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers[including minority-oriented newspapers,]must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continously effective. The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising the maximum effectiveness of this program.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
FEBRUARY 27, 1973
REVISION 249

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 7 - Pages 1 and 2

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 11 and 11a

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
Pages 2c and 2d
Pages 9 and 10
Pages 27 and 28
Page 33

Section 6 - Pages 3b and 4
Pages 7 and 8

Section 7 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 17 and 17a
Page 27

Section 9 - Pages 19 and 20
Page 20a
Pages 21 and 22

L. Patrick Gray, III

Acting Director

Enclosures (15)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at time field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at Bureau upon receipt of field request. (Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on list.

(1) Quality of assistance addressee is in a position to give
(2) Cooperation which has been afforded
(3) Following must appear on list:

[Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms]
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Postal Service Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) Following may appear on list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
Car Rental Agencies
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, U. S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Magistrates

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete
[[or when it is determined a source is deceased.]

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index[except when it has been determined that source is deceased, at which time general index card can be destroyed immediately. Under all other conditions the general index cards shall be retained for 20 years subsequent to the removal of cards from the special source of information index.]

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and extremist sources of information
Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and extremist sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section 130H, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or extremist source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the[Training]Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Results of Identification Division check
   f. Derogatory information
   g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
MARCH 27, 1973
REVISION 250

RE: REVISED PAGES.

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
- Section 1 - (Revised)
  - Pages 1 and 2
  - Pages 3 and 4
  - Pages 5 and 6
  - Pages 7 and 8
  - Page 9
- Section 9 - Page 1
  - Pages 1a and 2
- Section 14 - Page 17

Part II
- Section 1 - Pages 5a and 6
  - Pages 6a and 6b
  - Pages 11 and 12
- Section 2 - Pages 1b and 1c
  - Page 1d
  - Pages 1e and 2
- Section 4 - Pages 41 and 42-46
  - Pages 47 and 48
  - Pages 50a and 50b
- Section 6 - Pages 1 and 1a
  - Pages 1b and 2
  - Pages 5 and 5a
- Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6

Index - Pages 39 and 40
- Pages 41 and 42

L. Patrick Gray, III

Acting Director

Enclosures (23)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
    - a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
    - b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
    - c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
    - d. White Slave Traffic Act
    - e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
    - f. Illegal wearing of uniform
    - g. Impersonation
    - h. National Firearms Act
    - i. State Firearms Control Assistance Act; unlawful possession or receipt of firearms
    - j. Extortion
    - k. Red Cross Act
    - l. Theft from interstate shipment
    - m. May Act
    - n. Patent matters
    - o. Copyright matters
    - [p. [Bank Fraud and Embezzlement]
    - q. Mail fraud
    - r. Falsely claiming citizenship
    - s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
    - t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
    - u. Crimes on the high seas
    - v. National Bankruptcy Act
    - w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
    - x. Crimes on Indian reservation
    - y. Crimes on Government reservation
    - z. Bills of Lading Act
    - aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
    - ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
    - ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
    - ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
    - ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
    - af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
    - ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
    - ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised)
    - ai. Bank robbery
    - aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
    - [ak. Migratory Bird Act

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

2. Requesting authority for release
   a. By teletype
      At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
   b. By telephone where time is of essence
      Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with[Press Services Office]for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. In those instances in which a press release is issued at[FBIHQ,]television and radio media should be merely provided with a written copy of the press release, and Bureau personnel should not submit to live, filmed, or tape-recorded interviews of any kind, including the reading of the release itself, without prior Bureau authority. Tact and diplomacy must be exercised in declining to participate in such interviews. With respect to local press releases, SACs may, when requested, make personal appearances on television and radio provided no interviews are conducted and there is absolutely no elaboration over and above the original press release. These conditions should be made known in advance to television and radio station representatives when such requests are received. Reading of these local press releases on the telephone to the news media should be done by the SAC or ASAC.
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. In contacts with the press concerning a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny no information should be volunteered concerning the amount of loot obtained. Specific questions by members of the press concerning amount of loot may be answered only following the arrest of an individual or individuals for violation of the Federal bank robbery statute.
11. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.
12. In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee. No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter, without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing Bureau policy.

[[13. Bureau personnel, including SACs and ASACs, are not to participate
[in give-and-take news conferences without prior Bureau authority
[including clearance by the Press Services Office. This will be
[permitted only in the rarest of circumstances where mitigating facts
[clearly indicate it is to the Bureau's best interests to participate.]

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   d. Deleted
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office
   [inspection by[FBIHQ.]
   b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
   c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

   d. Deleted
4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National [Academy graduates
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
[d. [Deleted]
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
[Research[(Training Division)]

C. SPEECHES
1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television appearance, a manuscript of the remarks must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval unless previously approved Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and time does not permit prior Bureau approval. In some other cases involving important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material.
[To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS
1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
   a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
      (1) Scientific apparatus
      (2) Equipment
      (3) Personnel
      (4) Methods
      (5) Economics
   b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
      (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
      (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
      (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
      (4) Bad local crime conditions
      (5) Scientific crime detection experts
      (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. [(File in individual[pertinent school]files clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
      (7) Police training in colleges and universities
      (8) Aggravated sex offenders
      (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
      (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
2. Method of preparation for transmittal
   a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
   b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
   c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
   d. Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.
   e. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
   f. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
   g. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.

i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.

j. All clippings must be complete.

k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations should be forwarded.

l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.

4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau

a. General principle governing submissions
The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at [[FBIHQ]for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.

b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications

(1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the [attention of[Section IS-3, Intelligence Division)]unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition)should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.

(2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention [[Section IS-3, Intelligence Division,]informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.

(3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
June 27, 1973
Revision 253

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
  Section 1 - Pages 7 and 8

  Section 4 - Pages 5 and 6
    Pages 7 and 8

  Section 10 - Pages 1 and 2

  Section 14 - Pages 15 and 16

  Section 16 - Pages 7 and 8

Part II
  Section 2 - Page 1d
    Pages 9 and 10

  Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a
    Pages 25 and 26

  Section 4 - Page 12a
    Pages 19 and 20
    Pages 21 and 22

  Section 6 - Pages 1b and 2
    Pages 7 and 8

  Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6

  Section 8 - Pages 20a and 20b
    Pages 21 and 22
    Page 23-24

  Section 9 - Pages 9 and 10
    Pages 15e and 16
    Pages 19 and 20

Index - Pages 27a and 27b

William D. Ruckelshaus

Acting Director

Enclosures (23)

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. In contacts with the press concerning a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny no information should be volunteered concerning the amount of loot obtained. Specific questions by members of the press concerning amount of loot may be answered only following the arrest of an individual or individuals for violation of the Federal bank robbery statute.
11. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.
12. In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee. No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter, without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing Bureau policy.
13. Bureau personnel, including SACs and ASACs, are not to participate in give-and-take news conferences without prior Bureau authority including clearance by the Press Services Office. This will be permitted only in the rarest of circumstances where mitigating facts clearly indicate it is to the Bureau's best interests to participate.

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   d. Deleted
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by FBIHQ.
   b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
   c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.
   d. Deleted

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy graduates
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Deleted
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:

      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research[(Files and Communications Division)]

C. SPEECHES
1. [The speech program is the personal responsibility of the SAC, and the SAC or ASAC should handle principal commitments. If neither available, these can be handled by an experienced and well-informed Agent Supervisor approved for the commitment by the SAC or ASAC. Good judgment should dictate when a manuscript should be submitted to FBIHQ for approval in advance of a speaking engagement, particularly in regard to radio and television appearances.
2. It is not necessary to advise FBIHQ of each speaking engagement. Each office will maintain for a minimum of one year and one regular office inspection a control file in connection with acceptances and declinations of speech invitations. Each year on January 10th and on July 10th. each office will submit to FBIHQ a statistical report of speaking commitments handled. This will be divided into engagements by the SAC, the ASAC, and other Agent Supervisors; and will be further subdivided into speeches as well as radio, television, and Career Day appearances by these three groups.
3. Each office should maintain a speech material file for the use of speakers. This should include Law Enforcement Bulletin items, interesting case material, magazine articles, research literature, newspaper clippings pertaining to law enforcement matters of interest, and items of value in connection with public appearances of Bureau representatives. In addition to being maintained in current status, this speech material should be indexed as to subject matter in the office files.]

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS
1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete or when it is determined a source is deceased.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index except when it has been determined that source is deceased, at which time general index card can be destroyed immediately. Under all other conditions the general index cards shall be retained for 20 years subsequent to the removal of cards from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and extremist sources of information
Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and extremist sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section 130H, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or extremist source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter [for the attention of the [Files and Communications] Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Results of Identification Division check
   f. Derogatory information
   g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. [The frequency of personal contact with SAC contacts is left to the discretion of the SAC; contacts should be evaluated periodically to determine their effectiveness and the desirability of their continuance.]
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. [Each office must submit a complete alphabetical roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.]
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
AUGUST 27, 1973
REVISION 255

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
Section 1 - Pages 7 and 8
Page 9

Section 4 - Pages 17a and 18

Section 6 - Page 4a-b

Section 11 - Page 5

Part II
Section 1 - Page 1
Pages 1a and 2

Section 2 - Page 1d

Section 3 - Pages 3 and 3a

Section 4 - Pages 50a and 50b
Pages 53 and 54
Page 54a
Pages 55 and 56
Pages 57 and 57a
Pages 61 and 62

Section 6 - Pages 1b and 2
Pages 3 and 3a

Section 7 - Pages 21 and 21a
Pages 33 and 34

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 10a and 10b
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 18a and 18b

Section 9 - Pages 11 and 12

Index - Pages 1 and 2
Page 2a
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 17 and 18
Page 18a
Page 43
Pages 43a and 44

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (31)

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. In contacts with the press concerning a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny no information should be volunteered concerning the amount of loot obtained. Specific questions by members of the press concerning amount of loot may be answered only following the arrest of an individual or individuals for violation of the Federal bank robbery statute.
11. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.
12. In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee. No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter, without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing Bureau policy.
13. Bureau personnel, including SACs and ASACs, are not to participate in give-and-take news conferences without prior Bureau authority including clearance by the Press Services Office. This will be permitted only in the rarest of circumstances where mitigating facts clearly indicate it is to the Bureau's best interests to participate.

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    a. Foreword by the Director
    b. Interesting case write-ups
    c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
    d. Deleted
2. Distribution

    Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
    a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by FBIHQ.
    b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
    c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.
    d. Deleted

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy graduates
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Deleted
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Files and Communications Division)

C. SPEECHES

1. The speech program is the personal responsibility of the SAC, and the SAC or ASAC should handle principal commitments. If neither available, these can be handled by an experienced and well-informed Agent approved for the commitment by the SAC or ASAC. Good judgment should dictate when a manuscript should be submitted to FBIHQ for approval in advance of a speaking engagement, particularly in regard to radio and television appearances.

2 It is not necessary to advise FBIHQ of each speaking engagement. Each office will maintain for a minimum of one year and one regular office inspection a control file in connection with acceptances and declinations of speech invitations. Each year on January 10th and on July 10th. each office will submit to FBIHQ a statistical report of speaking commitments handled. This will be divided into engagements by the SAC, the ASAC, and other Agent Supervisors; and will be further subdivided into speeches as well as radio, television, and Career Day appearances by these three groups.

3. Each office should maintain a speech material file for the use of speakers. This should include Law Enforcement Bulletin items, interesting case material, magazine articles, research literature, newspaper clippings pertaining to law enforcement matters of interest, and items of value in connection with public appearances of Bureau representatives. In addition to being maintained in current status, this speech material should be indexed as to subject matter in the office files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.

i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

4. Do not:
   a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
   b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
   c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
   d. Use complicated sentence structure
   e. Use technical references to statutes
   f. Express personal opinions
   g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
   h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
   i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
   j. Use adjectives excessively

5. Transmittal
Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, attention [Files and Communications] Division.

6. Dissemination
New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreciable passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before release. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the Bureau on request.

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.

2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters. In all instances the circular letter must include the following:
   a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
   b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
   c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
   d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
   e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addressees is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.
6. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
7. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau a communication pertaining to a list of law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. One of the two following procedures should be used:

a. (1) On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each Department, the list described above. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.
   - (a) Chiefs of police
   - (b) Sheriffs
   - (c) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
   - (d) U. S. Marshals and deputies
   - (e) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
   - (f) Wardens of penal institutions
   - (g) District attorneys or county prosecutors
   - (h) Railway police (if desirable)
   - (i) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
   - (j) Any other officials who receive identification orders

   (2) Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
NOVEMBER 27, 1973
REVISION 258

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
  Section 3 - Page 3

  Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a

  Section 16 - Pages 1 and 1a
               Pages 3 and 3a
               Pages 3b and 4

Part II
  Section 1 - Page 1

  Section 3 - Pages 7b and 8
              Pages 17a and 18
              Page 19

  Section 4 - Page 18a
              Pages 41 and 42-46
              Pages 50a and 50b

  Section 5 - Pages 5 and 6

  Section 6 - Pages 3b and 4
              Pages 7 and 8

  Section 7 - Pages 21 and 21a

  Section 8 - Pages 27 and 28

  Section 9 - Pages 13 and 14

Index
  Pages 36a and 36b
  Pages 37 and 38
        39 and 40
        41 and 42
        45 and 46

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (23)

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at time field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to field office mailing list.

   a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at Bureau upon receipt of field request. (Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

   b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on list.

      (1) Quality of assistance addressee is in a position to give
      (2) Cooperation which has been afforded
      (3) Following must appear on list:
         - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
         - Cooperative Credit Bureaus
         - Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
         - FBINA Graduates
         - Hotels
         - Immigration and Naturalization Service
         - Missions Providing Lodging
         - Postal Service Inspectors
         - Postmasters
         - Salvation Army
         - Secret Service
         - [U. S. Customs Service]
         - U. S. Marshals
      (4) Following may appear on list:
         - Automobile Clubs
         - Banks
         - Car Rental Agencies
         - County Attorneys
         - County Coroners
         - Credit Companies
         - Detective Agencies
         - Enlistment Officers, U. S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps
         - Employment Service
         - Fire Departments
         - Forest Service
         - Gunsmiths
         - Insurance Companies
         - Movie Studios
         - Navy Shore Patrol
         - Oil Company Special Agents
         - Parole and Probation Officers
         - Plant Quarantine Officers
         - Protective Associations
         - Race Tracks
         - Savings and Loan Associations
         - Service Recruiting Officers
         - State Employment Offices
         - State Hospitals for Insane
         - Steamship Companies
         - Telegraph Companies
         - U. S. Attorneys
         - U. S. Magistrates

   c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

   d. Give consideration to desirability of circularizing motels.

   e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete or when it is determined a source is deceased.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index except when it has been determined that source is deceased, at which time general index card can be destroyed immediately. Under all other conditions the general index cards shall be retained for 20 years subsequent to the removal of cards from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and extremist sources of information
Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and extremist sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section 130H, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or extremist source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the [External Affairs] Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Results of Identification Division check
   f. Derogatory information
   g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. [The frequency of personal contact with SAC contacts is left to the discretion of the SAC; contacts should be evaluated periodically to determine their effectiveness and the desirability of their continuance.]
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. [Each office must submit a complete alphabetical roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.]
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
FEBRUARY 27, [illegible]74
REVISION 261

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
Section 12 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 9 and 10

Section 14 - Page 11b

Part II
Section 2 - Page 11

Section 3 - Page 3b
Pages 3c and 4
Pages 13c and 14
Pages 37 and 38

Section 4 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 1b and 2
Pages 35 and 36
Pages 37 and 38
Pages 39 and 40
Pages 41 and 42-46
Page 47-50
Pages 51 and 52
Pages 57b and 58
Pages 59 and 60

Section 6 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 1b and 1c
Pages 1d and 1e
Pages 1f and 2
Page 2a
Pages 3 and 3a
Pages 5c and 6
Pages 9 and 10

Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 23 and 24
Pages 33 and 34

Section 8 - Pages 11 and 12
Pages 13 and 14
Page 14a
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 18a and 18b
Page 18c
Pages 23 and 24

Index - Page 2a

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (39)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

[A. PRESS POLICY

1. Confidential Nature of FBI Operations
   See Part I, Section 1, page 9, paragraph B of Manual of Rules and Regulations.
2. Title 28, Section 50.2 of the Code of Federal Regulations concerning release of information by personnel of the Department of Justice relating to criminal and civil proceedings states:

"(a) General. (1) The availability to news media of information in criminal and civil cases is a matter which has become increasingly a subject of concern in the administration of justice. The purpose of this statement is to formulate specific guidelines for the release of such information by personnel of the Department of Justice.

"(2) While the release of information for the purpose of influencing a trial is, of course, always improper, there are valid reasons for making available to the public information about the administration of the law. The task of striking a fair balance between the protection of individuals accused of crime or involved in civil proceedings with the Government and public understandings of the problems of controlling crime and administering government depends largely on the exercise of sound judgment by those responsible for administering the law and by representatives of the press and other media.

"(3) Inasmuch as the Department of Justice has generally fulfilled its responsibilities with awareness and understanding of the competing needs in this area, this statement, to a considerable extent, reflects and formalizes the standards to which representatives of the Department have adhered in the past. Nonetheless, it will be helpful in ensuring uniformity of practice to set forth the following guidelines for all personnel of the Department of Justice.

"(4) Because of the difficulty and importance of the questions they raise, it is felt that some portions of the matters covered by this statement, such as the authorization to make available Federal conviction records and a description of items seized at the time of arrest, should be the subject of continuing review and consideration by the Department on the basis of experience and suggestions from those within and outside the Department.

"(b) Guidelines to criminal actions. (1) These guidelines shall apply to the release of information to news media from the time a person is the subject of a criminal investigation until any proceeding resulting from such as investigation has been terminated by trial or otherwise.

"(2) At no time shall personnel of the Department of Justice furnish any statement or information for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a defendant's trial, nor shall personnel of the Department furnish any statement or information, which could reasonably be expected to be disseminated by means of public communication, if such a statement or information may reasonably be expected to influence the outcome of a pending or future trial.

"(3) Personnel of the Department of Justice, subject to specific limitations imposed by law or court rule or order, may make public the following information:

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

"(i) The defendant's name, age, residence, employment, marital status, and similar background information.

"(ii) The substance or text of the charge, such as a complaint, indictment, or information.

"(iii) The identity of the investigating and/or arresting agency and the length or scope of an investigation.

"(iv) The circumstances immediately surrounding an arrest, including the time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, possession and use of weapons, and a description of physical items seized at the time of arrest.

"Disclosures should include only incontrovertible, factual matters, and should not include subjective observations. In addition, where background information or information relating to the circumstances of an arrest or investigation would be highly prejudicial or where the release thereof would serve no law enforcement function, such information should not be made public.

"(4) Personnel of the Department shall not volunteer for publication any information concerning a defendant's prior criminal record, but information drawn from Federal conviction records may be made available in response to a specific request.

"(5) Because of the particular danger of prejudice resulting from statements in the period approaching and during trial, they ought strenuously to be avoided during that period. Any such statement or release shall be made only on the infrequent occasion when circumstances absolutely demand a disclosure of information and shall include only information which is clearly not prejudicial.

"(6) The release of certain types of information generally tends to create dangers of prejudice without serving a significant law enforcement function. Therefore, personnel of the Department should refrain from making available the following:

"(i) Observations about a defendant's character.

"(ii) Statements, admissions, confessions, or alibis attributable to a defendant, or the refusal or failure of the accused to make a statement.

"(iii) Reference to investigative procedures such as fingerprints, polygraph examinations, ballistic tests, or laboratory tests, or to the refusal by the defendant to submit to such tests or examinations.

"(iv) Statements concerning the identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses.

"(v) Statements concerning evidence or argument in the case, whether or not it is anticipated that such evidence or argument will be used at trial.

"(vi) Any opinion as to the accused's guilt, or the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged, or the possibility of a plea to a lesser offense.

"(7) Personnel of the Department of Justice should take no action to encourage or assist news media in photographing or televising a defendant or accused person being held or transported in Federal custody. Departmental representatives should not make available photographs of a defendant unless a law enforcement function is served thereby.

"(8) This statement of policy is not intended to restrict the release of information concerning a defendant who is a fugitive from justice.
"(9) Since the purpose of this statement is to set forth generally applicable guidelines, there will, of course, be situations in which it will limit the release of information which would not be prejudicial under the particular circumstances. If a representative of the Department believes that in the interest of the fair administration of justice and the law enforcement process information beyond these guidelines should be released, in a particular case, he shall request the permission of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General to do so.
"(c) Guidelines to civil actions. Personnel of the Department of Justice associated with a civil action shall not during its investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, which a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial and which relates to:
"(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
"(2) The character, credibility, or criminal records of a party, witness, or prospective witness.
"(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.
"(4) An opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except as required by law or administrative rule.
"(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action."

3. News Releases
Fairness, accuracy, and sensitivity to the rights of defendants, as well as to the public's right to know, must prevail in all dealings with the news media. Favoritism should be shown toward no newsman or no news medium.

Information concerning the FBI, including information regarding arrests and other developments in cases investigated by the FBI, is disclosed to news media, including newspapers, news magazines, news services, and radio and television networks or stations, (a) as news releases or announcements, initiated by the FBI, and (b) as responses to inquiries emanating from newsmen.

Each field office should maintain a control file containing all news releases issued by the office since the last inspection.

a. "One-Office" news releases
The vast majority of news releases made by field offices are issued to announce arrests in FBI cases. The provisions of Section 50.2 clearly apply to all of these. If an SAC feels that an exception to those provisions should be made in any individual case, he should make his views known to the Assistant Directors of (a) the substantive division involved and (b) the External Affairs Division. Exceptions to the instructions provided in Section 50.2 can be approved only by the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General, not by any official of the FBI.

All news releases made by field offices should be issued over the name of the SAC. They should be issued to all interested news media in the field office territory as simultaneously as possible; and they should provide as full an account of the facts as can be disclosed within the provisions of Section 50.2. In news releases announcing arrests or other developments attributable to the joint efforts of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, appropriate recognition should, of course, be given to those other agencies.

SACs may authorize other experienced Special Agents, including Resident Agents, in their field offices to read or deliver news releases issued over the SAC's name to news media after the SAC has approved those news releases. However, those Special Agents should not expand upon the information in the news releases; and they should answer any inquiry or request for additional information by courteously telling the newsman involved that his inquiry or request will be brought to the attention of the SAC as quickly as possible for his consideration and action. The reason for the policy of referring all such matters to the SAC is to assure both uniformity and accuracy of any supplemental information that is provided to news media.

SACs also may authorize other experienced Special Agents to record news releases in compliance with requests of radio and television stations. However, only SACs or ASACs should make live or filmed television appearances involving the reading of news releases.

SACs have the option of accepting or declining such time-consuming requests made by radio and television stations. If declined, however, the declinations should be tactfully worded and explained so as to avoid any impression of partiality. If a request is accepted, the radio and/or television station involved should understand that the SAC or the Special Agent designated by the SAC will merely read the text of the news release and will not answer questions.

On occasion, SACs also issue news releases or make announcements dealing with administrative matters such as transfers of the SAC or ASAC of the field office or presentation of service awards to personnel of the field office. On such occasions, photographs and biographical sketches of the personnel involved may be made available to the news media. However, requests to interview these employees about their official duties and experiences should tactfully be declined.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

So as to minimize the opportunities for criminal elements to harass Special Agents and their families, neither photographs nor biographical sketches of Special Agents should be made available to news media in connection with news releases, announcements, or inquiries pertaining to FBI investigations. The sole exception is in the case of employees who are killed in line of duty, in which instances the release of photographs and biographical data should be coordinated with the Administrative Division and the External Affairs Division.

b. "Multi-Office" news releases

News releases announcing arrests or other important developments in wide-ranging investigations often require close coordination and simultaneous release to the press by two or more field offices. The External Affairs Division should be consulted before any such news release is made, and consideration should be given to the question of whether a national news release is merited.

c. National news releases

As a general rule, national news releases announcing arrests or other investigative developments are issued only in exceptional cases involving (1) prominent persons, such as well-known business and civic leaders, entertainers, athletes, or officials of local, county, state, or Federal Government; (2) persons of national notoriety, such as members of the "Ten Most Wanted Fugitives"; (3) persons arrested for crimes that have attracted nationwide interest, such as prevailed in the 1950 robbery of Brink's Inc., at Boston, Massachusetts, and the 1964 murder of three young civil rights workers in Neshoba County, Mississippi; and (4) persons whose crimes have international ramifications, such as espionage agents or fugitives who have fled abroad. The heads of headquarters and field divisions should assure that the essential facts of all such cases, including anticipated developments therein, are promptly brought to the attention of the External Affairs Division on a continuing basis.

National news releases generally will be issued in Washington, D. C. However, copies will be furnished to all interested field offices so that the SACs of those offices can make them available to local news media within minutes of their release in Washington.

SACs should not expand upon the contents of national news releases without approval of both the substantive division involved and the External Affairs Division.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

4. News Media Inquiries

There are two categories of news media inquiries. The first involves routine inquiries received at the field office regarding either investigative or administrative matters. These should be answered by the SAC or ASAC within the guidelines indicated above.

In responding to such inquiries, SACs and ASACs should be courteous, factual, and as helpful as possible. They should, however, avoid answering hypothetical questions or questions that would require them to express personal opinions on matters of intense local or national controversy.

The second category involves inquiries from the news media in emergency situations. Often these are received by Special Agents at the scenes of arrests, gun battles, or other fast-moving developments in investigations.

Unless undercover assignments or similar overriding circumstances dictate otherwise, Special Agents who are approached by newsmen at the scenes of fast-moving developments in FBI cases should (a) identify themselves as "a Special Agent of the FBI," (b) furnish the name of the field office to which they are assigned, and (c) state the general nature of the investigative operations, such as "We are here to serve an arrest (or a search) warrant." Requests for additional information should be answered by courteously referring the newsman to the field office or to the temporary field headquarters if such a temporary field headquarters has been established in the area.

Only SACs or ASACs should participate in question-and-answer interviews with representatives of any news medium at the scenes of fast-moving developments in FBI cases. In emergency situations, however, Special Agents can relay reporters' questions to the SAC by telephone or radio; and the SAC's responses thereto can be furnished to the reporters in the SAC's name by a Special Agent. In other than such emergency situations, Special Agents should courteously refer newsmen to the SAC or ASAC for answers to their questions; and Special Agents' investigative responsibilities attendant to such fast-moving developments must take precedence over questions or inquiries of newsmen.

No FBI employee should knowingly furnish an erroneous, deceptive, or misleading answer to a news media inquiry. In the overwhelming majority of cases, an unequivocal and definitive answer can be given reporters' questions regarding whether the FBI is, or is not, investigating a specific criminal act, as well as the reason why we have or have not instituted investigation. However, in kidnap-for-ransom cases and related crimes involving a threat against human life, neither the fact that the crime has occurred, nor the fact that the FBI is investigating it, should be disclosed or confirmed without the approval of the substantive investigative division and the External Affairs Division.

Due to the sensitivity of many banking-type institutions to publicity concerning the amount of loot obtained in robberies, burglaries, and larcenies of financial institutions, such information should not be disclosed to news media without the concurrence of the General Investigative Division and the External Affairs Division.

Under no circumstances should any employee ask or suggest that a newsman withhold information from the public without the concurrence of the substantive investigative division and the External Affairs Division.

5. Fugitive Publicity

News releases and other public disclosures designed to solicit public cooperation in the apprehension of FBI fugitives may contain more facts about the fugitive's criminal background than are permissible in news releases and announcements regarding arrests.

In publicity regarding FBI fugitives, extreme care should be taken to avoid statements that brand a fugitive as guilty of a crime for which he has not been convicted. Arrest numbers or other data that identify a photograph as having been made in connection with a past arrest or imprisonment should not appear in photographs of fugitives that are furnished to news media.

Field offices should coordinate all fugitive publicity with the Special Investigative Division and the External Affairs Division; and they should not hesitate to consult the External Affairs Division regarding questions or problems that arise in any area of news media relations.

6. Liaison With News Media

SACs who consider it necessary or advisable to do so may use one or more experienced Special Agents to assist in facilitating prompt and effective liaison with the news media. Such Agents will not be spokesmen for their field offices. They may furnish information to news media in the SAC's name after it has been approved by the SAC. They also may assist in preparing news releases, as well as responses to news media inquiries. These Agents should devote no more time to such news media liaison duties than is absolutely necessary.

It is the intent of these guidelines to facilitate a more open stance and, thereby, a mutually beneficial relationship between FBI and news media representatives. SACs, as well as other employees acting for them in news media relations, should be as responsive as practical and possible to inquiries and requests made by newsmen. The term "No comment" should be avoided except when its use is absolutely necessary. If an SAC does not know the answer to a newsman's question, he should have no hesitancy in stating, "I don't know," and/or, depending upon the nature of the inquiry, telling the newsman that he will contact him (the newsman) as soon as he has information that can be furnished to him.

SACs should avail themselves of every opportunity to meet and become well acquainted with leading citizens throughout their field divisions, including representatives of all important news media. They should seek to cultivate a personal, as well as an official, relationship with these individuals to the fullest extent that the demands of other duties make possible.]

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    - a. Foreword by the Director
    - b. Interesting case write-ups
    - c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
    - d. Deleted
2. Distribution

    Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
    - a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by FBIHQ.
    - b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
    - c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.
    - d. Deleted
4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
    - a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy graduates
    - b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
    - c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
    - d. Deleted
    - e. Police and firearms training subjects
    - f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
    - g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:

      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      [Research[(External Affairs]Division)

C. SPEECHES

1. The speech program is the personal responsibility of the SAC, and the SAC or ASAC should handle principal commitments. If neither available, these can be handled by an experienced and well-informed Agent approved for the commitment by the SAC or ASAC. Good judgment should dictate when a manuscript should be submitted to FBIHQ for approval in advance of a speaking engagement, particularly in regard to radio and television appearances.
2. It is not necessary to advise FBIHQ of each speaking engagement. Each office will maintain for a minimum of one year and one regular office inspection a control file in connection with acceptances and declinations of speech invitations. Each year on January 10th and on July 10th. each office will submit to FBIHQ a statistical report of speaking commitments handled. This will be divided into engagements by the SAC, the ASAC, and other Agent Supervisors; and will be further subdivided into speeches as well as radio, television, and Career Day appearances by these three groups.
3. Each office should maintain a speech material file for the use of speakers. This should include Law Enforcement Bulletin items, interesting case material, magazine articles, research literature, newspaper clippings pertaining to law enforcement matters of interest, and items of value in connection with public appearances of Bureau representatives. In addition to being maintained in current status, this speech material should be indexed as to subject matter in the office files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
    a. Requested by the Bureau
    b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
    c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
    a. Major importance
    b. Public interest
    c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
    d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
    a. Double spaced
    b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
    c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
    d. Accurately
    e. After a review of the entire file
    f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
    g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.
i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

4. Do not:
   a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
   b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
   c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
   d. Use complicated sentence structure
   e. Use technical references to statutes
   f. Express personal opinions
   g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
   h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
   i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
   j. Use adjectives excessively
5. Transmittal
   Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, attention [External Affairs] Division.
6. Dissemination
   New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreciable passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before release. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the Bureau on request.

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.
2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters. In all instances the circular letter must include the following:
   a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
   b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
   c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
   d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
   e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addressees is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.
6. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
7. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau a communication pertaining to a list of law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. One of the two following procedures should be used:

a. (1) On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each Department, the list described above. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.
    - (a) Chiefs of police
    - (b) Sheriffs
    - (c) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
    - (d) U. S. Marshals and deputies
    - (e) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
    - (f) Wardens of penal institutions
    - (g) District attorneys or county prosecutors
    - (h) Railway police (if desirable)
    - (i) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
    - (j) Any other officials who receive identification orders

   (2) Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

I. VISITS TO FIELD OFFICES

1. Non-Bureau governmental officials
   a. Do not discuss Bureau policies, plans, or relationships. Courteously advise the visitor that inquiries concerning such matters are to be made at the Bureau at Washington.
   b. Advise the Bureau of the visit, identity of the visitor, purpose, matters discussed, courtesies extended, and observations of interest to the Bureau.
2. Departmental officials
   a. Be courteous.
   b. Do not offer office space, clerical and stenographic assistance, or chauffeuring in Bureau automobiles.
   c. Do not furnish information unless prior notification has been received that the official would contact the field office for information. If no notification received, before furnishing information clearance must be obtained from the Bureau.
   d. Advise the Bureau in case of doubt.

J. MISCELLANEOUS

[1. [Firearms, defensive tactics,]and disarming demonstrations
   Are to be confined to law enforcement groups.
2. Credentials
   Are to be exhibited to all persons interviewed in such manner that the person to whom shown has an opportunity to observe and understand the connection of the Agent with the FBI.
3. Law enforcement officials
   a. Contact with
      (1) Contact must be maintained with law enforcement officials for the purpose of securing information of violations of Federal laws within the jurisdiction of the Bureau.
      (2) Agents are to call on police executives when in their cities unless such visits would be so frequent as to be embarrassing.
      (3) Local law enforcement agencies should be advised by letter of the disposition of prosecutive action taken in Federal court in cases

referred to Bureau by local law enforcement agencies or where Bureau fugitives are taken into custody by local law enforcement officers. They should also be advised of violations of local laws coming to the attention of the FBI.

b. Visits to Washington
When the field requests special courtesies be afforded certain individuals, including law enforcement officers, coming to Washington, D. C., the communication so advising the Bureau shall contain biographical data and a brief summary of information in the field office files concerning the visitor.

When law enforcement executives are contemplating a visit to the Bureau at Washington, D. C., ask them to call at the office of the [Assistant Director of External Affairs Division, Room 5634,] Justice Building.

c. Letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, and condolence
When letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, or condolence from the Director are recommended by the field, such recommendations should be submitted promptly. They should include the specific facts on which the recommendation is based, full identifying data and address of the citizen, and the result of a search of the field office indices concerning the citizen. [Form FD-468 may be used.]
In connection with the election of officers of police associations at conventions covering more than one field division territory, the field division in whose territory the convention was physically held is responsible for submitting any recommendations for letters of congratulations. The office submitting such request should summarize briefly the relations with these officers, incorporating any derogatory data which might preclude such letters. Inasmuch as the recommending office is not likely to possess all data, pertinent other field divisions should submit a brief, supplemental summary concerning officers recommended for letters who reside in their territory.

4. Inquiries concerning status of Bureau cases
When a state official has expressed interest in the prosecutive status of a Bureau case, for a legitimate reason, such as deferment of state prosecution pending the outcome of the Federal case, insure that such official is kept appropriately advised, including the final outcome of the matter.

5. U. S. Cabinet officers, Senators, and Congressmen
If an SAC receives an inquiry from a Cabinet officer or U. S. Senator or Congressman concerning an official matter, it should be brought to the attention of the Bureau's attention immediately.

K. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Definition
An individual, organization, or concern willingly furnishing information to employees frequently enough to justify making a record where the source need not be protected. If occasionally the source must be protected, this may be done. If sources must be constantly concealed, they become informants or confidential sources and must be handled as such.

1. Index
Index card (3 by 5 inches) must be made up to contain:
   a. Names
   b. Addresses
   c. Organization or concern
   d. Type of information furnished
   e. Date of development

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    a. Federal judges
    b. U. S. Attorneys
    c. Only outstanding state judges
    d. Governors
    e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    f. State attorneys general
    g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    i. In the principal cities:
        (1) Mayors
        (2) Chiefs of police
        (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        (9) Heads of larger universities
        (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        (11) Top representatives of airlines
        (12) Managers of leading airports
        (13) Top representatives of railroads
        (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        (19) Heads of leading banks
        (20) Influential minority leaders
14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.
15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

[[M.] NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers including minority-oriented newspapers, must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously effective. The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising the maximum effectiveness of this program.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

[[N. BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM REGARDING MATTERS OF NATIONAL INTEREST
This program is coordinated by the External Affairs Division and is devoted primarily to supplying SACs facts regarding current happenings, including both administrative and investigative developments, that are topics of nationwide press coverage and public interest.

All such communications to SACs bear the caption "BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM" and are in the form of either teletypes or airtels, dependent upon the exigencies of the situation.

The purpose of this program is to assure that each SAC possesses the key facts concerning important happenings anywhere within the FBI that command widespread public interest. Information furnished to SACs under this program should prove helpful to them, as well as to other FBI personnel, in answering questions, correcting misunderstandings, and dispelling false rumors that may exist either within or without the ranks of the FBI. In some instances, however, the information may be of such a nature that it cannot be disclosed in whole or in part to outsiders. In fact, occasionally it is necessary to restrict discussion and disclosure of the information even within FBIHQ and field offices. Guidelines furnished on each communication should be strictly followed.

FBIHQ and field office personnel should promptly bring to the attention of the External Affairs Division all current items and developments that they feel merit consideration for inclusion under this program.]

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
MAY 28, 1974
REVISION 264

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
Table of Contents - Pages 5 and 6

Section 1 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 4 - Pages 11a and 12

Section 5 - Page 13

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 6

Section 10 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 12 - Pages 1b and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 16 - Pages 1d and 2

Part II
Section 3 - Pages 5a and 6
Pages 11 and 11a
Pages 27 and 28
Pages 35 and 36
Pages 37 and 38

Part II (cont.)
Section 4 - Pages 13 and 14
Pages 29 and 30
Pages 57 and 57a

Section 6 - Pages 1f and 2
Page 2a
Pages 3 and 3a
Pages 9 and 10

Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8

Section 8 - Page 18c
Page 29

Section 9 - Pages 17a and 18

Index - Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19a and 20
Pages 20a and 20b

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (31)

[Under no circumstances should any employee ask or suggest that a newsman withhold information from the public without the concurrence of the substantive investigative division and the External Affairs Division.

5. Fugitive Publicity

News releases and other public disclosures designed to solicit public cooperation in the apprehension of FBI fugitives may contain more facts about the fugitive's criminal background than are permissible in news releases and announcements regarding arrests.

In publicity regarding FBI fugitives, extreme care should be taken to avoid statements that brand a fugitive as guilty of a crime for which he has not been convicted. Arrest numbers or other data that identify a photograph as having been made in connection with a past arrest or imprisonment should not appear in photographs of fugitives that are furnished to news media.

Field offices should coordinate all fugitive publicity with the Special Investigative Division and the External Affairs Division; and they should not hesitate to consult the External Affairs Division regarding questions or problems that arise in any area of news media relations.

6. Liaison With News Media

SACs who consider it necessary or advisable to do so may use one or more experienced Special Agents to assist in facilitating prompt and effective liaison with the news media. Such Agents will not be spokesmen for their field offices. They may furnish information to news media in the SAC's name after it has been approved by the SAC. They also may assist in preparing news releases, as well as responses to news media inquiries. These Agents should devote no more time to such news media liaison duties than is absolutely necessary.

It is the intent of these guidelines to facilitate a more open stance and, thereby, a mutually beneficial relationship between FBI and news media representatives. SACs, as well as other employees acting for them in news media relations, should be as responsive as practical and possible to inquiries and requests made by newsmen. The term "No comment" should be avoided except when its use is absolutely necessary. If an SAC does not know the answer to a newsman's question, he should have no hesitancy in stating, "I don't know," and/or, depending upon the nature of the inquiry, telling the newsman that he will contact him (the newsman) as soon as he has information that can be furnished to him.

SACs should avail themselves of every opportunity to meet and become well acquainted with leading citizens throughout their field divisions, including representatives of all important news media. They should seek to cultivate a personal, as well as an official, relationship with these individuals to the fullest extent that the demands of other duties make possible.]

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    - a. Foreword by the Director
    - b. [Fugitive notices and interesting or unusual fingerprint patterns
    - c. Articles and features designed to inform law enforcement officers of new, but proven, programs and techniques to enhance their professional capabilities
    - d. Items alerting law enforcement officers to dangerous weapons or techniques utilized by the criminal element]
2. Distribution

    Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
    - a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by FBIHQ.
    - b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
    - c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.
    - d. Deleted
4. [Suggestions and submissions
    - a. Each field office is required to submit three suggestions for byline articles from each state within its territory. Prior to submitting suggestions, proposed authors may be approached to determine their willingness to prepare an article and to identify the scope of their topic. However, proposed authors should not be asked to prepare a manuscript until the Bureau notifies the field office that the suggestion has been accepted and the article is requested. In contacts with any proposed or potential authors, absolutely no representations should be made which would obligate the FBI to any publishing commitments since many factors determine which articles received are ultimately published.
    - b. In suggesting featured articles, consideration should mainly be given to manuscripts concerning proven programs and techniques of law enforcement which may be of significant value to other agencies. Suggestions should be concerned with training, research, or operational matters. Avoid items of a "newsletter" nature and matters which have a limited scope of interest in the profession.
    - c. Each field office should be alert to exceptional photographs which could be recommended for use as a cover for the magazine. The Bureau wishes to project on the Bulletin's cover the best image of law enforcement. Attention-getting photographs showing officers giving aid to helpless citizens, protecting the weak, comforting the injured, or apprehending the guilty are examples of those that should be recommended when they come to the attention of field offices.
    - d. Transmit all material for the magazine to the Bureau under the caption:

        FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
        Research Section (External Affairs Division)]

C. SPEECHES

1. The speech program is the personal responsibility of the SAC, and the SAC or ASAC should handle principal commitments. If neither available, these can be handled by an experienced and well-informed Agent approved for the commitment by the SAC or ASAC. Good judgment should dictate when a manuscript should be submitted to FBIHQ for approval in advance of a speaking engagement, particularly in regard to radio and television appearances.
2. It is not necessary to advise FBIHQ of each speaking engagement. Each office will maintain for a minimum of one year and one regular office inspection a control file in connection with acceptances and declinations of speech invitations. Each year on January 10th and on July 10th each office will submit to FBIHQ a statistical report of speaking commitments handled. This will be divided into engagements by the SAC, the ASAC, and other Agent Supervisors; and will be further subdivided into speeches as well as radio, television, and Career Day appearances by these three groups.
3. Each office should maintain a speech material file for the use of speakers. This should include Law Enforcement Bulletin items, interesting case material, magazine articles, research literature, newspaper clippings pertaining to law enforcement matters of interest, and items of value in connection with public appearances of Bureau representatives. In addition to being maintained in current status, this speech material should be indexed as to subject matter in the office files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence
   h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.
   i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

4. Do not:
    a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
    b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
    c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
    d. Use complicated sentence structure
    e. Use technical references to statutes
    f. Express personal opinions
    g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
    h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
    i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
    j. Use adjectives excessively
5. Transmittal
Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, Attention: External Affairs Division.
6. Dissemination
[Field Offices will be advised by routing slip when new write-ups are prepared. If copies are desired, an appropriate letter should be submitted to the Bureau, Attention: External Affairs Division, setting forth the specific use for which the write-up is intended. In instances where write-ups, either those previously prepared or those to be published in the future, may be released outside the Bureau, it will be necessary to first obtain Bureau approval.
7. Interesting case control file
A copy of all communications concerning the dissemination of write-ups outside the Bureau is to be placed in the Interesting Case Control file. These communications should contain the identity of the person to whom the write-up is being made available, as well as the purpose for which it is to be used.]

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS
1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.
2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters. In all instances the circular letter must include the following:
    a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
    b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
    c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
    d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
    e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addressees is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.
6. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
7. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

   On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau a communication pertaining to a list of law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. One of the two following procedures should be used:

   a. (1) On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each Department, the list described above. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.
      - (a) Chiefs of police
      - (b) Sheriffs
      - (c) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      - (d) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      - (e) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      - (f) Wardens of penal institutions
      - (g) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      - (h) Railway police (if desirable)
      - (i) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      - (j) Any other officials who receive identification orders

      (2) Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    - a. Federal judges
    - b. U. S. Attorneys
    - c. Only outstanding state judges
    - d. Governors
    - e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    - f. State attorneys general
    - g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    - h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    - i. In the principal cities:
        - (1) Mayors
        - (2) Chiefs of police
        - (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        - (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio[and television] stations
        - (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        - (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        - (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        - (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        - (9) Heads of larger universities
        - (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        - (11) Top representatives of airlines
        - (12) Managers of leading airports
        - (13) Top representatives of railroads
        - (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        - (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        - (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        - (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        - (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        - (19) Heads of leading banks
        - (20) Influential minority leaders

14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers including minority-oriented newspapers, must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously effective. The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising the maximum effectiveness of this program.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

[N. BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM REGARDING MATTERS OF NATIONAL INTEREST
This program is coordinated by the External Affairs Division and is devoted primarily to supplying SACs facts regarding current happenings, including both administrative and investigative developments, that are topics of nationwide press coverage and public interest.

All such communications to SACs bear the caption "BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM" and are in the form of either teletypes or airtels, dependent upon the exigencies of the situation.

The purpose of this program is to assure that each SAC possesses the key facts concerning important happenings anywhere within the FBI that command widespread public interest. Information furnished to SACs under this program should prove helpful to them, as well as to other FBI personnel, in answering questions, correcting misunderstandings, and dispelling false rumors that may exist either within or without the ranks of the FBI. In some instances, however, the information may be of such a nature that it cannot be disclosed in whole or in part to outsiders. In fact, occasionally it is necessary to restrict discussion and disclosure of the information even within FBIHQ and field offices. Guidelines furnished on each communication should be strictly followed.

FBIHQ and field office personnel should promptly bring to the attention of the External Affairs Division all current items and developments that they feel merit consideration for inclusion under this program.]

MANUAL OF RU[illegible]S AND REGULATIONS
DECEMBER 27, 1974
REVISION 271

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
  Table of Contents - Pages 3 and 4
    Pages 5 and 6

  Section 6 - Page 7-8
    Pages 9 and 10

  Section 16 - Pages 3 and 3a

  Section 18 - (New Section)
    Pages 1 and 2
    Pages 3 and 4

Part II
  Section 1 - Pages 1a and 2
    Pages 3 and 4

  Section 2 - Pages 1 and 1a

  Section 3 - Pages 11c and 12
    Pages 17a and 18

  Section 4 - Pages 35 and 36
    Pages 37 and 38
    Pages 41 and 42-46
    Page 47-50
    Pages 57b and 58
    Pages 59 and 60
    Pages 63 and 64

  Section 6 - Pages 3 and 3a
    Page 5b

  Section 8 - Pages 1b and 2

Index - Pages 7 and 8

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (23)

4. Do not:
   a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
   b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
   c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
   d. Use complicated sentence structure
   e. Use technical references to statutes
   f. Express personal opinions
   g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
   h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
   i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
   j. Use adjectives excessively
5. Transmittal
   Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, Attention: External Affairs Division.
6. Dissemination
   [Field Offices will be advised by routing slip when new write-ups are prepared. If copies are desired, an appropriate letter should be submitted to the Bureau, Attention: External Affairs Division, setting forth the specific use for which the write-up is intended. In instances where write-ups, either those previously prepared or those to be published in the future, may be released outside the Bureau, it will be necessary to first obtain Bureau approval.
7. Interesting case control file
   A copy of all communications concerning the dissemination of write-ups outside the Bureau is to be placed in the Interesting Case Control file. These communications should contain the identity of the person to whom the write-up is being made available, as well as the purpose for which it is to be used.]

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS
1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.
2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters. In all instances the circular letter must include the following:
   a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
   b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
   c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
   d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
   e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addressees is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.
6. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, [[color, religion, sex, or national origin.]
7. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

[F. RADIO[AND TELEVISION]BROADCASTS

[Radio[and television]broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau a communication pertaining to a list of law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. One of the two following procedures should be used:

a. (1) On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each Department, the list described above. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.

(a) Chiefs of police
(b) Sheriffs
(c) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
(d) U. S. Marshals and deputies
(e) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
(f) Wardens of penal institutions
(g) District attorneys or county prosecutors
(h) Railway police (if desirable)
(i) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
(j) Any other officials who receive identification orders

(2) Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.

c. Purchase of individual publications at Bureau request

When the Bureau requests a field office to purchase and forward one or more copies of publications of security interest, it is desired, unless otherwise specifically stated, that nonevidentiary copies be forwarded. With respect to these specific Bureau requests for the purchase of individual copies of publications, the requested nonevidentiary copies should be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip via ordinary mail.

d. Obtaining and retaining evidentiary copies of publications in the field

When the submitting office determines, or is advised by the Bureau, that a certain issue of a publication (which has already been forwarded to the Bureau) is deemed to be of sufficient importance to warrant the obtaining of an evidentiary copy of that issue, a copy thereof should be obtained through live informants or by having an Agent purchase a copy at a public outlet for that publication, if confidentially feasible. The evidentiary copy, bearing complete identifying data, should be retained as evidence in the field office; and the Bureau should be so advised by letter, setting forth complete identifying data concerning the evidentiary copy, together with the caption and file number of the file in which the evidentiary copy is retained.

e. Transmittal of evidentiary copies of publications to the Bureau

Instances in which the field will transmit evidentiary copies of publications to the Bureau will be limited almost exclusively to the submission of copies of foreign language publications for translation of certain material for use as evidence. In these instances, it is required that:

(1) Each copy submitted bear complete identifying data
(2) The material be forwarded in sealed envelopes labeled "Evidence"
(3) The material be forwarded via registered mail
(4) The cover letter of transmittal be marked for the attention of the FBI Laboratory; state clearly that it is contemplated that the publications (and translations thereof) will be used as evidence; identify clearly the enclosed publications as to title, place of publication, and date of issue; show the method of transmittal of the evidence to the Bureau; and indicate the desired disposition of the evidence.

f. Calling attention of Bureau to publications of security interest

When a field office obtains an evidentiary copy of a publication which it desires to call to the Bureau's attention, a letter should be addressed to the Bureau to that end. Title, author, publisher, and the general nature should be very briefly set forth, together with the identifying data proper to the evidentiary copy. The letter should be informative, not requiring an answer. A nonevidentiary duplicate copy of that publication should be enclosed with the letter, if readily available. If a nonevidentiary copy is not readily available, that fact should be stated in the letter. If the Bureau desires to obtain a nonevidentiary duplicate copy of the publication for review, efforts will be made to obtain it through the appropriate field office. If not obtained, the office possessing the evidentiary copy will be requested to forward to the Bureau a Photostat thereof.

MANUAL OF RU[illegible] AND REGULATIONS
JANUARY 27, 1975
REVISION 272

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part II
Section 3 - Pages 1c and 2
Pages 3c and 4
Pages 5a and 6
Page 11b
Pages 11c and 12
Pages 13 and 13a
Page 13b
Pages 13c and 14
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 15b and 15c
Pages 15d and 16
Page 17
Pages 33 and 34
Pages 35 and 36

Section 4 - Pages 1b and 2
Pages 7 and 8
Page 8a
Pages 33a and 34
Pages 65 and 66

Section 6 - Page 2a

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 23 and 24-26
(Delete pages 25 and 26)

Section 9 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 9 and 10
Page 17
Pages 19 and 20

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (27)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

C. SPEECHES

1. The speech program is the personal responsibility of the SAC, and the SAC or ASAC should handle principal commitments. If neither available, these can be handled by an experienced and well-informed Agent approved for the commitment by the SAC or ASAC. Good judgment should dictate when a manuscript should be submitted to FBIHQ for approval in advance of a speaking engagement, particularly in regard to radio and television appearances.
2. It is not necessary to advise FBIHQ of each speaking engagement. Each office will maintain for a minimum of one year and one regular office inspection a control file in connection with acceptances and declinations of speech invitations. Each year on January 10th and on July 10th. each office will submit to FBIHQ a statistical report of speaking commitments handled. This will be divided into engagements by the SAC, the ASAC, and other Agent Supervisors; and will be further subdivided into speeches as well as radio, television, and Career Day appearances by these three groups. [In addition, identify the 10 most important speeches given during the 6-month period covered by the report and indicate who gave them.]
3. Each office should maintain a speech material file for the use of speakers. This should include Law Enforcement Bulletin items, interesting case material, magazine articles, research literature, newspaper clippings pertaining to law enforcement matters of interest, and items of value in connection with public appearances of Bureau representatives. In addition to being maintained in current status, this speech material should be indexed as to subject matter in the office files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
    a. Requested by the Bureau
    b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
    c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
    a. Major importance
    b. Public interest
    c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
    d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
    a. Double spaced
    b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
    c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
    d. Accurately
    e. After a review of the entire file
    f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
    g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence
    h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.
    i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

MANUAL OF RUL[illegible] AND REGULATIONS
FEBRUARY 27, 1[illegible]75
REVISION 273

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
Table of Contents - Pages 5 and 6

Section 12 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 5 and 6

Section 14 - Pages 13 and 14

Section 16 - Pages 3 and 3a
Page 3b

Section 17 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Part II
Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 9 add 10
Pages 15 and 15a

Section 4 - Page 47-50
Pages 59 and 60

Section 5 - Page 13

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a
Page 7-8
Pages 9 and 10

Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6

Section 8 - Pages 27 and 28
Pages 29 and 30

Section 9 - Pages 21 and 22
Page 25

Index - Page 43

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (23)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
   a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
      (1) Scientific apparatus
      (2) Equipment
      (3) Personnel
      (4) Methods
      (5) Economics
   b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
      (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
      (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
      (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
      (4) Bad local crime conditions
      (5) Scientific crime detection experts
      (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual pertinent school files clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
      (7) Police training in colleges and universities
      (8) Aggravated sex offenders
      (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
      (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
2. Method of preparation for transmittal
   a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
   b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
   c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
   d. Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.
   e. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
   f. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
   g. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.

i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.

j. All clippings must be complete.

k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations should be forwarded.

l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.

4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau

a. General principle governing submissions

[The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at [FBIHQ]for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.

b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications

[(1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of[Section IS-3, Intelligence Division)]unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition)should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.

[(2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention [Section IS-3, Intelligence Division,]informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.

(3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete or when it is determined a source is deceased.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index except when it has been determined that source is deceased, at which time general index card can be destroyed immediately. Under all other conditions the general index cards shall be retained for 20 years subsequent to the removal of cards from the special source of information index.

2. Files
   Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and extremist sources of information
   Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and extremist sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section[130I,]item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or extremist source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

[L. [PUBLIC CONTACTS

1. Public contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI.
2. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit leading officials located in the field division.]

3. Persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:

   a. Federal judges
   b. U. S. Attorneys
   c. Only outstanding state judges
   d. Governors
   e. Leading state and county prosecutors
   f. State attorneys general
   g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
   h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
   i. In the principal cities:
      (1) Mayors
      (2) Chiefs of police
      (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
      (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio and television stations
      (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
      (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
      (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
      (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
      (9) Heads of larger universities
      (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
      (11) Top representatives of airlines
      (12) Managers of leading airports
      (13) Top representatives of railroads
      (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
      (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
      (16) Top representatives of Western Union
      (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
      (18) Heads of better business bureaus
      (19) Heads of leading banks
      (20) Influential minority leaders

M. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 3i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers including minority-oriented newspapers, must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously effective. The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising the maximum effectiveness of this program.

[N. BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM REGARDING MATTERS OF NATIONAL INTEREST
This program is coordinated by the External Affairs Division and is devoted primarily to supplying SACs facts regarding current happenings, including both administrative and investigative developments, that are topics of nationwide press coverage and public interest.

All such communications to SACs bear the caption "BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM" and are in the form of either teletypes or airtels, dependent upon the exigencies of the situation.

The purpose of this program is to assure that each SAC possesses the key facts concerning important happenings anywhere within the FBI that command widespread public interest. Information furnished to SACs under this program should prove helpful to them, as well as to other FBI personnel, in answering questions, correcting misunderstandings, and dispelling false rumors that may exist either within or without the ranks of the FBI. In some instances, however, the information may be of such a nature that it cannot be disclosed in whole or in part to outsiders. In fact, occasionally it is necessary to restrict discussion and disclosure of the information even within FBIHQ and field offices. Guidelines furnished on each communication should be strictly followed.

FBIHQ and field office personnel should promptly bring to the attention of the External Affairs Division all current items and developments that they feel merit consideration for inclusion under this program.]

MARCH 27, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 214

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Part I

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 4 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~

Section 7 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 10 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 14 - Pages 15 and 16

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~6a and 6b~~

Section 2 - Page ~~4a~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~33 and 34~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~37 and 38~~
Pages ~~50a and 50b~~

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a

Section 7 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 8 - Page 23-24
Pages ~~27 and 28~~

Index

Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Page ~~27~~
Pages ~~27a and 27b~~
Pages ~~27c and 28~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~33 and 34~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (23)

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest

a. Relating to law enforcement concerning

(1) Scientific apparatus

(2) Equipment

(3) Personnel

(4) Methods

(5) Economics

b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern

(1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.

(2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation

(3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime

(4) Bad local crime conditions

(5) Scientific crime detection experts

(6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual[pertinent school]files clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)

(7) Police training in colleges and universities

(8) Aggravated sex offenders

(9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.

(10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.

2. Method of preparation for transmittal

a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.

b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.

c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.

d. Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.

e. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.

f. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.

g. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.
i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.
j. All clippings must be complete.
k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations should be forwarded.
l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.
4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau
   a. General principle governing submissions
   The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.
   b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications
      (1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the [attention of [Research Section, Domestic Intelligence Division)] unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

      Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.
      (2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention [[Research Section, Domestic Intelligence Division,]informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.
      (3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

FEBRUARY 27, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 212

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 5 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages 11 and 12
Page ~~13~~ (Pages 14 and 15 deleted)

Section 6 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 13 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~
Pages 5 and 6 (Page 5a deleted)
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~8a and 8b~~
Pages 9 and 10

Section 17 - Page ~~9~~

Part II

Section 1 - Page ~~1~~

Section 2 - Pages ~~5a and 6~~

Section 3 - Pages 3c and 4
Page 5
Pages ~~5a and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 7a~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages ~~15b and 15c~~
Pages ~~37 and 38~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Pages ~~2c and 2d~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~22a and 22b~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~65 and 66~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages 21 and 21a

Section 9 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Index

Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Page ~~34a~~
Pages ~~41 and 42~~
Pages ~~43 and 44~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (43)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.

10. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

[[11. In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide
[news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee.
[No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection
[with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter,
[without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other
[Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing
[Bureau policy.]

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    a. Foreword by the Director
    b. Interesting case write-ups
    c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
    d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution

    Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
    a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.
    b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
    c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

   d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   - a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   - b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   - c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   - d. Human interest items from local police work
   - e. Police and firearms training subjects
   - f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   - g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:

     FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
     Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television[appearance,]a manuscript of the[remarks]must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval[unless previously approved Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and time does not permit prior Bureau approval.] In some other cases involving important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   - a. Requested by the Bureau
   - b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   - c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   - a. Major importance
   - b. Public interest
   - c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   - d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   - a. Double spaced
   - b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   - c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   - d. Accurately
   - e. After a review of the entire file
   - f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   - g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

JANUARY 30, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 211

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 5 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~
Pages ~~4c and 4d~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 13 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 17 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~3~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~1a and 2~~

Section 2 - Page 1d

Section 3 - Pages ~~19a and 20~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~1b and 2~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~4c~~ and 4d

Index

Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~28c and 28d~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
    - a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
    - b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
    - c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
    - d. White Slave Traffic Act
    - e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
    - f. Illegal wearing of uniform
    - g. Impersonation
    - h. National Firearms Act
    - i. [State Firearms Control Assistance Act; unlawful possession or receipt of firearms]
    - j. Extortion
    - k. Red Cross Act
    - l. Theft from interstate shipment
    - m. May Act
    - n. Patent matters
    - o. Copyright matters
    - p. Federal Reserve Act
    - q. Mail fraud
    - r. Falsely claiming citizenship
    - s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
    - t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
    - u. Crimes on the high seas
    - v. National Bankruptcy Act
    - w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
    - x. Crimes on Indian reservation
    - y. Crimes on Government reservation
    - z. Bills of Lading Act
    - aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
    - ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
    - ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
    - ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
    - ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
    - af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
    - ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
    - ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised)
    - ai. Bank robbery
    - aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
    - ak. Migratory Game Bird Act

2. Requesting authority for release
    a. By teletype
       At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
    b. By telephone where time is of essence
       Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with the office of the division head of the Crime Records Division for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. [In those instances in which a press release is issued at SOG, television and radio media should be merely provided with a written copy of the press release, and Bureau personnel should not submit to live, filmed, or tape-recorded interviews of any kind, including the reading of the release itself, without prior Bureau authority. Tact and diplomacy must be exercised in declining to participate in such interviews. With respect to local press releases, SACs may, when requested, make personal appearances on television and radio provided no interviews are conducted and there is absolutely no elaboration over and above the original press release. These conditions should be made known in advance to television and radio station representatives when such requests are received.]
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution

   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.
   b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
   c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Human interest items from local police work
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television[appearance,]a manuscript of the[remarks]must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval[unless previously approved Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and time does not permit prior Bureau approval.] In some other cases involving important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

OCTOBER 31, 1969
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 208

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Pages 15 and 16

Part II

Section 1 - Pages 9a and 10

Section 2 - Page 7

Section 3 - Pages 15 and 15a

Section 4 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 2c and 2d
Pages 9 and 10
Pages 29 and 30
Pages 50a and 50b

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a

Section 8 - Pages 4a and 4b
Pages 27 and 28

Index

Pages 1 and 2
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 27 and 28
Pages 28a and 28b
Pages 31 and 32
Pages 33 and 34
Page 34a
Pages 37 and 38
Pages 41 and 42
Pages 43 and 44

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (23)

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
    a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
        (1) Scientific apparatus
        (2) Equipment
        (3) Personnel
        (4) Methods
        (5) Economics
    b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
        (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
        (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation.
        (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
        (4) Bad local crime conditions
        (5) Scientific crime detection experts
        (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual[pertinent school]files clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
        (7) Police training in colleges and universities
        (8) Aggravated sex offenders
        (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
        (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
2. Method of preparation for transmittal
    a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
    b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
    c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
    d. Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.
    e. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
    f. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
    g. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.
i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.
j. All clippings must be complete.
k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations should be forwarded.
l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.
4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau
   a. General principle governing submissions
   The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.
   b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications
      (1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of the Central Research Unit) unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

      Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.
      (2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention Central Research Unit, informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.
      (3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

JULY 28, 1969
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 205

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages 1 and 2

Part I

Section 5 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 11 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4
Page 5

Section 12 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 6a and 6b

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 25 and 26

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
Pages 7 and 8
Page 15
Pages 65 and 66

Section 6 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 7 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 21 and 21a
Pages 31 and 32

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 9 - Pages 15d and 16
Page 25

Index

Pages 1 and 2
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 27 and 28 (Pages 26c,26d,26e, and 26f deleted)
Pages 28a and 28b
Pages 28c and 28d
Pages 31 and 32
Pages 37 and 38
Pages 39 and 40
Pages 45 and 46

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (31)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
   Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
   Every six months a letter of justification[(FD-401)]should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. [Follow instructions set out in]section 130G, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Results of Identification Division check
   f. Derogatory information
   g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

APRIL 25, 1969
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 202

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part II

Section 3 - Page ~~11b~~
Pages ~~15b and 15c~~
Page ~~19~~
Pages ~~19a and 20~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~47 and 48~~
Pages ~~49 and 50~~
Pages ~~65 and 66~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~3b and 4~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Page ~~8a~~
Pages ~~21b and 21c~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages 6a and 6b

Index

Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~14a~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (23)

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol, Tobacco[and Firearms] Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
Car Rental Agencies
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, U. S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

December 27, 1968
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 198

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

- Section 4 - Pages 7 and 8
- Section 11 - Pages 3 and 4
- Section 14 - Page 5
  - Pages 7 and 8
  - Pages 9 and 10

Part II

- Section 6 - Pages 3b and 4
- Section 7 - Pages 20a and 20b

Index

- Pages 1 and 2
- Page 14a
- Pages 17 and 18
- Pages 19 and 20

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (11)

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4). The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
[Car Rental Agencies]
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers,[U. S. Air Force,]Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

September 27, 1968
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 195

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

- Pages 1 and 2
- Pages 5 and 6

Part I

- Section 2 - Deleted
- Section 12 - Page 1
- Section 16 - Pages 1b and 2
  - Pages 3 and 3a

Part II

- Section 3 - Page 3b
  - Pages 9 and 10
  - Pages 15 and 15a
- Section 4 - Pages 49 and 50
  - Pages 65 and 66
  - Page 67
- Section 5 - Pages 3b and 4
- Section 6 - Pages 7 and 8
- Section 7 - Pages 17 and 17a

Index

- Pages 3 and 4
- Pages 9 and 10
- Pages 21 and 22
- Pages 37 and 38
- Pages 41 and 42

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
[Every[six]months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. For security sources of information, see section 107N, item 3b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed; for racial sources of information, see section 130G, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Results of Identification Division check
   f. Derogatory information
   g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

August 27, 1[illegible]
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 194

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 12 - Pag~~e 1~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~15 and 16~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 3a~~

Part II

Section 3 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages 15d and 16

Section 4 - Page ~~41-46~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Index

Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
(Pages 24a and 24b deleted)
Pages ~~26a and 26b~~
Pages ~~26c and 26d~~
Pages ~~26e and 26f~~
Pages ~~45 and 46~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

SECT[illegible] 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND [illegible]BLIC CONTACTS

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
    - a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
    - b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
    - c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
    - d. White Slave Traffic Act
    - e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
    - f. Illegal wearing of uniform
    - g. Impersonation
    - h. National Firearms Act
    - i. [State Firearms Control Assistance Act; unlawful possession or receipt of firearms]
    - j. Extortion
    - k. Red Cross Act
    - l. Theft from interstate shipment
    - m. May Act
    - n. Patent matters
    - o. Copyright matters
    - p. Federal Reserve Act
    - q. Mail fraud
    - r. Falsely claiming citizenship
    - s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
    - t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
    - u. Crimes on the high seas
    - v. National Bankruptcy Act
    - w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
    - x. Crimes on Indian reservation
    - y. Crimes on Government reservation
    - z. Bills of Lading Act
    - aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
    - ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
    - ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
    - ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
    - ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
    - af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
    - ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
    - ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised)
    - ai. Bank robbery
    - aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
    - ak. Migratory Game Bird Act

2. Requesting authority for release
   a. By teletype
      At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
   b. By telephone where time is of essence
      Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with the office of the division head of the Crime Records Division for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. [In the normal process of issuing press releases,[either local or national,
   [SACs may, when requested, make personal appearances for television and radio,
   [provided no interviews are conducted and there is absolutely no elaboration
   [over and above the original press release. These conditions should be made
   [known in advance to television and radio station representatives when such
   [requests are received.]
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.
9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

May 27, 1968
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 191

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 6 - Pages ~~4c and 4d~~

Section 15 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part II

Section 1 - Page ~~1~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~3 and 3a~~
Page ~~3b~~
Pages ~~3c and 4~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages ~~15b and 15c~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~29 and 30~~

Section 6 - Pages 3 and 3a
Pages ~~3b and 4~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~17 and 17a~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~15d and 16~~

Index

Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
(Pages 24c, 24d 24e, and 24f deleted)
Pages ~~26a and 26b~~
Pages ~~26c and 26d~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Pages ~~37 and 38~~
Pages ~~41 and 42~~
Pages ~~45 and 46~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (27)

h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.

i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

Do not:

a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
d. Use complicated sentence structure
e. Use technical references to statutes
f. Express personal opinions
g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
j. Use adjectives excessively

5. Transmittal

Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, attention Crime Records Division.

6. Dissemination

New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreciable passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before release. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the Bureau on request.

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.

2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. [On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters.] In all instances [the circular] letter must include the following:

a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addressees is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.
6. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
7. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

[[On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau
[a communication pertaining to a list of law enforcement officials and
[agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. One of the two following
[procedures should be used:]
[a. [(1)] On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the of-
[ficials of each Department,[the list described above.] Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.

[[(a)] Chiefs of police
[[(b)] Sheriffs
[[(c)] State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
[[(d)] U. S. Marshals and deputies
[[(e)] Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
[[(f)] Wardens of penal institutions
[[(g)] District attorneys or county prosecutors
[[(h)] Railway police (if desirable)
[[(i)] Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
[[(j)] Any other officials who receive identification orders

[(2)] Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.

[(3)] Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

[b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.]

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
[Car Rental Agencies]
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, [U. S. Air Force,] Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

January 27, 1967

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 174

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Part I

Section 3 - Page ~~3~~

Section 5 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~7b and 8~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~1a and 2~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~3 and 3a~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~5a and 6~~

Section 2 - Pages ~~7a and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~13b and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~63 and 64~~

Section 5 - Pages ~~3 and 3a~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~ (Pages 6a
Pages ~~7 and 8~~ and 6b
Pages ~~9 and 10 deleted~~)
Page 11-14
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Page ~~25~~
Pages ~~25a and 26~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Index

Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~4a~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~14a and 14b~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Pages ~~32a and 32b~~
Pages ~~32c and 32d~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~
Pages ~~41 and 42~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (47)

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.

[5. [A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.]

[6.] Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.

[7.] Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
   a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.
      (1) Chiefs of police
      (2) Sheriffs
      (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      (6) Wardens of penal institutions
      (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      (8) Railway police (if desirable)
      (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
   b. Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.
   c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa [zip code]	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa [zip code]	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa [zip code]	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
[Car Rental Agencies]
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, [U. S. Air Force,] Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

December 29, 1967
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 186

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 1 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 13 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 14 - Page ~~5~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Part II

Section 3 - Pages ~~29 and 30~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 7 - Page ~~8a~~

Index

Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (11)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
   Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
   Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. For security sources of information, see section 107N, item 3b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed; for racial sources of information, see section 130G, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. [A complete file review must be made[and an FD-9 submitted]on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   [[e. Results of Identification Division check]
   [[f.] Derogatory information
   [[g.] Recommendation of SAC

   Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

March 28, 1966

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 163

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages 5 and 6

Part I

Section 2 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 3 - Page 3

Section 11 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 13 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 16 - Pages 1b and 2

Part II

Section 2 - Pages 7a and 8

Section 3 - Pages 1b and 2
Page 19
Pages 19a and 20

Section 4 - Pages 23 and 24

Section 5 - Page 2a
Pages 3 and 3a

Section 6 - Page 9

Index

Pages 3 and 4
Page 4a
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 15 and 16 (Pages 14c and 14d deleted)
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 18a and 18b
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 22a and 22b
Pages 25 and 26
Pages 35 and 36
Pages 37 and 38

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (26)

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    a. Federal judges
    b. U. S. Attorneys
    c. Only outstanding state judges
    d. Governors
    e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    f. State attorneys general
    g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    i. In the principal cities:
        (1) Mayors
        (2) Chiefs of police
        (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        (9) Heads of larger universities
        (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        (11) Top representatives of airlines
        (12) Managers of leading airports
        (13) Top representatives of railroads
        (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        (19) Heads of leading banks

14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

[M. [DELETED]

N. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously effective. The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising the maximum effectiveness of this program.

December 27, [illegible]5

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 160

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 10 - Page 2a

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 15c and 16
Page 17 ✓
Pages 29 and 30

Section 4 - Pages 2c and 2d
Pages 3 and 4
Pages 11 and 12
Pages 23 and 24

Section 6 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 9 - Pages 11 and 12
Pages 15b and 15c

Index

Pages 3 and 4
Pages 17 and 18

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (14)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
    - a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
    - b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
    - c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
    - d. White Slave Traffic Act
    - e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
    - f. Illegal wearing of uniform
    - g. Impersonation
    - h. National Firearms Act
    - i. Federal Firearms Act
    - j. Extortion
    - k. Red Cross Act
    - l. Theft from interstate shipment
    - m. May Act
    - n. Patent matters
    - o. Copyright matters
    - p. Federal Reserve Act
    - q. Mail fraud
    - r. Falsely claiming citizenship
    - s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
    - t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
    - u. Crimes on the high seas
    - v. National Bankruptcy Act
    - w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
    - x. Crimes on Indian reservation
    - y. Crimes on Government reservation
    - z. Bills of Lading Act
    - aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
    - ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
    - ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
    - ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
    - ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
    - af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
    - ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
    - ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised)
    - ai. Bank robbery
    - aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
    - ak. Migratory Game Bird Act

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

2. Requesting authority for release
   a. By teletype
   At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
   b. By telephone where time is of essence
   Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with the office of the division head of the Crime Records Division for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. In the normal process of issuing press releases,[either local or national, SACs may, when requested, make personal appearances for television and radio, provided no interviews are conducted and there is absolutely no elaboration over and above the original press release. These conditions should be made known in advance to television and radio station representatives when such requests are received.]
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.
9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

March 29, 196

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 151

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Part I

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~

Section 8 - Page ~~1~~
Pages ~~1a and 2~~
Page ~~3~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 17 (New section)
Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~3~~

Part II

Section 2 - Pages ~~1c and 2~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~17 and 18~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Page ~~65~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 9 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Index - Pages 1 and 2
Page ~~2a~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~ (Pages 6a and 6b deleted)
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~14a and 14b~~
Page ~~14c~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (31)

PART II

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
    - a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
    - b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
    - c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
    - d. White Slave Traffic Act
    - e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
    - f. Illegal wearing of uniform
    - g. Impersonation
    - h. National Firearms Act
    - i. Federal Firearms Act
    - j. Extortion
    - k. Red Cross Act
    - l. Theft from interstate shipment
    - m. May Act
    - n. Patent matters
    - o. Copyright matters
    - p. Federal Reserve Act
    - q. Mail fraud
    - r. Falsely claiming citizenship
    - s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
    - t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
    - u. Crimes on the high seas
    - v. National Bankruptcy Act
    - w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
    - x. Crimes on Indian reservation
    - y. Crimes on Government reservation
    - z. Bills of Lading Act
    - aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
    - ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
    - ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
    - ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
    - ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
    - af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
    - ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
    - ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised)
    - ai. Bank robbery
    - aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
    - ak. Migratory Game Bird Act

2. Requesting authority for release
   a. By teletype
      At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
   b. By telephone where time is of essence
      Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with the office of the division head of the Crime Records Division for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. In the normal process of issuing press releases,[television and radio media should be merely provided with a written copy of the press release, and]Bureau personnel should not submit to live, filmed,[or tape-recorded interviews of any kind in connection with it.] Tact and diplomacy must be exercised in declining to participate in such interviews.
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.
9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.

3. Security and racial sources of information
Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. [For security sources of information,]see section 107N, item 3b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed;[for racial sources of information, see section 130G, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions.] If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "_____, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Derogatory information
   f. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
    a. Name of the contact
    b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
    c. Nature of service which can be received
    d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
    e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
    f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
    g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located[in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located]in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

June 29, 1964

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 142

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 1 - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 5 and 6

Section 4 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 12 - Pages 1a and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 14 - Pages 11c and 12

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 5a and 6
Pages 13 and 13a
Pages 13b and 14
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 29 and 30

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
Pages 2c and 2d
Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 25a and 26
Pages 27 and 28
Pages 37 and 38
Pages 57a and 58

Section 6 - Page 9

Section 7 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 8 - Pages 11 and 12
Page 12a
Pages 21 and 22

Section 9 - Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 23 and 24

Index

Pages 11 and 12
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 23 and 24
Pages 37 and 38

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (31)

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    - a. Federal judges
    - b. U. S. Attorneys
    - c. Only outstanding state judges
    - d. Governors
    - e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    - f. State attorneys general
    - g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    - h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    - i. In the principal cities:
        - (1) Mayors
        - (2) Chiefs of police
        - (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        - (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        - (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        - (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        - (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        - (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        - (9) Heads of larger universities
        - (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        - (11) Top representatives of airlines
        - (12) Managers of leading airports
        - (13) Top representatives of railroads
        - (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        - (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        - (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        - (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        - (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        - (19) Heads of leading banks

14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

The SAC or ASAC shall contact at least once each year all national officers, departmental (state) officers, and members of the Americanism Commission of The American Legion. A letter shall be submitted on March 15 of each year showing that the above American Legion officials have been contacted.

N. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously
[effective. [The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his
[office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising
[the maximum effectiveness of this program.]

May 27, 1964

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 141

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 5 - Page 7
Pages 7a and 8

Section 6 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 9 and 10

Section 15 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 16 - Pages 1b and 2

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 9 and 10
Pages 13b and 14
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 25 and 26
Pages 27 and 28

Section 4 - Pages 4a and 4b
Pages 25a and 26
Pages 37 and 38

Section 6 - Pages 1b and 2

Section 7 - Pages 23 and 24

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a
Page 3

Section 9 - Pages 23 and 24

Index - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 25 and 26
Pages 26a and 26b
(Page 30a deleted)
Pages 31 and 32
Pages 32a and 32b

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (26)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   - a. Foreword by the Director
   - b. Interesting case write-ups
   - c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   - d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   - a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.
   - [[b. This file[may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.]
   - c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

   d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Human interest items from local police work
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television[appearance,]a manuscript of the[remarks]must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval[unless previously approved Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and time does not permit prior Bureau approval.] In some other cases involving important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

January 27, [illegible]64

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 137

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 3 - Page 3

Section 12 - Page 6a

Section 16 - Pages 1b and 2

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 3 and 3a
Pages 3b and 4
Page 5
Pages 5a and 6
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 25 and 26

Section 4 - Pages 2c and 2d
Page 25
Pages 25a and 26
Pages 35 and 36
Pages 37 and 38-46
Pages 47 and 48
Pages 59 and 60
Pages 63 and 64

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a

Section 7 - Pages 17 and 17a

Section 9 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 11 and 12
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 15b and 16
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 23 and 24

Index - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 27 and 28
Pages 29 and 30
Pages 31 and 32
Pages 35 and 36

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (34)

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU
  1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
    a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
      (1) Scientific apparatus
      (2) Equipment
      (3) Personnel
      (4) Methods
      (5) Economics
    b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
      (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
      (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
      (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
      (4) Bad local crime conditions
      (5) Scientific crime detection experts
      (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. [(File in individual[pertinent school]files clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
      (7) Police training in colleges and universities
      (8) Aggravated sex offenders
      (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
      (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
  2. Method of preparation for transmittal
    a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
    b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
    c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
    d. Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.
    e. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
    f. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
    g. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.

i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.

j. All clippings must be complete.

k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations and racial matters should be forwarded.

l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.

4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau

a. General principle governing submissions
The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.

b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications

(1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of the Central Research[Unit)]unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.

(2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention Central Research[Unit,]informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.

(3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

October 28, [illegible]63

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 134

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
Pages 2c and 2d
Pages 7 and 8

Section 10 - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 11 and 12
Page 13

Section 12 - Pages 5 and 6

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 3b and 4
Pages 5 and 6
Pages 25 and 26

Section 4 - Pages 49 and 50

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a

Section 7 - Pages 7 and 8-14
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 19 and 20

Section 8 - Pages 4a and 4b

Section 9 - Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 15b and 16

Index - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 9 and 10
Pages 11 and 12
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 21 and 22

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (24)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
   - a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
     - (1) Scientific apparatus
     - (2) Equipment
     - (3) Personnel
     - (4) Methods
     - (5) Economics
   - b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
     - (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
     - (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
     - (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
     - (4) Bad local crime conditions
     - (5) Scientific crime detection experts
     - (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual files of police agencies clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
     - (7) Police training in colleges and universities
     - (8) Aggravated sex offenders
     - (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
     - (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
2. Method of preparation for transmittal
   - a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
   - b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
   - c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
   - [d. [Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.]
   - [[e.] Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
   - [[f.] Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
   - [[g.] No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.

i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.

j. All clippings must be complete.

k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations and racial matters should be forwarded.

l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.

4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau

a. General principle governing submissions

The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.

b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications

(1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of the Central Research[Unit)]unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.

(2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention Central Research[Unit,]informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.

(3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

September 27, 1963

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 133

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 3 - Page ~~3~~

Section 10 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Page ~~13~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 15 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~4a and 4b~~
Pages ~~4c and 4d~~
Page ~~4e~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Page ~~9~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~3 and 3a~~

Part II

Section 6 - Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 8 - Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Index - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (27)

h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.

i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

Do not:

a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation

b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950

c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases

d. Use complicated sentence structure

e. Use technical references to statutes

f. Express personal opinions

g. Reveal identity of confidential informants

h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"

i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter

j. Use adjectives excessively

5. Transmittal

Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, attention Crime Records Division.

6. Dissemination

New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreciable passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before release. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the Bureau on request.

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.

2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. [On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters.] In all instances [the circular] letter must include the following:

   a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known

   b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence

   c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially

   d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety

   e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
   a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.
      (1) Chiefs of police
      (2) Sheriffs
      (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      (6) Wardens of penal institutions
      (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      (8) Railway police (if desirable)
      (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
   b. Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.
   c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
[Car Rental Agencies]
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers,[U. S. Air Force,]Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

July 26, 1963

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 130

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
Pages 2c and 2d

Section 5 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 10 - Pages 3 and 4
Page 11

Section 14 - Pages 10a and 10b
Pages 11c and 12

Part II

Section 1 - Pages 3 and 4
Page 5

Section 2 - Pages 1e and 2

Section 3 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 13a and 14
Pages 15c and 16
Pages 17 and 18

Section 4 - Pages 37 and 38-46
Pages 51 and 52
Pages 53 and 54
Pages 59 and 60
Pages 61 and 62

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a
Pages 7 and 8

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 6a and 6b

Index - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 11 and 12
Pages 17 and 18

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (28)

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU
  1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
    a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
      (1) Scientific apparatus
      (2) Equipment
      (3) Personnel
      (4) Methods
      (5) Economics
    b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
      (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
      (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
      (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
      (4) Bad local crime conditions
      (5) Scientific crime detection experts
      (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual files of police agencies clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
      (7) Police training in colleges and universities
      (8) Aggravated sex offenders
      (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
      (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
  2. Method of preparation for transmittal
    a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
    b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
    c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
[d. [Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.]
[[e.] Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
[[f.] Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
[[g.] No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

[[h.] If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.

[[i.] Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.

[[j.] All clippings must be complete.

[[k.] Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations and racial matters should be forwarded.

[[l.] Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.
4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau
   a. General principle governing submissions
   The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.
   b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications
      (1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of the Central Research Section) unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

      Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.
      (2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention Central Research Section, informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.
      (3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.

3. Security and racial sources of information
Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. See section 107N, 3b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

[4. Gifts[should not be given to sources since such actions might be
[misconstrued.]

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "______, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
Use the following subheadings in the order given:
a. Description of proposed SAC contact
b. Services this contact can provide
c. Past relations with field office
d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
e. Derogatory information
f. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located[in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located]in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

March 29, 1963

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 126

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 1 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Pages ~~2c and 2d~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 5a~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page 3
Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Page ~~9~~

Part II

Section 2 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~5b and 6~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~3b and 4~~
Pages ~~13a and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Page ~~12a~~
Pages ~~15a and 16~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~47 and 48~~
Pages ~~49 and 50~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~14i and 14j~~
Pages ~~14k and 14l~~

Index - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Pages ~~26a and 26b~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (40)

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    a. Foreword by the Director
    b. Interesting case write-ups
    c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
    d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution

    Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
    a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. [For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.]
    b. This file is to be kept permanently.
    c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Human interest items from local police work
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to [any radio or television[appearance,]a manuscript of the[remarks]must be [submitted for the Bureau's review and approval[unless previously approved [Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and [time does not permit prior Bureau approval.] In some other cases involv- [ing important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

October 29, 1962

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 121

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 2 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 10 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 13 - Pages ~~1a and 2~~
Page ~~7~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3a and 4~~
Pages ~~10a and 10b~~
Pages ~~11 and 11a~~
Page ~~11b~~
Pages ~~11c and 12~~
~~11c 4 12~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5a and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9a and 10~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~19 and 20~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Pages ~~2c and 2d~~
Page ~~12a~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~21 and 22~~
Page ~~22a~~
Pages ~~33 and 34~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~49 and 50~~

Section 6 - Pages 5c and 6 ✓

Section 7- Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~14a and 14b~~
Pages ~~14c and 14d~~
Pages ~~14e and 14f~~
Pages ~~14g and 14h~~
Pages ~~14i and 14j~~
Pages ~~14k and 14L~~
Pages ~~14m and 14n~~
Pages ~~14o and 14p~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~21 and 22~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~ ✓

Section 9 - Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~21 and 22~~

Index - Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~
Pages ~~33 and 34~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (47)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

I. VISITS TO FIELD OFFICES

1. Non-Bureau governmental officials
   a. Do not discuss Bureau policies, plans, or relationships. Courteously advise the visitor that inquiries concerning such matters are to be made at the Bureau at Washington.
   b. Advise the Bureau of the visit, identity of the visitor, purpose, matters discussed, courtesies extended, and observations of interest to the Bureau.
2. Departmental officials
   a. Be courteous.
   b. Do not offer office space, clerical and stenographic assistance, or chauffeuring in Bureau automobiles.
   c. Do not furnish information unless prior notification has been received that the official would contact the field office for information. If no notification received, before furnishing information clearance must be obtained from the Bureau.
   d. Advise the Bureau in case of doubt.

J. MISCELLANEOUS

[1. [Firearms, defensive tactics,]and disarming demonstrations
   Are to be confined to law enforcement groups.
2. Credentials
   Are to be exhibited to all persons interviewed in such manner that the person to whom shown has an opportunity to observe and understand the connection of the Agent with the FBI.
3. Law enforcement officials
   a. Contact with
      (1) Contact must be maintained with law enforcement officials for the purpose of securing information of violations of Federal laws within the jurisdiction of the Bureau.
      (2) Agents are to call on police executives when in their cities unless such visits would be so frequent as to be embarrassing.
      (3) Local law enforcement agencies should be advised by letter of the disposition of prosecutive action taken in Federal court in cases

referred to Bureau by local law enforcement agencies or where Bureau fugitives are taken into custody by local law enforcement officers. They should also be advised of violations of local laws coming to the attention of the FBI.

b. Visits to Washington
When the field requests special courtesies be afforded certain individuals, including law enforcement officers, coming to Washington, D. C., the communication so advising the Bureau shall contain biographical data and a brief summary of information in the field office files concerning the visitor.

[[When law enforcement executives are contemplating a visit to the Bureau at Washington, D. C., ask them to call at the office of the[head of the]Training Division, Room[5234,]Justice Building.

c. Letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, and condolence
When letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, or condolence from the Director are recommended by the field, such recommendations should be submitted promptly. They should include the specific facts on which the recommendation is based, full identifying data and address of the citizen, and the result of a search of the field office indices concerning the citizen. In connection with the election of officers of police associations at conventions covering more than one field division territory, the field division in whose territory the convention was physically held is responsible for submitting any recommendations for letters of congratulations. The office submitting such request should summarize briefly the relations with these officers, incorporating any derogatory data which might preclude such letters. Inasmuch as the recommending office is not likely to possess all data, pertinent other field divisions should submit a brief, supplemental summary concerning officers recommended for letters who reside in their territory.

4. Inquiries concerning status of Bureau cases
When a state official has expressed interest in the prosecutive status of a Bureau case, for a legitimate reason, such as deferment of state prosecution pending the outcome of the Federal case, insure that such official is kept appropriately advised, including the final outcome of the matter.

5. U. S. Cabinet officers, Senators, and Congressmen
If an SAC receives an inquiry from a Cabinet officer or U. S. Senator or Congressman concerning an official matter, it should be brought to the Bureau's attention immediately.

K. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Definition
An individual, organization, or concern willingly furnishing information to employees frequently enough to justify making a record where the source need not be protected. If occasionally the source must be protected, this may be done. If sources must be constantly concealed, they become informants or confidential sources and must be handled as such.

1. Index
Index card (3 by 5 inches) must be made up to contain:
   a. Names
   b. Addresses
   c. Organization or concern
   d. Type of information furnished
   e. Date of development

June 27, 1962

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 117

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Part I

Section 1 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Part II

Section 2 - Pages ~~1d and 2~~
Pages ~~5 and 5a~~
Pages ~~5b and 6~~
Page ~~7~~
Pages ~~7a and 8~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~13a and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Page ~~8a~~
Page ~~65~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Page ~~9~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~14a and 14b~~
Pages ~~14c and 14d~~
Pages ~~14e and 14f~~
Pages ~~14g and 14h~~
Pages ~~14i and 14j~~
Page ~~14k~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Page ~~17~~
Pages ~~17a and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~15b and 16~~

Index - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
Pages ~~26a and 26b~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~
Page ~~28a~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (46)

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    - a. Foreword by the Director
    - b. Interesting case write-ups
    - c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
    - d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
    - a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. [For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.]
    - b. This file is to be kept permanently.
    - c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

   d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Human interest items from local police work
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television speech, a manuscript of the speech must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval. In some other cases involving important speeches not on radio or television, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    a. Federal judges
    b. U. S. Attorneys
    c. Only outstanding state judges
    d. Governors
    e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    f. State attorneys general
    g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    i. In the principal cities:
        (1) Mayors
        (2) Chiefs of police
        (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        (9) Heads of larger universities
        (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        (11) Top representatives of air lines
        (12) Managers of leading airports
        (13) Top representatives of railroads
        (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        (19) Heads of leading banks

14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

The SAC or ASAC shall contact at least once each year all national officers, departmental (state) officers, and members of the Americanism Commission of The American Legion. A letter shall be submitted on March 15 of each year showing that the above American Legion officials have been contacted.

N. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously effective. [Annually, on May 15,]the SAC must advise the Bureau of the number of newspapers[and radio and television stations]in his territory, the number with which he has had contact or with which representatives of his office have made contact, and the steps he is taking to insure maximum effectiveness of this type of contact, as well as what material other than spot news items was furnished to these[media;]e.g., the Director's Introduction in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin each month.

April 30, 1962

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 115

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 3 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~3~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Section 8 - Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 10 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~ (Page 3a deleted)
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 14 - Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~5a and 6~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~3b and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~11 and 11a~~
Pages ~~13a and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~

Section 4 - Page ~~4a~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~21 and 22~~
Page ~~25~~
Pages ~~25a and 26~~
Pages ~~33 and 34~~
Pages ~~37 and 38 46~~
Pages ~~49 and 50~~

Section 5 - Pages ~~3b and 4~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Pages ~~5 and 5a~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~6a and 6b~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Page ~~17~~
Pages ~~17a and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~

Index - Pages ~~15 and 16~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (52)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN
This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution
   [[Limited] to law enforcement officers and others engaged in [or having a
   [legitimate interest in] law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter.
   b. This file is to be kept permanently.
   c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   - a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   - b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   - c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   - d. Human interest items from local police work
   - e. Police and firearms training subjects
   - f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   - g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:

     FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
     Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television speech, a manuscript of the speech must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval. In some other cases involving important speeches not on radio or television, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   - a. Requested by the Bureau
   - b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   - c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   - a. Major importance
   - b. Public interest
   - c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   - d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   - a. Double spaced
   - b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   - c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   - d. Accurately
   - e. After a review of the entire file
   - f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   - g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
    a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
        (1) Scientific apparatus
        (2) Equipment
        (3) Personnel
        (4) Methods
        (5) Economics
    b. Newspaper clippings,[other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern]
        (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
        (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
        (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
        (4) Bad local crime conditions
        (5) Scientific crime detection experts
        (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual files of police agencies clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
        (7) Police training in colleges and universities
        (8) Aggravated sex offenders
        (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
        [(10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.]
2. Method of preparation for transmittal
    a. Mount the clipping on[form FD-350 within the borders shown.
    b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
    c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
    d. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
    e. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
    f. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

g. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.

h. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.

i. All clippings must be complete.

j. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations and racial matters should be forwarded.]

[k.] Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local[paper.] Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive[at] headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.

4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau

a. General principle governing submissions

The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.

b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications

(1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of the Central Research Section) unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.

(2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention Central Research Section, informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.

(3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

February 27, 19

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 113

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 5 and 6

Part I

Section 1 - Pages 3 and 4
Page 5

Section 14 - Pages 13a and 14
Page 15

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7b and 8
Pages 11c and 12
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 21 and 22
Page 23-24

Section 4 - Pages 19 and 20
Pages 27 and 28
Pages 37 and 38-46
Pages 57 and 58

Section 5 - Page 11

Section 6 - Pages 3a and 4

Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 9 - Pages 19 and 20

Index - Pages 9 and 10

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (22)

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
   a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. [Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.]
      (1) Chiefs of police
      (2) Sheriffs
      (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      (6) Wardens of penal institutions
      (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      (8) Railway police (if desirable)
      (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
   b. Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.
   c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.
    a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.
    b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.
        (1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give
        (2) The cooperation which has been afforded
        (3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

        (4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
[Car Rental Agencies]
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, [U. S. Air Force,]Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

    c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.
    d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.
    e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

January 29, 196

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 112

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 3 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Pages ~~5b and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 10 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 13 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Page ~~7~~

Section 14 - Page ~~11b~~
Pages ~~11c and 12~~
Pages ~~13a and 14~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Part II

Section 1 - Page ~~1~~
Pages ~~1a and 2~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~3 and 3a~~
Pages ~~15b and 16~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~15a and 16~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~
Pages ~~5c and 6~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~35 and 36~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~
Pages ~~6a and 6b~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~17 and 18~~

Index - Pages ~~19 and 20~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (33)

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
   a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. [Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.]
      (1) Chiefs of police
      (2) Sheriffs
      (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      (6) Wardens of penal institutions
      (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      (8) Railway police (if desirable)
      (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
   b. Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.
   c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. [A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.]

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps
[Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
[State Employment Offices]
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

I. VISITS TO FIELD OFFICES

1. Non-Bureau governmental officials
    a. Do not discuss Bureau policies, plans, or relationships. Courteously advise the visitor that inquiries concerning such matters are to be made at the Bureau at Washington.
    b. Advise the Bureau of the visit, identity of the visitor, purpose, matters discussed, courtesies extended, and observations of interest to the Bureau.
2. Departmental officials
    a. Be courteous.
    b. Do not offer office space, clerical and stenographic assistance, or chauffeuring in Bureau automobiles.
    c. Do not furnish information unless prior notification has been received that the official would contact the field office for information. If no notification received, before furnishing information clearance must be obtained from the Bureau.
    d. Advise the Bureau in case of doubt.

J. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Disarming demonstrations
   Are to be confined to law enforcement groups.
2. Credentials
   Are to be exhibited to all persons interviewed in such manner that the person to whom shown has an opportunity to observe and understand the connection of the Agent with the FBI.
3. Law enforcement officials
    a. Contact with
        (1) Contact must be maintained with law enforcement officials for the purpose of securing information of violations of Federal laws within the jurisdiction of the Bureau.
        (2) Agents are to call on police executives when in their cities unless such visits would be so frequent as to be embarrassing.
        (3) Local law enforcement agencies should be advised by letter of the disposition of prosecutive action taken in Federal court in cases

referred to Bureau by local law enforcement agencies or where Bureau fugitives are taken into custody by local law enforcement officers. They should also be advised of violations of local laws coming to the attention of the FBI.

b. Visits to Washington
When the field requests special courtesies be afforded certain individuals, including law enforcement officers, coming to Washington, D. C., the communication so advising the Bureau shall contain biographical data and a brief summary of information in the field office files concerning the visitor.

When law enforcement executives are contemplating a visit to the Bureau at Washington, D. C., ask them to call at the office of the Assistant Director, Training and Inspection Division, Room 5256, Justice Building.

c. Letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, and condolence
When letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, or condolence from the Director are recommended by the field, such recommendations should be submitted promptly. They should include the specific facts on which the recommendation is based, full identifying data and address of the citizen, and the result of a search of the field office indices concerning the citizen. In connection with the election of officers of police associations at conventions covering more than one field division territory, the field division in whose territory the convention was physically held is responsible for submitting any recommendations for letters of congratulations. The office submitting such request should summarize briefly the relations with these officers, incorporating any derogatory data which might preclude such letters. Inasmuch as the recommending office is not likely to possess all data, pertinent other field divisions should submit a brief, supplemental summary concerning officers recommended for letters who reside in their territory.

[4. [Inquiries concerning status of Bureau cases
[When a state official has expressed interest in the prosecutive status
[of a Bureau case, for a legitimate reason, such as deferment of state
[prosecution pending the outcome of the Federal case, insure that such
[official is kept appropriately advised, including the final outcome
[of the matter.]

5. U. S. Cabinet officers, Senators, and Congressmen
If an SAC receives an inquiry from a Cabinet officer or U. S. Senator or Congressman concerning an official matter, it should be brought to the attention immediately.

K. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Definition
An individual, organization, or concern willingly furnishing information to employees frequently enough to justify making a record where the source need not be protected. If occasionally the source must be protected, this may be done. If sources must be constantly concealed, they become informants or confidential sources and must be handled as such.

1. Index
Index card (3 by 5 inches) must be made up to contain:
a. Names
b. Addresses
c. Organization or concern
d. Type of information furnished
e. Date of development

January 27, 1961

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 100

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Part I

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 2
Page 3

Section 4 - Pages 11 and 12
Page 13
Pages ~~13a~~ and 14

Section 10 - Page 2a

Section 11 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 14 - Pages 11 and 11a
Page 11b
Pages 11c and 12
Page 13

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 3 and 3a
Pages 3b and 4
Pages 7a and 8

Section 4 - Pages 29 and 30

Section 6 - Pages 3a and 4

Section 7 - Pages 15 and 16

Section 9 - Pages 21 and 22

Index - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 23 and 24
Pages 29 and 30
Page 35

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (28)

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
   a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful.
      (1) Chiefs of police
      (2) Sheriffs
      (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      (6) Wardens of penal institutions
      (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      (8) Railway police (if desirable)
      (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders

[b. Changes in the list are to be reported[in duplicate]to the Bureau as they occur.

   c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

[	[Page No.]	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
[	[4]	Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
[	[7]	Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
[	[3]	Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. [A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.]

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers,
  U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
[State Employment Offices]
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

October 27, 196

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 109

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages 5 and 6

Part I

Section 1 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 9 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 10 - Page 2a

Section 12 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 15 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 16 - Page 3
Pages 3a and 4

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 11c and 12
Pages 25 and 26

Section 6 - Page 9

Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6
Page 21b
Pages 29 and 30

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 9 - Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 15b and 16
Pages 19 and 20

Index - Pages 11 and 12
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 23 and 24
Pages 25 and 26
Page 26a
Pages 27 and 28

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (26)

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    a. Federal judges
    b. U. S. Attorneys
    c. Only outstanding state judges
    d. Governors
    e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    f. State attorneys general
    g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    i. In the principal cities:
        (1) Mayors
        (2) Chiefs of police
        (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        (9) Heads of larger universities
        (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        (11) Top representatives of air lines
        (12) Managers of leading airports
        (13) Top representatives of railroads
        (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        (19) Heads of leading banks
14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.
15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

The SAC or ASAC shall contact at least once each year all national officers, departmental (state) officers, and members of the Americanism Commission of The American Legion. A letter shall be submitted on March 15 of each year showing that the above American Legion officials have been contacted.

[N. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously effective. Each 90 days (November 15, February 15, May 15, August 15), the SAC must advise the Bureau of the number of newspapers in his territory, the number with which he has had contact or with which representatives of his office have made contact, and the steps he is taking to insure maximum effectiveness of this type of contact, as well as what material other than spot news items was furnished to these newspapers; e.g., the Director's Introduction in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin each month.]

November 28, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 98 Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Pages 3 and 4
Page 5

Section 12 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 16 - Pages 5 and 6

Part II

Section 2 - Page 4a
Pages 9 and 10

Section 3 - Pages 25 and 26

Section 4 - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 27 and 28
Pages 29 and 30
Pages 35 and 36
Pages 37 and 38-46
Pages 49 and 50
Pages 57 and 58

Section 6 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 7 - Pages 15 and 16

Section 9 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 9 and 10
Pages 13 and 14
Page 15
Pages 15a and 16
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 21 and 22

Index - Pages 7 and 8

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (27)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
   Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
   Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. See section 107N,[3b,]volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "_____, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
   Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Derogatory information
   f. Recommendation of SAC

   Submit an original and two copies,[but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication.] If the SAC contact is approved,[the single-page]copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a[letter]is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

   SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located[in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located]in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

September 30, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND EGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 95

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 9 and 10
Pages 11 and 12
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 15 and 16

Section 11 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 12 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 9 and 10

Part II

Section 1 - Page 5

Section 2 - Pages 1d and 2
Pages 5a and 6

Section 3 - Pages 1b and 2
Page 3
Pages 3a and 4
Pages 5 and 6
Pages 13a and 14
Pages 15 and 15a

Section 4 - Pages 29 and 30
Pages 47 and 48

Section 5 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 6 - Pages 1b and 2
Page 3
Pages 7 and 8
Page 9

Section 7 - Page 6a
Pages 17a and 18
Pages 19 and 20
Page 20a
Page 21b
Pages 35 and 36

Section 8 - Pages 1a and 2

Section 9 - Pages 21 and 22

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (33)

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution
   Restricted to law enforcement officers and others engaged in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter.
   b. This file is to be kept permanently.
   c. [Current copy should be placed]in bookcase, available to all Agents.

- d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   - a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   - b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   - c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   - d. Human interest items from local police work
   - e. Police and firearms training subjects
   - f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   - g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:

     FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
     Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television speech, a manuscript of the speech must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval. In some other cases involving important speeches not on radio or television, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   - a. Requested by the Bureau
   - b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   - c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   - a. Major importance
   - b. Public interest
   - c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   - d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   - a. Double spaced
   - b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   - c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   - d. Accurately
   - e. After a review of the entire file
   - f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   - g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.

[[i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity
[of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The
[documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately
[the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.]

4. Do not:
   a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
   b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
   c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
   d. Use complicated sentence structure
   e. Use technical references to statutes
   f. Express personal opinions
   g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
   h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
   i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
   j. Use adjectives excessively
5. Transmittal
   Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, attention Crime Records Division.
6. Dissemination
   New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreciable passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before release. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the Bureau on request.

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.
2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. In all instances this letter must include the following:
   a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
   b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
   c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
   d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
   e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

   In all other instances, including requests for circularization in other field divisions, prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters.
3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial
[sources of information. See section 107N,[3b,]volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "_____, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
Use the following subheadings in the order given:
a. Description of proposed SAC contact
b. Services this contact can provide
c. Past relations with field office
d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
e. Derogatory information
f. Recommendation of SAC

[Submit an original and two copies,[but one of the copies should consist
[only of the first page of the communication.] If the SAC contact is
[approved,[the single-page]copy is to be stamped approved and returned
[to the field. If the contact is not approved, a[letter]is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."

[[7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three
[times each year; those located in resident agencies must be contacted at
[least two times each year.]

8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

[[13.] Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:

a. Federal judges
b. U. S. Attorneys
c. Only outstanding state judges
d. Governors
e. Leading state and county prosecutors
f. State attorneys general
g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
i. In the principal cities:
    (1) Mayors
    (2) Chiefs of police
    (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
    (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
    (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
    (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
    (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
    (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
    (9) Heads of larger universities
    (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
    (11) Top representatives of air lines
    (12) Managers of leading airports
    (13) Top representatives of railroads
    (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
    (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
    (16) Top representatives of Western Union
    (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
    (18) Heads of better business bureaus
    (19) Heads of leading banks

[[14.] Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

[[15.] Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

The SAC or ASAC shall contact at least once each year all national officers, departmental (state) officers, and members of the Americanism Commission of The American Legion. A letter shall be submitted on March 15 of each year showing that the above American Legion officials have been contacted.

August 26, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 94

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
  Section 4 - Pages 1 and 2
  Section 6 - Pages 3 and 4
  Section 8 - Pages 1 and 2
                  Pages 3 and 4

Part II
  Section 2 - Pages 1d and 2
                  Page 4a
  Section 6 - Page 3
  Section 7 - Page 21b
  Section 8 - Pages 4c and 4d
                  Pages 5 and 6
                  Pages 17 and 18
                  Pages 19 and 20
  Section 9 - Pages 15a and 16

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (13)

- d. Accurately
- e. After a review of the entire file
- f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
- g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence
- h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.

4. Do not:
    - a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
    - b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
    - c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
    - d. Use complicated sentence structure
    - e. Use technical references to statutes
    - f. Express personal opinions
    - g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
    - h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
    - i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
    - j. Use adjectives excessively
5. Transmittal
    Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, attention Crime Records Division.

[[6. Dissemination
[New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible
[interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration
[given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreci-
[able passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before re-
[lease. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the
[Bureau on request.]

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.
2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. In all instances this letter must include the following:
    - a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
    - b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
    - c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
    - d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
    - e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

    In all other instances, including requests for circularization in other field divisions, prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters.
3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.

July 27, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 93

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages 1 and 2

Part I

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 4 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 2a and 2b
Page 5
Pages 5a and 6

Section 6 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 4a and 4b
Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8
Page 9

Section 10 - Pages 3 and 4

Part II

Section 1 - Page 1
Pages 1a and 2
Pages 9 and 10

Section 2 - Page 5
Pages 5a and 6
Pages 7 and 8

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 4 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 29 and 30
Pages 63 and 64

Section 6 - Pages 3a and 4

Section 8 - Page 1
Pages 1a and 2

Index - Pages 5 and 6

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (26)

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
    a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful.
        (1) Chiefs of police
        (2) Sheriffs
        (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
        (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
        (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
        (6) Wardens of penal institutions
        (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
        (8) Railway police (if desirable)
        (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
        (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
    b. Changes in the list are to be reported to the Bureau as they occur.
    c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. [A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.]

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
[State Employment Offices]
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

April 29, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
Revision Number 90

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part II

Section 2 - Page 5

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 5 and 6

Section 4 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 6 - Pages 7 and 8
Page 9

Section 7 - Page 6a
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 25 and 26

Section 8 - Pages 17 and 18

Section 9 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 23 and 24

Index - Pages 7 and 8

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (18)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
   Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
   Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. See section 107N,[3b,]volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "_____, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
   Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Derogatory information
   f. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies,[but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication.] If the SAC contact is approved,[the single-page]copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a[letter]is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
    a. Name of the contact
    b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
    c. Nature of service which can be received
    d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
    e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
    f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
    g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
8. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
9. [Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
10. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.]
11. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

12. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    a. Federal judges
    b. U. S. Attorneys
    c. Only outstanding state judges
    d. Governors
    e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    f. State attorneys general
    g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    i. In the principal cities:
        (1) Mayors
        (2) Chiefs of police
        (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        (9) Heads of larger universities
        (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        (11) Top representatives of air lines
        (12) Managers of leading airports
        (13) Top representatives of railroads
        (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        (19) Heads of leading banks
13. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.
14. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

The SAC or ASAC shall contact at least once each year all national officers, departmental (state) officers, and members of the Americanism Commission of The American Legion. A letter shall be submitted on March 15 of each year[showing]that the above American Legion officials have been contacted.

February 29, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
Revision Number 88

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Page ~~5~~

Part I

Section 3 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~5a and 6~~
Pages ~~6a and 6b~~

Section 2 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Page ~~11~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~11 and 11a~~
Pages ~~11c~~ and 12
Page ~~13~~
Pages ~~13a and 14~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~

Part II (continued)

Section 4 - Pages ~~1a and 2~~
Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Page ~~2c~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Page ~~4a~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~21 and 22~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~ ✓
Pages 31 and 32 ✓
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~49 and 50~~ ✓
Pages ~~51 and 52~~
Pages ~~59 and 60~~
Pages ~~63 and 64~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages 21 and 22
Page ~~22a~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~

Index - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Page ~~20a~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (49)

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
   a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful.
      (1) Chiefs of police
      (2) Sheriffs
      (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      (6) Wardens of penal institutions
      (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      (8) Railway police (if desirable)
      (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
   b. Changes in the list are to be reported to the Bureau as they occur.
   c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations.
    a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.
    b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.
        (1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give
        (2) The cooperation which has been afforded
        (3) The following must appear on the list:
            Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
            Bureau of Customs
            Cooperative Credit Bureaus
            Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
            FBINA Graduates
            Hotels
            Immigration and Naturalization Service
            Missions Providing Lodging
            Post Office Inspectors
            Postmasters
            Salvation Army
            Secret Service
            U. S. Marshals
        (4) The following may appear on the list:
            Automobile Clubs
            Banks
            County Attorneys
            County Coroners
            Credit Companies
            Detective Agencies
            Enlistment Officers,
              U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps
            Employment Service
            Fire Departments
            Forest Service
            Gunsmiths
            Insurance Companies
            Movie Studios
            Navy Shore Patrol
            Oil Company Special Agents
            Parole and Probation Officers
            Plant Quarantine Officers
            Protective Associations
            Race Tracks
            Savings and Loan Associations
            Service Recruiting Officers
            State Hospitals for Insane
            Steamship Companies
            Telegraph Companies
            U. S. Attorneys
            U. S. Commissioners
    c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.
    d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.
    [e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.]

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial [sources of information. See section 107N,[3b,]volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "_____, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Derogatory information
   f. Recommendation of SAC

[Submit an original and two copies,[but one of the copies should consist
[only of the first page of the communication.] If the SAC contact is
[approved,[the single-page]copy is to be stamped approved and returned
[to the field. If the contact is not approved, a[letter]is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by 5-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
    - a. Name of the contact
    - b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
    - c. Nature of service which can be received
    - d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
    - e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
    - f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
    - g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. [If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
8. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.]
9. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.
10. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    - a. Federal judges
    - b. U. S. Attorneys
    - c. Only outstanding state judges
    - d. Governors
    - e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    - f. State attorneys general
    - g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    - h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    - i. In the principal cities:
        - (1) Mayors
        - (2) Chiefs of police
        - (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        - (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        - (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        - (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        - (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        - (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        - (9) Heads of larger universities
        - (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        - (11) Top representatives of air lines
        - (12) Managers of leading airports
        - (13) Top representatives of railroads
        - (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        - (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        - (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        - (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        - (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        - (19) Heads of leading banks

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. [Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above.] Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies [to be filed] is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful.

a. Chiefs of police
b. Sheriffs
c. State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
d. U. S. Marshals and deputies
e. Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
f. Wardens of penal institutions
g. District attorneys or county prosecutors
h. Railway police (if desirable)
i. Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
j. Any other officials who receive identification orders
  (1) Changes in the list are to be reported to the Bureau as they occur.
  (2) The list is to be forwarded to the Bureau on March 1 in duplicate.
  (3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

[[e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.]

January 29, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS *obsolete*
Revision Number 87

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 5 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8

Section 6 - Pages 3 and 4

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 1b and 2
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 15 and 15a

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
(Page 12a)
Pages 17 and 18
Page 23
Pages 63 and 64

Part II (continued)

Section 6 - Pages 3a and 4

Section 9 - Pages 1 and 2

Index - Page 6a
Pages 7 and 8
Page 12a
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 25 and 26

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

PART 2

583

SECTION 87

PART II

(1960 TO 1968)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

D. SECURITY INVESTIGATIO[illegible] OF INDIVIDUALS

1. Definitions

The term "basic revolutionary organization" or "basic revolutionary group" when used hereinafter in this subsection shall apply to any one or all of the following organizations or groups in order to distinguish the organizations from front organizations:

- a. Communist Party, USA
- b. Socialist Workers Party
- c. Progressive Labor Party
- d. Proletarian Party of America
- e. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
- f. Johnson-Forest Group
- g. American Socialist Clubs
- h. See also 87C 1d.
- [i. Black nationalist extremists, although technically not members of basic revolutionary organizations within the above meaning, should be investigated under the same rules. (See section 122, volume IV, of this manual for additional guides.)]

2. Responsibility of the Bureau

a. To conduct thorough investigation into the background and subversive activities of all persons in the U. S. and Puerto Rico who are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security. Each SAC will be held responsible for the proper investigation of all persons in his area who, because of membership or affiliation with basic revolutionary organizations or other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, may be potentially dangerous.

b. To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of individuals constituting a threat to the internal security and develop sufficient information and evidence through investigation to sustain appropriate action by the Bureau should it become necessary for the Federal Government to institute prosecutive action against such individuals in courts of law or control their movement and activities in the event of a national emergency

3. Purpose of investigation

The primary purpose of these investigations is twofold, namely:

a. Determination of dangerousness

To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals in the U. S. and Puerto Rico who, because of their membership in, activity in, or association with one or more of the revolutionary groups defined above or related groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country, and the consequent collection of sufficient information concerning their subversive activities to justify apprehension in event of a national emergency

b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes

To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals who have been or may be violating laws of the U. S.

(1) Direct investigation towards obtaining admissible evidence to establish the violation.

(2) Be alert for any information indicating a violation of the Federal statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, and sedition.

(3) Title 18, USC, § 2385, paragraph (1), prohibits the advocacy, etc., of forceful or violent overthrow of the Government. Paragraph (2) prohibits the printing and distribution of propaganda advocating the forceful overthrow of the Government. (Affiliation with an organization is not a prerequisite to prosecution under paragraphs (1) and (2).) Paragraph (3) makes it unlawful to organize or help to organize any society, etc., of persons who advocate overthrow of the Government by force or violence, or to be or become a member of or become affiliated with any such society knowing the purposes thereof. Conspiracy to violate this section is covered by Title 18, USC, § 371 (general conspiracy statute).

(4) Title 18, USC, § [illegible], penalizes attempts to undermine the loyalty, discipline, or morale of the armed forces. Alleged violations should be reported immediately to the Bureau.

(5) Title 5, USC, § 7311, and Title 18, USC, § 1918, prohibit Government employment of persons who are disloyal or who assert the right to strike against the Government. Title 5, USC, § 3333, provides that an individual accepting office or employment in the Government of the U. S. shall, within 60 days, execute an affidavit certifying that he does not advocate the violent overthrow of the U. S. Government, etc. The execution of a false affidavit constitutes a fraud on, or attempt to defraud, the Government within the purview of Title 5, USC, § 303, so as to authorize Special Agents of the Bureau to administer oaths in investigations arising out of this law. Alleged violations of this law called to your attention should be furnished to the Bureau promptly and no investigation should be initiated on the basis of complaints received without prior Bureau authority. Refer to section [19c, volume II,] of this manual for procedures to be followed regarding possible violations of this law discovered or received in connection with security of Government employees investigations.

(6) Title 18, USC, § 1001, includes possible fraud against the Government violations wherein there are concealments or falsifications relating to subversive information. These violations must be presented to the Department by the Bureau for a prosecutive opinion rather than being presented locally to USAs. They ordinarily involve the execution of U. S. Government forms. Common violators are employees of private concerns having Government contracts who execute Government forms required for clearance for access to classified information.

Upon receipt of information indicating a violation of this type, investigation under the "Security Matter - Fraud Against the Government" character should be initiated and the Bureau immediately advised. The Department has advised that it is essential, to establish jurisdiction, to prove that the form was presented to a Government agency for action or determination. This, therefore, should be the first investigative step. If the form was not presented to a Government agency, no further investigation should be made and the Bureau so advised. In this case, however, remain alert for information the form is later presented to Government agency. The fact subject actually signed the form must be established by testimony of witnesses to the signature, handwriting examination, or other conclusive evidence. The original of the form must be located. Sources that furnished pertinent information concerning subject during previous investigations and other potential witnesses should be thoroughly interviewed to determine the basis for each item of pertinent information furnished and to obtain the identities of other potential witnesses. Where affiliation with subversive organizations is involved, interview individuals who were members of same units of these organizations as subject for indicia of his membership, such as attendance at closed meetings, payment of dues, holding of office, etc. If possible, develop evidence to supplant pertinent information furnished by current informants. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview the subject. Interview subject and potential witnesses furnishing pertinent information under oath and obtain sworn signed statements if possible. An exception may be made when interviewing established sources, such as current informants, if oath and/or signed statements not considered desirable under circumstances. Be guided by instructions in section 6b, (7), below when interviewing potential witnesses with subversive backgrounds.

in a key facility, copies of reports bearing the dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," should be furnished to appropriate intelligence agencies of the armed services by the field offices as shown in section 87D 7e (2) of this manual. For instructions regarding dissemination to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, see 87D 7c (3) of this manual.

Specific instructions with regard to all phases of our responsibilities under Executive Order 10450, including policy, investigative procedures, and dissemination are set out in section[19,] volume[II,]of this manual.

(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services

Dissemination should be made locally to the intelligence service of the military branch involved.

(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

FAA issues certificates to airmen who are defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew in the navigation of aircraft while under way: individuals directly in charge of the inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in the capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Subversive data developed concerning persons within such definitions should be furnished to the Bureau by report or letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, together with cover communication recommending that such data be furnished to FAA. Such dissemination will be made only at the Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5.

(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service

Under the agreement between the Bureau and the Secret Service concerning Presidential protection dated 2-3-65, which is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual, reports are to be disseminated henceforth to Secret Service in all security index cases. An extra copy of the report in these cases should be furnished the Bureau. At the time the agreement was entered into, letterhead memoranda in all security index cases had been disseminated to Secret Service. Therefore, prior reports in these cases will not be disseminated.

Under the terms of the agreement, it is essential to advise Secret Service of the reason or reasons for referral - statement of the class or classes in appendix B of the agreement which the individual referred fits. For this purpose utilize form FD-376, which is designed to serve as a letter of transmittal for both local dissemination and dissemination at the SOG. The original and one copy of this form should be forwarded to the Bureau. A copy is to be maintained in the main case file and upon transferral of office of origin in any case, the new office of origin is to be furnished a copy. Careful consideration must be given to insure that the individual is properly categorized. In the case of subject being recommended for the security index, withhold dissemination pending Bureau approval of his security index status only in those cases in which the subject is categorized as falling within category 3 of the agreement between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service concerning Presidential protection. Forward FD-376 as in any other case. Prompt dissemination should be made of information developed regarding individuals falling within other than category 3.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

V. Inactive section.................................. 56
(7) Periodic verification of addresses.................... 57
(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards.................................. 58
(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards.................................. 58
  (a) Subjects of security index cards.................................. 58
  (b) Top functionaries.................................. 59
  (c) Subjects tabbed for priority.................................. 60
  (d) Subjects not included in security index.......... 60
(10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index.................................. 60
  (a) Death of subject.................................. 60
  (b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction 60
  (c) Imprisonment of subject.................................. 60
  (d) Induction of subject into the armed forces........ 60
  (e) Security informants.................................. 60
  (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous.................................. 61
  (g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection....... 61
  (h) Subjects of Chinese extraction.................. 62
(11) Priority apprehension program.................................. 62
  (a) Purpose.................................. 62
  (b) Subjects to be tabbed priority.................................. 62
  (c) Recommendations for and removal of priority designation.................................. 63
  (d) Administrative procedures for handling priority program.................................. 63
  (e) General.................................. 64
c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities and defense facilities.................................. 64
  (1) Responsibility.................................. 64
  (2) Inclusion in security index.................................. 65
  (3) Dissemination.................................. 65
  (4) Status of cases.................................. 66
d. Top functionary program.................................. 66
  (1) General.................................. 66
  (2) Definition of top functionary.................................. 66
  (3) Manner of designation of top functionary.................. 66
  (4) Regulations governing the handling of top functionaries 67
  (5) Maintenance of list.................................. 67

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

- e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index 70
  - (1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations 70
  - (2) Security of Government employees investigations 70
  - (3) Atomic Energy Act, U. S. Information Agency applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations 70
- f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports. 71
  - (1) General 71
  - (2) Schedule of submission of reports 72
  - (3) Origin 72
  - (4) Classification 72
  - (5) Title 72
  - (6) Character 73
    - (a) Top functionaries 73
    - (b) Others 73
  - (7) Status 73
    - (a) Top functionaries 73
    - (b) Key facility cases 73
    - (c) Other security index subjects 74
    - (d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index.. 74
    - (e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein 74
  - (8) Content 74
  - (9) Administrative data 77
    - (a) General 77
    - (b) Documentation of reports 78
- g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 79

8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations 79
- a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau 80
  - (1) Aliens and naturalized citizens 80
  - (2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services 80
  - (3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense 80
  - (4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard 80

(D) When the office of origin for a security index [or reserve index A]subject against whose identification record a notice has been placed is changed, form FD-128[or FD-128a,]submitted to change office of origin, should[show]that a security flash notice has been posted with the Identification Division. An extra copy of the form FD-128[or FD-128a] should be specifically sent to the Identification Division in order that its records will[show]the new office of origin to which future records will be[submitted.]

(E) Cancel a security flash notice when (1) it is learned that the subject of such is deceased or (2) such subject is determined to be no longer of security interest. Do not cancel the security flash notice when a subject is removed from the security index solely by application of the security index criteria.

(j) Physical description

I. Obtain and report a detailed physical description.

II. During the course of the initial investigation in any security-type case, including espionage and nationalistic tendency cases, the physical characteristics and description of the subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation. It is not necessary to observe personally the subject of any case where preliminary investigation determines the basis for opening the case is unfounded.

III. The subject should be personally observed, if possible, early in the investigation after it is determined that a complete investigation is warranted to develop the extent of a subject's subversive activities and to consider whether the subject's name should be added to the security index. This action should be taken in the course of developing background information to determine the true identity and existence of the subject and to assist in establishing that the subject of the investigation is the person against whom the subversive allegations have been made. Each subject should be personally observed whenever a complete security investigation is conducted even though a security index card is not being recommended at the completion of the investigation.

IV. Do not delay the submission of form FD-122 recommending the addition of a subject's name to the security index even though it has not been possible to observe personally the subject if it has been determined through investigation that the subject is dangerous or potentially dangerous.

V. If a security index card is not being recommended after all logical investigation has been conducted and it has not been possible to observe personally the subject during the investigation, the case may be closed even though this has not been done. If a security index card has been recommended and prepared and it has not been possible to personally observe the subject, the case shall remain open until such time as the subject is personally observed, except when it has been determined that the subject is residing outside the U. S. or Puerto Rico, in which event the case may be closed if there is no other pending investigation and the matter should be followed administratively to be certain that the subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

(k) Photograph

I. Reasonable efforts should be made during the investigation of a security subject to obtain a photograph of the subject through usual sources.

II. Cases on security index subjects are to be maintained in a pending status until such time as a suitable photograph is obtained unless circumstances dictate otherwise, in which case the Bureau should be advised. Once a photograph has been obtained, continue to be alert for the existence of more recent photographs which may become available.

III. [Forward a copy of photographs of security index subjects to the Bureau for dissemination to U. S. Secret Service headquarters.]

(3) Criteria for placing and retaining names in the security index

(a) The addition to and retention of names in the security index shall be governed by the following criteria:

I. No name shall be added to or retained in the security index unless one or more of the following situations have been established through investigation:

(A). Subject has had membership[in,]or participation in the activities of, a basic revolutionary organization within the last five years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(B) Subject has had membership[in,]or participation in the affairs of, one or more front organizations which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a[basic] revolutionary[organization,]in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of[those]aims[and]purposes of the front organization[which coincide with those of a basic revolutionary organization,]within the last three years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(C) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member[of]or a participant in the activities of a[basic revolutionary or front organization,]has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to[commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of the national, state, and local governments and of the defense effort.]

(D) Although investigation has failed to establish [the facts required by (A), (B), or (C) above, either as to the substance of those criteria or because there have been no overt acts or statements within the time limits prescribed,]facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts[of the kind described in (C) above.]

II. [Activity in support of Cuban regime

Careful consideration should be given to recommending for inclusion in the security index those individuals who in the light of the clear identification of the Cuban Government as procommunist, pro-Soviet bloc, and anti-U. S., would be deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the U. S. in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U. S. In connection therewith, there should be a substantial showing of data within the following standards:

(A) An individual has served as a leader or officer or has substantially participated in the activities of a pro-Castro organization and has engaged in activities which have included either the preparation or distribution of pro-Cuban or anti-U. S. propaganda; the active collection of funds for any agency or representative of the Cuban Government or for a pro-Castro group, which funds are not intended for the relief of human suffering or other charitable purposes; active participation in acts of violence against anti-Castro individuals or groups or against the U. S.; or the active collection of intelligence data regarding the national defense of the U. S. or which would serve the purposes of the Cuban Government as opposed to the interests of the U. S., where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such data is to be or has been conveyed to any agency or representative of the Cuban Government.

(B) An individual, whether he has participated in organizational activity or not, has engaged in one or more activities specified in (A) above and it has been clearly established, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe the loyalty of the individual would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the Cuban Government and the U. S.

(C) Aliens of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship should be considered for the security index when it is determined that one of these (1) is likely to foster, encourage, or promote the policies, programs, or objectives of the Cuban Government, or collaborate with the Cuban Government or (2) is likely to engage in or attempt to engage in acts of espionage, sabotage, or other activities inimical or detrimental to the defense or public safety of the U. S. as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals. Activities on a subject's part which should be considered in determining whether his name should be added to the security index under the foregoing would include but should not be limited to (1) participation in organizations supporting the Castro regime, (2) participation in picket lines formed in support of the Cuban Government, (3) contacts with Cuban agents operating in this country on behalf of the Cuban Government, or (4) statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the U. S. and Cuba.

agency responsible for such action. Forward such data to Bureau and incorporate in next report submitted concerning individual in question. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau and there is no case on individual being denied clearance, give consideration to opening a security investigation if information received from intelligence agency warrants such action.

(2) Inclusion in security index

In recommending key facility employee for inclusion in security index, FD-122 is to contain:

(a) Key facility geographical reference number

(b) Abbreviation for agency having security responsibility. [The Department of the Army has been designated the agency having security responsibility for all key facilities.]

(c) Abbreviations for other agencies known to have classified contracts with the key facility. Interested agencies should be identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on security index cards returned from Bureau.

(d) [Deleted]

If subject of existing security index card is found to have become employed in a key facility, FD-122 must be submitted to Bureau with above-required key facility data set forth thereon. Case is then to be handled in accordance with instructions set forth below concerning key facility cases.

(3) Dissemination

Upon receipt of original complaint or allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, a summary of complaint and information concerning the individual should be furnished immediately by letter to interested intelligence agency. Intelligence agency should then be advised whether a security investigation is being conducted of the individual and, if investigation is being conducted, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion of investigation. Letter to intelligence agency should clearly point out that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation by FBI.

In addition to disseminating to interested intelligence agencies information of a derogatory security nature developed concerning persons employed at facilities holding classified contracts, with the exception of classified contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission, such information should be furnished to the Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, 43215, attention Chief, Adjudication Division. In each instance, advise the interested intelligence agency that dissemination has been made to DISCO. This dissemination is to include derogatory security information developed concerning persons who may not be currently employed at such a facility but who are known to be holders of an industrial security clearance.

These instructions do not apply to allegations of espionage or those of such a confidential character as would not ordinarily be disseminated. Such information appearing to be of immediate interest to other intelligence agencies should be submitted to Bureau by most expeditious means, depending upon the circumstances, with a request that the Bureau consider advisability of disseminating it.

Disseminate copies of each report to the local representative of agency having security responsibility, as well as to local representative of other intelligence agencies known to have

classified contracts with the key facility. Copies of reports for the Marine Corps should be disseminated locally to NISO.

Dissemination to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), the Research and Development Board (RDB), and the Maritime Administration (MA) will be made at the Bureau, and not in the field.

(4) Status of cases

After all active investigation conducted, place in a[pending-inactive]status. Forty-five days before report due, make case pending active and check with armed services representative at the key facility or with other reliable sources to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

[(Also see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 4D, item 2a, (6), and section 4M, item 4, for instructions concerning synopses and classification of reports in key facility cases.)]

d. Top functionary program

(1) General

Purpose of top functionary program is to select for special attention those individuals in a subversive movement who are of outstanding importance to the effectiveness of the movement.

Top functionary program is described below as pertaining to the Communist Party, USA. However, it also applies to important individuals active in or on behalf of other basic revolutionary groups, subversive organizations, or unorganized groups who have indicated a propensity for violence.

(2) Definition of top functionary

A top functionary is an individual, either a member or a nonmember of the Communist Party, to whom, because of his importance, it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention in order to keep abreast of communism on a national basis in the U. S. Necessarily, such an individual would be on a high policy level in the movement. This also applies to an individual, either a member or a nonmember of other subversive organizations or unorganized groups, who would be on a high policy level in the movement.

The term "top functionary" is not to be construed as requiring that individuals in this category must actually hold official positions in the organizations but shall be given a broad enough construction to include others who are of equal importance because of their influence in the movement itself, or their position and activities outside the party in labor, front, or similar organizations or movements. Black nationalist extremists whose importance justifies continuous investigative attention should be considered for designation as top functionaries.

(3) Manner of designation of top functionary

Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate a subject as a top functionary. Submit such recommendation to Bureau by letter containing reasons for the recommendation. Bureau desires to be very selective in this matter and to concentrate on individuals who, on a national basis, are the guiding hands in the communist movement and other subversive movements. Top functionaries are to be included in priority I and reports are to be submitted in accordance with 87D 7f (2).

At the seat of Government a careful appraisal will be made of the field's recommendation, following which the office will be advised concerning the Bureau's decision on the recommendation.

(4) Regulations governing the handling of top functionaries

(a) Designation and deletion of top functionary status
Designate or remove a subject as a top functionary by individual letter to the Bureau carrying the subject in the caption and containing a brief statement as to the reason for designation or deletion.

Where office of origin for top functionaries is transferred, deletions in the old office of origin and additions in the new office are handled in accordance with 87D 7b (9) (b).

(b) Photographs
Photographs must be obtained for each top functionary. Whenever possible, the photographs should be obtained from public records, law enforcement agencies, state or Federal Government agencies, and similar sources. Where more direct means employed, use extreme care to avoid prejudicing the investigation. Send [two copies (one is for Secret Service headquarters)] of photograph of each top functionary to the Bureau, either by cover letter or as enclosure to a report. Maintain a copy of each photograph in the subject's individual case file in the field. If album of top functionary photographs maintained, be sure duplicates are also filed in each individual subject's file.

(c) Handwriting specimens
Suitable handwriting specimens of each top functionary must be obtained. Whenever possible, obtain handwriting specimens from public records, law enforcement agencies, and similar sources. Again, if more direct means employed, use extreme care. Send specimens to the Bureau under a separate cover letter by registered mail for the attention of the FBI Laboratory. Letter should bear caption of individual case.

Handwriting specimens should be sufficiently extensive to permit possible future comparisons by the Laboratory. When specimens submitted may be of value as evidence, letter of transmittal should so state and Bureau should be requested to return specimens after copies have been made.

(d) Security index cards
Request preparation by FD-122 at the earliest possible moment. Same rules apply to preparation and maintenance as apply to other security index cards. All security index cards for top functionaries shall be designated for priority I.

(e) Change of office of origin
FD-128 changing office of origin on a top functionary automatically deletes him as top functionary in old office and adds him as a top functionary in new office. For further instructions concerning the change of office of origin in these cases, see 87D 7b (9) (b).

(f) Reports
I. Character - Internal Security - (followed by appropriate letter designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency)

(5) Maintenance of list
Each office must maintain a current list on top functionaries.

e. Correlation of [illegible]er investigations with the se[illegible]ity index and reserve index

Individuals investigated by the Bureau under any character against whom subversive information is developed must be constantly borne in mind for inclusion in the security index and/or reserve index.

(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations

Subjects of these investigations must be included in the security index and/or the reserve index if they meet the standards for inclusion therein. It is the responsibility of the investigating Agent and field supervising official to make appropriate recommendations for preparation of the security index card and/or the reserve index card, whenever appropriate.

(2) Security of Government employees (SGE) investigations

Subjects of all SGE investigations against whom subversive derogatory information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or reserve index.

The Agent conducting investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer such cases to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling. Copies of reports showing disloyal information must be submitted to the field office covering the subject's residence, when developed by any other office.

When an individual who has previously been investigated under the SGE character is the subject of a security index card and is still employed by the Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, the dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and the character of the subject's security case should be used in the report being submitted. This will insure that the reports are referred to the appropriate desks for supervision at the Bureau, as well as in the field. These reports should be written according to the standards prevailing for SGE reports.

Disseminate these dual character reports the same as any other security report. Representatives of other intelligence agencies requesting reports showing the actual SGE investigation should be informed to direct the request to their Washington headquarters for referral to the Bureau.

(3) Atomic Energy Act, U. S. Information Agency applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations

Subjects of all above investigations against whom subversive information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or the reserve index. In each such case the Agent conducting the investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer the matter to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling.

Copies of reports showing disloyal information must be submitted to the office covering the subject's residence, whenever developed by another office.

(6) Character

(a) Top functionaries

Internal Security (or Racial Matters if subject is a black nationalist) - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Internal Security - C
Internal Security - SWP
Racial Matters - NOI

(b) Others

Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Security Matter - C
Security Matter - SWP
Security Matter - X (native fascist)
Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a top functionary, the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject is designated a top functionary, the first report after the designation and all subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. Communications regarding subjects who are employed in key facilities should bear the words "Key Facility" in the character. Communications regarding subjects who are members of the Communist Party, USA, National Committee should bear the words "National Committee" in the character. Black nationalist investigations and racial matters should be given the character set out in section 122, volume IV, of this manual.

(7) Status

All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the proceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:

(a) Top functionaries

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted quarterly. Forty-five days prior to the date a quarterly report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(b) [Key facility cases

Key facility cases are to be maintained in pending-inactive status. (See 87D 7c (4).)]

(c) Other security index subjects

I. Closed

(A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of[a periodic]investigative report [according to priority designation.] If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter (form FD-400) to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed. The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the[periodic]report is due. Such cases shall also be opened and assigned six months after submission of the[periodic]report to accomplish verification of addresses[and further verification must be handled in accordance with 87D 7b (7) (b).] Upon such verification, the cases should be closed administratively.

(d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index

I. Pending inactive

(A) If all active investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau

(B) Set forth lead to follow Bureau for security index card and if approved for dissemination of report to Secret Service.

II. Closed

(A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau and dissemination to Secret Service

(B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (c) above.

(e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein

I. Closed

(A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

[(8)] Content

(a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.

I. Background

(A) Birth date
(B) Citizenship status
(C) Education
(D) Marital status
(E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
(F) Identification record
(G) Employment
(H) Residence
(I) Status of health (if known)

II. Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front[groups,]black nationalist extremist groups,[and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups]

(A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.

(B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

National
  Committee, CPUSA, character, 73
  Defense Education Act of 1958, 22
  Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
  Science Foundation Act of 1950, 22
Naturalized citizens
  dissemination of information concerning, 80
  investigations of, 26
Negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
New office of origin, 58,67,81a

Observation of subject, 28,50,57
Office of origin, 27a,58,59,67,72,81,81a
Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
Overt acts, 45

Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
Photographic surveillances, 35,37
Photographs, 28,78
  of top functionaries, 28,67
  status of security index cases while obtaining, 28
Physical
  condition, 61,74
  description, 28
  surveillances, 35,37
    maintenance of SA's notes, 38
Position
  and importance, 30
  in labor organizations, 29
Potential dangerousness, 44
  of Nation of Islam members, 46
Preservation of evidence, 37
Pretext, 32,37,39,56,57
Priority apprehension program, 62,77
  administrative procedures, 63
  priority designations, 49,53,58, 60,62,63,74
    I, 49,57,62,63,64,66,67,72,78
    II, 49,62,63,64,72,78
    III, 49,63,72
    changes in, 58,63
    color of cards, 63
    justification for, 47
    recommendation for, 63
    removal of, 63,64
    reports, schedule of, 72
    who to be tabbed, 62,63
  purpose, 62

Private records, 36
Public
  Law 87-835, 22
  source information, 36
  utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Purpose of
  interviews, 38
  investigation, 19
  priority apprehension program, 62
  reserve index, 42a
  security index, 43

Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
Recommendation for inclusion in
  section A, reserve index, 42b,61
  security index, 46a,47,63
    Cuban activity, 45a,45b
    status, 74
    when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    when subject is out of country, 48
    when there is missing background information, 47
Reevaluation of security index status, 46,57,72,78
Registrars, contacting, 25
Reinterviews, 42
Relatives in armed forces, 27
Removal from security index, 46a,60,61,63
  priority I, 64
  priority II, 64
Reports
  administrative data in, 77
  character of, 73
    top functionaries, 67,73
  content of, 74
  cumulative items, 76
  dissemination of, 79 (See also dissemination.)
  documentation of, 78
  lumping information in, 76
  narrative-type statements, 77
  negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
  schedule of, 72,73
  status of, 73
  summarizing information in, 76,77
  summary, 21,47,59,71,76
  title of, 72
  topical headings in, 74
  when necessary after interview, 41
  when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  when not necessary after interview, 40a
  when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Reserve index, 42a
  arrangement, 42b
  cards, content and appearance, 43
  content, 43
  flash notice, 27
  names deleted from security index, 61,62
  purpose, 42a
  reference to on cover page, 77
  removal from, 43
  section A
    changes, 42c
    individuals to be included, 42b,61
    interviews of subjects of, 39
    recommendations for inclusion in, 42b,61
  section B, 42c
    security index cards placed in, 62
  standards for, 42a
  subjects
    applicant investigations, 70
    espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    security of Government employees investigations, 70
Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
Responsibility of Bureau, 19,64
Restrictions on investigations, 24

Schedule of reports, 72,73
Scope of investigation, 26
Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Secret Service, dissemination to, 81,81a
  closing case, 47,74
  letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
  photographs to, 28,67
  reserve index cards, stamping, 43
Security
  flash notice
    cancellation of, 27a
    notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    placing, 27
  index, 43
    arrangement of, 50
    cards
      cancellation of, 38,42,60,61,62
      changes on, 58,78
      color of, 63
Security (continued)
  index (continued)
    cards (continued)
      content and appearance of, 48
      of top functionaries, 67
      tabbing, 45b,53,60,62,63,64,67
      transfers to reserve index, 61,62
    criteria for, 44a,45
    Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53,64,81a
    dangerousness, 44
    dissemination to
      Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81a
      Secret Service, 81,81a
        letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
        photographs, 28,67
        reports, 47,74,81,81a
    purpose, 43
    recommendation for, 45a,45b,46a,47,63
    reevaluation of status, 46,57,72,78
    reference to on cover page, 77
    removal from, 46a,60,61,63
      priority I or II, 64
    subjects of
      applicant investigations, 70
      espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      security of Government employees investigations, 70
    summary reports, 47,59,71
    verification of addresses and employment, 32,54,57,58,74,81a
  informants, 34
    cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
    contacting, 34,74
  of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
Signed statements, 41
Sino-Soviet bloc, 44a,57
Sleepers, 31,52
Special section of security index, 52
  cards, 49,52,53,56
  Cuban, 49,53
  exception to unavailable section, 56
Standards for reserve index, 42a
  section A, 42b
Status of cases, 73
  on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66,73
  on subjects in security index, 74
  on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  on top functionaries, 59,73

Communist Party members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Special Agents attending mass meetings, etc.

4. Internal Security Act of 1950

To insure successful proceedings against a communist front organization under this act, a preponderance of admissible evidence must be secured to[show]extent to which

- a. Persons active in management, direction, or supervision of an organization are active in management, direction, or supervision, or as representatives, of
- b. Its support, financial or otherwise, is derived from
- c. Its funds, resources, or personnel are used to further or promote objectives of
- d. Positions taken or advanced by it from time to time do not deviate from those of

Any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or the world communist movement.

5. Panel sources

- a. Purpose

  To develop potential witnesses who will be willing to obtain and introduce legally admissible evidence re subversive nature of organizations in future prosecutive action
- b. Program
  - (1) Since Special Agent and active security informant testimony is undesirable, field should recruit panel of potential witnesses locally. Some may be found among American Legion contacts, plant informants, former and exposed security informants, etc.
  - (2) Panel members should attend public rallies and meetings, as well as obtain literature of organizations they are covering.
  - (3) To aid panelists, exhibit photographs of individuals they will most likely encounter at front organization functions.
  - (4) Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, the same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants. (See section 107, volume IV, of this manual.)
  - (5) Legitimate expenses incurred by panel members should be reimbursed in same manner as security informants.
  - (6) Eliminate inactive, ineffective, or unsatisfactory panelists on a continuing basis. At time of submission of semiannual letter, office panel should be reviewed to make certain all such panelists have been removed.
  - (7) Identities of panelists should be concealed.
- c. Administrative handling
  - (1) Check prospective panelists through office indices, local police department, credit records, and established informants. If no undesirable information is developed, initial contact may be made with panelist to ascertain cooperativeness.
  - (2) Submit names of cooperative panelists to Bureau by letter outlining complete background and recommendation as to inclusion in office panel. [One of the required copies of the letter to the Bureau should consist only of the first page of the letter. When approving the field's recommendation, this single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" by Bureau and will be returned.] Be certain such individuals are not plants and will consider relationship with Bureau in confidence.

(3) Open 134 [illegible]e when active investigation o[illegible]rospective panelist is initiated. When preliminary investigation completed and Bureau has approved panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly.

Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.

(4) Only Agents designated should handle panelists.

(5) Every [six]months submit letter of justification to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section 107N, 3b, volume IV, of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

(6) Summary letter captioned "Panel Source Program" (Bufile 134-1113) to be prepared and submitted to Bureau March 25 and September 25 each year. Use following topical outline:

(a) Status of program
Include progress in panel development. Show total number of new panelists developed and total number of panelists discontinued during six months' period.

(b) Total number panel sources active

(c) Names of organizations covered

(d) Number and identities of panelists redesignated to informant or potential informant status since institution of panel program

d. Suggestion
Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel members and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization cases, security informants, and communist publications.

6. Classification - 100

7. Character - Internal Security - letters for organizational activity or nationalistic tendency; e.g., (C), (SWP), (Miscellaneous), etc.

with any additional information contained in the Bureau's files.

6. The names of subscribers to Communist Party nominating petitions and the names appearing on subscription lists of [the Communist Party, USA, publications] and publications and organs of the organizations set forth in 1 a, b, c, and d must be indexed in the field office covering the address shown for the subscriber and should not be forwarded to the Bureau for indexing. Mailing lists as such which cannot be identified as membership lists of subversive organizations also should be indexed in the field and not forwarded to the Bureau. Field offices obtaining such lists must promptly furnish them to the office covering the address shown for the subscriber.
7. Important subversive derogatory information concerning any individual and any new subversive derogatory information concerning any individual of importance must be brought to the attention of the Bureau by expeditious means.
8. Subversive and nonsubversive derogatory information coming to the attention of the field office through a name check or otherwise on an employee of the executive branch of the Government, which information is within the purview of Executive Order 10450, should be forwarded promptly to the Bureau for dissemination to the Civil Service Commission. In addition, subversive derogatory and other information relating to other employees of the Government and to employees of the United Nations and of other public international organizations received by the field office should be brought immediately to the attention of the Bureau.
9. These instructions do not affect and are in addition to existing instructions for the submission of information in report form.

C. INVESTIGATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, AND OTHER MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS

1. Policy

a. Communist Party, USA

By Presidential directive on 9-6-39, and subsequent restatements (see section 102, volume IV, of this manual), this Bureau is charged with the responsibility of coordinating all information with regard to the internal security of the U. S. Since 1939, a large portion of the Bureau's security investigations has been directed toward a coverage of the activities of communists and other groups whose aims seek the overthrow of the U. S. Government. The Communist Party, USA, is the best organized and most dangerous from a security standpoint. The party is not an isolated or purely domestic organization but is part of an international communist movement led and dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the ultimate aim of which is to establish a world-wide communist state. The Communist Party, USA, bases its theory on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. (Considerable evidence shows that these principles look toward the violent overthrow of the U. S. Government or its downfall in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.) It would be a grave error to suppose that, because the party is actually and potentially small, it is not dangerous. The contemplated role of the party is such that it can be played best by an organization which is cohesive, easily mobilized, highly maneuverable, fanatically zealous, well disciplined, and immediately responsive in an emergency to the demands of its leaders. The highest authority in the Communist Party, USA, is the national convention which meets approximately once every two years. Between these conventions, the national committee is the highest authority of the party.

The Communist P[illegible]ty, USA, is divided into distr[illegible] and state organizations, then into county, city, section, and club organizations. The number and nature of these subdivisions are dependent on the number of members in the various localities. Every party member must belong to a party club.

The Communist Party strategy and policy is based primarily on the loyal support and defense of the Soviet Union. The party line changes from time to time depending upon the current program of the international communist movement.

b. Socialist Workers Party
The Socialist Workers Party was founded at a convention held in Chicago, Illinois, from 12-31-37 to 1-3-38. The present headquarters are located at 116 University Place, New York 3, New York. The following statements are taken from the "Declaration of Principles and Constitution of the Socialist Workers Party" which was adopted at this convention:

"The purpose of the party is set forth in its declaration of principles: Its purpose shall be to educate and organize the working class for the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a workers government to achieve Socialism." (From article 11 under the caption "Purpose.")

"We call upon all revolutionary militants to join with us to build the SWP into the mass revolutionary party which will lead the working class of the United States to power; and which, together with the revolutionists of all countries united in the Fourth International, will achieve the victory of the international revolution and of world Socialism."

"The main specific task of the SWP is the mobilization of the American masses for struggle against American Capitalism, and for its overthrow...." (Part III of above pamphlet.)

Shortly after the Fourth International was founded in Switzerland on 9-3-38, the Socialist Workers Party in the U. S. announced that it was the "American Section" of the "world party of the Socialist revolution" (Fourth International). At a special convention on 12-21-40, the Socialist Workers Party passed a resolution ending its organizational connection with the Fourth International (because of the passage of the Voorhis Act).

This organization follows the Marxist-Leninist-Trotskyist line. Statements made by functionaries indicate that in the event of war between the U. S. and the Soviet Union, the Socialist Workers Party would defend the latter.

c. [Deleted]

field office territory, the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a national level position, and the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a district level position above the status of "club chairman." Members of the Communist Party, USA, who are now carried as unidentified but who are known to be members of the Negro race should be included in the total number of Negroes.

When possible, totals should be broken down as to nationality, sex, employment, veterans, and membership in unions. Auxiliary offices which, due to lack of Communist Party activity in their divisions, have been authorized to submit data by quarterly letter should include membership figures in these letters to the Bureau and office of origin. These letters to be submitted by auxiliary offices prior to first day of month in which quarterly report is due. Office of origin responsible to obtain complete figures from its auxiliary offices.

(b) In preparing estimates, best available informants and sources must be used. Include in cover pages of quarterly reports evaluation of degree of reliability of figures furnished by each source and of final figures submitted. Also include in cover pages total number of individuals positively identified as Communist Party members and total number of individuals tentatively identified as party members within the twelve-month period immediately preceding the submission of the quarterly report. In reporting membership figures, information from one source only is not acceptable unless facts are set forth demonstrating information from this source is the most accurate and most reliable information available.

(c) Explain in detail any increase or decrease in membership figures previously submitted. Where informants use such terms as "inactive" or "paper" members, their exact understanding of the meaning of the terms used and the number of individuals so described must be clearly explained. Full explanation must be made as to whether individuals so described are included in final membership figures submitted, together with reason for their inclusion or exclusion.

(d) Results of membership recruiting drives

(e) Make discreet efforts to ascertain results of annual national registration drives.

(f) To reduce indexing at the Bureau, each report should contain a statement in the cover pages that all persons named in the report as members of the Communist Party and who reside within the area covered by the reporting office are listed in the security index, or are informants or sources, with the exception of those listed. If any name is listed, a statement should be made as to whether the name has been previously furnished to the Bureau for indexing. The status of the investigation of any listed individual should be shown.

(3) Funds (Bureau file 100-3-63)

(a) Income and expenditures

(b) Plans and results of fund drives including:

I. Total amount sought by the state Communist Party organization

II. Specific amount to be contributed by the state organization to the national committee fund drive

III. Specific amount to be contributed by the state organization to[the party]fund drive

IV. Specific amount to be retained by the state organization after contributing to the national committee and[the party]fund drives for use in the state organization's own operations

(c) Large contributions by known party groups or front organizations
(d) Identity of any new party "angels"
(e) Distribution of funds not sent to Communist Party headquarters, such as funds in safe-deposit boxes, separate bank accounts, etc.
(f) Any special padding of expense accounts by Communist Party functionaries should be reported.
(g) Possible violations of state or Federal tax laws.
(h) Disbursements and collections of the "Reserve Fund"
(i) Receipt of any money from abroad

(4) Security measures (Bureau file 100-3-84)
Any activities on the part of the security commission of the district which bring about new or unusual security measures, such as reducing clubs to "group captain systems," destruction of records, use of codes, clandestine meetings, investigations by the party of party members, etc.

(5) Underground operations (Bureau file 100-3-94)
Pertinent general information suitable for dissemination relating to underground operations of Communist Party. No information should be included in quarterly reports which would jeopardize informants or special investigative techniques. Current investigations relating to expanded underground operations during period 1951-1955 should be submitted by separate letter under individual case caption and should not be included in quarterly reports except for general information relating to methods of operation.

(6) Factionalism (Bureau file 100-3-88)
(a) Submit pertinent information indicating that any ranking Communist Party members or group of members have developed views as "left-wing sectarianists" or "right-wing opportunists" inasmuch as the party has a policy of expelling members who develop such views.
(b) Unusual disputes or arguments between leading communists in any district should be included in this section.

(7) International relations (Bureau file 100-3-81)
(a) Information relating to communication or contact between Communist Party, USA, and communist parties of other countries
(b) Identities of Communist Party officials who plan to travel in foreign countries, including the reason for their travel
(c) Reaction of responsible Communist Party officials to events taking place in foreign countries
(d) Communist Party strategy and tactics directed to attacks on U. S. foreign policy and support of U. S. S. R. and satellite foreign policy
(e) Policy matter concerning colonial affairs, such as Communist Party policy relative to obtaining of independence by colonial people

(8) United Nations (Bureau file 100-3-80)
(a) Communist Party policy or pertinent information in connection with the United Nations, including such matters as infiltration of the United Nations, contacts by Communist Party officials with representatives to the United Nations
(b) Communist Party strategy and tactics directed toward attacking U. S. policy and/or to support U. S. S. R. or satellite policy in the United Nations

(9) Deleted

4. Annual Communist Party, USA, organizational and membership survey
Each office is instructed to initiate by February 1 of each year a detailed and analytical survey of the organization and membership of the Communist Party in its territory, results to be forwarded to the Bureau by April 1. Set forth in detail the complete organizational structure of each Communist Party district or state organization including district and county committees, together with the identities of officers from the club through the district level. Identify each Communist Party club and section in the district, together with the identities of individual club members and most recent date each member was so identified. Where identification of an individual is tentative, this fact should be indicated by placing the word "tentative" after the individual's name. Note the informant coverage in each club, as well as on district and county committees, by setting forth the symbol numbers of the informants. In those instances in which no informant coverage exists in a particular club or on a district or county committee, this fact should be noted. In addition, summarize the overall findings by setting forth the estimated Communist Party membership in the field office territory, together with the number of members who have been positively and tentatively identified as such within the immediately preceding 12-month period. Charts and maps should be used in setting forth the geographic distribution of the Communist Party whenever feasible. Offices which are auxiliary offices in investigation of a Communist Party district should furnish the required information to the office of origin for inclusion in its survey by March 15 of each year.

Following the organizational breakdown, each office should critically appraise its knowledge of the Communist Party organization within its division and set forth its comments and recommendations concerning investigative activity to be undertaken to eliminate any weaknesses detected. In those instances in which the disclosed weakness is that of lack of adequate informant coverage, advise in detail of the number of Bureau-approved potential security informants being developed in the particular area, as well as concrete plans to obtain additional informant coverage in the future.

Each survey should contain a statement that all persons identified as members of the Communist Party are listed in the security index, or are informants or sources. Any exceptions should be named and a statement made as to whether the name has previously been furnished to the Bureau for indexing. The status of the investigation of each person listed should be shown.

5. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C (code name "CIRM"). Bufile 100-442529. Office of origin: New York.
   a. Quarterly reports (to reach the Bureau by February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1) should be submitted by each field office for the purpose of reporting, in a centralized manner, all available information bearing upon the communist influence in racial matters. Included should be information developed under the title of a variety of matters, such as CPUSA, Negro question, communist influence in racial matters; communist infiltration of various organizations, such as the Congress of Racial Equality, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and the like; investigations of subversive individuals active in the racial movement; investigations of communist fronts and other miscellaneous organizations; and racial disturbances and other racial matters investigated under the racial matter character. Information should be included in these quarterly reports, notwithstanding the fact that it will duplicate reporting in the other substantive matters referred to above. These reports shall be designed to precisely spell

out the full extent of the communist influence in racial matters. They should separate words and intentions from actions; mere participation from direct influence; and the bona fide communist from the mere "do-gooder." They should not include information concerning legitimate efforts in the racial movement where there is no communist taint.

b. Information should be reported according to the following outline. All main headings designated by Roman numerals must be accounted for. If there is no information to report under a particular main heading, the heading should appear, followed by a statement "No information developed."

I. COMMUNIST STRATEGY

(A) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

(1) Plans, strategy, party line, and the like made at national meetings, including expressions by national and other functionaries

(2) Plans, etc., made at district and lower level meetings, including expressions by local leaders and rank-and-file members.

(3) Plans, etc., as revealed in party publications and other propaganda media, such as written directives, press releases, and the like

Information under item 3 should be reported by the office covering the origin of the publications, such as the New York Office for ["The Daily World,"] "Political Affairs," and directives from party headquarters; San Francisco Office for "People's World"; etc. Party expressions, oral or written, when directly related to a specific event covered under II, should be included under II.

(B) OTHER COMMUNIST GROUPS (Such as Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor Party, Workers World Party, and the like)

Under (B), report information under separate numbered subheadings for each organization. Report here information generally along the same lines as for (A) above.

II. COMMUNIST TACTICS

In this part report information on communist direction and influence of and participation in racial demonstrations, disturbances, drives, boycotts, and any other similar activities with racial overtones. This part will illustrate how communist activities attempt to exploit racial situations and expand communist influence, thus furthering communist objectives. List activities in chronological order with lettered subheadings, such as:

(A) DEMONSTRATION, CLEVELAND, OHIO, [1-10-68]

(B) STORE BOYCOTT, YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO, [3-6-68]

Under each subheading include such information as nature of event; sponsoring and participating groups; total participants; number and identities of subversives involved; specifics as to whether subversives directed, controlled, instigated, or merely participated; whether violence resulted and, if so, whether subversives involved; arrests of subversives and court disposition; and any other information believed pertinent to the overall picture of communist influence. Efforts by supporting groups to avoid communist involvement should also be reported. If a particular event had no communist involvement, it should, of course, not be included in the report.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

87D

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

D. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS 19
- 1. Definitions 19
- 2. Responsibility of the Bureau 19
- 3. Purpose of investigation 19
  - a. Determination of dangerousness 19
  - b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes 19
- 4. Individuals to be investigated 22
  - a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49 22
  - b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements 22
  - c. Special training in a subversive movement 23
  - d. Military service 23
  - e. Employment in key facilities 23
  - f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs 23
- 5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals 24
  - a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning 24
    - (1) Subjects connected with institutions of learning 24
      - (a) Prior Bureau authority to institute investigation. 24
        - I. Faculty members 24
        - II. Students and nonacademic employees 24
        - III. Requests for Bureau authority 24
      - (b) Contacts during investigation 25
        - I. Persons permissible to contact 25
          - (A) Established reliable sources 25
          - (B) Individuals not connected with institutions of learning 25
        - II. Students, faculty members, or other employees. 25
        - III. Superiors of faculty members 25
      - (c) Receiving voluntary information 25
    - (2) Subjects not connected with an institution of learning. 25
    - (3) Contacts of foreign establishments 25
  - b. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations or international organizations, and members of the armed forces 25
- 6. Investigative procedures concerning individuals 26
  - a. General 26
  - b. Scope of investigations 26
    - (1) Background 26
      - (a) True name and aliases 26
      - (b) Residence address 26
      - (c) Occupation or business 26
      - (d) Business or employment address 26
      - (e) Citizenship status 26
        - I. Alien 26
        - II. Naturalized citizen 26
        - III. Native-born citizen 26
      - (f) Nationality background 26
      - (g) Military record 27
      - (h) Close relatives in armed forces 27
      - (i) Identification record - (Security flash notice FD-165) 27
      - (j) Physical description 28
      - (k) Photograph 28
      - (l) Handwriting specimens 29
      - (m) Labor union membership 29

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page
(2) Subversive activity.......... 29
  (a) Membership or affiliation.......... 29
  (b) Knowledge of aims and purposes.......... 29
  (c) Position and importance.......... 30
(3) Missing subjects.......... 31
(4) Individuals traveling abroad.......... 33
(5) Investigative techniques.......... 34
  (a) File reviews.......... 34
  (b) Security informants.......... 34
  (c) Physical surveillances.......... 35
  (d) Photographic surveillances.......... 35
  (e) Public sources.......... 36
  (f) Records of private firms.......... 36
  (g) Deleted
  (h) Deleted
  (i) Channelizing information to case files.......... 36
(6) Preservation of evidence.......... 37
(7) Interviews with subjects of security investigations.......... 38
  (a) Purpose.......... 38
  (b) Subjects not included in the security index.......... 38
  (c) Security index subjects.......... 38
  (d) Without Bureau authority the SAC may.......... 38
  (e) Prior Bureau authority.......... 39
  (f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews.......... 40
  (g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects.......... 42
7. Administrative procedures.......... 42a
a. Reserve index.......... 42a
  (1) Purpose.......... 42a
  (2) Individuals to be included.......... 42a
  (3) Arrangement.......... 42b
  (4) Content.......... 43
  (5) Removal and deletion of cards.......... 43
b. Security index.......... 43
  (1) Purpose.......... 43
  (2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual.......... 44
  (3) Criteria for placing and retaining names in the security index.......... 45
  (4) Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards.......... 46a
  (5) Content and appearance of security index card.......... 48
    (a) Data to appear on face of card.......... 48
    (b) Data to appear on separate attached card.......... 50
  (6) Arrangement of the security index.......... 50
    (a) At Bureau.......... 50
    (b) In the field office.......... 51
      I. Geographical section.......... 51
      II. Alphabetical section.......... 51
      III. Special section.......... 52
        (A) Espionage subjects.......... 52
        (B) U. S. Government employees.......... 52
        (C) Atomic energy program employees.......... 52
        (D) Foreign government employees.......... 52
        (E) United Nations Secretariat and other international organization employees.......... 52
        (F) Pro-Tito individuals.......... 52
        (G) Cuban.......... 53
      IV. Unavailable section.......... 53
        (A) Missing subjects.......... 54
        (B) Subjects out of the country.......... 54
        (C) Imprisoned subjects.......... 54
        (D) Exception - re. special section.......... 56

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page
V. Inactive section 56
(7) Periodic verification of addresses 57
(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards 58
(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards 58
    (a) Subjects of security index cards 58
    (b) Top functionaries 59
    (c) Subjects tabbed for priority 60
    (d) Subjects not included in security index 60
(10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index 60
    (a) Death of subject 60
    (b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction 60
    (c) Imprisonment of subject 60
    (d) Induction of subject into the armed forces 60
    (e) Security informants 60
    (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous 61
    (g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection 61
    (h) Subjects of Chinese extraction 62
(11) Priority apprehension program 62
    (a) Purpose 62
    (b) Subjects to be tabbed priority 62
    (c) Recommendations for and removal of priority designation 63
    (d) Administrative procedures for handling priority program 63
    (e) General 64
c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities and defense facilities 64
    (1) Responsibility 64
    (2) Inclusion in security index 65
    (3) Dissemination 65
    (4) Status of cases 66
d. Top functionary program 66
    (1) General 66
    (2) Deleted
    (3) Definition of top functionary 66
    (4) Manner of designation of top functionary 66
    (5) Regulations governing the handling of top functionaries 67
    (6) Maintenance of list 67

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index 70
  (1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations 70
  (2) Security of Government employees investigations 70
  (3) Atomic Energy Act, U. S. Information Agency applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations 70
f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports. 71
  (1) General 71
  (2) Schedule of submission of reports 72
  (3) Origin 72
  (4) Classification 72
  (5) Title 72
  (6) Character 73
    (a) Top functionaries 73
    (b) Others 73
  (7) Status 73
    (a) Top functionaries 73
    (b) Deleted
    (c) Other security index subjects 74
    (d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index.. 74
    (e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein 74
  (8) Content 74
  (9) Administrative data 77
    (a) General 77
    (b) Documentation of reports 78
g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 79
8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations 79
a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau 80
  (1) Aliens and naturalized citizens 80
  (2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services 80
  (3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense 80
  (4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard 80

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

(5) Seamen and subjects employed in the maritime industry, including longshoremen and other water-front employees. 80
(6) Employees of the Federal Government within the purview of Executive Order 10450...................... 80
(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services.. 81
(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration.. 81
(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service.. 81
(10) Dissemination at the Bureau........................... 81a
b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction..................... 82
(1) Members of the armed forces.......................... 82

Index. 82a

(D) When the office of origin for a security index [or reserve index A]subject against whose identification record a notice has been placed is changed, form FD-128[or FD-128a,]submitted to change office of origin, should[show]that a security flash notice has been posted with the Identification Division. An extra copy of the form FD-128[or FD-128a] should be specifically sent to the Identification Division in order that its records will[show]the new office of origin to which future records will be[submitted.]

(E) Cancel a security flash notice when (1) it is learned that the subject of such is deceased or (2) such subject is determined to be no longer of security interest. Do not cancel the security flash notice when a subject is removed from the security index solely by application of the security index criteria.

(j) Physical description

I. Obtain and report a detailed physical description.

II. During the course of the initial investigation in any security-type case, including espionage and nationalistic tendency cases, the physical characteristics and description of the subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation. It is not necessary to observe personally the subject of any case where preliminary investigation determines the basis for opening the case is unfounded.

III. The subject should be personally observed, if possible, early in the investigation after it is determined that a complete investigation is warranted to develop the extent of a subject's subversive activities and to consider whether the subject's name should be added to the security index. This action should be taken in the course of developing background information to determine the true identity and existence of the subject and to assist in establishing that the subject of the investigation is the person against whom the subversive allegations have been made. Each subject should be personally observed whenever a complete security investigation is conducted even though a security index card is not being recommended at the completion of the investigation.

IV. Do not delay the submission of form FD-122 recommending the addition of a subject's name to the security index even though it has not been possible to observe personally the subject if it has been determined through investigation that the subject is dangerous or potentially dangerous.

V. If a security index card is not being recommended after all logical investigation has been conducted and it has not been possible to observe personally the subject during the investigation, the case may be closed even though this has not been done. If a security index card has been recommended and prepared and it has not been possible to personally observe the subject, the case shall remain open until such time as the subject is personally observed, except when it has been determined that the subject is residing outside the U. S. or Puerto Rico, in which event the case may be closed if there is no other pending investigation and the matter should be followed administratively to be certain that the subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

(k) Photograph

I. Reasonable efforts should be made during the investigation of a security subject to obtain a photograph of the subject through usual sources.

II. Cases on security index subjects are to be maintained in a pending status until such time as a suitable photograph is obtained unless circumstances dictate otherwise, in which case the Bureau should be advised. Once a photograph has been obtained, continue to be alert for the existence of more recent photographs which may become available.

III. Do not forward a copy of the photograph to the Bureau unless the subject has been designated a [top functionary.]

(l) Handwriting specimens

I. If, during the investigation of security matter cases, it is disclosed that samples of the subject's handwriting are readily available, obtain specimens for possible future use and maintain in the file in the field.

II. A case is not to be left in a pending status merely for the purpose of obtaining handwriting specimens.

III. [Deleted]

(m) Labor union membership

If the subject is being investigated because of Communist Party membership, ascertain the identity of any labor organization of which he is a member and what position he holds in the labor organization, if any.

(2) Subversive activity

(a) Membership or affiliation

Obtain admissible and convincing evidence that the subject is a member of, or affiliated with, one of the basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations wherever possible. Such evidence may be either direct or circumstantial, or both. It is not possible to list the innumerable and varied forms in which such evidence may be found. Some of the more common types are:

I. Oral or written statements or admissions of the subject made publicly or privately to other individuals

II. Statements of confidential informants and other persons who are in a position to know the facts and can testify to them

III. Official letterheads and documents of subversive organizations containing information which identifies the subjects with the organizations. This will include membership and dues records wherever obtainable.

IV. Selective service records in which the subject admits membership in or position with a subversive organization

V. Attendance at closed meetings and conventions of a subversive organization

VI. Letters to publications, public officials, or other persons signed by the subject in an official position with a subversive organization or wherein the subject admits membership in or adherence to the principles of a subversive organization

VII. Recruitment or attempt to recruit members for a subversive organization

VIII. Solicitations or contributions of funds for subversive organization

IX. Seeking public office as a candidate for a subversive organization

X. Association with other individuals who are known to be members of or affiliated with subversive organizations

With regard to the question of membership, attention is directed to section 87H of this manual relating to the provisions of the Communist Control Act of 1954. This act sets out a list of 14 criteria itemized in 87H 2, which should be considered "in determining membership or participation in the Communist Party or any other organization defined in this Act, or knowledge of the purpose or objective of such party or organization...." These criteria include, e.g., listing as a member in organization records, contributions to the organization, and acceptance of organization discipline.

(b) Knowledge of aims and purposes

Admissible and convincing evidence that the subject knows the aims and purposes of the subversive organizations to overthrow the Government by force and violence should also be obtained. Mere proof of membership in or affiliation with such an organization is not sufficient to prove such knowledge.

Proof that the subject has such knowledge of the revolutionary purposes of the organization may be existent in several forms, several of which are discussed below:

I. Direct admissible evidence, such as statements made by the subject, or by responsible officials of the subversive organization in the subject's presence at organizational classes or meetings expounding the organization's doctrine in which the necessity or advisability of using force or violence in the overthrow of the Government is asserted, should be obtained, if at all possible.

Occasionally, statements of this nature are available in the subject's writings, sometimes in an indirect or veiled form.

II. Length of time in a subversive organization
III. Official positions held in the organization especially in educational, propaganda, or policy-making capacities
IV. Charter membership in the organization, participation in the original establishment of the organization
V. Extensive and long-continued participation in various organizational activities
VI. Attendance or teaching at organization schools or classes, especially leadership classes
VII. Preparation or distribution of party propaganda
VIII. Recruiting and fund-raising activities
IX. Possession of Marxist or revolutionary literature
X. Urging others to read literature of a revolutionary character, etc.

While none of the above types of evidence may be of sufficient value alone, a combination of a number of them may constitute convincing proof.

It should be remembered that the revolutionary purposes of a subversive organization are frequently cloaked in veiled language or in language significant only to persons familiar with Marxist or revolutionary terminology. Such obscure statements should not be ignored, but should be fully reported as it may be possible in legal proceedings to bring out the significance of such statements through expert witnesses, the testimony of informants, or the introduction of literature clarifying them. Confidential informants and other sources should be carefully interrogated and files thoroughly reviewed for the purpose of developing all revolutionary statements. In such instances, complete details should be obtained, together with all corroborating evidence. The names of all persons present when such statements are made should be ascertained and the facts reported in the individual case file of the person making the statement and of all persons present when the statement was made. The circumstances under which the statement was made should, of course, be ascertained and reported.

(c) Position and importance

I. Information reflecting the importance of an individual to a subversive organization or movement should be fully developed and reported. The member or affiliate may be dangerous or important because of his position, influence or activities outside the organization, or both. The facts in this regard should be fully developed. The individual may hold an important and strategic position or exercise great influence in a labor organization or other mass organization; in a racial, nationality, youth or other group; in an important front organization; in radio, newspaper, motion picture or other cultural,

(d) During the first contact, the interviewing Agent will introduce himself as a Special Agent of the FBI by use of credentials or badge and will open the conversation by using an appropriate pretext or by reciting the Bureau's responsibilities in the security field and asking the subject whether he can be of assistance to the Government. If the individual has been a member of a basic revolutionary organization and indicates he might cooperate, he may be questioned during the initial contact about his own activities in order to further ascertain the extent to which he will cooperate. This original interview is for the sole purpose of allowing the Agent to determine whether the individual being interviewed might be cooperative.

(e) Prior Bureau authority

I. Subjects of active current investigations where no interview with prior Bureau authority has previously been conducted

II. Closed cases where the subject is on the security index and no prior interview has been conducted

III. Subjects of investigations requested by the Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant-type cases, loyalty cases, etc.

IV. Any persons where circumstances indicate a delicate situation exists and a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, religious field, publishing houses, labor leaders, and the like. Bureau authority must be requested with respect to situations of this kind even though prior interviews have been had with these interviewees.

V. Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts

VI. Subjects of section A reserve index cards

In any of the above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview a subject of a security investigation except those persons under IV above. This does not relieve you of the responsibility of submitting reports in security cases when due.

VII. The request for Bureau authority for the interview should be set forth in the first paragraph of the letter and unless you are recommending a special manner or procedure for conducting the interview, the first paragraph should contain the following statements:

"Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If this subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during the initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of the Manual of Instructions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as a PSI."

Form FD-336 contains the above statement and may be used in requesting Bureau authority for the interview.

The above statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents during initial contacts and recontacts from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potentialities as an informant.

VIII. Letters requesting Bureau authority for the interview must contain the following information, if available:

(A) Residence address, occupation, employment and race of subject, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health

(B) Marital status. If married, the occupation, employment, and race of the spouse.

(C) Length of time subject a member of or affiliated with subversive organizations and positions he held in such organizations. In cases in which investigation is based on some allegation or circumstances of a security nature other than membership in or affiliation with subversive organizations, facts upon which investigation is predicated should be briefly set forth.

(D) If married, information indicating the spouse is or has been a member of or affiliated with subversive groups, the position held in such groups, and the length of time of such membership or affiliation

(E) Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups

(F) Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of the subject and, if married, of the spouse

(G) What is expected to be gained by the interview

IX. In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding the seven items listed above must be set out under the appropriate number but the above headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any of the items, you should make the appropriate comment under the respective number.

X. All letters requesting Bureau authority to interview the subject of a security investigation must be personally approved by the SAC.

XI. One of the required copies of the letter to the Bureau should consist only of the first page of the letter. When unnecessary for Bureau to issue specific instructions or comments in connection with authorizing an interview, the Bureau will approve the request by placing an appropriate rubber-stamp impression on the single-page copy of the incoming letter and return it by routing slip.

XII. Upon receipt of Bureau authority, the interview must be conducted within[45]days. If this is impossible, advise Bureau of the reasons why the interview was not effected and state that the subject will be contacted within the next[45]days. At the end of the second[45-day]period if the interview has not been conducted, request additional authority. Include in the letters any new information bearing upon the advisability of conducting the interview.

(f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews

I. Interviews must be conducted by two Special Agents. An Agent experienced in security investigations who has knowledge of Bureau regulations regarding development of informants must conduct the actual interrogation. Approach need not be made by both Agents at the same time and one Agent may observe from a secure distance. Background of subject and individual circumstances will determine exactly how approach should be handled in each case. Two Agents should be physically present during any interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all types of Bureau cases.

II. Preparations for interview must be thorough and conducted so that interviewing Agents will not be compromised, the Bureau will not be embarrassed, and confidential informants will not be exposed.

XI. Inform subjects connected with labor unions that the Bureau is not interested in employee-employer relations and is concerned only with obtaining information on infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements.

XII. Furnish no information and make no statements to a person being interviewed which might later be used to embarrass the Bureau. Agents should not allow themselves to be interviewed by the interviewee or to be placed in a position of answering questions instead of asking them.

XIII. Terminate immediately an interview if the subject proves to be hostile or uncooperative on initial contact.

XIV. Exploit a subject's knowledge to the utmost if he is found to be willing to furnish information of value.

XV. Questions asked of a subject being interviewed should be so worded as to require an admission or denial of all pertinent items of subversive information developed during prior investigation unless to do so would expose investigative techniques or security informants.

XVI. A cordial and friendly attitude alone on the part of a subject should not be construed as evidence of cooperation insofar as potential dangerousness is concerned when he fails to admit or furnish substantially the same subversive information verified through previous investigation.

XVII. Inform the subject that we are interested in interviewing him in great detail and arrange to conduct the interviews over as extended a period of time as necessary to develop the matter fully. Conduct necessary investigation or research to verify or add to what is being developed on interview. Request information from other offices or the Bureau to assist in the interview if needed.

XVIII. Reduce information obtained to a signed statement if subject willing that this be done.

XVIX. Determine willingness to testify to information furnished in possible future Federal proceedings.

XX. Consider possibility of developing these individuals as informants. If possibility is apparent, pursue matter with view to establishing subject as a reliable source in the subversive movement with which he has been connected.

XXI. When no information is developed during the course of an interview which would affect a subject's status, submit the results thereof in letter form immediately following the interview and also in the next report submitted in the case. At least one report will be submitted in each case in which a subject is interviewed with Bureau authority. In the case of an individual employed in or holding a sensitive position enumerated in 87D 6b (7) (e) IV above, the results of all interviews must be submitted promptly in report form until such time as he begins to cooperate as a security informant or a source.

XXII. Report information regarding the subject's admissions of his own subversive activities and associations and set forth a statement to the effect that he did or did not furnish information regarding subversive activities of others.

XXIII. Report statements of denial regarding subject's subversive activities developed through prior investigation and follow by a brief summary statement of the past subversive activity which is being denied by the subject.

XXIV. L[illegible]er transmitting results of an [illegible]terview must contain:

(A) A definite statement or conclusion of interviewing Agents as to cooperativeness of subject

(B) Whether information furnished by him coincides substantially with information developed against him

(C) Reasons for the conclusions

(D) Statement as to subject's availability as a potential witness and evaluation of subject's potential as an informant or confidential source

(E) Further contacts contemplated

(F) Recommendation that the security index card be canceled when it is determined from statements furnished by a security index subject regarding his subversive activities and associates, considered with other known information and factors, that the subject is no longer to be considered dangerous to the internal security in time of an emergency

XXV. The above instructions shall not preclude immediate interview of subject of a security-type investigation who contacts a Bureau representative and expresses a desire to furnish information concerning subversive activities. They do not apply to an interview of a person once he is an established informant or confidential source.

XXVI. Reinterviews with security index subjects should be considered on a systematic basis. This may be done by considering a recontact immediately prior to the time when it is necessary to submit[a periodic]report. In security index cases in which reports are submitted more frequently than once a year, the interview should be considered at least once a year. In all cases in which subjects have been interviewed in the past with Bureau authority and no reinterview is conducted prior to the submission of the[periodic] report, the cover page(s) accompanying report should [show]why a reinterview was not conducted. Results of reinterviews should be submitted in report form.

(g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects

I. A dead file should be maintained for reference purposes in those offices having sufficient volume of security work to justify such action.

II. Copies of memoranda designated for individual case files should be routed to this file. Such memoranda to contain:

(A) The background of the defectee

(B) Type of information he may furnish

(C) Period covered by this data

IV. [illegible]nges, additions, and deletion[illegible]f data appearing in section A of reserve index cards

(A) Changes in data appearing on section A reserve index cards should be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a.

(B) Deletions from section A of the reserve index [shall]be recommended by letter. The letter should set forth the basis for the recommendation.

(C) Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section A cards to new office of origin.

(b) Section B

I. This section is to contain the names of all other individuals included in the reserve index. This section is to be maintained only in the field office. The file of a reserve index B subject should be reviewed whenever informant information or other information is channeled to the file. A determination should be made at that time as to whether additional investigation is warranted.

II. Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section B cards to new office of origin.

(b) Where p[illegible]ntial dangerousness of a subj[illegible] has been established and inclusion of that subject in security index is warranted, the office of origin shall submit a recommendation for inclusion in security index by submitting form FD-122 to Bureau. Form must be prepared in triplicate. Original and one copy shall be forwarded to Bureau and one copy will be placed in subject's investigative case file.

Nothing should appear on FD-122 or subsequently on the security index card which is not in the subject's case file. Form FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend a subject for inclusion in the security index and (2) to submit changes to data which appears on face of security index cards already existent.

Proper selection should be made in the opening paragraph option. FD-122 is submitted with abstract when used to recommend the subject for inclusion in the security index and without abstract when used to indicate additions, deletions, or changes in data appearing on existing cards.

(c) When form FD-122 is submitted to Bureau recommending inclusion of a name in security index, attach additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of facts on which recommendation has been based. Facts must be in detail to clearly show soundness of recommendation. [Complete justification for designated priority level for apprehension must be included.] Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must contain pertinent dates of subject's activities.

(d) When, at conclusion of investigation, subject's name is not being recommended for security index, set out a brief summary statement in the appropriate communication closing the case showing reasons for the decision.

(e) Security index cards shall be recommended by and maintained by office of origin only.

(f) A current report must be in possession of the Bureau when subject is recommended for security index. If it is the initial report in the case, it must be a summary report. If, however, prior investigative reports have been submitted which are suitable for dissemination and are appropriately documented, a summary report need not be submitted.

(g) To assure that subject recommended for security index will receive proper attention, case shall be kept in pending or pending-inactive status until security index card has been received from Bureau and filed in office security index. If case continues in pending status because of outstanding investigation, reports shall carry a lead to follow authorization of security index card by the Bureau and if approved to disseminate a copy of the report to Secret Service in addition to other leads. If outstanding investigation has been completed and case would otherwise be closed upon submission of the report and form FD-122, case shall be placed in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and if approved to disseminate the copy of the report to Secret Service. In latter instance, upon receipt of security index card and following local dissemination to Secret Service, case may be closed administratively.

(h) Recommendation for security index card should not be delayed because of absence of information concerning race, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, or description where security index card is warranted. In such instances, recommendation for the card should be submitted with [illegible] current report and case retained in pending status with [illegible] investigation continuing to determine missing items of information.

(i) Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for the security index provided instructions set forth in 87D 6b (3) and (4) are followed. Forms FD-122 submitted on subjects should include data required in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV below.

(j) When form FD-122 is submitted recommending a security index card be prepared on a subject who is of Chinese extraction, the words "Other - Chinese" must be included in the space on the form calling for a statement as to the subject's race. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending that a security index card be prepared on a person who is not of Chinese extraction but who has shown definite sympathies with Communist China, the form should include under "Miscellaneous" a statement to the effect "sympathetic to Communist China."

(k) Upon receipt of form FD-122 at Bureau, the case of the subject will be reviewed and if recommendation of field is concurred in, security index cards will be prepared. Duplicate copy of form will be returned to office of origin stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." The three cards shall be filed in security index as outlined below. The returned copy of FD-122 shall be placed in subject's main investigative case file. Offices with a geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive an extra card.

(l) When security index cards are received from Bureau, data thereon must be checked for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards of similar size to security index cards which are stapled to back of two of the cards. One card will then be filed in the geographical section of office security index (except special section cards and unavailable section cards - see 87D 7b (6) (b) III and IV below), and one card shall be filed in the duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. The other card is filed in alphabetical section of security index. No information shall be permanently added, deleted, or changed on face of security index card without complying with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (8).

(5) Content and appearance of security index card

(a) Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain the following information. If any of items enumerated in I through XIV are missing at time the security index card is made, the case should be continued as pending and investigation conducted to obtain the necessary information. Set forth under each item below are possible categories in which subject may be classified, together with code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on form FD-122 when sending form to Bureau recommending security index card be prepared. Code letters should subsequently appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

I. Name and aliases

The full and correct name and aliases of the subject must be contained on the security index card. When the true name of a subject or any aliases are changed, added, deleted, or are found to be incorrect, form FD-122 must be submitted showing the correct data to be placed on the security index card.

II. Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)

	III.	Se	
		Male	M
		Female	F
	IV.	Citizenship	
		Native born	NB
		Naturalized	NA
		Alien	AL
		(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
	V.	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
		Communist Party, USA	COM
		Progressive Labor Party	PLP
		Socialist Workers Party	SWP
		Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
		American Socialist Clubs	ASC
		Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
		Proletarian Party of America	PPA
		Students for a Democratic Society	SDS
		Spartacist League	SPL
[[		[American Workers' Communist Party	AWC]
		Workers World Party	WWP
		Anarchist	ANA
		Nation of Islam	NOI
		Revolutionary Action Movement	RAM
		Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee	SNC
		Black Nationalist	BNT
		Bulgarian	BUL
		Cuban	CUB
		Czechoslovakian	CZE
		Hungarian	HUN
		Romanian	ROM
		Russian	RUS
		Yugoslavian	YUG
[	VI.	[Priority designation	
[		Priority I	P I
[		Priority II	P II
[		Priority III	P III]
[	VII.	Top functionary designation (where applicable)	
[		Top functionary	TF
	VIII.	Special section cards	
		Atomic energy program employees	AEP
		Cuban special section	CUB
		Espionage subjects	ESP
		Foreign government employees	FGE
		Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
		United Nations employees	UNE
		U. S. Government employees	GOV
	IX.	Unavailable section cards	
		Missing	MI
		Out of country	OC
		Imprisoned	PR
	X.	Date and place of birth	
	XI.	Key facility geographical reference number obtained from the Department of Defense Key Facilities List and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility (where applicable)	
	XII.	Residence address	
	XIII.	Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.	
	XIV.	Field office file number	

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description

(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division

(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. This photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.

(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms

(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by [automatic data processing]and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

unequivocal regardless of Yugoslavia's foreign policies.

(G) Cuban

In order that, in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U. S., special handling may be afforded those subjects whose organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies are shown as "Cuban." Security index cards denoting such will contain the code "CUB" on line 1.

Standards for inclusion of subjects in the special section of the security index are the same as those for any other potentially dangerous subject.

When submitting a recommendation for preparation of a security index card on an individual falling in one of the above categories, form FD-122 must include the words "Special Section" typed in the upper right portion thereof. The proper category should be typed on FD-122 in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)."

Security index cards to be placed in the special section shall bear the appropriate code letters in the upper right portion designating the subsection in which the cards should be placed. Upon receipt from the Bureau of the three security index cards of subjects in these categories, the required additional data shall be placed on two which shall be filed alphabetically in the appropriate subsection of the special section. The third card shall be filed in the alphabetical section of the security index. Under no circumstances should special section security index cards be filed in the geographical section of the index.

When a security index subject whose card is maintained in the special section no longer comes within one of the categories of the special section, FD-122 must be submitted with the words "Remove from Special Section" typed in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." If the card should be placed in the unavailable section, the statement "Place in Unavailable Section" should be added in this space. When the new cards are received from the Bureau, they should be checked for accuracy and the description and photograph, if available, should be placed on separate cards of similar size and attached to the back of two of the cards. These two cards should then be filed in the geographical or unavailable section (where applicable) and the other card filed in the alphabetical section of the security index. The old cards should be destroyed.

The special section card shall[indicate the priority level for apprehension.]

It is not contemplated that subjects of security index cards maintained in the special section will be apprehended under a mass apprehension program. The cases of such subjects shall be given individual attention upon the inception of the apprehension program and the subjects will not be apprehended in the absence of specific Bureau instructions in each case.

IV. Unavailable section

Security index cards of individuals who are missing, out of the country, or are imprisoned shall be retained in the unavailable section. This section shall be broken down into three subsections headed by tabs marked "Missing,"

"Out of the Country," and "Imprisoned." The unavailable section shall be maintained in accordance with the following instructions:

(A) Missing subjects

Security index subjects are not to be included in the unavailable section as missing immediately upon determination that they are no longer located at their previously known places of residence or employment. The action required in 87D 6b (3) above must be taken prior to submitting FD-122 placing a subject in the unavailable section as a missing subject. The Bureau must be periodically advised of the investigative steps taken to locate missing security index subjects in accordance with 87D 6b (3).

If the subject is missing, the word "Missing" shall be typed in the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)."

(B) Subjects out of the country

The security index cards of subjects who are found to have departed from the U. S. or Puerto Rico for a foreign country shall be placed in this subsection of the unavailable section of the security index unless their cards should be cancelled in accordance with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (10) (b).

If the subject is out of the country, the words "Out of the Country" shall be typed in the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." If the foreign address is known, place it on FD-122 in the space provided for the residence address. If the subject is only known to be in a certain foreign country and his residence there is not known or is only known to be traveling abroad, include this information on FD-122. If the subject's current employment abroad is known, include it on FD-122.

The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least each six months for verification of the subject's address, the same as any other security index case, to determine if the subject has returned to this country.

Appropriate stops should be placed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to be advised of information which may become available to it indicating the subject's return to this country.

(C) Imprisoned subjects

The cards of security index subjects who are found to be imprisoned shall be placed in the unavailable section of the security index.

If the subject is in prison, the word "Imprisoned" shall be typed on the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." The identity of the institution in which the subject is incarcerated shall be typed in the space provided for the residence address. The space for the business address shall be left blank.

[illegible]uld be completely filled out [illegible]t as if a first [illegible]commendation is being made, and submitted with a current report. If not, the Bureau should be advised of the reasons for not reactivating his security index card. In either case, cancel the inactive card.

(7) Periodic verification of addresses

(a) The data recorded on security index cards shall be in an up-to-date status at all times.

(b) The whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. [The residence and business addresses of security index subjects in priority I must be checked at least once each three months.] The residence and business addresses of all [other] security index subjects must be checked at least once each six months, except those imprisoned and those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. (defection to a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, including Cuba since 10-1-60) (see section 105G, item 3, volume IV, of this manual). The residence and employment of those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. must be verified every thirty days. The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least each six months to determine if he has returned to this country.

Perfect arrangements to be advised on a current basis of any indication that the subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change his residence or employment. Periodic checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under appropriate pretext by telephone [once each six months for those individuals in priority I and once each year for all other subjects. Pretext means may be utilized during other periodic checks conducted either personally or through appropriate sources.]

(c) The physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and the individual case file of each security index subject shall show that this has been done. If a security index subject has not been personally observed previously, this should be done during the next verification of the subject's residence and/or business addresses.

(d) Use form FD-154 in verifying addresses of security index subjects when its use will facilitate the checking of the addresses. When FD-154 is not used in verifying addresses, a notation must be made on the last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in the subject's case file showing the subject's current residence and business addresses and the date such addresses were verified. This must be done to assure that the file will contain all information concerning the status of the case and that the file will come to the attention of the Agent or field supervisor to determine if additional action is warranted at the time of the verification of addresses. Each time that a security index subject's residence and employment are verified, the case must be reevaluated to assure that the subject is qualified for inclusion in the security index under the criteria for such inclusion. A notation to the effect that the case has been reviewed for this purpose shall be made in the file.

(e) If it is determined that the residence or business address or both have been changed from those appearing on the security index card, FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau with the current residence or business address shown thereon. In such instances, FD-122 should show only the changes to be made on the security index card. FD-122 should be accompanied by form FD-366 for dissemination to Secret Service. Secret Service should be advised locally by dissemination of FD-366.

(f) The project of verifying addresses of security index subjects shall be handled by reopening and assigning the cases for verification and closing the cases administratively upon accomplishment of verifications. Verification should also be made at the time of submission of all [periodic] investigative reports and should be reported therein.

(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards

(a) Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, [priority designation,] date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility (see 87D 7c (2) below), residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by form FD-128.

(b) Insertion or removal of cards from special section or unavailable section should be handled pursuant to 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV.

(c) Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing security index cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.

(d) Indicate use of FD-122 for changes by checking proper opening paragraph and submit without abstract.

(e) Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."

(f) Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected security index cards with duplicate copy of FD-122 (stamped "Corrected Security Index cards attached. Substitute for cards in file and destroy old cards. Place photograph and description on reverse side of geographical cards."), action to be taken includes:

I. Check accuracy of data on cards.

II. Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to back of corrected cards, staple them, and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV above.

III. File third card in alphabetical section of security index.

IV. Destroy old cards.

(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards

(a) Subjects of security index cards

I. Requests to verify addresses of security index subjects from other offices must be assigned immediately and results of investigation to verify the new address must be transmitted to the office of origin within two weeks.

II. Office of origin, upon receipt of verification of address, should submit FD-128 immediately transferring office of origin. Forms regarding unavailable section subjects should be prepared in accordance with 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.

III. Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies thereof to office covering subject's new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and security index cards. FD-128 should show full title [and priority level designation.]

IV. Information concerning key facility employment of subject in new office should be furnished by that office to old office of origin so that geographical reference

n[illegible], agency having security responsibility, and interested agencies can be included on FD-128 submitted by old office of origin.

V. Where security index flash notice has been placed with Identification Division, notation to that effect must appear on FD-128 and extra copy of FD-128 must be specifically designated for Bureau marked "Attention Identification Division" so that those records will [show]new office controlling existing security index flash notice.

VI. The old office of origin will submit current report.

Submission of FD-128 should not be delayed solely for preparation of reports when office of origin is to be changed, but notation should be made on FD-128 that old office of origin is preparing report.

Case will remain pending in both old and new offices of origin until report is submitted by old office of origin. The new office of origin is responsible to follow the matter until the report is submitted.

VII. The new office of origin is to review the pertinent material received with FD-128, as well as pertinent information in the files of the new office, to determine whether additional investigation is warranted. If no additional investigation is warranted, advise Bureau by letter that the case is being placed in a closed status.

VIII. Upon receipt of FD-128, office covering new address of subject will be office of origin with no other communication necessary in this regard. New office of origin will place its file number on security index cards received and place them in security index of that office.

IX. Upon receipt of new security index cards from Bureau with copy of FD-128, new office of origin is to transfer information from reverse side of old geographical cards to two of the new cards, appropriately file new cards, and destroy old cards.

(b) Top functionaries

Mechanics of transferring cases for all security index subjects as described above shall apply to top functionaries. Additional procedures in[this category]are:

I. Notification to Bureau of deletion of subject as top functionary in old office of origin will be handled merely by designation in space provided on FD-128 that subject was top functionary.

II. Upon receipt of form FD-128, new office of origin shall automatically designate subject top functionary and continue case in an assigned pending status[until investigation is completed. After investigation is completed and a summary report has been submitted by the old office of origin, the case may be placed in a pending-inactive status.] Within three months, new office of origin is to conduct active investigation, submit investigative report on subject, and advise Bureau concerning continued designation of subject in[this category.]

[illegible], agency having security responsibility, and interested agencies can be included on FD-128 submitted by old office of origin.

V. Where security index flash notice has been placed with Identification Division, notation to that effect must appear on FD-128 and extra copy of FD-128 must be specifically designated for Bureau marked "Attention Identification Division" so that those records will [show]new office controlling existing security index flash notice.

VI. The old office of origin will submit current report.

Submission of FD-128 should not be delayed solely for preparation of reports when office of origin is to be changed, but notation should be made on FD-128 that old office of origin is preparing report.

Case will remain pending in both old and new offices of origin until report is submitted by old office of origin. The new office of origin is responsible to follow the matter until the report is submitted.

VII. The new office of origin is to review the pertinent material received with FD-128, as well as pertinent information in the files of the new office, to determine whether additional investigation is warranted. If no additional investigation is warranted, advise Bureau by letter that the case is being placed in a closed status.

VIII. Upon receipt of FD-128, office covering new address of subject will be office of origin with no other communication necessary in this regard. New office of origin will place its file number on security index cards received and place them in security index of that office.

IX. Upon receipt of new security index cards from Bureau with copy of FD-128, new office of origin is to transfer information from reverse side of old geographical cards to two of the new cards, appropriately file new cards, and destroy old cards.

(b) Top functionaries

Mechanics of transferring cases for all security index subjects as described above shall apply to top functionaries. Additional procedures in[this category]are:

I. Notification to Bureau of deletion of subject as top functionary in old office of origin will be handled merely by designation in space provided on FD-128 that subject was top functionary.

II. Upon receipt of form FD-128, new office of origin shall automatically designate subject top functionary and continue case in an assigned pending status[until investigation is completed. After investigation is completed and a summary report has been submitted by the old office of origin, the case may be placed in a pending-inactive status.] Within three months, new office of origin is to conduct active investigation, submit investigative report on subject, and advise Bureau concerning continued designation of subject in[this category.]

(c) Subjects tabbed for [priority]
Security index card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in new office of origin until such time as it is determined by receipt of information by that office that priority designation is not warranted under the provisions of 87D 7b (11) below.

(d) Subjects not included in security index

I. Transfer office of origin by FD-128 only upon verification by another office of subject's presence in that division. FD-128 should show full title.

II. Enclose copies of all investigative reports and other pertinent serials with copies of FD-128 to new office of origin.

III. New office of origin is to investigate or advise Bureau that case closed if no action warranted

(10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index
SAC shall personally recommend the removal of any name from the security index under the conditions set out in 87D 7b (4). Recommendation to cancel subject's name from the security index should be accompanied by a current investigative report except in case of death of the subject.

(a) Death of subject
Destroy security index card without Bureau authority, but advise Bureau by letterhead memorandum.

(b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction
Upon learning of the departure of a security index subject from the U. S. or Puerto Rico for a foreign country, immediately ascertain conditions surrounding his departure.

No security index card shall be canceled by reason of a subject's departure for a foreign country unless that subject is an alien who has permanently departed either voluntarily or as a result of deportation proceedings. In such instances the security index cards will be canceled only after the subject's departure has been verified as being permanent. If a U. S. citizen who is included in the security index and who has been out of the country is found to have renounced his citizenship and taken citizenship of a foreign country, his security index card may be canceled only after it has been determined that he does not intend to return to the U. S.

Recommendations to cancel the security index cards of such subjects shall be made by letter directed to the Bureau. The cards shall be canceled only after receipt of advice from the Bureau that the Bureau's security index cards have been canceled.

(c) Imprisonment of subject
Security index cards shall not be canceled by reason of a subject's having been imprisoned regardless of the length of time he will be incarcerated. The cards of such subjects shall be placed in the unavailable section of the security index and the cases handled thereafter in accordance with the instructions set forth in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.

(d) Induction of subject into the armed forces
Security index cards of subjects who have been inducted into the armed forces of the U. S. are to be placed in the inactive section of the field security index. Follow the procedure set forth above under 87D 7b (6) (b) (V).

(e) Security informants
The security index card of any subject who is developed as a security informant should be canceled. In requesting the Bureau's permission to designate such a subject as a security informant, direct Bureau's

attention to the existence of a security index card for that individual. In all such instances a specific recommendation must be made concerning the cancellation of the card. The card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate the subject as a security informant.

(f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous
Instructions set out below should be read in conjunction with 87D 6b (7) (c) herein relating to interviews with security index subjects.

Frequently, after a subject is included in the security index, information is received or investigation develops information indicating that he is no longer a threat to the internal security by reason of [physical condition,] defection or expulsion from the subversive movement, membership in or affiliation with which was the reason for placing him in the security index. Such defection may be shown by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over an extended period of time or upon declaration of opposition to the principles of the subversive movement. The latter may manifest itself in declarations by a subject in the presence of confidential informants or other sources, statements to the press, or actual contact with Bureau representatives and admission of previous subversive activity.

When sufficient information is at hand regarding subject's present sympathies to reach conclusion that he should no longer be scheduled for apprehension as a dangerous subversive, request authority to interview subject or advise Bureau of reasons why subject should not be interviewed. Bureau will not cancel security index card without consideration being given to interview of subject. See 87D 6b (7) (c) and (d).

If, upon interview, subject proves cooperative to extent that his security index card should be canceled, advise Bureau by letter of results together with a recommendation for cancellation which must be approved by Bureau.

(g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection
As security index cases are reviewed upon reopening in the field, there will be instances in which removal will be required by application of the security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3). With the passage of time, limits specified in criteria will operate to remove certain subjects even though there is no affirmative indication of defection.

Letters recommending removal of a subject's name from the security index should be accompanied by form FD-122a if facts in the case warrant the inclusion of subject's name in section A of the reserve index.

The following procedures should be followed in the case of those individuals not being recommended for inclusion in section A of the reserve index:

I. When subjects are removed from security index solely on basis of application of security index criteria as cases are reopened and reviewed in the field, retain security index cards pertaining to such subjects bearing the descriptive matter on reverse sides; i.e., the cards previously filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Destroy cards previously filed in alphabetical section. Those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards under provisions of 87D 7b (6) (b) I should retain but one card in each instance, destroying second geographical card as well as card previously filed in alphabetical section.

II. Mark canceled across face of each card being retained and file in the reserve index, section B.

III. The above instructions do not apply in the case of individuals removed from the security index based upon activity in the Nation of Islam. Security index cards in such cases should be destroyed.

(h) Subjects of Chinese extraction

In any communication recommending cancellation of a security index card on a subject of Chinese extraction, such communication must contain the words "Other - Chinese." This regulation relates specifically to those subjects placed on the security index following a recommendation submitted in accordance with the instructions contained in section 87D 7b (4) (j) above.

[(11) Priority apprehension program

(a) Purpose

Many individuals included in security index because of their training, violent tendencies, or prominence in subversive activity are extremely dangerous and would be more inclined to commit or capable of committing overt acts against the U. S. in time of national emergency than would others in security index. Degree of dangerousness of such individuals is so pronounced that in interest of security they must be immobilized in the least possible time prior to others
[in security index.

[Individuals in security index tabbed[priority I and/or
[priority II]would be arrested first in event of a limited but grave emergency, probably without the arrest of other security index subjects.

In an all-out emergency, all subjects whose names are in the security index will be considered for immediate apprehension.

[Each individual case should stand on its own merits and decision to consider subjects for priority of apprehension should be based on subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies.

[(b) Subjects to be tabbed[priority]
[I. Each security index subject should be considered for
[[priority I]tabbing who falls within one or more of
[following categories:
[[(A)] All top functionaries
[[(B) All individuals considered to be hard core national
[and state basic revolutionary organization leaders
[and those leaders of other subversive organizations
[and unorganized groups and individuals who have in-
[dicated a propensity for violence and/or have received
[special training in sabotage, espionage, and/or
[guerrilla warfare. Examples of activities of indi-
[viduals who should be included in this priority are
[as follows:]
[[i.] Activity as organizers or leaders in the
[organization
[[ii.] Special training at Lenin School or Far Eastern
[Institute in Moscow
[[iii.] Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men,
[or active participation in violent strikes, riots,
[or demonstrations
[[iv.] Violent statements or strong revolutionary
[tendencies as shown by their activities

[v.] Persons active in the Communist[Party or other organization underground apparatus]

[vi.] Any other security index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent, or disruptionist in the event of an emergency

[(C) Individuals employed in or having access to key and/or defense facilities

II. Security index subjects considered for priority II

(A) All individuals who are considered to be of second level leadership of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations and individuals who present a significant threat but are in less influential positions than those in priority I

III. All other individuals on the security index will be tabbed priority III.]

(c) Recommendations for and removal of[priority]designation

I. Approval of SAC

Designation of each subject[as to priority]or removal of any subject therefrom must be personally approved by SAC, or in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.

II. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending either tabbing for[priority]or deletion of such tabbing, attach an additional page setting out a brief summary of facts upon which the recommendation is based.

(d) Administrative procedures for handling[priority]program

Take following action to assure that security index cards for subjects tabbed for priority of apprehension will be readily available for emergency action in your office:

I. [Deleted]

II. Geographical section

Divide geographical section of security index into[three] distinct parts.

(A) Part I of geographical section shall include only security index cards for subjects who are tabbed [priority I.]

(B) Part II of geographical section shall contain security index cards for all subjects that are tabbed priority II.]

(C) [Part III of geographical section should contain security index cards for all subjects who are tabbed priority III.]

[(D)] In offices having two separate and distinct geographical sections, i.e., geographical-employment and geographical-residence, as provided under 87D 7b (6) herein, each such geographical section must be broken into[parts I, II, and III.]

[(E) Priority cards will be the following colors: priority I - beige, priority II - green, priority III - white]

III. Alphabetical section

(A) One security index card for each subject is to be filed in alphabetical section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever.

(B) [Deleted]

(C) [Priority]tabbings approved at Bureau will be shown on security index cards forwarded to field by code letters["P I," "P II," or "P III"]in first line on [the]cards.

IV. [Deleted]

(e) General

I. Tabbing of cards

The alphabetical security index cards on those individuals designated as "Pro-Cuban" should be tabbed with a metal tab.

II. Removal from[priority I and priority II]

Careful analysis must be made of each case in which deletion from[priority I and priority II]is proposed. For instance, when a[subject]is being removed from [priority I or priority II tabbing,]file review may well disclose that subject qualifies for[priority]tabbing for reasons covered in 87D 7b (11) (b).

c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities and defense facilities

(1) Responsibility

FBI is responsible by Presidential directive for keeping other Federal agencies advised of developments within their jurisdiction affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated as vital to the national defense and welfare by the Department of Defense.

FBI is responsible under Delimitations Agreement for investigating employees of private contractors who have contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where credible subversive information concerning employee is obtained. Thorough investigation must be conducted and consideration for inclusion in security index given concerning any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in the past, a member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom sufficient other subversive information is in our possession which warrants such action.

(a) Requests for investigation from another agency

When another agency requests investigation of individual employed in key facility and/or defense facility, institute investigation immediately if basis of request so warrants. Advise Bureau of request, basis thereof, and that investigation is being conducted.

(b) Verification of key facility or defense facility status of place of employment

Department of Defense Key Facilities List and Defense Facilities List (maintained in each office) must be checked for verification of information that a security investigation subject's place of employment may be included in such list.

(c) Individuals denied access to restricted information

Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently advise that an individual has been denied clearance to work in a defense plant or to handle classified or restricted information. In some instances clearance is denied based on information furnished by Bureau. At other times, information in Bureau files is very meager or possibly negative and basis for such denial of clearance is not known. The intelligence agency is responsible for furnishing Bureau with any information involving disloyalty or subversiveness.

Office receiving notification that an individual has been denied clearance must ascertain promptly basis for such denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of

agency responsible for such action. Forward such data to Bureau and incorporate in next report submitted concerning individual in question. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau and there is no case on individual being denied clearance, give consideration to opening a security investigation if information received from intelligence agency warrants such action.

(2) Inclusion in security index

In recommending key facility employee for inclusion in security index, FD-122 is to contain:

(a) Key facility geographical reference number
[(b) Abbreviation for agency having security responsibility. [The
[Department of the Army has been designated the agency having
[security responsibility for all key facilities.]
(c) Abbreviations for other agencies known to have classified contracts with the key facility. Interested agencies should be identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on security index cards returned from Bureau.
[(d) [Deleted]

If subject of existing security index card is found to have become employed in a key facility, FD-122 must be submitted to Bureau with above-required key facility data set forth thereon. Case is then to be handled in accordance with instructions set forth below concerning key facility cases.

(3) Dissemination

Upon receipt of original complaint or allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, a summary of complaint and information concerning the individual should be furnished immediately by letter to interested intelligence agency. Intelligence agency should then be advised whether a security investigation is being conducted of the individual and, if investigation is being conducted, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion of investigation. Letter to intelligence agency should clearly point out that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation by FBI.

In addition to disseminating to interested intelligence agencies information of a derogatory security nature developed concerning persons employed at facilities holding classified contracts, with the exception of classified contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission, such information should be furnished to the Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, 43215, attention Chief, Adjudication Division. In each instance, advise the interested intelligence agency that dissemination has been made to DISCO. This dissemination is to include derogatory security information developed concerning persons who may not be currently employed at such a facility but who are known to be holders of an industrial security clearance.

These instructions do not apply to allegations of espionage or those of such a confidential character as would not ordinarily be disseminated. Such information appearing to be of immediate interest to other intelligence agencies should be submitted to Bureau by most expeditious means, depending upon the circumstances, with a request that the Bureau consider advisability of disseminating it.

Disseminate copies of each report to the local representative of agency having security responsibility, as well as to local representative of other intelligence agencies known to have

classified contracts with the key facility. Copies of reports for the Marine Corps should be disseminated locally to NISO.

Dissemination to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), the Research and Development Board (RDB), and the Maritime Administration (MA) will be made at the Bureau, and not in the field.

(4) Status of cases

After all active investigation conducted, place in a closed status. Forty-five days before report due, make case pending active and check with armed services representative at the key facility, or with other reliable sources, to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

d. Top functionary program

(1) General

Purpose of top functionary program is to select for special attention those individuals in a subversive movement who are of outstanding importance to the effectiveness of the movement.

Top functionary program is described below as pertaining to the Communist Party, USA. However, it also applies to important individuals active in or on behalf of other basic revolutionary groups,[subversive organizations, or unorganized groups who have indicated a propensity for violence.]

(2) [Deleted]

(3) Definition[of top functionary]

A top functionary is an individual, either a member or a nonmember of the Communist Party, to whom, because of his importance, it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention in order to keep abreast of communism on a national basis in the U. S. Necessarily, such an individual would be on a high policy level in the movement. [This also applies to an individual, either a member or a nonmember of other subversive organizations or unorganized groups, who would be on a high policy level in the movement.]

The term "top functionary" is not to be construed as requiring that individuals in this category must actually hold official positions in[the]organizations but shall be given a broad enough construction to include others who are of equal importance because of their influence in the movement itself, or their position and activities outside the party in labor, front, or similar organizations or movements. Black nationalist extremists whose importance justifies continuous investigative attention should be considered for designation as top functionaries.

(4) Manner of designation[of top functionary]

Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate a subject as a top functionary. Submit such recommendation to Bureau by letter containing reasons for the recommendation. Bureau desires to be very selective in this matter and to concentrate on individuals who, on a national basis, are the guiding hands in the communist movement[and other subversive movements. Top functionaries are to be included in priority I and reports are to be submitted in accordance with 87D 7f (2).]

At the seat of Government a careful appraisal will be made of the field's recommendation, following which the office will be advised concerning the Bureau's decision on the recommendation.

(5) Regulations governing [the handling] of top functionaries

[(a) Designation and deletion of top functionary status
Designate or remove a subject as a top functionary by individual letter to the Bureau carrying the subject in the caption and containing a brief statement as to the reason for designation or deletion.

Where office of origin for top functionaries is transferred, deletions in the old office of origin and additions in the new office are handled in accordance with 87D 7b (9) (b).

(b) Photographs
Photographs must be obtained for each top functionary. Whenever possible, the photographs should be obtained from public records, law enforcement agencies, state or Federal Government agencies, and similar sources. Where more direct means employed, use extreme care to avoid prejudicing the investigation. Send one copy of photograph of each top functionary to the Bureau, either by cover letter or as enclosure to a report. Maintain a copy of each photograph in the subject's individual case file in the field. If album of top functionary photographs maintained, be sure duplicates are also filed in each individual subject's file.

(c) Handwriting specimens
Suitable handwriting specimens of each top functionary must be obtained. Whenever possible, obtain handwriting specimens from public records, law enforcement agencies, and similar sources. Again, if more direct means employed, use extreme care. Send specimens to the Bureau under a separate cover letter by registered mail for the attention of the FBI Laboratory. Letter should bear caption of individual case.

Handwriting specimens should be sufficiently extensive to permit possible future comparisons by the Laboratory. When specimens submitted may be of value as evidence, letter of transmittal should so state and Bureau should be requested to return specimens after copies have been made.

(d) Security index cards
Request preparation by FD-122 at the earliest possible moment. Same rules apply to preparation and maintenance as apply to other security index cards. All security index cards for top functionaries shall be designated for priority I.

(e) Change of office of origin
FD-128 changing office of origin on a top functionary automatically deletes him as top functionary in old office and adds him as a top functionary in new office. For further instructions concerning the change of office of origin in these cases, see 87D 7b (9) (b).

(f) Reports
I. Character - Internal Security - (followed by appropriate letter designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency)

(6) Maintenance of list
Each office must maintain a current list on top functionaries.]

e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index

Individuals investigated by the Bureau under any character against whom subversive information is developed must be constantly borne in mind for inclusion in the security index and/or reserve index.

(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations

Subjects of these investigations must be included in the security index and/or the reserve index if they meet the standards for inclusion therein. It is the responsibility of the investigating Agent and field supervising official to make appropriate recommendations for preparation of the security index card and/or the reserve index card, whenever appropriate.

(2) Security of Government employees (SGE) investigations

Subjects of all SGE investigations against whom subversive derogatory information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or reserve index.

The Agent conducting investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer such cases to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling. Copies of reports showing disloyal information must be submitted to the field office covering the subject's residence, when developed by any other office.

When an individual who has previously been investigated under the SGE character is the subject of a security index card and is still employed by the Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, the dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and the character of the subject's security case should be used in the report being submitted. This will insure that the reports are referred to the appropriate desks for supervision at the Bureau, as well as in the field. These reports should be written according to the standards prevailing for SGE reports.

Disseminate these dual character reports the same as any other security report. Representatives of other intelligence agencies requesting reports showing the actual SGE investigation should be informed to direct the request to their Washington headquarters for referral to the Bureau.

(3) Atomic Energy Act, U. S. Information Agency applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations

Subjects of all above investigations against whom subversive information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or the reserve index. In each such case the Agent conducting the investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer the matter to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling.

Copies of reports showing disloyal information must be submitted to the office covering the subject's residence, whenever developed by another office.

When the s[illegible]ect of such an investigation i[illegible] presently in the security index, a letter must be directed to the Bureau at the time the report is submitted advising that the subject is in the security index.

Information of interest to FBI and/or AEC obtained subsequent to completion of Atomic Energy Act - applicant investigations concerning AEC employees or persons having access to restricted data should be handled according to instructions in section 20, volume II, of this manual.

[f. [Submission of and general rules concerning security reports]

(1) General

[[Submission of summary reports should not be delayed for the
[purpose of conducting current investigation in previously
[closed cases, but appropriate leads should be set out.]
[

Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened or placed in a pending status for the purpose of preparing investigative reports in accordance with the schedule outlined in 87D 7f[(2) and (7).]

Office indices and any material channelized to the case file since the most recent report should be reviewed and the case brought up to date by appropriate investigation to determine subject's current activities.

Each time that a case is reopened and brought up to date, it should be critically analyzed in the light of the security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3) herein. This procedure must be followed on a continuing basis for each security index subject.

(2) [Schedule of submission of reports
Reports shall be submitted on individuals designated for priority as follows: priority I - semiannually (top functionaries - quarterly); priority II - annually; priority III - every 2 years.]

[(3)] Origin
The office of origin will be that office covering the territory wherein the subject's subversive activities occur. In most instances this will also be the office in which territory the subject resides and is employed. In those cases in which the subject's subversive activities take place in the territory of an office other than the office covering the place of residence and/or employment, the office of origin shall be that office which can best cover the subversive activities of the subject.

[(4)] Classification
(a) 100 - for individuals affiliated with the basic revolutionary and front organizations of Marxian ideology
(b) 105 - for members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups or others having nationalistic tendencies of a non-Marxist character
(c) 157 - Nation of Islam and other black nationalist matters

[(5)] Title
Only one subject shall be carried in the title of each report. Separate reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of their relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

[[(6)] Character

[(a) Top functionaries

Internal Security (or Racial Matters if subject is a black nationalist) - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Internal Security - C
Internal Security - SWP
Racial Matters - NOI

(b) Others

Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Security Matter - C
Security Matter - SWP
Security Matter - X (native fascist)
Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

[When a subject is deleted as a [top functionary,] the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject [is designated a [top functionary,] the first report after the designation and all subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. Communications regarding subjects who are employed in key facilities should bear the words "Key Facility" in the character. Communications regarding subjects who are members of the Communist Party, USA, National Committee should bear the words "National Committee" in the character. Black nationalist investigations and racial matters should be given the character set out in section 122, volume IV, of this manual.

[[(7)] Status

All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:

(a) Top functionaries

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted quarterly. Forty-five days prior to the date a quarterly report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

[(b) [Deleted]

(c) Other security index subjects

I. Closed

(A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of[a periodic]investigative report [according to priority designation.] If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter (form FD-400) to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed. The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the[periodic]report is due. Such cases shall also be opened and assigned six months after submission of the[periodic]report to accomplish verification of addresses[and further verification must be handled in accordance with 87D 7b (7) (b).] Upon such verification, the cases should be closed administratively.

(d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index

I. Pending inactive

(A) If all active investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau

(B) Set forth lead to follow Bureau for security index card and if approved for dissemination of report to Secret Service.

II. Closed

(A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau and dissemination to Secret Service

(B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (c) above.

(e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein

I. Closed

(A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

[(8)] Content

(a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.

I. Background

(A) Birth date
(B) Citizenship status
(C) Education
(D) Marital status
(E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
(F) Identification record
(G) Employment
(H) Residence
(I) Status of health (if known)

II. Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front[groups, Black nationalist extremist groups,[and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups]

(A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.

(B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

III. Revolutionary statements made by subject showing advocacy of overthrow of Government by force or violence

- (A) Determine each statement and ascertain full details surrounding each.
- (B) Determine all statements by subject showing complete adherence to principles of Marxism-Leninism or other revolutionary doctrines espoused by subversive group with which subject is identified.

IV. All other activities of subject indicating furtherance of program of subversive organizations with which he is associated

- (A) Speeches
- (B) Writings
- (C) Organizational directives and/or educational outlines signed by or issued by subject, or issued while subject was officer of organization
- (D) Determine all pertinent contacts between subject and leaders of party.
- (E) Ascertain details concerning the subject's attendance at Lenin School, attendance at training schools of subversive organizations with which subject has been identified, or activity as instructor at such schools.

V. False statements made by subject including use of aliases Such evidence obtained from passports, voting, marital records, income tax returns, employment and selective service records, among others, may be in your files.

VI. Miscellaneous
Consider pertinent items not falling under the above categories.

(b) So far as possible all reports on individuals should be confined to:

I. Proof of membership and activity in basic revolutionary organization, front organizations, [and/or other organizations or unorganized groups]

II. Information concerning position and importance of subject in subversive movement

III. Pertinent background information

Include in security reports only information pertinent to determining whether or not subject is engaged in subversive activities. Be certain to set out the date or period to which it pertains; e.g., John Doe advised on January 15, 1968, that subject attended Communist Party meetings in January, 1962, in Syracuse, New York.

(c) Information suggestive of additional leads and information of particular significance in showing subject's knowledge of and adherence to revolutionary aims of organization or organizations with which he is associated should be fully and carefully reported.

(d) Each report is to include all information having any pertinency as to whether or not there is justification for security index card. This includes pertinent information concerning background and subversive activities.

(e) When previous summary reports which have been prepared are not suitable for dissemination because of disclosure of sources, information contained therein should be included in current summary reports with sources fully protected. Each office must be certain that all pertinent information has been incorporated in either a past or current disseminative summary report.

(f) Frequently information will have been obtained[reporting] subject's presence at numerous meetings of subversive organizations over a period of years. In many instances these facts will have been reported by only one informant. In others, two or three informants will have reported subject's attendance at meetings. The question of pertinency of all such items is dependent upon the weight of all of the evidence obtained against the subject.

(g) Such repetitious and cumulative items to be specifically set forth in reports may be reduced in number to the point where they will be limited to a representative number of such items. Each such item specifically set forth must be fully documented.

(h) The number of such items to be included in each instance will be dependent upon the preponderance of other evidence available for inclusion in the report which will lend weight to our case against the subject.

(i) Selection of such items with regard to period of time will be dependent upon all facts developed against subject. Selection should be based upon the objective of specifically reporting data sufficient to justify continued detention of each subject if apprehended.

When selection of representative number of such items is made, they should be followed by a general statement summarizing any other items furnished by source. The summarizing statement should indicate that source advised during a specified period of time that subject also attended a certain number of other meetings during a certain period.

In the documentation of a summarizing statement set out the file number and serial scope.

(j) In con[illegible]tion with periodic reports in [illegible]curity index cases, there are instances in which evidence of extensive activity in subversive organizations will be developed. In these cases it is permissible to report such information in narrative-type statements without indicating exact dates of activity; however, the period of time involved must be shown, as well as the inclusive dates of the informant reports.

This type reporting is not to be utilized in Smith Act of 1940 cases or Internal Security Act of 1950 cases. The narrative statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions and information from each source must be reported in separate narrative statements.

(k) The above instructions in no way remove responsibility for reporting all items of pertinence to the Bureau, bearing in mind the fact that Bureau files must be complete insofar as matters of substance are concerned, nor is responsibility removed for the reporting in detail of information tending to establish a subject's knowledge of the basic aims and purposes of the subversive organizations with which affiliated or information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

In the documentation of narrative statements set forth the location of the original documents in the field office files by the file number and serial scope.

[(9)] Administrative data

(a) General

All references to the following items, all administrative in nature, should be contained in cover pages accompanying reports:

1. Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), forms FD-122, FD-122a, FD-128, and FD-128a, and Bureau instructions for handling cases or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature.

II. Whenever reports relating to security index subjects contain data affecting material included on subject's existing security index card, the cover pages accompanying the report shall include as the last page form FD-305, appropriately checked, which form contains items pertaining to the following:

(A) That subject's name is included in the security index or agitator index

[(B) That data appearing on security index card[or agitator index card]is current

[(C) That FD-122[or FD-397]has been submitted to Bureau where security index card[or agitator index card] changes are necessary

(D) That a suitable photograph is or is not available and date photograph was taken

(E) That subject is employed in a key facility and agency charged with security responsibility is specified and that agencies interested in that facility are specified

(F) Reason for classifying report

(G) Dates subject was previously interviewed and reason for not reinterviewing subject

(H) That subject no longer meets security index or agitator index criteria and a letter has been directed to the Bureau recommending cancellation

(I) That subject's case has been reevaluated and reasons are set forth as to why subject's activities continue to fall within security index or agitator index criteria

[(J) That subject's security index card is[designated priority I or priority II]and reasons why subject's activities warrant[such designation]

III. Form FD-305a containing items pertinent to reserve index subjects will be similarly utilized in connection with the submission of reports in reserve index cases.

(b) Documentation of reports

I. Deleted

II. If information necessary for complete documentation is not available in subject's case file, necessary review of other office files should be made. If not obtainable, this fact must be indicated in the cover page(s) accompanying report to the Bureau.

III. Extensive investigation should not be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have in the past furnished background information or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed that subject, according to reliable records, such as birth records, school records, or records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in report. Further verification will not be necessary.

IV. During the preparation of summary reports it is often found that information being incorporated into a report was originally obtained by another office and all of the necessary information for complete documentation will not be in the possession of the office preparing the report. In such an instance, if the office preparing the report is in possession of photostats of documents obtained by the other offices and the identity

in a key facility, copies of reports bearing the dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," should be furnished to appropriate intelligence agencies of the armed services by the field offices as shown in sections 69, volume III, and 87D 7e (2). of this manual. For instructions regarding dissemination to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, see 87D 7c (3), of this manual.

Specific instructions with regard to all phases of our responsibilities under Executive Order 10450, including policy, investigative procedures, and dissemination are set out in section 69, volume III, of this manual.

(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services
Dissemination should be made locally to the intelligence service of the military branch involved.

(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen who are defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew in the navigation of aircraft while under way: individuals directly in charge of the inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in the capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Subversive data developed concerning persons within such definitions should be furnished to the Bureau by report or letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, together with cover communication recommending that such data be furnished to FAA. Such dissemination will be made only at the Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5.

(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service
Under the agreement between the Bureau and the Secret Service concerning Presidential protection dated 2-3-65, which is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual, reports are to be disseminated henceforth to Secret Service in all security index cases. An extra copy of the report in these cases should be furnished the Bureau. At the time the agreement was entered into, letterhead memoranda in all security index cases had been disseminated to Secret Service. Therefore, prior reports in these cases will not be disseminated.

Under the terms of the agreement, it is essential to advise Secret Service of the reason or reasons for referral - statement of the class or classes in appendix B of the agreement which the individual referred fits. For this purpose utilize form FD-376, which is designed to serve as a letter of transmittal for both local dissemination and dissemination at the SOG. The original and one copy of this form should be forwarded to the Bureau. A copy is to be maintained in the main case file and upon transferral of office of origin in any case, the new office of origin is to be furnished a copy. Careful consideration must be given to insure that the individual is properly categorized. In the case of subject being recommended for the security index, withhold dissemination pending Bureau approval of his security index status [only in those cases in which the subject is categorized as falling within category 3 of the agreement between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service concerning Presidential protection.] Forward FD-376 as in any other case. [Prompt dissemination should be made of information developed regarding individuals falling within other than category 3.]

In the case of individual subject of prior investigation who is currently being recommended for the security index, do not disseminate prior reports. However, prepare a letterhead memorandum including pertinent information previously developed which should be disseminated to Secret Service, together with the current report. Copies of this letterhead memorandum should be forwarded to the Bureau for dissemination at headquarters level.

After initial dissemination to Secret Service in security index cases, as changes occur in the status of the individuals involved with respect to residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally and furnish two copies of the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Form FD-366 may be used for this purpose. The letterhead memorandum should contain a reference to the previous communication disseminated to Secret Service.

When reporting changes in residence and/or employment concerning Chinese and Cuban aliens on the security index, in addition to dissemination to Secret Service, also advise the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) locally, and furnish four copies of the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Bear in mind in filling out the reference that some letterhead memoranda have been expressly prepared for dissemination to Secret Service only and have not been furnished to the Department or INS; therefore, the copy furnished INS locally and two of the copies furnished the Bureau should reference the last communication to INS.

For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in other than security index cases, refer to section 134B, volume IV, of this manual.

Upon transfer of office of origin in one of these cases, the old office of origin is to furnish Secret Service locally with the subject's new residence and business address and advise the Bureau that such has been done by the submission of two copies of the letterhead memorandum disseminated locally. The new office of origin need take no action regarding dissemination to Secret Service until such time as further changes occur with respect to the subject's status or until preparation of the next periodic report in the case.

(10) Dissemination at the Bureau

There are some situations in which dissemination is made at the Bureau instead of in the field. In the majority of instances, information received by the FBI should properly be furnished immediately to some other agency within the executive branch of the Government so that the responsibilities of the other agency might be fulfilled properly. Care must be taken, however, not to disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where such a procedure is deemed inadvisable because of the inadequacy of security measures in that branch. In these instances the data should be brought to the immediate attention of the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. An example of the latter is, of course, the Atomic Energy Commission, which receives reports only through the Bureau, as noted in section 87D 7c (3) of this manual. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including the State Department, only at the SOG, as set out in 87D 6b (4). Dissemination is also made at the SOG to the State Department, unless it appears undesirable, in those cases in which subjects have been indicted for violations grounded on subversive activities.

Dissemination in these cases is made to preclude these subjects from utilizing the fact they obtained a passport to refute allegations of subversive connections. The State Department, therefore, will be in possession of data concerning a defendant should he attempt to utilize this tactic in such an action.

b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction

(1) Members of the armed forces

The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the armed forces intelligence agencies states that the responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest.

Thus, in discharging our basic responsibilities in the internal security field, it is imperative that information concerning members of the military services be referred immediately to the appropriate branch having primary responsibility for its personnel. This procedure is mandatory, even though the security aspects of the data have not been fully resolved or verified. It should be specifically pointed out in such instances that the information has not been verified.

Section 87D 5b of this manual instructs that if it is determined a security subject is a member of the armed services the investigation must at that point be discontinued immediately and reported to the Bureau. The basis for such instruction lies in the fact that the subject is no longer within our investigative jurisdiction. In addition, dissemination of pertinent reports must be made locally in the field to the appropriate intelligence agency.

Our responsibility with regard to military personnel is not confined to those who have been the subjects of security investigations. It extends to any subversive derogatory data developed against a member of the armed services during any of our investigations of either individuals or organizations. For instance, if it is determined that a member of the armed forces has been in contact with a security subject or with any individual or group raising security implications, the appropriate intelligence service should be immediately advised locally. This should be done even though the security aspects of the contact have not been resolved, so that the military services may be in a position to discharge their responsibilities. It must be pointed out to them specifically in such instances that the data are unverified, and pertinent developments must be transmitted to them thereafter immediately upon receipt.

Section 87D 6b (1) (h) provides that during the course of security investigations it must be determined whether the subjects have any close relatives in the armed forces. Our responsibilities require that such associations be called to the attention of the appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on the security subjects involved. The evaluation of these associations lies entirely within the province of the intelligence services, but for the reasons stated previously herein it is incumbent upon the Bureau to disseminate this information immediately upon receipt.

Any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel must be set out in a letter to the Bureau, together with a statement as to the local dissemination made in the field. Such letter should be accompanied by a letterhead memorandum setting out with particularity the subversive data in a form entirely suitable for dissemination.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Abstract slips, 47,58
- Addresses, verification of (See verification of addresses.)
- Administrative
  - data, 77
  - tickler, 55,56,74
- Admissible evidence, 29,37
- Agitator index, 78
- Agreement between FBI and Secret Service, 81
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
  - Chinese, 48,62,81a
  - Cuban, 45a,45b,81a
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80,81a
  - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Appearance - content of security index cards, 48
- Applicant investigations, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Armed forces
  - dissemination to, 82
  - members of, 25
  - record in, 27
  - relatives in, 27
  - subjects entering, 56,60
  - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of security index, 50
  - alphabetical section, 51,63
  - at Bureau, 50
  - geographical section, 51,63
  - in field office, 51
  - inactive section, 56
  - special section, 52 (See also special section of security index.)
  - unavailable section, 53 (See also unavailable section of security index.)
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71

- Black nationalist cases
  - character of case, 73
  - classification, 72
  - definitions, 19
  - reports
    - anarchist beliefs, 46a
    - content, 74
  - security index, 43,49
  - top functionary, 66
- Bureau
  - applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
  - authority to investigate individuals, 24
  - responsibility, 19,64

- Cancellation of
  - security flash notice, 27a
  - security index cards
    - after induction into armed forces, 60
    - mechanics, 60
    - on departure from U. S., 60
    - only after interview, 38
    - recommending, 42,61
    - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 74
- Changes on security index cards, 58,78
- Channelizing, 24,34,36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
  - top functionaries, 67,73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
  - aliens, changes in residence or employment, dissemination to Secret Service and INS, 81a
  - extraction, 48,62
  - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Color of security index cards, 63
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants (See security informants.)
- Contacting
  - faculty members, 25
  - informants, 34,74
  - registrars, 25
  - students, 25
  - superiors of faculty members, 25
- Contacts
  - during investigation, 25
  - of foreign establishments, 25
- Content
  - and appearance
    - of reserve index cards, 43
    - of security index cards, 48
  - of reports, 74
- Corroboration, 37
- Cover pages, 77,78
- Criteria for inclusion in security index, 44a,45
- Cuban
  - activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  - aliens, 45a,45b,81a
  - contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a
  - pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  - special section, 49,53
  - tabbing cards, 45b,64

- Dangerousness
  - definition of, 44
  - determination of, 44
  - Nation of Islam membership, 46
- Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Defectors to Sino-Soviet-bloc countries, 57
- Defense
  - facilities, 64
    - list, 64
    - persons in considered for priority I, 63
    - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
  - Industrial Security Clearance Office, 65,81
  - Supply Agency, 65,81
- Definitions, 19
  - of dangerousness, 44
  - of top functionaries, 66
- Delimitations Agreement, 64,82
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Determination of
  - dangerousness, 44
  - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Disaffection of U. S. citizens abroad, 57
- Dissemination
  - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 82
  - of reports
    - at SOG, 81a
    - in field, 79
    - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
  - to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, 65,81
  - to Immigration and Naturalization Service, 80,81a
  - to Secret Service, 81,81a
    - closing case, 47,74
    - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
    - stamping reserve index cards, 43
- Documentation of reports, 78
  - completion of, 78
- Employees of
  - international organizations, 25
  - U. S. Government, 25,70
    - dissemination of data re, 80
- Employment, verification of (See verification of.)
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Evidence, 37
  - desirability of
    - admissibility, 29,37
    - corroboration, 37
  - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  - of membership or affiliation, 29
  - preservation of, 37
- Executive Order 10450, 33,80,81

- Faculty members
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File on defected subjects, 42
- File reviews, 34
- Flash notices (security)
  - cancellation of, 27a
  - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  - placing, 27
- Foreign
  - diplomats, 25
  - establishments, 25
  - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
  - tours, 33a,57
  - travel, 33,54,57
- Forms
  - FD-122, 28,34,48,49,53 to 58,67,74,78
    - abstracts for, 47
    - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    - cover letter thereto, 32
    - Cuban subjects, 45b

Forms (continued)
  FD-122 (continued)
    placing name in or removing from special section of security index, 53
      unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    priority tabbing or removal of such tabbing, 63,64
    recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    reference to, 77
    succinct summary with, 47
      Cuban subjects, 45b
    when subject employed in key facility, 65
  FD-122a, 42b,42c,61,77
  FD-128, 55,57 to 60,67
    reference to, 77
    when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    when subject moves, 58,59
  FD-128a, 27a,42c,77
  FD-154, 57
  FD-165, 27,77
  FD-186, 50
  FD-305, 74,78
  FD-305a, 78
  FD-306, 36
  FD-336, 39
  FD-366, 57,81a
  FD-376, 81
  FD-397, 78
  FD-400, 74
Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22

Geographical
  reference number of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  section of security index, 51,63
Government employees, 25,70,80

Handwriting, 29
  of top functionaries, 67
Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41
Husband and wife, security investigations, 72

Identification record, 27
Immigration and Naturalization Service, dissemination to, 80,81a
Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,57,60
Inactive section of security index, 56
Indices, check of, 34,72
Individuals
  to be investigated, 22
  traveling abroad, 33
    against whom stops are placed, 34
    disaffection for U. S., 57
    verification of addresses, 57
    who are included in security index, 34
    who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  with foreign diplomatic status, 26
Industrial security clearances, dissemination re, 65,81
Informants (See security informants.)
Interviews
  Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  Bureau authority, 39,40a
  conditions for, 40
    conducting at place of employment, 40a
  content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  contents of letter containing results of, 42
  determine willingness to testify during, 41
  evaluation of, 45b
  forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  no report needed afterward, 40a
  of hostile subjects, 41
  of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 24,25
  of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  of security index subjects, 38

NDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Interviews (continued)
  - of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  - of subjects who express desire for, 42
  - on SAC authority, 38
  - preparations for, 40
  - purpose of, 38
  - recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  - results not affecting security index status, 41
  - signed statements in connection with, 41
  - to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  - when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when to discontinue, 40a,41
  - when report needed after, 41
  - with Bureau authority, 39
- Investigations
  - aliens, 26,80 (See also aliens.)
  - faculty members, 24
  - members of labor unions, 29,39,41
  - naturalized citizens, 26,80
  - purpose, 19
  - restrictions on, 24
  - students, 24
- Investigative
  - procedures, 26
  - techniques, 34
    - file reviews, 34
    - photographic surveillances, 35,37
    - physical surveillances, 35,38
    - private firms, records, 36
    - public source information, 36
    - security informants, 34

- Key facilities, 64
  - character, 73
  - Delimitations Agreement, 64
  - employees
    - considered for priority I, 63
    - included in security index, 65
  - list, 49,64
  - responsibility, 64
    - agency having security, 49,58,59,65
  - status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,74
  - when to investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

- Labor union membership, 29
- Labor unions, 29,39,41
- Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Letter in lieu of report, security index cases, 74
- List
  - defense facilities, 64
  - key facilities, 49, [illegible]
  - top functionaries, [illegible]
- Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Lumping information in reports, 76

- Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Members of
  - armed forces, 25
    - dissemination of information concerning, 82
  - labor unions, 29,39,41
  - law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Membership or affiliation, 29
  - concealment of, 31
- Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  - letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  - unavailable section of security index, 32,54
- Movement of subjects, 58
  - not in security index, 60
  - security index subjects, 58
  - tabbed for priority, 60
  - top functionaries, 59,67

- Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
- Nation of Islam
  - abbreviation for organizational affiliation, 49
  - character, 73
  - classification, 72
  - potential dangerousness, 46
  - removal of cards from security index, 62
  - what members to be investigated, 23

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

National
  Committee, CPUSA, character, 73
  Defense Education Act of 1958, 22
  Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
  Science Foundation Act of 1950, 22
Naturalized citizens
  dissemination of information concerning, 80
  investigations of, 26
Negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
New office of origin, 58,67,81a

Observation of subject, 28,50,57
Office of origin, 27a,58,59,67,72,81,81a
Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
Overt acts, 45

Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
Photographic surveillances, 35,37
Photographs, 28,78
  of top functionaries, 28,67
  status of security index cases while obtaining, 28
Physical
  condition, 61,74
  description, 28
  surveillances, 35,37
    maintenance of SA's notes, 38
Position
  and importance, 30
  in labor organizations, 29
Potential dangerousness, 44
  of Nation of Islam members, 46
Preservation of evidence, 37
Pretext, 32,37,39,56,57
Priority apprehension program, 62
  administrative procedures, 63
  priority designations, 49,53,58,60,62,63,74
    I, 49,57,62,63,64,66,67,72,78
    II, 49,62,63,64,72,78
    III, 49,63,72
    changes in, 58,63
    color of cards, 63
    justification for, 47
    recommendation for, 63
    removal of, 63,64
    reports, schedule of, 72
    who to be tabbed, 62,63
  purpose, 62

Private records, 36
Public
  Law 87-835, 22
  source information, 36
  utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Purpose of
  interviews, 38
  investigation, 19
  priority apprehension program, 62
  reserve index, 42a
  security index, 43

Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
Recommendation for inclusion in
  section A, reserve index, 42b,61
  security index, 46a,47,63
    Cuban activity, 45a,45b
    status, 74
    when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    when subject is out of country, 48
    when there is missing background information, 47
Reevaluation of security index status, 46,57,72,78
Registrars, contacting, 25
Reinterviews, 42
Relatives in armed forces, 27
Removal from security index, 46a,60,61,63
  priority I, 64
  priority II, 64
Reports
  administrative data in, 77
  character of, 73
    top functionaries, 67
  content of, 74
  cumulative items, 76
  dissemination of, 79 (See also dissemination.)
  documentation of, 78
  lumping information in, 76
  narrative-type statements, 77
  negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
  schedule of, 72,73
  status of, 73
  summarizing information in, 76,77
  summary, 21,47,59,71,76
  title of, 72
  topical headings in, 74
  when necessary after interview, 41
  when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  when not necessary after interview, 40a
  when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39

- Reserve index, 42a
  - arrangement, 42b
  - cards, content and appearance, 43
  - content, 43
  - flash notice, 27
  - names deleted from security index, 61,62
  - purpose, 42a
  - reference to on cover page, 77
  - removal from, 43
  - section A
    - changes, 42c
    - individuals to be included, 42b,61
    - interviews of subjects of, 39
    - recommendations for inclusion in, 42b,61
  - section B, 42c
    - security index cards placed in, 62
  - standards for, 42a
  - subjects
    - applicant investigations, 70
    - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    - security of Government employees investigations, 70
- Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
- Responsibility of Bureau, 19,64
- Restrictions on investigations, 24

- Schedule of reports, 72,73
- Scope of investigation, 26
- Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Secret Service, dissemination to, 81,81a
  - closing case, 47,74
  - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
  - reserve index cards, stamping, 43
- Security
  - flash notice
    - cancellation of, 27a
    - notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    - placing, 27
  - index, 43
    - arrangement of, 50
    - cards
      - cancellation of, 38,42,60,61,62
      - changes in, 58,78
      - color of, 53
- Security (continued)
  - index (continued)
    - cards (continued)
      - content and appearance of, 48
      - of top functionaries, 67
      - tabbing, 45b,53,60,62,63,64,67
      - transfers to reserve index, 61,62
    - criteria for, 44a,45
    - Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53,64,81a
    - dangerousness, 44
    - dissemination to
      - Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81a
      - Secret Service, 81,81a
        - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
        - reports, 47,74,81,81a
    - purpose, 43
    - recommendation for, 45a,45b,46a,47,63
    - reevaluation of status, 46,57,72,78
    - reference to on cover page, 77
    - removal from, 46a,60,61,63
      - priority I or II, 64
    - subjects of
      - applicant investigations, 70
      - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      - security of Government employees investigations, 70
    - summary reports, 47,54,81
    - verification of addresses and employment, 32,54,57,58,74,81a
  - informants, 34
    - cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
    - contacting, 34,74
  - of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Signed statements, 41
- Sino-Soviet bloc, 44a,57
- Sleepers, 31,52
- Special section of security index, 52
  - cards, 49,52,53,56
  - Cuban, 49,53
  - exception to unavailable section, 56
- Standards for reserve index, 42a
  - section A, 42b
- Status of cases, 73
  - on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66,74
  - on subjects in security index, 74
  - on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  - on top functionaries, 59,73

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Status of cases (continued)
  while obtaining photographs, 28
  while securing handwriting, 29
  while verifying residence and employment, 58,74
Students
  contacts with, 25
  investigations of, 24
Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
Summary reports, 21,47,59,71,76
Superiors of faculty members, 25
Surveillances
  photographic, 35,37
  physical, 35,38

Tabbing SI cards, 45b,53,60,62,63,64,67
Thumbnail sketches, 79
Title of reports, 72
Top functionaries, 66,67
  change of office of origin, 67
  character, 67,73
  definition of, 66
  deletion of, 67
  designation of, 66,67
  handling of, 67
  handwriting of, 67
  list, 67
  movement of, 59,67
  photographs of, 28,67
  priority I, 62,66,67,72
  program, 66
  regulations governing, 67
  reports on, 59,66,67,72,77
    status of, 73
  tabbing for priority, 62,63,66,67
Topical headings in reports, 74
Tours, 33a,57
Travel
  abroad, 33,54,57
  behind iron curtain, 34

Unavailable section of security index, 53
  imprisoned subjects, 54
  missing subjects, 32,54
  subjects traveling abroad, 34,54
Underground membership or activity, 31
United Nations employees, 25,52
U. S. Government employees, 25,70,80
U. S. Information Agency, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70

Verification of
  addresses, security index, 32,54, 57,58,74,81a
  employment, security index, 32,57,74,81a
  key facility or defense facility status of place of employment, 64
Voice of America (See U. S. Information Agency.)

Wife and husband, security investigations, 72

Yugoslav intelligence agents, contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a

Communist Party members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Special Agents attending mass meetings, etc.

4. Internal Security Act of 1950
To insure successful proceedings against a communist front organization under this act, a preponderance of admissible evidence must be secured to[show]extent to which
   a. Persons active in management, direction, or supervision of an organization are active in management, direction, or supervision, or as representatives, of
   b. Its support, financial or otherwise, is derived from
   c. Its funds, resources, or personnel are used to further or promote objectives of
   d. Positions taken or advanced by it from time to time do not deviate from those of

Any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or the world communist movement.

5. Panel sources
   a. Purpose
   To develop potential witnesses who will be willing to obtain and introduce legally admissible evidence re subversive nature of organizations in future prosecutive action
   b. Program
      (1) Since Special Agent and active security informant testimony is undesirable, field should recruit panel of potential witnesses locally. Some may be found among American Legion contacts, plant informants, former and exposed security informants, etc.
      (2) Panel members should attend public rallies and meetings, as well as obtain literature of organizations they are covering.
      (3) To aid panelists, exhibit photographs of individuals they will most likely encounter at front organization functions.
      (4) Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, the same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants. (See section 107, volume IV, of this manual.)
      (5) Legitimate expenses incurred by panel members should be reimbursed in same manner as security informants.
      (6) Eliminate inactive, ineffective, or unsatisfactory panelists on a continuing basis. At time of submission of semiannual letter, office panel should be reviewed to make certain all such panelists have been removed.
      (7) Identities of panelists should be concealed.
   c. Administrative handling
      (1) Check prospective panelists through office indices, local police department, credit records, and established informants. If no undesirable information is developed, initial contact may be made with panelist to ascertain cooperativeness.
      (2) Submit names of cooperative panelists to Bureau by letter outlining complete background and recommendation as to inclusion in office panel. [One of the required copies of the letter to the Bureau should consist only of the first page of the letter. When approving the field's recommendation, this single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" by Bureau and will be returned.] Be certain such individuals are not plants and will consider relationship with Bureau in confidence.

(3) Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panelist is initiated. When preliminary investigation completed and Bureau has approved panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly.

Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.

(4) Only Agents designated should handle panelists.

(5) Every four months submit letter of justification to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section 107N, 3b, volume IV, of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

(6) Summary letter captioned "Panel Source Program" (Bufile 134-1113) to be prepared and submitted to Bureau March 25 and September 25 each year. Use following topical outline:

(a) Status of program
Include progress in panel development. Show total number of new panelists developed and total number of panelists discontinued during six months' period.
(b) Total number panel sources active
(c) Names of organizations covered
(d) Number and identities of panelists redesignated to informant or potential informant status since institution of panel program

d. Suggestion
Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel members and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization cases, security informants, and communist publications.

6. Classification - 100

7. Character - Internal Security - letters for organizational activity or nationalistic tendency; e.g., (C), (SWP), (Miscellaneous), etc.

(5) Character

(a) Key figures and top functionaries

Internal Security[(or Racial Matters if subject is a black nationalist)]- followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Internal Security - C
Internal Security - SWP
[Racial Matters - NOI]

(b) Others

Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Security Matter - C
Security Matter - SWP
Security Matter - X (native fascist)
Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a key figure, the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject is designated a key figure, the first report after the designation and all subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. Communications regarding subjects who are employed in key facilities should bear the words "Key Facility" in the character. Communications regarding subjects who are members of the Communist Party, USA, National Committee should bear the words "National Committee" in the character. [Black nationalist investigations and racial matters should be given the character set out in section 122, volume IV, of this manual.]

(6) Status

All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:

(a) Top functionaries

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted quarterly. Forty-five days prior to the date a quarterly report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(b) Key figures

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted semiannually. Forty-five days prior to the date a semiannual report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(c) Other security index subjects
  I. Closed
    (A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of an annual investigative report. If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter [(form FD-400)] to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed. The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the annual report is due. Such cases shall also be opened and assigned six months after submission of the annual report to accomplish verification of addresses. Upon such verification, the cases should be closed administratively.

(d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index
  I. Pending inactive
    (A) If all [illegible] investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau
    (B) Set forth lead to follow Bureau for security index card and if approved for dissemination of report to Secret Service.
  II. Closed
    (A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau and dissemination to Secret Service
    (B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (c) above.

(e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein
  I. Closed
    (A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(7) Content
  (a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.
    I. Background
      (A) Birth date
      (B) Citizenship status
      (C) Education
      (D) Marital status
      (E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
      (F) Identification record
      (G) Employment
      (H) Residence
      (I) Status of health (if known)
    II. Connections with Communist Party (or other basic revolutionary groups and/or front organizations or black nationalist extremist groups)
      (A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.
      (B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

(10) [Deleted]

f. Established sources and informants who are students or employees at an institution of learning, but who are not reporting on any campus activities or any matter pertaining to the educational institution, may be contacted without Bureau authority. These contacts must be made away from the campus.

g. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Bureau Agents during course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority.

h. Photographic surveillances

(1) No photographic surveillances are to be conducted in communist front organization cases unless it is essential to protect Bureau's interests in internal security field by supplementing live informant coverage of a particular meeting with such a surveillance.

(2) Request Bureau authority to institute such a surveillance and outline manner in which it will be conducted and supervision which will be afforded it.

(3) No such surveillances should be instituted without specific Bureau authority.

(3) By force or violence, or
By assassination of any officer of such government
It will be necessary to show:
- (a) The identity and official capacity of such officer
- (b) The identity of persons conspiring to assassinate, or actually assassinating such officer
- (c) Full details surrounding the assassination or attempted assassination
- (d) Reasons for the assassination, and ends to be gained by such assassinations, or

b. Printed, published, edited, issued, or circulated
- (1) The person with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the U.S., or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof
- (2) Printed, published, edited, issued, circulated, sold, distributed, or publicly displayed written or printed matter
- (3) Advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government

of the U. S. by force or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof, or

- c. Organized society, group, or assembly
  - (1) The person organized, or helped organize, a society, group, or assembly of persons
  - (2) Which taught, advocated, or encouraged the overthrowing or destruction of the Government of the U. S., or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof
  - (3) By force or violence, or
  - (4) The person became a member of, or affiliated with, such society, group, or assembly of persons
  - (5) Knowing the purpose thereof

B. SUBMISSION TO THE BUREAU OF SUBVERSIVE DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUALS

1. To insure the proper discharge of the Bureau's responsibility to furnish information at the seat of Government at the request of other agencies and to have it available at the seat of Government when such requests are received from other agencies, the Bureau must be promptly furnished, for indexing purposes, by offices covering the national and local headquarters of the various subversive organizations, the names of, and identifying data concerning, persons affiliated with and becoming affiliated with the following types of organizations:
   - a. Basic revolutionary organizations or groups
     - Communist Party, USA
     - Socialist Workers Party
     - Proletarian Party of America
     - Other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, if any, of the preceding three organizations
     - Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
   - b. Nationalist and fascist-type groups
   - c. Front organizations of 1, a and b above, including those
     - (1) Cited by the Attorney General
     - (2) Cited or declared by the House Committee on Un-American Activities or by any of the various legislative committees
     - (3) Described as such or as an organization dominated or controlled by one of the basic revolutionary organizations or groups by security informants or other sources of known reliability
   - [[d. Black nationalist extremist groups]

   Such lists should include the organization's membership list and any other record showing affiliation.
2. Field offices obtaining information concerning such affiliation of individuals residing outside their territory must expeditiously furnish such information to the office covering the address of the person.
3. The information should be submitted to the Bureau in duplicate by letter captioned with the title of the organizational case file, for example, "Communist Party, USA, ________ District, ________ Division; Internal Security - C" or "Socialist Workers Party, ________ Division; Internal Security - SWP" and should clearly indicate that the list is being furnished to the Bureau for indexing purposes only.
4. Information received from all sources, including that received from confidential sources, highly confidential sources, reports of security informants and sources, and public and other sources, should be reviewed to insure that the Bureau has been furnished in the past and will be furnished in the future lists of all individuals (together with identifying data) affiliated with all organizations set forth in 1 a, b, [c, [and d.]
5. In forwarding such information to the Bureau, the offices should incorporate, insofar as possible, information concerning a number of individuals in one letter. The letter should contain sufficient identifying data concerning each individual to enable the Bureau to identify that individual

with any additional information contained in the Bureau's files.

6. The names of subscribers to Communist Party nominating petitions and the names appearing on subscription lists of "The Worker," "People's World," and publications and organs of the organizations set forth in 1 a, b, c, and d must be indexed in the field office covering the address shown for the subscriber and should not be forwarded to the Bureau for indexing. Mailing lists as such which cannot be identified as membership lists of subversive organizations also should be indexed in the field and not forwarded to the Bureau. Field offices obtaining such lists must promptly furnish them to the office covering the address shown for the subscriber.
7. Important subversive derogatory information concerning any individual and any new subversive derogatory information concerning any individual of importance must be brought to the attention of the Bureau by expeditious means.
8. Subversive and nonsubversive derogatory information coming to the attention of the field office through a name check or otherwise on an employee of the executive branch of the Government, which information is within the purview of Executive Order 10450, should be forwarded promptly to the Bureau for dissemination to the Civil Service Commission. In addition, subversive derogatory and other information relating to other employees of the Government and to employees of the United Nations and of other public international organizations received by the field office should be brought immediately to the attention of the Bureau.
9. These instructions do not affect and are in addition to existing instructions for the submission of information in report form.

C. INVESTIGATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, AND OTHER MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS

1. Policy

a. Communist Party, USA

By Presidential Directive on 9-6-39 and subsequent restatements (see section 102, volume IV, of this manual), this Bureau is charged with the responsibility of coordinating all information with regard to the internal security of the U. S. Since 1939, a large portion of the Bureau's security investigations has been directed toward a coverage of the activities of communists and other groups whose aims seek the overthrow of the U. S. Government. The Communist Party, USA, is the best organized and most dangerous from a security standpoint. The party is not an isolated or purely domestic organization but is part of an international communist movement led and dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the ultimate aim of which is to establish a world-wide communist state. The Communist Party, USA, bases its theory on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. (Considerable evidence shows that these principles look toward the violent overthrow of the U. S. Government or its downfall in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.) It would be a grave error to suppose that, because the party is actually and potentially small, it is not dangerous. The contemplated role of the party is such that it can be played best by an organization which is cohesive, easily mobilized, highly maneuverable, fanatically zealous, well disciplined, and immediately responsive in an emergency to the demands of its leaders. The highest authority in the Communist Party, USA, is the national convention which meets approximately once every two years. Between these conventions, the national committee is the highest authority of the party.

The Communist Party, USA, is divided into district and state organizations, then into county, city, section, and club organizations. The number and nature of these subdivisions are dependent on the number of members in the various localities. Every party member must belong to a party club.

The Communist Party strategy and policy is based primarily on the loyal support and defense of the Soviet Union. The party line changes from time to time depending upon the current program of the international communist movement.

b. Socialist Workers Party

The Socialist Workers Party was founded at a convention held in Chicago, Illinois, from 12-31-37 to 1-3-38. The present headquarters are located at 116 University Place, New York 3, New York. The following statements are taken from the "Declaration of Principles and Constitution of the Socialist Workers Party" which was adopted at this convention:

"The purpose of the party is set forth in its declaration of principles: Its purpose shall be to educate and organize the working class for the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a workers government to achieve Socialism." (From article 11 under the caption "Purpose.")

"We call upon all revolutionary militants to join with us to build the SWP into the mass revolutionary party which will lead the working class of the United States to power; and which, together with the revolutionists of all countries united in the Fourth International, will achieve the victory of the international revolution and of world Socialism."

"The main specific task of the SWP is the mobilization of the American masses for struggle against American Capitalism, and for its overthrow...." (Part III of above pamphlet.)

Shortly after the Fourth International was founded in Switzerland on 9-3-38, the Socialist Workers Party in the U. S. announced that it was the "American Section" of the "world party of the Socialist revolution" (Fourth International). At a special convention on 12-21-40, the Socialist Workers Party passed a resolution ending its organizational connection with the Fourth International (because of the passage of the Voorhis Act).

This organization follows the Marxist-Leninist-Trotskyist line. Statements made by functionaries indicate that in the event of war between the U. S. and the Soviet Union, the Socialist Workers Party would defend the latter.

c. [Deleted]

d. Other Marxist revolutionary groups

A long-established group which would come under this category is the Proletarian Party of America, a relatively small organization.

There also are a few small groups composed of ex-members of the Communist Party, USA, who have voluntarily left the party or who have been expelled, usually for factionalism.

e. General

Communist investigations must be conducted in a most discreet and thorough manner at all times. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during the course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority. Bureau employees should not discuss communist or related investigations with any unauthorized individual. The subject of communism is not to be used in speeches of Bureau employees without specific authorization. However, there is considerable mimeographed material in each office, including speeches, testimony, and magazine articles prepared by the Director which could be furnished outside individuals interested in the subject of communism without any discussion.

2. Purposes of investigation

a. The investigation of the Communist Party, USA, and other similar-type organizations is of twofold purpose: (1) to obtain legally admissible evidence against these organizations for prosecution under existing Federal statutes set out above and (2) to follow closely the activities of these organizations from an intelligence viewpoint to have a day-to-day appraisal of the strength, dangerousness, and activities of these organizations seeking the overthrow of the U. S. Government.

b. Suggestions for proper coverage of the investigation of the Communist Party as an organization and similar organizations should include:

(1) The assignment of sufficient Agent personnel to insure that all of the important ramifications of party activities are properly covered

(2) Development of confidential informants in all party levels, including the national headquarters organization

(3) The constant effort to develop admissible evidence against party officials for violation of Federal laws

[c. [Deleted]

3. Investigative procedures and suggestions
This section contains detailed investigative guides for use in investigating and reporting activities of the Communist Party, USA.

a. To accurately and clearly show the true nature of the Communist Party, USA, data concerning the following topics must be fully developed and reported. When material contains information that would be logically reported under more than one topic heading but to do so would make the separate accounts unintelligible, report all the material under the main heading and only refer to the information under the other breakdowns. Do not repeat same data under separate headings. Reports on the Communist Party, USA, as an organization must be submitted by each office quarterly and should cover activities for the preceding three-month period. All offices are required to use the following breakdown in preparing quarterly reports on the Communist Party, USA. Each subfile caption must start on a separate page.

(1) Organization (Bureau file 100-3-69)

(a) Security setup of district and/or state organization. Office covering district headquarters, describe the location and size of Communist Party office facilities, rent paid, and name and number of office employees. List address and/or post office box number of party headquarters.

(b) Identify principal district officials and important functionaries, together with titles, and furnish a short resume of important aotivities of each during three-month period.

(c) Names of new commissions or special committees, identity and capacity of individual members thereof. Submit resume of activities of groups under appropriate subfile captions.

(d) Special meetings embracing only organizational matters. Other pertinent matters discussed at meetings concerning policy or strategy to be submitted under appropriate subfile captions.

(e) Extend this outline as far as necessary for clarity and to meet needs of office under this or any succeeding subsection. Auxiliary offices submit pertinent data concerning above matters which do not normally come to attention of office covering district headquarters.

(2) Membership (Bureau file 100-3-68)

(a) Quarterly reports are not to contain any membership statistics. Cover pages accompanying each quarterly report must contain latest available statistics relating to total number of Communist Party members in the district. Membership data must start on a separate cover page,[which page(s) must be devoted exclusively to such data.] Office of origin, which is office covering Communist Party district headquarters, should submit following figures:

I. For entire Communist Party district
II. For individual states covered by Communist Party district
III. For number of Communist Party members in area covered by field office

Auxiliary offices should submit following membership figures to the Bureau and office of origin:

I. For state or portion of state covered by that field office
II. For number of Communist Party members in the area covered by that field office

[The total number of Communist Party members in the area covered by field office, either origin or auxiliary, should be broken down as to the total number of Negroes in the overall numerical strength of the Communist Party, USA, in the

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page
V. Inactive section 56
(7) Periodic verification of addresses 57
(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards 58
(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards 58
  (a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries 58
  (b) Key figures and top functionaries 59
  (c) Subjects tabbed for detcom 60
  (d) Subjects not included in security index 60
(10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index 60
  (a) Death of subject 60
  (b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction 60
  (c) Imprisonment of subject 60
  (d) Induction of subject into the armed forces 60
  (e) Security informants 60
  (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous 61
  (g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection 61
  (h) Subjects of Chinese extraction 62
(11) Priority apprehension program (DETCOM) 62
  (a) Purpose 62
  (b) Subjects to be tabbed detcom 62
  (c) Recommendations for and removal of detcom designation 63
  (d) Administrative procedures for handling detcom program 63
  (e) General 64
c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities and defense facilities 64
  (1) Responsibility 64
  (2) Inclusion in security index 65
  (3) Dissemination 65
  (4) Status of cases 66
d. Key figure and top functionary program 66
  (1) General 66
  (2) Key figures 66
    (a) Definition 66
    (b) Regulations governing the handling of the key figure program 67
      I. Designation and deletion of key figure status. 67
      II. Photographs 67
      III. Handwriting specimens 67
      IV. Security index cards 68
      V. Change of office of origin 68
      VI. Reports 68
      VII. Maintenance of key figure list 69
  (3) Top functionaries 69
    (a) Definition 69
    (b) Manner of designation 69
    (c) Regulations governing top functionaries 70

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index 70
  (1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations 70
  (2) Security of Government employees investigations 70
  (3) Atomic Energy Act, U. S. Information Agency applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations 70
f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports 71
  (1) General 71
  (2) Origin 72
  (3) Classification 72
  (4) Title 72
  (5) Character 73
    (a) Key figures and top functionaries 73
    (b) Others 73
  (6) Status 73
    (a) Top functionaries 73
    (b) Key figures 73
    (c) Other security index subjects........ 74
    (d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index.. 74
    (e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein 74
  (7) Content 74
  (8) Administrative data 77
    (a) General 77
    (b) Documentation of reports 78
g. Channelizing memoranda - instruction of 79
8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations 79
  a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau 80
    (1) Aliens and naturalized citizens 80
    (2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services 80
    (3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense 80
    (4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard 80

D. SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS

1. Definitions

The term "basic revolutionary organization" or "basic revolutionary group" when used hereinafter in this subsection shall apply to any one or all of the following organizations or groups in order to distinguish the organizations from front organizations:

a. Communist Party, USA
b. Socialist Workers Party
c. Progressive Labor Party
d. Proletarian Party of America
e. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
f. Johnson-Forest Group
g. American Socialist Clubs
h. See also 87C 1d.
[i. Black nationalist extremists, although technically not members of basic revolutionary organizations within the above meaning, should be investigated under the same rules. (See section 122, volume IV, of this manual for additional guides.)]

2. Responsibility of the Bureau

a. To conduct thorough investigation into the background and subversive activities of all persons in the U. S. and Puerto Rico who are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security. Each SAC will be held responsible for the proper investigation of all persons in his area who, because of membership or affiliation with basic revolutionary organizations or other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, may be potentially dangerous.

b. To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of individuals constituting a threat to the internal security and develop sufficient information and evidence through investigation to sustain appropriate action by the Bureau should it become necessary for the Federal Government to institute prosecutive action against such individuals in courts of law or control their movements and activities in the event of a national emergency

3. Purpose of investigation

The primary purpose of these investigations is twofold, namely:

a. Determination of dangerousness

To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals in the U. S. and Puerto Rico who, because of their membership in, activity in, or association with one or more of the revolutionary groups defined above or related groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country, and the consequent collection of sufficient information concerning their subversive activities to justify apprehension in event of a national emergency

b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes

To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals who have been or may be violating laws of the U. S.

(1) Direct investigation towards obtaining admissible evidence to establish the violation.

(2) Be alert for any information indicating a violation of the Federal statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, and sedition.

(3) Title 18, USC, § 2385, paragraph (1), prohibits the advocacy, etc., of forceful or violent overthrow of the Government. Paragraph (2) prohibits the printing and distribution of propaganda advocating the forceful overthrow of the Government. (Affiliation with an organization is not a prerequisite to prosecution under paragraphs (1) and (2).) Paragraph (3) makes it unlawful to organize or help to organize any society, etc., of persons who advocate overthrow of the Government by force or violence, or to be or become a member of or become affiliated with any such society knowing the purposes thereof. Conspiracy to violate this section is covered by Title 18, USC, § 371 (general conspiracy statute).

(4) Title 18, USC, § 2387, penalizes attempts to undermine the loyalty, discipline, or morale of the armed forces. Alleged violations should be reported immediately to the Bureau.

(5) Title 5, USC, §[7311, and Title 18, USC, § 1918,]prohibit Government employment of persons who are disloyal or who assert the right to strike against the Government. [Title 5, USC, § 3333,]provides that an individual accepting office or employment in the Government of the U. S. shall, within 60 days, execute an affidavit certifying that he does not advocate the violent overthrow of the U. S. Government, etc. The execution of a false affidavit constitutes a fraud on, or attempt to defraud, the Government within the purview of Title 5, USC, §[303,]so as to authorize Special Agents of the Bureau to administer oaths in investigations arising out of this Law. Alleged violations of this law called to your attention should be furnished to the Bureau promptly and no investigation should be initiated on the basis of complaints received without prior Bureau authority. Refer to section 69H of this manual entitled "Security of Government Employees - Fraud Against the Government" for procedures to be followed regarding possible violations of this law discovered or received in connection with security of Government employees investigations.

(6) Title 18, USC, § 1001, includes possible fraud against the Government violations wherein there are concealments or falsifications relating to subversive information. These violations must be presented to the Department by the Bureau for a prosecutive opinion rather than being presented locally to USAs. They ordinarily involve the execution of U. S. Government forms. Common violations are employees of private concerns having Government contracts who execute Government forms required for clearance for access to classified information.

Upon receipt of information indicating a violation of this type, investigation under the "Security Matter - Fraud Against the Government" character should be initiated and the Bureau immediately advised. The Department has advised that it is essential, to establish jurisdiction, to prove that the form was presented to a Government agency for action or determination. This, therefore, should be the first investigative step. If the form was not presented to a Government agency, no further investigation should be made and the Bureau so advised. In this case, however, remain alert for information the form is later presented to Government agency. The fact subject actually signed the form must be established by testimony of witnesses to the signature, handwriting examination, or other conclusive evidence. The original of the form must be located. Sources that furnished pertinent information concerning subject during previous investigations and other potential witnesses should be thoroughly interviewed to determine the basis for each item of pertinent information furnished and to obtain the identities of other potential witnesses. Where affiliation with subversive organizations is involved, interview individuals who were members of same units of these organizations as subject for indicia of his membership, such as attendance at closed meetings, payment of dues, holding of office, etc. If possible, develop evidence to supplant pertinent information furnished by current informants. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview the subject. Interview subject and potential witnesses furnishing pertinent information under oath and obtain sworn signed statements if possible. An exception may be made when interviewing established sources, such as current informants, if oath and/or signed statements not considered desirable under circumstances. Be guided by instructions in section 6b, (7), below when interviewing potential witnesses with subversive backgrounds.

(4) Content

(a) Each card in section A and section B should contain, as a minimum, the following:

I. Name and aliases
II. Race
III. Sex
IV. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
V. Citizenship
VI. Residence
VII. Employment
VIII. Birth data
IX. Office file number
X. The letters "SS" if dissemination has been made to Secret Service in accordance with instructions in section 134B, item 2, volume IV, of this manual

(b) In addition, membership and position or association in a subversive group or groups, together with the source and date of the information, may be added.

(5) Removal and deletion of cards

(a) Destroy cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources or who subsequently become subjects of security index cards.

(b) Advise the Bureau of the destruction only in the case of section A cards.

b. Security index

(1) Purpose

(a) Security index cards are prepared and maintained by the Bureau to serve as operational guide for apprehension of persons deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country in the event of a national emergency.

(b) It shall contain the names of all persons who have been determined through investigation to be dangerous or potentially dangerous because of their membership in or affiliation with or espousal of doctrines of basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations or who are black nationalist extremists and who will be apprehended upon receipt of instructions from the Attorney General.

(c) It shall include subjects of espionage investigations and any other type of Bureau investigation provided their activities bring them within the scope of the security index criteria.

(d) Action shall be taken against individuals included in the security index only upon authorization of warrants of arrest by the Attorney General. However, in preparing and maintaining the security index, to all practical effects, the Bureau is making the decision as to those persons who will be apprehended in the event of an emergency, inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised that he does not have funds or

manpower to review security index cases.

(e) Names shall be included in the security index only when investigation has established and reports[show] sufficient facts and evidence to justify the inclusion of each subject in the security index.

(f) The contents of the security index must be accurate and correct at all times. Matters pertaining to its preparation and maintenance must be given preferred, expeditious, continuous, and detailed attention.

(g) Matters pertaining to the security index are strictly confidential and are not to be mentioned or alluded to in investigative reports.

(h) The general operation and content of the security index must not be discussed by field personnel of the Bureau without prior Bureau authority.

(i) Matters pertaining to the security index may be discussed with duly qualified representatives of other Federal intelligence agencies only on a strictly confidential basis and only in instances in which an individual subject of prime interest to one of these services is involved.

(2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual

(a) The dangerousness of a member or affiliate of a subversive organization does not necessarily depend entirely upon his personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or a disposition to violence. Although these factors must be taken into consideration in evaluating an individual's potential dangerousness, other factors are essential in making this determination. An individual's dangerousness also depends upon the contribution he has made or is making in the advancement of the principles and aims of the subversive movement with which he is connected or his subversive potentialities in the event of a national emergency. Bear in mind that a subject active in a subversive organization is not merely an isolated individual but is a part of an organization of which the purposes are opposed to the best interests of the U. S. An individual's loyalty to a subversive organization and the principles thereof is a primary factor to take into consideration in evaluating his potential dangerousness; [however, regardless of evidence of subversive affiliation, all evidence developed during the course of a security investigation must be carefully weighed for the purpose of determining whether the subject's activities depict him as a potentially dangerous individual in time of a national emergency. Factors having a bearing upon an individual's potential dangerousness are numerous and will vary in each case in degree.]

Among such factors are:

I. Long continued membership in a subversive organization
II. Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools
III. Frequent or regular attendance at organizational meetings and functions
IV. Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization
V. Possession of or continued study of revolutionary literature
VI. Preparation or distribution of subversive propaganda and/or literature
VII. Holding positions in the subversive organization or in other organizations of a front character which indicate confidence of such organizations in his loyalty
VIII. Espousal of a subversive doctrine exemplified in his acts and utterances

particular attention should be given during the course of investigations of individual members of this organization to the developing and reporting of such statements on the part of these individuals, including the reporting of violent and revolutionary statements made by other members in their presence. Such statements should be reported in detail. [These instructions should be applied to other black nationalist extremist groups.]

(e) When subjects are removed from the security index solely on the basis of application of the above criteria with no affirmative indication of defection, retain the cancelled security index cards for future reference under procedures set out in 87D 7b (10) (g).

(4) Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards

(a) The SAC shall personally recommend inclusion in and removal of any name from the security index except in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects, in which offices the recommendations must be made by the SAC, the ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.

should be completely filled out just as if a first recommendation is being made, and submitted with a current report. If not, the Bureau should be advised of the reasons for not reactivating his security index card. In either case, cancel the inactive card.

(7) Periodic verification of addresses

(a) The data recorded on security index cards shall be in an up-to-date status at all times.

(b) The whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. The residence and business addresses of all security index subjects must be checked at least once each six months, except those imprisoned and those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. (defection to a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, [including Cuba since 10-1-60)] (see section 105G, item 3, volume IV, of this manual). The residence and employment of those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. must be verified every thirty days. The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least each six months to determine if he has returned to this country.

Perfect arrangements to be advised on a current basis of any indication that the subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change his residence or employment. Periodic checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under appropriate pretext by telephone, or other expeditious means.

(c) The physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and the individual case file of each security index subject shall show that this has been done. If a security index subject has not been personally observed previously, this should be done during the next verification of the subject's residence and/or business addresses.

(d) Use form FD-154 in verifying addresses of security index subjects when its use will facilitate the checking of the addresses. When FD-154 is not used in verifying addresses, a notation must be made on the last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in the subject's case file showing the subject's current residence and business addresses and the date such addresses were verified. This must be done to assure that the file will contain all information concerning the status of the case and that the file will come to the attention of the Agent or field supervisor to determine if additional action is warranted at the time of the verification of addresses. Each time that a security index subject's residence and employment are verified, the case must be reevaluated to assure that the subject is qualified for inclusion in the security index under the criteria for such inclusion. A notation to the effect that the case has been reviewed for this purpose shall be made in the file.

(e) If it is determined that the residence or business address or both have been changed from those appearing on the security index card, FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau with the current residence or business address shown thereon. In such instances, FD-122 should show only the changes to be made on the security index card. FD-122 should be accompanied by form FD-366 for dissemination to Secret Service. Secret Service should be advised locally by dissemination of FD-366.

(f) The [illegible]ject of verifying addresses o[illegible]ecurity index subjects (other than top functionaries and key figures) shall be handled by reopening and assigning the cases for verification and closing the cases administratively upon accomplishment of verifications. Top functionary and key figure cases are to be handled as provided in section 87D 7f [(6).] Verifications should also be made at the time of submission of all annual investigative reports and should be reported therein.

(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards

(a) Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, detcom classification, date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility (see 87D 7c (2) below), residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by form FD-128.

(b) Insertion or removal of cards from special section or unavailable section should be handled pursuant to 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV.

(c) Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing security index cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.

(d) Indicate use of FD-122 for changes by checking proper opening paragraph and submit without abstract.

(e) Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."

(f) Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected security index cards with duplicate copy of FD-122 (stamped "Corrected Security Index cards attached. Substitute for cards in file and destroy old cards. Place photograph and description on reverse side of geographical cards."), action to be taken includes:

I. Check accuracy of data on cards.

II. Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to back of corrected cards, staple them and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV above.

III. File third card in alphabetical section of security index.

IV. Destroy old cards.

(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards

(a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries

I. Requests to verify addresses of security index subjects from other offices must be assigned immediately and results of investigation to verify the new address must be transmitted to the office of origin within two weeks.

II. Office of origin, upon receipt of verification of address, should submit FD-128 immediately transferring office of origin. Forms regarding unavailable section subjects should be prepared in accordance with 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.

III. Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies thereof to office covering subject's new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and security index cards. FD-128 should show full title.

IV. Information concerning key facility employment of subject in new office should be furnished by that office to old office of origin so that geographical reference

selecting key figures in the labor field, give consideration to the critical nature of the industry or trade involved and the fact that certain industries, such as transportation and communication, are particularly vulnerable to communist infiltration and sudden disruptive action.

V. Editors, publishers, and business managers of generally recognized communist publications or communist publishing houses and operators of the important communist bookstores

VI. Prominent figures in the communist-owned and -controlled educational institutions, generally referred to as workers schools

VII. Attorneys and bondsmen who are active in the communist movement and are known to furnish important assistance to the communist movement

VIII. Espionage or nationalistic tendency subjects whose activities are connected to a significant degree with the program of the Communist Party, provided they have no recognized diplomatic status. Investigation and preparation, submission, and dissemination of reports governed by instructions issued in individual cases in this category and the general rules governing key figures as subsequently set forth in this section are not applicable to these subjects.

The above list is not all-inclusive. There may be individuals who, because of their profession, position in public life, Government employment, or other associations, may not see fit to serve outwardly in behalf of the Communist Party or its related groups but who, because of their established communist sympathies and their contributions to the communist movement, might well conform to the general key figure definition set out above. Membership in the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations is not a prerequisite to being a key figure and the designation may apply to both citizens and aliens [and to black nationalist extremists.]

(b) Regulations governing the handling of the key figure program

I. Designation and deletion of key figure status

Designate or remove a subject as a key figure by individual letter to the Bureau carrying the subject in the caption and containing a brief statement as to the reason for designation or deletion.

Where office of origin for key figures is transferred, deletions in the old office of origin and additions in the new office are handled in accordance with 87D 7b (9) (b) above.

II. Photographs

Photographs must be obtained for each key figure. Whenever possible, the photographs should be obtained from public records, law enforcement agencies, state or Federal Government agencies, and similar sources. Where more direct means employed, use extreme care to avoid prejudicing the investigation. Send one copy of photograph of each key figure to the Bureau, either by cover letter or as enclosure to a report. Maintain a copy of each photograph in the subject's individual case file in the field. If album of key figure photographs maintained, be sure duplicates are also filed in each individual subject's file.

III. Handwriting specimens

Suitable handwriting specimens of each key figure must be obtained. Whenever possible, obtain handwriting specimens from public records, law enforcement agencies, and similar sources. Again, if more direct means employed, use extreme care. Send specimens to the Bureau under a separate cover letter by registered mail for the attention of the FBI Laboratory. Letter should bear caption of individual case.

Handwriting specimens should be sufficiently extensive to permit possible future comparisons by the Laboratory. When specimens submitted may be of value as evidence, letter of transmittal should so state and Bureau should be requested to return specimens after copies have been made.

IV. Security index cards
Request preparation by FD-122 at the earliest possible moment. Same rules apply to preparation and maintenance as apply to other security index cards. All security index cards for key figures shall be tabbed for detcom under the priority apprehension program.

V. Change of office of origin
FD-128 changing office of origin on a key figure automatically deletes him as key figure in old office and adds him as a key figure in new office. For further instructions concerning the change of office of origin in these cases, see 87D 7b (9) (b).

VI. Reports

(A) Character - Internal Security - (followed by appropriate letter designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency)

(B) Submit reports every six months [showing] the subject's activities since last report. The key figure designations should be continuously evaluated so that their status will not be continued unless justified. These cases may be placed in a pending-inactive status as soon as the following conditions exist:

i. Reports have been submitted [showing] complete investigation definitely establishing by information of evidentiary nature subject's communist connections and activities and his importance in the communist movement plus essential background information.

ii. When no further action necessary other than maintaining contact with informants, keeping informed of subject's whereabouts, and generally following his activities. It is imperative that established sources of information be continued and still further informant coverage effected.

iii. Do not advise the Bureau by letter that case placed in pending-inactive status. Place cases on six-month ticklers to insure prompt submission of reports at six-month intervals.

iv. Cases involving key figures and top functionaries should be maintained in a pending status until such time as suitable photographs of subjects are obtained unless, of course, circumstances dictate to the contrary, in which case the Bureau should be so advised. The fact that handwriting specimens of key figures and top functionaries have not been secured should not prevent placing these cases in a pending-inactive status when all reasonable efforts have been made to secure them.

(C) Key figure cases may be closed and the designations deleted when subject enters the armed forces or other circumstances arise warranting such action. Additional information received shall be channelized to the closed file.

VII. Maintenance of key figure list

(A) Each office must maintain current list of key figures including top functionaries. List may be kept by simple list system, by maintaining a file wherein all additions and deletions to the list are reported, or by a card index system. Maintain key figure list separate from security index.

(B) Key figures should retain their designation notwithstanding their departure for foreign travel or other circumstances requiring temporary discontinuance of investigation.

(C) Should a key figure become subject of a security of Government employees investigation, his name should continue to appear on the key figure list, but the investigation shall proceed in accordance with existing instructions governing SGE cases.

(3) Top functionaries

(a) Definition

A top functionary is an individual, either a member or a nonmember of the Communist Party, to whom, because of his importance, it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention in order to keep abreast of communism on a national basis in the U. S. Necessarily, such an individual would be on a high policy level in the movement.

The term "top functionary" is not to be construed as requiring that individuals in this category must actually hold official positions in party organizations but shall be given a broad enough construction to include others who are of equal importance because of their influence in the movement itself, or their position and activities outside the party in labor, front, or similar organizations or movements. [Black nationalist extremists whose importance justifies continuous investigative attention should be considered for designation as top functionaries.]

(b) Manner of designation

Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate a subject as a top functionary. Submit such recommendation to Bureau by letter containing reasons for the recommendation. Bureau desires to be very selective in this matter and to concentrate on individuals who, on a national basis, are the guiding hands in the communist movement.

At the seat of Government a careful appraisal will be made of the field's recommendation, following which the office will be advised concerning the Bureau's decision on the recommendation.

(c) Regulations governing top functionaries

I. Regulations set forth under (2) (b) above pertaining to key figures relative to photographs, handwriting specimens, security index cards, change of office of origin, detcom tabbing, character of reports, and inclusion in the key figure list apply to individuals designated as top functionaries.

II. Reports
Submit reports on top functionaries quarterly. Make status pending-inactive if there are no outstanding leads for active investigation.

e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index
Individuals investigated by the Bureau under any character against whom subversive information is developed must be constantly borne in mind for inclusion in the security index and/or reserve index.

(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations
Subjects of these investigations must be included in the security index and/or the reserve index if they meet the standards for inclusion therein. It is the responsibility of the investigating Agent or field supervising official to make appropriate recommendation for preparation of the security index card and/or the reserve index card, whenever appropriate.

(2) Security of Government employees (SGE) investigations
Subjects of all SGE investigations against whom subversive derogatory information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or reserve index.

The Agent conducting investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer such cases to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling. Copies of reports showing disloyal information must be submitted to the field office covering the subject's residence, when developed by any other office.

When an individual who has previously been investigated under the SGE character is the subject of a security index card and is still employed by the Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, the dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and the character of the subject's security case should be used in the report being submitted. This will insure that the reports are referred to the appropriate desks for supervision at the Bureau, as well as in the field. These reports should be written according to the standards prevailing for SGE reports.

Disseminate these dual character reports the same as any other security report. Representatives of other intelligence agencies requesting reports showing the actual SGE investigation should be informed to direct the request to their Washington headquarters for referral to the Bureau.

(3) Atomic Energy Act, [U. S. Information Agency] applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations
Subjects of all above investigations against whom subversive information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or the reserve index. In each such case the Agent conducting the investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer the matter to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling.

Copies of reports showing disloyal information must be submitted to the office covering the subject's residence, whenever developed by another office.

When the [illegible]ject of such an investigation [illegible] presently in the security index, a letter must be directed to the Bureau at the time the report is submitted advising that the subject is in the security index.

Information of interest to FBI and/or AEC obtained subsequent to completion of Atomic Energy Act - applicant investigations concerning AEC employees or persons having access to restricted data should be handled according to instructions in section 20, volume II, of this manual.

f. [Submission of and general rules concerning security reports]

(1) General

[Submission of summary reports should not be delayed for the purpose of conducting current investigation in previously closed cases, but appropriate leads should be set out.]

Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened or placed in a pending status for the purpose of preparing investigative reports in accordance with the schedule outlined in 87D 7f[(6).]

Office indices and any material channelized to the case file since the most recent report should be reviewed and the case brought up to date by appropriate investigation to determine subject's current activities.

Each time that a case is reopened and brought up to date, it should be critically analyzed in the light of the security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3) herein. This procedure must be followed on a continuing basis for each security index subject.

(2) Origin

The office of origin will be that office covering the territory wherein the subject's subversive activities occur. In most instances this will also be the office in which territory the subject resides and is employed. In those cases in which the subject's subversive activities take place in the territory of an office other than the office covering the place of residence and/or employment, the office of origin shall be that office which can best cover the subversive activities of the subject.

(3) Classification

(a) 100 - for individuals affiliated with the basic revolutionary and front organizations of Marxian ideology

(b) 105 - for members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups or others having nationalistic tendencies of a non-Marxist character

[(c) 157 - Nation of Islam and other black nationalist matters]

(4) Title

Only one subject shall be carried in the title of each report. Separate reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of their relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

(5) Character

(a) Key figures and top functionaries

Internal Security [(or Racial Matters if subject is a black nationalist)]- followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Internal Security - C
Internal Security - SWP
[Racial Matters - NOI]

(b) Others

Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Security Matter - C
Security Matter - SWP
Security Matter - X (native fascist)
Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a key figure, the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject is designated a key figure, the first report after the designation and all subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. Communications regarding subjects who are employed in key facilities should bear the words "Key Facility" in the character. Communications regarding subjects who are members of the Communist Party, USA, National Committee should bear the words "National Committee" in the character. [Black nationalist investigations and racial matters should be given the character set out in section 122, volume IV, of this manual.]

(6) Status

All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:

(a) Top functionaries

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted quarterly. Forty-five days prior to the date a quarterly report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(b) Key figures

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted semiannually. Forty-five days prior to the date a semiannual report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(c) Other security index subjects

I. Closed

(A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of an annual investigative report. If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed. The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the annual report is due. Such cases shall also be opened and assigned six months after submission of the annual report to accomplish verification of addresses. Upon such verification, the cases should be closed administratively.

(d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index

I. Pending inactive

(A) If all active investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau.

(B) Set forth lead to follow Bureau for security index card and if approved for dissemination of report to Secret Service.

II. Closed

(A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau and dissemination to Secret Service

(B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in[(c)]above.

(e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein

I. Closed

(A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(7) Content

(a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.

I. Background

(A) Birth date
(B) Citizenship status
(C) Education
(D) Marital status
(E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
(F) Identification record
(G) Employment
(H) Residence
(I) Status of health (if known)

II. Connections with Communist Party (or other basic revolutionary groups and/or front organizations[or black nationalist extremist groups)]

(A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.

(B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

(j) In connection with periodic reports in security index cases, there are instances in which evidence of extensive activity in subversive organizations will be developed. In these cases it is permissible to report such information in narrative-type statements without indicating exact dates of activity; however, the period of time involved must be shown, as well as the inclusive dates of the informant reports.

This type reporting is not to be utilized in Smith Act of 1940 cases or Internal Security Act of 1950 cases. The narrative statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions and information from each source must be reported in separate narrative statements.

(k) The above instructions in no way remove responsibility for reporting all items of pertinence to the Bureau, bearing in mind the fact that Bureau files must be complete insofar as matters of substance are concerned, nor is responsibility removed for the reporting in detail of information tending to establish a subject's knowledge of the basic aims and purposes of the subversive organizations with which affiliated or information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

In the documentation of narrative statements set forth the location of the original documents in the field office files by the file number and serial scope.

[[(8)] Administrative data

(a) General

All references to the following items, all administrative in nature, should be contained in cover pages accompanying reports:

I. Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, key figure or top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), forms FD-122, FD-122a, FD-128, and FD-128a, and Bureau instructions for handling cases or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature

II. Whenever reports relating to security index subjects contain data affecting material included on subject's existing security index card, the cover pages accompanying the report shall include as the last page form FD-305 appropriately checked, which form contains items pertaining to the following:

(A) That subject's name is included in the security index [or agitator index]

(B) That data appearing on security index card is current

(C) That FD-122 has been submitted to Bureau where security index card changes are necessary

(D) That a suitable photograph is or is not available and date photograph was taken

(E) That subject is employed in a key facility and agency charged with security responsibility is specified and that agencies interested in that facility are specified

(F) Reason for classifying report

(G) Dates subject was previously interviewed and reason for not reinterviewing subject

(H) That subject no longer meets security index [or agitator index] criteria and a letter has been directed to the Bureau recommending cancellation

(I) That subject's case has been reevaluated and reasons are set forth as to why subject's activities continue to fall within security index [or agitator index] criteria

(J) That subject's security index card is or is not tabbed detcom and reasons why subject's activities warrant detcom tabbing

III. Form FD-305a containing items pertinent to reserve index subjects will be similarly utilized in connection with the submission of reports in reserve index cases.

(b) Documentation of reports

I. Deleted

II. If information necessary for complete documentation is not available in subject's case file, necessary review of other office files should be made. If not obtainable, this fact must be indicated in the cover page(s) accompanying report to the Bureau.

III. Extensive investigation should not be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have in the past furnished background information or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed that subject, according to reliable records, such as birth records, school records, or records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in report. Further verification will not be necessary.

IV. During the preparation of summary reports it is often found that information being incorporated into a report was originally obtained by another office and all of the necessary information for complete documentation will not be in the possession of the office preparing the report. In such an instance, if the office preparing the report is in possession of photostats of documents obtained by the other offices and the identity

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
eferences are to page.

- Abstract slips, 47,58
- Addresses, verification of (See verification of addresses.)
- Administrative
  - data, 77
  - tickler, 55,56,74
- Admissible evidence, 29,37
- Agitator index, 78
- Agreement between FBI and Secret Service, 81
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
  - Chinese, 48,62,81a
  - Cuban, 45a,45b,81a
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80,81a
  - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
- Applicant investigations, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Armed forces
  - dissemination to, 81a
  - members of, 25
  - record in, 27
  - relatives in, 27
  - subjects entering, 56,60
  - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of security index, 50
  - alphabetical section, 51,63
  - at Bureau, 50
  - geographical section, 51,63
  - in field office, 51
  - inactive section, 56
  - special section, 52 (See also special section of security index.)
  - unavailable section, 53 (See also unavailable section of security index.)
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71

- Black nationalist cases
  - character of case, 73
  - classification, 72
  - definitions, 19
  - key figures, 67,73
  - reports
    - anarchist beliefs, 46a
    - content, 4
  - security index, 43,49
  - top functionary, 69
- Bureau
  - applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
  - authority to investigate, 24
  - responsibility, 19

- Cancellation of
  - security flash notice, 27a
  - security index cards
    - after induction into armed forces, 60
    - mechanics, 60
    - on departure from U. S., 60
    - only after interview, 38
    - recommending, 42,61
    - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 74
- Changes on security index cards, 58
- Channelizing, 24,34,36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
  - aliens, changes in residence or employment, dissemination to Secret Service and INS, 81a
  - extraction, 48,62
  - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants, 74
- Contacting
  - faculty members, 25
  - registrars, 25
  - students, 25
  - superiors of faculty members, 25
- Contacts
  - during investigation, 25
  - of foreign establishments, 25
- Content
  - and appearance
    - of reserve index cards, 43
    - of security index cards, 48
  - of reports, 74
- Corroboration, 37
- Cover pages, 77,78
- Criteria for inclusion in security index, 44a,45
- Cuban
  - activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  - aliens, 45a,45b,81a
  - contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a
  - pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  - special section, 49,53
  - tabbing cards, 45b,64

- Dangerousness
  - definition of, 44
  - determination of, 44
  - Nation of Islam membership, 46
- Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Defected subjects, 42
Defectors to Sino-Soviet-bloc countries, 57
Defense
- facilities, 64
  - list, 64
  - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Industrial Security Clearance Office, 65,81
- Supply Agency, 65,81

Definitions, 19
- of dangerousness, 44
- of key figures, 66
- of top functionaries, 69

Delimitations Agreement, 64,81a
Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
Detcom, 62
- administrative procedures, 63
- key figures, 62,68
- purpose, 62
- removal from, 58, 63,64
- special section, 53,64
- top functionaries, 62,70
- who to be tabbed, 62,70

Determination of
- dangerousness, 44
- membership and position in labor organizations, 29

Disaffection of U. S. citizens abroad, 57
Dissemination
- concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81a
- of reports
  - at SOG, 81a
  - in field, 79
  - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
- to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, 65,81
- to Immigration and Naturalization Service, 80,81a
- to Secret Service, 81
  - closing case, 47,74
  - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
  - stamping reserve index cards, 43

Documentation of reports, 78
- completion of, 78

Employees of
- international organizations, 25
- U. S. Government, 25,70
  - dissemination of data re, 80

Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
Evidence, 37
- desirability of
  - admissibility, 29,37
  - corroboration, 37
- of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
- of membership or affiliation, 29
- preservation of, 37

Executive Order 10450, 33,80,81

Faculty members
- contacts with, 25
- investigation of, 24

Fifth amendment, 46
File on defected subjects, 42
File reviews, 34
Flash notices (security)
- cancellation of, 27a
- notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
- placing, 27

Foreign
- diplomats, 25
- establishments, 25
- intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- tours, 33a
- travel, 33,69

Forms
- FD-122, 28,34,48,49,53 to 58,68,74
  - abstracts for, 47
  - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
  - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
  - cover letter thereto, 32
  - Cuban subjects, 45b
  - detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63

E. INVESTIGATIONS OF COMMUNIST FRONT AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purposes
   - a. To obtain sufficient pertinent data to make possible accurate determination of organization's true character
   - b. To obtain intelligence data and keep Department and other interested Government agencies advised regarding existence and activities of subversive organizations
   - c. To obtain legally admissible evidence re subversive nature of such organizations to permit implementation of:
     - (1) Internal Security Act of 1950
     - (2) Registration Act
     - (3) Smith Act of 1940
     - (4) Executive Order 10450
2. General policy
   - a. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations, [including those affiliated with the new left movement]
     - (1) Upon receipt of information concerning formation of such a group, immediately open a case and advise Bureau at that time.
     - (2) [Conduct] sufficient inquiry [through established sources] to determine true character of group.
       - (a) If further investigation warranted, [submit report and, thereafter, handle in accordance with] established report writing procedures.
       - (b) If further investigation not warranted, advise Bureau results of [preliminary inquiry] and specific reasons for determination in letter form [and furnish any pertinent information developed in form suitable for dissemination.]
   - b. Established subversive groups
     - (1) Keep Bureau currently advised by appropriate communication re pertinent activities including any changes in principal officers, structure of organizations, and forthcoming events.
     - (2) If no specific leads outstanding, case may be placed in pending-inactive status after submission of initial report.
     - (3) Submit reports at least every six months.
     - (4) In reports concerning communist front organizations and miscellaneous organizations, such as the Nation of Islam and those affiliated with the new left movement, leadership in which is grounds for inclusion in the security index, include on cover pages a statement that all persons named in the report as officers or leaders who reside within the area covered by the reporting office are listed in the security index or are informants or sources. The cover pages of reports concerning those organizations affiliated with the new left movement should also contain this statement in reference to leading activists in the organizations, as well as their officers or leaders. Exceptions should be named and a statement made as to the status of their investigations.
   - c. Organizations political in character
     - (1) Investigation should not be instituted without Bureau approval.
     - (2) Furnish all pertinent information concerning communist infiltration, influence, or control of such organizations to Bureau in letter form.
   - d. Organizations connected with institutions of learning
     - (1) No investigation to be conducted without prior Bureau approval
     - (2) If requesting Bureau authority to investigate, submit complete available data and reason investigation is desired.
     - (3) If Bureau authority granted, it will be permissible to contact all established reliable sources, including those functioning in an administrative capacity with an institution of learning.
     - (4) Before conducting any interview with a student, graduate student, or professor connected with an institution of learning re security-type investigation of an organization, whether organization itself has been connected with institution of learning, Bureau authority must be obtained to conduct such interview. Submit complete justification for desired interview to Bureau.
     - (5) Section 87D 5a (1) of this manual should be read in conjunction with above instructions.

e. Legitimate no[illegible]mmuni[illegible]ganizations that are[illegible]unist infiltrated

(1) No investigation should be conducted without prior Bureau approval.

(2) Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced Agents.

(3) Advise Bureau promptly under caption "Cominfil (name of organization)" when one of the following exists and include your recommendation for instituting an investigation:

(a) The Communist Party has specifically instructed its members to infiltrate the organization.

(b) Communist Party members have infiltrated the organization in sufficient strength to influence or control the organization.

(4) When advising Bureau, include data concerning following items:

(a) Name and address of organization

(b) Extent of communist infiltration

(c) Identities of Communist Party members and positions held in organization

(d) Informant coverage afforded organization
Set forth positions held by informants and whether informants are members or merely reporting on organization.

(e) Recommendation whether additional investigation is deemed warranted

Above instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates, as well as the national organization. Break down information required under items (c) and (d) above by local chapters where such exist.

(5) No informant or source should be instructed by the FBI to join or attend meetings. If Communist Party asks the informant to do so, he should, of course, comply.

(6) No member of the organization not already an established source should be contacted regarding the organization. This does not preclude pretext interviews where advisable.

(7) Data concerning following topics should be fully developed and reported on:

(a) Basis for investigation and fact that our investigation is directed solely toward establishing extent of Communist Party infiltration, or that organization is specific target for infiltration, and that Bureau is not investigating legitimate activities of organization.

(b) Address of organization

(c) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership

(d) Principal officers of organization

(e) Communist Party program to infiltrate this organization and influence its policy

(f) Results of this program, including Communist Party affiliations of officers and members

(8) Caption of all correspondence should contain the phrase "Communist Infiltration of" preceding the name of the organization.

(9) In the event infiltration of the organization reaches such a proportion that its activities are dominated and controlled by the Communist Party, submit your recommendation to the Bureau regarding changing the investigation from communist infiltration to that of a communist front.

i. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against the President

On 2-3-65, an "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection" was signed and became effective. This agreement is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual.

The agreement provides that the FBI, in its investigations of organizations whose activities are inimical to the welfare of the U. S., will be alert to and promptly notify Secret Service of any information indicating a plot against the person of the President; thereafter, it is the responsibility of Secret Service to initiate such action as is necessary to neutralize such a plot.

The field must be alert during the course of the investigation of an organization for information indicating a plot against the person of the President. Upon receipt of such information, immediately furnish complete details to the nearest office of Secret Service and appropriate local law enforcement agencies and advise the Bureau at that time by teletype, or telephone if the facts warrant, of the information furnished and the fact it has been so disseminated. An immediate attempt should be made to verify the information received but no evaluation of the information should be attempted.

Prepare at once a letterhead memorandum which should include complete details disseminated and the identities of the Secret Service officer and the local law enforcement officers to whom given and the date and time of notification. Promptly disseminate the letterhead memorandum locally to Secret Service and any other appropriate Government agency and furnish sufficient copies to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Thereafter, copies of all letterhead memoranda and reports concerning the organization should be disseminated locally to Secret Service on a continuing basis and extra copies of such communications should be furnished the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG.

The field should insure that the identities of the members of the organization who are "in" on the plot are determined. Background information concerning the individuals (see items 1 and 3 of appendix A to the agreement) should be fully developed and included in the communications prepared and disseminated to Secret Service. If such identities and information are known at the time the initial information is received, they should be included in the first letterhead memorandum prepared in the matter.

3. Investigative procedures and suggestions re communist front organizations,
[[subversive organizations, suspected subversive organizations, and new
[left groups]
[To accurately and clearly show true nature of [these] groups, data concerning the following topics, where applicable, should be fully developed and reported on:

a. Origin and scope

Date of formation. Circumstances under which founded. Determine who in Communist Party instructed organization be set up; whether decision to set up group made at meeting of party functionaries and, if so, identify functionaries present; identity of individual or individuals responsible for organizing group. Identify all known chapters, if any, and location thereof.

b. Whether incorporated

Many organizations are incorporated requiring filing of incorporation papers with appropriate state officials.

c. Aims and purposes
[Particular emphasis should be placed on determining whether the organization advocates violence, resistance, and unlawful activity.]

d. Location of headquarters

e. Officers
List principal officers, board of directors, etc., and appropriate characterization of each showing [subversive] affiliation.

The cover pages of the report should state that all persons named as officers or leaders of the organization who reside within the area covered by the reporting office are listed in the security index or are informants or sources. [The cover pages of reports concerning those organizations affiliated with the new left movement should also contain this statement in reference to leading activists in the organization, as well as their officers or leaders.] Exceptions should be named and information furnished concerning the status of their investigations.

f. Membership
Ascertain estimated membership. Whenever possible, secure membership lists, mailing lists, or other records showing affiliation with organization. Usually obtainable through informant coverage or utilization of various investigative techniques. Secure accurate description of all lists to make sure there is no confusion as to the exact identity or significance of list being reported on.

g. Official organ, if any, and other literature
(1) May be obtained through confidential mailbox, panel sources, and confidential informants
(2) All such literature should be appropriately identified.
(3) At least one copy of each pertinent piece of literature should be promptly furnished to Bureau.

h. General activities

i. Finances
Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Location of bank accounts frequently obtainable through confidential informants, credit records, public utility records, records of rental agent, and monitoring of other organizations' bank accounts. [It is extremely important that emphasis be placed on determining if funds are being furnished the organizations from foreign sources and if there is any rapport between the organizations and organizations in foreign countries.]

j. Support given to Communist Party
Preponderance of evidence should be developed showing support, financial or otherwise, given by the organization to the Communist Party.

k. Support received from Communist Party
Preponderance of evidence should be developed showing support, financial or otherwise, received by the organization from the Communist Party.

l. Implementation of Communist Party line
Can usually be shown through comparison of programs and literature of organization with those of Communist Party during any particular period.

Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through the following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various types of public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of information, interviews with past or present

G. INTERNAL SECURITY ACT [illegible]F 1950 (PUBLIC LAW 831, 81st C[illegible]GRESS, CHAPTER 1024. SECOND SESSION) (TITLE 50, USC, §§ 781-816)[(PUBLIC LAW 237, 90th CONGRESS)]

The Internal Security Act of 1950 became effective on 9-23-50. The act generally provides for the registration of communist-action and communist front organizations: amends the obstruction of justice statute; implements the espionage and sabotage statutes and various immigration and naturalization regulations; prohibits contributing to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship; and provides for the detention of individuals in the case of an emergency. [It was amended effective 1-2-68 to delete the requirement that communist organizations and their members register themselves with the Attorney General, a procedure ruled unconstitutional by the U. S. Supreme Court on the grounds that such action violated the constitutional rights against self-incrimination. The amended provisions provide that, upon petition by the Attorney General, the Subversive Activities Control Board would hold quasi-judicial hearings and would determine whether the individuals and organizations cited were communist. The Subversive Activities Control Board would instruct the Attorney General to maintain a public list of individuals found to be members of communist-action organizations and of groups found to be communist-action, communist front, or communist-infiltrated organizations.]

The following provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 appear elsewhere in this manual as follows:

Subject	Provisions of I. S. A. - 1950	Manual references
Espionage	§§ 4b, c, d, e, f, 18, 19	§ 36
Excludable aliens	§ 22	§ 105
Sabotage	§ 21	§ 86
Obstruction of justice	§ 31	§ 76

Sections 23-30 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 deal with immigration and naturalization matters which are under the primary jurisdiction of Immigration and Naturalization Service.

This section of the manual is limited to the remaining provisions of the Internal Security Act pertaining to communist-action organizations, communist front organizations, contributing to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship, and the detention of individuals in the case of an emergency.

1. Communist-action organizations
   a. Definition - Title 50, USC, § 782 (3)
   "The term 'Communist-action organization' means any organization in the United States (other than a diplomatic representative or mission of a foreign government accredited as such by the Department of State) which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 781 of this title, and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist movement as referred to in said section."
   b. [Deleted]
   c. [Deleted]
   d. Factors to be considered by the Subversive Activities Control Board in determining whether an organization is a communist-action organization (Title 50, USC, § 792 (e))
   "(1) the extent to which its policies are formulated and carried out and its activities performed, pursuant to directives or to effectuate the policies of the foreign government or foreign organization in which is vested, or under the domination or control of which is exercised, the direction and control of the world Communist movement referred to in section 781 of this title; and

"(2) the extent to which its views and policies do not deviate from those of such foreign government or foreign organization; and

"(3) the extent to which it receives financial or other aid, directly or indirectly, from or at the direction of such foreign government or foreign organization; and

"(4) the extent to which it sends members or representatives to any foreign country for instruction or training in the principles, policies, strategy, or tactics of such world Communist movement; and

"(5) the extent to which it reports to such foreign government or foreign organization or to its representatives; and

"(6) the extent to which its principal leaders or a substantial number of its members are subject to or recognize the disciplinary power of such foreign government or foreign organization or its representatives; and

"(7) the extent to which, for the purpose of concealing foreign direction, domination, or control, or of expediting or promoting its objectives, (i) it fails to disclose, or resists efforts to obtain information as to, its membership (by keeping membership lists in code, by instructing members to refuse to acknowledge membership, or by any other method); (ii) its members refuse to acknowledge membership therein; (iii) it fails to disclose, or resists efforts to obtain information as to, records other than membership lists; (iv) its meetings are secret; and (v) it otherwise operates on a secret basis; and

"(8) the extent to which its principal leaders or a substantial number of its members consider the allegiance they owe to the United States as subordinate to their obligations to such foreign government or foreign organization."

[e. [Deleted]

[f. [Deleted]

[g. [Deleted]

[h. [Deleted]

2. Communist front organizations

a. Definition - Title 50, USC, § 782

"The term 'Communist-front organization' means any organization in the United States (other than a Communist-action organization" defined above) "which (A) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by a Communist-action organization, or (B) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by one or more members of a Communist-action organization, and (C) is primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to a Communist-action organization, a Communist foreign government, or the world Communist movement, referred to in section 781 of this title."

[b. [Deleted]

[c. [Deleted]

[d. Factors to be considered by the Subversive Activities Control Board in determining whether an organization is a communist front organization (Title 50, USC, § 792 (f))

"(1) the extent to which persons who are active in its management, direction, or supervision, whether or not holding office therein, are active in the management, direction, or supervision of, or as representatives or members of, any Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or the world Communist movement referred to in section 781 of this title; and

"(2) The extent of which its support, financial or otherwise, is derived from any Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or the world Communist movement, referred to in section 781 of this title; and

"(3) the extent to which its funds, resources, or personnel are used to further or promote the objectives of any Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or the world Communist movement referred to in section 781 of this title; and

"(4) the exte[illegible]to which the positions taken [illegible]dvanced by it from time to time o[illegible] matters of policy do not deviate from those of any Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or the world Communist movement referred to in section 781 of this title."

e. [Deleted]

f. [Deleted]

3. How proceedings are instituted (Title 50, USC, § 792 (§ 13 of act))

Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any organization is a communist-action organization or a communist front organization, or that any individual is a member of an organization determined by a final order of the Board to be such, he shall file a petition with the Board and serve upon the organization or individual, as the case may be, a copy thereof, for a determination that such is true via a hearing before the Board.

4. Findings of the Board and publication of same (Title 50, USC, § 792 (§ 13 of act))

If, after a hearing on the matter, the Board finds - (1) that an organization is a communist-action organization or a communist front organization, it shall make a report in writing to state its findings and cause to be served on s[illegible] organization an order determining the organization to be a communist-[illegible]tion organization or a communist front organization, or (2) that an [illegible]dividual is a member of a communist-action organization, it shall make a report in writing in which it shall state its findings and cause to be served on such individual an order determining such individual to be a member of a communist-action organization.

a. Findings of the Board shall be published in the Federal Register that such orders have become final and this publication shall be notice to all persons that such orders have become final. Records of the Board concerning such hearings shall be available to the public.

5. Employment of members; contribution of funds, services, or advice by Government personnel (Title 50, USC, § 784 (§ 5 of act))

"(a) When there is in effect a final order of the Board determining any organization to be a Communist-action organization or a Communist-front organization, it shall be unlawful -

"(1) For any member of such organization, with knowledge or notice of such final order of the Board -

"(A) in seeking, accepting, or holding any nonelective office or employment under the United States, to conceal or fail to disclose the fact that he is a member of such organization; or

"(B) to hold any nonelective office or employment under the United States; or

"(C) in seeking, accepting, or holding employment in any defense facility, to conceal or fail to disclose the fact that he is a member of such organization; or

"(D) if such organization is a Communist-action organization, to engage in any employment in any defense facility; or

"(E) to hold office or employment with any labor organization, as that term is defined in section 2 (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U. S. C. 152), or to represent any employer in any matter or proceeding arising or pending under that Act.

"(2) For any officer or employee of the United States or of any defense facility, with knowledge or notice of such final order of the Board -

"(A) to c[illegible]tribute funds or services to such organization; or

"(B) to a[illegible]ise, counsel or urge any person, with knowledge or notice that such [illegible]rson is a member of such organization, to perform, or to omit to perform any act if such act or omission would constitute a violation of any provision of paragraph (1) of this subsection."

6. Use of mail and instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce (Title 50, USC, § 789 (§ 10 of act))
The act requires any person acting for or on behalf of any organization for which there is in effect a final order of the Board determining it to be a communist-action organization or communist front to label properly all publications transmitted through the mail or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce.]

[7.] Penalties (Title 50, USC, § 794 (§ 15 of act))
Any organization which violates any provision of section 10 of this act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for each such violation by a fine of not more than $10,000. Any individual who violates any provision of section 5 or 10 of this act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for each such violation by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both.

[8.] Reporting of evidence developed on individual members
Any admissible evidence showing a violation of the Internal Security Act of 1950,[as amended](Title 50, USC, § 784), as it pertains to union officers, employees, and representatives of management[(see item 5, part (a) (1) (B) above,]and volume III, section 67C, of this manual), should be furnished the Bureau in a report on the individual and the report should carry the single character, Internal Security Act of 1950 - Labor (classification 122). Any admissible evidence showing a violation of this act on the part of any other individual should be furnished the Bureau in report on the individual and the report should carry the dual character Internal Security - C or Security Matter - C; and Internal Security Act of 1950 (classification 100), except employment in a defense facility in which case the words "Defense Facility" should appear instead of Internal Security Act of 1950. See section 87D of this manual for complete instructions relative to investigation of individuals.

[9.] Instructions
The Bureau's responsibilities in connection with the internal security of this country necessitate that we promptly and thoroughly investigate all organizations subject to communist infiltration, influence, or control as set forth in section 87E of this manual. In view of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the necessity of developing legally admissible evidence as to the communist character of any organization must be emphasized during our investigation. Keeping in mind the factors to be considered by the Subversive Activities Control Board in determining whether an organization is a communist front, every effort must be made to develop legally admissible evidence relating to these factors. An investigation of any organization which might fall within the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 should carry the dual character, Internal Security - C, Internal Security Act of 1950.

[10.] Emergency detention provisions (Title 50, USC, §§ 811-826)
Sections 100 to 111 inclusive cover the detention provisions of the act in the event of a state of "Internal Security Emergency" and set up a program for the arrests of certain individuals, provisions for hearings after arrest, and the right to judicial review. Criminal provisions are set out in sections 112 to 114 inclusive, making it unlawful in connection with the detention provisions of the act to resist arrest, knowingly disregard or evade apprehension, escape from confinement, or conspire with others to escape from confinement or detention. Violations are also set out covering the aiding and assisting in the commission of the violations mentioned above and in the willful interference with the activities of any member of a review board set up under the detention provisions or any of its agents.

a. Bureau instructions
These provisions do not affect instructions regarding individuals considered dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security as outlined in section 87D of this manual.

[[11.] Contributing to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship (Title 50, USC, § 783(a))

Section 4(a) of the Internal Security Act of 1950 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to combine, conspire, or agree with any other person to perform any act which would substantially contribute to the establishment within the U. S. of a totalitarian dictatorship, the
[direction and control of which[is to]be vested in, or exercised by or under the domination or control of, any foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign individual. (The term "totalitarian dictatorship," according to the act, refers to systems of government not representative in fact, characterized by (A) the existence of a single political party, organized on a dictatorial basis, with so close an identity between such party and its policies and the governmental policies of the country in which it exists, that the party and the government constitute an indistinguishable unit, and (B) the forcible suppression of opposition to such party.)

a. Elements
   (1) A person knowingly combined, conspired, or agreed with another person
   (2) To perform any act which would substantially contribute to the establishment within the U. S. of a totalitarian dictatorship
   (3) The direction and control of which is to be vested in, or exercised by or under the control of, any foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign individual

b. Penalty

Maximum - $10,000 or ten years or both, and thereafter be ineligible to hold any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the U. S.

c. Statute of limitations

Ten years, except statute will not run on officer or employee of the U. S., etc., until after his employment has ceased

d. Evidence

Neither the holding of office nor membership in any communist organization by any person shall constitute per se a violation of section 4(a) of the Internal Security Act of 1950 or of any other criminal
[statute.

e. Departmental instructions

The Department has requested the Bureau to furnish any information developed relating to this violation.

[f. [Deleted]

H. COMMUNIST CONTROL ACT OF [illegible]54 (PUBLIC LAW 637-83RD CONG[illegible]S, CHAPTER 886 - SECOND SESSION) (TITLE [illegible], USC, §§ 841-844)

The Communist Control Act of 1954 became effective on 8-24-54, when the legislation was signed into law by the President. The act is divided into three measures: (1) termination of rights, privileges, and immunities formerly enjoyed by the Communist Party and subsidiary organizations, (2) determining membership in the Communist Party, USA, and other subversive groups, and (3) amendment to the Internal Security Act of 1950 bringing within its purview Communist-infiltrated organizations.

1. Terminating rights, privileges, and immunities

Title 50, USC, § 842, provides "The Communist Party of the United States, or any successors of such party regardless of the assumed name, whose object or purpose is to overthrow the Government of the United States, or the government of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein by force and violence, are not entitled to any of the rights, privileges and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof; and whatever rights, privileges and immunities which have heretofore been granted to said party or any subsidiary organization by reason of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof, are hereby terminated: Provided, however, That nothing in this section shall be construed as amending the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended."

The Department has advised that the purpose of this provision is not to constitute the Communist Party an illegal organization so as to make mere membership a criminal offense, punishable as a misdemeanor or felony. Rather, it was intended by Congress, and the statute's apparent effect is, merely to strip the party of rights, privileges, and immunities under Federal law as an alleged political party and in other respects without affecting its amenability to the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended.

No particular enforcement measures are provided for under this section. The forums where this provision will most likely be tested are various administrative agencies of the U.S. and its political subdivisions. This section may also result in civil litigation in U.S. District courts, possibly in the nature of mandamus, injunction, quo warranto and scire facias proceedings.

The question as to what "rights, privileges and immunities" the Communist Party heretofore has enjoyed and now has lost is a legal question which must be decided on the merits of each individual case. The Department has advised that it does not contemplate initiating any action per se under this section of the act and will leave to the interested Government agency involved the decision of initiating civil action to terminate the rights, privileges and immunities formerly enjoyed by the Communist Party, USA. The Department has suggested that the following types of information be forwarded to the interested Government agency by the Bureau for its information and consideration under this act. The Department desires to be advised of this referral for its information only.

a. Petitions, applications, slates and similar documents filed with competent election authorities on behalf of the Communist Party and its candidates for Federal office, or for office in any political subdivision of the U.S., as aforesaid, in connection with any primary or election

b. Permits, licenses, etc., issued to the Communist Party, or to any of its subsidiaries, by any department or agency of the Government of the U.S., or of its political subdivisions. This includes mailing permits issued by the Post Office Department, import and export licenses granted by the Department of Commerce and approved by the Bureau of Customs, etc.

c. Applications filed by the Communist Party, or any of its subsidiaries, with any department or agency of the Government of the U.S., or of

(b) Where potential dangerousness of a subject has been established and inclusion of that subject in security index is warranted, the office of origin shall submit a recommendation for inclusion in security index by submitting form FD-122 to Bureau. Form must be prepared in triplicate. Original and one copy shall be forwarded to Bureau and one copy will be placed in subject's investigative case file.

Nothing should appear on FD-122 or subsequently on the security index card which is not in the subject's case file. Form FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend a subject for inclusion in the security index and (2) to submit changes to data which appears on face of security index cards already existent.

Proper selection should be made in the opening paragraph option. FD-122 is submitted with abstract when used to recommend the subject for inclusion in the security index and without abstract when used to indicate additions, deletions, or changes in data appearing on existing cards.

(c) When form FD-122 is submitted to Bureau recommending inclusion of a name in security index, attach additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of facts on which recommendation has been based. Facts must be in detail to clearly show soundness of recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must contain pertinent dates of subject's activities.

(d) When, at conclusion of investigation, subject's name is not being recommended for security index, set out a brief summary statement in the appropriate communication closing the case showing reasons for the decision.

(e) Security index cards shall be recommended by and maintained by office of origin only.

(f) A current report must be in possession of the Bureau when subject is recommended for security index. If it is the initial report in the case, it must be a summary report. If, however, prior investigative reports have been submitted which are suitable for dissemination and are appropriately documented, a summary report need not be submitted.

(g) To assure that subject recommended for security index will receive proper attention, case shall be kept in pending or pending-inactive status until security index card has been received from Bureau and filed in office security index. If case continues in pending status because of outstanding investigation, reports shall carry a lead to follow authorization of security index card by the Bureau and if approved to[disseminate a copy of the report to]Secret Service in addition to other leads. If outstanding investigation has been completed and case would otherwise be closed upon submission of the report and form FD-122, case shall be placed in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and if approved[disseminate the copy of the report]to Secret Service. In latter instance, upon receipt of security index card and following local dissemination to Secret Service, case may be closed administratively.

(h) Recommendation for security index card should not be delayed because of absence of information concerning race, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, or description where security index card is warranted. In such instances, recommendation for the card should be submitted with a current report and case retained in pending status with active investigation continuing to determine missing items of information.

(i) Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for the security index provided instructions set forth in 87D 6b (3) and (4) are followed. Forms FD-122 submitted on subjects should include data required in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV below.

(j) When form FD-122 is submitted recommending a security index card be prepared on a subject who is of Chinese extraction, the words "Other - Chinese" must be included in the space on the form calling for a statement as to the subject's race. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending that a security index card be prepared on a person who is not of Chinese extraction but who has shown definite sympathies with Communist China, the form should include under "Miscellaneous" a statement to the effect "sympathetic to Communist China."

(k) Upon receipt of form FD-122 at Bureau, the case of the subject will be reviewed and if recommendation of field is concurred in, security index cards will be prepared. Duplicate copy of form will be returned to office of origin stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." The three cards shall be filed in security index as outlined below. The returned copy of FD-122 shall be placed in subject's main investigative case file. Offices with geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive an extra card.

(l) When security index cards are received from Bureau, data thereon must be checked for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards of similar size to security index cards which are stapled to back of two of the cards. One card will then be filed in the geographical section of office security index (except special section cards and unavailable section cards - see 87D 7b (6) (b) III and IV below), and one card shall be filed in the duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. The other card is filed in alphabetical section of security index. No information shall be permanently added, deleted, or changed on face of security index card without complying with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (8).

(5) Content and appearance of security index card

(a) Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain the following information. If any of items enumerated in I through XIV are missing at time the security index card is made, the case should be continued as pending and investigation conducted to obtain the necessary information. Set forth under each item below are possible categories in which subject may be classified, together with code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on form FD-122 when sending form to Bureau recommending security index card be prepared. Code letters should subsequently appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

I. Name and aliases

The full and correct name and aliases of the subject must be contained on the security index card. When the true name of a subject or any aliases are changed, added, deleted, or are found to be incorrect, form FD-122 must be submitted showing the correct data to be placed on the security index card.

II. Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)

III.	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
IV.	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien	AL
	(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
V.	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	Progressive Labor Party	PLP
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	[Students for a Democratic Society	SDS
	Spartacist League	SPL
	Provisional Organizing Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party	POC
	Workers World Party	WWP
	Anarchist	ANA]
	Nation of Islam	NOI
	[Revolutionary Action Movement	RAM
	Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee	SNC
	Black Nationalist	BNT]
	Bulgarian	BUL
	Cuban	CUB
	Czechoslovakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Romanian	ROM
	Russian	RUS
	Yugoslavian	YUG
VI.	Dangerousness classification (where applicable)	
	Detcom	DC
VII.	Key figure and top functionary designation (where applicable)	
	Key figure	KF
	Top functionary	TF
VIII.	Special section cards	
	Atomic energy program employees	AEP
	Cuban special section	CUB
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
	United Nations employees	UNE
	U. S. Government employees	GOV
IX.	Unavailable section cards	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
X.	Date and place of birth	
XI.	Key facility geographical reference number obtained from the Department of Defense Key Facilities List and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility (where applicable)	
XII.	Residence address	
XIII.	Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.	
XIV.	Field office file number	

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description

(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division

(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. [This photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.]

(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms

(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notice in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The white 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by this machine and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

(D) Whether or not defectee available for interview by all Agents

(E) Whether he is in position to testify and willing to do so

III. Do not include information concerning security informants for security reasons.

IV. Proper maintenance of this file will be useful in identifying persons who may be in a position to furnish information of value in the future and will obviate necessity of extensive file reviews in this connection.

V. A special index may be used for this file if desirable. If used, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating names, times, and places defectees were in a subversive movement and a brief description of information available from them. Break index down geographically and subdivide by years if desirable.

7. Administrative procedures

[a. Reserve index

(1) Purpose

The reserve index is designed to represent those persons who, in the light of ever-changing conditions, should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation, or action under the security index program. This index may serve as an administrative aid and working index containing a central repository of the names of individuals having sympathy for or affiliation with the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations.

(2) Individuals to be included

This index is to contain names of individuals when, following investigation, the information does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the security index when there is evidence of:

(a) Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection

(b) Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.

(c) The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support, or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.

(d) Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(e) Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection.

(3) Arrangement

This index is to be maintained in two sections, section A and section B. Each section will be maintained alphabetically on 5- by 3-inch cards.

(a) Section A

Section A of the reserve index is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following the apprehension of security index subjects.

I. Section A should include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the security index criteria but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material/financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Include in this section those individuals meeting the standards for inclusion in the reserve index and who fall within the following categories:

(A) Professors, teachers, and educators
(B) Labor union organizers or leaders
(C) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others in the mass media field
(D) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists
(E) Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level
(F) Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid

II. Recommendations for inclusion of names in the reserve index (section A)

(A) Recommendations for inclusion of names in section A of the reserve index are to be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a. A succinct summary setting forth the basis for the recommendation should be attached to the form FD 122a unless the recommendation is made simultaneously with a recommendation that the subject's name be deleted from the security index. In addition, if no report is accompanying the recommendation a statement to that effect should appear on the page containing the succinct summary.

(B) Upon Bureau approval of recommendation for the inclusion of an individual's name in section A of the reserve index, two reserve index cards will be forwarded to the field. Add on the reverse side available descriptive data. One card is to be filed in your office, and one card is to be filed away from headquarters city at the same location as the extra set of security index cards is now stored.

III. [The field office file of a reserve index A subject should be reviewed whenever informant information or other information is channeled to the file. A determination should be made as to whether additional investigation is warranted and whether current information is sufficient for inclusion in the reserve index.]

(A) [Deleted]
(B) [Deleted]
(C) [Deleted]

IV. Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing in section A of reserve index cards

(A) Changes in data appearing on section A reserve index cards should be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a.

(B) Deletions from section A of the reserve index should be recommended by letter. The letter should set forth the basis for the recommendation.

(C) Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section A cards to new office of origin.

(b) Section B

I. This section is to contain the names of all other individuals included in the reserve index. This section is to be maintained only in the field office. [The file of a reserve index B subject should be reviewed whenever informant information or other information is channeled to the file. A determination should be made at that time as to whether additional investigation is warranted.]

II. Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section B cards to new office of origin.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Forms (continued)
  FD-122 (continued)
    placing name in or removing from special section of security index, 53
      unavailable section of security index, 32,5[illegible]
    recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    reference to, 77
    succinct summary with, 47
      Cuban subjects, 45b
    when subject employed in key facility, 65
  FD-122a, 42b,42c,61,77
  FD-128, 55,57 to 60,68
    reference to, 77
    when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    when subject moves, 58,59
  FD-128a, 27a,42c,77
  FD-154, [illegible]7
  FD-16[illegible], 27,77
  FD-18[illegible], [illegible]0
  FD-30[illegible], [illegible]4,78
  [illegible], 78
  [illegible], [illegible]6
  [illegible], [illegible]9
  [illegible], 57,81a
  FD-[illegible], 81
Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22

Geographical
  reference number of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  section of security index, 51,63
Government employees, 25,70,80

Handwriting, 29
  of key figures, 29,67
  of top functionaries, 70
Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41
Husband and wife, security investigations, 72

Identification record, 27
Immigration and Naturalization Service, dissemination to, 80,81a
Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,57,60
Inactive section of security index, 56
Indices, check of, 34,72
Individuals
  to be investigated, 22
  traveling abroad, 33
    against whom stops are placed, 34
    who are included in security index, 34
    who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  with foreign diplomatic status, 26
Industrial security clearances, dissemination re, 65,81
Informants, cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
Interviews
  Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  Bureau authority, 39,40a
  conditions for, 40
    conducting at place of employment, 40a
  content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  contents of letter containing results of, 42
  determine willingness to testify during, 41
  evaluation of, 45b
  forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  no report needed afterward, 40a
  of hostile subjects, 41
  of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 24,25
  of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  of security index subjects, 38

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Interviews (continued)
  - of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  - of subjects who express desire for, 42
  - on SAC authority, 38
  - preparations for, 40
  - purpose of, 38
  - recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  - results not affecting security index status, 41
  - signed statements in connection with, 41
  - to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  - when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when to discontinue, 40a, 41
  - when report needed after, 41
  - with Bureau authority, 39
- Investigations
  - aliens, 26,80
  - faculty members, 24
  - members of labor unions, 29,41
  - naturalized citizens, 26,80
  - restrictions on, 24
  - [illegible], 24
- Investigative
  - procedures, 26
  - techniques, 34
    - file reviews, 34
    - photographic surveillances, 35,37
    - physical surveillances, 35,38
    - private firms, records, 36
    - public source information, 36
    - security informants, 34

- Key facilities, 64
  - character, 73
  - Delimitations Agreement, 64
  - employees included in security index, 65
  - list, 49,64
  - responsibility, 64
    - agency having security, 49,58,59,65
  - status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,74
  - when to investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Key figures
  - definition of, 66
  - designation of, 67
  - foreign travel by, 69
  - handling of, 67
  - handwriting of, 29,67
  - in armed forces, 68
  - list, 69
- Key figures (continued)
  - movement of, 59,68
  - photographs of, 28,67,68
  - program, 66
  - reports on, 68
    - semiannual, 39,59,68,73
  - status of reports on, 68,73
  - when become subjects of SGE cases, 69
- Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

- Labor union membership, 29
- Labor unions, 41
- Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Letter in lieu of report, security index cases, 74
- Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Lumping information in reports, 76

- Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Members of
  - armed forces, dissemination of information concerning, 81a
  - labor unions, 29,41
  - law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Membership or affiliation, 29
- Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  - letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  - unavailable section of security index, 32,54
- Movement of
  - key figures, 59,68
  - subjects, 58
    - key figures, 59,68
    - not in security index, 60
    - security index subjects, 58
    - tabbed for detcom, 60
    - top functionaries, 59

- Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
- Nation of Islam
  - abbreviation for organizational affiliation, 49
  - potential dangerousness, 36
  - removal of cards from security index, 62
  - what members to be investigated, 23

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

National
  Committee, CPUSA, character, 73
  Defense Education Act of 1958, 22
  Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
  Science Foundation Act of 1950, 22
Naturalized citizens
  dissemination of information concerning, 80
  investigations of, 26
Negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
New office of origin, 58,81a

Observation of subject, 28,50,57
Office of origin, 27a,58,59,68,72,81,81a
Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
Overt acts, 45

Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
Photographic surveillances, 35,37
Photographs, 28
  of key figures,28,67,68
  of top functionaries,68,70
  status of security index cases while obtaining, 28,68
Physical
  description, 28
  surveillances, 35
    maintenance of S[illegible] notes, 38
Position
  and importance, 30
  in labor organizations, 29
Potential dangerousness, 44
  of Nation of Islam members, 46
Preservation of evidence, 37
Priority apprehension program, 62
Private records, 36
Public
  Law 87-835, 22
  source information, 36
  utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Purpose of
  investigation, 19
  security index, 43

Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
Recommendation for inclusion in
  section A, reserve index, 42b,61
  security index, 47
    Cuban activity, 45a,45b
    status, 74
    when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    when subject is out of country, 48
    when there is missing background information, 47
Reevaluation of security index status, 46,57,72,78
Reinterviews, 42
Relatives in armed forces, 27
Removal from security index, 46a,60,61
Reports
  administrative data in, 77
  character of, 73
  content of, 74
  cumulative items, 76
  dissemination of, 79
    to Secret Service, 47,74,81
  documentation of, 78
  lumping information in, 76
  narrative-type statements, 77
  negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
  schedule of, 73
  status of, 73
  summarizing information in, 76
  summary, 21,47,71,76
  title of, 72
  topical headings in, 74
  when necessary after interview, 41
  when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  when not necessary after interview, 40a
  when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
Reserve index, 42a
  arrangement, 42b
  cards, content and appearance, 43
  content, 43
  flash notice, 27
  names deleted from security index, 61,62

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Reserve index (continued)
  - purpose, 42a
  - reference to on cover page, 77
  - removal from, 43
  - section A
    - changes, 42c
    - individuals to be included, 42b,61
    - interviews of subjects of, 39
    - recommendations for inclusion in, 42b,61
  - section B, 42c
    - security index cards placed in, 62
  - standards for, 42a
  - subjects
    - applicant investigations, 70
    - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    - security of Government employees investigations, 70
- Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
- Responsibility of Bureau, 19,64
- Restrictions on investigations, 24

- Schedule of reports, 73
- Scope of investigation, 26
- Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Secret Service, dissemination to, 81
  - closing case, 47,74
  - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
  - reserve index cards, stamping, 43
- Security
  - flash notice
    - cancellation of, 27a
    - notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    - placing, 27
  - index, 43
    - arrangement of, 50
    - cards
      - cancellation of, 38,42,60,61,62
      - changes on, 58

- Security (continued)
  - index (continued)
    - cards (continued)
      - content and appearance of, 48
      - of key figures, 68
      - tabbing, 45b,53,62,64,68,70
      - transfers to reserve index, 61,62
    - criteria for, 44a,45
    - Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53,64,81a
    - dangerousness, 44
    - dissemination to
      - Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81a
      - Secret Service, 81
        - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
        - reports, 47,74,81
    - purpose, 43
    - recommendation for, 45a,45b,46a,47
    - reevaluation of status, 46,57,72,78
    - reference to on cover page, 77
    - removal from, 46a,61
    - subjects of
      - applicant investigations, 70
      - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      - security of Government employees investigations, 70
    - summary reports, 47
    - verification of addresses and employment, 32,54,57,58,74,81a
  - informants, 34
    - cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
  - of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Signed statements, 41
- Sino-Soviet bloc, 44a,57
- Sleepers, 31,52
- Special section of security index, 52
  - cards, 49,56
  - Cuban, 49,53
  - exception to unavailable section, 56
- Standards for reserve index, 42a
  - section A, 42b
- Status of cases, 73
  - on key figures, 68,73
  - on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66,74
  - on subjects in security index, 74
  - on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  - on top functionaries, 73

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Status of cases (continued)
  while obtaining photographs, 2[illegible]
  while securing handwriting, 2[illegible]
  while verifying residence and employment, 58,7[illegible]
Students
  contacts with, 25
  investigations of, 24
Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
Summary reports, 21,47,71,76
Superiors of faculty members, 25
Surveillances
  photographic, 35,37
  physical, 35,38

Tabbing SI cards, 45b,53,62,64,68, 70
Thumbnail sketches, 79
Title of reports, 72
Top functionaries, 66,69
  change of office of origin, 70
  definition of, 69
  designation of, 69
  handwriting of, 70
  inclusion in key figure list, 70
  movement of, 59
  photographs of, 68,70
  program, 66
  regulations governing, 70
  reports on, 59,70
    status of, 70,73
  tabbing for detcom, 62,70
Topical headings in reports, 74
Tours, 33a
Travel
  abroad, 33,69
  behind iron curtain, 34

Unavailable section of security index, 53
  imprisoned subjects, 54
  missing subjects, 32,54
  subjects traveling abroad, 34,54
Underground membership or activity, 31
United Nations employees, 25,52
U. S. Government employees, 25,70,80
U. S. Information Agency, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70

Verification of
  addresses, security index, 32,54, 57,58,74,81a
  employment, security index, 32,57,74,81a
  key facility or defense facility status of place of employment, 64
Voice of America (See U. S. Information Agency.)

Wife and husband, security investigations, 72

Yugoslav intelligence agents, contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a

E. INVESTIGATIONS OF COMMUNIST FRONT AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purposes
    - a. To obtain sufficient pertinent data to make possible accurate determination of organization's true character
    - b. To obtain intelligence data and keep Department and other interested Government agencies advised regarding existence and activities of subversive organizations
    - c. To obtain legally admissible evidence re subversive nature of such organizations to permit implementation of:
        - (1) Internal Security Act of 1950
        - (2) Registration Act
        - (3) Smith Act of 1940
        - (4) Executive Order 10450
2. General policy
    - a. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations
        - (1) Upon receipt of information concerning formation of such a group, immediately open a case and advise Bureau at that time.
        - (2) After conducting sufficient inquiry to determine true character of group
            - (a) If further investigation warranted, advise Bureau through established report writing procedures.
            - (b) If further investigation not warranted, advise Bureau results of investigation and specific reasons for determination in letter form.
    - b. Established subversive groups
        - (1) Keep Bureau currently advised by appropriate communication re pertinent activities including any changes in principal officers, structure of organizations, and forthcoming events.
        - (2) If no specific leads outstanding, case may be placed in pending-inactive status after submission of initial report.
        - (3) Submit reports at least every six months.
        - (4) In reports concerning communist front organizations and miscellaneous organizations, such as the Nation of Islam[and those affiliated with the new left movement,]leadership in which is grounds for inclusion in the security index, include on cover pages a statement that all persons named in the report as officers or leaders who reside within the area covered by the reporting office are listed in the security index or are informants or sources. [The cover pages of reports concerning those organizations affiliated with the new left movement should also contain this statement in reference to leading activists in the organizations, as well as their officers or leaders.] Exceptions should be named and a statement made as to the status of their investigations.
    - c. Organizations political in character
        - (1) Investigation should not be instituted without Bureau approval.
        - (2) Furnish all pertinent information concerning communist infiltration, influence, or control of such organizations to Bureau in letter form.
    - d. Organizations connected with institutions of learning
        - (1) No investigation to be conducted without prior Bureau approval
        - (2) If requesting Bureau authority to investigate, submit complete available data and reason investigation is desired.
        - (3) If Bureau authority granted, it will be permissible to contact all established reliable sources, including those functioning in an administrative capacity with an institution of learning.
        - (4) Before conducting any interview with a student, graduate student, or professor connected with an institution of learning re security-type investigation of an organization, whether organization itself has been connected with institution of learning, Bureau authority must be obtained to conduct such interview. Submit complete justification for desired interview to Bureau.
        - (5) Section 87D 5a (1) of this manual should be read in conjunction with above instructions.
    - e. Legitimate noncommunist organizations that are communist infiltrated
        - (1) No investigation should be conducted without prior Bureau approval.

(2) Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced Agents.

(3) Advise Bureau promptly under caption "Cominfil (name of organization)" when one of the following exists and include your recommendation for instituting an investigation:
  (a) The Communist Party has specifically instructed its members to infiltrate the organization.
  (b) Communist Party members have infiltrated the organization in sufficient strength to influence or control the organization.

(4) When advising Bureau, include data concerning following items:
  (a) Name and address of organization
  (b) Extent of communist infiltration
  (c) Identities of Communist Party members and positions held in organization
  (d) Informant coverage afforded organization
  Set forth positions held by informants and whether informants are members or merely reporting on organization.
  (e) Recommendation whether additional investigation is deemed warranted

Above instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates, as well as the national organization. Break down information required under items (c) and (d) above by local chapters where such exist.

(5) No informant or source should be instructed by the FBI to join or attend meetings. If Communist Party asks the informant to do so, he should, of course, comply.

(6) No member of the organization not already an established source should be contacted regarding the organization. This does not preclude pretext interviews where advisable.

(7) Data concerning following topics should be fully developed and reported on:
  (a) Basis for investigation and fact that our investigation is directed solely toward establishing extent of Communist Party infiltration, or that organization is specific target for infiltration, and that Bureau is not investigating legitimate activities of organization.
  (b) Address of organization
  (c) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership
  (d) Principal officers of organization
  (e) Communist Party program to infiltrate this organization and influence its policy
  (f) Results of this program, including Communist Party affiliations of officers and members

(8) Caption of all correspondence should contain the phrase "Communist Infiltration of" preceding the name of the organization.

(9) In the event infiltration of the organization reaches such a proportion that its activities are dominated and controlled by the Communist Party, submit your recommendation to the Bureau regarding changing the investigation from communist infiltration to that of a communist front.

should be completely filled out just as if a first recommendation is being made, and submitted with a current report. If not, the Bureau should be advised of the reasons for not reactivating his security index card. In either case, cancel the inactive card.

(7) Periodic verification of addresses

(a) The data recorded on security index cards shall be in an up-to-date status at all times.

(b) The whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. The residence and business addresses of all security index subjects must be checked at least once each six months, except those imprisoned and those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. (defection to a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, [including Cuba since 10-1-60]) (see section 105G, item 3, volume IV, of this manual). The residence and employment of those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. must be verified every thirty days. The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least each six months to determine if he has returned to this country.

Perfect arrangements to be advised on a current basis of any indication that the subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change his residence or employment. Periodic checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under appropriate pretext by telephone, or other expeditious means.

(c) The physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and the individual case file of each security index subject shall show that this has been done. If a security index subject has not been personally observed previously, this should be done during the next verification of the subject's residence and/or business addresses.

(d) Use form FD-154 in verifying addresses of security index subjects when its use will facilitate the checking of the addresses. When FD-154 is not used in verifying addresses, a notation must be made on the last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in the subject's case file showing the subject's current residence and business addresses and the date such addresses were verified. This must be done to assure that the file will contain all information concerning the status of the case and that the file will come to the attention of the Agent or field supervisor to determine if additional action is warranted at the time of the verification of addresses. Each time that a security index subject's residence and employment are verified, the case must be reevaluated to assure that the subject is qualified for inclusion in the security index under the criteria for such inclusion. A notation to the effect that the case has been reviewed for this purpose shall be made in the file.

(e) If it is determined that the residence or business address or both have been changed from those appearing on the security index card, FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau with the current residence or business address shown thereon. In such instances, FD-122 should show only the changes to be made on the security index card. FD-122 should be accompanied by form FD-366 for dissemination to Secret Service. Secret Service should be advised locally by dissemination of FD-366.

(f) The project of verifying addresses of security index subjects (other than top functionaries and key figures) shall be handled by reopening and assigning the cases for verification and closing the cases administratively upon accomplishment of verifications. Top functionary and key figure cases are to be handled as provided in section 87D 7f (8). Verifications should also be made at the time of submission of all annual investigative reports and should be reported therein.

(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards

(a) Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, detcom classification, date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility (see 87D 7c (2) below), residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by form FD-128.

(b) Insertion or removal of cards from special section or unavailable section should be handled pursuant to 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV.

(c) Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing security index cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.

(d) Indicate use of FD-122 for changes by checking proper opening paragraph and submit without abstract.

(e) Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."

(f) Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected security index cards with duplicate copy of FD-122 (stamped "Corrected Security Index cards attached. Substitute for cards in file and destroy old cards. Place photograph and description on reverse side of geographical cards."), action to be taken includes:

I. Check accuracy of data on cards.

II. Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to back of corrected cards, staple them and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV above.

III. File third card in alphabetical section of security index.

IV. Destroy old cards.

(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards

(a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries

I. Requests to verify addresses of security index subjects from other offices must be assigned immediately and results of investigation to verify the new address must be transmitted to the office of origin within two weeks.

II. Office of origin, upon receipt of verification of address, should submit FD-128 immediately transferring office of origin. Forms regarding unavailable section subjects should be prepared in accordance with 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.

III. Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies thereof to office covering subject's new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and security index cards. FD-128 should show full title.

IV. Information concerning key facility employment of subject in new office should be furnished by that office to old office of origin so that geographical reference

II.	Race	
	White and Caucasian	W
	Negro	N
	Chinese	C
	Others.	O
	(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)	
III.	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
IV.	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien	AL
	(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
V.	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	Progressive Labor Party	PLP
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	Nation of Islam	NOI
	Bulgarian	BUL
	Cuban	CUB
	Czechoslovakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Romanian	ROM
	Russian	RUS
	Yugoslavian	YUG
VI.	Dangerousness classification (where applicable)	
	Detcom	DC
VII.	Key figure and top functionary designation (where applicable)	
	Key figure	KF
	Top functionary	TF
VIII.	Special section cards	
	Atomic energy program employees	AEP
	Cuban special section	CUB
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
	United Nations employees	UNE
	U. S. Government employees	GOV
IX.	Unavailable section cards	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
X.	Date and place of birth	
XI.	Key facility geographical reference number obtained from the Department of Defense Key Facilities List and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility (where applicable)	
XII.	Residence address	
XIII.	Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.	
XIV.	Field office file number	

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description

(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division

(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. [This photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.]

(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms

(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The white 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by this machine and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

agency responsible for such action. Forward such data to Bureau and incorporate in next report submitted concerning individual in question. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau and there is no case on individual being denied clearance, give consideration to opening a security investigation if information received from intelligence agency warrants such action.

(2) Inclusion in security index

In recommending key facility employee for inclusion in security index, FD-122 is to contain:

(a) Key facility geographical reference number

(b) Abbreviation for agency having security responsibility. [The Department of the Army has been designated the agency having security responsibility for all key facilities.]

(c) Abbreviations for other agencies known to have classified contracts with the key facility. Interested agencies should be identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on security index cards returned from Bureau.

(d) [Deleted]

If subject of existing security index card is found to have become employed in a key facility, FD-122 must be submitted to Bureau with above-required key facility data set forth thereon. Case is then to be handled in accordance with instructions set forth below concerning key facility cases.

(3) Dissemination

Upon receipt of original complaint or allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, a summary of complaint and information concerning the individual should be furnished immediately by letter to interested intelligence agency. Intelligence agency should then be advised whether a security investigation is being conducted of the individual and, if investigation is being conducted, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion of investigation. Letter to intelligence agency should clearly point out that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation by FBI.

In addition to disseminating to interested intelligence agencies information of a derogatory security nature developed concerning persons employed at facilities holding classified contracts, with the exception of classified contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission, such information should be furnished to the Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, 43215, attention Chief, Adjudication Division. In each instance, advise the interested intelligence agency that dissemination has been made to DISCO. This dissemination is to include derogatory security information developed concerning persons who may not be currently employed at such a facility but who are known to be holders of an industrial security clearance.

These instructions do not apply to allegations of espionage or those of such a confidential character as would not ordinarily be disseminated. Such information appearing to be of immediate interest to other intelligence agencies should be submitted to Bureau by most expeditious means, depending upon the circumstances, with a request that the Bureau consider advisability of disseminating it.

Disseminate copies of each report to the local representative of agency having security responsibility, as well as to local representative of other intelligence agencies known to have

classified contracts with the key facility. Copies of reports for the Marine Corps should be disseminated locally to[NISO.]

Dissemination to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), the Research and Development Board (RDB), and the Maritime Administration (MA) will be made at the Bureau, and not in the field.

(4) Status of cases

After all active investigation conducted, place in a closed status. Forty-five days before report due, make case pending active and check with armed services representative at the key facility, or with other reliable sources, to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

d. Key figure and top functionary program

(1) General

Purpose of key figure and top functionary program is to select for special attention those individuals in a subversive movement who are of outstanding importance to the effectiveness of the movement.

Key figure and top functionary program is described below as pertaining to the Communist Party, USA. However, it also applies to important individuals active in or on behalf of other basic revolutionary groups.

(2) Key figures

(a) Definition

A key figure is an individual, either a member or non-member of the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organization, who, by reason of his official position in the organization or his connections with the communist movement and his activities on its behalf, is considered of sufficient importance and potential dangerousness from an internal security standpoint to require immediate apprehension or detention in the event of an emergency. Individuals coming within the following categories shall be considered within the definition of a key figure:

I. National, district, and state officers and the principal officers of the local clubs of the Communist Party

II. The principal organizers of the Communist Party

III. Those communists who are executive officers or outstanding figures in established communist front or communist-controlled organizations, foreign language groups, and Negro organizations infiltrated by communists

IV. Individuals extensively engaged in communist infiltration of the labor movement, including principal officers of labor organizations who are members of or closely affiliated with the Communist Party. In

in a key facility, copies of reports bearing the dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," should be furnished to appropriate intelligence agencies of the armed services by the field offices as shown in sections 69, volume III, and 87D 7c (2), of this manual. For instructions regarding dissemination to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, see 87D 7c (3), of this manual.

Specific instructions with regard to all phases of our responsibilities under Executive Order 10450, including policy, investigative procedures, and dissemination are set out in section 69, volume III, of this manual.

(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services
Dissemination should be made locally to the intelligence service of the military branch involved.

(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation[Administration](FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen who are defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew in the navigation of aircraft while under way: individuals directly in charge of the inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in the capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Subversive data developed concerning persons within such definitions should be furnished to the Bureau by report or letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, together with cover communication recommending that such data be furnished to FAA. Such dissemination will be made only at the Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5.

(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service
Under the agreement between the Bureau and the Secret Service concerning Presidential protection dated 2-3-65, which is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual, reports are to be disseminated henceforth to Secret Service in all security index cases. An extra copy of the report in these cases should be furnished the Bureau. At the time the agreement was entered into, letterhead memoranda in all security index cases had been disseminated to Secret Service. Therefore, prior reports in these cases will not be disseminated.

Under the terms of the agreement, it is essential to advise Secret Service of the reason or reasons for referral - statement of the class or classes in appendix B of the agreement which the individual referred fits. For this purpose utilize form FD-376, which is designed to serve as a letter of transmittal for both local dissemination and dissemination at the SOG. The original and one copy of this form should be forwarded to the Bureau. A copy is to be maintained in the main case file and upon transferral of office of origin in any case, the new office of origin is to be furnished a copy. Careful consideration must be given to insure that the individual is properly categorized. In the case of subject being recommended for the security index, withhold dissemination pending Bureau approval of his security index status; forward FD-376 as in any other case.

In the case of individual subject of prior investigation who is currently being recommended for the security index, do not disseminate prior reports. However, prepare a letterhead memorandum including pertinent information previously developed which should be disseminated to Secret Service, together with the current report. Copies of this letterhead memorandum should be forwarded to the Bureau for dissemination at headquarters level.

[G. VISITORS TO COMMUNIST-BLOC COUNTRIES [AND TO CUBA] (For instructions on visitors to Communist China, see section 105F.)

Soviet-bloc Intelligence Services (SBIS) have used the technique of contacting visitors to communist-bloc countries to recruit intelligence agents from among the visitors. Individuals in the U. S., either permanent resident aliens or [others who travel to communist-bloc countries (except Yugoslavia) [and to Cuba,] should be considered as being available to SBIS for recruitment purposes. On a highly selective basis, and with an absolute minimum of investigative effort, a small percentage of these visitors should be interviewed, when information concerning such travel comes to attention of the field offices, in order to uncover any visitors who may have been approached for recruitment. If, after interview, available data indicates recruitment approach was made, further investigation should be conducted to determine whether individual represents a security risk and/or may be used against SBIS. Interviews can also: (1) produce sources in various nationality fields; (2) serve to alert visitors to notify FBI in event they are contacted or learn of anyone contacted by SBIS; (3) have a deterrent effect on persons interviewed; (4) produce positive intelligence information of interest to other government agencies.

1. Permanent resident aliens

Prior to 12-1-60, aliens who had been granted permanent residence in the U. S. were not subject to travel restrictions imposed upon U. S. citizens traveling on U. S. passports. New departure control regulations were published in the "Federal Register" 12-1-60 which prohibit the departure of permanent resident aliens from the U. S. who intend to travel to or through Albania, communist-controlled China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Departure for these areas may be authorized in individual cases by the Secretary of State after consultation with the Attorney General.

The regulations also require permanent resident aliens who intend to depart the U. S. for travel to or through Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Zone of Germany ("German Democratic Republic"), Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or Yugoslavia to obtain from INS reentry permits prior to departure from the U. S.

[[The "Federal Register" 1-19-61 added Cuba to the list of countries to
[which permanent resident aliens in the U. S. could not travel without
[authorization of the Secretary of State in consultation with the Attorney
[General. On that date, the necessity for permanent resident aliens in
[the U. S. to obtain reentry permits from INS prior to departure from
[the U. S. was also published in the "Federal Register."]

a. Notification

(1) Each INS district office which is a files control office will pursuant to instructions from INS central office furnish to local FBI offices the identities of permanent resident aliens applying for reentry permits. Locations of INS files control offices are set forth in section 9, page 4f, volume I, of this manual. Arrangements should be made by local liaison with INS to secure, on a continuing basis, the identities of such aliens who have secured reentry permits.

(2) The Department of State will notify the Bureau of the identities of those resident aliens who have been authorized by the Secretary of State to travel to or through Albania, communist- [controlled China, [Cuba,] North Korea, and North Vietnam. Upon receipt of such information from the Department of State, Bureau will search the names through Bureau records and furnish results to interested field offices.

b. Office of origin

In all cases involving resident aliens, the office of origin will be the field office covering the known residence in the U. S. of the alien.

(b) Contacts during investigation

I. Once Bureau authority is granted to conduct the investigation, it is permissible to contact:

(A) [Established sources functioning in an administrative capacity, such as the registrar, director of admissions, dean of men, dean of women, and security officers and their subordinates. Contacts may be made on the campus. Established sources and informants not reporting on campus activities or any matter pertaining to the educational institution may be contacted away from the campus.]

(B) All individuals not connected with the institution of learning who, consistent with discretion, would be contacted in a usual security case; e.g., neighbors, credit agencies, past employers, etc.

II. No contacts are to be made with students, graduate students, and professors[other than those sources outlined in (b) I (A) above] at educational institutions without prior Bureau authority. In requesting Bureau authority for such contacts, full justification should be set forth, as well as the individual's name, position, and a positive statement concerning his discretion and reliability.

III. Superiors of faculty members

No contact should be made with the superiors of a subject who is a member of the faculty since the superiors might take action against the subject as a result of our contact.

(c) Receiving voluntary information

These instructions must not deter or prevent the immediate and proper interview of any person connected with an institution of learning who desires of his own volition to furnish information to the Bureau or who desires to be contacted by an Agent.

(2) Subjects not connected with an institution of learning

When the subject of a security-type investigation is not connected with an institution of learning and you desire to interview, in connection with the case, a student, faculty member, or other employee of an institution of learning, prior Bureau authority must be obtained[unless the individual to be interviewed is one of those listed in (b) I (A) above.] In requesting authority, the name, position, and a positive statement concerning that person's discretion and reliability should be furnished to the Bureau.

(3). Contacts of foreign establishments

In connection with investigations of contacts of Soviet, satellite, and Yugoslav officials and official establishments, Bureau authority must be obtained before conducting any inquiries or surveillances at any school, college, or university[except contacts with those individuals set out in (b) I (A) above.] Submit complete facts and your recommendation when requesting such authority.

b. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations or international organizations, and members of the armed forces

Should information be received or investigation develop the fact that an individual being investigated under a security caption is or becomes

an employee of the U.S. Government, of a foreign official establishment, of the United Nations or other international organizations, has foreign diplomatic or official status or is a member of the U.S. armed forces, the matter should be immediately reported to the Bureau and no further investigation should be conducted except upon specific Bureau authority.

6. Investigative procedures concerning individuals

a. General

These investigations must be thorough and exhaustive. Obviously, the dangerousness of an individual cannot be determined through cursory investigation. All pertinent information concerning the subject's background and subversive activity must be fully developed and reported to assure an accurate evaluation of his degree of dangerousness.

Due to the intelligence nature of these investigations, discretion must be used at all times to prevent subjects from becoming unduly apprised that they are under investigation by this Bureau.

Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during the course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority.

b. Scope of investigations

Set forth below are items which should be obtained during these investigations.

(1) Background
- (a) True name and aliases
- (b) Residence address
- (c) Occupation or business
- (d) Business or employment address
- (e) Citizenship status

  Ascertain the citizenship status of the subject as early as possible in the investigation.
  - I. Alien
    - (A) If the subject is an alien, determine the date and place of birth.
    - (B) Determine his nationality (that is, the country of which he is a citizen or sovereign of which he is a subject), together with the date, port and vessel or other means of entry into the U.S.
    - (C) Determine whether the subject entered as an immigrant or nonimmigrant.
    - (D) Ascertain any steps taken toward naturalization and reason for denial of citizenship where such denial exists.
    - (E) Ascertain any available facts indicating whether entry into the U.S. was legal or illegal.
  - II. Naturalized citizen
    - (A) Ascertain date and place of birth, nationality prior to naturalization, date, port and vessel or other means of entry into the U.S.
    - (B) Ascertain the date when, place and court where, subject was naturalized and any facts tending to indicate fraud or illegality in connection with his naturalization.
    - (C) Ascertain the last place of foreign residence, place from which the subject emigrated to the U.S. and the date of such emigration.
    - (D) Ascertain any absences from the U.S.
  - III. Native-born citizen
    - (A) Determine date and place of birth.
- (f) Nationality background
  - I. During the course of investigation, efforts should be made to ascertain from sources contacted the date and place of birth of the subject's parents and spouse and the parents of the spouse.

E. INVESTIGATIONS OF COMMUNIST FRONT AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purposes
    a. To obtain sufficient pertinent data to make possible accurate determination of organization's true character
    b. To obtain intelligence data and keep Department and other interested Government agencies advised regarding existence and activities of subversive organizations
    c. To obtain legally admissible evidence re subversive nature of such organizations to permit implementation of:
        (1) Internal Security Act of 1950
        (2) Registration Act
        (3) Smith Act of 1940
        (4) Executive Order 10450
2. General policy
    a. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations
        (1) Upon receipt of information concerning formation of such a group, immediately open a case and advise Bureau at that time.
        (2) After conducting sufficient inquiry to determine true character of group
            (a) If further investigation warranted, advise Bureau through established report writing procedures.
            (b) If further investigation not warranted, advise Bureau results of investigation and specific reasons for determination in letter form.
    b. Established subversive groups
        (1) Keep Bureau currently advised by appropriate communication re pertinent activities including any changes in principal officers, structure of organizations, and forthcoming events.
        (2) If no specific leads outstanding, case may be placed in pending-inactive status after submission of initial report.
        (3) Submit reports at least every six months.
        (4) In reports concerning communist front organizations and miscellaneous organizations, such as the Nation of Islam, leadership in which is grounds for inclusion in the security index, include on cover pages a statement that all persons named in the report as officers or leaders and who reside within the area covered by the reporting office are listed in the security index or are informants or sources. Exceptions should be named and a statement made as to the status of their investigations.
    c. Organizations political in character
        (1) Investigation should not be instituted without Bureau approval.
        (2) Furnish all pertinent information concerning communist infiltration, influence, or control of such organizations to Bureau in letter form.
    d. Organizations connected with institutions of learning
        (1) No investigation to be conducted without prior Bureau approval
        (2) If requesting Bureau authority to investigate, submit complete available data and reason investigation is desired.
        (3) If Bureau authority granted, it will be permissible to contact all established reliable sources, [including those functioning in an administrative capacity with an institution of learning.]
        (4) Before conducting any interview with [a student, graduate student, or professor] connected with an institution of learning re security-type investigation of an organization, whether organization itself has been connected with institution of learning, Bureau authority must be obtained to conduct such interview. Submit complete justification for desired interview to Bureau.
        (5) Section 87D 5a (1) of this manual should be read in conjunction with above instructions.
    e. Legitimate noncommunist organizations that are communist infiltrated
        (1) No investigation should be conducted without prior Bureau approval.

(2) Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced Agents.

(3) Advise Bureau promptly under caption "Cominfil (name of organization)" when one of the following exists and include your recommendation for instituting an investigation:
- (a) The Communist Party has specifically instructed its members to infiltrate the organization.
- (b) Communist Party members have infiltrated the organization in sufficient strength to influence or control the organization.

(4) When advising Bureau, include data concerning following items:
- (a) Name and address of organization
- (b) Extent of communist infiltration
- (c) Identities of Communist Party members and positions held in organization
- (d) Informant coverage afforded organization
  Set forth positions held by informants and whether informants are members or merely reporting on organization.
- (e) Recommendation whether additional investigation is deemed warranted

Above instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates, as well as the national organization. Break down information required under items (c) and (d) above by local chapters where such exist.

(5) No informant or source should be instructed by the FBI to join or attend meetings. If Communist Party asks the informant to do so, he should, of course, comply.

(6) No member of the organization not already an established source should be contacted regarding the organization. This does not preclude pretext interviews where advisable.

(7) Data concerning following topics should be fully developed and reported on:
- (a) Basis for investigation and fact that our investigation is directed solely toward establishing extent of Communist Party infiltration, or that organization is specific target for infiltration, and that Bureau is not investigating legitimate activities of organization.
- (b) Address of organization
- (c) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership
- (d) Principal officers of organization
- (e) Communist Party program to infiltrate this organization and influence its policy
- (f) Results of this program, including Communist Party affiliations of officers and members

(8) Caption of all correspondence should contain the phrase "Communist Infiltration of" preceding the name of the organization.

(9) In the event infiltration of the organization reaches such a proportion that its activities are dominated and controlled by the Communist Party, submit your recommendation to the Bureau regarding changing the investigation from communist infiltration to that of a communist front.

(10) Communist infiltration of mass organizations program

(a) Submit semiannual letters March 1 and September 1 under caption of above program, Bufile 100-3-106, using following topical outline and headings:

I. Information concerning Communist Party program
Furnish summary of information received concerning overall Communist Party program to infiltrate mass organizations, nationally and locally; steps taken to carry out program including statements made by Communist Party leaders, directives issued by the Communist Party, and articles appearing in Communist Party publications; and success being achieved by party.

II. Recommendations for additional investigation
Briefly outline steps being taken to keep abreast of Communist Party efforts to infiltrate mass organizations and indicate specifically what additional investigation will be undertaken to determine the extent to which mass organizations are being influenced, dominated, or controlled by the Communist Party.

III. Identity of organizations which are targets for infiltration or have been infiltrated by the Communist Party
List names and Bureau file numbers of all organizations which are subject of a pending communist infiltration case. Include descriptive data concerning each organization and indicate extent to which organization has been infiltrated.

f. [Established sources and informants who are students or employees at an institution of learning, but who are not reporting on any campus activities or any matter pertaining to the educational institution, may be contacted without Bureau authority. These contacts must be made away from the campus.]

[g.] Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Bureau Agents during course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority.

[h.] Photographic surveillances

(1) No photographic surveillances are to be conducted in communist front organization cases unless it is essential to protect Bureau's interests in internal security field by supplementing live informant coverage of a particular meeting with such a surveillance.

(2) Request Bureau authority to institute such a surveillance and outline manner in which it will be conducted and supervision which will be afforded it.

(3) No such surveillances should be instituted without specific Bureau authority.

[[i.] Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against the President

On 2-3-65, an "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection" was signed and became effective. This agreement is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual.

The agreement provides that the FBI, in its investigations of organizations whose activities are inimical to the welfare of the U. S., will be alert to and promptly notify Secret Service of any information indicating a plot against the person of the President; thereafter, it is the responsibility of Secret Service to initiate such action as is necessary to neutralize such a plot.

The field must be alert during the course of the investigation of an organization for information indicating a plot against the person of the President. Upon receipt of such information, immediately furnish complete details to the nearest office of Secret Service and appropriate local law enforcement agencies and advise the Bureau at that time by teletype, or telephone if the facts warrant, of the information furnished and the fact it has been so disseminated. An immediate attempt should be made to verify the information received but no evaluation of the information should be attempted.

Prepare at once a letterhead memorandum which should include complete details disseminated and the identities of the Secret Service officer and the local law enforcement officers to whom given and the date and time of notification. Promptly disseminate the letterhead memorandum locally to Secret Service and any other appropriate Government agency and furnish sufficient copies to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Thereafter, copies of all letterhead memoranda and reports concerning the organization should be disseminated locally to Secret Service on a continuing basis and extra copies of such communications should be furnished the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG.

The field should insure that the identities of the members of the organization who are "in" on the plot are determined. Background information concerning the individuals (see items 1 and 3 of appendix A to the agreement) should be fully developed and included in the communications prepared and disseminated to Secret Service. If such identities and information are known at the time the initial information is received, they should be included in the first letterhead memorandum prepared in the matter.

(5) In evaluating this type of case, carefully consider the nature and activities of the front organization in behalf of the Communist Party or other revolutionary organizations throughout the country or in a certain area.

c. Special training in a subversive movement
  (1) Training in the Lenin School or in a subversive movement abroad
  (2) Leadership training in one of the basic revolutionary organizations mentioned above

d. Military service
  (1) Service in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Membership in one of the basic revolutionary organizations is not a prerequisite to initiating investigations in this category.
  (2) Service in the military forces of any country, including the U. S. armed forces or the Office of Strategic Services whenever there is an allegation that an individual has been a member of one of the basic revolutionary organizations at any time

e. Employment in key facilities
Investigate the activities of any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been at any time in the past a member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom sufficient other subversive information is known.

f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs
Individuals who, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, are likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare. Membership or affiliation in basic revolutionary or front groups is not a prerequisite to initiating investigations of this type. Use sound judgment and discretion in this evaluation.

Falling within the above category are members of the Nation of Islam. When it is known or becomes known that this organization is active in the field office territory, a security-type investigation of all individuals who are reported to be (1) functionaries or leaders of the Nation of Islam, or (2) active participants carrying out fanatical and disloyal aims of the organization should be initiated. Investigations should not be initiated based on mere membership alone.

During the course of security investigations of individuals affiliated with the Nation of Islam, be alert for any information indicating a possible violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948.

The above standards for institutions of investigations of individuals are not to be interpreted as all-inclusive. Where there is doubt an individual may be a current threat to the internal security of the nation, the question should be resolved in the interest of security and investigation conducted.

The categories specified as a through f above are to be distinguished from the criteria to govern the addition of subjects to and retention of subjects in the security index, set out in 87D 7b (3). Investigation should be undertaken when cases fall within the preceding categories, even though under existing criteria the subjects would not be placed in the security index on the information available. The cases should thereafter be investigated actively to determine the scope of subversive activities in which the subjects have been engaged and to fully develop all aspects of the cases in order that a determination can be made with respect to security index status.

Complaints alleging subversive activities of individuals which are received from anonymous sources should not be disregarded provided the allegations are sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight to warrant investigation. Such allegations should receive same consideration as if the identity of the source was known. Do not open cases for investigation based on nonspecific or vague allegations which do not fall within the standards for opening investigations.

Do not institute investigations because of membership in organizations which do not advocate the use of force to bring about changes in the existing Government, e.g., the Socialist Party, the Socialist Labor Party, the Independent Workers of the World and the Independence Party of Puerto Rico (Partido Independentista Puertorriqueno), etc.

Security-type cases already existent must be continually and carefully evaluated to determine that we are fulfilling our responsibilities in the internal security field. Subversive information received regarding any individual should be channelized to the individual's main file. If no main file exists, one should be opened. Cases not warranting further investigative action should be promptly closed and should not be permitted to continue endlessly without a definite objective.

5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals
   a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning
      (1) Subjects connected with institutions of learning
      The following restrictions apply to employees and students of colleges, universities, and elementary and secondary schools supported by private or public funds. Students and employees of schools, such as the Jefferson School of Social Science, the California Labor School, and others founded by or supported by revolutionary groups, do not come within the meaning of these instructions.
         (a) Prior Bureau authority to institute investigation
            I. Faculty members
            Bureau authority is necessary prior to initiating a security investigation of a faculty member.
            II. Students and nonacademic employees
            Bureau authority is not needed prior to initiating a security investigation of a student or nonacademic employee provided no unusual circumstances exist which would require advice from the Bureau prior to initiating the investigation. Each SAC must see that there is a sound basis for initiating security investigations of such individuals.
            III. Requests for Bureau authority
            When requesting Bureau authority to conduct a security investigation of an individual connected with an institution of learning, the letter should set forth the identity of the subject, his position, and the basis for the investigation.

(b) Contacts during investigation

I. Once Bureau authority is granted to conduct the investigation, it is permissible to contact:

(A) [Deleted]

(B) All individuals not connected with the institution of learning who, consistent with discretion, would be contacted in a usual security case; e.g., neighbors, credit agencies, past employers, etc.

(C) [Deleted]

II. [No contacts are to be made with students, graduate students, and professors, including established sources, informants, and other sources at educational institutions without prior Bureau authority. In requesting Bureau authority for such contacts, full justification should be set forth, as well as the individual's name, position, and a positive statement concerning his discretion and reliability.]

[III.] Superiors of faculty members

No contact should be made with the superiors of a subject who is a member of the faculty since the superiors might take action against the subject as a result of our contact.

(c) Receiving voluntary information

These instructions must not deter or prevent the immediate and proper interview of any person connected with an institution of learning who desires of his own volition to furnish information to the Bureau or who desires to be contacted by an Agent.

(2) Subjects not connected with an institution of learning

When the subject of a security-type investigation is not connected with an institution of learning and you desire to interview, in connection with the case, a student, faculty member, or other employee of an institution of learning, prior Bureau authority must be obtained for such an interview. In requesting authority, the name, position, and a positive statement concerning that person's discretion and reliability should be furnished to the Bureau.

(3) Contacts of foreign establishments

In connection with investigations of contacts of Soviet, satellite, and Yugoslav officials and official establishments, Bureau authority must be obtained before conducting any inquiries or surveillances at any school, college, or university. Submit complete facts and your recommendation when requesting such authority.

b. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations or international organizations, and members of the armed forces

Should information be received or investigation develop the fact that an individual being investigated under a security caption is or becomes

an employee of the U.S. Government, of a foreign official establishment, of the United Nations or other international organizations, has foreign diplomatic or official status or is a member of the U.S. armed forces, the matter should be immediately reported to the Bureau and no further investigation should be conducted except upon specific Bureau authority.

6. Investigative procedures concerning individuals
   a. General
   These investigations must be thorough and exhaustive. Obviously, the dangerousness of an individual cannot be determined through cursory investigation. All pertinent information concerning the subject's background and subversive activity must be fully developed and reported to assure an accurate evaluation of his degree of dangerousness.

   Due to the intelligence nature of these investigations, discretion must be used at all times to prevent subjects from becoming unduly apprised that they are under investigation by this Bureau.

   Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during the course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority.
   b. Scope of investigations
   Set forth below are items which should be obtained during these investigations.
   (1) Background
      (a) True name and aliases
      (b) Residence address
      (c) Occupation or business
      (d) Business or employment address
      (e) Citizenship status
      Ascertain the citizenship status of the subject as early as possible in the investigation.
         I. Alien
            (A) If the subject is an alien, determine the date and place of birth.
            (B) Determine his nationality (that is, the country of which he is a citizen or sovereign of which he is a subject), together with the date, port and vessel or other means of entry into the U.S.
            (C) Determine whether the subject entered as an immigrant or nonimmigrant.
            (D) Ascertain any steps taken toward naturalization and reason for denial of citizenship where such denial exists.
            (E) Ascertain any available facts indicating whether entry into the U.S. was legal or illegal.
         II. Naturalized citizen
            (A) Ascertain date and place of birth, nationality prior to naturalization, date, port and vessel or other means of entry into the U.S.
            (B) Ascertain the date when, place and court where, subject was naturalized and any facts tending to indicate fraud or illegality in connection with his naturalization.
            (C) Ascertain the last place of foreign residence, place from which the subject emigrated to the U.S. and the date of such emigration.
            (D) Ascertain any absences from the U.S.
         III. Native-born citizen
            (A) Determine date and place of birth.
      (f) Nationality background
         I. During the course of investigation, efforts should be made to ascertain from sources contacted the date and place of birth of the subject's parents and spouse and the parents of the spouse.

E. INVESTIGATIONS OF COMMUNIST FRONT AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purposes
    a. To obtain sufficient pertinent data to make possible accurate determination of organization's true character
    b. To obtain intelligence data and keep Department and other interested Government agencies advised regarding existence and activities of subversive organizations
    c. To obtain legally admissible evidence re subversive nature of such organizations to permit implementation of:
        (1) Internal Security Act of 1950
        (2) Registration Act
        (3) Smith Act of 1940
        (4) Executive Order 10450
2. General policy
    a. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations
        (1) Upon receipt of information concerning formation of such a group, immediately open a case and advise Bureau at that time.
        (2) After conducting sufficient inquiry to determine true character of group
            (a) If further investigation warranted, advise Bureau through established report writing procedures.
            (b) If further investigation not warranted, advise Bureau results of investigation and specific reasons for determination in letter form.
    b. Established subversive groups
        (1) Keep Bureau currently advised by appropriate communication re pertinent activities including any changes in principal officers, structure of organizations, and forthcoming events.
        (2) If no specific leads outstanding, case may be placed in pending-inactive status after submission of initial report.
        (3) Submit reports at least every six months.
        (4) In reports concerning communist front organizations and miscellaneous organizations, such as the Nation of Islam, leadership in which is grounds for inclusion in the security index, include on cover pages a statement that all persons named in the report as officers or leaders and who reside within the area covered by the reporting office are listed in the security index or are informants or sources. Exceptions should be named and a statement made as to the status of their investigations.
    c. Organizations political in character
        (1) Investigation should not be instituted without Bureau approval.
        (2) Furnish all pertinent information concerning communist infiltration, influence, or control of such organizations to Bureau in letter form.
    d. Organizations connected with institutions of learning
        (1) No investigation to be conducted without prior Bureau approval
        (2) If requesting Bureau authority to investigate, submit complete available data and reason investigation is desired.
        (3) If Bureau authority granted, it will be permissible to contact all established reliable sources, [except]those connected with institution of learning. [No contacts with established sources connected with institution of learning can be made in security matters without specific Bureau authority. In requesting permission to contact such sources, request should identify person to be contacted, reason for contact, results of field office indices check, and statement whether possible embarrassment to Bureau might result if contact is made.]
        (4) Before conducting any interview with individual connected with institution of learning re security-type investigation of an organization, whether organization itself has been connected with institution of learning, Bureau authority must be obtained to conduct such interview. [Submit complete justification for desired interview to Bureau.]
        (5) Section 87D 5a (1) of this manual should be read in conjunction with above instructions.
    e. Legitimate noncommunist organizations that are communist infiltrated
        (1) No investigation should be conducted without prior Bureau approval.

(2) Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced Agents.

(3) Advise Bureau promptly under caption "Cominfil (name of organization)" when one of the following exists and include your recommendation for instituting an investigation:
  (a) The Communist Party has specifically instructed its members to infiltrate the organization.
  (b) Communist Party members have infiltrated the organization in sufficient strength to influence or control the organization.

(4) When advising Bureau, include data concerning following items:
  (a) Name and address of organization
  (b) Extent of communist infiltration
  (c) Identities of Communist Party members and positions held in organization
  (d) Informant coverage afforded organization
  Set forth positions held by informants and whether informants are members or merely reporting on organization.
  (e) Recommendation whether additional investigation is deemed warranted

Above instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates, as well as the national organization. Break down information required under items (c) and (d) above by local chapters where such exist.

(5) No informant or source should be instructed by the FBI to join or attend meetings. If Communist Party asks the informant to do so, he should, of course, comply.

(6) No member of the organization not already an established source should be contacted regarding the organization. This does not preclude pretext interviews where advisable.

(7) Data concerning following topics should be fully developed and reported on:
  (a) Basis for investigation and fact that our investigation is directed solely toward establishing extent of Communist Party infiltration, or that organization is specific target for infiltration, and that Bureau is not investigating legitimate activities of organization.
  (b) Address of organization
  (c) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership
  (d) Principal officers of organization
  (e) Communist Party program to infiltrate this organization and influence its policy
  (f) Results of this program, including Communist Party affiliations of officers and members

(8) Caption of all correspondence should contain the phrase "Communist Infiltration of" preceding the name of the organization.

(9) In the event infiltration of the organization reaches such a proportion that its activities are dominated and controlled by the Communist Party, submit your recommendation to the Bureau regarding changing the investigation from communist infiltration to that of a communist front.

attend party educational classes and schools within dictates of discretion and without jeopardizing their security.

(23) Communist Party attempts to infiltrate mass organizations (Bureau file 100-3-106)
Information regarding Communist Party programs and attempts to infiltrate mass organizations, such as parent-teacher associations, church groups, and civic groups

(24) Public appearances of party leaders (Bureau file 100-3-114)
   (a) Identity of national and district functionaries, openly representing the Communist Party, USA, who make public appearances on radio and television and who appear before groups, such as youth, Negro, labor, church, farm, and minority groups
   (b) Date and place of appearance, identity of groups sponsoring speaker, and succinct summary of subject matter discussed

[(25)] Strategy in industry (Bureau file 100-3-89)
[Matters should be reported in the Communist Party, USA, quarterly report under a separate section captioned "Strategy in Industry." If an office has no activity in this field, set out this fact in the cover pages of the Communist Party, USA, quarterly report or in the letter submitted in lieu of such report.]

The investigation in this[matter]shall cover all plans, strategy, tactics, and infiltration activities by the Communist Party, USA, directed against all industry, with special emphasis on activities connected with basic and vital industries. Particular attention shall be given to the composition, meetings, plans, and activities of Communist Party industrial and trade-union commissions and industrial and trade-union districts and clubs. Pertinent activities of individual communists charged with Communist Party duties in this field shall be included in reports. The information reported shall be grouped according to the industry involved, rather than according to individual labor unions. Refer to the subsection F on investigation of communist infiltration of labor unions and subsection H on Communist Control Act of 1954 for instructions regarding investigations concerning communist infiltration of specific labor unions.

Follow rule set out under item 3a, (2) (f), above, concerning listing of Communist Party members who are not in the security index.

[b. Deleted]

c. Any important developments concerning pertinent phases of Communist Party activity, such as certain security measures, important national or regional Communist Party meetings, changes in personnel in national Communist Party organization, underground activities, and other important matters should be brought to attention of Bureau by teletype, airtel, or letter as circumstances may require and later incorporated in quarterly reports. Such information, where pertinent, is disseminated on high level to other Government officials. Each office is to carefully evaluate data thus submitted so Bureau will at all times be advised of important developments and so no unnecessary duplication will result in reporting such information.

d. Extreme care must be used to assure statements relating to affiliations or membership in proscribed or subversive organization are accurate in all respects. Identification of suspected organizations or individuals with information of a possible subversive nature must be accomplished by showing exact basis for such identification, plus corroboration for same wherever possible. In no case should a person be referred to as a "known communist" unless he is publicly known as such. Whenever an individual other than the subject of a report is mentioned for the purpose of showing subversive activity or sympathy on the part of the subject, the individual so mentioned should be described with an authoritative statement showing the subversive connection: e.g., "Reported by T____ to have been a member of the White Collar Club of the Communist Party in 1945."

e. Specific requirements relating to Communist Party, USA, investigations
   (1) New York Office has responsibility of investigating and reporting separately on national committee meetings, national training schools, and other important national meetings. New York is responsible for reporting activities of the New York District.

f. Socialist Workers Party and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups
   The New York Office should submit quarterly reports on the Socialist Workers Party designating reports as pending. Separate reports should be submitted: one pertaining to local activities, the other pertaining to activities on a national basis. Auxiliary offices should submit reports each six months and may carry their cases in a pending-inactive status. Reports on less active Marxist-Leninist groups should be submitted semiannually and also may be carried as pending inactive. [Follow rule set out under item 3a, (2) (f), above, and identify on cover pages members of the local Socialist Workers Party, or other organizations, who are not in the security index and are not informants or sources.]

g. Classification - 100

h. Title and character of communications
   (1) Communist Party, USA
   Entitle all communications covering a national convention or national organizational activity of the party:

Communist Party, USA
Internal Security - C

Caption all communications covering activities in a particular district:

Communist Party, USA
_____________District
_____________Division
Internal Security - C

Caption all communications covering activities in states not included in a district:

Communist Party, USA
State of_____________
_____________Division
Internal Security - C

   (2) Socialist Workers Party
   Entitle all communications covering a national convention or national organizational activity of the Socialist Workers Party:

Socialist Workers Party
Internal Security - SWP

Caption all communications covering activities within a particular field division:

Socialist Workers Party
_____________Division
Internal Security - SWP

   (3) Other Marxist revolutionary groups
   All communications covering other Marxist revolutionary groups should carry the name of the organization and the classification, Internal Security; e.g.,

Proletarian Party of America
Internal Security - PPA

(l) Handwriting specimens

I. If, during the investigation of security matter cases, it is disclosed that samples of the subject's handwriting are readily available, obtain specimens for possible future use and maintain in the file in the field.

II. A case is not to be left in a pending status merely for the purpose of obtaining handwriting specimens.

III. Handwriting specimens must be obtained for all key figures and forwarded to the Bureau.

(m) Labor union membership

If the subject is being investigated because of Communist Party membership, ascertain the identity of any labor organization of which he is a member and what position he holds in the labor organization, if any.

(2) Subversive activity

(a) Membership or affiliation

Obtain admissible and convincing evidence that the subject is a member of, or affiliated with, one of the basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations wherever possible. Such evidence may be either direct or circumstantial, or both. It is not possible to list the innumerable and varied forms in which such evidence may be found. Some of the more common types are:

I. Oral or written statements or admissions of the subject made publicly or privately to other individuals

II. Statements of confidential informants and other persons who are in a position to know the facts and can testify to them

III. Official letterheads and documents of subversive organizations containing information which identifies the subjects with the organizations. This will include membership and dues records wherever obtainable.

IV. Selective service records in which the subject admits membership in or position with a subversive organization

V. Attendance at closed meetings and conventions of a subversive organization

VI. Letters to publications, public officials, or other persons signed by the subject in an official position with a subversive organization or wherein the subject admits membership in or adherence to the principles of a subversive organization

VII. Recruitment or attempt to recruit members for a subversive organization

VIII. Solicitations or contributions of funds for subversive organization

IX. Seeking public office as a candidate for a subversive organization

X. Association with other individuals who are known to be members of or affiliated with subversive organizations

With regard to the question of membership, attention is directed to section 87H of this manual relating to the provisions of the Communist Control Act of 1954. This [illegible] sets out a list of 14 criteria itemized in 87H 2, which should be considered "in determining membership or participation in the Communist Party or any other organization defined in this Act, or knowledge of the purpose or objective of such party or organization...." These criteria include, e.g., listing as a member in organization records, contributions to the organization, and acceptance of organization discipline.

(b) Knowledge of aims and purposes

Admissible and convincing evidence that the subject knows the aims and purposes of the subversive organizations to overthrow the Government by force and violence should also be obtained. Mere proof of membership in or affiliation with such an organization is not sufficient to prove such knowledge.

Proof that the subject has such knowledge of the revolutionary purposes of the organization may be existent in several forms, several of which are discussed below:

I. Direct admissible evidence, such as statements made by the subject, or by responsible officials of the subversive organization in the subject's presence at organizational classes or meetings expounding the organization's doctrine in which the necessity or advisability of using force or violence in the overthrow of the Government is asserted, should be obtained, if at all possible.

Occasionally, statements of this nature are available in the subject's writings, sometimes in an indirect or veiled form.

II. Length of time in a subversive organization

III. Official positions held in the organization especially in educational, propaganda, or policy-making capacities

IV. Charter membership in the organization, participation in the original establishment of the organization

V. Extensive and long-continued participation in various organizational activities

VI. Attendance or teaching at organization schools or classes, especially leadership classes

VII. Preparation or distribution of party propaganda

VIII. Recruiting and fund-raising activities

IX. Possession of Marxist or revolutionary literature

X. Urging others to read literature of a revolutionary character, etc.

While none of the above types of evidence may be of sufficient value alone, a combination of a number of them may constitute convincing proof.

It should be remembered that the revolutionary purposes of a subversive organization are frequently cloaked in veiled language or in language significant only to persons familiar with Marxist or revolutionary terminology. Such obscure statements should not be ignored, but should be fully reported as it may be possible in legal proceedings to bring out the significance of such statements through expert witnesses, the testimony of informants, or the introduction of literature clarifying them. Confidential informants and other sources should be carefully interrogated and files thoroughly reviewed for the purpose of developing all revolutionary statements. In such instances, complete details should be obtained, together with all corroborating evidence. The names of all persons present when such statements are made should be ascertained and the facts reported in the individual case file of the person making the statement and of all persons present when the statement was made. The circumstances under which the statement was made should, of course, be ascertained and reported.

(c) Position and importance

I. Information reflecting the importance of an individual to a subversive organization or movement should be fully developed and reported. The member or affiliate may be dangerous or important because of his position, influence or activities outside the organization, or both. The facts in this regard should be fully developed. The individual may hold an important and strategic position or exercise great influence in a labor organization or other mass organization; in a racial, nationality, youth or other group; in an important front organization; in radio, newspaper, motion picture or other cultural,

agency responsible for such action. Forward such data to Bureau and incorporate in next report submitted concerning individual in question. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau and there is no case on individual being denied clearance, give consideration to opening a security investigation if information received from intelligence agency warrants such action.

(2) Inclusion in security index

In recommending key facility employee for inclusion in security index, FD-122 is to contain:

(a) Key facility geographical reference number

(b) Abbreviation for agency having security responsibility

(c) Abbreviations for other agencies known to have classified contracts with the key facility. Interested agencies should be identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on security index cards returned from Bureau.

(d) Abbreviation AEC immediately following abbreviation for agency having security responsibility when abbreviation of responsible agency on key facilities list is followed by asterisk, which denotes Atomic Energy Commission is involved in security responsibility. This data will appear on security index cards returned from the Bureau.

If subject of existing security index card is found to have become employed in a key facility, FD-122 must be submitted to Bureau with above-required key facility data set forth thereon. Case is then to be handled in accordance with instructions set forth below concerning key facility cases.

(3) Dissemination

Upon receipt of original complaint or allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, a summary of complaint and information concerning the individual should be furnished immediately by letter to interested intelligence agency. Intelligence agency should then be advised whether a security investigation is being conducted of the individual and, if investigation is being conducted, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion of investigation. Letter to intelligence agency should clearly point out that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation by FBI.

In addition to disseminating to interested intelligence agencies information of a derogatory security nature developed concerning persons employed at facilities holding classified contracts, with the exception of classified contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission, such information should be furnished to the Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, 43215, attention Chief, Adjudication Division. In each instance, advise the interested intelligence agency that dissemination has been made to DISCO. This dissemination is to include derogatory [security] information developed concerning persons who may not be currently employed at such a facility but who are known to be holders of an industrial security clearance.

These instructions do not apply to allegations of espionage or those of such a confidential character as would not ordinarily be disseminated. Such information appearing to be of immediate interest to other intelligence agencies should be submitted to Bureau by most expeditious means, depending upon the circumstances, with a request that the Bureau consider advisability of disseminating it.

Disseminate copies of each report to the local representative of agency having security responsibility, as well as to local representative of other intelligence agencies known to have

[classified contracts with the key facility.] Copies of reports for the Marine Corps should be disseminated locally to ONI.

Dissemination to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), the Research and Development Board (RDB), and the Maritime Administration (MA) will be made at the Bureau, and not in the field.

(4) Status of cases

After all active investigation conducted, place in a closed status. Forty-five days before report due, make case pending active and check with armed services representative at the key facility, or with other reliable sources, to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

d. Key figure and top functionary program

(1) General

Purpose of key figure and top functionary program is to select for special attention those individuals in a subversive movement who are of outstanding importance to the effectiveness of the movement.

Key figure and top functionary program is described below as pertaining to the Communist Party, USA. However, it also applies to important individuals active in or on behalf of other basic revolutionary groups.

(2) Key figures

(a) Definition

A key figure is an individual, either a member or nonmember of the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organization, who, by reason of his official position in the organization or his connections with the communist movement and his activities on its behalf, is considered of sufficient importance and potential dangerousness from an internal security standpoint to require immediate apprehension or detention in the event of an emergency. Individuals coming within the following categories shall be considered within the definition of a key figure:

I. National, district, and state officers and the principal officers of the local clubs of the Communist Party

II. The principal organizers of the Communist Party

III. Those communists who are executive officers or outstanding figures in established communist front or communist-controlled organizations, foreign language groups, and Negro organizations infiltrated by communists

IV. Individuals extensively engaged in communist infiltration of the labor movement, including principal officers of labor organizations who are members of or closely affiliated with the Communist Party. In

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Abstract slips, 47,58
- Administrative
  - data, 77
  - tickler, 55,56,74
- Admissible evidence, 29,37
- Agreement between FBI and Secret Service, 81
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
  - Chinese, 48,62,81a
  - Cuban, 45a,45b,81a
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80,81a
  - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Annual review of section A, reserve index, 42b
- Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
- Applicant investigations, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Armed forces
  - dissemination to, 81a
  - members of, 25
  - record in, 27
  - relatives in, 27
  - subjects entering, 56,60
  - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of security index, 50
  - alphabetical section, 51,63
  - at Bureau, 50
  - geographical section, 51,63
  - in field office, 51
  - inactive section, 56
  - special section, 52 (See also special section of security index.)
  - unavailable section, 53 (See also unavailable section of security index.)
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71

- Bureau
  - applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
  - authority to investigate, 24
  - responsibility, 19

- Cancellation of
  - security flash notice, 27a
  - security index cards
    - after induction into armed forces, 60
    - mechanics, 60
    - on departure from U. S., 60
    - only after interview, 38
    - recommending, 42,61
    - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 74
- Changes on security index cards, 58
- Channelizing, 24,34,36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
  - aliens, changes in residence or employment, dissemination to Secret Service and INS, 81a
  - extraction, 48,62
  - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants, 74
- Contacting
  - faculty members, 25
  - registrars, 25
  - students, 25
  - superiors of faculty members, 25
- Contacts
  - during investigation, 25
  - with foreign establishments, 25
- Content
  - and appearance
    - of reserve index cards, 43
    - of security index cards, 48
  - of reports, 74
- Corroboration, 37
- Criteria for inclusion in security index, 44a,45
- Cuban
  - activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  - aliens, 45a,45b,81a
  - contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a
  - pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  - special section, 49,53
  - tabbing cards, 45b,64

- Dangerousness
  - definition of, 44
  - determination of, 44
  - Nation of Islam membership, 46
- Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Defectors to Sino-Soviet-bloc countries, 57
- Defense
  - facilities, 64
    - list, 64
    - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
  - Industrial Security Clearance Office, 65,81
  - Supply Agency, 65,81
- Definitions, 19
  - of dangerousness, 44
  - of key figures, 66
  - of top functionaries, 69
- Delimitations Agreement, 64,81a
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Detcom, 62
  - administrative procedures, 63
  - key figures, 62,68
  - purpose, 62
  - removal from, 58, 63,64
  - special section, 53,64
  - top functionaries, 62,70
  - who to be tabbed, 62,70
- Determination of
  - dangerousness, 44
  - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Disaffection of U. S. citizens abroad, 57
- Dissemination
  - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81a
  - of reports
    - at SOG, 81a
    - in field, 79
    - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
  - to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, 65,81
  - to Immigration and Naturalization Service, 80,81a
  - to Secret Service, 81
    - closing case, 47,74
    - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
    - stamping reserve index cards, 43
- Documentation of reports, 78
  - completion of, 78
- Employees of
  - international organizations, 25
  - U. S. Government, 25,70
    - dissemination of data re, 80
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Evidence, 37
  - desirability of
    - admissibility, 29,37
    - corroboration, 37
  - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  - of membership or affiliation, 29
  - preservation of, 37
- Executive Order 10450, 33,80,81

- Faculty members
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File on defected subjects, 42
- File reviews, 34
- Flash notices (security)
  - cancellation of, 27a
  - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  - placing, 27
- Foreign
  - diplomats, 25
  - establishments, 25
  - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
  - tours, 33a
  - travel, 33,69
- Forms
  - FD-122, 28,34,48,49,53 to 58,68,74
    - abstracts for, 47
    - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    - cover letter thereto, 32
    - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Forms (continued)
  FD-122 (continued)
    placing name in or removing from special section of security index, 53
      unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    reference to, 77
    succinct summary with, 47
      Cuban subjects, 45b
    when subject employed in key facility, 65
  FD-122a, 42b,42c,61,77
  FD-128, 55,57 to 60,68
    reference to, 77
    when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    when subject moves, 58,59
  FD-128a, 27a,42c,77
  FD-154, 57
  FD-154a, 42b,42c
  FD-165, 27,77
  FD-186, 50
  FD-305, 74,78
  FD-305a, 78
  FD-306, 36
  FD-336, 39
  FD-366, 57,81a
  FD-376, 81
Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22

Geographical
  reference number of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  section of security index, 51,63
Government employees, 25,70,80

Handwriting, 29
  of key figures, 29,67
  of top functionaries, 70
Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41
Husband and wife, security investigations, 72

Identification record, 27
Immigration and Naturalization Service, dissemination to, 80,81a
Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,57,60
Inactive section of security index, 56
Indices, check of, 34,72
Individuals
  to be investigated, 22
  traveling abroad, 33
    against whom stops are placed, 34
    who are included in security index, 34
    who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  with foreign diplomatic status, 26
Industrial security clearances, dissemination re, 65,81
Informants, cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
Interviews
  Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  Bureau authority, 39,40a
  conditions for, 40
    conducting at place of employment, 40a
  content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  contents of letter containing results of, 42
  determine willingness to testify during, 41
  evaluation of, 45b
  forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  no report needed afterward, 40a
  of hostile subjects, 41
  of individuals connected with institutions learning, 24, [illegible]
  of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  of security index subjects, 38

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Interviews (continued)
  - of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  - of subjects who express desire for, 41
  - on SAC authority, 39
  - preparations for, 40
  - purpose of, 38
  - recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  - results not affecting security index status, 41
  - signed statements in connection with, 41
  - to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  - when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when to discontinue, 40a
  - when report needed after, 41
  - with Bureau authority, 39
- Investigations
  - aliens, 26
  - faculty members, 24
  - members of labor unions, 29,41
  - naturalized citizens, 26,80
  - restrictions on, 24
  - students, 24
- Investigative
  - procedures, 26
  - techniques, 34
    - file reviews, 34
    - photographic surveillances, 35,37
    - physical surveillances, 35,38
    - private firms, records, 36
    - public source information, 36
    - security informants, 34

- Key facilities, 64
  - character, 73
  - Delimitations Agreement, 64
  - employees included in security index, 65
  - list, 49,64,65
  - responsiblity, 64
  - status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,74
  - when to investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Key figures
  - definition of, 66
  - designation of, 67
  - foreign travel by, 69
  - handling of, 67
  - handwriting of, 29,67
  - in armed forces, 68
  - list, 69
- Key figures (continued)
  - movement of, 59,68
  - photographs of, 28,67,68
  - program, 66
  - reports on, 68
    - semiannual, 39,59,68,73
  - status of reports on, 68,73
  - when become subjects of SGE cases, 69
- Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

- Labor union membership, 29
- Labor unions, 41
- Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Letter in lieu of report, security index cases, 74
- Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Lumping information in reports, 76

- Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Members of
  - armed forces, dissemination of information concerning, 81a
  - labor unions, 29,41
  - law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Membership or affiliation, 29
- Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  - letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  - unavailable section of security index, 32,54
- Movement of
  - key figures, 59,68
  - subjects, 58
    - key figures, 59,68
    - not in security index, 60
    - security index subjects, 58
    - tabbed for detcom, 60
    - top functionaries, 59

- Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
- Nation of Islam
  - potential dangerousness, 46
  - what members to be investigated, 23

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- National
  - Committee, CPUSA, character, 73
  - Defense Education Act of 1958, 22
  - Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - Science Foundation Act of 1950, 22
- Naturalized citizens
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - investigations of, 26
- Negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
- New office of origin, 58

- Observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Office of origin, 27a,58,59,68,72,81,81a
- Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
- Overt acts, 45

- Periodic review of reserve index
  - section A, 42b
  - section B, 42c
- Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Photographic surveillances, 35,37
- Photographs, 28
  - of key figures, 28,67,68
  - of top functionaries, 68,70
  - status of security index cases while obtaining, 28,68
- Physical
  - description, 28
  - surveillances, 35
    - maintenance of SA's notes, 38
- Position
  - and importance, 30
  - in labor organizations, 29
- Potential dangerousness, 44.
  - of Nation of Islam members, 46
- Preservation of evidence, 37
- Priority apprehension program, 62
- Private records, 36
- Public
  - Law 87-835, 22
  - source information, 36
  - utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Purpose of
  - investigation, 19
  - security index, 43

- Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
- Recommendation for inclusion in
  - section A, reserve index, 42b,61
  - security index, 47
    - Cuban activity, 45a,45b
    - status, 74
    - when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    - when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    - when subject is out of country, 48
    - when there is missing background information, 47
- Reevaluation of security index status, 46,57,72,78
- Registrars of institutions of learning, 24,25
- Reinterviews, 42
- Relatives in armed forces, 27
- Removal from security index, 46a,60,61
- Reports
  - administrative data in, 77
  - character of, 73
  - content of, 74
  - cumulative items, 76
  - dissemination of, 79
    - to Secret Service, 47,74,81
  - documentation of, 78
  - lumping information in, 76
  - narrative-type statements, 77
  - negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
  - schedule of, 73
  - status of, 73
  - summarizing information in, 76
  - summary, 21,47,71,76
  - title of, 72
  - topical headings in, 74
  - when necessary after interview, 41
  - when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  - when not necessary after interview, 40a
  - when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
- Reserve index, 42a
  - arrangement, 42b
  - cards, content and appearance, 43
  - content, 43
  - flash notice, 27
  - names deleted from security index, 61,62

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Reserve index (continued)
  - purpose, 42a
  - reference to on cover page, 77
  - removal from, 43
  - section A
    - changes, 42c
    - individuals to be included, 42b,61
    - interviews of subjects of, 39
    - periodic review of, 42b
    - recommendations for inclusion in, 42b,61
    - verification of residence and employment, 42b
    - when to submit reports, 42b
  - section B, 42c,62
    - review of cases, 42c
    - security index cards placed in, 62
    - verification of residence and employment, 42c
  - standards for, 42a
  - subjects
    - applicant investigations, 70
    - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    - security of Government employees investigations, 70
- Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
- Responsibility of Bureau, 19
- Restrictions on investigations, 24

- Schedule of reports, 73
- Scope of investigation, 26
- Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Secret Service, dissemination to, 81
  - closing case, 47,74
  - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
  - reserve index cards, stamping, 43
- Security
  - flash notice
    - cancellation of, 27a
    - notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    - placing, 27
  - index,43
    - arrangement of, 50
    - cards
      - cancellation of, 38,42,60,61
      - changes on, 58

- Security (continued)
  - index (continued)
    - cards (continued)
      - content and appearance of, 48
      - of key figures, 68
      - tabbing, 45b,53,62,64,68,70
      - transfers to reserve index, 61,62
    - criteria for, 44a,45
    - Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53,64,81a
    - dangerousness, 44
    - dissemination to
      - Immigration and Naturalization Service, 83
      - Secret Service, 81
        - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
        - reports, 47,74,81
    - purpose, 43
    - recommendation for, 45a,45b,46a,47
    - reevaluation of status, 46,57,72,78
    - reference to on cover page, 77
    - removal from, 46a,61
    - subjects of
      - applicant investigations, 70
      - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      - security of Government employees investigations, 70
    - summary reports, 47
    - verification of addresses and employment, 32,54,57,58,74,81a
  - informants, 34
    - cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
  - of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Signed statements, 41
- Sino-Soviet bloc, 44a,57
- Sleepers, 31,52
- Special section of security index, 52
  - cards, 49,56
  - Cuban, 49,53
  - exception to unavailable section, 56
- Standards for reserve index, 42a
  - section A, 42b
- Status of cases, 73
  - on key figures, 68,73
  - on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66,74
  - on subjects in security index, 74
  - on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  - on top functionaries, 73

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Status of cases (continued)
  - while obtaining photographs, 28
  - while securing handwriting, 29
  - while verifying residence and employment, 58,74
- Students
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigations of, 24
- Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
- Summary reports, 21,47,71,76
- Superiors of faculty members, 25
- Surveillances
  - photographic, 35,37
  - physical, 35,38

- Tabbing SI cards, 45b,53,62,64,68, 70
- Thumbnail sketches, 79
- Title of reports, 72
- Top functionaries, 66,69
  - change of office of origin, 70
  - definition of, 69
  - designation of, 69
  - handwriting of, 70
  - inclusion in key figure list, 70
  - movement of, 59
  - photographs of, 68,70
  - program, 66
  - regulations governing, 70
  - reports on, 59,70
    - status of, 70,73
  - tabbing for detcom, 62,70
- Topical headings in reports, 74
- Tours, 33a
- Travel
  - abroad, 33,69
  - behind iron curtain, 34

- Unavailable section of security index, 53
  - imprisoned subjects, 54
  - missing subjects, 32,54
  - subjects traveling abroad, 34,54
- Underground membership or activity, 31
- United Nations employees, 25,52
- U. S. Government employees, 25,70,80
- U. S. Information Agency, inclusion of employees in security index or reserve index, 70

- Verification of
  - addresses
    - reserve index
      - section A, 42b
      - section B, 42c
    - security index, 32,54,57,58,74,81a
  - employment
    - reserve index
      - section A, 42b
      - section B, 42c
    - security index, 32,57,74,81a
  - key facility or defense facility status of place of employment, 64
- Voice of America (See U. S. Information Agency.)

- Wife and husband, security investigations, 72

- Yugoslav intelligence agents, contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a

field office territory, the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a national level position, and the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a district level position above the status of "club chairman." Members of the Communist Party, USA, who are now carried as unidentified but who are known to be members of the Negro race should be included in the total number of Negroes.

When possible, totals should be broken down as to nationality, sex, employment, veterans, and membership in unions. Auxiliary offices which, due to lack of Communist Party activity in their divisions, have been authorized to submit data by quarterly letter should include membership figures in these letters to the Bureau and office of origin. These letters to be submitted by auxiliary offices prior to first day of month in which quarterly report is due. Office of origin responsible to obtain complete figures from its auxiliary offices.

(b) In preparing estimates, best available informants and sources must be used. Include in cover pages of quarterly reports evaluation of degree of reliability of figures furnished by each source and of final figures submitted. Also include in cover pages total number of individuals positively identified as Communist Party members and total number of individuals tentatively identified as party members within the twelve-month period immediately preceding the submission of the quarterly report. In reporting membership figures, information from one source only is not acceptable unless facts are set forth demonstrating information from this source is the most accurate and most reliable information available.

(c) Explain in detail any increase or decrease in membership figures previously submitted. Where informants use such terms as "inactive" or "paper" members, their exact understanding of the meaning of the terms used and the number of individuals so described must be clearly explained. Full explanation must be made as to whether individuals so described are included in final membership figures submitted, together with reason for their inclusion or exclusion.

(d) Results of membership recruiting drives

(e) Make discreet efforts to ascertain results of annual national registration drives.

[(f) To reduce indexing at the Bureau, each report should contain a statement in the cover pages that all persons named in the report as members of the Communist Party and who reside within the area covered by the reporting office are listed in the security index, or are informants or sources, with the exception of those listed. If any name is listed, a statement should be made as to whether the name has been previously furnished to the Bureau for indexing. The status of the investigation of any listed individual should be shown.]

(3) Funds (Bureau file 100-3-63)

(a) Income and expenditures

(b) Plans and results of fund drives including:

I. Total amount sought by the state Communist Party organization

II. Specific amount to be contributed by the state organization to the national committee fund drive

III. Specific amount to be contributed by the state organization to "The Worker" fund drive

IV. Specific amount to be retained by the state organization after contributing to the national committee and "The Worker" fund drives for use in the state organization's own operations

(c) Large contributions by known party groups or front organizations
(d) Identity of any new party "angels"
(e) Distribution of funds not sent to Communist Party headquarters, such as funds in safe-deposit boxes, separate bank accounts, etc.
(f) Any special padding of expense accounts by Communist Party functionaries should be reported.
(g) Possible violations of state or Federal tax laws
(h) Disbursements and collections of the "Reserve Fund"
(i) Receipt of any money from abroad

(4) Security measures (Bureau file 100-3-84)
Any activities on the part of the security commission of the district which bring about new or unusual security measures, such as reducing clubs to "group captain systems," destruction of records, use of codes, clandestine meetings, investigations by the party of party members, etc.

(5) Underground operations (Bureau file 100-3-94)
Pertinent general information suitable for dissemination relating to underground operations of Communist Party. No information should be included in quarterly reports which would jeopardize informants or special investigative techniques. Current investigations relating to expanded underground operations during period 1951-1955 should be submitted by separate letter under individual case caption and should not be included in quarterly reports except for general information relating to methods of operation.

(6) Factionalism (Bureau file 100-3-88)
(a) Submit pertinent information indicating that any ranking Communist Party members or group of members have developed views as "left-wing sectarianists" or "right-wing opportunists" inasmuch as the party has a policy of expelling members who develop such views.
(b) Unusual disputes or arguments between leading communists in any district should be included in this section.

(7) International relations (Bureau file 100-3-81)
(a) Information relating to communication or contact between Communist Party, USA, and communist parties of other countries
(b) Identities of Communist Party officials who plan to travel in foreign countries, including the reason for their travel
(c) Reaction of responsible Communist Party officials to events taking place in foreign countries
(d) Communist Party strategy and tactics directed to attacks on U. S. foreign policy and support of U. S. S. R. and satellite foreign policy
(e) Policy matter concerning colonial affairs, such as Communist Party policy relative to obtaining of independence by colonial people.

(8) United Nations (Bureau file 100-3-80)
(a) Communist Party policy or pertinent information in connection with the United Nations, including such matters as infiltration of the United Nations, contacts by Communist Party officials with representatives to the United Nations
(b) Communist Party strategy and tactics directed toward attacking U. S. policy and/or to support U. S. S. R. or satellite policy in the United Nations

(9) Deleted

attend party educational classes and schools within dictates of discretion and without jeopardizing their security.

(23) Communist Party attempts to infiltrate mass organizations (Bureau file 100-3-106)
Information regarding Communist Party programs and attempts to infiltrate mass organizations, such as parent-teacher associations, church groups, and civic groups

(24) Public appearances of party leaders (Bureau file 100-3-114)
- (a) Identity of national and district functionaries, openly representing the Communist Party, USA, who make public appearances on radio and television and who appear before groups, such as youth, Negro, labor, church, farm, and minority groups
- (b) Date and place of appearance, identity of groups sponsoring speaker, and succinct summary of subject matter discussed

b. Communist Party, USA - strategy in industry (Bureau file 100-3-89)
A separate case shall be maintained by each office on this basic phase of Communist Party activity. Offices of origin will be the same as in the Communist Party, USA, case. Reports will be submitted quarterly. Offices with no activity to report may submit letters. The instructions in paragraphs g and h will apply, with the addition of "Strategy in Industry" to the designated captions.

The investigation in this case shall cover all plans, strategy, tactics, and infiltration activities by the Communist Party, USA, directed against all industry, with special emphasis on activities connected with basic and vital industries. Particular attention shall be given to the composition, meetings, plans, and activities of Communist Party industrial and trade-union commissions and industrial and trade-union districts and clubs. Pertinent activities of individual communists charged with Communist Party duties in this field shall be included in reports. The information reported shall be grouped according to the industry involved, rather than accord to individual labor unions. Refer to the subsection F on investi tion of communist infiltration of labor unions and subsection H o Communist Control Act of 1954 for instructions regarding investigations concerning communist infiltration of specific labor unions.

[Follow rule set out under item 3a, (2) (f), above, concerning listing of Communist Party members who are not in the security index.]

c. Any important developments concerning pertinent phases of Communist Party activity, such as certain security measures, important national or regional Communist Party meetings, changes in personnel in national Communist Party organization, underground activities, and other important matters should be brought to attention of Bureau by teletype, airtel, or letter as circumstances may require and later incorporated in quarterly reports. Such information, where pertinent, is disseminated on high level to other Government officials. Each office is to carefully evaluate data thus submitted so Bureau will at all times be advised of important developments and so no unnecessary duplication will result in reporting such information.

d. Extreme care must be used to assure statements relating to affiliations or membership in proscribed or subversive organization are accurate in all respects. Identification of suspected organizations or individuals with information of a possible subversive nature must be accomplished by showing exact basis for such identification, plus corroboration for same wherever possible. In no case should a person be referred to as a "known communist" unless he is publicly known as such. Whenever an individual other than the subject of a report is mentioned for the purpose of showing subversive activity or sympathy on the part of the subject, the individual so mentioned should be described with an authoritative statement showing the subversive connection; e.g., "Reported by T____ to have been a member of the White Collar Club of the Communist Party in 1945."

e. Specific requirements relating to Communist Party, USA, investigations
   (1) New York Office has responsibility of investigating and reporting separately on national committee meetings, national training schools, and other important national meetings. New York is responsible for reporting activities of the New York District.

f. Socialist Workers Party and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups
   The New York Office should submit quarterly reports on the Socialist Workers Party designating reports as pending. Separate reports should be submitted: one pertaining to local activities, the other pertaining to activities on a national basis. Auxiliary offices should submit reports each six months and may carry their cases in a pending-inactive status. Reports on less active Marxist-Leninist groups should be submitted semiannually and also may be carried as pending inactive. [Follow rule set out under item 3a, (2) (f), above, and identify on cover pages members of the local Socialist Workers Party, or other organizations, who are not in the security index and are not informants or sources.]

g. Classification - 100

h. Title and character of communications
   (1) Communist Party, USA
   Entitle all communications covering a national convention or national organizational activity of the party:

Communist Party, USA
Internal Security - C

Caption all communications covering activities in a particular district:

Communist Party, USA
__________ District
__________ Division
Internal Security - C

Caption all communications covering activities in states not included in a district:

Communist Party, USA
State of __________
__________ Division
Internal Security - C

   (2) Socialist Workers Party
   Entitle all communications covering a national convention or national organizational activity of the Socialist Workers Party:

Socialist Workers Party
Internal Security - SWP

Caption all communications covering activities within a particular field division:

Socialist Workers Party
__________ Division
Internal Security - SWP

   (3) Other Marxist revolutionary groups
   All communications covering other Marxist revolutionary groups should carry the name of the organization and the classification, Internal Security; e.g.,

Proletarian Party of America
Internal Security - PPA

4. Annual Communist Party, USA, organizational and membership survey Each office is instructed to initiate by February 1 of each year a detailed and analytical survey of the organization and membership of the Communist Party in its territory, results to be forwarded to the Bureau by April 1. Set forth in detail the complete organizational structure of each Communist Party district or state organization including district and county committees, together with the identities of officers from the club through the district level. Identify each Communist Party club and section in the district, together with the identities of individual club members and most recent date each member was so identified. Where identification of an individual is tentative, this fact should be indicated by placing the word "tentative" after the individual's name. Note the informant coverage in each club, as well as on district and county committees, by setting forth the symbol numbers of the informants. In those instances in which no informant coverage exists in a particular club or on a district or county committee, this fact should be noted. In addition, summarize the overall findings by setting forth the estimated Communist Party membership in the field office territory, together with the number of members who have been positively and tentatively identified as such within the immediately preceding 12-month period. Charts and maps should be used in setting forth the geographic distribution of the Communist Party whenever feasible. Offices which are auxiliary offices in investigation of a Communist Party district should furnish the required information to the office of origin for inclusion in its survey by March 15 of each year.

Following the organizational breakdown, each office should critically appraise its knowledge of the Communist Party organization within its division and set forth its comments and recommendations concerning investigative activity to be undertaken to eliminate any weaknesses detected. In those instances in which the disclosed weakness is that of lack of adequate informant coverage, advise in detail of the number of Bureau-approved potential security informants being developed in the particular area, as well as concrete plans to obtain additional informant coverage in the future.

[Each survey should contain a statement that all persons identified as members of the Communist Party are listed in the security index, or are informants or sources. Any exceptions should be named and a statement made as to whether the name has previously been furnished to the Bureau for indexing. The status of the investigation of each person listed should be shown.]

5. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C (code name "CIRM"). Bufile 100-442529. Office of origin: New York.
   a. Quarterly reports (to reach the Bureau by February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1) should be submitted by each field office for the purpose of reporting, in a centralized manner, all available information bearing upon the communist influence in racial matters. Included should be information developed under the title of a variety of matters, such as CPUSA, Negro question, communist influence in racial matters; communist infiltration of various organizations, such as the Congress of Racial Equality, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and the like; investigations of subversive individuals active in the racial movement; investigations of communist fronts and other miscellaneous organizations; and racial disturbances and other racial matters investigated under the racial matter character. Information should be included in these quarterly reports, notwithstanding the fact that it will duplicate reporting in the other substantive matters referred to above. These reports shall be designed to precisely spell

out the full extent of the communist influence in racial matters. They should separate words and intentions from actions; mere participation from direct influence; and the bona fide communist from the mere "do-gooder." They should not include information concerning legitimate efforts in the racial movement where there is no communist taint.

b. Information should be reported according to the following outline. All main headings denoted by Roman numerals must be accounted for. If there is no information to report under a particular main heading, the heading should appear, followed by a statement "No information developed."

I. COMMUNIST STRATEGY

(A) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

(1) Plans, strategy, party line, and the like made at national meetings, including expressions by national and other functionaries

(2) Plans, etc., made at district and lower level meetings, including expressions by local leaders and rank-and-file members

(3) Plans, etc., as revealed in party publications and other propaganda media, such as written directives, press releases, and the like

Information under item 3 should be reported by the office covering the origin of the publications, such as the New York Office for "The Worker," "Political Affairs," and directives from party headquarters; San Francisco Office for "People's World"; etc. Party expressions, oral or written, when directly related to a specific event covered under II, should be included under II.

(B) OTHER COMMUNIST GROUPS (Such as Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor [Party,]Workers World Party, and the like)

Under (B), report information under separate numbered subheadings for each organization. Report here information generally along the same lines as for (A) above.

II. COMMUNIST TACTICS

In this part report information on communist direction and influence of and participation in racial demonstrations, disturbances, drives, boycotts, and any other similar activities with racial overtones. This part will illustrate how communist activities attempt to exploit racial situations and expand communist influence, thus furthering communist objectives. List activities in chronological order with lettered subheadings, such as:

(A) DEMONSTRATION, CLEVELAND, OHIO, 1-10-66

(B) STORE BOYCOTT, YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO, 3-6-66

Under each subheading include such information as nature of event; sponsoring and participating groups; total participants; number and identities of subversives involved; specifics as to whether subversives directed, controlled, instigated, or merely participated; whether violence resulted and, if so, whether subversives involved; arrests of subversives and court disposition; and any other information believed pertinent to the overall picture of communist influence. Efforts by supporting groups to avoid communist involvement should also be reported. If a particular event had no communist involvement, it should, of course, not be included in the report.

III. COMMUNIST PENETRATION AND INFLUENCE IN RACIAL AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Field offices should set out information concerning only the local branches of the organizations which are in its territory. The office covering the national headquarters of an organization should set out pertinent data as to the national headquarters, as well as any local affiliates in its territory, separating the national from the locals. The number of members, nationally and by locals, should be indicated. Include under each organization information as to officers and others in positions of influence who have present or past subversive connections; information as to other subversives who are merely members; specific evidence of influence wielded by subversives; policy concerning communist participation in the organization's activities, such as prohibition of communists holding office or membership (if no such stated policy, so indicate); and use and distribution of communist propaganda.

IV. MISCELLANEOUS

If at all possible, information to be included should be set out under the basic main headings I, II, or III. However, should there be some pertinent information to report which does not lend itself to the first three parts, it will be permissible to include it in part IV - MISCELLANEOUS.

c. The term "communist" should be interpreted in its broad sense as including persons not only adhering to the principles of the CPUSA itself, but also to such splinter and offshoot groups as the Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor[Party,]and the like.

d. Any office which has no information to report should so advise the Bureau by letter in lieu of a report. If any positive information, however limited, is available, it must be submitted by report. The same appropriate local dissemination to other agencies should be made as is made for the quarterly reports concerning the CPUSA. Except as otherwise indicated above, the regular report writing rules for security reports shall be applicable.

[e. Follow rule set out under item 3a, (2) (f), above, concerning listing of those Communist Party members named in the reports who are not in the security index.]

D. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

1. Definitions

The term "basic revolutionary organization" or "basic revolutionary group" when used hereinafter in this subsection shall apply to any one or all of the following organizations or groups in order to distinguish the organizations from front organizations:

- a. Communist Party, USA
- b. Socialist Workers Party
- c. Progressive Labor[Party]
- d. Proletarian Party of America
- e. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
- f. Johnson-Forest Group
- g. American Socialist Clubs
- h. See also 87C 1d.

2. Responsibility of the Bureau

a. To conduct thorough investigation into the background and subversive activities of all persons in the U. S. and Puerto Rico who are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security. Each SAC will be held responsible for the proper investigation of all persons in his area who, because of membership or affiliation with basic revolutionary organizations or other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, may be potentially dangerous.

b. To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of individuals constituting a threat to the internal security and develop sufficient information and evidence through investigation to sustain appropriate action by the Bureau should it become necessary for the Federal Government to institute prosecutive action against such individuals in courts of law or control their movement and activities in the event of a national emergency

3. Purpose of investigation

The primary purpose of these investigations is twofold, namely:

a. Determination of dangerousness

To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals in the U. S. and Puerto Rico who, because of their membership in, activity in, or association with one or more of the revolutionary groups defined above or related groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country, and the consequent collection of sufficient information concerning their subversive activities to justify apprehension in event of a national emergency

b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes

To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals who have been or may be violating laws of the U. S.

(1) Direct investigation towards obtaining admissible evidence to establish the violation.

(2) Be alert for any information indicating a violation of the Federal statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, and sedition.

(3) Title 18, USC, § 2385, paragraph (1), prohibits the advocacy, etc., of forceful or violent overthrow of the Government. Paragraph (2) prohibits the printing and distribution of propaganda advocating the forceful overthrow of the Government. (Affiliation with an organization is not a prerequisite to prosecution under paragraphs (1) and (2).) Paragraph (3) makes it unlawful to organize or help to organize any society, etc., of persons who advocate overthrow of the Government by force or violence, or to be or become a member of or become affiliated with any such society knowing the purposes thereof. Conspiracy to violate this section is covered by Title 18, USC, § 371 (general conspiracy statute).

(4) Title 18, USC, § 2387, penalizes attempts to undermine the loyalty, discipline, or morale of the armed forces. Alleged violations should be reported immediately to the Bureau.

(5) Title 5, USC, §[7311, and Title 18, USC, § 1918,]prohibit Government employment of persons who are disloyal or who assert the right to strike against the Government. [Title 5, USC, § 3333,]provides that an individual accepting office or employment in the Government of the U. S. shall, within 60 days, execute an affidavit certifying that he does not advocate the violent overthrow of the U. S. Government, etc. The execution of a false affidavit constitutes a fraud on, or attempt to defraud, the Government within the purview of Title 5, USC, §[303,]so as to authorize Special Agents of the Bureau to administer oaths in investigations arising out of this law. Alleged violations of this law called to your attention should be furnished to the Bureau promptly and no investigation should be initiated on the basis of complaints received without prior Bureau authority. Refer to section 69H of this manual entitled "Security of Government Employees - Fraud Against the Government" for procedures to be followed regarding possible violations of this law discovered or received in connection with security of Government employees investigations.

(6) Title 18, USC, § 1001, includes possible fraud against the Government violations wherein there are concealments or falsifications relating to subversive information. These violations must be presented to the Department by the Bureau for a prosecutive opinion rather than being presented locally to USAs. They ordinarily involve the execution of U. S. Government forms. Common violators are employees of private concerns having Government contracts who execute Government forms required for clearance for access to classified information.

Upon receipt of information indicating a violation of this type, investigation under the "Security Matter - Fraud Against the Government" character should be initiated and the Bureau immediately advised. The Department has advised that it is essential, to establish jurisdiction, to prove that the form was presented to a Government agency for action or determination. This, therefore, should be the first investigative step. If the form was not presented to a Government agency, no further investigation should be made and the Bureau so advised. In this case, [illegible] remain alert for information the form is later presented [illegible] Government agency. The fact subject actually signed the [illegible] must be established by testimony of witnesses to the signature, handwriting examination, or other conclusive evidence. The original of the form must be located. Sources that furnished pertinent information concerning subject during previous investigations and other potential witnesses should be thoroughly interviewed to determine the basis for each item of pertinent information furnished and to obtain the identities of other potential witnesses. Where affiliation with subversive organizations is involved, interview individuals who were members of same units of these organizations as subject for indicia of his membership, such as attendance at closed meetings, payment of dues, holding of office, etc. If possible, develop evidence to supplant pertinent information furnished by current informants. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview the subject. Interview subject and potential witnesses furnishing pertinent information under oath and obtain sworn signed statements if possible. An exception may be made when interviewing established sources, such as current informants, if oath and/or signed statements not considered desirable under circumstances. Be guided [illegible] instructions in section 6b, (7), below when interviewing potential witnesses with subversive backgrounds.

E. INVESTIGATIONS OF COMMUNIST FRONT AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purposes
   - a. To obtain sufficient pertinent data to make possible accurate determination of organization's true character
   - b. To obtain intelligence data and keep Department and other interested Government agencies advised regarding existence and activities of subversive organizations
   - c. To obtain legally admissible evidence re subversive nature of such organizations to permit implementation of:
     - (1) Internal Security Act of 1950
     - (2) Registration Act
     - (3) Smith Act of 1940
     - (4) Executive Order 10450
2. General policy -
   - a. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations
     - (1) Upon receipt of information concerning formation of such a group, immediately open a case and advise Bureau at that time.
     - (2) After conducting sufficient inquiry to determine true character of group
       - (a) If further investigation warranted, advise Bureau through established report writing procedures.
       - (b) If further investigation not warranted, advise Bureau results of investigation and specific reasons for determination in letter form.
   - b. Established subversive groups
     - (1) Keep Bureau currently advised by appropriate communication re pertinent activities including any changes in principal officers, structure of organizations, and forthcoming events.
     - (2) If no specific leads outstanding, case may be placed in pending-inactive status after submission of initial report.
     - (3) Submit reports at least every six months.
     - [(4) In reports concerning communist front organizations and miscellaneous organizations, such as the Nation of Islam, leadership in which is grounds for inclusion in the security index, include on cover pages a statement that all persons named in the report as officers or leaders and who reside within the area covered by the reporting office are listed in the security index or are informants or sources. Exceptions should be named and a statement made as to the status of their investigations.]
   - c. Organizations political in character
     - (1) Investigation should not be instituted without Bureau approval.
     - (2) Furnish all pertinent information concerning communist infiltration, influence, or control of such organizations to Bureau in letter form.
   - d. Organizations connected with institutions of learning
     - (1) No investigation to be conducted without prior Bureau approval
     - (2) If requesting Bureau authority to investigate, submit complete available data and reason investigation is desired.
     - (3) If Bureau authority granted, it will be permissible to contact all established reliable sources, including those connected with institution of learning.
     - (4) Before conducting any interview with individual connected with institution of learning re security-type investigation of an organization, whether organization itself has been connected with institution of learning, Bureau authority must be obtained to conduct such interview unless individual is established reliable source.
     - (5) Section 87D 5a (1) of this manual should be read in conjunction with above instructions.
   - e. Legitimate noncommunist organizations that are communist infiltrated
     - (1) No investigation should be conducted without prior Bureau approval.

(2) Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced Agents.

(3) Advise Bureau promptly under caption "Cominfil (name of organization)" when one of the following exists and include your recommendation for instituting an investigation:
  (a) The Communist Party has specifically instructed its members to infiltrate the organization.
  (b) Communist Party members have infiltrated the organization in sufficient strength to influence or control the organization.

(4) When advising Bureau, include data concerning following items:
  (a) Name and address of organization
  (b) Extent of communist infiltration
  (c) Identities of Communist Party members and positions held in organization
  (d) Informant coverage afforded organization
  Set forth positions held by informants and whether informants are members or merely reporting on organization.
  (e) Recommendation whether additional investigation is deemed warranted

Above instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates, as well as the national organization. Break down information required under items (c) and (d) above by local chapters where such exist.

(5) No informant or source should be instructed by the FBI to join or attend meetings. If Communist Party asks the informant to do so, he should, of course, comply.

(6) No member of the organization not already an established source should be contacted regarding the organization. This does not preclude pretext interviews where advisable.

(7) Data concerning following topics should be fully developed and reported on:
  (a) Basis for investigation and fact that our investigation is directed solely toward establishing extent of Communist Party infiltration, or that organization specific target for infiltration, and that Bureau not investigating legitimate activities of organization.
  (b) Address of organization
  (c) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership
  (d) Principal officers of organization
  (e) Communist Party program to infiltrate this organization and influence its policy
  (f) Results of this program, including Communist Party affiliations of officers and members

(8) Caption of all correspondence should contain the phrase "Communist Infiltration of" preceding the name of the organization.

(9) In the event infiltration of the organization reaches such a proportion that its activities are dominated and controlled by the Communist Party, submit your recommendation to the Bureau regarding changing the investigation from communist infiltration to that of a communist front.

[h. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against the President

On 2-3-65, an "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection" was signed and became effective. This agreement is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual.

The agreement provides that the FBI, in its investigations of organizations whose activities are inimical to the welfare of the U. S., will be alert to and promptly notify Secret Service of any information indicating a plot against the person of the President; thereafter, it is the responsibility of Secret Service to initiate such action as is necessary to neutralize such a plot.

The field must be alert during the course of the investigation of an organization for information indicating a plot against the person of the President. Upon receipt of such information, immediately furnish complete details to the nearest office of Secret Service and appropriate local law enforcement agencies and advise the Bureau at that time by teletype, or telephone if the facts warrant, of the information furnished and the fact it has been so disseminated. An immediate attempt should be made to verify the information received but no evaluation of the information should be attempted.

Prepare at once a letterhead memorandum which should include complete details disseminated and the identities of the Secret Service officer and the local law enforcement officers to whom given and the date and time of notification. Promptly disseminate the letterhead memorandum locally to Secret Service and any other appropriate Government agency and furnish sufficient copies to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Thereafter, copies of all letterhead memoranda and reports concerning the organization should be disseminated locally to Secret Service on a continuing basis and extra copies of such communications should be furnished the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG.

The field should insure that the identities of the members of the organization who are "in" on the plot are determined. Background information concerning the individuals (see items 1 and 3 of appendix A to the agreement) should be fully developed and included in the communications prepared and disseminated to Secret Service. If such identities and information are known at the time the initial information is received, they should be included in the first letterhead memorandum prepared in the matter.]

3. Investigative procedures and suggestions re communist front organizations
To accurately and clearly show true nature of communist front groups, data concerning the following topics, where applicable, should be fully developed and reported on:

a. Origin and scope
Date of formation. Circumstances under which founded.
Determine who in Communist Party instructed organization be set up; whether decision to set up group made at meeting of party functionaries and, if so, identify functionaries present; identity of individual or individuals responsible for organizing group. Identify all known chapters, if any, and location thereof.

b. Whether incorporated
Many organizations are incorporated requiring filing of incorporation papers with appropriate state officials.

c. Aims and purposes

d. Location of headquarters

e. Officers
List principal officers, board of directors, etc., and appropriate characterization of each showing communist affiliation.

[The cover pages of the report should state that all persons named as officers or leaders of the organization and who reside within the area covered by the reporting office are listed in the security index or are informants or sources. Exceptions should be named and information furnished concerning the status of their investigations.]

f. Membership
Ascertain estimated membership. Whenever possible, secure membership lists, mailing lists, or other records[showing]affiliation with organization. Usually obtainable through informant coverage or utilization of various investigative techniques. Secure accurate description of all lists to make sure there is no confusion as to the exact identity or significance of list being reported on.

g. Official organ, if any, and other literature
(1) May be obtained through confidential mailbox, panel sources, and confidential informants
(2) All such literature should be appropriately identified.
(3) At least one copy of each pertinent piece of literature should be promptly furnished to Bureau.

h. General activities

i. Finances
Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Location of bank accounts frequently obtainable through confidential informants, credit records, public utility records, records of rental agent, and monitoring of other organizations' bank accounts.

j. Support given to Communist Party
Preponderance of evidence should be developed[showing]support, financial or otherwise, given by the organization to the Communist Party.

k. Support received from Communist Party
Preponderance of evidence should be developed[showing]support, financial or otherwise, received by the organization from the Communist Party.

l. Implementation of Communist Party line
Can usually be shown through comparison of programs and literature of organization with those of Communist Party during any particular period.

Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through the following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various types of public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of information, interviews with past or present

(6) Character

(a) Key figures and top functionaries

Internal Security - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Internal Security - C
Internal Security - SWP

(b) Others

Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Security Matter - C
Security Matter - SWP
Security Matter - X (native fascist)
Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a key figure, the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject is designated a key figure, the first report after the designation and all subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. [Communications regarding subjects who are employed in key facilities should bear the words "Key Facility" in the character. Communications regarding subjects who are members of the Communist Party, USA, National Committee should bear the words "National Committee" in the character.]

(7) Deleted

(8) Status

All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:

(a) Top functionaries

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted quarterly. Forty-five days prior to the date a quarterly report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(b) Key figures

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted semiannually. Forty-five days prior to the date a semiannual report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(c) Deleted

(d) Other security index subjects
- I. Closed
  - (A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of an annual investigative report. If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed. The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the annual report is due. Such cases shall also be opened and assigned six months after submission of the annual report to accomplish verification of addresses. Upon such verification, the cases should be closed administratively.

(e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index
- I. Pending inactive
  - (A) If all active investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau
  - (B) Set forth lead to follow Bureau for security index card and if approved[for dissemination of report to] Secret Service.
- II. Closed
  - (A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau and dissemination to Secret Service
  - (B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (d) above.

(f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein
- I. Closed
  - (A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(9) Content

(a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.
- I. Background
  - (A) Birth date
  - (B) Citizenship status
  - (C) Education
  - (D) Marital status
  - (E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
  - (F) Identification record
  - (G) Employment
  - (H) Residence
  - (I) Status of health (if known)
- II. Connections with Communist Party (or other basic revolutionary groups and/or front organizations)
  - (A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.
  - (B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

1. Reporting of evidence developed on individual members

   Any admissible evidence showing a violation of the Internal Security Act of 1950, Title 50, USC, § 784 (a) (1) (E), as it pertains to union officers, employees, and representatives of management (see paragraph f(4), page 93, of this section and volume III, section 67C, of this manual) should be furnished to the Bureau in a report on the individual[and the report should]carry the single character, Internal Security Act of 1950 - Labor (classification 122). Any admissible evidence showing a violation of this act on the part of any other individual should be furnished to the Bureau in a report on the individual and[the report should]carry the dual character, Internal Security - C or Security Matter - C, and Internal Security Act of 1950 (classification 100),[except employment in a defense facility in which case the words "Defense Facility" should appear instead of Internal Security Act of 1950.] See section 87D of this manual for complete instructions relative to investigations of individuals.

2. Communist front organizations

   a. Definition - Title 50, USC, § 782

      "The term 'Communist-front organization' means any organization in the United States (other than a Communist-action organization

(j) In connection with periodic re[illegible] in security index cases, there are instances in [illegible] evidence of extensive activity in subversive organizations will be developed. In these cases it is permissible to report such information in narrative-type statements without indicating exact dates of activity; however, the period of time involved must be shown, as well as the inclusive dates of the informant reports.

This type reporting is not to be utilized in Smith Act of 1940 cases or Internal Security Act of 1950 cases. The narrative statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions and information from each source must be reported in separate narrative statements.

(k) The above instructions in no way remove responsibility for reporting all items of pertinence to the Bureau, bearing in mind the fact that Bureau files must be complete insofar as matters of substance are concerned, nor is responsibility removed for the reporting in detail of information tending to establish a subject's knowledge of the basic aims and purposes of the subversive organizations with which affiliated or information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

In the documentation of narrative statements set forth the location of the original documents in the field office files by the file number and serial scope.

(10) Administrative data

(a) General

All references to the following items, all administrative in nature, should be contained in cover pages accompanying reports:

I. Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, key figure or top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), forms FD-122, FD-122a, FD-128, and FD-128a, and Bureau instructions for handling cases or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature

II. Whenever reports relating to security index subjects contain data affecting material included on subject's existing security index card, the cover pages accompanying the report shall include as the last page form FD-305, appropriately checked, which form contains items pertaining to the following:

(A) That subject is included in the security index
(B) That data appearing on security index card is current
(C) That FD-122 has been submitted to Bureau where security index card changes are necessary
(D) That a suitable photograph is or is not available [and date photograph was taken]
(E) That subject is employed in a key facility and agency charged with security responsibility is specified and that agencies interested in that facility are specified
(F) Reason for classifying report
(G) Dates subject was previously interviewed and reason for not reinterviewing subject
(H) That subject no longer meets security index criteria and a letter has been directed to the Bureau recommending cancellation of the security index card
(I) That subject's case has been reevaluated and reasons are set forth as to why subject's activities continue to fall within security index criteria
(J) That subject's security index card is or is not tabbed detcom and reasons why subject's activities warrant detcom tabbing

III. Form FD-305a containing items pertinent to reserve index subjects will be similarly utilized in connection with the submission of reports in reserve index cases.

(b) Documentation of reports

I. Deleted

II. If information necessary for complete documentation is not available in subject's case file, necessary review of other office files should be made. If not obtainable, this fact must be indicated in the cover page(s) accompanying report to the Bureau.

III. Extensive investigation should not be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have in the past furnished background information or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed that subject, according to reliable records, such as birth records, school records, or records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in report. Further verification will not be necessary.

IV. During the preparation of summary reports it is often found that information being incorporated into a report was originally obtained by another office and all of the necessary information for complete documentation will not be in the possession of the office preparing the report. In such an instance, if the office preparing the report is in possession of photostats of documents obtained by the other offices and the identity

(10) Communist infiltration of mass organizations program

(a) Submit semiannual letters March 1 and September 1 under caption of above program, Bufile 100-3-106, using following topical outline and headings:

I. Information concerning Communist Party program
Furnish summary of information received concerning overall Communist Party program to infiltrate mass organizations, nationally and locally; steps taken to carry out program[including statements made by Communist Party leaders, directives issued by the Communist Party, and articles appearing in Communist Party publications;] and success being achieved by party.

II. [Recommendations for additional investigation
Briefly outline steps being taken to keep abreast of Communist Party efforts to infiltrate mass organizations and indicate specifically what additional investigation will be undertaken to determine the extent to which mass organizations are being influenced, dominated, or controlled by the Communist Party.

III. Identity of organizations which are targets for infiltration or have been infiltrated by the Communist Party
List names and Bureau file numbers of all organizations which are subject of a pending communist infiltration case. Include descriptive data concerning each organization and indicate extent to which organization has been infiltrated.]

f. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Bureau Agents during course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority.

g. Photographic surveillances

(1) No photographic surveillances are to be conducted in communist front organization cases unless it is essential to protect Bureau's interests in internal security field by supplementing live informant coverage of a particular meeting with such a surveillance.

(2) Request Bureau authority to institute such a surveillance and outline manner in which it will be conducted and supervision which will be afforded it.

(3) No such surveillances should be instituted without specific Bureau authority.

in a key facility, copies of reports bearing the dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C" should be furnished to appropriate intelligence agencies of the armed services by the field offices as shown in sections 69, volume III, and 87D 7c (2), of this manual. For instructions regarding dissemination to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, see 8 [illegible] (3), of this manual.

Specific instructions with regard to all phases of our responsibilities under Executive Order 10450, including policy, investigative procedures, and dissemination are set out in section 69, volume III, of this manual.

(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services
Dissemination should be made locally to the intelligence service of the military branch involved.

(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen who are defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew in the navigation of aircraft while under way: individuals directly in charge of the inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in the capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Subversive data developed concerning persons within such definitions should be furnished to the Bureau by report or letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, together with cover communication recommending that such data be furnished to FAA. Such dissemination will be made only at the Bureau. [For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5.]

(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service
Under the agreement between the Bureau and the Secret Service concerning Presidential protection dated 2-3-65, which is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual, reports are to be disseminated henceforth to Secret Service in all security index cases. An extra copy of the report in these cases should be furnished the Bureau. At the time the agreement was entered into, letterhead memoranda in all security index cases had been disseminated to Secret Service. Therefore, prior reports in these cases will not be disseminated.

Under the terms of the agreement, it is essential to advise Secret Service of the reason or reasons for referral - statement of the class or classes in appendix B of the agreement which the individual referred fits. For this purpose utilize form FD-376, which is designed to serve as a letter of transmittal for both local dissemination and dissemination at the SOG. The original and one copy of this form should be forwarded to the Bureau. A copy is to be maintained in the main case file and upon transferral of office of origin in any case, the new office of origin is to be furnished a copy. Careful consideration must be given to insure that the individual is properly categorized. In the case of subject being recommended for the security index, withhold dissemination pending Bureau approval of his security index status; forward FD-376 as in any other case.

In the case of individual subject of prior investigation who is currently being recommended for the security index, do not disseminate prior reports. However, prepare a letterhead memorandum including pertinent information previously developed which should be disseminated to Secret Service, together with the current report. Copies of this letterhead memorandum should be forwarded to the Bureau for dissemination at headquarters level.

(4) Content

(a) Each card in section A and section B should contain, as a minimum, the following:

I. Name and aliases
II. Race
III. Sex
IV. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
V. Citizenship
VI. Residence
VII. Employment
VIII. Birth data
IX. Office file number
X. The letters "SS" if dissemination has been made to Secret Service in accordance with instructions in section[134D,]item 2, volume[IV,]of this manual

(b) In addition, membership and position or association in a subversive group or groups, together with the source and date of the information, may be added.

(5) Removal and deletion of cards

(a) Destroy cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources or who subsequently become subjects of security index cards.

(b) Advise the Bureau of the destruction only in the case of section A cards.

b. Security index

(1) Purpose

(a) Security index cards are prepared and maintained by the Bureau to serve as operational guide for apprehension of persons deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country in the event of a national emergency.

(b) It shall contain the names of all persons who have been determined through investigation to be dangerous or potentially dangerous because of their membership in or affiliation with or espousal of the principles of basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations and who will be apprehended upon receipt of instructions from the Attorney General.

(c) It shall include subjects of espionage investigations and any other type of Bureau investigation provided their activities bring them within the scope of the security index criteria.

(d) Action shall be taken against individuals included in the security index only upon authorization of warrants of arrest by the Attorney General. However in preparing and maintaining the security index, to all practical effects, the Bureau is making the decision as to those persons who will be apprehended in the event of an emergency, inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised that he does not have funds or

manpower to review security index cases.

(e) Names shall be included in the security index only when investigation has established and reports[show] sufficient facts and evidence to justify the inclusion of each subject in the security index.

(f) The contents of the security index must be accurate and correct at all times. Matters pertaining to its preparation and maintenance must be given preferred, expeditious, continuous, and detailed attention.

(g) Matters pertaining to the security index are strictly confidential and are not to be mentioned or alluded to in investigative reports.

(h) The general operation and content of the security index must not be discussed by field personnel of the Bureau without prior Bureau authority.

(i) Matters pertaining to the security index may be discussed with duly qualified representatives of other Federal intelligence agencies only on a strictly confidential basis and only in instances in which an individual subject of prime interest to one of these services is involved.

(2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual

(a) The dangerousness of a member or affiliate of a subversive organization does not necessarily depend entirely upon his personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or a disposition to violence. Although these factors must be taken into consideration in evaluating an individual's potential dangerousness, other factors are essential in making this determination. An individual's dangerousness also depends upon the contribution he has made or is making to the advancement of the principles and aims of the subversive movement with which he is connected or his subversive potentialities in the event of a national emergency. Bear in mind that a subject active in a subversive organization is not merely an isolated individual but is a part of an organization of which the purposes are opposed to the best interests of the U. S. An individual's loyalty to a subversive organization and the principles thereof is a primary factor to take into consideration in evaluating his potential dangerousness;[however, regardless of evidence of subversive affiliation, all evidence developed during the course of a security investigation must be carefully weighed for the purpose of determining whether the subject's activities depict him as a potentially dangerous individual in time of a national emergency. Factors having a bearing upon an individual's potential dangerousness are numerous and will vary in each case in degree.]

Among such factors are:

I. Long continued membership in a subversive organization
II. Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools
III. Frequent or regular attendance at organizational meetings and functions
IV. Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization
V. Possession of or continued study of revolutionary literature
VI. Preparation or distribution of subversive propaganda and/or literature
VII. Holding positions in the subversive organization or in other organizations of a front character which indicate confidence of such organizations in his loyalty
VIII. Espousal of a subversive doctrine exemplified in his acts and utterances

After initial dissemination to Secret Service in security index cases, as changes occur in the status of the individuals involved with respect to residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally and furnish two copies of the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Form FD-366 may be used for this purpose. The letterhead memorandum should contain a reference to the previous communication disseminated to Secret Service.

When reporting changes in residence and/or employment concerning Chinese and Cuban aliens on the security index, in addition to dissemination to Secret Service, also advise the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) locally, and furnish four copies of the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Bear in mind in filling out the reference that some letterhead memoranda have been expressly prepared for dissemination to Secret Service only and are not to be furnished to the Department or INS; therefore, the copy furnished INS locally and two of the copies furnished the Bureau should reference the last communication to INS.

[For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in other than security index cases, refer to section[134B,]
[volume[IV,]of this manual.

Upon transfer of office of origin in one of these cases, the old office of origin is to furnish Secret Service locally with the subject's new residence and business address and advise the Bureau that such has been done by the submission of two copies of the letterhead memorandum disseminated locally. The new office of origin need take no action regarding dissemination to Secret Service until such time as further changes occur with respect to the subject's status or until preparation of the next periodic report in the case.

(10) Dissemination at the Bureau

There are some situations in which dissemination is made at the Bureau instead of in the field. In the majority of instances, information received by the FBI should [illegible] be furnished immediately to some other agency within the executive branch of the Government so that the responsibilities of the other agency might be fulfilled properly. Care must be taken, however, to disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where such a procedure is deemed inadvisable because of the inadequacy of security measures in that agency. In these instances the data should be brought to the immediate attention of the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. An example of the latter is, of course, the Atomic Energy Commission which receives reports only through the Bureau, as noted in section 87D 7c (3) of this manual. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including the State Department, on at the SOG, as set out in 87D b (4). Dissemination is also made at the SOG to the State Department, unless it appears undesirable, in those cases in which subjects have been indicted for violations grounded on subversive activities. Dissemination in these cases is made to preclude these subjects from utilizing the fact they obtained a passport to refute allegations of subversive connections. The State Department, therefore, will be in possession of data concerning a defendant should he attempt to utilize this tactic in such an action.

b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction

(1) Members of the armed forces

The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the armed forces intelligence agencies states that the responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest.

Thus, in discharging our basic responsibilities in the internal security field, it is imperative that information concerning members of the military services be referred immediately to the appropriate branch having primary responsibility for its personnel. This procedure is mandatory, even though the security aspects of the data have not been fully resolved or verified. It should be specifically pointed out in such instances that the information has not been verified.

Section 87D 5b of this manual instructs that if it is determined a security subject is a member of the armed services the investigation must at that point be discontinued immediately and reported to the Bureau. The basis for such instruction lies in the fact that the subject is no longer within our investigative jurisdiction. In addition, dissemination of pertinent reports must be made locally in the field to the appropriate intelligence agency.

Our responsibility with regard to military personnel is not confined to those who have been the subjects of security investigations. It extends to any subversive derogatory data developed against a member of the armed services during any of our investigations of either individuals or organizations. For instance, if it is determined that a member of the armed forces has been in contact with a security subject or with any individual or group raising security implications, the appropriate intelligence service should be immediately advised locally. This should be done even though the security aspects of the contact have not been resolved, so that the military services may be in a position to discharge their responsibilities. It must be pointed out to them specifically in such instances that the data are unverified, and pertinent developments must be transmitted to them thereafter immediately upon receipt.

Section 87D 6b (1) (h) provides that during the course of security investigations it must be determined whether the subject [illegible] any close relatives in the armed forces. Our responsibility requires that such associations be called to the attention [illegible] the appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on the security subjects involved. The evaluation of these associations lies entirely within the province of the intelligence services, but for the reasons stated previously herein it is incumbent upon the Bureau to disseminate this information immediately upon receipt.

Any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel must be set out in a letter to the Bureau together with a statement as to the local dissemination made in the field. Such letter should be accompanied by a [letterhead] memorandum setting out with particularity the subversive data in a form entirely suitable for dissemination.

II. Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)

III. Sex

Male	M
Female	F

IV. Citizenship

Native born	NB
Naturalized	NA
Alien	AL

(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)

V. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency

Communist Party, USA	COM
Progressive Labor Party	PLP
Socialist Workers Party	SWP
Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
American Socialist Clubs	ASC
Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
Proletarian Party of America	PPA
Nation of Islam	NOI
Bulgarian	BUL
Cuban	CUB
Czechoslovakian	CZE
Hungarian	HUN
[Romanian	ROM]
Russian	RUS
Yugoslavian	YUG

VI. Dangerousness classification (where applicable)

Detcom	DC

VII. Key figure and top functionary designation (where applicable)

Key figure	KF
Top functionary	TF

VIII. Special section cards

Atomic energy program employees	AEP
Cuban special section	CUB
Espionage subjects	ESP
Foreign government employees	FGE
Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
United Nations employees	UNE
U. S. Government employees	GOV

IX. Unavailable section cards

Missing	MI
Out of country	OC
Imprisoned	PR

X. Date and place of birth

XI. Key facility geographical reference number and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility obtained from the Department of Defense Key Facilities List (where applicable)

XII. Residence address

XIII. Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.

XIV. Field office file number

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description

(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division

(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. [This photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.]

(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms

(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The white 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by this machine and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

agency responsible for such action. Forward such data to Bureau and incorporate in next report submitted concerning individual in question. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau and there is no case on individual being denied clearance, give consideration to opening a security investigation if information received from intelligence agency warrants such action.

(2) Inclusion in security index

In recommending key facility employee for inclusion in security index, FD-122 is to contain:

(a) Key facility geographical reference number

(b) Abbreviation for agency having security responsibility

(c) Abbreviations for other agencies known to have classified contracts with the key facility. Interested agencies should be identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on security index cards returned from Bureau.

(d) Abbreviation AEC immediately following abbreviation for agency having security responsibility when abbreviation of responsible agency on key facilities list is followed by asterisk, which denotes Atomic Energy Commission is involved in security responsibility. This data will appear on security index cards returned from the Bureau.

If subject of existing security index card is found to have become employed in a key facility, FD-122 must be submitted to Bureau with above-required key facility data set forth thereon. Case is then to be handled in accordance with instructions set forth below concerning key facility cases.

(3) Dissemination

Upon receipt of original complaint or allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, a summary of complaint and information concerning the individual should be furnished immediately by letter to interested intelligence agency. Intelligence agency should then be advised whether a security investigation is being conducted of the individual and, if investigation is being conducted, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion of investigation. Letter to intelligence agency should clearly point out that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation by FBI.

[In addition to disseminating to interested intelligence agencies information of a derogatory security nature developed concerning persons employed at facilities holding classified contracts, with the exception of classified contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission, such information should be furnished to the Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, 43215, attention Chief, Adjudication Division. In each instance, advise the interested intelligence agency that dissemination has been made to DISCO. This dissemination is to include derogatory subversive information developed concerning persons who may not be currently employed at such a facility but who are known to be holders of an industrial security clearance.]

These instructions do not apply to allegations of espionage or those of such a confidential character as would not ordinarily be disseminated. Such information appearing to be of immediate interest to other intelligence agencies should be submitted to Bureau by most expeditious means, depending upon the circumstances, with a request that the Bureau consider advisability of disseminating it.

Disseminate copies of each report to the local representative of agency having security responsibility, as well as to local representative of other intelligence agencies known to have

classified contracts with the key facility.] Copies of reports for the Marine Corps should be disseminated locally to ONI.

Dissemination to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), the Research and Development Board (RDB), and the Maritime Administration (MA) will be made at the Bureau, and not in the field.

(4) Status of cases

After all active investigation conducted, place in a closed status. Forty-five days before report due, make case pending active and check with armed services representative at the key facility, or with other reliable sources, to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

d. Key figure and top functionary program

(1) General

Purpose of key figure and top functionary program is to select for special attention those individuals in a subversive movement who are of outstanding importance to the effectiveness of the movement.

Key figure and top functionary program is described below as pertaining to the Communist Party, USA. However, it also applies to important individuals active in or on behalf of other basic revolutionary groups.

(2) Key figures

(a) Definition

A key figure is an individual, either a member or nonmember of the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organization, who, by reason of his official position in the organization or his connections with the communist movement and his activities on its behalf, is considered of sufficient importance and potential dangerousness from an internal security standpoint to require immediate apprehension or detention in the event of an emergency. Individuals coming within the following categories shall be considered within the definition of a key figure:

I. National, district, and state officers and the principal officers of the local clubs of the Communist Party

II. The principal organizers of the Communist Party

III. Those communists who are executive officers or outstanding figures in established communist front or communist-controlled organizations, foreign language groups, and Negro organizations infiltrated by communists

IV. Individuals extensively engaged in communist infiltration of the labor movement, including principal officers of labor organizations who are members of or closely affiliated with the Communist Party. In

in a key facility, copies of reports bearing the dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," should be furnished to appropriate intelligence agencies of the armed services by the field offices as shown in sections 69, volume III, and 87D 7e (2), of this manual. [For instructions regarding dissemination to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, see 87D 7c (3), of this manual.]

Specific instructions with regard to all phases of our responsibilities under Executive Order 10450, including policy, investigative procedures, and dissemination are set out in section 69, volume III, of this manual.

(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services
Dissemination should be made locally to the intelligence service of the military branch involved.

(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Agency
Federal Aviation Agency issues certificates to airmen who are defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew in the navigation of aircraft while under way: individuals directly in charge of the inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in the capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Subversive data developed concerning persons within such definitions should be furnished to the Bureau by report or letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, together with cover communication recommending that such data be furnished to Federal Aviation Agency. Such dissemination will be made only at the Bureau.

(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service
Under the agreement between the Bureau and the Secret Service concerning Presidential protection dated 2-3-65, which is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual, reports are to be disseminated henceforth to Secret Service in all security index cases. An extra copy of the report in these cases should be furnished the Bureau. At the time the agreement was entered into, letterhead memoranda in all security index cases had been disseminated to Secret Service. Therefore, prior reports in these cases will not be disseminated.

Under the terms of the agreement, it is essential to advise Secret Service of the reason or reasons for referral - statement of the class or classes in appendix B of the agreement which the individual referred fits. For this purpose utilize form FD-376, which is designed to serve as a letter of transmittal for both local dissemination and dissemination at the SOG. The original and one copy of this form should be forwarded to the Bureau. A copy is to be maintained in the main case file and upon transferral of office of origin in any case, the new office of origin is to be furnished a copy. Careful consideration must be given to insure that the individual is properly categorized. In the case of subject being recommended for the security index, withhold dissemination pending Bureau approval of his security index status; forward FD-376 as in any other case.

In the case of individual subject of prior investigation who is currently being recommended for the security index, do not disseminate prior reports. However, prepare a letterhead memorandum including pertinent information previously developed which should be disseminated to Secret Service, together with the current report. Copies of this letterhead memorandum should be forwarded to the Bureau for dissemination at headquarters level.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Abstract slips, 47,58
- Administrative
  - data, 77
  - tickler, 55,56,74
- Admissible evidence, 29,37
- Agreement between FBI and Secret Service, 81
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
  - Cuban, 45a,45b,81a
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80,81a
  - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Annual review of section A, reserve index, 42b
- Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
- Armed forces
  - dissemination to, 81a
  - members of, 25
  - record in, 27
  - relatives in, 27
  - subjects entering, 56,60
  - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of security index, 50
  - alphabetical section, 51,63
  - at Bureau, 50
  - geographical section, 51,63
  - in field office, 51
  - inactive section, 56
  - special section, 52
  - unavailable section, 53
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71

- Bureau
  - applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
  - authority to investigate, 24
  - responsibility, 19

- Cancellation of
  - security flash notice, 27a
  - security index cards
    - after induction into armed forces, 60
    - mechanics, 60
    - on departure from U. S., 60
    - only after interview, 38
    - recommending, 42,61
    - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 74
- Changes on security index cards, 58
- Channelizing, 24,34,36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
  - aliens, changes in residence or employment, dissemination to Secret Service and INS, 81a
  - extraction, 48,62
  - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants, 74
- Contacting
  - faculty members, 25
  - registrars, 25
  - students, 25
  - superiors of faculty members, 25
- Contacts
  - during investigation, 25
  - with foreign establishments, 25
- Content
  - and appearance
    - of reserve index cards, 43
    - of security index cards, 48
  - of reports, 74
- Corroboration, 37
- Criteria for inclusion in security index, 44a,45
- Cuban
  - activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  - aliens, 45a,45b,81a
  - contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a
  - pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  - special section, 49,53
  - tabbing cards, 45b,64

- Dangerousness
  - definition of, 44
  - determination of, 44
  - Nation of Islam membership, 46
- Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Defectors to Sino-Soviet-bloc countries, 57
- Defense
  - facilities, 64,73
    - list, 64
    - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
  - Industrial Security Clearance Office, 65,81
  - Supply Agency, 65,81
- Definitions, 19
  - of dangerousness, 44
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Detcom, 62
  - administrative procedures, 63
  - key figures, 62,68
  - purpose, 62
  - removal from, 58, 63,64
  - special section, 53,64
  - top functionaries, 62,70
  - who to be tabbed, 62
- Determination of
  - dangerousness, 44
  - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Disaffection of U. S. citizens abroad, 57
- Dissemination
  - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81a
  - of reports
    - at SOG, 81a
    - in field, 79
  - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
  - to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, 65,81
  - to Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81a
  - to Secret Service, 81
    - closing case, 47,74
    - stamping reserve index cards, 43
- Documentation of reports, 78
  - completion of, 78

- Employees of
  - international organizations, 25
  - U. S. Government, 25
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70

- Evidence, 37
  - desirability of
    - admissibility, 29,37
    - corroboration, 37
  - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  - of membership or affiliation, 29
  - preservation of, 37

- Faculty members
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File on defected subjects, 42
- File reviews, 34
- Flash notices (security)
  - cancellation of, 27a
  - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  - when place, 27
- Foreign
  - diplomats, 25
  - establishments, 25
  - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
  - tours, 33a
  - travel, 33
- Forms
  - FD-122, 28,34,48,49,53 to 58,68,74
    - abstracts for, 47
    - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    - cover letter thereto, 32
    - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63
    - placing name in or removing from
      - special section of security index, 53
      - unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    - recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - reference to, 77
    - succinct summary with, 47
      - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - when subject employed in key facility, 65

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Forms (continued)
  - FD-122a, 42b,42c,61,77
  - FD-128, 55,57 to 60,68
    - reference to, 77
    - when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    - when subject moves, 58,59
  - FD-128a, 27a,42c,77
  - FD-154, 57
  - FD-154a, 42b,42c
  - FD-165, 27,77
  - FD-186, 50
  - FD-305, 74,78
  - FD-305a, 78
  - FD-306, 36
  - FD-336, 39
  - FD-366, 57,81a
  - FD-376, 81
- Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22

- Geographical
  - reference number of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  - section of security index, 51,63
- Government employees, 25,70,80

- Handwriting, 29
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
- Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41
- Husband and wife, security investigations, 72

- Identification record, 27
- Immigration and Naturalization Service, dissemination to, 80,81a
- Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,57,60
- Inactive section of security index, 56
- Indices, check of, 34,72
- Individuals
  - to be investigated, 22
  - traveling abroad, 33
    - against whom stops are placed, 34
    - who are included in security index, 34
    - who travel behind iron curtain, 34
- Individuals (continued)
  - traveling abroad (continued)
    - with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    - with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  - with foreign diplomatic status, 26
- Industrial security clearances, dissemination re, 65,81
- Informants, cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
- Interviews
  - Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  - Bureau authority, 39,40a
  - conditions for, 40
    - conducting at place of employment, 40a
  - content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  - contents of letter containing results of, 42
  - determine willingness to testify during, 41
  - evaluation of, 45b
  - forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  - no report needed afterward, 40a
  - of hostile subjects, 41
  - of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 24,25
  - of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  - of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  - of security index subjects, 38
  - of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  - of subjects who express desire for, 42
  - on SAC authority, 38
  - preparations for, 40
  - purpose of, 38
  - recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  - results not affecting security index status, 41
  - signed statements in connection with, 41
  - to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  - when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Interviews (continued)
  when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  when discontinue, 40a
  when report needed after, 41
  with Bureau authority, 39
Investigations of
  aliens, 26
  faculty members, 24
  members of labor unions, 29
  naturalized citizens, 26
  students, 24
Investigative
  procedures, 26
  techniques, 34
    file reviews, 34
    photographic surveillances, 35
    physical surveillances, 35
    private firms, records, 36
    public source information, 36
    security informants, 34

Key facilities, 64
  Delimitations Agreement, 64
  employees included in security index, 65
  list, 49,64,65
  responsibility, 64
  status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,74
  when investigate individuals employed in, 64
Key figures
  definition of, 66
  designation of, 67
  foreign travel by, 69
  handling of, 67
  handwriting of, 67
  in armed forces, 68
  list, 69
  movement of, 59,68
  photographs of, 67
  program, 66
  reports on, 68
  status of reports on, 68,73
  when become subjects of SGE cases, 69
Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

Labor union membership, 29
Labor unions, 41
Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
Letter in lieu of report, security index cases, 74
Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Lumping information in reports, 76

Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Members of
  armed forces, dissemination of information concerning, 81a
  labor unions, 29
  law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
Membership or affiliation, 29
Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  unavailable section of security index, 54
Movement of
  key figures, 59,68
  subjects, 58
    key figures, 59,68
    not in security index, 60
    security index subjects, 5[illegible]
    tabbed for detcom, 60
    top functionaries, 59

Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
Nation of Islam
  potential dangerousness, 46
  what members to be investigated, 23

fi[illegible] office territory, the name an[illegible] title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a national level position, and the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a district level position above the status of "club chairman." Members of the Communist Party, USA, who are now carried as unidentified but who are known to be members of the Negro race should be included in the total number of Negroes.]

When possible, totals should be broken down as to nationality, sex, employment, veterans, and membership in unions. Auxiliary offices which, due to lack of Communist Party activity in their divisions, have been authorized to submit data by quarterly letter should include membership figures in these letters to the Bureau and office of origin. These letters to be submitted by auxiliary offices prior to first day of month in which quarterly report is due. Office of origin responsible to obtain complete figures from its auxiliary offices.

(b) In preparing estimates, best available informants and sources must be used. Include in cover pages of quarterly reports evaluation of degree of reliability of figures furnished by each source and of final figures submitted. Also include in cover pages total number of individuals positively identified as Communist Party members and total number of individuals tentatively identified as party members within the twelve-month period immediately preceding the submission of the quarterly report. In reporting membership figures, information from one source only is not acceptable unless facts are set forth demonstrating information from this source is the most accurate and most reliable information available.

(c) Explain in detail any increase or decrease in membership figures previously submitted. Where informants use such terms as "inactive" or "paper" members, their exact understanding of the meaning of the terms used and the number of individuals so described must be clearly explained. Full explanation must be made as to whether individuals so described are included in final membership figures submitted, together with reason for their inclusion or exclusion.

(d) Results of membership recruiting drives

(e) Make discreet efforts to ascertain results of annual national registration drives.

(3) Funds (Bureau file 100-3-63)

(a) Income and expenditures

(b) Plans and results of fund drives including:

I. Total amount sought by the state Communist Party organization

II. Specific amount to be contributed by the state organization to the national committee fund drive

III. Specific amount to be contributed by the state organization to "The Worker" fund drive

IV. Specific amount to be retained by the state organization after contributing to the national committee and "The Worker" fund drives for use in the state organization's own operations

(c) Large contributions by known party groups or front organizations

(d) Identity of any new party "angels"

(e) Distribution of funds not sent to Communist Party headquarters, such as funds in safe-deposit boxes, separate bank accounts, etc.

(f) Any special padding of expense accounts by Communist Party functionaries should be reported.

(g) Possible violations of state or Federal tax laws
(h) Disbursements and collections of the "Reserve Fund"
(i) Receipt of any money from abroad

(4) Security measures (Bureau file 100-3-84)
Any activities on the part of the security commission of the district which bring about new or unusual security measures, such as reducing clubs to "group captain systems," destruction of records, use of codes, clandestine meetings, investigations by the party of party members, etc.

(5) Underground operations (Bureau file 100-3-94)
Pertinent general information suitable for dissemination relating to underground operations of Communist Party. No information should be included in quarterly reports which would jeopardize informants or special investigative techniques. Current investigations relating to expanded underground operations during period 1951-1955 should be submitted by separate letter under individual case caption and should not be included in quarterly reports except for general information relating to methods of operation.

(6) Factionalism (Bureau file 100-3-88)
(a). Submit pertinent information indicating that any ranking Communist Party members or group of members have developed views as "left-wing sectarianists" or "right-wing opportunists" inasmuch as the party has a policy of expelli members who develop such views.
(b) Unusual disputes or arguments between leading communists in any district should be included in this section.

(7) International relations (Bureau file 100-3-81)
(a) Information relating to communication or contact between Communist Party, USA, and communist parties of other countries
(b) Identities of Communist Party officials who plan to travel in foreign countries, including the reason for their travel
(c) Reaction of responsible Communist Party officials to events taking place in foreign countries
(d) Communist Party strategy and tactics directed to attacks on U. S. foreign policy and support of U. S. S. R. and satellite foreign policy
[(e) Policy matter concerning colonial affairs, such as Communist Party policy relative to obtaining of independence by colonial people]

(8) United Nations (Bureau file 100-3-80)
(a) Communist Party policy or pertinent information in connection with the United Nations, including such matters as infiltration of the United Nations, contacts by Communist Party officials with representatives to the United Nations
(b) Communist Party strategy and tactics directed toward attacking U. S. policy and/or to support U. S. S. R. or satellite policy in the United Nations

(9) [Deleted]

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Forms (continued)
  - FD-128a, 27a,42c,77
  - FD-154, 57
  - FD-154a, 42b,42c
  - FD-165, 27,77
  - FD-186, 50
  - FD-305, 74,78
  - FD-305a, 78
  - FD-306, 36
  - FD-336, 39
  - FD-366, 57,81a
  - FD-376, 81
- Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22

- Geographical
  - reference number of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  - section of security index, 51,63
- Government employees, 25,70,80

- Handwriting, 29
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
- Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41
- Husband and wife, security investigations, 72

- Identification record , 27
- Immigration and Naturalization Service, dissemination to, 80,81a
- Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,57,60
- Inactive section of security index, 56
- Indices, check of, 34,72
- Individuals
  - to be investigated, 22
  - traveling abroad, 33
    - against whom stops are placed, 34
    - who are included in security index, 34
    - who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    - with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    - with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  - with foreign diplomatic status, 26
- Informants, cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
- Interviews
  - Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  - Bureau authority, 39,40a
  - conditions for, 40
    - conducting at place of employment, 40a
  - content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  - contents of letter containing results of, 42
  - determine willingness to testify during, 41
  - evaluation of, 45b
  - forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  - no report needed afterward, 40a
  - of hostile subjects, 41
  - of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 24, 25
  - of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  - of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  - of security index subjects, 38
  - of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  - of subjects who express desire for, 42
  - on SAC authority, 38
  - preparations for, 40
  - purpose of, 38
  - recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  - results not affecting security index status, 41
  - signed statements in connection with, 41
  - to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  - when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when discontinue, 40a
  - when report needed after, 41
  - with Bureau authority, 39

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Investigations of
  aliens, 26
  faculty members, 24
  members of labor unions, 29
  naturalized citizens, 26
  students, 24
Investigative
  procedures, 26
  techniques, 34
    file reviews, 34
    photographic surveillances, 35
    physical surveillances, 35
    private firms, records, 36
    public source information, 36
    security informants, 34

Key facilities, 64
  Delimitations Agreement, 64
  employees included in security index, 65
  list, 49,64,65
  responsibility, 64
  status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,74
  when investigate individuals employed in, 64
Key figures
  definition of, 66
  designation of, 67
  foreign travel by, 69
  handling of, 67
  handwriting of, 67
  in armed forces, 68
  list, 69
  movement of, 59,68
  photographs of, 67
  program, 66
  reports on, 68
  status of reports on, 68,73
  when become subjects of SGE cases, 69
Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

Labor union membership, 29
Labor unions, 41
Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
Letter in lieu of report, security index cases, 74
Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Lumping information in reports, 76

Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Members of
  armed forces, dissemination of information concerning, 81a
  labor unions, 29
  law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
Membership or affiliation, 29
Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  unavailable section of security index, 54
Movement of
  key figures, 59,68
  subjects, 58
    key figures, 59,68
    security index subjects, 58
    subjects not in security index, 60
    subjects tabbed for detcom, 60
    top functionaries, 59

Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
Nation of Islam
  potential dangerousness, 46
  what members to be investigated, 23

(D) Whether or not defectee available for interview by all Agents

(E) Whether he is in position to testify and willing to do so

III. Do not include information concerning security informants for security reasons.

IV. Proper maintenance of this file will be useful in identifying persons who may be in a position to furnish information of value in the future and will obviate necessity of extensive file reviews in this connection.

V. A special index may be used for this file if desirable. If used, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating names, times, and places defectees were in a subversive movement and a brief description of information available from them. Break index down geographically and subdivide by years if desirable.

7. Administrative procedures

[a. Reserve index

(1) Purpose

The reserve index is designed to represent those persons who, in the light of ever-changing conditions, should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation, or action under the security index program. This index may serve as an administrative aid and working index containing a central repository of the names of individuals having sympathy for or affiliation with the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations.

(2) Individuals to be included

This index is to contain names of individuals when, following investigation, the information does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the security index when there is evidence of:

(a) Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection

(b) Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.

(c) The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support, or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.

(d) Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(e) Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(3) Arrangement

This index is to be maintained in two sections, section A and section B. Each section will be maintained alphabetically on 5- by 8-inch cards.

(a) Section A

Section A of the reserve index is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following the apprehension of security index subjects.

I. Section A should include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the security index criteria but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Include in this section those individuals meeting the standards for inclusion in the reserve index and who fall within the following categories:

(A) Professors, teachers, and educators
(B) Labor union organizers or leaders
(C) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others in the mass media field
(D) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists
(E) Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level
(F) Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid

II. Recommendations for inclusion of names in the reserve index (section A)

(A) Recommendations for inclusion of names in section A of the reserve index are to be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a. A succinct summary setting forth the basis for this recommendation should be attached to the form FD-122a unless the recommendation is made simultaneously with a recommendation that the subject's name be deleted from the security index. In addition, if no report is accompanying the recommendation, a statement to that effect should appear on the page containing the succinct summary.

(B) Upon Bureau approval of recommendation for the inclusion of an individual's name in section A of the reserve index, two reserve index cards will be forwarded to the field. Add on the reverse side available descriptive data. One card is to be filed in your office, and one card is to be filed away from headquarters city at the same location as the extra set of security index cards is now stored.

III. Periodic review of section A of the reserve index

Investigations of individuals listed in section A of the reserve index are to be brought up to date annually and considered for security index status or retention in the reserve index. Form [FD-154a] may be used for the annual review. This investigation should include, as a minimum:

(A) Verification of residence and employment
(B) Indices search and file review to determine whether additional investigation is warranted or whether an interview with the individual is desirable
(C) If additional investigation is conducted or if there is unreported information of a subversive nature contained in the files, submit a report.

IV. Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing in section A of reserve index cards

(A) Changes in data appearing on section A reserve index cards should be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a.

(B) Deletions from section A of the reserve index should be recommended by letter. The letter should set forth the basis for the recommendation.

(C) Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section A cards to new office of origin.

(b) Section B

I. This section is to contain the names of all other individuals included in the reserve index. This section is to be maintained only in the field office. Cases falling within this category should be thoroughly reviewed and analyzed from an investigative viewpoint at least once every two years on a continuing basis. As a minimum this review should include verification of residence and employment and contact with logical sources and informants. Be alert to selecting logical subjects for interview as means of developing potential sources, informants, and witnesses. Also be alert for recommending individuals for inclusion in section A of the reserve index or the security index if warranted. Form[FD-154a may be used for this review.]

II. Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section B cards to new office of origin.

D. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

1. Definitions

The term "basic revolutionary organization" or "basic revolutionary group" when used hereinafter in this subsection shall apply to any one or all of the following organizations or groups in order to distinguish the organizations from front organizations:

a. Communist Party, USA
b. Socialist Workers Party
c. Progressive Labor[Party]
d. Proletarian Party of America
e. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
f. Johnson-Forest Group
g. American Socialist Clubs
h. See also 87C 1d.

2. Responsibility of the Bureau

a. To conduct thorough investigation into the background and subversive activities of all persons in the U. S. and Puerto Rico who are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security. Each SAC will be held responsible for the proper investigation of all persons in his area who, because of membership or affiliation with basic revolutionary organizations or other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, may be potentially dangerous.

b. To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of individuals constituting a threat to the internal security and develop sufficient information and evidence through investigation to sustain appropriate action by the Bureau should it become necessary for the Federal Government to institute prosecutive action against such individuals in courts of law or control their movement and activities in the event of a national emergency

3. Purpose of investigation

The primary purpose of these investigations is twofold, namely:

a. Determination of dangerousness
To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals in the U. S. and Puerto Rico who, because of their membership in, activity in, or association with one or more of the revolutionary groups defined above or related groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country, and the consequent collection of sufficient information concerning their subversive activities to justify apprehension in event of a national emergency

b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes
To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals who have been or may be violating laws of the U. S.

(1) Direct investigation towards obtaining admissible evidence to establish the violation.

(2) Be alert for any information indicating a violation of the Federal statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, and sedition.

(3) Title 18, USC, § 2385, paragraph (1), prohibits the advocacy, etc., of forceful or violent overthrow of the Government. Paragraph (2) prohibits the printing and distribution of propaganda advocating the forceful overthrow of the Government. (Affiliation with an organization is not a prerequisite to prosecution under paragraphs (1) and (2).) Paragraph (3) makes it unlawful to organize or help to organize any society, etc., of persons who advocate overthrow of the Government by force or violence, or to be or become a member of or become affiliated with any such society knowing the purposes thereof. Conspiracy to violate this section is covered by Title 18, USC, § 371 (general conspiracy statute).

(4) Title 18, USC, § 2387, penalizes attempts to undermine the loyalty, discipline, or morale of the armed forces. Alleged violations should be reported immediately to the Bureau.

(5) Title 5, USC, §§ 118p, 118q, and 118r (Public Law 330, 84th Congress, approved 9-9-55), prohibits Government employment of persons who are disloyal or who assert the right to strike against the Government. The law provides that an individual accepting office or employment in the Government of the U. S. shall, within 60 days, execute an affidavit certifying that he does not advocate the violent overthrow of the U. S. Government, etc. The execution of a false affidavit constitutes a fraud on, or attempt to defraud, the Government within the purview of Title 5, USC, § 93, so as to authorize Special Agents of the Bureau to administer oaths in investigations arising out of this law. Alleged violations of this law called to your attention should be furnished to the Bureau promptly and no investigation should be initiated on the basis of complaints received without prior Bureau authority. Refer to section[69H]of this manual entitled "Security of Government Employees - Fraud Against the Government" for procedures to be followed regarding possible violations of this law discovered or received in connection with security of Government employees investigations.

(6) Title 18, USC, § 1001, includes possible fraud against the Government violations wherein there are concealments or falsifications relating to subversive information. These violations must be presented to the Department by the Bureau for a prosecutive opinion rather than being presented locally to USAs. They ordinarily involve the execution of U. S. Government forms. Common violators are employees of private concerns having Government contracts who execute Government forms required for clearance for access to classified information.

Upon receipt of information indicating a violation of this type, investigation under the "Security Matter - Fraud Against the Government" character should be initiated and the Bureau immediately advised. The Department has advised that it is essential, to establish jurisdiction, to prove that the form was presented to a Government agency for action or determination. This, therefore, should be the first investigative step. If the form was not presented to a Government agency, no further investigation should be made and the Bureau so advised. In this case, however, remain alert for information the form is later presented to Government agency. The fact subject actually signed the form must be established by testimony of witnesses to the signature, handwriting examination, or other conclusive evidence. The original of the form must be located. Sources that furnished pertinent information concerning subject during previous investigations and other potential witnesses should be thoroughly interviewed to determine the basis for each item of pertinent information furnished and to obtain the identities of other potential witnesses. Where affiliation with subversive organizations is involved, interview individuals who were members of same units of these organizations as subject for indicia of his membership, such as attendance at closed meetings, payment of dues, holding of office, etc. If possible, develop evidence to supplement pertinent information furnished by current informants. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview the subject. Interview subject and potential witnesses furnishing pertinent information under oath and obtain sworn signed statements if possible. An exception may be made when interviewing established sources, such as current informants, if oath and/or signed statements not considered desirable under circumstances. Be guided by instructions in section 6b, (7), below when interviewing potential witnesses with subversive backgrounds.

II.	Race	
	White and Caucasian	W
	Negro	N
	Chinese	C
	Others	O
	(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)	
III.	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
IV.	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien	AL
	(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
V.	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	Progressive Labor[Party]	[PLP]
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	Nation of Islam	NOI
	Bulgarian	BUL
	Cuban	CUB
	Czechoslavakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Rumanian	RUM
	Russian	RUS
	Yugoslavian	YUG
VI.	Dangerousness classification (where applicable)	
	Detcom	DC
VII.	Key figure and top functionary designation (where applicable)	
	Key figure	KF
	Top functionary	TF
VIII.	Special section cards	
	Atomic energy program employees	AEP
	Cuban special section	CUB
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
	United Nations employees	UNE
	U. S. Government employees	GOV
IX.	Unavailable section cards	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
X.	Date and place of birth	
XI.	Key facility geographical reference number and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility obtained from the Department of Defense Key Facilities List (where applicable)	
XII.	Residence address	
XIII.	Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.	
XIV.	Field office file number	

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

- (A) Complete description
- (B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division
- (C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. [This photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.]
- (D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
- (E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The white 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by this machine and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

d. Other Marxist revolutionary groups
A long-established group which would come under this category is the Proletarian Party of America, a relatively small organization.

There also are a few small groups composed of ex-members of the Communist Party, USA, who have voluntarily left the party or who have been expelled, usually for factionalism.

e. General
Communist investigations must be conducted in a most discreet and thorough manner at all times. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during the course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority. Bureau employees should not discuss communist or related investigations with any unauthorized individual. The subject of communism is not to be used in speeches of Bureau employees without specific authorization. However, there is considerable mimeographed material in each office, including speeches, testimony, and magazine articles prepared by the Director which could be furnished outside individuals interested in the subject of communism without any discussion.

2. Purposes of investigation

a. The investigation of the Communist Party, USA, and other similar-type organizations is of twofold purpose: (1) to obtain legally admissible evidence against these organizations for prosecution under existing Federal statutes set out above and (2) to follow closely the activities of these organizations from an intelligence viewpoint to have a day-to-day appraisal of the strength, dangerousness, and activities of these organizations seeking the overthrow of the U. S. Government.

b. Suggestions for proper coverage of the investigation of the Communist Party as an organization and similar organizations should include:

(1) The assignment of sufficient Agent personnel to insure that all of the important ramifications of party activities are properly covered

(2) Development of confidential informants in all party levels, including the national headquarters organization

[(3) [Deleted]

(4) The constant effort to develop admissible evidence against party officials for violation of Federal laws

c. Brief to establish illegal status of Communist Party, USA

(1) Purpose of brief is to collect all legally admissible evidence to prove illegality of party in one file. (Bufile 100-3-74)

(2) Reports on brief to establish illegal status must be submitted by each office quarterly and should include only legally admissible evidence obtained during preceding three-month period. If there is no information to report, include a statement to that effect in the cover pages of the quarterly report for the same period entitled "Communist Party, USA, Internal Security - C" (no copy needed for Bufile 100-3-74).

(3) It is advisable to use the following breakdown in preparing reports:

(a) Origin and continuity of the party

(b) Pertinent statements, writings, and instructions relating to (1) Marxism-Leninism, (2) imperialism, (3) proletarian internationalism, (4) defense of USSR, (5) revolutionary statements

(c) Internal Security Act of 1950. Include under this heading any admissible evidence which would tend to prove a violation of section 4(a) of this act.

3. Investigative procedures and suggestions
This section contains detailed investigative guides for use in investigating and reporting activities of the Communist Party, USA.

a. To accurately and clearly show the true nature of the Communist Party, USA, data concerning the following topics must be fully developed and reported. When material contains information that would be logically reported under more than one topic heading but to do so would make the separate accounts unintelligible, report all the material under the main heading and only refer to the information under the other breakdowns. Do not repeat same data under separate headings. Reports on the Communist Party, USA, as an organization must be submitted by each office quarterly and should cover activities for the preceding three-month period. All offices are required to use the following breakdown in preparing quarterly reports on the Communist Party, USA. Each subfile caption must start on a separate page.

(1) Organization (Bureau file 100-3-69)

(a) Security setup of district and/or state organization. Office covering district headquarters, describe the location and size of Communist Party office facilities, rent paid, and name and number of office employees. List address and/or post office box number of party headquarters.

(b) Identify principal district officials and important functionaries, together with titles, and furnish a short resume of important activities of each during three-month period.

(c) Names of new commissions or special committees, identity and capacity of individual members thereof. Submit resume of activities of groups under appropriate subfile captions.

(d) Special meetings embracing only organizational matters. Other pertinent matters discussed at meetings concerning policy or strategy to be submitted under appropriate subfile captions.

(e) Extend this outline as far as necessary for clarity and to meet needs of office under this or any succeeding subsection. Auxiliary offices submit pertinent data concerning above matters which do not normally come to attention of office covering district headquarters.

(2) Membership (Bureau file 100-3-68)

(a) Quarterly reports are not to contain any membership statistics. Cover pages accompanying each quarterly report must contain latest available statistics relating to total number of Communist Party members in the district. Membership data must start on a separate cover page,[which page(s) must be devoted exclusively to such data.] Office of origin, which is office covering Communist Party district headquarters, should submit following figures:

I. For entire Communist Party district
II. For individual states covered by Communist Party district
III. For number of Communist Party members in area covered by field office

Auxiliary offices should submit following membership figures to the Bureau and office of origin:

I. For state or portion of state covered by that field office
II. For number of Communist Party members in the area covered by that field office

[The total number of Communist Party members in the area covered by field office, either origin or auxiliary, should be broken down as to the total number of Negroes in the overall numerical strength of the Communist Party, USA, in the

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Tabbing SI cards, 45b,62,64,68,70
- Thumbnail sketches, 79
- Title of reports, 72
- Top functionaries, 66,69
  - change of office of origin, 70
  - definition of, 69
  - designation of, 69
  - handwriting of, 70
  - inclusion in key figure list, 70
  - movement of, 59
  - photographs of, 70
  - program, 66
  - regulations governing, 70
  - reports on, 59,70
    - status of, 70,73
  - tabbing for detcom, 62,70
- Topical headings in reports, 74
- Tours, 33a
- Travel
  - abroad, 33
  - behind iron curtain, 34

- Unavailable section of security index, 53
  - imprisoned subjects, 54
  - missing subjects, 32,54
  - subjects traveling abroad, 34,54
- Underground membership or activity, 31
- United Nations employees, 25,52
- U. S. Government employees, 25
- U. S. Information Agency, inclusion of employees in security index or reserve index, 70

- Verification of
  - addresses
    - reserve index
      - section A, 42b
      - section B, 42c
    - security index, 32,57,74,81a
  - employment
    - reserve index
      - section A, 42b
      - section B, 42c
    - security index, 32,57,74,81a
  - key facility or defense facility status of place of employment, 64
- Voice of America (See U. S. Information Agency.)

- Wife and husband, security investigations, 72

- Yugoslav intelligence agents, contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a

(b) Where potential dangerousness of a subject has been established and inclusion of that subject in security index is warranted, the office of origin shall submit a recommendation for inclusion in security index by submitting form FD-122 to Bureau. Form must be prepared in triplicate. Original and one copy shall be forwarded to Bureau and one copy will be placed in subject's investigative case file.

Nothing should appear on FD-122 or subsequently on the security index card which is not in the subject's case file. Form FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend a subject for inclusion in the security index and (2) to submit changes to data which appears on face of security index cards already existent.

Proper selection should be made in the opening paragraph option. FD-122 is submitted with abstract when used to recommend the subject for inclusion in the security index and without abstract when used to indicate additions, deletions, or changes in data appearing on existing cards.

(c) When form FD-122 is submitted to Bureau recommending inclusion of a name in security index, attach additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of facts on which recommendation has been based. Facts must be in detail to clearly show soundness of recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must contain pertinent dates of subject's activities.

(d) When, at conclusion of investigation, subject's name is not being recommended for security index, set out a brief summary statement in the appropriate communication closing the case showing reasons for the decision.

(e) Security index cards shall be recommended by and maintained by office of origin only.

(f) A current report must be in possession of the Bureau when subject is recommended for security index. If it is the initial report in the case, it must be a summary report. If, however, prior investigative reports have been submitted which are suitable for dissemination and are appropriately documented, a summary report need not be submitted.

(g) To assure that subject recommended for security index will receive proper attention, case shall be kept in pending or pending-inactive status until security index card has been received from Bureau and filed in office security index. If case continues in pending status because of outstanding investigation, reports shall carry a lead to follow authorization of security index card by the Bureau and if approved to[disseminate a copy of the report to]Secret Service in addition to other leads. If outstanding investigation has been completed and case would otherwise be closed upon submission of the report and form FD-122, case shall be placed in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and if approved[to disseminate the copy of the report]to Secret Service. In latter instance, upon receipt of security index card and following local dissemination to Secret Service, case may be closed administratively.

(h) Recommendation for security index card should not be delayed because of absence of information concerning race, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, or description where security index card is warranted. In such instances, recommendation for the card should be submitted with a current report and case retained in pending status with active investigation continuing to determine missing items of information.

(i) Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for the security index provided instructions set forth in 87D 6b (3) and (4) are followed. Forms FD-122 submitted on subjects should include data required in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV below.

(j) When form FD-122 is submitted recommending a security index card be prepared on a subject who is of Chinese extraction, the words "Other - Chinese" must be included in the space on the form calling for a statement as to the subject's race. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending that a security index card be prepared on a person who is not of Chinese extraction but who has shown definite sympathies with communist China, the form should include under "Miscellaneous" a statement to the effect "sympathetic to Communist China."

(k) Upon receipt of form FD-122 at Bureau, the case of the subject will be reviewed and if recommendation of field is concurred in, security index cards will be prepared. Duplicate copy of form will be returned to office of origin stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." The three cards shall be filed in security index as outlined below. The returned copy of FD-122 shall be placed in subject's main investigative case file. Offices with a geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive an extra card.

(l) When security index cards are received from Bureau, data thereon must be checked for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards of similar size to security index cards which are stap to back of two of the cards. One card will then be ed in the geographical section of office security index (except special section cards and unavailable section cards - see 87D 7b (6) (b) III and IV below), and one card shall be filed in the duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. The other card is filed in alphabetical section of security index. No information shall be permanently added, deleted, or changed on face of security index card without complying with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (8).

(5) Content and appearance of security index card

(a) Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain the following information. If any of items enumerated in I through XIV are missing at time the security index card is made, the case should be continued as pending and investigation conducted to obtain the necessary information. Set forth under each item below are possible categories in which subject may be classified, together with code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on form FD-122 when sending form to Bureau recommending security index card be prepared. Code letters should subsequently appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

I. Name and aliases

The full and correct name and aliases of the subject must be contained on the security index card. When the true name of a subject or any aliases are changed, added, deleted, or are found to be incorrect, form FD-122 must be submitted[showing]the correct data to be placed on the security index card.

(6) Character
  (a) Key figures and top functionaries
  Internal Security - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.
  Examples:
    Internal Security - C
    Internal Security - SWP
  (b) Others
  Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.
  Examples:
    Security Matter - C
    Security Matter - SWP
    Security Matter - X (native fascist)
    Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a key figure, the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject is designated a key figure, the first report after the designation and all subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. In any event, if subject is employed in a[defense facility so designated by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 5 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended,]add the additional character "Internal Security Act of 1950" if the organizational activity of the subject is of a communist nature.

(7) Deleted

(8) Status

All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:

(a) Top functionaries
  I. Pending inactive
    (A) Reports are to be submitted quarterly. Forty-five days prior to the date a quarterly report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(b) Key figures
  I. Pending inactive
    (A) Reports are to be submitted semiannually. Forty-five days prior to the date a semiannual report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(c) Deleted

(d) Other security index subjects

I. Closed

(A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of an annual investigative report. If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed. The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the annual report is due. Such cases shall also be opened and assigned six months after submission of the annual report to accomplish verification of addresses. Upon such verification, the cases should be closed administratively.

(e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index

I. Pending inactive

(A) If all active investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau

[(B) Set forth lead to follow Bureau for security index card and if approved [for dissemination of report to] Secret Service.

II. Closed

[(A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau and dissemination to Secret Service

(B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (d) above.

(f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein

I. Closed

(A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(9) Content

(a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.

I. Background

(A) Birth date
(B) Citizenship status
(C) Education
(D) Marital status
(E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
(F) Identification record
(G) Employment
(H) Residence
(I) Status of health (if known)

II. Connections with Communist Party (or other basic revolutionary groups and/or front organizations)

(A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.

(B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

in a key facility, copies of reports bearing the dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," should be furnished to appropriate intelligence agencies of the armed services by the field offices as shown in sections 69, volume III, and 87D 7e (2), of this manual.

Specific instructions with regard to all phases of our responsibilities under Executive Order 10450, including policy, investigative procedures, and dissemination are set out in section 69, volume III, of this manual.

(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services
Dissemination should be made locally to the intelligence service of the military branch involved.

(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Agency
Federal Aviation Agency issues certificates to airmen who are defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew in the navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of the inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in the capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Subversive data developed concerning persons within such definitions should be furnished to the Bureau by report or letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, together with cover communication recommending that such data be furnished to Federal Aviation Agency. Such dissemination will be made only at the Bureau.

(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service
[Under the agreement between the Bureau and the Secret Service concerning Presidential protection dated 2-3-65, which is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual, reports are to be disseminated henceforth to Secret Service in all security index cases. An extra copy of the report in these cases should be furnished the Bureau. At the time the agreement was entered into, letterhead memoranda in all security index cases had been disseminated to Secret Service. Therefore, prior reports in these cases will not be disseminated.

Under the terms of the agreement, it is essential to advise Secret Service of the reason or reasons for referral - statement of the class or classes in appendix B of the agreement which the individual referred fits. For this purpose utilize form FD-376, which is designed to serve as a letter of transmittal for both local dissemination and dissemination at the SOG. The original and one copy of this form should be forwarded to the Bureau. A copy is to be maintained in the main case file and upon transferral of office of origin in any case, the new office of origin is to be furnished a copy. Careful consideration must be given to insure that the individual is properly categorized. In the case of subject being recommended for the security index, withhold dissemination pending Bureau approval of his security index status; forward FD-376 as in any other case.

In the case of individual subject of prior investigation who is currently being recommended for the security index, do not disseminate prior reports. However, prepare a letterhead memorandum including pertinent information previously developed which should be disseminated to Secret Service, together with the current report. Copies of this letterhead memorandum should be forwarded to the Bureau for dissemination at headquarters level.]

After initial[dissemination to Secret Service]in security index cases, as changes occur in the status of the individuals involved with respect to residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally and furnish two copies of the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Form FD-366 may be used for this purpose. The letterhead memorandum should contain a reference to the previous communication disseminated to Secret Service.

When reporting changes in residence and/or employment concerning Chinese and Cuban aliens on the security index, in addition to dissemination to Secret Service, also advise the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) locally, and furnish four copies of the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Bear in mind in filling out the reference that some[letterhead] memoranda have been expressly prepared for dissemination to Secret Service only and have not been furnished to the Department or INS; therefore, the copy furnished INS locally and two of the copies furnished the Bureau should reference the last communication to INS.

For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in other than security index cases, refer to section 83K, volume III, of this manual.

Upon transfer of office of origin in one of these cases, the old office of origin is to furnish Secret Service locally with the subject's new residence and business address and advise the Bureau that such has been done by the submission of two copies of the letterhead memorandum disseminated locally. The new office of origin need take no action regarding dissemination to Secret Service until such time as further changes occur with respect to the subject's status[or until preparation of the next periodic report in the case.].

(10) Dissemination at the Bureau

There are some situations in which dissemination is made at the Bureau instead of in the field. In the majority of instances, information received by the FBI should properly be furnished immediately to some other agency within the executive branch of the Government so that the responsibilities of the other agency might be fulfilled properly. Care must be taken, however, not to disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where such a procedure is deemed inadvisable because of the inadequacy of security measures in that branch. In these instances the data should be brought to the immediate attention of the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. An example of the latter is, of course, the Atomic Energy Commission, which receives reports only through the Bureau, as noted in section 87D 7c (3) of this manual. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including the State Department, only at the SOG, as set out in 87D 6b (4). Dissemination is also made at the SOG to the State Department, unless it appears undesirable, in those cases in which subjects have been indicted for violations grounded on subversive activities. Dissemination in these cases is made to preclude these subjects from utilizing the fact they obtained a passport to refute allegations of subversive connections. The State Department, therefore, will be in possession of data concerning a defendant should he attempt to utilize this tactic in such an action.

b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction

(1) Members of the armed forces

The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the armed forces intelligence agencies states that the responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest.

Thus, in discharging our basic responsibilities in the internal security field, it is imperative that information concerning members of the military services be referred immediately to the appropriate branch having primary responsibility for its personnel. This procedure is mandatory, even though the security aspects of the data have not been fully resolved or verified. It should be specifically pointed out in such instances that the information has not been verified.

Section 87D 5b of this manual instructs that if it is determined a security subject is a member of the armed services the investigation must at that point be discontinued immediately and reported to the Bureau. The basis for such instruction lies in the fact that the subject is no longer within our investigative jurisdiction. In addition, dissemination of pertinent reports must be made locally in the field to the appropriate intelligence agency.

Our responsibility with regard to military personnel is not confined to those who have been the subjects of security investigations. It extends to any subversive derogatory data developed against a member of the armed services during any of our investigations of either individuals or organizations. For instance, if it is determined that a member of the armed forces has been in contact with a security subject or with any individual or group raising security implications, the appropriate intelligence service should be immediately advised locally. This should be done even though the security aspects of the contact have not been resolved, so that the military services may be in a position to discharge their responsibilities. It must be pointed out to them specifically in such instances that the data are unverified, and pertinent developments must be transmitted to them thereafter immediately upon receipt.

Section 87D 6b (1) (h) provides that during the course of security investigations it must be determined whether the subjects have any close relatives in the armed forces. Our responsibilities require that such associations be called to the attention of the appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on the security subjects involved. The evaluation of these associations lies entirely within the province of the intelligence services, but for the reasons stated previously herein it is incumbent upon the Bureau to disseminate this information immediately upon receipt.

Any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel must be set out in a letter to the Bureau, together with a statement as to the local dissemination made in the field. Such letter should be accompanied by a [letterhead] memorandum setting out with particularity the subversive data in a form entirely suitable for dissemination.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Abstract slips, 47,58
- Administrative
  - data, 77
  - tickler, 55,56,74
- Admissible evidence, 29,37
- Agreement between FBI and Secret Service, 81
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
  - Cuban, 45a,45b,81a
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80,81a
  - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Annual review of section A, reserve index, 42b
- Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
- Armed forces
  - dissemination to, 81a
  - members of, 25
  - record in, 27
  - relatives in, 27
  - subjects entering, 56,60
  - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of security index, 50
  - alphabetical section, 51,63
  - at Bureau, 50
  - geographical section, 51,63
  - in field office, 51
  - inactive section, 56
  - special section, 52
  - unavailable section, 53
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71

- Bureau
  - applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
  - authority to investigate, 24
  - responsibility, 19

- Cancellation of
  - security flash notice, 27a
  - security index cards
    - after induction into armed forces, 60
    - mechanics, 60
    - on departure from U. S., 60
    - only after interview, 38
    - recommending, 42,61
    - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 74
- Changes on security index cards, 58
- Channelizing, 24,34,36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
  - aliens, changes in residence or employment, dissemination to Secret Service and INS, 81a
  - extraction, 48,62
  - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants, 74
- Contacting
  - faculty members, 25
  - registrars, 25
  - students, 25
  - superiors of faculty members, 25
- Contacts
  - during investigation, 25
  - with foreign establishments, 25
- Content
  - and appearance
    - of reserve index cards, 43
    - of security index cards, 48
  - of reports, 74
- Corroboration, 37
- Criteria for inclusion in security index, 44a,45
- Cuban
  - activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  - aliens, 45a,45b,81a
  - contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a
  - pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  - special section, 49,53
  - tabbing cards, 45b,64

- Dangerousness
  - definition of, 44
  - determination of, 44
  - Nation of Islam membership, 46
- Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Defectors to Sino-Soviet-bloc countries, 57
- Defense facilities, 64,73
  - list, 64
  - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Definitions, 19
  - of dangerousness, 44
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Detcom, 62
  - administrative procedures, 63
  - key figures, 62,68
  - purpose, 62
  - removal from, 58,63,64
  - special section, 53,64
  - top functionaries, 62,70
  - who to be tabbed, 62
- Determination of
  - dangerousness, 44
  - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Disaffection of U. S. citizens abroad, 57
- Dissemination
  - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81a
  - of reports
    - at SOG, 81a
    - in field, 79
    - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
  - to Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81a
  - to Secret Service, 81
    - closing case, 47,74
    - stamping reserve index cards, 43
- Documentation of reports, 78
  - completion of, 78

- Employees of
  - international organizations, 25
  - U. S. Government, 25
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Evidence, 37
  - desirability of
    - admissibility, 29,37
    - corroboration, 37
  - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  - of membership or affiliation, 29
  - preservation of, 37

- Faculty members
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File on defected subjects, 42
- File reviews, 34
- Flash notices (security)
  - cancellation of, 27a
  - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  - when place, 27
- Foreign
  - diplomats, 25
  - establishments, 25
  - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70.
  - tours, 33a
  - travel, 33
- Forms
  - FD-122, 28,34,48,49,53 to 58,68,74
    - abstracts for, 47
    - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    - cover letter thereto, 32
    - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63
    - placing name in or removing from
      - special section of security index, 53
      - unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    - recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - reference to, 77
    - succinct summary with, 47
      - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - when subject employed in key facility, 65
  - FD-122a, 42b,42c,61,77
  - FD-128, 55,57 to 60,68
    - reference to, 77
    - when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    - when subject moves, 58,59

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Forms (continued)
  - FD-128a, 27a,42c,77
  - FD-154, 42b,42c,57
  - FD-165, 27,77
  - FD-186, 50
  - FD-305, 74,78
  - FD-305a, 78
  - FD-306, 36
  - FD-336, 39
  - FD-366, 57,81a
  - FD-376, 81
- Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22

- Geographical
  - reference number of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  - section of security index, 51,63
- Government employees, 25,70,80

- Handwriting, 29
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
- Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41
- Husband and wife, security investigations, 72

- Identification record , 27
- Immigration and Naturalization Service, dissemination to, 80,81a
- Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,57,60
- Inactive section of security index, 56
- Indices, check of, 72
- Individuals
  - to be investigated, 22
  - traveling abroad, 33
    - against whom stops are placed, 34
    - who are included in security index, 34
    - who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    - with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    - with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  - with foreign diplomatic status, 26
- Informants, cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
- Interviews
  - Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  - Bureau authority, 39,40a
  - conditions for, 40
    - conducting at place of employment, 40a
  - content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  - contents of letter containing results of, 42
  - determine willingness to testify during, 41
  - evaluation of, 45b
  - forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  - no report needed afterward, 40a
  - of hostile subjects, 41
  - of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 24, 25
  - of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  - of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  - of security index subjects, 38
  - of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  - of subjects who express desire for, 42
  - on SAC authority, 38
  - preparations for, 40
  - purpose of, 38
  - recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  - results not affecting security index status, 41
  - signed statements in connection with, 41
  - to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  - when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when discontinue, 40a
  - when report needed after, 41
  - with Bureau authority, 39

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Investigations of
  aliens, 26
  faculty members, 24
  members of labor unions, 29
  naturalized citizens, 26
  students, 24
Investigative
  procedures, 26
  techniques, 34
    file reviews, 34
    photographic surveillances, 35
    physical surveillances, 35
    private firms, records, 36
    public source information, 36
    security informants, 34

Key facilities, 64
  Delimitations Agreement, 64
  employees included in security index, 65
  list, 49,64,65
  responsibility, 64
  status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,74
  when investigate individuals employed in, 64
Key figures
  definition of, 66
  designation of, 67
  foreign travel by, 69
  handling of, 67
  handwriting of, 67
  in armed forces, 68
  list, 69
  movement of, 59,68
  photographs of, 67
  program, 66
  reports on, 68
  status of reports on, 68,73
  when become subjects of SGE cases, 69
Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

Labor union membership, 29
Labor unions, 41
Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
Letter in lieu of report, security index cases, 74
Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Lumping information in reports, 76

Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Members of
  armed forces, dissemination of information concerning, 81a
  labor unions, 29
  law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
Membership or affiliation, 29
Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  unavailable section of security index, 54
Movement of
  key figures, 59,68
  subjects, 58
    key figures, 59,68
    security index subjects, 58
    subjects not in security index, 60
    subjects tabbed for detcom, 60
    top functionaries, 59

Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
Nation of Islam
  potential dangerousness, 46
  what members to be investigated, 23

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- National
  - Defense Education Act of 1958, 22
  - Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - Science Foundation Act of 1950, 22
- Naturalized citizens
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - investigations of, 26
- Negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
- New office of origin, 58
- Observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Office of origin, 27a,58,59,72,81a
- Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
- Overt acts, 45
- Periodic review of reserve index
  - section A, 42b
  - section B, 42c
- Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Photographic surveillances, 35,37
- Photographs, 28
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
  - status of security index cases while obtaining, 28,68
- Physical
  - description, 28
  - surveillances, 35
    - maintenance of SA's notes, 38
- Position
  - and importance, 30
  - in labor organizations, 29
- Potential dangerousness, 44
  - of Nation of Islam members, 46
- Preservation of evidence, 37
- Priority apprehension program, 62
- Private records, 36
- Public
  - Law 87-835, 22
  - source information, 36
  - utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Purpose of
  - investigation, 19
  - security index, 43
- Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
- Recommendation for inclusion in
  - section A, reserve index, 42b,61
  - security index, 47
    - Cuban activity, 45a,45b
    - status, 74
    - when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    - when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    - when subject is out of country, 48
    - when there is missing background information, 47
- Re-evaluation of security index status, 46,57,72,78
- Registrars of institutions of learning, 24,25
- Reinterviews, 42
- Relatives in armed forces, 27
- Removal from security index, 46a,61
- Reports
  - administrative data in, 77
  - character of, 73
  - content of, 74
  - cumulative items, 76
  - dissemination of, 79
    - to Secret Service, 81
  - documentation of, 78
  - lumping information in, 76
  - narrative-type statements, 77
  - negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
  - schedule of, 73
  - status of, 73
  - summarizing information in, 76
  - title of, 72
  - topical headings in, 74
  - when necessary after interview, 41
  - when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  - when not necessary after interview, 40a
  - when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
- Reserve index, 42a
  - arrangement, 42b
  - cards, content and appearance, 43
  - content, 43
  - names deleted from security index, 61,62

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Reserve index (continued)
  - purpose, 42a
  - removal from, 43
  - section A
    - changes, 42c
    - individuals to be included, 42b,61
    - periodic review of, 42b
    - recommendations for inclusion in, 42b,61
    - when to submit reports, 42b
  - section B, 42c,62
    - review of cases, 42c
    - verification of residence and employment, 42c
  - standards for, 42a
  - subjects
    - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    - security of Government employees case in, 70
- Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
- Responsibility of Bureau, 19
- Restrictions on investigations, 24
- Schedule of reports, 73
- Scope of investigation, 26
- Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Secret Service, dissemination to, 81
  - closing case, 47,74
  - reserve index cards, stamping, 43
- Security
  - flash notice
    - cancellation of, 27a
    - notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    - when place, 27
  - index, 43
    - arrangement of, 50
    - cards
      - cancellation of, 38,42,60
      - changes on, 58
      - content and appearance of, 48
      - of key figures, 68
      - tabbing, 45b,62,64,68,70
      - transfers to reserve index, 61,62
    - criteria for, 44a,45
    - Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53,64,81a
    - dangerousness, 44
    - dissemination to
      - Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81a
      - Secret Service, 81
    - purpose, 43
- Security (continued)
  - index (continued)
    - recommendation for, 45a,45b,46a,47
    - re-evaluation of status, 46,57,72,78
    - removal from, 46a,61
    - subjects of
      - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      - security of Government employees case in, 70
    - summary reports, 47
  - informants, 34
    - cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
  - of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Signed statements, 41
- Sino-Soviet bloc, 44a
- Sleepers, 31,52
- Special section of security index, 52
  - cards, 49,56
  - Cuban, 49,53
  - exception to unavailable section, 56
- Standards for reserve index, 42a
  - section A, 42b
- Status of cases, 73
  - on key figures, 73
  - on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66,74
  - on subjects in security index, 74
  - on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  - on top functionaries, 73
  - while obtaining photographs, 28
  - while securing handwriting, 29
  - while verifying residence and employment, 57,74
- Students
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigations of, 24
- Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
- Summary reports, 47,71,76
- Superiors of faculty members, 25
- Surveillances
  - photographic, 35,37
  - physical, 35

(10) Communist infiltration of mass organizations program

(a) Submit semiannual letters March 1 and September 1 under caption of above program, Bufile 100-3-106, using following topical outline and headings:

I. Information concerning Communist Party program
Furnish summary of information received concerning over-all Communist Party program to infiltrate mass organizations, nationally and locally; steps taken to carry out program; identity specific groups which are targets for infiltration or which have been infiltrated by party members; and success being achieved by party.

II. Organizations concerning which information previously submitted
Only list names and Bureau file numbers concerning]those cases wherein, since submission of last semiannual letter, letters using the five-point outline set out under item (4) above were furnished to Bureau. Do not list those cases which were under investigation by Bureau authority at time of submission of last semiannual letter.

III. Organizations concerning which information being submitted for first time with instant letter
Only list names and Bureau file numbers (if known) of those organizations concerning which information has not previously been furnished Bureau but which is being furnished, together with recommendations regarding future investigations, for first time with instant letter. Submit information, using five-point outline as set out under item (4) above, as enclosure to letter. Submit separate enclosure on each organization listed in this category. Furnish two copies of each enclosure and sufficient copies of cover letter in order that one copy each of semiannual letter and enclosure can be placed in Bureau file on organization. This will eliminate necessity of submitting separate summary letter under each individual case caption. Do not use T symbols in enclosure, but set out identities of sources.

f. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Bureau Agents during course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority.

g. Photographic surveillances

(1) No photographic surveillances are to be conducted in communist front organization cases unless it is essential to protect Bureau's interests in internal security field by supplementing live informant coverage of a particular meeting with such a surveillance.

(2) Request Bureau authority to institute such a surveillance and outline manner in which it will be conducted and supervision which will be afforded it.

(3) No such surveillances should be instituted without specific Bureau authority.

[h. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against the President

On 2-3-65, an "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection" was signed and became effective. This agreement is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual.

The agreement provides that the FBI, in its investigations of organizations whose activities are inimical to the welfare of the U. S., will be alert to and promptly notify Secret Service of any information indicating a plot against the person of the President; thereafter, it is the responsibility of Secret Service to initiate such action as is necessary to neutralize such a plot.

The field must be alert during the course of the investigation of an organization for information indicating a plot against the person of the President. Upon receipt of such information, immediately furnish complete details to the nearest office of Secret Service and appropriate local law enforcement agencies and advise the Bureau at that time by teletype, or telephone if the facts warrant, of the information furnished and the fact it has been so disseminated. An immediate attempt should be made to verify the information received but no evaluation of the information should be attempted.

Prepare at once a letterhead memorandum which should include complete details disseminated and the identities of the Secret Service officer and the local law enforcement officers to whom given and the date and time of notification. Promptly disseminate the letterhead memorandum locally to Secret Service and any other appropriate Government agency and furnish sufficient copies to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Thereafter, copies of all letterhead memoranda and reports concerning the organization should be disseminated locally to Secret Service on a continuing basis and extra copies of such communications should be furnished the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG.

The field should insure that the identities of the members of the organization who are "in" on the plot are determined. Background information concerning the individuals (see items 1 and 3 of appendix A to the agreement) should be fully developed and included in the communications prepared and disseminated to Secret Service. If such identities and information are known at the time the initial information is received, they should be included in the first letterhead memorandum prepared in the matter.]

3. Investigative procedures and suggestions re communist front organizations
To accurately and clearly show true nature of communist front groups, data concerning the following topics, where applicable, should be fully developed and reported on:
   a. Origin and scope
   Date of formation. Circumstances under which founded. Determine who in Communist Party instructed organization be set up; whether decision to set up group made at meeting of party functionaries and, if so, identify functionaries present; identity of individual or individuals responsible for organizing group. Identify all known chapters, if any, and location thereof.
   b. Whether incorporated
   Many organizations are incorporated requiring filing of incorporation papers with appropriate state officials.
   c. Aims and purposes
   d. Location of headquarters
   e. Officers
   List principal officers, board of directors, etc., and appropriate characterization of each showing communist affiliation.
   f. Membership
   Ascertain estimated membership. Whenever possible, secure membership lists, mailing lists, or other records reflecting affiliation with organization. Usually obtainable through informant coverage or utilization of various investigative techniques. Secure accurate description of all lists to make sure there is no confusion as to the exact identity or significance of list being reported on.
   g. Official organ, if any, and other literature
      (1) May be obtained through confidential mailbox, panel sources, and confidential informants
      (2) All such literature should be appropriately identified.
      (3) At least one copy of each pertinent piece of literature should be promptly furnished to Bureau.
   h. General activities
   i. Finances
   Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Location of bank accounts frequently obtainable through confidential informants, credit records, public utility records, records of rental agent, and monitoring of other organizations' bank accounts.
   j. Support given to Communist Party
   Preponderance of evidence should be developed reflecting support, financial or otherwise, given by the organization to the Communist Party.
   k. Support received from Communist Party
   Preponderance of evidence should be developed reflecting support, financial or otherwise, received by the organization from the Communist Party.
   l. Implementation of Communist Party line
   Can usually be shown through comparison of programs and literature of organization with those of Communist Party during any particular period.

Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through the following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various types of public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of information, interviews with past or present

of the source, date of activity, date received, and name of the Agent receiving the information are known, it is not necessary to request the office originally obtaining the information to document it further by furnishing information showing the location of the original in the office files. If all documentation, except the latter item, is not in the possession of the office preparing the report, it should be obtained.

V. If it is found desirable to include in a report the identities of individuals who are known communists and have been associates of the subject to lend weight to evidence of the subject's potential dangerousness, only the source of the information showing the associate to be a communist need be identified.

VI. In a very limited number of instances it may be necessary to obtain a thumbnail sketch or characterization of an individual or organization from another office or the Bureau. When such information is received in your office, it should be placed in thumbnail sketch files so that it will be available to and can be readily located by Agents having future need for it, thereby eliminating repeated requests of another office for the same information.

[g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
Channelizing memoranda in organizational and individual security case files may be destroyed following submission of reports in these cases.

[[Copies of informant's statements designated for the 100 classification
[case files of informants may be destroyed when one year old on an
[annual basis.]

[In destroying these[communications,]be guided by instructions for destruction of channelizing memoranda as set out in Manual of Rules and Regulations.

8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations
The proper utilization of information received by the Bureau is foremost among our responsibilities as an investigative agency. It is the Bureau's duty to keep the proper intelligence agencies informed concerning information of interest to them. Further, information which comes to the attention of the Bureau in connection with the conduct of investigations normally and regularly within the jurisdiction of the Bureau, which information is believed to be of interest to another agency within the executive branch of the Government, should be forwarded to the interested agency unless there are good and compelling reasons not to do so. This is in line with the Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives which provide for the dissemination to other agencies of information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters where the specific agency has a present or potential interest in the information.

Set out hereafter is a summarization of existing Bureau requirements regarding dissemination of security information developed on individuals during the course of regular investigations in the security field. It

should be apparent that all conceivable situations cannot be anticipated. For that reason, the data below should be considered as pertaining to representative situations which occur frequently enough to warrant specific treatment. The basic rule to follow is, of course, that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in the executive branch of the Government and that the term "interested agency" must be interpreted in the light of reason and common sense. Any unusual situations should be brought to the attention of the Bureau promptly for consideration and disposition.

Considerations affecting the national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico necessitate that the broadest possible construction be given to the existing requirements of dissemination to the intelligence services located in those areas. The Anchorage, Honolulu, and San Juan Offices should adhere to such policy and effect such dissemination as to discharge fully our responsibilities as laid down in Bureau instructions, together with practices which have been dictated by circumstances within those particular offices.

The material set out below must be read in conjunction with the Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5, which discusses the Bureau's over-all responsibilities in dissemination, together with existing policies, qualifications, and exceptions.

a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau

(1) Aliens and naturalized citizens
Information concerning aliens and naturalized citizens which might have a bearing on the deportation or denaturalization of such individuals should in all instances be forwarded to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Refer to the Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5. If any doubt exists, the matter should in all instances be resolved in favor of dissemination.

(2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services
Dissemination in these cases is treated specifically in section 87D 7c[(3)] of this manual.

(3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense
Dissemination should be made locally to G-2 and, in addition, to other intelligence services if their interest is apparent in individual cases or in specific facilities.

(4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard
Dissemination should be made locally to the appropriate military intelligence service. Dissemination to headquarters of the appropriate services will be made at SOG.

(5) Seamen and subjects employed in the maritime industry, including longshoremen and other water-front employees
Dissemination should be made to the Coast Guard on a local level and, when circumstances dictate, to other intelligence agencies, including ONI, which have an interest in the data reported. Appropriate dissemination on a headquarters level will be made at SOG.

(6) Employees of the Federal Government within the purview of Executive Order 10450
No dissemination of the reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in the field. If, however, subject is employed

(b) Where potential dangerousness of a subject has been established and inclusion of that subject in security index is warranted, the office of origin shall submit a recommendation for inclusion in security index by submitting form FD-122 to Bureau. Form must be prepared in triplicate. Original and one copy shall be forwarded to Bureau and one copy will be placed in subject's investigative case file.

Nothing should appear on FD-122 or subsequently on the security index card which is not in the subject's case file. Form FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend a subject for inclusion in the security index and (2) to submit changes to data which appears on face of security index cards already existent.

Proper selection should be made in the opening paragraph option. FD-122 is submitted with abstract when used to recommend the subject for inclusion in the security index and without abstract when used to indicate additions, deletions, or changes in data appearing on existing cards.

(c) When form FD-122 is submitted to Bureau recommending inclusion of a name in security index, attach an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of facts on which recommendation has been based. Facts must be in detail to clearly show soundness of recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must contain pertinent dates of subject's activities.

(d) When, at conclusion of investigation, subject's name is not being recommended for security index, set out a brief summary statement in the appropriate communication closing the case showing reasons for the decision.

(e) Security index cards shall be recommended by and maintained by office of origin only.

(f) A current report must be in possession of the Bureau when subject is recommended for security index. If it is the initial report in the case, it must be a summary report. If, however, prior investigative reports have been submitted which are suitable for dissemination and are appropriately documented, a summary report need not be submitted.

(g) To assure that subject recommended for security index will receive proper attention, case shall be kept in pending or pending-inactive status until security index card has been received from Bureau and filed in office security index. If case continues in pending status because of outstanding investigation, reports shall carry a lead to follow authorization of security index card by the Bureau[and if approved to submit letterhead memorandum for Secret Service]in addition to other leads. If outstanding investigation has been completed and case would otherwise be closed upon submission of the report and form FD-122, case shall be placed in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau[and if approved submit letterhead memorandum for dissemination to Secret Service.] In latter instance, upon receipt of[security index card and following local dissemination to Secret Service of Bureau-approved letterhead memorandum,]case may be closed administratively.

(h) Recommendation for security index card should not be delayed because of absence of information concerning race, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, or description where security index card is warranted. In such instances, recommendation for the card should be submitted with a current report and case retained in pending status with active investigation continuing to determine missing items of information.

(i) Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for the security index provided instructions set forth in 87D 6b (3) and (4) are followed. Forms FD-122 submitted on subjects should include data required in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV below.

(j) When form FD-122 is submitted recommending a security index card be prepared on a subject who is of Chinese extraction, the words "Other -- Chinese" must be included in the space on the form calling for a statement as to the subject's race. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending that a security index card be prepared on a person who is not of Chinese extraction but who has shown definite sympathies with communist China, the form should include under "Miscellaneous" a statement to the effect "sympathetic to Communist China."

(k) Upon receipt of form FD-122 at Bureau, the case of the subject will be reviewed and if recommendation of field is concurred in, security index cards will be prepared. Duplicate copy of form will be returned to office of origin stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." The three cards shall be filed in security index as outlined below. The returned copy of FD-122 shall be placed in subject's main investigative case file. Offices with a geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive an extra card.

(l) When security index cards are received from Bureau, data thereon must be checked for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards of similar size to security index cards which are stapled to back of two of the cards. One card will then be filed in the geographical section of office security index (except special section cards and unavailable section cards - see 87D 7b (6) (b) III and IV below), and one card shall be filed in the duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. The other card is filed in alphabetical section of security index. No information shall be permanently added, deleted, or changed on face of security index card without complying with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (8).

(5) Content and appearance of security index card

(a) Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain the following information. If any of items enumerated in I through XIV are missing at time the security index card is made, the case should be continued as pending and investigation conducted to obtain the necessary information. Set forth under each item below are possible categories in which subject may be classified, together with code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on form FD-122 when sending form to Bureau recommending security index card be prepared. Code letters should subsequently appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

I. Name and aliases

The full and correct name and aliases of the subject must be contained on the security index card. When the true name of a subject or any aliases are changed, added, deleted, or are found to be incorrect, form FD-122 must be submitted[showing]the correct data to be placed on the security index card.

II. Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)

III. Sex

Male	M
Female	F

IV. Citizenship

Native born	NB
Naturalized	NA
Alien	AL

(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)

V. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency

Communist Party, USA	COM
[Progressive Labor Movement	PLM]
Socialist Workers Party	SWP
Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
American Socialist Clubs	ASC
Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
Proletarian Party of America	PPA
Nation of Islam	NOI
Bulgarian	BUL
Cuban	CUB
Czechoslavakian	CZE
Hungarian	HUN
Rumanian	RUM
Russian	RUS
Yugoslavian	YUG

VI. Dangerousness classification (where applicable)

Detcom	DC

VII. Key figure and top functionary designation (where applicable)

Key figure	KF
Top functionary	TF

VIII. Special section cards

Atomic energy program employees	AEP
Cuban special section	CUB
Espionage subjects	ESP
Foreign government employees	FGE
Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
United Nations employees	UNE
U. S. Government employees	GOV

IX. Unavailable section cards

Missing	MI
Out of country	OC
Imprisoned	PR

X. Date and place of birth

XI. Key facility geographical reference number and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility obtained from the Department of Defense Key Facilities List (where applicable)

XII. Residence address

XIII. Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.

XIV. Field office file number

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description

(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division

(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. [This photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.]

(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms

(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The white 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by this machine and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

When it is determined that a security index subject is imprisoned, make arrangements with the confining institutions to be informed of the subject's release. An administrative tickler should be set up for a date shortly prior to the expected date of the subject's release to assure that you are informed of the subject's release. Upon receipt of advice of the release of the subject, ascertain whether the subject should be continued in the security index. If so, submit FD-122 in accordance with instructions set forth below.

Standards for inclusion of such subjects in the unavailable section of the security index are the same as those for any other potentially dangerous subject.

When submitting a recommendation for inclusion of a subject in the unavailable section who has not previously been included in the security index or changing an existing security index card from the geographical or special sections to the unavailable section, FD-122 must include the words "Unavailable Section" typed in the upper right portion thereof..

Places of former residence or former employment are not to be included on security index cards of subjects who are missing, who are out of the country, or who are imprisoned inasmuch as such data serves no useful purpose on the card.

Security index cards to be placed in the unavailable section shall bear code letters in the upper right portion designating the subsection in which the cards should be placed. Upon receipt of the three cards from the Bureau for each subject in one of these categories, place the required additional data on two which shall be filed alphabetically in the appropriate subsection of the unavailable section. File the third card in the alphabetical section of the security index.

When a subject who has been included in the unavailable section as a missing subject is located in your office territory or a subject who has been out of the country has returned to your territory or an imprisoned subject has been released, submit FD-122[showing]the subject's current residence and place of employment. The words "Remove from Unavailable Section" shall be typed in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)" on FD-122. If the subject's card is to be placed in the special section, the statement "Place in Special Section - Espionage (or Foreign Government Employee, etc.)" should be added in this space. When the new cards are received from the Bureau, they shall be checked for accuracy and the description and photograph, if available, shall be placed on two of the three cards. These two cards shall then be filed in the geographical or special section (where applicable) and the other card shall then be filed in the alphabetical section. The old cards in the unavailable and alphabetical sections shall be destroyed.

When a subject who has been included in the unavailable section is located in another division, FD-128 shall be submitted to the Bureau and the new office of origin with the pertinent data placed thereon including his current residence and business addresses. The notation "Remove from Unavailable Section" shall be typed in the space to the right of the addresses. New security index cards will then be submitted to the new office of origin by the Bureau.

(D) Exception - re special section
Security index cards relating to special section subjects will continue to be maintained in the special section rather than in the unavailable section. When it is determined that a special section subject is out of the country, imprisoned, or missing, FD-122 shall be submitted to the Bureau with the appropriate unavailable category designated as set forth above. New cards retaining the special section designation, as well as indicating the unavailable category, will be prepared. Upon receipt of these amended cards from the Bureau, two copies will be filed in the special section of the field office security index and one copy will be filed in the alphabetical section.

V. Inactive section
Each office shall maintain an inactive section in its security index which will contain the security index cards of individuals who were included in the active security index at the time they were inducted into the armed forces.

Upon learning of the induction of a subject into one of the armed forces, a letter is to be submitted to the Bureau advising of the identity of the branch of service into which the subject was inducted, together with the date and place of induction.

If pertinent information which has not previously been set forth in report form exists in the office files, the same shall be included in an investigative report which is to be forwarded as an enclosure to the letter advising of the subject's entrance into the armed forces. The Bureau will then furnish appropriate intelligence agencies with pertinent information concerning that subject and request notification in the event of the subject's discharge from the service.

The geographical security index cards for such subjects shall be placed in the inactive section of the field security index. Destroy the alphabetical cards.

Set up an administrative tickler for each subject in the inactive section. At the termination of each six-month period, appropriate inquiry is to be made by the field to determine if the subject has been discharged from military service. Such checks should be made locally through pretext inquiries if necessary. If such information is not obtainable locally, submit a letter[requesting a check to the field office covering the records for]the appropriate service.

Upon learning that a subject carried in the inactive section of the security index has returned to civilian status, determine whether his activities warrant inclusion in the active security index. If so, FD-122

(6) Character
  (a) Key figures and top functionaries
    Internal Security - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.
    Examples:
      Internal Security - C
      Internal Security - SWP
  (b) Others
    Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.
    Examples:
      Security Matter - C
      Security Matter - SWP
      Security Matter - X (native fascist)
      Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a key figure, the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject is designated a key figure, the first report after the designation and all subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. In any event, if subject is employed in a[defense facility so designated by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 5 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended,]add the additional character "Internal Security Act of 1950" if the organizational activity of the subject is of a communist nature.

(7) Deleted

(8) Status

All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:
  (a) Top functionaries
    I. Pending inactive
      (A) Reports are to be submitted quarterly. Forty-five days prior to the date a quarterly report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.
  (b) Key figures
    I. Pending inactive
      (A) Reports are to be submitted semiannually. Forty-five days prior to the date a semiannual report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.
  (c) Deleted

(d) Other security index subjects
  I. Closed
    (A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of an annual investigative report. If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed. The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the annual report is due. Such cases shall also be opened and assigned six months after submission of the annual report to accomplish verification of addresses. Upon such verification, the cases should be closed administratively.

(e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index
  I. Pending inactive
    (A) If all active investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau
    (B) Set forth lead to follow Bureau for security index card[and if approved to submit letterhead memorandum for Secret Service.]
  II. Closed
    (A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau [and dissemination of Bureau-approved letterhead memorandum to Secret Service]
    (B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (d) above.

(f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein
  I. Closed
    (A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(9) Content
(a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.
  I. Background
    (A) Birth date
    (B) Citizenship status
    (C) Education
    (D) Marital status
    (E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
    (F) Identification record
    (G) Employment
    (H) Residence
    (I) Status of health (if known)
  II. Connections with Communist Party (or other basic revolutionary groups and/or front organizations)
    (A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.
    (B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

(3) By force or violence, or
By assassination of any officer of such government
It will be necessary to show:
(a) The identity and official capacity of such officer
(b) The identity of persons conspiring to assassinate, or actually assassinating such officer
(c) Full details surrounding the assassination or attempted assassination
(d) Reasons for the assassination, and ends to be gained by such assassinations, or

b. Printed, published, edited, issued, or circulated
(1) The person with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the U.S., or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof
(2) Printed, published, edited, issued, circulated, sold, distributed, or publicly displayed written or printed matter
(3) Advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government

of the U. S. by force or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof, or

c. Organized society, group, or assembly
  (1) The person organized, or helped organize, a society, group, or assembly of persons
  (2) Which taught, advocated, or encouraged the overthrowing or destruction of the Government of the U. S., or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof
  (3) By force or violence, or
  (4) The person became a member of, or affiliated with, such society, group, or assembly of persons
  (5) Knowing the purpose thereof

B. SUBMISSION TO THE BUREAU OF SUBVERSIVE DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUALS

1. To insure the proper discharge of the Bureau's responsibility to furnish information at the seat of Government at the request of other agencies and to have it available at the seat of Government when such requests are received from other agencies, the Bureau must be promptly furnished, for indexing purposes by offices covering the national and local headquarters of the various subversive organizations, the names of, and identifying data concerning, persons affiliated with and becoming affiliated with the following types of organizations listed below.
  a. Basic revolutionary organizations or groups
     Communist Party, USA
     Socialist Workers Party
     [Proletarian Party of America
     Other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups,
     [if any, of the preceding[three]organizations
     Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
  b. Nationalist and fascist-type groups
  c. Front organizations of 1, a and b above, including those
     (1) Cited by the Attorney General
     (2) Cited or declared by the House Committee on Un-American Activities or by any of the various legislative committees
     (3) Described as such or as an organization dominated or controlled by one of the basic revolutionary organizations or groups by security informants or other sources of known reliability

   Such lists should include the organization's membership list and any other record showing affiliation.

2. Field offices obtaining information concerning such affiliation of individuals residing outside their territory must expeditiously furnish such information to the office covering the address of the person.

3. The information should be submitted to the Bureau in duplicate by letter captioned with the title of the organizational case file, for example, "Communist Party, USA, ________ District, ________ Division; Internal [Security - C" or["Socialist Workers Party, ________ Division; Internal [Security - SWP"]and should clearly indicate that the list is being furnished to the Bureau for indexing purposes only.

4. [Information received from all sources, including that received from [confidential sources, highly confidential sources, reports of security informants and sources, and public and other sources, should be reviewed to insure that the Bureau has been furnished in the past and will be furnished in the future lists of all individuals (together with identifying data) affiliated with all organizations set forth in 1 a, b, and c.

5. In forwarding such information to the Bureau, the offices should incorporate, insofar as possible, information concerning a number of individuals in one letter. The letter should contain sufficient identifying data concerning each individual to enable the Bureau to identify that individual

IV. Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing in section A of reserve index cards

(A) Changes in data appearing on section A reserve index cards should be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a.

(B) Deletions from section A of the reserve index should be recommended by letter. The letter should set forth the basis for the recommendation.

(C) Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section A cards to new office of origin.

(b) Section B

I. This section is to contain the names of all other individuals included in the reserve index. This section is to be maintained only in the field office. [Cases falling within this category should be thoroughly reviewed and analyzed from an investigative viewpoint at least once every two years on a continuing basis. As a minimum this review should include verification of residence and employment and contact with logical sources and informants. Be alert to selecting logical subjects for interview as means of developing potential sources, informants, and witnesses. Also be alert for recommending individuals for inclusion in section A of the reserve index or the security index if warranted. Form FD-154 can be adapted for use in cases in this category.]

II. Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section B cards to new office of origin.

(4) Content
- (a) Each card in section A and section B should contain, as a minimum, the following:
  - I. Name and aliases
  - II. Race
  - III. Sex
  - IV. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
  - V. Citizenship
  - VI. Residence
  - VII. Employment
  - VIII. Birth data
  - IX. Office file number
  - X. The letters "SS" if dissemination has been made to Secret Service in accordance with instructions in section 83K, item 2, volume III, of this manual
- (b) In addition, membership and position or association in a subversive group or groups, together with the source and date of the information, may be added.

(5) Removal and deletion of cards
- (a) Destroy cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources or who subsequently become subjects of security index cards.
- (b) Advise the Bureau of the destruction only in the case of section A cards.

b. Security index

(1) Purpose
- (a) Security index cards are prepared and maintained by the Bureau to serve as operational guide for apprehension of persons deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country in the event of a national emergency.
- (b) It shall contain the names of all persons who have been determined through investigation to be dangerous or potentially dangerous because of their membership in or affiliation with or espousal of doctrines of basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations and who will be apprehended upon receipt of instructions from the Attorney General.
- (c) It shall include subjects of espionage investigations and any other type of Bureau investigation provided their activities bring them within the scope of the security index criteria.
- (d) Action shall be taken against individuals included in the security index only upon authorization of warrants of arrest by the Attorney General. However, in preparing and maintaining the security index, to all practical effects, the Bureau is making the decision as to those persons who will be apprehended in the event of an emergency, inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised that he does not have funds or

manpower to review security index cases.

(e) Names shall be included in the security index only when investigation has established and reports[show] sufficient facts and evidence to justify the inclusion of each subject in the security index.

(f) The contents of the security index must be accurate and correct at all times. Matters pertaining to its preparation and maintenance must be given preferred, expeditious, continuous, and detailed attention.

(g) Matters pertaining to the security index are strictly confidential and are not to be mentioned or alluded to in investigative reports.

(h) The general operation and content of the security index must not be discussed by field personnel of the Bureau without prior Bureau authority.

(i) Matters pertaining to the security index may be discussed with duly qualified representatives of other Federal intelligence agencies only on a strictly confidential basis and only in instances in which an individual subject of prime interest to one of these services is involved.

(2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual

(a) The dangerousness of a member or affiliate of a subversive organization does not necessarily depend entirely upon his personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or a disposition to violence. Although these factors must be taken into consideration in evaluating an individual's potential dangerousness, other factors are essential in making this determination. An individual's dangerousness also depends upon the contribution he has made or is making in the advancement of the principles and aims of the subversive movement with which he is connected or his subversive potentialities in the event of a national emergency. Bear in mind that a subject active in a subversive organization is not merely an isolated individual but is a part of an organization of which the purposes are opposed to the best interests of the U. S. An individual's loyalty to a subversive organization and the principles thereof is a primary factor to take into consideration in evaluating his potential dangerousness;[however, regardless of evidence of subversive affiliation, all evidence developed during the course of a security investigation must be carefully weighed for the purpose of determining whether the subject's activities depict him as a potentially dangerous individual in time of a national emergency. Factors having a bearing upon an individual's potential dangerousness are numerous and will vary in each case in degree.] Among such factors are:

I. Long continued membership in a subversive organization
II. Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools
III. Frequent or regular attendance at organizational meetings and functions
IV. Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization
V. Possession of or continued study of revolutionary literature
VI. Preparation or distribution of subversive propaganda and/or literature
VII. Holding positions in the subversive organization or in other organizations of a front character which indicate confidence of such organizations in his loyalty
VIII. Espousal of a subversive doctrine exemplified in his acts and utterances

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Forms (continued)
  - FD-128a, 27a,42c,77
  - FD-154, 42b,42c,57
  - FD-165, 27,77
  - FD-186, 50
  - FD-305, 74,78
  - FD-305a, 78
  - FD-306, 36
  - FD-336, 39
  - FD-366, 81
- Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22

- Geographical
  - reference number of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  - section of security index, 51,63
- Government employees, 25,70,80

- Handwriting, 29
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
- Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41
- Husband and wife, security investigations, 72

- Identification record , 27
- Immigration and Naturalization Service, dissemination to, 80,81
- Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,57,60
- Inactive section of security index, 56
- Indices, check of, 72
- Individuals
  - to be investigated, 22
  - traveling abroad, 33
    - against whom stops are placed, 34
    - who are included in security index, 34
    - who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    - with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    - with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  - with foreign diplomatic status, 26
- Informants, cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
- Interviews
  - Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  - Bureau authority, 39,40a
  - conditions for, 40
    - conducting at place of employment, 40a
  - content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  - contents of letter containing results of, 42
  - determine willingness to testify during, 41
  - evaluation of, 45b
  - forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  - no report needed afterward, 40a
  - of hostile subjects, 41
  - of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 24, 25
  - of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  - of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  - of security index subjects, 38
  - of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  - of subjects who express desire for, 42
  - on SAC authority, 38
  - preparations for, 40
  - purpose of, 38
  - recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  - results not affecting security index status, 41
  - signed statements in connection with, 41
  - to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  - when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when discontinue, 40a
  - when report needed after, 41
  - with Bureau authority, 39

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Investigations of
  - aliens, 26
  - faculty members, 24
  - members of labor unions, 29
  - naturalized citizens, 26
  - students, 24
- Investigative
  - procedures, 26
  - techniques, 34
    - file reviews, 34
    - photographic surveillances, 35
    - physical surveillances, 35
    - private firms, records, 36
    - public source information, 36
    - security informants, 34
- Key facilities, 64
  - Delimitations Agreement, 64
  - employees included in security index, 65
  - list, 49,64,65
  - responsibility, 64
  - status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,74
  - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Key figures
  - definition of, 66
  - designation of, 67
  - foreign travel by, 69
  - handling of, 67
  - handwriting of, 67
  - in armed forces, 68
  - list, 69
  - movement of, 59,68
  - photographs of, 67
  - program, 66
  - reports on, 68
  - status of reports on, 68,73
  - when become subjects of SGE cases, 69
- Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
- Labor union membership, 29
- Labor unions, 43
- Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Letter in lieu of report, security index cases, 74
- Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Lumping information in reports, 76
- Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Members of
  - armed forces, dissemination of information concerning, 81a
  - labor unions, 29
  - law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Membership or affiliation, 29
- Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  - letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  - unavailable section of security index, 54
- Movement of
  - key figures, 59,68
  - subjects, 58
    - key figures, 59,68
    - security index subjects, 58
    - subjects not in security index, 60
    - subjects tabbed for detcom, 60
    - top functionaries, 59
- Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
- Nation of Islam
  - potential dangerousness, 46
  - what members to be investigated, 23

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- National
  - Defense Education Act of 1958, 22
  - Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - Science Foundation Act of 1950, 22
- Naturalized citizens
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - investigations of, 26
- Negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
- New office of origin, 58

- Observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Office of origin, 27a,58,59,72,81a
- Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
- Overt acts, 45

- Periodic review of reserve index
  - section A, 42b
  - section B, 42c
- Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Photographic surveillances, 35,37
- Photographs, 28
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
  - status of security index cases while obtaining, 28,68
- Physical
  - description, 28
  - surveillances, 35
    - maintenance of SA's notes, 38
- Position
  - and importance, 30
  - in labor organizations, 29
- Potential dangerousness, 44
  - of Nation of Islam members, 46
- Preservation of evidence, 37
- Priority apprehension program, 62
- Private records, 36
- Public
  - Law 87-835, 22
  - source information, 36
  - utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Purpose of
  - investigation, 19
  - security index, 43

- Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
- Recommendation for inclusion in
  - section A, reserve index, 42b,61
  - security index, 47
    - Cuban activity, 45a,45b
    - when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    - when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    - when subject is out of country, 48
    - when there is missing background information, 47
- Re-evaluation of security index status, 57,72,78
- Registrars of institutions of learning, 24,25
- Reinterviews, 42
- Relatives in armed forces, 27
- Removal from security index, 46a,61
- Reports
  - administrative data in, 77
  - character of, 73
  - content of, 74
  - cumulative items, 76
  - dissemination of, 79
  - documentation of, 78
  - lumping information in, 76
  - narrative-type statements, 77
  - negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
  - schedule of, 73
  - status of, 73
  - summarizing information in, 76
  - title of, 72
  - topical headings in, 74
  - when necessary after interview, 41
  - when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  - when not necessary after interview, 40a
  - when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
- Reserve index, 42a
  - arrangement, 42b
  - cards, content and appearance, 43
  - content, 43
  - names deleted from security index, 61,62

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Reserve index (continued)
  purpose, 42a
  removal from, 43
  section A
    changes, 42c
    individuals to be included, 42b,61
    periodic review of, 42b
    recommendations for inclusion in, 42b,61
    when to submit reports, 42b
  section B, 42c,62
    review of cases, 42c
    verification of residence and employment, 42c
  standards for, 42a
  subjects
    espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    security of Government employees case in, 70
Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
Responsibility of Bureau, 19
Restrictions on investigations, 24

Schedule of reports, 73
Scope of investigation, 26
Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Secret Service, dissemination to, 81
  reserve index cards, stamping, 43
Security
  flash notice
    cancellation of, 27a
    notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    when place, 27
  index, 43
    arrangement of, 50
    cards
      cancellation of, 38,42,60
      changes on, 58
      content and appearance of, 48
      of key figures, 68
      tabbing, 45b,62,64,68,70
      transfers to reserve index, 61,62
    criteria for, 44a,45
    Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53,64
    dangerousness, 44
    dissemination to
      Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81
      Secret Service, 81
    purpose, 43
Security (continued)
  index (continued)
    recommendation for, 45a,45b,46a,47
    re-evaluation of status, 46,57,72,78
    removal from, 46a,61
    subjects of
      espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      security of Government employees case in, 70
    summary reports, 47
  informants, 34
    cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
  of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
Signed statements, 41
Sino-Soviet bloc, 44a
Sleepers, 31,52
Special section of security index, 52
  cards, 49,56
  Cuban, 49,53
  exception to unavailable section, 56
Standards for reserve index, 42a
  section A, 42b
Status of cases, 73
  on key figures, 73
  on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66,74
  on subjects in security index, 74
  on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  on top functionaries, 73
  while obtaining photographs, 28
  while securing handwriting, 29
  while verifying residence and employment, 57
Students
  contacts with, 25
  investigations of, 24
Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
Summary reports, 47,71,76
Superiors of faculty members, 25
Surveillances
  photographic, 35,37
  physical, 35

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Tabbing SI cards, 45b,62,64,68, 70
Thumbnail sketches, 79
Title of reports, 72
Top functionaries, 66,69
  change of office of origin, 70
  definition of, 69
  designation of, 69
  handwriting of, 70
  inclusion in key figure list, 70
  movement of, 59
  photographs of, 70
  program, 66
  regulations governing, 70
  reports on, 59,70
    status of, 70,73
  tabbing for detcom, 62,70
Topical headings in reports, 74
Tours, 33a
Travel
  abroad, 33
  behind iron curtain, 34

Unavailable section of security index, 53
  imprisoned subjects, 54
  missing subjects, 32,54
  subjects traveling abroad, 34,54
Underground membership or activity, 31
United Nations employees, 25
U. S. Government employees, 25
U. S. Information Agency, inclusion of employees in security index or reserve index, 70

Verification of
  addresses
    reserve index
      section A, 42b
      section B, 42c
    security index, 32,57,74,81
  employment
    reserve index
      section A, 42b
      section B, 42c
    security index, 32,57,74,81
  key facility or defense facility status of place of employment, 64
Voice of America (See U. S. Information Agency.)

Wife and husband, security investigations, 72

Yugoslav intelligence agents, contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a

The above is not all-inclusive. Facts developed in each case will produce information which will be indicative of the necessity for conducting further investigation along lines which will necessitate the use of various investigative techniques to develop the case fully. The successful investigation of an individual will depend upon the resourcefulness of the investigating Agents in developing techniques which will further establish the subversive activity of a subject.

Discretion must be used in those instances in which contact with persons known to the subject is believed desirable. Where such contact is contemplated, the Agent should assure himself of the character, loyalty, and reliability of the person to be contacted concerning the subject by reviewing the office indices and in some instances conducting preliminary inquiry, possibly under pretext, with others to ascertain the character, reliability, and loyalty of the person of whom inquiry concerning the subject is intended.

In conducting security investigations the necessity of obtaining admissible evidence must be continually borne in mind. However, sources furnishing information of a confidential nature are valuable and should be continued and enlarged for the purpose of obtaining information which can be corroborated by other sources which can be disclosed, thus rendering the information admissible as evidence.

The danger of relying upon evidence from only one confidential informant or other source is obvious and every effort should be made to obtain evidence from various types of sources and through various investigative techniques.

Information obtained from one source should be corroborated by contacts with confidential informants, public and private sources, through physical and photographic surveillances, review of office files, and other sources. Adequate coordination of information received from confidential sources with active investigation should be maintained at all times. For example, when it is ascertained through one of these sources that an important meeting is to occur, the nature of the meeting should be confirmed if possible by independent sources which can furnish evidence of an admissible character. The meeting should be covered by arrangement for attendance by confidential informants to obtain admissible evidence of the proceedings. The meetings should be placed under physical surveillance, licenses of automobiles parked near the meeting place noted, and attendants identified. If possible and advisable, photographic surveillances should be established. Other types of information received from confidential sources should receive similar attention in order that verification may be made and admissible evidence developed.

(6) Preservation of evidence

(a) Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained with a view to its possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.

[(b) Satisfactory notes or[statements]from informants necessary from which to refresh their recollection in the event they are called upon to testify at some future date. Such
[notes[and statements]must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and must contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.

[(c) Informant's original notes or[statements]not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings

(d) The above applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or evidence otherwise obtained by Agents.

(7) Interviews with subjects of security investigations

(a) Purpose

I. To determine a subject's sympathies when investigation is inconclusive or to determine whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines

II. To develop information concerning subject's activities and those of others known to him to have been associated with a subversive movement

III. To develop security informants

(b) Subjects not included in the security index
No security investigation of an individual shall be closed unless the subject is included in the security index or consideration given to interviewing him.

(c) Security index subjects

I. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of a security index card on an individual by reason of inactivity in a subversive movement until he has been interviewed or Bureau advised why an interview is inadvisable or impossible.

II. Active subversives should be considered as potential informants. Consider interviews with selected individuals currently active in subversive organizations for development of additional active informants. Proper selection of individuals for interview is most important. They must possess necessary attributes for security informant work.

(d) Without Bureau authority the SAC may:

I. Authorize interviews with individuals who have not been subjects of security investigations and the available subversive information against them is not sufficient to warrant opening cases at this time

II. Grant authority to interview subjects of security cases where the persons have previously been interviewed with prior Bureau authority, provided no change has taken place in the subjects' status and the interviews are conducted under the same conditions as previously authorized

III. Authorize interviews of all persons who were the subjects of security investigations where the cases are now closed (This will include persons who were previously on the security index but whose names have been removed and the cases now closed.)

IV. In authorizing these interviews no communication to the Bureau will be necessary and if there is a closed file, it should be reopened. If there is no closed file, a new case file of 134 category should be opened. The case should be assigned to an Agent to determine the residence of the subject, to make certain that the subject is identical with the information in the files,
[and[to determine]his current employment.

(A) The Agent to whom the case is assigned will prepare a memorandum for the SAC setting forth the information and requesting authority to conduct an interview with the subject solely for the purpose of determining his attitude toward cooperating with the FBI.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Abstract slips, 47,58
Administrative
  data, 77
  tickler, 55,56,74
Admissible evidence, 29,37
Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
Aliens
  Cuban, 45a,45b,81
  dissemination of information concerning, 80,81
  investigation of, 26
Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
Annual review of section A, reserve index, 42b
Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
Armed forces
  dissemination to, 81a
  members of, 25
  record in, 27
  relatives in, 27
  subjects entering, 56,60
  subjects in, 25
Arrangement of security index, 50
  alphabetical section, 51,63
  at Bureau, 50
  geographical section, 51,63
  in field office, 51
  inactive section, 56
  special section, 52
  unavailable section, 53
Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71

Bureau
  applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
  authority to investigate, 24
  responsibility, 19

Cancellation of
  security flash notice, 27a
  security index cards
    after induction into armed forces, 60
    mechanics, 60
    on departure from U. S., 60
    only after interview, 38
    recommending, 42,61
    upon death, 60
Canvassing informants, 74
Changes on security index cards, 58
Channelizing, 24,34,36,72,79
Character of reports, 73
Characterizations, 79
Chinese
  aliens, changes in residence or employment, dissemination to Secret Service and INS, 81
  extraction, 48,62
  sympathies, 48
Classification of cases, 72
Concealment of membership, 31
Confidential informants, 74
Contacting
  faculty members, 25
  registrars, 25
  students, 25
  superiors of faculty members, 25
Contacts
  during investigation, 25
  with foreign establishments, 25
Content
  and appearance
    of reserve index cards, 43
    of security index cards, 48
  of reports, 74
Corroboration, 37
Criteria for inclusion in security index, 44a,45
Cuban
  activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  aliens, 45a,45b,81
  contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a
  pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  special section, 49,53
  tabbing cards, 45b,64

Dangerousness
  definition of, 44
  determination of, 44
  Nation of Islam membership, 46
Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Defectors to Sino-Soviet-bloc countries, 57
- Defense facilities, 64,73
  - list, 64
  - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Definitions, 19
  - of dangerousness, 44
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Detcom, 62
  - administrative procedures, 63
  - key figures, 62,68
  - purpose, 62
  - removal from, 58,63,64
  - top functionaries, 62,70
  - who to be tabbed, 62
- Determination of
  - dangerousness, 44
  - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Disaffection of U. S. citizens abroad, 57
- Dissemination
  - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81a
  - of reports
    - at SOG, 81a
    - in field, 79
    - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
  - to Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81
  - to Secret Service, 81
    - stamping reserve index cards, 43
- Documentation of reports, 78
  - completion of, 78

- Employees of
  - international organizations, 25
  - U. S. Government, 25
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Evidence, 37
  - desirability of
    - admissibility, 29,37
    - corroboration, 37
  - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  - of membership or affiliation, 29
  - preservation of, 37

- Faculty members
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File on defected subjects, 42
- File reviews, 34
- Flash notices (security)
  - cancellation of, 27a
  - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  - when place, 27
- Foreign
  - diplomats, 25
  - establishments, 25
  - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
  - tours, 33a
  - travel, 33
- Forms
  - FD-122, 28,34,48,49,53 to 58,68,74
    - abstracts for, 47
    - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    - cover letter thereto, 32
    - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63
    - placing name in or removing from special section of security index, 53
      - unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    - recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - reference to, 77
    - succinct summary with, 47
      - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - when subject employed in key facility, 65
  - FD-122a, 42b,43,61,77
  - FD-128, 55,57 to 60,68
    - reference to, 77
    - when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    - when subject moves, 58,59

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

- D. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS 19
  - 1. Definitions 19
  - 2. Responsibility of the Bureau 19
  - 3. Purpose of investigation 19
    - a. Determination of dangerousness 19
    - b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes 19
  - 4. Individuals to be investigated 22
    - a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49 22
    - b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements 22
    - c. Special training in a subversive movement 23
    - d. Military service 23
    - e. Employment in key facilities 23
    - f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs 23
  - 5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals 24
    - a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning 24
      - (1) Subjects connected with institutions of learning 24
        - (a) Prior Bureau authority to institute investigation 24
          - I. Faculty members 24
          - II. Students and nonacademic employees 24
          - III. Requests for Bureau authority 24
        - (b) Contacts during investigation 25
          - I. Persons permissible to contact 25
            - (A) Established reliable sources 25
            - (B) Individuals not connected with institutions of learning 25
            - (C) Registrars 25
          - II. Superiors of faculty members 25
          - III. Students, faculty members, or other employees 25
        - (c) Receiving voluntary information 25
      - (2) Subjects not connected with an institution of learning 25
      - (3) Contacts of foreign establishments 25
    - b. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations or international organizations, and members of the armed forces 25
  - 6. Investigative procedures concerning individuals 26
    - a. General 26
    - b. Scope of investigations 26
      - (1) Background 26
        - (a) True name and aliases 26
        - (b) Residence address 26
        - (c) Occupation or business 26
        - (d) Business or employment address 26
        - (e) Citizenship status 26
          - I. Alien 26
          - II. Naturalized citizen 26
          - III. Native-born citizen 26
        - (f) Nationality background 26
        - (g) Military record 27
        - (h) Close relatives in armed forces 27
        - (i) Identification record - (Security flash notice FD-165) 27
        - (j) Physical description 28
        - (k) Photograph 28
        - (l) Handwriting specimens 29
        - (m) Labor union membership 29

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page
(2) Subversive activity 29
(a) Membership or affiliation 29
(b) Knowledge of aims and purposes 29
(c) Position and importance 30
(3) Missing subjects 31
(4) Individuals traveling abroad 33
(5) Investigative techniques 34
(a) File reviews 34
(b) Security informants 34
(c) Physical surveillances 35
(d) Photographic surveillances 35
(e) Public sources 36
(f) Records of private firms 36
(g) Deleted
(h) Deleted
(i) Channelizing information to case files 36
(6) Preservation of evidence 37
(7) Interviews with subjects of security investigations 38
(a) Purpose 38
(b) Subjects not included in the security index 38
(c) Security index subjects 38
(d) Without Bureau authority the SAC may 38
(e) Prior Bureau authority 39
(f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews 40
(g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects 42
7. Administrative procedures 42a
a. Reserve index 42a
(1) Purpose 42a
(2) Individuals to be included 42a
(3) Arrangement 42b
(4) Content 43
(5) Removal and deletion of cards 43
b. Security index 43
(1) Purpose 43
(2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual 44
(3) Criteria for placing and retaining names in the security index ... 45
(4) Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards 46a
(5) Content and appearance of security index card 48
(a) Data to appear on face of card 48
(b) Data to appear on separate attached card 50
(6) Arrangement of the security index 50
(a) At Bureau 50
(b) In the field office 51
I. Geographical section 51
II. Alphabetical section 51
III. Special section 52
(A) Espionage subjects 52
(B) U. S. Government employees 52
(C) Atomic energy program employees 52
(D) Foreign government employees 52
(E) United Nations Secretariat and other international organization employees 52
(F) Pro-Tito individuals 52
(G) Cuban 53
IV. Unavailable section 53
(A) Missing subjects 54
(B) Subjects out of the country 54
(C) Imprisoned subjects 54
(D) Exception - re special section 56

D. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

1. Definitions

   The term "basic revolutionary organization" or "basic revolutionary group" when used hereinafter in this subsection shall apply to any one or all of the following organizations or groups in order to distinguish the organizations from front organizations:

   a. Communist Party, USA
   b. Socialist Workers Party
   c. [Progressive Labor Movement]
   d. Proletarian Party of America
   e. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
   f. Johnson-Forest Group
   g. American Socialist Clubs
   h. See also 87C 1d.

2. Responsibility of the Bureau

   a. To conduct thorough investigation into the background and subversive activities of all persons in the U. S. and Puerto Rico who are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security. Each SAC will be held responsible for the proper investigation of all persons in his area who, because of membership or affiliation with basic revolutionary organizations or other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, may be potentially dangerous.

   b. To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of individuals constituting a threat to the internal security and develop sufficient information and evidence through investigation to sustain appropriate action by the Bureau should it become necessary for the Federal Government to institute prosecutive action against such individuals in courts of law or control their movement and activities in the event of a national emergency

3. Purpose of investigation

   The primary purpose of these investigations is twofold, namely:

   a. Determination of dangerousness

      To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals in the U. S. and Puerto Rico who, because of their membership in, activity in, or association with one or more of the revolutionary groups defined above or related groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country, and the consequent collection of sufficient information concerning their subversive activities to justify apprehension in event of a national emergency

   b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes

      To determine the identities, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals who have been or may be violating laws of the U. S.

      (1) Direct investigation towards obtaining admissible evidence to establish the violation.

      (2) Be alert for any information indicating a violation of the Federal statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, and sedition.

      (3) Title 18, USC, § 2385, paragraph (1), prohibits the advocacy, etc., of forceful or violent overthrow of the Government. Paragraph (2) prohibits the printing and distribution of propaganda advocating the forceful overthrow of the Government. (Affiliation with an organization is not a prerequisite to prosecution under paragraphs (1) and (2).) Paragraph (3) makes it unlawful to organize or help to organize any society, etc., of persons who advocate overthrow of the Government by force or violence, or to be or become a member of or become affiliated with any such society knowing the purposes thereof. Conspiracy to violate this section is covered by Title 18, USC, § 371 (general conspiracy statute).

      (4) Title 18, USC, § 2387, penalizes attempts to undermine the loyalty, discipline, or morale of the armed forces. Alleged violations should be reported immediately to the Bureau.

(5) Title 5, USC, §§ 118p, 118q, and 118r (Public Law 330, 84th Congress, approved 9-9-55), prohibits Government employment of persons who are disloyal or who assert the right to strike against the Government. The law provides that an individual accepting office or employment in the Government of the U. S. shall, within 60 days, execute an affidavit certifying that he does not advocate the violent overthrow of the U. S. Government, etc. The execution of a false affidavit constitutes a fraud on, or attempt to defraud, the Government within the purview of Title 5, USC, § 93, so as to authorize Special Agents of the Bureau to administer oaths in investigations arising out of this law. Alleged violations of this law called to your attention should be furnished to the Bureau promptly and no investigation should be initiated on the basis of complaints received without prior Bureau authority. Refer to section[69H]of this manual entitled "Security of Government Employees - Fraud Against the Government" for procedures to be followed regarding possible violations of this law discovered or received in connection with security of Government employees investigations.

(6) Title 18, USC, § 1001, includes possible fraud against the Government violations wherein there are concealments or falsifications relating to subversive information. These violations must be presented to the Department by the Bureau for a prosecutive opinion rather than being presented locally to USAs. They ordinarily involve the execution of U. S. Government forms. Common violators are employees of private concerns having Government contracts who execute Government forms required for clearance for access to classified information.

Upon receipt of information indicating a violation of this type, investigation under the "Security Matter - Fraud Against the Government" character should be initiated and the Bureau immediately advised. The Department has advised that it is essential, to establish jurisdiction, to prove that the form was presented to a Government agency for action or determination. This, therefore, should be the first investigative step. If the form was not presented to a Government agency, no further investigation should be made and the Bureau so advised. In this case, however, remain alert for information the form is later presented to Government agency. The fact subject actually signed the form must be established by testimony of witnesses to the signature, handwriting examination, or other conclusive evidence. The original of the form must be located. Sources that furnished pertinent information concerning subject during previous investigations and other potential witnesses should be thoroughly interviewed to determine the basis for each item of pertinent information furnished and to obtain the identities of other potential witnesses. Where affiliation with subversive organizations is involved, interview individuals who were members of same units of these organizations as subject for indicia of his membership, such as attendance at closed meetings, payment of dues, holding of office, etc. If possible, develop evidence to supplant pertinent information furnished by current informants. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview the subject. Interview subject and potential witnesses furnishing pertinent information under oath and obtain sworn signed statements if possible. An exception may be made when interviewing established sources, such as current informants, if oath and/or signed statements not considered desirable under circumstances. Be guided by instructions in section 6b, (7), below when interviewing potential witnesses with subversive backgrounds.

(c) Physical surveillances

I. Intelligence information and admissible evidence obtained through the use of physical surveillances in these investigations are of extreme value. Physical surveillances should be used whenever, in the opinion of the SAC, information of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of the existing circumstances and available manpower.

II. When information is received through other sources indicating that unit or mass meetings of subversive organizations are to take place, or clandestine meetings of certain individuals in a subversive movement are to be held with other unidentified individuals, physical surveillances should be used when practical to corroborate such information and further develop details concerning such meetings; that is, details of action taken at the meetings, identification of individuals in attendance, and extent of participation of the various individuals present.

III. Proper and well-coordinated physical surveillances of various individuals in leadership or underground capacities of a subversive movement will develop a chain of activity within the movement, which not only establishes the importance and position of those individuals directly involved but will also serve to identify others who may not yet be identified with the movement.

IV. The success of physical surveillances depends upon the resourcefulness and ingenuity of the Agents assigned to them. The Agents must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion in the performance of such duties to avoid embarrassment to the Bureau. They must be alert at all times not only to observe the specific activity of the subject but to observe countersurveillances which may be used to identify the Agents and thereafter embarrass the Bureau.

(d) Photographic surveillances

I. Photographic evidence which establishes meetings between individuals involved in these investigations and which establishes that subjects enter or leave certain buildings, etc., at the time it is known that meetings of subversive organizations are taking place therein is invaluable in establishing a complete chain of evidence. Photographs of such activities add convincing, admissible, physical evidence in establishing the subversive activities of individuals.

II. Photographic surveillances must be properly correlated with other investigative techniques to assure that maximum of evidence is being obtained. They must be well planned and conducted in a discreet manner. Care should be taken to conceal properly the equipment used to avoid detection of the surveillances not only by the subject but also by any other individuals in the proximity of the surveillance.

(e) Public sources

Full use must be made of all sources of information which are public in nature. Obtain background and lineage data from public birth records at local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, city, county, and state recorders' offices, public utility records, school records, etc., whenever contact with such sources can be expected to produce information of value. Publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities should be obtained and indexed as reference material to assist in obtaining complete coverage of a subversive movement and the individuals connected therewith.

(f) Records of private firms

Where pertinent information is indicated to be available in the records of private business firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, merchants with whom an individual may have conducted business, etc., contact should be had with such firms provided that contact will not jeopardize the investigation by enabling the subject to become unduly cognizant of our investigative interest in him.

[(g) [Deleted]

[(h) [Deleted]

(i) Channelizing information to case files

I. When information is received as a result of subversive activities concerning various individuals [showing] their membership or activities in subversive groups and organizations, such information should be channelized to the main case files of the individuals involved. A mimeographed form (FD-306) may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings.

[II. When information received from live informants, physical surveillances, and photographic surveillances is channelized to the individual case files, the channelizing memoranda or other documents being placed in the individual files must be documented.

II.	Race	
	White and Caucasian	W
	Negro	N
	Chinese	C
	Others	O
	(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)	
III.	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
IV.	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien	AL
	(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
V.	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	[Progressive Labor Movement	PLM]
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	Nation of Islam	NOI
	Bulgarian	BUL
	Cuban	CUB
	Czechoslavakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Rumanian	RUM
	Russian	RUS
	Yugoslavian	YUG
VI.	Dangerousness classification (where applicable)	
	Detcom	DC
VII.	Key figure and top functionary designation (where applicable)	
	Key figure	KF
	Top functionary	TF
VIII.	Special section cards	
	Atomic energy program employees	AEP
	Cuban special section	CUB
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
	United Nations employees	UNE
	U. S. Government employees	GOV
IX.	Unavailable section cards	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
X.	Date and place of birth	
XI.	Key facility geographical reference number and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility obtained from the Department of Defense Key Facilities List (where applicable)	
XII.	Residence address	
XIII.	Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.	
XIV.	Field office file number	

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description
(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division
(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below
(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The white 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by this machine and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

should be completely filled out just as if a first recommendation is being made, and submitted with a current report. If not, the Bureau should be advised of the reasons for not reactivating his security index card. In either case, cancel the inactive card.

(7) Periodic verification of addresses

(a) The data recorded on security index cards shall be in an up-to-date status at all times.

(b) The whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. The residence and business addresses of all security index subjects must be checked at least once each six months,[except those imprisoned and those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. (defection to a Sino-Soviet-bloc country) (see section 105G, item 3, volume IV, of this manual). The residence and employment of those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. must be verified every thirty days.] The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least each six months to determine if he has returned to this country.

Perfect arrangements to be advised[on a current basis of any indication that the subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change his residence or employment.] Periodic checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under appropriate pretext by telephone, or other expeditious means.

(c) The physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and the individual case file of each security index subject shall show that this has been done. If a security index subject has not been personally observed previously, this should be done during the next verification of the subject's residence and/or business addresses.

(d) Use form FD-154 in verifying addresses of security index subjects when its use will facilitate the checking of the addresses. When FD-154 is not used in verifying addresses, a notation must be made on the last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in the subject's case file showing the subject's current residence and business addresses and the date such addresses were verified. This must be done to assure that the file will contain all information concerning the status of the case and that the file will come to the attention of the Agent or field supervisor to determine if additional action is warranted at the time of the verification of addresses. Each time that a security index subject's residence and employment are verified, the case must be re-evaluated to assure that the subject is qualified for inclusion in the security index under the criteria for such inclusion. A notation to the effect that the case has been reviewed for this purpose shall be made in the file.

(e) If it is determined that the residence or business address or both have been changed from those appearing on the security index card, FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau with the current residence or business address shown thereon. In such instances, FD-122 should show only the changes to be made on the security index card. [FD-122 should be accompanied by form FD-366 for dissemination to Secret Service. Secret Service should be advised locally by dissemination of FD-366.]

(f) The project of verifying addresses of security index subjects (other than top functionaries and key figures) shall be handled by reopening and assigning the cases for verification and closing the cases administratively upon accomplishment of verifications. Top functionary and key figure cases are to be handled as provided in section 87D 7f (8). Verifications should also be made at the time of submission of all annual investigative reports and should be reported therein.

(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards

(a) Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, detcom classification, date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility (see 87D 7c (2) below), residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by form FD-128.

(b) Insertion or removal of cards from special section or unavailable section should be handled pursuant to 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV.

(c) Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing security index cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.

(d) Indicate use of FD-122 for changes by checking proper opening paragraph and submit without abstract.

(e) Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."

(f) Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected security index cards with duplicate copy of FD-122 (stamped "Corrected Security Index cards attached. Substitute for cards in file and destroy old cards. Place photograph and description on reverse side of geographical cards."), action to be taken includes:

I. Check accuracy of data on cards.

II. Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to back of corrected cards, staple them and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV above.

III. File third card in alphabetical section of security index.

IV. Destroy old cards.

(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards

(a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries

I. Requests to verify addresses of security index subjects from other offices must be assigned immediately and results of investigation to verify the new address must be transmitted to the office of origin within two weeks.

II. Office of origin, upon receipt of verification of address, should submit FD-128 immediately transferring office of origin. Forms regarding unavailable section subjects should be prepared in accordance with 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.

III. Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies thereof to office covering subject's new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and security index cards. FD-128 should show full title.

IV. Information concerning key facility employment of subject in new office should be furnished by that office to old office of origin so that geographical reference

in a key facility, copies of reports bearing the dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," should be furnished to appropriate intelligence agencies of the armed services by the field offices as shown in sections 69, volume III, and 87D 7e (2), of this manual.

Specific instructions with regard to all phases of our responsibilities under Executive Order 10450, including policy, investigative procedures, and dissemination are set out in section 69, volume III, of this manual.

(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services
Dissemination should be made locally to the intelligence service of the military branch involved.

(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Agency
Federal Aviation Agency issues certificates to airmen who are defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew in the navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of the inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in the capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Subversive data developed concerning persons within such definitions should be furnished to the Bureau by report or letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, together with cover communication recommending that such data be furnished to Federal Aviation Agency. Such dissemination will be made only at the Bureau.

(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service
Letterhead memoranda are to be disseminated to Secret Service in all security index cases. These letterhead memoranda should contain background data on the individuals involved, residence, employment, and a description. They should contain any information indicative of emotional instability or any factors indicative of a propensity for violence, as well as any information indicating that the subject is in possession of firearms. The above should be followed by a succinct statement concerning the subject's affiliation with or participation in a subversive movement. They are not to contain any reference to the security index program.

Dissemination of these letterhead memoranda to Secret Service will be made both at the Bureau and in the field following review at the Bureau. Submit in quadruplicate under the individual caption. Instructions regarding dissemination in the field will be issued after Bureau review.

After initial submission of letterhead memoranda in security index cases, as changes occur in the status of the individuals involved with respect to residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally and furnish two copies of the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Form FD-366 may be used for this purpose. The letterhead memorandum should contain a reference to the previous communication disseminated to Secret Service.

[When reporting changes in residence and/or employment concerning Chinese and Cuban aliens on the security index, in addition to dissemination to Secret Service, also advise the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) locally, and furnish four copies of the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. Bear in mind in filling out the reference that some memoranda have been expressly prepared for dissemination to Secret Service only and have not been furnished to the Department or INS; therefore, the copy furnished INS locally and two of the copies furnished the Bureau should reference the last communication to INS.]

For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in other than security index cases, refer to section 83K, volume III, of this manual.

Copies of letterhead memoranda prepared in security index cases should be retained in the individual case files only.

Upon transfer of office of origin in one of these cases, the [old]office of origin is to furnish Secret Service locally with [the subject's new residence and business address]and advise the Bureau that such has been done by the submission of two copies of the letterhead memorandum disseminated locally. [The new office of origin need take no action regarding dissemination to Secret Service until such time as further changes occur with respect to the subject's status.]

(10) Dissemination at the Bureau

There are some situations in which dissemination is made at the Bureau instead of in the field. In the majority of instances, information received by the FBI should properly be furnished immediately to some other agency within the executive branch of the Government so that the responsibilities of the other agency might be fulfilled properly. Care must be taken, however, not to disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where such a procedure is deemed inadvisable because of the inadequacy of security measures in that branch. In these instances the data should be brought to the immediate attention of the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. An example of the latter is, of course, the Atomic Energy Commission, which receives reports only through the Bureau, as noted in section 87D 7c (3) of this manual. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including the State Department, only at the SOG, as set out in 87D 6b (4). Dissemination is also made at the SOG to the State Department, unless it appears undesirable, in those cases in which subjects have been indicted for violations grounded on subversive activities. Dissemination in these cases is made to preclude these subjects from utilizing the fact they obtained a passport to refute allegations of subversive connections. The State Department, therefore, will be in possession of data concerning a defendant should he attempt to utilize this tactic in such an action.

b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction

(1) Members of the armed forces

The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the armed forces intelligence agencies states that the responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest.

Thus, in discharging our basic responsibilities in the internal security field, it is imperative that information concerning members of the military services be referred immediately to the appropriate branch having primary responsibility for its personnel. This procedure is mandatory, even though the security aspects of the data have not been fully resolved or verified. It should be specifically pointed out in such instances that the information has not been verified.

Section 87D 5b of this manual instructs that if it is determined a security subject is a member of the armed services the investigation must at that point be discontinued immediately and reported to the Bureau. The basis for such instruction lies in the fact that the subject is no longer within our investigative jurisdiction. In addition, dissemination of pertinent reports must be made locally in the field to the appropriate intelligence agency.

Our responsibility with regard to military personnel is not confined to those who have been the subjects of security investigations. It extends to any subversive derogatory data developed against a member of the armed services during any of our investigations of either individuals or organizations. For instance, if it is determined that a member of the armed forces has been in contact with a security subject or with any individual or group raising security implications, the appropriate intelligence service should be immediately advised locally. This should be done even though the security aspects of the contact have not been resolved, so that the military services may be in a position to discharge their responsibilities. It must be pointed out to them specifically in such instances that the data are unverified, and pertinent developments must be transmitted to them thereafter immediately upon receipt.

Section 87D 6b (1) (h) provides that during the course of security investigations it must be determined whether the subjects have any close relatives in the armed forces. Our responsibilities require that such associations be called to the attention of the appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on the security subjects involved. The evaluation of these associations lies entirely within the province of the intelligence services, but for the reasons stated previously herein it is incumbent upon the Bureau to disseminate this information immediately upon receipt.

[Any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel must be set out in a letter to the Bureau, together with a statement as to the local dissemination made in the field. Such letter should be accompanied by a[letterhead] memorandum setting out with particularity the subversive data in a form entirely suitable for dissemination.

4. Annual Communist Party, USA, organizational and membership survey Each office is instructed to initiate by February 1 of each year a detailed and analytical survey of the organization and membership of the Communist Party in its territory, results to be forwarded to the Bureau by April 1. Set forth in detail the complete organizational structure of each Communist Party district or state organization including district and county committees, together with the identities of officers from the club through the district level. Identify each Communist Party club and section in the district, together with the identities of individual club members and most recent date each member was so identified. Where identification of an individual is tentative, this fact should be indicated by placing the word "tentative" after the individual's name. Note the informant coverage in each club, as well as on district and county committees, by setting forth the symbol numbers of the informants. In those instances in which no informant coverage exists in a particular club or on a district or county committee, this fact should be noted. In addition, summarize the over-all findings by setting forth the estimated Communist Party membership in the field office territory, together with the number of members who have been positively and tentatively identified as such within the immediately preceding 12-month period. Charts and maps should be used in setting forth the geographic distribution of the Communist Party whenever feasible. Offices which are auxiliary offices in investigation of a Communist Party district should furnish the required information to the office of origin for inclusion in its survey by March 15 of each year.

Following the organizational breakdown, each office should critically appraise its knowledge of the Communist Party organization within its division and set forth its comments and recommendations concerning investigative activity to be undertaken to eliminate any weaknesses detected. In those instances in which the disclosed weakness is that of lack of adequate informant coverage, advise in detail of the number of Bureau-approved potential security informants being developed in the particular area, as well as concrete plans to obtain additional informant coverage in the future.

[5. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C (code name "CIRM"). Bufile 100-442529. Office of origin: New York.

a. Quarterly reports (to reach the Bureau by February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1) should be submitted by each field office for the purpose of reporting, in a centralized manner, all available information bearing upon the communist influence in racial matters. Included should be information developed under the title of a variety of matters, such as CPUSA, Negro question, communist influence in racial matters; communist infiltration of various organizations, such as the Congress of Racial Equality, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and the like; investigations of subversive individuals active in the racial movement; investigations of communist fronts and other miscellaneous organizations; and racial disturbances and other racial matters investigated under the racial matter character. Information should be included in these quarterly reports, notwithstanding the fact that it will duplicate reporting in the other substantive matters referred to above. These reports shall be designed to precisely spell out the full extent of the communist influence in racial matters. They should separate words and intentions from actions; mere participation from direct influence; and the bona fide communist from the mere "do-gooder." They should not include information concerning legitimate efforts in the racial movement where there is no communist taint.

(10) Political activities (Bureau file 100-3-72)
   (a) Political activities in which party is engaged, including names and identities of party member candidates or party-sponsored candidates for public office
   (b) Details relating to party sponsorship of third party movements

(11) Legislative activities (Bureau file 100-3-70)
   (a) Activities of the Communist Party and/or its members in connection with legislation or proposed legislation which affects status of the party or activities of the party and its members
   (b) Activities of the Communist Party and/or its members in connection with legislation which does not directly affect the party or its members but which party deems expedient to promote so it may appear to be closely aligned or in favor of a worthy cause

(12) Domestic administration issues (Bureau file 100-3-83)
   (a) Communist Party activities with relation to domestic administration issues, such as antilynching laws, poll tax, etc. Only the over-all policy of the party in these matters should be included in quarterly reports.

(13) [Deleted]

(14) Youth matters (Bureau file 100-3-76)
Over-all policy and activities of the Communist Party youth commissions relative to infiltration of youth groups and exploitation of youth. Youth front activities should be submitted under appropriate front organization caption and should not be included in Communist Party quarterly reports.

(15) Women's matters (Bureau file 100-3-78)
Pertinent Communist Party over-all policy and activities of the women's commission relating to the infiltration of women's groups, exploitation of women

(16) Farmer's matters (Bureau file 100-3-79)
Pertinent Communist Party over-all policy and activities of the farm commission relative to the infiltration of farmer groups, exploitation of farmers, etc.

(17) Cultural activities (Bureau file 100-3-90)
The cultural commissions are, for the most part, composed of secret members of the party. These commissions propagate the cultural activities of the Communist Party which are displayed primarily through communist front organizations, as well as the carrying out of the Communist Party line in the fields of radio, publishing, education, science, and

arts. Individual members of the cultural sections have close ties in many instances with suspected international communist representatives. The following of this phase of the Communist Party movement is most important to develop the full and complete picture of Communist Party activities.

[(18) Veteran's matters (Bureau file 100-3-73)
Communist Party policy and activities of a significant character directed toward the exploiting of veterans and their problems

[(19) National group commissions (Bureau file 100-3-91)
(a) Activity on the part of various Communist Party national group commissions, including identities of leaders and members of the commissions
(b) Special Communist Party policies relating to infiltration of minority groups

[(20) Religion (Bureau file 100-3-82)
(a) Communist Party policy relating to its approach to religion or to penetration of established religious groups
(b) Any particular vehement statements made against religious bodies by ranking communists

[(21) Pamphlets and publications (Bureau file 100-3-86)
(a) Changes in the field division with respect to establishment of new bookstores, increased distribution of party literature, publication of Communist Party literature and pamphlets, and other pertinent information relating to preparation and dissemination of Communist Party literature
(b) Forward to Bureau by letter any important Communist Party publications published within a field division. Mention the publication in quarterly report, but do not describe in detail in the report.

[(22) Education (Bureau file 100-3-71)
(a) Statements or class material which advocates overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence
(b) Pertinent evidence and information relating to educational programs of the party. The following are deemed of utmost importance:
I. Instructions from national and/or district headquarters relative to the education of both new and experienced members
II. Courses or curricula given, together with any educational outlines and assigned or suggested reading. (There should be no long quotations in reports and any exhibits or enclosures should be forwarded to Bureau by separate letter.)
III. Important statements and remarks by instructors who should in turn be sufficiently identified so as to establish their status as duly designated or qualified party instructors
IV. Succinct digest of notes or memoranda of informants who attend the classes or schools. (Copies of the actual notes or memoranda should be submitted promptly by separate letter.)
V. Identities, if available, of members receiving instructions. Concentrate on having confidential informants

b. Information should be reported according to the following outline. All main headings denoted by Roman numerals must be accounted for. If there is no information to report under a particular main heading, the heading should appear, followed by a statement "No information developed."

I. COMMUNIST STRATEGY

(A) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

(1) Plans, strategy, party line, and the like made at national meetings, including expressions by national and other functionaries

(2) Plans, etc., made at district and lower level meetings, including expressions by local leaders and rank-and-file members

(3) Plans, etc., as revealed in party publications and other propaganda media, such as written directives, press releases, and the like

Information under item 3 should be reported by the office covering the origin of the publications, such as the New York Office for "The Worker," "Political Affairs," and directives from party headquarters; San Francisco Office for "People's World"; etc. Party expressions, oral or written, when directly related to a specific event covered under II, should be included under II.

(B) OTHER COMMUNIST GROUPS (Such as Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor, Workers World Party, and the like)

Under (B), report information under separate numbered subheadings for each organization. Report here information generally along the same lines as for (A) above.

II. COMMUNIST TACTICS

In this part report information on communist direction and influence of and participation in racial demonstrations, disturbances, drives, boycotts, and any other similar activities with racial overtones. This part will illustrate how communist activities attempt to exploit racial situations and expand communist influence, thus furthering communist objectives. List activities in chronological order with lettered subheadings, such as:

(A) DEMONSTRATION, CLEVELAND, OHIO, 1-10-63
(B) STORE BOYCOTT, YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO, 3-6-63

Under each subheading include such information as nature of event; sponsoring and participating groups; total participants; number and identities of subversives involved; specifics as to whether subversives directed, controlled, instigated, or merely participated; whether violence resulted and, if so, whether subversives involved; arrests of subversives and court disposition; and any other information believed pertinent to the over-all picture of communist influence. Efforts by supporting groups to avoid communist involvement should also be reported. If a particular event had no communist involvement, it should, of course, not be included in the report.

[III. COMMUNIST PENETRATION AND INFLUENCE IN RACIAL AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Field offices should set out information concerning only the local branches of the organizations which are in its territory. The office covering the national headquarters of an organization should set out pertinent data as to the national headquarters, as well as any local affiliates in its territory, separating the national from the locals. The number of members, nationally and by locals, should be indicated. Include under each organization information as to officers and others in positions of influence who have present or past subversive connections; information as to other subversives who are merely members; specific evidence of influence wielded by subversives; policy concerning communist participation in the organization's activities, such as prohibition of communists holding office or membership (if no such stated policy, so indicate); and use and distribution of communist propaganda.

IV. MISCELLANEOUS

If at all possible, information to be included should be set out under the basic main headings I, II, or III. However, should there be some pertinent information to report which does not lend itself to the first three parts, it will be permissible to include it in part IV - MISCELLANEOUS.

c. The term "communist" should be interpreted in its broad sense as including persons not only adhering to the principles of the CPUSA itself, but also to such splinter and offshoot groups as the Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor, and the like.

d. Any office which has no information to report should so advise the Bureau by letter in lieu of a report. If any positive information, however limited, is available, it must be submitted by report. The same appropriate local dissemination to other agencies should be made as is made for the quarterly reports concerning the CPUSA. Except as otherwise indicated above, the regular report writing rules for security reports shall be applicable.]

IV. Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing in section A of reserve index cards

(A) Changes in data appearing on section A reserve index cards should be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a.

(B) Deletions from section A of the reserve index should be recommended by letter. The letter should set forth the basis for the recommendation.

(C) Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section A cards to new office of origin.

(b) Section B

I. This section is to contain the names of all other individuals included in the reserve index. This section is to be maintained only in the field office.

II. Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section B cards to new office of origin.

(4) Content

(a) Each card in section A and section B should contain, as a minimum, the following:

I. Name and aliases
II. Race
III. Sex
IV. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
V. Citizenship
VI. Residence
VII. Employment
VIII. Birth data
IX. Office file number
[X. The letters "SS" if dissemination has been made to Secret Service in accordance with instructions in section 83K, item 2, volume III, of this manual]

(b) In addition, membership and position or association in a subversive group or groups, together with the source and date of the information, may be added.

(5) Removal and deletion of cards

(a) Destroy cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources or who subsequently become subjects of security index cards.

(b) Advise the Bureau of the destruction only in the case of section A cards.

b. Security index

(1) Purpose

(a) Security index cards are prepared and maintained by the Bureau to serve as operational guide for apprehension of persons deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country in the event of a national emergency.

(b) It shall contain the names of all persons who have been determined through investigation to be dangerous or potentially dangerous because of their membership in or affiliation with or espousal of doctrines of basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations and who will be apprehended upon receipt of instructions from the Attorney General.

(c) It shall include subjects of espionage investigations and any other type of Bureau investigation provided their activities bring them within the scope of the security index criteria.

(d) Action shall be taken against individuals included in the security index only upon authorization of warrants of arrest by the Attorney General. However, in preparing and maintaining the security index, to all practical effects, the Bureau is making the decision as to those persons who will be apprehended in the event of an emergency, inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised that he does not have funds or

manpower to review security index cases.

(e) Names shall be included in the security index only when investigation has established and reports[show] sufficient facts and evidence to justify the inclusion of each subject in the security index.

(f) The contents of the security index must be accurate and correct at all times. Matters pertaining to its preparation and maintenance must be given preferred, expeditious, continuous, and detailed attention.

(g) Matters pertaining to the security index are strictly confidential and are not to be mentioned or alluded to in investigative reports.

(h) The general operation and content of the security index must not be discussed by field personnel of the Bureau without prior Bureau authority.

(i) Matters pertaining to the security index may be discussed with duly qualified representatives of other Federal intelligence agencies only on a strictly confidential basis and only in instances in which an individual subject of prime interest to one of these services is involved.

(2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual

(a) The dangerousness of a member or affiliate of a subversive organization does not necessarily depend entirely upon his personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or a disposition to violence. Although these factors must be taken into consideration in evaluating an individual's potential dangerousness, other factors are essential in making this determination. An individual's dangerousness also depends upon the contribution he has made or is making in the advancement of the principles and aims of the subversive movement with which he is connected or his subversive potentialities in the event of a national emergency. Bear in mind that a subject active in a subversive organization is not merely an isolated individual but is a part of an organization of which the purposes are opposed to the best interests of the U. S. An individual's loyalty to a subversive organization and the principles thereof is a primary factor to take into consideration in evaluating his potential dangerousness;[however, regardless of evidence of subversive affiliation, all evidence developed during the course of a security investigation must be carefully weighed for the purpose of determining whether the subject's activities depict him as a potentially dangerous individual in time of a national emergency. Factors having a bearing upon an individual's potential dangerousness are numerous and will vary in each case in degree.]

Among such factors are:

I. Long continued membership in a subversive organization
II. Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools
III. Frequent or regular attendance at organizational meetings and functions
IV. Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization
V. Possession of or continued study of revolutionary literature
VI. Preparation or distribution of subversive propaganda and/or literature
VII. Holding positions in the subversive organization or in other organizations of a front character which indicate confidence of such organizations in his loyalty
VIII. Espousal of a subversive doctrine exemplified in his acts and utterances

in a key facility, copies of reports bearing the dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," should be furnished to appropriate intelligence agencies of the armed services by the field offices as shown in sections 69, volume III, and 87D 7c (2), of this manual.

Specific instructions with regard to all phases of our responsibilities under Executive Order 10450, including policy, investigative procedures, and dissemination are set out in section 69, volume III, of this manual.

(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services
Dissemination should be made locally to the intelligence service of the military branch involved.

(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Agency
Federal Aviation Agency issues certificates to airmen who are defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew in the navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of the inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in the capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Subversive data developed concerning persons within such definitions should be furnished to the Bureau by report or letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, together with cover communication recommending that such data be furnished to Federal Aviation Agency. Such dissemination will be made only at the Bureau.

(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service
Letterhead memoranda are to be disseminated to Secret Service in all security index cases. These letterhead memoranda should contain background data on the individuals involved, residence, employment, and a description. They should contain any information indicative of emotional instability or any factors indicative of a propensity for violence, as well as any information indicating that the subject is in possession of firearms. The above should be followed by a succinct statement concerning the subject's affiliation with or participation in a subversive movement. They are not to contain any reference to the security index program.

Dissemination of these letterhead memoranda to Secret Service will be made both at the Bureau and in the field following review at the Bureau. Submit in quadruplicate under the individual caption. Instructions regarding dissemination in the field will be issued after Bureau review.

After initial submission of letterhead memoranda in security index cases, as changes occur in the status of the individuals involved with respect to residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally and furnish two copies of the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. [Form FD-366 may be used for this purpose.] The letterhead memorandum should contain a reference to the previous communication disseminated to Secret Service.

For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in other than security index cases, refer to section 83K, volume III, of this manual.

Copies of letterhead memoranda prepared in security index cases should be retained in the individual case files only.

Upon transfer of office of origin in one of these cases, the new office of origin is to furnish Secret Service locally with pertinent data concerning the subject and advise the Bureau that such has been done by the submission of two copies of the letterhead memorandum disseminated locally.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page
        V. Inactive section 56
    (7) Periodic verification of addresses 57
    (8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards 58
    (9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards 58
        (a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries 58
        (b) Key figures and top functionaries 59
        (c) Subjects tabbed for detcom 60
        (d) Subjects not included in security index 60
    (10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index 60
        (a) Death of subject 60
        (b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction 60
        (c) Imprisonment of subject 60
        (d) Induction of subject into the armed forces 60
        (e) Security informants 60
        (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous 61
        (g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection 61
        (h) Subjects of Chinese extraction 62
    (11) Priority apprehension program (DETCOM) 62
        (a) Purpose 62
        (b) Subjects to be tabbed detcom 62
        (c) Recommendations for and removal of detcom designation 63
        (d) Administrative procedures for handling detcom program 63
        (e) General 64
c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities and defense facilities 64
    (1) Responsibility 64
    (2) Inclusion in security index 65
    (3) Dissemination 65
    (4) Status of cases 66
d. Key figure and top functionary program 66
    (1) General 66
    (2) Key figures 66
        (a) Definition 66
        (b) Regulations governing the handling of the key figure program 67
            I. Designation and deletion of key figure status. 67
            II. Photographs 67
            III. Handwriting specimens 67
            IV. Security index cards 68
            V. Change of office of origin 68
            VI. Reports 68
            VII. Maintenance of key figure list 69
            VIII. Deleted
    (3) Top functionaries 69
        (a) Definition 69
        (b) Manner of designation 69
        (c) Regulations governing top functionaries 70
e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index 70

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations 70
(2) Security of Government employees investigations........ 70
(3) Atomic Energy Act, U. S. Information Agency applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations........ 70
f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports. 71
(1) General 71
(2) Origin 72
(3) Deleted
(4) Classification 72
(5) Title 72
(6) Character 73
(a) Key figures and top functionaries 73
(b) Others 73
(7) Deleted
(8) Status 73
(a) Top functionaries 73
(b) Key figures 73
(c) Deleted
(d) Other security index subjects 74
(e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index . 74
(f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein 74
(9) Content 74
(10) Administrative data 77
(a) General 77
(b) Documentation of reports 78
g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of........ 79
8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations 79
a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau 80
(1) Aliens and naturalized citizens 80
(2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services 80
(3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense 80
(4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard 80

agency responsible for such action. Forward such data to Bureau and incorporate in next report submitted concerning individual in question. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau and there is no case on individual being denied clearance, give consideration to opening a security investigation if information received from intelligence agency warrants such action.

(2) Inclusion in security index

In recommending key facility employee for inclusion in security index, FD-122 is to contain:

(a) Key facility geographical reference number
(b) Abbreviation for agency having security responsibility
(c) Abbreviations for[other]agencies[known to have classified contracts with the key facility.] Interested agencies should be identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on security index cards returned from Bureau.
(d) Abbreviation AEC immediately following abbreviation for agency having security responsibility when abbreviation of responsible agency on key facilities list is followed by asterisk, which denotes Atomic Energy Commission is involved in security responsibility. This data will appear on security index cards returned from the Bureau.

If subject of existing security index card is found to have become employed in a key facility, FD-122 must be submitted to Bureau with above-required key facility data set forth thereon. Case is then to be handled in accordance with instructions set forth below concerning key facility cases.

(3) Dissemination

Upon receipt of original complaint or allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, a summary of complaint and information concerning the individual should be furnished immediately by letter to interested intelligence agency. Intelligence agency should then be advised whether a security investigation is being conducted of the individual and, if investigation is being conducted, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion of investigation. Letter to intelligence agency should clearly point out that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation by FBI.

These instructions do not apply to allegations of espionage or those of such a confidential character as would not ordinarily be disseminated. Such information appearing to be of immediate interest to other intelligence agencies should be submitted to Bureau by most expeditious means, depending upon the circumstances, with a request that the Bureau consider advisability of disseminating it.

Disseminate copies of each report to the local representative [of agency having security responsibility, as well as to local representative of other intelligence agencies known to have classified contracts with the key facility.] Copies of reports for the Marine Corps should be disseminated locally to ONI.

Dissemination to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), the Research and Development Board (RDB), and the Maritime Administration (MA) will be made at the Bureau, and not in the field.

(4) Status of cases

After all active investigation conducted, place in a closed status. Forty-five days before report due, make case pending active and check with armed services representative at the key facility, or with other reliable sources, to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

d. Key figure and top functionary program

(1) General

Purpose of key figure and top functionary program is to select for special attention those individuals in a subversive movement who are of outstanding importance to the effectiveness of the movement.

Key figure and top functionary program is described below as pertaining to the Communist Party, USA. However, it also applies to important individuals active in or on behalf of other basic revolutionary groups.

(2) Key figures

(a) Definition

A key figure is an individual, either a member or non-member of the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organization, who, by reason of his official position in the organization or his connections with the communist movement and his activities on its behalf, is considered of sufficient importance and potential dangerousness from an internal security standpoint to require immediate apprehension or detention in the event of an emergency. Individuals coming within the following categories shall be considered within the definition of a key figure:

I. National, district, and state officers and the principal officers of the local clubs of the Communist Party

II. The principal organizers of the Communist Party

III. Those communists who are executive officers or outstanding figures in established communist front or communist-controlled organizations, foreign language groups, and Negro organizations infiltrated by communists

IV. Individuals extensively engaged in communist infiltration of the labor movement, including principal officers of labor organizations who are members of or closely affiliated with the Communist Party. In

(10) Dissemination at the Bureau

There are some situations in which dissemination is made at the Bureau instead of in the field. In the majority of instances, information received by the FBI should properly be furnished immediately to some other agency within the executive branch of the Government so that the responsibilities of the other agency might be fulfilled properly. Care must be taken, however, not to disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where such a procedure is deemed inadvisable because of the inadequacy of security measures in that branch. In these instances the data should be brought to the immediate attention of the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. An example of the latter is, of course, the Atomic Energy Commission, which receives reports only through the Bureau, as noted in section 87D 7c[(3)]of this manual. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including the State Department, only at the SOG, as set out in 87D 6b (4). Dissemination is also made at the SOG to the State Department, unless it appears undesirable, in those cases in which subjects have been indicted for violations grounded on subversive activities. Dissemination in these cases is made to preclude these subjects from utilizing the fact they obtained a passport to refute allegations of subversive connections. The State Department, therefore, will be in possession of data concerning a defendant should he attempt to utilize this tactic in such an action.

b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction

(1) Members of the armed forces

The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the armed forces intelligence agencies states that the responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest.

Thus, in discharging our basic responsibilities in the internal security field, it is imperative that information concerning member of the military services be referred immediately to the appropriate branch having primary responsibility for its personnel. This procedure is mandatory, even though the security aspects of the data have not been fully resolved or verified. It should be specifically pointed out in such instances that the information has not been verified.

Section 87D 5b of this manual instructs that if it is determined a security subject is a member of the armed services the investigation must at that point be discontinued immediately and reported to the Bureau. The basis for such instruction lies in the fact that the subject is no longer within our investigative jurisdiction. In addition, dissemination of pertinent reports must be made locally in the field to the appropriate intelligence agency.

Our responsibility with regard to military personnel is not confined to those who have been the subjects of security investigations. It extends to any subversive derogatory data developed against a member of the armed services during any of our investigations of either individuals or organizations. For instance, if it is determined that a member of the armed forces has been in contact with a security subject or with any individual or group raising security implications, the appropriate intelligence service should be immediately advised locally. This should be done even though the security aspects of the contact have not been resolved, so that the military services may be in a position to discharge their responsibilities. It must be pointed out to them specifically in such instances that the data are unverified, and pertinent developments must be transmitted to them thereafter immediately upon receipt.

Section 87D 6b (1) (h) provides that during the course of security investigations it must be determined whether the subjects have any close relatives in the armed forces. Our responsibilities require that such associations be called to the attention of the appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on the security subjects involved. The evaluation of these associations lies entirely within the province of the intelligence services, but for the reasons stated previously herein it is incumbent upon the Bureau to disseminate this information immediately upon receipt.

Any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel must be set out in a letter to the Bureau, together with a statement as to the local dissemination made in the field. Such letter should be accompanied by a[letterhead] memorandum setting out with particularity the subversive data in a form entirely suitable for dissemination.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Administrative
  - data, 77
  - tickler, 55,56,74
- Admissible evidence, 29,37
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
  - Cuban, 45a,45b
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Annual review of section A, reserve index, 42b
- Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
- Armed forces
  - dissemination to, 81a
  - members of, 25
  - record in, 27
  - relatives in, 27
  - subjects entering, 56,60
  - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of security index, 50
  - alphabetical section, 51,63
  - at Bureau, 50
  - geographical section, 51,63
  - in field office, 51
  - inactive section, 56
  - special section, 52
  - unavailable section, 53
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71

- Bureau
  - applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
  - authority to investigate, 24
  - responsibility, 19

- Cancellation of
  - security flash notice, 27a
  - security index cards
    - after induction into armed forces, 60
    - mechanics, 60
    - on departure from U. S., 60
    - only after interview, 38
    - recommending, 42,61
    - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 74
- Changes on security index cards, 58
- Channelizing, 24,34,36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
  - extraction, 48,62
  - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants, 74
- Contacting
  - faculty members, 25
  - registrars, 25
  - students, 25
  - superiors of faculty members, 25
- Contacts
  - during investigation, 25
  - with foreign establishments, 25
- Content
  - and appearance
    - of reserve index cards, 43
    - of security index cards, 48
  - of reports, 74
- Corroboration, 37
- Criteria for inclusion in security index, 44a,45
- Cuban
  - activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  - aliens, 45a,45b
  - contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a
  - pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  - special section, 49,53
  - tabbing cards, 45b,64

- Dangerousness
  - definition of, 44
  - determination of, 44
  - Nation of Islam membership, 46
- Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Defense facilities, 64,73
  - list, 64
  - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Definitions, 19
  - of dangerousness, 44
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Detcom, 62
  - administrative procedures, 63
  - key figures, 62,68
  - purpose, 62
  - removal from, 58,63,64
  - top functionaries, 62,70
  - who to be tabbed, 62
- Determination of
  - dangerousness, 44
  - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Dissemination
  - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81a
  - of reports
    - at SOG, 81a
    - in field, 79
    - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
  - to Secret Service, 81
- Documentation of reports, 78
  - completion of, 78

- Employees of
  - international organizations, 25
  - U. S. Government, 25
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Evidence, 37
  - desirability of
    - admissibility, 29,37
    - corroboration, 37
  - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  - of membership or affiliation, 29
  - preservation of, 37

- Faculty members
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File on defected subjects, 42
- File reviews, 34
- Flash notices (security)
  - cancellation of, 27a
  - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  - when place, 27
- Foreign
  - diplomats, 25
  - establishments, 25
  - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
  - tours, 33a
  - travel, 33
- Forms
  - FD-122, 28,34,48,49,53 to 58,68,74
    - abstracts for, 47
    - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 43
    - cover letter thereto, 32
    - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63
    - placing name in or removing from
      - special section of security index, 53
      - unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    - recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - reference to, 77
    - succinct summary with, 47
      - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - when subject employed in key facility, 65
  - FD-122a, 42b,43,61,77
  - FD-128, 55,57 to 60,68
    - reference to, 77
    - when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    - when subject moves, 58,59

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Forms (continued)
  - FD-128a, 27a,43,77
  - FD-154, 42b,57
  - FD-165, 27,77
  - FD-186, 50
  - FD-305, 74,78
  - FD-305a, 78
- Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22

- Geographical
  - reference of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  - section of security index, 51,63
- Government employees, 25,70,80

- Handwriting, 29
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
- Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41
- Husband and wife, security investigations, 72

- Identification record, 27
- Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,60
- Inactive section of security index, 56
- Indices, check of, 72
- Individuals
  - to be investigated, 22
  - traveling abroad, 33
    - against whom stops are placed, 34
    - who are included in security index, 34
    - who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    - with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    - with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  - with foreign diplomatic status, 26
- Informants, cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
- Interviews
  - Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  - Bureau authority, 39,40a
  - conditions for, 40
    - conducting at place of employment, 40a
  - content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  - contents of letter containing results of, 42
  - determine willingness to testify during, 41
  - evaluation of, 45b
  - forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  - no report needed afterward, 40a
  - of hostile subjects, 41
  - of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 24, 25
  - of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  - of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  - of security index subjects, 38
  - of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  - of subjects who express desire for, 42
  - on SAC authority, 38
  - preparations for, 40
  - purpose of, 38
  - recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  - results not affecting security index status, 41
  - signed statements in connection with, 41
  - to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  - when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when discontinue, 40a
  - when report needed after, 41
  - with Bureau authority, 39

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Investigations of
  - aliens, 26
  - faculty members, 24
  - members of labor unions, 29
  - naturalized citizens, 26
  - students, 24
- Investigative
  - procedures, 26
  - techniques, 34
    - file reviews, 34
    - mail covers, 36
    - photographic surveillances, 35
    - physical surveillances, 35
    - private records of firms, 36
    - public source information, 36
    - security informants, 34
    - trash covers, 36

- Key facilities, 64
  - Delimitations Agreement, 64
  - employees included in security index, 65
  - list, 49,64,65
  - responsibility, 64
  - status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,74
  - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Key figures
  - definition of, 66
  - designation of, 67
  - foreign travel by, 69
  - handling of, 67
  - handwriting of, 67
  - in armed forces, 68
  - list, 69
  - movement of, 59,68
  - photographs of, 67
  - program, 66
  - reports on, 68
  - status of reports on, 68,73
  - when become subjects of SGE cases, 69
- Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

- Labor union membership, 29
- Labor unions, 41
- Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Letter in lieu of report, security index cases, 74
- Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Lumping information in reports, 76

- Mail covers, 36
- Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Members of
  - armed forces, dissemination of information concerning, 81a
  - labor unions, 29
  - law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Membership or affiliation, 29
- Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  - letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  - unavailable section of security index, 54
- Movement of
  - key figures, 59,68
  - subjects, 58
    - key figures, 59,68
    - security index subjects, 58
    - subjects not in security index, 60
    - subjects tabbed for detcom, 60
    - top functionaries, 59

- Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
- Nation of Islam
  - potential dangerousness, 46
  - what members to be investigated, 23

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- National
  - Defense Education Act of 1958, 22
  - Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - Science Foundation Act of 1950, 22
- Naturalized citizens
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - investigations of, 26
- Negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
- New office of origin, 58

- Observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Office of origin, 27a,58,59,72,81
- Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
- Overt acts, 45

- Periodic review of section A, reserve index, 42b
- Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Photographic surveillances, 35
- Photographs, 28
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
  - status of security index cases while obtaining, 28,68
- Physical
  - description, 28
  - surveillances, 35
    - maintenance of SA's notes, 38
- Position
  - and importance, 30
  - in labor organizations, 29
- Potential dangerousness, 44
  - of Nation of Islam members, 46
- Preservation of evidence, 37
- Priority apprehension program, 62
- Private records, 36
- Public
  - Law 87-835, 22
  - source information, 36
  - utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Purpose of
  - investigation, 19
  - security index, 43

- Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
- Recommendation for inclusion in
  - section A, reserve index, 42b,61
  - security index, 47
    - Cuban activity, 45a,45b
    - when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    - when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    - when subject is out of country, 48
    - when there is missing background information, 47
- Re-evaluation of security index status, 57,72,78
- Registrars of institutions of learning, 24,25
- Reinterviews, 42
- Relatives in armed forces, 27
- Removal from security index, 46a,61
- Reports
  - administrative data in, 77
  - character of, 73
  - content of, 74
  - cumulative items, 76
  - dissemination of, 79
  - documentation of, 78
  - lumping information in, 76
  - narrative-type statements, 77
  - negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
  - schedule of, 73
  - status of, 73
  - summarizing information in, 76
  - title of, 72
  - topical headings in, 74
  - when necessary after interview, 41
  - when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  - when not necessary after interview, 40a
  - when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
- Reserve index, 42a
  - arrangement, 42b
  - cards, content and appearance, 43
  - content, 43
  - names deleted from security index, 61,62

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Reserve index (continued)
  - purpose, 42a
  - removal from, 43
  - section A
    - changes, 43
    - individuals to be included, 42b,61
    - periodic review of, 42b
    - recommendations for inclusion in, 42b,61
    - when to submit reports, 42b
  - section B, 43,62
  - standards for, 42a
  - subjects
    - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    - security of Government employees case in, 70
- Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
- Responsibility of Bureau, 19
- Restrictions on investigations, 24
- Schedule of reports, 73
- Scope of investigation, 26
- Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Secret Service, dissemination to, 81
- Security
  - flash notice
    - cancellation of, 27a
    - notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    - when place, 27
  - index, 43
    - arrangement of, 50
    - cards
      - cancellation of, 38,42,60
      - changes on, 58
      - content and appearance of, 48
      - of key figures, 68
      - tabbing, 45b,62,64,68,70
      - transfers to reserve index, 61,62
    - criteria for, 44a,45
    - Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53,64
    - dangerousness, 44
    - dissemination to Secret Service, 81
    - purpose, 43
- Security (continued)
  - index (continued)
    - recommendation for, 45a,45b,46a,47
    - re-evaluation of status, 46,57,72,78
    - removal from, 46a,61
    - subjects of
      - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      - security of Government employees case in, 70
    - summary reports, 47
  - informants, 34
    - cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
  - of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Signed statements, 41
- Sino-Soviet bloc, 44a
- Sleepers, 31,52
- Special section of security index, 52
  - Cuban, 49,53
- Standards for reserve index, 42a
  - section A, 42b
- Status of cases, 73
  - on key figures, 73
  - on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66,74
  - on subjects in security index, 74
  - on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  - on top functionaries, 73
  - while obtaining photographs, 28
  - while securing handwriting, 29
  - while verifying residence and employment, 57
- Students
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigations of, 24
- Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
- Summary reports, 47,71,76
- Superiors of faculty members, 25
- Surveillances
  - photographic, 35
  - physical, 35

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Tabbing SI cards, 45b, 62, 64, 68, 70
- Thumbnail sketches, 79
- Title of reports, 72
- Top functionaries, 66, 69
  - change of office of origin, 70
  - definition of, 69
  - designation of, 69
  - handwriting of, 70
  - inclusion in key figure list, 70
  - movement of, 59
  - photographs of, 70
  - program, 66
  - regulations governing, 70
  - reports on, 59, 70
    - status of, 70, 73
  - tabbing for detcom, 62, 70
- Topical headings in reports, 74
- Tours, 33a
- Trash covers, 36
- Travel
  - abroad, 33
  - behind iron curtain, 34

- Unavailable section of security index, 53
  - imprisoned subjects, 54
  - missing subjects, 32, 54
  - subjects traveling abroad, 34, 54
- Underground membership or activity, 31
- United Nations employees, 25
- U. S. Government employees, 25
- U. S. Information Agency, inclusion of employees in security index or reserve index, 70

- Verification of
  - addresses
    - reserve index, section A, 42b
    - security index, 32, 57, 74, 81
  - employment
    - reserve index, section A, 42b
    - security index, 32, 57, 74, 81
  - key facility or defense facility status of place of employment, 64
- Voice of America (See U. S. Information Agency.)

- Wife and husband, security investigations, 72

- Yugoslov intelligence agents, contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

(5) Seamen and subjects employed in the maritime industry, including longshoremen and other water-front employees 80
(6) Employees of the Federal Government within the purview of Executive Order 10450 80
(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services 81
(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Agency.. 81
(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service 81
(10) Dissemination at the Bureau 81a
b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction 81a
(1) Members of the armed forces 81a

Index 82a

in a key facility, copies of reports bearing the dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," should be furnished to appropriate intelligence agencies of the armed services by the field offices as[shown]in sections 69,[volume III,] and 87D 7e (2),[of this manual.]

Specific instructions with regard to all phases of our responsibilities under Executive Order 10450, including policy, investigative procedures, and dissemination are set out in section 69, [volume III,]of this manual.

(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services
Dissemination should be made locally to the intelligence service of the military branch involved.

(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Agency
Federal Aviation Agency issues certificates to airmen who are defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew in the navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of the inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in the capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Subversive data developed concerning persons within such definitions should be furnished to the Bureau by report or letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, together with cover communication recommending that such data be furnished to Federal Aviation Agency. Such dissemination will be made only at the Bureau.

(9) [Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service
Letterhead memoranda are to be disseminated to Secret Service in all security index cases. These letterhead memoranda should contain background data on the individuals involved, residence, employment, and a description. They should contain any information indicative of emotional instability or any factors indicative of a propensity for violence, as well as any information indicating that the subject is in possession of firearms. The above should be followed by a succinct statement concerning the subject's affiliation with or participation in a subversive movement. They are not to contain any reference to the security index program.

Dissemination of these letterhead memoranda to Secret Service will be made both at the Bureau and in the field following review at the Bureau. Submit in quadruplicate under the individual caption. Instructions regarding dissemination in the field will be issued after Bureau review.

After initial submission of letterhead memoranda in security index cases, as changes occur in the status of the individuals involved with respect to residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally and furnish two copies of the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. The letterhead memorandum should contain a reference to the previous communication disseminated to Secret Service.

For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in other than security index cases, refer to section 83K, volume III, of this manual.

Copies of letterhead memoranda prepared in security index cases should be retained in the individual case files only.

Upon transfer of office of origin in one of these cases, the new office of origin is to furnish Secret Service locally with pertinent data concerning the subject and advise the Bureau that such has been done by the submission of two copies of the letterhead memorandum disseminated locally.]

[[(10)] Dissemination at the Bureau

There are some situations in which dissemination is made at the Bureau instead of in the field. In the majority of instances, information received by the FBI should properly be furnished immediately to some other agency within the executive branch of the Government so that the responsibilities of the other agency might be fulfilled properly. Care must be taken, however, not to disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where such a procedure is deemed inadvisable because of the inadequacy of security measures in that branch. In these instances the data should be brought to the immediate attention of the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. An example of the latter is, of course, the Atomic Energy Commission, which receives reports only through the Bureau, as noted in section 87D 7c (4) of this manual. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including the State Department, only at the SOG, as set out in 87D 6b (4). Dissemination is also made at the SOG to the State Department, unless it appears undesirable, in those cases in which subjects have been indicted for violations grounded on subversive activities. Dissemination in these cases is made to preclude these subjects from utilizing the fact they obtained a passport to refute allegations of subversive connections. The State Department, therefore, will be in possession of data concerning a defendant should he attempt to utilize this tactic in such an action.

b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction

(1) Members of the armed forces

The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the armed forces intelligence agencies states that the responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest.

Thus, in discharging our basic responsibilities in the internal security field, it is imperative that information concerning members of the military services be referred immediately to the appropriate branch having primary responsibility for its personnel. This procedure is mandatory, even though the security aspects of the data have not been fully resolved or verified. It should be specifically pointed out in such instances that the information has not been verified.

Section 87D 5b of this manual instructs that if it is determined a security subject is a member of the armed services the investigation must at that point be discontinued immediately and reported to the Bureau. The basis for such instruction lies in the fact that the subject is no longer within our investigative jurisdiction. In addition, dissemination of pertinent reports must be made locally in the field to the appropriate intelligence agency.

Our responsibility with regard to military personnel is not confined to those who have been the subjects of security investigations. It extends to any subversive derogatory data developed against a member of the armed services during any of our investigations of either individuals or organizations. For instance, if it is determined that a member of the armed forces has been in contact with a security subject or with any individual or group raising security implications, the appropriate intelligence service should be immediately advised locally. This should be done even though the security aspects of the contact have not been resolved, so that the military services may be in a position to discharge their responsibilities. It must be pointed out to them specifically in such instances that the data are unverified, and pertinent developments must be transmitted to them thereafter immediately upon receipt.

Section 87D 6b (1) (h) provides that during the course of security investigations it must be determined whether the subjects have any close relatives in the armed forces. Our responsibilities require that such associations be called to the attention of the appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on the security subjects involved. The evaluation of these associations lies entirely within the province of the intelligence services, but for the reasons stated previously herein it is incumbent upon the Bureau to disseminate this information immediately upon receipt.

Any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel must be set out in a letter to the Bureau, together with a statement as to the local dissemination made in the field. Such letter should be accompanied by a[letterhead] memorandum setting out with particularity the subversive data in a form entirely suitable for dissemination.

(j) In connection with periodic reports in security index cases, there are instances in which evidence of extensive activity in subversive organizations will be developed. In these cases it is permissible to report such information in narrative-type statements without indicating exact dates of activity; however, the period of time involved must be shown, as well as the inclusive dates of the informant reports.

This type reporting is not to be utilized in Smith Act of 1940 cases or Internal Security Act of 1950 cases. The narrative statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions and information from each source must be reported in separate narrative statements.

(k) The above instructions in no way remove responsibility for reporting all items of pertinence to the Bureau, bearing in mind the fact that Bureau files must be complete insofar as matters of substance are concerned, nor is responsibility removed for the reporting in detail of information tending to establish a subject's knowledge of the basic aims and purposes of the subversive organizations with which affiliated or information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

In the documentation of narrative statements set forth the location of the original documents in the field office files by the file number and serial scope.

(10) Administrative data

(a) General

All references to the following items, all administrative in nature, should be contained in cover pages accompanying reports:

I. Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, key figure or top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), forms FD-122, FD-122a, FD-128, and FD-128a, and Bureau instructions for handling cases or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature

II. Whenever reports relating to security index subjects contain data affecting material included on subject's existing security index card, the cover pages accompanying the report shall include as the last page form FD-305, appropriately checked, which form contains items pertaining to the following:

(A) That subject is included in the security index
(B) That data appearing on security index card is current
(C) That FD-122 has been submitted to Bureau where security index card changes are necessary
(D) That a suitable photograph is or is not available
(E) That subject is employed in a key facility[and agency charged with security responsibility is specified]and that agencies interested in that facility are specified
(F) Reason for classifying report
(G) Dates subject was previously interviewed and reason for not reinterviewing subject
(H) That subject no longer meets security index criteria and a letter has been directed to the Bureau recommending cancellation of the security index card
(I) That subject's case has been re-evaluated and reasons are set forth as to why subject's activities continue to fall within security index criteria
(J) That subject's security index card is or is not tabbed detcom and[reasons why]subject's activities warrant detcom tabbing

III. Form FD-305a containing items pertinent to reserve index subjects will be similarly utilized in connection with the submission of reports in reserve index cases.

(b) Documentation of reports

I. Deleted

II. If information necessary for complete documentation is not available in subject's case file, necessary review of other office files should be made. If not obtainable, this fact must be indicated in the cover page(s) accompanying report to the Bureau.

III. Extensive investigation should not be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have in the past furnished background information or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed that subject, according to reliable records, such as birth records, school records, or records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in report. Further verification will not be necessary.

IV. During the preparation of summary reports it is often found that information being incorporated into a report was originally obtained by another office and all of the necessary information for complete documentation will not be in the possession of the office preparing the report. In such an instance, if the office preparing the report is in possession of Photostats of documents obtained by the other offices and the identity

selecting key figures in the labor field, give consideration to the critical nature of the industry or trade involved and the fact that certain industries, such as transportation and communication, are particularly vulnerable to Communist infiltration and sudden disruptive action.

V. Editors, publishers and business managers of generally recognized Communist publications or Communist publishing houses and operators of the important Communist bookstores

VI. Prominent figures in the Communist-owned and -controlled educational institutions, generally referred to as workers schools

VII. Attorneys and bondsmen who are active in the Communist movement and are known to furnish important assistance to the Communist movement

VIII. Espionage or nationalistic tendency subjects whose activities are connected to a significant degree with the program of the Communist Party, provided they have no recognized diplomatic status. Investigation and preparation, submission and dissemination of reports governed by instructions issued in individual cases in this category and the general rules governing key figures as subsequently set forth in this section are not applicable to these subjects.

The above list is not all-inclusive. There may be individuals who, because of their profession, position in public life, Government employment or other associations, may not see fit to serve outwardly in behalf of the Communist Party or its related groups but who, because of their established Communist sympathies and their contributions to the Communist movement, might well conform to the general key figure definition set out above. Membership in the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations is not a prerequisite to being a key figure and the designation may apply to both citizens and aliens.

(b) Regulations governing the handling of the key figure program

I. Designation and deletion of key figure status

Designate or remove a subject as a key figure by individual letter to the Bureau carrying the subject in the caption and containing a brief statement as to the reason for designation or deletion.

Where office of origin for key figures is transferred, deletions in the old office of origin and additions in the new office are handled in accordance with 87D 7b (9) (b) above.

II. Photographs

Photographs must be obtained for each key figure. Whenever possible, the photographs should be obtained from public records, law enforcement agencies, state or Federal Government agencies and similar sources. Where more direct means employed, use extreme care to avoid prejudicing the investigation. Send one copy of photograph of each key figure to the Bureau, either by cover letter or as enclosure to a report. Maintain a copy of each photograph in the subject's individual case file in the field. If album of key figure photographs maintained, be sure duplicates are also filed in each individual subject's file.

III. Handwriting specimens

Suitable handwriting specimens of each key figure must be obtained. Whenever possible, obtain handwriting specimens from public records, law enforcement agencies, and similar sources. Again, if more direct means employed, use extreme care. Send specimens to the Bureau under a separate cover letter by registered mail for the attention of the FBI Laboratory. Letter should bear caption of individual case.

Handwriting specimens should be sufficiently extensive to permit possible future comparisons by the Laboratory. When specimens submitted may be of value as evidence, letter of transmittal should so state and Bureau should be requested to return specimens after copies have been made.

IV. Security index cards

Request preparation by FD-122 at the earliest possible moment. Same rules apply to preparation and maintenance as apply to other security index cards. All security index cards for key figures shall be tabbed for detcom under the priority apprehension program.

V. Change of office of origin

FD-128 changing office of origin on a key figure automatically deletes him as key figure in old office and adds him as a key figure in new office. For further instructions concerning the change of office of origin in these cases, see 87D 7b (9) (b).

VI. Reports

(A) Character - Internal Security - (followed by appropriate letter designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency)

(B) Submit reports every six months [showing] the subject's activities since last report. The key figure designations should be continuously evaluated so that their status will not be continued unless justified. These cases may be placed in a pending-inactive status as soon as the following conditions exist:

i. Reports have been submitted [showing] complete investigation definitely establishing by information of evidentiary nature subject's communist connections and activities and his importance in the communist movement plus essential background information.

ii. When no further action necessary other than maintaining contact with informants, keeping informed of subject's whereabouts, and generally following his activities. It is imperative that established sources of information be continued and still further informant coverage effected.

iii. Do not advise the Bureau by letter that case placed in pending-inactive status. Place cases on six-month ticklers to insure prompt submission of reports at six-month intervals.

iv. Cases involving key figures and top functionaries should be maintained in a pending status until such time as suitable photographs of subjects are obtained unless, of course, circumstances dictate to the contrary, in which case the Bureau should be so advised. The fact that handwriting specimens of key figures and top functionaries have not been secured should not prevent placing these cases in a pending-inactive status when all reasonable efforts have been made to secure them.

(C) Key figure cases may be closed and the designations deleted when subject enters the armed forces or other circumstances arise warranting such action. Additional information received shall be channelized to the closed file.

IV. Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing in section A of reserve index cards

(A) Changes in data appearing on section A reserve index cards should be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a.

(B) Deletions from section A of the reserve index should be recommended by letter. The letter should set forth the basis for the recommendation.

(C) Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section A cards to new office of origin.

(b) Section B

I. This section is to contain the names of all other individuals included in the reserve index. This section is to be maintained only in the field office.

II. Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section B cards to new office of origin.

(4) Content

(a) Each card in section A and section B should contain, as a minimum, the following:

- I. Name and aliases
- II. Race
- III. Sex
- IV. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
- V. Citizenship
- VI. Residence
- VII. Employment
- VIII. Birth data
- IX. Office file number

(b) In addition, membership and position or association in a subversive group or groups, together with the source and date of the information, may be added.

(5) Removal and deletion of cards

(a) Destroy cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources or who subsequently become subjects of security index cards.

(b) Advise the Bureau of the destruction only in the case of section A cards.]

b. Security index

(1) Purpose

(a) Security index cards are prepared and maintained by the Bureau to serve as operational guide for apprehension of persons deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country in the event of a national emergency.

(b) It shall contain the names of all persons who have been determined through investigation to be dangerous or potentially dangerous because of their membership in or affiliation with or espousal of doctrines of basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations and who will be apprehended upon receipt of instructions from the Attorney General.

(c) It shall include subjects of espionage investigations and any other type of Bureau investigation provided their activities bring them within the scope of the security index criteria.

(d) Action shall be taken against individuals included in the security index only upon authorization of warrants of arrest by the Attorney General. However, in preparing and maintaining the security index, to all practical effects, the Bureau is making the decision as to those persons who will be apprehended in the event of an emergency, inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised that he does not have funds or

manpower to review security index cases.

(e) Names shall be included in the security index only when investigation has established and reports[show] sufficient facts and evidence to justify the inclusion of each subject in the security index.

(f) The contents of the security index must be accurate and correct at all times. Matters pertaining to its preparation and maintenance must be given preferred, expeditious, continuous, and detailed attention.

(g) Matters pertaining to the security index are strictly confidential and are not to be mentioned or alluded to in investigative reports.

(h) The general operation and content of the security index must not be discussed by field personnel of the Bureau without prior Bureau authority.

(i) Matters pertaining to the security index may be discussed with duly qualified representatives of other Federal intelligence agencies only on a strictly confidential basis and only in instances in which an individual subject of prime interest to one of these services is involved.

(2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual

(a) The dangerousness of a member or affiliate of a subversive organization does not necessarily depend entirely upon his personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or a disposition to violence. Although these factors must be taken into consideration in evaluating an individual's potential dangerousness, other factors are essential in making this determination. An individual's dangerousness also depends upon the contribution he has made or is making in the advancement of the principles and aims of the subversive movement with which he is connected or his subversive potentialities in the event of a national emergency. Bear in mind that a subject active in a subversive organization is not merely an isolated individual but is a part of an organization of which the purposes are opposed to the best interests of the U. S. An individual's loyalty to a subversive organization and the principles thereof is a primary factor to take into consideration in evaluating his potential dangerousness;[however, regardless of evidence of subversive affiliation, all evidence developed during the course of a security investigation must be carefully weighed for the purpose of determining whether the subject's activities depict him as a potentially dangerous individual in time of a national emergency. Factors having a bearing upon an individual's potential dangerousness are numerous and will vary in each case in degree.]

Among such factors are:

I. Long continued membership in a subversive organization

II. Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools

III. Frequent or regular attendance at organizational meetings and functions

IV. Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization

V. Possession of or continued study of revolutionary literature

VI. Preparation or distribution of subversive propaganda and/or literature

VII. Holding positions in the subversive organization or in other organizations of a front character which indicate confidence of such organizations in his loyalty

VIII. Espousal of a subversive doctrine exemplified in his acts and utterances

IX. Contributions to or collections of funds for the organization

X. Recruitment of new members

XI. Revolutionary background

XII. Participation in picket lines in which the subversive organization is interested or which it has fostered, or in demonstrations, riots, mass meetings, or pressure group activity fostered by the organization

XIII. Violation of penal laws arising out of activities as a subversive

XIV. Active service in armed forces supported by a subversive movement, such as service in the Loyalist Forces during the Spanish Civil War which were supported by communism

XV. Constant support of the Soviet Union in acts and utterances

XVI. Acting as a courier for the subversive movement or as a confidential mail drop therefor

XVII. Constant participation in the activities of a subversive organization or advancement of the organization's aims or interests, especially when such participation involves financial sacrifices or personal inconvenience or disadvantage

[XVIII. Contacts with Sino-Soviet-bloc establishments (including Cuba) where purpose of contact cannot be determined or contact indicates communist sympathies

XIX. Contacts with Sino-Soviet-bloc, Cuban, or Yugoslav intelligence agents where purpose of contact cannot be determined or contact indicates communist sympathies

XX. Individuals who have defected, revoked, or sought revocation of their U. S. citizenship in favor of a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, who have returned to the U. S., and who have taken no positive steps to counteract such action

XXI. Statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with a Sino-Soviet-bloc country in the event of armed conflict between the U. S. and a Sino-Soviet-bloc country

XXII. Training and/or participation in espionage, sabotage, or intelligence activities

XXIII. A history of emotional instability or irrational behavior on the part of an individual with a subversive background whose prior acts depict a propensity for violence and hatred against organized government

(b) The security index criteria which governs whether an individual's name is to be added to the security index and/or retained thereon are set forth below. The above factors, while not all-inclusive, must be taken into consideration in each individual security case in arriving at a determination as to whether the subject thereof falls within the security index criteria and thus should be included in the security index.]

(c) An individual shall not be deemed dangerous merely because one or more of the above factors are applicable in his case.

(3) Criteria for placing and retaining names in the security index

(a) The addition to and retention of names in the security index shall be governed by the following criteria:

I. No name shall be added to or retained in the security index unless one or more of the following situations have been established through investigation:

(A) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(B) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organizations within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(C) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(D) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of emergency.

II. Activity in support of Cuban regime

Careful consideration should be given to recommending for inclusion in the security index those individuals who in the light of the clear identification of the Cuban Government as procommunist, pro-Soviet bloc, and anti-U. S., would be deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the U. S. in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U. S. In connection therewith, there should be a substantial showing of data within the following standards:

(A) An individual has served as a leader or officer or has substantially participated in the activities of a pro-Castro organization and has engaged in activities which have included either the preparation or distribution of pro-Cuban or anti-U. S. propaganda; the active collection of funds for any agency or representative of the Cuban Government or for a pro-Castro group, which funds are not intended for the relief of human suffering or other charitable purposes; active participation in acts of violence against anti-Castro individuals or groups or against the U. S.; or the active collection of intelligence data regarding the national defense of the U. S. or which would serve the purposes of the Cuban Government as opposed to the interests of the U. S., where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such data is to be or has been conveyed to any agency or representative of the Cuban Government.

(B) An individual, whether he has participated in organizational activity or not, has engaged in one or more activities specified in (A) above and it has been clearly established, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe the loyalty of the individual would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the Cuban Government and the U. S.

(C) Aliens of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship should be considered for the security index when it is determined that one of these (1) is likely to foster, encourage, or promote the policies, programs, or objectives of the Cuban Government, or collaborate with the Cuban Government or (2) is likely to engage in or attempt to engage in acts of espionage, sabotage, or other activities inimical or detrimental to the defense or public safety of the U. S. as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals. Activities on a subject's part which should be considered in determining whether his name should be added to the security index under the foregoing would include but should not be limited to (1) participation in organizations supporting the Castro regime, (2) participation in picket lines formed in support of the Cuban Government, (3) contacts with Cuban agents operating in this country on behalf of the Cuban Government, or (4) statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the U. S. and Cuba.

locate subjects are not to be submitted. The Bureau will closely follow investigative action to locate missing security index subjects.

II. If you receive indications that the subject went to Mexico or Canada, request the Bureau to alert other appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to determine any available verifying information through liaison channels.

III. If the subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, the Washington Field Office should be requested to check the records of the Passport Office of the State Department for verification.

IV. When all logical leads have been exhausted in the case of a missing important functionary, consideration should be given to circularizing all field offices with the subject's photograph and background information for the purpose of alerting the entire field to the identity of the subject. Bureau authority must be obtained before circularization is made. In seeking Bureau authority, advise the Bureau as to the position held by the subject and what efforts have already been made to locate him.

If this procedure is to be effective, its application must necessarily be restrictive in the number of subjects to which it is applied. Therefore, requests to circularize must be made only after every possible lead has been exhausted and then only in the cases of the most important missing functionaries.

(4) Individuals traveling abroad (Also consider section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

When information is received indicating that
- a subject of a current or past security investigation,
- a past member of a basic revolutionary organization,
- a member since July, 1950, of an organization designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450,
- a member since July, 1950, of an organization declared subversive by the House Committee on Un-American Activities or other legislative committees, or
- a member since July, 1950, of an organization described by reliable informants or sources as being dominated or controlled by one of the basic revolutionary organizations

intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel, take the following action:

(a) Immediately advise the Bureau[by letterhead memorandum] setting forth complete available details concerning the foreign travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, the exact name under which the passport was issued, the number of the passport, and the office issuing the passport, if known. Include in the letterhead memorandum a full description of the subject, including all aliases, and in the case of Chinese and Korean subjects Chinese telegraphic code[and Korean telegraphic code]numbers, as well as a concise resume of available subversive data regarding the subject. Do not delay in advising the Bureau of the actual or intended travel while developing the details of the travel as time is of the essence in this matter.

(b) Set out a lead for the Washington Field Office for a check of the records of the Passport Office, Department of State; however, do not limit efforts to develop above information to a check of such records.

d. Other Marxist revolutionary groups
A long-established group which would come under this category is the Proletarian Party of America, a relatively small organization.

There also are a few small groups composed of ex-members of the Communist Party, USA, who have voluntarily left the party or who have been expelled, usually for factionalism.

e. General
Communist investigations must be conducted in a most discreet and thorough manner at all times. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during the course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority. Bureau employees should not discuss communist or related investigations with any unauthorized individual. The subject of communism is not to be used in speeches of Bureau employees without specific authorization. However, there is considerable mimeographed material in each office, including speeches, testimony, and magazine articles prepared by the Director which could be furnished outside individuals interested in the subject of communism without any discussion.

2. Purposes of investigation

a. The investigation of the Communist Party, USA, and other similar-type organizations is of twofold purpose: (1) to obtain legally admissible evidence against these organizations for prosecution under existing Federal statutes set out above and (2) to follow closely the activities of these organizations from an intelligence viewpoint to have a day-to-day appraisal of the strength, dangerousness, and activities of these organizations seeking the overthrow of the U. S. Government.

b. Suggestions for proper coverage of the investigation of the Communist Party as an organization and similar organizations should include:
(1) The assignment of sufficient Agent personnel to insure that all of the important ramifications of party activities are properly covered
(2) Development of confidential informants in all party levels, including the national headquarters organization
(3) The establishment of trash and mail covers on pertinent headquarters and party functionaries
(4) The constant effort to develop admissible evidence against party officials for violation of Federal laws

c. Brief to establish illegal status of Communist Party, USA
(1) Purpose of brief is to collect all legally admissible evidence to prove illegality of party in one file. (Bufile 100-3-74.)
(2) Reports on brief to establish illegal status must be submitted by each office quarterly and should include only legally admissible evidence obtained during preceding three-month period. [If there is no information to report, include a statement to that effect in the cover pages of the quarterly report for the same period entitled "Communist Party, USA, Internal Security - C" (no copy needed for Bufile 100-3-74).]
(3) It is advisable to use the following breakdown in preparing reports:
(a) Origin and continuity of the party
(b) Pertinent statements, writings, and instructions relating to (1) Marxism-Leninism, (2) imperialism, (3) proletarian internationalism, (4) defense of USSR, (5) revolutionary statements
(c) Internal Security Act of 1950. Include under this heading any admissible evidence which would tend to prove a violation of section 4(a) of this act.

3. Investigative procedures and suggestions
This section contains detailed investigative guides for use in investigating and reporting activities of the Communist Party, USA.
   a. To accurately and clearly show the true nature of the Communist Party, USA, data concerning the following topics must be fully developed and reported. When material contains information that would be logically reported under more than one topic heading but to do so would make the separate accounts unintelligible, report all the material under the main heading and only refer to the information under the other breakdowns. Do not repeat same data under separate headings. Reports on the Communist Party, USA, as an organization must be submitted by each office quarterly and should cover activities for the preceding three-month period. All offices are required to use the following breakdown in preparing quarterly reports on the Communist Party, USA. Each subfile caption must start on a separate page.
      (1) Organization (Bureau file 100-3-69)
         (a) Security setup of district and/or state organization. Office covering district headquarters, describe the location and size of Communist Party office facilities, rent paid, and name and number of office employees. List address and/or post office box number of party headquarters.
         (b) Identify principal district officials and important functionaries, together with titles, and furnish a short resume of important activities of each during three-month period.
         (c) Names of new commissions or special committees, identity and capacity of individual members thereof. Submit resume of activities of groups under appropriate subfile captions.
         (d) Special meetings embracing only organizational matters. Other pertinent matters discussed at meetings concerning policy or strategy to be submitted under appropriate subfile captions.
         (e) Extend this outline as far as necessary for clarity and to meet needs of office under this or any succeeding subsection. Auxiliary offices submit pertinent data concerning above matters which do not normally come to attention of office covering district headquarters.
      (2) Membership (Bureau file 100-3-68)
         (a) Quarterly reports are not to contain any membership statistics. Cover pages accompanying each quarterly report must contain latest available statistics relating to total number of Communist Party members in the district. Membership data must start on a separate cover page, [which page(s) must be devoted exclusively to such data.] Office of origin, which is office covering Communist Party district headquarters, should submit following figures:
            I. For entire Communist Party district
            II. For individual states covered by Communist Party district
            III. For number of Communist Party members in area covered by field office

            Auxiliary offices should submit following membership figures to the Bureau and office of origin:
            I. For state or portion of state covered by that field office
            II. For number of Communist Party members in the area covered by that field office

            [The total number of Communist Party members in the area covered by field office, either origin or auxiliary, should be broken down as to the total number of Negroes in the overall numerical strength of the Communist Party, USA, in the

field office territory, the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a national level position, and the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a district level position above the status of "club chairman." Members of the Communist Party, USA, who are now carried as unidentified but who are known to be members of the Negro race should be included in the total number of Negroes.]

When possible, totals should be broken down as to nationality, sex, employment, veterans, and membership in unions. Auxiliary offices which, due to lack of Communist Party activity in their divisions, have been authorized to submit data by quarterly letter should include membership figures in these letters to the Bureau and office of origin. These letters to be submitted by auxiliary offices prior to first day of month in which quarterly report is due. Office of origin responsible to obtain complete figures from its auxiliary offices.

(b) In preparing estimates, best available informants and sources must be used. Include in cover pages of quarterly reports evaluation of degree of reliability of figures furnished by each source and of final figures submitted. Also include in cover pages total number of individuals positively identified as Communist Party members and total number of individuals tentatively identified as party members within the twelve-month period immediately preceding the submission of the quarterly report. In reporting membership figures, information from one source only is not acceptable unless facts are set forth demonstrating information from this source is the most accurate and most reliable information available.

(c) Explain in detail any increase or decrease in membership figures previously submitted. Where informants use such terms as "inactive" or "paper" members, their exact understanding of the meaning of the terms used and the number of individuals so described must be clearly explained. Full explanation must be made as to whether individuals so described are included in final membership figures submitted, together with reason for their inclusion or exclusion.

(d) Results of membership recruiting drives

(e) Make discreet efforts to ascertain results of annual national registration drives.

(3) Funds (Bureau file 100-3-63)

(a) Income and expenditures

(b) Plans and results of fund drives including:

- I. Total amount sought by the state Communist Party organization
- II. Specific amount to be contributed by the state organization to the national committee fund drive
- III. Specific amount to be contributed by the state organization to "The Worker" fund drive
- IV. Specific amount to be retained by the state organization after contributing to the national committee and "The Worker" fund drives for use in the state organization's own operations

(c) Large contributions by known party groups or front organizations

(d) Identity of any new party "angels"

(e) Distribution of funds not sent to Communist Party headquarters, such as funds in safe-deposit boxes, separate bank accounts, etc.

(f) Any special padding of expense accounts by Communist Party functionaries should be reported.

(g) Possible violations of state or Federal tax laws

(h) Disbursements and collections of the "Reserve Fund"

(i) Receipt of any money from abroad

(4) Security measures (Bureau file 100-3-84)
Any activities on the part of the security commission of the district which bring about new or unusual security measures, such as reducing clubs to "group captain systems," destruction of records, use of codes, clandestine meetings, investigations by the party of party members, etc.

(5) Underground operations (Bureau file 100-3-94)
Pertinent general information suitable for dissemination relating to underground operations of Communist Party. No information should be included in quarterly reports which would jeopardize informants or special investigative techniques. Current investigations relating to expanded underground operations during period 1951-1955 should be submitted by separate letter under individual case caption and should not be included in quarterly reports except for general information relating to methods of operation.

(6) Factionalism (Bureau file 100-3-88)

(a) Submit pertinent information reflecting that any ranking Communist Party members or group of members have developed views as "left-wing sectarianists" or "right-wing opportunists" inasmuch as the party has a policy of expelling members who develop such views.

(b) Unusual disputes or arguments between leading communists in any district should be included in this section.

(7) International relations (Bureau file 100-3-81)

(a) Information relating to communication or contact between Communist Party, USA, and communist parties of other countries

(b) Identities of Communist Party officials who plan to travel in foreign countries, including the reason for their travel

(c) Reaction of responsible Communist Party officials to events taking place in foreign countries

(d) Communist Party strategy and tactics directed to attacks on U. S. foreign policy and support of U. S. S. R. and satellite foreign policy.

(8) United Nations (Bureau file 100-3-80)

(a) Communist Party policy or pertinent information in connection with the United Nations, including such matters as infiltration of the United Nations, contacts by Communist Party officials with representatives to the United Nations

(b) Communist Party strategy and tactics directed toward attacking U. S. policy and/or to support U. S. S. R. or satellite policy in the United Nations

(9) Colonial matters (Bureau file 100-3-77)
Communist Party policy relating to colonial or semicolonial areas. While much of the information relating to this section will be submitted under "International Relations," this section covers special policy matters concerning colonial affairs, such as Communist Party policy relative to obtaining of independence by colonial people.

(10) Political activities (Bureau file 100-3-72)
  (a) Political activities in which party is engaged, including names and identities of party member candidates or party-sponsored candidates for public office
  (b) Details relating to party sponsorship of third party movements

(11) Legislative activities (Bureau file 100-3-70)
  (a) Activities of the Communist Party and/or its members in connection with legislation or proposed legislation which affects status of the party or activities of the party and its members
  (b) Activities of the Communist Party and or its members in connection with legislation which does not directly affect the party or its members but which party deems expedient to promote so it may appear to be closely aligned or in favor of a worthy cause

(12) Domestic administration issues (Bureau file 100-3-83)
  (a) Communist Party activities with relation to domestic administration issues, such as antilynching laws, poll tax, etc. Only the over-all policy of the party in these matters should be included in quarterly reports.

(13) Negro question[- communist influence in racial matters](Bureau file[100-3-116)]
Communist Party policy and activities of a significant character directed to exploitation of the Negro and his problems. [Particularly, include communist activities in connection with racial matters.] Activities of Negro front organizations should be submitted under appropriate front organization caption and should not be included in Communist Party quarterly reports.

(14) Youth matters (Bureau file 100-3-76)
Over-all policy and activities of the Communist Party youth commissions relative to infiltration of youth groups and exploitation of youth. Youth front activities should be submitted under appropriate front organization caption and should not be included in Communist Party quarterly reports.

(15) Women's matters (Bureau file 100-3-78)
Pertinent Communist Party over-all policy and activities of the women's commission relating to the infiltration of women's groups, exploitation of women

(16) Farmer's matters (Bureau file 100-3-79)
Pertinent Communist Party over-all policy and activities of the farm commission relative to the infiltration of farmer groups, exploitation of farmers, etc.

(17) Cultural activities (Bureau file 100-3-90)
The cultural commissions are, for the most part, composed of secret members of the party. These commissions propagate the cultural activities of the Communist Party which are displayed primarily through communist front organizations, as well as the carrying out of the Communist Party line in the fields of radio, publishing, education, science, and

arts. Individual members of the cultural sections have close ties in many instances with suspected international communist representatives. The following of this phase of the Communist Party movement is most important to develop the full and complete picture of Communist Party activities.

[(18) Veteran's matters (Bureau file 100-3-73)
Communist Party policy and activities of a significant character directed toward the exploiting of veterans and their problems

[(19) National group commissions (Bureau file 100-3-91)
- (a) Activity on the part of various Communist Party national group commissions, including identities of leaders and members of the commissions
- (b) Special Communist Party policies relating to infiltration of minority groups

[(20) Religion (Bureau file 100-3-82)
- (a) Communist Party policy relating to its approach to religion or to penetration of established religious groups
- (b) Any particular vehement statements made against religious bodies by ranking communists

[(21) Pamphlets and publications (Bureau file 100-3-86)
- (a) Changes in the field division with respect to establishment of new bookstores, increased distribution of party literature, publication of Communist Party literature and pamphlets, and other pertinent information relating to preparation and dissemination of Communist Party literature
- (b) Forward to Bureau by letter any important Communist Party publications published within a field division. Mention the publication in quarterly report, but do not describe in detail in the report.

[(22) Education (Bureau file 100-3-71)
- (a) Statements or class material which advocates overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence
- (b) Pertinent evidence and information relating to educational programs of the party. The following are deemed of utmost importance:
  - I. Instructions from national and/or district headquarters relative to the education of both new and experienced members
  - II. Courses or curricula given, together with any educational outlines and assigned or suggested reading. (There should be no long quotations in reports and any exhibits or enclosures should be forwarded to Bureau by separate letter.)
  - III. Important statements and remarks by instructors who should in turn be sufficiently identified so as to establish their status as duly designated or qualified party instructors
  - IV. Succinct digest of notes or memoranda of informants who attend the classes or schools. (Copies of the actual notes or memoranda should be submitted promptly by separate letter.)
  - V. Identities, if available, of members receiving instructions. Concentrate on having confidential informants

When the subject of such an investigation is presently in the security index, a letter must be directed to the Bureau at the time the report is submitted advising that the subject is in the security index.

Information of interest to FBI and/or AEC obtained subsequent to completion of Atomic Energy Act - applicant investigations concerning AEC employees or persons having access to restricted data should be handled according to instructions in section 20, volume II, of this manual.

f. [Submission of and general rules concerning security reports]

(1) General

[Submission of summary reports should not be delayed for the purpose of conducting current investigation in previously closed cases, but appropriate leads should be set out.]

Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened or placed in a pending status for the purpose of preparing investigative reports in accordance with the schedule outlined in 87D 7f (8).

Office indices and any material channelized to the case file since the most recent report should be reviewed and the case brought up to date by appropriate investigation to determine subject's current activities.

Each time that a case is reopened and brought up to date, it should be critically analyzed in the light of the security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3) herein. This procedure must be followed on a continuing basis for each security index subject.

(2) Origin

The office of origin will be that office covering the territory wherein the subject's subversive activities occur. In most instances this will also be the office in which territory the subject resides and is employed. In those cases in which the subject's subversive activities take place in the territory of an office other than the office covering the place of residence and/or employment, the office of origin shall be that office which can best cover the subversive activities of the subject.

(3) Deleted

(4) Classification

(a) 100 - for individuals affiliated with the basic revolutionary and front organizations of Marxian ideology and members of the Nation of Islam

(b) 105 - for members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups or others having nationalistic tendencies of a non-Marxist character

(5) Title

Only one subject shall be carried in the title of each report. Separate reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of their relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

(6) Character

(a) Key figures and top functionaries
Internal Security - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.
Examples:

Internal Security - C
Internal Security - SWP

(b) Others
Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.
Examples:

Security Matter - C
Security Matter - SWP
Security Matter - X (native fascist)
Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a key figure, the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject is designated a key figure, the first report after the designation and all subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. In any event, if subject is employed in a[defense facility so designated by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 5 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended,]add the additional character "Internal Security Act of 1950" if the organizational activity of the subject is of a communist nature.

(7) Deleted

(8) Status

All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:

(a) Top functionaries

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted quarterly. Forty-five days prior to the date a quarterly report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(b) Key figures

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted semiannually. Forty-five days prior to the date a semiannual report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(c) Deleted

(d) Other security index subjects

I. Closed

(A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of an annual investigative report. [If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed.] The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the annual report is due. Such cases shall also be opened and assigned six months after submission of the annual report to accomplish verification of addresses. Upon such verification, the cases should be closed administratively.

(e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index

I. Pending inactive

(A) If all active investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau

(B) Lead to follow Bureau for security index card should be set forth.

II. Closed

(A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau

(B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (d) above.

(f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein

I. Closed

(A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(9) Content

(a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.

I. Background

(A) Birth date
(B) Citizenship status
(C) Education
(D) Marital status
(E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
(F) Identification record
(G) Employment
(H) Residence
(I) Status of health (if known)

II. Connections with Communist Party (or other basic revolutionary groups and/or front organizations)

(A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.

(B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Administrative data, 77
- Admissible evidence, 29,37
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
  - Cuban, 45a,45b
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Annual review of section A, reserve index, 42b
- Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
- Armed forces.
  - dissemination to, 81
  - members of, 25
  - record in, 27
  - relatives in, 27
  - subjects entering, 56,60
  - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of security index, 50
  - alphabetical section, 51,63
  - at Bureau, 50
  - geographical section, 51,63
  - in field office, 51
  - inactive section, 56
  - special section, 52
  - unavailable section, 53
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71

- Bureau
  - applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
  - authority to investigate, 24
  - responsibility, 19

- Cancellation of
  - security flash notice, 27a
  - security index cards
    - after induction into armed forces, 60
    - mechanics, 60
    - on departure from U. S., 60
    - only after interview, 38
    - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 74
- Changes on security index cards, 58
- Channelizing, 36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
  - extraction, 48,62
  - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants, 74
- Contacting
  - faculty members, 25
  - registrars, 25
  - students, 25
  - superiors of faculty members, 25
- Contacts
  - during investigation, 25
  - with foreign establishments, 25
- Content
  - and appearance
    - of reserve index cards, 43
    - of security index cards, 48
  - of reports, 74
- Corroboration, 37
- Criteria for inclusion in security index, 45
- Cuban
  - activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  - aliens, 45a,45b
  - pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  - special section, 49,53
  - tabbing cards, 45b,64

- Dangerousness
  - definition of, 44
  - determination of, 44
  - Nation of Islam membership, 46
- Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Defense facilities, 64,73
  - list, 64
  - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Definitions, 19
  - of dangerousness, 44
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Detcom, 62
  - administrative procedures, 63
  - key figures, 62,68
  - purpose, 62
  - removal from, 58,63,64
  - top functionaries, 62,70
  - who to be tabbed, 62
- Determination of
  - dangerousness, 44
  - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Dissemination
  - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81
  - of reports
    - at SOG, 81
    - in field, 79
    - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
- Documentation of reports, 78
  - completion of, 78

- Employees of
  - international organizations, 25
  - U. S. Government, 25
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Evidence, 37
  - desirability of
    - admissibility, 29,37
    - corroboration, 37
  - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  - of membership or affiliation, 29
  - preservation of, 37

- Faculty members
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File on defected subjects, 42
- File reviews, 34
- Flash notices (security)
  - cancellation of, 27a
  - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  - when place, 27
- Foreign
  - diplomats, 25
  - establishments, 25
  - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
  - tours, 33a
  - travel, 33
- Forms
  - FD-122
    - abstracts for, 47
    - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    - cover letter thereto, 32
    - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63
    - placing name in or removing from
      - special section of security index, 53
      - unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    - recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - reference to, 77
    - succinct summary with, 47
      - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - when subject employed in key facility, 65
  - FD-122a, 42b,43,61,77
  - FD-128
    - reference to, 77
    - when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    - when subject moves, 58,59

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Forms (continued)
  - FD-128a, 27a,43,77
  - FD-154, 57
  - FD-165, 27,77
  - FD-186, 50
  - FD-305, 74,78
  - FD-305a, 78
- Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22
- Geographical
  - reference of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  - section of security index, 51,63
- Government employees, 25,70,80
- Handwriting, 29
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
- Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41
- Identification record, 27
- Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,60
- Inactive section of security index, 56
- Indices, check of, 72
- Individuals
  - to be investigated, 22
  - traveling abroad, 33
    - against whom stops are placed, 34
    - who are included in security index, 34
    - who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    - with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    - with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  - with foreign diplomatic status, 26
- Informants, cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
- Interviews
  - Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  - Bureau authority, 39,40a
  - conditions for, 40
    - conducting at place of employment, 40a
  - content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  - contents of letter containing results of, 42
  - determine willingness to testify during, 41
  - evaluation of, 45b
  - forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  - no report needed afterward, 40a
  - of hostile subjects, 41
  - of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 24, 25
  - of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  - of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  - of security index subjects, 38
  - of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  - of subjects who express desire for, 42
  - on SAC authority, 38
  - preparations for, 40
  - purpose of, 38
  - recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  - results not affecting security index status, 41
  - signed statements in connection with, 41
  - to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  - when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when discontinue, 40a
  - when report needed after, 41
  - with Bureau authority, 39

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Investigations of
  - aliens, 26
  - faculty members, 24
  - members of labor unions, 29
  - naturalized citizens, 26
  - students, 24
- Investigative
  - procedures, 26
  - techniques, 34
    - file reviews, 34
    - mail covers, 36
    - photographic surveillances, 35
    - physical surveillances, 35
    - private records of firms, 36
    - public source information, 36
    - security informants, 34
    - trash covers, 36

- Key facilities, 64
  - Delimitations Agreement, 64
  - employees included in security index, 65
  - list, 64
  - responsibility, 64
  - status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,74
  - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Key figures
  - definition of, 66
  - designation of, 67
  - foreign travel by, 69
  - handling of, 67
  - handwriting of, 67
  - in armed forces, 68
  - list, 69
  - movement of, 59,68
  - photographs of, 67
  - program, 66
  - reports on, 68
  - status of reports on, 68,73
  - when become subjects of SGE cases, 69
- Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

- Labor union membership, 29
- Labor unions, 41
- Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Letter in lieu of report, security index cases, 74
- Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Lumping information in reports, 76

- Mail covers, 36
- Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Members of
  - armed forces, dissemination of information concerning, 81
  - labor unions, 29
  - law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Membership or affiliation, 29
- Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  - letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  - unavailable section of security index, 54
- Movement of
  - key figures, 59,68
  - subjects, 58
    - key figures, 59,68
    - security index subjects, 58
    - subjects not in security index, 60
    - subjects tabbed for detcom, 60
    - top functionaries, 59

- Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
- Nation of Islam
  - potential dangerousness, 46
  - what members to be investigated, 23

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

National
  Defense Education Act of 1958, 22
  Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
  Science Foundation Act of 1950, 22
Naturalized citizens
  dissemination of information concerning, 80
  investigations of, 26
Negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
New office of origin, 58

Observation of subject, 28,50,57
Office of origin, 27a,58,59,72
Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
Overt acts, 45

Periodic review of section A, reserve index, 42b
Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
Photographic surveillances, 35
Photographs, 28
  of key figures, 67
  of top functionaries, 70
  status of security index cases while obtaining, 28,68
Physical
  description, 28
  surveillances, 35
    maintenance of SA's notes, 38
Position
  and importance, 30
  in labor organizations, 29
Potential dangerousness, 44
  of Nation of Islam members, 46
Preservation of evidence, 37
Priority apprehension program, 62
Private records, 36
Public
  Law 87-835, 22
  source information, 36
  utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Purpose of
  investigation, 19
  security index, 43

Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
Recommendation for inclusion in
  section A, reserve index, 42b,61
  security index, 47
    Cuban activity, 45a,45b
    when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    when subject is out of country, 48
    when there is missing background information, 47
Re-evaluation of security index status, 57,72,78
Registrars of institutions of learning, 24,25
Reinterviews, 42
Relatives in armed forces, 27
Removal from security index, 46a,61
Reports
  administrative data in, 77
  character of, 73
  content of, 74
  cumulative items, 76
  dissemination of, 79
  documentation of, 7[illegible]
  lumping information in, 76
  narrative-type statements, 77
  negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 74
  schedule of, 73
  status of, 73
  summarizing information in, 76
  title of, 72
  topical headings in, 74
  when necessary after interview, 41
  when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  when not necessary after interview, 40a
  when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
Reserve index, 42a
  arrangement, 42b
  cards, content and appearance, 43
  content, 43
  names deleted from security index, 61,62

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Reserve index (continued)
  purpose, 42a
  removal from, 43
  section A
    changes, 43
    individuals to be included, 42b,61
    periodic review of, 42b
    recommendations for inclusion in, 42b,61
    when to submit reports, 42b
  section B, 43,62
  standards for, 42a
  subjects
    espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    security of Government employees case in, 70
Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
Responsibility of Bureau, 19
Restrictions on investigations, 24

Schedule of reports, 73
Scope of investigation, 26
Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Security
  flash notice
    cancellation of, 27a
    notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    when place, 27
  index, 43
    arrangement of, 50
    cards
      cancellation of, 38,42,60
      changes on, 58
      content and appearance of, 48
      of key figures, 68
      tabbing, 45b,62,64,68,70
      transfers to reserve index, 61, 62
    criteria for, 45
    Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53,64
    dangerousness, 44
    purpose, 43
Security (continued)
  index (continued)
    recommendation for, 45a,45b,46a,47
    re-evaluation of status, 72
    removal from, 46a,61
    subjects of
      espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      security of Government employees case in, 70
    summary reports, 47
  informants, 34
    cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
  of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
Signed statements, 41
Sleepers, 31,52
Special section of security index, 52
  Cuban, 49,53
Standards for reserve index, 42a
  section A, 42b
Status of cases, 73
  on key figures, 73
  on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66,74
  on subjects in security index, 74
  on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  on top functionaries, 73
  while obtaining photographs, 28
  while securing handwriting, 29
  while verifying residence and employment, 57
Students
  contacts with, 25
  investigations of, 24
Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
Summary reports, 47,71
Superiors of faculty members, 25
Surveillances
  photographic, 35
  physical, 35

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Tabbing SI cards, 45b, 62, 64, 68, 70
Thumbnail sketches, 79
Title of reports, 72
Top functionaries, 66, 69
  change of office of origin, 70
  definition of, 69
  designation of, 69
  handwriting of, 70
  inclusion in key figure list, 70
  movement of, 59
  photographs of, 70
  program, 66
  regulations governing, 70
  reports on, 70
    status of, 70, 73
  tabbing for detcom, 62, 70
Topical headings in reports, 74
Tours, 33a
Trash covers, 36
Travel
  abroad, 33
  behind iron curtain, 34

Unavailable section of security index, 53
  imprisoned subjects, 54
  missing subjects, 32, 54
  subjects traveling abroad, 34, 54
Underground membership or activity, 31
United Nations employees, 25
U. S. Government employees, 25
U. S. Information Agency, inclusion of employees in security index or reserve index, 70

Verification of
  addresses
    reserve index, section A, 42b
    security index, 32, 57, 74
  employment
    reserve index, section A, 42b
    security index, 32, 57, 74
  key facility or defense facility status of place of employment, 64
Voice of America (See U. S. Information Agency.)

Communist Party members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Special Agents attending mass meetings, etc.

4. Internal Security Act of 1950
   To insure successful proceedings against a communist front organization under this act, a preponderance of admissible evidence must be secured to[show]extent to which
   a. Persons active in management, direction, or supervision of an organization are active in management, direction, or supervision, or as representatives, of
   b. Its support, financial or otherwise, is derived from
   c. Its funds, resources, or personnel are used to further or promote objectives of
   d. Positions taken or advanced by it from time to time do not deviate from those of

   Any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or the world communist movement.
5. Panel sources
   a. Purpose
      To develop potential witnesses who will be willing to obtain and introduce legally admissible evidence re subversive nature of organizations in future prosecutive action.
   b. Program
      (1) Since Special Agent and active security informant testimony is undesirable, field should recruit panel of potential witnesses locally. Some may be found among American Legion contacts, plant informants, former and exposed security informants, etc.
      (2) Panel members should attend public rallies and meetings, as well as obtain literature of organizations they are covering.
      (3) To aid panelists, exhibit photographs of individuals they will most likely encounter at front organization functions.
      (4) Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, the same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants. (See section 107, volume IV, of this manual.)
      (5) Legitimate expenses incurred by panel members should be reimbursed in same manner as security informants.
      (6) Eliminate inactive, ineffective, or unsatisfactory panelists on a continuing basis. At time of submission of semiannual letter, office panel should be reviewed to make certain all such panelists have been removed.
      (7) Identities of panelists should be concealed.
   c. Administrative handling
      (1) Check prospective panelists through office indices, local police department, credit records, and established informants. If no undesirable information is developed, initial contact may be made with panelist to ascertain cooperativeness.
      (2) Submit names of cooperative panelists to Bureau by letter outlining complete background and recommendation as to inclusion in office panel. [One of the required copies of the letter to the Bureau should consist only of the first page of the letter. When approving the field's recommendation, this single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" by Bureau and will be returned.] Be certain such individuals are not plants and will consider relationship with Bureau in confidence.

(3) Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panelist is initiated. When preliminary investigation completed and Bureau has approved panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly.

Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.

(4) Only Agents designated should handle panelists.

(5) Every four months submit letter of justification to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section 107N, 3b, volume IV, of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

[Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.]

(6) Summary letter captioned "Panel Source Program" (Bufile 134-1113) to be prepared and submitted to Bureau March 25 and September 25 each year. Use following topical outline:

(a) Status of program
Include progress in panel development. Show total number of new panelists developed and total number of panelists discontinued during six months' period.

(b) Total number panel sources active

(c) Names of organizations covered

(d) Number and identities of panelists redesignated to informant or potential informant status since institution of panel program

d. Suggestion
Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel members and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization cases, security informants, and communist publications; e.g., "The Worker."

6. Classification - 100

7. Character - Internal Security - letters for organizational activity or nationalistic tendency; e.g., (C), (SWP), (Miscellaneous), etc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

- V. Inactive section ... 56
- (7) Periodic verification of addresses ... 57
- (8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards ... 58
- (9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards ... 58
  - (a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries ... 58
  - (b) Key figures and top functionaries ... 59
  - (c) Subjects tabbed for detcom ... 60
  - (d) Subjects not included in security index ... 60
- (10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index ... 60
  - (a) Death of subject ... 60
  - (b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction 60
  - (c) Imprisonment of subject ... 60
  - (d) Induction of subject into the armed forces ... 60
  - (e) Security informants ... 60
  - (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous ... 61
  - (g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection... 61
  - (h) Subjects of Chinese extraction... 62
- (11) Priority apprehension program (DETCOM) ... 62
  - (a) Purpose ... 62
  - (b) Subjects to be tabbed detcom ... 62
  - (c) Recommendations for and removal of detcom designation ... 63
  - (d) Administrative procedures for handling detcom program ... 63
  - (e) General... 64
- c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities and defense facilities ... 64
  - (1) Responsibility ... 64
  - (2) Inclusion in security index ... 65
  - (3) Deleted
  - (4) Dissemination ... 65
  - (5) Status of cases ... 66
- d. Key figure and top functionary program ... 66
  - (1) General ... 66
  - (2) Key figures ... 66
    - (a) Definition ... 66
    - (b) Regulations governing the handling of the key figure program ... 67
      - I. Designation and deletion of key figure status 67
      - II. Photographs ... 67
      - III. Handwriting specimens ... 67
      - IV. Security index cards ... 68
      - V. Change of office of origin ... 68
      - VI. Reports ... 68
      - VII. Maintenance of key figure list ... 69
      - VIII. Deleted
  - (3) Top functionaries ... 69
    - (a) Definition ... 69
    - (b) Manner of designation ... 69
    - (c) Regulations governing top functionaries ... 70
- e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index... 70

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page
(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations 70
(2) Security of Government employees investigations........ 70
(3) Atomic Energy Act, U. S. Information Agency applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations........ 70
f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports. 71
(1) General 71
(2) Origin 72
(3) Deleted
(4) Classification 72
(5) Title 72
(6) Character 73
(a) Key figures and top functionaries 73
(b) Others 73
(7) Deleted
(8) Status 73
(a) Top functionaries 73
(b) Key figures 73
(c) Deleted
(d) Other security index subjects 74
(e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index . 74
(f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein 74
(9) Content 74
(10) Administrative data 77
(a) General 77
(b) Documentation of reports 78
g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of........ 79
8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations 79
a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau 80
(1) Aliens and naturalized citizens 80
(2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services 80
(3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense 80
(4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard 80

locate subjects are not to be submitted. The Bureau will closely follow investigative action to locate missing security index subjects.

II. If you receive indications that the subject went to Mexico or Canada, request the Bureau to alert other appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to determine any available verifying information through liaison channels.

III. If the subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, the Washington Field Office should be requested to check the records of the Passport Office of the State Department for verification.

IV. When all logical leads have been exhausted in the case of a missing important functionary, consideration should be given to circularizing all field offices with the subject's photograph and background information for the purpose of alerting the entire field to the identity of the subject. Bureau authority must be obtained before circularization is made. In seeking Bureau authority, advise the Bureau as to the position held by the subject and what efforts have already been made to locate him.

If this procedure is to be effective, its application must necessarily be restrictive in the number of subjects to which it is applied. Therefore, requests to circularize must be made only after every possible lead has been exhausted and then only in the cases of the most important missing functionaries.

(4) Individuals traveling abroad (Also consider section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

When information is received indicating that
- a subject of a current or past security investigation,
- a past member of a basic revolutionary organization,
- a member since July, 1950, of an organization designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450,
- a member since July, 1950, of an organization declared subversive by the House Committee on Un-American Activities or other legislative committees, or
- a member since July, 1950, of an organization described by reliable informants or sources as being dominated or controlled by one of the basic revolutionary organizations

intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel, take the following action:

(a) Immediately advise the Bureau[by letterhead memorandum] setting forth complete available details concerning the foreign travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, the exact name under which the passport was issued, the number of the passport, and the office issuing the passport, if known. [Include in the letterhead memorandum a full description of the subject, including all aliases, and in the case of Chinese and Korean subjects CTC numbers, as well as a concise resume of available subversive data regarding the subject.] Do not delay[in]advising the Bureau of the actual or intended travel while developing[the details of the travel]as time is of the essence in this matter.

(b) Set out a lead for the Washington Field Office for a check of the records of the Passport Office, Department of State; however, do not limit efforts to develop above information to a check of such records.

[(c)] Information concerning these subjects' proposed travel abroad, including information concerning their subversive activities, is furnished by the Bureau to the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and legal attaches if the proposed travel is in areas covered by such. [If the travel is in areas covered by legal attaches, forward sufficient copies of the letterhead memorandum to enable dissemination of three copies to each of the legal attaches involved. For each legal attache to whom dissemination is to be made, forward one photograph of the subject, if available. In the cover letter accompanying the letterhead memorandum, indicate extent of foreign investigation recommended or whether only stops should be placed with appropriate security services abroad.

(d) Subsequent reports in individual cases should contain the details regarding subject's travel.] In nonsecurity index cases[in which letterhead memoranda are submitted,] all available data regarding subject's subversive activities and affiliations should be carefully evaluated with a view toward determining whether a full security investigation should be conducted and the communication transmitting data regarding a subject's travel should contain a statement as to whether a security investigation is being initiated and, if not, reasons therefor.

(e) When information is received that an individual with a subversive background falling within the categories set out previously herein is forming a tour group for foreign travel or an organization which is considered subversive is sponsoring such a tour, advise appropriate offices under the caption of the tour name or the organization sponsoring the tour of the identities of the individuals participating in the tour and furnish the Bureau a letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination to the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and appropriate legal attaches, including therein all readily available information pertaining to the tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names of individuals making up the tour with addresses, if available, and a thumbnail sketch of the organization or individual sponsoring the tour.

Letterhead memoranda relating to the tours will be disseminated by the Bureau with a statement that, as individuals participating are identified, recipients will be furnished with memoranda under the individual case caption where those individuals are found to have subversive backgrounds. Therefore, the appropriate field offices should immediately identify and submit individual memoranda concerning such individuals. The details of travel will be replaced by a reference to the memorandum previously prepared under the caption of the organization sponsoring the tour. Prepare individual memoranda only in the cases of individuals with subversive backgrounds falling within the categories set out previously herein.

In addition, appropriate offices should submit a letter to the Bureau under the organization caption listing the names of those individuals residing within their territory who are traveling with the tour group and on whom no subversive information is found.

[(f) Advise the Bureau promptly in form suitable for dissemination of a subject's return from travel abroad in those instances in which stops have been placed with security services abroad through the agencies listed above. In instances in which an individual against whom stops have been placed has traveled to any country behind the Iron Curtain, the Bureau shall also be furnished at that time with recommendations as to the desirability of interview of such person and with advice as to whether additional investigation concerning him is contemplated. In the event such an interview is authorized, it shall be conducted promptly and the case shall not be closed until such interview is had and the results thereof submitted in report form.

[(g) In some instances a security investigation of a subject not yet included in the security index may be in progress at the time it is found that the subject has recently departed for a foreign country. If the evidence developed at that time warrants the inclusion of the subject in the security index were it not for the fact that he is outside the U. S., form FD-122 should be submitted recommending his inclusion in the unavailable section of the security index. After all initial investigation is completed, the subject's case will be handled the same as those of other subjects of a similar status who are included in the unavailable section as out of the country.

If the subject is an alien who has been deported or has otherwise permanently departed from the U. S., he should not be included in the security index.

When it is determined that a security index subject has departed for a foreign country, his security index card shall be placed in the unavailable section and his case handled in accordance with the instructions set forth under 87D 7b (6) (b) IV.

(5) Investigative techniques
While it is not possible to enumerate all investigative techniques which can and should be employed in these investigations, there are certain proven techniques which have been used with continued success and should be applied wherever possible.

(a) File reviews
Upon the initiation of a security investigation of an individual, check the office indices and review files thoroughly for any pertinent information on record showing background and subversive activity of each individual subject. Include such information in the initial investigative report.

Once a main security file has been opened for an individual, subsequent information received concerning him should be channelized to that file. The reference cards pertaining to the subject should be consolidated in the indices after each check and review of files has been made.

(b) Security informants
Success of security investigations of individuals is primarily dependent upon a broad confidential informant coverage within every phase of subversive activity. Information and evidence developed through such sources are unsurpassed in value because of possible use not only for intelligence purposes but also as admissible evidence.

VII. Maintenance of key figure list

(A) Each office must maintain current list of key figures including top functionaries. List may be kept by simple list system, by maintaining a file wherein all additions and deletions to the list are reported, or by a card index system. Maintain key figure list separate from security index.

(B) Key figures should retain their designation notwithstanding their departure for foreign travel or other circumstances requiring temporary discontinuance of investigation.

(C) Should a key figure become subject of a security of Government employees investigation, his name should continue to appear on the key figure list, but the investigation shall proceed in accordance with existing instructions governing SGE cases.

VIII. [Deleted]

(3) Top functionaries

(a) Definition

A top functionary is an individual, either a member or a nonmember of the Communist Party, to whom, because of his importance, it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention in order to keep abreast of communism on a national basis in the U. S. Necessarily, such an individual would be on a high policy level in the movement.

The term "top functionary" is not to be construed as requiring that individuals in this category must actually hold official positions in party organizations but shall be given a broad enough construction to include others who are of equal importance because of their influence in the movement itself, or their position and activities outside the party in labor, front, or similar organizations or movements.

(b) Manner of designation

Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate a subject as a top functionary. Submit such recommendation to Bureau by letter containing reasons for the recommendation. Bureau desires to be very selective in this matter and to concentrate on individuals who, on a national basis, are the guiding hands in the communist movement.

At the seat of Government a careful appraisal will be made of the field's recommendation, following which the office will be advised concerning the Bureau's decision on the recommendation.

(c) Regulations governing top functionaries

I. Regulations set forth under (2) (b) above pertaining to key figures relative to photographs, handwriting specimens, security index cards, change of office of origin, detcom tabbing, character of reports, and inclusion in the key figure list apply to individuals designated as top functionaries.

II. Reports

Submit reports on top functionaries quarterly. Make status pending-inactive if there are no outstanding leads for active investigation.

e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index

Individuals investigated by the Bureau under any character against whom subversive information is developed must be constantly borne in mind for inclusion in the security index and/or reserve index.

(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations

Subjects of these investigations must be included in the security index and/or the reserve index if they meet the standards for inclusion therein. It is the responsibility of the investigating Agent and field supervising official to make appropriate recommendations for preparation of the security index card and/or the reserve index card, whenever appropriate.

(2) Security of Government employees (SGE) investigations

Subjects of all SGE investigations against whom subversive derogatory information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or reserve index.

The Agent conducting investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer such cases to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling. Copies of reports showing disloyal information must be submitted to the field office covering the subject's residence, when developed by any other office.

When an individual who has previously been investigated under the SGE character is the subject of a security index card and is still employed by the Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, the dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and the character of the subject's security case should be used in the report being submitted. This will insure that the reports are referred to the appropriate desks for supervision at the Bureau, as well as in the field. These reports should be written according to the standards prevailing for SGE reports.

Disseminate these dual character reports the same as any other security report. Representatives of other intelligence agencies requesting reports showing the actual SGE investigation should be informed to direct the request to their Washington headquarters for referral to the Bureau.

(3) Atomic Energy Act, [U. S. Information Agency] applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations

Subjects of all above investigations against whom subversive information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or the reserve index. In each such case the Agent conducting the investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer the matter to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling.

Copies of reports showing disloyal information must be submitted to the office covering the subject's residence, whenever developed by another office.

of the source, date of activity, date received, and name of the Agent receiving the information are known, it is not necessary to request the office originally obtaining the information to document it further by furnishing information showing the location of the original in the office files. If all documentation, except the latter item, is not in the possession of the office preparing the report, it should be obtained.

V. If it is found desirable to include in a report the identities of individuals who are known communists and have been associates of the subject to lend weight to evidence of the subject's potential dangerousness, only the source of the information showing the associate to be a communist need be identified.

VI. In a very limited number of instances it may be necessary to obtain a thumbnail sketch or characterization of an individual or organization from another office or the Bureau. When such information is received in your office, it should be placed in thumbnail sketch files so that it will be available to and can be readily located by Agents having future need for it, thereby eliminating repeated requests of another office for the same information.

g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

Channelizing memoranda in organizational and individual security case files may be destroyed following submission of reports in these cases.

[Copies of informant's statements designated for the 100 classification case files of informants may be destroyed when one year old on an annual basis.]

In destroying these [communications,] be guided by instructions for destruction of channelizing memoranda as set out in Manual of Rules and Regulations.

8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations

The proper utilization of information received by the Bureau is foremost among our responsibilities as an investigative agency. It is the Bureau's duty to keep the proper intelligence agencies informed concerning information of interest to them. Further, information which comes to the attention of the Bureau in connection with the conduct of investigations normally and regularly within the jurisdiction of the Bureau, which information is believed to be of interest to another agency within the executive branch of the Government, should be forwarded to the interested agency unless there are good and compelling reasons not to do so. This is in line with the Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives which provide for the dissemination to other agencies of information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters where the specific agency has a present or potential interest in the information.

Set out hereafter is a summarization of existing Bureau requirements regarding dissemination of security information developed on individuals during the course of regular investigations in the security field. It

should be apparent that all conceivable situations cannot be anticipated. For that reason, the data below should be considered as pertaining to representative situations which occur frequently enough to warrant specific treatment. The basic rule to follow is, of course, that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in the executive branch of the Government and that the term "interested agency" must be interpreted in the light of reason and common sense. Any unusual situations should be brought to the attention of the Bureau promptly for consideration and disposition.

Considerations affecting the national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico necessitate that the broadest possible construction be given to the existing requirements of dissemination to the intelligence services located in those areas. The Anchorage, Honolulu, and San Juan Offices should adhere to such policy and effect such dissemination as to discharge fully our responsibilities as laid down in Bureau instructions, together with practices which have been dictated by circumstances within those particular offices.

The material set out below must be read in conjunction with the Manual of Rules and Regulations,[part II,]section 5, which discusses the Bureau's over-all responsibilities in dissemination, together with existing policies, qualifications, and exceptions.

a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau

(1) Aliens and naturalized citizens

Information concerning aliens and naturalized citizens which might have a bearing on the deportation or denaturalization of such individuals should in all instances be forwarded to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Refer to the Manual of Rules and Regulations,[part II,]section 5. If any doubt exists, the matter should in all instances be resolved in favor of dissemination.

(2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services

Dissemination in these cases is treated specifically in section 87D 7c (4) of this manual.

(3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense

Dissemination should be made locally to G-2 and, in addition, to other intelligence services if their interest is apparent in individual cases or in specific facilities.

(4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard

Dissemination should be made locally to the appropriate military intelligence service. Dissemination to headquarters of the appropriate services will be made at SOG.

(5) Seamen and subjects employed in the maritime industry, including longshoremen and other water-front employees

Dissemination should be made to the Coast Guard on a local level and, when circumstances dictate, to other intelligence agencies, including ONI, which have an interest in the data reported. Appropriate dissemination on a headquarters level will be made at SOG.

(6) Employees of the Federal Government within the purview of Executive Order 10450

No dissemination of the reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in the field. If, however, subject is employed

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Tabbing SI cards, 45b,62,64, 70
Thumbnail sketches, 79
Title of reports, 72
Top functionaries, 66,69
  change of office of origin, 70
  definition of, 69
  designation of, 69
  handwriting of, 70
  inclusion in key figure list, 70
  movement of, 59
  photographs of, 70
  program, 66
  regulations governing, 70
  reports on, 70
    status of, 70,73
  tabbing for detcom, 62,70
Topical headings in reports, 74
Tours, 33a
Trash covers, 36
Travel
  abroad, 33
  behind iron curtain, 34

Unavailable section of security index, 53
  imprisoned subjects, 54
  missing subjects, 32,54
  subjects traveling abroad, 34,54
Underground membership or activity, 31
United Nations employees, 25
U. S. Government employees, 25
U. S. Information Agency, inclusion of employees in security index or reserve index, 70

Verification of
  addresses
    reserve index, section A, 42b
    security index, 32,57
  employment
    reserve index, section A, 42b
    security index, 32,57
  key facility or defense facility status of place of employment, 64
Voice of America (See U. S. Information Agency.)

(10) [Communist infiltration of mass organizations program]

[(a)] Submit semiannual letters March 1 and September 1 under caption[of above program,]Bufile 100-3-106, using following topical outline and headings:

I. [Information]concerning Communist Party program
[Furnish summary of information]received concerning [over-all]Communist Party program to infiltrate mass organizations, nationally and locally; steps taken to carry out program;[identity specific groups which are targets for infiltration or which have been infiltrated by party members;]and success being achieved by party.

II. Organizations concerning which[information]previously submitted
Only list names and Bureau file numbers[concerning]those [cases wherein, since submission of last semiannual letter, letters using the five-point outline set out under item (4) above were furnished to Bureau. Do not list those cases which were under investigation by Bureau authority at time of submission of last semiannual letter.]

III. Organizations concerning which[information]being submitted[for first time]with instant letter
[Only]list names and Bureau file numbers (if known) of those organizations concerning which[information has not previously been furnished Bureau but which is being furnished, together with recommendations regarding future investigations, for first time with instant letter. Submit information, using five-point outline as set out under item (4) above, as enclosure to letter.] Submit separate enclosure on each organization listed in this category. Furnish two copies of each enclosure and sufficient copies of cover letter in order that[one]copy[each]of semiannual letter and enclosure can be placed in Bureau file on organization. This will eliminate necessity of submitting[separate] summary letter under each individual case caption. Do not use T symbols in enclosure, but set out[identities] of sources.

f. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Bureau Agents during course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority.

g. Photographic surveillances

(1) No photographic surveillances are to be conducted in communist front organization cases unless it is essential to protect Bureau's interests in internal security field by supplementing live informant coverage of a particular meeting with such a surveillance.

(2) Request Bureau authority to institute such a surveillance and outline manner in which it will be conducted and supervision which will be afforded it.

(3) No such surveillances should be instituted without specific Bureau authority.

3. Investigative procedures and suggestions re communist front organizations
   To accurately and clearly show true nature of communist front groups, data concerning the following topics, where applicable, should be fully developed and reported on:

   a. Origin and scope
      Date of formation. Circumstances under which founded. Determine who in Communist Party instructed organization be set up; whether decision to set up group made at meeting of party functionaries and, if so, identify functionaries present; identity of individual or individuals responsible for organizing group. Identify all known chapters, if any, and location thereof.

   b. Whether incorporated
      Many organizations are incorporated requiring filing of incorporation papers with appropriate state officials.

   c. Aims and purposes

   d. Location of headquarters

   e. Officers
      List principal officers, board of directors, etc., and appropriate characterization of each showing communist affiliation.

   f. Membership
      Ascertain estimated membership. Whenever possible, secure membership lists, mailing lists, or other records reflecting affiliation with organization. Usually obtainable through informant coverage or utilization of various investigative techniques. Secure accurate description of all lists to make sure there is no confusion as to the exact identity or significance of list being reported on.

   g. Official organ, if any, and other literature
      (1) May be obtained through confidential mailbox, panel sources, and confidential informants
      (2) All such literature should be appropriately identified.
      (3) At least one copy of each pertinent piece of literature should be promptly furnished to Bureau.

   h. General activities

   i. Finances
      Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Location of bank accounts frequently obtainable through confidential informants, credit records, public utility records, records of rental agent, and monitoring of other organizations' bank accounts.

   j. Support given to Communist Party
      Preponderance of evidence should be developed reflecting support, financial or otherwise, given by the organization to the Communist Party.

   k. Support received from Communist Party
      Preponderance of evidence should be developed reflecting support, financial or otherwise, received by the organization from the Communist Party.

   l. Implementation of Communist Party line
      Can usually be shown through comparison of programs and literature of organization with those of Communist Party during any particular period.

   Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through the following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various types of public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of information, interviews with past or present

d. Other Marxist revolutionary groups
A long-established group which would come under this category is the Proletarian Party of America, a relatively small organization.

There also are a few small groups composed of ex-members of the Communist Party, USA, who have voluntarily left the party or who have been expelled, usually for factionalism.

e. General
Communist investigations must be conducted in a most discreet and thorough manner at all times. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during the course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority. Bureau employees should not discuss communist or related investigations with any unauthorized individual. The subject of communism is not to be used in speeches of Bureau employees without specific authorization. However, there is considerable mimeographed material in each office, including speeches, testimony, and magazine articles prepared by the Director which could be furnished outside individuals interested in the subject of communism without any discussion.

2. Purposes of investigation

a. The investigation of the Communist Party, USA, and other similar-type organizations is of twofold purpose: (1) to obtain legally admissible evidence against these organizations for prosecution under existing Federal statutes set out above and (2) to follow closely the activities of these organizations from an intelligence viewpoint to have a day-to-day appraisal of the strength, dangerousness, and activities of these organizations seeking the overthrow of the U. S. Government.

b. Suggestions for proper coverage of the investigation of the Communist Party as an organization and similar organizations should include:

(1) The assignment of sufficient Agent personnel to insure that all of the important ramifications of party activities are properly covered

(2) Development of confidential informants in all party levels, including the national headquarters organization

(3) The establishment of trash and mail covers on pertinent headquarters and party functionaries

(4) The constant effort to develop admissible evidence against party officials for violation of Federal laws

c. Brief to establish illegal status of Communist Party, USA

(1) Purpose of brief is to collect all legally admissible evidence to prove illegality of party in one file. (Bufile 100-3-74.)

(2) Reports on brief to establish illegal status must be submitted by each office quarterly and should include only legally admissible evidence obtained during preceding three-month period. [If there is no information to report, include a statement to that effect in the cover pages of the quarterly report for the same period entitled "Communist Party, USA, Internal Security - C" (no copy needed for Bufile 100-3-74).]

(3) It is advisable to use the following breakdown in preparing reports:

(a) Origin and continuity of the party

(b) Pertinent statements, writings, and instructions relating to (1) Marxism-Leninism, (2) imperialism, (3) proletarian internationalism, (4) defense of USSR, (5) revolutionary statements

(c) Internal Security Act of 1950. Include under this heading any admissible evidence which would tend to prove a violation of section 4(a) of this act.

3. Investigative procedures and suggestions
This section contains detailed investigative guides for use in investigating and reporting activities of the Communist Party, USA.

a. To accurately and clearly show the true nature of the Communist Party, USA, data concerning the following topics must be fully developed and reported. [When material contains information that would be logically reported under more than one topic heading but to do so would make the separate accounts unintelligible, report all the material under the main heading and only refer to the information under the other breakdowns. Do not repeat same data under separate headings.] Reports on the Communist Party, USA, as an organization must be submitted by each office quarterly and should cover activities for the preceding three-month period. All offices are required to use the following breakdown in preparing quarterly reports on the Communist Party, USA. Each subfile caption must start on a separate page.

(1) Organization (Bureau file 100-3-69)

(a) Security setup of district and/or state organization. Office covering district headquarters, describe the location and size of Communist Party office facilities, rent paid, and name and number of office employees. [List address and/or post office box number of party headquarters.]

(b) [Identify]principal district officials and important functionaries, together with[titles, and furnish a] short resume of important activities of each during three-month period.

(c) Names of new commissions or special committees, identity and capacity of individual members thereof. Submit resume of activities of groups under appropriate subfile captions.

(d) Special meetings embracing only organizational matters. Other pertinent matters discussed at meetings concerning policy or strategy to be submitted under appropriate subfile captions.

(e) Extend this outline as far as necessary for clarity and to meet needs of office under this or any succeeding subsection. Auxiliary offices submit pertinent data concerning above matters which do not normally come to attention of office covering district headquarters.

(2) Membership (Bureau file 100-3-68)

(a) Quarterly reports are not to contain any membership statistics. Cover pages accompanying each quarterly report must contain latest available statistics relating to total number of Communist Party members in the district. Membership data must start on a separate cover page. Office of origin, which is office covering Communist Party district headquarters, should submit following figures:

I. For entire Communist Party district
II. For individual states covered by Communist Party district
III. For number of Communist Party members in area covered by field office

Auxiliary offices should submit following membership figures to the Bureau and office of origin:

I. For state or portion of state covered by that field office
II. For number of Communist Party members in the area covered by that field office

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

- V. Inactive section 56
- (7) Periodic verification of addresses 57
- (8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards 58
- (9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards 58
  - (a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries 58
  - (b) Key figures and top functionaries 59
  - (c) Subjects tabbed for detcom 60
  - (d) Subjects not included in security index 60
- (10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index 60
  - (a) Death of subject 60
  - (b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction 60
  - (c) Imprisonment of subject 60
  - (d) Induction of subject into the armed forces 60
  - (e) Security informants 60
  - (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous 61
  - (g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection...... 61
  - (h) Subjects of Chinese extraction.......... 62
- (11) Priority apprehension program (DETCOM) 62
  - (a) Purpose 62
  - (b) Subjects to be tabbed detcom 62
  - (c) Recommendations for and removal of detcom designation 63
  - (d) Administrative procedures for handling detcom program 63
  - (e) General.......... 64
- c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities and defense facilities 64
  - (1) Responsibility 64
  - (2) Inclusion in security index 65
  - (3) Deleted
  - (4) Dissemination 65
  - (5) Status of cases 66
- d. Key figure and top functionary program 66
  - (1) General 66
  - (2) Key figures 66
    - (a) Definition 66
    - (b) Regulations governing the handling of the key figure program 67
      - I. Designation and deletion of key figure status 67
      - II. Photographs 67
      - III. Handwriting specimens 67
      - IV. Security index cards 68
      - V. Change of office of origin 68
      - VI. Reports 68
      - VII. Maintenance of key figure list 69
      - VIII. Deleted
  - (3) Top functionaries 69
    - (a) Definition 69
    - (b) Manner of designation 69
    - (c) Regulations governing top functionaries 70
- e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index.......... 70

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

- (1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations 70
- (2) Security of Government employees investigations 70
- (3) Atomic Energy Act, Voice of America applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations 70

f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports. 71
- (1) General 71
- (2) Origin 72
- (3) Deleted
- (4) Classification 72
- (5) Title 72
- (6) Character 73
  - (a) Key figures and top functionaries 73
  - (b) Others 73
- (7) Deleted
- (8) Status 73
  - (a) Top functionaries 73
  - (b) Key figures 73
  - (c) Deleted
  - (d) Other security index subjects 74
  - (e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index . 74
  - (f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein 74
- (9) Content 74
- (10) Administrative data 77
  - (a) General 77
  - (b) Documentation of reports 78

g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases 79

8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations 79

a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau 80
- (1) Aliens and naturalized citizens 80
- (2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services 80
- (3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense 80
- (4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard 80

If a question of law arises as to existence of violation, advise Bureau and hold investigation in abeyance until opinion is obtained from Department. Where the materiality of the denial or omission indicates a full investigation is not warranted, a limited investigation may be conducted; e.g., where denial of past International Workers Order (IWO) membership made and files show membership in IWO but no participation in its activities. However, the Department has advised it is unable to adopt any fixed policy as to whether prosecution is warranted in any particular category of cases of this type and desires to review and consider each case individually. Therefore, the basic facts concerning the execution and filing of the document and the subversive activity denied should be submitted in report form for presentation to the Department, even though the basis for the concealment or fraudulent statement does not appear to be material.

Investigate and report criminal fraud violation (such as concealment of arrests) arising during security-type fraud investigation on same subject in conjunction with the investigation of the security-type fraud. Both violations will be presented to the Department by the Bureau. If, however, the security-type fraud investigation is discontinued, handle the criminal fraud separately in accordance with section 47 of this manual. Military intelligence agencies often refer cases for security investigations under Delimitations Agreement in which security-type fraud violations also involved. If the subversive information does not warrant full security investigation but does indicate a possible fraud violation, advise the interested agency the Bureau's investigation will be directed toward proving the possible violation of law and that any background investigation contemplated by it pursuant to its administrative responsibilities will not interfere with our investigation. Advise agency any pertinent information developed during our investigation will be furnished it and request it to do likewise. Thereafter, immediately initiate the security matter - fraud against the Government investigation. If the subversive information warrants full security investigation and also indicates a fraud violation, advise interested agency the Bureau is initiating a full security investigation in conjunction with investigation of the possible violation of law and results will be furnished it upon receipt. Thereafter, immediately institute such an investigation looking toward inclusion of subject on security index and proving possible violation of law. Expedite investigation where military has referred case.

If admissible evidence developed does not warrant submission of prosecutive summary report, submit results of investigation in investigative report.

(7) Public Law 87-835, approved 10-16-62, amended the National Defense Education Act of 1958 and the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 which provide Federal funds for scholarships and fellowships. Members of organizations which have registered under the Internal Security Act of 1950 or have been ordered to register by the Subversive Activities Control Board are prohibited from applying for, using, or attempting to use a scholarship or fellowship if any part of the funds therefor is appropriated under these acts. Penalty for violation is $10,000 fine or five years' imprisonment or both. Acts also require full disclosure of any criminal conviction since applicant's sixteenth birthday and concerning any pending criminal charges punishable by confinement over 30 days. Title 18, USC, § 1001, applies to the latter provision.

[[(8) Refer to section 87G captioned "Internal Security Act of 1950"
[for possible additional violations that may arise under the
[provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950.]

4. Individuals to be investigated

It is not possible to formulate any hard-and-fast standards by which the dangerousness of individual members or affiliates of revolutionary organizations may be automatically measured because of manner revolutionary organizations function and great scope and variety of activities. Exercise sound judgment and discretion in evaluating importance and dangerousness of individual members or affiliates.

As a general policy, investigate the activities of any individual falling within one or more of the following categories who does not come within one of the restrictions on investigations listed under 87D, 5, below:

a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49

b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements

(1) Any individual who, since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea (6-25-50), continued to espouse the line of one or more of the above-mentioned revolutionary organizations or related groups thereby defining his or her adherence to policies opposed to best interests of the U. S.

(2) Espousal mentioned above encompasses a wide variety and range of activities. Membership in one or more of the basic revolutionary organizations is not a prerequisite to the institution of an investigation of an individual within this category.

(3) Espousal expressed by membership or active participation in subversive front groups (whether or not cited by the Attorney General) must be evaluated in each case. Consider nature and type of front organization, as well as extent of individual's activities on behalf of the front organization or in support of the basic revolutionary organization. Open investigation in every instance in which information available indicates a subject is actively engaged in the affairs of a subversive front organization in a leadership capacity or by active participation in the furtherance of the aims and purposes of the front organization.

(4) Do not open an investigation on mere membership alone in a front organization in the absence of allegations of active participation or leadership in the group unless information is available indicating past membership at any time in a basic revolutionary organization or sufficient other derogatory information is known.

II.	[illegible]ce	
	White and Caucasian	W
	Negro	N
	Chinese	C
	Others	O
	(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)	
III.	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
IV.	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien	AL
	(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
V.	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	Independent Socialist League	ISL
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	[Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN]
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	Nation of Islam	NOI
	Bulgarian	BUL
	Cuban	CUB
	Czechoslovakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Rumanian	RUM
	Russian	RUS
	Yugoslavian	YUG
VI.	Dangerousness classification	(where applicable)
	Detcom	DC
VII.	Key figure and top functionary designation (where applicable)	
	Key figure	KF
	Top functionary	TF
VIII.	Special section cards	
	Atomic energy program employees	AEP
	Cuban special section	CUB
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
	United Nations employees	UNE
	U. S. Government employees	GOV
IX.	Unavailable section cards	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
X.	Date and place of birth	
XI.	Key facility geographical reference number and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility obtained from the Department of Defense Key Facilities List (where applicable)	
XII.	Residence address	
XIII.	Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.	
XIV.	Field office file number	

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description
(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division
(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below
(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The white 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by this machine and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

III. Persons active in Communist Party underground

IV. Any other security index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent, or disruptionist in the event of an emergency

(c) Recommendations for and removal of detcom designation

I. Approval of SAC

Designation of each subject for detcom program or removal of any subject therefrom must be personally approved by SAC, or in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor. If individual subjects being recommended for inclusion in security index are also being recommended for detcom, above-required approval by SAC may be handled in conjunction with requirements specified in 87D 7b (4).

II. [When form FD-122 is submitted recommending either tabbing for detcom or deletion of such tabbing, attach an additional page setting out a brief summary of facts upon which the recommendation is based.]

III. [Deleted]

(d) Administrative procedures for handling detcom program

Take following action to assure that security index cards for subjects tabbed detcom for priority of apprehension will be readily available for emergency action in your office:

I. Consider each security index case for detcom tabbing whether subject's security index card is filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections of security index.

II. Geographical section

Divide geographical section of security index into two distinct parts.

(A) Part I of geographical section shall include only security index cards for subjects who are tabbed detcom under instructions noted above.

(B) Part II of geographical section shall contain security index cards for all subjects that are NOT tabbed detcom.

(C) In offices having two separate and distinct geographical sections, i.e., geographical-employment and geographical-residence, as provided under 87D 7b (6) herein, each such geographical section must be broken into parts I and II, in line with foregoing, so that cards tabbed detcom will be separated and maintained apart from other security index cards.

(D) No colored tabs necessary on cards of detcom subjects in geographical section.

III. Alphabetical section

(A) One security index card for each subject is to be filed in alphabetical section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever.

(B) Affix a colored tab to each security index card designated for detcom in alphabetical section to readily identify such subjects.

(C) Detcom tabbings approved at Bureau will be shown on security index cards forwarded to field by code letters "DC" in first line on cards and by word "DETCOM" stamped in large red letters.

IV. Special section and unavailable section
Security index cards of detcom subjects filed in special and unavailable sections are to be designated by affixing colored tabs.

(e) General

I. Tabbing of cards
No security index card is to contain tabs for any purpose other than to designate detcom classification under foregoing provisions with the following exception. The alphabetical security index cards on those individuals designated as "Pro-Cuban" should be tabbed with a metal tab of a color different from those used to tab detcom subjects.

II. Removal from detcom category
Careful analysis must be made of each case in which deletion from detcom category is proposed. For instance, when a key figure is being removed from such status, file review may well disclose that subject qualifies for detcom tabbing for reasons covered in 87D 7b (11) (b), above, independent of key figure status.

[c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities[and
[defense facilities]

(1) Responsibility
FBI is responsible by Presidential directive for keeping other Federal agencies advised of developments within their jurisdiction affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated as vital to the national defense and welfare by the Department of Defense.

FBI is responsible under Delimitations Agreement for investigating employees of private contractors who have contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where credible subversive information concerning employee is obtained. Thorough investigation must be conducted and consideration for inclusion in security index given concerning any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in the past, a member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom sufficient other subversive information is in our possession which warrants such action.

(a) Requests for investigation from another agency
When another agency requests investigation of individual
[employed in key facility[and/or defense facility,]institute
[investigation immediately if basis of request so warrants.
Advise Bureau of request, basis thereof, and that investigation is being conducted.

[(b) Verification of key facility[or defense facility]status of place of employment
[Department of Defense Key Facilities List[and Defense Facilities
[List](maintained in each office) must be checked for verification of information that a security investigation subject's place of employment may be included in such list.

(c) Individuals denied access to restricted information
Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently advise that an individual has been denied clearance to work in a defense plant or to handle classified or restricted information. In some instances clearance is denied based on information furnished by Bureau. At other times, information in Bureau files is very meager or possibly negative and basis for such denial of clearance is not known. The intelligence agency is responsible for furnishing Bureau with any information involving disloyalty or subversiveness.

Office receiving notification that an individual has been denied clearance must ascertain promptly basis for such denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of

When the subject of such an investigation is presently in the security index, a letter must be directed to the Bureau at the time the report is submitted advising that the subject is in the security index.

Information of interest to FBI and/or AEC obtained subsequent to completion of Atomic Energy Act - applicant investigations concerning AEC employees or persons having access to restricted data should be handled according to instructions in section 20, volume II, of this manual.

f. [Submission of and general rules concerning security reports]

(1) General

[Submission of summary reports should not be delayed for the purpose of conducting current investigation in previously closed cases, but appropriate leads should be set out.]

Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened or placed in a pending status for the purpose of preparing investigative reports in accordance with the schedule outlined in 87D 7f (8).

Office indices and any material channelized to the case file since the most recent report should be reviewed and the case brought up to date by appropriate investigation to determine subject's current activities.

If no subversive information is available, the fact that appropriate confidential informants have been contacted with negative results should be submitted in report form. This is necessary in order that the Department can be advised of the status of the case of each individual who is listed for apprehension in the case of an emergency.

Each time that a case is reopened and brought up to date, it should be critically analyzed in the light of the security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3) herein. This procedure must be followed on a continuing basis for each security index subject.

(2) Origin
The office of origin will be that office covering the territory wherein the subject's subversive activities occur. In most instances this will also be the office in which territory the subject resides and is employed. In those cases in which the subject's subversive activities take place in the territory of an office other than the office covering the place of residence and/or employment, the office of origin shall be that office which can best cover the subversive activities of the subject.

(3) Deleted

(4) Classification
- (a) 100 - for individuals affiliated with the basic revolutionary and front organizations of Marxian ideology and members of the Nation of Islam
- (b) 105 - for members of [Puerto Rican nationalist groups] or others having nationalistic tendencies of a non-Marxist character

(5) Title
Only one subject shall be carried in the title of each report. Separate reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of their relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

(6) Character

(a) Key figures and top functionaries

Internal Security - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Internal Security - C
Internal Security - SWP

(b) Others

Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Security Matter - C
Security Matter - SWP
Security Matter - X (native fascist)
Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a key figure, the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject is designated key figure, the first report after the designation and subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. In any event, if subject is employed in a[defense facility so designated by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 5 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended,]add the additional character "Internal Security Act of 1950" if the organizational activity of the subject is of a communist nature.

(7) Deleted

(8) Status

All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:

(a) Top functionaries

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted quarterly. Forty-five days prior to the date a quarterly report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(b) Key figures

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted semiannually. Forty-five days prior to the date a semiannual report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(c) Deleted

(d) Other security index subjects
  I. Closed
    (A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of an annual investigative report. The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the annual report is due. Such cases shall also be opened and assigned six months after submission of the annual report to accomplish verification of addresses. Upon such verification, the cases should be closed administratively.

(e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index
  I. Pending inactive
    (A) If all active investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau
    (B) Lead to follow Bureau for security index card should be set forth.
  II. Closed
    (A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau
    (B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (d) above.

(f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein
  I. Closed
    (A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(9) [Content]

(a) [In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.]
  I. Background
    (A) Birth date
    (B) Citizenship status
    (C) Education
    (D) Marital status
    (E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
    (F) Identification record
    (G) Employment
    (H) Residence
    (I) Status of health (if known)
  II. Connections with Communist Party (or other basic revolutionary groups and/or front organizations)
    (A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.
    (B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

(j) In connection with periodic reports in security index cases, there are instances in which evidence of extensive activity in subversive organizations will be developed. In these cases it is permissible to report such information in narrative-type statements without indicating exact dates of activity; however, the period of time involved must be shown, as well as the inclusive dates of the informant reports.

This type reporting is not to be utilized in Smith Act of 1940 cases or Internal Security Act of 1950 cases. The narrative statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions and information from each source must be reported in separate narrative statements.

(k) The above instructions in no way remove responsibility for reporting all items of pertinence to the Bureau, bearing in mind the fact that Bureau files must be complete insofar as matters of substance are concerned, nor is responsibility removed for the reporting in detail of information tending to establish a subject's knowledge of the basic aims and purposes of the subversive organizations with which affiliated or information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

In the documentation of narrative statements set forth the location of the original documents in the field office files by the file number and serial scope.

(10) Administrative data

(a) General

All references to the following items, all administrative in nature, should be contained in cover pages accompanying reports:

I. Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, key figure or top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), forms FD-122, FD-122a, FD-128, and FD-128a, and Bureau instructions for handling cases or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature

II. Whenever reports relating to security index subjects contain data affecting material included on subject's existing security index card, the cover pages accompanying the report shall include as the last page form FD-305, appropriately checked, which form contains items pertaining to the following:

(A) That subject is included in the security index
(B) That data appearing on security index card is current or requires change
(C) That FD-122 has been submitted to Bureau where security index card changes are necessary
(D) That a suitable photograph is or is not available
(E) [Deleted]
(F) That subject is employed in a key facility and that agencies interested in that facility are specified
(G) Reason for classifying report
(H) Dates subject was previously interviewed and reason for not reinterviewing subject
(I) That subject no longer meets security index criteria and a letter has been directed to the Bureau recommending cancellation of the security index card
(J) That subject's case has been re-evaluated and reasons are set forth as to why subject's activities continue to fall within security index criteria
(K) That subject's security index card is or is not tabbed detcom and that subject's activities do or do not warrant detcom tabbing

III. Form FD-305a containing items pertinent to reserve index subjects will be similarly utilized in connection with the submission of reports in reserve index cases.

(b) Documentation of reports

I. Deleted

II. If information necessary for complete documentation is not available in subject's case file, necessary review of other office files should be made. If not obtainable, this fact must be indicated in the cover page(s) accompanying report to the Bureau.

III. Extensive investigation should not be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have in the past furnished background information or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed that subject, according to reliable records, such as birth records, school records, or records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in report. Further verification will not be necessary.

IV. During the preparation of summary reports it is often found that information being incorporated into a report was originally obtained by another office and all of the necessary information for complete documentation will not be in the possession of the office preparing the report. In such an instance, if the office preparing the report is in possession of Photostats of documents obtained by the other offices and the identity

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Administrative data, 77
- Admissible evidence, 37
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
  - Cuban, 45a,45b
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Annual review of section A, reserve index, 42b
- Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
- Armed forces
  - dissemination to, 81
  - members of, 25
  - record in, 27
  - relatives in, 27
  - subjects entering, 56,60
  - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of security index, 50
  - alphabetical section, 51,63
  - at Bureau, 50
  - geographical section, 51,63
  - in field office, 51
  - inactive section, 56
  - special section, 52
  - unavailable section, 53
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security index, 70,71

- Bureau
  - applicants, inclusion in security index, 70
  - authority to investigate, 24
  - responsibility, 19

- Cancellation of
  - security flash notice, 27a
  - security index cards
    - after induction into armed forces, 60
    - mechanics, 60
    - on departure from U. S., 60
    - only after interview, 38
    - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 72
- Changes on security index cards, 58
- Channelizing, 36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
  - extraction, 48,62
  - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants, 72
- Contacting
  - faculty members, 25
  - registrars, 25
  - students, 25
  - superiors of faculty members, 25
- Contacts
  - during investigation, 25
  - with foreign establishments, 25
- Content
  - and appearance
    - of reserve index cards, 43
    - of security index cards, 48
  - of reports, 74
- Corroboration, 37
- Criteria for inclusion in security index, 45
- Cuban
  - activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  - aliens, 45a,45b
  - pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  - special section, 49,53
  - tabbing cards, 45b,64

- Dangerousness
  - definition of, 44
  - determination of, 44
  - Nation of Islam membership, 46
- Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Defense facilities, 64,73
  - list, 64
  - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Definitions, 19
  - of dangerousness, 44
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Detcom, 62
  - administrative procedures, 63
  - key figures, 68
  - purpose, 62
  - removal from, 58,63,64
  - top functionaries, 62,70
  - who to be tabbed, 62
- Determination of
  - dangerousness, 44
  - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Dissemination
  - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81
  - of reports
    - at SOG, 81
    - in field, 79
    - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
- Documentation of reports, 78
  - completion of, 78
- Employees of
  - international organizations, 25
  - U. S. Government, 25
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Evidence, 37
  - desirability of
    - admissibility, 29,37
    - corroboration, 37
  - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  - of membership or affiliation, 29
  - preservation of, 37
- Faculty members
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File on defected subjects, 42
- File reviews, 34
- Flash notices (security)
  - cancellation of, 27a
  - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  - when place, 27
- Foreign
  - diplomats, 25
  - establishments, 25
  - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
  - tours, 33a
  - travel, 33
- Forms
  - FD-122
    - abstracts for, 47
    - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    - cover letter thereto, 32
    - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63
    - placing name in or removing from special section of security index, 53
      - unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    - recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - reference to, 77
    - succinct summary with, 47
      - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - when subject employed in key facility, 65
  - FD-122a, 42b,43,61,77
  - FD-128
    - reference to, 77
    - when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    - when subject moves, 58,59

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Tabbing SI cards, 45b, 62, 64, 70
Thumbnail sketches, 79
Title of reports, 72
Top functionaries, 66, 69
  change of office of origin, 70
  definition of, 69
  designation of, 69
  handwriting of, 70
  inclusion in key figure list, 70
  movement of, 59
  photographs of, 70
  program, 66
  regulations governing, 70
  reports on, 70
    status of, 70, 73
  tabbing for detcom, 62, 70
Topical headings in reports, 74
Tours, 33a
Trash covers, 36
Travel
  abroad, 33
  behind iron curtain, 34

Unavailable section of security index, 53
  imprisoned subjects, 54
  missing subjects, 32, 54
  subjects traveling abroad, 34, 54
Underground membership or activity, 31
United Nations employees, 25
U. S. Government employees, 25

Verification of
  addresses
    reserve index, section A, 42b
    security index, 32, 57
  employment
    reserve index, section A, 42b
    security index, 32, 57
  key facility or defense facility status of place of employment, 64
Voice of America, inclusion of employees in security index or reserve index, 70

(D) Whether or not defectee available for interview by all Agents

(E) Whether he is in position to testify and willing to do so

III. Do not include information concerning security informants for security reasons.

IV. Proper maintenance of this file will be useful in identifying persons who may be in a position to furnish information of value in the future and will obviate necessity of extensive file reviews in this connection.

V. A special index may be used for this file if desirable. If used, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating names, times, and places defectees were in a subversive movement and a brief description of information available from them. Break index down geographically and subdivide by years if desirable.

7. Administrative procedures

[a. Reserve index

(1) Purpose

The reserve index is designed to represent those persons who, in the light of ever-changing conditions, should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation, or action under the security index program. This index may serve as an administrative aid and working index containing a central repository of the names of individuals having sympathy for or affiliation with the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations.

(2) Individuals to be included

This index is to contain names of individuals when, following investigation, the information does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the security index when there is evidence of:

(a) Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection

(b) Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.

(c) The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support, or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.

(d) Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(e) Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(3) Arrangement

This index is to be maintained in two sections, section A and section B. Each section will be maintained alphabetically on 5- by 8-inch cards.

(a) Section A

Section A of the reserve index is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following the apprehension of security index subjects.

I. Section A should include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the security index criteria but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Include in this section those individuals meeting the standards for inclusion in the reserve index and who fall within the following categories:

- (A) Professors, teachers, and educators
- (B) Labor union organizers or leaders
- (C) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others in the mass media field
- (D) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists
- (E) Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level
- (F) Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid

II. Recommendations for inclusion of names in the reserve index (section A)

(A) Recommendations for inclusion of names in section A of the reserve index are to be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a. A succinct summary setting forth the basis for the recommendation should be attached to the form FD-122a[unless the recommendation is made simultaneously with a recommendation that the subject's name be deleted from the security index.] In addition, if no report is accompanying the recommendation, a statement to that effect should appear on the page containing the succinct summary.

(B) Upon Bureau approval of recommendation for the inclusion of an individual's name in section A of the reserve index, two reserve index cards will be forwarded to the field. Add on the reverse side available descriptive data. One card is to be filed in your office, and one card is to be filed away from headquarters city at the same location as the extra set of security index cards are now stored.

III. Periodic review of section A of the reserve index

Investigations of individuals listed in section A of the reserve index are to be brought up to date annually and considered for security index status or retention in the reserve index. Form FD-154 may be used for the annual review by amending it for use in reserve index cases. This investigation should include, as a minimum:

- (A) Verification of residence and employment
- (B) Indices search and file review to determine whether additional investigation is warranted or whether an interview with the individual is desirable
- (C) If additional investigation is conducted or if there is unreported information of a subversive nature contained in the files, submit a report.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- National
  - Defense Education Act of 1958, 22
  - Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - Science Foundation Act of 1950, 22
- Naturalized citizens
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - investigations of, 26
- New office of origin, 58

- Observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Office of origin, 27a,58,59,72
- Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
- Overt acts, 45

- Periodic review of section A, reserve index, 42b
- Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Photographic surveillances, 35
- Photographs, 28
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
  - status of security index cases while obtaining, 28,68
- Physical
  - description, 28
  - surveillances, 35
    - maintenance of SA's notes, 38
- Position
  - and importance, 30
  - in labor organizations, 29
- Potential dangerousness, 44
  - of Nation of Islam members, 46
- Preservation of evidence, 37
- Priority apprehension program, 62
- Private records, 36
- Public
  - Law 87-835, 22
  - source information, 36
  - utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Purpose of
  - investigation, 19
  - security index, 43

- Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
- Recommendation for inclusion in
  - section A, reserve index, 42b,61
  - security index, 47
    - Cuban activity, 45a,45b
    - when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    - when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    - when subject is out of country, 48
    - when there is missing background information, 47
- Re-evaluation of security index status, 57,72,78
- Registrars of institutions of learning, 24,25
- Reinterviews, 42
- Relatives in armed forces, 27
- Removal from security index, 46a,61
- Reports
  - administrative data in, 77
  - character of, 73
  - content of, 74
  - cumulative items, 76
  - dissemination of, 79
  - documentation of, 78
  - lumping information in, 76
  - narrative-type statements, 77
  - schedule of, 73
  - status of, 73
  - summarizing information in, 76
  - title of, 72
  - topical headings in, 74
  - when necessary after interview, 41
  - when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  - when not necessary after interview, 40a
  - when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
- Reserve index, 42a
  - arrangement, 42b
  - cards, content and appearance, 43
  - content, 43
  - names deleted from security index, 61,62

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Reserve index (continued)
  purpose, 42a
  removal from, 43
  section A
    changes, 43
    individuals to be included, 42b,61
    periodic review of, 42b
    recommendations for inclusion in, 42b,61
    when to submit reports, 42b
  section B, 43,62
  standards for, 42a
  subjects
    espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    security of Government employees case in, 70
Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
Responsibility of Bureau, 19
Restrictions on investigations, 24

Schedule of reports, 73
Scope of investigation, 26.
Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Security
  flash notice
    cancellation of, 27a
    notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    when place, 27
  index, 43
    arrangement of, 50
    cards
      cancellation of, 38,42,60
      changes on, 58
      content and appearance of, 48
      of key figures, 68
      tabbing, 45b,62,64,70
      transfers to reserve index, 61, 62
    criteria for, 45
    Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53,64
    dangerousness, 44
    purpose, 43
Security (continued)
  index (continued)
    recommendation for, 45a,45b,46a,47
    re-evaluation of status, 72
    removal from, 46a,61
    subjects of
      espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      security of Government employees case in, 70
    summary reports, 47
  informants, 34
    cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
  of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
Signed statements, 41
Sleepers, 31,52
Special section of security index, 52
  Cuban, 49,53
Standards for reserve index, 42a
  section A, 42b
Status of cases, 73
  on key figures, 73
  on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66
  on subjects in security index, 74
  on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  on top functionaries, 73
  while obtaining photographs, 28
  while securing handwriting, 29
  while verifying residence and employment, 57
Students
  contacts with, 25
  investigations of, 24
Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
Summary reports, 47,71
Superiors of faculty members, 25
Surveillances
  photographic, 35
  physical, 35

If a question of law arises as to existence of violation, advise Bureau and hold investigation in abeyance until opinion is obtained from Department. Where the materiality of the denial or omission indicates a full investigation is not warranted, a limited investigation may be conducted; e.g., where denial of past International Workers Order (IWO) membership made and files show membership in IWO but no participation in its activities. However, the Department has advised it is unable to adopt any fixed policy as to whether prosecution is warranted in any particular category of cases of this type and desires to review and consider each case individually. Therefore, the basic facts concerning the execution and filing of the document and the subversive activity denied should be submitted in report form for presentation to the Department, even though the basis for the concealment or fraudulent statement does not appear to be material.

Investigate and report criminal fraud violation (such as concealment of arrests) arising during security-type fraud investigation on same subject in conjunction with the investigation of the security-type fraud. Both violations will be presented to the Department by the Bureau. If, however, the security-type fraud investigation is discontinued, handle the criminal fraud separately in accordance with section 47 of this manual. Military intelligence agencies often refer cases for security investigations under Delimitations Agreement in which security-type fraud violations also involved. If the subversive information does not warrant full security investigation but does indicate a possible fraud violation, advise the interested agency the Bureau's investigation will be directed toward proving the possible violation of law and that any background investigation contemplated by it pursuant to its administrative responsibilities will not interfere with our investigation. Advise agency any pertinent information developed during our investigation will be furnished it and request it to do likewise. Thereafter, immediately initiate the security matter - fraud against the Government investigation. If the subversive information warrants full security investigation and also indicates a fraud violation, advise interested agency the Bureau is initiating a full security investigation in conjunction with investigation of the possible violation of law and results will be furnished it upon receipt. Thereafter, immediately institute such an investigation looking toward inclusion of subject on security index and proving possible violation of law. Expedite investigation where military has referred case.

If admissible evidence developed does not warrant submission of prosecutive summary report, submit results of investigation in investigative report.

[(7) Public Law 87-835, approved 10-16-62, amended the National Defense Education Act of 1958 and the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 which provide Federal funds for scholarships and fellowships. Members of organizations which have registered under the Internal Security Act of 1950 or have been ordered to register by the Subversive Activities Control Board are prohibited from applying for, using, or attempting to use a scholarship or fellowship if any part of the funds therefor is appropriated under these acts. Penalty for violation is $10,000 fine or five years' imprisonment or both. Acts also require full disclosure of any criminal conviction since applicant's sixteenth birthday and concerning any pending criminal charges punishable by confinement over 30 days. Title 18, USC, § 1001, applies to the latter provision.]

4. Individuals to be investigated

It is not possible to formulate any hard-and-fast standards by which the dangerousness of individual members or affiliates of revolutionary organizations may be automatically measured because of manner revolutionary organizations function and great scope and variety of activities. Exercise sound judgment and discretion in evaluating importance and dangerousness of individual members or affiliates.

As a general policy, investigate the activities of any individual falling within one or more of the following categories who does not come within one of the restrictions on investigations listed under 87D, 5, below:

a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49

b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements

(1) Any individual who, since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea (6-25-50), continued to espouse the line of one or more of the above-mentioned revolutionary organizations or related groups thereby defining his or her adherence to policies opposed to best interests of the U. S.

(2) Espousal mentioned above encompasses a wide variety and range of activities. Membership in one or more of the basic revolutionary organizations is not a prerequisite to the institution of an investigation of an individual within this category.

(3) Espousal expressed by membership or active participation in subversive front groups (whether or not cited by the Attorney General) must be evaluated in each case. Consider nature and type of front organization, as well as extent of individual's activities on behalf of the front organization or in support of the basic revolutionary organization. Open investigation in every instance in which information available indicates a subject is actively engaged in the affairs of a subversive front organization in a leadership capacity or by active participation in the furtherance of the aims and purposes of the front organization.

(4) Do not open an investigation on mere membership alone in a front organization in the absence of allegations of active participation or leadership in the group unless information is available indicating past membership at any time in a basic revolutionary organization or sufficient other derogatory information is known.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Forms (continued)
  - FD-128a, 27a,43,77
  - FD-154, 57
  - FD-165, 27,77
  - FD-186, 50
  - FD-305, 78
  - FD-305a, 78
- Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22

- Geographical
  - reference of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  - section of security index, 51,63
- Government employees, 25,70,80

- Handwriting, 29
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
- Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41

- Identification record, 27
- Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,60
- Inactive section of security index, 56
- Indices, check of, 72
- Individuals
  - to be investigated, 22
  - traveling abroad, 33
    - against whom stops are placed, 34
    - who are included in security index, 34
    - who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    - with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    - with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  - with foreign diplomatic status, 26
- Informants, cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
- Interviews
  - Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  - Bureau authority, 39,40a
  - conditions for, 40
    - conducting at place of employment, 40a
  - content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  - contents of letter containing results of, 42
  - determine willingness to testify during, 41
  - evaluation of, 45b
  - forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  - no report needed afterward, 40a
  - of hostile subjects, 41
  - of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 25
  - of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  - of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  - of security index subjects, 38
  - of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  - of subjects who express desire for, 42
  - on SAC authority, 38
  - preparations for, 40
  - purpose of, 38
  - recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  - results not affecting security index status, 41
  - signed statements in connection with, 41
  - to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  - when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  - when discontinue, 40a
  - when report needed after, 41
  - with Bureau authority, 39

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Investigations of
  aliens, 26
  faculty members, 24
  members of labor unions, 29
  naturalized citizens, 26
  students, 24
Investigative
  procedures, 26
  techniques, 34
    file reviews, 34
    mail covers, 36
    photographic surveillances, 35
    physical surveillances, 35
    private records of firms, 36
    public source information, 36
    security informants, 34
    trash covers, 36

Key facilities, 64
  Delimitations Agreement, 64
  employees included in security index, 65
  list, 64
  responsibility, 64
  status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,74
  when investigate individuals employed in, 64
Key figures
  definition of, 66
  designation of, 67
  foreign travel by, 69
  handling of, 67
  handwriting of, 67
  in armed forces, 68
  list, 69
  movement of, 59,68
  photographs of, 67
  program, 66
  reports on, 68
  status of reports on, 68,73
  when become subjects of SGE cases, 69
Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

Labor union membership, 29
Labor unions, 41
Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Lumping information in reports, 76

Mail covers, 36
Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Members of
  armed forces, dissemination of information concerning, 81
  labor unions, 29
  law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
Membership or affiliation, 29
Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  unavailable section of security index, 54
Movement of
  key figures, 59,68
  subjects, 58
    key figures, 59,68
    security index subjects, 58
    subjects not in security index, 60
    subjects tabbed for detcom, 60
    top functionaries, 59

Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
Nation of Islam
  potential dangerousness, 46
  what members to be investigated, 23

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

D. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS 19
- 1. Definitions 19
- 2. Responsibility of the Bureau 19
- 3. Purpose of investigation 19
  - a. Determination of dangerousness 19
  - b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes 19
- 4. Individuals to be investigated 22
  - a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49 22
  - b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements 22
  - c. Special training in a subversive movement 23
  - d. Military service 23
  - e. Employment in key facilities 23
  - f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs 23
- 5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals 24
  - a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning 24
    - (1) Subjects connected with institutions of learning 24
      - (a) Prior Bureau authority to institute investigation 24
        - I. Faculty members 24
        - II. Students and nonacademic employees 24
        - III. Requests for Bureau authority 24
      - (b) Contacts during investigation 25
        - I. Persons permissible to contact 25
          - (A) Established reliable sources 25
          - (B) Individuals not connected with institutions of learning 25
          - (C) Registrars 25
        - II. Superiors of faculty members 25
        - III. Students, faculty members, or other employees 25
      - (c) Receiving voluntary information 25
    - (2) Subjects not connected with an institution of learning 25
    - (3) Contacts of foreign establishments 25
  - b. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations or international organizations, and members of the armed forces 25
- 6. Investigative procedures concerning individuals 26
  - a. General 26
  - b. Scope of investigations 26
    - (1) Background 26
      - (a) True name and aliases 26
      - (b) Residence address 26
      - (c) Occupation or business 26
      - (d) Business or employment address 26
      - (e) Citizenship status 26
        - I. Alien 26
        - II. Naturalized citizen 26
        - III. Native-born citizen 26
      - (f) Nationality background 26
      - (g) Military record 27
      - (h) Close relatives in armed forces 27
      - (i) Identification record - (Security flash notice FD-165) 27
      - (j) Physical description 28
      - (k) Photograph 28
      - (l) Handwriting specimens 29
      - (m) Labor union membership 29

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

(2) Subversive activity 29
  (a) Membership or affiliation 29
  (b) Knowledge of aims and purposes 29
  (c) Position and importance 30
(3) Missing subjects 31
(4) Individuals traveling abroad 33
(5) Investigative techniques 34
  (a) File reviews 34
  (b) Security informants 34
  (c) Physical surveillances 35
  (d) Photographic surveillances 35
  (e) Public sources 36
  (f) Records of private firms 36
  (g) Mail covers 36
  (h) Trash covers 36
  (i) Channelizing information to case files 36
(6) Preservation of evidence 37
(7) Interviews with subjects of security investigations 38
  (a) Purpose 38
  (b) Subjects not included in the security index 38
  (c) Security index subjects 38
  (d) Without Bureau authority the SAC may 38
  (e) Prior Bureau authority 39
  (f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews 40
  (g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects 42

7. Administrative procedures 42a
  a. Reserve index 42a
    (1) Purpose 42a
    (2) Individuals to be included 42a
    (3) Arrangement 42b
    (4) Content 43
    (5) Removal and deletion of cards 43
  b. Security index 43
    (1) Purpose 43
    (2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual 44
    (3) Criteria for placing and retaining names in the security index 45
    (4) Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards 46a
    (5) Content and appearance of security index card 48
      (a) Data to appear on face of card 48
      (b) Data to appear on separate attached card 50
    (6) Arrangement of the security index 50
      (a) At Bureau 50
      (b) In the field office 51
        I. Geographical section 51
        II. Alphabetical section 51
        III. Special section 52
          (A) Espionage subjects 52
          (B) U. S. Government employees 52
          (C) Atomic energy program employees 52
          (D) Foreign government employees 52
          (E) United Nations Secretariat and other international organization employees 52
          (F) Pro-Tito individuals 52
          (G) Cuban 53
        IV. Unavailable section 53
          (A) Missing subjects 54
          (B) Subjects out of the country 54
          (C) Imprisoned subjects 54
          (D) Exception - re special section 56

XIII. Violation of penal laws arising out of activities as a subversive

XIV. Active service in armed forces supported by a subversive movement, such as service in the Loyalist Forces during the Spanish Civil War which were supported by communism

XV. Constant support of the Soviet Union in acts and utterances

XVI. Acting as a courier for the subversive movement or as a confidential mail drop therefor

XVII. Constant participation in the activities of a subversive organization or advancement of the organization's aims or interests, especially when such participation involves financial sacrifices or personal inconvenience or disadvantage

(b) The above factors, while not all-inclusive, should be used as a guide for determination of potential dangerousness. They are not to be considered as criteria for placing an individual on the security index; however, should be considered as indicating loyalty to a subversive organization.

(c) An individual shall not be deemed dangerous merely because one or more of the above factors are applicable in his case.

(3) Criteria for placing and retaining names in the security index

(a) The addition to and retention of names in the security index shall be governed by the following criteria:

I. No name shall be added to or retained in the security index unless one or more of the following situations have been established through investigation:

(A) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(B) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organizations within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(C) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(D) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of emergency.

II. [Activity in support of Cuban regime

Careful consideration should be given to recommending for inclusion in the security index those individuals who in the light of the clear identification of the Cuban Government as procommunist, pro-Soviet bloc, and anti-U. S., would be deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the U. S. in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U. S. In connection therewith, there should be a substantial showing of data within the following standards:

(A) An individual has served as a leader or officer or has subtantially participated in the activities of a pro-Castro organization and has engaged in activities which have included either the preparation or distribution of pro-Cuban or anti-U. S. propaganda; the active collection of funds for any agency or representative of the Cuban Government or for a pro-Castro group, which funds are not intended for the relief of human suffering or other charitable purposes; active participation in acts of violence against anti-Castro individuals or groups or against the U. S.; or the active collection of intelligence data regarding the national defense of the U. S. or which would serve the purposes of the Cuban Government as opposed to the interests of the U. S., where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such data is to be or has been conveyed to any agency or representative of the Cuban Government.

(B) An individual, whether he has participated in organizational activity or not, has engaged in one or more activities specified in (A) above and it has been clearly established, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe the loyalty of the individual would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the Cuban Government and the U. S.

(C) Aliens of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship should be considered for the security index when it is determined that one of these (1) is likely to foster, encourage, or promote the policies, programs, or objectives of the Cuban Government, or collaborate with the Cuban Government or (2) is likely to engage in or attempt to engage in acts of espionage, sabotage, or other activities inimical or detrimental to the defense or public safety of the U. S. as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals. Activities on a subject's part which should be considered in determining whether his name should be added to the security index under the foregoing would include but should not be limited to (1) participation in organizations supporting the Castro regime, (2) participation in picket lines formed in support of the Cuban Government, (3) contacts with Cuban agents operating in this country on behalf of the Cuban Government, or (4) statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the U. S. and Cuba.

(D) In connection with all individuals recommended for addition to the security index in consideration of the above-mentioned standards there must be a clear showing, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there has been a continuing sympathy for the aims and objectives of the Cuban Government since 10-1-60.

Since the courses of action which might be followed in the event of a limited emergency between Cuba and the U. S. would, in all probability, be different for aliens as distinguished from U. S. citizens it is imperative that the citizenship status of individuals recommended under criteria set forth above be clearly established.

III. Pro-Cuban activity

All individuals now on, or subsequently added to, the security index under criteria set forth in paragraphs (3) (a) I (A) (B) (C) (D) above should be tabbed as "Pro-Cuban" if their activites and sympathies have been such that they warrant special consideration in the event of a limited emergency involving Cuba and the U. S. This tabbing will include not only Cubans but also non-Cubans who have been engaged in substantial activities in furtherance of the aims and purposes of the Cuban Government, in support of pro-Castro groups or organizations, or in furtherance of the communist or subversive infiltration of pro-Castro groups. To effect this tabbing, submit form FD-122 to the Bureau with the notation "Pro-Cuban" typed directly opposite the words "Miscellaneous (specify)" in the space provided on the form. Attached to the form FD-122 should be an additional page containing a concise summary of facts which prompt the recommendation for this tabbing. These instructions in no way affect the character of cases under which subjects are currently being investigated. Security index cards sent to the field on such subjects will contain the capital letter "C" on the left side of the card at the beginning of the second line. These cards should not be kept in the "Cuban" special section of the index and these cards should be tabbed with a metal tab as mentioned in 87D 7b (11) (e) I under tabbing of cards.]

IV.] In evaluating interviews insofar as security index status is concerned, be guided as follows:

(A) Whenever a subject of a security investigation by a positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicates a continued adherence to the doctrines, aims or purposes of a revolutionary organization or a front organization, the positive statement shall be considered an overt act on the part of subject in establishing continued adherence.

(E) Other than as indicated above, interviews with security index subjects or potential security index subjects are not to be considered as factors requiring the placing or retaining of names of persons on the security index; for example, lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not to be regarded as such factors.

(b) Item I (D), above, must be given strict interpretation. It is not to be construed as a "catchall" for cases not otherwise meeting security index standards, and there must be overwhelming evidence to support any security index case, predicated upon the terms of item I (D). Further, any recommendation for retention in or addition to the security index based upon item I (D) must note specifically those factors which bring the individual cases within its provisions.

(c) With regard to the effect of resort to the fifth amendment by a witness appearing before a governmental body, the Department was requested to advise as to whether such action should be considered an overt act within the terms of the security index criteria under the following circumstances: (1) when the subject was asked directly concerning present membership in a subversive organization and (2) when the question calls for a response as to past membership in such organization. The Department's reply was as follows: "A refusal to answer these two questions must be considered an overt act within the Security Index criteria. There is, of course, the rare possibility that some individual who is not and never has been a member of a subversive organization, may take refuge in the Fifth Amendment, for idealistic reasons. However, your question is limited to those cases where the available information would seem to bring the subject within the criteria except for an overt act within the required period. A subsequent resort to the Fifth Amendment by such a person as outlined in your letter would seem to supply the missing element and negate any inference that he may have changed his beliefs or turned against the organizations or subversive persons with which he was known to have sympathized or supported."

This does not mean that refuge in the fifth amendment will automatically require the inclusion or retention of a subject in the security index. It must be construed in the light of the information available as to the scope and extent of subversive activity of the individual subject. It is imperative our security index cases be reviewed critical on a continuing basis to insure that they are completely sound and that it is established beyond question that such subjects are potentially dangerous.

(d) [The Department has advised that, from its study of available evidence concerning the Nation of Islam, it appears that the antiwhite and anti-U. S. Government teachings of this organization would constitute it a potentially dangerous instrumentality in the event of a national emergency, and that statements and activities on the part of individual members of the Nation of Islam indicating anarchist and revolutionary beliefs should be considered in making a judgment as to whether or not such individual members should be included in the security index. In view of the above,

II.	Race	
	White and Caucasian	W
	Negro	N
	Chinese	C
	Others	O
	(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)	
III.	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
IV.	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien	AL
	(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
V.	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	Independent Socialist League	ISL
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico	NPR
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	Nation of Islam	NOI
	Bulgarian	BUL
	[Cuban	CUB]
	Czechoslovakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Rumanian	RUM
	Russian	RUS
	Yugoslavian	YUG
VI.	Dangerousness classification (where applicable)	
	Detcom	DC
VII.	Key figure and top functionary designation (where applicable)	
	Key figure	KF
	Top functionary	TF
VIII.	Special section cards	
	Atomic energy program employees	AEP
	[Cuban special section	CUB]
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
	United Nations employees	UNE
	U. S. Government employees	GOV
IX.	Unavailable section cards	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
X.	Date and place of birth	
XI.	Key facility geographical reference number and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility obtained from the Department of Defense key facilities list (where applicable)	
XII.	Residence address	
XIII.	Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.	
XIV.	Field office file number	

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description
(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division
(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below
(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The white 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by this machine and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

(b) In the field office

[The active security index in each field office is maintained in four sections: geographical, alphabetical, unavailable, and special sections. In addition, a complete set of each field office's security index is maintained away from headquarters city. This additional set is to be maintained in exactly the same manner as the geographical section security index breakdown with the unavailable and special section cards filed in back of the geographical section cards.]

I. Geographical section

Procedures affecting the geographical section of the security index are set out in 87D 7b (11) pertaining to the priority of apprehension of subjects and should be read in conjunction with the material noted hereinafter.

After receipt of the three 5- by 8-inch security index cards from the Bureau and after the necessary data have been added to two of the cards, one card shall be filed in the geographical section of the office security index (except special section and unavailable section cards; see III and IV below) and one card shall be filed in the duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. This section shall be broken down geographically by residence address in accordance with the needs of each office. For example, where such breakdown is logical, it should be broken down by state, county, city and, if conditions in the city so warrant, into boroughs or suburbs and precincts. There will be instances involving routine change of residence in which the security index cards will reflect "unknown" residence. To facilitate filing such cards in the geographical section, a breakdown therein should be utilized, designated "Verification Pending," to contain the security index cards of (1) subjects whose addresses are listed as "unknown" but leads outstanding are expected to result in the prompt location of those persons within the division and (2) subjects whose whereabouts in another division is actually in the process of verification, the cards bearing the address in the interim as "unknown." The security index cards in the geographical section shall be filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown.

The geographical section of the field office security index will be the section to be used should apprehension of the subjects in the index become necessary. Cards contained therein will be withdrawn and used by the apprehending Agents.

It may be feasible in offices covering large industrial areas to set up a second geographical section in which the security index cards are filed according to the employment of the subjects. Such procedure may be established only upon receipt of specific Bureau authority. Apprehensions may thus be made by using either the geographical-residence or the geographical-employment sections, the choice depending upon the time of day the apprehensions are initiated.

II. Alphabetical section

Procedures affecting the alphabetical section of the security index are set out in 87D 7b (11) pertaining to the priority of apprehension of subjects and should be read in conjunction with the material noted hereinafter.

The duplicate card shall be filed in the alphabetical section which will be maintained in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever.

The alphabetical card will be in the nature of a control card. Should the original or geographical card be withdrawn from the geographical section for apprehension purposes, an appropriate notation shall be made on the alphabetical card for the purpose of administrative handling.

III. Special section

Security index cards of individuals coming within the categories enumerated below shall be retained in the special section of the security index for the reasons stated. This section shall be broken down into [seven] subsections headed by tabs designating the categories. The special section is to be maintained in accordance with the following instructions:

(A) Espionage subjects
When apprehension of the subject will destroy chances of penetration and control of an operating espionage parallel or would destroy known chances of penetration and control of a "sleeper" parallel

(B) U. S. Government employees
In order that the identities of the subjects so employed can be readily determined and specific consideration given to each such subject before apprehension is ordered

(C) Atomic energy program employees
Because their apprehension must be cleared with the Atomic Energy Commission representatives to avoid interference with atomic energy work

(D) Foreign government employees
So that individual consideration may be given to each individual on the basis of the relations then existing between the U. S. Government and the country by which the subject is employed

(E) United Nations Secretariat and other international organization employees
Because of the fact that they are employees of such organizations, regardless of their national origin, and the State Department must be notified after such apprehensions take place. In this category would be citizens of the U. S. and those immigrants or stateless persons not holding diplomatic visas and who do not have protection of the International Organization Immunities Act.

(F) Pro-Tito individuals
Because such individuals, although pro-Marxist-Leninist, adhere to the Tito form of communism as opposed to the Stalin or Russian form of communism. In light of the current international situation, it is not possible to predict whether Tito would become aligned with Russia in the event of open hostilities or would align himself on the side of the U. S. and its allies. Therefore, Tito adherents in the security index must receive consideration for apprehension separate from others included in the index.

Supporters of the Tito government are not considered to include members of any communist splinter groups who from time to time make statements in support of Tito, but should include only those individuals, particularly those of Yugoslav birth or descent, whose support of Tito is clear and

unequivocal regardless of Yugoslavia's foreign policies.

[(G) Cuban
In order that, in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U. S., special handling may be afforded those subjects whose organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies are shown as "Cuban." Security index cards denoting such will contain the code "CUB" on line 1.]

Standards for inclusion of subjects in the special section of the security index are the same as those for any other potentially dangerous subject.

When submitting a recommendation for preparation of a security index card on an individual falling in one of the above categories, form FD-122 must include the words "Special Section" typed in the upper right portion thereof. The proper category should be typed on FD-122 in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)."

Security index cards to be placed in the special section shall bear the appropriate code letters in the upper right portion designating the subsection in which the cards should be placed. Upon receipt from the Bureau of the three security index cards of subjects in these categories, the required additional data shall be placed on two which shall be filed alphabetically in the appropriate subsection of the special section. The third card shall be filed in the alphabetical section of the security index. Under no circumstances should special section security index cards be filed in the geographical section of the index.

When a security index subject whose card is maintained in the special section no longer comes within one of the categories of the special section, FD-122 must be submitted with the words "Remove from Special Section" typed in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." If the card should be placed in the unavailable section, the statement "Place in Unavailable Section" should be added in this space. When the new cards are received from the Bureau, they should be checked for accuracy and the description and photograph, if available, should be placed on separate cards of similar size and attached to the back of two of the cards. These two cards should then be filed in the geographical or unavailable section (where applicable) and the other card filed in the alphabetical section of the security index. The old cards should be destroyed.

When a special section subject is scheduled for priority apprehension under the detcom program, the special section card shall be appropriately tabbed.

It is not contemplated that subjects of security index cards maintained in the special section will be apprehended under a mass apprehension program. The cases of such subjects shall be given individual attention upon the inception of the apprehension program and the subjects will not be apprehended in the absence of specific Bureau instructions in each case.

IV. Unavailable section
Security index cards of individuals who are missing, out of the country, or are imprisoned shall be retained in the unavailable section. This section shall be broken down into three subsections headed by tabs marked "Missing,"

"Out of the Country," and "Imprisoned." The unavailable section shall be maintained in accordance with the following instructions:

(A) Missing subjects
Security index subjects are not to be included in the unavailable section as missing immediately upon determination that they are no longer located at their previously known places of residence or employment. The action required in 87D 6b (3) above must be taken prior to submitting FD-122 placing a subject in the unavailable section as a missing subject. The Bureau must be periodically advised of the investigative steps taken to locate missing security index subjects in accordance with 87D 6b (3).

If the subject is missing, the word "Missing" shall be typed in the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)."

(B) Subjects out of the country
The security index cards of subjects who are found to have departed from the U. S. or Puerto Rico for a foreign country shall be placed in this subsection of the unavailable section of the security index unless their cards should be cancelled in accordance with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (10) (b).

If the subject is out of the country, the words "Out of the Country" shall be typed in the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." If the foreign address is known, place it on FD-122 in the space provided for the residence address. If the subject is only known to be in a certain foreign country and his residence there is not known or is only known to be traveling abroad, include this information on FD-122. If the subject's current employment abroad is known, include it on FD-122.

The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least each six months for verification of the subject's address, the same as any other security index case, to determine if the subject has returned to this country.

Appropriate stops should be placed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to be advised of information which may become available to it indicating the subject's return to this country.

(C) Imprisoned subjects
The cards of security index subjects who are found to be imprisoned shall be placed in the unavailable section of the security index.

If the subject is in prison, the word "Imprisoned" shall be typed on the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." The identity of the institution in which the subject is incarcerated shall be typed in the space provided for the residence address. The space for the business address shall be left blank.

III. Persons active in Communist Party underground

IV. Any other security index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent, or disruptionist in the event of an emergency

(c) Recommendations for and removal of detcom designation

I. Approval of SAC

Designation of each subject for detcom program or removal of any subject therefrom must be personally approved by SAC, or in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor. If individual subjects being recommended for inclusion in security index are also being recommended for detcom, above-required approval by SAC may be handled in conjunction with requirements specified in 87D 7b (4).

II. [When form FD-122 is submitted recommending either tabbing for detcom or deletion of such tabbing, attach an additional page setting out a brief summary of facts upon which the recommendation is based.]

III. [Deleted]

(d) Administrative procedures for handling detcom program

Take following action to assure that security index cards for subjects tabbed detcom for priority of apprehension will be readily available for emergency action in your office:

I. Consider each security index case for detcom tabbing whether subject's security index card is filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections of security index.

II. Geographical section

Divide geographical section of security index into two distinct parts.

(A) Part I of geographical section shall include only security index cards for subjects who are tabbed detcom under instructions noted above.

(B) Part II of geographical section shall contain security index cards for all subjects that are NOT tabbed detcom.

(C) In offices having two separate and distinct geographical sections, i.e., geographical-employment and geographical-residence, as provided under 87D 7b (6) herein, each such geographical section must be broken into parts I and II, in line with foregoing, so that cards tabbed detcom will be separated and maintained apart from other security index cards.

(D) No colored tabs necessary on cards of detcom subjects in geographical section.

III. Alphabetical section

(A) One security index card for each subject is to be filed in alphabetical section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever.

(B) Affix a colored tab to each security index card designated for detcom in alphabetical section to readily identify such subjects.

(C) Detcom tabbings approved at Bureau will be shown on security index cards forwarded to field by code letters "DC" in first line on cards and by word "DETCOM" stamped in large red letters.

IV. Special section and unavailable section

Security index cards of detcom subjects filed in special and unavailable sections are to be designated by affixing colored tabs.

(c) General

I. Tabbing of cards

No security index card is to contain tabs for any purpose other than to designate detcom classification under foregoing provisions[with the following exception. The alphabetical security index cards on those individuals designated as "Pro-Cuban" should be tabbed with a metal tab of a color different from those used to tab detcom subjects.]

II. Removal from detcom category

Careful analysis must be made of each case in which deletion from detcom category is proposed. For instance, when a key figure is being removed from such status, file review may well disclose that subject qualifies for detcom tabbing for reasons covered in 87D 7b (11) (b), above, independent of key figure status.

c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

(1) Responsibility

FBI is responsible by Presidential directive for keeping other Federal agencies advised of developments within their jurisdiction affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated as vital to the national defense and welfare by the Department of Defense.

FBI is responsible under Delimitations Agreement for investigating employees of private contractors who have contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where credible subversive information concerning employee is obtained. Thorough investigation must be conducted and consideration for inclusion in security index given concerning any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in the past, a member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom sufficient other subversive information is in our possession which warrants such action.

(a) Requests for investigation from another agency

When another agency requests investigation of individual employed in key facility, institute investigation immediately if basis of request so warrants. Advise Bureau of request, basis thereof, and that investigation is being conducted.

(b) Verification of key facility status of place of employment

Department of Defense key facilities list (maintained in each office) must be checked for verification of information that a security investigation subject's place of employment may be included in such list.

(c) Individuals denied access to restricted information

Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently advise that an individual has been denied clearance to work in a defense plant or to handle classified or restricted information. In some instances clearance is denied based on information furnished by Bureau. At other times, information in Bureau files is very meager or possibly negative and basis for such denial of clearance is not known. The intelligence agency is responsible for furnishing Bureau with any information involving disloyalty or subversiveness.

Office receiving notification that an individual has been denied clearance must ascertain promptly basis for such denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of

(j) In connection with periodic reports in security index cases, there are instances in which evidence of extensive activity in subversive organizations will be developed. In these cases it is permissible to report such information in narrative-type statements without indicating exact dates of activity; however, the period of time involved must be shown,[as well as the inclusive dates of the informant reports.]

This type reporting is not to be utilized in Smith Act of 1940 cases or Internal Security Act of 1950 cases with the exception of key facility cases. The narrative statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions and information from each source must be reported in separate narrative statements.

(k) The above instructions in no way remove responsibility for reporting all items of pertinence to the Bureau, bearing in mind the fact that Bureau files must be complete insofar as matters of substance are concerned, nor is responsibility removed for the reporting in detail of information tending to establish a subject's knowledge of the basic aims and purposes of the subversive organizations with which affiliated or information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

In the documentation of narrative statements set forth the location of the original documents in the field office files by the file number and serial scope.

(10) Administrative data

(a) General

All references to the following items, all administrative in nature, should be contained in cover pages accompanying reports:

I. Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, key figure or top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), forms FD-122, FD-122a, FD-128, and FD-128a, and Bureau instructions for handling cases or any information contained in Bureau or field corresponden which is not investigative in nature

II. Whenever reports relating to security index subjects contain data affecting material included on subject's existing security index card, the cover pages accompanying the report shall include as the last page form FD-305, appropriately checked, which form contains items pertaining to the following:

(A) That subject is included in the security index
(B) That data appearing on security index card is current or requires change
(C) That FD-122 has been submitted to Bureau where security index card changes are necessary
(D) That a suitable photograph is or is not available
(E) [Deleted]
(F) That subject is employed in a key facility and that agencies interested in that facility are specified
(G) Reason for classifying report
(H) Dates subject was previously interviewed and reason for not reinterviewing subject
(I) That subject no longer meets security index criteria and a letter has been directed to the Bureau recommending cancellation of the security index card
(J) That subject's case has been re-evaluated and reasons are set forth as to why subject's activities continue to fall within security index criteria
(K) That subject's security index card is or is not tabbed detcom and that subject's activities do or do not warrant detcom tabbing

III. Form FD-305a containing items pertinent to reserve index subjects will be similarly utilized in connection with the submission of reports in reserve index cases.

(b) Documentation of reports

I. Deleted

II. If information necessary for complete documentation is not available in subject's case file, necessary review of other office files should be made. If not obtainable, this fact must be indicated in the cover page(s) accompanying report to the Bureau.

III. Extensive investigation should not be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have in the past furnished background information or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed that subject, according to reliable records, such as birth records, school records, or records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in report. Further verification will not be necessary.

IV. During the preparation of summary reports it is often found that information being incorporated into a report was originally obtained by another office and all of the necessary information for complete documentation will not be in the possession of the office preparing the report. In such an instance, if the office preparing the report is in possession of Photostats of documents obtained by the other offices and the identity

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Administrative data, 77
Admissible evidence, 37
Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
Aliens
  Cuban, 45a,45b
  dissemination of information concerning, 80
  investigation of, 26
Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
Annual review of section A, reserve index, 42b
Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
Armed forces
  dissemination to, 81
  members of, 25
  record in, 27
  relatives in, 27
  subjects entering, 56,60
  subjects in, 25
Arrangement of security index, 50
  alphabetical section, 51,63
  at Bureau, 50
  geographical section, 51,63
  in field office, 51
  inactive section, 56
  special section, 52
  unavailable section, 53
Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security index, 70,71

Bureau
  applicants, inclusion in security index, 70
  authority to investigate, 24
  responsibility, 19

Cancellation of
  security flash notice, 27a
  security index cards
    after induction into armed forces, 60
    mechanics, 60
    on departure from U. S., 60
    only after interview, 38
    upon death, 60
Canvassing informants, 72
Changes on security index cards, 58
Channelizing, 36,72,79
Character of reports, 73
Characterizations, 79
Chinese
  extraction, 48,62
  sympathies, 48
Classification of cases, 72
Concealment of membership, 31
Confidential informants, 72
Contacting
  faculty members, 25
  registrars, 25
  students, 25
  superiors of faculty members, 25
Contacts
  during investigation, 25
  with foreign establishments, 25
Content
  and appearance
    of reserve index cards, 43
    of security index cards, 48
  of reports, 74
Corroboration, 37
Criteria for inclusion in security index, 45
Cuban
  activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  aliens, 45a,45b
  pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  special section, 49,53
  tabbing cards, 45b,64

Dangerousness
  definition of, 44
  determination of, 44
  Nation of Islam membership, 46
Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Definitions, 19
  - of dangerousness, 44
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index, 70
- Detcom, 62
  - administrative procedures, 63
  - key figures, 68
  - purpose, 62
  - removal from, 58,63,64
  - top functionaries, 62,70
  - who to be tabbed, 62
- Determination of
  - dangerousness, 44
  - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Dissemination
  - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81
  - of reports
    - at SOG, 81
    - in field, 79
    - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
- Documentation of reports, 78
  - completion of, 78
- Employees of
  - international organizations, 25
  - U. S. Government, 25
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Evidence, 37
  - desirability of
    - admissibility, 29,37
    - corroboration, 37
  - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  - of membership or affiliation, 29
  - preservation of, 37
- Faculty members
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File on defected subjects, 42
- File reviews, 34
- Flash notices (security)
  - cancellation of, 27a
  - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  - when place, 27
- Foreign
  - diplomats, 25
  - establishments, 25
  - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index, 70
  - tours, 33a
  - travel, 33
- Forms
  - FD-122
    - abstracts for, 47
    - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    - cover letter thereto, 32
    - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63
    - placing name in or removing from special section of security index, 53
      - unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    - recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - reference to, 77
    - succinct summary with, 47
      - Cuban subjects, 45b
    - when subject employed in key facility, 65
  - FD-122a, 42b,43,61,77
  - FD-128
    - reference to, 77
    - when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    - when subject moves, 58,59

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- National Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Naturalized citizens
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - investigations of, 26
- New office of origin, 58

- Observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Office of origin, 27a,58,59,72
- Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
- Overt acts, 45

- Periodic review of section A, reserve index, 42b
- Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
- Photographic surveillances, 35
- Photographs, 28
  - of key figures, 67
  - of top functionaries, 70
  - status of security index cases while obtaining, 28,68
- Physical
  - description, 28
  - surveillances, 35
    - maintenance of SA's notes, 38
- Position
  - and importance, 30
  - in labor organizations, 29
- Potential dangerousness, 44
  - of Nation of Islam members, 46
- Preservation of evidence, 37
- Priority apprehension program, 62
- Private records, 36
- Public
  - source information, 36
  - utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Purpose of
  - investigation, 19
  - security index, 43

- Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
- Recommendation for inclusion in
  - section A, reserve index, 42b,61
  - security index, 47
    - Cuban activity, 45a,45b
    - when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    - when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    - when subject is out of country, 48
    - when there is missing background information, 47
- Re-evaluation of security index status, 57,72,78
- Registrars of institutions of learning, 24,25
- Reinterviews, 42
- Relatives in armed forces, 27
- Removal from security index, 46a,61
- Reports
  - administrative data in, 77
  - character of, 73
  - content of, 74
  - cumulative items, 76
  - dissemination of, 79
  - documentation of, 78
  - lumping information in, 76
  - narrative-type statements, 77
  - schedule of, 73
  - status of, 73
  - summarizing information in, 76
  - title of, 72
  - topical heading in, 74
  - when necessary after interview, 41
  - when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  - when not necessary after interview, 40a
  - when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
- Reserve index, 42a
  - arrangement, 42b
  - cards, content and appearance, 43
  - content, 43
  - names deleted from security index, 51,62

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Reserve index (continued)
  - purpose, 42a
  - removal from, 43
  - section A
    - changes, 43
    - individuals to be included, 42b,61
    - periodic review of, 42b
    - recommendations for inclusion in, 42b,61
    - when to submit reports, 42b
  - section B, 43,62
  - standards for, 42a
  - subjects
    - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    - security of Government employees case in, 70
- Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
- Responsibility of Bureau, 19
- Restrictions on investigations, 24
- Schedule of reports, 73
- Scope of investigation, 26
- Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Security
  - flash notice
    - cancellation of, 27a
    - notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    - when place, 27
  - index, 43
    - arrangement of, 50
    - cards
      - cancellation of, 38,42,60
      - changes on, 58
      - content and appearance of, 48
      - of key figures, 68
      - tabbing, 45b,62,64,70
      - transfers to reserve index, 61, 62
    - criteria for, 45
    - Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53,64
    - dangerousness, 44
    - purpose, 43
- Security (continued)
  - index (continued)
    - recommendation for, 45a,45b,46a,47
    - re-evaluation of status, 72
    - removal from, 46a,61
    - subjects of
      - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      - security of Government employees case in, 70
    - summary reports, 47
  - informants, 34
    - cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
  - of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Signed statements, 41
- Sleepers, 31,52
- Special section of security index, 52
  - Cuban, 49,53
- Standards for reserve index, 42a
  - section A, 42b
- Status of cases, 73
  - on key figures, 73
  - on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66
  - on subjects in security index, 74
  - on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  - on top functionaries, 73
  - while obtaining photographs, [illegible]
  - while securing handwri[illegible]
  - while verifying resid[illegible] employment, 57
- Students
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigations of, 24
- Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
- Summary reports, 47,71
- Superiors of faculty members, 25
- Surveillances
  - photographic, 35
  - physical, 35

(c) In the case of an individual previously the subject of investigation, the case should be brought up to date by the prompt submission of a report in the event there is unreported information contained in the file. If reports have not previously been submitted in the case, a letterhead memorandum summarizing the available subversive data should accompany the initial letter advising the Bureau of the proposed travel. [In nonsecurity index cases all available data regarding subject's subversive activities and affiliations should be carefully evaluated with a view toward determining whether a full security investigation should be conducted and the communication transmitting data regarding a subject's travel should contain a statement as to whether a security investigation is being initiated and, if not, reasons therefor.]

(d) Information concerning these subjects' proposed travel abroad, including information concerning their subversive activities, is furnished by the Bureau to the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and legal attaches if the proposed travel is in areas covered by such and, frequently, requests are made of one or all of the above to place stops with appropriate security services abroad to be advised of the activities of these subjects.

(e) When information is received that an individual with a subversive background falling within the categories set out previously herein is forming a tour group for foreign travel or an organization which is considered subversive is sponsoring such a tour, advise appropriate offices under the caption of the tour name or the organization sponsoring the tour of the identities of the individuals participating in the tour and furnish the Bureau a letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination to the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and appropriate legal attaches, including therein all readily available information pertaining to the tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names of individuals making up the tour with addresses, if available, and a thumbnail sketch of the organization or individual sponsoring the tour.

Letterhead memoranda relating to the tours will be disseminated by the Bureau with a statement that, as individuals participating are identified, recipients will be furnished with memoranda under the individual case caption where those individuals are found to have subversive backgrounds. Therefore, the appropriate field offices should immediately identify and submit individual memoranda concerning such individuals. The details of travel will be replaced by a reference to the memorandum previously prepared under the caption of the organization sponsoring the tour. Prepare individual memoranda only in the cases of individuals with subversive backgrounds falling within the categories set out previously herein.

In addition, appropriate offices should submit a letter to the Bureau under the organization caption listing the names of those individuals residing within their territory who are traveling with the tour group and on whom no subversive information is found.

(f) Advise the Bureau promptly in form suitable for dissemination of a subject's return from travel abroad in those instances in which stops have been placed with security services abroad through the agencies listed above. In instances in which an individual against whom stops have been placed has traveled to any country behind the Iron Curtain, the Bureau shall also be furnished at that time with recommendations as to the desirability of interview of such person and with advice as to whether additional investigation concerning him is contemplated. In the event such an interview is authorized, it shall be conducted promptly and the case shall not be closed until such interview is had and the results thereof submitted in report form.

(g) In some instances a security investigation of a subject not yet included in the security index may be in progress at the time it is found that the subject has recently departed for a foreign country. If the evidence developed at that time warrants the inclusion of the subject in the security index were it not for the fact that he is outside the U. S., form FD-122 should be submitted recommending his inclusion in the unavailable section of the security index. After all initial investigation is completed, the subject's case will be handled the same as those of other subjects of a similar status who are included in the unavailable section as out of the country.

If the subject is an alien who has been deported or has otherwise permanently departed from the U. S., he should not be included in the security index.

When it is determined that a security index subject has departed for a foreign country, his security index card shall be placed in the unavailable section and his case handled in accordance with the instructions set forth under 87D 7b (6) (b) IV.

(5) Investigative techniques

While it is not possible to enumerate all investigative techniques which can and should be employed in these investigations, there are certain proven techniques which have been used with continued success and should be applied wherever possible.

(a) File reviews

Upon the initiation of a security investigation of an individual, check the office indices and review files thoroughly for any pertinent information on record showing background and subversive activity of each individual subject. Include such information in the initial investigative report.

Once a main security file has been opened for an individual, subsequent information received concerning him should be channelized to that file. The reference cards pertaining to the subject should be consolidated in the indices after each check and review of files has been made.

(b) Security informants

Success of security investigations of individuals is primarily dependent upon a broad confidential informant coverage within every phase of subversive activity. Information and evidence developed through such sources are unsurpassed in value because of possible use not only for intelligence purposes but also as admissible evidence.

(b) Where potential dangerousness of a subject has been established and inclusion of that subject in security index is warranted, the office of origin shall submit a recommendation for inclusion in security index by submitting form FD-122 to Bureau. Form must be prepared in triplicate. Original and one copy shall be forwarded to Bureau and one copy will be placed in subject's investigative case file.

Nothing should appear on FD-122 or subsequently on the security index card which is not in the subject's case file. Form FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend a subject for inclusion in the security index and (2) to submit changes to data which appears on face of security index cards already existent.

Proper selection should be made in the opening paragraph option. FD-122 is submitted with abstract when used to recommend the subject for inclusion in the security index and without abstract when used to indicate additions, deletions, or changes in data appearing on existing cards.

(c) When form FD-122 is submitted to Bureau recommending inclusion of a name in security index, attach an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of facts on which recommendation has been based. Facts must be in detail to clearly[show]soundness of recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must contain pertinent dates of subject's activities.

(d) When, at conclusion of investigation, subject's name is not being recommended for security index, set out a brief summary statement[in the appropriate communication closing the case]showing reasons for the decision.

(e) Security index cards shall be recommended by and maintained by office of origin only.

(f) A current report must be in possession of the Bureau when subject is recommended for security index. If it is the initial report in the case, it must be a summary report. If, however, prior investigative reports have been submitted which are suitable for dissemination and are appropriately documented, a summary report need not be submitted.

(g) To assure that subject recommended for security index will receive proper attention, case shall be kept in pending or pending-inactive status until security index card has been received from Bureau and filed in office security index. If case continues in pending status because of outstanding investigation, reports shall carry a lead to follow authorization of security index card by the Bureau in addition to other leads. If outstanding investigation has been completed and case would otherwise be closed upon submission of the report and form FD-122, case shall be placed in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau. In latter instance, upon receipt of Bureau's response, case may be closed administratively.

(h) Recommendation for security index card should not be delayed because of absence of information concerning race, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, or description where security index card is warranted. In such instances, recommendation for the card should be submitted with a current report and case retained in pending status with active investigation continuing to determine missing items of information.

(i) Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for the security index provided instructions set forth in 87D 6b (3) and (4) are followed. Forms FD-122 submitted on subjects should include data required in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV below.

(j) When form FD-122 is submitted recommending a security index card be prepared on a subject who is of Chinese extraction, the words "Other - Chinese" must be included in the space on the form calling for a statement as to the subject's race. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending that a security index card be prepared on a person who is not of Chinese extraction but who has shown definite sympathies with communist China, the form should include under "Miscellaneous" a statement to the effect "sympathetic to Communist China."

(k) Upon receipt of form FD-122 at Bureau, the case of the subject will be reviewed and if recommendation of field is concurred in, security index cards will be prepared. Duplicate copy of form will be returned to office of origin stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." The three cards shall be filed in security index as outlined below. The returned copy of FD-122 shall be placed in subject's main investigative case file. Offices with a geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive an extra card.

(l) When security index cards are received from Bureau, data thereon must be checked for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards of similar size to security index cards which are stapled to back of two of the cards. One card will then be filed in the geographical section of office security index (except special section cards and unavailable section cards - see 87D 7b (6) (b) III and IV below), and one card shall be filed in the duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. The other card is filed in alphabetical section of security index. No information shall be permanently added, deleted, or changed on face of security index card without complying with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (8).

(5) Content and appearance of security index card

(a) Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain the following information. If any of items enumerated in I through XIV are missing at time the security index card is made, the case should be continued as pending and investigation conducted to obtain the necessary information. Set forth under each item below are possible categories in which subject may be classified, together with code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on form FD-122 when sending form to Bureau recommending security index card be prepared. Code letters should subsequently appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

I. Name and aliases

The full and correct name and aliases of the subject must be contained on the security index card. When the true name of a subject or any aliases are changed, added, deleted, or are found to be incorrect, form FD-122 must be submitted [showing] the correct data to be placed on the security index card.

attention to the existence of a security index card for that individual. In all such instances a specific recommendation must be made concerning the cancellation of the card. The card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate the subject as a security informant.

(f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous
Instructions set out below should be read in conjunction with 87D 6b (7) (c) herein relating to interviews with security index subjects.

Frequently, after a subject is included in the security index, information is received or investigation develops information[indicating]that he is no longer a threat to the internal security by reason of defection or expulsion from the subversive movement, membership in or affiliation with which was the reason for placing him in the security index. Such defection may be[shown]by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over an extended period of time or upon declaration of opposition to the principles of the subversive movement. The latter may manifest itself in declarations by a subject in the presence of confidential informants or other sources, statements to the press, or actual contact with Bureau representatives and admission of previous subversive activity.

When sufficient information is at hand regarding subject's present sympathies to reach conclusion that he should no longer be scheduled for apprehension as a dangerous subversive, request authority to interview subject or advise Bureau of reasons why subject should not be interviewed. Bureau will not cancel security index card without consideration being given to interview of subject. See 87D 6b (7) (c) and (d).

If, upon interview, subject proves cooperative to extent that his security index card should be cancelled, advise Bureau by letter of results together with a recommendation for cancellation which must be approved by Bureau.

(g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection
As security index cards are reviewed upon reopening in the field, there will be instances in which removal will be required by application of the security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3). With the passage of time, limits specified in criteria will operate to remove certain subjects even though there is no affirmative indication of defection.

[Letters recommending removal of a subject's name from the security index should be accompanied by form FD-122a if facts in the case warrant the inclusion of subject's name in section A of the reserve index.]

The following[procedures]should be followed[in the case of those individuals not being recommended for inclusion in section A of the reserve index:]

I. When subjects are removed from security index solely on basis of application of security index criteria as cases are reopened and reviewed in the field, retain security index cards pertaining to such subjects bearing the descriptive matter on reverse sides; i.e., the cards previously filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Destroy cards previously filed in alphabetical section. Those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards under provisions of 87D 7b (6) (b) I should retain but one card in each instance, destroying second geographical card as well as card previously filed in alphabetical section.

[II. Mark canceled across face of each card being retained and file in the reserve index,[section B.]

[III. [Deleted]

[IV. The above instructions do not apply in the case of individuals removed from the security index based upon activity in the Nation of Islam. Security index cards in such cases should be destroyed.

(h) Subjects of Chinese extraction
In any communication recommending cancellation of a security index card on a subject of Chinese extraction, such communication must contain the words "Other - Chinese." This regulation relates specifically to those subjects placed on the security index following a recommendation submitted in accordance with the instructions contained in section 87D 7b (4) (j) above.

(11) Priority apprehension program (DETCOM)

(a) Purpose
Many individuals included in security index because of their training, violent tendencies, or prominence in subversive activity are extremely dangerous and would be more inclined to commit or capable of committing overt acts against the U. S. in time of national emergency than would others in security index. Degree of dangerousness of such individuals is so pronounced that in interest of security they must be immobilized in the least possible time prior to others in security index. The administrative procedure developed to make apprehensions on a priority basis is referred to as the detcom program. Subjects designated for priority apprehension are referred to as detcom subjects.

Individuals in security index tabbed detcom would be arrested first in event of a limited but grave emergency, probably without the arrest of other security index subjects.

In an all-out emergency, all subjects whose names are in the security index will be considered for immediate apprehension.

Subjects tabbed for detcom should comprise a hard core of subversives. Each individual case should stand on its own merits and decision to consider subjects for priority of apprehension should be based on subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies.

(b) Subjects to be tabbed detcom
Each security index subject should be considered for detcom tabbing (priority of arrest) who falls within one or more of following categories:

I. All top functionaries and key figures

II. Currently active communists or members of any basic revolutionary organization (active within past year) when there is evidence of one or more of following:
  (A) Activity as local organizers or leaders in the organization
  (B) Special training at Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow
  (C) Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men, or active participation in violent strikes, riots, or demonstrations
  (D) Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Administrative data, 77
Admissible evidence, 37
Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
Aliens
  dissemination of information concerning, 80
  investigation of, 26
Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
Annual review of section A, reserve index, 42b
Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
Armed forces
  dissemination to, 81
  members of, 25
  record in, 27
  relatives in, 27
  subjects entering, 56,60
  subjects in, 25
Arrangement of security index, 50
  alphabetical section, 51,63
  at Bureau, 50
  geographical section, 51,63
  in field office, 51
  inactive section, 56
  special section, 52
  unavailable section, 53
Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security index, 70,71

Bureau
  applicants, inclusion in security index, 70
  authority to investigate, 24
  responsibility, 19

Cancellation of
  security flash notice, 27a
  security index cards
    after induction into armed forces, 60
    mechanics, 60
    on departure from U. S., 60
    only after interview, 38
    upon death, 60
Canvassing informants, 72
Changes on security index cards, 58
Channelizing, 36,72,79
Character of reports, 73
Characterizations, 79
Chinese
  extraction, 48,62
  sympathies, 48
Classification of cases, 72
Concealment of membership, 31
Confidential informants, 72
Contacting
  faculty members, 25
  registrars, 25
  students, 25
  superiors of faculty members, 25
Contacts
  during investigation, 25
  with foreign establishments, 25
Content
  and appearance
    of reserve index cards, 43
    of security index cards, 48
  of reports, 74
Corroboration, 37
Criteria for inclusion in security index, 45

Dangerousness
  definition of, 44
  determination of, 44
  Nation of Islam membership, 46
Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Defected subjects, 42
Definitions, 19
  of dangerousness, 44
Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index, 70
Detcom, 62
  administrative procedures, 63
  key figures, 68
  purpose, 62
  removal from, 58,63,64
  top functionaries, 62,70
  who to be tabbed, 62
Determination of
  dangerousness, 44
  membership and position in labor organizations, 29
Dissemination
  concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81
  of reports
    at SOG, 81
    in field, 79
    on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
Documentation of reports, 78
  completion of, 78

Employees of
  international organizations, 25
  U. S. Government, 25
Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
Evidence, 37
  desirability of
    admissibility, 29,37
    corroboration, 37
  of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  of membership or affiliation, 29
  preservation of, 37

Faculty members
  contacts with, 25
  investigation of, 24
Fifth amendment, 46
File on defected subjects, 42
File reviews, 34
Flash notices (security)
  cancellation of, 27a
  notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  when place, 27
Foreign
  diplomats, 25
  establishments, 25
  intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index, 70
  tours, 33a
  travel, 33
Forms
  FD-122
    abstracts for, 47
    changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    cover letter thereto, 32
    detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63
    placing name in or removing from
      special section of security index, 53
      unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    recommending for inclusion in security index, 47
    recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    reference to, 77
    succinct summary with, 47
    when subject employed in key facility, 65
  FD-122a, 42b,43,61,77
  FD-128
    reference to, 77
    when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    when subject moves, 58,59

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

National Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Naturalized citizens
  dissemination of information concerning, 80
  investigations of, 26
New office of origin, 58

Observation of subject, 28,50,57
Office of origin, 27a,58,59,72
Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
Overt acts, 45

Periodic review of section A, reserve index, 42b
Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
Photographic surveillances, 35
Photographs, 28
  of key figures, 67
  of top functionaries, 70
  status of security index cases while obtaining, 28,68
Physical
  description, 28
  surveillances, 35
    maintenance of SA's notes, 38
Position
  and importance, 30
  in labor organizations, 29
Potential dangerousness, 44
  of Nation of Islam members, 46
Preservation of evidence, 37
Priority apprehension program, 62
Private records, 36
Public
  source information, 36
  utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Purpose of
  investigation, 19
  security index, 43

Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
Recommendation for inclusion in
  section A, reserve index, 42b,61
  security index, 47
    when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    when subject is out of country, 48
    when there is missing background information, 47
Re-evaluation of security index status, 57,72,78
Registrars of institutions of learning, 24,25
Reinterviews, 42
Relatives in armed forces, 27
Removal from security index, 46a,61
Reports
  administrative data in, 77
  character of, 73
  content of, 74
  cumulative items, 76
  dissemination of, 79
  documentation of, 78
  lumping information in, 76
  narrative-type statements, 77
  schedule of, 73
  status of, 73
  summarizing information in, 76
  title of, 72
  topical headings in, 74
  when necessary after interview, 41
  when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  when not necessary after interview, 40a
  when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
Reserve index, 42a
  arrangement, 42b
  cards, content and appearance 43
  content, 43
  names deleted from security index, 61,62

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Reserve index (continued)
  - purpose, 42a
  - removal from, 43
  - section A
    - changes, 43
    - individuals to be included, 42b,61
    - periodic review of, 42b
    - recommendations for inclusion in, 42b,61
    - when to submit reports, 42b
  - section B, 43,62
  - standards for, 42a
  - subjects
    - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    - security of Government employees case in, 70
- Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
- Responsibility of Bureau, 19
- Restrictions on investigations, 24

- Schedule of reports, 73
- Scope of investigation, 26
- Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Security
  - flash notice
    - cancellation of, 27a
    - notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    - when place, 27
  - index, 43
    - arrangement of, 50
    - cards
      - cancellation of, 38,42,60
      - changes on, 58
      - content and appearance of, 48
      - of key figures, 68
      - transfers to reserve index, 61, 62
    - criteria for, 45
    - dangerousness, 44
    - purpose, 43
- Security (continued)
  - index (continued)
    - recommendation for, 46a,47
    - re-evaluation of status, 72
    - removal from, 46a,61
    - subjects of
      - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      - security of Government employees case in, 70
    - summary reports, 47
  - informants, 34
    - cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
  - of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Signed statements, 41
- Sleepers, 31,52
- Special section of security index, 52
- Standards for reserve index, 42a
  - section A, 42b
- Status of cases, 73
  - on key figures, 73
  - on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 6[illegible]
  - on subjects in security index, 74
  - on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  - on top functionaries, 73
  - while obtaining photographs, 28
  - while securing handwriting, 29
  - while verifying residence and employment, 57
- Students
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigations of, 24
- Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
- Summary reports, 47,71
- Superiors of faculty members, 25
- Surveillances
  - photographic, 35
  - physical, 35

(2) The act provides that any individual who is or becomes a member of any organization concerning which there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring such organization to register under the act as a Communist-action organization, more than thirty days have lapsed since such order has become final and the organization is not so registered, shall within sixty days after said order has become final, or within thirty days after becoming a member of such organization, whichever is later, register with the Attorney General as a member of such organization. (§ 8 (a)) (Title 50, USC, § 787 (a))

(3) Each individual who is or becomes a member of any organization which he knows to be registered under the act as a Communist-action organization, but which has failed to include the individual's name upon a list of members thereof filed with the Attorney General, as required by the act, shall, within sixty days after obtaining such knowledge, register with the Attorney General as a member of such organization. (§ 8 (b)) (Title 50, USC, § 787 (b))

(4) It is unlawful for any member of a Communist-action organization which has registered under the act, or there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring such organization to register, with knowledge or notice that such organization is so registered or that such order has become final: to conceal or fail to disclose the fact that he is a member of such organization in seeking, accepting or holding any nonelective office or employment under the U.S.; or, to hold any nonelective office or employment under the U.S.; or, to conceal or fail to disclose the fact that he is a member of such organization in seeking, accepting or holding employment in any defense facility; or, to engage in any employment in any defense facility if such organization is a Communist-action organization; or, to hold office or employment with any labor organization, as that term is defined in section 2 (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (Title 29, USC, § 152), or to represent any employer in any matter or proceeding arising or pending under that act. (§ 5 (a) (1)) (Title 50, USC, § 784(a) (1))

(5) When a Communist-action organization is registered under the act, or there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring such organization to register, it shall be unlawful for any member of such organization, with knowledge or notice that such organization is so registered or that such order has become final, to make application for a passport, or renewal of a passport, to be issued or renewed by the authority of the U.S., or to use or attempt to use such passport. (§ 6 (a)) Title 50, USC, § 785 (a))

(6) The act requires any person acting for or on behalf of any Communist-action organization which is registered, or required by final order of the Board to register, to label properly all publications transmitted through the mail or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce. (§ 10 (1)) (Title 50, USC, § 789 (1))

(7) Any individual who, in a registration statement or annual report, willfully makes any false statement or willfully omits to state any fact which is required to be stated, or which is necessary to make the statements made or information given not misleading, is guilty of a violation. (§ 15 (b)) (Title 50, USC, § 794 (b))

g. Miscellaneous regulations affecting other persons dealing with Communist organizations and members thereof

(1) It is unlawful for any officer or employee of the U.S. or of any defense facility, with knowledge or notice that such organization is registered with the Attorney General as a Communist-action organization or a Communist front organization, or that there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring such organization to register: (1) to contribute funds or services

to such organization; or, (2) to advise, counsel, or urge any person, with knowledge or notice that such person is a member of such organization, to perform, or omit to perform, any act if such act or omission would constitute a violation of any provision of section 5 (2) (1). (§ 5 (a) (2)) (Title 50, USC, § 784 (2))

(2) Where an organization is registered, or there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring an organization to register, as a communist-action organization, it shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the U. S. to issue a passport to, or renew the passport of, any individual knowing or having reason to believe that the individual is a member of such organization. (§ 6 (b)) (Title 50, USC, § 785 (b))

h. Penalties (Title 50, USC, § 794)
If there is in effect with respect to a communist-action organization or individual a final order of the Board requiring registration or determining that it is a communist-infiltrated organization under section 7 or section 8 of the Internal Security Act: (1) such organization shall, upon conviction of failure to register, to file a registration statement or annual report, or to keep records as required by section 7, be punished for each such offense by fine of not more than $10,000, and (2) each individual having a duty under subsection h of section 7 to register or to file any registration statement or annual report on behalf of such organization, and each individual having a duty to register under section 8, shall, upon conviction of failure so to register or to file any such registration statement or annual report, be punished for each such offense by a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Each day of failure to register, whether on the part of the organization or any individual, shall constitute a separate offense.

Any individual who, in a registration statement or annual report, willfully makes any false statement or willfully omits to state any fact which is required to be stated shall upon conviction thereof be punished for each such offense by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Each false statement willfully made, and each willful omission to state any fact which is required to be stated, shall constitute a separate offense, and each listing of the name or address of any one individual shall be deemed to be a separate statement.

Any organization which violates any provision of section 10 of this act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for each such violation by a fine of not more than $10,000. Any individual who violates any provision of sections 5, 6, or 10 of this act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for each such violation by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both.

Note: The fact of the registration of any person under section 7 or section 8 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 as an officer or member of any communist organization shall not be received in evidence against such person in any prosecution for any alleged violation of any other criminal statute.

i. Reporting of evidence developed on individual members

[Any admissible evidence showing a violation of the Internal Security Act of 1950, Title 50, USC, § 784 (a) (1) (E), as it pertains to union officers, employees, and representatives of management (see paragraph f(4), page 93, of this section and volume III, section 67C, of this manual) should be furnished to the Bureau in a report on the individual and carrying the single character, Internal Security Act of 1950 - Labor (classification 122).] Any admissible evidence showing a violation[of this act]on the part of any[other]individual should be furnished to the Bureau in a report on the individual and carrying the dual character, Internal Security - C or Security Matter - C, and Internal Security Act of 1950[(classification 100).] See section 87D[of this manual]for complete instructions relative to investigations of individuals.

2. Communist front organizations

a. Definition - Title 50, USC, § 782

"The term 'Communist-front organization' means any organization in the United States (other than a Communist-action organization

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page
V. Inactive section 56
(7) Periodic verification of addresses 57
(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards 58
(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards 58
  (a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries 58
  (b) Key figures and top functionaries 59
  (c) Subjects tabbed for Detcom 60
  (d) Subjects not included in security index 60
(10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index 60
  (a) Death of subject 60
  (b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction 60
  (c) Imprisonment of subject 60
  (d) Induction of subject into the armed forces 60
  (e) Security informants 60
  (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous 61
  (g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection...... 61
  (h) Subjects of Chinese extraction........ 62
(11) Priority apprehension program (DETCOM) 62
  (a) Purpose 62
  (b) Subjects to be tabbed detcom 62
  (c) Recommendations for and removal of detcom designation 63
  (d) Administrative procedures for handling detcom program 63
  (e) General 64
c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities . 64
(1) Responsibility 64
(2) Inclusion in security index 65
(3) Deleted
(4) Dissemination 65
(5) Status of cases 66
d. Key figure and top functionary program 66
(1) General 66
(2) Key figures 66
  (a) Definition 66
  (b) Regulations governing the handling of the key figure program 67
    I. Designation and deletion of key figure status 67
    II. Photographs 67
    III. Handwriting specimens 67
    IV. Security index cards 68
    V. Change of office of origin 68
    VI. Reports 68
    VII. Maintenance of key figure list 69
    VIII. Deleted
(3) Top functionaries 69
  (a) Definition 69
  (b) Manner of designation 59
  (c) Regulations governing top functionaries 70
e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index........ 70

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

- (1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations 70
- (2) Security of Government employees investigations 70
- (3) Atomic Energy Act, Voice of America applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations 70

f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports. 71

- (1) General 71
- (2) Origin 72
- (3) Deleted
- (4) Classification 72
- (5) Title 72
- (6) Character 73
  - (a) Key figures and top functionaries 73
  - (b) Others 73
- (7) Deleted
- (8) Status 73
  - (a) Top functionaries 73
  - (b) Key figures 73
  - (c) Deleted
  - (d) Other security index subjects 74
  - (e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index . 74
  - (f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein 74
- (9) Content 74
- (10) Administrative data 77
  - (a) General 77
  - (b) Documentation of reports 78

g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases 79

8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations 79

a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau 80

- (1) Aliens and naturalized citizens 80
- (2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services 80
- (3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense 80
- (4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard 80

of the source, date of activity, date received, and name of the Agent receiving the information are known, it is not necessary to request the office originally obtaining the information to document it further by furnishing information showing the location of the original in the office files. If all documentation, except the latter item, is not in the possession of the office preparing the report, it should be obtained.

V. If it is found desirable to include in a report the identities of individuals who are known communists and have been associates of the subject to lend weight to evidence of the subject's potential dangerousness, only the source of the information showing the associate to be a communist need be identified.

VI. In a very limited number of instances it may be necessary to obtain a thumbnail sketch or characterization of an individual or organization from another office or the Bureau. When such information is received in your office, it should be placed in thumbnail sketch files so that it will be available to and can be readily located by Agents having future need for it, thereby eliminating repeated requests of another office for the same information.

g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases

Channelizing memoranda in organizational and individual security case files may be destroyed following submission of reports in these cases.
[In destroying these memoranda, be guided by instructions[for destruction
[of channelizing memoranda as set out in Manual of Rules and Regulations.]
[8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations

The proper utilization of information received by the Bureau is foremost among our responsibilities as an investigative agency. It is the Bureau's duty to keep the proper intelligence agencies informed concerning information of interest to them. Further, information which comes to the attention of the Bureau in connection with the conduct of investigations normally and regularly within the jurisdiction of the Bureau, which information is believed to be of interest to another agency within the executive branch of the Government, should be forwarded to the interested agency unless there are good and compelling reasons not to do so. This is in line with the Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives which provide for the dissemination to other agencies of information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters where the specific agency has a present or potential interest in the information.

Set out hereafter is a summarization of existing Bureau requirements regarding dissemination of security information developed on individuals during the course of regular investigations in the security field. It

should be apparent that all conceivable situations cannot be anticipated. For that reason, the data below should be considered as pertaining to representative situations which occur frequently enough to warrant specific treatment. The basic rule to follow is, of course, that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in the executive branch of the Government and that the term "interested agency" must be interpreted in the light of reason and common sense. Any unusual situations should be brought to the attention of the Bureau promptly for consideration and disposition.

Considerations affecting the national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico necessitate that the broadest possible construction be given to the existing requirements of dissemination to the intelligence services located in those areas. The Anchorage, Honolulu, and San Juan Offices should adhere to such policy and effect such dissemination as to discharge fully our responsibilities as laid down in Bureau instructions, together with practices which have been dictated by circumstances within those particular offices.

The material set out below must be read in conjunction with the Manual of Rules and Regulations,[part II,]section 5, which discusses the Bureau's over-all responsibilities in dissemination, together with existing policies, qualifications, and exceptions.

a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau

(1) Aliens and naturalized citizens
Information concerning aliens and naturalized citizens which might have a bearing on the deportation or denaturalization of such individuals should in all instances be forwarded to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Refer to the Manual of Rules and Regulations,[part II,]section 5. If any doubt exists, the matter should in all instances be resolved in favor of dissemination.

(2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services
Dissemination in these cases is treated specifically in section 87D 7c (4) of this manual.

(3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense
Dissemination should be made locally to G-2 and, in addition, to other intelligence services if their interest is apparent in individual cases or in specific facilities.

(4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard
Dissemination should be made locally to the appropriate military intelligence service. Dissemination to headquarters of the appropriate services will be made at SOG.

(5) Seamen and subjects employed in the maritime industry, including longshoremen and other water-front employees
Dissemination should be made to the Coast Guard on a local level and, when circumstances dictate, to other intelligence agencies, including ONI, which have an interest in the data reported. Appropriate dissemination on a headquarters level will be made at SOG.

(6) Employees of the Federal Government within the purview of Executive Order 10450
No dissemination of the reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in the field. If, however, subject is employed

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Administrative data, 77
- Admissible evidence, 37
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80
  - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Annual review of section A, reserve index, 42b
- Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
- Armed forces
  - dissemination to, 81
  - members of, 25
  - record in, 27
  - relatives in, 27
  - subjects entering, 56,60
  - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of security index, 50
  - alphabetical section, 51,63
  - at Bureau, 50
  - geographical section, 51,63
  - in field office, 51
  - inactive section, 56
  - special section, 52
  - unavailable section, 53
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security index, 70,71

- Bureau
  - applicants, inclusion in security index, 70
  - authority to investigate, 24
  - responsibility, 19

- Cancellation of
  - security flash notice, 27a
  - security index cards
    - after induction into armed forces, 60
    - mechanics, 60
    - on departure from U. S., 60
    - only after interview, 38
    - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 72
- Changes on security index cards, 58
- Channelizing, 36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
  - extraction, 48,62
  - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants, 72
- Contacting
  - faculty members, 25
  - registrars, 25
  - students, 25
  - superiors of faculty members, 25
- Contacts
  - during investigation, 25
  - with foreign establishments, 25
- Content
  - and appearance
    - of reserve index cards, 43
    - of security index cards, 48
  - of reports, 74
- Corroboration, 37
- Criteria for inclusion in security index, 45

- Dangerousness
  - definition of, 44
  - determination of, 44
  - Nation of Islam membership, 46
- Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Definitions, 19
  - of dangerousness, 44
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index, 70
- Detcom, 62
  - administrative procedures, 63
  - key figures, 68
  - purpose, 62
  - removal from, 58,63,64
  - top functionaries, 62,70
  - who to be tabbed, 62
- Determination of
  - dangerousness, 44
  - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Dissemination
  - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81
  - of reports
    - at SOG, 81
    - in field, 79
    - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
- Documentation of reports, 78
  - completion of, 78
- Employees of
  - international organizations, 25
  - U. S. Government, 25
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Evidence, 37
  - desirability of
    - admissibility, 29,37
    - corroboration, 37
  - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  - of membership or affiliation, 29
  - preservation of, 37
- Faculty members
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File reviews, 34
- Files on defected subjects, 42
- Flash notices (security)
  - cancellation of, 27a
  - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  - when place, 27
- Foreign
  - diplomats, 25
  - establishments, 25
  - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index, 70
  - tours, 33a
  - travel, 33
- Forms
  - FD-122
    - abstracts for, 47
    - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    - cover letter thereto, 32
    - detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63
    - placing name in or removing from
      - special section of security index, 53
      - unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - recommending for inclusion in security index, 47
    - recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    - reference to, 77
    - succinct summary with, 47
    - when subject employed in key facility, 65
  - FD-122a, 42b,43,62,77
  - FD-128
    - reference to, 77
    - when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    - when subject moves, 58,59

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Thumbnail sketches, 79
- Title of reports, 72
- Top functionaries, 66,69
  - change of office of origin, 70
  - definition of, 69
  - designation of, 69
  - handwriting of, 70
  - inclusion in key figure list, 70
  - movement of, 59
  - photographs of, 70
  - program, 66
  - regulations governing, 70
  - reports on, 70
    - status of, 70,73
  - tabbing for detcom, 62,70
- Topical headings in reports, 74
- Tours, 33a
- Trash covers, 36
- Travel
  - abroad, 33
  - behind iron curtain, 34

- Unavailable section of security index, 53
  - imprisoned subjects, 54
  - missing subjects, 32,54
  - subjects traveling abroad, 34,54
- Underground membership or activity, 31
- United Nations employees, 25
- U. S. Government employees, 25

- Verification of
  - addresses
    - reserve index, section A, 42b
    - security index, 57
  - employment
    - reserve index, section A, 42b
    - security index, 57
- Voice of America, inclusion of employees in security index or reserve index, 70

E. INVESTIGATIONS OF COMMUNIST FRONT AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purposes
    - a. To obtain sufficient pertinent data to make possible accurate determination of organization's true character
    - b. To obtain intelligence data and keep Department and other interested Government agencies advised regarding existence and activities of subversive organizations
    - c. To obtain legally admissible evidence re subversive nature of such organizations to permit implementation of:
        - (1) Internal Security Act of 1950
        - (2) Registration Act
        - (3) Smith Act of 1940
        - (4) Executive Order 10450
2. General policy
    - a. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations
        - (1) [Upon receipt of information concerning formation of such a group, immediately open a case and advise Bureau at that time.
        - (2) After conducting sufficient inquiry to determine true character of group
            - (a) If further investigation warranted, advise Bureau through established report writing procedures.
            - (b) If further investigation not warranted, advise Bureau results of investigation and specific reasons for determination in letter form.]
        - (3) [Deleted]
        - (4) [Deleted]
    - b. Established subversive groups
        - (1) Keep Bureau currently advised by appropriate communication re pertinent activities including any changes in principal officers, structure of organizations, and forthcoming events.
        - (2) If no specific leads outstanding, case may be placed in pending-inactive status after submission of initial report.
        - (3) Submit reports at least every six months.
    - c. Organizations political in character
        - (1) Investigation should not be instituted without Bureau approval.
        - (2) Furnish all pertinent information concerning communist infiltration, influence, or control of such organizations to Bureau in letter form.
    - d. Organizations connected with institutions of learning
        - (1) No investigation to be conducted without prior Bureau approval
        - (2) If requesting Bureau authority to investigate, submit complete available data and reason investigation is desired.
        - (3) If Bureau authority granted, it will be permissible to contact all established reliable sources, including those connected with institution of learning.
        - (4) Before conducting any interview with individual connected with institution of learning re security-type investigation of an organization, whether organization itself has been connected with institution of learning, Bureau authority must be obtained to conduct such interview unless individual is established reliable source.
        - (5) Section 87D 5a (1) of this manual should be read in conjunction with above instructions.
    - e. Legitimate noncommunist organizations that are communist infiltrate
        - (1) No investigation should be conducted without prior Bureau approval.
        - (2) Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced Agents.
        - (3) Advise Bureau promptly under caption "Cominfil (name of organization)" when one of the following exists and include

your recommendation for instituting an investigation:
- (a) The Communist Party has specifically instructed its members to infiltrate the organization.
- (b) Communist Party members have infiltrated the organization in sufficient strength to influence or control the organization.

(4) When advising Bureau, include data concerning following items:
- (a) Name and address of organization
- (b) Extent of communist infiltration
- (c) Identities of Communist Party members and positions held in organization
- (d) Informant coverage afforded organization
  Set forth positions held by informants and whether informants are members or merely reporting on organization.
- (e) Recommendation whether additional investigation is deemed warranted

Above instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates, as well as the national organization. Break down information required under items (c) and (d) above by local chapters where such exist.

(5) No informant or source should be instructed by the FBI to join or attend meetings. If Communist Party asks the informant to do so, he should, of course, comply.

(6) No member of the organization not already an established source should be contacted regarding the organization. This does not preclude pretext interviews where advisable.

(7) Data concerning following topics should be fully developed and reported on:
- (a) Basis for investigation and fact that our investigation is directed solely toward establishing extent of Communist Party infiltration, or that organization is specific target for infiltration, and that Bureau is not investigating legitimate activities of organization.
- (b) Address of organization
- (c) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership
- (d) Principal officers of organization
- (e) Communist Party program to infiltrate this organization and influence its policy
- (f) Results of this program, including Communist Party affiliations of officers and members

(8) Caption of all correspondence should contain the phrase "Communist Infiltration of" preceding the name of the organization.

(9) In the event infiltration of the organization reaches such proportion that its activities are dominated and controlled by the Communist Party, submit your recommendation to the Bureau regarding changing the investigation from communist infiltration to that of a communist front.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

(5) Seamen and subjects employed in the maritime industry, including longshoremen and other water-front employees 80

(6) Employees of the Federal Government, within the purview of Executive Order 10450 80

(7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a branch of the armed services 81

(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Agency.. 81

(9) Dissemination at the Bureau 81

b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction 81

(1) Members of the armed forces 81

Index 82a

III. Persons active in Communist Party underground

IV. Any other security index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent, or disruptionist in the event of an emergency

(c) Recommendations for and removal of detcom designation

I. Approval of SAC

Designation of each subject for detcom program or removal of any subject therefrom must be personally approved by SAC, or in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor. If individual subjects being recommended for inclusion in security index are also being recommended for detcom, above-required approval by SAC may be handled in conjunction with requirements specified in 87D 7b (4).

II. [When form FD-122 is submitted recommending either tabbing for detcom or deletion of such tabbing, attach an additional page setting out a brief summary of facts upon which the recommendation is based.]

III. [Deleted]

(d) Administrative procedures for handling detcom program

Take following action to assure that security index cards for subjects tabbed detcom for priority of apprehension will be readily available for emergency action in your office:

I. Consider each security index case for detcom tabbing whether subject's security index card is filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections of security index.

II. Geographical section

Divide geographical section of security index into two distinct parts.

(A) Part I of geographical section shall include only security index cards for subjects who are tabbed detcom under instructions noted above.

(B) Part II of geographical section shall contain security index cards for all subjects that are NOT tabbed detcom.

(C) In offices having two separate and distinct geographical sections, i.e., geographical-employment and geographical-residence, as provided under 87D 7b (6) herein, each such geographical section must be broken into parts I and II, in line with foregoing, so that cards tabbed detcom will be separated and maintained apart from other security index cards.

(D) No colored tabs necessary on cards of detcom subjects in geographical section.

III. Alphabetical section

(A) One security index card for each subject is to be filed in alphabetical section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever.

(B) Affix a colored tab to each security index card designated for detcom in alphabetical section to readily identify such subjects.

(C) Detcom tabbings approved at Bureau will be shown on security index cards forwarded to field by code letters "DC" in first line on cards and by word "DETCOM" stamped in large red letters.

IV. Special section and unavailable section
Security index cards of Detcom subjects filed in special and unavailable sections are to be designated by affixing colored tabs.

(e) General

I. Tabbing of cards
No security index card is to contain tabs for any purpose other than to designate Detcom classification under foregoing provisions.

II. Removal from Detcom category
Careful analysis must be made of each case in which deletion from Detcom category is proposed. For instance, when a key figure is being removed from such status, file review may well disclose that subject qualifies for Detcom tabbing for reasons covered in 87D 7b (11) (b), above, independent of key figure status.

c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

(1) Responsibility
FBI is responsible by Presidential directive for keeping other Federal agencies advised of developments within their jurisdiction affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated as vital to the national defense and welfare by the Department of Defense.

FBI is responsible under Delimitations Agreement for investigating employees of private contractors who have contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where credible subversive information concerning employee is obtained. Thorough investigation must be conducted and consideration for inclusion in security index given concerning any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in the past, a member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom sufficient other subversive information is in our possession which warrants such action.

(a) Requests for investigation from another agency
When another agency requests investigation of individual employed in key facility, institute investigation immediately if basis of request so warrants. Advise Bureau of request, basis thereof, and that investigation is being conducted.

(b) Verification of key facility status of place of empl
Department of Defense key facilities list (maint
each office) must be checked for verification of
mation that a security investigation subject's p
employment may be included in such list.

(c) Individuals denied access to restricted information
Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently advise that an individual has been denied clearance to work in a defense plant or to handle classified or restricted information. In some instances clearance is denied based on information furnished by Bureau. At other times, information in Bureau files is very meager or possibly negative and basis for such denial of clearance is not known. The intelligence agency is responsible for furnishing Bureau with any information involving disloyalty or subversiveness.

Office receiving notification that an individual has been denied clearance must ascertain promptly basis for such denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Administrative data, 77
Admissible evidence, 37
Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
Aliens
  dissemination of information concerning, 80
  investigation of, 26
Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
Annual review of section A, reserve index, 42b
Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
Armed forces
  dissemination to, 81
  members of, 25
  record in, 27
  relatives in, 27
  subjects entering, 56,60
  subjects in, 25
Arrangement of security index, 50
  alphabetical section, 51
  at Bureau, 50
  geographical section, 51
  in field office, 51
  inactive section, 56
  special section, 52
  unavailable section, 53
Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security index, 70,71

Bureau.
  applicants, inclusion in security index, 70
  authority to investigate, 24
  responsibility, 19

Cancellation of
  security flash notice, 27a
  security index cards
    after induction into armed forces, 60
    mechanics, 60
    on departure from U. S., 60
    only after interview, 38
    upon death, 60
Canvassing informants, 72
Changes on security index cards, 58
Channelizing, 36,72,78a
Character of reports, 73
Characterizations, 78a
Chinese
  extraction, 48,62
  sympathies, 48
Classification of cases, 72
Concealment of membership, 31
Confidential informants, 72
Contacting
  faculty members, 25
  registrars, 25
  students, 25
  superiors of faculty members, 25
Contacts
  during investigation, 25
  with foreign establishments, 25
Content
  and appearance
    of reserve index cards, 43
    of security index cards, 48
  of reports, 74
Corroboration, 37
Criteria for inclusion in security index, 45

Dangerousness
  definition of, 44
  determination of, 44
  Nation of Islam membership, 46
Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Defected subjects, 42
Definitions, 19
  of dangerousness, 44
Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index, 70
Detcom, 62
  administrative procedures, 63
  key figures, 68
  purpose, 62
  removal from, 58,63,64
  top functionaries, 70
  who to be tabbed, 62
Determination of
  dangerousness, 44
  membership and position in labor organizations, 29
Dissemination
  concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 81
  of reports
    at SOG, 81
    in field, 79
    on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
Documentation of reports, 78
  completion of, 78

Employees of
  international organizations, 25
  U. S. Government, 25
Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
Evidence, 37
  desirability of
    admissibility, 37
    corroboration, 37
  of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  of membership or affiliation, 29
  preservation of, 37

Faculty members
  contacts with, 25
  investigation of, 24
Fifth amendment, 46
File reviews, 34
Files on defected subjects, 42
Flash notices (security)
  cancellation of, 27a
  notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  when place, 27
Foreign
  diplomats, 25
  establishments, 25
  intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index, 70
  tours, 33a
  travel, 33
Forms
  FD-122
    abstracts for, 47
    changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    cover letter thereto, 32
    detcom tabbing or deletion of such tabbing, 63
    placing name in or removing from
      special section of security index, 53
      unavailable section of security index, 54
    recommending for inclusion in security index, 47
    recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32
    reference to, 77
    succinct summary with, 47
    when subject employed in key facility, 65
  FD-122a, 42b,43,62,77
  FD-128
    reference to, 77
    when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    when subject moves, 58,59

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Forms (continued)
  FD-128a, 27a, 43, 77
  FD-154, 57
  FD-165, 27, 77
  FD-186, 50
  FD-305, 78
  FD-305a, 78

Geographical
  reference of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  section of security index, 51, 63
Government employees, 25, 70, 80

Handwriting, 29
  of key figures, 67
  of top functionaries, 70
Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41

Identification records, 27
Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54, 60
Inactive section of security index, 56
Indices, check of, 72
Individuals
  to be investigated, 22
  traveling abroad, 33
    against whom stops are placed, 34
    who are included in security index, 34
    who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  with foreign diplomatic status, 26
Informants, cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
Interviews
  Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  Bureau authority, 39, 40a
  conditions for, 40
    conducting at place of employment, 40a
  content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  contents of letter containing results of, 42
  determine willingness to testify during, 41
  evaluation of, 45
  forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  no report needed afterward, 40a
  of hostile subjects, 41
  of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 25
  of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  of security index subjects, 38
  of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  of subjects who express desire for, 42
  on SAC authority, 38
  preparations for, 40
  purpose of, 38
  recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  results not affecting security index status, 41
  signed statements in connection with, 41
  to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  when discontinue, 40a
  when report needed after, 41
  with Bureau authority, 39

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Investigations of
  - aliens, 26
  - faculty members, 24
  - members of labor unions, 29
  - naturalized citizens, 26
  - students, 24
- Investigative
  - procedures, 26
  - techniques, 34
    - file reviews, 34
    - mail covers, 36
    - photographic surveillances, 35
    - physical surveillances, 35
    - private records of firms, 36
    - public source information, 36
    - security informants, 34
    - trash covers, 36
- Key facilities, 64
  - Delimitations Agreement, 64
  - employees included in security index, 65
  - list, 64
  - responsibility, 64
  - status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,74
  - when investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Key figures
  - definition of, 66
  - designation of, 67
  - foreign travel by, 69
  - handling of, 67
  - handwriting of, 67
  - in armed forces, 68
  - list, 69
  - movement of, 59,68
  - photographs of, 67
  - program, 66
  - reports on, 68
  - status of reports on, 68,73
  - when become subjects of SGE cases, 69
- Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
- Labor union membership, 29
- Labor unions, 41
- Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Lumping information in reports, 76
- Mail covers, 36
- Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Members of
  - armed forces, dissemination of information concerning, 81
  - labor unions, 29
  - law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Membership or affiliation, 29
- Missing subjects, 31,54
  - letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  - unavailable section of security index, 54
- Movement of
  - key figures, 59,68
  - subjects, 58
    - key figures, 59,68
    - security index subjects, 58
    - subjects not in security index, 60
    - subjects tabbed for detcom, 60
    - top functionaries, 59
- Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
- Nation of Islam
  - potential dangerousness, 46
  - what members to be investigated, 23

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

National Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Naturalized citizens
  dissemination of information concerning, 80
  investigations of, 26
New office of origin, 58

Observation of subject, 28,50,57
Office of origin, 27a,58,59,72
Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
Overt acts, 45

Periodic review of section A, reserve index, 42b
Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
Photographic surveillances, 35
Photographs, 28
  of key figures, 67
  of top functionaries, 70
  status of security index cases while obtaining, 28,68
Physical
  description, 28
  surveillances, 35
    maintenance of SA's notes, 38
Position
  and importance, 30
  in labor organizations, 29
Potential dangerousness, 44
  of Nation of Islam members, 46
Preservation of evidence, 37
Priority apprehension program, 62
Private records, 36
Public
  source information, 36
  utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Purpose of
  investigation, 19
  security index, 43

Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
Recommendation for inclusion in
  section A, reserve index, 42b
  security index, 47
    when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
    when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
    when subject is out of country, 48
    when there is missing background information, 47
Re-evaluation of security index status, 72
Registrars of institutions of learning, 24,25
Reinterviews, 42
Relatives in armed forces, 27
Removal from security index, 46a
Reports
  administrative data in, 77
  character of, 73
  content of, 74
  cumulative items, 76
  dissemination of, 79
  documentation of, 78
  lumping information in, 76
  narrative-type statements, 77
  schedule of, 73
  status of, 73
  summarizing information in, 76
  title of, 72
  topical headings in, 74
  when necessary after interview, 41
  when necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
  when not necessary after interview, 40a
  when not necessary at time requesting Bureau authority to interview, 39
Reserve index, 42a
  arrangement, 42b
  cards, content and appearance, 43
  content, 43
  names deleted from security index, 62

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Reserve index (continued)
  - purpose, 42a
  - removal from, 43
  - section A
    - changes, 43
    - individuals to be included, 42b
    - periodic review of, 42b
    - recommendations for inclusion in, 42b
    - when to submit reports, 42b
  - section B, 43
  - standards for, 42a
  - subjects
    - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    - security of Government employees case in, 70
- Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
- Responsibility of Bureau, 19
- Restrictions on investigations, 24

- Schedule of reports, 73
- Scope of investigation, 26
- Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Security
  - flash notice
    - cancellation of, 27a
    - notation concerning on FD-128, 59
    - when place, 27
  - index, 43
    - arrangement of, 50
    - cards
      - cancellation of, 38,60
      - changes on, 58
      - content and appearance of, 48
      - of key figures, 68
      - transfers to reserve index, 62
    - criteria for, 45
    - dangerousness, 44
    - purpose, 43
- Security (continued)
  - index (continued)
    - recommendation for, 46a,47
    - re-evaluation of status, 72
    - removal from, 46a
    - subjects of
      - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      - security of Government employees case in, 70
    - summary reports, 47
  - informants, 34
    - cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
  - of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Signed statements, 41
- Sleepers, 31,52
- Special section of security index, 52
- Standards for reserve index, 42a
  - section A, 42b
- Status of cases, 73
  - on key figures, 73
  - on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66
  - on subjects in security index, 74
  - on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  - on top functionaries, 73
  - while obtaining photographs, 28
  - while securing handwriting, 29
  - while verifying residence and employment, 57
- Students
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigations of, 24
- Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
- Summary reports, 47,71
- Superiors of faculty members, 25
- Surveillances
  - photographic, 35
  - physical, 35

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Thumbnail sketches, 78a
Title of reports, 72
Top functionaries, 66,69
  change of office of origin, 70
  definition of, 69
  designation of, 69
  handwriting of, 70
  inclusion in key figure list, 70
  movement of, 59
  photographs of, 70
  program, 66
  regulations governing, 70
  reports on, 70
    status of, 70,73
  tabbing for detcom, 70
Topical headings in reports, 74
Tours, 33a
Trash covers, 36
Travel
  abroad, 33
  behind iron curtain, 34

Unavailable section of security index, 53
  imprisoned subjects, 54
  missing subjects, 32,54
  subjects traveling abroad, 34,54
Underground membership or activity, 31
United Nations employees, 25
U. S. Government employees, 25

Verification of
  addresses
    reserve index, section A, 42b
    security index, 57
  employment
    reserve index, section A, 42b
    security index, 57
Voice of America, inclusion of employees in security index or reserve index, 70

d. Other Marxist revolutionary groups
A long-established group which would come under this category is the Proletarian Party of America, a relatively small organization.

There also are a few small groups composed of ex-members of the Communist Party, USA, who have voluntarily left the party or who have been expelled, usually for factionalism.

e. General
Communist investigations must be conducted in a most discreet and thorough manner at all times. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during the course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority. Bureau employees should not discuss communist or related investigations with any unauthorized individual. The subject of communism is not to be used in speeches of Bureau employees without specific authorization. However, there is considerable mimeographed material in each office, including speeches, testimony, and magazine articles prepared by the Director which could be furnished outside individuals interested in the subject of communism without any discussion.

2. Purposes of investigation

a. The investigation of the Communist Party, USA, and other similar-type organizations is of twofold purpose: (1) to obtain legally admissible evidence against these organizations for prosecution under existing Federal statutes set out above and (2) to follow closely the activities of these organizations from an intelligence viewpoint to have a day-to-day appraisal of the strength, dangerousness and activities of these organizations seeking the overthrow of the U. S. Government.

b. Suggestions for proper coverage of the investigation of the Communist Party as an organization and similar organizations should include:
(1) The assignment of sufficient Agent personnel to insure that all of the important ramifications of party activities are properly covered
(2) Development of confidential informants in all party levels, including the national headquarters organization
(3) The establishment of trash and mail covers on pertinent headquarters and party functionaries
(4) The constant effort to develop admissible evidence against party officials for violation of Federal laws

[c. Brief to establish illegal status of Communist Party, USA
(1) Purpose of brief is to collect all legally admissible evidence to prove illegality of party in one file. (Bufile 100-3-74)
(2) Reports on brief to establish illegal status must be submitted by each office quarterly and should include only legally admissible evidence obtained during preceding three-month period. (If no information to report, letter may be submitted.)
(3) It is advisable to use the following breakdown in preparing reports:
(a) Origin and continuity of the party
(b) Pertinent statements, writings, and instructions relating to (1) Marxism-Leninism, (2) imperialism, (3) proletarian internationalism, (4) defense of USSR, (5) revolutionary statements
(c) Internal Security Act of 1950. Include under this heading any admissible evidence which would tend to prove a violation of section 4(a) of this act.]

3. Investigative [illegible]edures and suggestions
This section contains detailed investigative guides for use in investigating and reporting activities of the Communist Party, USA.
   a. To accurately and clearly show the true nature of the Communist Party, USA, data concerning the following topics must be fully developed and reported. [When material contains information that would be logically reported under more than one topic heading but to do so would make the separate accounts unintelligible, report all the material under the main heading and only refer to the information under the other breakdowns. Do not repeat same data under separate headings.] Reports on the Communist Party, USA, as an organization must be submitted by each office quarterly and should cover activities for the preceding three-month period. All offices are required to use the following breakdown in preparing quarterly reports on the Communist Party, USA. Each subfile caption must start on a separate page.
      (1) Organization (Bureau file 100-3-69)
         (a) Security setup of district and/or state organization. Office covering district headquarters, describe the location and size of Communist Party office facilities, rent paid, and name and number of office employees. [List address and/or post office box number of party headquarters.]
         (b) [Identify]principal district officials and important functionaries, together with[titles, and furnish a] short resume of important activities of each during three-month period.
         (c) Names of new commissions or special committees, identity and capacity of individual members thereof. Submit resume of activities of groups under appropriate subfile captions.
         (d) Special meetings embracing only organizational matters. Other pertinent matters discussed at meetings concerning policy or strategy to be submitted under appropriate subfile captions.
         (e) Extend this outline as far as necessary for clarity and to meet needs of office under this or any succeeding subsection. Auxiliary offices submit pertinent data concerning above matters which do not normally come to attention of office covering district headquarters.
      (2) Membership (Bureau file 100-3-68)
         (a) Quarterly reports are not to contain any membership statistics. Cover pages accompanying each quarterly report must contain latest available statistics relating to total number of Communist Party members in the district. Membership data must start on a separate cover page. Office of origin, which is office cove Communist Party district headquarters, should submit following figures:
            I. For entire Communist Party district
            II. For individual states covered by Communist Party district
            III. For number of Communist Party members in area covered by field office

            Auxiliary offices should submit following membership figures to the Bureau and office of origin:
            I. For state or portion of state covered by that field office
            II. For number of Communist Party members in the area covered by that field office

(D) Whether or not defectee [illegible]ailable for interview by all Agents

(E) Whether he is in position to testify and willing to do so

III. Do not include information concerning security informants for security reasons.

IV. Proper maintenance of this file will be useful in identifying persons who may be in a position to furnish information of value in the future and will obviate necessity of extensive file reviews in this connection.

V. A special index may be used for this file if desirable. If used, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating names, times, and places defectees were in a subversive movement and a brief description of information available from them. Break index down geographically and subdivide by years if desirable.

7. Administrative procedures

a. Reserve index

(1) Purpose

The reserve index is designed to represent those persons who, in the light of ever-changing conditions, should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation, or action under the security index program. This index may serve as an administrative aid and working index containing a central repository of the names of individuals having sympathy for or affiliation with the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations.

(2) Individuals to be included

This index is to contain names of individuals when, following investigation, the information does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the security index when there is evidence of:

(a) Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 19[illegible], together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection

(b) Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.

(c) The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support, or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.

(d) Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(e) Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(3) Arrangement

This index is to be maintained in two sections, section A and section B. Each section will be maintained alphabetically on 5- by 8-inch cards.

(a) Section A

Section A of the reserve index is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following the apprehension of security index subjects.

I. Section A should include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the security index criteria but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Include in this section those individuals meeting the standards for inclusion in the reserve index and who fall within the following categories:

(A) Professors, teachers, and educators
(B) Labor union organizers or leaders
(C) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others in the mass media field
(D) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists
(E) Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level
(F) Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid

II. Recommendations for inclusion of names in the reserve index (section A)

(A) Recommendations for inclusion of names in section A of the reserve index are to be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a. A succinct summary setting forth the basis for the recommendation should be attached to the form FD-122a. In addition, if no report is accompanying the recommendation, a statement to that effect should appear on the page containing the succinct summary.

(B) Upon Bureau approval of recommendation for the inclusion of an individual's name in section A of the reserve index, two reserve index cards will be forwarded to the field. [Add]on the reverse side available descriptive data. One card is to be filed in your office, and one card is to be filed away from headquarters city at the same location as the extra set of security index cards are now stored.

III. Periodic review of section A of the reserve index

Investigations of individuals listed in section A of the reserve index are to be brought up to date annually and considered for security index status or retention in the reserve index. Form FD-154 may be used for the annual review by amending it for use in reserve index cases. This investigation should include, as a minimum:

(A) Verification of residence and employment
(B) Indices search and file review to determine whether additional investigation is warranted or whether an interview with the individual is desirable
(C) If additional investigation is conducted or if there is unreported information of a subversive nature contained in the files, submit a report.

(b) Where potential dangerousness of a subject has been established and inclusion of that subject in security index is warranted, the office of origin shall submit a recommendation for inclusion in security index by submitting form FD-122 to Bureau. Form must be prepared in triplicate. Original and one copy shall be forwarded to Bureau and one copy will be placed in subject's investigative case file.

Nothing should appear on FD-122 or subsequently on the security index card which is not in the subject's case file. Form FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend a subject for inclusion in the security index and (2) to submit changes to data which appears on face of security index cards already existent.

Proper selection should be made in the opening paragraph option. FD-122 is submitted with abstract when used to recommend the subject for inclusion in the security index and without abstract when used to indicate additions, deletions, or changes in data appearing on existing cards.

(c) When form FD-122 is submitted to Bureau recommending inclusion of a name in security index, attach an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of facts on which recommendation has been based. Facts must be in detail to clearly reflect soundness of recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must contain pertinent dates of subject's activities.

(d) When, at conclusion of investigation, subject's name is not being recommended for security index, set out a brief summary statement in the cover page(s) accompanying closing report[showing]reasons for decision.

(e) Security index cards shall be recommended by and maintained by office of origin only.

(f) [A current report must be in possession of the Bureau when subject is recommended for security index. If it is the initial report in the case, it must be a summary report. If, however, prior investigative reports have been submitted which are suitable for dissemination and are appropriately documented, a summary report need not be submitted.]

(g) To assure that subject recommended for security index will receive proper attention, case shall be kept in pending or pending-inactive status until security index card has been received from Bureau and filed in office security index. If case continues in pending status because of outstanding investigation, reports shall carry a lead to follow authorization of security index card by the Bureau in addition to other leads. If outstanding investigation has been completed and case would otherwise be closed upon submission of the report and form FD-122, case shall be placed in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau. In latter instance, upon receipt of Bureau's response, case may be closed administratively.

(h) Recommendation for security index card should not be delayed because of absence of information concerning race, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, or description where security index card is warranted. In such instances, recommendation for the card should be submitted with a current report and case retained in pending status with active investigation continuing to determine missing items of information.

(i) Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for the security index provided instructions set forth in 87D 6b (3) and (4) are followed. Forms FD-122 submitted on subjects should include data required in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV below.

(j) When form FD-122 is submitted recommending a security index card be prepared on a subject who is of Chinese extraction, the words "Other - Chinese" must be included in the space on the form calling for a statement as to the subject's race. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending that a security index card be prepared on a person who is not of Chinese extraction but who has shown definite sympathies with communist China, the form should include under "Miscellaneous" a statement to the effect "sympathetic to Communist China."

(k) Upon receipt of form FD-122 at Bureau, the case of the subject will be reviewed and if recommendation of field is concurred in, security index cards will be prepared. Duplicate copy of form will be returned to office of origin stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." The three cards shall be filed in security index as outlined below. The returned copy of FD-122 shall be placed in subject's main investigative case file. Offices with a geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive an extra card.

(l) When security index cards are received from Bureau, data thereon must be checked for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards of similar size to security index cards which are stapled to back of two of the cards. One card will then be filed in the geographical section of office security index (except special section cards and unavailable section cards - see 87D 7b (6) (b) III and IV below), and one card shall be filed in the duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. The other card is filed in alphabetical section of security index. No information shall be permanently added, deleted, or changed on face of security index card without complying with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (8).

(5) Content and appearance of security index card

(a) Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain the following information. If any of items enumerated in I through XIV are missing at time the security index card is made, the case should be continued as pending and investigation conducted to obtain the necessary information. Set forth under each item below are possible categories in which subject may be classified, together with code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on form FD-122 when sending form to Bureau recommending security index card be prepared. Code letters should subsequently appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

I. Name and aliases

The full and correct name and aliases of the subject must be contained on the security index card. When the true name of a subject or any aliases are changed, added, deleted, or are found to be incorrect, form FD-122 must be submitted[showing]the correct data to be placed on the security index card.

~~information.~~

II.	Race	
	White and Caucasian	W
	Negro	N
	Chinese	C
	Others	O
	(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)	
III.	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
IV.	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien	AL
	(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
V.	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	Independent Socialist League	ISL
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico	NPR
	Union Del Pueblo Pro Constituyente De La Republica De Puerto Rico (Union of the People for the Establishment of the Republic of Puerto Rico)	UPR
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	Nation of Islam	NOI
	Russian	RUS
	Bulgarian	BUL
	Rumanian	RUM
	Czechoslovakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Yugoslavian	YUG
VI.	Dangerousness classification (where applicable)	
	Detcom	DC
VII.	Key figure and top functionary designation (where applicable)	
	Key figure	KF
	Top functionary	TF
VIII.	Special section cards	
	United Nations employees	UNE
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	U. S. Government employees	GOV
	Atomic energy program employees	AEP
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
IX.	Unavailable section cards	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
X.	Date and place of birth	
XI.	Key facility geographical reference number and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility obtained from the Department of Defense key facilities list (where applicable)	
XII.	Residence address	
XIII.	Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.	
XIV.	Field office file number	

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description
(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division
(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below
(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The white 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by this machine and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

unequivocal regardless of Yugoslavia's foreign policies.

Standards for inclusion of subjects in the special section of the security index are the same as those for any other potentially dangerous subject.

When submitting a recommendation for preparation of a security index card on an individual falling in one of the above categories, form FD-122 must include the words "Special Section" typed in the upper right portion thereof. The proper category should be typed on FD-122 in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)."

Security index cards to be placed in the special section shall bear the appropriate code letters in the upper right portion designating the subsection in which the cards should be placed. Upon receipt from the Bureau of the three security index cards of subjects in these categories, the required additional data shall be placed on two which shall be filed alphabetically in the appropriate subsection of the special section. The third card shall be filed in the alphabetical section of the security index. Under no circumstances should special section security index cards be filed in the geographical section of the index.

When a security index subject whose card is maintained in the special section no longer comes within one of the categories of the special section, FD-122 must be submitted with the words "Remove from Special Section" typed in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." If the card should be placed in the unavailable section, the statement "Place in Unavailable Section" should be added in this space. When the new cards are received from the Bureau, they should be checked for accuracy and the description and photograph, if available, should be placed on separate cards of similar size and attached to the back of two of the cards. These two cards should then be filed in the geographical or unavailable section (where applicable) and the other card filed in the alphabetical section of the security index. The old cards should be destroyed.

When a special section subject is scheduled for priority apprehension under the detcom program, the special section card shall be appropriately tabbed.

It is not contemplated that subjects of security index cards maintained in the special section will be apprehended under a mass apprehension program. The cases of such subjects shall be given individual attention upon the inception of the apprehension program and the subjects will not be apprehended in the absence of specific Bureau instructions in each case.

IV. Unavailable section

Security index cards of individuals who are missing, out of the country, or are imprisoned shall be retained in the unavailable section. This section shall be broken down into three subsections headed by tabs marked "Missing,"

"Out of the Country," and "Imprisoned." The unavailable section shall be maintained in accordance with the following instructions:

(A) Missing subjects

Security index subjects are not to be included in the unavailable section as missing immediately upon determination that they are no longer located at their previously known places of residence or employment. The action required in 87D 6b (3) above must be taken prior to submitting FD-122 placing a subject in the unavailable section as a missing subject. The Bureau must be periodically advised of the investigative steps taken to locate missing security index subjects in accordance with 87D 6b (3).

If the subject is missing, the word "Missing" shall be typed in the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)."

(B) Subjects out of the country

The security index cards of subjects who are found to have departed from the U. S. or Puerto Rico for a foreign country shall be placed in this subsection of the unavailable section of the security index unless their cards should be cancelled in accordance with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (10) (b).

If the subject is out of the country, the words "Out of the Country" shall be typed in the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." If the foreign address is known, place it on FD-122 in the space provided for the residence address. If the subject is only known to be in a certain foreign country and his residence there is not known or is only known to be traveling abroad, include this information on FD-122. If the subject's current employment abroad is known, include it on FD-122.

The case of any security index subject who is of the country must be followed at least each months for verification of the subject's addre the same as any other security index case, to determine if the subject has returned to this country.

Appropriate stops should be placed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to be advised of information which may become available to it indicating the subject's return to this country.

(C) Imprisoned subjects

The cards of security index subjects who are found to be imprisoned shall be placed in the unavailable section of the security index.

If the subject is in prison, the word "Imprisoned" shall be typed on the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." The identity of the institution in which the subject is incarcerated shall be typed in the space provided for the residence address. The space for the business address shall be left blank.

When it is determined that a security index subject is imprisoned, make arrangements with the confining institutions to be informed of the subject's release. An administrative tickler should be set up for a date shortly prior to the expected date of the subject's release to assure that you are informed of the subject's release. Upon receipt of advice of the release of the subject, ascertain whether the subject should be continued in the security index. If so, submit FD-122 in accordance with instructions set forth below.

Standards for inclusion of such subjects in the unavailable section of the security index are the same as those for any other potentially dangerous subject.

When submitting a recommendation for inclusion of a subject in the unavailable section who has not previously been included in the security index or changing an existing security index card from the geographical or special sections to the unavailable section, FD-122 must include the words "Unavailable Section" typed in the upper right portion thereof.

Places of former residence or former employment are not to be included on security index cards of subjects who are missing, who are out of the country, or who are imprisoned inasmuch as such data serves no useful purpose on the card.

Security index cards to be placed in the unavailable section shall bear code letters in the upper right portion designating the subsection in which the cards should be placed. Upon receipt of the three cards from the Bureau for each subject in one of these categories, place the required additional data on two which shall be filed alphabetically in the appropriate subsection of the unavailable section. File the third card in the alphabetical section of the security index.

When a subject who has been included in the unavailable section as a missing subject is located in your office territory or a subject who has been out of the country has returned to your territory or an imprisoned subject has been released, submit FD-122[showing the subject's current residence and place of employment. The words "Remove from Unavailable Section" shall be typed in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)" on FD-122. If the subject's card is to be placed in the special section, the statement "Place in Special Section - Espionage (or Foreign Government Employee, etc.)" should be added in this space. When the new cards are received from the Bureau, they shall be checked for accuracy and the description and photograph, if available, shall be placed on two of the three cards. These two cards shall then be filed in the geographical or special section (where applicable) and the other card shall then be filed in the alphabetical section. The old cards in the unavailable and alphabetical sections shall be destroyed.

When a subject who has been included in the unavailable section is located in another division, FD-128 shall

should be completely filled out just as if a first recommendation is being made, and submitted with a current report. If not, the Bureau should be advised of the reasons for not reactivating his security index card. In either case, cancel the inactive card.

(7) Periodic verification of addresses

(a) The data recorded on security index cards shall be in an up-to-date status at all times.

(b) The whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. The residence and business addresses of all security index subjects except those who are imprisoned must be checked at least once each six months. The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least each six months to determine if he has returned to this country.

Perfect arrangements to be advised of any change in the subject's residence and/or business addresses. Periodic checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under appropriate pretext by telephone, or other expeditious means.

(c) The physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and the individual case file of each security index subject shall[show]that this has been done. If a security index subject has not been personally observed previously, this should be done during the next verification of the subject's residence and/or business addresses.

(d) Use form FD-154 in verifying addresses of security index subjects when its use will facilitate the checking of the addresses. When FD-154 is not used in verifying addresses, a notation must be made on the last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in the subject's case file[showing]the subject's current residence and business addresses and the date such addresses were verified. This must be done to assure that the file will contain all information concerning the status of the case and that the file will come to the attention of the Agent or field supervisor to determine if additional action is warranted at the time of the verification of addresses. Each time that a security index subject's residence and employment are verified, the case must be re-evaluated to assure that the subject is qualified for inclusion in the security index under the criteria for such inclusion. A notation to the effect that the case has been reviewed for this purpose shall be made in the file.

(e) If it is determined that the residence or business address or both have been changed from those appearing on the security index card, FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau with the current residence or business address[shown] thereon. In such instances, FD-122 should[show]only the changes to be made on the security index card.

(f) The project of verifying addresses of security index subjects (other than top functionaries [and]key figures) shall be handled by reopening and assigning the cases for verification and closing the cases administratively upon accomplishment of verifications. Top functionary [and]key figure cases are to be handled as provided in section 87D, 7f, (8). Verifications should also be made at the time of submission of all annual investigative reports and should be reported therein.

(g) [Deleted]

(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards

(a) Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, detcom classification, date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility (see 87D 7c (2) below), residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by form FD-128.

(b) Insertion or removal of cards from special section or unavailable section should be handled pursuant to 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV.

(c) Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing security index cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.

(d) Indicate use of FD-122 for changes by checking proper opening paragraph and submit without abstract.

(e) Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."

(f) Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected security index cards with duplicate copy of FD-122 (stamped "Corrected Security Index cards attached. Substitute for cards in file and destroy old cards. Place photograph and description on reverse side of geographical cards."), action to be taken includes:

I. Check accuracy of data on cards.

II. [Deleted]

III. Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to back of corrected cards, staple them and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV above.

IV. File third card in alphabetical section of security index.

V. Destroy old cards.

(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards

(a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries

I. Requests to verify addresses of security index subjects from other offices must be assigned immediately and results of investigation to verify the new address must be transmitted to the office of origin within two weeks.

II. Office of origin, upon receipt of verification of address, should submit FD-128 immediately transferring office of origin. Forms regarding unavailable section subjects should be prepared in accordance with 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.

III. Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies thereof to office covering subject's new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and security index cards. FD-128 should show full title.

IV. Information concerning key facility employment of subject in new office should be furnished by that office to old office of origin so that geographical reference

of the source, date of activi[illegible], date received, and name of the Agent receiving the information are known, it is not necessary to request the office originally obtaining the information to document it further by furnishing information showing the location of the original in the office files. If all documentation, except the latter item, is not in the possession of the office preparing the report, it should be obtained.

V. If it is found desirable to include in a report the identities of individuals who are known communists and have been associates of the subject to lend weight to evidence of the subject's potential dangerousness, only the source of the information showing the associate to be a communist need be identified.

VI. In a very limited number of instances it may be necessary to obtain a thumbnail sketch or characterization of an individual or organization from another office or the Bureau. When such information is received in your office, it should be placed in thumbnail sketch files so that it will be available to and can be readily located by Agents having future need for it, thereby eliminating repeated requests of another office for the same information.

g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases

Channelizing memoranda in organizational and individual security case files may be destroyed following submission of reports in these cases. In destroying these memoranda, be guided by the following instructions:

(1) The Agent, at the time he dictates the report, is to prepare a memorandum listing the channelizing memoranda to be destroyed by serial or serial scope and requesting the chief clerk's office to destroy. This memorandum should indicate that pertinent information contained in the serials to be destroyed was incorporated in the report. Use form FD-338 for this purpose.

(2) The cover pages accompanying the report will list the file and serial number of the original informant reports or master channelizing memoranda.

(3) In the case of multiple volumes the destruction memorandum should be prepared by the Agent in sufficient numbers so that one copy will appear in each volume of the multiple volume file being stripped.

(4) Prior to destruction, the Agent's recommendations are to be reviewed and approved by the supervisor at the time he reviews and approves the report.

(5) Employee destroying the channelizing memoranda must place date of destruction and his initials [illegible] the destruction memorandum. Thereafter, this memorandum will be filed in the case file as a permanent record of the serials destroyed.

(6) Channelizing memoranda[based on confidential investigative techniques]may be destroyed without the necessity of identifying in the cover pages of the report the exact location in the office files of the original information. The use of an asterisk identifies the source and the original information can be readily located.

(7) Channelizing memoranda of translations of foreign language newspapers and periodicals may be destroyed provided the original translation is maintained in the main file of the publication concerned.

(8) Do not destroy channelizing memoranda in the following instances:

locate subjects are not to be submitted. The Bureau will closely follow investigative action to locate missing security index subjects.

II. If you receive indications that the subject went to Mexico or Canada, request the Bureau to alert other appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to determine any available verifying information through liaison channels.

III. If the subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, the Washington Field Office should be requested to check the records of the Passport Office of the State Department for verification.

IV. When all logical leads have been exhausted in the case of a missing important functionary, consideration should be given to circularizing all field offices with the subject's photograph and background information for the purpose of alerting the entire field to the identity of the subject. Bureau authority must be obtained before circularization is made. In seeking Bureau authority, advise the Bureau as to the position held by the subject and what efforts have already been made to locate him.

If this procedure is to be effective, its application must necessarily be restrictive in the number of subjects to which it is applied. Therefore, requests to circularize must be made only after every possible lead has been exhausted and then only in the cases of the most important missing functionaries.

[(4) Individuals traveling abroad (Also consider section[105G,] volume IV, of this manual.)

When information is received indicating that
- a subject of a current or past security investigation,
- a past member of a basic revolutionary organization,
- a member since July, 1950, of an organization designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450,
- a member since July, 1950, of an organization declared subversive by the House Committee on Un-American Activities or other legislative committees, or
- a member since July, 1950, of an organization described by reliable informants or sources as being dominated or controlled by one of the basic revolutionary organizations

intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel, take the following action:

(a) Immediately advise the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination, setting forth complete available details concerning the foreign travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, the exact name under which the passport was issued, the number of the passport, and the office issuing the passport, if known. However, do not delay advising the Bureau of the actual or intended travel while developing the above information as time is of the essence in this matter.

(b) Set out a lead for the Washington Field Office for a check of the records of the Passport Office, Department of State; however, do not limit efforts to develop above information to a check of such records.

(D) Whether or not defectee available for interview by all Agents

(E) Whether he is in position to testify and willing to do so

III. Do not include information concerning security informants for security reasons.

IV. Proper maintenance of this file will be useful in identifying persons who may be in a position to furnish information of value in the future and will obviate necessity of extensive file reviews in this connection.

V. A special index may be used for this file if desirable. If used, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating names, times, and places defectees were in a subversive movement and a brief description of information available from them. Break index down geographically and subdivide by years if desirable.

7. Administrative procedures

[a. Reserve index

(1) Purpose

The reserve index is designed to represent those persons who, in the light of ever-changing conditions, should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation, or action under the security index program. This index may serve as an administrative aid and working index containing a central repository of the names of individuals having sympathy for or affiliation with the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations.

(2) Individuals to be included

This index is to contain names of individuals when, following investigation, the information does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the security index when there is evidence of:

(a) Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection

(b) Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.

(c) The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support, or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.

(d) Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(e) Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(3) Arrangement

This index is to be maintained in two sections, section A and section B. Each section will be maintained alphabetically on 5- by 8-inch cards.

(a) Section A

Section A of the reserve index is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and or other action following the apprehension of security index subjects.

I. Section A should include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the security index criteria but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Include in this section those individuals meeting the standards for inclusion in the reserve index and who fall within the following categories:

(A) Professors, teachers, and educators
(B) Labor union organizers or leaders
(C) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others in the mass media field
(D) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists
(E) Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level
(F) Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid

II. Recommendations for inclusion of names in the reserve index (section A)

(A) Recommendations for inclusion of names in section A of the reserve index are to be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a. A succinct summary setting forth the basis for the recommendation should be attached to the form FD-122a. In addition, if no report is accompanying the recommendation, a statement to that effect should appear on the page containing the succinct summary.

(B) Upon Bureau approval of recommendation for the inclusion of an individual's name in section A of the reserve index, two reserve index cards will be forwarded to the field. To these cards should be added the office file number and on the reverse side should be added available descriptive data. One card is to be filed in your office, and one card is to be filed away from headquarters city at the same location as the extra set of security index cards are now stored.

III. Periodic review of section A of the reserve index

[[[Investigations of individuals listed in section A of the reserve index are to be brought up to date annually and considered for security index status or retention in the reserve index. [Form FD-154 may be used for the annual review by amending it for use in reserve index cases.] This investigation should include, as a minimum:

(A) Verification of residence and employment
(B) Indices search and file review to determine whether additional investigation is warranted or whether an interview with the individual is desirable
(C) If additional investigation is conducted or if there is unreported information of a subversive nature contained in the files, submit a report.

d. Other Marxist revolutionary groups
A long-established group which would come under this category is the Proletarian Party of America, a relatively small organization.

There also are a few small groups composed of ex-members of the Communist Party, USA, who have voluntarily left the party or who have been expelled, usually for factionalism.

e. General
Communist investigations must be conducted in a most discreet and thorough manner at all times. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during the course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority. Bureau employees should not discuss communist or related investigations with any unauthorized individual. The subject of communism is not to be used in speeches of Bureau employees without specific authorization. However, there is considerable mimeographed material in each office, including speeches, testimony, and magazine articles prepared by the Director which could be furnished outside individuals interested in the subject of communism without any discussion.

2. Purposes of investigation

a. The investigation of the Communist Party, USA, and other similar-type organizations is of twofold purpose: (1) to obtain legally admissible evidence against these organizations for prosecution under existing Federal statutes set out above and (2) to follow closely the activities of these organizations from an intelligence viewpoint to have a day-to-day appraisal of the strength, dangerousness, and activities of these organizations seeking the overthrow of the U. S. Government.

b. Suggestions for proper coverage of the investigation of the Communist Party as an organization and similar organizations should include:

(1) The assignment of sufficient Agent personnel to insure that all of the important ramifications of party activities are properly covered
(2) Development of confidential informants in all party levels, including the national headquarters organization
(3) The establishment of trash and mail covers on pertinent headquarters and party functionaries
(4) The constant effort to develop admissible evidence against party officials for violation of Federal laws

[c. Brief to establish illegal status of Communist Party, USA

(1) Purpose of brief is to collect all legally admissible evidence to prove illegality of party in one file. (Bufile 100-3-74.)
(2) Reports on brief to establish illegal status must be submitted by each office quarterly and should include only legally admissible evidence obtained during preceding three-month period. (If no information to report, letter may be submitted.)
(3) It is advisable to use the following breakdown in preparing reports:
    (a) Origin and continuity of the party
    (b) Pertinent statements, writings, and instructions relating to (1) Marxism-Leninism, (2) imperialism, (3) proletarian internationalism, (4) defense of USSR, (5) revolutionary statements
    (c) Internal Security Act of 1950. Include under this heading any admissible evidence which would tend to prove a violation of section 4(a) of this act.]

3. Investigative procedures and suggestions
This section contains detailed investigative guides for use in investigating and reporting activities of the Communist Party, USA.

a. To accurately and clearly show the true nature of the Communist Party, USA, data concerning the following topics must be fully developed and reported. Reports on the Communist Party, USA, as an organization must be submitted by each office quarterly and should cover activities for the preceding three-month period. All offices are required to use the following breakdown in preparing quarterly reports on the Communist Party, USA. Each subfile caption must start on a separate page.

(1) Organization (Bureau file 100-3-69)

(a) Security setup of district and/or state organization. Office covering district headquarters, describe the population, the location, and size of Communist Party office facilities, rent paid, and name and number of office employees.

(b) Identities and short biographic sketches of principal district officials including chairman, secretary, and other paid and/or important functionaries, together with short resume of important activities of each during three-month period.

(c) Names of new commissions or special committees, identity and capacity of individual members thereof. Submit resume of activities of groups under appropriate subfile captions.

(d) Special meetings embracing only organizational matters. Other pertinent matters discussed at meetings concerning policy or strategy to be submitted under appropriate subfile captions.

(e) Extend this outline as far as necessary for clarity and to meet needs of office under this or any succeeding subsection. Auxiliary offices submit pertinent data concerning above matters which do not normally come to attention of office covering district headquarters.

(2) Membership (Bureau file 100-3-68)

(a) [Quarterly reports are not to contain any membership statistics. Cover pages accompanying each quarterly report must contain latest available statistics relating to total number of Communist Party members in the district. Membership data must start on a separate cover page.] Office of origin, which is office covering Communist Party district headquarters, should submit following figures:

I. For entire Communist Party district
II. For individual states covered by Communist Party district
III. For number of Communist Party members in area covered by field office

Auxiliary offices should submit following membership figures to the Bureau and office of origin:

I. For state or portion of state covered by that field office
II. For number of Communist Party members in the area covered by that field office

When possible, totals should be broken down as to nationality, race, sex, employment, veterans, and membership in unions. Auxiliary offices which, due to lack of Communist Party activity in their divisions, have been authorized to submit data by quarterly letter should include membership figures in these letters to the Bureau and office of origin. These letters to be submitted by auxiliary offices prior to first day of month in which quarterly report is due. Office of origin responsible to obtain complete figures from its auxiliary offices.

(b) In preparing estimates, best available informants and sources must be used. Include in cover pages of quarterly reports evaluation of degree of reliability of figures furnished by each source and of final figures submitted. Also include in cover pages total number of individuals positively identified as Communist Party members and total number of individuals tentatively identified as party members [within the twelve-month period immediately preceding the submission of the quarterly report.] In reporting membership figures, information from one source only is not acceptable unless facts are set forth demonstrating information from this source is the most accurate and most reliable information available.

(c) Explain in detail any increase or decrease in membership figures previously submitted. Where informants use such terms as "inactive" or "paper" members, their exact understanding of the meaning of the terms used and the number of individuals so described must be clearly explained. Full explanation must be made as to whether individuals so described are included in final membership figures submitted, together with reason for their inclusion or exclusion.

(d) Results of membership recruiting drives

(e) Make discreet efforts to ascertain results of annual national registration drives.

(3) Funds (Bureau file 100-3-63)

(a) Income and expenditures

(b) Plans and results of fund drives including:

I. Total amount sought by the state Communist Party organization

II. Specific amount to be contributed by the state organization to the national committee fund drive

III. Specific amount to be contributed by the state organization to "The Worker" fund drive

IV. Specific amount to be retained by the state organization after contributing to the national committee and "The Worker" fund drives for use in the state organization's own operations

(c) Large contributions by known party groups or front organizations

(d) Identity of any new party "angels"

(e) Distribution of funds not sent to Communist Party headquarters, such as funds in safe-deposit boxes, separate bank accounts, etc.

(f) Any special padding of expense accounts by Communist Party functionaries should be reported.

(g) Possible violations of state or Federal tax laws
(h) Disbursements and collections of the "Reserve Fund"
(i) Receipt of any money from abroad

(4) Security measures (Bureau file 100-3-84)
Any activities on the part of the security commission of the district which bring about new or unusual security measures, such as reducing clubs to "group captain systems," destruction of records, use of codes, clandestine meetings, investigations by the party of party members, etc.

(5) Underground operations (Bureau file 100-3-94)
Pertinent general information suitable for dissemination relating to underground operations of Communist Party. No information should be included in quarterly reports which would jeopardize informants or special investigative techniques. Current investigations relating to expanded underground operations during period 1951-1955 should be submitted by separate letter under individual case caption and should not be included in quarterly reports except for general information relating to methods of operation.

(6) Factionalism (Bureau file 100-3-88)
(a) Submit pertinent information reflecting that any ranking Communist Party members or group of members have developed views as "left-wing sectarianists" or "right-wing opportunists" inasmuch as the party has a policy of expelling members who develop such views.
(b) Unusual disputes or arguments between leading communists in any district should be included in this section.

(7) International relations (Bureau file 100-3-81)
(a) Information relating to communication or contact between Communist Party, USA, and communist parties of other countries
(b) Identities of Communist Party officials who plan to travel in foreign countries, including the reason for their travel
(c) Reaction of responsible Communist Party officials to events taking place in foreign countries
(d) Communist Party strategy and tactics directed to attacks on U. S. foreign policy and support of U. S. S. R. and satellite foreign policy.

(8) United Nations (Bureau file 100-3-80)
(a) Communist Party policy or pertinent information in connection with the United Nations, including such matters as infiltration of the United Nations, contacts by Communist Party officials with representatives to the United Nations
(b) Communist Party strategy and tactics directed toward attacking U. S. policy and/or to support U. S. S. R. or satellite policy in the United Nations

(9) Colonial matters (Bureau file 100-3-77)
Communist Party policy relating to colonial or semicolonial areas. While much of the information relating to this section will be submitted under "International Relations," this section covers special policy matters concerning colonial affairs, such as Communist Party policy relative to obtaining of independence by colonial people.

III. Revolutionary statements made by subject showing advocacy of overthrow of Government by force or violence

- (A) [Determine]each statement and[ascertain]full details surrounding each.
- (B) [Determine]all statements by subject showing complete adherence to principles of Marxism-Leninism or other revolutionary doctrines espoused by subversive groups with which subject is identified.

IV. All other activities of subject indicating furtherance of program of subversive organizations with which he is associated

- (A) Speeches
- (B) Writings
- (C) Organizational directives and/or educational outlines signed by or issued by subject, or issued while subject was officer of organization
- (D) [Determine]all pertinent contacts between subject and leaders of party.
- (E) [Ascertain]details concerning the subject's attendance at Lenin School, attendance at training schools of subversive organizations with which subject has been identified, or activity as instructor at such schools.

V. False statements made by subject including use of aliases Such evidence obtained from passports, voting, marital records, income tax returns, employment and selective service records, among others, may be in your files.

VI. Miscellaneous

[Consider]pertinent items not falling under the above categories.

(b) So far as possible all reports on individuals should be confined to:

- I. Proof of membership and activity in basic revolutionary organization and/or front organizations with knowledge of purpose thereof
- II. Information concerning position and importance of subject in subversive movement
- III. Pertinent background information

Include in security reports only information pertinent to determining whether or not subject is engaged in subversive activities. [Be certain to set out the date or period to which it pertains; e.g., John Doe advised on January 15, 1958, that subject attended Communist Party meetings in January, 1942, in Syracuse, New York.]

(c) Information suggestive of additional leads and information of particular significance in showing subject's knowledge of and adherence to revolutionary aims of organization or organizations with which he is associated should be fully and carefully reported.

(d) Each report is to include all information having any pertinency as to whether or not there is justification for security index card. This includes pertinent information concerning background and subversive activities.

(e) When previous summary reports which have been prepared are not suitable for dissemination because of disclosure of sources, information contained therein should be included in current summary reports with sources fully protected. Each office must be certain that all pertinent information has been incorporated in either a past or current disseminative summary report.

[(f) Frequently information will have been obtained[reporting] subject's presence at numerous meetings of subversive organizations over a period of years. In many instances these facts will have been reported by only one informant. In others, two or three informants will have reported subject's attendance at meetings. The question of pertinency of all such items is dependent upon the weight of all of the evidence obtained against the subject.

(g) Such repetitious and cumulative items to be specifically set forth in reports may be reduced in number to the point where they will be limited to a representative number of such items. Each such item specifically set forth must be fully documented.

(h) The number of such items to be included in each instance will be dependent upon the preponderance of other evidence available for inclusion in the report which will lend weight to our case against the subject.

(i) Selection of such items with regard to period of time will be dependent upon all facts developed against subject. Selection should be based upon the objective of specifically reporting data sufficient to justify continued detention of each subject if apprehended.

When selection of representative number of such items is made, they should be followed by a general statement summarizing any other items furnished by source. The summarizing statement should indicate that source advised during a specified period of time that subject also attended a certain number of other meetings during a certain period.

In the documentation of a summarizing statement set out the file number and serial scope.

[

(j) [In connection with periodic reports in security index cases, there are instances in which evidence of extensive activity in subversive organizations will be developed. In these cases it is permissible to report such information in narrative-type statements without indicating exact dates of activity; however, the period of time involved must be shown; e.g., June, 1960 - June, 1961.

This type reporting is not to be utilized in Smith Act of 1940 cases or Internal Security Act of 1950 cases with the exception of key facility cases. The narrative statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions and information from each source must be reported in separate narrative statements.

(k) The above instructions in no way remove responsibility for reporting all items of pertinence to the Bureau, bearing in mind the fact that Bureau files must be complete insofar as matters of substance are concerned, nor is responsibility removed for the reporting in detail of information tending to establish a subject's knowledge of the basic aims and purposes of the subversive organizations with which affiliated or information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

In the documentation of narrative statements set forth the location of the original documents in the field office files by the file number and serial scope.]

(10) Administrative data

(a) General

All references to the following items, all administrative in nature, should be contained in cover pages accompanying reports:

I. Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, key figure or top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), forms FD-122, FD-122a, FD-128, and FD-128a, and Bureau instructions for handling cases or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature

II. Whenever reports relating to security index subjects contain data affecting material included on subject's existing security index card, the cover pages accompanying the report shall include as the last page form FD-305, appropriately checked, which form contains items pertaining to the following:

(A) That subject is included in the security index
(B) That data appearing on security index card is current or requires change
(C) That FD-122 has been submitted to Bureau where security index card changes are necessary
(D) That a suitable photograph is or is not available
(E) That consideration has been given to the use of T symbols
(F) That subject is employed in a key facility and that agencies interested in that facility are specified
(G) Reason for classifying report
(H) Dates subject was previously interviewed and reason for not reinterviewing subject
(I) That subject no longer meets security index criteria and a letter has been directed to the Bureau recommending cancellation of the security index card
(J) That subject's case has been re-evaluated and reasons are set forth as to why subject's activities continue to fall within security index criteria
(K) That subject's security index card is or is not tabbed detcom and that subject's activities do or do not warrant detcom tabbing

[[[[III. Form FD-305a containing items pertinent to reserve index subjects will be similarly utilized in connection with the submission of reports in reserve index cases.]

(b) Documentation of reports

I. Deleted

II. If information necessary for complete documentation is not available in subject's case file, necessary review of other office files should be made. If not obtainable, this fact must be indicated in the cover page(s) accompanying report to the Bureau.

III. Extensive investigation should not be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have in the past furnished background information or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed that subject, according to reliable records, such as birth records, school records, or records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in report. Further verification will not be necessary.

IV. During the preparation of summary reports it is often found that information being incorporated into a report was originally obtained by another office and all of the necessary information for complete documentation will not be in the possession of the office preparing the report. In such an instance, if the office preparing the report is in possession of Photostats of documents obtained by the other offices and the identity

attend party educational classes and schools within dictates of discretion and without jeopardizing their security.

(23) Communist Party attempts to infiltrate mass organizations (Bureau file 100-3-106)
Information regarding Communist Party programs and attempts to infiltrate mass organizations, such as parent-teacher associations, church groups, and civic groups

[(24) Public appearances of party leaders (Bureau file 100-3-114)
(a) Identity of national and district functionaries, openly representing the Communist Party, USA, who make public appearances on radio and television and who appear before groups, such as youth, Negro, labor, church, farm, and minority groups
(b) Date and place of appearance, identity of group sponsoring speaker, and succinct summary of subject matter discussed]

b. Communist Party, USA - strategy in industry (Bureau file 100-3-89)
A separate case shall be maintained by each office on this basic phase of Communist Party activity. Offices of origin will be the same as in the Communist Party, USA, case. Reports will be submitted quarterly. Offices with no activity to report may submit letters. The instructions in paragraphs g and h will apply, with the addition of "Strategy in Industry" to the designated captions.

The investigation in this case shall cover all plans, strategy, tactics, and infiltration activities by the Communist Party, USA, directed against all industry, with special emphasis on activities connected with basic and vital industries. Particular attention shall be given to the composition, meetings, plans, and activities of Communist Party industrial and trade-union commissions and industrial and trade-union districts and clubs. Pertinent activities of individual communists charged with Communist Party duties in this field shall be included in reports. The information reported shall be grouped according to the industry involved, rather than according to individual labor unions. Refer to the subsection F on investigation of communist infiltration of labor unions and subsection H on Communist Control Act of 1954 for instructions regarding investigations concerning communist infiltration of specific labor unions.

c. Any important developments concerning pertinent phases of Communist Party activity, such as certain security measures, important national or regional Communist Party meetings, changes in personnel in national Communist Party organization, underground activities, and other important matters should be brought to attention of Bureau by teletype, airtel, or letter as circumstances may require and later incorporated in quarterly reports. Such information, where pertinent, is disseminated on high level to other Government officials. Each office is to carefully evaluate data thus submitted so Bureau will at all times be advised of important developments and so no unnecessary duplication will result in reporting such information.

d. Extreme care must be used to assure statements relating to affiliations or membership in proscribed or subversive organization are accurate in all respects. Identification of suspected organizations or individuals with information of a possible subversive nature must be accomplished by showing exact basis for such identification, plus corroboration for same wherever possible. In no case should a person be referred to as a "known communist" unless he is publicly known as such. Whenever an individual other than the subject of a report is mentioned for the purpose of showing subversive activity or sympathy on the part of the subject, the individual so mentioned should be described with an authoritative statement showing the subversive connection; e.g., "Reported by T_____ to have been a member of the White Collar Club of the Communist Party in 1945."

e. Specific requirements relating to Communist Party, USA, investigations

(1) New York Office has responsibility of investigating and reporting separately on national committee meetings, national training schools, and other important national meetings. New York is responsible for reporting activities of the New York District.

f. Socialist Workers Party and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups

The New York Office should submit quarterly reports on the Socialist Workers Party designating reports as pending. Separate reports should be submitted: one pertaining to local activities, the other pertaining to activities on a national basis. Auxiliary offices should submit reports each six months and may carry their cases in a pending-inactive status. Reports on less active Marxist-Leninist groups should be submitted semiannually and also may be carried as pending inactive.

g. Classification - 100

h. Title and character of communications

(1) Communist Party, USA

Entitle all communications covering a national convention or national organizational activity of the party:

Communist Party, USA
Internal Security - C

Caption all communications covering activities in a particular district:

Communist Party, USA
____________ District
____________ Division
Internal Security - C

Caption all communications covering activities in states not included in a district:

Communist Party, USA
State of __________
____________ Division
Internal Security - C

(2) Socialist Workers Party

Entitle all communications covering a national convention or national organizational activity of the Socialist Workers Party:

Socialist Workers Party
Internal Security - SWP

Caption all communications covering activities within a particular field division:

Socialist Workers Party
____________ Division
Internal Security - SWP

(3) Other Marxist revolutionary groups

All communications covering other Marxist revolutionary groups should carry the name of the organization and the classification, Internal Security; e.g.,

Proletarian Party of America
Internal Security - PPA

II.	Race	
	White and Caucasian	W
	Negro	N
	Chinese	C
	Others (All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)	O
III.	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
IV.	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien (If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	AL
V.	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	Independent Socialist League	ISL
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico	NPR
	Union Del Pueblo Pro Constituyente De La Republica De Puerto Rico (Union of the People for the Establishment of the Republic of Puerto Rico)	UPR
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	Nation of Islam	NOI
	Russian	RUS
	Bulgarian	BUL
	Rumanian	RUM
	Czechoslovakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Yugoslavian	YUG
VI.	Dangerousness classification (where applicable)	
	Detcom	DC
VII.	Key figure and top functionary designation (where applicable)	
	Key figure	KF
	Top functionary	TF
VIII.	Special section cards	
	United Nations employees	UNE
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	U. S. Government employees	GOV
	Atomic energy program employees	AEP
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
IX.	Unavailable section cards	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
X.	Date and place of birth	
XI.	Key facility geographical reference number and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility obtained from the Department of Defense key facilities list (where applicable)	
XII.	Residence address	
XIII.	Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. [Labor union affiliation, if any.]	
XIV.	Field office file number (to be added to the face of geographical and alphabetical security index cards upon receipt from Bureau)	

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description
(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division
(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below
(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The white 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by this machine and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

V. Inactive section 56
(7) Periodic verification of addresses 57
(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards 58
(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards 58
(a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries 58
(b) Key figures and top functionaries 59
(c) Subjects tabbed for Detcom 60
(d) Subjects not included in security index 60
(10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index 60
(a) Death of subject 60
(b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction 60
(c) Imprisonment of subject 60
(d) Induction of subject into the armed forces 60
(e) Security informants 60
(f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous 61
(g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection.......... 61
(h) Subjects of Chinese extraction.......... 62
(11) Priority apprehension program (DETCOM) 62
(a) Purpose 62
(b) Subjects to be tabbed detcom 62
(c) Recommendations for and removal of detcom designation 63
(d) Administrative procedures for handling detcom program 63
(e) General 64
c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities . 64
(1) Responsibility 64
(2) Inclusion in security index 65
(3) Deleted
(4) Dissemination 65
(5) Status of cases 66
d. Key figure and top functionary program 66
(1) General 66
(2) Key figures 66
(a) Definition 66
(b) Regulations governing the handling of the key figure program 67
I. Designation and deletion of key figure status 67
II. Photographs 67
III. Handwriting specimens 67
IV. Security index cards 68
V. Change of office of origin 68
VI. Reports 68
VII. Maintenance of key figure list 69
VIII. Deleted
(3) Top functionaries 69
(a) Definition 69
(b) Manner of designation 69
(c) Regulations governing top functionaries 70
e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index.......... 70

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

- (1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations 70
- (2) Security of Government employees investigations 70
- (3) Atomic Energy Act, Voice of America applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations 70

f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports. 71

- (1) General 71
- (2) Origin 72
- (3) Deleted
- (4) Classification 72
- (5) Title 72
- (6) Character 73
  - (a) Key figures and top functionaries 73
  - (b) Others 73
- (7) Deleted
- (8) Status 73
  - (a) Top functionaries 73
  - (b) Key figures 73
  - (c) Deleted
  - (d) Other security index subjects 74
  - (e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index . 74
  - (f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein 74
- (9) Content 74
- (10) Administrative data 77
  - (a) General 77
  - (b) Documentation of reports 78

g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases 78a

8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations 79

a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau 80

- (1) Aliens and naturalized citizens 80
- (2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services 80
- (3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense 80
- (4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard 80

(b) Where potential dangerousness of a subject has been established and inclusion of that subject in security index is warranted, the office of origin shall submit a recommendation for inclusion in security index by submitting form FD-122 to Bureau. Form must be prepared in triplicate. Original and one copy shall be forwarded to Bureau and one copy will be placed in subject's investigative case file.

Nothing should appear on FD-122 or subsequently on the security index card which is not in the subject's case file. Form FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend a subject for inclusion in the security index and (2) to submit changes to data which appears on face of security index cards already existent.

Proper selection should be made in the opening paragraph option. FD-122 is submitted with abstract when used to recommend the subject for inclusion in the security index and without abstract when used to indicate additions, deletions, or changes in data appearing on existing cards.

(c) When form FD-122 is submitted to Bureau recommending inclusion of a name in security index, attach an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of facts on which recommendation has been based. Facts must be in detail to clearly reflect soundness of recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must contain pertinent dates of subject's activities.

(d) When, at conclusion of investigation, subject's name is not being recommended for security index, set out a brief summary statement in the cover page(s) accompanying closing report[showing]reasons for decision.

(e) Security index cards shall be recommended by and maintained by office of origin only.

(f) [A current report must be in possession of the Bureau when subject is recommended for security index. If it is the initial report in the case, it must be a summary report. If, however, prior investigative reports have been submitted which are suitable for dissemination and are appropriately documented, a summary report need not be submitted.]

(g) To assure that subject recommended for security index will receive proper attention, case shall be kept in pending or pending-inactive status until security index card has been received from Bureau and filed in office security index. If case continues in pending status because of outstanding investigation, reports shall carry a lead to follow authorization of security index card by the Bureau in addition to other leads. If outstanding investigation has been completed and case would otherwise be closed upon submission of the report and form FD-122, case shall be placed in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau. In latter instance, upon receipt of Bureau's response, case may be closed administratively.

(h) Recommendation for security index card should not be delayed because of absence of information concerning race, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, or description where security index card is warranted. In such instances, recommendation for the card should be submitted with a current report and case retained in pending status with active investigation continuing to determine missing items of information.

(i) Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for the security index provided instructions set forth in 87D 6b (3) and (4) are followed. Forms FD-122 submitted on subjects should include data required in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV below.

(j) [When form FD-122 is submitted recommending a security index card be prepared on a subject who is of Chinese extraction, the words "Other - Chinese" must be included in the space on the form calling for a statement as to the subject's race. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending that a security index card be prepared on a person who is not of Chinese extraction but who has shown definite sympathies with Communist China, the form should include under "Miscellaneous" a statement to the effect "sympathetic to Communist China."]

(k) Upon receipt of form FD-122 at Bureau, the case of the subject will be reviewed and if recommendation of field is concurred in, security index cards will be prepared. Duplicate copy of form will be returned to office of origin stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." The three cards shall be filed in security index as outlined below. The returned copy of FD-122 shall be placed in subject's main investigative case file. Offices with a geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive an extra card.

(l) When security index cards are received from Bureau, data thereon must be checked for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for field office file number, description, and photograph. Office file number should be placed on face of all cards. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards of similar size to security index cards which are stapled to back of two of the cards. One card will then be filed in the geographical section of office security index (except special section cards and unavailable section cards - see 87D 7b (6) (b) III and IV below), and one card shall be filed in the duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. The other card is filed in alphabetical section of security index. No information other than office file number shall be permanently added, deleted, or changed on face of security index card without complying with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (8).

(5) Content and appearance of security index card

(a) Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain the following information. If any of items enumerated in I through XIV are missing at time the security index card is made, the case should be continued as pending and investigation conducted to obtain the necessary information. Set forth under each item below are possible categories in which subject may be classified, together with code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on form FD-122 when sending form to Bureau recommending security index card be prepared. Code letters should subsequently appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

I. Name and aliases

The full and correct name and aliases of the subject must be contained on the security index card. When the true name of a subject or any aliases are changed, added, deleted, or are found to be incorrect, form FD-122 must be submitted reflecting the correct data to be placed on the security index card.

should be completely filled out just as if a first recommendation is being made, and submitted with a current report. If not, the Bureau should be advised of the reasons for not reactivating his security index card. In either case, cancel the inactive card.

(7) Periodic verification of addresses

(a) The data recorded on security index cards shall be in an up-to-date status at all times.

(b) The whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. The residence and business addresses of all security index subjects except those who are imprisoned must be checked at least once each six months. The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least each six months to determine if he has returned to this country.

Perfect arrangements to be advised of any change in the subject's residence and/or business addresses. Periodic checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under appropriate pretext by telephone, or other expeditious means.

(c) The physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and the individual case file of each security index subject shall[show]that this has been done. If a security index subject has not been personally observed previously, this should be done during the next verification of the subject's residence and/or business addresses.

(d) Use form FD-154 in verifying addresses of security index subjects when its use will facilitate the checking of the addresses. When FD-154 is not used in verifying addresses, a notation must be made on the last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in the subject's case file[showing]the subject's current residence and business addresses and the date such addresses were verified. This must be done to assure that the file will contain all information concerning the status of the case and that the file will come to the attention of the Agent or field supervisor to determine if additional action is warranted at the time of the verification of addresses. Each time that a security index subject's residence and employment are verified, the case must be re-evaluated to assure that the subject is qualified for inclusion in the security index under the criteria for such inclusion. A notation to the effect that the case has been reviewed for this purpose shall be made in the file.

(e) If it is determined that the residence or business address or both have been changed from those appearing on the security index card, FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau with the current residence or business address[shown] thereon. In such instances, FD-122 should[show]only the changes to be made on the security index card.

(f) The project of verifying addresses of security index subjects (other than top functionaries [and]key figures) shall be handled by reopening and assigning the cases for verification and closing the cases administratively upon accomplishment of verifications. Top functionary [and]key figure cases are to be handled as provided in section 87D, 7f, (8). Verifications should also be made at the time of submission of all annual investigative reports and should be reported therein.

(g) [Deleted]

(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards

(a) Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, detcom classification, date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility (see 87D 7c (2) below), residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by form FD-128.

(b) Insertion or removal of cards from special section or unavailable section should be handled pursuant to 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV.

(c) Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing security index cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.

(d) Indicate use of FD-122 for changes by checking proper opening paragraph and submit without abstract.

(e) Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."

(f) Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected security index cards with duplicate copy of FD-122 (stamped "Corrected Security Index cards attached. Substitute for cards in file and destroy old cards. Place photograph and description on reverse side of geographical cards."), action to be taken includes:

I. Check accuracy of data on cards.

II. Place office file number on face of all cards.

III. Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to back of corrected cards, staple them and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV above.

IV. File[third]card in alphabetical section of security index.

V. Destroy old cards.

(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards

(a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries

I. Requests to verify addresses of security index subjects from other offices must be assigned immediately and results of investigation to verify the new address must be transmitted to the office of origin within two weeks.

II. Office of origin, upon receipt of verification of address, should submit FD-128 immediately transferring office of origin. Forms regarding unavailable section subjects should be prepared in accordance with 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.

III. Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies thereof to office covering subject's new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials,[photograph if available,[and security index cards. [FD-128 should show full title.]

IV. Information concerning key facility employment of subject in new office should be furnished by that office to old office of origin so that geographical reference

agency responsible for such action. Forward such data to Bureau and incorporate in next report submitted concerning individual in question. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau and there is no case on individual being denied clearance, give consideration to opening a security investigation if information received from intelligence agency warrants such action.

(2) Inclusion in security index

In recommending key facility employee for inclusion in security index, FD-122 is to contain:

(a) Key facility geographical reference number

(b) Abbreviation for agency having security responsibility

(c) Abbreviations for interested agencies obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List. Interested agencies should be identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on security index cards returned from Bureau.

(d) Abbreviation AEC immediately following abbreviation for agency having security responsibility when abbreviation of responsible agency on key facilities list is followed by asterisk, which denotes Atomic Energy Commission is involved in security responsibility. This data will appear on security index cards returned from the Bureau.

If subject of existing security index card is found to have become employed in a key facility, FD-122 must be submitted to Bureau with above-required key facility data set forth thereon. Case is then to be handled in accordance with instructions set forth below concerning key facility cases.

(3) [Deleted]

(4) Dissemination

Upon receipt of original complaint or allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, a summary of complaint and information concerning the individual should be furnished immediately by [letter] to interested intelligence agency. Intelligence agency should then be advised whether a security investigation is being conducted of the individual and, if investigation is being conducted, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion of investigation. Letter to intelligence agency should clearly point out that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation by FBI.

These instructions do not apply to allegations of espionage or those of such a confidential character as would not ordinarily be disseminated. Such information appearing to be of immediate interest to other intelligence agencies should be submitted to Bureau by most expeditious means, depending upon the circumstances, with a request that the Bureau consider advisability of disseminating it.

Disseminate copies of each report to local representatives of interested intelligence agencies as reflected in key facilities list, including in all cases the agency having security responsibility. Copies of reports for the Marine Corps should be disseminated locally to ONI.

Dissemination to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), the Research and Development Board (RDB), and the Maritime Administration (MA) will be made at the Bureau, and not in the field.

(5) Status of cases

After all active investigation conducted, place in a[closed] status. Forty-five days before report due, make case pending active and check with armed services representative at the key facility, or with other reliable sources, to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

d. Key figure and top functionary program

(1) General

Purpose of key figure and top functionary program is to select for special attention those individuals in a subversive movement who are of outstanding importance to the effectiveness of the movement.

Key figure and top functionary program is described below as pertaining to the Communist Party, USA. However, it also applies to important individuals active in or on behalf of other basic revolutionary groups.

(2) Key figures

(a) Definition

A key figure is an individual, either a member or nonmember of the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organization, who, by reason of his official position in the organization or his connections with the communist movement and his activities on its behalf, is considered of sufficient importance and potential dangerousness from an internal security standpoint to require immediate apprehension or detention in the event of an emergency. Individuals coming within the following categories shall be considered within the definition of a key figure:

I. National, district, and state officers and the principal officers of the local clubs of the Communist Party

II. The principal organizers of the Communist Party

III. Those communists who are executive officers or outstanding figures in established communist front or controlled organizations, foreign language groups, and Negro organizations infiltrated by communists

IV. Individuals extensively engaged in communist infiltration of the labor movement, including principal officers of labor organizations who are members of or closely affiliated with the Communist Party. In

VII. Maintenance of key figure list

(A) Each office must maintain current list of key figures including top functionaries. List may be kept by simple list system, by maintaining a file wherein all additions and deletions to the list are reported, or by a card index system. Maintain key figure list separate from security index.

(B) Key figures should retain their designation notwithstanding their departure for foreign travel or other circumstances requiring temporary discontinuance of investigation.

(C) Should a key figure become subject of a security of Government employees investigation, his name should continue to appear on the key figure list, but the investigation shall proceed in accordance with existing instructions governing SGE cases.

VIII. [Deleted]

(3) Top functionaries

(a) Definition

A top functionary is an individual, either a member or a nonmember of the Communist Party, to whom, because of his importance, it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention in order to keep abreast of communism on a national basis in the U. S. Necessarily, such an individual would be on a high policy level in the movement.

The term "top functionary" is not to be construed as requiring that individuals in this category must actually hold official positions in party organizations but shall be given a broad enough construction to include others who are of equal importance because of their influence in the movement itself, or their position and activities outside the party in labor, front, or similar organizations or movements.

(b) Manner of designation

Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate a subject as a top functionary. Submit such recommendation to Bureau by letter containing reasons for the recommendation. Bureau desires to be very selective in this matter and to concentrate on individuals who, on a national basis, are the guiding hands in the communist movement.

At the seat of Government a careful appraisal will be made of the field's recommendation, following which the office will be advised concerning the Bureau's decision on the recommendation.

(c) Regulations governing top functionaries

I. Regulations set forth under (2) (b) above pertaining to key figures relative to photographs, handwriting specimens, security index cards, change of office of origin, detcom tabbing, character of reports, and inclusion in the key figure list apply to individuals designated as top functionaries.

II. Reports
Submit reports on top functionaries quarterly. Make status pending-inactive if there are no outstanding leads for active investigation.

e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and [reserve]index

Individuals investigated by the Bureau under any character against whom subversive information is developed must be constantly borne in mind for inclusion in the security index and/or[reserve]index.

(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations
Subjects of these investigations must be included in the security index and/or the[reserve]index if they meet the standards for inclusion therein. It is the responsibility of the investigating Agent and field supervising official to make appropriate recommendations for preparation of the security index card and/or the [reserve]index card, whenever appropriate.

(2) Security of Government employees (SGE) investigations
Subjects of all SGE investigations against whom subversive derogatory information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or[reserve]index.

The Agent conducting investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer such cases to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling. Copies of reports[showing]disloyal information must be submitted to the field office covering the subject's residence, when developed by any other office.

When an individual who has previously been investigated under the SGE character is the subject of a security index card and is still employed by the Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, the dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and the character of the subject's security case should be used in the report being submitted. This will insure that the reports are referred to the appropriate desks for supervision at the Bureau, as well as in the field. These reports should be written according to the standards prevailing for SGE reports.

Disseminate these dual character reports the same as any other security report. Representatives of other intelligence agencies requesting reports[showing]the actual SGE investigation should be informed to direct the request to their Washington headquarters for referral to the Bureau.

(3) Atomic Energy Act, Voice of America applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations
Subjects of all above investigations against whom subversive information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or the[reserve]index. In each such case the Agent conducting the investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer the matter to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling.

Copies of reports[showing]disloyal information must be submitted to the office covering the subject's residence, whenever developed by another office.

(6) Character
- (a) Key figures and top functionaries
  Internal Security - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.
  Examples:
  Internal Security - C
  Internal Security - SWP
- (b) Others
  Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.
  Examples:
  Security Matter - C
  Security Matter - SWP
  Security Matter - X (native fascist)
  Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a key figure, the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject is designated a key figure, the first report after the designation and all subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. In any event, if subject is employed in a key facility, add the additional character "Internal Security Act of 1950" if the organizational activity of the subject is of a communist nature.

(7) Deleted

(8) Status
All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:
- (a) Top functionaries
  - I. Pending inactive
    - (A) Reports are to be submitted quarterly. Forty-five days prior to the date a quarterly report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.
- (b) Key figures
  - I. Pending inactive
    - (A) Reports are to be submitted semiannually. Forty-five days prior to the date a semiannual report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.
- (c) [Deleted]

(d) Other security index subjects

I. Closed

(A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of an annual investigative report. The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the annual report is due. Such cases shall also be opened and assigned six months after submission of the annual report to accomplish verification of addresses. Upon such verification, the cases should be closed administratively.

(e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index

I. Pending inactive

(A) If all active investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau

(B) Lead to follow Bureau for security index card should be set forth.

II. Closed

(A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau

(B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (d) above.

(f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein

I. Closed

(A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(9) [Content]

(a) [In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.]

I. Background

(A) Birth date

(B) Citizenship status

(C) Education

(D) Marital status

(E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)

(F) Identification record

(G) Employment

(H) Residence

(I) Status of health (if known)

II. Connections with Communist Party (or other basic revolutionary groups and/or front organizations)

(A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.

(B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

of the source, date of activity, date received, and name of the Agent receiving the information are known, it is not necessary to request the office originally obtaining the information to document it further by furnishing information showing the location of the original in the office files. If all documentation, except the latter item, is not in the possession of the office preparing the report, it should be obtained.

V. If it is found desirable to include in a report the identities of individuals who are known communists and have been associates of the subject to lend weight to evidence of the subject's potential dangerousness, only the source of the information showing the associate to be a communist need be identified.

VI. In a very limited number of instances it may be necessary to obtain a thumbnail sketch or characterization of an individual or organization from another office or the Bureau. When such information is received in your office, it should be placed in thumbnail sketch files so that it will be available to and can be readily located by Agents having future need for it, thereby eliminating repeated requests of another office for the same information.

g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases

Channelizing memoranda in organizational and individual security case files may be destroyed following submission of reports in these cases. In destroying these memoranda, be guided by the following instructions:

(1) The Agent, at the time he dictates the report, is to prepare a memorandum listing the channelizing memoranda to be destroyed by serial or serial scope and requesting the chief clerk's office to destroy. This memorandum should indicate that pertinent information contained in the serials to be destroyed was incorporated in the report. [Use form FD-338 for this purpose.]

(2) The cover pages accompanying the report will list the file and serial number of the original informant reports or master channelizing memoranda.

(3) In the case of multiple volumes the destruction memorandum should be prepared by the Agent in sufficient numbers so that one copy will appear in each volume of the multiple volume file being stripped.

(4) Prior to destruction, the Agent's recommendations are to be reviewed and approved by the supervisor at the time he reviews and approves the report.

(5) Employee destroying the channelizing memoranda must place date of destruction and his initials on the destruction memorandum. Thereafter, this memorandum will be filed in the case file as a permanent record of the serials destroyed.

(6) Technical and microphone surveillance channelizing memoranda may be destroyed without the necessity of identifying in the cover pages of the report the exact location in the office files of the original information. The use of an asterisk identifies the source and the original information can be readily located.

(7) [Channelizing memoranda of translations of foreign language newspapers and periodicals may be destroyed provided the original translation is maintained in the main file of the publication concerned.]

(8) Do not destroy channelizing memoranda in the following instances:

locate subjects are not to be submitted. The Bureau will closely follow investigative action to locate missing security index subjects.

II. If you receive indications that the subject went to Mexico or Canada, request the Bureau to alert other appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to determine any available verifying information through liaison channels.

III. If the subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, the Washington Field Office should be requested to check the records of the Passport Office of the State Department for verification.

IV. When all logical leads have been exhausted in the case of a missing important functionary, consideration should be given to circularizing all field offices with the subject's photograph and background information for the purpose of alerting the entire field to the identity of the subject. Bureau authority must be obtained before circularization is made. In seeking Bureau authority, advise the Bureau as to the position held by the subject and what efforts have already been made to locate him.

If this procedure is to be effective, its application must necessarily be restrictive in the number of subjects to which it is applied. Therefore, requests to circularize must be made only after every possible lead has been exhausted and then only in the cases of the most important missing functionaries.

(4) Individuals traveling abroad (If subject is a resident alien, also consider section 105E, 4, volume IV, of this manual.)
When information is received indicating that
[[a subject of a current or past security investigation,
[a past member of a basic revolutionary organization,
[a member since July, 1950, of an organization designated
[pursuant to Executive Order 10450,
[a member since July, 1950, of an organization declared
[subversive by the House Committee on Un-American
[Activities or other legislative committees, or
[a member since July, 1950, of an organization described
[by reliable informants or sources as being dominated or
[controlled by one of the basic revolutionary organizations]
intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel, take the following action:

(a) Immediately advise the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination, setting forth complete available details concerning the foreign travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, the exact name under which the passport was issued, the number of the passport, and the office issuing the passport, if known. However, do not delay advising the Bureau of the actual or intended travel while developing the above information as time is of the essence in this matter.

(b) Set out a lead for the Washington Field Office for a check of the records of the Passport Office, Department of State; however, do not limit efforts to develop above information to a check of such records.

(c) In the case of an individual previously the subject of investigation, the case should be brought up to date by the prompt submission of a report in the event there is unreported information contained in the file. If reports have not previously been submitted in the case, a letterhead memorandum summarizing the available subversive data should accompany the initial letter advising the Bureau of the proposed travel.

(d) Information concerning these subjects' proposed travel abroad, including information concerning their subversive activities, is furnished by the Bureau to the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and legal attaches if the proposed travel is in areas covered by such and, frequently, requests are made of one or all of the above to place stops with appropriate security services abroad to be advised of the activities of these subjects.

(e) When information is received that an individual with a subversive background[falling within the categories set out previously herein]is forming a tour group for foreign travel or an organization which is considered subversive is sponsoring such a tour, advise appropriate offices under the caption of the tour name or the organization sponsoring the tour of the identities of the individuals participating in the tour and furnish the Bureau a letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination to the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and appropriate legal attaches, including therein all readily available information pertaining to the tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names of individuals making up the tour with addresses, if available, and a thumbnail sketch of the organization or individual sponsoring the tour.

Letterhead memoranda relating to the tours will be disseminated by the Bureau with a statement that, as individuals participating are identified, recipients will be furnished with memoranda under the individual case caption where those individuals are found to have subversive backgrounds. Therefore, the appropriate field offices should immediately identify and submit individual memoranda concerning such individuals. The details of travel will be replaced by a reference to the memorandum previously prepared under the caption of the organization sponsoring the tour. Prepare individual memoranda only in the cases of individuals with subversive backgrounds[falling within the categories set out previously herein.]

In addition, appropriate offices should submit a letter to the Bureau under the organization caption listing the names of those individuals residing within their territory who are traveling with the tour group and on whom no subversive information is found.

(f) Advise the Bureau promptly in form suitable for dissemination of a subject's return from travel abroad in those instances in which stops have been placed with security services abroad through the agencies listed above. In instances in which an individual against whom stops have been placed has traveled to any country behind the Iron Curtain, the Bureau shall also be furnished at that time with recommendations as to the desirability of interview of such person and with advice as to whether additional investigation concerning him is contemplated. In the event such an interview is authorized, it shall be conducted promptly and the case shall not be closed until such interview is had and the results thereof submitted in report form.

(g) In some instances a security investigation of a subject not yet included in the security index may be in progress at the time it is found that the subject has recently departed for a foreign country. If the evidence developed at that time warrants the inclusion of the subject in the security index were it not for the fact that he is outside the U. S., form FD-122 should be submitted recommending his inclusion in the unavailable section of the security index. After all initial investigation is completed, the subject's case will be handled the same as those of other subjects of a similar status who are included in the unavailable section as out of the country.

If the subject is an alien who has been deported or has otherwise permanently departed from the U. S., he should not be included in the security index.

When it is determined that a security index subject has departed for a foreign country, his security index card shall be placed in the unavailable section and his case handled in accordance with the instructions set forth under 87D 7b (6) (b) IV.

(5) Investigative techniques

While it is not possible to enumerate all investigative techniques which can and should be employed in these investigations, there are certain proven techniques which have been used with continued success and should be applied wherever possible.

(a) File reviews

Upon the initiation of a security investigation of an individual, check the office indices and review files thoroughly for any pertinent information on record showing background and subversive activity of each individual subject. Include such information in the initial investigative report.

Once a main security file has been opened for an individual, subsequent information received concerning him should be channelized to that file. The reference cards pertaining to the subject should be consolidated in the indices after each check and review of files has been made.

(b) Security informants

Success of security investigations of individuals is primarily dependent upon a broad confidential informant coverage within every phase of subversive activity. Information and evidence developed through such sources are unsurpassed in value because of possible use not only for intelligence purposes but also as admissible evidence.

(B) During the first contact, the interviewing Agent will introduce himself as a Special Agent of the FBI by use of credentials or badge and will open the conversation by using an appropriate pretext or by reciting the Bureau's responsibilities in the security field and asking the subject whether he can be of assistance to the Government. If the individual has been a member of a basic revolutionary organization and indicates he might cooperate, he may be questioned during the initial contact about his own activities in order to further ascertain the extent to which he will cooperate. This original interview is for the sole purpose of allowing the Agent to determine whether the individual being interviewed might be cooperative.

(e) Prior Bureau authority

I. Subjects of active current investigations where no interview with prior Bureau authority has previously been conducted

II. Closed cases where the subject is on the security index and no prior interview has been conducted

III. Subjects of investigations requested by the Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant-type cases, loyalty cases, etc.

IV. Any persons where circumstances indicate a delicate situation exists and a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, religious field, publishing houses, labor leaders, and the like. Bureau authority must be requested with respect to situations of this kind even though prior interviews have been had with these interviewees.

V. Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts

VI. Subjects of section A reserve index cards

In any of the above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview a subject of a security investigation except those persons under IV above. This does not relieve you of the responsibility of submitting reports in security cases when due; e.g., annual reports in routine security index cases and six-month reports in key figure cases.

VII. The request for Bureau authority for the interview should be set forth in the first paragraph of the letter and unless you are recommending a special manner or procedure for conducting the interview, the first paragraph should contain the following statements:

"Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If this subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during the initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of the Manual of Instructions [will be] conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as a PSI."

[Form FD-336 contains the above statement and may be used in requesting Bureau authority for the interview.]

The above statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents during initial contacts and recontacts from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potentialities as an informant.

VIII. Letters requesting Bureau authority for the interview must contain the following information, if available:

(A) Residence address, occupation, employment and race of subject, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health

(B) Marital status. If married, the occupation, employment, and race of the spouse.

(C) Length of time subject a member of or affiliated with subversive organizations and positions he held in such organizations. In cases in which investigation is based on some allegation or circumstances of a security nature other than membership in or affiliation with subversive organizations, facts upon which investigation is predicated should be briefly set forth.

(D) If married, information indicating the spouse is or has been a member of or affiliated with subversive groups, the position held in such groups, and the length of time of such membership or affiliation

(E) Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups

(F) Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of the subject and, if married, of the spouse

(G) What is expected to be gained by the interview

IX. In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding the seven items listed above must be set out under the appropriate number but the above headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any of the items, you should make the appropriate comments after the respective number.

X. All letters requesting Bureau authority to interview the subject of a security investigation must be personally approved by the SAC.

XI. One of the required copies of the letter to the Bureau should consist only of the first page of the letter. When unnecessary for Bureau to issue specific instructions or comments in connection with authorizing an interview, the Bureau will approve the request by placing an appropriate rubber-stamp impression on the single-page copy of the incoming letter and return it by routing slip.

[[XII. Upon receipt of Bureau authority, the interview must be conducted within[45]days. If this is impossible, advise Bureau of the reasons why the interview was not effected and state that the subject will be contacted within the next[45]days. At the end of the second[45-day]period if the interview has not been conducted, request additional authority. Include in the letters any new information bearing upon the advisability of conducting the interview.

(f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews

I. Interviews must be conducted by two Special Agents. An Agent experienced in security investigations who has knowledge of Bureau regulations regarding development of informants must conduct the actual interrogation. Approach need not be made by both Agents at the same time and one Agent may observe from a secure distance. Background of subject and individual circumstances will determine exactly how approach should be handled in each case. Two Agents should be physically present during any interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all types of Bureau cases.

II. Preparations for interview must be thorough and conducted so that interviewing Agents will not be compromised, the Bureau will not be embarrassed, and confidential informants will not be exposed.

(10) Submit semiannual letters March 1 and September 1 under caption "Communist Infiltration of Mass Organizations," Bufile 100-3-106. Set forth desired data utilizing following topical outline and headings:

(a) I. Data concerning Communist Party program
Set forth details of data received concerning Communist Party's program, both nationally and locally, to infiltrate mass organizations; steps taken to carry out program; and success being achieved by party.

(b) II. Organizations concerning which data previously submitted
[Only]list names and Bureau file numbers, if known, of those organizations concerning which data has been furnished to Bureau since submission of previous semiannual letter.

(c)III. Organizations concerning which data being submitted by instant letter
List the names and Bureau file numbers, if known, of those organizations concerning which data is being submitted with semiannual letter[for the first time.] Submit data as enclosure to letter. Utilize five-point outline set out under item (4) above. Submit separate enclosure on each organization listed in this category. Furnish two copies of each enclosure and sufficient copies of cover letter in order that copy of semiannual letter and enclosure can be placed in Bureau file on organization. This will eliminate necessity of submitting summary letter under each individual case caption. Do not use T symbols in enclosure, but set out identity of sources.

f. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Bureau Agents during course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority.

g. Photographic surveillances

(1) No photographic surveillances are to be conducted in communist front organization cases unless it is essential to protect Bureau's interests in internal security field by supplementing live informant coverage of a particular meeting with such a surveillance.

(2) Request Bureau authority to institute such a surveillance and outline manner in which it will be conducted and supervision which will be afforded it.

(3) No such surveillances should be instituted without specific Bureau authority.

3. Investigative procedures and suggestions re communist front organizations
To accurately and clearly show true nature of communist front groups, data concerning the following topics, where applicable, should be fully developed and reported on:

a. Origin and scope
Date of formation. Circumstances under which founded. Determine who in Communist Party instructed organization be set up; whether decision to set up group made at meeting of party functionaries and, if so, identify functionaries present; identity of individual or individuals responsible for organizing group. Identify all known chapters, if any, and location thereof.

b. Whether incorporated
Many organizations are incorporated requiring filing of incorporation papers with appropriate state officials.

c. Aims and purposes

d. Location of headquarters

e. Officers
List principal officers, board of directors, etc., and appropriate characterization of each showing communist affiliation.

f. Membership
Ascertain estimated membership. Whenever possible, secure membership lists, mailing lists, or other records reflecting affiliation with organization. Usually obtainable through informant coverage or utilization of various investigative techniques. Secure accurate description of all lists to make sure there is no confusion as to the exact identity or significance of list being reported on.

g. Official organ, if any, and other literature
(1) May be obtained through confidential mailbox, panel sources, and confidential informants
(2) All such literature should be appropriately identified.
(3) At least one copy of each pertinent piece of literature should be promptly furnished to Bureau.

h. General activities

i. Finances
Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Location of bank accounts frequently obtainable through confidential informants, credit records, public utility records, records of rental agent, and monitoring of other organizations' bank accounts.

j. Support given to Communist Party
Preponderance of evidence should be developed reflecting support, financial or otherwise, given by the organization to the Communist Party.

k. Support received from Communist Party
Preponderance of evidence should be developed reflecting support, financial or otherwise, received by the organization from the Communist Party.

l. Implementation of Communist Party line
Can usually be shown through comparison of programs and literature of organization with those of Communist Party during any particular period.

Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through the following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various types of public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of information, interviews with past or present

locate subjects are not to be submitted. The Bureau will closely follow investigative action to locate missing security index subjects.

II. If you receive indications that the subject went to Mexico or Canada, request the Bureau to alert other appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to determine any available verifying information through liaison channels.

III. If the subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, the Washington Field Office should be requested to check the records of the Passport Office of the State Department for verification.

IV. When all logical leads have been exhausted in the case of a missing important functionary, consideration should be given to circularizing all field offices with the subject's photograph and background information for the purpose of alerting the entire field to the identity of the subject. Bureau authority must be obtained before circularization is made. In seeking Bureau authority, advise the Bureau as to the position held by the subject and what efforts have already been made to locate him.

If this procedure is to be effective, its application must necessarily be restrictive in the number of subjects to which it is applied. Therefore, requests to circularize must be made only after every possible lead has been exhausted and then only in the cases of the most important missing functionaries.

[[(4) Individuals traveling abroad[(If subject is a resident alien, also consider section 105E, 4, volume IV, of this manual.)]

When information is received indicating that any individual on whom we have subversive derogatory information intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel, take the following action:

(a) Immediately advise the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination, setting forth complete available details concerning the foreign travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, the exact name under which the passport was issued, the number of the passport, and the office issuing the passport, if known. However, do not delay advising the Bureau of the actual or intended travel while developing the above information as time is of the essence in this matter.

(b) Set out a lead for the Washington Field Office for a check of the records of the Passport Office, Department of State; however, do not limit efforts to develop above information to a check of such records.

(c) In the case of an individual previously the subject of investigation, the case should be brought up to date by the prompt submission of a report in the event there is unreported information contained in the file. If reports have not previously been submitted in the case, a letterhead memorandum summarizing the available subversive data should accompany the initial letter advising the Bureau of the proposed travel.

(d) Information concerning these subjects' proposed travel abroad, including information concerning their subversive activities, is furnished by the Bureau to the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and legal attaches if the proposed travel is in areas covered by such and, frequently, requests are made of one or all of the above to place stops with appropriate security services abroad to be advised of the activities of these subjects.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page
- V. Inactive section 56
- (7) Periodic verification of addresses 57
- (8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards 58
- (9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards 58
  - (a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries 58
  - (b) Key figures and top functionaries 59
  - (c) Subjects tabbed for Detcom 60
  - (d) Subjects not included in security index 60
- (10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index 60
  - (a) Death of subject 60
  - (b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction 60
  - (c) Imprisonment of subject 60
  - (d) Induction of subject into the armed forces 60
  - (e) Security informants 60
  - (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous 61
  - (g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection...... 61
  - (h) Subjects of Chinese extraction........ 62
- (11) Priority apprehension program (DETCOM) 62
  - (a) Purpose 62
  - (b) Subjects to be tabbed detcom 62
  - (c) Recommendations for and removal of detcom designation 63
  - (d) Administrative procedures for handling detcom program 63
  - (e) General 64
- c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities . 64
  - (1) Responsibility 64
  - (2) Inclusion in security index 65
  - (3) Deleted
  - (4) Dissemination 65
  - (5) Status of cases 66
- d. Key figure and top functionary program 66
  - (1) General 66
  - (2) Key figures 66
    - (a) Definition 66
    - (b) Regulations governing the handling of the key figure program 67
      - I. Designation and deletion of key figure status 67
      - II. Photographs 67
      - III. Handwriting specimens 67
      - IV. Security index cards 68
      - V. Change of office of origin 68
      - VI. Reports 68
      - VII. Maintenance of key figure list 69
      - VIII. Transmitting list of key figures to Bureau ... 69
  - (3) Top functionaries 69
    - (a) Definition 69
    - (b) Manner of designation 69
    - (c) Regulations governing top functionaries 70
- e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index........ 70

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page
(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations 70
(2) Security of Government employees investigations 70
(3) Atomic Energy Act, Voice of America applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations 70
f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports. 71
(1) General 71
(2) Origin 72
(3) Deleted
(4) Classification 72
(5) Title 72
(6) Character 73
(a) Key figures and top functionaries 73
(b) Others 73
(7) Deleted
(8) Status 73
(a) Top functionaries 73
(b) Key figures 73
(c) Security index subjects employed in key facilities 73
(d) Other security index subjects 74
(e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index . 74
(f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein 74
(9) Content 74
(10) Administrative data 77
(a) General 77
(b) Documentation of reports 78
g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases 78a
8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations 79
a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau 80
(1) Aliens and naturalized citizens 80
(2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services 80
(3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense 80
(4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard 80

of the source, date of activity, date received, and name of the Agent receiving the information are known, it is not necessary to request the office originally obtaining the information to document it further by furnishing information showing the location of the original in the office files. If all documentation, except the latter item, is not in the possession of the office preparing the report, it should be obtained.

V. If it is found desirable to include in a report the identities of individuals who are known communists and have been associates of the subject to lend weight to evidence of the subject's potential dangerousness, only the source of the information showing the associate to be a communist need be identified.

VI. In a very limited number of instances it may be necessary to obtain a thumbnail sketch or characterization of an individual or organization from another office or the Bureau. When such information is received in your office, it should be placed in thumbnail sketch files so that it will be available to and can be readily located by Agents having future need for it, thereby eliminating repeated requests of another office for the same information.

[g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases

Channelizing memoranda in organizational and individual security case files may be destroyed following submission of reports in these cases. In destroying these memoranda, be guided by the following instructions:

(1) The Agent, at the time he dictates the report, is to prepare a memorandum listing the channelizing memoranda to be destroyed by serial or serial scope and requesting the chief clerk's office to destroy. This memorandum should indicate that pertinent information contained in the serials to be destroyed was incorporated in the report.

(2) The cover pages accompanying the report will list the file and serial number of the original informant reports or master channelizing memoranda.

(3) In the case of multiple volumes the destruction memorandum should be prepared by the Agent in sufficient numbers so that one copy will appear in each volume of the multiple volume file being stripped.

(4) Prior to destruction, the Agent's recommendations are to be reviewed and approved by the supervisor at the time he reviews and approves the report.

(5) Employee destroying the channelizing memoranda must place date of destruction and his initials on the destruction memorandum. Thereafter, this memorandum will be filed in the case file as a permanent record of the serial destroyed.

(6) Technical and microphone surveillance channelizing memoranda may be destroyed without the necessity of identifying in the cover pages of the report the exact location in the office files of the original information. The use of an asterisk identifies the source and the original information can be readily located.

(7) Do not destroy channelizing memoranda in the following instances:

[(a) When the original information is not contained elsewhere in your office

(b) Serial one of a file regardless of its nature

(c) Serials containing indexing. It would appear that if indexing was necessary to channelizing memoranda, such indexing would only be done in the main case file as set forth in the title of the communication.

(d) Serials showing "action" information; e.g., opening, closing, posting, or instructions given by a supervisor to an Agent concerning the case.

The destruction of these channelizing memoranda should be subject to close supervisory control to insure that all pertinent information contained in these memoranda is reported in the investigative report.]

8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations

The proper utilization of information received by the Bureau is foremost among our responsibilities as an investigative agency. It is the Bureau's duty to keep the proper intelligence agencies informed concerning information of interest to them. Further, information which comes to the attention of the Bureau in connection with the conduct of investigations normally and regularly within the jurisdiction of the Bureau, which information is believed to be of interest to another agency within the executive branch of the Government, should be forwarded to the interested agency unless there are good and compelling reasons not to do so. This is in line with the Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives which provide for the dissemination to other agencies of information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters where the specific agency has a present or potential interest in the information.

Set out hereafter is a summarization of existing Bureau requirements regarding dissemination of security information developed on individuals during the course of regular investigations in the security field. It

should be apparent that all conceivable situations cannot be anticipated. For that reason, the data below should be considered as pertaining to representative situations which occur frequently enough to warrant specific treatment. The basic rule to follow is, of course, that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in the executive branch of the Government and that the term "interested agency" must be interpreted in the light of reason and common sense. Any unusual situations should be brought to the attention of the Bureau promptly for consideration and disposition.

Considerations affecting the national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico necessitate that the broadest possible construction be given to the existing requirements of dissemination to the intelligence services located in those areas. The Anchorage, Honolulu, and San Juan Offices should adhere to such policy and effect such dissemination as to discharge fully our responsibilities as laid down in Bureau instructions, together with practices which have been dictated by circumstances within those particular offices.

[The material set out below must be read in conjunction with the Manual of Rules and Regulations,[part II,]section 5, which discusses the Bureau's over-all responsibilities in dissemination, together with existing policies, qualifications, and exceptions.

a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau

(1) Aliens and naturalized citizens
Information concerning aliens and naturalized citizens which might have a bearing on the deportation or denaturalization of such individuals should in all instances be forwarded to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Refer to
[the Manual of Rules and Regulations,[part II,]section 5. If any doubt exists, the matter should in all instances be resolved in favor of dissemination.

(2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services
Dissemination in these cases is treated specifically in section 87D 7c (4) of this manual.

(3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense
Dissemination should be made locally to G-2 and, in addition, to other intelligence services if their interest is apparent in individual cases or in specific facilities.

(4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard
Dissemination should be made locally to the appropriate military intelligence service. Dissemination to headquarters of the appropriate services will be made at SOG.

(5) Seamen and subjects employed in the maritime industry, including longshoremen and other water-front employees
Dissemination should be made to the Coast Guard on a local level and, when circumstances dictate, to other intelligence agencies, including ONI, which have an interest in the data reported. Appropriate dissemination on a headquarters level will be made at SOG.

(6) Employees of the Federal Government within the purview of Executive Order 10450
No dissemination of the reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in the field. If, however, subject is employed

(l) Handwriting specimens

I. If, during the investigation of security matter cases, it is disclosed that samples of the subject's handwriting are readily available, obtain specimens for possible future use and maintain in the file in the field.

II. A case is not to be left in a pending status merely for the purpose of obtaining handwriting specimens.

III. Handwriting specimens must be obtained for all key figures and forwarded to the Bureau.

[(m) Labor union membership

If the subject is being investigated because of Communist Party membership, ascertain the identity of any labor organization of which he is a member and what position he holds in the labor organization, if any. (See section 124, volume IV, of this manual for possible violations involved.)]

(2) Subversive activity

(a) Membership or affiliation

Obtain admissible and convincing evidence that the subject is a member of, or affiliated with, one of the basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations wherever possible. Such evidence may be either direct or circumstantial, or both. It is not possible to list the innumerable and varied forms in which such evidence may be found. Some of the more common types are:

I. Oral or written statements or admissions of the subject made publicly or privately to other individuals

II. Statements of confidential informants and other persons who are in a position to know the facts and can testify to them

III. Official letterheads and documents of subversive organizations containing information which identifies the subjects with the organizations. This will include membership and dues records wherever obtainable.

IV. Selective service records in which the subject admits membership in or position with a subversive organization

V. Attendance at closed meetings and conventions of a subversive organization

VI. Letters to publications, public officials, or other persons signed by the subject in an official position with a subversive organization or wherein the subject admits membership in or adherence to the principles of a subversive organization

VII. Recruitment or attempt to recruit members for a subversive organization

VIII. Solicitations or contributions of funds for subversive organization

IX. Seeking public office as a candidate for a subversive organization

X. Association with other individuals who are known to be members of or affiliated with subversive organizations

With regard to the question of membership, attention is directed to section 87H of this manual relating to the provisions of the Communist Control Act of 1954. This act sets out a list of 14 criteria itemized in 87H 2, which should be considered "in determining membership or participation in the Communist Party or any other organization defined in this Act, or knowledge of the purpose or objective of such party or organization...." These criteria include, e.g., listing as a member in organization records, contributions to the organization, and acceptance of organization discipline.

(b) Knowledge of aims and purposes

Admissible and convincing evidence that the subject knows the aims and purposes of the subversive organizations to overthrow the Government by force and violence should also be obtained. Mere proof of membership in or affiliation with such an organization is not sufficient to prove such knowledge.

Proof that the subject has such knowledge of the revolutionary purposes of the organization may be existent in several forms, several of which are discussed below:

I. Direct admissible evidence, such as statements made by the subject, or by responsible officials of the subversive organization in the subject's presence at organizational classes or meetings expounding the organization's doctrine in which the necessity or advisability of using force or violence in the overthrow of the Government is asserted, should be obtained, if at all possible.

Occasionally, statements of this nature are available in the subject's writings, sometimes in an indirect or veiled form.

II. Length of time in a subversive organization
III. Official positions held in the organization especially in educational, propaganda, or policy-making capacities
IV. Charter membership in the organization, participation in the original establishment of the organization
V. Extensive and long-continued participation in various organizational activities
VI. Attendance or teaching at organization schools or classes, especially leadership classes
VII. Preparation or distribution of party propaganda
VIII. Recruiting and fund-raising activities
IX. Possession of Marxist or revolutionary literature
X. Urging others to read literature of a revolutionary character, etc.

While none of the above types of evidence may be of sufficient value alone, a combination of a number of them may constitute convincing proof.

It should be remembered that the revolutionary purposes of a subversive organization are frequently cloaked in veiled language or in language significant only to persons familiar with Marxist or revolutionary terminology. Such obscure statements should not be ignored, but should be fully reported as it may be possible in legal proceedings to bring out the significance of such statements through expert witnesses, the testimony of informants, or the introduction of literature clarifying them. Confidential informants and other sources should be carefully interrogated and files thoroughly reviewed for the purpose of developing all revolutionary statements. In such instances, complete details should be obtained, together with all corroborating evidence. The names of all persons present when such statements are made should be ascertained and the facts reported in the individual case file of the person making the statement and of all persons present when the statement was made. The circumstances under which the statement was made should, of course, be ascertained and reported.

(c) Position and importance

I. Information reflecting the importance of an individual to a subversive organization or movement should be fully developed and reported. The member or affiliate may be dangerous or important because of his position, influence or activities outside the organization, or both. The facts in this regard should be fully developed. The individual may hold an important and strategic position or exercise great influence in a labor organization or other mass organization; in a racial, nationality, youth or other group; in an important front organization; in radio, newspaper, motion picture or other cultural,

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

D. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS 19
- 1. Definitions 19
- 2. Responsibility of the Bureau 19
- 3. Purpose of investigation 19
  - a. Determination of dangerousness 19
  - b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes 19
- 4. Individuals to be investigated 22
  - a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49 22
  - b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements 22
  - c. Special training in a subversive movement 23
  - d. Military service 23
  - e. Employment in key facilities 23
  - f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs 23
- 5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals 24
  - a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning 24
    - (1) Subjects connected with institutions of learning 24
      - (a) Prior Bureau authority to institute investigation . 24
        - I. Faculty members 24
        - II. Students and nonacademic employees 24
        - III. Requests for Bureau authority 24
      - (b) Contacts during investigation 25
        - I. Persons permissible to contact 25
          - (A) Established reliable sources 25
          - (B) Individuals not connected with institutions of learning 25
          - (C) Registrars 25
        - II. Superiors of faculty members 25
        - III. Students, faculty members, or other employees.. 25
      - (c) Receiving voluntary information 25
    - (2) Subjects not connected with an institution of learning . 25
    - (3) Contacts of foreign establishments 25
  - b. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations or international organizations, and members of the armed forces 25
- 6. Investigative procedures concerning individuals 26
  - a. General 26
  - b. Scope of investigations 26
    - (1) Background 26
      - (a) True name and aliases 26
      - (b) Residence address 26
      - (c) Occupation or business 26
      - (d) Business or employment address 26
      - (e) Citizenship status 26
        - I. Alien 26
        - II. Naturalized citizen 26
        - III. Native-born citizen 26
      - (f) Nationality background 26
      - (g) Military record 27
      - (h) Close relatives in armed forces 27
      - (i) Identification record - (Security flash notice FD-165) 27
      - (j) Physical description 28
      - (k) Photograph 28
      - (l) Handwriting specimens 29

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

(2) Subversive activity 29
  (a) Membership or affiliation 29
  (b) Knowledge of aims and purposes 29
  (c) Position and importance 30
(3) Missing subjects 31
(4) Individuals traveling abroad 33
(5) Investigative techniques 34
  (a) File reviews 34
  (b) Security informants 34
  (c) Physical surveillances 35
  (d) Photographic surveillances 35
  (e) Public sources 36
  (f) Records of private firms 36
  (g) Mail covers 36
  (h) Trash covers 36
  (i) Channelizing information to case files 36
(6) Preservation of evidence 37
(7) Interviews with subjects of security investigations 38
  (a) Purpose 38
  (b) Subjects not included in the security index 38
  (c) Security index subjects 38
  (d) Without Bureau authority the SAC may.......... 38
  (e) Prior Bureau authority.......... 39
  (f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews.......... 40
  (g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects.......... 42

7. Administrative procedures 42a
  a. Reserve index.......... 42a
    (1) Purpose 42a
    (2) Individuals to be included 42a
    (3) Arrangement 42b
    (4) Content 43
    (5) Removal and deletion of cards 43
  b. Security index 43
    (1) Purpose 43
    (2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual 44
    (3) Criteria for placing and retaining names in the security index 45
    (4) Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards 46a
    (5) Content and appearance of security index card 48
      (a) Data to appear on face of card 48
      (b) Data to appear on separate attached card 50
    (6) Arrangement of the security index 50
      (a) At Bureau 50
      (b) In the field office 51
        I. Geographical section 51
        II. Alphabetical section 51
        III. Special section 52
          (A) Espionage subjects 52
          (B) U. S. Government employees 52
          (C) Atomic energy program employees 52
          (D) Foreign government employees 52
          (E) United Nations Secretariat and other international organization employees 52
          (F) Pro-Tito individuals 52
        IV. Unavailable section 53
          (A) Missing subjects 54
          (B) Subjects out of the country 54
          (C) Imprisoned subjects 54
          (D) Exception - re special section 56

This should be done prior to requesting authority to institute the investigation where sufficient identifying information is not otherwise available.

(b) Contacts during investigation

I. Once Bureau authority is granted to conduct the investigation, it is permissible to contact:

(A) All established reliable sources, including those connected with the institution of learning

(B) All individuals not connected with the institution of learning who, consistent with discretion, would be contacted in a usual security case; e.g., neighbors, credit agencies, past employers, etc.

(C) Registrars
If the registrar is reliable and can be depended upon not to divulge the Bureau's identity, Bureau authority is not needed in these cases to contact the registrar's office to obtain background data useful for identification purposes, to develop other proper investigative leads, or to verify connection with the institution of learning.

II. Superiors of faculty members
No contact should be made with the superiors of a subject who is a member of the faculty since the superiors might take action against the subject as a result of our contact.

III. Students, faculty members, or other employees
If, during the course of an investigation of a subject who is connected with an institution of learning, it is desired to interview a student, faculty member, or other employee of an institution of learning who is not an established reliable source, prior Bureau authority must be obtained. When requesting authority to interview such an individual, that individual's name, position, and a positive statement concerning his discretion and reliability should be furnished to the Bureau.

(c) Receiving voluntary information
These instructions must not deter or prevent the immediate and proper interview of any person connected with an institution of learning who desires of his own volition to furnish information to the Bureau or who desires to be contacted by an Agent.

(2) Subjects not connected with an institution of learning
When the subject of a security-type investigation is not connected with an institution of learning and you desire to interview, in connection with the case, a student, faculty member, or other employee of an institution of learning, prior Bureau authority must be obtained for such an interview unless the student, faculty member, or other employee is an established reliable contact of the office. In requesting authority, the name, position, and a positive statement concerning that person's discretion and reliability should be furnished to the Bureau.

(3) Contacts of foreign establishments
In connection with investigations of contacts of Soviet, satellite, and Yugoslav officials and official establishments, [except for inquiries of reliable established sources,]Bureau authority must be obtained before conducting any inquiries or surveillances at any school, college, or university. Submit complete facts and your recommendation when requesting such authority.

b. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations or international organizations, and members of the armed forces
Should information be received or investigation develop the fact that an individual being investigated under a security caption is or becomes

an employee of the U.S. Government, of a foreign official establishment, of the United Nations or other international organizations, has foreign diplomatic or official status or is a member of the U.S. armed forces, the matter should be immediately reported to the Bureau and no further investigation should be conducted except upon specific Bureau authority.

6. Investigative procedures concerning individuals

a. General

These investigations must be thorough and exhaustive. Obviously, the dangerousness of an individual cannot be determined through cursory investigation. All pertinent information concerning the subject's background and subversive activity must be fully developed and reported to assure an accurate evaluation of his degree of dangerousness.

Due to the intelligence nature of these investigations, discretion must be used at all times to prevent subjects from becoming unduly apprised that they are under investigation by this Bureau.

Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during the course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority.

b. Scope of investigations

Set forth below are items which should be obtained during these investigations.

(1) Background
- (a) True name and aliases
- (b) Residence address
- (c) Occupation or business
- (d) Business or employment address
- (e) Citizenship status

  Ascertain the citizenship status of the subject as early as possible in the investigation.

  I. Alien
    - (A) If the subject is an alien, determine the date and place of birth.
    - (B) Determine his nationality (that is, the country of which he is a citizen or sovereign of which he is a subject), together with the date, port and vessel or other means of entry into the U.S.
    - (C) Determine whether the subject entered as an immigrant or nonimmigrant.
    - (D) Ascertain any steps taken toward naturalization and reason for denial of citizenship where such denial exists.
    - (E) Ascertain any available facts indicating whether entry into the U.S. was legal or illegal.

  II. Naturalized citizen
    - (A) Ascertain date and place of birth, nationality prior to naturalization, date, port and vessel or other means of entry into the U.S.
    - (B) Ascertain the date when, place and court where, subject was naturalized and any facts tending to indicate fraud or illegality in connection with his naturalization.
    - (C) Ascertain the last place of foreign residence, place from which the subject emigrated to the U.S. and the date of such emigration.
    - (D) Ascertain any absences from the U.S.

  III. Native-born citizen
    - (A) Determine date and place of birth.
- (f) Nationality background

  I. During the course of investigation, efforts should be made to ascertain from sources contacted the date and place of birth of the subject's parents and spouse and the parents of the spouse.

II. No investigation should be conducted solely to obtain such information but include such data in the report. Separate reports setting out such data are not desired.

(g) Military record

I. Determine whether the subject has ever served in the U. S. armed forces.

II. Determine the time, place, and circumstances of such service, as well as the type of discharge received.

III. Report information concerning membership in veterans' organizations.

IV. Determine whether subject ever served in the armed forces of any foreign government, in connection with which available pertinent facts should be obtained.

(h) Close relatives in armed forces

I. Determine whether the subject has any close relatives in the armed forces or in other positions of trust and confidence, whether public or private, having to do with national defense.

(i) Identification record

I. Be alert for indications a subject of a security investigation has an identification record[showing] arrests and/or civil data. Local police records should be checked.

II. When a subject has been approved for the security index[or reserve index A,]submit form FD-165 to request a check of the records of the Identification Division and the posting of a flash notice if fingerprints are found. FD-165 will be returned if a positive identification cannot be made with fingerprints already on file. In such cases, either copies of one or more identification records which may or may not pertain to the subject will be attached or the form will be stamped: "Unable to identify in Ident Division files. Bureau should be furnished fingerprints or additional identifying data."

III. The office of origin is responsible for effecting identification when a record has been furnished by the Identification Division as being possibly identical. If a positive identification cannot be made, it is not necessary to communicate with the Identification Division.

IV. Security flash notice (form FD-165)

(A) Flash notices shall be placed with the Identification Division on security index subjects[and reserve index A subjects]who have identification records. Form FD-165 is used to place and cancel these notices and to obtain a transcript of subject's record.

(B) Do not maintain a security flash notice for any security index[or reserve index A]subject when no identification record for subject exists in the Identification Division.

(C) Do not place a security flash notice on a subject of a security investigation who is not included in the security index[or reserve index A.]

(D) When the office of origin for a security index [or reserve index A]subject against whose identification record a notice has been placed is changed, form FD-128[or FD-128a,]submitted to change office of origin, should[show]that a security flash notice has been posted with the Identification Division. An extra copy of the form FD-128[or FD-128a] should be specifically sent to the Identification Division in order that its records will[show]the new office of origin to which future records will be[submitted.]

(E) Cancel a security flash notice when (1) it is learned that the subject of such is deceased or (2) such subject is determined to be no longer of security interest. Do not cancel the security flash notice when a subject is removed from the security index solely by application of the security index criteria.

(j) Physical description

I. Obtain and report a detailed physical description.

II. During the course of the initial investigation in any security-type case, including espionage and nationalistic tendency cases, the physical characteristics and description of the subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation. It is not necessary to observe personally the subject of any case where preliminary investigation determines the basis for opening the case is unfounded.

III. The subject should be personally observed, if possible, early in the investigation after it is determined that a complete investigation is warranted to develop the extent of a subject's subversive activities and to consider whether the subject's name should be added to the security index. This action should be taken in the course of developing background information to determine the true identity and existence of the subject and to assist in establishing that the subject of the investigation is the person against whom the subversive allegations have been made. Each subject should be personally observed whenever a complete security investigation is conducted even though a security index card is not being recommended at the completion of the investigation.

IV. Do not delay the submission of form FD-122 recommending the addition of a subject's name to the security index even though it has not been possible to observe personally the subject if it has been determined through investigation that the subject is dangerous or potentially dangerous.

V. If a security index card is not being recommended after all logical investigation has been conducted and it has not been possible to observe personally the subject during the investigation, the case may be closed even though this has not been done. If a security index card has been recommended and prepared and it has not been possible to personally observe the subject, the case shall remain open until such time as the subject is personally observed, except when it has been determined that the subject is residing outside the continental U. S., Hawaii, Alaska, or Puerto Rico, in which event the case may be closed if there is no other pending investigation and the matter should be followed administratively to be certain that the subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

(k) Photograph

I. Reasonable efforts should be made during the investigation [of a security subject]to obtain a photograph of the subject through usual sources.

II. [Deleted]

III. [Cases on security index subjects are to be maintained in a pending status until such time as a suitable photograph is obtained unless circumstances dictate otherwise, in which case the Bureau should be advised.] Once a photograph has been obtained, continue to be alert for the existence of more recent photographs which may become available.

IV. Do not forward a copy of the photograph to the Bureau unless the subject has been designated a key figure.

(B) During the first contact, the interviewing Agent will introduce himself as a Special Agent of the FBI by use of credentials or badge and will open the conversation by using an appropriate pretext or by reciting the Bureau's responsibilities in the security field and asking the subject whether he can be of assistance to the Government. If the individual has been a member of a basic revolutionary organization and indicates he might cooperate, he may be questioned during the initial contact about his own activities in order to further ascertain the extent to which he will cooperate. This original interview is for the sole purpose of allowing the Agent to determine whether the individual being interviewed might be cooperative.

(e) Prior Bureau authority

I. Subjects of active current investigations where no interview with prior Bureau authority has previously been conducted

II. Closed cases where the subject is on the security index and no prior interview has been conducted

III. Subjects of investigations requested by the Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant-type cases, loyalty cases, etc.

IV. Any persons where circumstances indicate a delicate situation exists and a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, religious field, publishing houses, labor leaders, and the like. Bureau authority must be requested with respect to situations of this kind even though prior interviews have been had with these interviewees.

V. Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts

VI. Subjects of section A reserve index cards

In any of the above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview a subject of a security investigation except those persons under IV above. This does not relieve you of the responsibility of submitting reports in security cases when due; e.g., annual reports in routine security index cases and six-month reports in key figure cases.

VII. [The request for Bureau authority for the interview should be set forth in the first paragraph of the letter and unless you are recommending a special manner or procedure for conducting the interview, the first paragraph should contain the following statements:

"Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If this subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during the initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of the Manual of Instructions is being conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as a PSI."

The above statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents during initial contacts and recontacts from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potentialities as an informant.]

VIII. Letters requesting Bureau authority for the interview must contain the following information, if available:

(A) Residence address, occupation, employment and race of subject, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health

(B) Marital status. If married, the occupation, employment, and race of the spouse.

(C) Length of time subject a member of or affiliated with subversive organizations and positions he held in such organizations. In cases in which investigation is based on some allegation or circumstances of a security nature other than membership in or affiliation with subversive organizations, facts upon which investigation is predicated should be briefly set forth.

(D) If married, information indicating the spouse is or has been a member of or affiliated with subversive groups, the position held in such groups, and the length of time of such membership or affiliation

(E) Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups

(F) Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of the subject and, if married, of the spouse

(G) What is expected to be gained by the interview

IX. In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding the seven items listed above must be set out under the appropriate number but the above headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any of the items, you should make the appropriate comments after the respective number.

X. All letters requesting Bureau authority to interview the subject of a security investigation must be personally approved by the SAC.

XI. One of the required copies of the letter to the Bureau should consist only of the first page of the letter. When unnecessary for Bureau to issue specific instructions or comments in connection with authorizing an interview, the Bureau will approve the request by placing an appropriate rubber-stamp impression on the single-page copy of the incoming letter and return it by routing slip.

XII. Upon receipt of Bureau authority, the interview must be conducted within 30 days. If this is impossible, advise Bureau of the reasons why the interview was not effected and state that the subject will be contacted within the next 30 days. At the end of the second 30-day period if the interview has not been conducted, request additional authority. Include in the letters any new information bearing upon the advisability of conducting the interview.

(f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews

I. Interviews must be conducted by two Special Agents. An Agent experienced in security investigations who has knowledge of Bureau regulations regarding development of informants must conduct the actual interrogation. Approach need not be made by both Agents at the same time and one Agent may observe from a secure distance. Background of subject and individual circumstances will determine exactly how approach should be handled in each case. Two Agents should be physically present during any interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all types of Bureau cases.

II. Preparations for interview must be thorough and conducted so that interviewing Agents will not be compromised, the Bureau will not be embarrassed, and confidential informants will not be exposed.

(10) Political activities (Bureau file 100-3-72)
  (a) Political activities in which party is engaged, including names and identities of party member candidates or party-sponsored candidates for public office
  (b) Details relating to party sponsorship of third party movements

(11) Legislative activities (Bureau file 100-3-70)
  (a) Activities of the Communist Party and/or its members in connection with legislation or proposed legislation which affects status of the party or activities of the party and its members
  (b) Activities of the Communist Party and/or its members in connection with legislation which does not directly affect the party or its members but which party deems expedient to promote so it may appear to be closely aligned or in favor of a worthy cause

(12) Domestic administration issues (Bureau file 100-3-83)
  (a) Communist Party activities with relation to domestic administration issues, such as antilynching laws, poll tax, etc. Only the over-all policy of the party in these matters should be included in quarterly reports.

(13) Negro question (Bureau file 100-3-75)
Communist Party policy and activities of a significant character directed to exploitation of the Negro and his problems. Activities of Negro front organizations should be submitted under appropriate front organization caption and should not be included in Communist Party quarterly reports.

(14) Youth matters (Bureau file 100-3-76)
Over-all policy and activities of the Communist Party youth commissions relative to infiltration of youth groups and exploitation of youth. Youth front activities should be submitted under appropriate front organization caption and should not be included in Communist Party quarterly reports.

(15) Women's matters (Bureau file 100-3-78)
Pertinent Communist Party over-all policy and activities of the women's commission relating to the infiltration of women's groups, exploitation of women

(16) Farmer's matters (Bureau file 100-3-79)
Pertinent Communist Party over-all policy and activities of the farm commission relative to the infiltration of farmer groups, exploitation of farmers, etc.

(17) Cultural activities (Bureau file 100-3-90)
The cultural commissions are, for the most part, composed of secret members of the party. These commissions propagate the cultural activities of the Communist Party which are displayed primarily through communist front organizations, as well as the carrying out of the Communist Party line in the fields of radio, publishing, education, science, and

arts. Individual members of the cultural sections have close ties in many instances with suspected international communist representatives. The following of this phase of the Communist Party movement is most important to develop the full and complete picture of Communist Party activities.

[(18) Veteran's matters (Bureau file 100-3-73)
Communist Party policy and activities of a significant character directed toward the exploiting of veterans and their problems

[(19) National group commissions (Bureau file 100-3-91)
(a) Activity on the part of various Communist Party national group commissions, including identities of leaders and members of the commissions
(b) Special Communist Party policies relating to infiltration of minority groups

[(20) Religion (Bureau file 100-3-82)
(a) Communist Party policy relating to its approach to religion or to penetration of established religious groups
(b) Any particular vehement statements made against religious bodies by ranking communists

[(21) Pamphlets and publications (Bureau file 100-3-86)
(a) Changes in the field division with respect to establishment of new bookstores, increased distribution of party literature, publication of Communist Party literature and pamphlets, and other pertinent information relating to preparation and dissemination of Communist Party literature
(b) Forward to Bureau by letter any important Communist Party publications published within a field division. Mention the publication in quarterly report, but do not describe in detail in the report.

[(22) Education (Bureau file 100-3-71)
(a) Statements or class material which advocates overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence
(b) Pertinent evidence and information relating to educational programs of the party. The following are deemed of utmost importance:
I. Instructions from national and/or district headquarters relative to the education of both new and experienced members
II. Courses or curricula given, together with any educational outlines and assigned or suggested reading. (There should be no long quotations in reports and any exhibits or enclosures should be forwarded to Bureau by separate letter.)
III. Important statements and remarks by instructors who should in turn be sufficiently identified so as to establish their status as duly designated or qualified party instructors
IV. Succinct digest of notes or memoranda of informants who attend the classes or schools. (Copies of the actual notes or memoranda should be submitted promptly by separate letter.)
V. Identities, if available, of members receiving instructions. Concentrate on having confidential informants

attend party educational classes and schools within dictates of discretion and without jeopardizing their security.

(23) Communist Party attempts to infiltrate mass organizations (Bureau file 100-3-106)
Information regarding Communist Party programs and attempts to infiltrate mass organizations, such as parent-teacher associations, church groups, and civic groups

[b. Communist Party, USA - strategy in industry (Bureau file 100-3-89)
A separate case shall be maintained by each office on this basic phase of Communist Party activity. Offices of origin will be the same as in the Communist Party, USA, case. Reports will be submitted quarterly. Offices with no activity to report may submit letters. The instructions in paragraphs g and h will apply, with the addition of "Strategy in Industry" to the designated captions.

The investigation in this case shall cover all plans, strategy, tactics, and infiltration activities by the Communist Party, USA, directed against all industry, with special emphasis on activities connected with basic and vital industries. Particular attention shall be given to the composition, meetings, plans, and activities of Communist Party industrial and trade-union commissions and industrial and trade-union districts and clubs. Pertinent activities of individual communists charged with Communist Party duties in this field shall be included in reports. The information reported shall be grouped according to the industry involved, rather than according to individual labor unions. Refer to the subsection F on investigation of communist infiltration of labor unions and subsection H on Communist Control Act of 1954 for instructions regarding investigations concerning communist infiltration of specific labor unions.]

c. Any important developments concerning pertinent phases of Communist Party activity, such as certain security measures, important national or regional Communist Party meetings, changes in personnel in national Communist Party organization, underground activities, and other important matters should be brought to attention of Bureau by teletype, airtel, or letter as circumstances may require and later incorporated in quarterly reports. Such information, where pertinent, is disseminated on high level to other Government officials. Each office is to carefully evaluate data thus submitted so Bureau will at all times be advised of important developments and so no unnecessary duplication will result in reporting such information.

d. Extreme care must be used to assure statements relating to affiliations or membership in proscribed or subversive organization are accurate in all respects. Identification of suspected organizations or individuals with information of a possible subversive nature must be accomplished by showing exact basis for such identification, plus corroboration for same wherever possible. In no case should a person be referred to as a "known communist" unless he is publicly known as such.. Whenever an individual other than the subject of a report is mentioned for the purpose of showing subversive activity or sympathy on the part of the subject, the individual so mentioned should be described with an authoritative statement[showing]the subversive connection; e.g., "Reported by T_____ to have been a member of the White Collar Club of the Communist Party in 1945."

e. Specific requirements relating to Communist Party, USA, investigations

(1) New York Office has responsibility of investigating and reporting separately on national committee meetings, national training schools, and other important national meetings. New York is responsible for reporting activities of the New York District.

f. Socialist Workers Party and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups
The New York Office should submit quarterly reports on the Socialist Workers Party designating reports as pending. Separate reports should be submitted: one pertaining to local activities, the other pertaining to activities on a national basis. Auxiliary offices should submit reports each six months and may carry their cases in a pending-inactive status. Reports on less active Marxist-Leninist groups should be submitted semiannually and also may be carried as pending inactive.

g. Classification - 100

h. Title and character of communications

(1) Communist Party, USA
Entitle all communications covering a national convention or national organizational activity of the party:

Communist Party, USA
Internal Security - C

Caption all communications covering activities in a particular district:

Communist Party, USA
__________ District
__________ Division
Internal Security - C

Caption all communications covering activities in states not included in a district:

Communist Party, USA
State of __________
__________ Division
Internal Security - C

(2) Socialist Workers Party
Entitle all communications covering a national convention or national organizational activity of the Socialist Workers Party:

Socialist Workers Party
Internal Security - SWP

Caption all communications covering activities within a particular field division:

Socialist Workers Party
__________ Division
Internal Security - SWP

(3) Other Marxist revolutionary groups
All communications covering other Marxist revolutionary groups should carry the name of the organization and the classification, Internal Security; e.g.,

Proletarian Party of America
Internal Security - PPA

The above is not all-inclusive. Facts developed in each case will produce information which will be indicative of the necessity for conducting further investigation along lines which will necessitate the use of various investigative techniques to develop the case fully. The successful investigation of an individual will depend upon the resourcefulness of the investigating Agents in developing techniques which will further establish the subversive activity of a subject.

Discretion must be used in those instances in which contact with persons known to the subject is believed desirable. Where such contact is contemplated, the Agent should assure himself of the character, loyalty, and reliability of the person to be contacted concerning the subject by reviewing the office indices and in some instances conducting preliminary inquiry, possibly under pretext, with others to ascertain the character, reliability, and loyalty of the person of whom inquiry concerning the subject is intended.

In conducting security investigations the necessity of obtaining admissible evidence must be continually borne in mind. However, sources furnishing information of a confidential nature are valuable and should be continued and enlarged for the purpose of obtaining information which can be corroborated by other sources which can be disclosed, thus rendering the information admissible as evidence.

The danger of relying upon evidence from only one confidential informant or other source is obvious and every effort should be made to obtain evidence from various types of sources and through various investigative techniques.

Information obtained from one source should be corroborated by contacts with confidential informants, public and private sources, through physical and photographic surveillances and mail covers, review of office files, and other sources. Adequate coordination of information received from confidential sources with active investigation should be maintained at all times. For example, when it is ascertained through one of these sources that an important meeting is to occur, the nature of the meeting should be confirmed if possible by independent sources which can furnish evidence of an admissible character. The meeting should be covered by arrangement for attendance by confidential informants to obtain admissible evidence of the proceedings. The meetings should be placed under physical surveillance, licenses of automobiles parked near the meeting place noted, and attendants identified. If possible and advisable, photographic surveillances should be established. Other types of information received from confidential sources should receive similar attention in order that verification may be made and admissible evidence developed.

(6) Preservation of evidence
  (a) Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained with a view to its possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.

[(b) Satisfactory notes or[statements]from informants necessary from which to refresh their recollection in the event they are called upon to testify at some future date. Such [notes[and statements]must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and must contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.

[(c) Informant's original notes or[statements]not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings

(d) The above applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or evidence otherwise obtained by Agents.

(7) Interviews with subjects of security investigations

(a) Purpose

I. To determine a subject's sympathies when investigation is inconclusive or to determine whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines

II. To develop information concerning subject's activities and those of others known to him to have been associated with a subversive movement

III. To develop security informants

(b) Subjects not included in the security index

No security investigation of an individual shall be closed unless the subject is included in the security index or consideration given to interviewing him.

(c) Security index subjects

I. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of a security index card on an individual by reason of inactivity in a subversive movement until he has been interviewed or Bureau advised why an interview is inadvisable or impossible.

II. Active subversives should be considered as potential informants. Consider interviews with selected individuals currently active in subversive organizations for development of additional active informants. Proper selection of individuals for interview is most important. They must possess necessary attributes for security informant work.

(d) Without Bureau authority the SAC may:

I. Authorize interviews with individuals who have not been subjects of security investigations and the available subversive information against them is not sufficient to warrant opening cases at this time

II. Grant authority to interview subjects of security cases where the persons have previously been interviewed with prior Bureau authority, provided no change has taken place in the subjects' status and the interviews are conducted under the same conditions as previously authorized

III. Authorize interviews of all persons who were the subjects of security investigations where the cases are now closed (This will include persons who were previously on the security index but whose names have been removed and the cases now closed.)

IV. In authorizing these interviews no communication to the Bureau will be necessary and if there is a closed file, it should be reopened. If there is no closed file, a new case file of 134 category should be opened. The case should be assigned to an Agent to determine the residence of the subject, to make certain that the subject is identical with the information in the files, [and[to determine]his current employment.

(A) The Agent to whom the case is assigned will prepare a memorandum for the SAC setting forth the information and requesting authority to conduct an interview with the subject solely for the purpose of determining his attitude toward cooperating with the FBI.

atten[illegible]n to the existence of a secur[illegible] index card for that individual. In all such instances a specific recommendation must be made concerning the cancellation of the card. The card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate the subject as a[security] informant.

(f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous
Instructions set out below should be read in conjunction with 87D 6b (7) (c) herein relating to interviews with security index subjects.

Frequently, after a subject is included in the security index, information is received or investigation develops information reflecting that he is no longer a threat to the internal security by reason of defection or expulsion from the subversive movement, membership in or affiliation with which was the reason for placing him in the security index. Such defection may be reflected by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over an extended period of time or upon declaration of opposition to the principles of the subversive movement. The latter may manifest itself in declarations by a subject in the presence of confidential informants or other sources, statements to the press, or actual contact with Bureau representatives and admission of previous subversive activity.

When sufficient information is at hand regarding subject's present sympathies to reach conclusion that he should no longer be scheduled for apprehension as a dangerous subversive, request authority to interview subject or advise Bureau of reasons why subject should not be interviewed. Bureau will not cancel security index card without consideration being given to interview of subject. See 87D 6b (7) (c) and (d).

If, upon interview, subject proves cooperative to extent that his security index card should be cancelled, advise Bureau by letter of results together with a recommendation for cancellation which must be approved by Bureau.

(g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection
As security index cases are reviewed upon reopening in the field, there will be instances in which removal will be required by application of the security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3). With the passage of time, limits specified in criteria will operate to remove certain subjects even though there is no affirmative indication of defection.

Although these subjects will in fact be removed from security index, the following procedure should be followed to allow for possible future reference to these cases.

I. When subjects are removed from security index solely on basis of application of security index criteria as cases are reopened and reviewed in the field, retain security index cards pertaining to such subjects bearing the descriptive matter on reverse sides; i.e., the cards previously filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Destroy cards previously filed in alphabetical section. Those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards under provisions of 87D 7b (6) (b) I should retain but one card in each instance, destroying second geographical card as well as card previously filed in alphabetical section.

II. Mark canceled across face of each such card being retained and file it in the reserve index.

III. Consider whether the subject's name should be placed in section A of the reserve index. If his name should be included in section A, submit form FD-122a.

[[IV. The above instructions do not apply in the case of
[individuals removed from the security index based upon
[activity in the Nation of Islam. Security index cards
[in such cases should be destroyed.]

(h) Subjects of Chinese extraction
In any communication recommending cancellation of a security index card on a subject of Chinese extraction, such communication must contain the words "Other - Chinese." This regulation relates specifically to those subjects placed on the security index following a recommendation submitted in accordance with the instructions contained in section 87D 7b (4) (j) above.

(11) Priority apprehension program (DETCOM)

(a) Purpose
Many individuals included in security index because of their training, violent tendencies, or prominence in subversive activity are extremely dangerous and would be more inclined to commit or capable of committing overt acts against the U. S. in time of national emergency than would others in security index. Degree of dangerousness of such individuals is so pronounced that in interest of security they must be immobilized in the least possible time prior to others in security index. The administrative procedure developed to make apprehensions on a priority basis is referred to as the detcom program. Subjects designated for priority apprehension are referred to as detcom subjects.

Individuals in security index tabbed detcom would be arrested first in event of a limited but grave emergency, probably without the arrest of other security index subjects.

In an all-out emergency, all subjects whose names are in the security index will be considered for immediate apprehension.

Subjects tabbed for detcom should comprise a hard core of subversives. Each individual case should stand on its own merits and decision to consider subjects for priority of apprehension should be based on subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies.

(b) Subjects to be tabbed detcom
Each security index subject should be considered for detcom tabbing (priority of arrest) who falls within one or more of following categories:

I. All top functionaries and key figures

II. Currently active communists or members of any basic revolutionary organization (active within past year) when there is evidence of one or more of following:
  (A) Activity as local organizers or leaders in the organization
  (B) Special training at Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow
  (C) Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men, or active participation in violent strikes, riots, or demonstrations
  (D) Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities

(j) In reporting activities of a subject since January 1, 1949, a greater percentage of repetitious and cumulative items and in most instances all such items should be specifically reported.

It will be particularly incumbent upon the reporting Agent to report specifically such items in those cases in which there is little information[indicating]subversive activity of a subject since January 1, 1949. In those cases in which there is an enormous number of such items, you may be more liberal in the selection of those items to be reported specifically.

(10) Administrative data

(a) General

All references to the following items, all administrative in nature, should be contained in cover pages accompanying reports:

I. [Reserve]index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, key figure or top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), forms FD-122,[FD-122a,]FD-128, and [FD-128a,]and Bureau instructions for handling cases or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature

II. Whenever reports relating to security index subjects contain data affecting material included on subject's existing security index card, the cover pages accompanying the report shall include as the last page form FD-305, appropriately checked, which form contains items pertaining to the following:

(A) That subject is included in the security index
(B) That data appearing on security index card is current or requires change
(C) That FD-122 has been submitted to Bureau where security index card changes are necessary
(D) That a suitable photograph is or is not available
(E) That consideration has been given to the use of T symbols
(F) That subject is employed in a key facility and that agencies interested in that facility are specified
(G) Reason for classifying report
(H) Dates subject was previously interviewed and reason for not reinterviewing subject
(I) That subject no longer meets security index criteria and a letter has been directed to the Bureau recommending cancellation of the security index card
(J) That subject's case has been re-evaluated and reasons are set forth as to why subject's activities continue to fall within security index criteria
(K) That subject's security index card is or is not tabbed detcom and that subject's activities do or do not warrant detcom tabbing

[III. Form FD-305a containing items pertinent to reserve index subjects will be similarly utilized in connection with the submission of reports in reserve index cases.]

(b) Documentation of reports

I. Deleted

II. If information necessary for complete documentation is not available in subject's case file, necessary review of other office files should be made. If not obtainable, this fact must be indicated in the cover page(s) accompanying report to the Bureau.

III. Extensive investigation should not be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have in the past furnished background information or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed that subject, according to reliable records, such as birth records, school records, or records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in report. Further verification will not be necessary.

IV. During the preparation of summary reports it is often found that information being incorporated into a report was originally obtained by another office and all of the necessary information for complete documentation will not be in the possession of the office preparing the report. In such an instance, if the office preparing the report is in possession of Photostats of documents obtained by the other offices and the identity

(3) By force or violence, or
By assassination of any officer of such government
It will be necessary to show:
- (a) The identity and official capacity of such officer
- (b) The identity of persons conspiring to assassinate, or actually assassinating such officer
- (c) Full details surrounding the assassination or attempted assassination
- (d) Reasons for the assassination, and ends to be gained by such assassinations, or

b. Printed, published, edited, issued, or circulated
- (1) The person with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the U.S., or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof
- (2) Printed, published, edited, issued, circulated, sold, distributed, or publicly displayed written or printed matter
- (3) Advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government

of the U. S. by force or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof, or

- c. Organized society, group, or assembly
    - (1) The person organized, or helped organize a society, group, or assembly of persons
    - (2) Which taught, advocated, or encouraged the overthrowing or destruction of the Government of the U. S., or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof
    - (3) By force or violence, or
    - (4) The person became a member of, or affiliated with such society, group, or assembly of persons
    - (5) Knowing the purpose thereof

B. SUBMISSION TO THE BUREAU OF SUBVERSIVE DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUALS

1. To insure the proper discharge of the Bureau's responsibility to furnish information at the seat of Government at the request of other agencies and to have it available at the seat of Government when such requests are received from other agencies, the Bureau must be promptly furnished, for indexing purposes by offices covering the national and local headquarters of the various subversive organizations, the names of, and identifying data concerning, persons affiliated with and becoming affiliated with the following types of organizations listed below.
    - a. Basic revolutionary organizations or groups
      Communist Party, USA
      Socialist Workers Party
      Independent Socialist League
      Proletarian Party of America
      Other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, if any, of the preceding four organizations
      Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
    - b. Nationalist and fascist-type groups
    - c. Front organizations of 1, a and b above, including those
        - (1) Cited by the Attorney General
        - (2) Cited or declared by the House Committee on Un-American Activities or by any of the various legislative committees
        - (3) Described as such or as an organization dominated or controlled by one of the basic revolutionary organizations or groups by security informants or other sources of known reliability

   Such lists should include the organization's membership list and any other record showing affiliation.
2. Field offices obtaining information concerning such affiliation of individuals residing outside their territory must expeditiously furnish such information to the office covering the address of the person.
3. The information should be submitted to the Bureau in duplicate by letter captioned with the title of the organizational case file, for example, "Communist Party, USA, ________District, ________Division; Internal Security - C" or "International Workers Order, ________Division; Internal Security - C" and should clearly indicate that the list is being furnished to the Bureau for indexing purposes only.
4. Information received from all sources, including that received from trash covers, confidential sources, highly confidential sources, reports of security informants and sources, and public and other sources, should be reviewed to insure that the Bureau has been furnished in the past and will be furnished in the future lists of all individuals (together with identifying data) affiliated with all organizations set forth in 1 a, b, and c.
5. In forwarding such information to the Bureau, the offices should incorporate, insofar as possible, information concerning a number of individuals in one letter. The letter should contain sufficient identifying data concerning each individual to enable the Bureau to identify that individual

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

D. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS 19
  1. Definitions 19
  2. Responsibility of the Bureau 19
  3. Purpose of investigation 19
    a. Determination of dangerousness 19
    b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes 19
  4. Individuals to be investigated 22
    a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49 22
    b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements 22
    c. Special training in a subversive movement 23
    d. Military service 23
    e. Employment in key facilities 23
    f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs 23
  5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals 24
    a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning 24
      (1) Subjects connected with institutions of learning 24
        (a) Prior Bureau authority to institute investigation 24
          I. Faculty members 24
          II. Students and nonacademic employees 24
          III. Requests for Bureau authority 24
        (b) Contacts during investigation 25
          I. Persons permissible to contact 25
            (A) Established reliable sources 25
            (B) Individuals not connected with institutions of learning 25
            (C) Registrars 25
          II. Superiors of faculty members 25
          III. Students, faculty members, or other employees.. 25
        (c) Receiving voluntary information 25
      (2) Subjects not connected with an institution of learning 25
      (3) Contacts of foreign establishments 25
    b. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations or international organizations, and members of the armed forces 25
  6. Investigative procedures concerning individuals 26
    a. General 26
    b. Scope of investigations 26
      (1) Background 26
        (a) True name and aliases 26
        (b) Residence address 26
        (c) Occupation or business 26
        (d) Business or employment address 26
        (e) Citizenship status 26
          I. Alien 26
          II. Naturalized citizen 26
          III. Native-born citizen 26
        (f) Nationality background 26
        (g) Military record 27
        (h) Close relatives in armed forces 27
        (i) Identification record - (Security index flash notice FD-165) 27
        (j) Physical description 28
        (k) Photograph 28
        (l) Handwriting specimens 29

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

- (2) Subversive activity 29
  - (a) Membership or affiliation 29
  - (b) Knowledge of aims and purposes 29
  - (c) Position and importance 30
- (3) Missing subjects 31
- (4) Individuals traveling abroad 33
- (5) Investigative techniques 34
  - (a) File reviews 34
  - (b) Security informants 34
  - (c) Physical surveillances 35
  - (d) Photographic surveillances 35
  - (e) Public sources 36
  - (f) Records of private firms 36
  - (g) Mail covers 36
  - (h) Trash covers 36
  - (i) Channelizing information to case files 36
- (6) Preservation of evidence 37
- (7) Interviews with subjects of security investigations 38
  - (a) Purpose 38
  - (b) Subjects not included in the security index 38
  - (c) Security index subjects 38
  - (d) Without Bureau authority the SAC may.......... 38
  - (e) Prior Bureau authority.......... 39
  - (f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews.......... 40
  - (g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects.......... 42

7. Administrative procedures 42a
- a. Reserve index.......... 42a
  - (1) Purpose 42a
  - (2) Individuals to be included 42a
  - (3) Arrangement 42b
  - (4) Content 43
  - (5) Removal and deletion of cards 43
- b. Security index 43
  - (1) Purpose 43
  - (2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual 44
  - (3) Criteria for placing and retaining names in the security index 45
  - (4) Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards 46a
  - (5) Content and appearance of security index card 48
    - (a) Data to appear on face of card 48
    - (b) Data to appear on separate attached card 50
  - (6) Arrangement of the security index 50
    - (a) At Bureau 50
    - (b) In the field office 51
      - I. Geographical section 51
      - II. Alphabetical section 51
      - III. Special section 52
        - (A) Espionage subjects 52
        - (B) U. S. Government employees 52
        - (C) Atomic energy program employees 52
        - (D) Foreign government employees 52
        - (E) United Nations Secretariat and other international organization employees 52
        - (F) Pro-Tito individuals 52
      - IV. Unavailable section 53
        - (A) Missing subjects 54
        - (B) Subjects out of the country 54
        - (C) Imprisoned subjects 54
        - (D) Exception - re special section 56

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

- V. Inactive section 56
- (7) Periodic verification of addresses 57
- (8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards 58
- (9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards 58
  - (a) Subjects of security index cards other than key figures and top functionaries 58
  - (b) Key figures and top functionaries 59
  - (c) Subjects tabbed for Detcom 60
  - (d) Subjects not included in security index 60
- (10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index 60
  - (a) Death of subject 60
  - (b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction 60
  - (c) Imprisonment of subject 60
  - (d) Induction of subject into the armed forces 60
  - (e) Security informants 60
  - (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous 61
  - (g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection...... 61
  - (h) Subjects of Chinese extraction........ 62
- (11) Priority apprehension program (DETCOM) 62
  - (a) Purpose 62
  - (b) Subjects to be tabbed detcom 62
  - (c) Recommendations for and removal of detcom designation 63
  - (d) Administrative procedures for handling detcom program 63
  - (e) General 64
- c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities . 64
  - (1) Responsibility 64
  - (2) Inclusion in security index 65
  - (3) Deleted
  - (4) Dissemination 65
  - (5) Status of cases 66
- d. Key figure and top functionary program 66
  - (1) General 66
  - (2) Key figures 66
    - (a) Definition 66
    - (b) Regulations governing the handling of the key figure program 67
      - I. Designation and deletion of key figure status 67
      - II. Photographs 67
      - III. Handwriting specimens 67
      - IV. Security index cards 68
      - V. Change of office of origin 68
      - VI. Reports 68
      - VII. Maintenance of key figure list 69
      - VIII. Transmitting list of key figures to Bureau ... 69
  - (3) Top functionaries 69
    - (a) Definition 69
    - (b) Manner of designation 69
    - (c) Regulations governing top functionaries 70
- e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index........ 70

attention to the existence of a security index card for that individual. In all such instances a specific recommendation must be made concerning the cancellation of the card. The card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate the subject as a[security] informant.

(f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous
Instructions set out below should be read in conjunction with 87D 6b (7) (c) herein relating to interviews with security index subjects.

Frequently, after a subject is included in the security index, information is received or investigation develops information reflecting that he is no longer a threat to the internal security by reason of defection or expulsion from the subversive movement, membership in or affiliation with which was the reason for placing him in the security index. Such defection may be reflected by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over an extended period of time or upon declaration of opposition to the principles of the subversive movement. The latter may manifest itself in declarations by a subject in the presence of confidential informants or other sources, statements to the press, or actual contact with Bureau representatives and admission of previous subversive activity.

When sufficient information is at hand regarding subject's present sympathies to reach conclusion that he should no longer be scheduled for apprehension as a dangerous subversive, request authority to interview subject or advise Bureau of reasons why subject should not be interviewed. Bureau will not cancel security index card without consideration being given to interview of subject. See 87D 6b (7) (c) and (d).

If, upon interview, subject proves cooperative to extent that his security index card should be cancelled, advise Bureau by letter of results together with a recommendation for cancellation which must be approved by Bureau.

(g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection
As security index cases are reviewed upon reopening in the field, there will be instances in which removal will be required by application of the security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3). With the passage of time, limits specified in criteria will operate to remove certain subjects even though there is no affirmative indication of defection.

Although these subjects will in fact be removed from security index, the following procedure should be followed to allow for possible future reference to these cases.

I. When subjects are removed from security index solely on basis of application of security index criteria as cases are reopened and reviewed in the field, retain security index cards pertaining to such subjects bearing the descriptive matter on reverse sides; i.e., the cards previously filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Destroy cards previously filed in alphabetical section. Those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards under provisions of 87D 7b (6) (b) I should retain but one card in each instance, destroying second geographical card as well as card previously filed in alphabetical section.

II. Mark canceled across face of each such card being retained and file it in the[reserve]index.

III. [Consider whether the subject's name should be placed in section A of the reserve index. If his name should be included in section A, submit form FD-122a.]

(h) Subjects of Chinese extraction

In any communication recommending cancellation of a security index card on a subject of Chinese extraction, such communication must contain the words "Other - Chinese." This regulation relates specifically to those subjects placed on the security index following a recommendation submitted in accordance with the instructions contained in section 87D 7b (4) (j) above.

(11) Priority apprehension program (DETCOM)

(a) Purpose

Many individuals included in security index because of their training, violent tendencies, or prominence in subversive activity are extremely dangerous and would be more inclined to commit or capable of committing overt acts against the U. S. in time of national emergency than would others in security index. Degree of dangerousness of such individuals is so pronounced that in interest of security they must be immobilized in the least possible time prior to others in security index. The administrative procedure developed to make apprehensions on a priority basis is referred to as the detcom program. Subjects designated for priority apprehension are referred to as detcom subjects.

Individuals in security index tabbed detcom would be arrested first in event of a limited but grave emergency, probably without the arrest of other security index subjects.

In an all-out emergency, all subjects whose names are in the security index will be considered for immediate apprehension.

Subjects tabbed for detcom should comprise a hard core of subversives. Each individual case should stand on its own merits and decision to consider subjects for priority of apprehension should be based on subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies.

(b) Subjects to be tabbed detcom

Each security index subject should be considered for detcom tabbing (priority of arrest) who falls within one or more of following categories:

I. All top functionaries and key figures

II. Currently active communists or members of any basic revolutionary organization (active within past year) when there is evidence of one or more of following:

- (A) Activity as local organizers or leaders in the organization
- (B) Special training at Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow
- (C) Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men, or active participation in violent strikes, riots, or demonstrations
- (D) Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities

VII. Maintenance of key figure list

(A) Each office must maintain current list of key figures including top functionaries. List may be kept by simple list system, by maintaining a file wherein all additions and deletions to the list are reported, or by a card index system. Maintain key figure list separate from security index.

(B) Key figures should retain their designation notwithstanding their departure for foreign travel or other circumstances requiring temporary discontinuance of investigation.

(C) Should a key figure become subject of a security of Government employees investigation, his name should continue to appear on the key figure list, but the investigation shall proceed in accordance with existing instructions governing SGE cases.

VIII. Transmitting list of key figures to Bureau

(A) Submit list of key figures to the Bureau by letter on April 1 and October 1 each year. Letter should list key figures alphabetically and set forth in separate columns after each name the following:

- i. Status of case
- ii. [Deleted]
- iii. Whether a photograph has been sent to the Bureau
- iv. Whether a handwriting specimen has been sent to the Bureau
- v. Any position held in the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations and in any labor union

(B) List only the most important offices in the party or union if subject holds several, or the most important office he holds in a front organization if no party office is held.

(C) Caption letter as are all letters submitted in the main Communist Party case for each field office; viz., "Communist Party, USA, ________ District, New York Division, Internal Security - C, Key Figure List."

(3) Top functionaries

(a) Definition

A top functionary is an individual, either a member or a nonmember of the Communist Party, to whom, because of his importance, it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention in order to keep abreast of communism on a national basis in the U. S. Necessarily, such an individual would be on a high policy level in the movement.

The term "top functionary" is not to be construed as requiring that individuals in this category must actually hold official positions in party organizations but shall be given a broad enough construction to include others who are of equal importance because of their influence in the movement itself, or their position and activities outside the party in labor, front, or similar organizations or movements.

(b) Manner of designation

Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate a subject as a top functionary. Submit such recommendation to Bureau by letter containing reasons for the recommendation. Bureau desires to be very selective in this matter and to concentrate on individuals who, on a national basis, are the guiding hands in the communist movement.

At the seat of Government a careful appraisal will be made of the field's recommendation, following which the office will be advised concerning the Bureau's decision on the recommendation.

(c) Regulations governing top functionaries

I. Regulations set forth under (2) (b) above pertaining to key figures relative to photographs, handwriting specimens, security index cards, change of office of origin, detcom tabbing, character of reports, and inclusion in the key figure list apply to individuals designated as top functionaries.

II. Reports

Submit reports on top functionaries quarterly. Make status pending-inactive if there are no outstanding leads for active investigation.

e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and [reserve]index

Individuals investigated by the Bureau under any character against whom subversive information is developed must be constantly borne in mind for inclusion in the security index and/or[reserve]index.

(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations

Subjects of these investigations must be included in the security index and/or the[reserve]index if they meet the standards for inclusion therein. It is the responsibility of the investigating Agent and field supervising official to make appropriate recommendations for preparation of the security index card and/or the [reserve]index card, whenever appropriate.

(2) Security of Government employees (SGE) investigations

Subjects of all SGE investigations against whom subversive derogatory information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or[reserve]index.

The Agent conducting investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer such cases to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling. Copies of reports[showing]disloyal information must be submitted to the field office covering the subject's residence, when developed by any other office.

When an individual who has previously been investigated under the SGE character is the subject of a security index card and is still employed by the Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, the dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and the character of the subject's security case should be used in the report being submitted. This will insure that the reports are referred to the appropriate desks for supervision at the Bureau, as well as in the field. These reports should be written according to the standards prevailing for SGE reports.

Disseminate these dual character reports the same as any other security report. Representatives of other intelligence agencies requesting reports[showing]the actual SGE investigation should be informed to direct the request to their Washington headquarters for referral to the Bureau.

(3) Atomic Energy Act, Voice of America applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations

Subjects of all above investigations against whom subversive information has been developed must be considered for inclusion in the security index and/or the[reserve]index. In each such case the Agent conducting the investigation in the office covering the subject's residence must refer the matter to the field supervisor in charge of the security index program for appropriate handling.

Copies of reports[showing]disloyal information must be submitted to the office covering the subject's residence, whenever developed by another office.

(j) In reporting activities of a subject since January 1, 1949, a greater percentage of repetitious and cumulative items and in most instances all such items should be specifically reported.

It will be particularly incumbent upon the reporting Agent to report specifically such items in those cases in which there is little information[indicating]subversive activity of a subject since January 1, 1949. In those cases in which there is an enormous number of such items, you may be more liberal in the selection of those items to be reported specifically.

(10) Administrative data

(a) General

All references to the following items, all administrative in nature, should be contained in cover pages accompanying reports:

I. [Reserve]index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, key figure or top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), forms FD-122,[FD-122a,]FD-128, and [FD-128a,]and Bureau instructions for handling cases or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature

II. Whenever reports relating to security index subjects contain data affecting material included on subject's existing security index card, the cover pages accompanying the report shall include as the last page form FD-305, appropriately checked, which form contains items pertaining to the following:

(A) That subject is included in the security index
(B) That data appearing on security index card is current or requires change
(C) That FD-122 has been submitted to Bureau where security index card changes are necessary
(D) That a suitable photograph is or is not available
(E) That consideration has been given to the use of T symbols
(F) That subject is employed in a key facility and that agencies interested in that facility are specified
(G) Reason for classifying report
(H) [Dates subject was previously interviewed and] reason for not reinterviewing subject
(I) That subject no longer meets security index criteria and a letter has been directed to the Bureau recommending cancellation of the security index card
(J) That subject's case has been re-evaluated and reasons are set forth as to why subject's activities continue to fall within security index criteria
(K) That subject's security index card is or is not tabbed detcom and that [subject's] activities do or do not warrant detcom tabbing

(b) Documentation of reports

I. Deleted

II. If information necessary for complete documentation is not available in subject's case file, necessary review of other office files should be made. If not obtainable, this fact must be indicated in the cover page(s) accompanying report to the Bureau.

III. Extensive investigation should not be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have in the past furnished background information or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation [revealed] that subject, according to reliable records, such as birth records, school records, or records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in report. Further verification will not be necessary.

IV. During the preparation of summary reports it is often found that information being incorporated into a report was originally obtained by another office and all of the necessary information for complete documentation will not be in the possession of the office preparing the report. In such an instance, if the office preparing the report is in possession of Photostats of documents obtained by the other offices and the identity

(d) During the first contact, t[illegible]nterviewing Agent will introduce himself as a Special Agent of the FBI by use of credentials or badge and will open the conversation by using an appropriate pretext or by reciting the Bureau's responsibilities in the security field and asking the subject whether he can be of assistance to the Government. If the individual has been a member of a basic revolutionary organization and indicates he might cooperate, he may be questioned during the initial contact about his own activities in order to further ascertain the extent to which he will cooperate. This original interview is for the sole purpose of allowing the Agent to determine whether the individual being interviewed might be cooperative.

(e) Prior Bureau authority

I. Subjects of active current investigations where no interview with prior Bureau authority has previously been conducted

II. Closed cases where the subject is on the security index and no prior interview has been conducted

III. Subjects of investigations requested by the Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant-type cases, loyalty cases, etc.

IV. Any persons where circumstances indicate a delicate situation exists and a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, religious field, publishing houses, labor leaders, and the like. Bureau authority must be requested with respect to situations of this kind even though prior interviews have been had with these interviewees.

V. Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts

In any of the above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview a subject of a security investigation except those persons under IV above. This does not relieve you of the responsiblity of submitting reports in security cases when due; for example, annual reports in routine security index cases and six-month reports in key figure cases.

VI. Letters requesting Bureau authority for the interview must contain the following information, if available:

(A) Residence address, occupation, employment and race of subject, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health

(B) Marital status. If married, the occupation, employment, and race of the spouse.

(C) Length of time subject a member of or affiliated with subversive organizations and positions he held in such organizations. [In cases in which investigation is based on some allegation or circumstances of a security nature other than membership in or affiliation with subversive organizations, facts upon which investigation is predicated should be briefly set forth.]

(D) If married, information indicating the spouse is or has been a member of or affiliated with subversive groups, the position held in such groups, and the length of time of such membership or affiliation [illegible]) Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups

(F) Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of the subject and, if married, of the spouse

(G) What is expected to be gained by the interview

VII. In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding the seven items listed above must be set out under the appropriate number but the above headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any of the items, you should make the appropriate comments after the respective number.

VIII. In addition, unless you are recommending a special manner or procedure for conducting the interview, such as interviewing under pretext, the last paragraph of each letter should contain the following statement: "Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects." The last paragraph should also contain the statement: "If this subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during the initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of the Manual of Instructions is being conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as a PSI." This statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents during initial contacts and recontacts from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potentialities as an informant.

IX. All letters requesting Bureau authority to interview the subject of a security investigation must be personally approved by the SAC.

X. [One of the required copies of the letter to the Bureau should consist only of the first page of the letter.] When unnecessary for Bureau to issue specific instructions or comments in connection with authorizing an interview, the Bureau will approve[the request]by placing an appropriate rubber-stamp impression on[the single-page]copy of the incoming letter and return [it]by routing slip.

XI. Upon receipt of Bureau authority, the interview must be conducted within 30 days. If this is impossible, advise Bureau of the reasons why the interview was not effected and state that the subject will be contacted within the next 30 days. At the end of the second 30-day period if the interview has not been conducted, request additional authority. Include in the letters any new information bearing upon the advisability of conducting the interview.

(f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews

I. Interviews must be conducted by two Special Agents. An Agent experienced in security investigations who has knowledge of Bureau regulations regarding development of informants must conduct the actual interrogation. Approach need not be made by both Agents at the same time and one Agent may observe from a secure distance. Background of subject and individual circumstances will determine exactly how approach should be handled in each case. Two Agents should be physically present during any interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all types of Bureau cases.

II. Preparations for interview must be thorough and conducted so that interviewing Agents will not be compromised, the Bureau will not be embarrassed, and confidential informants will not be exposed.

Communist Party [redacted]rs, review of field office : [redacted] pretext interviews, surveillances, Spe Agents attending mass meetin etc.

4. Internal Security Act of 1950

To insure successful proceedings against a communist front organization under this act, a preponderance of admissible evidence must be secured to[show]extent to which

a. Persons active in management, direction, or supervision of an organization are active in management, direction, or supervision, or as representatives, of

b. Its support, financial or otherwise, is derived from

c. Its funds, resources, or personnel are used to further or promote objectives of

d. Positions taken or advanced by it from time to time do not deviate from those of

Any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or the world communist movement.

5. Panel sources

a. Purpose

To develop potential witnesses who will be willing to obtain and introduce legally admissible evidence re subversive nature of organizations in future prosecutive action

b. Program

(1) Since Special Agent and active security informant testimony is undesirable, field should recruit panel of potential witnesses locally. Some may be found among American Legion contacts, plant informants, former and exposed security informants, etc.

(2) Panel members should attend public rallies and meetings, as well as obtain literature of organizations they are covering.

(3) To aid panelists, exhibit photographs of individuals they will most likely encounter at front organization functions.

(4) Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, the same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants. (See section 107, volume IV, of this manual.)

(5) Legitimate expenses incurred by panel members should be reimbursed in same manner as security informants.

(6) Eliminate inactive, ineffective, or unsatisfactory panelists on a continuing basis. At time of submission of semiannual letter, office panel should be reviewed to make certain all such panelists have been removed.

(7) Identities of panelists should be concealed.

c. Administrative handling

(1) Check prospective panelists through office indices, local police department, credit records, and established informants. If no undesirable information is developed, initial contact may be made with panelist to ascertain cooperativeness.

(2) Submit names of cooperative panelists to Bureau by letter outlining complete background and recommendation as to inclusion in office panel. [One of the required copies of the letter to the Bureau should consist only of the first page of the letter. When approving the field's recommendation, this single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" by Bureau and will be returned.] Be certain such individuals are not plants and will consider relationship with Bureau in confidence.

(3) Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panelist is initiated. When preliminary investigation completed and Bureau has approved panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly.

Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.

(4) Only Agents designated should handle panelists.

(5) Every four months submit letter of justification to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section 107N,[3b,]volume IV, of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

(6) Summary letter captioned "Panel Source Program" (Bufile 134-1113) to be prepared and submitted to Bureau March 25 and September 25 each year. Use following topical outline:

(a) Status of program
Include progress in panel development. [Show]total number of new panelists developed and total number of panelists discontinued during six months' period.

(b) Total number panel sources active

(c) Names of organizations covered

(d) Number and identities of panelists redesignated to informant or potential informant status since institution of panel program

d. Suggestion
Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel members and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization cases, security informants, and communist publications; e.g., "The Worker."

6. Classification - 100

7. Character - Internal Security - letters for organizational activity or nationalistic tendency; e.g., (C), (SWP), (Miscellaneous), etc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations 70
(2) Security of Government employees investigations 70
(3) Atomic Energy Act, Voice of America applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations 70
f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports. 71
(1) General 71
(2) Origin 72
(3) Deleted
(4) Classification 72
(5) Title 72
(6) Character 73
(a) Key figures and top functionaries 73
(b) Others 73
(7) Deleted
(8) Status 73
(a) Top functionaries 73
(b) Key figures 73
(c) Security index subjects employed in key facilities 73
(d) Other security index subjects 74
(e) Cases of subjects recommended for security index . 74
(f) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein 74
(9) Content 74
(10) Administrative data 77
(a) General 77
(b) Documentation of reports 78
8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations 79
a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau 80
(1) Aliens and naturalized citizens 80
(2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services 80
(3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense 80
(4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard 80

locate subjects are not to be submitted. The Bureau will closely follow investigative action to locate missing security index subjects.

II. If you receive indications that the subject went to Mexico or Canada, request the Bureau to alert other appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to determine any available verifying information through liaison channels.

III. If the subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, the Washington Field Office should be requested to check the records of the Passport Office of the State Department for verification.

IV. When all logical leads have been exhausted in the case of a missing important functionary, consideration should be given to circularizing all field offices with the subject's photograph and background information for the purpose of alerting the entire field to the identity of the subject. Bureau authority must be obtained before circularization is made. In seeking Bureau authority, advise the Bureau as to the position held by the subject and what efforts have already been made to locate him.

If this procedure is to be effective, its application must necessarily be restrictive in the number of subjects to which it is applied. Therefore, requests to circularize must be made only after every possible lead has been exhausted and then only in the cases of the most important missing functionaries.

(4) Individuals traveling abroad

When information is received indicating that any individual on whom we have subversive derogatory information intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel, take the following action:

(a) Immediately advise the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination, setting forth complete available details concerning the foreign travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, the exact name under which the passport was issued, the number of the passport, and the office issuing the passport, if known. However, do not delay advising the Bureau of the actual or intended travel while developing the above information as time is of the essence in this matter.

(b) Set out a lead for the Washington Field Office for a check of the records of the Passport Office, Department of State; however, do not limit efforts to develop above information to a check of such records.

(c) In the case of an individual previously the subject of investigation, the case should be brought up to date by the prompt submission of a report in the event there is unreported information contained in the file. If reports have not previously been submitted in the case, a letterhead memorandum summarizing the available subversive data should accompany the initial letter advising the Bureau of the proposed travel.

(d) Information concerning these subjects' proposed travel abroad, including information concerning their subversive activities, is furnished by the Bureau to the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and legal attaches if the proposed travel is in areas covered by such and, frequently, requests are made of one or all of the above to place stops with appropriate security services abroad to be advised of the activities of these subjects.

[(e) When information is received that an individual with a subversive background is forming a tour group for foreign travel or an organization which is considered subversive is sponsoring such a tour, advise appropriate offices under the caption of the tour name or the organization sponsoring the tour of the identities of the individuals participating in the tour and furnish the Bureau a letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination to the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and appropriate legal attaches, including therein all readily available information pertaining to the tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names of individuals making up the tour with addresses, if available, and a thumbnail sketch of the organization or individual sponsoring the tour.

Letterhead memoranda relating to the tours will be disseminated by the Bureau with a statement that, as individuals participating are identified, recipients will be furnished with memoranda under the individual case caption where those individuals are found to have subversive backgrounds. Therefore, the appropriate field offices should immediately identify and submit individual memoranda concerning such individuals. The details of travel will be replaced by a reference to the memorandum previously prepared under the caption of the organization sponsoring the tour. Prepare individual memoranda only in the cases of individuals with subversive backgrounds.

In addition, appropriate offices should submit a letter to the Bureau under the organization caption listing the names of those individuals residing within their territory who are traveling with the tour group and on whom no subversive information is found.]

[(f) Advise the Bureau promptly in form suitable for dissemination of a subject's return from travel abroad in those instances in which stops have been placed with security services abroad through the agencies listed above. In instances in which an individual against whom stops have been placed has traveled to any country behind the Iron Curtain, the Bureau shall also be furnished at that time with recommendations as to the desirability of interview of such person and with advice as to whether additional investigation concerning him is contemplated. In the event such an interview is authorized, it shall be conducted promptly and the case shall not be closed until such interview is had and the results thereof submitted in report form.

[(g) In some instances a security investigation of a subject not yet included in the security index may be in progress at the time it is found that the subject has recently departed for a foreign country. If the evidence developed at that time warrants the inclusion of the subject in the security index were it not for the fact that he is outside the U. S., form FD-122 should be submitted recommending his inclusion in the unavailable section of the security index. After all initial investigation is completed, the subject's case will be handled the same as those of other subjects of a similar status who are included in the unavailable section as out of the country.

If the subject is an alien who has been deported or has otherwise permanently departed from the U. S., he should not be included in the security index.

When it is determined that a security index subject has departed for a foreign country, his security index card shall be placed in the unavailable section and his case handled in accordance with the instructions set forth under 87D 7b (6) (b) IV.

(5) Investigative techniques

While it is not possible to enumerate all investigative techniques which can and should be employed in these investigations, there are certain proven techniques which have been used with continued success and should be applied wherever possible.

(a) File reviews

Upon the initiation of a security investigation of an individual, check the office indices and review files thoroughly for any pertinent information on record showing background and subversive activity of each individual subject. Include such information in the initial investigative report.

Once a main security file has been opened for an individual, subsequent information received concerning him should be channelized to that file. The reference cards pertaining to the subject should be consolidated in the indices after each check and review of files has been made.

(b) Security informants

Success of security investigations of individuals is primarily dependent upon a broad confidential informant coverage within every phase of subversive activity. Information and evidence developed through such sources are unsurpassed in value because of possible use not only for intelligence purposes but also as admissible evidence.

(B) During the first contact, the interviewing Agent will introduce himself as a Special Agent of the FBI by use of credentials or badge and will open the conversation by using an appropriate pretext or by reciting the Bureau's responsibilities in the security field and asking the subject whether he can be of assistance to the Government. If the individual has been a member of a basic revolutionary organization and indicates he might cooperate, he may be questioned during the initial contact about his own activities in order to further ascertain the extent to which he will cooperate. This original interview is for the sole purpose of allowing the Agent to determine whether the individual being interviewed might be cooperative.

(e) Prior Bureau authority

I. Subjects of active current investigations where no interview with prior Bureau authority has previously been conducted

II. Closed cases where the subject is on the security index and no prior interview has been conducted

III. Subjects of investigations requested by the Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant-type cases, loyalty cases, etc.

IV. Any persons where circumstances indicate a delicate situation exists and a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, religious field, publishing houses, labor leaders, and the like. Bureau authority must be requested with respect to situations of this kind even though prior interviews have been had with these interviewees.

V. Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts

[VI. Subjects of section A reserve index cards]

In any of the above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview a subject of a security investigation except those persons under IV above. This does not relieve you of the responsiblity of submitting reports in security cases when due; for example, annual reports in routine security index cases and six-month reports in key figure cases.

VII. Letters requesting Bureau authority for the interview must contain the following information, if available:

(A) Residence address, occupation, employment and race of subject, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health

(B) Marital status. If married, the occupation, employment, and race of the spouse.

(C) Length of time subject a member of or affiliated with subversive organizations and positions he held in such organizations. In cases in which investigation is based on some allegation or circumstances of a security nature other than membership in or affiliation with subversive organizations, facts upon which investigation is predicated should be briefly set forth.

(D) If married, information indicating the spouse is or has been a member of or affiliated with subversive groups, the position held in such groups, and the length of time of such membership or affiliation

(E) Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups

(F) Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathics of the subject and, if married, of the spouse

(G) What is expected to be gained by the interview

VIII. In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding the seven items listed above must be set out under the appropriate number but the above headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any of the items, you should make the appropriate comments after the respective number.

IX. In addition, unless you are recommending a special manner or procedure for conducting the interview, such as interviewing under pretext, the last paragraph of each letter should contain the following statement: "Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects." The last paragraph should also contain the statement: "If this subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during the initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of the Manual of Instructions is being conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as a PSI." This statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents during initial contacts and recontacts from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potentialities as an informant.

X. All letters requesting Bureau authority to interview the subject of a security investigation must be personally approved by the SAC.

XI. One of the required copies of the letter to the Bureau should consist only of the first page of the letter. When unnecessary for Bureau to issue specific instructions or comments in connection with authorizing an interview, the Bureau will approve the request by placing an appropriate rubber-stamp impression on the single-page copy of the incoming letter and return it by routing slip.

XII. Upon receipt of Bureau authority, the interview must be conducted within 30 days. If this is impossible, advise Bureau of the reasons why the interview was not effected and state that the subject will be contacted within the next 30 days. At the end of the second 30-day period if the interview has not been conducted, request additional authority. Include in the letters any new information bearing upon the advisability of conducting the interview.

(f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews

I. Interviews must be conducted by two Special Agents. An Agent experienced in security investigations who has knowledge of Bureau regulations regarding development of informants must conduct the actual interrogation. Approach need not be made by both Agents at the same time and one Agent may observe from a secure distance. Background of subject and individual circumstances will determine exactly how approach should be handled in each case. Two Agents should be physically present during any interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all types of Bureau cases.

II. Preparations for interview must be thorough and conducted so that interviewing Agents will not be compromised, the Bureau will not be embarrassed, and confidential informants will not be exposed.

(D) Whether or not defectee available for interview by all Agents

(E) Whether he is in position to testify and willing to do so

III. Do not include information concerning security informants for security reasons.

IV. Proper maintenance of this file will be useful in identifying persons who may be in a position to furnish information of value in the future and will obviate necessity of extensive file reviews in this connection.

V. A special index may be used for this file if desirable. If used, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating names, times, and places defectees were in a subversive movement and a brief description of information available from them. Break index down geographically and subdivide by years if desirable.

7. Administrative procedures.

[a. Reserve index

(1) Purpose

The reserve index is designed to represent those persons who, in the light of ever-changing conditions, should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation, or action under the security index program. This index may serve as an administrative aid and working index containing a central repository of the names of individuals having sympathy for or affiliation with the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations.

(2) Individuals to be included

This index is to contain names of individuals when, following investigation, the information does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the security index when there is evidence of:

(a) Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection

(b) Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.

(c) The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support, or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.

(d) Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(e) Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(3) Arrangement

This index is to be maintained in two sections, section A and section B. Each section will be maintained alphabetically on 5- by 8-inch cards.

(a) Section A

Section A of the reserve index is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following the apprehension of security index subjects.

I. Section A should include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the security index criteria but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Include in this section those individuals meeting the standards for inclusion in the reserve index and who fall within the following categories:

(A) Professors, teachers, and educators
(B) Labor union organizers or leaders
(C) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others in the mass media field
(D) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists
(E) Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level
(F) Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid

II. Recommendations for inclusion of names in the reserve index (section A)

(A) Recommendations for inclusion of names in section A of the reserve index are to be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a. A succinct summary setting forth the basis for the recommendation should be attached to the form FD-122a. In addition, if no report is accompanying the recommendation, a statement to that effect should appear on the page containing the succinct summary.

(B) Upon Bureau approval of recommendation for the inclusion of an individual's name in section A of the reserve index, two reserve index cards will be forwarded to the field. To these cards should be added the office file number and on the reverse side should be added available descriptive data. One card is to be filed in your office, and one card is to be filed away from headquarters city at the same location as the extra set of security index cards are now stored.

III. Periodic review of section A of the reserve index

Investigations of individuals listed in section A of the reserve index are to be brought up to date annually and considered for security index status or retention in the reserve index. This investigation should include, as a minimum:

(A) Verification of residence and employment
(B) Indices search and file review to determine whether additional investigation is warranted or whether an interview with the individual is desirable
(C) If additional investigation is conducted or if there is unreported information of a subversive nature contained in the files, submit a report.

[IV. Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing in section A of reserve index cards

(A) Changes in data appearing on section A reserve index cards should be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a.

(B) Deletions from section A of the reserve index should be recommended by letter. The letter should set forth the basis for the recommendation.

(C) Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section A cards to new office of origin.

(b) Section B

I. This section is to contain the names of all other individuals included in the reserve index. This section is to be maintained only in the field office.

II. Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form FD-128a. Forward section B cards to new office of origin.

(4) Content

(a) Each card in section A and section B should contain, as a minimum, the following:

I. Name and aliases
II. Race
III. Sex
IV. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
V. Citizenship
VI. Residence
VII. Employment
VIII. Birth data
IX. Office file number

(b) In addition, membership and position or association in a subversive group or groups, together with the source and date of the information, may be added.

(5) Removal and deletion of cards

(a) Destroy cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources or who subsequently become subjects of security index cards.

(b) Advise the Bureau of the destruction only in the case of section A cards.]

b. Security index

(1) Purpose

(a) Security index cards are prepared and maintained by the Bureau to serve as operational guide for apprehension of persons deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country in the event of a national emergency.

(b) It shall contain the names of all persons who have been determined through investigation to be dangerous or potentially dangerous because of their membership in or affiliation with or espousal of doctrines of basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations and who will be apprehended upon receipt of instructions from the Attorney General.

(c) It shall include subjects of espionage investigations and any other type of Bureau investigation provided their activities bring them within the scope of the security index criteria.

(d) Action shall be taken against individuals included in the security index only upon authorization of warrants of arrest by the Attorney General. However, in preparing and maintaining the security index, to all practical effects, the Bureau is making the decision as to those persons who will be apprehended in the event of an emergency, inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised that he does not have funds or

manpower to review security index cases.

(e) Names shall be included in the security index only when investigation has established and reports reflect sufficient facts and evidence to justify the inclusion of each subject in the security index.

(f) The contents of the security index must be accurate and correct at all times. Matters pertaining to its preparation and maintenance must be given preferred, expeditious, continuous and detailed attention.

(g) Matters pertaining to the security index are strictly confidential and are not to be mentioned or alluded to in investigative reports.

(h) The general operation and content of the security index must not be discussed by field personnel of the Bureau without prior Bureau authority.

(i) Matters pertaining to the security index may be discussed with duly qualified representatives of other Federal intelligence agencies only on a strictly confidential basis and only in instances wherein an individual subject of prime interest to one of these services is involved.

(2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual

(a) The dangerousness of a member or affiliate of a subversive organization does not necessarily depend entirely upon his personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or a disposition to violence. Although these factors must be taken into consideration in evaluating an individual's potential dangerousness, other factors are essential in making this determination. An individual's dangerousness also depends upon the contribution he has made or is making in the advancement of the principles and aims of the subversive movement with which he is connected or his subversive potentialities in the event of a national emergency. Bear in mind that a subject active in a subversive organization is not merely an isolated individual but is a part of an organization of which the purposes are opposed to the best interests of the U.S. An individual's loyalty to a subversive organization and the principles thereof is a primary factor to take into consideration in evaluating his potential dangerousness. Factors indicating an individual's loyalty to such an organization are numerous and will vary with each case in degree. Among such factors are:

I. Long continued membership in a subversive organization
II. Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools
III. Frequent or regular attendance at organizational meetings and functions
IV. Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization
V. Possession of or continued study of revolutionary literature
VI. Preparation or distribution of subversive propaganda and/or literature
VII. Holding positions in the subversive organization or in other organizations of a front character which indicate confidence of such organizations in his loyalty
VIII. Espousal of a subversive doctrine exemplified in his acts and utterances
IX. Contributions to or collections of funds for the organization
X. Recruitment of new members
XI. Revolutionary background
XII. Participation in picket lines in which the subversive organization is interested or which it has fostered, or in demonstrations, riots, mass meetings, or pressure group activity fostered by the organization

number, agency having security responsibility, and interested agencies can be included on FD-128 submitted by old office of origin.

V. Where security index flash notice has been placed with Identification Division, notation to that effect must appear on FD-128 and extra copy of FD-128 must be specifically designated for Bureau marked "Attention Identification Division" so that those records will reflect new office controlling existing security index flash notice.

VI. The old office of origin will submit current report.

Submission of FD-128 should not be delayed solely for preparation of reports when office of origin is to be changed, but notation should be made on FD-128 that old office of origin is preparing report.

Case will remain pending in both old and new offices of origin until report is submitted by old office of origin. The new office of origin is responsible to follow the matter until the report is submitted.

VII. The new office of origin is to review the pertinent material received with FD-128, as well as pertinent information in the files of the new office, to determine whether additional investigation is warranted. If no additional investigation is warranted, advise Bureau by[letter] that the case is being placed in a closed status.

VIII. Upon receipt of FD-128, office covering new address of subject will be office of origin with no other communication necessary in this regard. New office of origin will place its file number on security index cards received and place them in security index of that office.

IX. Upon receipt of new security index cards from Bureau with copy of FD-128, new office of origin is to transfer information from reverse side of old geographical cards to[two]of the new cards, appropriately file new cards, and destroy old cards.

(b) Key figures and top functionaries

Mechanics of transferring cases for all security index subjects as described above shall apply to key figures and top functionaries. Additional procedures in these categories are:

I. Notification to Bureau of deletion of subject as key figure or top functionary in old office of origin will be handled merely by designation in space provided on FD-128 that subject was key figure or top functionary.

II. Upon receipt of form FD-128, new office of origin shall automatically designate subject a key figure or top functionary and continue case in an assigned pending-inactive status if no further investigation is to be conducted at that time and necessary summary report has been submitted. Within six months in cases of key figures or within three months in cases of top functionaries, new office of origin is to conduct active investigation, submit investigative report on subject, and advise Bureau concerning continued designation of subject in these categories.

(c) Subjects tabbed for detcom
Security index card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in new office of origin until such time as it is determined by receipt of information by that office that priority designation is not warranted under the provisions of 87D 7b (11) below.

(d) Subjects not included in security index

I. Transfer office of origin by FD-128 only upon verification by another office of subject's presence in that division. FD-128 should show full title.

II. Enclose copies of all investigative reports and other pertinent serials with copies of FD-128 to new office of origin.

III. New office of origin is to investigate or advise Bureau that case closed if no action warranted

(10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index
SAC shall personally recommend the removal of any name from the security index under the conditions set out in 87D 7b (4). Recommendation to cancel subject's name from the security index should be accompanied by a current investigative report except in case of death of the subject.

(a) Death of subject
Destroy security index card without Bureau authority, but advise Bureau by [letterhead memorandum.]

(b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction
Upon learning of the departure of a security index subject from the U. S., Hawaii, Alaska, or Puerto Rico for a foreign country, immediately ascertain conditions surrounding his departure.

No security index card shall be canceled by reason of a subject's departure for a foreign country unless that subject is an alien who has permanently departed either voluntarily or as a result of deportation proceedings. In such instances the security index cards will be canceled only after the subject's departure has been verified as being permanent. If a U. S. citizen who is included in the security index and who has been out of the country is found to have renounced his citizenship and taken citizenship of a foreign country, his security index card may be canceled only after it has been determined that he does not intend to return to the U. S.

Recommendations to cancel the security index cards of such subjects shall be made by letter directed to the Bureau. The cards shall be canceled only after receipt of advice from the Bureau that the Bureau's security index cards have been canceled.

(c) Imprisonment of subject
Security index cards shall not be canceled by reason of a subject's having been imprisoned regardless of the length of time he will be incarcerated. The cards of such subjects shall be placed in the unavailable section of the security index and the cases handled thereafter in accordance with the instructions set forth in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.

(d) Induction of subject into the armed forces
Security index cards of subjects who have been inducted into the armed forces of the U. S. are to be placed in the inactive section of the field security index. Follow the procedure set forth above under 87D 7b (6) (b) (V).

(e) Security informants
The security index card of any subject who is developed as a security informant should be canceled. In requesting the Bureau's permission to designate such a subject as a security informant, direct Bureau's

[illegible] should be done prior to requesting authority to institute the investigation where sufficient identifying information is not otherwise available.

(b) Contacts during investigation

I. Once Bureau authority is granted to conduct the investigation, it is permissible to contact:

(A) All established reliable sources, including those connected with the institution of learning

(B) All individuals not connected with the institution of learning who, consistent with discretion, would be contacted in a usual security case; e.g., neighbors, credit agencies, past employers, etc.

(C) Registrars
If the registrar is reliable and can be depended upon not to divulge the Bureau's identity, Bureau authority is not needed in these cases to contact the registrar's office to obtain background data useful for identification purposes, to develop other proper investigative leads, or to verify connection with the institution of learning.

II. Superiors of faculty members
No contact should be made with the superiors of a subject who is a member of the faculty since the superiors might take action against the subject as a result of our contact.

III. Students, faculty members, or other employees
If, during the course of an investigation of a subject who is connected with an institution of learning, it is desired to interview a student, faculty member, or other employee of an institution of learning who is not an established reliable source, prior Bureau authority must be obtained. When requesting authority to interview such an individual, that individual's name, position, and a positive statement concerning his discretion and reliability should be furnished to the Bureau.

(c) Receiving voluntary information
These instructions must not deter or prevent the immediate and proper interview of any person connected with an institution of learning who desires of his own volition to furnish information to the Bureau or who desires to be contacted by an Agent.

(2) Subjects not connected with an institution of learning
When the subject of a security-type investigation is not connected with an institution of learning and you desire to interview, in connection with the case, a student, faculty member, or other employee of an institution of learning, prior Bureau authority must be obtained for such an interview unless the student, faculty member, or other employee is an established, reliable contact of the office. In requesting authority, the name, position, and a positive statement concerning that person's discretion and reliability should be furnished to the Bureau.

(3) Contacts of foreign establishments
In connection with investigations of contacts of Soviet, satellite, and Yugoslav officials and official establishments, Bureau authority must be obtained before conducting any inquiries or surveillances at any school, college, or university. Submit complete facts and your recommendation when requesting such authority.

b. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations or international organizations, and members of the armed forces
Should information be received or investigation develop the fact that an individual being investigated under a security caption is or becomes

an employee of the U.S. Government, of a foreign official establishment, of the United Nations or other international organizations, has foreign diplomatic or official status or is a member of the U.S. armed forces, the matter should be immediately reported to the Bureau and no further investigation should be conducted except upon specific Bureau authority.

6. Investigative procedures concerning individuals

a. General

These investigations must be thorough and exhaustive. Obviously, the dangerousness of an individual cannot be determined through cursory investigation. All pertinent information concerning the subject's background and subversive activity must be fully developed and reported to assure an accurate evaluation of his degree of dangerousness.

Due to the intelligence nature of these investigations, discretion must be used at all times to prevent subjects from becoming unduly apprised that they are under investigation by this Bureau.

Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during the course of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority.

b. Scope of investigations

Set forth below are items which should be obtained during these investigations.

(1) Background

- (a) True name and aliases
- (b) Residence address
- (c) Occupation or business
- (d) Business or employment address
- (e) Citizenship status

  Ascertain the citizenship status of the subject as early as possible in the investigation.

  - I. Alien
    - (A) If the subject is an alien, determine the date and place of birth.
    - (B) Determine his nationality (that is, the country of which he is a citizen or sovereign of which he is a subject), together with the date, port and vessel or other means of entry into the U.S.
    - (C) Determine whether the subject entered as an immigrant or nonimmigrant.
    - (D) Ascertain any steps taken toward naturalization and reason for denial of citizenship where such denial exists.
    - (E) Ascertain any available facts indicating whether entry into the U.S. was legal or illegal.
  - II. Naturalized citizen
    - (A) Ascertain date and place of birth, nationality prior to naturalization, date, port and vessel or other means of entry into the U.S.
    - (B) Ascertain the date when, place and court where, subject was naturalized and any facts tending to indicate fraud or illegality in connection with his naturalization.
    - (C) Ascertain the last place of foreign residence, place from which the subject emigrated to the U.S. and the date of such emigration.
    - (D) Ascertain any absences from the U.S.
  - III. Native-born citizen
    - (A) Determine date and place of birth.
- (f) Nationality background
  - I. During the course of investigation, efforts should be made to ascertain from sources contacted the date and place of birth of the subject's parents and spouse and the parents of the spouse.

January 29, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
Revision Number 87

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 5 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8

Section 6 - Pages 3 and 4

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 1b and 2
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 15 and 15a

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
(Page 12a)
Pages 17 and 18
Page 23
Pages 63 and 64

Part II (continued)

Section 6 - Pages 3a and 4

Section 9 - Pages 1 and 2

Index - Page 6a
Pages 7 and 8
Page 12a
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 25 and 26

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

PART 2

583

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. [Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above.] Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies[to be filed] is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

   On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful.

   a. Chiefs of police
   b. Sheriffs
   c. State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
   d. U. S. Marshals and deputies
   e. Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
   f. Wardens of penal institutions
   g. District attorneys or county prosecutors
   h. Railway police (if desirable)
   i. Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
   j. Any other officials who receive identification orders
      (1) Changes in the list are to be reported to the Bureau as they occur.
      (2) The list is to be forwarded to the Bureau on March 1 in duplicate.
      (3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

- Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
- Bureau of Customs
- Cooperative Credit Bureaus
- Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
- FBINA Graduates
- Hotels
- Immigration and Naturalization Service
- Missions Providing Lodging
- Post Office Inspectors
- Postmasters
- Salvation Army
- Secret Service
- U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

- Automobile Clubs
- Banks
- County Attorneys
- County Coroners
- Credit Companies
- Detective Agencies
- Enlistment Officers,
  - U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps
- Employment Service
- Fire Departments
- Forest Service
- Gunsmiths
- Insurance Companies
- Movie Studios
- Navy Shore Patrol
- Oil Company Special Agents
- Parole and Probation Officers
- Plant Quarantine Officers
- Protective Associations
- Race Tracks
- Savings and Loan Associations
- Service Recruiting Officers
- State Hospitals for Insane
- Steamship Companies
- Telegraph Companies
- U. S. Attorneys
- U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

[e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.]

July 27, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 93

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages 1 and 2

Part I

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 4 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 2a and 2b
Page 5
Pages 5a and 6

Section 6 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 4a and 4b
Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8
Page 9

Section 10 - Pages 3 and 4

Part II

Section 1 - Page 1
Pages 1a and 2
Pages 9 and 10

Section 2 - Page 5
Pages 5a and 6
Pages 7 and 8

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 4 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 29 and 30
Pages 63 and 64

Section 6 - Pages 3a and 4

Section 8 - Page 1
Pages 1a and 2

Index - Pages 5 and 6

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (26)

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
   a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful.
      (1) Chiefs of police
      (2) Sheriffs
      (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      (6) Wardens of penal institutions
      (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      (8) Railway police (if desirable)
      (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
   b. Changes in the list are to be reported to the Bureau as they occur.
   c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. [A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.]

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers,
  U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
[State Employment Offices]
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

August 26, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 94

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
  Section 4 - Pages 1 and 2
  Section 6 - Pages 3 and 4
  Section 8 - Pages 1 and 2
                    Pages 3 and 4

Part II
  Section 2 - Pages 1d and 2
                    Page 4a
  Section 6 - Page 3
  Section 7 - Page 21b
  Section 8 - Pages 4c and 4d
                    Pages 5 and 6
                    Pages 17 and 18
                    Pages 19 and 20
  Section 9 - Pages 15a and 16

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (13)

d. Accurately
e. After a review of the entire file
f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence
h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.

4. Do not:
   a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
   b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
   c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
   d. Use complicated sentence structure
   e. Use technical references to statutes
   f. Express personal opinions
   g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
   h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
   i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
   j. Use adjectives excessively
5. Transmittal
   Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, attention Crime Records Division.

[[6. Dissemination
[New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible
[interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration
[given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreci-
[able passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before re-
[lease. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the
[Bureau on request.]

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS
1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.
2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. In all instances this letter must include the following:
   a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
   b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
   c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
   d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
   e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

   In all other instances, including requests for circularization in other field divisions, prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters.
3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.

September 30, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND [illegible]ULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 95

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 9 and 10
Pages 11 and 12
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 15 and 16

Section 11 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 12 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 9 and 10

Part II

Section 1 - Page 5

Section 2 - Pages 1d and 2
Pages 5a and 6

Section 3 - Pages 1b and 2
Page 3
Pages 3a and 4
Pages 5 and 6
Pages 13a and 14
Pages 15 and 15a

Section 4 - Pages 29 and 30
Pages 47 and 48

Section 5 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 6 - Pages 1b and 2
Page 3
Pages 7 and 8
Page 9

Section 7 - Page 6a
Pages 17a and 18
Pages 19 and 20
Page 20a
Page 21b
Pages 35 and 36

Section 8 - Pages 1a and 2

Section 9 - Pages 21 and 22

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (33)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   - a. Foreword by the Director
   - b. Interesting case write-ups
   - c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   - d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution

   Restricted to law enforcement officers and others engaged in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   - a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter.
   - b. This file is to be kept permanently.
   - c. [Current copy should be placed]in bookcase, available to all Agents.

d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Human interest items from local police work
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television speech, a manuscript of the speech must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval. In some other cases involving important speeches not on radio or television, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.

[[i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.]

4. Do not:
   - a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
   - b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
   - c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
   - d. Use complicated sentence structure
   - e. Use technical references to statutes
   - f. Express personal opinions
   - g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
   - h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
   - i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
   - j. Use adjectives excessively
5. Transmittal
   Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, attention Crime Records Division.
6. Dissemination
   New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreciable passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before release. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the Bureau on request.

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.
2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. In all instances this letter must include the following:
   - a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
   - b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
   - c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
   - d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
   - e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

   In all other instances, including requests for circularization in other field divisions, prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters.
3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
   Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
   Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. See section 107N,[3b,]volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "_____, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
   Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Derogatory information
   f. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies,[but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication.] If the SAC contact is approved,[the single-page]copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a[letter]is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."

[[7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three
[times each year; those located in resident agencies must be contacted at
[least two times each year.]

8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

[[13.] Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:

- a. Federal judges
- b. U. S. Attorneys
- c. Only outstanding state judges
- d. Governors
- e. Leading state and county prosecutors
- f. State attorneys general
- g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
- h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
- i. In the principal cities:
  - (1) Mayors
  - (2) Chiefs of police
  - (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
  - (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
  - (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
  - (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
  - (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
  - (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
  - (9) Heads of larger universities
  - (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
  - (11) Top representatives of air lines
  - (12) Managers of leading airports
  - (13) Top representatives of railroads
  - (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
  - (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
  - (16) Top representatives of Western Union
  - (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
  - (18) Heads of better business bureaus
  - (19) Heads of leading banks

[[14.] Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

[[15.] Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

The SAC or ASAC shall contact at least once each year all national officers, departmental (state) officers, and members of the Americanism Commission of The American Legion. A letter shall be submitted on March 15 of each year showing that the above American Legion officials have been contacted.

November 28, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 98

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Pages 3 and 4
    Page 5

Section 12 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 16 - Pages 5 and 6

Part II

Section 2 - Page 4a
    Pages 9 and 10

Section 3 - Pages 25 and 26

Section 4 - Pages 3 and 4
    Pages 7 and 8
    Pages 13 and 14
    Pages 27 and 28
    Pages 29 and 30
    Pages 35 and 36
    Pages 37 and 38-46
    Pages 49 and 50
    Pages 57 and 58

Section 6 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 7 - Pages 15 and 16

Section 9 - Pages 7 and 8
    Pages 9 and 10
    Pages 13 and 14
    Page 15
    Pages 15a and 16
    Pages 17 and 18
    Pages 19 and 20
    Pages 21 and 22

Index - Pages 7 and 8

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (27)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. See section 107N,[3b,]volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "_____, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
Use the following subheadings in the order given:
a. Description of proposed SAC contact
b. Services this contact can provide
c. Past relations with field office
d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
e. Derogatory information
f. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies,[but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication.] If the SAC contact is approved,[the single-page]copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a[letter]is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located[in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located]in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

February 29, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
Revision Number 88

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Page ~~5~~

Part I

Section 3 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~5a and 6~~
Pages ~~6a and 6b~~

Section 2 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Page ~~11~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~11 and 11a~~
Pages ~~11c~~ and 12
Page ~~13~~
Pages ~~13a and 14~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~

Part II (continued)

Section 4 - Pages ~~1a and 2~~
Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Page ~~2c~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Page ~~4a~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~21 and 22~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
Pages 31 and 32 ✓
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~49~~ and ~~50~~
Pages ~~51 and 52~~
Pages ~~59 and 60~~
Pages ~~63 and 64~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages 21 and 22
Page 22a

Section 9 - Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~

Index - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Page ~~20a~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (49)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.

3. Security and racial sources of information
Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. See section 107N,[3b,]volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

4. Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "______, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Derogatory information
   f. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies,[but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication.] If the SAC contact is approved,[the single-page]copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a[letter]is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by 5-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. [If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
8. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.]
9. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.
10. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
   a. Federal judges
   b. U. S. Attorneys
   c. Only outstanding state judges
   d. Governors
   e. Leading state and county prosecutors
   f. State attorneys general
   g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
   h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
   i. In the principal cities:
      (1) Mayors
      (2) Chiefs of police
      (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
      (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
      (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
      (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
      (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
      (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
      (9) Heads of larger universities
      (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
      (11) Top representatives of air lines
      (12) Managers of leading airports
      (13) Top representatives of railroads
      (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
      (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
      (16) Top representatives of Western Union
      (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
      (18) Heads of better business bureaus
      (19) Heads of leading banks

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
    a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful.
        (1) Chiefs of police
        (2) Sheriffs
        (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
        (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
        (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
        (6) Wardens of penal institutions
        (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
        (8) Railway police (if desirable)
        (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
        (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
    b. Changes in the list are to be reported to the Bureau as they occur.
    c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

   (1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

   (2) The cooperation which has been afforded

   (3) The following must appear on the list:
      - Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
      - Bureau of Customs
      - Cooperative Credit Bureaus
      - Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
      - FBINA Graduates
      - Hotels
      - Immigration and Naturalization Service
      - Missions Providing Lodging
      - Post Office Inspectors
      - Postmasters
      - Salvation Army
      - Secret Service
      - U. S. Marshals

   (4) The following may appear on the list:
      - Automobile Clubs
      - Banks
      - County Attorneys
      - County Coroners
      - Credit Companies
      - Detective Agencies
      - Enlistment Officers, U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps
      - Employment Service
      - Fire Departments
      - Forest Service
      - Gunsmiths
      - Insurance Companies
      - Movie Studios
      - Navy Shore Patrol
      - Oil Company Special Agents
      - Parole and Probation Officers
      - Plant Quarantine Officers
      - Protective Associations
      - Race Tracks
      - Savings and Loan Associations
      - Service Recruiting Officers
      - State Hospitals for Insane
      - Steamship Companies
      - Telegraph Companies
      - U. S. Attorneys
      - U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

[e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.]

April 29, 1960

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
Revision Number 90

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part II

Section 2 - Page 5

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 5 and 6

Section 4 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 6 - Pages 7 and 8
Page 9

Section 7 - Page 6a
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 25 and 26

Section 8 - Pages 17 and 18

Section 9 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 23 and 24

Index - Pages 7 and 8

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (18)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
   Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
   Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. See section 107N,[3b,]volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "_____, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
   Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Derogatory information
   f. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies,[but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication.] If the SAC contact is approved,[the single-page]copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a[letter]is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   - a. Name of the contact
   - b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   - c. Nature of service which can be received
   - d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   - e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   - f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   - g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
8. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
9. [Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
10. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.]
11. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

12. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    a. Federal judges
    b. U. S. Attorneys
    c. Only outstanding state judges
    d. Governors
    e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    f. State attorneys general
    g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    i. In the principal cities:
        (1) Mayors
        (2) Chiefs of police
        (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        (9) Heads of larger universities
        (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        (11) Top representatives of air lines
        (12) Managers of leading airports
        (13) Top representatives of railroads
        (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        (19) Heads of leading banks

13. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

14. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

The SAC or ASAC shall contact at least once each year all national officers, departmental (state) officers, and members of the Americanism Commission of The American Legion. A letter shall be submitted on March 15 of each year[showing]that the above American Legion officials have been contacted.

January 27, 1961

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 100

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Part I

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 2
Page 3

Section 4 - Pages 11 and 12
Page 13
Pages ~~13a and~~ 14

Section 10 - Page 2a

Section 11 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 14 - Pages 11 and 11a
Page 11b
Pages 11c and 12
Page 13

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 3 and 3a
Pages 3b and 4
Pages 7a and 8

Section 4 - Pages 29 and 30

Section 6 - Pages 3a and 4

Section 7 - Pages 15 and 16

Section 9 - Pages 21 and 22

Index - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 23 and 24
Pages 29 and 30
Page 35

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (28)

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
    a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful.
        (1) Chiefs of police
        (2) Sheriffs
        (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
        (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
        (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
        (6) Wardens of penal institutions
        (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
        (8) Railway police (if desirable)
        (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
        (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
    [b. Changes in the list are to be reported[in duplicate]to the Bureau as they occur.
    c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

	[Page No.]	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
[	[4]	Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
[	[7]	Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
[	[3]	Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. [A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.]

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers,
U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
[State Employment Offices]
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

October 27, 1961

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 109

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages 5 and 6

Part I

Section 1 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 9 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 10 - Page 2a

Section 12 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 15 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 16 - Page 3
Pages 3a and 4

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 11c and 12
Pages 25 and 26

Section 6 - Page 9

Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6
Page 21b
Pages 29 and 30

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 9 - Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 15b and 16
Pages 19 and 20

Index - Pages 11 and 12
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 23 and 24
Pages 25 and 26
Page 26a
Pages 27 and 28

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (26)

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    a. Federal judges
    b. U. S. Attorneys
    c. Only outstanding state judges
    d. Governors
    e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    f. State attorneys general
    g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    i. In the principal cities:
        (1) Mayors
        (2) Chiefs of police
        (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        (9) Heads of larger universities
        (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        (11) Top representatives of air lines
        (12) Managers of leading airports
        (13) Top representatives of railroads
        (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        (19) Heads of leading banks

14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.
15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

The SAC or ASAC shall contact at least once each year all national officers, departmental (state) officers, and members of the Americanism Commission of The American Legion. A letter shall be submitted on March 15 of each year showing that the above American Legion officials have been contacted.

[N. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS
[As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of
[leading newspapers must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other
[news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a
[field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously
[effective. Each 90 days (November 15, February 15, May 15, August 15),
[the SAC must advise the Bureau of the number of newspapers in his territory,
[the number with which he has had contact or with which representatives of
[his office have made contact, and the steps he is taking to insure maximum
[effectiveness of this type of contact, as well as what material other than
[spot news items was furnished to these newspapers; e.g., the Director's
[Introduction in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin each month.]

January 29, 1962

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 112

[illegible] c letter

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 3 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Pages ~~5b and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 10 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 13 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Page ~~7~~

Section 14 - Page ~~11b~~
Pages ~~11c and 12~~
Pages ~~13a and 14~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Part II

Section 1 - Page ~~1~~
Pages ~~1a and 2~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~3 and 3a~~
Pages ~~15b and 16~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~15a and 16~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~
Pages ~~5c and 6~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~35 and 36~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~
Pages ~~6a and 6b~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages 15 and 16

Section 9 - Pages ~~17 and 18~~

Index - Pages ~~19 and 20~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (33)

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
   a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. [Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.]
      (1) Chiefs of police
      (2) Sheriffs
      (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      (6) Wardens of penal institutions
      (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      (8) Railway police (if desirable)
      (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
   b. Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.
   c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. [A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.]

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

- Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
- Bureau of Customs
- Cooperative Credit Bureaus
- Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
- FBINA Graduates
- Hotels
- Immigration and Naturalization Service
- Missions Providing Lodging
- Post Office Inspectors
- Postmasters
- Salvation Army
- Secret Service
- U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

- Automobile Clubs
- Banks
- County Attorneys
- County Coroners
- Credit Companies
- Detective Agencies
- Enlistment Officers, U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps
- Employment Service
- Fire Departments
- Forest Service
- Gunsmiths
- Insurance Companies
- Movie Studios
- Navy Shore Patrol
- Oil Company Special Agents
- Parole and Probation Officers
- Plant Quarantine Officers
- Protective Associations
- Race Tracks
- Savings and Loan Associations
- Service Recruiting Officers
- [State Employment Offices]
- State Hospitals for Insane
- Steamship Companies
- Telegraph Companies
- U. S. Attorneys
- U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

PART II

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

I. VISITS TO FIELD OFFICES
  1. Non-Bureau governmental officials
    a. Do not discuss Bureau policies, plans, or relationships. Courteously advise the visitor that inquiries concerning such matters are to be made at the Bureau at Washington.
    b. Advise the Bureau of the visit, identity of the visitor, purpose, matters discussed, courtesies extended, and observations of interest to the Bureau.
  2. Departmental officials
    a. Be courteous.
    b. Do not offer office space, clerical and stenographic assistance, or chauffeuring in Bureau automobiles.
    c. Do not furnish information unless prior notification has been received that the official would contact the field office for information. If no notification received, before furnishing information clearance must be obtained from the Bureau.
    d. Advise the Bureau in case of doubt.

J. MISCELLANEOUS
  1. Disarming demonstrations
     Are to be confined to law enforcement groups.
  2. Credentials
     Are to be exhibited to all persons interviewed in such manner that the person to whom shown has an opportunity to observe and understand the connection of the Agent with the FBI.
  3. Law enforcement officials
    a. Contact with
      (1) Contact must be maintained with law enforcement officials for the purpose of securing information of violations of Federal laws within the jurisdiction of the Bureau.
      (2) Agents are to call on police executives when in their cities unless such visits would be so frequent as to be embarrassing.
      (3) Local law enforcement agencies should be advised by letter of the disposition of prosecutive action taken in Federal court in cases

referred to Bureau by local law enforcement agencies or where Bureau fugitives are taken into custody by local law enforcement officers. They should also be advised of violations of local laws coming to the attention of the FBI.

b. Visits to Washington
When the field requests special courtesies be afforded certain individuals, including law enforcement officers, coming to Washington, D. C., the communication so advising the Bureau shall contain biographical data and a brief summary of information in the field office files concerning the visitor.

When law enforcement executives are contemplating a visit to the Bureau at Washington, D. C., ask them to call at the office of the Assistant Director, Training and Inspection Division, Room 5256, Justice Building.

c. Letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, and condolence
When letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, or condolence from the Director are recommended by the field, such recommendations should be submitted promptly. They should include the specific facts on which the recommendation is based, full identifying data and address of the citizen, and the result of a search of the field office indices concerning the citizen. In connection with the election of officers of police associations at conventions covering more than one field division territory, the field division in whose territory the convention was physically held is responsible for submitting any recommendations for letters of congratulations. The office submitting such request should summarize briefly the relations with these officers, incorporating any derogatory data which might preclude such letters. Inasmuch as the recommending office is not likely to possess all data, pertinent other field divisions should submit a brief, supplemental summary concerning officers recommended for letters who reside in their territory.

[4. [Inquiries concerning status of Bureau cases
[When a state official has expressed interest in the prosecutive status
[of a Bureau case, for a legitimate reason, such as deferment of state
[prosecution pending the outcome of the Federal case, insure that such
[official is kept appropriately advised, including the final outcome
[of the matter.]

5. U. S. Cabinet officers, Senators, and Congressmen
If an SAC receives an inquiry from a Cabinet officer or U. S. Senator or Congressman concerning an official matter, it should be brought to the Bureau's attention immediately.

K. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Definition
An individual, organization, or concern willingly furnishing information to employees frequently enough to justify making a record where the source need not be protected. If occasionally the source must be protected, this may be done. If sources must be constantly concealed, they become informants or confidential sources and must be handled as such.

1. Index
Index card (3 by 5 inches) must be made up to contain:
   a. Names
   b. Addresses
   c. Organization or concern
   d. Type of information furnished
   e. Date of development

February 27, 1962

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 113

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 5 and 6

Part I

Section 1 - Pages 3 and 4
Page 5

Section 14 - Pages 13a and 14
Page 15

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7b and 8
Pages 11c and 12
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 21 and 22
Page 23-24

Section 4 - Pages 19 and 20
Pages 27 and 28
Pages 37 and 38-46
Pages 57 and 58

Section 5 - Page 11

Section 6 - Pages 3a and 4

Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 9 - Pages 19 and 20

Index - Pages 9 and 10

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (22)

4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
   a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. [Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.]
      (1) Chiefs of police
      (2) Sheriffs
      (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      (6) Wardens of penal institutions
      (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      (8) Railway police (if desirable)
      (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
   b. Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.
   c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
[Car Rental Agencies]
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, [U. S. Air Force,] Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

April 30, 1962

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 115

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 3 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~3~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Section 8 - Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 10 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~ (Page 3a deleted)
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 14 - Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~5a and 6~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~3b and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~11 and 11a~~
Pages ~~13a and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~

Section 4 - Page ~~4a~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~21 and 22~~
Page ~~25~~
Pages ~~25a and 26~~
Pages ~~33 and 34~~
Pages ~~37 and 38 46~~
Pages ~~49 and 50~~

Section 5 - Pages ~~3b and 4~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Pages ~~5 and 5a~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~6a and 6b~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Page ~~17~~
Pages ~~17a and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~

Index - Pages ~~15 and 16~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (52)

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    a. Foreword by the Director
    b. Interesting case write-ups
    c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
    d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution

[[Limited] to law enforcement officers and others engaged in[or having a
[legitimate interest in]law enforcement work

3. Filing and indexing
    a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter.
    b. This file is to be kept permanently.
    c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

  d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
  a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
  b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
  c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
  d. Human interest items from local police work
  e. Police and firearms training subjects
  f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
  g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
     FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
     Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television speech, a manuscript of the speech must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval. In some other cases involving important speeches not on radio or television, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
  a. Requested by the Bureau
  b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
  c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
  a. Major importance
  b. Public interest
  c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
  d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
  a. Double spaced
  b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
  c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
  d. Accurately
  e. After a review of the entire file
  f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
  g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
   a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
      (1) Scientific apparatus
      (2) Equipment
      (3) Personnel
      (4) Methods
      (5) Economics
   b. Newspaper clippings,[other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern]
      (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
      (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
      (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
      (4) Bad local crime conditions
      (5) Scientific crime detection experts
      (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual files of police agencies clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
      (7) Police training in colleges and universities
      (8) Aggravated sex offenders
      (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
      [(10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.]
2. Method of preparation for transmittal
   a. Mount the clipping on[form FD-350 within the borders shown.
   b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
   c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
   d. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
   e. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
   f. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

g. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.
h. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.
i. All clippings must be complete.
j. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations and racial matters should be forwarded.]
[k.] Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local[paper.] Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive[at] headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.
4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau
a. General principle governing submissions
The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.
b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications
(1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of the Central Research Section) unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.

(2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention Central Research Section, informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.
(3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

June 27, 1962

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 117

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Part I

Section 1 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Part II

Section 2 - Pages ~~1a and 2~~
Pages ~~5 and 5a~~
Pages ~~5b and 6~~
Page ~~7~~
Pages ~~7a and 8~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~13a and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Page ~~8a~~
Page ~~65~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Page ~~9~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~14a and 14b~~
Pages ~~14c and 14d~~
Pages ~~14e and 14f~~
Pages ~~14g and 14h~~
Pages ~~14i and 14j~~
Page ~~14k~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Page ~~17~~
Pages ~~17a and 18~~
Pages ~~19~~ and 20
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~15b and 16~~

Index - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~11~~ and 12
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~23~~ and 24
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
Pages ~~26a and 26b~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~
Page ~~28a~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (46)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    a. Foreword by the Director
    b. Interesting case write-ups
    c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
    d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution
    Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
    a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. [For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.]
    b. This file is to be kept permanently.
    c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   - a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   - b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   - c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   - d. Human interest items from local police work
   - e. Police and firearms training subjects
   - f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   - g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
     FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
     Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television speech, a manuscript of the speech must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval. In some other cases involving important speeches not on radio or television, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   - a. Requested by the Bureau
   - b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   - c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   - a. Major importance
   - b. Public interest
   - c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   - d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   - a. Double spaced
   - b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   - c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   - d. Accurately
   - e. After a review of the entire file
   - f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   - g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    - a. Federal judges
    - b. U. S. Attorneys
    - c. Only outstanding state judges
    - d. Governors
    - e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    - f. State attorneys general
    - g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    - h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    - i. In the principal cities:
        - (1) Mayors
        - (2) Chiefs of police
        - (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        - (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        - (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        - (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        - (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        - (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        - (9) Heads of larger universities
        - (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        - (11) Top representatives of air lines
        - (12) Managers of leading airports
        - (13) Top representatives of railroads
        - (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        - (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        - (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        - (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        - (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        - (19) Heads of leading banks

14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

The SAC or ASAC shall contact at least once each year all national officers, departmental (state) officers, and members of the Americanism Commission of The American Legion. A letter shall be submitted on March 15 of each year showing that the above American Legion officials have been contacted.

N. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously
[effective. [Annually, on May 15,]the SAC must advise the Bureau of the
[number of newspapers[and radio and television stations]in his territory, the number with which he has had contact or with which representatives of his office have made contact, and the steps he is taking to insure maximum effectiveness of this type of contact, as well as what material other than
[spot news items was furnished to these[media;]e.g., the Director's Introduction in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin each month.

October 29, 1962

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 121

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 2 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 10 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 13 - Pages ~~1a and 2~~
Page ~~7~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3a and 4~~
Pages ~~10a and 10b~~
Pages ~~11 and 11a~~
Page ~~11b~~
Pages ~~11c and 12~~
~~[illegible]~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5a and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9a and 10~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~19 and 20~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Pages ~~2c and 2d~~
Page ~~12a~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~21 and 22~~
Page ~~22a~~
Pages ~~33 and 34~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~49 and 50~~

Section 6 - Pages 5c and 6

Section 7- Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~14a and 14b~~
Pages ~~14c and 14d~~
Pages ~~14e and 14f~~
Pages ~~14g and 14h~~
Pages ~~14i and 14j~~
Pages ~~14k and 14L~~
Pages ~~14m and 14n~~
Pages ~~14o and 14p~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~21 and 22~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~21 and 22~~

Index - Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~
Pages ~~33 and 34~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (47)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

I. VISITS TO FIELD OFFICES

1. Non-Bureau governmental officials
    a. Do not discuss Bureau policies, plans, or relationships. Courteously advise the visitor that inquiries concerning such matters are to be made at the Bureau at Washington.
    b. Advise the Bureau of the visit, identity of the visitor, purpose, matters discussed, courtesies extended, and observations of interest to the Bureau.
2. Departmental officials
    a. Be courteous.
    b. Do not offer office space, clerical and stenographic assistance, or chauffeuring in Bureau automobiles.
    c. Do not furnish information unless prior notification has been received that the official would contact the field office for information. If no notification received, before furnishing information clearance must be obtained from the Bureau.
    d. Advise the Bureau in case of doubt.

J. MISCELLANEOUS

[1. [Firearms, defensive tactics,]and disarming demonstrations
Are to be confined to law enforcement groups.

2. Credentials
Are to be exhibited to all persons interviewed in such manner that the person to whom shown has an opportunity to observe and understand the connection of the Agent with the FBI.

3. Law enforcement officials
    a. Contact with
        (1) Contact must be maintained with law enforcement officials for the purpose of securing information of violations of Federal laws within the jurisdiction of the Bureau.
        (2) Agents are to call on police executives when in their cities unless such visits would be so frequent as to be embarrassing.
        (3) Local law enforcement agencies should be advised by letter of the disposition of prosecutive action taken in Federal court in cases

referred to Bureau by local law enforcement agencies or where Bureau fugitives are taken into custody by local law enforcement officers. They should also be advised of violations of local laws coming to the attention of the FBI.

b. Visits to Washington
When the field requests special courtesies be afforded certain individuals, including law enforcement officers, coming to Washington, D. C., the communication so advising the Bureau shall contain biographical data and a brief summary of information in the field office files concerning the visitor.

[When law enforcement executives are contemplating a visit to the Bureau at Washington, D. C., ask them to call at the office of the[head of
[the]Training Division, Room[5234,]Justice Building.

c. Letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, and condolence
When letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, or condolence from the Director are recommended by the field, such recommendations should be submitted promptly. They should include the specific facts on which the recommendation is based, full identifying data and address of the citizen, and the result of a search of the field office indices concerning the citizen. In connection with the election of officers of police associations at conventions covering more than one field division territory, the field division in whose territory the convention was physically held is responsible for submitting any recommendations for letters of congratulations. The office submitting such request should summarize briefly the relations with these officers, incorporating any derogatory data which might preclude such letters. Inasmuch as the recommending office is not likely to possess all data, pertinent other field divisions should submit a brief, supplemental summary concerning officers recommended for letters who reside in their territory.

4. Inquiries concerning status of Bureau cases
When a state official has expressed interest in the prosecutive status of a Bureau case, for a legitimate reason, such as deferment of state prosecution pending the outcome of the Federal case, insure that such official is kept appropriately advised, including the final outcome of the matter.

5. U. S. Cabinet officers, Senators, and Congressmen
If an SAC receives an inquiry from a Cabinet officer or U. S. Senator or Congressman concerning an official matter, it should be brought to the Bureau's attention immediately.

K. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Definition
An individual, organization, or concern willingly furnishing information to employees frequently enough to justify making a record where the source need not be protected. If occasionally the source must be protected, this may be done. If sources must be constantly concealed, they become informants or confidential sources and must be handled as such.

1. Index
Index card (3 by 5 inches) must be made up to contain:
   a. Names
   b. Addresses
   c. Organization or concern
   d. Type of information furnished
   e. Date of development

March 29, 1963

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 126

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 1 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Pages ~~2c and 2d~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 5a~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page 3
Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Page ~~9~~

Part II

Section 2 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~5b and 6~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~3b and 4~~
Pages ~~13a and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Page ~~12a~~
Pages ~~15a and 16~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~47 and 48~~
Pages ~~49 and 50~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~14i and 14j~~
Pages ~~14k and 14l~~

Index - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Pages ~~26a and 26b~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (40)

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   - a. Foreword by the Director
   - b. Interesting case write-ups
   - c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   - d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution

   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   - a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. [For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.]
   - b. This file is to be kept permanently.
   - c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
    - a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
    - b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
    - c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
    - d. Human interest items from local police work
    - e. Police and firearms training subjects
    - f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
    - g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:

      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to
[any radio or television[appearance,]a manuscript of the[remarks]must be
[submitted for the Bureau's review and approval[unless previously approved
[Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and
[time does not permit prior Bureau approval.] In some other cases involv-
[ing important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
    - a. Requested by the Bureau
    - b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
    - c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
    - a. Major importance
    - b. Public interest
    - c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
    - d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
    - a. Double spaced
    - b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
    - c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
    - d. Accurately
    - e. After a review of the entire file
    - f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
    - g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

July 26, 1963

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 130

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
Pages 2c and 2d

Section 5 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 10 - Pages 3 and 4
Page 11

Section 14 - Pages 10a and 10b
Pages 11c and 12

Part II

Section 1 - Pages 3 and 4
Page 5

Section 2 - Pages 1e and 2

Section 3 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 13a and 14
Pages 15c and 16
Pages 17 and 18

Section 4 - Pages 37 and 38-46
Pages 51 and 52
Pages 53 and 54
Pages 59 and 60
Pages 61 and 62

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a
Pages 7 and 8

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 6a and 6b

Index - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 11 and 12
Pages 17 and 18

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (28)

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
   a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
      (1) Scientific apparatus
      (2) Equipment
      (3) Personnel
      (4) Methods
      (5) Economics
   b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
      (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
      (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
      (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
      (4) Bad local crime conditions
      (5) Scientific crime detection experts
      (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual files of police agencies clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
      (7) Police training in colleges and universities
      (8) Aggravated sex offenders
      (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
      (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
2. Method of preparation for transmittal
   a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
   b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
   c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
   [d. [Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.]
   [[e.] Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
   [[f.] Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
   [[g.] No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

[[h.] If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.

[[i.] Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.

[[j.] All clippings must be complete.

[[k.] Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations and racial matters should be forwarded.

[[l.] Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.
4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau
   a. General principle governing submissions
      The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.
   b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications
      (1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of the Central Research Section) unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

          Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.
      (2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention Central Research Section, informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.
      (3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. See section 107N, 3b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
[4. Gifts[should not be given to sources since such actions might be
[misconstrued.]

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "______, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
Use the following subheadings in the order given:
a. Description of proposed SAC contact
b. Services this contact can provide
c. Past relations with field office
d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
e. Derogatory information
f. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located[in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located]in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

September 27, 1963

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 133

Charlotte

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 3 - Page ~~3~~

Section 10 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Page ~~13~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 15 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~4a and 4b~~
Pages ~~4c and 4d~~
Page ~~4e~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Page ~~9~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~3 and 3a~~

Part II

Section 6 - Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 8 - Page ~~3~~
Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Index - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (27)

h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.

i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

Do not:

a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
d. Use complicated sentence structure
e. Use technical references to statutes
f. Express personal opinions
g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
j. Use adjectives excessively

5. Transmittal

Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, attention Crime Records Division.

6. Dissemination

New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreciable passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before release. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the Bureau on request.

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.

2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. [On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters.] In all instances [the circular] letter must include the following:

a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
6. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
    a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.
        (1) Chiefs of police
        (2) Sheriffs
        (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
        (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
        (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
        (6) Wardens of penal institutions
        (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
        (8) Railway police (if desirable)
        (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
        (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
    b. Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.
    c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.
   a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.
   b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.
      (1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give
      (2) The cooperation which has been afforded
      (3) The following must appear on the list:
         Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
         Bureau of Customs
         Cooperative Credit Bureaus
         Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
         FBINA Graduates
         Hotels
         Immigration and Naturalization Service
         Missions Providing Lodging
         Post Office Inspectors
         Postmasters
         Salvation Army
         Secret Service
         U. S. Marshals
      (4) The following may appear on the list:
         Automobile Clubs
         Banks
         [Car Rental Agencies]
         County Attorneys
         County Coroners
         Credit Companies
         Detective Agencies
         Enlistment Officers, [U. S. Air Force,] Army, Navy, Marine Corps
         Employment Service
         Fire Departments
         Forest Service
         Gunsmiths
         Insurance Companies
         Movie Studios
         Navy Shore Patrol
         Oil Company Special Agents
         Parole and Probation Officers
         Plant Quarantine Officers
         Protective Associations
         Race Tracks
         Savings and Loan Associations
         Service Recruiting Officers
         State Employment Offices
         State Hospitals for Insane
         Steamship Companies
         Telegraph Companies
         U. S. Attorneys
         U. S. Commissioners
   c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.
   d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.
   e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

October 28, 1

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 134

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
Pages 2c and 2d
Pages 7 and 8

Section 10 - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 11 and 12
Page 13

Section 12 - Pages 5 and 6

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 3b and 4
Pages 5 and 6
Pages 25 and 26

Section 4 - Pages 49 and 50

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a

Section 7 - Pages 7 and 8-14
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 19 and 20

Section 8 - Pages 4a and 4b

Section 9 - Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 15b and 16

Index - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 9 and 10
Pages 11 and 12
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 21 and 22

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (24)

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU
  1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
    a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
      (1) Scientific apparatus
      (2) Equipment
      (3) Personnel
      (4) Methods
      (5) Economics
    b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
      (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
      (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
      (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
      (4) Bad local crime conditions
      (5) Scientific crime detection experts
      (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual files of police agencies clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
      (7) Police training in colleges and universities
      (8) Aggravated sex offenders
      (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
      (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
  2. Method of preparation for transmittal
    a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
    b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
    c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
[d. [Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.]
[[e.] Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
[[f.] Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
[[g.] No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.
i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.
j. All clippings must be complete.
k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations and racial matters should be forwarded.
l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.
4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau
   a. General principle governing submissions
   The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.
   b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications
      (1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of the Central Research[Unit)]unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

      Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.
      (2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention Central Research[Unit,]informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.
      (3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

January 27, 1[illegible]4

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 137

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 3 - Page 3

Section 12 - Page 6a

Section 16 - Pages 1b and 2

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 3 and 3a
Pages 3b and 4
Page 5
Pages 5a and 6
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 25 and 26

Section 4 - Pages 2c and 2d
Page 25
Pages 25a and 26
Pages 35 and 36
Pages 37 and 38-46
Pages 47 and 48
Pages 59 and 60
Pages 63 and 64

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a

Section 7 - Pages 17 and 17a

Section 9 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 11 and 12
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 15b and 16
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 23 and 24

Index - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 27 and 28
Pages 29 and 30
Pages 31 and 32
Pages 35 and 36

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (34)

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest

a. Relating to law enforcement concerning

(1) Scientific apparatus

(2) Equipment

(3) Personnel

(4) Methods

(5) Economics

b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern

(1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.

(2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation

(3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime

(4) Bad local crime conditions

(5) Scientific crime detection experts

(6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual[pertinent school]files clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)

(7) Police training in colleges and universities

(8) Aggravated sex offenders

(9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.

(10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.

2. Method of preparation for transmittal

a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.

b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.

c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.

d. Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.

e. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.

f. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.

g. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.
i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.
j. All clippings must be complete.
k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations and racial matters should be forwarded.
l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.
4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau
   a. General principle governing submissions
   The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.
   b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications
      (1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of the Central Research[Unit)]unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

      Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.
      (2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention Central Research[Unit,]informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.
      (3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

May 27, 1964

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 141

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 5 - Page 7
Pages 7a and 8

Section 6 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 9 and 10

Section 15 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 16 - Pages 1b and 2

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 9 and 10
Pages 13b and 14
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 25 and 26
Pages 27 and 28

Section 4 - Pages 4a and 4b
Pages 25a and 26
Pages 37 and 38

Section 6 - Pages 1b and 2

Section 7 - Pages 23 and 24

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a
Page 3

Section 9 - Pages 23 and 24

Index - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 25 and 26
Pages 26a and 26b
(Page 30a deleted)
Pages 31 and 32
Pages 32a and 32b

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (26)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    - a. Foreword by the Director
    - b. Interesting case write-ups
    - c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
    - d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution

   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
    - a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.
    - [b. This file[may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain
    - [index cards.]
    - c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

SECTION 6. - PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Human interest items from local police work
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to [any radio or television[appearance,]a manuscript of the[remarks]must be [submitted for the Bureau's review and approval[unless previously approved [Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and [time does not permit prior Bureau approval.] In some other cases involv- [ing important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

June 29, 1964

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 142

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 1 - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 5 and 6

Section 4 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 12 - Pages 1a and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 14 - Pages 11c and 12

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 5a and 6
Pages 13 and 13a
Pages 13b and 14
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 29 and 30

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
Pages 2c and 2d
Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 25a and 26
Pages 27 and 28
Pages 37 and 38
Pages 57a and 58

Section 6 - Page 9

Section 7 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 8 - Pages 11 and 12
Page 12a
Pages 21 and 22

Section 9 - Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 23 and 24

Index

Pages 11 and 12
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 23 and 24
Pages 37 and 38

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (31)

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    - a. Federal judges
    - b. U. S. Attorneys
    - c. Only outstanding state judges
    - d. Governors
    - e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    - f. State attorneys general
    - g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    - h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    - i. In the principal cities:
        - (1) Mayors
        - (2) Chiefs of police
        - (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        - (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        - (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        - (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        - (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        - (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        - (9) Heads of larger universities
        - (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        - (11) Top representatives of airlines
        - (12) Managers of leading airports
        - (13) Top representatives of railroads
        - (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        - (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        - (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        - (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        - (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        - (19) Heads of leading banks

14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

The SAC or ASAC shall contact at least once each year all national officers, departmental (state) officers, and members of the Americanism Commission of The American Legion. A letter shall be submitted on March 15 of each year showing that the above American Legion officials have been contacted.

N. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously effective. [The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising the maximum effectiveness of this program.]

March 29, 1965

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION NUMBER 151

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Part I

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~

Section 8 - Page ~~1~~
Pages ~~1a and 2~~
Page ~~3~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 17 (New section)
Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~3~~

Part II

Section 2 - Pages ~~1c and 2~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~17 and 18~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Page ~~65~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 9 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Index - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~2a~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~ (Pages 6a and 6b deleted)
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~14a and 14b~~
Page ~~14c~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (31)

2. Requesting authority for release
   a. By teletype
      At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
   b. By telephone where time is of essence
      Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with the office of the division head of the Crime Records Division for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. [In the normal process of issuing press releases,[television and radio
   [media should be merely provided with a written copy of the press release,
   [and]Bureau personnel should not submit to live, filmed,[or tape-
   [recorded interviews of any kind in connection with it.] Tact and
   [diplomacy must be exercised in declining to participate in such interviews.
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.
9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
    - a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
    - b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
    - c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
    - d. White Slave Traffic Act
    - e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
    - f. Illegal wearing of uniform
    - g. Impersonation
    - h. National Firearms Act
    - i. Federal Firearms Act
    - j. Extortion
    - k. Red Cross Act
    - l. Theft from interstate shipment
    - m. May Act
    - n. Patent matters
    - o. Copyright matters
    - p. Federal Reserve Act
    - q. Mail fraud
    - r. Falsely claiming citizenship
    - s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
    - t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
    - u. Crimes on the high seas
    - v. National Bankruptcy Act
    - w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
    - x. Crimes on Indian reservation
    - y. Crimes on Government reservation
    - z. Bills of Lading Act
    - aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
    - ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
    - ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
    - ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
    - ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
    - af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
    - ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
    - ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised)
    - ai. Bank robbery
    - aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
    - ak. Migratory Game Bird Act

activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located[in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located]in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
   Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
   Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. [For security sources of information,]see section 107N, item 3b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed;[for racial sources of information, see section 130G, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions.] If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "_____, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division.
   Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Derogatory information
   f. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal

December 27, 1[illegible]

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 160

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 10 - Page 2a

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 15c and 16
Page 17
Pages 29 and 30

Section 4 - Pages 2c and 2d
Pages 3 and 4
Pages 11 and 12
Pages 23 and 24

Section 6 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 9 - Pages 11 and 12
Pages 15b and 15c

Index

Pages 3 and 4
Pages 17 and 18

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (14)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
    - a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
    - b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
    - c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
    - d. White Slave Traffic Act
    - e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
    - f. Illegal wearing of uniform
    - g. Impersonation
    - h. National Firearms Act
    - i. Federal Firearms Act
    - j. Extortion
    - k. Red Cross Act
    - l. Theft from interstate shipment
    - m. May Act
    - n. Patent matters
    - o. Copyright matters
    - p. Federal Reserve Act
    - q. Mail fraud
    - r. Falsely claiming citizenship
    - s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
    - t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
    - u. Crimes on the high seas
    - v. National Bankruptcy Act
    - w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
    - x. Crimes on Indian reservation
    - y. Crimes on Government reservation
    - z. Bills of Lading Act
    - aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
    - ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
    - ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
    - ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
    - ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
    - af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
    - ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
    - ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised)
    - ai. Bank robbery
    - aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
    - ak. Migratory Game Bird Act

2. Requesting authority for release
   a. By teletype
      At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
   b. By telephone where time is of essence
      Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with the office of the division head of the Crime Records Division for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. In the normal process of issuing press releases, [either local or national, SACs may, when requested, make personal appearances for television and radio, provided no interviews are conducted and there is absolutely no elaboration over and above the original press release. These conditions should be made known in advance to television and radio station representatives when such requests are received.]
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.
9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

March 28, 1966

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 163

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages may be noted by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages 5 and 6

Part I

Section 2 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 3 - Page 3

Section 11 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 13 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 16 - Pages 1b and 2

Part II

Section 2 - Pages 7a and 8

Section 3 - Pages 1b and 2
Page 19
Pages 19a and 20

Section 4 - Pages 23 and 24

Section 5 - Page 2a
Pages 3 and 3a

Section 6 - Page 9

Index

Pages 3 and 4
Page 4a
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 13 and 14
Pages 15 and 16 (Pages 14c and 14d deleted)
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 18a and 18b
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 22a and 22b
Pages 25 and 26
Pages 35 and 36
Pages 37 and 38

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (26)

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    - a. Federal judges
    - b. U. S. Attorneys
    - c. Only outstanding state judges
    - d. Governors
    - e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    - f. State attorneys general
    - g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    - h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    - i. In the principal cities:
        - (1) Mayors
        - (2) Chiefs of police
        - (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        - (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        - (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        - (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        - (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        - (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        - (9) Heads of larger universities
        - (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        - (11) Top representatives of airlines
        - (12) Managers of leading airports
        - (13) Top representatives of railroads
        - (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        - (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        - (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        - (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        - (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        - (19) Heads of leading banks

14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

[M. [DELETED]

N. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously effective. The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising the maximum effectiveness of this program.

January 27, 1967

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 174

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Part I

Section 3 - Page ~~3~~

Section 5 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~7b and 8~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~1a and 2~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~3 and 3a~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~5a and 6~~

Section 2 - Pages ~~7a and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~13b and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~63 and 64~~

Section 5 - Pages ~~3 and 3a~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~ (Pages 6a
Pages ~~7 and 8~~ and 6b
Pages ~~9 and 10 deleted~~)
Page 11-14
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Page ~~25~~
Pages ~~25a and 26~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Index

Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~4a~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~14a and 14b~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Pages ~~32a and 32b~~
Pages ~~32c and 32d~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~
Pages ~~41 and 42~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (47)

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addresses is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.

[5. [A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.]

[6.] Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.

[7.] Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials
    a. On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each department, a list of such law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.
        (1) Chiefs of police
        (2) Sheriffs
        (3) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
        (4) U. S. Marshals and deputies
        (5) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
        (6) Wardens of penal institutions
        (7) District attorneys or county prosecutors
        (8) Railway police (if desirable)
        (9) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
        (10) Any other officials who receive identification orders
    b. Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.
    c. Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa [zip code]	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa [zip code]	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa [zip code]	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

- Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
- Bureau of Customs
- Cooperative Credit Bureaus
- Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
- FBINA Graduates
- Hotels
- Immigration and Naturalization Service
- Missions Providing Lodging
- Post Office Inspectors
- Postmasters
- Salvation Army
- Secret Service
- U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

- Automobile Clubs
- Banks
- [[Car Rental Agencies]
- County Attorneys
- County Coroners
- Credit Companies
- Detective Agencies
- [[Enlistment Officers, [U. S. Air Force,] Army, Navy, Marine Corps
- Employment Service
- Fire Departments
- Forest Service
- Gunsmiths
- Insurance Companies
- Movie Studios
- Navy Shore Patrol
- Oil Company Special Agents
- Parole and Probation Officers
- Plant Quarantine Officers
- Protective Associations
- Race Tracks
- Savings and Loan Associations
- Service Recruiting Officers
- State Employment Offices
- State Hospitals for Insane
- Steamship Companies
- Telegraph Companies
- U. S. Attorneys
- U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

December 29, 1967
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 186

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 1 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 13 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 14 - Page ~~5~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Part II

Section 3 - Pages ~~29 and 30~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 7 - Page ~~8a~~

Index

Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (11)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
   Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
   Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. For security sources of information, see section 107N, item 3b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed; for racial sources of information, see section 130G, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
[2. A complete file review must be made[and an FD-9 submitted]on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   [[e. Results of Identification Division check]
   [[f.] Derogatory information
   [[g.] Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

May 27, 1968
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 191

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 6 - Pages ~~4c and 4d~~

Section 15 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part II

Section 1 - Page ~~1~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~3 and 3a~~
Page ~~3b~~
Pages ~~3c and 4~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages ~~15b and 15c~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~29 and 30~~

Section 6 - Pages 3 and 3a
Pages ~~3b and 4~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~17 and 17a~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~15d and 16~~

Index

Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
(Pages 24c, 24d 24e,
and 24f deleted)
Pages ~~26a and 26b~~
Pages 26c and 26d
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Pages ~~37 and 38~~
Pages ~~41 and 42~~
Pages ~~45 and 46~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (27)

h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.

i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

Do not:

a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
d. Use complicated sentence structure
e. Use technical references to statutes
f. Express personal opinions
g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
j. Use adjectives excessively

5. Transmittal

Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, attention Crime Records Division.

6. Dissemination

New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreciable passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before release. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the Bureau on request.

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.

2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. [On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters.] In all instances [the circular] letter must include the following:

a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addressees is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.
6. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
7. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

[[On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau
[a communication pertaining to a list of law enforcement officials and
[agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. One of the two following
[procedures should be used:]
[a. [(1)] On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the of-
[ficials of each Department, [the list described above.] Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.
[[(a)] Chiefs of police
[[(b)] Sheriffs
[[(c)] State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
[[(d)] U. S. Marshals and deputies
[[(e)] Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
[[(f)] Wardens of penal institutions
[[(g)] District attorneys or county prosecutors
[[(h)] Railway police (if desirable)
[[(i)] Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
[[(j)] Any other officials who receive identification orders

[(2)] Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.

[(3)] Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

[b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.]

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
[Car Rental Agencies]
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, [U. S. Air Force,] Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

August 27, 1968
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 194

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 12 - Pa~~ge 1~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~15 and 16~~

Section 16 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 3a~~

Part II

Section 3 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages 15d and 16

Section 4 - Page ~~41-46~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Index

Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
(Pages 24a and 24b deleted)
Pages ~~26a and 26b~~
Pages ~~26c and 26d~~
Pages ~~26e and 26f~~
Pages ~~45 and 46~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

SECTI[illegible] 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND P[illegible]LIC CONTACTS

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
    - a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
    - b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
    - c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
    - d. White Slave Traffic Act
    - e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
    - f. Illegal wearing of uniform
    - g. Impersonation
    - h. National Firearms Act
    - i. [State Firearms Control Assistance Act; unlawful possession or receipt of firearms]
    - j. Extortion
    - k. Red Cross Act
    - l. Theft from interstate shipment
    - m. May Act
    - n. Patent matters
    - o. Copyright matters
    - p. Federal Reserve Act
    - q. Mail fraud
    - r. Falsely claiming citizenship
    - s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
    - t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
    - u. Crimes on the high seas
    - v. National Bankruptcy Act
    - w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
    - x. Crimes on Indian reservation
    - y. Crimes on Government reservation
    - z. Bills of Lading Act
    - aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
    - ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
    - ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
    - ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
    - ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
    - af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
    - ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
    - ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised)
    - ai. Bank robbery
    - aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
    - ak. Migratory Game Bird Act

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

2. Requesting authority for release
   a. By teletype
   At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
   b. By telephone where time is of essence
   Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with the office of the division head of the Crime Records Division for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. In the normal process of issuing press releases,[either local or national, SACs may, when requested, make personal appearances for television and radio, provided no interviews are conducted and there is absolutely no elaboration over and above the original press release. These conditions should be made known in advance to television and radio station representatives when such requests are received.]
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.
9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

September 27, 1968
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 195

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages 1 and 2
Pages 5 and 6

Part I

Section 2 - Deleted

Section 12 - Page 1

Section 16 - Pages 1b and 2
Pages 3 and 3a

Part II

Section 3 - Page 3b
Pages 9 and 10
Pages 15 and 15a

Section 4 - Pages 49 and 50
Pages 65 and 66
Page 67

Section 5 - Pages 3b and 4

Section 6 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 7 - Pages 17 and 17a

Index

Pages 3 and 4
Pages 9 and 10
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 37 and 38
Pages 41 and 42

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.

3. Security and racial sources of information
Every[six]months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. For security sources of information, see section 107N, item 3b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions for form to be followed; for racial sources of information, see section 130G, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
    a. Description of proposed SAC contact
    b. Services this contact can provide
    c. Past relations with field office
    d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
    e. Results of Identification Division check
    f. Derogatory information
    g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

December 27, 1968
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 198

obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 11 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 14 - Page 5
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 9 and 10

Part II

Section 6 - Pages 3b and 4

Section 7 - Pages 20a and 20b

Index

Pages 1 and 2
Page 14a
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19 and 20

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (11)

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

(1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

(2) The cooperation which has been afforded

(3) The following must appear on the list:

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) The following may appear on the list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
[Car Rental Agencies]
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, [U. S. Air Force,] Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

APRIL 25, 1969
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 202

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part II

Section 3 - Page ~~11b~~
Pages ~~15b and 15c~~
Page ~~19~~
Pages ~~19a and 20~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~47 and 48~~
Pages ~~49 and 50~~
Pages ~~65 and 66~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~3b and 4~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Page ~~8a~~
Pages ~~21b and 21c~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages 6a and 6b

Index

Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~14a~~
Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~27 and 28~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (23)

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders

Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, check circulars, and apprehension orders are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at the time the field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to the field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at the Bureau upon receipt of field request. (The Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on the list.

   (1) The quality of the assistance the addressee is in a position to give

   (2) The cooperation which has been afforded

   (3) The following must appear on the list:

   - Alcohol, Tobacco[and Firearms] Division
   - Bureau of Customs
   - Cooperative Credit Bureaus
   - Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
   - FBINA Graduates
   - Hotels
   - Immigration and Naturalization Service
   - Missions Providing Lodging
   - Post Office Inspectors
   - Postmasters
   - Salvation Army
   - Secret Service
   - U. S. Marshals

   (4) The following may appear on the list:

   - Automobile Clubs
   - Banks
   - Car Rental Agencies
   - County Attorneys
   - County Coroners
   - Credit Companies
   - Detective Agencies
   - Enlistment Officers, U. S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps
   - Employment Service
   - Fire Departments
   - Forest Service
   - Gunsmiths
   - Insurance Companies
   - Movie Studios
   - Navy Shore Patrol
   - Oil Company Special Agents
   - Parole and Probation Officers
   - Plant Quarantine Officers
   - Protective Associations
   - Race Tracks
   - Savings and Loan Associations
   - Service Recruiting Officers
   - State Employment Offices
   - State Hospitals for Insane
   - Steamship Companies
   - Telegraph Companies
   - U. S. Attorneys
   - U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to the desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

JULY 28, 1969
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 205

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages 1 and 2

Part I

Section 5 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 11 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4
Page 5

Section 12 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 6a and 6b

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 25 and 26

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
Pages 7 and 8
Page 15
Pages 65 and 66

Section 6 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 7 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 21 and 21a
Pages 31 and 32

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 9 - Pages 15d and 16
Page 25

Index

Pages 1 and 2
Pages 15 and 16
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 27 and 28 (Pages 26c,26d,26e, and 26f deleted)
Pages 28a and 28b
Pages 28c and 28d
Pages 31 and 32
Pages 37 and 38
Pages 39 and 40
Pages 45 and 46

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (31)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.

3. Security and racial sources of information
Every six months a letter of justification[(FD-401)]should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. [Follow instructions set out in]section 130G, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Results of Identification Division check
   f. Derogatory information
   g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
    a. Name of the contact
    b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
    c. Nature of service which can be received
    d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
    e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
    f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
    g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

OCTOBER 31, 1969
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 208

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Pages 15 and 16

Part II

Section 1 - Pages 9a and 10

Section 2 - Page 7

Section 3 - Pages 15 and 15a

Section 4 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 2c and 2d
Pages 9 and 10
Pages 29 and 30
Pages 50a and 50b

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a

Section 8 - Pages 4a and 4b
Pages 27 and 28

Index

Pages 1 and 2
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 27 and 28
Pages 28a and 28b
Pages 31 and 32
Pages 33 and 34
Page 34a
Pages 37 and 38
Pages 41 and 42
Pages 43 and 44

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (23)

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
   a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
      (1) Scientific apparatus
      (2) Equipment
      (3) Personnel
      (4) Methods
      (5) Economics
   b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
      (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
      (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
      (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
      (4) Bad local crime conditions
      (5) Scientific crime detection experts
      (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual[pertinent school]files clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
      (7) Police training in colleges and universities
      (8) Aggravated sex offenders
      (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
      (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
2. Method of preparation for transmittal
   a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
   b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
   c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
   d. Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.
   e. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
   f. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
   g. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.
i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.
j. All clippings must be complete.
k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations should be forwarded.
l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.
4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau
   a. General principle governing submissions
   The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.
   b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications
      (1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of the Central Research Unit) unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

      Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.
      (2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention Central Research Unit, informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.
      (3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

JANUARY 30, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 211

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 5 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~
Pages ~~4c and 4d~~

Section 12 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 13 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 17 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Page ~~3~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~1a and 2~~

Section 2 - Page 1d

Section 3 - Pages ~~19a and 20~~

Section 6 - Pages 1 and 1a 1c & 1a
Pages ~~1b and 2~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~4c and~~ 4d

Index

Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~28c and 28d~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
    - a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
    - b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
    - c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
    - d. White Slave Traffic Act
    - e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
    - f. Illegal wearing of uniform
    - g. Impersonation
    - h. National Firearms Act
    - [i. [State Firearms Control Assistance Act; unlawful possession or receipt of firearms]
    - j. Extortion
    - k. Red Cross Act
    - l. Theft from interstate shipment
    - m. May Act
    - n. Patent matters
    - o. Copyright matters
    - p. Federal Reserve Act
    - q. Mail fraud
    - r. Falsely claiming citizenship
    - s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
    - t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
    - u. Crimes on the high seas
    - v. National Bankruptcy Act
    - w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
    - x. Crimes on Indian reservation
    - y. Crimes on Government reservation
    - z. Bills of Lading Act
    - aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
    - ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
    - ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
    - ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
    - ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
    - af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
    - ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
    - ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised)
    - ai. Bank robbery
    - aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
    - ak. Migratory Game Bird Act

2. Requesting authority for release
    a. By teletype
    At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
    b. By telephone where time is of essence
    Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with the office of the division head of the Crime Records Division for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. [In those instances in which a press release is issued at SOG, television and radio media should be merely provided with a written copy of the press release, and Bureau personnel should not submit to live, filmed, or tape-recorded interviews of any kind, including the reading of the release itself, without prior Bureau authority. Tact and diplomacy must be exercised in declining to participate in such interviews. With respect to local press releases, SACs may, when requested, make personal appearances on television and radio provided no interviews are conducted and there is absolutely no elaboration over and above the original press release. These conditions should be made known in advance to television and radio station representatives when such requests are received.]
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    a. Foreword by the Director
    b. Interesting case write-ups
    c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
    d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
    a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.
    b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
    c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Human interest items from local police work
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:

      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television[appearance,]a manuscript of the[remarks]must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval[unless previously approved Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and time does not permit prior Bureau approval.] In some other cases involving important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

FEBRUARY 27, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 212

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 5 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages 11 and 12
Page ~~13~~ (Pages 14 and 15 deleted)

Section 6 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 13 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 14 - Pages ~~3a and 4~~
Pages 5 and 6 (Page 5a deleted)
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~8a and 8b~~
Pages 9 and 10

Section 17 - Page ~~9~~

Part II

Section 1 - Page ~~1~~

Section 2 - Pages ~~5a and 6~~

Section 3 - Pages 3c and 4
Page 5
Pages ~~5a and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 7a~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages ~~15b and 15c~~
Pages ~~37 and 38~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Pages ~~2c and 2d~~
Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Pages ~~22a and 22b~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~65 and 66~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages 21 and 21a

Section 9 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Index

Pages ~~15 and 16~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Page ~~34a~~
Pages ~~41 and 42~~
Pages ~~43 and 44~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (43)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.

10. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

[[11. In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee. No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter, without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing Bureau policy.]

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
    a. Foreword by the Director
    b. Interesting case write-ups
    c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
    d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution

    Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
    a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.
    b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
    c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   - a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   - b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   - c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   - d. Human interest items from local police work
   - e. Police and firearms training subjects
   - f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   - g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:

     FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
     Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to [any radio or television[appearance,]a manuscript of the[remarks]must be [submitted for the Bureau's review and approval[unless previously approved [Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and [time does not permit prior Bureau approval.] In some other cases involv- [ing important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   - a. Requested by the Bureau
   - b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   - c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   - a. Major importance
   - b. Public interest
   - c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   - d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   - a. Double spaced
   - b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   - c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   - d. Accurately
   - e. After a review of the entire file
   - f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   - g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

MARCH 27, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 214

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pag~~es 5 and 6~~

Part I

Section 3 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11 and 12~~

Section 7 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 10 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 14 - Pages 15 and 16

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~6a and 6b~~

Section 2 - Page ~~4a~~

Section 3 - Pages ~~33 and 34~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~37 and 38~~
Pages ~~50a and 50b~~

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a

Section 7 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 8 - Page 23-24
Pages ~~27 and 28~~

Index

Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Page ~~27~~
Pages ~~27a and 27b~~
Pages ~~27c and 28~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~33 and 34~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (23)

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
   a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
      (1) Scientific apparatus
      (2) Equipment
      (3) Personnel
      (4) Methods
      (5) Economics
   b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
      (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
      (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
      (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
      (4) Bad local crime conditions
      (5) Scientific crime detection experts
      (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual[pertinent school]files clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
      (7) Police training in colleges and universities
      (8) Aggravated sex offenders
      (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
      (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
2. Method of preparation for transmittal
   a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
   b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
   c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
   d. Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.
   e. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
   f. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
   g. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.

i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.

j. All clippings must be complete.

k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations should be forwarded.

l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.

4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau

a. General principle governing submissions

The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at the SOG for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.

b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications

[(1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of [Research Section, Domestic Intelligence Division)] unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.

[(2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention [Research Section, Domestic Intelligence Division,] informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.

(3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

APRIL 27, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 215

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Table of Contents

Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Part I

Section 4 - Pages ~~13 and 14~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Section 8 - Page ~~1~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~ (Page 3a deleted)

Section 12 - Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 15 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~ (Page 4a deleted)
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages 9a and 10

Section 3 - Pages 7b and 8
Page 20a
Pages ~~29 and 30~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Pages ~~57a and 58~~
Pages ~~59 and 60~~
Pages ~~65 and 66~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~3b and 4~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages 4c and 4d
Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages ~~11~~ and 12

Index

Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~9 and 10~~
Pages 11 and 12

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (31)

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at time field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at Bureau upon receipt of field request. (Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on list.

(1) Quality of assistance addressee is in a position to give
(2) Cooperation which has been afforded
(3) Following must appear on list:

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Post Office Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) Following may appear on list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
Car Rental Agencies
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, U. S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Commissioners

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

MAY 28, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 216

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 14 - Pag~~e 17~~

Part II

Section 1 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~13 and 14~~
Page ~~15~~
Pages ~~29 and 30~~
Pages ~~33 and 34~~
Pages ~~51 and 52~~

Section 5 - Pages ~~11 and 12~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 8 - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~17 and 18~~

Index

Pages ~~17 and 18~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~ (Page 24a deleted)
Page ~~26a~~
Pages 35 and 36
Pages 39 and 40
Pages 45 and 46

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
   Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and racial sources of information
   Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section [130H,]item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or racial source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Results of Identification Division check
   f. Derogatory information
   g. Recommendation of SAC

   Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

JUNE 26, 1970
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
REVISION 217

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 4 - Page 17
Pages ~~17a and 18~~

Section 13- Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages 9 and 10

Part II

Section 3 - Pages ~~11 and 11a~~
Page ~~11b~~
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~

Section 4 - Pages ~~2a and 2b~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 6 - Pages ~~1b and 2~~

Section 7 - Pages ~~25a and 26~~

Section 9 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Index

Pages ~~19 and 20~~ (Page 18a deleted)
Page ~~20a~~
Pages ~~28a and 28b~~
Pages 31 and 32
Page 34a
Pages ~~37 and 38~~
Pages 41 and 42

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.

[[10. In contacts with the press concerning a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny no information should be volunteered concerning the amount of loot obtained. Specific questions by members of the press concerning amount of loot may be answered only following the arrest of an individual or individuals for violation of the Federal bank robbery statute.]

[[11.] Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

[[12.] In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee. No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter, without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing Bureau policy.

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   d. Insert containing notices regarding the ten most wanted fugitives; fugitives wanted by the Bureau and the police, including fingerprint classifications and physical descriptions; a limited number of missing persons with their photographs
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.
   b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
   c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

d. Each insert should be filed with the bulletin to which it relates. No indexing of individual notices contained therein is necessary.

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Human interest items from local police work
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television[appearance,]a manuscript of the[remarks]must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval[unless previously approved Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and time does not permit prior Bureau approval.] In some other cases involving important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
NOVEMBER 27, 1970
REVISION 222

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 12 - - Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 15 - - Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Part II

Section I - - Pages ~~5a and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Section 3 - - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~

Section 4 - - Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~37 and 38~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~
Pages ~~41-46~~
Pages ~~47 and 48~~
Pages 49 and 50

Section 5 - - Pages ~~3 and 3a~~

Section 6 - - Pages 1b and 2

Section 7 - - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Index

Pages 17 and 18

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (15)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.

10. In contacts with the press concerning a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny no information should be volunteered concerning the amount of loot obtained. Specific questions by members of the press concerning amount of loot may be answered only following the arrest of an individual or individuals for violation of the Federal bank robbery statute.

11. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.

12. In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee. No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter, without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing Bureau policy.

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   [d. [Deleted]
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by SOG.
   b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
   c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

[d. [Deleted]

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy men
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Human interest items from local police work
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Crime Records)

C. SPEECHES
1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television appearance, a manuscript of the remarks must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval unless previously approved Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and time does not permit prior Bureau approval. In some other cases involving important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, FBI Notes, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS
1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
JANUARY 27, 1971
REVISION 224

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I.

Section 4 - - Pages ~~9 and 10~~

Section 5 - - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 6 - - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~
Page ~~11~~ (new)

Section 11 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 14 - Page ~~17~~

Part II

Section 1 - - Pages ~~5a and 6~~

Section 2 - - Page ~~5~~
Pages ~~5a and 6~~

Section 4 - - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~

Section 6 - - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 7 - - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~7 and 8~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (17)

SECTIO[illegible]. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PU[illegible]C CONTACTS.

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
   a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
   b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
   c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
   d. White Slave Traffic Act
   e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
   f. Illegal wearing of uniform
   g. Impersonation
   h. National Firearms Act
   i. [State Firearms Control Assistance Act; unlawful possession or receipt of firearms]
   j. Extortion
   k. Red Cross Act
   l. Theft from interstate shipment
   m. May Act
   n. Patent matters
   o. Copyright matters
   p. Federal Reserve Act
   q. Mail fraud
   r. Falsely claiming citizenship
   s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
   t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
   u. Crimes on the high seas
   v. National Bankruptcy Act
   w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
   x. Crimes on Indian reservation
   y. Crimes on Government reservation
   z. Bills of Lading Act
   aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
   ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
   ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
   ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
   ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
   af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
   ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
   ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised)
   ai. Bank robbery
   aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
   ak. Migratory Game Bird Act

2. Requesting authority for release
   a. By teletype
   At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
   b. By telephone where time is of essence
   Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with the office of the division head of the Crime Records Division for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. In those instances in which a press release is issued at SOG, television and radio media should be merely provided with a written copy of the press release, and Bureau personnel should not submit to live, filmed, or tape-recorded interviews of any kind, including the reading of the release itself, without prior Bureau authority. Tact and diplomacy must be exercised in declining to participate in such interviews. With respect to local press releases, SACs may, when requested, make personal appearances on television and radio provided no interviews are conducted and there is absolutely no elaboration over and above the original press release. These conditions should be made known in advance to television and radio station representatives when such requests are received.[Reading of these local press releases on the telephone to the news media should be done by the SAC or ASAC.]
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
AUGUST 27, 1971
REVISION 231

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Table of Contents
Pages ~~1 and 2~~

Part II

Section 3 - - Pages ~~1b and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 3a~~
Page 3b
Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages ~~15b and 15c~~
Pages ~~15d and 16~~
Page ~~19~~
Pages ~~25 and 26~~

Section 4 - - Page 12a
Pages 15a and 16
Pages 21 and 22
Pages 22a and 22b
Pages ~~23 and 24~~
Page 28a
Page 33
Pages ~~33a and 34~~
Pages ~~35 and 36~~
Pages ~~37 and 38~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~
Pages ~~41 and 42-46~~
Pages 47 and 48

Section 5 - - Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Section 6 - - Pages 7 and 8

Section 7 - - Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Pages ~~25a and 26~~
Page ~~27~~
Pages 27a and 28

Section 8 - - Pages ~~1 and 1a~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~4a and 4b~~

Section 9 - - Pages ~~15 and 15a~~
Pages ~~15b and 15c~~
Page ~~15d~~
Pages ~~15e and 16~~
Page ~~17~~
Pages ~~17a and 18~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
Pages ~~21 and 22~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (39)

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and[extremist]sources of information
Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and[extremist] sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section 130H, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or[extremist] source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
    a. Description of proposed SAC contact
    b. Services this contact can provide
    c. Past relations with field office
    d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
    e. Results of Identification Division check
    f. Derogatory information
    g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
    a. Name of the contact
    b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
    c. Nature of service which can be received
    d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
    e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
    f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
    g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
MARCH 28, 1972
REVISION 238

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 10 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Section 14 - Page ~~11b~~
Pages 11c and 12
Pages 13 and 14
Page 17

Part II

Section 3 - - Pages ~~11c and 12~~
Page 13b

Section 4 - - Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages 25b and 26
Pages 37 and 38
Pages 39 and 40

Part II (continued)

Section 6 - - Pages 3b and 4

Section 7 - - Pages ~~17 and 17a~~

Section 9 - - Pages 21 and 22
Page 25

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (15)

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at time field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at Bureau upon receipt of field request. (Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on list.

(1) Quality of assistance addressee is in a position to give
(2) Cooperation which has been afforded
(3) Following must appear on list:

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
[Postal Service]Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) Following may appear on list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
Car Rental Agencies
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, U. S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S.[Magistrates]

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
AUGUST 28, 1972
REVISION 243

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 6 - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 4c and 4d
Pages 5 and 6

Section 10 - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 5 and 6

Section 12 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 1b and 2
Pages 5 and 6
Pages 6a and 6b

Section 13 - Pages 1-1a and 2

Section 16 - Pages 3 and 3a
Pages 3b and 4
Pages 5 and 6

Part II

Section 3 - Page 12a

Section 5 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and~~ 6
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 9 and 10
Pages ~~11 and 12~~
Page 13

Section 6 - Page 9

Section 9 - Pages 9 and 10

L. Patrick Gray, III

Acting Director

Enclosures (23)

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    - a. Federal judges
    - b. U. S. Attorneys
    - c. Only outstanding state judges
    - d. Governors
    - e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    - f. State attorneys general
    - g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    - h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    - i. In the principal cities:
        - (1) Mayors
        - (2) Chiefs of police
        - (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        - (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        - (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        - (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        - (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        - (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        - (9) Heads of larger universities
        - [(10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        - (11) Top representatives of airlines
        - (12) Managers of leading airports
        - (13) Top representatives of railroads
        - (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        - (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        - (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        - (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        - (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        - (19) Heads of leading banks
        - [(20) Influential minority leaders]

14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. DELETED

N. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of [leading newspapers[including minority-oriented newspapers,]must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continously effective. The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising the maximum effectiveness of this program.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
FEBRUARY 27, 1973
REVISION 249

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I

Section 7 - Pages 1 and 2

Part II

Section 3 - Pages 11 and 11a

Section 4 - Pages 2a and 2b
Pages 2c and 2d
Pages 9 and 10
Pages 27 and 28
Page 33

Section 6 - Pages 3b and 4
Pages 7 and 8

Section 7 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 17 and 17a
Page 27

Section 9 - Pages 19 and 20
Page 20a
Pages 21 and 22

L. Patrick Gray, III

Acting Director

Enclosures (15)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at time field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at Bureau upon receipt of field request. (Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on list.

(1) Quality of assistance addressee is in a position to give

(2) Cooperation which has been afforded

(3) Following must appear on list:

[Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms]
Bureau of Customs
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Postal Service Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
U. S. Marshals

(4) Following may appear on list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
Car Rental Agencies
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, U. S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Magistrates

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete
[[or when it is determined a source is deceased.]

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special
[source of information index[except when it has been determined that source is
[deceased, at which time general index card can be destroyed immediately.
[Under all other conditions the general index cards shall be retained for
[20 years subsequent to the removal of cards from the special source of
[information index.]

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and extremist sources of information
Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and extremist sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section 130H, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or extremist source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter
[for the attention of the[Training]Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
    a. Description of proposed SAC contact
    b. Services this contact can provide
    c. Past relations with field office
    d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
    e. Results of Identification Division check
    f. Derogatory information
    g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. SAC contacts located in headquarters city must be contacted at least three times each year; those located in areas regularly covered by road trips out of headquarters city or located in resident agencies must be contacted at least two times each year.
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. Each office must submit a complete roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of May and November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
MARCH 27, 1973
REVISION 250

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
Section 1 - (Revised)
Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4
Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8
Page 9

Section 9 - Page 1
Pages 1a and 2

Section 14 - Page 17

Part II
Section 1 - Pages 5a and 6
Pages 6a and 6b
Pages 11 and 12

Section 2 - Pages 1b and 1c
Page 1d
Pages 1e and 2

Section 4 - Pages 41 and 42-46
Pages 47 and 48
Pages 50a and 50b

Section 6 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 1b and 2
Pages 5 and 5a

Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6

Index - Pages 39 and 40
Pages 41 and 42

L. Patrick Gray, III

Acting Director

Enclosures (23)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

A. PRESS RELEASES

Employees are forbidden to furnish to the press either directly or indirectly any information concerning Bureau matters without prior authorization from the Bureau except in following instances. (Bureau in turn must obtain departmental clearance as set forth in Departmental Order 2460.)

1. Bureau authority is granted for SACs to make releases on purely routine cases, local in nature, not involving other field divisions, national policy, national interest, other Federal agencies, state, county, or municipal employees, or persons of prominence whose names would be newsworthy in themselves, and where arrests have been made with the authorization of the USA in the following classifications. The Bureau is to be advised that such releases have been made.
    - a. Routine cases in which complaints have been filed
    - b. Selective Service cases, except when draft boards are involved
    - c. Interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle, except when widespread rings are involved
    - d. White Slave Traffic Act
    - e. Deserter cases, except charges growing out of the harboring of deserters
    - f. Illegal wearing of uniform
    - g. Impersonation
    - h. National Firearms Act
    - i. State Firearms Control Assistance Act; unlawful possession or receipt of firearms
    - j. Extortion
    - k. Red Cross Act
    - l. Theft from interstate shipment
    - m. May Act
    - n. Patent matters
    - o. Copyright matters
    - p. [Bank Fraud and Embezzlement]
    - q. Mail fraud
    - r. Falsely claiming citizenship
    - s. Illegal manufacture, possession, or wearing of civil defense insignia
    - t. Illegal manufacture, sale, or use of military cremation urn
    - u. Crimes on the high seas
    - v. National Bankruptcy Act
    - w. Theft, embezzlement, robbery, illegal possession of, or destruction of Government property
    - x. Crimes on Indian reservation
    - y. Crimes on Government reservation
    - z. Bills of Lading Act
    - aa. False entries in records of interstate carriers
    - ab. Illegal use of a railroad pass
    - ac. Interstate transportation of gambling devices
    - ad. Interstate transportation of lottery tickets
    - ae. Interstate transportation of obscene matter
    - af. Escaped Federal prisoner, escape and rescue, parole violator or conditional release violator or probation violator
    - ag. Interstate transportation of stolen property
    - ah. Unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, unlawful flight to avoid confinement, unlawful flight to avoid giving testimony (Bureau still to be promptly advised)
    - ai. Bank robbery
    - aj. Interstate transportation of stolen cattle
    - ak. Migratory Bird Act

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

2. Requesting authority for release
   a. By teletype .
   At least four hours before the time of release, developments in the case, an outline of the release, and statement release will be made UACB are to be furnished the Bureau.
   b. By telephone where time is of essence
   [Confer with division head having supervision of the matter for investigative clearance and with[Press Services Office]for final press clearance. While good judgment must prevail, in important cases in which a local newspaper deadline is approaching, it may be advisable to telephone the Bureau for clearance.
3. Press releases are to be made personally only by the SAC or in his absence by the ASAC.
4. Releases are to be made both at headquarters and the local area affected by developments. All material prepared for the public must be reviewed word for word. It is not to contain words or phrases which might be regarded as objectionable or offensive to a member of any race, creed, or religious sect. Thorough advance planning should be utilized wherever possible, and all press releases should be coordinated to eliminate any avoidable delays.
5. In the absence of an overriding consideration bearing on the public interest, no statement should be put in an announcement to the press to the effect that a subject either has confessed or has admitted his crimes without specific Bureau approval. In case of doubt, consult the Bureau. When the fact that a subject has given a confession is included in a complaint and an inquiry is forthcoming from the press, a "no comment" reply should be given. The complaint is a court record and must be left to speak for itself.
6. On-the-spot announcements by SAC are authorized in emergency situations in which good judgment so dictates. Emergency on-the-spot statements by Agents limited to their official identity and, if known, the identity of fugitive or criminal in gun battle. If badly wanted fugitive apprehended in remote area and SAC absent, Agent may, in rare emergency only and where time of essence, furnish bare details. Contact by SAC with press should be effected immediately where press desires further details.
7. [In those instances in which a press release is issued at[FBIHQ,]television and radio media should be merely provided with a written copy of the press release, and Bureau personnel should not submit to live, filmed, or tape-recorded interviews of any kind, including the reading of the release itself, without prior Bureau authority. Tact and diplomacy must be exercised in declining to participate in such interviews. With respect to local press releases, SACs may, when requested, make personal appearances on television and radio provided no interviews are conducted and there is absolutely no elaboration over and above the original press release. These conditions should be made known in advance to television and radio station representatives when such requests are received. Reading of these local press releases on the telephone to the news media should be done by the SAC or ASAC.
8. In the absence of special circumstances, Bureau Agents should never suggest or request a reporter or another representative of a newspaper or similar publication to withhold the publication of news. In the event that special circumstances do exist, it will be necessary to clear with the Bureau prior to making any such request.

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. In contacts with the press concerning a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny no information should be volunteered concerning the amount of loot obtained. Specific questions by members of the press concerning amount of loot may be answered only following the arrest of an individual or individuals for violation of the Federal bank robbery statute.
11. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.
12. In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee. No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter, without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing Bureau policy.

[[13. Bureau personnel, including SACs and ASACs, are not to participate
[in give-and-take news conferences without prior Bureau authority
[including clearance by the Press Services Office. This will be
[permitted only in the rarest of circumstances where mitigating facts
[clearly indicate it is to the Bureau's best interests to participate.]

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   d. Deleted
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office
[inspection by[FBIHQ.]
   b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
   c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

d. Deleted

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National [Academy graduates
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   [d. [Deleted]
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      [Research[(Training Division)]

C. SPEECHES

1. Bureau is to be notified of all speaking engagements. Speaking engagements are to be handled by the SAC. If he cannot handle them, the ASAC should. If neither can, an Agent previously approved as a speaker is to be designated and the Bureau advised UACB. Changes in speaking engagements must be communicated promptly to the Bureau. Three weeks prior to any radio or television appearance, a manuscript of the remarks must be submitted for the Bureau's review and approval unless previously approved Bureau material is utilized or the program is of an impromptu nature and time does not permit prior Bureau approval. In some other cases involving important speeches, the Bureau will specifically request such manuscripts. If speech is to be broadcast or televised, prior Bureau approval of manuscript and commitment must be obtained. These regulations, as well as all other FBI administrative procedures, should not be the subject of comment to the public.
2. Copy of Bureau letter approving speaker should be placed in his field personnel file.
3. Each office is to designate a supervisor to handle speech material. [To this supervisor must be routed law enforcement bulletins, interesting case material, magazines, research literature, and newspaper clippings containing information of value to police instructors and approved speakers. This material to be indexed as to subject matter and filed in the speech material files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU

1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
   - a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
     - (1) Scientific apparatus
     - (2) Equipment
     - (3) Personnel
     - (4) Methods
     - (5) Economics
   - b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
     - (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
     - (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
     - (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
     - (4) Bad local crime conditions
     - (5) Scientific crime detection experts
     - (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. [(File in individual[pertinent school]files clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
     - (7) Police training in colleges and universities
     - (8) Aggravated sex offenders
     - (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning Members of Congress or the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
     - (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
2. Method of preparation for transmittal
   - a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
   - b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
   - c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
   - d. Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.
   - e. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
   - f. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
   - g. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.

i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.

j. All clippings must be complete.

k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations should be forwarded.

l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.

4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau

a. General principle governing submissions

The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at [FBIHQ] for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.

b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications

(1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of [Section IS-3, Intelligence Division)] unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.

(2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention [Section IS-3, Intelligence Division,] informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.

(3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

MANUAL OF [illegible]LES AND REGULATIONS
June 27, 1973
Revision 253

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
Section 1 - Pages 7 and 8

Section 4 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8

Section 10 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 14 - Pages 15 and 16

Section 16 - Pages 7 and 8

Part II
Section 2 - Page 1d
Pages 9 and 10

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 25 and 26

Section 4 - Page 12a
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 21 and 22

Section 6 - Pages 1b and 2
Pages 7 and 8

Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6

Section 8 - Pages 20a and 20b
Pages 21 and 22
Page 23-24

Section 9 - Pages 9 and 10
Pages 15e and 16
Pages 19 and 20

Index - Pages 27a and 27b

William D. Ruckelshaus

Acting Director

Enclosures (23)

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. In contacts with the press concerning a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny no information should be volunteered concerning the amount of loot obtained. Specific questions by members of the press concerning amount of loot may be answered only following the arrest of an individual or individuals for violation of the Federal bank robbery statute.
11. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.
12. In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee. No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter, without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing Bureau policy.
13. Bureau personnel, including SACs and ASACs, are not to participate in give-and-take news conferences without prior Bureau authority including clearance by the Press Services Office. This will be permitted only in the rarest of circumstances where mitigating facts clearly indicate it is to the Bureau's best interests to participate.

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   d. Deleted
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by FBIHQ.
   b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
   c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.
   d. Deleted

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy graduates
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Deleted
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research[(Files and Communications Division)]

C. SPEECHES

1. [The speech program is the personal responsibility of the SAC, and the SAC or ASAC should handle principal commitments. If neither available, these can be handled by an experienced and well-informed Agent Supervisor approved for the commitment by the SAC or ASAC. Good judgment should dictate when a manuscript should be submitted to FBIHQ for approval in advance of a speaking engagement, particularly in regard to radio and television appearances.
2. It is not necessary to advise FBIHQ of each speaking engagement. Each office will maintain for a minimum of one year and one regular office inspection a control file in connection with acceptances and declinations of speech invitations. Each year on January 10th and on July 10th. each office will submit to FBIHQ a statistical report of speaking commitments handled. This will be divided into engagements by the SAC, the ASAC, and other Agent Supervisors; and will be further subdivided into speeches as well as radio, television, and Career Day appearances by these three groups.
3. Each office should maintain a speech material file for the use of speakers. This should include Law Enforcement Bulletin items, interesting case material, magazine articles, research literature, newspaper clippings pertaining to law enforcement matters of interest, and items of value in connection with public appearances of Bureau representatives. In addition to being maintained in current status, this speech material should be indexed as to subject matter in the office files.]

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete or when it is determined a source is deceased.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index except when it has been determined that source is deceased, at which time general index card can be destroyed immediately. Under all other conditions the general index cards shall be retained for 20 years subsequent to the removal of cards from the special source of information index.

2. Files
   Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and extremist sources of information
   Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and extremist sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section 130H, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or extremist source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS

1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter for the attention of the [Files and Communications] Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Results of Identification Division check
   f. Derogatory information
   g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
    a. Name of the contact
    b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
    c. Nature of service which can be received
    d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
    e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
    f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
    g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. [The frequency of personal contact with SAC contacts is left to the discretion of the SAC; contacts should be evaluated periodically to determine their effectiveness and the desirability of their continuance.]
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. [Each office must submit a complete alphabetical roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.]
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
AUGUST 27, 1973
REVISION 255

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
Section 1 - Pages 7 and 8
Page 9

Section 4 - Pages 17a and 18

Section 6 - Page 4a-b

Section 11 - Page 5

Part II
Section 1 - Page 1
Pages 1a and 2

Section 2 - Page 1d

Section 3 - Pages 3 and 3a

Section 4 - Pages 50a and 50b
Pages 53 and 54
Page 54a
Pages 55 and 56
Pages 57 and 57a
Pages 61 and 62

Section 6 - Pages 1b and 2
Pages 3 and 3a

Section 7 - Pages 21 and 21a
Pages 33 and 34

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 10a and 10b
Pages 17 and 18
Pages 18a and 18b

Section 9 - Pages 11 and 12

Index - Pages 1 and 2
Page 2a
Pages 7 and 8
Pages 17 and 18
Page 18a
Page 43
Pages 43a and 44

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (31)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

9. In cases involving bombings having an apparent racial or religious basis with the resultant public interest, the SAC should issue a statement to the press indicating the SAC has arrived at the scene or is en route to actively assist local investigative authorities, making available to them every possible cooperative service of the FBI, including the Bureau's full laboratory and identification facilities, to further assist them by handling out-of-state leads, and to take charge of all investigative efforts that may indicate any Federal violation. At no time should this statement indicate that the criminal act is obviously outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI nor should full investigative responsibility for the incident be either assumed or declared. The issuance of this statement requires prior Bureau approval in every such instance, and the Bureau should be contacted telephonically and furnished known facts of the incident so a prompt statement can be authorized.
10. In contacts with the press concerning a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny no information should be volunteered concerning the amount of loot obtained. Specific questions by members of the press concerning amount of loot may be answered only following the arrest of an individual or individuals for violation of the Federal bank robbery statute.
11. Copies of Bureau press releases to be placed in case file and press release file if exists.
12. In connection with service awards to Bureau personnel, SACs may provide news media with a photograph and a brief biographical sketch of employee. No employee may submit to a personal interview by a newsman in connection with such an award or under any other circumstances, for that matter, without prior Bureau authority. This does not preclude an SAC or other Bureau official from issuing news releases in accordance with existing Bureau policy.
13. Bureau personnel, including SACs and ASACs, are not to participate in give-and-take news conferences without prior Bureau authority including clearance by the Press Services Office. This will be permitted only in the rarest of circumstances where mitigating facts clearly indicate it is to the Bureau's best interests to participate.

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   d. Deleted
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by FBIHQ.
   b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
   c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.
   d. Deleted

4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy graduates
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Deleted
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:

      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      Research (Files and Communications Division)

C. SPEECHES

1. The speech program is the personal responsibility of the SAC, and the SAC or ASAC should handle principal commitments. If neither available, these can be handled by an experienced and well-informed Agent approved for the commitment by the SAC or ASAC. Good judgment should dictate when a manuscript should be submitted to FBIHQ for approval in advance of a speaking engagement, particularly in regard to radio and television appearances.

2 It is not necessary to advise FBIHQ of each speaking engagement. Each office will maintain for a minimum of one year and one regular office inspection a control file in connection with acceptances and declinations of speech invitations. Each year on January 10th and on July 10th. each office will submit to FBIHQ a statistical report of speaking commitments handled. This will be divided into engagements by the SAC, the ASAC, and other Agent Supervisors; and will be further subdivided into speeches as well as radio, television, and Career Day appearances by these three groups.

3. Each office should maintain a speech material file for the use of speakers. This should include Law Enforcement Bulletin items, interesting case material, magazine articles, research literature, newspaper clippings pertaining to law enforcement matters of interest, and items of value in connection with public appearances of Bureau representatives. In addition to being maintained in current status, this speech material should be indexed as to subject matter in the office files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.

i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

4. Do not:
   a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
   b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
   c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
   d. Use complicated sentence structure
   e. Use technical references to statutes
   f. Express personal opinions
   g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
   h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
   i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
   j. Use adjectives excessively

5. Transmittal
Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by [routing slip, attention [Files and Communications] Division.

6. Dissemination
New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreciable passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before release. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the Bureau on request.

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.

2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters. In all instances the circular letter must include the following:
   a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
   b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
   c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
   d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
   e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addressees is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.
6. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
7. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

   On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau a communication pertaining to a list of law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. One of the two following procedures should be used:

   a. (1) On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each Department, the list described above. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.
      - (a) Chiefs of police
      - (b) Sheriffs
      - (c) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      - (d) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      - (e) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      - (f) Wardens of penal institutions
      - (g) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      - (h) Railway police (if desirable)
      - (i) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      - (j) Any other officials who receive identification orders

   (2) Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
NOVEMBER 27, 1973
REVISION 258

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
  Section 3 - Page 3

  Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a

  Section 16 - Pages 1 and 1a
                Pages 3 and 3a
                Pages 3b and 4

Part II
  Section 1 - Page 1

  Section 3 - Pages 7b and 8
               Pages 17a and 18
               Page 19

  Section 4 - Page 18a
               Pages 41 and 42-46
               Pages 50a and 50b

  Section 5 - Pages 5 and 6

  Section 6 - Pages 3b and 4
               Pages 7 and 8

  Section 7 - Pages 21 and 21a

  Section 8 - Pages 27 and 28

  Section 9 - Pages 13 and 14

Index
  Pages 36a and 36b
  Pages 37 and 38
        39 and 40
        41 and 42
        45 and 46

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (23)

(3) Letters advising the Bureau of changes are to be set up as indicated:

Page No.	City	Deleted	Added	Remarks
4	Center City, Iowa zip code	John M. Doe, Sheriff Wayne County	R. Roe, Sheriff Wayne County	
7	Jonesville, Iowa zip code	Richard Brown Chief of Police		Deceased successor not named
3	Brownsville, Iowa zip code	George Smith Constable	George Smythe	To show correct spelling

b. As an alternative, offices which believe it will save time and material may make any necessary changes as they occur in this list by typing the appropriate change on a strip of paper which will be taped over the item to be corrected. [The date of the revision will be typed on a strip of paper and will be taped under the page number of the amended page.] The page bearing the correction may then be reproduced on Xerox equipment and the new copy inserted in place of the corrected. Copies of the amended pages may then be furnished to the Bureau and interested employees in the offices. In this procedure, it is necessary to appropriately flag each individual change so that it may be readily identified without the necessity of a name-by-name review. Offices using this procedure must make the customary annual review of the list and submit a letter to the Bureau on March 1 of each year advising that the list the Bureau has is accurate and current.

2. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars
Each field office must maintain a mailing list composed of individuals and organizations to which identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be sent. Each field office must review annually its mailing list in order to see that no data is sent to firms which have ceased business or have merged with other organizations. A survey should be conducted by Agents each year by every office, at time field office mailing list is purged, to determine whether additional names of individuals and businesses should be added to field office mailing list.

a. Addressograph plates are to be prepared at Bureau upon receipt of field request. (Bureau will prepare, on its own initiative, Addressograph plates for new FBINA graduates.) Title of position is used rather than name of incumbent.

b. Decide what organizations, individuals, or concerns are to appear on list.

(1) Quality of assistance addressee is in a position to give

(2) Cooperation which has been afforded

(3) Following must appear on list:

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
Cooperative Credit Bureaus
Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Officers
FBINA Graduates
Hotels
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Missions Providing Lodging
Postal Service Inspectors
Postmasters
Salvation Army
Secret Service
[U. S. Customs Service]
U. S. Marshals

(4) Following may appear on list:

Automobile Clubs
Banks
Car Rental Agencies
County Attorneys
County Coroners
Credit Companies
Detective Agencies
Enlistment Officers, U. S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps
Employment Service
Fire Departments
Forest Service
Gunsmiths
Insurance Companies
Movie Studios
Navy Shore Patrol
Oil Company Special Agents
Parole and Probation Officers
Plant Quarantine Officers
Protective Associations
Race Tracks
Savings and Loan Associations
Service Recruiting Officers
State Employment Offices
State Hospitals for Insane
Steamship Companies
Telegraph Companies
U. S. Attorneys
U. S. Magistrates

c. Identification orders, wanted flyers, and check circulars are to be furnished newspapers and periodicals only upon their specific request. Should a compelling reason exist for distribution of an identification order, a wanted flyer, or a check circular, such as possible employment of a fugitive by a newspaper or periodical, secure Bureau approval for such distribution.

d. Give consideration to desirability of circularizing motels.

e. Veterans Administration (VA) installations should be circularized on identification order fugitives who are veterans. Office of origin has responsibility for instructing other offices to initiate distribution to VA installations in such cases.

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete or when it is determined a source is deceased.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index except when it has been determined that source is deceased, at which time general index card can be destroyed immediately. Under all other conditions the general index cards shall be retained for 20 years subsequent to the removal of cards from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.
3. Security and extremist sources of information
Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and extremist sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section 130H, item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or extremist source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

L. SAC CONTACTS
1. SAC contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service, or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI upon the request of the SAC.
2. A complete file review must be made and an FD-9 submitted on each contact (file review on spouses, near relatives, or business not necessary unless special circumstances prevail).
3. SAC contacts must be approved by the Bureau. Request this approval by letter to the Bureau captioned "________, SAC Contact." Mark the letter [for the attention of the [External Affairs] Division. Use the following subheadings in the order given:
   a. Description of proposed SAC contact
   b. Services this contact can provide
   c. Past relations with field office
   d. Thumbnail sketch of known history
   e. Results of Identification Division check
   f. Derogatory information
   g. Recommendation of SAC

Submit an original and two copies, but one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the communication. If the SAC contact is approved, the single-page copy is to be stamped approved and returned to the field. If the contact is not approved, a letter is to be submitted to the field stating why the individual cannot be used as an SAC contact.

SACs must be alert in recommending SAC contacts that they are not proposing individuals who because of business connections or personal activities or close association with other persons will be involved in unfavorable publicity or become the subject of adverse investigative activity, or who will capitalize on their friendly association with the SAC.

4. Except where a suitable file is already in existence, a dead file in classification 80 is to be opened on each contact.
5. A three- by five-inch card on each contact is to be retained in an SAC contact box in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Each card is to contain:
   a. Name of the contact
   b. Office and home addresses and telephone numbers
   c. Nature of service which can be received
   d. Any comments which would be helpful in handling the individual
   e. Date of first contact and name of SAC first developing the contact (Show in the lower left corner on the front of the card.)
   f. Dates of contacts by the SAC (to be entered on the reverse side of the card in longhand). Contacts more frequent than quarterly should not be listed.
   g. Any necessary descriptive data
6. Each contact is to be indexed in the general indices. The card is to show the name of the individual, date of preparation, and the notation, "See SAC."
7. [The frequency of personal contact with SAC contacts is left to the discretion of the SAC; contacts should be evaluated periodically to determine their effectiveness and the desirability of their continuance.]
8. Advise Bureau immediately when a contact is discontinued UACB. If the contact is transferred or moves to another city located within another field division, a copy of the communication advising of the discontinuance should be designated for that field division. Also advise field division of background information re contact.
9. Advise Bureau promptly of changes of addresses or status of SAC contacts.
10. [Each office must submit a complete alphabetical roster of SAC contacts to reach the Bureau by the first week of November each year. If there are any changes in address, employment, or other pertinent data, such information should be set forth. If there is no change in status, so state.]
11. From time to time, the Bureau sends these contacts reprints of speeches and other material to assist in making them more "FBI minded" and aware of some of the problems confronting us. Any indication that such material is not welcomed by any SAC contact should be made known to the Bureau without delay.
12. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit all persons listed as SAC contacts and in addition leading officials located in the field division.

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
FEBRUARY 27, 1[illegible]4
REVISION 261

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
- Section 12 - Pages 5 and 6
  - Pages 9 and 10
- Section 14 - Page 11b

Part II
- Section 2 - Page 11
- Section 3 - Page 3b
  - Pages 3c and 4
  - Pages 13c and 14
  - Pages 37 and 38
- Section 4 - Pages 1 and 1a
  - Pages 1b and 2
  - Pages 35 and 36
  - Pages 37 and 38
  - Pages 39 and 40
  - Pages 41 and 42-46
  - Page 47-50
  - Pages 51 and 52
  - Pages 57b and 58
  - Pages 59 and 60
- Section 6 - Pages 1 and 1a
  - Pages 1b and 1c
  - Pages 1d and 1e
  - Pages 1f and 2
  - Page 2a
  - Pages 3 and 3a
  - Pages 5c and 6
  - Pages 9 and 10
- Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6
  - Pages 7 and 8
  - Pages 23 and 24
  - Pages 33 and 34
- Section 8 - Pages 11 and 12
  - Pages 13 and 14
  - Page 14a
  - Pages 15 and 16
  - Pages 17 and 18
  - Pages 18a and 18b
  - Page 18c
  - Pages 23 and 24

Index - Page 2a

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (39)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

[[A. PRESS POLICY

1. Confidential Nature of FBI Operations
   See Part I, Section 1, page 9, paragraph B of Manual of Rules and Regulations.
2. Title 28, Section 50.2 of the Code of Federal Regulations concerning release of information by personnel of the Department of Justice relating to criminal and civil proceedings states:

"(a) General. (1) The availability to news media of information in criminal and civil cases is a matter which has become increasingly a subject of concern in the administration of justice. The purpose of this statement is to formulate specific guidelines for the release of such information by personnel of the Department of Justice.

"(2) While the release of information for the purpose of influencing a trial is, of course, always improper, there are valid reasons for making available to the public information about the administration of the law. The task of striking a fair balance between the protection of individuals accused of crime or involved in civil proceedings with the Government and public understandings of the problems of controlling crime and administering government depends largely on the exercise of sound judgment by those responsible for administering the law and by representatives of the press and other media.

"(3) Inasmuch as the Department of Justice has generally fulfilled its responsibilities with awareness and understanding of the competing needs in this area, this statement, to a considerable extent, reflects and formalizes the standards to which representatives of the Department have adhered in the past. Nonetheless, it will be helpful in ensuring uniformity of practice to set forth the following guidelines for all personnel of the Department of Justice.

"(4) Because of the difficulty and importance of the questions they raise, it is felt that some portions of the matters covered by this statement, such as the authorization to make available Federal conviction records and a description of items seized at the time of arrest, should be the subject of continuing review and consideration by the Department on the basis of experience and suggestions from those within and outside the Department.

"(b) Guidelines to criminal actions. (1) These guidelines shall apply to the release of information to news media from the time a person is the subject of a criminal investigation until any proceeding resulting from such as investigation has been terminated by trial or otherwise.

"(2) At no time shall personnel of the Department of Justice furnish any statement or information for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a defendant's trial, nor shall personnel of the Department furnish any statement or information, which could reasonably be expected to be disseminated by means of public communication, if such a statement or information may reasonably be expected to influence the outcome of a pending or future trial.

"(3) Personnel of the Department of Justice, subject to specific limitations imposed by law or court rule or order, may make public the following information:

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

"(i) The defendant's name, age, residence, employment, marital status, and similar background information.
"(ii) The substance or text of the charge, such as a complaint, indictment, or information.
"(iii) The identity of the investigating and/or arresting agency and the length or scope of an investigation.
"(iv) The circumstances immediately surrounding an arrest, including the time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, possession and use of weapons, and a description of physical items seized at the time of arrest.

"Disclosures should include only incontrovertible, factual matters, and should not include subjective observations. In addition, where background information or information relating to the circumstances of an arrest or investigation would be highly prejudicial or where the release thereof would serve no law enforcement function, such information should not be made public.

"(4) Personnel of the Department shall not volunteer for publication any information concerning a defendant's prior criminal record, but information drawn from Federal conviction records may be made available in response to a specific request.

"(5) Because of the particular danger of prejudice resulting from statements in the period approaching and during trial, they ought strenuously to be avoided during that period. Any such statement or release shall be made only on the infrequent occasion when circumstances absolutely demand a disclosure of information and shall include only information which is clearly not prejudicial.

"(6) The release of certain types of information generally tends to create dangers of prejudice without serving a significant law enforcement function. Therefore, personnel of the Department should refrain from making available the following:
"(i) Observations about a defendant's character.
"(ii) Statements, admissions, confessions, or alibis attributable to a defendant, or the refusal or failure of the accused to make a statement.
"(iii) Reference to investigative procedures such as fingerprints, polygraph examinations, ballistic tests, or laboratory tests, or to the refusal by the defendant to submit to such tests or examinations.
"(iv) Statements concerning the identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses.
"(v) Statements concerning evidence or argument in the case, whether or not it is anticipated that such evidence or argument will be used at trial.
"(vi) Any opinion as to the accused's guilt, or the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged, or the possibility of a plea to a lesser offense.

"(7) Personnel of the Department of Justice should take no action to encourage or assist news media in photographing or televising a defendant or accused person being held or transported in Federal custody. Departmental representatives should not make available photographs of a defendant unless a law enforcement function is served thereby.

"(8) This statement of policy is not intended to restrict the release of information concerning a defendant who is a fugitive from justice.

"(9) Since the purpose of this statement is to set forth generally applicable guidelines, there will, of course, be situations in which it will limit the release of information which would not be prejudicial under the particular circumstances. If a representative of the Department believes that in the interest of the fair administration of justice and the law enforcement process information beyond these guidelines should be released, in a particular case, he shall request the permission of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General to do so.

"(c) Guidelines to civil actions. Personnel of the Department of Justice associated with a civil action shall not during its investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, which a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial and which relates to:

"(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.

"(2) The character, credibility, or criminal records of a party, witness, or prospective witness.

"(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.

"(4) An opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except as required by law or administrative rule.

"(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action."

3. News Releases

Fairness, accuracy, and sensitivity to the rights of defendants, as well as to the public's right to know, must prevail in all dealings with the news media. Favoritism should be shown toward no newsman or no news medium.

Information concerning the FBI, including information regarding arrests and other developments in cases investigated by the FBI, is disclosed to news media, including newspapers, news magazines, news services, and radio and television networks or stations, (a) as news releases or announcements, initiated by the FBI, and (b) as responses to inquiries emanating from newsmen.

Each field office should maintain a control file containing all news releases issued by the office since the last inspection.

a. "One-Office" news releases

The vast majority of news releases made by field offices are issued to announce arrests in FBI cases. The provisions of Section 50.2 clearly apply to all of these. If an SAC feels that an exception to those provisions should be made in any individual case, he should make his views known to the Assistant Directors of (a) the substantive division involved and (b) the External Affairs Division. Exceptions to the instructions provided in Section 50.2 can be approved only by the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General, not by any official of the FBI.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

All news releases made by field offices should be issued over the name of the SAC. They should be issued to all interested news media in the field office territory as simultaneously as possible; and they should provide as full an account of the facts as can be disclosed within the provisions of Section 50.2. In news releases announcing arrests or other developments attributable to the joint efforts of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, appropriate recognition should, of course, be given to those other agencies.

SACs may authorize other experienced Special Agents, including Resident Agents, in their field offices to read or deliver news releases issued over the SAC's name to news media after the SAC has approved those news releases. However, those Special Agents should not expand upon the information in the news releases; and they should answer any inquiry or request for additional information by courteously telling the newsman involved that his inquiry or request will be brought to the attention of the SAC as quickly as possible for his consideration and action. The reason for the policy of referring all such matters to the SAC is to assure both uniformity and accuracy of any supplemental information that is provided to news media.

SACs also may authorize other experienced Special Agents to record news releases in compliance with requests of radio and television stations. However, only SACs or ASACs should make live or filmed television appearances involving the reading of news releases.

SACs have the option of accepting or declining such time-consuming requests made by radio and television stations. If declined, however, the declinations should be tactfully worded and explained so as to avoid any impression of partiality. If a request is accepted, the radio and/or television station involved should understand that the SAC or the Special Agent designated by the SAC will merely read the text of the news release and will not answer questions.

On occasion, SACs also issue news releases or make announcements dealing with administrative matters such as transfers of the SAC or ASAC of the field office or presentation of service awards to personnel of the field office. On such occasions, photographs and biographical sketches of the personnel involved may be made available to the news media. However, requests to interview these employees about their official duties and experiences should tactfully be declined.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

So as to minimize the opportunities for criminal elements to harass Special Agents and their families, neither photographs nor biographical sketches of Special Agents should be made available to news media in connection with news releases, announcements, or inquiries pertaining to FBI investigations. The sole exception is in the case of employees who are killed in line of duty, in which instances the release of photographs and biographical data should be coordinated with the Administrative Division and the External Affairs Division.

b. "Multi-Office" news releases
News releases announcing arrests or other important developments in wide-ranging investigations often require close coordination and simultaneous release to the press by two or more field offices. The External Affairs Division should be consulted before any such news release is made, and consideration should be given to the question of whether a national news release is merited.

c. National news releases
As a general rule, national news releases announcing arrests or other investigative developments are issued only in exceptional cases involving (1) prominent persons, such as well-known business and civic leaders, entertainers, athletes, or officials of local, county, state, or Federal Government; (2) persons of national notoriety, such as members of the "Ten Most Wanted Fugitives"; (3) persons arrested for crimes that have attracted nationwide interest, such as prevailed in the 1950 robbery of Brink's Inc., at Boston, Massachusetts, and the 1964 murder of three young civil rights workers in Neshoba County, Mississippi; and (4) persons whose crimes have international ramifications, such as espionage agents or fugitives who have fled abroad. The heads of headquarters and field divisions should assure that the essential facts of all such cases, including anticipated developments therein, are promptly brought to the attention of the External Affairs Division on a continuing basis.

National news releases generally will be issued in Washington, D. C. However, copies will be furnished to all interested field offices so that the SACs of those offices can make them available to local news media within minutes of their release in Washington.

SACs should not expand upon the contents of national news releases without approval of both the substantive division involved and the External Affairs Division.

4. News Media Inquiries

There are two categories of news media inquiries. The first involves routine inquiries received at the field office regarding either investigative or administrative matters. These should be answered by the SAC or ASAC within the guidelines indicated above.

In responding to such inquiries, SACs and ASACs should be courteous, factual, and as helpful as possible. They should, however, avoid answering hypothetical questions or questions that would require them to express personal opinions on matters of intense local or national controversy.

The second category involves inquiries from the news media in emergency situations. Often these are received by Special Agents at the scenes of arrests, gun battles, or other fast-moving developments in investigations.

Unless undercover assignments or similar overriding circumstances dictate otherwise, Special Agents who are approached by newsmen at the scenes of fast-moving developments in FBI cases should (a) identify themselves as "a Special Agent of the FBI," (b) furnish the name of the field office to which they are assigned, and (c) state the general nature of the investigative operations, such as "We are here to serve an arrest (or a search) warrant." Requests for additional information should be answered by courteously referring the newsman to the field office or to the temporary field headquarters if such a temporary field headquarters has been established in the area.

Only SACs or ASACs should participate in question-and-answer interviews with representatives of any news medium at the scenes of fast-moving developments in FBI cases. In emergency situations, however, Special Agents can relay reporters' questions to the SAC by telephone or radio; and the SAC's responses thereto can be furnished to the reporters in the SAC's name by a Special Agent. In other than such emergency situations, Special Agents should courteously refer newsmen to the SAC or ASAC for answers to their questions; and Special Agents' investigative responsibilities attendant to such fast-moving developments must take precedence over questions or inquiries of newsmen.

No FBI employee should knowingly furnish an erroneous, deceptive, or misleading answer to a news media inquiry. In the overwhelming majority of cases, an unequivocal and definitive answer can be given reporters' questions regarding whether the FBI is, or is not, investigating a specific criminal act, as well as the reason why we have or have not instituted investigation. However, in kidnap-for-ransom cases and related crimes involving a threat against human life, neither the fact that the crime has occurred, nor the fact that the FBI is investigating it, should be disclosed or confirmed without the approval of the substantive investigative division and the External Affairs Division.

Due to the sensitivity of many banking-type institutions to publicity concerning the amount of loot obtained in robberies, burglaries, and larcenies of financial institutions, such information should not be disclosed to news media without the concurrence of the General Investigative Division and the External Affairs Division.

Under no circumstances should any employee ask or suggest that a newsman withhold information from the public without the concurrence of the substantive investigative division and the External Affairs Division.

5. Fugitive Publicity

News releases and other public disclosures designed to solicit public cooperation in the apprehension of FBI fugitives may contain more facts about the fugitive's criminal background than are permissible in news releases and announcements regarding arrests.

In publicity regarding FBI fugitives, extreme care should be taken to avoid statements that brand a fugitive as guilty of a crime for which he has not been convicted. Arrest numbers or other data that identify a photograph as having been made in connection with a past arrest or imprisonment should not appear in photographs of fugitives that are furnished to news media.

Field offices should coordinate all fugitive publicity with the Special Investigative Division and the External Affairs Division; and they should not hesitate to consult the External Affairs Division regarding questions or problems that arise in any area of news media relations.

6. Liaison With News Media

SACs who consider it necessary or advisable to do so may use one or more experienced Special Agents to assist in facilitating prompt and effective liaison with the news media. Such Agents will not be spokesmen for their field offices. They may furnish information to news media in the SAC's name after it has been approved by the SAC. They also may assist in preparing news releases, as well as responses to news media inquiries. These Agents should devote no more time to such news media liaison duties than is absolutely necessary.

It is the intent of these guidelines to facilitate a more open stance and, thereby, a mutually beneficial relationship between FBI and news media representatives. SACs, as well as other employees acting for them in news media relations, should be as responsive as practical and possible to inquiries and requests made by newsmen. The term "No comment" should be avoided except when its use is absolutely necessary. If an SAC does not know the answer to a newsman's question, he should have no hesitancy in stating, "I don't know," and/or, depending upon the nature of the inquiry, telling the newsman that he will contact him (the newsman) as soon as he has information that can be furnished to him.

SACs should avail themselves of every opportunity to meet and become well acquainted with leading citizens throughout their field divisions, including representatives of all important news media. They should seek to cultivate a personal, as well as an official, relationship with these individuals to the fullest extent that the demands of other duties make possible.]

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   a. Foreword by the Director
   b. Interesting case write-ups
   c. Articles which might assist law enforcement officers
   d. Deleted
2. Distribution
   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by FBIHQ.
   b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
   c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.
   d. Deleted
4. Each office must submit to the Bureau annually at least three suggestions for articles, identifying the suggested author, and briefly describing the nature of the suggested article. The article should not be prepared, submitted, or mentioned to the suggested author until the Bureau directs that it be obtained. Suggestions may cover any general or specific subject of law enforcement interest, including the following:
   a. Better investigative or administrative methods and techniques of any nature, particularly those used or developed by FBI National Academy graduates
   b. Improved or unusual equipment being used
   c. Complicated, unusual, and well-handled cases which are illustrative of law enforcement problems and excellent police work
   d. Deleted
   e. Police and firearms training subjects
   f. Crime prevention articles from departments which have taken aggressive action to combat juvenile delinquency
   g. Transmit all material to the Bureau under the caption:
      FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
      [Research[(External Affairs]Division)

C. SPEECHES

1. The speech program is the personal responsibility of the SAC, and the SAC or ASAC should handle principal commitments. If neither available, these can be handled by an experienced and well-informed Agent approved for the commitment by the SAC or ASAC. Good judgment should dictate when a manuscript should be submitted to FBIHQ for approval in advance of a speaking engagement, particularly in regard to radio and television appearances.
2. It is not necessary to advise FBIHQ of each speaking engagement. Each office will maintain for a minimum of one year and one regular office inspection a control file in connection with acceptances and declinations of speech invitations. Each year on January 10th and on July 10th. each office will submit to FBIHQ a statistical report of speaking commitments handled. This will be divided into engagements by the SAC, the ASAC, and other Agent Supervisors; and will be further subdivided into speeches as well as radio, television, and Career Day appearances by these three groups.
3. Each office should maintain a speech material file for the use of speakers. This should include Law Enforcement Bulletin items, interesting case material, magazine articles, research literature, newspaper clippings pertaining to law enforcement matters of interest, and items of value in connection with public appearances of Bureau representatives. In addition to being maintained in current status, this speech material should be indexed as to subject matter in the office files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
    a. Requested by the Bureau
    b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
    c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
    a. Major importance
    b. Public interest
    c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
    d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
    a. Double spaced
    b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
    c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
    d. Accurately
    e. After a review of the entire file
    f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
    g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence

h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.

i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

4. Do not:
   a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
   b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
   c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
   d. Use complicated sentence structure
   e. Use technical references to statutes
   f. Express personal opinions
   g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
   h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
   i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
   j. Use adjectives excessively

5. Transmittal

[Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, attention [External Affairs] Division.

6. Dissemination

New ones issued by the Bureau should be carefully reviewed for possible interest to feature writers in field office territory and consideration given to supplying them to appropriate writers. If there is an appreciable passage of time after issuance, obtain Bureau approval before release. Pertinent photographs, if available, will be furnished by the Bureau on request.

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.

2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters. In all instances the circular letter must include the following:
   a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
   b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
   c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
   d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
   e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addressees is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.
6. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
7. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

   On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau a communication pertaining to a list of law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. One of the two following procedures should be used:

   a. (1) On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each Department, the list described above. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.
      - (a) Chiefs of police
      - (b) Sheriffs
      - (c) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      - (d) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      - (e) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      - (f) Wardens of penal institutions
      - (g) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      - (h) Railway police (if desirable)
      - (i) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      - (j) Any other officials who receive identification orders

      (2) Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

I. VISITS TO FIELD OFFICES

1. Non-Bureau governmental officials
    a. Do not discuss Bureau policies, plans, or relationships. Courteously advise the visitor that inquiries concerning such matters are to be made at the Bureau at Washington.
    b. Advise the Bureau of the visit, identity of the visitor, purpose, matters discussed, courtesies extended, and observations of interest to the Bureau.
2. Departmental officials
    a. Be courteous.
    b. Do not offer office space, clerical and stenographic assistance, or chauffeuring in Bureau automobiles.
    c. Do not furnish information unless prior notification has been received that the official would contact the field office for information. If no notification received, before furnishing information clearance must be obtained from the Bureau.
    d. Advise the Bureau in case of doubt.

J. MISCELLANEOUS

[1. [Firearms, defensive tactics,]and disarming demonstrations
    Are to be confined to law enforcement groups.
2. Credentials
    Are to be exhibited to all persons interviewed in such manner that the person to whom shown has an opportunity to observe and understand the connection of the Agent with the FBI.
3. Law enforcement officials
    a. Contact with
        (1) Contact must be maintained with law enforcement officials for the purpose of securing information of violations of Federal laws within the jurisdiction of the Bureau.
        (2) Agents are to call on police executives when in their cities unless such visits would be so frequent as to be embarrassing.
        (3) Local law enforcement agencies should be advised by letter of the disposition of prosecutive action taken in Federal court in cases

referred to Bureau by local law enforcement agencies or where Bureau fugitives are taken into custody by local law enforcement officers. They should also be advised of violations of local laws coming to the attention of the FBI.

b. Visits to Washington

When the field requests special courtesies be afforded certain individuals, including law enforcement officers, coming to Washington, D. C., the communication so advising the Bureau shall contain biographical data and a brief summary of information in the field office files concerning the visitor.

[When law enforcement executives are contemplating a visit to the Bureau at Washington, D. C., ask them to call at the office of the [Assistant Director of External Affairs Division, Room 5634,] Justice Building.

c. Letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, and condolence

When letters of commendation, congratulations, appreciation, or condolence from the Director are recommended by the field, such recommendations should be submitted promptly. They should include the specific facts on which the recommendation is based, full identifying data and address of the citizen, and the result of a search of the field office indices concerning the citizen. [Form FD-468 may be used.] In connection with the election of officers of police associations at conventions covering more than one field division territory, the field division in whose territory the convention was physically held is responsible for submitting any recommendations for letters of congratulations. The office submitting such request should summarize briefly the relations with these officers, incorporating any derogatory data which might preclude such letters. Inasmuch as the recommending office is not likely to possess all data, pertinent other field divisions should submit a brief, supplemental summary concerning officers recommended for letters who reside in their territory.

4. Inquiries concerning status of Bureau cases

When a state official has expressed interest in the prosecutive status of a Bureau case, for a legitimate reason, such as deferment of state prosecution pending the outcome of the Federal case, insure that such official is kept appropriately advised, including the final outcome of the matter.

5. U. S. Cabinet officers, Senators, and Congressmen

If an SAC receives an inquiry from a Cabinet officer or U. S. Senator or Congressman concerning an official matter, it should be brought to the Bureau's attention immediately.

K. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Definition

An individual, organization, or concern willingly furnishing information to employees frequently enough to justify making a record where the source need not be protected. If occasionally the source must be protected, this may be done. If sources must be constantly concealed, they become informants or confidential sources and must be handled as such.

1. Index

Index card (3 by 5 inches) must be made up to contain:

a. Names
b. Addresses
c. Organization or concern
d. Type of information furnished
e. Date of development

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    - a. Federal judges
    - b. U. S. Attorneys
    - c. Only outstanding state judges
    - d. Governors
    - e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    - f. State attorneys general
    - g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    - h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    - i. In the principal cities:
        - (1) Mayors
        - (2) Chiefs of police
        - (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        - (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio stations
        - (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        - (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        - (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        - (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        - (9) Heads of larger universities
        - (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        - (11) Top representatives of airlines
        - (12) Managers of leading airports
        - (13) Top representatives of railroads
        - (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        - (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        - (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        - (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        - (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        - (19) Heads of leading banks
        - (20) Influential minority leaders

14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

[[M.] NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers including minority-oriented newspapers, must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously effective. The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising the maximum effectiveness of this program.

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

[[N. BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM REGARDING MATTERS OF NATIONAL INTEREST

This program is coordinated by the External Affairs Division and is devoted primarily to supplying SACs facts regarding current happenings, including both administrative and investigative developments, that are topics of nationwide press coverage and public interest.

All such communications to SACs bear the caption "BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM" and are in the form of either teletypes or airtels, dependent upon the exigencies of the situation.

The purpose of this program is to assure that each SAC possesses the key facts concerning important happenings anywhere within the FBI that command widespread public interest. Information furnished to SACs under this program should prove helpful to them, as well as to other FBI personnel, in answering questions, correcting misunderstandings, and dispelling false rumors that may exist either within or without the ranks of the FBI. In some instances, however, the information may be of such a nature that it cannot be disclosed in whole or in part to outsiders. In fact, occasionally it is necessary to restrict discussion and disclosure of the information even within FBIHQ and field offices. Guidelines furnished on each communication should be strictly followed.

FBIHQ and field office personnel should promptly bring to the attention of the External Affairs Division all current items and developments that they feel merit consideration for inclusion under this program.]

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
MAY 28, 1974
REVISION 264

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
Table of Contents - Pages 5 and 6

Section 1 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 3 - Pages 1 and 2

Section 4 - Pages 11a and 12

Section 5 - Page 13

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 6

Section 10 - Pages 3 and 4

Section 12 - Pages 1b and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 16 - Pages 1d and 2

Part II
Section 3 - Pages 5a and 6
Pages 11 and 11a
Pages 27 and 28
Pages 35 and 36
Pages 37 and 38

Part II (cont.)
Section 4 - Pages 13 and 14
Pages 29 and 30
Pages 57 and 57a

Section 6 - Pages 1f and 2
Page 2a
Pages 3 and 3a
Pages 9 and 10

Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6
Pages 7 and 8

Section 8 - Page 18c
Page 29

Section 9 - Pages 17a and 18

Index - Pages 17 and 18
Pages 19a and 20
Pages 20a and 20b

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (31)

Under no circumstances should any employee ask or suggest that a newsman withhold information from the public without the concurrence of the substantive investigative division and the External Affairs Division.

5. Fugitive Publicity

News releases and other public disclosures designed to solicit public cooperation in the apprehension of FBI fugitives may contain more facts about the fugitive's criminal background than are permissible in news releases and announcements regarding arrests.

In publicity regarding FBI fugitives, extreme care should be taken to avoid statements that brand a fugitive as guilty of a crime for which he has not been convicted. Arrest numbers or other data that identify a photograph as having been made in connection with a past arrest or imprisonment should not appear in photographs of fugitives that are furnished to news media.

Field offices should coordinate all fugitive publicity with the Special Investigative Division and the External Affairs Division; and they should not hesitate to consult the External Affairs Division regarding questions or problems that arise in any area of news media relations.

6. Liaison With News Media

SACs who consider it necessary or advisable to do so may use one or more experienced Special Agents to assist in facilitating prompt and effective liaison with the news media. Such Agents will not be spokesmen for their field offices. They may furnish information to news media in the SAC's name after it has been approved by the SAC. They also may assist in preparing news releases, as well as responses to news media inquiries. These Agents should devote no more time to such news media liaison duties than is absolutely necessary.

It is the intent of these guidelines to facilitate a more open stance and, thereby, a mutually beneficial relationship between FBI and news media representatives. SACs, as well as other employees acting for them in news media relations, should be as responsive as practical and possible to inquiries and requests made by newsmen. The term "No comment" should be avoided except when its use is absolutely necessary. If an SAC does not know the answer to a newsman's question, he should have no hesitancy in stating, "I don't know," and/or, depending upon the nature of the inquiry, telling the newsman that he will contact him (the newsman) as soon as he has information that can be furnished to him.

SACs should avail themselves of every opportunity to meet and become well acquainted with leading citizens throughout their field divisions, including representatives of all important news media. They should seek to cultivate a personal, as well as an official, relationship with these individuals to the fullest extent that the demands of other duties make possible.]

B. FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

This publication is issued the first of each month by the Bureau for the benefit of law enforcement agencies.

1. Contents
   - a. Foreword by the Director
   - b. [Fugitive notices and interesting or unusual fingerprint patterns
   - c. Articles and features designed to inform law enforcement officers of new, but proven, programs and techniques to enhance their professional capabilities
   - d. Items alerting law enforcement officers to dangerous weapons or techniques utilized by the criminal element]
2. Distribution

   Limited to law enforcement officers and others engaged in or having a legitimate interest in law enforcement work
3. Filing and indexing
   - a. In a 66 classification file, bound on the side, and fully indexed. Informative matter to be indexed under subject matter. For uniformity, the Bureau is to forward by routing slip to all divisions each month an indexing list of the basic and pertinent items to be indexed. Index cards are to be prepared by each office. Any additional items not listed but considered to be worthy of indexing by a particular office should also be indexed. The indexing lists are to be destroyed after the field office inspection by FBIHQ.
   - b. This file may be destroyed when it is over five years old. Retain index cards.
   - c. Current copy should be placed in bookcase, available to all Agents.
   - d. Deleted
4. [Suggestions and submissions
   - a. Each field office is required to submit three suggestions for byline articles from each state within its territory. Prior to submitting suggestions, proposed authors may be approached to determine their willingness to prepare an article and to identify the scope of their topic. However, proposed authors should not be asked to prepare a manuscript until the Bureau notifies the field office that the suggestion has been accepted and the article is requested. In contacts with any proposed or potential authors, absolutely no representations should be made which would obligate the FBI to any publishing commitments since many factors determine which articles received are ultimately published.
   - b. In suggesting featured articles, consideration should mainly be given to manuscripts concerning proven programs and techniques of law enforcement which may be of significant value to other agencies. Suggestions should be concerned with training, research, or operational matters. Avoid items of a "newsletter" nature and matters which have a limited scope of interest in the profession.
   - c. Each field office should be alert to exceptional photographs which could be recommended for use as a cover for the magazine. The Bureau wishes to project on the Bulletin's cover the best image of law enforcement. Attention-getting photographs showing officers giving aid to helpless citizens, protecting the weak, comforting the injured, or apprehending the guilty are examples of those that should be recommended when they come to the attention of field offices.
   - d. Transmit all material for the magazine to the Bureau under the caption:

     FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
     Research Section (External Affairs Division)]

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

C. SPEECHES

1. The speech program is the personal responsibility of the SAC, and the SAC or ASAC should handle principal commitments. If neither available, these can be handled by an experienced and well-informed Agent approved for the commitment by the SAC or ASAC. Good judgment should dictate when a manuscript should be submitted to FBIHQ for approval in advance of a speaking engagement, particularly in regard to radio and television appearances.
2. It is not necessary to advise FBIHQ of each speaking engagement. Each office will maintain for a minimum of one year and one regular office inspection a control file in connection with acceptances and declinations of speech invitations. Each year on January 10th and on July 10th. each office will submit to FBIHQ a statistical report of speaking commitments handled. This will be divided into engagements by the SAC, the ASAC, and other Agent Supervisors; and will be further subdivided into speeches as well as radio, television, and Career Day appearances by these three groups.
3. Each office should maintain a speech material file for the use of speakers. This should include Law Enforcement Bulletin items, interesting case material, magazine articles, research literature, newspaper clippings pertaining to law enforcement matters of interest, and items of value in connection with public appearances of Bureau representatives. In addition to being maintained in current status, this speech material should be indexed as to subject matter in the office files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence
   h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.
   i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

4. Do not:
    a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
    b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
    c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
    d. Use complicated sentence structure
    e. Use technical references to statutes
    f. Express personal opinions
    g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
    h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
    i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
    j. Use adjectives excessively
5. Transmittal
   Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, Attention: External Affairs Division.
6. Dissemination
   [Field Offices will be advised by routing slip when new write-ups are prepared. If copies are desired, an appropriate letter should be submitted to the Bureau, Attention: External Affairs Division, setting forth the specific use for which the write-up is intended. In instances where write-ups, either those previously prepared or those to be published in the future, may be released outside the Bureau, it will be necessary to first obtain Bureau approval.
7. Interesting case control file
   A copy of all communications concerning the dissemination of write-ups outside the Bureau is to be placed in the Interesting Case Control file. These communications should contain the identity of the person to whom the write-up is being made available, as well as the purpose for which it is to be used.]

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.
2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters. In all instances the circular letter must include the following:
    a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
    b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
    c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
    d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
    e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addressees is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.
6. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, creed, or religion.
7. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

F. RADIO BROADCASTS

Radio broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

   On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau a communication pertaining to a list of law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. One of the two following procedures should be used:

   a. (1) On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each Department, the list described above. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.
      - (a) Chiefs of police
      - (b) Sheriffs
      - (c) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
      - (d) U. S. Marshals and deputies
      - (e) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
      - (f) Wardens of penal institutions
      - (g) District attorneys or county prosecutors
      - (h) Railway police (if desirable)
      - (i) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
      - (j) Any other officials who receive identification orders

      (2) Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.

13. Additional persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:
    - a. Federal judges
    - b. U. S. Attorneys
    - c. Only outstanding state judges
    - d. Governors
    - e. Leading state and county prosecutors
    - f. State attorneys general
    - g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
    - h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
    - i. In the principal cities:
        - (1) Mayors
        - (2) Chiefs of police
        - (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
        - (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio[and television] stations
        - (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
        - (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
        - (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
        - (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
        - (9) Heads of larger universities
        - (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
        - (11) Top representatives of airlines
        - (12) Managers of leading airports
        - (13) Top representatives of railroads
        - (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
        - (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
        - (16) Top representatives of Western Union
        - (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
        - (18) Heads of better business bureaus
        - (19) Heads of leading banks
        - (20) Influential minority leaders

14. Any derogatory information obtained after the Bureau has approved the SAC contact should be reported to the Bureau promptly.

15. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

M. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 13i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers including minority-oriented newspapers, must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously effective. The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising the maximum effectiveness of this program.

[N. BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM REGARDING MATTERS OF NATIONAL INTEREST
This program is coordinated by the External Affairs Division and is devoted primarily to supplying SACs facts regarding current happenings, including both administrative and investigative developments, that are topics of nationwide press coverage and public interest.

All such communications to SACs bear the caption "BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM" and are in the form of either teletypes or airtels, dependent upon the exigencies of the situation.

The purpose of this program is to assure that each SAC possesses the key facts concerning important happenings anywhere within the FBI that command widespread public interest. Information furnished to SACs under this program should prove helpful to them, as well as to other FBI personnel, in answering questions, correcting misunderstandings, and dispelling false rumors that may exist either within or without the ranks of the FBI. In some instances, however, the information may be of such a nature that it cannot be disclosed in whole or in part to outsiders. In fact, occasionally it is necessary to restrict discussion and disclosure of the information even within FBIHQ and field offices. Guidelines furnished on each communication should be strictly followed.

FBIHQ and field office personnel should promptly bring to the attention of the External Affairs Division all current items and developments that they feel merit consideration for inclusion under this program.]

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
DECEMBER 27, 1974
REVISION 271

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
Table of Contents - Pages 3 and 4
Pages 5 and 6

Section 6 - Page 7-8
Pages 9 and 10

Section 16 - Pages 3 and 3a

Section 18 - (New Section)
Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Part II
Section 1 - Pages 1a and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Section 2 - Pages 1 and 1a

Section 3 - Pages 11c and 12
Pages 17a and 18

Section 4 - Pages 35 and 36
Pages 37 and 38
Pages 41 and 42-46
Page 47-50
Pages 57b and 58
Pages 59 and 60
Pages 63 and 64

Section 6 - Pages 3 and 3a
Page 5b

Section 8 - Pages 1b and 2

Index - Pages 7 and 8

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (23)

4. Do not:
   a. Identify law enforcement officers by name but by title and NA affiliation
   b. Show aliases of subjects of Dependents Assistance Act of 1950
   c. Show aliases of victims of WSTA cases
   d. Use complicated sentence structure
   e. Use technical references to statutes
   f. Express personal opinions
   g. Reveal identity of confidential informants
   h. Use Bureau expressions like "the subject" and "the Bureau"
   i. Prepare interesting case write-ups on juveniles, sex offenders, and parole violators but submit these by letter
   j. Use adjectives excessively
5. Transmittal
   Set forth all data necessary for Bureau's consideration at the beginning of write-up and then follow with interesting case data. Transmit by routing slip, Attention: External Affairs Division.
6. Dissemination
   [Field Offices will be advised by routing slip when new write-ups are prepared. If copies are desired, an appropriate letter should be submitted to the Bureau, Attention: External Affairs Division, setting forth the specific use for which the write-up is intended. In instances where write-ups, either those previously prepared or those to be published in the future, may be released outside the Bureau, it will be necessary to first obtain Bureau approval.
7. Interesting case control file
   A copy of all communications concerning the dissemination of write-ups outside the Bureau is to be placed in the Interesting Case Control file. These communications should contain the identity of the person to whom the write-up is being made available, as well as the purpose for which it is to be used.]

E. CIRCULAR LETTERS, TRADE AND BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS

1. Circular letters must be approved in advance by the Bureau and sent in by the office initiating the request.
2. SACs may approve the use of a circular letter directed to banking-type institutions within their own divisions to expedite circularization of known serial numbers of money included in the loot taken in a bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny. On a highly selective basis, on approval of the SAC, leads may be set out to contiguous offices to circularize banking-type institutions in those divisions, and the Bureau should be notified that this action is being taken unless advised to the contrary. Communications setting out such leads must include sufficient facts to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate and justify the additional circularization. In all other cases prior Bureau approval must be obtained in accordance with existing rules governing circular letters. In all instances the circular letter must include the following:
   a. A brief concise statement concerning the bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny and the fact that included in the loot or money taken was money, the serial numbers of which are known
   b. List of known serial numbers according to denomination, series year if known, alphabetical order, and numerical sequence
   c. A statement that the matter is to be treated confidentially
   d. A cautionary statement that no bank employee should take any action which would tend to jeopardize his or her life or safety
   e. The address and the telephone number of the field office with a statement that any person should contact the field office by calling collect

3. Auxiliary offices are to advise the office of origin by letter of the results obtained through a circular letter. Office of origin should summarize the results in its next report.
4. One copy of the circular letter is to be filed. A list of addressees is to be attached. Upon the receipt of a reply, the addressee's name is to be checked to indicate this fact. Replies which are entirely negative should not be filed unless there is reason for doing so. Only negative replies are to be destroyed after handling in accordance with item 3 above. Sub-A files may be used when the number of replies to be filed is large.
5. A 66 file may be opened to retain copies of circular letters distributed in order to facilitate the handling of incoming inquiries and replies. Only one copy of each circular letter is to be filed therein. If the 66 file is maintained, the material therein is to be destroyed after it is a year old if it is no longer needed.
6. Circular letters and other information to be distributed or released to the public must be so worded as to be unobjectionable to any race, [[color, religion, sex, or national origin.]
7. Trade publications may, with advance Bureau approval, be used to publicize information concerning fugitives known to be active in particular trades, businesses, or professions. The field office where the publication is located should check its indices concerning the publication, as well as the person or persons who will have to be contacted, before seeking Bureau approval, and sufficient identifying data should be furnished so that an appropriate Bureau indices check may be made.

[F. RADIO [AND TELEVISION] BROADCASTS

[Radio [and television] broadcasts without advance Bureau approval may be made in hot-pursuit fugitive cases. Care must be exercised in broadcasting a license number believed used by fugitive as it may be disposed of to an innocent third person.

G. FIELD OFFICE LISTS

1. Law enforcement officials

On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau a communication pertaining to a list of law enforcement officials and agencies whose cooperation might be helpful. One of the two following procedures should be used:

a. (1) On March 1 of each year all field offices shall forward to the Bureau in duplicate, and with a space left between the officials of each Department, the list described above. Indicate by an asterisk any change which was not previously called to the Bureau's attention.

- (a) Chiefs of police
- (b) Sheriffs
- (c) State police or highway patrol commanders and ranking officers in command of districts
- (d) U. S. Marshals and deputies
- (e) Ranking Federal law enforcement officers
- (f) Wardens of penal institutions
- (g) District attorneys or county prosecutors
- (h) Railway police (if desirable)
- (i) Officers receiving law enforcement bulletins
- (j) Any other officials who receive identification orders

(2) Changes in the list are to be reported in duplicate to the Bureau as they occur.

c. Purchase of individual publications at Bureau request
When the Bureau requests a field office to purchase and forward one or more copies of publications of security interest, it is desired, unless otherwise specifically stated, that nonevidentiary copies be forwarded. With respect to these specific Bureau requests for the purchase of individual copies of publications, the requested nonevidentiary copies should be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip via ordinary mail.

d. Obtaining and retaining evidentiary copies of publications in the field
When the submitting office determines, or is advised by the Bureau, that a certain issue of a publication (which has already been forwarded to the Bureau) is deemed to be of sufficient importance to warrant the obtaining of an evidentiary copy of that issue, a copy thereof should be obtained through live informants or by having an Agent purchase a copy at a public outlet for that publication, if confidentially feasible. The evidentiary copy, bearing complete identifying data, should be retained as evidence in the field office, and the Bureau should be so advised by letter, setting forth complete identifying data concerning the evidentiary copy, together with the caption and file number of the file in which the evidentiary copy is retained.

e. Transmittal of evidentiary copies of publications to the Bureau
Instances in which the field will transmit evidentiary copies of publications to the Bureau will be limited almost exclusively to the submission of copies of foreign language publications for translation of certain material for use as evidence. In these instances, it is required that:

(1) Each copy submitted bear complete identifying data
(2) The material be forwarded in sealed envelopes labeled "Evidence"
(3) The material be forwarded via registered mail
(4) The cover letter of transmittal be marked for the attention of the FBI Laboratory; state clearly that it is contemplated that the publications (and translations thereof) will be used as evidence; identify clearly the enclosed publications as to title, place of publication, and date of issue; show the method of transmittal of the evidence to the Bureau; and indicate the desired disposition of the evidence.

f. Calling attention of Bureau to publications of security interest
When a field office obtains an evidentiary copy of a publication which it desires to call to the Bureau's attention, a letter should be addressed to the Bureau to that end. Title, author, publisher, and the general nature should be very briefly set forth, together with the identifying data proper to the evidentiary copy. The letter should be informative, not requiring an answer. A nonevidentiary duplicate copy of that publication should be enclosed with the letter, if readily available. If a nonevidentiary copy is not readily available, that fact should be stated in the letter. If the Bureau desires to obtain a nonevidentiary duplicate copy of the publication for review, efforts will be made to obtain it through the appropriate field office. If not obtained, the office possessing the evidentiary copy will be requested to forward to the Bureau a Photostat thereof.

MANUAL OF RULE[illegible]ND REGULATIONS
JANUARY 27, 1975
REVISION 272

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part II
Section 3 - Pages 1c and 2
Pages 3c and 4
Pages 5a and 6
Page 11b
Pages 11c and 12
Pages 13 and 13a
Page 13b
Pages 13c and 14
Pages 15 and 15a
Pages 15b and 15c
Pages 15d and 16
Page 17
Pages 33 and 34
Pages 35 and 36

Section 4 - Pages 1b and 2
Pages 7 and 8
Page 8a
Pages 33a and 34
Pages 65 and 66

Section 6 - Page 2a

Section 8 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 19 and 20
Pages 23 and 24-26
(Delete pages 25 and 26)

Section 9 - Pages 7 and 8
Pages 9 and 10
Page 17
Pages 19 and 20

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (27)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

C. SPEECHES

1. The speech program is the personal responsibility of the SAC, and the SAC or ASAC should handle principal commitments. If neither available, these can be handled by an experienced and well-informed Agent approved for the commitment by the SAC or ASAC. Good judgment should dictate when a manuscript should be submitted to FBIHQ for approval in advance of a speaking engagement, particularly in regard to radio and television appearances.
2. It is not necessary to advise FBIHQ of each speaking engagement. Each office will maintain for a minimum of one year and one regular office inspection a control file in connection with acceptances and declinations of speech invitations. Each year on January 10th and on July 10th. each office will submit to FBIHQ a statistical report of speaking commitments handled. This will be divided into engagements by the SAC, the ASAC, and other Agent Supervisors; and will be further subdivided into speeches as well as radio, television, and Career Day appearances by these three groups. [In addition, identify the 10 most important speeches given during the 6-month period covered by the report and indicate who gave them.]
3. Each office should maintain a speech material file for the use of speakers. This should include Law Enforcement Bulletin items, interesting case material, magazine articles, research literature, newspaper clippings pertaining to law enforcement matters of interest, and items of value in connection with public appearances of Bureau representatives. In addition to being maintained in current status, this speech material should be indexed as to subject matter in the office files.

D. INTERESTING CASE WRITE-UPS

1. Write-ups of interesting cases may be:
   a. Requested by the Bureau
   b. Voluntarily submitted by the office of origin
   c. Suggested by other offices
2. They are prepared concerning cases of:
   a. Major importance
   b. Public interest
   c. Unusual and effective investigative techniques
   d. Novel investigations of human interest
3. They are prepared:
   a. Double spaced
   b. Bureau file number to appear in upper left corner of first page
   c. Title includes names and aliases of convicted subjects
   d. Accurately
   e. After a review of the entire file
   f. In chronological or logical order, with all dates definite
   g. Showing the actual time which is to be served under sentence
   h. To include as many pertinent photographs as possible to make the write-up interesting. The photographs should not necessarily be of subjects alone but should be of paraphernalia used by the criminal, photographs of unusual loot obtained, scenes of various locales, etc. If photographs submitted do not belong to the FBI, it is necessary to inform the Bureau of their source and whether the owner of the photographs has any objection to their being reproduced in publications.
   i. Each portion of the write-up should be documented as to the identity of the report or other communication from which facts were taken. The documentation should be set off by parentheses and follow immediately the portion of the write-up to which it pertains.

MANUAL OF RULES [illegible]ND REGULATIONS
FEBRUARY 27, 1975
REVISION 273

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, enclosed herewith, which have been revised. Revisions appearing on these pages are identified by brackets. The date appearing at the bottom of the pages indicates the date of revision. The new pages should be inserted immediately in the appropriate section and the old corresponding pages should be removed and turned over to the Special Agent in Charge who has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

This cover letter should be retained until the next consecutively numbered letter is received. This will enable the field office immediately to detect the failure to receive the latest manual revisions.

Part I
Table of Contents - Pages 5 and 6

Section 12 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 5 and 6

Section 14 - Pages 13 and 14

Section 16 - Pages 3 and 3a
Page 3b

Section 17 - Pages 1 and 2
Pages 3 and 4

Part II
Section 3 - Pages 1 and 1a
Pages 9 add 10
Pages 15 and 15a

Section 4 - Page 47-50
Pages 59 and 60

Section 5 - Page 13

Section 6 - Pages 5 and 5a
Page 7-8
Pages 9 and 10

Section 7 - Pages 5 and 6

Section 8 - Pages 27 and 28
Pages 29 and 30

Section 9 - Pages 21 and 22
Page 25

Index - Page 43

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Enclosures (23)

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

H. INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU
1. Which does not have a nationwide circulation or interest
   a. Relating to law enforcement concerning
      (1) Scientific apparatus
      (2) Equipment
      (3) Personnel
      (4) Methods
      (5) Economics
   b. Newspaper clippings, other than items bearing the date line of a national wire service, should be submitted when they concern
      (1) The FBI, derogatory and complimentary. If possible, show author.
      (2) Outstanding abuses of parole and probation
      (3) Outstanding instances of juvenile crime
      (4) Bad local crime conditions
      (5) Scientific crime detection experts
      (6) Bureau police schools only when there is some unusual feature about the publicity. Examples: items setting forth comments made by police officers as to the value of police schools; comments on the caliber of schools in which FBI participates; incidents in which a police officer credits instruction he received in a police school as enabling him to capture a fugitive, solve a case, or otherwise perform his work more efficiently. (File in individual pertinent school files clippings relative to each police school in which field participates.)
      (7) Police training in colleges and universities
      (8) Aggravated sex offenders
      (9) Matters appearing in the press concerning the names of prominent persons who are mentioned in connection with Bureau cases. These matters also include wire service stories mentioning directly or indirectly persons of prominence in pending investigations being handled in your division. Forward such matters immediately and if there is any question as to what action should be taken ask for specific instructions.
      (10) Items of interest by nationally syndicated columnists need not be submitted if it is apparent that such items will come to the Bureau's attention through its review of Washington, D. C., newspapers. Columns of interest by writers syndicated regionally should, of course, be submitted.
2. Method of preparation for transmittal
   a. Mount the clipping on form FD-350 within the borders shown.
   b. Do not fold the clipping except in the case of a very large picture or in the case of a single word in a headline too long to fit in the allotted space. Make certain the clipping is placed evenly on the paper and does not hang over its edges. If necessary, a second page may be used and the only requirement is that a margin at least 1 1/2 inches deep should be left at the top of the page.
   c. The large block on the right side of FD-350 has space for the insertion of the names of more than one newspaper. The names of newspapers clipped may be overprinted in this space. Placing the page number on the line in front of the name of the newspaper will serve to designate which paper the clipping is from. The page number may be written in longhand. Only the page number on which the article begins should be shown. If overprinting is not used, required information other than page number should be typed.
   d. Show whether the matter mentioned is being investigated.
   e. Insert staples horizontally at the top and bottom and vertically at the sides of all clippings. Use only a sufficient number of staples to hold the clipping securely to the paper.
   f. Do not mutilate or mark clipping in any manner by underlining or circling words or by drawing arrows to direct attention.
   g. No cover letter needed when submitting clippings unless clarification is required for a particular clipping. This may be handled by routing slip, letter, or airtel accompanying clipping in question.

- h. If an item to be submitted appears on more than one page of the newspaper, the words "Continued on page...," the subheadline on the continued page, and the words "Continued from page..." should not be mounted.
- i. Mounted clippings should read from top to bottom, column by column, from left to right.
- j. All clippings must be complete.
- k. Only one copy of a clipping need be submitted except that two copies of all items pertaining to actual or possible civil rights violations should be forwarded.
- l. Include clippings with other mail being sent to Bureau on the day that the clippings appear in the local paper. Forward clippings from resident agencies the day they arrive at headquarters city.

3. Resident Agents must be alert for material appearing in the local press.
4. Submission of publications of security interest to the Bureau
   - a. General principle governing submissions
     The Bureau desires to receive publications of security interest at [FBIHQ] for purposes of information, research, and intelligence. Consequently, it is requested that evidentiary copies of publications be retained in the field and only nonevidentiary copies be forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip.
   - b. Manner of handling and forwarding nonevidentiary copies of publications
     - (1) Nonevidentiary copies of newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals, news bulletins, and books, obtained regularly (by subscription or repeated purchase) and forwarded to the Bureau, need not be identified as to source. They should be submitted via ordinary mail by routing slip (marked for the attention of [Section IS-3, Intelligence Division)] unless transmittal by cover letter has been specifically requested. Routing slips may be used to notify the Bureau of routine administrative matters, such as temporary suspension of a publication (e.g., during summer months, lack of funds), temporary delay in obtaining or receiving particular issues of a publication, or other information which will keep the Bureau informed relative to the status of these publications. To avoid confusion, nonevidentiary copies which have been marked for identification (source, Agent, date, and place of acquisition) should be further annotated: "Not Evidence."

       Letters should be used in connection with initiating action or ceasing action to obtain publications desired by the Bureau; to call to the attention of the Bureau specific items of information connected with these publications; and in those instances in which good judgment dictates that certain circumstances or information should be recorded in letter form.
     - (2) Each SAC and each legal attache must keep the Bureau, attention [Section IS-3, Intelligence Division,] informed on a current basis regarding publications (including books) of potential interest that are not included in the current list of publications which is supplied periodically to the field and to the legal attaches. These publications would include those published by subjects of security or counterintelligence investigations and publications which may otherwise have a security or counterintelligence significance.
     - (3) Each SAC and each legal attache should insure that the handling of publications for which his office is responsible is being given adequate supervision at all times. Subscriptions to these publications should be followed closely to insure that the publications are received at the Bureau on a current basis. The Bureau should be advised of the expiration date of the subscription to each publication in sufficient time to enable the Bureau to determine the necessity for renewal.

Included in the index may be individuals in Government, business, or industry. Do not include law enforcement officers unless they are unusually cooperative or furnish special types of information. Set up the index alphabetically, geographically by states and towns; alphabetically in the subdivisions; and alphabetically by AEA facility, or by type of information.

Maintain the index where it is available to all Agents. An index may be maintained in resident agencies having approved office space which can be securely locked and having locked cabinets in which records can be kept. Source of information cards may be kept by resident Agents not having approved office space but working out of their homes whenever the SAC feels it is practicable to do so and the cards will be securely retained in a locked, steel file cabinet. Cards shall be kept as in the field office. The cards shall pertain only to the territory covered; under such circumstances there shall be no duplicate cards in the field office. Cards are to be deleted when obsolete or when it is determined a source is deceased.

Index sources of information in the general office index; do not remove such index cards at the time obsolete cards are deleted from the special source of information index except when it has been determined that source is deceased, at which time general index card can be destroyed immediately. Under all other conditions the general index cards shall be retained for 20 years subsequent to the removal of cards from the special source of information index.

2. Files
Do not make up files or write memoranda for the preparation of sources of information.

3. Security and extremist sources of information
Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and extremist [sources of information. Follow instructions set out in section[130I,]item 2b, volume IV, of the Manual of Instructions. If the security or extremist source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

4. Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

[L. [PUBLIC CONTACTS

[1. Public contacts are defined as persons who, because of their positions, can and do render extraordinary service or provide unusual and highly valuable assistance to the FBI.

[2. Immediately upon assuming the duties of SAC, such SAC should visit leading officials located in the field division.]

[3. Persons to be contacted shortly after the arrival of the SAC include:

- a. Federal judges
- b. U. S. Attorneys
- c. Only outstanding state judges
- d. Governors
- e. Leading state and county prosecutors
- f. State attorneys general
- g. Officers of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys
- h. Executive secretary of state chamber of commerce
- i. In the principal cities:
    - (1) Mayors
    - (2) Chiefs of police
    - (3) Officials of newspapers, including publishers, managing editors, city editors of leading newspapers, heads of newspaper wire services
    - (4) Managers or owners of leading and most important radio and television stations
    - (5) Heads of outstanding or more important civic clubs, such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions
    - (6) Executive secretary or director of chambers of commerce
    - (7) Heads of Federal intelligence agencies
    - (8) Outstanding leaders of Government and business
    - (9) Heads of larger universities
    - (10) Outstanding religious leaders of any faith, such as the Bishop of a diocese of any faith or the leading Rabbi
    - (11) Top representatives of airlines
    - (12) Managers of leading airports
    - (13) Top representatives of railroads
    - (14) Managers of leading railroad stations
    - (15) Top representatives of telephone companies
    - (16) Top representatives of Western Union
    - (17) Managers of the most outstanding and important hotels
    - (18) Heads of better business bureaus
    - (19) Heads of leading banks
    - (20) Influential minority leaders

M. NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

As indicated in subsection L, paragraph 3i, (3), above, officials of leading newspapers including minority-oriented newspapers, must be contacted by SACs. Smaller newspapers and other news media are not to be neglected, however, and, throughout his tenure in a field office, the SAC must insure that his press contacts are continuously effective. The number of contacts made by him and representatives of his office and the material furnished news media will be considered in appraising the maximum effectiveness of this program.

[N. BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM REGARDING MATTERS OF NATIONAL INTEREST

This program is coordinated by the External Affairs Division and is devoted primarily to supplying SACs facts regarding current happenings, including both administrative and investigative developments, that are topics of nationwide press coverage and public interest.

All such communications to SACs bear the caption "BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM" and are in the form of either teletypes or airtels, dependent upon the exigencies of the situation.

The purpose of this program is to assure that each SAC possesses the key facts concerning important happenings anywhere within the FBI that command widespread public interest. Information furnished to SACs under this program should prove helpful to them, as well as to other FBI personnel, in answering questions, correcting misunderstandings, and dispelling false rumors that may exist either within or without the ranks of the FBI. In some instances, however, the information may be of such a nature that it cannot be disclosed in whole or in part to outsiders. In fact, occasionally it is necessary to restrict discussion and disclosure of the information even within FBIHQ and field offices. Guidelines furnished on each communication should be strictly followed.

FBIHQ and field office personnel should promptly bring to the attention of the External Affairs Division all current items and developments that they feel merit consideration for inclusion under this program.]

62-116395-583	10 Encl. 1	EWL:mjg 8/1/75

THE AG U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Ref made to 7/28/75, supersedng reqst for FBI matrls recvd on that date frm SSC. Enclsd is memo for forwardng to Committee whch respnds to reqsts in Categries I thru IV on which a dealin for compliane was set for 8/1/75. Also enclosd for ur records is copy of memo prepard for Committee.

S.F. Phillips

SECTION 107

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SER. 583
PART 1

SECTION 107. [IN[illegible]RNAL]SECURITY INFORMANTS AND C[illegible]IDENTIAL SOURCES; [AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[[PART I. INTERNAL SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES]

Page

A. Definitions 3
  1. Security informant 3
  2. Potential security informant 3
  3. [Deleted]
  4. Confidential source 3
  5. Panel source 3

B. Sources of Potential Informants 3

C. Background Inquiries on Individuals Being Considered for Informant Purposes 3

D. Approval, Indoctrination, and Development of Potential Informants 4

E. Bureau Policy 5
  1. Development of military personnel 5
  2. Contacts by designated Agents 5
  3. Divulging information to informant 5
  4. Recording investigative activity 5

F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Informants 5
  1. Caution against divulging relationship 5
  2. Developing additional background 5
  3. Indications of instability 5
  4. Contacts by Agents 6
  5. Checking reliability 6
  6. Fingerprints 6
  7. Control - statement of cooperation 7
  8. Execution of party questionnaires 7
  9. Informant's activity in organizations 7
  10. Transfer of informants to other areas 8
  11. Action by informant when uncovered 8
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others 8
  13. Preparation for testifying 8

G. Informants' Information 8
  1. General instructions re oral and written information 8
  2. Recording written and oral information 9
  3. Transmission of information 10
  4. Handling of lead information 10
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 10

H. Symbols 11
  1. Assigning numbers 11
  2. Communications - use of symbols 11

I. Indexing 11

J. Indices 11
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 11
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 12
  3. Agents' informative index 12

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

[M. [Monthly and Quarterly Letters] 17
N. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements.............. 18
O. Discontinued Informants... 19
P. Furnishing Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).. 20
Q. Corrective Action on False Information.......................... 21
R. Confidential Sources.. 21
  1. Definition.. 21
  2. Assignment of symbols....................................... 21
  3. Index... 22
  4. Files... 22
  5. Utilization... 22
  6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments.. 22
  7. Gifts... 22
  8. Discontinuance.. 22
S. Panel Sources... 22
  1. Definition.. 22
  2. Background investigation and approval....................... 22
  3. Administrative handling..................................... 23
T. Double Agent Operations... 23
  1. Passage of information...................................... 23
  2. Locating information to pass................................ 23
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority.................................. 23
  4. Retention of copies of passed material...................... 24
  5. Handling money and property received by double agents....... 24
U. Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning.. 24
  1. Use of students... 24
[2. [Deleted]
  3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage.................... 25
V. Classification.. 25

[107 SECTION 107. [INT[illegible]AL]SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CON[illegible]DENTIAL SOURCES; [AND [illegible]REIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSE[illegible]]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

K. Informant Files 13
  1. Opening 13
  2. Monthly administrative report 13
  3. Assignment and tickler cards 13
  4. Subfiles 13
  5. Channelization 13
  6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 13
  7. Correspondence 13
  8. Maintenance of files 13
  9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 14
  10. Form FD-238 14
  11. Bulky material submitted by informant 14
L. Payments to Informants 14
  1. No gifts to informants 14
  2. SAC authority 14
  3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority 14
  4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 15
  5. Receipts 15
  6. Income tax returns 16
  7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 16
  8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 17
M. Monthly and Quarterly Letters 17
N. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 18
O. Discontinued Informants 19
P. Furnishing Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 20
Q. Corrective Action on False Information 21
R. Confidential Sources 21
  1. Definition 21
  2. Assignment of symbols 21
  3. Index 22
  4. Files 22
  5. Utilization 22
  6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 22
  7. Gifts 22
  8. Discontinuance 22
S. Panel Sources 22
  1. Definition 22
  2. Background investigation and approval 22
  3. Administrative handling 23
[T. [Deleted]
U. Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning 24
  1. Use of students 24
  2. Deleted
  3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage 24
V. Classification 24

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[[PART II. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (FCI) ASSETS

Page

[W. Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Assets

1. Definitions.......... 25
   a. Informative Assets (IA).......... 25
   b. Operational Assets (OA).......... 25
2. Objectives of OA.......... 25
3. Individuals to be considered as OAs.......... 26
4. Restrictions.......... 26
5. Development of U. S. Military or other U. S. Government Personnel.......... 27
6. Development of personnel of foreign diplomatic establishment or international organization.......... 28
7. Development.......... 28
8. Opening of asset files.......... 28
9. Maintenance of FCI asset files and indices.......... 28
10. Symbol numbers.......... 29
11. Captions.......... 29
12. Background inquiries and interviews.......... 29
13. Authority to operate assets.......... 30
14. Contact with assets.......... 30
15. Confidentiality of relationship.......... 30
16. Reliability of assets.......... 31
17. Assignment of pseudonyms.......... 31
18. Recording of information received from asset.......... 31
19. Channelization of information of intelligence value received from the asset.......... 32
20. Passage of documents, written report or oral information, to hostile foreign intelligence.......... 32
21. Oral information received from debriefing asset.......... 34
22. Coverage of OA meets with foreign intelligence officer, co-opted worker, or agent.......... 34
23. Disinformation.......... 35
24. OA cover story.......... 35
25. Receipt of money or property by OA.......... 35
26. Payments to FCI assets - either OA or IA.......... 35
27. Evaluation of FCI assets.......... 36
28. Income tax returns.......... 37
29. Receipt of unemployment compensation.......... 37
30. Monthly and quarterly letters.......... 37
31. Corrective action on false information.......... 38
32. Discontinuance of assets.......... 38
33. Discontinued assets.......... 39
34. Classification.......... 39]

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

PART I

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. [Deleted]
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file.
5. Review armed services record if applicable.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
   [a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of racial and/or security informants, the number of potential racial and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.]
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
   a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
   b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
   c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
   d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.
   e. If potential informant is student, teacher, or has any similar relations with school, college, or university, in initial interview and subsequent handling, follow current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
3. Do not interview female potential informants in their homes or apartments unless necessary and any such interviews should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of superior in field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to Bureau.

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file.
5. Review armed services record if applicable.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. [Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise.] Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
    a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of [extremist] and/or security informants, the number of potential [extremist] and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
    a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
    b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
    c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
    d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.
    e. If potential informant is student, teacher, or has any similar relations with school, college, or university, in initial interview and subsequent handling, follow current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
3. Do not interview female potential informants in their homes or apartments unless necessary and any such interviews should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of superior in field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups and there will be no embarrassment to Bureau.

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. [Limit credit check of individual to identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment.)] Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file.
5. Review armed services record if applicable.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
    a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of extremist and/or security informants, the number of potential extremist and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
    a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
    b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
    c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
    d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.

[4. Check local arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file.

5. Review armed services record if applicable.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
   a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of extremist and/or security informants, the number of potential extremist and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
   a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
   b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
   c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
   d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check local arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file. [In order to eliminate the possibility of jeopardizing the security of Bureau informants, the word "Informant" should not be indicated in blank ballot box on FD-165. It should be noted the informant file number serves as an indication to the Identification Division of the type of flash notice desired.]
5. Review armed services record if applicable.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
    a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of extremist and/or security informants, the number of potential extremist and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
    a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
    b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
    c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
    d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check local arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file. In order to eliminate the possibility of jeopardizing the security of Bureau informants, the word "Informant" should not be indicated in blank ballot box on FD-165. It should be noted the informant file number serves as an indication to the Identification Division of the type of flash notice desired.
5. Review armed services record if applicable. [FD-356 must be used in any routine check pertaining to informants making sure all references, such as symbol number, which would tend to identify individual as an informant are deleted.]
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
    a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of extremist and/or security informants, the number of potential extremist and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
    a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
    b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
    c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
    d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check local arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file. In order to eliminate the possibility of jeopardizing the security of Bureau informants, the word "Informant" should not be indicated in blank ballot box on FD-165. It should be noted the informant file number serves as an indication to the Identification Division of the type of flash notice desired.
5. Review armed services record if applicable. FD-356 must be used in any routine check pertaining to informants making sure all references, such as symbol number, which would tend to identify individual as an informant are deleted.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
[8. [Deleted]

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
    a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of extremist and/or security informants, the number of potential extremist and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
    a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
    b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
    c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
    d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.

e. If potential informant is student, teacher, or has any similar relations with school, college, or university, in initial interview and subsequent handling, follow current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

3. Do not interview female potential informants in their homes or apartments unless necessary and any such interviews should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of superior in field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups and there will be no embarrassment to Bureau.

e. If potential informant is student, teacher, or has any similar relations with school, college, or university, in initial interview and subsequent handling, follow current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

3. Do not interview female potential informants in their homes or apartments unless necessary and any such interviews should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of superior in field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups and there will be no embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Except in espiona[illegible] and foreign nationality matte[illegible] where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on circumstances, contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401) concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by Bureau.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on circumstances, contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401) concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by Bureau.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on circumstances, contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401) concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by Bureau.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.

[[5. All informants and sources are to be debriefed on at least a monthly
[basis regarding their knowledge of narcotics activities.]

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on circumstances, contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401) concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among[active duty]military personnel.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.
5. All informants and sources are to be debriefed on at least a monthly basis regarding their knowledge of narcotics activities.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401)concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among active duty military personnel.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.
5. All informants and sources are to be debriefed on at least a monthly basis regarding their knowledge of narcotics activities.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401)concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among active duty military personnel.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.
5. All informants and sources are to be debriefed on at least a monthly basis regarding their knowledge of narcotics activities.

[6. All pending informant files are to be reviewed personally by appropriate supervisory personnel on a regular periodic basis not to exceed 60 days. This review must include the informant's file and its subfiles.]

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Contacts by Agents
   - [a. Informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
   - b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
   - c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
   - d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
   - e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. [
   - f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
   - g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
   - h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
   - i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
   - j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.

5. Checking reliability
   - a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
   - b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.

6. Fingerprints
   - a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
   - b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
   - c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

d. Flash notice is to be placed by field with Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.

e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

7. Control - statement of cooperation

a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants to obtain maximum results and prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

b. Obtain signed statement set out below when feasible and practical. Where it is not practical to secure such signed statement from an informant, advise Bureau of complete details. SAC and Agent handling informant should determine appropriate time in informant's operation when statement should be completed.

> I, ________, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.

(Signed) ________ ____________

Witnessed: ________________

8. Execution of party questionnaires

Informants, particularly in Communist Party, often must execute party questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeoparidze their position as informants. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant.

9. Informant's activity in organizations

a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.

b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.

c. Changes in organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions are labeled as such.

d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but in such manner as to avoid suspicion.

10. Transfer of informants to other areas
    a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.
    b. Keep in mind overall coverage of organizations. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, encourage him to do so in order to provide wider coverage for Bureau's work.
11. Action by informant when uncovered
    a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, instruct him to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.
    b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without facts to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse issue to point where his services may not be lost.
    c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from strict discipline of organization involved, and thus cast off suspicion.
12. Requests of informant to help defend others
    a. If requested by Communist Party, or other interested parties to assist in preparation of defense in subversive-type cases or handle assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline.
    b. Such requests should be reported immediately to contacting Agent and made matter of record.
    c. If informant cannot avoid becoming involved, instruct him not to report any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.
    d. Promptly report any such incident to Bureau.
    e. [If an informant is present in conversation between an attorney and individual under criminal indictment, he should immediately leave. If he is unable to do so and inadvertently learns of defense plans or strategy, he is not to report the substance of any such conversation to the FBI. Additionally, the informant is not to engage in or report the substance of a conversation with a criminal defendant dealing with the offense for which the defendant is under indictment.]
13. Preparation for testifying
    Contacting Agent must condition informant to fact that someday knowledge he possesses may be needed as evidence in court. Psychologically prepare informant for fact that he may at future date be called upon to testify to information he has furnished on security matters. Proper indoctrination of informant is essential as Bureau must provide witnesses whenever Department initiates prosecutions in security cases.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION
1. General instructions re oral and written information
    a. These instructions apply to security informants, potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
    b. Specific instructions must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
    c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after meeting or activity.
    d. Written statements should be submitted when possible. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
    e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
    f. All information furnished by informants must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelizing and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies. When informant's statement contains references to large number of individuals and/or organizations, and exceeds two pages, consider channelizing to substantive case file only those por-

10. Transfer of informants to other areas
    a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.
    b. Keep in mind overall coverage of organizations. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, encourage him to do so in order to provide wider coverage for Bureau's work.
11. Action by informant when uncovered
    a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, instruct him to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.
    b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without facts to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse issue to point where his services may not be lost.
    c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from strict discipline of organization involved, and thus cast off suspicion.
12. Requests of informant to help defend others
    a. If requested by Communist Party, or other interested parties to assist in preparation of defense in subversive-type cases or handle assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline.
    b. Such requests should be reported immediately to contacting Agent and made matter of record.
    c. If informant cannot avoid becoming involved, instruct him not to report any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.
    d. Promptly report any such incident to Bureau.
    e. If an informant is present in conversation between an attorney and individual under criminal indictment, he should immediately leave. If he is unable to do so and inadvertently learns of defense plans or strategy, he is not to report the substance of any such conversation to the FBI. Additionally, the informant is not to engage in or report the substance of a conversation with a criminal defendant dealing with the offense for which the defendant is under indictment.
13. Preparation for testifying
    Contacting Agent must condition informant to fact that someday knowledge he possesses may be needed as evidence in court. Psychologically prepare informant for fact that he may at future date be called upon to testify to information he has furnished on security matters. Proper indoctrination of informant is essential as Bureau must provide witnesses whenever Department initiates prosecutions in security cases.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION
1. General instructions re oral and written information
    a. These instructions apply to security informants, potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
    b. Specific instructions must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
    c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after meeting or activity.
    d. Written statements should be submitted when possible. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
    e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
    f. All information furnished by informants must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelizing and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies. [In those instances in which an informant reports that an individual attended a meeting but took no active part therein and/or

10. Transfer of informants to other areas
    - a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.
    - b. Keep in mind overall coverage of organizations. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, encourage him to do so in order to provide wider coverage for Bureau's work.
11. Action by informant when uncovered
    - a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, instruct him to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.
    - b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without facts to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse issue to point where his services may not be lost.
    - c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from strict discipline of organization involved, and thus cast off suspicion.
12. Requests of informant to help defend others
    - a. If requested by Communist Party, or other interested parties to assist in preparation of defense in subversive-type cases or handle assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline.
    - b. Such requests should be reported immediately to contacting Agent and made matter of record.
    - c. If informant cannot avoid becoming involved, instruct him not to report any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.
    - d. Promptly report any such incident to Bureau.
    - e. If an informant is present in conversation between an attorney and individual under criminal indictment, he should immediately leave. If he is unable to do so and inadvertently learns of defense plans or strategy, he is not to report the substance of any such conversation to the FBI. Additionally, the informant is not to engage in or report the substance of a conversation with a criminal defendant dealing with the offense for which the defendant is under indictment.
13. Preparation for testifying

    Contacting Agent must condition informant to fact that someday knowledge he possesses may be needed as evidence in court. Psychologically prepare informant for fact that he may at future date be called upon to testify to information he has furnished on security matters. Proper indoctrination of informant is essential as Bureau must provide witnesses whenever Department initiates prosecutions in security cases.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION

1. General instructions re oral and written information
    - a. These instructions apply to security informants, potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
    - b. Specific instructions must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
    - c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after meeting or activity.
    - d. Written statements should be submitted when possible.
    - e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
    - f. All information furnished by informants must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelizing and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies. In those instances in which an informant reports that an individual attended a meeting but took no active part therein and/or

tions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should be employed unless logical reason dictates otherwise.

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

2. Recording written and oral information
   a. Written by informant
      (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
      (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
      (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
      (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at top of statement.
      (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement.
      (6) Informants should include in statements specific dates and places; purpose of meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; and specific activity or comments of individuals present.
      (7) Informant should identify statement by affixing his code name immediately under the last written line on each page. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or initials of his code name.
      (8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.
      (9) Informant should refer to himself in body of statement by his true name and use third person.
      (10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., or place any markings whatever thereon.
      (11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on channelizing memorandum containing applicable items set forth on form FD-306.
      (12) Extraneous material should be kept to absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
         (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau
         (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant
         (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

      Such data should be furnished orally by informant and recorded in memorandum form for informant file.
   b. Furnished orally by informant
      (1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with making of oral statement by informant to Agent. Leave out following items:
         (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau
         (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant
         (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

      Such data should be recorded in memorandum for informant file.
      (2) Prepare on paper devoid of Bureau markings or identification.
      (3) Date at top with date informant furnished information. No other date is desired except date of meeting or activity described in body of statement.

tions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should be employed unless logical reason dictates otherwise. [When preparing lengthy channelizing memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit the number of copies prepared for each other such office to two. Clearly indicate next to the name of the receiving office, the number of the page containing information pertinent to that office and note on cover page that distribution of material to the receiving field office files is left to discretion of the receiving office. If the channelizing memorandum includes names of individuals who merely attended a meeting or gathering and played no important role, the reporting office is to attach to the channelizing memorandum a one-page memorandum listing the names of all individuals who were merely in attendance and had no important function. The preparation and distribution of the additional copies of the one-page attachment are left to the discretion of the receiving office.]

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

2. Recording written and oral information
   a. Written by informant
      (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
      (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
      (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
      (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at top of statement.
      (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement.
      (6) Informants should include in statements specific dates and places; purpose of meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; and specific activity or comments of individuals present.
      (7) Informant should identify statement by affixing his code name immediately under the last written line on each page. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or initials of his code name.
      (8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.
      (9) Informant should refer to himself in body of statement by his true name and use third person.
      (10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., or place any markings whatever thereon.
      (11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on channelizing memorandum containing applicable items set forth on form FD-306.
      (12) Extraneous material should be kept to absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
         (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau
         (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant

nothing transpired of potential prosecutive value with respect to the individual, FD-306 should list the substantive case file number or should list subject's name and it will not be necessary to staple a copy of the informant's statement to FD-306.] When informant's statement contains references to large number of individuals and/or organizations, and exceeds two pages, consider channelizing to substantive case file only those portions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should be employed unless logical reason dictates otherwise. When preparing lengthy channelizing memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit the number of copies prepared for each other such office to two. Clearly indicate next to the name of the receiving office, the number of the page containing information pertinent to that office and note on cover page that distribution of material to the receiving field office files is left to discretion of the receiving office. If the channelizing memorandum includes names of individuals who merely attended a meeting or gathering and played no important role, the reporting office is to attach to the channelizing memorandum a one-page memorandum listing the names of all individuals who were merely in attendance and had no important function. The preparation and distribution of the additional copies of the one-page attachment are left to the discretion of the receiving office.

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

2. Recording written and oral information
   a. Written by informant
      (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
      (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
      (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
      (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at top of statement.
      (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement.
      (6) Informants should include in statements specific dates and places; purpose of meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; and specific activity or comments of individuals present.
      (7) Informant should identify statement by affixing his code name immediately under the last written line on each page. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or initials of his code name.
      (8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.
      (9) Informant should refer to himself in body of statement by his true name and use third person.
      (10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., or place any markings whatever thereon.
      (11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on channelizing memorandum containing applicable items set forth on form FD-306.
      (12) Extraneous material should be kept to absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
         (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau
         (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant

nothing transpired of potential prosecutive value with respect to the individual, FD-306 should list the substantive case file number or should list subject's name and it will not be necessary to staple a copy of the informant's statement to FD-306. When informant's statement contains references to large number of individuals and/or organizations, and exceeds two pages, consider channelizing to substantive case file only those portions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should be employed unless logical reason dictates otherwise. When preparing lengthy channelizing memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit the number of copies prepared for each other such office to two. Clearly indicate next to the name of the receiving office, the number of the page containing information pertinent to that office and note on cover page that distribution of material to the receiving field office files is left to discretion of the receiving office. If the channelizing memorandum includes names of individuals who merely attended a meeting or gathering and played no important role, the reporting office is to attach to the channelizing memorandum a one-page memorandum listing the names of all individuals who were merely in attendance and had no important function. The preparation and distribution of the additional copies of the one-page attachment are left to the discretion of the receiving office.

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

2. Recording written and oral information

a. Written by informant

(1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.

(2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.

(3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at top of statement.

(5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement.

(6) Informants should include in statements specific dates and places; purpose of meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; and specific activity or comments of individuals present.

(7) Informant should identify statement by affixing his code name immediately under the last written line on each page. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or initials of his code name.

(8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.

(9) Informant should refer to himself in body of statement by his true name and use third person.

(10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., or place any markings whatever thereon.

(11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on channelizing memorandum containing applicable items set forth on form FD-306.

(12) Extraneous material should be kept to absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:

(a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau

(b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant

(c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

Such data should be furnished orally by informant and recorded in memorandum form for informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant

(1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with making of oral statement by informant to Agent. Leave out following items:

(a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau

(b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant

(c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

Such data should be recorded in memorandum for informant file.

(2) Prepare on paper devoid of Bureau markings or identification.

(3) Date at top with date informant furnished information. No other date is desired except date of meeting or activity described in body of statement.

(c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

Such data should be furnished orally by informant and recorded in memorandum form for informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant
  (1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with making of oral statement by informant to Agent. Leave out following items:
    (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau
    (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant
    (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

  Such data should be recorded in memorandum for informant file.
  (2) Prepare on paper devoid of Bureau markings or identification.
  (3) Date at top with date informant furnished information. No other date is desired except date of meeting or activity described in body of statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by Agent as if informant were preparing them himself.

(5) Information, after being reduced to writing, should be read promptly by informant and acknowledged by affixing his code name on each page.

(6) After informant authenticates statement, contacting Agent should prepare cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it. Thereafter statement should be handled as written one.

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be included in office memorandum by Agent and should not be initialed by informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information
   - a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants when possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such contacts. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.
   - b. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory. More than one informant may send statements to a post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of postal employees.
   - c. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under fictitious name.
   - d. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for extended period of time.
   - e. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication.

4. Handling of lead information
   - a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to logical conclusion.
   - b. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, tickler card should be prepared to follow informant and take other logical steps to obtain additional identifying data. Restrict tickler cards to information which would warrant investigation if identity established. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants
   - a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon informant's code name.
   - b. Informant should affix date he received material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, date he furnished material should be affixed.
   - c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material.
   - d. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items. See section 107K for filing instructions.

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
    - a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
    - b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant use of such designations.
    - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
    - d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
    - e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; [letters["CS"]for confidential source.
    - f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to racial, etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY-000-S to NY-000-C or to NY-000-R).
2. Communications - use of symbols
    - a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
    - b. In all communications after initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
    - c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
    - d. Informants and sources entering another division
        - (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
        - (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
        - (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
    - e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not assigned, name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
    - f. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, caption of communication should also show character and country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

J. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index

    Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice

    - a. Alphabetical name index

        In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, and security confidential sources. This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
   - a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
   - b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant use of such designations.
   - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   - d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
   - e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; letters "CS" for confidential source.
   - f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to racial, etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-S to NY 000-C or to NY 000-R).
2. Communications - use of symbols
   - a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
   - b. In all communications after initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
   - c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
   - d. Informants and sources entering another division
     - (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
     - (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
     - (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
   - e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not assigned, name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
   - f. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, caption of communication should also show character and country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

J. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index

   Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice
   - a. Alphabetical name index

     In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, and security confidential sources. This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
   - a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
   - b. [A symbol number designation should be afforded to all individuals from the time any step (generally the opening of an informant or source file) is taken to develop them as sources or informants.]
   - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   - d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
   - e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; letters "CS" for confidential source.
   - f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to[extremist,]etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-S to NY 000-C or to NY[000-E).]
   - [g. [An asterisk should not be used to designate certain highly sensitive informants or investigative techniques. Do not include asterisk in reporting information from such sources.]
2. Communications - use of symbols
   - a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
   - b. In all communications after initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
   - c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
   - d. Informants and sources entering another division
     - (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial[secure teletype] to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. [Such a teletype should not be routed to a Resident Agency.] Office receiving such [teletype]should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
     - (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
     - (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
   - e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not[used,]name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
   - f. [Captions of communications concerning informants and sources should contain a precise character designation to identify the organization with which they are most closely associated or on which they are most capable of furnishing information (i.e., Security Matter - Students for a Democratic Society or SM - SDS, Security Matter - Young Socialist Alliance or SM - YSA, Security Matter - Communist or SM - C, etc.).] In espionage and foreign nationality matters, caption of communication should also show character and country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
    a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
    b. A symbol number designation should be afforded to all individuals from the time any step (generally the opening of an informant or source file) is taken to develop them as sources or informants. [Upon assigning a symbol number, Bureau should be immediately advised by secure teletype of the symbol number, informant's true name, available background information, and cover name, if assigned, for indexing purposes.]
    c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
    d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
    e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; letters "CS" for confidential source.
    f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to extremist, etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-S to NY 000-C or to NY 000-E).
    g. An asterisk should not be used to designate certain highly sensitive informants or investigative techniques. Do not include asterisk in reporting information from such sources.
2. Communications - use of symbols
    a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
    b. In all communications after initial [one,] Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
    c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
    d. Informants and sources entering another division
        (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial secure teletype to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. Such a teletype should not be routed to a Resident Agency. Office receiving such teletype should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
        (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
        (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
    e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not used, name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
    f. Captions of communications concerning informants and sources should contain a precise character designation to identify the organization with which they are most closely associated or on which they are most capable of furnishing information (i.e., Security Matter - Students for a Democratic Society or SM - SDS, Security Matter - Young Socialist Alliance or SM - YSA, Security Matter - Communist or SM - C, etc.). In espionage and foreign nationality matters, caption of communication should also show character and country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
   a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
   b. A symbol number designation should be afforded to all individuals from the time any step (generally the opening of an informant or source file) is taken to develop them as sources or informants. Upon assigning a symbol number, Bureau should be immediately advised by secure teletype of the symbol number, informant's true name, available background information, and cover name, if assigned, for indexing purposes.
   c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
   e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; letters "CS" for confidential source.
   f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to extremist, etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-S to NY 000-C or to NY 000-E).
   g. An asterisk should not be used to designate certain highly sensitive informants or investigative techniques. Do not include asterisk in reporting information from such sources.
2. Communications - use of symbols
   a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
   b. In all communications after initial one, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
   c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
   d. Informants and sources entering another division
      (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial secure teletype to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. Such a teletype should not be routed to a Resident Agency. Office receiving such teletype should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
      (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be canceled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
      (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
   e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not used, name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
   f. Captions of communications concerning informants and sources should contain a precise character designation to identify the organization with which they are most closely associated or on which they are most capable of furnishing information (i.e.,[Subversive]Matter - Students for a Democratic Society or SM - SDS,[Subversive]Matter - Young Socialist Alliance or SM - YSA,[Subversive]Matter -[Communist Party, USA]or SM -[CPUSA,]etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

Security Informant" shall not appear.

J. INDICES
1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
   Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice
   a. Alphabetical name index
      In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, and security confidential sources. This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.
   b. Symbol number index
      This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.
   c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.
   d. Index cards
      Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

      Symbol: File No:
      (Informant, potential informant, or confidential source)

      Name:

   e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.
2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"
   a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.
   b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.
   c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.
   d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.
3. Agents' informative index
   a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.
   b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.
   c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.
   d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.
   e. [Deleted.]
   f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.
   g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.
   h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.
   i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

J. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
   Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice
   a. Alphabetical name index
      In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, security confidential sources,[informative assets, and operational assets.] This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.
   b. Symbol number index
      This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.
   c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.
   d. Index cards
      Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

      Symbol: File No:
      (Informant, potential informant, confidential source,[informative asset, or operational asset)]

      Name:

   e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.
2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"
   a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.
   b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.
   c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.
   d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.
3. Agents' informative index
   a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.
   b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.
   c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.
   d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.
   e. Deleted.
   f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.
   g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.
   h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.
   i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

K. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
   - a. When active investigation is initiated regarding potential informant or confidential source who is not subject of security-type file, open 134 file.
   - b. If individual is subject of security case and after being interviewed appears to have potential as informant, open separate 134 file to follow informant development. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, existing file may be used if this is practical.
   - c. Maintain individual files on all active informants as pending active files.
2. Monthly administrative report

   Include files on potential informants and informants in tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.
3. Assignment and tickler cards

   Maintain assignment and tickler cards, but do not show true name of informant, [potential informant, panel source or confidential source] on such cards.
4. Subfiles
   - a. Subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. File in this subfile original of each statement, whether personally written by informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent. Staple executed form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items on form FD-306 to original of each such statement.
   - b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization

   Include excerpts from informant's statement in regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to case file in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

   See Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Correspondence

   Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption.
8. Maintenance of files
   - a. Maintain all symbol number informant files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by SAC.
   - b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in open files section, provided there is no disclosure of informant's identity on statements.
   - c. Maintain informant files so that all information furnished by informant will be immediately available when needed.
   - d. In addition, maintain these files so identities of cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be obtained immediately by simply referring to file of informant and without extensive research.

K. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
    a. When active investigation is initiated regarding potential informant or confidential source who is not subject of security-type file, open 134 file.
    b. If individual is subject of security case and after being interviewed appears to have potential as informant, open separate 134 file to follow informant development.
    c. Maintain individual files on all active informants as pending active files.
2. Monthly administrative report
   Include files on potential informants and informants in tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.
3. Assignment and tickler cards
   Maintain assignment and tickler cards, but do not show true name of informant, potential informant, panel source or confidential source on such cards.
4. Subfiles
    a. Subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral. File in this subfile original of each statement, whether personally written by informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent. Staple executed form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items on form FD-306 to original of each such statement.
    b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Include excerpts from informant's statement in regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to case file in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   See Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Correspondence
   Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption.
8. Maintenance of files
    a. Maintain all symbol number informant files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by SAC.
    b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in open files section, provided there is no disclosure of informant's identity on statements.
    c. Maintain informant files so that all information furnished by informant will be immediately available when needed.
    d. In addition, maintain these files so identities of cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be obtained immediately by simply referring to file of informant and without extensive research.

9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
   From time to time, Department expresses interest in using particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as witness. Place copies of all correspondence of this type in informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize information concerning each informant and place summary in appropriate file.
10. Form FD-238
    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) is used in security informant and potential security informant files in nature of table of contents or index to show where in file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as top document in informant file and is not to be serialized. If particular section of form is not applicable, note such thereon.
11. Bulky material submitted by informant
    Where informant or source submits bulky material other than statement and same pertains to specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in investigative case file, together with copy of form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum. File original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum in subfile of informant or source and note thereon file and serial number where bulky material is located.

L. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS

1. No gifts to informants
   - a. Gifts should not be given to informants.
   - b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on businesslike basis.
   - c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority
   - a. When deemed necessary and expedient to expend money to develop individual as informant to obtain information concerning security matters which is not otherwise obtainable or to advance expense money to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments up to $400 and totaling not more than $400 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization.
   - b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   - c. Blue slip reclaiming payments authorized by SAC must clearly and accurately explain circumstances and summarize information obtained so Bureau will be in position to pass intelligently on such matters.
   - d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to individual who has received payments totaling $400. Once individual has been paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on regular basis, recommendation should be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis."

[[e. All newly developed security informants are to be paid under SAC
[authority for the first six months unless unusual circumstances
[exist. If additional funds under SAC authority are necessary during
[this period, submit request accompanied by detailed justification of
[past expenditures.]

3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority
   - a. To pay anyone on a regular basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   - b. In requesting this authorization, use form FD-401:
     - (1) Membership
       List current membership and position held in any subversive group.
     - (2) Amount paid for services and expenses
       List by the month or week. Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.
     - (3) Number of activities and persons on whom coverage is provided
       List number and type of meetings attended and other activities and number of persons on whom informant furnishes coverage and their importance.

9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
   From time to time, Department expresses interest in using particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as witness. Place copies of all correspondence of this type in informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize information concerning each informant and place summary in appropriate file.
10. Form FD-238
   Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) is used in security informant and potential security informant files in nature of table of contents or index to show where in file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as top document in informant file and is not to be serialized. If particular section of form is not applicable, note such thereon.
11. Bulky material submitted by informant
   Where informant or source submits bulky material other than statement and same pertains to specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in investigative case file, together with copy of form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum. File original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum in subfile of informant or source and note thereon file and serial number where bulky material is located.

L. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS

1. No gifts to informants
   - a. Gifts should not be given to informants.
   - b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on businesslike basis.
   - c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority
   - a. When deemed necessary and expedient to expend money to develop individual as informant to obtain information concerning security matters which is not otherwise obtainable or to advance expense money to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments up to $400 and totaling not more than $400 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization.
   - b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   - c. Blue slip reclaiming payments authorized by SAC must clearly and accurately explain circumstances and summarize information obtained so Bureau will be in position to pass intelligently on such matters.
   - d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to individual who has received payments totaling $400. Once individual has been paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on regular basis, recommendation should be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis."
   - e. All newly developed security informants are to be paid under SAC authority for the first six months unless unusual circumstances exist. If additional funds under SAC authority are necessary during this period, submit request accompanied by detailed justification of past expenditures.
3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority
   - a. To pay anyone on a regular basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   - b. In requesting this authorization, use form FD-401:
     - (1) Membership
       List current membership and position held in any subversive group. [If position identifies informant, submit separately by secure teletype (nitel).]
     - (2) Amount paid for services and expenses
       List by the month or week. Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.
     - (3) Number of activities and persons on whom coverage is provided
       List number and type of meetings attended and other activities and number of persons on whom informant furnishes coverage and their importance.

9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
From time to time, Department expresses interest in using particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as witness. Place copies of all correspondence of this type in informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize information concerning each informant and place summary in appropriate file.

10. Form FD-238
Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) is used in security informant and potential security informant files in nature of table of contents or index to show where in file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as top document in informant file and is not to be serialized. If particular section of form is not applicable, note such thereon.

11. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than statement and same pertains to specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in investigative case file, together with copy of form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum. File original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum in subfile of informant or source and note thereon file and serial number where bulky material is located.

L. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on businesslike basis.
   c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.

2. SAC authority
   a. When deemed necessary and expedient to expend money to develop individual as informant to obtain information concerning security matters which is not otherwise obtainable or to advance expense money to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments up to $400 and totaling not more than $400 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. Blue slip reclaiming payments authorized by SAC must clearly and accurately explain circumstances and summarize information obtained so Bureau will be in position to pass intelligently on such matters.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to individual who has received payments totaling $400. Once individual has been paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on regular basis, recommendation should be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis."
   e. All newly developed security informants are to be paid under SAC authority for the first six months unless unusual circumstances exist. If additional funds under SAC authority are necessary during this period, submit request accompanied by detailed justification of past expenditures.

3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a regular basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, use form FD-401:
      (1) Membership
      List current membership and position held in any subversive group. If position identifies informant, submit separately by secure teletype (nitel).
      (2) Amount paid for services and expenses
      List by the month or week. Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.
      (3) Number of activities and persons on whom coverage is provided
      List number and type of meetings attended and other activities and number of persons on whom informant furnishes coverage and their importance.

(4) Number of statements submitted
Combine total number of oral and written statements submitted and show only total number.

(5) Stability and reliability
Check positive box if informant is considered stable and reliable. If not or if there are any personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or any other similar problems presented by informant, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(6) Indoctrination against disclosure
If informant has been indoctrinated against disclosure, check positive box.

(7) Percentage of information verified
Show percentage of information furnished by informant which has been verified through other sources.

(8) All necessary action taken on information furnished
If all action has been taken, check positive box. If not, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(9) Summary of information furnished
This summary should be concise, highlighting more pertinent information furnished by informant. Do not attempt to summarize all information furnished by informant.

(10) Miscellaneous
Furnish any change in informant's residence and employment[by secure teletype (nitel),]steps being taken to advance informant, and any other pertinent information which should be brought to Bureau's attention. Include statement that source has been advised that all payments of money made to him for services rendered must be declared as income on his tax return and has agreed to do so.

c. When payment to informant has been authorized for definite period of time, advise Bureau at least two weeks in advance of expiration of period as to whether services of informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in item 3b, above.

e. Submit letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant in duplicate except that copy should consist only of first page of letter. When payments are approved, single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at Bureau and returned. If recommendation is not approved, field will be advised by separate communication.

f. When payments are authorized by Bureau, it is personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure that full value is being received.

g. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears information being produced by informant is not commensurate with payments made to him, immediately discontinue payments or adjust accordingly and promptly advise Bureau.

h. If any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, FD-401 must be transmitted to Bureau every six months after date of designation containing same information set out in item 3b, above, except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases, comment is necessary regarding only applicable items.

5. Receipts
When payments are made either on SAC authority or prior Bureau approval, obtain receipts in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If receipt cannot be obtained for particular payment, set forth complete circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.

(4) Number of statements submitted
Combine total number of oral and written statements submitted and show only total number.

(5) Stability and reliability
Check positive box if informant is considered stable and reliable. If not or if there are any personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or any other similar problems presented by informant, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(6) Indoctrination against disclosure
If informant has been indoctrinated against disclosure, check positive box.

(7) Percentage of information verified
Show percentage of information furnished by informant which has been verified through other sources.

(8) All necessary action taken on information furnished
If all action has been taken, check positive box. If not, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(9) Summary of information furnished
This summary should be concise, highlighting more pertinent information furnished by informant. Do not attempt to summarize all information furnished by informant.

(10) Miscellaneous
Furnish any change in informant's residence and employment by secure teletype (nitel), steps being taken to advance informant, and any other pertinent information which should be brought to Bureau's attention. Include statement that source has been advised that all payments of money made to him for services rendered must be declared as income on his tax return and has agreed to do so.

c. When payment to informant has been authorized for definite period of time, advise Bureau at least two weeks in advance of expiration of period as to whether services of informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in item 3b, above.

e. Submit letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant in duplicate except that copy should consist only of first page of letter. When payments are approved, single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at Bureau and returned. If recommendation is not approved, field will be advised by separate communication.

f. When payments are authorized by Bureau, it is personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure that full value is being received.

g. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears information being produced by informant is not commensurate with payments made to him, immediately discontinue payments or adjust accordingly and promptly advise Bureau.

h. If any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, FD-401 must be transmitted to Bureau every six months after date of designation containing same information set out in item 3b, above, except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB.

5. Receipts
When payments are made either on SAC authority or prior Bureau approval, obtain receipts in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If receipt cannot be obtained for particular payment, set forth complete circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.

a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.

b. Receipts should clearly show:
(1) Date on which payment was made
(2) Period for which made when informant is paid on period basis
(3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where pertinent
(4) Name of Agent making payment
(5) Signature of person receiving money

c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.

d. If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by informant and not by Agent.

e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to Bureau, staple them directly to blue slip, leaving margin of one to one and one-half inches at top to avoid contact with Acco fastener punch. Place staples so that date or other data appearing on receipt will not be mutilated and all information on receipt can be easily read without detaching it from blue slip.

6. Income tax returns

a. [Advise informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau that such compensation must be reported as income when filing a Federal income tax form, and, where appropriate, state and local tax forms. Informants must be periodically advised of the above and complete details of any reported problem an informant has encountered with the taxing authorities are to be expeditiously furnished the Bureau.]

b. Bureau income should be set forth on Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

c. If informant is self-employed and files schedule C as self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with Bureau.

d. If informant cannot report payments received from Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as informant, such payments will be subject to 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning procedure to be followed in handling and control of money withheld.

e. When informant or former informant is initially considered as potential witness in Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on income he received from Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, Bureau must furnish Department set of photostats of original receipts signed by prospective witnesses. Original receipts and set of photostats will be transmitted to field office in whose territory trial will take place. Office handling prosecution must determine from Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to Bureau following information:

a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.

b. Receipts should clearly show:

(1) Date on which payment was made
(2) Period for which made when informant is paid on period basis
(3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where pertinent
(4) Name of Agent making payment
(5) Signature of person receiving money

c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.

d. If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by informant and not by Agent.

e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to Bureau, staple them directly to blue slip, leaving margin of one to one and one-half inches at top to avoid contact with Acco fastener punch. Place staples so that date or other data appearing on receipt will not be mutilated and all information on receipt can be easily read without detaching it from blue slip.

6. Income tax returns

a. Advise informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau that such compensation must be reported as income when filing a Federal income tax form, and, where appropriate, state and local tax forms. Informants must be periodically advised of the above and complete details of any reported problem an informant has encountered with the taxing authorities are to be expeditiously furnished the Bureau.

b. Bureau income should be set forth on Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

c. If informant is self-employed and files schedule C as self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with Bureau.

d. If informant cannot report payments received from Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as informant, such payments will be subject to 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning procedure to be followed in handling and control of money withheld.

e. When informant or former informant is initially considered as potential witness in Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on income he received from Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, Bureau must
[furnish Department set of [reproduced copies] of original receipts signed by prospective witnesses. Original receipts and set of
[[reproduced copies] will be transmitted to field office in whose territory trial will take place. Office handling prosecution must determine from Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to Bureau following information:

(1) Correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) First date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) Date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.

d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

[M. MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY LETTERS

1. Submit monthly letter (FD-451, 451a) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Field divisions east of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 3rd of each month; field divisions west of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 7th of each month. Monthly letter should include the following:

a. Number of security informants, potential security informants, confidential sources, and panel sources at the beginning and end of each month also showing the number added and deleted during the month.

b. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to informant and source development.

c. Money paid for services and expenses under SAC authority.

d. Statistical accomplishments.

e. Security informant accomplishments.

(1) Co[illegible]ct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) First date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) Date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.

d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of [Voucher-Statistical Section, Computer Systems Division.] Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

M. MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY LETTERS

1. Submit monthly letter (FD-451, 451a) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Field divisions east of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 3rd of each month; field divisions west of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 7th of each month. Monthly letter should include the following:

a. Number of security informants, potential security informants, confidential sources, and panel sources at the beginning and end of each month also showing the number added and deleted during the month.

b. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to informant and source development.

c. Money paid for services and expenses under SAC authority.

d. Statistical accomplishments.

e. Security informant accomplishments.

(1) Correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) First date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) Date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.

d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of [Data Processing] Section, Computer Systems Division. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

M. MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY LETTERS

1. Submit monthly letter (FD-451, 451a) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Field divisions east of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 3rd of each month; field divisions west of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 7th of each month. Monthly letter should include the following:

a. Number of security informants, potential security informants, confidential sources, and panel sources at the beginning and end of each month also showing the number added and deleted during the month.
b. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to informant and source development.
c. Money paid for services and expenses under SAC authority.
d. Statistical accomplishments.
e. Security informant accomplishments.

(1) Correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) First date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) Date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.

d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

M. MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY LETTERS

1. Submit monthly letter (FD-451, 451a) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Field divisions east of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 3rd of each month; field divisions west of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 7th of each month. Monthly letter should include the following:

a. Number of security informants, potential security informants, confidential sources, panel sources, [informative assets, and operational assets]at the beginning and end of each month also showing the number added and deleted during the month
b. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to informant and source development
c. Money paid for services and expenses under SAC authority
d. Statistical accomplishments
e. Security informant accomplishments

(1) Correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) First date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) Date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.

d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

M. MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY LETTERS

[1. Submit monthly letter (FD-451,451a) to Bureau. Field divisions east of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 3rd of each month; field divisions west of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 7th of each month. Monthly letter should include the following:

a. Number of security informants, potential security informants, confidential sources, panel sources, informative assets, and operational assets at the beginning and end of each month also showing the number added and deleted during the month
b. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to informant and source development
c. Money paid for services and expenses under SAC authority
d. Statistical accomplishments
e. Security informant accomplishments

[2. Submit quarterly letter (FD-451b) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Quarterly letter should include the following:
  - [a. Name, location and number of subversive groups including identities of groups on college campuses, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
  - [b. Symbol numbers of member informants providing coverage who are members of organizations. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.
  - [c. Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning subversive acts of violence, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
  - [d. Symbol numbers of informants and sources providing coverage of individuals or groups shown in Column C. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.]

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

2. Submit quarterly letter (FD-451b) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Quarterly letter should include the following:
    a. Name, location and number of subversive groups including identities of groups on college campuses, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
    b. Symbol numbers of member informants providing coverage who are members of organizations. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.
    c. Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning subversive acts of violence, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
    d. Symbol numbers of informants and sources providing coverage of individuals or groups shown in Column C. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

[2. Submit quarterly letter (FD-451b) to Bureau. Quarterly letter should include the following:
   a. Name, location and number of subversive groups including identities of groups on college campuses, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   b. Symbol numbers of member informants providing coverage who are members of organizations. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.
   c. Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning subversive acts of violence, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   d. Symbol numbers of informants and sources providing coverage of individuals or groups shown in Column C. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

O. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When services of informant are discontinued, mark name card "cancelled." Destroy symbol card. Never destroy name card.
2. Refile name card in numerical order by symbol number in symbol number index. If discontinued informant, potential informant, or confidential source to whom symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove name card from symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in name card section of index.
3. When potential informant or confidential source is discontinued and permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy alphabetical index card.
4. Advise Bureau of date when potential informant or informant is discontinued and reason therefor. Advise Bureau as to whether or not informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. Identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which informant has furnished information must be ascertained and Bureau advised in compliance with section 19, volume II, of this manual.
5. Review informant's file to determine if correspondence between Bureau and field relating to Department's interest in using informant as witness is contained therein. In those cases in which Department has indicated desire to consider informant when he becomes available, advise Bureau in each such substantive case, except when it is obvious statute of limitations has run or case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When above action is completed, advise Bureau.
6. Statement shall also be made to effect that measures to control informants, set out in item 7, below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears such are warranted.
7. When services of informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that informant will look to Bureau for counsel prior to taking any action against Bureau's best interests. Determine whether he has plans for writing book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, impress him with desirability of coming to Bureau for assistance and guidance. If informant insists on engaging in such activities, Bureau will consider placing him in contact with reliable publisher, but it must be made clear to informant that Bureau will not sponsor or endorse any book or publication which he elects to write.
8. All payments to discontinued informants and confidential sources must be made on strict c.o.d. basis. Obtain Bureau authority before making such payments. Submit complete details as to information furnished by discontinued informant or source in past and what is to be expected of informant or source in future.
9. Once informant is exposed in any manner whatsoever, do not carry him as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth, together with descriptive data.
10. When office receives information concerning, or obtains information from, an ex-informant, copies of memoranda prepared must be furnished to office which originally handled informant so that file will be as complete as possible.
11. When informant has been discontinued for cause, such as unreliability, do not contact him in future for information. If he furnishes information it should be accepted, but in setting out information in reports or communications use individual's true name, together with appropriate description of his reliability.
12. [Remove flash notice [per item F, 6, e of this section.]
13. Avoid repeated use of discontinued informant as witness at security trials and hearings. Make all-out effort to develop witnesses who can furnish same testimony. Advise Bureau of any indication by Government attorneys that informant-witness who has previously testified will be called upon for testimony at subsequent trial or hearing and furnish comments concerning possibility of supplanting testimony of individual involved. Submit under appropriate case character.

O. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When services of informant are discontinued, mark name card "canceled." Destroy symbol card. Never destroy name card.
2. Refile name card in numerical order by symbol number in symbol number index. If discontinued informant, potential informant, or confidential source to whom symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove name card from symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in name card section of index.
3. When potential informant or confidential source is discontinued and permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy alphabetical index card.
4. Advise Bureau of date when potential informant or informant is discontinued and reason therefor. Advise Bureau as to whether or not informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. Identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which informant has furnished information must be ascertained and Bureau advised in compliance with section 19, volume II, of this manual.
5. Review informant's file to determine if correspondence between Bureau and field relating to Department's interest in using informant as witness is contained therein. In those cases in which Department has indicated desire to consider informant when he becomes available, advise Bureau in each such substantive case, except when it is obvious statute of limitations has run or case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When above action is completed, advise Bureau.
6. Statement shall also be made to effect that measures to control informants, set out in item 7, below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears such are warranted.
7. When services of informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that informant will look to Bureau for counsel prior to taking any action against Bureau's best interests. Determine whether he has plans for writing book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, impress him with desirability of coming to Bureau for assistance and guidance. If informant insists on engaging in such activities, Bureau will consider placing him in contact with reliable publisher, but it must be made clear to informant that Bureau will not sponsor or endorse any book or publication which he elects to write.
8. All payments to discontinued informants and confidential sources must be made on strict c.o.d. basis. Obtain Bureau authority before making such payments. Submit complete details as to information furnished by discontinued informant or source in past and what is to be expected of informant or source in future.
9. Once informant is exposed in any manner whatsoever, do not carry him as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth, together with descriptive data.
10. When office receives information concerning, or obtains information from, an ex-informant, copies of memoranda prepared must be furnished to office which originally handled informant so that file will be as complete as possible.
11. When informant has been discontinued for cause, such as unreliability, do not contact him in future for information. If he furnishes information it should be accepted, but in setting out information in reports or communications use individual's true name, together with appropriate description of his reliability.
12. Remove flash notice per item F, 6, e of this section.
13. Avoid repeated use of discontinued informant as witness at security trials and hearings. Make all-out effort to develop witnesses who can furnish same testimony. Advise Bureau of any indication by Government attorneys that informant-witness who has previously testified will be called upon for testimony at subsequent trial or hearing and furnish comments concerning possibility of supplanting testimony of individual involved. Submit under appropriate case character.

14. Make every effort to prevent discontinued informant from becoming involved in situations which may prove embarrassing to informant or Government. Immediately after he testifies for first time, SAC should have serious talk with informant in presence of Agent who handled informant. This interview should be conducted in field office and informant told that:
    a. He will no longer be operated by Bureau
    b. Since he is public figure, he will probably be contacted by representatives of press, radio, and television for interviews and appearances
    c. He may be sought as witness by congressional committees, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and state authorities
    d. In connection with such interviews and appearances, informant must continue to be factual and truthful and must not build up or embellish statements, for if he does so he will wind up in serious trouble

    Advise Bureau results of such interview and comment on its possible effectiveness.

    Be alert to possibilities of former informant being contacted by representatives of publicity media and as witness by congressional committees, INS, and state authorities. SAC is responsible for knowing when former informant is scheduled or is likely to appear at hearing or make public appearance of any kind. Prior thereto in each instance, former informant must be contacted and instructions above reiterated by Agent who handled informant. Emphasize to former informant that he must stick to truth and make certain he can back up what he says, and if there is any deviation he will be subjected to criticism, possible libel, slander, or other criminal actions. If he inquires as to whether he should appear or testify or otherwise cooperate with any public or private individual or agency, advise him he must make that decision himself, but if he has appeared as Government witness in case which has not been finally adjudicated and decides in affirmative, he should contact USA for instructions. Advise Bureau of any such situations and results of any interviews conducted.
15. When contacting Agent feels discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to Bureau, make arrangements to have former informant come to field office where he will be personally met by SAC. At that time, he should be impressed with fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to security of country and remind him that he signed agreement when he was active as informant to maintain his relation with Bureau on confidential basis. SAC should stress necessity for informant to maintain this confidence.

P. FURNISHING INFORMANTS TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)
    1. INS, in order to enforce its responsibilities, must obtain evidence to prove that certain aliens, due to their membership in certain groups, are undesirable and deportable or subject to denaturalization.
    2. Cooperate fully with INS in these cases and make efforts consistent with your own interests to make available information and witnesses where possible.
    3. If contacted by INS inquiring for informants and you have discontinued informant or one who would be of assistance to INS and whose loss would not affect your work, furnish his identity to Bureau, together with your recommendation.
    4. Bureau will review facts and advise as to whether or not his identity may be disclosed to INS.
    5. Before any informant is turned over to INS, obtain his permission.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   [a. [A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken
   [to develop an individual as a confidential source.]
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series
   [of numbers used for security, [extremist,]and criminal informants.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a confidential source.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   - d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY 000-S.
   - e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, extremist, and criminal informants.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION [illegible] FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a confidential source.
   b. Advise Bureau by[secure teletype (Nitel)]giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY 000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, extremist, and criminal informants.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a confidential source.
   b. Advise Bureau by secure teletype (Nitel) giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY 000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, extremist, and criminal informants.

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, racial informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, racial informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must [certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, [extremist]informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, racial informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must[certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, extremist informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, racial informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must[certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military
[records. [Limit credit check of individual to identifying information
[only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment).]

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, extremist informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant,[extremist]informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must[certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records. Limit credit check of individual to identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment).

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, extremist informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, extremist informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, arrest and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must[certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate arrest and military records.

3. Index
    - a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, extremist informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
    - b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, extremist informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
    - a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
    - [b. Contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
    - c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
    - d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
        - (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, arrest and service record, if any
        - (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
        - (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
        - (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
    - a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
    - b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.
    - c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
    - a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate arrest and military records.

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

(1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

(4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

f. [A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a panel source.] Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number, e.g., PS NY-000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information

a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.

b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.

c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass

Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority

Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:

a. Newspaper or magazine article

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

(1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

(4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

f. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a panel source. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number, e.g., PS NY 000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information

a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.

b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.

c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass

Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority

Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:

a. Newspaper or magazine article

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

[c. Submit[secure teletype (Nitel)]to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

(1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

(4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

f. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a panel source. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number, e.g., PS NY 000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information

a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.

b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.

c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass

Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority

Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:

a. Newspaper or magazine article

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit secure teletype (Nitel) to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

(1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

(4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

f. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a panel source. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number, e.g., PS NY 000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

[T. [DELETED]

- b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material
    - a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.
    - b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.
    - c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.
    - d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.
5. Handling money and property received by double agents
    - a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.
    - b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.
    - c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
    - d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
    - a. Students under age of [18] years are not to be developed as security informants, [potential security informants,] or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
    - b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.
2. Quarterly letters
    - a. On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). Include following:
        - (1) Specific productivity
        - (2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus
        - (3) Frequency of contact
    - b. Quarterly letters on all racial and security informants or sources should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter:
        - (1) Number of informants, potential informants, and other sources active and under development at each educational institution affected
        - (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources

- b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material
    - a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.
    - b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.
    - c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.
    - d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.
5. Handling money and property received by double agents
    - a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.
    - b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.
    - c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
    - d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
    - a. Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
    - b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.
2. Quarterly letters
    - a. On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). Include following:
        - (1) Specific productivity
        - (2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus
        - (3) Frequency of contact
    - [b. Quarterly letters on all[extremist]and security informants or sources should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter:
        - (1) Number of informants, potential informants, and other sources active and under development at each educational institution affected
        - (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources

   b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material
   a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.
   b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.
   c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.
   d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.
5. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   a. Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
   b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.

[2. [Deleted]

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   a. Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
   b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.
2. Deleted
3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage
   Each office must have continuous and well-planned program to obtain necessary coverage at institutions of learning so that Bureau can fulfill its obligations. Care with which this must be done in no way lessens responsibility of each field office to have proper coverage.

V. CLASSIFICATION - 134

[W. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (FCI) ASSETS

This subsection deals with the development and operation of human assets, a field referred to as Human Intelligence or HUMINT. FCI assets are to be handled exclusively under this subsection, except for the administrative instructions pertaining to informant indices, and monthly statistical letters, set out in Part I; such exceptions are noted herein.

1. Definitions

   FCI assets fall into two categories: informative assets and operational assets.

   a. Informative assets (IA)

      Individuals in position to furnish continuing information relative to the location, overt activities, and personalities of the targets of FBI investigations, e.g., doorman, garage attendant, neighbor, tradesman, rental agent, building superintendent, fellow employee, social contact, business contact, banker, ethnic community source, etc.; or individuals who have left or openly defected from a foreign country and can furnish information of intelligence value. An IA is not actively involved in an intelligence operation as such; should he become so involved he then could become an OA.

   b. Operational assets (OA)

      Individual actively involved in intelligence operations.

      This category includes but is not limited to the following individuals:

      Defector-in-place: A foreign official who overtly continues to work for his government and covertly provides information to us of intelligence value. A defector-in-place will in most instances be connected with a foreign government's intelligence service;

      Double agent: An OA who is cooperating with a foreign intelligence service on our behalf and under our control;

      Asset under development: Individuals selected for their apparent attractiveness to foreign intelligence services whom we attempt to put in contact with such services for operational exploitation, sometimes known as a "dangle operation"; or individuals already in contact with a foreign intelligence service who have an immediate potential for development into double agents.

      Adoption of the generic term OA does not preclude use of the specific terms, e.g., double agent, where applicable, in official communications.

2. Objectives of OA

   a. Penetration

      Penetration of legal and illegal networks, identification of intelligence personnel and targets; collection of information regarding methods of operations; collection of positive intelligence.

b. Control
-of information foreign intelligence services obtain;
-of recruitment, by creating Bureau-controlled OAs;
-of foreign operations, by keeping foreign intelligence services occupied handling our OAs.

c. Collection of evidence for prosecution

d. Deception (Disinformation)
Passing inaccurate or accurate information designed to cause foreign intelligence services to draw conclusions or initiate action to their disadvantage and/or to U. S. advantage.

e. Neutralization: to provide basis for persona non grata (PNG) action, exclusion, arrest or other disruptive action.

f. Collection by OA of personality characteristics data on foreign officials for purpose of defection analysis.

3. Individuals to be considered as OAs

a. Foreign officials in a position to furnish information of intelligence value. An intelligence officer (IO) is, of course, the most valuable OA. An official who is not an IO, while of lesser value, is still a highly desirable OA because of the positive intelligence and information on the personalities and activities of other officials that he can provide.

b. Agents of foreign intelligence services. When these individuals are identified, and the prospect and value of recruiting them outweighs any prosecutive potential, they should be seriously considered for development as OAs.

c. Contacts of foreign officials. When contacts of foreign officials are identified as being of interest to a foreign intelligence service, we should attempt to enlist their cooperation and direct them against that intelligence service.

d. Individuals who are particularly attractive to a foreign intelligence service. Our objective is to determine the specific interests of foreign intelligence services or individual IOs, and to then recruit asset(s) who would appear to that service or IO to satisfy their needs. Such assets must have potential for operation within a reasonably expected period of time.

e. Former assets who currently offer potential for exploitation.

4. Restrictions
FBIHQ authority is required prior to conducting detailed background investigation of any of the following individuals as an FCI asset, whether IA or OA. Of course, some investigation must initially be conducted, without disclosing our interest, to sufficiently identify the individual and generally assess his potential, so that FBIHQ can conduct a meaningful indices search and make an intelligent evaluation of the risks versus value involved.

a. Individual under 21 years of age

b. Official or employee of the United Nations or other public international organizations of a governmental or quasi-governmental nature

c. Official or employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or government

d. Faculty member of an institution of learning
e. Labor leader
f. Federal, state, or local government official
g. News media employee
h. Prominent entertainment figure
i. Prominent religious figure
j. Member of the U. S. Military
k. U. S. Government employee

After FBIHQ authority to conduct detailed background investigation has been received, and investigation completed, FBIHQ authority is also required to conduct initial interview of the above individuals, whether IA or OA.

5. Development of U. S. Military or other U. S. Government Personnel
Whenever it becomes desirable to develop a member of the U. S. Military or an employee of another Government agency as an FCI asset, FBIHQ notifies the respective military service or agency of our interest. To facilitate this notification the office desiring to develop such an individual should submit to FBIHQ 5 copies of an LHM setting out:
a. Proposed asset's name, rank or position, and current place of assignment.
b. Area of FBI interest in the asset, in general, and the foreign intelligence service, and official, if known, against which it is anticipated asset will be directed.
c. Extent of anticipated coverage to be provided by the asset, i.e., describe the services he will provide.
d. The last paragraph of this LHM should read: "It is requested that no further dissemination of the foregoing be made without prior reference to FBI Headquarters. If you agree with our contemplated use of the above individual, please return a copy of this memorandum with your acknowledgement."
e. Members of the military: estimated time period within which you wish to utilize the asset; desirability that the asset remain in his current area of assignment for a specified period of time. Upon receipt of clearance from the military, FBIHQ will select code name for future use in identifying the asset. This code name will be furnished to military intelligence component at headquarters level and to FBI field divisions. Every 6 months thereafter, as long as the FBI has continuing operational interest in the asset, an LHM captioned with code name should be transmitted to FBIHQ, by routing slip captioned with informant's symbol number. The LHM is to contain a statement that the asset continues to be of operational use to the FBI, and a statement detailing any difficulties encountered in control or direction of the asset or a statement that no such difficulties exist.

NOTE: Generally, the U. S. Armed Forces may not be utilized to enforce the civilian criminal law; however, they may be utilized for foreign counterintelligence purposes. In foreign counterintelligence investigations in which there is a possibility of criminal prosecution, use of military personnel as assets might jeopardize successful prosecution, and all such cases must be discussed in detail with FBIHQ prior to utilization of such military assets.

6. Development of personnel of foreign diplomatic establishment or international organization
Whenever it becomes desirable to develop an official or employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or government, or of a public international organization of a governmental or quasi-governmental nature, who is not a national of a hostile country, e.g., Canadian, Argentinian, or U. S. United Nations Secretariat (UNSEC) employee to target against Soviet-bloc UNSEC employee, FBIHQ asks for authorization from State Department to conduct background investigation. FBIHQ must inform State Department of the proposed asset's name, rank or position, nationality, current place of assignment, and, generally, the type of use we intend to make of the asset. After authorization has been received and background investigation completed, if individual offers asset potential, submit results of background investigation in LHM and in cover communication request authority to interview. FBIHQ will then request authorization from State Department to interview.
7. Development
The development of assets depends on the individual circumstances of each situation. No rigid procedural steps or contact schedules can be imposed which will uniformly apply to all cases; however, the development should proceed with the objective of obtaining valuable results as quickly as feasible, consistent with maintaining the asset's security, credibility, and confidence, and with developing the asset's potential to its fullest.
8. Opening of asset files
Open a 134 file for all individuals at the time they are first considered for development as assets. This file should consist of two parts: a main file which will contain all identifying data, results of background investigation, personal status data, and administrative data; and a subfile which will contain at least one copy of all information provided by asset. The asset is not to be identified, beyond his symbol number, in subfile.

Maintain files of all active assets as pending. Utilize FD-238 as unserialized top document in main file.

Assignment and tickler cards must not reflect name of asset; use symbol and/or file number.
9. Maintenance of FCI asset files and indices
Maintain all FCI asset files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, or employee designated by SAC.

Files of FCI assets will be included in calculation of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.

FCI asset indices will be maintained according to the administrative instructions set out under section 107 J, part I, of this manual.

10. Symbol numbers
Assign a symbol number to all individuals when first considered for development as asset. The symbol number is to consist of two-letter prefix identifying the office, a numerical sequence number (which will never be reassigned to another asset or informant), and suffix which describes the type of asset, e.g., NY 1001-OA (or IA). The numerical sequence is to be the same as that used for all other informants, e.g., potential security informant, security informant, criminal informant, etc. The suffix may change if the nature of the information provided changes, e.g., from IA to OA. Submit identity of asset and symbol number assigned to FBIHQ via coded "Nitel"; this is the only communication ever in which both asset's true name and symbol number are to appear together. Assets must not be informed of their symbol numbers.

11. Captions
In administrative communications dealing solely with asset, indicate in caption the character and the country concerning which the asset is reporting, e.g., NY 1001-OA, IS-R (Russia).

12. Background inquiries and interviews
    a. Informative asset
    Based on the type of information the IA can provide, the nature and extent of contact with him, and the IA's relationship with the target:
        (1) Conduct sufficient background investigation to satisfy the SAC as to the IA's stability, suitability, reliability, and potential. For example, a more detailed background investigation is required for a social or business contact than for a doorman or building superintendent. A minimal background investigation should include appropriate police and field offices' indices checks.
        (2) Request search of FBIHQ indices.
        (3) Check NCIC.
        (4) Submit FD-165 for search of FBIHQ identification records; make no reference to individual as IA on FD-165. Also utilize FD-165 to place stop.
        (5) Outside of the restrictions set out in 4. above, interview IA prospect on SAC authority.
    b. Operational asset
    When an individual appears to have OA potential conduct the following background investigation commensurate with OA's security:
        (1) Obtain pertinent data on OA's personal history (date and place of birth, nationality and citizenship, social security number or other identifying numbers, family status, names of immediate family, past and present residences, employments, etc.), and other data such as physical description, patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, reputation, and business connections.
        (2) Check appropriate police and field offices' indices.
        (3) Request search of FBIHQ indices.
        (4) Check NCIC.

(5) Submit FD-165 for search of FBIHQ identification records; make no reference to individual as OA on FD-165; and also utilize FD-165 to place stop.

(6) If applicable, check armed services records, both at Military Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri, and at Defense Central Index of Investigations, Ft. Holabird, Maryland.

(7) Canvass logical sources, commensurate with OA's security.

(8) Upon completion of above investigation submit results to FBIHQ via coded teletype, preferably "Nitel," and interview UACB.

c. All leads to auxiliary offices must be sent and replied to, via coded teletype, preferably "Nitel," under caption utilizing asset's true name, followed by "IS-(country)." Do not set out asset's symbol number. Do not send copies of such leads of IAs to FBIHQ. Leads must be covered within 45 days; office of origin notify auxiliary offices of this time limit when setting out leads.

13. Authority to operate assets

IAs are approved and operated on SAC authority. Inform FBIHQ via coded "Nitel" when SAC approval given, and type of information IA can provide. OAs are approved and operated on FBIHQ authority. After interview of OA submit results of interview via coded "Nitel" requesting FBIHQ approval to operate. Detail OA's potential and your contemplated use of OA.

In exceptional cases, when the results of the interview and details of the OA's potential and contemplated use are voluminous, the practicality of "Nitel" and the relative security of the mails should be balanced against the sensitivity of the information and the security of the asset. Where the former factors prevail, submit summary by "Nitel" and full results and details by letter or airtel.

14. Contact with assets

Contact should be maintained commensurate with maximum productivity, security, and development of asset's further potential. If an asset has not been contacted for a period of 45 days, a memorandum to the SAC must be directed to the asset's main file stating the reason(s) why no contact was made.

Do not disclose to asset any information not essential to his operation.

15. Confidentiality of relationship

Emphasize to all assets that the effectiveness of the FBI's investigation, and in some instances his own personal security, depend on both sides maintaining the confidentiality of the relationship. If the asset feels he must disclose this relationship to another, e.g., wife, parent, employer, etc., or circumstances develop in which asset requests FBI to disclose the relationship to another, e.g., to an employer threatening dismissal of asset because of his affiliation with certain individuals or groups, notify FBIHQ with recommendation to disclose relationship and continue under these conditions or to terminate relationship with or without disclosing relationship, and reasons for recommendation.

16. Reliability of assets
Reliability of all assets must be constantly checked. If any doubt exists concerning asset, give consideration to use of various investigative techniques to insure asset is completely reliable and is furnishing accurate information.

17. Assignment of pseudonyms
In sensitive cases, where necessary; if asset will sign reports or receipts; or if asset is an OA receiving operational funds from a foreign intelligence service or payment from the U. S. which requires bookkeeping records, assign pseudonym for these purposes.

18. Recording of information received from asset
When recording information from any asset in a communication prepared for dissemination, characterize the asset either as one "with whom contact has been insufficient to determine reliability," or as one "who has furnished reliable information in the past."

a. Oral information
   (1) Information pertaining to asset's personal status is recorded in 134 main file, e.g., marital difficulties, change of employment, change of residence.
   (2) Information pertaining to operational administrative matters is recorded in asset's 134 subfile. When this data, e.g., location of meet sites, times of meets, any data which tends to identify asset, is furnished to FBIHQ, it should not be included in communications prepared for dissemination, but in cover pages. When the asset is a member of the military, submit, in addition to the communication for dissemination described immediately above, a communication for dissemination containing all operational administrative details for the information of the asset's service.
   (3) Information of intelligence value should be submitted to FBIHQ via appropriate communication, and, if of interest to other U. S. agencies or friendly foreign services, should be submitted to FBIHQ in form suitable for dissemination.
   (4) Execute and maintain form FD-209 in asset's main file concerning contacts with asset. If contacts produced information of intelligence value, record only date of contacts; if negative, record as such.

b. Written information
   (1) Written information prepared by asset, or by FBI SA for signature of asset, pertaining to operational activities (not a written report passed by asset to his principal) must be dated at the top of page one and signed at the bottom of each numbered page by the asset using his pseudonym. This material may be maintained as an attachment to a serialized memorandum in the asset's subfile (punched holes are allowed), or in a 1a section of the asset's 134 subfile.
   (2) Information received in this manner should be devoid of FBI identification, block or time stamps, serialization number or other administrative markings.
   (3) Only the original need be maintained; asset must not keep a copy.

(4) Any corrections, changes, erasures, additions, or deletions on original must be identified by asset using his pseudonym initials beside it.

(5) Handling FBI SA must not make any changes on the original or permit his name to be recorded therein.

(6) Written information pertaining to operational activities should not include administrative matters pertaining to asset's personal status.

(7) Handle recording of written information and contact with asset in same manner as detailed under recording of oral information.

19. Channelization of information of intelligence value received from the asset

Important factor in channelizing information of intelligence value received from the asset to substantive case files is the security of the asset.

Limit information in communication sent to substantive file to only that necessary for that case; i.e., do not send one comprehensive communication to several substantive files if to do so might compromise source or other individual. (Be aware that some of our documents are being made available in response to subpoenas, and the court is sometimes not allowing excision of material not pertinent to case in question. Consequently, other individuals or operations can be "blown" by revealing one such comprehensive memo.)

a. Extract information of value received from asset and channelize to substantive case files either inter- or intra-office by separate communications under substantive case captions.

b. A copy of all channelizing communications must be maintained in an asset's subfile.

20. Passage of documents, written report or oral information, to hostile foreign intelligence

Type of information to be passed depends on circumstances of particular operation, interests of involved foreign intelligence service, the credible access of the OA and the time element involved.

Great care should be given to the selection of information to be passed to insure the operation accrues to the overall benefit of the U. S.

a. Authority for passage

FBIHQ authority required for passage of all classified information and unclassified information prepared for limited use by concerned Federal and local governments, not intended for public consumption.

Above FBIHQ authority applies to passage of documents, written reports, and oral information.

SAC authority required for passage of material prepared by commercial concerns, Federal, and local governments for public distribution. Examples are: newspaper and magazine articles, pamphlets and brochures, photographs, background information on companies and organizations. If there is any doubt that material selected to be passed is not in the best interest of the U. S., submit material to FBIHQ for clearance; e.g., see Example (1) following.

b. Clearance requirements for information to be passed under FBIHQ authority
Submit original and 9 copies of LHM to FBIHQ bearing appropriate classification via cover communication with appropriate caption. Leave LHM uncaptioned; FBIHQ will insert code name caption.

The first paragraph of the LHM should read: "It is requested that clearance be granted for passage in this operation of the following items to a representative of (name of foreign intelligence service)."

If the information to be passed is a document, set forth an adequate description of it in the LHM.

Examples:
(1) Article entitled "Moon Rockets," prepared by physicist John Doe, January, 1972, issue of "__________," publication of American Rocket Society.
(2) Air Force Training Manual captioned "_________," dated July, 1972, classified "Secret."

In addition, also submit to FBIHQ, if possible, a true copy of document for review which will be returned after clearance by FBIHQ is obtained.

If the information to be passed is a written report prepared by OA, set forth report verbatim in the LHM.

If the information to be passed is oral, set forth oral information verbatim in the LHM.

If more than one item of information in any form is to be passed, number each item in the LHM.

The last paragraph of the LHM should contain the sentence: "The above data should not be further disseminated."

Upon receipt of LHM, FBIHQ will submit to appropriate authorities and request clearance. Reply will be promptly furnished to field.

c. Notification to FBIHQ of passage of document, written report, or oral information which required clearance
After passage, submit original and 9 copies of uncaptioned LHM bearing appropriate classification via cover communication with appropriate caption. FBIHQ will insert code name caption. In LHM refer to LHM which requested clearance. LHM should merely state, "On (date) our source transmitted the information detailed in referenced memorandum to (name of foreign intelligence service)."

If referenced memorandum detailed more than one item, do not list the items unless one or more was not passed. In such an instance list only those items that were passed.

The last paragraph of the LHM should contain the following sentence, "The above data should not be further disseminated."

d. Administrative handling of documents, written reports, and oral information selected for passage

(1) Documents and written reports
Field offices should retain a copy of document or written report passed which would be identified by OA as a true copy of item passed by him. No other marks, identifying data, staple or punch holes should be placed on field office copy.

When submitting document or written report to FBIHQ, identify it, in cover communication, as the actual item which will be passed or a copy.

To insure that the actual document to be passed is not contaminated by fingerprints of FBI personnel, maintain in plastic envelope when being handled in field office or when submitted to FBIHQ.

Documents obtained by FBIHQ or other field offices from commercial concerns or other government agencies which will be passed will be handled in similar fashion.

If copy of document is maintained on permanent basis by preparing concern or agency and available at a later date, no need exists to submit copy to FBIHQ or to maintain in field office file. If copy not maintained on permanent basis, a copy should be retained in field office file.

(2) Oral information
Oral information passed must be recorded in a signed statement or FD-302.

Purpose for preserving documents and written reports is for evidence in event of prosecution, persona non grata action, expulsion, etc.

21. Oral information received from debriefing asset
Oral information received upon debriefing an asset (i.e., not necessarily pertaining to information passed) must be recorded in a signed statement or FD-302.

22. Coverage of OA meets with foreign intelligence officer, co-opted worker, or agent.
Coverage of these meets is required except when prohibited by security or other overriding factors.

a. To cross-check the OA. We must be as certain as possible that the OA is reporting details of his meets accurately.

b. To verify identification of principal or agent and to gather information about modus operandi.

c. Consider use of photography and other technological surveillance techniques to provide data for improving future CI operations or improving chances for success of official actions, e.g., prosecution, persona non grata action.

Be aware that these meets are often covered by the principal's intelligence service using photography, radio intercepts, and possible electronic surveillance.

23. Disinformation
The passage of deceptive information by an OA is a complex operation which requires detailed planning and coordination between field office and FBIHQ. This technique should be employed only in OA operations in which the foreign intelligence service has apparently accepted the bona fides of the OA, when the benefit will clearly outweigh the risk to the overall OA operation.

24. OA cover story
Be aware that a foreign intelligence principal may interrogate an OA in great detail as to how he secured his information, his family situation, his modus operandi, motivation, etc. Handling FBI SA must adequately prepare an OA for this probability. The most credible cover story is the one which involves the least fabrication.

Unless security or other considerations dictate otherwise, the OA should personally obtain the information he passes.

25. Receipt of money or property by OA
Impress upon each OA that money or property received from a foreign intelligence principal or agent must be turned over to the FBI since retention of this money would put the OA in technical violation of Federal statutes, and this money may be used as evidence or exhibit. Compensation to the OA from the FBI for his cooperation is to be handled separately. Nominal or personal gifts, necessary for the OA's security and to maintain his relationship with the principal, may be given back to the OA by his handling FBI SA, following FBIHQ approval. Consider the desirability and feasibility of obtaining a signed statement from each OA reflecting his understanding of this requirement. The obtaining of such a statement is not mandatory, but desirable.

Department attorneys have advised that, while it is not necessary to preserve that actual currency received by an OA, it is highly desirable to do so in cases in which prosecution could ensue. Whether or not the actual currency is retained, obtain a written statement from the OA describing the currency received by [type of note and issuing Federal Reserve Bank,] denomination, series number, and serial number; and also make an independent record of such currency.

The above instructions are not to be interpreted to require the impounding of funds paid to an OA by a foreign government or foreign intelligence service for goods or services rendered by the OA in legitimate, business transactions.

26. Payments to FCI assets - either OA or IA
   a. When deemed necessary and expedient, each SAC is authorized to expend up to $400 to develop FCI assets. This money may be used to pay for services and/or expenses. This authority is renewable by FBIHQ if the initial $400 has been expended. Blue slip reclaiming payments from FBIHQ need not summarize information obtained since proliferation of this information could possibly jeopardize asset's security.

23. Disinformation
The passage of deceptive information by an OA is a complex operation which requires detailed planning and coordination between field office and FBIHQ. This technique should be employed only in OA operations in which the foreign intelligence service has apparently accepted the bona fides of the OA, when the benefit will clearly outweigh the risk to the overall OA operation.

24. OA cover story
Be aware that a foreign intelligence principal may interrogate an OA in great detail as to how he secured his information, his family situation, his modus operandi, motivation, etc. Handling FBI SA must adequately prepare an OA for this probability. The most credible cover story is the one which involves the least fabrication.

Unless security or other considerations dictate otherwise, the OA should personally obtain the information he passes.

25. Receipt of money or property by OA
Impress upon each OA that money or property received from a foreign intelligence principal or agent must be turned over to the FBI since retention of this money would put the OA in technical violation of Federal statutes, and this money may be used as evidence or exhibit. Compensation to the OA from the FBI for his cooperation is to be handled separately. Nominal or personal gifts, necessary for the OA's security and to maintain his relationship with the principal, may be given back to the OA by his handling FBI SA, following FBIHQ approval. Consider the desirability and feasibility of obtaining a signed statement from each OA reflecting his understanding of this requirement. The obtaining of such a statement is not mandatory, but desirable.

Department attorneys have advised that, while it is not necessary to preserve that actual currency received by an OA, it is highly desirable to do so in cases in which prosecution could ensue. Whether or not the actual currency is retained, obtain a written statement from the OA describing the currency received by denomination, series number, and serial number; and also make an independent record of such currency.

The above instructions are not to be interpreted to require the impounding of funds paid to an OA by a foreign government or foreign intelligence service for goods or services rendered by the OA in legitimate, business transactions.

26. Payments to FCI assets - either OA or IA
   a. When deemed necessary and expedient, each SAC is authorized to expend up to $400 to develop FCI assets. This money may be used to pay for services and/or expenses. This authority is renewable by FBIHQ if the initial $400 has been expended. Blue slip reclaiming payments from FBIHQ need not summarize information obtained since proliferation of this information could possibly jeopardize asset's security.

b. FBIHQ authority
- (1) If FCI asset is of such continuing value to justify regular payments, such payments must be approved by FBIHQ.
- (2) When initially requesting regular payment, submit evaluation via coded "Nitel" in the following order:
  - (a) Amount paid to date, broken down into expenses and services
  - (b) Number of contacts with handling FBI SA since last evaluation
  - (c) Evaluation of stability and reliability
  - (d) Concise summary of most valuable information furnished since last evaluation
  - (e) Miscellaneous - changes in personal status, residence, employment, personal problems, etc., since last evaluation
  - (f) SAC recommendations for authority to pay asset for next six-month period; specify amount to be authorized for services and amount for expenses
- (3) Continuation request should be made two weeks in advance of expiration of authority.
- (4) Submit an interim request for increase in regular payments authorized via coded "Nitel," with full justification.

c. Receipts

When payments are made either on SAC authority or FBIHQ authority, obtain receipts whenever possible. If receipt cannot be obtained, set forth circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.
- (1) Receipts should be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.
- (2) Receipts should show:
  - (a) Date when payment was made
  - (b) Period for which made when asset is paid on period basis
  - (c) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services and expenses
  - (d) Name of FBI SA making payment
  - (e) Signature of asset receiving money using pseudonym assigned
- (3) Receipts are not to be witnessed.
- (4) If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by asset and not by FBI SA.
- (5) When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to FBIHQ, staple them directly to blue slip so that all information on receipt can be read without detaching it from blue slip.

27. Evaluation of FCI assets

a. OA

Whether OA is paid (under either FBIHQ or SAC authority) or unpaid, submit coded "Nitel" every six months evaluating OA according to the format of 26. b. (2). If the OA has been paid during the preceding six-month period, merely set out the amount paid during that period (under 26. b. (2) (a)).

b. FBIHQ authority

(1) If FCI asset is of such continuing value to justify regular payments, such payments must be approved by FBIHQ.

(2) When initially requesting regular payment, submit evaluation via coded "Nitel" in the following order:

- (a) Amount paid to date, broken down into expenses and services
- (b) Number of contacts with handling FBI SA since last evaluation
- (c) Evaluation of stability and reliability
- (d) Concise summary of most valuable information furnished since last evaluation
- (e) Miscellaneous - changes in personal status, residence, employment, personal problems, etc., since last evaluation
- (f) SAC recommendations for authority to pay asset for next six-month period; specify amount to be authorized for services and amount for expenses

(3) Continuation request should be made two weeks in advance of expiration of authority.

(4) Submit an interim request for increase in regular payments authorized via coded "Nitel," with full justification.

c. Receipts

When payments are made either on SAC authority or FBIHQ authority, obtain receipts whenever possible. If receipt cannot be obtained, set forth circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.

(1) Receipts should be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.

(2) Receipts should show:

- (a) Date when payment was made
- (b) Period for which made when asset is paid on period basis
- (c) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services and expenses
- (d) Name of FBI SA making payment
- (e) Signature of asset receiving money using pseudonym assigned

(3) Receipts are not to be witnessed.

(4) If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by asset and not by FBI SA.

(5) When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to FBIHQ, staple them directly to blue slip so that all information on receipt can be read without detaching it from blue slip.

27. Evaluation of FCI assets

a. OA

Whether OA is paid (under either FBIHQ or SAC authority) or unpaid, submit coded "Nitel" every six months evaluating OA according to the format of 26. b. (2). [If the OA is unpaid, submit six-month evaluation and request for continued utilization, if appropriate, on UACB basis.] If the OA has been paid during the preceding six-month period, merely set out the amount paid during that period (under 26. b. (2) (a)).

b. IA
  (1) Paid on FBIHQ authority
  Submit evaluation as instructed for OA above
  (2) Paid on SAC authority or unpaid
  Every six months submit memorandum to SAC evaluating IA according to the format of 26. b. (2).

c. Assets who are members of the military, whether IA or OA
See 5. e.

28. Income tax returns

a. Inform assets who receive compensation for their services to FBI that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.

b. FBI income should be set forth on Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to asset's position and station in life.

c. If asset is self-employed and files Schedule C as self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his FBI income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with FBI.

d. If asset cannot report payments received from FBI for services without jeopardizing his security, such payments will be subject to 20 percent withholding tax. There are three categories in which taxes will not be withheld from payments to FCI assets:
  (1) For reimbursement of expenses
  (2) Under SAC authority
  (3) To assets who have been able to report FBI income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning procedure to be followed in handling and control of money withheld.

e. When asset or former asset is considered as potential witness in FBI case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on income he received from FBI for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and submit recommendations to FBIHQ for handling situation.

29. Receipt of unemployment compensation
State law may require all applicants for unemployment compensation to list all sources of income. Payment of out-of-pocket expenses need not be listed as income when applying for unemployment compensation; however, payment for services must be listed. FBIHQ should be consulted in each case where this situation arises.

30. Monthly and quarterly letters
For these administrative details, see section 107, part I, M, of this manual.

31. Corrective action on false information

a. When it is determined that current asset or former asset has furnished false information, promptly inform FBIHQ of complete facts.

b. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing asset in future, such as "source of known unreliability" or "source who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."

c. FBIHQ will advise which designation to use; the field office will then proceed with review of all data furnished by asset and label information from him accordingly.

d. All communications containing information from asset which have been sent to FBIHQ, FBI field offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected. Corrective action should be taken by letter. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information from asset. Corrective letters should refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made. Amended pages should not be prepared unless you are so instructed by FBIHQ in accordance with instructions of part II, section 4, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

e. Instruct each field office which has made further dissemination of asset's information to follow instructions set forth above.

f. Set up control file regarding this corrective action and upon completion of same submit to FBIHQ final letter under asset's caption identifying each case by title, character, FBIHQ file number if known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent FBIHQ files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.

g. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from asset should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.

h. Occasionally, former asset through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was asset. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that former asset in absence of definite indication that he furnished unreliable information while he was asset.

i. Dissemination of information from assets of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

32. Discontinuance of assets

Advise FBIHQ under asset's symbol number caption when services of asset are discontinued.

33. Discontinued assets
   a. When services of asset are discontinued, mark name card "canceled." Destroy symbol card. Never destroy name card.
   b. Refile name card in numerical order by symbol number in symbol number index. When discontinued asset is later reactivated, remove name card from symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in name card section of FCI asset index.
   c. Inform FBIHQ of date when asset is discontinued and reason therefor, and whether or not asset is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. Inform FBIHQ according to instructions in volume II, section 19, of this manual of identity of all Security of Government Employees cases in which asset has furnished information.
   d. If the discontinued asset is a member of the U. S. Military or another U. S. Government employee, submit LHM to FBIHQ merely stating the fact of discontinuance. FBIHQ will use LHM to notify asset's headquarters.
   e. Once asset is exposed in any manner, do not carry him as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth.
   f. If a former asset furnishes information to an office other than the office which originally handled him, the new office should notify the old office of its intended use of the asset and request pertinent background information.
   g. Remove flash notice on OA's (i.e., the stop placed via FD-165 when conducting original background inquiries on OA) one year after discontinuance.

34. Classification - 134

4. Contacts by Agents
    a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where frequency of contact is dependent on circumstances, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
    b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
    c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
    d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
    e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.
    f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
    g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
    h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
    i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
    j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.
5. Checking reliability
    a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
    b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
6. Fingerprints
    a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
    b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
    c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

4. Contacts by Agents
   a. Informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
   b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
   c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
   d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
   e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication.
   f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
   g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
   h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
   i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
   j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.
5. Checking reliability
   a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
   b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
6. Fingerprints
   a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
   b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
   c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

Security Informant" shall not appear.

J. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
   Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice
   - a. Alphabetical name index
     In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, and security confidential sources. This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.
   - b. Symbol number index
     This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.
   - c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.
   - d. Index cards
     Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

     Symbol: (Informant, potential informant, or confidential source)

     File No:

     Name:

   - e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.
2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"
   - a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.
   - b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.
   - c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.
   - d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.
3. Agents' informative index
   - a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.
   - b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.
   - c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.
   - d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.
   - [e. [Deleted.]
   - f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.
   - g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.
   - h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.
   - i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

4. Contacts by Agents
    a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where frequency of contact is dependent on circumstances, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
    b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
    c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
    d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
    e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.
    f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
    g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
    h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
    i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
    j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.
5. Checking reliability
    a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
    b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
6. Fingerprints
    a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
    b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
    c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

d. Flash notice is to be placed by field with Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.

e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

7. Control - statement of cooperation

a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents to obtain maximum results and prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

b. Obtain signed statement set out below when feasible and practical. Where it is not practical to secure such signed statement from an informant or double agent, advise Bureau of complete details. SAC and Agent handling informant or double agent should determine appropriate time in informant's operation when statement should be completed.

> I, ________, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.

(Signed) ________ ___________

Witnessed: _______________

8. Execution of party questionnaires

Informants, particularly in Communist Party, often must execute party questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeoparidze their position as informants. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant.

9. Informant's activity in organizations

a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.

b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.

c. Changes in organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions are labeled as such.

d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but in such manner as to avoid suspicion.

(4) Number of statements submitted
Combine total number of oral and written statements submitted and show only total number.

(5) Stability and reliability
Check positive box if informant is considered stable and reliable. If not or if there are any personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or any other similar problems presented by informant, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(6) Indoctrination against disclosure
If informant has been indoctrinated against disclosure, check positive box.

(7) Percentage of information verified
Show percentage of information furnished by informant which has been verified through other sources.

(8) All necessary action taken on information furnished
If all action has been taken, check positive box. If not, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(9) Summary of information furnished
This summary should be concise, highlighting more pertinent information furnished by informant. Do not attempt to summarize all information furnished by informant.

(10) Miscellaneous
Furnish any change in informant's residence and employment [by secure teletype (nitel),] steps being taken to advance informant, and any other pertinent information which should be brought to Bureau's attention. Include statement that source has been advised that all payments of money made to him for services rendered must be declared as income on his tax return and has agreed to do so.

c. When payment to informant has been authorized for definite period of time, advise Bureau at least two weeks in advance of expiration of period as to whether services of informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in item 3b, above.

e. Submit letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant in duplicate except that copy should consist only of first page of letter. When payments are approved, single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at Bureau and returned. If recommendation is not approved, field will be advised by separate communication.

f. When payments are authorized by Bureau, it is personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure that full value is being received.

g. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears information being produced by informant is not commensurate with payments made to him, immediately discontinue payments or adjust accordingly and promptly advise Bureau.

h. If any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, FD-401 must be transmitted to Bureau every six months after date of designation containing same information set out in item 3b, above, except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases, comment is necessary regarding only applicable items.

5. Receipts
When payments are made either on SAC authority or prior Bureau approval, obtain receipts in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If receipt cannot be obtained for particular payment, set forth complete circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.

K. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
    a. When active investigation is initiated regarding potential informant or confidential source who is not subject of security-type file, open 134 file.
    b. If individual is subject of security case and after being interviewed appears to have potential as informant, open separate 134 file to follow informant development. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, existing file may be used if this is practical.
    c. Maintain individual files on all active informants as pending active files.
2. Monthly administrative report
    Include files on potential informants and informants in tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.
3. Assignment and tickler cards
    Maintain assignment and tickler cards, but do not show true name of informant, [potential informant, panel source or confidential source] on such cards.
4. Subfiles
    a. Subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. File in this subfile original of each statement, whether personally written by informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent. Staple executed form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items on form FD-306 to original of each such statement.
    b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
    Include excerpts from informant's statement in regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to case file in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
    See Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Correspondence
    Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption.
8. Maintenance of files
    a. Maintain all symbol number informant files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by SAC.
    b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in open files section, provided there is no disclosure of informant's identity on statements.
    c. Maintain informant files so that all information furnished by informant will be immediately available when needed.
    d. In addition, maintain these files so identities of cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be obtained immediately by simply referring to file of informant and without extensive research.

a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.

b. Receipts should clearly show:
   (1) Date on which payment was made
   (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on period basis
   (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where pertinent
   (4) Name of Agent making payment
   (5) Signature of person receiving money

c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.

d. If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by informant and not by Agent.

e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to Bureau, staple them directly to blue slip, leaving margin of one to one and one-half inches at top to avoid contact with Acco fastener punch. Place staples so that date or other data appearing on receipt will not be mutilated and all information on receipt can be easily read without detaching it from blue slip.

6. Income tax returns

a. Advise informants who receive compensation for their services to Bureau that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.

b. Bureau income should be set forth on Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

c. If informant is self-employed and files schedule C as self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with Bureau.

d. If informant cannot report payments received from Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as informant, such payments will be subject to 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning procedure to be followed in handling and control of money withheld.

e. When informant or former informant is initially considered as potential witness in Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on income he received from Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, Bureau must furnish Department set of photostats of original receipts signed by prospective witnesses. Original receipts and set of photostats will be transmitted to field office in whose territory trial will take place. Office handling prosecution must determine from Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to Bureau following information:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
[A. Definitions........ 3
[1. Security informant........ 3
[2. Potential security informant........ 3
[3. Double agent........ 3
[4. Confidential source........ 3
[5. Panel source........ 3
[B. Sources of Potential Informants........ 3
[C. Background Inquiries on Individuals Being Considered for
[Informant Purposes........ 3
[D. Approval, Indoctrination, and Development of Potential Informants........ 4
[E. Bureau Policy........ 5
[1. Development of military personnel........ 5
[2. Contacts by designated Agents........ 5
[3. Divulging information to informant........ 5
[4. Recording investigative activity........ 5
[F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Informants........ 5
[1. Caution against divulging relationship........ 5
[2. Developing additional background........ 5
[3. Indications of instability........ 5
[4. Contacts by Agents........ 6
[5. Checking reliability........ 6
[6. Fingerprints........ 6
[7. Control - statement of cooperation........ 7
[8. Execution of party questionnaires........ 7
[9. Informant's activity in organizations........ 7
[10. Transfer of informants to other areas........ 8
[11. Action by informant when uncovered........ 8
[12. Requests of informant to help defend others........ 8
[13. Preparation for testifying........ 8
[G. Informants' Information........ 8
[1. General instructions re oral and written information........ 8
[2. Recording written and oral information........ 9
[3. Transmission of information........ 10
[4. Handling of lead information........ 10
[5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants........ 10
[H. Symbols........ 11
[1. Assigning numbers........ 11
[2. Communications - use of symbols........ 11
[I. Indexing........ 11
[J. Indices........ 11
[1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index........ 11
[2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"... 12
[3. Agents' informative index........ 12
[K. Informant Files........ 13
[1. Opening........ 13
[2. Monthly administrative report........ 13
[3. Assignment and tickler cards........ 13
[4. Subfiles........ 13
[5. Channelization........ 13
[6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of........ 13
[7. Correspondence........ 13
[8. Maintenance of files........ 13
[9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re.... 14
[10. Form FD-238........ 14
[11. Bulky material submitted by informant........ 14
[L. Payments to Informants........ 14
[1. No gifts to informants........ 14
[2. SAC authority........ 14
[3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority........ 14
[4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau
[authority........ 15
[5. Receipts........ 15
[6. Income tax returns........ 16
[7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses........ 16
[8. Receipt of unemployment compensation........ 17

[2. Submit quarterly letter (FD-451b) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Quarterly letter should include the following:
   a. Name, location and number of subversive groups including identities of groups on college campuses, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   b. Symbol numbers of member informants providing coverage who are members of organizations. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.
   c. Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning subversive acts of violence, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   d. Symbol numbers of informants and sources providing coverage of individuals or groups shown in Column C. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.]

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

K. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
   a. When active investigation is initiated regarding potential informant or confidential source who is not subject of security-type file, open 134 file.
   b. If individual is subject of security case and after being interviewed appears to have potential as informant, open separate 134 file to follow informant development. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, existing file may be used if this is practical.
   c. Maintain individual files on all active informants as pending active files.
2. Monthly administrative report
   Include files on potential informants and informants in tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.
3. Assignment and tickler cards
   Maintain assignment and tickler cards, but do not show true name of informant,[potential informant, panel source or confidential source] on such cards.
4. Subfiles
   a. Subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. File in this subfile original of each statement, whether personally written by informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent. Staple executed form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items on form FD-306 to original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Include excerpts from informant's statement in regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to case file in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   See Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Correspondence
   Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption.
8. Maintenance of files
   a. Maintain all symbol number informant files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by SAC.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in open files section, provided there is no disclosure of informant's identity on statements.
   c. Maintain informant files so that all information furnished by informant will be immediately available when needed.
   d. In addition, maintain these files so identities of cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be obtained immediately by simply referring to file of informant and without extensive research.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, extremist informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, extremist informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, arrest and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must [certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate arrest and military records.

b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material
   a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.
   b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.
   c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.
   d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.
5. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   a. Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
   b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.

[2. [Deleted]

[2. Submit quarterly letter (FD-451b) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Quarterly letter should include the following:
   a. Name, location and number of subversive groups including identities of groups on college campuses, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   b. Symbol numbers of member informants providing coverage who are members of organizations. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.
   c. Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning subversive acts of violence, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   d. Symbol numbers of informants and sources providing coverage of individuals or groups shown in Column C. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.]

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a confidential source.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY 000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, extremist, and criminal informants.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by Agent as if informant were preparing them himself.

(5) Information, after being reduced to writing, should be read promptly by informant and acknowledged by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, such authentication is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) After informant authenticates statement, contacting Agent should prepare cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it. Thereafter statement should be handled as written one.

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be included in office memorandum by Agent and should not be initialed by informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information

a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants when possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such contacts. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.

b. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory. More than one informant may send statements to a post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of postal employees.

c. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under fictitious name.

d. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for extended period of time.

e. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication.

4. Handling of lead information

a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to logical conclusion.

b. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, tickler card should be prepared to follow informant and take other logical steps to obtain additional identifying data. Restrict tickler cards to information which would warrant investigation if identity established. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants

a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon informant's code name.

b. Informant should affix date he received material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, date he furnished material should be affixed.

c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material.

d. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items. See section 107K for filing instructions.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications' containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a confidential source.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY 000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, extremist, and criminal informants.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

(1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

(4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

f. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a panel source. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number, e.g., PS NY 000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information

a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.

b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.

c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass

Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority

Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:

a. Newspaper or magazine article

b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material

a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.

b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.

c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.

d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.

5. Handling money and property received by double agents

a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.

b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.

c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students

a. Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.

b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.

2. Quarterly letters

a. On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). Include following:

(1) Specific productivity

(2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus

(3) Frequency of contact

[b. Quarterly letters on all[extremist]and security informants or sources should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter:

(1) Number of informants, potential informants, and other sources active and under development at each educational institution affected

(2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

4. Contacts by Agents
    - a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where frequency of contact is dependent on circumstances, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
    - b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
    - c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
    - d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
    - e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.
    - f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
    - g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
    - h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
    - i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
    - j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.
5. Checking reliability
    - a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
    - b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
6. Fingerprints
    - a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
    - b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
    - c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

(1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

(4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

f. Symbol number may be assigned if unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY-000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information

a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.

b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.

c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass

Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority

Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:

a. Newspaper or magazine article

9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
   From time to time, Department expresses interest in using particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as witness. Place copies of all correspondence of this type in informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize information concerning each informant and place summary in appropriate file.
10. Form FD-238
    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) is used in security informant and potential security informant files in nature of table of contents or index to show where in file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as top document in informant file and is not to be serialized. If particular section of form is not applicable, note such thereon.
11. Bulky material submitted by informant
    Where informant or source submits bulky material other than statement and same pertains to specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in investigative case file, together with copy of form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum. File original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum in subfile of informant or source and note thereon file and serial number where bulky material is located.

L. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on businesslike basis.
   c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority
   a. When deemed necessary and expedient to expend money to develop individual as informant to obtain information concerning security matters which is not otherwise obtainable or to advance expense money to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments up to $400 and totaling not more than $400 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. Blue slip reclaiming payments authorized by SAC must clearly and accurately explain circumstances and summarize information obtained so Bureau will be in position to pass intelligently on such matters.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to individual who has received payments totaling $400. Once individual has been paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on regular basis, recommendation should be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis."
3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a regular basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, use form FD-401:
      (1) Membership
          List current membership and position held in any subversive group.
      (2) Amount paid for services and expenses
          List by the month or week. Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.
      (3) Number of activities and persons on whom coverage is provided
          List number and type of meetings attended and other activities and number of persons on whom informant furnishes coverage and their importance.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

4. Contacts by Agents
    a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where frequency of contact is dependent on circumstances, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
    b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
    c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
    d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
    e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.
    f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
    g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
    h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
    i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
    j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.
5. Checking reliability
    a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
    b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
6. Fingerprints
    a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
    b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
    c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

- d. Flash notice is to be placed by field with Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.
- e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

7. Control - statement of cooperation
   - a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents to obtain maximum results and prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.
   - b. Obtain signed statement set out below when feasible and practical. Where it is not practical to secure such signed statement from an informant or double agent, advise Bureau of complete details. SAC and Agent handling informant or double agent should determine appropriate time in informant's operation when statement should be completed.

> I, ________, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.

(Signed) ________ ____________

Witnessed: ________________

8. Execution of party questionnaires

   Informants, particularly in Communist Party, often must execute party questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeoparidze their position as informants. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant.

9. Informant's activity in organizations
   - a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.
   - b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.
   - c. Changes in organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions are labeled as such.
   - d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but in such manner as to avoid suspicion.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by Agent as if informant were preparing them himself.

(5) Information, after being reduced to writing, should be read promptly by informant and acknowledged by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, such authentication is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) After informant authenticates statement, contacting Agent should prepare cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it. Thereafter statement should be handled as written one.

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be included in office memorandum by Agent and should not be initialed by informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information

a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants when possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such contacts. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.

b. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory. More than one informant may send statements to a post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of postal employees.

c. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under fictitious name.

d. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for extended period of time.

e. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication.

4. Handling of lead information

a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to logical conclusion.

b. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, tickler card should be prepared to follow informant and take other logical steps to obtain additional identifying data. Restrict tickler cards to information which would warrant investigation if identity established. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants

a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon informant's code name.

b. Informant should affix date he received material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, date he furnished material should be affixed.

c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material.

d. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items. See section 107K for filing instructions.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. Symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, racial, and criminal informants.

b. Symbol number index
This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.

c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.

d. Index cards
Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

Symbol: (Informant, potential informant, or confidential source)	File No:
Name:	

e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.

2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"
   a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.
   b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.
   c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.
   d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.
3. Agents' informative index
   a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.
   b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.
   c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.
   d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.
   e. Potential informants, confidential sources, panel sources, and sources of information who do not have permanent symbols should be set forth by name.
   f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.
   g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.
   h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.
   i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

b. Symbol number index
This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.

c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.

d. Index cards
Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

Symbol: File No:
(Informant, potential
informant, or confidential
source)

Name:

e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.

2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"

a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.

b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.

c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.

d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.

3. Agents' informative index

a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.

b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.

c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.

d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.

e. Potential informants, confidential sources, panel sources, and sources of information who do not have permanent symbols should be set forth by name.

f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.

g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.

h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.

i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

14. Make every effort to prevent discontinued informant from becoming involved in situations which may prove embarrassing to informant or Government. Immediately after he testifies for first time, SAC should have serious talk with informant in presence of Agent who handled informant. This interview should be conducted in field office and informant told that:
    a. He will no longer be operated by Bureau
    b. Since he is public figure, he will probably be contacted by representatives of press, radio, and television for interviews and appearances
    c. He may be sought as witness by congressional committees, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and state authorities
    d. In connection with such interviews and appearances, informant must continue to be factual and truthful and must not build up or embellish statements, for if he does so he will wind up in serious trouble

    Advise Bureau results of such interview and comment on its possible effectiveness.

    Be alert to possibilities of former informant being contacted by representatives of publicity media and as witness by congressional committees, INS, and state authorities. SAC is responsible for knowing when former informant is scheduled or is likely to appear at hearing or make public appearance of of any kind. Prior thereto in each instance, former informant must be contacted and instructions above reiterated by Agent who handled informant. Emphasize to former informant that he must stick to truth and make certain he can back up what he says, and if there is any deviation he will be subjected to criticism, possible libel, slander, or other criminal actions. If he inquires as to whether he should appear or testify or otherwise cooperate with any public or private individual or agency, advise him he must make that decision himself, but if he has appeared as Government witness in case which has not been finally adjudicated and decides in affirmative, he should contact USA for instructions. Advise Bureau of any such situations and results of any interviews conducted.
15. When contacting Agent feels discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to Bureau, make arrangements to have former informant come to field office where he will be personally met by SAC. At that time, he should be impressed with fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to security of country and remind him that he signed agreement when he was active as informant to maintain his relation with Bureau on confidential basis. SAC should stress necessity for informant to maintain this confidence.

P. FURNISHING INFORMANTS TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)
1. INS, in order to enforce its responsibilities, must obtain evidence to prove that certain aliens, due to their membership in certain groups, are undesirable and deportable or subject to denaturalization.
2. Cooperate fully with INS in these cases and make efforts consistent with your own interests to make available information and witnesses where possible.
3. If contacted by INS inquiring for informants and you have discontinued informant or one who would be of assistance to INS and whose loss would not affect your work, furnish his identity to Bureau, together with your recommendation.
4. Bureau will review facts and advise as to whether or not his identity may be disclosed to INS.
5. Before any informant is turned over to INS, obtain his permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
[A. Definitions 3
[1. Security informant 3
[2. Potential security informant 3
[3. Double agent 3
[4. Confidential source 3
[5. Panel source 3
[B. Sources of Potential Informants 3
[C. Background Inquiries on Individuals Being Considered for Informant Purposes 3
[D. Approval, Indoctrination, and Development of Potential Informants 4
[E. Bureau Policy 5
[1. Development of military personnel 5
[2. Contacts by designated Agents 5
[3. Divulging information to informant 5
[4. Recording investigative activity 5
[F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Informants 5
[1. Caution against divulging relationship 5
[2. Developing additional background 5
[3. Indications of instability 5
[4. Contacts by Agents 6
[5. Checking reliability 6
[6. Fingerprints 6
[7. Control - statement of cooperation 7
[8. Execution of party questionnaires 7
[9. Informant's activity in organizations 7
[10. Transfer of informants to other areas 8
[11. Action by informant when uncovered 8
[12. Requests of informant to help defend others 8
[13. Preparation for testifying 8
[G. Informants' Information 8
[1. General instructions re oral and written information 8
[2. Recording written and oral information 9
[3. Transmission of information 10
[4. Handling of lead information 10
[5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 10
[H. Symbols 11
[1. Assigning numbers 11
[2. Communications - use of symbols 11
[I. Indexing 11
[J. Indices 11
[1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 11
[2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 12
[3. Agents' informative index 12
[K. Informant Files 13
[1. Opening 13
[2. Monthly administrative report 13
[3. Assignment and tickler cards 13
[4. Subfiles 13
[5. Channelization 13
[6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 13
[7. Correspondence 13
[8. Maintenance of files 13
[9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 14
[10. Form FD-238 14
[11. Bulky material submitted by informant 14
[L. Payments to Informants 14
[1. No gifts to informants 14
[2. SAC authority 14
[3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority 14
[4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 15
[5. Receipts 15
[6. Income tax returns 16
[7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 16
[8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 17

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

[M. Annual Letter.......... 17
[N. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements.......... 18
[O. Discontinued Informants.......... 19
[P. Furnishing Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service
[(INS).......... 20
[Q. Corrective Action on False Information.......... 21
[R. Confidential Sources.......... 21
[1. Definition.......... 21
[2. Assignment of symbols.......... 21
[3. Index.......... 22
[4. Files.......... 22
[5. Utilization.......... 22
[6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability
[and payments.......... 22
[7. Gifts.......... 22
[8. Discontinuance.......... 22
[S. Panel Sources.......... 22
[1. Definition.......... 22
[2. Background investigation and approval.......... 22
[3. Administrative handling.......... 23
[T. Double Agent Operations.......... 23
[1. Passage of information.......... 23
[2. Locating information to pass.......... 23
[3. Obtaining Bureau authority.......... 23
[4. Retention of copies of passed material.......... 24
[5. Handling money and property received by double agents.......... 24
[U. Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of
[Learning.......... 24
[1. Use of students.......... 24
[2. Quarterly letters.......... 24
[3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage.......... 25
[V. Classification.......... 25

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file.
5. Review armed services record if applicable.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
   a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
   b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
   c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
   d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.
   e. If potential informant is student, teacher, or has any similar relations with school, college, or university, in initial interview and subsequent handling, follow current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
3. Do not interview female potential informants in their homes or apartments unless necessary and any such interviews should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of superior in field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on circumstances, contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.

5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401) concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under section 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by Bureau.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Contacts by Agents
   - a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where frequency of contact is dependent on circumstances, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
   - b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
   - c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
   - d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
   - e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.
   - f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
   - g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
   - h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
   - i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
   - j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.

5. Checking reliability
   - a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
   - b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.

6. Fingerprints
   - a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
   - b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
   - c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

- d. Flash notice is to be placed by field with Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.
- e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

7. Control - statement of cooperation
   - a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents to obtain maximum results and prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.
   - b. Obtain signed statement set out below when feasible and practical. Where it is not practical to secure such signed statement from an informant or double agent, advise Bureau of complete details. SAC and Agent handling informant or double agent should determine appropriate time in informant's operation when statement should be completed.

> I, ________, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.

(Signed) ________ ____________

Witnessed: ________________

8. Execution of party questionnaires

   Informants, particularly in Communist Party, often must execute party questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeoparidze their position as informants. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant.

9. Informant's activity in organizations
   - a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.
   - b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.
   - c. Changes in organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions are labeled as such.
   - d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but in such manner as to avoid suspicion.

10. Transfer of informants to other areas
    a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.
    b. Keep in mind overall coverage of organizations. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, encourage him to do so in order to provide wider coverage for Bureau's work.
11. Action by informant when uncovered
    a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, instruct him to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.
    b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without facts to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse issue to point where his services may not be lost.
    c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from strict discipline of organization involved, and thus cast off suspicion.
12. Requests of informant to help defend others
    a. If requested by Communist Party, or other interested parties to assist in preparation of defense in subversive-type cases or handle assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline.
    b. Such requests should be reported immediately to contacting Agent and made matter of record.
    c. If informant cannot avoid becoming involved, instruct him not to report any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.
    d. Promptly report any such incident to Bureau.
13. Preparation for testifying
    Contacting Agent must condition informant to fact that someday knowledge he possesses may be needed as evidence in court. Psychologically prepare informant for fact that he may at future date be called upon to testify to information he has furnished on security matters. Proper indoctrination of informant is essential as Bureau must provide witnesses whenever Department initiates prosecutions in security cases.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION
1. General instructions re oral and written information
    a. These instructions apply to security informants, potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
    b. Specific instructions must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
    c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after meeting or activity.
    d. Written statements should be submitted when possible. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
    e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
    f. All information furnished by informants must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelizing and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies. When informant's statement contains references to large number of individuals and/or organizations, and exceeds two pages, consider channelizing to substantive case file only those portions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should be employed unless logical reason dictates otherwise.

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

2. Recording written and oral information

a. Written by informant

(1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.

(2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.

(3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at top of statement.

(5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement.

(6) Informants should include in statements specific dates and places; purpose of meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; and specific activity or comments of individuals present.

(7) Informant should identify statement by affixing his code name immediately under the last written line on each page. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or initials of his code name.

(8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.

(9) Informant should refer to himself in body of statement by his true name and use third person.

(10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., or place any markings whatever thereon.

(11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on channelizing memorandum containing applicable items set forth on form FD-306.

(12) Extraneous material should be kept to absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:

(a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau

(b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant

(c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

Such data should be furnished orally by informant and recorded in memorandum form for informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant

(1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with making of oral statement by informant to Agent. Leave out following items:

(a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau

(b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant

(c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

Such data should be recorded in memorandum for informant file.

(2) Prepare on paper devoid of Bureau markings or identification.

(3) Date at top with date informant furnished information. No other date is desired except date of meeting or activity described in body of statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by Agent as if informant were preparing them himself.

(5) Information, after being reduced to writing, should be read promptly by informant and acknowledged by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, such authentication is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) After informant authenticates statement, contacting Agent should prepare cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it. Thereafter statement should be handled as written one.

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be included in office memorandum by Agent and should not be initialed by informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information

a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants when possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such contacts. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.

b. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory. More than one informant may send statements to a post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of postal employees.

c. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under fictitious name.

d. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for extended period of time.

e. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication.

4. Handling of lead information

a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to logical conclusion.

b. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, tickler card should be prepared to follow informant and take other logical steps to obtain additional identifying data. Restrict tickler cards to information which would warrant investigation if identity established. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants

a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon informant's code name.

b. Informant should affix date he received material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, date he furnished material should be affixed.

c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material.

d. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items. See section 107K for filing instructions.

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
   - a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
   - b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant use of such designations.
   - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   - d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
   - e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; letters "CS" for confidential source.
   - f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to racial, etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY-000-S to NY-000-C or to NY-000-R).
2. Communications - use of symbols
   - a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
   - b. In all communications after initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
   - c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
   - d. Informants and sources entering another division
     - (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
     - (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
     - (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
   - e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not assigned, name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
   - f. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, caption of communication should also show character and country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

J. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index

   Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice
   - a. Alphabetical name index

     In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, and security confidential sources. This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.

b. Symbol number index
This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.

c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.

d. Index cards
Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

Symbol: File No:
(Informant, potential
informant, or confidential
source)

Name:

e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.

2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"

a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.

b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.

c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.

d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.

3. Agents' informative index

a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.

b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.

c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.

d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.

e. Potential informants, confidential sources, panel sources, and sources of information who do not have permanent symbols should be set forth by name.

f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.

g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.

h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.

i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

[K. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
   - a. When active investigation is initiated regarding potential informant or confidential source who is not subject of security-type file, open 134 file.
   - b. If individual is subject of security case and after being interviewed appears to have potential as informant, open separate 134 file to follow informant development. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, existing file may be used if this is practical.
   - c. Maintain individual files on all active informants as pending active files.
2. Monthly administrative report
   Include files on potential informants and informants in tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.
3. Assignment and tickler cards
   Maintain assignment and tickler cards, but do not show true name of informant on such cards.
4. Subfiles
   - a. Subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. File in this subfile original of each statement, whether personally written by informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent. Staple executed form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items on form FD-306 to original of each such statement.
   - b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Include excerpts from informant's statement in regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to case file in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   See Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Correspondence
   Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption.
8. Maintenance of files
   - a. Maintain all symbol number informant files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by SAC.
   - b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in open files section, provided there is no disclosure of informant's identity on statements.
   - c. Maintain informant files so that all information furnished by informant will be immediately available when needed.
   - d. In addition, maintain these files so identities of cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be obtained immediately by simply referring to file of informant and without extensive research.

9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
   From time to time, Department expresses interest in using particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as witness. Place copies of all correspondence of this type in informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize information concerning each informant and place summary in appropriate file.
10. Form FD-238
    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) is used in security informant and potential security informant files in nature of table of contents or index to show where in file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as top document in informant file and is not to be serialized. If particular section of form is not applicable, note such thereon.
11. Bulky material submitted by informant
    Where informant or source submits bulky material other than statement and same pertains to specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in investigative case file, together with copy of form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum. File original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum in subfile of informant or source and note thereon file and serial number where bulky material is located.

L. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS

1. No gifts to informants
   - a. Gifts should not be given to informants.
   - b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on businesslike basis.
   - c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority
   - a. When deemed necessary and expedient to expend money to develop individual as informant to obtain information concerning security matters which is not otherwise obtainable or to advance expense money to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments up to $400 and totaling not more than $400 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization.
   - b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   - c. Blue slip reclaiming payments authorized by SAC must clearly and accurately explain circumstances and summarize information obtained so Bureau will be in position to pass intelligently on such matters.
   - d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to individual who has received payments totaling $400. Once individual has been paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on regular basis, recommendation should be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis."
3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority
   - a. To pay anyone on a regular basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   - b. In requesting this authorization, use form FD-401:
     - (1) Membership
       List current membership and position held in any subversive group.
     - (2) Amount paid for services and expenses
       List by the month or week. Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.
     - (3) Number of activities and persons on whom coverage is provided
       List number and type of meetings attended and other activities and number of persons on whom informant furnishes coverage and their importance.

(4) Number of statements submitted
Combine total number of oral and written statements submitted and show only total number.

(5) Stability and reliability
Check positive box if informant is considered stable and reliable. If not or if there are any personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or any other similar problems presented by informant, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(6) Indoctrination against disclosure
If informant has been indoctrinated against disclosure, check positive box.

(7) Percentage of information verified
Show percentage of information furnished by informant which has been verified through other sources.

(8) All necessary action taken on information furnished
If all action has been taken, check positive box. If not, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(9) Summary of information furnished
This summary should be concise, highlighting more pertinent information furnished by informant. Do not attempt to summarize all information furnished by informant.

(10) Miscellaneous
Furnish any change in informant's residence and employment, steps being taken to advance informant, and any other pertinent information which should be brought to Bureau's attention. Include statement that source has been advised that all payments of money made to him for services rendered must be declared as income on his tax return and has agreed to do so.

c. When payment to informant has been authorized for definite period of time, advise Bureau at least two weeks in advance of expiration of period as to whether services of informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in item 3b, above.

e. Submit letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant in duplicate except that copy should consist only of first page of letter. When payments are approved, single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at Bureau and returned. If recommendation is not approved, field will be advised by separate communication.

f. When payments are authorized by Bureau, it is personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure that full value is being received.

g. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears information being produced by informant is not commensurate with payments made to him, immediately discontinue payments or adjust accordingly and promptly advise Bureau.

h. If any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, FD-401 must be transmitted to Bureau every six months after date of designation containing same information set out in item 3b, above, except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases, comment is necessary regarding only applicable items.

5. Receipts
When payments are made either on SAC authority or prior Bureau approval, obtain receipts in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If receipt cannot be obtained for particular payment, set forth complete circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.

a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.

b. Receipts should clearly show:
  (1) Date on which payment was made
  (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on period basis
  (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where pertinent
  (4) Name of Agent making payment
  (5) Signature of person receiving money

c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.

d. If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by informant and not by Agent.

e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to Bureau, staple them directly to blue slip, leaving margin of one to one and one-half inches at top to avoid contact with Acco fastener punch. Place staples so that date or other data appearing on receipt will not be mutilated and all information on receipt can be easily read without detaching it from blue slip.

6. Income tax returns

a. Advise informants who receive compensation for their services to Bureau that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.

b. Bureau income should be set forth on Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

c. If informant is self-employed and files schedule C as self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with Bureau.

d. If informant cannot report payments received from Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as informant, such payments will be subject to 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning procedure to be followed in handling and control of money withheld.

e. When informant or former informant is initially considered as potential witness in Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on income he received from Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, Bureau must furnish Department set of photostats of original receipts signed by prospective witnesses. Original receipts and set of photostats will be transmitted to field office in whose territory trial will take place. Office handling prosecution must determine from Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to Bureau following information:

14. Make every effort to prevent discontinued informant from becoming involved in situations which may prove embarrassing to informant or Government. Immediately after he testifies for first time, SAC should have serious talk with informant in presence of Agent who handled informant. This interview should be conducted in field office and informant told that:
    a. He will no longer be operated by Bureau
    b. Since he is public figure, he will probably be contacted by representatives of press, radio, and television for interviews and appearances
    c. He may be sought as witness by congressional committees, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and state authorities
    d. In connection with such interviews and appearances, informant must continue to be factual and truthful and must not build up or embellish statements, for if he does so he will wind up in serious trouble

    Advise Bureau results of such interview and comment on its possible effectiveness.

    Be alert to possibilities of former informant being contacted by representatives of publicity media and as witness by congressional committees, INS, and state authorities. SAC is responsible for knowing when former informant is scheduled or is likely to appear at hearing or make public appearance of of any kind. Prior thereto in each instance, former informant must be contacted and instructions above reiterated by Agent who handled informant. Emphasize to former informant that he must stick to truth and make certain he can back up what he says, and if there is any deviation he will be subjected to criticism, possible libel, slander, or other criminal actions. If he inquires as to whether he should appear or testify or otherwise cooperate with any public or private individual or agency, advise him he must make that decision himself, but if he has appeared as Government witness in case which has not been finally adjudicated and decides in affirmative, he should contact USA for instructions. Advise Bureau of any such situations and results of any interviews conducted.

15. When contacting Agent feels discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to Bureau, make arrangements to have former informant come to field office where he will be personally met by SAC. At that time, he should be impressed with fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to security of country and remind him that he signed agreement when he was active as informant to maintain his relation with Bureau on confidential basis. SAC should stress necessity for informant to maintain this confidence.

P. FURNISHING INFORMANTS TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

1. INS, in order to enforce its responsibilities, must obtain evidence to prove that certain aliens, due to their membership in certain groups, are undesirable and deportable or subject to denaturalization.
2. Cooperate fully with INS in these cases and make efforts consistent with your own interests to make available information and witnesses where possible.
3. If contacted by INS inquiring for informants and you have discontinued informant or one who would be of assistance to INS and whose loss would not affect your work, furnish his identity to Bureau, together with your recommendation.
4. Bureau will review facts and advise as to whether or not his identity may be disclosed to INS.
5. Before any informant is turned over to INS, obtain his permission.

O. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When services of informant are discontinued, mark name card "cancelled." Destroy symbol card. Never destroy name card.
2. Refile name card in numerical order by symbol number in symbol number index. If discontinued informant, potential informant, or confidential source to whom symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove name card from symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in name card section of index.
3. When potential informant or confidential source is discontinued and permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy alphabetical index card.
4. Advise Bureau of date when potential informant or informant is discontinued and reason therefor. Advise Bureau as to whether or not informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. Identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which informant has furnished information must be ascertained and Bureau advised in compliance with section 19, volume II, of this manual.
5. Review informant's file to determine if correspondence between Bureau and field relating to Department's interest in using informant as witness is contained therein. In those cases in which Department has indicated desire to consider informant when he becomes available, advise Bureau in each such substantive case, except when it is obvious statute of limitations has run or case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When above action is completed, advise Bureau.
6. Statement shall also be made to effect that measures to control informants, set out in item 7, below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears such are warranted.
7. When services of informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that informant will look to Bureau for counsel prior to taking any action against Bureau's best interests. Determine whether he has plans for writing book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, impress him with desirability of coming to Bureau for assistance and guidance. If informant insists on engaging in such activities, Bureau will consider placing him in contact with reliable publisher, but it must be made clear to informant that Bureau will not sponsor or endorse any book or publication which he elects to write.
8. All payments to discontinued informants and confidential sources must be made on strict c.o.d. basis. Obtain Bureau authority before making such payments. Submit complete details as to information furnished by discontinued informant or source in past and what is to be expected of informant or source in future.
9. Once informant is exposed in any manner whatsoever, do not carry him as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth, together with descriptive data.
10. When office receives information concerning, or obtains information from, an ex-informant, copies of memoranda prepared must be furnished to office which originally handled informant so that file will be as complete as possible.
11. When informant has been discontinued for cause, such as unreliability, do not contact him in future for information. If he furnishes information it should be accepted, but in setting out information in reports or communications use individual's true name, together with appropriate description of his reliability.
12. Remove flash notice.
13. Avoid repeated use of discontinued informant as witness at security trials and hearings. Make all-out effort to develop witnesses who can furnish same testimony. Advise Bureau of any indication by Government attorneys that informant-witness who has previously testified will be called upon for testimony at subsequent trial or hearing and furnish comments concerning possibility of supplanting testimony of individual involved. Submit under appropriate case character.

(1) Correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) First date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) Date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.

d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

M. ANNUAL LETTER

1. Submit annual letter to Bureau including following:

a. Symbol numbers of all informants and confidential sources being paid under Bureau authority (not SAC authority) for services or expenses. If confidential source has no symbol number, list name.

b. Symbol numbers of all informants not paid under Bureau authority

c. Comment concerning present informant coverage of office, together with information concerning actions being taken to improve coverage

d. List under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit show approximate membership and symbol numbers and positions of informants affording coverage. Where no informant coverage exists or is provided by sources who are not members, so indicate.

Include any additional pertinent information that may be helpful in overall evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally used and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

2. Listed below are dates annual letters are to be submitted by respective offices:

Office	Dates
Albany, Albuquerque, Alexandria, Anchorage	January 15
Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham	January 31
Boston, Buffalo, Butte	February 15
Charlotte	February 28
Chicago	January 31
Cincinnati, Cleveland	February 28
Columbia, Dallas, Denver	March 15
Detroit, El Paso	March 31
Honolulu, Houston	April 15
Indianapolis, Jackson	April 30
Jacksonville, Kansas City	May 15
Knoxville, Las Vegas	May 31
Little Rock	June 15
Los Angeles	February 28
Louisville	June 15
Memphis, Miami	June 30
Milwaukee	March 31
Minneapolis	April 30
Mobile	July 15
Newark	May 31
New Haven	July 15
New Orleans	July 31
New York	September 30
Norfolk	July 31
Oklahoma City, Omaha	August 15
Philadelphia, Phoenix	August 31
Pittsburgh, Portland	September 15
Richmond, Sacramento	September 30
St. Louis, Salt Lake City	October 15
San Antonio, San Diego, San Francisco	October 31
San Juan, Savannah, Seattle	November 15
Springfield, Tampa, Washington, D. C.	November 30

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

O. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When services of informant are discontinued, mark name card "cancelled." Destroy symbol card. Never destroy name card.
2. Refile name card in numerical order by symbol number in symbol number index. If discontinued informant, potential informant, or confidential source to whom symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove name card from symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in name card section of index.
3. When potential informant or confidential source is discontinued and permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy alphabetical index card.
4. Advise Bureau of date when potential informant or informant is discontinued and reason therefor. Advise Bureau as to whether or not informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. Identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which informant has furnished information must be ascertained and Bureau advised in compliance with section 19, volume II, of this manual.
5. Review informant's file to determine if correspondence between Bureau and field relating to Department's interest in using informant as witness is contained therein. In those cases in which Department has indicated desire to consider informant when he becomes available, advise Bureau in each such substantive case, except when it is obvious statute of limitations has run or case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When above action is completed, advise Bureau.
6. Statement shall also be made to effect that measures to control informants, set out in item 7, below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears such are warranted.
7. When services of informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that informant will look to Bureau for counsel prior to taking any action against Bureau's best interests. Determine whether he has plans for writing book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, impress him with desirability of coming to Bureau for assistance and guidance. If informant insists on engaging in such activities, Bureau will consider placing him in contact with reliable publisher, but it must be made clear to informant that Bureau will not sponsor or endorse any book or publication which he elects to write.
8. All payments to discontinued informants and confidential sources must be made on strict c.o.d. basis. Obtain Bureau authority before making such payments. Submit complete details as to information furnished by discontinued informant or source in past and what is to be expected of informant or source in future.
9. Once informant is exposed in any manner whatsoever, do not carry him as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth, together with descriptive data.
10. When office receives information concerning, or obtains information from, an ex-informant, copies of memoranda prepared must be furnished to office which originally handled informant so that file will be as complete as possible.
11. When informant has been discontinued for cause, such as unreliability, do not contact him in future for information. If he furnishes information it should be accepted, but in setting out information in reports or communications use individual's true name, together with appropriate description of his reliability.
12. Remove flash notice.
13. Avoid repeated use of discontinued informant as witness at security trials and hearings. Make all-out effort to develop witnesses who can furnish same testimony. Advise Bureau of any indication by Government attorneys that informant-witness who has previously testified will be called upon for testimony at subsequent trial or hearing and furnish comments concerning possibility of supplanting testimony of individual involved. Submit under appropriate case character.

14. Make every effort to prevent discontinued informant from becoming involved in situations which may prove embarrassing to informant or Government. Immediately after he testifies for first time, SAC should have serious talk with informant in presence of Agent who handled informant. This interview should be conducted in field office and informant told that:
    a. He will no longer be operated by Bureau
    b. Since he is public figure, he will probably be contacted by representatives of press, radio, and television for interviews and appearances
    c. He may be sought as witness by congressional committees, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and state authorities
    d. In connection with such interviews and appearances, informant must continue to be factual and truthful and must not build up or embellish statements, for if he does so he will wind up in serious trouble

    Advise Bureau results of such interview and comment on its possible effectiveness.

    Be alert to possibilities of former informant being contacted by representatives of publicity media and as witness by congressional committees, INS, and state authorities. SAC is responsible for knowing when former informant is scheduled or is likely to appear at hearing or make public appearance of of any kind. Prior thereto in each instance, former informant must be contacted and instructions above reiterated by Agent who handled informant. Emphasize to former informant that he must stick to truth and make certain he can back up what he says, and if there is any deviation he will be subjected to criticism, possible libel, slander, or other criminal actions. If he inquires as to whether he should appear or testify or otherwise cooperate with any public or private individual or agency, advise him he must make that decision himself, but if he has appeared as Government witness in case which has not been finally adjudicated and decides in affirmative, he should contact USA for instructions. Advise Bureau of any such situations and results of any interviews conducted.

15. When contacting Agent feels discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to Bureau, make arrangements to have former informant come to field office where he will be personally met by SAC. At that time, he should be impressed with fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to security of country and remind him that he signed agreement when he was active as informant to maintain his relation with Bureau on confidential basis. SAC should stress necessity for informant to maintain this confidence.

P. FURNISHING INFORMANTS TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

1. INS, in order to enforce its responsibilities, must obtain evidence to prove that certain aliens, due to their membership in certain groups, are undesirable and deportable or subject to denaturalization.
2. Cooperate fully with INS in these cases and make efforts consistent with your own interests to make available information and witnesses where possible.
3. If contacted by INS inquiring for informants and you have discontinued informant or one who would be of assistance to INS and whose loss would not affect your work, furnish his identity to Bureau, together with your recommendation.
4. Bureau will review facts and advise as to whether or not his identity may be disclosed to INS.
5. Before any informant is turned over to INS, obtain his permission.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. Symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   - d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, racial, and criminal informants.

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, racial informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, racial informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must dictate memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

[S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

(1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

(4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

f. Symbol number may be assigned if unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY-000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information

a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.

b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.

c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass

Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority

Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:

a. Newspaper or magazine article

b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material
   a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.
   b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.
   c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.
   d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.
5. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   a. Students under age of 21 years are not to be developed as security informants or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
   b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.
2. Quarterly letters
   a. On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). Include following:
      (1) Specific productivity
      (2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus
      (3) Frequency of contact
   b. Quarterly letters on all racial and security informants or sources should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter:
      (1) Number of informants, potential informants, and other sources active and under development at each educational institution affected
      (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources

[3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage
[Each office must have continuous and well-planned program to obtain
[necessary coverage at institutions of learning so that Bureau can fulfill
[its obligations. Care with which this must be done in no way lessens
[responsibility of each field office to have proper coverage.
[
[V. CLASSIFICATION - 134

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
A. Definitions.......... 3
  1. Security informant.......... 3
  2. Potential security informant.......... 3
  3. Double agent.......... 3
  4. Confidential source.......... 3
  5. Panel source.......... 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants.......... 3
C. Interviews with and Development of Background on Individuals Being Considered for Informant Purposes.......... 4
D. Approval, Indoctrination, Development, and Control of Potential Security Informants.......... 5
E. Bureau Policy.......... 6
  1. Development of military personnel.......... 6
  2. Contacts by designated Agents.......... 6
  3. Divulging information to informant.......... 6
  4. Recording investigative activity.......... 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants.......... 7
  1. Caution against divulging relationship.......... 7
  2. Developing additional background.......... 7
  3. Handling indications of instability.......... 7
  4. Contacts by Agents.......... 7
    Form FD-209.......... 8
  5. Checking reliability.......... 8
  6. Fingerprints.......... 8
  7. Control - statement of cooperation.......... 8
  8. Execution of party questionnaires.......... 9
  9. Informant's activity in organizations.......... 9
  10. Transfer of informant to other areas.......... 9
  11. Action by informant when uncovered.......... 9
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others.......... 10
  13. Preparation for testifying.......... 10
G. Informants' Information.......... 10a
  1. General instructions re oral and written information.......... 10a
  2. Recording written and oral information.......... 10a
  3. Transmission of information.......... 12
  4. Handling of lead information.......... 12
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants.......... 12
H. Passing Information in Double Agent Operations.......... 13
  1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition.......... 13
  2. Locating information to pass.......... 13
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority.......... 13
  4. Retention of copies of passed material.......... 13
I. Symbols.......... 13a
  1. Assigning numbers.......... 13a
  2. Communications - use of symbols.......... 14
J. Indexing.......... 14
K. Indices.......... 14
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index.......... 14
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"..... 15
  3. Agents' informative index.......... 15
  4. Currency and security.......... 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

L. Index Cards 15
M. Informant Files 16
  1. Opening 16
  2. Monthly administrative report 16
  3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
  4. Subfiles 17
  5. Channelization 17
  6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 17
  7. Dissemination of information 17
  8. Correspondence 17
  9. Maintenance of files 17
  10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
  11. Form FD-238 17
  12. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
  1. No gifts to informants 18
  2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
  3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
  4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 20
  5. Receipts 20
  6. Income tax returns 20
  7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
  8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
  9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
O. Annual Letter 22
P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
Q. Discontinued Informants 24
R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 26
S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
T. Classification 27
U. Confidential Sources 27
  1. Definition 27
  2. Assignment of symbols 27
  3. Index 27
  4. Files 27
  5. Utilization 28
  6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 28
  7. Gifts 28
  8. Discontinuance 28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
L. Index Cards 16
M. Informant Files 16
  1. Opening 16
  2. Monthly administrative report 16
  3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
  4. Subfiles 17
  5. Channelization 17
  6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 17
  7. Dissemination of information 17
  8. Correspondence 17
  9. Maintenance of files 17
  10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
  11. Form FD-238 17
  12. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
  1. No gifts to informants 18
  2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
  3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
  4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 20
  5. Receipts 20
  6. Income tax returns 20
  7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
  8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
  9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
O. Annual Letter 22
P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
Q. Discontinued Informants 24
R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 26
S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
T. Confidential Sources 27
  1. Definition 27
  2. Assignment of symbols 27
  3. Index 27
  4. Files 27
  5. Utilization 28
  6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 28
  7. Gifts 28
  8. Discontinuance 28
U. Panel Sources 29
  1. Definition 29
  2. Background investigation and approval 29
  3. Administrative handling 29
V. Classification 29

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant

   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security[or intelligence]matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal, that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value;[or furnish pertinent foreign intelligence data of value on a regular basis.]

2. Potential security informant

   Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith,[or is in a position to secure pertinent foreign intelligence data,]and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.

3. Double agent

   A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.

4. Confidential source

   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. As assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. in behalf of foreign principal, that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value; or furnish pertinent foreign intelligence data of value on a regular basis.

2. Potential security informant
Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. in behalf of foreign principal or can be so closely associated therewith, or is in a position to secure pertinent foreign intelligence data, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.

3. Double agent
A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.

4. Confidential source
An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

[[5. Panel source
[An individual who is not involved in a subversive group but who will attend
[its public gatherings in behalf of the FBI for intelligence purposes or
[as a potential witness]

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS
Information should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

C. INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When a decision is made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted, however, until the individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, and section 10[illegible], item 6b, (9), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the individual is known to them
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the individual can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by the investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an[FD-165]form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain any record he may have[and to place a stop against his fingerprints if they are on file.]
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and defecto program, section 105K, 6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered.
9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.
10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate an individual as a potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONTROL OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as a Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with his development. Do not submit on a UACB basis. Include a physical description.

[[2.] After designation as a Bureau-approved potential security informant, the following matters should be made clear to him:
   a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
   b. He is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
   c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain the confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has a special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individuals, this should be ascertained and an appropriate recommendation made to the Bureau. The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau and you will be advised accordingly.
   d. If the potential informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements.
   e. If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has a similar relations with a school, college, or university, in the initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.

[[3.] Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau.

[[4.] Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.

[[5.] Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every [six] months. Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain
[informative summary of information furnished during past [six] months, and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These letters should follow the form indicated under section 107N, 3b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation.

[[6.] Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.

[[7.] During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities discontinue efforts.

[[8.] During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.

[[9.] From the first interview with a potential informant through his development and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant.

[[10.] When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
No information should be divulged to a potential informant or an informant concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.

h. Any arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in the minds of either the Agent or informant as to the methods of payment, amount, place, and time.

i. Informants should be instructed to use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants the[nonpublished]office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.

j. Positive information received from informant should be the subject of a written statement by informant or a memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in the informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.

k. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.

l. The dates of negative contacts and file numbers of the cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where a file has more than one subject, the name of the subject under inquiry should also be noted. Do not set forth title of the case involved on the form.

m. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.

n. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and former should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent in absence of Agent to whom informant is assigned.

5. Checking reliability

a. Reliability of informants must be constantly checked.

b. Consideration should be given to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.

c. Checks on reliability must be constantly reviewed during time informant is active.

6. Fingerprints

a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to the contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.

b. If informant refuses, do not force the issue.

c. Informant's fingerprints, when obtained, should be forwarded as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258. This card should be properly executed showing subject's complete description, including date and place of birth. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

d. A flash notice is to be placed by the field in the files of the Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.

e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year following discontinuance. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

7. Control - statement of cooperation

a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents in order to obtain maximum results in security cases and to prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION

1. General instructions re oral and written information
   a. Instructions regarding preparation, submission, and handling of information received from informants apply not only to security informants but also to potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
   b. Specific instructions and guidance must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
   c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after a meeting or activity.
   d. Written statements should be submitted whenever possible, but if such cannot be done information may be provided orally. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
   e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
   f. All information furnished by informants orally or in writing must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for[channelization]and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies.
   g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise the trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. The trial attorney will thus be prepared in the event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.
   h. See subsection M for instructions regarding filing informant statements.
2. Recording written and oral information
   a. Written by informant
      (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
      (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
      (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
      (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at the top of it.
      (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or each separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement whether the information is of evidentiary or intelligence value.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION

1. General instructions re oral and written information
   - a. Instructions regarding preparation, submission, and handling of information received from informants apply not only to security informants but also to potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
   - b. Specific instructions and guidance must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
   - c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after a meeting or activity.
   - d. Written statements should be submitted whenever possible, but if such cannot be done information may be provided orally. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
   - e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
   - f. All information furnished by informants orally or in writing must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies. [In those instances in which informant's statement contains references to a large number of individuals and/or organizations, and statement exceeds two pages in length, consideration should be given to channelizing to a substantive case file only those portions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire informant's statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should save filing space, time of reviewing files, and should be employed unless a logical reason dictates otherwise.]
   - g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testmony.
   - h. See subsection M for instructions regarding filing informant statements.
2. Recording written and oral information
   - a. Written by informant
     - (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
     - (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
     - (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
     - (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at the top of it.
     - (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or each separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement whether the information is of evidentiary or intelligence value.

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. Channelization

Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."

6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.

7. Dissemination of information

Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.

8. Correspondence

Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

9. Maintenance of files
   a. All symbol number informant]files,[pending and closed,]shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, field supervisor,[or responsible employee designated by the SAC.]
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re

From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

11. Form FD-238

Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. Channelization
   Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for [channelization] and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies.

6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.

7. Dissemination of information
   Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.

8. Correspondence
   Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

9. Maintenance of files
   a. All symbol number informant files, pending and closed, shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by the SAC.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
   From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

11. Form FD-238
   Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

12. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
   a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to [$400] and totaling not more than [$400] on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling [$400.]
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
      (1) Recommendation
      (Use following wording as nearly as possible:
      "I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months, effective ___(date).")

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

12. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
    a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
    b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
    c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
[[For instructions regarding payments under SAC authority, refer to section
[130G, item 1, of this manual since comparable instructions apply to security
[informants and sources as those set forth for racial informants and sources.]
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
    a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
[b. In requesting [authorization for payments, a justification must be fur-
[nished Bureau. For this purpose, use form FD-401 and execute in accord-
[ance with instructions for racial informants and sources contained in
[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual. Justification for payments,
[of course, is based on activity of informant, potential informant, or
[source in matters having primarily a security rather than racial in-
[terest. In espionage and foreign nationality matters use subheadings,
[where applicable.]

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

12. Bulky material submitted by informant
    Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
    a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
    b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
    c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
    [For instructions regarding payments under SAC authority, refer to section [130H,]item 1, of this manual since comparable instructions apply to security informants and sources as those set forth for racial informants and sources.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
    a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
    b. In requesting authorization for payments, a justification must be furnished Bureau. For this purpose, use form FD-401 and execute in accordance with instructions for racial informants and sources contained in [section[130H,]item 2b, of this manual. Justification for payments, of course, is based on activity of informant, potential informant, or source in matters having primarily a security rather than racial interest. In espionage and foreign nationality matters use subheadings, where applicable.

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")

(3) Current membership and position held in subversive organizations

(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period. [Information and/or services available only from the informant must be specifically identified. (If there is none, a statement to that effect should be set out.)]

(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month (Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)

(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity

(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted (List separately.)

(8) Information furnished of unusual value

(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance

(10) Steps being taken to advance informant

(11) Stability and reliability (Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)

(12) Indoctrination against disclosure (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)

(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished

(14) Miscellaneous (Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every[six]months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

[d. Every six months a letter of justification[(FD-401)]should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow[instructions set forth in section 130G, item 2b, of this manual.]

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in section [130H,] item 2b, of this manual.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

[4. [Six-month]evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communi-
[cation must be transmitted to the Bureau every[six]months after the
date of designation containing the same information set out above in
subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation
of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB.
In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding
only those applicable items in subsection 3b.

5. Receipts

When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.

a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.

b. Receipts should clearly show:
   (1) Date on which payment was made
   (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
   (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
   (4) Name of Agent making payment
   (5) Signature of person receiving the money

c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.

d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.

e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns

a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.

b. Bureau income should be set forth on the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.

d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication[(FD-401)]must be transmitted to the Bureau every six months after the date of designation containing the same information set out in[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual]except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual.]

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
   e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Bureau income should be set forth on the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.
   c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.
   d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication (FD-401) must be transmitted to the Bureau every six months after the date of designation containing the same information set out in section
[[130H,]item 2b, of this manual except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is
[necessary regarding only those applicable items in section[130H,]item 2b, of this manual.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
   e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Bureau income should be set forth on the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.
   c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.
   d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.

b. Whenever a p[illegible] informant and/or source beco[illegible] unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

9. Handling money and property received by double agents

a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.

b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name.

c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.

[0. [ANNUAL]LETTER

[[Annual]letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid under Bureau authority (not SAC authority) for services or expenses. If the confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all security informants not paid under Bureau authority.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. [As a separate section of the[annual]letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

[[Annual]letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in overall evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

5. Listed below are a[illegible] of the Bureau offices and the dates[annual] letters should be submitted:

Office	Dates
[Albany	January 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	January 31
Baltimore	" "
Birmingham	" "
Boston	February 15
Buffalo	" "
Butte	" "
Charlotte	February 28
Chicago	January 31
Cincinnati	February 28
Cleveland	" "
Columbia	March 15
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	March 31
El Paso	" "
Honolulu	April 15
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	April 30
Jackson	" "
Jacksonville	May 15
Kansas City	" "
Knoxville	May 31
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	June 15
Los Angeles	February 28
Louisville	June 15
Memphis	June 30
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	March 31
Minneapolis	April 30
Mobile	July 15
Newark	May 31
New Haven	July 15
New Orleans	July 31
New York	September 30
Norfolk	July 31
Oklahoma City	August 15
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	August 31
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	September 15
Portland	" "
Richmond	September 30
Sacramento	" "
St. Louis	October 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	October 31
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	November 15
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	November 30
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "]

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates annual letters should be submitted:

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15
Albuquerque	" "
[[Alexandria	" "]
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	January 31
Baltimore	" "
Birmingham	" "
Boston	February 15
Buffalo	" "
Butte	" "
Charlotte	February 28
Chicago	January 31
Cincinnati	February 28
Cleveland	" "
Columbia	March 15
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	March 31
El Paso	" "
Honolulu	April 15
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	April 30
Jackson	" "
Jacksonville	May 15
Kansas City	" "
Knoxville	May 31
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	June 15
Los Angeles	February 28
Louisville	June 15
Memphis	June 30
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	March 31
Minneapolis	April 30
Mobile	July 15
Newark	May 31
New Haven	July 15
New Orleans	July 31
New York	September 30
Norfolk	July 31
Oklahoma City	August 15
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	August 31
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	September 15
Portland	" "
Richmond	September 30
Sacramento	" "
St. Louis	October 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	October 31
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	November 15
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	November 30
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau of the date when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section[19,]volume[II,]of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Columbia	" "
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jackson	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
[Sacramento]	June 15 and December 15
St. Louis	" "
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

[5. Listed below are [illegible]l of the Bureau offices and th[illegible]ates[annual]
[letters should be submitted:

Office	Dates
[Albany	January 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	January 31
Baltimore	" "
Birmingham	" "
Boston	February 15
Buffalo	" "
Butte	" "
Charlotte	February 28
Chicago	January 31
Cincinnati	February 28
Cleveland	" "
Columbia	March 15
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	March 31
El Paso	" "
Honolulu	April 15
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	April 30
Jackson	" "
Jacksonville	May 15
Kansas City	" "
Knoxville	May 31
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	June 15
Los Angeles	February 28
Louisville	June 15
Memphis	June 30
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	March 31
Minneapolis	April 30
Mobile	July 15
Newark	May 31
New Haven	July 15
New Orleans	July 31
New York	September 30
Norfolk	July 31
Oklahoma City	August 15
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	August 31
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	September 15
Portland	" "
Richmond	September 30
Sacramento	" "
St. Louis	October 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	October 31
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	November 15
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	November 30
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "]

[illegible] each area [illegible] ed Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.

[illegible] set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon [illegible]letion of same submit to the Bureau a [illegible] letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, [illegible] known, and date of communication.

10. The letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

[T.] CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential sources; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files

   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N,[item]3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization[or if he is not an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization]and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   [c. If the security confidential source is employed by a foreign diplomatic establishment (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by an international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau every four months. See 107N,[item]3b, for form of letter.]
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of the date when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every[six]months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N, item 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   c. If the security confidential source is employed by a foreign diplomatic establishment (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by an international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau every[six]months. See 107N, item 3b, for form of letter.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of the date when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N, item 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   c. If the security confidential source is employed by a foreign diplomatic establishment (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by an international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau every six months. See 107N, item 3b, for form of letter.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of the date when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments

[a. Every six months a letter of justification[(FD-401)]should be sub-
mitted to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security
[confidential sources. See[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual]
for form of letter.

   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

   c. If the security confidential source is employed by a foreign diplomatic establishment (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by an international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary
[Fund, etc.), a letter of justification[(FD-401)]should be submitted
[to Bureau every six months. See[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual]
for form of letter.

7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of the date when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See section[130H,]item 2b, of this manual for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   c. If the security confidential source is employed by a foreign diplomatic establishment (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by an international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), a letter of justification (FD-401)]should be submitted to Bureau every six months. See section[130H,]item 2b, of this manual for form of letter.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of the date when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

[U. PANEL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.

2. Background investigation and approval
   - a. Check prospective panelists through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.
   - b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with a prospective panelist to ascertain person's cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
   - c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out following information:
     - (1) Results of required background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses
     - (2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as a panel source, together with results of any interviews conducted with him
     - (3) A statement to effect subject is being considered a panel source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union or educational institution he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.
   - d. One of required copies of letter requesting authority to use a subject as a panel source should consist only of first page of letter. If request is approved at Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a panel source.

3. Administrative handling
   - a. Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants.
   - b. Payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered should be handled in same manner as payments to security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
   - c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panelist is initiated. After Bureau has approved a panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.
   - d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.
   - e. Every six months submit letter of justification to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section 107N, item 3b, of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   - f. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY 000-S.
   - g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel sources and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization contacts, security informants, and publications.
   - h. Advise Bureau of the date when panel source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.]

[V.] CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. PANEL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panelists through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.
   b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with a prospective panelist to ascertain person's cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
   c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out following information:
      (1) Results of required background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses
      (2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as a panel source, together with results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to effect subject is being considered a panel source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union or educational institution he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.
   d. One of required copies of letter requesting authority to use a subject as a panel source should consist only of first page of letter. If request is approved at Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a panel source.
3. Administrative handling
   a. Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants.
   b. Payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered should be handled in same manner as payments to security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
   c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panelist is initiated. After Bureau has approved a panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.
   d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.
   e. Every six months submit letter of justification[(FD-401)]to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section [130G, item 2b,]of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   f. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY 000-S.
   g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel sources and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization cases, security informants, and publications.
   h. Advise Bureau of the date when panel source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

V. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panelists through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.
   b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with a prospective panelist to ascertain person's cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
   c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out following information:
      (1) Results of required background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses
      (2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as a panel source, together with results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to effect subject is being considered a panel source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union or educational institution he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.
   d. One of required copies of letter requesting authority to use a subject as a panel source should consist only of first page of letter. If request is approved at Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a panel source.
3. Administrative handling
   a. Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants.
   b. Payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered should be handled in same manner as payments to security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
   c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panelist is initiated. After Bureau has approved a panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.
   d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.
   e. Every six months submit letter of justification (FD-401) to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section 130G, item 2b, of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   f. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY 000-S.
   g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel sources and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization cases, security informants, and publications.
   h. Advise Bureau of the date when panel source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

U. PANEL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   - a. Check prospective panelists through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.
   - b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with a prospective panelist to ascertain person's cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
   - c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out following information:
     - (1) Results of required background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses
     - (2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as a panel source, together with results of any interviews conducted with him
     - (3) A statement to effect subject is being considered a panel source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union or educational institution he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.
   - d. One of required copies of letter requesting authority to use a subject as a panel source should consist only of first page of letter. If request is approved at Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a panel source.
3. Administrative handling
   - a. Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants.
   - b. Payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered should be handled in same manner as payments to security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
   - c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panelist is initiated. After Bureau has approved a panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.
   - d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.
   - e. Every six months submit letter of justification (FD-401) to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section [130H,]item 2b, of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   - f. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY 000-S.
   - g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel sources and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization cases, security informants, and publications.
   - h. Advise Bureau of the date when panel source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

[V. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   a. Students under age of 21 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.

   b. Upon initial contact with a potential student security informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands that FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities. Taking this statement should place Bureau in a position to refute possible subsequent false allegations as to nature and purpose of source's cooperation with FBI.
2. Quarterly letters
   a. Beginning 1-1-70, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as a security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). (Quarterly letters are not to take place of or be combined with six months' payment justification letters.) Include following in quarterly letters:
      (1) Specific productivity
      (2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus
      (3) Frequency of contact

   b. Quarterly letters of security and racial informants should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter concerning security sources:
      (1) Number of security informants, potential security informants, and other security sources active and under development at each educational institution affected
      (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources
3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage
   Each office must have a continuous and well-planned program to obtain necessary coverage at institutions of learning so that Bureau can fulfill its obligations. Care with which this must be done in no way lessens responsibility of each individual field office to have proper coverage.

[W.] CLASSIFICATION - 134

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in section [130H,] item 2b, of this manual.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. Channelization
Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for [channelization] and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies.

6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.

7. Dissemination of information
Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.

8. Correspondence
Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

9. Maintenance of files
   a. All symbol number informant files, pending and closed, shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by the SAC.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

11. Form FD-238
Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
   If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication[(FD-401)]must be transmitted to the Bureau every six months after the date of designation containing the same information set out in[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual]except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual.]
5. Receipts
   When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
   e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.
6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Bureau income should be set forth on the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.
   c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.
   d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

[T.] CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   - d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   - a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   - b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   - c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files

   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

[V. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
    - a. Students under age of 21 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
    - b. Upon initial contact with a potential student security informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands that FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities. Taking this statement should place Bureau in a position to refute possible subsequent false allegations as to nature and purpose of source's cooperation with FBI.
2. Quarterly letters
    - a. Beginning 1-1-70, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as a security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). (Quarterly letters are not to take place of or be combined with six months' payment justification letters.) Include following in quarterly letters:
        - (1) Specific productivity
        - (2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus
        - (3) Frequency of contact
    - b. Quarterly letters of security and racial informants should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter concerning security sources:
        - (1) Number of security informants, potential security informants, and other security sources active and under development at each educational institution affected
        - (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources
3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage

    Each office must have a continuous and well-planned program to obtain necessary coverage at institutions of learning so that Bureau can fulfill its obligations. Care with which this must be done in no way lessens responsibility of each individual field office to have proper coverage.

[W.] CLASSIFICATION - 134

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. Channelization
Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for [channelization]and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies.

6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.

7. Dissemination of information
Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.

8. Correspondence
Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

9. Maintenance of files
   a. All symbol number informant files, pending and closed, shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by the SAC.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

11. Form FD-238
Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

[T.] CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   - d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   - a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   - b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   - c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files

   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K, 6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

C. INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When a decision is made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted, however, until the individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, and section 105K, item 6b, (9), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the individual is known to them
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the individual can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by the investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an [FD-165] form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain any record he may have [and to place a stop against his fingerprints if they are on file.]
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

Subfiles

a. Subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.

b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. Channelization

Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for [channelization]and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies.

6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.

7. Dissemination of information

Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.

8. Correspondence

Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

9. Maintenance of files

a. All symbol number informant files, pending and closed, shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by the SAC.

b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.

c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.

d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re

From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

11. Form FD-238

Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

P. SIGNING LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau of the date when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section[19,]volume[II,]of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
A. Definitions 3
  1. Security informant 3
  2. Potential security informant 3
  3. Double agent 3
  4. Confidential source 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
C. Interviews with and Development of Background on Individuals Being Considered for Informant Purposes 4
D. Approval, Indoctrination, Development, and Control of Potential Security Informants 5
E. Bureau Policy 6
  1. Development of military personnel 6
  2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
  3. Divulging information to informant 6
  4. Recording investigative activity 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
  1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
  2. Developing additional background 7
  3. Handling indications of instability 7
  4. Contacts by Agents 7
    Form FD-209 8
  5. Checking reliability 8
  6. Fingerprints 8
  7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
  8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
  9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
  10. Transfer of informants to other areas 9
  11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
  13. Preparation for testifying 10
G. Informants' information 10a
  1. General instructions re oral and written information 10a
  2. Recording written and oral information 10a
  3. Transmission of information 12
  4. Handling of lead information 12
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations 13
  1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
  2. Locating information to pass 13
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
  4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
I. Symbols 13a
  1. Assigning numbers 13a
  2. Communications - use of symbols 14
J. Indexing 14
K. Indices 14
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
  3. Agents' informative index 15
  4. Currency and security 16

[[e.] When an informant or former informant is initially considered as a potential witness in a Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on the income he received from the Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling the situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses
   a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department a set of photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place. The office handling prosecution must determine from the Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:
      (1) The correct, full name
      (2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
      (3) The first date of contact by your office
      (4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
      (5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
      (6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
      (7) The date of last contact by your office
      (8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office
   b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.
   c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.
   d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation
   a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau [illegible] be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the [illegible] law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau[of the date]when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source;[e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."] Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   - d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   - a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   - b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   - c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files

   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of the form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

12. Bulky material submitted by informant
When an informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and it pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   c. [Deleted]
   d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informant
   a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments in amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 [illegible] period, regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have not been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   b. Individuals who are paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
      (1) Recommendation
      (Use following wording as nearly as possible:
      "I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months, effective ___(date).")

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

12. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   c. [Deleted]
   d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
   a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on [illegible] basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
      (1) Recommendation
      (Use following wording as nearly as possible:
      "I recommend that authority be granted to
      continue (increase, decrease) payments to the
      above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week)
      for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week)
      for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months,
      effective ___(date).")

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
A. Definitions 3
  1. Security informant 3
  2. Potential security informant 3
  3. Double agent 3
  4. Confidential source 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
C. Interviews with and Development of Background on Individuals Being Considered for Informant Purposes 4
D. Approval, Indoctrination, Development, and Control of Potential Security Informants 5
E. Bureau Policy 6
  1. Development of military personnel 6
  2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
  3. Divulging information to informant 6
  4. Recording investigative activity 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
  1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
  2. Developing additional background 7
  3. Handling indications of instability 7
  4. Contacts by Agents 7
    Form FD-209 8
  5. Checking reliability 8
  6. Fingerprints 8
  7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
  8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
  9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
  10. Transfer of informants to other areas 9
  11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
  13. Preparation for testifying 10
G. Informants' information 10a
  1. General instructions re oral and written information 10a
  2. Recording written and oral information 10a
  3. Transmission of information 12
  4. Handling of lead information 12
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations 13
  1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
  2. Locating information to pass 13
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
  4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
I. Symbols 13a
  1. Assigning numbers 13a
  2. Communications - use of symbols 14
J. Indexing 14
K. Indices 14
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
  3. Agents' informative index 15
  4. Currency and security 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

L. Index Cards 16
M. Informant Files 16
    1. Opening 16
    2. Monthly administrative report 16
    3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
    4. Subfiles 17
    5. Channelization 17
    6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 17
    7. Dissemination of information 17
    8. Correspondence 17
    9. Maintenance of files 17
    10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
    11. Form FD-238 17
    12. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
    1. No gifts to informants 18
    2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
    3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
    4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 20
    5. Receipts 20
    6. Income tax returns 20
    7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
    8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
    9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
O. Semiannual Letter 22
P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
Q. Discontinued Informants 24
R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 26
S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
T. Classification 27
U. Confidential Sources 27
    1. Definition 27
    2. Assignment of symbols 27
    3. Index 27
    4. Files 27
    5. Utilization 28
    6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 28
    7. Gifts 28
    8. Discontinuance 28

A. DEFINITIONS
1. Security informant
Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security[or intelligence]matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal, that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value;[or furnish pertinent foreign intelligence data of value on a regular basis.]
2. Potential security informant
Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith,[or is in a position to secure pertinent foreign intelligence data,]and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.
4. Confidential source
An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS
Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:
1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attend only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K, 6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

C. INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When a decision is made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted, however, until the individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, and section 105K, item 6b, [[(9),]volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the individual is known to them
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the individual can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by the investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain any record he may have.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

[8. [Persons being considered for use]in espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105K, 6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered.

9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.

[10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct,[or designate]an individual as a potential[security]informant.

[D. [APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONTROL OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS]

[1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as a Bureau-approved potential security informant and[to]proceed with his development.
[[Do not submit on a UACB basis. Include a physical description.]

[2. [Deleted]

[3. [After designation as a Bureau-approved potential security informant, the following matters should be made clear to him:]

[[a.] His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved.

[[b.] He is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.

[[c.] His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has a special problem which would require revealing his[assistance]to his wife[or other pertinent individual,] this should be[ascertained and an appropriate recommendation made to the Bureau.] The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau[and you will be advised accordingly.]

[[d.] If the potential informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements.

[[e.] If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in the initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.

4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau.

5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.

6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months. Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months, and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and relaibility and his indoctrination against disclosure. These letters should follow the form indicated under section 107N, 3b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation.

7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.

[8. During [contacts] with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.

[9. [Deleted]

[10. [Deleted]

[[11.] During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.

[[12.] From the first interview with a potential informant through his development and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant.

[[13.] When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility
[of using informant as a witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.

2. Contacts by designated Agents
Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.

3. Divulging information to informant
No information should be divulged to a potential informant or an informant concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.

4. Recording investigative activity
All investigative activity must be made a matter of record in the field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Sources include all confidential informants - criminal, security, [and racial.] Agents must not have and use informants known only to the individual Agents personally.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF SECURITY INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   a. During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant the absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging through any media any information regarding his relationship with Bureau.
   b. These instructions must be properly worded and phrased to prevent any possibility Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   a. During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant.
   b. After gaining informant's confidence, information will be elicited which may be pertinent to his operation and may have effect upon his retention, such as data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk as an informant.
3. Handling indications of instability
   a. Details of any indications of instability should be furnished to the Bureau immediately upon being obtained, with recommendations as to informant's continuance.
   b. Set forth the steps being taken to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Contacts by Agents
   a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where the frequency of contact is dependent on the circumstances of each case, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks.
   b. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for an exception to this requirement (except in espionage and foreign nationality matters). In requesting such exception, set forth all attendant circumstances.
   c. During each contact, informant's activities since previous contact should be carefully reviewed and the contacting Agent should make certain the informant has furnished in writing or verbally all information and data which he has obtained since the last contact. If additional or supplementary information is furnished during this contact with the informant, this information should be handled in the same manner as outlined in subsection G.
   d. Contacting Agent should become so well acquainted with informant that he will not breach the confidential relationship. If there is slightest indication informant may do so, Agent should be able to anticipate this action and forestall it.
   e. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but also direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows how informant is thinking with regard to Bureau connection. This relationship should not be so reciprocal that informant obtains information concerning Agent or Agent's business, personal or official.
   f. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent and later cause embarrassment to Agent or Bureau by using for his own advantage such knowledge which he may obtain.
   g. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.

h. Any arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in the minds of either the Agent or informant as to the methods of payment, amount, place, and time.

i. Informants should be instructed to use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants the unlisted office telephone number for emergency communication. [This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.]

j. Positive information received from informant should be the subject of a written statement by informant or a memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in the informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.

k. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.

l. The dates of negative contacts and file numbers of the cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where a file has more than one subject, the name of the subject under inquiry should also be noted. Do not set forth title of the case involved on the form.

m. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.

n. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and former should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent in absence of Agent to whom informant is assigned.

5. [Checking reliability]
   a. Reliability of informants must be constantly checked.
   b. Consideration should be given to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
   c. Checks on reliability must be constantly reviewed during time informant is active.

6. Fingerprints
   a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to the contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
   b. If informant refuses, do not force the issue.
   c. Informant's fingerprints, when obtained, should be forwarded as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258. This card should be properly executed showing subject's complete description, including date and place of birth. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.
   d. A flash notice is to be placed by the field in the files of the Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.
   e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year following discontinuance. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

7. [Control - statement of cooperation]
   a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents in order to obtain maximum results in security cases and to prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

b. As means of obtaining closer control, obtain signed statement set out below whenever feasible and practical. In those instances in which it is not practical to secure a signed statement from an informant or double agent, advise Bureau of complete details. The SAC and the Agent handling the informant or double agent should determine the appropriate time in the informant's operation when the statement should be completed.

> I, _____, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.
>
> (Signed) ____________
>
> Witnessed: ____________

[[8. Execution of party questionnaires]

a. Informants, particularly in Communist Party, ofttimes must execute "Party" questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeopardize their position as informants.

b. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant to be certain his identity as informant is protected.

[[9. Informant's activity in organizations]

a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.

b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of the organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.

c. Changes in the organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of the motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions and suggestions given are labeled as such.

d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but at the same time should be cautioned to do so in such a manner as to avoid suspicion.

[[10. Transfer of informants to other areas]

a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.

b. Keep in mind over-all coverage of organization. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, by all means encourage him to do so in order to provide a wider coverage for the Bureau's work.

[[11. Action by informant when uncovered]

a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, he should be instructed to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.

b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse the issue the point where his services may not be lost. This procedure should be carefully handled and each situation considered on its merits.

c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from the strict discipline of the organization involved, as by so doing he may cast off suspicion.

12. Requests of informant to help defend others
    a. If a security informant is requested by the Communist Party, communists being prosecuted by the Government, or by other interested parties to assist in the preparation of the defense in subversive-type cases or receives assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline such assignments.
    b. Any such request received by informant should be reported immediately to the contacting Agent and made a matter of record.
    c. If the informant cannot avoid becoming involved, he should be instructed not to report to the contacting Agent any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.
    d. Any such incident must be reported promptly to the Bureau.

[13. Preparation for testifying
Contacting Agent must condition the informant to the fact that someday the knowledge he possesses may be needed as evidence in court to assist the Government in combating the evil of communism. Psychologically prepare the informant for the fact that he may at some future date be called upon to render a still further contribution to his Government by testifying to the information he has furnished on security matters. Proper indoctrination of the informant is essential as the Bureau must provide witnesses whenever the Department initiates prosecutions in security cases.]

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATIO

1. General instructions re oral and written information
    - a. Instructions regarding preparation, submission, and handling of information received from informants apply not only to security informants but also to potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
    - b. Specific instructions and guidance must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
    - c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after a meeting or activity.
    - d. Written statements should be submitted whenever possible, but if such cannot be done information may be provided orally. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
    - e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
    - f. All information furnished by informants orally or in writing must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."
    - g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise the trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. The trial attorney will thus be prepared in the event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.
    - h. See subsection M for instructions regarding filing informant statements.
2. Recording written and oral information
    - a. Written by informant
        - (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
        - (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
        - (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
        - (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at the top of it.
        - (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or each separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement whether the information is of evidentiary or intelligence value.

(6) Informants should inc in the body of their statements specific dates and places; pur of the meeting or activity being related; identities o akers and persons present, plus their known status in any gr ; specific activity engaged in by each individual present; an comments made by each individual.

[(7) Informant should identify [his statement] by affixing his code
[name [immediately under the last written line on each page.] Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or the initials of his code name.

(8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.

(9) Informant should refer to himself in the body of the statement by his true name and he should use the third person.

(10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., thereto, nor should he place any markings thereon, such as his initials, date of receipt from informant, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc.

(11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a nnelizing memorandum which should contain the applic le items set forth on form FD-306.

(12) Extraneous material should be kept to an absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
   (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
   (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
   (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be furnished orally by informant to contacting Agent who will record the information in memorandum form for the informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant

(1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with the making of the oral statement by the informant to the Agent. The following items furnished by informant should be left out:
   (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
   (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
   (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be recorded in memorandum form for the informant file.

(2) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(3) Date it at the top with the date the informant furnishes the information to the Agent. No other date is desired except the date of the meeting or activity which shall be set forth in the body of the statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or each separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by the Agent as if the informant were preparing them himself.

(5) The information, after being reduced to writing, should then be read promptly by the informant and acknowledged by him by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters authentication by informants is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) After informant authenticates his statement, contacting Agent should prepare a cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it and thereafter the statement should be handled as a written one in accordance with instructions set out in 2, a, (10), and (11).

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be incorporated in an office memorandum by the Agent and should not be initialed by the informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information

a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants whenever possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such personal contacts.

b. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency.

c. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.

d. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory.

e. More than one informant may send statements to a specific post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of post office employees.

f. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under a fictitious name in the same manner as d.

g. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for any extended period of time.

h. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest to Bureau, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication. Office should take any necessary action without delay.

4. Handling of lead information

a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to a logical conclusion.

b. If there is only partial name of individual or meager descripti data, and if there is sufficient data available to do so, file s be opened and assigned to effect an identification and to take a necessary action.

c. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, a tickler card should be prepared to follow with the informant and take other logical steps in an effort to obtain additional identifying data concerning the individual. Tickler cards should be restricted to information which would warrant investigation if an identity is established. This will eliminate inconsequential items, but at the same time definite steps must be taken to run out affirmative information. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile. If an identification is made, a file should be opened and any necessary action taken in connection therewith.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants

a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon the informant's code name.

b. Informant should affix date he received the material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, the date he furnished material should be affixed.

c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material by Agents or clerical personnel.

d. All such material should be transmitted in the same manner as statements furnished by informant.
e. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. See section 107M for filing instructions.

H. PASSING INFORMATION IN DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS
1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition
   a. In double agent operations information requested by the principals is frequently passed either to build up a double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.
   b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that a net gain accrues to the U. S.
   c. The information which is passed should be carefully handled and appropriate explanations created for its acquisition by the double agent to avoid his compromise.
2. Locating information to pass
   Wherever possible the field office handling the double agent should locate appropriate information to be passed; however, the Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of Government agencies.
3. Obtaining Bureau authority
   Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in a double agent operation except:
   a. Newspaper articles
   b. Magazine articles
   c. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by a private company or corporation for distribution or sale to the public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use by engineering staffs and not intended for release to the public.)
4. Retention of copies of passed material
   a. True copies should be retained by the office of origin of any documents or material related to the national defense which is passed in double agent operations.
   b. Such material should be appropriately identified by the double agent.
   c. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with the passage of such material.
   d. Similar action should be taken with regard to any material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to the national defense.
   e. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where there is assurance that copies can be obtained at a later date from the Government agency or private concern having custody.

I. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers

a. All informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of which the Bureau must be advised. Once a number is assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant, source, or confidential technique,[regardless of type or designation.]

b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant the use of such designations.

c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.

d. An additional cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between the informant and the field office.

e. Bureau should be advised of this cover name in addition to the permanent symbol.

[f. The prefix of a symbol number is made up of the appropriate field office teletype abbreviation followed by the appropriate assigned number.

g. The suffix of the symbol number will consist of the letter "S" to designate a security informant; the letters "PSI" to designate a potential security informant.

h. Although an individual, confidential technique, or source may subsequently furnish information requiring a change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to racial, etc.), the number previously assigned will remain the same; however, the suffix is to be changed to the appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-S to NY 000-C or to NY 000-R).]

2. Communications - use of symbols
    a. After Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
    b. In all communications after the initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
    c. In communications between offices, the same procedure is to be followed.
    d. Informants and sources entering another division
        (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
        (2) Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence.
        (3) If an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
[e. [Deleted]
[f. In communications concerning a potential security informant[when
[a symbol number is not assigned,]the name of the potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
[g. [Deleted]
[h. [Deleted]
[i. [Deleted]
    j. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the caption of the communication should show in addition a character and the country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing the mail at the Bureau.

J. INDEXING
1. True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name assigned to them for informants' use in submitting their statements, but not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name.
2. These index cards should show the file number of the informant and such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

K. INDICES
1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
    a. Alphabetical name index
        (1) In all offices all active potential security and security informant cards are to be kept by the SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice. This is to be known as the alphabetical name index.
        (2) File these cards in alphabetical order and also include cards for security confidential sources. These cards should show whether the individual is a potential informant, an informant, or a confidential source furnishing information on security matters.

b. Symbol number index
   (1) The same official as set out in 1a (1) above is to maintain the symbol number index. This index shall contain a card for each individual to whom a symbol number has been assigned.
   (2) File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind the numerical symbol index.

c. The above indices (alphabetical name index and symbol number index) shall not be available for review by Agents seeking informant help in connection with their cases.

d. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by the official having custody of the cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of his activities and type of information he furnishes.

2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"
   a. A separate index may be maintained for the use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.
   b. If such index is maintained, a separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source that has been furnished.
   c. These cards should contain brief background data, together with the identity of the Bureau communication which contains the complete background data.
   d. File these cards alphabetically by name and symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.

3. Agents' informative index
   a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by the same official as set out in 1a (1) above for the use of Agents on the type of informant coverage in the division.
   b. File these cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.
   c. Behind each geographical location there should be a guide card indicating the type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Civil Rights Congress, Polish Activity, etc.
   d. On this guide card set forth the symbol numbers of the informants and confidential sources who can provide this coverage.
   e. Potential informants, confidential sources, panel sources, and sources of information who do not have permanent symbols should be set forth by name.
   f. When an individual can provide more than one type of information, his symbol or identity (if a potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information without [illegible] nent symbol) should be set forth on as many guide cards [illegible] y provide types of information.
   g. These guide cards should[show the above data and it is [illegible] to place alongside the name or symbol number, as the case [illegible], the names of the contacting Agents to whom a request may [illegible] for a specific check with the individual.
   h. Also, there may be set forth on these guide cards symbol [illegible] of informants who move outside the division and who still [illegible] excellent sources regarding past activities. They should [illegible] declassified from informants to confidential sources or sources of information. If any such individual has moved from a division and is being utilized by the division to which he has moved and has received a symbol number from the latter division, such designation should be indicated on the guide card.
   i. The names or symbol numbers, as the case may [illegible], of individuals contained in the index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on the appropriate guide cards in this index.

4. Currency and security
All indices shall be maintained in a current status at all times in a manner which provides tight security of the information and yet makes it easily available to Agents having a need thereof.

L. INDEX CARDS

[1. Index cards [(FD-348) shall be executed] for the alphabetical name index.
[2. [Use form FD-348] for the symbol number index. [Execute only the following
[items:]

Symbol:
(Informant, potential
informant, or confidential
source)

File No:

Name:

3. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in the informant's administrative file.

M. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
   a. When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as an informant or confidential source and he is not the subject of a security-type file, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the subject are discontinued.
   b. If an individual is the subject of a security case and after being interviewed with Bureau authority he indicates he is cooperative and has potentiality as an informant, a 134 file should be opened and maintained in a pending status while under development as a potential informant. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the existing file may be used rather than opening a new 134 file if this is practical and will reduce paper work.
   c. Individual files on all active informants should be maintained and carried as pending active cases.
2. Monthly administrative report
Files on potential informants and informants shall be included in the tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in the monthly administrative report.
3. Assignment and tickler cards
   a. Assignment and tickler cards should be maintained.
   b. The true name of informant is not to appear on the assignment and tickler cards.

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Dissemination of information
   Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.
8. Correspondence
   Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.
9. Maintenance of files
   a. All pending files on security informants shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, or field supervisor as the informant indices are maintained and described in subsection K.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.
10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
    From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.
11. Form FD-238
    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

12. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
[c. [Deleted]
   d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
   a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
      (1) Recommendation
      (Use following wording as nearly as possible: "I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months, effective ___(date).")

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")
(3) Current membership and position held in subversive organizations
(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period
(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month
(Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)
(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity
(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted
(List separately.)
(8) Information furnished of unusual value
(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance
(10) Steps being taken to advance informant
(11) Stability and reliability
(Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)
(12) Indoctrination against disclosure
(State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)
(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished.
(14) Miscellaneous
(Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
   e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Bureau income should be set forth[on the]Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.
   c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.
   d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.

[e.] When an informant or former informant is initially considered as a potential witness in a Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on the income he received from the Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling the situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses
   a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department a set of photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place. The office handling prosecution must determine from the Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:
      (1) The correct, full name
      (2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
      (3) The first date of contact by your office
      (4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
      (5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
      (6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
      (7) The date of last contact by your office
      (8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office
   b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.
   c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.
   d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation
   a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

9. Handling money and property received by double agents

a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.

b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name.

c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid under Bureau authority (not SAC authority) for services or expenses. If the confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all security informants not paid under Bureau authority.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factor should be shown relative to each unit.

Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

5. Listed below ar[illegible]ll of the Bureau offices and [illegible] dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
[[Columbia	" "]
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jackson	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. [Advise the Bureau[of the date]when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

such activities, the Bureau will consider placing him in contact with a reliable publisher, but it must be made clear to the informant that the Bureau will not sponsor or endorse any book or publication which he elects to write.

9. All payments to discontinued security informants and confidential sources must be made on a strict c.o.d. basis. Obtain Bureau authority before making any such payments. In requesting Bureau authority for payments of this type, submit complete details as to the information furnished by the discontinued informant or source in the past and what is to be expected of the informant or source in the future.
10. Once an informant is exposed in any manner whatsoever he is no longer to be carried as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth, together with descriptive data.
11. When an office receives information concerning, or obtains information from, an ex-informant, copies of memoranda prepared must be furnished to the office which originally handled the informant so that the file of the ex-informant will be as complete as possible.
12. When an informant has been discontinued for cause, such as unreliability, he should not be contacted in the future for information. If such an individual furnishes information it should be accepted, but in setting out the information in reports or communications use the individual's true name, together with an appropriate description of his reliability.
13. Remove flash notice per section F, 6.
14. Repeated use of the same discontinued informant as a witness at security trials and hearings should be avoided. Make an all-out effort to develop witnesses who can furnish the same testimony as that expected of previously used witnesses. Advise Bureau of any indication by Government attorneys that an informant-witness who has previously testified will be called upon for testimony at a subsequent trial or hearing and furnish your comments concerning possibility of supplanting the testimony of individual involved. Submit communication under appropriate case character.
15. Every effort should be made to prevent a discontinued informant from becoming involved in situations which may prove embarrassing to informant or the Government. Immediately after he testifies for the first time, a serious talk should be had with informant by the SAC in the presence of the Agent who handled the informant. This interview should be conducted in the field office and informant told that:
    a. He will no longer be operated by the Bureau
    b. Since he is a public figure, he will probably be contacted by representatives of the press, radio, and television for interviews and appearances
    c. He may be sought as a witness by congressional committees, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and by state authorities
    d. (Firmly stress.) In connection with such interviews and appearances, informant must continue to be factual and truthful and must not build up or embellish the statements, for if he does so he will wind up in serious trouble.

Advise Bureau results of such interview and comment on its possible effectiveness.

Be alert to the possibilities of former informant being contacted by representatives of publicity media and as a witness by congressional committees, INS, and state authorities. It will be the SAC's responsibility to know when a former informant is scheduled or is likely to appear at a hearing or make a public appearance of any kind. Prior thereto in each instance, former informant must be contacted and instructions above set forth reiterated by Agent who handled the informant. Emphasize to former informant that he must stick to the truth and make certain he can back up what he says, and if there is any deviation he will be subjected to harassment, criticism, possible libel, slander, or other criminal actions. If he inquires as to whether he should appear or testify or otherwise cooperate with any public or private individual or agency, advise him he must make that decision humself, but if he has appeared as a Government witness in a case which has not been finally adjudicated and decides in the affirmative, he should contact the USA for instructions. Advise Bureau of any such situations and the results of any interviews conducted.

[[16. Whenever contacting Agent feels a discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to the Bureau, arrangements should be made to have the former informant come to the field office where he will be personally met by the SAC. At that time, he should be impressed with the fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to the security of the country and remind him that he signed an agreement when he was active as an informant to maintain his relation with the Bureau on a confidential basis. The SAC should stress the necessity for the informant to maintain this confidence.]

R. FURNISHING OF INFORMANTS TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

1. INS conducts investigations of alien communists as required under the Immigration Act of 10-16-18, as amended. INS, in order to enforce this statute, must obtain evidence to prove that certain aliens, due to their membership in certain groups, are undesirable and deportable or subject to denaturalization.
2. Cooperate fully with INS in these cases and make efforts consistent with your own cases and interests to make available information and witnesses where possible.
3. In this regard, if contacted by INS inquiring for informants and you have a discontinued informant or one who would be of assistance to INS and whose loss would not affect your work, furnish his identity to the Bureau, together with your recommendation.
4. The Bureau will then review all of the facts concerning such informant and advise as to whether or not his identity may be disclosed to INS.
5. Exercise care in recommending informants for disclosure to INS so that you will not find yourself without proper coverage.
6. Before any informant is turned over to INS, obtain informant's permission.

S. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that an informant or ex-informant furnished false information while an informant, advise Bureau by airmail of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing the informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with a review of all data furnished by the individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from the informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify the cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing the information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to the specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by the Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations; corrective action should be called to the attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.

2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; [e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."] Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   - d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   - a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   - b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   - c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files

   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
7. Gifts

   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance

   Advise Bureau[of the date]when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. Definitions 3
  1. Security informant 3
  2. Potential security informant 3
  3. Double agent 3
  4. Confidential source 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
C. Investigation of Potential Security Informants 4
D. Interviews and Development of Potential Security Informants 5
E. Bureau Policy 6
  1. Development of military personnel 6
  2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
  3. Divulging information to informant 6
  4. Recording investigative activity 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
  1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
  2. Developing additional background 7
  3. Handling indications of instability 7
  4. Contacts by Agents 7
    Form FD-209 8
  5. Checking reliability 8
  6. Fingerprints 8
  7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
  8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
  9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
  10. Transfer of informants to other areas 9
  11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
  13. Preparation for testifying 10
G. Informants' information 10a
  1. General instructions re oral and written information 10a
  2. Recording written and oral information 10a
  3. Transmission of information 12
  4. Handling of lead information 12
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations 13
  1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
  2. Locating information to pass 13
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
  4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
I. Symbols 13a
  1. Assigning numbers 13a
  2. Communications - use of symbols 14
J. Indexing 14
K. Indices 14
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
  3. Agents' informative index 15
  4. Currency and security 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
A. Definitions 3
  1. Security informant 3
  2. Potential security informant 3
  3. Double agent 3
  4. Confidential source 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
C. Investigation of Potential Security Informants 4
D. Interviews and Development of Potential Security Informants 5
E. Bureau Policy 6
  1. Development of military personnel 6
  2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
  3. Divulging information to informant 6
  4. Recording investigative activity 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
  1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
  2. Developing additional background 7
  3. Handling indications of instability 7
  4. Contacts by Agents 7
    Form FD-209 8
  5. Checking reliability 8
  6. Fingerprints 8
  7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
  8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
  9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
  10. Transfer of informants to other areas 9
  11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
  13. Preparation for testifying 10
G. Informants' information 10a
  1. General instructions re oral and written information 10a
  2. Recording written and oral information 10a
  3. Transmission of information 12
  4. Handling of lead information 12
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations 13
  1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
  2. Locating information to pass 13
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
  4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
I. Symbols 13
  1. Assigning numbers 13
  2. Communications - use of symbols 14
J. Indexing 14
K. Indices 14
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
  3. Agents' informative index 15
  4. Currency and security 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
A. Definitions 3
  1. Security informant 3
  2. Potential security informant 3
  3. Double agent 3
  4. Confidential source 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
C. Investigation of Potential Security Informants 4
D. Interviews and Development of Potential Security Informants 5
E. Bureau Policy 6
  1. Development of military personnel 6
  2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
  3. Divulging information to informant 6
  4. Recording investigative activity 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
  1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
  2. Developing additional background 7
  3. Handling indications of instability 7
  4. Contacts by Agents 7
[Form FD-209 8
  5. Checking reliability 8
  6. Fingerprints 8
  7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
  8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
  9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
  10. Transfer of informants to other areas 9
  11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
G. Informants' Information 10
  1. General instructions re oral and written information 10
  2. Recording written and oral information 10
  3. Transmission of information 12
  4. Handling of lead information 12
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations 13
  1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
  2. Locating information to pass 13
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
  4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
I. Symbols 13
  1. Assigning numbers 13
  2. Communications - use of symbols 14
J. Indexing 14
K. Indices 14
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
  3. Agents' informative index 15
  4. Currency and security 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
[A. Definitions 3
[1. Security informant 3
[2. Potential security informant 3
[3. Double agent 3
[4. Confidential source 3
[B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
[C. Investigation of Potential Security Informants 4
[D. Interviews and Development of Potential Security Informants 5
[E. Bureau Policy 6
[1. Development of military personnel 6
[2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
[3. Divulging information to informant 6
[4. Recording investigative activity 7
[F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
[1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
[2. Developing additional background 7
[3. Handling indications of instability 7
[4. Contacts by Agents 7
[5. Checking reliability 8
[6. Fingerprints 8
[7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
[8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
[9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
[10. Transfer of informants to other areas 9
[11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
[12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
[G. Informants' Information 10
[1. General instructions re oral and written information 10
[2. Recording written and oral information 10
[3. Transmission of information 12
[4. Handling of lead information 12
[5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
[H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations 13
[1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
[2. Locating information to pass 13
[3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
[4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
[I. Symbols 13
[1. Assigning numbers 13
[2. Communications - use of symbols 14
[J. Indexing 14
[K. Indices 14
[1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
[2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
[3. Agents' informative index 15
[4. Currency and security 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

L. Index Cards 16
M. Informant Files 16
  1. Opening 16
  2. Monthly administrative report 16
  3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
  4. Subfiles 17
  5. Channelization 17
  6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 17
  7. Dissemination of information 17
  8. Correspondence 17
  9. Maintenance of files 17
  10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
  11. Form FD-238 17
  12. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
  1. No gifts to informants 18
  2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
  3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
  4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 20
  5. Receipts 20
  6. Income tax returns 20
  7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
  8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
  9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
O. Semiannual Letter 22
P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
Q. Discontinued Informants 24
R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 26
S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
T. Classification 27
U. Confidential Sources 27
  1. Definition 27
  2. Assignment of symbols 27
  3. Index 27
  4. Files 27
  5. Utilization 28
  6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 28
  7. Gifts 28
  8. Discontinuance 28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
[L. Index Cards 15
[M. Informant Files 16
[1. Opening 16
[2. Monthly administrative report 16
[3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
[4. Subfiles 17
[5. Channelization 17
[6. Dissemination of information 17
[7. Correspondence 17
[8. Maintenance of files 17
[9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
[10. Form FD-238 17
[11. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
[N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
[1. No gifts to informants 18
[2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
[3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
[4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau
[authority 20
[5. Receipts 20
[6. Income tax returns 20
[7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
[8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
[9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
[O. Semiannual Letter 22
[P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
[Q. Discontinued Informants 24
[R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service
[(INS) 26
[S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
[T. Classification 27
[U. Confidential Sources 27
[1. Definition 27
[2. Assignment of symbols 27
[3. Index 27
[4. Files 27
[5. Utilization 28
[6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of
[stability and payments 28
[7. Gifts 28
[8. Discontinuance 28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
[L. Index Cards 15
[M. Informant Files 16
[1. Opening 16
[2. Monthly administrative report 16
[3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
[4. Subfiles 17
[5. Channelization 17
[6. Dissemination of information 17
[7. Correspondence 17
[8. Maintenance of files 17
[9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
[10. Form FD-238 17
[11. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
[N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
[1. No gifts to informants 18
[2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
[3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
[4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau
[authority 20
[5. Receipts 20
[6. Income tax returns 20
[7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
[8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
[9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
[O. Semiannual Letter 22
[P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
[Q. Discontinued Informants 24
[R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service
[(INS) 26
[S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
[T. Classification 27
[U. Confidential Sources 27
[1. Definition 27
[2. Assignment of symbols 27
[3. Index 27
[4. Files 27
[5. Utilization 28
[6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of
[stability and payments 28
[7. Gifts 28
[8. Discontinuance 28

protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

[9. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name or number.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.]

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid for services or expenses on a regular basis. If such confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all unpaid security informants.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

[L. Index Cards 16
[M. Informant Files 16
[1. Opening 16
[2. Monthly administrative report 16
[3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
[4. Subfiles 17
[5. Channelization 17
[6. Dissemination of information 17
[7. Correspondence 17
[8. Maintenance of files 17
[9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
[10. Form FD-238 17
[11. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
[N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
[1. No gifts to informants 18
[2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
[3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
[4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 20
[5. Receipts 20
[6. Income tax returns 20
[7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
[8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
[9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
[O. Semiannual Letter 22
[P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
[Q. Discontinued Informants 24
[R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 26
[S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
[T. Classification 27
[U. Confidential Sources 27
[1. Definition 27
[2. Assignment of symbols 27
[3. Index 27
[4. Files 27
[5. Utilization 28
[6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 28
[7. Gifts 28
[8. Discontinuance 28

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informan[illegible]
Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor-
[mation on security[or intelligence]matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal, that he is able to obtain and does provide current information
[of value;[or furnish pertinent foreign intelligence data of value on a regular
[basis.]

2. Potential security informant
Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign
[principal or can become closely associated therewith,[or is in a position
[to secure pertinent foreign intelligence data,]and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.

3. Double agent
A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.

4. Confidential source
An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
    a. Complainants in security matters
    b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
    c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
    d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
    e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
    f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.
4. Confidential source
   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or is in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.

2. Potential security informant
Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.

3. Double agent
A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.

4. Confidential source
An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
    a. Complainants in security matters
    b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
    c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
    d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
    e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
    f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.
4. Confidential source
An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers, telephone company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, [and]employees of the United Nations Secretariat. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
    a. Complainants in security matters
    b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
    c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
    d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
    e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
    f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. [Deleted]
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.
4. Confidential source
   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers, telephone company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations Secretariat, and individuals who furnish trash in connection with trash covers. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals which are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. [Review of[reserve]index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Survey possibilities of trash covers.
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members. The Progressive Party file also might prove a fertile field.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant

   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant

   Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent

   A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.
4. Confidential source

   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers, telephone company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations Secretariat, and individuals who furnish trash in connection with trash covers. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals which are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   - a. Complainants in security matters
   - b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   - c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   - d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   - e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   - f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of[reserve]index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Survey possibilities of trash covers.
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members. The Progressive Party file also might prove a fertile field.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.

[3. Double agent
   A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.

4. Confidential source
   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be; bankers, telephone company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations Secretariat, and individuals who furnish trash in connection with trash covers. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.]

[B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL[SECURITY]INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals which are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   - a. Complainants in security matters
   - b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   - c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   - d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   - e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   - f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of communist index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Survey possibilities of trash covers.
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members. The Progressive Party file also might prove a fertile field.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

[C. [INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING
[CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES]

When a decision is made to consider a particular individual for informant
[purposes, background investigation must be conducted. [Extensive background
[investigation should not be conducted, however, until the individual has
[been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the
[Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions
[imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, and section 105K, item 6b,
[(10), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation
[should]consist of the following:

[1. Check of field office files for derogatory information
[2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the[individual]
[is known to[them]
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must
[definitely establish that the[individual]can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability.
[Securing background information from the[individual]is not sufficient;
[[his]background must be established by the investigation,[including discreet
[inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.]
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identi-
[fication Division to obtain[any]record [he may have.]
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

[C. [INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING
[CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES]

When a decision is made to consider a particular individual for informant
[purposes, background investigation must be conducted. [Extensive background
[investigation should not be conducted, however, until the individual has
[been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the
[Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions
[imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, and section 105K, item 6b,
[(10), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation
[should]consist of the following:

[1. Check of field office files for derogatory information
[2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the[individual]
[is known to[them].
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must
[definitely establish that the[individual]can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability.
[Securing background information from the[individual]is not sufficient;
[[his]background must be established by the investigation,[including discreet
[inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.]
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identi-
[fication Division to obtain[any]record [he may have.]
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

C. INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature
2. [Discreet canvass of[logical]informants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

C. INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature
[2. Discreet canvass of[logical]informants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See desoco program, section 105K, 6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

C. INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature
[2. Discreet canvass of[logical]informants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.

[[16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
[17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
[18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed
[in the U. S.
[19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are
[in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who
[will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the
[Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)]

[C. INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL[SECURITY]INFORMANTS

When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature
2. Discreet canvass of other informants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.

[[16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
[17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
[18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed
[in the U. S.
[19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are
[in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who
[will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the
[Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)]

[C. INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL[SECURITY]INFORMANTS

When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature
2. Discreet canvass of other informants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

8. Potential security informants in espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and desecco program, section 105K,6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered.
9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.
10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant.

D. INTERVIEWS AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to[designate]individual as a[Bureau-approved potential]security informant[and proceed with his development.]
2. When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy.
3. Carefully plan initial interviews as to time and location to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau.
5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.
6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months. Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months, and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These letters should follow the form indicated under section 107N, 3b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation.
7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.
8. During interviews with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
9. Potential informant should have contacts, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field.
10. If individual does not have potential as above described but is willing to cooperate, consider indicating to him he can be of assistance if he places himself in a position where he may be able to obtain information of value. In this regard, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desires; also, it may be mentioned that if he subscribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest may be shown in him which,if developed, would be the means whereby he could obtain information.
11. Inform potential informants who agree to assist the Bureau that such assistance must be strictly voluntary and they are to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved.

8. Potential security informants in espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and desecco program, section 105K,6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered.
9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.
10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant.

D. INTERVIEWS AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS
1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to develop individual as a security informant.
2. When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy.
3. Carefully plan initial interviews as to time and location to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau.
5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.
6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months. Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months, and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These letters should follow the form indicated under section 1[illegible] 3b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation.
7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.
8. During interviews with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
9. Potential informant should have contacts, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field.
10. If individual does not have potential as above described but is willing to cooperate, consider indicating to him he can be of assistance if he places himself in a position where he may be able to obtain information of value. In this regard, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desires; also, it may be mentioned that if he subscribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest may be shown in him which, if developed, would be the means whereby he could obtain information.
11. Inform potential informants who agree to assist the Bureau that such assistance must be strictly voluntary and they are to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved.

8. Potential security informants in espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105K, 6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered.
9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.
10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant.

D. INTERVIEWS AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to develop individual as a security informant.
2. When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy.
3. Carefully plan initial interviews as to time and location to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau.
5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.
6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months. [Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis,]should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months, and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These[letters should]follow the[form indicated]under section 107N, 3b, [but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation.] (Refer to section 105K, 6h, (3), (b), volume IV, of this manual for exception to this rule in deseco matters.)
7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.
8. During interviews with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
9. Potential informant should have contacts, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field.
10. If individual does not have potential as above described but is willing to cooperate, consider indicating to him he can be of assistance if he places himself in a position where he may be able to obtain information of value. In this regard, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desires; also, it may be mentioned that if he subscribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest may be shown in him which, if developed, would be the means whereby he could obtain information.
11. Inform potential informants who agree to assist the Bureau that such assistance must be strictly voluntary and they are to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved.

8. [Potential security informants in espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105K,6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered.]
9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.
10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant.

[D. INTERVIEWS[AND DEVELOPMENT OF]POTENTIAL[SECURITY]INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to develop individual as a security informant.
2. When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy.
3. Carefully plan initial interviews as to time and location to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews[in their residences]should be conducted by two Agents[after specific approval of the]superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. [This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau.
5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case,]potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.
6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months. These progress letters should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These certifications may follow the wording suggested under section 107N,[3b, (11) and (12). (Refer to section 105K, 6h, (3), (b), volume IV, of this manual for exceptions to this rule in deseco matters.)]
7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.
8. During interviews with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
9. Potential informant should have contacts, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field.
10. If individual does not have potential as above described but is willing to cooperate, consider indicating to him he can be of assistance if he places himself in a position where he may be able to obtain information of value. In this regard, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desires; also, it may be mentioned that if he subscribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest may be shown in him which,if developed, would be the means whereby he could obtain information.

[11. Inform potential informants who agree to assist the Bureau that such assistance must be strictly voluntary and they are to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved.

[12. During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.

[13. Specifically advise each potential informant that he is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon the informant.

[14. Advise potential informant that his cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. This must be thoroughly impressed upon the informant before you accept him as such. If the informant has a special problem which would require his revealing his relationship to his wife, etc., this should be learned from him during the initial interview and a recommendation made to the Bureau when the results of the interview are furnished. The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau.

[15. If a prospective informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration in labor unions by subversive elements.

[16. If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in his initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.

[17. From the first interview with a potential informant through his development and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant.

[18. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a potential witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.]

E. BUREAU POLICY

[[1. Development of military personnel]

Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.

[[2. Contacts by designated Agents]

[Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated[to contact him.]

[[3. Divulging information to informant]

[No information should be divulged to[a potential]informant[or an informant] concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to[his]proper operation.

[12. During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants
[may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it
[becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive
[organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires
[as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that
[his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question
[arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his
[cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible
[individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it
[impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service
[which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before
[taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's
[cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.
[13. Specifically advise each potential informant that he is not and cannot
[consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI.
[In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes
[must be impressed upon the informant.
[14. Advise potential informant that his cooperation must be strictly confidential
[at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this
[confidence he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the
[mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential
[basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and in
[so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. This
[must be thoroughly impressed upon the informant before you accept him
[as such. If the informant has a special problem which would require
[his revealing his relationship to his wife, etc., this should be learned
[from him during the initial interview and a recommendation made to the
[Bureau when the results of the interview are furnished. The special
[circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau.
[15. If a prospective informant is connected in any manner with a labor
[union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-
[employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining
[information on the infiltration in labor unions by subversive elements.
[16. If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar
[relations with a school, college, or university, in his initial interview
[and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning
[investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.
[17. From the first interview with a potential informant through his development
[and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at
[all times to be certain he is not a plant.
[18. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and
[otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent
[symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally
[initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background
[must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility
[of using informant as a potential witness. If individual has any
[weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and
[to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.]

E. BUREAU POLICY

[[1. Development of military personnel]
Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.

[[2. Contacts by designated Agents]
[Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by
[the Agent or Agents specifically designated[to contact him.]

[[3. Divulging information to informant]
[No information should be divulged to[a potential]informant[or an informant]
concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that
[which is essential to[his]proper operation.

[12. During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.

[13. Specifically advise each potential informant that he is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon the informant.

[14. Advise potential informant that his cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. This must be thoroughly impressed upon the informant before you accept him as such. If the informant has a special problem which would require his revealing his relationship to his wife, etc., this should be learned from him during the initial interview and a recommendation made to the Bureau when the results of the interview are furnished. The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau.

[15. If a prospective informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration in labor unions by subversive elements.

[16. If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in his initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.

[17. From the first interview with a potential informant through his development and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant.

[18. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a potential witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.]

E. BUREAU POLICY

[[1. Development of military personnel]

Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.

[[2. Contacts by designated Agents]

[Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated[to contact him.]

[[3. Divulging information to informant]

[No information should be divulged to[a potential]informant[or an informant] concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to[his]proper operation.

[12. During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.

13. Specifically advise each potential informant that he is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon the informant.

14. Advise potential informant that his cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. This must be thoroughly impressed upon the informant before you accept him as such. If the informant has a special problem which would require his revealing his relationship to his wife, etc., this should be learned from him during the initial interview and a recommendation made to the Bureau when the results of the interview are furnished. The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau.

15. If a prospective informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration in labor unions by subversive elements.

16. If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in his initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.

17. From the first interview with a potential informant through his development and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant.

18. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a potential witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.]

E. BUREAU POLICY

[1. Development of military personnel]

Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.

[2. Contacts by designated Agents]

Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated[to contact him.]

[3. Divulging information to informant]

No information should be divulged to[a potential]informant[or an informant] concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to[his]proper operation.

[4. [Recording investigative activity]
All investigative activity must be made a matter of record in the field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Sources include all confidential informants - criminal or security. Agents must not have and use informants known only to the individual Agents personally.

[F. INDOCTRINATION,[DIRECTION,]AND CONTROL OF[SECURITY]INFORMANTS

[1. [Caution against divulging relationship]
a. During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant the absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging through any media any information regarding his relationship with Bureau.
b. These instructions must be properly worded and phrased to prevent any possibility Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.

[2. [Developing additional background]
a. During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant.
b. After gaining informant's confidence, information will be elicited which may be pertinent to his operation and may have effect upon his retention, such as data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk as an informant.

[3. [Handling indications of instability]
a. Details of any indications of instability should be furnished to the Bureau immediately upon being obtained, with recommendations as to informant's continuance.
b. Set forth the steps being taken to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.

[4. Contacts[by Agents]
[a. [Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where the
[frequency of contact is dependent on the circumstances of each
[case,]informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks.
b. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific
[Bureau authority for an exception to this requirement[(except in
[espionage and foreign nationality matters).] In requesting such exception, set forth all attendant circumstances.
c. During each contact, informant's activities since previous contact should be carefully reviewed and the contacting Agent should make certain the informant has furnished in writing or verbally all information and data which he has obtained since the last contact. If additional or supplementary information is furnished during this contact with the informant, this information should be handled in the same manner as outlined in subsection G.
d. Contacting Agent should become so well acquainted with informant that he will not breach the confidential relationship. If there is slightest indication informant may do so, Agent should be able to anticipate this action and forestall it.
e. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but also direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows how informant is thinking with regard to Bureau connection. This relationship should not be so reciprocal that informant obtains information concerning Agent or Agent's business, personal or official.
f. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent and later cause embarrassment to Agent or Bureau by using for his own advantage such knowledge which he may obtain.
g. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.

h. Any arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in the minds of either the Agent or informant as to the methods of payment, amount, place, and time.

i. Informants should be instructed to use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants the unlisted office telephone number for
[emergency communication. [This rule is not practical in all espionage
[and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.]

j. Positive information received from informant should be the subject of a written statement by informant or a memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in the informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.

k. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.

l. The dates of negative contacts and file numbers of the cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where a file has more than one subject, the name of the subject under inquiry should also be noted. Do not set forth title of the case involved on the form.

m. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.

n. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and former should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent in absence of Agent to whom informant is assigned.

[5. [Checking reliability]

a. Reliability of informants must be constantly checked.

b. Consideration should be given to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.

c. Checks on reliability must be constantly reviewed during time informant is active.

6. Fingerprints

a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to the contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.

b. If informant refuses, do not force the issue.

c. Informant's fingerprints, when obtained, should be forwarded as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258. This card should be properly executed showing subject's complete description, including date and place of birth. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

d. A flash notice is to be placed by the field in the files of the Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.

e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year following discontinuance. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

[7. [Control - statement of cooperation]

a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents in order to obtain maximum results in security cases and to prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

b. As means of obtaining closer control, obtain signed statement set out below whenever feasible and practical. In those instances in which it is not practical to secure a signed statement from an informant or double agent, advise Bureau of complete details. The SAC and the Agent handling the informant or double agent should determine the appropriate time in the informant's operation when the statement should be completed.

> I, _____, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.
>
> (Signed) _____ _____
>
> Witnessed: __________

[8. Execution of party questionnaires]
  a. Informants, particularly in Communist Party, ofttimes must execute "Party" questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeopardize their position as informants.
  b. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant to be certain his identity as informant is protected.

[[9. Informant's activity in organizations]
  a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.
  b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of the organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.
  c. Changes in the organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of the motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions and suggestions given are labeled as such.
  d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but at the same time they should be cautioned to do so in such a manner as to avoid suspicion.

[[10. Transfer of informants to other areas]
  a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.
  b. Keep in mind over-all coverage of organizations. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, by all means encourage him to do so in order to provide a wider coverage for the Bureau's work.

[[11. Action by informant when uncovered]
  a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, he should be instructed to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.
  b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without facts to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse the issue to the point where his services may not be lost. This procedure should be carefully handled and each situation considered on its merits.
  c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from the strict discipline of the organization involved, as by so doing he may cast off suspicion.

[[12. Requests of informant to help defend others]

a. If a security informant is requested by the Communist Party, communists being prosecuted by the Government, or by other interested parties to assist in the preparation of the defense in subversive-type cases or receives assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline such assignments.

b. Any such request received by informant should be reported immediately to the contacting Agent and made a matter of record.

c. If the informant cannot avoid becoming involved, he should be instructed not to report to the contacting Agent any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.

d. Any such incident must be reported promptly to the Bureau.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION

[1. General instructions[re oral and written information]

a. Instructions regarding preparation, submission, and handling of information received from informants apply not only to security informants but also to potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.

b. Specific instructions and guidance must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.

c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after a meeting or activity.

d. Written statements should be submitted whenever possible, but if such
[cannot be done information may be provided orally. [In espionage and
[foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary
[only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In
[the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to
[prosecution are involved.)]

e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.

f. All information furnished by informants orally or in writing must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise the trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. The trial attorney will thus be prepared in the event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

h. See subsection M for instructions regarding filing informant statements.

[2. Recording[written and oral information]

a. Written by informant

(1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.

(2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.

(3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at the top of it.

(5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or each separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement whether the information is of evidentiary or intelligence value.

(6) Informants should include in the body of their statements specific dates and places; purpose of the meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; specific activity engaged in by each individual present; and comments made by each individual.

(7) Informant should identify each page at the bottom by affixing his code name. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified[by informant affixing his code name or the initials of his code name.]

(8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.

(9) Informant should refer to himself in the body of the statement by his true name and he should use the third person.

(10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., thereto, nor should he place any markings thereon, such as his initials, date of receipt from informant, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc.

(11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum which should contain the applicable items set forth on form FD-306.

(12) Extraneous material should be kept to an absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:

  (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
  (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
  (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be furnished orally by informant to contacting Agent who will record the information in memorandum form for the informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant

(1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with the making of the oral statement by the informant to the Agent. The following items furnished by informant should be left out:

  (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
  (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
  (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant.

These data should be recorded in memorandum form for the informant file.

(2) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(3) Date it at the top with the date the informant furnishes the information to the Agent. No other date is desired except the date of the meeting or activity which shall be set forth in the body of the statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or each separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by the Agent as if the informant were preparing them himself.

(5) The information, after being reduced to writing, should then be read promptly by the informant and acknowledged by him by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters authentication by informants is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) Informants should include in the body of their statements specific dates and places; purpose of the meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; specific activity engaged in by each individual present; and comments made by each individual.

(7) Informant should identify each page at the bottom by affixing his code name. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be similarly identified.

(8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.

(9) Informant should refer to himself in the body of the statement by his true name and he should use the third person.

(10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., thereto, nor should he place any markings thereon, such as his initials, date of receipt from informant, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc.

(11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum which should contain the applicable items set forth on form FD-306.

(12) Extraneous material should be kept to an absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:

(a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
(b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
(c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be furnished orally by informant to contacting Agent who will record the information in memorandum form for the informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant

(1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with the making of the oral statement by the informant to the Agent. The following items furnished by informant should be left out:

(a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
(b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
(c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be recorded in memorandum form for the informant file.

(2) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(3) Date it at the top with the date the informant furnishes the information to the Agent. No other date is desired except the date of the meeting or activity which shall be set forth in the body of the statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or each separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by the Agent as if the informant were preparing them himself.

(5) The information, after being reduced to writing, should then be read promptly by the informant and acknowledged by him by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters authentication by informants is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) Informants should include in the body of their statements specific dates and places; purpose of the meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; specific activity engaged in by each individual present; and comments made by each individual.

(7) Informant should identify each page at the bottom by affixing his code name or code symbol (not his permanent symbol number or true name). Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be similarly identified.

(8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.

(9) Informant should refer to himself in the body of the statement by his true name and he should use the third person.

(10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., thereto, nor should he place any markings thereon, such as his initials, date of receipt from informant, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc.

(11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum which should contain the applicable items set forth on form FD-306.

(12) Extraneous material should be kept to an absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
   (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
   (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
   (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be furnished orally by informant to contacting Agent who will record the information in memorandum form for the informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant

(1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with the making of the oral statement by the informant to the Agent. The following items furnished by informant should be left out:
   (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
   (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
   (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be recorded in memorandum form for the informant file.

(2) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(3) Date it at the top with the date the informant furnishes the information to the Agent. No other date is desired except the date of the meeting or activity which shall be set forth in the body of the statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or each separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by the Agent as if the informant were preparing them himself.

(5) The information, after being reduced to writing, should then be read promptly by the informant and acknowledged by him by affixing his code name or code symbol on each page. [In espionage and foreign nationality matters authentication by informants is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.]

(6) After informant authenticates his statement, contacting Agent should prepare a cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it and thereafter the statement should be handled as a written one in accordance with instructions set out in 2, a, (10), and (11).

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be incorporated in an office memorandum by the Agent and should not be initialed by the informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information
   - a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants whenever possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such personal contacts.
   - b. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency.
   - c. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.
   - d. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory.
   - e. More than one informant may send statements to a specific post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of post office employees.
   - f. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under a fictitious name in the same manner as d.
   - g. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for any extended period of time.
   - h. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest to Bureau, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication. Office should take any necessary action without delay.

4. Handling of lead information
   - a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to a logical conclusion.
   - b. If there is only partial name of individual or meager descriptive data, and if there is sufficient data available to do so, file should be opened and assigned to effect an identification and to take any necessary action.
   - c. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, a tickler card should be prepared to follow with the informant and take other logical steps in an effort to obtain additional identifying data concerning the individual. Tickler cards should be restricted to information which would warrant investigation if an identity is established. This will eliminate inconsequential items, but at the same time definite steps must be taken to run out affirmative information. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile. If an identification is made, a file should be opened and any necessary action taken in connection therewith.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants
   - a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon the informant's code name.
   - b. Informant should affix date he received the material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, the date he furnished material should be affixed.
   - c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols etc., should be placed on documentary material by Agents or clerical personnel.

(6) After informant authenticates his statement, contacting Agent should prepare a cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it and thereafter the statement should be handled as a written one in accordance with instructions set out in 2, a, (10), and (11).

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be incorporated in an office memorandum by the Agent and should not be initialed by the informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information

a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants whenever possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such personal contacts.

b. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency.

c. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.

d. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory.

e. More than one informant may send statements to a specific post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of post office employees.

f. Envelope enclosing statement should bear the return address of another confidential post office box obtained under a fictitious name in the same manner as d.

g. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for any extended period of time.

h. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest to Bureau, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication. Office should take any necessary action without delay.

4. Handling of lead information

a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to a logical conclusion.

b. If there is only partial name of individual or meager descriptive data, and if there is sufficient data available to do so, file should be opened and assigned to effect an identification and to take any necessary action.

c. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, a tickler card should be prepared to follow with the informant and take other logical steps in an effort to obtain additional identifying data concerning the individual. Tickler cards should be restricted to information which would warrant investigation if an identity is established. This will eliminate inconsequential items, but at the same time definite steps must be taken to run out affirmative information. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile. If an identification is made, a file should be opened and any necessary action taken in connection therewith.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants

a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon the informant's code name.

b. Informant should affix date he received the material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, the date he furnished material should be affixed.

c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material by Agents or clerical personnel.

(6) After informant authenticates his statement, contacting Agent should prepare a cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it and thereafter the statement should be handled as a written one in accordance with instructions set out in 2, a, (10), and (11).

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be incorporated in an office memorandum by the Agent and should not be initialed by the informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission[of information]

a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants whenever possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such personal contacts.

b. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency.

c. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.

d. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory.

e. More than one informant may send statements to a specific post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of post office employees.

f. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under a fictitious name in the same manner as d.

g. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for any extended period of time.

h. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest to Bureau, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication. Office should take any necessary action without delay.

4. Handling of lead information

a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to a logical conclusion.

b. If there is only partial name of individual or meager descriptive data, and if there is sufficient data available to do so, file should be opened and assigned to effect an identification and to take any necessary action.

c. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, a tickler card should be prepared to follow with the informant and take other logical steps in an effort to obtain additional identifying data concerning the individual. Tickler cards should be restricted to information which would warrant investigation if an identity is established. This will eliminate inconsequential items, but at the same time definite steps must be taken to run out affirmative information. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile. If an identification is made, a file should be opened and any necessary action taken in connection therewith.

5. [Handling documentary]material furnished[by informants]

a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon the informant's code name or code symbol (not his true name or his permanent symbol number).

b. Informant should affix date he received the material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, the date he furnished material should be affixed.

c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material by Agents or clerical personnel.

d. All such material should be transmitted in the same manner as statements furnished by informant.

e. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. See section 107M for filing instructions.

H. PASSING INFORMATION IN DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition
   - a. In double agent operations information requested by the principals is frequently passed either to build up a double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.
   - b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that a net gain accrues to the U. S.
   - c. The information which is passed should be carefully handled and appropriate explanations created for its acquisition by the double agent to avoid his compromise.

2. Locating information to pass
   Wherever possible the field office handling the double agent should locate appropriate information to be passed; however, the Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority
   Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in a double agent operation except:
   - a. Newspaper articles
   - b. Magazine articles
   - c. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by a private company or corporation for distribution or sale to the public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use by engineering staffs and not intended for release to the public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material
   - a. True copies should be retained by the office of origin of any documents or material related to the national defense which is passed in double agent operations.
   - b. Such material should be appropriately identified by the double agent.
   - c. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with the passage of such material.
   - d. Similar action should be taken with regard to any material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to the national defense.
   - e. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where there is assurance that copies can be obtained at a later date from the Government agency or private concern having custody.

I. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
   - a. All informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of which the Bureau must be advised. Once a symbol number is assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned[to any other security, racial, or criminal informant or source or confidential technique.]
   - b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant the use of such designations.
   - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   - d. An additional cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between the informant and the field office.
   - e. Bureau should be advised of this cover name in addition to the permanent symbol.

- d. All such material should be transmitted in the same manner as statements furnished by informant.
- e. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. See section 107M for filing instructions.

H. PASSING INFORMATION IN DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition
   - a. In double agent operations information requested by the principals is frequently passed either to build up a double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.
   - b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that a net gain accrues to the U. S.
   - c. The information which is passed should be carefully handled and appropriate explanations created for its acquisition by the double agent to avoid his compromise.
2. Locating information to pass
   Wherever possible the field office handling the double agent should locate appropriate information to be passed; however, the Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of Government agencies.
3. Obtaining Bureau authority
   Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in a double agent operation except:
   - a. Newspaper articles
   - b. Magazine articles
   - c. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by a private company or corporation for distribution or sale to the public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use by engineering staffs and not intended for release to the public.)
4. Retention of copies of passed material
   - a. True copies should be retained by the office of origin of any documents or material related to the national defense which is passed in double agent operations.
   - b. Such material should be appropriately identified by the double agent.
   - c. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with the passage of such material.
   - d. Similar action should be taken with regard to any material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to the national defense.
   - e. It is not necessary to retain copies of build-up material obviously not evidentiary in nature where there is assurance that copies can be obtained at a later date from the Government agency or private concern having custody.

I. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
   - a. All informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of which the Bureau must be advised. Once a symbol number is assigned, it must not subsequently be reassigned to another[individual.]
   - b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant the use of such designations.
   - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   - d. An additional cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between the informant and the field office.
   - e. Bureau should be advised of this cover name in addition to the permanent symbol.

d. All such material should be transmitted in the same manner as statements furnished by informant.
e. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. See section 107M for filing instructions.

H. PASSING INFORMATION IN DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition
    a. In double agent operations information requested by the principals is frequently passed either to build up a double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.
    b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that a net gain accrues to the U. S.
    c. The information which is passed should be carefully handled and appropriate explanations created for its acquisition by the double agent to avoid his compromise.
2. Locating information to pass
    Wherever possible the field office handling the double agent should locate appropriate information to be passed; however, the Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of Government agencies.
3. Obtaining Bureau authority
    Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in a double agent operation except:
    a. Newspaper articles
    b. Magazine articles
    c. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by a private company or corporation for distribution or sale to the public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use by engineering staffs and not intended for release to the public.)
4. Retention of copies of passed material
    a. True copies should be retained by the office of origin of any documents or material related to the national defense which is passed in double agent operations.
    b. Such material should be appropriately identified by the double agent.
    c. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with the passage of such material.
    d. Similar action should be taken with regard to any material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to the national defense.
    e. It is not necessary to retain copies of build-up material obviously not evidentiary in nature where there is assurance that copies can be obtained at a later date from the Government agency or private concern having custody.

I. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
    a. All informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of
    [which the Bureau must be advised. [Once a symbol number is assigned,
    [it must not subsequently be reassigned to another informant.]
    b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant the use of such designations.
    c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
    [d. An additional cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between the informant and the field office.
    [e. Bureau should be advised of this cover name in addition to the permanent symbol.

d. All such material should be transmitted in the same manner as statements furnished by informant.

e. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. See section 107M for filing instructions.

[H. PASSING INFORMATION IN DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition
   a. In double agent operations information requested by the principals is frequently passed either to build up a double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.
   b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that a net gain accrues to the U. S.
   c. The information which is passed should be carefully handled and appropriate explanations created for its acquisition by the double agent to avoid his compromise.
2. Locating information to pass
   Wherever possible the field office handling the double agent should locate appropriate information to be passed; however, the Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of Government agencies.
3. Obtaining Bureau authority
   Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in a double agent operation except:
   a. Newspaper articles
   b. Magazine articles
   c. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by a private company or corporation for distribution or sale to the public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use by engineering staffs and not intended for release to the public.)
4. Retention of copies of passed material
   a. True copies should be retained by the office of origin of any documents or material related to the national defense which is passed in double agent operations.
   b. Such material should be appropriately identified by the double agent.
   c. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with the passage of such material.
   d. Similar action should be taken with regard to any material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to the national defense.
   e. It is not necessary to retain copies of build-up material obviously not evidentiary in nature where there is assurance that copies can be obtained at a later date from the Government agency or private concern having custody.]

I. SYMBOLS

[1. [Assigning numbers]
   a. All informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of which the Bureau must be advised.
   b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant the use of such designations.
   c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   d. An additional cover name or number should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between the informant and the field office.
   e. Bureau should be advised of this cover name or number in addition to the permanent symbol.

2. Communications - use of symbols
    a. After Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
    b. In all communications after the initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
    c. In communications between offices, the same procedure is to be followed.
    d. Informants and sources entering another division
        (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
        (2) Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence.
        (3) If an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
    e. In communications, the teletype abbreviation for the field office, symbol, and letter suffix "S" shall be shown to identify the informant; e.g., "NY 000-S."
    f. In communications concerning a potential security informant, the name of the potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
    g. Similarly, in communications relative to confidential sources, the abbreviation "CS" should be used; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."
    h. When symbol numbers are assigned to potential security informants, the designation should be as follows: "LA 000-PSI."
    i. In communications relative to a confidential source having a permanent symbol number, the following should be used: "CS LA 000-S."
    j. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the caption of the communication should show in addition a character and the country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing the mail at the Bureau.

J. INDEXING

1. True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name assigned to them for informants' use in submitting their statements, but not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name.
2. These index cards should show the file number of the informant and such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

K. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
    a. Alphabetical name index
        (1) In all offices all active potential security and security informant cards are to be kept by the SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice. This is to be known as the alphabetical name index.
        (2) File these cards in alphabetical order and also include cards for security confidential sources. These cards should show whether the individual is a potential informant, an informant, or a confidential source furnishing information on security matters.

2. Communications - use of symbols
    - a. After Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
    - b. In all communications after the initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
    - c. In communications between offices, the same procedure is to be followed.
    - d. Informants and sources entering another division
        - (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
        - (2) Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence.
        - (3) If an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
    - e. In communications, the teletype abbreviation for the field office, symbol, and letter suffix "S" shall be shown to identify the informant; e.g., "NY 000-S."
    - f. In communications concerning a potential security informant, the name of the potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
    - g. Similarly, in communications relative to confidential sources, the abbreviation "CS" should be used; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."
    - h. When symbol numbers are assigned to potential security informants, the designation should be as follows: "LA 000-PSI."
    - i. In communications relative to a confidential source having a permanent symbol number, the following should be used: "CS LA 000-S."
    - j. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the caption of the communication should show in addition a character and the country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing the mail at the Bureau.

J. INDEXING

1. True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name assigned to them for informants' use in submitting their statements, but not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name.
2. These index cards should show the file number of the informant and such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

K. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
    - a. Alphabetical name index
        - (1) In all offices all active potential security and security informant cards are to be kept by the SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice. This is to be known as the alphabetical name index.
        - (2) File these cards in alphabetical order and also include cards for security confidential sources. These cards should show whether the individual is a potential informant, an informant, or a confidential source furnishing information on security matters.

2. Communications - use of symbols

a. After Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.

b. In all communications after the initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.

c. In communications between offices, the same procedure is to be followed.

d. Informants and sources entering another division

(1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.

(2) Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence.

(3) If an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.

e. In communications, the teletype abbreviation for the field office, symbol, and letter suffix "S" shall be shown to identify the informant; e.g., "NY 000-S."

f. In communications concerning a potential security informant, the name of the potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."

g. Similarly, in communications relative to confidential sources, the abbreviation "CS" should be used; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."

h. When symbol numbers are assigned to potential security informants, the designation should be as follows: "LA 000-PSI."

i. In communications relative to a confidential source having a permanent symbol number, the following should be used: "CS LA 000-S."

j. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the caption of the communication should show in addition a character and the country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing the mail at the Bureau.

J. INDEXING

1. True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name assigned to them for informants' use in submitting their statements, but not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name.

2. These index cards should show the file number of the informant and such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

K. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index

a. Alphabetical name index

(1) In all offices all active potential security and security informant cards are to be kept by the SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice. This is to be known as the alphabetical name index.

(2) File these cards in alphabetical order and also include cards for security confidential sources. These cards should show whether the individual is a potential informant, an informant, or a confidential source furnishing information on security matters.

[2. Communications - use of symbols]

a. After Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.

b. In all communications after the initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.

c. In communications between offices, the same procedure is to be followed.

[d. Informants and sources entering another division]

(1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.

(2) Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence.

(3) If an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.

e. In communications, the teletype abbreviation for the field office, symbol, and letter suffix "S" shall be shown to identify the informant; e.g., "NY 000-S."

f. In communications concerning a potential security informant, the name of the potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."

g. Similarly, in communications relative to confidential sources, the abbreviation "CS" should be used; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."

h. When symbol numbers are assigned to potential security informants, the designation should be as follows: "LA 000-PSI."

i. In communications relative to a confidential source having a permanent symbol number, the following should be used: "CS LA 000-S."

[j. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the caption of the communication should show in addition a character and the country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing the mail at the Bureau.]

J. INDEXING

1. True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name or number assigned to them for informants' use in submitting their statements, but not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name.

2. These index cards should[show]the file number of the informant and such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

K. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index

a. Alphabetical name index

(1) In all offices all active potential security and security informant cards are to be kept by the SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice. This is to be known as the alphabetical name index.

(2) File these cards in alphabetical order and also include cards for security confidential sources. These cards should show whether the individual is a potential informant, an informant, or a confidential source furnishing information on security matters.

b. Symbol number index
   (1) The same official as set out in 1a (1) above is to maintain the symbol number index. This index shall contain a card for each individual to whom a symbol number has been assigned.
   (2) File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind the numerical symbol index.

c. The above indices (alphabetical name index and symbol number index) shall not be available for review by Agents seeking informant help in connection with their cases.

d. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by the official having custody of the cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of his activities and type of information he furnishes.

2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"

a. A separate index may be maintained for the use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.

b. If such index is maintained, a separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source that has been furnished.

c. These cards should contain brief background data, together with the identity of the Bureau communication which contains the complete background data.

d. File these cards alphabetically by name and symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.

3. Agents' informative index

a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by the same official as set out in 1a (1) above for the use of Agents on the type of informant coverage in the division.

b. File these cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.

c. Behind each geographical location there should be a guide card indicating the type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Civil Rights Congress, Polish Activity, etc.

d. On this guide card set forth the symbol numbers of the informants and confidential sources who can provide this coverage.

e. Potential informants, confidential sources, panel sources, and sources of information who do not have permanent symbols should be set forth by name.

f. When an individual can provide more than one type of information, his symbol or identity (if a potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information without a permanent symbol) should be set forth on as many guide cards as he may provide types of information.

[g. These guide cards should[show]the above data and it is permissible to place alongside the name or symbol number, as the case may be, the names of the contacting Agents to whom a request may be made for a specific check with the individual.

h. Also, there may be set forth on these guide cards symbol numbers of informants who move outside a division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities. They should be declassified from informants to confidential sources or sources of information. If any such individual has moved from a division and is being utilized by the division to which he has moved and has received a symbol number from the latter division, such designation should be indicated on the guide card.

i. The names or symbol numbers, as the case may be, of individuals contained in the index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on the appropriate guide cards in this index.

[4. [Currency and security]
All indices shall be maintained in a current status at all times in a manner which provides tight security of the information and yet makes it easily available to Agents having a need thereof.

L. INDEX CARDS

1. Index cards (3 by 5 inches) for the alphabetical name index shall be prepared as follows:

Name: (Informant, potential informant, or confidential source)
Symbol No:
File No:
Residence:
Telephone Number:
Business:
Telephone Number:
Type of Information:

Contacting Agent:
Alternate Agent:

2. Index cards (3 by 5 inches) for the symbol number index shall be prepared as follows:

Symbol: (Informant, potential informant, or confidential source)
File No:

Name:

3. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is[shown]in the informant's administrative file.

M. INFORMANT FILES

[1. [Opening]

a. When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as an informant or confidential source and he is not the subject of a security-type file, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the subject are discontinued.

b. If an individual is the subject of a security case and after being interviewed with Bureau authority he indicates he is cooperative and has potentiality as an informant, a 134 file should be opened and maintained in a pending status while under development as a potential informant.
[[In espionage and foreign nationality matters the existing file may
[be used rather than opening a new 134 file if this is practical and
[will reduce paper work.]

c. Individual files on all active informants should be maintained and carried as pending active files.

[2. [Monthly administrative report]
Files on potential informants and informants shall be included in the tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in the monthly administrative report.

[3. [Assignment and tickler cards]

a. Assignment and tickler cards should be maintained.

b. The true name of informant is not to appear on the assignment and tickler cards.

4. Subfiles

a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.

b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. Channelization

Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."

6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.

7. Dissemination of information

Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.

8. Correspondence

Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

9. Maintenance of files

a. All pending files on security informants shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, or field supervisor as the informant indices are maintained and described in subsection K.

b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.

c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.

d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re

From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

11. Form FD-238

Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases
   For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda in security cases following submission of reports, see[Manual of Rules and Regulations.]
7. Dissemination of information
   Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.
8. Correspondence
   Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.
9. Maintenance of files
   a. All pending files on security informants shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, or field supervisor as the informant indices are maintained and described in subsection K.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.
10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
    From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.
11. Form FD-238
    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. Channelization
Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."

[6. *Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases*
For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda in security cases following submission of reports, see volume III, section 87D, item 7g, of this manual.]

7. Dissemination of information
Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.

8. Correspondence
Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

9. Maintenance of files
   a. All pending files on security informants shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, or field supervisor as the informant indices are maintained and described in subsection K.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

11. Form FD-238
Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

4. [Subfiles]
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral,[except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution.] The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. [Channelization]
Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."

6. [Dissemination of information]
Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions[showing]the subject matter of the information.

7. [Correspondence]
Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

8. [Maintenance of files]
   a. All pending files on security informants shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, or field supervisor as the informant indices are maintained and described in subsection K.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

9. [Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re]
From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence[showing]this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

10. [Form FD-238]
Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in t[illegible] pertinent informant file and [illegible] not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

[[12.] Bulky material submitted by informant

Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
   - a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   - b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   - c. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items.
   - d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
   - a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   - b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   - c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   - d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   - a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   - b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
     - (1) Recommendation

       (Use following wording as nearly as possible: "I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months, effective ___(date).")

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

[[12.] Bulky material submitted by informant

Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
   - a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   - b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   - c. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items.
   - d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
   - a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   - b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   - c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   - d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   - a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   - b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
     - (1) Recommendation
       (Use following wording as nearly as possible:
       "I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months, effective ___(date).")

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

[[12.] Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED
1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   c. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items.
   d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
   a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
      (1) Recommendation
      (Use following wording as nearly as possible:
      "I recommend that authority be granted to
      continue (increase, decrease) payments to the
      above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week)
      for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week)
      for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months,
      effective ___(date).")

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized.
[[If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be
[noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be
[noted at that time.]
[11. [Bulky material submitted by informant]

Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

[N. PAYMENTS[TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED]

[1. [No gifts to informants]

a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.

b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.

c. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items.

d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.

[2. [SAC authority to pay informants]

a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.

b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."

c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.

d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.

[3. [Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority]

a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.

b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth
[containing the following items and using the subheadings[shown.]
[[(In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings
[where applicable.)]

(1) Recommendation

(Use following wording as nearly as possible:
"I recommend that authority be granted to
continue (increase, decrease) payments to the
above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week)
for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week)
for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months,
effective ___(date).")

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")

(3) Current membership [and position held] in subversive organizations [(When justification is submitted for racial informants, substitute the word "racial" for the word "subversive.")]

(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period

(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month (Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)

(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity

(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted (List separately.)

(8) Information furnished of unusual value

(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance

(10) Steps being taken to advance informant

(11) Stability and reliability (Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)

(12) Indoctrination against disclosure (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)

(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished

(14) Miscellaneous (Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

8 1/2 x 11

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")

(3) Current membership[and position held]in subversive organizations [(When justification is submitted for racial informants, substitute the word "racial" for the word "subversive.")]

(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period

(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month
(Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)

(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity

(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted
(List separately.)

(8) Information furnished of unusual value

(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance

(10) Steps being taken to advance informant

(11) Stability and reliability
(Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)

(12) Indoctrination against disclosure
(State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)

(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished

(14) Miscellaneous
(Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a specific period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")

[(3) Current membership[and position held]in subversive organizations
[[(When justification is submitted for racial informants, sub-
[stitute the word "racial" for the word "subversive.")]

(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period

(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month
(Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)

(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity

(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted
(List separately.)

(8) Information furnished of unusual value

(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance

(10) Steps being taken to advance informant

(11) Stability and reliability
(Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)

(12) Indoctrination against disclosure
(State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)

(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished

(14) Miscellaneous
(Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")
(3) Current membership in subversive organizations
(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period
(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month
(Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)
(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity
(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted
(List separately.)
(8) Information furnished of unusual value
(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance
[(10) [Steps being taken to advance informant]
(11) Stability and reliability
(Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)
(12) Indoctrination against disclosure
(State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)
(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished
(14) Miscellaneous
(Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")
(3) Current membership in subversive organizations
(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period
(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month (Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)
(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity
(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted (List separately.)
(8) Information furnished of unusual value
(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance
(10) Informant's potential for advancement
(11) Stability and reliability (Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)
(12) Indoctrination against disclosure (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)
(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished
(14) Miscellaneous (Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

[e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

[h. [Discontinuance of payments]
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

[i. [Extraordinary expenses]
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b.
5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
    a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
    b. Receipts should clearly show:
        (1) Date on which payment was made
        (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
        (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
        (4) Name of Agent making payment
        (5) Signature of person receiving the money
    c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
    d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
    e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.
6. Income tax returns
    a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
    [b.] Bureau income should be set forth under item 5 on page one of the Federal income tax return, form 1040, and explained under part V,[3,] schedule B, of the return as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.
    [c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.
    d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.]

4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
   e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Since all informants are considered independent contractors, [illegible] they receive from the Bureau is self-employment income but, si[illegible] Bureau does not consider their activity as the carrying on of [illegible] or business, they may consider dispensing with the filing of a schedule C as part of form 1040 if they so desire.
   c. The informant's own personal situation, however, should be taken into consideration as he may receive income from other sources as an independent contractor which would require the deduction of self-employment tax, regardless of any Bureau income he may receive.
   d. In considering the filing of a tax on self-employment income, such a return is based upon net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more. If an informant receives less than $400 from the Bureau and has no other self-employment income, this money in any event is not subject to the self-employment tax. If the informant receives $4800 or more from outside employment subject to Social Security tax, again the self-employment tax requirements do not apply.
   e. Bureau income should be set forth under item[5]on pa[illegible]ne of the Federal income tax return, form 1040, and explained [illegible]r[part [illegible] schedule B,]of the return as income received from other sources or personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. [If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.]
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. [Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.]
   [e.] When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Since all informants are considered independent contractors, the income they receive from the Bureau is self-employment income but, since the Bureau does not consider their activity as the carrying on of a trade or business, they may consider dispensing with the filing of a schedule C as part of form 1040 if they so desire.
   c. The informant's own personal situation, however, should be taken into consideration as he may receive income from other sources as an independent contractor which would require the deduction of self-employment tax, regardless of any Bureau income he may receive.
   d. In considering the filing of a tax on self-employment income, such a return is based upon net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more. If an informant receives less than $400 from the Bureau and has no other self-employment income, this money in any event is not subject to the self-employment tax. If the informant receives $4800 or more from outside employment subject to Social Security tax, again the self-employment tax requirements do not apply.
   e. Bureau income should be set forth under item 10 on page one of the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as "Other Income" and explained under schedule H(3) on page three of the return as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation [of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth[UACB.] In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Since all informants are considered independent contractors, the income they receive from the Bureau is self-employment income but, since the Bureau does not consider their activity as the carrying on of a trade or business, they may consider dispensing with the filing of a schedule C as part of form 1040 if they so desire.
   c. The informant's own personal situation, however, should be taken into consideration as he may receive income from other sources as an independent contractor which would require the deduction of self-employment tax, regardless of any Bureau income he may receive.
   d. In considering the filing of a tax on self-employment income, such a return is based upon net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more. If an informant receives less than $400 from the Bureau and has no other self-employment income, this money in any event is not subject to the self-employment tax. If the informant receives $4800 or more from outside employment subject to Social Security tax, again the self-employment tax requirements do not apply.
   e. Bureau income should be set forth under item 10 on page one of the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as "Other Income" and explained under schedule H(3) on page three of the return as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

[4. [Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority]
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth.
[[In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding
[only those applicable items in subsection 3b.]

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Since all informants are considered independent contractors, the income they receive from the Bureau is self-employment income but, since the Bureau does not consider their activity as the carrying on of a trade or business, they may consider dispensing with the filing of a schedule C as part of form 1040 if they so desire.
   c. The informant's own personal situation, however, should be taken into consideration as he may receive income from other sources as an independent contractor which would require the deduction of self-employment tax, regardless of any Bureau income he may receive.
   d. In considering the filing of a tax on self-employment income, such a return is based upon net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more. If an informant receives less than $400 from the Bureau and has no other self-employment income, this money in any event is not subject to the self-employment tax. If the informant re-
[ceives[$4800]or more from outside employment subject to Social Security tax, again the self-employment tax requirements do not apply.
   e. Bureau income should be set forth under item 10 on page one of the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as "Other Income" and explained under schedule H(3) on page three of the return as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

f. If the informant receives from outside employment less than $4800, all of which is subject to Social Security tax, the amount on which he will have to report for Social Security tax purposes, if he completes a schedule C, is the difference between the amount received from regular employment and $4800.

g. If informant completes a schedule C, the nature of business of the self-employed must be stated and informants should be instructed to use as the nature of self-employment any applicable occupation without revealing connection with the Bureau.

[h. When an informant or former informant is initially considered as a potential witness in a Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on the income he received from the Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling the situation.]

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department a set of Photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of Photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place. The office handling prosecution must determine from the Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:

(1) The correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) The first date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) The date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.

d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

- f. If the informant receives from outside employment less than $4800, all of which is subject to Social Security tax, the amount on which he will have to report for Social Security tax purposes, if he completes a schedule C, is the difference between the amount received from regular employment and $4800.
- g. If informant completes a schedule C, the nature of business of the self-employed must be stated and informants should be instructed to use as the nature of self-employment any applicable occupation without revealing connection with the Bureau.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses
   - a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department[a set of Photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of Photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place.] The office handling prosecution must determine from the[Government] attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:
     - (1) The correct, full name
     - (2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
     - (3) The first date of contact by your office
     - (4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
     - (5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. [Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.]
     - (6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
     - (7) The date of last contact by your office
     - (8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office
   - b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.
   - c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.
   - d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation
   - a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.
   - b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to

f. If the informant receives from outside employment less than $4800, all of which is subject to Social Security tax, the amount on which he will have to report for Social Security tax purposes, if he completes a schedule C, is the difference between the amount received from regular employment and $4800.

g. If informant completes a schedule C, the nature of business of the self-employed must be stated and informants should be instructed to use as the nature of self-employment any applicable occupation without revealing connection with the Bureau.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department[a set of Photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of Photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place.] The office handling prosecution must determine from the[Government] attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:

(1) The correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) The first date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. [Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.]
(6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) The date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.

d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to

f. If the informant receives from outside employment less than $4800, all of which is subject to Social Security tax, the amount on which he will have to report for Social Security tax purposes, if he completes a schedule C, is the difference between the amount received from regular employment and $4800.

g. If informant completes a schedule C, the nature of business of the self-employed must be stated and informants should be instructed to use as the nature of self-employment any applicable occupation without revealing connection with the Bureau.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department[a set of Photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of Photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place.] The office handling prosecution must determine from the[Government] attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:

(1) The correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) The first date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. [Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.]
(6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) The date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.

d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to

f. If the informant receives from outside employment less than[$4800,] all of which is subject to Social Security tax, the amount on which he will have to report for Social Security tax purposes, if he completes a schedule C, is the difference between the amount received from regular employment and[$4800.]

g. If informant completes a schedule C, the nature of business of the self-employed must be stated and informants should be instructed to use as the nature of self-employment any applicable occupation without revealing connection with the Bureau.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department tabulations of payments made to such prospective witnesses. The office handling prosecution must determine from the departmental attorneys what individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:

(1) The correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) The first date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses
(6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) The date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.

d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

9. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid under Bureau authority (not SAC authority) for services or expenses. If the confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all security informants not paid under Bureau authority.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

9. Handling money and property received by double agents
    a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.
    b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name.
    c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
    d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential
[sources being paid under[Bureau authority (not SAC authority)]for
[services or expenses. If[the]confidential source has no symbol
number, list his name.
[2. Also list the symbol numbers of all security informants[not paid
[under Bureau authority.]
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquart City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

9. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid for services or expenses on a regular basis. If such confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all unpaid security informants.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

[9. Handling money and property received by double agents

a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.

b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name or number.

c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.]

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid for services or expenses on a regular basis. If such confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all unpaid security informants.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
[[Jackson	" "]
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
[Las Vegas	" "]
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
[[Las Vegas	" "]
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
[Las Vegas	" "]
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
[[Tampa	" "]
Washington, D. C.	" "

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.

[4. Advise the Bureau[of the date]when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. [Advise the Bureau [of the date] when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.

[4. Advise the Bureau[of the date]when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the inf ant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each suc substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the s of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This except does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. The symbol number shall not be subsequently reassigned to another informant. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section[69F, volume III, of this manual.]
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those cases in which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card ["cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. The symbol number shall not be subsequently reassigned to another informant. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in [compliance with section[69F, volume III, of this manual.]
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those cases in which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. The symbol number shall not be subsequently reassigned to another informant. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section[69F, volume III, of this manual.]
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those cases in which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

such activities, the Bureau will consider placing him in contact with a reliable publisher, but it must be made clear to the informant that the Bureau will not sponsor or endorse any book or publication which he elects to write.

9. All payments to discontinued security informants and confidential sources must be made on a strict c.o.d. basis. Obtain Bureau authority before making any such payments. In requesting Bureau authority for payments of this type, submit complete details as to the information furnished by the discontinued informant or source in the past and what is to be expected of the informant or source in the future.

10. Once an informant is exposed in any manner whatsoever he is no longer to be carried as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth, together with descriptive data.

11. When an office receives information concerning, or obtains information from, an ex-informant, copies of memoranda prepared must be furnished to the office which originally handled the informant so that the file of the ex-informant will be as complete as possible.

12. When an informant has been discontinued for cause, such as unreliability, he should not be contacted in the future for information. If such an individual furnishes information it should be accepted, but in setting out the information in reports or communications use the individual's true name, together with an appropriate description of his reliability.

[13. Remove flash notice per section F,[6.]

14. Repeated use of the same discontinued informant as a witness at security trials and hearings should be avoided. Make an all-out effort to develop witnesses who can furnish the same testimony as that expected of previously used witnesses. Advise Bureau of any indication by Government attorneys that an informant-witness who has previously testified will be called upon for testimony at a subsequent trial or hearing and furnish your comments concerning possibility of supplanting the testimony of individual involved. Submit communication under appropriate case character.

15. Every effort should be made to prevent a discontinued informant from becoming involved in situations which may prove embarrassing to informant or the Government. Immediately after he testifies for the first time, a serious talk should be had with informant by the SAC in the presence of the Agent who handled the informant. This interview should be conducted in the field office and informant told that:

a. He will no longer be operated by the Bureau
b. Since he is a public figure, he will probably be contacted by representatives of the press, radio, and television for interviews and appearances
c. He may be sought as a witness by congressional committees, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and by state authorities
d. (Firmly stress.) In connection with such interviews and appearances, informant must continue to be factual and truthful and must not build up or embellish the statements, for if he does so he will wind up in serious trouble.

Advise Bureau results of such interview and comment on its possible effectiveness.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security or racial investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security and potential racial informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. [One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist [illegible] of the first page of the letter.] If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the [single-page] copy and [it will be] returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security or racial confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security or racial source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
7. Gifts
   Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

Be alert to the possibilities of former informant being contacted by representatives of publicity media and as a witness by congressional committees, INS, and state authorities. It will be the SAC's responsibility to know when a former informant is scheduled or is likely to appear at a hearing or make a public appearance of any kind. Prior thereto in each instance, former informant must be contacted and instructions above set forth reiterated by Agent who handled the informant. Emphasize to former informant that he must stick to the truth and make certain he can back up what he says, and if there is any deviation he will be subjected to harassment, criticism, possible libel, slander, or other criminal actions. If he inquires as to whether he should appear or testify or otherwise cooperate with any public or private individual or agency, advise him he must make that decision himself, but if he has appeared as a Government witness in a case which has not been finally adjudicated and decides in the affirmative, he should contact the USA for instructions. Advise Bureau of any such situations and the results of any interviews conducted.

R. FURNISHING OF INFORMANTS TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

1. INS conducts investigations of alien communists as required under the Immigration Act of 10-16-18, as amended. INS, in order to enforce this statute, must obtain evidence to prove that certain aliens, due to their membership in certain groups, are undesirable and deportable or subject to denaturalization.
2. Cooperate fully with INS in these cases and make efforts consistent with your own cases and interests to make available information and witnesses where possible.
3. In this regard, if contacted by INS inquiring for informants and you have a discontinued informant or one who would be of assistance to INS and whose loss would not affect your work, furnish his identity to the Bureau, together with your recommendation.
4. The Bureau will then review all of the facts concerning such informant and advise as to whether or not his identity may be disclosed to INS.
5. Exercise care in recommending informants for disclosure to INS so that you will not find yourself without proper coverage.
6. Before any informant is turned over to INS, obtain informant's permission.

[S. CORRECTIVE ACTION[ON FALSE INFORMATION]

1. When it is determined that an informant or ex-informant furnished false information while an informant, advise Bureau by airmail of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing the informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with a review of all data furnished by the individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from the informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify the cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing the information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to the specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by the Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations; corrective action should be called to the attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source;[e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."] Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.

2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source. Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   - d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security,[racial,]and criminal informants.
3. Index
   - a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, [racial informant index,]or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   - b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   - c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index,[racial informant index,]and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in[these] types of investigations.
4. Files

   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
1. Definition
See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source. Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. [Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security,[racial,]and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. [Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, [racial informant index,]or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. [[Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index,[racial informant index,]and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in[these] types of investigations.
4. Files
[When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source. Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards [on form FD-348] like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in both types of investigations.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. The same procedure should be followed concerning racial confidential sources, the classification being 137. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source. Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards [on form FD-348] like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in both types of investigations.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. The same procedure should be followed concerning racial confidential sources, the classification being 137. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   [[See page 3 of this section.]

2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications
     [for confidential source. [Communications relating to espionage and
     [foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character
     [indicating the country involved; e.g.,]IS - R for Russia.]
   - d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security and criminal informants.
3. Index
   - a. Index cards (3 by 5 inches) like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   - b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   - c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in both types of investigations.
4. Files

   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. The same procedure should be followed concerning racial confidential sources, the classification being 137. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

[[See page 3 of this section.]

2. Assignment of symbols
    a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
    b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
    c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications [for confidential source. [Communications relating to espionage and [foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character [indicating the country involved; e.g.,]IS - R for Russia.]
    d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
    e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security and criminal informants.
3. Index
    a. Index cards (3 by 5 inches) like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
    b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
    c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in both types of investigations.
4. Files

When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. The same procedure should be followed concerning racial confidential sources, the classification being 137. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau[of the date]when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security or racial investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security and potential racial informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security or racial source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
7. Gifts

[[Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be
[misconstrued.]

8. Discontinuance

Advise Bureau when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security or racial investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security and potential racial informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. [One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter.] If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the[single-page]copy and[it will be]returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.

6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security or racial source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

7. Gifts
   Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Utilization

a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security or racial investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security and potential racial informants.

b. [Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case,] confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.

c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.

d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.

e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:

(1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any

(2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.

f. If such request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation is to be placed on the duplicate copy and this latter copy returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.

6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of stability and payments

a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial confidential sources. See 107N, [3b,] for form of letter.

b. If the security or racial source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

7. Gifts

Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

8. Discontinuance

Advise Bureau when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

S F Phillips

SECTION 107

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

583
Part 1

(1) Correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) First date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) Date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.

d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

M. MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY LETTERS

[1. Submit monthly letter (FD-451,451a) to Bureau. Field divisions east of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 3rd of each month; field divisions west of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 7th of each month. Monthly letter should include the following:

a. Number of security informants, potential security informants, confidential sources, panel sources, informative assets, and operational assets at the beginning and end of each month also showing the number added and deleted during the month
b. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to informant and source development
c. Money paid for services and expenses under SAC authority
d. Statistical accomplishments
e. Security informant accomplishments

[2. Submit quarterly letter (FD-451b) to Bureau. Quarterly letter should include the following:
    a. Name, location and number of subversive groups including identities of groups on college campuses, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
    b. Symbol numbers of member informants providing coverage who are members of organizations. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.
    c. Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning subversive acts of violence, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
    d. Symbol numbers of informants and sources providing coverage of individuals or groups shown in Column C. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

DO NOT GIVE

23. Disinformation
The passage of deceptive information by an OA is a complex operation which requires detailed planning and coordination between field office and FBIHQ. This technique should be employed only in OA operations in which the foreign intelligence service has apparently accepted the bona fides of the OA, when the benefit will clearly outweigh the risk to the overall OA operation.

24. OA cover story
Be aware that a foreign intelligence principal may interrogate an OA in great detail as to how he secured his information, his family situation, his modus operandi, motivation, etc. Handling FBI SA must adequately prepare an OA for this probability. The most credible cover story is the one which involves the least fabrication.

Unless security or other considerations dictate otherwise, the OA should personally obtain the information he passes.

25. Receipt of money or property by OA
Impress upon each OA that money or property received from a foreign intelligence principal or agent must be turned over to the FBI since retention of this money would put the OA in technical violation of Federal statutes, and this money may be used as evidence or exhibit. Compensation to the OA from the FBI for his cooperation is to be handled separately. Nominal or personal gifts, necessary for the OA's security and to maintain his relationship with the principal, may be given back to the OA by his handling FBI SA, following FBIHQ approval. Consider the desirability and feasibility of obtaining a signed statement from each OA reflecting his understanding of this requirement. The obtaining of such a statement is not mandatory, but desirable.

Department attorneys have advised that, while it is not necessary to preserve that actual currency received by an OA, it is highly desirable to do so in cases in which prosecution could ensue. Whether or not the actual currency is retained, obtain a written statement from the OA
[describing the currency received by[type of note and issuing Federal
[Reserve Bank,]denomination, series number, and serial number; and also make an independent record of such currency.

The above instructions are not to be interpreted to require the impounding of funds paid to an OA by a foreign government or foreign intelligence service for goods or services rendered by the OA in legitimate, business transactions.

26. Payments to FCI assets - either OA or IA
a. When deemed necessary and expedient, each SAC is authorized to expend up to $400 to develop FCI assets. This money may be used to pay for services and/or expenses. This authority is renewable by FBIHQ if the initial $400 has been expended. Blue slip reclaiming payments from FBIHQ need not summarize information obtained since proliferation of this information could possibly jeopardize asset's security.

b. FBIHQ authority
  (1) If FCI asset is of such continuing value to justify regular payments, such payments must be approved by FBIHQ.
  (2) When initially requesting regular payment, submit evaluation via coded "Nitel" in the following order:
    (a) Amount paid to date, broken down into expenses and services
    (b) Number of contacts with handling FBI SA since last evaluation
    (c) Evaluation of stability and reliability
    (d) Concise summary of most valuable information furnished since last evaluation
    (e) Miscellaneous - changes in personal status, residence, employment, personal problems, etc., since last evaluation
    (f) SAC recommendations for authority to pay asset for next six-month period; specify amount to be authorized for services and amount for expenses
  (3) Continuation request should be made two weeks in advance of expiration of authority.
  (4) Submit an interim request for increase in regular payments authorized via coded "Nitel," with full justification.

c. Receipts

When payments are made either on SAC authority or FBIHQ authority, obtain receipts whenever possible. If receipt cannot be obtained, set forth circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.
  (1) Receipts should be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.
  (2) Receipts should show:
    (a) Date when payment was made
    (b) Period for which made when asset is paid on period basis
    (c) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services and expenses
    (d) Name of FBI SA making payment
    (e) Signature of asset receiving money using pseudonym assigned
  (3) Receipts are not to be witnessed.
  (4) If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by asset and not by FBI SA.
  (5) When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to FBIHQ, staple them directly to blue slip so that all information on receipt can be read without detaching it from blue slip.

27. Evaluation of FCI assets

a. OA

Whether OA is paid (under either FBIHQ or SAC authority) or unpaid, submit coded "Nitel" every six months evaluating OA according to the format of 26. b. (2). [If the OA is unpaid, submit six-month evaluation and request for continued utilization, if appropriate, on UACB basis.] If the OA has been paid during the preceding six-month period, merely set out the amount paid during that period (under 26. b. (2) (a)).

4. Contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401)concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among active duty military personnel.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.
5. All informants and sources are to be debriefed on at least a monthly basis regarding their knowledge of narcotics activities.

[[6. All pending informant files are to be reviewed personally by appropriate
[supervisory personnel on a regular periodic basis not to exceed 60 days.
[This review must include the informant's file and its subfiles.]

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Contacts by Agents
   - [a. Informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
   - b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
   - c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
   - d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
   - e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. [
   - f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
   - g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
   - h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
   - i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
   - j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.

5. Checking reliability
   - a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
   - b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.

6. Fingerprints
   - a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
   - b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
   - c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

[SECTION 107. [INTERNAL]SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES; [[AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[[PART I. INTERNAL SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES]

Page

A. Definitions........ 3
  1. Security informant........ 3
  2. Potential security informant........ 3
[3. [Deleted]
  4. Confidential source........ 3
  5. Panel source........ 3
B. Sources of Potential Informants........ 3
C. Background Inquiries on Individuals Being Considered for Informant Purposes........ 3
D. Approval, Indoctrination, and Development of Potential Informants........ 4
E. Bureau Policy........ 5
  1. Development of military personnel........ 5
  2. Contacts by designated Agents........ 5
  3. Divulging information to informant........ 5
  4. Recording investigative activity........ 5
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Informants........ 5
  1. Caution against divulging relationship........ 5
  2. Developing additional background........ 5
  3. Indications of instability........ 5
  4. Contacts by Agents........ 6
  5. Checking reliability........ 6
  6. Fingerprints........ 6
  7. Control - statement of cooperation........ 7
  8. Execution of party questionnaires........ 7
  9. Informant's activity in organizations........ 7
  10. Transfer of informants to other areas........ 8
  11. Action by informant when uncovered........ 8
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others........ 8
  13. Preparation for testifying........ 8
G. Informants' Information........ 8
  1. General instructions re oral and written information........ 8
  2. Recording written and oral information........ 9
  3. Transmission of information........ 10
  4. Handling of lead information........ 10
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants........ 10
H. Symbols........ 11
  1. Assigning numbers........ 11
  2. Communications - use of symbols........ 11
I. Indexing........ 11
J. Indices........ 11
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index........ 11
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"... 12
  3. Agents' informative index........ 12

SECTION 107. [INTERNAL]SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES; [AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

K. Informant Files 13
  1. Opening 13
  2. Monthly administrative report 13
  3. Assignment and tickler cards 13
  4. Subfiles 13
  5. Channelization 13
  6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 13
  7. Correspondence 13
  8. Maintenance of files 13
  9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 14
  10. Form FD-238 14
  11. Bulky material submitted by informant 14
L. Payments to Informants 14
  1. No gifts to informants 14
  2. SAC authority 14
  3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority 14
  4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 15
  5. Receipts 15
  6. Income tax returns 16
  7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 16
  8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 17
M. Monthly and Quarterly Letters 17
N. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 18
O. Discontinued Informants 19
P. Furnishing Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 20
Q. Corrective Action on False Information 21
R. Confidential Sources 21
  1. Definition 21
  2. Assignment of symbols 21
  3. Index 22
  4. Files 22
  5. Utilization 22
  6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 22
  7. Gifts 22
  8. Discontinuance 22
S. Panel Sources 22
  1. Definition 22
  2. Background investigation and approval 22
  3. Administrative handling 23
[T. [Deleted]
U. Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning 24
  1. Use of students 24
  2. Deleted
  3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage 24
V. Classification 24

TABLE OF CONTENTS

"SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION"

[[PART II. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (FCI) ASSETS

Page

[W. Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Assets

[1. Definitions.. 25
[a. Informative Assets (IA).................................. 25
[b. Operational Assets (OA).................................. 25
[2. Objectives of OA... 25
[3. Individuals to be considered as OAs.......................... 26
[4. Restrictions... 26
[5. Development of U. S. Military or other U. S. Government Personnel.. 27
[6. Development of personnel of foreign diplomatic establishment or international organization.............................. 28
[7. Development.. 28
[8. Opening of asset files....................................... 28
[9. Maintenance of FCI asset files and indices................... 28
[10. Symbol numbers.. 29
[11. Captions.. 29
[12. Background inquiries and interviews......................... 29
[13. Authority to operate assets................................. 30
[14. Contact with assets... 30
[15. Confidentiality of relationship............................. 30
[16. Reliability of assets....................................... 31
[17. Assignment of pseudonyms.................................... 31
[18. Recording of information received from asset................ 31
[19. Channelization of information of intelligence value received from the asset.. 32
[20. Passage of documents, written report or oral information, to hostile foreign intelligence............................... 32
[21. Oral information received from debriefing asset............. 34
[22. Coverage of OA meets with foreign intelligence officer, co-opted worker, or agent.................................... 34
[23. Disinformation.. 35
[24. OA cover story.. 35
[25. Receipt of money or property by OA.......................... 35
[26. Payments to FCI assets - either OA or IA.................... 35
[27. Evaluation of FCI assets.................................... 36
[28. Income tax returns.. 37
[29. Receipt of unemployment compensation........................ 37
[30. Monthly and quarterly letters............................... 37
[31. Corrective action on false information...................... 38
[32. Discontinuance of assets.................................... 38
[33. Discontinued assets... 39
[34. Classification.. 39]

"SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION"

[SECTION 107. [INTERNAL]SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES; 107A-C
[[AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS]

PART I

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.

[3. [Deleted]

4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check local arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file. In order to eliminate the possibility of jeopardizing the security of Bureau informants, the word "Informant" should not be indicated in blank ballot box on FD-165. It should be noted the informant file number serves as an indication to the Identification Division of the type of flash notice desired.
5. Review armed services record if applicable. FD-356 must be used in any routine check pertaining to informants making sure all references, such as symbol number, which would tend to identify individual as an informant are deleted.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
[8. [Deleted]

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
   a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of extremist and/or security informants, the number of potential extremist and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
   a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
   b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
   c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
   d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.

e. If potential informant is student, teacher, or has any similar relations with school, college, or university, in initial interview and subsequent handling, follow current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

3. Do not interview female potential informants in their homes or apartments unless necessary and any such interviews should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of superior in field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups and there will be no embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401)concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among active duty military personnel.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.
5. All informants and sources are to be debriefed on at least a monthly basis regarding their knowledge of narcotics activities.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Contacts by Agents
   a. Informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
   b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
   c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
   d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
   e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication.
   f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
   g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
   h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
   i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
   j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.
5. Checking reliability
   a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
   b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
6. Fingerprints
   a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
   b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
   c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

d. Flash notice is to be placed by field with Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.

e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

7. Control - statement of cooperation

[a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants to obtain maximum results and prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

b. Obtain signed statement set out below when feasible and practical. Where it is not practical to secure such signed statement from an [informant, advise Bureau of complete details. SAC and Agent handling [informant should determine appropriate time in informant's operation when statement should be completed.

> I, ________, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.

(Signed) ________ ____________

Witnessed: ______________

8. Execution of party questionnaires

Informants, particularly in Communist Party, often must execute party questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeoparidze their position as informants. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant.

9. Informant's activity in organizations

a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.

b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.

c. Changes in organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions are labeled as such.

d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but in such manner as to avoid suspicion.

10. Transfer of informants to other areas
    a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.
    b. Keep in mind overall coverage of organizations. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, encourage him to do so in order to provide wider coverage for Bureau's work.
11. Action by informant when uncovered
    a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, instruct him to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.
    b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without facts to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse issue to point where his services may not be lost.
    c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from strict discipline of organization involved, and thus cast off suspicion.
12. Requests of informant to help defend others
    a. If requested by Communist Party, or other interested parties to assist in preparation of defense in subversive-type cases or handle assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline.
    b. Such requests should be reported immediately to contacting Agent and made matter of record.
    c. If informant cannot avoid becoming involved, instruct him not to report any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.
    d. Promptly report any such incident to Bureau.
    e. If an informant is present in conversation between an attorney and individual under criminal indictment, he should immediately leave. If he is unable to do so and inadvertently learns of defense plans or strategy, he is not to report the substance of any such conversation to the FBI. Additionally, the informant is not to engage in or report the substance of a conversation with a criminal defendant dealing with the offense for which the defendant is under indictment.
13. Preparation for testifying
    Contacting Agent must condition informant to fact that someday knowledge he possesses may be needed as evidence in court. Psychologically prepare informant for fact that he may at future date be called upon to testify to information he has furnished on security matters. Proper indoctrination of informant is essential as Bureau must provide witnesses whenever Department initiates prosecutions in security cases.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION
1. General instructions re oral and written information
    a. These instructions apply to security informants, potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
    b. Specific instructions must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
    c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after meeting or activity.
    [d. Written statements should be submitted when possible.
    e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
    f. All information furnished by informants must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelizing and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies. In those instances in which an informant reports that an individual attended a meeting but took no active part therein and/or

nothing transpired of potential prosecutive value with respect to the individual, FD-306 should list the substantive case file number or should list subject's name and it will not be necessary to staple a copy of the informant's statement to FD-306. When informant's statement contains references to large number of individuals and/or organizations, and exceeds two pages, consider channelizing to substantive case file only those portions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should be employed unless logical reason dictates otherwise. When preparing lengthy channelizing memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit the number of copies prepared for each other such office to two. Clearly indicate next to the name of the receiving office, the number of the page containing information pertinent to that office and note on cover page that distribution of material to the receiving field office files is left to discretion of the receiving office. If the channelizing memorandum includes names of individuals who merely attended a meeting or gathering and played no important role, the reporting office is to attach to the channelizing memorandum a one-page memorandum listing the names of all individuals who were merely in attendance and had no important function. The preparation and distribution of the additional copies of the one-page attachment are left to the discretion of the receiving office.

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

2. Recording written and oral information
   a. Written by informant
      (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
      (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
      (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
      (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at top of statement.
      (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement.
      (6) Informants should include in statements specific dates and places; purpose of meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; and specific activity or comments of individuals present.
      (7) Informant should identify statement by affixing his code name immediately under the last written line on each page. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or initials of his code name.
      (8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.
      (9) Informant should refer to himself in body of statement by his true name and use third person.
      (10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., or place any markings whatever thereon.
      (11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on channelizing memorandum containing applicable items set forth on form FD-306.
      (12) Extraneous material should be kept to absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
         (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau
         (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant

(c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

Such data should be furnished orally by informant and recorded in memorandum form for informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant
  (1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with making of oral statement by informant to Agent. Leave out following items:
    (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau
    (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant
    (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

  Such data should be recorded in memorandum for informant file.
  (2) Prepare on paper devoid of Bureau markings or identification.
  (3) Date at top with date informant furnished information. No other date is desired except date of meeting or activity described in body of statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by Agent as if informant were preparing them himself.
(5) Information, after being reduced to writing, should be read promptly by informant and acknowledged by affixing his code name on each page.
(6) After informant authenticates statement, contacting Agent should prepare cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it. Thereafter statement should be handled as written one.
(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be included in office memorandum by Agent and should not be initialed by informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information
   a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants when possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such contacts. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.
   b. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory. More than one informant may send statements to a post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of postal employees.
   c. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under fictitious name.
   d. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for extended period of time.
   e. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication.
4. Handling of lead information
   a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to logical conclusion.
   b. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, tickler card should be prepared to follow informant and take other logical steps to obtain additional identifying data. Restrict tickler cards to information which would warrant investigation if identity established. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile.
5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants
   a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon informant's code name.
   b. Informant should affix date he received material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, date he furnished material should be affixed.
   c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material.
   d. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items. See section 107K for filing instructions.

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
   - a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
   - b. A symbol number designation should be afforded to all individuals from the time any step (generally the opening of an informant or source file) is taken to develop them as sources or informants. Upon assigning a symbol number, Bureau should be immediately advised by secure teletype of the symbol number, informant's true name, available background information, and cover name, if assigned, for indexing purposes.
   - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   - d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
   - e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; letters "CS" for confidential source.
   - f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to extremist, etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-S to NY 000-C or to NY 000-E).
   - g. An asterisk should not be used to designate certain highly sensitive informants or investigative techniques. Do not include asterisk in reporting information from such sources.
2. Communications - use of symbols
   - a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
   - b. In all communications after initial one, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
   - c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
   - d. Informants and sources entering another division
     - (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial secure teletype to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. Such a teletype should not be routed to a Resident Agency. Office receiving such teletype should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
     - (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be canceled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
     - (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
   - e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not used, name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
   - f. Captions of communications concerning informants and sources should contain a precise character designation to identify the organization with which they are most closely associated or on which they are most capable of furnishing information (i.e.,[Subversive]Matter - Students for a Democratic Society or SM - SDS,[Subversive]Matter - Young Socialist Alliance or SM - YSA,[Subversive]Matter -[Communist Party, USA]or SM -[CPUSA,]etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

J. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
   Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice
   a. Alphabetical name index
      In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, security con-
[fidential sources,[informative assets, and operational assets.] This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.
   b. Symbol number index
      This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.
   c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.
   d. Index cards
      Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

      Symbol: File No:
      (Informant, potential
      informant, confidential
[source,[informative asset,
[or operational asset)]

      Name:

   e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.

2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"
   a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.
   b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.
   c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.
   d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.

3. Agents' informative index
   a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.
   b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.
   c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.
   d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.
   e. Deleted.
   f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.
   g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.
   h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.
   i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

K. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
   - a. When active investigation is initiated regarding potential informant or confidential source who is not subject of security-type file, open 134 file.
   - b. If individual is subject of security case and after being interviewed appears to have potential as informant, open separate 134 file to [follow informant development.
   - c. Maintain individual files on all active informants as pending active files.
2. Monthly administrative report
   Include files on potential informants and informants in tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.
3. Assignment and tickler cards
   Maintain assignment and tickler cards, but do not show true name of informant, potential informant, panel source or confidential source on such cards.
4. Subfiles
   - a. [Subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral. File in this subfile original of each statement, whether personally written by informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent. Staple executed form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items on form FD-306 to original of each such statement.
   - b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Include excerpts from informant's statement in regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to case file in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   See Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Correspondence
   Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption.
8. Maintenance of files
   - a. Maintain all symbol number informant files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by SAC.
   - b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in open files section, provided there is no disclosure of informant's identity on statements.
   - c. Maintain informant files so that all information furnished by informant will be immediately available when needed.
   - d. In addition, maintain these files so identities of cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be obtained immediately by simply referring to file of informant and without extensive research.

9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
From time to time, Department expresses interest in using particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as witness. Place copies of all correspondence of this type in informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize information concerning each informant and place summary in appropriate file.
10. Form FD-238
Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) is used in security informant and potential security informant files in nature of table of contents or index to show where in file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as top document in informant file and is not to be serialized. If particular section of form is not applicable, note such thereon.
11. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than statement and same pertains to specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in investigative case file, together with copy of form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum. File original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum in subfile of informant or source and note thereon file and serial number where bulky material is located.

L. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS
1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on businesslike basis.
   c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority
   a. When deemed necessary and expedient to expend money to develop individual as informant to obtain information concerning security matters which is not otherwise obtainable or to advance expense money to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments up to $400 and totaling not more than $400 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. Blue slip reclaiming payments authorized by SAC must clearly and accurately explain circumstances and summarize information obtained so Bureau will be in position to pass intelligently on such matters.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to individual who has received payments totaling $400. Once individual has been paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on regular basis, recommendation should be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis."
   e. All newly developed security informants are to be paid under SAC authority for the first six months unless unusual circumstances exist. If additional funds under SAC authority are necessary during this period, submit request accompanied by detailed justification of past expenditures.
3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a regular basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, use form FD-401:
      (1) Membership
      List current membership and position held in any subversive group. If position identifies informant, submit separately by secure teletype (nitel).
      (2) Amount paid for services and expenses
      List by the month or week. Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.
      (3) Number of activities and persons on whom coverage is provided
      List number and type of meetings attended and other activities and number of persons on whom informant furnishes coverage and their importance.

(4) Number of statements submitted
Combine total number of oral and written statements submitted and show only total number.

(5) Stability and reliability
Check positive box if informant is considered stable and reliable. If not or if there are any personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or any other similar problems presented by informant, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(6) Indoctrination against disclosure
If informant has been indoctrinated against disclosure, check positive box.

(7) Percentage of information verified
Show percentage of information furnished by informant which has been verified through other sources.

(8) All necessary action taken on information furnished
If all action has been taken, check positive box. If not, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(9) Summary of information furnished
This summary should be concise, highlighting more pertinent information furnished by informant. Do not attempt to summarize all information furnished by informant.

(10) Miscellaneous
Furnish any change in informant's residence and employment by secure teletype (nitel), steps being taken to advance informant, and any other pertinent information which should be brought to Bureau's attention. Include statement that source has been advised that all payments of money made to him for services rendered must be declared as income on his tax return and has agreed to do so.

c. When payment to informant has been authorized for definite period of time, advise Bureau at least two weeks in advance of expiration of period as to whether services of informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in item 3b, above.

e. Submit letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant in duplicate except that copy should consist only of first page of letter. When payments are approved, single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at Bureau and returned. If recommendation is not approved, field will be advised by separate communication.

f. When payments are authorized by Bureau, it is personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure that full value is being received.

g. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears information being produced by informant is not commensurate with payments made to him, immediately discontinue payments or adjust accordingly and promptly advise Bureau.

h. If any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, FD-401 must be transmitted to Bureau every six months after date of designation containing same information set out in item 3b, above, except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of
[informant should also be set forth UACB.

5. Receipts
When payments are made either on SAC authority or prior Bureau approval, obtain receipts in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If receipt cannot be obtained for particular payment, set forth complete circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.

a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.

b. Receipts should clearly show:
   (1) Date on which payment was made
   (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on period basis
   (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where pertinent
   (4) Name of Agent making payment
   (5) Signature of person receiving money

c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.

d. If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by informant and not by Agent.

e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to Bureau, staple them directly to blue slip, leaving margin of one to one and one-half inches at top to avoid contact with Acco fastener punch. Place staples so that date or other data appearing on receipt will not be mutilated and all information on receipt can be easily read without detaching it from blue slip.

6. Income tax returns

a. Advise informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau that such compensation must be reported as income when filing a Federal income tax form, and, where appropriate, state and local tax forms. Informants must be periodically advised of the above and complete details of any reported problem an informant has encountered with the taxing authorities are to be expeditiously furnished the Bureau.

b. Bureau income should be set forth on Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

c. If informant is self-employed and files schedule C as self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with Bureau.

d. If informant cannot report payments received from Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as informant, such payments will be subject to 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning procedure to be followed in handling and control of money withheld.

e. When informant or former informant is initially considered as potential witness in Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on income he received from Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, Bureau must
[furnish Department set of [reproduced copies] of original receipts signed by prospective witnesses. Original receipts and set of
[[reproduced copies] will be transmitted to field office in whose territory trial will take place. Office handling prosecution must determine from Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to Bureau following information:

(1) Correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) First date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) Date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.

d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

M. MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY LETTERS

1. Submit monthly letter (FD-451, 451a) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Field divisions east of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 3rd of each month; field divisions west of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 7th of each month. Monthly letter should include the following:

a. Number of security informants, potential security informants, confidential sources, panel sources, [informative assets, and operational assets]at the beginning and end of each month also showing the number added and deleted during the month
b. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to informant and source development
c. Money paid for services and expenses under SAC authority
d. Statistical accomplishments
e. Security informant accomplishments

2. Submit quarterly letter [(FD-451b) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Quarterly letter should include the following:
   a. Name, location and number of subversive groups including identities of groups on college campuses, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   b. Symbol numbers of member informants providing coverage who are members of organizations. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.
   c. Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning subversive acts of violence, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   d. Symbol numbers of informants and sources providing coverage of individuals or groups shown in Column C. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

O. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When services of informant are discontinued, mark name card "canceled." Destroy symbol card. Never destroy name card.
2. Refile name card in numerical order by symbol number in symbol number index. If discontinued informant, potential informant, or confidential source to whom symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove name card from symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in name card section of index.
3. When potential informant or confidential source is discontinued and permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy alphabetical index card.
4. Advise Bureau of date when potential informant or informant is discontinued and reason therefor. Advise Bureau as to whether or not informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. Identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which informant has furnished information must be ascertained and Bureau advised in compliance with section 19, volume II, of this manual.
5. Review informant's file to determine if correspondence between Bureau and field relating to Department's interest in using informant as witness is contained therein. In those cases in which Department has indicated desire to consider informant when he becomes available, advise Bureau in each such substantive case, except when it is obvious statute of limitations has run or case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When above action is completed, advise Bureau.
6. Statement shall also be made to effect that measures to control informants, set out in item 7, below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears such are warranted.
7. When services of informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that informant will look to Bureau for counsel prior to taking any action against Bureau's best interests. Determine whether he has plans for writing book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, impress him with desirability of coming to Bureau for assistance and guidance. If informant insists on engaging in such activities, Bureau will consider placing him in contact with reliable publisher, but it must be made clear to informant that Bureau will not sponsor or endorse any book or publication which he elects to write.
8. All payments to discontinued informants and confidential sources must be made on strict c.o.d. basis. Obtain Bureau authority before making such payments. Submit complete details as to information furnished by discontinued informant or source in past and what is to be expected of informant or source in future.
9. Once informant is exposed in any manner whatsoever, do not carry him as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth, together with descriptive data.
10. When office receives information concerning, or obtains information from, an ex-informant, copies of memoranda prepared must be furnished to office which originally handled informant so that file will be as complete as possible.
11. When informant has been discontinued for cause, such as unreliability, do not contact him in future for information. If he furnishes information it should be accepted, but in setting out information in reports or communications use individual's true name, together with appropriate description of his reliability.
12. Remove flash notice per item F, 6, e of this section.
13. Avoid repeated use of discontinued informant as witness at security trials and hearings. Make all-out effort to develop witnesses who can furnish same testimony. Advise Bureau of any indication by Government attorneys that informant-witness who has previously testified will be called upon for testimony at subsequent trial or hearing and furnish comments concerning possibility of supplanting testimony of individual involved. Submit under appropriate case character.

14. Make every effort to prevent discontinued informant from becoming involved in situations which may prove embarrassing to informant or Government. Immediately after he testifies for first time, SAC should have serious talk with informant in presence of Agent who handled informant. This interview should be conducted in field office and informant told that:
    a. He will no longer be operated by Bureau
    b. Since he is public figure, he will probably be contacted by representatives of press, radio, and television for interviews and appearances
    c. He may be sought as witness by congressional committees, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and state authorities
    d. In connection with such interviews and appearances, informant must continue to be factual and truthful and must not build up or embellish statements, for if he does so he will wind up in serious trouble

    Advise Bureau results of such interview and comment on its possible effectiveness.

    Be alert to possibilities of former informant being contacted by representatives of publicity media and as witness by congressional committees, INS, and state authorities. SAC is responsible for knowing when former informant is scheduled or is likely to appear at hearing or make public appearance of any kind. Prior thereto in each instance, former informant must be contacted and instructions above reiterated by Agent who handled informant. Emphasize to former informant that he must stick to truth and make certain he can back up what he says, and if there is any deviation he will be subjected to criticism, possible libel, slander, or other criminal actions. If he inquires as to whether he should appear or testify or otherwise cooperate with any public or private individual or agency, advise him he must make that decision himself, but if he has appeared as Government witness in case which has not been finally adjudicated and decides in affirmative, he should contact USA for instructions. Advise Bureau of any such situations and results of any interviews conducted.
15. When contacting Agent feels discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to Bureau, make arrangements to have former informant come to field office where he will be personally met by SAC. At that time, he should be impressed with fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to security of country and remind him that he signed agreement when he was active as informant to maintain his relation with Bureau on confidential basis. SAC should stress necessity for informant to maintain this confidence.

P. FURNISHING INFORMANTS TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)
1. INS, in order to enforce its responsibilities, must obtain evidence to prove that certain aliens, due to their membership in certain groups, are undesirable and deportable or subject to denaturalization.
2. Cooperate fully with INS in these cases and make efforts consistent with your own interests to make available information and witnesses where possible.
3. If contacted by INS inquiring for informants and you have discontinued informant or one who would be of assistance to INS and whose loss would not affect your work, furnish his identity to Bureau, together with your recommendation.
4. Bureau will review facts and advise as to whether or not his identity may be disclosed to INS.
5. Before any informant is turned over to INS, obtain his permission.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a confidential source.
   b. Advise Bureau by secure teletype (Nitel) giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY 000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, extremist, and criminal informants.

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, extremist informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, extremist informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   [b. Contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, arrest and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate arrest and military records.

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit secure teletype (Nitel) to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

(1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

(4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

f. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a panel source. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number, e.g., PS NY 000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

[T. [DELETED]

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   a. Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
   b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.
2. Deleted
3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage
   Each office must have continuous and well-planned program to obtain necessary coverage at institutions of learning so that Bureau can fulfill its obligations. Care with which this must be done in no way lessens responsibility of each field office to have proper coverage.

V. CLASSIFICATION - 134

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
[Tampa	" "]
Washington, D. C.	" "

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. The symbol number shall not be subsequently reassigned to another informant. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section[69F, volume III, of this manual.]
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those cases in which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.
4. Confidential source
An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers, telephone company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations Secretariat, and individuals who furnish trash in connection with trash covers. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals which are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
    a. Complainants in security matters
    b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
    c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
    d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
    e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
    f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of[reserve]index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Survey possibilities of trash covers.
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members. The Progressive Party file also might prove a fertile field.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries

10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.

11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.

12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.

13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.

14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active

15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.

[[16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.

[17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat

[18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed
[in the U. S.

[19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are
[in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who
[will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the
[Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K, 6h, volume IV, of this manual.)]

[C. INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL[SECURITY]INFORMANTS

When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature
2. Discreet canvass of other informants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

[9. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name or number.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.]

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid for services or expenses on a regular basis. If such confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all unpaid security informants.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

   Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

   Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

f. If the informant receives from outside employment less than $4800, all of which is subject to Social Security tax, the amount on which he will have to report for Social Security tax purposes, if he completes a schedule C, is the difference between the amount received from regular employment and $4800.

g. If informant completes a schedule C, the nature of business of the self-employed must be stated and informants should be instructed to use as the nature of self-employment any applicable occupation without revealing connection with the Bureau.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department[a set of Photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of Photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place.] The office handling prosecution must determine from the[Government] attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:

(1) The correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) The first date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. [Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.]
(6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) The date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.

d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to

such activities, the Bureau will consider placing him in contact with a reliable publisher, but it must be made clear to the informant that the Bureau will not sponsor or endorse any book or publication which he elects to write.

9. All payments to discontinued security informants and confidential sources must be made on a strict c.o.d. basis. Obtain Bureau authority before making any such payments. In requesting Bureau authority for payments of this type, submit complete details as to the information furnished by the discontinued informant or source in the past and what is to be expected of the informant or source in the future.
10. Once an informant is exposed in any manner whatsoever he is no longer to be carried as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth, together with descriptive data.
11. When an office receives information concerning, or obtains information from, an ex-informant, copies of memoranda prepared must be furnished to the office which originally handled the informant so that the file of the ex-informant will be as complete as possible.
12. When an informant has been discontinued for cause, such as unreliability, he should not be contacted in the future for information. If such an individual furnishes information it should be accepted, but in setting out the information in reports or communications use the individual's true name, together with an appropriate description of his reliability.
13. Remove flash notice per section F, 6.
14. Repeated use of the same discontinued informant as a witness at security trials and hearings should be avoided. Make an all-out effort to develop witnesses who can furnish the same testimony as that expected of previously used witnesses. Advise Bureau of any indication by Government attorneys that an informant-witness who has previously testified will be called upon for testimony at a subsequent trial or hearing and furnish your comments concerning possibility of supplanting the testimony of individual involved. Submit communication under appropriate case character.
15. Every effort should be made to prevent a discontinued informant from becoming involved in situations which may prove embarrassing to informant or the Government. Immediately after he testifies for the first time, a serious talk should be had with informant by the SAC in the presence of the agent who handled the informant. This interview should be conducted in the field office and informant told that:
    a. He will no longer be operated by the Bureau
    b. Since he is a public figure, he will probably be contacted by representatives of the press, radio, and television for interviews and appearances
    c. He may be sought as a witness by congressional committees, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and by state authorities
    d. (Firmly stress.) In connection with such interviews and appearances, informant must continue to be factual and truthful and must not build up or embellish the statements, for if he does so he will wind up in serious trouble.

Advise Bureau results of such interview and comment on its possible effectiveness.

Be alert to the possibilities of former informant being contacted by representatives of publicity media and as a witness by congressional committees, INS, and state authorities. It will be the SAC's responsibility to know when a former informant is scheduled or is likely to appear at a hearing or make a public appearance of any kind. Prior thereto in each instance, former informant must be contacted and instructions above set forth reiterated by Agent who handled the informant. Emphasize to former informant that he must stick to the truth and make certain he can back up what he says, and if there is any deviation he will be subjected to harassment, criticism, possible libel, slander, or other criminal actions. If he inquires as to whether he should appear or testify or otherwise cooperate with any public or private individual or agency, advise him he must make that decision humself, but if he has appeared as a Government witness in a case which has not been finally adjudicated and decides in the affirmative, he should contact the USA for instructions. Advise Bureau of any such situations and the results of any interviews conducted.

[16. Whenever contacting Agent feels a discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to the Bureau, arrangements should be made to have the former informant come to the field office where he will be personally met by the SAC. At that time, he should be impressed with the fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to the security of the country and remind him that he signed an agreement when he was active as an informant to maintain his relation with the Bureau on a confidential basis. The SAC should stress the necessity for the informant to maintain this confidence.]

R. FURNISHING OF INFORMANTS TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

1. INS conducts investigations of alien communists as required under the Immigration Act of 10-16-18, as amended. INS, in order to enforce this statute, must obtain evidence to prove that certain aliens, due to their membership in certain groups, are undesirable and deportable or subject to denaturalization.
2. Cooperate fully with INS in these cases and make efforts consistent with your own cases and interests to make available information and witnesses where possible.
3. In this regard, if contacted by INS inquiring for informants and you have a discontinued informant or one who would be of assistance to INS and whose loss would not affect your work, furnish his identity to the Bureau, together with your recommendation.
4. The Bureau will then review all of the facts concerning such informant and advise as to whether or not his identity may be disclosed to INS.
5. Exercise care in recommending informants for disclosure to INS so that you will not find yourself without proper coverage.
6. Before any informant is turned over to INS, obtain informant's permission.

S. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that an informant or ex-informant furnished false information while an informant, advise Bureau by airmail of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing the informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with a review of all data furnished by the individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from the informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify the cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing the information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to the specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by the Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations; corrective action should be called to the attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
[Las Vegas	" "]
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. The symbol number shall not be subsequently reassigned to another informant. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section [69F, volume III, of this manual.]
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those cases in which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."

[6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases
   For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda in security cases following submission of reports, see volume III, section 87D, item 7g, of this manual.]

7. Dissemination of information
   Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.
8. Correspondence
   Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.
9. Maintenance of files
   a. All pending files on security informants shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, or field supervisor as the informant indices are maintained and described in subsection K.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.
10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
    From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.
11. Form FD-238
    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

[[12.] Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   c. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items.
   d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
   a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
      (1) Recommendation
      (Use following wording as nearly as possible:
      "I recommend that authority be granted to
      continue (increase, decrease) payments to the
      above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week)
      for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week)
      for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months,
      effective ___(date).")

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
[Las Vegas	" "]
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")
(3) Current membership in subversive organizations
(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period
(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month
(Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)
(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity
(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted
(List separately.)
(8) Information furnished of unusual value
(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance
[(10) [Steps being taken to advance informant]
(11) Stability and reliability
(Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)
(12) Indoctrination against disclosure
(State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)
(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished
(14) Miscellaneous
(Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth[UACB.] In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Since all informants are considered independent contractors, the income they receive from the Bureau is self-employment income but, since the Bureau does not consider their activity as the carrying on of a trade or business, they may consider dispensing with the filing of a schedule C as part of form 1040 if they so desire.
   c. The informant's own personal situation, however, should be taken into consideration as he may receive income from other sources as an independent contractor which would require the deduction of self-employment tax, regardless of any Bureau income he may receive.
   d. In considering the filing of a tax on self-employment income, such a return is based upon net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more. If an informant receives less than $400 from the Bureau and has no other self-employment income, this money in any event is not subject to the self-employment tax. If the informant receives $4800 or more from outside employment subject to Social Security tax, again the self-employment tax requirements do not apply.
   e. Bureau income should be set forth under item 10 on page one of the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as "Other Income" and explained under schedule H(3) on page three of the return as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

- d. All such material should be transmitted in the same manner as statements furnished by informant.
- e. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. See section 107M for filing instructions.

H. PASSING INFORMATION IN DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition
    - a. In double agent operations information requested by the principals is frequently passed either to build up a double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.
    - b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that a net gain accrues to the U. S.
    - c. The information which is passed should be carefully handled and appropriate explanations created for its acquisition by the double agent to avoid his compromise.
2. Locating information to pass
   Wherever possible the field office handling the double agent should locate appropriate information to be passed; however, the Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of Government agencies.
3. Obtaining Bureau authority
   Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in a double agent operation except:
    - a. Newspaper articles
    - b. Magazine articles
    - c. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by a private company or corporation for distribution or sale to the public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use by engineering staffs and not intended for release to the public.)
4. Retention of copies of passed material
    - a. True copies should be retained by the office of origin of any documents or material related to the national defense which is passed in double agent operations.
    - b. Such material should be appropriately identified by the double agent.
    - c. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with the passage of such material.
    - d. Similar action should be taken with regard to any material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to the national defense.
    - e. It is not necessary to retain copies of build-up material obviously not evidentiary in nature where there is assurance that copies can be obtained at a later date from the Government agency or private concern having custody.

I. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
    - a. All informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of
      [which the Bureau must be advised. [Once a symbol number is assigned,
      [it must not subsequently be reassigned to another informant.]
    - b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant the use of such designations.
    - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
    - [d. An additional cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between the informant and the field office.
    - [e. Bureau should be advised of this cover name in addition to the permanent symbol.

2. Communications - use of symbols
   a. After Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
   b. In all communications after the initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
   c. In communications between offices, the same procedure is to be followed.
   d. Informants and sources entering another division
      (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
      (2) Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence.
      (3) If an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
   e. In communications, the teletype abbreviation for the field office, symbol, and letter suffix "S" shall be shown to identify the informant; e.g., "NY 000-S."
   f. In communications concerning a potential security informant, the name of the potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
   g. Similarly, in communications relative to confidential sources, the abbreviation "CS" should be used; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."
   h. When symbol numbers are assigned to potential security informants, the designation should be as follows: "LA 000-PSI."
   i. In communications relative to a confidential source having a permanent symbol number, the following should be used: "CS LA 000-S."
   j. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the caption of the communication should show in addition a character and the country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing the mail at the Bureau.

J. INDEXING
1. True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name assigned to them for informants' use in submitting their statements, but not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name.
2. These index cards should show the file number of the informant and such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

K. INDICES
1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
   a. Alphabetical name index
      (1) In all offices all active potential security and security informant cards are to be kept by the SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice. This is to be known as the alphabetical name index.
      (2) File these cards in alphabetical order and also include cards for security confidential sources. These cards should show whether the individual is a potential informant, an informant, or a confidential source furnishing information on security matters.

8. Potential security informants in espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105K, 6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered.
9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.
10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant.

D. INTERVIEWS AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to develop individual as a security informant.
2. When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy.
3. Carefully plan initial interviews as to time and location to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau.
5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.
6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months. [Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis,]should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months, and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These[letters should]follow the[form indicated]under section 107N, 3b, [but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation.] (Refer to section 105K, 6h, (3), (b), volume IV, of this manual for exception to this rule in deseco matters.)
7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.
8. During interviews with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
9. Potential informant should have contacts, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field.
10. If individual does not have potential as above described but is willing to cooperate, consider indicating to him he can be of assistance if he places himself in a position where he may be able to obtain information of value. In this regard, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desires; also, it may be mentioned that if he subscribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest may be shown in him which, if developed, would be the means whereby he could obtain information.
11. Inform potential informants who agree to assist the Bureau that such assistance must be strictly voluntary and they are to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved.

12. During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.

13. Specifically advise each potential informant that he is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon the informant.

14. Advise potential informant that his cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. This must be thoroughly impressed upon the informant before you accept him as such. If the informant has a special problem which would require his revealing his relationship to his wife, etc., this should be learned from him during the initial interview and a recommendation made to the Bureau when the results of the interview are furnished. The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau.

15. If a prospective informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration in labor unions by subversive elements.

16. If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in his initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.

17. From the first interview with a potential informant through his development and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant.

18. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a potential witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.]

E. BUREAU POLICY

[1. Development of military personnel]
Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.

[2. Contacts by designated Agents]
Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated[to contact him.]

[3. Divulging information to informant]
No information should be divulged to[a potential]informant[or an informant] concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to[his]proper operation.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.
4. Confidential source
   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers, telephone company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations Secretariat, and individuals who furnish trash in connection with trash covers. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals which are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. [Review of[reserve]index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Survey possibilities of trash covers.
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members. The Progressive Party file also might prove a fertile field.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K, 6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

C. INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature
2. Discreet canvass of[logical]informants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
A. Definitions 3
  1. Security informant 3
  2. Potential security informant 3
  3. Double agent 3
  4. Confidential source 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
C. Investigation of Potential Security Informants 4
D. Interviews and Development of Potential Security Informants 5
E. Bureau Policy 6
  1. Development of military personnel 6
  2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
  3. Divulging information to informant 6
  4. Recording investigative activity 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
  1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
  2. Developing additional background 7
  3. Handling indications of instability 7
  4. Contacts by Agents 7
    [Form FD-209 8
  5. Checking reliability 8
  6. Fingerprints 8
  7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
  8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
  9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
  10. Transfer of informants to other areas 9
  11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
G. Informants' Information 10
  1. General instructions re oral and written information 10
  2. Recording written and oral information 10
  3. Transmission of information 12
  4. Handling of lead information 12
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations 13
  1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
  2. Locating information to pass 13
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
  4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
I. Symbols 13
  1. Assigning numbers 13
  2. Communications - use of symbols 14
J. Indexing 14
K. Indices 14
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
  3. Agents' informative index 15
  4. Currency and security 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
[L. Index Cards 15
[M. Informant Files 16
[1. Opening 16
[2. Monthly administrative report 16
[3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
[4. Subfiles 17
[5. Channelization 17
[6. Dissemination of information 17
[7. Correspondence 17
[8. Maintenance of files 17
[9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
[10. Form FD-238 17
[11. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
[N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
[1. No gifts to informants 18
[2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
[3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
[4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 20
[5. Receipts 20
[6. Income tax returns 20
[7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
[8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
[9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
[O. Semiannual Letter 22
[P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
[Q. Discontinued Informants 24
[R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 26
[S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
[T. Classification 27
[U. Confidential Sources 27
[1. Definition 27
[2. Assignment of symbols 27
[3. Index 27
[4. Files 27
[5. Utilization 28
[6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 28
[7. Gifts 28
[8. Discontinuance 28

f. If the informant receives from outside employment less than $4800, all of which is subject to Social Security tax, the amount on which he will have to report for Social Security tax purposes, if he completes a schedule C, is the difference between the amount received from regular employment and $4800.

g. If informant completes a schedule C, the nature of business of the self-employed must be stated and informants should be instructed to use as the nature of self-employment any applicable occupation without revealing connection with the Bureau.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department[a set of Photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of Photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place.] The office handling prosecution must determine from the[Government] attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:

(1) The correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) The first date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. [Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.]
(6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) The date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.

d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to

protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

9. Handling money and property received by double agents
   - a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.
   - b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name.
   - c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   - d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid for services or expenses on a regular basis. If such confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all unpaid security informants.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

(6) Informants should include in the body of their statements specific dates and places; purpose of the meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; specific activity engaged in by each individual present; and comments made by each individual.

(7) Informant should identify each page at the bottom by affixing his code name. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be similarly identified.

(8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.

(9) Informant should refer to himself in the body of the statement by his true name and he should use the third person.

(10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., thereto, nor should he place any markings thereon, such as his initials, date of receipt from informant, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc.

(11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum which should contain the applicable items set forth on form FD-306.

(12) Extraneous material should be kept to an absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
   (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
   (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
   (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be furnished orally by informant to contacting Agent who will record the information in memorandum form for the informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant

(1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with the making of the oral statement by the informant to the Agent. The following items furnished by informant should be left out:
   (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
   (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
   (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be recorded in memorandum form for the informant file.

(2) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(3) Date it at the top with the date the informant furnishes the information to the Agent. No other date is desired except the date of the meeting or activity which shall be set forth in the body of the statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or each separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by the Agent as if the informant were preparing them himself.

(5) The information, after being reduced to writing, should then be read promptly by the informant and acknowledged by him by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters authentication by informants is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) After informant authenticates his statement, contacting Agent should prepare a cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it and thereafter the statement should be handled as a written one in accordance with instructions set out in 2, a, (10), and (11).

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be incorporated in an office memorandum by the Agent and should not be initialed by the informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information

a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants whenever possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such personal contacts.

b. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency.

c. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.

d. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may [illegible] listed in post office directory.

e. More than one informant may send statements to a specific post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of post office employees.

f. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under a fictitious name in the same manner as d.

g. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for any extended period of time.

h. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest to Bureau, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication. Office should take any necessary action without delay.

4. Handling of lead information

a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to a logical conclusion.

b. If there is only partial name of individual or meager descriptive data, and if there is sufficient data available to do so, file should be opened and assigned to effect an identification and to take any necessary action.

c. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, a tickler card should be prepared to follow with the informant and take other logical steps in an effort to obtain additional identifying data concerning the individual. Tickler cards should be restricted to information which would warrant investigation if an identity is established. This will eliminate inconsequential items, but at the same time definite steps must be taken to run out affirmative information. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile. If an identification is made, a file should be opened and any necessary action taken in connection therewith.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants

a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon the informant's code name.

b. Informant should affix date he received the material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, the date he furnished material should be affixed.

c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material by Agents or clerical personnel.

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")
(3) Current membership[and position held]in subversive organizations [(When justification is submitted for racial informants, substitute the word "racial" for the word "subversive.")]
(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period
(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month (Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)
(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity
(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted (List separately.)
(8) Information furnished of unusual value
(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance
(10) Steps being taken to advance informant
(11) Stability and reliability (Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)
(12) Indoctrination against disclosure (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)
(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished
(14) Miscellaneous (Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. [If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.]
    a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
    b. Receipts should clearly show:
        (1) Date on which payment was made
        (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
        (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
        (4) Name of Agent making payment
        (5) Signature of person receiving the money
    c. [Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
    d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.]
    [e.] When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
    a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
    b. Since all informants are considered independent contractors, the income they receive from the Bureau is self-employment income but, since the Bureau does not consider their activity as the carrying on of a trade or business, they may consider dispensing with the filing of a schedule C as part of form 1040 if they so desire.
    c. The informant's own personal situation, however, should be taken into consideration as he may receive income from other sources as an independent contractor which would require the deduction of self-employment tax, regardless of any Bureau income he may receive.
    d. In considering the filing of a tax on self-employment income, such a return is based upon net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more. If an informant receives less than $400 from the Bureau and has no other self-employment income, this money in any event is not subject to the self-employment tax. If the informant receives $4800 or more from outside employment subject to Social Security tax, again the self-employment tax requirements do not apply.
    e. Bureau income should be set forth under item 10 on page one of the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as "Other Income" and explained under schedule H(3) on page three of the return as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

f. If the informant receives from outside employment less than $4800, all of which is subject to Social Security tax, the amount on which he will have to report for Social Security tax purposes, if he completes a schedule C, is the difference between the amount received from regular employment and $4800.

g. If informant completes a schedule C, the nature of business of the self-employed must be stated and informants should be instructed to use as the nature of self-employment any applicable occupation without revealing connection with the Bureau.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department[a set of Photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of Photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place.] The office handling prosecution must determine from the[Government] attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:

(1) The correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) The first date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. [Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.]
(6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) The date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.

d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to

protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

9. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential
[sources being paid under[Bureau authority (not SAC authority)]for
[services or expenses. If[the]confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
[2. Also list the symbol numbers of all security informants[not paid
[under Bureau authority.]
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquart City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

(6) Informants should include in the body of their statements specific dates and places; purpose of the meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; specific activity engaged in by each individual present; and comments made by each individual.

(7) Informant should identify each page at the bottom by affixing his code name. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified [by informant affixing his code name or the initials of his code name.]

(8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.

(9) Informant should refer to himself in the body of the statement by his true name and he should use the third person.

(10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., thereto, nor should he place any markings thereon, such as his initials, date of receipt from informant, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc.

(11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum which should contain the applicable items set forth on form FD-306.

(12) Extraneous material should be kept to an absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
- (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
- (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
- (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be furnished orally by informant to contacting Agent who will record the information in memorandum form for the informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant

(1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with the making of the oral statement by the informant to the Agent. The following items furnished by informant should be left out:
- (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
- (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
- (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant.

These data should be recorded in memorandum form for the informant file.

(2) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(3) Date it at the top with the date the informant furnishes the information to the Agent. No other date is desired except the date of the meeting or activity which shall be set forth in the body of the statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or each separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by the Agent as if the informant were preparing them himself.

(5) The information, after being reduced to writing, should then be read promptly by the informant and acknowledged by him by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters authentication by informants is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) After informant authenticates his statement, contacting Agent should prepare a cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it and thereafter the statement should be handled as a written one in accordance with instructions set out in 2, a, (10), and (11).

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be incorporated in an office memorandum by the Agent and should not be initialed by the informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information
   - a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants whenever possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such personal contacts.
   - b. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency.
   - c. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.
   - d. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory.
   - e. More than one informant may send statements to a specific post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of post office employees.
   - f. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under a fictitious name in the same manner as d.
   - g. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for any extended period of time.
   - h. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest to Bureau, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication. Office should take any necessary action without delay.

4. Handling of lead information
   - a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to a logical conclusion.
   - b. If there is only partial name of individual or meager descriptive data, and if there is sufficient data available to do so, file should be opened and assigned to effect an identification and to take any necessary action.
   - c. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, a tickler card should be prepared to follow with the informant and take other logical steps in an effort to obtain additional identifying data concerning the individual. Tickler cards should be restricted to information which would warrant investigation if an identity is established. This will eliminate inconsequential items, but at the same time definite steps must be taken to run out affirmative information. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile. If an identification is made, a file should be opened and any necessary action taken in connection therewith.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants
   - a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon the informant's code name.
   - b. Informant should affix date he received the material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, the date he furnished material should be affixed.
   - c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material by Agents or clerical personnel.

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of following submission of reports in security cases
   For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda in security cases following submission of reports, see[Manual of Rules and Regulations.]
7. Dissemination of information
   Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.
8. Correspondence
   Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.
9. Maintenance of files
   a. All pending files on security informants shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, or field supervisor as the informant indices are maintained and described in subsection K.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to assure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.
10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
    From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.
11. Form FD-238
    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

[[12.] Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
    - a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
    - b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
    - c. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items.
    - d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
    - a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
    - b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
    - c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
    - d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
    - a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
    - b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
        - (1) Recommendation
          (Use following wording as nearly as possible:
          "I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months, effective ___(date).")

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source. Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards [on form FD-348] like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in both types of investigations.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. The same procedure should be followed concerning racial confidential sources, the classification being 137. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security or racial investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security and potential racial informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. [One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist of [illegible] of the first page of the letter.] If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the[single-page]copy and[it will be]returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of stab[illegible]y and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submi[illegible] the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security [illegible]ial confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security or racial source is not being paid on Bur[illegible]thorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
7. Gifts
   Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

f. If the informant receives from outside employment less than $4800, all of which is subject to Social Security tax, the amount on which he will have to report for Social Security tax purposes, if he completes a schedule C, is the difference between the amount received from regular employment and $4800.

g. If informant completes a schedule C, the nature of business of the self-employed must be stated and informants should be instructed to use as the nature of self-employment any applicable occupation without revealing connection with the Bureau.

[h. When an informant or former informant is initially considered as a potential witness in a Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on the income he received from the Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling the situation.]

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department a set of Photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of Photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place. The office handling prosecution must determine from the Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:

(1) The correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) The first date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) The date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.

d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

9. Handling money and property received by double agents

a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.

b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name.

c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid under Bureau authority (not SAC authority) for services or expenses. If the confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all security informants not paid under Bureau authority.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. When no informant coverage exists or where coverage [illegible] provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factor should be shown relative to each unit.

Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")
(3) Current membership[and position held]in subversive organizations [(When justification is submitted for racial informants, substitute the word "racial" for the word "subversive.")]
(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period
(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month (Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)
(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity
(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted (List separately.)
(8) Information furnished of unusual value
(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance
(10) Steps being taken to advance informant
(11) Stability and reliability (Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)
(12) Indoctrination against disclosure (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)
(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished
(14) Miscellaneous (Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a [illegible] period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.
d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.
e. Letter requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.
f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.
g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.
h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.
i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
   e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Since all informants are considered independent contractors, the income they receive from the Bureau is self-employment income but, since the Bureau does not consider their activity as the carrying on of a trade or business, they may consider dispensing with the filing of a schedule C as part of form 1040 if they so desire.
   c. The informant's own personal situation, however, should be taken into consideration as he may receive income from other sources as an independent contractor which would require the deduction of self-employment tax, regardless of any Bureau income he may receive.
   d. In considering the filing of a tax on self-employment income, such a return is based upon net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more. If an informant receives less than $400 from the Bureau and has no other self-employment income, this money in any event is not subject to the self-employment tax. If the informant receives $4800 or more from outside employment subject to Social Security tax, again the self-employment tax requirements do not apply.
   e. Bureau income should be set forth under item[5]on page one of the Federal income tax return, form 1040, and explained under[part of schedule B,]of the return as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

b. Symbol number index
    (1) The same official as set out in 1a (1) above is to maintain the symbol number index. This index shall contain a card for each individual to whom a symbol number has been assigned.
    (2) File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind the numerical symbol index.

c. The above indices (alphabetical name index and symbol number index) shall not be available for review by Agents seeking informant help in connection with their cases.

d. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by the official having custody of the cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of his activities and type of information he furnishes.

2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"

a. A separate index may be maintained for the use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.

b. If such index is maintained, a separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source that has been furnished.

c. These cards should contain brief background data, together with the identity of the Bureau communication which contains the complete background data.

d. File these cards alphabetically by name and symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.

3. Agents' informative index

a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by the same official as set out in 1a (1) above for the use of Agents on the type of informant coverage in the division.

b. File these cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.

c. Behind each geographical location there should be a guide card indicating the type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Civil Rights Congress, Polish Activity, etc.

d. On this guide card set forth the symbol numbers of the informants and confidential sources who c[illegible] provide this coverage.

e. Potential informants, confidential sources, panel sources, and sources of information who do not have permanent symbols should be set forth by name.

f. When an individual can provide more than one type of information, his symbol or identity (if a potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information without [illegible] nent symbol) should be set forth on as many [illegible] cards [illegible] y provide types of information.

g. These guide cards should[sh[illegible] the above da[illegible] and it is [illegible] e to p[illegible] alongside the name [illegible] symbol number, as the case [illegible], the names of the contacting Agents to [illegible] a request may [illegible] for a specific check with the individual.

h. Also, there may be set forth [illegible] these guide cards symbol [illegible] s of informants who move outside [illegible] division and who still [illegible] excellent sources regarding past activities. They should [illegible] declassified from informants to confidential sources or sources of information. If any such individual has [illegible] from a division and is being utilized by the division to [illegible] has moved and has received a symbol number from the latter [illegible]sion, such designation should be indicated on the guide card.

i. The names or symbol numbers, as the case may [illegible], of individuals contained in the index entitled "Informants [illegible] Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on the appropriate guide cards in this index.

4. Currency and security
All indices shall be maintained in a current status at all times in a manner which provides tight security of the information and yet makes it easily available to Agents having a need thereof.

L. INDEX CARDS

[1. Index cards [(FD-348) shall be executed] for the alphabetical name index.

[2. [Use form FD-348] for the symbol number index. [Execute only the following
[items:]

Symbol: File No:
(Informant, potential
informant, or confidential
source)

Name:

3. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in the informant's administrative file.

M. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
   a. When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as an informant or confidential source and he is not the subject of a security-type file, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the subject are discontinued.
   b. If an individual is the subject of a security case and after being interviewed with Bureau authority he indicates he is cooperative and has potentiality as an informant, a 134 file should be opened and maintained in a pending status while under development as a potential informant. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the existing file may be used rather than opening a new 134 file if this is practical and will reduce paper work.
   c. Individual files on all active informants should be maintained and carried as pending active cases.

2. Monthly administrative report
Files on potential informants and informants shall be included in the tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in the monthly administrative report.

3. Assignment and tickler cards
   a. Assignment and tickler cards should be maintained.
   b. The true name of informant is not to appear on the assignment and tickler cards.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION

1. General instructions re oral and written information
   a. Instructions regarding preparation, submission, and handling of information received from informants apply not only to security informants but also to potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
   b. Specific instructions and guidance must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
   c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after a meeting or activity.
   d. Written statements should be submitted whenever possible, but if such cannot be done information may be provided orally. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
   e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
   f. All information furnished by informants orally or in writing must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."
   g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise the trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. The trial attorney will thus be prepared in the event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.
   h. See subsection M for instructions regarding filing informant statements.
2. Recording written and oral information
   a. Written by informant
      (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
      (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
      (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
      (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at the top of it.
      (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or each separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement whether the information is of evidentiary or intelligence value.

b. As means of obtaining closer control, obtain signed statement set out below whenever feasible and practical. In those instances in which it is not practical to secure a signed statement from an informant or double agent, advise Bureau of complete details. The SAC and the Agent handling the informant or double agent should determine the appropriate time in the informant's operation when the statement should be completed.

> I, _____, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.
>
> (Signed) _____ _____
>
> Witnessed: _____

[[8. Execution of party questionnaires]

a. Informants, particularly in Communist Party, ofttimes must execute "Party" questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeopardize their positions as informants.

b. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant to be certain his identity as informant is protected.

[[9. Informant's activity in organizations]

a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.

b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of the organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.

c. Changes in the organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of the motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions and suggestions given are labeled as such.

d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but at the same time should be cautioned to do so in such a manner as to avoid suspicion.

[[10. Transfer of informants to other areas]

a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.

b. Keep in mind over-all coverage of organizations. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, by all means encourage him to do so in order to provide a wider coverage for the Bureau's work.

[[11. Action by informant when uncovered]

a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, he should be instructed to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.

b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without [illegible] to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse the issue [illegible] the point where his services may not be lost. This procedure should be carefully handled and each situation considered on its merits.

c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from the strict discipline of the organization involved, as by so doing he may cast off suspicion.

12. Requests of informant to help defend others
    a. If a security informant is requested by the Communist Party, communists being prosecuted by the Government, or by other interested parties to assist in the preparation of the defense in subversive-type cases or receives assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline such assignments.
    b. Any such request received by informant should be reported immediately to the contacting Agent and made a matter of record.
    c. If the informant cannot avoid becoming involved, he should be instructed not to report to the contacting Agent any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.
    d. Any such incident must be reported promptly to the Bureau.

[13. Preparation for testifying

Contacting Agent must condition the informant to the fact that someday the knowledge he possesses may be needed as evidence in court to assist the Government in combating the evil of communism. Psychologically prepare the informant for the fact that he may at some future date be called upon to render a still further contribution to his Government by testifying to the information he has furnished on security matters. Proper indoctrination of the informant is essential as the Bureau must provide witnesses whenever the Department initiates prosecutions in security cases.]

8. Potential security informants in espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105K, 6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered.
9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.
10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant.

D. INTERVIEWS AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to develop individual as a security informant.
2. When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy.
3. Carefully plan initial interviews as to time and location to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau.
5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.
6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months. Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months, and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These letters should follow the form indicated under section 1[illegible] 3b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation.
7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.
8. During interviews with potential informants, if it develops individual. does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
9. Potential informant should have contacts, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field.
10. If individual does not have potential as above described but is willing to cooperate, consider indicating to him he can be of assistance if he places himself in a position where he may be able to obtain information of value. In this regard, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desires; also, it may be mentioned that if he subscribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest may be shown in him which, if developed, would be the means whereby he could obtain information.
11. Inform potential informants who agree to assist the Bureau that such assistance must be strictly voluntary and they are to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved.

[12. During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.

13. Specifically advise each potential informant that he is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon the informant.

14. Advise potential informant that his cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and in so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. This must be thoroughly impressed upon the informant before you accept him as such. If the informant has a special problem which would require his revealing his relationship to his wife, etc., this should be learned from him during the initial interview and a recommendation made to the Bureau when the results of the interview are furnished. The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau.

15. If a prospective informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration in labor unions by subversive elements.

16. If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in his initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.

17. From the first interview with a potential informant through his development and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant.

18. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a potential witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.]

E. BUREAU POLICY

[1. Development of military personnel]
Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.

[2. Contacts by designated Agents]
Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated[to contact him.]

[3. Divulging information to informant]
No information should be divulged to[a potential]informant[or an informant] concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to[his]proper operation.

SECTION 107. SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. Definitions 3
  1. Security informant 3
  2. Potential security informant 3
  3. Double agent 3
  4. Confidential source 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
C. Investigation of Potential Security Informants 4
D. Interviews and Development of Potential Security Informants 5
E. Bureau Policy 6
  1. Development of military personnel 6
  2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
  3. Divulging information to informant 6
  4. Recording investigative activity 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
  1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
  2. Developing additional background 7
  3. Handling indications of instability 7
  4. Contacts by Agents 7
    Form FD-209 8
  5. Checking reliability 8
  6. Fingerprints 8
  7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
  8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
  9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
  10. Transfer of informants to other areas 9
  11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
  13. Preparation for testifying 10
G. Informants' information 10a
  1. General instructions re oral and written information 10a
  2. Recording written and oral information 10a
  3. Transmission of information 12
  4. Handling of lead information 12
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations 13
  1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
  2. Locating information to pass 13
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
  4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
I. Symbols 13
  1. Assigning numbers 13
  2. Communications - use of symbols 14
J. Indexing 14
K. Indices 14
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
  3. Agents' informative index 15
  4. Currency and security 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
[L. Index Cards 15
[M. Informant Files 16
[1. Opening 16
[2. Monthly administrative report 16
[3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
[4. Subfiles 17
[5. Channelization 17
[6. Dissemination of information 17
[7. Correspondence 17
[8. Maintenance of files 17
[9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
[10. Form FD-238 17
[11. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
[N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
[1. No gifts to informants 18
[2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
[3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
[4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau
[authority 20
[5. Receipts 20
[6. Income tax returns 20
[7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
[8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
[9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
[O. Semiannual Letter 22
[P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
[Q. Discontinued Informants 24
[R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service
[(INS) 26
[S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
[T. Classification 27
[U. Confidential Sources 27
[1. Definition 27
[2. Assignment of symbols 27
[3. Index 27
[4. Files 27
[5. Utilization 28
[6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of
[stability and payments 28
[7. Gifts 28
[8. Discontinuance 28

(6) Informants should inc n the body of their statements specific dates and places; pur of the meeting or activity being related; identities o akers and persons present, plus their known status in any g ; specific activity engaged in by each individual present; a comments made by each individual.

(7) Informant should identify[his statement]by affixing his code name[immediately under the last written line on each page.] Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or the initials of his code name.

(8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.

(9) Informant should refer to himself in the body of the statement by his true name and he should use the third person.

(10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., thereto, nor should he place any markings thereon, such as his initials, date of receipt from informant, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc.

(11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a nnelizing memorandum which should contain the applic e items set forth on form FD-306.

(12) Extraneous material should be kept to an absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
   (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
   (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
   (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be furnished orally by informant to contacting Agent who will record the information in memorandum form for the informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant

(1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with the making of the oral statement by the informant to the Agent. The following items furnished by informant should be left out:
   (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
   (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
   (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be recorded in memorandum form for the informant file.

(2) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(3) Date it at the top with the date the informant furnishes the information to the Agent. No other date is desired except the date of the meeting or activity which shall be set forth in the body of the statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or each separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by the Agent as if the informant were preparing them himself.

(5) The information, after being reduced to writing, should then be read promptly by the informant and acknowledged by him by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters authentication by informants is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) After informant authenticates his statement, contacting Agent should prepare a cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it and thereafter the statement should be handled as a written one in accordance with instructions set out in 2, a, (10), and (11).

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be incorporated in an office memorandum by the Agent and should not be initialed by the informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information
   - a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants whenever possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such personal contacts.
   - b. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency.
   - c. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.
   - d. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory.
   - e. More than one informant may send statements to a specific post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of post office employees.
   - f. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under a fictitious name in the same manner as d.
   - g. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for any extended period of time.
   - h. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest to Bureau, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication. Office should take any necessary action without delay.

4. Handling of lead information
   - a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to a logical conclusion.
   - b. If there is only partial name of individual or meager descripti data, and if there is sufficient data available to do so, file s be opened and assigned to effect an identification and to take a necessary action.
   - c. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, a tickler card should be prepared to follow with the informant and take other logical steps in an effort to obtain additional identifying data concerning the individual. Tickler cards should be restricted to information which would warrant investigation if an identity is established. This will eliminate inconsequential items, but at the same time definite steps must be taken to run out affirmative information. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile. If an identification is made, a file should be opened and any necessary action taken in connection therewith.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants
   - a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon the informant's code name.
   - b. Informant should affix date he received the material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, the date he furnished material should be affixed.
   - c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material by Agents or clerical personnel.

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. Channelization
Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."

[6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
[For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.

7. Dissemination of information
Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.

8. Correspondence
Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

9. Maintenance of files
   a. All pending files on security informants shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, or field supervisor as the informant indices are maintained and described in subsection K.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

11. Form FD-238
Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

[[12.] Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
   - a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   - b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   - c. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items.
   - d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
   - a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   - b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   - c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   - d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   - a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   - b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
     - (1) Recommendation
       (Use following wording as nearly as possible:
       "I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months, effective ___(date).")

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source. Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards [on form FD-348] like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in both types of investigations.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. The same procedure should be followed concerning racial confidential sources, the classification being 137. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security or racial investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security and potential racial informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security or racial source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
7. Gifts

[[Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be
[misconstrued.]

8. Discontinuance

Advise Bureau when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

12. Bulky material submitted by informant
    Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
    - a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
    - b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
    - c. [Deleted]
    - d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
    - a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
    - b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
    - c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
    - d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
    - a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
    - b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
        - (1) Recommendation
          (Use following wording as nearly as possible: "I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months, effective ___(date).")

4. Subfiles
    - a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
    - b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. Channelization
Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."

6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.

7. Dissemination of information
Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.

8. Correspondence
Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

9. Maintenance of files
    - a. All pending files on security informants shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, or field supervisor as the informant indices are maintained and described in subsection K.
    - b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
    - c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
    - d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

11. Form FD-238
Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source. Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security,[racial,]and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, [racial informant index,]or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index,[racial informant index,]and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in[these] types of investigations.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
    a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
    b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
    c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
    d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
    e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
        (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
        (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
        (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
    f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
    a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
    b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
7. Gifts

    Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance

    Advise Bureau when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made a matter of record in the field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Sources include all confidential informants - criminal, security,[and racial.]. Agents must not have and use informants known only to the individual Agents personally.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF SECURITY INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   a. During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant the absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging through any media any information regarding his relationship with Bureau.
   b. These instructions must be properly worded and phrased to prevent any possibility Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   a. During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant.
   b. After gaining informant's confidence, information will be elicited which may be pertinent to his operation and may have effect upon his retention, such as data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk as an informant.
3. Handling indications of instability
   a. Details of any indications of instability should be furnished to the Bureau immediately upon being obtained, with recommendations as to informant's continuance.
   b. Set forth the steps being taken to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Contacts by Agents
   a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where the frequency of contact is dependent on the circumstances of each case, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks.
   b. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for an exception to this requirement (except in espionage and foreign nationality matters). In requesting such exception, set forth all attendant circumstances.
   c. During each contact, informant's activities since previous contact should be carefully reviewed and the contacting Agent should make certain the informant has furnished in writing or verbally all information and data which he has obtained since the last contact. If additional or supplementary information is furnished during this contact with the informant, this information should be handled in the same manner as outlined in subsection G.
   d. Contacting Agent should become so well acquainted with informant that he will not breach the confidential relationship. If there is slightest indication informant may do so, Agent should be able to anticipate this action and forestall it.
   e. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but also direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows how informant is thinking with regard to Bureau connection. This relationship should not be so reciprocal that informant obtains information concerning Agent or Agent's business, personal or official.
   f. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent and later cause embarrassment to Agent or Bureau by using for his own advantage such knowledge which he may obtain.
   g. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.

h. Any arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in the minds of either the Agent or informant as to the methods of payment, amount, place, and time.

i. Informants should be instructed to use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants the unlisted office telephone number for emergency communication. [This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.]

j. Positive information received from informant should be the subject of a written statement by informant or a memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in the informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.

k. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.

l. The dates of negative contacts and file numbers of the cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where a file has more than one subject, the name of the subject under inquiry should also be noted. Do not set forth title of the case involved on the form.

m. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.

n. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and former should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent in absence of Agent to whom informant is assigned.

[5. [Checking reliability]

a. Reliability of informants must be constantly checked.

b. Consideration should be given to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.

c. Checks on reliability must be constantly reviewed during time informant is active.

6. Fingerprints

a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to the contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.

b. If informant refuses, do not force the issue.

c. Informant's fingerprints, when obtained, should be forwarded as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258. This card should be properly executed showing subject's complete description, including date and place of birth. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

d. A flash notice is to be placed by the field in the files of the Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.

e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year following discontinuance. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

[7. [Control - statement of cooperation]

a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents in order to obtain maximum results in security cases and to prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

    d. All such material should be transmitted in the same manner as statements furnished by informant.
    e. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. See section 107M for filing instructions.

H. PASSING INFORMATION IN DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition
    a. In double agent operations information requested by the principals is frequently passed either to build up a double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.
    b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that a net gain accrues to the U. S.
    c. The information which is passed should be carefully handled and appropriate explanations created for its acquisition by the double agent to avoid his compromise.
2. Locating information to pass
   Wherever possible the field office handling the double agent should locate appropriate information to be passed; however, the Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of Government agencies.
3. Obtaining Bureau authority
   Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in a double agent operation except:
    a. Newspaper articles
    b. Magazine articles
    c. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by a private company or corporation for distribution or sale to the public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use by engineering staffs and not intended for release to the public.)
4. Retention of copies of passed material
    a. True copies should be retained by the office of origin of any documents or material related to the national defense which is passed in double agent operations.
    b. Such material should be appropriately identified by the double agent.
    c. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with the passage of such material.
    d. Similar action should be taken with regard to any material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to the national defense.
    e. It is not necessary to retain copies of build-up material obviously not evidentiary in nature where there is assurance that copies can be obtained at a later date from the Government agency or private concern having custody.

I. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
    a. All informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of which the Bureau must be advised. Once a symbol number is assigned, it must not subsequently be reassigned to another[individual.]
    b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant the use of such designations.
    c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
    d. An additional cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between the informant and the field office.
    e. Bureau should be advised of this cover name in addition to the permanent symbol.

2. Communications - use of symbols
    - a. After Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
    - b. In all communications after the initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
    - c. In communications between offices, the same procedure is to be followed.
    - d. Informants and sources entering another division
        - (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
        - (2) Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence.
        - (3) If an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
    - e. In communications, the teletype abbreviation for the field office, symbol, and letter suffix "S" shall be shown to identify the informant; e.g., "NY 000-S."
    - f. In communications concerning a potential security informant, the name of the potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
    - g. Similarly, in communications relative to confidential sources, the abbreviation "CS" should be used; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."
    - h. When symbol numbers are assigned to potential security informants, the designation should be as follows: "LA 000-PSI."
    - i. In communications relative to a confidential source having a permanent symbol number, the following should be used: "CS LA 000-S."
    - j. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the caption of the communication should show in addition a character and the country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing the mail at the Bureau.

J. INDEXING

1. True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name assigned to them for informants' use in submitting their statements, but not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name.
2. These index cards should show the file number of the informant and such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

K. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
    - a. Alphabetical name index
        - (1) In all offices all active potential security and security informant cards are to be kept by the SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice. This is to be known as the alphabetical name index.
        - (2) File these cards in alphabetical order and also include cards for security confidential sources. These cards should show whether the individual is a potential informant, an informant, or a confidential source furnishing information on security matters.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source. Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from
[the series of symbol numbers used for your security,[racial,]and
   criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must
   be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index,
[[racial informant index,]or the security informant index, depending on
   the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the
[criminal informant index,[racial informant index,]and the security
[informant index if the source furnishes information of value in[these]
   types of investigations.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who
   has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification
   file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts
[to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened
   on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with
   that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the
   SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance
   [Advise Bureau[of the date]when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
[[Las Vegas	" "]
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.

[4. Advise the Bureau[of the date]when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.

5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

d. All such material should be transmitted in the same manner as statements furnished by informant.
e. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. See section 107M for filing instructions.

H. PASSING INFORMATION IN DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS
1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition
   a. In double agent operations information requested by the principals is frequently passed either to build up a double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.
   b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that a net gain accrues to the U. S.
   c. The information which is passed should be carefully handled and appropriate explanations created for its acquisition by the double agent to avoid his compromise.
2. Locating information to pass
   Wherever possible the field office handling the double agent should locate appropriate information to be passed; however, the Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of Government agencies.
3. Obtaining Bureau authority
   Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in a double agent operation except:
   a. Newspaper articles
   b. Magazine articles
   c. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by a private company or corporation for distribution or sale to the public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use by engineering staffs and not intended for release to the public.)
4. Retention of copies of passed material
   a. True copies should be retained by the office of origin of any documents or material related to the national defense which is passed in double agent operations.
   b. Such material should be appropriately identified by the double agent.
   c. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with the passage of such material.
   d. Similar action should be taken with regard to any material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to the national defense.
   e. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where there is assurance that copies can be obtained at a later date from the Government agency or private concern having custody.

I. SYMBOLS
1. Assigning numbers
   a. All informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of which the Bureau must be advised. Once a symbol number is assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned[to any other security, racial, or criminal informant or source or confidential technique.]
   b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant the use of such designations.
   c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   d. An additional cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between the informant and the field office.
   e. Bureau should be advised of this cover name in addition to the permanent symbol.

2. Communications - use of symbols
   a. After Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
   b. In all communications after the initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
   c. In communications between offices, the same procedure is to be followed.
   d. Informants and sources entering another division
      (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
      (2) Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence.
      (3) If an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
   e. In communications, the teletype abbreviation for the field office, symbol, and letter suffix "S" shall be shown to identify the informant; e.g., "NY 000-S."
   f. In communications concerning a potential security informant, the name of the potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
   g. Similarly, in communications relative to confidential sources, the abbreviation "CS" should be used; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."
   h. When symbol numbers are assigned to potential security informants, the designation should be as follows: "LA 000-PSI."
   i. In communications relative to a confidential source having a permanent symbol number, the following should be used: "CS LA 000-S."
   j. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the caption of the communication should show in addition a character and the country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing the mail at the Bureau.

J. INDEXING
1. True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name assigned to them for informants' use in submitting their statements, but not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name.
2. These index cards should show the file number of the informant and such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

K. INDICES
1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
   a. Alphabetical name index
      (1) In all offices all active potential security and security informant cards are to be kept by the SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice. This is to be known as the alphabetical name index.
      (2) File these cards in alphabetical order and also include cards for security confidential sources. These cards should show whether the individual is a potential informant, an informant, or a confidential source furnishing information on security matters.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source;[e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."] Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   - d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   - a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   - b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   - c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau[of the date]when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
[Jackson	" "]
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. [Advise the Bureau[of the date]when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

I. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
    a. All informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of which the Bureau must be advised. Once a number is assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant, source, or confidential technique,[regardless of type or designation.]
    b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant the use of such designations.
    c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
    d. An additional cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between the informant and the field office.
    e. Bureau should be advised of this cover name in addition to the permanent symbol.
    [f. The prefix of a symbol number is made up of the appropriate field office teletype abbreviation followed by the appropriate assigned number.
    g. The suffix of the symbol number will consist of the letter "S" to designate a security informant; the letters "PSI" to designate a potential security informant.
    h. Although an individual, confidential technique, or source may subsequently furnish information requiring a change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to racial, etc.), the number previously assigned will remain the same; however, the suffix is to be changed to the appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-S to NY 000-C or to NY 000-R).]

2. Communications - use of symbols
    a. After Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
    b. In all communications after the initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
    c. In communications between offices, the same procedure is to be followed.
    d. Informants and sources entering another division
        (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
        (2) Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence.
        (3) If an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.

[e. [Deleted]

[f. In communications concerning a potential security informant[when
[a symbol number is not assigned,]the name of the potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."

[g. [Deleted]

[h. [Deleted]

[i. [Deleted]

j. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the caption of the communication should show in addition a character and the country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing the mail at the Bureau.

J. INDEXING

1. True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name assigned to them for informants' use in submitting their statements, but not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name.
2. These index cards should show the file number of the informant and such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

K. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
    a. Alphabetical name index
        (1) In all offices all active potential security and security informant cards are to be kept by the SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice. This is to be known as the alphabetical name index.
        (2) File these cards in alphabetical order and also include cards for security confidential sources. These cards should show whether the individual is a potential informant, an informant, or a confidential source furnishing information on security matters.

   - d. All such material should be transmitted in the same manner as statements furnished by informant.
   - e. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. See section 107M for filing instructions.

H. PASSING INFORMATION IN DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition
   - a. In double agent operations information requested by the principals is frequently passed either to build up a double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.
   - b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that a net gain accrues to the U. S.
   - c. The information which is passed should be carefully handled and appropriate explanations created for its acquisition by the double agent to avoid his compromise.
2. Locating information to pass

   Wherever possible the field office handling the double agent should locate appropriate information to be passed; however, the Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of Government agencies.
3. Obtaining Bureau authority

   Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in a double agent operation except:
   - a. Newspaper articles
   - b. Magazine articles
   - c. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by a private company or corporation for distribution or sale to the public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use by engineering staffs and not intended for release to the public.)
4. Retention of copies of passed material
   - a. True copies should be retained by the office of origin of any documents or material related to the national defense which is passed in double agent operations.
   - b. Such material should be appropriately identified by the double agent.
   - c. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with the passage of such material.
   - d. Similar action should be taken with regard to any material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to the national defense.
   - e. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where there is assurance that copies can be obtained at a later date from the Government agency or private concern having custody.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
A. Definitions 3
1. Security informant 3
2. Potential security informant 3
3. Double agent 3
4. Confidential source 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
C. Investigation of Potential Security Informants 4
D. Interviews and Development of Potential Security Informants 5
E. Bureau Policy 6
1. Development of military personnel 6
2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
3. Divulging information to informant 6
4. Recording investigative activity 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
2. Developing additional background 7
3. Handling indications of instability 7
4. Contacts by Agents 7
Form FD-209 8
5. Checking reliability 8
6. Fingerprints 8
7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
10. Transfer of informants to other areas 9
11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
13. Preparation for testifying 10
G. Informants' information 10a
1. General instructions re oral and written information 10a
2. Recording written and oral information 10a
3. Transmission of information 12
4. Handling of lead information 12
5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations 13
1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
2. Locating information to pass 13
3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
I. Symbols 13a
1. Assigning numbers 13a
2. Communications - use of symbols 14
J. Indexing 14
K. Indices 14
1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
3. Agents' informative index 15
4. Currency and security 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
L. Index Cards 16
M. Informant Files 16
    1. Opening 16
    2. Monthly administrative report 16
    3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
    4. Subfiles 17
    5. Channelization 17
    6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 17
    7. Dissemination of information 17
    8. Correspondence 17
    9. Maintenance of files 17
    10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
    11. Form FD-238 17
    12. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
    1. No gifts to informants 18
    2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
    3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
    4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 20
    5. Receipts 20
    6. Income tax returns 20
    7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
    8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
    9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
O. Semiannual Letter 22
P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
Q. Discontinued Informants 24
R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 26
S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
T. Classification 27
U. Confidential Sources 27
    1. Definition 27
    2. Assignment of symbols 27
    3. Index 27
    4. Files 27
    5. Utilization 28
    6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 28
    7. Gifts 28
    8. Discontinuance 28

[e.] When an informant or former informant is initially considered as a potential witness in a Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on the income he received from the Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling the situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses
   - a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department a set of photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place. The office handling prosecution must determine from the Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:
     - (1) The correct, full name
     - (2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
     - (3) The first date of contact by your office
     - (4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
     - (5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
     - (6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
     - (7) The date of last contact by your office
     - (8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office
   - b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.
   - c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.
   - d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation
   - a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

9. Handling money and property received by double agents

a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.

b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name.

c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid under Bureau authority (not SAC authority) for services or expenses. If the confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all security informants not paid under Bureau authority.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")

(3) Current membership[and position held]in subversive organizations [(When justification is submitted for racial informants, substitute the word "racial" for the word "subversive.")]

(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period

(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month (Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)

(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity

(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted (List separately.)

(8) Information furnished of unusual value

(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance

(10) Steps being taken to advance informant

(11) Stability and reliability (Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)

(12) Indoctrination against disclosure (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)

(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished

(14) Miscellaneous (Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
   e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   [b.] Bureau income should be set forth under item 5 on page one of the Federal income tax return, form 1040, and explained under part V,[3,] schedule B, of the return as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.
   [c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.
   d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.]

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.
4. Confidential source
   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers, telephone company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, [and]employees of the United Nations Secretariat. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. [Deleted]
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

C. INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature
2. Discreet canvass of[logical]informants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")
(3) Current membership and position held in subversive organizations
(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period
(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month (Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)
(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity
(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted (List separately.)
(8) Information furnished of unusual value
(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance
(10) Steps being taken to advance informant
(11) Stability and reliability (Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)
(12) Indoctrination against disclosure (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)
(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished.
(14) Miscellaneous (Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.
d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.
e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.
f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.
g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.
h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.
i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
   e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   [b. Bureau income should be set forth[on the]Federal income tax
   [return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.
   c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.
   d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.

8. Potential security informants in espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105K,6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered.
9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.
10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant.

D. INTERVIEWS AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to[designate]individual as a[Bureau-approved potential]security informant[and proceed with his development.]
2. When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy.
3. Carefully plan initial interviews as to time and location to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau.
5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.
6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months. Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months, and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These letters should follow the form indicated under section 107N, 3b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation.
7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.
8. During interviews with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
9. Potential informant should have contacts, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field.
10. If individual does not have potential as above described but is willing to cooperate, consider indicating to him he can be of assistance if he places himself in a position where he may be able to obtain information of value. In this regard, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desires; also, it may be mentioned that if he subscribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest may be shown in him which, if developed, would be the means whereby he could obtain information.
11. Inform potential informants who agree to assist the Bureau that such assistance must be strictly voluntary and they are to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved.

[12. During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.

[13. Specifically advise each potential informant that he is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon the informant.

[14. Advise potential informant that his cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. This must be thoroughly impressed upon the informant before you accept him as such. If the informant has a special problem which would require his revealing his relationship to his wife, etc., this should be learned from him during the initial interview and a recommendation made to the Bureau when the results of the interview are furnished. The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau.

[15. If a prospective informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration in labor unions by subversive elements.

[16. If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in his initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.

[17. From the first interview with a potential informant through his development and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant.

[18. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a potential witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.]

E. BUREAU POLICY

[[1. Development of military personnel]

Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.

[[2. Contacts by designated Agents]

[Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated[to contact him.]

[[3. Divulging information to informant]

[No information should be divulged to[a potential]informant[or an informant] concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to[his]proper operation.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.
4. Confidential source
An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
    a. Complainants in security matters
    b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
    c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
    d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
    e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
    f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

C. INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature
2. Discreet canvass of [logical] informants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

8. [Persons being considered for use]in espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105K, 6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered.
9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.
10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct,[or designate]an individual as a potential[security]informant.

[D. [APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONTROL OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS]

1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as a Bureau-approved potential security informant and[to]proceed with his development. [Do not submit on a UACB basis. Include a physical description.]
2. [Deleted]
3. [After designation as a Bureau-approved potential security informant, the following matters should be made clear to him:]
   [a.] His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
   [b.] He is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
   [c.] His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has a special problem which would require revealing his[assistance]to his wife[or other pertinent individual,] this should be[ascertained and an appropriate recommendation made to the Bureau.] The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau[and you will be advised accordingly.]
   [d.] If the potential informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements.
   [e.] If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in the initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.
4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau.
5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.
6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months. Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months, and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and relaibility and his indoctrination against disclosure. These letters should follow the form indicated under section 107N, 3b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation.

7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.

[8. During[contacts]with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.

[9. [Deleted]

[10. [Deleted]

[[11.] During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.

[[12.] From the first interview with a potential informant through his development and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant.

[[13.] When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility
[of using informant as a witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.

2. Contacts by designated Agents
Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.

3. Divulging information to informant
No information should be divulged to a potential informant or an informant concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant

Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.

2. Potential security informant

Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.

3. Double agent

A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.

4. Confidential source

An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K, 6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

[C. [INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING
[CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES]

When a decision is made to consider a particular individual for informant
[purposes, background investigation must be conducted. [Extensive background
[investigation should not be conducted, however, until the individual has
[been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the
[Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions
[imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, and section 105K, item 6b,
[(10), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation
[should]consist of the following:

[1. Check of field office files for derogatory information
[2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the[individual]
[is known to[them].
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must
[definitely establish that the[individual]can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability.
[Securing background information from the[individual]is not sufficient;
[[his]background must be established by the investigation,[including discreet
[inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.]
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identi-
[fication Division to obtain[any]record [he may have.]
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

L. Index Cards 16
M. Informant Files 16
  1. Opening 16
  2. Monthly administrative report 16
  3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
  4. Subfiles 17
  5. Channelization 17
  6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 17
  7. Dissemination of information 17
  8. Correspondence 17
  9. Maintenance of files 17
  10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
  11. Form FD-238 17
  12. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
  1. No gifts to informants 18
  2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
  3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
  4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 20
  5. Receipts 20
  6. Income tax returns 20
  7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
  8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
  9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
O. Semiannual Letter 22
P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
Q. Discontinued Informants 24
R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 26
S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
T. Classification 27
U. Confidential Sources 27
  1. Definition 27
  2. Assignment of symbols 27
  3. Index 27
  4. Files 27
  5. Utilization 28
  6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 28
  7. Gifts 28
  8. Discontinuance 28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
A. Definitions 3
  1. Security informant 3
  2. Potential security informant 3
  3. Double agent 3
  4. Confidential source 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
C. Interviews with and Development of Background on Individuals Being Considered for Informant Purposes 4
D. Approval, Indoctrination, Development, and Control of Potential Security Informants 5
E. Bureau Policy 6
  1. Development of military personnel 6
  2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
  3. Divulging information to informant 6
  4. Recording investigative activity 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
  1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
  2. Developing additional background 7
  3. Handling indications of instability 7
  4. Contacts by Agents 7
    Form FD-209 8
  5. Checking reliability 8
  6. Fingerprints 8
  7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
  8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
  9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
  10. Transfer of informants to other areas 9
  11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
  13. Preparation for testifying 10
G. Informants' information 10a
  1. General instructions re oral and written information 10a
  2. Recording written and oral information 10a
  3. Transmission of information 12
  4. Handling of lead information 12
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations 13
  1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
  2. Locating information to pass 13
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
  4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
I. Symbols 13a
  1. Assigning numbers 13a
  2. Communications - use of symbols 14
J. Indexing 14
K. Indices 14
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
  3. Agents' informative index 15
  4. Currency and security 16

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
[Columbia	" "]
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jackson	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.

[4. Advise the Bureau[of the date]when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.

5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant

   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security [or intelligence] matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal, that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value; [or furnish pertinent foreign intelligence data of value on a regular basis.]

2. Potential security informant

   Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, [or is in a position to secure pertinent foreign intelligence data,] and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.

3. Double agent

   A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.

4. Confidential source

   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K, 6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

[C. [INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING
[CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES]
When a decision is made to consider a particular individual for informant
[purposes, background investigation must be conducted. [Extensive background
[investigation should not be conducted, however, until the individual has
[been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the
[Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions
[imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, and section 105K, item 6b,
[(10), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation
[should]consist of the following:
[1. Check of field office files for derogatory information
[2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the[individual]
[is known to[them]
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must
[definitely establish that the[individual]can be utilized without any
danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability.
[Securing background information from the[individual]is not sufficient;
[[his]background must be established by the investigation,[including discreet
[inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.]
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identi-
[fication Division to obtain[any]record [he may have.]
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant

   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor-
[mation on security[or intelligence]matters exclusively for Bureau and whose
identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings
of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in
such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage
activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign
principal, that he is able to obtain and does provide current information
[of value;[or furnish pertinent foreign intelligence data of value on a regular
[basis.]

2. Potential security informant

   Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization
or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign
[principal or can become closely associated therewith,[or is in a position
[to secure pertinent foreign intelligence data,]and is making affirmative
effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position
actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.

3. Double agent

   A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.

4. Confidential source

   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

C. INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When a decision is made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted, however, until the individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, and section 105K, item 6b, [[(9),]volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the individual is known to them
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the individual can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by the investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain any record he may have.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source;[e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."] Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   - d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   - a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   - b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   - c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files

   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.

6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N,[item]3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization[or if he is not an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization]and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   [c. If the security confidential source is employed by a foreign diplomatic establishment (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by an international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau every four months. See 107N,[item]3b, for form of letter.]

7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of the date when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Columbia	" "
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jackson	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
[Sacramento]	June 15 and December 15
St. Louis	" "
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.

[4. Advise the Bureau[of the date]when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.

5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

h. Any arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in the minds of either the Agent or informant as to the methods of payment, amount, place, and time.

i. Informants should be instructed to use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants the [nonpublished] office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.

j. Positive information received from informant should be the subject of a written statement by informant or a memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in the informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.

k. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.

l. The dates of negative contacts and file numbers of the cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where a file has more than one subject, the name of the subject under inquiry should also be noted. Do not set forth title of the case involved on the form.

m. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.

n. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and former should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent in absence of Agent to whom informant is assigned.

5. Checking reliability

a. Reliability of informants must be constantly checked.

b. Consideration should be given to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.

c. Checks on reliability must be constantly reviewed during time informant is active.

6. Fingerprints

a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to the contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.

b. If informant refuses, do not force the issue.

c. Informant's fingerprints, when obtained, should be forwarded as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258. This card should be properly executed showing subject's complete description, including date and place of birth. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

d. A flash notice is to be placed by the field in the files of the Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.

e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year following discontinuance. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

7. Control - statement of cooperation

a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents in order to obtain maximum results in security cases and to prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made a matter of record in the field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Sources include all confidential informants - criminal, security, [and racial.] Agents must not have and use informants known only to the individual Agents personally.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF SECURITY INFORMANTS
1. Caution against divulging relationship
   a. During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant the absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging through any media any information regarding his relationship with Bureau.
   b. These instructions must be properly worded and phrased to prevent any possibility Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   a. During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant.
   b. After gaining informant's confidence, information will be elicited which may be pertinent to his operation and may have effect upon his retention, such as data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk as an informant.
3. Handling indications of instability
   a. Details of any indications of instability should be furnished to the Bureau immediately upon being obtained, with recommendations as to informant's continuance.
   b. Set forth the steps being taken to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Contacts by Agents
   a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where the frequency of contact is dependent on the circumstances of each case, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks.
   b. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for an exception to this requirement (except in espionage and foreign nationality matters). In requesting such exception, set forth all attendant circumstances.
   c. During each contact, informant's activities since previous contact should be carefully reviewed and the contacting Agent should make certain the informant has furnished in writing or verbally all information and data which he has obtained since the last contact. If additional or supplementary information is furnished during this contact with the informant, this information should be handled in the same manner as outlined in subsection G.
   d. Contacting Agent should become so well acquainted with informant that he will not breach the confidential relationship. If there is slightest indication informant may do so, Agent should be able to anticipate this action and forestall it.
   e. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but also direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows how informant is thinking with regard to Bureau connection. This relationship should not be so reciprocal that informant obtains information concerning Agent or Agent's business, personal or official.
   f. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent and later cause embarrassment to Agent or Bureau by using for his own advantage such knowledge which he may obtain.
   g. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal, that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value;[or furnish pertinent foreign intelligence data of value on a regular basis.]
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith,[or is in a position to secure pertinent foreign intelligence data,]and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.
4. Confidential source
   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. As an assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K, 6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When a decision is made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted, however, until the individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, and section 105[illegible], item 6b, (9), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the individual is known to them
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the individual can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by the investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an [FD-165] form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain any record he may have [and to place a stop against his fingerprints if they are on file.]
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

4. Subfiles

   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.

   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. Channelization

   Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."

6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

   For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.

7. Dissemination of information

   Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of information.

8. [illegible]

   Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

9. Maintenance of files

   a. All symbol number informant]files,[pending and closed,]shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, field supervisor,[or responsible employee designated by the SAC.]

   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.

   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.

   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re

    From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

11. Form FD-238

    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

12. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   [c. [Deleted]
   d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
   a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on [illegible] regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of [illegible], this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. [illegible] requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
      (1) Recommendation
      (Use following wording as nearly as possible:
      "I recommend that authority be granted to
      continue (increase, decrease) payments to the
      above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week)
      for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week)
      for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months,
      effective ___(date).")

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant [illegible] submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for [channelization] and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Dissemination of information
   Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.
8. Correspondence
   Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.
9. Maintenance of files
   a. All symbol number informant files, pending and closed, shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by the SAC.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.
10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
    From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.
11. Form FD-238
    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in the pertinent inf[illegible] file and is not to be serialized. If [illegible] particular section of the form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. [illegible] later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted [illegible].

12. Bulky [illegible] submitted by informant
Where [illegible] source submits bulky material other than a statement and [illegible] pertaining to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED
1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should [illegible] be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   c. [Deleted]
   d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, [illegible] industries, or [illegible] companies and request assistance [illegible] payments of money, gifts [illegible] products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
   a. [illegible] special [illegible] in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money [illegible] information concerning matters or persons under investigation [illegible] not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money [illegible] individual to obtain such information, [illegible] may approve payments [illegible] up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 [illegible] regardless of the number of payments. [illegible] applies only to [illegible] who have never been regularly paid for services [illegible] expenses [illegible] Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   b. Individuals who [illegible] paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence [illegible] an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" [illegible] on "Bureau authorization."
   c. The blue slip containing any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will [illegible] in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
      (1) Recommendation
      (Use following wording as nearly as possible: "I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months, effective ___(date).")

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION

1. General instructions re oral and written information
    - a. Instructions regarding preparation, submission, and handling of information received from informants apply not only to security informants but also to potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
    - b. Specific instructions and guidance must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
    - c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after a meeting or activity.
    - d. Written statements should be submitted whenever possible, but if such cannot be done information may be provided orally. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
    - e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
    - f. All information furnished by informants orally or in writing must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for[channelization]and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies.
    - g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise the trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. The trial attorney will then be prepared in the event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.
    - h. See subsection M for instructions regarding filing informant statements.
2. Recording written and oral information
    - a. Written by informant
        - (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
        - (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
        - (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
        - (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at the top of it.
        - (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or each separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement whether the information is of evidentiary or intelligence value.

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source;[e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."] Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every[six]months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N, item 3b, for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   c. If the security confidential source is employed by a foreign diplomatic establishment (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by an international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau every[six]months. See 107N, item 3b, for form of letter.
7. Gifts

   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance

   Advise Bureau of the date when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

[5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates [annual]
[letters should be submitted:

Office	Dates
[Albany	January 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	January 31
Baltimore	" "
Birmingham	" "
Boston	February 15
Buffalo	" "
Butte	" "
Charlotte	February 28
Chicago	January 31
Cincinnati	February 28
Cleveland	" "
Columbia	March 15
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	March 31
El Paso	" "
Honolulu	April 15
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	April 30
Jackson	" "
Jacksonville	May 15
Kansas City	" "
Knoxville	May 31
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	June 15
Los Angeles	February 28
Louisville	June 15
Memphis	June 30
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	March 31
Minneapolis	April 30
Mobile	July 15
Newark	May 31
New Haven	July 15
New Orleans	July 31
New York	September 30
Norfolk	July 31
Oklahoma City	August 15
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	August 31
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	September 15
Portland	" "
Richmond	September 30
Sacramento	" "
St. Louis	October 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	October 31
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	November 15
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	November 30
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "]

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. [Advise the Bureau[of the date]when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

[[e.] When an informant or former informant is initially considered as a potential witness in a Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on the income he received from the Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling the situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses
   a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department a set of photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses. The original receipts and a set of photostats will be transmitted to the field office in whose territory the trial will take place. The office handling prosecution must determine from the Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:
      (1) The correct, full name
      (2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
      (3) The first date of contact by your office
      (4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
      (5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to the Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
      (6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
      (7) The date of last contact by your office
      (8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office
   b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.
   c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.
   d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation
   a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who [illegible] the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail [illegible] comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau [illegible] be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the [illegible] law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office [illegible] determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

9. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.

[O. [ANNUAL]LETTER

[[Annual]letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid under Bureau authority (not SAC authority) for services or expenses. If the confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all security informants not paid under Bureau authority.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. [As a separate section of the[annual]letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

   Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

[[Annual]letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in overall evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")

(3) Current membership and position held in subversive organizations

(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period. [Information and/or services available only from the informant must be specifically identified. (If there is none, a statement to that effect should be set out.)]

(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month (Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under S/C authority.)

(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity

(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted (List separately.)

(8) Information furnished of unusual value

(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance

(10) Steps being taken to advance informant

(11) Stability and reliability (Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)

(12) Indoctrination against disclosure (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)

(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished

(14) Miscellaneous (Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every[six]months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. [Six-month]evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every[six]months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
   e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Bureau income should be set forth on the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.
   c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.
   d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.

8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and defector program, section 105K, 6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered.
9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.
10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate an individual as a potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONTROL OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as a Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with his development. Do not submit on a UACB basis. Include a physical description.

[[2.] After designation as a Bureau-approved potential security informant, the following matters should be made clear to him:
   a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
   b. He is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
   c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain the confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has a special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individuals, this should be ascertained and an appropriate recommendation made to the Bureau. The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau and you will be advised accordingly.
   d. If the potential informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements.
   e. If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has similar relations with a school, college, or university, in the initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.

[[3.] Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau.

[[4.] Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.

[[5.] Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every[six]months. Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during past[six]months, and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These letters should follow the form indicated under section 107N, 3b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation.

[[6.] Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.

[[7.] During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.

[[8.] During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.

[[9.] From the first interview with a potential informant through his development and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant.

[[10.] When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to a potential informant or an informant concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
A. Definitions.......... 3
  1. Security informant.......... 3
  2. Potential security informant.......... 3
  3. Double agent.......... 3
  4. Confidential source.......... 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants.......... 3
C. Interviews with and Development of Background on Individuals Being Considered for Informant Purposes.......... 4
D. Approval, Indoctrination, Development, and Control of Potential Security Informants.......... 5
E. Bureau Policy.......... 6
  1. Development of military personnel.......... 6
  2. Contacts by designated Agents.......... 6
  3. Divulging information to informant.......... 6
  4. Recording investigative activity.......... 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants.......... 7
  1. Caution against divulging relationship.......... 7
  2. Developing additional background.......... 7
  3. Handling indications of instability.......... 7
  4. Contacts by Agents.......... 7
    Form FD-209.......... 8
  5. Checking reliability.......... 8
  6. Fingerprints.......... 8
  7. Control - statement of cooperation.......... 8
  8. Execution of party questionnaires.......... 9
  9. Informant's activity in organizations.......... 9
  10. Transfer of informants to other areas.......... 9
  11. Action by informant when uncovered.......... 9
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others.......... 10
  13. Preparation for testifying.......... 10
G. Informants' information.......... 10a
  1. General instructions re oral and written information.......... 10a
  2. Recording written and oral information.......... 10a
  3. Transmission of information.......... 12
  4. Handling of lead information.......... 12
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants.......... 12
H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations.......... 13
  1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition.......... 13
  2. Locating information to pass.......... 13
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority.......... 13
  4. Retention of copies of passed material.......... 13
I. Symbols.......... 13a
  1. Assigning numbers.......... 13a
  2. Communications - use of symbols.......... 14
J. Indexing.......... 14
K. Indices.......... 14
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index.......... 14
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions".......... 15
  3. Agents' informative index.......... 15
  4. Currency and security.......... 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
L. Index Cards 16
M. Informant Files 16
  1. Opening 16
  2. Monthly administrative report 16
  3. Assignment and tickler cards 16
  4. Subfiles 17
  5. Channelization 17
  6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 17
  7. Dissemination of information 17
  8. Correspondence 17
  9. Maintenance of files 17
  10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 17
  11. Form FD-238 17
  12. Bulky material submitted by informant 18
N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received 18
  1. No gifts to informants 18
  2. SAC authority to pay informants 18
  3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority 18
  4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 20
  5. Receipts 20
  6. Income tax returns 20
  7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 21
  8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 21
  9. Handling money and property received by double agents 22
O. Annual Letter 22
P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 24
Q. Discontinued Informants 24
R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 26
S. Corrective Action on False Information 26
T. Classification 27
U. Confidential Sources 27
  1. Definition 27
  2. Assignment of symbols 27
  3. Index 27
  4. Files 27
  5. Utilization 28
  6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 28
  7. Gifts 28
  8. Discontinuance 28

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates[annual] letters should be submitted:

Office	Dates
[Albany	January 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	January 31
Baltimore	" "
Birmingham	" "
Boston	February 15
Buffalo	" "
Butte	" "
Charlotte	February 28
Chicago	January 31
Cincinnati	February 28
Cleveland	" "
Columbia	March 15
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	March 31
El Paso	" "
Honolulu	April 15
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	April 30
Jackson	" "
Jacksonville	May 15
Kansas City	" "
Knoxville	May 31
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	June 15
Los Angeles	February 28
Louisville	June 15
Memphis	June 30
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	March 31
Minneapolis	April 30
Mobile	July 15
Newark	May 31
New Haven	July 15
New Orleans	July 31
New York	September 30
Norfolk	July 31
Oklahoma City	August 15
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	August 31
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	September 15
Portland	" "
Richmond	September 30
Sacramento	" "
St. Louis	October 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	October 31
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	November 15
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	November 30
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "]

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau of the date when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section[19,]volume[II,]of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

[U. PANEL SOURCES

1. Definition

See page 3 of this section.

2. Background investigation and approval

a. Check prospective panelists through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with a prospective panelist to ascertain person's cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out following information:

(1) Results of required background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as a panel source, together with results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) A statement to effect subject is being considered a panel source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union or educational institution he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

d. One of required copies of letter requesting authority to use a subject as a panel source should consist only of first page of letter. If request is approved at Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a panel source.

3. Administrative handling

a. Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants.

b. Payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered should be handled in same manner as payments to security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panelist is initiated. After Bureau has approved a panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit letter of justification to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section 107N, item 3b, of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

f. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY 000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel sources and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization cases, security informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of the date when panel source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.]

[V.] CLASSIFICATION - 134

[illegible] office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.

[illegible] Set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a [illegible] letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, if known, and date of communication.

[illegible] The letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.

11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an [illegible] informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

[T.] CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential sources; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage or foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files

   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   - a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   - b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   - c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   - d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   - e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
     - (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
     - (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
     - (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   - f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.

6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   - a. Every six months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107N, item 3b, for form of letter.
   - b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   - c. If the security confidential source is employed by a foreign diplomatic establishment (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by an international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau every six months. See 107N, item 3b, for form of letter.

7. Gifts

   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

8. Discontinuance

   Advise Bureau of the date when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

5. Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates annual letters should be submitted:

[

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15
Albuquerque	" "
[Alexandria	" "]
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	January 31
Baltimore	" "
Birmingham	" "
Boston	February 15
Buffalo	" "
Butte	" "
Charlotte	February 28
Chicago	January 31
Cincinnati	February 28
Cleveland	" "
Columbia	March 15
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	March 31
El Paso	" "
Honolulu	April 15
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	April 30
Jackson	" "
Jacksonville	May 15
Kansas City	" "
Knoxville	[illegible]
Las Vegas	" "
Little Rock	June [illegible]
Los Angeles	February 28
Louisville	June 15
Memphis	June 30
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	March 31
Minneapolis	April 30
Mobile	July 15
Newark	May 31
New Haven	July 15
New Orleans	July 31
New York	September 30
Norfolk	July 31
Oklahoma City	August 15
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	August 31
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	September 15
Portland	" "
Richmond	September 30
Sacramento	" "
St. Louis	October 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	October 31
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	November 15
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	November 30
Tampa	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

)

P. [illegible] LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS
1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS
1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau of the date when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in [compliance with section[19,]volume[II,]of this manual.
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

[illegible]s

a. [illegible] each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.

b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.

5. Channelization

Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies.

6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.

7. Dissemination of information

Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.

8. Correspondence

Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.

9. Maintenance of files

a. All symbol number informant files, pending and closed, shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by the SAC.

b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.

c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.

d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.

10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re

From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.

11. Form FD-238

Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

12. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
    a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
    b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
    c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
    a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to[$400]and totaling not more than[$400]on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
    b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
    c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
    d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling[$400.]
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
    a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
    b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing the following items and using the subheadings shown. (In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings where applicable.)
        (1) Recommendation
        (Use following wording as nearly as possible:
        "I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months, effective ___(date).")

[illegible]

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. in behalf of foreign principal, that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value; or furnish pertinent foreign intelligence data of value on a regular basis.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in a po[illegible] to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or in[illegible]gence activities in the U. S. in behalf of foreign principal or can b[illegible] closely associated therewith, or is in a position to secure pertinent foreign intelligence data, and is making affirmative effort through associations or co[illegible]cts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   A specia[illegible]d type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, rec[illegible]ing assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intellige[illegible] service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.
4. Confidential source
   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

[[5. Panel source
[An individual who is not involved in a subversive group but who will attend
[[illegible] public gatherings in behalf of the FBI for intelligence purposes or
[[illegible] potential witness]

B. SOURC[illegible] POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS
Informa[illegible] should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are ini[illegible]l to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informan[illegible] may be obtained through alertn[illegible] in the course of normal investigative a[illegible]tivity. Live informant coverage [illegible]ends for the most part upon initiat[illegible] and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obta[illegible]g potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Ev[illegible]tion of
   a. [illegible]plainants in security matters
   b. [illegible]rsons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. [illegible]ubjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hard[illegible]hip, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. [illegible]reau applicants as possible informants
   e. [illegible]sonal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau [illegible]loyees
   f. [illegible]ces of information, confidential sources, and contacts on con[illegible]tinuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals
3. Review of reserve index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Deleted
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications [illegible] disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, sh[illegible] not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only [illegible] few meetings of [illegible] front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of [illegible]mmunist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the [illegible]quaintance of party members.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.
16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K, 6h, volume IV, of this manual.)

C. INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When a decision is made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted, however, until the individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, and section 105K, item 6b, (9), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the individual is known to them
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the individual can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by the investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for
[the completion of an [FD-165] form which should be transmitted to the Identi-
[fication Division to obtain any record he may have [and to place a stop
[against his fingerprints if they are on file.]
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. Definitions 3
  1. Security informant 3
  2. Potential security informant 3
  3. Double agent 3
  4. Confidential source 3
  5. Panel source 3
B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
C. Interviews with and Development of Background on Individuals Being Considered for Informant Purposes 4
D. Approval, Indoctrination, Development, and Control of Potential Security Informants 5
E. Bureau Policy 6
  1. Development of military personnel 6
  2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
  3. Divulging information to informant 6
  4. Recording investigative activity 7
F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
  1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
  2. Developing additional background 7
  3. Handling indications of instability 7
  4. Contacts by Agents 7
    Form FD-209 8
  5. Checking reliability 8
  6. Fingerprints 8
  7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
  8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
  9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
  10. Transfer of informant to other areas 9
  11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
  12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
  13. Preparation for testifying 10
G. Informants' Information 10a
  1. General instructions re oral and written information 10a
  2. Recording written and oral information 10a
  3. Transmission of information 12
  4. Handling of lead information 12
  5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
H. Passing Information in Double Agent Operations 13
  1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
  2. Locating information to pass 13
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
  4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
I. Symbols 13a
  1. Assigning numbers 13a
  2. Communications - use of symbols 14
J. Indexing 14
K. Indices 14
  1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
  2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
  3. Agents' informative index 15
  4. Currency and security 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
L. Index Cards.. 16
M. Informant Files.. 16
  1. Opening.. 16
  2. Monthly administrative report.................................... 16
  3. Assignment and tickler cards..................................... 16
  4. Subfiles... 17
  5. Channelization... 17
  6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of.......................... 17
  7. Dissemination of information..................................... 17
  8. Correspondence... 17
  9. Maintenance of files... 17
  10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re....... 17
  11. Form FD-238... 17
  12. Bulky material submitted by informant........................... 18
N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received................. 18
  1. No gifts to informants... 18
  2. SAC authority to pay informants.................................. 18
  3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority.................. 18
  4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority.. 20
  5. Receipts... 20
  6. Income tax returns... 20
  7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses........................ 21
  8. Receipt of unemployment compensation............................. 21
  9. Handling money and property received by double agents............ 22
O. Annual Letter.. 22
P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements............... 24
Q. Discontinued Informants.. 24
R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)... 26
S. Corrective Action on False Information............................. 26
T. Confidential Sources... 27
  1. Definition... 27
  2. Assignment of symbols.. 27
  3. Index.. 27
  4. Files.. 27
  5. Utilization.. 28
  6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments... 28
  7. Gifts.. 28
  8. Discontinuance... 28
U. Panel Sources.. 29
  1. Definition... 29
  2. Background investigation and approval............................ 29
  3. Administrative handling.. 29
V. Classification... 29

U. PANEL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   - a. Check prospective panelists through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.
   - b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with a prospective panelist to ascertain person's cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
   - c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out following information:
     - (1) Results of required background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses
     - (2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as a panel source, together with results of any interviews conducted with him
     - (3) A statement to effect subject is being considered a panel source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union or educational institution he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.
   - d. One of required copies of letter requesting authority to use a subject as a panel source should consist only of first page of letter. If request is approved at Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a panel source.
3. Administrative handling
   - a. Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants.
   - b. Payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered should be handled in same manner as payments to security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
   - c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panelist is initiated. After Bureau has approved a panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.
   - d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.
   - e. Every six months submit letter of justification[(FD-401)]to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section [130G, item 2b,]of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   - f. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY 000-S.
   - g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel sources and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization cases, security informants, and publications.
   - h. Advise Bureau of the date when panel source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

V. CLASSIFICATION - 134

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

[T.] CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months a letter of justification[(FD-401)]should be submitted to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual] for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   c. If the security confidential source is employed by a foreign diplomatic establishment (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by an international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), a letter of justification[(FD-401)]should be submitted to Bureau every six months. See[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual] for form of letter.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of the date when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

[d. Every six months a letter of justification[(FD-401)]should be submitted
[to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow[instructions
[set forth in section 130G, item 2b, of this manual.]

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication[(FD-401)]must be transmitted to the Bureau every six months after the date of designation containing the same information set out in[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual]except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual.]

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
   e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Bureau income should be set forth on the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.
   c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.
   d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for [channelization]and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Dissemination of information
   Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.
8. Correspondence
   Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.
9. Maintenance of files
   a. All symbol number informant files, pending and closed, shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by the SAC.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.
10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
    From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.
11. Form FD-238
    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

12. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
[[For instructions regarding payments under SAC authority, refer to section
[130G, item 1, of this manual since comparable instructions apply to security
[informants and sources as those set forth for racial informants and sources.]
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
[b. In requesting[authorization for payments, a justification must be fur-
[nished Bureau. For this purpose, use form FD-401 and execute in accord-
[ance with instructions for racial informants and sources contained in
[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual. Justification for payments,
[of course, is based on activity of informant, potential informant, or
[source in matters having primarily a security rather than racial in-
[terest. In espionage and foreign nationality matters use subheadings,
[where applicable.]

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION

1. General instructions re oral and written information
   a. Instructions regarding preparation, submission, and handling of information received from informants apply not only to security informants but also to potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
   b. Specific instructions and guidance must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
   c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after a meeting or activity.
   d. Written statements should be submitted whenever possible, but if such cannot be done information may be provided orally. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
   e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
   f. All information furnished by informants orally or in writing must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies. [In those instances in which informant's statement contains references to a large number of individuals and/or organizations, and statement exceeds two pages in length, consideration should be given to channelizing to a substantive case file only those portions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire informant's statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should save filing space, time of reviewing files, and should be employed unless a logical reason dictates otherwise.]
   g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testmony.
   h. See subsection M for instructions regarding filing informant statements.
2. Recording written and oral information
   a. Written by informant
      (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
      (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
      (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
      (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at the top of it.
      (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or each separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement whether the information is of evidentiary or intelligence value.

U. PANEL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.

2. Background investigation and approval

   a. Check prospective panelists through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.

   b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with a prospective panelist to ascertain person's cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

   c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out following information:

      (1) Results of required background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

      (2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as a panel source, together with results of any interviews conducted with him

      (3) A statement to effect subject is being considered a panel source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union or educational institution he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

   d. One of required copies of letter requesting authority to use a subject as a panel source should consist only of first page of letter. If request is approved at Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a panel source.

3. Administrative handling

   a. Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants.

   b. Payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered should be handled in same manner as payments to security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources since such actions might be misconstrued.

   c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panelist is initiated. After Bureau has approved a panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.

   d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

   e. Every six months submit letter of justification (FD-401) to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section 130G, item 2b, of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

   f. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY 000-S.

   g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel sources and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization cases, security informants, and publications.

   h. Advise Bureau of the date when panel source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

[V. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   a. Students under age of 21 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
   b. Upon initial contact with a potential student security informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands that FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities. Taking this statement should place Bureau in a position to refute possible subsequent false allegations as to nature and purpose of source's cooperation with FBI.
2. Quarterly letters
   a. Beginning 1-1-70, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as a security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). (Quarterly letters are not to take place of or be combined with six months' payment justification letters.) Include following in quarterly letters:
      (1) Specific productivity
      (2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus
      (3) Frequency of contact
   b. Quarterly letters of security and racial informants should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter concerning security sources:
      (1) Number of security informants, potential security informants, and other security sources active and under development at each educational institution affected
      (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources
3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage
   Each office must have a continuous and well-planned program to obtain necessary coverage at institutions of learning so that Bureau can fulfill its obligations. Care with which this must be done in no way lessens responsibility of each individual field office to have proper coverage.

[W.] CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. PANEL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   - a. Check prospective panelists through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.
   - b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with a prospective panelist to ascertain person's cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
   - c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out following information:
     - (1) Results of required background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses
     - (2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as a panel source, together with results of any interviews conducted with him
     - (3) A statement to effect subject is being considered a panel source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union or educational institution he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.
   - d. One of required copies of letter requesting authority to use a subject as a panel source should consist only of first page of letter. If request is approved at Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a panel source.
3. Administrative handling
   - a. Handle notes, statements, and exhibits of panelists in same manner as other evidence. As panelists may subsequently become security informants, same procedure should be followed in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panelists as is afforded that received from security informants.
   - b. Payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered should be handled in same manner as payments to security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
   - c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panelist is initiated. After Bureau has approved a panelist, close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Regular contacts with panelists should be noted in their respective files.
   - d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.
   - e. Every six months submit letter of justification (FD-401) to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. See section [130H,]item 2b, of this manual for form of letter. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   - f. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY 000-S.
   - g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain roster of current panel sources and current list of scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of scheduled organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent receives notice of coming events from Agents handling organization cases, security informants, and publications.
   - h. Advise Bureau of the date when panel source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

[V. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   - a. Students under age of 21 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
   - b. Upon initial contact with a potential student security informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands that FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities. Taking this statement should place Bureau in a position to refute possible subsequent false allegations as to nature and purpose of source's cooperation with FBI.
2. Quarterly letters
   - a. Beginning 1-1-70, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as a security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). (Quarterly letters are not to take place of or be combined with six months' payment justification letters.) Include following in quarterly letters:
     - (1) Specific productivity
     - (2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus
     - (3) Frequency of contact
   - b. Quarterly letters of security and racial informants should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter concerning security sources:
     - (1) Number of security informants, potential security informants, and other security sources active and under development at each educational institution affected
     - (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources
3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage
   Each office must have a continuous and well-planned program to obtain necessary coverage at institutions of learning so that Bureau can fulfill its obligations. Care with which this must be done in no way lessens responsibility of each individual field office to have proper coverage.

[W.] CLASSIFICATION - 134

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

[T.] CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., IS - R for Russia.
   d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants.
3. Index
   a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter. If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the single-page copy and it will be returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See section[130H,]item 2b, of this manual for form of letter.
   b. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   c. If the security confidential source is employed by a foreign diplomatic establishment (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by an international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), a letter of justification (FD-401)]should be submitted to Bureau every six months. See section[130H,]item 2b, of this manual for form of letter.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources since such actions might be misconstrued.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of the date when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in section [130H,] item 2b, of this manual.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication[(FD-401)]must be transmitted to the Bureau every six months after the date of designation containing the same information set out in[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual]except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in[section 130G, item 2b, of this manual.]

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
    a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
    b. Receipts should clearly show:
        (1) Date on which payment was made
        (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
        (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
        (4) Name of Agent making payment
        (5) Signature of person receiving the money
    c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
    d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
    e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
    a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
    b. Bureau income should be set forth on the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.
    c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.
    d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.

4. Subfiles
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for [channelization]and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   For instructions concerning the destruction of channelizing memoranda, see Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Dissemination of information
   Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions showing the subject matter of the information.
8. Correspondence
   Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.
9. Maintenance of files
   a. All symbol number informant files, pending and closed, shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by the SAC.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.
10. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
   From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.
11. Form FD-238
   Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized. If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.

12. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

N. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority to pay informants
For instructions regarding payments under SAC authority, refer to section
[[130H,]item 1, of this manual since comparable instructions apply to security informants and sources as those set forth for racial informants and sources.
3. Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting authorization for payments, a justification must be furnished Bureau. For this purpose, use form FD-401 and execute in accordance with instructions for racial informants and sources contained in
[section[130H,]item 2b, of this manual. Justification for payments, of course, is based on activity of informant, potential informant, or source in matters having primarily a security rather than racial interest. In espionage and foreign nationality matters use subheadings, where applicable.

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months a letter of justification (FD-401) should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in section [130H,]item 2b, of this manual.

e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

h. Discontinuance of payments

If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

i. Extraordinary expenses

In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication (FD-401) must be transmitted to the Bureau every six months after the date of designation containing the same information set out in section [[130H,]item 2b, of this manual except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is [necessary regarding only those applicable items in section[130H,]item 2b, of this manual.

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
   a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.
   b. Receipts should clearly show:
      (1) Date on which payment was made
      (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
      (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
      (4) Name of Agent making payment
      (5) Signature of person receiving the money
   c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
   d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.
   e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns
   a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
   b. Bureau income should be set forth on the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.
   c. If the informant is self-employed and files a schedule C as a self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau.
   d. Effective 1-1-65, in those instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as an informant, such payments will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld.

[3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage
[Each office must have continuous and well-planned program to obtain
[necessary coverage at institutions of learning so that Bureau can fulfill
[its obligations. Care with which this must be done in no way lessens
[responsibility of each field office to have proper coverage.
[
[V. CLASSIFICATION - 134

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

(1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

(4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

f. Symbol number may be assigned if unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY-000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information

a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.

b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.

c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass

Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority

Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:

a. Newspaper or magazine article

   b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material
   - a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.
   - b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.
   - c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.
   - d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.
5. Handling money and property received by double agents
   - a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.
   - b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.
   - c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   - d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   - a. Students under age of 21 years are not to be developed as security informants or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
   - b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.
2. Quarterly letters
   - a. On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). Include following:
     - (1) Specific productivity
     - (2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus
     - (3) Frequency of contact
   - b. Quarterly letters on all racial and security informants or sources should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter:
     - (1) Number of informants, potential informants, and other sources active and under development at each educational institution affected
     - (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, racial informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, racial informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must dictate memorandum to SAC for file containing same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. Symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, racial, and criminal informants.

- (1) Correct, full name
- (2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
- (3) First date of contact by your office
- (4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
- (5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
- (6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
- (7) Date of last contact by your office
- (8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.

d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

   a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

   b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

M. ANNUAL LETTER

1. Submit annual letter to Bureau including following:

   a. Symbol numbers of all informants and confidential sources being paid under Bureau authority (not SAC authority) for services or expenses. If confidential source has no symbol number, list name.

   b. Symbol numbers of all informants not paid under Bureau authority

   c. Comment concerning present informant coverage of office, together with information concerning actions being taken to improve coverage

   d. List under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

Under each unit show approximate membership and symbol numbers and positions of informants affording coverage. Where no informant coverage exists or is provided by sources who are not members, so indicate.

Include any additional pertinent information that may be helpful in overall evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally used and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

2. Listed below are dates annual letters are to be submitted by respective offices:

Office	Dates
Albany, Albuquerque, Alexandria, Anchorage	January 15
Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham	January 31
Boston, Buffalo, Butte	February 15
Charlotte	February 28
Chicago	January 31
Cincinnati, Cleveland	February 28
Columbia, Dallas, Denver	March 15
Detroit, El Paso	March 31
Honolulu, Houston	April 15
Indianapolis, Jackson	April 30
Jacksonville, Kansas City	May 15
Knoxville, Las Vegas	May 31
Little Rock	June 15
Los Angeles	February 28
Louisville	June 15
Memphis, Miami	June 30
Milwaukee	March 31
Minneapolis	April 30
Mobile	July 15
Newark	May 31
New Haven	July 15
New Orleans	July 31
New York	September 30
Norfolk	July 31
Oklahoma City, Omaha	August 15
Philadelphia, Phoenix	August 31
Pittsburgh, Portland	September 15
Richmond, Sacramento	September 30
St. Louis, Salt Lake City	October 15
San Antonio, San Diego, San Francisco	October 31
San Juan, Savannah, Seattle	November 15
Springfield, Tampa, Washington, D. C.	November 30

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

O. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When services of informant are discontinued, mark name card "cancelled." Destroy symbol card. Never destroy name card.
2. Refile name card in numerical order by symbol number in symbol number index. If discontinued informant, potential informant, or confidential source to whom symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove name card from symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in name card section of index.
3. When potential informant or confidential source is discontinued and permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy alphabetical index card.
4. Advise Bureau of date when potential informant or informant is discontinued and reason therefor. Advise Bureau as to whether or not informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. Identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which informant has furnished information must be ascertained and Bureau advised in compliance with section 19, volume II, of this manual.
5. Review informant's file to determine if correspondence between Bureau and field relating to Department's interest in using informant as witness is contained therein. In those cases in which Department has indicated desire to consider informant when he becomes available, advise Bureau in each such substantive case, except when it is obvious statute of limitations has run or case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When above action is completed, advise Bureau.
6. Statement shall also be made to effect that measures to control informants, set out in item 7, below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears such are warranted.
7. When services of informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that informant will look to Bureau for counsel prior to taking any action against Bureau's best interests. Determine whether he has plans for writing book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, impress him with desirability of coming to Bureau for assistance and guidance. If informant insists on engaging in such activities, Bureau will consider placing him in contact with reliable publisher, but it must be made clear to informant that Bureau will not sponsor or endorse any book or publication which he elects to write.
8. All payments to discontinued informants and confidential sources must be made on strict c.o.d. basis. Obtain Bureau authority before making such payments. Submit complete details as to information furnished by discontinued informant or source in past and what is to be expected of informant or source in future.
9. Once informant is exposed in any manner whatsoever, do not carry him as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth, together with descriptive data.
10. When office receives information concerning, or obtains information from, an ex-informant, copies of memoranda prepared must be furnished to office which originally handled informant so that file will be as complete as possible.
11. When informant has been discontinued for cause, such as unreliability, do not contact him in future for information. If he furnishes information it should be accepted, but in setting out information in reports or communications use individual's true name, together with appropriate description of his reliability.
12. Remove flash notice.
13. Avoid repeated use of discontinued informant as witness at security trials and hearings. Make all-out effort to develop witnesses who can furnish same testimony. Advise Bureau of any indication by Government attorneys that informant-witness who has previously testified will be called upon for testimony at subsequent trial or hearing and furnish comments concerning possibility of supplanting testimony of individual involved. Submit under appropriate case character.

14. Make every effort to prevent discontinued informant from becoming involved in situations which may prove embarrassing to informant or Government. Immediately after he testifies for first time, SAC should have serious talk with informant in presence of Agent who handled informant. This interview should be conducted in field office and informant told that:
    a. He will no longer be operated by Bureau
    b. Since he is public figure, he will probably be contacted by representatives of press, radio, and television for interviews and appearances
    c. He may be sought as witness by congressional committees, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and state authorities
    d. In connection with such interviews and appearances, informant must continue to be factual and truthful and must not build up or embellish statements, for if he does so he will wind up in serious trouble

    Advise Bureau results of such interview and comment on its possible effectiveness.

    Be alert to possibilities of former informant being contacted by representatives of publicity media and as witness by congressional committees, INS, and state authorities. SAC is responsible for knowing when former informant is scheduled or is likely to appear at hearing or make public appearance of of any kind. Prior thereto in each instance, former informant must be contacted and instructions above reiterated by Agent who handled informant. Emphasize to former informant that he must stick to truth and make certain he can back up what he says, and if there is any deviation he will be subjected to criticism, possible libel, slander, or other criminal actions. If he inquires as to whether he should appear or testify or otherwise cooperate with any public or private individual or agency, advise him he must make that decision himself, but if he has appeared as Government witness in case which has not been finally adjudicated and decides in affirmative, he should contact USA for instructions. Advise Bureau of any such situations and results of any interviews conducted.

15. When contacting Agent feels discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to Bureau, make arrangements to have former informant come to field office where he will be personally met by SAC. At that time, he should be impressed with fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to security of country and remind him that he signed agreement when he was active as informant to maintain his relation with Bureau on confidential basis. SAC should stress necessity for informant to maintain this confidence.

P. FURNISHING INFORMANTS TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

1. INS, in order to enforce its responsibilities, must obtain evidence to prove that certain aliens, due to their membership in certain groups, are undesirable and deportable or subject to denaturalization.
2. Cooperate fully with INS in these cases and make efforts consistent with your own interests to make available information and witnesses where possible.
3. If contacted by INS inquiring for informants and you have discontinued informant or one who would be of assistance to INS and whose loss would not affect your work, furnish his identity to Bureau, together with your recommendation.
4. Bureau will review facts and advise as to whether or not his identity may be disclosed to INS.
5. Before any informant is turned over to INS, obtain his permission.

a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.

b. Receipts should clearly show:

   (1) Date on which payment was made
   (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on period basis
   (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where pertinent
   (4) Name of Agent making payment
   (5) Signature of person receiving money

c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.

d. If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by informant and not by Agent.

e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to Bureau, staple them directly to blue slip, leaving margin of one to one and one-half inches at top to avoid contact with Acco fastener punch. Place staples so that date or other data appearing on receipt will not be mutilated and all information on receipt can be easily read without detaching it from blue slip.

6. Income tax returns

a. Advise informants who receive compensation for their services to Bureau that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.

b. Bureau income should be set forth on Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

c. If informant is self-employed and files schedule C as self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with Bureau.

d. If informant cannot report payments received from Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as informant, such payments will be subject to 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning procedure to be followed in handling and control of money withheld.

e. When informant or former informant is initially considered as potential witness in Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on income he received from Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, Bureau must furnish Department set of photostats of original receipts signed by prospective witnesses. Original receipts and set of photostats will be transmitted to field office in whose territory trial will take place. Office handling prosecution must determine from Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to Bureau following information:

(4) Number of statements submitted
Combine total number of oral and written statements submitted and show only total number.

(5) Stability and reliability
Check positive box if informant is considered stable and reliable. If not or if there are any personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or any other similar problems presented by informant, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(6) Indoctrination against disclosure
If informant has been indoctrinated against disclosure, check positive box.

(7) Percentage of information verified
Show percentage of information furnished by informant which has been verified through other sources.

(8) All necessary action taken on information furnished
If all action has been taken, check positive box. If not, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(9) Summary of information furnished
This summary should be concise, highlighting more pertinent information furnished by informant. Do not attempt to summarize all information furnished by informant.

(10) Miscellaneous
Furnish any change in informant's residence and employment, steps being taken to advance informant, and any other pertinent information which should be brought to Bureau's attention. Include statement that source has been advised that all payments of money made to him for services rendered must be declared as income on his tax return and has agreed to do so.

c. When payment to informant has been authorized for definite period of time, advise Bureau at least two weeks in advance of expiration of period as to whether services of informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in item 3b, above.

e. Submit letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant in duplicate except that copy should consist only of first page of letter. When payments are approved, single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at Bureau and returned. If recommendation is not approved, field will be advised by separate communication.

f. When payments are authorized by Bureau, it is personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure that full value is being received.

g. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears information being produced by informant is not commensurate with payments made to him, immediately discontinue payments or adjust accordingly and promptly advise Bureau.

h. If any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, FD-401 must be transmitted to Bureau every six months after date of designation containing same information set out in item 3b, above, except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases, comment is necessary regarding only applicable items.

5. Receipts
When payments are made either on SAC authority or prior Bureau approval, obtain receipts in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If receipt cannot be obtained for particular payment, set forth complete circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.

[K. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
   a. When active investigation is initiated regarding potential informant or confidential source who is not subject of security-type file, open 134 file.
   b. If individual is subject of security case and after being interviewed appears to have potential as informant, open separate 134 file to follow informant development. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, existing file may be used if this is practical.
   c. Maintain individual files on all active informants as pending active files.
2. Monthly administrative report
   Include files on potential informants and informants in tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.
3. Assignment and tickler cards
   Maintain assignment and tickler cards, but do not show true name of informant on such cards.
4. Subfiles
   a. Subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. File in this subfile original of each statement, whether personally written by informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent. Staple executed form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items on form FD-306 to original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Include excerpts from informant's statement in regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to case file in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   See Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Correspondence
   Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption.
8. Maintenance of files
   a. Maintain all symbol number informant files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by SAC.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in open files section, provided there is no disclosure of informant's identity on statements.
   c. Maintain informant files so that all information furnished by informant will be immediately available when needed.
   d. In addition, maintain these files so identities of cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be obtained immediately by simply referring to file of informant and without extensive research.

9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
From time to time, Department expresses interest in using particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as witness. Place copies of all correspondence of this type in informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize information concerning each informant and place summary in appropriate file.

10. Form FD-238
Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) is used in security informant and potential security informant files in nature of table of contents or index to show where in file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as top document in informant file and is not to be serialized. If particular section of form is not applicable, note such thereon.

11. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than statement and same pertains to specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in investigative case file, together with copy of form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum. File original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum in subfile of informant or source and note thereon file and serial number where bulky material is located.

L. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on businesslike basis.
   c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority
   a. When deemed necessary and expedient to expend money to develop individual as informant to obtain information concerning security matters which is not otherwise obtainable or to advance expense money to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments up to $400 and totaling not more than $400 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. Blue slip reclaiming payments authorized by SAC must clearly and accurately explain circumstances and summarize information obtained so Bureau will be in position to pass intelligently on such matters.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to individual who has received payments totaling $400. Once individual has been paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on regular basis, recommendation should be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis."
3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a regular basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, use form FD-401:
      (1) Membership
      List current membership and position held in any subversive group.
      (2) Amount paid for services and expenses
      List by the month or week. Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.
      (3) Number of activities and persons on whom coverage is provided
      List number and type of meetings attended and other activities and number of persons on whom informant furnishes coverage and their importance.

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
   - a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
   - b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant use of such designations.
   - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   - d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
   - e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; letters "OS" for confidential source.
   - f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to racial, etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY-000-S to NY-000-C or to NY-000-R).
2. Communications - use of symbols
   - a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
   - b. In all communications after initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
   - c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
   - d. Informants and sources entering another division
     - (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
     - (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
     - (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
   - e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not assigned, name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
   - f. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, caption of communication should also show character and country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

J. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index

   Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice
   - a. Alphabetical name index

     In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, and security confidential sources. This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.

b. Symbol number index
This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.

c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.

d. Index cards
Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

Symbol: File No:
(Informant, potential
informant, or confidential
source)

Name:

e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.

2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"
   a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.
   b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.
   c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.
   d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.

3. Agents' informative index
   a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.
   b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.
   c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.
   d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.
   e. Potential informants, confidential sources, panel sources, and sources of information who do not have permanent symbols should be set forth by name.
   f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.
   g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.
   h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.
   i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

2. Recording written and oral information
   a. Written by informant
      (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
      (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
      (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
      (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at top of statement.
      (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement.
      (6) Informants should include in statements specific dates and places; purpose of meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; and specific activity or comments of individuals present.
      (7) Informant should identify statement by affixing his code name immediately under the last written line on each page. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or initials of his code name.
      (8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.
      (9) Informant should refer to himself in body of statement by his true name and use third person.
      (10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., or place any markings whatever thereon.
      (11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on channelizing memorandum containing applicable items set forth on form FD-306.
      (12) Extraneous material should be kept to absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
         (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau
         (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant
         (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

      Such data should be furnished orally by informant and recorded in memorandum form for informant file.
   b. Furnished orally by informant
      (1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with making of oral statement by informant to Agent. Leave out following items:
         (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau
         (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant
         (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

      Such data should be recorded in memorandum for informant file.
      (2) Prepare on paper devoid of Bureau markings or identification.
      (3) Date at top with date informant furnished information. No other date is desired except date of meeting or activity described in body of statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by Agent as if informant were preparing them himself.

(5) Information, after being reduced to writing, should be read promptly by informant and acknowledged by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, such authentication is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) After informant authenticates statement, contacting Agent should prepare cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it. Thereafter statement should be handled as written one.

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be included in office memorandum by Agent and should not be initialed by informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information

a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants when possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such contacts. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.

b. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory. More than one informant may send statements to a post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of postal employees.

c. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under fictitious name.

d. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for extended period of time.

e. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication.

4. Handling of lead information

a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to logical conclusion.

b. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, tickler card should be prepared to follow informant and take other logical steps to obtain additional identifying data. Restrict tickler cards to information which would warrant investigation if identity established. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants

a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon informant's code name.

b. Informant should affix date he received material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, date he furnished material should be affixed.

c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material.

d. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items. See section 107K for filing instructions.

d. Flash notice is to be placed by field with Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.

e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

7. Control - statement of cooperation

a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents to obtain maximum results and prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

b. Obtain signed statement set out below when feasible and practical. Where it is not practical to secure such signed statement from an informant or double agent, advise Bureau of complete details. SAC and Agent handling informant or double agent should determine appropriate time in informant's operation when statement should be completed.

> I, ________, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.
>
> (Signed) ________ ____________
>
> Witnessed: ________________

8. Execution of party questionnaires

Informants, particularly in Communist Party, often must execute party questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeoparidze their position as informants. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant.

9. Informant's activity in organizations

a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.

b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.

c. Changes in organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions are labeled as such.

d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but in such manner as to avoid suspicion.

10. Transfer of informants to other areas
    a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.
    b. Keep in mind overall coverage of organizations. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, encourage him to do so in order to provide wider coverage for Bureau's work.
11. Action by informant when uncovered
    a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, instruct him to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.
    b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without facts to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse issue to point where his services may not be lost.
    c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from strict discipline of organization involved, and thus cast off suspicion.
12. Requests of informant to help defend others
    a. If requested by Communist Party, or other interested parties to assist in preparation of defense in subversive-type cases or handle assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline.
    b. Such requests should be reported immediately to contacting Agent and made matter of record.
    c. If informant cannot avoid becoming involved, instruct him not to report any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.
    d. Promptly report any such incident to Bureau.
13. Preparation for testifying
    Contacting Agent must condition informant to fact that someday knowledge he possesses may be needed as evidence in court. Psychologically prepare informant for fact that he may at future date be called upon to testify to information he has furnished on security matters. Proper indoctrination of informant is essential as Bureau must provide witnesses whenever Department initiates prosecutions in security cases.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION

1. General instructions re oral and written information
    a. These instructions apply to security informants, potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
    b. Specific instructions must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
    c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after meeting or activity.
    d. Written statements should be submitted when possible. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
    e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
    f. All information furnished by informants must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelizing and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies. When informant's statement contains references to large number of individuals and/or organizations, and exceeds two pages, consider channelizing to substantive case file only those portions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should be employed unless logical reason dictates otherwise.

5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401) concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under section 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by Bureau.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Contacts by Agents
   a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where frequency of contact is dependent on circumstances, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
   b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
   c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
   d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
   e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.
   f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
   g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
   h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
   i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
   j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.
5. Checking reliability
   a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
   b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
6. Fingerprints
   a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
   b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
   c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file.
5. Review armed services record if applicable.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
   a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
   b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
   c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
   d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.
   e. If potential informant is student, teacher, or has any similar relations with school, college, or university, in initial interview and subsequent handling, follow current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
3. Do not interview female potential informants in their homes or apartments unless necessary and any such interviews should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of superior in field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on circumstances, contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

[M. Annual Letter 17
[N. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 18
[O. Discontinued Informants 19
[P. Furnishing Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service
[(INS) 20
[Q. Corrective Action on False Information 21
[R. Confidential Sources 21
[1. Definition 21
[2. Assignment of symbols 21
[3. Index 22
[4. Files 22
[5. Utilization 22
[6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability
[and payments 22
[7. Gifts 22
[8. Discontinuance 22
[S. Panel Sources 22
[1. Definition 22
[2. Background investigation and approval 22
[3. Administrative handling 23
[T. Double Agent Operations 23
[1. Passage of information 23
[2. Locating information to pass 23
[3. Obtaining Bureau authority 23
[4. Retention of copies of passed material 24
[5. Handling money and property received by double agents 24
[U. Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of
[Learning 24
[1. Use of students 24
[2. Quarterly letters 24
[3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage 25
[V. Classification 25

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

[A. Definitions 3
[1. Security informant 3
[2. Potential security informant 3
[3. Double agent 3
[4. Confidential source 3
[5. Panel source 3
[B. Sources of Potential Informants 3
[C. Background Inquiries on Individuals Being Considered for Informant Purposes 3
[D. Approval, Indoctrination, and Development of Potential Informants 4
[E. Bureau Policy 5
[1. Development of military personnel 5
[2. Contacts by designated Agents 5
[3. Divulging information to informant 5
[4. Recording investigative activity 5
[F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Informants 5
[1. Caution against divulging relationship 5
[2. Developing additional background 5
[3. Indications of instability 5
[4. Contacts by Agents 6
[5. Checking reliability 6
[6. Fingerprints 6
[7. Control - statement of cooperation 7
[8. Execution of party questionnaires 7
[9. Informant's activity in organizations 7
[10. Transfer of informants to other areas 8
[11. Action by informant when uncovered 8
[12. Requests of informant to help defend others 8
[13. Preparation for testifying 8
[G. Informants' Information 8
[1. General instructions re oral and written information 8
[2. Recording written and oral information 9
[3. Transmission of information 10
[4. Handling of lead information 10
[5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 10
[H. Symbols 11
[1. Assigning numbers 11
[2. Communications - use of symbols 11
[I. Indexing 11
[J. Indices 11
[1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 11
[2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 12
[3. Agents' informative index 12
[K. Informant Files 13
[1. Opening 13
[2. Monthly administrative report 13
[3. Assignment and tickler cards 13
[4. Subfiles 13
[5. Channelization 13
[6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 13
[7. Correspondence 13
[8. Maintenance of files 13
[9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 14
[10. Form FD-238 14
[11. Bulky material submitted by informant 14
[L. Payments to Informants 14
[1. No gifts to informants 14
[2. SAC authority 14
[3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority 14
[4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 15
[5. Receipts 15
[6. Income tax returns 16
[7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 16
[8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 17

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

  (1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

  (2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

  (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

  (4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

  a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

  b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

  c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

  d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

  e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

  f. Symbol number may be assigned if unusual security problem exists or if typing would be saved. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number; e.g., PS NY-000-S.

  g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

  h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information

  a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.

  b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.

  c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass

Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority

Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:

  a. Newspaper or magazine article

b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material
   a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.
   b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.
   c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.
   d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.
5. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   a. Students under age of [18] years are not to be developed as security informants, [potential security informants,] or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
   b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.
2. Quarterly letters
   a. On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). Include following:
      (1) Specific productivity
      (2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus
      (3) Frequency of contact
   b. Quarterly letters on all racial and security informants or sources should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter:
      (1) Number of informants, potential informants, and other sources active and under development at each educational institution affected
      (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources

14. Make every effort to prevent discontinued informant from becoming involved in situations which may prove embarrassing to informant or Government. Immediately after he testifies for first time, SAC should have serious talk with informant in presence of Agent who handled informant. This interview should be conducted in field office and informant told that:
    a. He will no longer be operated by Bureau
    b. Since he is public figure, he will probably be contacted by representatives of press, radio, and television for interviews and appearances
    c. He may be sought as witness by congressional committees, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and state authorities
    d. In connection with such interviews and appearances, informant must continue to be factual and truthful and must not build up or embellish statements, for if he does so he will wind up in serious trouble

    Advise Bureau results of such interview and comment on its possible effectiveness.

    Be alert to possibilities of former informant being contacted by representatives of publicity media and as witness by congressional committees, INS, and state authorities. SAC is responsible for knowing when former informant is scheduled or is likely to appear at hearing or make public appearance of of any kind. Prior thereto in each instance, former informant must be contacted and instructions above reiterated by Agent who handled informant. Emphasize to former informant that he must stick to truth and make certain he can back up what he says, and if there is any deviation he will be subjected to criticism, possible libel, slander, or other criminal actions. If he inquires as to whether he should appear or testify or otherwise cooperate with any public or private individual or agency, advise him he must make that decision himself, but if he has appeared as Government witness in case which has not been finally adjudicated and decides in affirmative, he should contact USA for instructions. Advise Bureau of any such situations and results of any interviews conducted.

15. When contacting Agent feels discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to Bureau, make arrangements to have former informant come to field office where he will be personally met by SAC. At that time, he should be impressed with fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to security of country and remind him that he signed agreement when he was active as informant to maintain his relation with Bureau on confidential basis. SAC should stress necessity for informant to maintain this confidence.

P. FURNISHING INFORMANTS TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

1. INS, in order to enforce its responsibilities, must obtain evidence to prove that certain aliens, due to their membership in certain groups, are undesirable and deportable or subject to denaturalization.
2. Cooperate fully with INS in these cases and make efforts consistent with your own interests to make available information and witnesses where possible.
3. If contacted by INS inquiring for informants and you have discontinued informant or one who would be of assistance to INS and whose loss would not affect your work, furnish his identity to Bureau, together with your recommendation.
4. Bureau will review facts and advise as to whether or not his identity may be disclosed to INS.
5. Before any informant is turned over to INS, obtain his permission.

O. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When services of informant are discontinued, mark name card "cancelled." Destroy symbol card. Never destroy name card.
2. Refile name card in numerical order by symbol number in symbol number index. If discontinued informant, potential informant, or confidential source to whom symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove name card from symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in name card section of index.
3. When potential informant or confidential source is discontinued and permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy alphabetical index card.
4. Advise Bureau of date when potential informant or informant is discontinued and reason therefor. Advise Bureau as to whether or not informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. Identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which informant has furnished information must be ascertained and Bureau advised in compliance with section 19, volume II, of this manual.
5. Review informant's file to determine if correspondence between Bureau and field relating to Department's interest in using informant as witness is contained therein. In those cases in which Department has indicated desire to consider informant when he becomes available, advise Bureau in each such substantive case, except when it is obvious statute of limitations has run or case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When above action is completed, advise Bureau.
6. Statement shall also be made to effect that measures to control informants, set out in item 7, below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears such are warranted.
7. When services of informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that informant will look to Bureau for counsel prior to taking any action against Bureau's best interests. Determine whether he has plans for writing book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, impress him with desirability of coming to Bureau for assistance and guidance. If informant insists on engaging in such activities, Bureau will consider placing him in contact with reliable publisher, but it must be made clear to informant that Bureau will not sponsor or endorse any book or publication which he elects to write.
8. All payments to discontinued informants and confidential sources must be made on strict c.o.d. basis. Obtain Bureau authority before making such payments. Submit complete details as to information furnished by discontinued informant or source in past and what is to be expected of informant or source in future.
9. Once informant is exposed in any manner whatsoever, do not carry him as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth, together with descriptive data.
10. When office receives information concerning, or obtains information from, an ex-informant, copies of memoranda prepared must be furnished to office which originally handled informant so that file will be as complete as possible.
11. When informant has been discontinued for cause, such as unreliability, do not contact him in future for information. If he furnishes information it should be accepted, but in setting out information in reports or communications use individual's true name, together with appropriate description of his reliability.

[12. Remove flash notice[per item F, 6, e of this section.]

13. Avoid repeated use of discontinued informant as witness at security trials and hearings. Make all-out effort to develop witnesses who can furnish same testimony. Advise Bureau of any indication by Government attorneys that informant-witness who has previously testified will be called upon for testimony at subsequent trial or hearing and furnish comments concerning possibility of supplanting testimony of individual involved. Submit under appropriate case character.

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
    a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
    b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant use of such designations.
    c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
    d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
    e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; letters["CS"]for confidential source.
    f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to racial, etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY-000-S to NY-000-C or to NY-000-R).
2. Communications - use of symbols
    a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
    b. In all communications after initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
    c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
    d. Informants and sources entering another division
        (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
        (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
        (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
    e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not assigned, name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
    f. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, caption of communication should also show character and country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

J. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
   Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice
    a. Alphabetical name index
       In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, and security confidential sources. This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.

b. Symbol number index
This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.

c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.

d. Index cards
Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

Symbol: File No:
(Informant, potential
informant, or confidential
source)

Name:

e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.

2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"

a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.

b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.

c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.

d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.

3. Agents' informative index

a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.

b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.

c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.

d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.

e. Potential informants, confidential sources, panel sources, and sources of information who do not have permanent symbols should be set forth by name.

f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.

g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.

h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.

i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

b. Symbol number index
This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.

c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.

d. Index cards
Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

Symbol: File No:
(Informant, potential
informant, or confidential
source)

Name:

e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.

2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"
a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.
b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.
c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.
d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.

3. Agents' informative index
a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.
b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.
c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.
d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.
e. Potential informants, confidential sources, panel sources, and sources of information who do not have permanent symbols should be set forth by name.
f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.
g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.
h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.
i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
    - a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
    - b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant use of such designations.
    - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
    - d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
    - e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; letters "CS" for confidential source.
    - f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to racial, etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-S to NY 000-C or to NY 000-R).
2. Communications - use of symbols
    - a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
    - b. In all communications after initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
    - c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
    - d. Informants and sources entering another division
        - (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
        - (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
        - (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
    - e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not assigned, name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
    - f. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, caption of communication should also show character and country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

J. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
   Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice
    - a. Alphabetical name index
      In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, and security confidential sources. This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, racial informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, racial informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must[certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
   1. Definition
      See page 3 of this section.
   2. Background investigation and approval
      a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. Symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   - d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, racial, and criminal informants.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by Agent as if informant were preparing them himself.

(5) Information, after being reduced to writing, should be read promptly by informant and acknowledged by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, such authentication is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) After informant authenticates statement, contacting Agent should prepare cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it. Thereafter statement should be handled as written one.

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be included in office memorandum by Agent and should not be initialed by informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information

a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants when possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such contacts. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.

b. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory. More than one informant may send statements to a post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of postal employees.

c. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under fictitious name.

d. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for extended period of time.

e. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication.

4. Handling of lead information

a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to logical conclusion.

b. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, tickler card should be prepared to follow informant and take other logical steps to obtain additional identifying data. Restrict tickler cards to information which would warrant investigation if identity established. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants

a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon informant's code name.

b. Informant should affix date he received material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, date he furnished material should be affixed.

c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material.

d. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items. See section 107K for filing instructions.

tions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should be employed unless logical reason dictates otherwise.

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

2. Recording written and oral information
   a. Written by informant
      (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
      (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
      (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
      (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at top of statement.
      (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement.
      (6) Informants should include in statements specific dates and places; purpose of meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; and specific activity or comments of individuals present.
      (7) Informant should identify statement by affixing his code name immediately under the last written line on each page. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or initials of his code name.
      (8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.
      (9) Informant should refer to himself in body of statement by his true name and use third person.
      (10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., or place any markings whatever thereon.
      (11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on channelizing memorandum containing applicable items set forth on form FD-306.
      (12) Extraneous material should be kept to absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
         (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau
         (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant
         (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

      Such data should be furnished orally by informant and recorded in memorandum form for informant file.

   b. Furnished orally by informant
      (1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with making of oral statement by informant to Agent. Leave out following items:
         (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau.
         (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant
         (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

      Such data should be recorded in memorandum for informant file.
      (2) Prepare on paper devoid of Bureau markings or identification.
      (3) Date at top with date informant furnished information. No other date is desired except date of meeting or activity described in body of statement.

10. Transfer of informants to other areas
    a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.
    b. Keep in mind overall coverage of organizations. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, encourage him to do so in order to provide wider coverage for Bureau's work.
11. Action by informant when uncovered
    a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, instruct him to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.
    b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without facts to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse issue to point where his services may not be lost.
    c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from strict discipline of organization involved, and thus cast off suspicion.
12. Requests of informant to help defend others
    a. If requested by Communist Party, or other interested parties to assist in preparation of defense in subversive-type cases or handle assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline.
    b. Such requests should be reported immediately to contacting Agent and made matter of record.
    c. If informant cannot avoid becoming involved, instruct him not to report any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.
    d. Promptly report any such incident to Bureau.
    e. [If an informant is present in conversation between an attorney and individual under criminal indictment, he should immediately leave. If he is unable to do so and inadvertently learns of defense plans or strategy, he is not to report the substance of any such conversation to the FBI. Additionally, the informant is not to engage in or report the substance of a conversation with a criminal defendant dealing with the offense for which the defendant is under indictment.]
13. Preparation for testifying
    Contacting Agent must condition informant to fact that someday knowledge he possesses may be needed as evidence in court. Psychologically prepare informant for fact that he may at future date be called upon to testify to information he has furnished on security matters. Proper indoctrination of informant is essential as Bureau must provide witnesses whenever Department initiates prosecutions in security cases.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION
1. General instructions re oral and written information
    a. These instructions apply to security informants, potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
    b. Specific instructions must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
    c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after meeting or activity.
    d. Written statements should be submitted when possible. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
    e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
    f. All information furnished by informants must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelizing and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies. When informant's statement contains references to large number of individuals and/or organizations, and exceeds two pages, consider channelizing to substantive case file only those por-

d. Flash notice is to be placed by field with Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.

e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

7. Control - statement of cooperation

a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents to obtain maximum results and prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

b. Obtain signed statement set out below when feasible and practical. Where it is not practical to secure such signed statement from an informant or double agent, advise Bureau of complete details. SAC and Agent handling informant or double agent should determine appropriate time in informant's operation when statement should be completed.

> I, ________, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.

(Signed) ________ ____________

Witnessed: ______________

8. Execution of party questionnaires

Informants, particularly in Communist Party, often must execute party questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeoparidze their position as informants. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant.

9. Informant's activity in organizations

a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.

b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.

c. Changes in organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions are labeled as such.

d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but in such manner as to avoid suspicion.

4. Contacts by Agents
   a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where frequency of contact is dependent on circumstances, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
   b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
   c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
   d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
   e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.
   f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
   g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
   h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
   i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
   j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.
5. Checking reliability
   a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
   b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
6. Fingerprints
   a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
   b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
   c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

4. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on circumstances, contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401) concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by Bureau.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file.
5. Review armed services record if applicable.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
    - [a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of racial and/or security informants, the number of potential racial and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.]
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
    - a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
    - b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
    - c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
    - d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.
    - e. If potential informant is student, teacher, or has any similar relations with school, college, or university, in initial interview and subsequent handling, follow current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
3. Do not interview female potential informants in their homes or apartments unless necessary and any such interviews should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of superior in field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to Bureau.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
From time to time, Department expresses interest in using particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as witness. Place copies of all correspondence of this type in informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize information concerning each informant and place summary in appropriate file.

10. Form FD-238
Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) is used in security informant and potential security informant files in nature of table of contents or index to show where in file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as top document in informant file and is not to be serialized. If particular section of form is not applicable, note such thereon.

11. Bulky material submitted by informant
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than statement and same pertains to specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in investigative case file, together with copy of form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum. File original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum in subfile of informant or source and note thereon file and serial number where bulky material is located.

L. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on businesslike basis.
   c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.

2. SAC authority
   a. When deemed necessary and expedient to expend money to develop individual as informant to obtain information concerning security matters which is not otherwise obtainable or to advance expense money to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments up to $400 and totaling not more than $400 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. Blue slip reclaiming payments authorized by SAC must clearly and accurately explain circumstances and summarize information obtained so Bureau will be in position to pass intelligently on such matters.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to individual who has received payments totaling $400. Once individual has been paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on regular basis, recommendation should be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis."

3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a regular basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, use form FD-401:
      (1) Membership
      List current membership and position held in any subversive group.
      (2) Amount paid for services and expenses
      List by the month or week. Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.
      (3) Number of activities and persons on whom coverage is provided
      List number and type of meetings attended and other activities and number of persons on whom informant furnishes coverage and their importance.

K. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
   a. When active investigation is initiated regarding potential informant or confidential source who is not subject of security-type file, open 134 file.
   b. If individual is subject of security case and after being interviewed appears to have potential as informant, open separate 134 file to follow informant development. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, existing file may be used if this is practical.
   c. Maintain individual files on all active informants as pending active files.
2. Monthly administrative report
   Include files on potential informants and informants in tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.
3. Assignment and tickler cards
   [Maintain assignment and tickler cards, but do not show true name of informant,[potential informant, panel source or confidential source] on such cards.
4. Subfiles
   a. Subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. File in this subfile original of each statement, whether personally written by informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent. Staple executed form FD-305 or channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items on form FD-306 to original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Include excerpts from informant's statement in regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to case file in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   See Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Correspondence
   Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption.
8. Maintenance of files
   a. Maintain all symbol number informant files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by SAC.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in open files section, provided there is no disclosure of informant's identity on statements.
   c. Maintain informant files so that all information furnished by informant will be immediately available when needed.
   d. In addition, maintain these files so identities of cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be obtained immediately by simply referring to file of informant and without extensive research.

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

(1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

(4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

f. [A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a panel source.] Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number, e.g., PS NY-000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information

a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.

b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.

c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass

Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority

Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:

a. Newspaper or magazine article

b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material
   a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.
   b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.
   c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.
   d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.
5. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   a. Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
   b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.
2. Quarterly letters
   a. On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). Include following:
      (1) Specific productivity
      (2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus
      (3) Frequency of contact
   b. Quarterly letters on all[extremist]and security informants or sources should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter:
      (1) Number of informants, potential informants, and other sources active and under development at each educational institution affected
      (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources

3. Index
   - a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, [extremist]informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   - b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, racial informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   - a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   - b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   - c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   - d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
     - (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
     - (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
     - (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
     - (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   - a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   - b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must[certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   - c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   - a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   - [a. [A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken
   - [to develop an individual as a confidential source.]
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   - d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - [e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, [extremist,]and criminal informants.

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.

[4. Check local arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file.

5. Review armed services record if applicable.

6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.

7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.

8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
    a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of extremist and/or security informants, the number of potential extremist and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.

2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
    a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
    b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
    c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
    d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of/
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material

a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.

b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.

c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.

d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.

5. Handling money and property received by double agents

a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.

b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.

c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students

a. Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.

b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.

[2. [Deleted]

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

(1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

(2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

(3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

(4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

f. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a panel source. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number, e.g., PS NY 000-S.

g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information

a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.

b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.

c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass

Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority

Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:

a. Newspaper or magazine article

[2. Submit quarterly letter (FD-451b) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Quarterly letter should include the following:
   a. Name, location and number of subversive groups including identities of groups on college campuses, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   b. Symbol numbers of member informants providing coverage who are members of organizations. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.
   c. Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning subversive acts of violence, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   d. Symbol numbers of informants and sources providing coverage of individuals or groups shown in Column C. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.]

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

(1) Correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) First date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) Date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.

d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

[M. MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY LETTERS

1. Submit monthly letter (FD-451, 451a) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Field divisions east of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 3rd of each month; field divisions west of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 7th of each month. Monthly letter should include the following:

a. Number of security informants, potential security informants, confidential sources, and panel sources at the beginning and end of each month also showing the number added and deleted during the month.

b. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to informant and source development.

c. Money paid for services and expenses under SAC authority.

d. Statistical accomplishments.

e. Security informant accomplishments.

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check local arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file. [In order to eliminate the possibility of jeopardizing the security of Bureau informants, the word "Informant" should not be indicated in blank ballot box on FD-165. It should be noted the informant file number serves as an indication to the Identification Division of the type of flash notice desired.]
5. Review armed services record if applicable.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
    a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of extremist and/or security informants, the number of potential extremist and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
    a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
    b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
    c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
    d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

[2. Submit quarterly letter (FD-451b) to Bureau by secure teletype system
[(NITEL). Quarterly letter should include the following:
[a. Name, location and number of subversive groups including identities
[of groups on college campuses, exclusive of those in black extremist,
[white hate or espionage matters.
[b. Symbol numbers of member informants providing coverage who are members
[of organizations. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain
[why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being
[taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is antici-
[pated for each group.
[c. Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are
[active in planning subversive acts of violence, exclusive of those
[in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
[d. Symbol numbers of informants and sources providing coverage of
[individuals or groups shown in Column C. If no member informant,
[attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants.
[Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants
[and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.]

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

    (1) Correct, full name
    (2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
    (3) First date of contact by your office
    (4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
    (5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
    (6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
    (7) Date of last contact by your office
    (8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office
  b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.
  c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.
  d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of [Voucher-Statistical Section, Computer Systems Division.] Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation
  a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.
  b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

M. MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY LETTERS

1. Submit monthly letter (FD-451, 451a) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Field divisions east of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 3rd of each month; field divisions west of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 7th of each month. Monthly letter should include the following:
  a. Number of security informants, potential security informants, confidential sources, and panel sources at the beginning and end of each month also showing the number added and deleted during the month.
  b. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to informant and source development.
  c. Money paid for services and expenses under SAC authority.
  d. Statistical accomplishments.
  e. Security informant accomplishments.

b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material

a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.

b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.

c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.

d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.

5. Handling money and property received by double agents

a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.

b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.

c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students

a. Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.

b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.

[2. [Deleted]

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit[secure teletype (Nitel)]to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:
   (1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses
   (2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him
   (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.
   (4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling
   a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.
   b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.
   c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.
   d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.
   e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.
   f. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a panel source. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number, e.g., PS NY 000-S.
   g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.
   h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information
   a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.
   b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.
   c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass
   Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority
   Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:
   a. Newspaper or magazine article

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, extremist informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, extremist informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, arrest and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must[certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate arrest and military records.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a confidential source.
   [b. Advise Bureau by [secure teletype (Nitel)] giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY 000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, extremist, and criminal informants.

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check local arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file. In order to eliminate the possibility of jeopardizing the security of Bureau informants, the word "Informant" should not be indicated in blank ballot box on FD-165. It should be noted the informant file number serves as an indication to the Identification Division of the type of flash notice desired.
5. Review armed services record if applicable. [FD-356 must be used in any routine check pertaining to informants making sure all references, such as symbol number, which would tend to identify individual as an informant are deleted.]
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
    a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of extremist and/or security informants, the number of potential extremist and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
    a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
    b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
    c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
    d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
   From time to time, Department expresses interest in using particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as witness. Place copies of all correspondence of this type in informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize information concerning each informant and place summary in appropriate file.
10. Form FD-238
    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) is used in security informant and potential security informant files in nature of table of contents or index to show where in file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as top document in informant file and is not to be serialized. If particular section of form is not applicable, note such thereon.
11. Bulky material submitted by informant
    Where informant or source submits bulky material other than statement and same pertains to specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in investigative case file, together with copy of form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum. File original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum in subfile of informant or source and note thereon file and serial number where bulky material is located.

L. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS

1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on businesslike basis.
   c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority
   a. When deemed necessary and expedient to expend money to develop individual as informant to obtain information concerning security matters which is not otherwise obtainable or to advance expense money to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments up to $400 and totaling not more than $400 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. Blue slip reclaiming payments authorized by SAC must clearly and accurately explain circumstances and summarize information obtained so Bureau will be in position to pass intelligently on such matters.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to individual who has received payments totaling $400. Once individual has been paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on regular basis, recommendation should be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis."
   [e. All newly developed security informants are to be paid under SAC authority for the first six months unless unusual circumstances exist. If additional funds under SAC authority are necessary during this period, submit request accompanied by detailed justification of past expenditures.]
3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a regular basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, use form FD-401:
      (1) Membership
      List current membership and position held in any subversive group.
      (2) Amount paid for services and expenses
      List by the month or week. Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.
      (3) Number of activities and persons on whom coverage is provided
      List number and type of meetings attended and other activities and number of persons on whom informant furnishes coverage and their importance.

K. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
    a. When active investigation is initiated regarding potential informant or confidential source who is not subject of security-type file, open 134 file.
    b. If individual is subject of security case and after being interviewed appears to have potential as informant, open separate 134 file to follow informant development. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, existing file may be used if this is practical.
    c. Maintain individual files on all active informants as pending active files.
2. Monthly administrative report
   Include files on potential informants and informants in tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.
3. Assignment and tickler cards
   Maintain assignment and tickler cards, but do not show true name of informant, [potential informant, panel source or confidential source] on such cards.
4. Subfiles
    a. Subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. File in this subfile original of each statement, whether personally written by informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent. Staple executed form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items on form FD-306 to original of each such statement.
    b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Include excerpts from informant's statement in regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to case file in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   See Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Correspondence
   Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption.
8. Maintenance of files
    a. Maintain all symbol number informant files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by SAC.
    b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in open files section, provided there is no disclosure of informant's identity on statements.
    c. Maintain informant files so that all information furnished by informant will be immediately available when needed.
    d. In addition, maintain these files so identities of cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be obtained immediately by simply referring to file of informant and without extensive research.

4. Contacts by Agents
    a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where frequency of contact is dependent on circumstances, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
    b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
    c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
    d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
    e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.
    f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
    g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
    h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
    i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
    j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.
5. Checking reliability
    a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
    b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
6. Fingerprints
    a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
    b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
    c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

4. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on circumstances, contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401) concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by Bureau.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.

[[5. All informants and sources are to be debriefed on at least a monthly
[basis regarding their knowledge of narcotics activities.]

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

[2. Submit quarterly letter (FD-451b) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Quarterly letter should include the following:
   a. Name, location and number of subversive groups including identities of groups on college campuses, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   b. Symbol numbers of member informants providing coverage who are members of organizations. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.
   c. Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning subversive acts of violence, exclusive of those in black extremist, white hate or espionage matters.
   d. Symbol numbers of informants and sources providing coverage of individuals or groups shown in Column C. If no member informant, attach addendum and explain why you do not have member informants. Indicate specific action being taken to develop member informants and date such coverage is anticipated for each group.]

N. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Make every effort to guide informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
3. Bureau will consider as last resort advising another agency of informant's relationship with Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to minimum in view of obvious dangers to informant.
4. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau advised as promptly as possible, together with appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
5. In no instance should you permit informant to sign loyalty oath in negative.

(1) Correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) First date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) Tabulation of all payments, broken down as to services and expenses. Although tabulations are not furnished to Department, those prepared by your office will be reconciled with Bureau records.
(6) Listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) Date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with particular individual, Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where informant has previously been used and tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from date of last trial in which individual was used.

d. Above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to attention of [Data Processing] Section, Computer Systems Division. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to Bureau with copies designated for interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs and become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as prerequisite for unemployment compensation and informants and/or sources who are being paid by Bureau fail to comply, situation is potentially embarrassing. Bureau cannot be placed in position of condoning violation of state law on part of any informant or source. Field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. When paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit recommendations to Bureau on UACB basis. At same time, weigh seriously possible need for informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to protect his security. Fellow members of subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of identity, discontinue Bureau payments during period of unemployment compensation benefits.

M. MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY LETTERS

1. Submit monthly letter (FD-451, 451a) to Bureau by secure teletype system (NITEL). Field divisions east of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 3rd of each month; field divisions west of the Mississippi must submit this information by the 7th of each month. Monthly letter should include the following:

a. Number of security informants, potential security informants, confidential sources, and panel sources at the beginning and end of each month also showing the number added and deleted during the month.
b. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to informant and source development.
c. Money paid for services and expenses under SAC authority.
d. Statistical accomplishments.
e. Security informant accomplishments.

Page

[M. [Monthly and Quarterly Letters] 17
N. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements 18
O. Discontinued Informants 19
P. Furnishing Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 20
Q. Corrective Action on False Information 21
R. Confidential Sources 21
  1. Definition 21
  2. Assignment of symbols 21
  3. Index 22
  4. Files 22
  5. Utilization 22
  6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments 22
  7. Gifts 22
  8. Discontinuance 22
S. Panel Sources 22
  1. Definition 22
  2. Background investigation and approval 22
  3. Administrative handling 23
T. Double Agent Operations 23
  1. Passage of information 23
  2. Locating information to pass 23
  3. Obtaining Bureau authority 23
  4. Retention of copies of passed material 24
  5. Handling money and property received by double agents 24
U. Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning 24
  1. Use of students 24
[2. [Deleted]
  3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage 25
V. Classification 25

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

[A. Definitions 3
[1. Security informant 3
[2. Potential security informant 3
[3. Double agent 3
[4. Confidential source 3
[5. Panel source 3
[B. Sources of Potential Informants 3
[C. Background Inquiries on Individuals Being Considered for Informant Purposes 3
[D. Approval, Indoctrination, and Development of Potential Informants 4
[E. Bureau Policy 5
[1. Development of military personnel 5
[2. Contacts by designated Agents 5
[3. Divulging information to informant 5
[4. Recording investigative activity 5
[F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Informants 5
[1. Caution against divulging relationship 5
[2. Developing additional background 5
[3. Indications of instability 5
[4. Contacts by Agents 6
[5. Checking reliability 6
[6. Fingerprints 6
[7. Control - statement of cooperation 7
[8. Execution of party questionnaires 7
[9. Informant's activity in organizations 7
[10. Transfer of informants to other areas 8
[11. Action by informant when uncovered 8
[12. Requests of informant to help defend others 8
[13. Preparation for testifying 8
[G. Informants' Information 8
[1. General instructions re oral and written information 8
[2. Recording written and oral information 9
[3. Transmission of information 10
[4. Handling of lead information 10
[5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 10
[H. Symbols 11
[1. Assigning numbers 11
[2. Communications - use of symbols 11
[I. Indexing 11
[J. Indices 11
[1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 11
[2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 12
[3. Agents' informative index 12
[K. Informant Files 13
[1. Opening 13
[2. Monthly administrative report 13
[3. Assignment and tickler cards 13
[4. Subfiles 13
[5. Channelization 13
[6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 13
[7. Correspondence 13
[8. Maintenance of files 13
[9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re 14
[10. Form FD-238 14
[11. Bulky material submitted by informant 14
[L. Payments to Informants 14
[1. No gifts to informants 14
[2. SAC authority 14
[3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority 14
[4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority 15
[5. Receipts 15
[6. Income tax returns 16
[7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses 16
[8. Receipt of unemployment compensation 17

a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.

b. Receipts should clearly show:
   (1) Date on which payment was made
   (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on period basis
   (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where pertinent
   (4) Name of Agent making payment
   (5) Signature of person receiving money

c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.

d. If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by informant and not by Agent.

e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to Bureau, staple them directly to blue slip, leaving margin of one to one and one-half inches at top to avoid contact with Acco fastener punch. Place staples so that date or other data appearing on receipt will not be mutilated and all information on receipt can be easily read without detaching it from blue slip.

6. Income tax returns

a. Advise informants who receive compensation for their services to Bureau that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.

b. Bureau income should be set forth on Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

c. If informant is self-employed and files schedule C as self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with Bureau.

d. If informant cannot report payments received from Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as informant, such payments will be subject to 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning procedure to be followed in handling and control of money withheld.

e. When informant or former informant is initially considered as potential witness in Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on income he received from Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, Bureau must furnish Department set of photostats of original receipts signed by prospective witnesses. Original receipts and set of photostats will be transmitted to field office in whose territory trial will take place. Office handling prosecution must determine from Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to Bureau following information:

(4) Number of statements submitted
Combine total number of oral and written statements submitted and show only total number.

(5) Stability and reliability
Check positive box if informant is considered stable and reliable. If not or if there are any personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or any other similar problems presented by informant, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(6) Indoctrination against disclosure
If informant has been indoctrinated against disclosure, check positive box.

(7) Percentage of information verified
Show percentage of information furnished by informant which has been verified through other sources.

(8) All necessary action taken on information furnished
If all action has been taken, check positive box. If not, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(9) Summary of information furnished
This summary should be concise, highlighting more pertinent information furnished by informant. Do not attempt to summarize all information furnished by informant.

(10) Miscellaneous
[[Furnish any change in informant's residence and employment[by secure teletype (nitel),]steps being taken to advance informant, and any other pertinent information which should be brought to Bureau's attention. Include statement that source has been advised that all payments of money made to him for services rendered must be declared as income on his tax return and has agreed to do so.

c. When payment to informant has been authorized for definite period of time, advise Bureau at least two weeks in advance of expiration of period as to whether services of informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in item 3b, above.

e. Submit letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant in duplicate except that copy should consist only of first page of letter. When payments are approved, single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at Bureau and returned. If recommendation is not approved, field will be advised by separate communication.

f. When payments are authorized by Bureau, it is personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure that full value is being received.

g. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears information being produced by informant is not commensurate with payments made to him, immediately discontinue payments or adjust accordingly and promptly advise Bureau.

h. If any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, FD-401 must be transmitted to Bureau every six months after date of designation containing same information set out in item 3b, above, except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases, comment is necessary regarding only applicable items.

5. Receipts
When payments are made either on SAC authority or prior Bureau approval, obtain receipts in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If receipt cannot be obtained for particular payment, set forth complete circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.

9. Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re
   From time to time, Department expresses interest in using particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as witness. Place copies of all correspondence of this type in informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize information concerning each informant and place summary in appropriate file.
10. Form FD-238
   Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) is used in security informant and potential security informant files in nature of table of contents or index to show where in file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as top document in informant file and is not to be serialized. If particular section of form is not applicable, note such thereon.
11. Bulky material submitted by informant
   Where informant or source submits bulky material other than statement and same pertains to specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in investigative case file, together with copy of form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum. File original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum in subfile of informant or source and note thereon file and serial number where bulky material is located.

L. PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS
1. No gifts to informants
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on businesslike basis.
   c. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.
2. SAC authority
   a. When deemed necessary and expedient to expend money to develop individual as informant to obtain information concerning security matters which is not otherwise obtainable or to advance expense money to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments up to $400 and totaling not more than $400 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. Blue slip reclaiming payments authorized by SAC must clearly and accurately explain circumstances and summarize information obtained so Bureau will be in position to pass intelligently on such matters.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to individual who has received payments totaling $400. Once individual has been paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on regular basis, recommendation should be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis."
   e. All newly developed security informants are to be paid under SAC authority for the first six months unless unusual circumstances exist. If additional funds under SAC authority are necessary during this period, submit request accompanied by detailed justification of past expenditures.
3. Payments on a regular basis - Bureau authority
   a. To pay anyone on a regular basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, use form FD-401:
      (1) Membership
          List current membership and position held in any subversive group. [If position identifies informant, submit separately by secure teletype (nitel).]
      (2) Amount paid for services and expenses
          List by the month or week. Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.
      (3) Number of activities and persons on whom coverage is provided
          List number and type of meetings attended and other activities and number of persons on whom informant furnishes coverage and their importance.

K. INFORMANT FILES

1. Opening
   a. When active investigation is initiated regarding potential informant or confidential source who is not subject of security-type file, open 134 file.
   b. If individual is subject of security case and after being interviewed appears to have potential as informant, open separate 134 file to follow informant development. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, existing file may be used if this is practical.
   c. Maintain individual files on all active informants as pending active files.
2. Monthly administrative report
   Include files on potential informants and informants in tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.
3. Assignment and tickler cards
   Maintain assignment and tickler cards, but do not show true name of informant,[potential informant, panel source or confidential source] on such cards.
4. Subfiles
   a. Subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral, except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution. File in this subfile original of each statement, whether personally written by informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent. Staple executed form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items on form FD-306 to original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. Channelization
   Include excerpts from informant's statement in regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to case file in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelization and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and all copies.
6. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
   See Manual of Rules and Regulations.
7. Correspondence
   Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption.
8. Maintenance of files
   a. Maintain all symbol number informant files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, field supervisor, or responsible employee designated by SAC.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in open files section, provided there is no disclosure of informant's identity on statements.
   c. Maintain informant files so that all information furnished by informant will be immediately available when needed.
   d. In addition, maintain these files so identities of cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be obtained immediately by simply referring to file of informant and without extensive research.

a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.

b. Receipts should clearly show:
   (1) Date on which payment was made
   (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on period basis
   (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where pertinent
   (4) Name of Agent making payment
   (5) Signature of person receiving money

c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.

d. If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by informant and not by Agent.

e. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to Bureau, staple them directly to blue slip, leaving margin of one to one and one-half inches at top to avoid contact with Acco fastener punch. Place staples so that date or other data appearing on receipt will not be mutilated and all information on receipt can be easily read without detaching it from blue slip.

6. Income tax returns

a. [Advise informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau that such compensation must be reported as income when filing a Federal income tax form, and, where appropriate, state and local tax forms. Informants must be periodically advised of the above and complete details of any reported problem an informant has encountered with the taxing authorities are to be expeditiously furnished the Bureau.]

b. Bureau income should be set forth on Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

c. If informant is self-employed and files schedule C as self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with Bureau.

d. If informant cannot report payments received from Bureau for services without jeopardizing his security as informant, such payments will be subject to 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning procedure to be followed in handling and control of money withheld.

e. When informant or former informant is initially considered as potential witness in Bureau case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on income he received from Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling situation.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, Bureau must furnish Department set of photostats of original receipts signed by prospective witnesses. Original receipts and set of photostats will be transmitted to field office in whose territory trial will take place. Office handling prosecution must determine from Government attorney which individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to Bureau following information:

(4) Number of statements submitted
Combine total number of oral and written statements submitted and show only total number.

(5) Stability and reliability
Check positive box if informant is considered stable and reliable. If not or if there are any personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or any other similar problems presented by informant, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(6) Indoctrination against disclosure
If informant has been indoctrinated against disclosure, check positive box.

(7) Percentage of information verified
Show percentage of information furnished by informant which has been verified through other sources.

(8) All necessary action taken on information furnished
If all action has been taken, check positive box. If not, check negative box and explain under "Miscellaneous."

(9) Summary of information furnished
This summary should be concise, highlighting more pertinent information furnished by informant. Do not attempt to summarize all information furnished by informant.

(10) Miscellaneous
Furnish any change in informant's residence and employment[by secure teletype (nitel),]steps being taken to advance informant, and any other pertinent information which should be brought to Bureau's attention. Include statement that source has been advised that all payments of money made to him for services rendered must be declared as income on his tax return and has agreed to do so.

c. When payment to informant has been authorized for definite period of time, advise Bureau at least two weeks in advance of expiration of period as to whether services of informant are to be continued.

d. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow instructions set forth in item 3b, above.

e. Submit letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant in duplicate except that copy should consist only of first page of letter. When payments are approved, single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at Bureau and returned. If recommendation is not approved, field will be advised by separate communication.

f. When payments are authorized by Bureau, it is personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure that full value is being received.

g. Discontinuance of payments
If at any time it appears information being produced by informant is not commensurate with payments made to him, immediately discontinue payments or adjust accordingly and promptly advise Bureau.

h. If any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

4. Six-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority
If informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, FD-401 must be transmitted to Bureau every six months after date of designation containing same information set out in item 3b, above, except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. In espionage and foreign nationality cases, comment is necessary regarding only applicable items.

5. Receipts
When payments are made either on SAC authority or prior Bureau approval, obtain receipts in every instance in which it is possible to do so. If receipt cannot be obtained for particular payment, set forth complete circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.

nothing transpired of potential prosecutive value with respect to the individual, FD-306 should list the substantive case file number or should list subject's name and it will not be necessary to staple a copy of the informant's statement to FD-306.] When informant's statement contains references to large number of individuals and/or organizations, and exceeds two pages, consider channelizing to substantive case file only those portions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should be employed unless logical reason dictates otherwise. When preparing lengthy channelizing memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit the number of copies prepared for each other such office to two. Clearly indicate next to the name of the receiving office, the number of the page containing information pertinent to that office and note on cover page that distribution of material to the receiving field office files is left to discretion of the receiving office. If the channelizing memorandum includes names of individuals who merely attended a meeting or gathering and played no important role, the reporting office is to attach to the channelizing memorandum a one-page memorandum listing the names of all individuals who were merely in attendance and had no important function. The preparation and distribution of the additional copies of the one-page attachment are left to the discretion of the receiving office.

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

2. Recording written and oral information
   a. Written by informant
      (1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.
      (2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.
      (3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.
      (4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at top of statement.
      (5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement.
      (6) Informants should include in statements specific dates and places; purpose of meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; and specific activity or comments of individuals present.
      (7) Informant should identify statement by affixing his code name immediately under the last written line on each page. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or initials of his code name.
      (8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.
      (9) Informant should refer to himself in body of statement by his true name and use third person.
      (10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., or place any markings whatever thereon.
      (11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on channelizing memorandum containing applicable items set forth on form FD-306.
      (12) Extraneous material should be kept to absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:
         (a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau
         (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant

10. Transfer of informants to other areas
    a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.
    b. Keep in mind overall coverage of organizations. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, encourage him to do so in order to provide wider coverage for Bureau's work.
11. Action by informant when uncovered
    a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, instruct him to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.
    b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without facts to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse issue to point where his services may not be lost.
    c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from strict discipline of organization involved, and thus cast off suspicion.
12. Requests of informant to help defend others
    a. If requested by Communist Party, or other interested parties to assist in preparation of defense in subversive-type cases or handle assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline.
    b. Such requests should be reported immediately to contacting Agent and made matter of record.
    c. If informant cannot avoid becoming involved, instruct him not to report any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.
    d. Promptly report any such incident to Bureau.
    e. If an informant is present in conversation between an attorney and individual under criminal indictment, he should immediately leave. If he is unable to do so and inadvertently learns of defense plans or strategy, he is not to report the substance of any such conversation to the FBI. Additionally, the informant is not to engage in or report the substance of a conversation with a criminal defendant dealing with the offense for which the defendant is under indictment.
13. Preparation for testifying
    Contacting Agent must condition informant to fact that someday knowledge he possesses may be needed as evidence in court. Psychologically prepare informant for fact that he may at future date be called upon to testify to information he has furnished on security matters. Proper indoctrination of informant is essential as Bureau must provide witnesses whenever Department initiates prosecutions in security cases.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION
1. General instructions re oral and written information
    a. These instructions apply to security informants, potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.
    b. Specific instructions must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.
    c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after meeting or activity.
    d. Written statements should be submitted when possible. In espionage and foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to prosecution are involved.)
    e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.
    f. All information furnished by informants must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of channelizing memorandum if desired. If so, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for channelizing and staple one copy to each copy of informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies. [In those instances in which an informant reports that an individual attended a meeting but took no active part therein and/or

d. Flash notice is to be placed by field with Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.

e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

7. Control - statement of cooperation

a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents to obtain maximum results and prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

b. Obtain signed statement set out below when feasible and practical. Where it is not practical to secure such signed statement from an informant or double agent, advise Bureau of complete details. SAC and Agent handling informant or double agent should determine appropriate time in informant's operation when statement should be completed.

> I, ________, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.
>
> (Signed) ________ ___________
>
> Witnessed: ______________

8. Execution of party questionnaires

Informants, particularly in Communist Party, often must execute party questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeoparidze their position as informants. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant.

9. Informant's activity in organizations

a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.

b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.

c. Changes in organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions are labeled as such.

d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but in such manner as to avoid suspicion.

4. Contacts by Agents
   a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where frequency of contact is dependent on circumstances, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
   b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
   c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
   d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
   e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.
   f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
   g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
   h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
   i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
   j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.
5. Checking reliability
   a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
   b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
6. Fingerprints
   a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
   b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
   c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

4. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on circumstances, contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401) concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
[Do not develop informants among[active duty]military personnel.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.
5. All informants and sources are to be debriefed on at least a monthly basis regarding their knowledge of narcotics activities.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

Security Informant" shall not appear.

J. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
   Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice
   a. Alphabetical name index
      In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, and security confidential sources. This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.
   b. Symbol number index
      This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.
   c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.
   d. Index cards
      Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

      Symbol: File No:
      (Informant, potential
      informant, or confidential
      source)

      Name:

   e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.
2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"
   a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.
   b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.
   c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.
   d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.
3. Agents' informative index
   a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.
   b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.
   c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.
   d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.
   [e. [Deleted.]
   f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.
   g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.
   h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.
   i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
   a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
   b. A symbol number designation should be afforded to all individuals from the time any step (generally the opening of an informant or source file) is taken to develop them as sources or informants. [Upon assigning a symbol number, Bureau should be immediately advised by secure teletype of the symbol number, informant's true name, available background information, and cover name, if assigned, for indexing purposes.]
   c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
   e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; letters "CS" for confidential source.
   f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to extremist, etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-S to NY 000-C or to NY 000-E).
   g. An asterisk should not be used to designate certain highly sensitive informants or investigative techniques. Do not include asterisk in reporting information from such sources.
2. Communications - use of symbols
   a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
   b. In all communications after initial[one,]Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
   c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
   d. Informants and sources entering another division
      (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial secure teletype to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. Such a teletype should not be routed to a Resident Agency. Office receiving such teletype should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
      (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
      (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
   e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not used, name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
   f. Captions of communications concerning informants and sources should contain a precise character designation to identify the organization with which they are most closely associated or on which they are most capable of furnishing information (i.e., Security Matter - Students for a Democratic Society or SM - SDS, Security Matter - Young Socialist Alliance or SM - YSA, Security Matter - Communist or SM - C, etc.). In espionage and foreign nationality matters, caption of communication should also show character and country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a confidential source.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY 000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, extremist, and criminal informants.

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, extremist informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, extremist informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, arrest and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must[certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate arrest and military records.

tions of statement which apply to particular individual or organization. Of course, entire statement should be filed in informant's subfile. This procedure should be employed unless logical reason dictates otherwise. [When preparing lengthy channelizing memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit the number of copies prepared for each other such office to two. Clearly indicate next to the name of the receiving office, the number of the page containing information pertinent to that office and note on cover page that distribution of material to the receiving field office files is left to discretion of the receiving office. If the channelizing memorandum includes names of individuals who merely attended a meeting or gathering and played no important role, the reporting office is to attach to the channelizing memorandum a one-page memorandum listing the names of all individuals who were merely in attendance and had no important function. The preparation and distribution of the additional copies of the one-page attachment are left to the discretion of the receiving office.]

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. Trial attorney will thus be prepared in event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

2. Recording written and oral information

a. Written by informant

(1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.

(2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.

(3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at top of statement.

(5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement.

(6) Informants should include in statements specific dates and places; purpose of meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; and specific activity or comments of individuals present.

(7) Informant should identify statement by affixing his code name immediately under the last written line on each page. Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be identified by informant affixing his code name or initials of his code name.

(8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.

(9) Informant should refer to himself in body of statement by his true name and use third person.

(10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., or place any markings whatever thereon.

(11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on channelizing memorandum containing applicable items set forth on form FD-306.

(12) Extraneous material should be kept to absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:

(a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau

(b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant

(c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

Such data should be furnished orally by informant and recorded in memorandum form for informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant

(1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with making of oral statement by informant to Agent. Leave out following items:

(a) Any reference concerning Director and Bureau

(b) References to other documents and statements submitted by informant

(c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent

Such data should be recorded in memorandum for informant file.

(2) Prepare on paper devoid of Bureau markings or identification.

(3) Date at top with date informant furnished information. No other date is desired except date of meeting or activity described in body of statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by Agent as if informant were preparing them himself.

(5) Information, after being reduced to writing, should be read promptly by informant and acknowledged by affixing his code name on each page. In espionage and foreign nationality matters, such authentication is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.

(6) After informant authenticates statement, contacting Agent should prepare cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it. Thereafter statement should be handled as written one.

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be included in office memorandum by Agent and should not be initialed by informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission of information

a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants when possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such contacts. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.

b. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory. More than one informant may send statements to a post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of postal employees.

c. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under fictitious name.

d. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for extended period of time.

e. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication.

4. Handling of lead information

a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to logical conclusion.

b. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, tickler card should be prepared to follow informant and take other logical steps to obtain additional identifying data. Restrict tickler cards to information which would warrant investigation if identity established. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile.

5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants

a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon informant's code name.

b. Informant should affix date he received material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, date he furnished material should be affixed.

c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material.

d. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items. See section 107K for filing instructions.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a confidential source.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY 000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, extremist, and criminal informants.

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, extremist informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant,[extremist]informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must[certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
   1. Definition
      See page 3 of this section.
   2. Background investigation and approval
      a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military records. Limit credit check of individual to identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment).

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. [Limit credit check of individual to identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment.)] Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file.
5. Review armed services record if applicable.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
    a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of extremist and/or security informants, the number of potential extremist and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
    a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
    b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
    c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
    d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.

e. If potential informant is student, teacher, or has any similar relations with school, college, or university, in initial interview and subsequent handling, follow current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

3. Do not interview female potential informants in their homes or apartments unless necessary and any such interviews should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of superior in field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups and there will be no embarrassment to Bureau.

Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION

1. When it is determined that informant or ex-informant furnished false information while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.
8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of information to follow instructions set forth above.
9. Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
10. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
11. All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
12. Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant.
13. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Assignment of symbols
   a. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a confidential source.
   b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   c. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS." Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R.
   d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbreviation "CS" is to appear before symbol number; e.g., CS NY 000-S.
   e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series of numbers used for security, extremist, and criminal informants.

3. Index
   a. Prepare index cards on form FD-348 and file as adjunct to criminal informant, extremist informant, or security informant index, depending on type information furnished.
   b. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with criminal informant, racial informant, and security informant index where logical.
4. Files
   When active investigation is initiated relative to prospective confidential source, open 134 file (or 137 for criminal sources) and maintain as pending until efforts to develop individual are discontinued.
5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used in security investigations, secure Bureau approval, and furnish background data of same type required for potential security informants.
   b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances, contact confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained at least once every two weeks. Such contacts may be posted.
   c. Contacts should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   d. Letter to Bureau requesting authority to use subject as confidential source is to set out clearly:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of expected cooperation of individual and results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered confidential source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
      (4) One copy of letter requesting authority should consist only of first page. If request is approved at Bureau, stamped notation to this effect will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.
6. Security confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments. See subsection L, item 3b, above.
   b. If source is not being paid on Bureau authorization or if he is not employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or an international organization and is being used regularly, Agent handling must[certify stability and reliability by executing statement on this point contained on FD-209 used to record contact. Certification must be made at intervals of no longer than six months.]
   c. If source is employed by foreign diplomatic establishments (embassy, consulate, United Nations Mission, etc.) or by international organization (United Nations Secretariat, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, etc.), submit FD-401 to Bureau every six months.
7. Gifts
   Gifts should not be given to sources.
8. Discontinuance
   Advise Bureau of date when source is discontinued and reasons.

S. PANEL SOURCES
1. Definition
   See page 3 of this section.
2. Background investigation and approval
   a. Check prospective panel source through office indices, canvass logical informants, review appropriate credit, arrest, and military
[records. [Limit credit check of individual to identifying information
[only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment).]

b. If no pertinent derogatory information is developed, initial contact may be made with prospective panel source to ascertain cooperativeness; however, in regard to individuals associated with educational institutions, be guided by current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.

c. Submit letter to Bureau requesting authority to use individual as a panel source and set out:

   (1) Results of background investigation and data as to date and place of birth, citizenship status if foreign born, residence and employment addresses

   (2) Details of expected area of activity of individual as panel source and results of any interviews conducted with him

   (3) Statement to effect subject is being considered panel source and will be advised he is not Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with Bureau. Also, statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant and, if connected with labor union or educational institution, he will be advised of Bureau policy on such matters.

   (4) One copy of letter should consist only of first page. If approved at Bureau, stamped notation indicating Bureau approval will be placed on single-page copy and it will be returned to field.

3. Administrative handling

   a. Follow same procedure in handling, processing, and reporting data and material furnished by panel sources as afforded security informants.

   b. Handle payments for legitimate expenses incurred and services rendered in same manner as security informants. Gifts should not be given to panel sources.

   c. Open 134 file when active investigation of prospective panel source initiated. Close file administratively if panelist is not contacted regularly. Note contacts with panelists in their respective files.

   d. Only Agents designated in particular case should contact panelists.

   e. Every six months submit FD-401 to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel source. If source not paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing certification as to stability and reliability.

   f. A symbol number should be assigned from the time any step is taken to develop an individual as a panel source. Use abbreviation "PS" before symbol number, e.g., PS NY 000-S.

   g. Designate, where practicable, coordinating Agent to maintain current roster of panel sources and scheduled organization activities, who will notify Agents handling individual panelists of organizational functions to be covered. Coordinating Agent should receive notice of coming events from Agents handling organizations, informants, and publications.

   h. Advise Bureau of date panel source is discontinued and reasons.

T. DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Passage of information

   a. In double agent operations information requested by principals is frequently passed either to build up double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.

   b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that net gain accrues to U. S.

   c. Information passed should be carefully handled and logical explanations created for its acquisition by double agent.

2. Locating information to pass

   Where possible field office handling double agent should locate appropriate information; however, Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of other Government agencies.

3. Obtaining Bureau authority

   Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in double agent operation except:

   a. Newspaper or magazine article

   b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribution or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.)

4. Retention of copies of passed material
   a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed.
   b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage.
   c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense.
   d. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody.

5. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute statement describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary.

U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

1. Use of students
   a. Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau.
   b. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities.

2. Quarterly letters
   a. On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources). Include following:
      (1) Specific productivity
      (2) Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus
      (3) Frequency of contact
   b. Quarterly letters on all[extremist]and security informants or sources should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter:
      (1) Number of informants, potential informants, and other sources active and under development at each educational institution affected
      (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.
3. Double agent
   Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance
4. Confidential source
   Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them.
5. Panel source
   Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness

B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters
   b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   c. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees
   d. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts
2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former security informants
3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry.
5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings

C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES

When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include:

1. Check of field office files
2. Discreet canvass of logical informants

3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file.
5. Review armed services record if applicable.
6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve.
7. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details.
8. Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items.

Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate individual as potential security informant.

D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. [Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel). Be brief and concise.] Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description.
    a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of [extremist] and/or security informants, the number of potential [extremist] and/or potential security informants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains.
2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, following matters should be made clear to him:
    a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation involved.
    b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him.
    c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau.
    d. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements.
    e. If potential informant is student, teacher, or has any similar relations with school, college, or university, in initial interview and subsequent handling, follow current instructions concerning investigations on campuses.
3. Do not interview female potential informants in their homes or apartments unless necessary and any such interviews should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of superior in field office responsible for development of informants. This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups and there will be no embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on circumstances, contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks.
5. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Submit letters (FD-401) concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of information furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § 107L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning payments.
6. Post record of all contacts with potential informants.
7. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
8. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential informant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority.
9. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
10. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

E. BUREAU POLICY

1. Development of military personnel
   Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by Bureau.
2. Contacts by designated Agents
   Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him.
3. Divulging information to informant
   No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.
4. Recording investigative activity
   All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally.

F. INDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS

1. Caution against divulging relationship
   During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his relationship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.
2. Developing additional background
   During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant. Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk.
3. Indications of instability
   Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.

4. Contacts by Agents
   a. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where frequency of contact is dependent on circumstances, informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific Bureau authority for exception to this requirement.
   b. During each contact, carefully review informant's activities since previous contact and make certain informant has furnished all information which he has obtained since last contact.
   c. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows informant's attitude towards Bureau. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.
   d. Arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in minds of either Agent or informant as to methods of payment, amount, place, and time.
   e. Informants should use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants nonpublished office telephone number for emergency communication. This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.
   f. Positive information received from informant should be subject of written statement by informant or memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.
   g. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.
   h. Dates of negative contacts and file numbers of cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where file has more than one subject, name of subject under inquiry should be noted. Do not set forth title of case involved.
   i. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.
   j. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent where necessary.
5. Checking reliability
   a. Reliability of all active informants must be constantly checked.
   b. Give consideration to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.
6. Fingerprints
   a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.
   b. If informant refuses, do not force issue.
   c. Forward informant's fingerprints as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258, fully executed. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

Security Informant" shall not appear.

J. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index
   Are to be kept by SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice
   a. Alphabetical name index
      In all offices maintain card index showing true identities of all security informants, potential security informants, and security confidential sources. This is to be known as alphabetical name index. File cards in alphabetical order.
   b. Symbol number index
      This index shall contain card for each individual to whom symbol number has been assigned. File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind numerical symbol index.
   c. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by official having custody of cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of activities and type of information he furnishes.
   d. Index cards
      Index cards (FD-348) shall be executed for alphabetical name index and symbol number index. Execute only following items:

      Symbol: File No:
      (Informant, potential informant, or confidential source)

      Name:

   e. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is shown in informant's administrative file.
2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"
   a. A separate index may be maintained for use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.
   b. If such index maintained, separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source included.
   c. Cards should contain brief background data and identity of Bureau communication showing background data.
   d. File cards alphabetically by name and/or symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.
3. Agents' informative index
   a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by same official as set out in item 1, above, for use of Agents on type of informant coverage in division.
   b. File cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.
   c. Behind each geographical location, place guide card indicating type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Polish Activity, etc.
   d. On guide card set forth symbol numbers of informants and confidential sources who can provide coverage.
   [e. [Deleted.]
   f. When individual can provide more than one type of information, set forth his symbol or identity on as many guide cards as applicable.
   g. Guide cards should show above data and it is permissible to place alongside name or symbol number names of contacting Agents.
   h. Also, symbol numbers of informants who move outside division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities may be set forth on guide cards.
   i. Names or symbol numbers of individuals contained in index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on appropriate guide cards in this index.

H. SYMBOLS

1. Assigning numbers
   - a. All informants should be designated by permanent symbol number of which Bureau must be advised. Once number assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant or source.
   - b. [A symbol number designation should be afforded to all individuals from the time any step (generally the opening of an informant or source file) is taken to develop them as sources or informants.]
   - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   - d. Cover name should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between informant and field office. Advise Bureau of cover name.
   - e. Prefix of symbol number consists of appropriate field office teletype abbreviation. Suffix of symbol number will consist of letter "S" for security informant; letters "PSI" for potential security informant; letters "CS" for confidential source.
   - f. Although source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g., from security to criminal or to[extremist,]etc.), number previously assigned will remain same; however, suffix is to be changed to appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-S to NY 000-C or to NY[000-E).]
   - [g. [An asterisk should not be used to designate certain highly sensitive informants or investigative techniques. Do not include asterisk in reporting information from such sources.]
2. Communications - use of symbols
   - a. After Bureau is advised of permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.
   - b. In all communications after initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.
   - c. In communications between offices, follow same procedure.
   - d. Informants and sources entering another division
     - (1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis should be referred to in initial[secure teletype] to interested office by true name and symbol number if necessary for other division to know identity. [Such a teletype should not be routed to a Resident Agency.] Office receiving such [teletype]should make appropriate index cards for "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.
     - (2) Individuals who leave division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name used in all administrative correspondence.
     - (3) If informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.
   - e. In communications concerning potential security informant when a symbol number is not[used,]name of potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."
   - f. [Captions of communications concerning informants and sources should contain a precise character designation to identify the organization with which they are most closely associated or on which they are most capable of furnishing information (i.e., Security Matter - Students for a Democratic Society or SM - SDS, Security Matter - Young Socialist Alliance or SM - YSA, Security Matter - Communist or SM - C, etc.).] In espionage and foreign nationality matters, caption of communication should also show character and country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing at Bureau.

I. INDEXING

True names and aliases of all informants, as well as cover name assigned, shall be indexed in general office indices as any other name. Index cards should show file number of informant, but such terms as "Informant" or "Potential

[W. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (FCI) ASSETS

This subsection deals with the development and operation of human assets, a field referred to as Human Intelligence or HUMINT. FCI assets are to be handled exclusively under this subsection, except for the administrative instructions pertaining to informant indices, and monthly statistical letters, set out in Part I; such exceptions are noted herein.

1. Definitions

FCI assets fall into two categories: informative assets and operational assets.

a. Informative assets (IA)

Individuals in position to furnish continuing information relative to the location, overt activities, and personalities of the targets of FBI investigations, e.g., doorman, garage attendant, neighbor, tradesman, rental agent, building superintendent, fellow employee, social contact, business contact, banker, ethnic community source, etc.; or individuals who have left or openly defected from a foreign country and can furnish information of intelligence value. An IA is not actively involved in an intelligence operation as such; should he become so involved he then could become an OA.

b. Operational assets (OA)

Individual actively involved in intelligence operations.

This category includes but is not limited to the following individuals:

Defector-in-place: A foreign official who overtly continues to work for his government and covertly provides information to us of intelligence value. A defector-in-place will in most instances be connected with a foreign government's intelligence service;

Double agent: An OA who is cooperating with a foreign intelligence service on our behalf and under our control;

Asset under development: Individuals selected for their apparent attractiveness to foreign intelligence services whom we attempt to put in contact with such services for operational exploitation, sometimes known as a "dangle operation"; or individuals already in contact with a foreign intelligence service who have an immediate potential for development into double agents.

Adoption of the generic term OA does not preclude use of the specific terms, e.g., double agent, where applicable, in official communications.

2. Objectives of OA

a. Penetration

Penetration of legal and illegal networks, identification of intelligence personnel and targets; collection of information regarding methods of operations; collection of positive intelligence.

b. Control
 -of information foreign intelligence services obtain;
 -of recruitment, by creating Bureau-controlled OAs;
 -of foreign operations, by keeping foreign intelligence services occupied handling our OAs.

c. Collection of evidence for prosecution

d. Deception (Disinformation)
 Passing inaccurate or accurate information designed to cause foreign intelligence services to draw conclusions or initiate action to their disadvantage and/or to U. S. advantage.

e. Neutralization: to provide basis for persona non grata (PNG) action, exclusion, arrest or other disruptive action.

f. Collection by OA of personality characteristics data on foreign officials for purpose of defection analysis.

3. Individuals to be considered as OAs

 a. Foreign officials in a position to furnish information of intelligence value. An intelligence officer (IO) is, of course, the most valuable OA. An official who is not an IO, while of lesser value, is still a highly desirable OA because of the positive intelligence and information on the personalities and activities of other officials that he can provide.

 b. Agents of foreign intelligence services. When these individuals are identified, and the prospect and value of recruiting them outweighs any prosecutive potential, they should be seriously considered for development as OAs.

 c. Contacts of foreign officials. When contacts of foreign officials are identified as being of interest to a foreign intelligence service, we should attempt to enlist their cooperation and direct them against that intelligence service.

 d. Individuals who are particularly attractive to a foreign intelligence service. Our objective is to determine the specific interests of foreign intelligence services or individual IOs, and to then recruit asset(s) who would appear to that service or IO to satisfy their needs. Such assets must have potential for operation within a reasonably expected period of time.

 e. Former assets who currently offer potential for exploitation.

4. Restrictions
 FBIHQ authority is required prior to conducting detailed background investigation of any of the following individuals as an FCI asset, whether IA or OA. Of course, some investigation must initially be conducted, without disclosing our interest, to sufficiently identify the individual and generally assess his potential, so that FBIHQ can conduct a meaningful indices search and make an intelligent evaluation of the risks versus value involved.

 a. Individual under 21 years of age

 b. Official or employee of the United Nations or other public international organizations of a governmental or quasi-governmental nature

 c. Official or employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or government

d. Faculty member of an institution of learning
e. Labor leader
f. Federal, state, or local government official
g. News media employee
h. Prominent entertainment figure
i. Prominent religious figure
j. Member of the U. S. Military
k. U. S. Government employee

After FBIHQ authority to conduct detailed background investigation has been received, and investigation completed, FBIHQ authority is also required to conduct initial interview of the above individuals, whether IA or OA.

5. Development of U. S. Military or other U. S. Government Personnel
Whenever it becomes desirable to develop a member of the U. S. Military or an employee of another Government agency as an FCI asset, FBIHQ notifies the respective military service or agency of our interest. To facilitate this notification the office desiring to develop such an individual should submit to FBIHQ 5 copies of an LHM setting out:
a. Proposed asset's name, rank or position, and current place of assignment.
b. Area of FBI interest in the asset, in general, and the foreign intelligence service, and official, if known, against which it is anticipated asset will be directed.
c. Extent of anticipated coverage to be provided by the asset, i.e., describe the services he will provide.
d. The last paragraph of this LHM should read:
"It is requested that no further dissemination of the foregoing be made without prior reference to FBI Headquarters. If you agree with our contemplated use of the above individual, please return a copy of this memorandum with your acknowledgement."
e. Members of the military: estimated time period within which you wish to utilize the asset; desirability that the asset remain in his current area of assignment for a specified period of time. Upon receipt of clearance from the military, FBIHQ will select code name for future use in identifying the asset. This code name will be furnished to military intelligence component at headquarters level and to FBI field divisions. Every 6 months thereafter, as long as the FBI has continuing operational interest in the asset, an LHM captioned with code name should be transmitted to FBIHQ, by routing slip captioned with informant's symbol number. The LHM is to contain a statement that the asset continues to be of operational use to the FBI, and a statement detailing any difficulties encountered in control or direction of the asset or a statement that no such difficulties exist.

NOTE: Generally, the U. S. Armed Forces may not be utilized to enforce the civilian criminal law; however, they may be utilized for foreign counterintelligence purposes. In foreign counterintelligence investigations in which there is a possibility of criminal prosecution, use of military personnel as assets might jeopardize successful prosecution, and all such cases must be discussed in detail with FBIHQ prior to utilization of such military assets.

[6. Development of personnel of foreign diplomatic establishment or international organization
Whenever it becomes desirable to develop an official or employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment or government, or of a public international organization of a governmental or quasi-governmental nature, who is not a national of a hostile country, e.g., Canadian, Argentinian, or U. S. United Nations Secretariat (UNSEC) employee to target against Soviet-bloc UNSEC employee, FBIHQ asks for authorization from State Department to conduct background investigation. FBIHQ must inform State Department of the proposed asset's name, rank or position, nationality, current place of assignment, and, generally, the type of use we intend to make of the asset. After authorization has been received and background investigation completed, if individual offers asset potential, submit results of background investigation in LHM and in cover communication request authority to interview. FBIHQ will then request authorization from State Department to interview.

7. Development
The development of assets depends on the individual circumstances of each situation. No rigid procedural steps or contact schedules can be imposed which will uniformly apply to all cases; however, the development should proceed with the objective of obtaining valuable results as quickly as feasible, consistent with maintaining the asset's security, credibility, and confidence, and with developing the asset's potential to its fullest.

8. Opening of asset files
Open a 134 file for all individuals at the time they are first considered for development as assets. This file should consist of two parts: a main file which will contain all identifying data, results of background investigation, personal status data, and administrative data; and a subfile which will contain at least one copy of all information provided by asset. The asset is not to be identified, beyond his symbol number, in subfile.

[Maintain files of all active assets as pending. Utilize FD-238 as unserialized top document in main file.

[Assignment and tickler cards must not reflect name of asset; use symbol and/or file number.

9. Maintenance of FCI asset files and indices
Maintain all FCI asset files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, or employee designated by SAC.

[Files of FCI assets will be included in calculation of delinquencies in monthly administrative report.

[FCI asset indices will be maintained according to the administrative instructions set out under section 107 J, part I, of this manual.

10. Symbol numbers
Assign a symbol number to all individuals when first considered for development as asset. The symbol number is to consist of two-letter prefix identifying the office, a numerical sequence number (which will never be reassigned to another asset or informant), and suffix which describes the type of asset, e.g., NY 1001-OA (or IA). The numerical sequence is to be the same as that used for all other informants, e.g., potential security informant, security informant, criminal informant, etc. The suffix may change if the nature of the information provided changes, e.g., from IA to OA. Submit identity of asset and symbol number assigned to FBIHQ via coded "Nitel"; this is the only communication ever in which both asset's true name and symbol number are to appear together. Assets must not be informed of their symbol numbers.

11. Captions
In administrative communications dealing solely with asset, indicate in caption the character and the country concerning which the asset is reporting, e.g., NY 1001-OA, IS-R (Russia).

12. Background inquiries and interviews
    a. Informative asset
    Based on the type of information the IA can provide, the nature and extent of contact with him, and the IA's relationship with the target:
        (1) Conduct sufficient background investigation to satisfy the SAC as to the IA's stability, suitability, reliability, and potential. For example, a more detailed background investigation is required for a social or business contact than for a doorman or building superintendent. A minimal background investigation should include appropriate police and field offices' indices checks.
        (2) Request search of FBIHQ indices.
        (3) Check NCIC.
        (4) Submit FD-165 for search of FBIHQ identification records; make no reference to individual as IA on FD-165. Also utilize FD-165 to place stop.
        (5) Outside of the restrictions set out in 4. above, interview IA prospect on SAC authority.
    b. Operational asset
    When an individual appears to have OA potential conduct the following background investigation commensurate with OA's security:
        (1) Obtain pertinent data on OA's personal history (date and place of birth, nationality and citizenship, social security number or other identifying numbers, family status, names of immediate family, past and present residences, employments, etc.), and other data such as physical description, patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, reputation, and business connections.
        (2) Check appropriate police and field offices' indices.
        (3) Request search of FBIHQ indices.
        (4) Check NCIC.

(5) Submit FD-165 for search of FBIHQ identification records; make no reference to individual as OA on FD-165; and also utilize FD-165 to place stop.

(6) If applicable, check armed services records, both at Military Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri, and at Defense Central Index of Investigations, Ft. Holabird, Maryland.

(7) Canvass logical sources, commensurate with OA's security.

(8) Upon completion of above investigation submit results to FBIHQ via coded teletype, preferably "Nitel," and interview UACB.

c. All leads to auxiliary offices must be sent and replied to, via coded teletype, preferably "Nitel," under caption utilizing asset's true name, followed by "IS-(country)." Do not set out asset's symbol number. Do not send copies of such leads of IAs to FBIHQ. Leads must be covered within 45 days; office of origin notify auxiliary offices of this time limit when setting out leads.

13. Authority to operate assets

IAs are approved and operated on SAC authority. Inform FBIHQ via coded "Nitel" when SAC approval given, and type of information IA can provide. OAs are approved and operated on FBIHQ authority. After interview of OA submit results of interview via coded "Nitel" requesting FBIHQ approval to operate. Detail OA's potential and your contemplated use of OA.

In exceptional cases, when the results of the interview and details of the OA's potential and contemplated use are voluminous, the practicality of "Nitel" and the relative security of the mails should be balanced against the sensitivity of the information and the security of the asset. Where the former factors prevail, submit summary by "Nitel" and full results and details by letter or airtel.

14. Contact with assets

Contact should be maintained commensurate with maximum productivity, security, and development of asset's further potential. If an asset has not been contacted for a period of 45 days, a memorandum to the SAC must be directed to the asset's main file stating the reason(s) why no contact was made.

Do not disclose to asset any information not essential to his operation.

15. Confidentiality of relationship

Emphasize to all assets that the effectiveness of the FBI's investigation, and in some instances his own personal security, depend on both sides maintaining the confidentiality of the relationship. If the asset feels he must disclose this relationship to another, e.g., wife, parent, employer, etc., or circumstances develop in which asset requests FBI to disclose the relationship to another, e.g., to an employer threatening dismissal of asset because of his affiliation with certain individuals or groups, notify FBIHQ with recommendation to disclose relationship and continue under these conditions or to terminate relationship with or without disclosing relationship, and reasons for recommendation.

16. Reliability of assets
Reliability of all assets must be constantly checked. If any doubt exists concerning asset, give consideration to use of various investigative techniques to insure asset is completely reliable and is furnishing accurate information.

17. Assignment of pseudonyms
In sensitive cases, where necessary; if asset will sign reports or receipts; or if asset is an OA receiving operational funds from a foreign intelligence service or payment from the U. S. which requires bookkeeping records, assign pseudonym for these purposes.

18. Recording of information received from asset
When recording information from any asset in a communication prepared for dissemination, characterize the asset either as one "with whom contact has been insufficient to determine reliability," or as one "who has furnished reliable information in the past."

a. Oral information

(1) Information pertaining to asset's personal status is recorded in 134 main file, e.g., marital difficulties, change of employment, change of residence.

(2) Information pertaining to operational administrative matters is recorded in asset's 134 subfile. When this data, e.g., location of meet sites, times of meets, any data which tends to identify asset, is furnished to FBIHQ, it should not be included in communications prepared for dissemination, but in cover pages. When the asset is a member of the military, submit, in addition to the communication for dissemination described immediately above, a communication for dissemination containing all operational administrative details for the information of the asset's service.

(3) Information of intelligence value should be submitted to FBIHQ via appropriate communication, and, if of interest to other U. S. agencies or friendly foreign services, should be submitted to FBIHQ in form suitable for dissemination.

(4) Execute and maintain form FD-209 in asset's main file concerning contacts with asset. If contacts produced information of intelligence value, record only date of contacts; if negative, record as such.

b. Written information

(1) Written information prepared by asset, or by FBI SA for signature of asset, pertaining to operational activities (not a written report passed by asset to his principal) must be dated at the top of page one and signed at the bottom of each numbered page by the asset using his pseudonym. This material may be maintained as an attachment to a serialized memorandum in the asset's subfile (punched holes are allowed), or in a 1a section of the asset's 134 subfile.

(2) Information received in this manner should be devoid of FBI identification, block or time stamps, serialization number or other administrative markings.

(3) Only the original need be maintained; asset must not keep a copy.

(4) Any corrections, changes, erasures, additions, or deletions on original must be identified by asset using his pseudonym initials beside it.

(5) Handling FBI SA must not make any changes on the original or permit his name to be recorded therein.

(6) Written information pertaining to operational activities should not include administrative matters pertaining to asset's personal status.

(7) Handle recording of written information and contact with asset in same manner as detailed under recording of oral information.

19. Channelization of information of intelligence value received from the asset

Important factor in channelizing information of intelligence value received from the asset to substantive case files is the security of the asset.

Limit information in communication sent to substantive file to only that necessary for that case; i.e., do not send one comprehensive communication to several substantive files if to do so might compromise source or other individual. (Be aware that some of our documents are being made available in response to subpoenas, and the court is sometimes not allowing excision of material not pertinent to case in question. Consequently, other individuals or operations can be "blown" by revealing one such comprehensive memo.)

a. Extract information of value received from asset and channelize to substantive case files either inter- or intra-office by separate communications under substantive case captions.

b. A copy of all channelizing communications must be maintained in an asset's subfile.

20. Passage of documents, written report or oral information, to hostile foreign intelligence

Type of information to be passed depends on circumstances of particular operation, interests of involved foreign intelligence service, the credible access of the OA and the time element involved.

Great care should be given to the selection of information to be passed to insure the operation accrues to the overall benefit of the U. S.

a. Authority for passage

FBIHQ authority required for passage of all classified information and unclassified information prepared for limited use by concerned Federal and local governments, not intended for public consumption.

Above FBIHQ authority applies to passage of documents, written reports, and oral information.

SAC authority required for passage of material prepared by commercial concerns, Federal, and local governments for public distribution. Examples are: newspaper and magazine articles, pamphlets and brochures, photographs, background information on companies and organizations. If there is any doubt that material selected to be passed is not in the best interest of the U. S., submit material to FBIHQ for clearance; e.g., see Example (1) following.

"SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION"

b. Clearance requirements for information to be passed under FBIHQ authority
Submit original and 9 copies of LHM to FBIHQ bearing appropriate classification via cover communication with appropriate caption. Leave LHM uncaptioned; FBIHQ will insert code name caption.

The first paragraph of the LHM should read: "It is requested that clearance be granted for passage in this operation of the following items to a representative of (name of foreign intelligence service)."

If the information to be passed is a document, set forth an adequate description of it in the LHM.

Examples:
(1) Article entitled "Moon Rockets," prepared by physicist John Doe, January, 1972, issue of "__________," publication of American Rocket Society.
(2) Air Force Training Manual captioned "__________," dated July, 1972, classified "Secret."

In addition, also submit to FBIHQ, if possible, a true copy of document for review which will be returned after clearance by FBIHQ is obtained.

If the information to be passed is a written report prepared by OA, set forth report verbatim in the LHM.

If the information to be passed is oral, set forth oral information verbatim in the LHM.

If more than one item of information in any form is to be passed, number each item in the LHM.

The last paragraph of the LHM should contain the sentence: "The above data should not be further disseminated."

Upon receipt of LHM, FBIHQ will submit to appropriate authorities and request clearance. Reply will be promptly furnished to field.

c. Notification to FBIHQ of passage of document, written report, or oral information which required clearance
After passage, submit original and 9 copies of uncaptioned LHM bearing appropriate classification via cover communication with appropriate caption. FBIHQ will insert code name caption. In LHM refer to LHM which requested clearance. LHM should merely state, "On (date) our source transmitted the information detailed in referenced memorandum to (name of foreign intelligence service)."

If referenced memorandum detailed more than one item, do not list the items unless one or more was not passed. In such an instance list only those items that were passed.

The last paragraph of the LHM should contain the following sentence, "The above data should not be further disseminated."

"SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION"

d. Administrative handling of documents, written reports, and oral information selected for passage

(1) Documents and written reports
Field offices should retain a copy of document or written report passed which would be identified by OA as a true copy of item passed by him. No other marks, identifying data, staple or punch holes should be placed on field office copy.

When submitting document or written report to FBIHQ, identify it, in cover communication, as the actual item which will be passed or a copy.

To insure that the actual document to be passed is not contaminated by fingerprints of FBI personnel, maintain in plastic envelope when being handled in field office or when submitted to FBIHQ.

Documents obtained by FBIHQ or other field offices from commercial concerns or other government agencies which will be passed will be handled in similar fashion.

If copy of document is maintained on permanent basis by preparing concern or agency and available at a later date, no need exists to submit copy to FBIHQ or to maintain in field office file. If copy not maintained on permanent basis, a copy should be retained in field office file.

(2) Oral information
Oral information passed must be recorded in a signed statement or FD-302.

Purpose for preserving documents and written reports is for evidence in event of prosecution, persona non grata action, expulsion, etc.

21. Oral information received from debriefing asset
Oral information received upon debriefing an asset (i.e., not necessarily pertaining to information passed) must be recorded in a signed statement or FD-302.

22. Coverage of OA meets with foreign intelligence officer, co-opted worker, or agent.
Coverage of these meets is required except when prohibited by security or other overriding factors.

a. To cross-check the OA. We must be as certain as possible that the OA is reporting details of his meets accurately.

b. To verify identification of principal or agent and to gather information about modus operandi.

c. Consider use of photography and other technological surveillance techniques to provide data for improving future CI operations or improving chances for success of official actions, e.g., prosecution, persona non grata action.

Be aware that these meets are often covered by the principal's intelligence service using photography, radio intercepts, and possible electronic surveillance.

23. Disinformation
The passage of deceptive information by an OA is a complex operation which requires detailed planning and coordination between field office and FBIHQ. This technique should be employed only in OA operations in which the foreign intelligence service has apparently accepted the bona fides of the OA, when the benefit will clearly outweigh the risk to the overall OA operation.

24. OA cover story
Be aware that a foreign intelligence principal may interrogate an OA in great detail as to how he secured his information, his family situation, his modus operandi, motivation, etc. Handling FBI SA must adequately prepare an OA for this probability. The most credible cover story is the one which involves the least fabrication.

Unless security or other considerations dictate otherwise, the OA should personally obtain the information he passes.

25. Receipt of money or property by OA
Impress upon each OA that money or property received from a foreign intelligence principal or agent must be turned over to the FBI since retention of this money would put the OA in technical violation of Federal statutes, and this money may be used as evidence or exhibit. Compensation to the OA from the FBI for his cooperation is to be handled separately. Nominal or personal gifts, necessary for the OA's security and to maintain his relationship with the principal, may be given back to the OA by his handling FBI SA, following FBIHQ approval. Consider the desirability and feasibility of obtaining a signed statement from each OA reflecting his understanding of this requirement. The obtaining of such a statement is not mandatory, but desirable.

Department attorneys have advised that, while it is not necessary to preserve that actual currency received by an OA, it is highly desirable to do so in cases in which prosecution could ensue. Whether or not the actual currency is retained, obtain a written statement from the OA describing the currency received by denomination, series number, and serial number; and also make an independent record of such currency.

The above instructions are not to be interpreted to require the impounding of funds paid to an OA by a foreign government or foreign intelligence service for goods or services rendered by the OA in legitimate, business transactions.

26. Payments to FCI assets - either OA or IA
   a. When deemed necessary and expedient, each SAC is authorized to expend up to $400 to develop FCI assets. This money may be used to pay for services and/or expenses. This authority is renewable by FBIHQ if the initial $400 has been expended. Blue slip reclaiming payments from FBIHQ need not summarize information obtained since proliferation of this information could possibly jeopardize asset's security.

b. FBIHQ authority
- (1) If FCI asset is of such continuing value to justify regular payments, such payments must be approved by FBIHQ.
- (2) When initially requesting regular payment, submit evaluation via coded "Nitel" in the following order:
  - (a) Amount paid to date, broken down into expenses and services
  - (b) Number of contacts with handling FBI SA since last evaluation
  - (c) Evaluation of stability and reliability
  - (d) Concise summary of most valuable information furnished since last evaluation
  - (e) Miscellaneous - changes in personal status, residence, employment, personal problems, etc., since last evaluation
  - (f) SAC recommendations for authority to pay asset for next six-month period; specify amount to be authorized for services and amount for expenses
- (3) Continuation request should be made two weeks in advance of expiration of authority.
- (4) Submit an interim request for increase in regular payments authorized via coded "Nitel," with full justification.

c. Receipts

When payments are made either on SAC authority or FBIHQ authority, obtain receipts whenever possible. If receipt cannot be obtained, set forth circumstances on blue slip at time reimbursement is claimed.
- (1) Receipts should be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce receipts in evidence, they will not relate to other documents or files.
- (2) Receipts should show:
  - (a) Date when payment was made
  - (b) Period for which made when asset is paid on period basis
  - (c) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services and expenses
  - (d) Name of FBI SA making payment
  - (e) Signature of asset receiving money using pseudonym assigned
- (3) Receipts are not to be witnessed.
- (4) If necessary to make corrections on receipts, they must be initialed by asset and not by FBI SA.
- (5) When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to FBIHQ, staple them directly to blue slip so that all information on receipt can be read without detaching it from blue slip.

27. Evaluation of FCI assets

a. OA

Whether OA is paid (under either FBIHQ or SAC authority) or unpaid, submit coded "Nitel" every six months evaluating OA according to the format of 26. b. (2). If the OA has been paid during the preceding six-month period, merely set out the amount paid during that period (under 26. b. (2) (a)).

- b. IA
  - (1) Paid on FBIHQ authority
    Submit evaluation as instructed for OA above
  - (2) Paid on SAC authority or unpaid
    Every six months submit memorandum to SAC evaluating IA according to the format of 26. b. (2).
- c. Assets who are members of the military, whether IA or OA
  See 5. e.

28. Income tax returns
  - a. Inform assets who receive compensation for their services to FBI that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.
  - b. FBI income should be set forth on Federal income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to asset's position and station in life.
  - c. If asset is self-employed and files Schedule C as self-employed individual, it may be possible to include his FBI income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with FBI.
  - d. If asset cannot report payments received from FBI for services without jeopardizing his security, such payments will be subject to 20 percent withholding tax. There are three categories in which taxes will not be withheld from payments to FCI assets:
    - (1) For reimbursement of expenses
    - (2) Under SAC authority
    - (3) To assets who have been able to report FBI income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning procedure to be followed in handling and control of money withheld.
  - e. When asset or former asset is considered as potential witness in FBI case, determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on income he received from FBI for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and submit recommendations to FBIHQ for handling situation.

29. Receipt of unemployment compensation
  State law may require all applicants for unemployment compensation to list all sources of income. Payment of out-of-pocket expenses need not be listed as income when applying for unemployment compensation; however, payment for services must be listed. FBIHQ should be consulted in each case where this situation arises.

30. Monthly and quarterly letters
  For these administrative details, see section 107, part I, M, of this manual.

31. Corrective action on false information
    a. When it is determined that current asset or former asset has furnished false information, promptly inform FBIHQ of complete facts.
    b. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing asset in future, such as "source of known unreliability" or "source who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
    c. FBIHQ will advise which designation to use; the field office will then proceed with review of all data furnished by asset and label information from him accordingly.
    d. All communications containing information from asset which have been sent to FBIHQ, FBI field offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected. Corrective action should be taken by letter. Identify cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing information from asset. Corrective letters should refer to specific report, page number, and change to be made. Amended pages should not be prepared unless you are so instructed by FBIHQ in accordance with instructions of part II, section 4, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
    e. Instruct each field office which has made further dissemination of asset's information to follow instructions set forth above.
    f. Set up control file regarding this corrective action and upon completion of same submit to FBIHQ final letter under asset's caption identifying each case by title, character, FBIHQ file number if known, and date of communication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent FBIHQ files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken.
    g. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from asset should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
    h. Occasionally, former asset through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was asset. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that former asset in absence of definite indication that he furnished unreliable information while he was asset.
    i. Dissemination of information from assets of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
32. Discontinuance of assets
    Advise FBIHQ under asset's symbol number caption when services of asset are discontinued.

"SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION"

33. Discontinued assets
    a. When services of asset are discontinued, mark name card "canceled." Destroy symbol card. Never destroy name card.
    b. Refile name card in numerical order by symbol number in symbol number index. When discontinued asset is later reactivated, remove name card from symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in name card section of FCI asset index.
    c. Inform FBIHQ of date when asset is discontinued and reason therefor, and whether or not asset is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. Inform FBIHQ according to instructions in volume II, section 19, of this manual of identity of all Security of Government Employees cases in which asset has furnished information.
    d. If the discontinued asset is a member of the U. S. Military or another U. S. Government employee, submit LHM to FBIHQ merely stating the fact of discontinuance. FBIHQ will use LHM to notify asset's headquarters.
    e. Once asset is exposed in any manner, do not carry him as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth.
    f. If a former asset furnishes information to an office other than the office which originally handled him, the new office should notify the old office of its intended use of the asset and request pertinent background information.
    g. Remove flash notice on OA's (i.e., the stop placed via FD-165 when conducting original background inquiries on OA) one year after discontinuance.

34. Classification - 134

"SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION"

8. Instruct each inte[illegible]sted Bureau office which has ma[illegible] further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

[[See page 3 of this section.]

2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source. [Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g.,]IS - R for Russia.]
   - d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security and criminal informants.
3. Index
   - a. Index cards (3 by 5 inches) like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   - b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   - c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in both types of investigations.
4. Files

   When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. The same procedure should be followed concerning racial confidential sources, the classification being 137. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security or racial investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security and potential racial informants.
   b. [Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case,]confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
      (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
      (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
      (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   f. If such request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation is to be placed on the duplicate copy and this latter copy returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.

6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial confidential sources. See 107N,[3b,]for form of letter.
   b. If the security or racial source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

7. Gifts

   Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

8. Discontinuance

   Advise Bureau when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

such activities, the Bureau will consider placing him in contact with a reliable publisher, but it must be made clear to the informant that the Bureau will not sponsor or endorse any book or publication which he elects to write.

9. All payments to discontinued security informants and confidential sources must be made on a strict c.o.d. basis. Obtain Bureau authority before making any such payments. In requesting Bureau authority for payments of this type, submit complete details as to the information furnished by the discontinued informant or source in the past and what is to be expected of the informant or source in the future.

10. Once an informant is exposed in any manner whatsoever he is no longer to be carried as a concealed source in reports or memoranda. His true name is to be set forth, together with descriptive data.

11. When an office receives information concerning, or obtains information from, an ex-informant, copies of memoranda prepared must be furnished to the office which originally handled the informant so that the file of the ex-informant will be as complete as possible.

12. When an informant has been discontinued for cause, such as unreliability, he should not be contacted in the future for information. If such an individual furnishes information it should be accepted, but in setting out the information in reports or communications use the individual's true name, together with an appropriate description of his reliability.

[13. Remove flash notice per section F,[6.]

14. Repeated use of the same discontinued informant as a witness at security trials and hearings should be avoided. Make an all-out effort to develop witnesses who can furnish the same testimony as that expected of previously used witnesses. Advise Bureau of any indication by Government attorneys that an informant-witness who has previously testified will be called upon for testimony at a subsequent trial or hearing and furnish your comments concerning possibility of supplanting the testimony of individual involved. Submit communication under appropriate case character.

15. Every effort should be made to prevent a discontinued informant from becoming involved in situations which may prove embarrassing to informant or the Government. Immediately after he testifies for the first time, a serious talk should be had with informant by the SAC in the presence of the Agent who handled the informant. This interview should be conducted in the field office and informant told that:

a. He will no longer be operated by the Bureau
b. Since he is a public figure, he will probably be contacted by representatives of the press, radio, and television for interviews and appearances
c. He may be sought as a witness by congressional committees, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and by state authorities
d. (Firmly stress.) In connection with such interviews and appearances, informant must continue to be factual and truthful and must not build up or embellish the statements, for if he does so he will wind up in serious trouble.

Advise Bureau results of such interview and comment on its possible effectiveness.

Be alert to the possibilities of former informant being contacted by representatives of publicity media and as a witness by congressional committees, INS, and state authorities. It will be the SAC's responsibility to know when a former informant is scheduled or is likely to appear at a hearing or make a public appearance of any kind. Prior thereto in each instance, former informant must be contacted and instructions above set forth reiterated by Agent who handled the informant. Emphasize to former informant that he must stick to the truth and make certain he can back up what he says, and if there is any deviation he will be subjected to harassment, criticism, possible libel, slander, or other criminal actions. If he inquires as to whether he should appear or testify or otherwise cooperate with any public or private individual or agency, advise him he must make that decision himself, but if he has appeared as a Government witness in a case which has not been finally adjudicated and decides in the affirmative, he should contact the USA for instructions. Advise Bureau of any such situations and the results of any interviews conducted.

R. FURNISHING OF INFORMANTS TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

1. INS conducts investigations of alien communists as required under the Immigration Act of 10-16-18, as amended. INS, in order to enforce this statute, must obtain evidence to prove that certain aliens, due to their membership in certain groups, are undesirable and deportable or subject to denaturalization.
2. Cooperate fully with INS in these cases and make efforts consistent with your own cases and interests to make available information and witnesses where possible.
3. In this regard, if contacted by INS inquiring for informants and you have a discontinued informant or one who would be of assistance to INS and whose loss would not affect your work, furnish his identity to the Bureau, together with your recommendation.
4. The Bureau will then review all of the facts concerning such informant and advise as to whether or not his identity may be disclosed to INS.
5. Exercise care in recommending informants for disclosure to INS so that you will not find yourself without proper coverage.
6. Before any informant is turned over to INS, obtain informant's permission.

[S. CORRECTIVE ACTION[ON FALSE INFORMATION]

1. When it is determined that an informant or ex-informant furnished false information while an informant, advise Bureau by airmail of complete facts.
2. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing the informant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or "informant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past."
3. Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with a review of all data furnished by the individual and label information from him accordingly.
4. All communications containing information from the informant which have been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected.
5. Identify the cases individually by title and character, together with dates of communications containing the information.
6. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be crystal clear and refer to the specific report, page number, and change to be made.
7. Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by the Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations; corrective action should be called to the attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter.

5. Listed below are a[illegible] of the Bureau offices and the [illegible]ates semiannual letters should be submitted. This list is also applicable to the submission of semiannual letters on criminal informants.

Office	Dates
Albany	January 15 and July 15
Albuquerque	" "
Anchorage	" "
Atlanta	" "
Baltimore	January 31 and July 31
Birmingham	" "
Boston	" "
Buffalo	" "
Butte	February 15 and August 15
Charlotte	" "
Chicago	" "
Cincinnati	" "
Cleveland	February 28 and August 31
Dallas	" "
Denver	" "
Detroit	" "
El Paso	March 15 and September 15
Honolulu	" "
Houston	" "
Indianapolis	" "
Jacksonville	" "
Kansas City	March 31 and September 30
Knoxville	" "
Little Rock	" "
Los Angeles	" "
Louisville	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	" "
Miami	" "
Milwaukee	" "
Minneapolis	April 30 and October 31
Mobile	" "
Newark	" "
New Haven	" "
New Orleans	May 15 and November 15
New York	" "
Norfolk	" "
Oklahoma City	" "
Omaha	" "
Philadelphia	May 31 and November 30
Phoenix	" "
Pittsburgh	" "
Portland	" "
Richmond	" "
St. Louis	June 15 and December 15
Salt Lake City	" "
San Antonio	" "
San Diego	" "
San Francisco	" "
San Juan	June 30 and December 31
Savannah	" "
Seattle	" "
Springfield	" "
Washington, D. C.	" "

P. SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS

1. Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fill out loyalty oaths or forms.
2. Informants should be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form.
3. Advise Bureau promptly of all such situations which cannot be avoided.
4. The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the informant.
5. Each such situation must be carefully considered and Bureau is to be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recommendation for proposed action.
6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty oath in the negative.

Q. DISCONTINUED INFORMANTS

1. When the services of an informant are discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled." Destroy the symbol card. Never destroy the name card.
2. Refile the name card in numerical order by symbol number in the symbol number index. The symbol number shall not be subsequently reassigned to another informant. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom a symbol number was once assigned later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol number index, mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index.
3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discontinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alphabetical index card.
4. Advise the Bureau when a potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason therefor.
5. Advise the Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section[69F, volume III, of this manual.]
6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those cases in which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the informant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated. This exception does not apply to security of Government employees cases. When all above action is completed, advise the Bureau.
7. A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to control informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommendations shall be made when it appears that such are warranted.
8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close contact with him so that the informant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against the Bureau's best interests. When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or otherwise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in

f. If the informant receives from outside employment less than[$4800,] all of which is subject to Social Security tax, the amount on which he will have to report for Social Security tax purposes, if he completes a schedule C, is the difference between the amount received from regular employment and[$4800.]

g. If informant completes a schedule C, the nature of business of the self-employed must be stated and informants should be instructed to use as the nature of self-employment any applicable occupation without revealing connection with the Bureau.

7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses

a. In trials in which informants, former informants, or other persons who were paid sums of money are prospective witnesses, the Bureau must furnish the Department tabulations of payments made to such prospective witnesses. The office handling prosecution must determine from the departmental attorneys what individuals are to be used as witnesses. Thereafter the office should furnish and/or cause other appropriate offices to furnish to the Bureau the following information:

(1) The correct, full name
(2) All aliases, code names, and symbol numbers
(3) The first date of contact by your office
(4) If first contact was prior to September, 1944, the names of all SAs, SACs, and ASACs who contacted and may have made payments
(5) A tabulation of all payments, broken down as to the amount applicable to services and the amount applicable to expenses
(6) A listing of any advances, refunds, and outstanding balances of advances
(7) The date of last contact by your office
(8) Whether the individual has been contacted by any other office

b. Each individual and each item of information must be accounted for. If no contact was made with a particular individual, the Bureau must be so advised.

c. Where an informant has previously been used and a tabulation of payments was prepared, information for items (5) through (8) need be given only from the date of the last trial from which the individual was used.

d. The above information should be submitted separate and apart from correspondence setting forth derogatory information, and should be addressed to the attention of the Administrative Division, Voucher Unit. Interdivisional correspondence should be addressed to the Bureau with copies designated for the interested offices.

8. Receipt of unemployment compensation

a. At times security informants and/or sources temporarily lose their jobs with private industry due to strikes, economic conditions, or similar circumstances. As a result they become eligible for unemployment compensation. Where unemployment regulations require listing of all sources of income as a prerequisite for obtaining unemployment compensation and security informants and/or sources who at the time are being paid by the Bureau for services rendered fail to comply, the situation is potentially embarrassing. The Bureau cannot be placed in the position of condoning a violation of the state law on the part of any informant or source. Each field office must determine from state unemployment compensation officials effect of unemployment compensation laws on paid informants and/or sources. Depending on local requirements, informants and sources must be alerted accordingly.

b. Whenever a paid informant and/or source becomes unemployed or has knowledge of impending unemployment, discuss all facts with him and submit observations and recommendations to Bureau. Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, follow recommended action. Each office must assume the responsibility of guarding against informant's accepting a Bureau payment that would conflict with unemployment compensation laws. At the same time, weigh seriously the possible need for an informant to apply and accept unemployment compensation to

protect his security. Fellow members of the pertinent subversive organization may be aware of his unemployment status and would expect him to apply. Where a state requires notification of Bureau payments to informants that would necessitate disclosure of their identity, then Bureau payments should be discontinued during the period they receive unemployment compensation benefits.

[9. Handling money and property received by double agents
   a. Double agents must turn over to the Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with the double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to the double agent at the inception of the operation (consider obtaining a signed statement to this effect). Exceptions to this rule must be specifically approved by the Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to the Bureau.
   b. Any money or property received by a double agent from his principal represents possible future evidence and the double agent should execute a statement describing the money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. This statement should be signed by the double agent's code name or number.
   c. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations.
   d. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in the event testimony is later necessary.]

O. SEMIANNUAL LETTER

A semiannual letter should be submitted to the Bureau by each office as follows:

1. List the symbol numbers of all security informants and confidential sources being paid for services or expenses on a regular basis. If such confidential source has no symbol number, list his name.
2. Also list the symbol numbers of all unpaid security informants.
3. Set forth any comments concerning the present status of the informant coverage of the office, together with information concerning what actions are being taken to improve the security informant coverage.
4. As a separate section of the semiannual letter, list under "Headquarters City" and each resident agency all subversive organizations broken down into each division and unit thereof, such as clubs, committees, and chapters.

   Under each unit the approximate membership, together with the symbol numbers and positions of security informants affording coverage, should be set out. Where no informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such factors should be shown relative to each unit.

   Semiannual letters may include any additional pertinent information re informant coverage that may be helpful in over-all evaluation, such as informants in other divisions who are occasionally utilized and highly placed informants who furnish area-wide, national, or international information.

(2) Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state "no change.")
(3) Current membership in subversive organizations
(4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period
(5) Amount paid for services and expenses by month (Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority.)
(6) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity
(7) Number of written and oral statements submitted (List separately.)
(8) Information furnished of unusual value
(9) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance
(10) Informant's potential for advancement
(11) Stability and reliability (Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)
(12) Indoctrination against disclosure (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)
(13) All necessary action taken on information furnished
(14) Miscellaneous (Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention)

(Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.")

c. When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued.

d. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. Follow form in subsection 3b.

[e. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field.

f. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit.

g. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsibility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is being received.

[h. [Discontinuance of payments]
If at any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised.

[i. [Extraordinary expenses]
In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraordinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority.

[4. [Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority]
If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth.

[[In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding
[only those applicable items in subsection 3b.]

5. Receipts
When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so.

a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files.

b. Receipts should clearly show:
   (1) Date on which payment was made
   (2) Period for which made when informant is paid on a period basis
   (3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent
   (4) Name of Agent making payment
   (5) Signature of person receiving the money

c. When transmitting receipts and itemized statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one-half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can be easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must be taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles.

6. Income tax returns

a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return.

b. Since all informants are considered independent contractors, the income they receive from the Bureau is self-employment income but, since the Bureau does not consider their activity as the carrying on of a trade or business, they may consider dispensing with the filing of a schedule C as part of form 1040 if they so desire.

c. The informant's own personal situation, however, should be taken into consideration as he may receive income from other sources as an independent contractor which would require the deduction of self-employment tax, regardless of any Bureau income he may receive.

d. In considering the filing of a tax on self-employment income, such a return is based upon net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more. If an informant receives less than $400 from the Bureau and has no other self-employment income, this money in any event is not subject to the self-employment tax. If the informant re-
[ceives[$4800]or more from outside employment subject to Social Security tax, again the self-employment tax requirements do not apply.

e. Bureau income should be set forth under item 10 on page one of the Federal income tax return, form 1040, as "Other Income" and explained under schedule H(3) on page three of the return as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life.

4. [Subfiles]
   a. A subfile is required on each informant who submits statements, written or oral,[except in espionage or foreign nationality matters where a subfile is necessary only in those instances involving possible prosecution.] The original of each statement, whether personally written by the informant or furnished orally and reduced to writing by contacting Agent, should be filed in this subfile. Executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306 should be stapled to the original of each such statement.
   b. Holes may be punched in original statements of informants for secure filing, but care must be taken to prevent obliteration of any portion of statements or notations thereon.
5. [Channelization]
   Excerpts from the informant's statement are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. Form FD-306 may be used to disseminate this information to the case file in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."
6. [Dissemination of information]
   Information submitted by informants, potential informants, confidential sources, or sources of information should be reported to the Bureau and interested offices and other agencies whenever necessary by the appropriate means of communication under captions[showing]the subject matter of the information.
7. [Correspondence]
   Correspondence submitted in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished to the Bureau under a substantive case caption.
8. [Maintenance of files]
   a. All pending files on security informants shall be maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the SAC, ASAC, or field supervisor as the informant indices are maintained and described in subsection K.
   b. Subfiles containing written statements may be maintained in the open files section, provided there is no disclosure of the informant's identity on the statements.
   c. All informant files should be maintained in such a manner as to insure that all information furnished by a particular informant will be immediately available upon the request of the Bureau.
   d. In addition, these files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research.
9. [Use of informant by Department - filing correspondence re]
   From time to time, the Department expresses an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness. As a result, there will be correspondence[showing]this situation between the Bureau and the field. Place copies of all such correspondence in the informant's file. Occasionally such correspondence may be voluminous and apply to more than one informant. In those cases, summarize the information concerning each particular informant and place the summary in the appropriate informant's file.
10. [Form FD-238]
    Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) has been approved for use in security informant and potential security informant files. It is to be used in the nature of a table of contents or as an index to show where in the file particular data can be found. This form is to be kept as the top

document in the pertinent informant file and is not to [illegible] serialized.
[[If a particular section of this form is not applicable, such should be noted thereon. If it later becomes applicable, the serial number can be noted at that time.]

[11. [Bulky material submitted by informant]
Where informant or source submits bulky material other than a statement and same pertains to a specific investigative matter, bulky material may be filed in the investigative case file, together with a copy of executed form FD-306 or a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. In such a case, the original form FD-306 or channelizing memorandum should be filed in the subfile of the informant or source and the file and serial number where the bulky material is located should be noted thereon.

[N. PAYMENTS[TO INFORMANTS AND HANDLING MONEY RECEIVED]
[1. [No gifts to informants]
   a. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued.
   b. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis.
   c. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items.
   d. Investigative employees must not approach, directly or indirectly, representatives of companies, private industries, or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts, or products of such companies to informants.

[2. [SAC authority to pay informants]
   a. In specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information, SAC may approve payments of amounts up to $200 and totaling not more than $200 on a c.o.d. basis regardless of the number of payments. This applies only to individuals who have never been regularly paid for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authorization, regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized.
   b. Individual who is paid on SAC authority should not be described in correspondence as an informant or source who is being paid on a "regular basis" or on "Bureau authorization."
   c. The blue slip reclaiming any of these payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained so the Bureau will be in a position to pass intelligently such blue slips for payment.
   d. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling $200.

[3. [Payments on continuing basis - Bureau authority]
   a. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization.
   b. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth
[containing the following items and using the subheadings[shown.]
[[(In espionage and foreign nationality matters, use subheadings
[where applicable.)]
      (1) Recommendation
         (Use following wording as nearly as possible: "I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for services, plus up to $___(amount) per___(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of ___months, effective ___(date).")

b. Symbol number index

(1) The same official as set out in 1a (1) above is to maintain the symbol number index. This index shall contain a card for each individual to whom a symbol number has been assigned.

(2) File cards numerically and any symbols which consist of fictitious names shall be filed alphabetically behind the numerical symbol index.

c. The above indices (alphabetical name index and symbol number index) shall not be available for review by Agents seeking informant help in connection with their cases.

d. Where good reason exists for an Agent to obtain information from either of these indices, it should be furnished by the official having custody of the cards. These indices should be used as a guide only; informant's file must be reviewed to determine specific nature of his activities and type of information he furnishes.

2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions"

a. A separate index may be maintained for the use of Agents on informants and sources in other divisions who may be available for assistance.

b. If such index is maintained, a separate index card is to be prepared on each informant and source that has been furnished.

c. These cards should contain brief background data, together with the identity of the Bureau communication which contains the complete background data.

d. File these cards alphabetically by name and symbol number. Duplicate cards may be prepared to be filed geographically and/or by subject matter.

3. Agents' informative index

a. An Agents' informative index may be maintained by the same official as set out in 1a (1) above for the use of Agents on the type of informant coverage in the division.

b. File these cards by geographical location, arranged alphabetically by states, cities, subdivisions within cities, etc.

c. Behind each geographical location there should be a guide card indicating the type of information which can be furnished, such as Communist Party, Civil Rights Congress, Polish Activity, etc.

d. On this guide card set forth the symbol numbers of the informants and confidential sources who can provide this coverage.

e. Potential informants, confidential sources, panel sources, and sources of information who do not have permanent symbols should be set forth by name.

f. When an individual can provide more than one type of information, his symbol or identity (if a potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information without a permanent symbol) should be set forth on as many guide cards as he may provide types of information.

[g. These guide cards should[show]the above data and it is permissible to place alongside the name or symbol number, as the case may be, the names of the contacting Agents to whom a request may be made for a specific check with the individual.

h. Also, there may be set forth on these guide cards symbol numbers of informants who move outside a division and who still may be excellent sources regarding past activities. They should be declassified from informants to confidential sources or sources of information. If any such individual has moved from a division and is being utilized by the division to which he has moved and has received a symbol number from the latter division, such designation should be indicated on the guide card.

i. The names or symbol numbers, as the case may be, of individuals contained in the index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" who can be of assistance to your office may be set forth on the appropriate guide cards in this index.

[4. [Currency and security]
All indices shall be maintained in a current status at all times in a manner which provides tight security of the information and yet makes it easily available to Agents having a need thereof.

L. INDEX CARDS

1. Index cards (3 by 5 inches) for the alphabetical name index shall be prepared as follows:

Name: Symbol No:
(Informant, potential
informant, or confidential
source) File No:
Residence:
Telephone Number:
Business:
Telephone Number:
Type of Information:

Contacting Agent:
Alternate Agent:

2. Index cards (3 by 5 inches) for the symbol number index shall be prepared as follows:

Symbol: File No:
(Informant, potential
informant, or confidential
source)

Name:

3. Contacts with informants should not be posted on index cards since this information is[shown]in the informant's administrative file.

M. INFORMANT FILES

[1. [Opening]
a. When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as an informant or confidential source and he is not the subject of a security-type file, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the subject are discontinued.
b. If an individual is the subject of a security case and after being interviewed with Bureau authority he indicates he is cooperative and has potentiality as an informant, a 134 file should be opened and maintained in a pending status while under development as a potential informant.
[[In espionage and foreign nationality matters the existing file may
[be used rather than opening a new 134 file if this is practical and
[will reduce paper work.]
c. Individual files on all active informants should be maintained and carried as pending active files.

[2. [Monthly administrative report]
Files on potential informants and informants shall be included in the tabulations and calculations of delinquencies in the monthly administrative report.

[3. [Assignment and tickler cards]
a. Assignment and tickler cards should be maintained.
b. The true name of informant is not to appear on the assignment and tickler cards.

- d. All such mater[illegible]l should be transmitted in the [illegible]me manner as statements furnished by informant.
- e. Receipt of such material should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum containing all applicable items set forth on form FD-306. See section 107M for filing instructions.

[H. PASSING INFORMATION IN DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS

1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition
   - a. In double agent operations information requested by the principals is frequently passed either to build up a double agent's stature or as evidence of espionage activity.
   - b. Each case must be carefully evaluated to make certain that a net gain accrues to the U. S.
   - c. The information which is passed should be carefully handled and appropriate explanations created for its acquisition by the double agent to avoid his compromise.
2. Locating information to pass

   Wherever possible the field office handling the double agent should locate appropriate information to be passed; however, the Bureau can assist in fulfilling requests for information in possession of Government agencies.
3. Obtaining Bureau authority

   Bureau authority must be obtained to pass any information in a double agent operation except:
   - a. Newspaper articles
   - b. Magazine articles
   - c. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by a private company or corporation for distribution or sale to the public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use by engineering staffs and not intended for release to the public.)
4. Retention of copies of passed material
   - a. True copies should be retained by the office of origin of any documents or material related to the national defense which is passed in double agent operations.
   - b. Such material should be appropriately identified by the double agent.
   - c. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with the passage of such material.
   - d. Similar action should be taken with regard to any material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to the national defense.
   - e. It is not necessary to retain copies of build-up material obviously not evidentiary in nature where there is assurance that copies can be obtained at a later date from the Government agency or private concern having custody.]

I. SYMBOLS

1. [Assigning numbers]
   - a. All informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of which the Bureau must be advised.
   - b. Potential security informants and confidential sources whose identity must be protected may be assigned permanent symbol numbers if they are producing sufficient information to warrant the use of such designations.
   - c. Individuals to whom permanent symbols assigned are not to be advised of such symbols.
   - d. An additional cover name or number should be used by informant in signing his statements and in communications between the informant and the field office.
   - e. Bureau should be advised of this cover name or number in addition to the permanent symbol.

[2. Communications - use of symbols]

a. After Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use symbol number.

b. In all communications after the initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth.

c. In communications between offices, the same procedure is to be followed.

[d. Informants and sources entering another division]

(1) Active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.

(2) Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled, and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence.

(3) If an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.

e. In communications, the teletype abbreviation for the field office, symbol, and letter suffix "S" shall be shown to identify the informant; e.g., "NY 000-S."

f. In communications concerning a potential security informant, the name of the potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI."

g. Similarly, in communications relative to confidential sources, the abbreviation "CS" should be used; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."

h. When symbol numbers are assigned to potential security informants, the designation should be as follows: "LA 000-PSI."

i. In communications relative to a confidential source having a permanent symbol number, the following should be used: "CS LA 000-S."

[j. In espionage and foreign nationality matters the caption of the communication should show in addition a character and the country designation (i.e., IS - R for Russia or IS - PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing the mail at the Bureau.]

J. INDEXING

1. True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name or number assigned to them for informants' use in submitting their statements, but not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name.

2. These index cards should[show]the file number of the informant and such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear.

K. INDICES

1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index

a. Alphabetical name index

(1) In all offices all active potential security and security informant cards are to be kept by the SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best administrative practice. This is to be known as the alphabetical name index.

(2) File these cards in alphabetical order and also include cards for security confidential sources. These cards should show whether the individual is a potential informant, an informant, or a confidential source furnishing information on security matters.

(6) Informants should include in the body of their statements specific dates and places; purpose of the meeting or activity being related; identities of speakers and persons present, plus their known status in any group; specific activity engaged in by each individual present; and comments made by each individual.

(7) Informant should identify each page at the bottom by affixing his code name or code symbol (not his permanent symbol number or true name). Any corrections, erasures, changes, or additions should be similarly identified.

(8) Agents' names should never appear on any page.

(9) Informant should refer to himself in the body of the statement by his true name and he should use the third person.

(10) Agent receiving written statement should not make any corrections, additions, deletions, etc., thereto, nor should he place any markings thereon, such as his initials, date of receipt from informant, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc.

(11) Do not block stamp or serialize. Receipt and serialization should be recorded on form FD-306 or on a channelizing memorandum which should contain the applicable items set forth on form FD-306.

(12) Extraneous material should be kept to an absolute minimum. Informants should leave out such items as:

- (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
- (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
- (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be furnished orally by informant to contacting Agent who will record the information in memorandum form for the informant file.

b. Furnished orally by informant

(1) Contacting Agent should promptly reduce information to writing so that it will be accurately recorded as contemporaneously as possible with the making of the oral statement by the informant to the Agent. The following items furnished by informant should be left out:

- (a) Any reference concerning the Director and the Bureau
- (b) References to other documents and statements submitted by the informant
- (c) Obvious administrative material, such as operational instructions given by contacting Agent to informant

These data should be recorded in memorandum form for the informant file.

(2) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(3) Date it at the top with the date the informant furnishes the information to the Agent. No other date is desired except the date of the meeting or activity which shall be set forth in the body of the statement.

(4) Separate statements should be prepared for each meeting or each separate activity in which informants engage and should be dictated by the Agent as if the informant were preparing them himself.

(5) The information, after being reduced to writing, should then be read promptly by the informant and acknowledged by him by affixing his code name or code symbol on each page. [In espionage and foreign nationality matters authentication by informants is necessary only where future prosecution is possible.]

(6) After informant authenticates his statement, contacting Agent should prepare a cover sheet, form FD-306, which should be stapled to it and thereafter the statement should be handled as a written one in accordance with instructions set out in 2, a, (10), and (11).

(7) Oral information furnished by informant purely of lead value should be incorporated in an office memorandum by the Agent and should not be initialed by the informant or exhibited to him or treated as evidence.

3. Transmission[of information]

a. Statements should be personally delivered to contacting Agent by informants whenever possible. Careful consideration should be given to full security of all such personal contacts.

b. They should never be mailed to field office or resident agency.

c. If they cannot be obtained personally by contacting Agent, obtain confidential post office boxes for their receipt.

d. Confidential post office boxes should be obtained under fictitious names and not under names of persons who may be listed in post office directory.

e. More than one informant may send statements to a specific post office box, but consideration should be given to obtaining post office boxes in different post office stations to prevent suspicion on part of post office employees.

f. Envelope enclosing statement should have return address of another confidential post office box obtained under a fictitious name in the same manner as d.

g. Statements should be collected at post office boxes regularly, but time of pickup should be varied. Work out system of rotation whereby same Agent or Agents will not appear at same post office box for any extended period of time.

h. When informant receives information of vital and immediate interest to Bureau, he should furnish it as promptly as possible to contacting Agent or office by most appropriate means of communication. Office should take any necessary action without delay.

4. Handling of lead information

a. All lead information obtained from informant must be run out to a logical conclusion.

b. If there is only partial name of individual or meager descriptive data, and if there is sufficient data available to do so, file should be opened and assigned to effect an identification and to take any necessary action.

c. If there is insufficient information to warrant opening case, a tickler card should be prepared to follow with the informant and take other logical steps in an effort to obtain additional identifying data concerning the individual. Tickler cards should be restricted to information which would warrant investigation if an identity is established. This will eliminate inconsequential items, but at the same time definite steps must be taken to run out affirmative information. If no identification is made after reasonable effort, prepare memorandum for informant's subfile. If an identification is made, a file should be opened and any necessary action taken in connection therewith.

[5. [Handling documentary]material furnished[by informants]

a. Pamphlets and similar documentary material furnished by informants should have placed thereon the informant's code name or code symbol (not his true name or his permanent symbol number).

b. Informant should affix date he received the material. If informant cannot recall date of receipt, the date he furnished material should be affixed.

c. No additional markings of any kind, such as initials, date received, permanent symbol number of informant, file numbers, indexing symbols, etc., should be placed on documentary material by Agents or clerical personnel.

b. As means of obtaining closer control, obtain signed statement set out below whenever feasible and practical. In those instances in which it is not practical to secure a signed statement from an informant or double agent, advise Bureau of complete details. The SAC and the Agent handling the informant or double agent should determine the appropriate time in the informant's operation when the statement should be completed.

> I, ______, have voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.
>
> (Signed) ______ ______
>
> Witnessed: __________

[8. Execution of party questionnaires]
- a. Informants, particularly in Communist Party, ofttimes must execute "Party" questionnaires and in doing so should be instructed to be extremely careful not to jeopardize their position as informants.
- b. If necessary, each item in questionnaire should be discussed with informant to be certain his identity as informant is protected.

[9. Informant's activity in organizations]
- a. Informants in organizations must be impressed with necessity of carrying on normal activity, such as canvassing, sale, and distribution of literature, leaflets, etc.
- b. When feasible, informants should be instructed to accept direction from leaders; request instruction and interpretation of the organization's precepts; request leaders to furnish sources for study purposes; and enter discussions, not quietly sit back as observers.
- c. Changes in the organization's conduct, policy, or strategy should be reported on as they occur. Have informants give their opinions of the motivation behind such changes, but be certain opinions and suggestions given are labeled as such.
- d. Informants must be encouraged to increase contacts within their orbit in order to gain higher positions, but at the same time they should be cautioned to do so in such a manner as to avoid suspicion.

[[10. Transfer of informants to other areas]
- a. Keep alert to possibility of transferring informants to areas needing coverage through change in residence or employment.
- b. Keep in mind over-all coverage of organizations. If informant becomes prominent and may be able to expand his field of activity beyond your field division, by all means encourage him to do so in order to provide a wider coverage for the Bureau's work.

[[11. Action by informant when uncovered]
- a. If informant is uncovered by subversive elements, he should be instructed to defend himself vigorously and demand proof of his informant activity.
- b. Suspicion in many cases is directed to an informant without facts to back it up and by bluffing informant may confuse the issue to the point where his services may not be lost. This procedure should be carefully handled and each situation considered on its merits.
- c. In some cases it may be necessary for informant to acquiesce to charges of deviation from the strict discipline of the organization involved, as by so doing he may cast off suspicion.

[[12. Requests of informant to help defend others]

a. If a security informant is requested by the Communist Party, communists being prosecuted by the Government, or by other interested parties to assist in the preparation of the defense in subversive-type cases or receives assignment where such information is readily available, informant should tactfully decline such assignments.

b. Any such request received by informant should be reported immediately to the contacting Agent and made a matter of record.

c. If the informant cannot avoid becoming involved, he should be instructed not to report to the contacting Agent any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy.

d. Any such incident must be reported promptly to the Bureau.

G. INFORMANTS' INFORMATION

[1. General instructions[re oral and written information]

a. Instructions regarding preparation, submission, and handling of information received from informants apply not only to security informants but also to potential security informants, panel sources, security confidential sources, and security sources of information.

b. Specific instructions and guidance must be given to informants concerning preparation of statements containing their information.

c. They should be submitted as quickly as possible after a meeting or activity.

d. Written statements should be submitted whenever possible, but if such
[cannot be done information may be provided orally. [In espionage and
[foreign nationality matters written statements are usually necessary
[only in those instances involving possible future prosecution. (In
[the majority of cases diplomats or officials who are not subject to
[prosecution are involved.)]

e. Carefully scrutinize each, bearing in mind that if informant is called upon to testify at a later date his statements will very likely be introduced in court.

f. All information furnished by informants orally or in writing must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, channelized, and all necessary action taken. Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. If so used, prepare copies of FD-306 as needed for dissemination and staple one copy to each copy of the informant's statement being channelized. Channelization should be noted on original FD-306 and on all copies under "Remarks."

g. Prior to any prosecution or administrative hearing, advise the trial attorney that informant not only furnished information concerning instant case but also provided other statements not pertinent to case at issue. The trial attorney will thus be prepared in the event informant testifies on direct examination or cross-examination that he furnished information in addition to his testimony.

h. See subsection M for instructions regarding filing informant statements.

[2. Recording[written and oral information]

a. Written by informant

(1) May be in handwriting or hand printing of informant or typed.

(2) Original only should be submitted and informants should never retain any copies or notes relating thereto. Continuously check informants to see that they do not keep any notes or copies.

(3) Prepare on paper devoid of any Bureau markings or identification.

(4) Date when informant prepares statement should be placed at the top of it.

(5) All information obtained by informants regarding each meeting or each separate activity in which they engage should be submitted in one statement whether the information is of evidentiary or intelligence value.

[4. [Recording investigative activity]
All investigative activity must be made a matter of record in the field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Sources include all confidential informants - criminal or security. Agents must not have and use informants known only to the individual Agents personally.

[F. INDOCTRINATION,[DIRECTION,]AND CONTROL OF[SECURITY]INFORMANTS

[1. [Caution against divulging relationship]
- a. During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon informant the absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging through any media any information regarding his relationship with Bureau.
- b. These instructions must be properly worded and phrased to prevent any possibility Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.

[2. [Developing additional background]
- a. During development of informant, additional data concerning his background should be continuously obtained from informant.
- b. After gaining informant's confidence, information will be elicited which may be pertinent to his operation and may have effect upon his retention, such as data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make him a risk as an informant.

[3. [Handling indications of instability]
- a. Details of any indications of instability should be furnished to the Bureau immediately upon being obtained, with recommendations as to informant's continuance.
- b. Set forth the steps being taken to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.

[4. Contacts[by Agents]
- a. [Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where the
[frequency of contact is dependent on the circumstances of each
[case,]informants should be contacted as often as necessary, but
at least one personal contact should be made every two weeks.
- b. If such frequent contacts cannot be established, obtain specific
[Bureau authority for an exception to this requirement[(except in
[espionage and foreign nationality matters).] In requesting such
exception, set forth all attendant circumstances.
- c. During each contact, informant's activities since previous contact should be carefully reviewed and the contacting Agent should make certain the informant has furnished in writing or verbally all information and data which he has obtained since the last contact. If additional or supplementary information is furnished during this contact with the informant, this information should be handled in the same manner as outlined in subsection G.
- d. Contacting Agent should become so well acquainted with informant that he will not breach the confidential relationship. If there is slightest indication informant may do so, Agent should be able to anticipate this action and forestall it.
- e. Contacting Agent should not only collect information but also direct informant, be aware of his activities, and maintain such close relationship that he knows how informant is thinking with regard to Bureau connection. This relationship should not be so reciprocal that informant obtains information concerning Agent or Agent's business, personal or official.
- f. Good judgment must prevail in handling informant to see he does not become too familiar with Agent and later cause embarrassment to Agent or Bureau by using for his own advantage such knowledge which he may obtain.
- g. Promptly advise Bureau of any indication informant is wavering in Bureau relationship.

h. Any arrangements for paying informant or personally contacting him must be specific and no doubt should be left in the minds of either the Agent or informant as to the methods of payment, amount, place, and time.

i. Informants should be instructed to use only public telephones in communicating with contacting Agent and consideration should be given to furnishing informants the unlisted office telephone number for emergency communication. [This rule is not practical in all espionage and foreign nationality matters but should be followed where applicable.]

j. Positive information received from informant should be the subject of a written statement by informant or a memorandum prepared by contacting Agent to be placed in the informant's subfile and appropriately channelized.

k. Record dates of all contacts, whether negative or positive, in informant's administrative file. Memorandum or form FD-209 may be used. If informant contacted frequently, one memorandum or form may be used for several contacts.

l. The dates of negative contacts and file numbers of the cases involved must appear in informant's administrative file. Where a file has more than one subject, the name of the subject under inquiry should also be noted. Do not set forth title of the case involved on the form.

m. If positive information received from informant, show only dates of contacts in informant's administrative file. Place positive information in informant's subfile and appropriately channelize same.

n. Alternate Agent should be designated for contacts with informant and former should be thoroughly acquainted with informant so that contacts may be handled by alternate Agent in absence of Agent to whom informant is assigned.

[5. [Checking reliability]

a. Reliability of informants must be constantly checked.

b. Consideration should be given to use of any investigative technique deemed necessary to be certain they are completely reliable and are furnishing accurate, truthful information.

c. Checks on reliability must be constantly reviewed during time informant is active.

6. Fingerprints

a. After informant has been developed and unless some reason to the contrary exists, obtain and forward his fingerprints to Identification Division if they are not on file there.

b. If informant refuses, do not force the issue.

c. Informant's fingerprints, when obtained, should be forwarded as enclosure to FD-165 using applicant-type fingerprint card, form FD-258. This card should be properly executed showing subject's complete description, including date and place of birth. Appropriate field office should be shown as contributor, field case file number in number space, and "inquiry" in space for "company and address" on face of card.

d. A flash notice is to be placed by the field in the files of the Identification Division by submission of form FD-165, using informant's true name for each informant who has fingerprints on file.

e. When informant is discontinued, retain flash notice for one year following discontinuance. Insure that notice is canceled at that time by submission of form FD-165 or advise Bureau as to why notice should be continued. If fingerprints obtained solely for this purpose, remove fingerprints from criminal file.

[7. [Control - statement of cooperation]

a. Close control must be exercised over activities of informants and double agents in order to obtain maximum results in security cases and to prevent any possible embarrassment to Bureau.

[8. [Potential security informants in espionage and foreign nationality cases
[many times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of
[the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and
[deseco program, section 105K,6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.)
[However, where practical the above items should be covered.]
9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days.
10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant.

[D. INTERVIEWS[AND DEVELOPMENT OF]POTENTIAL[SECURITY]INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to develop individual as a security informant.
2. When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy.
3. Carefully plan initial interviews as to time and location to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau.
4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless
[necessary and all such interviews[in their residences]should be conducted
[by two Agents[after specific approval of the]superior in the field
[office responsible for development of informants. [This instruction is
[not applicable where active investigation has established that the
[potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of
[affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment
[to the Bureau.
[5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is
[maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the
[case,]potential informants should be contacted personally at least
once every two weeks in the same manner as informants.
6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months. These progress letters should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These certifications may follow the
[wording suggested under section 107N,[3b, (11) and (12). (Refer to
[section 105K, 6h, (3), (b), volume IV, of this manual for exceptions to
[this rule in deseco matters.)]
7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent.
8. During interviews with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts.
9. Potential informant should have contacts, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field.
10. If individual does not have potential as above described but is willing to cooperate, consider indicating to him he can be of assistance if he places himself in a position where he may be able to obtain information of value. In this regard, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desires; also, it may be mentioned that if he subscribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest may be shown in him which, if developed, would be the means whereby he could obtain information.
[[11. Inform potential informants who agree to assist the Bureau that such
[assistance must be strictly voluntary and they are to understand that
[there is no coercion or intimidation involved.

12. During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or informant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained.
13. Specifically advise each potential informant that he is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon the informant.
14. Advise potential informant that his cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. This must be thoroughly impressed upon the informant before you accept him as such. If the informant has a special problem which would require his revealing his relationship to his wife, etc., this should be learned from him during the initial interview and a recommendation made to the Bureau when the results of the interview are furnished. The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau.
15. If a prospective informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration in labor unions by subversive elements.
16. If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in his initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities.
17. From the first interview with a potential informant through his development and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant.
18. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a potential witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau.]

E. BUREAU POLICY

[1. Development of military personnel]
Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reservations, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau.

[2. Contacts by designated Agents]
Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated[to contact him.]

[3. Divulging information to informant]
No information should be divulged to[a potential]informant[or an informant] concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to[his]proper operation.

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Security informant
   Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current information of value.
2. Potential security informant
   Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau.

[3. Double agent
   A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance.

4. Confidential source
   An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be; bankers, telephone company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations Secretariat, and individuals who furnish trash in connection with trash covers. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.]

[B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL[SECURITY]INFORMANTS

Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals which are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested:

1. Evaluation of
   a. Complainants in security matters
   b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases
   c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty
   d. Bureau applicants as possible informants
   e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees
   f. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on continuous basis
2. Review of closed security files on individuals.
3. Review of communist index
4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
5. Survey possibilities of trash covers.
6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA.
7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members. The Progressive Party file also might prove a fertile field.

9. Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries
10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.
11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.
12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact.
13. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an industrial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.
14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active
15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact.

[[16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S.
[17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat
[18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S.
[19. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)]

[C. INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL[SECURITY]INFORMANTS

When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following:

1. Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature
2. Discreet canvass of other informants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office
3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation.
4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identification Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant.
5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran.
6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve.
7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
[A. Definitions 3
[1. Security informant 3
[2. Potential security informant 3
[3. Double agent 3
[4. Confidential source 3
[B. Sources of Potential Security Informants 3
[C. Investigation of Potential Security Informants 4
[D. Interviews and Development of Potential Security Informants 5
[E. Bureau Policy 6
[1. Development of military personnel 6
[2. Contacts by designated Agents 6
[3. Divulging information to informant 6
[4. Recording investigative activity 7
[F. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants 7
[1. Caution against divulging relationship 7
[2. Developing additional background 7
[3. Handling indications of instability 7
[4. Contacts by Agents 7
[5. Checking reliability 8
[6. Fingerprints 8
[7. Control - statement of cooperation 8
[8. Execution of party questionnaires 9
[9. Informant's activity in organizations 9
[10. Transfer of informants to other areas 9
[11. Action by informant when uncovered 9
[12. Requests of informant to help defend others 10
[G. Informants' Information 10
[1. General instructions re oral and written information 10
[2. Recording written and oral information 10
[3. Transmission of information 12
[4. Handling of lead information 12
[5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants 12
[H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations 13
[1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition 13
[2. Locating information to pass 13
[3. Obtaining Bureau authority 13
[4. Retention of copies of passed material 13
[I. Symbols 13
[1. Assigning numbers 13
[2. Communications - use of symbols 14
[J. Indexing 14
[K. Indices 14
[1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index 14
[2. Index entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" 15
[3. Agents' informative index 15
[4. Currency and security 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
[L. Index Cards ... 16
[M. Informant Files ... 16
[1. Opening ... 16
[2. Monthly administrative report ... 16
[3. Assignment and tickler cards ... 16
[4. Subfiles ... 17
[5. Channelization ... 17
[6. Dissemination of information ... 17
[7. Correspondence ... 17
[8. Maintenance of files ... 17
[9. Use of informant by Department – filing correspondence re ... 17
[10. Form FD-238 ... 17
[11. Bulky material submitted by informant ... 18
[N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received ... 18
[1. No gifts to informants ... 18
[2. SAC authority to pay informants ... 18
[3. Payments on continuing basis – Bureau authority ... 18
[4. Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau
[authority ... 20
[5. Receipts ... 20
[6. Income tax returns ... 20
[7. Stipulation re payments made to witnesses ... 21
[8. Receipt of unemployment compensation ... 21
[9. Handling money and property received by double agents ... 22
[O. Semiannual Letter ... 22
[P. Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements ... 24
[Q. Discontinued Informants ... 24
[R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service
[(INS) ... 26
[S. Corrective Action on False Information ... 26
[T. Classification ... 27
[U. Confidential Sources ... 27
[1. Definition ... 27
[2. Assignment of symbols ... 27
[3. Index ... 27
[4. Files ... 27
[5. Utilization ... 28
[6. Security and racial confidential sources – certification of
[stability and payments ... 28
[7. Gifts ... 28
[8. Discontinuance ... 28

8. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemination of such information to follow the instructions set forth above.
9. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication.
10. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance.
11. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made.
12. It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done.
13. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individual in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant.
14. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

T. CLASSIFICATION - 134

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

1. Definition

[[See page 3 of this section.]

2. Assignment of symbols
   - a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved.
   - b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished.
   - c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications
[for confidential source. [Communications relating to espionage and
[foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character
[indicating the country involved; e.g.,]IS - R for Russia.]
   - d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S.
   - e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security and criminal informants.
3. Index
   - a. Index cards (3 by 5 inches) like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished.
   - b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on informants.
   - c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in both types of investigations.
4. Files

When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. The same procedure should be followed concerning racial confidential sources, the classification being 137. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC.

5. Utilization
   - a. If confidential source is to be used for assistance in security or racial investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security and potential racial informants.
   - b. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as security informants.
   - c. Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted.
   - d. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose.
   - e. The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source is to set out clearly the following information:
     - (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any
     - (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him
     - (3) A statement to the effect subject is being considered a confidential source and that he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, a statement should be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is connected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.
   - f. [One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use a subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter.] If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the[single-page]copy and[it will be]returned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source. Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained.

6. Security and racial confidential sources - certification of stability and payments
   - a. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial confidential sources. See 107N, 3b, for form of letter.
   - b. If the security or racial source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

7. Gifts

   Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

8. Discontinuance

   Advise Bureau when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor.

SECTION 87

PART I

(1969 TO PRESENT)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. General Guidelines 3
- 1. Investigative jurisdiction 3
  - a. Rebellion or insurrection 3
  - b. Seditious conspiracy 3
  - c. Advocating the overthrow of the Government 3
  - d. Internal Security Act of 1950 and Communist Control Act of 1954 4
- 2. Prosecutive determination 4
- 3. Related statutes 4
- 4. Definitions 5
- 5. Predication for investigation 5
- [6. Accuracy of characterizations [6]
- 7. Investigations and contacts with individuals connected with institutions of learning 6
- 8. Use of officers from other agencies 6

B. Investigation of Organizations 6
- 1. Purpose 6
- 2. Responsibility to initiate investigations 6
- 3. Scope of investigation 6
- 4. Infiltration of nonsubversive groups 7
  - a. General 7
  - b. Caption and preface 7
  - c. Limitations on investigation 7
  - d. Conversion to full scale investigation 8
- 5. Subversive publications 8
- 6. Investigative steps 8
- 7. Administrative and reporting procedures 8
  - a. Reporting requirements and status 8
  - b. Informant coverage 8
  - c. Topical headings 8
  - d. Character 8
  - e. Classification 8
  - f. Copies 9
  - g. Closing of case 9

C. Investigation of Individuals 9
- 1. General policy 9
  - a. Purpose 9
  - b. Individuals to be investigated 9
  - c. Limitations on investigations 9
  - d. Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval 9
  - e. Members of U. S. armed forces 9
  - [[f. Candidates for or occupants of elective public office 9a]
- 2. Investigative procedures 10
  - a. Scope of investigation 10
  - b. Investigative steps 10
  - c. Interviews of subjects 11
    - (1) Policy 11
    - (2) Purpose 11
    - (3) Approval to interview 11
    - (4) Letter requesting FBIHQ approval to interview subject 11
    - (5) If interview not conducted within 60 days, submit letter advising FBIHQ 12

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
- (6) Conduct of interview 12
- (7) Direction of subject's activities 12
- (8) Reporting results of interview 12
- 3. Reporting procedures 13
  - a. General 13
  - b. Summarizing information 13
  - c. Administrative or cover pages 13
  - d. Office of origin 13
  - e. Title of communications 14
  - f. Classification 14
  - g. Character 14
  - h. Copies of reports or LHMs 14
  - i. Status 14
  - j. Closing and reopening of cases 14
  - k. Subjects traveling abroad 14
  - l. Submission of information on members of subversive groups 15
  - m. Control files on former members of subversive organizations 15
  - n. Channeling information to case files 16
  - o. Movement of subjects between offices 16
  - [p. Destruction of channeling memoranda 16
- 4. Urban Guerrilla Warfare .... 16]
- D. Dissemination of Data Developed 16
  - 1. General policy 16
  - 2. Specific requirements 16
    - a. Members of armed forces 16
    - b. Aliens and naturalized citizens 17
    - c. Individuals employed in or having access to Key Facilities or employees of private contractors of the Armed Forces 17
    - d. Employees of public utilities 17
    - e. Members of military reserve branches or National Guard 17
    - f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry 17
    - g. Employees of Federal Government 17
    - h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under jurisdiction of branch of armed forces 17
    - i. Airmen licensed by Federal Aviation Administration 17
    - j. Dissemination to Secret Service 18
  - 3. Restrictions on field dissemination 18
- E. Administrative Index (ADEX) 18
  - 1. Purpose and general policy 18
  - 2. Criteria 18
  - 3. Recommendation for preparation of ADEX card 19
  - 4. Format of ADEX card 20
  - 5. Arrangement of ADEX 21
    - a. At FBIHQ 21
    - b. In field office 21
      - (1) Alphabetical section 21
      - (2) Geographical section 21
      - (3) Unavailable section 21
  - 6. Special interest subjects 21
  - 7. Changes in residence and employment of ADEX subjects 22
  - 8. Changes in other background data 22
  - 9. Movement of ADEX subjects between offices 22
  - 10. Subject entering U. S. armed forces 22
  - 11. Removal of cards from ADEX 22
  - 12. Reporting Procedures on ADEX subjects 23
  - 13. Deleted 23

f. Copies
Furnish 5 copies of reports and LHMs except where instructed otherwise in individual cases.

g. Closing of case
If it is determined subject organization is not currently engaged in subversive activities, submit pertinent facts in closing report.

C. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS

1. General policy

a. Purpose
To develop evidence of any violations of the statutes enumerated in A. 1. above and keep the Department and other agencies and officials of Executive Branch advised of information developed which pertains to their areas of responsibility and interest.

b. Individuals to be investigated
Investigations should be conducted to fully identify and determine the activities and affiliations of persons who:
Are reported to be engaged in activities which may result in a violation of statutes enumerated in A. 1. above. This includes individuals who are current active members of subversive organization or movement. Where formal membership in a subversive movement does not exist, it includes individuals who are actively supporting the subversive goals of the movement.
Priority investigative attention should be given to individuals who are known or suspected of being involved in subversive activities which are of a clandestine, underground, or violent nature.

c. Limitations on investigations
All investigations conducted should avoid nebulous or sweeping inquiries which are not relevant to objectives. Under no circumstances should an investigation be conducted of any individual merely on the basis that such individual supports unpopular causes or opposes Government policies.

d. Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval
Obtain FBIHQ approval for investigation of:
(1) U. S. Government employee
(2) Officials or employees of United Nations or other public international organizations of a governmental or quasi-governmental nature.
(3) Officials or employees of foreign diplomatic establishments or governments, or foreign exchange participants (representatives of foreign countries who are in U. S. as part of official exchange program).
(4) Faculty members of institutions of learning.
FBIHQ approval is not required for investigation of student or nonacademic employees of institutions of learning in the absence of unusual circumstances. If during a pending investigation it is discovered that the subject fits one of above categories, suspend active investigation and advise FBIHQ with recommendation as to further action.

e. Members of United States armed forces
No investigation should be conducted of active[members of U. S. military forces or retirees from the "regular" components of the armed forces who are subject to Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and over whom the military retains control (retirees from military reserve forces are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice).] If it is determined that a subject fits in this category, terminate investigation and promptly furnish pertinent data to appropriate counterintelligence branch of U. S. armed forces. Advise FBIHQ in form suitable for dissemination.

[f. Candidates for or occupants of elective public office

Upon learning of the candidacy for public office of a member of a subversive organization, the office of origin should promptly furnish FBIHQ with a communication suitable for dissemination setting forth sufficient identifying data and a brief summary of the individual's subversive activities together with details of the individual's candidacy for public office. In the absence of a violation of a specific Federal statute, no investigation should be conducted until subject's candidacy for public office is resolved. Information received during the period of the individual's candidacy indicating a specific violation of Federal law(s) should be furnished FBIHQ by means consistent with the exigencies of the situation along with recommendations as to additional action warranted. Other unsolicited subversive information received from sources and informants or obtained incidental to other investigations should be channeled to the individual's file and, when appropriate, furnished FBIHQ in disseminative form with recommendations as to additional action warranted.

Results of candidacy in every instance should be furnished FBIHQ under individual caption. Should the candidate have been defeated, necessary communication should contain recommendations as to additional action warranted. Should the candidate be elected, necessary communication should contain statement that in the absence of information indicating a specific violation of a Federal statute, no additional investigation will be conducted. At such time as the individual ceases to serve in public office, the office of origin should submit such information to FBIHQ accompanied by recommendations as to additional action warranted. Should information be received indicating a violation of a specific Federal statute while the individual is in office, receiving office should submit pertinent information to FBIHQ by means consistent with the exigencies of the situation along with recommendations as to additional action deemed warranted.]

2. Investigative procedures
   a. Scope of investigation.
      Data concerning the following items should be developed and reported, if pertinent:
      (1) Background information, including
         (a) True name and aliases.
         (b) Date and place of birth. [Where practicable, verify through appropriate bureau of vital statistics or birth registrar.]
         (c) Residences, past and present.
         (d) Occupations and employments, past and present.
         (e) Citizenship status; where applicable, naturalization data.
         (f) Family background. If available, include identities of immediate family and any information indicating they are employed in sensitive positions or by U. S. Government. If member of immediate family is known to be engaged in subversive activities, include succinct resume.
         (g) Military records, including any service in foreign forces.
         (h) Educational background.
         (i) Arrest record and disposition of charges.
         (j) Physical description. Make reasonable effort to secure photograph.
         (k) Handwriting and/or handprinting specimens should be obtained, if readily available, and kept in case file. Special efforts should be made to secure such specimens with regard to leaders of subversive groups and they should be furnished to FBIHQ by letter for attention of FBI Laboratory to be included in National Security File.
      (2) Subversive activities and affiliations, including
         (a) Information concerning membership in subversive movements, organizations or front groups, date and circumstances of admission, positions held, and participation in activities of organization (e.g., attendance at meetings or other functions, fund-raising or recruitment efforts on behalf of organization, contributions, etc.)
         (b) Statements made or other factors which indicate awareness of the subversive nature of group, including involvement in underground operations, and/or in any other illegal or violent actions promoted by organization or movement.
         (c) Information tending to show subject's importance in subversive movement or organization, e.g., degree of influence and leadership exercised, close association with national or local leaders, participation in policy decisions.
   b. Investigative steps
      The following steps should be considered, but are not all inclusive.
      (1) File reviews. Office indices should be checked. Any pertinent information developed should be included in initial report. Where logical, check files of other field offices and/or FBIHQ.
      (2) Public source material. Make full use of public records and public sources of information, including hearings of congressional or other Government committees both state and Federal, and publications, including those issued by subversive groups.
      (3) Check of files of other government agencies, both Federal and local, which could logically be expected to have pertinent information.

3. Reporting Procedures
   a. General
      (1) Pertinent information developed during investigation may be reported either by report or LHM.
      Reports should be submitted:
         (a) When setting out results of extended inquiries such as summary of subject's activities.
         (b) When subject is being recommended for inclusion in ADEX.

      LHM should be used to report timely or significant information regarding subject's current activities.
      (2) All communications should be limited to:
         (a) Information regarding subject's subversive activities, sympathies, and affiliations.
         (b) Pertinent background data concerning subversive individuals or groups with which subject is connected.
         (c) Essential background data regarding subject.

      They should not include information regarding subject's social or personal affairs or other background data not relevant to subject's subversive activities or affiliations.
      (3) Information in both reports and LHMs should be organized under topical headings. Main headings and subheadings should be employed to make the communication as readable as possible.
   b. Summarizing information.
   When reporting information of repetitious or cumulative nature, such as attendance at regular meetings of subversive group, use summary narrative statement. Exact dates are not needed, but time period involved should be indicated. Summary statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions. Information from different sources should be reported separately and any significant items must be set forth in detail.
   c. Administrative or Cover Pages
      (1) Material to be included
      Pertinent information concerning following should be included in administrative pages of report or cover communication of LHM: References to other reports or correspondence, ADEX status, reference to security flash notice (FD-165) or transfer of origin (FD-128), reason for classification, if any, documentation of data contained in report or LHM, identities of confidential sources, leads, and other administrative or noninvestigative material. Use form (FD-305) for ADEX cases. If used, nonsymbol source page should be last page.
      (2) Documentation
         (a) In documenting information originating with another field office, file number of original document need not be shown provided source, date information received, and receiving Agent are identified.
         (b) Do not conduct extensive inquiries to document background information.
         (c) In characterizing persons who associate with subject, identify source but further documentation not required.
   d. Office of Origin
   Office covering place where subject's principal subversive activities occur or originate should be origin. In unusual circumstances where

there is doubt as to which office should be origin, request FBIHQ to designate office of origin.

e. Title of communications
Normally, only one subject should be carried in title of each report or LHM and separate reports should be submitted for each subject regardless of relationship. However, when reporting virtually identical information concerning two related individuals (e.g., travel data concerning a husband and wife) an exception can be made and single LHM or report submitted. In such cases dual captions should be used and an extra copy of communication provided.

f. Classification - 100

g. Character
(1) Designation "Subversive Matter" (or abbreviation SM) should be used in all cases. Add organizational affiliation when chief group with which subject is connected is under current investigation or has approved[characterization.]
Example: Subversive Matter - CPUSA
Subversive Matter - SWP
(2) Where meaningful organization affiliation cannot be shown, use caption "Subversive Matter."

h. Copies of reports or LHMs
In all instances furnish four copies to FBIHQ to cover dissemination to Department (2) and Secret Service (1). Where it appears dissemination will be made to other agencies at FBIHQ level, furnish one additional copy for each such agency involved.

i. Status
Carry cases as pending until logical inquiries aimed at resolving purpose of investigation have been completed. As minimum, case should be kept pending until essential background data regarding subject has been secured and sufficient information developed to present good picture of nature and extent of subversive activities engaged in by subject.

j. Closing and reopening of cases
If it is determined that subject's current activities do not involve an actual or potential violation of one or more of the statutes enumerated in A. 1. above, case should be closed.

Case may be reopened at a later date if additional information is received which indicates subject's subsequent activities involve or may result in a violation of the statutes cited in A. 1.

k. Subject traveling abroad (Also see section 105G volume IV, of this manual).
Take following action when information is received that subject of current investigation intends to travel abroad or has departed on foreign travel (except where travel is of brief duration and is known to be for innocuous purpose, such as vacation):
(1) Immediately notify FBIHQ of available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination, itinerary, purpose of trip, and pertinent passport data. Include full description of subject, including aliases. Set out concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising FBIHQ while developing details if time is of essence.

(2) If necessary, set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State.

(3) Pertinent information is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and interested Legal Attaches. Furnish FBIHQ with six copies of LHM (2-Department, 1-Secret Service, 1-State, 1-CIA) plus an additional four copies for each Legal Attache Office which covers area in subject's itinerary (1-Legat, 3-Legat's sources). Also, furnish one copy of subject's photograph, if available, for each Legat Office involved. If stop should be placed with security services abroad, so indicate in cover letter. Set out requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page captioned "Leads" at end of LHM. Request should not refer to Legal Attache or request investigation by any particular service.

(4) Advise FBIHQ promptly by LHM of subject's return. Reference any prior memoranda dealing with the subject's travel. If subject has traveled to a communist country, furnish recommendation as to interview and advise whether additional investigation being conducted.

(5) Take following action when information is received that organization or individual engaged in subversive activities is forming tour group for foreign travel:

(a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, as to identities of individuals participating in tour and furnish LHM to FBIHQ for dissemination to State Department, CIA, and interested Legal Attaches. Include readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, dates, names, and addresses of participants, and [characterization]of organization or individual sponsoring tour.

(b) Other offices should immediately identify participants residing within their respective territories and submit LHMs on those of security interest. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. In cover letter, list participants on whom there is no subversive information.

l. Submission of information on members of subversive groups.

(1) Offices covering national headquarters or local units of subversive groups should promptly furnish FBIHQ names and identifying data regarding persons affiliated with such groups. Furnish information by letter, and indicate list is being furnished for indexing purposes.

(2) Information regarding subversive affiliation of individuals residing in territory of other offices should be furnished to latter.

(3) Subscription lists of publications of subversive organizations should be indexed in field office covering address shown for subscriber but should not be forwarded to FBIHQ.

m. Control files on former members of subversive organizations.

(1) Offices having sufficient volume may, at the option of the appropriate supervisor, maintain control files on former members of subversive organizations. Such files will preclude necessity for extensive file reviews to identify persons who are in position to furnish information of value in particular cases.

(2) Where appropriate, make copies of communications for these files. Insofar as practical these files should contain following information regarding ex-members of subversive groups: background, type of information possessed, time period covered, availability for interview and for testimony.

n. Channeling information to case files

(1) Memoranda regarding membership or activity in subversive organizations, including summaries of informant reports, should be channeled to case files of individuals involved. When information from informants or surveillances is channeled to individual case files, it should be documented.

(2) When preparing lengthy channeling memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit number of copies prepared to two for each other office. Clearly indicate next to names of other offices the page number containing information of interest and note on cover page that distribution of material to individual case files should be handled by recipient offices.

o. Movement of subjects between offices

If office of origin receives information that subject of current or past investigation changes residence to territory of another division, office of origin request verification within 30 days. If new residence confirmed, office of origin submit FD-128 to transfer origin. Office of origin should furnish new office with any pertinent subversive data which has not previously been reported in a form suitable for dissemination, or suitable for incorporation in an LHM or report.

p. Destruction of Channeling Memoranda

At the option of appropriate field supervisors, in order to avoid the accumulation of channeling memoranda in a case file as well as to facilitate the subsequent preparation of LHMs or reports, the following procedure may be used: Files may be reopened for preparation of an "investigative insert" for later inclusion in a LHM or report, using T symbols identifying informants who have furnished prior information. Agent preparing this insert should also prepare a cover memorandum showing what serials in the file have been covered by his review and also identifying all symbol number informants involved and indicating the location of the original data (similar to documentation in the cover pages of a report). The channeling memoranda covered in the review can then be destroyed and the "investigative insert" along with its cover memorandum can, if necessary, be forwarded to another field division in the event the subject moves.

[4. Urban Guerrilla Warfare

(Instructions relating to investigations of above subject matter are contained in section 122, item A8, Manual of Instructions.)]

D. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED

1. General Policy

Information developed during these investigations should be furnished to other agencies in Executive Branch which have a legitimate interest. See MRR, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities and policies in dissemination.

Do not disseminate earlier reports without reviewing them to insure they meet current reporting standards. If they are unsuitable for dissemination, prepare LHM containing pertinent information.

2. Specific requirements

Following instructions cover representative situations which occur frequently.

a. Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires free exchange of all information of mutual interest between subscribing agencies. Immediately refer any derogatory or possibly significant information developed concerning members of military services, including contacts with individuals or groups of security interest, to military service having primary responsibility.

SECT 87. INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVE E ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

A. GENERAL GUIDELINES

1. Investigative jurisdiction

FBI investigations under this section are based on specific statutory jurisdiction and Departmental instructions.

Investigations conducted under this section are to be directed to the gathering of material pertinent to a determination whether or not the subject has violated, or is engaged in activities which may result in a violation of, one or more of the statutes enumerated below; or in fulfillment of Departmental instructions.

There are three principal statutes which provide a basis for these investigations, as follows:

a. Rebellion or insurrection (T18, USC § 2383).
"Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States."

b. Seditious conspiracy (T18, USC § 2384).
"If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."

c. Advocating the overthrow of the Government (T18, USC § 2385).
"Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government; or

"Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or

"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof--

"Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by

the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.

"If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section, each shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.

"As used in this section, the terms 'organizes' and 'organize', with respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons, include the recruiting of new members, the forming of new units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes, and other units of such society, group, or assembly of persons."

The courts have interpreted this statute to require advocacy to action, i.e., advocacy to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in something.

In addition to the three principal statutes outlined above, there are two other statutes which might provide a statutory foundation for an investigation under this section. These are:

d. [Internal Security Act of 1950 (T 50, USC, § 783a)

In addition to the three principal statutes outlined in subparagraphs a., b., and c., the Internal Security Act could provide a statutory basis for investigation of certain cases under this Section. This Act makes it unlawful to knowingly contribute to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship within the United States which is controlled by a foreign government, organization, or individual.]

2. Prosecutive determination

All discussions pertaining to the prosecutive potential of investigations initiated under this section will be conducted by FBIHQ with Departmental officials. These cases should not be discussed with local U. S. Attorney's office without FBIHQ approval.

3. Related statutes

There are a number of other statutes under the FBI's investigative jurisdiction which should be borne in mind in handling these investigations. Information concerning possible violations of such statutes is frequently developed during these investigations. Where this occurs the field should consider the desirability of conducting investigation in line with the policies and procedures governing the statute in question.

A list of other Federal statutes which may arise during these investigations is outlined in an appendix to this manual.

4. Definitions

The term "subversive activities" as used in this section denotes activities which are aimed at overthrowing, destroying or undermining the Government of the United States or any of its political subdivisions by the illegal means prohibited by statutes enumerated in A. 1. above. The term "subversive organization" or "subversive movement" denotes a group or movement which is known to engage in or advocate subversive activities, as defined above.

5. Predication for investigation
In all cases handled under the provisions of this section, the first communication prepared for outside dissemination (report or LHM) should show specifically the statute upon which the investigation is based together with necessary supporting facts. Where investigation has been specifically requested by Department, this should be indicated. The following examples are illustrative; however, the basis for each individual case must be tailored to the circumstances of such case.

a. "This investigation is based on information that the subject's activities could involve violation of T 18, USC, § 2383 (Rebellion or Insurrection), and § 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy). A source whose reliability has not been determined has informed that the subject is planning, along with others, to travel to Washington, D. C., on April 30, 1971, to participate in planned violent demonstrations during the first week in May, 1971, to 'shut down the Government.' Demonstration plans include the blocking of streets and highways, destruction of personal and Government property, and physical obstruction to prevent Government employees from reporting to work."

b. "This investigation is based on information that the subject's activities could involve a violation of T 18, USC, § 2385 (Advocating the overthrow of the Government). The subject is an admitted member (or has been identified as a member by a confidential source who has provided reliable information in the past) of (name of group). The (name of group) in its public statements and publications advocates the desirability and necessity of overthrowing the U. S. Government by force or violence, and the assassination of U. S. Government officers. The same source has reported that the subject actively supports these positions."

Where possible, the first intra-Bureau communication prepared which indicates that investigation is being[conducted]should specifically indicate the statutory basis for the investigation. However, there may be occasions involving individuals or groups in contact with known subversive elements where the purpose of the contact is not initially known and where a preliminary inquiry must be made to determine whether a statutory basis exists for full investigation. In these instances, a preliminary inquiry may be undertaken, through established sources, for a period not to exceed 90 days, without specifically indicating the specific statutory basis for the inquiry. If after the conclusion of 90 days it has not been possible to establish a statutory basis but further inquiry appears necessary, FBIHQ must be furnished a succinct summary of the facts by letter together with specific recommendations as to further action. In all cases, of course, investigations must be based on indications that subject may be engaged in subversive activity, whether or not a specific statutory basis is cited.

In the event preliminary inquiries fail to establish a sound basis for investigation, the case should be promptly closed and there is no need to advise FBIHQ (unless FBIHQ has been previously advised of the inquiry). Nor is there any need to prepare an LHM or report where no pertinent subversive derogatory information has been developed.

If the statutory basis for an investigation should change or be expanded to include an additional statute or statutes, the first communication prepared subsequent to such change or expansion should specifically show such changes. Similarly, this information should be included in the next report or LHM prepared in the case.

6. Accuracy of characterizations
   Assure that statements relating to characterizations of an individual or organization, or relating to affiliations with or membership in any organization, are founded on firm bases. Identify sources for such characterizations or statements of affiliation or membership if such characterizations, affiliations or memberships are not commonly and publicly known.
7. Investigations and contacts with individuals connected with institutions of learning
   a. Prior FBIHQ approval is required to:
      (1) Institute investigation of a faculty member or an organization connected with an educational institution.
      (2) Interview any student or faculty member who is not an established source. (Requests to conduct interviews must include individual's name, position, and an assessment of his reliability and discretion.)
   b. Contacts with established sources in an administrative capacity may be made on campus. Contacts with other established sources, e.g., students and nonacademic employees, should be made off campus.
8. Use of officers from other agencies
   Members of other law enforcement or intelligence agencies are not to accompany Agents handling these investigations without specific approval by the SAC.

B. INVESTIGATION OF ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purpose
   To develop evidence of any violations of statutes enumerated in A. 1. above and to keep the Department and other agencies and officials of the Executive Branch apprised of information developed which pertains to their areas of interest and responsibility.
2. Responsibility to initiate investigations
   When information is received indicating an organization may be engaged in subversive activities or may be a front group for subversive organization, field office should initiate preliminary investigation confined to established sources. Notify FBIHQ that investigation has been undertaken. [Within [90] days submit results by letter with recommendation as to whether or not further investigation is warranted.
3. Scope of investigation
   Pertinent data concerning following items should be obtained and reported:
   a. Origin and scope
      Date and circumstances of founding including any incorporation data. Identities of organizers. Location of headquarters and chapters or affiliates, if any.
   b. Stated aims and purposes, especially any information showing advocacy of violence or illegal activity.
   c. Officers
      Principal officers and/or leaders with succinct resume of subversive backgrounds, if any.
   d. Membership
      Total active membership, including logical breakdowns by organizational structure and geographical area, if applicable. If exact membership figures are not available and estimates are given, be certain they are plainly shown as estimates. In cover pages or cover communications, include evaluation of reliability of membership figures cited, as well as comments concerning any significant factors involving membership, e.g., increases or decreases, notable shift in composition of group by age, sex, nationality, etc. Be certain to secure accurate description of all lists referred to so as to avoid confusion as to exact identity or significance of such lists.
   e. Publications
      All publications of group with emphasis on any which clearly depict subversive character of organization.

(2) If necessary, set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State.

(3) Pertinent information is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and interested Legal Attaches. Furnish FBIHQ with six copies of LHM (2-Department, 1-Secret Service, 1-State, 1-CIA) plus an additional four copies for each Legal Attache Office which covers area in subject's itinerary (1-Legat, 3-Legat's sources). Also, furnish one copy of subject's photograph, if available, for each Legat Office involved. If stop should be placed with security services abroad, so indicate in cover letter. Set out requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page captioned "Leads" at end of LHM. Request should not refer to Legal Attache or request investigation by any particular service.

(4) Advise FBIHQ promptly by LHM of subject's return. Reference any prior memoranda dealing with the subject's travel. If subject has traveled to a communist country, furnish recommendation as to interview and advise whether additional investigation being conducted.

(5) Take following action when information is received that organization or individual engaged in subversive activities is forming tour group for foreign travel:

(a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, as to identities of individuals participating in tour and furnish LHM to FBIHQ for dissemination to State Department, CIA, and interested Legal Attaches. Include readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, dates, names, and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.

(b) Other offices should immediately identify participants residing within their respective territories and submit LHMs on those of security interest. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. In cover letter, list participants on whom there is no subversive information.

l. Submission of information on members of subversive groups.

(1) Offices covering national headquarters or local units of subversive groups should promptly furnish FBIHQ names and identifying data regarding persons affiliated with such groups. Furnish information by letter, and indicate list is being furnished for indexing purposes.

(2) Information regarding subversive affiliation of individuals residing in territory of other offices should be furnished to latter.

(3) Subscription lists of publications of subversive organizations should be indexed in field office covering address shown for subscriber but should not be forwarded to FBIHQ.

m. Control files on former members of subversive organizations.

(1) Offices having sufficient volume may, at the option of the appropriate supervisor, maintain control files on former members of subversive organizations. Such files will preclude necessity for extensive file reviews to identify persons who are in position to furnish information of value in particular cases.

(2) Where appropriate, make copies of communications for these files. Insofar as practical these files should contain following information regarding ex-members of subversive groups: background, type of information possessed, time period covered, availability for interview and for testimony.

n. Channeling information to case files

(1) Memoranda regarding membership or activity in subversive organizations, including summaries of informant reports, should be channeled to case files of individuals involved. When information from informants or surveillances is channeled to individual case files, it should be documented.

(2) When preparing lengthy channeling memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit number of copies prepared to two for each other office. Clearly indicate next to names of other offices the page number containing information of interest and note on cover page that distribution of material to individual case files should be handled by recipient offices.

o. Movement of subjects between offices

If office of origin receives information that subject of current or past investigation changes residence to territory of another division, office of origin request verification within 30 days. If new residence confirmed, office of origin submit FD-128 to transfer origin. Office of origin should furnish new office with any pertinent subversive data which has not previously been reported in a form suitable for dissemination, or suitable for incorporation in an LHM or report.

p. Destruction of Channeling Memoranda

At the option of appropriate field supervisors, in order to avoid the accumulation of channeling memoranda in a case file as well as to facilitate the subsequent preparation of LHMs or reports, the following procedure may be used: Files may be reopened for preparation of an "investigative insert" for later inclusion in a LHM or report, using T symbols identifying informants who have furnished prior information. Agent preparing this insert should also prepare a cover memorandum showing what serials in the file have been covered by his review and also identifying all symbol number informants involved and indicating the location of the original data (similar to documentation in the cover pages of a report). The channeling memoranda covered in the review can then be destroyed and the "investigative insert" along with its cover memorandum can, if necessary, be forwarded to another field division in the event the subject moves.

[4. Urban Guerrilla Warfare

(Instructions relating to investigations of above subject matter are contained in section 122, item A8, Manual of Instructions.)]

D. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED

1. General Policy

Information developed during these investigations should be furnished to other agencies in Executive Branch which have a legitimate interest. See MRR, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities and policies in dissemination.

Do not disseminate earlier reports without reviewing them to insure they meet current reporting standards. If they are unsuitable for dissemination, prepare LHM containing pertinent information.

2. Specific requirements

Following instructions cover representative situations which occur frequently.

a. Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires free exchange of all information of mutual interest between subscribing agencies. Immediately refer any derogatory or possibly significant information developed concerning members of military services, including contacts with individuals or groups of security interest, to military service having primary responsibility.

SECTI[illegible]87. INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERS[illegible]E ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

- A. General Guidelines 3
  - 1. Investigative jurisdiction 3
    - a. Rebellion or insurrection 3
    - b. Seditious conspiracy 3
    - c. Advocating the overthrow of the Government 3
    - d. Internal Security Act of 1950 and Communist Control Act of 1954 4
  - 2. Prosecutive determination 4
  - 3. Related statutes 4
  - 4. Definitions 5
  - 5. Predication for investigation 5
  - 6. Accuracy of characterizations 5
  - 7. Investigations and contacts with individuals connected with institutions of learning 6
  - 8. Use of officers from other agencies 6
- B. Investigation of Organizations 6
  - 1. Purpose 6
  - 2. Responsibility to initiate investigations 6
  - 3. Scope of investigation 6
  - 4. Infiltration of nonsubversive groups 7
    - a. General 7
    - b. Caption and preface 7
    - c. Limitations on investigation 7
    - d. Conversion to full scale investigation 8
  - 5. Subversive publications 8
  - 6. Investigative steps 8
  - 7. Administrative and reporting procedures 8
    - a. Reporting requirements and status 8
    - b. Informant coverage 8
    - c. Topical headings 8
    - d. Character 8
    - e. Classification 8
    - f. Copies 9
    - g. Closing of case 9
- C. Investigation of Individuals 9
  - 1. General policy 9
    - a. Purpose 9
    - b. Individuals to be investigated 9
    - c. Limitations on investigations 9
    - d. Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval 9
    - e. Members of U. S. armed forces 9
  - 2. Investigative procedures 10
    - a. Scope of investigation 10
    - b. Investigative steps 10
    - c. Interviews of subjects 11
      - (1) Policy 11
      - (2) Purpose 11
      - (3) Approval to interview 11
      - (4) Letter requesting FBIHQ approval to interview subject 11
      - (5) If interview not conducted within 60 days, submit letter advising FBIHQ 12

SECTION 87. INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
(6) Conduct of interview.......... 12
(7) Direction of subject's activities.......... 12
(8) Reporting results of interview.......... 12
3. Reporting procedures.......... 13
a. General.......... 13
b. Summarizing information.......... 13
c. Administrative or cover pages.......... 13
d. Office of origin.......... 13
e. Title of communications.......... 14
f. Classification.......... 14
g. Character.......... 14
h. Copies of reports or LHMs.......... 14
i. Status.......... 14
j. Closing and reopening of cases.......... 14
k. Subjects traveling abroad.......... 14
l. Submission of information on members of subversive groups.......... 15
m. Control files on former members of subversive organizations.......... 15
n. Channeling information to case files.......... 16
o. Movement of subjects between offices.......... 16
D. Dissemination of Data Developed.......... 16
1. General policy.......... 16
2. Specific requirements.......... 16
a. Members of armed forces.......... 16
b. Aliens and naturalized citizens.......... 17
c. Individuals employed in or having access to Key Facilities or employees of private contractors of the Armed Forces.......... 17
d. Employees of public utilities.......... 17
e. Members of military reserve branches or National Guard... 17
f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry.......... 17
g. Employees of Federal Government.......... 17
h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under jurisdiction of branch of armed forces.......... 17
i. Airmen licensed by Federal Aviation Administration.......... 17
[j. Dissemination to Secret Service.......... [18]
3. Restrictions on field dissemination.......... 18
E. Administrative Index (ADEX).......... 18
1. Purpose and general policy.......... 18
2. Criteria.......... 18
3. Recommendation for preparation of ADEX card.......... 19
4. Format of ADEX card.......... 20
5. Arrangement of ADEX.......... 21
a. At FBIHQ.......... 21
b. In field office.......... 21
(1) Alphabetical section.......... 21
(2) Geographical section.......... 21
(3) Unavailable section.......... 21
6. Special interest subjects.......... 21
7. Changes in residence and employment of ADEX subjects.......... 22
8. Changes in other background data.......... 22
9. Movement of ADEX subjects between offices.......... 22
10. Subject entering U. S. armed forces.......... 22
11. Removal of cards from ADEX.......... 22
12. Reporting Procedures on ADEX subjects.......... 23
[13. [Deleted].......... 23

(4) Records of private firms. Obtain pertinent available information from records of private firms such as past or present employers. Checks of credit agencies should be limited to securing identifying information only.

(5) Contacts with neighbors and fellow employees. Such inquiries should be made only where there is expectation they will develop pertinent information not otherwise available.

(6) Canvass of established sources and informants. Contact informants and sources in position to be knowledgeable concerning subversive groups with which subject is affiliated.

(7) Physical and photographic surveillances. These should be considered on selective basis when circumstances indicate they may be productive.

c. Interviews of subjects

(1) Policy

Subjects of investigation should be interviewed unless there is a sound basis for not doing so. Generally, interviews should be considered after background inquiries have been completed and a good picture of subject's activities developed.
If a decision not to interview a subject is made, this should be fully explained in case file and FBIHQ advised whenever FBIHQ is cognizant of investigation.

(2) Purpose

To develop information regarding subversive activities in which the subject is engaged.

(3) Approval to interview

All interviews of subjects may be approved by SAC except following instances which require FBIHQ approval:

(a) Deleted
(b) When subject is nationally prominent or where circumstances otherwise indicate the interview could be widely publicized, such as labor leaders, educators, religious leaders or journalists.
(c) When interview is to be conducted in presence of subject's attorney and/or aide.
(d) When subject is connected with institution of learning.

[In those instances where FBIHQ approval is not required, case Agent should prepare a memorandum requesting SAC authority for interview. This memorandum should include a succinct resume of the case, including a review of office files concerning a subject, and should indicate the objectives of an interview. Memorandum must be approved by SAC or in his absence, by a designated official.]

(4) Letter requesting FBIHQ approval to interview subject

(a) Letter should concisely set out available data concerning following items:

I. Residence address, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship and any health factors which could affect conduct of interview.
II. Marital status, employment and citizenship of spouse.
III. Succinct summary of subject's subversive activities, membership of affiliation with subversive groups, and positions held.
IV. Similar summary regarding spouse's affiliation with subversive activities.
V. Similar summary concerning subversive activities on part of close relatives.
VI. Resume of subject's current sympathies and status in subversive movement or organization and any indication of disaffection.

VII. Subject's arrest record and disposition of charges; any information indicating a propensity for violence.
VIII. What is expected to be gained by interview?

List above items by number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available concerning a particular item, so indicate.

(b) Submit one copy of letter and additional copy of first page only which can be returned by FBIHQ stamped "Approved."

(5) If interview not conducted within 60 days, submit letter advising FBIHQ:
(a) Reason interview not conducted.
(b) Any new information pertinent to desirability of interview.
(c) Whether efforts to interview subject will be pursued. Thereafter, keep FBIHQ advised at least each 60 days as to progress of matter.

(6) Conduct of interview.
(a) Interviews of subjects entitled to the warning and waiver shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements set forth in Volume I, Manual of Instructions, Section 2B, page 15. If the interview is being conducted for intelligence information rather than an admission or confession of guilt, no warning is required. Moreover, if the investigation has failed to develop information indicating a possible violation of Federal law by the subject, it would be permissible to interview the subject without a warning as he does not fit the criteria of those entitled to a warning of rights. Carefully plan interview so there will be no compromise of sources, sensitive techniques or interviewing personnel. An overriding consideration to always bear in mind is that interview should elicit from, not provide information to the subject.
(b) Interview at subject's place of employment should be avoided if possible. If attorney or aide is present during interview, interview must be conducted by two Agents.
(c) If, during conduct of interview subject desires that his attorney or aide be present, the interview should be tactfully terminated, and FBIHQ should be informed with recommendation whether or not to resume interview.
(d) In all other instances, SAC has responsibility and option of deciding when two Agents should handle interview. Safety of Agents is first priority to consider.

(7) Direction of subject's activities.
Prior FBIHQ approval is required before taking any steps to direct the subject's activities even though he may appear to be cooperative during the interview.

(8) Reporting results of interview.
(a) Record results of interview on FD-302.
(b) Pertinent results of interview should be included in next report or LHM unless circumstances indicate need for more expeditious reporting. In cover letter or administrative pages, include observations of interviewing Agents as to subject's cooperativeness, any relevant information concerning subject's appearance or characteristics, and assessment of information developed by interview in light of other data known to your office.

b. This would include leaders of organizations whose aims include the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the United States or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by unlawful means. The term "leaders" denotes those individuals, irrespective of title, who are in a position to significantly influence the policies or direct the activities of the group. Mere membership in an organization, without the element of leadership or without a demonstrated willingness and capability described in paragraph a, is not sufficient for inclusion in ADEX.

c. Individuals should be considered a "current threat" to the national security when reliable information has been developed that they have engaged in activity or exhibited the requisite willingness and capability falling within the above-described criteria during prior two years and there is no indication they have ceased such activity. However, there may be instances where retention of an individual in ADEX is justified even though no pertinent information is available during the prior two years. For example, such retention might be warranted in the case of individuals who have gone into hiding[or]temporarily left the country. [Following guidelines should be followed with respect to imprisoned subjects. If already on ADEX and sentence is such that the earliest possible release date from actual incarceration is more than two years after sentencing, subject should be recommended for removal from ADEX. If possible, stop should be placed with facility where incarcerated so office will receive notification of release, after which subject should be considered for possible reactivation on ADEX. Whether or not a stop can be placed, necessary administrative procedure should be set up so that subject's continued incarceration is verified at least every six months. If case is not pending, it should be placed in a pending inactive rather than closed status. If a subject under investigation appears to qualify for ADEX but is under sentence for over two years as described above, do not recommend for ADEX but follow procedures described above to consider for ADEX upon release from imprisonment. Sentences which permit releases in less than two years should be ignored as a factor in considering ADEX status. These guidelines are for application only as to ADEX status and have no bearing on whether or not subjects should be investigated. For those cases in a closed status at time these new guidelines become effective, they should be brought in line with the new guidelines when the cases are next reviewed for any reason.]

d. ADEX should not include individuals who may be ideologically committed to a philosophy which calls for the downfall of our form of government or which favors another form of society but who have not shown a current willingness or capability of engaging in meaningful action to promote their beliefs. This might apply, for example, to rank-and-file members of the Socialist Workers Party or the Communist Party, USA, or other old-line revolutionary groups which have advocated an overthrow of our present form of government but where subject's activity is primarily ideological in nature and not oriented toward action. Each case should be reviewed on an individual basis in the light of the criteria enumerated above.

3. Recommendation for preparation of ADEX card

a. When dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin should prepare recommendation on FD-122, in triplicate. Forward original and copy to FBIHQ, and place copy in subject's file.

b. Attach additional page or pages to FD-122 setting out succinct summary of facts on which recommendation based.

c. Nonprosecutive summary report should be submitted when subject is recommended for ADEX unless one was previously furnished to FBIHQ. In latter instance, submit up-to-date report.

d. Do not delay recommendation for ADEX because of absence of complete background or descriptive data.

e. Do not defer recommendation for ADEX because subject is missing, temporarily out of the country, or in prison.

f. If FBIHQ approves recommendation, ADEX cards will be prepared including two copies for field. Copy of FD-122 will be returned stamped "ADEX card approved, copies attached." Check cards for accuracy. Place one in alphabetical section of field office ADEX and other in either geographical section or unavailable section.

g. When subject is approved for ADEX, submit Security Flash Notice (FD-165) to check records of Identification Division and post flash notice if fingerprints of subject are on file. FD-165 will be returned if positive identification cannot be made. In latter event, FD-165 should be submitted every two years as long as subject remains on ADEX and no fingerprint record has been located. These submissions should be timed to coincide with biennial review of case.

4. Format of ADEX card

a. Data to appear on face of card

Itemized below are descriptive categories in which subject may be classified and corresponding abbreviations for use on FD-122 and ADEX card.

(1) Full name and aliases

(2) Date and place of birth

(3) Race

White	W
Black	B
Other	O

(4) Sex

Male	M
Female	F

(5) Citizenship

U. S. Citizen	CT
Alien	AL

(6) Residence address

(7) Employment (occupation and address)

(8) Type of activity

Black Extremist	BEX
Communist (pro-Chinese)	CMC
Communist (pro-Soviet)	CMS
Communist (Trotskyist)	CMT
Foreign Nationality	FRN
Puerto Rican Nationalist	PRN
Revolutionary	REV
Miscellaneous	MSC

Activities connected with "New Left" or anarchistic elements should be shown as "Revolutionary." The term "Foreign Nationality" covers foreign-directed subversion, e.g., Soviet or Chicom espionage, Arab terrorism. The abbreviation FRN should be followed by nationality involved e.g., FRN-Arab, FRN-Cuban.

(9) Special Interest

Espionage Subjects	ESP
Foreign government employees	FGE
U. S. Government employees	GOV

(10) Unavailable section

Missing	MI
Out of country	OC
Imprisoned	PR

(11) Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List), if applicable, and agency having security responsibility, which is Army.

(12) Field office and FBIHQ file numbers

b. Data to appear on separate card attached to ADEX card in geographical or unavailable section.

(1) Physical description

(2) Photograph, with date taken. It should be most current or best likeness of subject available.

f. Copies
Furnish 5 copies of reports and LHMs except where instructed otherwise in individual cases.

g. Closing of case
If it is determined subject organization is not currently engaged in subversive activities, submit pertinent facts in closing report.

C. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS

1. General policy

a. Purpose
To develop evidence of any violations of the statutes enumerated in A. 1. above and keep the Department and other agencies and officials of Executive Branch advised of information developed which pertains to their areas of responsibility and interest.

b. Individuals to be investigated
Investigations should be conducted to fully identify and determine the activities and affiliations of persons who:
Are reported to be engaged in activities which may result in a violation of statutes enumerated in A. 1. above. This includes individuals who are current active members of subversive organization or movement. Where formal membership in a subversive movement does not exist, it includes individuals who are actively supporting the subversive goals of the movement.
Priority investigative attention should be given to individuals who are known or suspected of being involved in subversive activities which are of a clandestine, underground, or violent nature.

c. Limitations on investigations
All investigations conducted should avoid nebulous or sweeping inquiries which are not relevant to objectives. Under no circumstances should an investigation be conducted of any individual merely on the basis that such individual supports unpopular causes or opposes Government policies.

d. Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval
Obtain FBIHQ approval for investigation of:
(1) U. S. Government employee
(2) Officials or employees of United Nations or other public international organizations of a governmental or quasi-governmental nature.
(3) Officials or employees of foreign diplomatic establishments or governments, or foreign exchange participants (representatives of foreign countries who are in U. S. as part of official exchange program).
(4) Faculty members of institutions of learning.
FBIHQ approval is not required for investigation of student or nonacademic employees of institutions of learning in the absence of unusual circumstances. If during a pending investigation it is discovered that the subject fits one of above categories, suspend active investigation and advise FBIHQ with recommendation as to further action.

e. Members of United States armed forces
No investigation should be conducted of active [members of U. S. military forces or retirees from the "regular" components of the armed forces who are subject to Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and over whom the military retains control (retirees from military reserve forces are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice).] If it is determined that a subject fits in this category, terminate investigation and promptly furnish pertinent data to appropriate counterintelligence branch of U. S. armed forces. Advise FBIHQ in form suitable for dissemination.

2. Investigative procedures
   a. Scope of investigation.
      Data concerning the following items should be developed and reported, if pertinent:
      (1) Background information, including
         (a) True name and aliases.
         (b) Date and place of birth. [Where practicable, verify through appropriate bureau of vital statistics or birth registrar.]
         (c) Residences, past and present.
         (d) Occupations and employments, past and present.
         (e) Citizenship status; where applicable, naturalization data.
         (f) Family background. If available, include identities of immediate family and any information indicating they are employed in sensitive positions or by U. S. Government. If member of immediate family is known to be engaged in subversive activities, include succinct resume.
         (g) Military records, including any service in foreign forces.
         (h) Educational background.
         (i) Arrest record and disposition of charges.
         (j) Physical description. Make reasonable effort to secure photograph.
         (k) Handwriting and/or handprinting specimens should be obtained, if readily available, and kept in case file. Special efforts should be made to secure such specimens with regard to leaders of subversive groups and they should be furnished to FBIHQ by letter for attention of FBI Laboratory to be included in National Security File.
      (2) Subversive activities and affiliations, including
         (a) Information concerning membership in subversive movements, organizations or front groups, date and circumstances of admission, positions held, and participation in activities of organization (e.g., attendance at meetings or other functions, fund-raising or recruitment efforts on behalf of organization, contributions, etc.)
         (b) Statements made or other factors which indicate awareness of the subversive nature of group, including involvement in underground operations, and/or in any other illegal or violent actions promoted by organization or movement.
         (c) Information tending to show subject's importance in subversive movement or organization, e.g., degree of influence and leadership exercised, close association with national or local leaders, participation in policy decisions.
   b. Investigative steps
      The following steps should be considered, but are not all inclusive.
      (1) File reviews. Office indices should be checked. Any pertinent information developed should be included in initial report. Where logical, check files of other field offices and/or FBIHQ.
      (2) Public source material. Make full use of public records and public sources of information, including hearings of congressional or other Government committees both state and Federal, and publications, including those issued by subversive groups.
      (3) Check of files of other government agencies, both Federal and local, which could logically be expected to have pertinent information.

In all of the above cases recommend removal from ADEX by FD-122 with attached succinct summary of facts. In all instances except c., submit current LHM or report for dissemination to Secret Service at FBIHQ and also furnish report or LHM to Secret Service locally.

12. Reporting procedures on ADEX subjects
    a. An initial summary report must be submitted at time subject is recommended for inclusion in ADEX.
    b. Additional reports should not be submitted solely for sake of reporting; however, in the event complexity of case or other reasons so dictate, the SAC or FBIHQ may instruct that reports be submitted.
    c. Current significant pertinent information and/or activities of subject should be reported on current basis as it occurs utilizing teletypes, nitels or airtels with letterhead memoranda suitable for dissemination.
    d. In the absence of unusual circumstances (imprisonment, prolonged absence on foreign travel, etc.), ADEX cases should be kept pending and a communication submitted to FBIHQ at least every 90 days reporting on subject's activities. In the event subject has been inactive for 90 days, you should comment as to whether continuation on ADEX is warranted.

[13. [Deleted]

f. Copies
Furnish 5 copies of reports and LHMs except where instructed otherwise in individual cases.

g. Closing of case
If it is determined subject organization is not currently engaged in subversive activities, submit pertinent facts in closing report.

C. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS

1. General policy

a. Purpose
To develop evidence of any violations of the statutes enumerated in A. 1. above and keep the Department and other agencies and officials of Executive Branch advised of information developed which pertains to their areas of responsibility and interest.

b. Individuals to be investigated
Investigations should be conducted to fully identify and determine the activities and affiliations of persons who:
Are reported to be engaged in activities which may result in a violation of statutes enumerated in A. 1. above. This includes individuals who are current active members of subversive organization or movement. Where formal membership in a subversive movement does not exist, it includes individuals who are actively supporting the subversive goals of the movement.
Priority investigative attention should be given to individuals who are known or suspected of being involved in subversive activities which are of a clandestine, underground, or violent nature.

c. Limitations on investigations
All investigations conducted should avoid nebulous or sweeping inquiries which are not relevant to objectives. Under no circumstances should an investigation be conducted of any individual merely on the basis that such individual supports unpopular causes or opposes Government policies.

d. Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval
Obtain FBIHQ approval for investigation of:
(1) U. S. Government employee
(2) Officials or employees of United Nations or other public international organizations of a governmental or quasi-governmental nature.
(3) Officials or employees of foreign diplomatic establishments or governments,[or foreign exchange participants (representatives of foreign countries who are in U. S. as part of official exchange program).]
(4) Faculty members of institutions of learning.
FBIHQ approval is not required for investigation of student or nonacademic employees of institutions of learning in the absence of unusual circumstances. If during a pending investigation it is discovered that the subject fits one of above categories, suspend active investigation and advise FBIHQ with recommendation as to further action.

e. Members of United States armed forces
No investigation should be conducted of active or retired members of United States military forces. If it is determined that a subject fits in this category, terminate investigation and promptly furnish pertinent data to appropriate counterintelligence branch of United States armed forces. Advise FBIHQ in form suitable for dissemination.

2. Investigative procedures
   a. Scope of investigation.
      Data concerning the following items should be developed and reported, if pertinent:
      (1) Background information, including
         (a) True name and aliases.
         (b) Date and place of birth. [Where practicable, verify through appropriate bureau of vital statistics or birth registrar.]
         (c) Residences, past and present.
         (d) Occupations and employments, past and present.
         (e) Citizenship status; where applicable, naturalization data.
         (f) Family background. If available, include identities of immediate family and any information indicating they are employed in sensitive positions or by U. S. Government. If member of immediate family is known to be engaged in subversive activities, include succinct resume.
         (g) Military records, including any service in foreign forces.
         (h) Educational background.
         (i) Arrest record and disposition of charges.
         (j) Physical description. Make reasonable effort to secure photograph.
         (k) Handwriting and/or handprinting specimens should be obtained, if readily available, and kept in case file. Special efforts should be made to secure such specimens with regard to leaders of subversive groups and they should be furnished to FBIHQ by letter for attention of FBI Laboratory to be included in National Security File.
      (2) Subversive activities and affiliations, including
         (a) Information concerning membership in subversive movements, organizations or front groups, date and circumstances of admission, positions held, and participation in activities of organization (e.g., attendance at meetings or other functions, fund-raising or recruitment efforts on behalf of organization, contributions, etc.)
         (b) Statements made or other factors which indicate awareness of the subversive nature of group, including involvement in underground operations, and/or in any other illegal or violent actions promoted by organization or movement.
         (c) Information tending to show subject's importance in subversive movement or organization, e.g., degree of influence and leadership exercised, close association with national or local leaders, participation in policy decisions.
   b. Investigative steps
      The following steps should be considered, but are not all inclusive.
      (1) File reviews. Office indices should be checked. Any pertinent information developed should be included in initial report. Where logical, check files of other field offices and/or FBIHQ.
      (2) Public source material. Make full use of public records and public sources of information, including hearings of congressional or other Government committees both state and Federal, and publications, including those issued by subversive groups.
      (3) Check of files of other government agencies, both Federal and local, which could logically be expected to have pertinent information.

SECT[illegible]87. INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVER[illegible]E ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVI[illegible]ALS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. General Guidelines 3
  1. Investigative jurisdiction 3
    a. Rebellion or insurrection 3
    b. Seditious conspiracy 3
    c. Advocating the overthrow of the Government 3
    d. Internal Security Act of 1950 and Communist Control Act of 1954 4
  2. Prosecutive determination 4
  3. Related statutes 4
  4. Definitions 5
  5. Predication for investigation 5
  6. Accuracy of characterizations 5
  7. Investigations and contacts with individuals connected with institutions of learning 6
  8. Use of officers from other agencies 6
B. Investigation of Organizations 6
  1. Purpose 6
  2. Responsibility to initiate investigations 6
  3. Scope of investigation 6
  4. Infiltration of nonsubversive groups 7
    a. General 7
    b. Caption and preface 7
    c. Limitations on investigation 7
    d. Conversion to full scale investigation 8
  5. Subversive publications 8
  6. Investigative steps 8
  7. Administrative and reporting procedures 8
    a. Reporting requirements and status 8
    b. Informant coverage 8
    c. Topical headings 8
    d. Character 8
    e. Classification 8
    f. Copies 9
    g. Closing of case 9
C. Investigation of Individuals 9
  1. General policy 9
    a. Purpose 9
    b. Individuals to be investigated 9
    c. Limitations on investigations 9
    d. Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval 9
    e. Members of U. S. armed forces 9
  2. Investigative procedures 10
    a. Scope of investigation 10
    b. Investigative steps 10
    c. Interviews of subjects 11
      (1) Policy 11
      (2) Purpose 11
      (3) Approval to interview 11
      (4) Letter requesting FBIHQ approval to interview subject 11
      (5) If interview not conducted within 60 days, submit letter advising FBIHQ 12

SECTION 87. INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

        (6) Conduct of interview 12
        (7) Direction of subject's activities 12
        (8) Reporting results of interview 12
  3. Reporting procedures 13
    a. General 13
    b. Summarizing information 13
    c. Administrative or cover pages 13
    d. Office of origin 13
    e. Title of communications 14
    f. Classification 14
    g. Character 14
    h. Copies of reports or LHMs 14
    i. Status 14
    j. Closing and reopening of cases 14
    k. Subjects traveling abroad 14
    l. Submission of information on members of subversive groups 15
    m. Control files on former members of subversive organizations 15
    n. Channeling information to case files 16
    o. Movement of subjects between offices 16
D. Dissemination of Data Developed 16
  1. General policy 16
  2. Specific requirements 16
    a. Members of armed forces 16
    b. Aliens and naturalized citizens 17
    c. Individuals employed in or having access to Key Facilities or employees of private contractors of the Armed Forces 17
    d. Employees of public utilities 17
    e. Members of military reserve branches or National Guard 17
    f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry 17
    g. Employees of Federal Government 17
    h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under jurisdiction of branch of armed forces 17
    i. Airmen licensed by Federal Aviation Administration 17
    j. Dissemination to Secret Service 17
  3. Restrictions on field dissemination 18
E. Administrative Index (ADEX) 18
  1. Purpose and general policy 18
  2. Criteria 18
  3. Recommendation for preparation of ADEX card 19
  4. Format of ADEX card 20
  5. Arrangement of ADEX 21
    a. At FBIHQ 21
    b. In field office 21
        (1) Alphabetical section 21
        (2) Geographical section 21
        (3) Unavailable section 21
  6. Special interest subjects 21
  7. Changes in residence and employment of ADEX subjects 22
  8. Changes in other background data 22
  9. Movement of ADEX subjects between offices 22
  10. Subject entering U. S. armed forces 22
  11. Removal of cards from ADEX 22
[[12. Reporting Procedures on ADEX subjects 23]
[[13.] Reevaluation of ADEX status 23

A. GENERAL GUIDELINES

1. Investigative jurisdiction
   FBI investigations under this section are based on specific statutory jurisdiction and Departmental instructions.

Investigations conducted under this section are to be directed to the gathering of material pertinent to a determination whether or not the subject has violated, or is engaged in activities which may result in a violation of, one or more of the statutes enumerated below; or in fulfillment of Departmental instructions.

There are three principal statutes which provide a basis for these investigations, as follows:

a. Rebellion or insurrection (T18, USC § 2383).
   "Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States."

b. Seditious conspiracy (T18, USC § 2384).
   "If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."

c. Advocating the overthrow of the Government (T18, USC § 2385).
   "Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government; or

   "Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or

   "Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof--

   "Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by

the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.

"If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section, each shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.

"As used in this section, the terms 'organizes' and 'organize', with respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons, include the recruiting of new members, the forming of new units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes, and other units of such society, group, or assembly of persons."

The courts have interpreted this statute to require advocacy to action, i.e., advocacy to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in something.

In addition to the three principal statutes outlined above, there are two other statutes which might provide a statutory foundation for an investigation under this section. These are:

[d. The Internal Security Act of 1950[(T 50, USC, §§ 781-798)]and the
[Communist Control Act of 1954 (T 50, USC, §§[841-844).]

In summary, these statutes make it unlawful to knowingly contribute to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship within the United States which is controlled by a foreign government, organization, or individual. The statutes also impose various restrictions on the activities of members or organizations cited by the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) as "communist action," "communist front," or "communist infiltrated" groups. The restrictions apply principally to employment by the Federal government or by a defense facility.

The former SACB cited only one organization, the Communist Party, USA, which was named as a "communist action" group.

2. Prosecutive determination
All discussions pertaining to the prosecutive potential of investigations initiated under this section will be conducted by FBIHQ with Departmental officials. These cases should not be discussed with local U. S. Attorney's office without FBIHQ approval.

3. Related statutes
There are a number of other statutes under the FBI's investigative jurisdiction which should be borne in mind in handling these investigations. Information concerning possible violations of such statutes is frequently developed during these investigations. Where this occurs the field should consider the desirability of conducting investigation in line with the policies and procedures governing the statute in question.

A list of other Federal statutes which may arise during these investigations is outlined in an appendix to this manual.

4. Definitions
The term "subversive activities" as used in this section denotes activities which are aimed at overthrowing, destroying or undermining the Government of the United States or any of its political subdivisions by the illegal means prohibited by statutes enumerated in A. 1. above. The term "subversive organization" or "subversive movement" denotes a group or movement which is known to engage in or advocate subversive activities, as defined above.

5. Predication for investigation

[In all cases handled under the provisions of this section, the first communication prepared for outside dissemination (report or LHM) should show specifically the statute upon which the investigation is based together with necessary supporting facts. Where investigation has been specifically requested by Department, this should be indicated. The following examples are illustrative; however, the basis for each individual case must be tailored to the circumstances of such case.

a. "This investigation is based on information that the subject's activities could involve violation of T 18, USC, § 2383 (Rebellion or Insurrection), and § 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy). A source whose reliability has not been determined has informed that the subject is planning, along with others, to travel to Washington, D. C., on April 30, 1971, to participate in planned violent demonstrations during the first week in May, 1971, to 'shut down the Government.' Demonstration plans include the blocking of streets and highways, destruction of personal and Government property, and physical obstruction to prevent Government employees from reporting to work."

b. "This investigation is based on information that the subject's activities could involve a violation of T 18, USC, § 2385 (Advocating the overthrow of the Government). The subject is an admitted member (or has been identified as a member by a confidential source who has provided reliable information in the past) of (name of group). The (name of group) in its public statements and publications advocates the desirability and necessity of overthrowing the U. S. Government by force or violence, and the assassination of U. S. Government officers. The same source has reported that the subject actively supports these positions."

Where possible, the first intra-Bureau communication prepared which indicates that investigation is being initiated (intraoffice memorandum, letter, airtel, teletype, etc.) should specifically indicate the statutory basis for the investigation. However, there may be occasions involving individuals or groups in contact with known subversive elements where the purpose of the contact is not initially known and where a preliminary inquiry must be made to determine whether a statutory basis exists for full investigation. In these instances, a preliminary inquiry may be undertaken, through established sources, for a period not to exceed 90 days, without specifically indicating the specific statutory basis for the inquiry. If after the conclusion of 90 days it has not been possible to establish a statutory basis but further inquiry appears necessary, FBIHQ must be furnished a succinct summary of the facts by letter together with specific recommendations as to further action. In all cases, of course, investigations must be based on indications that subject may be engaged in subversive activity, whether or not a specific statutory basis is cited.

In the event preliminary inquiries fail to establish a sound basis for investigation, the case should be promptly closed and there is no need to advise FBIHQ (unless FBIHQ has been previously advised of the inquiry). Nor is there any need to prepare an LHM or report where no pertinent subversive derogatory information has been developed.

If the statutory basis for an investigation should change or be expanded to include an additional statute or statutes, the first communication prepared subsequent to such change or expansion should specifically show such changes. Similarly, this information should be included in the next report or LHM prepared in the case.]

6. Accuracy of characterizations
   Assure that statements relating to characterizations of an individual or organization, or relating to affiliations with or membership in any organization, are founded on firm bases. Identify sources for such characterizations or statements of affiliation or membership if such characterizations, affiliations or memberships are not commonly and publicly known.
7. Investigations and contacts with individuals connected with institutions of learning
   - a. Prior FBIHQ approval is required to:
     - (1) Institute investigation of a faculty member or an organization connected with an educational institution.
     - (2) Interview any student or faculty member who is not an established source. (Requests to conduct interviews must include individual's name, position, and an assessment of his reliability and discretion.)
   - b. Contacts with established sources in an administrative capacity may be made on campus. Contacts with other established sources, e.g., students and nonacademic employees, should be made off campus.
8. Use of officers from other agencies
   Members of other law enforcement or intelligence agencies are not to accompany Agents handling these investigations without specific approval by the SAC.

B. INVESTIGATION OF ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purpose
   To develop evidence of any violations of statutes enumerated in A. 1. above and to keep the Department and other agencies and officials of the Executive Branch apprised of information developed which pertains to their areas of interest and responsibility.
2. Responsibility to initiate investigations
   When information is received indicating an organization may be engaged in subversive activities or may be a front group for subversive organization, field office should initiate preliminary investigation confined to established sources. Notify FBIHQ that investigation has been undertaken. Within[90]days submit results by letter with recommendation as to whether or not further investigation is warranted.
3. Scope of investigation
   Pertinent data concerning following items should be obtained and reported:
   - a. Origin and scope
     Date and circumstances of founding including any incorporation data. Identities of organizers. Location of headquarters and chapters or affiliates, if any.
   - b. Stated aims and purposes, especially any information showing advocacy of violence or illegal activity.
   - c. Officers
     Principal officers and/or leaders with succinct resume of subversive backgrounds, if any.
   - d. Membership
     Total active membership, including logical breakdowns by organizational structure and geographical area, if applicable. If exact membership figures are not available and estimates are given, be certain they are plainly shown as estimates. In cover pages or cover communications, include evaluation of reliability of membership figures cited, as well as comments concerning any significant factors involving membership, e.g., increases or decreases, notable shift in composition of group by age, sex, nationality, etc. Be certain to secure accurate description of all lists referred to so as to avoid confusion as to exact identity or significance of such lists.
   - e. Publications
     All publications of group with emphasis on any which clearly depict subversive character of organization.

Furnish FBIHQ with copy of publications which portray subversive character of group or which advocate violence. Ascertain sources of funds for publications. When it is operated as distinct entity, a separate investigation should be initiated concerning the publication.

f. Finances

Sources of funds and nature of expenditures, in particular whether any income is received from or contributions made to foreign elements.

g. Connections with other groups

Develop pertinent information concerning ties with other subversive elements including material and/or moral support given or received. Be especially alert to detect connections with foreign subversive elements or indications of foreign allegiance or control. Also determine and report any significant connections or cooperation with nonsubversive groups.

h. Activities

Describe activities of group. Afford special emphasis to any underground operations or activities involving violence or threatened violence. Include any pertinent data showing success or failure of organization in achieving its stated goals.

4. Infiltration of nonsubversive groups

a. General

When information is received indicating that subversive group is seeking to systematically infiltrate and control a nonsubversive organization, available data should be submitted by letter with recommendations as to initiating active investigation. Recommendation to undertake investigation should be supported by available background information concerning target organization (including name and locations, estimated membership, principal officers, and nature of activities) and resume of extent of subversive infiltration efforts (including identities of known subversives who have joined target organization and positions held), provide brief statement as to investigation planned. If approved by FBIHQ conduct discreet investigation limited to determining and reporting activities which are related to or in furtherance of subversive infiltration. These instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates as well as national organization.

b. Caption and preface

Captions of communications should show that subversive infiltration of target organization is objective of investigation, not organization itself, e.g., "Infiltration of (Name of target organization) by (Name of subversive organization)." All communications prepared for dissemination should carry prefatory statement which clearly conveys this point, e.g., "This investigation is directed solely towards establishing the extent of infiltration, domination, or control of the (Name of nonsubversive organization) by the (Name of subversive organization). It is not concerned with the normal activities of the (Name of nonsubversive organization)." In addition, preface should succinctly show the predication for out investigation of the subversive group involved.

c. Limitations on investigation

(1) Other than with established sources, no interviews should be initiated with members, leaders, or officers of infiltrated organization without prior FBIHQ approval (except where they can be handled by suitable pretext). However, this does not preclude accepting information volunteered to FBI.

(2) Informants and sources should not be directed by FBI to join or participate in activities of target organization. However, if subversive group requests informant to do so, latter may comply.

(3) Be certain all persons interviewed, including informants, are aware that FBI is not interested in normal activities of target organization but solely in efforts to influence or control the organization by subversive elements.

d. Conversion to full scale investigation

If target organization becomes completely dominated and controlled by subversive elements, advise FBIHQ on UACB basis that full investigation is being initiated as subversive organization. Drop infiltration designation from title of case.

5. Subversive publications

Each office should review[any independent subversive]publications produced in its territory[(as contrasted with publications issued by subversive groups which are under investigation, see B. 3. e. above)]to determine whether any advocate violations within FBI jurisdiction. If so, submit available information by LHM to FBIHQ with copy of pertinent material and make recommendations as to further action. Insure that FBIHQ is aware of all subversive publications with brief identifying data.

6. Investigative steps

Efforts should be made to develop reliable informants at all levels and in all segments of subversive organization.

Live informant coverage should be supplemented by other logical investigation including review of appropriate public records and publications, interviews with former members of group and, on selective basis, through such techniques as physical and photographic surveillance.

7. Administrative and reporting procedures

a. Reporting requirements and status

When necessary data has been developed concerning organization's activities (See B.[3.]above), submit report. After initial report, reports should be submitted semiannually (unless FBIHQ has instructed otherwise in individual cases). LHM may be used to provide FBIHQ or other interested agencies with significant data of immediate interest on an interim basis between reports.

b. Informant coverage

Cover pages of reports should include a brief summary of informant coverage available with respect to the organization, identifying informants who report on the group's activities by symbol number and showing specifically which informants are members of the group.

c. Topical headings

Both reports and LHMs should be organized under logical headings.

d. Character

All cases should use character "Internal Security," e.g., "Communist Party, USA; Internal Security." In case of subsidiary or front group, character should show name or abbreviation of the parent organization, e.g., "Young Workers Liberation League, Internal Security - CPUSA"; "Young Socialist Alliance, Internal Security - SWP." Caption of subversive infiltration cases should include name of subversive group and target organization, e.g., "Infiltration of (Name of target organization) by Socialist Workers Party, Internal Security - SWP."

e. Classification - 100

f. Copies

Furnish 5 copies of reports and LHMs except where instructed otherwise in individual cases.

g. Closing of case

If it is determined subject organization is not currently engaged in subversive activities, submit pertinent facts in closing report.

C. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS

1. General policy

a. Purpose

To develop evidence of any violations of the statutes enumerated in A. 1. above and keep the Department and other agencies and officials of Executive Branch advised of information developed which pertains to their areas of responsibility and interest.

b. Individuals to be investigated

Investigations should be conducted to fully identify and determine the activities and affiliations of persons who:

Are reported to be engaged in activities which may result in a violation of statutes enumerated in A. 1. above. This includes individuals who are current active members of subversive organization or movement. Where formal membership in a subversive movement does not exist, it includes individuals who are actively supporting the subversive goals of the movement.

Priority investigative attention should be given to individuals who are known or suspected of being involved in subversive activities which are of a clandestine, underground, or violent nature.

c. Limitations on investigations

All investigations conducted should avoid nebulous or sweeping inquiries which are not relevant to objectives. Under no circumstances should an investigation be conducted of any individual merely on the basis that such individual supports unpopular causes or opposes Government policies.

d. Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval

Obtain FBIHQ approval for investigation of:

(1) U. S. Government employee

(2) Officials or employees of United Nations or other public international organizations of a governmental or quasi-governmental nature.

(3) Officials or employees of foreign diplomatic establishments or governments.

(4) Faculty members of institutions of learning.

FBIHQ approval is not required for investigation of student or nonacademic employees of institutions of learning in the absence of unusual circumstances. If during a pending investigation it is discovered that the subject fits one of above categories, suspend active investigation and advise FBIHQ with recommendation as to further action.

e. Members of United States armed forces

No investigation should be conducted of active or retired members of United States military forces. If it is determined that a subject fits in this category, terminate investigation and promptly furnish pertinent data to appropriate counterintelligence branch of United States armed forces. Advise FBIHQ in form suitable for dissemination.

2. Investigative procedures
   a. Scope of investigation.
      Data concerning the following items should be developed and reported, if pertinent:
      (1) Background information, including
         (a) True name and aliases.
         (b) Date and place of birth. [Where practicable, verify through appropriate bureau of vital statistics or birth registrar.]
         (c) Residences, past and present.
         (d) Occupations and employments, past and present.
         (e) Citizenship status; where applicable, naturalization data.
         (f) Family background. If available, include identities of immediate family and any information indicating they are employed in sensitive positions or by U. S. Government. If member of immediate family is known to be engaged in subversive activities, include succinct resume.
         (g) Military records, including any service in foreign forces.
         (h) Educational background.
         (i) Arrest record and disposition of charges.
         (j) Physical description. Make reasonable effort to secure photograph.
         (k) Handwriting and/or handprinting specimens should be obtained, if readily available, and kept in case file. Special efforts should be made to secure such specimens with regard to leaders of subversive groups and they should be furnished to FBIHQ by letter for attention of FBI Laboratory to be included in National Security File.
      (2) Subversive activities and affiliations, including
         (a) Information concerning membership in subversive movements, organizations or front groups, date and circumstances of admission, positions held, and participation in activities of organization (e.g., attendance at meetings or other functions, fund-raising or recruitment efforts on behalf of organization, contributions, etc.)
         (b) Statements made or other factors which indicate awareness of the subversive nature of group, including involvement in underground operations, and/or in any other illegal or violent actions promoted by organization or movement.
         (c) Information tending to show subject's importance in subversive movement or organization, e.g., degree of influence and leadership exercised, close association with national or local leaders, participation in policy decisions.
   b. Investigative steps
      The following steps should be considered, but are not all inclusive.
      (1) File reviews. Office indices should be checked. Any pertinent information developed should be included in initial report. Where logical, check files of other field offices and/or FBIHQ.
      (2) Public source material. Make full use of public records and public sources of information, including hearings of congressional or other Government committees both state and Federal, and publications, including those issued by subversive groups.
      (3) Check of files of other government agencies, both Federal and local, which could logically be expected to have pertinent information.

(4) Records of private firms. Obtain pertinent available information from records of private firms such as past or present employers. Checks of credit agencies should be limited to securing identifying information only.

(5) Contacts with neighbors and fellow employees. Such inquiries should be made only where there is expectation they will develop pertinent information not otherwise available.

(6) Canvass of established sources and informants. Contact informants and sources in position to be knowledgeable concerning subversive groups with which subject is affiliated.

(7) Physical and photographic surveillances. These should be considered on selective basis when circumstances indicate they may be productive.

c. Interviews of subjects

(1) Policy
Subjects of investigation should be interviewed[unless there is a sound basis for not doing so.] Generally, interviews should be considered after background inquiries have been completed and a good picture of subject's activities developed.
If a decision not to interview a subject is made, this should be fully explained in case file and FBIHQ advised whenever FBIHQ is cognizant of investigation.

(2) Purpose
To develop information regarding subversive activities in which the subject is engaged.

(3) Approval to interview
All interviews of subjects may be approved by SAC except following instances which require FBIHQ approval:

- (a) [Deleted]
- (b) When subject is nationally prominent or where circumstances otherwise indicate the interview could be widely publicized, such as labor leaders, educators, religious leaders or journalists.
- (c) When interview is to be conducted in presence of subject's attorney and/or aide.
- (d) When subject is connected with institution of learning.

(4) Letter requesting FBIHQ approval to interview subject

- (a) Letter should concisely set out available data concerning following items:
  - I. Residence address, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship and any health factors which could affect conduct of interview.
  - II. Marital status, employment and citizenship of spouse.
  - III. Succinct summary of subject's subversive activities, membership of affiliation with subversive groups, and positions held.
  - IV. Similar summary regarding spouse's affiliation with subversive activities.
  - V. Similar summary concerning subversive activities on part of close relatives.
  - VI. Resume of subject's current sympathies and status in subversive movement or organization and any indication of disaffection.

VII. Subject's arrest record and disposition of charges; any information indicating a propensity for violence.
VIII. What is expected to be gained by interview?

List above items by number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available concerning a particular item, so indicate.

(b) Submit one copy of letter and additional copy of first page only which can be returned by FBIHQ stamped "Approved."

(5) If interview not conducted within 60 days, submit letter advising FBIHQ:
(a) Reason interview not conducted.
(b) Any new information pertinent to desirability of interview.
(c) Whether efforts to interview subject will be pursued. Thereafter, keep FBIHQ advised at least each 60 days as to progress of matter.

(6) Conduct of interview.
(a) Interviews of subjects entitled to the warning and waiver shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements set forth in Volume I, Manual of Instructions, Section 2B, page 15. If the interview is being conducted for intelligence information rather than an admission or confession of guilt, no warning is required. Moreover, if the investigation has failed to develop information indicating a possible violation of Federal law by the subject, it would be permissible to interview the subject without a warning as he does not fit the criteria of those entitled to a warning of rights. Carefully plan interview so there will be no compromise of sources, sensitive techniques or interviewing personnel. An overriding consideration to always bear in mind is that interview should elicit from, not provide information to the subject.
(b) Interview at subject's place of employment should be avoided if possible. If attorney or aide is present during interview, interview must be conducted by two Agents.
(c) If, during conduct of interview subject desires that his attorney or aide be present, the interview should be tactfully terminated, and FBIHQ should be informed with recommendation whether or not to resume interview.
(d) In all other instances, SAC has responsibility and option of deciding when two Agents should handle interview. Safety of Agents is first priority to consider.

(7) Direction of subject's activities.
Prior FBIHQ approval is required before taking any steps to direct the subject's activities even though he may appear to be cooperative during the interview.

(8) Reporting results of interview.
(a) Record results of interview on FD-302.
(b) Pertinent results of interview should be included in next report or LHM unless circumstances indicate need for more expeditious reporting. In cover letter or administrative pages, include observations of interviewing Agents as to subject's cooperativeness, any relevant information concerning subject's appearance or characteristics, and assessment of information developed by interview in light of other data known to your office.

3. Reporting Procedures

a. General

(1) Pertinent information developed during investigation may be reported either by report or LHM.
Reports should be submitted:
- (a) When setting out results of extended inquiries such as summary of subject's activities.
- (b) When subject is being recommended for inclusion in ADEX.

LHM should be used to report timely or significant information regarding subject's current activities.

(2) All communications should be limited to:
- (a) Information regarding subject's subversive activities, sympathies, and affiliations.
- (b) Pertinent background data concerning subversive individuals or groups with which subject is connected.
- (c) Essential background data regarding subject.

They should not include information regarding subject's social or personal affairs or other background data not relevant to subject's subversive activities or affiliations.

(3) Information in both reports and LHMs should be organized under topical headings. Main headings and subheadings should be employed to make the communication as readable as possible.

b. Summarizing information.
When reporting information of repetitious or cumulative nature, such as attendance at regular meetings of subversive group, use summary narrative statement. Exact dates are not needed, but time period involved should be indicated. Summary statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions. Information from different sources should be reported separately and any significant items must be set forth in detail.

c. Administrative or Cover Pages

(1) Material to be included
Pertinent information concerning following should be included in administrative pages of report or cover communication of LHM: References to other reports or correspondence, ADEX status, reference to security flash notice (FD-165) or transfer of origin (FD-128), reason for classification, if any, documentation of data contained in report or LHM, identities of confidential sources, leads, and other administrative or noninvestigative material. Use form (FD-305) for ADEX cases. If used, nonsymbol source page should be last page.

(2) Documentation
- (a) In documenting information originating with another field office, file number of original document need not be shown provided source, date information received, and receiving Agent are identified.
- (b) Do not conduct extensive inquiries to document background information.
- (c) In characterizing persons who associate with subject, identify source but further documentation not required.

d. Office of Origin
Office covering place where subject's principal subversive activities occur or originate should be origin. In unusual circumstances where

there is doubt as to which office should be origin, request FBIHQ to designate office of origin.

e. Title of communications
Normally, only one subject should be carried in title of each report or LHM and separate reports should be submitted for each subject regardless of relationship. However, when reporting virtually identical information concerning two related individuals (e.g., travel data concerning a husband and wife) an exception can be made and single LHM or report submitted. In such cases dual captions should be used and an extra copy of communication provided.

f. Classification - 100

g. Character
(1) Designation "Subversive Matter" (or abbreviation SM) should be used in all cases. Add organizational affiliation when chief group with which subject is connected is under current investigation or has approved thumbnail sketch.
Example: Subversive Matter - CPUSA
Subversive Matter - SWP
(2) Where meaningful organization affiliation cannot be shown, use caption "Subversive Matter."

h. Copies of reports or LHMs
In all instances furnish four copies to FBIHQ to cover dissemination to Department (2) and Secret Service (1). Where it appears dissemination will be made to other agencies at FBIHQ level, furnish one additional copy for each such agency involved.

i. Status
Carry cases as pending until logical inquiries aimed at resolving purpose of investigation have been completed. As minimum, case should be kept pending until essential background data regarding subject has been secured and sufficient information developed to present good picture of nature and extent of subversive activities engaged in by subject.

j. Closing and reopening of cases
If it is determined that subject's current activities do not involve an actual or potential violation of one or more of the statutes enumerated in A. 1. above, case should be closed.

Case may be reopened at a later date if additional information is received which indicates subject's subsequent activities involve or may result in a violation of the statutes cited in A. 1.

k. Subject traveling abroad (Also see section 105G volume IV, of this manual).
Take following action when information is received that subject of current investigation intends to travel abroad or has departed on foreign travel (except where travel is of brief duration and is known to be for innocuous purpose, such as vacation):
(1) Immediately notify FBIHQ of available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination, itinerary, purpose of trip, and pertinent passport data. Include full description of subject, including aliases. Set out concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising FBIHQ while developing details if time is of essence.

(2) If necessary, set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State.

(3) Pertinent information is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and interested Legal Attaches. Furnish FBIHQ with six copies of LHM (2-Department, 1-Secret Service, 1-State, 1-CIA) plus an additional four copies for each Legal Attache Office which covers area in subject's itinerary (1-Legat, 3-Legat's sources). Also, furnish one copy of subject's photograph, if available, for each Legat Office involved. If stop should be placed with security services abroad, so indicate in cover letter. Set out requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page captioned "Leads" at end of LHM. Request should not refer to Legal Attache or request investigation by any particular service.

(4) Advise FBIHQ promptly by LHM of subject's return. [Reference any prior memoranda dealing with the subject's travel.] If subject has traveled to a communist country, furnish recommendation as to interview and advise whether additional investigation being conducted.

(5) Take following action when information is received that organization or individual engaged in subversive activities is forming tour group for foreign travel:

(a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, as to identities of individuals participating in tour and furnish LHM to FBIHQ for dissemination to State Department, CIA, and interested Legal Attaches. Include readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, dates, names, and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.

(b) Other offices should immediately identify participants residing within their respective territories and submit LHMs on those of security interest. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. In cover letter, list participants on whom there is no subversive information.

l. Submission of information on members of subversive groups.

(1) Offices covering national headquarters or local units of subversive groups should promptly furnish FBIHQ names and identifying data regarding persons affiliated with such groups. Furnish information by letter, and indicate list is being furnished for indexing purposes.

(2) Information regarding subversive affiliation of individuals residing in territory of other offices should be furnished to latter.

(3) Subscription lists of publications of subversive organizations should be indexed in field office covering address shown for subscriber but should not be forwarded to FBIHQ.

m. Control files on former members of subversive organizations.

(1) Offices having sufficient volume[may, at the option of the appropriate supervisor,]maintain control files on former members of subversive organizations. Such files will preclude necessity for extensive file reviews to identify persons who are in position to furnish information of value in particular cases.

(2) Where appropriate, make copies of communications for these files. Insofar as practical these files should contain following information

regarding ex-members of subversive groups: background, type of information possessed, time period covered, availability for interview and for testimony.

n. Channeling information to case files

(1) Memoranda regarding membership or activity in subversive organizations, including summaries of informant reports, should be channeled to case files of individuals involved. When information from informants or surveillances is channeled to individual case files, it should be documented.

(2) When preparing lengthy channeling memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit number of copies prepared to two for each other office. Clearly indicate next to names of other offices the page number containing information of interest and note on cover page that distribution of material to individual case files should be handled by recipient offices.

o. Movement of subjects between offices

If office of origin receives information that subject of current or past investigation changes residence to territory of another division, office of origin request verification within 30 days. If new residence confirmed, office of origin submit FD-128 to transfer origin. [Office of origin should furnish new office with any pertinent subversive data which has not previously been reported in a form suitable for dissemination, or suitable for incorporation in an LHM or report.

p. Destruction of Channeling Memoranda

At the option of appropriate field supervisors, in order to avoid the accumulation of channeling memoranda in a case file as well as to facilitate the subsequent preparation of LHMs or reports, the following procedure may be used: Files may be reopened for preparation of an "investigative insert" for later inclusion in a LHM or report, using T symbols identifying informants who have furnished prior information. Agent preparing this insert should also prepare a cover memorandum showing what serials in the file have been covered by his review and also identifying all symbol number informants involved and indicating the location of the original data (similar to documentation in the cover pages of a report). The channeling memoranda covered in the review can then be destroyed and the "investigative insert" along with its cover memorandum can, if necessary, be forwarded to another field division in the event the subject moves.]

D. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED

1. General Policy

Information developed during these investigations should be furnished to other agencies in Executive Branch which have a legitimate interest. See MRR, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities and policies in dissemination.

Do not disseminate earlier reports without reviewing them to insure they meet current reporting standards. If they are unsuitable for dissemination, prepare LHM containing pertinent information.

2. Specific requirements

Following instructions cover representative situations which occur frequently.

a. Members of armed forces

Deliminations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires free exchange of all information of mutual interest between subscribing agencies. Immediately refer any derogatory or possibly significant information developed concerning members of military services, including contacts with individuals or groups of security interest, to military service having primary responsibility.

If it is determined subject of FBI investigation is member of armed services, discontinue immediately, advise FBIHQ, and disseminate pertinent information locally to appropriate intelligence agency. If it is determined subject has close relatives in armed forces, promptly advise appropriate military intelligence service, and furnish pertinent information, including reports, on subject involved. Evaluation of such association lies entirely within province of military intelligence service.

In all instances, advise FBIHQ concerning any possible subversive contacts or derogatory information developed concerning military personnel, including local dissemination made. Enclose four copies of LHM or report setting out pertinent data.

b. Aliens and naturalized citizens
Furnish any information which might have bearing on their deportation or denaturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) locally.

c. Individuals employed in or having access to Key Facilities, or employees of private contractors of the Armed Forces
Under Delimitations Agreements, FBI is responsible to disseminate pertinent data to the counterintelligence agencies of the Armed Forces. [Also disseminate pertinent information concerning such individuals to the Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio 43215, Attention Chief, Adjudication Division and advise interested military intelligence agency of such dissemination to DISCO. However, with regard to facilities having classified contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), dissemination to AEC is made only at FBIHQ.] See section 102, volume IV, of this manual for details.

d. Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities)
Disseminate pertinent data locally to Army and any other Federal agency whose interest is apparent.

e. Members of military reserve branches or National Guard
Disseminate pertinent security data locally to appropriate military intelligence service.

f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including longshoremen and waterfront employees
Disseminate pertinent security data locally to Coast Guard and when circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies, including NISO.

g. Employees of Federal Government
Any subversive information received concerning an employee of an agency of the Executive Branch should be promptly forwarded to FBIHQ for dissemination to interested agencies. No dissemination of reports in Security of Government Employee cases should be made in field. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under EO 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.

h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under jurisdiction of branch of armed services
Disseminate pertinent data locally to appropriate military intelligence service.

i. Airmen licensed by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen (pilot, mechanic, or member of crew); to individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft; and to aircraft dispatchers or air-traffic control tower operation.

Furnish pertinent data concerning such persons to FBIHQ by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend dissemination to FAA.

j. Dissemination to Secret Service
Under agreement between FBI and Secret Service concerning protective responsibilities (set out in section 102, volume IV, of this manual), reports and LHMs are disseminated to Secret Service both locally and at FBIHQ in all cases which meet standards set forth. This includes virtually all cases on individuals where any substantial information exists as to subversive activities or sympathies of subject. When photographs are available send copies to Secret Service locally and to FBIHQ for dissemination at headquarters level.

(1) Secret Service should be advised of reason for referral; i.e., statement of class or classes of agreement which apply to subject. FD-376 serves as letter of transmittal for both local and FBIHQ dissemination. Forward original and one copy to FBIHQ and maintain copy in case file.

(2) After initial dissemination, as changes occur in residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally by FD-366 and furnish two copies to FBIHQ. FD-366 must be submitted even though changes in residence and/or employment are noted in report or LHM being submitted.

(3) For instructions governing dissemination to Secret Service in matters involving threats against President, refer to section 134B, volume IV, of this manual.

(4) Upon transfer of office of origin, old office of origin should furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address by LHM or FD-366. Provide copies to FBIHQ and new office of origin for dissemination to Secret Service headquarters and branch office covering new residence, respectively.

(5) As an administrative aid to insure proper dissemination, the file covers of cases in which dissemination is being made to Secret Service may be stamped "SS."

3. Restrictions on field dissemination
If security measures are known to be inadequate at local office of another Government agency, do not disseminate locally, but bring matter to attention of FBIHQ for headquarters dissemination.

E. ADMINISTRATIVE INDEX (ADEX)

1. Purpose and general policy

a. To have a readily available and up-to-date listing of individuals deemed currently dangerous to the national security. Objective is to identify individuals who should be afforded priority investigative coverage in the event of a national emergency.

b. Under no circumstance should individuals be included in ADEX merely because of their opposition to Government policies or because of the exercise of their constitutional rights of protest and dissent.

c. ADEX is strictly an administrative device. It should not be treated as a factor in determining basic investigative decisions, i.e., whether an investigation should be opened or closed, the extent of investigation to be conducted in a particular case, etc.

2. Criteria

a. ADEX should include individuals whose actions or statements have established that they represent a current threat to the national security, i.e.,:
Individuals (whether affiliated with organized groups or not) who have shown a willingness and capability of engaging in treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, sabotage, espionage, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, assassination of government officials, or other such acts which would result in interference with or a threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state or local government.

In all of the above cases recommend removal from ADEX by FD-122 with attached succinct summary of facts. In all instances except c., submit current LHM or report for dissemination to Secret Service at FBIHQ and also furnish report or LHM to Secret Service locally.

[12. Reporting procedures on ADEX subjects

a. An initial summary report must be submitted at time subject is recommended for inclusion in ADEX.

b. Additional reports should not be submitted solely for sake of reporting; however, in the event complexity of case or other reasons so dictate, the SAC or FBIHQ may instruct that reports be submitted.

c. Current significant pertinent information and/or activities of subject should be reported on current basis as it occurs utilizing teletypes, nitels or airtels with letterhead memoranda suitable for dissemination.

d. In the absence of unusual circumstances (imprisonment, prolonged absence on foreign travel, etc.), ADEX cases should be kept pending and a communication submitted to FBIHQ at least every 90 days reporting on subject's activities. In the event subject has been inactive for 90 days, you should comment as to whether continuation on ADEX is warranted.]

[13.] Reevaluation of ADEX status

Prepare administrative tickler concerning each ADEX subject to come up at two-year intervals. This tickler, which is independent of any assignment card, should prompt careful assessment of case to insure subject still falls within ADEX criteria.

SECT N 87. INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVE VE ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIV ALS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. General Guidelines 3
  1. Investigative jurisdiction 3
    a. Rebellion or insurrection 3
    b. Seditious conspiracy 3
    c. Advocating the overthrow of the Government 3
    d. Internal Security Act of 1950 and Communist Control Act of 1954 4
  2. Prosecutive determination 4
  3. Related statutes 4
  4. Definitions 5
  5. Predication for investigation 5
  6. Accuracy of characterizations 5
  7. Investigations and contacts with individuals connected with institutions of learning 6
  8. Use of officers from other agencies 6
B. Investigation of Organizations 6
  1. Purpose 6
  2. Responsibility to initiate investigations 6
  3. Scope of investigation 6
  4. Infiltration of nonsubversive groups 7
    a. General 7
    b. Caption and preface 7
    c. Limitations on investigation 7
    d. Conversion to full scale investigation 8
  5. Subversive publications 8
  6. Investigative steps 8
  7. Administrative and reporting procedures 8
    a. Reporting requirements and status 8
    b. Informant coverage 8
    c. Topical headings 8
    d. Character 8
    e. Classification 8
    f. Copies 9
    g. Closing of case 9
C. Investigation of Individuals 9
  1. General policy 9
    a. Purpose 9
    b. Individuals to be investigated 9
    c. Limitations on investigations 9
    d. Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval 9
    e. Members of U. S. armed forces 9
  2. Investigative procedures 10
    a. Scope of investigation 10
    b. Investigative steps 10
    c. Interviews of subjects 11
      (1) Policy 11
      (2) Purpose 11
      (3) Approval to interview 11
      (4) Letter requesting FBIHQ approval to interview subject 11
      (5) If interview not conducted within 60 days, submit letter advising FBIHQ 12

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

        (6) Conduct of interview.......... 12
        (7) Direction of subject's activities.......... 12
        (8) Reporting results of interview.......... 12
    3. Reporting procedures.......... 13
        a. General.......... 13
        b. Summarizing information.......... 13
        c. Administrative or cover pages.......... 13
        d. Office of origin.......... 13
        e. Title of communications.......... 14
        f. Classification.......... 14
        g. Character.......... 14
        h. Copies of reports or LHMs.......... 14
        i. Status.......... 14
        j. Closing and reopening of cases.......... 14
        k. Subjects traveling abroad.......... 14
        l. Submission of information on members of subversive groups.......... 15
        m. Control files on former members of subversive organizations.......... 15
        n. Channeling information to case files.......... 16
        o. Movement of subjects between offices.......... 16
D. Dissemination of Data Developed.......... 16
    1. General policy.......... 16
    2. Specific requirements.......... 16
        a. Members of armed forces.......... 16
        b. Aliens and naturalized citizens.......... 17
        c. Individuals employed in or having access to Key Facilities or employees of private contractors of the Armed Forces.......... 17
        d. Employees of public utilities.......... 17
        e. Members of military reserve branches or National Guard... 17
        f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry.......... 17
        g. Employees of Federal Government.......... 17
        h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under jurisdiction of branch of armed forces.......... 17
        i. Airmen licensed by Federal Aviation Administration.......... 17
        j. Dissemination to Secret Service.......... 17
    3. Restrictions on field dissemination.......... 18
E. Administrative Index (ADEX).......... 18
    1. Purpose and general policy.......... 18
    2. Criteria.......... 18
    3. Recommendation for preparation of ADEX card.......... 19
    4. Format of ADEX card.......... 20
    5. Arrangement of ADEX.......... 21
        a. At FBIHQ.......... 21
        b. In field office.......... 21
            (1) Alphabetical section.......... 21
            (2) Geographical section.......... 21
            (3) Unavailable section.......... 21
    6. Special interest subjects.......... 21
    7. Changes in residence and employment of ADEX subjects.......... 22
    8. Changes in other background data.......... 22
    9. Movement of ADEX subjects between offices.......... 22
    10. Subject entering U. S. armed forces.......... 22
    11. Removal of cards from ADEX.......... 22
    12. Reevaluation of ADEX status.......... 23

A. GENERAL GUIDELINES

1. Investigative jurisdiction

FBI investigations under this section are based on specific statutory jurisdiction and Departmental instructions.

Investigations conducted under this section are to be directed to the gathering of material pertinent to a determination whether or not the subject has violated, or is engaged in activities which may result in a violation of, one or more of the statutes enumerated below; or in fulfillment of Departmental instructions.

There are three principal statutes which provide a basis for these investigations, as follows:

a. Rebellion or insurrection (T18, USC § 2383).
"Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States."

b. Seditious conspiracy (T18, USC § 2384).
"If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."

c. Advocating the overthrow of the Government (T18, USC § 2385).
"Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government; or

"Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or

"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof--

"Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by

the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.

"If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section, each shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.

"As used in this section, the terms 'organizes' and 'organize', with respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons, include the recruiting of new members, the forming of new units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes, and other units of such society, group, or assembly of persons."

The courts have interpreted this statute to require advocacy to action, i.e., advocacy to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in something.

In addition to the three principal statutes outlined above, there are two other statutes which might provide a statutory foundation for an investigation under this section. These are:

d. The Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Communist Control Act of 1954 (T50, USC §§ 781-810).

In summary, these statutes make it unlawful to knowingly contribute to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship within the United States which is controlled by a foreign government, organization, or individual. The statutes also impose various restrictions on the activities of members or organizations cited by the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) as "communist action," "communist front," or "communist infiltrated" groups. The restrictions apply principally to employment by the Federal government or by a defense facility.

The former SACB cited only one organization, the Communist Party, USA, which was named as a "communist action" group.

2. Prosecutive determination
All discussions pertaining to the prosecutive potential of investigations initiated under this section will be conducted by FBIHQ with Departmental officials. These cases should not be discussed with local U. S. Attorney's office without FBIHQ approval.

3. Related statutes
There are a number of other statutes under the FBI's investigative jurisdiction which should be borne in mind in handling these investigations. Information concerning possible violations of such statutes is frequently developed during these investigations. Where this occurs the field should consider the desirability of conducting investigation in line with the policies and procedures governing the statute in question.

A list of other Federal statutes which may arise during these investigations is outlined in an appendix to this manual.

4. Definitions
The term "subversive activities" as used in this section denotes activities which are aimed at overthrowing, destroying or undermining the Government of the United States or any of its political subdivisions by the illegal means prohibited by statutes enumerated in A. 1. above. The term "subversive organization" or "subversive movement" denotes a group or movement which is known to engage in or advocate subversive activities, as defined above.

5. Predication for investigation
In all cases handled under the provisions of this section, the first communication prepared which indicates an investigation is being initiated (intraoffice memorandum, letter, airtel, teletype or report) should show specifically the statute upon which the investigation is based together with all the supporting facts. Such a predication must be included in the first communication to FBIHQ and the first report or LHM prepared in each case. Where investigation has been specifically requested by Department, this should be indicated in predication. The following examples are illustrative; however, the predication for each individual case must be tailored to the circumstances of such case.

a. "This investigation is based on information that the subject's activities may be in violation of T18, USC § 2383 (Rebellion or insurrection), and § 2384 (Seditious conspiracy). A source whose reliability has not been determined has informed that the subject is planning, along with others, to travel to Washington, D. C., on April 30, 1971, to participate in planned violent demonstrations during the first week in May, 1971, to 'shut down the Government.' Demonstration plans include the blocking of streets and highways, destruction of personal and Government property, and physical obstruction to prevent Government employees from reporting to work."

b. "This investigation is based on information that the subject's activities may be in violation of T18, USC § 2385 (Advocating the overthrow of the Government). The subject is an admitted member (or has been identified as a member by a confidential source who has provided reliable information in the past) of (name of group). The (name of group) in its public statements and publications advocates the desirability and necessity of overthrowing the U. S. Government by force or violence, and the assassination of U. S. Government officers. The same source has reported that the subject actively supports these positions."

If the statutory basis for an investigation should change or be expanded to include an additional statute or statutes, the first communication prepared subsequent to such change or expansion should specifically show such changes. Similarly, this information should be included in the next report or LHM prepared in the case.

6. Accuracy of characterizations
Assure that statements relating to characterizations of an individual or organization, or relating to affiliations with or membership in any organization, are founded on a firm bases. Identify sources for such characterizations or statements of affiliation or membership if such characterizations, affiliations or memberships are not commonly and publicly known.

7. Investigations and contacts with individuals connected with institutions of learning
   a. Prior FBIHQ approval is required to:
      (1) Institute investigation of a faculty member or an organization connected with an educational institution.
      (2) Interview any student or faculty member who is not an established source. (Requests to conduct interviews must include individual's name, position, and an assessment of his reliability and discretion.)
   b. Contacts with established sources in an administrative capacity may be made on campus. Contacts with other established sources, e.g., students and nonacademic employees, should be made off campus.

8. Use of officers from other agencies
Members of other law enforcement or intelligence agencies are not to accompany Agents handling these investigations without specific approval by the SAC.

B. INVESTIGATION OF ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purpose
To develop evidence of any violations of statutes enumerated in A. 1. above and to keep the Department and other agencies and officials of the Executive Branch apprised of information developed which pertains to their areas of interest and responsibility.

2. Responsibility to initiate investigations
When information is received indicating an organization may be engaged in subversive activities or may be a front group for subversive organization, field office should initiate preliminary investigation confined to established sources. Notify FBIHQ that investigation has been undertaken. Within 45 days submit results by letter with recommendation as to whether or not further investigation is warranted.

3. Scope of investigation
Pertinent data concerning following items should be obtained and reported:
   a. Origin and scope
   Date and circumstances of founding including any incorporation data. Identities of organizers. Location of headquarters and chapters or affiliates, if any.
   b. Stated aims and purposes, especially any information showing advocacy of violence or illegal activity.
   c. Officers
   Principal officers and/or leaders with succinct resume of subversive backgrounds, if any.
   d. Membership
   Total active membership, including logical breakdowns by organizational structure and geographical area, if applicable. If exact membership figures are not available and estimates are given, be certain they are plainly shown as estimates. In cover pages or cover communications, include evaluation of reliability of membership figures cited, as well as comments concerning any significant factors involving membership, e.g., increases or decreases, notable shift in composition of group by age, sex, nationality, etc. Be certain to secure accurate description of all lists referred to so as to avoid confusion as to exact identity or significance of such lists.
   e. Publications
   All publications of group with emphasis on any which clearly depict subversive character of organization.

Furnish FBIHQ with copy of publications which portray subversive character of group or which advocate violence. Ascertain sources of funds for publications. When it is operated as distinct entity, a separate investigation should be initiated concerning the publication.

f. Finances

Sources of funds and nature of expenditures, in particular whether any income is received from or contributions made to foreign elements.

g. Connections with other groups

Develop pertinent information concerning ties with other subversive elements including material and/or moral support given or received. Be especially alert to detect connections with foreign subversive elements or indications of foreign allegiance or control. Also determine and report any significant connections or cooperation with nonsubversive groups.

h. Activities

Describe activities of group. Afford special emphasis to any underground operations or activities involving violence or threatened violence. Include any pertinent data showing success or failure of organization in achieving its stated goals.

4. Infiltration of nonsubversive groups

a. General

When information is received indicating that subversive group is seeking to systematically infiltrate and control a nonsubversive organization, available data should be submitted by letter with recommendations as to initiating active investigation. Recommendation to undertake investigation should be supported by available background information concerning target organization (including name and locations, estimated membership, principal officers, and nature of activities) and resume of extent of subversive infiltration efforts (including identities of known subversives who have joined target organization and positions held), provide brief statement as to investigation planned. If approved by FBIHQ conduct discreet investigation limited to determining and reporting activities which are related to or in furtherance of subversive infiltration. These instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates as well as national organization.

b. Caption and preface

Captions of communications should show that subversive infiltration of target organization is objective of investigation, not organization itself, e.g., "Infiltration of (Name of target organization) by (Name of subversive organization)." All communications prepared for dissemination should carry prefatory statement which clearly conveys this point, e.g., "This investigation is directed solely towards establishing the extent of infiltration, domination, or control of the (Name of nonsubversive organization) by the (Name of subversive organization). It is not concerned with the normal activities of the (Name of nonsubversive organization)." In addition, preface should succinctly show the predication for out investigation of the subversive group involved.

c. Limitations on investigation

(1) Other than with established sources, no interviews should be initiated with members, leaders, or officers of infiltrated organization without prior FBIHQ approval (except where they can be handled by suitable pretext). However, this does not preclude accepting information volunteered to FBI.

(2) Informants and sources should not be directed by FBI to join or participate in activities of target organization. However, if subversive group requests informant to do so, latter may comply.

(3) Be certain all persons interviewed, including informants, are aware that FBI is not interested in normal activities of target organization but solely in efforts to influence or control the organization by subversive elements.

d. Conversion to full scale investigation
If target organization becomes completely dominated and controlled by subversive elements, advise FBIHQ on UACB basis that full investigation is being initiated as subversive organization. Drop infiltration designation from title of case.

5. Subversive publications
Each office should review such publications produced in its territory to determine whether any advocate subversion, violence, or violations within FBI jurisdiction. If so, submit available information by LHM to FBIHQ with copy of pertinent material and make recommendations as to further action. Insure that FBIHQ is aware of all subversive publications with brief identifying data.

6. Investigative steps
Efforts should be made to develop reliable informants at all levels and in all segments of subversive organization.

Live informant coverage should be supplemented by other logical investigation including review of appropriate public records and publications, interviews with former members of group and, on selective basis, through such techniques as physical and photographic surveillance.

7. Administrative and reporting procedures

a. Reporting requirements and status
When necessary data has been developed concerning organization's activities (See B. 2. above), submit report. After initial report, reports should be submitted semiannually (unless FBIHQ has instructed otherwise in individual cases). LHM may be used to provide FBIHQ or other interested agencies with significant data of immediate interest on an interim basis between reports.

b. Informant coverage
Cover pages of reports should include a brief summary of informant coverage available with respect to the organization, identifying informants who report on the group's activities by symbol number and showing specifically which informants are members of the group.

c. Topical headings
Both reports and LHMs should be organized under logical headings.

d. Character
All cases should use character "Internal Security," e.g., "Communist Party, USA; Internal Security." In case of subsidiary or front group, character should show name or abbreviation of the parent organization, e.g., "Young Workers Liberation League, Internal Security - CPUSA"; "Young Socialist Alliance, Internal Security - SWP." Caption of subversive infiltration cases should include name of subversive group and target organization, e.g., "Infiltration of (Name of target organization) by Socialist Workers Party, Internal Security - SWP."

e. Classification - 100

f. Copies
Furnish 5 copies of reports and LHMs except where instructed otherwise in individual cases.

g. Closing of case
In it is determined subject organization is not currently engaged in subversive activities, submit pertinent facts in closing report.

C. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS

1. General policy

a. Purpose
To develop evidence of any violations of the statutes enumerated in A. 1. above and keep the Department and other agencies and officials of Executive Branch advised of information developed which pertains to their areas of responsibility and interest.

b. Individuals to be investigated
Investigations should be conducted to fully identify and determine the activities and affiliations of persons who:
Are reported to be engaged in activities which may result in a violation of statutes enumerated in A. 1. above. This includes individuals who are current active members of subversive organization or movement. Where formal membership in a subversive movement does not exist, it includes individuals who are actively supporting the subversive goals of the movement.
Priority investigative attention should be given to individuals who are known or suspected of being involved in subversive activities which are of a clandestine, underground, or violent nature.

c. Limitations on investigations
All investigations conducted should avoid nebulous or sweeping inquiries which are not relevant to objectives. Under no circumstances should an investigation be conducted of any individual merely on the basis that such individual supports unpopular causes or opposes Government policies.

d. Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval
Obtain FBIHQ approval for investigation of:
(1) U. S. Government employee
(2) Officials or employees of United Nations or other public international organizations of a governmental or quasi-governmental nature.
(3) Officials or employees of foreign diplomatic establishments or governments.
(4) Faculty members of institutions of learning.
FBIHQ approval is not required for investigation of student or nonacademic employees of institutions of learning in the absence of unusual circumstances. If during a pending investigation it is discovered that the subject fits one of above categories, suspend active investigation and advise FBIHQ with recommendation as to further action.

e. Members of United States armed forces.
No investigation should be conducted of active or retired members of of United States military forces. If it is determined that a subject fits in this category, terminate investigation and promptly furnish pertinent data to appropriate counterintelligence branch of United States armed forces. Advise FBIHQ in form suitable for dissemination.

2. Investigative procedures
   - a. Scope of investigation.
     Data concerning the following items should be developed and reported, if pertinent:
     - (1) Background information, including
       - (a) True name and aliases.
       - (b) Date and place of birth.
       - (c) Residences, past and present.
       - (d) Occupations and employments, past and present.
       - (e) Citizenship status; where applicable, naturalization data.
       - (f) Family background. If available, include identities of immediate family and any information indicating they are employed in sensitive positions or by U. S. Government. If member of immediate family is known to be engaged in subversive activities, include succinct resume.
       - (g) Military records, including any service in foregin forces.
       - (h) Educational background.
       - (i) Arrest record and disposition of charges.
       - (j) Physical description. Make reasonable effort to secure photograph.
       - (k) Handwriting and/or handprinting specimens should be obtained, if readily available, and kept in case file. Special efforts should be made to secure such specimens with regard to leaders of subversive groups and they should be furnished to FBIHQ by letter for attention of FBI Laboratory to be included in National Security File.
     - (2) Subversive activities and affiliations, including
       - (a) Information concerning membership in subversive movements, organizations or front groups, date and circumstances of adminsion, positions held, and participation in activities of organization (e.g., attendance at meetings or other functions, fund-raising or recruitment efforts on behalf of organization, contributions, etc.)
       - (b) Statements made or other factors which indicate awareness of the subversive nature of group, including involvement in underground operations, and/or in any other illegal or violent actions promoted by organization or movement.
       - (c) Information tending to show subject's importance in subversive movement or organization, e.g., degree of influence and leadership exercised, close association with national or local leaders, participation in policy decisions.
   - b. Investigative steps
     The following steps should be considered, but are not all inclusive.
     - (1) File reviews. Office indices should be checked. Any pertinent information developed should be included in initial report. Where logical, check files of other field offices and/or FBIHQ.
     - (2) Public source material. Make full use of public records and public sources of information, including hearings of congressional or other Government committees both state and Federal, and publications, including those issued by subversive groups.
     - (3) Check of files of other government agencies, both Federal and local, which could logically be expected to have pertinent information.

(4) Records of private firms. Obtain pertinent available information from records of private firms such as past or present employers. Checks of credit agencies should be limited to securing identifying information only.

(5) Contacts with neighbors and fellow employees. Such inquiries should be made only where there is expectation they will develop pertinent information not otherwise available.

(6) Canvass of established sources and informants. Contact informants and sources in position to be knowledgeable concerning subversive groups with which subject is affiliated.

(7) Physical and photographic surveillances. These should be considered on selective basis when circumstances indicate they may be productive.

c. Interviews of subjects

(1) Policy

Subjects of investigation should be interviewed in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Generally, interviews should be considered after background inquiries have been completed and a good picture of subject's activities developed.

If a decision not to interview a subject is made, this should be fully explained in case file and FBIHQ advised whenever FBIHQ is cognizant of investigation.

(2) Purpose

To develop information regarding subversive activities in which the subject is engaged.

(3) Approval to interview

All interviews of subjects may be approved by SAC except following instances which require FBIHQ approval:

(a) When subject holds leadership position in subversive organization.

(b) When subject is nationally prominent or where circumstances otherwise indicate the interview could be widely publicized, such as labor leaders, educators, religious leaders or journalists.

(c) When interview is to be conducted in presence of subject's attorney and/or aide.

(d) When subject is connected with institution of learning.

(4) Letter requesting FBIHQ approval to interview subject.

(a) Letter should concisely set out available data concerning following items.

I. Residence address, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship and any health factors which could affect conduct of interview.

II. Marital status, employment and citizenship of spouse.

III. Succinct summary of subject's subversive activities, membership on affiliation with subversive groups, and positions held.

IV. Similar summary regarding spouse's affiliation with subversive activities.

V. Similar summary concerning subversive activities on part of close relatives.

VI. Resume of subject's current sympathies and status in subversive movement or organization and any indication of disaffection.

VII. Subject's arrest record and disposition of charges; any information indicating a propensity for violence.
VIII. What is expected to be gained by interview?

List above items by number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available concerning a particular item, so indicate.

(b) Submit one copy of letter and additional copy of first page only which can be returned by FBIHQ stamped "Approved."

(5) If interview not conducted within 60 days, submit letter advising FBIHQ:
(a) Reason interview not conducted.
(b) Any new information pertinent to desirability of interview.
(c) Whether efforts to interview subject will be pursued. Thereafter, keep FBIHQ advised at least each 60 days as to progress of matter.

(6) Conduct of interview.
(a) Interviews of subjects entitled to the warning and waiver shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements set forth in Volume I, Manual of Instructions, Section 2B, page 15. If the interview is being conducted for intelligence information rather than an admission or confession of guilt, no warning is required. Moreover, if the investigation has failed to develop information indicating a possible violation of Federal law by the subject, it would be permissible to interview the subject without a warning as he does not fit the criteria of those entitled to a warning of rights. Carefully plan interview so there will be no compromise of sources, sensitive techniques or interviewing personnel. An overriding consideration to always bear in mind is that interview should elicit from, not provide information to the subject.
(b) Interview at subject's place of employment should be avoided if possible. If attorney or aide is present during interview, interview must be conducted by two Agents.
(c) If, during conduct of interview subject desires that his attorney or aide be present, the interview should be tactfully terminated, and FBIHQ should be informed with recommendation whether or not to resume interview.
(d) In all other instances, SAC has responsibility and option of deciding when two Agents should handle interview. Safety of Agents is first priority to consider.

(7) Direction of subject's activities.
Prior FBIHQ approval is required before taking any steps to direct the subject's activities even though he may appear to be cooperative during the interview.

(8) Reporting results of interview.
(a) Record results of interview on FD-302.
(b) Pertinent results of interview should be included in next report or LHM unless circumstances indicate need for more expeditious reporting. In cover letter or administrative pages, include observations of interviewing Agents as to subject's cooperativeness, any relevant information concerning subject's appearance or characteristics, and assessment of information developed by interview in light of other data known to your office.

3. Reporting Procedures

a. General

(1) Pertinent information developed during investigation may be reported either by report or LHM.

Reports should be submitted:

(a) When setting out results of extended inquiries such as summary of subject's activities.

(b) When subject is being recommended for inclusion in ADEX.

LHM should be used to report timely or significant information regarding subject's current activities.

(2) All communications should be limited to:

(a) Information regarding subject's subversive activities, sympathies, and affiliations.

(b) Pertinent background data concerning subversive individuals or groups with which subject is connected.

(c) Essential background data regarding subject.

They should not include information regarding subject's social or personal affairs or other background data not relevant to subject's subversive activities or affiliations.

(3) Information in both reports and LHMs should be organized under topical headings. Main headings and subheadings should be employed to make the communication as readable as possible.

b. Summarizing information.

When reporting information of repetitious or cumulative nature, such as attendance at regular meetings of subversive group, use summary narrative statement. Exact dates are not needed, but time period involved should be indicated. Summary statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions. Information from different sources should be reported separately and any significant items must be set forth in detail.

c. Administrative or Cover Pages

(1) Material to be included

Pertinent information concerning following should be included in administrative pages of report or cover communication of LHM: References to other reports or correspondence, ADEX status, reference to security flash notice (FD-165) or transfer of origin (FD-128), reason for classification, if any, documentation of data contained in report or LHM, identities of confidential sources, leads, and other administrative or noninvestigative material. Use form (FD-305) for ADEX cases. If used, nonsymbol source page should be last page.

(2) Documentation

(a) In documenting information originating with another field office, file number of original document need not be shown provided source, date information received, and receiving Agent are identified.

(b) Do not conduct extensive inquiries to document background information.

(c) In characterizing persons who associate with subject, identify source but further documentation not required.

d. Office of Origin

Office covering place where subject's principal subversive activities occur or originate should be origin. In unusual circumstances where

there is doubt as to which office should be origin, request FBIHQ to designate office of origin.

e. Title of communications

Normally, only one subject should be carried in title of each report or LHM and separate reports should be submitted for each subject regardless of relationship. However, when reporting virtually identical information concerning two related individuals (e.g., travel data concerning a husband and wife) an exception can be made and single LHM or report submitted. In such cases dual captions should be used and an extra copy of communication provided.

f. Classification - 100

g. Character

(1) Designation "Subversive Matter" (or abbreviation SM) should be used in all cases. Add organizational affiliation when chief group with which subject is connected is under current investigation or has approved thumbnail sketch.

Example: Subversive Matter - CPUSA
Subversive Matter - SWP

(2) Where meaningful organization affiliation cannot be shown, use caption "Subversive Matter."

h. Copies of reports or LHMs

In all instances furnish four copies to FBIHQ to cover dissemination to Department (2) and Secret Service (1). Where it appears dissemination will be made to other agencies at FBIHQ level, furnish one additional copy for each such agency involved.

i. Status

Carry cases as pending until logical inquiries aimed at resolving purpose of investigation have been completed. As minimum, case should be keep pending until essential background data regarding subject has been secured and sufficient information developed to present good picture of nature and extent of subversive activities engaged in by subject.

j. Closing and reopening of cases

If it is determined that subject's current activities do not involve an actual or potential violation of one or more of the statutes enumerated in A. 1. above, case should be closed.

Case may be reopened at a later date if additional information is received which indicates subject's subsequent activities involve or may result in a violation of the statutes cited in A. 1.

k. Subject traveling abroad (Also see section 105G volume IV, of this manual).

Take following action when information is received that subject of current investigation intends to travel abroad or has departed on foreign travel (except where travel is of brief duration and is known to be for innocuous purpose, such as vacation):

(1) Immediately notify FBIHQ of available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination, itinerary, purpose of trip, and pertinent passport data. Include full description of subject, including aliases. Set out concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising FBIHQ while developing details if time is of essence.

(2) If necessary, set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State.

(3) Pertinent information is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and interested Legal Attaches. Furnish FBIHQ with six copies of LHM (2-Department, 1-Secret Service, 1-State, 1-CIA) plus an additional four copies for each Legal Attache Office which covers area in subject's itinerary (1-Legat, 3-Legat's sources). Also, furnish one copy of subject's photograph, if available, for each Legat Office involved. If stop should be placed with security services abroad, so indicate in cover letter. Set out requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page captioned "Leads" at end of LHM. Request should not refer to Legal Attache or request investigation by any particular service.

(4) Advise FBIHQ promptly by LHM of subject's return. If subject has traveled to a communist country, furnish recommendation as to interview and advise whether additional investigation being conducted.

(5) Take following action when information is received that organization or individual engaged in subversive activities is forming tour group for foreign travel:

  (a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, as to identities of individuals participating in tour and furnish LHM to FBIHQ for dissemination to State Department, CIA, and interested Legal Attaches. Include readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, dates, names, and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.

  (b) Other offices should immediately identify participants residing within their respective territories and submit LHMs on those of security interest. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. In cover letter, list participants on whom there is no subversive information.

l. Submission of information on members of subversive groups.

(1) Offices covering national headquarters or local units of subversive groups should promptly furnish FBIHQ names and identifying data regarding persons affiliated with such groups. Furnish information by letter, and indicate list is being furnished for indexing purposes.

(2) Information regarding subversive affiliation of individuals residing in territory of other offices should be furnished to latter.

(3) Subscription lists of publications of subversive organizations should be indexed in field office covering address shown for subscriber but should not be forwarded to FBIHQ.

m. Control files on former members of subversive organizations.

(1) Offices having sufficient volume should maintain control files on former members of subversive organizations. Such files will preclude necessity for extensive file reviews to identify persons who are in position to furnish information of value in particular cases.

(2) Where appropriate, make copies of communications for these files. Insofar as practical these files should contain following information

regarding ex-members of subversive groups: background, type of information possessed, time period covered, availability for interview and for testimony.

n. Channeling information to case files

(1) Memoranda regarding membership or activity in subversive organizations, including summaries of informant reports, should be channeled to case files of individuals involved. When information from informants or surveillances is channeled to individual case files, it should be documented.

(2) When preparing lengthy channeling memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit number of copies prepared to two for each other office. Clearly indicate next to names of other offices the page number containing information of interest and note on cover page that distribution of material to individual case files should be handled by recipient offices.

o. Movement of subjects between offices.

If office of origin receives information that subject of current or past investigation changes residence to territory of another division, office of origin request verification within 30 days. If new residence confirmed, office of origin submit FD-128 to transfer origin.

D. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED

1. General Policy

Information developed during these investigations should be furnished to other agencies in Executive Branch which have a legitimate interest. See MRR, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities and policies in dissemination.

Do not disseminate earlier reports without reviewing them to insure they meet current reporting standards. If they are unsuitable for dissemination, prepare LHM containing pertinent information.

2. Specific requirements

Following instructions cover representative situations which occur frequently.

a. Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires free exchange of all information of mutual interest between subscribing agencies. Immediately refer any derogatory or possibly significant information developed concerning members of military services, including contacts with individuals or groups of security interest, to military service having primary responsibility.

If it is determined subject of FBI investigation is member of armed services, discontinue immediately, advise FBIHQ, and disseminate pertinent information locally to appropriate intelligence agency. If it is determined subject has close relatives in armed forces, promptly advise appropriate military intelligence service, and furnish pertinent information, including reports, on subject involved. Evaluation of such association lies entirely within province of military intelligence service.

In all instances, advise FBIHQ concerning any possible subversive contacts or derogatory information developed concerning military personnel, including local dissemination made. Enclose four copies of LHM or report setting out pertinent data.

b. Aliens and naturalized citizens
Furnish any information which might have bearing on their deportation or denaturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) locally.

c. Individuals employed in or having access to Key Facilities, or employees of private contractors of the Armed Forces
Under Delimitations Agreements, FBI is responsible to disseminate pertinent data to the counterintelligence agencies of the Armed Forces. See section 102, volume IV, of this manual for details.

d. Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities)
Disseminate pertinent data locally to Army and any other Federal agency whose interest is apparent.

e. Members of military reserve branches or National Guard
Disseminate pertinent security data locally to appropriate military intelligence service.

f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including longshoremen and waterfront employees
Disseminate pertinent security data locally to Coast Guard and when circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies, including NISO.

g. Employees of Federal Government
Any subversive information received concerning an employee of an agency of the Executive Branch should be promptly forwarded to FBIHQ for dissemination to interested agencies. No dissemination of reports in Security of Government Employee cases should be made in field. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under EO 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.

h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under jurisdiction of branch of armed services
Disseminate pertinent data locally to appropriate military intelligence service.

i. Airmen licensed by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen (pilot, mechanic, or member of crew); to individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft; and to aircraft dispatchers or air-traffic control tower operation.

Furnish pertinent data concerning such persons to FBIHQ by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend dissemination to FAA.

j. Dissemination to Secret Service
Under agreement between FBI and Secret Service concerning protective responsibilities dated 11-26-71 (set out in section 102, volume IV, of this manual), reports and LHMs are disseminated to Secret Service both locally and at FBIHQ in all cases which meet standards set forth. This includes virtually all cases on individuals where any substantial information exists as to subversive activities or sympathies of subject. When photographs are available send copies

to Secret Service locally and to FBIHQ for dissemination at headquarters level.

(1) Secret Service should be advised of reason for referral; i.e., statement of class or classes of agreement which applies to subject. FD-376 serves as letter of transmittal for both local and FBIHQ dissemination. Forward original and one copy to FBIHQ and maintain copy in case file.

(2) After initial dissemination, as changes occur in residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally by FD-366 and furnish two copies to FBIHQ. FD-366 must be submitted even though changes in residence and/or employment are noted in report or LHM being submitted.

(3) For instructions governing dissemination to Secret Service in matters involving threats against President, refer to section 134B, volume IV, of this manual.

(4) Upon transfer of office of origin, old office of origin should furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address by LHM or FD-366. Provide copies to FBIHQ and new office of origin for dissemination to Secret Service headquarters and branch office covering new residence, respectively.

(5) As an administrative aid to insure proper dissemination, the file covers of cases in which dissemination is being made to Secret Service may by stamped "SS."

3. Restrictions on field dissemination

If security measures are known to be inadequate at local office of another Government agency, do not disseminate locally, but bring matter to attention of FBIHQ for headquarters dissemination.

E. ADMINISTRATIVE INDEX (ADEX)

1. Purpose and general policy

a. To have a readily available and up-to-date listing of individuals deemed currently dangerous to the national security. Objective is to identify individuals who should be afforded priority investigative coverage in the event of a national emergency.

b. Under no circumstance should individuals be included in ADEX merely because of their opposition to Government policies or because of the exercise of their constitutional rights of protest and dissent.

c. ADEX is strictly an administrative device. It should not be treated as a factor in determining basic investigative decisions, i.e., whether an investigation should be opened or closed, the extent of investigation to be conducted in a particular case, etc.

2. Criteria

a. ADEX should include individuals whose actions or statements have established that they represent a current threat to the national security, i.e.,:

Individuals (whether affiliated with organized groups or not) who have shown a willingness and capability of engaging in treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, sabotage, espionage, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, assassination of government officials, or other such acts which would result in interference with or a threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state or local government.

b. This would include leaders of organizations whose aims include the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the United States or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by unlawful means. The term "leaders" denotes those individuals, irrespective of title, who are in a position to significantly influence the policies or direct the activities of the group. Mere membership in an organization, without the element of leadership or without a demonstrated willingness and capability described in paragraph a, is not sufficient for inclusion in ADEX.

c. Individuals should be considered a "current threat" to the national security when reliable information has been developed that they have engaged in activity or exhibited the requisite willingness and capability falling within the above-described criteria during prior two years and there is no indication they have ceased such activity. However, there may be instances where retention of an individual in ADEX is justified even though no pertinent information is available during the prior two years. For example, such retention might be warranted in the case of individuals who have gone into hiding, temporarily left the country, or been imprisoned.

d. ADEX should not include individuals who may be ideologically committed to a philosophy which calls for the downfall of our form of government or which favors another form of society but who have not shown a current willingness or capability of engaging in meaningful action to promote their beliefs. This might apply, for example, to rank-and-file members of the Socialist Workers Party or the Communist Party, USA, or other old-line revolutionary groups which have advocated an overthrow of our present form of government but where subject's activity is primarily ideological in nature and not oriented toward action. Each case should be reviewed on an individual basis in the light of the criteria enumerated above.

3. Recommendation for preparation of ADEX card

a. When dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin should prepare recommendation on FD-122, in triplicate. Forward original and copy to FBIHQ, and place copy in subject's file.

b. Attach additional page or pages to FD-122 setting out succinct summary of facts on which recommendation based.

c. Nonprosecutive summary report should be submitted when subject is recommended for ADEX unless one was previously furnished to FBIHQ. In latter instance, submit up-to-date report.

d. Do not delay recommendation for ADEX because of absence of complete background or descriptive data.

e. Do not defer recommendation for ADEX because subject is missing, temporarily out of the country, or in prison.

f. If FBIHQ approves recommendation, ADEX cards will be prepared including two copies for field. Copy of FD-122 will be returned stamped "ADEX card approved, copies attached." Check cards for accuracy. Place one in alphabetical section of field office ADEX and other in either geographical section or unavailable section.

g. When subject is approved for ADEX, submit Security Flash Notice (FD-165) to check records of Identification Division and post flash notice if fingerprints of subject are on file. FD-165 will be returned if positive identification cannot be made. In latter event, FD-165 should be submitted every two years as long as subject remains on ADEX and no fingerprint record has been located. These submissions should be timed to coincide with biennial review of case.

4. Format of ADEX card.

a. Data to appear on face of card

Itemized below are descriptive categories in which subject may be classified and corresponding abbreviations for use on FD-122 and ADEX card.

(1) Full name and aliases

(2) Date and place of birth

(3) Race

White	W
Black	B
Other	O

(4) Sex

Male	M
Female	F

(5) Citizenship

U. S. Citizen	CT
Alien	AL

(6) Residence address

(7) Employment (occupation and address)

(8) Type of activity

Black Extremist	BEX
Communist (pro-Chinese)	CMC
Communist (pro-Soviet)	CMS
Communist (Trotskyist)	CMT
Foreign Nationality	FRN
Puerto Rican Nationalist	PRN
Revolutionary	REV
Miscellaneous	MSC

Activities connected with "New Left" or anarchistic elements should be shown as "Revolutionary." The term "Foreign Nationality" covers foreign-directed subversion, e.g., Soviet or Chicom espionage, Arab terrorism. The abbreviation FRN should be followed by nationality involved e.g., FRN-Arab, FRN-Cuban.

(9) Special Interest

Espionage Subjects	ESP
Foreign government employees	FGE
U. S. Government employees	GOV

(10) Unavailable section

Missing	MI
Out of country	OC
Imprisoned	PR

(11) Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List), if applicable, and agency having security responsibility, which is Army.

(12) Field office and FBIHQ file numbers

b. Data to appear on separate card attached to ADEX card in geographical or unavailable section.

(1) Physical description

(2) Photograph, with date taken. It should be most current or best likeness of subject available.

(3) Dangerous characteristics of subject, e.g., notation if subject carries firearms.

(4) Any special information needed to locate subject.

(5) Notation that security flash notice (FD-165) has been posted with Identification Division

(6) FBI number and fingerprint classification, when available.

Case should normally be kept pending to secure all pertinent identifying data enumerated in paragraphs a. and b. above. However, if it appears a considerable amount of effort would be required to obtain a particular item, use judgment in deciding whether to continue in pending status solely for this purpose.

Use FD-186 to report above information. File in case file.

5. Arrangement of ADEX

a. At FBIHQ.

Index is printed on IBM cards, two copies of which are sent to field. An alphabetical breakdown of true names and all aliases of subjects is maintained at FBIHQ.

b. In field office

Index is maintained in three sections:

(1) Alphabetical section

This section includes one complete set of current ADEX cards.

(2) Geographical section

This section includes ADEX cards of all subjects except those who are missing, temporarily out of the country, or in prison. Geographical section is broken down by residence address in accord with needs of each office, e.g., by state, county, city, or if needed, into boroughs or suburbs. Cards are filed alphabetically under each such breakdown.

(3) Unavailable section

This section includes cards of individuals who are missing, out of the country for an indefinite period, or imprisoned, broken down into three corresponding subsections.

(a) Missing subjects

(b) Subjects out of country for indefinite period

Include foreign residence and employment addresses on FD-122, if known. Place stops with INS to be advised of subject's return. Verify foreign residence annually.

(c) Subjects imprisoned

Identify institution in which subject is incarcerated on FD-122. Request prison authorities to notify us of subject's release and set tickler to verify.

6. Special interest subjects

Following classes of individuals could be of special interest in national emergency:

a. Espionage subjects

Any action taken in these cases should be handled, if possible, in such manner as to not destroy the opportunity to penetrate an active espionage network.

b. Foreign government employees

Any action taken in these cases must be handled so as to minimize the possibilities of diplomatic repercussions.

c. U. S. Government employees
These subjects are of special interest to Department of Justice. Cards on "Special Interest" subjects should be filed in regular sequence with other ADEX cards.

7. Changes in residence and employment of ADEX subjects
a. Develop sources to insure that any such changes are promptly brought to our attention.
b. Submit FD-122 whenever changes occur. Also submit FD-366 to FBIHQ and Secret Service locally.

8. Changes in other background data
a. Submit any changes, additions, or deletions in data required by FD-122 in an updated FD-122. If item being deleted, specify "Delete."
b. Make notations concerning change on existing ADEX card pending receipt of revised card from FBIHQ.

9. Movement of ADEX subjects between offices
a. Requests from other offices to verify addresses of subjects should be handled within thirty days.
b. Upon verification of new address, office of origin submit FD-128 transferring origin. Furnish original and copy to FBIHQ and two copies to office covering new address enclosing copies of previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and ADEX cards.
c. If flash notice (FD-165) has been placed with Identification Division, note on FD-128 and designate extra copy for FBIHQ, attention Identification Division.
d. Old office of origin submit current report or LHM whenever there is pertinent information to report. Do not delay submission of FD-128 solely for preparation of report or LHM, but note on FD-128 latter being prepared. Old office of origin furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business addresses by FD-366 and provide copies to new office of origin for dissemination to Secret Service there.
e. If new office of origin plans no further investigation, advise FBIHQ by letter that case is being closed.

10. Subject entering U. S. armed forces
Submit FD-122 to cancel ADEX and FD-366 to advise Secret Service, furnishing copy of latter to local Secret Service office. Be certain interested military agency has been forwarded all pertinent subversive data regarding subject and is aware of subject's entry into armed forces. Where appropriate, prepare up-to-date LHM or report for dissemination to military agency and to Secret Service both at FBIHQ and field level. While subject is serving in armed forces, appropriate military agency has complete jurisdiction over his activities and no active investigation should be conducted by FBI. Geographical card for subject should be filed in case file marked "canceled" and alphabetical card destroyed. When subject returns to civilian status, determine if activities warrant inclusion in ADEX. If so, submit FD-122 so recommending as well as current report. If not, advise FBIHQ by letter.

11. Removal of cards from ADEX
Subject should be removed from ADEX for any of the following reasons:
a. Death
b. Permanent departure from U. S. or Puerto Rico
c. Designation as security informant
d. Subject no longer falls within ADEX criteria

In all of the above cases recommend removal from ADEX by FD-122 with attached succinct summary of facts. In all instances except c., submit current LHM or report for dissemination to Secret Service at FBIHQ and also furnish report or LHM to Secret Service locally.

12. Reevaluation of ADEX status
Prepare administrative tickler concerning each ADEX subject to come up at two-year intervals. This tickler, which is independent of any assignment card, should prompt careful assessment of case to insure subject still falls within ADEX criteria.

d. Above also applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or concerning evidence otherwise obtained.

13. Interviews with subjects of security investigations

a. Policy

[(1)] No security investigation of an individual is to be closed unless subject is included in ADEX or consideration given to interview. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of ADEX card for inactivity until subject has been interviewed or Bureau advised why interview is inadvisable.

[(2) With regard to subversive and revolutionary organizations, rank-and-file members and their counterparts in similar nonmembership groups may be interviewed on SAC authority; however, prior Bureau authority must be obtained for interviews of subjects when circumstances indicate a delicate situation and a greater than usual risk involved, such as nationally prominent individuals, labor leaders and persons in educational, mass media, religious or publishing fields. Prior Bureau authority is also required to interview those who have publicly disclosed or are likely to disclose to the mass media contacts by Bureau Agents for the purpose of placing the Bureau in a bad light by falsely charging harassment or who have misstated or are likely to misstate the facts concerning the interview for self-serving purposes.

(3) Prior to interview, conduct informant, credit (identifying information only), arrest, and indices checks on individual to be interviewed, determine employment, establish subject not employed or connected with any sensitive area requiring Bureau authorization for an interview, and prepare memorandum for SAC setting forth available facts. Each such interview must be personally approved by SAC. If subject not interviewed, closing communication must show reason for not interviewing.

(4) Where prior Bureau authority is required, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview subject.]

b. Purpose

(1) When investigation is inconclusive, to determine subject's sympathies and whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines

(2) To develop information concerning activities of subject and his associates in subversive movement

(3) To develop informants

c. [Deleted]

d. [Deleted]

e. [Deleted]

f. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview
  (1) In absence of special circumstances, include following statement in first paragraph of letter.
    (a) Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of Manual of Instructions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as PSI.
    (b) Form FD-336 contains above statement and may be used. Statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potential as informant.
    (c) If available, letter must contain following information:
      I. Residence address, occupation, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health
      II. Marital status. If married, occupation, employment, and race of spouse.
      III. Length of time subject was member of or affiliated with subversive organization and positions held. When investigation is based on circumstances other than membership or affiliation with subversive organizations, briefly set forth facts.
      IV. If married, state if spouse is or has been member of or affiliated with subversive groups, positions held, and period of such membership or affiliation.
      V. Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups
      VI. Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of subject and, if married, of spouse
      VII. What is expected to be gained by interview
    (d) In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding seven items listed must be set out under appropriate number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any item, so indicate after number.
  (2) Letters must be personally approved by SAC.
  (3) One copy of letter should only be first page of letter. When unnecessary to issue specific instructions, Bureau will approve request by stamping this page and returning by routing slip.
  (4) When authorized, interview must be conducted within 45 days. If not possible, advise Bureau and indicate subject will be contacted within 45 days. If interview has not been conducted at end of second period, request new authority. Include any new information bearing upon advisability of interview.

g. Preparation for and conduct of interview
  (1) Preparation must be thorough and interview conducted so that Agents will not be compromised, Bureau will not be embarrassed, and informants will not be exposed. CPUSA has planned traps for Agents attempting interviews with members by installing recording machines in members' homes or endeavoring to have interview observed by concealed third party.
  (2) [Safety, security, sensitivity and good judgment are considerations in evaluating necessity for two Agents to conduct interview of any subject in all types of security investigations, i.e., revolutionary, subversive or extremist. Special Agents in Charge have responsibility and option of deciding when two Agents should be present during any interview of this nature. Safety of Special Agents should be first priority in any evaluation in this regard. If two Agents conduct interview, background of subject and circumstances will determine how approach should be handled. Agent experienced in security investigations who is knowledgeable regarding development of informants should conduct interrogation. Actual approach need not be made by two Agents; one Agent may observe from secure distance.]

f. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview

(1) In absence of special circumstances, include following statement in first paragraph of letter.

(a) Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of Manual of Instructions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as PSI.

(b) Form FD-336 contains above statement and may be used. Statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potential as informant.

(c) If available, letter must contain following information:

I. Residence address, occupation, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health

II. Marital status. If married, occupation, employment, and race of spouse.

III. Length of time subject was member of or affiliated with subversive organization and positions held. When investigation is based on circumstances other than membership or affiliation with subversive organizations, briefly set forth facts.

IV. If married, state if spouse is or has been member of or affiliated with subversive groups, positions held, and period of such membership or affiliation.

V. Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups

VI. Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of subject and, if married, of spouse

VII. What is expected to be gained by interview

(d) In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding seven items listed must be set out under appropriate number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any item, so indicate after number.

(2) Letters must be personally approved by SAC.

(3) One copy of letter should only be first page of letter. When unnecessary to issue specific instructions, Bureau will approve request by stamping this page and returning by routing slip.

(4) When authorized, interview must be conducted within 45 days. If not possible, advise Bureau and indicate subject will be contacted within 45 days. If interview has not been conducted at end of second period, request new authority. Include any new information bearing upon advisability of interview.

g. Preparation for and conduct of interview

(1) Preparation must be thorough and interview conducted so that Agents will not be compromised, Bureau will not be embarrassed, and informants will not be exposed. CPUSA has planned traps for Agents attempting interviews with members by installing recording machines in members' homes or endeavoring to have interview observed by concealed third party.

(2) Interviews should be conducted by two Agents. Agent experienced in security investigations who is knowledgeable regarding development of informants should conduct interrogation. Actual approach need not be made by both Agents; one Agent may observe from secure distance. (Two Agents should be physically present during interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all cases.) Background of subject and circumstances will determine how approach should be handled.

d. Above also applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or concerning evidence otherwise obtained.

13. Interviews with subjects of security investigations

a. Policy

[(1)] No security investigation of an individual is to be closed unless subject is included in ADEX or consideration given to interview. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of ADEX card for inactivity until subject has been interviewed or Bureau advised why interview is inadvisable.

[(2) With regard to subversive and revolutionary organizations, rank-and-file members and their counterparts in similar nonmembership groups may be interviewed on SAC authority; however, prior Bureau authority must be obtained for interviews of subjects when circumstances indicate a delicate situation and a greater than usual risk involved, such as nationally prominent individuals, labor leaders and persons in educational, mass media, religious or publishing fields. Prior Bureau authority is also required to interview those who have publicly disclosed or are likely to disclose to the mass media contacts by Bureau Agents for the purpose of placing the Bureau in a bad light by falsely charging harassment or who have misstated or are likely to misstate the facts concerning the interview for self-serving purposes.

(3) Prior to interview, conduct informant, credit (identifying information only), arrest, and indices checks on individual to be interviewed, determine employment, establish subject not employed or connected with any sensitive area requiring Bureau authorization for an interview, and prepare memorandum for SAC setting forth available facts. Each such interview must be personally approved by SAC. If subject not interviewed, closing communication must show reason for not interviewing.

(4) Where prior Bureau authority is required, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview subject.]

b. Purpose

(1) When investigation is inconclusive, to determine subject's sympathies and whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines

(2) To develop information concerning activities of subject and his associates in subversive movement

(3) To develop informants

c. [Deleted]

d. [Deleted]

e. [Deleted]

furnish copies of reports bearing dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," to appropriate intelligence agencies of armed services. Instructions regarding dissemination to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, appear in this section of this manual under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities - dissemination. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under Executive Order 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.

h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under cognizance of branch of armed services
Disseminate locally to intelligence service of military branch involved.

i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen, defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of crew in navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Furnish subversive data concerning such persons to Bureau by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend it be furnished to FAA. Dissemination will be made only at Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see MRR, part II, section 5.

j. Dissemination to Secret Service
Under agreement between FBI and Secret Service concerning protective responsibilities dated 11-26-71 (set out in section 102, volume IV, of this manual), reports or LHMs are disseminated to Secret Service (both locally and at[FBIHQ]in all cases which meet standards set forth As practical matter, this includes virtually all security cases on individuals where any substantial information exists as to subversive, extremist, or revolutionary activities or sympathies on the subject's part. Furnish Bureau extra copy of report or LHM in these cases.

(1) Secret Service must be advised of reason for referral; that is, statement of class or classes of agreement which applies to subject. Use FD-376, which serves as letter of transmittal for both local and[FBIHQ]dissemination. Forward original and one copy to Bureau. Maintain copy in case file and upon transfer of origin, furnish copy to new office of origin. Be certain individual is properly categorized.

(2) If subject of prior investigation is being recommended for ADEX, do not disseminate prior reports without first reviewing them carefully to insure they meet current reporting standards and are suitable for dissemination. If one or more prior reports are found unsuitable for dissemination, prepare LHM containing the pertinent information involved for dissemination to Secret Service along with current report. Forward copies of such LHM to Bureau for[FBIHQ]dissemination.

(3) After initial dissemination to Secret Service, as changes occur in residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally by FD-366 and furnish two copies to Bureau.

(4) For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in matters involving threats against President, refer to section 134B, volume IV, of this manual.

(5) Upon transfer of office of origin in these cases, old office of origin should furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address by LHM or FD-366 with copies to Bureau and new office of origin for dissemination to Secret Service headquarters and Secret Service office covering new residence, respectively.

k. Dissemination at Bureau

There are situations in which dissemination is made only at Bureau. Do not disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where security measures are inadequate. In such instances [bring data to immediate attention of Bureau for[FBIHQ]dissemination. In addition, Atomic Energy Commission receives reports only through Bureau. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including State [Department, only at[FBIHQ.]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. Statutes ... 7
  1. Public Law 733 as implemented by EO 10450 ... 7
  2. Smith Act of 1940 (Title 18, USC, § 2385). Advocating overthrow of Government ... 7
  3. Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50, USC, §§ 781-816) ... 7
    a. Communist-action organizations ... 8
      (1) Definition (§ 782) ... 8
      (2) Factors to be considered by Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) in determining whether organization is communist-action organization (§ 792) ... 8
    b. Communist front organizations ... 8
      (1) Definition (§ 782) ... 8
      (2) Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist front organization (§ 792) ... 8
    c. How proceedings are instituted (§ 792) ... 8
    d. Findings of Board and publication of same (§ 792) ... 8
    e. Employment of members; contributions of funds, services, or advice by Government personnel (§ 784) ... 8
    f. Use of mail and instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce (§ 789) ... 9
    g. Deleted 9
    h. Contributing to establishment of totalitarian dictatorship (§ 783) ... 9
  4. Communist Control Act of 1954 ... 9
    a. Definition of communist-infiltrated organization ... 9
    b. Proceedings when Attorney General has reason to believe organization is communist infiltrated ... 10
    c. Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist infiltrated (§ 792a) ... 10
  5. Other statutes ... 11
    a. Fraud against Government (Title 18, USC, § 1001) ... 11
    b. Private correspondence with foreign governments (Title 18, USC, § 953) ... 11
    c. Rebellion or insurrection (Title 18, USC, § 2383) ... 11
    d. Sedition (Title 18, USC, §§ 2387, 2388, and 2391) ... 11
    e. Seditious conspiracy (Title 18, USC, § 2384) ... 11
    f. Recruiting for service against U. S. (Title 18, USC, § 2389) ... 11
    g. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended by Expatriation Act of 1954 ... 11
[B. Investigation of Communist Party, USA; Socialist Workers Party; Other Marxist Revolutionary-Type Organizations; Front Groups; [Revolutionary Activities]and Miscellaneous Organizations ... 12
  1. Purposes of investigation ... 12
  2. Policy ... 12
    a. General ... 12
    b. Established subversive groups ... 12
[[c. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations, including those affiliated with[revolutionary activities]movement ... 12
    d. Political organizations ... 13
    e. Organizations connected with institutions of learning ... 13
    f. Legitimate noncommunist organizations which are communist infiltrated ... 13
[g. Revolutionary[Activities]underground-type publications ... 13a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

[3. Investigative procedures re subversive organizations, [revolutionary activities]groups, suspected subversive organizations, and communist fronts........................ 14
  a. Origin and scope.. 14
  b. Whether incorporated.................................... 14
  c. Aims and purposes....................................... 14
  d. Location of headquarters................................ 14
  e. Officers.. 14
  f. Membership.. 14
  g. Official organ, if any, and other literature............ 14
  h. General activities...................................... 14
  i. Finances.. 15
  j. Support given to or received from CPUSA or other communist group.. 15
  k. Implementation of CPUSA line or that of other communist group... 15
  l. Accuracy of identifications............................. 15
  m. Specific requirements for CPUSA investigations.......... 15
  n. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyist groups.............................. 15
4. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against President.................................. 15
5. Communist influence in racial matters, Internal Security - C. 16
6. Title and character.. 16
7. Classification... 16
C. Investigation of Communist Infiltration of Labor Unions......... 17
1. Purpose of investigation................................... 17
2. Policy... 17
3. Title.. 17
4. Classification... 17
5. Character.. 17
D. Investigations of Individuals - Policy and Objectives........... 18
1. Definitions.. 18
2. FBI responsibility... 18
3. Purposes of investigation.................................. 18
4. Individuals to be investigated............................. 18
5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals............ 19
  a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning.................. 19
  b. Subjects not connected with institution of learning...... 20
  c. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishment, employees of United Nations or international organizations, and members of armed forces.. 20
6. Fraud against Government (FAG) violations.................. 20
  a. Policy.. 20
  b. Investigation... 20
  c. Legal questions... 20
  d. Cases referred by military.............................. 21
7. Submission of subversive derogatory information on individuals.. 21

5. Other statutes

Following statutes should also be considered in security investigations.

a. Fraud against Government (Title 18, USC, § 1001)
This section includes possible fraud against Government violations through concealments or falsifications relating to subversive information. Violation must be presented to Department instead of local USAs for prosecutive opinion. They ordinarily involve execution of U. S. Government forms. Common violators are employees of private concerns having Government contracts who execute Government forms required for clearance for access to classified information. (See section 47, volume II, of this manual.)

b. Private correspondence with foreign governments (Title 18, USC, § 953)
Prohibits U. S. citizen from corresponding, without U. S. authority, with foreign government to influence conduct of that government in relation to any disputes or controversies with U. S. or to defeat measures of U. S.

c. Rebellion or insurrection (Title 18, USC, § 2383)
Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against authority of U. S. or its laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under U. S.

d. Sedition (Title 18, USC, §§ 2387, 2388, and 2391)
These sections penalize attempts to undermine loyalty, discipline, or morale of U. S. armed forces. (See section 88, volume III, of this manual.)

e. Seditious conspiracy (Title 18, USC, § 2384)
If two or more persons in any state or territory, or in any place subject to jurisdiction of U. S., conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force Government of U. S., or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay execution of any law of U. S., or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of U. S. contrary to authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

f. Recruiting for service against U. S. (Title 18, USC, § 2389)
Whoever recruits soldiers or sailors within U. S., or in any place subject to its jurisdiction, to engage in armed hostility against the same; or whoever opens within U. S., or any place subject to its jurisdiction, a recruiting station for enlistment of soldiers and sailors to serve in any manner in armed hostilities against U. S. shall be fined not more that $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

g. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended by Expatriation Act of 1954
The 1952 act provides that national of U. S., whether by birth or naturalization, shall automatically lose his nationality if he is convicted of: (1) committing any act of treason against U. S., or (2) attempting to overthrow by force U. S. Government, or (3) bearing arms against U. S. Offenses committed subsequent to 12-24-52 where conviction is obtained make defendant subject to expatriation. Expatriation Act of 1954 provides for expatriation when subject is convicted for one of following offenses subsequent to 9-3-54: (1) violating or conspiring to violate Title 18, USC, § 2383 (inciting rebellion or insurrection against U. S.); or (2) willfully performing any act in violation of Title 18, USC, § 2385 (Smith Act of 1940); or (3) violating Title 18, USC, § 2384, by engaging in conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force U. S. Government; or (4) levying war against U. S.

B. INVESTIGATION OF C[illegible]UNIST PARTY, USA; SOCIALIST WO[illegible]ERS PARTY; OTHER MARXIST [REVOLUTIONARY-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS; FRONT GROUPS; [REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES] AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purposes of investigation
   - a. To obtain legally admissible evidence for prosecution under existing Federal statutes
   - b. To obtain sufficient pertinent data to determine organization's character and permit implementation of EO 10450
   - c. To obtain intelligence data in order to have day-to-day appraisal of strength, dangerousness, and activities of organization; and to keep Department and other interested Government agencies advised

   Specific objectives should include:
   - a. Development of confidential informants at all levels of organization
   - b. Coverage of all important ramifications of organization's activities
   - c. Development of admissible evidence against organization's officials for violation of Federal laws
2. Policy
   - a. General
     - (1) By Presidential directive 9-6-39, and subsequent restatements, FBI is charged with responsibility for coordinating all information regarding U. S. internal security.
     - (2) FBI employees should not discuss communist or related investigations with any unauthorized individuals. This subject is not to be discussed in speeches of Bureau employees without specific authorization. However, mimeographed material, including speeches, testimony, and magazine articles prepared by Director, may be furnished without discussion to individuals interested.
     - (3) Investigations must be conducted in most discreet and thorough manner. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during security investigations without Bureau authority.
     - (4) Established sources and informants who are students or employees at institution of learning, but who are not reporting on any campus activities or any matter pertaining to educational institution, may be contacted without Bureau authority. These contacts must be made away from campus.
     - (5) No photographic surveillances are to be conducted in security cases without specific Bureau authority and then only when essential to protect Bureau's interest in internal security cases by supplementing informant coverage. In request for Bureau authority for photographic surveillance, outline manner in which it will be conducted and supervised.
   - b. Established subversive groups
     - (1) Keep Bureau currently advised by appropriate communication, and later incorporate in reports, all pertinent activities, including any changes in principal officers, structure of organization, and forthcoming events.
     - (2) If no specific leads outstanding, case may be placed in pending-inactive status after submission of initial report.
     - (3) Submit reports semiannually unless advised otherwise in individual cases.
   - [c. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations, including those affiliated with [revolutionary activities] movement.
     - (1) When information is received concerning formation of group, immediately open case and advise Bureau.
     - (2) Conduct sufficient inquiry through established sources to determine character of group.
       - (a) If further investigation warranted, submit report and thereafter submit reports semiannually unless advised otherwise in individual cases.
       - (b) If further investigation not warranted, furnish Bureau results of preliminary inquiry and reasons for this determination by letter. Incorporate any pertinent information in form suitable for dissemination.

(8) Develop fully and include following in report:
   (a) Address of organization
   (b) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership
   (c) Principal officers of organization
   (d) Pertinent information showing communist objective is to infiltrate organization and influence its policy. Results of infiltration efforts, including communist affiliations of officers and members.

(9) Caption of all correspondence should contain "Communist Infiltration" preceding name of organization.

(10) If organization becomes completely dominated and controlled by CPUSA or other communist group, submit recommendation to Bureau to drop "Communist Infiltration" from title and investigate as communist front.

g. Revolutionary[Activities]underground-type publications

(1) Conduct no investigation without prior Bureau approval.

(2) Review all[revolutionary activities]underground-type publications coming to your attention to determine if pertinent material therein advocates civil disobedience, rioting, preparation or use of explosives, and other extremist activity. Advise Bureau of results of review and request Bureau approval for investigation. Submit your request using caption containing title of publication with character "IS -[Revolutionary Activities."]

(3) Upon receipt of Bureau authority for investigation, obtain information concerning nature of publication, its location, circulation, sources of income, and principal organizers.

(4) Handle investigation discreetly through established sources and submit results in form suitable for dissemination.

3. Investigative procedures re subversive organizations,[revolutionary activities]groups, suspected subversive organizations, and communist fronts
Develop fully and report on following topics, where applicable:

a. Origin and scope
Date of formation. Circumstances under which founded. Identify individual or individuals responsible for organizing group. Identify all chapters and give their locations.

b. Whether incorporated
Determine if organization has filed incorporation papers with appropriate state officials.

c. Aims and purposes
Determine whether organization advocates violence, resistance, and unlawful activity.

d. Location of headquarters

e. Officers
List principal officers, including board of directors, and give appropriate characterization of each showing subversive affiliation.

f. Membership

(1) General
Ascertain estimated membership. Whenever possible, secure membership lists, mailing lists, or other records showing affiliation with organization. Secure accurate description of all lists to eliminate confusion as to exact identity or significance of any list.

(2) CPUSA
Details of semiannual reports are not to contain membership statistics. Following instructions are for cover pages.

(a) Cover pages must contain latest statistics on total CPUSA members in district. Set forth on separate page or pages. Offices covering district headquarters should submit following figures: for entire district, for individual states, or portion of state covered by district. Auxiliary offices which have been authorized to submit this data by letter should include membership figures in such letters and submit them to Bureau and office of origin on April 1 and October 1. Office of origin responsible to obtain complete figures from auxiliary offices.

(b) Each office must show for its territory following: number of Negroes in CPUSA, name and title of each Negro who has national level position or who has district level position above that of club chairman. When possible, membership totals should be broken down as to nationality, sex, employment, veteran status, and membership in unions.

(c) Include evaluation of reliability of figures furnished by each source and of final figures. Use of only one source is not acceptable unless facts demonstrate such information is most reliable available. Also include totals of positively identified CPUSA members and tentatively identified members within six-month period preceding report.

(d) Explain in detail any increase or decrease in membership. Include results of membership recruiting drives. Endeavor to ascertain results of national registration drives.

(e) Include whether all persons identified as CPUSA members in report who reside within area covered by reporting office are listed in Administrative Index (ADEX), or are informants or sources. List any exception by name and show status of investigation and whether name has been furnished to Bureau for indexing.

g. Official organ, if any, and other literature

(1) May be obtained through confidential mailbox, panel sources, and confidential informants

(2) Appropriately identify all such literature.

(3) Promptly furnish to Bureau at least one copy of each pertinent piece of literature.

h. General activities

i. Finances
Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Emphasis must be placed on determining if funds are being furnished organizations from foreign sources and if there is any rapport between the organizations and organizations in foreign countries.

j. Support given to or received from CPUSA or other communist group
Develop evidence showing support, financial or otherwise, given by organization to CPUSA or other communist group or received by organization from CPUSA or other communist group.

k. Implementation of CPUSA line or that of other communist group
Usually shown through comparison of programs and literature of organization with those of CPUSA or other communist group during any particular period.

l. Accuracy of identifications
Use extreme care to assure statements relating to affiliations or membership in subversive organizations are accurate in all respects. Show exact basis, plus corroboration wherever possible, for identification of suspected organizations or individuals with information of a possible subversive nature. Never refer to a person as a "known communist" unless he is publicly known as such.

m. Specific requirements for CPUSA investigations
Follow previously established reporting format. New York is responsible, in addition to reporting activities of New York District, for investigating and reporting separately on national committee meetings, national training schools, and other important national meetings.

n. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyist groups
All offices submit semiannual reports and carry as pending inactive, except New York whose report on SWP activities on national basis should be designated pending. New York also submit report on local SWP activities. Indicate in cover pages whether all persons identified in report as members of SWP or as members of other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyist groups who reside within area covered by reporting office are listed in[Administrative Index (ADEX),]or are informants or sources. List any exception by name and show status of investigation and state whether name has been furnished Bureau for indexing.

Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of information, interviews with past or present CPUSA members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Agents attending mass meetings, etc.

4. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against President
On[11-26-71,]an "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the[United States]Secret Service Concerning[Protective Responsibilities"] was signed and became effective. This agreement is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual. Agreement provides that FBI, in its investigations of organizations whose activities are inimical to welfare of U. S., will be alert to and promptly notify Secret Service of any information indicating plot against person of the President. It is responsibility of Secret Service to initiate necessary action to neutralize such plot.

a. Be alert during investigation of organization for information indicating plot against person of President. Upon receipt, immediately furnish complete details to nearest office of Secret Service and appropriate local law enforcement agencies and advise Bureau by teletype, or telephone if facts warrant, of information furnished and fact it has been so disseminated. Attempt immediately to verify information, but do not attempt evaluation of information.

b. Promptly prepare LHM, including complete details disseminated and identities of Secret Service officer and local law enforcement officers to whom given and date and time of notification. Promptly disseminate LHM locally to Secret Service and any other appropriate Government agency and furnish sufficient copies to Bureau for dissemination at[FBIHQ.] Disseminate copies of all LHMs and reports concerning organization locally to Secret Service on continuing basis and furnish extra copies of such communications to Bureau for dissemination at[FBIHQ.]

c. Determine identities of members of organization involved in plot. Background information concerning such individuals should be fully developed and included in communications disseminated to Secret Service.

5. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C (code name "CIRM"). Bufile 100-442529. Office of origin: New York

a. Submit quarterly reports, to reach Bureau by February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1 on full extent of communist influence in racial matters. Include information on communist infiltration of Negro organizations and subversive individuals active in racial movement. Include this information even if it duplicates information in other reports. Offices with no information to report advise Bureau by letter.

b. Use three-part outline in report: (1) Communist Strategy, (2) Communist Tactics, and (3) Communist Penetration and Influence in Racial Organizations. Under strategy, include plans and line of CPUSA and other communist groups, such as SWP and Progressive Labor Party. Under tactics, describe communist direction, influence, and participation in demonstrations, disturbances, and other events with racial overtones. List events in chronological order with appropriate subheadings. In part three, report influence of subversives in racial organizations.

6. Title and character.
Communications covering organizations and groups should carry the name of the organization and characters as set out below.

a. Internal Security - Communist
The use of this character will apply to:
(1) Communist basic revolutionary organizations (both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese); for example, Communist Party, USA, and Progressive Labor Party.
(2) Communist front groups.
(3) Communist infiltrated groups.

b. Internal Security - Communist (Trotskyist)
The use of this character will apply to:
(1) Trotskyist basic revolutionary organizations such as the Socialist Workers Party, Workers World Party, Young Socialist Alliance and Youth Against War and Fascism.
(2) Trotskyist fronts such as the Student Mobilization Committee.

c. Internal Security -[Revolutionary Activities]
This will include all organizations affiliated with[Revolutionary] Movement[groups]except those which would be characterized as Communist or Trotskyist front and infiltrated groups.

Where appropriate, include identity of particular district or field division; e.g.,

Communist Party, USA
____________District
____________Division
Internal Security - C

7. Classification - 100

5. Recommendation [illegible] and preparation of ADEX cards
   a. When potential dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin is to prepare recommendation to Bureau on FD-122, in triplicate. Forward original and copy to Bureau, and place copy in subject's file. FD-122 has three uses: (1) to recommend subject for ADEX, (2) to submit changes for existing cards, and (3) to recommend subject be deleted from ADEX. Submit abstract when recommending subject for ADEX, or removal from ADEX, but no abstract for changes.
   b. When FD-122 is submitted to recommend subject for ADEX, attach additional page or pages setting out succinct summary of facts on which recommendation based. Facts must be in sufficient detail to support recommendation, including justification for designated category.
   c. If, at conclusion of investigation, subject is not being recommended for ADEX, closing communication should show reasons.
   d. Summary report must be submitted when subject is recommended for ADEX unless one was previously furnished to Bureau. In latter instance, up-to-date report or LHM should be submitted. If case is pending because of outstanding leads, set out additional lead to follow authorization of ADEX card by Bureau. If case would otherwise be closed, place in pending-inactive status with lead to follow approval by Bureau and then close administratively.
   e. Do not delay recommendations for ADEX because of absence of background or descriptive data. Submit recommendation with current report and retain in pending status to obtain missing items.
   f. Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for ADEX. FD-122 should include data required for unavailable section.
   g. If Bureau approves recommendation, ADEX cards will be prepared. Copy of FD-122 will be returned stamped "ADEX card approved and prepared, two copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card." These cards should be filed in field office ADEX as outlined below. Place returned copy of FD-122 in subject's main file.
   h. When cards are received from Bureau, check data for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph, which are maintained on separate card stapled to back of one ADEX card. File this card in geographical section (except unavailable section cards.) Second ADEX card is filed in alphabetical section.
6. Inclusion in Stop Index File
   a. Submit FD-122 in triplicate to Bureau when designating Category I ADEX subjects who are extremists for inclusion in Stop Index File.
   b. Succinct summary with FD-122 should contain recommendation for inclusion in Stop Index File and appropriate descriptive data.
   c. After recommendation approved, the third FD-122 copy will be forwarded to the Voucher-Statistical Section which maintains the Stop Index File for Category I ADEX extremist subjects.
7. Content and appearance of ADEX card
   a. Data to appear on face of card
      When complete, face of ADEX card should contain following information. If any items are missing, keep case pending to obtain necessary information. Set forth under each item are possible categories in which subject may be classified and code letters for appropriate space on FD-122. These code letters will appear on cards received from Bureau.
      (1) Name and aliases
          Full and correct name and aliases of subject
      (2) Race

White (Caucasian)	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others, including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indian, etc.)

(3)	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
(4)	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien	AL
	(If unknown, space should be left blank, but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
(5)	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	American Workers' Communist Party	AWC
	Black Nationalist	BNT
	Black Panther Party	BPP
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	Groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
	Minutemen	MIN
[	Nation of Islam	NOI
	Progressive Labor Party	PLP
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	Revolutionary Action Movement	RAM
[	[Revolutionary Activities	RA]
	Revolutionary Union	RU
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Spartacist League	SPL
	Student National Coordinating Committee	SNC
	Students for a Democratic Society	SDS
	Workers World Party	WWP
	Albanian	ALB
	Bulgarian	BUL
	Chinese	CH
	Cuban	CUB
	Czechoslovakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Polish	POL
	Romanian	ROM
	Russian	RUS
	Yugoslavian	YUG
(6)	Category designation	
	Category I	C I
	Category II	C II
	Category III	C III
	Category IV	C IV
(7)	Special Tabbing	
	Pro-Cuban	CUB
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	U. S. Government employees	GOV
(8)	Unavailable section	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
(9)	Date and place of birth	

6. Character
   a. The designation "Security Matter" (SM where appropriate) is to be set out in all instances. Use organizational affiliation where organization with which subject is affiliated is under current or continuing investigation or where a Bureau-approved thumbnail sketch exists.
      Examples: Security Matter - C (Communist)
      Security Matter - SWP (Socialist Workers Party)
      Security Matter - SMC (Student Mobilization Committee)
   b. Every effort is to be made to use a meaningful organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency designation; however, where this cannot be done, following designations should be used:
      (1) Security Matter - Subversive (Where activity of subject consists primarily of efforts to disrupt or destroy Government operations through violent protest and is in line with espousal or support of philosophy which advocates overthrow of Government by any means possible, including force and violence, and/or a demonstrated propensity for violence to achieve the same objective or to deny others their rights under the Constitution.)
      (2) Security Matter -[Revolutionary Activities](Where activity of subject is primarily extremist, student and/or communal-existence oriented and relates to violent efforts to disrupt or destroy Government operations in line with espousal or support of a philosophy which advocates overthrow of the Government by any means possible, including force and violence, and/or a demonstrated propensity for violence to achieve the same objective or to deny others their rights under the Constitution.)

7. Status
   Carry cases as pending until all active investigation has been conducted. Thereafter, status shall be as follows:
   a. Category I: Cases should remain in pending status and report or LHM submitted six months from date of last report or LHM.
   b. Category II: Cases should be reopened 45 days prior to six months from date of last verification to meet annual reporting and six-month verifications requirements.
   c. Category III: Cases should be reopened 45 days prior to one year from date of last annual verifications to meet annual reporting and verifications requirements.
   d. Category IV: Cases in which there have been reports, or LHMs in lieu of reports, or verifications within last year should be reopened 45 days prior to one year from that date to meet annual verifications requirements and 45 days prior to two years from that date to meet biennial reporting requirements.
   e. Subjects recommended for ADEX
      (1) Pending inactive
          If all active investigation completed at time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau, set forth lead to follow for ADEX approval.
      (2) Closed
          After ADEX approved, follow by administrative tickler for periodic report.
   f. Subject not being recommended for ADEX
      Closed - prior to closing, comply with instructions pertaining to interviews.

8. Content
   a. Include following and handle under topical headings (both in reports and LHMs) where appropriate.
      (1) Background
          (a) Birth data
          (b) Citizenship status

(c) Education
(d) Marital status
(e) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
(f) Identification record
(g) Employment
(h) Residence
(i) Status of health (if known)

(2) Connections with basic revolutionary groups, front groups, and/or other subversive organizations or movements
(a) Information concerning admission into group, including sponsors, etc.
(b) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement

(3) Revolutionary statements by subject
(a) Determine each statement and full details surrounding it.
(b) Determine all statements showing adherence to principles of Marxism-Leninism or other revolutionary doctrines.

(4) Other activities indicating furtherance of program of subversive organizations
(a) Speeches and writings
(b) Organizational directives and/or educational outlines signed by or issued by subject, or issued while subject was officer of organization
(c) Pertinent contacts between subject and leaders of organizations
(d) Details concerning subject's attendance or connection with subversive training schools

(5) False statements made by subject, including aliases
Evidence may be obtained from passports, tax returns, and voting, marital, employment, and selective service records.

(6) Miscellaneous
Pertinent items not falling under above categories

b. Reports on individuals should be confined to:
(1) Information as to membership and activity in basic revolutionary organizations, front organizations, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups
(2) Position and importance of subject in subversive movement
(3) Pertinent background information
Include only information pertinent to determining whether or not subject is engaged in subversive activities. Set out date or period to which it pertains; e.g., John Doe advised on January 15, 1970, that subject attended CP meetings in January, 1965, in Syracuse, New York.

c. Summarizing information
(1) When prior summary reports are not suitable for dissemination, include all pertinent information in current summary report with sources fully protected.
(2) Repetitious and cumulative items may be limited to representative number with each item set forth fully documented. Number of items will depend upon preponderance of other information showing dangerousness of subject.
(3) When selection of representative number of items is made, follow with summary statement that source advised during specified period of time subject also attended certain number of other meetings. (Set out file number and serial range in documenting such statements.)
(4) Where there is extensive activity in subversive organizations, it is permissible to use narrative statements without exact dates of

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. Statutes 7
  1. Public Law 733 as implemented by EO 10450 7
  2. Smith Act of 1940 (Title 18, USC, § 2385). Advocating overthrow of Government 7
  3. Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50, USC, §§ 781-816) 7
    a. Communist-action organizations 8
      (1) Definition (§ 782) 8
      (2) Factors to be considered by Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) in determining whether organization is communist-action organization (§ 792) 8
    b. Communist front organizations 8
      (1) Definition (§ 782) 8
      (2) Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist front organization (§ 792) 8
    c. How proceedings are instituted (§ 792) 8
    d. Findings of Board and publication of same (§ 792) 8
    e. Employment of members; contributions of funds, services, or advice by Government personnel (§ 784) 8
    f. Use of mail and instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce (§ 789) 9
[g. [Deleted] 9
    h. Contributing to establishment of totalitarian dictatorship (§ 783) 9
  4. Communist Control Act of 1954 9
    a. Definition of communist-infiltrated organization 9
    b. Proceedings when Attorney General has reason to believe organization is communist infiltrated 10
    c. Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist infiltrated (§ 792a) 10
  5. Other statutes 11
    a. Fraud against Government (Title 18, USC, § 1001) 11
    b. Private correspondence with foreign governments (Title 18, USC, § 953) 11
    c. Rebellion or insurrection (Title 18, USC, § 2383) 11
    d. Sedition (Title 18, USC, §§ 2387, 2388, and 2391) 11
    e. Seditious conspiracy (Title 18, USC, § 2384) 11
    f. Recruiting for service against U. S. (Title 18, USC, § 2389) 11
    g. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended by Expatriation Act of 1954 11
B. Investigation of Communist Party, USA; Socialist Workers Party; Other Marxist Revolutionary-Type Organizations; Front Groups; New Left and Miscellaneous Organizations 12
  1. Purposes of investigation 12
  2. Policy 12
    a. General 12
    b. Established subversive groups 12
    c. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations, including those affiliated with new left movement 12
    d. Political organizations 13
    e. Organizations connected with institutions of learning 13
    f. Legitimate noncommunist organizations which are communist infiltrated 13
[[g. Revolutionary New Left underground-type publications 13a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

3. Investigative procedures re subversive organizations, new left groups, suspected subversive organizations, and communist fronts........ 14
   a. Origin and scope........ 14
   b. Whether incorporated........ 14
   c. Aims and purposes........ 14
   d. Location of headquarters........ 14
   e. Officers........ 14
   f. Membership........ 14
   g. Official organ, if any, and other literature........ 14
   h. General activities........ 14
   i. Finances........ 15
   j. Support given to or received from CPUSA or other communist group........ 15
   k. Implementation of CPUSA line or that of other communist group........ 15
   l. Accuracy of identifications........ 15
   m. Specific requirements for CPUSA investigations........ 15
   n. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyist groups........ 15
4. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against President........ 15
5. Communist influence in racial matters, Internal Security - C. 16
6. Title and character........ 16
7. Classification........ 16

C. Investigation of Communist Infiltration of Labor Unions........ 17
1. Purpose of investigation........ 17
2. Policy........ 17
3. Title........ 17
4. Classification........ 17
5. Character........ 17

D. Investigations of Individuals - Policy and Objectives........ 18
1. Definitions........ 18
2. FBI responsibility........ 18
3. Purposes of investigation........ 18
4. Individuals to be investigated........ 18
5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals........ 19
   a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning........ 19
   b. Subjects not connected with institution of learning........ 20
   c. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishment, employees of United Nations or international organizations, and members of armed forces........ 20
6. Fraud against Government (FAG) violations........ 20
   a. Policy........ 20
   b. Investigation........ 20
   c. Legal questions........ 20
   d. Cases referred by military........ 21
7. Submission of subversive derogatory information on individuals........ 21

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

E. Investigation of Individuals - Investigative Procedures and Techniques 22
  1. General 22
  2. Scope of investigations 22
    a. Background 22
    b. Subversive activity 23
  3. Missing security subjects 24
  4. Individuals traveling abroad 25
  5. File reviews 26
  6. Security informants 26
  7. Physical surveillances 26
  8. Photographic surveillances 26
  9. Public sources 26
  10. Records of private firms 26
  11. Channelizing of information to case files 26
  12. Preservation of evidence 26a
  13. Interviews with subjects of security investigations 27
    a. Policy 27
    b. Purpose 27
    c. SAC authority 27
    d. Procedures for interviews under SAC authority 27
    e. Prior Bureau authority 27
    f. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview 28
    g. Preparation for and conduct of interview 28
    h. Reporting results of interview 29
    i. Reinterviews of [ADEX] subjects 30
    j. Maintenance of control file on former members of subversive organizations 30
F. Administrative Index 31
  1. Purpose and general policy 31
  2. Categories 31
    a. Category I 31
    b. Category II 31
    c. Category III 31
    d. Category IV 32
  3. Factors relating to dangerousness 32
  4. Evaluating interviews 32
  5. Recommendation for and preparation of ADEX cards 33
  6. Inclusion in Stop Index File 33
  7. Content and appearance of ADEX card 33
    a. Data to appear on face of card 33
    b. Data to appear on separate attached card 35
  8. Arrangement of ADEX 35
    a. At Bureau 35
    b. In Field Office 35
      (1) Geographical section 35
      (2) Alphabetical section 35
      (3) Unavailable section 35
    c. Special interest subjects 36
      (1) Espionage subjects 36
      (2) U. S. Government employees 37
      (3) Foreign government employees 37
      (4) Pro-Cuban individuals 37

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
9. Periodic verification of addresses 38
10. Changes, additions, and deletions of data on ADEX cards 38
11. Movement of subjects between offices 38
12. Cancellation and removal of cards from ADEX 39
    a. Death of a subject 39
    b. Permanent departure 39
    c. Imprisonment of subject 39
    d. Entry of subject into armed forces 39
    e. Security informants 40
    f. Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous 40
13. Administrative procedures regarding Category designation 40
    a. Changes in category 40
    b. Colors of ADEX cards 40
14. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities 40
    a. Responsibility 40
    b. Inclusion in ADEX 41
    c. Dissemination 41
    d. Status of cases 42
    e. Reports 42
15. Correlation of other investigations with ADEX 42
G. Reports on Individuals 42
1. General 42
2. Schedule of submission of reports or LHMs 42
3. Origin 42
4. Classification 42
5. Title 42
6. Character 43
7. Status 43
8. Content 43
9. Administrative data - cover pages 45
    a. General 45
    b. Documentation of reports 45
10. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 45
H. Dissemination of Data Developed in Security Investigations 45
1. Policy 45
2. Bureau requirements 45
    a. Members of armed forces 46
    b. Aliens and naturalized citizens 46
    c. Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with military services 46
    d. Employees of public utilities 46
    e. Individuals on inactive duty who are members of or hold commissions in reserve branches or National Guard 46
    f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including longshoremen and waterfront employees 46
    g. Employees of Federal Government within purview of Executive Order 10450 46
    h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of defense installation 47
    i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration 47
    j. Dissemination to Secret Service 47
    k. Dissemination at Bureau .... 48]

A. STATUTES

There are four principal statutes to consider in security investigations: Public Law 733 as implemented by Executive Order (EO) 10450, Smith Act of 1940, Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA-50), and Communist Control Act of 1954. On occasion, other statutes may be applicable, such as seditious conspiracy, treason, fraud against Government, and Registration Act.

1. Public Law 733 as implemented by EO 10450

President, by Executive Order 10450, dated 4-27-53, established government-wide employee security program, based on authority and approach set forth by Congress in Public Law 733, enacted on 8-26-50.

Section 8(a) of EO 10450 provides that investigations conducted pursuant to this order shall be designed to develop information as to whether employment or retention in employment in Federal service of person being investigated is clearly consistent with interests of national security. Such information relates, among other things, to following:

> "Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."

Attorney General's part of employee security program consists of making full field investigations through FBI; maintaining list of totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive organizations; and giving agencies advice in establishing and maintaining their security programs.

2. Smith Act of 1940 (Title 18, USC, § 2385). Advocating overthrow of Government

Smith Act prohibits knowingly advocating or teaching overthrow of Government by force or violence; publishing or circulating written or printed material with intent to cause such overthrow; attempting to organize group of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage such overthrow; and conspiring to commit these offenses. Penalty for conviction carries fine of not more than $20,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than 20 years and shall be ineligible for employment by U. S. or any department or agency thereof for five years next following his conviction. Decisions by Supreme Court on 6-7-57 and 6-5-61 established new evidentiary standards, such as proof of incitement to action, which must be met by Government in future prosecutions under this act.

[3. Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50, USC, §§[781-810)]

Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA-50) became effective 9-23-50. It generally provides for registration of communist-action and communist front organizations; amends obstruction of justice statute; implements espionage and sabotage statutes and various immigration and naturalization regula-
[tions;[and]prohibits contributing to establishment of totalitarian dic-
[tatorship. Act was amended 1-2-68 to delete requirement that communist organizations and their members register with Attorney General, a procedure ruled unconstitutional by Supreme Court because it violated constitutional rights against self-incrimination. This manual section is limited to ISA-50 provisions pertaining to communist-action organizations,
[communist front organizations,[and]contributing to establishment of
[totalitarian dictatorship.

a. Communist-action organizations

(1) Definition (§ 782)

Term "communist-action organization" means any organization in U. S. (other than diplomatic representative or mission of foreign government accredited by Department of State) which is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by foreign government or foreign organization controlling world communist movement (referred to in section 781) and which operates primarily to advance objectives of world communist movement.

(2) Factors to be considered by Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) in determining whether organization is communist-action organization (§ 792)

SACB considers relationship of organization under review to foreign organization or foreign government described in above definition in regard to policies, activities, accountability, training received, financial support, concealment of foreign direction, and allegiance of its principal leaders to such foreign government or foreign organization.

b. Communist front organizations

(1) Definition (§ 782)

Term "communist front organization" means any organization in U. S. (other than communist-action organization) which (a) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by communist-action organization or (b) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by one or more members of communist-action organization, and (c) is primarily operated for purpose of giving aid and support to communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement.

(2) Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist front organization (§ 792)

SACB considers extent to which organization is managed and financed by any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement. SACB also considers extent to which organization's policies are similar to and extent it promotes objectives of any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement.

c. How proceedings are instituted (§ 792)

When Attorney General has reason to believe any organization is communist-action or communist front organization, he files petition with SACB (and serves upon organization copy thereof) for determination that such is true by hearing before SACB.

d. Findings of Board and publication of same (§ 792)

If, after hearing, SACB finds (1) that organization is communist-action or communist front organization, it makes report in writing of its findings and causes to be served on such organization an order determining organization to be communist-action or communist front organization.

Findings of SACB are published in Federal Register and this publication is notice to all persons that such orders have become final; records of SACB concerning such hearings shall be available to public.

e. Employment of members; contributions of funds, services, or advice by Government personnel (§ 784)

When there is in effect final order of SACB determining any organization to be communist-action or communist front organization, it shall be unlawful

(1) For any member of such organization with knowledge or notice of such final order: (a) to conceal or fail to disclose that he is a member of such organization in seeking, accepting, or holding any nonelective office or employment under U. S.; (b) to hold any nonelective office or employment under U. S.; (c) to conceal or fail to disclose that he is member of such organization in seeking, accepting, or holding employment in any defense facility; or (d) to hold office or employment with any labor organization, as defined in section 2 (5) of National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or to represent any employer in any matter or proceeding arising or pending under that act.

(2) For any officer or employee of U. S. or of any defense facility, with knowledge or notice of such final order of SACB: (a) to contribute funds or services to such organization; or (b) to advise, counsel, or urge any person, with knowledge or notice that such person is member of such organization, to perform or omit to perform, any act if such act or omission would constitute violation of any provision of paragraph (1) above.

f. Use of mail and instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce (§ 789)
Act requires any person acting for or on behalf of any organization for which there is in effect final order of SACB determining it to be communist-action or communist front organization to label properly all publications transmitted through mail or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce.

[g. [Deleted]

h. Contributing to establishment of totalitarian dictatorship (§ 783)
ISA-50 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to combine, conspire, or agree with any other person to perform any act which would substantially contribute to establishment within U. S. of a totalitarian dictatorship, direction and control of which is to be vested in, or exercised by, or under domination or control of any foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign individual. Maximum penalty is $10,000 or 10 years, or both, and thereafter be inelegible to hold any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by Constitution or laws of U. S. Statute of limitations is 10 years, except statute will not run on officer or employee of U. S. until after his employment has ceased.

4. Communist Control Act of 1954
Act is divided into three measures: (a) termination of rights, privileges, and immunities formerly enjoyed by CPUSA and subsidiary organizations: (b) determination of membership in CPUSA and other subversive organizations; and (c) amendment of ISA-50, bringing within its purview communist-infiltrated organizations. This manual section is limited to provisions pertaining to communist-infiltrated organizations (Title 50, USC, § 782).

a. Definition of communist-infiltrated organization
Term "communist-infiltrated organization" means any organization in U. S. (other than communist-action or communist front organization) which (1) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by individual or individuals who are, or who within three years have been, actively engaged in giving aid or support to communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement, and (2) is serving, or within last three years has served, as means for (a) giving aid or support to any such organization, government, or

movement, or (b) impairment of military strength of U. S. or its industrial capacity to furnish logistical support required by its armed forces. Provided, however, that any labor organization which is affiliate in good standing of national federation or other labor organizations whose policies and activities have been directed to opposing communist organizations, communist foreign government, or world communist movement shall be presumed prima facie not to be communist-infiltrated organization.

b. Proceedings when Attorney General has reason to believe organization is communist infiltrated

He may file petition with SACB and serve copy on communist-infiltrated organization. He may join more than one organization as respondents to his petition. Hearings will then be conducted by SACB on evidence presented by Attorney General. SACB is empowered to make finding that organization is or is not communist-infiltrated, and within six months after an unfavorable determination organization may petition for a new determination.

SACB is also authorized to notify National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) of its findings and to publish findings in Federal Register. NLRB has power to deny organizations found to be communist infiltrated representation before it, and upon petition of twenty per cent of membership of communist-infiltrated labor union to NLRB, that body may nullify rights of union to represent its members and call for election to determine new bargaining representative.

c. Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist infiltrated (§ 792a)

SACB shall consider following:

(1) To what extent, if any, effective management of affairs of organization is conducted by one or more individuals who are, or within three years have been, (a) members, agents, or representatives of any communist organization, any communist foreign government, or the world communist movement with knowledge of nature and purpose thereof; or (b) engaged in giving aid or support to any such organization, government, or movement with knowledge of nature and purpose

(2) To what extent, if any, policies of such organization are, or within three years have been, formulated and carried out pursuant to direction or advice or any member, agent, or representative of any such organization, government, or movement

(3) To what extent, if any, personnel and resources of such organization are, or within three years have been, used to further or promote objectives of any such communist organization, government, or movement

(4) To what extent, if any, such organization within three years has received from, or furnished to or for use of, any such communist organization, government, or movement any funds or other material assistance

(5) To what extent, if any, such organization is, or within three years has been, affiliated in any way with any such communist organization, government, or movement

(6) To what extent, if any, affiliation of such organization, or any individual or individuals who are members thereof, or who manage its affairs, with any such communist organization, government, or movement is concealed from or is not disclosed to the membership

(7) To what extent, if any, such organization or any of its managers or members are, or within three years have been, knowingly engaged (a) in any conduct punishable under § 783 or § 794 or under chapter 37, 105, or 115 of Title 18; or (b) with intent to impair military strength of U. S. or its industrial capacity to furnish logistical or other support required by its armed forces, in any activity resulting in or contributing to any such impairment

d. Political or[illegible]izations
  - (1) Obtain Bureau approval to institute investigation.
  - (2) Furnish all pertinent information re communist infiltration, influence, or control of organization to Bureau by letter.

e. Organizations connected with institutions of learning
  - (1) Conduct no investigation without prior Bureau approval.
  - (2) In request for Bureau approval, submit all available data and reason investigation is necessary.
  - (3) If Bureau authority granted, it is permissible to contact all established reliable sources, including those in administrative capacity with institution of learning.
  - (4) Complete justification must be submitted and Bureau authortiy obtained before conducting interview with student, graduate student, or professor connected with institution of learning.

f. Legitimate noncommunist organizations which are communist infiltrated
  - (1) Conduct no investigation without prior Bureau approval.
  - (2) Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced Agents.
  - (3) Advise Bureau promptly under caption "Cominfil (name of organization)" when one of following exists and include recommendation for instituting investigation:
    - (a) Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) or other communist organization has specifically instructed its members to infiltrate organization.
    - (b) CPUSA members or members of other communist groups have infiltrated organization in sufficient strength to influence or control organization.
  - (4) When advising Bureau, include following:
    - (a) Name and address of organization
    - (b) Extent of communist infiltration
    - (c) Identities of CPUSA members or members of other communist groups and positions held in organization
    - (d) List of informants who hold positions, are members, or report on organization
    - (e) Recommendation as to additional investigation

    Above instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates, as well as national organization. Break down information required under items (c) and (d) above by local chapters where they exist.
  - (5) No informant or source should be instructed by FBI to join or attend meetings. If CPUSA or other communist organization asks informant to do so, he should comply.
  - (6) No member of organization not already established source should be contacted regarding organization. This does not preclude pretext interviews where advisable.
  - (7) Include in first paragraph of details of report basis for investigation and statement it is directed solely toward establishing extent of infiltration or that organization is specific target for infiltration, and that Bureau is not investigating legitimate activities of organization.

(8) Develop fully and include following in report:
  (a) Address of organization
  (b) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership
  (c) Principal officers of organization
  (d) Pertinent information showing communist objective is to infiltrate organization and influence its policy. Results of infiltration efforts, including communist affiliations of officers and members.

(9) Caption of all correspondence should contain "Communist Infiltration" preceding name of organization.

(10) If organization becomes completely dominated and controlled by CPUSA or other communist group, submit recommendation to Bureau to drop "Communist Infiltration" from title and investigate as communist front.

[g. Revolutionary New Left underground-type publications

(1) Conduct no investigation without prior Bureau approval.

(2) Review all New Left underground-type publications coming to your attention to determine if pertinent material therein advocates civil disobedience, rioting, preparation or use of explosives, and other extremist activity. Advise Bureau of results of review and request Bureau approval for investigation. Submit your request using caption containing title of publication with character "IS - New Left."

(3) Upon receipt of Bureau authority for investigation, obtain information concerning nature of publication, its location, circulation, sources of income, and principal organizers.

(4) Handle investigation discreetly through established sources and submit results in form suitable for dissemination.]

3. Investigative procedures re subversive organizations, new left groups, suspected subversive organizations, and communist fronts

Develop fully and report on following topics, where applicable:

- a. Origin and scope
  Date of formation. Circumstances under which founded. Identify individual or individuals responsible for organizing group. Identify all chapters and give their locations.
- b. Whether incorporated
  Determine if organization has filed incorporation papers with appropriate state officials.
- c. Aims and purposes
  Determine whether organization advocates violence, resistance, and unlawful activity.
- d. Location of headquarters
- e. Officers
  List principal officers, including board of directors, and give appropriate characterization of each showing subversive affiliation.
- f. Membership
  - (1) General
    Ascertain estimated membership. Whenever possible, secure membership lists, mailing lists, or other records showing affiliation with organization. Secure accurate description of all lists to eliminate confusion as to exact identity or significance of any list.
  - (2) CPUSA
    Details of semiannual reports are not to contain membership statistics. Following instructions are for cover pages.
    - (a) Cover pages must contain latest statistics on total CPUSA members in district. Set forth on separate page or pages. Offices covering district headquarters should submit following figures: for entire district, for individual states, or portion of state covered by district. Auxiliary offices which have been authorized to submit this data by letter should include membership figures in such letters and submit them to Bureau and office of origin on April 1 and October 1. Office of origin responsible to obtain complete figures from auxiliary offices.
    - (b) Each office must show for its territory following: number of Negroes in CPUSA, name and title of each Negro who has national level position or who has district level position above that of club chairman. When possible, membership totals should be broken down as to nationality, sex, employment, veteran status, and membership in unions.
    - (c) Include evaluation of reliability of figures furnished by each source and of final figures. Use of only one source is not acceptable unless facts demonstrate such information is most reliable available. Also include totals of positively identified CPUSA members and tentatively identified members within six-month period preceding report.
    - (d) Explain in detail any increase or decrease in membership. Include results of membership recruiting drives. Endeavor to ascertain results of national registration drives.
    - (e) Include whether all persons identified as CPUSA members in report who reside within area covered by reporting office are listed in[Administrative Index (ADEX),]or are informants or sources. List any exception by name and show status of investigation and whether name has been furnished to Bureau for indexing.
- g. Official organ, if any, and other literature
  - (1) May be obtained through confidential mailbox, panel sources, and confidential informants
  - (2) Appropriately identify all such literature.
  - (3) Promptly furnish to Bureau at least one copy of each pertinent piece of literature.
- h. General activities

i. Finances
Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Emphasis must be placed on determining if funds are being furnished organizations from foreign sources and if there is any rapport between the organizations and organizations in foreign countries.

j. Support given to or received from CPUSA or other communist group
Develop evidence showing support, financial or otherwise, given by organization to CPUSA or other communist group or received by organization from CPUSA or other communist group.

k. Implementation of CPUSA line or that of other communist group
Usually shown through comparison of programs and literature of organization with those of CPUSA or other communist group during any particular period.

l. Accuracy of identifications
Use extreme care to assure statements relating to affiliations or membership in subversive organizations are accurate in all respects. Show exact basis, plus corroboration wherever possible, for identification of suspected organizations or individuals with information of a possible subversive nature. Never refer to a person as a "known communist" unless he is publicly known as such.

m. Specific requirements for CPUSA investigations
Follow previously established reporting format. New York is responsible, in addition to reporting activities of New York District, for investigating and reporting separately on national committee meetings, national training schools, and other important national meetings.

n. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyist groups
All offices submit semiannual reports and carry as pending inactive, except New York whose report on SWP activities on national basis should be designated pending. New York also submit report on local SWP activities. Indicate in cover pages whether all persons identified in report as members of SWP or as members of other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyist groups who reside within area covered by reporting office are listed in[Administrative Index (ADEX),]or are informants or sources. List any exception by name and show status of investigation and state whether name has been furnished Bureau for indexing.

Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of information, interviews with past or present CPUSA members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Agents attending mass meetings, etc.

4. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against President
On[11-26-71,]an "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the[United States]Secret Service Concerning[Protective Responsibilities"] was signed and became effective. This agreement is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual. Agreement provides that FBI, in its investigations of organizations whose activities are inimical to welfare of U. S., will be alert to and promptly notify Secret Service of any information indicating plot against person of the President. It is responsibility of Secret Service to initiate necessary action to neutralize such plot.

a. Be alert during investigation of organization for information indicating plot against person of President. Upon receipt, immediately furnish complete details to nearest office of Secret Service and appropriate local law enforcement agencies and advise Bureau by teletype, or telephone if facts warrant, of information furnished and fact it has been so disseminated. Attempt immediately to verify information, but do not attempt evaluation of information.

b. Promptly prepare LHM, including complete details disseminated and identities of Secret Service officer and local law enforcement officers to whom given and date and time of notification. Promptly disseminate LHM locally to Secret Service and any other appropriate Government agency and furnish sufficient copies to Bureau for dissemination at SOG. Disseminate copies of all LHMs and reports concerning organization locally to Secret Service on continuing basis and furnish extra copies of such communications to Bureau for dissemination at SOG.

c. Determine identities of members of organization involved in plot. Background information concerning such individuals should be fully developed and included in communications disseminated to Secret Service.

5. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C (code name "CIRM"). Bufile 100-442529. Office of origin: New York

a. Submit quarterly reports, to reach Bureau by February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1 on full extent of communist influence in racial matters. Include information on communist infiltration of Negro organizations and subversive individuals active in racial movement. Include this information even if it duplicates information in other reports. Offices with no information to report advise Bureau by letter.

b. Use three-part outline in report: (1) Communist Strategy, (2) Communist Tactics, and (3) Communist Penetration and Influence in Racial Organizations. Under strategy, include plans and line of CPUSA and other communist groups, such as SWP and Progressive Labor Party. Under tactics, describe communist direction, influence, and participation in demonstrations, disturbances, and other events with racial overtones. List events in chronological order with appropriate subheadings. In part three, report influence of subversives in racial organizations.

6. Title and character.

[Communications covering organizations and groups should carry the name of the organization and characters as set out below.

a. Internal Security - Communist

The use of this character will apply to:

(1) Communist basic revolutionary organizations (both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese); for example, Communist Party, USA, and Progressive Labor Party.

(2) Communist front groups.

(3) Communist infiltrated groups.

b. Internal Security - Communist (Trotskyist)

The use of this character will apply to:

(1) Trotskyist basic revolutionary organizations such as the Socialist Workers Party, Workers World Party, Young Socialist Alliance and Youth Against War and Fascism.

(2) Trotskyist fronts such as the Student Mobilization Committee.

c. Internal Security - New Left

This will include all organizations affiliated with the New Left Movement except those which would be characterized as Communist or Trotskyist front and infiltrated groups.]

Where appropriate, include identity of particular district or field division; e.g.,

Communist Party, USA
____________District
____________Division
Internal Security - C

7. Classification - 100

C. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF LABOR UNIONS

1. Purpose of investigation
   a. To obtain complete picture of control communists have over vital industry in U. S.
   b. To develop data concerning extent of communist control over important trade unions
   c. To develop evidence necessary to establish under provisions of Communist Control Act of 1954 that a labor union is communist infiltrated at time Attorney General files petition.
   d. To determine identity of each important communist in labor movement
2. Policy
   a. Prior Bureau authority required to conduct active investigation. Bureau will advise field of unions being considered under Communist Control Act of 1954. Give continuous, thorough, and expeditious attention because of limited period (three years) pertinent evidence is admissible under statutory limits in act.
   b. Ascertain availability and willingness to testify of all possible witnesses for benefit of Department in considering cases for presentation to Subversive Activities Control Board. Current informants and confidential sources should be described as currently furnishing information to FBI and not as unavailable. Department must be furnished brief statement on background and any known factors affecting credibility of all other witnesses, including discontinued informants. Investigative techniques not available for use in court may be described as unavailable.
   c. Investigation is limited to activities of individuals acting in furtherance or apparent furtherance of communist program. Goal is complete picture of extent of communist infiltration and domination.
   d. Labor union as such is not subject of investigation. Title of all communications must clearly show communist infiltration is subject of investigation. FBI is not interested in employer-employee relationships or legitimate union activities.
   e. Prior Bureau authority required to conduct interview with any officer or official of labor union during investigation of communist infiltration unless officer or official is established reliable source or confidential informant.
   f. Prepare brief history of union, including origin, constitution, bylaws, and organizational structure. Office of origin is responsible for coverage of officers and personnel of national or international office. Auxiliary offices responsible for coverage of international representatives, organizers, and regional, district, council, and local officers active within their territories.
3. Title
   Title of all communications should clearly show that communist infiltration of union involved is subject of investigation, not the union itself; e.g.,

   "Communist Infiltration of
   United Electrical Workers of
   America"
4. Classification - 100
5. Character - Internal Security - C

D. INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

1. Definitions

Following organizations are examples of "basic revolutionary organizations."

a. Communist Party, USA
b. Socialist Workers Party
c. Progressive Labor Party
d. Proletarian Party of America
e. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
f. Revolutionary Union

Black nationalist extremists and members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups and Puerto Rican subversive proindependence groups, although technically not members of basic revolutionary organizations, should be investigated under same rules. (See section 122, volume IV, of this manual.)

2. FBI responsibility

To conduct thorough investigations into background and activities of all persons in U. S. and Puerto Rico who are dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security. Each SAC is responsible for investigation of persons in his area who, because of membership or affiliation with basic revolutionary organizations or other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, may be potentially dangerous.

3. Purposes of investigation

a. Determination of dangerousness

To determine identity, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals in U. S. and Puerto Rico who, because of their membership in, activity in, or association with one or more revolutionary groups or related groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security; collection of sufficient information concerning their subversive activities to[intelligently evaluate extent of investigation needed.]

b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes

To determine identity, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals who have been or may be violating laws of U. S.

(1) Direct investigation to obtain admissible evidence to establish violation.

(2) Be alert for violation of Federal statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, and sedition.

4. Individuals to be investigated

Exercise sound judgment and discretion in evaluating importance and dangerousness of individuals or affiliates. Investigate activities of any individual falling within one or more of following[conditions] who does not come within restrictions on investigations listed under 87D, item 5, below:

a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49

b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements

Espousal encompasses wide variety and range of activities. Actual membership in basic revolutionary organization is not prerequisite. Espousal may be expressed by membership or active participation in subversive front groups. Open investigation in every instance in which subject is actively engaged in affairs of subversive front organization in leadership capacity or by active participation in furtherance of aims and purposes of front organizations. Do not open on mere membership in front organization unless there is past membership at any time in basic revolutionary organization or other subversive derogatory information.

c. Special training

(1) Training in subversive movement abroad

(2) Leadership training in basic revolutionary organization

d. Military service

(1) Service in Abraham Lincoln Brigade; membership in basic revolutionary organization not prerequisite

(2) Service in military forces of any country, including U. S. armed forces, whenever individual has ever been member of basic revolutionary organization

e. Employment i[illegible]ey facilities
Individual employed in or having access to key facility who is alleged to have been at any time member of any basic revolutionary organization

f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs
Individuals who, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, are likely to seize upon national emergency to endanger public safety and welfare. Membership or affiliation in basic revolutionary or front groups not prerequisite.

Above standards are not all-inclusive. Resolve doubts in interest of security and conduct investigation.

Complaints from anonymous sources alleging subversive activities should be considered as basis for investigation.

Security cases must be evaluated continually to determine if we are fulfilling responsibilities in internal security field and those cases not warranting further investigation should be closed promptly.

5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals
Do not institute investigations because of membership in organizations which do not advocate use of force to bring about changes in existing Government; e.g., Socialist Party, Independent Workers of the World, and Independence Party of Puerto Rico.

a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning

(1) Prior Bureau authority required to institute investigation of faculty members.

Bureau authority not needed for student or nonacademic employee provided no unusual circumstances exist which would require advice from Bureau prior to investigation and there is sound basis for investigation. In requests for Bureau authority, identify subject, his position, and basis for investigation.

(2) Contacts during investigation

(a) After Bureau authority granted, it is permissible to contact:

I. Established sources functioning in an administrative capacity, such as registrar, director of admissions, dean of men, dean of women, and security officers and their subordinates. Contacts may be made on campus. Other established sources and informants must be contacted away from campus.

II. All individuals not connected with institutions of learning who, consistent with discretion, would be contacted in security case, such as neighbors and past employers.

(b) No contacts are to be made with students, graduate students, and professors (other than sources outlined above) at educational institutions without prior Bureau authority. When requesting authority, give full justification, individual's name, position, and statement concerning his discretion and reliability.

(c) Superiors of faculty members should not be contacted.

(3) Receiving voluntary information
These instructions must not deter immediate interview of any person connected with institution of learning who desires to furnish information to FBI or be contacted by an Agent.

b. Subjects not connected with institution of learning

When subject of investigation is not connected with an institution of learning and interview of student, faculty member, or other employee of institution of learning is desired, prior Bureau authority must be obtained except for established sources. When requesting authority, furnish name, position, and a positive statement concerning person's discretion and reliability.

c. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishment, employees of United Nations or international organizations, and members of armed forces

If subject of investigation is or becomes employee of U. S. Government, foreign official establishment, United Nations, or other international organization, has foreign diplomatic or official status, or is member of U. S. armed forces, advise Bureau and request authority for further investigation.

6. Fraud against Government (FAG) violations

a. Policy

(1) Upon receipt of information indicating violation of this type, initiate investigation under "Security Matter - Fraud Against the Government" character and immediately advise Bureau.

(2) Investigate and report criminal fraud violation (such as concealment of arrests) arising during security-type fraud investigation on same subject in conjunction with investigation of security-type fraud. Bureau will present both violations to Department. If security-type fraud investigation is discontinued, handle criminal fraud separately following instructions in section section 47, volume II, of this manual.

(3) If admissible evidence developed does not warrant submission of prosecutive summary report, submit results in investigative report.

b. Investigation

(1) To establish jurisdiction, it is necessary to prove that form was presented to Government agency for action or determination, and this should be first investigative objective. If form was not presented to Government agency, conduct no further investigation and so advise Bureau.

(2) It must be established that subject actually signed form by testimony of witnesses to signature, handwriting examination, or other conclusive evidence. Original of form must be located. Thoroughly interview any sources who furnished pertinent information concerning subject during any previous investigation and other potential witnesses to determine basis for each item of pertinent information furnished and identities of other potential witnesses.

(3) Where affiliation with subversive organizations is involved, interview individuals who were members of same units as subject for evidence of his membership, such as attendance at closed meetings, payment of dues, holding of office, etc. If possible, develop evidence to supplant pertinent information furnished by current informants. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview subject.

(4) Interview subject and potential witnesses furnishing pertinent information under oath and obtain sworn signed statements if possible. Exception may be made when interviewing established sources, such as current informants, if oath and/or signed statements not considered desirable under circumstances. Be guided by instructions below concerning interviews with subjects of security investigations when interviewing potential witnesses with subversive backgrounds.

c. Legal questions

If question of law arises as to existence of violation, advise Bureau and hold investigation in abeyance for Department's opinion. Department has no fixed policy as to prosecution in these cases and desires to consider each case. Submit basic facts concerning execution and filing of document and subversive activity denied in report for presentation to Department, even though basis for concealment or fraudulent statement does not appear to be material.

d. Cases referre[illegible]y military
Military intelligence agencies often refer cases for security investigations under Delimitations Agreement in which security-type fraud violations are involved. If subversive information does not warrant full security investigation but does indicate possible fraud violation, advise interested agency that FBI's investigation will be directed toward proving possible violation of law and that any background investigation contemplated by it pursuant to its administrative responsibilities will not interfere with FBI investigation. Advise agency pertinent information developed will be furnished and request agency to do likewise. Immediately initiate security matter - fraud against the Government investigation. If subversive information warrants full security investigation and also indicates fraud violation, advise interested agency that Bureau is initiating full security investigation in conjunction with investigation of possible violation of law and results will be furnished. Conduct expedite investigation to determine subject's dangerousness and whether a fraud violation is involved.

7. Submission of subversive derogatory information on individuals

a. Offices covering national or local headquarters of various subversive groups should promptly furnish Bureau names and identifying data regarding persons affiliated with such groups, to include basic revolutionary organizations, fascist-type organizations, black extremist organizations, and front groups of these. Furnish Bureau such information by letter and, where appropriate, indicate that list of names is being furnished for Bureau indexing purposes.

b. Information from all sources should be reviewed to insure Bureau has been furnished lists of all individuals affiliated with organizations enumerated in item a. Include information concerning a number of individuals in one letter if possible. Set out sufficient identifying data to facilitate check of Bureau files.

c. Offices obtaining information regarding subversive affiliation of individuals residing outside their territories should promptly advise offices covering such persons' addresses.

d. Names of subscribers to Communist Party nominating petitions and names appearing on subscription lists of subversive organizations should be indexed in field office covering address shown for subscriber but should not be forwarded to Bureau for indexing.

e. Important subversive information concerning any individual and any new subversive information concerning an individual of importance should be furnished Bureau expeditiously.

f. Subversive and/or derogatory information coming to attention of field office through name check or otherwise on employee of executive branch of Government, which information is within purview of EO 10450, should be forwarded promptly to Bureau for dissemination to Civil Service Commission. Such information relating to other employees of Government or employees of United Nations and other public international organizations should be furnished Bureau immediately.

E, INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS - INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

1. General

All pertinent information concerning subject's background and subversive activity must be fully developed and reported to assure accurate evaluation of his dangerousness. Use discretion to prevent subjects from becoming unnecessarily aware of investigation.

Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents in security investigations without prior Bureau authority.

2. Scope of investigations

Following should be obtained:

a. Background

(1) True name and aliases

(2) Residence address

(3) Occupation or business and employment address

(4) Citizenship status, including date and place of birth and pertinent data concerning naturalization of aliens

(5) Family background

If possible, ascertain from sources contacted and report date and place of birth of subject's parents and spouse and parents of spouse. Do not conduct investigation solely for this information.

(6) Military record

Determine if subject has served in U. S. armed forces; time, place, and circumstances of such service; type of discharge received; and any membership in veterans' organizations. If subject served in armed forces of any foreign government, determine pertinent facts.

(7) Close relatives

Determine whether subject has any close relatives in U. S. armed forces or in other positions of trust and confidence, whether public or private, relating to national defense.

(8) Identification record

(a) Be alert for identification record showing arrests and/or civil data. Check local police records.

[(b) When subject is approved for[ADEX,]submit[Security Flash
[Notice](FD-165) to check records of Identification Division and to post flash notice if fingerprints on file. FD-165 will be returned if positive identification cannot be made with fingerprints on file. Office of origin is responsible for resolving identification when record has been furnished by Identification Division as possibly identical. If positive identification cannot be made, it is not necessary to communicate further with Identification Division.

[(c) When office of origin is changed for[ADEX]subject after flash notice has been placed, form FD-128 (changing origin) should so indicate. Send extra copy of FD-128 to Identification Division so its records will show new office of origin.

[(d) [Concerning subjects who are in ADEX on whom no finger-
[prints are on file with the Identification Division, an
[FD-165 should be submitted periodically. Category I
[subject requests should be submitted every six months.
[In the case of Category II and III subjects, requests
[should be submitted on annual basis in conjunction with the
[submission of annual report. In the case of Category IV
[subjects, requests should be submitted every two years in
[conjunction with reports. This periodic notification is
[no longer needed upon advice by Identification Division
[of a fingerprint record on the subject and the placing of
[a stop against such record.]

- (e) Cancel flash notice when subject dies or is no longer of security interest.

(9) Physical description
- (a) Obtain and report detailed physical description.
- (b) Each subject should be personally observed whenever complete security investigation is conducted; however, do not delay submission of form FD-122 (recommending subject for[ADEX)]when it has not been possible to observe subject. Keep case open until personal observation accomplished. When subject is outside U. S. or Puerto Rico, this requirement may be followed administratively until subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

(10) Photograph

Make reasonable efforts during investigation to obtain photograph of subject. Maintain case on[ADEX]subject in pending status until suitable photograph is obtained unless circumstances dictate otherwise, in which case advise Bureau. Forward copy of photographs to Bureau for dissemination to Secret Service. [Efforts should be made to obtain photographs which are a good likeness of the subject's current appearance.]

(11) Handwriting specimens

If readily available, obtain handwriting specimens for possible future use and maintain in subject's file. Case is not to be kept pending merely to obtain such specimens. [Special efforts should be made to secure handwriting specimens of the leaders of militant or revolutionary organizations and they should be submitted to the Bureau by cover letter for attention of FBI Laboratory so as to be included in the National Security File. When they may be of value as evidence, transmittal letter should so state and request their return after copies have been made.]

(12) Labor union membership

If subject is member of basic revolutionary group, ascertain his trade-union affiliation and what, if any, position he holds in labor organization.

b. Subversive activity

(1) Membership or affiliation

Obtain admissible evidence that subject is member of, or affiliated with, one of basic revolutionary and/or front organizations. Some more common types of evidence are:

(a) Oral or written statements or admissions of subject made publicly or privately
(b) Statements of informants and others in position to know and can testify to facts
(c) Official letterheads, documents, and membership and dues records identifying subjects with such organizations
(d) Selective service records in which subject admits membership
(e) Attendance at closed meetings and conventions of such organizations
(f) Letters to publications, public officials, or others signed by subject and admitting membership in or adherence to principles of such organization
(g) Recruitment or attempt to recruit members for such organization
(h) Solicitations or contributions of funds for such organization
(i) Seeking public office as candidate for such organization

Communist Control Act of 1954 sets out list of 14 criteria to be considered in determining membership, including acceptance of organization discipline.

(2) Knowledge of aims and purposes

Obtain admissible evidence that subject knows aims and purposes of subversive organization to overthrow Government by force and violence. Mere proof of membership or affiliation is not sufficient to prove knowledge. Proof that subject has knowledge includes:

(a) Direct admissible evidence, such as oral or written statements made by subject, or by responsible officials of subversive organization in subject's presence
(b) Length of time in subversive organization
(c) Official positions held in organization, especially in educational, propaganda, or policy-making capacities
(d) Charter membership in organization, participation in original establishment of organization
(e) Extensive and long-continued participation in various organizational activities

(f) Attendance or teaching at organization schools or classes, especially leadership classes
(g) Preparation or distribution of party propaganda
(h) Recruiting and fund-raising activities
(i) Possession of Marxist or revolutionary literature or urging others to read literature of revolutionary character

While none of the above may be of sufficient value alone, a combination may constitute convincing proof. Revolutionary purposes of subversive organization are frequently cloaked in veiled language or in language significant only to persons familiar with Marxist or revolutionary terminology. Such statements should be fully reported. Develop and report all revolutionary statements and circumstances under which made.

(3) Position and importance
(a) Information showing importance of individual to subversive organization or movement should be fully developed and reported. Member or affiliate may be dangerous or important because of his position, influence, or activities inside or outside organization, or both.
(b) Concealment of membership and underground activity
Member or affiliate may be highly dangerous although he takes no part in overt activities of organization. Subject may have assignment in underground and is not to contact or associate openly with others in subversive movement. By virtue of this assignment in secret operations, such individuals must be considered most dangerous. Be continually alert that individual may be serving in underground capacity. All logical investigative techniques should be used to develop fully individual's activities in underground; identities of other individuals engaged in underground operations; and method of operation, extent, and purposes of underground.

Coverage must be sufficient to insure underground activities of subversive movement are known. Identities of individuals who are directing underground operations; location of hiding places of fugitives and underground leaders; and locations of secret printing presses, mimeograph machines, and large stationery supplies must be known at all times.

[[3.] Missing security subjects
[[a.] Location of all dangerous subversives must be known at all times. Each subject remaining out of control at time of national emergency represents threat to national security.
[[b. Deleted]
[[c.] When information is received that ADEX subject has changed his residence and/or employment, case must be opened and assigned for active investigation to locate subject.
[[d.] If subject has gone into hiding, or is working clandestinely in underground capacity, he can be classified as missing subject and
[should be included in unavailable section of [ADEX.] When FD-122 is submitted to Bureau, send cover letter advising of investigative steps
[taken to locate [subject.]
[[e.] Investigations to locate missing [ADEX] subjects must be given
[preferential and continuous attention [and should] be handled as thoroughly as fugitive investigation.
[[(1)] Advise Bureau each 45 days by letter of steps taken to locate
[missing [ADEX] subject. Do not submit reports which merely set forth negative results of investigation.
[[(2)] If subject may have gone to Mexico or Canada, request Bureau to alert appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to seek verifying information through liaison channels. If subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, request Washington Field Office (WFO) to check records of Passport Office of State Department for verification.

[(3)] When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of important [security subject,]consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information.

[4.] Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following[circumstances]intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of current security investigation, subject in[categories]I and II of[ADEX,]past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage.

[a.] Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issued, number of passport, and issuing office, if known. Include full description of subject and all aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers). Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence.

[b.] Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check.

[c.] Information concerning subject's proposed travel abroad, including information concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches. If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of three copies to each legal attache involved. For each of these legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover letter should so indicate. Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LHM. Request should not refer to legal attache or request investigation by particular agency abroad.

[d.] Subsequent report in individual case should contain details regarding subject's travel.

[e.] Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of[circumstances] described in first paragraph under item[4]above.

[(1)] Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, identities of individuals participating in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CIA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.

[(2)] Offices should immediately identify participants and submit LHMs on those in one of categories described in first paragraph under item 4 above, Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information.

[[f.] Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel abroad. If such individual has traveled behind Iron Curtain, also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state whether additional investigation is contemplated.

[[5.] File reviews

Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent information showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidate reference cards pertaining to subject in indices.

[[6.] Security informants

Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed in value both for intelligence purposes and as admissible evidence.

[[7.] Physical surveillances

Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, information of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of existing circumstances and available manpower.

a. When information is received that meetings of subversive organizations are to take place, physical surveillances should be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants.

b. Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities serve to identify others within movement.

c. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau.

[[8.] Photographic surveillances

Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows subjects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations affords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be properly correlated with other investigative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance.

[[9.] Public sources

Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain background and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state records, public utility records, and school records. Credit check of individual should be limited to obtaining identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment). Obtain and index as reference material publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities.

[[10.] Records of private firms

Where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms provided it will not jeopardize investigation.

[[11.] a. Channelizing of information to case files

Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be channelized to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances is channelized to individual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information received from informants and confidential sources with active investigation.

b. Preparation of channelizing memoranda for other offices. When preparing lengthy channelizing memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit the number of copies prepared for each other such office to two. Clearly indicate next to the name of the receiving office the number of the page containing information pertinent to that office and note on cover page that distribution of material for case files is being left to the discretion of the receiving office. If the channelizing memorandum includes names of individuals who merely attend a meeting or gathering, and played no important role, the reporting office is to attach to the channelizing memorandum a one-page memorandum listing the names of all individuals who were merely in attendance and had no important function. The preparation and distribution of additional copies of the one-page attachment are left to the discretion of the receiving office.

[[12.] Preservation of evidence

Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence.

a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.

b. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recollection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.

c. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings.

d. Above also applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or concerning evidence otherwise obtained.

[[13.] Interviews with subjects of security investigations

a. Policy

No security investigation of an individual is to be closed unless subject is included in[ADEX]or consideration given to interview. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of[ADEX]card for inactivity until subject has been interviewed or Bureau advised why interview is inadvisable.

b. Purpose

(1) When investigation is inconclusive, to determine subject's sympathies and whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines

(2) To develop information concerning activities of subject and his associates in subversive movement

(3) To develop informants

c. SAC authority

Without Bureau authority SAC may:

(1) Authorize interviews with individuals who have not been subjects of security investigations and available information does not warrant opening case

(2) Authorize interviews of subjects of security cases who have previously been interviewed with Bureau authority, provided no change has taken place in subject's status and interviews are conducted under same conditions as previously authorized

(3) Authorize interviews of subjects of closed security cases

(4) Authorize interviews of rank-and-file black extremists except as noted in section 122, volume IV, of this manual

d. Procedures for interviews under SAC authority

(1) If there is closed file, reopen it. If none, open case in 134 [classification.]

(2) Case Agent[should]prepare memorandum requesting SAC authority to conduct interview of subject to determine his attitude towards cooperation with FBI. [Review of office files should be included.]

(3) During first contact Agent should identify himself, outline Bureau's responsibilities in security field, and request subject's assistance. If individual has been member of basic revolutionary organization and appears cooperative, he may be questioned about his own activities. However, this interview is for sole purpose of determining whether subject might be cooperative.

(4) If cooperative, advise Bureau and conduct background investigation under section 107, volume IV, of this manual. If uncooperative, prepare brief memorandum for file and close case. Letter to Bureau not necessary.

e. Prior Bureau authority

Prior Bureau authority required for:

(1) Subjects of active current investigation where no prior Bureau authority has been obtained

(2) Closed cases on current[ADEX]subjects where no prior interview has been conducted

(3) Subjects of investigations requested by Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant and loyalty cases

(4) Individuals when circumstances indicate delicate situation and greater than usual risk involved, such as labor leaders and individuals in educational, mass media, religious, or publishing fields. Bureau authority needed even though there were prior interviews.

(5) Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts

(6) [Deleted]

In above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview subject.

f. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview

- (1) In absence of special circumstances, include following statement in first paragraph of letter.
    - (a) Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of Manual of Instructions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as PSI.
    - (b) Form FD-336 contains above statement and may be used. Statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potential as informant.
    - (c) If available, letter must contain following information:
        - I. Residence address, occupation, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health
        - II. Marital status. If married, occupation, employment, and race of spouse.
        - III. Length of time subject was member of or affiliated with subversive organization and positions held. When investigation is based on circumstances other than membership or affiliation with subversive organizations, briefly set forth facts.
        - IV. If married, state if spouse is or has been member of or affiliated with subversive groups, positions held, and period of such membership or affiliation.
        - V. Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups
        - VI. Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of subject and, if married, of spouse
        - VII. What is expected to be gained by interview
    - (d) In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding seven items listed must be set out under appropriate number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any item, so indicate after number.
- (2) Letters must be personally approved by SAC.
- (3) One copy of letter should only be first page of letter. When unnecessary to issue specific instructions, Bureau will approve request by stamping this page and returning by routing slip.
- (4) When authorized, interview must be conducted within 45 days. If not possible, advise Bureau and indicate subject will be contacted within 45 days. If interview has not been conducted at end of second period, request new authority. Include any new information bearing upon advisability of interview.

g. Preparation for and conduct of interview

- (1) Preparation must be thorough and interview conducted so that Agents will not be compromised, Bureau will not be embarrassed, and informants will not be exposed. CPUSA has planned traps for Agents attempting interviews with members by installing recording machines in members' homes or endeavoring to have interview observed by concealed third party.
- (2) Interviews should be conducted by two Agents. Agent experienced in security investigations who is knowledgeable regarding development of informants should conduct interrogation. Actual approach need not be made by both Agents; one Agent may observe from secure distance. (Two Agents should be physically present during interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all cases.) Background of subject and circumstances will determine how approach should be handled.

(3) Interviews of active communists should be conducted at secure place other than subject's residence or place of employment. If reasonable effort has been made for such approach and it is not practical, set forth circumstances and request Bureau authority to make contact at home or place of business explaining any need to contact employer. Letter should contain statement that, if subject appears cooperative, arrangements will be made for another interview at secure place away from residence or employment, if necessary, to determine fully degree of cooperation.

(4) If subject cooperative upon initial contact, further contact may be had without Bureau authority. No limitation on number of recontacts, but use good judgment. If interview authorized by Bureau, advise Bureau of results of contact and plans for recontacts. Obtain specific authority to make recontact where circumstances indicate delicate situation and greater than usual risks involved, such as labor leaders and individuals employed in educational, mass media, religious, and publishing fields.

(5) Terminate interview with active subversive if third person arrives during interview. Furnish Bureau details and obtain Bureau authority prior to reinterview.

(6) Terminate interview immediately if subject is hostile or uncooperative.

(7) Inform subjects connected with labor unions that Bureau is not interested in employee-employer relations and is concerned only with infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements. Furnish no information and make no statements to embarrass Bureau. Questions should require admission or denial by subject of all pertinent items of subversive information unless to do so would expose investigative techniques or security informants. Cordial and friendly attitude alone is not evidence of cooperation insofar as potential dangerousness is concerned when subject fails to admit or verify subversive information obtained through previous investigation.

(8) If cooperative, inform subject we want to interview him in detail and arrange interviews over extended period if necessary to exploit subject's knowledge to utmost. Conduct necessary investigation or research to corroborate and develop information received.

(9) Where appropriate, reduce information obtained to signed statement and determine his willingness to testify to information furnished if needed in Federal proceedings.

h. Reporting results of interview

(1) When no information is developed during interview which would affect subject's[ADEX]status, promptly submit results by letter and include in next report[or LHM.] If individual is employed in or holds sensitive position in trade-union, educational, mass media, religious, or publishing fields, results of all interviews must be submitted promptly in report or LHM,[except where subject is developed as]security informant or source.

(2) Report subject's admissions of his subversive activities and associations and indicate whether he did or did not furnish information regarding subversive activities of others.

(3) Report[any]statements by subject denying subversive activities and follow with concise statement of such activity[as shown by prior investigation.]

(4) Letter transmitting results of interview must contain:
  (a) Conclusion of interviewing Agents as to cooperativeness of subject and reasons for conclusion
  (b) Statement as to whether information furnished coincides substantially with other available information

(c) Statement as to subject's availability as potential witness and evaluation of subject's potential as informant or confidential source and whether further contacts contemplated

(d) [Recommendation that ADEX card be canceled when interview, considered with other available information, indicates subject is no longer dangerous to internal security.]

(e) Pertinent information regarding subject's appearance or characteristics which has not previously been reported

i. Reinterviews of [ADEX] subjects

Consider reinterviews with [ADEX] subjects on systematic basis. Consider such reinterviews when necessary to review case or when case comes up on tickler.

j. Maintenance of control file on former members of subversive organizations

(1) Offices having sufficient volume should maintain control file on former members of subversive organizations for reference purposes. This file will obviate necessity for extensive file reviews to identify persons who may be in position to furnish information of value in future.

(2) Copies of memoranda designated for individual case files should be routed to this file. Such memoranda should contain: background of person, type of information he may furnish, period covered by this data, whether or not person is available for interview by all Agents, and whether he is in position and willing to testify.

(3) This file should not include information concerning security informants.

(4) If special index is used in conjunction with this file, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating times and places persons were in subversive movement and brief description of information available from them. It may be broken down geographically and subdivided by years.

F. ADMINISTRATIVE INDEX

1. Purpose and general policy
   a. To have a readily available and up-to-date listing of individuals who are deemed dangerous to the internal security, especially in the event of a national emergency.
   b. The Administrative Index (referred to as ADEX) includes the names and identifying data concerning individuals who fall within four categories of dangerousness described below.
   c. Under no circumstances should individuals be included in ADEX, or otherwise be the subject of investigative attention, merely because of their opposition to Government policies or because of the exercise of their constitutional rights of protest and dissent. The ADEX is intended, and should be utilized, solely to list individuals who constitute a potential or actual threat to the internal security of the United States and/or whose activities and statements indicate that they would resort to violent, illegal, or subversive means.
   d. Matters relating to the ADEX are not to be included in reports or LHMs prepared for dissemination outside the Bureau. If field office believes that special circumstances justify discussion of ADEX with qualified representatives of other Federal agencies on strictly confidential basis, furnish full facts to Bureau and request prior approval for such action.
   e. Contents of ADEX must be accurate and correct at all times. Matters relating to its maintenance should be given preferred attention.
2. Categories
   a. Category I
      (1) All national leaders of revolutionary organizations whose aims and purposes include the overthrow and destruction of the Government by force and violence or other unconstitutional means, and individuals affiliated therewith who have demonstrated propensity for violence against the person rather than property or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, guerrilla warfare, or have engaged in underground-type operations.
      (2) Revolutionaries, though unaffiliated with any specific organization, who have demonstrated by acts or statements a propensity for violence, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state, and local Governments and of the defense efforts.
      (3) National leaders of extremist organizations.
      (4) Any individual who qualifies for the ADEX should be included in Category I if he is employed in or has access to a key facility.
   b. Category II
      (1) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and extremist organizations. Secondary leadership would comprise, for example, regional, state, and local leaders who are involved in policy making in fulfilling anti-U. S. objectives of their respective revolutionary organizations and whose activities do not justify their inclusion in Category I.
      (2) Active participants in furthering the aims and purposes of the revolutionary or extremist organization with which affiliated.
      (3) Other unaffiliated revolutionaries or extremists who have demonstrated by acts or statements a propensity for violence against property rather than persons.
   c. Category III
      (1) Rank-and-file membership in, or participation in activities of, revolutionary organizations within the last five years as evidenced by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(2) Leadership or activist position in affiliated fronts of revolutionary organizations within the last three years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(3) An individual who, although not a member of or participant in activities of revolutionary organizations or considered an activist in affiliated fronts, has exhibited a revolutionary ideology and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state, and local governments and of the defense efforts.

d. Category IV

(1) Individuals whose activities do not meet criteria of Categories I, II or III but who are in a position to influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense and are likely to furnish financial aid or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements because of their sympathy, associations, or ideology.

3. Factors relating to dangerousness

a. Dangerousness of individual does not depend solely upon personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or disposition to violence. It also depends upon contribution subject has made or is making in advancing principles and aims of subversive movement, or his subversive potential in event of national emergency. All information must be carefully weighed. Among factors having bearing are:

(1) Long membership in subversive organization
(2) Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools
(3) Possession of or study of revolutionary literature
(4) Espousal of subversive doctrines as shown by acts and utterances
(5) Contributions to or collections of funds for organizations
(6) Recruitment of new members
(7) Support of communist bloc powers in acts and utterances
(8) Activity as courier or confidential mail drop for subversive movement
(9) Regular participation in activities of subversive organization, especially when this involves sacrifices, inconveniences, or disadvantages
(10) Individuals who have defected, revoked, or sought revocation of U. S. citizenship in favor of communist country, have returned to U. S., and have taken no positive steps to counteract such action
(11) Statements or activities on subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe his loyalty would lie with communist country in event of armed conflict between U. S. and that country
(12) Training and/or participation in espionage, sabotage, or intelligence activities
(13) History of emotional instability or irrational behavior, prior acts indicating propensity for violence, coupled with subversive background or hatred against organized government

4. Evaluating interviews

a. Positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicating adherence to doctrines, aims, or purposes of revolutionary organization or front organization shall be considered in evaluating an individual's dangerousness.

b. Other than above, interviews are not factors in making determination as to ADEX; e.g., lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not factors.

5. Recommendation for and preparation of ADEX cards

a. When potential dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin is to prepare recommendation to Bureau on FD-122, in triplicate. Forward original and copy to Bureau, and place copy in subject's file. FD-122 has three uses: (1) to recommend subject for ADEX, (2) to submit changes for existing cards, and (3) to recommend subject be deleted from ADEX. Submit abstract when recommending subject for ADEX, or removal from ADEX, but no abstract for changes.

b. When FD-122 is submitted to recommend subject for ADEX, attach additional page or pages setting out succinct summary of facts on which recommendation based. Facts must be in sufficient detail to support recommendation, including justification for designated category.

c. If, at conclusion of investigation, subject is not being recommended for ADEX, closing communication should show reasons.

d. Summary report must be submitted when subject is recommended for ADEX unless one was previously furnished to Bureau. In latter instance, up-to-date report or LHM should be submitted. If case is pending because of outstanding leads, set out additional lead to follow authorization of ADEX card by Bureau. If case would otherwise be closed, place in pending-inactive status with lead to follow approval by Bureau and then close administratively.

e. Do not delay recommendations for ADEX because of absence of background or descriptive data. Submit recommendation with current report and retain in pending status to obtain missing items.

f. Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for ADEX. FD-122 should include data required for unavailable section.

g. If Bureau approves recommendation, ADEX cards will be prepared. Copy of FD-122 will be returned stamped "ADEX card approved and prepared, two copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card." These cards should be filed in field office ADEX as outlined below. Place returned copy of FD-122 in subject's main file.

h. When cards are received from Bureau, check data for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph, which are maintained on separate card stapled to back of one ADEX card. File this card in geographical section (except unavailable section cards.) Second ADEX card is filed in alphabetical section.

6. Inclusion in Stop Index File

a. Submit FD-122 in triplicate to Bureau when designating Category I ADEX subjects who are extremists for inclusion in Stop Index File.

b. Succinct summary with FD-122 should contain recommendation for inclusion in Stop Index File and appropriate descriptive data.

c. After recommendation approved, the third FD-122 copy will be forwarded to the Voucher-Statistical Section which maintains the Stop Index File for Category I ADEX extremist subjects.

7. Content and appearance of ADEX card

a. Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of ADEX card should contain following information. If any items are missing, keep case pending to obtain necessary information. Set forth under each item are possible categories in which subject may be classified and code letters for appropriate space on FD-122. These code letters will appear on cards received from Bureau.

(1) Name and aliases

Full and correct name and aliases of subject

(2) Race

White (Caucasian)	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others, including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indian, etc.)

(3)	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
(4)	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien	AL
	(If unknown, space should be left blank, but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
(5)	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	American Workers' Communist Party	AWC
	Black Nationalist	BNT
	Black Panther Party	BPP
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	Groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
	Minutemen	MIN
	Nation of Islam	NOI
	New Left	NL
	Progressive Labor Party	PLP
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	Revolutionary Action Movement	RAM
	Revolutionary Union	RU
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Spartacist League	SPL
	Student National Coordinating Committee	SNC
	Students for a Democratic Society	SDS
	Workers World Party	WWP
	Albanian	ALB
	Bulgarian	BUL
	Chinese	CH
	Cuban	CUB
	Czechoslovakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Polish	POL
	Romanian	ROM
	Russian	RUS
	Yugoslavian	YUG
(6)	Category designation	
	Category I	C I
	Category II	C II
	Category III	C III
	Category IV	C IV
(7)	Special Tabbing	
	Pro-Cuban	CUB
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	U. S. Government employees	GCV
(8)	Unavailable section	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
(9)	Date and place of birth	

(10) Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List)
(11) Residence address
(12) Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating subject.
(13) Field office and Bureau file numbers

b. Data to appear on separate attached card
(1) Place following data on separate card attached to reverse side of ADEX card being filed in geographical, or unavailable sections.
(a) Complete description
(b) Notation that security flash notice has been placed in Identification Division
(c) Photograph, with date taken. It is to be most current or best likeness of subject available.
(d) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
(e) Other data which will assist in locating subject, such as directions to residence or employment when these are unusual.
(2) Upon posting of security flash notice, field will be furnished FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of ADEX card filed in geographical or unavailable sections.
(3) Use FD-186 to report information for separate card attached to card. Case Agent should fill in form and forward to clerical employee designated to post information. Thereafter, file FD-186 in case file. FD-186 may be used to note that subject has been physically observed.

8. Arrangement of ADEX

a. At Bureau
Entire index is maintained on IBM tabulating cards, which are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to field. An alphabetical breakdown of true names and all aliases of subjects is also maintained at Bureau.

b. In field office
Index is maintained in three sections: geographical, unavailable, and alphabetical sections.

(1) Geographical section
After receipt of two cards from Bureau and after descriptive data has been added to one, file latter in geographical section (or unavailable section, if applicable). Geographical section is broken down by residence address in accord with needs of each office, e.g., by state, county, city, or if needed, into boroughs or suburbs. Cards are filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown.

Cards will show "unknown" residence for subjects (a) whose addresses are not known but prompt location within division is expected and (b) whose location in another division is being verified. File in breakdown designated "Verification Pending."

(2) Alphabetical section
File duplicate card alphabetically in this section; there is no other breakdown.

(3) Unavailable section
Cards of individuals who are missing, out of the country, or imprisoned are retained in unavailable section, broken down into three subsections, as follows:
(a) Missing subjects
Subjects are not to be included in unavailable section until action required in instructions for missing subjects is taken (see paragraph E. 3 of this section). If subject is missing, word "Missing" is typed on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous."

(b) Subjects out of country
Place cards for subjects who have departed from U. S. or Puerto Rico for foreign country in this subsection unless they should be canceled in accordance with instructions below under permanent departure.

Investigation of subject not yet included in ADEX may be in progress at time subject departs for foreign country. If facts otherwise warrant, submit FD-122 recommending inclusion in unavailable section.

If subject is out of country, type words "Out of Country" on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous." If foreign address known, include on FD-122 in space provided. If subject is only known to be in certain foreign country or is only known to be traveling abroad, include this on FD-122. If subject's current employment abroad is known, include on FD-122.

Follow case of any ADEX subject who is out of country at least once each year for verification of address and to determine if subject has returned. Place appropriate stops with Immigration and Naturalization Service to be advised of return.

(c) Imprisoned subjects
Place cards of imprisoned ADEX subjects in unavailable section. Type word "Imprisoned" on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous." Identify institution in which subject is incarcerated in space provided for residence. Arrange with confining institution to be informed of subject's release. Set tickler shortly prior to expected release to verify. After release, determine whether subject should be retained in ADEX.

When submitting recommendation for unavailable section, include words "Unavailable Section" in upper right portion of FD-122. Do not include former residence or former employment. ADEX cards for unavailable section will bear code letters in upper right portion designating proper subsection.

Upon receipt of two cards from Bureau, check for accuracy, place required descriptive data on one, and file latter in unavailable section. File other card in alphabetical section. When missing subject is located or subject who has been out of country has returned or imprisoned subject released, submit FD-122 showing current residence and place of employment. Type words "Remove from Unavailable Section" after "Miscellaneous." When subject in unavailable section is located in another division, submit FD-128 to Bureau and new office of origin. Type "Remove from Unavailable Section" in space to right of addresses. Bureau will send revised cards to new office of origin.

c. Special interest subjects
Certain classes of individuals could be of special interest depending on the particular circumstances of a national emergency. These include the following:

(1) Espionage subjects
In the event of a national emergency, special consideration should be given to these individuals to insure that investigation or any

other action taken to neutralize their activities is handled, if possible, in such manner as to not destroy the opportunity to penetrate an active espionage network. When submitting FD-122 regarding such individual, the words "Special Interest" should be typed in upper right portion and the abbreviation "ESP" should be shown in the space provided after "Miscellaneous."

(2) U. S. Government employees
The Department has requested regular advice as to the identities of all U. S. Government employees whose names are listed in ADEX. When submitting FD-122 regarding such individual, the words "Special Interest" should be typed in upper right portion and the abbreviation "GOV" should be shown in the space provided after "Miscellaneous."

(3) Foreign government employees
In the event of a national emergency, special consideration should be given to these individuals to insure that investigation or other action taken to neutralize their activities is handled so as to minimize the possibilities of diplomatic repercussions. When submitting FD-122 regarding such individual, the words "Special Interest" should be typed in upper right portion and the abbreviation "FGE" shown in the space provided after "Miscellaneous."

(4) Pro-Cuban individuals
In the event of a limited emergency involving the U. S. and Cuba, consideration should be given to affording special attention to the investigation of these individuals. This would include individuals who are included in the ADEX solely on the basis of pro-Cuban activities or sympathies as well as individuals who are included in ADEX primarily because of other activities or affiliations but who have shown a marked sympathy for the communist regime in Cuba or who otherwise would be of special interest in the event of a U. S.-Cuban conflict. When submitting FD-122 regarding such individual, the words "Special Interest" should be typed in upper right portion and the abbreviation "CUB" should be shown in the space provided after "Miscellaneous."

FD-122 forms submitted relative to individuals in above "Special Interest" classes should, in addition to listing the appropriate abbreviation after "Miscellaneous," also indicate any other applicable organizational or nationalistic affiliation. For instance, FD-122 concerning a leader of the Communist Party, USA, who is a U. S. Government employee, would carry the abbreviation "GOV" as a miscellaneous item (and would have "Special Interest" typed in upper right portion) and in addition would be checked as to Communist Party affiliation.

Cards on "Special Interest" subjects should be filed in regular sequence with other ADEX cards in both the geographical (or unavailable, if applicable) and alphabetical sections and receive same handling as other ADEX cards except for instructions set forth above. Automatic Data Processing equipment at the Bureau will furnish on demand lists of individuals in any one or all of above "Special Interest" classes.

ADEX cards for "Special Interest" subjects will bear appropriate code letters in upper right portion designating type of case. When subject no longer comes within one of classes of special interest, submit FD-122 with words "Remove from Special Interest" typed after "Miscellaneous." If card should be placed in unavailable section, add "Place in Unavailable Section." When new cards are received from Bureau, destroy old cards.

9. Periodic verification of addresses
   a. Data on ADEX cards should be up to date at all times.
   b. Whereabouts of all ADEX subjects should be known at all times. Check residence and business addresses of subjects in Category I at least once each three months. Residence and business address of Category II subjects should be checked at least once each 6 months and of Category III and IV subjects at least once each year. These instructions, however, do not apply to subjects who are imprisoned (see instructions relating to unavailable section of ADEX) or those who meet criteria as disaffected U. S. citizens (see Section 105 H). Residence and employment of latter must be verified each 90 days. Case of any subject who is out of country must be followed at least once every year to determine if he has returned.

      Arrange to be advised on current basis of any indication subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change residence or employment. Checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under pretext by telephone once each six months for Category I subjects and once every two years for all others.
   c. Use FD-154 when it will facilitate verifying addresses. When FD-154 is not used, notation should be made on last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in subject's file showing addresses and date verified. Each time residence and employment verified, reevaluate case to assure subject is still within criteria. Make notation in file to this effect.
   d. If residence and/or business address has changed, submit FD-122 to Bureau showing only changes to be made. Also submit FD-366 to Bureau for dissemination to Secret Service and give copy to Secret Service locally.
   e. Handle verifications by reopening and assigning cases and closing administratively when accomplished. Where appropriate, handle verifications at time cases are reopened for periodic reports or LHM and include results in report or LHM. Otherwise, record verifications on FD-154 and place in case file.

10. Changes, additions, and deletions of data on ADEX cards
    a. Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, category designation, date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility, residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by FD-128.
    b. Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.
    c. Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."
    d. Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected card, take following action:
       (1) Check accuracy of data on cards.
       (2) Transfer separate card with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section card to corrected card and file in geographical section, (or unavailable section, if applicable).
       (3) File other card in alphabetical section.
       (4) Destroy old cards.

11. Movement of subjects between offices
    a. Subjects of ADEX cards
       (1) Assign immediately requests from other offices to verify addresses of subjects and transmit results within thirty days.
       (2) New office furnish old office information concerning key facility employment of subject so that geographical reference number,

agency having security responsibility, and interested agencies can be included on FD-128 submitted by old office of origin.

(3) Office of origin, upon verification of address, immediately submit FD-128 transferring origin. Submit original and one copy to Bureau and two copies to office covering new address enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and ADEX cards. Show full title and designation.

(4) Where flash notice has been placed with Identification Division, note on FD-128 and designate extra copy of FD-128 for Bureau for attention of Identification Division.

(5) Old office of origin submit current report or LHM. If LHM submitted, cover communication should include same documentation as is required in administrative pages of reports.

Do not delay submission of FD-128 solely for preparation of report or LHM, but note on FD-128 that appropriate communication is being prepared. Old office of origin should furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business addresses by FD-366. Copy of FD-366 should be provided to new office of origin for dissemination to Secret Service locally by latter office. Case will remain pending in both old and new offices until report or LHM is submitted by old office. New office of origin is responsible to follow matter until completed.

(6) New office of origin should review pertinent material received with FD-128 and information in its files to determine if additional investigation warranted. If not, advise Bureau by letter that case is being closed.

(7) Upon receipt of FD-128, office covering new address is origin and should place office file number on ADEX cards and file them in its ADEX.

(8) Upon receipt of new cards from Bureau, new office is to transfer information from reverse side of old geographical card to new card, appropriately file new cards, and destroy old ones.

b. Subjects not included in ADEX

(1) Transfer office of origin by FD-128 upon verification by another office of subject's presence in that division. Enclose copies of all reports and other pertinent serials to new office of origin.

(2) New office of origin should initiate appropriate investigation or advise Bureau case closed if no action warranted.

12. Cancellation and removal of cards from ADEX

a. Death of a subject

Destroy card and advise Bureau by LHM.

b. Permanent departure

Upon learning of subject's departure from U. S. or Puerto Rico for foreign country, immediately ascertain conditions of departure. No card shall be canceled by reason of such departure unless subject is alien whose permanent departure has been verified. If U. S. citizen who has been out of country has renounced U. S. citizenship and taken citizenship of foreign country, card may be canceled when it has been determined he does not intend to return to U. S.

c. Imprisonment of subject

Do not cancel card because subject imprisoned, regardless of length of time he will be incarcerated. Place card in unavailable section and handle as set forth under imprisoned subjects above.

d. Entry of subject into armed forces

Upon learning of entry, submit to Bureau FD-122 to cancel ADEX and FD-366 to advise Secret Service of entry, disseminating copy of FD-366 locally to Secret Service. Also submit report or LHM setting forth pertinent information not previously reported and including facts regarding subject's entry into armed forces. Disseminate copy of report or LHM locally to appropriate military intelligence agency and furnish copies to Bureau for dissemination at headquarters level. Place case in closed status.

Remove subject from ADEX. File geographical card for subject in case file marked "canceled" and destroy alphabetical card. Set administrative tickler and each six months make appropriate inquiry to determine if subject has been discharged. Make such checks locally, through pretext if necessary, and, if necessary, submit letter requesting check by field office covering records of appropriate service.

When subject returns to civilian status, determine whether his activities still warrant inclusion in ADEX. If so, submit complete FD-122 as if initial recommendation being made, and current report. If not, advise Bureau of reasons.

e. Security informants

Card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate person security informant. In requesting Bureau authority to designate individual as security informant, call attention to ADEX card and recommend cancellation.

f. Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous

Frequently information is received or investigation develops that subject no longer represents threat to internal security by reason of physical condition, defection, or expulsion from subversive movement. Such defection may be shown by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over extended period, or by open declaration. In such cases, interview of subject should be recommended unless there are specific reasons to the contrary.

In all cases recommendation for removal from the ADEX should be made by FD-122 with attached succinct summary of facts on which the recommendation is based. Submit abstract with FD-122.

13. Administrative procedures regarding category designations

a. Changes in category

When facts warrant changing category designation for a particular subject, submit FD-122 indicating change to be made and attach additional page setting forth brief summary of facts supporting this recommendation.

b. Colors of ADEX cards

ADEX cards will be the following colors:

Category I - beige
Category II - green
Category III - white
Category IV - yellow

In both geographical and alphabetical sections of ADEX there should be no separate sequence of cards by category level. Of course, if necessary to identify subjects of any one category, for administrative purposes or otherwise, this could be accomplished readily by reference to the particular color involved.

14. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

a. Responsibility

FBI is responsible by Presidential directive to advise interested Federal agencies of developments affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated vital to national defense by Department of Defense. Under Delimitations Agreement FBI is responsible for investigating employees of private contractors holding contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where there is credible subversive information concerning employee. Conduct thorough investigation and consider for ADEX any individual employed in or having access to key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in past, member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom there is sufficient subversive information to warrant such action.

(1) Requests for investigation from another agency
When another agency requests investigation of individual employed in key facility, institute investigation immediately if basis of request warrants, and advise Bureau.

(2) Verification of key facility status
Check Key Facilities List (maintained in each office) to verify that subject's place of employment is included.

(3) Individuals denied access to restricted information
Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently report individual has been denied clearance to work in defense plant or to handle classified information. Intelligence agency is responsible to furnish Bureau with any information involving disloyalty or subversion. Office receiving such notification must promptly ascertain basis for denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of agency responsible for such action. Forward data to Bureau and include in next report. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau, open security investigation if information warrants.

b. Inclusion in ADEX
In recommending key facility employee for ADEX, FD-122 is to contain:
(1) Key facility geographical reference number
(2) Abbreviation for Department of Army (A), which has security responsibility for all key facilities
(3) Abbreviations for other agencies known to have classified contracts with key facility. Interested agencies are identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on ADEX cards.
(4) Recommendation for Category I designation

c. Dissemination
Following guidelines relative to dissemination of information in these cases should not be considered as hard-and-fast rules. If special circumstances exist which would dictate that outside dissemination should not be made or should be deferred (for example, the possibility of compromising a highly sensitive investigation) withhold dissemination and promptly submit appropriate recommendations to Bureau for its consideration.

Upon receipt of allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, immediately furnish by letter to interested agency (1) summary of allegation and information concerning individual; (2) statement that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation; (3) advise as to whether security investigation is being conducted and, if so, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion. With exception noted below, disseminate derogatory information of security nature concerning persons employed at facilities holding classified contracts both to interested intelligence agencies and to Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio 43215, attention Chief, Adjudication Division (advise interested intelligence agency of dissemination to DISCO). This includes persons who may not currently be key facility employees but are known to hold industrial security clearances. Exception involves facilities holding classified contracts with Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Dissemination to AEC is made only at Bureau.

Disseminate copies of reports for Marine Corps locally to Naval Investigative Service Office (NISO). Dissemination to Defense Atomic Support Agency, Research and Development Board and Maritime Administration is made only at Bureau.

d. Status of cases
After all investigation is conducted, place in pending-inactive status. Make case pending-active 45 days before report due and check with armed services representative at key facility or with other reliable sources to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

e. Reports
See Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 4D, item 2a, (6), and section 4M, item 4, for instructions concerning synopsis and classification of reports in key facility cases. Synopsis must set forth subject's employment specifying that subject works at key facility and statement that subject has or has not access to classified or restricted material.

15. Correlation of other investigations with ADEX
Individuals investigated by Bureau under any classification against whom subversive information is developed must be considered for ADEX. This includes espionage, foreign intelligence, applicant-type, and security of Government employees (SGE) investigations. When individual previously investigated under SGE classification is ADEX subject and is still employed by Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, use dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and character of security case in reports to insure proper routing. Use standards prevailing for SGE reports. Disseminate as any other security report. If other agencies locally request reports of SGE investigation, advise them to direct request to their headquarters for referral to Bureau.

G. REPORTS ON INDIVIDUALS

1. General
Cases of all ADEX subjects must be reopened for preparation of reports or LHMs following schedule below. LHM is permissible when information to be reported is brief and consists of no more than five pages. LHM should include appropriate main and subheadings where applicable. In connection with Categories III and IV only, if there is no additional information to report since last submission, FD-400 should be used in lieu of LHM. Critically analyze each case in light of ADEX criteria each time it is reopened and brought up to date.

2. Schedule of submission of reports or LHMs
In all cases, initial submission should be summary report but subsequent information may be furnished by LHM, if appropriate.
a. Category I - semiannually
b. Category II - annually
c. Category III - annually
d. Category IV - biennially

3. Origin
Office covering territory in which subject's subversive activities occur

4. Classification
a. 100 - for individuals affiliated with revolutionary or communist organizations or fronts
b. 105 - for members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups (or others having foreign nationalistic tendencies)

5. Title
Carry only one subject in title of each report. Submit separate reports for each subject regardless of relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

6. Character
   a. The designation "Security Matter" (SM where appropriate) is to be set out in all instances. Use organizational affiliation where organization with which subject is affiliated is under current or continuing investigation or where a Bureau-approved thumbnail sketch exists.
      Examples: Security Matter - C (Communist)
      Security Matter - SWP (Socialist Workers Party)
      Security Matter - SMC (Student Mobilization Committee)
   b. Every effort is to be made to use a meaningful organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency designation; however, where this cannot be done, following designations should be used:
      (1) Security Matter - Subversive (Where activity of subject consists primarily of efforts to disrupt or destroy Government operations through violent protest and is in line with espousal or support of philosophy which advocates overthrow of Government by any means possible, including force and violence, and/or a demonstrated propensity for violence to achieve the same objective or to deny others their rights under the Constitution.)
      (2) Security Matter - New Left (Where activity of subject is primarily extremist, student and/or communal-existence oriented and relates to violent efforts to disrupt or destroy Government operations in line with espousal or support of a philosophy which advocates overthrow of the Government by any means possible, including force and violence, and/or a demonstrated propensity for violence to achieve the same objective or to deny others their rights under the Constitution.)
7. Status
   Carry cases as pending until all active investigation has been conducted. Thereafter, status shall be as follows:
   a. Category I: Cases should remain in pending status and report or LHM submitted six months from date of last report or LHM.
   b. Category II: Cases should be reopened 45 days prior to six months from date of last verification to meet annual reporting and six-month verifications requirements.
   c. Category III: Cases should be reopened 45 days prior to one year from date of last annual verifications to meet annual reporting and verifications requirements.
   d. Category IV: Cases in which there have been reports, or LHMs in lieu of reports, or verifications within last year should be reopened 45 days prior to one year from that date to meet annual verifications requirements and 45 days prior to two years from that date to meet biennial reporting requirements.
   e. Subjects recommended for ADEX
      (1) Pending inactive
      If all active investigation completed at time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau, set forth lead to follow for ADEX approval.
      (2) Closed
      After ADEX approved, follow by administrative tickler for periodic report.
   f. Subject not being recommended for ADEX
      Closed - prior to closing, comply with instructions pertaining to interviews.
8. Content
   a. Include following and handle under topical headings (both in reports and LHMs) where appropriate.
      (1) Background
         (a) Birth data
         (b) Citizenship status

(c) Education
(d) Marital status
(e) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
(f) Identification record
(g) Employment
(h) Residence
(i) Status of health (if known)

(2) Connections with basic revolutionary groups, front groups, and/or other subversive organizations or movements
(a) Information concerning admission into group, including sponsors, etc.
(b) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement

(3) Revolutionary statements by subject
(a) Determine each statement and full details surrounding it.
(b) Determine all statements showing adherence to principles of Marxism-Leninism or other revolutionary doctrines.

(4) Other activities indicating furtherance of program of subversive organizations
(a) Speeches and writings
(b) Organizational directives and/or educational outlines signed by or issued by subject, or issued while subject was officer of organization
(c) Pertinent contacts between subject and leaders of organizations
(d) Details concerning subject's attendance or connection with subversive training schools

(5) False statements made by subject, including aliases
Evidence may be obtained from passports, tax returns, and voting, marital, employment, and selective service records.

(6) Miscellaneous
Pertinent items not falling under above categories

b. Reports on individuals should be confined to:
(1) Information as to membership and activity in basic revolutionary organizations, front organizations, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups
(2) Position and importance of subject in subversive movement
(3) Pertinent background information
Include only information pertinent to determining whether or not subject is engaged in subversive activities. Set out date or period to which it pertains; e.g., John Doe advised on January 15, 1970, that subject attended CP meetings in January, 1965, in Syracuse, New York.

c. Summarizing information
(1) When prior summary reports are not suitable for dissemination, include all pertinent information in current summary report with sources fully protected.
(2) Repetitious and cumulative items may be limited to representative number with each item set forth fully documented. Number of items will depend upon preponderance of other information showing dangerousness of subject.
(3) When selection of representative number of items is made, follow with summary statement that source advised during specified period of time subject also attended certain number of other meetings. (Set out file number and serial range in documenting such statements.)
(4) Where there is extensive activity in subversive organizations, it is permissible to use narrative statements without exact dates of

activity; however, show period of time involved and inclusive dates of informant reports. Summary statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions. Information from different sources must be reported separately.

(5) Above instructions do not lessen responsibility for reporting all pertinent items.

9. Administrative data - cover pages

a. General

References to following administrative items should be in cover pages accompanying reports:

(1) ADEX, file numbers and titles of other cases, category level, security flash notice (FD-165), FD-122, FD-128, and noninvestigative information

(2) In all ADEX cases, FD-305, appropriately filled out, shall be the last page of cover pages to annual reports and the last page of cover communications to LHMs submitted in lieu of annual reports. (If non-symbol informant page is used, FD-305 would be next to last page.)

b. Documentation of reports

(1) Complete documentation of all reports is required. This also applies to LHMs.

(2) If information necessary for complete documentation is not in subject's file, review other office files, as needed. If not obtainable, so state in cover pages.

(3) Do not conduct extensive investigation to locate sources of background information or to otherwise document background information.

(4) Office preparing summary report may include information originally obtained by another office but may not have necessary documentation. If office preparing report has copies of documents obtained by another office and identity of source, date of activity, date received, and receiving Agent are known, it is not necessary to obtain file number of original. Pertinent documentation, other than file number, should be obtained from auxiliary office.

(5) When report includes references to known subversives who have associated with subject, identify source of characterization in cover pages without further documentation.

(6) When it is necessary to obtain thumbnail sketch, place in thumbnail sketch file so it will be readily available for future use.

10. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

Channelizing memoranda may be destroyed following submission of reports. Copies of informant's statements designated for 100 classification files of informants may be destroyed when one year old. (See instructions for destruction of channelizing memoranda in MRR, part II, section 3D, item 8.)

H. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

1. Policy

Proper use of information received is foremost among Bureau's responsibilities. Information obtained during investigations should be forwarded to other interested agencies in executive branch unless there are compelling reasons not to do so. Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives provide for dissemination to other agencies which have present or potential interest information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters.

2. Bureau requirements

All conceivable situations cannot be anticipated, however, following instructions pertain to representative situations which occur frequently. Basic rule is that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in executive branch. Term "interested agency" must be interpreted in light of reason and common sense. Bring any unusual situations to Bureau's attention promptly for consideration.

Considerations affecting national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico require broadest possible construction of requirements for dissemination to intelligence services in those areas. See MRR, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities and policies in dissemination.

a. Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires each agency to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing agencies all information of mutual interest. Any information developed concerning members of military services must be referred immediately to appropriate military branch having primary responsibility, even though allegations have not been fully resolved or verified. Specifically point out in such instances that information has not been verified. If it is determined subject is member of armed services, discontinue investigation immediately, advise Bureau, and disseminate pertinent reports locally to appropriate intelligence agency. Dissemination regarding military personnel is not confined to subjects of security investigations but extends to any subversive data developed against member of armed services during FBI investigations. If member of armed forces has been in contact with security subject or any individual or group with security implications, immediately advise appropriate local intelligence service, even though security aspects of contact have not been resolved. Point out in such instances that information is unverified and transmit any additional developments immediately.

Determine during security investigations whether subjects have any close relatives in armed forces. Promptly call such associations to attention of appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on subjects involved. Evaluation of these associations lies entirely within province of military intelligence services, but Bureau must disseminate this information immediately upon receipt. Advise Bureau by letter concerning any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel, including statement as to local dissemination and enclosing LHM setting out subversive data.

b. Aliens and naturalized citizens

Furnish information which might have bearing on their deportation or denaturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). If in doubt, disseminate.

c. Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with military services

See instructions in this section concerning individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.

d. Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on key facilities list or otherwise in manufacture of materials vital to national defense

Disseminate locally to Army and other intelligence services if their interest is apparent.

e. Individuals on inactive duty who are members of or hold commissions in reserve branches or National Guard

Disseminate locally to appropriate military intelligence service.

f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including longshoremen and waterfront employees

Disseminate locally to Coast Guard and, when circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies, including NISO.

g. Employees of Federal Government within purview of Executive Order 10450

No dissemination of reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in field. If, however, subject is employed in key facility, furnish copies of reports bearing dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," to appropriate intelligence agencies of armed services. Instructions regarding dissemination to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, appear in this section of this manual under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities - dissemination. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under Executive Order 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.

h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under cognizance of branch of armed services
Disseminate locally to intelligence service of military branch involved.

i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen, defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of crew in navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Furnish subversive data concerning such persons to Bureau by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend it be furnished to FAA. Dissemination will be made only at Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see MRR, part II, section 5.

j. Dissemination to Secret Service
Under agreement between FBI and Secret Service concerning protective responsibilities dated 11-26-71 (set out in section 102, volume IV, of this manual), reports or LHMs are disseminated to Secret Service (both locally and at SOG) in all cases which meet standards set forth. As practical matter, this includes virtually all security cases on individuals where any substantial information exists as to subversive, extremist, or revolutionary activities or sympathies on the subject's part. Furnish Bureau extra copy of report or LHM in these cases.

(1) Secret Service must be advised of reason for referral; that is, statement of class or classes of agreement which applies to subject. Use FD-376, which serves as letter of transmittal for both local and SOG dissemination. Forward original and one copy to Bureau. Maintain copy in case file and upon transfer of origin, furnish copy to new office of origin. Be certain individual is properly categorized.

(2) If subject of prior investigation is being recommended for ADEX, do not disseminate prior reports without first reviewing them carefully to insure they meet current reporting standards and are suitable for dissemination. If one or more prior reports are found unsuitable for dissemination, prepare LHM containing the pertinent information involved for dissemination to Secret Service along with current report. Forward copies of such LHM to Bureau for SOG dissemination.

(3) After initial dissemination to Secret Service, as changes occur in residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally by FD-366 and furnish two copies to Bureau.

(4) For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in matters involving threats against President, refer to section 134B, volume IV, of this manual.

(5) Upon transfer of office of origin in these cases, old office of origin should furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address by LHM or FD-366 with copies to Bureau and new office of origin for dissemination to Secret Service headquarters and Secret Service office covering new residence, respectively.

k. Dissemination at Bureau

There are situations in which dissemination is made only at Bureau. Do not disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where security measures are inadequate. In such instances bring data to immediate attention of Bureau for SOG dissemination. In addition, Atomic Energy Commission receives reports only through Bureau. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including State Department, only at SOG.]

(c) When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of missing important functionary, consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information.

d. Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following categories intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of current security investigation, subject in priorities I and II of security index, past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage.

(1) Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issued, number of passport, and issuing office, if known. Include full description of subject and all aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers). Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence.

(2) Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check.

(3) Information concerning subject's proposed travel abroad, including information concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches. If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of three copies to each legal attache involved. For each of these legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover letter should so indicate. Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LHM. Request should not refer to legal attache or request investigation by particular agency abroad.

(4) Subsequent report in individual case should contain details regarding subject's travel. In nonsecurity index cases where LHMs are submitted, communication transmitting data regarding travel should indicate whether investigation is being initiated and, if not, why.

(5) Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above.

(a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, identities of individuals participating in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CIA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.

(b) Offices should immediately identify participants and submit LHMs on those in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information.

(6) Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel abroad. If such individual has traveled behind Iron Curtain, also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state whether additional investigation is contemplated.

3. File reviews
Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent information showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidate reference cards pertaining to subject in indices.

4. Security informants
Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed in value both for intelligence purposes and as admissible evidence.

5. Physical surveillances
Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, information of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of existing circumstances and available manpower.
   a. When information is received that meetings of subversive organizations are to take place, physical surveillances should be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants.
   b. Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities serve to identify others within movement.
   c. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau.

6. Photographic surveillances
Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows subjects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations affords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be properly correlated with other investigative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance.

7. Public sources
Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain background and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state records, public utility records, and school records. Credit check of individual should be limited to obtaining identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment). Obtain and index as reference material publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities.

8. Records of private firms
Where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms provided it will not jeopardize investigation.

[9. [a.] Channelizing of information to case files
Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be channelized to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances is channelized to individual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information recieved from informants and confidential sources with active investigation.

[b. Preparation of channelizing memoranda for other offices. When preparing lengthy channelizing memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit the number of copies prepared for each other such office to two. Clearly indicate next to the name of the receiving office the number of the page containing information pertinent to that office and note on cover page that distribution of material for case files is being left to the discretion of the receiving office. If the channelizing memorandum includes names of individuals who merely attend a meeting or gathering, and played no important role, the reporting office is to attach to the channelizing memorandum a one-page memorandum listing the names of all individuals who were merely in attendance and had no important function. The preparation and distribution of additional copies of the one-page attachment are left to the discretion of the receiving office.]

10. Preservation of evidence

Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence.

a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.

b. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recollection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.

c. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings.

(4) Office preparing summary report may include information originally obtained by another office but may not have necessary documentation. If office preparing report has copies of documents obtained by another office and identity of source, date of activity, date received, and receiving Agent are known, it is not necessary to obtain file number of original. Pertinent documentation, other than file number, should be obtained from auxiliary office.

(5) When report includes references to known subversives who have associated with subject, identify source of characterization in cover pages without further documentation.

(6) When it is necessary to obtain thumbnail sketch, place in thumbnail sketch file so it will be readily available for future use.

10. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

[Channelizing memoranda [must] be destroyed following submission of [reports [or following submission of letterhead memoranda (LHM), or [when information is of no value to report or LHM.] Copies of informant's statements designated for 100 classification files of informants may be destroyed when one year old. (See instructions for destruction of channelizing memoranda in MRR, part II, section 3D, item 8.)

I. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

1. Policy

Proper utilization of information received is foremost among Bureau's responsibilities. Information obtained during investigations should be forwarded to other interested agencies in executive branch unless there are compelling reasons not to do so. Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives provide for dissemination to other agencies which have present or potential interest information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters.

2. Bureau requirements

Because all conceivable situations cannot be anticipated, data below pertains to representative situations which occur frequently. Basic rule is that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in executive branch. Term "interested agency" must be interpreted in light of reason and common sense. Bring any unusual situations to Bureau's attention promptly for consideration.

Considerations affecting national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico necessitate broadest possible construction to requirements for dissemination to intelligence services in those areas. See Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities, policies, and exceptions in dissemination.

a. Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires each agency to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing agencies all information of mutual interest. Any information developed concerning members of military services must be referred immediately to appropriate military branch having primary responsibility, even though allegations have not been fully resolved or verified. Specifically point out in such instances that information has not been verified. When it is determined security subject is member of armed services, discontinue investigation immediately, advise Bureau, and disseminate pertinent reports locally to appropriate intelligence agency. Dissemination regarding military personnel is not confined to subjects of security investigations but extends to any subversive data developed against member of armed services during FBI investigations. If member of armed forces has been in contact with security subject or any individual or group with security implications, immediately advise appropriate local intelligence service, even though security aspects of contact have not been resolved. Point out in such instances that information is unverified and transmit any additional developments immediately.

Determine during security investigations whether subjects have any close relatives in armed forces. Promptly call such associations to attention of appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on subjects involved. Evaluation of these associations lies entirely within province of military intelligence services, but Bureau must disseminate this information immediately upon receipt. Advise Bureau by letter concerning any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel, including statement as to local dissemination and enclosing LHM setting out subversive data.

b. Aliens and naturalized citizens
Furnish information concerning aliens and naturalized citizens which might have bearing on their deportation or[denaturalization]to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). If in doubt, disseminate.

c. Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with military services
See instructions in this section concerning individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.

d. Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on key facilities list or otherwise in item c, above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in manufacture of materials vital to national defense
Disseminate locally to Army and other intelligence services if their interest is apparent.

e. Individuals on inactive duty who are members of or hold commissions in reserve branches or National Guard
Disseminate locally to appropriate military intelligence service.

f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including longshoremen and water-front employees
Disseminate locally to Coast Guard and, when circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies, including NISO.

g. Employees of Federal Government within purview of Executive Order 10450
No dissemination of reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in field. If, however, subject is employed in key facility, furnish copies of reports bearing dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," to appropriate intelligence agencies of armed services. Instructions regarding dissemination to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, appear in this section of this manual under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities - dissemination. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under Executive Order 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.

h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under cognizance of branch of armed services
Disseminate locally to intelligence service of military branch involved.

i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen, defined as persons in command or acting as[pilot,]mechanic, or member of crew in navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Furnish to Bureau subversive data concerning such persons by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend such data be furnished to FAA. Dissemination will be made only at Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5.

(c) When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of missing important functionary, consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information.

d. Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following categories intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of current security investigation, subject in priorities I and II of security index, past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage.

(1) Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issued, number of passport, and issuing office, if known. Include full description of subject and all aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers). Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence.

(2) Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check.

(3) Information concerning subject's proposed travel abroad, including information concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches. If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of three copies to each legal attache involved. For each of these legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover letter should so indicate. Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LHM. Request should not refer to legal attache or request investigation by particular agency abroad.

(4) Subsequent report in individual case should contain details regarding subject's travel. In nonsecurity index cases where LHMs are submitted, communication transmitting data regarding travel should indicate whether investigation is being initiated and, if not, why.

(5) Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above.

(a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, identities of individuals participating in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CIA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.

(b) Offices should immediately identify participants and submit LHMs on those in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information.

(6) Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel abroad. If such individual has traveled behind Iron Curtain, also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state whether additional investigation is contemplated.

3. File reviews
Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent information showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidate reference cards pertaining to subject in indices.

4. Security informants
Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed in value both for intelligence purposes and as admissible evidence.

5. Physical surveillances
Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, information of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of existing circumstances and available manpower.
   a. When information is received that meetings of subversive organizations are to take place, physical surveillances should be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants.
   b. Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities serve to identify others within movement.
   c. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau.

6. Photographic surveillances
Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows subjects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations affords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be properly correlated with other investigative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance.

7. Public sources
Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain background and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state records, public utility records, and school records. [Credit check of individual should be limited to obtaining identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment).] Obtain and index as reference material publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities.

8. Records of private firms
Where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms provided it will not jeopardize investigation.

9. Channelizing of information to case files
Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be channelized to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances is channelized to individual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information received from informants and confidential sources with active investigation.

10. Preservation of evidence
Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence.
   a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.
   b. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recollection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.
   c. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings.

d. Above also applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or concerning evidence otherwise obtained.

11. Interviews with subjects of security investigations

a. Policy

No security investigation of an individual is to be closed unless subject is included in security index or consideration given to interview. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of security index card for inactivity until subject has been interviewed or Bureau advised why interview is inadvisable.

b. Purpose

(1) When investigation is inconclusive, to determine subject's sympathies and whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines
(2) To develop information concerning activities of subject and his associates in subversive movement
(3) To develop informants

c. SAC authority

Without Bureau authority SAC may:

(1) Authorize interviews with individuals who have not been subjects of security investigations and available information does not warrant opening case
(2) Authorize interviews of subjects of security cases who have previously been interviewed with Bureau authority, provided no change has taken place in subject's status and interviews are conducted under same conditions as previously authorized
(3) Authorize interviews of subjects of closed security cases including persons who were on security index but were removed
(4) Authorize interviews of rank-and-file black extremists except as noted in section 122, volume IV, of this manual

d. Procedures for interviews under SAC authority

(1) If there is closed file, reopen it. If none, open case in 134 category to resolve whether subject is identical with information in files and determine his current employment and residence.
(2) Case Agent will prepare memorandum requesting SAC authority to conduct interview of subject to determine his attitude towards cooperation with FBI.
(3) During first contact Agent should identify himself, outline Bureau's responsibilities in security field, and request subject's assistance. If individual has been member of basic revolutionary organization and appears cooperative, he may be questioned about his own activities. However, this interview is for sole purpose of determining whether subject might be cooperative.
(4) If cooperative, advise Bureau and conduct background investigation under section 107, volume IV, of this manual. If uncooperative, prepare brief memorandum for file and close case. Letter to Bureau not necessary.

e. Prior Bureau authority

Prior Bureau authority required for:

(1) Subjects of active current investigation where no prior Bureau authority has been obtained
(2) Closed cases on current security index subjects where no prior interview has been conducted
(3) Subjects of investigations requested by Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant and loyalty cases
(4) Individuals when circumstances indicate delicate situation and greater than usual risk involved, such as labor leaders and individuals in educational, mass media, religious, or publishing fields. Bureau authority needed even though there were prior interviews.
(5) Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts
(6) Subjects of section A reserve index cards

In above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview subject.

f. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview

(1) In absence of special circumstances, include following statement in first paragraph of letter.

(a) Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of Manual of Instructions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as PSI.

(b) Form FD-336 contains above statement and may be used. Statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potential as informant.

(c) If available, letter must contain following information:

I. Residence address, occupation, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health

II. Marital status. If married, occupation, employment, and race of spouse.

III. Length of time subject was member of or affiliated with subversive organization and positions held. When investigation is based on circumstances other than membership or affiliation with subversive organizations, briefly set forth facts.

IV. If married, state if spouse is or has been member of or affiliated with subversive groups, positions held, and period of such membership or affiliation.

V. Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups

VI. Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of subject and, if married, of spouse

VII. What is expected to be gained by interview

(d) In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding seven items listed must be set out under appropriate number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any item, so indicate after number.

(2) Letters must be personally approved by SAC.

(3) One copy of letter should only be first page of letter. When unnecessary to issue specific instructions, Bureau will approve request by stamping this page and returning by routing slip.

(4) When authorized, interview must be conducted within 45 days. If not possible, advise Bureau and indicate subject will be contacted within 45 days. If interview has not been conducted at end of second period, request new authority. Include any new information bearing upon advisability of interview.

g. Preparation for and conduct of interview

(1) Preparation must be thorough and interview conducted so that Agents will not be compromised, Bureau will not be embarrassed, and informants will not be exposed. CPUSA has planned traps for Agents attempting interviews with members by installing recording machines in members' homes or endeavoring to have interview observed by concealed third party.

(2) Interviews should be conducted by two Agents. Agent experienced in security investigations who is knowledgeable regarding development of informants should conduct interrogation. Actual approach need not be made by both Agents; one Agent may observe from secure distance. (Two Agents should be physically present during interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all cases.) Background of subject and circumstances will determine how approach should be handled.

i. Finances
Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Emphasis must be placed on determining if funds are being furnished organizations from foreign sources and if there is any rapport between the organizations and organizations in foreign countries.

j. Support given to or received from CPUSA or other communist group
Develop evidence showing support, financial or otherwise, given by organization to CPUSA or other communist group or received by organization from CPUSA or other communist group.

k. Implementation of CPUSA line or that of other communist group
Usually shown through comparison of programs and literature of organization with those of CPUSA or other communist group during any particular period.

l. Accuracy of identifications
Use extreme care to assure statements relating to affiliations or membership in subversive organizations are accurate in all respects. Show exact basis, plus corroboration wherever possible, for identification of suspected organizations or individuals with information of a possible subversive nature. Never refer to a person as a "known communist" unless he is publicly known as such.

m. Specific requirements for CPUSA investigations
Follow previously established reporting format. New York is responsible, in addition to reporting activities of New York District, for investigating and reporting separately on national committee meetings, national training schools, and other important national meetings.

n. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups
All offices submit semiannual reports and carry as pending inactive, except New York whose report on SWP activities on national basis should be designated pending. New York also submit report on local SWP activities. Indicate in cover pages whether all persons identified in report as members of SWP or as members of other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups who reside within area covered by reporting office are listed in security index, or are informants or sources. List any exception by name and show status of investigation and state whether name has been furnished Bureau for indexing.

Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of information, interviews with past or present CPUSA members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Agents attending mass meetings, etc.

4. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against President
On 2-3-65, an "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection" was signed and became effective. This agreement is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual. Agreement provides that FBI, in its investigations of organizations whose activities are inimical to welfare of U. S., will be alert to and promptly notify Secret Service of any information indicating plot against person of the President. It is responsibility of Secret Service to initiate necessary action to neutralize such plot.

a. Be alert during investigation of organization for information indicating plot against person of President. Upon receipt, immediately furnish complete details to nearest office of Secret Service and appropriate local law enforcement agencies and advise Bureau by teletype, or telephone if facts warrant, of information furnished and fact it has been so disseminated. Attempt immediately to verify information, but do not attempt evaluation of information.

b. Promptly prepare LHM, including complete details disseminated and identities of Secret Service officer and local law enforcement officers to whom given and date and time of notification. Promptly disseminate LHM locally to Secret Service and any other appropriate Government agency and furnish sufficient copies to Bureau for dissemination at SOG. Disseminate copies of all LHMs and reports concerning organization locally to Secret Service on continuing basis and furnish extra copies of such communications to Bureau for dissemination at SOG.

c. Determine identities of members of organization involved in plot. Background information concerning such individuals should be fully developed and included in communications disseminated to Secret Service.

5. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C (code name "CIRM"). Bufile 100-442529. Office of origin: New York

a. Submit quarterly reports, to reach Bureau by February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1 on full extent of communist influence in racial matters. Include information on communist infiltration of Negro organizations and subversive individuals active in racial movement. Include this information even if it duplicates information in other reports. Offices with no information to report advise Bureau by letter.

b. Use three-part outline in report: (1) Communist Strategy, (2) Communist Tactics, and (3) Communist Penetration and Influence in Racial Organizations. Under strategy, include plans and line of CPUSA and other communist groups, such as SWP and Progressive Labor Party. Under tactics, describe communist direction, influence, and participation in demonstrations, disturbances, and other events with racial overtones. List events in chronological order with appropriate subheadings. In part three, report influence of subversives in racial organizations.

6. Title and character.

[Communications covering organizations and groups should carry the name of the organization and characters as set out below.

a. Internal Security - Communist

The use of this character will apply to:

(1) Communist basic revolutionary organizations (both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese); for example, Communist Party, USA, and Progressive Labor Party.

(2) Communist front groups.

(3) Communist infiltrated groups.

b. Internal Security - Communist (Trotskyist)

The use of this character will apply to:

(1) Trotskyist basic revolutionary organizations such as the Socialist Workers Party, Workers World Party, Young Socialist Alliance and Youth Against War and Fascism.

(2) Trotskyist fronts such as the Student Mobilization Committee.

c. Internal Security - New Left

This will include all organizations affiliated with the New Left Movement except those which would be characterized as Communist or Trotskyist front and infiltrated groups.]

Where appropriate, include identity of particular district or field division; e.g.,

Communist Party, USA
____________District
____________Division
Internal Security - C

7. Classification - 100

(5) Examples of organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency

American Socialist Clubs	ASC
American Workers' Communist Party	AWC
Black Nationalist	BNT
Black Panther Party	BPP
Communist Party, USA	COM
Minutemen	MIN
Nation of Islam	NOI
Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
[New Left	NL]
Progressive Labor Party	PLP
Proletarian Party of America	PPA
Revolutionary Action Movement	RAM
Revolutionary Union	RU
Socialist Workers Party	SWP
Spartacist League	SPL
Student National Coordinating Committee	SNC
Students for a Democratic Society	SDS
Workers World Party	WWP
Bulgarian	BUL
Cuban	CUB
Czechoslovakian	CZE
Hungarian	HUN
Romanian	ROM
Russian	RUS
Yugoslavian	YUG

(6) Priority designation

Priority I	P I
Priority II	P II
Priority III	P III

(7) Top functionary designation (where applicable)

Top functionary	TF

(8) Special section cards

Atomic energy program employees	AEP
Cuban special section	CUB
Espionage subjects	ESP
Foreign government employees	FGE
Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
United Nations employees	UNE
U. S. Government employees	GOV

(9) Unavailable section cards

Missing	MI
Out of country	OC
Imprisoned	PR

(10) Date and place of birth

(11) Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List) and abbreviation denoting agency having security responsibility

(12) Residence address

(13) Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating subject in emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.

(14) Field office file number

b. Data to appear on separate attached card

(1) Place following data on separate card attached to reverse side of security index card being filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Cards contain printed captions for recording descriptive data which can be augmented if necessary.

(a) Complete description

(b) Notation that security index flash notice has been posted in Identification Division

(c) Photograph, with date taken. It is to be most current or best likeness of subject.

(d) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms

(e) Other data which will assist in apprehension, such as directions to residence or employment when these are unusual, number of minor children and aged dependents

(2) If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending. Upon posting of security index flash notice, field will be furnished FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.

(3) Use FD-186 to report information for separate card attached to back of security index card. Case Agent should fill in form and forward to clerical employee designated to post information. Thereafter, file FD-186 in case file. FD-186 may be used to record information that subject has been physically observed and to note descriptive data.

6. Arrangment of security index

a. At Bureau

Entire index is maintained on IBM tabulating cards. Security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to field. An alphabetical breakdown of true names and all aliases of subjects is also maintained at Bureau for administrative purposes.

b. In field office

Active security index in each field office is maintained in four sections: geographical, alphabetical, unavailable, and special sections. [Complete set of each field office's Security Index is also maintained in Headquarters city in a state of readiness to be evacuated on a moment's notice in the same manner as geographical section with unavailable and special section cards filed in back.]

(1) Geographical section

After receipt of three security index cards from Bureau and after necessary data have been added to two cards, file one in geographical section of index (except special section and unavailable section cards) and one in duplicate set maintained away from headquarters city. Geographical section is broken down by residence address in accordance with needs of each office. Where logical, it should be broken down by state, county, city, and, if needed, into boroughs or suburbs and precincts. Cards are filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown. Cards in this section will be withdrawn and used by Agents should apprehension of subjects become necessary.

Cards will show "unknown" residence for (a) subjects whose addresses are not known but prompt location within division is expected and (b) subjects whose location in another division is in process of verification. File these cards in breakdown designated "Verification Pending." With Bureau authority, offices covering large industrial areas may set up second geographical section and file cards by subjects' employment. Depending on time of day apprehensions are initiated, geographical-employment or geographical-residence section may be used.

(2) Alphabetical section

File duplicate card alphabetically in this section; there is no other breakdown. Alphabetical card is control card. If card is withdrawn from geographical section for apprehension, make notation on alphabetical card.

b. Definition
Top functionary is individual who is on high-policy level in CPUSA, other subversive organizations, or unorganized groups, to whom it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention because of his importance. Term "top functionary" does not require that individuals actually hold official positions in organizations but is given broad construction to include others of equal importance because of their influence in movement itself, or their position and activities outside movement in labor, front, or similar organizations. Consider black nationalist extremists whose importance justifies continuous investigative attention.

c. Manner of designation
Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate subject as top functionary. Top functionaries are to be in priority I and reports are submitted annually.

d. Regulations governing handling of top functionaries

(1) Designation and deletion of top functionary status
Handle by letter to Bureau containing brief statement of reason for designation or deletion.

(2) Photographs
Obtain photographs for each top functionary. Send two copies (one for Secret Service) to Bureau, either by cover letter or as enclosure to report. Maintain copy in subject's file. If album of top functionary photographs maintained, keep duplicate in subject's file.

(3) Handwriting specimens
Obtain suitable handwriting specimens of each top functionary. When possible, obtain specimens from public records, law enforcement agencies, and similar sources. Send specimens to Bureau under separate cover letter by registered mail for attention of FBI Laboratory. When they may be of value as evidence, so state in transmittal letter and request their return after copies have been made. Specimens should be sufficient to permit future comparisons by Laboratory.

(4) Security index cards
Request preparation by FD-122 at earliest possible moment.

(5) Change of office of origin
FD-128 changing office of origin on top functionary automatically deletes him as top functionary in old office and adds him as top functionary in new office.

(6) [Deleted]

e. Maintenance of list
Each office must maintain current list of top functionaries.

14. Correlation of other investigations with security index and reserve index
Individuals investigated by Bureau under any classification against whom subversive information is developed must be considered for security index and/or reserve index. This includes espionage, foreign intelligence, applicant-type, and security of Government employees (SGE) investigations. When individual previously investigated under SGE classification is security index subject and is still employed by Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, use dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and character of security case in reports to insure routing to proper field and Bureau desks for supervision. Use standards prevailing for SGE reports. Disseminate these reports as any other security report. Advise representatives of other agencies requesting reports of SGE investigation to direct request to their headquarters for referral to Bureau.

H. REPORTS ON INDIVIDUALS

1. General

   Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened for preparation of reports following schedule below. Critically analyze each case in light of security index criteria each time it is reopened and brought up to date.

2. Schedule of submission of reports
   - a. Priority I - annually
   - b. Priority II - annually
   - c. Priority III - initial report must be summary. Subsequent information may be furnished by LHM. Each office is responsible to insure all pertinent developments are furnished Bureau.

3. Origin

   Office covering territory in which subject's subversive activities occur

4. Classification
   - a. 100 - for individuals affiliated with basic revolutionary and front organizations of Marxist ideology
   - b. 105 - for member of Puerto Rican nationalist groups or others having foreign nationalistic tendencies
   - c. 157 - Nation of Islam and other black nationalist subjects

5. Title

   Only one subject shall be carried in title of each report. Separate reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

6. Character
   - [a. The designation "Security Matter" (SM where appropriate) is to be set out in all instances. Use organizational affiliation where the organization of the subject is a current or continuing investigation or where a Bureau-approved thumbnail sketch exists. Examples:

     Security Matter - C (Communist)
     Security Matter - SWP (Socialist Workers Party)
     Security Matter - SMC (Student Mobilization Committee

   - b. Every effort is to be made to use a meaningful organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency designation; however, where this cannot be done, the following designations are to be adhered to in submitting to the Bureau:
     - (1) Security Matter - Subversive (Where activity of subject is primarily protest in nature and is related to demonstrations and other efforts to disrupt or destroy Government operations in line with espousal or support of a philosophy which advocates overthrow of the Government by any means possible, including force and violence, and/or a demonstrated propensity for violence to achieve the same objective or to deny others their rights under the Constitution.)
     - (2) Security Matter - New Left (Where activity of subject is primarily violence, extremist, student and/or communal-existence oriented and relates to demonstrations and other efforts to disrupt or destroy Government operations in line with espousal or support of a philosophy which advocates overthrow of the Government by any means possible, including force and violence, and/or a demonstrated propensity for violence to achieve the same objective or to deny others their rights under the Constitution.)]

7. Status
Carry cases as pending until all active investigation has been conducted. Thereafter, status shall be as follows:
   a. Top functionaries
      Pending inactive. Submit reports annually. Place case in pending-active status 45 days prior to date report due.
   b. Key facility cases
      Pending inactive. See instructions under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.
   c. Other security index subjects
      (1) Closed
         (a) Follow by administrative tickler to insure submission of periodic reports according to priority designation. If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and information consists only of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with sources, submit FD-400 in lieu of report setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted and any pertinent administrative data. Also submit FD-305 properly executed. Open case 45 days prior to date report due.

C. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF LABOR UNIONS

1. Purpose of investigation
    - a. To obtain complete picture of control communists have over vital industry in U. S.
    - b. To develop data concerning extent of communist control over important trade unions
    - c. To develop evidence necessary to establish under provisions of Communist Control Act of 1954 that a labor union is communist infiltrated at time Attorney General files petition
    - d. To determine identity of each important communist in labor movement
2. Policy
    - a. Prior Bureau authority required to conduct active investigation. Bureau will advise field of unions being considered under Communist Control Act of 1954. Give continuous, thorough, and expeditious attention because of limited period (three years) pertinent evidence is admissible under statutory limits in act.
    - b. Ascertain availability and willingness to testify of all possible witnesses for benefit of Department in considering cases for presentation to Subversive Activities Control Board. Current informants and confidential sources should be described as currently furnishing information to FBI and not as unavailable. Department must be furnished brief statement on background and any known factors affecting credibility of all other witnesses, including discontinued informants. Investigative techniques not available for use in court may be described as unavailable.
    - c. Investigation is limited to activities of individuals acting in furtherance or apparent furtherance of communist program. Goal is complete picture of extent of communist infiltration and domination.
    - d. Labor union as such is not subject of investigation. Title of all communications must clearly show communist infiltration is subject of investigation. FBI is not interested in employer-employee relationships or legitimate union activities.
    - e. Prior Bureau authority required to conduct interview with any officer or official of labor union during investigation of communist infiltration unless officer or official is established reliable source or confidential informant.
    - f. Prepare brief history of union, including origin, constitution, bylaws, and organizational structure. Office of origin is responsible for coverage of officers and personnel of national or international office. Auxiliary offices responsible for coverage of international representatives, organizers, and regional, district, council, and local officers active within their territories.
3. Title

    Title of all communications should clearly show that communist infiltration of union involved is subject of investigation, not the union itself; e.g.,

    "Communist Infiltration of
    United Electrical Workers of
    America"
4. Classification - 100
5. Character - Internal Security - C

D. INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

1. Definitions

[Following organizations are [examples of] "basic revolutionary organizations."

   - a. Communist Party, USA
   - b. Socialist Workers Party
   - c. Progressive Labor Party
   - d. Proletarian Party of America
   - e. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
   - [f. [Revolutionary Union]

   Black nationalist extremists and members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups and Puerto Rican subversive proindependence groups, although technically not members of basic revolutionary organizations, should be investigated under same rules. (See section 122, volume IV, of this manual.)

2. FBI responsibility

   To conduct thorough investigations into background and activities of all persons in U. S. and Puerto Rico who are dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security. Each SAC is responsible for investigation of persons in his area who, because of membership or affiliation with basic revolutionary organizations or other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, may be potentially dangerous.

3. Purposes of investigation

   a. Determination of dangerousness

      To determine identity, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals in U. S. and Puerto Rico who, because of their membership in, activity in, or association with one or more revolutionary groups or related groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security; collection of sufficient information concerning their subversive activities to justify apprehension in national emergency.

   b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes

      To determine identity, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals who have been or may be violating laws of U. S.

      (1) Direct investigation to obtain admissible evidence to establish violation.

      (2) Be alert for violation of Federal statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, and sedition.

4. Individuals to be investigated

   Exercise sound judgment and discretion in evaluating importance and dangerousness of individuals or affiliates. Investigate activities of any individual falling within one or more of following categories who does not come within restrictions on investigations listed under 87D, item 5, below:

   a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49

   b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements

      Espousal encompasses wide variety and range of activities. Actual membership in basic revolutionary organization is not prerequisite. Espousal may be expressed by membership or active participation in subversive front groups. Open investigation in every instance in which subject is actively engaged in affairs of subversive front organization in leadership capacity or by active participation in furtherance of aims and purposes of front organizations. Do not open on mere membership in front organization unless there is past membership at any time in basic revolutionary organization or other subversive derogatory information.

   c. Special training

      (1) Training in subversive movement abroad

      (2) Leadership training in basic revolutionary organization

   d. Military service

      (1) Service in Abraham Lincoln Brigade; membership in basic revolutionary organization not prerequisite

      (2) Service in military forces of any country, including U. S. armed forces, whenever individual has ever been member of basic revolutionary organization

d. Cases referred by military
Military intelligence agencies often refer cases for security investigations under Delimitations Agreement in which security-type fraud violations are involved. If subversive information does not warrant full security investigation but does indicate possible fraud violation, advise interested agency that FBI's investigation will be directed toward proving possible violation of law and that any background investigation contemplated by it pursuant to its administrative responsibilities will not interfere with FBI investigation. Advise agency pertinent information developed will be furnished and request agency to do likewise. Immediately initiate security matter - fraud against the Government investigation. If subversive information warrants full security investigation and also indicates fraud violation, advise interested agency that Bureau is initiating full security investigation in conjunction with investigation of possible violation of law and results will be furnished. Conduct expedite investigation to determine subject's dangerousness and whether a fraud violation is involved.

7. Submission of subversive derogatory information on individuals

a. Offices covering national or local headquarters of various subversive groups should promptly furnish Bureau names and identifying data regarding persons affiliated with such groups, to include basic revolutionary organizations, fascist-type organizations, black extremist organizations, and front groups of these. Furnish Bureau such information by letter and, where appropriate, indicate that list of names is being furnished for Bureau indexing purposes.

b. Information from all sources should be reviewed to insure Bureau has been furnished lists of all individuals affiliated with organizations enumerated in item a. Include information concerning a number of individuals in one letter if possible. Set out sufficient identifying data to facilitate check of Bureau files.

c. Offices obtaining information regarding subversive affiliation of individuals residing outside their territories should promptly advise offices covering such persons' addresses.

d. Names of subscribers to Communist Party nominating petitions and names appearing on subscription lists of subversive organizations should be indexed in field office covering address shown for subscriber but should not be forwarded to Bureau for indexing.

e. Important subversive information concerning any individual and any new subversive information concerning an individual of importance should be furnished Bureau expeditiously.

f. Subversive and/or derogatory information coming to attention of field office through name check or otherwise on employee of executive branch of Government, which information is within purview of EO 10450, should be forwarded promptly to Bureau for dissemination to Civil Service Commission. Such information relating to other employees of Government or employees of United Nations and other public international organizations should be furnished Bureau immediately.

E. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS - INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

1. General

All pertinent information concerning subject's background and subversive activity must be fully developed and reported to assure accurate evaluation of his dangerousness. Use discretion to prevent subjects from becoming unnecessarily aware of investigation.

Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents in security investigations without prior Bureau authority.

2. Scope of investigations

Following should be obtained:

a. Background

(1) True name and aliases

(2) Residence address

(3) Occupation or business and employment address

(4) Citizenship status, including date and place of birth and pertinent data concerning naturalization of aliens

(5) Family background

If possible, ascertain from sources contacted and report date and place of birth of subject's parents and spouse and parents of spouse. Do not conduct investigation solely for this information.

(6) Military record

Determine if subject has served in U. S. armed forces; time, place, and circumstances of such service; type of discharge received; and any membership in veterans' organizations. If subject served in armed forces of any foreign government, determine pertinent facts.

(7) Close relatives

Determine whether subject has any close relatives in U. S. armed forces or in other positions of trust and confidence, whether public or private, relating to national defense.

(8) Identification record

(a) Be alert for identification record showing arrests and/or civil data. Check local police records.

(b) When subject is approved for security index, submit FD-165 to check records of Identification Division and to post flash notice if fingerprints on file. FD-165 will be returned if positive identification cannot be made with fingerprints on file. Office of origin is responsible for resolving identification when record has been furnished by Identification Division as possibly identical. If positive identification cannot be made, it is not necessary to communicate further with Identification Division.

(c) When office of origin is changed for security index or reserve index A subject after flash notice has been placed, form FD-128 (changing origin) should so indicate. Send extra copy of FD-128 to Identification Division so its records will show new office of origin.

(d) [On those individuals who are Security Index subjects on whom no fingerprints are on file with the Identification Division, a Security Flash Notice (FD-165) should be submitted periodically on a staggered basis and at different intervals. Priority I, Security Index, subject requests should be submitted every six months commencing with the submission of an annual report and every six months thereafter. In the case of Priority II and Priority III, Security Index, subjects, requests should be submitted on an annual basis in conjunction with the submission of the annual report or annual verification of residence and employment. This periodic requirement is satisfied upon notification by the Identification Division of a fingerprint record on the subject and the placing of a stop against such record or upon the removal of a subject from the Security Index.]

[[(e)] Cancel security flash notice when subject dies or is no longer of security interest.

(9) Physical description
  (a) Obtain and report detailed physical description.
  (b) Each subject should be personally observed whenever complete security investigation is conducted. Such direct observation is mandatory for all security index subjects; however, do not delay submission of form FD-122 (recommending subject for security index) when it has not been possible to observe subject. Keep case open until personal observation accomplished. When subject is outside U. S. or Puerto Rico, this requirement may be followed administratively until subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

[(5) [Examples of]organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency

American Socialist Clubs	ASC
American Workers' Communist Party	AWC
Anarchist	ANA
Black Nationalist	BNT
Black Panther Party	BPP
Communist Party, USA	COM
Minutemen	MIN
Nation of Islam	NOI
Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
Progressive Labor Party	PLP
Proletarian Party of America	PPA
Revolutionary Action Movement	RAM
[[Revolutionary Union	RU]
Socialist Workers Party	SWP
Spartacist League	SPL
Student National Coordinating Committee	SNC
Students for a Democratic Society	SDS
Workers World Party	WWP
Bulgarian	BUL
Cuban	CUB
Czechoslovakian	CZE
Hungarian	HUN
Romanian	ROM
Russian	RUS
Yugoslavian	YUG

(6) Priority designation

Priority I	P I
Priority II	P II
Priority III	P III

(7) Top functionary designation (where applicable)

Top functionary	TF

(8) Special section cards

Atomic energy program employees	AEP
Cuban special section	CUB
Espionage subjects	ESP
Foreign government employees	FGE
Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
United Nations employees	UNE
U. S. Government employees	GOV

(9) Unavailable section cards

Missing	MI
Out of country	OC
Imprisoned	PR

(10) Date and place of birth

(11) Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List) and abbreviation denoting agency having security responsibility

(12) Residence address

(13) Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating subject in emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.

(14) Field office file number

b. Data to appear on separate attached card

(1) Place following data on separate card attached to reverse side of security index card being filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Cards contain printed captions for recording descriptive data which can be augmented if necessary.

(a) Complete description
(b) Notation that security index flash notice has been posted in Identification Division
(c) Photograph, with date taken. It is to be most current or best likeness of subject.
(d) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
(e) Other data which will assist in apprehension, such as directions to residence or employment when these are unusual, number of minor children and aged dependents

(2) If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending. Upon posting of security index flash notice, field will be furnished FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.

(3) Use FD-186 to report information for separate card attached to back of security index card. Case Agent should fill in form and forward to clerical employee designated to post information. Thereafter, file FD-186 in case file. FD-186 may be used to record information that subject has been physically observed and to note descriptive data.

6. Arrangment of security index

a. At Bureau

Entire index is maintained on IBM tabulating cards. Security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to field. An alphabetical breakdown of true names and all aliases of subjects is also maintained at Bureau for administrative purposes.

b. In field office

Active security index in each field office is maintained in four sections: geographical, alphabetical, unavailable, and special sections. Complete set of each field office's security index is also maintained away from headquarters city in same manner as geographical section with unavailable and special section cards filed in back.

(1) Geographical section

After receipt of three security index cards from Bureau and after necessary data have been added to two cards, file one in geographical section of index (except special section and unavailable section cards) and one in duplicate set maintained away from headquarters city. Geographical section is broken down by residence address in accordance with needs of each office. Where logical, it should be broken down by state, county, city, and, if needed, into boroughs or suburbs and precincts. Cards are filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown. Cards in this section will be withdrawn and used by Agents should apprehension of subjects become necessary.

Cards will show "unknown" residence for (a) subjects whose addresses are not known but prompt location within division is expected and (b) subjects whose location in another division is in process of verification. File these cards in breakdown designated "Verification Pending." With Bureau authority, offices covering large industrial areas may set up second geographical section and file cards by subjects' employment. Depending on time of day apprehensions are initiated, geographical-employment or geographical-residence section may be used.

(2) Alphabetical section

File duplicate card alphabetically in this section; there is no other breakdown. Alphabetical card is control card. If card is withdrawn from geographical section for apprehension, make notation on alphabetical card.

(4) In all instances there must be clear showing, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there has been continuing sympathy for aims and objectives of Cuban Government since 10-1-60. Citizenship status must be clearly established.

c. Pro-Cuban activity
All individuals in security index under basic criteria (item 3a, above) should be tabbed "Pro-Cuban" if by their activities and sympathies they warrant special consideration in event of limited emergency involving Cuba and U. S. This tabbing includes Cubans and non-Cubans who have engaged in activities in support of Cuban Government or pro-Castro groups. For this tabbing, submit FD-122 to Bureau with notation "Pro-Cuban" typed opposite words "Miscellaneous (specify)." Attach page containing concise summary of facts supporting recommendation. Security index cards sent to field on such subjects contain letter "C" on left side of card at beginning of second line. These cards are not kept in "Cuban" special section but are tabbed with metal tabs.

d. Evaluating interviews for security index status

(1) Positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicating adherence to doctrines, aims, or purposes of revolutionary organization or front organization shall be considered overt act.

(2) Other than above, interviews are not factors in making determination as to security index; e.g., lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not factors.

e. Effect of resort to fifth amendment
Department has advised resort to fifth amendment by witness appearing before governmental body should be considered overt act within security index criteria (1) when subject was asked directly concerning present membership in subversive organization and (2) when question calls for response as to past membership in organization in those cases in which available information would seem to bring subject within criteria except for overt act within required period.

f. Activity in Nation of Islam and other black nationalist extremist groups
Department has advised Nation of Islam constitutes potentially dangerous instrumentality in event of national emergency; statements and activities of individuals in Nation of Islam indicating anarchist and revolutionary beliefs should be considered in making judgment as to whether or not member should be in security index. Give particular attention to developing and reporting such statements, including violent and revolutionary statements made by other members in subject's presence. Statements should be reported in detail. Apply these instructions to other black nationalist extremist groups.

4. Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards

a. SAC must personally recommend inclusion in and removal of any name from security index except in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects, where recommendations can be made by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.

b. Where potential dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin is to[prepare]recommendation to Bureau on form FD-122, in triplicate. Forward original and copy to Bureau, and place copy in subject's file. Nothing should appear on FD-122 which is not in subject's file. FD-122 has[three]uses: (1) to recommend subject for security index, (2) to submit changes for existing cards,[and (3) to recommend subject be deleted from Security Index.]Submit abstract when recommending subject for security index but no abstract for changes[on the security index card.]

c. When FD-122 is submitted to recommend subject for security index, attach additional page or pages setting out succinct summary of facts on which recommendation based. Facts must be in sufficient detail to support recommendation, including justification for designated priority level for apprehension. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must show pertinent data of subject's activities.

d. If, at conclusion of investigation, subject is not being recommended for security index, set out brief summary statement in appropriate closing communication showing reasons.

e. Current summary report must be submitted to Bureau when subject is being recommended for security index. If case is pending because of outstanding leads, set out additional lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and, if approved, to disseminate copy of report to Secret Service. If case would otherwise be closed, place in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization by Bureau and, if approved, disseminate copy of report to Secret Service and then close case administratively.

f. Recommendations for security index should not be delayed because of absence of background or descriptive data. Submit recommendation with current report and retain in pending status to obtain missing items.

g. Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for security index. FD-122 should include data required for unavailable section.

h. When FD-122 is submitted recommending subject of Chinese extraction, include words "Other - Chinese" under race. When recommending person not of Chinese extraction but who has definite sympathies for Communist China, include under "Miscellaneous" following statement: "sympathetic to Communist China."

i. If Bureau approves recommendation, security index cards will be prepared. Copy of FD-122 will be returned stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." These cards should be filed in security index as outlined below. Place returned copy of FD-122 in subject's main file. (Offices with geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive extra card.)

j. When cards are received from Bureau, check data for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards which are stapled to back of two security index cards. File one of these cards in geographical section (except special section and unavailable section cards).[With the exception of Honolulu and Washington Field Offices,] file other in duplicate security index maintained[in headquarters city in a state of readiness to be evacuated on a moment's notice.]Third security index card is filed in alphabetical section.

5. Content and appearance of security index card

a. Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain following information. If any items are missing, case should be continued pending to obtain necessary information. Set forth under each item are possible categories in which subject may be classified and code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on FD-122. Code letters should appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

(1) Name and aliases

Full and correct name and aliases of subject

(2) Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others, including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)

(3) Sex

Male	M
Female	F

(4) Citizenship

Native born	NB
Naturalized	NA
Alien	AL

(If unknown, space should be left blank, but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)

(7) New office of origin is to review pertinent material received with FD-128 and information in its files to determine if additional investigation is warranted. If not, advise Bureau by letter case is being closed.

(8) Upon receipt of FD-128, office covering new address is origin and should place office file number on security index cards and file them in its security index.

(9) Upon receipt of new cards from Bureau with copy of FD-128, new office is to transfer information from reverse side of old geographical cards to two new cards, appropriately file new cards, and destroy old cards.

b. Top functionaries

Above-described mechanics of transferring cases also apply to top functionaries. Additional procedures in this category are:

(1) Notification to Bureau of deletion of subject as top functionary in old office of origin is handled by designation in space provided on FD-128 that subject was top functionary.

(2) Upon receipt of FD-128, new office of origin shall automatically designate subject top functionary and keep case pending. After investigation is completed and summary report has been submitted by old office, case may be placed in pending-inactive status. Within three months, new office is to conduct investigation, submit report, and advise Bureau concerning continued designation as top functionary.

c. Subjects tabbed for priority

Security index card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in new office of origin until that office determines that priority designation is not warranted under provisions set forth below.

d. Subjects not included in security index

(1) Transfer office of origin by FD-128 only upon verification by another office of subject's presence in that division. Enclose copies of all investigative reports and other pertinent serials to new office of origin.

(2) New office of origin is to investigate or advise Bureau case closed if no action warranted.

10. Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index

SAC must personally recommend removal of any name from security index except in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects where recommendations may be made by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.

a. Death of subject

Destroy card and advise Bureau by LHM.

b. Permanent departure

Upon learning of subject's departure from U. S. or Puerto Rico for foreign country, immediately ascertain conditions of departure for foreign country. No security index card shall be cancelled by reason of such departure unless subject is alien who has permanently departed and whose departure has been verified. If U. S. citizen who has been out of country has renounced his citizenship and taken citizenship of foreign country, security index card may be cancelled only after it has been determined he does not intend to return to U. S.

c. Imprisonment of subject

Do not cancel security index cards because subject imprisoned, regardless of length of time he will be incarcerated. Place cards in unavailable section and handle as set forth under imprisoned subjects above.

d. Induction of subject into armed forces

Place security index cards in inactive section and follow procedure set forth above under inactive section.

e. Security informants

Security index card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate person security informant. In requesting Bureau authority to designate individual as security informant, call attention to security index card and recommend cancellation.

f. Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous
Frequently information is received or investigation develops that subject is no longer threat to internal security by reason of physical condition, defection, or expulsion from subversive movement. Such defection may be shown by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over extended period or declaration of opposition to principles of subversive movement.

When there is sufficient information regarding subject's present sympathies to conclude he should no longer be considered dangerous, request authority for interview or advise Bureau why subject should not be interviewed. Bureau will not cancel security index card without consideration being given to interview. If, upon interview, subject proves cooperative, advise Bureau by letter and recommend cancellation.

[In all cases the recommendation for removal from the security index should be made by FD-122 with attached succinct summary of facts on which the recommendation is based. Submit abstract with FD-122 used to recommend removal from security index.]

g. Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection
With passage of time, limits specified in security index criteria will operate to remove subjects even though there is no affirmative indication of defection. When recommending such removal, consider if facts warrant inclusion of subject in section A of reserve index. Following procedures are for subjects not being recommended for inclusion in section A of reserve index:
(1) When subjects are removed from security index solely on basis of application of criteria, retain security index cards bearing descriptive matter on reverse sides; i.e., cards previously filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Destroy cards previously filed in alphabetical section. Those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards should retain only one card.
(2) Mark "cancelled" across face of each card retained and file in reserve index, section B.
(3) Above instructions do not apply to individuals removed from security index based upon activity in Nation of Islam. Their cards should be destroyed.

11. Priority apprehension program
a. Purpose
Some security index subjects, because of their training, violent tendencies, or prominence in subversive activity, would be more inclined or more capable of committing acts against U. S. in time of national emergency than others. Such subjects must be immobilized in least possible time. Individuals in security index tabbed priority I, and possibly priority II, would be arrested first in event of limited but grave emergency, probably without arrest of other subjects. In all-out emergency, consideration for apprehension will be given to all subjects. Decision as to priority of apprehension should be based on subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies.
b. Priority tabbing
(1) Each security index subject should be considered for priority I tabbing who falls within following categories:
(a) All top functionaries
(b) All individuals considered to be hard-core national and state leaders of basic revolutionary organizations and leaders of other subversive organizations and unorganized groups and individuals who have indicated propensity for violence and/or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, and/or guerrilla warfare, or have engaged in underground operations
(c) Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

(b) Priority III cases must be opened for verification of residence and employment on annual basis.
Review case file for any necessary action including re-evaluation of subject's status, or possible redesignation as priority I or II.

When pertinent information is submitted to Bureau for dissemination, FD-305 and FD-376 should accompany cover communication.

d. Subjects recommended for security index
  (1) Pending inactive
  If all active investigation completed at time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau, set forth lead to follow for security index approval and dissemination of report to Secret Service.
  (2) Closed
  After security index approved and dissemination to Secret Service, follow by administrative tickler for periodic report.

e. Subject not being recommended for index
Closed - prior to closing, comply with instructions pertaining to interviews.

8. Content

a. Include following and handle under topical headings where appropriate.
  (1) Background
    (a) Birth data
    (b) Citizenship status
    (c) Education
    (d) Marital status
    (e) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
    (f) Identification record
    (g) Employment
    (h) Residence
    (i) Status of health (if known)
  (2) Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front groups, black nationalist extremist groups, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups
    (a) Information concerning admission into revolutionary group, including sponsors, etc.
    (b) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement
  (3) Revolutionary statements by subject
    (a) Determine each statement and full details surrounding it.
    (b) Determine all statements showing adherence to principles of Marxism-Leninism or other revolutionary doctrines.
  (4) Other activities indicating furtherance of program of subversive organizations
    (a) Speeches and writings
    (b) Organizational directives and/or educational outlines signed by or issued by subject, or issued while subject was officer of organization
    (c) Pertinent contacts between subject and leaders of organizations
    (d) Details concerning subject's attendance or connection with subversive training schools
  (5) False statements made by subjects, including aliases
  Evidence may be obtained from passports, tax returns, and voting, marital, employment, and selective service records.
  (6) Miscellaneous
  Pertinent items not falling under above categories

b. Reports on individuals should be confined to:
  (1) Proof of membership and activity in basic revolutionary organizations, front organizations, and/or other organizations or unorganized groups

(2) Position and importance of subject in subversive movement
(3) Pertinent background information
Include only information pertinent to determining whether or not subject is engaged in subversive activities. Set out date or period to which it pertains; e.g., John Doe advised on January 15, 1970, that subject attended CP meetings in January, 1965, in Syracuse, New York.

c. Summarizing information
(1) When prior summary reports are not suitable for dissemination, include all pertinent information in current summary report with sources fully protected.
(2) Repetitious and cumulative items may be limited to representative number with each item set forth fully documented. Number of items will depend upon preponderance of other information showing dangerousness of subject. Base selection on need to report sufficient data to justify continued detention of subject if apprehended.
(3) When selection of representative number of items is made, follow with summary statement that source advised during specified period of time subject also attended certain number of other meetings. (Set out file number and serial range in documenting such statements.)
(4) Where there is extensive activity in subversive organizations, it is permissible to use narrative statements without exact dates of activity; however, show period of time involved and inclusive dates of informant reports. Do not use this type reporting in Smith Act of 1940 or ISA-50 cases. Summary statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions. Information from different sources must be reported separately.
(5) Above instructions do not lessen responsibility for reporting all pertinent items.

9. Administrative data - cover pages
a. General
References to following administrative items should be in cover pages accompanying reports:
(1) Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), FD-122, FD-128, and noninvestigative information
[(2) [In all security index cases, FD-305, appropriately filled out, shall be the last page of cover pages to annual reports and the last page of cover communications to LHMs submitted in lieu of annual reports.]

b. Documentation of reports
(1) Complete documentation of all reports is required. This also applies to LHMs submitted in priority III cases.
(2) If information necessary for complete documentation is not in subject's file, review other office files, as needed. If not obtainable, so state in cover pages.
(3) Do not conduct extensive investigation to locate sources who previously furnished background information for purposes of documentation or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed subject, according to reliable records, such as birth, school, or Immigration and Naturalization records, was born at certain place on certain date, report it without further verification.

(c) When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of missing important functionary, consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information.

d. Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following categories intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of current security investigation, subject in priorities I and II of security index, past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage.

(1) Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issued, number of passport, and issuing office, if known. Include full description of subject and all aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers). Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence.

(2) Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check.

(3) Information concerning subject's proposed travel abroad, including information concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches. If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of three copies to each legal attache involved. For each of these legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover letter should so indicate. Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LHM. Request should not refer to legal attache or request investigation by particular agency abroad.

(4) Subsequent report in individual case should contain details regarding subject's travel. In nonsecurity index cases where LHMs are submitted, communication transmitting data regarding travel should indicate whether investigation is being initiated and, if not, why.

(5) Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above.

(a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, identities of individuals participating in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CIA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.

(b) Offices should immediately identify participants and submit LHMs on those in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information.

(6) Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel abroad. If such individual has traveled behind Iron Curtain, also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state whether additional investigation is contemplated.

3. File reviews
Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent information showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidate reference cards pertaining to subject in indices.

4. Security informants
Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed in value both for intelligence purposes and as admissible evidence.

5. Physical surveillances
Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, information of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of existing circumstances and available manpower.
   a. When information is received that meetings of subversive organizations are to take place, physical surveillances should be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants.
   b. Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities serve to identify others within movement.
   c. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau.

6. Photographic surveillances
Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows subjects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations affords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be properly correlated with other investigative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance.

7. Public sources
Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain background and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state records, public utility records, and school records. Obtain and index as reference material publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities.

8. Records of private firms
Where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms provided it will not jeopardize investigation.

9. Channelizing of information to case files
Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be channelized to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances is channelized to individual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information received from informants and confidential sources with active investigation.

10. Preservation of evidence
Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence.
   a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.
   b. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recollection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.
   c. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings.
   d. Above also applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or concerning evidence otherwise obtained.

(4) In all instances there must be clear showing, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there has been continuing sympathy for aims and objectives of Cuban Government since 10-1-60. Citizenship status must be clearly established.

c. Pro-Cuban activity

All individuals in security index under basic criteria (item 3a, above) should be tabbed "Pro-Cuban" if by their activities and sympathies they warrant special consideration in event of limited emergency involving Cuba and U. S. This tabbing includes Cubans and non-Cubans who have engaged in activities in support of Cuban Government or pro-Castro groups. For this tabbing, submit FD-122 to Bureau with notation "Pro-Cuban" typed opposite words "Miscellaneous (specify)." Attach page containing concise summary of facts supporting recommendation. Security index cards sent to field on such subjects contain letter "C" on left side of card at beginning of second line. These cards are not kept in "Cuban" special section but are tabbed with metal tabs.

d. Evaluating interviews for security index status

(1) Positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicating adherence to doctrines, aims, or purposes of revolutionary organization or front organization shall be considered overt act.

(2) Other than above, interviews are not factors in making determination as to security index; e.g., lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not factors.

e. Effect of resort to fifth amendment

Department has advised resort to fifth amendment by witness appearing before governmental body should be considered overt act within security index criteria (1) when subject was asked directly concerning present membership in subversive organization and (2) when question calls for response as to past membership in organization in those cases in which available information would seem to bring subject within criteria except for overt act within required period.

f. Activity in Nation of Islam and other black nationalist extremist groups

Department has advised Nation of Islam constitutes potentially dangerous instrumentality in event of national emergency; statements and activities of individuals in Nation of Islam indicating anarchist and revolutionary beliefs should be considered in making judgment as to whether or not member should be in security index. Give particular attention to developing and reporting such statements, including violent and revolutionary statements made by other members in subject's presence. Statements should be reported in detail. Apply these instructions to other black nationalist extremist groups.

4. Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards

a. SAC must personally recommend inclusion in and removal of any name from security index except in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects, where recommendations can be made by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.

b. Where potential dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin is to submit recommendation to Bureau on form FD-122, in triplicate. Forward original and copy to Bureau, and place copy in subject's file. Nothing should appear on FD-122 which is not in subject's file. FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend subject for security index and (2) to submit changes for existing cards. Submit abstract when recommending subject for security index but no abstract for additions, deletions, or changes.

c. When FD-122 is submitted to recommend subject for security index, attach additional page or pages setting out succinct summary of facts on which recommendation based. Facts must be in sufficient detail to support recommendation, including justification for designated priority level for apprehension. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must show pertinent data of subject's activities.

d. If, at conclusion of investigation, subject is not being recommended for security index, set out brief summary statement in appropriate closing communication showing reasons.

e. Current summary report must be submitted to Bureau when subject is being recommended for security index. If case is pending because of outstanding leads, set out additional lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and, if approved, to disseminate copy of report to Secret Service. If case would otherwise be closed, place in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization by Bureau and, if approved, disseminate copy of report to Secret Service and then close case administratively.

f. Recommendations for security index should not be delayed because of absence of background or descriptive data. Submit recommendation with current report and retain in pending status to obtain missing items.

g. Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for security index. FD-122 should include data required for unavailable section.

h. When FD-122 is submitted recommending subject of Chinese extraction, include words "Other - Chinese" under race. When recommending person not of Chinese extraction but who has definite sympathies for Communist China, include under "Miscellaneous" following statement: "sympathetic to Communist China."

i. If Bureau approves recommendation, security index cards will be prepared. Copy of FD-122 will be returned stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." These cards should be filed in security index as outlined below. Place returned copy of FD-122 in subject's main file. (Offices with geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive extra card.)

j. When cards are received from Bureau, check data for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards which are stapled to back of two security index cards. File one of these cards in geographical section (except special section and unavailable section cards).[With the exception of Honolulu and Washington Field Offices,] file other in duplicate security index maintained[in headquarters city in a state of readiness to be evacuated on a moment's notice.]Third security index card is filed in alphabetical section.

5. Content and appearance of security index card

a. Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain following information. If any items are missing, case should be continued pending to obtain necessary information. Set forth under each item are possible categories in which subject may be classified and code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on FD-122. Code letters should appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

(1) Name and aliases

Full and correct name and aliases of subject

(2) Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others, including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)

(3) Sex

Male	M
Female	F

(4) Citizenship

Native born	NB
Naturalized	NA
Alien	AL

(If unknown, space should be left blank, but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)

(4) Office preparing summary report may include information originally obtained by another office but may not have necessary documentation. If office preparing report has copies of documents obtained by another office and identity of source, date of activity, date received, and receiving Agent are known, it is not necessary to obtain file number of original. Pertinent documentation, other than file number, should be obtained from auxiliary office.

(5) When report includes references to known subversives who have associated with subject, identify source of characterization in cover pages without further documentation.

(6) When it is necessary to obtain thumbnail sketch, place in thumbnail sketch file so it will be readily available for future use.

10. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

Channelizing memoranda may be destroyed following submission of reports. Copies of informant's statements designated for 100 classification files of informants may be destroyed when one year old. (See instructions for destruction of channelizing memoranda in Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 3D, item 8.)

I. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

1. Policy

Proper utilization of information received is foremost among Bureau's responsibilities. Information obtained during investigations should be forwarded to other interested agencies in executive branch unless there are compelling reasons not to do so. Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives provide for dissemination to other agencies which have present or potential interest information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters.

2. Bureau requirements

Because all conceivable situations cannot be anticipated, data below pertains to representative situations which occur frequently. Basic rule is that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in executive branch. Term "interested agency" must be interpreted in light of reason and common sense. Bring any unusual situations to Bureau's attention promptly for consideration.

Considerations affecting national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico necessitate broadest possible construction to requirements for dissemination to intelligence services in those areas. See Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities, policies, and exceptions in dissemination.

a. Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires each agency to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing agencies all information of mutual interest. Any information developed concerning members of military services must be referred immediately to appropriate military branch having primary responsibility, even though allegations have not been fully resolved or verified. Specifically point out in such instances that information has not been verified. When it is determined security subject is member of armed services, discontinue investigation immediately, advise Bureau, and disseminate pertinent reports locally to appropriate intelligence agency. Dissemination regarding military personnel is not confined to subjects of security investigations but extends to any subversive data developed against member of armed services during FBI investigations. If member of armed forces has been in contact with security subject or any individual or group with security implications, immediately advise appropriate local intelligence service, even though security aspects of contact have not been resolved. Point out in such instances that information is unverified and transmit any additional developments immediately.

Determine during security investigations whether subjects have any close relatives in armed forces. Promptly call such associations to attention of appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on subjects involved. Evaluation of these associations lies entirely within province of military intelligence services, but Bureau must disseminate this information immediately upon receipt. Advise Bureau by letter concerning any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel, including statement as to local dissemination and enclosing LHM setting out subversive data.

b. Aliens and naturalized citizens
Furnish information concerning aliens and naturalized citizens which might have bearing on their deportation or[denaturalization]to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). If in doubt, disseminate.

c. Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with military services
See instructions in this section concerning individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.

d. Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on key facilities list or otherwise in item c, above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in manufacture of materials vital to national defense
Disseminate locally to Army and other intelligence services if their interest is apparent.

e. Individuals on inactive duty who are members of or hold commissions in reserve branches or National Guard
Disseminate locally to appropriate military intelligence service.

f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including longshoremen and water-front employees
Disseminate locally to Coast Guard and, when circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies, including NISO.

g. Employees of Federal Government within purview of Executive Order 10450
No dissemination of reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in field. If, however, subject is employed in key facility, furnish copies of reports bearing dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," to appropriate intelligence agencies of armed services. Instructions regarding dissemination to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, appear in this section of this manual under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities - dissemination. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under Executive Order 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.

h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under cognizance of branch of armed services
Disseminate locally to intelligence service of military branch involved.

i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen, defined as persons in command or acting as[pilot,]mechanic, or member of crew in navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Furnish to Bureau subversive data concerning such persons by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend such data be furnished to FAA. Dissemination will be made only at Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

[A. Statutes 7
[1. Public Law 733 as implemented by EO 10450 7
[2. Smith Act of 1940 (Title 18, USC, § 2385). Advocating overthrow of Government 7
[3. Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50, USC, §§ 781-816) 7
[a. Communist-action organizations 8
[(1) Definition (§ 782) 8
[(2) Factors to be considered by Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) in determining whether organization is communist-action organization (§ 792) 8
[b. Communist front organizations 8
[(1) Definition (§ 782) 8
[(2) Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist front organization (§ 792) 8
[c. How proceedings are instituted (§ 792) 8
[d. Findings of Board and publication of same (§ 792) 8
[e. Employment of members; contributions of funds, services, or advice by Government personnel (§ 784) 8
[f. Use of mail and instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce (§ 789) 9
[g. Emergency detention provisions (§§ 811-826) 9
[h. Contributing to establishment of totalitarian dictatorship (§ 783) 9
[4. Communist Control Act of 1954 9
[a. Definition of communist-infiltrated organization 9
[b. Proceedings when Attorney General has reason to believe organization is communist infiltrated 10
[c. Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist infiltrated (§ 792a) 10
[5. Other statutes 11
[a. Fraud against Government (Title 18, USC, § 1001) 11
[b. Private correspondence with foreign governments (Title 18, USC, § 953) 11
[c. Rebellion or insurrection (Title 18, USC, § 2383) 11
[d. Sedition (Title 18, USC, §§ 2387, 2388, and 2391) 11
[e. Seditious conspiracy (Title 18, USC, § 2384) 11
[f. Recruiting for service against U. S. (Title 18, USC, § 2389) 11
[g. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended by Expatriation Act of 1954 11
[B. Investigation of Communist Party, USA; Socialist Workers Party; Other Marxist Revolutionary-Type Organizations; Front Groups; New Left and Miscellaneous Organizations 12
[1. Purposes of investigation 12
[2. Policy 12
[a. General 12
[b. Established subversive groups 12
[c. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations, including those affiliated with new left movement 12
[d. Political organizations 13
[e. Organizations connected with institutions of learning 13
[f. Legitimate noncommunist organizations which are communist infiltrated 13

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

[3. Investigative procedures re subversive organizations, new left groups, suspected subversive organizations, and communist fronts 14
[a. Origin and scope 14
[b. Whether incorporated 14
[c. Aims and purposes 14
[d. Location of headquarters 14
[e. Officers 14
[f. Membership 14
[g. Official organ, if any, and other literature 14
[h. General activities 14
[i. Finances 15
[j. Support given to or received from CPUSA or other communist group 15
[k. Implementation of CPUSA line or that of other communist group 15
[l. Accuracy of identifications 15
[m. Specific requirements for CPUSA investigations 15
[n. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups 15
[4. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against President 15
[5. Communist influence in racial matters, Internal Security - C. 16
[6. Title and character 16
[7. Classification 16
[C. Investigation of Communist Infiltration of Labor Unions 17
[1. Purpose of investigation 17
[2. Policy 17
[3. Title 17
[4. Classification 17
[5. Character 17
[D. Investigations of Individuals - Policy and Objectives 18
[1. Definitions 18
[2. FBI responsibility 18
[3. Purposes of investigation 18
[4. Individuals to be investigated 18
[5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals 19
[a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning 19
[b. Subjects not connected with institution of learning 20
[c. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishment, employees of United Nations or international organizations, and members of armed forces 20
[6. Fraud against Government (FAG) violations 20
[a. Policy 20
[b. Investigation 20
[c. Legal questions 20
[d. Cases referred by military 21
[7. Submission of subversive derogatory information on individuals 21

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
[E. Investigation of Individuals - Investigative Procedures
[and Techniques.................................... 22
[1. General.. 22
[2. Scope of investigations......................... 22
[a. Background.................................. 22
[b. Subversive activity......................... 23
[c. Missing security subjects................... 24
[d. Individuals traveling abroad................ 25
[3. File reviews.................................... 26
[4. Security informants............................. 26
[5. Physical surveillances.......................... 26
[6. Photographic surveillances...................... 26
[7. Public sources.................................. 26
[8. Records of private firms........................ 26
[9. Channelizing of information to case files....... 26
[10. Preservation of evidence....................... 26
[11. Interviews with subjects of security investigations.......... 27
[a. Policy...................................... 27
[b. Purpose..................................... 27
[c. SAC authority............................... 27
[d. Procedures for interviews under SAC authority............ 27
[e. Prior Bureau authority...................... 27
[f. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview.......... 28
[g. Preparation for and conduct of interview......... 28
[h. Reporting results of interview.............. 29
[i. Reinterviews of security index subjects..... 30
[j. Maintenance of control file on former members of sub-
[versive organizations.................... 30
[F. Reserve Index..................................... 31
[1. Purpose... 31
[2. Composition..................................... 31
[3. Arrangement..................................... 31
[a. Section A................................... 31
[b. Section B................................... 32
[4. Content... 32
[5. Removal and deletion of cards................... 32
[G. Security Index.................................... 33
[1. Purpose and general policy...................... 33
[2. Determination of dangerousness of individual.... 33
[3. Criteria for placing and retaining name in security index..... 34
[a. Basic criteria.............................. 34
[b. Activity in support of Cuban regime......... 34
[c. Pro-Cuban activity.......................... 35
[d. Evaluating interviews for security index status.......... 35
[e. Effect of resort to fifth amendment......... 35
[f. Activity in Nation of Islam and other black nationalist
[extremist groups......................... 35
[4. Recommendations for and preparation of security index
[cards....................................... 35
[5. Content and appearance of security index card... 36
[6. Arrangment of security index.................... 38
[a. At Bureau................................... 38
[b. In field office............................. 38
[(1) Geographical section.................... 38
[(2) Alphabetical section.................... 38
[(3) Special section......................... 39
[(4) Unavailable section..................... 40
[(5) Inactive section........................ 41

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

[7. Periodic verification of addresses 41
[8. Changes, additions, and deletions of data on security index cards 42
[9. Movement of subjects between offices 42
[10. Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index. 43
[11. Priority apprehension program 44
[a. Purpose 44
[b. Priority tabbing 44
[c. Recommendations for priority tabbing 45
[d. Administrative procedures 45
[e. Tabbing of cards 45
[12. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities ... 45
[a. Responsibility 45
[b. Inclusion in security index 46
[c. Dissemination 46
[d. Status of cases 46
[e. Reports 46
[13. Top functionary program 46
[a. General 46
[b. Definition 47
[c. Manner of designation 47
[d. Regulations governing handling of top functionaries 47
[e. Maintenance of list 47
[14. Correlation of other investigations with security index and reserve index 47
[H. Reports on Individuals 48
[1. General 48
[2. Schedule of submission of reports 48
[3. Origin 48
[4. Classification 48
[5. Title 48
[6. Character 48
[7. Status 48
[8. Content 49
[a. Include following and handle under topical headings where appropriate 49
[(1) Background 49
[(2) Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front groups, black nationalist extremist groups, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups 49
[(3) Revolutionary statements by subject 49
[(4) Other activities indicating furtherance of program of subversive organizations 49
[(5) False statements made by subjects, including aliases 49
[(6) Miscellaneous 49
[b. Reports on individuals should be confined to 49
[c. Summarizing information 50
[9. Administrative data - cover pages 50
[a. General 50
[b. Documentation of reports 50
[10. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of 51

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

[I. Dissemination of Data Developed in Security Investigations....... 51
[1. Policy.. 51
[2. Bureau requirements................................. 51
[a. Members of armed forces.......................... 52
[b. Aliens and naturalized citizens.................. 52
[c. Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with military services.................................. 52
[d. Employees of public utilities.................... 52
[e. Individuals on inactive duty who are members of or hold commissions in reserve branches or National Guard...... 52
[f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including longshoremen and water-front employees....... 52
[g. Employees of Federal Government within purview of Executive Order 10450.............................. 52
[h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of defense installation.................... 52
[i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration.................................. 52
[j. Dissemination to Secret Service.................. 53
[k. Dissemination at Bureau.......................... 53

A. STATUTES

There are four principal statutes to consider in security investigations: Public Law 733 as implemented by Executive Order (EO) 10450, Smith Act of 1940, Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA-50), and Communist Control Act of 1954. On occasion, other statutes may be applicable, such as seditious conspiracy, treason, fraud against Government, and Registration Act.

1. Public Law 733 as implemented by EO 10450

President, by Executive Order 10450, dated 4-27-53, established government-wide employee security program, based on authority and approach set forth by Congress in Public Law 733, enacted on 8-26-50.

Section 8(a) of EO 10450 provides that investigations conducted pursuant to this order shall be designed to develop information as to whether employment or retention in employment in Federal service of person being investigated is clearly consistent with interests of national security. Such information relates, among other things, to following:

> "Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."

Attorney General's part of employee security program consists of making full field investigations through FBI; maintaining list of totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive organizations; and giving agencies advice in establishing and maintaining their security programs.

2. Smith Act of 1940 (Title 18, USC, § 2385). Advocating overthrow of Government

Smith Act prohibits knowingly advocating or teaching overthrow of Government by force or violence; publishing or circulating written or printed material with intent to cause such overthrow; attempting to organize group of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage such overthrow; and conspiring to commit these offenses. Penalty for conviction carries fine of not more than $20,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than 20 years and shall be ineligible for employment by U. S. or any department or agency thereof for five years next following his conviction. Decisions by Supreme Court on 6-7-57 and 6-5-61 established new evidentiary standards, such as proof of incitement to action, which must be met by Government in future prosecutions under this act.

3. Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50, USC, §§ 781-816)

Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA-50) became effective 9-23-50. It generally provides for registration of communist-action and communist front organizations; amends obstruction of justice statute; implements espionage and sabotage statutes and various immigration and naturalization regulations; prohibits contributing to establishment of totalitarian dictatorship; and provides for detention of individuals in case of national emergency. Act was amended 1-2-68 to delete requirement that communist organizations and their members register with Attorney General, a procedure ruled unconstitutional by Supreme Court because it violated constitutional rights against self-incrimination. This manual section is limited to ISA-50 provisions pertaining to communist-action organizations, communist front organizations, contributing to establishment of totalitarian dictatorship, and detention of individuals in case of emergency.

a. Communist-action organizations

(1) Definition (§ 782)

Term "communist-action organization" means any organization in U. S. (other than diplomatic representative or mission of foreign government accredited by Department of State) which is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by foreign government or foreign organization controlling world communist movement (referred to in section 781) and which operates primarily to advance objectives of world communist movement.

(2) Factors to be considered by Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) in determining whether organization is communist-action organization (§ 792)

SACB considers relationship of organization under review to foreign organization or foreign government described in above definition in regard to policies, activities, accountability, training received, financial support, concealment of foreign direction, and allegiance of its principal leaders to such foreign government or foreign organization.

b. Communist front organizations

(1) Definition (§ 782)

Term "communist front organization" means any organization in U. S. (other than communist-action organization) which (a) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by communist-action organization or (b) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by one or more members of communist-action organization, and (c) is primarily operated for purpose of giving aid and support to communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement.

(2) Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist front organization (§ 792)

SACB considers extent to which organization is managed and financed by any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement. SACB also considers extent to which organization's policies are similar to and extent it promotes objectives of any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement.

c. How proceedings are instituted (§ 792)

When Attorney General has reason to believe any organization is communist-action or communist front organization, he files petition with SACB (and serves upon organization copy thereof) for determination that such is true by hearing before SACB.

d. Findings of Board and publication of same (§ 792)

If, after hearing, SACB finds (1) that organization is communist-action or communist front organization, it makes report in writing of its findings and causes to be served on such organization an order determining organization to be communist-action or communist front organization.

Findings of SACB are published in Federal Register and this publication is notice to all persons that such orders have become final; records of SACB concerning such hearings shall be available to public.

e. Employment of members; contributions of funds, services, or advice by Government personnel (§ 784)

When there is in effect final order of SACB determining any organization to be communist-action or communist front organization, it shall be unlawful

(1) For any member of such organization with knowledge or notice of such final order: (a) to conceal or fail to disclose that he is a member of such organization in seeking, accepting, or holding any nonelective office or employment under U. S.; (b) to hold any nonelective office or employment under U. S.; (c) to conceal or fail to disclose that he is member of such organization in seeking, accepting, or holding employment in any defense facility; or (d) to hold office or employment with any labor organization, as defined in section 2 (5) of National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or to represent any employer in any matter or proceeding arising or pending under that act.

(2) For any officer or employee of U. S. or of any defense facility, with knowledge or notice of such final order of SACB: (a) to contribute funds or services to such organization; or (b) to advise, counsel, or urge any person, with knowledge or notice that such person is member of such organization, to perform or omit to perform, any act if such act or omission would constitute violation of any provision of paragraph (1) above.

f. Use of mail and instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce (§ 789)

Act requires any person acting for or on behalf of any organization for which there is in effect final order of SACB determining it to be communist-action or communist front organization to label properly all publications transmitted through mail or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce.

g. Emergency detention provisions (§§ 811-826)

Detention provisions include establishment of program for arrests of certain individuals, hearings after arrests, and right to judicial review in event of "internal security emergency." Criminal provisions make it unlawful in connection with detention provisions to resist arrest, knowingly disregard or evade apprehension, escape from confinement, or conspire with others to escape from confinement or detention. Violations also cover aiding or assisting in commission of violations mentioned above and willful interference with activities of any members or agent of review board set up under detention provisions.

h. Contributing to establishment of totalitarian dictatorship (§ 783)

ISA-50 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to combine, conspire, or agree with any other person to perform any act which would substantially contribute to establishment within U. S. of a totalitarian dictatorship, direction and control of which is to be vested in, or exercised by, or under domination or control of any foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign individual. Maximum penalty is $10,000 or 10 years, ot both, and thereafter be inelegible to hold any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by Constitution or laws of U. S. Statute of limitations is 10 years, except statute will not run on officer or employee of U. S. until after his employment has ceased.

4. Communist Control Act of 1954

Act is divided into three measures: (a) termination of rights, privileges, and immunities formerly enjoyed by CPUSA and subsidiary organizations: (b) determination of membership in CPUSA and other subversive organizations; and (c) amendment of ISA-50, bringing within its purview communist-infiltrated organizations. This manual section is limited to provisions pertaining to communist-infiltrated organizations (Title 50, USC, § 782).

a. Definition of communist-infiltrated organization

Term "communist-infiltrated organization" means any organization in U. S. (other than communist-action or communist front organization) which (1) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by individual or individuals who are, or who within three years have been, actively engaged in giving aid or support to communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement, and (2) is serving, or within last three years has served, as means for (a) giving aid or support to any such organization, government, or movement, or (b) impairment of military strength of U. S. or its industrial capacity to furnish logistical support required by its armed forces. Provided, however, that any labor organization which is affiliate in good standing of national federation or other labor organizations whose policies and activities have been directed to opposing communist organizations, communist foreign government, or world communist movement shall be presumed prima facie not to be communist-infiltrated organization.

b. Proceedings when Attorney General has reason to believe organization is communist infiltrated

He may file petition with SACB and serve copy on communist-infiltrated organization. He may join more than one organization as respondents to his petition. Hearings will then be conducted by SACB on evidence presented by Attorney General. SACB is empowered to make finding that organization is or is not communist-infiltrated, and within six months after an unfavorable determination organization may petition for a new determination.

SACB is also authorized to notify National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) of its findings and to publish findings in Federal Register. NLRB has power to deny organizations found to be communist infiltrated representation before it, and upon petition of twenty per cent of membership of communist-infiltrated labor union to NLRB, that body may nullify rights of union to represent its members and call for election to determine new bargaining representative.

c. Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist infiltrated (§ 792a)

SACB shall consider following:

(1) To what extent, if any, effective management of affairs of organization is conducted by one or more individuals who are, or within three years have been, (a) members, agents, or representatives of any communist organization, any communist foreign government, or the world communist movement with knowledge of nature and purpose thereof; or (b) engaged in giving aid or support to any such organization, government, or movement with knowledge of nature and purpose

(2) To what extent, if any, policies of such organization are, or within three years have been, formulated and carried out pursuant to direction or advice or any member, agent, or representative of any such organization, government, or movement

(3) To what extent, if any, personnel and resources of such organization are, or within three years have been, used to further or promote objectives of any such communist organization, government, or movement

(4) To what extent, if any, such organization within three years has received from, or furnished to or for use of, any such communist organization, government, or movement any funds or other material assistance

(5) To what extent, if any, such organization is, or within three years has been, affiliated in any way with any such communist organization, government, or movement

(6) To what extent, if any, affiliation of such organization, or any individual or individuals who are members thereof, or who manage its affairs, with any such communist organization, government, or movement is concealed from or is not disclosed to the membership

(7) To what extent, if any, such organization or any of its managers or members are, or within three years have been, knowingly engaged (a) in any conduct punishable under § 783 or § 794 or under chapter 37, 105, or 115 of Title 18; or (b) with intent to impair military strength of U. S. or its industrial capacity to furnish logistical or other support required by its armed forces, in any activity resulting in or contributing to any such impairment

5. Other statutes

Following statutes should also be considered in security investigations.

a. Fraud against Government (Title 18, USC, § 1001)
This section includes possible fraud against Government violations through concealments or falsifications relating to subversive information. Violation must be presented to Department instead of local USAs for prosecutive opinion. They ordinarily involve execution of U. S. Government forms. Common violators are employees of private concerns having Government contracts who execute Government forms required for clearance for access to classified information. (See section 47, volume II, of this manual.)

b. Private correspondence with foreign governments (Title 18, USC, § 953)
Prohibits U. S. citizen from corresponding, without U. S. authority, with foreign government to influence conduct of that government in relation to any disputes or controversies with U. S. or to defeat measures of U. S.

c. Rebellion or insurrection (Title 18, USC, § 2383)
Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against authority of U. S. or its laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under U. S.

d. Sedition (Title 18, USC, §§ 2387, 2388, and 2391)
These sections penalize attempts to undermine loyalty, discipline, or morale of U. S. armed forces. (See section 88, volume III, of this manual.)

e. Seditious conspiracy (Title 18, USC, § 2384)
If two or more persons in any state or territory, or in any place subject to jurisdiction of U. S., conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force Government of U. S., or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay execution of any law of U. S., or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of U. S. contrary to authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

f. Recruiting for service against U. S. (Title 18, USC, § 2389)
Whoever recruits soldiers or sailors within U. S., or in any place subject to its jurisdiction, to engage in armed hostility against the same; or whoever opens within U. S., or any place subject to its jurisdiction, a recruiting station for enlistment of soldiers and sailors to serve in any manner in armed hostilities against U. S. shall be fined not more that $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

g. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended by Expatriation Act of 1954
The 1952 act provides that national of U. S., whether by birth or naturalization, shall automatically lose his nationality if he is convicted of: (1) committing any act of treason against U. S., or (2) attempting to overthrow by force U. S. Government, or (3) bearing arms against U. S. Offenses committed subsequent to 12-24-52 where conviction is obtained make defendant subject to expatriation. Expatriation Act of 1954 provides for expatriation when subject is convicted for one of following offenses subsequent to 9-3-54: (1) violating or conspiring to violate Title 18, USC, § 2383 (inciting rebellion or insurrection against U. S.); or (2) willfully performing any act in violation of Title 18, USC, § 2385 (Smith Act of 1940); or (3) violating Title 18, USC, § 2384, by engaging in conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force U. S. Government; or (4) levying war against U. S.

B. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY, USA; SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY; OTHER MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS; FRONT GROUPS; NEW LEFT AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purposes of investigation
    - a. To obtain legally admissible evidence for prosecution under existing Federal statutes
    - b. To obtain sufficient pertinent data to determine organization's character and permit implementation of EO 10450
    - c. To obtain intelligence data in order to have day-to-day appraisal of strength, dangerousness, and activities of organization; and to keep Department and other interested Government agencies advised

    Specific objectives should include:
    - a. Development of confidential informants at all levels of organization
    - b. Coverage of all important ramifications of organization's activities
    - c. Development of admissible evidence against organization's officials for violation of Federal laws
2. Policy
    - a. General
        - (1) By Presidential directive 9-6-39, and subsequent restatements, FBI is charged with responsibility for coordinating all information regarding U. S. internal security.
        - (2) FBI employees should not discuss communist or related investigations with any unauthorized individuals. This subject is not to be discussed in speeches of Bureau employees without specific authorization. However, mimeographed material, including speeches, testimony, and magazine articles prepared by Director, may be furnished without discussion to individuals interested.
        - (3) Investigations must be conducted in most discreet and thorough manner. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during security investigations without Bureau authority.
        - (4) Established sources and informants who are students or employees at institution of learning, but who are not reporting on any campus activities or any matter pertaining to educational institution, may be contacted without Bureau authority. These contacts must be made away from campus.
        - (5) No photographic surveillances are to be conducted in security cases without specific Bureau authority and then only when essential to protect Bureau's interest in internal security cases by supplementing informant coverage. In request for Bureau authority for photographic surveillance, outline manner in which it will be conducted and supervised.
    - b. Established subversive groups
        - (1) Keep Bureau currently advised by appropriate communication, and later incorporate in reports, all pertinent activities, including any changes in principal officers, structure of organization, and forthcoming events.
        - (2) If no specific leads outstanding, case may be placed in pending-inactive status after submission of initial report.
        - (3) Submit reports semiannually unless advised otherwise in individual cases.
    - c. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations, including those affiliated with new left movement
        - (1) When information is received concerning formation of group, immediately open case and advise Bureau.
        - (2) Conduct sufficient inquiry through established sources to determine character of group.
            - (a) If further investigation warranted, submit report and thereafter submit reports semiannually unless advised otherwise in individual cases.
            - (b) If further investigation not warranted, furnish Bureau results of preliminary inquiry and reasons for this determination by letter. Incorporate any pertinent information in form suitable for dissemination.

d. Political organizations
   (1) Obtain Bureau approval to institute investigation.
   (2) Furnish all pertinent information re communist infiltration, influence, or control of organization to Bureau by letter.

e. Organizations connected with institutions of learning
   (1) Conduct no investigation without prior Bureau approval.
   (2) In request for Bureau approval, submit all available data and reason investigation is necessary.
   (3) If Bureau authority granted, it is permissible to contact all established reliable sources, including those in administrative capacity with institution of learning.
   (4) Complete justification must be submitted and Bureau authortiy obtained before conducting interview with student, graduate student, or professor connected with institution of learning.

f. Legitimate noncommunist organizations which are communist infiltrated
   (1) Conduct no investigation without prior Bureau approval.
   (2) Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced Agents.
   (3) Advise Bureau promptly under caption "Cominfil (name of organization)" when one of following exists and include recommendation for instituting investigation:
      (a) Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) or other communist organization has specifically instructed its members to infiltrate organization.
      (b) CPUSA members or members of other communist groups have infiltrated organization in sufficient strength to influence or control organization.
   (4) When advising Bureau, include following:
      (a) Name and address of organization
      (b) Extent of communist infiltration
      (c) Identities of CPUSA members or members of other communist groups and positions held in organization
      (d) List of informants who hold positions, are members, or report on organization
      (e) Recommendation as to additional investigation

      Above instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates, as well as national organization. Break down information required under items (c) and (d) above by local chapters where they exist.
   (5) No informant or source should be instructed by FBI to join or attend meetings. If CPUSA or other communist organization asks informant to do so, he should comply.
   (6) No member of organization not already established source should be contacted regarding organization. This does not preclude pretext interviews where advisable.
   (7) Include in first paragraph of details of report basis for investigation and statement it is directed solely toward establishing extent of infiltration or that organization is specific target for infiltration, and that Bureau is not investigating legitimate activities of organization.
   (8) Develop fully and include following in report:
      (a) Address of organization
      (b) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership
      (c) Principal officers of organization
      (d) Pertinent information showing communist objective is to infiltrate organization and influence its policy. Results of infiltration efforts, including communist affiliations of officers and members.
   (9) Caption of all correspondence should contain "Communist Infiltration" preceding name of organization.
   (10) If organization becomes completely dominated and controlled by CPUSA or other communist group, submit recommendation to Bureau to drop "Communist Infiltration" from title and investigate as communist front.

3. Investigative procedures re subversive organizations, new left groups, suspected subversive organizations, and communist fronts
   Develop fully and report on following topics, where applicable:
   a. Origin and scope
      Date of formation. Circumstances under which founded. Identify individual or individuals responsible for organizing group. Identify all chapters and give their locations.
   b. Whether incorporated
      Determine if organization has filed incorporation papers with appropriate state officials.
   c. Aims and purposes
      Determine whether organization advocates violence, resistance, and unlawful activity.
   d. Location of headquarters
   e. Officers
      List principal officers, including board of directors, and give appropriate characterization of each showing subversive affiliation.
   f. Membership
      (1) General
          Ascertain estimated membership. Whenever possible, secure membership lists, mailing lists, or other records showing affiliation with organization. Secure accurate description of all lists to eliminate confusion as to exact identity or significance of any list.
      (2) CPUSA
          Details of semiannual reports are not to contain membership statistics. Following instructions are for cover pages.
          (a) Cover pages must contain latest statistics on total CPUSA members in district. Set forth on separate page or pages. Offices covering district headquarters should submit following figures: for entire district, for individual states, or portion of state covered by district. Auxiliary offices which have been authorized to submit this data by letter should include membership figures in such letters and submit them to Bureau and office of origin on April 1 and October 1. Office of origin responsible to obtain complete figures from auxiliary offices.
          (b) Each office must show for its territory following: number of Negroes in CPUSA, name and title of each Negro who has national level position or who has district level position above that of club chairman. When possible, membership totals should be broken down as to nationality, sex, employment, veteran status, and membership in unions.
          (c) Include evaluation of reliability of figures furnished by each source and of final figures. Use of only one source is not acceptable unless facts demonstrate such information is most reliable available. Also include totals of positively identified CPUSA members and tentatively identified members within six-month period preceding report.
          (d) Explain in detail any increase or decrease in membership. Include results of membership recruiting drives. Endeavor to ascertain results of national registration drives.
          (e) Include whether all persons identified as CPUSA members in report who reside within area covered by reporting office are listed in security index, or are informants or sources. List any exception by name and show status of investigation and whether name has been furnished to Bureau for indexing.
   g. Official organ, if any, and other literature
      (1) May be obtained through confidential mailbox, panel sources, and confidential informants
      (2) Appropriately identify all such literature.
      (3) Promptly furnish to Bureau at least one copy of each pertinent piece of literature.
   h. General activities

i. Finances
Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Emphasis must be placed on determining if funds are being furnished organizations from foreign sources and if there is any rapport between the organizations and organizations in foreign countries.

j. Support given to or received from CPUSA or other communist group
Develop evidence showing support, financial or otherwise, given by organization to CPUSA or other communist group or received by organization from CPUSA or other communist group.

k. Implementation of CPUSA line or that of other communist group
Usually shown through comparison of programs and literature of organization with those of CPUSA or other communist group during any particular period.

l. Accuracy of identifications
Use extreme care to assure statements relating to affiliations or membership in subversive organizations are accurate in all respects. Show exact basis, plus corroboration wherever possible, for identification of suspected organizations or individuals with information of a possible subversive nature. Never refer to a person as a "known communist" unless he is publicly known as such.

m. Specific requirements for CPUSA investigations
Follow previously established reporting format. New York is responsible, in addition to reporting activities of New York District, for investigating and reporting separately on national committee meetings, national training schools, and other important national meetings.

n. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups
All offices submit semiannual reports and carry as pending inactive, except New York whose report on SWP activities on national basis should be designated pending. New York also submit report on local SWP activities. Indicate in cover pages whether all persons identified in report as members of SWP or as members of other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups who reside within area covered by reporting office are listed in security index, or are informants or sources. List any exception by name and show status of investigation and state whether name has been furnished Bureau for indexing.

Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of information, interviews with past or present CPUSA members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Agents attending mass meetings, etc.

4. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against President
On 2-3-65, an "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection" was signed and became effective. This agreement is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual. Agreement provides that FBI, in its investigations of organizations whose activities are inimical to welfare of U. S., will be alert to and promptly notify Secret Service of any information indicating plot against person of the President. It is responsibility of Secret Service to initiate necessary action to neutralize such plot.

a. Be alert during investigation of organization for information indicating plot against person of President. Upon receipt, immediately furnish complete details to nearest office of Secret Service and appropriate local law enforcement agencies and advise Bureau by teletype, or telephone if facts warrant, of information furnished and fact it has been so disseminated. Attempt immediately to verify information, but do not attempt evaluation of information.

b. Promptly prepare LHM, including complete details disseminated and identities of Secret Service officer and local law enforcement officers to whom given and date and time of notification. Promptly disseminate LHM locally to Secret Service and any other appropriate Government agency and furnish sufficient copies to Bureau for dissemination at SOG. Disseminate copies of all LHMs and reports concerning organization locally to Secret Service on continuing basis and furnish extra copies of such communications to Bureau for dissemination at SOG.

c. Determine identities of members of organization involved in plot. Background information concerning such individuals should be fully developed and included in communications disseminated to Secret Service.

5. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C (code name "CIRM"). Bufile 100-442529. Office of origin: New York

a. Submit quarterly reports, to reach Bureau by February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1 on full extent of communist influence in racial matters. Include information on communist infiltration of Negro organizations and subversive individuals active in racial movement. Include this information even if it duplicates information in other reports. Offices with no information to report advise Bureau by letter.

b. Use three-part outline in report: (1) Communist Strategy, (2) Communist Tactics, and (3) Communist Penetration and Influence in Racial Organizations. Under strategy, include plans and line of CPUSA and other communist groups, such as SWP and Progressive Labor Party. Under tactics, describe communist direction, influence, and participation in demonstrations, disturbances, and other events with racial overtones. List events in chronological order with appropriate subheadings. In part three, report influence of subversives in racial organizations.

6. Title and character.

Communications covering organizations should carry name of organization and character "Internal Security" followed by principal organizational affiliation; e.g.,

Communist Party, USA
Internal Security - C

Socialist Workers Party
Internal Security - SWP

Where appropriate, include identity of particular district or field division; e.g.,

Communist Party, USA
____________ District
____________ Division
Internal Security - C

7. Classification - 100

C. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF LABOR UNIONS

1. Purpose of investigation
    - a. To obtain complete picture of control communists have over vital industry in U. S.
    - b. To develop data concerning extent of communist control over important trade unions
    - c. To develop evidence necessary to establish under provisions of Communist Control Act of 1954 that a labor union is communist infiltrated at time Attorney General files petition
    - d. To determine identity of each important communist in labor movement
2. Policy
    - a. Prior Bureau authority required to conduct active investigation. Bureau will advise field of unions being considered under Communist Control Act of 1954. Give continuous, thorough, and expeditious attention because of limited period (three years) pertinent evidence is admissible under statutory limits in act.
    - b. Ascertain availability and willingness to testify of all possible witnesses for benefit of Department in considering cases for presentation to Subversive Activities Control Board. Current informants and confidential sources should be described as currently furnishing information to FBI and not as unavailable. Department must be furnished brief statement on background and any known factors affecting credibility of all other witnesses, including discontinued informants. Investigative techniques not available for use in court may be described as unavailable.
    - c. Investigation is limited to activities of individuals acting in furtherance or apparent furtherance of communist program. Goal is complete picture of extent of communist infiltration and domination.
    - d. Labor union as such is not subject of investigation. Title of all communications must clearly show communist infiltration is subject of investigation. FBI is not interested in employer-employee relationships or legitimate union activities.
    - e. Prior Bureau authority required to conduct interview with any officer or official of labor union during investigation of communist infiltration unless officer or official is established reliable source or confidential informant.
    - f. Prepare brief history of union, including origin, constitution, bylaws, and organizational structure. Office of origin is responsible for coverage of officers and personnel of national or international office. Auxiliary offices responsible for coverage of international representatives, organizers, and regional, district, council, and local officers active within their territories.
3. Title

    Title of all communications should clearly show that communist infiltration of union involved is subject of investigation, not the union itself; e.g.,

    "Communist Infiltration of
    United Electrical Workers of
    America"
4. Classification - 100
5. Character - Internal Security - C

D. INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

1. Definitions

Following organizations are "basic revolutionary organizations."

- a. Communist Party, USA
- b. Socialist Workers Party
- c. Progressive Labor Party
- d. Proletarian Party of America
- e. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
- f. Johnson-Forest Group

Black nationalist extremists and members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups and Puerto Rican subversive proindependence groups, although technically not members of basic revolutionary organizations, should be investigated under same rules. (See section 122, volume IV, of this manual.)

2. FBI responsibility

To conduct thorough investigations into background and activities of all persons in U. S. and Puerto Rico who are dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security. Each SAC is responsible for investigation of persons in his area who, because of membership or affiliation with basic revolutionary organizations or other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, may be potentially dangerous.

3. Purposes of investigation

a. Determination of dangerousness

To determine identity, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals in U. S. and Puerto Rico who, because of their membership in, activity in, or association with one or more revolutionary groups or related groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security; collection of sufficient information concerning their subversive activities to justify apprehension in national emergency.

b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes

To determine identity, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals who have been or may be violating laws of U. S.

- (1) Direct investigation to obtain admissible evidence to establish violation.
- (2) Be alert for violation of Federal statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, and sedition.

4. Individuals to be investigated

Exercise sound judgment and discretion in evaluating importance and dangerousness of individuals or affiliates. Investigate activities of any individual falling within one or more of following categories who does not come within restrictions on investigations listed under 87D, item 5, below:

a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49

b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements

Espousal encompasses wide variety and range of activities. Actual membership in basic revolutionary organization is not prerequisite. Espousal may be expressed by membership or active participation in subversive front groups. Open investigation in every instance in which subject is actively engaged in affairs of subversive front organization in leadership capacity or by active participation in furtherance of aims and purposes of front organizations. Do not open on mere membership in front organization unless there is past membership at any time in basic revolutionary organization or other subversive derogatory information.

c. Special training

- (1) Training in subversive movement abroad
- (2) Leadership training in basic revolutionary organization

d. Military service

- (1) Service in Abraham Lincoln Brigade; membership in basic revolutionary organization not prerequisite
- (2) Service in military forces of any country, including U. S. armed forces, whenever individual has ever been member of basic revolutionary organization

e. Employment in key facilities
Individual employed in or having access to key facility who is alleged to have been at any time member of any basic revolutionary organization

f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs
Individuals who, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, are likely to seize upon national emergency to endanger public safety and welfare. Membership or affiliation in basic revolutionary or front groups not prerequisite.

Falling within above category are leaders of Nation of Islam (NOI). Conduct security investigation of all individuals reported to be functionaries or leaders of NOI or active participants carrying out aims of organization. Investigation should not be initiated based on mere membership. During investigation be alert for violation of Selective Service Act.

Above standards are not all-inclusive. Resolve doubts in interest of security and conduct investigation. Cases should be investigated so as to permit determination for possible inclusion in security index.

Complaints from anonymous sources alleging subversive activities should be considered as basis for investigation.

Security cases must be evaluated continually to determine if we are fulfilling responsibilities in internal security field and those cases not warranting further investigation should be closed promptly.

5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals
Do not institute investigations because of membership in organizations which do not advocate use of force to bring about changes in existing Government; e.g., Socialist Party, Independent Workers of the World, and Independence Party of Puerto Rico.

a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning

(1) Prior Bureau authority required to institute investigation of faculty members.

Bureau authority not needed for student or nonacademic employee provided no unusual circumstances exist which would require advice from Bureau prior to investigation and there is sound basis for investigation. In requests for Bureau authority, identify subject, his position, and basis for investigation.

(2) Contacts during investigation

(a) After Bureau authority granted, it is permissible to contact:

I. Established sources functioning in an administrative capacity, such as registrar, director of admissions, dean of men, dean of women, and security officers and their subordinates. Contacts may be made on campus. Other established sources and informants must be contacted away from campus.

II. All individuals not connected with institutions of learning who, consistent with discretion, would be contacted in security case, such as neighbors and past employers.

(b) No contacts are to be made with students, graduate students, and professors (other than sources outlined above) at educational institutions without prior Bureau authority. When requesting authority, give full justification, individual's name, position, and statement concerning his discretion and reliability.

(c) Superiors of faculty members should not be contacted.

(3) Receiving voluntary information
These instructions must not deter immediate interview of any person connected with institution of learning who desires to furnish information to FBI or be contacted by an Agent.

b. Subjects not connected with institution of learning

When subject of investigation is not connected with an institution of learning and interview of student, faculty member, or other employee of institution of learning is desired, prior Bureau authority must be obtained except for established sources. When requesting authority, furnish name, position, and a positive statement concerning person's discretion and reliability.

c. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishment, employees of United Nations or international organizations, and members of armed forces

If subject of investigation is or becomes employee of U. S. Government, foreign official establishment, United Nations, or other international organization, has foreign diplomatic or official status, or is member of U. S. armed forces, advise Bureau and request authority for further investigation.

6. Fraud against Government (FAG) violations

a. Policy

(1) Upon receipt of information indicating violation of this type, initiate investigation under "Security Matter - Fraud Against the Government" character and immediately advise Bureau.

(2) Investigate and report criminal fraud violation (such as concealment of arrests) arising during security-type fraud investigation on same subject in conjunction with investigation of security-type fraud. Bureau will present both violations to Department. If security-type fraud investigation is discontinued, handle criminal fraud separately following instructions in section section 47, volume II, of this manual.

(3) If admissible evidence developed does not warrant submission of prosecutive summary report, submit results in investigative report.

b. Investigation

(1) To establish jurisdiction, it is necessary to prove that form was presented to Government agency for action or determination, and this should be first investigative objective. If form was not presented to Government agency, conduct no further investigation and so advise Bureau.

(2) It must be established that subject actually signed form by testimony of witnesses to signature, handwriting examination, or other conclusive evidence. Original of form must be located. Thoroughly interview any sources who furnished pertinent information concerning subject during any previous investigation and other potential witnesses to determine basis for each item of pertinent information furnished and identities of other potential witnesses.

(3) Where affiliation with subversive organizations is involved, interview individuals who were members of same units as subject for evidence of his membership, such as attendance at closed meetings, payment of dues, holding of office, etc. If possible, develop evidence to supplant pertinent information furnished by current informants. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview subject.

(4) Interview subject and potential witnesses furnishing pertinent information under oath and obtain sworn signed statements if possible. Exception may be made when interviewing established sources, such as current informants, if oath and/or signed statements not considered desirable under circumstances. Be guided by instructions below concerning interviews with subjects of security investigations when interviewing potential witnesses with subversive backgrounds.

c. Legal questions

If question of law arises as to existence of violation, advise Bureau and hold investigation in abeyance for Department's opinion. Department has no fixed policy as to prosecution in these cases and desires to consider each case. Submit basic facts concerning execution and filing of document and subversive activity denied in report for presentation to Department, even though basis for concealment or fradulent statement does not appear to be material.

d. Cases referred by military
Military intelligence agencies often refer cases for security investigations under Delimitations Agreement in which security-type fraud violations are involved. If subversive information does not warrant full security investigation but does indicate possible fraud violation, advise interested agency that FBI's investigation will be directed toward proving possible violation of law and that any background investigation contemplated by it pursuant to its administrative responsibilities will not interfere with FBI investigation. Advise agency pertinent information developed will be furnished and request agency to do likewise. Immediately initiate security matter - fraud against the Government investigation. If subversive information warrants full security investigation and also indicates fraud violation, advise interested agency that Bureau is initiating full security investigation in conjunction with investigation of possible violation of law and results will be furnished. Conduct expedite investigation to determine subject's dangerousness and whether a fraud violation is involved.

7. Submission of subversive derogatory information on individuals

a. Offices covering national or local headquarters of various subversive groups should promptly furnish Bureau names and identifying data regarding persons affiliated with such groups, to include basic revolutionary organizations, fascist-type organizations, black extremist organizations, and front groups of these. Furnish Bureau such information by letter and, where appropriate, indicate that list of names is being furnished for Bureau indexing purposes.

b. Information from all sources should be reviewed to insure Bureau has been furnished lists of all individuals affiliated with organizations enumerated in item a. Include information concerning a number of individuals in one letter if possible. Set out sufficient identifying data to facilitate check of Bureau files.

c. Offices obtaining information regarding subversive affiliation of individuals residing outside their territories should promptly advise offices covering such persons' addresses.

d. Names of subscribers to Communist Party nominating petitions and names appearing on subscription lists of subversive organizations should be indexed in field office covering address shown for subscriber but should not be forwarded to Bureau for indexing.

e. Important subversive information concerning any individual and any new subversive information concerning an individual of importance should be furnished Bureau expeditiously.

f. Subversive and/or derogatory information coming to attention of field office through name check or otherwise on employee of executive branch of Government, which information is within purview of EO 10450, should be forwarded promptly to Bureau for dissemination to Civil Service Commission. Such information relating to other employees of Government or employees of United Nations and other public international organizations should be furnished Bureau immediately.

E. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS - INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

1. General

All pertinent information concerning subject's background and subversive activity must be fully developed and reported to assure accurate evaluation of his dangerousness. Use discretion to prevent subjects from becoming unnecessarily aware of investigation.

Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents in security investigations without prior Bureau authority.

2. Scope of investigations

Following should be obtained:

a. Background

- (1) True name and aliases
- (2) Residence address
- (3) Occupation or business and employment address
- (4) Citizenship status, including date and place of birth and pertinent data concerning naturalization of aliens
- (5) Family background
  If possible, ascertain from sources contacted and report date and place of birth of subject's parents and spouse and parents of spouse. Do not conduct investigation solely for this information.
- (6) Military record
  Determine if subject has served in U. S. armed forces; time, place, and circumstances of such service; type of discharge received; and any membership in veterans' organizations. If subject served in armed forces of any foreign government, determine pertinent facts.
- (7) Close relatives
  Determine whether subject has any close relatives in U. S. armed forces or in other positions of trust and confidence, whether public or private, relating to national defense.
- (8) Identification record
  - (a) Be alert for identification record showing arrests and/or civil data. Check local police records.
  - (b) When subject is approved for security index, submit FD-165 to check records of Identification Division and to post flash notice if fingerprints on file. FD-165 will be returned if positive identification cannot be made with fingerprints on file. Office of origin is responsible for resolving identification when record has been furnished by Identification Division as possibly identical. If positive identification cannot be made, it is not necessary to communicate further with Identification Division.
  - (c) When office of origin is changed for security index or reserve index A subject after flash notice has been placed, form FD-128 (changing origin) should so indicate. Send extra copy of FD-128 to Identification Division so its records will show new office of origin.
  - (d) Cancel security flash notice when subject dies or is no longer of security interest.
- (9) Physical description
  - (a) Obtain and report detailed physical description.
  - (b) Each subject should be personally observed whenever complete security investigation is conducted. Such direct observation is mandatory for all security index subjects; however, do not delay submission of form FD-122 (recommending subject for security index) when it has not been possible to observe subject. Keep case open until personal observation accomplished. When subject is outside U. S. or Puerto Rico, this requirement may be followed administratively until subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

(10) Photogra

Make reasonable efforts during investigation to obtain photograph of subject. Maintain cases on security index subjects in pending status until suitable photograph is obtained unless circumstances dictate otherwise, in which case advise Bureau. Once photograph has been obtained, be alert for more recent photographs. Forward copy of photographs of security index subjects to Bureau for dissemination to Secret Service.

(11) Handwriting specimens

If readily available, obtain handwriting specimens for possible future use and maintain in subject's file. Case is not to be kept pending merely to obtain such specimens.

(12) Labor union membership

If subject is member of basic revolutionary group, ascertain his trade-union affiliation and what, if any, position he holds in labor organization.

b. Subversive activity

(1) Membership or affiliation

Obtain admissible evidence that subject is member of, or affiliated with, one of basic revolutionary and/or front organizations. Some more common types of evidence are:

(a) Oral or written statements or admissions of subject made publicly or privately
(b) Statements of informants and others in position to know and can testify to facts
(c) Official letterheads, documents, and membership and dues records identifying subjects with such organizations
(d) Selective service records in which subject admits membership
(e) Attendance at closed meetings and conventions of such organizations
(f) Letters to publications, public officials, or others signed by subject and admitting membership in or adherence to principles of such organization
(g) Recruitment or attempt to recruit members for such organization
(h) Solicitations or contributions of funds for such organization
(i) Seeking public office as candidate for such organization

Communist Control Act of 1954 sets out list of 14 criteria to be considered in determining membership, including acceptance of organization discipline.

(2) Knowledge of aims and purposes

Obtain admissible evidence that subject knows aims and purposes of subversive organization to overthrow Government by force and violence. Mere proof of membership or affiliation is not sufficient to prove knowledge. Proof that subject has knowledge includes:

(a) Direct admissible evidence, such as oral or written statements made by subject, or by responsible officials of subversive organization in subject's presence
(b) Length of time in subversive organization
(c) Official positions held in organization, especially in educational, propaganda, or policy-making capacities
(d) Charter membership in organization, participation in original establishment of organization
(e) Extensive and long-continued participation in various organizational activities
(f) Attendance or teaching at organization schools or classes, especially leadership classes
(g) Preparation or distribution of party propaganda
(h) Recruiting and fund-raising activities
(i) Possession of Marxist or revolutionary literature or urging others to read literature of revolutionary character

While none of the above may be of sufficient value alone, a combination may constitute convincing proof. Revolutionary purposes of subversive organization are frequently cloaked in veiled language or in language significant only to persons familiar with Marxist or revolutionary terminology. Such statements should be fully reported. Develop and report all revolutionary statements and circumstances under which made.

(3) Position and importance

(a) Information showing importance of individual to subversive organization or movement should be fully developed and reported. Member or affiliate may be dangerous or important because of his position, influence, or activities inside or outside organization, or both.

(b) Concealment of membership and underground activity
Member or affiliate may be highly dangerous although he takes no part in overt activities of organization. Subject may have assignment in underground and is not to contact or associate openly with others in subversive movement. By virtue of this assignment in secret operations, such individuals must be considered most dangerous. Be continually alert that individual may be serving in underground capacity. All logical investigative techniques should be used to develop fully individual's activities in underground; identities of other individuals engaged in underground operations; and method of operation, extent, and purposes of underground.

Coverage must be sufficient to insure underground activities of subversive movement are known. Identities of individuals who are directing underground operations; location of hiding places of fugitives and underground leaders; and locations of secret printing presses, mimeograph machines, and large stationery supplies must be known at all times.

c. Missing security subjects

(1) Location of all dangerous subversives must be known at all times. Each subject remaining out of control at time of national emergency represents threat to national security.

(2) When subject of pending investigation fits standards for security index and his location is not known, recommend for unavailable section of security index.

(3) When information is received that security index subject has changed his residence and/or employment, case must be opened and assigned for active investigation to locate subject.

(4) If subject has deliberately absented himself to avoid detection by us, has gone into hiding, or is working clandestinely in underground capacity, he can be classified as missing subject and should be included in unavailable section of security index. When FD-122 is submitted to Bureau placing missing subject in unavailable section, also send cover letter advising of investigative steps already taken to locate him.

(5) Investigations to locate missing security index subjects must be given preferential and continuous attention. Investigation must be handled as thoroughly and promptly as fugitive investigation.

(a) Advise Bureau each 45 days by letter of steps taken to locate missing security index subject. Do not submit reports which merely set forth negative results of investigation to locate subject.

(b) If subject may have gone to Mexico or Canada, request Bureau to alert appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to seek verifying information through liaison channels. If subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, request Washington Field Office (WFO) to check records of Passport Office of State Department for verification.

(c) When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of missing important functionary, consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information.

d. Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following categories intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of current security investigation, subject in agitator index or priorities I and II of security index, past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage.

(1) Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issued, number of passport, and issuing office, if known. Include full description of subject and all aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers). Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence.

(2) Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check.

(3) Information concerning subject's proposed travel abroad, including information concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches. If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of three copies to each legal attache involved. For each of these legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover letter should so indicate. Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LHM. Request should not refer to legal attache or request investigation by particular agency abroad.

(4) Subsequent report in individual case should contain details regarding subject's travel. In nonsecurity index cases where LHMs are submitted, communication transmitting data regarding travel should indicate whether investigation is being initiated and, if not, why.

(5) Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above.

(a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, identities of individuals participating in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CIA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.

(b) Offices should immediately identify participants and submit LHMs on those in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information.

(6) Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel abroad. If such individual has traveled behind Iron Curtain, also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state whether additional investigation is contemplated.

3. File reviews

Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent information showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidate reference cards pertaining to subject in indices.

4. Security informants

Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed in value both for intelligence purposes and as admissible evidence.

5. Physical surveillances

Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, information of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of existing circumstances and available manpower.

a. When information is received that meetings of subversive organizations are to take place, physical surveillances should be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants.

b. Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities serve to identify others within movement.

c. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau.

6. Photographic surveillances

Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows subjects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations affords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be properly correlated with other investigative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance.

7. Public sources

Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain background and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state records, public utility records, and school records. Obtain and index as reference material publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities.

8. Records of private firms

Where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms provided it will not jeopardize investigation.

9. Channelizing of information to case files

Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be channelized to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances is channelized to individual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information received from informants and confidential sources with active investigation.

10. Preservation of evidence

Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence.

a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.

b. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recollection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.

c. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings.

d. Above also applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or concerning evidence otherwise obtained.

11. Interviews with subjects of security investigations

a. Policy

No security investigation of an individual is to be closed unless subject is included in security index or consideration given to interview. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of security index card for inactivity until subject has been interviewed or Bureau advised why interview is inadvisable.

b. Purpose

(1) When investigation is inconclusive, to determine subject's sympathies and whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines

(2) To develop information concerning activities of subject and his associates in subversive movement

(3) To develop informants

c. SAC authority

Without Bureau authority SAC may:

(1) Authorize interviews with individuals who have not been subjects of security investigations and available information does not warrant opening case

(2) Authorize interviews of subjects of security cases who have previously been interviewed with Bureau authority, provided no change has taken place in subject's status and interviews are conducted under same conditions as previously authorized

(3) Authorize interviews of subjects of closed security cases including persons who were on security index but were removed

(4) Authorize interviews of rank-and-file black extremists except as noted in section 122, volume IV, of this manual

d. Procedures for interviews under SAC authority

(1) If there is closed file, reopen it. If none, open case in 134 category to resolve whether subject is identical with information in files and determine his current employment and residence.

(2) Case Agent will prepare memorandum requesting SAC authority to conduct interview of subject to determine his attitude towards cooperation with FBI.

(3) During first contact Agent should identify himself, outline Bureau's responsibilities in security field, and request subject's assistance. If individual has been member of basic revolutionary organization and appears cooperative, he may be questioned about his own activities. However, this interview is for sole purpose of determining whether subject might be cooperative.

(4) If cooperative, advise Bureau and conduct background investigation under section 107, volume IV, of this manual. If uncooperative, prepare brief memorandum for file and close case. Letter to Bureau not necessary.

e. Prior Bureau authority

Prior Bureau authority required for:

(1) Subjects of active current investigation where no prior Bureau authority has been obtained

(2) Closed cases on current security index subjects where no prior interview has been conducted

(3) Subjects of investigations requested by Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant and loyalty cases

(4) Individuals when circumstances indicate delicate situation and greater than usual risk involved, such as labor leaders and individuals in educational, mass media, religious, or publishing fields. Bureau authority needed even though there were prior interviews.

(5) Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts

(6) Subjects of section A reserve index cards

In above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview subject.

f. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview
  (1) In absence of special circumstances, include following statement in first paragraph of letter.
    (a) Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of Manual of Instructions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as PSI.
    (b) Form FD-336 contains above statement and may be used. Statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potential as informant.
    (c) If available, letter must contain following information:
      I. Residence address, occupation, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health
      II. Marital status. If married, occupation, employment, and race of spouse.
      III. Length of time subject was member of or affiliated with subversive organization and positions held. When investigation is based on circumstances other than membership or affiliation with subversive organizations, briefly set forth facts.
      IV. If married, state if spouse is or has been member of or affiliated with subversive groups, positions held, and period of such membership or affiliation.
      V. Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups
      VI. Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of subject and, if married, of spouse
      VII. What is expected to be gained by interview
    (d) In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding seven items listed must be set out under appropriate number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any item, so indicate after number.
  (2) Letters must be personally approved by SAC.
  (3) One copy of letter should only be first page of letter. When unnecessary to issue specific instructions, Bureau will approve request by stamping this page and returning by routing slip.
  (4) When authorized, interview must be conducted within 45 days. If not possible, advise Bureau and indicate subject will be contacted within 45 days. If interview has not been conducted at end of second period, request new authority. Include any new information bearing upon advisability of interview.

g. Preparation for and conduct of interview
  (1) Preparation must be thorough and interview conducted so that Agents will not be compromised, Bureau will not be embarrassed, and informants will not be exposed. CPUSA has planned traps for Agents attempting interviews with members by installing recording machines in members' homes or endeavoring to have interview observed by concealed third party.
  (2) Interviews should be conducted by two Agents. Agent experienced in security investigations who is knowledgeable regarding development of informants should conduct interrogation. Actual approach need not be made by both Agents; one Agent may observe from secure distance. (Two Agents should be physically present during interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all cases.) Background of subject and circumstances will determine how approach should be handled.

(3) Interviews of active communists should be conducted at secure place other than subject's residence or place of employment. If reasonable effort has been made for such approach and it is not practical, set forth circumstances and request Bureau authority to make contact at home or place of business explaining any need to contact employer. Letter should contain statement that, if subject appears cooperative, arrangements will be made for another interview at secure place away from residence or employment, if necessary, to determine fully degree of cooperation.

(4) If subject cooperative upon initial contact, further contact may be had without Bureau authority. No limitation on number of recontacts, but use good judgment. If interview authorized by Bureau, advise Bureau of results of contact and plans for recontacts. Obtain specific authority to make recontact where circumstances indicate delicate situation and greater than usual risks involved, such as labor leaders and individuals employed in educational, mass media, religious, and publishing fields.

(5) Terminate interview with active subversive if third person arrives during interview. Furnish Bureau details and obtain Bureau authority prior to reinterview.

(6) Terminate interview immediately if subject is hostile or uncooperative.

(7) Inform subjects connected with labor unions that Bureau is not interested in employee-employer relations and is concerned only with infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements. Furnish no information and make no statements to embarrass Bureau. Questions should require admission or denial by subject of all pertinent items of subversive information unless to do so would expose investigative techniques or security informants. Cordial and friendly attitude alone is not evidence of cooperation insofar as potential dangerousness is concerned when subject fails to admit or verify subversive information obtained through previous investigation.

(8) If cooperative, inform subject we want to interview him in detail and arrange interviews over extended period if necessary to exploit subject's knowledge to utmost. Conduct necessary investigation or research to corroborate and develop information received.

(9) Where appropriate, reduce information obtained to signed statement and determine his willingness to testify to information furnished if needed in Federal proceedings.

h. Reporting results of interview

(1) When no information is developed during interview which would affect subject's security index status, promptly submit results by letter and include in next report. If individual is employed in or holds sensitive position in trade-union, educational, mass media, religious, or publishing fields, results of all interviews must be submitted promptly in report or LHM, depending on priority designation, until he begins to cooperate as security informant or source.

(2) Report subject's admissions of his subversive activities and associations and indicate whether he did or did not furnish information regarding subversive activities of others.

(3) Report statements by subject denying subversive activities developed through prior investigation and follow with concise statement of such past subversive activity.

(4) Letter transmitting results of interview must contain:

  (a) Definite statement or conclusion of interviewing Agents as to cooperativeness of subject and reasons for conclusion

  (b) Statement as to whether information furnished coincides substantially with other available information

(c) Statement as to subject's availability as potential witness and evaluation of subject's potential as informant or confidential source and whether further contacts contemplated

(d) Recommendation that security index card be canceled when statements furnished by subject regarding his subversive activities and associates, considered with other information and factors, indicate subject is no longer dangerous to internal security during emergency

(e) Pertinent information regarding subject's appearance or characteristics which has not previously been developed or reported

i. Reinterviews of security index subjects

Consider reinterviews with security index subjects on systematic basis. Consider such reinterviews when necessary to review case or when case comes up on tickler.

j. Maintenance of control file on former members of subversive organizations

(1) Offices having sufficient volume should maintain control file on former members of subversive organizations for reference purposes. This file will obviate necessity for extensive file reviews to identify persons who may be in position to furnish information of value in future.

(2) Copies of memoranda designated for individual case files should be routed to this file. Such memoranda should contain: background of person, type of information he may furnish, period covered by this data, whether or not person is available for interview by all Agents, and whether he is in position and willing to testify.

(3) This file should not include information concerning security informants.

(4) If special index is used in conjunction with this file, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating times and places persons were in subversive movement and brief description of information available from them. It may be broken down geographically and subdivided by years.

F. RESERVE INDEX

1. Purpose

   Reserve index includes persons who should be considered from standpoint of security with view toward investigation, interrogation, or security index. It serves as administrative aid and working index containing names of persons having sympathy for or affiliation with basic revolutionary organizations.

2. Composition

   Reserve index contains names of individuals about whom investigation did not develop sufficient information to justify security index, but there is no reliable evidence of defection and there is evidence of:

   a. Membership in basic revolutionary organization subsequent to 1-1-49, together with some indication of continuing sympathy or association with such organization or subversive front organization

   b. Activity, association, or sympathy for subversive cause during past five years, even though investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in revolutionary organization

   c. Associations, writings, financial support, or conduct in support of subversive organizations or international communist movement within past five years and individual is in position to influence others during national emergency

   d. Leadership or substantial activities in major subversive front groups over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association, or sympathy for subversive cause within past three years

   e. Membership in subversive front organization within past three years

3. Arrangement

   Each office is to maintain this index alphabetically on 5- by 8-inch cards in two sections, A and B.

   a. Section A

      Section A represents special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration for investigation and/or other action following apprehension of security index subjects.

      (1) Section A includes individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within security index criteria but who, in time of national emergency, are in position to influence others against national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements because of their subversive associations and ideology. Include individuals who meet standards for reserve index and are

         (a) Professors, teachers, and educators
         (b) Labor union organizers and leaders
         (c) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others in mass media field
         (d) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists
         (e) Other potentially influential persons on local or national level

      (2) Inclusion or deletion of names must be approved by SAC Reserve index A is maintained only in field offices. When name is deleted from security index, consider including in reserve index A. Upon approval by SAC, make two cards and file one in office and one away from headquarters city at same location as extra set of security index cards.

      (3) Review field office file of reserve index A subject whenever information is channeled to it to determine if additional investigation is warranted and if current information is sufficient for retention in reserve index.

      (4) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing in reserve index A cards

         (a) Forward changes in data to clerk in field office handling these cards.

(b) Handle change in office of origin by submission of form FD-128. Forward section A cards to new office of origin. Where necessary, forward pertinent information to new office of origin by succinct LHM and appropriate cover communication. Yellow file copy of LHM must show location of all original information contained therein.

b. Section B

(1) This section, which contains names of all others in reserve index, is maintained only in field office. Review file of reserve index B subject whenever information is channeled to it to determine if additional investigation is warranted.

(2) Handle changes in office of origin in same manner as reserve index A.

4. Content

a. Each card in section A and section B should contain, as minimum:

(1) Name and aliases
(2) Race
(3) Sex
(4) Citizenship and birth data
(5) Residence and employment
(6) Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
(7) Office file number
(8) Letters "SS" if dissemination has been made to Secret Service

b. Membership and position or association in subversive groups and source and date of information may be added.

5. Removal and deletion of cards

Destroy cards on individuals who become security informants, sources, or security index subjects.

G. SECURITY INDEX

1. Purpose and general policy
    a. Security index cards are maintained by Bureau as operational guide for apprehension of persons deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security in event of national emergency.
    b. Action will be taken against security index subjects only upon authorization of warrants of arrest by Attorney General.
    c. Names are included in security index only when investigation has established sufficient facts and evidence to justify inclusion.
    d. Contents of security index must be accurate and correct at all times. Give matters pertaining to its preparation and maintenance preferred attention.
    e. Matters pertaining to security index are not to be included in reports or LHM prepared for dissemination. Operation and content of security index must not be discussed outside Bureau. However, matters pertaining to security index may be discussed with qualified representatives of other Federal intelligence agencies on strictly confidential basis when subject is of prime interest to one of these services.
2. Determination of dangerousness of individual
    a. Dangerousness of individual does not depend entirely upon personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or disposition to violence. It also depends upon contribution he has made or is making in advancing principles and aims of subversive movement, or his subversive potential in event of national emergency. Loyalty to subversive organization and its principles is primary factor to consider in evaluating potential dangerousness. However, all evidence must be carefully weighed. Among factors having bearing are:
        (1) Long membership in subversive organization
        (2) Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools
        (3) Frequent or regular attendance at organizational meetings and functions
        (4) Possession of or study of revolutionary literature
        (5) Espousal of subversive doctrines exemplified in his acts and utterances
        (6) Contributions to or collections of funds for organization
        (7) Recruitment of new members
        (8) Active service in military forces which are supported by subversive movement
        (9) Constant support of Soviet Union in acts and utterances
        (10) Activity as courier or confidential mail drop for subversive movement
        (11) Constant participation in activities of subversive organization or advancement of organization's aims or interests, especially when this involves financial sacrifices or personal inconveniences or disadvantage
        (12) Individuals who have defected, revoked, or sought revocation of U. S. citizenship in favor of communist country, have returned to U. S., and have taken no positive steps to counteract such action
        (13) Statements or activities on subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe his loyalty would lie with communist country in event of armed conflict between U. S. and that country
        (14) Training and/or participation in espionage, sabotage, or intelligence activities
        (15) History of emotional instability or irrational behavior, prior acts indicating propensity for violence, when coupled with subversive background or hatred against organized government
    b. Above factors, which are not all-inclusive, should be taken into consideration in determining whether subject falls within security index criteria. Person shall not be deemed dangerous merely because one or more of these factors apply to him.

3. Criteria for placing and retaining name in security index
   - a. Basic criteria

     No name shall be added to or retained in security index unless one or more of following have been established through investigation:
     - (1) Subject has had membership in, or participation in activities of, basic revolutionary organization within last five years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
     - (2) Subject has had membership in, or participation in the affairs of, one or more front organizations which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a basic revolutionary organization, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in furtherance of those aims and purposes of the front organization which coincide with those of a basic revolutionary organization, within the last three years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
     - (3) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member of or a participant in activities of a basic revolutionary or front organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state, and local governments and of the defense effort.
     - (4) Although investigation has failed to establish the facts required by (1), (2), or (3) above, either as to the substance of those criteria or because there have been no overt acts or statements within time limits prescribed, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts of the kind described in (3) above.
   - b. Activity in support of Cuban regime

     Recommend for security index individuals who would be dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security of U. S. in event of emergency involving Cuba and U. S. There should be substantial showing of following:
     - (1) Individual has served in pro-Castro organization as leader or officer or engaged in preparation or distribution of pro-Cuban or anti-U. S. propaganda; active collection of funds for any agency or representative of Cuban Government or pro-Castro group; acts of violence against anti-Castro individuals or groups or against U. S.; or active collection of intelligence data regarding national defense of U. S. which would serve purposes of Cuban Government, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such data is to be or has been conveyed to any agency or representative of Cuban Government.
     - (2) Based on overt acts or statements or other evidence, there are reasonable grounds to believe loyalty of individual would lie with Cuban Government in event of armed conflict between Cuba and U. S.
     - (3) Alien of Cuban nationality or holding Cuban citizenship who (a) is likely to foster, encourage, or promote policies, programs, or objectives of Cuban Government, or collaborate with Cuban Government or (b) is likely to engage in or attempt to engage in acts of espionage, sabotage, or other activities detrimental to U. S. defense. Take into consideration (a) participation in organizations supporting Castro regime, (b) participation in picket lines formed in support of Cuban Government, or (c) contacts with Cuban agents operating in U. S. on behalf of Cuban Government.

(4) In all instances there must be clear showing, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there has been continuing sympathy for aims and objectives of Cuban Government since 10-1-60. Citizenship status must be clearly established.

c. Pro-Cuban activity
All individuals in security index under basic criteria (item 3a, above) should be tabbed "Pro-Cuban" if by their activities and sympathies they warrant special consideration in event of limited emergency involving Cuba and U. S. This tabbing includes Cubans and non-Cubans who have engaged in activities in support of Cuban Government or pro-Castro groups. For this tabbing, submit FD-122 to Bureau with notation "Pro-Cuban" typed opposite words "Miscellaneous (specify)." Attach page containing concise summary of facts supporting recommendation. Security index cards sent to field on such subjects contain letter "C" on left side of card at beginning of second line. These cards are not kept in "Cuban" special section but are tabbed with metal tabs.

d. Evaluating interviews for security index status

(1) Positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicating adherence to doctrines, aims, or purposes of revolutionary organization or front organization shall be considered overt act.

(2) Other than above, interviews are not factors in making determination as to security index; e.g., lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not factors.

e. Effect of resort to fifth amendment
Department has advised resort to fifth amendment by witness appearing before governmental body should be considered overt act within security index criteria (1) when subject was asked directly concerning present membership in subversive organization and (2) when question calls for response as to past membership in organization in those cases in which available information would seem to bring subject within criteria except for overt act within required period.

f. Activity in Nation of Islam and other black nationalist extremist groups
Department has advised Nation of Islam constitutes potentially dangerous instrumentality in event of national emergency; statements and activities of individuals in Nation of Islam indicating anarchist and revolutionary beliefs should be considered in making judgment as to whether or not member should be in security index. Give particular attention to developing and reporting such statements, including violent and revolutionary statements made by other members in subject's presence. Statements should be reported in detail. Apply these instructions to other black nationalist extremist groups.

4. Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards

a. SAC must personally recommend inclusion in and removal of any name from security index except in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects, where recommendations can be made by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.

b. Where potential dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin is to submit recommendation to Bureau on form FD-122, in triplicate. Forward original and copy to Bureau, and place copy in subject's file. Nothing should appear on FD-122 which is not in subject's file. FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend subject for security index and (2) to submit changes for existing cards. Submit abstract when recommending subject for security index but no abstract for additions, deletions, or changes.

c. When FD-122 is submitted to recommend subject for security index, attach additional page or pages setting out succinct summary of facts on which recommendation based. Facts must be in sufficient detail to support recommendation, including justification for designated priority level for apprehension. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must show pertinent data of subject's activities.

d. If, at conclusion of investigation, subject is not being recommended for security index, set out brief summary statement in appropriate closing communication showing reasons.

e. Current summary report must be submitted to Bureau when subject is being recommended for security index. If case is pending because of outstanding leads, set out additional lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and, if approved, to disseminate copy of report to Secret Service. If case would otherwise be closed, place in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization by Bureau and, if approved, disseminate copy of report to Secret Service and then close case administratively.

f. Recommendations for security index should not be delayed because of absence of background or descriptive data. Submit recommendation with current report and retain in pending status to obtain missing items.

g. Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for security index. FD-122 should include data required for unavailable section.

h. When FD-122 is submitted recommending subject of Chinese extraction, include words "Other - Chinese" under race. When recommending person not of Chinese extraction but who has definite sympathies for Communist China, include under "Miscellaneous" following statement: "sympathetic to Communist China."

i. If Bureau approves recommendation, security index cards will be prepared. Copy of FD-122 will be returned stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." These cards should be filed in security index as outlined below. Place returned copy of FD-122 in subject's main file. (Offices with geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive extra card.)

j. When cards are received from Bureau, check data for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards which are stapled to back of two security index cards. File one of these cards in geographical section (except special section and unavailable section cards). File other in duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. Third security index card is filed in alphabetical section.

5. Content and appearance of security index card

a. Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain following information. If any items are missing, case should be continued pending to obtain necessary information. Set forth under each item are possible categories in which subject may be classified and code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on form FD-122. Code letters should appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

(1) Name and aliases

Full and correct name and aliases of subject

(2) Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others, including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)

(3) Sex

Male	M
Female	F

(4) Citizenship

Native born	NB
Naturalized	NA
Alien	AL

(If unknown, space should be left blank, but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)

(5) Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency

American Socialist Clubs	ASC
American Workers' Communist Party	AWC
Anarchist	ANA
Black Nationalist	BNT
Black Panther Party	BPP
Communist Party, USA	COM
Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
Minutemen	MIN
Nation of Islam	NOI
Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
Progressive Labor Party	PLP
Proletarian Party of America	PPA
Revolutionary Action Movement	RAM
Socialist Workers Party	SWP
Spartacist League	SPL
Student National Coordinating Committee	SNC
Students for a Democratic Society	SDS
Workers World Party	WWP
Bulgarian	BUL
Cuban	CUB
Czechoslovakian	CZE
Hungarian	HUN
Romanian	ROM
Russian	RUS
Yugoslavian	YUG

(6) Priority designation

Priority I	P I
Priority II	P II
Priority III	P III

(7) Top functionary designation (where applicable)

Top functionary	TF

(8) Special section cards

Atomic energy program employees	AEP
Cuban special section	CUB
Espionage subjects	ESP
Foreign government employees	FGE
Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
United Nations employees	UNE
U. S. Government employees	GOV

(9) Unavailable section cards

Missing	MI
Out of country	OC
Imprisoned	PR

(10) Date and place of birth

(11) Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List) and abbreviation denoting agency having security responsibility

(12) Residence address

(13) Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating subject in emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.

(14) Field office file number

b. Data to appear on separate attached card

(1) Place following data on separate card attached to reverse side of security index card being filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Cards contain printed captions for recording descriptive data which can be augmented if necessary.

(a) Complete description
(b) Notation that security index flash notice has been posted in Identification Division
(c) Photograph, with date taken. It is to be most current or best likeness of subject.
(d) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
(e) Other data which will assist in apprehension, such as directions to residence or employment when these are unusual, number of minor children and aged dependents

(2) If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending. Upon posting of security index flash notice, field will be furnished FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.

(3) Use FD-186 to report information for separate card attached to back of security index card. Case Agent should fill in form and forward to clerical employee designated to post information. Thereafter, file FD-186 in case file. FD-186 may be used to record information that subject has been physically observed and to note descriptive data.

6. Arrangment of security index

a. At Bureau

Entire index is maintained on IBM tabulating cards. Security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to field. An alphabetical breakdown of true names and all aliases of subjects is also maintained at Bureau for administrative purposes.

b. In field office

Active security index in each field office is maintained in four sections: geographical, alphabetical, unavailable, and special sections. Complete set of each field office's security index is also maintained away from headquarters city in same manner as geographical section with unavailable and special section cards filed in back.

(1) Geographical section

After receipt of three security index cards from Bureau and after necessary data have been added to two cards, file one in geographical section of index (except special section and unavailable section cards) and one in duplicate set maintained away from headquarters city. Geographical section is broken down by residence address in accordance with needs of each office. Where logical, it should be broken down by state, county, city, and, if needed, into boroughs or suburbs and precincts. Cards are filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown. Cards in this section will be withdrawn and used by Agents should apprehension of subjects become necessary.

Cards will show "unknown" residence for (a) subjects whose addresses are not known but prompt location within division is expected and (b) subjects whose location in another division is in process of verification. File these cards in breakdown designated "Verification Pending." With Bureau authority, offices covering large industrial areas may set up second geographical section and file cards by subjects' employment. Depending on time of day apprehensions are initiated, geographical-employment or geographical-residence section may be used.

(2) Alphabetical section

File duplicate card alphabetically in this section; there is no other breakdown. Alphabetical card is control card. If card is withdrawn from geographical section for apprehension, make notation on alphabetical card.

(3) Special section
Retain cards on individuals in following categories in special section for reasons stated. Maintain special section in subsections as follows:

(a) Espionage subjects
When apprehension of subject will destroy chances of penetration and control of operating espionage parallel or destroy chances of penetration and control of "sleeper" parallel

(b) U. S. Government employees
So their identities can be readily determined and consideration given to each before apprehension is ordered

(c) Atomic energy program employees
Because their apprehension must be cleared with Atomic Energy Commission representatives to avoid interference with atomic energy work

(d) Foreign government employees
So consideration may be given to each on basis of relations then existing between U. S. Government and country involved

(e) United Nations Secretariat and other international organization employees
Because State Department must be notified after such apprehensions take place. This category includes U. S. citizens and immigrants or stateless persons not holding diplomatic visas and not having protection of International Organization Immunities Act.

(f) Pro-Tito individuals
Because such individuals, although pro-Marxist-Leninist, adhere to Tito form of communism and it is not possible to predict whether Tito would become aligned with Russia in event of open hostilities or would align himself on side of U. S. This does not include members of communist groups who from time to time make statements in support of Tito, but only individuals, particularly those of Yugoslav birth or descent, whose support of Tito is clear and unequivocal regardless of Yugoslavia's foreign policies.

(g) Cuban
So that, in event of emergency involving Cuba and U. S., special handling may be afforded those subjects on index solely on basis of pro-Castro affiliations, activities, or sympathies. (Security index cards denoting such contain code "CUB" on line 1.)

FD-122 recommending individuals in one of above categories should include words "Special Section" typed in upper right portion. Type proper category in space after "Miscellaneous (Specify)."

Cards for special section bear appropriate code letters in upper right portion designating proper subsection. When cards of subjects in these categories are received from Bureau, check for accuracy, place required additional data on two, and file alphabetically in appropriate subsection of special section. File third card in alphabetical section. Never file special section cards in geographical section.

When subject no longer comes within one of categories of special section, submit FD-122 with words "Remove from Special Section" typed in space provided after "Miscellaneous (Specify)." If card should be placed in unavailable section, add "Place in Unavailable Section" in this space. When new cards are received from Bureau, destroy old cards. Special section card shall indicate priority level for apprehension, although it is not contemplated that subjects in this section will be apprehended under mass apprehension program. Cases will be given individual attention and subjects will not be apprehended in absence of specific Bureau instructions.

(4) Unavailable section

Security index cards of individuals who are missing, out of the country, or are imprisoned are retained in unavailable section, broken down into three subsections headed by tabs, as follows:

(a) Missing subjects

Subjects are not to be included in unavailable section as missing immediately upon determination they are no longer at previously known places of residence or employment. Action required in instructions for missing subjects must be taken prior to placing subject in unavailable section. If subject is missing, word "Missing" is typed in space provided on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous (Specify)."

(b) Subjects out of country

Place cards for subject who have departed from U. S. or Puerto Rico for foreign country in this subsection unless cards should be cancelled in accordance with instructions below under permanent departure.

Investigation of subject not yet in security index may be in progress at time subject departed for foreign country. If facts otherwise warrant security index action, submit FD-122 recommending inclusion in unavailable section.

If subject is out of country, type words "Out of Country," in space provided on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous (Specify)." If foreign address known, place it on FD-122 in space provided. If subject is only known to be in certain foreign country or is only known to be traveling abroad, include this on FD-122. If subject's current employment abroad is known, include on FD-122.

Follow case of any security index subject who is out of country at least once each year for verification of address and to determine if subject has returned. Place appropriate stops with Immigration and Naturalization Service to be advised of subject's return.

(c) Imprisoned subjects

Place cards of imprisoned security index subjects in unavailable section. Type word "Imprisoned" in space provided on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous (Specify)." Show identity of institution in which subject is incarcerated in space provided for residence. Arrange with confining institution to be informed of subject's release. Set up tickler for date shortly prior to expected release to verify release. After release, determine whether subject should be retained in security index.

When submitting recommendation for unavailable section, include words "Unavailable Section" in upper right portion of FD-122. Do not include former residence or former employment on cards of subjects who are missing, out of country, or imprisoned. Cards for unavailable section shall bear code letters in upper right portion designating proper subsection. Upon receipt of three cards from Bureau, check for accuracy, place required additional data on two, and file alphabetically in appropriate subsection. File third card in alphabetical section. When a missing subject is located or subject who has been out of country has returned or imprisoned subject released, submit FD-122 showing current residence and place of employment. Type words "Remove from Unavailable Section" in space provided after "Miscellaneous (Specify)." If card is to be placed in special section, "Place in Special Section - Espionage (or Foreign Government Employee, etc.)" should be added. When new cards are received from Bureau, check for accuracy and place description and photograph, if available, on two of three cards. File these cards in geographical or special section (where applicable) and file other card in alphabetical section. Destroy old cards.

When subject in unavailable section is located in another division, submit FD-128 to Bureau and new office of origin. Type "Remove from Unavailable Section" in space to right of addresses. Bureau will send new security index cards to new office of origin.

(d) Exception - re special section

Special section subjects who are unavailable are maintained in special section rather than unavailable section. When special section subject is out of country, imprisoned, or missing, submit FD-122 with appropriate unavailable category designated. New cards will be prepared. Upon receipt of amended cards from Bureau, file two in special section and one in alphabetical section.

(5) Inactive section

Each office shall maintain inactive section in its security index to contain cards of subjects who were in active security index when inducted into armed forces.

Upon learning of induction, submit letter to Bureau advising branch of service and date and place of induction. If there is pertinent information which has not been set forth in report, prepare report and forward by letter advising of subject's induction. Bureau will furnish appropriate intelligence agencies with pertinent information and request notification of subject's discharge from service.

Place geographical cards for such subjects in inactive section and destroy alphabetical cards.

Set up administrative tickler for each subject in inactive section. Each six months make appropriate inquiry to determine if subject has been discharged. Make such checks locally, through pretext inquiries if necessary. If information is not obtainable locally, submit letter requesting check of office covering records of appropriate service.

When subject in inactive section has returned to civilian status, determine whether his activities warrant inclusion in active security index. If so, submit FD-122 completely filled out as if initial recommendation is being made, and submit current report. If not, furnish Bureau reasons for not reactivating security index card. In either case, cancel inactive card.

7. Periodic verification of addresses

a. Data on security index cards shall be up to date at all times.

b. Whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. Check residence and business addresses of subjects in priority I at least once each three months. Residence and business address of all other security index subjects must be checked at least once each year, except those imprisoned and those in security index because of disaffection for U. S. (see section 105G). Residence and employment of latter must be verified every 90 days. Case of any subject who is out of country must be followed at least once every year to determine if he has returned.

Arrange to be advised on current basis of any indication subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change residence or employment. Checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under pretext by telephone once each six months for priority I subjects and once every two years for all others.

c. Physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and noted in case file. If not observed previously, do so during next verification of addresses.

d. Use FD-154 when it will facilitate verifying addresses. When FD-154 is not used, notation should be made on last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in subject's file showing addresses and date verified. Each time residence and employment verified, reevaluate case to assure subject is still within criteria. Make notation in file to this effect.

e. If residence or business address or both have changed, submit FD-122 to Bureau showing only changes to be made. Also submit to Bureau FD-366 for dissemination to Secret Service. Advise Secret Service locally by FD-366.

f. Handle verifying addresses of security index subjects by reopening and assigning cases for verification and closing administratively when accomplished. In priority I and II cases, conduct verification of residence and employment when preparing reports and include therein. In priority III cases, record verification of residence and employment on FD-154 and place in case file.

8. Changes, additions, and deletions of data on security index cards

a. Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, priority designation, date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility, residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by FD-128.

b. Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.

c. Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."

d. Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected card with copy of FD-122, take following action:

(1) Check accuracy of data on cards.

(2) Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to corrected cards, and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see instructions for these sections.

(3) File third card in alphabetical section.

(4) Destroy old cards.

9. Movement of subjects between offices

a. Subjects of security index cards

(1) Assign immediately requests from other offices to verify addresses of subjects and transmit results within two weeks.

(2) New office furnish old office information concerning key facility employment of subject so that geographical reference number, agency having security responsibility, and interested agencies can be included on FD-128 submitted by old office of origin.

(3) Office of origin, upon verification of address, immediately submit FD-128 transferring office of origin.

(4) Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies to office covering new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and security index cards. Show full title and priority designation.

(5) Where flash notice has been placed with Identification Division, note on FD-128 and designate extra copy of FD-128 for Bureau for attention of Identification Division.

(6) Old office of origin will submit current report in priority I and II cases and succinct LHM in priority III cases. In latter instance, yellow file copy of LHM in old office of origin must include notations indicating exact location of all original information set forth in LHM.

Do not delay submission of FD-128 solely for preparation of report or LHM, but note on FD-128 that appropriate communication is being prepared. Old office of origin is responsible for furnishing Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address. Case will remain pending in both old and new offices until report or LHM is submitted by old office. New office of origin is responsible to follow matter until completed.

(7) New office of origin is to review pertinent material received with FD-128 and information in its files to determine if additional investigation is warranted. If not, advise Bureau by letter case is being closed.

(8) Upon receipt of FD-128, office covering new address is origin and should place office file number on security index cards and file them in its security index.

(9) Upon receipt of new cards from Bureau with copy of FD-128, new office is to transfer information from reverse side of old geographical cards to two new cards, appropriately file new cards, and destroy old cards.

b. Top functionaries

Above-described mechanics of transferring cases also apply to top functionaries. Additional procedures in this category are:

(1) Notification to Bureau of deletion of subject as top functionary in old office of origin is handled by designation in space provided on FD-128 that subject was top functionary.

(2) Upon receipt of FD-128, new office of origin shall automatically designate subject top functionary and keep case pending. After investigation is completed and summary report has been submitted by old office, case may be placed in pending-inactive status. Within three months, new office is to conduct investigation, submit report, and advise Bureau concerning continued designation as top functionary.

c. Subjects tabbed for priority

Security index card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in new office of origin until that office determines that priority designation is not warranted under provisions set forth below.

d. Subjects not included in security index

(1) Transfer office of origin by FD-128 only upon verification by another office of subject's presence in that division. Enclose copies of all investigative reports and other pertinent serials to new office of origin.

(2) New office of origin is to investigate or advise Bureau case closed if no action warranted.

10. Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index

SAC must personally recommend removal of any name from security index except in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects where recommendations may be made by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.

a. Death of subject

Destroy card and advise Bureau by LHM.

b. Permanent departure

Upon learning of subject's departure from U. S. or Puerto Rico for foreign country, immediately ascertain conditions of departure for foreign country. No security index card shall be cancelled by reason of such departure unless subject is alien who has permanently departed and whose departure has been verified. If U. S. citizen who has been out of country has renounced his citizenship and taken citizenship of foreign country, security index card may be cancelled only after it has been determined he does not intend to return to U. S.

c. Imprisonment of subject

Do not cancel security index cards because subject imprisoned, regardless of length of time he will be incarcerated. Place cards in unavailable section and handle as set forth under imprisoned subjects above.

d. Induction of subject into armed forces

Place security index cards in inactive section and follow procedure set forth above under inactive section.

e. Security informants

Security index card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate person security informant. In requesting Bureau authority to designate individual as security informant, call attention to security index card and recommend cancellation.

f. Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous

Frequently information is received or investigation develops that subject is no longer threat to internal security by reason of physical condition, defection, or expulsion from subversive movement. Such defection may be shown by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over extended period or declaration of opposition to principles of subversive movement.

When there is sufficient information regarding subject's present sympathies to conclude he should no longer be considered dangerous, request authority for interview or advise Bureau why subject should not be interviewed. Bureau will not cancel security index card without consideration being given to interview. If, upon interview, subject proves cooperative, advise Bureau by letter and recommend cancellation.

g. Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection

With passage of time, limits specified in security index criteria will operate to remove subjects even though there is no affirmative indication of defection. When recommending such removal, consider if facts warrant inclusion of subject in section A of reserve index. Following procedures are for subjects not being recommended for inclusion in section A of reserve index:

(1) When subjects are removed from security index solely on basis of application of criteria, retain security index cards bearing descriptive matter on reverse sides; i.e., cards previously filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Destroy cards previously filed in alphabetical section. Those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards should retain only one card.

(2) Mark "cancelled" across face of each card retained and file in reserve index, section B.

(3) Above instructions do not apply to individuals removed from security index based upon activity in Nation of Islam. Their cards should be destroyed.

11. Priority apprehension program

a. Purpose

Some security index subjects, because of their training, violent tendencies, or prominence in subversive activity, would be more inclined or more capable of committing acts against U. S. in time of national emergency than others. Such subjects must be immobilized in least possible time. Individuals in security index tabbed priority I, and possibly priority II, would be arrested first in event of limited but grave emergency, probably without arrest of other subjects. In all-out emergency, consideration for apprehension will be given to all subjects. Decision as to priority of apprehension should be based on subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies.

b. Priority tabbing

(1) Each security index subject should be considered for priority I tabbing who falls within following categories:

(a) All top functionaries

(b) All individuals considered to be hard-core national and state leaders of basic revolutionary organizations and leaders of other subversive organizations and unorganized groups and individuals who have indicated propensity for violence and/or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, and/or guerrilla warfare, or have engaged in underground operations

(c) Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

(2) Security index subjects considered for priority II
All individuals who are considered to be of second level leadership of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations and individuals who present significant threat but are in less influential positions than those in priority I

(3) All other security index subjects will be tabbed priority III.

c. Recommendations for priority tabbing

(1) Approval of SAC
Designation of each subject as to priority or any change in priority must be personally approved by SAC, or in office having more than 1,000 security index subjects by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.

(2) When FD-122 is submitted recommending either tabbing for priority or change in such tabbing, attach additional page setting forth brief summary of facts supporting recommendation.

d. Administrative procedures
Take following action to assure security index cards will be readily available for emergency action:

(1) Geographical section
Divide geographical section into three parts.

(a) Cards for subjects tabbed priority I
(b) Cards for subjects tabbed priority II
(c) Cards for subjects tabbed priority III
(d) In offices having two geographical sections, i.e., geographical-employment and geographical-residence, each section must have parts I, II, and III.
(e) Priority cards will be following colors:
Priority I - beige, priority II - green, priority III - white

(2) Alphabetical section
Alphabetical section is broken down into two groupings. First group includes priority I and II cards. Second group contains priority III cards

e. Tabbing of cards
Tab alphabetical cards on subjects designated "Pro-Cuban" with metal tab.

12. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

a. Responsibility
FBI is responsible by Presidential directive to advise interested Federal agencies of developments affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated vital to national defense by Department of Defense. FBI is responsible under Delimitations Agreement for investigating employees of private contactors who have contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where there is credible subversive information concerning employee. Conduct thorough investigation and consider for security index any individual employed in or having access to key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in past, member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom there is sufficient other subversive information to warrant such action.

(1) Requests for investigation from another agency
When another agency requests investigation of individual employed in key facility, institute investigation immediately if basis of request so warrants, and advise Bureau.

(2) Verification of key facility status
Check Department of Defense Key Facilities List (maintained in each office) for verification that subject's place of employment is included.

(3) Individuals denied access to restricted information
Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently report individual has been denied clearance to work in defense plant or to handle classified or restricted information. Intelligence agency is responsible for furnishing Bureau with any information involving

disloyalty or subversiveness. Office receiving such notification must ascertain promptly basis for denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of agency responsible for such action. Forward data to Bureau and include in next report submitted. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau, open security investigation if information warrants.

b. Inclusion in security index

In recommending key facility employee for security index, FD-122 is to contain:

(1) Key facility geographical reference number

(2) Abbreviation for Department of Army (A), which has been designated agency having security responsibility for all key facilities

(3) Abbreviations for other agencies known to have classified contracts with key facility. Interested agencies are identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on security index cards.

(4) Recommendation for priority I designation

c. Dissemination

Upon receipt of allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, immediately furnish by letter to interested agency (1) summary of allegation and information concerning individual; (2) a statement that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation; (3) advice as to whether security investigation is being conducted and, if so, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion. With exception noted below, disseminate information of derogatory security nature concerning persons employed at facilities holding classified contracts both to interested intelligence agencies and to Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio 43215, attention Chief, Adjudication Division (advise interested intelligence agency of dissemination to DISCO). This includes persons who may not currently be key facility employees but are known to hold industrial security clearances. Exception involves facilities holding classified contracts with Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Dissemination to AEC is made only at Bureau.

These instructions do not apply to allegations of espionage or those of confidential character not ordinarily disseminated. Such information of direct interest to other intelligence agencies should be submitted to Bureau expeditiously with request that Bureau consider dissemination.

Disseminate copies of reports for Marine Corps locally to Naval Investigative Service Office (NISCO). Dissemination to Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA), Research and Development Board (RDB), and Maritime Administration (MA) is made only at Bureau.

d. Status of cases

After all investigation is conducted, place in pending-inactive status. Make case pending-active 45 days before report due and check with armed services representative at key facility or with other reliable sources to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

e. Reports

See Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 4D, item 2a, (6), and section 4M, item 4, for instructions concerning synopsis and classification of reports in key facility cases. Synopsis must set forth employment and statement that subject has or has not access to classified or restricted material.

13. Top functionary program

a. General

Purpose is to select for special attention individuals of key importance to subversive movement.

b. Definition
Top functionary is individual who is on high-policy level in CPUSA, other subversive organizations, or unorganized groups, to whom it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention because of his importance. Term "top functionary" does not require that individuals actually hold official positions in organizations but is given broad construction to include others of equal importance because of their influence in movement itself, or their position and activities outside movement in labor, front, or similar organizations. Consider black nationalist extremists whose importance justifies continuous investigative attention.

c. Manner of designation
Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate subject as top functionary. Top functionaries are to be in priority I and reports are submitted annually.

d. Regulations governing handling of top functionaries

(1) Designation and deletion of top functionary status
Handle by letter to Bureau containing brief statement of reason for designation or deletion.

(2) Photographs
Obtain photographs for each top functionary. Send two copies (one for Secret Service) to Bureau, either by cover letter or as enclosure to report. Maintain copy in subject's file. If album of top functionary photographs maintained, keep duplicate in subject's file.

(3) Handwriting specimens
Obtain suitable handwriting specimens of each top functionary. When possible, obtain specimens from public records, law enforcement agencies, and similar sources. Send specimens to Bureau under separate cover letter by registered mail for attention of FBI Laboratory. When they may be of value as evidence, so state in transmittal letter and request their return after copies have been made. Specimens should be sufficient to permit future comparisons by Laboratory.

(4) Security index cards
Request preparation by FD-122 at earliest possible moment.

(5) Change of office of origin
FD-128 changing office of origin on top functionary automatically deletes him as top functionary in old office and adds him as top functionary in new office.

(6) Reports
Character - Internal Security - (followed by appropriate letter designating organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency)

e. Maintenance of list
Each office must maintain current list of top functionaries.

14. Correlation of other investigations with security index and reserve index
Individuals investigated by Bureau under any classification against whom subversive information is developed must be considered for security index and/or reserve index. This includes espionage, foreign intelligence, applicant-type, and security of Government employees (SGE) investigations. When individual previously investigated under SGE classification is security index subject and is still employed by Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, use dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and character of security case in reports to insure routing to proper field and Bureau desks for supervision. Use standards prevailing for SGE reports. Disseminate these reports as any other security report. Advise representatives of other agencios requesting reports of SGE investigation to direct request to their headquarters for referral to Bureau.

H. REPORTS ON INDIVIDUALS

1. General

Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened for preparation of reports following schedule below. Critically analyze each case in light of security index criteria each time it is reopened and brought up to date.

2. Schedule of submission of reports

a. Priority I - annually

b. Priority II - annually

c. Priority III - initial report must be summary. Subsequent information may be furnished by LHM. Each office is responsible to insure all pertinent developments are furnished Bureau.

3. Origin

Office covering territory in which subject's subversive activities occur

4. Classification

a. 100 - for individuals affiliated with basic revolutionary and front organizations of Marxist ideology

b. 105 - for member of Puerto Rican nationalist groups or others having foreign nationalistic tendencies

c. 157 - Nation of Islam and other black nationalist subjects

5. Title

Only one subject shall be carried in title of each report. Separate reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

6. Character

a. Top functionaries

Internal Security (or Racial Matters, if subject is black nationalist) - followed by letters designating organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies. Examples:

Internal Security - C
Internal Security - SWP
Racial Matters - NOI

b. Others

Security Matter - followed by letters designating organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies. Examples:

Security Matter - C
Security Matter - SWP
Security Matter - X (native fascist)
Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When subject is deleted as top functionary, change character from internal security to security matter in next communication. Communications regarding subjects employed in key facilities should have "Key Facility" in character. Communications regarding CPUSA National Committee members should have "National Committee" in character. Black nationalist investigations and racial matters should have character as set out in section 122, volume IV, of this manual.

7. Status

Carry cases as pending until all active investigation has been conducted. Thereafter, status shall be as follows:

a. Top functionaries

Pending inactive. Submit reports annually. Place case in pending-active status 45 days prior to date report due.

b. Key facility cases

Pending inactive. See instructions under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.

c. Other security index subjects

(1) Closed

(a) Follow by administrative tickler to insure submission of periodic reports according to priority designation. If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and information consists only of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with sources, submit FD-400 in lieu of report setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted and any pertinent administrative data. Also submit FD-305 properly executed. Open case 45 days prior to date report due.

(b) Priority III cases must be opened for verification of residence and employment on annual basis.
Review case file for any necessary action including reevaluation of subject's status, or possible redesignation as priority I or II.

When pertinent information is submitted to Bureau for dissemination, FD-305 and FD-376 should accompany cover communication.

d. Subjects recommended for security index
(1) Pending inactive
If all active investigation completed at time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau, set forth lead to follow for security index approval and dissemination of report to Secret Service.
(2) Closed
After security index approved and dissemination to Secret Service, follow by administrative tickler for periodic report.

e. Subject not being recommended for index
Closed - prior to closing, comply with instructions pertaining to interviews.

8. Content

a. Include following and handle under topical headings where appropriate.
(1) Background
(a) Birth data
(b) Citizenship status
(c) Education
(d) Marital status
(e) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
(f) Identification record
(g) Employment
(h) Residence
(i) Status of health (if known)
(2) Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front groups, black nationalist extremist groups, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups
(a) Information concerning admission into revolutionary group, including sponsors, etc.
(b) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement
(3) Revolutionary statements by subject
(a) Determine each statement and full details surrounding it.
(b) Determine all statements showing adherence to principles of Marxism-Leninism or other revolutionary doctrines.
(4) Other activities indicating furtherance of program of subversive organizations
(a) Speeches and writings
(b) Organizational directives and/or educational outlines signed by or issued by subject, or issued while subject was officer of organization
(c) Pertinent contacts between subject and leaders of organizations
(d) Details concerning subject's attendance or connection with subversive training schools
(5) False statements made by subjects, including aliases
Evidence may be obtained from passports, tax returns, and voting, marital, employment, and selective service records.
(6) Miscellaneous
Pertinent items not falling under above categories

b. Reports on individuals should be confined to:
(1) Proof of membership and activity in basic revolutionary organizations, front organizations, and/or other organizations or unorganized groups

(2) Position and importance of subject in subversive movement

(3) Pertinent background information

Include only information pertinent to determining whether or not subject is engaged in subversive activities. Set out date or period to which it pertains; e.g., John Doe advised on January 15, 1970, that subject attended CP meetings in January, 1965, in Syracuse, New York.

c. Summarizing information

(1) When prior summary reports are not suitable for dissemination, include all pertinent information in current summary report with sources fully protected.

(2) Repetitious and cumulative items may be limited to representative number with each item set forth fully documented. Number of items will depend upon preponderance of other information showing dangerousness of subject. Base selection on need to report sufficient data to justify continued detention of subject if apprehended.

(3) When selection of representative number of items is made, follow with summary statement that source advised during specified period of time subject also attended certain number of other meetings. (Set out file number and serial range in documenting such statements.)

(4) Where there is extensive activity in subversive organizations, it is permissible to use narrative statements without exact dates of activity; however, show period of time involved and inclusive dates of informant reports. Do not use this type reporting in Smith Act of 1940 or ISA-50 cases. Summary statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions. Information from different sources must be reported separately.

(5) Above instructions do not lessen responsibility for reporting all pertinent items.

9. Administrative data - cover pages

a. General

References to following administrative items should be in cover pages accompanying reports:

(1) Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), FD-122, FD-128, and non-investigative information

(2) When report contains data affecting subject's existing security index card, FD-305, appropriately checked, should be last page of cover pages. This form provides checklist for various items regarding security index.

(3) Attach FD-305 to cover communication submitting LHM in priority III cases.

b. Documentation of reports

(1) Complete documentation of all reports is required. This also applies to LHMs submitted in priority III cases.

(2) If information necessary for complete documentation is not in subject's file, review other office files, as needed. If not obtainable, so state in cover pages.

(3) Do not conduct extensive investigation to locate sources who previously furnished background information for purposes of documentation or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed subject, according to reliable records, such as birth, school, or Immigration and Naturalization records, was born at certain place on certain date, report it without further verification.

(4) Office preparing summary report may include information originally obtained by another office but may not have necessary documentation. If office preparing report has copies of documents obtained by another office and identity of source, date of activity, date received, and receiving Agent are known, it is not necessary to obtain file number of original. Pertinent documentation, other than file number, should be obtained from auxiliary office.

(5) When report includes references to known subversives who have associated with subject, identify source of characterization in cover pages without further documentation.

(6) When it is necessary to obtain thumbnail sketch, place in thumbnail sketch file so it will be readily available for future use.

10. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

Channelizing memoranda may be destroyed following submission of reports. Copies of informant's statements designated for 100 classification files of informants may be destroyed when one year old. (See instructions for destruction of channelizing memoranda in Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 3D, item 8.)

I. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

1. Policy

Proper utilization of information received is foremost among Bureau's responsibilities. Information obtained during investigations should be forwarded to other interested agencies in executive branch unless there are compelling reasons not to do so. Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives provide for dissemination to other agencies which have present or potential interest information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters.

2. Bureau requirements

Because all conceivable situations cannot be anticipated, data below pertains to representative situations which occur frequently. Basic rule is that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in executive branch. Term "interested agency" must be interpreted in light of reason and common sense. Bring any unusual situations to Bureau's attention promptly for consideration.

Considerations affecting national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico necessitate broadest possible construction to requirements for dissemination to intelligence services in those areas. See Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities, policies, and exceptions in dissemination.

a. Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires each agency to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing agencies all information of mutual interest. Any information developed concerning members of military services must be referred immediately to appropriate military branch having primary responsibility, even though allegations have not been fully resolved or verified. Specifically point out in such instances that information has not been verified. When it is determined security subject is member of armed services, discontinue investigation immediately, advise Bureau, and disseminate pertinent reports locally to appropriate intelligence agency. Dissemination regarding military personnel is not confined to subjects of security investigations but extends to any subversive data developed against member of armed services during FBI investigations. If member of armed forces has been in contact with security subject or any individual or group with security implications, immediately advise appropriate local intelligence service, even though security aspects of contact have not been resolved. Point out in such instances that information is unverified and transmit any additional developments immediately.

Determine during security investigations whether subjects have any close relatives in armed forces. Promptly call such associations to attention of appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on subjects involved. Evaluation of these associations lies entirely within province of military intelligence services, but Bureau must disseminate this information immediately upon receipt. Advise Bureau by letter concerning any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel, including statement as to local dissemination and enclosing LHM setting out subversive data.

b. Aliens and naturalized citizens
Furnish information concerning aliens and naturalized citizens which might have bearing on their deportation or denatualization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). If in doubt, disseminate.

c. Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with military services
See instructions in this section concerning individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.

d. Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on key facilities list or otherwise in item c, above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in manufacture of materials vital to national defense
Disseminate locally to Army and other intelligence services if their interest is apparent.

e. Individuals on inactive duty who are members of or hold commissions in reserve branches or National Guard
Disseminate locally to appropriate military intelligence service.

f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including longshoremen and water-front employees
Disseminate locally to Coast Guard and, when circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies, including NISO.

g. Employees of Federal Government within purview of Executive Order 10450
No dissemination of reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in field. If, however, subject is employed in key facility, furnish copies of reports bearing dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," to appropriate intelligence agencies of armed services. Instructions regarding dissemination to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, appear in this section of this manual under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities - dissemination. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under Executive Order 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.

h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under cognizance of branch of armed services
Disseminate locally to intelligence service of military branch involved.

i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen, defined as persons in command or acting as polot, mechanic, or member of crew in navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Furnish to Bureau subversive data concerning such persons by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend such data be furnished to FAA. Dissemination will be made only at Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5.

[j. Dissemination to Secret Service

Under agreement between FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection dated 2-3-65 (set out in entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual), reports are disseminated to Secret Service in all security index cases. Furnish Bureau extra copy of reports in these cases.

(1) Secret Service must be advised of reason or reasons for referral; that is, statement of class or classes in appendix B of agreement which applies to subject. Use FD-376, which serves as letter of transmittal for both local and SOG dissemination. Forward original and one copy to Bureau. Maintain copy in case file and upon transfer of origin, furnish copy to new office of origin. Be certain individual is properly categorized. When subject is being recommended for security index, withhold dissemination pending Bureau approval only if subject is in category 3 of agreement. Make prompt dissemination of information developed on subjects other than those in category 3.

(2) If subject of prior investigation is being recommended for security index, do not disseminate prior reports. Prepare LHM containing pertinent information previously developed and disseminate to Secret Service with current report. Forward copies of LHM to Bureau for SOG dissemination.

(3) FD-376 should accompany LHM submitted in priority III cases.

(4) After initial dissemination to Secret Service in security index cases, as changes occur in residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally and furnish two copies of LHM, containing reference to previous communication disseminated to Secret Service, to Bureau for SOG dissemination. FD-366 may be used for this purpose.

(5) When reporting changes in residence and/or employment of Chinese and Cuban aliens on security index, disseminate to Secret Service, advise INS locally, and furnish four copies of LHM to Bureau for SOG dissemination. Copy furnished INS locally and two copies furnished Bureau should reference last communication to INS.

(6) For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in matters involving threats against President, refer to section 134B, volume IV, of this manual.

(7) Upon transfer of office of origin in these cases, old office of origin is to furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address and advise Bureau this has been done by submission of two copies of LHM disseminated locally. New office of origin need take no action regarding dissemination to Secret Service until further changes occur in subject's status or preparation of next periodic report.

k. Dissemination at Bureau

There are situations in which dissemination is made only at Bureau. Do not disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where security measures are inadequate. In these instances bring data to immediate attention of Bureau for SOG dissemination. In addition, Atomic Energy Commission receives reports only through Bureau. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including State Department, only at SOG.]

locate subjects are not to be submitted. The Bureau will closely follow investigative action to locate missing security index subjects.

II. If you receive indications that the subject went to Mexico or Canada, request the Bureau to alert other appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to determine any available verifying information through liaison channels.

III. If the subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, the Washington Field Office should be requested to check the records of the Passport Office of the State Department for verification.

IV. When all logical leads have been exhausted in the case of a missing important functionary, consideration should be given to circularizing all field offices with the subject's photograph and background information for the purpose of alerting the entire field to the identity of the subject. Bureau authority must be obtained before circularization is made. In seeking Bureau authority, advise the Bureau as to the position held by the subject and what efforts have already been made to locate him.

If this procedure is to be effective, its application must necessarily be restrictive in the number of subjects to which it is applied. Therefore, requests to circularize must be made only after every possible lead has been exhausted and then only in the cases of the most important missing functionaries.

(4) Individuals traveling abroad (Also consider section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

When information is received indicating that[(1) a subject of a current security investigation, (2) a subject whose name is included in agitator index or priorities I or II of security index, or (3) where information available indicates a subject of a past security investigation may be a "sleeper" or in an underground capacity, or where current information otherwise would indicate a need to effect foreign coverage,] intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel, take following action:

(a) Immediately advise the Bureau by letterhead memorandum setting forth complete available details concerning the foreign travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, the exact name under which the passport was issued, the number of the passport, and the office issuing the passport, if known. Include in the letterhead memorandum a full description of the subject, including all aliases, and in the case of Chinese and Korean subjects Chinese telegraphic code and Korean telegraphic code numbers, as well as a concise resume of available subversive data regarding the subject. Do not delay in advising the Bureau of the actual or intended travel while developing the details of the travel as time is of the essence in this matter.

(b) Set out a lead for the Washington Field Office for a check of the records of the Passport Office, Department of State; however, do not limit efforts to develop above information to a check of such records.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

D. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS 19
  1. Definitions 19
  2. Responsibility of the Bureau 19
  3. Purpose of investigation 19
    a. Determination of dangerousness 19
    b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes 19
  4. Individuals to be investigated 22
    a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49 22
    b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements 22
    c. Special training in a subversive movement 23
    d. Military service 23
    e. Employment in key facilities 23
    f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs 23
  5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals 24
    a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning 24
      (1) Subjects connected with institutions of learning 24
        (a) Prior Bureau authority to institute investigation. 24
          I. Faculty members 24
          II. Students and nonacademic employees 24
          III. Requests for Bureau authority 24
        (b) Contacts during investigation 25
          I. Persons permissible to contact 25
            (A) Established sources 25
            (B) Individuals not connected with institution of learning 25
          II. Students and professors 25
          III. Superiors of faculty members 25
        (c) Receiving voluntary information 25
      (2) Subjects not connected with an institution of learning. 25
      (3) Contacts of foreign establishments 25
    b. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations or international organizations, and members of the armed forces 25
  6. Investigative procedures concerning individuals 26
    a. General 26
    b. Scope of investigations 26
      (1) Background 26
        (a) True name and aliases 26
        (b) Residence address 26
        (c) Occupation or business 26
        (d) Business or employment address 26
        (e) Citizenship status 26
          I. Alien 26
          II. Naturalized citizen 26
          III. Native-born citizen 26
        (f) Nationality background 26
        (g) Military record 27
        (h) Close relatives in armed forces 27
        (i) Identification record - (Security flash notice FD-165) 27
        (j) Physical description 28
        (k) Photograph 28
        (l) Handwriting specimens 29
        (m) Labor union membership 29

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

(2) Subversive activity 29
    (a) Membership or affiliation 29
    (b) Knowledge of aims and purposes 29
    (c) Position and importance 30
(3) Missing subjects 31
(4) Individuals traveling abroad 33
(5) Investigative techniques 34
    (a) File reviews 34
    (b) Security informants 34
    (c) Physical surveillances 35
    (d) Photographic surveillances 35
    (e) Public sources 36
    (f) Records of private firms 36
    (g) Deleted
    (h) Deleted
    (i) Channelizing information to case files 36
(6) Preservation of evidence 37
(7) Interviews with subjects of security investigations 38
    (a) Purpose 38
    (b) Subjects not included in the security index 38
    (c) Security index subjects 38
    (d) Without Bureau authority the SAC may 38
    (e) Prior Bureau authority 39
    (f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews 40
    (g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects 42
7. Administrative procedures 42a
  a. Reserve index 42a
    (1) Purpose 42a
    (2) Individuals to be included 42a
    (3) Arrangement 42b
    (4) Content 43
    (5) Removal and deletion of cards 43
  b. Security index 43
    (1) Purpose 43
    (2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual 44
    (3) Criteria for placing and retaining names in the security index 45
    (4) Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards 46a
    (5) Content and appearance of security index card 48
        (a) Data to appear on face of card 48
        (b) Data to appear on separate attached card 50
    (6) Arrangement of the security index 50
        (a) At Bureau 50
        (b) In the field office 51
            I. Geographical section 51
            II. Alphabetical section 51
            III. Special section 52
                (A) Espionage subjects 52
                (B) U. S. Government employees 52
                (C) Atomic energy program employees 52
                (D) Foreign government employees 52
                (E) United Nations Secretariat and other international organization employees 52
                (F) Pro-Tito individuals 52
                (G) Cuban 53
            IV. Unavailable section 53
                (A) Missing subjects 54
                (B) Subjects out of the country 54
                (C) Imprisoned subjects 54
                (D) Exception - re special section 56

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

V. Inactive section 56
(7) Periodic verification of addresses 57
(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards 58
(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards 58a
  (a) Subjects of security index cards 58a
  (b) Top functionaries 59
  (c) Subjects tabbed for priority 60
  (d) Subjects not included in security index 60
(10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index 60
  (a) Death of subject 60
  (b) Permanent departure from Bureau's jurisdiction 60
  (c) Imprisonment of subject 60
  (d) Induction of subject into armed forces 60
  (e) Security informants 60
  (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous 61
  (g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection 61
  (h) Subjects of Chinese extraction 62
(11) Priority apprehension program 62
  (a) Purpose 62
  (b) Subjects to be tabbed priority 62
  (c) Recommendations for and removal of priority designation 63
  (d) Administrative procedures for handling priority program 63
  (e) General 64
c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities 64
  (1) Responsibility 64
  (2) Inclusion in security index 65
  (3) Dissemination 65
  (4) Status of cases 66
d. Top functionary program 66
  (1) General 66
  (2) Definition of top functionary 66
  (3) Manner of designation of top functionary 66
  (4) Regulations governing the handling of top functionaries 67
  (5) Maintenance of list 67

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index.......... 70
  (1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations...... 70
  (2) Security of Government employees investigations........ 70
  (3) Atomic Energy Act, U. S. Information Agency applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations.......... 70
f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports. 71
  (1) General.......... 71
  (2) Schedule of submission of reports.......... 72
  (3) Origin.......... 72
  (4) Classification.......... 72
  (5) Title.......... 72
  (6) Character.......... 73
    (a) Top functionaries.......... 73
    (b) Others.......... 73
  (7) Status.......... 73
    (a) Top functionaries.......... 73
    (b) Key facility cases.......... 73
    (c) Other security index subjects.......... 73
    (d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index.. 74
    (e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein.......... 74
  (8) Content.......... 74
  (9) Administrative data.......... 77
    (a) General.......... 77
    (b) Documentation of reports.......... 78
g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of.......... 79
8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations...... 79
a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau.......... 80
  (1) Aliens and naturalized citizens.......... 80
  (2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services.......... 80
  (3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense.......... 80
  (4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard.......... 80

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

(5) Seamen and subjects employed in the maritime industry, including longshoremen and other water-front employees. 80
(6) Employees of the Federal Government within the purview of Executive Order 10450........................ 80
(7) Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under cognizance of a branch of armed services............... 81
(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration.. 81
(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service.. 81
(10) Dissemination at Bureau................................ 81a
b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction.................... 82
(1) Members of the armed forces............................ 82

Index... 82a

(D) When the office of origin for a security index or reserve index A subject against whose identification record a notice has been placed is changed, form FD-128 submitted to change office of origin should show that a security flash notice has been posted with Identification Division. An extra copy of form FD-128 should be specifically sent to Identification Division in order that its records will show new office of origin to which future records will be submitted.

(E) Cancel a security flash notice when (1) it is learned that subject of such is deceased or (2) such subject is determined to be no longer of security interest. Do not cancel security flash notice when a subject is removed from security index solely by application of security index criteria.

(j) Physical description

I. Obtain and report a detailed physical description.

II. During the course of the initial investigation in any security-type case, including espionage and nationalistic tendency cases, the physical characteristics and description of the subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation. It is not necessary to observe personally the subject of any case where preliminary investigation determines the basis for opening the case is unfounded.

III. The subject should be personally observed, if possible, early in the investigation after it is determined that a complete investigation is warranted to develop the extent of a subject's subversive activities and to consider whether the subject's name should be added to the security index. This action should be taken in the course of developing background information to determine the true identity and existence of the subject and to assist in establishing that the subject of the investigation is the person against whom the subversive allegations have been made. Each subject should be personally observed whenever a complete security investigation is conducted even though a security index card is not being recommended at the completion of the investigation.

IV. Do not delay the submission of form FD-122 recommending the addition of a subject's name to the security index even though it has not been possible to observe personally the subject if it has been determined through investigation that the subject is dangerous or potentially dangerous.

V. If a security index card is not being recommended after all logical investigation has been conducted and it has not been possible to observe personally the subject during the investigation, the case may be closed even though this has not been done. If a security index card has been recommended and prepared and it has not been possible to personally observe the subject, the case shall remain open until such time as the subject is personally observed, except when it has been determined that the subject is residing outside the U. S. or Puerto Rico, in which event the case may be closed if there is no other pending investigation and the matter should be followed administratively to be certain that the subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

(k) Photograph

I. Reasonable efforts should be made during the investigation of a security subject to obtain a photograph of the subject through usual sources.

II. Cases on security index subjects are to be maintained in a pending status until such time as a suitable photograph is obtained unless circumstances dictate otherwise, in which case the Bureau should be advised. Once a photograph has been obtained, continue to be alert for the existence of more recent photographs which may become available.

III. [Forward a copy of photographs of security index subjects to the Bureau for dissemination to U. S. Secret Service headquarters.]

(B) During first contact, interviewing Agent will introduce himself as a Special Agent of FBI by use of credentials or badge and will open conversation by using an appropriate pretext or by reciting Bureau's responsibilities in security field and asking subject whether he can be of assistance to Government. If individual has been a member of a basic revolutionary organization and indicates he might cooperate, he may be questioned during initial contact about his own activities in order to further ascertain extent to which he will cooperate. This original interview is for sole purpose of allowing Agent to determine whether individual being interviewed might be cooperative.

(e) Prior Bureau authority

I. Subjects of active current investigations where no interview with prior Bureau authority has previously been conducted

II. Closed cases where subject is on security index and no prior interview has been conducted

III. Subjects of investigations requested by Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant-type cases, loyalty cases, etc.

IV. Any persons where circumstances indicate a delicate situation exists and a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, religious field, publishing houses, labor leaders, and the like. Bureau authority must be requested with respect to situations of this kind even though prior interviews have been had with these interviewees.

V. Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts

VI. Subjects of section A reserve index cards

In any of the above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview a subject of a security investigation. This does not relieve you of responsibility of submitting reports in security cases when due.

VII. Request for Bureau authority for interview should be set forth in first paragraph of letter[(after reference)] and unless you are recommending a special manner or procedure for conducting interview, paragraph should contain following statements:

"Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If this subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during the initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of the Manual of Instructions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as a PSI."

Form FD-336 contains above statement and may be used in requesting Bureau authority for interview.

Above statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents during initial contacts and recontacts from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potentialities as an informant.

VIII. Letters requesting Bureau authority for the interview must contain the following information, if available:

(A) Residence address, occupation, employment and race of subject, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health

(B) Marital status. If married, the occupation, employment, and race of the spouse.

(C) Length of time subject a member of or affiliated with subversive organizations and positions he held in such organizations. In cases in which investigation is based on some allegation or circumstances of a security nature other than membership in or affiliation with subversive organizations, facts upon which investigation is predicated should be briefly set forth.

(D) If married, information indicating the spouse is or has been a member of or affiliated with subversive groups, the position held in such groups, and the length of time of such membership or affiliation.

(E) Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups

(F) Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of the subject and, if married, of the spouse

(G) What is expected to be gained by the interview

IX. In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding the seven items listed above must be set out under the appropriate number but the above headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any of the items, you should make the appropriate comments after the respective number.

X. All letters requesting Bureau authority to interview the subject of a security investigation must be personally approved by the SAC.

XI. One of the required copies of the letter to the Bureau should consist only of the first page of the letter. When unnecessary for Bureau to issue specific instructions or comments in connection with authorizing an interview, the Bureau will approve the request by placing an appropriate rubber-stamp impression on the single-page copy of the incoming letter and return it by routing slip.

XII. Upon receipt of Bureau authority, the interview must be conducted within[45]days. If this is impossible, advise Bureau of the reasons why the interview was not effected and state that the subject will be contacted within the next[45]days. At the end of the second[45-day]period if the interview has not been conducted, request additional authority. Include in the letters any new information bearing upon the advisability of conducting the interview.

(f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews

I. Interviews must be conducted by two Special Agents. An Agent experienced in security investigations who has knowledge of Bureau regulations regarding development of informants must conduct the actual interrogation. Approach need not be made by both Agents at the same time and one Agent may observe from a secure distance. Background of subject and individual circumstances will determine exactly how approach should be handled in each case. Two Agents should be physically present during any interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all types of Bureau cases.

II. Preparations for interview must be thorough and conducted so that interviewing Agents will not be compromised, the Bureau will not be embarrassed, and confidential informants will not be exposed.

XI. Inform subjects connected with labor unions that Bureau is not interested in employee-employer relations and is concerned only with obtaining information on infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements.

XII. Furnish no information and make no statements to a person being interviewed which might later be used to embarrass Bureau. Agents should not allow themselves to be interviewed by interviewee or to be placed in a position of answering questions instead of asking them.

XIII. Terminate immediately an interview if subject proves to be hostile or uncooperative on initial contact.

XIV. Exploit a subject's knowledge to utmost if he is found to be willing to furnish information of value.

XV. Questions asked of a subject being interviewed should be so worded as to require an admission or denial of all pertinent items of subversive information developed during prior investigation unless to do so would expose investigative techniques or security informants.

XVI. A cordial and friendly attitude alone on part of a subject should not be construed as evidence of cooperation insofar as potential dangerousness is concerned when he fails to admit or furnish substantially same subversive information verified through previous investigation.

XVII. Inform subject that we are interested in interviewing him in great detail and arrange to conduct interviews over as extended a period of time as necessary to develop matter fully. Conduct necessary investigation or research to verify or add to what is being developed on interview. Request information from other offices or Bureau to assist in interview if needed.

XVIII. Reduce information obtained to a signed statement if subject willing that this be done.

XVIX. Determine willingness to testify to information furnished in possible future Federal proceedings.

XX. Consider possibility of developing these individuals as informants. If possibility is apparent, pursue matter with view to establishing subject as a reliable source in subversive movement with which he has been connected.

XXI. When no information is developed during course of an interview which would affect a subject's status, submit results thereof in letter form immediately following interview and also in next report submitted in case. At least one report will be submitted in each case in which a subject is interviewed with Bureau authority. In case of an individual employed in or holding a sensitive position enumerated in 87D 6b (7) (e) IV above, results of all interviews must be submitted promptly in report[or letterhead memorandum]form, [depending on priority designation,]until such time as he begins to cooperate as a security informant or a source.

XXII. Report information regarding subject's admissions of his own subversive activities and associations and set forth a statement to effect that he did or did not furnish information regarding subversive activities of others.

XXIII. Report statements of denial regarding subject's subversive activities developed through prior investigation and follow by a brief summary statement of past subversive activity which is being denied by subject.

XXIV. Letter transmitting results of an interview must contain:

(A) A definite statement or conclusion of interviewing Agents as to cooperativeness of subject

(B) Whether information furnished by him coincides substantially with information developed against him

(C) Reasons for the conclusions

(D) Statement as to subject's availability as a potential witness and evaluation of subject's potential as an informant or confidential source

(E) Further contacts contemplated

(F) Recommendation that security index card be canceled when it is determined from statements furnished by a security index subject regarding his subversive activities and associates, considered with other known information and factors, that subject is no longer to be considered dangerous to internal security in time of an emergency

XXV. Above instructions shall not preclude immediate interview of subject of a security-type investigation who contacts a Bureau representative and expresses a desire to furnish information concerning subversive activities. They do not apply to an interview of a person once he is an established informant or confidential source.

XXVI. Reinterviews with security index subjects should be considered on a systematic basis. This may be done by
[considering a recontact when it is necessary [to review
[case or submit appropriate periodic communication to
[Bureau.]

(g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects

I. A dead file should be maintained for reference purposes in those offices having sufficient volume of security work to justify such action.

II. Copies of memoranda designated for individual case files should be routed to this file. Such memoranda to contain:

(A) The background of the defectee

(B) Type of information he may furnish

(C) Period covered by this data

(D) Whether or not defectee available for interview by all Agents

(E) Whether he is in position to testify and willing to do so

III. Do not include information concerning security informants for security reasons.

IV. Proper maintenance of this file will be useful in identifying persons who may be in a position to furnish information of value in the future and will obviate necessity of extensive file reviews in this connection.

V. A special index may be used for this file if desirable. If used, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating names, times, and places defectees were in a subversive movement and a brief description of information available from them. Break index down geographically and subdivide by years if desirable.

7. Administrative procedures

[a. Reserve index

(1) Purpose

The reserve index is designed to represent those persons who, in the light of ever-changing conditions, should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation, or action under the security index program. This index may serve as an administrative aid and working index containing a central repository of the names of individuals having sympathy for or affiliation with the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations.

(2) Individuals to be included

This index is to contain names of individuals when, following investigation, the information does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the security index when there is evidence of:

(a) Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection

(b) Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.

(c) The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support, or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.

(d) Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(e) Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(3) Arrangement

This index is to be maintained[by each field office]in two sections, section A and section B. Each section will be maintained alphabetically on 5- by 8-inch cards.

(a) Section A

Section A of reserve index is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following apprehension of security index subjects.

I. Section A should include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within security index criteria but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Include in this section those individuals meeting standards for inclusion in reserve index and who fall within following categories:

(A) Professors, teachers, and educators
(B) Labor union organizers or leaders
(C) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others in mass media field
(D) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists
(E) Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level
(F) Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid

II. Inclusion[or deletion]of names in reserve index (section A)[must be approved by SAC.

(A) Reserve index (section A) will be maintained strictly by each field office. When a subject's name has been deleted from security index, consideration should be given to including his name in reserve index (section A). Upon approval by SAC for inclusion of an individual's name in section A of reserve index, two cards will be made, one card to be filed in your office and one card to be filed away from headquarters city at same location as extra set of security index cards is now stored.]

(B) [Deleted]

III. Field office file of a reserve index A subject should be reviewed whenever informant information or other information is channeled to file. A determination should be made as to whether additional investigation is warranted and whether current information is sufficient for inclusion in reserve index.

IV. Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing in section A of reserve index cards

(A) Changes in data appearing on section A reserve index cards should be[forwarded to clerk in each field division handling these cards.]

(B) [Deleted]

(C) Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form[FD-128.] Forward section A cards to new office of origin. [Where necessary pertinent information should be forwarded to new office of origin through preparation of a succinct letterhead memorandum which will be forwarded by appropriate cover communication.

(D) In preparing a succinct letterhead memorandum for purpose of transmitting pertinent information to new office of origin, yellow file copy for office preparing this memorandum must contain notations as to exact location of all original information contained therein. Statements should be included in cover communication transmitting succinct letterhead memorandum indicating that original source information has been noted on office file copy.]

(b) Section B

I. This section is to contain names of all other individuals included in reserve index. This section is to be maintained only in field office. File of a reserve index B subject should be reviewed whenever informant information or other information is channeled to file. A determination should be made at that time as to whether additional investigation is warranted.

II. Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form[FD-128 as set forth concerning section A of reserve index.] Forward section B cards to new office of origin.

(4) Content

(a) Each card in section A and section B should contain, as a minimum, the following:

I. Name and aliases
II. Race
III. Sex
IV. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
V. Citizenship
VI. Residence
VII. Employment
VIII. Birth data
IX. Office file number
X. Letters "SS" if dissemination has been made to Secret Service in accordance with instructions in section 134B, item 2, volume IV, of this manual

(b) In addition, membership and position or association in a subversive group or groups, together with source and date of information, may be added.

(5) Removal and deletion of cards

(a) Destroy cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources or who subsequently become subjects of security index cards.

(b) [Deleted]

b. Security index

(1) Purpose

(a) Security index cards are prepared and maintained by Bureau to serve as operational guide for apprehension of persons deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security of country in event of a national emergency.

(b) It shall contain names of all persons who have been determined through investigation to be dangerous or potentially dangerous because of their membership in or affiliation with or espousal of doctrines of basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations or who are black nationalist extremists and who will be apprehended upon receipt of instructions from Attorney General.

(c) It shall include subjects of espionage investigations and any other type of Bureau investigation provided their activities bring them within scope of security index criteria.

(d) Action shall be taken against individuals included in security index only upon authorization of warrants of arrest by Attorney General.

(e) Names shall be included in security index only when investigation has established and reports show sufficient facts and evidence to justify inclusion of each subject in security index.

(f) Contents of security index must be accurate and correct at all times. Matters pertaining to its preparation and maintenance must be given preferred, expeditious, continuous, and detailed attention.

(g) Matters pertaining to security index are strictly confidential and are not to be mentioned or alluded to in investigative reports.

(h) General operation and content of security index must not be discussed by field personnel of Bureau without prior Bureau authority.

(i) Matters pertaining to security index may be discussed with duly qualified representatives of other Federal intelligence agencies only on a strictly confidential basis and only in instances in which an individual subject of prime interest to one of these services is involved.

(2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual

(a) The dangerousness of a member or affiliate of a subversive organization does not necessarily depend entirely upon his personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or a disposition to violence. Although these factors must be taken into consideration in evaluating an individual's potential dangerousness, other factors are essential in making this determination. An individual's dangerousness also depends upon contribution he has made or is making in advancement of principles and aims of subversive movement with which he is connected or his subversive potentialities in event of a national emergency. Bear in mind that a subject active in a subversive organization is not merely an isolated individual but is a part of an organization of which the purposes are opposed to best interests of U. S. An individual's loyalty to a subversive organization and the principles thereof is a primary factor to take into consideration in evaluating his potential dangerousness; however, regardless of evidence of subversive affiliation, all evidence developed during course of a security investigation must be carefully weighed for purpose of determining whether subject's activities depict him as a potentially dangerous individual in time of a national emergency. Factors having a bearing upon an individual's potential dangerousness are numerous and will vary in each case in degree.

Among such factors are:

I. Long continued membership in a subversive organization
II. Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools
III. Frequent or regular attendance at organizational meetings and functions
IV. Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization
V. Possession of or continued study of revolutionary literature
VI. Preparation or distribution of subversive propaganda and/or literature
VII. Holding positions in subversive organization or in other organizations of a front character which indicate confidence of such organizations in his loyalty
VIII. Espousal of a subversive doctrine exemplified in his acts and utterances

(b) Where potential dangerousness of a subject has been established and inclusion of that subject in security index is warranted, office of origin shall submit a recommendation for inclusion in security index by submitting form FD-122 to Bureau. Form must be prepared in triplicate. Forward original and one copy to Bureau and place one copy in subject's investigative case file.

Nothing should appear on FD-122 or subsequently on security index card which is not in subject's case file. Form FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend a subject for inclusion in security index and (2) to submit changes to data which appears on face of security index cards already existent.

Proper selection should be made in opening paragraph option. FD-122 is submitted with abstract when used to recommend subject for inclusion in security index and without abstract when used to indicate additions, deletions, or changes in data appearing on existing cards.

(c) When form FD-122 is submitted to Bureau recommending inclusion of a name in security index, attach additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of facts on which recommendation has been based. Facts must be in detail to clearly show soundness of recommendation. Complete justification for designated priority level for apprehension must be included. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must contain pertinent dates of subject's activities.

(d) When, at conclusion of investigation, subject's name is not being recommended for security index, set out a brief summary statement in appropriate communication closing case showing reasons for decision.

(e) Security index cards shall be recommended by and maintained by office of origin only.

(f) A current[summary]report must be in possession of Bureau when subject is recommended for security index.

(g) To assure that subject recommended for security index will receive proper attention, case shall be kept in pending or pending-inactive status until security index card has been received from Bureau and filed in office security index. If case continues in pending status because of outstanding investigation, reports shall carry a lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and if approved to disseminate a copy of report to Secret Service in addition to other leads. If outstanding investigation has been completed and case would otherwise be closed upon submission of report and form FD-122, case shall be placed in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and if approved to disseminate copy of report to Secret Service. In latter instance, upon receipt of security index card and following local dissemination to Secret Service, case may be closed administratively.

(h) Recommendation for security index card should not be delayed because of absence of information concerning race, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, or description where security index card is warranted. In such instances, recommendation for card should be submitted with a current report and case retained in pending status with active investigation continuing to determine missing items of information.

(i) Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for the security index provided instructions set forth in 87D 6b (3) and (4) are followed. Forms FD-122 submitted on subjects should include data required in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV below.

(j) When form FD-122 is submitted recommending a security index card be prepared on a subject who is of Chinese extraction, the words "Other - Chinese" must be included in the space on the form calling for a statement as to the subject's race. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending that a security index card be prepared on a person who is not of Chinese extraction but who has shown definite sympathies with Communist China, the form should include under "Miscellaneous" a statement to the effect "sympathetic to Communist China."

(k) Upon receipt of form FD-122 at Bureau, the case of the subject will be reviewed and if recommendation of field is concurred in, security index cards will be prepared. Duplicate copy of form will be returned to office of origin stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." The three cards shall be filed in security index as outlined below. The returned copy of FD-122 shall be placed in subject's main investigative case file. Offices with a geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive an extra card.

(l) When security index cards are received from Bureau, data thereon must be checked for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards of similar size to security index cards which are stapled to back of two of the cards. One card will then be filed in the geographical section of office security index (except special section cards and unavailable section cards - see 87D 7b (6) (b) III and IV below), and one card shall be filed in the duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. The other card is filed in alphabetical section of security index. No information shall be permanently added, deleted, or changed on face of security index card without complying with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (8).

(5) Content and appearance of security index card

(a) Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain the following information. If any of items enumerated in I through XIV are missing at time the security index card is made, the case should be continued as pending and investigation conducted to obtain the necessary information. Set forth under each item below are possible categories in which subject may be classified, together with code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on form FD-122 when sending form to Bureau recommending security index card be prepared. Code letters should subsequently appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

I. Name and aliases

The full and correct name and aliases of the subject must be contained on the security index card. When the true name of a subject or any aliases are changed, added, deleted, or are found to be incorrect, form FD-122 must be submitted showing the correct data to be placed on the security index card.

II. Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)

III.	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
IV.	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien	AL
	(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
V.	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	American Workers' Communist Party	AWC
	Anarchist	ANA
	Black Nationalist	BNT
[	[Black Panther Party	BPP]
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
	Minutemen	MIN
	Nation of Islam	NOI
	Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
	Progressive Labor Party	PLP
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	Revolutionary Action Movement	RAM
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Spartacist League	SPL
	Student National Coordinating Committee	SNC
	Students for a Democratic Society	SDS
	Workers World Party	WWP
	Bulgarian	BUL
	Cuban	CUB
	Czechoslovakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Romanian	ROM
	Russian	RUS
	Yugoslavian	YUG
VI.	Priority designation	
	Priority I	P I
	Priority II	P II
	Priority III	P III
VII.	Top functionary designation (where applicable)	
	Top functionary	TF
VIII.	Special section cards	
	Atomic energy program employees	AEP
	Cuban special section	CUB
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
	United Nations employees	UNE
	U. S. Government employees	GOV
IX.	Unavailable section cards	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
X.	Date and place of birth	
XI.	Key facility geographical reference number obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List and abbreviation denoting agency having security responsibility for key facility (where applicable)	
XII.	Residence address	

XIII. Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.

XIV. Field office file number

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description

(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division

(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. This photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.

(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms

(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

should be completely filled out just as if a first recommendation is being made, and submitted with a current report. If not, the Bureau should be advised of the reasons for not reactivating his security index card. In either case, cancel the inactive card.

(7) Periodic verification of addresses

(a) The data recorded on security index cards shall be in an up-to-date status at all times.

(b) The whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. The residence and business addresses of security index subjects in priority I must be checked at least once each three months. The residence and business addresses of all other security index subjects must be checked at least once each[year,]except those imprisoned and those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. (defection to a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, including Cuba since 10-1-60) (see section 105G, item 3, volume IV, of this manual). The residence and employment of those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. must be verified every[ninety]days. The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least[once each year]to determine if he has returned to this country.

Perfect arrangements to be advised on a current basis of any indication that the subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change his residence or employment. Periodic checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under appropriate pretext by telephone once each six months for those individuals in priority I and once[every two years] for all other subjects. Pretext means may be utilized during other periodic checks conducted either personally or through appropriate sources.

(c) The physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and the individual case file of each security index subject shall show that this has been done. If a security index subject has not been personally observed previously, this should be done during the next verification of the subject's residence and/or business addresses.

(d) Use form FD-154 in verifying addresses of security index subjects when its use will facilitate the checking of the addresses. When FD-154 is not used in verifying addresses, a notation must be made on the last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in the subject's case file showing the subject's current residence and business addresses and the date such addresses were verified. This must be done to assure that the file will contain all information concerning the status of the case and that the file will come to the attention of the Agent or field supervisor to determine if additional action is warranted at the time of the verification of addresses. Each time that a security index subject's residence and employment are verified, the case must be reevaluated to assure that the subject is qualified for inclusion in the security index under the criteria for such inclusion. A notation to the effect that the case has been reviewed for this purpose shall be made in the file.

(e) If it is determined that the residence or business address or both have been changed from those appearing on the security index card, FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau with the current residence or business address shown thereon. In such instances, FD-122 should show only the changes to be made on the security index card. FD-122 should be accompanied by form FD-366 for dissemination to Secret Service. Secret Service should be advised locally by dissemination of FD-366.

(f) Project of verifying addresses of security index subjects shall be handled by reopening and assigning cases for verification and closing cases administratively upon accomplishment of verifications. [In priority I and priority II security index cases, verification of residence and employment should be conducted at time of submission of investigative reports and should be included therein.

I. In priority III security index cases, verification of residence and employment should be recorded on FD-154 and placed in case file. Such information may be included in letterhead memorandum when prepared.]

(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards

(a) Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, priority designation, date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility (see 87D 7c (2) below), residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by form FD-128.

(b) Insertion or removal of cards from special section or unavailable section should be handled pursuant to 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV.

(c) Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing security index cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.

(d) Indicate use of FD-122 for changes by checking proper opening paragraph and submit without abstract.

(e) Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."

(f) Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected security index cards with duplicate copy of FD-122 (stamped "Corrected Security Index cards attached. Substitute for cards in file and destroy old cards. Place photograph and description on reserve side of geographical cards."), action to be taken includes:

I. Check accuracy of data on cards.

II. Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to back of corrected cards, staple them, and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV above.

III. File third card in alphabetical section of security index.

IV. Destroy old cards.

(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards

(a) Subjects of security index cards

I. Requests to verify addresses of security index subjects from other offices must be assigned immediately and results of investigation to verify new address must be transmitted to office of origin within two weeks.

II. Office of origin, upon receipt of verification of address, should submit FD-128 immediately transferring office of origin. Forms regarding unavailable section subjects should be prepared in accordance with 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.

III. Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies thereof to office covering subject's new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and security index cards. FD-128 should show full title and priority level designation.

IV. Information concerning key facility employment of subject in new office should be furnished by that office to old office of origin so that geographical reference number, agency having security responsibility, and interested agencies can be included on FD-128 submitted by old office of origin.

V. Where security index flash notice has been placed with Identification Division, notation to that effect must appear on FD-128 and extra copy of FD-128 must be specifically designated for Bureau marked for attention of Identification Division so that those records will show new office controlling existing security index flash notice.

VI. Old office of origin will submit current report[in priority I and priority II security index cases and a succinct letterhead memorandum in priority III security index cases.]

Submission of FD-128 should not be delayed solely for preparation of report[or letterhead memorandum]when office of origin is to be changed, but notation should be made on FD-128 that old office of origin is preparing [appropriate communication.]

[Old office of origin is responsible for furnishing Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address.]

Case will remain pending in both old and new offices of origin until report[or letterhead memorandum]is submitted by old office of origin. New office of origin is responsible to follow matter until[completed.]

[In Priority III security index cases, a succinct letterhead memorandum should be prepared setting forth all pertinent information for Bureau and new office of origin. If applicable, information contained therein may be summarized. Yellow file copy retained by old office of origin must contain notations indicating exact location of all original information which has been set forth or summarized in letterhead memorandum. Cover communication transmitting such letterhead memoranda must contain a statement indicating that such notations have been made.]

VII. New office of origin is to review pertinent material received with FD-128, as well as pertinent information in files of new office, to determine whether additional investigation is warranted. If no additional investigation is warranted, advise Bureau by letter that case is being placed in a closed status.

VIII. Upon receipt of FD-128, office covering new address of subject will be office of origin with no other communication necessary in this regard. New office of origin will place its file number on security index cards received and place them in security index of that office.

IX. Upon receipt of new security index cards from Bureau with copy of FD-128, new office of origin is to transfer information from reverse side of old geographical cards to two of the new cards, appropriately file new cards, and destroy old cards.

(b) Top functionaries

Mechanics of transferring cases for all security index subjects as described above shall apply to top functionaries. Additional procedures in this category are:

I. Notification to Bureau of deletion of subject as top functionary in old office of origin will be handled merely by designation in space provided on FD-128 that subject was top functionary.

II. Upon receipt of form FD-128, new office of origin shall automatically designate subject top functionary and continue case in an assigned pending status until investigation is completed. After investigation is completed and a summary report has been submitted by old office of origin, case may be placed in a pending-inactive status. Within three months, new office of origin is to conduct active investigation, submit investigative report on subject, and advise Bureau concerning continued designation of subject in this category.

(c) Subjects tabbed for priority
Security index card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in new office of origin until such time as it is determined by receipt of information by that office that priority designation is not warranted under provisions of 87D 7b (11) below.

(d) Subjects not included in security index
I. Transfer office of origin by FD-128 only upon verification by another office of subject's presence in that division. FD-128 should show full title.
II. Enclose copies of all investigative reports and other pertinent serials with copies of FD-128 to new office of origin.
III. New office of origin is to investigate or advise Bureau that case closed if no action warranted

(10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index
SAC shall personally recommend removal of any name from security index under conditions set out in 87D 7b (4).

(a) Death of subject
Destroy security index card without Bureau authority, but advise Bureau by letterhead memorandum.

(b) Permanent departure from Bureau's jurisdiction
Upon learning of departure of a security index subject from U. S. or Puerto Rico for a foreign country, immediately ascertain conditions surrounding his departure.

No security index card shall be canceled by reason of a subject's departure for a foreign country unless that subject is an alien who has permanently departed either voluntarily or as a result of deportation proceedings. In such instances security index cards will be canceled only after subject's departure has been verified as being permanent. If a U. S. citizen who is included in security index and who has been out of country is found to have renounced his citizenship and taken citizenship of a foreign country, his security index card may be canceled only after it has been determined that he does not intend to return to U. S.

Recommendations to cancel security index cards of such subjects shall be made by letter directed to Bureau. Cards shall be canceled only after receipt of advice from Bureau that Bureau's security index cards have been canceled.

(c) Imprisonment of subject
Security index cards shall not be canceled by reason of a subject's having been imprisoned regardless of length of time he will be incarcerated. Cards of such subjects shall be placed in unavailable section of security index and cases handled thereafter in accordance with instructions set forth in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.

(d) Induction of subject into armed forces
Security index cards of subjects who have been inducted into armed forces of U. S. are to be placed in inactive section of field security index. Follow procedure set forth above under 87D 7b (6) (b) (V).

(e) Security informants
Security index card of any subject who is developed as a security informant should be canceled. In requesting Bureau's permission to designate such a subject as a security informant, direct Bureau's

attention to existence of a security index card for that individual. In all such instances a specific recommendation must be made concerning cancellation of card. Card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate subject as a security informant.

(f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous
Instructions set out below should be read in conjunction with 87D 6b (7) (c) herein relating to interviews with security index subjects.

Frequently, after a subject is included in security index, information is received or investigation develops information indicating that he is no longer a threat to internal security by reason of physical condition, defection or expulsion from subversive movement, membership in or affiliation with which was reason for placing him in security index. Such defection may be shown by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over an extended period of time or upon declaration of opposition to principles of subversive movement. Latter may manifest itself in declarations by a subject in presence of confidential informants or other sources, statements to press, or actual contact with Bureau representatives and admission of previous subversive activity.

When sufficient information is at hand regarding subject's present sympathies to reach conclusion that he should no longer be scheduled for apprehension as a dangerous subversive, request authority to interview subject or advise Bureau of reasons why subject should not be interviewed. Bureau will not cancel security index card without consideration being given to interview of subject. See 87D 6b (7) (c) and (d).

If, upon interview, subject proves cooperative to extent that his security index card should be canceled, advise Bureau by letter of results, together with a recommendation for cancellation which must be approved by Bureau.

(g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection
As security index cases are reviewed upon reopening in field, there will be instances in which removal will be required by application of security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3). With passage of time, limits specified in criteria will operate to remove certain subjects even though there is no affirmative indication of defection.

[[When]recommending removal of a subject's name from security
[index,[consider]if facts in case warrant inclusion of subject's name in section A of reserve index.

[Follow procedures[set out hereafter for]those individuals not being recommended for inclusion in section A of reserve index:

I. When subjects are removed from security index solely on basis of application of security index criteria as cases are reopened and reviewed in field, retain security index cards pertaining to such subjects bearing descriptive matter on reverse sides; i.e., cards previously filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Destroy cards previously filed in alphabetical section. Those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards under provisions of 87D 7b (6) (b) I should retain but one card in each instance, destroying second geographical card as well as card previously filed in alphabetical section.

II. Mark canceled across face of each card being retained and file in the reserve index, section B.

III. Above instructions do not apply[to]individuals removed from security index based upon activity in Nation of Islam. Security index cards in such cases should be destroyed.

(h) Subjects of Chinese extraction

In any communication recommending cancellation of a security index card on a subject of Chinese extraction, such communication must contain the words "Other - Chinese." This regulation relates specifically to those subjects placed on security index following a recommendation submitted in accordance with instructions contained in section 87D 7b (4) (j) above.

(11) Priority apprehension program

(a) Purpose

Many individuals included in security index because of their training, violent tendencies, or prominence in subversive activity are extremely dangerous and would be more inclined to commit or capable of committing overt acts against U. S. in time of national emergency than would others in security index. Degree of dangerousness of such individuals is so pronounced that in interest of security they must be immobilized in least possible time prior to others in security index.

Individuals in security index tabbed priority I and[possibly] priority II would be arrested first in event of a limited but grave emergency, probably without arrest of other security index subjects.

In an all-out emergency,[secondary consideration for apprehension will be given to]all subjects whose names are[included in priority III of security index.]

Each individual case should stand on its own merits and decision to consider subjects for priority of apprehension should be based on subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendenceis.

(b) Subjects to be tabbed priority

I. Each security index subject should be considered for priority I tabbing who falls within one or more of following categories:

(A) All top functionaries

(B) All individuals considered to be hard core national and state basic revolutionary organization leaders and those leaders of other subversive organizations and unorganized groups and individuals who have indicated a propensity for violence and/or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, and/or guerrilla warfare. Examples of activities of individuals who should be included in this priority are as follows:

i. Activity as organizers or leaders in the organization

ii. Special training at Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow

iii. Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men, or active participation in violent strikes, riots, or demonstrations

iv. Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities

v. Persons active in Communist Party or other organization underground apparatus

vi. Any other security index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent, or disruptionist in event of an emergency

(C) Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

II. Security index subjects considered for priority II

(A) All individuals who are considered to be of second level leadership of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations and individuals who present a significant threat but are in less influential positions than those in priority I

III. All other individuals on security index will be tabbed priority III.

(c) Recommendations for and removal of priority designation

I. Approval of SAC
Designation of each subject as to priority or removal of any subject therefrom must be personally approved by SAC, or in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.

II. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending either tabbing for priority or deletion of such tabbing, attach an additional page setting out a brief summary of facts upon which recommendation is based.

(d) Administrative procedures for handling priority program
Take following action to assure that security index cards for subjects tabbed for priority of apprehension will be readily available for emergency action in your office:

I. Geographical section
Divide geographical section of security index into three distinct parts.

(A) Part I of geographical section shall include only security index cards for subjects who are tabbed priority I.

(B) Part II of geographical section shall contain security index cards for all subjects that are tabbed priority II.

(C) Part III of geographical section should contain security index cards for all subjects who are tabbed priority III.

(D) In offices having two separate and distinct geographical sections, i.e., geographical-employment and geographical-residence, as provided under 87D 7b (6) herein, each such geographical section must be broken into parts I, II, and III.

(E) Priority cards will be the following colors: priority I - beige, priority II - green, priority III - white.

II. Alphabetical section

(A) [Alphabetical section will be broken down into two groupings. First group will include priority I and priority II security index cards filed in strict alphabetical order. Second group will contain all priority III security index cards filed in strict alphabetical order.]

(B) Priority tabbings approved at Bureau will be shown on security index cards forwarded to field by code letters "P I," "P II," or "P III" in first line on cards.

(e) General

I. Tabbing of cards

The alphabetical security index cards on those individuals designated as "Pro-Cuban" should be tabbed with a metal tab.

II. Removal from priority I and priority II

Careful analysis must be made of each case in which deletion from priority I and priority II is proposed. For instance, when a subject is being removed from priority I or priority II tabbing, file review may well disclose that subject qualifies for priority tabbing for reasons covered in 87D 7b (11) (b).

c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

(1) Responsibility

FBI is responsible by Presidential directive for keeping other Federal agencies advised of developments within their jurisdiction affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated as vital to the national defense and welfare by the Department of Defense.

FBI is responsible under Delimitations Agreement for investigating employees of private contractors who have contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where credible subversive information concerning employee is obtained. Thorough investigation must be conducted and consideration for inclusion in security index given concerning any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in the past, a member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom sufficient other subversive information is in our possession which warrants such action.

(a) Requests for investigation from another agency

When another agency requests investigation of individual employed in key facility, institute investigation immediately if basis of request so warrants. Advise Bureau of request, basis thereof, and that investigation is being conducted.

(b) Verification of key facility status of place of employment

Department of Defense Key Facilities List (maintained in each office) must be checked for verification of information that a security investigation subject's place of employment may be included in such list.

(c) Individuals denied access to restricted information

Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently advise that an individual has been denied clearance to work in a defense plant or to handle classified or restricted information. In some instances clearance is denied based on information furnished by Bureau. At other times, information in Bureau files is very meager or possibly negative and basis for such denial of clearance is not known. The intelligence agency is responsible for furnishing Bureau with any information involving disloyalty or subversiveness.

Office receiving notification that an individual has been denied clearance must ascertain promptly basis for such denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of

agency responsible for such action. Forward such data to Bureau and include in next report submitted concerning individual in question. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau and there is no case on individual being denied clearance, give consideration to opening a security investigation if information received from intelligence agency warrants such action.

(2) Inclusion in security index

In recommending key facility employee for inclusion in security index, FD-122 is to contain:

(a) Key facility geographical reference number

(b) Abbreviation for agency having security responsibility. The Department of the Army has been designated agency having security responsibility for all key facilities.

(c) Abbreviations for other agencies known to have classified contracts with key facility. Interested agencies should be identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on security index cards returned from Bureau.

(d) [Recommendation that individual be designated as priority I security index subject]

If subject of existing security index card is found to have become employed in a key facility, FD-122 must be submitted to Bureau with above-required key facility data set forth thereon. Case is then to be handled in accordance with instructions set forth below concerning key facility cases.

(3) Dissemination

Upon receipt of original complaint or allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, a summary of complaint and information concerning individual should be furnished immediately by letter to interested intelligence agency. Intelligence agency should then be advised whether a security investigation is being conducted of individual and, if investigation is being conducted, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion of investigation. Letter to intelligence agency should clearly point out that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation by FBI.

In addition to disseminating to interested intelligence agencies information of a derogatory security nature developed concerning persons employed at facilities holding classified contracts, with exception of classified contracts with Atomic Energy Commission, such information should be furnished to Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, 43215, attention Chief, Adjudication Division. In each instance, advise interested intelligence agency that dissemination has been made to DISCO. This dissemination is to include derogatory security information developed concerning persons who may not be currently employed at such a facility but who are known to be holders of an industrial security clearance.

These instructions do not apply to allegations of espionage or those of such a confidential character as would not ordinarily be disseminated. Such information appearing to be of immediate interest to other intelligence agencies should be submitted to Bureau by most expeditious means, depending upon circumstances, with a request that Bureau consider advisability of disseminating it.

Disseminate copies of each report to local representative of agency having security responsibility, as well as to local representative of other intelligence agencies known to have

classified contracts with the key facility. Copies of reports for the Marine Corps should be disseminated locally to NISO.

Dissemination to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), the Research and Development Board (RDB), and the Maritime Administration (MA) will be made at the Bureau, and not in the field.

(4) Status of cases

After all active investigation conducted, place in a[pending-inactive]status. Forty-five days before report due, make case pending active and check with armed services representative at the key facility or with other reliable sources to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

[(Also see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 4D, item 2a, (6), and section 4M, item 4, for instructions concerning synopses and classification of reports in key facility cases.)]

d. Top functionary program

(1) General

Purpose of top functionary program is to select for special attention those individuals in a subversive movement who are of outstanding importance to the effectiveness of the movement.

Top functionary program is described below as pertaining to the Communist Party, USA. However, it also applies to important individuals active in or on behalf of other basic revolutionary groups, subversive organizations, or unorganized groups who have indicated a propensity for violence.

(2) Definition of top functionary

A top functionary is an individual, either a member or a nonmember of the Communist Party, to whom, because of his importance, it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention in order to keep abreast of communism on a national basis in the U. S. Necessarily, such an individual would be on a high policy level in the movement. This also applies to an individual, either a member or a nonmember of other subversive organizations or unorganized groups, who would be on a high policy level in the movement.

The term "top functionary" is not to be construed as requiring that individuals in this category must actually hold official positions in the organizations but shall be given a broad enough construction to include others who are of equal importance because of their influence in the movement itself, or their position and activities outside the party in labor, front, or similar organizations or movements. Black nationalist extremists whose importance justifies continuous investigative attention should be considered for designation as top functionaries.

(3) Manner of designation of top functionary

Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate a subject as a top functionary. Submit such recommendation to Bureau by letter containing reasons for the recommendation. Bureau desires to be very selective in this matter and to concentrate on individuals who, on a national basis, are the guiding hands in the communist movement and other subversive movements. Top functionaries are to be included in priority I and reports are to be submitted in accordance with 87D 7f (2).

When the subject of such an investigation is presently in the security index, a letter must be directed to the Bureau at the time the report is submitted advising that the subject is in the security index.

Information of interest to FBI and/or AEC obtained subsequent to completion of Atomic Energy Act - applicant investigations concerning AEC employees or persons having access to restricted data should be handled according to instructions in section 20, volume II, of this manual.

f. [Submission of and general rules concerning security reports]

(1) General

[Submission of summary reports should not be delayed for the purpose of conducting current investigation in previously closed cases, but appropriate leads should be set out.]

Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened or placed in a pending status for purpose of preparing investigative reports in accordance with schedule outlined in 87D 7f (2) and (7).

Office indices and any material channelized to case file since most recent report should be reviewed and case brought up to date by appropriate investigation to determine subject's current activities.

Each time that a case is reopened and brought up to date, it should be critically analyzed in light of security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3) herein. This procedure must be followed on a continuing basis for each security index subject.

(2) Schedule of submission of reports

Reports shall be submitted on individuals designated for priority as follows:

- (a) Priority I - annually
  (top functionaries - annually)
- (b) Priority II - annually
- (c) Priority III -[initial report recommending individual for priority III of the security index must be a summary-type investigative report. Once individual is approved for priority III, subsequent information may be furnished by letterhead memorandum with no investigative report being required.

  Each field office will be responsible, however, to insure that all pertinent developments regarding priority III subjects are furnished to Bureau.]

(3) Origin

Office of origin will be that office covering territory in which subject's subversive activities occur. In most instances this will also be office in which territory subject resides and is employed. In those cases in which subject's subversive activities take place in territory of an office other than office covering place of residence and/or employment, office of origin shall be that office which can best cover subversive activities of subject.

(4) Classification

- (a) 100 - for individuals affiliated with basic revolutionary and front organizations of Marxian ideology
- (b) 105 - for members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups or others having nationalistic tendencies of a non-Marxist character
- (c) 157 - Nation of Islam and other black nationalist matters

(5) Title

Only one subject shall be carried in title of each report. Separate reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of their relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

(6) Character

(a) Top functionaries
Internal Security (or Racial Matters if subject is a black nationalist) - followed by letters designating organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies. Examples:

Internal Security - C
Internal Security - SWP
Racial Matters - NOI

(b) Others
Security Matter - followed by letters designating organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies. Examples:

Security Matter - C
Security Matter - SWP
Security Matter - X (native fascist)
Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a top functionary, character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in first[communication]following deletion and all subsequent [communications.] When a security matter subject is designated a top functionary, first report after designation and all subsequent reports shall bear internal security character. Communications regarding subjects who are employed in key facilities should bear words "Key Facility" in character. Communications regarding subjects who are members of Communist Party, USA, National Committee should bear words "National Committee" in character. Black nationalist investigations and racial matters should be given character set out in section 122, volume IV, of this manual.

(7) Status
All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, status shall be as follows:

(a) Top functionaries
I. Pending inactive
(A) Reports are to be submitted annually. Forty-five days prior to date a report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for preparation of report so that report can be submitted at designated time.

(b) Key facility cases
Key facility cases are to be maintained in pending-inactive status. (See 87D 7c (4).)

(c) Other security index subjects
I. Closed
(A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of a periodic investigative report according to priority designation[for priority I and priority II.] If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter (form FD-400) to Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed. Cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to date periodic report is due.

[(B) Each priority III security index case must be opened for verification of residence and employment on an annual basis. In connection with this verification, case file must be thoroughly reviewed for any necessary action including a reevaluation of subject's status. This will include removal from priority III or possible redesignation as a priority I or priority II security index subject.

Where necessary, pertinent information may be submitted to Bureau or other field offices through preparation of a letterhead memorandum. When pertinent information is submitted to Bureau for dissemination to interested agencies of executive branch of U. S. Government, forms FD-305 and FD-376 should accompany cover communication transmitting letterhead memorandum. (Refer to 87D 7a (3) (a) IV (D) for instructions regarding change of office of origin.)]

(d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index
  I. Pending inactive
    (A) If all active investigation completed at time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau
    (B) Set forth lead to follow Bureau for security index card and if approved for dissemination of report to Secret Service.
  II. Closed
    (A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau and dissemination to Secret Service
    (B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (c) above.

(e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein
  I. Closed
    (A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(8) Content
(a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.
  I. Background
    (A) Birth date
    (B) Citizenship status
    (C) Education
    (D) Marital status
    (E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
    (F) Identification record
    (G) Employment
    (H) Residence
    (I) Status of health (if known)
  II. Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front groups, black nationalist extremist groups, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups
    (A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.
    (B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

(j) In connection with periodic reports in security index cases, there are instances in which evidence of extensive activity in subversive organizations will be developed. In these cases it is permissible to report such information in narrative-type statements without indicating exact dates of activity; however, period of time involved must be shown, as well as inclusive dates of informant reports.

This type reporting is not to be utilized in Smith Act of 1940 cases or Internal Security Act of 1950 cases. Narrative statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions and information from each source must be reported in separate narrative statements.

(k) Above instructions in no way remove responsibility for reporting all items of pertinence to Bureau, bearing in mind fact that Bureau files must be complete insofar as matters of substance are concerned, nor is responsibility removed for reporting in detail of information tending to establish a subject's knowledge of basic aims and purposes of subversive organizations with which affiliated or information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

In documentation of narrative statements, set forth location of original documents in field office files by file number and serial scope.

(9) Administrative data

(a) General

All references to following items, all administrative in nature, should be contained in cover pages accompanying reports:

I. Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), forms FD-122 and FD-128, and Bureau instructions for handling cases or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature.

II. Whenever reports relating to security index subjects contain data affecting material included on subject's existing security index card, cover pages accompanying report shall include as last page form FD-305, appropriately checked, which form contains items pertaining to following:

(A) That subject's name is included in security index or agitator index
(B) That data appearing on security index card or agitator index card is current
(C) That FD-122 or FD-397 has been submitted to Bureau where security index card or agitator index card changes are necessary
(D) That a suitable photograph is or is not available and date photograph was taken
(E) That subject is employed in a key facility and agency charged with security responsibility is specified and that agencies interested in that facility are specified
(F) Reason for classifying report
(G) Dates subject was previously interviewed and reason for not reinterviewing subject
(H) That subject no longer meets security index or agitator index criteria and a letter has been directed to Bureau recommending cancellation
(I) That subject's case has been reevaluated and reasons are set forth as to why subject's activities continue to fall within security index or agitator index criteria
(J) That subject's security index card is designated priority I, priority II, or[priority III]and reasons why subject's activities warrant such designation

III. Form[FD-305 appropriately completed is also to be attached to cover communication submitting letterhead memorandum in priority III security index cases.]

(b) Documentation of reports

I. [Complete documentation of all reports is required. This also applies to succinct letterhead memoranda submitted in priority III security index cases and other similar letterhead memoranda where necessary. In this regard, see 87D 7a (3) (a) IV D.]

II. If information necessary for complete documentation is not available in subject's case file, necessary review of other office files should be made. If not obtainable, this fact must be indicated in cover page(s) accompanying report to Bureau.

III. Extensive investigation should not be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have in past furnished background information or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed that subject, according to reliable records, such as birth records, school records, or records of Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in report. Further verification will not be necessary.

IV. During preparation of summary reports, it is often found that information being included in a report was originally obtained by another office and all of necessary information for complete documentation will not be in possession of office preparing report. In such an instance, if office preparing report is in possession of photostats of documents obtained by other offices and identity

In case of individual subject of prior investigation who is currently being recommended for security index, do not disseminate prior reports. However, prepare a letterhead memorandum including pertinent information previously developed which should be disseminated to Secret Service, together with current report. Copies of this letterhead memorandum should be forwarded to Bureau for dissemination at headquarters level.

[FD-376 should also accompany succinct letterhead memoranda submitted in priority III security index cases.]

After initial dissemination to Secret Service in security index cases, as changes occur in status of individuals involved with respect to residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally and furnish two copies of letterhead memorandum to Bureau for dissemination at SOG. Form FD-366 may be used for this purpose. Letterhead memorandum should contain a reference to previous communication disseminated to Secret Service.

When reporting changes in residence and/or employment concerning Chinese and Cuban aliens on security index, in addition to dissemination to Secret Service, also advise Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) locally, and furnish four copies of letterhead memorandum to Bureau for dissemination at SOG. Bear in mind in filling out reference that some letterhead memoranda have been expressly prepared for dissemination to Secret Service only and have not been furnished to Department or INS; therefore, copy furnished INS locally and two of copies furnished Bureau should reference last communication to INS.

For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in other than security index cases, refer to section 134B, volume IV, of this manual.

Upon transfer of office of origin in one of these cases, old office of origin is to furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address and advise Bureau that such has been done by submission of two copies of letterhead memorandum disseminated locally. New office of origin need take no action regarding dissemination to Secret Service until such time as further changes occur with respect to subject's status or until preparation of next periodic report in case.

(10) Dissemination at Bureau

There are some situations in which dissemination is made at Bureau instead of in field. In majority of instances, information received by FBI should properly be furnished immediately to some other agency within executive branch of Government so that responsibilities of other agency might be fulfilled properly. Care must be taken, however, not to disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where such a procedure is deemed inadvisable because of inadequacy of security measures in that branch. In these instances data should be brought to immediate attention of Bureau for dissemination at SOG. An example of latter is, of course, Atomic Energy Commission, which receives reports only through Bureau, as noted in section 87D 7c (3) of this manual. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including State Department, only at SOG, as set out in 87D 6b (4). Dissemination is also made at SOG to State Department, unless it appears undesirable, in those cases in which subjects have been indicted for violations grounded on subversive activities.

Dissemination in these cases is made to preclude these subjects from utilizing the fact they obtained a passport to refute allegations of subversive connections. The State Department, therefore, will be in possession of data concerning a defendant should he attempt to utilize this tactic in such an action.

b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction

(1) Members of the armed forces

The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the armed forces intelligence agencies states that the responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest.

Thus, in discharging our basic responsibilities in the internal security field, it is imperative that information concerning members of the military services be referred immediately to the appropriate branch having primary responsibility for its personnel. This procedure is mandatory, even though the security aspects of the data have not been fully resolved or verified. It should be specifically pointed out in such instances that the information has not been verified.

Section 87D 5b of this manual instructs that if it is determined a security subject is a member of the armed services the investigation must at that point be discontinued immediately and reported to the Bureau. The basis for such instruction lies in the fact that the subject is no longer within our investigative jurisdiction. In addition, dissemination of pertinent reports must be made locally in the field to the appropriate intelligence agency.

Our responsibility with regard to military personnel is not confined to those who have been the subjects of security investigations. It extends to any subversive derogatory data developed against a member of the armed services during any of our investigations of either individuals or organizations. For instance, if it is determined that a member of the armed forces has been in contact with a security subject or with any individual or group raising security implications, the appropriate intelligence service should be immediately advised locally. This should be done even though the security aspects of the contact have not been resolved, so that the military services may be in a position to discharge their responsibilities. It must be pointed out to them specifically in such instances that the data are unverified, and pertinent developments must be transmitted to them thereafter immediately upon receipt.

Section 87D 6b (1) (h) provides that during the course of security investigations it must be determined whether the subjects have any close relatives in the armed forces. Our responsibilities require that such associations be called to the attention of the appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on the security subjects involved. The evaluation of these associations lies entirely within the province of the intelligence services, but for the reasons stated previously herein it is incumbent upon the Bureau to disseminate this information immediately upon receipt.

Any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel must be set out in a letter to the Bureau, together with a statement as to the local dissemination made in the field. Such letter should be accompanied by a letterhead memorandum setting out with particularity the subversive data in a form entirely suitable for dissemination.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Abstract slips, 47,58
- Addresses, verification of (See verification of addresses.)
- Administrative
  - data, 77
  - tickler, 55,56,73
- Admissible evidence, 29,37
- Agitator index, 33,78
- Agreement between FBI and Secret Service, 81
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
  - Chinese, 48,62,81a
  - Cuban, 45a,45b,81a
  - dissemination of information concerning, 80,81a
  - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Appearance and content of
  - reserve index cards, 43
  - security index cards, 48
- Applicant investigations, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Armed forces
  - dissemination to, 82
  - members of, 25
  - record in, 27
  - relatives in, 27
  - subjects entering, 56,60
  - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of
  - reserve index, 42b
  - security index, 50
    - alphabetical section, 51,63
    - at Bureau, 50
    - geographical section, 51,63
    - in field office, 51
    - inactive section, 56
    - special section, 52 (See also special section of security index.)
    - unavailable section, 53 (See also unavailable section of security index.)
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71
- Black nationalist cases
  - character of case, 73
  - classification, 72
  - definitions, 19
  - reports
    - anarchist beliefs, 46a
    - content, 74
  - security index, 43,49
  - top functionary, 66
- Bureau
  - applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
  - authority to investigate individuals, 24
  - responsibility, 19,64
- Cancellation of
  - security flash notice, 27a
  - security index cards, 60,62
    - after induction into armed forces, 60
    - mechanics, 60
    - on departure from U. S., 60
    - only after interview, 38
    - recommending, 42,61
    - security informant, 60
    - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 73
- Changes on
  - reserve index cards, section A, 42c
  - security index cards, 58,78
- Channelizing, 24,34,36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
  - top functionaries, 67,73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
  - aliens, changes in residence or employment, dissemination to Secret Service and INS, 81a
  - extraction, 48,62
  - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Color of security index cards, 63
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants (See security informants.)

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Contacting
  faculty members, 25
  informants, 34,73
  registrars, 25
  students, 25
  superiors of faculty members, 25
Contacts
  during investigation, 25
  of foreign establishments, 25
Content
  and appearance
    of reserve index cards, 43
    of security index cards, 48
  of reports, 74
Corroboration, 37
Cover pages, 77,78
Criteria for inclusion in security index, 44a,45
Cuban
  activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  aliens, 45a,45b,81a
  contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a
  pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  special section, 49,53
  tabbing cards, 45b,64

Dangerousness
  definition of, 44
  determination of, 44
  Nation of Islam membership, 46
Death of security index subject, 60
Defected subjects, 42
Defectors to Sino-Soviet-bloc countries, 57
Defense
  Industrial Security Clearance Office, 65,81
  Supply Agency, 65,81
Definitions, 19
  of dangerousness, 44
  of top functionaries, 66
Delimitations Agreement, 64,82
Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
Determination of
  dangerousness, 44
  membership and position in labor organizations, 29
Disaffection of U. S. citizens abroad, 57

Dissemination
  concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 82
  of letterhead memoranda, 33a,42c, 58a,74,81,81a
  of reports
    at SOG, 81a
    in field, 79
    on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
  to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, 65,81
  to Immigration and Naturalization Service, 80,81a
  to Secret Service, 81,81a
    addresses
      business, change in, 58a
      residence, change in, 58a
    closing case, 47,74
    letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
    reports, 47,74,81,81a
    stamping reserve index cards, 43
Documentation of
  letterhead memorandum, 42c,58a,78
  reports, 78
    completion of, 78

Employees of
  international organizations, 25
  U. S. Government, 25,70
    dissemination of data re, 80
Employment, verification of (See verification of.)
Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
Evidence, 37
  desirability of
    admissibility, 29,37
    corroboration, 37
  of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  of membership or affiliation, 29
  preservation of, 37
Executive Order 10450, 80,81

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Faculty members
  contact with, 25
  investigation of, 24
Fifth amendment, 46
File on defected subjects, 42
File reviews, 34
Flash notices (security)
  cancellation of, 27a
  notation concerning, on FD-128, 58a
  placing, 27
Foreign
  diplomats, 25
  establishments, 25
  intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
  tours, 33a,57
  travel, 33,54,57
Forms
  FD-122, 28,34,48,49,53 to 58,67,74,78
    abstracts for, 47
    changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    cover letter thereto, 32
    Cuban subjects, 45b
    key facility employee, 65
    placing name in or removing from special section of security index, 53
      unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    priority tabbing or removal of such tabbing, 63
    recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    reference to, 77
    succinct summary with, 47
      Cuban subjects, 45b
  FD-128, 42c,55,57 to 60,67
    reference to, 77
    when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    when subject moves, 58,58a,59
  FD-154, 57,58
  FD-165, 27,77
  FD-186, 50
  FD-305, 73,74,78
  FD-306, 36
  FD-336, 39
  FD-366, 57,81a
  FD-376, 74,81,81a
  FD-397, 78
  FD-400, 73
Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22

Geographical
  reference number of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  section of security index, 51,63
Government employees, 25,70,80

Handwriting, 29
  of top functionaries, 67
Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41
Husband and wife, security investigations, 72

Identification record, 27
Immigration and Naturalization Service, dissemination to, 80,81a
Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,57,60
Inactive section of security index, 56
Indices, check of, 34,72
Individuals
  to be investigated, 22
  traveling abroad, 33
    against whom stops are placed, 34
    disaffection for U. S., 57
    verification of addresses, 57
    who are included in security index, 34
    who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  with foreign diplomatic status, 26
Industrial security clearances, dissemination re, 65,81

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Informants (See security informants.)
- Interviews
  - Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  - Bureau authority, 39,40a
  - conditions for, 40
    - conducting at place of employment, 40a
  - content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  - contents of letter containing results of, 42
  - determine willingness to testify during, 41
  - discontinuing, 40a,41
  - evaluation of, 45b
  - forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  - of hostile subjects, 41
  - of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 24,25
  - of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  - of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  - of security index subjects, 38
  - of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  - of subjects who express desire for, 42
  - on SAC authority, 38
  - preparations for, 40
  - purpose of, 38
  - recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  - reinterviews, 42
  - report
    - needed after, 41
    - not necessary
      - afterward, 40a
      - when requesting Bureau permission, 39
  - results not affecting security index status, 41
  - signed statements in connection with, 41
  - to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  - with Bureau authority, 39
- Investigations
  - aliens, 26,80 (See also aliens.)
  - faculty members, 24
  - members of labor unions, 29,39,41
  - naturalized citizens, 26,80
  - purpose, 19
  - restrictions on, 24
  - scope of, 26
  - students, 24
- Investigative
  - procedures, 26
  - techniques, 34
    - file reviews, 34
    - photographic surveillances, 35,37
    - physical surveillances, 35,37,38
    - private firms, records, 36
    - public source information, 36
    - security informants, 34

- Key facilities, 64
  - character, 73
  - Delimitations Agreement, 64
  - employees
    - considered for priority I, 63
    - included in security index, 65
  - list, 49,64
  - responsibility, 64
    - agency having security, 49,58,58a,65
  - status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,73
  - when to investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

- Labor union membership, 29
- Labor unions, 29,39,41
- Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Letterhead memorandum, 33,33a,41,42c, 57,58,58a,60,72,74,78, 81,81a, 82
- Letters in lieu of reports, security index cases, 73
- List
  - key facilities, 49, 64
  - top functionaries, 67
- Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Lumping information in reports, 76

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Members of
  armed forces, 25
    dissemination of information concerning, 82
  labor unions, 29,39,41
  law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
Membership or affiliation, 29
  concealment of, 31
Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  unavailable section of security index, 32,54
Movement of subjects, 58a
  not in security index, 60
  security index subjects, 58a
  tabbed for priority, 60
  top functionaries, 59,67

Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
Nation of Islam
  abbreviation for organizational affiliation, 49
  character, 73
  classification, 72
  members to be investigated, 23
  potential dangerousness, 46
  removal of cards from security index, 62
National
  Committee, CPUSA, character, 73
  Defense Education Act of 1958, 22
  Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
  Science Foundation Act of 1950, 22
Naturalized citizens
  dissemination of information concerning, 80
  investigations of, 26
Negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 73
New office of origin, 58a,59,60,67,81a

Observation of subject, 28,50,57
Office of origin, 27a,42c,58,58a,59,67,72,81,81a
Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
Overt acts, 45

Personal observation of subject, 28,50,57
Photographic surveillances, 35,37
Photographs, 28,78
  of top functionaries, 28,67
  status of security index cases while obtaining, 28
  to Secret Service, 28,67
Physical
  condition, 61,74
  description, 28
  surveillances, 35,37
    maintenance of SA's notes, 38
Position
  and importance, 30
  in labor organizations, 29
Potential dangerousness, 44
  of Nation of Islam members, 46
Preservation of evidence, 37
Pretext, 32,37,39,56,57

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Priority apprehension program, 62,77
  administrative procedures, 63
  priority designations, 41,49,53,58, 60,62,63,74
    I, 49,57,58,58a,62,63,64,65,66, 67,72,73,74,78
    II, 49,58,58a,62,63,64,72,73,74,78
    III, 49,58,58a,62,63,72,74,78,81a
    changes in, 58,63
    color of cards, 63
    justification for, 47
    recommendation for, 63
    removal of, 63,64
    reports, schedule of, 72
    who to be tabbed, 62,63
  purpose, 62
Private records, 36
Public
  Law 87-835, 22
  source information, 36
  utility employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Purpose of
  interviews, 38
  investigation, 19
  priority apprehension program, 62
  reserve index, 42a
  security index, 43

Receipt of information of subversive activities, 25
Recommendation for inclusion in security index, 46a,47,63,72
  Cuban activity, 45a,45b
  key facility employee, 65
  status, 74
  when subject has Chinese sympathy, 48
  when subject is of Chinese extraction, 48
  when subject is out of country, 34,48
  when there is missing background information, 47
Reevaluation of security index status, 46,57,72, 74,78
Registrars, contacting, 25
Reinterviews, 42
Relatives in armed forces, 27
Removal from
  reserve index, 42b,43
  security index, 42b,46a,60, 61,63
    priority I, 64
    priority II, 64
Reports
  administrative data in, 77
  character of, 73
    top functionaries, 67,73
  content of, 74
  cumulative items, 76
  dissemination of, 79 (See also dissemination.)
  documentation of, 78
  lumping information in, 76
  narrative-type statements, 77
  negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 73
  schedule of, 72,73
  status of, 73
  summarizing information in, 76,77
  summary, 21,47,59,71,76
  title of, 72
  topical headings in, 74
  when necessary after interview, 41
  when not necessary after interview, 40a
Reserve index, 42a
  arrangement, 42b
  cards
    changes on, 42c
    content and appearance, 43
    number prepared, 42b
    stamping, 43
  content, 43
  flash notice, 27
  inclusion of names in, 42b
  names deleted from security index, 42b,61,62
  purpose, 42a
  reference to on cover page, 77
  removal from, 42b,43
  section A
    changes, 42c
    individuals to be included, 42b,61
    interviews of subjects of, 39
  section B, 42c
    security index cards placed in, 62
  standards for, 42a

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

- Reserve index (continued)
  - subjects
    - applicant investigations, 70
    - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
    - security of Government employees investigations, 70
    - travel abroad, 33
- Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
- Responsibility of Bureau, 19,64
- Restrictions on investigations, 24
- Schedule of reports, 72,73
- Scope of investigation, 26
- Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Secret Service, dissemination to, 81,81a
  - addresses
    - business, change in, 58a
    - residence, change in, 58a
  - closing case, 47,74
  - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
  - photographs to, 28,67
  - reports to, 47,74,81,81a
  - reserve index cards, stamping, 43
- Security
  - flash notice
    - cancellation of, 27a
    - notation concerning on FD-128, 58a
    - placing, 27
  - index, 43
    - arrangement of, 50 (See also arrangement of security index.)
    - cards
      - cancellation of, 38,42,60,61,62
      - changes on, 58,78
      - color of, 63
      - content and appearance of, 48
      - of top functionaries, 67
      - tabbing, 45b,53,60,62,63,64,67
      - transfers to reserve index, 42b, 61,62
- Security (continued)
  - index (continued)
    - criteria for, 44a,45
    - Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53, 64,81a
    - dangerousness, 44
    - dissemination to
      - Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81a
      - Secret Service, 81,81a
        - letterhead memoranda, 57,81, 81a
        - photographs, 28,67
        - reports, 47,74,81,81a
    - purpose, 43
    - recommendation for, 34,45a,45b, 46a,47,48,63,65,72,74
    - reevaluation of status, 46,57,72, 74,78
    - reference to on cover page, 77
    - removal from, 42b,46a,60,61,63
    - priority I or II, 64
    - subjects of
      - applicant investigations, 70
      - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
      - movement of (See movement of subjects.)
      - security of Government employees investigations, 70
      - travel abroad, 33
    - summary reports, 21,47,59,71,76
    - verification of addresses and employment, 32,54,57, 58,58a,73,74,81a
  - informants, 34
    - cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
    - contacting, 34,73
  - of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Signed statements, 41
- Sino-Soviet bloc, 44a,57
- Sleepers, 31,33,52
- Special section of security index, 52
  - cards, 49,52,53,56
  - Cuban, 49,53
  - exception to unavailable section, 56
- Standards for reserve index, 42a
  - section A, 42b

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Status of cases, 73
  on security index subjects employed in key facilities, 66,73
  on subjects in security index, 73,74
  on subjects recommended for security index, 74
  on top functionaries, 59,73
  while obtaining photographs, 28
  while securing handwriting, 29
  while verifying residence and employment, 58,73,74
Students
  contacts with, 25
  investigations of, 24
Summarizing information in reports, 76,77
Summary reports, 21,47,59,71,76
Superiors of faculty members, 25
Surveillances
  photographic, 35,37
  physical, 35,37,38

Tabbing SI cards, 45b,53,60,62,63, 64,67
Thumbnail sketches, 79
Title of reports, 72
Top functionaries, 66,67
  change of office of origin, 67
  character, 67,73
  definition of, 66
  deletion of, 67
  designation of, 66,67
  handling of, 67
  handwriting of, 67
  list, 67
  movement of, 59,67
  photographs of, 28,67
  priority I, 62,66,67,72
  program, 66
  regulations governing, 67
  reports on, 59,66,67,72,77
    status of, 73
  tabbing for priority, 62,63,66,67
Topical headings in reports, 74
Tours, 33a,57
Travel
  abroad, 33,54,57
  behind iron curtain, 34

Unavailable section of security index, 53
  imprisoned subjects, 54
  missing subjects, 32,54
  subjects traveling abroad, 34,54
Underground membership or activity, 31
United Nations employees, 25,52
U. S. Government employees, 25,70,80
U. S. Information Agency, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70

Verification of
  addresses, security index, 32,54, 57,58,58a,73,74,81a
  employment, security index, 32,54,57,58,58a,73,74,81a
  key facility status of place of employment, 64
Voice of America (See U. S. Information Agency.)

Wife and husband, security investigations, 72

Yugoslav intelligence agents, contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a

out the full extent of the communist influence in racial matters. They should separate words and intentions from actions; mere participation from direct influence; and the bona fide communist from the mere "do-gooder." They should not include information concerning legitimate efforts in the racial movement where there is no communist taint.

b. Information should be reported according to the following outline. All main headings denoted by Roman numerals must be accounted for. If there is no information to report under a particular main heading, the heading should appear, followed by a statement "No information developed."

I. COMMUNIST STRATEGY

(A) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

(1) Plans, strategy, party line, and the like made at national meetings, including expressions by national and other functionaries

(2) Plans, etc., made at district and lower level meetings, including expressions by local leaders and rank-and-file members

(3) Plans, etc., as revealed in party publications and other propaganda media, such as written directives, press releases, and the like

Information under item 3 should be reported by the office covering the origin of the publications, such as the New York Office for ["The Daily World,"] "Political Affairs," and directives from party headquarters; San Francisco Office for "People's World"; etc. Party expressions, oral or written, when directly related to a specific event covered under II, should be included under II.

(B) OTHER COMMUNIST GROUPS (Such as Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor Party, Workers World Party, and the like)

Under (B), report information under separate numbered subheadings for each organization. Report here information generally along the same lines as for (A) above.

II. COMMUNIST TACTICS

In this part report information on communist direction and influence of and participation in racial demonstrations, disturbances, drives, boycotts, and any other similar activities with racial overtones. This part will illustrate how communist activities attempt to exploit racial situations and expand communist influence, thus furthering communist objectives. List activities in chronological order with lettered subheadings, such as:

(A) DEMONSTRATION, CLEVELAND, OHIO, [1-10-68]

(B) STORE BOYCOTT, YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO, [3-6-68]

Under each subheading include such information as nature of event; sponsoring and participating groups; total participants; number and identities of subversives involved; specifics as to whether subversives directed, controlled, instigated, or merely participated; whether violence resulted and, if so, whether subversives involved; arrests of subversives and court disposition; and any other information believed pertinent to the overall picture of communist influence. Efforts by supporting groups to avoid communist involvement should also be reported. If a particular event had no communist involvement, it should, of course, not be included in the report.

4. Annual Communist Party, USA, organizational and membership survey
Each office is instructed to initiate by February 1 of each year a detailed and analytical survey of the organization and membership of the Communist Party in its territory, results to be forwarded to the Bureau by April 1. Set forth in detail the complete organizational structure of each Communist Party district or state organization including district and county committees, together with the identities of officers from the club through the district level. Identify each Communist Party club and section in the district, together with the identities of individual club members and most recent date each member was so identified. Where identification of an individual is tentative, this fact should be indicated by placing the word "tentative" after the individual's name. Note the informant coverage in each club, as well as on district and county committees, by setting forth the symbol numbers of the informants. In those instances in which no informant coverage exists in a particular club or on a district or county committee, this fact should be noted. In addition, summarize the overall findings by setting forth the estimated Communist Party membership in the field office territory, together with the number of members who have been positively and tentatively identified as such within the immediately preceding 12-month period. Charts and maps should be used in setting forth the geographic distribution of the Communist Party whenever feasible. Offices which are auxiliary offices in investigation of a Communist Party district should furnish the required information to the office of origin for inclusion in its survey by March 15 of each year.

Following the organizational breakdown, each office should critically appraise its knowledge of the Communist Party organization within its division and set forth its comments and recommendations concerning investigative activity to be undertaken to eliminate any weaknesses detected. In those instances in which the disclosed weakness is that of lack of adequate informant coverage, advise in detail of the number of Bureau-approved potential security informants being developed in the particular area, as well as concrete plans to obtain additional informant coverage in the future.

Each survey should contain a statement that all persons identified as members of the Communist Party are listed in the security index, or are informants or sources. Any exceptions should be named and a statement made as to whether the name has previously been furnished to the Bureau for indexing. The status of the investigation of each person listed should be shown.

5. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C (code name "CIRM"). Bufile 100-442529. Office of origin: New York.
   a. Quarterly reports (to reach the Bureau by February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1) should be submitted by each field office for the purpose of reporting, in a centralized manner, all available information bearing upon the communist influence in racial matters. Included should be information developed under the title of a variety of matters, such as CPUSA, Negro question, communist influence in racial matters; communist infiltration of various organizations, such as the Congress of Racial Equality, Student[National]Coordinating Committee, and the like; investigations of subversive individuals active in the racial movement; investigations of communist fronts and other miscellaneous organizations; and racial disturbances and other racial matters investigated under the racial matter character. Information should be included in these quarterly reports, notwithstanding the fact that it will duplicate reporting in the other substantive matters referred to above. These reports shall be designed to precisely spell

III.	Sex	
	Male	M
	Female	F
IV.	Citizenship	
	Native born	NB
	Naturalized	NA
	Alien	AL
	(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)	
V.	Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency	
	American Socialist Clubs	ASC
	American Workers' Communist Party	AWC
	Anarchist	ANA
	Black Nationalist	BNT
	Communist Party, USA	COM
	Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
	Minutemen	MIN
	Nation of Islam	NOI
	Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
	Progressive Labor Party	PLP
	Proletarian Party of America	PPA
	Revolutionary Action Movement	RAM
	Socialist Workers Party	SWP
	Spartacist League	SPL
	Student[National]Coordinating Committee	SNC
	Students for a Democratic Society	SDS
	Workers World Party	WWP
	Bulgarian	BUL
	Cuban	CUB
	Czechoslovakian	CZE
	Hungarian	HUN
	Romanian	ROM
	Russian	RUS
	Yugoslavian	YUG
VI.	Priority designation	
	Priority I	P I
	Priority II	P II
	Priority III	P III
VII.	Top functionary designation (where applicable)	
	Top functionary	TF
VIII.	Special section cards	
	Atomic energy program employees	AEP
	Cuban special section	CUB
	Espionage subjects	ESP
	Foreign government employees	FGE
	Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
	United Nations employees	UNE
	U. S. Government employees	GOV
IX.	Unavailable section cards	
	Missing	MI
	Out of country	OC
	Imprisoned	PR
X.	Date and place of birth	
XI.	Key facility geographical reference number obtained from the Department of Defense Key Facilities List and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility (where applicable)	
XII.	Residence address	

XIII. Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.

XIV. Field office file number

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the securi index card being filed in the geographical, speci or unavailable sections. Data will not be attach the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be aug by other data required.

(A) Complete description

(B) Notation that security index flash notice ha submitted for posting in Identification Divi

(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. T photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.

(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, includi notation if subject possesses firearms

(E) Other data which will assist in effecting app hension of subject, such as directions to re [illegible] ce or employment, where subject not situated i [illegible] l locations, listing of number of minor childr and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case mu be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record informati [illegible] t a security index subject has been physically [illegible] rved. Descriptive data developed during observat [illegible] the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posti.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire secur [illegible] index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The [illegible] 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become nece for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedur makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the ~~true~~ names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative pur [illegible] es.

The Communist Party, USA, is divided into district and state organizations, then into county, city, section, and club organizations. The number and nature of these subdivisions are dependent on the number of members in the various localities. Every party member must belong to a party club.

The Communist Party strategy and policy is based primarily on the loyal support and defense of the Soviet Union. The party line changes from time to time depending upon the current program of the international communist movement.

b. Socialist Workers Party

The Socialist Workers Party was founded at a convention held in Chicago, Illinois, from 12-31-37 to 1-3-38. The following statements are taken from the "Declaration of Principles and Constitution of the Socialist Workers Party" which was adopted at this convention:

"The purpose of the party is set forth in its declaration of principles: Its purpose shall be to educate and organize the working class for the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a workers government to achieve Socialism." (From article 11 under the caption "Purpose.")

"We call upon all revolutionary militants to join with us to build the SWP into the mass revolutionary party which will lead the working class of the United States to power; and which, together with the revolutionists of all countries united in the Fourth International, will achieve the victory of the international revolution and of world Socialism."

"The main specific task of the SWP is the mobilization of the American masses for struggle against American Capitalism, and for its overthrow...." (Part III of above pamphlet.)

Shortly after the Fourth International was founded in Switzerland on 9-3-38, the Socialist Workers Party in the U. S. announced that it was the "American Section" of the "world party of the Socialist revolution" (Fourth International). At a special convention on 12-21-40, the Socialist Workers Party passed a resolution ending its organizational connection with the Fourth International (because of the passage of the Voorhis Act).

This organization follows the Marxist-Leninist-Trotskyist line. Statements made by functionaries indicate that in the event of war between the U. S. and the Soviet Union, the Socialist Workers Party would defend the latter.

c. Deleted

with any additi[illegible] information contained in the [illegible]reau's files.

6. The names of subscribers to Communist Party nominating petitions
[and the names appearing on subscription lists of[the Communist Party,
[USA,publications]and publications and organs of the organizations set forth in 1 a, b, c, and d must be indexed in the field office covering the address shown for the subscriber and should not be forwarded to the Bureau for indexing. Mailing lists as such which cannot be identified as membership lists of subversive organizations also should be indexed in the field and not forwarded to the Bureau. Field offices obtaining such lists must promptly furnish them to the office covering the address shown for the subscriber.

7. Important subversive derogatory information concerning any individual and any new subversive derogatory information concerning any individual of importance must be brought to the attention of the Bureau by expeditious means.

8. Subversive and nonsubversive derogatory information coming to the attention of the field office through a name check or otherwise on an employee of the executive branch of the Government, which information is within the purview of Executive Order 10450, should be forwarded promptly to the Bureau for dissemination to the Civil Service Commission. In addition, subversive derogatory and other information relating to other employees of the Government and to employees of the United Nations and of other public international organizations received by the field office should be brought immediately to the attention of the Bureau.

9. These instructions do not affect and are in addition to existing instructions for the submission of information in report form.

C. INVESTIGATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, AND OTHER MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS

1. Policy

a. Communist Party, USA

By Presidential directive on 9-6-39, and subsequent restatements (see section 102, volume IV, of this manual), this Bureau is charged with the responsibility of coordinating all information with regard to the internal security of the U. S. Since 1939, a large portion of the Bureau's security investigations has been directed toward a coverage of the activities of communists and other groups whose aims seek the overthrow of the U. S. Government. The Communist Party, USA, is the best organized and most dangerous from a security standpoint. The party is not an isolated or purely domestic organization but is part of an international communist movement led and dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the ultimate aim of which is to establish a world-wide communist state. The Communist Party, USA, bases its theory on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. (Considerable evidence shows that these principles look toward the violent overthrow of the U. S. Government or its downfall in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.) It would be a grave error to suppose that, because the party is actually and potentially small, it is not dangerous. The contemplated role of the party is such that it can be played best by an organization which is cohesive, easily mobilized, highly maneuverable, fanatically zealous, well disciplined, and immediately responsive in an emergency to the demands of its leaders. The highest authority in the Communist Party, USA, is the national convention which meets approximately once every two years. Between these conventions, the national committee is the highest authority of the party.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Forms (continued)
  FD-122 (continued)
    placing name in or removing from special section of security index, 53
    unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    priority tabbing or removal of such tabbing, 63,64
    recommending for inclusion in security index, 45b,47
    recommending missing subjects for unavailable section of security index, 32,54
    reference to, 77
    succinct summary with, 47
      Cuban subjects, 45b
    when subject employed in key facility, 65
  FD-122a, 42b,42c,61,77
  FD-128, 55,57 to 60,67
    reference to, 77
    when security flash notice is on file, 27a
    when subject moves, 58,59
  FD-128a, 27a,42c,77
  FD-154, 57
  FD-165, 27,77
  FD-186, 50
  FD-305, 74,78
  FD-305a, 78
  FD-306, 36
  FD-336, 39
  FD-366, 57,81a
  FD-376, 81
  FD-397, 78
  FD-400, 74
Fraud against the Government, 20,21,22

Geographical
  reference number of key facility shown on security index card, 49
  section of security index, 51,63
Government employees, 25,70,80

Handwriting, 29
  of top functionaries, 67
Hostile subjects, interviews of, 41
Husband and wife, security investigations, 72

Identification record, 27
Immigration and Naturalization Service, dissemination to, 80,81a
Imprisoned subjects in security index, 54,57,60
Inactive section of security index, 56
Indices, check of, 34,72
Individuals
  to be investigated, 22
  traveling abroad, 33
    against whom stops are placed, 34
    disaffection for U. S., 57
    verification of addresses, 57
    who are included in security index, 34
    who travel behind iron curtain, 34
    with tours when no subversive information on individual, 33a
    with tours when there is subversive information on individual, 33a
  with foreign diplomatic status, 26
Industrial security clearances, dissemination re, 65,81
Informants (See security informants.)
Interviews
  Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
  Bureau authority, 39,40a
  conditions for, 40
    conducting at place of employment, 40a
  content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
  contents of letter containing results of, 42
  determine willingness to testify during, 41
  evaluation of, 45b
  forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
  no report needed afterward, 40a
  of hostile subjects, 41
  of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 24,25
  of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
  of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
  of security index subjects, 38

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D

References are to page.

Interviews (continued)
  of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
  of subjects who express desire for, [illegible]
  on SAC authority, [illegible]
  preparations for, 40
  purpose of, 38
  recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
  results not affecting security index status, 41
  signed statements in connection with, 41
  to be conducted within 45 days, 40
  when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
  when to discontinue, 40a,41
  when report needed after, 41
  with Bureau authority, 39
Investigations
  aliens, 26,80 (See also aliens.)
  faculty members, 24
  members of labor unions, 29,39,41
  naturalized citizens, 26,80
  purpose, 19
  restrictions on, 24
  students, 24
Investigative
  procedures, 26
  techniques, 34
    file reviews, 34
    photographic surveillances, 35,37
    physical surveillances, 35,37,38
    private firms, records, 36
    public source information, 36
    security informants, 34

Key facilities, 64
  character, 73
  Delimitations Agreement, 64
  employees
    considered for priority I, 63
    included in security index, 65
  list, 49,64
  responsibility, 64
    agency having security, 49,58,59,65
  status of reports of subjects employed in, 66,73
  when to investigate individuals employed in, 64
Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

Labor union membership, 29
Labor unions, 29,39,41
Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
Letter in lieu of report, security index cases, 74
List
  key facilities, 49, 64
  top functionaries, 67
Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Lumping information in reports, 76

Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Members of
  armed forces, 25
    dissemination of information concerning, 82
  labor unions, 29,39,41
  law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
Membership or affiliation, 29
  concealment of, 31
Missing subjects, 31,48,54
  letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
  unavailable section of security index, 32,54
Movement of subjects, 58
  not in security index, 60
  security index subjects, 58
  tabbed for priority, 60
  top functionaries, 59,67

Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
Nation of Islam
  abbreviation for organizational affiliation, 49
  character, 73
  classification, 72
  potential dangerousness, 46
  removal of cards from security index, 62
  what members to be investigated, 23

Communist Party members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Special Agents attending mass meetings, etc.

4. Internal Security Act of 1950
To insure successful proceedings against a communist front organization under this act, a preponderance of admissible evidence must be secured to show extent to which
   a. Persons active in management, direction, or supervision of an organization are active in management, direction, or supervision, or as representatives, of
   b. Its support, financial or otherwise, is derived from
   c. Its funds, resources, or personnel are used to further or promote objectives of
   d. Positions taken or advanced by it from time to time do not deviate from those of
Any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or the world communist movement.

[5. [Deleted]

6. Classification - 100

7. Character - Internal Security - letters for organizational activity or nationalistic tendency; e.g., (C), (SWP), (Miscellaneous), etc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page
- V. Inactive section.............................. 56
- (7) Periodic verification of addresses.......................... 57
- (8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards............................... 58
- (9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards.................................. 58
  - (a) Subjects of security index cards.................................. 58
  - (b) Top functionaries............................... 59
  - (c) Subjects tabbed for priority...................... 60
  - (d) Subjects not included in security index........... 60
- (10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index... 60
  - (a) Death of subject.................................. 60
  - (b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction 60
  - (c) Imprisonment of subject........................... 60
  - (d) Induction of subject into the armed forces........ 60
  - (e) Security informants............................... 60
  - (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous.. 61
  - (g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection....... 61
  - (h) Subjects of Chinese extraction.................... 62
- (11) Priority apprehension program........................... 62
  - (a) Purpose... 62
  - (b) Subjects to be tabbed priority.................... 62
  - (c) Recommendations for and removal of priority designation....................................... 63
  - (d) Administrative procedures for handling priority program... 63
  - (e) General... 64
- c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.. 64
  - (1) Responsibility.. 64
  - (2) Inclusion in security index........................... 65
  - (3) Dissemination... 65
  - (4) Status of cases....................................... 66
- d. Top functionary program.................................. 66
  - (1) General... 66
  - (2) Definition of top functionary......................... 66
  - (3) Manner of designation of top functionary.............. 66
  - (4) Regulations governing the handling of top functionaries 67
  - (5) Maintenance of list................................... 67

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Page

e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index.......... 70
  (1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations.......... 70
  (2) Security of Government employees investigations.......... 70
  (3) Atomic Energy Act, U. S. Information Agency applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations.......... 70
f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports. 71
  (1) General.......... 71
  (2) Schedule of submission of reports.......... 72
  (3) Origin.......... 72
  (4) Classification.......... 72
  (5) Title.......... 72
  (6) Character.......... 73
    (a) Top functionaries.......... 73
    (b) Others.......... 73
  (7) Status.......... 73
    (a) Top functionaries.......... 73
    (b) Key facility cases.......... 73
    (c) Other security index subjects.......... 74
    (d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index.. 74
    (e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein.......... 74
  (8) Content.......... 74
  (9) Administrative data.......... 77
    (a) General.......... 77
    (b) Documentation of reports.......... 78
g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of.......... 79
8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations.... 79
  a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau.......... 80
    (1) Aliens and naturalized citizens.......... [illegible]
    (2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services.......... 80
    (3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense.......... 80
    (4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard.......... 80

III. Sex

Male	M
Female	F

IV. Citizenship

Native born	NB
Naturalized	NA
Alien	AL

(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)

V. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency

American Socialist Clubs	ASC
American Workers' Communist Party	AWC
Anarchist	ANA
Black Nationalist	BNT
Communist Party, USA	COM
Johnson-Forest Group	JFG
[Minutemen	MIN]
Nation of Islam	NOI
Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico	PRN
Progressive Labor Party	PLP
Proletarian Party of America	PPA
Revolutionary Action Movement	RAM
Socialist Workers Party	SWP
Spartacist League	SPL
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee	SNC
Students for a Democratic Society	SDS
Workers World Party	WWP
Bulgarian	BUL
Cuban	CUB
Czechoslovakian	CZE
Hungarian	HUN
Romanian	ROM
Russian	RUS
Yugoslavian	YUG

VI. Priority designation

Priority I	P I
Priority II	P II
Priority III	P III

VII. Top functionary designation (where applicable)

Top functionary	TF

VIII. Special section cards

Atomic energy program employees	AEP
Cuban special section	CUB
Espionage subjects	ESP
Foreign government employees	FGE
Pro-Tito subjects	YUG
United Nations employees	UNE
U. S. Government employees	GOV

IX. Unavailable section cards

Missing	MI
Out of country	OC
Imprisoned	PR

X. Date and place of birth

XI. Key facility geographical reference number obtained fr the Department of Defense Key Facilities List and abbr viation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility (where applicable)

XII. Residence address

XIII. Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.

XIV. Field office file number

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description

(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division

(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. This photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.

(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms

(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appe ing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attach it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all alia of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bur. for administrative purposes.

v. Persons active in the Communist Party or other organization underground apparatus

vi. Any other security index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent, or disruptionist in the event of an emergency

(C) Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

II. Security index subjects considered for priority II

(A) All individuals who are considered to be of second level leadership of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations and individuals who present a significant threat but are in less influential positions than those in priority I

III. All other individuals on the security index will be tabbed priority III.

(c) Recommendations for and removal of priority designation

I. Approval of SAC
Designation of each subject as to priority or removal of any subject therefrom must be personally approved by SAC, or in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.

II. When form FD-[illegible] is submitted recommending either tabbing for priority or deletion of such tabbing, attach an additional page setting out a brief summary of facts upon which the recommendation is based.

(d) Administrative procedures for handling priority program
Take following action to assure that security index cards for subjects tabbed for priority of apprehension will be readily available for emergency action in your office:

I. Geographical section
Divide geographical section of security index into three distinct parts.

(A) Part I of geographical section shall include only security index cards for subjects who are tabbed priority I.

(B) Part II of geographical section shall contain security index cards for all subjects that are tabbed priority II.

(C) Part III of geographical section should contain security index cards for all subjects who are tabbed priority III.

(D) In offices having two separate and distinct geographical sections, i.e., geographical-employment and geographical-residence, as provided under 87D 7b (6) herein, each such geographical section must be broken into parts I, II, and III.

(E) Priority cards will be the following colors: priority I - beige, priority II - green, priority III - white

III. Alphabetical section

(A) One security index card for each subject is to be filed in alphabetical section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever.

(B) Priority tabbings approved at Bureau will be shown on security index cards forwarded to field by code letters "P I," "P II," or "P III" in first line on the cards.

(e) General

I. Tabbing of cards

The alphabetical security index cards on those individuals designated as "Pro-Cuban" should be tabbed with a metal tab.

II. Removal from priority I and priority II

Careful analysis must be made of each case in which deletion from priority I and priority II is proposed. For instance, when a subject is being removed from priority I or priority II tabbing, file review may well disclose that subject qualifies for priority tabbing for reasons covered in 87D 7b (11) (b).

c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

(1) Responsibility

FBI is responsible by Presidential directive for keeping other Federal agencies advised of developments within their jurisdiction affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated as vital to the national defense and welfare by the Department of Defense.

FBI is responsible under Delimitations Agreement for investigating employees of private contractors who have contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where credible subversive information concerning employee is obtained. Thorough investigation must be conducted and consideration for inclusion in security index given concerning any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in the past, a member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom sufficient other subversive information is in our possession which warrants such action.

(a) Requests for investigation from another agency

When another agency requests investigation of individual employed in key facility, institute investigation immediately if basis of request so warrants. Advise Bureau of request, basis thereof, and that investigation is being conducted.

(b) Verification of key facility status of place of employment

Department of Defense Key Facilities List (maintained in each office) must be checked for verification of information that a security investigation subject's place of employment may be included in such list.

(c) Individuals denied access to restricted information

Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently advise that an individual has been denied clearance to work in a defense plant or to handle classified or restricted information. In some instances clearance is denied based on information furnished by Bureau. At other times, information in Bureau files is very meager or possibly negative and basis for such denial of clearance is not known. The intelligence agency is responsible for furnishing Bureau with any information involving disloyalty or subversiveness.

Office receiving notification that an individual has been denied clearance must ascertain promptly basis for such denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Abstract slips, 47,58
Addresses, verification of (See verification of addresses.)
Administrative
  data, 77
  tickler, 55,56,74
Admissible evidence, 29,37
Agitator index, 33,78
Agreement between FBI and Secret Service, 81
Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
Aliens
  Chinese, 48,62,81a
  Cuban, 45a,45b,81a
  dissemination of information concerning, 80,81a
  investigation of, 26
Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
Applicant investigations, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
Armed forces
  dissemination to, 82
  members of, 25
  record in, 27
  relatives in, 27
  subjects entering, 56,60
  subjects in, 25
Arrangement of security index, 50
  alphabetical section, 51,63
  at Bureau, 50
  geographical section, 51,63
  in field office, 51
  inactive section, 56
  special section, 52 (See also special section of security index.)
  unavailable section, 53 (See also unavailable section of security index.)
Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71

Black nationalist cases
  character of case, 73
  classification, 72
  definitions, 19
  reports
    anarchist beliefs, 46a
    content, 74
  security index, 43,49
  top functionary, 66
Bureau
  applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
  authority to investigate individuals, 24
  responsibility, 19,64

Cancellation of
  security flash notice, 27a
  security index cards
    after induction into armed forces, 60
    mechanics, 60
    on departure from U. S., 60
    only after interview, 38
    recommending, 42,61
    upon death, 60
Canvassing informants, 74
Changes on security index cards, 58,78
Channelizing, 24,34,36,72,79
Character of reports, 73
  top functionaries, 67,73
Characterizations, 79
Chinese
  aliens, changes in residence or employment, dissemination to Secret Service and INS, 81a
  extraction, 48,62
  sympathies, 48
Classification of cases, 72
Color of security index cards, 63
Concealment of membership, 31
Confidential informants (See security informants.)
Contacting
  faculty members, 25
  informants, 34,74
  registrars, 25
  students, 25
  superiors of faculty members, 25
Contacts
  during investigation, 25
  of foreign establishments, 25
Content
  and appearance
    of reserve index cards, 43
    of security index cards, 48
  of reports, 74
Corroboration, 37
Cover pages, 77,78
Criteria for inclusion in security index, 44a,45
Cuban
  activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
  aliens, 45a,45b,81a
  contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a
  pro-Cuban activity, 45b
  special section, 49,53
  tabbing cards, 45b,64

Dangerousness
  definition of, 44
  determination of, 44
  Nation of Islam membership, 46
Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Defectors to Sino-Soviet-bloc countries, 57
- Defense
  - Industrial Security Clearance Office, 65,81
  - Supply Agency, 65,81
- Definitions, 19
  - of dangerousness, 44
  - of top functionaries, 66
- Delimitations Agreement, 64,82
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Determination of
  - dangerousness, 44
  - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Disaffection of U. S. citizens abroad, 57
- Dissemination
  - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 82
  - of reports
    - at SOG, 81a
    - in field, 79
    - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
  - to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, 65,81
  - to Immigration and Naturalization Service, 80,81a
  - to Secret Service, 81,81a
    - closing case, 47,74
    - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
    - stamping reserve index cards, 43
- Documentation of reports, 78
  - completion of, 78
- Employees of
  - international organizations, 25
  - U. S. Government, 25,70
    - dissemination of data re, 80
- Employment, verification of (See verification of.)
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Evidence, 37
  - desirability of
    - admissibility, 29,37
    - corroboration, 37
  - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
  - of membership or affiliation, 29
  - preservation of, 37
- Executive Order 10450, 80,81
- Faculty members
  - contacts with, 25
  - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File on defected subjects, 42
- File reviews, 34
- Flash notices (security)
  - cancellation of, 27a
  - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
  - placing, 27
- Foreign
  - diplomats, 25
  - establishments, 25
  - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
  - tours, 33a,57
  - travel, 33,54,57
- Forms
  - FD-122, 28,34,48,49,53 to 58,67,74,78
    - abstracts for, 47
    - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
    - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
    - cover letter thereto, 32
    - Cuban subjects, 45b

"(4) the extent to which the positions taken or advanced by it from time to time on matters of policy do not deviate from those of any Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or the world Communist movement referred to in section 781 of this title."

e. [Deleted]

f. [Deleted]

3. [How proceedings are instituted (Title 50, USC, § 792 (§ 13 of act))
Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any organization is a communist-action organization or a communist front organization, or that any individual is a member of an organization determined by a final order of the Board to be such, he shall file a petition with the Board and serve upon the organization or individual, as the case may be, a copy thereof, for a determination that such is true via a hearing before the Board.

4. Findings of the Board and publication of same (Title 50, USC, § 792 (§ 13 of act))
If, after a hearing on the matter, the Board finds - (1) that an organization is a communist-action organization or a communist front organization, it shall make a report in writing to state its findings and cause to be served on such organization an order determining the organization to be a communist-action organization or a communist front organization, or (2) that an individual is a member of a communist-action organization, it shall make a report in writing in which it shall state its findings and cause to be served on such individual an order determining such individual to be a member of a communist-action organization.

a. Findings of the Board shall be published in the Federal Register that such orders have become final and this publication shall be notice to all persons that such orders have become final. Records of the Board concerning such hearings shall be available to the public.

5. Employment of members; contribution of funds, services, or advice by Government personnel (Title 50, USC, § 784 (§ 5 of act))
"(a) When there is in effect a final order of the Board determining any organization to be a Communist-action organization or a Communist-front organization, it shall be unlawful -
"(1) For any member of such organization, with knowledge or notice of such final order of the Board -
"(A) in seeking, accepting, or holding any nonelective office or employment under the United States, to conceal or fail to disclose the fact that he is a member of such organization; or
"(B) to hold any nonelective office or employment under the United States; or
"(C) in seeking, accepting, or holding employment in any defense facility, to conceal or fail to disclose the fact that he is a member of such organization; or
"(D) if such organization is a Communist-action organization, to engage in any employment in any defense facility; or
"(E) to hold office or employment with any labor organization, as that term is defined in section 2 (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U. S. C. 152), or to represent any employer in any matter or proceeding arising or pending under that Act.
"(2) For any officer or employee of the United States or of any defense facility, with knowledge or notice of such final order of the Board -
"(A) to contribute funds or services to such organization; or
"(B) to advise, counsel or urge any person, with knowledge or notice that such person is a member of such organization, to perform, or to omit to perform, any act if such act or omission would constitute a violation of any provision of paragraph (1) of this subsection."

6. Use of mail and instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce (Title 50, USC, § 789 (§ 10 of act))

   The act requires any person acting for or on behalf of any organization for which there is in effect a final order of the Board determining it to be a communist-action organization or communist front to label properly all publications transmitted through the mail or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce.

7. Penalties (Title 50, USC, § 794 (§ 15 of act))

   Any organization which violates any provision of section 10 of this act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for each such violation by a fine of not more than $10,000. Any individual who violates any provision of section 5 or 10 of this act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for each such violation by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both.

8. Reporting of evidence developed on individual members

   Any admissible evidence showing a violation of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended (Title 50, USC, § 784), as it pertains to union officers, employees, and representatives of management (see item 5, part (a) (1) (E) above, and volume III, section 67C, of this manual), should be furnished the Bureau in a report on the individual and the report should carry the single character, Internal Security Act of 1950 - Labor (classification 122). Any admissible evidence showing a violation of this act on the part of any other individual should be furnished the Bureau in report on the individual and the report should carry the dual character, Internal Security - C or Security Matter - C, and Internal Security Act of 1950 (classification 100). See section 87D of this manual for complete instructions relative to investigation of individuals.

9. Instructions

   The Bureau's responsibilities in connection with the internal security of this country necessitate that we promptly and thoroughly investigate all organizations subject to communist infiltration, influence, or control as set forth in section 87E of this manual. In view of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the necessity of developing legally admissible evidence as to the communist character of any organization must be emphasized during our investigation. Keeping in mind the factors to be considered by the Subversive Activities Control Board in determining whether an organization is a communist front, every effort must be made to develop legally admissible evidence relating to these factors. An investigation of any organization which might fall within the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 should carry the dual character, Internal Security - C, Internal Security Act of 1950.

10. Emergency detention provisions (Title 50, USC, §§ 811-826)

    Sections 100 to 111 inclusive cover the detention provisions of the act in the event of a state of "Internal Security Emergency" and set up a program for the arrests of certain individuals, provisions for hearings after arrest, and the right to judicial review. Criminal provisions are set out in sections 112 to 114 inclusive, making it unlawful in connection with the detention provisions of the act to resist arrest, knowingly disregard or evade apprehension, escape from confinement, or conspire with others to escape from confinement or detention. Violations are also set out covering the aiding and assisting in the commission of the violations mentioned above and in the willful interference with the activities of any member of a review board set up under the detention provisions or any of its agents.

    a. Bureau instructions

       These provisions do not affect instructions regarding individuals considered dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security as outlined in section 87D of this manual.

(3) By force or violence, or

By assassination of any officer of such government

It will be necessary to show:

(a) The identity and official capacity of such officer

(b) The identity of persons conspiring to assassinate, or actually assassinating such officer

(c) Full details surrounding the assassination or attempted assassination

(d) Reasons for the assassination, and ends to be gained by such assassinations, or

b. Printed, published, edited, issued, or circulated

(1) The person with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the U.S., or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof

(2) Printed, published, edited, issued, circulated, sold, distributed, or publicly displayed written or printed matter

(3) Advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government .

of the U. S. by force or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof, or

- c. Organized society, group, or assembly
  - (1) The person organized, or helped organize, a society, group, or assembly of persons
  - (2) Which taught, advocated, or encouraged the overthrowing or destruction of the Government of the U. S., or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof -
  - (3) By force or violence, or
  - (4) The person became a member of, or affiliated with, such society, group, or assembly of persons
  - (5) Knowing the purpose thereof

B. SUBMISSION TO THE BUREAU OF SUBVERSIVE DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUALS

1. To insure the proper discharge of the Bureau's responsibility to furnish information at the seat of Government at the request of other agencies and to have it available at the seat of Government when such requests are received from other agencies, the Bureau must be promptly furnished, for indexing purposes, by offices covering the national and local headquarters of the various subversive organizations, the names of, and identifying data concerning, persons affiliated with and becoming affiliated with the following types of organizations:
   - a. Basic revolutionary organizations or groups
     - Communist Party, USA
     - Socialist Workers Party
     - Proletarian Party of America
     - Other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, if any, of the preceding three organizations
     - Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
   - b. Nationalist and fascist-type groups
   - c. Front organizations of 1, a and b above, including those
     - (1) Cited by the Attorney General
     - (2) Cited or declared by the House Committee on Un-American Activities [(now House Committee on Internal Security)] or by any of the various legislative committees
     - (3) Described as such or as an organization dominated or controlled by one of the basic revolutionary organizations or groups by security informants or other sources of known reliability
   - d. Black nationalist extremist groups

   Such lists should include the organization's membership list and any other record showing affiliation.
2. Field offices obtaining information concerning such affiliation of individuals residing outside their territory must expeditiously furnish such information to the office covering the address of the person.
3. The information should be submitted to the Bureau in duplicate by letter captioned with the title of the organizational case file, for example, "Communist Party, USA, ________ District, ________ Division; Internal Security - C" or "Socialist Workers Party, ________ Division; Internal Security - SWP" and should clearly indicate that the list is being furnished to the Bureau for indexing purposes only.
4. Information received from all sources, including that received from confidential sources, highly confidential sources, reports of security informants and sources, and public and other sources, should be reviewed to insure that the Bureau has been furnished in the past and will be furnished in the future lists of all individuals (together with identifying data) affiliated with all organizations set forth in 1 a, b, c, and d.
5. In forwarding such information to the Bureau, the offices should incorporate, insofar as possible, information concerning a number of individuals in one letter. The letter should contain sufficient identifying data concerning each individual to enable the Bureau to identify that individual

(5) In evaluating this type of case, carefully consider the nature and activities of the front organization in behalf of the Communist Party or other revolutionary organizations throughout the country or in a certain area.

c. Special training in a subversive movement
   (1) Training in the Lenin School or in a subversive movement abroad
   (2) Leadership training in one of the basic revolutionary organizations mentioned above

d. Military service
   (1) Service in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Membership in one of the basic revolutionary organizations is not a prerequisite to initiating investigations in this category.
   (2) Service in the military forces of any country, including the U. S. armed forces or the Office of Strategic Services whenever there is an allegation that an individual has been a member of one of the basic revolutionary organizations at any time

e. Employment in key facilities
Investigate the activities of any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been at any time in the past a member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom sufficient other subversive information is known.

f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs
Individuals who, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, are likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare. Membership or affiliation in basic revolutionary or front groups is not a prerequisite to initiating investigations of this type. Use sound judgment and discretion in this evaluation,

Falling within the above category are members of the Nation of Islam. When it is known or becomes known that this organization is active in the field office territory, a security-type investigation of all individuals who are reported to be (1) functionaries or leaders of the Nation of Islam, or (2) active participants in carrying out fanatical and disloyal aims of the organization should be initiated. Investigations should not be initiated based on mere membership alone.

During the course of security investigations of individuals affiliated with the Nation of Islam, be alert for any information indicating a possible violation of the Selective Service Act.

The above standards for institutions of investigations of individuals are not to be interpreted as all-inclusive. Where there is doubt an individual may be a current threat to the internal security of the nation, the question should be resolved in the interest of security and investigation conducted.

The categories specified as a through f above are to be distinguished from the criteria to govern the addition of subjects to and retention of subjects in the security index, set out in 87D 7b (3). Investigation should be undertaken when cases fall within the preceding categories, even though under existing criteria the subjects would not be placed in the security index on the information available. The cases should thereafter be investigated actively to determine the scope of subversive activities in which the subjects have been engaged and to fully develop all aspects of the cases in order that a determination can be made with respect to security index status.

Complaints alleging subversive activities of individuals which are received from anonymous sources should not be disregarded provided the allegations are sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight to warrant investigation. Such allegations should receive same consideration as if the identity of the source was known. Do not open cases for investigation based on nonspecific or vague allegations which do not fall within the standards for opening investigations.

Do not institute investigations because of membership in organizations which do not advocate the use of force to bring about changes in the existing Government, e.g., the Socialist Party, the Socialist Labor Party, the Independent Workers of the World and the Independence Party of Puerto Rico (Partido Independentista Puertorriqueno), etc.

Security-type cases already existent must be continually and carefully evaluated to determine that we are fulfilling our responsibilities in the internal security field. Subversive information received regarding any individual should be channelized to the individual's main file. If no main file exists, one should be opened. Cases not warranting further investigative action should be promptly closed and should not be permitted to continue endlessly without a definite objective.

5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals
   a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning
      (1) Subjects connected with institutions of learning
      The following restrictions apply to employees and students of colleges, universities, and elementary and secondary schools supported by private or public funds. Students and employees of schools, such as the Jefferson School of Social Science, the California Labor School, and others founded by or supported by revolutionary groups, do not come within the meaning of these instructions.
         (a) Prior Bureau authority to institute investigation
            I. Faculty members
            Bureau authority is necessary prior to initiating a security investigation of a faculty member.
            II. Students and nonacademic employees
            Bureau authority is not needed prior to initiating a security investigation of a student or nonacademic employee provided no unusual circumstances exist which would require advice from the Bureau prior to initiating the investigation. Each SAC must see that there is a sound basis for initiating security investigations of such individuals.
            III. Requests for Bureau authority
            When requesting Bureau authority to conduct a security investigation of an individual connected with an institution of learning, the letter should set forth the identity of the subject, his position, and the basis for the investigation.

locate subjects are not to be submitted. The Bureau will closely follow investigative action to locate missing security index subjects.

II. If you receive indications that the subject went to Mexico or Canada, request the Bureau to alert other appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to determine any available verifying information through liaison channels.

III. If the subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, the Washington Field Office should be requested to check the records of the Passport Office of the State Department for verification.

IV. When all logical leads have been exhausted in the case of a missing important functionary, consideration should be given to circularizing all field offices with the subject's photograph and background information for the purpose of alerting the entire field to the identity of the subject. Bureau authority must be obtained before circularization is made. In seeking Bureau authority, advise the Bureau as to the position held by the subject and what efforts have already been made to locate him.

If this procedure is to be effective, its application must necessarily be restrictive in the number of subjects to which it is applied. Therefore, requests to circularize must be made only after every possible lead has been exhausted and then only in the cases of the most important missing functionaries.

(4) Individuals traveling abroad (Also consider section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

When information is received indicating that

a subject of a current[security investigation or where there is information showing subversive activity by a security subject during the past five years,

a subject whose name is included in security index, agitator index, or section A of reserve index,

a subject of a past security investigation who is likely to remain in a foreign country over six months, or

where information available indicates a subject of a past security investigation, although inactive for over five years, may be a "sleeper" or in an underground capacity, or where current information would indicate a need to effect foreign coverage]

intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel, take the following action:

(a) Immediately advise the Bureau by letterhead memorandum setting forth complete available details concerning the foreign travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, the exact name under which the passport was issued, the number of the passport, and the office issuing the passport, if known. Include in the letterhead memorandum a full description of the subject, including all aliases, and in the case of Chinese and Korean subjects Chinese telegraphic code and Korean telegraphic code numbers, as well as a concise resume of available subversive data regarding the subject. Do not delay in advising the Bureau of the actual or intended travel while developing the details of the travel as time is of the essence in this matter.

(b) Set out a lead for the Washington Field Office for a check of the records of the Passport Office, Department of State; however, do not limit efforts to develop above information to a check of such records.

XI. Inform subjects connected with labor unions that the Bureau is not interested in employee-employer relations and is concerned only with obtaining information on infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements.

XII. Furnish no information and make no statements to a person being interviewed which might later be used to embarrass the Bureau. Agents should not allow themselves to be interviewed by the interviewee or to be placed in a position of answering questions instead of asking them.

XIII. Terminate immediately an interview if the subject proves to be hostile or uncooperative on initial contact.

XIV. Exploit a subject's knowledge to the utmost if he is found to be willing to furnish information of value.

XV. Questions asked of a subject being interviewed should be so worded as to require an admission or denial of all pertinent items of subversive information developed during prior investigation unless to do so would expose investigative techniques or security informants.

XVI. A cordial and friendly attitude alone on the part of a subject should not be construed as evidence of cooperation insofar as potential dangerousness is concerned when he fails to admit or furnish substantially the same subversive information verified through previous investigation.

XVII. Inform the subject that we are interested in interviewing him in great detail and arrange to conduct the interviews over as extended a period of time as necessary to develop the matter fully. Conduct necessary investigation or research to verify or add to what is being developed on interview. Request information from other offices or the Bureau to assist in the interview if necessary.

XVIII. Reduce information obtained to a signed statement if subject willing that this be done.

XVIX. Determine willingness to testify to information furnished in possible future Federal proceedings.

XX. Consider possibility of developing these individuals as informants. If possibility is apparent, pursue matter with view to establishing subject as a reliable source in the subversive movement with which he has been connected.

XXI. When no information is developed during the course of an interview which would affect a subject's status, submit the results thereof in letter form immediately following the interview and also in the next report submitted in the case. At least one report will be submitted in each case in which a subject is interviewed with Bureau authority. In the case of an individual employed in or holding a sensitive position enumerated in 87D 6b (7) (e) IV above, the results of all interviews must be submitted promptly in report form until such time as he begins to cooperate as a security informant or a source.

XXII. Report information regarding the subject's admissions of his own subversive activities and associations and set forth a statement to the effect that he did or did not furnish information regarding subversive activities of others.

XXIII. Report statements of denial regarding subject's subversive activities developed through prior investigation and follow by a brief summary statement of the past subversive activity which is being denied by the subject.

XXIV. Letter transmitting results of an interview must contain:
- (A) A definite statement or conclusion of interviewing Agents as to cooperativeness of subject
- (B) Whether information furnished by him coincides substantially with information developed against him
- (C) Reasons for the conclusions
- (D) Statement as to subject's availability as a potential witness and evaluation of subject's potential as an informant or confidential source
- (E) Further contacts contemplated
- (F) Recommendation that the security index card be canceled when it is determined from statements furnished by a security index subject regarding his subversive activities and associates, considered with other known information and factors, that the subject is no longer to be considered dangerous to the internal security in time of an emergency

XXV. The above instructions shall not preclude immediate interview of subject of a security-type investigation who contacts a Bureau representative and expresses a desire to furnish information concerning subversive activities. They do not apply to an interview of a person once he is an established informant or confidential source.

XXVI. Reinterviews with security index subjects should be considered on a systematic basis. This may be done by considering a recontact immediately prior to the time when it is necessary to submit a periodic report. In all cases in which subjects have been interviewed in the past with Bureau authority and no reinterview is conducted prior to the submission of the periodic report, the cover page(s) accompanying report should show why a reinterview was not conducted. Results of reinterviews should be submitted in report form.

(g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects

I. A dead file should be maintained for reference purposes in those offices having sufficient volume of security work to justify such action.

II. Copies of memoranda designated for individual case files should be routed to this file. Such memoranda to contain:
- (A) The background of the defectee
- (B) Type of information he may furnish
- (C) Period covered by this data

unequivocal regardless of Yugoslavia's foreign policies.

(G) Cuban

In order that, in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U. S., special handling may be afforded those subjects whose organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies are shown as "Cuban." Security index cards denoting such will contain the code "CUB" on line 1.

Standards for inclusion of subjects in the special section of the security index are the same as those for any other potentially dangerous subject.

When submitting a recommendation for preparation of a security index card on an individual falling in one of the above categories, form FD-122 must include the words "Special Section" typed in the upper right portion thereof. The proper category should be typed on FD-122 in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)."

Security index cards to be placed in the special section shall bear the appropriate code letters in the upper right portion designating the subsection in which the cards should be placed. Upon receipt from the Bureau of the three security index cards of subjects in these categories, the required additional data shall be placed on two which shall be filed alphabetically in the appropriate subsection of the special section. The third card shall be filed in the alphabetical section of the security index. Under no circumstances should special section security index cards be filed in the geographical section of the index.

When a security index subject whose card is maintained in the special section no longer comes within one of the categories of the special section, FD-122 must be submitted with the words "Remove from Special Section" typed in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." If the card should be placed in the unavailable section, the statement "Place in Unavailable Section" should be added in this space. When the new cards are received from the Bureau, they should be checked for accuracy and the description and photograph, if available, should be placed on separate cards of similar size and attached to the back of two of the cards. These two cards should then be filed in the geographical or unavailable section (where applicable) and the other card filed in the alphabetical section of the security index. The old cards should be destroyed.

[The special section card shall[indicate the priority
[level for apprehension.]

It is not contemplated that subjects of security index cards maintained in the special section will be apprehended under a mass apprehension program. The cases of such subjects shall be given individual attention upon the inception of the apprehension program and the subjects will not be apprehended in the absence of specific Bureau instructions in each case.

IV. Unavailable section

Security index cards of individuals who are missing, out of the country, or are imprisoned shall be retained in the unavailable section. This section shall be broken down into three subsections headed by tabs marked "Missing,"

"Out of the Country," and "Imprisoned." The unavailable section shall be maintained in accordance with the following instructions:

(A) Missing subjects

Security index subjects are not to be included in the unavailable section as missing immediately upon determination that they are no longer located at their previously known places of residence or employment. The action required in 87D 6b (3) above must be taken prior to submitting FD-122 placing a subject in the unavailable section as a missing subject. The Bureau must be periodically advised of the investigative steps taken to locate missing security index subjects in accordance with 87D 6b (3).

If the subject is missing, the word "Missing" shall be typed in the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)."

(B) Subjects out of the country

The security index cards of subjects who are found to have departed from the U. S. or Puerto Rico for a foreign country shall be placed in this subsection of the unavailable section of the security index unless their cards should be cancelled in accordance with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (10) (b).

If the subject is out of the country, the words "Out of the Country" shall be typed in the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." If the foreign address is known, place it on FD-122 in the space provided for the residence address. If the subject is only known to be in a certain foreign country and his residence there is not known or is only known to be traveling abroad, include this information on FD-122. If the subject's current employment abroad is known, include it on FD-122.

The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least[once each year]for verification of the subject's address, the same as any other security index case, to determine if the subject has returned to this country.

Appropriate stops should be placed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to be advised of information which may become available to it indicating the subject's return to this country.

(C) Imprisoned subjects

The cards of security index subjects who are found to be imprisoned shall be placed in the unavailable section of the security index.

If the subject is in prison, the word "Imprisoned" shall be typed on the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." The identity of the institution in which the subject is incarcerated shall be typed in the space provided for the residence address. The space for the business address shall be left blank.

should be completely filled out just as if a first recommendation is being made, and submitted with a current report. If not, the Bureau should be advised of the reasons for not reactivating his security index card. In either case, cancel the inactive card.

(7) Periodic verification of addresses

(a) The data recorded on security index cards shall be in an up-to-date status at all times.

(b) The whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. The residence and business addresses of security index subjects in priority I must be checked at least once each three months. The residence and business addresses of all other security index subjects must be checked at least once each[year,]except those imprisioned and those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. (defection to a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, including Cuba since 10-1-60) (see section 105G, item 3, volume IV, of this manual). The residence and employment of those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. must be verified every[ninety]days. The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least[once each year]to determine if he has returned to this country.

Perfect arrangements to be advised on a current basis of any indication that the subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change his residence or employment. Periodic checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under appropriate pretext by telephone once each six months for those individuals in priority I and once[every two years] for all other subjects. Pretext means may be utilized during other periodic checks conducted either personally or through appropriate sources.

(c) The physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and the individual case file of each security index subject shall show that this has been done. If a security index subject has not been personally observed previously, this should be done during the next verification of the subject's residence and/or business addresses.

(d) Use form FD-154 in verifying addresses of security index subjects when its use will facilitate the checking of the addresses. When FD-154 is not used in verifying addresses, a notation must be made on the last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in the subject's case file showing the subject's current residence and business addresses and the date such addresses were verified. This must be done to assure that the file will contain all information concerning the status of the case and that the file will come to the attention of the Agent or field supervisor to determine if additional action is warranted at the time of the verification of addresses. Each time that a security index subject's residence and employment are verified, the case must be reevaluated to assure that the subject is qualified for inclusion in the security index under the criteria for such inclusion. A notation to the effect that the case has been reviewed for this purpose shall be made in the file.

(e) If it is determined that the residence or business address or both have been changed from those appearing on the security index card, FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau with the current residence or business address shown thereon. In such instances, FD-122 should show only the changes to be made on the security index card. FD-122 should be accompanied by form FD-366 for dissemination to Secret Service. Secret Service should be advised locally by dissemination of FD-366.

(f) The project of verifying addresses of security index subjects shall be handled by reopening and assigning the cases for verification and closing the cases administratively upon accomplishment of verifications. Verification should also be made at the time of submission of all[periodic]investigative reports and should be reported therein.

(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards

(a) Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies,[priority designation,] date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility (see 87D 7c (2) below), residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by form FD-128.

(b) Insertion or removal of cards from special section or unavailable section should be handled pursuant to 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV.

(c) Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing security index cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.

(d) Indicate use of FD-122 for changes by checking proper opening paragraph and submit without abstract.

(e) Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."

(f) Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected security index cards with duplicate copy of FD-122 (stamped "Corrected Security Index cards attached. Substitute for cards in file and destroy old cards. Place photograph and description on reverse side of geographical cards."), action to be taken includes:

I. Check accuracy of data on cards.

II. Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to back of corrected cards, staple them, and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV above.

III. File third card in alphabetical section of security index.

IV. Destroy old cards.

(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards

(a) Subjects of security index cards

I. Requests to verify addresses of security index subjects from other offices must be assigned immediately and results of investigation to verify the new address must be transmitted to the office of origin within two weeks.

II. Office of origin, upon receipt of verification of address, should submit FD-128 immediately transferring office of origin. Forms regarding unavailable section subjects should be prepared in accordance with 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.

III. Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies thereof to office covering subject's new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and security index cards. FD-128 should show full title[and priority level designation.]

IV. Information concerning key facility employment of subject in new office should be furnished by that office to old office of origin so that geographical reference

When the subject of such an investigation is presently in the security index, a letter must be directed to the Bureau at the time the report is submitted advising that the subject is in the security index.

Information of interest to FBI and/or AEC obtained subsequent to completion of Atomic Energy Act - applicant investigations concerning AEC employees or persons having access to restricted data should be handled according to instructions in section 20, volume II, of this manual.

[f. [Submission of and general rules concerning security reports]

(1) General

[[Submission of summary reports should not be delayed for the
[purpose of conducting current investigation in previously
[closed cases, but appropriate leads should be set out.]
[

Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened or placed in a pending status for the purpose of preparing investigative reports in accordance with the schedule outlined in 87D 7f (2) and (7).

Office indices and any material channelized to the case file since the most recent report should be reviewed and the case brought up to date by appropriate investigation to determine subject's current activities.

Each time that a case is reopened and brought up to date, it should be critically analyzed in the light of the security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3) herein. This procedure must be followed on a continuing basis for each security index subject.

(2) Schedule of submission of reports
Reports shall be submitted on individuals designated for priority as follows: priority I -[annually](top functionaries - [annually);]priority II - annually; priority III - every 2 years.

(3) Origin
The office of origin will be that office covering the territory wherein the subject's subversive activities occur. In most instances this will also be the office in which territory the subject resides and is employed. In those cases in which the subject's subversive activities take place in the territory of an office other than the office covering the place of residence and/or employment, the office of origin shall be that office which can best cover the subversive activities of the subject.

(4) Classification
- (a) 100 - for individuals affiliated with the basic revolutionary and front organizations of Marxian ideology
- (b) 105 - for members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups or others having nationalistic tendencies of a non-Marxist character
- (c) 157 - Nation of Islam and other black nationalist matters

(5) Title
Only one subject shall be carried in the title of each report. Separate reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of their relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

(6) Character
- (a) Top functionaries
  Internal Security (or Racial Matters if subject is a black nationalist) - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.
  Examples:
  Internal Security - C
  Internal Security - SWP
  Racial Matters - NOI
- (b) Others
  Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.
  Examples:
  Security Matter - C
  Security Matter - SWP
  Security Matter - X (native fascist)
  Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a top functionary, the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject is designated a top functionary, the first report after the designation and all subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. Communications regarding subjects who are employed in key facilities should bear the words "Key Facility" in the character. Communications regarding subjects who are members of the Communist Party, USA, National Committee should bear the words "National Committee" in the character. Black nationalist investigations and racial matters should be given the character set out in section 122, volume IV, of this manual.

(7) Status
All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:
- (a) Top functionaries
  - I. Pending inactive
    - (A) Reports are to be submitted[annually.] Forty-five days prior to the date a report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.
- (b) Key facility cases
  Key facility cases are to be maintained in pending-inactive status. (See 87D 7c (4).)

(c) Other security index subjects

I. Closed

(A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of a periodic investigative report according to priority designation. If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter (form FD-400) to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed. The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the periodic report is due.

(d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index

I. Pending inactive

(A) If all active investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau

(B) Set forth lead to follow Bureau for security index card and if approved for dissemination of report to Secret Service.

II. Closed

(A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau and dissemination to Secret Service

(B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (c) above.

(e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein

I. Closed

(A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(8) Content

(a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.:

I. Background

(A) Birth date
(B) Citizenship status
(C) Education
(D) Marital status
(E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
(F) Identification record
(G) Employment
(H) Residence
(I) Status of health (if known)

II. Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front groups, black nationalist extremist groups, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups

(A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.

(B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

The above is not all-inclusive. Facts developed in each case will produce information which will be indicative of the necessity for conducting further investigation along lines which will necessitate the use of various investigative techniques to develop the case fully. The successful investigation of an individual will depend upon the resourcefulness of the investigating Agents in developing techniques which will further establish the subversive activity of a subject.

Discretion must be used in those instances in which contact with persons known to the subject is believed desirable. Where such contact is contemplated, the Agent should assure himself of the character, loyalty, and reliability of the person to be contacted concerning the subject by reviewing the office indices and in some instances conducting preliminary inquiry, possibly under pretext, with others to ascertain the character, reliability, and loyalty of the person of whom inquiry concerning the subject is intended.

In conducting security investigations the necessity of obtaining admissible evidence must be continually borne in mind. However, sources furnishing information of a confidential nature are valuable and should be continued and enlarged for the purpose of obtaining information which can be corroborated by other sources which can be disclosed, thus rendering the information admissible as evidence.

The danger of relying upon evidence from only one confidential informant or other source is obvious and every effort should be made to obtain evidence from various types of sources and through various investigative techniques.

Information obtained from one source should be corroborated by contacts with confidential informants, public and private sources, through physical and photographic surveillances, review of office files, and other sources. Adequate coordination of information received from confidential sources with active investigation should be maintained at all times. For example, when it is ascertained through one of these sources that an important meeting is to occur, the nature of the meeting should be confirmed if possible by independent sources which can furnish evidence of an admissible character. The meeting should be covered by arrangement for attendance by confidential informants to obtain admissible evidence of the proceedings. The meetings should be placed under physical surveillance, licenses of automobiles parked near the meeting place noted, and attendants identified. If possible and advisable, photographic surveillances should be established. Other types of information received from confidential sources should receive similar attention in order that verification may be made and admissible evidence developed.

(6) Preservation of evidence

(a) Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained with a view to its possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.

87D

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

(b) Satisfactory notes or statements [illegible] informants necessary from which to refresh their recollection in the event they [illegible] called upon to testify at some future date. Such notes and statements must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and must contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.

(c) Informant's original notes or statements not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings

(d) The above applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or evidence otherwise obtained by Agents.

(7) Interviews with subjects of security investigations

(a) Purpose

I. To determine a subject's sympathies when investigation is inconclusive or to determine whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines

II. To develop information concerning subject's activities and those of others known to him to have been associated with a subversive movement

III. To develop security informants

(b) Subjects not included in the security index
No security investigation of an individual shall be closed unless the subject is included in the security index or consideration given to interviewing him.

(c) Security index subjects

I. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of a security index card on an individual by reason of inactivity in a subversive movement until he has been interviewed or Bureau advised why an interview is inadvisable or impossible.

II. Active subversives should be considered as potential informants. Consider interviews with selected individuals currently active in subversive organizations for development of additional active informants. Proper selection of individuals for interview is most important. They must possess necessary attributes for security informant work.

(d) Without Bureau authority the SAC may:

I. Authorize interviews with individuals who have not been subjects of security investigations and the available subversive information against them is not sufficient to warrant opening cases at this time

II. Grant authority to interview subjects of security cases where the persons have previously been interviewed with prior Bureau authority, provided no change has taken place in the subjects' status and the interviews are conducted under the same conditions as previously authorized

III. Authorize interviews of all persons who were the subjects of security investigations where the cases are now closed (This will include persons who were previously on the security index but whose names have been removed and the cases now closed.)

[IV. Authorize interviews of rank-and-file black extremists except as noted in section 122, volume IV, of this manual]

[V.] In authorizing these interviews no communication to the Bureau will be necessary and if there is a closed file, it should be reopened. If there is no closed file, a new case file of 134 category should be opened. The case should be assigned to an Agent to determine the residence of the subject, to make certain that the subject is identical with the information in the files, and to determine his current employment.

(A) The Agent to whom the case is assigned will prepare a memorandum for the SAC setting forth the information and requesting authority to conduct an interview with the subject solely for the purpose of determining his attitude toward cooperating with the FBI.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/10/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10193-10258
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	94-37374-2ND NR 35

Document Information

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	DONAHOE, S. B.
TO :	BELMONT, A. H.
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/23/1960
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	JFK, SPEECH, REACTION, UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/24/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF NSA
COMMENTS :	

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Parsons
1 - Belmont 1 - Ruehl
1 - Donahoe
1 - G. C. Moore

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 9/23/60

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

John F. Kennedy

SUBJECT: UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC REACTION TO SPEECH OF SENATOR JOHN KENNEDY
INTERNAL SECURITY - UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

TOP SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 1678REP/CH
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
4/17/87 NOV 8 1990

United Arab Republic (UAR) Ambassador to U.S. advised (TS) his country 8/26/60 Senator John Kennedy delivered speech to Zionist's Congress re solution Arab-Israeli dispute. UAR Ambassador stated speech contained fallacies and exaggerated (TS) statements and promises. UAR Ambassador subsequently contacted (TS) by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, who apologized for Kennedy's speech and explained it was dictated by political expediency.

On 9/22/60, National Security Agency furnished an intercept of coded diplomatic traffic from UAR Ambassador to (TS) Cairo, dated 8/26/60, classified "Top Secret Daunt" as it relates to communications intelligence. (TS)

According to the intercept, UAR Ambassador claimed Senator Fulbright stated Kennedy's speech was not an expression of what could be considered policy of Democratic administration with Kennedy as President. (TS)

UAR Ambassador reportedly advised Senator Fulbright (TS) of Ambassador's official displeasure with Senator Kennedy's (TS) speech as it was replete with fallacies and bias and disparagements regarding UAR rights and disregarded UAR feelings, thus indicating Senator Kennedy places personal interest before justice and interests of U.S. Senator Fulbright was advised continued efforts to obtain Jewish votes at expense of Arabs will have serious consequences, and UAR Ambassador expected Senator Fulbright to exert (TS) efforts to end such activities. Senator Fulbright stated he would attempt to comply with this request. (TS)

UAR Ambassador advised his superiors Senator Fulbright (TS) contacted him probably after consulting with Senator Kennedy whose speech was motivated by Senator Kennedy's desire to obtain Jewish, Catholic, and Negro minority votes in order to compensate for his loss of votes among Protestant majority which opposes Kennedy because of his Catholicism. The Ambassador was (TS)

VERbat
(6

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR ~~3-26-97~~
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
4/29/98 mdc

TOP SECRET (JFK)

94-37374
NOT RECORDED
46 OCT 3 1960
18 SEP 29 1960

UAR. INT. SEC.

52 OCT 7 1960

COPY TO MR. TOLSON

109-12-376-72

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

of the opinion purpose of speech was solely to obtain Jewish votes rather than to formulate party or governmental policy. He believed such speeches are consistent with Zionist's efforts to create breech between UAR and other governments. ~~(TS)~~ (U)

It was opinion of [UAR Ambassador] that Senator Fulbright's [S] visit with him not be disclosed. ~~(TS)~~

RECOMMENDATION:

For information. ~~TS~~ (U)

9/24

TOP SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10203-10246
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 92-3171-442

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, CG
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/05/61
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	SGI, ASSOC, CONFERENCE, RFK SPEAKING BEFORE GROUP
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	2, 4
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/29/95
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	INC NOTE

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

10/[illegible]61

Summary

Giancana, a Chicago mobster and target for early prosecution, is devising plans to remove pressure for hoodlum element. The hoodlum element in Chicago making plans to have the AG "toned" down during his appearance before Italian group during Columbus Day proceedings in Chicago on October 12, 1961. Information obtained from our technical coverage. Giancana also issued instruction to have a suspected informant taken for a ride. AG being advised.

16203-10246

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-20-84 BY SP5RJ6/CSL

4-41(Rev. 0-2-61)

DECODED COPY

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

☐ **Radio** ☒ **Teletype**

URGENT 10-5-61 11:26 PM SM

TO DIRECTOR AND SAC SAN FRANCISCO

FROM SAC CHICAGO 060234

ATTENTION ASST. DIRECTOR COURTNEY EVANS. SAMUEL M. GIANCANA, AKA. AR. ANTIRACKETEERING DAILY SUMMARY. CG 6486-C* ADVISED LAST NIGHT OF LENGTHEY CONFERENCES BETWEEN GIANCANA AND VARIOUS HOODLUMS. AMONG THOSE ATTENDING AS BEING IDENTIFIED WERE DOMINIC BLASI AND ROSS PRIO. PRIO WAS CONCERNED OVER THE FACT THAT ATTORNEY GENERAL KENNEDY IS MAKING AN APPEARANCE IN CHICAGO BEFORE AN ITALIAN AMERICAN GROUP DURING COLUMBUS DAY PROCEEDINGS HERE. HE FELT THAT ONE ANUNZIO, HEAD OF THIS GROUP, SHOULD BE TOLD TO TONE DOWN ON KENNEDY, THAT THIS WAS AN OBVIOUS ATTEMPT, ACCORDING TO PRIO, OF KENNEDY TO CONVINCE THE ITALIAN PEOPLE HERE THAT HE IS FRIENDLY TO THIS ETHNIC GROUP. PRIO ADVISED GIANCANA THAT HE IS CONNECTED WITH AN OFFICIAL OF A NEW MAGAZINE IN CHICAGO BELIEVED TO BE NAMED SHOW BUSINESS ILLUSTRATED, AND THAT THIS OFFICIAL IS WILLING TO EDITORIALIZE IN THE MAGAZINE AGAINST ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS CREATING INVESTIGATIONS AGAINST THE HOODLUM ELEMENT. ONE SUGGESTION OFFERED BY GIANCANA WAS TO HAVE THIS INDIVIDUAL COMMENT ON THE FACT THAT KENNEDY IS SPENDING ALL HIS TIME INVESTIGATING BOOKMAKERS AND NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO THOSE WHO ARE ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT, NAMELY, THE COMMUNISTS. TWO UNKNOWN PERSONS SPOKE WITH GIANCANA AND ADVISED THAT THEY HAD IDENTIFIED TWO INFORMANTS

Memo A.G. 10-7-61

92-3171-440

OCT 16 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-20-84 BY SP5RJ6/CAL

57 OCT 19 1961

SENT DIRECTOR 10-6-61

REC-46 EX-103

MR. BELMONT FOR THE DIRECTOR

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4-741 (Rev. 3-2-61)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ **Radio** ☒ **Teletype**

PAGE TWO FROM SAC CHICAGO 060234

UTILIZED BY THE STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, COOK COUNTY, IN MAKING GAMBLING RAIDS. AFTER OUTLINING TO GIANCANA THE REASONS FOR SUSPECTING ONE INFORMANT, GIANCANA GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO "PUT HIM IN A STEAM BOX, TAKE HIM FOR A RIDE, HIT HIM IN THE HEAD AND THROW HIM IN THE (UNKNOWN)." POSSIBILITY EXISTS THIS INFORMANT MAY BE IDENTICAL TO CG 6093-C. THIS INFORMANT POSSIBLY HAS BEEN FURNISHING INFORMATION DIRECTLY TO THE STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE RELATING TO GAMBLING ACTIVITIES. IT IS NOTED THAT THE INFORMANT HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE STATES ATTORNEYS POLICE CONCERNING HIS RECENT CONVICTION IN COOK COUNTY FOR INTIMIDATION OF A WITNESS. THE INFORMANT POSSIBLY WAS CONTACTED BY THE STATES ATTORNEYS POLICE AND VOLUNTEERED TO ASSIST THE STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE IN RETURN FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE THEN PENDING CASE IN COURT. IN ORDER TO PROTECT SOURCE IT IS NOT DEEMED ADVISABLE TO DISCUSS THESE POSSIBILITIES WITH INFORMANT. CG 6093-C BEING ALERTED BY CONTACTING AGENT TO BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS AND ALERT IN ALL HIS FUTURE ACTIVITIES. THIS ALERT WILL BE GIVEN HIM IN SUCH A WAY SO THAT THE SOURCE IS COMPLETELY PROTECTED. CHICAGO CONSIDERS IT INADVISABLE TO FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING OTHER INFORMANT TO STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT CG 6486-C* ADVISED LAST NIGHT THAT THEY HAD SOMEONE IN THE STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE ON THEIR PAYROLL AND THAT HE WAS FURNISHING THEM INFORMATION CONCERNING ACTIVITIES IN STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE. ROSS SPENCER, FORMER AGENT AND CHIEF INVESTIGATOR AT STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, IS PRESENTLY OUT OF THE COUNTRY ATTENDING IACP CONVENTION. EVEN IF INFORMATION EVENTUALLY GIVEN TO SPENCER, THIS OFFICE HAS NO CONTROL OVER THE DISSEMINATION WHICH SPENCER MIGHT

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4-41 (Rev. 6-2-65)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ **Radio** ☒ **Teletype**

PAGE THREE FROM SAC CHICAGO 060234

MAKE OF INFORMATION, THEREBY JEOPARDIZING SOURCE. FULL CONTEXT OF THESE TWO CONVERSATIONS CONTAINED IN DAILY AIRTEL SUMMARY THIS DATE UNDER CAPTION ACTIVITIES OF TOP HOODLUMS, CHICAGO DIVISION. U ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

RECEIVED: 12:43 AM LAM

CC: MR. EVANS

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10203-10276
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2717-43

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : PEARCE, J. ROBERT
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 11/24/59
PAGES : 18
SUBJECTS : ABR, ASSOC, B/F INT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/05/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Report Form
FD-263 (5-12-55)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office	Office of Origin	Date	Investigative Period	
PHILADELPHIA	PHILADELPHIA	11/24/59	10/7/59 - 11/17/59	

TITLE OF CASE

✓ 0 ANGELO BRUNO, aka.

Report made by: J. ROBERT PEARCE
Typed By: MMR

CHARACTER OF CASE

ANTI-RACKETEERING

~~Synopsis~~

Reference

Report of SA J. ROBERT PEARCE dated 10/8/59 at Philadelphia.

- P -

Leads

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLA.

*1. Will remain in contact with Miami 655-PC who, according to Miami letter to Philadelphia, 12/31/58, dined at the Luau Restaurant, North Bay Village, Fla., on 11/19/58 with ANGELO BRUNO. It should be learned from this informant if BRUNO has liquidated his interest in Cuba; if BRUNO has other financial interests in the Dominican Republic; if BRUNO intends to return to the Miami, Fla., vicinity; and the identity of all individuals with whom BRUNO had interests in the Hotel Plaza Gambling Casino in Havana, Cuba.

Approved CEH Special Agent In Charge

Do not write in spaces below

Copies made:

3 - Bureau (92-2717) ICC 47120
2 - Miami (92-139)
2 - Newark (92-478)
2 - Philadelphia (92-444)

0-17 to PH (2 not 3 copies needed)
JGL DEC 8 1959

92-2717-43
REC-37
EX-100
25 NOV 27 1959
CRIMINAL STAT. SECT.

INVESTIGATIVE DIV. RECD

274

57 DEC 10 1959

Property of FBI - This report is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

AT NORTH MIAMI BEACH, FLA.

*1. Will interview FNU BRUNO, alleged to be a Councilman at North Miami Beach, and a relative of ANGELO BRUNO, and endeavor to obtain the same general information as outlined above.

*2. Will consider interview of JOE MILLSTEIN, characterized as a night club owner, and shylock in Miami letter to Philadelphia dated 12/31/58, reportedly a friend of ANGELO BRUNO. The degree of association between Councilman BRUNO and JOE MILLSTEIN should be ascertained.

NEWARK

AT MT. HOLLY, N.J.

Can disregard previous lead to locate scene of operation of alleged crap game being operated there as informants have stated that this game is no longer in operation.

AT TRENTON, N.J.

Will ascertain the identity of the owner of the J. C. Vending Machines, Inc., 947 Southard Street, Trenton, N.J., and determine the association between this person and ANGELO BRUNO. Bear in mind that this individual might possibly be BEN GALLUP which is mentioned in the instant report and has previously been identified as an associate of BRUNO in Miami, Fla.

PHILADELPHIA

AT PHILADELPHIA, PA.

*1. Will attempt to locate and interview JOHNNIE ROCCO, allegedly connected with ANGELO BRUNO in disposing of Cuban currency brought into the country by BRUNO.

*2. Will endeavor to identify banking facilities used by BRUNO in Philadelphia.

3. Will maintain contact with informants who have knowledge of BRUNO's activities to learn of his movements and activities.

Informants

T-1	PH 535-C to SA ROBERT W. HOLMES.
T-2	PCI ARTHUR NEWMAN, Havana confidential source, information furnished unknown date.
T-3	PH 269-C to SA DALE M. HIESTAND, 10/9,15/59
T-4	THERESA DOUGHERTY, Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, to SE E. DAVIS PORTER.

Criminal Informant Coverage

PH 251-C	South Philadelphia racket figures widely acquainted with racket element. Has identified BRUNO's associates and illegal activities.
PH 269-C	Closely associated with subject. Has journeyed to Miami, Fla., with BRUNO.
PH 518-C	A local prostitute, formerly married to racket figure. Knows BRUNO and many of his associates.
PH 489-C	Numbers writer, Bootlegger. Familiar with BRUNO's activities.
PH 535-C	Old-time bootlegger, gambler, widely acquainted. Knows BRUNO.
PH 523-C	Former spouse, local Top Hoodlum. Well acquainted. Knows BRUNO.

Administrative Data

Credit and criminal checks in Miami, Fla. were conducted by IC CLIFFORD M. WERNER.

43

As previously set out a lead was outstanding to contact JOHNNY ROCCO for interview regarding his connection with ANGELO BRUNO in disposing of Cuban currency. It is pointed out that ROCCO has not been interviewed because of active investigation of him for violations of ITSMV and ITSP Statutes. Process is outstanding in the EDPA on ROCCO for these violations and he will be interviewed at the earliest possible date when the interview will not interfere with other investigation.

FD-204 (Rev. 9-23-58)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of:	J. ROBERT PEARCE	Office: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Date:	11/24/59	
File Number:	Philadelphia 92-444	Bureau 92-2717
Title:	ANGELO BRUNO	
Character:	ANTI-RACKETEERING	

Synopsis:

ANGELO BRUNO continues negotiations for contract to remove garbage from city of Philadelphia to vicinity of Salem, N.J. via water. One informant says no toll calls originated from BRUNO's residence 7/59 to 10/59. BRUNO observed riding Pontiac sedan registered to J. C. Vending Machines, Inc., 947 Southard Street, Trenton, N.J. PHIL TESTA, Lieutenant of BRUNO, driving black sedan, Pennsylvania registration F 2562. BRUNO's crap game, Mt. Holly, N.J. no longer in operation, according to one informant.

- P -

DETAILS:

B. CRIMINAL RECORD

On November 3, 1959, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Washington, D.C., made inquiry of the Identification Division as to the criminal record of ANGELO BRUNO, FBI #1045 098.

C. ASSOCIATES

At Miami, Fla.

BEN GALLUP NS.

By letter dated October 22, 1959, the Miami Division furnished the following information:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of any kind. It is the property of the FBI, and is a loan to your agency; it and/or its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

PH 92-444

On October 14, 1959, Mrs. ELOISE MANGONE advised that the All-Coin Amusement Company 2820 Northwest 7th Avenue, Miami, Fla., which operates vending machines and juke boxes, is owned by JOSEPH and ELOISE MANGONE. Mrs. MANGONE said that BEN GALLUP was in Miami during the 1957-1958 winter season for approximately six months, that he had rented a house, address unknown, on one of the islands adjacent to Miami Beach. She said that GALLUP had contacted her and her husband with a proposition to buy into their vending machine business but after considerable negotiating the deal was never consummated.

Mrs. MANGONE said that she was familiar with all of the persons engaged in the vending machine business in the Miami area and that BEN GALLUP did not enter into the business in Miami and to her knowledge has not been in Miami since the 1957-1958 season. She said that GALLUP was originally from Trenton, N.J. and was believed to have returned to Trenton where he was in the cigarette vending machine business. Mrs. MANGONE advised that during the time GALLUP was negotiating with them to purchase their business he used the All-Coin Amusement Company, 2820 Northwest 7th Avenue, Miami, as a mailing address and received mail during his stay in Miami. Mrs. MANGONE denied any further knowledge of GALLUP's associates, background, activities, or present whereabouts. It was stated that it was apparent during the interview of Mrs. MANGONE that she was reluctant to furnish information concerning GALLUP or his associates.

On October 2, 1959, the following agencies of Greater Miami were checked with negative results for information concerning BEN GALLUP:

- Miami Beach Police Department
- Miami Credit Bureau
- Dade County Department of Public Safety
- Miami Municipal Court
- Miami Police Department

92 501 - 3051

At Philadelphia, Pa.

On October 30, 1959, PHILIP TESTA, Lieutenant of ANGELO BRUNO, was observed driving a black sedan with Pennsylvania registration F 2562 by SA JOSEPH A. VERICA. This Pennsylvania registration is issued to MARIA TESTA, 918 South 10th Street.

On October 20, 1959, Philadelphia Confidential Informant T-1 advised that the crap game being operated in Mt. Holly, N.J. by BRUNO closed after running only one week due to lack of business. T-1 said that BRUNO was not actually running the game but his name was being used. T-1 said the game was being run by the "Trenton Boys" and that CARL PAPPY IPPOLITO of Trenton was running the game. T-1 said that IPPOLITO was a friend of BRUNO.

Philadelphia Confidential Informant T-4 advised on October 30, 1959, that the phone listed to J. ANNALORO, 934 Snyder Avenue, Philadelphia, HO 2-5158, had no toll calls from July 26, 1959, to October 25, 1959.

D. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

T-1 on October 13, 1959, advised that ANGELO BRUNO continued to operate numbers in South Philadelphia and to do some loan sharking. T-1 said that BRUNO to his knowledge continues to "answer to " Camden (N.J.).

On October 30, 1959, Lieutenant TOM CLOONEY, 24th and Wolf Streets, Philadelphia, advised that ANGELO BRUNO, according to information he had received, continues to operate in the numbers racket in South Philadelphia.

E. LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISES

Gambling - Cuba

By letter dated October 22, 1959, the Miami Division advised as follows regarding gambling in Cuba:

Prior to May 1959, ANGELO BRUNO told Philadelphia Confidential Informant T-2 that he, BRUNO, was one of the interest holders in the Hotel Plaza Gambling Casino and that this casino had received permission to reopen in June 1959. It was said that in August 1959 the following gambling casinos continued to be opened in Havana for operation:

Tropicana Hotel

Havana Hilton Hotel

Hotel Nacional

Capri Hotel

Havana Riviera Hotel

The remaining gambling casinos, including the Hotel Plaza Gambling Casino, were closed either because of Government edict or financial difficulties.

It was also stated that on August 14, 1959, GLEN ASMUSSEN, Immigration and Naturalization Service, telephonically advised the Miami Office that "ANGELO" ANNALORO had arrived from Havana, Cuba, via Pan American Airlines, flight #420 at 8:15 p.m., August 14, 1959. The residence address of ANNALORO, an alias used by BRUNO, was 934 Snyder Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa. ANNALORO said he was a citizen of the United States.

On September 28, 1959, Inspector WALLACE SHANLEY, U. S. Customs, Miami, advised SA CHARLES W. ADMISTON that he had received no information concerning ANGELO BRUNO's activities, either in Havana or the Dominican Republic.

Trash Removal Contracts City of Philadelphia

As previously reported ANGELO BRUNO was making arrangements in Philadelphia through Philadelphia City Councilman PAUL D'ORTONA to receive a contract with the city of Philadelphia to haul trash and garbage from Philadelphia via water.

On October 15, 1959, Philadelphia Confidential Informant T-3 said that ANGELO BRUNO met on the evening of October 14, 1959, with SAM ROSE, Philadelphia City Councilman, to discuss BRUNO's proposed contract with the city of Philadelphia for removal of trash. T-3 said that BRUNO had indicated that the land purchased, described below, was about to be concluded and that POLLINAwho made the down payment on the land was not DOMENICK POLLINA, Philadelphia Top Hoodlum. T-3 did not know if this POLLINA was the relative of DOMENICK POLLINA.

On October 7, 1959, U. S. Game Management Agent in New Jersey HARRY E. GREENWALD advised SA IRVING R. DEAN that an 800 plus acre plot of land on the south side of Mad Horse Creek in Salem County, N.J. was owned by RIESS EWEN of Salem, N.J. This land was said to be surrounded by a 2500 acre plot owned by THOMAS DICKSON, Clerk of the County Court of Salem, N.J. who is fighting the sale of the 800 acres owned by EWEN to one (FNU) POLLINA, described as a South Philadelphian who had made a down payment of $3500 toward a purchase price of $75.00 per acre for EWEN's acreage. It was said that the state of New Jersey had offered EWEN $35.00 an acre for his land as a proposed public shooting grounds for wild ducks.

GREENWALD also said that the Salem, N.J. City Council unanimously opposed the sale of EWEN's acreage when it became known that the acreage was intended for a garbage disposal area. Two weeks after this action, however, it is alleged that the entire City Council of Salem, N.J. reversed its decision and voted for the sale of EWEN's property, knowing that it was to be used as a garbage disposal area.

The property was described as being only accessible by water and that the only obstacle holding up the sale of the land at the present time is the riparian rights to the land which is now in the process of litigation.

On October 19, 1959, GREENWALD advised SA DEAN that THOMAS DICKSON, described above, was contacted by an individual, presumably a JOHN POLLINA, in an endeavor to purchase his 2500 acre plot in Salem, N.J. GREENWALD allegedly was told by DICKSON that it was demanded that he set a price for his land and that DICKSON would be contacted Wednesday evening, October 21, 1959, for his answer. GREENWALD said that DICKSON had called him and related this information. DICKSON was said to be extremely worried over what may happen to him or his family if he does not sell the land.

By letter October 26, 1959, the Newark Division advised that THOMAS PANCOAST DICKSON on October 20, 1959, was interviewed by SA ROBERT D. ALDRICH and advised as follows:

DICKSON did not know other than from rumor who was involved in the sale of land to the land adjoining his property for the purpose of using it as a garbage disposal area. He had been approached to sell his land by CHARLES ACTON, Swedesboro, N.J., a real estate dealer. No threats were made to him but ACTON told him that the people he represented "had to have the land" and for him to name his price and they would buy.

DICKSON has heard from sources unrecalled that the POLLINAs were the persons behind the project but he observed that there appeared to be a great deal of political pressure coming from the State of New Jersey regarding the matter. It appeared that the state wanted to use Salem County as a dump ground for the whole state since dumping on the North Jersey meadows has been stopped.

A. W. W. HOWELL, Box 459, Parsippany, N.J., told DICKSON that the state of New Jersey had made an official investigation concerning the matter so he, DICKSON, called a Detective Sergeant EMIL DALINT of the New Jersey State Police at West Trenton, N.J., who admitted to him that such an investigation had been made and a file existed but that he preferred that DICKSON talk to his superior, Deputy Attorney General JOHN J. BURGIN for any official information. DICKSON did not proceed further.

DICKSON said that local meetings have been held in Salem in an effort to get an ordinance passed forbidding any such dumping and an official of the City Health Department, one JOHN ZEMHAMPSKI (phonetic) has appeared and argued strongly against passage of such restrictions. In DICKSON's opinion this man had no business at such a meeting. DICKSON said there had been many rumors around Salem concerning large payoffs to New Jersey state officials but DICKSON cannot substantiate any of these. DICKSON said he would attempt to cooperate with the FBI in every way should threats be made to him as he definitely did not intend to sell his land for a dump.

T-3 on October 9, 1959, said that BRUNO had stated that they were then ready to purchase land at Salem, N.J. but BRUNO furnished no additional information. It was also said that BRUNO stated that all of the City Councilmen in Philadelphia were going to get a "cut" from this business venture. Councilmen SAMUEL ROSE and PAUL D'ORTONA were said to be the most active in the proposed business venture. It was said that Chief Magistrate JOSEPH HERSCH had a definite interest in the matter. On October 15, 1959, T-3 said that HERSCH was a close, personal friend of BRUNO.

T-3 said that the land in Salem, N.J. had been purchased with a $20,000 down payment and had a $47,000 balance remaining. It was said that the agreed price would be $2.65 per ton for removal of garbage from the city. MICKEY ROSE, a relative of Councilman SAMUEL ROSE, will be the front for the group. It is noted that i has previously been reported that the investment in this venture will be approximately $400,000.

G. TRAVEL

On October 26, 1959, Lieutenant TOM CLOONEY, Philadelphia Police Department, advised SA THOMAS F. CARRIG that ANGELO BRUNO had been observed by him driving a grey Pontiac sedan with New Jersey registration X/M 9530 J. The Newark Division advised on October 30, 1959, that New Jersey registration "Commercial" X/M 9530 J is registered to the J. C. Vending Machines, Inc., 947 Southard Street, Trenton, N.J., for a 1957 Pontiac coupe.

FD-204 (Rev. 9-23-58)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: J. ROBERT PEARCE
Date: 11/24/59
Office: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

File Number: Philadelphia 92-444
Bureau 92-2717

Title: ANGELO BRUNO

Character: ANTI-RACKETEERING

Synopsis:

ANGELO BRUNO continues negotiations for contract to remove garbage from city of Philadelphia to vicinity of Salem, N.J. via water. One informant says no toll calls originated from BRUNO's residence 7/59 to 10/59. BRUNO observed riding Pontiac sedan registered to J. C. Vending Machines, Inc., 947 Southard Street, Trenton, N.J. PHIL TESTA, Lieutenant of BRUNO, driving black sedan, Pennsylvania registration F 2562. BRUNO's crap game, Mt. Holly, N.J. no longer in operation, according to one informant.

- P -

DETAILS:

B. CRIMINAL RECORD

On November 3, 1959, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Washington, D.C., made inquiry of the Identification Division as to the criminal record of ANGELO BRUNO, FBI #1045 098.

C. ASSOCIATES

At Miami, Fla.

BEN GALLUP

By letter dated October 22, 1959, the Miami Division furnished the following information:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of any kind. It is the property of the FBI, and is a loan to your agency; it and/or its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. 16—74625-1 GPO

On October 14, 1959, Mrs. ELOISE MANGONE advised that the All-Coin Amusement Company 2820 Northwest 7th Avenue, Miami, Fla., which operates vending machines and juke boxes, is owned by JOSEPH and ELOISE MANGONE. Mrs. MANGONE said that BEN GALLUP was in Miami during the 1957-1958 winter season for approximately six months, that he had rented a house, address unknown, on one of the islands adjacent to Miami Beach. She said that GALLUP had contacted her and her husband with a proposition to buy into their vending machine business but after considerable negotiating the deal was never consummated.

Mrs. MANGONE said that she was familiar with all of the persons engaged in the vending machine business in the Miami area and that BEN GALLUP did not enter into the business in Miami and to her knowledge has not been in Miami since the 1957-1958 season. She said that GALLUP was originally from Trenton, N.J. and was believed to have returned to Trenton where he was in the cigarette vending machine business. Mrs. MANGONE advised that during the time GALLUP was negotiating with them to purchase their business he used the All-Coin Amusement Company, 2820 Northwest 7th Avenue, Miami, as a mailing address and received mail during his stay in Miami. Mrs. MANGONE denied any further knowledge of GALLUP's associates, background, activities, or present whereabouts. It was stated that it was apparent during the interview of Mrs. MANGONE that she was reluctant to furnish information concerning GALLUP or his associates.

On October 2, 1959, the following agencies of Greater Miami were checked with negative results for information concerning BEN GALLUP:

Miami Beach Police Department

Miami Credit Bureau

Dade County Department of Public Safety

Miami Municipal Court

Miami Police Department

At Philadelphia, Pa.

On October 30, 1959, PHILIP TESTA, Lieutenant of ANGELO BRUNO, was observed driving a black sedan with Pennsylvania registration F 2562 by SA JOSEPH A. VERICA. This Pennsylvania registration is issued to MARIA TESTA, 918 South 10th Street.

On October 20, 1959, Philadelphia Confidential Informant T-1 advised that the crap game being operated in Mt. Holly, N.J. by BRUNO closed after running only one week due to lack of business. T-1 said that BRUNO was not actually running the game but his name was being used. T-1 said the game was being run by the "Trenton Boys" and that CARL PAPPY IPPOLITO of Trenton was running the game. T-1 said that IPPOLITO was a friend of BRUNO.

Philadelphia Confidential Informant T-4 advised on October 30, 1959, that the phone listed to J. ANNALORO, 934 Snyder Avenue, Philadelphia, HO 2-5158, had no toll calls from July 26, 1959, to October 25, 1959.

D. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

T-1 on October 13, 1959, advised that ANGELO BRUNO continued to operate numbers in South Philadelphia and to do some loan sharking. T-1 said that BRUNO to his knowledge continues to "answer to " Camden (N.J.).

On October 30, 1959, Lieutenant TOM CLOONEY, 24th and Wolf Streets, Philadelphia, advised that ANGELO BRUNO, according to information he had received, continues to operate in the numbers racket in South Philadelphia.

E. LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISES

Gambling - Cuba

By letter dated October 22, 1959, the Miami Division advised as follows regarding gambling in Cuba:

Prior to May 1959, ANGELO BRUNO told Philadelphia Confidential Informant T-2 that he, BRUNO, was one of the interest holders in the Hotel Plaza Gambling Casino and that this casino had received permission to reopen in June 1959. It was said that in August 1959 the following gambling casinos continued to be opened in Havana for operation:

Tropicana Hotel

Havana Hilton Hotel

Hotel Nacional

Capri Hotel

Havana Riviera Hotel

The remaining gambling casinos, including the Hotel Plaza Gambling Casino, were closed either because of Government edict or financial difficulties.

It was also stated that on August 14, 1959, GLEN ASMUSSEN, Immigration and Naturalization Service, telephonically advised the Miami Office that ANGELO ANNALORO had arrived from Havana, Cuba, via Pan American Airlines, flight #420 at 8:15 p.m., August 14, 1959. The residence address of ANNALORO, an alias used by BRUNO, was 934 Snyder Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa. ANNALORO said he was a citizen of the United States.

On September 28, 1959, Inspector WALLACE SHANLEY, U. S. Customs, Miami, advised SA CHARLES W. ADMISTON that he had received no information concerning ANGELO BRUNO's activities, either in Havana or the Dominican Republic.

Trash Removal Contracts City of Philadelphia

As previously reported ANGELO BRUNO was making arrangements in Philadelphia through Philadelphia City Councilman PAUL D'ORTONA to receive a contract with the city of Philadelphia to haul trash and garbage from Philadelphia via water.

On October 15, 1959, Philadelphia Confidential Informant T-3 said that ANGELO BRUNO met on the evening of October 14, 1959, with SAM ROSE, Philadelphia City Councilman, to discuss BRUNO's proposed contract with the city of Philadelphia for removal of trash. T-3 said that BRUNO had indicated that the land purchased, described below, was about to be concluded and that POLLINAwho made the down payment on the land was not DOMENICK POLLINA, Philadelphia Top Hoodlum. T-3 did not know if this POLLINA was the relative of DOMENICK POLLINA.

On October 7, 1959, U. S. Game Management Agent in New Jersey HARRY E. GREENWALD advised SA IRVING R. DEAN that an 800 plus acre plot of land on the south side of Mad Horse Creek in Salem County, N.J. was owned by RIESS EWEN of Salem, N.J. This land was said to be surrounded by a 2500 acre plot owned by THOMAS DICKSON, Clerk of the County Court of Salem, N.J. who is fighting the sale of the 800 acres owned by EWEN to one (FNU) POLLINA, described as a South Philadelphian who had made a down payment of $3500 toward a purchase price of $75.00 per acre for EWEN's acreage. It was said that the state of New Jersey had offered EWEN $35.00 an acre for his land as a proposed public shooting grounds for wild ducks.

GREENWALD also said that the Salem, N.J. City Council unanimously opposed the sale of EWEN's acreage when it became known that the acreage was intended for a garbage disposal area. Two weeks after this action, however, it is alleged that the entire City Council of Salem, N.J. reversed its decision and voted for the sale of EWEN's property, knowing that it was to be used as a garbage disposal area.

The property was described as being only accessible by water and that the only obstacle holding up the sale of the land at the present time is the riparian rights to the land which is now in the process of litigation.

On October 19, 1959, GREENWALD advised SA DEAN that THOMAS DICKSON, described above, was contacted by an individual, presumably a JOHN POLLINA, in an endeavor to purchase his 2500 acre plot in Salem, N.J. GREENWALD allegedly was told by DICKSON that it was demanded that he set a price for his land and that DICKSON would be contacted Wednesday evening, October 21, 1959, for his answer. GREENWALD said that DICKSON had called him and related this information. DICKSON was said to be extremely worried over what may happen to him or his family if he does not sell the land.

By letter October 26, 1959, the Newark Division advised that THOMAS PANCOAST DICKSON on October 20, 1959, was interviewed by SA ROBERT D. ALDRICH and advised as follows:

DICKSON did not know other than from rumor who was involved in the sale of land to the land adjoining his property for the purpose of using it as a garbage disposal area. He had been approached to sell his land by CHARLES ACTON, Swedesboro, N.J., a real estate dealer. No threats were made to him but ACTON told him that the people he represented "had to have the land" and for him to name his price and they would buy.

DICKSON has heard from sources unrecalled that the POLLINAs were the persons behind the project but he observed that there appeared to be a great deal of political pressure coming from the State of New Jersey regarding the matter. It appeared that the state wanted to use Salem County as a dump ground for the whole state since dumping on the North Jersey meadows has been stopped.

A. W. W. HOWELL, Box 459, Parsippany, N.J., told DICKSON that the state of New Jersey had made an official investigation concerning the matter so he, DICKSON, called a Detective Sergeant EMIL DALINT of the New Jersey State Police at West Trenton, N.J., who admitted to him that such an investigation had been made and a file existed but that he preferred that DICKSON talk to his superior, Deputy Attorney General JOHN J. BURGIN for any official information. DICKSON did not proceed further.

DICKSON said that local meetings have been held in Salem in an effort to get an ordinance passed forbidding any such dumping and an official of the City Health Department, one JOHN ZEMHAMPSKI (phonetic) has appeared and argued strongly against passage of such restrictions. In DICKSON's opinion this man had no business at such a meeting. DICKSON said there had been many rumors around Salem concerning large payoffs to New Jersey state officials but DICKSON cannot substantiate any of these. DICKSON said he would attempt to cooperate with the FBI in every way should threats be made to him as he definitely did not intend to sell his land for a dump.

T-3 on October 9, 1959, said that BRUNO had stated that they were then ready to purchase land at Salem, N.J. but BRUNO furnished no additional information. It was also said that BRUNO stated that all of the City Councilmen in Philadelphia were going to get a "cut" from this business venture. Councilmen SAMUEL ROSE and PAUL D'ORTONA were said to be the most active in the proposed business venture. It was said that Chief Magistrate JOSEPH HERSCH had a definite interest in the matter. On October 15, 1959, T-3 said that HERSCH was a close, personal friend of BRUNO.

T-3 said that the land in Salem, N.J. had been purchased with a $20,000 down payment and had a $47,000 balance remaining. It was said that the agreed price would be $2.65 per ton for removal of garbage from the city. MICKEY ROSE, a relative of Councilman SAMUEL ROSE, will be the front for the group. It is noted that i has previously been reported that the investment in this venture will be approximately $400,000.

G. TRAVEL

On October 26, 1959, Lieutenant TOM CLOONEY, Philadelphia Police Department, advised SA THOMAS F. CARRIG that ANGELO BRUNO had been observed by him driving a grey Pontiac sedan with New Jersey registration X/M 9530 J. The Newark Division advised on October 30, 1959, that New Jersey registration "Commercial" X/M 9530 J is registered to the J. C. Vending Machines, Inc., 947 Southard Street, Trenton, N.J., for a 1957 Pontiac coupe.

10503-10518

Date : 04/30/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10203-10292
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2713-515

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, NO
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 12/16/68
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : CM, ASSOC, TRA, ATTORNEY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/30/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

F 2-64)

FBI

Date: 12-16-68

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

Tele. Room
Miss Gandy

TO: HOUSTON AND DIRECTOR (AIRMAIL)

FROM: NEW ORLEANS (92-36)

URSIC

CARLOS MARCELLO; AR

1 7 3 4

NO ONE SEVEN THREE FOUR DASH PC, THIS DATE ADVISED SUBJECT BEING DRIVEN BY SAL BOEMIA TO BAY CITY, TEXAS IN SUBJECT'S BLACK LINCOLN CONTINENTAL, LOUISIANA LICENSE NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT DASH SIXTYNINE THREE TWO ZERO B EIGHT SEVEN ONE.

SUBJECT TO PICK UP "PICOU", LAFAYETTE, LOUISIANA ASSOCIATE OF THE SUBJECT. SUBJECT TRANSPORTING TRANSCRIPT OF HIS TRIAL AT LAREDO, TEXAS AND TO MEET WITH DOCTOR FRANK RAGANO, ATTORNEY FOR LCN BOSS SANTO TRAFFICANTE OF TAMPA, FLA.

SOURCE ALSO ADVISED GUISEPPE GAGLIANO, FORMER UNDER BOSS LCN IN NEW ORLEANS TO BE IN ATTENDANCE. PURPOSE OF MEETING UNKNOWN TO SOURCE AND SUBJECT TO RETURN ON WEDNESDAY TWELVE EIGHTEEN SIXTYEIGHT.

EX-113 REC 4 92-2713-515

JAN 2 1969

HOUSTON, AT BAY CITY, TEXAS:

CONTACT APPROPRIATE SOURCES AND ANY OTHER INVESTIGATION DEEMED APPROPRIATE TO DETERMINE SUBJECT'S PRESENCE AND LOCATION OF MEETING IN BAY CITY, TEXAS.

END PAGE ONE...

① - BUREAU 1 - TAMPA 1 - NEW ORLEANS

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

JAN 10 1969

NO 92-36

PAGE TWO

IT IS BEING NOTED SUBJECT PREVIOUSLY IN CONTACT WITH MOISE SIMON, ATTORNEY FOR BROWN AND ROOT BAY CITY, TEXAS RE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SALE OF CHURCHILL FARMS INC.

HOUSTON EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION IN UTILIZATION OF ABOVE INFO SO AS NOT TO COMPROMISE HIGHTLY SENSATIVE SOURCE ABOVE.

END.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10203-10294
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2713-1ST NR 516

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HAHN, DELBERT W.
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 04/18/69
PAGES : 20
SUBJECTS : CM, ASSOC, INTV, MITCHELL, DAVID LYNN, RING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4, REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/30/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF USCG
COMMENTS : REFERRED TO USCG

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
NEW ORLEANS	NEW ORLEANS	4/18/69	12/5/68 - 4/11/69

TITLE OF CASE

DAVID LYNN MITCHELL, aka
Theft of $54,170.00 in Jewelry, 8/16/67,
West Hollywood, California;
ADDIE KATHERINE EARLE - VICTIM;
MARGARET ELAINE ADAMS, aka;
ANTHONY ROSSI, aka
Tony Rossi,
A. Rossie,
Ovidio Limone,
Tony LaMont,
Tony Lamonte -
FUGITIVE

REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
SA DELBERT W. HAHN	-kbz

CHARACTER OF CASE

ITSP - MT;
ITSP - RECEIVING AND CONCEALING;
UFAP - BURGLARY AND GRAND THEFT;
HARBORING

P. D

87-92096-49

ORIGINAL FILED IN

W

REFERENCES: New Orleans report of SA DELBERT W. HAHN, 12/2/68.
Mobile airtel to New Orleans, 1/13/69.
Sacramento report of SA DONALD H. MOE, 1/29/69.
Tampa report of SA DAVID P. GRIMES, 1/31/69.
Mobile letter to Tampa, 2/3/69.
New Olreans airtel to Sacramento, 2/11/69.
New York letter to Tampa, 2/18/69.

(References continued Cover Page B)

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☒ NONE						ACQUITTALS
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES	

CASE HAS BEEN:
PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☒ YES ☐ NO
PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☒ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

4 - Bureau
(1 - 87-92096)
(3 - 92-2713)
1 - USA, New Orleans
1 - Departmental Attorney, OWEN NEFF, New Orleans
1 - Atlanta (87-14204)(Info.)

(Copies Made continued Cover Page B)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

92-2713-

NOT RECORDED
168 APR 22 1969

Notations

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency				
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.				
By				

x66

COVER PAGE

55 MAY 13 1969

COPIES MADE (CONTINUED):

2 - Houston
3 - Los Angeles
    (2 - 87-26930)
    (1 - USA, Los Angeles)
1 - San Francisco (Info.)
2 - Tampa
    (1 - 88-4851)
    (1 - USA, Tampa)
1 - WFO (87-16906)(Info.)
5 - New Orleans
    (2 - 87-14835)
    (1 - 92-36)
    (1 - 92-801)
    (1 - 92-841)

* * * *

REFERENCES (CONTINUED):

Honolulu teletype to New Orleans, 2/26/69.
New Orleans airtel to WFO, 2/27/69.
Sacramento airtel to Tampa, 2/27/69.
New Orleans airtel to Bureau, 3/12/69.
New Orleans airtel to Boston, 3/20/69.
Boston letter to New Orleans, 3/25/69.
Tampa letter to New Orleans, 3/28/69.
New York letter to New Orleans, 4/3/69.
New Orleans airtel to Atlanta, 4/4/69.
Sacramento letter to Tampa, 4/8/69.
Tampa letter to Director, 4/7/69.
Tampa report of SA DAVID P. GRIMES, 4/8/69.
New Orleans airtel to Tampa, 4/9/69.

-P-

NO 87-14835

INFORMANTS:

PCI ANTHONY SAM SERIO advised on 3/29/69, that he was in the Bun Restaurant on 3/27/69, and overheard ROSSI's former partner in conversation with an unknown person stated that ROSSI was in San Francisco, Calif.

LEADS:

LOS ANGELES

AT WEST HOLLYWOOD, CALIFORNIA. MITCHELL, in signed statements, says he sold an emerald ring to New Orleans top hoodlum and LCN member, CARLOS MARCELLO. Ring was described by MITCHELL as "emerald ring set in platinum with twenty-two diamond baguettes surrounding the center emerald and about twenty-two diamond "stars" or "tips" in a second circle around the other diamonds. This is believed to be Item #7 on the inventory letter dated 5/25/65.

Reinterview ADDIE KATHERINE EARLE and determine which item this ring could be and obtain from her a photograph of the ring, if available, or a reasonably accurate sketch of the ring.

Please expedite.

HOUSTON

AT GALVESTON, TEXAS. MITCHELL states stolen jewelry given to one FRANK WALLS to hold. WALLS employed at Canal Jewelry. MITCHELL claims WALLS dated his mother, BETTY MITCHELL (deceased), in 1951, when they lived in Galveston. They lived in an apartment adjacent to a beauty shop. The owner of the beauty shop lived in an apartment above the beauty shop. The shop is located "North and adjacent to the Sears Roebuck parking lot." WALLS allegedly operated a "club" in Galveston. The owner of the beauty shop knew his mother and WALLS.

NO 87-14835

LEADS (CONTINUED):

Houston is requested to attempt to locate and identify the beauty shop owner and interview her in an effort to verify MITCHELL's statement and identify FRANK WALLS.

Houston will also conduct credit, criminal, and other logical checks to identify FRANK WALLS.

Expeditious handling is requested.

NEW ORLEANS

AT NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA. Will set out leads as developed to locate and arrest ANTHONY ROSSI.

Will confer with AUSA and Departmental Attorney re prosecution of ROSSI; possible appearance of DAVID LYNN MITCHELL before Federal Grand Jury at New Orleans; and attempt to develop prosecutable ITSP-RECEIVING violation re CARLOS MARCELLO.

Will continue investigation at Canal Jewelry to identify FRANK WALLS.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

No report submitted prior to this time as no information of prosecutive value obtained that was not already known by AUSA, New Orleans. Investigation as to present whereabouts of ANTHONY ROSSI and subsequent leads were set out in referenced communications as developed.

Information copies are furnished to those offices having outstanding investigation, and/or prosecution pending or anticipated.

Copies of this report are furnished to the Bureau for Bufile 92-2713, CARLOS MARCELLO - AR, inasmuch as MITCHELL states he sold one of the stolen rings to MARCELLO and has furnished signed statements to that effect. Copy of report also disseminated to Departmental Attorney, OWEN NEFF, New Orleans.

-D*-
COVER PAGE

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:
1 - U. S. Attorney, New Orleans, Louisiana
1 - Departmental Attorney, OWEN NEFF, New Orleans, Louisiana
1 - U. S. Attorney, Los Angeles, California
1 - U. S. Attorney, Tampa, Florida

Report of: SA DELBERT W. HAHN **Office:** NEW ORLEANS
Date: 4/18/69

Field Office File #: NO 87-14835 **Bureau File #:** 87-92096

Title:
DAVID LYNN MITCHELL,
Theft of $54,170.00 in Jewelry, August 16, 1967,
West Hollywood, California;
ADDIE KATHERINE EARLE - VICTIM;
MARGARET ELAINE ADAMS;
ANTHONY ROSSI

Character:
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY - MAJOR THEFT;
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY - RECEIVING AND CONCEALING;
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION - BURGLARY AND GRAND THEFT;
HARBORING

Synopsis:

ROSSI, as OVIDIO LIMONE, obtained Coast Guard Z card #1281740, 7/31/68, at New Orleans. ROSSI cancelled insurance on Cadillac and by letter requested premium refund be forwarded to New York address. FBI Lab identified handwriting of hotel safe deposit box receipt as that of ANTHONY ROSSI. DAVID LYNN MITCHELL identified photo of CARLOS MARCELLO and furnished signed statement that he sold emerald ring to MARCELLO in Canal Jewelry Store for $3,000. ROSSI HAS PRIOR ARREST FOR ASSAULT AND ROBBERY AND SHOULD BE APPROACHED CAUTIOUSLY.

- P -

DETAILS:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

On December 3, 1968, ELIZABETH MILLER, Principal, Peters Junior High, advised that DEBBIE PORTER ROSSI was an eighth grade student, but has been absent since November 18, 1968. No request for forwarding of her school records has been received. School records reflect her mother to be BARBARA ANNE PORTER ROSSI and her father to be ANTHONY ROSSI. She transferred from Sugar Hill School, Buford, Georgia.

On December 10, 1968, appropriate officials at the following hotels were contacted and all advised that there were no unclaimed safe deposit box contents:

ROYAL ORLEANS HOTEL

JUNG HOTEL

ROOSEVELT HOTEL

BOURBON ORLEANS HOTEL

SHERATON-DELTA HOTEL

MONTELEONE HOTEL

SHERATON CHARLES HOTEL

On January 6, 1969, Mrs. MARGAURITE BAHM, Personnel Manager, Marsh-McClennan Insurance Company, 225 Baronne, advised that BARBARA ANNE PORTER ROSSI worked for her company until November 18, 1968, at which time she obtained her pay check, said she was sick, and would be under a doctor's care until such time as she was able to return to work. Her Social Security Number is 257-46-1088, and her date of birth is January 25,1937. Her father is Reverend PORTER, Buford, Georgia, telephone 945-7031. Her daughter is DEBORA ANN PORTER ROSSI, date of birth March 17, 1956, father ANTHONY ROSSI.

On January 17, 1969, Mrs. BAHM advised she had just received a letter from ROSSI, stating that he had sold a Cadillac on which her company has the policy and requesting that the refund be mailed to Mrs. CAROL POLIZZI, 9511 Shore Road, Brooklyn, New York.

Credit Bureau records made available by LANCE GARCIA, January 17, 1969, reflect that ANTHONY ROSSI is married to BARBARA and is employed at Rubensteins Clothing Store.

On January 16, 1969, Lieutenant Commander, R. G. NELSON, United States Coast Guard, Senior Inspector, made available United States Coast Guard form CG 719B, which reflects that OVIDIO LIMONE, also known as TONY ROSSI, applied for seaman's papers and submitted a letter of intent to employ from Waterman Steamship Company.

On January 17, 1969, LOUIS S. O'NEIL, Waterman Steamship Company, advised his records reflect that his office was requested to write a letter of intent by BOB LUNA of New Orleans Shipping Company. O'NEIL stated he wrote the letter, although there was no intention to employ ROSSI and that such is a common practice in the industry.

On January 17, 1969, BOB LUNA, JR., 2609 Veronica Drive, was interviewed at New Orleans Shipping Company, 436 Camp Street. He advised that SALVADORE ESCOTO, who resides at 1012 Esplanade, and is a merchant seaman he went to school with, asked him to have a letter of intent written for a friend of his, ANTHONY ROSSI. LUNA stated he went to Waterman Steamship, who at his request wrote the letter. He delivered the letter to ESCOTO in front of the Bun Restaurant. ESCOTO was with another unknown male in sunglasses who upon receipt of the letter, gave him a fifth of whiskey. A photograph of ANTHONY ROSSI was exhibited, but LUNA was not able to identify it. LUNA stated he does not know ROSSI personally and did it as a favor for ESCOTO to promote business.

On January 17, 1969, Mrs. SALVADOR ESCOTO, 1012 Esplanade, advised her husband is presently in Japan, on the "SS GREEN LAKE." She knows he took ROSSI to get seaman's papers, but he is just an acquaintance and she has no information as to his present whereabouts.

On February 14, 1969, it was determined that ANTHONY ROSSI's telephone number former at 119 South Claiborne, was transferred to 8917 Apple Avenue.

Attempts to contact the resident at 8917 Apple Avenue were negative on February 27, 1969, and March 5, 1969.

The following investigation was conducted by SA DELBERT W. HAHN and SA ANDRE N. FORTIER, on March 25, 1969, at New Orleans, Louisiana:

ANN OLE, 8917 Apple Avenue, advised she is the step-daughter of NINO NOLTE. Her mother had ANTHONY ROSSI's telephone transferred to the OLE residence in order to avoid the $25.00 deposit. She knows ROSSI only as the business partner in the Bus Restaurant with her step-father. She has not seen ROSSI and has no knowledge of his present whereabouts. She has nothing to do with her step-father and he has nothing to do with her; they do not get along.

An attempt was made to contact NINO NOLTE at 8908 Nelson Avenue. ESSIE MAE GUILLOUT, 2909 Willow Street, telephone number TW 1-7914, was at the residence and advised she is the maid. She does not know ROSSI and his photograph was not familiar to her.

On April 11, 1969, SALVADORE ESCOTO advised he had met ROSSI by frequenting the Bun Restaurant, which ROSSI apparently owned.

On one occasion, ROSSI asked him to help him get seaman's papers as he desired to go to sea. ESCOTO stated he then asked his friend, BOB LUNA, to get a letter of intent for ROSSI. The letter was obtained and ESCOTO gave it to ROSSI at the Bun. ROSSI never told him that he had obtained a job and never mentioned that he would be taking a trip. ESCOTO stated he knew nothing about ROSSI's personal life and only knew him by contacting him at the Bun Restaurant when he went there to eat or drink coffee.

AT DENVER, COLORADO

The following investigation was conducted by SA LEROY W. GREEN:

Mr. BUEL O'LOUGHLIN, Identification Division, Denver, Colorado Police Department, advised on December 17, 1968, that he was unable to locate any record identifiable with ANTHONY ROSSI, either under his true name or known aliases.

Mrs. GRACE NICHOLS, Master Files Section, Colorado Department of Motor Vehicles, Denver, advised on January 3, 1969, that she was unable to locate any driver's license for ANTHONY ROSSI, either under his true name or known aliases.

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

The New York Division advised by communication dated February 18, 1969, that on January 30, 1969, Mr. and Mrs. CHARLES POLIZZI, 5911 Shore Road, Brooklyn, New York, advised SA PAUL E MARUM and SA MARIO SIMEONE, JR., that ANTHONY ROSSI is the half brother of Mr. POLIZZI's late mother. Mr. POLIZZI stated that the first time he ever saw ANTHONY ROSSI was four years ago when ROSSI came to New York, to attend POLIZZI's mother's funeral. POLIZZI stated that he never heard from ROSSI again until the afternoon of January 20, 1969, when he received a telephone call at his home from ROSSI who stated that he was in New York, about to leave on a trip for Europe, and would like to see him. Mr. POLIZZI stated that January 20 was the day of the Superbowl Football Game and he did not wish to travel into Manhattan that afternoon and miss the ball game. Mrs. CAROL POLIZZI advised that she had never met ROSSI, but spoke to him on this occasion at which time she recalled that ROSSI asked her where she was employed. Mrs. POLIZZI stated that she informed him that she was employed as a Secretary in Manhattan, and gave him the address where she worked. ROSSI informed her that he would appreciate it if she could do some typing for him the following day and she agreed to do so.

Mrs. POLIZZI stated that the following day, ROSSI came to her office, asked her to Xerox a bill of sale and dictated to her a letter to his insurance company in which he requested a refund of his automobile insurance premium due to the fact that he had sold his automobile.

Mr. POLIZZI stated that later on that day, he, his wife, and ROSSI met at a coffee shop at Seventh Avenue, and 54th Street, in Manhattan, and had dinner. At this time ROSSI stated that he was planning to take a trip to Europe, within the next few days, and requested that refund on his automobile insurance be placed in the POLIZZI's bank account until such time as he could contact them for it.

Mr. POLIZZI stated that after having had dinner with ROSSI on that occasion, he has not seen or heard from him since. Mr. and Mrs. POLIZZI were informed of subject's fugitive status and the provisions of the Harboring Statute. Mr. POLIZZI stated that he was in his third year at City College of New York, studying architecture and works at two jobs in order to attend school and stated that due to this and in view of the fact that he has only seen ROSSI twice in his entire life, he would not do anything to jeopardize his future and would contact the FBI at once if he heard from ROSSI in the future.

On January 23, 1969, AL KERR, Secretary and Treasurer, Seaman's International Union, New York, advised SA DAVID G. JENKINS that he could find no records in the files of that union for ANTHONY ROSSI or OVIDIOLIMONI.

On February 4, 1969, EILEEN BROWN, Dispatcher's Office, National Maritime Union, 36 7th Avenue, New York, advised SA JENKINS that she could find no record in the files of that union for ANTHONY ROSSI or OVIDIOLIMONI.

On April 3, 1969, the New York Division advised that on March 12, 1969, Detective JOHN LOCKMAN, Recovered Property Section, New York City Police Department, advised that his department submitted an inquiry on VIN E6142738 as a result of a notice received from the Embassy Auto Sales, 1721 Broadway, New York, that this automobile had been purchased.

On March 13, 1969, HARRY BAKER, Manager, Embassy Auto Sales, advised that his records reflect that on January 13, 1969, he purchased a 1966 Cadillac El Dorado, VIN E6142738, from ANTHONY and BARBARA A. ROSSI, 199 South Claiborne Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana.

A photograph of ANTHONY and BARBARA ROSSI was displayed to BAKER and he identified the individuals in the photograph as the persons from whom he purchased the Cadillac. BAKER stated ROSSI, at the time of the sale, was accompanied by a white male about thirty years of age, dark hair and clean-shaven. BAKER was informed of ROSSI's fugitive status and he agreed to notify the New York Office in the event he was recontacted by ROSSI.

On March 19, 1969, CHARLES POLIZZI, 5911 Shore Road, Brooklyn, New York, advised that he has not heard from ROSSI since initially contacted by the FBI. He again indicated his willingness to notify the FBI in the event that he obtained information concerning ROSSI's whereabouts. POLIZZI stated he could furnish no information as to the individual who accompanied ROSSI at the time of the sale of his Cadillac at Embassy Auto Sales.

It is noted that CHARLES POLIZZI wears a full beard.

AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS.

By communication dated January 28, 1969, the Boston Division advised that on January 27, 1969, Mrs. MARIE MEROLA, Secretary of State's Office, Providence, Rhode Island, advised the records reflect that Crown Import Corporation, 671½ Broadway, Providence, Rhode Island, was incorporated on January 18, 1968. The incorporators were JOAN SHEPLEY of 9 Almy Street, Providence, Rhode Island, GLORIA COLELLA, 42 Paolino Street, Johnston, Rhode Island, and SYDNEY KRAMAR of 86 Farragut Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island. There were no officers listed for this company.

On January 27, 1969, the records of the Providence, Rhode Island Police Department, Identification Division, reflected that ANGELO PALMISANO, date of birth December 9, 1915, FBI Number 2477651, was arrested on March 22, 1937, for assault and was sentenced to three months unappealed. Discontinued on" January 16, 1946, with payment of cost. He was arrested on April 14, 1939, for operating a motor vehicle without a license and fined $5.00 and costs. He was further arrested on May 29, 1955, for gambling with dice on Sunday, fined $5.00 and costs.

On January 27, 1969, Captain JOHN EDDY, Providence, Rhode Island Police Department, Detective Division, advised that the Crown Import Corporation at 671½ Broadway, is probably identical with the company which formerly occupied 667 Broadway, known as the Capital Manufacturing Company. He stated this company went out of business approximately one year ago and was formerly the company that dealt with "Gaffer" watches, which are cheap, inexpensive Swiss-made watches, bearing names similar to those of well-known watches.

He stated in one instance, watches were sold which bore the name Homilton and were confused by unknowing individuals with Hamilton watches.

He stated this company was never known to deal in any stolen jewelry or other type of merchandise and dealt primarily with the "Gaffer" watches.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 3/10/69

DAVID LYNN MITCHELL was interviewed at the Sierra Conservation Center, Jamestown, California. MITCHELL was warned of his rights by Special Agent DONALD H. LEE and he waived them, as shown on an executed Warning and Waiver form. MITCHELL was told that this interview was for the purpose of attempting to further identify an individual who he knew as FRANK WALLS and to whom he has previously indicated he gave a quantity of stolen jewelry.

MITCHELL described WALLS as follows:

Name:	FRANK WALLS
Race:	White
Sex:	Male
Complexion:	Medium
Hair:	Black, receding at temples, slightly graying, combed straight back.
Build:	Medium
Age:	Approximately 40
Scars and Marks:	None recalled
Eyes:	Not recalled
Height:	Five feet eleven to six feet
Weight:	160-165 pounds

MITCHELL stated that WALLS dressed well in a business suit which he could not further describe. He cannot recall ever seeing any car owned by WALLS.

MITCHELL stated that he met with WALLS in the office of the Canal Jewelry and Loan Company, New Orleans, Louisiana.

MITCHELL said that he does not know what position that WALLS held with Canal Jewelry and Loan, but that he had "free run of the store." He advised that in addition to WALLS,

On 2/23/69 at Jamestown, California File # SC 87-174

by SA DONALD H. LEE &
SA DAVID D. THOMAS/jls Date dictated 3/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

he noticed the following described employees in the store.

1. A young man who worked behind the "wire cage" where merchandise was pawned, six feet, light colored hair, mid-20's.

2. A woman in her mid-40's with grayish black hair who worked behind the cashier's desk.

3. A salesman, very short, about five feet five inches with a mustache.

He could furnish no additional descriptive data concerning the above individuals advising that he only saw them in the store and did not talk to them.

MITCHELL stated that the safe in which the jewelry was placed by WALLS was a large, double doored safe located in the office of Canal Jewelry and Loan. He advised that the office was located at the rear of the store; that upon entering the store, you walk straight back, up two or three stairs and turn right to enter the office.

MITCHELL stated that WALLS went with his mother, BETTY MITCHELL, in about 1951 or 1952, when MITCHELL was six or seven years of age. MITCHELL said that at that time, he and his mother were living in an apartment in Galveston, Texas, adjacent to a beauty parlor. The owner-operator of the beauty parlor, name not recalled, resided in an upstairs apartment; she was their landlady. This apartment and beauty parlor is still in existence and as of about one year ago, was still owned and operated by the same woman. It is located directly North, and adjacent to a Sears Roebuck & Company parking lot. The parking lot is located directly East, and adjacent to the Sears Roebuck & Company store. The Beauty Shop operator-landlady was a close friend of the mother of MITCHELL and was acquainted with WALLS.

MITCHELL could furnish no information about the name or location of the club allegedly operated by WALLS in Galveston at that time.

MITCHELL stated he is certain that the name used by WALLS in Galveston was FRANK WALLS since he recognized this name when he met WALLS in New Orleans; thereafter, he asked WALLS if he was the same WALLS that had gone with his mother and WALLS affirmed that he was.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 3/10/69

DAVID LYNN MITCHELL was interviewed at the Sierra Conservation Center, Jamestown, California. MITCHELL was warned of his rights by Special Agent DONALD H. NOX and he waived them, as shown on an executed Warning and Waiver Form. MITCHELL furnished signed statement as follows:

"February 28, 1969
"Sierra Conservation Center
"Jamestown, California

"I, DAVID LYNN MITCHELL, furnish the following voluntary statement to DONALD H. NOX and DAVID G. THOMAS, who have identified themselves to me as Special Agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. NOX has told me that this inquiry relates to the identification of an individual or individuals to whom jewelry was sold. This jewelry had previously been taken by me from the house of AUDIA KATHERINE EARLE. Mr. NOX exhibited five photographs of five different persons to me. From this group of photographs, I selected a photograph which I identified as a photograph of an individual known to me as CARLOS MARCELLO. This is the person to whom I sold an emerald ring while in the office of the Canal Jewelry and Loan Company in New Orleans, Louisiana.

"This office was located at the rear of the Canal Jewelry and Loan Company and could not be viewed from the store, itself. The office contained a large, double doored safe, a desk and one or two chairs. To gain entrance to the office, required going up two or three stairs, at the rear of the store.

On 2/28/69 at Jamestown, California File # SC 87-174

by SA DONALD H. NOX & SA DAVID G. THOMAS/JLF Date dictated 3/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

"I have identified the photograph of CARLOS MARCELLO by writing on the reverse of the photograph:

"This is a photo of CARLOS MARCELLO" and signing my name.

"I have read the above two page statement. It is true and correct.

"DAVID L. MITCHELL
"2/28/69
"Jamestown, Calif.

WITNESS: DONALD H. LOE,
Special Agent, FBI, 2/28/69.
DAVID D. THOMAS
Special Agent, FBI, 2/28/69."

The following described photographs were exhibited to DAVID LYNN MITCHELL:

1. CARLOS MARCELLO

2. CHARLES DAVID STUTZMAN, Federal Bureau of Investigation Number 299-459-B.

3. HOWARD MARVIN STOVALL, Federal Bureau of Investigation Number 286-933-C.

4. ELLIS C. SANDERS, Federal Bureau of Investigation Number 4-070-093.

5. DELBERT DEAN DORSEY, Federal Bureau of Investigation Number 215-876-A.

Form Approved, Budget Bureau Number 48-R 355.1

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
U. S. COAST GUARD
CG-719B (Rev. 11-62)

SEAMAN'S CERTIFICATE APPLICATIO

BOOK. NO.

M. M. D. NO. Z-1281260

TO: COMMANDANT (MVP-1) CHECK ONE: ☒ ORIGINAL ☐ SUPPLEMENTAL

TYPE OF CERTIFICATE (Check one): ☐ CONTINUOUS DISCHARGE BOOK ☒ U.S. MERCHANT MARINER'S DOCUMENT

PORT OF [illegible]

DATE 12 June 1968

ENDORSED AS [illegible]



NAME OF APPLICANT - PRINT (Last, first and middle): LIMONE, Ovidio (alias ROSSI, Anthony)

ADDRESS OF APPLICANT: 119 So. Claiborne St., Apt. 874, New Orleans, Louisiana, 70112

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 230-34-4963

DATE OF BIRTH (Day, month and year): 16 August 1916

PLACE OF BIRTH (City, state and country): New York, New York

HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COMPLEXION	COLOR OF HAIR	COLOR OF EYES
5-9½	170	Ruddy	Blk. Grey	Brown

NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: Barbara Ann Rossi

RELATIONSHIP: Wife

ADDRESS OF NEXT OF KIN: Same as above.

CITIZENSHIP OR NATIONALITY RECORD

DATE NATURALIZED	COURT OF NATURALIZATION	CITY	STATE

IF NATURALIZED THROUGH FATHER, STATE HIS NAME: [illegible]

PROOF OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP (Describe): New York birth cert. 40022 Filed: 8-25-16.

IF NOT NATURALIZED, IS DECLARATION OF INTENTION FILED? (If so, state place, date and file number of intention papers) [illegible]

IF ALIEN, DESCRIBE PROOF OF NATIONALITY [illegible]

IF RESIDENT ALIEN, STATE PROOF PRESENTED AND REGISTRATION NO.

NARCOTIC RECORD (If any)

Have you ever been convicted of violation of the narcotic drug laws of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any State or Territory of the United States? ☒ No ☐ Yes. If "Yes," state place, date, and particulars of each conviction.

O.L. + A.R.

Have you ever used or been addicted to the use of narcotics? ☒ No ☐ Yes. If "Yes," state place, date, and particulars of use or addiction.

O.L. + A.R.

LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE RECORD

(Itemize all licenses or certificates now in your possession)

DESCRIPTION OF PAPERS	PLACE OF ISSUE	DATE OF ISSUE	NO. OF ISSUE

IF ANY LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE HELD BY YOU HAS EVER BEEN REVOKED OR SUSPENDED, SO STATE, GIVING ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

RECORD OF QUALIFYING SERVICE

(1. Must be certified by official discharges or letters from masters or such other authority deemed reliable.
2. Additional service may be listed on blank sheet and attached to this form)

NAME OF VESSEL	NATIONALITY	SERVICE	GROSS TONNAGE	RATING OF SEAMAN	DATE OF SHIPMENT	DATE OF DISCHARGE
Letter of commitment of employment from NATIONAL STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, dated 6-12-68						

EDITION OF 9-58 MAY BE USED

CERTIFICATION BY APPLICANT

I hereby certify that all the statements on this application are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief; that I have never received from the United States Government the document(s) for which I now make application; that I have not applied for and been refused the rating(s) requested in this application within the past 30 days; and that no document(s) or endorsement(s) on such document(s) previously issued to me is (are) currently revoked, suspended, or under voluntary surrender.

U. S. COAST GUARD JUL 19 9 35 AM '68

Signature of seaman Ovidio Limone (Alias Anthony Rossi)

1968 JUN 21

I have accordingly issued the document(s) listed below this 31 day of July, 19 68 at NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Signature and title of issuing officer ... LT

WASHINGTON D.C. MERCHANT VESSEL PERSONNEL

OATH (*To be administered by issuing officer to applicants for document(s) in ratings other than Able Seaman or Q. M. E. D.*)

I hereby swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and honestly perform all the duties required of me by law and carry out the lawful orders of my superior officers on shipboard.

Signature of seaman Ovidio Limone (Anthony Rossi)

Subscribed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me this 31 day of July, 19 68, at NEW ORLEANS, LA, County of Orleans, State (Territory or District) of Louisiana

Signature and title of issuing officer ... LT

U. S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

15 I have this day examined the physical condition Ovidio Limone (alias Anthony Rossi) and have found him ☑ competent ☐ incompetent for the rating of STWD'S DEPT. (FH).

Surgeon, U. S. Public Health Service

CERTIFICATE ISSUED (*Applicant will not write in this space*)	
1. CONTINUOUS DISCHARGE BOOK NUMBER	
2. U. S. MERCHANT MARINER'S DOCUMENT NO. Z-1261740 ENDORSED AS:	
(a) CERTIFICATE OF EFFICIENCY AS LIFEBOAT MAN	☐
(b) CERTIFICATE AS TANKERMAN	☐
(c) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AS ABLE SEAMAN	☐
FOR THE WATERS OF	
(d) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AS Q.M.E.D.	☐
(e) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AS ORDINARY SEAMAN, WIPER, STEWARD'S DEPARTMENT (F.H.)	XX
NUMBER	

FINGERPRINTS - RIGHT HAND (rolled impressions)

(*In order to make a proper rolled impression, it is necessary that fingers be rolled from nail to nail*)

1. THUMB	2. INDEX	3. MIDDLE	4. RING	5. LITTLE

FINGERPRINTS - LEFT HAND (rolled impressions)

6. THUMB	7. INDEX	8. MIDDLE	9. RING	10. LITTLE

GPO 946-727

12 JUN 1968

WATERMAN
STEAMSHIP CORPORATION

CABLE ADDRESS "WACOR"
GENERAL OFFICES
NEW YORK, N. Y., U. S. A.
708 RICHARDS BUILDING
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70112

BRANCH OFFICES
MOBILE LOS ANGELES

BRANCH OFFICES
NEW ORLEANS SAN FRANCISCO
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1968

United States Coast Guard
201 Gateway Building
124 Camp Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

Dear Sir:

Ovidio Limone
alias

This will introduce Mr. Anthony Rossi, whom we wish to employ aboard our vessels.

Please issue him seaman papers with Ordinary Seaman, Wiper and Messman's endorsements.

Yours very truly,

WATERMAN STEAMSHIP CORPORATION

L. S. O'Neil

L. S. O'Neil

LSO'N/jbj

Date : 08/10/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10203-10464
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2914-189

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, PG
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 07/28/61
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS : GM, ASSOC, IDENT, DESCRIPTIVE-TYPE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/10/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS : INC LHM

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (92-2914)

DATE: 7/28/61

FROM : SAC, PITTSBURGH (92-236)

SUBJECT: GABRIEL MANNARINO, aka.
AR

ReBuairtel to New York, 7/7/61, captioned "Criminal Intelligence Program."

Enclosed for the Bureau are four copies of the Special Summary Report of SA THOMAS G. FORSYTH III, Pittsburgh, 7/28/61, and four copies of a letterhead memorandum containing brief descriptive-type characterizations for each of the T-symbols utilized in that report.

SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

2 - Bureau (Enc-8)
1 - Pittsburgh

TGF/vmm
(3)

EX-PROC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/87 BY SP6BJA/GCL
#211,326

6-29-94 SP8 MAC/KSR
(JFK)

4 det.

REC- 59

92-2914-189

14 JUL 31 1961

ENCLOSURE

25

56 AUG 11 1961

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
July 28, 1961

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

GABRIEL MANNARINO, Aka.
ANTI-RACKETEERING

Reference report of Special Agent THOMAS G. FORSYTH III, Pittsburgh, dated July 28, 1961.

There follows a descriptive-type characterization for those individuals whose identities were concealed in referenced report by use of T-symbols:

PG T-1 is a real estate expert and land speculator in Westmoreland County, Pa., whose professional services have been used on occasion by SAMUEL and GABRIEL MANNARINO and their associates.

PG T-2 is a New Kensington, Pa., numbers writer, formerly connected with prostitution activities.

PG T-3 is a physician whose professional services have on occasions been used by members of the MANNARINO organization and who frequents MANNARINO controlled gambling and after-hours establishments.

PG T-4 is a Pittsburgh, Pa., man who has acted as a consultant to MANNARINO in connection with legitimate enterprises.

PG T-5 is a Pittsburgh, Pa., gambler, formerly active in Las Vegas, Nevada, and Miami, Florida, who is readily accepted into MANNARINO controlled establishments.

PG T-6 is a Pittsburgh, Pa., numbers writer who has had acquaintanceship and a few transactions with MANNARINO since at least 1950.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP8MAC/KSR
ON 6-29-94

cc Dept
cc 4/7/16

#211,326
~~Classified by SP6BJR/GCL~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 10/15/87~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (JFK)

ENCLOSURE
92-2914-189

COPIES DESTROYED
328 MAY 22 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PG T-7	is a tavern operator-numbers writer, active in Fayette County, Pa., for over 20 years.
PG T-8	is a social acquaintance of MANNARINO's who resides in Allegheny Township, Westmoreland County, Pa.
PG T-9	is a New Kensington, Pa., police officer of many years experience.
PG T-10	is a gambler and numbers operator who was so engaged in New Kensington, Pa., for over 30 years until 1960.
PG T-11	is a prostitute who has had periodic contacts with MANNARINO and his associates in New Kensington, Pa.
PG T-12	is a Pittsburgh, Pa., businessman who is widely known in Western Pennsylvania gambling and prostitution circles.
PG T-13	is a police officer of many years experience in the Turtle Creek Valley section of Allegheny County, Pa.
PG T-14	[is a man formerly active in management of a gambling casino in Havana, Cuba.] ~~(S)~~ (U)
PG T-15	[is a man formerly active in operation of a Havana gambling casino.] ~~(S)~~ (U)
PG T-16	[is a man who has conducted considerable investigation of security and criminal activities in Cuba.] ~~(S)~~ (U)
PG T-17	is a Pittsburgh, Pa., gambler and thief who does errands for known racket leaders.
PG T-18	is a prostitute and waitress who has had contact with MANNARINO and his associates.
PG T-19	is a Wheeling, W. Va., gambler.
PG T-20	is a man with wide experience in the vending and pinball machine business in and near New Kensington, Pa.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

GABRIEL MANNARINO, Aka.

PG T-21 is a Pittsburgh, Pa., businesswoman who frequents places where gamblers and racketeers congregate.

PG T-22 is a Parnassus, Pa., numbers writer who has known MANNARINO since the latter was a child.

PG T-23 is a Farrell, Pa., numbers writer and gambler.

PG T-24 is owner of an Allegheny County, Pa., gambling casino which competes with MANNARINO's casino.

PG T-25 is a man with current activities regarding numbers, horse bets and lottery ticket sales in New Kensington, Pa., and surrounding area.

PG T-26 is a prostitute who has had contacts with MANNARINO associates in New Kensington, Pa.

PG T-27 is a minor political figure and businessman in New Kensington, Pa.

MMT-1 is a Miami Beach, Florida, gambler and burglar.

CONFIDENTIAL

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
July 28, 1961

GABRIEL MANNARINO, Aka.
ANTI-RACKETEERING

Reference report of Special Agent THOMAS G. FORSYTH III, Pittsburgh, dated July 28, 1961.

There follows a descriptive-type characterization for those individuals whose identities were concealed in referenced report by use of T-symbols:

PG T-1 is a real estate expert and land speculator in Westmoreland County, Pa., whose professional services have been used on occasion by SAMUEL and GABRIEL MANNARINO and their associates.

PG T-2 is a New Kensington, Pa., numbers writer, formerly connected with prostitution activities.

PG T-3 is a physician whose professional services have on occasions been used by members of the MANNARINO organization and who frequents MANNARINO controlled gambling and after-hours establishments.

PG T-4 is a Pittsburgh, Pa., man who has acted as a consultant to MANNARINO in connection with legitimate enterprises.

PG T-5 is a Pittsburgh, Pa., gambler, formerly active in Las Vegas, Nevada, and Miami, Florida, who is readily accepted into MANNARINO controlled establishments.

PG T-6 is a Pittsburgh, Pa., numbers writer who has had acquaintanceship and a few transactions with MANNARINO since at least 1950.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/87 BY SP6BJM/GCL

#211,326
6-29-94 SR 8 MAC/KSR (JFK)

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10203-10465
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2914-190

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, PG
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 08/03/61
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : GM, ASSOC, B/F INT, FARM, GAMBLING ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/10/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 3 1961
TELETYPE

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. DeLoach
- Mr. Evans
- Mr. Malone
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Ingram
- Miss Gandy

n

URGENT 8-3-61 4-54 PM TGH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI, /92-2914/ /92-2918/

FROM SAC, PITTSBURGH /92-236/ /92-228/

GABRIEL MANNARINO, AKA, AR, SAMUEL MANNARINO , AKA, AR. ON AUGUST THIRD, SIXTY ONE, PG FIVE FOUR FIVE DASH C ADVISED THAT GABRIEL MANNARINO HAS BOUGHT OR LEASED A FARM IN WESTMORELAND COUNTY, BELIEVED NEAR CAMP JOAN, PA. HE IS USING THE BARN TO HOLD GAMBLING GAMES IN ANTICIPATION OF A MOVE BY A NEW CITY ADMINISTRATION IN NEW KENSINGTON, PA., TO SUPPRESS GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN TOWN. INFORMANT WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNINNG LOCATION OF FARM AND IDENTITIES OF PERSONS INVOLVED. BOTH SUBJECTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

END AND AK PLS

WA 4-55 PM OK FBI WA RAM

TU DISC

REC- 30

92-2914-190

AUG 8 1961

25

62 AUG 11 1961

EX. - 102

Date : 08/10/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10203-10466
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2914-191

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, PG
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 08/07/61
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : GM, ASSOC, SMO, TRA, MM, FL, MURIN, MARTIN, B/F INT, DISPUTE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/10/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

UREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NICATIONS SECTION
UG 7 1961
TELETYPE

Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

0 URGENT 8-7-61 P 4-25 PM NP

TO, DIRECTOR, FBI -92-2914--92-2918 AND SAC, MIAMI-92-155

FROM, SAC, PITTSBURGH -92-236--92-228

GARBIEL MANNARINO, ALSO KNOWN AS, AR, SAMUEL MANNARINO, ALSO KNOWN AS, AR. PG SIX ONE FIVE DASH C ADVISED THAT ON THE EVENING OF AUGUST FIVE LAST, VICTOR STANZIANO AND WILLIE SAMS, BOTH OF NEW KENSINGTON, PA., AGREED THAT SAMS WOULD GO TO GREATER PITTSBURGH AIRPORT THAT EVENING TO PICK UP SAM MANNARINO WHO WAS ARRIVING FROM MIAMI, FLORIDA, ACCOMPANIED BY AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN. STANZIANO STATED THAT THE MANNARINOS ARE CONTROLLED IN SOME RESPECTS BY QUOTE SOME BIG GUYS UPSTAIRS. UNQUOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, HE POINTED OUT THAT IN NINETEEN SIXTY, THE MANNARINOS BECAME ANGRY AT A NEW KENSINGTON CONTRACTOR NAMED MARTIN MURIN, WHO HAD FRONTED SOME OF THEIR LEGITIMATE BUSINESS HOLDINGS AND WHO BROKE AWAY FROM THEM AFTER A DISPUTE. THE MANNARINOS MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A QUOTE TORPEDO UNQUOTE FROM SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, TO QUOTE TAKE CARE OF UNQUOTE MURIN. HOWEVER, FOR SOME REASON, QUOTE THE BIG GUYS UNQUOTE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 92-2918

REC- 35 92-2914-191

AUG 8 1961

25

66 AUG 11 1961

PAGE TWO

HEARD ABOUT THEIR PLANS AND ORDERED THE MANNARINOS NOT TO HARM MURIN. MIAMI WILL CONTACT EASTERN AIRLINES AND FIND OUT WHICH FLIGHT SAM MANNARINO TOOK WHICH ARRIVED PITTSBURGH EVENING OF AUGUST FIVE LAST AND IDENTIFICATION OF HIS TRAVELLING COMPANION. BOTH SUBJECTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

END ACK PLS

4-30 PM OK FBI WA MSL

MM OK FBI MM MH

DISC

VV

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10203-10468
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2914-193

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, PG
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 08/08/61
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : GM, SMO, ASSOC, GAMBLING ACT, PURCHASE, ANCHORAGE ROAD HOUSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/10/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 8 1961
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

URGENT 8-8-61 10-45 PM EDST WRJ

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-2914 OWAWOQI

FROM SAC, PITTSBURGH 92-228 92-236

GABRIEL MANNARINO, ALSO KNOWN AS, AR SAMUEL MANNARINO, ALSO KNOWN AS, AR. PG SIX TWO ONE - C ADVISES MANNARINO-S NEGOTIATING TO PURCHASE OR LEASE ANCHORAGE ROAD HOUSE, ALLEGHENY RIVER BLVD., AND SANDY CREEK ROAD, VERONA, PA., IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE ADMINSTRATION CHANGE IN CITY OF NEW KENSINGTON, PA., THIS COMING FALL. PLANS ARE TO MOVE ENTIRE GAMBLING OPERATION TO THIS NEW SPOT IF NECESSARY. SUBJECT-S SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS

R

END AND ACK PLS
10-47 PM OK FBI WA WS
TU DSC

REC- 29 92-2914-183

AUG 10 1961

EX 104

55 AUG 14 1961

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10203-10482
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2914-207

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, PG
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 08/30/61
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : GM, SMO, ASSOC, RAID, WARRANT, SAMS, WILLIAM

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/10/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS : INC A/T

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

8/31/61

AIRTEL

TO: SAC, Pittsburgh (92-236)

FROM: Director, FBI (92-2914) — 207

REC-23

GABRIEL MANNARINO, aka.
AR

EX-107

Reurtel 8/30/61.

According to retel an informant advised that gamblers in the New Kensington area are saying that since Willie Sams is never caught in Internal Revenue Service raids he either has a highly placed tipster in the Pittsburgh Federal Building or he is an informant for some Federal agency.

You should take immediate advantage of this information and turn it to our benefit. You should certainly be able to use this material as an aid in obtaining good information from Sams and/or to disrupt his portion of the Mannarino racket empire.

RDC:rap
(4)

MAILED 4
AUG 3 1 1961
COMM-FBI

lson
lmont
ır
lahan
ırad
.oach
ns
ıne
ın
van
l
ır
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

64 SEP 7 1961

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 30 1961
TELETYPE

URGENT 8-30-61 7-08 PM EDST DLH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-2914 92-2918

FROM SAC, PITTSBURGH 92-236 92-228

GABRIEL MANNARINO, AKA, AR., SAMUEL MANNARINO, AKA, AR. ON AUGUST THIRTY, INSTANT, PG SIX ONE FIVE DASH C ADVISED WILLIAM SAMS, WHO HAS BEEN HIDING TO AVOID SERVICE OF IRS WARRANT SINCE NEW KENSINGTON, PA., RAID ON AUGUST TWENTYFOUR LAST, WILL RETURN TO NEW KENSINGTON EVENING OF SEPTEMBER ONE NEXT. THIS INFORMATION FURNISHED LOCALLY TO USM AND IRS, PITTSBURGH. INFORMANT STATED GAMBLERS IN NEW KENSINGTON ARE GOSSIPING ABOUT FACT WILLIAM SAMS IS NEVER COUGHT IN IRS RAIDS. THESE GAMBLERS ARE SPECULATING THAT SAMS EITHER HAS A HIGHLY PLACED TIPSTER IN PITTSBURGH FEDERAL BUILDING OR THAT SAMS IS AN INFORMANT OF SOME FEDERAL AGENCY. BOTH SUBJECTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

END AND ACK PLS

7-10 PM OK FBI WA MSL

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 92-2918

EX. - 107 REC- 21 92-2914-207

17 SEP 1 1961

AUG 30 3 33 PM '61

F B I
REC'D-TELETYPE UNIT

...ted to Pittsburgh
8-31-61

XEROX
SEP 5 1961

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10203-10485
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-2914-210

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, PG
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/05/61
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	GM, SMO, SAMS, WILLIAM, ARRESTED, KEN IRON AND STEEL CO.
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	4
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/10/98
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
SEP 5 1961
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

URGENT

7
744385 9-5-61 6-08 PM EDST DLH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-2914 92-2918

FROM SAC, PITTSBURGH 92-236 92-228

GABRIEL MANNARINO, AKA., AR. SAMUEL MANNARINO, AKA., AR. WITH REFERENCE TO IRS, PITTSBURGH, PA., RAID ON MANNARINO GAMBLING CASINO AND HORSE ROOM IN NEW KENSINGTON, ON ~~SEPTEMBER~~ AUGUST TWENTYFOUR, LAST, SA OF IRS ARRESTED WILLIAM SAMS, ON SEPTEMBER ONE, LAST AT KEN IRON AND STEEL COMPANY, NEW KENSINGTON, PA., BASED ON WARRANTS CHARGING VIOLATION OF FEDERAL WAGERING TAX LAWS. NOTE THAT SAMS IS INCLUDED UNDER THE TOP ECHELON CIP. INFORMANT ADVISED ABOVE GAMBLING CASINO AND HORSE ROOM ARE NOW BACK TO ALMOST NORMAL OPERATIONS. BOTH SUBJECTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

END AND ACK PLS

REC- 29 92-2914-210

6-10 PM OK FBI WA JS RECEIVED YOUR TWO OK

TU DISC

14 SEP 8 1961

EX-113

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

XEROX
SEP 8 1961

FBI
REC'D-TELETYPE UNIT

64 SEP 12 1961

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Date : 08/10/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10203-10489
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2914-214

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, PG
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 09/12/61
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : GM, SMO, ASSOC, GAMBLING ACT, RAID, CASINO, ARRESTED

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/10/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS : INC NOTE

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
SEP 1 2 1961
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

dh

URGENT 9-12-61 9-57 PM EDST DLH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-2914 92-2918

FROM SAC, PITTSBURGH 92-236 92-228

ANTIRACKETEERING
GABRIEL MANNARINO, AKA., AR., SAMUEL MANNARINO, AKA., AR. ON NINE TWELVE INSTANT, PITTSBURGH PG SIX ONE TWO ~~DASH~~ C ADVISED THAT ON NINE TEN LAST, AT THE BONFIRE RESTAURANT WHICH HE OWNS, LOCATED ON ROUTE FIFTYSIX, NEAR LEECHBURG, PA., SAM MANNARINO WAS DISCUSSING RAID BY IRS ON GAMBLING CASINO IN NEW KENSINGTON, PA., ON EIGHT TWENTYFOUR LAST. HE SAID HE RECOMMENDED SIX MONTHS AGO THAT GABRIEL MANNARINO CLOSE THE CASINO, BUT EVEN THROUGH HIS ADVICE WAS NOT HEEDED, A LOT OF THOSE ARRESTED IN THE RAID WILL HAVE TO BE DISCHARGED BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT ONLY ARRESTED THEM IN HOPES OF GETTING INFORMATION AND WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROVE VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL TAX LAWS. MANNARINO SAID THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES RAIDED IS GETTING VERY SHAKY. HE INDICATED THAT HE IS DISAPPOINTED IN POLITICIANS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THAT HENCEFORTH HE MAY BACK REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES. HE CONCLUDED THAT WHILE HE STILL THOUGHT PRESIDENT

END PAGE ONE

REC- 83 92-2914-214

EX-112

SEP 14 1961

57 SEP 18 1961

PAGE TWO

JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS ~~QUOTE~~ " A GOOD FELLOW, " ~~UNQUOTE~~ HE ALSO THOUGHT AG ROBERT KENNEDY ~~QUOTE~~ " CAN NOT BE TALKED TO. " ~~UNQUOTE~~.

BOTH SUBJECTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

END AND ACK PLS

10-00 PM OK FBI WA RAC

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

9/13/61

BACKGROUND

Sam Mannarino,Pittsburgh hoodlum target,is disappointed in Democratic party and may switch allegiance to Republician party although he still thinks President Kennedy is a "good fellow". He also thinks AG Kennedy "can Not be talked to."

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY	FBI
RECORD NUMBER	124-10203-10494
RECORDS SERIES	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	92-2914-217

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR	FBI
FROM	SAC, PG
TO	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE	
DATE	09/26/61
PAGES	1
SUBJECTS	GM, SMO, ASSOC, GAMBLING ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS	4
CURRENT STATUS	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	08/10/98
OPENING CRITERIA	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
SEP 26 1961
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

URGENT 9-26-61 8-33 PM TGH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI /92-2914/ /92-2918/

FROM SAC, PITTSBURGH /92-236/ /92-228/

GABRIEL MANNARINO, AKA, AR. SAMUEL MANNARINO, AKA, AR. ON EVENING OF SEPT. TWENTY FIVE LAST, A PCI ADVISED THAT GAMBLING OF ALL TYPES HAS BEEN SUPPRESSED IN NEW KENSINGTON , PA., TO A POINT BEYOND ANYTHING IN HIS RECOLLECTION FOR LAST TWENTY FIVE YEARS. NUMBERS, SPORTS BETS AND HORSE BETS ARE DOWN TO ABOUT TWENTY FIVE PERCENT OF THE NORMAL OF ONE MONTH AGO AND CARD, CRAPS AND BARBOUT GAMES ARE EXTINCT. MANY GAMBLERS IN NEW KENSINGTON FEAR THEY WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED FOR A LONG TIME AND ALSO FEAR, SINCE THEY ~~ARE NOW~~ AWARE OF THE EXTENSIVE IRS INVESTIGATION , THAT THEY MAY BE INDICTED FEDERALLY. PG SIX ONE FIVE DASH C ADVISES THAT ON SEPT. TWENTY FIVE LAST, WILLIE SAMS, THE MANNARINO QUOTE BRAINS END QUOTE IN GAMBLING OPERATIONS, CONSULTED WITH AN ATTORNEY IN A ROOM IN THE CARLTON HOUSE, PITTSBURGH, DUE TO SAMS- BELIEF THAT THE IRS IS INVESTIGATING HIM AND MAY MAKE A SUCCESSFUL CASE AGAINST HIM. BOTH SUBJECTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

REC-26 92-2914-217

SEP 27 1961

~~CORR LAST LINE WRD 1 SHD BE SUBJECTS~~

END AND ACK PLS

WA 8-37 PM OK FBI WA RAC

TU DISC

58 SEP 28 1961

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 92-2911

Date : 08/10/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10203-10497
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2914-220

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, PG
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 09/27/61
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : GM, SMO, ASSOC, B/F INT, LLOYDS LIMITED, CIANCUTTI, THOMAS, ANTHONY, GAMBLING ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/10/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
SEP 27 1961
TELETYPE

URGENT 9-27-61 6-12 PM EDST DLH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-2914 92-2918

FROM SAC, PITTSBURGH 92-236 92-228

GABRIEL MANNARINO, AKA, AR., SAMUEL MANNARINO, AKA, AR. ON SEPT TWENTY SEVEN, INSTANT, PG SIX ONE FIVE DASH C ADVISED THAT THE MANNARINOS HAVE FURTHER SOLIDIFIED THEIR MOVE INTO PITTSBURGH, PA. RECENTLY, THEY TOOK OVER LLOYDS, LIMITED, A MEN-S CLOTHING STORE ON MURRAY AVENUE IN THE SQUIRREL HILL SECTION. THIS STORE HAS BEEN OWNED FOR YEARS BY PITTSBURGH GAMBLER AND MANNARINO ASSOCIATE DAVE LAWRENCE. TOP LIEUTENANT THOMAS ANTHONY CIANCUTTI, AKA, SONNY, IS NOMINALLY NEW OWNER AND UNDOUBTEDLY WILL USE IT AS A FRONT FOR PITTSBURGH SHYLOCKING AND GAMBLING ACTIVITIES. BOTH SUBJECTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

END ANC ACK PLS

6-15 P M OK FBI WA DA

TU DSC

REC-96 92-2914-220

SEP 28 1961

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 92-2918

EX-112

57 OCT 3 1961

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY	FBI
RECORD NUMBER	124-10204-10004
RECORDS SERIES	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	92-3182-1022

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR	FBI
FROM	LEG, BR
TO	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE	
DATE	01/04/65
PAGES	3
SUBJECTS	GAL, COMPANION, TRA, ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS	4
CURRENT STATUS	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	01/06/95
OPENING CRITERIA	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS	INC LHM

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 1/4/65

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : Director, FBI (92-3182)

FROM: Legat, Bern (92-10) (P)

GUS ALEX, aka
AR

On 12/31/64 the Swiss Central Police Bureau, Bern, furnished information which has been made the subject of a letterhead memorandum, 4 copies of which are enclosed.

One copy each of this communication is being designated for Legat, Bonn, and Chicago since these offices have conducted previous investigation in this case.

This case is being retained in a pending status in this office to report results of further investigation in Switzerland.

Attention is called to the alleged statement by ALEX that he knew very well he was being watched by the police by order of his native country.

5 - Bureau (Encl. 4) ENCLOSURE
 (1 - Liaison)(Encl.)
 (1 - Chicago)(92-373)
1 - Bonn (92-5)(Encl.)(info)(direct)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(7)

REC- 52 92-3182-1022

14 JAN 7 1965

2cc LHM to Cg by/a (07)
1cc LHM for info to D+
1/8/65
JGL:rak

cc: Chicago
cc: mns

C.C. WICK

FILED

58 JAN 13 1965

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

January 4, 1965

GUS ALEX

The Swiss Central Police Bureau, Bern, Switzerland, furnished the following information:

The Zurich Police have established the following:

ALEX arrived at Zurich-Kloten Airport from New York-Paris on December 20, 1964, by TWA Flight 802. DIETGARD FUEGER checked in at the Dolder Grand Hotel in Zurich on December 19, 1964. She was accompanied by her mother, who left Zurich again on December 21, 1964, by air for Munich, Germany.

On December 22, 1964, ALEX and FUEGER left Zurich at 10:00 a.m. by car in the direction of Pontresina. The car in question was a "Peugeot 404" which ALEX rented from Hertz AG. On leaving the hotel he hired a taxi stationed at the Dolder Grand Hotel, which acted as a guide in front of his car as far as the outskirts of Zurich.

The driver of this taxi was later interviewed by the Zurich Police. He stated that he had driven ALEX on various occasions, e.g. on January 27, 1964, to Kloten Airport. On said journey ALEX had been looking time and again to see whether any car was following the taxi. ALEX had then mentioned that he knew very well he was being watched by the police by order of his native country.

The driver also mentioned that after he had guided ALEX and FUEGER out of town on December 22, 1964, ALEX had asked him whether he would be available on January 5, 1965. He, ALEX, would return on that day to Zurich.

In this respect, Zurich Police informed that ALEX reserved two rooms at the Dolder Grand Hotel for January 5.

92-3182-1022

ENCLOSURE 904-10004

During the stay at the Dolder Grand Hotel, ALEX and FUEGER made the following telephone calls:

Date	Number	Person Called
December 20, 1964	273232	Hertz AG, car rental contractors, Lagerstrasse 32, Zurich
	341600	Swissair, Zurich
	348400	Swissway Auto-Rental, Zeltweg 74, Zurich 7
	327010	Hotel Baur-au-Lac, Zurich
	082/66451	Schlosshotel, Pontresina
	38675/312	Evergreen Park, USA
	842121	Swissair, Zurich-Kloten
	341600	Swissair, Zurich (booking a seat for December 21, 1964, Flight No. 216 to Munich, for Mrs. FUEGER)
December 21, 1964	7116	Giessen, Germany (made by FUEGER)
December 22, 1964	273233	Hertz AG, Zurich

"This document contains neither recommendations
nor conclusions of the [illegible] the property
of the [illegible] agency; it and
its contents are not to be distributed outside
your agency."

92-3182-1022
1000[illegible]

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY	FBI
RECORD NUMBER	124-10204-10101
RECORDS SERIES	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	92-3182-1117

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR	FBI
FROM	SAC, CG
TO	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE	
DATE	11/04/65
PAGES	9
SUBJECTS	GAL, SWISS ENTRY BAN, OC, RES, EMP, ARREST, LAPD, COMPANION, ASSOC, TELCAL, REL, LABOR, TRA
DOCUMENT TYPE	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT, PHOTO
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS	4, SECTION 10(a)2
CURRENT STATUS	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	01/18/95
OPENING CRITERIA	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS	INC RESP, LHM, ENV

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

11-8-65

Airtel

To: SAC, Chicago (92-373) REC- 48

From: Director, FBI (92-3182) - 1117

ST-101

GUS ALEX, aka
AR

Re Bureau airtel 10-26-65 and your airtel 11-4-65.

It is not felt that the letterhead memorandum submitted with your airtel contains sufficient specific information to resolve the question raised by Swiss authorities concerning the identity of Alex and the proof that he is the individual who is the subject of the Swiss entry ban.

You should resubmit a revised letterhead memorandum containing more detailed and evidential type information to support the identification of Alex as a leading Chicago hoodlum figure and as the person banned by Swiss authorities. Consideration should be given to setting forth any pertinent information as to Alex's record of arrests. Also dates of pertinent travel to Europe and Switzerland and passport data on Alex.

Also advise Bureau of pertinent handwriting comparison which can be made to establish that Alex is the person who visited Switzerland and submit any necessary specimens in order that the Laboratory can immediately make indicated comparison.

MAILED 19
NOV 8 1965
COMM-FBI

Legat has requested this matter be given prompt attention and in view of this, you should resubmit requested material by 11-11-65.

NOTE: Chicago hoodlum Gus Alex and his paramour visit Switzerland each winter on vacation and Legat Bern has established appropriate coverage in past years through Swiss authorities. Following last visit of Alex during past winter Swiss authorities issued a prohibition against Alex's re-entry into this country on the basis that he was an undesirable. Alex has appealed and Swiss police now advise they feel there is some question of identity as to whether there are two persons by the name of Gus Alex involved and have requested further verification concerning this.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JGL:mlp
(4)

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1529

DEC 1965

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

NA 11/6/65 M

FBI

Date: 11/4/65

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________ (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (92-3182)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (92-373)

SUBJECT: GUS ALEX, aka.
AR

Re Bureau airtel to Chicago dated 10/26/65.

Enclosed herewith are six (6) copies of a letterhead memorandum reflecting information relative to the identification of GUS ALEX, subject of top hoodlum investigation in the United States and the GUS ALEX who is the subject of a Swiss entry ban.

Also enclosed is one copy each of the following items to assist Swiss authorities in effecting an investigation:

A photo of GUS ALEX taken in Los Angeles in 1959 at the time of his arrest there.

A photo of GUS ALEX and SUZANNE FUEGER taken in Switzerland in 1963.

A photo and signature of ALEX as it appeared on his passport in 1959.

It is suggested that Swiss authorities may desire to obtain an affidavit from GUS ALEX to confirm or deny his identity and his presence regarding specific travels in Switzerland. His refusal to execute an affidavit could be a basis for denying ALEX future entry into Switzerland.

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

ENCLOSURE

REC. 48

airtel to CP 11-8-65 mp

92-3182-117

ST-101

4 NOV 16 1965

3 - Bureau (Enc. 9)
1 - Chicago
EWA:flk
(4)

2 Photos attached + placed with resubmission from CG -

C. C. Wick

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

10(a)(2)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
November 4, 1965

GUS ALEX
ANTI-RACKETEERING

The following information is set forth to substantiate the fact that Gus Alex, the subject of the Swiss entry ban and member of the Chicago underworld, is identical with the Gus Alex who claims residence in Evergreen Park, Illinois, and employment in the publicity department of the De Luxe Cigarette Service, Incorporated, Niles, Illinois.

Enclosed is one copy of a photograph of Gus Alex taken when he was arrested in 1959 by the Los Angeles, California, Police Department, and of Alex and his paramour, Suzanne Fueger, taken in Switzerland in 1963. Both photographs represent the same individual who is recognized by the Chicago Police and Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel as the person observed in almost daily contact and association with other top ranking hoodlums in Chicago. He is also identical with the individual about whom this correspondence concerns.

Alex actually resides in apartment 10 C at 1150 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, however, in order to hide his identity he has utilized his recently deceased mother's address, 9353 South Spaulding, Evergreen Park, Illinois, for mailing purposes. On numerous occasions Alex has been observed entering his mother's residence and has parked his automobile in front of this address. Her telephone number was GArden 3-8675, Area Code 312, which telephone was listed to Mrs. Nick Alex. It is noted that Alex called this number on several occasions while visiting Switzerland in the past.

COPIES DESTROYED
914 MAY 24 1972

ENCLOSURE

92-3182-1117

RE: GUS ALEX
ANTI-RACKETEERING

It has been reported by the Swiss Central Police Bureau that Alex's employer, De Luxe Cigarette Service, Incorporated, certified that he has worked in their publicity department since 1957 and has never given any reason for complaints.

It is noted that Alex claims income from this company which company for years has been reportedly controlled by hoodlums. Alex now is reportedly in charge of this company having taken it over from a close friend and fellow hoodlum, Edward Vogel. Alex on numerous occasions has been observed at this location with his chauffeur and body guard Nathan "Butch" Ladon.

In 1958 Alex was summoned to Washington, D.C., to appear before the Mc Clellan Senate Rackets Committee investigating hoodlum infiltration into labor and business in Chicago. Alex refused to cooperate and furnished no information, taking refuge behind the 5th Amendment. He refused to answer all questions except for his name and address.

Grand Jury [JFK Law 10(a)2]

Captain William Duffy, Operating Director, Intelligence Section, Organized Crime Division, Chicago Police Department, advised that Gus Alex is a top ranking member of organized crime in Chicago and is closely allied with the top ranking members of the hoodlum element. Duffy advised further that he has maintained continuous investigation of Alex for years and of Alex's affiliations with the De Luxe Cigarette Service, Incorporated. Duffy stated that Alex has been completely uncooperative and that there is no question concerning his involvement with Chicago's underworld in organized crime.

92-3182-1117
10(a) (2)

RE: GUS ALEX
ANTI-RACKETEERING

Also enclosed for use in effecting an identification of Alex is a photograph and signature of Gus Alex as it appears on his United States Passport issued in 1959.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
November 4, 1965

GUS ALEX
ANTI-RACKETEERING

The following information is set forth to substantiate the fact that Gus Alex, the subject of the Swiss entry ban and member of the Chicago underworld, is identical with the Gus Alex who claims residence in Evergreen Park, Illinois, and employment in the publicity department of the De Luxe Cigarette Service, Incorporated, Niles, Illinois.

Enclosed is one copy of a photograph of Gus Alex taken when he was arrested in 1959 by the Los Angeles, California, Police Department, and of Alex and his paramour, Suzanne Fueger, taken in Switzerland in 1963. Both photographs represent the same individual who is recognized by the Chicago Police and Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel as the person observed in almost daily contact and association with other top ranking hoodlums in Chicago. He is also identical with the individual about whom this correspondence concerns.

Alex actually resides in apartment 10 C at 1150 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, however, in order to hide his identity he has utilized his recently deceased mother's address, 9353 South Spaulding, Evergreen Park, Illinois, for mailing purposes. On numerous occasions Alex has been observed entering his mother's residence and has parked his automobile in front of this address. Her telephone number was GArden 3-8675, Area Code 312, which telephone was listed to Mrs. Nick Alex. It is noted that Alex called this number on several occasions while visiting Switzerland in the past.

ENCLOSURES 9

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (92-3182)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (92-373)

SUBJECT: GUS ALEX, aka.
AR

Enclosed are six (6) copies of a LHM reflecting info relative to the identification of GUS ALEX. Also enclosed are three (3) photos.

Letter (airtel) dated 11/4/65.

204-10101

ENCLOSURE

92-3182-1117



Gus Alex

NAME AND ADDRESS IN THE UNITED STATES:

Gus Alex

7353 S. Spaulding Evergreen Pk Il

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10146
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2781-97

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 05/20/59
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : LST, REL, ACT, ASSOC

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (92-2781)

DATE: 5/20/59

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (92-88)

SUBJECT: SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., aka.
ANTI-RACKETEERING

(OO - Miami)

On 5/11/59, MM-416-C furnished information concerning the captioned subject to SA JAMES P. O'NEIL.

The informant stated that recently publicity was afforded the forth coming marriage of the subject's daughter, MARY JO TRAFFICANTE, to AUGUST C. PANIELLO. PANIELLO, according to the informant, is the son of the late Dr. SANTIAGO PANIELLO and Mrs. ELVIRA PANIELLO, presently residing in the Embassy Apartments, Tampa, Florida.

The subject's daughter is currently attending the University of Tampa, Tampa, Florida, and is a member of the Sophomore Class. PANIELLO, a graduate of the University of Tampa, is a student at the Stetson University College of Law, St. Petersburg, Florida.

The informant related that the wedding, scheduled for an unspecified date in 6/59, was opposed by the subject and his wife, partially because PANIELLO was previously married and divorced. The informant stated that the wedding, according to information from sources in Tampa, will take place in Havana, Cuba, and the reason given is to avoid any publicity and the subject's presence in Tampa.

This information is being furnished to the Bureau for transmittal to the Legat, Havana, as there is the possibility that the wedding may be the occasion for a gathering of associates of TRAFFICANTE, particularly those highly placed in the Underworld.

4 - Bureau
3 - Miami (1 - 137-225)
JPO:ded
(7)

REC- 36 92-2781-97

25 MAY 25 1959

Legat, Havana
5/27/59

CRIM INTEL

66 MAY 27 1959

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10147
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2781-1ST NR 97

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 05/23/59
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : LST, ASSOC, BUSS, GAMBLING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

5/23/59

AIRTEL AIRMAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (62-)

ELOY GARCIA
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING

MM 416-C has advised this office GARCIA, a Cuban, is "hiding" at the home of LOUIS DIAZ, 2715 Royal Court, Tampa, Fla. GARCIA identified as operator of Johnny's 21 Club, located at 21st and "O" Ave., opposite Capri Hotel. GARCIA is a close friend of RICHARD PEREZ, aka "EL MONO," Tampa gambler working for SANTO TRAFFICANTE, Jr., in Havana, and GARCIA supposedly was a contact between TRAFFICANTE and the Batista Government.

LOUIS DIAZ and RICHARD PEREZ are married to sisters and were formerly associated in a bolita operation at Tampa taken over by TRAFFICANTE.

According to informant, GARCIA reportedly being sought by the Castro Government for dealing in Cuban money and some fraud case in which he was involved with a judge. Informant advises GARCIA was allegedly involved in dope traffic and strong arm activity.

Legat immediately advise Miami if GARCIA being sought by present Government and on what charges.

4 - Bureau (AM)
4 - Miami (1 - 92-88 SANTO TRAFFICANTE)
(1 - 137-225)
JPO:sll
(8)

ORIGINAL FILED IN [illegible]

92-[illegible]
NOT RECORDED
87 MAY 29 1959

30

62 JUN 8 1959

Information will be furnished INS if GARCIA in United States illegally but consideration will be given to interview of GARCIA for information concerning SANTO TRAFFICANTE.

Additional copies being furnished Bureau for transmittal Legat, Havana.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10154
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2781-104

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 06/17/59
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : LST, DEPORTATION PROCEEDING, REL, WEDDING, ASSOC

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 6-17-59

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (92-2781)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (92-88)

SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., Aka.
ANTI-RACKETEERING

MM 416-C advised 6-16-59, wedding of subject's daughter being held as scheduled, Sunday, 6-21-59, at Havana Hilton Hotel, Havana, Cuba. Ninety-eight R.S.V.P. invitations tendered to associates and friends, Tampa and Miami, Fla. Air transportation, hotel accommodations and all expenses included.

JIMMIE LONGO, subject's "bodyguard" advised informant's source deportation proceeding against subject by Cuban authorities "off." Informant advised he learned from other sources LUIS ORLANDO RODRIGUEZ, removed as cabinet minister by FIDEL CASTRO, had been pressing case against subject and American underworld element.

JOSE NAVARRE now holding office. Will "cooperate."

Extra copies furnished for Legat, Havana.

5 - Bureau (AM)
3 - Miami (2 - 92-88)
(1 - 137-225)

JPO:plm
(8)

Rec'd too late to forward Legat prior to 6-21

REC- 73

EX- 131

92-2781-104

7 JUN 19 1959

CRIM. INTEL.

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent M Per

62 JUL 6 1959 168

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10204-10157
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-2781-106

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	LEG, HAVANA
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/13/59
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	LST, DEPORTED FROM CUBA, REL, WEDDING, ASSOC
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	4
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	10/07/98
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office M[redacted]um • UNITED [redacted]VERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (92-2781)

July 13, 1959

FROM : Legat, Havana (92-1)

SUBJECT: SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., aka
ANTI-RACKETEERING

59-2-3

Reference Havana letter dated June 10, 1959.

HAV-33 advised on June 15, 1959, that both the subject and HENRY SAAVEDRA, who represented subject's interests in the Hotel Capri, continue to be detained by Cuban police. Source said it appeared that subject and SAAVEDRA might be deported from Cuba in the near future.

On June 29, 1959, HAV-33 informed that TRAFFICANTE was temporarily released from jail on June 21, 1959, in order to attend his daughter's wedding at the Hotel Havana-Hilton. Source said that TRAFFICANTE appeared at the hotel in the company of representatives of the Cuban Ministry of Justice and the Cuban Secret Police. Source noted that several hundred people attended the wedding celebration at the Hotel Hilton and that most of these individuals were persons employed by the gambling casinos in the Havana area. Source said that Miami Top Hoodlum, JACK LANSKY, and Boston Top Hoodlum, JOHN WILLIAMS, were observed at the wedding celebration.

7/a Cuba

Mass.-Cu Att

On July 1, 1959, PCI Arthur Newman (conceal), Credit Manager of the gambling casino at the Hotel Nacional, advised that the majority of the persons in attendance at the wedding of subject's daughter were individuals employed in the gambling casinos in Havana. Source noted there was only one small group of persons comprising TRAFFICANTE's immediate family and close friends in Tampa, who came from the United States to be present at the wedding. Source noted that most of the hoodlums in the United States are well aware that police authorities would be on the look-out for individuals possibly attending the wedding of TRAFFICANTE's daughter in Havana and for that reason many hoodlums who might have attended stayed in the United States.

Sent 7/20/59

6 - Bureau (1-cc: Albany and New York
2-cc: Miami 92-88) CX-132

1 - Havana
DJB:MEG
(7)

JUL 20 11 00 AM '59

INVESTIGATIVE DIV.
REC'D - LGT
JUL 20 1959

REC- 89 92-2781-106

JUL 13 3 08 PM '59

JUL 16 1959

CRIM INTEL.

On July 10, 1959, Vice Consul Hugh D. Kessler, Citizenship Section, American Embassy, Havana, advised that he had received information from the Cuban authorities that the decree ordering subject's deportation would be published in the official Cuban Government gazette on July 13, 1959, and it was expected that subject would be deported to the United States on approximately July 14, 1959.

Extra copies of this letter have been prepared for forwarding by the Bureau to the Albany (1), New York (1) and Miami (2) offices.

Pending.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10203
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2781-1134

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, TP
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 10/12/66
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : LST, LCN ACT, ASSOC, TRA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/21/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 10/12/66

Transmit the following in ______________________

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (92-2781)

FROM: SAC, TAMPA (92-1) (P)

SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., aka
AR
(OO:TP)

One copy being furnished Las Vegas as information has previously been obtained by Tampa indicating TRAFFICANTE's alleged presence in Las Vegas although contact with logical Las Vegas informants and source of information has not established TRAFFICANTE's presence.

Enclosed for Butte is one photo of SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., taken 9/30/66.

For info Butte and WFO, SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., along with 12 other reported LCN figures, were located by the New York City PD on the evening of 9/22/66 at La Stella Restaurant, Queens, New York. TRAFFICANTE has been reported to be the "boss" of LCN in Florida.

B

On 9/23/66, TP 41-C advised that during the Labor Day weekend TRAFFICANTE had been at his St. Petersburg Beach residence and made the statement that he had recently been in London, England and that gambling was profitable. At this time, TRAFFICANTE indicated that he

3 - Bureau
2 - Butte (Enc. 1)
1 - Las Vegas (92-681) (Info)
2 - WFO
2 - Tampa
JAA:bb
(10)

REC-58 92-2781-1134

OCT 14 1966

C. G. WICK

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

70 OCT

had flown from London to California, then to Las Vegas, Nevada, then to New York, and then to Miami, before returning to Tampa for the Labor Day weekend. TRAFFICANTE apparently did not detail time in London, nor give any indication of how much time he had spent in each of the above-mentioned locations. TP 41-C of the opinion from TRAFFICANTE's remarks that he had had a companion on his London, England, trip, but identity not known at this time. Investigation has indicated that British officials are aware that DINO CELLINI is Managing Director of the Colony Club, Berkley Square, London, and CELLINI has in the past been identified as an associate of SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR.

In addition, on October 7, 1966, TP 120-C advised that sometime prior to 9/22/66, TRAFFICANTE's 5-year-old grandson, SANTOS PANIELLO, who resides with his mother, Mrs. AUGIE (MARY JO) PANIELLO, at 2505 Bristol, Tampa, had received a box containing a very expensive-looking cowboy suit. TP 120-C indicated that this box containing the cowboy suit was from the Indian Trading Post, Yellowstone National Park, but that the wrapping, which would indicate air mailed and how addressed, had been removed from the box.

For the additional information of Butte and WFO, TRAFFICANTE has in the past, when securing air passage, used the names contained on the LCN membership card index and the names T. MOETOS, JAMES BRUNO, ED VALDEZ, and JOE GARCIA, the latter name having been used by TRAFFICANTE in traveling to the meeting in New York during September 1966. TRAFFICANTE has a current U. S. passport issued in the name of SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., # F-391387, issued 5/28/65 at Miami, Fla. Previous investigation has indicated that Bureau of Customs had placed stops with INS concerning TRAFFICANTE's foreign travels, but Tampa not in possession of any indication that INS or Bureau of Customs has information that TRAFFICANTE recently out of the U. S.

Tampa has submitted FD-315 requesting F-1 and F-3 type stops.

LHM to be forwarded to LEGAT, London, being prepared and will be furnished to the Bureau for dissemination.

LEADS:

BUTTE DIVISION

REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~ USC/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 9/14/98 dl
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

AT YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK

Will, at Indian Trading Post, attempt to determine details of purchase including date purchased, name used in making purchase, and any other information that would aid in placing TRAFFICANTE at any location at any given time.

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Will, at Bureau of Customs, determine nature of stop requested and any information obtained by Customs as a result of such stop.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10204
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2781-1135

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, TP
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 10/20/66
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : LST, BKG, RES, ASSOC

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/21/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS : INC LHM

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 10/20/66

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (92-2781)

FROM: SAC, TAMPA (92-1) (P)

SUBJECT: SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., aka
AR
(OO: Tampa)

Re Tampa airtel to Director dated 10/12/66.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies of an LHM for transmittal to Legat London. Also enclosed are two photographs of SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR. taken New York, New York 9/66.

Source referred to in attached LHM is TP 41-C who made the information available to SA JOHN A. AMBLER.

SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANDEROUS.

3 - Bureau (Enc. 8) 2 photos ENCLOSURE
2 - Tampa
JAA:lm
(5)

REC 26

92-2781-1135

R. C. WICK

EX 109

3 cc LHM + 2 photos to Legat, London, by O-7 10-26-66 ARW:djg

1 cc airtel + LHM ded

12 OCT 24 1966

NINE

61 OCT 31 1966

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UN ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Tampa, Florida
October 20, 1966

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR.

On September 23, 1966, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past and who is associated with Santo Trafficante, Jr., advised as follows:

During Labor Day, 1966 weekend, Santo Trafficante, Jr., had been at his St. Petersburg Beach, Florida residence located on El Centro. Trafficante, during the weekend, made the statement that he had recently been in London, England and that gambling in England was profitable. Trafficante in commenting concerning his trip, indicated that he had flown from London, England to California but gave no indication of how he had originally arrived in London.

Santo Trafficante, Jr., was born November 15, 1914 at Tampa, Florida, is 5 feet 10 inches, weighs 175 pounds, has light brown thinning hair, hazel eyes and has United States Passport Number F-391387 in the name of Santo Trafficante, Jr., issued May 28, 1965.

Trafficante maintains residences at 2505 Bristol Avenue, Tampa, Florida; 521 Northeast 71st Street, Miami, Florida; and El Centro, St. Petersburg Beach, Florida. Trafficante in the past has known to have been associated with Dino Cellini, who reportedly is employed as managing director of the Colony Club, Berkley Square, London, England.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

92-2781-1135

ENCLOSURE [illegible]

ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Tampa, Florida
October 20, 1966

SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR.

On September 23, 1966, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past and who is associated with Santo Trafficante, Jr., advised as follows:

During Labor Day, 1966 weekend, Santo Trafficante, Jr., had been at his St. Petersburg Beach, Florida residence located on El Centro. Trafficante, during the weekend, made the statement that he had recently been in London, England and that gambling in England was profitable. Trafficante in commenting concerning his trip, indicated that he had flown from London, England to California but gave no indication of how he had originally arrived in London.

Santo Trafficante, Jr., was born November 15, 1914 at Tampa, Florida, is 5 feet 10 inches, weighs 175 pounds, has light brown thinning hair, hazel eyes and has United States Passport Number F-391387 in the name of Santo Trafficante, Jr., issued May 28, 1965.

Trafficante maintains residences at 2505 Bristol Avenue, Tampa, Florida; 521 Northeast 71st Street, Miami, Florida; and El Centro, St. Petersburg Beach, Florida. Trafficante in the past has known to have been associated with Dino Cellini, who reportedly is employed as managing director of the Colony Club, Berkley Square, London, England.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10204-10206
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-2781-1137

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, TP
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	11/04/66
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	LST, BKG, RES, REL, TRA, ASSOC
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	4
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	10/21/98
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11/4/66

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (92-2781)

FROM: SAC, TAMPA (92-1) (P)

SUBJECT: SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., aka
AR
(OO: TP)

T. [illegible]

Re New Orleans airtel to Director captioned "LA COSA NOSTRA" dated 10/31/66.

Enclosed for Miami is a xerox copy of referenced New Orleans airtel.

For information of New Orleans, SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR. spends a considerable portion of time at his Miami, Florida residence, 523 Northeast 71st Street and it is suggested that New Orleans in the future when furnishing information concerning TRAFFICANTE, include Miami as recipient.

For further information New Orleans TRAFFICANTE's wife JOSEPHINE was involved in an automobile accident in Tampa 5/18/66 and was confined St. Joseph's Hospital, Tampa from dateoof accident until 6/19/66.

TP 120-C, who has daily access to TRAFFICANTE's Tampa residence, on 6/11/66, indicated no visitors had been at the residence during the past few days. It is further noted that TRAFFICANTE's married daughter, her husband, and their five year old son also maintain their home at TRAFFICANTE's Tampa residence.

3 - Bureau
2 - New Orleans
1 - Miami (Enc. 1) (RM) (92-88)
2 - Tampa
JAA:lm
(8)

92-2781-1137

REC 22

NOV 7 1966

61 NOV 28 1966

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

In addition, records airport parking, Miami Airport, indicate that TRAFFICANTE's automobile was not on the parking lot during the period of 5/27/66 to 6/4/66, which would suggest from past experience that TRAFFICANTE was actually present in the Miami, Florida area from 5/27/66 to 6/4/66. Likewise, records indicate that TRAFFICANTE's automobile was on the parking lot from 6/4/66 until 6/10/66 which would suggest that TRAFFICANTE was not in Miami. Possibility therefore exists that MARCELLO's visit mentioned in referenced airtel would have been to TRAFFICANTE's Miami residence instead of his Tampa residence.

Furthermore, TP 120-C on 7/6/66 indicated that TRAFFICANTE, his wife, their daughter, and her family had spent some of the July 4th weekend at least at TRAFFICANTE's St. Petersburg Beach residence located at 3610 El Centro. Likewise, records of the airport parking lot, Miami, indicate that TRAFFICANTE's automobile was parked on the airport parking lot from 6/27/66 to 7/2/66 at which time it was removed from the lot at 12:52 p.m. Records further reflect that the car again appeared on the parking lot at 6:07 7/2/66 and remained on the parking lot until 11:22 p.m., 7/6/66. From TRAFFICANTE's habit pattern, it thus appears that he was out of the Miami area from 6/27/66 to the afternoon of 7/2/66 and then from evening of 7/2/66 to 7/6/66.

New Orleans's attention is called to New Orleans file 162-156 captioned "AUGUSTINE PRIMO LAZZARA" and New Orleans file 92-320 captioned "JOSEPH MARCELLO, JR." which indicates some contact between LAZZARA and MARCELLO and it is an established fact that AUGUSTINE PRIMO LAZZARA is a very close associate of SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR.

LEADS

NEW ORLEANS DIVISION

New Orleans is requested to furnish Tampa suitable photographs of CARLOS MARCELLO, JOSEPH MARCELLO, JR., and their wives for exhibition to TP 120-C and other sources familiar with TRAFFICANTE's associates. Only photograph at present available to Tampa of CARLOS MARCELLO is that contained on LCN membership index card.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY	FBI
RECORD NUMBER	124-10204-10209
RECORDS SERIES	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	92-2781-1140

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR	FBI
FROM	LEG, PA
TO	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE	
DATE	12/05/66
PAGES	1
SUBJECTS	LST, TRA, ASSOC
DOCUMENT TYPE	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS	4
CURRENT STATUS	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	04/14/95
OPENING CRITERIA	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS	

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

4-3 (Rev. 1-27-66)

[For]

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM XXX CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

STATE 07
DEFERRED ~~12-5-66~~
TO DIRECTOR (92-2781)
FROM LEGAT PARIS NO. 537

SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR. AR.

REBU TELEPHONE CALL NOVEMBER 22 LAST.

SPANISH POLICE ADVISE SUBJECT ARRIVED MADRID NOVEMBER 23 AND DEPARTED NOVEMBER 28 LAST PER SCHEDULE. THEY ADVISE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF TRIP APPEARED TO BE CONTACT WITH CUBAN ATTORNEY RAFAEL GARCIA BANGO OF MADRID REGARDING POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF PROPERTY IN MADRID.

PORTUGUESE POLICE ADVISE SUBJECT TRANSITED LISBON WITHOUT LEAVING AIRPORT.

GARCIA MENTIONED MIAMI MEMORANDUM AUGUST 5 LAST, CAPTIONED "JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA CUBANA (JURE), INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA; NEUTRALITY MATTERS."

REPORT FOLLOWS.

105-114543-273

EX-103
REC-59 92-2781-1140

RECEIVED: 10:29 AM JER

3RD CC: MR. BRENNAN

DEC 9 1966

1cc to Miami (info) 12/9/66

DEC 15 1966

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Date : 04/14/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY	FBI
RECORD NUMBER	124-10204-10211
RECORDS SERIES	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	92-2781-1142

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR	FBI
FROM	LEG, PA
TO	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE	
DATE	12/05/66
PAGES	3
SUBJECTS	LST, TRA, ASSOC
DOCUMENT TYPE	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS	4
CURRENT STATUS	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	04/14/95
OPENING CRITERIA	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS	INC LHM

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

[For]

FBI

Date: 12-5-66

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: Director, FBI (92-2781)

FROM: Legat, Paris (92-58) (Ruc)

SUBJECT: SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR.
AR

encl

Re Paris cable 12-5-66.

Enclosed are 5 copies of an LHM captioned and dated as above.

In the event any additional information is received regarding the subjects from either the Directorate General of Security (DGS), Madrid, or the Portuguese International and State Security Police (PIDE), Lisbon, in the future, the Bureau and Miami will be immediately advised.

ENCLOSURE

5 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
(1 - Liaison Section
1 - Miami, for info.)
1 - Paris
VVK:HD
(6)

T. Simpson
T. Emery

1cc DOJ
1541

REC- 19 92-2781-1142

EX-108

10 DEC 9 1966

1 cc of airtel
1cc LHM to mm by 0-7
12-9-66
BAW: djg

FCC • Wick

FINO

55 DEC 23 1966

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

[For]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 5, 1966

SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR.

On November 30, 1966, JOSE NIETO GOMEZ, Dirección General de Seguridad (Directorate General of Security), Spanish National Police, Madrid, Spain, advised that SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., arrived at Barajas Airport, Madrid, Spain, aboard Aeronaves de Mexico flight 450 on November 23, 1966. He remained in Madrid until November 28, 1966, when he departed en route Lisbon, Portugal.

Spain
Cuba

While in Madrid, he was in frequent contact with a Cuban attorney by the name of RAFAEL GARCIA BANGO, Calle Méjico #9, Madrid. According to NIETO, the principal purpose of TRAFFICANTE's visit to Spain was to contact GARCIA BANGO regarding the possible purchase of property in Madrid. While in Madrid, TRAFFICANTE, accompanied by GARCIA BANGO and at times with GARCIA BANGO's wife and daughter, frequented numerous restaurants, shows, and night clubs.

On December 2, 1966, Inspector JOSE MANUEL DA CUNHA PASSO of the Portuguese International and State Security Police (PIDE), Lisbon, Portugal, advised that SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., arrived at the Lisbon Airport, Lisbon, Portugal, on November 28, 1966, and that he departed on the same date without having actually left the Lisbon Airport.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

92-2781-1142

[for]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 5, 1966

SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR.

On November 30, 1966, JOSE NIETO GOMEZ, Dirección General de Seguridad (Directorate General of Security), Spanish National Police, Madrid, Spain, advised that SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., arrived at Barajas Airport, Madrid, Spain, aboard Aeronaves de Mexico flight 450 on November 23, 1966. He remained in Madrid until November 28, 1966, when he departed en route Lisbon, Portugal.

While in Madrid, he was in frequent contact with a Cuban attorney by the name of RAFAEL GARCIA BANGO, Calle Méjico #9, Madrid. According to NIETO, the principal purpose of TRAFFICANTE's visit to Spain was to contact GARCIA BANGO regarding the possible purchase of property in Madrid. While in Madrid, TRAFFICANTE, accompanied by GARCIA BANGO and at times with GARCIA BANGO's wife and daughter, frequented numerous restaurants, shows, and night clubs.

On December 2, 1966, Inspector JOSE MANUEL DA CUNHA PASSO of the Portuguese International and State Security Police (PIDE), Lisbon, Portugal, advised that SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., arrived at the Lisbon Airport, Lisbon, Portugal, on November 28, 1966, and that he departed on the same date without having actually left the Lisbon Airport.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

9261-10811

Date : 10/21/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10212
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2781-1143

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, NO
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 11/18/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : LST, ASSOC, CM, PHOTO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/21/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11/18/66

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (92-2781)

FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS (92-74)(P)

SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., aka
AR
OO: TP

Re Tampa airtel to Director, FBI, dated 11/4/66.

Enclosed for the Tampa and Miami Offices are two photographs each of CARLOS MARCELLO. It is noted that both these photographs are excellent likenesses of CARLOS MARCELLO.

Tampa requested to show photo of CARLOS MARCELLO to TP 120-C and other sources familiar with TRAFFICANTE's associates.

Tampa requested not to make any inquiry of any informant relative to the visit of CARLOS and JOSEPH MARCELLO and their respective wives, as is Miami, due to the fact that this would immediately identify the informant who furnished this information.

Tampa and Miami requested to show CARLOS MARCELLO's photo only to logical informants, including TP 120-C.

3 - BUREAU
2 - TAMPA (92-1) (ENCS.-2)
2 - MIAMI (92-88) (ENCS.-2)
2 - NEW ORLEANS
PJC:eah
(9)

REC-52

92-2781-1143

EX 10

NOV 21 1966

ARMED AND DANGEROUS

C. C. WICK

~~F~~ F146

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

70 DEC 14 1966

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10213
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2781-1144

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, NO
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 11/25/66
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : LST, TRA, ASSOC

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/21/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11/25/66

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (92-2781)

FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS (92-74)

SUBJECT: SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., aka
AR

REC-163

Re Tampa airtel to Bureau 11/4/66.

NO 1457-C-TE advised SA PATRICK J. COLLINS, JR., on 11/23/66 that it was sometime in early June, 1966, that CARLOS MARCELLO and JOSEPH MARCELLO, together with their spouses, visited TRAFFICANTE in Florida. Informant stated that the MARCELLOs flew from New Orleans to Tampa, where they were met by PRIMO LAZZARO and his wife, ALICE LAZZARO. Informant stated that ALICE LAZZARO was born and raised in Cuba.

LA

FLA

IN CUBA

Informant stated that PRIMO LAZZARO owns some type of restaurant or nightclub in Tampa and for the past five to six months, has been commuting frequently between New Orleans and Tampa, acting as the middle-man between TRAFFICANTE and MARCELLO. Informant stated that PRIMO and ALICE LAZZARO have often socially visited Mr. and Mrs. JOSEPH MARCELLO.

The LAZZAROs met the MARCELLOs at the Tampa airport and took them to TRAFFICANTE's Tampa home where they stayed overnight. Early the next morning, the LAZZAROs drove the MARCELLOs to TRAFFICANTE's beach house at

3 - Bureau (92-2781)
2 - Tampa (92-1)
2 - Miami (92-88)
3 - New Orleans

PJC:sam
(10)

REC-63

EX-108

92-2781-1144

NOV 28 1966

67 DEC 19 1966

DEC 13 1966

NINE

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

St. Petersburg, Florida. CARLOS MARCELLO and his spouse stayed at the beach house with SANTO TRAFFICANTE and the LAZZAROs. JOSEPH MARCELLO and his wife stayed at a nearby motel. Informant does not know the address of this beach house.

Regarding TRAFFICANTE's 7/4/66 visit to New Orleans, informant knows that TRAFFICANTE was at the Churchhill Farms estate of CARLOS MARCELLO during the early afternoon of 7/4/66. Informant does not know exactly when TRAFFICANTE arrived, but felt he had stayed overnight at Churchhill Farms. During the early morning of 7/6/66, CARLOS MARCELLO and JOSEPH MARCELLO, together with their spouses and TRAFFICANTE, drove across Lake Pontchartrain to the home CARLOS MARCELLO rents in Covington, La., and spent the better part of the day there. CARLOS and JOSEPH MARCELLO and SANTO TRAFFICANTE left that home during the early evening hours of 7/6/66; however, informant does not know where they proceeded from there. Informant next saw CARLOS and JOSEPH MARCELLO during the evening of 7/7/66.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10215
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2781-1145

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, LO
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 01/06/67
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : LST, TRA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/14/95
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-03

[For]

UNITED STATES GO\ .NMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI
DATE: 1/6/67

FROM : Legat, London (92-66) (RUC)

SUBJECT: SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR.
AR

~~Lac~~ 10

fd 217

Re Tampa memo 10/20/66.

On 1/5/67 Detective Sergeant Trevor Lloyd-Hughes, Criminel Intelligence Squad, New Scotland Yard, advised that he has been unable to locate any record of subject having visited the United Kingdom within the past three years.

3 - Bureau
1 - Liaison (direct)
1 - London
ACM:vw
(5)

cc by 0-7 to TP
1/18/67

REC-71 92-2781 1145

5 JAN 12 1967

EX-115

NEIR

55 JAN 19 1967

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10278
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 2-1821-28

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : DIRECTOR, FBI
TO : SAC, MM
TITLE :
DATE : 08/02/63
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : ACA, VDEH, EXPLOSIVES, SEIZED, BOMBING RAID

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/11/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

1 - Nasca

8/2/63

Airtel

To: SAC, Miami
2 - New Orleans
2 - Newark
2 - Atlanta
2 - Jacksonville

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE ~~11/15/84~~ 4/18/94 BY SP6BJN/GCL
SP8 MAC/GAT (JFK)

From: Director, FBI

VICTOR DOMINADOR ESPINOSA HERNANDEZ, et al.
NEUTRALITY MATTERS

ReNOtel 8/1/63 in captioned matter.

Miami immediately advise results of interview of Miami PCI Michael McLaney, particularly whether he is related to William Julius McLaney. In view of Michael McLaney's reported interest in 6/15/63 plan to bomb Cuba, he might well have a connection with this case and may have influenced William McLaney to cooperate in captioned matter.

Miami also immediately interview Antonio Soto, Evelio Alpizar, Miguel Alvarez, Sam Benton and Jose de Jesus Basulto Leon who have been mentioned in previous Miami communications as possibly being involved in this matter, as well as any other suspects developed through investigation. Miami also interview Gonzalo Herrera, former Cuban airlines pilot and other logical former Cuban pilots who may have been approached to pilot planes in this matter. If not already done, all suspects connected with the June 15, 1963, attempt to bomb Cuba, which was handled by Customs, should be interviewed.

1 - Albany
1 - New York
1 - Springfield

~~VHN~~:pal
(15)

REC- 9
62-1821-
19 AUG 8 1963

MAILED 20
AUG 2 - 1963
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

62 AUG 12 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

2-1821

Airtel to SAC, Miami
Re: VICTOR DOMINADOR ESPINOSA HERNANDEZ, et al.

New Orleans obtain as accurate an estimate as possible of the cash value of the explosives and other material seized. Advise Bureau of this figure by airtel and be certain to include it as a recovery value in the forthcoming report being submitted. All offices conducting investigation in the matter cover leads immediately upon receipt, and surep without delay in view of the importance of this case and the Department's interest. Report significant developments to Bureau by teletype.

Every effort should be made to identify all participants, the source of funds, the source of arms and the location of planes, if any, which were to be utilized in the bombing attack on Cuba. All offices will keep Bureau, Miami and New Orleans currently advised of all developments.

[illegible]

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10297
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-98177-2

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, MX
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 05/26/61
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : LHJ, RES, REL, ASSOC, TRA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/13/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

CONF~~ID~~ENTIAL

MAY 26 1961

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: [LEGAT, MEXICO CITY] (u)

11-16-94 ~~Classified by~~ SP8MAC/EH
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~ JFK

SUBJECT: LOUIS HENRY JONES
IS - CUBA
[(MC 105-2226)] (u)

LENNA SCHWEITZER JONES
IS - CUBA
[(MC 105-2227)] (u)

BETH MICHEL WOLLAND
IS - CUBA
[(MC 105-2228)] (u)

JOHN ARTHUR SWEETMAN
IS - CUBA
[(MC 105-2225)] (u)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM

6-25-97
SLD/KSR
7-24-97
(JFK)

105-98170
105-98178
105-98175

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mdc
ON 9/4/97 (JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~ EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~CLASS. & EXT. BY SP-4 SJM/bjt 1-2-4.3~~
~~REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2~~
~~DATE OF REVIEW 8/12/81~~

ReBulets 4/17/61 and 5/12/61.

The records of the Citizenship Unit, U. S. Embassy, Mexico, D. F., as checked by SA WALLACE R. HEITMAN on 4/27/61, reflect information concerning LOUIS HENRY JONES and LENNA SCHWEITZER JONES, but do not reflect information for JOHN ARTHUR SWEETMAN or BETH MICHEL WOLLAND.

These citizenship records reflect that LOUIS HENRY JONES registered at the U. S. Embassy, showing that he was the bearer of U.S. Passport #1595957, issued 5/28/59 and expires 5/27/61; renewed 4/19/61 and expires 5/27/63. This registration shows LOUIS HENRY JONES was born 3/17/34, Arlington Heights, Ohio, and reflects his New York address as 309 West 99th St., New York City and persons to notify in the event of an emergency as Dr. MORTON D. SCHWEITZER, 310 West 94th St., New York City, and EARL R. JONES, Rural Route #3, Lebanon, Ohio. The residence of LOUIS HENRY JONES in Mexico City was

REVIEWED BY DOS/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/8/97 mp/clal
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

P.
25 - Bureau
(4 - Chicago)
(4 - Cleveland)
(4 - Detroit, 105-5947)
(4 - Indianapolis)
(4 - WFO)
4 - Mexico City
WRH:ij
(29)

CONFIDENTIAL (u)

REC 22

105-98177-2

16 JUN 5 1961

4 cc's
Copy to Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, WFO,
by routing slip for Indianapolis
☒ info ☐ action
date 6-9-61
by FEJ/st

ADM. INT. SEC.

57 JUN 9 1961

MC 105-2226 X(u)

given as Calle Rhin 29-7, telephone 35-14-15. The registration shows that LOUIS HENRY JONES stated that he intended to be absent from the U. S. for approximately one year.

The citizenship records concerning LENNA SCHWEITZER JONES reflected that she is the holder of U. S. Passport #1595958, issued on 5/28/59 and expires 5/27/61; renewed 4/19/61 to expire 5/27/63. Her birth date was shown as 4/13/35 at Pasadena, California. Her address in Mexico City and persons to notify in case of an emergency were listed the same as on the registration of LOUIS HENRY JONES, above. LENNA SCHWEITZER JONES, on her registration, showed that she intended to be absent for a period of one year. It is noted that there is no photograph of either subject in citizenship files, Mexico, D. F.

MEX-42 (S)(u) (protect identity) X who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on 5/15/61 that the address at Calle Rhin 29 is a building known as the Hotel Carmen. Inquiry by MEX-42 at this address reflected one LOUIS JONES (u) and family, address 401 West Hoover, Ann Arbor, Michigan, professor and student, had registered at the hotel on 4/3/61 and had resided in Apartment #7, with a person reportedly his wife and another woman until 5/5/61, on which date the three persons left the hotel in an automobile, destination unknown. X

MEX-42 (S)(u) was unable to obtain a description of the automobile or to determine by his inquiries of where these persons went, who are believed to be identical with LOUIS HENRY JONES, LENNA SCHWEITZER JONES and BETH MICHEL WOLLAND. X

CIA Station, Mexico, D. F., has been requested to furnish any information in their files for the subjects. (S)(u)

LEAD X(u)

MEXICO CITY OFFICE: X(u)

AT MEXICO, D. F.: X(u)

Will continue, through sources and informants, to determine if the captioned individuals left Mexico for Cuba. X(u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MC 105-2226 (U)

Additional copies of this memorandum are being furnished the Bureau for the information of the Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis and Washington Field Offices.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10322
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-98177-1ST NR 23

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, NY
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 07/17/63
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : LHJ, JONES, LENNA SCHWEITZER, ASSOC, HDW, COMPARISON

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/08/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-98176) DATE: 7/17/63

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-49812) (P)

SUBJECT: LENNA SCHWEITZER JONES
IS-CUBA
(OO:NY)

11-16-94
Classified by SP8MAC/EH
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

Re Bu airtel, 4/26/63 to NY, DE, WFO, Boston and Mexico City, which instructed Detroit to obtain known samples of writing of subject, her husband, LOUIS HENRY JONES and BETH MICHELE WOLLAND for comparison with questioned material obtained by Michigan State Police.

Re Detroit report of SA MELVILLE H. SHANNON, dated 7/1/63, which requested NYO to set necessary leads to obtain handwriting specimens.

Recontact with [NY 3164-S,] (X)(U) who had had contact with BETH MICHELE WOLLAND, confirmed that he is in possession of no specimens of her handwriting. (X)

BOSTON: Boston letter, 6/7/63, under WOLLAND caption furnished Bureau with 4 page letter to RAY T. MENTZER, JR., last page of which contained some handwriting.

It is assumed this material has been or will be furnished to the Laboratory for comparison.

4- Bureau (105-98176) (RM)
(1-105-98177) (LOUIS HENRY JONES)
(1-105-98178) (BETH MICHELE WOLLAND)
1- Boston (105-7773) (Info) (RM)
2- Cleveland (105-25436) (WOLLAND) (RM)
3- Detroit (105-6316) (RM)
(1-105-6317) (LOUIS HENRY JONES)
(1-105-5947) (BETH MICHELE WOLLAND)
2- Portland (100-10375) (WOLLAND) (RM)
4- WFO (105-42975) (RM)
(1-105-42974) (LOUIS HENRY JONES)
(1-105-41859) (BETH MICHELE WOLLAND)
1- New York (105-48772) (WOLLAND)
1- New York (105-49813) (LOUIS HENRY JONES)
1- New York (105-49812)

JMK:keg
(19)

CLASS. & EXT BY SP-4JRA WA
~~REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2~~
DATE OF REVIEW 7-[illegible]83
7/10/81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668-SLD/mde
ON 8/4/97 (JFK)

1 105-98177

NOT RECORDED
150 JUL 19 1963

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/10/81 BY SP-16S RJ/WA

51 JUL 24 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

105-98176-32

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DETROIT:

Detroit airtel to Bureau, 3/6/63, reflects LENNA SCHWEITZER JONES and mother stayed overnight at Ann Arbor, Michigan, 2/20/63, at the Bell Tower Motel. The possibility exists JONES executed a registration form at that time which might furnish handwriting specimens.

Detroit should also consider contact, through established sources at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, for samples of writing of LOUIS HENRY JONES which might be located in the files of the University of Michigan, which he attended as a graduate student.

CLEVELAND:

It is noted WOLLAND's family presently resides in Shaker Heights and WOLLAND herself resides there at irregular intervals. Cleveland attempt, through logical sources to obtain known specimens of WOLLAND's handwriting for comparison with questioned Detroit material.

PORTLAND:

WOLLAND, prior to May, 1963, resided and worked in the Portland area.

Portland, at logical sources, seek to obtain known specimens of WOLLAND's handwriting.

WFO:

Will at United States Departmentof State Passport Office attempt to obtain for comparison such samples of the writing of WOLLAND, LENNA SCHWEITZER JONES and LOUIS HENRY JONES, as may appear on forms executed by them in connection with passport applications.

For the assistance of WFO, the following are pertinent passport numbers:

LOUIS H. JONES	NO. 1595958
LENNA JONES	NO. 1595957
BETH WOLLAND	NO. B-053303

Recipient offices successful in obtaining handwriting specimens of LOUIS HENRY JONES, LENNA SCHWEITZER JONES and/or BETH MICHELE WOLLAND for submission to FBI Laboratory, should request that copy of Laboratory report be furnished NYO.

Date : 05/09/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10204-10495
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-95507-1, 2, 3, 4, 5

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, NK
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 01/31/61
PAGES : 45
SUBJECTS : EEA, REL, RES, TRA, BKG, EMP, PRO-CASTRO ACT, ARREST, ARMS SMUGGLING, ASSOC

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/08/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS : INC 3 MEMO, A/T, RPT, 5 S/S

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-95507) DATE: 5/5/61

FROM : SAC, NEWARK (105-9440)

SUBJECT: EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER, Aka.
IS-CUBA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-29-94 BY SP8MAC/EH (JFK)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6BJA/dal
ON 3/7/95 #246

Re report of SA HERBERT L. BLOM at Newark dated 4/25/61. (U)

Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If this subject is co-operative, no affirmative steps will be taken during the initial interview to direct her activities and complete background investigation required by Section 107C of the Manual of Instructions is being conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as a PSI. (U)

A. Subject resides at Box 208, Route 36, Union Beach, New Jersey (mailing address is Keyport, N. J.); she is employed as a cashier at Ye Cottage Inn, Keyport, N. J. She was born 5/19/61, Newark, N. J., and is a U. S. citizen. Her health appears to be satisfactory. (U)

NO LOC

B. She was formerly married to WALTER KORABIAK. Her probation record notes she is divorced from him and that he resides in California. (U)

C. Subject was convicted in 1958 for conspiracy and unlawful possession of firearms. Investigation reflects close association with MANUEL ARQUES and was assisting in plan to return CARLOS PRIO to power in Cuba. She has continued association with ARQUES since her conviction. (U)

U, S, A

D. No information available.

E. No information available. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

188

F. A news interview of subject contained in a local newspaper on 3/26/61 reflects a purported change in her attitude against CASTRO, whereas at one time she had favored what CASTRO stood for. (U)

page 2

See Bureau note

REC- 33 105-95507-5

EX-114

2 Bureau (RM)
1 Newark
HLB:mad
(3)

APPROVED 5/15/61 (Date)
✓ Submit results in ~~form~~ REPORT suitable for dissemination.
✓ Bufiles contain no additional pertinent information identifiable with subject.

9 MAY 8 1961

NAT. ~~REP.~~ SEC.

ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF Class. & action
DATE 3/10/78

100-Newark (Action)
REC/ST 5/15/61

MAILED 27
MAY 15 1961
COMM-FBI

57 MAY 16 1961
MAIL ROOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G. If co-operative and if her confidence can be gained, it is believed that she could furnish valuable information concerning current Cuban matters based on her association with persons who have been so involved. X (u)

Bureau note:

Current inquiries of subject are based on report that subject was prasing Castro in her conversations. Since she has apparently changed her attitude towards Castro, an interview of her would be logical method to determine if she possesses any information of value regarding the Cuban situation and to appraise her informant potential. X (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

5-11, 1961

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention Travis
☑ Return to James 1531 486
Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☑ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main ______ References Only

Type of Search Requested:
☐ Restricted to Locality of ______
☑ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject Evelyn Eleanore Archer
Birthdate & Place 5-19-21 N.J.
Address sitd 2-8-61
Localities
R# ______ Date 5-11 Searcher Initials Ej
Prod.

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
MF 105-95507	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-3-94 BY SP8MAC/EH
(JFK)

FD-263 (Rev. 5-1-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE NEWARK	OFFICE OF ORIGIN NEWARK	DATE 4/25/61	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 1/24/61 - 4/20/61	
TITLE OF CASE CHANGED EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER, aka. Evelyn Archer, Mrs. Walter Korabiak, Ruby Archer, Regmu Archer, Ruby Korbin		REPORT MADE BY HERBERT L. BLOM		TYPED BY vwb
		CHARACTER OF CASE IS - CUBA		

The title is marked "Changed" to show subject's full name as EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER and to make addition of the following names: REGMU ARCHER, RUBY KORBIN. Title was previously EVELYN ARCHER, aka. Mrs. Walter Korabiak, Ruby Archer.

CC TO: CIA
REQ. REC'D. 10-26-64
OCT 28 1964
ANS. BY: JEP JAC

REFERENCES

Newark letter to Bureau, 1/31/61.
Miami airtel to Bureau, 2/6/61.
Bureau letter to Newark, 2/16/61.
Houston letter to Bureau, 3/7/61.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Newark indices contain no identifiable references concerning MANUEL ARTAS, MANDEL ARQVES or MANUEL ARQUES.

Miami indices contain no references to HYMAN GOTTSMAN.

Bureau files contain no additional pertinent information

APPROVED RWB	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

9 - Bureau (105-95507) (RM)
1 - Miami (105-3507) (Info.) (RM)
3 - Newark (105-9440)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

105-95507-4
5/4
17 ~~APR 26~~ 1961
MCT - 20
REC- 71

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency	Copy to: CIA/State/RAB			
Request Recd.	[illegible]/OSI/G2			
Date Fwd.	[illegible] routing slip for info.			
How Fwd.	Date 5-4-61 by FEG/SR			
By				

Notations

INT. SEC.

4-29-94 SP8MAC/EH (JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED #211,326
DATE 12/3/84 BY SP6BJA/GCL
3/5/85 SP6BJA/GCL #211,326

62 MAY 10 1961

concerning the subject or MANUEL ARQUES than made available in Miami airtel to Bureau, dated 2/6/61.

BERNARD HOLMES BRENNAN, mentioned in instant report, is Former MM 715-S who, during 10/60, publicly disclosed his former association as a Bureau informant.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source	File Number Where Located
NK T-1 JOSEPH QUAIL Health Inspector Middletown Township, N.J. (By Request)	105-9440-2
NK T-2 ALICE DONNELLY New Jersey Bell Telephone Company English Plaza Red Bank, N.J. (By Request)	105-9440-2
NK T-3 Mrs. PEG MUNDEN Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company Miami Beach, Florida (By Request)	105-9440-3

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed and T-symbols were utilized only in those instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed.

LEADS

NEWARK DIVISION

AT NEWARK, N.J.

Will request Bureau authority to interview subject.

MIAMI (INFORMATION)

One copy of this report is being furnished Miami for their information in view of their interest in MANUEL ARQUES and inasmuch as subject periodically visits Miami.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: HERBERT L. BLOM
Date: April 25, 1961

Office: NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

Field Office File #: 105-9440

Bureau File #: 105-95507

Title: EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-29-94 BY SP8MAC/EH
JFK

~~Classified by 1259~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
88098 5/15/97

Character: IS - CUBA

Synopsis: In 1/61, subject was praising CASTRO and in conversation with NK T-1, asked if he was interested in making money and if so, she would have him meet a friend from either Cuba or Miami. NK T-1, in 4/61, advised subject has made no further mention concerning this matter. Previous investigation shows subject has been associated with Cubans involved in Cuban affairs. Probation records show subject and others were arrested during 2/58, in Texas, charged with conspiracy and unlawful possession of firearms. On 7/11/58, subject was sentenced in U.S.D.C., Houston, Texas, two years and fined $500.00, but was placed on 22 months probation. Background information and association with MANUEL ARQUES set forth. 3/26/61 issue of "Asbury Park Sunday Press" contains interview by reporter showing subject's present attitude concerning Cuba. U

~~TO FOREIGN AGENCIES~~
~~OFFICES~~
~~ADVISED BY ROUTING~~
~~SLIP(S) OF Classification~~
~~DATE 3/16/98 JJ/mtg~~

~~- P - DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 BJA/GCL~~
~~ON 12/3/81 #211,326~~
3/5/85 SP6BJA/GCL #211,326

DETAILS:

On January 24, 1961, NK T-1 advised that several months previously, while talking to the subject at a bar, she was praising FIDEL CASTRO and what he was doing for Cuba. Later in the conversation, she asked the informant how he felt about making a "buck" or if he cared how he made it. NK T-1, in going along with the conversation, stated to her that he was interested in making money, to which she replied that she was expecting a friend from either Cuba or Miami (not recalled by NK T-1) and that when he arrived she would have them get together. U

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Since that time, according to NK T-1, subject has made no further mention of this matter, although he has seen her on several occasions. NK T-1 said he had heard it rumored that the subject has been involved in the sale of guns to Cuba in the past, as well as having visited Cuba since CASTRO took power, but did not know this of his own knowledge.

NEE
EIOLA

NK T-1 said that ARCHER is divorced from her husband, has two children and resides with her mother, ~~ANNA~~ ARCHER, on Route 36, Union Beach, New Jersey. He added that she is employed as a cashier at Ye Cottage Inn, Keyport, New Jersey.

B. APPROX. 1902
BORN NEWARK, N.J.
AKA MRS. FREDERICK ARCHER

It is to be noted that during the course of another investigation the subject's mother, ANNA ARCHER, was interviewed at her home by SA VICTOR J. CAMPI, on July 6, 1960, concerning an abandoned car found near her home. Upon requesting a paper upon which she said she had written the license number of the abandoned car, Mrs. ARCHER started to enter the next room, at which time a woman's voice, in a loud tone, objected to an effort to open the door. Mrs. ARCHER said her daughter was making a phone call and that when the call was completed she would obtain the requested item. Shortly thereafter, the subject emerged from the next room stating she had been interrupted making a very important telephone call -- a call to Cuba. She did not identify the individual to whom she was talking nor did she furnish any information concerning this telephone conversation.

On October 6, 1960, Captain WALTER HUTTON, Union Beach, New Jersey, Police Department, advised SA CAMPI that the subject had two brothers, noting that one brother, FREDDIE ARCHER, was a well-known boxer. He noted that the subject had been married to a local man but had stopped living together in the late 1940s and since that time her mother, ANNA ARCHER, has been helping to rear the two children from that marriage. Captain HUTTON did not know how the subject made her living, but it was his opinion she probably had boyfriends who kept her, that she did a bit of traveling with her boyfriends but always returned to visit her children. He said the subject was also known under the name RUBY KORBIN.

No
Loc

In the course of another investigation, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division (ATTD) Agent JOHN C. MULLIN, on January 18, 1960, advised ~~SA LINCOLN~~ J. STOKES that the last girlfriend of CHARLIE "THE BLADE" TOURINE was a girl named EVELYN ARCHER (phonetic) of Houston, Texas. He said this girl was married and may be involved in gun purchasing and selling.

CONFIDENTIAL

On January 24, 1961, NK T-2 advised that ANNA ARCHER, Route 36, Union Beach, New Jersey, is the subscriber to COlfax 4-2033 and that the following toll calls had been made from this number:

October 21, 1960	Call from Mrs. FNU ARCHER to MANDEL ARQVES at Havana 77241
November 18, 1960	Call to Miami (JE 1-7635)
November 24, 1960	Call to Miami (JE 1-7635)
December 3, 1960	Collect call to MANUEL ARTAS Add Loc. from Miami (JE 1-7635) to CO 4-2033

The above information cannot be made public except in the usual proceeding following the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.

On January 25, 1961, Mr. EMERSON TSCHUPP, Deputy Director, Enforcement Division, New Jersey State Alcohol Beverage Control, 1100 Raymond Boulevard, Newark, New Jersey, advised SA JACK W. SUNDERLAND that as of October 21, 1959, the subject was listed as an employee at Ye Cottage Inn, 149 West Front Street, Keyport, New Jersey, as a cashier.

On January 26, 1961, Birth Records were made available to SA SUNDERLAND at the Bureau of Vital Statistics, City Hall, Newark, New Jersey, wherein it was noted that one REGMU (not completely legible) ARCHER was born May 19, 1921, at Newark, New Jersey. This record noted a name change to EVELYN ARCHER on June 8, 1936. The address where the birth occurred was 326 - 18th Avenue, Newark, New Jersey. Her parents were listed as FREDERICK B. APPROX 1900 ARCHER, age 21, a toolmaker, born in Newark, New Jersey, and ANNA FIODA, age 19, born in Newark, New Jersey.

In an effort to check divorce records concerning the subject, the following departments were contacted with negative results:

January 30, 1961	Mrs. ELSIE WALZER, Docket Clerk, Monmouth County Clerk's Office, Freehold, New Jersey.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 7, 1961	Records of New Jersey Superior Court, West State Street, Trenton, New Jersey, checked by SA NORMAN A. HENDRICKS.
January 26, 1961	Miss FRANCES BEAM, Essex County Clerk's Office, Hall of Records, Newark, New Jersey, contacted by SA JACK W. SUNDERLAND.

On January 25, 1961, JOHN MILES, Monmouth County Identification Bureau, Freehold, New Jersey, advised the files of his office contained no record concerning the subject. U

SELMA JENNINGS, Credit Bureau of Central New Jersey, 103 East Front Street, Red Bank, New Jersey, advised on January 26, 1961, that according to her records EVELYN ARCHER, Box 408, Union Beach, New Jersey, (Keyport, New Jersey, mailing address) was listed as a widow and that as of April 12, 1949, there was an account listed to her under the name of EVELYN and WALTER AKA W[illegible] KOROIAK KORABIAK, RD 1, Box 408, Keyport, New Jersey. Her credit record was listed as a troublesome account and showed previous employments at The Magnolia Inn, Matawan, New Jersey, on March 19, 1957, and at Ye Cottage Inn, Keyport, New Jersey, on June 2, 1953. U

CAL

58
43
15

AKA- ROBERT R. MCKEOWN

On February 18, 1958, upon the basis of information furnished by ~~the~~ San Antonio Office concerning the purchase of a boat by ROBERT ~~MC KEOWN~~, determined to be the BUDDY DEE, United States Customs took possession of this vessel which had departed from Patterson, Louisiana, for Houston, Texas, with MANUEL MARQUES, RUBY ARCHER, also known as EVELYN ARCHER, of Keyport, New Jersey, and ABELARDO RENE PUJOL Y BARRERA on board. U

TEXAS

FLORIDA

CUBA

The February 26, 1958, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled, "Arms Plot Suspect Surrenders," bearing a Houston, Texas, dateline. This article revealed that ROBERT MC KEOWN had surrendered Tuesday and was charged immediately with two counts of violating the National Firearms Act. This article disclosed that MC KEOWN was described by Federal authorities as the "mystery man" in the Houston phase of an alleged plot to supply Cuban nationals with firearms. U

On April 4, 1961, the subject's file was made available to SA DANIEL E. BRANDT by BRAYTON CRIST, United States Probation Officer, Trenton, New Jersey. U

The file shows EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER, RD 1, Box 208, Keyport, New Jersey, was arrested during February, 1958, at

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Seabrook, Texas, and charged with conspiracy and unlawful possession of firearms. The co-defendants in the case were listed as MANUEL ARQUES, MARIO SILVERIO VILLAMINA, FRANCISCO GONZALES OBREGON and ABELARDO PUJOL BARRERA.

On July 11, 1958, the subject was sentenced in United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston, Texas, to two years and a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00). On August 12, 1958, the sentence was reduced to 18 months - suspended, 22 months probation and a five hundred dollar ($500.00) fine. The fine was paid by the subject on July 17, 1958.

A letter dated June 23, 1958, from the United States Probation Office, Houston, Texas, to the Probation Office, Trenton, New Jersey, indicated the subject had been involved in a conspiracy to take part in a military expedition and enterprise to be carried on from within the United States against Cuba. The letter continued that the subject, who had represented herself as Mrs. MANUEL ARQUES but who was not married to ARQUES, had met ARQUES in Miami, Florida, while on vacation. ARQUES' father, who was on the Miami Police Department, was known to CARLOS PRIO, former President of Cuba. The subject was assisting ARQUES in a plan to have PRIO returned to control in Cuba in place of BATISTE, for which ARQUES would be given a high government position. The firearms which were in the possession of the subject were to be sent to CASTRO by boat.

The subject's parole supervision was transferred to Trenton, New Jersey, on September 22, 1958.

On October 13, 1958, the subject testified in United States District Court, Houston, Texas, against ROBERT R. MC KEOWN, and en route to Texas she visited Miami, Florida, and on returning to New Jersey visited Key West, Florida,

During January, 1959, the subject went to Miami, Florida, without obtaining permission, and on January 23, 1959, she and ARQUES appeared at the United States Probation Office, Miami, and asked for permission to return to Cuba. Her address at that time was 2350 S. W. 13th Street, Miami, Florida. Permission for her to go to Cuba was denied by the Judge at United States District Court, Houston, Texas.

The supervision of the subject's parole was transferred to Miami, Florida, on February 12, 1959, and she returned to her Keyport, New Jersey, address on July 10, 1959. She visited ARQUES at Miami on November 4, 1959, residing care of Mrs. R. GOODMAN,

ADDRESS: 342 NE. 35th St.
MIAMI, FLORIDA

342 N. E. 35th Street, Miami, Florida, and returned to New Jersey on November 18, 1959. She went to Miami on March 25, 1960, where she lived at the Hotel America until she returned to New Jersey on April 11, 1960. U

The files show the subject's probation expired on June 12, 1960, and that during June, 1960, she was going to accompany her boyfriend, MANUEL ARQUES, to Canada, where he was going to promote tourist trade to Cuba. After her trip to Canada, she and ARQUES were going to marry and return to Cuba. U

The file contained the following background information: U

Name	EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER
Date of Birth	May 19, 1921, Newark, New Jersey
Race	White
Sex	Female
Address	RD 1, Box 208, Keyport, New Jersey
Occupation	Cashier and waitress
Employer	Cottage Inn, Keyport, New Jersey
Father	FRED ARCHER, 34 Cale Crespis, Santa Barbara, California
Mother	ANNA ARCHER, Keyport, New Jersey
Son	JEFFERY
Daughter	VALERIE
Ex-Husband	WALTER KORBIAC, California

REVIEWED BY USCS/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 7.23.97 dad
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

On August 5, 1960, MICHAEL A. ROMANO, United States Customs, Miami, Florida, advised SA WILLIAM P. KELLY the name "RUBY ARCHER, Box 208, Keyport, N.J." was found among other names and addresses in the possession of MANUEL ARQUES on July 22, 1960, on which date ROMANO searched the baggage and person of ARQUES at Miami International Airport, following ARQUES' return from Havana on that date.

On March 25, 1960, BERNARD HOLMES BRENNAN, Moodus, Connecticut, advised SA WILLIAM A. WIGHTMAN, at Miami, that as of March 25, 1960, MANUEL ARQUES was dating a girl named EVELYN ARCHER, who then lived at the American Hotel, 273 N.E. Second Street, Miami. U

On October 26, 1960, BRENNAN advised he went to Havana to meet ARQUES during September, 1960. He stated that while at Havana, "RUBY," not further identified, was there with ARQUES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BRENNAN stated "RUBY" was worried about her parents knowing she was in Cuba, and she expressed concern about the large number of Chinese men at the Commodore Hotel, Havana, whom she saw eating on one occasion, and stated she did not like it at all. U

MANUEL ARQUES, a self-admitted supporter of CARLOS PRIO, exiled former President of Cuba, and naturalized United States citizen of Cuban birth, formerly was Publicity Director of the Cuban Tourist Commission at Miami until he resigned during November, 1960. ARQUES has been identified by several sources as having been an intelligence agent in the United States for JUAN ORTA, who, until recently, was the Secretary for FIDEL CASTRO. X (U)

Upon interview by Bureau Agents on December 1, 1960, ARQUES denied ever having been a Cuban intelligence agent. However, he admitted sending written and verbal messages to ORTA during 1959 concerning activities in the United States of "Batistianos." ARQUES stated he was not in accord with policies of the Castro Government and considered communism to be dominant in the Castro regime. X AKA; MANUEL ARQUES (U) ~~MANU~~

POB. CUBA

On January 20, 1961, ARQUES advised SA WILLIAM P. KELLY that his residence then was 1050 N. W. Seventh Street, Miami, Florida. U

On February 3, 1961, NK T-3 advised that telephone number JE 1 - 7635 was listed to HYMAN GOTTSMAN, 1225 - 11th Street, Apartment 2, Miami Beach, Florida. U

The above records are confidential and can only be obtained through issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. U

The March 26, 1961, issue of "The Asbury Park Sunday Press" carried the following article concerning the subject following an interview by CHARLES BROWER, Press Staff Writer: U

"SHORE WOMAN WHO AIDED CASTRO
SORRY, SAYS CUBANS LIKE US

" By CHARLES BROWER
Press Staff Writer

" UNION BEACH -- Despite FIDEL CASTRO's hate America campaign, the average Cuban holds no dislike for Americans. U

" This is the observation of a local woman who aided, in what she terms a minor way, the young Cuban dictator's rise to power over three years ago.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

" Miss EVELYN ARCHER, Rte. 36, who helped supply arms to Cuban rebels prior to CASTRO's victory over former Cuban strongman FULGENCIO BATISTA, said she is 'sad and unhappy' at the results of the Cuban revolution.

" 'The Cuban people do not hate Americans.'

" Many Ask About Americans

" In fact, she said, many Cubans ask if the Americans really hate them.

" Miss ARCHER said she was received warmly by Cubans both in Havana and in the interior during a visit to the island last fall. 'They treated me wonderfully,' she said.

" 'CASTRO has betrayed the people who put him in power. He has not kept the many promises he made after his victory early in 1959.'

" Among the unkept promises made by the bearded dictator were free elections throughout Cuba within a year.

" Arrested in Texas

" 'The Cuban people want to live under a democracy; they do not want communism,' she asserted. 'CASTRO,' she said, 'certainly leans toward communism.'

" Miss ARCHER and five other Cuban rebel sympathizers were arrested three years ago in Texas as they attempted to ship arms to rebels in Cuba. She was fined and given an 18-month suspended jail sentence after pleading no defense to charges of conspiracy to overthrow the Cuban government headed by BATISTA.

" The attractive brunette was also placed on probation for 22 months and barred from traveling to Cuba during the probation period.

" 'I'm not ashamed of what I did. I'm only sorry it has turned out the way it has,' she said.

" Asked if she would do it all over again she declared she would but 'not exactly in the same way.'

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"   Minor Role

" Miss ARCHER became involved in the Cuban revolution through Cuban friends she had met during visits to Cuba and Miami. Her part was only a minor one, she says.

" She is reluctant to publicly bring up her past associations with the Cuban revolution, but agreed only to convey to Americans the message that the Cuban people simply have nothing against Americans.

" 'More and more people are breaking away from the CASTRO regime each day. They are escaping into the hills and out of the country by any means possible. Thousands have been granted political asylum in this country.'

" Miss ARCHER said she holds high hopes for the future liberation of the Cuban people. Although she said she is not associated now with revolutionary movements and knows of no specific plans to overthrow CASTRO she added it is readily known that such movements are active.

" 'Many of the groups have been organizing in Miami,' she said.

" Friends she had been associated with in aiding the revolution have all defected from Cuba since her visit last fall. It is for this reason, she said, she would not dare return to Cuba as long as CASTRO is in power.

"   'Crazy With Power'

" When asked why CASTRO has failed to keep his promises and to bring freedom to Cuba, Miss ARCHER replied that 'he has perhaps gone crazy with power.'

" She added that his luster as a hero is wearing off.

" Miss ARCHER is employed as a hostess in a Shore restaurant. She was born in Newark and moved here about 14 years ago. She lives with her mother, Mrs. ANNA ARCHER."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On April 18, 1961, NK T-1 advised that the subject was still working at the Ye Cottage Inn, Keyport, New Jersey, and in recent conversation with her, she has made no further mention concerning their conversation in January, 1961, whereby she had stated she would introduce him to a friend of hers from Cuba or Miami. Upon viewing photographs of MANUEL ARQUES, he said this person was unknown to him.

The following physical description of the subject was obtained from the New Jersey Department of Motor Vehicles, Trenton, New Jersey, on February 7, 1961, by SA NORMAN A. HENDRICKS and from personal observation:

Name	EVELYN ARCHER
Residence	Box 208, Route 36, Keyport, New Jersey
Race	White
Sex	Female
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Dark
Height	Five feet, three inches
Weight	Approximately 135 pounds

FD-323 (3-58)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Newark, New Jersey

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. NK 105-9440

April 25, 1961

Title **EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER**

Character **IS - CUBA**

Reference **Report of SA HERBERT L. BLOM dated April 25, 1961, at Newark.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

11

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

204-10495

FD-263 (Rev. 5-1-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
NEWARK	NEWARK	4/25/61	1/24/61 - 4/20/61

TITLE OF CASE
CHANGED
EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER, aka.
Evelyn Archer, Mrs. Walter
Korabiak, Ruby Archer, Regmu
Archer, Ruby Korbin

REPORT MADE BY: HERBERT L. BLOM
TYPED BY: vwb

CHARACTER OF CASE: IS - CUBA

x

The title is marked "Changed" to show subject's full name as EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER and to make addition of the following names: REGMU ARCHER, RUBY KORBIN. Title was previously EVELYN ARCHER, aka. Mrs. Walter Korabiak, Ruby Archer.

REFERENCES

Newark letter to Bureau, 1/31/61.
Miami airtel to Bureau, 2/6/61.
Bureau letter to Newark, 2/16/61.
Houston letter to Bureau, 3/7/61.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Newark indices contain no identifiable references concerning MANUEL ARTAS, MANDEL ARQVES or MANUEL ARQUES.

Miami indices contain no references to HYMAN GOTTSMAN.

Bureau files contain no additional pertinent information

APPROVED
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

9 - Bureau (105-95507) (RM)
1 - Miami (105-3507) (Info.) (RM)
3 - Newark (105-9440)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency				
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.				
By				

Notations

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED #211,326
DATE 12/3/84 BY SP6BJA/GCL
3/5/85 SP6BJA/GCL #211,326
4/29/94 SP8MAC/EH JFK

concerning the subject or MANUEL ARQUES than made available in Miami airtel to Bureau, dated 2/6/61. U

BERNARD HOLMES BRENNAN, mentioned in instant report, is Former MM 715-S who, during 10/60, publicly disclosed his former association as a Bureau informant. U

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source	File Number Where Located
NK T-1 JOSEPH QUAIL Health Inspector Middletown Township, N.J. (By Request)	105-9440-2
NK T-2 ALICE DONNELLY New Jersey Bell Telephone Company English Plaza Red Bank, N.J. (By Request)	105-9440-2
NK T-3 Mrs. PEG MUNDEN Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company Miami Beach, Florida (By Request)	105-9440-3

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed and T-symbols were utilized only in those instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed. U

LEADS

NEWARK DIVISION

AT NEWARK, N.J.

Will request Bureau authority to interview subject. U

MIAMI (INFORMATION)

One copy of this report is being furnished Miami for their information in view of their interest in MANUEL ARQUES and inasmuch as subject periodically visits Miami. U

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-29-94 BY SP8MAC/EH (JFK)

Copy to:

Report of: HERBERT L. BLOM
Date: April 25, 1961

Office: NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

Field Office File #: 105-9440

Bureau File #: 105-95507

Title: EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by 1259~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
3/15/77

Character: IS - CUBA

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

Synopsis: In 1/61, subject was praising CASTRO and in conversation with NK T-1, asked if he was interested in making money and if so, she would have him meet a friend from either Cuba or Miami. NK T-1, in 4/61, advised subject has made no further mention concerning this matter. Previous investigation shows subject has been associated with Cubans involved in Cuban affairs. Probation records show subject and others were arrested during 2/58, in Texas, charged with conspiracy and unlawful possession of firearms. On 7/11/58, subject was sentenced in U.S.D.C., Houston, Texas, two years and fined $500.00, but was placed on 22 months probation. Background information and association with MANUEL ARQUES set forth. 3/26/61 issue of "Asbury Park Sunday Press" contains interview by reporter showing subject's present attitude concerning Cuba.

- P -

~~DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 BJA/GCL~~
~~ON 12/[illegible]/84 #211,326~~
3/[illegible]/85 SP6 BJA/GCL #211,326

DETAILS:

On January 24, 1961, NK T-1 advised that several months previously, while talking to the subject at a bar, she was praising FIDEL CASTRO and what he was doing for Cuba. Later in the conversation, she asked the informant how he felt about making a "buck" or if he cared how he made it. NK T-1, in going along with the conversation, stated to her that he was interested in making money, to which she replied that she was expecting a friend from either Cuba or Miami (not recalled by NK T-1) and that when he arrived she would have them get together.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Since that time, according to NK T-1, subject has made no further mention of this matter, although he has seen her on several occasions. NK T-1 said he had heard it rumored that the subject has been involved in the sale of guns to Cuba in the past, as well as having visited Cuba since CASTRO took power, but did not know this of his own knowledge.

NK T-1 said that ARCHER is divorced from her husband, has two children and resides with her mother, ANNA ARCHER, on Route 36, Union Beach, New Jersey. He added that she is employed as a cashier at Ye Cottage Inn, Keyport, New Jersey.

It is to be noted that during the course of another investigation the subject's mother, ANNA ARCHER, was interviewed at her home by SA VICTOR J. CAMPI, on July 6, 1960, concerning an abandoned car found near her home. Upon requesting a paper upon which she said she had written the license number of the abandoned car, Mrs. ARCHER started to enter the next room, at which time a woman's voice, in a loud tone, objected to an effort to open the door. Mrs. ARCHER said her daughter was making a phone call and that when the call was completed she would obtain the requested item. Shortly thereafter, the subject emerged from the next room stating she had been interrupted making a very important telephone call -- a call to Cuba. She did not identify the individual to whom she was talking nor did she furnish any information concerning this telephone conversation.

On October 6, 1960, Captain WALTER HUTTON, Union Beach, New Jersey, Police Department, advised SA CAMPI that the subject had two brothers, noting that one brother, FREDDIE ARCHER, was a well-known boxer. He noted that the subject had been married to a local man but had stopped living together in the late 1940s and since that time her mother, ANNA ARCHER, has been helping to rear the two children from that marriage. Captain HUTTON did not know how the subject made her living, but it was his opinion she probably had boyfriends who kept her, that she did a bit of traveling with her boyfriends but always returned to visit her children. He said the subject was also known under the name RUBY KORBIN.

In the course of another investigation, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division (ATTD) Agent JOHN C. MULLIN, on January 18, 1960, advised SA LINCOLN J. STOKES that the last girlfriend of CHARLIE "THE BLADE" TOURINE was a girl named EVELYN ARCHER (phonetic) of Houston, Texas. He said this girl was married and may be involved in gun purchasing and selling.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On January 24, 1961, NK T-2 advised that ANNA ARCHER, Route 36, Union Beach, New Jersey, is the subscriber to COlfax 4-2033 and that the following toll calls had been made from this number:

October 21, 1960	Call from Mrs. FNU ARCHER to MANDEL ARQVES at Havana 77241
November 18, 1960	Call to Miami (JE 1-7635)
November 24, 1960	Call to Miami (JE 1-7635)
December 3, 1960	Collect call to MANUEL ARTAS from Miami (JE 1-7635) to CO 4-2033

The above information cannot be made public except in the usual proceeding following the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.

On January 25, 1961, Mr. EMERSON TSCHUPP, Deputy Director, Enforcement Division, New Jersey State Alcohol Beverage Control, 1100 Raymond Boulevard, Newark, New Jersey, advised SA JACK W. SUNDERLAND that as of October 21, 1959, the subject was listed as an employee at Ye Cottage Inn, 149 West Front Street, Keyport, New Jersey, as a cashier.

On January 26, 1961, Birth Records were made available to SA SUNDERLAND at the Bureau of Vital Statistics, City Hall, Newark, New Jersey, wherein it was noted that one REGMU (not completely legible) ARCHER was born May 19, 1921, at Newark, New Jersey. This record noted a name change to EVELYN ARCHER on June 8, 1936. The address where the birth occurred was 326 - 18th Avenue, Newark, New Jersey. Her parents were listed as FREDERICK ARCHER, age 21, a toolmaker, born in Newark, New Jersey, and ANNA FIOLA, age 19, born in Newark, New Jersey.

In an effort to check divorce records concerning the subject, the following departments were contacted with negative results:

January 30, 1961	Mrs. ELSIE WALZER, Docket Clerk, Monmouth County Clerk's Office, Freehold, New Jersey.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 7, 1961 — Records of New Jersey Superior Court, West State Street, Trenton, New Jersey, checked by SA NORMAN A. HENDRICKS.

January 26, 1961 — Miss FRANCES BEAM, Essex County Clerk's Office, Hall of Records, Newark, New Jersey, contacted by SA JACK W. SUNDERLAND.

On January 25, 1961, JOHN MILES, Monmouth County Identification Bureau, Freehold, New Jersey, advised the files of his office contained no record concerning the subject.

SELMA JENNINGS, Credit Bureau of Central New Jersey, 103 East Front Street, Red Bank, New Jersey, advised on January 26, 1961, that according to her records EVELYN ARCHER, Box 408, Union Beach, New Jersey, (Keyport, New Jersey, mailing address) was listed as a widow and that as of April 12, 1949, there was an account listed to her under the name of EVELYN and WALTER KORABIAK, RD 1, Box 408, Keyport, New Jersey. Her credit record was listed as a troublesome account and showed previous employments at The Magnolia Inn, Matawan, New Jersey, on March 19, 1957, and at Ye Cottage Inn, Keyport, New Jersey, on June 2, 1953.

On February 18, 1958, upon the basis of information furnished by the San Antonio Office concerning the purchase of a boat by ROBERT MC KEOWN, determined to be the BUDDY DEE, United States Customs took possession of this vessel which had departed from Patterson, Louisiana, for Houston, Texas, with MANUEL ARQUES, RUBY ARCHER, also known as EVELYN ARCHER, of Keyport, New Jersey, and ABELARDO RENE PUJOL Y BARRERA on board.

The February 26, 1958, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled, "Arms Plot Suspect Surrenders," bearing a Houston, Texas, dateline. This article revealed that ROBERT MC KEOWN had surrendered Tuesday and was charged immediately with two counts of violating the National Firearms Act. This article disclosed that MC KEOWN was described by Federal authorities as the "mystery man" in the Houston phase of an alleged plot to supply Cuban nationals with firearms.

On April 4, 1961, the subject's file was made available to SA DANIEL E. BRANDT by BRAYTON CRIST, United States Probation Officer, Trenton, New Jersey.

The file shows EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER, RD 1, Box 208, Keyport, New Jersey, was arrested during February, 1958, at

Seabrook, Texas, and charged with conspiracy and unlawful possession of firearms. The co-defendants in the case were listed as MANUEL ARQUES, MARIO SILVERIO VILLAMINA, FRANCISCO GONZALES OBREGON and ABELARDO PUJOL BARRERA.

On July 11, 1958, the subject was sentenced in United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston, Texas, to two years and a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00). On August 12, 1958, the sentence was reduced to 18 months - suspended, 22 months probation and a five hundred dollar ($500.00) fine. The fine was paid by the subject on July 17, 1958.

A letter dated June 23, 1958, from the United States Probation Office, Houston, Texas, to the Probation Office, Trenton, New Jersey, indicated the subject had been involved in a conspiracy to take part in a military expedition and enterprise to be carried on from within the United States against Cuba. The letter continued that the subject, who had represented herself as Mrs. MANUEL ARQUES but who was not married to ARQUES, had met ARQUES in Miami, Florida, while on vacation. ARQUES' father, who was on the Miami Police Department, was known to CARLOS PRIO, former President of Cuba. The subject was assisting ARQUES in a plan to have PRIO returned to control in Cuba in place of BATISTE, for which ARQUES would be given a high government position. The firearms which were in the possession of the subject were to be sent to CASTRO by boat.

The subject's parole supervision was transferred to Trenton, New Jersey, on September 22, 1958.

On October 13, 1958, the subject testified in United States District Court, Houston, Texas, against ROBERT R. MC KEOWN, and en route to Texas she visited Miami, Florida, and on returning to New Jersey visited Key West, Florida,

During January, 1959, the subject went to Miami, Florida, without obtaining permission, and on January 23, 1959, she and ARQUES appeared at the United States Probation Office, Miami, and asked for permission to return to Cuba. Her address at that time was 2350 S. W. 13th Street, Miami, Florida. Permission for her to go to Cuba was denied by the Judge at United States District Court, Houston, Texas.

The supervision of the subject's parole was transferred to Miami, Florida, on February 12, 1959, and she returned to her Keyport, New Jersey, address on July 10, 1959. She visited ARQUES at Miami on November 4, 1959, residing care of Mrs. R. GOODMAN, 342 N. E. 35th Street, Miami, Florida, and returned to New Jersey on November 18, 1959. She went to Miami on March 25, 1960, where she lived at the Hotel America until she returned to New Jersey on April 11, 1960.

The files show the subject's probation expired on June 12, 1960, and that during June, 1960, she was going to accompany her boyfriend, MANUEL ARQUES, to Canada, where he was going to promote tourist trade to Cuba. After her trip to Canada, she and ARQUES were going to marry and return to Cuba.

The file contained the following background information:

Name	EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER
Date of Birth	May 19, 1921, Newark, New Jersey
Race	White
Sex	Female
Address	RD 1, Box 208, Keyport, New Jersey
Occupation	Cashier and waitress
Employer	Cottage Inn, Keyport, New Jersey
Father	FRED ARCHER, 34 Cale Crespis, Santa Barbara, California
Mother	ANNA ARCHER, Keyport, New Jersey
Son	JEFFERY
Daughter	VALERIE
Ex-Husband	WALTER KORBIAC, California

REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~ USCS/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 2 23 97 ddt
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

On August 5, 1960, MICHAEL A. ROMANO, United States Customs, Miami, Florida, advised SA WILLIAM P. KELLY the name "RUBY ARCHER, Box 208, Keyport, N.J." was found among other names and addresses in the possession of MANUEL ARQUES on July 22, 1960, on which date ROMANO searched the baggage and person of ARQUES at Miami International Airport, following ARQUES' return from Havana on that date.

On March 25, 1960, BERNARD HOLMES BRENNAN, Moodus, Connecticut, advised SA WILLIAM A. WIGHTMAN, at Miami, that as of March 25, 1960, MANUEL ARQUES was dating a girl named EVELYN ARCHER, who then lived at the American Hotel, 273 N.E. Second Street, Miami.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On October 26, 1960, BRENNAN advised he went to Havana to meet ARQUES during September, 1960. He stated that while at Havana, "RUBY," not further identified, was there with ARQUES.

BRENNAN stated "RUBY" was worried about her parents knowing she was in Cuba, and she expressed concern about the large number of Chinese men at the Commodore Hotel, Havana, whom she saw eating on one occasion, and stated she did not like it at all.

MANUEL ARQUES, a self-admitted supporter of CARLOS PRIO, exiled former President of Cuba, and naturalized United States citizen of Cuban birth, formerly was Publicity Director of the Cuban Tourist Commission at Miami until he resigned during November, 1960. ARQUES has been identified by several sources as having been an intelligence agent in the United States for JUAN ORTA, who, until recently, was the Secretary for FIDEL CASTRO. X (u)

Upon interview by Bureau Agents on December 1, 1960, ARQUES denied ever having been a Cuban intelligence agent. However, he admitted sending written and verbal messages to ORTA during 1959 concerning activities in the United States of "Batistianos." ARQUES stated he was not in accord with policies of the Castro Government and considered communism to be dominant in the Castro regime. X (u)

On January 20, 1961, ARQUES advised SA WILLIAM P. KELLY that his residence then was 1050 N. W. Seventh Street, Miami, Florida.

On February 3, 1961, NK T-3 advised that telephone number JE 1 - 7635 was listed to HYMAN GOTTSMAN, 1225 - 11th Street, Apartment 2, Miami Beach, Florida.

The above records are confidential and can only be obtained through issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.

The March 26, 1961, issue of "The Asbury Park Sunday Press" carried the following article concerning the subject following an interview by CHARLES BROWER, Press Staff Writer:

"SHORE WOMAN WHO AIDED CASTRO
SORRY, SAYS CUBANS LIKE US

" By CHARLES BROWER
Press Staff Writer

" UNION BEACH -- Despite FIDEL CASTRO's hate America campaign, the average Cuban holds no dislike for Americans.

" This is the observation of a local woman who aided, in what she terms a minor way, the young Cuban dictator's rise to power over three years ago.

" Miss EVELYN ARCHER, Rte. 36, who helped supply arms to Cuban rebels prior to CASTRO's victory over former Cuban strongman FULGENCIO BATISTA, said she is 'sad and unhappy' at the results of the Cuban revolution.

" 'The Cuban people do not hate Americans.'

" Many Ask About Americans

" In fact, she said, many Cubans ask if the Americans really hate them.

" Miss ARCHER said she was received warmly by Cubans both in Havana and in the interior during a visit to the island last fall. 'They treated me wonderfully,' she said.

" 'CASTRO has betrayed the people who put him in power. He has not kept the many promises he made after his victory early in 1959.'

" Among the unkept promises made by the bearded dictator were free elections throughout Cuba within a year.

" Arrested in Texas

" 'The Cuban people want to live under a democracy; they do not want communism,' she asserted. 'CASTRO,' she said, 'certainly leans toward communism.'

" Miss ARCHER and five other Cuban rebel sympathizers were arrested three years ago in Texas as they attempted to ship arms to rebels in Cuba. She was fined and given an 18-month suspended jail sentence after pleading no defense to charges of conspiracy to overthrow the Cuban government headed by BATISTA.

" The attractive brunette was also placed on probation for 22 months and barred from traveling to Cuba during the probation period.

" 'I'm not ashamed of what I did. I'm only sorry it has turned out the way it has,' she said.

" Asked if she would do it all over again she declared she would but 'not exactly in the same way.'

"   Minor Role

" Miss ARCHER became involved in the Cuban revolution through Cuban friends she had met during visits to Cuba and Miami. Her part was only a minor one, she says.

" She is reluctant to publicly bring up her past associations with the Cuban revolution, but agreed only to convey to Americans the message that the Cuban people simply have nothing against Americans.

" 'More and more people are breaking away from the CASTRO regime each day. They are escaping into the hills and out of the country by any means possible. Thousands have been granted political asylum in this country.'

" Miss ARCHER said she holds high hopes for the future liberation of the Cuban people. Although she said she is not associated now with revolutionary movements and knows of no specific plans to overthrow CASTRO she added it is readily known that such movements are active.

" 'Many of the groups have been organizing in Miami,' she said.

" Friends she had been associated with in aiding the revolution have all defected from Cuba since her visit last fall. It is for this reason, she said, she would not dare return to Cuba as long as CASTRO is in power.

"   'Crazy With Power'

" When asked why CASTRO has failed to keep his promises and to bring freedom to Cuba, Miss ARCHER replied that 'he has perhaps gone crazy with power.'

" She added that his luster as a hero is wearing off.

" Miss ARCHER is employed as a hostess in a Shore restaurant. She was born in Newark and moved here about 14 years ago. She lives with her mother, Mrs. ANNA ARCHER."

On April 18, 1961, NK T-1 advised that the subject was still working at the Ye Cottage Inn, Keyport, New Jersey, and in recent conversation with her, she has made no further mention concerning their conversation in January, 1961, whereby she had stated she would introduce him to a friend of hers from Cuba or Miami. Upon viewing photographs of MANUEL ARQUES, he said this person was unknown to him.

The following physical description of the subject was obtained from the New Jersey Department of Motor Vehicles, Trenton, New Jersey, on February 7, 1961, by SA NORMAN A. HENDRICKS and from personal observation:

Name	EVELYN ARCHER
Residence	Box 208, Route 36, Keyport, New Jersey
Race	White
Sex	Female
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Dark
Height	Five feet, three inches
Weight	Approximately 135 pounds

FD-323 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Newark, New Jersey

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. **NK 105-9440**

April 25, 1961

Title **EVELYN ELEANORE ARCHER**

Character **IS - CUBA**

Reference **Report of SA HERBERT L. BLOM dated April 25, 1961, at Newark.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104
UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-95507) DATE: 3/7/61

FROM : SAC, HOUSTON (105-735)

SUBJECT: EVELYN ARCHER, aka.
IS - CUBA
(OO-Newark)

FD205-MK 4-25-61
Bu de. 4-25-61 Wll
Kept in dist.
re. Bu. 5-2-61
fdy

RE: Newark letter to the Bureau dated 1/31/61;
Miami airtel to the Bureau dated 2/6/61.

Review of Houston file captioned "CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, ET AL, FPM - CUBA; NEUTRALITY MATTERS; REGISTRATION ACT" OO Miami, Bufile 109-430, Newark file 109-2, Miami file 2-165, reflects that Miami as office of origin in this matter was in possession of all pertinent information regarding EVELYN ARCHER. Houston Office has nothing to add to Miami summation contained in referenced airtel dated 2/6/61.

RUC
2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Miami (105-3507)
(105-2201) (Info.) (RM)
2 - Newark (105-9440) (RM)
2 - Houston
(1 - 109-7)

KBJ:yk
(8)

1 NT B

REC- 65 105-95507- 3

6 MAR 9 1961

EX 109

NAT. SEC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED #211,326
DATE 3/5/85 BY SP6BJA/GCL
4-29-94 SP8MAC/EH (JFK)

380
57 MAR 15 1961

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 2/6/61

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF~~ ~~DATE~~ ~~3/7/78~~

Transmit the following in ________________ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-3507)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-29-94 BY SP8 MAC/EH (JFK)

~~Classified by~~ ~~Exempt from GDS, Category~~ ~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

3/8/98 3/15/78

RE: CHANGED
EVELYN ARCHER, aka
Mrs. Walter Korabiak,
Ruby Archer
IS - CUBA
(OO: NEWARK)

Title of this case is marked CHANGED to reflect the additional name RUBY ARCHER, by which the subject is also known.

Re Newark letter to Director 1/31/61.

Newark airtel to Director 2/18/58, in case entitled "CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS; ET AL, FPM-CUBA; NEUTRALITY MATTERS; REGISTRATION ACT," (OO: MIAMI) (Bufile 109-430) (Newark file 109-2) (Miami file 2-165), reflects one RUBY ARCHER was listed as receiving mail at Mounted Ridge, Route 1, Box 208, Keyport, N. J., which box belonged to one Mrs. ALICE ARCHER. This information was furnished by JOHN HYER, Assistant Postmaster, Keyport, 2/14/58. Mrs. ALICE ARCHER's home was reflected by HYER to be on New Jersey Highway 36, Union Beach, N. J.

Further investigation at Union Beach reflected EVELYN ARCHER may have also used the name RUBY KORBIN. (The

~~DECLASSIFIED BY SP6BJT/ek ON 5/15/85~~ #241326

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF~~ ~~DATE~~ classification 3/14/78

-RUC-

REC- 59 MCT-16 105-95507-2

3 - Bureau (AM) (RM)
1 - Houston (Info) (AM) (RM)
2 - Newark (105-9440) (Encs-2) (AM) (RM)
2 - Miami (1 - 105-3507)
(1 - 105-2221)

50

17 FEB 9 1961

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

52 FEB 23 1961

(8)

C.C. - Wick

NAT. INT. SEC.

Approved: ________________ Sent ________________ M Per ________________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

MM 105-3507

CONFIDENTIAL

similiarity of KORBIN to subject's alias KORABIAK is noted.)

Houston airtel to Bureau 2/20/58, in the PRIO case, reflects RUBY ARCHER, aka EVELYN ARCHER, Keyport, N. J., the girlfriend of MANUEL ARQUES, was arrested, together with ARQUES and several other individuals associated with PRIO, by U. S. Customs, on 2/17/58, at Harris County, Texas, while in possession of arms and ammunition which were allegedly to be illegally exported from the U. S. to Cuba.

The 9/14/58 issue of "Diario Las Americas," a Miami, Florida daily Spanish language newspaper, reflects MANUEL ARQUES, EVELYN ARCHER, RENE PUJOL and FRANCISCO OBREGON were sentenced to two years in prison by Federal courts in connection with "trying to export illegally arms from the United States, intended for the Cuban rebels (of FIDEL CASTRO)," but were granted "parole." The date of sentencing was not reflected.

On 8/5/60, MICHAEL A. ROMANO, U. S. Customs, Miami, advised SA WILLIAM P. KELLY the name "RUBY ARCHER, Box 208, Keyport, New Jersey," was found among many other names and addresses in the possession of ARQUES on 7/22/60, on which date ROMANO searched the baggage and person of ARQUES at Miami International Airport, following ARQUES' return from Havana on that date.

CONFIDENTIAL

USCS
REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 7.23.97 Jal

☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

MM 105-3507

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

105-83817-
20 P1

On 3/25/60, former MM 715-S, BERNARD HOLMES BRENNAN, Moodus, Connecticut, who, during October, 1960, publicly disclosed his former association as a Bureau informant, advised SA WILLIAM A. WIGHTMAN that as of 3/25/60, MANUEL ARQUES was dating a girl named EVELYN ARCHER, who then lived at the America Hotel, 273 NE 2nd St., Miami. BRENNAN stated ARCHER was involved in an arms smuggling affair with ARQUES in the Houston area during February, 1958, and was reportedly arrested with ARQUES. U

The foregoing information received from BRENNAN is contained in Miami file 134-418-Sub A-13. U

On 10/26/60, former MM 715-S advised he went to Havana to meet ARQUES during September, 1960. He stated that while at Havana "RUBY" (not further identified) was there with ARQUES. Former MM 715-S stated "RUBY" was worried about her parents knowing she was in Cuba, and she expressed concern about the large number of Chinese men at the Commodore Hotel, Havana, whom "RUBY" saw eating on one occasion, and stated she did not like it at all. U

This information is located in Miami file 134-418-94, pages 3-4. U

Report of SA GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR., dated 3/13/58, Miami, in the PRIO case, a copy of which was furnished to Newark for information, reflects information concerning the arrest of RUBY ARCHER, ARQUES and others 2/18/58. U

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

MM 105-3507

CONFIDENTIAL

MANUEL ADALBERTO ARQUES DIAZ, aka MANUEL ARCE, MARIO ARCE, "MANNY," "MANOLO," "MANOLITO," IS-CUBA; REGISTRATION ACT - CUBA, is subject pending Bufile 105-83117, Miami file 105-2221, in which case Miami is origin. U

ARQUES, a self-admitted supporter of PRIO, and naturalized U. S. citizen of Cuban birth, formerly was Publicity Director of the Cuban Tourist Commission at Miami until he resigned during November, 1960. U

ARQUES has been identified by several sources as having been an intelligence agent in the U. S. for JUAN ORTA, who until recently was the Secretary of FIDEL CASTRO. X(u)

Upon interview by BuAgents 12/1/60, ARQUES denied ever having been a Cuban intelligence agent. However, he admitted sending written and verbal messages to ORTA during 1959 concerning activities in U. S. of "Batistianos." ARQUES stated he is not in accord with policies of CASTRO government and considers Communism to be dominant in CASTRO regime. X(u)

The following description of ARQUES was obtained through observation and interview by SAs WILLIAM P. KELLY and WILLIAM B. HOLLOMAN on 12/1/60: U

Name	MANUEL ADALBERTO ARQUES DIAZ
Also known as	Manolo Arques, Manolito Arques, "Manny"

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

MM 105-3507

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Race	White
Sex	Male
Date of birth	4/23/25
Place of birth	Havana, Cuba
Address	530 Ocean Drive, Miami Beach, Fla. (Barbizon Apartment Hotel), as of 12/1/60, with anticipated address after 12/2/60 being the Brazil Hotel Apts., 6525 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Fla.
Height	5'10"
Weight	160 lbs.
Build	Medium
Hair	"Salt and pepper"
Eyes	Green
Occupation	Former Publicity Director of Cuban Tourist Commission, Miami, Fla., 1/60 - 11/10/60; former car rental agent for Coture Car Rental Agency, Miami, Fla.; former desk clerk, Hotel America, Miami, Fla.; anticipated occupation after 12/2/60 - desk clerk, Brazil Hotel Apts., 6525 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Fla.

U

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

MM 105-3507 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Characteristics	Sharp features, sharply pointed nose, distinguished appearance, speaks English with noticeable Latin accent, well dressed
Marital status	Single
Parents	
Father	MARCOS ARQUES RODRIGUEZ, deceased
Mother	FRANCISCA DIAZ DE ARQUES, 714 Animas, Havana, Cuba
Nationality	Naturalized U. S. citizen, naturalized U. S. District Court, Lynchburg, Va., 1949
Education	Ferrum Junior College, Ferrum, Virginia, 1947-48; Lynchburg, Virginia, 1948-49
Social Security No.	229-36-5431 in name MANUEL ARQUES
Military service	U. S. Army
Army Serial No.	42281912, 9/3/46 - 5/12/47, Honorable Discharge
Admitted Criminal Record	Arrested by Cuban Police of BATISTA regime - 1956, for alleged revolutionary activities, held three days and released; 2/58 - Houston, Texas, attempted arms smuggling, served 18 months probation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

MM 105-3507

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 1/20/61, ARQUES advised SA KELLY his residence then was 1050 NW 7th St., Miami.

Records of Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., Miami Beach, Fla., were reviewed by IC JON W. ARMSTRONG, 2/3/61. Telephone JE 1-7635 is reflected to be listed to HYMAN GOTTSMAN, 1225 11th St., Apt. 2, Miami Beach.

The above records are confidential and can only be obtained through issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directed to Mr. JOHN J. RYAN, Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., Miami, or his authorized representative. The above information was obtained from Mrs. PEG MUNDEN, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., Miami Beach, Fla. (protect).

Miami indices reflect no references as to HYMAN GOTTSMAN.

Miami is aware of no recent contact between ARQUES and the subject.

Enclosed for Newark Office are 2 photos of MANUEL ADALBERTO ARQUES DIAZ, aka.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

1 - Mr. Janes

SAC, Newark (105-9440) 2/16/61

EX-114 REC-96

Director, FBI (105-95507) - 1

0-1 NK(2) 4/12/61

EVELYN ARCHER, aka.
IS - CUBA

ReNKlet 1/31/61 and MM airtel 2/6/61.

Bufiles disclose that pertinent information concerning subject was made available to Newark in referenced Miami airtel. Mandel Arqves mentioned in referenced Newark letter is undoubtedly identical with Manuel Arques. It is noted that background data concerning Arques is set forth in referenced Miami airtel.

Bufiles contain no additional information concerning Manuel Artas.

1 - Miami
1 - Houston

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED #211,326
DATE 3/5/85 BY SP6BJN/GCL
4-29-94 SP8MAC/EM(JFK)

FEJ:gp
(6)

NOTE:

Newark has initiated inquiries concerning subject on basis of pro-Castro remarks on part of subject. Newark requested review of indices concerning subject and persons with whom she is reportedly in contact.

0-1 NK 4-17-61
Rept. will be
sub. by 4-25-61
#4

MAILED 19
FEB 15 1961
COMM-FBI

olson
ohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Trotter
Evans
W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

52 FEB 23 1961

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

AL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/31/61

FROM : SAC, NEWARK (105-9440)

SUBJECT: EVELYN ARCHER, aka.
Mrs. Walter Korabiak
IS - CUBA

4-29-94 cos company SP8MAC/EH (JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 6
DATE 3/5/85 BY SP6 BJA/GCL
#211,326

2

On 1/24/61, JOSEPH QUAIL, Health Inspector, Middletown Township, New Jersey, who requested his identity be concealed, advised SA HERBERT L. BLOM he has known the subject for many years and that several months ago, while talking to her at a bar, she was praising FIDEL CASTRO and what he was doing for Cuba. Later in the conversation she asked QUAIL how he felt about making a "buck" or if he cared how he made it. QUAIL, in going along with the conversation, stated to her that he was interested in making money, to which she replied that she was expecting a friend from either Cuba or Miami (not recalled by QUAIL) and that when he arrived she would have them get together. Since that time, according to QUAIL, she has made no further mention of this matter, although he has seen her on several occasions. QUAIL said he had heard it rumored that ARCHER has been involved in the sale of guns to Cuba in the past as well as having visited Cuba since CASTRO took power but did not know this of his own knowledge.

105-8317

FD-217

QUAIL said that ARCHER is divorced from her husband, has two children and resides with her mother, ANNA ARCHER, on Route 36, Union Beach, N.J. QUAIL stated he would endeavor to discreetly obtain additional information concerning her activities.

It is to be noted that during the course of another investigation in the Union Beach, N.J., area, it was mentioned by Chief JOHN CONROY that EVELYN ARCHER had been incarcerated by some Federal Agency for gunrunning into Cuba. Chief CONROY said that this was rumor in his department and did not know the facts involved. He said he did not know how she made her

-P-
2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Miami (RM)
2 - Houston (RM)
1 - Newark
HLB:vwb
(7)

Let to Newark
2/10/61
FEJ:jjl
1-MM 1-Houston

EX-134

MCT-16

REC-82 105 - 95507 - 1

13 FEB 1 1961

NAT. SEC.

living but in his opinion she probably had a boyfriend who kept her, that she did a bit of traveling with her boyfriend but always returned to visit her children.

A review of ~~Newark~~ U.S.A. files shows that on 1/18/60, an ATTD agent furnished information that the last girlfriend of CHARLIE "THE BLADE" TOURINE was a girl named EVELYN ARCHER (ph) of Houston, Texas. He said this girl is married and may be involved in gun purchasing and selling.

On 1/24/61, ALICE DONNELLY, New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, Red Bank, N.J., (protect identity) advised SA BLOM that ANN ARCHER, Route 36, Union Beach, N.J., is the subscriber to COlfax 4-2033. She advised that toll calls from this number were as follows: ANNA ARCHOR

10/21/60 - Call from Mrs. FNU ARCHER to MANDEL ARQVES, at Havana 77241 CUBA

11/18/60 - Call to Miami (JE 1-7635)

11/24/60 - Call to Miami (JE 1-7635)

12/ 3/60 - Collect call from MANUEL ARTAS from Miami (JE 1-7635) to CO 4-2033 FLORIDA

Based on information obtained from JOSEPH QUAIL, credit records and Monmouth County, N.J., Election Records, ARCHER is described as follows:

Name	EVELYN ARCHER, aka. Mrs. Walter Korabiak
Residence	Route 36, Union Beach, N.J.
DOB	5/19/21, Newark, N.J.
Race	White
Sex	Female
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Dark
Height	5' 7"
Marital Status	Divorced
Occupation	Cashier

Newark indices are negative concerning MANDEL ARQVES or MANUEL ARTAS. U

The Bureau is requested to check indices for any pertinent information concerning subject's past activities of which Newark is not aware. U

The Bureau is also requested to check the names MANDEL ARQVES and MANUEL ARTAS. U

MIAMI OFFICE

1. Will identify subscriber to JE 1-7635. U

2. Will attempt to further identify MANUEL ARTAS, noting the similarity to the name MANDEL ARQVES of Havana. U

3. Will check indices for any pertinent information concerning subject. U

HOUSTON OFFICE

Will check indices for any pertinent information concerning subject. U

NEWARK OFFICE

AT NEWARK, N.J.

Will check ATTD, Newark, for all pertinent background information concerning subject. U

AT UNION BEACH, N.J.

Will secure additional background information concerning subject's activities. U

AT MIDDLETOWN TOWNSHIP, N.J.

Will recontact JOSEPH QUAIL for any additional information he can furnish concerning subject's activities. U

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

2-8, 1961

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☑ Attention Travis
☑ Return to James 1531 406
Supervisor Room Ext.

SECRET

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~DATE 3/5/95 BY SP6BJA/~~
#211,326/CC

Type of References Requested:
☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☑ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main ______ References Only

Type of Search Requested:
☐ Restricted to Locality of ______
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☑ Variations

5/3/94
Classified by SP8MAC/EA
Declassify on: OADR JFK

Subject Evelyn Archer aka
Birthdate & Place 5-19-21 - Newark, N.J.
Address Union Beach, N.J.

Localities Mrs. Walter Korabiak

R# ______ Date ______ Searcher Initials DM
Prod. ______

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
MF	105-95507 (Fn/mv)	
	~~109-430~~	
	~~42-94275~~ : DM	
	~~31-59884~~ DM	
	~~25-86169~~	~~1~~ Destroyed
NL	40-3798	621
OI	62-62736-3	2038 NL, 2037
		5727, 1303
OI	62-62736-5	ONLY 430, 268 NI
NL	[100-769	12605] (S)
NL	100-26266	5
NL	100-38784	318 p.8
OI	105-83117	20 p.9
		52 p.E, 3, 14, 43
L	109-430	2075 p.54
L	109-430-A	Hs. Post 8-13-58
	Evelyn Eleanor Archer	
LT	~~109-430~~	
written	109-430-A	Hs. Chronicle 8-7-58

SECRET

4-22a (Rev. 8-23-57)

NUMEROUS REFERENCE

SEARCH SLIP

Subj: Evelyn Archer

Supervisor James Room 1531

R#________ Date 2-8 Searcher Initial SM

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
	Evelyn M. Archer	
	~~31-48603~~	~~microfilm~~
NI	64-1608	93
	Evelyn Meldrum Archer	
	~~100-161920~~	~~14861~~
	Ruby Archer	
Lt	109-430	
	109-430-A	Hs. Press 3-12-58
		Dupe ~~Hs. Post 2-13-58~~
		Hs. Post 2-19-58
		Wash. Star 2-19-58
		Hs. Post 2-20-58
		Dupe ~~Wash. Star 2-19-58~~
Dupe pg 1	109-430	2075 p. 54
		2070
Lt	~~105-83117~~	~~3, 52 p. 9, 14~~
	~~31-60345~~	~~5 microfilm~~
NL	46-18715	148
	Mrs. Walter Korabiak	
Lt	~~105-95507~~	
	W. Korabiak	
	~~100-290592~~	1
	Name searched as listed only -	

written ②

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

2-8, 1961

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention
☑ Return to James 1531 406
Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☑ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main References Only

Type of Search Requested:
☐ Restricted to Locality of
☑ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject MANDEL ARQVES
Birthdate & Place
Address

Localities
R# Date Searcher Initials DM
Prod.

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
	Mandel Arques	
	NR	
	Mandel Arques	
	NR	
	Manny Arques	
	109-430	
PT	105-83117 - If ident, there are approx. 80 refs. on Manny, Manuel, and Buildups -	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED #211,326
DATE 3/5/85 BY SP6BJA/GCL
4-29-94 SP8MAC/EH (JFK)

Written

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

2-8, 1961

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention
☐ Return to James 1531 406
Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☑ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main ______ References Only

Type of Search Requested:
☐ Restricted to Locality of ______
☑ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject MANUEL ARTAS
Birthdate & Place
Address

Localities
R# Date Searcher Initials Dm
Prod.

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
	NR	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED #241,326
DATE 3/5/85 BY SP6BJA/GCL
4-29-94 SP8MAC/EH (JFK)

③

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/11/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10206-10180

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2781-646

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LABADIE, STEPHEN J.
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

TITLE :

DATE : 12/03/1962
PAGES : 39

SUBJECTS :
LST, ASSOC, ACT, TELCAL, TRA, GAMBLING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 4; 10(a)2
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/13/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF DEA

COMMENTS :

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
TAMPA	TAMPA	12/3/62	10/25-11/27/62

TITLE OF CASE

SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., Aka

REPORT MADE BY

SA STEPHEN J. LABADIE

TYPED BY

dh

CHARACTER OF CASE

AR

REFERENCE

Tampa report SA STEPHEN J. LABADIE 9/24/62
Miami teletype to Bureau 11/8/62
Legat, Mexico City, letter to Director 11/7/62
Miami teletype to Bureau 11/23/62 entitled "JOSEPH ANTHONY INDELICATO, Aka, AR"

- P -

ENCLOSURE

To the Bureau

Original and one copy of letterhead memorandum characterizing informants

LEADS

ATLANTA

APPROVED

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

92-2781-646

REC- 41

8 DEC 7 1962

EX.-120

COPIES MADE:

3 - Bureau (92-2781) (~~Enc 2~~)
1 - USA, Miami
(Attn. WILLIAM KENNEY)
2 - Atlanta
2 - Cincinnati
2 - Jacksonville (92-7)
2 - Miami (92-88)
2 - New York (92-846)
3 - Tampa (92-1)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	[illegible]			
Request Recd.	[illegible]			
Date Fwd.	12-14-62			
How Fwd.	[illegible]			
By	[illegible]			

Notations

58 DEC 19 1962

AT ATLANTA, GA.

Will identify subscribers to telephone MU 8-1682 and PO 7-0281 called 7/14/62 from Columbia Liquor Store Annex and thereafter conduct inquiry if deemed appropriate.

CINCINNATI

AT CINCINNATI, OHIO

Will identify subscribers to telephone 821-4731 called July 14, 1962, from Columbia Restaurant Liquor Store Annex and thereafter discreetly establish connection if any with subject or JAMES C. LONGO.

JACKSONVILLE

AT JACKSONVILLE, FLA.

Grand Jury [JFK Law 10(a)2]

1. Will remain alert for any and all information concerning subject noting the United States Department of Justice Attorney attempts [redacted]

2. Will identify subscribers to EL 6-4167 called 4/26/62 and CE 6-0935 called 7/30/62 from the Columbia Restaurant Liquor Store Annex at Leesburg, Florida.

3. Identify subscriber to 787-4233 called 4/10/62 from Garcia Instant Service Station relative to subject's association if any with subscriber.

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLA.

1. Will intensify coverage of subject's residence and his activities, not only in regards to issuance of a [redacted] but to obtain positive evidence in relationship to slot machines and other gambling equipment to go aboard Wappen Von Hamburg, alleged by Miami informant in the case entitled "JOSEPH ANTHONY INDELICATO, Aka, AR", Miami file 92-404.

92-2781-646

2. Will conduct all possible investigation with use of highly confidential Bureau techniques to establish whether subject has any connection with the slot machines or gambling equipment that was aboard the "Orange Sun".

3. Will intensify efforts to establish highly confidential Bureau coverage at subject's residence.*

4. Will provide Bureau with results of investigation of subject and LARRY DE JOSEPH's efforts to operate in Guatemala noting these results as instructed by the Bureau should be furnished to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination.

5. Will identify subscribers:

FR 1-8579, called 6/26/62

HI 1-8579, called 4/19/62

HI 5-1551, called 4/2/62

(all from CONIGLIO residence)

FR 1-8579, called 3/23/62, 5/5/62, 7/16/62, 8/23/62

(all from FRANCES CACCIATORE residence, noting same number called 6/26/62 from CONIGLIO)

FR 1-3561, called 6/6/62, 9/17/62

NE 3-3872, called 6/11/62

FR 3-1821, called 6/15/62, 7/6/62, 7/14/62, 8/6/62

JE 8-5968, called 7/3/62

6. Identify subscriber to FR 4-2906, noting this is the alleged girlfriend, telephone of SIDNEY HOROWITZ, and thereafter consider exploitation, noting HOROWITZ hangs out reportedly at Sunny's Restaurant, Miami Beach, Florida, and has been observed to visit subject's residence in Miami.

AT KEY WEST, FLA.

Identify subscriber to telephone CY 4-1081 called 7/6/62 from Columbia Liquor Store Annex noting there has been previous allegations of connections in Key West and Tampa.

NEW YORK

AT BROOKLYN, N.Y.

Identify subscriber to telephone 212, SH 8-7877 called 7/6/62 from Columbia Restaurant Liquor Store Annex which is hangout for subject's alleged body guard, JAMES C. LONGO.

AT NEW YORK CITY

Identify subscriber to telephone 212, MU 3-3540 called 8/17/62 from Columbia Restaurant Liquor Store Annex and thereafter conduct appropriate inquiry of above numbers establishing subject's connection, if any.

TAMPA

AT BROOKSVILLE, FLA.

Identify subscriber to telephone 796-3222 called 7/6/62 from CONIGLIO residence.

AT DADE CITY, FLA.

Identify subscriber to telephone 567-6125 called 4/4/62 from unlisted telephone at Garcia Instant Service Station.

AT FORT MYERS, FLA.

Identify subscriber to telephone ED 7-6661 called from Garcia Instant Service Station on 7/30/62 and thereafter establish what connection they may have with the subject or his body guard.

AT ORLANDO, FLA.

1. Identity subscriber to telephone GA 5-2611

called 4/12/62; to telephone GA 3-7291, called 4/30/62, and GA 5-2661, called 4/30/62, all from Garcia Instant Service Station.

2. Will maintain close liaison with USDC officials at Orlando on a daily basis so as to be in a position to know of the activities of the subject in relationship to [redacted]

Grand Jury [JFK Law 10(a)2]

3. Will consider establishment of highly confidential Bureau coverage on subject should subject remain in the Orlando area or be in contact with any individuals while there [redacted]

4. [redacted]

AT ST. PETERSBURG, FLA.

1. Identify subscriber to telephone 361-1011 called 6/2/62 and 6/30/62 from residence of FRANK CONIGLIO noting same number called 7/5/62 from Columbia Liquor Store Annex.

2. Identify subscriber to telephone 7-1197 called 7/19/62 from Garcia Instant Service and same number called from Columbia Restaurant 9/11/62.

3. Identify subscriber to telephone 361-1561 called from subject's residence 4/18/62, 5/23/62 and 7/9/62.

4. Identify subscriber to telephone 360-6731 called 6/29/62 and 7/6/62.

5. Identify subscriber to telephone 5-3187 called 9/18/62 from Columbia Liquor Store Annex.

AT TAMPA, FLA.

1. Will report results of investigation at Cape

92-2781-646

Haze and Lehigh Acres, Florida.

2. Will maintain contact with CIs,PCIs, neighbors of subject, as well as sources in oontact with subject's associates.

3. Will report results of investigation still outstanding, Legat, Mexico City, who advised by referenced letter that further inquiry is being made at Guatemala City, Guatemala.

4. Will continue efforts to further highly confidential Bureau coverage on subject's close associates.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Grand Jury [JFK Law 10(a)2]

The Bureau has been advised that Assistant Attorney General, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Department of Justice, Miami, WILLIAM KENNEY, while in Tampa on 11/9/62 advised he and the USA EDWARD F. BOARDMAN, MDF, were considering [redacted]

Miami Office advised the Bureau by referenced teletype in the case of JOSEPH ANTHONY INDELICATO, Aka, AR, Miami file 92-404, that informant information had been received that JOSEPH INDELICATO and RUBY STRAUSS may operate gambling ship in the Miami area during the coming winter season. Panamanian motor vessel, "Orange Sun", and German ship "Wappan Von Hamburg" aka "Empress of Bahamas", both operating out of Miami, were considered logical vessels to be used for this purpose. The Port Director, Miami, advised "Orange Sun" apparently is making regular scheduled runs, but to be chartered for convention groups.

Miami further advised JOHN CASEBOLT, Immigration Official, was aboard "Orange Sun" at West Palm Beach, Florida, Nov. 7, 1962, and observed approximately 50 slot machines covered and locked. He stated it took conventioneers of Florida Automobile Dealers Association from West Palm Beach to West End and returned during the period November 4 through 7, 1962.

92-2781-646

Information was further developed by an informant aboard "Wappan Von Hamburg" during the voyage of November 20, 1962, to Nassau and return, he learned 100 slot machines, plus faro table and other gambling equipment, to be delivered to ship within 30 days. Informant states "the doctor", or "the general", is to provide this gambling equipment. Identity of "the doctor" closely guarded aboard ship, but informant was told in confidence "the doctor" is "SANTOS from Tampa, Florida".

The Miami Office further advised due to the possibility that SANTOS was identical with subject, informant was instructed to further identify and obtain details regarding delivery of gambling equipment.

The Houston Office indices were negative regarding a VICTOR S. GUFFRIS as mentioned in the details of the report.

Information from the records of the General Telephone Company of Florida, Tampa, Florida, was made available to IC HENRY I. MC INTURFF on dates indicated on the FD-302s by Mr. GEORGE CARNES, Commercial Manager.

INFORMANTS

TP T-1 is CHARLES CUCCIA, PCI, Miami.

TP T-2 is PETER GIAMPAPA, PCI, Miami.

TP T-3 is MM 840-c.

TP T-4 is MM 797-PC.

✓TP T-5 is MM 845-C*.

TP T-6 is TP 41-C.

TP T-7 is DOMINICK LA ROCA, PCI.

✓TP T-8 is TP 79-C*.

TP T-9 is CESAR MARIO CAPAZ, PCI.

92-2781-646

TP T-10 is ROLANDO RODRIGUEZ, PCI.

TP T-11 is TP 80-C*.

- COVER PAGE H* -

92-2781-646

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - USA, Miami

Report of: SA STEPHEN J. LABADIE
Office: TAMPA
Date: 12/3/62
Field Office File #: 92-1
Bureau File #: 92-2781

Title: SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR.

Character: ANTI-RACKETEERING

Synopsis: Telephone toll calls from residence of EVARISTO GARCIA VIDAL, Miami, to Tampa, Florida, identified as to residences of FRANK CONIGLIO, 610 Luzon, Mrs. FRANCIS CACCIATORE, 1915 Carmen. Call to GARCIA Instant Service Station, same identified as place where subject's family has cars serviced in the past. Also, call to subject's Tampa residence, 2505 Bristol. Toll calls obtained for past six months period from above locations and leads set out to identify connections. Subject's whereabouts unrecorded at Miami or Tampa during latter October and subject reported on November 6, 1962, at Columbia Restaurant, Tampa, and at office of Tampa Attorney PAT WHITAKER, 308 Tampa Street. Subject and wife thereafter reported at Miami residence November 7, 1962, and rent paid for month of November. Subject observed in Miami in contact with STEFANO ANTHONY RANDAZZO and at Sonny's Restaurant, Miami Beach. Subject's past associate HARLAN BLACKBURN arrested on IRS case, Orlando, and subject may be subpoenaed before FGJ, Orlando, 12/10/62 as to his connections with BLACKBURN and general gambling in central Florida. Car used by subject in Miami observed Miami International Airport 11/23/62. No further action reported on ALBERT ANASTASIA murder case, NYC. Telephone toll calls obtained from telephone available to subject's associate JAMES C. LONGO and set out to determine connections. SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS DUE TO HIS PAST ASSOCIATIONS IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES.

- P -

DETAILS

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

I. POSSIBLE TELEPHONE CONTACTS OF SUBJECT AND ASSOCIATES

It has previously been reported by the Miami Office that subject was probably in contact with EVARISTO GARCIA VIDAL, a Cuban National, who is residing at 4001 S.W. 5th Street, Miami, Florida, with telephone 445-3115, and the telephone toll calls from such telephone were previously set out with the exception of the following information:

FD-302 (Rev. 1-25-60)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date November 8, 1962

The records of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company were reviewed and the following information obtained for telephone number 445-3115.

The number is listed to RITA GARCIA, 4001 S. W. 5th Street, Miami, Florida, and billed to same. The telephone was connected on February 16, 1962. GARCIA has no employment. She has a large bank account at the First National Bank, FR 7-3411. Mr. SIEBERT handles her account. ELIANA DE MARCOS (niece), FR 1-8579, was listed as a reference. Credit rating with the telephone company was listed as "D". - $50 deposit. GARCIA's husband is still in Cuba. GARCIA is very old. This is a published number.

The above records are confidential and can only be obtained through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, which should be directed to Mr. PRESTON M. COLLINS, South Florida Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami, Florida, or his authorized representative.

3

On 11/7/62 at Coral Gables, Florida File # Miami 92-88

by IC E. CLEON GLAZE:mgw Date dictated 11/7/62

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 1-25-60)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date November 8, 1962

The records of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company were reviewed and the following long distance calls were obtained for telephone number 445-3115, subscribed to by RITA GARCIA.

Date	City	Number	Other Data
9/24	Tampa, Fla.	259-2393	14 min.

The above records are confidential and can only be issued through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum which should be directed to Mr. PRESTON M. COLLINS, South Florida Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami, Florida, or his authorized representative.

4

On 11/7/62 at Coral Gables, Florida File # Miami 92-88

by IC E. CLEON GLAZE:mgw Date dictated 11/7/62

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

AT TAMPA, FLORIDA

RE: 259-2393

This number is presumably a GARCIA call on July 26, 1962, to Miami, Florida, from this number It is also noted that this number in Tampa was called again on September 24, 1962, as set forth above.

FD-302 (Rev. 1-25-60)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 10/31/62

1

Records of the General Telephone Company of Florida reveal the below listed telephone toll calls have been charged to telephone number 259-2393, which is subscribed to by FRANK CONIGLIO of 610 Luzon:

Billing Date July 16, 1962

6/23/62 to St. Petersburg, 361-1011, a day station 3 minute call

6/26/62 to Miami, FR 1-8579, a night station 8 minute call

6/30/62 to St. Petersburg, 361-1011, a day station 3 minute call

7/6/62 to Brooksville, 796-3222, a night station 3 minute call

Billing Date May 16, 1962

4/19/62 to Miami, FR 1-8579, a night station 5 minute call

Billing Date April 16, 1962

4/2/62 to Miami HI 5-1551, a day person to person 4 minute call

Records reflect no toll calls on billing dates of June 16, 1962, August 16, 1962, and September 16, 1962.

Information from the files of the General Telephone Company of Florida should only be made public after proper issuance of a subpoena duces tecum which should be directed to Mr. CARL D. BROREIN, JR., operating vice president of the General Telephone Company of Florida, or his authorized representative.

The telephone company was not requested to retain the toll records described above and they will normally be destroyed, after a period of six months.

On 10/25/62 at Tampa, Florida File # TP 92-1

by IC HENRY E. MC INTURFF:dh Date dictated 10/29/62

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

AT TAMPA, FLORIDA

RE: 278-2574

This number was called on July 24, 1962, apparently to a JOSEPH GARCIA. The 1962 Tampa, Florida City Directory lists JOSEPH A. GARCIA, wife ROSE M., as residing 507 Ellicott, as at Garcia's Instant Service and as a vice president, Central Bank of Tampa.

The Directory lists Garcia's Instant Service to JOE A. GARCIA, East Broadway, corner of 24th, with telephones 248-2113 and 248-2114.

FD-302 (Rev. 1-25-60)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 10/31/62

1

Records of the General Telephone Company of Florida reveal that the below listed telephone toll calls have been charged to telephone number 248-2574, which is an unlisted number subscribed to by Garcia's Instant Service, 24th Street and East Broadway, Tampa:

Billing Date May 6, 1962

4/4/62 to Dade City, Florida, 567-6125, a day person to person 3 minute call

4/10/62 to Leesburg, Florida, 787-4233, a day person to person 3 minute call

4/12/62 to Orlando, Florida, GA 5-2661, a day person to person 4 minute call

4/26/62 to Jacksonville, Florida, EL 6-4167, a day station 4 minute call

4/30/62 to Orlando, Florida, F 437291, a day person to person 3 minute call

4/30/62 to Orlando, Florida, GA 5-2661, a day person to person 3 minute call

Billing Date August 6, 1962

7/19/62 to St. Petersburg, Florida, 7-1197

7/30/62 to Jacksonville, Florida, EL 6-0935

7/30/62 to Fort Myers, Florida, ED 7-6661

There were no toll charges on the bills for the following billing dates:

June 6, 1962;
July 6, 1962;
September 6, 1962; and
October 6, 1962

On 10/23/62 at Tampa, Florida File # TP 92-1

by IC HENRY E. MC INTURFF:dh Date dictated 10/29/62

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Information from the files of the General Telephone Company of Florida should only be made public after proper issuance of a subpoena duces tecum which should be directed to Mr. CARL D. BROREIN, JR., operating vice president of the General Telephone Company of Florida, or his authorized representative.

The telephone company was not requested to retain the toll records described above and they will normally be destroyed after a period of six months.

AT TAMPA, FLORIDA

RE: 255-2175

This telephone number as recorded called previously from the GARCIA residence, Miami, Florida, on September 7, 10, 1962, apparently to Mrs. FRANCES CACCIATORE.

FD-302 (Rev. 1-25-60)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 10/31/62

1

Records of the General Telephone Company of Florida reveal below listed telephone toll calls have been charged to telephone number 255-2175, which is listed to FRANCES CACCIATORE of 1915 Carmen:

Billing Date April 16, 1962

3/23/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 1-8579, a day station call

Billing Date May 16, 1962

5/5/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 1-8579, a night station call

There were no toll charges made on billing dates of June 16, 1962 and July 16, 1962.

Billing Date August 16, 1962

7/16/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 1-8579, a night station call

Billing Date September 16, 1962

8/23/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 1-8579, a night station call

9/3/62, collect call from Miami, Florida, a day person to person call

Information from the files of the General Telephone Company of Florida should only be made public after proper issuance of a subpoena duces tecum which should be directed to Mr. CARL D. BROREIN, JR., operating vice president, General Telephone Company of Florida, or his authorized representative.

The telephone company was not requested to retain the toll call records described above and they will normally be destroyed after a period of six months.

On 10/26/62 at Tampa, Florida File # TP 92-1

by IC HENRY E. MC INTURFF:dh Date dictated 10/29/62

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

AT TAMPA, FLORIDA

RE: 876-2207

This number was called from the GARCIA residence in Miami on September 16, 1962, it being noted it is the unlisted telephone at 2505 Bristol, where subject's daughter SARA ANN TRAFFICANTE resides.

FD-302 (Rev. 1-25-60)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 10/31/62

1

Records of the General Telephone Company of Florida reveal that the below listed telephone toll calls have been charged to telephone number 876-2207, which is an unlisted number subscribed to by SANTO TRAFFICANTE of 2505 Bristol:

Billing Date May 11, 1962

4/1/62, collect call from Gainesville, Florida, a night station call

4/8/62, collect call from Gainesville, Florida, a night station call

4/11/62 to Gainesville, FR 2-9236, a day person to person call

4/16/62 to Gainesville, FR 2-9236, a day person to person call

4/18/62 to St. Petersburg, 361-1561, a day station call

4/19/62 to Louisville, Kentucky, 366-5594, a night station call

4/29/62, collect call from Gainesville, Florida, FR 2-9236, a night person to person call

5/9/62 to Gainesville, FR 2-9236, a night person to person call

Billing Date June 11, 1962

5/2/62, collect call from Gainesville, Florida, a night station call

5/13/62 to Gainesville, FR 6-7498, a night person to person call

5/17/62 to Gainesville, FR 2-9236, a day person to person call

5/23/62, collect call from Gainesville, Florida, a night station call

---

On 10/25/62 at Tampa, Florida File # TP 92-1

by IC HENRY E. MC INTURFF:dh Date dictated 10/29/62

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

5/23/62 to St. Petersburg, 361-1561, a day station call

5/30/62 to Cape Haze, Florida, MY 7-2991, a night station call

6/4/62 to Gainesville, FR 2-9236,a night person to person call

Billing Date July 11, 1962

6/29/62 to St. Petersburg, 360-6731, a day station call

7/6/62 to St. Petersburg, 360-6731, a day station call

Billing Date August 11, 1962

7/9/62 to Louisville, Kentucky, 585-4400, a day person to person call

7/9/62 to St. Petersburg, 361-1561, a day station call

7/9/62 to St. Petersburg, 361-1561, a day station call

7/9/62, collect call from St. Petersburg, Florida, a day station call

7/9/62, collect call from St. Petersburg, Florida, a day person to person call

7/18/62 to Wildwood, Florida, 748-4723, a day station call

7/18/62 to Bushnell, Florida, SY 3-2071, a day person to person call

7/18/62 to Bushnell, Florida, SY 3-2133, a day station call

On the billing date of September 11, 1962, there were no toll charges.

Billing Date October 11, 1962

9/11/62 to North Dade, Florida, WI 5-8812, a day station call

9/27/62, collect call from Atlanta, Georgia, a night station call

10/1/62 to Miami, Florida, PL 4-1912, a day station call

10/9/62 to Miami, Florida, PL 4-1912, a night station call

Information from the files of the General Telephone Company of Florida should only be made public after proper issuance of a subpoena duces tecum which should be directed toMMr. CARL D. BROREIN, JR., operating vice president of the General Telephone Company of Florida, or his authorized representative.

In regard to the preceding, it is noted that SARA ANN TRAFFICANTE, as previously reported, has a boyfriend, RICHARD VALDEZ, who resides in Tampa, but attends the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

It is noted that Louisville, Kentucky, subject's son-in-law, AUGUST PANIELLO, who also resides at 2505 Bristol Avenue, has relatives as previously reported.

It is noted LOUIS GERACI at Cape Haze, Florida, telephone MY 7-2991, has been previously interviewed.

It is noted the telephone number PL 4-1912 called on October 1 and 9, 1962, at Miami, Florida, has been previously identified as the phone at the residence of STEFANO ANTHONY RANDAZZO. He has been interviewed by Miami agents on at least three occasions, the oast being November 9, 1962, at which time he advised he could furnish no information concerning the activities of the subject.

The telephone number WI 5-8811 at North Dade, Florida, called on September 11, 1962, is the telephone at the residence of VINCENT AMATO, 19511 Northeast 19th Avenue, Miami, who has been previously identified as the son-in-law of STEFANO RANDAZZO and who has previously been interviewed on several occasions as the purchaser of the TRAFFICANTE residence at 2505 Bristol, Tampa.

II. GENERAL ACTIVITIES AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

The subject was not observed at 523 Northeast 71st Street from October 22 through 26, 1962 and for the period October 29 through November 2, 1962.

TP T-1 advised on October 22, 1962, that neither the subject or his wife had been seen in their neighborhood for three weeks, but noted the rent for the residence at 523 Northeast 71st Street was paid up until November 1, 1962.

TP T-2 stated on October 26, 1962 that the white Falcon sedan generally used by the subject while in Miami had not be4n seen for many weeks.

On October 26, 1962, the white Falcon was observed driven by EVERISTO GARCIA VIDAL, 4001 Southwest 5th Street,

92-2781-646

Miami, and the car was observed at such residence on October 29 through November 2, 1962.

On November 1, 1962, TP T-3 advised it had just been learned in the past several days that (first name unknown) NACHO GENER is in Miami, that GENER was Chief of Customs at Havana, Cuba, airport when PRIO was President of Cuba and that during the time BATISTA was in power in Cuba, GENER conspired with PRIO against BATISTA. Source recalled that he has already advised that after CASTRO took over Cuba, TRAFFICANTE stayed in Cuba in an effort to take over all gambling activities, but instead TRAFFICANTE ended up in jail for a while. This source said that either before or after TRAFFICANTE was jailed, he stayed in GENER's house in Cuba. Source heard as a result of his close feeling for GENER, TRAFFICANTE allegedly at this time, while GENER was in the United States, was giving $600.00 per month to GENER. Source was of the opinion that GENER would be in contact with TRAFFICANTE.

It is here noted that RAFAEL MACHO GENER has been previously interviewed by Miami agents and the results have been previously set forth in a report dated July 24, 1962.

TP T-1 advised on November 9, 1962, that the subject and his wife returned to their residence at 523 Northeast 71st Street on November 7, 1962, and noted the subject's wife paid the rent for the month of November and gave no indication that they made any plans to move. Source related no explanation was offered as to where they had been for the past month.

On November 7, 1962, TP T-4 advised subject had been observed on several occasions in the past in GEORGE's Tobacco Shop, 23rd Street and Liberty Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, but that subject had not been observed there for several weeks. GEORGE's Tobacco Shop is next door to SONNY's Restaurant, where subject has been seen several times in the past.

Mr. WILLIAM KENNEY, United States Department of Justice, attorney, at Miami, advised SA JACK LOUIS MARSHALL on November 8, 1962, that HARLAN BALCKBURN of Orlando, Florida, who has been listed in the past as an associate of the subject, was recently arrested by Internal Revenue Service in connection with gambling law violations and that [redacted]

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

On November 13, 1962, TP T-5 advised the subject was on such date seen at the new restaurant which STEFANO ANTHONY

92-2781-646

RANDAZZO planned to open around Thanksgiving, 1962.

On November 13, 1962, TONY RANDAZZO was observed by FBI agents to visit the subject's residence in Miami for several hours.

During the evening of November 14, 1962, subject was observed having dinner with his wife at SONNY's Restaurant, Miami Beach, Florida.

On November 15, 1962, TP T-3 advised source heard subject was recently in Brazil, reason unknown, and was to return to Miami on or about November 7 or 8, 1962. Source could furnish no further information in this regard.

Daily checks of subject's residence at Miami, Florida, failed to reflect any activities for the dates of November 19 through 23, 1962. The 1961 Falcon which was used by the subject and reported at the residence of EVERISTO GARCIA VIDAL, was located on November 23, 1962, in the parking lot of Miami International Airport where the parking ticket indicated the car was parked on November 22, 1962.

RE: GUATEMALO CASINO

It has previously been reported that LARRY de JOSEPH was "fronting" for the subject and others in a deal with the Guatemala Government in which a hotel with gambling casino will be constructed at Guatemala.

In view of the above, the following is reported:

On October 19, 1962, FRANK ARENZ, Vice-Consul, American Embassy, Guatemala City, Guatemala, advised he could locate no identifiable information in his files on LARRY DE JOSEPH, DONALD RICHARD SANDERS or subject.

On October 19, 1962, Colonel ALFREDO CASTANEDA, Minister of Interior, Guatemala City, advised that he had never heard of subject and said he feels certain there is no plan to permit gambling under discussion or consideration by the Guatemalan Government.

On October 20, 1962, JULIO PRADO GARCIA SALAS, Coordinating Minister for Central American Integration, Guatemala City, advised that LARRY de JOSEPH, DONALD RICHARD SANDERS and WALTER OSBORNE spent some time in Guatemala about three years ago.

92-2781-646

They had arrived to investigate a business for someone in the United States. They are believed to have made several trips to Guatemala. While in Guatemala, they stayed at the Hotel Maya Excelsior and also at the Pension Suiza and in both places cashed "No Fund" checks. As a result, they were arrested. Nothing ever came of the business which they had invested in, and they are not known to have any contacts in Guatemala at the present time.

He advised that AURELIANO SANCHEZ ARANGO, a Cuban, was in Guatemala City less than a year ago, at which time he was in the offices of ULIO PRADO GARCIA SALAS, together with Cubans JULIO GARCERON and EUSEBIO MUJAL. The only matters discussed were political matters pertaining to Guatemala and Cuba. Mr. PRADO stated that he had heard that SANCHEZ ARANGO is in Panama at the present time.

On October 20, 1962, RANDALL PETRIE, Assistant Manager, Hotel Maya Excelsior, Guatemala City, advised that he is certain LARRY de JOSEPH, DONALD RICHARD SANDERS and AURELIANO SANCHEZ ARANGO have not been guests at the hotel in the recent past. He said that he feels certain if they were guests of the hotel, it was at least several years ago. He advised he had never heard of any plan to construct a hotel and gambling casino in Guatemala.

ROY CRITTON, Manager, Pan American Hotel, Guatemala City, advised on October 20, 1962, that he had never heard of a plan to construct a hotel with gambling casino in Guatemala City.

III. GENERAL ACTIVITIES AT TAMPA, FLORIDA

On October 25, 1962, TP T-6 advised he went to Miami over the past week and efforts to contact JAMES DUCA, previously described as an associate of the subject in Miami, only determined he plays golf on a regular basis.

On October 26, 1962, TONY LICATA, 901 West Fribley, advised SAS JOHN R. BRETT and STEPHEN J. LABADIE that he had been closely associates in years past with many of Tampa's publicly described racket figures. He said he has been in the vending machine business for many years, but that in relation to SANTO TRAFFICANTE and his family, he had nothing whatsoever to do with them and did not know their business or operations, if any.

TP T-7 advised on November 6, 1962, that SANTO TRAFFICANTE walked into the Columbia Restaurant, alone, at

92-2781-646

11:45 AM November 6, 1962. Source stated SANTO stayed but for a few minutes and left alone. He crossed the street from the Columbia Restaurant to a shoe shine parlor, sat down for a shoe shine and his whereabouts after such time were unknown.

A check of subject's residence in Tampa, Columbia Restaurant, the residences and hangouts of his relatives, associates and contacts all on November 6, 1962, were negative to locate subject in Tampa.

On November 7, 1962, DANA CESSNA, reporter, "Tampa Times", a daily Tampa newspaper, advised SA JOHN D. MEDAGLIA that a source had told him SANTO TRAFFICANTE had returned to Tampa, Florida, on the morning of November 6, 1962, and had been in the office of Attorney PAT WHITAKER, 308 Tampa Street, an attorney who has represented the TRAFFICANTE family in the past.

On November 6, 1962 TP T-8 advised that JOE RAYMOND DIAZ, who has been previously described as an associate of the subject in Tampa, was interested in contacting subject's unlisted telephone 876-2207, at 2505 Bristol Avenue, but nothing further was learned by source.

Contacts have been maintained with TP T-6, TP T-7, TP T-9 as well as ELMIRA HERNANDEZ, who runs the coffee shop at the Columbia Restaurant, and all sources have advised subject has not returned to the Columbia Restaurant since November 6, 1962.

The same vehicles continue to be observed at 2505 Bristol Avenue and sources in the immediate neighborhood have not reported seeing subject.

Daily checks of subject's residence, as well as residence of his mother, and brother FANO, 3010 North Boulevard, as well as his brothers 701-05 West Alfred, and that of JAMES C. LONGO, 4214 Riverview for subject's presence have been negative.

Liaison is maintained on a regular basis with Captain ELLIS CLIFTON of the Vice Squad, Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, and with JACK de la LLANA, Intelligence Unit, Tampa Police Department, and law enforcement figures have not reported subject's presence in Tampa.

JACK de la LLANA, as above, advised as of November 15 and 26, 1962 that the latest information he had concerning the subject was from FRANK CHAPPELL of the Miami, Florida Intelligence Unit, who indicated to him that subject was observed in Miami with other individuals who were interested in opening some new restaurant. He advised that as of November 15, 1962, it had been agreed upon by the various Intelligence Unit representatives from Miami, Orlando, St. Petersburg, and Tampa, that they were going to advise one another as to subject's appearance and location should he leave one city and go to another.

It has previously been reported that Houston, Texas authorities had made some inquiry of Tampa Police Department concerning subject and therefore the Houston Office advised that on November 8, 1962, SA JAMES W. RUSSELL contacted Chief Deputy Sheriff LOYD FRAZIER of the Harris County Sheriff's Office regarding SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR. FRAZIER advised that he had requested background regarding subject and such had been done because he had been told by a source, not now recalled by him, that TRAFFICANTE may come to Houston, Texas, to contact an Italian by the name of VICTOR S. GUFFRIA. FRAZIER said that he had no background information on GUFFRIA and has received no information to date that TRAFFICANTE has made trips to Houston.

Relative to the information as indicated at Miami, Florida, that subject may have been in Brazil, SAM JOHNSON, United States Customs Agency, Tampa, Florida, has advised that United States Customs and United States Immigration and Naturalization Service stops have been maintained on subject for several years for any entry into the country and that the last stop was renewed for another year as of October 31, 1962. He advised United States Customs agents are on duty 24 hours per day and that he considered it most difficult to get into the United States and pass Immigration and Naturalization and United States Customs officials. He said going out of the country the person could get on any airlines, but it was the airlines responsibility for having the person have his correct documents and that the airlines are subject to heavy penalties should a person be found not having proper documents.

IV. ASSOCIATES

A. SIDNEY HOROWITZ, Aka Sid Howard

TP T-6 advised on October 25, 1962, that HOWARD was contacted in Miami, Florida, that HOWARD claimed he was hanging out at Miami Beach, and that he intended to remain there because things were too quiet in Tampa. Source reported that HOWARD's girlfriend in Miami, Florida, has telephone

FR 4-2906, but her name was not divulged. HOWARD, according to source, was in contact with BEN KULBACK, 2115 Washington Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, telephone JE 8-0794, it being noted this individual has formerly been identified as having visited subject's residence in Miami in the past.

B. JAMES C. LONGO
4214 Riverview
Tampa, Florida

It has been reported in the past that LONGO had met with WILLIE PEP relative to some person being contacted by the name of "RENO" at Key West, Florida. The San Francisco Office has now advised that WILLIE PEP is no longer at Santa Clara, California, but they have contact with his mother residing at 19 McKenley, Hartford, Connecticut.

Investigation in the past has revealed that whenever subject visits Tampa, on infrequent occasions, he may generally contact JAMES C. LONGO who frequents the Columbia Restaurant on an almost daily basis. LONGO has access to a telephone at the Columbia Restaurant Liquor Store Annex which is not generally used by the public nor would other personnel use such for long distance phone calls. In view of the above, the following is set forth:

FD-302 (Rev. 1-25-60)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 10/31/62

1

Records of the General Telephone Company of Florida reveal that the beloe listed telephone toll calls have been charged to telephone number 248-3347, which is subscribed to by the Columbia Restaurant Liquor Annex, address 2117 East Broadway Avenue. This service has been afforded since January 9, 1940.

Billing Date July 6, 1962

6/6/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 3-3561, a night person to person 14 minute call

6/11/62 to Miami, Florida, NE 3-3872, a day station 3 minute call

6/15/62, a telegram to New York, New York

6/15/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 3-1821, a night station 7 minute call

6/19/62 to Sarasota, Florida, 955-8733, a night person to person 4 minute call

7/3/62 to Miami, Florida, JE 8-5968, a night station 5 minute call

7/4/62 to Sarasota, Florida, 388-1916, a night station 8 minute call

7/5/62 to St.Petersburg, Florida, 361-1011, a night person to perxon 3 minute call

Billing Date August 6, 1962

7/2/62, collect call from Rochester, New York, a night person to person 13 minute call

7/3/62, collect call from Rochester, New York, a night station 22 minute call

On 10/23/62 at Tampa, Florida File # TP 92-1 TP 92-31

by IC HENRY E. MC INTURFF:dh Date dictated 10/29/62

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

7/5/62 to Brooklin, Massachusetts, area code 617, LO 6-5800, a day person to person 3 minute call

7/6/62 to Brooklyn, New York, area code 212, SH 8-7877, a day person to person 6 minute call

7/6/62 to Miami, Florida, JE 2-2468, a day person to person 3 minute call

7/6/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 3-1821, a night station 23 minute call

7/6/62 to Key West, Florida, CY 4-1018, a night person to person 4 minute call

7/11/62 to Sarasota, Florida, 388-1916, a day station 3 minute call

7/14/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 3-1821, a night person to person 17 minute call

7/23/62 to Miami, Florida, JE 2-2468, a day person to person 8 minute call

7/24/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 3-4613, a day station 5 minute call

Billing Date September 6, 1962

6/26/62 to Clearwater, Florida, 733-1492, a night station 11 minute call

7/2/62, collect call from Rochester, Minnesoto, a night station 11 minute call

7/5/62 to Rochester, Minnesoto, area code 507, AT 2-2581, a night person to person 8 minute call

7/14/62 to Cincinnati, Ohio, 821-4731, a day person to person 7 minute call

7/14/62 to Atlanta, Georgia, MU 8-1682, a day person to person 3 minute call

7/14/62 to Atlanta, Georgia, PO 7-0281, a day person to person 4 minute call

7/27/62, a telegram to Tallahassee, Florida

8/5/62, collect call from Miami, Florida, a night person to person 29 minute call

8/6/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 3-1821, a night station 10 minute call

8/10/62, collect call from St. Petersburg, Florida, a day person to person 5 minute call

8/17/62 to New York, New York, area code 212, MU 3-3540, a day person to person 3 minute call

8/18/62, collect call from Miami, Florida, a night person to person 18 minute call

8/25/62 to Winter Haven, Florida, 293-6325, a day station 3 minute call

8/29/62 to Tallahassee, Florida, 222-0747, a day station 4 minute call

Billing Date October 6, 1962

8/23/62, a telegram to Havana, Cuba

9/4/62, collect call from Gainesville, Florida, a night person to person 17 minute call

9/6/62 to St. Petersburg, Florida, 7-1197, a day station 5 minute call

9/11/62 to Jacksonville, Florida, EL 6-4167, a day person to person 4 minute call

9/15/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 9-0518, a day station 14 minute call

9/17/62 to Miami, Florida, FR 3-3561, a day person to person 15 minute call

9/18/62 to St. Petersburg, Florida, 5-3187, a day person to person 3 minute call

Information from the files of the General Telephone Company of Florida should only be made public after proper issuance of a subpoena duces tecum which should be directed to Mr. CARL D. BROREIN, JR., operating vice president of the General Telephone Company of Florida, or his authorized representative.

The telephone company was not requested to retain the toll records described above and they will normally be destroyed after a period of six months.

The above information from the records of the General Telephone Company was furnished toIC HENRY E. MC INTURFF on October 23, 1962 by Mr. GEORGE CARNES, Commercial Manager.

It is noted that the above referred to St. Petersburg telephone number 361-1011 was also called from the CONIGLIO residence as set forth previously in this report.

It has previously been reported that one of the owners of the Columbia Restaurant had been ill at Rochester, New York, and he is now deceased.

TP T-10 advised SAS JOHN A. AMBLER and JOHN H. MILLER on November 19, 1962, that JIMMY LONGO and JOHN DEMMI were betting heavily at the Tampa Dog Track on the night of November 16, 1962. Source said that LONGO and DEMMI were active in a pin ball and cigarette vending business which is headed up by the "SANTO TRAFFICANTE crowd". Source indicated there was maybe a movement to obtain vending machine installations of the Eli Witt Company.

On November 19, 1962, TP T-11 indicated that FRANK DIECIDUE of the Dixie Amusement, Inc., a vending machine business, may have some interest with the TRAFFICANTEs in vending machines.

V. RE: ALBERT ANASTASIA MURDER

On October 30, 1962, Detective WILLIAM GRAFF, 18th Squad, New York City Police Department, furnished the following information:

In connection with the investigation of the ALBERT ANASTASIA murder, the District Attorney's Office of the New York County was advised by the United States Department of Justice that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics had information of assistance in this investigation. Detective GRAFF ascertained the Federal narcotics agent with this information was OSCAR LEON DAVIS, presently a Deputy United States Marshal in Orlando, Florida. Detective GRAFF interviewed DAVIS and determined his informant was CARLOS DE TORRES, 227 Northwest 13th Avenue, Apartment 5, telephone FR 1-1077, Miami, Florida, business address 303 Ainsley Building, Miami.

DE TORRES was interviewed by Detective GRAFF and he stated SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., ROMAN OLIVEREA, one MARCERIA, and one CISCO were involved in the ALBERT ANASTASIA homicide. DE TORRES claimed OLIVEREA, MARCERIA, and CISCO received $35,000.00 for the killing. He said CISCO had been a bodyguard for ANASTASIA and that OLIVEREA had the role of "setting up" ANASTASIA. MARCERIA's role was not known to DE TORRES.

OEA
REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 7/26/95 DAB/ew/jtt

☐ RELEASE IN FULL
☒ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

92-2781-646

DE TORRES related he was not close to TRAFFICANTE but claimed that through his informant, CISCO, he would be able to secure further information regarding TRAFFICANTE. DE TORRES stated he originally advised Federal Narcotics Agent DAVIS of the above information in November, 1961. He said DAVIS told him there was a $10,000.00 reward for information in the ANASTASIA homicide, but later stated that after checking with authorities in New York City he had ascertained the reward was only $7,000.00. According to Detective GRAFF, there is no reward in this case.

Detective GRAFF identified CISCO as UBALDO SANTACROCE, New York City Police Department, Number B-474573, also known as CISCO BOB, and interviewed him. SANTACROCE stated he was presently employed on the docks in Hoboken, New Jersey, on the "Sun Dance", a fishing boat. SANTACROCE admitted he had told people he had worked for ANASTASIA, but told Detective GRAFF there was no truth in these statements. It was ascertained SANTACROCE was a narcotics user, and he was characterized as a "bum" whose information could not be considered reliable.

MARCERIA was identified as JOSE RAMON FAYAT, 441 Southwest 4th Street, Miami, Florida, owner of the Ideal Restaurant, 755 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida. However, SANTACROCE could not substantiate any of the story he had furnished DE TORRES.

Detective GRAFF advised he had closed out this phase of his investigation as to the ANASTASIA killing as being based on unreliable information.

Detective GRAFF stated it is the policy of the District Attorney's Office in New York County that no indictment be issued until that office is ready to apprehend those named in the indictment.

DEA
REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 7/26/95 DAB/PW/TIT
☐ RELEASE IN FULL
☒ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

92-2781-646

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Tampa, Florida
December 3, 1962

Title	SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., aka
Character	ANTI-RACKETEERING
Reference	Report dated and captioned as above.

TP T-1 is a source close to subject's Miami residence inaa position to know, but not in a position to testify.

TP T-2 is an individual in a position to know, but not in a position to testify.

TP T-3 is an individual who associates with the criminal element in Miami.

TP T-4 is an individual who associates with members of the criminal element in the Miami Beach area.

TP T-5 is a source who is unavailable for recontact.

TP T-6 is an individual who frequents withh members of the criminal element in Tampa on a daily basis.

TP T-7 is a source at the Columbia Restaurant in Tampa in a position to know, but not in a position to testify.

TP T-8 is a source at Tampa who is unavailable to testify.

TP T-9 is a source at Tampa who is in a position to know, but not in a position to testify.

TP T-10 is an individual formerly active in numbers, but who is not in a position to testify.

TP T-11 is a source who is unavailable to testify.

② - Bureau (92-278)
1 - Tampa (92-1)

SJL:dh
(3)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Tampa, Florida
December 3, 1962

Title	SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., aka
Character	ANTI-RACKETEERING
Reference	Report dated and captioned as above.

TP T-1 is a source close to subject's Miami residence inaa position to know, but not in a position to testify.

TP T-2 is an individual in a position to know, but not in a position to testify.

TP T-3 is an individual who associates with the criminal element in Miami.

TP T-4 is an individual who associates with members of the criminal element in the Miami Beach area.

TP T-5 is a source who is unavailable for recontact.

TP T-6 is an individual who frequents withh members of the criminal element in Tampa on a daily basis.

TP T-7 is a source at the Columbia Restaurant in Tampa in a position to know, but hot in a position to testify.

TP T-8 is a source at Tampa who is unavailable to testify.

TP T-9 is a source at Tampa who is in a position to know, but not in a position to testify.

TP T-10 is an individual formerly active in numbers, but who is not in a position to testify.

TP T-11 is a source who is unavailable to testify.

6 - Bureau (92-278)
1 - Tampa (92-1)

SJL:dh
(3)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Tampa, Florida

December 3, 1962

Title SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., aka
Character ANTI-RACKETEERING
Reference Report dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

TP T-10, with whom contact has been insufficient to determine his reliability.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY:	FBI
RECORD_NUMBER:	124-10206-10337
RECORD_SERIES:	HO
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER:	2-2173-37

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR:	FBI
FROM:	DIRECTOR. FBI
TO:	SAC. MM
TITLE:	
DATE:	10/15/1976
PAGES:	7
SUBJECT:	OBA, SUSP, CUBANA AIRLINES, BOMBING, TRA, ASSOC, POLIT

DOCUMENT_TYPE:	PAPER. TEXTUAL DOCUMENT		
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION:	Secret	NEW CLASSIFICATION:	
REVIEW_DATE:	05/11/1998	UPDATE_DATE:	
STATUS	Redact		

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

~~WV EIA163~~

~~OO RUFBI~~

~~DE RUEAIIA #6380 2890439~~T

~~ZNY SSSSS~~

0 ~~150354Z OCT 76T~~

~~FM CIA~~

TO ~~ZEN/SECRET SERVICE~~//ID

~~ZEN/DIRNSA//NSOC~~

~~ZEN/STATE RCI~~

~~ZEN/REASURY DEPT~~

~~ZEN/CNO~~

~~ZEN/SSO ACSI DA~~

~~ZEN/AFSSO USAF~~

~~RUEKJCS/DIA~~

~~ZEN/JCS~~

~~ZEN/SWS WASHDC~~

~~RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//OCI~~

~~RUFBI/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT~~ION

~~ZEN/CIA OPSCEN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 15 1976

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgmt. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT.
EXCEPT BRACKETS ON pgs.
2, 3, 4 AND 6 GMB 8-5-96

SLD/KSR
8-5-96
(JFK)

FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/12/94 BY SP8 MAC/GCL
(JFK)

BT For information CIA teletype 10/15/76 is set forth below

S E C R E T NOFORN. CITE CIA 928148.T

TDFIRDB-315/10256-76 (ADVANCE)T

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

CC

FNGKI2A 6380 SECRET NOFORN

SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--T
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.T

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI : LATE SEPTEMBER - 12 OCTOBER 1976T

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZUELA

ACQ : [VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. [HVC]-7514T (S)

SOURCE : A FORMER VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO STILL MAINTAINS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. HIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.T

1. [(FIELD] COMMENT: (~~S~~ U) IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1976 A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH WAS IN VENEZUELA UNDER THE PROTECTION OF VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ. FURTHERMORE, PEREZ HWD APPOINTED HIS SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ADVISER ORLANDO GARCIA TO PROTECT AND ASSIST

BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZUELA. FOR THIS INFORMATION SEE [HVC]-7498, DFIRDB-315/ -76. IN [HVC]-7483, DFIRDB-315/T (S) 09430-76, OF MID-SEPTEMBER, A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED THAT BOSCH ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA ON APPROXIMATELY 13 SEPTEMBER.)T

2. UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, BOSCH WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY GARCIA AND LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA, A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR AND ONE-IME MEMBER OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), WHO ESCORTED BOSCH TO HIS CARACAS HOTEL.T

(U) [FIELD] COMMENT: WHILE CURRENTLY NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZENS,T BOTH GARCIA AND POSADA ARE NATIVE-BORN CUBANS.)T

3. SOMETIME FOLLOWING BOSCH'S ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, A BS.T 5,000 (APPROXIMATELY U.S. $1,118) A PLATE FUND-RAISING DINNER FOR BOSCH WAS HELD AT THE HOME OF HILDO FOLGAR, A PROMINENT SURGEON AND CUBAN EXILE. IN ADDITPON TO BOSCH, AMONG THOSE ATTENDING THE DINNER WERE GARCIA; RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE, GARCIA'S DEPUTY WHO IS ALSO A NATIVE-BORN CUBAN; POSADA; AND AN UNIDENTIFIED HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.T

HAS DIFFERENT INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER BOSCH WAS EXFILTRATED OR IS OR IS NOT IN VENEZUELA. GARCIA SPOKE TO LEGATT SUNDAY MORNING, 10T OCTOBER, AND ON THZ AFTERNOON OF 12 OCTOBER TOLD HIM "NNFORMALLY"T THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD SHORTLY ADVISE ME THAT BOSCH WOULD BE TURNED OVER TO US. THIS WAS REPEATED TO LEGATT BY DISIP DIRECTOR RAUL GIMENEZ GAINZA AND OTHER DISIP OFFICIALS (NNCLUDING GARCIA) NN A MEETING THE MORNING OF 13 OCTOBER. CONCEIVABLY GARCIA CAN BE PLAYING A DARK GAME, BUT THE DISCREPANCIES ARE NOTEWORTHY.T I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL WORD AS TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION.)T

11. [FIELD](S) DISSEM: EMBASSY, LEGATT AT CARACAS: SENT TO [PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON , MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA,T GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA,T](S)

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--T NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTOS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.T CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2T

BT

#6380

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10210-10096

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3171-2493

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, MX
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 11/05/1974
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
SGI, INS, DEPORTATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Confidential
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/02/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

(Special Coll 6/13/94 - JFK)

~~SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION~~

Classified by SP5RJG/Bug
Declassify on: OADR
~~153 Ruff~~ 1678/RFP 4/10/84 6/14/85

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (92-3171) DATE: 11/5/74 2/16/96

CLASSIFIED BY: SP2CLC/KS
REASON: 1.5 (b)
DECLASSIFY ON: X 5
5668 SLD/rule 2/14/97 (JFK)

RTN Appeal 9-1125

FROM : LEGAT, MEXICO CITY (92-13) (P)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP (S) OF DATE~~ Class (4) 9/18/78

SUBJECT: SAMUEL M. GIANCANA, aka
(AR) SAM GIANCANA

Reference Mexico City airtel 11/4/74. (U)

The contents of this letter are relevant to referenced airtel setting out background concerning the possible reasons for subject's deportation. However, this is reported separately because classified confidential and not to be reported for dissemination. (U)

(C) [CIA, Mexico City,] was requested to furnish any information they might have concerning subject's presence in Mexico and deportation. On 10/1/74 [Mr. ROD MARSHALL] (C) advised that he had furnished some information which he believed originated with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) [to FERNANDO GUTIERREZ BARRIOS, the Subsecretary of Government (Gobernacion), the agency which deported subject.] (C) He believed this was done some weeks before subject was detained and deported. He did not recall exact circumstances but thought perhaps [Mr. HARRINGTON,] who was coordinating [C] with DEA at the time, might have asked him to do this. [MARSHALL] advised that after subject was detained, [GUTIERREZ BARRIOS] [C] called them to notify them of the detention and that subject was going to be deported. (C)

In subsequent contact, [GUTIERREZ BARRIOS] (C) said that this action was taken because subject was illegally in Mexico and that the action was not based on any activities of a criminal nature which might be considered in violation of Mexican law. At one point [GUTIERREZ BARRIOS] explained it by saying simply that the subject's papers were not in order. (C)

On 10/2/74 [Mr. MARSHALL] delivered a blind memorandum classified confidential dated 10/2/74 captioned "Information on Sam Giancana" as follows. (C)

REC-9 92-3171-2493

~~1357 SSR/mfs~~ 3 9.8.78

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CLASSIFIED BY~~
~~EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652~~
~~EXEMPTION CATEGORY~~ 2
~~AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON~~ Indefinite

263 NOV 12 1974

5-Bureau
(1-Foreign Liaison Unit)
(2-Chicago)(92-349)
1-Mexico City
SC:kvw
(6)

F56

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

5010-108-02
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

MEX 92-13

"On 23 May 1974 we asked a high-level source [C] within the Mexican Secretariat of Gobernacion for information that they might have on Sam GIANCANA. [C] The Department of Immigration is under the [C] Secretariat of Gobernacion, so it was believed that (C) they might have some information on GIANCANA. We never received a reply to this request. In July 1974, however, our contact within Gobernacion told [C] us that the Government of Mexico (GOM) was expelling GIANCANA from the country, to the United States, within 24 hours. (¢)

"In meetings held with our contact on 23 August, 28 September, and 1 October 1974, we brought up the subject of GIANCANA. The contract said that the local immigration authorities had been seeking GIANCANA because he was in the country illegally. They finally located him in July, arrested him on the spot, and deported him the following day. The expulsion was not carried out on the basis of any specific information supplied by the US Embassy, nor were there any indications that he was engaged in any criminal activity here. Rather it was an internal GOM decision to expel an unwanted alien who was living illegally in Mexico. (¢)(U)

It is noted that this blind memorandum does not appear to document the previous information from Mr. MARSHALL (C) and is somewhat contradictory. (¢)

In further explanation 10/2/74 Mr. MARSHALL said he [C] now believes Mr. HARRINGTON had asked him merely to determine [C] if Gobernacion had any information on the subject since (C) MARSHALL believed subject may have been designated by the embassy Narcotics Committee as a so-called "joint target." [C] He stated he did not believe that he had indicated in any manner to GUTIERREZ BARRIOS that the embassy thought subject [C] was involved in narcotics activities in Mexico. He did mentioned the possibility that because of emphasis being placed on narcotics by both governments, high Mexican officials might have reached the decision that subject should be expelled because of his widely publicized connections with the "MAFIA." (¢)(C)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/1/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10212-10160
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-120916-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, MM
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	05/01/1963
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	MZF, ASSOC, B/F INT, ACA, INFT, INFO, NEG, GAMBLING
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	03/24/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC LHM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

REC-35 3

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: MAY 1 1963

8-26-94
Classified by SP8 Mac/ude
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

HAS NO OBJECTION TO CLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
GMB 1-7-97
JFK SLD/KSL

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (105-7052) (C)
(105-7055) (C)

#211,326 multiple sources
Classified by ~~SGL~~ SP5 GCL
Declassify on: OADR 10/14/84

SUBJECT: LUIS ALBERTO CONDOM CAJIGAL, aka
Luis Condom
IS - CUBA
(Miami File 105-7052)

~~Classified by 1259~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
2/28/78

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF Curs 88
DATE 9-4-85

ALVARO MARTIN FERNANDEZ FOX, aka
Alvaro Fernandez
IS - CUBA
(Miami File 105-7055)

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum, captioned as above, suitable for dissemination. Two copies are for the use of the Legat, Mexico, in view of the information gathered concerning activities of Cubans in Mexico.

One letterhead memorandum has been written with the dual caption inasmuch as the information gathered concerning one individual pertained to the other.

The letterhead memorandum is classified "Secret" as it contains CIA information so classified. (U)

On 3/11/63, JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF, CIA representative Miami, Florida, advised the the original source of the information in this case and that furnished by his office was [RAFAEL PADRON PRADO, 575 SE 9th Avenue, Hialeah, Florida] (S)(S)

The TULIO PREITO mentioned in the enclosed letterhead memorandum is identical with TULIO INOCENCIO PREETO RUIZ, IS - CUBA, Bureau Origin, Miami file 105-5193. PRIETO is not a source of the Miami Office.

(2-1) 4 - Bureau (RM) (Encls. - 11)
(2 - Legat, Mexico) (RM)
2 - Miami
PJN:jkj
(6)

ENCLOSURE

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

REC-35

MCT-3

REC'D

105-120916

8 MAY 3 1963

Copy to: Mexico (Legat) by routing slip for ☒ info ☐ action
date 5-22-63
by

RS 5-22-63 to INS (Wash) & locally

67 MAY 31 1963

Copy to: CIA/State/~~[illegible]~~ ONI/OSI/ACSI by routing slip for info.
Date 5-22-63 by

EX-108

NAT. INT. SEC.

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF
DATE

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN 105-120917

SECRET

MM 105-7052
MM 105-7055

LUIS ALBERTO CONDOM CAJIGAL, who furnished information set forth in the letterhead memorandum, also advised [that he worked with CIA in Havana from the beginning of 1960 to November, 1960, through EMILIO FERNANDEZ, a U.S. citizen.] (S)

CONDOM also advised that ALVARO FERNANDEZ FOX, who was also interviewed in this matter, is the nephew of MARTIN FOX, former owner of the Tropicana Nightclub in Havana, Cuba. CONDOM believes that since coming to Miami from Mexico City, ALVARO FERNANDEZ has become involved in the bolita racket inasmuch as his uncle is supposed to be a bolita racketeer in Miami. It is noted that when interviewed, ALVARO FERNANDEZ stated that he is unemployed and lives from money furnished him by his uncle, MARTIN FOX, and another uncle, PEDRO FOX, also residing in Miami at 302 Southwest Beacom Boulevard.

ALVARO FERNANDEZ, in addition to the information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum, advised that while he was in Mexico City he worked as an informant for STEVE MINAS, U.S. Customs representative, U.S. Embassy, telephone 46-94-00, Extension 373, or home phone 48-02-50. He also advised that he was to contact Customs Agent ED FICKIE in Miami at FR 7-3571, which he did; however, FERNANDEZ has not been used by FICKIE in the Miami area. FERNANDEZ advised he helped on narcotics matters.

- INFORMANTS -

The representative of MM T-1, mentioned in the letterhead memorandum, is JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF, CIA, Miami, Florida. MM T-1 is CIA, Washington, D.C. ~~(S)~~(U)

The following sources, all of whom have some knowledge of Cuban activities in the Miami, Florida, area were contacted with negative results:

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE USCS
ON 11-25-96 dak
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/1/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10212-10337

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 100-401762-2ND NR 35

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 02/02/1960
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
RCF, SHF, EMP, BKG, TRA, CP ACT, ADMIN, INSTR

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA, INDEFINITE

COMMENTS : INC MEMO

SECRET

1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Floyd

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. except Brackets
Jm 10-6-97

100-339235
100-401762

Date: February 11, 1960

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans (S)(U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
SECURITY MATTER - C

RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
SECURITY MATTER - C

10/17/94
Classified by SP8MAC/GCL
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Reference is made to your letter dated February 2, 1960, concerning the captioned individuals, your file CSCI-3/758,444. (S)(U)

Provided the following change is made, dissemination of the data set out on page two of referenced memorandum [to the Swiss Federal Police] (S) will not interfere with the intelligence and investigative responsibilities of this Bureau. The last sentence on page two of the memorandum should be changed to read as follows:

"He is known to have received Communist literature, is believed to have made financial contributions to the Communist Party in the U.S., and there is information to indicate Communist Party membership on his part as late as 1957."

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
FEB 11
MAILED

This matter has been referred to the Legal Attaches in London, Paris, and Tokyo [to alert appropriate security services] (S) concerning possible travel of the Franks in England, France, and Japan.

100-339235-45

2 - New York (100-42479)(100-107383)(Enclosure)
1 - London (Enclosures - 3)
1 - Paris (Enclosures - 3)
1 - Tokyo (Enclosures - 3)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)

See note Legats, London, Paris, and Rome, and SAC, New York, page

NOTE ON YELLOW, PAGE 3.
WHF:lmk

ORIGINAL FILED IN
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

53 FEB 18 1960

SECRET

11-13-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 1.6 (JFK)

[Director
Central Intelligence Agency] ~~S~~(U)

It would be appreciated if your Agency would furnish this Bureau any pertinent information received concerning possible travel of the subjects to Communist China and concerning their presence in China. Should your Agency receive information that subjects plan to travel in England, France, or Japan, it would be appreciated if you would advise the appropriate Legal Attache in London, England; Paris, France; or Tokyo, Japan. ~~S~~(U)

ATTENTION LEGAL ATTACHES LONDON, PARIS, AND TOKYO, AND SAC, NEW YORK:

A Photostat of referenced Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memorandum is enclosed for all. It is possible that Paris may receive inquiries regarding the subjects through Swiss sources. In referenced memorandum CIA did not identify its [official Swiss] (S) source. This identification subsequently given to Bureau via Liaison. The Bureau approved CIA's furnishing this information [to the Swiss Federal Police inasmuch as CIA had conducted active investigation regarding subjects in Switzerland.] (S)

Also enclosed for each Legal Attache are one copy of a memorandum dated 11-26-58 concerning Richard Cyril Frank and one copy of a memorandum dated 1-26-60 concerning Susan Heiligman Frank. In view of reported plans of subjects to travel in England and France, and since it is anticipated that they may travel in the vicinity of Japan prior to their return to this country, the Legal Attaches at London, Paris, and Tokyo should [alert sources] (S) in England, France, and Japan concerning the Franks' contemplated travel in Europe and their possible plans to travel in China. [Background information concerning the subjects set forth on page two of enclosed CIA letter, as corrected in paragraph two of this letter] ~~S~~(U) may be made available [to your sources] (S) if deemed advisable. For your additional information, both subjects are on the Security Index.

New York remain alert in this matter and submit any information received concerning the subjects in a form suitable for dissemination. If not already done, New York submit FD-122's tabbed "Out of the country."

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

RA

2 FEB 1960 mj/4-1,2

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Susan and Richard Frank

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Jm 10-6-97
EXCEPT BRACKETS IN HAND WRITTEN NOTATION
SLD/KSR
6-16-98
(JFK)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/64 BY SP3mtc/cc (JFK)

1. In response to your 22 December communication (File No: 100-339235, 100-401762) we wish to inform you that we have received the following from an official Swiss source:

> "Richard Frank (born 1922), U.S. citizen, film technician, resident of New York, arrived at the Hotel Savoy in Bern with his wife Susan on 10 December 1959; they stayed there until 12 December leaving for Zurich. Frank inquired for a flight ticket to Prague from Zurich. While in Bern, Frank had contact with the Chinese Communist Embassy on two occasions; he or Mrs. Frank having called at the Embassy. No information is available on the nature of these contacts, nor do we have more detailed personalia."

2. We have observed that persons desiring to travel to Communist China from Switzerland frequently fly via Prague.

3. The following summary has been drawn from material which you have provided us on Subjects (see NY 100-42479, NY 100-107383 and Bureau 100-339235). Please advise if we may pass this summary to our Swiss source, but without revealing that your organization supplied the information contained in it:

(S)["Swiss source" is Swiss Federal Police] - per conv with Mrs J Roman, CIA
2/9/60

100-401762
NOT RECORDED
128 FEB 14 1960

100-339235-45

SECRET

SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10213-10310
RECORD SERIES: HO
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 149-5378-17

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: PETERSON. LEONARD C.
TO: DIRECTOR. FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 03/08/1968
PAGES: 194
SUBJECT: OBA, INTV, TRANSCRIPT OF ANONYMOUS CALL, SUSP, ARREST OF RMN, LIST OF BOMBINGS, LAB AND INDENT RPT
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER. TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 05/13/1998
UPDATE DATE:
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(A)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (4)

COMMENTS: RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 2

The following information was obtained by SA JAMES D. HAYES:

(S)

On February 23, 1968, [HARRY RANDALL] CIA Covert, Miami, (Protect), advised his office had received an anonymous tip as follows:

(S)

[RANDALL] explained he did not know the origin nor did he have any further information concerning this tip and was endeavoring to ascertain more about this matter, if possible.

X (X)

One RICARDO MORALES has a bank account, No. 80-657-9 in the Riverside Bank, Miami, Florida. 951 SW 1st Avenue is apparently the address of an apartment which had been utilized by Cuban Power. This account contained a receipt for rent on an apartment which has been used by Cuban Power. It is presumed this apartment has been used in the nature of a safehouse.

The foregoing information was furnished to Lieutenant HARVARD SWILLEY, Intelligence Unit, Miami Police Department, in connection with their current investigation of MORALES, who is currently incarcerated in the Dade County Jail under local violation.

D-1

MM 149-425
JGP/mev
1

SECRET

Re: [FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ TAMAYO;
RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE;
MANUEL PENABAZ] (X)(U)

SA JAMES J. O'CONNOR developed the following information from MM 1119-S on January 30, 1968: (X)(U)

MANUEL PENABAZ has been in Miami for the past couple of weeks. On January 26, 1968, he obtained a visa at the Consulate of Venezuela in Miami for travel to the Dominican Republic. He claims this travel is in connection with land sales. (X)(U)

PENABAZ stated he had clipped some newspaper articles regarding recent activities of Poder Cubano and had sent them to EDUARDO FERNANDEZ who is a Cuban currently serving as an officer in the U.S. Army believed stationed in California, possibly at Fort Ord. PENABAZ claimed that EDUARDO FERNANDEZ originated the idea or at least the name of Poder Cubano and PENABAZ mentioned the idea to FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ TAMAYO and RICARDO MORALES. PENABAZ claims that TAMAYO and MORALES are involved with another group in the bombings at Miami. PENABAZ stated there was a meeting at the residence of TAMAYO in Miami during the week of January 21-27, 1968, which was attended by several Cubans from New Jersey. TAMAYO reportedly showed them arms, description not known. Also, those at the meeting allegedly smoked marijuana. PENABAZ claims ORLANDO BOSCH has nothing to do with Poder Cubano. PENABAZ indicated he would be flying to the Dominican Republic via Pan American on January 31, 1968. (X)(U)

G SECRET

SUSPECTS

ANDRES JORGE GONZALEZ GONZALEZ
aka "Bombilla"
Date of Birth: October 17, 1931
INS Number: A12 478 993

PAULINO MARIO GUTIERREZ VIDAL
Date of Birth: June 22, 1923
INS Number: A12 891 809

(X)(U)

(S)

On January 30, 1968, HARRY RANDALL, CIA Covert, Miami (Protect), furnished the following information, which he said was classified "secret." He indicated all of this information is from their source OSCAR ANGULO (Protect). (S)

JORGE GONZALEZ, aka "Bombilla," resides at 51 N. W. 76th Avenue, Miami, telephone 226-6819. He drives a white Ford, approximately 1964 model, bearing 1968 Florida license 1-123172. (X)(U)

On January 26, 1968, the above-mentioned source (S) received a telephone call at his residence approximately (S) ten AM from PAULINO GUTIERREZ, inquiring about his, (S) source's, health and condition as a result of an automobile (S) accident in which the source was involved. During the course (S) of the conversation, PAULINO GUTIERREZ mentioned the Cuban (S) Power had just put another bomb a few minutes previously (to this conversation) in an office which sends parcels to (S) Cuba. No further details or information was furnished concerning this matter. (X)(X)(U)

On January 28, 1968, during the afternoon JORGE (S) GONZALEZ, aka "Bombilla," visited the source's residence. (S) He was interested in learning the reaction and opinion of the (X)(U) Cuban exiles with regard to Cuban Power. He was apparently attempting to find out what comments the Cuban exiles had made and what effect the purported activities of Cuban Power had had on the Cuban colony in the Miami area. (X)(X)(U)

GONZALEZ criticized FELIPE RIVERO's statements (S) [to the press] indicating that it was an open sign RIVERO had sold himself to the U. S. Government. (Reportedly RIVERO made a statement to the press concerning the recent bombings attributed to Cuban Power as being "acts of cowardice".) GONZALEZ also critized the attitude of the Second National Front of the Escambray. (~~X~~)(~~X~~)(~~S~~)(U)

GONZALEZ asked [the source's wife] (S) who was present at the time [on January 28, 1968,] if she could recognize the voice of [the person who [called their home (S) on January 20, 1968] at approximately [3:05 AM. Source's (S) wife] informed GONZALEZ [she had not been able to recognize (S) the voice because she was half asleep] at that time. [She (S) also stated she believed it was probably a joke and did (S) not give any satisfaction to GONZALEZ, even to the point of allowing him to have any indication she actually knew who the call was from.] (~~X~~)(~~X~~)(S)

GONZALEZ also stated that some of the Cuban exiles in the Miami area were of the opinion ORLANDO BOSCH was the creator of Cuban Power and "author" of the bombings. (The brains behind the bombings.) (~~X~~)(~~X~~)(~~S~~)(U)

The source further advised [TOMAS REGALADO, of (S) local Spanish-language radio station WFAB,] Miami, told (S) the source that [the FBI] had interrogated him and wanted (S) to know [if the voice of the person who called WFAB was that of BOSCH.] (~~X~~)(~~X~~)(S)

GONZALEZ also advised ["they" wanted the source to be the first to know] of the Cuban Power and the bombing (S) [of the B-25 airplane at the Miami International Airport,] (S) which is the reason ["they" called him at 3:05 AM * January 20, 1968, 15 minutes before the actual bombing.] (~~X~~)(~~X~~)(S)

[On January 28, 1968, during the meeting with] (S) GONZALEZ, [the source obtained GONZALEZ' address, telephone number, and observed the license plate of the car] which he (S) was driving. (~~X~~)(~~X~~)(~~S~~)(U)

By memorandum dated February 13, 1968, CIA, Miami, furnished the following additional information regarding JORGE GONZALEZ: (~~S~~)(u)

On February 9, 1968, [a contact of CIA advised that he had a conversation on the evening of February 7, 1968, with] JORGE GONZALEZ, military chief of the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR). GONZALEZ stated that the activities of the Cuban Power group would continue. He said they intended to "frighten" some members of the news media, such as NORMAN DIAZ ARTILES and JUAN AMADOR RODRIGUEZ of Radio Station WMIE, and SERGIO VIDAL CAYRO of Radio Station WFAB. (~~S~~)(u) (S)

GONZALEZ stated that they knew they were under investigation by the FBI. He said the only evidence against ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA during his trial for extortion was that the threatening notes had been typed on a typewriter to which BOSCH had access. For this reason, when Cuban Power had something to write, they rented a typewriter at the cost of $30.00 for the purpose. GONZALEZ said that different persons rented typewriters from different places in order to elude the investigative efforts of the FBI. (~~S~~)(u)

GONZALEZ said that Cuban Power was preparing news releases which would be sent to the local news media that night (February 7). According to GONZALEZ, the MIRR and ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA were preparing "an important work about Cuba" which would reaffirm the position of the MIRR so that there would be no connection between the MIRR and Cuban Power. GONZALEZ said this action would allay the suspicions of the FBI since it would appear that the MIRR was inactive. (~~S~~)(u)

M

bombings which had occurred in Miami. FELIPE RIVERO, of the CNM, commented regarding the recent bombings in Miami that the only thing a bombing such as occurred recently in Miami does is to take the medicine from the elderly and the children. RIVERO further stated that when he does something he signs his name to it. JORGE MASCANOSA, representative of RECE, would not talk against the bombings, however, at the same time LUIS CONTE AGERO also refused to make any comments regarding the bombings. CONTE stated, however, that he was against sending any packages to Cuba except medicine.

The following investigation was conducted by SA EDWIN PETER KRIEGER:

On January 26, 29 and 30, 1968, MM 1264-C was contacted regarding Cuban Power and the recent bombings in the Miami area.

Informant advised that he heard that a young group of Cubans in the age category of 18 to 20 years of age have been actually or personally involved in the local bombings in the Miami area. He felt that Cuban Power was using these young individuals in that they have no fear and they crave excitement. He further said that he heard that ORLANDO BOSCH is the leader of the Cuban Power group. He further stated that he believes it is this same group that is responsible for the bombing of B25 cargo aircraft at Miami International Airport on January 20, 1968.

Informant continued by saying that a source for the Cubans obtaining powder for any homemade bombs could be through Maule Industries, Miami, which handles explosive powder and this company hires many Cuban employees.

Informant said that he does rehabilitation work with young Cubans and Puerto Rican male individuals and that in contact with them he would remain alert to any additional problems that may arise, especially the bombing matters in the Miami area.

On January 29, 1968, [MM [1109]-S] advised SA ROBERT (C) G. STRONG that the recent dynamiting attacks are the work of ORLANDO BOSCH of M.I.R.R., [if they were done with TNT] (~~S~~)(U)

On January 31, 1968, at noon, SA SAMUEL W. JONES observed ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA at the corner of 18th Avenue and West Flagler Street, in company with two unidentified Cuban males. BOSCH was driving a Karmann Ghia Volkswagen with 1967 Alabama license 55-9211.

P

MM 149-425

SECRET

RE: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA;
ANDRES JORGE GONZALEZ-GONZALEZ;
PAULINO MARIO GUTIERREZ VIDAL;
JORGE IGNACIO GUTIERREZ ULLA
Date of Birth: June 22, 1923
INS #: A12 891 809

On January 26, 1968, SAS JOSEPH C. BALL and ROBERT G. STRONG, received information from [OSCAR ANGULO REYES] and his wife, [ANGELA] (S) which has been recorded on FD-302s, [but is classified secret at the request of CIA, Miami, [since ANGULO] (X) is of high operational interest to CIA.] (X)(U)(S)

The information received is as follows: (X)(U)

Mrs. ANGELA GARCIA DE ANGULO, 2900 N. W. 92nd Street, Miami, Florida, furnished the following information: (X)(U)

She advised that at about 3:00 AM on January 20, 1968, she received a telephone call at her residence from an unidentified male caller who asked to speak with her husband. When told her husband was not home, the caller instructed her to tell him, "We put a bomb on the plane for Merida," after which the caller hung up. She recognized the voice of the caller as that of ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, with whom she is well acquainted. (X)(U)

At 6:50 AM, the same date, she received another telephone call, believed to be from the same individual as above, who again asked for her husband. She advised the caller her husband had left for the airport and inquired if this was not BOSCH calling. The caller then excitedly stated he wanted to speak to her husband and hung up without answering her question. (X)(U)

She advised that she has talked with ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA on numerous occasions, both personally and on the telephone, and is thoroughly familiar with the voice of BOSCH. She stated she was certain the individual who made the above calls was BOSCH. (X)(U)

Q SECRET

OSCAR ANGULO REYES, 2900 N. W. 92nd Street, Miami, Florida, made available the following information: (~~S~~)(U)

On December 14, 1967, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, prominent Cuban exile leader who heads the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR), advised the source confidentially that the new Cuban exile organization called "Cuban Power" was being created by "my men in New York City" and indicated to the source that he would furnish more information at a later date. (~~S~~)(U)

On January 15, 1968, JORGE GONZALEZ, also known as "Bombilla," one of BOSCH's Lieutenants in the MIRR and Chief of the Military Department of the MIRR, advised the source that he was a member of Cuban Power, whose objective was the stopping of the sending of parcels to Cuba. He revealed that Cuban Power was responsible for the bombings of the Post Offices at Elizabeth, New Jersey, on December 4, 1967; New York City, December 9, 1967; and Havana, Cuba, January 8, 1968. He said in addition they had sent explosive packages to "traitors among the exiles." GONZALEZ stated that the top leaders of the MIRR were running the Cuban Power organization and that within seven or eight days they were going to cause an explosion which would be heard all over the world. (~~S~~)(U)

The source stated the above conversation with GONZALEZ occurred at the offices of the Cuban Express Company, 1753 West Flagler Street, Miami, and while the source and GONZALEZ were en route from the Cuban Express Company to the "Segundo Caribe Supermarket," 35th Street and N. W. 17th Avenue, Miami, where GONZALEZ' girlfriend is employed. (~~S~~)(U)

The source advised the Cuban Express Company is a shipping company engaged in shipment of parcels to Cuba and the company is owned by PAULINO GUTIERREZ VIDAL. GUTIERREZ VIDAL and his son, JORGE GUTIERREZ ULLA, are members of the MIRR and are close associates of ORLANDO BOSCH. BOSCH frequently meets with MIRR members at the (~~S~~)(U)

R

Cuban Express Company office and the source stated that recent bombings by Cuban Power may be an effort to eliminate competition, noting the Cuban Express Company is not one of those companies which has been bombed to date. (~~S~~)(U)

On January 16, 1968, the source again visited the Cuban Express Company office and talked with BOSCH, GUTIERREZ VIDAL, and another Cuban male, name unknown, described as Trigueno, about 25 years old, 5'6", stocky build, short black hair combed straight back, and known to be a member of the Military Department of the MIRR. During the ensuing conversation, BOSCH confirmed that a bomb would be set off by them within the next few days and stated he was then leaving for South Miami via Highway Number 1 to pick up some explosives. The source received the impression that both PAULINO GUTIERREZ VIDAL and the Cuban male were involved in this activity with BOSCH, since BOSCH spoke freely before them. (~~S~~) (U)

On January 19, 1968, the source again visited the Cuban Express office and talked with PAULINO GUTIERREZ VIDAL who was alone. GUTIERREZ VIDAL appeared to be very excited and stated, "The plane from Merida arrives today--stand by for the next 24 hours--we will have big news for you." GUTIERREZ indicated he had been in contact with FAUSTO DIAZ, local manager of the Compania Aerea de Carga Yucatan, in connection with his shipping business and that DIAZ had informed him of the scheduled arrival and departure times of the plane from Merida, Mexico. (~~S~~)(U)

On January 20, 1968, at approximately 3:00 AM, according to information supplied to the source by his wife, an unidentified male telephoned the home of the source and talked with his wife. The caller reportedly told his wife to tell him, "We put a bomb on the plane for Merida," after which the caller hung up. The source stated his wife, who is well acquainted with ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, recognized the caller's voice as that of BOSCH. (~~S~~)(U)

The source stated that at 6:50 AM, January 20, 1968, the above caller again called his residence and talked with his wife. The caller asked for the source and was told he had gone to the airport. The source's wife inquired if this was not BOSCH calling, after which the caller hung up. (~~S~~)(U)

The source was of the opinion BOSCH did not actually place the bomb on the B-25 cargo plane on January 20, 1968, but that this was probably effected by JORGE GONZALEZ, also known as "Bombilla," at the instructions of BOSCH. (~~S~~)(U)

The following information was developed by Special Agent JAMES D. HAYES:

On February 12, 1968, [HARRY RANDALL,] (S) CIA Covert, Miami (protect), advised [OSCAR ANGULO] (S) furnished the following information. This information is being furnished on a need-to-know basis and is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau. It is classified "SECRET". (~~S~~)

[On February 7, 1968, OSCAR ANGULO] during the (S) conversation with JORGE GONZALEZ, learned "they" were going to continue to frighten some members of the Press, including NORMAN DIAZ, JUAN AMADOR RODRIGUEZ and SERGIO VIDAL. [ANGULO] (S) did not furnish any further statistics or specific details or identification [concerning this brief conversation] (S)

NORMAN DIAZ and JUAN AMADOR RODRIGUEZ are announcers for local Spanish Language Radio Station WMIE, Miami, and SERGIO VIDAL CAYRO is Director of Operations and Sales Manager for local Spanish Language Radio Station WFAB, Miami, Florida. (~~S~~)(U)

On February 14, 1968, AUSTIN HORN, CIA Covert, Miami, (protect), advised [OSCAR ANGULO] (S) furnished the following information: (~~S~~)

(S) [OSCAR ANGULO] upon learning about the arrest of RICARDO MORALES, called JORGE GONZALEZ. At this time JORGE GONZALEZ remarked "it appears we have been infiltrated". JORGE GONZALEZ told [ANGULO] (S) he would come to Radio Station (~~S~~)(U)

T SECRET

(S)
WMIE to talk personally with ANGULO. JORGE GONZALEZ arrived at Radio Station WMIE, 36th Street and Allapattah, approximately 9:30 A.M., at which time ANGULO was busily engaged in conversation with another Cuban exile about a different matter. (S) JORGE GONZALEZ listened to this conversation; however, did not participate and shortly after 10:00 indicated that he had to leave because he had a 10:30 appointment, not further described. JORGE GONZALEZ left Radio Station WMIE without talking over the matter of mutual interest concerning the alleged bombings and Cuban Power. (S)(u)

On February 23, 1968, HARRY RANDALL (S) CIA Covert, Miami (protect), furnished the following information, which he indicated had been received from OSCAR ANGULO (S) This information was furnished on "a need-to-know" basis and is classified "SECRET". This information is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau. (X)

On February 11, 1968, OSCAR ANGULO, accompanied by ORLANDO BOSCH, met with JUAN FERNANDEZ CASTRO, an (S) automobile salesman, Miami, at 36th Street and N. Miami Avenue. (S) FERNANDEZ CASTRO told BOSCH that in the next few days he would have the most urgent items ready for him, referring to the time pencils. BOSCH told OSCAR ANGULO (S) not to worry about that incident which occurred at a residence in the Hialeah-Miami Springs area. BOSCH indicated apparently the local authorities did not take down his tag number and nothing has happened; therefore, ANGULO was above suspicion. (S)

On February 19, 1968, OSCAR ANGULO met with (S) JORGE GONZALEZ at Caridito's Super Market, 17th Avenue and N.W. 35th Street. (S) GONZALEZ had been trying urgently to contact ORLANDO BOSCH in connection with notices which they were planning to put out concerning the Cuban Power and MIRR organizations. During this conversation, GONZALEZ, (S) in a joking manner, told ANGULO "next time your wife gets a telephone call, tell her not to hang up". Supposedly, (S) this was just a laughing matter; however, ANGULO believes the telephone call made to his wife the morning of the bombing of the B-25 airplane transporting parcels to Cuba via Mexico was the incident to which GONZALEZ had (S) referred. (S)(u)

On February 22, 1968, at 9:00 A.M., OSCAR ANGULO was supposed to meet with ORLANDO BOSCH at local Spanish Language Radio Station WMIE, 36th Street, Miami; however, BOSCH's wife telephonically notified ANGULO at the radio station that BOSCH would not be able to keep his appointment. (S) At 6:45 P.M., on February 22, 1968, ANGULO talked with BOSCH by telephone (BOSCH's telephone is 443-9310) and (S) BOSCH said he had been very busy with important matters. He stated he would meet with ANGULO on February 23, 1968, at 9:00 A.M., at Radio Station WMIE. (S)

On February 22, 1968, at 7:15 P.M., OSCAR ANGULO telephonically attempted to contact JORGE GONZALEZ at his (S) residence unsuccessfully. GONZALEZ's sister said JORGE was (S) taking a bath at that time and suggested he call back in about three minutes. ANGULO stated he did not call back that evening. (S)

On February 23, 1968, at 9:00 A.M., JORGE GONZALEZ (S) called OSCAR ANGULO at Radio Station WMIE and talked with ANGULO. GONZALEZ stated he tried to call ANGULO the night (S) before, but could not get in touch with him. He said (S) ORLANDO BOSCH would not be able to see ANGULO on February 23, (S) 1968, because he had many important things to do. GONZALEZ related that on February 19 or 20, 1968, he left Miami destined for Key West, Florida, and told his sister if anyone called him he would be back in two or three days. GONZALEZ continued the FBI had tried to find him all over town. He said he had been preparing those things which they had discussed on February 19 or 20, 1968, not further (S) described. ANGULO noted at that time propaganda notices by Cuban Power and MIRR were discussed on February 19 or 20, and presumed this is what JORGE GONZALEZ had been referring to. Further, "they" were safeguarding material in a place, in a boat (for embarkation) for an attack on Cuba which the radio of FIDEL CASTRO would have to talk about because (S)(u) this matter will be of such magnitude that it cannot be overlooked (not further detailed or described) (~~S~~)(U)

JORGE GONZALEZ had a meeting with the FBI, according to ANGULO, and JORGE GONZALEZ advised that he had (S) met with the FBI and the FBI believes that GONZALEZ had something to do with the bombing of the Russian Embassy in Washington, D. C. GONZALEZ stated he had shown the FBI agent a gas receipt ticket he acquired for the boat in Key West. In this operation he would be accompanied by two people, not further described. Concerning the gas receipt ticket, above, GONZALEZ stated the FBI had even questioned the owner of the gas station to verify his purchase of the gas in order to verify GONZALEZ's presence in Key West at that time. (~~S~~)(U)

GONZALEZ stated he had talked with the FBI (~~S~~)(U) agents because ORLANDO BOSCH had so authorized. BOSCH did not want GONZALEZ to get in any trouble with the FBI. GONZALEZ also stated he did not want to be (~~S~~)(U) interrogated by the FBI and if they continued to molest him in his home he was going to obtain an attorney to stop these activities by the FBI. (~~S~~)(U)

On February 23, 1968, HARRY RANDALL, CIA Covert, (S) Miami, (protect), advised that OSCAR ANGULO ascertained (S) JORGE GONZALEZ was out of town for a few days, claiming to have been in Key West, Florida, to pick up some arms. ANGULO did not believe this to be true and asserted he (S) believed JORGE GONZALEZ had actually been visiting with (S) HARRY (LNU), a pilot in Orlando, Florida, not further identified. ANGULO related JORGE GONZALEZ had returned (S) to the Miami area as of February 23, 1968. (~~S~~)(U)

W

RE: JULIO ATON CONSTANZO PALAU
Date of Birth: May 22, 1936
Place of Birth: Cuba
INS #: A12 844 786

ROBERTO DOMEQ RODRIGUEZ
aka "Domec"
INS #: A12 854 781

NESTOR RODDA MEOQUI
aka Ernesto Rodda
Date of Birth: June 10, 1938
Residence: 3450 SW 10th Street
Apartment 3
Miami, Florida

The following information was obtained by SA JAMES D. HAYES:

(S)

On January 30, 1968, HARRY RANDALL, CIA Covert, Miami, telephonically furnished the following information, which he stated was classified "Secret." He advised the two sources of the information were very sensitive and therefore, this information is not to be disseminated outside of the Bureau and restricted to personnel within the FBI on a need-to-know basis. (~~S~~)

On January 29, 1968, MANUEL VILLA FANA MARTINEZ stated he had been told by MARIO FERRER PEREZ that the Miami Police Department representatives visited FERRER and ATON CONSTANZO PALAU on January 26, 1968. They asked for information regarding the Cuban Power movement and reportedly asked them to work as informants in the case. Both men allegedly told the police they knew nothing about Cuban Power. FERRER told VILLA FANA he had no intention of telling the Miami Police Department about Cuban Power, but he would inform VILLA FANA, who could pass the information to the CIA, and requested this not be furnished to the Police Department, because he is well known to the group involved. (~~S~~)(U) (S) (S) (S) (S)

FERRER said he knew the bombs planted recently at the package shipment stores were placed by ATON CONSTANZO PALAU and a Cuban Negro known only as "DOMEC." He stated "DOMEC" is possibly identical with ROBERTO DOMEQ RODRIGUEZ, INS Number A12 854 781. DOMEQ is a member of the group of ROLANDO ARCADIO MASFERRER ROJAS, which was arrested in January, 1967, in connection with the alleged attempted invasion of Haiti. (~~S~~) (U)

FERRER also stated the entire Cuban Power movement is under the control of ROLANDO MASFERRER. (~~S~~)(U)

A third member of the group is NESTOR RODDA MEOQUI, aka Ernesto Rodda, born June 10, 1938. RODDA resides at 3450 S. W. 10th Street, Apartment 3, Miami, but he can also be located at 3491 S. W. 11th Street, Apartment 1. (~~S~~) (U)

FERRER stated he observed ATON, DOMEQ and RODDA on the night the last three bombs were planted. On the following day, these three were in almost constant contact by phone and took unusual precautions to prevent their phone conversations from being overheard. ATON has reportedly told the Miami Police Department and other law enforcement agencies he has a cache of explosives, but that it is dynamite. FERRER believes from what ATON has told him, the cache is actually C-4 plastic explosive. (~~S~~)(U)

FERRER also stated C-4 is for sale in the Miami area by certain individuals not named in the Second National Front of the Escambray and others, unnamed, who can get it from New York and "Mafia" contacts, at $1.50 per pound, sold only in 100 pound lots. FERRER also advised a large quantity of acid-type time pencils from the same sources are available in the Miami area. (~~S~~)(U)

[RANDALL] advised he desired any contact with [VILLA FANA] (S) be made through CIA; however, these contacts can be made immediately if and when they may be desired by the FBI. (~~S~~)(U)

Y

SECRET

SECRET

RE: JULIO ATON CONSTANZO PALAU

The following information was obtained by SA LEONARD C. PETERSON:

On January 30, 1968, ALFREDO BARAD, assigned to Miami Intelligence Division, Miami Police Department, in connection with their investigation regarding the recent bombings in Miami, advised that PALAU had contacted him relative to the bombings and was primarily interested in furnishing information relative to the bombings if the Police Department would take care of a criminal matter in which he is involved. Officer BARAD advised that PALAU has been unable to furnish any pertinent information regarding the bombings and it is his impression that PALAU is not completely stable.

RE: JULIO ATON CONSTANZO PALAU
and
MANUEL VILLAFANA MARTINEZ
Date of Birth: April 27, 1926

On January 29, 1968, [CLAUDIO MEDINA HERNANDEZ] [C] PSI, (X) furnished the following information to SA WILLIAM E. (X) DOWLING: (X)

On January 28, 1968, he had a conversation with a man whose identity he did not wish to divulge, since this individual furnished him the following information after making him promise that he would not mention the man's name in discussing this matter with anyone else. (X)(u)

The source of the information [is a friend of] ATON [C] CONSTANZO, who resides on S. W. 4th Street, Miami (believed to be identical with ATON CONSTANZO PALAU, 752 S. W. 4th Street, Miami file 2-387). Source advised [MEDINA] that [C] CONSTANZO allows a group of Cubans to use his house for meetings, both evening and night, but that he, CONSTANZO, is not a member of the group. This is the group known as the Secret Anti-Communist Army (Ejercito Secreto Anti-Comunista) and they have recently adopted the name of Cuban Power (Poder Cubano). This source told [MEDINA] that [C] these Cubans are the ones responsible for the recent bombings in Miami, including the airplane at the airport and the three (X)

Z SECRET

business places in Southwest Miami. According to [MEDINA,] [C] the source did not mention any of the out of town bombings and, not wishing to appear too inquisitive, he did not inquire about that. (X)

The source told [MEDINA] that the leader of this group, [C] now known as Cuban Power, is MANUEL VILLAFANA who has worked for CIA for many years and is still directly employed by CIA. The other members of the group are not believed to be connected with CIA at this time, although many of them probably were in the past. (X)

The source told [MEDINA] that VILLAFANA and his [C] associates have plenty of C-4 and C-5 and the know-how to use it. (X)

[MEDINA] stated he had no further information [C] concerning this matter at present, but he will attempt to obtain more details and corroborating information. (X)

MANUEL VILLAFANA is the subject of Miami File 105-2615. [This is a dead file which shows only that VILLAFANA was of operational interest to CIA in 1960] (X)(S)

Miami file 62-3573 contains background information pertaining to VILLAFANA as follows:

MANUEL VILLAFANA MARTINEZ
Date of Birth: April 27, 1926
Place of Birth: Camaguey, Cuba
Parents: RAFAEL VILLAFANA TURINO
OLEMA MARTINEZ ROURA
Residence: Miami
Occupation: Air Force Pilot
In March, 1959, he was assigned to Mexico as Military and Air Attache with the rank of Captain.

In 1963, VILLAFANA was one of many Cubans forbidden by INS to leave the United States.

There are no recent references on VILLAFANA.

SECRET

AA

RE: ARTURO CARABALLO
CUCO (LNU)
ARMANDO FLEITES

The following informant report was obtained February 5, 1968, by SA JOHN E. MC HUGH from ~~MM~~ 1248-PSI ~~X~~(C)

CUCO (LNU) has been attending the classes on Tuesday and Thursday nights at 315 N. E. 23rd Street. ARTURO CARABALLO has been the instructor in the class on the handling of explosives, including C-4. (~~C~~)(u)

ARTURO CARABALLO is well pleased with the progress that CUCO (LNU) has been making, and indicated that if his services were ever needed he could be relied upon to do a good job. CUCO (LNU) seems to have the aptitude for the handling of explosives. (~~C~~)(u)

CUCO (LNU) is described as follows:

Sex:	Male
Race:	White
Nationality:	Cuban
Age:	Early 20's
Height:	5'9"
Weight:	200
Build:	Husky
Hair:	Black

(~~X~~)(u)

On February 6, 1968, MAX LESNICK, who was currently publishing a newspaper, "La Replica," in Miami, stopped by the office of the Second National Front of the Escambray to confer with ARMANDO FLEITES. LESNICK questioned FLEITES as to who was behind Cuban Power. FLEITES told LESNICK that he felt the Cubans supporting ex-President FULGENCIO BATISTA were responsible for the bombings. LESNICK did not agree with the opinion expressed by FLEITES and LESNICK thought it was a group from some revolutionary organization against CASTRO, but not necessarily Batistianos. When LESNICK left the office, FLEITES remarked that he just gave that answer to LESNICK to try to confuse him. FLEITES admitted he was in agreement with the bombings, but did not indicate he was participating in them. (~~X~~)(~~S~~)(u)

DD SECRET

SECRET

RE: RAMIRO DE LA FE
aka Captain Anton

The following information was developed on February 8, 1968, by SA WILLIAM P. KELLY from PCI JOHN ALEXANDER O'CONNELL:

On February 8, 1968, PCI had a conversation with Haitian Consul at Miami, EUGENE MAXIMILIEN. MAXIMILIEN claimed that "Captain ANTON," a white male Cuban, 34-36 years, about 6'1", or somewhat less, heavy build, dark hair, was recently convicted in Federal Court, Miami, in connection with the hijacking of a U. S. ship off Miami Beach. MAXIMILIEN stated "Captain ANTON" was the leader of the hijackers. (This may be referring to RAMIRO DE LA FE, one of the subjects in Miami file 45-1127.)

Regarding "Captain ANTON," MAXIMILIEN stated that this individual is currently locally engaged in "shaking down" (extorting) money from unidentified Latin American Consuls in Miami. MAXIMILIEN further stated that he believes "Captain ANTON" to be the person responsible for recent bombings in the Miami area, including the bombing of the Mexican Consul's home.

According to MAXIMILIEN, "Captain ANTON" drives a 1961 or 1962 Chevrolet, bearing Florida license 18W2221.

On January 29, 1968, MM 1109-S furnished the following (C) report to SA ROBERT G. STRONG: ~~(X)~~

There have been several exchanges of impressions and discussions among RAUL GRAMATGES, PEDRO FERREIRO and MARTINIANO ORTA, motivated by recent events in Cuba and here in Miami. Because of comments and opinions expressed in anti-CASTRO revolutionary groups in Miami, it is supposed that the recent dynamiting attacks are the work of one of these groups:

(1) M.I.R.R. of ORLANDO BOSCH (if they were done with TNT).

(U) ~~(X)~~

EE SECRET

RE: SERGIO FREIJO, aka., Sergio Freijo y Dedia, Carlos
Salgado-Suarez, DOB 7/21/24, Havana, Cuba,
Social Security #457-70-8161

The following investigation was conducted by SA JAMES D. HAYES:

On January 25, 1968, MM 724-S, an individual acquainted with certain phases of both pro and anti-CASTRO activities in Cuba and the United States, advised SERGIO FREIJO was in the Miami area while released on bond in connection with the hijacking of the freighter transport. He stated FREIJO is an explosives expert and was well known in Cuba for his terrorist activities. He also advised FREIJO had been in contact with members of the Cuban Youth of Ft. Jackson, an anti-CASTRO organization. (X)(U)

MM 724-S recalled that the Cuban Youth of Fort Jackson group had seriously considered dividing into small cellular units in order to undertake positive action purportedly against communism and FIDEL CASTRO. In this connection, they planned to use codes, which included the names of individuals who were actually in Cuba as pseudonyms, for either an operation or members of a cell. The organization planned to organize in a secretive active group within the organization with not more than 4 or 5 men to a cell in this inter-group. In order to maintain their anonymity, one cell would undertake a certain project for a short period of time and then cell number two would follow for another brief period of time and thereafter cell number three and number four, etc. Each time the cell which just completed the activity would move to the bottom of the list and become completely inactive in every respect. This is being done for a two-fold purpose: (1) to continue secrecy regarding the objectives, including secrecy among its own members and even between cells and (2) to prevent the local and/or Federal authorities from discovering their purpose and identity. X (U)

KK

ERNESTO DE LA FE, described as coordinator of "Los Accionistas de Cuba" (Actionists of Cuba) reportedly sent a communication to SERGIO FREIJO, giving FREIJO the signal to start activity against communism and CASTRO. No further details were mentioned in this connection. MM 724-S said ERNESTO DE LA FE is the brother of ROMERO DE LA FE, who is currently in the Miami area, released on bond from his arrest in connection with the hijacking of the "freighter transport." ERNESTO was the Minister of Press and Propaganda in the BATISTA Government and General Secretary of an anti-communist organization. He is currently serving a 30 year sentence in prison in Cuba. X (u)

MM 724-S believed SERGIO FREIJO has recently been in contact with Cuban news reporter BENJAMIN DE LA VEGA, who may be aware of the reported communication received by FREIJO from ERNESTO DE LA FE. X (u)

The following information was obtained from PCI JESUS DIEGUEZ on February 23 and 27, 1968, by SA JAMES J. O'CONNOR:

PCI related that SERGIO FREIJO "is the type to work with Poder Cubano". About a month ago FREIJO, who is employed at Aerodex, called PCI and inquired if the latter knew of a place in which a person could be hidden out. A few months previously FREIJO inquired if PCI could obtain explosives. PCI stated he replied in the negative to inquiries by FREIJO and that he did not ask FREIJO what was going on.

PCI advised that FREIJO has known him since Cuba. During the revolutionary activity against President BATISTA, FREIJO was involved in a plot to kill a communist organizer named FABIO GRAUBART, and, at that time, FREIJO was hidden by a group which included the PCI.

PCI had lived in Chicago prior to the hijacking of the freighter "Freight Forwarder" at Miami about September, 1967 by a group of Cubans headed by RAMIRO DE LA FE.

RE: [MM 492-S] (X)(U)

The following information was obtained by SA JAMES D. HAYES from MM 492-S and other sources close to this informant: (X)(U)

(X)(U)

[On February 1, 1968, MM 492-S advised] ANTONIO ARIAS announced over Spanish language radio station WFAB, Miami, at 7:50 AM, February 1, 1968, another Cuban Power communique had been received at this radio station.

On February 1, 1968, ANTONIO ARIAS advised bulletin number 2 of Cuban Power had been received at the station earlier that morning and he had made the announcement over the radio on one occasion concerning its receipt at the station. He advised he received it from OMAR MARCHANTE, employee, WFAB, who was on duty during the hours of 1AM to 5AM. MARCHANTE informed ARIAS the envelope had been pushed under the front door of the station and he had opened it and given it to ARIAS. MARCHANTE indicated he believed the envelope was left at the station at approximately 3:22 AM, February 1, 1968. ARIAS advised he had left the envelope and the bulletin in a special cabinet for SERGIO VIDAL CAYRO who was in charge of the station. (X)(U)

On February 1, 1968, SERGIO VIDAL CAYRO, Vice-President of the United Broadcasting Company of Florida and Director of Operations and Sales Manager of the Spanish language radio station WFAB, Miami, personally appeared at the Miami Office. He furnished bulletin number 2 of Cuban Power and the envelope, explaining he did not believe anyone else had touched it except ARIAS and MARCHANTE. He also made available a four page notice given to him by ISRAEL SOTO BARROSO on January 26, 1968. He noted SOTO BARROSO had expressed a desire to personally appear on the radio over WFAB but because of his communist background and the fact he is a controversial figure currently associated with FELIPE RIVERO and the Cuban Nationalist Association, VIDAL was holding this request in abeyance. SOTO BARROSO was accompanied by MIGUEL SAN PEDRO at the time he talked with

NW SECRET

On February 1, 1968, MM 492-S advised a meeting was held on this date of the Cuban Pharmacists in Exile concerning the recent bombings attributed to this Cuban Power. He stated 29 individuals attended this meeting, including owners, managers or their representatives of various pharmacies in the Miami area. There was a great difference of opinion among these individuals concerning the sending of parcels to Cuba; because of this controversy a committee was formed consisting of the representatives of the organization of Cuban Pharmacists in Exile, including ANDRES RODRIGUEZ, owner of Andres Pharmacy, 9th Avenue and West Flagler; CARLOS ACOSTA, Highland Park Pharmacy, 9th Street and NW 7th Avenue; Santa Clara Pharmacy, 8th Street and S. W. 23rd Avenue; "ANTORITO," representative of the Hialeah Pharmacy. This committee was instructed to prepare a manifesto for the press in the next day or so concerning a policy to be practiced by all members of this organization of Cuban Exile Pharmacists concerning the sending of parcels to Cuba. (X)(U)

MM 492-S believed the manifesto will state the pharmacists will continue to send parcels to Cuba, however, they will be limited exclusively to sending medicine and small socks for small children. The socks, which are not available in Cuba, can help to clothe youngsters but also help in the packing of the medicines. Further, MM 492-S believes they will strictly oppose the sending of any radio, electrical or automotive parts to Cuba. Further, news has been received from Cuba that FIDEL CASTRO's communist government of Cuba has reportedly not permitted any packages to be delivered to the recipients in Cuba since the bombing of the Havana Post Office, January 8, 1968. Therefore, it is believed no parcels will actually be sent to Cuba by the pharmacists until they have been assured by relatives in Cuba that packages are being received by these relatives in Cuba. (X)(U)

On February 1, 1968, (FNU) CEPERO, co-owner of Warfield Drugstore, 27th Avenue N. W. near 7th Street, advised they had received a threatening call concerning the sending of packages to Cuba a week or so ago. No further details available. (X)(U)

On February 1, 1968, VIRGILIO (LNU), co-owner of Warfield Drugstore, confidentially advised MM 492-S he believes ROLANDO MERULO, member of the CNM, might possibly be involved in the threat concerning ceasing of sending parcels to Cuba. He stated OTTO MERULO, brother of ROLANDO, (X)(U)

PP

SECRET

is reportedly serving a 15 year sentence in prison in Cuba. However, OTTO is reportedly the indoctrinator of Communism to the prisoners. (~~X~~)(U)

VIRGILIO (LNU) also informed MM 492-S one night he received an anonymous call trying to scare him into not sending packages to Cuba. When he asked the anonymous caller why he should not send and indicating that he would continue to do so until he is forced to stop, the caller hung up. VIRGILIO believed highly significant and possibly more than mere coincidence the following morning ROLANDO MERULO and another member of the staff of the newspaper "El Nacionalista" appeared at the store attempting to sell an ad for the "El Nacionalista" newspaper. VIRGILIO stated they took an ad in the paper at that time. He also advised MIGUEL SAN PEDRO, active leader of the CNM, is a customer at the Warfield Drugstore. VIRGILIO described the anonymous caller as a Cuban male who spoke perfect Spanish with Cuban inflection. He did not know the name of the individual but indicated the voice seemed very familiar to him and he would remain alert should he hear this voice again. (~~X~~)(U)

On February 5, 1968, MM 492-S furnished SA JAMES D. HAYES the following report on Cuban Power and bombings in the Miami area, along with informant's comments and conclusions:

The newspaper "PATRIA," which is directed by ARMANDO GARCIA SIFREDO, has always been opposed to terrorism, possibly because SIFREDO was one of the first victims of gunmen and terrorism in Miami. First, there was a bomb which exploded in front of his house some time ago. Then, he was playing dominoes on the porch of the home of his friend, VIVANCOS, S. W. 8th Avenue between 3rd and 4th Streets, and several shots were aimed at him from an auto. Later, another bomb exploded under his car. On another occasion, an unknown person hit him with his fists as he was leaving a restaurant, and for a long time he received telephone calls from anonymous persons who threatened to kill him because of the partiality shown in his newspaper "PATRIA" which sometimes defended General BATISTA and his friends, at other times opposed the Fidelistas, possible infiltrees, the people who keep coming in, etc. (~~X~~)(U)

99 SECRET

SECRET

SOTO BARROSO spoke of unity as a basis, and he considered FELIPE RIVERO DIAZ and CARLOS MARQUEZ STERLING as the best leaders, along with men like JOAQUIN MARTINEZ SAENZ and others. He said that the factory workers will join RIVERO and MARQUEZ STERLING and other organizations will continue to get closer to these two figures in exile in order to form complete unity among the exiles. (X)(U)

On the afternoon of February 5, 1968, sometime after 5, the Continental News Broadcast, which is directed by Commentator NORMAN DIAZ on WMIE, announced that it was going to transmit a letter from Cuban Power, and since MM 492-S could not get in touch with the contact there, he prepared a recording and was able to record the reading of the document signed by Cuban Power. (X)(U)

He advised he had the reel with the tape on which all the items which were broadcast were recorded. (X)(U)

He advised he could tell in advance that Cuban Power took the blame for the bomb which exploded in Havana, Cuba, for the others, and for the one which exploded under the plane at the Miami Airport, but refused to take the blame for the bomb placed under the auto of the Mexican Consul in Miami, Mr. REYES SPINDOLA, and explains that it did not participate in others. We do not know which ones they are referring to. (X)(U)

NORMAN DIAZ has the letter referred to, but source has not been able to speak to him. Neither has he been able to talk to SERGIO VIDAL to find out if he also received the press memorandum from Cuban Power. (X)(U)

It appears that Cuban Power is somewhat frightened by the investigations and the action of justice, and this may be the reason for the document which was broadcast on the afternoon of February 5, 1968, according to MM 492-S. (X)(U)

VV SECRET

SECRET

RE: Anonymous Telephone call to Radio Station WQAM, regarding the bombings in Miami on January 25, 1968

ROBERT KAY, Announcer, WQAM Radio Station, Miami, Florida, received a telephone call at 5:30 AM, January 25, 1968, which conversation was recorded by KAY.

On January 29, 1968, [MM [1115]-S] listened to this (C) recording and stated the caller sounded like that of ANGEL ESTEVEZ of the Second National Front of the Escambray (SNFE). However, the informant could not be definite in his identification. (X)

MM 1249-PSI listened to the recording on January 29, 1968. This informant stated the voice of the anonymous caller sounded like that of ERNESTO LEDO of the Cuban Nationalist Association (CNA) which is headed by FELIPE RIVERO. Informant stated he could not make a positive identification regarding the anonymous caller.

On January 26, 1968, TOMAS GARCIA FUSTE, who has requested his identity be protected, who is Assistant Station Manager and Announcer of Radio Station WFAB, reviewed the recording of the anonymous caller. FUSTE was unable to identify the anonymous caller.

On January 26, 1968, OSCAR ANGULO REYES, 2900 N. W. 92nd Street, Miami, a Radio Announcer for Radio Station WMIE, Miami, and his wife, listened to the taped recording of the anonymous caller. ANGULO and his wife tentatively identified the voice of the caller as that of ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, with whom they are acquainted. [ANGULO is of highly operational interest to CIA and CIA has requested his name be protected.](X)(S)

WW SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/12/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10213-10483

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-121229-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 05/27/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
LCA, ASSOC, CUBA IN ARMS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/19/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	00- K-3,262,509
SUBJECT	Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria (FIUR)	DATE DISTR.	27 May 63
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	Guide 303-BR
DATE OF INFO.	25 Apr 63 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	---/25 Apr 63 and earlier		

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT the BRACKETS KP 11-18-97

SLD/KSR 1-3-98 (JFK)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national presently residing in the United States.]

(S) [Source was a prominent sports writer and a very active member of the Havana Yacht Club.] He is presently employed as a reporter on a large newspaper and is in close contact with Cuban exile leaders.

8

[This report was developed by an AFNIN Air Force representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

[ON FILE IN THE CIA LIBRARY is a copy, in Spanish, of the Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria - FIUR.]

1. A Cuban exile, Julio V. Leal, residing at 4823 East 8th Court, Hialeah, Florida, claims to be the US Delegate of the "Cuban Government in Arms". He also claims that he received a copy of a proclamation prepared by members of the FIUR, in Cuba, and was authorized to release it to publicity sources. He provided me with a copy of the FIUR declaration. [See On File Material.] CUBA

2. On 25 Apr 63 Leal furnished me with a copy of a document, in Spanish, which showed the appointments to executive and cabinet posts of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Cuba in Arms. The names are:

President - To be announced at a later date for reasons of security.
Vice-President - Dr Gustavo Cuervo Rubio
Premier - Dr Jose Manuel Gutierrez
Secretary to the President - To be announced at a later date.
Minister of State - Dr Carlos Prio Socarras
Minister of Communications - Luis Conte Aguero
Minister of Transportation - Dr Aureliano Sanchez Arango
Minister of Commerce - Abel Mestre
Minister of Justice ~~- Dr Ricardo Rafael Sardinas~~
Minister of Interior - Dr Manuel Antonio de Varona
Minister of Education - Dr Jose Ignacio Lazaga
Minister of Public Works - Ing Manuel Ray
Minister of Health - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.
Minister of Defense - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.
Minister of Labor - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.

CUBA

Copy to MM/NY/WFO/SJ
by routing slip for
✓ info ___ action
date 6-5-63
by vvn/st

4 XEROX
JUN 4 1963

1 copies made
CWD Al Augere 2/13/78
105 - NEW

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

HQ b[y] HSCA re 3-14 request

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/4/95 BY SP8MAC/GCL (JFK)

213-10483

Rec'd in Rec 6-6-63

MAY 28 9 03 AM '63 TION, FBI

Minister of Agriculture - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.
Minister of Public Housing - To be announced at a later date.

The following individuals have been named Ministers without portfolio and subsecretaries:

REC-54 105-121229

11 JUN 5 1963

ST-102

Jose Ignacio Rivero	Humberto Medrano
Manuel Reyes	Fermin Peinado
Jorge Castellanos	Melchor Gaston
Lauraeano Batista Falla	Manuel Fernandez
Agusto Fernandez Conde	Enrique Huertas
Juan Manuel Salvat	

F73

67 JUN 13 1963

Designated Ambassador to Washington - Dr Guillermo Belt D.C. CUBA

OAS Delegate - Dr Herminio Portell Vila CUBA D.C.

Rtg 6-12

3. I doubt that Leal has been designated as the US representative for FIUR, and do not believe that the documents he gave me originated in Cuba. I suspect that another group of exiled Cuban politicians wrote the document in the US, and are trying to get national publicity in order to get support. I have recently heard that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo has been added to the list of Cabinet appointments. I doubt very much that Gutierrez and Ray would be fully accepted by the majority of Cubans in exile. CUBA

-end-

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10218-10058
RECORD_SERIES: HO
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 2-2173-1ST NR 130

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: DOS
FROM: SAUNDERS. HAROLD H.
TO: THE SECRETARY
TITLE:

DATE: 10/18/1976
PAGES: 10
SUBJECT: CASTRO, FIDEL, SPEECH, ALLEGATIONS, CIA INVOLVEMENT, CUBANA AIRLINER, BOMBING
DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER. TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 05/12/1998
UPDATE_DATE:
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (4)

COMMENTS: INC MEMO

W 291

9:30 AM
Bill Jones
advised OK
with changes
10-20-76
JGL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 19, 1976

Additional Questions (answers and comments needed by late morning, October 20)

Cubana Airlines

1. Has CIA had any relationship with Posada's investigative agency or any other business he may have had?

2. [What was the nature of the contacts CIA had with Posada after he was terminated? What did the contacts have to do with Cuba?] (S)

3. [Who was the visa for that Posada approached the CIA and the defense attache about in June 1976?] (S)

4. Does the CIA believe that the source of TDFIR DB-315/10256 deliberately, delayed passing on Bosch's and Posada's remarks about hitting a Cuban plane until after the incidents?

5. Does the CIA have any additional relevant information on any of the people named in the draft memorandum, or any other information relating to the sabotage of the plane, which it has not yet disseminated in TDFIR form?

6. Would CIA please provide whatever information it has concerning Orlando Garcia and Ricardo Morales so that para b on page 8 of the draft memorandum can be completed?

2-2173 N673

2-2173-102
-108-110

45-10848

NOT RECORDED
23 MAY 17 1977

F.B.I. INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/28/94 BY SP8mne/fcc (JFK)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. AS SANITIZED
JM 4/14/97

File! In 2-2173
6-882

SECRET/SENSITIVE

70 MAY 19 1977

by Cuban counterrevolutionaries. Now we decidedly believe the first assumption is correct. The CIA directly participated in the destruction of the Cubana aircraft in Barbados."

--The principal leaders of Cuban exile terrorist groups are closely linked through the CORU organization to CIA activities against Cuba.

In his speech, Castro did not make any specific allegations concerning a USG relationship with Orlando Bosch, or Luis Posada (two Cuban exile activists who were arrested by Venezuelan authorities in connection with the Cubana crash). However, the link with Bosch is implied since he is reported to be chief of CORU, the umbrella organization of Cuban exile terrorists.

Individuals Allegedly Involved

Hernan Ricardo Lozano

a. Involvement in the Crash: He was arrested in Trinidad on suspicion of having planted a bomb in the Cubana plane. Caracas radio announced on October 18 that he confessed to sabotaging the airliner. A [CIA] (S) source in Caracas reports that Ricardo may have been trained in the use of explosives and investigative techniques by Luis Posada. [CIA information also reveals that Trinidadian officials have told the Venezuelans that they have a taped] (S) [telephone conversation between Ricardo and Posada discussing their participation in the bombing.](S)

Ricardo, a Venezuelan citizen~~s~~, is a photographer employed by Posada in his industrial security firm in Caracas. A [CIA](S) source says that Ricardo is also a part time employee of the Venezuelan Intelligence Service (DISIP). He reportedly gathered photographic material on groups and individuals of interest to DISIP and the Venezuelan Government. He was hired by DISIP when Pasada was an official of that organization. The [CIA](S) source says that the Venezuelan Government is concerned and would be faced with serious problems if these connections become public knowledge.

b. Relationship with US: [CIA states it has had no contact with Ricardo.](S) The US Legal Attache in Caracas, Joseph S. Leo, says that he has had some dealings with Ricardo for help in expediting visa applications ~~[illegible]~~ [for a DISIP official's son, and for Ricardo himself. ~~and himself.~~ He also contacted Leo FOUR TIMES AFTER INITIAL VISIT AND ON TWO OCCASIONS ~~two times to~~ furnished photographs and biographical data on members of the Cuban Embassy in Caracas. Apparently, the material came from DISIP files.](S) During one visit, Ricardo attempted to solicit suggestions from the Legal Attache on activities which might be directed against the Cuban Embassy by an anti-Castro group to which he belonged. Leo says he discouraged Ricardo, pointing out that the US Government was attempting to prevent disruptive and

CARACAS TEL 10/8/76

terrorist activities by anti-Castro groups in the US, and Ricardo never repeated the suggestion.

Freddy Lugo

a. Involvement in the crash: Lugo was arrested in Trinidad with Ricardo on suspicion of having planted the bomb aboard the Cubana plane. A [CIA] (S) source alleges that Lugo apparently was only peripherally involved in the bombing and is not considered to be one of the leading participants.

Lugo, a Venezuelan citizen, is also a photographer employed by Posada's company. According to [a CIA] (S) source, he also worked for DISIP under the same arrangements noted above for Ricardo.

b. Relationship with US: [CIA states that it has had no contact with Lugo.] (S) The name and phone number of US Legal Attache Leo were discovered in Lugo's address book when he was arrested in Trinidad. Leo says that he has had ~~on~~ no contact with Lugo and speculates that his name and phone were furnished to Lugo by Posada.

Caracas Tel 10/7

Luis Posada Carriles

a. Involvement in Crash: Posada was arrested on October 14 in Venezuela along with Orlando Bosch and three others accused of conspiring to sabotage the plane. Posada, a Cuban exile who is now a Venezuelan citizen, is vehemently anti-Castro and is suspected of having been the main supporter of Bosch during the latter's stay in Venezuela prior to being arrested in November 1974. Posada was formerly chief of the counterintelligence division of the Venezuelan intelligence service, DISIP.

b. Relationship with US. X[CIA says that Posada was a paid informant. The relationship was discontinued in July 1967, but contact was reestablished in October of the same year.] When he lost his position in DISIP in March 1974, CIA says [the relationship was "amicably terminated." Though he was not paid thereafter, CIA continued to have occasional contact with him until February 1976 when a formal written agreement of termination was signed. The latest contact between CIA representatives and Posada occurred in June 1976 when CIA] declined to assist Posada on a visa matter. X(S) (S)

The US army attache has also used a Posada business partner (also a Cuban exile, whose name we do not have) as an informant (though not as an agent).

Our Legal Attache (Joseph Leo) became acquainted with Posada during the latter's employment [by DISIP](S), and after his resignation, Posada continued to contact Leo on rare occasions, usually in order to obtain personal service in regard to visa requests for relatives and business associates, the last being Ricardo on ~~October 1, 1976.~~ September 30, 1976 and October 1, 1976. Leo says he has seen Posada on about three occasions since 1973, the last being in June 1976 when Posada inquired if the FBI had interest in a Venezuelan who had hired two of his "operatives" as body guards.

Caracas tel 10/7

Caracas tel 10/8

Caracas tel 10/7 →

Orlando Bosch

a. Involvement in Crash: As noted above, Bosch was arrested in Venezuela for alleged involvement in the Cubana crash. In late June, a CIA source reported that an exile group headed by Bosch planned to bomb a Cubana flight between Panama and Havana. An FBI source has alleged that one attempt was made but the bomb did not detonate. A second try occurred in Jamaica on July 9, but the bomb exploded before the suitcase in which it was carried was put aboard the plane.

Miami LHM 9/14/76

According to [CIA sources] (S), Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez is said to be sympathetic to Bosch and has permitted him to travel freely in the country and solicit funds with the understanding that Venezuela would not be used as a base of operations or place of refuge. Bosch reportedly promised not to engage in terrorist activity while in Venezuela and received a token $500 contribution from Perez. [Another CIA source] (S) reported that after Bosch's arrival in Caracas in September, he stated during a fund raising dinner that "Now that our organization has come out of the Letelier job looking good, we are going to try something else." A few days later, Posada allegedly said, "We are going to hit a Cuban airliner" and "Orlando (Bosch) has the details."

b. Relationship with US. [CIA says there are no current or recent agency contacts with Orlando Bosch.] (S) The US is currently attempting to have Bosch deported from Venezuela to the US, where he is subject to immediate imprisonment for parole violation (spell out)

Frank Castro

a. Involvement in Crash: Venezuelan officials reportedly believe that Castro, (head of the FLNC terrorist organization, a component group in CORU) is deeply involved in the crash, though we have no details of his supposed involvement. Frank Castro was in Venezuela in late September 1976 and in mid-October was back in Miami. Frank Castro has admitted to FBI agents that he met with Bosch in Caracas on September 26 or 27, but denies any personal knowledge of the bombing of the Cubana plane.

b. Relationship with US; [CIA says there are no current or recent agency contacts with Frank Castro] (S), who is an American citizen with permanent residence in Santo Domingo.

Orlando Garcia and Ricardo Morales Navarrete

a. Involvement in Crash: Orlando Garcia is President Perez' security and intelligence advisor, and Morales is Garcia's deputy; both are Cuban exiles who are now Venezuelan citizens. [A CIA source] (S) claims that Garcia was directed to protect and assist Bosch during his stay in Venezuela. [Another CIA source] (S) reported that Garcia and Posada met Bosch upon his arrival and escorted him to his hotel. Both Garcia and Morales reportedly attended the fund-raising dinner during which Bosch allegedly made the remark about the "Letelier job," and after the Cubana crash Garcia may have made an effort to get Bosch out of Venezuela. It is possible, therefore that Garcia and/or Morales may have known in advance about the operation which led to the bombing of the plane.

b. Relationship with US:

Felix Martinez Suarez

a. Involvement in Crash: None, except by the alleged association with Ricardo, contained in Fidel Castro's charges.

b. Relationship with US: [CIA says that Suarez was a CIA media asset from 1961 to January 1974 when he was terminated as a result of his exposure in the Venezuelan media.] (S)

Castro's allegation regarding CORU: With regard to Castro's charge on CIA links with CORU, an FBI report of September 17 states that "a confidential source abroad" claims to have been told by Roberto Carballo (leader of the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs, AVBC, one of the component organizations of CORU) that in July of this year Carballo and three other Cuban exiles had been approached by representatives

Mexico cy
TL
9/17/76

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/11/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10221-10229
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-72630-3

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, SJ
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	08/27/1958
PAGES :	9
SUBJECTS :	PDL, ASSOC, PILOT, CASTRO, FIDEL, TRA, FLIGHT PLAN, DESTINATION, RCK
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/03/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC 6 S/S, MEMO

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/27/58

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN [illegible] EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Transmit the following in AIRTEL
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIR MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT except for the brackets
MKH 2-6-98

10/16/98 CLASSIFIED BY: 3038 ACIUR
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Dw

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAN JUAN (105-new)

SUBJECT: PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ;
RENALDO BLANCO HERNANDEZ;
ALBERTO EUSEBIO MOJENA
IS - CUBA

Rb

3-1
6-1
1-1
5-1
4-1
7-1

By communication marked "Secret" dated 8/26/58, (S) [DAVID R. McLEAN] H & R Section, [Fort Brooke (CIA)] advised that they received the following information from a usually reliable source. Information is prefaced with the following statement: "In view of the sensitive means through which we acquired it, it is requested that the FBI take no action which might compromise our source." [X]

Communication states that PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ, also known as PEDRO LUIS DIAZ, a Cuban born November 8, 1926 at Havana, is a pilot, courier, and possible agent for FIDEL CASTRO. DIAZ is reportedly associated with REINALDO BLANCO HERNANDEZ and ALBERTO EUSEBIO MOJENA who are Cubans and not further identified. Jamaican police believe that these three individuals operate from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. [X] (U)

DIAZ passed through Palisades Airport, Kingston, Jamaica, on May 5, 1958. On July 17, 1958, DIAZ arrived at the Palisades Airport, piloting a Cessna aircraft, #M5213D with BLANCO as a passenger. The [X] (U)

3-18-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

3 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Miami (RM)
4 - San Juan
(1 - 97-92)
(1 - 109-26)
JAD:aej
(9)

105-72630-3

JFK

REC-25

12 SEP 16

AUG 29 1958

NAT'L INT. SEC.

Approved: [illegible]
Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

Sent ______ M Per ______

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/11/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10221-10231

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-72630-5

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 10/02/1958
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
PDL, ADMIN, INSTR

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/29/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC LHM

ARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: OCT 2 - 1958

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (105-1598)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Ex copy for the brackets MKH 2-6-98

SUBJECT: PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ;
RENALDO BLANCO HERNANDEZ;
ALBERTO EUSEBIO MOJENA
IS - CUBA
00 - Miami

Enclosed herewith is report of SA ROBERT JAMES DWYER, Miami, dated and captioned as above, and Letterhead Memorandum.

REFERENCES

San Juan airtel to Bureau, 8/27/58.
Miami tel to Bureau, 9/3/58.
Butel to Miami, 9/3/58.
Legat, Havana, telephone call to Miami 9/3/57.

10/16/94 CLASSIFIED BY: SP3 JMC/UC
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ADMINISTRATIVE

All information contained in instant report was provided to the United States Customs Office, Miami, on September 3,5,8, and 18, 1958, as instructed by reButel September 3, 1958.

This report is classified "Secret", inasmuch as information received from [CIA, San Juan,] was so [S] classified. This information is set forth in enclosed report under symbol number T-1.

3-18-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/JLSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

INFORMANTS:

Identity of Source	Date of Activity or Description of Information	Date Received	Agent to Whom Furnished	File No. (JFK) Where Located

2 - Bureau (Encl.22) (RM)
2 - San Juan (97-92) (RM) (Encl.4)
(109-26)
1 - Miami
RJD:dlp
(5)

ENCLOSURE

105-726305

REC- 72 EX. - 133

52 NOV 18 1958

230

SECRET EX. - 133

14 OCT 3 1958

NAT. INT. SEC.

1 - San Juan

MM 105-1598

T-1 is [DAVID R. McCLAIN,] (S) H&R Section, Ft. [Brooke, Puerto Rico] (C/A) (S) [X]	[DIAZ BLANCO and MOJENA] [X] (U)	By rept dated [8/26/58] [X] (U)	[San Juan Office] [X] (U)	Instant report
T-2 is ONI report dated 5/14/58, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	FIGUERO	5/58	Bureau	Instant report
T-3 is Legat, Havana	Telephonic info re DIAZ and GOMEZ	9/3/58	HOWARD R. ALBAUGH	Instant report
T-4 is MM 635-S	PEDRO DIAZ	9/3/58	GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR.	Instant report
"	MOJENA	9/2/58	"	"
T-5 is EDUARDO HERNANDEZ, Cuban Consul General, Miami	Aircraft N48Q	9/8,18/58	ROBERT JAMES DWYER	"
T-6 is MM 639-S	PEDRO DIAZ	9/3/58	"	"
T-7 is BETTY UPDEGRAVE, Service Representative, Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., Miami.	Toll calls of RICARDO LORIE	9/18/58	LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.	"

REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 6/22/92 NLS [illegible]
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

391-10531

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10221-10245
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: CR 185-789-1655

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, BUE
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 10/11/1977
PAGES: 4
SUBJECT:

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 08/17/1998
UPDATE_DATE:
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

Consultation

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (4)

COMMENTS: REFERRED TO AISC

SECRET

P 111845Z OCT 77

OCT 11 8 46 PM '77

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FM BUENOS AIRES (157-35) (P)

TO DIRECTOR (185-789) PRIORITY 233-11

CARACAS (174-8) PRIORITY 039-11

BT

SECRET

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Fin. & Pers.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Spec. Inv.
Tech. Servs.
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

~~DE-67~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~CLASS. & EXT. BY~~ SP-1 GSK/clb
~~REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2. 4. 2~~ 1.2, 3
~~DATE OF REVIEW~~ 10-11-2007

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT.
EXCEPT BRACKETS
JM 6-18-97

(C) CHILBOM; PFO-MURDER; EID; OOJ. OO: WFO.

REMYCABLE, SEPTEMBER 23, 1977, WHICH CONTAINED INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE CENTRO NACIONAL DE INFORMACIONES (CNI) (FORMERLY KNOWN AS DINA) CONCERNING CONTACTS IN CHILE BY CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA. (S)

CUBA

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED BY [THE CIA STATION, SANTIAGO,] (S) CONCERNING INDIVIDUALS REFERRED TO IN MY CABLE OF REFERENCE; ~~(U)~~ (S)

[CIA STATION, SANTIAGO] (S) FILES CONTAINED ~~(S)~~ INFORMATION WHICH APPEARED IN THE JUNE 20, 1972 ISSUE OF "EL MERCURIO", A SPANISH LANGUAGE DAILY NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED IN SANTIAGO, PERTAINING TO CARLOS ASHTON UGALDE WHICH INDICATED THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS ELECTED TO THE POSITION OF EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT (TREASURER) ~~OR~~ OF THE ASSOCIATION OF CHILEAN RADIO BROADCASTERS

CHILE

ST-133

REC 12

185-789-1655

DE-67

9 OCT 13 1977

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF CUBBS
DATE 8-23-83

Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR
#211,326

Classification upheld per agency request
Brackets pg1, pg2, 3
letter 4/29/81
sp3 OB/KJ 5-14-81

0-13 MM, NK, NY + WFO
10/11/77 TFJ/ph

58 ~~NOV 9~~ 1977

SECRET

-1-

#211,326
Classified by SP3 dc/gel
Declassify on: OADR 8/11/83
per release in 190-12027-20x37

(SP8MAC/GCL 7/12/94)

89

BROADCASTERS (ARCHI) IN THE NEW DIRECTORATE FOR THAT ORGANIZATION DURING THE PERIOD 1972-1974. [IT COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED WHETHER CARLOS ASHTON UGALDE IS IDENTICAL WITH CORVETTE CAPTAIN CARLOS ASHTON, WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO THE CHILEAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (MFR) AND AN ALLEGED CONTACT F BOSCH.] ~~S~~ (U)

CHILE

(S) [CIA RECORDS, SANTIAGO] INDICATE THAT A CIA SOURCE OF UNKNOWN RELIABILITY REPORTED THAT IN 1969 MANUEL FUENTES WAS A REPORTER FOR RADIO BALMACEDA, SANTIAGO. CHILE ~~S~~

A NEWSPAPER ARTICLE APPEARING IN THE JULY 2, 1973 ISSUE OF "EL MERCURIO", SUPRA, REPORTED THAT MANUEL FUENTES WEDLING

MANUEL FUENTES WENDLING

(ALSO REPORTED AS WENDLING) WAS THE SECRETARY OF THE "PARIA Y LIBERTAD" ORGANIZATION. THE ARTICLE FURTHER REPORTED THAT CHILE FUENTES WEDLING, TOGETHER WITH FOUR OTHER MEMBERS OF "PATRIA Y LIBERTAD", SOUGHT ASYLUM IN THE ECUADORIAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO ON JUNE 29, 1973 AND THAT THE GROUP SUBSEQUENTLY TRAVELED TO ECUADOR AS ASYLEES ON JULY 7, 1973. IT IS NOTED THAT THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN VIOLENTLY OPPOSED BY "QATRIA Y LIBERTAD" AND THAT WITH THE OVERTHROW OF THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT ON SEPTEMBER

SECRET

11, 1973, IN ALL PROBABILITY, INDIVIDUALS WHO FLED CHILE FOR OPPOSITION TO THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO RETURN. (~~S~~U)

A USUALLY RELIABLE CIA SOURCE REPORTED IN SANTIAGO DURING 1971 THAT CHILEAN NAVAL CAPTAIN JAIME ROJAS BRUGUES WAS AN INSTRUCTOR OF CRYPTOLOGY IN THE CHILEAN ARMY G-2 INTELLIGENCE TRAINING GROUP. THE CIA SOURCE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM [A CLOSE FRIEND WHO WAS A STUDENT IN THIS INTELLIGENCE GROUP.] (S)

CHILE

RECORDS OF THE DEFENSE ATTACHE ~~OFFICE, SANTIAGO INDICATE THAT~~ JAIME ROJAS BRUGUES IN JANUARY, 1974 WAS SERVING AS THE SECURITY CHIEF OF THE CHILEAN MFR AND THAT HIS PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY WAS ASYLEE-REFUGEE AFFAIRS. DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE ~~RECORDS IN SANTIAGO INDICATE THAT~~ THE COMMANDER OF THE CHILEAN NAVAL TRAINING SHIP, "ESMERALDA" IS JORGE J. DAVANZO CINTOLESI. ~~IT~~ IS RECALLED ~~THAT~~ CNI ~~REPORTED~~ THAT BOSCH RE-ENTERED CHILE DURING AUGUST, 1975 WITH A FALSE CHILEAN PASSPORT UNDER THE IDENTITY OF HECTOR DAVANZO CINTOLESI. CNI ALSO REPORTED ~~THAT~~ THE PASSPORT OF HECTOR DAVANZO CINTOLESI UTILIZED BY BOSCH WAS FALSE AND THAT THE BIOGRAPHIC DATA CONTAINED THEREIN WAS IDENTICAL TO (S)

SECRET

PAGE FIVE BUE 157-35 S E C R E T

THAT PERTAINING TO THE BROTHER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE "ESMERALDA."

(S) (S)

BUREAU REQUESTED TO ADVISE MIAMI, NEWARK, NEW YORK AND WFO. (U)

ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5964, XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

BT

BT WZSIZQ ZE UEMY

JCWBKYE

SECRET

-4-

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10221-10271
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 185-789-1639

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: CIA
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 10/07/1977
PAGES: 2
SUBJECT:

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 08/17/1998
UPDATE DATE:
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

FRIENDS OF CASTRO.

Dom Rep

6. LASTLY, SOURCE IDENTIFIED ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ, A CUBAN EXILE, AS THE PERSON CASTRO SAID HAD CONTACT RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN CUBAN EXILES IN MIAMI AND CUBAN EXILES IN SANTIAGO, CHILE. OTERO, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, IS NOW IN MIAMI. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE NUMBER OF CUBAN EXILES IN SANTIAGO IS MINISCULE.)

7. ON 28 SEPTEMBER 1977 [THE SANTO DOMINGO STATION] OBTAINED THE (S) FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON CORU. IT IS SOURCED TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

8. SOURCE REPORTED THAT A CORU MEETING WAS HELD IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SOMETIME BETWEEN 19 AND 21 JUNE 1976, PROBABLY IN BONAO IN A HOUSE TRAILER. THOSE CUBAN EXILES IN ATTENDANCE WERE IDENTIFIED AS JORGE ALONSO PUJOLS, ERNESTO HERNANDEZ, PABLO MARTIN, FRANK TEIRA, LUIS ROSS, JOSE AGUILA, WILFREDO BLANCO, LEVI MARRERO, JOSE LUIS PRADO, ANDRES SARGEN, JOR GAS CANOSA, JUAN PEREZ FRANCO, FREDDY LUGO, GERMAN LOZANO, ORLANDO BOSCH, FERNANDO BUENO, AND GUILLERMO NOVO.

5

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/29/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10221-10328
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	2-1423-14

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, WMFO
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/30/1958
PAGES :	7
SUBJECTS :	IID, INTV, B/F INT, TESUR, RCK, REPRESENTATIVE, NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/14/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC LHM

WFO 105-26269

SECRET

Identity of Source	Date of Activity or Description of Information	Agent to Whom Furnished	File Number Where Located
T-4 GEORGE P. RICHARDS, Superintendent of the Wyatt Building	3/12/58	SA HOWARD FLETCHER, JR.	46-3393, Serials 40-43
	5/9/58	SA HOWARD FLETCHER, JR., and SA RICHARD B. KELLOGG	
T-5 [CIA] (~~S~~)(U)			
T-6 [WF 652-S*] (S)	3/19/54 3/22/54		100-340620
T-7 [WF 279-S*] (S)	March, 1954		
T-8 [WF 970-S*] (S)	September and October, 1956		
T-9 [WF 568-S*] (S)			
T-10	Not utilized		
T-11 [WILLIAM GOLDBURG, Officer, City Center Aviation Supply Co., 508 Arch Street, Phila. 6, Pa.] (S)	9/10/55 Re subject's contacts with PETAR MIHALDINEC as furnished by CIA letter to Bu dated 11/8/55.] (~~S~~)		Bufile 65-57903 WFO 65-4985-202
T-12 SAM GALLIN, Art Cap Co., 729 Broadway, NYC	8/28/57	NYO, FBI	105-24487

SECRET

SECRET

WFO 105-26269

5. Upon completion of above leads will consider requesting Bureau approval to interview the subject.

The attached report is being classified "Confidential" as it ~~[~~reveals our investigative interest in [the members of various foreign diplomatic establishments](S) in the Washington, D. C., area.~~]~~ ~~(c)~~ ~~(S)~~

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10222-10171
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	97-4133-8TH NR 118

Document Information

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	WANNALL, W. R.
TO :	SULLIVAN, W. C.
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/25/1964
PAGES :	3
SUBJECTS :	SPANISH VESSEL, SIERRA ARANZAZU, SUSP, SECRET ORGANIZATION OF CONTINENTAL ACTION, MRR, LIAISON WITH DOS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/22/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF NSA
COMMENTS :	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TOP SECRET

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ACTION

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

1 copies made for review at FBIHQ by HSCA 3.14.78

DATE: September 25, 1964

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: ATTACK ON SPANISH VESSEE "SIERRA ARANZAZU," 9/13/64
NEUTRALITY MATTERS

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Miss Holmes
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Nasca

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

SLD/HSC 3-4-98

~~CLASS. & EXT. BY~~
~~REASON-FCIM II,~~
~~DATE OF REVIEW~~

2/1/81

(S) Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario (C)

[Bureau Source Six] [(Communications Intelligence,] classified "Top Secret") has revealed that Spanish Ambassador to U.S. Merry del Val on 9/23/64 reported to his Foreign Ministry that he had visited General Marshall Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the previous day and next intended to visit the Director of the FBI. CIA has provided us a memorandum showing that on 9/22/64 the Ambassador met with General Carter who referred to assurances given by Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the U.S. was not involved in the sinking of captioned vessel. ~~(S)~~ Per NSA letter 2/27/98. mdc

(S) [Source Six] revealed that the Ambassador had a conference with State Department officials, including Mr. John Crimmins, who is the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, on 9/20/64. Following the conference the Ambassador advised the Spanish Foreign Ministry that he was told by a State Department official that the investigation of the sinking of captioned Spanish vessel was being carried out principally by the FBI in Miami and Puerto Rico and that in this connection the State Department official had an interview with Director of the FBI. In this connection, it may be noted that Bureau representatives met with Crimmins in his office at State Department regarding this matter on the morning of 9/20/64 (memorandum dated 9/20/64 submitted) and the Ambassador was probably told that State Department official had met with one of the Director's representatives and not the Director himself. We have no information indicating the Director has met with State Department official regarding this matter. (S)

No one ever met with me about it. H

Our memoranda in captioned matter dated 9/20 and 22/64 show that at request of Assistant Attorney General Yeagley we are investigating activities of an anti-Castro organization known as Secret Organization of Continental Action (OSAC). This investigation was started last July. Following the sinking of captioned vessel on 9/13/64, the OSAC claimed it was responsible for the sinking and, thus, we have been investigating this incident since that time. Crimmins on 9/20/64 advised us the Spanish Government was most upset over the attack on its vessel and that the U.S. Government agreed to cooperate in an investigation the Spaniards are conducting. [He asked if Bureau would object to his making available our investigative results to Spanish officials and we told him that we interposed no objection to State Department's doing so at its discretion] (U) ~~(S)~~

97-4133

BRACKETS DECLASS (TD3) IS NOW ~~DECLASS~~ DOS/ON 4-8-98

NOT RECORDED
71 OCT 14 1964

2-1877-24

ORIGINAL FILED IN

WRW:ams
(8)

OCT 15 1964

CONTINUED - OVER

12 OCT 14 1964

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
Re: ATTACK ON SPANISH VESSEL "SIERRA
ARANZAZU," 9/13/64
2-1877

We were subsequently advised by CIA on a very highly confidential basis (as set out in our 9/22/64 memorandum) that that Agency possessed information which very definitely indicated that an exile group which is receiving U.S. backing, known as Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR), was responsible for this attack. An error was made in that the persons carrying out the attack thought they were firing upon a Cuban vessel. Three Spaniards aboard the Spanish ship were killed as result of the attack. CIA deals with MRR based upon policy established by a Special Group, including representatives from CIA, State Department, Defense, and the White House. Former Attorney General Kennedy also served as a member of the group. CIA claimed it did not direct any of the MRR operations and the planned attack which resulted in sinking of the Spanish vessel was solely an operation engineered by MRR. Details regarding CIA's support of this group, of course, are unknown to Spanish authorities, although State Department is fully aware of complete details regarding this incident. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Our investigation in this matter is being pursued on an expedite and special basis and should be completed within about one week's time barring unforseen developments. Results are being made available as received to Crimmins at State Department as well as to Internal Security Division of Department. In the latter connection, it should be noted if persons involved in the sinking of captioned vessel undertook any acts in U.S. in support thereof, they might be in violation of the neutrality statutes or the conspiracy provisions relating to neutrality violations. We will request an opinion from Internal Security Division in this regard when our investigation is completed.

ACTION:

For the Director's information in the event he receives a request from Spanish Ambassador Merry del Val for an appointment. The Director may wish to consider taking the position that it would not be proper for him to see and talk to the Spanish Ambassador because the subject matter falls in the province of the State Department. ~~(S)~~ (U)

P 3 IS NOW
DECLASSIFIED
PER DOS ON 1-16-98

TOP SECRET

Date : 05/28/98

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10008
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-123084-1

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, NY
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 08/09/63
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : ACA, EPE, CHAPPEL, DAN, FINANCING RAIDS, ON CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/28/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: AUG 9 1963

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-62202) (RUC)

J.F.C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: EDUARDO PEREZ GONZALEZ
IS - CUBA
(OO:MIAMI)

~~Classified by~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

See Index

Re Bureau letter dated 6/25/63.

In accordance with referenced letter, the following informants, all of whom are familiar with various phases of anti-CASTRO activity in the NY area, were contacted and advised that the subject was unknown to them:

Informant (S)	Date	Contacting Agent
CSNY [2623]-S (S)	7/10/63	SA FRANCIS J. O'BRIEN
CSNY 2822-S	7/24/63	SA FRANCIS J. O'BRIEN
JESUS DE LOS HEROS	7/8/63	SA FRANCIS J. O'BRIEN

Source DE LOS HEROS is the husband of BERTA BARRETO, 340 East 80th St., NYC, who has in the past acted as a Cuban contact of attorney JAMES DONOVAN in his negotiations for the release of various Cuban prisoners. DE LOS HEROS advised that in April, 1963, one DAN CHAPPEL was released from a Cuban prison. CHAPPEL is reputed to be a cattle breeder in the Miami, Florida area and was alleged to be a politician in some way in that area. In 1960 and 1961, CHAPPEL was engaged in gambling enterprises in Cuba and reportedly

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(6)
(JFK) 11/17/99

MCT-14 REC 7 105-123084-1

AUG 12 1963

2- Bureau (RM)
2- Miami (RM)
1- New York (105-62202)

JFC:pm
(5)

NAT. INT. SEC.

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

163
AUG 19 1963 BJB

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

lost a great deal of money in this venture, which money had been given to him for use in the gambling venture in Cuba by an unknown syndicate of individuals in the United States. CHAPPEL is the only individual that DE LOS HEROS felt might fit the description of the American citizen formerly in a Cuban prison who was financing raids on Cuba and who was a friend of the subject.

NY sources familiar with anti-CASTRO activity in the NY area, although advising that the subject was unknown to them, stated that from time to time they would make appropriate discreet inquiries through other sources of theirs in the anti-CASTRO field in the United States in order to determine the subject's identity and that if any information of value along these lines is developed, they will immediately notify the NYO.

A review of the files of the NYO reflects no information identifiable with the subject; however, it was noted in NY file 105-55031-164 that a letterhead memorandum dated 3/25/63, at Miami, Florida, captioned "HAITIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES; IS-HAITI", on pages 3, 6 and 7, contain information relative to one ALBERTO BAYO, aka Captain Bayo, who was formerly connected with Alpha 66 and whose identity in reality is EDUARDO PEREZ, residing 351 Southwest 6th St., Apartment 2, Miami, Florida. On page 13 of this letterhead memorandum PEREZ is described as a Cuban exile who was very talkative, unpredictable and undependable.

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

993-10068

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY	FBI
RECORD NUMBER	124-10223-10015
RECORDS SERIES	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	CR 62-9-43-473

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR	FBI
FROM	ROBERTS, JOHN L.
TO	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE	
DATE	11/16/64
PAGES	2
SUBJECTS	CIP, JJC, EXOTIC DANCER, ARREST, MP PDT, MARCHILDON, ROBERT DALE, ASSOC, BKG, RES, EMP
DOCUMENT TYPE	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS	4
CURRENT STATUS	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	02/27/98
OPENING CRITERIA	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FD-263 (Rev. 5-1-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
MINNEAPOLIS	MINNEAPOLIS	11/16/64	4/15 - 11/1/64

TITLE OF CASE

CRIME CONDITIONS IN MINNESOTA, NORTH DAKOTA AND SOUTH DAKOTA

Criminal Intelligence Program

REPORT MADE BY: JOHN L. ROBERTS

TYPED BY: dmp

CHARACTER OF CASE

ANTI-RACKETEERING

ST

C

179 and

5
~~6~~
7
~~7-14~~
16
~~15-24~~
~~26-29~~
~~32-34~~
~~37-39~~
43
44
~~46-52~~

REFERENCE

Minneapolis report of SA JOHN L. ROBERTS dated April 30, 1964.

- P* -

ENCLOSURES

TO THE BUREAU

Original and one copy of a letterhead memorandum reflecting characterization of informants.

INFORMANTS

MP T-1 is MP 2435-C, who has been contacted by SA HARRY D. BERGLUND.

MP T-2 is MP 2455-C-TE, who has been contacted by SA HARRY D. BERGLUND.

H

APPROVED

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

③ - Bureau ~~(Enc. 2)~~ (AM)
1 - USA, Minneapolis
3 - Minneapolis (92-246)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

62-9-43-473

REC 45

EX.-112

2 NOV 18 1964

~~REC 40~~

REC- 49

EX 109

DISSEMINATION RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT

AGENCY	aag	Cr. Div		
REQUEST RECD.				
DATE FWD.	12/31/64			
HOW FWD.				
BY				

NOTATIONS

NINE

STAT. SECT.,

69 JAN 6 1965

1-1533 d+d

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—76324-1

Date : 03/06/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10017
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-69778-2

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, NY
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 11/19/65
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : JJC, ARREST, MP PDT, POSSESSION OF NARCOTICS, ASSOC

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/27/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/19/65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (65-23745)(C)

HAAS ERNST F.

SUBJECT: CHANGED
ERNST FRIEDRICH HAAS
ESP - R
(ALEM)
(OO: NEW YORK)

Classified by
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

The title of this case is being marked "Changed" to reflect the subject's complete name as ERNST FRIEDRICH HAAS as obtained from his INS File, Alien Registration Number (ARN) A-11 076 319, maintained by INS, NYC. (U)

ReWFOlet, dated 9/20/65, furnished the subject's name as a possible suspect for a KGB Illegal Agent under the criteria of the ALEM Program. Specifically, subject entered the US as the husband of an American citizen and immigrated from a country other than his native land. (C)

INS Data Processing Records, Central Files, WDC, reflect that ERNST FRIEDRICH HAAS, an Austrian national who last resided in France, entered the US at NYC in January of 1963, as the husband of an American citizen. His occupation was listed as that of a photographer and that he had previously entered the US in 1962. (U)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF
DATE 3-1-98

INS FILE

On 10/18/65, Mr. SIDNEY A. DAVIS, Assistant Chief, Records, Administration and Information Section, INS, 20 W. Broadway, NYC, made available to SA WILLIAM F. MARTIN the INS File for ERNST FRIEDRICH HAAS, ARN A-11 076 6319. (U)

MCT-5 65-69778-2

REC- 39

5 NOV 23 1965

2-Bureau
([redacted])
1-New York (65-23677)(ALEM) (C)
1-New York (65-23745)

RGP:jth
(4)

11/22/94 Classified by SP8 MAC/GAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mh (JFK)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
10/21/97

see also

SOVIET SECTION

(U)

53 DEC 9 1965

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

entitled "MURRAY L. HUMPHREYS aka; ANTI-RACKETEERING". U

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above information, which does not appear that the subject fits within the criterion of the ALEM Program. It is to be noted that the subject ~~(C)~~ was in the US for a considerable amount of time before he married an American citizen and had been granted Permanent Residence on a Non-Immigrant status prior to his marriage to CYNTHIA HAAS.

Although the subject did enter the US with the profession of a photographer and had employment with Magnum Photos, Inc. upon his entry, there does not appear that his services were solicited by this company because of a special skill. U

In view of the above, it is the opinion of the NYO that further investigation of the above is not warranted and this case is being placed in a closed status. U

Date : 01/25/96
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10042
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2918-62

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, OT
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 08/22/58
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS : [RESTRICTED]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/28/95
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS : INC LTR, RPT

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

5-82 (Rev. 4-29-57)

Date: 8-22-58

To: Director, FBI (Bufile: 92-2918)

Attention: ____________

From: Legal Attache, Ottawa (92-10)

Title SAMUEL MANNARINO, was.; GABRIEL MANNARINO, was.	Character ANTI-RACKETEERING
	Reference Pittsburgh let to BU 6-6-58.

Enclosed are the following communications received from the RCMP: Original and two copies of RCMP memorandum dated 8-21-58, together with enclosure consisting of three Photostats of RCMP Toronto, Ontario, Detachment report dated 8-15-58.

Remarks:

The RCMP Toronto report identifies Ben Littman of 287 Spondina Street, Toronto, Ontario, as Benjamin Leitman; and Ernie Shimanky, owner of the Isabelle Hotel in Toronto, as Ernest Chamandy, and further notes that while neither of the two have come to the attention of the RCMP in connection with illicit drug traffic, Leitman could always be considered a suspect, but there has been no reason to suspect Chamandy.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8/25/86 BY G1 BJA/GCL

Dissemination

☐ May be made as received

☐ May be made as indicated by stamp on enclosure

☐ May not be made without further clearance with RCMP

2cc's - PG-NEW 0-25 (Info)
9/3/58 JDD/pjc

Following offices would be interested in receiving copies of enclosures:

Pittsburgh (92-228) (92-236)

Status with this office:

☒ RUC

☐ Pending

3 - Bureau (Encls. 6)
1 - Ottawa
CPB:jhc
(4)

ENCLOSURE
REC-39

EX-123

60 SEP 5 1958 F94

Do not write in space below

92-2918-62 REC-39

17 AUG 26 1958

EX-123

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10064
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-356

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 10/23/62
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : JRO, RES, TRA, B/F INT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/20/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
OCT 23 1962
TELETYPE

3

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 10/23/62 7-35 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267 AND SAC, LAS VEGAS 92-467

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C 2P

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA. AR.

9-

2

LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT DASH C ADVISED HE LEARNED YESTERDAY AT FRIARS CLUB, BEVERLY HILLS, THAT ROSSELLI IN LAS VEGAS, NEVADA.

NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCE ADVISED SOMEONE, IDENTITY NOT KNOWN, AT ROSSELLI-S LOS ANGELES APARTMENT NIGHT OF OCTOBER TWENTY TWO DASH TWENTY THREE LAST AND ON AFTERNOON OCTOBER TWENTY THREE INSTANT.

RECORDS FIDELITY BANK, BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA REVEAL ON OCTOBER SEVENTEEN LAST, ROSSELLI DEPOSITED CHECK OF SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY ONE DOLLARS AND SIXTY SIX CENTS DRAWN ON UNION BANK, LOS ANGELES. SOURCE AT UNION BANK STATED THIS CHECK DATED OCTOBER SIXTEEN LAST, DRAWN ON EMANUEL ROTHMAN, CLIENT-S TRUST ACCOUNT, PAYABLE TO JOHN ROSSELLI AND BORE NOTATION ON FACT QUOTE DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS, B AND R ENTERPRISES UNQUOTE. INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT

END PAGE ONE

REC- 91

92-3267-356

0 C 15 31

10 OCT 24 1962

51 OCT 26 1962

PAGE TWO

ON SIMILAR CHECKS NOTATION SHOWED THE ENTERPRISE AS QUOTE R AND R ENTERPRISES UNQUOTE. EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO RESOLVE THIS DISCREPANCY. EMANUEL ROTHMAN IS ROSSELLI-S AUDITOR.

ON SEPTEMBER TWENTY NINE LAST AND OCTOBER TWO LAST, ROSSELLI ISSUED CHECKS OF TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS EACH PAYABLE TO DIPLOMAT APARTMENTS, LAS VEGAS. FORMER CHECK HAS NOTATION ON FACE QUOTE SEPT RENT UNQUOTE. PRIOR TO THIS, ROSSELLI-S RENT AT DIPLOMAT APARTMENTS HAS BEEN TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH. LAS VEGAS DETERMINE IF ROSSELLI HAS CHANGED APARTMENTS AT DIPLOMAT APARTMENTS.

LV ADVISED

ACK AND HOLD PLS

10-39 PM OK FBI WA NH

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10067
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-359

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 10/24/62
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : JRO, TRA, ASSOC

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/20/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
OCT 2 5 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 10-24-62 9-26 PM DRS

TO DIRECTOR, FBI /92-3267/

FROM SAC LOS ANGELES /92-113 C/

JOHN ROSELLI, ~~AKA AR.~~ also known as Anti-Racketeering LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT C WAS ADVISED BY EMPLOYEE AT FRIARS CLUB, BEVERLY HILLS, THAT ROSSELLI WAS GOING TO RETURN TO ~~LA~~ Los Angeles FROM ~~LV~~ Las Vegas EITHER OCTOBER TWENTY FOUR INSTANT OR TWENTY FIVE NEXT. SOURCE AT HAL ROACH STUDIOS, CULVER CITY, CALIF. STATED JOHNNY MASHIO WHO HAS BEEN WORKING IN LAS VEGAS ON CONTRACTS WITH HOTELS RE SHOOTING MOVIES OF FLOOR SHOWS IN CASINOS, IS NO LONGER ON GOOD TERMS WITH HAL ROACH, JR., FOR WHOM HE HAS BEEN WORKING AND IS CONTEMPLATING WORKING AGAIN WITH ROSSELLI IN EFFORTS TO FILM THE MOVIE. SOURCE SAID HE LEARNED THAT FRANK SINATRA WELL KNOWN ENTERTAINER, TOLD ROSSELLI TO ~~QUOTE~~ "THROW STRIKES" ~~UNQUOTE~~ AT HAL ROACH, JR., AND CARROLL CASE SO THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAKE MOVIE IN LV. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW WHAT, IF ANY, ACTION ROSSELLI HAS TAKEN IN LV.

XEØRRXEXXØMXXXXMXX

HOLD PLS

REC- 91 92-3267-359

EX-113

10 OCT 25 1962

C C1531

96

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10068
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-360

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 10/26/62
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : JRO, TRA, ASSOC, BUSS, JCEX, RES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/20/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
OCT 27 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 10/26/62 11-33 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C 2P

9- Brady

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA. AR.

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT THAT ROSSELLI ARRIVED LOS ANGELES ABOUT TWELVE THIRTY P. M. OCTOBER TWENTY SIX INSTANT ON NATIONAL AIRLINES FLIGHT THIRTY THREE FROM FLORIDA AND LEFT AIRPORT IN YELLOW CAB EIGHT ZERO TWO TWO.

NATIONAL AIRLINES ADVISED PASSENGER MANIFEST FLIGHT THIRTY THREE DOES NOT REFLECT JOHN ROSSELLI AS PASSENGER. THIS FLIGHT STARTED MIAMI AND ONLY STOP ENROUTE LOS ANGELES WAS TAMPA, FLORIDA.

YELLOW CAB COMPANY ADVISED CAB EIGHT ZERO TWO TWO PICKED UP FARE LOS ANGELES AIRPORT SHORTLY AFTER TWELVE THIRTY P. M. TODAY AND TOOK PASSENGER TO CORNER LINDEN AVENUE AND WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA. DRUCKER-S BARBERSHOP, OPERATED BY HARRY DRUCKER, FRIEND OF ROSSELLI, WHICH ROSSELLI

END PAGE ONE

REC- 37 92-3267-360

OCT 29 1962

41

ST-118

CC 1531

63 NOV 1 1962

PAGE TWO

FREQUENTS, LOCATED CORNER LINDEN AND WILSHIRE.

SOURCE, UNION BANK, FURNISHED PHOTOSTAT OF CHECK DATED AUGUST SIXTEEN LAST, FOR OVER SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS, WHICH ROSSELLI RECEIVED FROM ROTHMAN AND HAMILTON, CLIENT-S TRUST ACCOUNT. THIS CHECK CONTAINS TYPEWRITTEN NOTATION QUOTE DISTRIBUTION, B AND R ENTERPRISES UNQUOTE. NO INFORMATION PRESENTLY AVAILABLE NATURE THIS FIRM.

LA FOUR THREE NINE THREE DASH PC, WHO IS ACQUAINTED WITH JUDITH E. CAMPBELL, FRIEND OF ROSSELLI AND SAM GIANCANA OF CHICAGO, ADVISED CAMPBELL-S MOTHER INFORMED HIM TODAY THAT JUDITH CURRENTLY RESIDING PALM SPRINGS, CALIFORNIA, BUT WOULD NOT FURNISH HER ADDRESS. SOURCE WILL ENDEAVOR ASCERTAIN CAMPBELL-S PRESENT RESIDENCE AND ACTIVITIES.

~~CORR PAGE 2 LINE 8 WORD 11 SHOULD BE WITH~~

END AND CXXX ACK PLS

OK FBI WA 2-38 AN AM LVS

TU DISCT

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY	FBI
RECORD NUMBER	124-10223-10070
RECORDS SERIES	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	92-3267-362

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR	FBI
FROM	SAC, LA
TO	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE	
DATE	10/25/62
PAGES	2
SUBJECTS	JRO, RES, ASSOC, EMPLOYEE
DOCUMENT TYPE	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS	4, SECTION 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	01/15/99
OPENING CRITERIA	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF IRS
COMMENTS	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
OCT 26 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 10/25/62 10-34 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C 2P

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA AR. LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT DASH C WAS AT FRIARS CLUB, BEVERLY HILLS, ON AFTERNOON OCTOBER TWENTY FOUR LAST BUT ROSSELLI NOT AT CLUB ALTHOUGH SEVERAL OF HIS FRIENDS INCLUDING IRVING J. LEFF, PART OWNER, NEW FORNTIER HOTEL, LAS VEGAS, WERE THERE. NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCE FURNISHED INFORMATION THAT JOSEPH I. BREEN, JR., CLOSE FRIEND OF ROSSELLI, VISITED BRIEFLY AT ROSSELLI-S LA APARTMENT AFTERNOON OCTOBER TWENTY FIVE INSTANT AND LEFT WITH WHAT APPEARED TO BE A BAG OF LAUNDRY. REPRESENTATIVE, IRS, LA, ADVISED HE

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

LA FOUR FOUR TWO ONE PC ADVISED THAT JACK BROOKS WHO WORKED FOR ROSSELLI IN LAS VEGAS AT TROPICANA HOTEL SEVERAL YEARS AGO OPERATING

END PAGE ONE

REC- 91 92-3267-362

13 OCT 29 1962

EX-118 IRS

50 NOV 2 1962

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 7/28/98 ds

C 1531

☐ RELEASE IN FULL
☒ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

PAGE TWO

PARKING LOT AND CAR RENTALS WAS THEN CLOSE TO ROSSELLI BUT WAS NOT NOW ON GOOD TERMS WITH ROSSELLI AND COULD PROBABLY FURNISH INFORMATION OF VALUE CONCERNING ROSSELLI-S ACTIVITIES AT THAT TIME. INFORMANT SAID BROOKS PRESENTLY LIVING IN FLORIDA. BROOKS- TRUE NAME IS BROOKSTEIN AND HE HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED IN THE PAST BY LAS VEGAS AGENTS AND WAS NOT TOO COOPERATIVE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF INFORMANT-S STATEMENT THAT BROOKS NOT ON GOOD TERMS WITH ROSSELLI, EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO LOCATE HIM FOR INTERVIEW.

END AND ACK

END AND ACK FOR 2 MSG PLS

1-39 AM OK FBIWA LVS FOR TWO

TU DISC

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10223-10071
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-3267-363

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, LA
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/29/62
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	JRO, RES, CAR RENTAL, HERTZ CORP
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	4
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/20/98
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

NA
44
2/

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
OCT 30 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Stapleton

URGENT 10/29/62 9-18 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C 1P

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA. AR.

NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCES ADVISE ROSSELLI RESIDING LA APARTMENT MORNING OCTOBER TWENTY NINE, INSTANT. LATE MODEL CHEVROLET BEARING CALIFORNIA LICENSE XZX EIGHT EIGHT ZERO PARKED IN ROSSELLI STALL AT APARTMENT GARAGE.

9-

HERTZ CORPORATION ADVISED THEIR CAR WITH LICENSE XZX EIGHT EIGHT ZERO RENTED AT TWO THIRTEEN AM ON OCTOBER TWENTY NINE, INSTANT BY JOHN ROSSELLI FROM HERTZ STATION AT BEVERLY HILTON HOTEL, BH, CALIFORNIA. RENTAL MADE BY TELEPHONE AND CAR DELIVERED TO ROSSELLI AT FRIAR-S CLUB, BEVERLY HILLS. CARTE BLANCHE CREDIT CARD USED BY ROSSELLI TO RENT CAR AND HE STATED HE WOULD RETURN CAR NOVEMBER TWO, NEXT.

EX-108 REC- 30 92-3267-363

LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT DASH C WAS AT FRIAR-S CLUB OCTOBER TWENTY TWO, LAST BUT DID NOT SEE ROSSELLI. ROSSELLI WAS PAGED AND AN ACQUAINTANCE TOOK CALL AND TOLD CALLER ROSSELLI NOT THERE.

ACK AND HOLD RLS

cc 153

6 OCT 30 1962

12-22 AM OK FBI WA LVS

58 NOV 2 1962

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10073
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-365

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 11/01/62
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : [RESTRICTED]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4, SECTION 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/15/99
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF IRS
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

NA 5
4-23

IRS
REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 7/28/98 ac
☐ RELEASE IN FULL
☒ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 2 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 11/1/62 11-59 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA. AR.

NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCES ADVISE ROSSELLI STILL RESIDING HIS LOS ANGELES APARTMENT.

LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT C WAS AT FRIAR-S CLUB, BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF., AFTERNOON AND EVENING OCTOBER THIRTY ONE LAST BUT ROSSELLI NOT THERE.

SPECIAL AGENT, IRS, LOS ANGELES, ADVISED

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

92-3267-365

REC-6

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

END PAGE ONE

56 NOV 7 1962

EX-118

C 21531

PAGE TWO

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

CORR PAGE ~~1 LINE 12 WORD 3 SHOULD BE MONTE~~

END AND ACK

3-05 AM OK FBI WA RAC

TU DISC

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10074
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-366

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 10/31/62
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : JRO, ASSOC, TRA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/20/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 1 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 10/31/62 10-14 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELEX 92-113C 2P

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA. AR.

LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT C OBSERVED ROSSELLI AT FRIAR-S CLUB, BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF., ABOUT FOUR P. M. OCTOBER THIRTY LAST IN COMPANY IRVING J. LEFF, A PART OWNER, NEW FRONTIER HOTEL, LAS VEGAS, AND AN INDIVIDUAL CALLED QUOTE ROSS UNQUOTE. LEFF RELATED THAT DURING CUBAN CRISIS LAST WEEK PEOPLE RUSHED TO BUY FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION AND ROSSELLI SAID THAT HE WAS IN MIAMI DURING THIS PERIOD AND PEOPLE THERE WERE DOING THE SAME THING.

LEFF ASKED ROSSELLI WHY HE DIDN-T CALL AND TELL LEFF WHAT TO DO. ROSSELLI SAID HE WAS IN LAS VEGAS AND LEFF COULD HAVE CALLED HIM BUT LEFF WAS QUOTE TOO CHEAP UNQUOTE TO MAKE THE CALL. INFORMANT SAID THAT APPARENTLY ROSSELLI RETURNED TO LOS ANGELES FRIDAY, OCTOBER TWENTY SIX LAST AND THEN THE SAME NIGHT OR THE FOLLOWING MORNING DEPARTED

END PAGE ONE

REC-25 92-3267-366

14 NOV 2 1962

p.926 6/8/72

56 NOV 8 1962

ST-104

CC 1531

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10076
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-368

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 11/02/62
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : JRO, CAR RENTAL, HERTZ CORP, TRA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/20/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

NA 11/3/62

DERAL BUREAU OF INV
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 2 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 11-2-62 8-29 PM MB

TO DIRECTOR, FBI /92-3267/

113C

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES /92-~~[illegible]~~/ 2P

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA. AR

LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT DASH C ADVISED ROSSELLI AT THE FRIAR-S CLUB AFTERNOON NOVEMBER ONE LAST. DURING AFTERNOON NAME OF PAT O-MALLEY, WHO IS ALLEGEDLY AFFILIATED WITH VENDING MACHINE OPERATIONS IN CHICAGO AREA, WAS MENTIONED AND ROSSELLI STATED THAT HE KNEW EVERYONE IN THE RACKETS IN CHICAGO BUT THAT HE NEVER HEARD OF O-MALLEY. ROSSELLI ALSO SAID THAT IN LAS VEGAS QUOTED ODDS ARE EIGHT TO FIVE THAT PAT BROWN WILL WIN OVER NIXON IN THE RACE FOR GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA. ROSSELLI THEN ADDED THAT HE WAS BETTING ON BROWN TO WIN BUT HE WAS GOING TO VOTE FOR NIXON. IN THIS REGARD IT IS NOTED THAT ROSSELLI IS NOT A REGISTERED VOTER IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY AND BECAUSE OF HIS CONVICTION IN FORTY THREE IS NOT ENTITLED TO VOTE.

EX. - 120 REC- 43 92-3267-368

25 NOV 5 1962

NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCES ADVISE ROSSELLI STILL IN LOS ANGELES.

HERTZ CORP, BEVERLY HILTON HOTEL STATION, ADVISED ROSSELLI STILL HAS POSSESSION OF RENTAL CAR WHICH HE STATED HE WOULD RETURN

END PAGE ONE

54 NOV 8 1962

C 1531

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10077
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-369

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 11/05/62
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : JRO, SGI, RES, JCEX, BANK ACCOUNT, REL, TELCAL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/20/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 6 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 11/5/62 10-38 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C 2P

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA, AR.

REVIEW BANK ACCOUNT JUDITH E. CAMPBELL, FRIEND OF ROSSELLI AND SAM GIANCANA OF CHICAGO, REVEALED SHE HAS MADE NO DEPOSITS AND DRAWN NO CHECKS DURING PAST THIRTY DAYS AND BALANCE IS UNDER FOUR DOLLARS.

CHECK OF TOLL CALLS CHARGED TO ACCOUNT OF CAMPBELL-S PARENTS FROM AUGUST SEVEN LAST TO SEPTEMBER SIX LAST REVEALS NUMBEROUS CALLS TO ARMORY LOUNGE, FOREST PARK, ILLINOIS, ALLEGED HANGOUT OF SAM GIANCANA, ALSO MADE MANY CALLS TO TELEPHONE NUMBER NA TWO DASH ONE FOUR TWO TWO IN CHICAGO. SUBSCRIBER THIS NUMBER NOT KNOWN.

EX 109 REC- 31 92-3267-369

LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT DASH C ADVISED ROSSELLI AT FRIAR-S CLUB, B. H. PLAYING CARDS ON NOVEMBER TWO LAST FROM ABOUT THREE P. M. UNTIL SEVEN THIRTY P. M. DURING A POLITICAL DISCUSSION. ROSSELLI STATED QUOTE ALL POLITICIANS ARE A

END PAGE ONE

CC 1531

NOV 7 1962

51 NOV 9 1962

Date : 01/15/99
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10223-10079
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-3267-371

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, LA
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	11/08/62
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	JRO, RES, ASSOC
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	4, SECTION 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	01/15/99
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF IRS
COMMENTS :	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

NA 2/6
3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 9 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

REVIEWED BY IRS ~~FBI~~/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 7/28/98 ds

☐ RELEASE IN FULL
☒ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

URGENT 11/8/62 10-55 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C 2P

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA, AR. LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT DASH C ADVISED HE OBSERVED ROSSELLI AT FRIAR-S CLUB, B. H., CALIFORNIA ABOUT FOUR P. M., NOVEMBER SEVEN LAST. ROSSELLI TALKING WITH IRVING J. LEFF, PART OWNER, NEW FRONTIER HOTEL, LAS VEGAS. ROSSELLI STILL AT CLUB AT SIX THIRTY P. M. WHEN INFORMANT LEFT. NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCE ADVISED THAT NINETEEN SIXTY TWO FORD T-BIRD, CALIFORNIA LICENSE XBU EIGHT FOUR TWO PARKED IN ROSSELLI-S APARTMENT GARAGE STALL MORNING NOVEMBER EIGHT INSTANT. BUREARU PRVEIOUSLY ADVISED THIS CAR REGISTERED TO HERMAN SPITZEL, FORMER EMPLOYER AND CLOSE FRIEND OF ROSSELLI. IN MARCH, NINETEEN SIXTY ONE, ROSSELLI CONTACTED PRIVATE DETECTIVE FRED OTASH REGARDING AN INVESTIGATION OTASH WAS CONDUCTING FOR PETER FAIRCHILD, GUARDIAN OF ROBERT MACHRIS

END PAGE ONE

REC- 14 92-3267-371

13 NOV 9 1962

EX 109

C C1531

50 NOV 15 1962

WESTBROOK, TWENTY ONE YEAR OLD OIL HEIR, WHO MARRIED ONE JUDI MEREDITH. WESTBROOK FILED SUIT FOR DIVORCE AND MEREDITH DEMANDED TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLAR SETTLEMENT. INVESTIGATION BY OTASH ALLEGEDLY INDICATED MEREDITH NOTHING MORE THAN QUOTE HIGH CLASS PROSTITUTE UNQUOTE AND REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN INTIMATE WITH SEVERAL CELEBRITIES IN LAS VEGAS. ROSSELLI TOLD OTASH HE WAS SPEAKING IN BEHALF OF CELEBRITIES WHO MIGHT HAVE POSSIBLE BEEN INVOLVED WITH MEREDITH AND REPORTEDLY OFFERED OTASH FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS IF HE WOULD TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO AVOID ANY BIG SCANDAL OR DEROGATORY PUBLICITY. WESTBROOK GRANTED ANNULMENT AND ALLEGEDLY MADE QUOTE UNDER THE TABLE SETTLEMENT UNQUOTE WITH MEREDITH OF THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS. IRS AGENTS ADVISED

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

ACK AND HOLD PLS

2-05 AM OK FBI WA ENT

TU

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10082
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-374

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 11/13/62
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : JRO, RES, ASSOC, BUSS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4, SECTION 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/15/99
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF IRS
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 1 4 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 11/13/62 8-54 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C 2P

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA. AR.

LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT C ADVISED HE OBSERVED ROSSELLI AT FRIAR-S CLUB, BEVERLY HILLS, EVENING NOVEMBER NINE LAST AND LATE AFTERNOON AND EARLY EVENING NOVEMBER TWELVE LAST. NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCE LEARNED ROSSELLI AT LOS ANGELES APARTMENT MORNING NOVEMBER THIRTEEN INSTANT.

ACCORDING TO LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT C, ON NOVEMBER TWELVE LAST, ROSSELLI AT FRIAR-S CLUB WITH QUOTE COMMANDER UNQUOTE HERMAN SPITZEL, CLOSE FRIEND AND FORMER EMPLOYER OF ROSSELLI. ROSSELLI REMARKED QUOTE THE DIRTY SOB-S ARE DIGGING INTO TWO OF MY CORPORATIONS BUT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO FIND ANYTHING BECAUSE I HAVE A GUY WORKING FOR ME THAT HAS IT SO SCREWED UP THEY WILL NEVER FIND ANYTHING UNQOUTE. [redacted]

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

REVIEWED BY [illegible] ON 7/25/98
☐ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☒ TOTAL DENIAL

END PAGE ONE

REC-46 92-3267-374

50 NOV 20 1962

X-115

NOV 14 1962

PAGE TWO

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT C SAID ROSSELLI REFERS TO HERMAN SPITZEL AS QUOTE COMMANDER UNQUOTE., THAT SPITZEL SCHEDULED ENTER HOSPITAL NOVEMBER TWELVE LAST AND ROSSELLI WILL BE USING SPITZEL-S CAR FOR NEXT MONTH.

~~CORR ON TIME SHOULD BE 8-54 PM~~

END AND ACK PLS

12-00 AM OK FBI WA HFL

TU DISCO

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10083
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-375

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 11/09/62
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : JRO, FISUR, RES, ASSOC

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/20/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

No Action
30% 11/10/62

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 1 0 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 11/9/62 10-54 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C 1P

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA, AR.

LA FORTY TWO SIXTY EIGHT DASH C OBSERVED ROSSELLI AT FRIAR-S CLUB, BEVERLY HILLS, EVENING NOVEMBER EIGHT LAST PLAYING CARDS WITH ALEXANDER RUDOLPH PAREN PH UNPAREN, NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED. ABOUT EIGHT THIRTY P. M., ROSSELLI HAD DINNER AT CLUB WITH JONIE TAPS AND QUOTE DOC UNQUOTE MERMAN, WHO WERE DESCRIBED BY SOURCE AS OFFICIALS OF TWENTIETH CENTRUY FOX STUDIOS.

NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCE AND PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE [redacted] DISCLOSED ROSSELLI AT APARTMENT UNTIL AFTER THREE P. M. NOVEMBER NINE INSTANT AND FORD T BIRD REGISTERED TO HERMAN SPITZEL PARKED IN ROSSELLI-S STALL AT APARTMENT GARAGE. SPITZEL IS CLOSE FRIEND AND FORMER EMPLOYEE OF ROSSELLI.

END AND ACK

1-58 AM OK FBI WA JR

TU DISCO

REC- 31
92-3267-375

12 NOV 13 1962

EX 109

58 NOV 16 1962

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10223-10085
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-3267-377

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, LA
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	11/14/62
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	JRO, ASSOC, TRA, PHYSICAL EXAM
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	4
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/20/98
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 15 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 11/14/62 10-30 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113 2P

JOHN ROSELLI. AR.

ROSSELLI HAD RESERVATION WAL TO LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, SIX THIRTY PM, NOV. FOURTEEN INSTANT, BUT CANCELLED AND MADE NO OTHER RESERVATION.

LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT C WENT TO DINNER ON NOV. THIRTEEN LAST WITH ROSSELLI AND JONIE TAPS, WHO INFORMANT SAYS IS OFFICIAL AT TWENTIETH CENTRUY FOX STUDIO. DURING DINNER ROSSELLI SAID ABOUT SIX YEARS AGO HE RECEIVED SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY THOUSAND DOLLARS FROM BRYAN FOY, MOVIE PRODUCER, TO PURCHASE UNIDENTIFIED HOTEL AND CASINO DOWNTOWN LAS VEGAS/ THAT DEAL WENT THROUGH AND ROSSELLI RECEIVED POINTS FOR HANDLING. IDENTITY OF HOTEL NOT PRESENT KNOWN.

ROSSELLI SAID GOING TO SANTA BARBARA THIS WEEK FOR PHYSICAL CHECK UP AND TO PALM SPRINGS, CALIF. ON NOV. SIXTEEN NEXT.

EX. - 120 REC- 26 92-3267-377

NOV 15 1962

END PAGE ONE 95

54 NOV 21 1962

C C1531

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10223-10086
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-3267-378

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, LA
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	11/15/62
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	JRO, RES, TRA, PHYSICAL EXAM
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	4
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/20/98
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

NA 208

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INV
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF J
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 1 6 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 11/15/62 9-38 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C 1P

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA. AR.

NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCES COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION THAT ROSSELLI AT LA APARTMENT ON NOVEMBER FIFTEEN INSTANT AND CAR OF HERMAN SPITZEL, WHICH ROSSELLI HAS BEEN USING NOT PARKED AT APARTMENT. ROSSELLI MAY HAVE GONE TO SANTA BARBARA FOR PHYSICAL CHECK-UP AS HE STATED TO LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT DASH C HE PLANNED TO DO THIS WEEK.

LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT DASH C DID NOT SEE ROSSELLI AT FRIAR-S CLUB, BEVERLY HILLS, ON AFTERNOON OR EVENING NOVEMBER FOURTEEN LAST.

END AND ACXXX

ACK AND HOLD PLS

12-43 AM OK FBI WA HL XXX HFL

EX-100

REC-54 92-3267-378

10 NOV 16 1962

50 NOV 20 1962

41

Date : 04/24/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10223-10087
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-3267-379

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, LA
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	11/16/62
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	JRO, FISUR, RES, HANGOUTS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	4
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/20/98
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 16 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 11/16/62 8-40 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C 1P

JOHN ROSELLI. AKA. AR.

ROSSELLI NOT AT LOS ANGELES APARTMENT NOR AT USUAL HANGOUTS NOV. SIXTEEN INSTANT ACCORDING TO NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCES, ~~FISUR~~ PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE AND LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT DASH C.

HOLD PLS

REC- 31
92-3267-319

EX. - 120

NOV 19 1962

97

58 NOV 23 1962

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10088
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-380

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 11/19/62
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : JRO, ASSOC, INQUIRIES, WHEREABOUTS, OBTAIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, B/F INT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4, SECTION 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/15/99
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF IRS
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

IRS

REVIEWED BY ~~HS~~JFK TASK FORCE

ON 7/28/98

☐ RELEASE IN FULL

☒ RELEASE IN PART

☐ TOTAL DENIAL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 19 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 11/19/62 8-50 PM AH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-113C 2P

JOHN ROSELLI, AKA, AR.

b NO INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCES, INFORMANTS AND FISUR THAT ROSELLI CURRENTLY IN LOS ANGELES.

LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT DASH C ADVISED THAT ON NOVEMBER SIXTEEN LAST HERMAN SPITZEL, FRIEND OF ROSSELLI, WHOSE CAR FXXXM ROSELLI IS USING WAS AT FRIAR-S CLUB AND MAKING INQUIRIES RE ROSELLI-S WHEREABOUTS.

IRS ADVISED THEY OBTAINED FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS ON B AND R AND R AND R ENTERPRISES, INC., [redacted] a

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

REC- 23 92- -380

END PAGE ONE 97

5 6 NOV 23 1962

PAGE TWO

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

END AND ACHXXX ACK FOR 4 MSG PLS

11-56 PM OK FBI WA LVS FOR 4

TU DISC

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10101
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 109-584-4269

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : INS
FROM : HAUS, L. H.
TO : ALL STEAMSHIP LINES
TITLE :
DATE : 04/08/63
PAGES : 39
SUBJECTS : JURE, ACA, LIST, INDIVIDUALS, PREVENTION OF DEPARTURE, TO CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/05/96
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS : INC MEMO, 3 LISTS

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

1 - asca

SAC, Miami (105-1742) 7-29-65

Director, FBI (109-584)

SP8 mac/nde 1·12·95 (JFK)
242961
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 BY SP1/GPK/mg
6/28/85 SP6 BJT/GCL #211,326

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS - CUBA

On 7-21-65, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) furnished by liaison the following items:

1. INS letter to all steamship agencies dated 4-8-63.
2. Undated document captioned "Cuban Raiders Ordered Not To Depart."
3. Undated document captioned "The Following Notices of Prevention of Departure to Cuba are Still in Effect."
4. Undated document captioned "Total Number Served and Outstanding."

You will note that all of these documents deal with individuals who have been ordered not to depart from the United States. One copy of each of the above items is enclosed for Miami.

Enclosures - 4

VHN:dbc (4)

ST-112 REC-3 109-584-4269

2 JUL 29 1965

NOTE:

The items being furnished Miami were furnished SA B. F. Rose by Carl Burrows of INS headquarters.

ENCLOSURE

copied partially re-initialed dupe with 109-584-3868
3/1/73 #172

13 copies made for review at FBIHQ by HSCA Request 1/20/78

MAILED 2
JUL 28 1965
COMM-FBI

9/30/77 DJC/ma
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re req 9/7/77
see Bufile 62-117290

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

68 AUG 24 1965 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED ES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IMMIGRA N AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
0 West Broadway
ew York 7, N.Y.

~~SECRET~~

April 8, 1963

TO ALL STEAMSHIP LINES: ~~SEC~~

GENTLEMEN:

Please be advised that the departure from the United States of the following persons is to be prevented, in accordance with the authority contained in Section 215, Immigration and Nationality Act and Presidential Proclamation No. 3004 dated January 17, 1953.

If any attempt is made by the following to book passage, please advise the Immigration Office at 20 West Broadway, New York 7, New York, telephone BArclay 7-0300, extension 293.

ALVAREZ-AMADOR, Jesus DOB 9/25/31, Cuba
ALVAREZ, RODRIGUES, Santiago DOB 7/25/07, Cuba
DE CASTRO-RODRIGUEZ, Juan Fernandez, DOB 6/2/27, Cuba
CORDOVA-MENESES, Eusebio, DOB 5/14/25, Cuba
CUSTA de VALLE, Antonio, DOB 5/13/26, Cuba
DIAZ-LANZ, Marcos Jose, DOB 5/20/28, Cuba
DIAZ-LANZ, Pedro Luis, DOB 11/8/26, Cuba
ESTEVEZ-VIERA, Eulalio, DOB 2/2/10, Cuba
FAJARDO-ROJAS, Juan, DOB 9/17/22 or 4/10/24, Cuba
FLEITES-DIAZ, Armando, DOB 4/4/30, Cuba
FONT-SUMELL, Ramon, DOB 6/16/22, Cuba
GARCIA-OLLER, Salvador , DOB 8/15/32, Cuba
ICIAN-ARGUADIN, Rafael Santos, DOB 11/1/36, Cuba
MARTINEZ-Miguel, Torro Cicilio Argelio, DOB 11/22/27, Cuba
MOR-RUIZ, Eddie Jose Ramon Cristin, DOB 12/5/42, Cuba
MUINA-GOMEZ, Pedro Gaspar, DOB 1/19/20, Cuba
NOBREGAS-HEZIA, Leslie Jose A. DOB 3/18/26, Cuba
PENA-Ballate, Bernabe DOB 7/7/41, Cuba
PEREZ-Quesada, Antonio DOB 12/23/09 Spain (citizen of Cuba)
QUIZA-DOCAL, Manuel DOB 8/26/31, Cuba
ROCHA-Fernandez, Luis DOB 5/3/39 Cuba
SALVAT-ROQUE, Juan Manuel DOB 5/11/40 Cuba
VALE-ARES, Roberto DOB 11/8/26 Cuba
VECIANA-BLANCH, Antonio DOB 10/18/28 Cuba
VIDAL-Santiago, Felipe, DOB 2/3/26 Cuba

1-12-95
FBI INFO
Classified by SP8-Mac/mdc
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

Copy of list captioned
"The following Notices
of Prevention of Departure to Cuba
are still in effect"
furnished [illegible]
7/28/65

Very truly yours,

L. H. HAUS
Acting Assistant District
Director for Travel Control

109-584-4869

ENCLOSURE

1 copies made
MPR 4/13/78
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 3/14/78 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

7-29-65

~~SECRET~~

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10223-10121
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-3267-508

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	LEG, RO
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/30/63
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	JRO, BKG, RCK, ROSELLI, VINCENZO, ROSELLI, MARIA RUSSO, ROSELLI, GIOVANNI, MISUR
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	4
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/21/97
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The American Embassy
Rome, Italy

Date: July 30, 1963

To: Director, FBI (92-3267)

From: Legat, Rome (92-77) (RUC)

Subject: JOHN ROSELLI, aka
ANTI-RACKETEERING

Re Los Angeles airtel 6/3/63 which requested Legat check birth records in Caserta, Italy.

Dr. Aristide Manopulo, Central Bureau, Criminal Division, Italian National Police, Rome, Italy, advised on July 26, 1963, that a check of the birth records in Caserta, Italy, and in the surrounding communities failed to reveal a record for Vincenzo Roselli, Maria Russo Roselli, or Giovanni Roselli. The records were also searched under the name Rosselli.

Dr. Manopulo stated all of the above individuals are unknown in Caserta and in the surrounding communities.

5 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison Section)
(2 - Los Angeles 92-113)
1 - Rome 92-77

REC- 27 92-3267-508

AUG 5 1963

EX-108

TJB:RAA
(6)

2cc g let to
La dy 0-7
1cc BTD
8/9/63 JCT/kg

60 AUG 12 1963

Date : 09/29/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10159
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : SEE TITLE

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSA
FROM : NSA
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 08/31/71
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : JURE, ADMIN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/98
OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF NSA
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

~~SECRET~~

2/00[CUG]R07-71 ~~(S)~~
31 AUG 71 1935Z
NSA/WR (NS)
NSA/HCF-WRMC(CV)

FBI

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

① EACH

~~(S1)~~ (S) (U)

for 5 NASA
Wannall

COMINT REPO

00[CUG]R07-71 ~~(S)~~

[BUREAU SOURCE -6-] Cuba ~~(S1)(S)~~

WARNING

This Document Contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

This document is to be distributed to and read by only those persons who are officially indoctrinated in accordance with communications intelligence security regulations and who need the information in order to perform their duties.

No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence and nature of the source.

~~(S1)(S)~~

[64-330-210-5797]

INDEXED

NOT RECORDED
SEP 28 1971

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

FOI/PA # 21,326
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT.
E.O. # 12356
DATE 6/21/85 INITIALS GCL

~~(S-1)(S)(FBI)~~

FBI INFO 3/23/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mde
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK)

~~SECRET~~

2/00[CUG]R07-71 ~~(S)~~
ICU/INSE,INTL,PROP/B,O.
31 AUG 71 1935Z
NSA/WR (NS)
NSA/HCF-WRMC (CV)

INSURGENT GROUP APPARENTLY ACTIVE IN CUBA

CUBA

An insurgent group known as the Cuban Revolutionary Junta is apparently active inside Cuba according to clandestine radio sources.

A broadcast on Monday morning, 30 August, from the clandestine radio station, "the Voice of the New Cuba," which is apparently a part of the Cuban exile group, "Accion Sindical Independiente" [Independent Labor Action - ASI], the official organ of the National Revolutionary Anti-Communist Front, appealed to the Cuban people to try, in any way possible, to get in touch with a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta.

CUBA

Previously, this radio station transmitted instructions to members of unidentified insurgent groups((A)).

((A)) 2/00[CUG]R03-71 and 2/00[CUG]R05-71. ~~(S)~~

NSA/WR PLUS WHITE HOUSE, SECSER
NSA/HCF-WRMC PLUS FBI

~~SECRET~~

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

~~SECRET~~

124-10223-10159

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10164
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-513

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 08/16/63
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : JRO, RES, TRA, ASSOC, REL, MISUR

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4, SECTION 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/21/99
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF IRS
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

REC-120 2

Date: 8/16/63

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (92-3267)

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (92-113C)

RE: JOHN ROSELLI, aka
AR

Evo [illegible] last para pg 2

LA 4396-C* advised ROSSELLI not at his Los Angeles apartment from afternoon 8/9/63 until evening 8/12/63. Whereabouts during this period unknown.

On evening of 8/13/63 neighborhood source observed ROSSELLI leaving his apartment carrying extra clothing. He left in his 1963 T-Bird which was being driven by a dark haired girl who was possibly his current girl friend, NATALIE V. LOUGHRAN, aka Vickie Lockwood. LA 4396-C* advised ROSSELLI did not return to apartment until evening of 8/14/63. ROSSELLI and girl may have driven to San Diego on evening 8/13/63. San Diego Office advised that MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN registered for apartment #146 at Half Moon Inn, San Diego, California (a $65 per day suite) on 8/13/63 and that there are "a number of hangers on" with FRIEDMAN. San Diego has been requested to conduct investigation to determine if ROSSELLI was also there.

LA 4268-C advised that ROSSELLI was at the Friar's Club in Beverly Hills, California, on afternoon of 8/15/63. While there, he called an individual named HARRY and discussed a check and denied that he had endorsed any check. VERN LYNCH, IRS, advised that on the morning of 8/15/63 an IRS representative interviewed [redacted]

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

per IRS letter dated 7/28/98 do

3 - Bureau
1 - Los Angeles
HFD:Jcc
(4)

REC-120 92-3267-513

AUG 19 1963

EX-103

58 AUG 23 1963

Approved: Special Agent in Charge Sent ______ M Per ______

C. C. Wick

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

LA 4268-C advised that while in New York for the past month he met U.S. Congressman ALFRED SANTANGELO of Yorkville, N.Y., and one of SANTANGELO's first remarks was to inquire if informant knew JOHN ROSSELLI of L.A. and added that whenever he goes to Las Vegas or Los Angeles he stays with ROSSELLI and spends most of his time with him. When informant returned to Los Angeles, he mentioned SANTANGELO to ROSSELLI and ROSSELLI commented that SANTANGELO was a good friend.

D.C.

Nev.

Calif.

Legat, Rome, advised that check of records of births at Caserta, Italy, and surrounding communities failed to reveal a record for VINCENZO, MARIA or GIOVANNI ROSELLI or ROSSELLI. It is recalled that an informant stated he believed ROSSELLI's parents were from Caserta, Italy.

CALif.

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

92-3267-515

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10169
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-518

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, LA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 09/09/63
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : JRO, RES, ASSOC, TRA, MISUR

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/17/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FD-36 (Rev. 3-56)

8

F B I

Date: 9/9/63

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (92-3267)

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (92-113C)

RE: JOHN ROSELLI, aka
AR

LA 4396-C* advised that ROSSELLI has not resided at his Los Angeles apartment during the past week and has not been at the apartment since 8/28/63, when he went to Las Vegas, Nevada, with ALBERT FOLEY.

LA 4268-C advised that he has not observed ROSSELLI at the Friar's Club in Beverly Hills, California, for about one week.

The Las Vegas Office advised that as of 9/4/63 ROSSELLI was still registered at the Desert Inn Hotel in Las Vegas, however, he had not been observed in the hotel for two days and that one ALBERT FOLEY, who registered at the hotel on 8/28/63, gave his address as 3669 Old Shell Road, Mobile, Alabama. The Mobile address would indicate that ALBERT FOLEY is the Jesuit Priest from Spring Hill College, Mobile, Alabama.

CC: WH

On 8/31/63 ROSSELLI received a telephone call at the Desert Inn Hotel, from a Miss G. LOWELL at telephone number HO 6-3441, Hollywood, California. This is the telephone number of Martoni Italian Restaurant, Hollywood, California. Miss G. LOWELL is probably Miss GERALDINE LOWELL, who endeavored to locate ROSSELLI in Las Vegas on 8/28/63.

3 - Bureau
1 - Los Angeles

HFD:jcc
(4)

REC-29

92-3267-518

ST-112

6 SEP 10 1963

53 SEP 20 1963

Approved: WH Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

ROBERT W. LINDSAY, General Manager, Half Moon Inn, San Diego, California, advised that MAURICE FRIEDMAN and a large party were registered in two suites at this Inn from 8/22 - 25/63 and that ROSSELLI was present in this group.

On 9/4/63 LA 4268-C advised that BEN WOHLSTADER, a member of the Friars Club, showed informant a photograph of ROSSELLI, FRIEDMAN, JACK BARENFELD and MARTY GOODMAN, each with a girl firend seated at a table. WOHLSTADER said the photograph was taken the previous week at Del Webb's Ocean House, San Diego, California, on the occasion of the celebration of his, WOHLSTADER's, 30th wedding anniversary. The San Diego Office is being requested to endeavor to obtain some of the photographs through the photographer who took them.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10223-10171
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-3267-520

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, LA
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/21/63
PAGES :	3
SUBJECTS :	JRO, RES, TRA, ASSOC, BANK ACCOUNT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	4, SECTION 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	01/21/99
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF IRS
COMMENTS :	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 9/21/63

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (92-3267)

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (92-113C)

RE: JOHN ROSELLI, aka.
AR

ROSSELLI has been residing in Los Angeles since 9/11/63. On 9/20/63, he departed Los Angeles for Las Vegas, Nevada at 12:00 p.m. via TWA Flight #148.

On 9/13/63, VERNON E. LYNCH, Intelligence Unit, IRS, Los Angeles,

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

B

3-Bureau
1-Las Vegas (92-467)
2-Los Angeles
(HFD:ged
(6)

REC-20

92-3267-520

SEP 23 1963

C.C. Wick

per IRS letter dated 7/28/98 / drs

Approved: WGS 1804 Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

61 SEP 27 1963

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

It has already been reported to the Bureau that ROSSELLI deposited this $25,000.00 check to his account at the Fidelity Bank, Beverly Hills, California, on 7/11/63.

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

On 9/20/63, Los Angeles Police Department advised that recently one of their officers called the last known telephone number they had for ROSSELLI. This number was OL 4-7164. ROSSELLI has not had this number since March, 1961. The officer asked for ROSSELLI and the woman who answered said ROSSELLI was not there but would be in later. The woman then told the officer that Mr. NESSER was in and could probably help the caller (LAPD Officer). The officer declined to talk to NESSER. The Los Angeles Police Department ascertained that telephone number OL 4-7164 is currently listed to Home Savings and Loan Association. IRS, Los Angeles, who had also received this information from the Los Angeles Police Department ascertained that OL 4-7164 is answered by Lauria's Telephone Answering Service for GORDON NESSER, an employee of Home Savings and Loan. IRS also found that during the past two months, ROSSELLI has received several calls in c/o NESSER at telephone number OL 4-7164. IRS has already made arrangements for interview of NESSER regarding his relationship with ROSSELLI, and specifically as to whether or not ROSSELLI has invested money in some real estate venture.

IRS stated that on 9/13/63 IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]
IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]
On 9/16/63, LA 4129-C advised that shortly after noon on 9/13/63, ROSSELLI came to Perino's Restaurant alone and

92-3267-520

Date : 04/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10223-10173
RECORDS SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-3267-522

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, RH
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/27/63
PAGES :	10
SUBJECTS :	JRO, ASSOC, TELCAL, BKG, RCK, GAMBLING, RACK ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	4
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/17/98
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/27/63

FROM : SAC, RICHMOND (92-264) - P -

SUBJECT: JOHN ROSSELLI, aka
AR

(OO: LOS ANGELES)

9

Re Los Angeles letters to New York dated 8/7 and 30/63. U

The referenced communications requested the Richmond and various other Divisions to ascertain the identity of subscribers to numerous telephone numbers which have been called from a telephone of ROBERT A. MAHEU and Associates, 10889 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. U

The results of the investigation by Richmond are being forwarded to the Bureau because two former Special Agents of the FBI are among the subscribers to telephones called from this Los Angeles office. U

The following investigation was conducted by SA HOWARD E. RICHARDSON. The information from the telephone records referred to below is confidential and cannot be made public prior to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directed to the Manager of the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company (C & P Tel. Co.), or his duly authorized representative in the various cities referred to below: U

RE: WILLIAM J. STATEN
3531 N. Valley Street
Arlington, Virginia

The records of the C & P Tel. Co., Arlington, Va., on 8/19/63, revealed that number 536-6343 (KE 6-6343) is

2 - Bureau
2 - Los Angeles (92-113)
2 - WFO (92-715)
2 - Richmond
HER/mw
(8)

92-3267-522

2 SEP 30 1963

REC-104

XEROX
OCT 7 1963

55 OCT 9 1963

PERS. REC. UNIT

Credit Bureau, Inc., at which time he located a report dated 7/5/63. This report reflects that KEITH L. HANNA, and his wife VIRGINIA, have resided at 615 Poplar Drive, Falls Church, Virginia, since August 1, 1944. He was listed as being 51 years of age and employed by the Small Business Administration as an Administrator Comptroller where he had been employed since 12/17/51. His estimated income was listed as $12,845.00 per year. He was formerly employed by the U. S. Department of Agriculture as an accountant. He formerly resided at 316 N. Oxford St., Arlington, Va., and at Acton, Indiana. His credit was rated as satisfactory.

Officer HOTTLE, Records Section, Falls Church Police Department, Falls Church, Va., on 8/23/63, advised IC THOMAS E. DREWRY that records of his office do not contain any information identifiable with KEITH L. HANNA, approximately 51 years of age. He stated that the records of his office do reflect that one KEITH LAWRENCE HANNA, 615 Poplar St., Falls Church, Va., a white male, born 10/19/42, has been issued several traffic citations by that department. This individual appears to be a son of the above captioned KEITH L. HANNA.

RE: J. H. SIMS
5052 N. 36th Street
Arlington, Virginia

CS RH 97-C on 9/6/63, advised SA HOWARD E. RICHARDSON that telephone number KE 6-8604 is subscribed to by Captain JOHN H. SIMS, U. S. Navy, 5052 N. 36th St., Arlington, Va. This individual has Naval Serial Number 86445 and at the time this telephone service was installed on 8/11/61, was assigned to the Industrial War College as a member of the U. S. Navy.

RE: EUGENE T. TISON
2424 Lunceford Lane
Falls Church, Virginia

CS RH 97-C on 9/6/63, advised SA HOWARD E. RICHARDSON that telephone number TW 3-7764 and TW 3-8195 are both subscribed to by EUGENE T. TISON, 2424 Lunceford Lane, Falls Church, Va.

TISON has a "kep button" set.

The 1963 Falls Church, Va. City Directory reflects that EUGENE T. TISON, whose wife is identified as CATHERINE M. TISON, is a communications worker for the U. S. Government. His specific job and the agency for which he works were not identified.

LEADS:

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

1. Will verify the employment of ROSCOE C. WILLIAMS at the Standard Oil Company.

2. Will verify the employment of KEITH L. HANNA at the Small Business Administration.

3. Will contact logical sources and any information indicating gambling or racketeering activities on the part of any of the individuals mentioned herein as residence of the Virginia portion of the Washington, D. C.-Metropolitan area.

RICHMOND

AT ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

Will review the rental application of J. O'HARRA at the Governor Hill Apartments, 5111 S. 8th Road, for

Date : 04/17/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10223-10304
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 166-3200-1ST NR 524

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : DIRECTOR, FBI
TO : AG
TITLE :
DATE : 02/01/72
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : JRO, PARZOW, WILLIAM ALEXANDER, OC, RES, TRA, REL, BUSS, ASSOC

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/17/98
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

The Attorney General

February 1, 1972

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Bates
1 - Mr. Bolz
1 - Mr. Shanley

WILLIAM ALEXANDER PARZOW,
ALSO KNOWN AS
WILLIAM ABRAHAM PARZOW
ABE PARZOW
ABIE WILLIAMS
"ABIE THE SENATOR" Parzow
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD SECTION)

The following information was received from an informant of this Bureau who has furnished reliable information in the past. Because of the informant's sensitive position in organized crime, our Los Angeles, California, Office requests the information be dealt with in strict confidence.

William Alexander Parzow, reportedly well known in organized crime and a New Jersey resident, was visiting his son-in-law, Donald Brownstone, 19566 Columbia Avenue, Rialto, California, on January 10 and 11, 1972. According to the informant, Parzow operates an insurance business in New York, New York, and is a non-practicing attorney; however, his main business is influence peddling and politically fixing situations for individuals who have hoodlum connections and who can pay vast sums of money for this purpose. Parzow claims to be "well connected" with Murray M. Chotiner, former Special Counsel to the President, Edward Bennett Williams, the well known Washington, D. C., attorney, and William G. Hundley, former Section Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering, U. S. Department of Justice.

MAILED 2
FEB 1 1972
FBI

On January 10, 1972, while in Los Angeles, California, Parzow reportedly made the statement that one of the reasons he was in Los Angeles was that an unnamed individual in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, asked him to see if he could assist in obtaining the release of Manuel Ricky Jacobs who is currently incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution, Lompoc, California. This Bureau's files reveal Jacobs was convicted in U. S. District Court, Los Angeles, California, on December 18, 1969, for violations regarding interstate travel and use of interstate facilities in aid of racketeering enterprises, interstate transportation of fraudulently taken securities, and false statements in income tax returns.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 63-2972-3

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

JFS:bjp
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2.

166-3200-
NOT RECORDED
145 FEB 2 1972

FEB 2 1972

59 FEB 7 1972

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

On January 10, 1972, Parzow also indicated that he had in his possession Federal Grand Jury transcripts concerning an Eastern Pennsylvania grand jury that was looking into election law violations, which investigation was headed by a Federal Strike Force. He gave no reason for having the transcripts, but reportedly said the case involved one Pat Brown from California, not further identified, and four governors from other states. Parzow claimed to have received these transcripts from a ranking official with the Federal Strike Force. On January 11, 1972, Parzow exhibited certain documents which the informant believed to be question and answer Federal Grand Jury transcripts. They were from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and one was dated June 30, 1971.

On January 11, 1972, Parzow remarked that he had met the son of John Allesio and as a result of that meeting he intends to assist Allesio in effecting his early release from the Federal Correctional Institution, Lompoc. He said payment for this service will be in premiums paid to his New York insurance company; however, no insurance policy will be issued. This Bureau has determined that John Allesio is currently incarcerated in the above correctional institution following his conviction in U. S. District Court, San Diego, California, for tax fraud.

No investigation in this matter is being conducted by this Bureau in the absence of a specific request from the U. S. Department of Justice.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

NOTE: Above information furnished by LA 4711-C-TE who has furnished extremely reliable information in the past concerning organized crime matters. Because of the vague nature of the information attributed to subject Parzow, this information is being brought to the attention of the Department and no further action is indicated at this time.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10225-10195
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-114543-1ST NR 224

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	CIA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	01/19/1965
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	MR, CUBAN INVASION, COST, MILITARY MOBILIZATION
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	05/06/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ○ ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA

TDCSDB-315/00171-65

DATE OF INFO. JANUARY 1964 - EARLY JANUARY 1965

DISTR. 19 JANUARY 1965

SUBJECT

COST OF MOBILIZATION OF CUBAN ARMED FORCES AND EFFORT TO ECONOMIZE

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (18 JANUARY 1965)

REF D-AAP-06300

IN 62296

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-6535

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [A HIGHLY PLACED CUBAN OFFICIAL WHO HAS PROVIDED DOCUMENTARY INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN CONSIDERED RELIABLE SINCE FEBRUARY 1964.] (S)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Except for the Brackets JM 6-25-97 (SLD/NSR 8-2-97 JFK)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-22-94 BY SP8 ~~MAC~~/ICSR (JFK)

105-114543 (JURE)

1. DURING THE YEAR 1964, THE ESTIMATED COST OF MOBILIZATION PER MAN PER DAY TO THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT WAS $5.01 PESOS. THE 32-DAY MOBILIZATION OF 51,000 MEN IN THE SPRING OF 1964 REPORTEDLY COST THE MINISTRY OF THE ARMED FORCES A MINIMUM OF $8,176,320 PESOS. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS MOBILIZATION TOOK PLACE BEFORE AND AFTER 20 MAY WHEN AN INVASION ATTEMPT BY EXILE FORCES LED BY MANUEL RAY RIVERO WAS ANTICIPATED BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT.) 105-114543-

NOT RECORDED
191 JAN 26 1965

2. DURING LATE DECEMBER 1964 AND EARLY JANUARY [illegible]IZATION OF 17,000 MEN FOR NINE DAYS RESULTED IN A MINIMUM COST OF

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XASDX USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO FBI

CIA/NMCC NPIC TREASURY AD/CI I&NS

ORIGINAL FILED IN

58 JAN 29 1965

766

113-7-210

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10226-10305

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-9844-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

Document Information

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : TRANKLEY, ALLAN M.
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 03/31/1967
PAGES : 163

SUBJECTS :
NRO, PERSONAL HISTORY, BKG, CRIMINAL RECORD, ASSOC, CRIM ACT, LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISES, PHYSICAL DESCR

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted; 1B; 4; 10(a)2; 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/13/1999

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA, IRS, BOP

COMMENTS : REFERRED TO BOP, INC 8 RPT

263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
MIAMI	MIAMI	1/31/69	10/16/68 - 1/24/69

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
NORMAN ROTHMAN, aka	ALLAN M. TRANKLEY	bab
	CHARACTER OF CASE AR	

REFERENCES: Atlanta letter to Miami, 11/22/68.
Report of SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY, 11/25/68, at Miami.
Miami letter to Las Vegas, 12/9/68.
Miami teletype to New York, 1/7/69.

-P-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

LEAD:

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Will follow and report subject's activities.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☒ NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☒ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☒ NO

APPROVED — SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

3 - Bureau (92-9844)

2 - Miami (92-1870)

1 cc AAG 1527

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

92-9844-9 REC-33

6 FEB 3 1969

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency				
Request Recd.	1 CC. AAG, Criminal Division,			
Date Fwd.	Organized Crime and Racketeering			
How Fwd.	Section, Room 2524.			2/7/69
By				

Notations

NONE STAT. SECT.

51 FEB 10 1969

COVER PAGE

GPO 1968 O - 299-885

MM 92-1870

INFORMANTS

MM T-1 is MM 725-C

MM T-2 is PCI RICHARD N. FUENTES

MM T-3 is MM 509-C

B.*

COVER PAGE

339-10892

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Follow and report subject's activities.

INFORMANTS

MM T-1 is MM 509-C.

MM T-2 is MM 725-C.

55P-10302

MM 92-1870

MIAMI

AT WEST PALM BEACH, FLORIDA

Will determine owner of car on which 1967-1968 Florida license 6WW-6273 appears. Will conduct credit and criminal checks regarding this individual.

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Will follow and report subject's activities.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

The investigative period of this report predates the period of the last report submitted because investigation conducted was not received prior to the preparation of the last report.

INFORMANTS:

MM T-1 is MM 725-C.

B*
COVER PAGE

JJP-10302

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of:	ALLAN M. TRANKLEY	**Office:**	Miami, Florida
Date:	January 31, 1969		
Field Office File #:	92-1870	**Bureau File #:**	92-9844
Title:	NORMAN ROTHMAN		
Character:	ANTI-RACKETEERING		

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/ICSR
(JFK)

Synopsis:

Subject reportedly in Atlanta, Georgia, 10/68, to arrange for payment of gambling debts owed by Atlanta individual. Reportedly has lost Albion Lounge, Miami Beach, Fla., for failure to pay bills. Subject presently in NY, NY, purpose not known.

-P-

DETAILS:

TRAVEL

On November 25, 1968, Mr. A. NEWMAN, National Airlines, Miami International Airport, advised that subject had taken Flight #6 to New York, New York and had departed at 1:20 PM.

On December 9, 1968, JOE FALCONE, Station Manager, National Airlines, Miami International Airport, advised that subjectwas to take Flight #90 to LaGuardia Field, New York, New York, departing Miami at 5:00 PM. At 4:48 PM, subject was observed to board the plane. He was alone.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

MM 92-1870

INFORMANTS

MM T-1 is MM 727-C.

MM T-2 is MM 725-C.

- B* -
COVER PAGE

92-10332

MM 92-1870

ADMINISTRATIVE:

The information concerning subject's activities in Atlanta was not received prior to submission of report dated 11/25/68.

INFORMANTS:

MM T-1 is MM 725-C.

MM T-2 is AT 1881-C.

MM T-3 is DANNY BAITCHER, owner and manager of Fan and Bill's Restaurant, Atlanta, Georgia, who furnished information on a confidential basis.

REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~ IRS/JFK TASK FORCE

ON 6/19/98

☐ RELEASE IN FULL

☑ RELEASE IN PART

☐ TOTAL DENIAL

B*
COVER PAGE

55P-10302

ASSOCIATES

On December 3, 1968, FABIO DE CRESTOFARO was observed leaving the Albion Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida, at 3:20 PM. DE CRESTOFARO was observed to drive to the Fontainebleau Hotel, arriving at 3:30 PM.

On December 22, 1968, MM T-1 advised that DE CRESTOFARO is still shylocking in addition to being employed as a bartender in the Gigi Room of the Fontainebleau Hotel on the morning and afternoon shift, 11:00 AM to 6:00 PM.

RESIDENCE

Neither subject nor his automobile were observed at his residence on the following dates:

November 21, 25, 1968

December 18, 31, 1968

January 7, 22, 1969

On December 16, 1968, at 2:10 PM, an individual in a black Chevrolet bearing New York license ZU 7337 was observed to enter subject's residence. He was carrying a package.

On January 7, 1969, Special Agent DICK JAFFE, Internal Revenue Service, advised that he had been informed that subject was presently residing in Room 1932 of the City Squire Motor Inn, 51st Street and Broadway, New York, New York.

EMPLOYMENT

On October 16, 1968, MM T-2 advised SA JOHN P. GRANFIELD that subject had just arrived in Atlanta from Miami, Florida, and that subject's purpose in coming to Atlanta was apparently to collect $10,000 from an unknown individual.

On October 17, 1968, MM T-2 advised that the $10,000 subject was going to collect was very possibly a gambling debt owed to one of the Las Vegas casinos by HOWARD HALPERN. HALPERN is the owner of the American Fruit Purveyors, Inc., and is affiliated with DANNY BAITCHER in some way with the operation of Fan and Bill's Restaurant in Atlanta.

92-8844-9
550-10302

On November 8, 1968, MM T-3 advised SA JOHN A. OGDEN that HALPERN had gone to Las Vegas, Nevada in the past and gambled at an unidentified casino. Informant stated that HALPERN lost a considerable amount of money and that subject's visit to Atlanta was to collect the debt owed by HALPERN to the Las Vegas casino. Informant advised that HALPERN worked out an arrangement with subject but informant did not know the details thereof.

MM T-3 maintained that no threats or force of any kind was used by ROTHMAN in an effort to collect these debts.

On October 31, 1968, SA WILLIAM B. WATTS, JR., determined from R. G. Cox, Manager, Admiral Benbow Inn, 1470 Spring Street, N. W., Atlanta, that ROTHMAN stayed at this motel from October 16, 1968 to October 18, 1968. While there, ROTHMAN made two long distance toll calls. The record of these calls was sent to the motel's Memphis, Tennessee headquarters.

ME 92-831
MM 92-1870
GDO:tjm
1

The following investigation was conducted at Memphis, Tennessee, on December 17, 1968, by SA GEORGE D. OOSTERHOUS:

Mrs. JOAN WHITAKER, Bookkeeper, Admiral Benbow Inns, Inc., 29 South Bellevue Boulevard, made available records of long-distance telephone calls, which were made on October 17, 1968, from the Admiral Benbow Inn, 1470 Spring Street, Northwest, Atlanta, Georgia.

WHITAKER located two long-distance telephone call receipts for ROTHMAN made from Room 147. The first receipt indicated that ROTHMAN called area code 305 - telephone number 221-9573 and talked three minutes for total charges amounting to $.72.

The second receipt indicated ROTHMAN called area code 305 - telephone number 757-1695 and talked for three minutes for total charges amounting to $1.32.

There was no other information on these receipts.

Mrs. WHITAKER advised that the original long-distance telephone receipts would be made available to the FBI upon issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directed to Mr. BOB TUTT, Comptroller, Admiral Benbow Inns, Inc., 29 South Bellevue Boulevard, Memphis, Tennessee.

A review of the 1969 Miami Criss Cross Directory on January 13, 1969, revealed that telephone number 757-1695 is subscribed to by Webb Realty Associates, Biscayne Shopping Plaza, Miami, Florida.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 1/24/69

The records of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company were reviewed and the following information obtained for telephone number 221-9573:

Listed to	OLGA CHAVIANO
Billed to	Same
Address	2950 S. W. 78th Avenue
Date Connected	Prior to November, 1967
Employment	Self-employed - singer
Credit Rating with Telephone Co.	D

This is a non-published telephone number.

The above records are confidential and can only be obtained through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. This subpoena should be directed to Mr. JOHN D. SADLER, South Florida Commercial Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami, Florida, or his authorized representative.

6

On 1/17/69 at Coral Gables, Florida File # Miami 92-1870

by IC PHILIP F. CROGHAN:lht Date dictated 1/21/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

On December 22, 1968, MM T-1 advised that ROTHMAN was still out of town. He further advised that ROTHMAN lost the Albion Hotel Lounge for failure to pay his bills.

On January 3, 1969, MM T-1 advised that ROTHMAN had not returned to Miami.

On January 15, 1969, MM T-3 advised that the indebtedness which HOWARD HALPERN incurred took place at the Sands, Frontier, and Caesar's Palace Casinos. MM T-3 further advised that he assumes HALPERN is paying off his debts by making payments directly to those casinos.

MISCELLANEOUS

On January 24, 1969, BERNIE SULLIVAN, Ticket Counter Supervisor, National Airlines, Miami International Airport, advised that an unidentified individual had left a sealed envelope with a set of keys inside at the National Airlines counter for ROTHMAN to pick up. He advised he would notify the FBI when the envelope was picked up.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 92-1870

Miami, Florida
January 31, 1969

Title NORMAN ROTHMAN

Character ANTI-RACKETEERING

Reference is made to report of SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY dated and captioned as above at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-263 (Rev 3-8-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
MIAMI	MIAMI	11/25/68	9/27 - 11/20/68	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
O NORMAN ROTHMAN, aka.		ALLAN M. TRANKLEY		neb
		CHARACTER OF CASE AR		

n
Kup

REFERENCE: Report of SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY dated 9/27/68, at Miami; Atlanta letter to Miami, 10/15/68.

- P -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5-668 SLD/ksR
(JFK)

LEAD

MIAMI:

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Will follow and report subject's activities;

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☒ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☒ NO

APPROVED Kewl SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

3 - Bureau (92-9844)

2 - Miami (92-1870)

1cc DAD 1537

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

92-9844-8

REC 36

EX-113

12 NOV 27 1968

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency	1	CC. AAG, Criminal Division,		
Request Recd.	Organized Crime and Racketeering			
Date Fwd.	Section, Room 2524."			
How Fwd.	391			12/2/68

Notations

~~NINE~~

STAT. ~~SECT.~~

61 DEC 3 1968

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: ALLAN M. TRANKLEY
Date: November 25, 1968
Office: MIAMI, FLORIDA

Field Office File #: 92-1870
Bureau File #: 92-9844

Title: NORMAN ROTHMAN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

Character: ANTI-RACKETEERING

Synopsis: Subject has been observed on only one occasion during period 9/27 - 11/20/68. Attempt again made to cover subject's travel, but after placing a stop with airlines, anonymous telephone call received at Albion Lounge re checking on subject's travel. Subject reportedly still keeping company with mistress OLGA CHAVIANO.

- P -

DETAILS:

TRAVEL

On October 1, 1968, MM T-1 advised that he heard that NORMAN ROTHMAN went to New York City on his last trip from Miami. Informant stated he heard no comment relative to a stop at Atlanta, but pointed out that ROTHMAN, in the past, has flown to various places without making any comment on such trips.

Due to continued reports that ROTHMAN was again traveling frequently, Mr. R. W. GABLE, Reservations Manager, National Airlines, and JOE SMITH, station manager, National Airlines, were contacted again on October 3, 1968, and both advised they would contact the FBI should ROTHMAN's travel come to their attention.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967-O-273-878

On October 10, 1968, DICK WEISENBORN, Chief Supervisor, Reservations, Eastern Airlines, and CHARLES STATON, ticket counter manager, Eastern Airlines, were contacted regarding ROTHMAN's travel. They advised they would notify the FBI should ROTHMAN's travel come to their attention.

On October 10, 1968, MM T-1 advised that on October 4 or October 5, 1968, an anonymous telephone call was received at the Albion Lounge wherein the caller requested that FABIO DE CRESTOFARO be advised to alert NORMAN ROTHMAN that he was being checked on at the airport. Informant stated that DE CRESTOFARO located ROTHMAN in New York City and relayed this information to him. As a result, informant advised, ROTHMAN traveled under an assumed name on his return trip.

Informant stated he has no information as to where ROTHMAN makes reservations for his out-of-town trips. He stated there is a possibility that ROTHMAN secures the reservations through one of MAX EDER's friends or contacts.

On November 6, 1968, MM T-1 advised he had heard that NORMAN ROTHMAN had been out of town since October 22, 1968. Informant had no information as to where ROTHMAN traveled or the date of his return.

ASSOCIATES

On October 17, 1968, MM T-1 advised that PATTY ERRA, RALPH SORRENTINO, JOE INDELICATO, and NORMAN ROTHMAN were together on the afternoon of October 14, 1968, at the Albion Hotel Lounge.

On November 6, 1968, MM T-1 advised that FRANK COOK, bartender at the Albion Hotel lounge and a close friend of NORMAN ROTHMAN, has been selling some guns. Informant stated some of the guns were .38 caliber snub nose. Informant stated that COOK had about a dozen guns and heard that COOK expects about one hundred guns in the near future to sell in the area. Informant stated he does not know the source of the guns.

On October 31, 1968, MM T-3 advised that FRANK COOK, a bartender, is a close friend of NORMAN ROTHMAN.

CONTACTS

It was previously reported that NORMAN ROTHMAN had been in contact with an individual in Atlanta, Georgia, at telephone number 876-0701.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date October 15, 1968

Records Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Atlanta, Georgia, reflect local area number 876-0701, was listed to RONALD GELET, 120 Alden Avenue, NW, Apartment D3. Services were connected June 23, 1966, and the monthly bill is sent to Mr. R. J. HAYES, 708 Spring Street, NW, Atlanta.

Records pertaining to the above number can only be obtained by the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directed to Mr. THEODORE A. KING, Security Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, 805 Peachtree Street, NE, Atlanta, Georgia

4.

On 10/7/68 at Atlanta, Georgia File # Atlanta 92-738

by IC MARION W. DAVIS:mcc Date dictated 10/11/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

On October 7, 1968, Miss JO PRESSLEY, Atlanta, Georgia, Police Department (APD) Identification Division, and Mr. JOHN TALLENT, station captain's office, APD, advised records of their department were negative for a RONALD GELET or a R. J. HAYES.

Mr. JOHN RITTER, Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, advised records of his department were negative for a RONALD GELET or R. J. HAYES.

Mrs. BARBARA WAGER, Georgia State Motor Vehicle Bureau, Atlanta, advised she could locate no record of the vehicle registered under the name of RONALD GELET. Also, due to a large number of R. J. HAYES, ROBERT HAYES, and so forth, she could not identify a vehicle registered to R. J. HAYES without specifically knowing local address other than business address.

Mrs. DOT MERRIT, Georgia State Department of Public Safety, Driver's License Bureau, Atlanta, advised records were negative for RONALD GELET. Mrs. MERRIT further advised that she could not identify a R. J. HAYES in the files of her department without more specific information.

Atlanta City Directories reflect the address of 708 Spring Street was listed for Sol Mica of Georgia, Inc., contractors in aluminum siding.

On October 17, 1968, MM T-1 advised that ROTHMAN received a telephone call from one EDDIE (Last Name Unknown) out of Atlanta, Georgia, at about 11:45 p.m. on October 14, 1968. Informant stated he did not know the identity of EDDIE, or from where EDDIE was calling.

MISCELLANEOUS

ROTHMAN was not observed at his residence or at any of his known haunts on the following dates:

September 27, 30;

October 3, 4, 25, 29, 30;

November 5, 7, 13, 14, 18, 20, 1968.

On November 4, 1968, ROTHMAN's car was observed parked at his residence at 11:20 a.m.

On October 1, 1968, MM T-1 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN and ARMANDO (Last Name Unknown), a representative of the Hotel Employees, Bartenders, and Waitresses Union, along with "PINKY" SCHIFFMAN, President of Local 255, RUBY BLACKMER, and possibly MORRIS LANSBURGH, had a meeting apparently to discuss the hiring of a bartender at the Eden Roc Hotel. Informant further advised that before ROTHMAN went to the meeting, he talked the matter over with PATTY ERRA.

On October 17, 1968, MM T-1 advised ROTHMAN supports two homes, the home of his wife and the home of OLGA (Last Name Unknown), his mistress, whom he first met in Cuba.

On November 4, 1968, MM T-2 advised that OLGA MARIA CHAVIANO, ROTHMAN's mistress, resides at 2950 S. W. 78th Avenue. She has two children, ages eleven and twelve. She was born on August 9, 1925. She drives a 1968 Chevrolet.

On November 5, 1968, the address of OLGA CHAVIANO was verified. In the driveway to the residence was a 1968 Chevrolet bearing 1968 - 1969 Florida License 1W-36963, which is registered to CHAVIANO at 2950 S. W. 78th Avenue.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
November 25, 1968

MM 92-1870

Title NORMAN ROTHMAN

Character ANTI-RACKETEERING

Reference Report of Special Agent ALLAN M. TRANKLEY dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

550-10382

FD-263 (Rev. 3-8-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
MIAMI	MIAMI	9/27/68	7/30/68 - 9/24/68

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
0 NORMAN ROTHMAN, aka	ALLAN M. TRANKLEY	fp
	CHARACTER OF CASE AR	

9

REFERENCE: Report of SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY dated 7/18/68, at Miami, Florida.

- P -

LEADS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

ATLANTA

AT ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Determine subscriber to telephone number 876-0701. Conduct check of indices, and credit and criminal checks.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED None						ACQUITTALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☒ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☒ NO

APPROVED ... SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

92-9844-7

REC 54

11 OCT 2 1968

ST-115

COPIES MADE:

③ - Bureau (92-9844)
1 - USA, Miami
(Attn: Departmental Attorney EARLE)
2 - Atlanta
2 - Miami (92-1870)

1 cc DoJ 1537

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency				
Request Recd.	CC. AAG, Criminal Division,			
Date Fwd.	Organized Crime and Racketeering			
How Fwd.	Section, Room 2509			10/11/68
By				

54 OCT 14 1968

Notations

NINE

STAT. SECT.

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O—273-877

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - U.S. Attorney, Miami, Florida
(Attn: Departmental Attorney WILLIAM G. EARLE)

Report of: ALLAN M. TRANKLEY Office: Miami, Florida
Date: 9/27/68

Field Office File #: 92-1870 Bureau File #: 92-9844

Title: NORMAN ROTHMAN

Character: ANTI-RACKETEERING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

Synopsis:

ROTHMAN still resides at Surfside, Fla. He is reportedly now sole owner of the Albion Lounge although not observed at this place of business. Informant advised subject continues to travel around country for hoodlum element.

- P -

DETAILS:

RESIDENCE:

Subject continues to reside at 425 Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida.

On August 29, 1968, ROTHMAN's car was observed at his residence at 10:05 A.M.

On September 12, 1968, ROTHMAN's car was observed at his residence at 1:15 P.M. His residence was observed from 1:15 P.M. to 2:15 P.M. and no activity was noted.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967—O—273-878

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 9/27/68

The following observations were noted concerning the activities of NORMAN ROTHMAN:

9:20 A.M.	Observation initiated of ROTHMAN's residence at 425 S. Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida.
11 A.M.	FABIO DE CRESTOFARO observed to enter ROTHMAN's residence.
11:35 A.M.	DE CRESTOFARO observed to leave ROTHMAN's residence.
11:55 A.M.	ROTHMAN observed to leave the residence in his automobile.
12:07 A.M.	ROTHMAN arrived at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida and observed to enter hotel.
12:10 A.M.	Observation discontinued.

2

On 9/24/68 at Surfside-Miami, Florida File # Miami 92-1870

by SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY/fp Date dictated 9/25/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

On August 22, 1968, MM T-1 advised that he heard that the Albion Hotel Lounge is a hangout for those involved in narcotics traffic.

TRAVEL

On September 2, 1968, MM T-2 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN continues to travel around the country for the hoodlum element, but no longer travels for or under the cover of the International Lithographer Company as ROTHMAN and BEN LEVIN operator of same, are allegedly "on the outs".

On September 12, 1968, MM T-2 advised that he understood that ROTHMAN left for Atlanta or New York City on September 10, 1968.

BUSINESS

On September 2, 1968, MM T-2 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN is now the sole owner of the Albion Hotel Lounge and that IRVING BRENNER no longer has an interest in this lounge.

ASSOCIATES

On August 22, 1968, MM T-1 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN had contacted JOE SILESI in the solarium of the Seagull Hotel on or about July 29, 1968, and again on or about July 31, 1968.

JOSEPH ALBERT SILESI has been reliably identified as a member of the La Cosa Nostra who belongs to the CARLO GAMBINO "Family".

MM T-2 advised on September 12, 1968, that ROTHMAN is extremely close to one ARMANDO, who reportedly is business organizer for Local 255 of the Hotel, Restaurant and Bartenders Union and is the one largely responsible for obtaining jobs for Cubans in the hotels and restaurants in the Miami area.

MISCELLANEOUS

It has previously been reported that a Cadillac bearing 1967-68 Florida license 6WW-6273 has been observed in the area of the Albion Lounge on frequent occasions.

On July 30, 1968, SA ROBERT W. WISEMAN determined that the records of the Palm Beach County Auto License Agency, 810 Datura Street, West Palm Beach, Florida, reflected that 1967-68 Florida license 6WW-6273 was issued October 18, 1967 to HENRY FEINTUCH, M.D., for a 1968 Cadillac coupe, Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) J8123239.

The records of the Palm Beach County Credit Bureau, the West Palm Beach Police Department and the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office examined July 31, 1968, failed to reflect any identifiable reference to FEINTUCH.

JAMES L. DISMUCKES, Schooley-Cadillac, advised SA ROBERT W. WISEMAN on July 31, 1968, that instant car was sold October 18, 1967 to Dr. FEINTUCH of 3050 Lincoln Road, Miami Beach, Florida. This was a telephone call sale, for cash, and the customer was referred by one EMIL MORTON, 5646 North Bay Road, Miami Beach, Florida. There is nothing further available in the company records.

Observation of the Albion Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida on August 26, August 27, August 29, September 10 and September 12, 1968 did not disclose ROTHMAN's car.

On September 23, 1968, the Albion Lounge was observed from 2:35 P.M. to 4 P.M. and subject did not appear.

On September 6, 1968, MM T-2 reported that on September 4, 1968, an individual contacted NORMAN ROTHMAN by telephone from Atlanta, Georgia. The call came from Atlanta, telephone #876-0701.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida
September 27, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 92-1870

Title	NORMAN ROTHMAN
Character	ANTI-RACKETEERING
Reference	Report of SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

55e-10392

FD-263 (Rev. 3-8-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
MIAMI	MIAMI	7/18/68	4/2/68-7/17/68	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
NORMAN ROTHMAN, aka		ALLAN M. TRANKLEY		jah
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		AR		

REFERENCES: Report of SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY dated 5/28/68 at Miami.
Indianapolis letter to Miami dated 5/29/68.
Cincinnati letter to Miami dated 5/31/68.

P.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

LEADS:

NEWARK

AT TRENTON, NEW JERSEY

Will determine owner of car bearing New Jersey license JMW-688. Will check indices, credit and criminal on this individual.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					None	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☒ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☒ NO

APPROVED

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

92-9844-6

REC 37

15 JUL 22 1968

EX114

NINE

STAT. SECT.

COPIES MADE:

3 - Bureau (92-9844)
1 - USA, Miami
Attn: Departmental Attorney WILLIAM G. EARLE
2 - Newark
3 - Miami (92-1870)

1 cc D+D 1537

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Notations

Agency				
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.	CC. AAG, Criminal Division, Organized Crime and Racketeering			
How Fwd.	Section, Room 2524			
By			7/26/68	

53 JUL 29 1968

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - United States Attorney, Miami, Florida
Attention: Departmental Attorney
WILLIAM G. EARLE

Report of: ALLAN M. TRANKLEY **Office:** Miami, Florida
Date: July 18, 1968

Field Office File #: 92-1870 **Bureau File #:** 92-9844

Title: NORMAN ROTHMAN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668SLD/KSR
(JFK)

Character: ANTI-RACKETEERING

Synopsis:

Subject continues to reside Surfside, Fla. Reportedly receiving shylock payments at Albion Hotel Lounge.

P.

DETAILS:

RESIDENCE

Subject continues to reside at 425 Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida. He was not observed on June 5,6,11, 12, or 17, 1968.

On June 11, 1968, a Pontiac bearing New Jersey license JMW-688 was observed parked in front of ROTHMAN's residence.

On June 18, 1968, at 9:30 AM, ROTHMAN's car was observed at his residence. Also observed in the driveway was a car bearing 1968-1969 Florida license 1-96339.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967-O-273-878

CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

On July 4, 1968, MM T-1 advised that shylock payments are still being left for NORMAN ROTHMAN with the bartenders at the Albion Hotel Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida. Informant stated they still play gin and other card games on the bar, for money, at this lounge. Two Miami Beach Police Department detectives reportedly hang out there on a daily basis.

TRAVEL

On June 18, 1968, MM T-1 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN had been to Chicago and had been gone about two weeks but informant did not know whether ROTHMAN was in Chicago the entire two weeks or whether he had traveled elsewhere.

MISCELLANEOUS

On June 6, 1968, the following cars were observed at the Albion Hotel Lounge:

Plymouth bearing 1967-1968
Florida license 1-50451

Cadillac bearing 1967-1968
Florida license 6WW-6273

Pontiac bearing 1967-1968
Florida license 1W-51476

Oldsmobile bearing 1967-1968
Florida license 1-159916

Cadillac bearing 1968-1969
Florida license 1WW-1094

On June 11, 1968, the Cadillac bearing 1967-1968 Florida license 6WW-6273 was again observed at the Albion Hotel Lounge.

On June 20, 1968, at 2:30 PM, ROTHMAN's car, bearing 1968-1969 Florida license 1W32300, was observed at the Albion Hotel Lounge.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 7/2/68

The following observations were noted concerning the activities of NORMAN ROTHMAN:

10:00 A.M.	Observation initiated of ROTHMAN's residence at 425 South Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida.
11:15 A.M.	ROTHMAN observed to leave residence in his automobile.
11:30 A.M.	ROTHMAN arrived at Hotel Albion Lounge and entered lounge.
1:00 P.M.	Observation discontinued.

On 6/26/68 at Surfside-Miami Beach, Florida Miami 92-1870

by SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY/fp Date dictated 7/1/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

4

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 7/2/68

The following observations were noted concerning the Hotel Albion Lounge:

2:45 P.M.	Observation of Albion Lounge instituted.
2:50 P.M.	FABIO DI CRESTOFARO observed to leave the Albion Lounge, enter his automobile, and leave the area.
2:52 P.M.	Yellow car bearing 1968-69 Florida license 1-178118 observed parked in alley at Albion Lounge.
2:58 P.M.	White T-Bird bearing 1968-69 Florida license 1W22100 observed leaving parking space in alley at Albion Lounge.
3:05 P.M.	Two un-identified men and a woman observed to leave Albion Lounge in maroon Chevrolet bearing 1968-69 Florida license 1W-37229.
3:45 P.M.	Observation discontinued.

On 6/27/68 at Miami Beach, Florida File # Miami 92-1870

by SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY/fp Date dictated 7/1/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

5

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 7/5/68

The following observations were noted concerning the Albion Lounge, 1650 James Avenue:

12:50 PM	FABIO DI CRESTOFARO's automobile observed double parked at entrance of Hotel Albion.
12:53 PM	Yellow Chevrolet bearing 1968-69 Florida License 1E-3962 observed parked in alley by Albion Lounge.
12:54 PM	NORMAN ROTHMAN's car observed parked on James Avenue heading north, one half block from Albion Lounge.
12:55 PM	DI CRESTOFARO's car leaves the area.
1:30 PM	ROTHMAN leaves Albion Lounge. DI CRESTOFARO observed to move his automobile into ROTHMAN's parking place. ROTHMAN leaves the area driving his automobile.
2:00 PM	ROTHMAN arrives at parking lot in N. Miami Avenue and First Street. ROTHMAN observed to park his car and walk toward the Dade County Courthouse.
2:01 PM	Observation discontinued.

On 7/2/68 at Miami Beach, Florida File # Miami 92-1870

by SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY:cmr Date dictated 7/5/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

6

It was previously reported that a car bearing 1967 Ohio license 8270GG, as well as a car bearing 1967 Indiana license 18B805, registered to JAMES W. HARNEY, 805 Dunn Street, Muncie, Indiana, were on the parking lot of JOE SONKEN's restaurant in Hollywood, Florida, at the time ROTHMAN met with five individuals at this restaurant.

The following investigation was conducted by SA RUFUS THOMAS TYSON:

On April 2, 1968, DONNA HARRIS, License Index, Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Columbus, Ohio, advised that 1967 Ohio License 8270 GG was issued to DAVID C. KASSEM, 3960 Nine Mile Road, Cincinnati, Ohio, for a 1968 Cadillac coupe, Vehicle Identification No. J8135515, and was transferred on October 27, 1967, from a 1966 Pontiac, Vehicle Identification No. 266576E113577, which was sold in Louisville, Kentucky.

The following investigation was conducted by IC JAMES R. CLARK:

On May 22, 1968, GAYLA FOX, Credit Bureau of Cincinnati, Inc., advised DAVID C. KASSEM has been known to the agency's file since November, 1961. KASSEM's employment in 1961 was listed as Thrift Super Market.

On May 23, 1968, the following individuals, after reviewing their agency's files were unable to locate any information identifiable with KASSEM:

RUTH GORDON, Clerk, Cincinnati Police Department;

WILLIAM LAYER, Records, Hamilton County Sheriff's Office.

The following investigation was conducted by SA WILLIAM R. LISTON, Muncie, Indiana, on May 27, 1968:

Sergeant ROBERT VANDEVENDER, Records, Muncie Police Department, and MARION CUNNINGTON, Chief Deputy, Delaware County Sheriff's Office, advised their files contain no record for JAMES W. HARNEY.

Mrs. IRENE SHORT, Supervisor, Credit Bureau of Muncie, Indiana, advised their files reflect JAMES W. HARNEY and wife CLARA have been in the file since 1949. The last inquiry was in August 1966, at which time they were residing at 805 Dunn Street. JAMES W. HARNEY has been employed at Muncie Chevrolet since November 15, 1961, and his date of birth is July 28, 1922, Elwood, Indiana. CLARA HARNEY, as of May 1965, was listed as a bookkeeper at Superior Laundry, and had been there for ten years. They have a very good credit rating.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 92-1870

Miami, Florida
July 18, 1968

Title	NORMAN ROTHMAN
Character	ANTI-RACKETEERING
Reference	is made to report of Special Agent ALLAN M. TRANKLEY, dated and captioned as above at Miami.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

55P-10392

FD-263 (Rev. 3-8-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
MIAMI	MIAMI	5/28/68	3/19/68 - 5/21/68	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
NORMAN ROTHMAN, aka		ALLAN M. TRANKLEY		dmc
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		AR		

REFERENCES

Report of SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY dated 3/18/68, at Miami.
Las Vegas letter to Miami dated 4/1/68.
Pittsburgh letter to Miami dated 4/12/68.
New York letter to Miami dated 4/25/68.

- P -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

LEAD

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Will follow and report subject's activities.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED - NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☒ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☒ NO

APPROVED — SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

92-9844-5

REC-18

MAY 31 1968

EX-114

COPIES MADE:

③ - Bureau (92-9844)
1 - USA, Miami (Attn: Departmental Attorney WILLIAM EARLE)
2 - Miami (92-1870)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency				
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.				
By				

CC. AAG, Criminal Division.
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Room 2524

1CC DT DAM 1537 6/7/68

Notations

NINE

STAT SECT.

55 JUN 11 1968

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O—273-877

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:	1 - U. S. Attorney, Miami (Attention: Departmental Attorney WILLIAM EARLE)		
Report of:	ALLAN M. TRANKLEY	**Office:**	Miami, Florida
Date:	5/28/68		
Field Office File #:	92-1870	**Bureau File #:**	92-9844
Title:	NORMAN ROTHMAN		
Character:	ANTI-RACKETEERING		

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/ICSR

Synopsis:

Subject still residing Surfside, Florida. Continues to frequent Albion Lounge, Miami, Florida. Contacts of subject set out.

- P -

DETAILS

RESIDENCE

Subject continues to reside at 425 Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

On April 5, 1968, MM T-1 advised that ROTHMAN is earning his money in volume and in a quick manner which would indicate it comes from narcotics.

TRAVEL

On April 15, 1968, MM T-2 advised he received information that NORMAN ROTHMAN had traveled to Las Vegas, Nevada.

On April 18, 1968, MM T-2 advised that ROTHMAN had returned to Miami on April 15, 1968, and for some unknown reason, is avoiding contacts and telephone calls.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ASSOCIATES

On April 15, 1968, MM T-2 advised that FABIO DE CRESTOFARO does some shylock collecting for NORMAN ROTHMAN at the Fontainebleau Hotel, and that the bartenders at the Albion Hotel Lounge receive shylock collections in envelopes which they give to DE CRESTOFARO.

CONTACTS

It was previously reported that NORMAN ROTHMAN was possibly in contact with the subscriber of telephone number 989-9576.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 3/15/68

The records of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Hollywood, Florida, reflect that telephone number 989-9576 was formerly subscribed to by AUDREW MORITZ, 5717 West Hollywood Boulevard, Hollywood, Florida. This was a non-published telephone number. The records reflected that this number was disconnected approximately June, 1967, and Miss MORITZ returned to the Pennsylvania area.

The above information is confidential and can be obtained only through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directed to JAMES BARKER, District Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Hollywood, Florida.

On 3/5/68 at Hollywood, Florida File # Miami 92-1870

by SA EUGENE J. MC KINNEY/mm Date dictated 3/11/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

-3-

AUDREY MORITZ, who is the common law wife of THOMAS "SONNY" CIANCUTTI, top hoodlum from Pittsburgh, formerly resided with CIANCUTTI at 5715 West Hollywood Boulevard, Hollywood, Florida, but have since returned to the Pittsburgh area.

Previous investigation disclosed that ROTHMAN may have contacted the subscribers to the following Las Vegas, Nevada telephone numbers:

382-4925
734-6947
734-1212
735-1855
735-6614
735-8586
735-0330
735-0830
382-3657
735-7317

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date March 7, 1968

The following information was obtained from a review of the records of the Central Telephone Company, Las Vegas, Nevada, which records were made available to Special Assistant United States Attorney MICHAEL DE FEO based upon the issuance of a Federal Grand Jury subpoena dated January 23, 1968.

Las Vegas Telephone Number	Subscriber
382-4925	V. E. NATION, 549 East Oakey, owner of Roulette Motel
734-6947	Caesars Palace, 3570 Las Vegas Boulevard South, Hotel Purchasing Department
734-1212	Silver Slipper Casino, 3100 Las Vegas Boulevard South
735-1855	CARLOS DE VARONA, 3781½ Hazelwood; occupation in 1964 Bar Boy, Stardust Hotel
735-6614	Non-published, Dunes Hotel, Casino Cage
735-8586	JAY J. SARNO, 3541 Maricopa Way, Managing Director, Caesars Palace Hotel - Casino
735-0330	Sands Hotel, 3317 Las Vegas Boulevard South, ENTRATTER residence

On 2/29/68 at Las Vegas, Nevada File # LV 92-2163

by SA CARL F. FREEMAN/kd Date dictated 3/5/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

92-914-[illegible]-38

735-0830	EVERETT J. BLEDSOE, 2645 Van Patten, Number 5; retired U. S. Army and manager of apartments.
382-3657	ED GAMBARANA, 501 Parkway East, employed Caesars Palace Hotel - Casino
735-7317	ARNALDO ESTOPINAN, 1307 Exley Avenue; occupation carpenter, Chrome Manufacturing Company

92-9844-5
550-10302

JOE VALEN, who was contacted at Las Vegas, telephone number 382-4925, is unknown to the Las Vegas Office, and records of the Clark County Sheriff's Office and Las Vegas Police Department were negative regarding VALEN. The Credit Bureau of Southern Nevada listed that as of August 28, 1967, one JOE R. VALEN, age 35, was residing with his wife, MERNA VALEN, at 4176 East Pernoid, Las Vegas, Nevada. It was also noted that MERNA VALEN was a school teacher in the Clark County School District of Nevada.

Las Vegas telephone number 382-4925 is listed to VIRGIL EDWARD NATION, 549 East Oakey, Las Vegas. NATION is not known to the Las Vegas Office. The files of the Credit Bureau of Southern Nevada reflect that NATION and his wife, OLA EVELYN GOULD, have resided in Southern Nevada for several years and that Mr. NATION is presently retired. He formerly owned the Roulette Motel in Las Vegas. Mr. NATION, from 1942 to 1950, owned and operated the San Diego Motel, Denver, Colorado. He has no known hoodlum connections and his association, if any, with JOE VALEN is unknown.

Las Vegas telephone number 735-1855 is listed to CARLOS ARTURO DE VARONA, wife MARIE DE VARONA. The records of the Clark County Sheriff's Office reflect that DE VARONA, in 1964, was a barboy at the Stardust Hotel and that he had formerly been a soldier in the Cuban Army for two years. He came from Cuba to Las Vegas via Miami, Florida. He listed with the Sheriff's Office a friend, VICTOR NAVARRO, 807 East San Francisco, Las Vegas, Nevada. DE VARONA is described as a white male, born March 21, 1928, at Camaguey, Cuba (A# 11862568), 5'10" tall, 180 pounds, brown hair and eyes. In 1966 DE VARONA advised the Credit Bureau of Southern Nevada that he had formerly resided 34 years in Havana, Cuba.

(First name unknown) HUGO and TERRY DEUTSCH, who were contacted through Las Vegas telephone number 735-0830, are unknown to the Las Vegas Office. The records of the Las Vegas Police Department, Clark County Sheriff's Office and Credit Bureau of Southern Nevada were negative regarding HUGO and DEUTSCH. The subscriber of this Las Vegas telephone number is EVERETT J. BLEDSOE, who is unknown to the Las Vegas Office. BLEDSOE is the manager of the apartments at 2645 Van Patten, Las Vegas, and he resides in Apartment 5 at this address.

Las Vegas telephone number 382-3657 is listed to ED GAMBARANA (EDGAR GAMBARANA), who is presently employed in the Hotel Purchasing Section of Caesars Palace Hotel. He was formerly employed in the same position at the Sands Hotel, both Las Vegas, Nevada. GAMBARANA was allegedly employed at the Copa Cabana, New York City, prior to coming to the Southern Nevada area. He has been reported by one Las Vegas informant as a "bagman" for the Sands and Caesars Palace, but this has not been confirmed nor denied. GAMBARANA is described as a white male, born September 6, 1920, at New York, New York, 5'11" tall, 205 pounds, brown hair and eyes, Social Security Number 118-18-3520, wife PEGGY KALTENBORN. It is noted that PEGGY KALTENBORN GAMBARANA's father is R. J. KALTENBORN, a wealthy individual of Southern Nevada.

The Las Vegas Office has no record of ARNALDO ESTOPINAN. There is no record for ESTOPINAN at the Credit Bureau, Sheriff's Office or Las Vegas Police Department.

ART ROCCO, who was contacted at Las Vegas telephone number 734-4110, may be identical with ARTHUR ANTHONY ROCCO, FBI Number 3702619, of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who was in Las Vegas on October 18, 1967, and November 2, 1967. ROCCO, while in Las Vegas on these occasions, registered with the Clark County Sheriff's Office as an ex-felon.

Las Vegas telephone number 735-1363 has recently been changed to 735-0506, which is the main switchboard for "Circus Circus" a new casino which is presently under construction on the "Las Vegas Strip".

T. W. RICHARDSON, who was contacted at Las Vegas telephone number 734-1212, is an owner of the Silver Slipper Casino and was formerly an owner of the Frontier Hotel prior to the sale of this hotel to HOWARD HUGHES. RICHARDSON is an old-time gambler from Mississippi and he is presently under indictment by a Federal Grand Jury in Los Angeles, California, for Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering - Gambling.

Due to the limited amount of information regarding LES CRAWFORD, who was telephonically contacted at Caesars Palace, it has been impossible to identify him.

CARL COHEN, who was telephonically contacted at the Sands Hotel, was a stockholder at this hotel-casino prior to the purchase of this hotel by HOWARD HUGHES. COHEN presently is an employee of the Sands Hotel. Confidential sources have reported that COHEN was the holder of undisclosed interest in the Sands Hotel for JOSEPH "DOC" STACHER (Miami file 92-1248).

Las Vegas was unable to identify Miss EYRA, who was contacted at (JACK) ENTRATTER's residence in the Sands Hotel.

The Las Vegas Office was unable to identify GIL COLEMAN and ERWIN HARRIS.

JACKIE HELLER, who was contacted at the Sands Hotel, has been employed for years by this hotel as a lounge host.

Previous investigation has disclosed that ROTHMAN may have contacted the Keystone Sales Company, Inc., 725 Franklin Street, Johnstown, Pennsylvania.

The Keystone Sales Company, Inc. lists its President as JOSEPH REGINO and its Vice President as SEBASTIAN JOHN LA ROCCA who is a reported member of the La Cosa Nostra.

Previous investigation has disclosed that ROTHMAN possibly contacted the subscribers of the following telephone numbers:

244-0642
YU8-7513
UN6-4030
CO5-3910
PL7-2034
781-9683
CI7-1587
AU6-9335
OL2-6779
OL5-4299
BA5-2542
TW7-7370
TW7-3617
679-5891
AC2-7263
972-5597
LO4-0022
MO1-8282
OX7-4870
LO4-5760
JU2-1441
CA6-9345

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 3/29/68

The records of the New York Telephone Company revealed the identities of the subscribers to the telephone numbers set forth below:

244-0642	Simonson Fabrics Incorporated 36 West 36th Street New York City
YU 8-7513 (connected 10/6/63)	ESTHER HANDILLE 181 East 73 Street New York City Apartment 4F
UN 6-4030	No such exchange as UN 6 in the 516 area.
CO 5-3910	Southern Music Publishing Company 1619 Broadway New York City
PL 7-2034	JEROME WECHSLER 15 West 47th Street New York City Room 808
781-9683 (connected 11/8/67)	ROBERT REYES 511 West 171 Street New York City Apartment 2B
CI 7-1587 (247-1587)	CHARLES ABREU 144 West 46th Street New York City Apartment 5F
AU 6-9335	ISABEL PEREZ 629 West 135th Street New York City

On 3/29/68 at New York, New York File # NY 92-5000
MM 92-1870

by SA FRANCIS P. HENRY:lor Date dictated 3/29/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OL 2-6779 (Non-published)	JOYCE LEIGHTON 2305 Bruner Avenue Bronx, New York
OL 5-4299	MORRIS HUREWITZ 3466 Fish Avenue Bronx, New York Apartment 3A
BA 5-2542	SANFORD ROTHMAN 1756 Whitestone Road Whitestone, Queens,New York
TW 7-7370	HENRIETTE ROTHMAN 98-25 64th Road Rego Park, New York
TW 7-3617	OLGA J. KOUH (Mrs.) 100-25 Queens Boulevard Forest Hills,New York Apartment 4N
679-5891	JEROME ROSENTHAL 20 Park Avenue New York City Apartment 9C
AC 2-7263	Baumann Press 301 West 108th Street New York City Apartment 2F
972-5597	American Can 100 Park Avenue New York City
LO 4-0022	Liberty Travel Service Incorporated 152 West 42nd Street New York City

MO 1-8282 (connected 5/27/66)	Go Go Tours 51 East 42nd Street New York City
OX 7-4870 (connected 2/11/64)	United Investors Corporation 711 Third Avenue New York City
LO 4-5760 (connected 12/15/65)	Active Messenger Service Corporation 101 West 42nd Street Room 208 New York City
JU 2-1441 (connected 8/21/67)	A.B.C. Camera Corporation 356 West 44th Street New York City
CA 6-9345 (connected 2/17/64)	Mare Chiaro Restaurant 176½ Mulberry Street New York City

The above information is not to be made public except in the usual proceeding following the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, which should be directed to Mr. WILLIAM R. ENNIS, Security Supervisor, New York Telephone Company, 104 Broad Street, New York, New York 10004.

The records of the Credit Bureau of Greater New York as furnished by PAULINE DE FIORE to IC JOHN L. KAPP on April 5, 1968, contained the following:

Credit report (no date) revealed JOYCE LEIGHTON, (widow) resided at 2305 Bruner Avenue, Bronx, New York. Business was shown as R. C. Packaging Inc., (no address). Prior employment was Val Food Packaging Company, Inc., 226 East Fordham Road, Bronx, New York. She has an account with Manufacturers Hanover Trust. No derogatory information.

Credit report dated June, 1958, disclosed JEROME ROSENTHAL and wife KAY resided at 20 Park Avenue, New York. Prior address was 930 5th Avenue, New York City. He is self-employed as an advisor in the brokerage field and is actively engaged in this line. No derogatory information.

No credit records were located for the following:

ESTHER HANDILLE, 181 East 73rd Street,
Apartment 4F, New York City

JEROME WECHSLER, 15 West 47th Street,
New York City, Room 808

ROBERT REYES, 511 West 171st Street,
New York City, Apartment 2B

CHARLES ABREU, 144 West 46th Street,
New York City, Apartment 5F

ISABEL PEREZ, 629 West 135th Street,
New York City

MORRIS HUREWITZ, 3466 Fish Avenue, Bronx,
New York, Apartment 3A

SANFORD ROTHMAN, 1756 Whitestone Road,
Whitestone Queens, New York

HENRIETTE ROTHMAN, 98-25 64th Road,
Rego Park, New York

IRVING HOLME

VIC POSNER, 768 5th Avenue, New York City

STEVE MORRIS

(First Name Unknown) DELK

Mrs. OLGA J. KOUH, 100-25 Queens Boulevard,
Forest Hills, New York, Apartment 4N

On April 15, 1968, the records of the Bureau of Criminal Identification, New York City Police Department as caused to be checked by SA AUGUST J. MICEK, contained no arrest records for aforementioned individuals.

MISCELLANEOUS

On March 20, 1968, at 3:40 PM, NORMAN ROTHMAN and his car were observed in front of the Albion Hotel Lounge.

On March 27, 1968, ROTHMAN was observed to leave his residence at 425 Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida, at 1:00 PM and drive to the Albion Hotel Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida, arriving at 1:30 PM. On this occasion, ROTHMAN was driving a black over grey Oldsmobile, bearing temporary Florida license H37-141.

On March 28, 1968, ROTHMAN was again observed at the Albion Hotel Lounge arriving at 2:45 PM, driving a black over grey Oldsmobile with temporary Florida tag.

On March 29, 1968, ROTHMAN was observed to depart from the Albion Hotel Lounge at 2:25 PM driving a black over red Oldsmobile, bearing temporary Florida license H37-163.

On April 1, 1968, both new 1968 Oldsmobiles, one black over grey, four-door, and the other black over red two-door, were observed parked at ROTHMAN's residence in Surfside, Florida.

On April 16, 1968, ROTHMAN's black over grey Oldsmobile was observed to be bearing 1967-68 Florida license 1W 205421, and the license on the black over red Oldsmobile was noted as 1W 205422.

ROTHMAN and/or his automobile was observed at the Albion Hotel Lounge on the following dates:

April 24, 1968, at 3:50 PM

April 25, 1968, at 3:30 PM

April 26, 1968, at 1:45 PM

April 29, 1968, at 1:45 PM

May 13, 1968, at 3:00 PM

May 21, 1968, at 3:30 PM

On May 21, 1968, records of the Dade County Tag Agency revealed that 1967-68 Florida license 1D-78549 is for a Triumph sports car registered to CHARLES B. MC COMAS, 801 South Poinciana Boulevard, Miami Springs, Florida.

These records further reveal that the license tag 1D-81139 does not exist.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
May 28, 1968

Title NORMAN ROTHMAN

Character ANTI-RACKETEERING

Reference Report of Special Agent ALLAN M. TRANKLEY, dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[illegible]

FD-263 (Rev. 9-17-65)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
MIAMI	MIAMI	3/18/68	11/14/67 - 3/13/68

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
NORMAN ROTHMAN, aka Norm Rothman, Norman Roth	ALLAN M. TRANKLEY	pap
	CHARACTER OF CASE AR	

EX 109

REC 44

REFERENCES: Las Vegas letter to Miami, 12/26/67.
Report of SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY dated 12/26/67, at Miami.

-P-

LEADS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR (JFK)

JACKSONVILLE

AT PENSACOLA, FLORIDA:

Determine subscriber to telephone number 455-7158. Conduct Credit, Criminal and Indices Checks.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED: NONE

Case has been: Pending over one year ☑ Yes ☐ No; Pending prosecution over six months ☐ Yes ☑ No

APPROVED		SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW	
COPIES MADE:			92-9844-4	REC 98
	③ - Bureau (92-9844) 1 - USA, MIAMI (ATTN: DA WILLIAM EARLE) 2 - Jacksonville 2 - Miami (92-1870)		22 MAR 20 1968	EX-105

1cc D of J 1537

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				Notations
Agency	CC. AAG, Criminal Division,			Gardefs
Request Recd.	Organized Crime and Racketeering			Rutland
Date Fwd.	Section, Room 2624		3/25/68	SCS SECT.
How Fwd.				
By	HB			

62 APR 2 1968

REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~ DEA JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/7/97 dl
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA:

Will follow and report subscriber's activities.

ADMINISTRATIVE

The report of SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY dated December 26, 1967, at Miami, reflects that numerous telephone calls were made available by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics from ROTHMAN's residence, the residence of OLGA CHAVIANO, ROTHMAN's mistress, and from International Lithographers, ROTHMAN's place of employment at the time the phone calls were made.

A review of the subscribers to the various telephone numbers has been made. The information pertinent to calls which are business calls, has not been made a part of this report and is maintained in the files of the Miami Division.

On January 25, 1968, SA JAMES W. SIBERT, Hyattsville, Maryland, determined that telephone number 423-8594 is subscribed to by EDWARD A. WATSON, 5933-23rd Parkway, Apartment 312, Hillcrest Heights, Maryland. There was no criminal record for WATSON at the Prince George County Police Department, and the files of the Baltimore Office contain no information identifiable with EDWARD A. WATSON.

On February 21, 1968, IC PHILIP F. CROGHAN determined that telephone number 923-8111 is for the Diplomat Hotel, Hollywood, Florida.

Telephone number 983-5669 is for State Acceptance Company, Inc., 6910 S.W. 27th Street, Miramar, Florida.

Telephone number 923-8471 is for Golden Isles Hospital.

Telephone number 922-4993 is for ABE W. BERKOWITZ, 1644 Washington Street, Hollywood, California.

SJP-10802

Telephone number 989-9676 is for HARRY J. NICK, 6641 S.W. 9th Street, Hollywood, Florida.

Telephone number 989-9576 is for P.M. CENSORIO, 7945 Di Lido Boulevard, Miramar, Florida.

SA LAURENCE E. THOMAS determined that telephone number 731-8246, Cincinnati, Ohio, is for Dr. H.H. STEINBERG, 7281 Arcoma Drive. Dr. STEINBERG has no arrest record at the Cincinnati Police Department, and the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office and the Cincinnati indices do not contain any information identifiable with Dr. H. H. STEINBERG.

Telephone number 335-751, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is that of VICTOR CARLUCCI. CARLUCCI is a son-in-law of SAM MANNERINO, former member of La Cosa Nostra (LCN), now deceased. CARLUCCI was released from Lewisburg Federal Prison in December, 1964, after serving 40 months of a 5-year sentence for TGP, ITSP, FHA, NM, CONSPIRACY. NORMAN ROTHMAN was one of the subjects in this case in which an attempt was made to ship stolen firearms to Cuba.

Telephone number 335-4371 is for Catoris Candies, Inc. On June 17, 1964, and on December 8, 1964, PCI JAMES W. BURGART advised SA THOMAS G. FORSYTHE, III, that "KELLY" MANNARINO had acquired the controlling interest in the Catoris Candy Company and that he spent a lot of time in his office in the back of the candy company store. He said that LOUIS CATORIS, the former sole owner, still provided the know-how for the operation of the candy company and is still in charge of making the candy.

PCI BURGART has in the past, on numerous occasions, described GABRIEL MANNARINO, also known as "KELLY" MANNARINO, as the "Boss" of all illegal activities in the area of New Kensington for over 15 years.

SSP 10802

It is noted that MANNARINO was in attendance at the notorious Apalachin Conference in 1957, and there are strong indications that he is a member of LCN.

Pittsburgh indices are negative regarding this organization.

On January 23, 1968, Miss JANE HAMLIN, Dun and Bradstreet, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, furnished a report of this organization which reflected that on March 15, 1967, authorities had stated that this business was no longer in operation at the location cited. The President of this company was SAMUEL VALERIANO, (a CPA who had done accounting work from SAM MANNERINO). Also the report showed that SAM MANNERINO in July, 1966, had filed two judgments against Valstar, Inc., of $91,683 and $110,745.

Telephone number 337-7196 is for CLARENCE M. HARRIS, JR.

Pittsburgh indices are negative regarding HARRIS.

On February 7, 1968, Mrs. BARBARA GROSS, New Kensington Credit Bureau, advised a report of CLARENCE HARRIS, JR., 1137-5th Avenue, New Kensington, showed he was about 19 or 20, employed by the Aluminum Company of America, wife COLEEN, and as of May, 1967, had an account of the Columbia Record Club amounting to $19.62, placed with the Credit Bureau for collection.

On February 7, 1968, Patrolman JOSEPH MANGIONE, New Kensington Police Department, located no arrest record regarding HARRIS.

Telephone number 339-9371 is for Sons of Italy Lodge 881. Pittsburgh indices are negative regarding this lodge.

Telephone number 339-9371 is for SAUL SILVERMAN. Pittsburgh indices are negative regarding SILVERMAN.

Records of the New Kensington Credit Bureau, as furnished by Mrs. BARBARA GROSS, show that SILVERMAN, of 1133 5th Avenue, New Kensington, has been self-employed as an attorney since 1931. His business address is 2879 Leechburg Road, Lower Burrell, Pennsylvania, and he is the proprietor of the Stewart Plaza Shopping Center in Lower Burrell. He has a good credit record.

On February 7, 1968, Patrolman JOSEPH MANGIONE, New Kensington Police Department, advised he has no record for SILVERMAN.

A review of the Crisscross Telephone Directory for the Community of Ebensburg, Pennsylvania, disclosed that the telephone number 472-9540 is listed to the Joanne Dress Manufacturing Company, Ebensburg, Pennsylvania.

This dress manufacturing company is owned and operated by ANGELO PAPALIA, 320 East Highland Avenue, Ebensburg, Pennsylvania.

Pittsburgh files show that PAPALIA, in 1963, had built a home in Southeast 15th Court, Bel Aire, Florida, a few doors away from the home of JOHN LA ROCCA, identified as a member of LCN and head of the Pittsburgh family, and reportedly PAPALIA was a clannish associate of LA ROCCA.

Telephone number RO 1-0449 is for FRANK KRAWCZYK, 6128 North Kenmore, Chicago, Illinois. Indiana Credit and Criminal checks negative.

Telephone number 527-3730 is for JUNE MICHAELS, 400 East Randolph, Chicago, Illinois, Illinois Credit and Criminal checks negative.

E
COVER PAGE

Telephone number 224-5959, Tallahassee, Florida, is for GEORGE THOMAS, 1623 El Habana. Credit and Criminal checks negative.

Telephone number 734-7110, Las Vegas, Nevada, is the main switchboard of Caesar's Palace Hotel-Casino. J. SAINO and JAY SURINO, who was telephonically contacted, is apparently identical with JAY J. SARNO, who is an executive and owner of Caesar's Palace.

Telephone number 735-8586, Las Vegas, Nevada, is listed to JAY J. SARNO, 3541 Maricopa Way, Las Vegas, Nevada.

Telephone number 734-7110 is for JERRY ZAROWITZ who is the present casino Manager at Caesar's Palace. He is reported to have been associated with a nation-wide betting group known as "The Iron Curtain Group", comprised of ZAROWITZ, ELLIOT PAUL PRICE, ANTHONY SALERNO, RUBY LAZARUS and VINCENT ALO. ZAROWITZ has previously been convicted of attempted bribery of a New York Giants official football player.

The investigative period of this report overlaps that of referenced report. The investigative activity of an auxilliary office was conducted prior to referenced report, but was not received prior to the submission of referenced report.

INFORMANTS

MM T-1 is HOPE STOKES, 9124 Byron Avenue, Surfside, Florida, a neighbor of subject whose identity is concealed at her request.

MM T-2 is MM 725-C
MM T-3 is LV 121-C-TE
MM T-4 is LV 297-C

SSC-40302

MM T-5 is MM 869-PC
MM T-6 is PCI MARCELO NAPOLIELLO, Las Vegas, Nevada
MM T-7 is MM 727-C
MM T-8 is DANIEL PEREZ, 953 S.W. 1st Street, Miami, Florida, whose identity is concealed at his request.

G*
COVER PAGE

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - U.S. Attorney, Miami (ATTN: Departmental Attorney WILLIAM EARLE)

Report of: ALLAN M. TRANKLEY **Office:** Miami, Florida
Date: 3/18/68

Field Office File #: 92-1870 **Bureau File #:** 92-9844

Title: NORMAN ROTHMAN

Character: ANTI-RACKETEERING

Synopsis:

Subject continues to reside Surfside, Fla. Continues to associate with LCN figures in Miami, Fla., and has been described as carrier of funds and errand boy for LCN. Subject reportedly has been backing the Bolita operation of ERWIN BRENNER, using hoodlum money.

-P-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

DETAILS

RESIDENCE

ROTHMAN was observed at his residence, 425 Surfside, Boulevard, Surfside, Florida, on January 31, 1968; February 1, 8, 15, 1968; March 4, 7, 11 and 13, 1968.

On February 1, 1968, MM T-1 advised that there is no unusual activity at ROTHMAN's house during the evening hours.

ASSOCIATES

On December 20, 1967, MM T-2 advised that PATTY ERRA, NORMAN ROTHMAN, ANTHONY SALERNO, LOUIS (LNU), JOHN TRONALONE, "CHINK", and JOE INDELICATO were at "JOE the Bartender's Room", Hilton Plaza Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ERRA, SALERNO and INDELICATO have been identified as members of the La Cosa Nostra (LCN).

On January 16, 1968, MM T-2 advised that PATTY ERRA, NORMAN ROTHMAN, and ANTHONY SALERNO regularly hang around the Hilton Plaza Hotel.

On January 22, 1968, MM T-2 advised that FRANK (LNU), a Cuban and Captain of the waiters in "JOE the Bartender's Room", Hilton Plaza Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida, owes his job to NORMAN ROTHMAN and regularly runs around with ROTHMAN.

HANG OUTS

On January 16, 1968, MM T-2 advised that subject regularly hangs around the Hilton Plaza Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida.

CONTACTS

On November 14, 1967, MM T-3 advised that TOMMY ALTAMURA, who was recently shot and killed in Miami, Florida, was in Las Vegas, Nevada, with NORMAN ROTHMAN during June and July, 1967, and also during the latter part of August, 1967.

On November 16, 1967, MM T-4 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN, 1771 West Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, which is the address of International Lithographers, had been a resident at Caesar's Palace Hotel-Casino, September 10 through 15, 1967, and while at the hotel, had made the following long distance calls:

Date	Number
9/10/67	Area Code 305-221-9573
9/14/67	Area Code 305-221-3540
9/14/67	Area Code 305-864-5474
9/13/67	Area Code 305-221-9573
9/13/67	Area Code 305-864-5474
9/13/67	Area Code 213-455-7158
9/15/67	Area Code 305-221-9573

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 3/11/68

The records of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company were reviewed and the following information obtained from telephone number 221-9573:

Listed to:	OLGA CHAVIANO
Billed to:	OLGA CHAVIANO
Address:	2950 S.W. 78th Avenue Coral Gables FLA.
Date Connected:	November 10, 1967
Employment:	Self - vocalist
References Given:	Ex-husband MRS. NORMAN ROSSMAN 538-7871
Credit Rating with Telephone Co.:	D

Non-Published

The above records are confidential and can only be obtained through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. This subpoena should be directed to Mr. JOHN D. SADLER, South Florida Commercial Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami, Florida, or his authorized representative.

On 3/8/68 at Coral Gables, Florida File # Miami 92-1870

by IC PHILIP F. CROGHAN/mev Date dictated 3/8/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

3

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 3/5/68

1

The records of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company were reviewed and the following information obtained for telephone number 864-5474:

Listed to	NORMAN ROTHMAN
Billed to	Same
Address	425 Surfside Boulevard
Date Connected	June 2, 1965
Employment	Self
Other Service	866-4030 Connected December 1951 - working
Credit Rating with Telephone Company	B

This is a nonpublished number.

The above records are confidential and can only be obtained through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. This subpoena should be directed to Mr. JOHN D. SADLER, South Florida Commercial Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami, Florida, or his authorized representative.

On 3/1/68 at Miami Beach, Florida File # Miami 92-1870

by IC PHILIP F. CROGHAN:sl Date dictated 3/5/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

4

A review of the Miami, Florida, Crisscross Directory reveals that telephone number 221-3540 is listed to GERALD SCHWARTZ, 1810-86th Avenue, S.W., Miami, Florida.

On March 8, 1968, IC PHILIP CROGHAN was unable to locate any arrest records for GERALD SCHWARTZ at the Miami Beach Police Department, the Dade County Department of Public Safety, the Miami Municipal Court and the Miami Police Department.

CROGHAN determined that the files of the Greater Miami Credit Bureau reflect that GERALD SCHWARTZ is a Vice President of the County National Bank and has held this position for three years. He was formerly a factory representative for the Lullaby Products, Inc., and has a satisfactory credit record.

Examination of telephone directories reflect that telephone number 455-7158 is a Pensacola, Florida telephone number.

TRAVEL

On November 24, 1967, a review of the Clark County Sheriff's Office records, Las Vegas, Nevada, reflected the following residences for the subject in Las Vegas, Nevada:

Caesar's Palace, Room 775, 11/23-27/66
Caesar's Palace, Room 1275, 1/25/67
Caesar's Palace, Room 1079, 6/26/67
Frontier Hotel, Room 2053, 7/28/67
Caesar's Palace, Room 1451, 9/10/67
Bonanza Hotel, Room 115, 10/10/67
Frontier Hotel, Room 1731, 11/8/67

CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

On January 5, 1968, MM T-5 advised that ROTHMAN has been backing the Bolita operation of ERWIN BRENNER and that ROTHMAN is using hoodlum money. ERWIN BRENNER is a well-known Bolita operator in the Miami, Florida, area.

On January 8, 1968, MM T-6 advised that he heard that subject and several other persons, not further identified, but who are apparently connected with Caesar's Palace Hotel-Casino, are attempting to set up a casino in Majorca, Spain.

On January 12, 1968, MM T-7 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN is an errand boy for the LCN members in Miami, Florida, and also acts as a carrier of funds.

MM T-8 advised on February 2, 1968, that NORMAN ROTHMAN has been "backing" large scale pro-football bets in the Cuban Colony in Miami, Florida.

On February 12, 1968, ROTHMAN was observed to drive from his residence to JOE SONKEN's Gold Coast Restaurant, Hollywood, Florida, where he met with five other individuals, including SONKEN. The identity of the other individuals is not known.

Cars bearing the following license plates were observed in SONKEN's parking lot at the time ROTHMAN met with these individuals:

1967-68 Florida license 1D-81139
Pennsylvania license Z87-548
Texas license JXL-938
Indiana license 18B-805
Ohio license 8270GG
Kentucky license L68-632
Florida license 1D-78549

On March 1, 1968, Mrs. FAYE JUMPER, Supervisor, records room, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Department of Revenue, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, advised that Pennsylvania license Z87-548 is registered to Keystone Sales Company, Inc., 725 Franklin Street, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, for a Chevrolet sedan Vehicle Identification Number 164695Y183761.

LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISES

It has previously been reported that ROTHMAN, in fact, is owner of the Albion Hotel Lounge, 1650 James Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida.

ROTHMAN was observed at the Albion Lounge on February 8, and February 12, 1968, and March 13, 1968.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida
March 18, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 92-1870

Title	**NORMAN ROTHMAN**
Character	**ANTI-RACKETEERING**
Reference	**Report of Special Agent Allan M. Trankley dated and captioned as above at Miami, Florida.**

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-263 (Rev. 9-17-65)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE MIAMI	OFFICE OF ORIGIN MIAMI	DATE 12/26/67	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 6/6 - 12/14/67

TITLE OF CASE

NORMAN ROTHMAN, aka
Norm Rothman,
Norman Roth

SECRET

REPORT MADE BY: ALLAN M. TRANKLEY

TYPED BY: VC

CHARACTER OF CASE

ANTI-RACKETEERING

5T

10-19-96

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

REFERENCES

Report of SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY dated 6/22/67 at Miami.
Washington Field letter to Miami dated 6/30/67.
Phoenix teletypes to Miami dated 9/26 and 9/27/67.
Jacksonville letter to Miami dated 10/9/67.

- P -

LEADS

ATLANTA

At Atlanta, Georgia:

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED: None

INFORMATION CONTAINED [illegible] CLASSIFIED [illegible] WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

40

Case has been: Pending over one year ☒ Yes ☐ No; Pending prosecution over six months ☐ Yes ☒ No

APPROVED — SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

3 - Bureau (92-9844)
SEE COVER PAGE B FOR ADDITIONAL COPIES

1cc DTD 1537

3 - Miami (92-1870)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

92-9844-3

REC-1

3 DEC 29 1967

~~EX-113~~

REC-4

EX 104

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency				
Request Recd.	CC: AAG, Criminal Division,			
Date Fwd.	Organized Crime and Racketeering			
How Fwd.	Section, Room 2524		1/5/68	
By				

Notations

NINE
STAT. SECT.

SECRET

Class

57 FEB 14 1968

REC'D - CIV RIGHTS
FBI
FEB 12 3 27 PM '68

REC'D - CIV RIGHTS
FBI
JAN 12 4 17 PM '68

REC'D
DOM INTELL DIV
JAN 15 10 25 AM '68

RECEIVED
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
DIVISION
JAN 3 11 21 AM '68
U S DEPT OF JUSTICE
FBI

U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE
F.B.I.
FEB 12

RECEIVED
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE
DIVISION
JAN 12 3 10 PM '68

FEB 13 1968

FEB 12 1968

226-10305

SECRET

COPIES CONTINUED

1 - USA, Miami
    (Attention: Departmental Attorney
    WILLIAM EARLE)
2 - Atlanta
2 - Baltimore
2 - Boston
2 - Charlotte
2 - Chicago
2 - Cincinnati
2 - Columbia
2 - Detroit
2 - Houston
2 - Indianapolis
2 - Jacksonville
2 - Las Vegas
2 - Los Angeles
2 - New Haven
2 - New York
2 - Oklahoma City
2 - Pittsburgh
2 - Richmond
2 - Washington Field

Will determine subscribers to the following telephone numbers and conduct credit, criminal and indices checks:

355-3375
351-6324
873-4941

BALTIMORE

At Capitol Heights, Maryland:

Determine subscriber to telephone number 423-8594. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks.

BOSTON

At Palmer, Massachusetts:

SECRET

SECRET

Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks on HERBERT TULZMAN who was contacted at 283-3431.

CHARLOTTE

At Charlotte, North Carolina:

Determine subscribers to telephone numbers 334-3061 and 375-8444. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks.

CHICAGO

At Chicago, Illinois:

Determine subscribers to telephone numbers RO 1-0449, 527-3730, CA 6-5300, and MO 6-8300. Conduct credit, criminal, and indices checks.

CINCINNATI

At Cincinnati, Ohio:

Determine subscriber to telephone number 731-8246. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks:

COLUMBIA

At Greenville, South Carolina:

Will conduct same lead as above regarding telephone number 235-8955.

DETROIT

At Detroit, Michigan:

Will conduct same lead as above regarding telephone number 965-2426.

HOUSTON

At Houston, Texas:

SECRET

SECRET

Will conduct same lead as above concerning telephone number 226-1203.

INDIANAPOLIS

At Indianapolis, Indiana:

Will conduct same lead as above concerning telephone numbers 898-1010 and 545-2421.

JACKSONVILLE

At Tallahassee, Florida:

Will conduct same lead as above concerning telephone number 224-5959.

LAS VEGAS

At Las Vegas, Nevada:

1. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks on JOE VALEN contacted at telephone number 382-4925.

2. Same as to J. SAINO contacted at telephone number 734-7110.

3. Same as to ART ROCCO contacted at telephone number 734-4110.

4. Same as to BURTON COHEN contacted at telephone number 735-1363.

5. Same as to ED GAMBARANA contacted at telephone numbers 734-7110 and 734-6947.

6. Same as to JAY ZURINO contacted at telephone number 734-7110.

7. Same as to T. W. RICHARDSON contacted at telephone number 734-1212.

SECRET

SECRET

8. Determine subscriber to telephone number 735-1855. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks.

9. Same as to telephone number 735-6614.

10. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks on LES CRAWFORD who was contacted at telephone number 734-7110.

11. Same as to J. SARNEAU contacted at 735-8586.

12. Same as to CARL COHEN contacted at 735-9111.

13. Same as to JERRY ZAROWITZ contacted at 734-7110.

14. Same as to a Miss EYRA contacted at 735-0330.

15. Same as to JACKIE HELLER contacted at 735-9111.

16. Same as to GIL COLEMAN contacted at 735-1122.

17. Same as to ERWIN HARRIS contacted at 734-7110.

18. Same as to (FNU) HUGO contacted at 736-0380.

19. Same as to TERRY DEUTSCH contacted at 735-0830.

20. Determine subscriber to telephone number 735-7317. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks.

21. Same as to telephone number 382-3657.

LOS ANGELES

At Los Angeles, California:

1. Determine subscriber to telephone number OL 3-9610. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks.

2. Same as to telephone number OL 6-2055.

SECRET

SECRET

3. Same as to telephone number HO 5-5588.

NEW HAVEN

At New Haven, Connecticut:

Determine subscriber to telephone number 865-9775. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks.

At Stamford, Connecticut:

Same as to telephone number 325-3581.

At Bridgeport, Connecticut:

Same as to telephone number 367-4404.

At Westport, Connecticut:

Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks on FRED THOMPSON contacted at 226-4227.

NEW YORK

At New York, New York:

1. Determine the subscribers to the following telephone numbers. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks:

LO 4-5760
OX 7-4870
PL 1-7300
JU 2-1441
CA 6-9345
PL 9-3000
CO 5-3910
PL 7-2034
781-9683
CI 7-1587
247-1587

SECRET

SECRET

AU 6-9335
OL 2-6779
OL 5-4299
OL 2-6779
BA 5-2542
TW 7-7370
937-3800
TW 7-3617
TW 1-2500
679-5891
PL 7-3600
AC 2-7263
244-0642
YU 8-7513

2. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks on the following individuals:

IRVING HOLME contacted at 972-5597.

VIC POSNER contacted at PL 2-5890.

STEVE MORRIS contacted at LO 4-0022.

(FNU) DELK contacted at MO 1-8282.

At Bayville, New York:

Determine subscriber to telephone number UN 6-4030. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks.

OKLAHOMA CITY

At Oklahoma City, Oklahoma:

Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks on JUDY CLAYTON contacted at CE 6-5455.

PITTSBURGH

At Ebensburg, Pennsylvania:

Determine subscriber to telephone number 472-9540. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks.

SECRET

SECRET

At New Kensington, Pennsylvania:

1. Will determine subscribers to the following telephone numbers. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks:

335-7571
335-4371
335-1244
337-7196

2. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks on SAUL SILVERMAN contacted at 339-9371.

RICHMOND

At Cartersville, Virginia:

Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks on CARRIE GERPERSA.

WASHINGTON FIELD

At Washington, D. C. :

Determine subscriber to telephone number 666-6103. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks.

MIAMI

At Hollywood, Florida:

Determine subscribers to the following telephone numbers. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks:

923-8111
922-4993
983-5669
989-9576
989-9676
923-8471

At Ft. Lauderdale, Florida:

SECRET

SECRET

Determine subscriber to telephone number LO 5-7433. Conduct credit, criminal and indices checks.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Information below relates to contacts with (U) ~~(S)~~ [LUIS POSADA CARRILES] in regard to his knowledge of the activities of FRANK LANG "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL. At the time of original contact with [CARRILES, ~~(S)~~(U) he was an employee of CIA. During the latter stages of his contacts with SA WARREN R. WELSH his employment with CIA had been terminated. ~~(S)~~

BOMBINGS - MIAMI AREA
JANUARY - JUNE, 1967

A. [CONTACTS WITH [LUIS POSADA CARRILES,] ~~(S)~~ (U) CIA INFORMANT] ~~(S)~~

1. On July 24, 1965, CIA provided in memo form information received from a reliable source. This source was later identified as [LUIS POSADA CARRILES.] (S)

~~(S)~~ (U) [POSADA] advised that DIEGO BORGES was acting as an agent for three Americans who were seeking to buy pistols, explosives, blasting caps, hand grenades and silencers. The identity of the Americans was not known to [POSADA] although ~~(S)~~ (U) he believed they were members of the Ku Klux Klan or possibly the John Birch Society. ~~(S)~~

SECRET

SECRET

[POSADA] (X)(u) provided the following background information concerning individuals involved with BORGES in the procurement of arms and munitions by the three Americans: (X)

HERMINIO DIAZ, 732 NW 3rd Street, Miami, Florida, sold sixty hand grenades (USMK II) to BORGES for delivery to Americans. DIAZ received from BORGES three hundred sixty dollars for grenades but delivered only forty. Subsequently, BORGES asked source to go to DIAZ andeither pick up other twenty grenades or the one hundred twenty dollars in cash which they represented. (X)(u)

RAMON ESCARDA, 620 SW 9th Street, who served in the US Army, 1958-1959, was supposed to obtain one hundred pounds of pentolite for delivery to BORGES for $320-350. (X) (u)

FRANK TAMAYO, 3213 SW 8th Street, Miami, active in anti-CASTRO activities, sold .622 caliber silencers to Americans for $1,000. (X)(u)

Source gave descriptions of the three Americans and also recorded license plate of car utilized by group. (X)(u)

On October 23, 1965, [POSADA] (X)(u) interviewed by Bureau Agents. (u)(X) [POSADA] readily admitted he had been in contact with three Americans who were seeking to purchase hand grenades, weapons, silencers and explosives. He had been placed in contact with these Americans by DIEGO BORGES. He confirmed DIAZ, ESCARDA and TAMAYO were also involved in this transaction. [POSADA] (X)(u) said shortly after he established contact with Americans, his CIA contact gave him several photos in attempt to identify Americans. [POSADA] (X)(u) said he idnetified one of the photos as that of FRANK ROSENTHAL. Immediately after he identified this photo, CIA instructed him to break off all contact with these three Americans and to have nothing further to do with them. (X)

SECRET

SECRET

[POSADA] ~~(S)~~(u) said that six silencers which had been manufactured at the home of TAMAYO had been given by BORGES to ROSENTHAL. He said ESCARDA was looking for pentolite but did not know whether material delivered to ROSENTHAL. ~~(S)~~

On November 5, 1965, Bureau Agents exhibited photo of NORMAN ROTHMAN, FBI #152 585B, to [POSADA.] ~~(S)~~(u) (u) ~~(S)~~ [POSADA] identified ROTHMAN as one of Americans with ROSENTHAL. He was of the impression that ROTHMAN was personally known to BORGES and had introduced ROSENTHAL to BORGES. It is noted ROTHMAN was arrested April 9, 1959, and was later convicted of violation of the National Stolen Property Act. He was sentenced to five years in prison and ten thousand dollar fine. ~~(S)~~

2. By similar communication, dated June 15, 1967, CIA advised the Miami Division that [POSADA] ~~(S)~~ had (u) been contacted by FRANK ROSENTHAL during the month of October, 1966. ~~(S)~~

ROSENTHAL told [POSADA] ~~(S)~~(u) that all silencers he (u) had purchased from [POSADA] were pieces of junk and he felt ~~(S)~~(u) ~~(S)~~ [POSADA and] BORGES were responsible for this and maybe his friends would kill [POSADA and] BORGES. ~~(S)~~(u) ~~(S)~~

ROSENTHAL stated although he was out $5,000 from his (u) previous purchases, he did not want money from [POSADA.] ~~(S)~~ ROSENTHAL said he knew [POSADA] ~~(S)~~(u) was working for CIA and he wanted some CIA equipment. [POSADA] allegedly ~~(S)~~(u) refused to do this but [POSADA made a number of fuse devices which he gave to ROSENTHAL.] ~~(S)~~(u)

(u) ~~(S)~~ This same memo reflects ROSENTHAL contacted [POSADA] in early June, 1967. ROSENTHAL stated the fuse devices were no good which were previously furnished and made a request for more CIA fuse devices and remote control unit for detonating explosive charges. ~~(S)~~

SECRET

On June 12, 1967, [POSADA] ~~(S)~~(u) stated ROSENTHAL contacted him on June 11, 1967. ROSENTHAL asked for requested equipment and told source he would get him if he did not deliver. [POSADA] ~~(S)~~(u) refused to do anything more for ROSENTHAL. ~~(S)~~

3. On June 22, 1967, SAs JAMES J. O'CONNOR and WARREN R. WELSH met with [LUIS POSADA] ~~(S)~~(u) at Dinner Key, Coconut Grove, Florida. ~~(S)~~

[POSADA] ~~(S)~~(u) at this time, reiterated his past dealings with FRANK ROSENTHAL from the time of the Spring of 1965, through June 12, 1967. (u)~~(S)~~ [POSADA] made one additional remark concerning his involvement with ROSENTHAL during 1965. He stated that he did not directly furnish ROSENTHAL any of the explosives, et al, which he requested although he was introduced (u) to ROSENTHAL [as an expert in the field of explosives.] ~~(S)~~ For his expertise knowledge he was given (u) $500 by ROSENTHAL sometime during the month of May, 1965. ~~(S)~~ [POSADA] indicated that he gave this money to CIA, who in turn at a later date gave this money back to him. ~~(S)~~

4. On June 23, 1967, SA JAMES J. O'CONNOR was telephonically contacted by [POSADA. POSADA] ~~(S)~~(u) related that on June 22, 1967, he met with FRANK ROSENTHAL. Subject requested 250 pounds of C-4 explosives, a large quantity of pencil type devices and a remote control explosive apparatus. ROSENTHAL stated to source that money was no problem and he would pay twenty-five times the original cost if this was necessary. ~~(S)~~

ROSENTHAL further related (u)~~(S)~~ to [POSADA] that there would be at least twenty more bombings and additional corpses would be appearing in the Miami area. Subject stated that he would be out of town for several weeks although he requested a meeting with source on June 29, June 30, or July 1, 1967. ~~(S)~~

SECRET

5. On June 2[illegible], 1967, SA WARREN R. WELSH met with LUIS POSADA (~~S~~)(U) at the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida. (~~S~~)

On this date, POSADA (~~S~~)(U) was shown a photograph taken by the Dade County Public Safety Department, Miami, Florida, of an explosive device found at the apartment residence of MICKEY ZION, 7501 East Treasure Drive, North Bay Village, Miami, Florida. This device was intended to go off in the bedroom area of ZION's apartment on May 30, 1967. (U)(~~S~~) POSADA identified the explosive material as pentolite. He stated that he had provided ROSENTHAL with pencil type devices similar although not identical to the devices appearing in the photograph. (~~S~~)

6. On June 26, 1967, SA WARREN R. WELSH met with source at Dinner Key, Coconut Grove, Florida. (~~S~~)(U)

POSADA (~~S~~)(U) advised that the cost of C-4 to ROSENTHAL would be \$5-\$7 a pound. The ingredients of C-4 are 92% RDX and 8% gelatin. The material is packaged in plastic type containers weighing approximately 2½ pounds each. He stated that the cost of the pencil type devices would vary between \$10 and \$15 per pencil. (~~S~~)

Source related that on June 24, 1967, he was contacted by DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA, son of now deceased Cuban gambling figure OSCAR ECHEMENDIA. ECHEMENDIA wanted source to meet with him concerning the obtainment of explosives for an unknown group of individuals. (~~S~~)(U)

On June 25, 1967, source and ECHEMENDIA went to a location somewhere between SW 78th Court and 29th Terrace or 30th Street, in the southwest section of Miami. (This address is that of OLGA CHAVIANO, a Cuban dancer who is the girlfriend of NORMAN ROTHMAN. ROTHMAN is the subject of AR investigation by the Miami Division.) (~~S~~)(U)

SECRET

MM 92-1870 SECRET

[POSADA] ~~(S)~~(U) stated that he met with an unknown individual who was introduced to him as a Chilean. This individual spoke excellent Spanish and good English. Unknown individual was interested in obtaining pentolite pencil type devices, a .308 caliber silencer and any other delay type material which source could locate. At this meet source said that he could see NORMAN ROTHMAN several hundred yards away from the place of his meet with the Chilean. ~~(S)~~

After the meet source stated that ECHEMENDIA told him that the Chilean he had just talked with was the man responsible for the recent bombings at MICKEY ZION's apartment, Rand's Cleaners and Alfie's Sundries. ECHEMENDIA said that this individual is working for NORMAN ROTHMAN, who is now a big man in Miami and a representative of the Mafia. ~~(S)~~(U)

(U)~~(S)~~ 7. On June 27, 1967, SA WARREN R. WELSH met with [LUIS POSADA] in the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida. ~~(S)~~

(U)~~(S)~~ [POSADA] identified a photograph of ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE as the Chilean whom he had met with on June 25, 1967. (It is noted that MAESTRE is a Federal Bureau of Narcotics fugitive who is also a close associate of NORMAN ROTHMAN.) ~~(S)~~

Arrested 12/4/67
See p. DD

8. On June 28, 1967, [LUIS POSADA] ~~(S)~~(U) was contacted telephonically by SA WELSH, who was in Washington, D.C. ~~(S)~~

Source advised that on June 28, 1967, ROSENTHAL had called his house, at which time his wife told ROSENTHAL that source would be out of town for several days. ~~(S)~~(U)

~~(S)~~(U)
9. On June 28, 1967. [LUIS POSADA] telephonically contacted SA JAMES J. O'CONNOR. ~~(S)~~

SECRET

Source indicated that during the morning of this date he met with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA. At this meet he promised to furnish ECHEMENDIA with the various materials requested by ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE. Source quoted ECHEMENDIA a price of $10 a pound for C-4 and $150 per silencer without the pistol. (~~S~~)(u)

Source further advised that ECHEMENDIA told him that he was to meet at midnight, June 29, 1967, with NORMAN ROTHMAN at the Albion Hotel Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida. The purpose of this meet, according to source, was to obtain an okay on the price of materials which were to be provided to the Chilean. (~~S~~)(u)

(u)(~~S~~) 10. On July 5, 1967, SA WELSH met with [LUIS POSADA] in the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida. (~~S~~)

Source stated that he was trying to analyze in his own mind the various meetings he has had with FRANK ROSENTHAL, NORMAN ROTHMAN, DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA and ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE. From all indications it appears that ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE is performing the bombings for FRANK ROSENTHAL. (~~S~~)(u)

He reflected that the original contact between ECHEMENDIA, ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE and himself came about through a mutual friend by the name of LUCIO CABRERA. He described the latter individual as a former gunsmith in the 20506 Brigade. CABRERA was first contacted by DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA to obtain various explosives for a Chilean who was a close associate of NORMAN ROTHMAN. He stated that CABRERA contacted him as a potential source of these explosive devices since he had only had one previous contact with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA. (~~S~~)(u)

Source stated that he had obtained a remote control explosive device for ROSENTHAL although he could not at this time obtain all the C-4 or pencil (~~S~~)(u)

SECRET

type devices requested by ROSENTHAL. He indicated that in order to obtain all the C-4 requested by ROSENTHAL he would have to contact LUIS MARTI, who resides in the State of New Jersey. He stated that MARTI is the source for Cubans who desire explosives. (~~S~~) (U)

11. On July 7, 1967, SA WELSH met with (U)(~~S~~)[LUIS POSADA] in the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida. (~~S~~)

He related that during the evening of July 6, 1967, ROSENTHAL met him at their usual meeting place, behind Roger's Food Market, located on the corner of SW 27th Avenue and 25th Street. (~~S~~)(U)

ROSENTHAL, in a very amiable mood, reflected that he would be leaving town either next Tuesday or Wednesday, and would need his explosive materials by that time. He further requested two grease guns with silencers and two M-2 carbines. ROSENTHAL said that he would make contact with source sometime during July 10, 1967, for the time of delivery. (~~S~~) (U)

Source stated that the cost of the grease guns would be $175 per gun and the price of the carbines would be $120 per unit. He also indicated that during the above described meeting there was an unknown individual sitting in ROSENTHAL's car. (~~S~~)(U)

Source also related that he had had a two hour talk with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA on July 6, 1967. ECHEMENDIA told him that the Chicago mob was contemplating the takeover of the gambling business in the Miami area. DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA stated that a representative of this group came to his house several nights ago and discussed the gambling situation. ECHEMENDIA stated that he was to receive an influential position with this group for the purpose of controlling the Cuban bolita operators. (~~S~~) (U)

SECRET

ECHEMENDIA further stated that on the evening of his meet with NORMAN ROTHMAN at the Albion Hotel Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida, ROTHMAN had previously been in contact with MEYER LANSKY. (~~S~~)(U)

ECHEMENDIA also commented on a Cuban bolita operator by the name of EVARISTO GARCIA VIDAL. ECHEMENDIA stated that VIDAL was on the outs with the mob in view of his failure to pay the proper percentage of his earnings to the group. Because of this disfavor, the mob is allegedly out to kill VIDAL. (~~S~~)(U)

12. On July 10, 1967, SA WELSH telephonically contacted [LUIS POSADA] (~~S~~)(U)

(U)(~~S~~)[POSADA] stated that he had talked with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA regarding the silencers he was to obtain for the Peruvian individual. ECHEMENDIA indicated that he was going to give one of the silencers to MARGOSA, a car salesman in the Miami area, who would test the equipment for the Peruvian. (SA FRANCIS J. DUFFIN obtained information that MARGOSA was formerly Sergeant of Police in Cuba and a Special Guard at the Tropicana Hotel in Havana. This hotel was operated by OSCAR ECHEMENDIA, now deceased.) (~~S~~)

(~~S~~)(U)

13. SA WELSH contacted [LUIS POSADA] in person at the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida, on July 11, 1967. (~~S~~)

In conversation with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA he ascertained that MARGOSA was well pleased with the silencers which he was testing for the Peruvian. (U)(~~S~~)[POSADA] stated that he was going to charge the Peruvian $150 per silencer, $15 per pencil and $10 a pound for C-4 explosive. (~~S~~)

[POSADA] (~~S~~)(U) was instructed at this time regarding the tenure of conversation he should have with ROSENTHAL at their next contact. He was requested to make up a (~~S~~)

SECRET

story concerning a dummy customs raid at his residence and the fact that because of this raid he could not produce the requested explosive devices for ROSENTHAL. (~~S~~)

(u) (~~S~~) During the late evening hours of July 11, 1967, [POSADA] telephonically contacted SA WELSH and advised him that he had just been contacted by his CIA supervisor. He informed him that he was no longer in the employment of CIA due to an order emanating in Washington, D.C. He was told that this action by CIA headquarters in Washington had nothing to do with either his previous work record with CIA or his present contact with the FBI Office in Miami. (~~S~~)

(u)(~~S~~) [POSADA] further stated at this time that ROSENTHAL had contacted his home at approximately 10:45 PM at which time his wife explained that her husband had been in trouble and that he would contact ROSENTHAL tomorrow. (~~S~~)(u)

14. SA WELSH contacted [LUIS POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) via telephone on July 12, 1967. (~~S~~)

[POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) stated that at approximately 10:30 AM on this date he contacted ROSENTHAL at his residence. ROSENTHAL would not talk on his home phone and requested [POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) to contact him at a pre-arranged number and time. (~~S~~)

After making this telephonic contact, [POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) indicated that ROSENTHAL was extremely aggravated over the stalling tactics of [POSADA.] (~~S~~)(u) He gave [POSADA] an ultimatum to either produce the material in ten days or forget about everything. (~~S~~)(u) (~~S~~)

[POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) also related that on this date, DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA had contacted him and he informed ECHEMENDIA that the [customs had raided his house] (~~S~~)(u) the previous day. ECHEMENDIA stated that this [raid] (~~S~~)(u) meant nothing and he (~~S~~)

SECRET

should not be worried about it. ECHEMENDIA stated that ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE was not presently in the Miami area. (~~S~~)

15. On July 13, 1967, SA WELSH contacted AUSTIN HORN, CIA, Miami. (~~S~~)(u)

HORN stated that [LUIS POSADA CARRILES] (~~S~~)(u) was no longer an employee of CIA. He stated that the decision to release [POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) came from their Washington headquarters in view of the fact that [POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) had without authorization withdrawn himself from an anti-CASTRO group [called Resa] (~~S~~) (S)(u)

HORN commented that [POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) was instructed to continue his cooperation with the FBI Office in Miami and that he would be paid through September, 1967, as long as he cooperated with this other Federal agency. (~~S~~)

(~~S~~)(u) 16. On July 14, 1967, SA WELSH met with [LUIS POSADA] at Dinner Key, Coconut Grove, Florida. (~~S~~)

[POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) stated that he had conferred on this date with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA and ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE was not in town. ECHEMENDIA told [POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) that he was not going to place a sepcific order of explosives with [POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) until he found out exactly what MAESTRE and the Peruvian wanted, insofar as volume of explosive material. (~~S~~)

[POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) said that he had heard nothing more from ROSENTHAL. (~~S~~)

He further indicated that inasmuch as he is not presently employed in the Miami area he was contemplating a trip [to Venezuela] (~~S~~)(u) in order to secure a permanent type job. (~~S~~)

SECRET

17. On July 15, 1967, [LUIS POSADA] ~~S~~(u) was telephonically contacted by SA WELSH. (~~S~~)

[POSADA] ~~S~~(u) advised that DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA advised that ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE had returned to Miami on this date. He stated that ECHEMENDIA and MAESTRE were going to meet later on this date in the southwest section of Miami. According to [POSADA], ~~S~~(u) after this meeting ECHEMENDIA would contact him regarding the volume and type of explosives wanted by MAESTRE. (~~S~~)

18. On July 18, 1967, SA WELSH met in person with [LUIS POSADA] in the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida. (~~S~~) ~~S~~(u)

[POSADA] ~~S~~(u) stated that he had just finished talking to DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA. He ascertained that ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE had not participated in the bombing of a Miami police officer in the southwest section of Miami. MAESTRE had left with NORMAN ROTHMAN on either Sunday night or Monday morning for an unknown destination out of Florida. (~~S~~)

ECHEMENDIA related to [POSADA] ~~S~~(u) that a policeman by the name of DOBSON or DAWSON was helping the "mob boys". ECHEMENDIA also related that he had heard that ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE and NORMAN ROTHMAN were responsible for the recent bombing at the Thunderbird Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. (~~S~~)

19. On July 24, 1967, [LUIS POSADA] ~~S~~(u) was telephonically contacted by SA WELSH. (~~S~~)

[POSADA] ~~S~~(u) stated that on July 20, 1967, FRANK ROSENTHAL had contacted him at his residence. [POSADA] ~~S~~(u) at this time told ROSENTHAL that he was no longer interested ~~S~~

SECRET

in obtaining explosives for him and that he wished to have no further dealings with him. After hearing (U) this, ROSENTHAL became very irate and gave back to ~~(S)~~ [POSADA] a number of pencils that he had previously secured from him. ~~(S)~~

(U) ~~(S)~~ [POSADA] stated that he became very upset over the conduct of ROSENTHAL and requested him to leave his residence in three seconds or he would shoot him in the head. After this threat by [POSADA] ROSENTHAL ~~(S)~~ (U) told him "that someday when he was playing gin rummy [POSADA] would be killed". ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~(S)~~ (U) 20. On August 1, 1967, [LUIS POSADA] ~~(S)~~ (U) was contacted telephonically by SA WELSH. ~~(S)~~

[POSADA] ~~(S)~~ (U) stated that on this date he had been in contact with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA. ECHEMENDIA stated that NORMAN ROTHMAN had gone to the Hollywood, California area and ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE had departed for Peru. Source could not learn the duration of either of these two visits. ~~(S)~~

He stated that he was no longer going to contact DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA and told this individual that he could no longer supply him with explosive material. ~~(S)~~ (U)

21. On August 4, 1967, [LUIS POSADA] ~~(S)~~ (U) was contacted in person by SA WELSH at the corner of US 1 and Bird Road. ~~(S)~~

[POSADA] ~~(S)~~ (U) stated that several days after his last confrontation with ROSENTHAL he received a letter in the mail from an unknown individual. He stated that the contents of this letter consisted of eight pennies which were held together by Scotch tape and a .350 caliber bullet. (U) ~~(S)~~ [POSADA] did not know the significance of either of the items although he surmised that ROSENTHAL had sent these things to him. ~~(S)~~

SECRET

SECRET

MM 92-1870

[POSADA] (~~S~~)(u) stated that he had heard nothing during the past week from FRANK ROSENTHAL and has told DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA not to contact him. (~~S~~)

In conclusion, (u)(~~S~~) [POSADA] stated that he was contemplating a trip to Caracas, Venezuela, on Tuesday, August 8, 1967. (~~S~~)

The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Miami, Florida, made available telephone toll calls from telephone numbers to which ROTHMAN had access. The following toll calls are from telephone number 866-4030, a non-published number, in the name of ETHEL ROTHMAN, wife of NORMAN ROTHMAN:

Date	Location	Number
11/10/66	Hollywood, Florida	923-8111
11/12/66	Hollywood, Florida	923-8111
11/20/66	Bronx, New York	OL 2-6779
11/27/66	Bronx, New York	OL 5-4299
12/9/66	Bronx, New York	OL 5-4299
12/31/66	Cincinnati, Ohio	731-8246
1/22/67	Hollywood, Florida	922-4993
1/22/67	Hollywood, Florida	922-4993
2/16/67	Ft. Lauderdale, Florida	LO 5-7433
2/16/67	Bayville, New York	UN 6-4030
2/26/67	Hollywood, Florida	983-5669
3/5/67	Bronx, New York	OL 2-6779
3/15/67	Hollywood, Florida	989-9576

- COVER PAGE -

REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~ DOJ JFK TASK FORCE
10/7/97 dch
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

SECRET

SECRET

Date	Location	Number	Other Data
3/27/67	Queens, New York	BA 5-2542	
3/31/67	Hollywood, Florida	989-9676	
4/7/67	Hollywood, Florida	989-9576	
4/11/67	Queens, New York	TW 7-7370	
4/26/67	Hollywood, Florida	923-8471	
4/28/67	Hollywood, Florida	983-5669	
5/2/67	Pittsburg, Pennsylvania	391-8800	

The following toll calls are from telephone number 226-1203, a non-published number in the name of OLGA CHAVIANO, ROTHMAN's mistress:

Date	Location	Number	Other Data
12/8/66	New York, N.Y.	CO 5-3910	
12/19/66	Ebensburg, Pa.	472-9540	
12/25/66	New York, N.Y.	PL 7-2034	
1/2/67	Tallahassee, Fla.	224-5959	
1/8/67	Capitol Heights, Md.	423-8594	
1/18/67	New York, N.Y.	781-9683	
1/19/67	New York, N.Y.	CI 7-1587	
1/20/67	Miami collect	from 247-1587	New York, N.Y.
2/12/67	New Kensington, Pa.	335-7571	
2/27/67	Hollywood, Fla.	989-9576	

SECRET

MM 92-1870

SECRET

Date	Location	Number	Other Data
3/3/67	Miami, collect	from 226-1203	Houston, Texas to NORMAN ROTHMAN
3/19/67	Hollywood, Fla.	989-9576	
3/26/67	New York, N.Y.	AU 6-9335	
4/2/67	New Kensington, Pa.	335-7571	
4/11/67	Chicago, Ill.	RO 1-0449	
4/19/67	New Kensington, Pa.	335-4371	

The following toll calls are from telephone number 538-7871, a number listed to International Lithographers, 1771 West Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, ROTHMAN's former place of employment:

Location	Number	Other Data
New Kensington, Pa.	412 335-4371	
New York, N.Y.	212 LO 4-5760	
Los Angeles, Calif.	213 OL3-9610	
New Haven, Conn.	203 865-9775	
Detroit, Mich.	313 965-2426	
Atlanta, Ga.	404 873-4941	
Greenville, S. C.	803 235-8955	
New York, N.Y.	212 OX7-4870	
Queens, N.Y.	212 937-3800	
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 382-4925	to JOE VALEN

SECRET

MM 92-1870

SECRET

Location	Number	Other Data
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 734-7110	to J. SAINO from N. ROTHMAN
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 734-4110	to ART. ROCCO from ROTHMAN
New York, N.Y.	212 LO4-0022	to STEVE MORRIS
New York, N.Y.	212 MO1-8282	to DELK from ROTHMAN
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 735-1363	to BURTON COHEN
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 734-7110	to ED GAMBARANA
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 734-6947	to ED GAMBARANA from ROTHMAN
Washington, D. C., collect	from 666-6103	
Chicago, Ill.	312 527-3730	
New Kensington, Pa.	412 335-1244	
New York, N.Y.	212 PL 1-7300	
Indianapolis, Ind.	317 898-1010	
Los Angeles, Calif.	213 OL 6-2055	
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 734-7110	to ELLIOT PRICE
Westport, Conn.	203 226-4227	to FRED THOMPSON from ROTHMAN
New York, N.Y.	212 972-5597	to IRVING HOLME from ROTHMAN
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 734-7110	to JAY ZUNNO from ROTHMAN

SECRET

SECRET

MM 92-1870

Location	Number	Other Data
Palmer, Mass.	413 283-3431	to HERBERT TOLZMAN from ROTHMAN
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 734-1212	to T. W. RICHARDSON from ROTHMAN
Chicago, Ill.	312 CA 6-5300	to CRONIN
Stamford, Conn.	203 325-3581	
New York, N.Y.	212 JU 2-1441	
Capitol Heights, Md.	202 423-8594	
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 735-1855	
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 734-7110	to N. ROTHMAN Rm. 1275
Oklahoma City, Okla.	405 CE 6-5455	to JUDY CLAYTON
Chicago, Ill.	312 MO 6-8300	
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 735-7317	
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 734-7110	to LES CRAWFORD
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 735-8586	J. SANO or J. SARNEAU
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 735-9111	to CARL COHEN
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 734-7110	to JERRY ZAROWITZ from ROTHMAN
Cartersville, Va.	5-4334	to CARRIE GERPERSA
Bridgeport, Conn.	367-4404	collect to Miami
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 735-0330	to Miss EYRA from ROTHMAN

SECRET

SECRET

Location	Number	Other Data
Atlanta, Ga.	404 355-3375	
New York, N.Y.	212 CA 6-9345	
Queens, N.Y.	212 TW 7-3617	
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 735-9111	to JACKIE HELLER from ROTHMAN
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 735-1122	to GIL COLEMAN
New York, N.Y.	212 PL 9-3000	
Brooklyn, N.Y.	212 TW 1-2500	
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 734-7110	to ERWIN HARRIS
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 382-3657	from ROTHMAN
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 736-0380	to HUGO from ROTHMAN
New York, N.Y.	212 679-5891	
New York, N.Y.	212 PL 7-3600	
New York, N.Y.	212 PL 2-5890	to VIC POSNER
New York, N.Y.	212 YU 6-0630	to COHEN
New York, N.Y.	212 AC 2-7263	
Los Angeles, Calif.	213 HO 5-7158	
New Kensington, Pa.	339-9371	to SAUL SILVERMAN from ROTHMAN
Indianapolis, Ind.	317 545-2421	

SECRET

SECRET

Location	Number	Other Data
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 735-6614	
Las Vegas, Nev.	702 735-0830	to TERRY DEUTSCH
New York, N.Y.	222 581-1000	to TERRY DEUTSCH
New Kensington, Pa.	412 335-7571	
New Kensington, Pa.	412 335-4371	
New York, N.Y.	212 244-0642	
New York, N.Y.	212 YU 8-7513	
Atlanta, Ga.	404 351-6324	
Los Angeles, Calif.	213 HO 5-5588	
New Kensington, Pa.	412 337-7196	
Charlotte, N. C.	704 334-3061	
Charlotte, N. C.	704 375-8444	
Unknown	444 566-0592	

SECRET

On September 26, 1967, Phoenix advised that JONATHAN CURTIS, former PCI and CI of the New York Division, who resides at 1500 Bay Road, Morton Towers South, Apartment 1406, Miami Beach, Florida, was in contact with the Phoenix Division on three recent occasions. He advised on September 25, 1967, that he is presently on assignment for NORMAN ROTHMAN, owner, Albion Hotel, Lincoln Road, Miami Beach, Florida. ROTHMAN is acting as a "buffer" between SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR. and CURTIS to bring a reported six million dollars in "hot" securities of jewelry into the United States through Nogales, Arizona, in the immediate future.

CURTIS contends he will be staying at the El Dorado Hotel, Nogales, Arizona, and is to await contact from an unknown individual or individuals whom he is to act as a bodyguard for, in bringing "hot" items to undisclosed destination in the United States. CURTIS recalled he has been paid $2,000 to date by ROTHMAN and allegedly is to receive $8,000 upon completion of the assignment. CURTIS advised ROTHMAN has been giving him instructions by "bits" and therefore he is not in a position to furnish additional details.

On September 27, 1967, Phoenix advised that JONATHAN CURTIS was interviewed on the evening of September 26, 1967. He again claimed that his "principal" gave him $2,000 as advance on this deal but claimed that he is a compulsive gambler and that he lost most of the money at a dog track in Phoenix. He again demanded that the Bureau advance him money in this matter and was advised that he could only be paid on a C.O.D. basis. CURTIS then stated he planned to forget the whole deal and would call his "principal" in Miami and try to give him some excuse for asking him

SECRET

for money to enable him to return to Miami. He stated no one had contacted him to date regarding this deal.

In view of the possible Customs violation, Phoenix disseminated this matter to U. S. Customs, Nogales, Arizona.

SERGIO CASTRO is presently incarcerated in the Hudson County Jail, Jersey City, New Jersey, for bank robbery. There is also a case on CASTRO in New York on federal counterfeiting charges.

This case was placed in a pending inactive status on June 22, 1967, and Departmental Attorney WALLACE H. JOHNSON, JR. advised that agents of the Federal Narcotics Bureau in Miami, Florida, would conduct an investigation in Miami relative to the possibility of ROTHMAN being engaged in narcotics and that the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Unit would conduct an investigation of the Albion Lounge.

REMAINS UNCLASS PER DOJ ON 6-17-98
SLD/KSR
6-23-98
(JFK)

The Federal Narcotics Bureau in Miami conducted an investigation of ROTHMAN and is still conducting its investigation in an effort to prove that ROTHMAN is engaged in narcotics.

On December 12, 1967, ROBERT NICKOLOFF, Agent in Charge of the Miami Branch of the Federal Narcotics Bureau, advised that ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE had been arrested in Spain on or about December 4, 1967. A copy of the interview of this individual will be furnished to the Bureau.

The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Unit did not conduct an investigation of the Albion Lounge.

INFORMANTS

MM T-1 is MM 1124-PC.

MM T-2 is MM 725-C.

MM T-3 is MM 1176-PC.

MM T-4 is PCI JOANNE HALL.

REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~ DEA/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/7/97 dal
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

- DD -
- COVER PAGE -

SECRET

SECRET

MM T-5 is PCI BERNARD SHAFFER.

MM T-6 is LV 121-C-TE.

MM T-7 is SERGIO CASTRO.

MM T-8 is THOMAS LOPEZ, Internal Revenue Service, whose identity is concealed at his request.

IRS

REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~/JFK TASK FORCE

ON 6/19/98 jm

☐ RELEASE IN FULL

☑ RELEASE IN PART

☐ TOTAL DENIAL

- EE* -

- COVER PAGE -

SECRET

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - USA, Miami, Florida
(Attention: Departmental Attorney WILLIAM EARLE)

Report of: ALLAN M. TRANKLEY **Office:** Miami, Florida
Date: December 26, 1967

Field Office File #: 92-1870 **Bureau File #:** 92-9844

Title: NORMAN ROTHMAN

Character: ANTI-RACKETEERING

Synopsis:

Subject continues to reside Surfside, Fla. Reportedly now employed organizing junket flights to New Frontier Hotel and Casino, Las Vegas, Nev. Also still owns Albion Lounge, Miami Beach, Fla. Subject continues to associate with PATTY ERRA and reportedly with SANTO TRAFFICANTE.

- P -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

DETAILS:

RESIDENCE

On December 14, 1967, it was determined that ROTHMAN continues to reside at 425 Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida.

HANGOUTS

On June 6, 1967, MM T-1 advised that ROTHMAN occasionally visits the Fontainebleau Hotel and is a good friend of MAX EDER. He occasionally cashes checks at the Fontainebleau Hotel.

EMPLOYMENT

On August 24, 1967, MM T-2 advised that ROTHMAN was no longer connected with the International Lithographers Company.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

On October 2, 1967, MM T-4 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN travelled to Las Vegas, Nevada, on September 27, 1967, for the purpose of meeting with ED HUMMELSTEIN and GENE EDWIN, both of Memphis, Tennessee. HUMMELSTEIN is the president and founder of Faith Memphis Plates, while EDWIN is a building contractor in that city. This trio met for the purpose of finalizing the organization of junket flights to the New Frontier Hotel and Casino, Las Vegas, Nevada. They will be equal partners with one-third each, however, ROTHMAN will not be carried on the books as a member of this organization.

ROTHMAN's function is that of making the proper connections with the people in Las Vegas to honor these junkets. He is also working on trying to obtain the junkets for Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas.

Nevada

On November 3, 1967, MM T-2 advised that he heard that ROTHMAN acquired IRVING BRENNER's interest in the Albion Hotel Lounge. ROTHMAN paid BRENNER a certain amount of money but owes BRENNER a considerable sum which ROTHMAN will not pay.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

On August 25, 1967, MM T-2 advised that FABIO O. DE CRESTOFARO is still pushing and collecting shylock money for NORMAN ROTHMAN who in turn works for PATTY ERRA. FIA

FIA

FIA

On November ~~1,~~ 1967, MM T-7 advised that his knowledge of SANTO TRAFFICANTE dates back to the BATISTA regime and up to 1963. He continued that he was closely associated with OSCAR ECHEMENDIA and MARTIN FOX, co-owners of the Tropicana Casino, Havana, Cuba. During his days in Havana, Cuba, OSCAR ECHEMENDIA hired him on occasions as a bodyguard and chauffeur. He stated he learned through OSCAR that Italian racketeer, SANTO TRAFFICANTE, had a large interest in the Tropicana Casino, and that he was considered one of the "big bosses" there.

MM T-7 advised that prior to the revolution, he was contacted by an American, named NORMAN ROTHMAN, who was allegedly a close friend of SANTO TRAFFICANTE. He met

ROTHMAN at an expensive motel in Havana, Cuba, with another Cuban and ROTHMAN offered them $5,000.00 to kill an unknown American, who was to arrive in Havana, Cuba. MM T-7 did not know ROTHMAN, and he refused to make the "hit" for ROTHMAN. MM T-7 did not know if this "hit" was ever made.

Sometime during 1961, he met OSCAR ECHEMENDIA in Miami, Florida, where informant was now living. OSCAR hired him again to drive him around on occasions. He added most of his trips with ECHEMENDIA were at night, since OSCAR enjoyed drinking and partying. He learned at this time that OSCAR's partner was still MARTIN FOX, and that they had the largest Bolita bank in Miami, Florida. This business had been made possible through their friend, SANTO TRAFFICANTE. ECHEMENDIA told informant that SANTO received a percentage of their weekly Bolita operation for protection against police or anybody moving in. MM T-7 added that he believes ECHEMENDIA's operation took in about $50,000.00 or $60,000.00 weekly in Bolita gambling. ECHEMENDIA often told informant that if it was not for SANTO TRAFFICANTE, he would not have anything nor could he possibly operate.

MM T-7 advised that he observed SANTO TRAFFICANTE, sometime in 1962, at the Bel Air Hotel Cocktail Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida, with owner of this club, NORMAN ROTHMAN. SANTO was with a big Cuban politician named MACHO GEENER, who was an important Cuban during the Batista regime. Informant learned at this time that ROTHMAN was very close to SANTO TRAFFICANTE and that ROTHMAN was also involved in many illegal activities. Informant stated that ROTHMAN at this time was allegedly masterminding big robberies of wealthy homes in the Miami area, which involved large jewelry thefts. ROTHMAN would hire Cuban holdup men, who would take all their orders from him on the particular home to be hit, and then ROTHMAN would fence the hot "goods" or "ice."

FlA

MM T-7 further advised that he attended a big wedding reception given by NORMAN ROTHMAN, in 1962, for his son. MEYER LANSKY was seen at this party with other big shot hoodlums from the Miami area.

Fla.

MM T-7 advised that OSCAR ECHEMENDIA received large shipments of Puerto Rican lottery tickets weekly through the U. S. Mails. Informant stated he personally observed RAFAEL LORETO (deceased), during 1963, pick up a large package addressed to him at the Post Office in Miami, Florida, which contained a large shipment of the above tickets. LORETO told him that ECHEMENDIA assigned about eight of his operators to handle these tickets, but each one was given a different week to pick up the shipment at the U. S. Post Office. Other known operators for ECHEMENDIA were RAUL FERNANDEZ; OSCAR's son, DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA; PEDRO FOX, brother of MARTIN FOX. He continued that since OSCAR and MARTIN FOX's deaths, PEDRO FOX and DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA were left the bolita business. He advised that he doubts if DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA can handle this operation, since he does not have the knowledge or personality to handle such a large operation. FLA

FLA

MM T-7 stated that other large Cuban Bolita operators, during 1963, in Miami, Florida, were MIGUEL ANGEL CANO and his brother, ARMANDO CANO. He added that these Cubans owned a large hotel, which contained the Toledo Restaurant. He stated that ARMANDO has been arrested for gambling, but he believes MIGUEL CANO, may still be a big operator in Bolita and the Puerto Rican lottery.

TRAVEL

On June 7, 1967, MM T-2 advised that around May 10, 1967, NORMAN ROTHMAN went to New York City reportedly to handle some business for PATTY ERRA. He stated that ROTHMAN usually checks into the Americana Hotel. MM T-2 further advised that ROTHMAN went to Pittsburgh to attend the funeral of SAM MANNARINO.

On June 16, 1967, MM T-2 advised that ROTHMAN went to MANNARINO's funeral with PATTY ERRA.

Files Passport Office, Department of State, reviewed by SA KENNETH J. HASER on July 3, 1967, disclose that NORMAN ROTHMAN was last issued passport G-308507 at Washington, D. C. on March 21, 1966, for proposed vacation travel to Portugal and Spain for approximately one month. On application dated March 9, 1966, at Miami, he stated he

State Dept.'s info on pgs. 4,5,6
will remain unclass per their
letter dtd 9-10-97
SLD/KSR 6-23-98
(JFK)

intended to depart New York City about March, 1966, by unnamed airline, not by organized tour. Stated he expected to take another trip abroad within the year. This passport was valid for three years' travel to all countries except Albania, Cuba and those portions of China, Korea and Viet Nam under Communist control.

ROTHMAN stated he was born December 26, 1914, at New York City, and file contains sworn birth statement dated August 21, 1959, at Dade County, Florida, by BESS WEINBERG, 540 74th Street, Miami Beach, Florida, aunt of NORMAN ROTHMAN of the Biltmore Terrace Hotel, stating that she was present at his birth.

ROTHMAN originally furnished permanent residence and mailing address in March, 1966, as 425 Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida, but later changed this to 2305 Bruner Avenue, Bronx, New York, in care of LEIGHTON. ROTHMAN listed parents as LEON ROTHMAN and BETTY TANENBAUM, born in Rumania and both United States citizens. He stated last married in December, 1936, to ETHEL HUREWITZ, born at New York City, May 26, 1915, marriage not terminated. In the event of death or accident, he requested his wife, Mrs. ETHEL ROTHMAN, be notified at his address.

File shows ROTHMAN was first issued passport 1515395 at Miami, Florida, on August 25, 1959, for proposed six weeks' pleasure travel to South America. He stated he intended to depart Miami about September 1, 1959, by unnamed airline, not by organized tour. He stated he had made one trip abroad in preceding twelve months. This passport was valid for two years. Permanent residence then given as Biltmore Terrace Hotel, 87th Street and Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida. In application, he stated he had been in Cuba from 1951 to 1959 (it being noted that no passport was then required for travel to Cuba).

The following description appeared in his file:

Height	5'11"
Hair	Black/grey
Eyes	Green
Occupation	Executive

It is pointed out that, under passport regulations, ROTHMAN may use passport for lawful travel within period of its validity whenever and as often as desired without further notification to Department of State or other government agency. Passport Office does not receive information as to whether or when a passport is used for foreign travel.

On July 7, 1967, MM T-2 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN and ALBERTO (last name unknown) left Miami on June 27, 1967, for Las Vegas, Nevada, and returned to Miami on July 1, 1967. Informant stated that ROTHMAN and ALBERTO spent considerable time at Caesar's Palace Hotel and Gambling Casino.

On July 7, 1967, MM T-3 advised that he heard that ROTHMAN makes several trips a year to visit BATISTA in Spain.

On July 17, 1967, FRANCIS SMITH, Internal Revenue Service, advised that an informant had advised him that NORMAN ROTHMAN was to leave for Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on the night of July 17, 1967. United Airlines flights 578 departed Miami at 6:40 p.m.; 598 departing Miami at 12:55 a.m. and 454 departing Miami 1:10 a.m. were checked and ROTHMAN was not among the passengers.

On August 24, 1967, MM T-2 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN has not been travelling as much as he did in the past.

On September 14, 1967, MM T-6 advised that on September 12, 1967, ROTHMAN had stayed at the Caesar's Palace Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada.

ASSOCIATES

On December 5, 1967, MM T-2 advised that PATTY ERRA and NORMAN ROTHMAN have been seen together on several occasions at the Hilton Plaza Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida. Informant further advised that the opening of the Hilton Plaza Hotel will be on December 15, 1967, and that PATTY ERRA, MAX EDER and NORMAN ROTHMAN have reservations for the opening.

FIA

On December 6, 1967, MM T-8 advised that on December 4, 1967, about 5:45 p.m., he observed the green

92-9844-3

Chevrolet Chevelle of SANTO TRAFFICANTE parked in the driveway of the TRAFFICANTE residence at 740 N. E. 155th Street, Miami, Florida. At approximately 7:10 p.m., TRAFFICANTE, dressed in a business suit, entered the bar at VINCENT CAPRA's restaurant, 8400 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami. He walked through the bar and into a rear dining room. About ten minutes later, PATSY ERRA, NORMAN ROTHMAN, and two unknown males, all dressed in business suits, entered the bar and walked into the rear dining room.

MISCELLANEOUS

On August 2, 1967, MM T-3 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN had cashed a great number of checks at the Fontainebleau Hotel varying in amounts up to $1500 and reportedly used ten different names in cashing the checks.

On August 24, 1967, MM T-2 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN is trying to sell the Albion Hotel Lounge and that his asking price is $13,000 plus the cost of the liquor on hand.

On August 25, 1967, MM T-2 advised that JOE INDELICATO, RALPH SORRENTINO and NORMAN ROTHMAN have been discussing the construction of a motel with a Holiday Inn label.

FIA

FIA

On September 28, 1967, MM T-5 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN made a shylock loan from THOMAS ALTAMURA, purpose not known.

92-9844-3

JK 92-879
MED/mhw
1

The following investigation was conducted by SA MICHAEL E. DILL:

AT EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA

On September 20, 1967, JOSEPH SUMMERS, Records Office, Eglin Federal Prison Camp, furnished the prison file for NORMAN ROTHMAN, number 389EF. This file reflected the following background and descriptive data concerning the subject:

ROTHMAN was convicted in the Western District of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on February 4, 1960, for conspiring, aiding and abetting to transport stolen property in interstate and foreign commerce, and using interstate and foreign wires to defraud. ROTHMAN was sentenced to five years and a $10,000 fine on this charge. ROTHMAN began serving his sentence at the Federal Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia, on August 28, 1961. On July 10, 1962, he was transferred from Atlanta to Federal Correctional Institution, Tallahassee, Florida. On September 12, 1963, subject was transferred to the Eglin Federal Prison Camp, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, where he remained until his release on February 18, 1965. The following individuals were listed as co-defendants with ROTHMAN:

JOSEPH MEROLA

STUART SUTOR

VICTOR CARLUCCI

JOSEPH GIORDANO

DANIEL HANNA

All FIA

ROTHMAN's file contained a copy of a letter, dated September 22, 1961, from the Director, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, which reflected that on November 4, 1958, inspectors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and state officers detained an airplane which had landed at the Morgantown Airport, Morgantown, West Virginia. The pilot of this aircraft was determined to be STUART SUTOR.

57-48/13

8

JK 92-879
MED/mhw
2

A search of this aircraft reflected that there were 135 rifles and guns located on the aircraft. Subsequent investigation revealed that 121 of these weapons had been stolen from the National Guard Armory in Canton, Ohio. As a result of the seizure of these weapons, investigation resulted in a conspiracy case being presented against SUTOR, NORMAN ROTHMAN, and others. Upon his arrest, SUTOR reported that the aircraft he was piloting had been rented from DuPont Air Interest, Miami, Florida.

Further investigation into this matter revealed that in August 1958, JOE and SAM GIARUSSO had contacted a LEONARD RICCI, a licensed firearm dealer, and told him they had a contact from Florida who wanted all the United States Army type rifles he could get. In October 1958, ROTHMAN, who was described as a well known gambler formerly of New Kensington, Pennsylvania, and who allegedly represented the Mannarino Gambling Interest in Cuba, contacted a Doctor LEWIS C. PESSOLANO in Miami Springs, Florida. ROTHMAN was reported to have asked PESSOLANO to purchase an airplane for the purpose of going north to pick up a load of firearms and to obtain the services of a pilot who could be trusted for the flight. A short time later, PESSOLANO contacted STUART SUTOR and made arrangements for SUTOR to pilot this plane. SUTOR was subsequently introduced to JOSEPH MEROLA at Miami, Florida, who with SUTOR left for Pennsylvania to pick up the weapons. On October 26, 1958, SUTOR and MEROLA landed their plane at the Alleghany Valley Airport near New Kensington, Pennsylvania, where they were met by three men who arrived at the field in a 1958 Oldsmobile and panel truck with the name S and S Distributing Company written on the side. The stolen weapons were apparently transferred to SUTOR's plane at that time.

Gabriel*Mannarino

This letter further reflects that GABRIEL and SAM MANNARINO, who were listed as co-conspirators in this matter, were the owners of the S and S Distributing Company and that their truck was used to transport the stolen weapons. MANNARINO was reported to have made a telephone call to PESSOLANO a short time later and inquired if SUTOR would keep his mouth shut in reference to the law enforcement officers. ROTHMAN was reported to have described SAM MANNARINO as a "very dear friend."

FIA

9

ROTHMAN's file further reflects a summary report prepared in 1961 by the Federal Prison authorities. Information contained in the personal history and family background portion of this report was reported to have been accumulated from social letters received from the subject's wife and from initial interview with the subject. At that time information reflected that the subject was born December 26, 1914, in New York City, New York. His father, LEON ROTHMAN, was born in Rumania and died in 1954. His mother, BETTY ROTHMAN, was also born in Rumania and died in 1953. ROTHMAN's brother, IRVIN G. ROTHMAN, was reported to be residing at 9825 64th Street, New York City, New York, and at the time was 45 years of age. ROTHMAN's other brother, SANFORD ROTHMAN, was reported to be residing at 1756 166th Street, New York City, New York, and was listed as being 42 years of age. ROTHMAN claimed that he attended school in the New York area, completing the eighth grade. He also reported that he entered the United States Army in 1945, served about seven months and was honorably discharged in 1945.

Subject was further reported to have been a cafe manager and owner in Cuba. He claimed that he was a nightclub owner in Havanna, Cuba, and left his club when the communist took over, led by FIDEL CASTRO. ROTHMAN also claimed to have managed Mother Kelly's Nightclub in Miami, Florida. ROTHMAN also reported that he was the business manager of the Alborn Lounge and Alborn Hotel in Miami, Florida. He also furnished information concerning his having operated gambling houses in Cuba and having participated in gun running.

ROTHMAN was reported to have married ETHEL HUREWITZ in New York City, New York, in 1936. ROTHMAN and his wife have three sons, namely, CAPPY ROTHMAN, age 23 (1961), 425 Surfside Building, Miami Beach, Florida; SANFORD ROTHMAN, age 21 (1961), 7353 Gary Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida; and ROLAND ROTHMAN, age 16 (1961), who at the time was a student at the Staunton Military Academy Staunton, Virginia.

JK 92-879
MED/mhw
4

The following listed individuals were reflected in the subject's prison file as individuals who were on his approved correspondence and/or approved visitor list:

WILLIAM F. SMITH (friend)
Limestone, Tennessee

MYRON WIDETT (friend)
Summit Hotel, New York City, New York

ALBERTO ARDURA (friend)
Bel Aire Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida

MANOLITA REVYELTA (friend)
Bel Aire Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida

Mr. and Mrs. CESAR ALONZO
74 Northeast 24th Street
Miami, Florida

Mr. and Mrs. OSCAR ECHEMEDIA (friends)
1211 Southwest 19th Street
Miami, Florida

Mr. and Mrs. MICHAEL GIORANO (friends)
1710 Meridan Avenue
Miami Beach, Florida
(GIORANO, FBI number 217 633 B, was reported to have been arrested on July 6, 1962, at Miami Beach, Florida, for possession of gambling equipment.)

The following description of NORMAN ROTHMAN was obtained from the subject's prison file:

Name	NORMAN ROTHMAN
Race	White
Sex	Male
Date of Birth	December 26, 1914
Place of Birth	Brooklyn, New York
Height	5 feet 11 1/2 inches
Weight	200 pounds

Hair	Black
Eyes	Green
FBI Number	152 585 B
Residence	1949 - 1961, 425 Surfside Boulevard, Miami Beach, Florida
Previous employment	1959 - 1960, Baltimore Terrace Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida; 1948 - 1959, self-employed, Havanna, Cuba (manager of restaurant and club); Mother Kelly's Nightclub, Miami Beach, Florida, bar manager; Alborn Hotel and Lounge, Miami, Florida, business manager
Relatives	
Wife	ETHEL ROTHMAN 425 Surfside Boulevard Miami Beach, Florida (1961)
Sons	CAPPY M. ROTHMAN SANFORD S. ROTHMAN RONALD H. ROTHMAN
Brothers	IRVIN G. ROTHMAN New York City, New York SANFORD, New York City, New York
Associates	Doctor ALBERT REINHARZ 519 Seybold Building Miami, Florida (proposed advisor) MEDWIN BENJAMIN, president, Southwestern Steel Corporation, 350 Lincoln Road Miami, Florida (proposed employer)
Education	Completed 9th grade
Religion	Jewish

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida
December 26, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 92-1870

Title	NORMAN ROTHMAN
Character	ANTI-RACKETEERING
Reference	Report of Special Agent Allan M. Trankley dated and captioned as above at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

(Rev. 9-17-65)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
MIAMI	MIAMI	6/22/67	3/2 - 6/16/67	
TITLE OF CASE		**REPORT MADE BY**		**TYPED BY**
NORMAN ROTHMAN, aka Norm Rothman, Norman Roth		ALLAN M. TRANKLEY		vas
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		AR		

0

2

3

REFERENCES: Report of SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY, dated 3/31/67, at Miami.
Miami airtel to Washington Field, dated 5/11/67.

- P* -

ENCLOSURES

TO BUREAU

Enclosed for the Bureau is an original and one copy of a Letterhead Memorandum characterizing the informants utilized in this report.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

Case has been: Pending over one year ☐ Yes ☑ No; Pending prosecution over six months ☐ Yes ☑ No

APPROVED — SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

③ - Bureau (92-9844) ~~(Enc 2)~~
1 - USA, Miami
(Attn: Departmental Attorney
WALLACE H. JOHNSON, JR.)
2 - Miami (92-1870)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

92 - 9844 - 2

REC-72

15 JUN 26 1967

EX-103

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency				
Request Recd.	1	CC. AAG, Criminal Division,		
Date Fwd.	Organized Crime and Racketeering			
How Fwd. 4/12	Section, Room 2524			
By	51 JUL 3 1967	CC	D+D	6/29/67

Notations

1537

NINE STAT. SECT.

MM 92-1870

ADMINISTRATIVE

Departmental Attorney WALLACE H. JOHNSON, JR. advised on May 26, 1967, that Agents of the Federal Narcotics Bureau in Miami, Florida, will conduct an investigation in Miami relative to the possibility of ROTHMAN being engaged in narcotics. The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Unit will conduct an investigation of the Albion Lounge. Mr. JOHNSON stated that he has instructed both agencies to keep the FBI informed as to the progress of the investigations. He stated further that should a narcotics violation against ROTHMAN be proved, he would endeavor to use ROTHMAN to give him MAX EDER or PASQUALE ERRA. REMAINS UNCLASS PER DOJ ON 6-17-98 SLD/JLSR 6-23-98 (JFK)

In view of the above, this case has been placed in a pending inactive status for six months.

The period of investigation of this report predates the date of referenced report. The information secured on those dates which predate the investigative period was not available at the time referenced report was prepared.

INFORMANTS

MM T-1 is MM 492-S.

MM T-2 is MM 1176-PC.

MM T-3 is MM 725-C.

MM T-4 is HO 1196-PC.

MM T-5 is LV 297-C.

MM T-6 is ALBERT GAROFALO, Agent, Bureau of Narcotics.

REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~ OCA JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/7/97 dal
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

32P-0292

MM 92-1870

MM T-7 is MM 673-C.

MM T-8 is LV 117-C-TE.

MM T-9 is DONALD CHAPPEL, National Airlines, Miami International Airport.

- C* -
COVER PAGE

55P-10302

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - U. S. Attorney, Miami
(ATTN: Departmental Attorney WALLACE H. JOHNSON, JR.)

Report of: ALLAN M. TRANKLEY **Office:** Miami, Florida
Date: 6/22/67

Field Office File #: 92-1870 **Bureau File #:** 92-9844

Title: NORMAN ROTHMAN

Character: ANTI-RACKETEERING

Synopsis:

Subject continues to reside Surfside, Fla., and still employed with International Lithographers, Inc., Miami Beach, Fla. Subject may be involved in the handling of narcotics. Subject continues to associate with PATTY ERRA and MAX EDER. Identities of individuals Miami area contacted by subject while in Las Vegas, Nevada, set out.

Info from DOJ remains unclass per DOJ on 6-17-98 SLD/KSR 6-23-98 (JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

- P* -

DETAILS:

PERSONAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Marital Status

On March 2, 1967, MM T-1 advised that OLGA CHAVIANO is now back with NORMAN ROTHMAN. MM T-1 advised that ROTHMAN had stated that he wished to resume his relationship with CHAVIANO and that he now had plenty of money.

Residence

ROTHMAN continues to reside at 425 Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Employment

On May 4, 1967, at 10:20 A. M., NORMAN ROTHMAN was observed arriving at International Lithographers.

On May 12, 1967, an automobile belonging to NORMAN ROTHMAN was observed at International Lithographers at 3:05 P. M.

ASSOCIATES

On March 6, 1967, MM T-2 advised that on the night of March 2, 1967, NORMAN ROTHMAN with a party of four saw the FRANK SINATRA show at the Fontainebleau Hotel. One of the individuals in the ROTHMAN party was FABIO DE CRESTOFARO.

FLA

On March 2, 1967, MM T-3 advised that KELLY MANNARINO, PATTY ERRA and NORMAN ROTHMAN had dinner together at Dean Martin's Restaurant either on the night of February 27 or 28, 1967. MM T-3 further advised that PATTY ERRA frequents the Albion Hotel Lounge at irregular times.

FLA

MM T-3 advised that on March 2, 1967, ROTHMAN spent the greater portion of the day with KELLY MANNARINO.

On April 25, 1967, MM T-4 advised that he had no further information concerning the subject and his associates. He stated FABIO DE CRESTOFARO is still an associate of ROTHMAN and can be contacted at the following Miami, Florida, telephone numbers:

PL 8-1137
PL 1-3974
531-0847

On April 3, 1967, MM T-3 advised that SAM MANNARINO attended the wedding of RONNIE ROTHMAN, NORMAN ROTHMAN's son, on March 21, 1967.

On April 21, 1967, MM T-3 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN and FABIO DE CRESTOFARO are reportedly in good financial condition. These two individuals plus one ALBERTO (Last Name Unknown) are supposed to have made some money in real estate, further details not known. ALBERTO associates constantly with ROTHMAN and is seen frequently at the Albion Lounge. ALBERTO is described as white male, age 33-35, 5 feet 10 inches, 185 pounds, wavy black hair, protruding front teeth.

MM T-3 advised that DE CRESTOFARO appears to be the boss at the Albion Lounge. MM T-3 further advised that PATTY ERRA was at the Albion Lounge several times within the past two weeks.

MM T-3 advised that PATTY ERRA, NICK JEROME and MAX EDER reportedly attended the wedding of RONNIE ROTHMAN, NORMAN ROTHMAN's son. MM T-3 stated that NICK JEROME is rarely seen with the "boys" but regularly talks to NORMAN ROTHMAN on the telephone.

FLA

CONTACTS

On March 24, 1967, MM T-5 advised that ROTHMAN on December 3, 4 and 5, 1966, telephoned from Las Vegas, Nevada, to Miami, Florida, telephone number 226-1203. MM T-5 further advised that on December 2, 1966, ROTHMAN telephoned from Las Vegas, Nevada, to Miami, Florida, telephone number 758-1337, and on December 3, 1966, made a telephone call to Miami, Florida, telephone number 949-0044 from Las Vegas, Nevada.

MM T-5 advised that on December 5, 1966, ROTHMAN called Miami, Florida, telephone number 373-3089 from Las Vegas, Nevada.

On April 14, 1967, a review of the Miami criss-cross directory revealed that telephone number 373-3089 is listed to SIMON CAMACHO, Camacho Cigars, 1761 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida.

02 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date April 24, 1967

1.

The records of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company were reviewed and the following information obtained for telephone number 226-1203:

Listed to:	OLGA CHAVIANO
Billed to:	Same
Address:	3020 S. W. 78th Court
Date Connected:	July 19, 1966
Employment:	Self - entertainer - vocalist
References Given:	Ex-husband, NORMAN ROSSMAN, 538-7871

(Non-Published)

The above records are confidential and can be obtained only through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. This subpoena should be directed to Mr. GEORGE LESTER FREEMAN, South Florida Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami, Florida, or his authorized representative.

5

On 4/18/67 at Coral Gables, Florida File # Miami 92-1870

by Investigative Clerk PHILIP F. CROGHAN/neb Date dictated 4/19/67

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

(Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 4/20/67

1.

The records of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company were reviewed and the following information obtained for telephone number 758-1337:

Listed to	FABIO DE CRISTOFARO
Billed to	Same
Address	440 N. E. 110th Street
Date connected	1/4/63
Employment	Fontainebleau Hotel, Bartender
Other service	Same number at 765 N. E. 96th Street, 1/63-4/4/66
References given	D. BARRIE UN 6-0031
Credit rating with Telephone Company	B
Type of service	Non-Published

The above records are confidential and can only be obtained through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. This subpoena should be directed to Mr. GEORGE LESTER FREEMAN, South Florida Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami, Florida, or his authorized representative.

6

On 4/18/67 at North Dade, Florida File # Miami 92-1870

by IC PHILIP F. CROGHAN/jaj Date dictated 4/20/67

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 4/20/67

1.

The records of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company were reviewed and the following information obtained for telephone number 949-0044:

Listed to	SANFORD SCOTT ROTHMAN
Billed to	Mrs. SANFORD ROTHMAN
Address	1140 N. E. 203rd Street
Date connected	12/6/60
Employment	Unknown
Other service	None
References given	None
Credit rating with Telephone Company	C
Type of service	Non-Listed

The above records are confidential and can only be obtained through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. This subpoena should be directed to Mr. GEORGE LESTER FREEMAN, South Florida Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami, Florida, or his authorized representative.

7

On 4/18/67 at North Dade, Florida File # Miami 92-1870

by IC PHILIP F. CROGHAN/jaj Date dictated 4/20/67

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

On March 23, 1967, MM T-6 advised that GEORGE VARSA, Export Sales Manager for Foreign Trade Representations, 90 West Street, New York City, had been arrested on March 22, 1967, for having facilitated the smuggling of six kilograms of heroin into the United States. The intended recipients for the heroin were ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE and PHILIPPE SPADARO.

MM T-6 stated that at the vacated apartment of LARRAIN-MAESTRE, among various papers seized, were the following addresses and business cards:

Albion Cocktail Lounge
Albion Hotel
1650 James Avenue
Miami Beach, Florida
SANFORD ROTHMAN, Manager

A business card for International Lithographers, 1771 West Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, telephone 305-538-7871, NORMAN ROTHMAN, account executive.

An identical business card was also found with the embossed name of BEN LEVIN.

Found also was a receipt for a Western Union money order, March 6, 1967, issued to SANFORD ROTHMAN, 153 D 57th Street, telephone 935-0416, for $1,100 sent to ETHEL ROTHMAN, 425 Surfside Boulevard, Miami Beach, Florida. It is noted that 153 D 57th Street is the residence of ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE with telephone 935-0416 listed to him.

35P-10302

On April 3, 1967, MM T-3 advised that FABIO DE CRESTOFARO is now shylocking and pushing out money for NORMAN ROTHMAN who in turn has the backing of PATTY ERRA.

LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISES

MM T-3 advised on March 2, 1967, that NORMAN ROTHMAN and his son, SANFORD ROTHMAN, are stealing IRVING BRENNER blind with respect to the Albion Hotel Lounge. MM T-3 stated that ROTHMAN and his son hope to make BRENNER so disgusted with the lounge that he will sell out his interest to them.

TRAVEL

MM T-3 advised on March 9, 1967, that NORMAN ROTHMAN had flown to Las Vegas, Los Angeles and Chicago and had returned to Miami, Florida, around March 10, 1967.

On April 20, 1967, stops were placed with JOSEPH A. FRASCA, Station Manager, National Airlines, Miami International Airport, and with R. W. GABLE, Reservations Manager, National Airlines, regarding NORMAN ROTHMAN's travel to Las Vegas, Nevada.

On April 22, 1967, MM T-9 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN was scheduled to arrive Sunday, April 23, 1967, on BOAC Flight 447 from Nassau and to depart the same date for Los Angeles, California, on Flight 51 leaving at 5:00 P. M.

The departing passengers of BOAC Flight 447 were observed at the Miami International Airport on April 23, 1967, as well as the boarding passengers of Flight 51 and ROTHMAN was not observed in either group of passengers.

MM T-7 advised on May 5, 1967, that NORMAN ROTHMAN has a "cover" to some of his trips around the country used at International Lithographers claiming he is securing business for this company.

On May 19, 1967, MM T-3 advised that he received information that NORMAN ROTHMAN had some kind of business at the Americana Hotel in New York City on or about May 4, 1967.

On May 26, 1967, MM T-8 advised that he had no additional information concerning NORMAN ROTHMAN's travels to Las Vegas, Nevada.

MISCELLANEOUS

MM T-3 advised on March 9, 1967, that ROTHMAN had received between $4,000 and $5,000 on March 2, 1967, and reportedly is paying off some of his debts and shylock loans. The source of the money was not known to MM T-3.

-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1.

Date 4/13/67

HARRY SOLOMON was interviewed at 17th Street and Meridian Avenue. He advised that he has been employed at the Albion Lounge for the past 14 years as the night bartender. He further advised that to all intents and purposes, **SANFORD ROTHMAN**, son of **NORMAN ROTHMAN**, is the manager of the Albion Lounge. He stated that **NORMAN ROTHMAN** appears at the Albion Lounge from time to time, orders a few drinks and then leaves. He has never observed any type of meeting taking place in the Albion Lounge and **NORMAN ROTHMAN** is usually alone when he visits this lounge. **SOLOMON** stated he does not know **NORMAN ROTHMAN** on a social basis and knows nothing regarding his activities.

11

On 4/12/67 at Miami Beach, Florida File # Miami 92-1870

by SA ALLAN M. TRANKLEY:mm Date dictated 4/13/67

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

On May 8, 1967, ROTHMAN's Pontiac was observed at his residence at 425 Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida, at 3:15 P. M.

On May 9, 1967, ROTHMAN's white Bonneville Pontiac was observed in front of his residence at 1:00 P. M. and 3:45 P. M.

On May 10, 1967, ROTHMAN's car was observed at his residence at 3:00 P. M.

On May 15, 1967, there was observed at 425 Surfside Boulevard at 3:00 P. M. a 1967 maroon Bonneville two door Pontiac with black vinyl top bearing 1967-68 Florida license 1W-28716.

A check of the records of the Dade County Tag Agency revealed that this automobile is registered to ETHEL ROTHMAN, 425 Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
June 22, 1967

RE: NORMAN ROTHMAN
ANTI-RACKETEERING

Reference is made to report of Special Agent Allan M. Trankley, dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida.

The following is a characterization of the informants utilized in above-referenced report:

MM T-1 is an individual who has some knowledge of some of the Cuban people in Miami, Florida.

MM T-2 is an individual who has knowledge of some of the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-3 is a businessman who has wide association in the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-4 is an individual who is in contact with the criminal element.

MM T-5 is an individual who has some knowledge of the people who frequent the gambling casinos in Las Vegas, Nevada.

MM T-6 is an employee of another Federal investigative agency.

MM T-7 is an individual who is in contact with the criminal element.

RE: NORMAN ROTHMAN

MM T-8 is an individual who has some knowledge of the people who frequent the gambling casinos in Las Vegas, Nevada.

MM T-9 is an individual who has some knowledge of scheduled airline flights.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
June 22, 1967

Title	NORMAN ROTHMAN
Character	ANTI-RACKETEERING
Reference	Report of Special Agent ALLAN M. TRANKLEY, dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-263 (Rev. 9-17-65)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE MIAMI	OFFICE OF ORIGIN MIAMI	DATE 3/31/67	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 12/26/66 - 3/7/67	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY ALLAN M. TRANKLEY		TYPED BY kc
NORMAN ROTHMAN, aka Norm Rothman, Norman Roth		CHARACTER OF CASE AR		

MB

9
DLD

- REFERENCES -

Las Vegas letters to Miami, 12/19/66, 1/5/67, and 2/27/67;
Miami letter to Las Vegas, 2/27/67.

- P -

ENCLOSURES TO BUREAU:

Enclosed for the Bureau are an original and one copy of a letterhead memorandum characterizing the informants utilized in this report.

- LEADS -

ATLANTA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

Case has been: Pending over one year ☐ Yes ☒ No; Pending prosecution over six months ☐ Yes ☒ No

APPROVED | SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE | DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

- 3 - Bureau (~~Enc. 2~~)
- 1 - USA, Miami
  (Attn: Departmental Atty.
  WALLACE H. JOHNSON, JR.)
- 2 - Atlanta
- 2 - Miami (92-1870)

1 cc Dad

92- 9844 - 1

MCT-34

REC- 59

APR 3 1967

ST-117

NINE

STAT. SECT.

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	
Request Recd.	1 CC AAG, Criminal Division,
Date Fwd.	Organized Crime and Racketeering
How Fwd.	Section, Room 2524 4/7/67
By	

Notations

54 APR 13 1967

At Atlanta, Georgia:

Will review subject's file at the Federal Penitentiary and furnish all background information.

MIAMI

At Miami, Florida:

Will follow and report activities of subject.

- ADMINISTRATIVE -

The files of the Miami Division contain a great deal of information regarding subject and his activities relating to Cuba, both before and after the CASTRO Regime. None of this information has been set out in this report.

Only the most recent dates involving the investigation of subject are included in the period of investigation.

- INFORMANTS -

MM T-1 is Dun and Bradstreet records.

MM T-2 is MM 761-S.

MM T-3 is MM 1058-C.

MM T-4 is former PSI RICHARD B. JAFFE.

MM T-5 is MM 509-C.

MM T-6 is MM 725-C.

MM T97 is MM 1176-PC.

MM T-8 is MM 744-C.

92-1038

MM 92-1870

MM T-9 is PCI JOHN K. KERNAN.

MM T-10 is MM 675-C.

MM T-11 is Legal Attache, Havana, Cuba.

MM T-12 is MM 334-C.

MM T-13 is HERB RAU, PCI.

MM T-14 is former MM 647-C.

MM T-15 is MM 676-PC.

MM T-16 is PCI WILLIE SHULMAN.

MM T-17 is MM 764-C-TE.

MM T-18 is LV 117-C-TE.

MM T-19 is LV 121-C-TE.

MM T-20 is MM 342-PC.

MM T-21 is PCI MURRAY LENCHNER.

MM T-22 is MM 1116-C.

MM T-23 is JOHN P. DADES, PCI.

MM T-24 is HO 1196-PC.

MM T-25 is MM 942-C.

MM T-26 is MM 1171-C.

MM T-27 is MM 1165-C.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - United States Attorney, Miami, Florida
(Attention: Departmental Attorney
WALLACE H. JOHNSON, JR.)

Report of: ALLAN M. TRANKLEY **Office:** Miami, Florida
Date: 3/31/67

Field Office File #: 92-1870 **Bureau File #:**

Title: NORMAN ROTHMAN

Character: ANTI-RACKETEERING

Synopsis:

Subject, a resident of Miami Beach, Fla., was born 12/26/14, in NYC; was active in gambling in Cuba in the Sans Souci Nightclub and reportedly controlled all slot machines in Cuba except those in Havana. Subject's gambling activity in Cuba reportedly backed financially by MANNARINO brothers from New Kensington, Pa., and PATSY ERRA, all LCN figures. Subject convicted in 1960 with others attempting to smuggle guns, stolen from a National Guard armory in Ohio to Cuba and received 5-year prison term and $10,000 fine. Subject reportedly an associate of SANTO TRAFFICANTE, JR., LCN figure from Tampa, Fla. Subject currently reported to have undisclosed interest in Albion Lounge, Miami Beach, and to be employed with International Lithographers. Also reportedly deeply involved in shylock business with PATSY ERRA. Physical description set out.

- P -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

DETAILS

PERSONAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Birth Data

On February 8, 1960, IC WALTER P. QUIGLEY checked the birth records in Bronx, New York, which reflected under Record No. 15680/14 that NORMAN ROTHMAN, white male, was born December 26, 1914, at Bronx, New York.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Marital Status

A review of the records of the Passport Office, State Department, First National Bank Building, Miami, Florida, on September 2, 1959, revealed that on December 26, 1936, ROTHMAN married ETHEL HURWITZ

Citizenship Status

ROTHMAN is a US citizen by virtue of his birth in this country.

Children

On November 9, 1959, MM T-1 advised that ROTHMAN has a son named CAPPY MILES ROTHMAN.

On February 23, 1967, ROTHMAN advised that he has a son named SANFORD ROTHMAN.

On January 13, 1960, MM T-2 advised that ROTHMAN has a son named JORGE ROTHMAN whose mother is OLGA CHAVIANO.

Other Relatives

Birth records, as checked by IC WALTER P. QUIGLEY on February 8, 1960, reveal ROTHMAN's parents as LEON ROTHMAN, born in Rumania, and BETTY TANNENBAUM, also born in Rumania.

Records of the Passport Office, State Department, First National Bank Building, Miami, Florida, reviewed by SA GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR. on September 2, 1959, revealed that ROTHMAN has an aunt, BESS WEINBERG, 540 74th Street, Miami Beach, Florida. REMAIN UNCLASS per State DEPT. ON 9-16-97
SLD/KSR 6-23-98 (JFK)

SSe-10302

MM 92-1870

Residences

ROTHMAN presently resides at 425 Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida.

Birth records reveal that ROTHMAN formerly resided at 1155 Prospect Avenue, Bronx, New York.

Employments

On July 25, 1952, MM T-11 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN was the front man for the gambling concession at the Sans Souci Nightclub in Havana, Cuba, and was backed by money of SAM and GABRIEL MANNARINO of New Kensington, Pennsylvania.

On August 31, 1959, MM T-4 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN was managing the Biltmore Terrace Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida.

On October 12, 1959, IC CLIFFORD M. WERNER reviewed the records of the Credit Bureau of Greater Miami which revealed that NORMAN ROTHMAN formerly owned the Royal Palm Sportswear, Hollywood, Florida.

On August 9, 1960, JOHN VAN DEVIR, Customs Agent, advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN was operating the cocktail lounges in the Bel-Aire Hotel, and the bar in the Surfside Plaza Hotel. REMAINS UNCLASS PER CUSTOMS ON 9-19-97
SLD/KSR 6-23-98 (JFK)

On September 12, 1960, MM T-5 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN, HARRY COHEN and SAMUEL "STRETCH" RUBIN were partners in the operation of the cocktail lounges at the Bel-Aire and Surfside Plaza Hotels.

On February 23, 1967, ROTHMAN was interviewed on another matter by SAs JACK LOUIS MARSHAL and ALLAN M. TRANKLEY and advised that he is presently employed by International Lithographers, Inc., 1771 West Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida.

SSe-\0302-

On March 3, 1967, MM T-3 furnished the following information:

In June, 1966, he received information that the International Lithographers, 1771 West Avenue, Miami Beach, telephone 538-7871, was chartered as a Florida corporation on April 21, 1966. This firm assumed the functions of the Personally Yours Stationers, Inc. The International Lithographers originally began in 1948 as a partnership of BEN LEVIN and members of his family; in 1953, he incorporated as Personally Yours Press Inc., which was subject to a great deal of litigation and suits all of which allegedly took place after BEN LEVIN, the principal, left the firm; and it was under the operation of LEVIN's divorced wife, MILDRED LEVIN. In 1963, Personally Yours Press, Inc., was discontinued and the premises were occupied by Mastercraft Printers who in turn sold the assets to the present owners of International Lithographers, which are BEN LEVIN, Mrs. OLIVE LEVIN, wife of BEN LEVIN, and JOSEPH MALEK.

BEN LEVIN was born in 1910 at Fargo, North Dakota. For a number of years prior to 1940, he operated as a manufacturer's representative; 1940-1941, was in the US Armed Forces; 1941-1942, he again became a manufacturer's representative, but returned to the Armed Services from 1942-44. He came to Miami in 1944, and promoted Chefs Frozen Food Products and other frozen food lines, but discontinued this in 1948. He then organized the partnership known as Personally Yours Press.

JOE MALEK is a local attorney, and OLIVE LEVIN is listed primarily for corporate purposes.

CRIMINAL RECORD

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATI
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

J. Edgar Hoover
Director.

The following FBI record, NUMBER 152 585 B, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
Naval Intelligence Washington District of Columbia	Norman Rothman #A 1809	applicant September 29, 1941		
Army	Norman Rothman #42210484	March 14, 1945		
Police Department Miami Beach Florida	Norman Rothman #A-12890	January 29, 1948	vagrancy investigation	February 2, 194 dismissed
United States Marshal Miami Florida	Norman Rothman #846-M-Cr	March 27, 1959	National Firearms Act	released on bond ret'ble in the West District of Pa at Pgh
United States Marshal Pittsburgh Pennsylvania	Norman Rothman #Cr.Pgh.Pa./ 15750	April 9, 1959	violation National Stolen Property Act receiving and concealing rifles	convicted Unit States District Court Pittsburg Pennsylvania February 4, 196 conspiracy to receive stolen Government property, inter- state transportation o stolen property Federal Firearms Act, National Firearms Act Mutual Security Act Munitions Control sentenced 5 years custody Attorney General $10,000 committed

Information shown on this Identification R
shown or further explanation of charge is desired, c
Notations indicated by * are NOT based c
with subject of this record.

5

• final disposition is not
‡ being possibly identical

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

J. Edgar Hoover
Director.

The following FBI record, NUMBER 152 535 B, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
Federal Bureau of Investigation Miami Florida	Norman Rothman #87-8756	July 2, 1959	interstate transportation of stolen property conspiracy	
United States Marshal Miami Florida	Norman Rothman #990-M-Cr	July 6, 1959	interstate transportation of stolen property conspiracy	released on bo returnable in the North District of Ill at Chgo
Allegheny County Detective Bureau Pittsburgh Pennsylvania	Norman Rothman #96157	February 4, 1960	National Stolen Property Act	sentenced 5 years Attorney General
United States Marshal Pittsburgh Pennsylvania	Norman Rothman #59Cr374 ND-Ill 12472Cr,ND-Ill	February 5, 1960	pledging and concealing stolen property transported in interstate and foreign commerce use of interstate and foreign wire communication in furtherance of a scheme and artifice to defraud	
Allegheny County Detention Bureau Pittsburgh Pennsylvania	Norman Rothman #96157	August 25, 1961	violation National Stolen Property Act	five years imprisonment (Federal)

Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. Where final disposition is not shown or further explanation of charge is desired, communicate with agency contributing those fingerprints.
Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

J. Edgar Hoover
Director.

3

The following FBI record, NUMBER 152 585 B, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
United States Penitentiary Atlanta Georgia	Norman Rotham #84216	August 28, 1961	Conspiring Aiding and abetting to Transport Stolen Property in Interstate and Foreign Commerce Using Interstate and Foreign Wire to Defraud	Five years
Cook County Jail Chicago Illinois	Rathman Norman #232505	October 29, 1961	Safe Keeping United States Marshal	delivered to United States Marshall November 11 196
United States Marshal Chicago Illinois	Norman Rothman #62627	October 28, 1961	Habeas Corpus Ad prosecution From Atlanta Georgia Peniten-tiary at present serving time	returned on same Writ to United States Penitentiary Atlanta Georgia November 11 19
Cook County Jail Chicago Illinois	Norman Rothman #286943	January 17 1962	~~Safe Keeping~~ United States Marshal	
Fed Corr Inst Tallahassee Fla	Norman Rothman 19492-TF	5-1-62 received in transf from 84216-A	I/S transp stolen prop (consp aid)	

Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. Where final disposition is not shown or further explanation of charge is desired, communicate with agency contributing those fingerprints.
Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

7

JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

J. Edgar Hoover
Director.

The following FBI record, NUMBER [illegible], is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
USP Atlanta Ga	Norman Rothman #84216-A	7-23-62 received via transfer from #19492-TF Tallahassee Fla FCI	stolen property I/S consp aiding & abett to transp	
Pub Safety Dept Miami Fla	Norman Rothman #72160	6-25-63	hold for USM	rel to USM
Fed Pr Camp Eglin AFB Fla	Norman Rothman #389-EF	9-11-63 trans fr Fed Corr Inst Tallahassee Fla #19492-TF	consp (aid & abet I/S transp stolen prop)	1-19-65 MR
PD Miami Beach Fla	Norman Rothman #A-12890	2-22-65	VCR	not held
SO Miami Fla	Norman Rothman #CR 72160	2-25-65	criminal reg	rel instantly

- 2 6-

Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. Where final disposition is not shown or further explanation of charge is desired, communicate with agency contributing those fingerprints.

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961—O—615915

8

ASSOCIATES

On October 22, 1962, MAX LURIE advised he represents NORMAN ROTHMAN. LURIE stated he recently received a letter from NORMAN ROTHMAN, who was in the Federal Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia, telling him that he, ROTHMAN, had made a statement to the FBI in Atlanta, that he had loaned PATSY ERRA approximately $100,000. LURIE stated that he prepared a mortgage for ROTHMAN to cover a loan from ROTHMAN to ERRA in 1959. LURIE stated that he knows of no other loans made by ROTHMAN to ERRA, and that he has no record of any other loans made by ROTHMAN to ERRA.

Recorded in Official Record Book 1503, Page 35, Records of Dade County, Florida, is a mortgage deed executed June 26, 1959, by PATRICK ERRA and FRANCES ERRA, his wife, Mortgagors, to NORMAN ROTHMAN, Mortgagee. The deed was given to secure a promissory note dated June 26, 1959, for $59,000 payable in five years with no interest. The deed was signed by PATRICK and FRANCES ERRA, witnessed by MAX LURIE and one other witness, name illegible. It was notarized before STANLEY HILLMAN, Notary Public, State of Florida at Large, and filed for record June 29, 1959.

On August 20, 1965, ROTHMAN was interviewed by Agents of the Miami Office. During the course of this interview, ROTHMAN related quite readily that among his closest associates and friends are SANTOS TRAFFICANTE, JR., DAVID YARAS, PASQUALE MICHAEL ERRA and SAMMY MANNARINO. SANTOS TRAFFICANTE, JR. and PATSY ERRA are reported members of the La Cosa Nostra (LCN).

MM T-6 advised on November 4, 1966, that he learned that a close friend of NORMAN ROTHMAN is "CHUBBY" GREEN, a route supervisor for Budweiser Beer Company, who also runs the coffee shop in the Sea Brook Motel in Surfside, Florida.

On November 8, 1966, MM T-6 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN's associate in the Albion Lounge is IRVING BRENNER, the bolita operator.

MM T-7 advised on November 18, 1966, that NORMAN ROTHMAN had not been observed with close associate MAX EDER for the past two weeks.

On December 16, 1966, MM T-8 advised that BEN LEVIN, an associate of NORMAN ROTHMAN, had sunk close to one-half million dollars into Copa City, which LEVIN is renting out for feature films, sound recordings and commercial films.

MM T-6 advised on December 26, 1966, that FABIO O. DE CRESTOFARO, a bolita counting house operator and bartender, is an associate of NORMAN ROTHMAN. MM T-6 advised further that RALPH SORRENTINO and JOE INDELICATO are also associates of NORMAN ROTHMAN.

On December 22, 1966, MM T-5 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN spends a great deal of time with BEN LEVIN, owner of the International Lithographers, Inc., and Copa City, and allegedly has some kind of proposition with LEVIN.

On January 6, 1967, MM T-6 advised that RALPH SORRENTINO and JOE INDELICATO are attempting to form a painting contracting firm which will have as its front AL HARRIS. This firm allegedly is going after big painting contracts and SORRENTINO ahd HARRIS are attempting to procure contracts through NORMAN ROTHMAN, who has agreed to get this firm some contracts through his contacts and the contacts of BEN LEVIN.

On February 3, 1967, MM T-9 advised that he understands NORMAN ROTHMAN is extremely close to BEN LEVIN, owner of Copa City, and International Lithographers and that ROTHMAN is making trips out of the city, reasons unknown, in connection with his association with LEVIN.

On January 20, 1967, MM T-7 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN spent some time with MAX EDER at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida.

CONTACTS

On March 27, 1961, MM T-5 advised that SAM MANNARINO and NORMAN ROTHMAN visited the Midtown Social Club, Miami Beach, Florida, on March 14, 1961, and talked to MIKE COPPOLA and JOE MORRISON.

On December 3, 1965, MM T-5 advised that ROTHMAN was in contact with RUBY LAZARUS at the Sea Gull Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida.

On March 10, 1966, MM T-5 advised that ROTHMAN contacted JOE SILESI at the Sea Gull Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida.

On October 3, 1966, MM T-10 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN was contacting MAX EDER at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach, late at night on several occasions.

On October 19, 1966, MM T-6 advised that ROTHMAN had a meeting with SAM MANNARINO in Chicago, Illinois, date and place unknown. MM T-6 stated that ROTHMAN and MANNARINO reportedly get together rather frequently but do not meet each other in the Pittsburgh or Miami areas.

On October 25, 1966, MM T-6 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN is reportedly on call to run errands and make trips around the country for PATTY ERRA or SAM MANNARINO.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

On July 25, 1952, MM T-11 advised that the gambling concession at the Sans Souci Nightclub in Havana, Cuba, was backed by the money of SAM and GABRIEL MANNARINO of

New Kensington, Pennsylvania, and that the front name for the concession was NORMAN ROTHMAN. SAM and GABRIEL MANNARINO are reported members of the LCN.

On November 16, 1955, MM T-12 advised that SANTOS TRAFFICANTE, JR. had taken over the Sans Souci Nightclub in Havana, Cuba, and left ROTHMAN in as manager.

On October 10, 1955, CARL HACKER furnished the Albany Office of the FBI with the following information:

He is former international representative of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union. Information which HACKER has furnished has been accurate and reliable.

HACKER stated he was sent to Miami Beach in May, 1954, as International Representative to take over Local 255, which local was in trusteeship.

He stated he was approached by one NORMIE ROTHMAN and ROTHMAN told him that it was necessary for him and his associates to control the political situation in Miami Beach. ROTHMAN propositioned HACKER as follows:

ROTHMAN would be appointed International Representative of the Hotel Workers Union, and three organizers, of ROTHMAN's designation, would be appointed in Local 255. These individuals were to be on the Union payroll. ROTHMAN and these organizers would then organize for the Hotel Workers Union in Miami Beach. ROTHMAN stated that he and his associates had "something" on every hotel operator in Miami Beach and they would be forced to permit him to organize their workers. ROTHMAN indicated that he and his associates would benefit in that they would have the sizeable block of votes which could be controlled through the union. ROTHMAN indicated at the end of a one-year organizational period he and his associates would expect a fixed annual contribution from the Hotel Workers Union.

HACKER said he listened to the proposition only to ascertain the extent of ROTHMAN's interest in muscling in on the Hotel Workers Union. He said he then presented this proposition to JACK WEINBURGER, formerly Organizational Secretary, now General Secretary of the Union. WEINBURGER stated that this must be discussed with ED MILLER, who agreed with the proposal, except the appointment of ROTHMAN as International Representative. MILLER indicated he would get around this somehow. In December, 1954, HACKER was telephonically contacted by ED MILLER and instructed to turn over the affairs of Local 255 to one ALBERT BERLIN, a former associate of the gangster element. This appointment in HACKER's opinion indicated ROTHMAN had gotten to MILLER, apparently through ROGER LEBENNER, Business Agent for Local 133 of the Hotel Workers Union, and that MILLER was working with ROTHMAN. HACKER stated he could never work with MILLER and resigned on December 13, 1954. HACKER stated that in April, 1955, the first hotel in Miami Beach was struck by the Hotel Workers Union, and the strike which presently involves 22 hotels is still going on. The Hotel Workers Union is pouring $120,000 a month into this strike. He can only conclude the hotel operators did not accede to ROTHMAN's shakedown. He is convinced, however, that ROTHMAN made the attempt, and that MILLER is cooperating with him.

On July 30, 1956, AL MANHEIM advised that ABE GOODMAN was in the bolita business in Cuba with ELI QUAIN and NORMAN ROTHMAN.

On July 30, 1956, NORMAN ROTHMAN, Chicago, Illinois, shipped 32,800 pounds of gambling equipment to NORMAN ROTHMAN, Miami, Florida. The equipment arrived in Miami, Florida, on August 3, 1956, and was located at Tamiami Tours, Inc., Transport Company. The U. S. Attorney, Miami, Florida, authorized the seizure of this equipment; and the equipment was seized on August 6, 1956, and turned over to the US Marshal on August 7, 1956. Prosecution of ROTHMAN was declined by the US Attorney's Office, Miami, Florida, and the gambling equipment was destroyed.

SSC-10302

In December, 1957, MM T-13 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN controlled all of the slot machines in Cuba with the exception of those in Havana.

The Brockville Trust and Savings Company located at Brockville, Ontario, Canada, was burglarized between the hours of 7:30 PM, May 3, 1958, and 8:30 AM, May 4, 1958. Taken in the theft were bearer bonds, registered bonds, jewelry and cash. A Federal Grand Jury at Chicago returned a suppressed indictment against ROTHMAN on June 30, 1959, charging him with aiding and abetting on one count of Title 18, Section 2315, US Code, and all counts of Title 18, Section 1343, US Code. Warrant was issued by the US District Judge, Chicago, and bond set at $5,000. ROTHMAN was apprehended by Bureau Agents, Miami, Florida, on July 2, 1959, and released on $5,000 bond. He was not convicted on these charges.

On May 14, 1958, MM T-14 advised that PATSY ERRA had an interest in the Sans Souci Nightclub along with ROTHMAN and SAM MANNARINO.

On September 2, 1959, MM T-15 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN appears to be the individuals who arranges all illegal deals at the Biltmore Terrace Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida, and that this hotel is headquarters for narcotics and call-girl operations.

On October 26, 1959, MM T-16 advised that ROTHMAN appears to be working with PASQUALE MICHAEL ERRA and possibly with SAM and GABRIEL MANNARINO.

In 1960, subject, along with others, was convicted attempting to smuggle guns, stolen from a National Guard armory in Ohio to Cuba and received a five-year prison term and a $10,000 fine.

On May 21, 1966, MM T-6 advised that ROTHMAN is deeply involved in the shylock business and is looking out for some of PATTY ERRA's interests in this field and likely is closely tied in with MAX EDER as he holds conferences with EDER on behalf of ERRA. MM T-6 also advised that he received information that ROTHMAN as either a representative of ERRA or EDER or both, has some arrangement whereby items which are taken as security from time to time when a shylock loan is made are pawned. MM T-6 stated he further learned that stolen jewelry enters into the picture but could furnish no additional information regarding this phase of the business. Reportedly, EDER, ERRA and ROTHMAN deal with the Simpson Pawn Shop, North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida.

MM T-17 advised on September 26, 1966, that NORMAN ROTHMAN is trying to get a foothold in either San Juan, Puerto Rico, or Caribbean gambling casino set up through some Cubans he was acquainted with in Havana, Cuba.

On October 19, 1966, MM T-6 advised that he learned NORMAN ROTHMAN had arrived back in Miami from a trip to Houston, Texas; Las Vegas, Nevada; Los Angeles, California, and Chicago, Illinois, to handle some business for PATTY ERRA. ROTHMAN was described to MM T-6 as a "trouble shooter" for ERRA.

On October 25, 1966, MM T-6 advised that he heard that ROTHMAN and his superiors finance and set up Cubans in business and get a piece of the business or make the Cubans a shylock loan. Cubans that do business with ROTHMAN and his associates meet him at the Albion Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida.

MM T-6 advised on October 25, 1966, that NORMAN ROTHMAN regularly meets with MAX EDER at the Fontainebleau Hotel; that EDER is a part of ERRA's operation and that ERRA and EDER meet at least once daily.

On November 15, 1966, MM T-6 advised he was told that NORMAN ROTHMAN, MAX EDER and PATTY ERRA promote or put up money for Latin individuals in and out of the United States.

On November 26, 1966, MM T-6 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN is handling the necessary collections for the shylock operation of PATTY ERRA and that these collections are handled out of the Albion Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida.

On December 12, 1966, and December 13, 1966, MM T-18 and MM T-19 respectively advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN of Miami, Florida, had been in the Caesars Palace Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada, and was receiving "favored treatment" by the Caesars Palace Casino executives and that ROTHMAN was some important person who was reportedly in the market for, or had already obtained, some undisclosed interest in a Las Vegas gambling operation.

LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISES

On April 22, 1966, MM T-6 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN and his friends wished to purchased the Albion Hotel Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida, but wouldnot pay the price asked by RALPH SORRENTINO. MM T-6 further advised that JOE INDELICATO talked to SORRENTINO and that as a result of this talk the purchase price was lowered, and ROTHMAN and his friends bought this lounge.

On October 10, 1966, MM T-20 advised that PATSY ERRA aided ROTHMAN financially in the purchase of the Albion Lounge.

On October 12, 1966, MM T-6 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN had an interest in the Albion Lounge.

On December 14, 1966, MM T-21 advised that the Albion Lounge is a well-known local hangout for hoodlums and police characters and that NORMAN ROTHMAN has the major interest in this lounge.

On December 19, 1966, MM T-7 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN represents PATSY ERRA's interest in Dean Martin's Restaurant on the 79th Street Causeway, Miami, Florida.

On December 26, 1966, MM T-6 advised that IRVING BRENNER is associated with NORMAN ROTHMAN in the Albion Lounge, and that both BRENNER and ROTHMAN's interest in this lounge are undisclosed.

On December 29, 1966, MM T-6 advised that he heard ROTHMAN had made some overtures to take over the lounge at the Bahama Steak Lounge on the 79th Street Causeway in North Bay Village, Miami, Florida.

On January 1, 1967, MM T-22 advised that he was told that NORMAN ROTHMAN and IRVING BRENNER operate the Albion Hotel Lounge.

TRAVEL

On April 8, 1966, MM T-25 advised that ROTHMAN made a trip to Spain.

On October 12, 1966, MM T-6 advised that he heard that NORMAN ROTHMAN was traveling in Europe part of the summer. ROTHMAN reportedly was in Spain and Portugal.

On October 19, 1966, MM T-6 advised that he learned NORMAN ROTHMAN arrived back in Miami from a trip to Houston, Texas; Las Vegas, Nevada; Los Angeles, California, and Chicago, Illinois, where he handled some business for PATTY ERRA.

On November 4, 1966, MM T-6 advised that ROTHMAN was supposed to leave for New York and Philadelphia that day and return to Miami, Florida, on November 8, 1966.

On December 20, 1966, MM T-6 advised that he was told that NORMAN ROTHMAN had been on a three-week trip to Las Vegas, Nevada, and Chicago, Illinois, and had returned to Miami on December 5, 1966. On December 10, 1966, ROTHMAN reportedly left Miami, destination unknown, and returned to Miami on December 18, 1966.

On December 26, 1966, MM T-6 advised that he heard that NORMAN ROTHMAN had recently been in Jacksonville, Florida.

On December 28, 1966, MM T-9 advised that he was told that NORMAN ROTHMAN and PATTY ERRA attended the wedding of SAM MANNARINO's niece in New Kensington, Pennsylvania.

On January 3, 1967, MM T-23 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN was a guest at the Caesar's Palace Hotel and Casino, Las Vegas, Nevada, for the period November 21, 1966, through December 6, 1966, and that the hotel bill of $545.93 was "comped" by the hotel and that ROTHMAN paid $163.58 for items such as tips and long distance telephone calls made against his room.

On January 11, 1967, MM T-6 advised that he understood that NORMAN ROTHMAN and BEN LEVIN planned to go to the Bahama Islands on January 11, 1967, and return the next day.

On January 27, 1967, MM T-6 advised that ROTHMAN left for Las Vegas, Nevada, on January 24, 1967, and was expected back in Miami on January 28, 1967. MM T-6 further advised that ROTHMAN's traveling is becoming a topic of conversation in racket circles as to the cause and purpose of same.

On March 7, 1967, MM T-24 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN had in the past month made three trips to Las Vegas, Nevada. MM T-24 stated that ROTH and MAX EDER, who has the parking concession and the card room at the

Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida, are believed to be setting up something big. MM T-24 stated that they have had one FAB DECRISTIFARO making numerous trips throughout the United States and to Puerto Rico. In fact, DECRISTIFARO left Miami on Thursday, March 2, 1967, for San Juan, Puerto Rico, pursuant to the same operation. MM T-24 stated that while it was possible this operation was in connection with some new gambling setup, he felt something else was involved.

MISCELLANEOUS

On December 9, 1966, MM T-19 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN of Miami, Florida, had been at the Caesars Palace, Las Vegas, Nevada, and has "juice" with the Caesars Palace Casino executives.

On October 27, 1966, MM T-26 advised that at the present time NORMAN ROTHMAN is driving two automobiles. They are a 1961 Ford, bearing 1966 Florida License 1W58564, and a 1959 Chevrolet, bearing 1966 Florida License 1W58566. Both are listed to ETHEL ROTHMAN, 425 Surfside Boulevard, Surfside, Florida.

On January 6, 1967, MM T-6 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN is indebted to THOMAS ALTAMURA on a shylock loan and ALTAMURA recently put out word that he wanted ROTHMAN to pay up on his delinquent loan.

On January 27, 1967, MM T-27 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN has a Cuban mistress who had a child by him and who is now living in Miami. She was the famous television singer in Cuba named OLGA CHAVIANO.

On February 14, 1967, MM T-18 advised that NORMAN ROTHMAN of Miami had been seen around the Las Vegas gambling casinos during the early part of February, 1967, and that NORMAN ROTHMAN is extremely influential with the Caesars Palace Casino employees and executives.

MM 92-1870

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

Race:	White
Sex:	Male
Date of Birth:	December 26, 1914
Place of Birth:	Bronx, New York
Father:	LEON ROTHMAN born Rumania
Mother:	BETTY ROTHMAN, born Rumania
Wife:	ETHEL HURWITZ born May 26, 1915, New York City
Hair:	Black-greying
Eyes:	Green
Height:	6'
Complexion:	Dark
Residence:	425 Surfside Boulevard Surfside, Florida.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida
March 31, 1967

Title	NORMAN ROTHMAN
Character	ANTI-RACKETEERING
Reference	Report of Special Agent ALLAN M. TRANKLEY, dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
March 31, 1967

Re: NORMAN ROTHMAN
ANTI-RACKETEERING

Reference is made to report of Special Agent ALLAN M. TRANKLEY, dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida.

The following is a characterization of the informants utilized in above-referenced report:

MM T-1 is a business organization which, at times, is able to furnish general information regarding the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-2 is an individual who has many contacts among the Cuban element in Miami, Florida.

MM T-3 is an individual who has some knowledge of the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-4 is an individual who, by virtue of his former position, was able to furnish information regarding subject.

MM T-5 is an individual who mingles with the criminal element on a daily basis in the Miami area.

MM T-6 is a businessman who has wide association in the criminal element in the Miami area.

MM T-7 is an individual who has knowledge of some of the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-8 is the supervisor of an agency which conducts credit investigations and can obtain information as to financial and business interests of hoodlums and racketeers.

COPIES DESTROYED
3 (JUN 18 1972

Re: NORMAN ROTHMAN

MM T-9 is an individual who has some knowledge of the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-10 is a businessman who has knowledge of some of the activities of the criminal element.

MM T-11 is a Confidential Source Abroad.

MM T-12 is an individual who had some knowledge of the activities of the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-13 is an individual who has some knowledge of the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-14 is an individual who was associated with members of the criminal element in the Greater Miami, Florida, area in several business ventures. During this association he was able to learn of the activities of certain individuals.

MM T-15 is a businessman and ex-convict associated with the criminal element and gamblers in the Greater Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-16 is an individual who has some knowledge of the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-17 is an individual formerly connected with the gambling industry in Havana, Cuba.

MM T-18 is an individual who has some knowledge of the people who frequent the gambling casinos in Las Vegas, Nevada.

MM T-19 is an individual who has some knowledge of the people who frequent the gambling casinos in Las Vegas, Nevada.

MM T-20 is a Miami businessman known to be in contact with the local criminal element.

Re: NORMAN ROTHMAN

MM T-21 is an individual who has some knowledge of the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-22 is a businessman who on occasions comes into receipt of information regarding the criminal element.

MM T-23 is an individual who has some knowledge of the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-24 is an individual who is in contact with the criminal element.

MM T-25 is a businessman who on occasions comes into receipt of information regarding the criminal element.

MM T-26 is a businessman who on occasions comes into receipt of information regarding the criminal element.

MM T-27 is an individual who formerly resided in Havana, Cuba, now residing in Miami, Florida, who has some knowledge of criminal activities among the Cuban element in Miami.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
March 31, 1967

Re: **NORMAN ROTHMAN**
ANTI-RACKETEERING

Reference is made to report of Special Agent ALLAN M. TRANKLEY, dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida.

The following is a characterization of the informants utilized in above-referenced report:

MM T-1 is a business organization which, at times, is able to furnish general information regarding the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-2 is an individual who has many contacts among the Cuban element in Miami, Florida.

MM T-3 is an individual who has some knowledge of the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-4 is an individual who, by virtue of his former position, was able to furnish information regarding subject.

MM T-5 is an individual who mingles with the criminal element on a daily basis in the Miami area.

MM T-6 is a businessman who has wide association in the criminal element in the Miami area.

MM T-7 is an individual who has knowledge of some of the criminal element in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-8 is the supervisor of an agency which conducts credit investigations and can obtain information as to financial and business interests of hoodlums and racketeers.

88P-10302

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10237-10009
RECORD_SERIES: DL
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 89-43-4926

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:

DATE: 00/00/0000
PAGES: 1
SUBJECT: SEE FBI 62-109060-3681

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 04/15/1994
UPDATE_DATE:
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

8/21/64

SECRET

SECRET

AIRTEL

TO : Director, FBI (62-109060)

FROM: Legat, Bern (62-43) (RUC)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DEC[illegible]
RELEASE [illegible] [illegible]ATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. Kp 4/19/97
As Sanitized.

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
11/22/63, DALLAS, TEXAS
MISC. - INFO CONCERNING

See Ser 4820

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ReBuairtel 8/7/64.

Enclosed for Dallas are 25 copies each of insert pages 1 and 2 with results of interview of ANGHEL DRAGOMIR. As instructed by the Bureau, this insert incorporates the translated letter from DRAGOMIR with appropriate comments concerning the matter having been referred to the Bureau for investigation.

Information on an individual by the name ANGHEL DRAGOMIR from Bureau files as included in reairtel has not been included in insert since identity has not been proven and the information is not pertinent in any case.

The other Government agency referred to in the insert is the Research Branch (covert CIA), the Embassy, Vienna, Austria. (S) (S) (S)

#6454

Classified by SP6 BJA/MDC
Declassify on: OADR 1-17-84
PER CIA letter
9-23-88

6 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)(Encl.)
(2 - Dallas)(89-43)(Encl. 50)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(7)

Insert to files for 89.
copy pulled
RBS

89-43-4926

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
[illegible] 1964
FBI — DALLAS
RBS

SECRET

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1146, 1148-1151, 1153-1156, 1157, 1158-1165

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88296 Date: 2025

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer

November 20, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC requests contained in letter of Senator Frank Church dated November 7, 1975, for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to SSC requests in referenced letter.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3ALM/EHL
MDR 16

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JTA:adn
(9)

REC-7 62-116395-1165

NOTE:

A copy of the SSC letter 11/7/75, is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

DEC 12 1975

Jma

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Affairs
& Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm.

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

5-Woc16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 16 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

~~SECRET~~ 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer

62-116395

November 20, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC requests contained in letter of Senator Frank Church dated November 7, 1975, for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials in response to requests contained in the above SSC letter.

The attention of the SSC is invited to FBI memorandum dated November 11, 1975, which referred to a highly sensitive oral briefing furnished to Senator Church and selected members of the SSC Staff by FBI personnel on November 5, 1975. This briefing was intended, in part, to serve in lieu of any written information in response to SSC requests for communications documenting Stanley David Levison as a secret member of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA).

Because of SSC insistence in requesting items to establish factual basis for Levison's secret CPUSA membership, as set forth in referenced SSC letter, our New York office was contacted for documents representing original recordings from Bureau informants concerning Levison. As a result our New York office provided the material which is now being delivered and which has served as a basis for statements in various FBI documents that Levison was a secret member of the CPUSA.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

MDR 16

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
ON 10/27/00

JTA:adn
(8)

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified by 2047~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

62 116395 1165

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

It is noted that referenced SSC letter requested unexcised copies of the February 22, and June 12, 1962, communications from New York which appear to have been the "articulated predicates for the 'cominfil' case." The SSC letter did not identify captions of these communications; nor identify any specific "cominfil case." Therefore, we were unable to locate any pertinent documents bearing these dates in our Headquarters files. At a meeting on November 12, 1975, between SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein and representatives of the Intelligence Division of the FBI, it was agreed that the two documents apparently referred to above are New York airtel dated February 12, 1962, captioned "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; SM-C" and New York letter dated August 21, 1962, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; IS-C."

New York airtel dated February 12, 1962, is being delivered with this memorandum among those documents received from our New York office. Excisions in this document are fewer than those made in a copy previously provided the SSC. A copy bearing no or fewer excisions cannot be provided the SSC for reasons made clear during the oral briefing of Senator Church and selected SSC Staff members on November 5, 1975.

It is noted that New York letter dated August 21, 1962, which is being delivered with this memorandum, is not believed to have been previously provided the SSC.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/20/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

11/7/75 request - KING

Originating Office: FBI 235p

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/26/75

Received by: Lynsey Oster

Title: clk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHK

ENCLOSURE

62 [illegible] 1165

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, J[illegible]ENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 7, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Office of Deputy Attorney General
Room 4313
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/27/00 BY SP2ALM/LCL

Dear Mr. Shaheen:

I want you to know how much I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you and your associates the other day about the Martin Luther King, Jr. case. It was most helpful to have the benefit of the Bureau's knowledge concerning the background of the case, and I can assure you that we will do everything possible to avoid jeopardizing any sensitive FBI sources or ongoing operations.

I do want to reiterate our need for the specific items set forth in earlier document requests which would presumably establish the factual basis for your conclusion as of various dates in 1962, 1963 and 1964 that Stanley Levison was a "secret member of the Communist Party, USA." Of course in the event that there is no particular document in any of those years wherein Levison was so-identified to the FBI, I think it would be helpful for you to let us know so that we may consider our outstanding requests in that context. Finally, of course, we still need unexcised copies of the February 22 and June 12, 1962 communications from New York which appear to have been the articulated predicates for the "cominfil" case.

Once again, I want to thank you for your time and I look forward to hearing from you further on this subject.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

Rept to AG, cc DAG
Encl-2 11/20/75
JTA:adn

RECEIVED
NOV 7 1975

62-116395-1165

ENCLOSURE

5. Phillips

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/20/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/27/00 BY SL2Alm/EHL

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 11/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

S

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Intelligence collection
Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials regarding Martin L. King, Jr., Stanley D. Levison and SCLC. Items to establish factual basis for Levison's secret CP, USA membership was obtained from FBI New York Office and furnished SSC.

62-116395

FMK:fmk

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER 11-7-75

DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM NEW YORK OFFICE INDICATING CPUSA MEMBERSHIP OF STANLEY DAVID LEVISON

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

18

Retain

62-116375-1165

ENCLOSURE

Sen 1165

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO : SAC (100-111180)

DATE: 4/17/64

FROM : SA JAMES M. KIRBY (414)

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
ON 10/27/00

SUBJECT: STANLEY LEVISON
IS-C

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION (SFIO)

On 4/9/64, (NY 694-S* made the following observations with regard to the) CP status of STANLEY LEVISON:

LEVISON has been an important Party member for many years (and never at any time differed with the Party with respect to the Party line. His only difference with the Party has been with respect to the fact that in his opinion the Party was not sufficiently "militant" in defending Negro rights. In this respect, he has been to the "left" of the Party. LEVISON's differences with the Party are merely "tactical." He has never criticized the Party, except with respect to the Party's handling of the Negro question. The fact that he does not accept domination by the Party with regard to the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement should not be construed to mean that he has broken with the Party in all respects. The Party today is as anxious to reestablish friendly relations with LEVISON as it was in the past.) SFIO

(It should be noted that LEVISON never has been officially "drummed out" of the Party, nor has anyone ever criticized him for being opposed to the Party's general principles. It further should be noted that according to the CP Constitution, it would require formal expulsion of LEVISON to state that he is officially out of the Party. SFIO

LEVISON never has said anything reflecting that he does not continue to be a CP member. It should be noted that it would be in the interests of the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement, with which he is associated, if he would publicly repudiate the Party, which he has never done. It should be further noted that in an effort to renew friendly relations)

Classified by 2116
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

JMK:mmd
(1)

100-111180-[illegible]

SEARCHED........INDEXED........
SERIALIZED........FILED........
APR 17 1964
FBI - NEW YORK

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

with LEVISON, the Party designated BEN DAVIS to contact LEVISON. LEVISON had always expressed the opinion that BEN DAVIS was the only CP functionary who had a sufficiently "militant attitude" as regards CP activities in behalf of the Negro movement. The fact that DAVIS and LEVISON as yet have not met should not be construed to mean that LEVISON has refused to confer with DAVIS. As NY 694-S* understands the situation, DAVIS has been awaiting contact by LEVISON, and LEVISON similarly has been awaiting contact by DAVIS. Each of these individuals is sufficiently egotistical to expect that the other would make the first move in an effort to establish contact. NY 694-S* believes that probably the reason why DAVIS and LEVISON have not met is that arrangements for their meeting were to be made by LEM HARRIS and that HARRIS has not made the proper efforts to effect a meeting between LEVISON and DAVIS.

SF10

NY 694-S* has never obtained any information reflecting that LEVISON has changed his thinking with regard to Marxism. Even though his present estrangement from the Party might be construed as reflecting he is no longer a CP member, there is no reason to come to the conclusion that LEVISON is no longer an ideological Communist.

JACK talked to LEM HARRIS yesterday who said he contacted STAN LEVENSON by phone and was given a cordial hello which was a change from the past when he was cool.

LEM said he had not seen LEVENSON, tried to call him and would like to see him immediately to which LEVENSON said, "I would like very much to see you but I don't have the time now. I'm leaving and packing for a trip. I will be glad to see you in six weeks."

LEVENSON implied that he was going to Ecuador but LEM doesn't know why. There was no anger shown, and LEVENSON will see LEM when he returns in six weeks.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, NEW YORK (100-111180) DATE: 7/26/63 TOP SECRET

FROM : SA FRANCIS T. LEONARD

SUBJECT: STANLEY DAVID LEVISON
IS-C

The following is being submitted as a revised characterization of the subject:

STANLEY LEVISON is a secret member of the Communist Party, United States of America (CPUSA).

NY T-
July 16, 1963

NY T- is (INFORMANT NY 694-S*.)

A three by five card has been prepared containing the above characterization and will be filed in the library of the NYO.

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/EHL
ON 10/27/00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1 - NY (100-111180) (414)
FTL: rmv
(1)

[illegible]

[illegible] (1 [illegible])

134-91-3849

[redacted]
Classified by 2116
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
JUL 26 1963
FBI — NEW YORK

TOP SECRET

FBI
Date: 6/13/63

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (~~100-166670~~) 100-106670

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-136585)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING
SM - C
(OO: ATLANTA)

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY OP3ALM/EHL
ON 10/27/00

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION (SFIO)

Extreme caution must be exercised with respect to dissemination of the information herein inasmuch as, by its nature, said information tends to identify NY 694-S*, a valuable informant, as the source. Unless this information is obtained from a source other than NY 694-S*, it should not be included--even in paraphrased form--in the investigative section of a report.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

7 - Bureau (~~100-166670~~) 100-106670 (RM)
(1 - 100-392452) (STANLEY LEVISON)
(1 - 100-358916) (HUNTER PITTS O'DELL)
(1 - 157-286) (MARTIN LUTHER KING)
(1 - 100-) (ROY LEVISON)
2 - Atlanta (100-5586) (MARTIN LUTHER KING) (INFO)(RM)
(1 - 157-) (MARTIN LUTHER KING)
1 - Chicago (134-46-Inv.) (INFO)(RM)
SFIO
1 - NY 134-91 (INV.) (41)
1 - NY 100-111180 (STANLEY LEVISON) (414)
1 - NY 100-91330 (HUNTER PITTS O'DELL) (414)
1 - NY 100-111203 (ROY LEVISON) (414)
1 - NY 100-7658 (LEM HARRIS) (414)
1 - NY 157-826 (MARTIN LUTHER KING) (412)
1 - NY 100-136585 (412)

#

ACB:gmg
(20)

Approved: ______________________ Sent ________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classified by 2116~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

SF10

On 6/13/63, NY 694-S* furnished the following information to SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON:

On 6/12/63, LEMENT HARRIS, CPUSA Reserve Fund functionary, told NY 694-S* that in a recent meeting with STANLEY LEVISON, the latter furnished him the following information:

The LEVISONS, particularly STANLEY, are still MARTIN LUTHER KING's "brain trust"--now more than ever before. This is so despite the fact that at a meeting of STANLEY LEVISON, ROY LEVISON, HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, MARTIN LUTHER KING and "the Attorney General's chief assistant", the Attorney General's assistant, pointing to the LEVISONS and HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, stated to MARTIN LUTHER KING, "These men are Party members; watch out for them."

MARTIN LUTHER KING did not "bat an eyelash" upon hearing the Assistant Attorney General's remark, and after the latter left the meeting, those in the group smiled at each other. STANLEY LEVISON said to KING, at this time, "I congratulate you on the way you acted regarding his warning. You are a real Marxist-Leninist. This is how a true Marxist-Leninist acts."

Everything that KING does he first discusses with STANLEY LEVISON and he accepts LEVISON's advice wholeheartedly. KING also wholeheartedly accepts the advice of HUNTER PITTS O'DELL as regards matters within the latter's local jurisdiction.

MARTIN LUTHER KING was asked by a group of newspaper reporters whether he takes orders from "the Communists", and also, whether he took "orders from STANLEY LEVISON." KING's response was that he took orders only from God.

By reason of the fact that the LEVISONS feel that the Party has done little, if anything, to assist the fight

for civil rights for Negroes, and further, since they feel that the Party, as a result of this "do nothing" attitude, has lost prestige, they will no longer permit the Party to dominate or control their activities in the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement. They are severing themselves, financially and in a disciplinary way, from the Party. The LEVISONS and O'DELL are still Party members, but do not desire to be openly "linked up" with the Party. Although they are "disenchanted" with the Party, they are not quitting the Party. With respect to the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement, they will act on their own initiative, and will not accept instructions from the Party.

SF10

LEM HARRIS then advised that the Party, however, still would like to control the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement. BEN DAVIS has been assigned to be "liaison or intermediary" with the LEVISONS and HUNTER PITTS O'DELL. Whether or not the LEVISONS and O'DELL will maintain liaison regarding matters concerning the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement is a matter for them to decide. In view of LEVISON's statement with respect to advising MARTIN LUTHER KING independently of Party instructions, it would seem that DAVIS may not have any success in maintaining liaison with the LEVISONS and HUNTER PITTS O'DELL. The LEVISONS and O'DELL are aware of the fact that BEN DAVIS has been given this assignment by the Party.

SF10

MARTIN LUTHER KING, according to LEM HARRIS, is referred to by such top Party functionaries as GUS HALL, BEN DAVIS, JIM JACKSON and CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT as a "true, genuine, Marxist-Leninist from the top of his head to the tips of his toes." In the Party, the report is that MARTIN LUTHER KING is following a Marxist-Leninist line.

NY 694-S* advised that he asked LEM HARRIS whether or not, to the latter's knowledge, MARTIN LUTHER KING was a member of the CPUSA. LEM HARRIS replied that he did not know.

X

SAC, NEW YORK (100-111180)　　　　8/30/62

8/31

SA FRANCIS T. LEONARD (415)

STANLEY LEVISON
IS-C

The following characterization is being submitted for approval with respect to the subject:

NY T- who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on August 28, 1962, that STANLEY LEVISON is a secret member of the Communist Party, United States of America (CP, USA), and (contributes funds to the CP on a regular basis.)

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION

NY T- is (INFORMANT NY 694-S*.)

MDR 16

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHC
ON 10/27/00

(1) - NY 134-91-INV.) S/10
1 - NY 100-111180 (415)

FTL: gmm
(2)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

X 116 2

213

FBI

DATE: 2/12/62

Transmit the following via AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100 -)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-136585)

SUBJECT: DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SM-C (OO: Atlanta)

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION (SFIO)

(Extreme caution must be exercised with respect to dissemination of the information herein since, by its nature, it tends to identify NY 694-S*, a valuable informant, as the source thereof. Unless this information is obtained from a source other than NY 694-S*, it should not be incorporated - even in paraphrased form - in the investigative section of a report.)

On 2/12/62, (Informant NY 694-S*) advised SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON as follows:

SFIO (In a recent meeting with LEMENT HARRIS, CPUSA functionary associated with the CPUSA Reserve Fund operation, the informant was told by HARRIS that shortly before GUS HALL, CPUSA General Secretary, went to the West Coast, HARRIS transmitted to HALL a "confidential verbal report" on Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, furnished to HARRIS by) STANLEY LEVISON, KING's attorney and advisor, who is a secret member of the CP (and a regular contributor to the CPUSA Rserve Fund. LEVISON's report was as follows:)

4-Bureau (100-) (RM)
(1-100-392452) (STANLEY LEVISON)
1-Atlanta (100-) (DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.) (RM)
(1-NY 134-91 (INV.) (41))
SFIO 1-NY 100-111180 (STANLEY LEVISON) (415)
(1-NY 100-7658 (LEMENT HARRIS) (415))
(1-NY 100-84994 (GUS HALL) (415))
1-NY 100-136585 (412)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
10/31/00

~~SECRET~~

ACB:ume
(11)

Classified by 2166
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SEARCHED INDEXED~~
~~SERIALIZED FILED~~

NY 100-136585 5F10

(When Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING was invited to address the AFL-CIO convention some time ago, KING, on LEVISON's advice, first obtained approval to do so from A. PHILLIP RANDOLPH, negro labor leader, who, if he had not been consulted in the matter, might have felt that KING's making a speech at the aforesaid convention was a blow to RANDOLPH's prestige.

KING delivered a remarkably effective speech at the AFL-CIO convention, and, as a result, received invitations from numerous labor leaders, including "MC DONALD of Steel," to address their respective unions. As the outstanding champion of negro rights in the country, KING is a powerful political influence, recognized as such by the higher echelons of the Democratic Party. He has access to Attorney General ROBERT KENNEDY and President KENNEDY, who, politically, need KING, particularly in the South, where in cities like Atlanta and New Orleans the negro vote now constitutes the balance of power, and where KING controls the negro vote.

JAMES HOFFA, Teamsters Union "boss" appreciates the political power of KING, particularly the fact that KING can influence the 90,000 negro members of the Teamsters Union. HOFFA invited KING to address the Teamsters Union, and KING accepted the invitation. Knowing that KING is being deferred to by Attorney General KENNEDY, and President KENNEDY, HOFFA requested KING to contact the Attorney General in an effort to influence the latter "to lay off" HOFFA. KING was inclined to do as HOFFA requested, but LEVISON convinced him that to do so would be politically unwise, inexpedient, and likely to be a "boomerang," since the Attorney General would never accede to such a request, particularly in the case of HOFFA.

LEVISON had to steer KING away from another politically hazardous situation. Some months ago OTTO PREMINGER, Hollywood movie director, entered into negotiations with a KING representative for KING to play a part in a picture which PREMINGER would direct. Although PREMINGER's offer was "tempting," since it meant "fast, easy money" for KING's organization, LEVISON realized that for KING to accept the offer would lower the latter's prestige. After convincing KING of this fact, LEVISON personally telephoned to PREMINGER, telling him that "the deal was off.")

NY 100-136585

What LEVISON particularly wanted GUS HALL to knew is that "KING is a wholehearted Marxist, who has studied it (Marxism), believes in it, and agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly."

GUS HALL, according to HARRIS, was "elated" to receive LEVISON's report on LUTHER KING.

SF10

~~CRET~~

SSC LETTER 11-7-75

NY LETTER DATED 8-21-62 CAPTIONED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, IS-C"

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM /EHL

RETAIN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-438794) DATE: 8/21/62

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-149194)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE
(SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
IS-C

(OO: Atlanta)

ReBulet to Atlanta, 7/20/62, which requested NY to furnish the Bureau and Atlanta with observations and analysis of the extent of CP influence or infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

CONF. SOURCE

On 3/10/61, (ANDREW ANGIOLETTI, Chief Clerk,) Manufacturers Trust Company, 275 West 125th Street, NYC, advised that there is an account maintained at this branch by the SCLC, whose officers are listed as MARTIN LUTHER KING, President; BAYARD RUSTIN, Secretary; and STANLEY D. LEVISON, Assistant Treasurer.

INF.

(CG 5824-S*) on 8/6/57, advised that STANLEY LEVISON and his brother, ROY BENNETT, were active in (CP financial matters and business ventures which contribute to the CP.)

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELL. OPER. (SFIO)

INF

(NY 694-S*) advised in October, 1961, that LEVISON continues to (donate money to the CP, USA.) SFIO

INF

During the period of February 9-15, 1957, (CG 5824-S*) advised that the 16th National Convention, CP, USA, was held in NYC on February 9-12, 1957, and that BAYARD RUSTIN attended some of the convention sessions as a guest.

2-Bureau (100-438794) (RM)
2-Atlanta (100-5718) (RM)
1-New York (100-149194)

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

REC-3

16 AUG 23 1962

EEG:eac
(5)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 12047~~
~~EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION~~
~~SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652~~
~~EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2~~
~~AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Indefinite~~

Ltr to NY
2 - Atlanta
8-29-62
HK:mer

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHC
ON 10/27/00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

informant informant file #

BA 969-S advised on 11/22/60, (BA 134-13A-615) that at a National Negro Commission meeting held on 11/19, 20/60, at CP Headquarters, 23 West 26th Street, NYC, TED BASSETT, a representative of "The Worker", stated that the CP is now in the process of placing members of the Party in key positions in the SCLC. BASSETT continued by saying that a Western Conference of the Christian Leadership is now being formed and a CP member is the leader in this conference.

informant

NY 694-S* advised on 5/1/62, that on 4/30/62, ISADORE WOFSY, CP, USA fund functionary, said that according to LEM HARRIS, he was told by STANLEY LEVISON that the CP, USA had sent "an experienced, professional, secret organizer" to New Orleans, who would assist the MARTIN LUTHER KING group there in its fight for political equality of Negroes. LEVISON allegedly told HARRIS that he personally, and not the Party, was financing this organizer. SF10

informant Hosea?

NY 694-S* advised on 5/2/62, that according to LEM HARRIS, the secret CP organizer, whom the CP, USA had sent to New Orleans, was JOSE HUDSON. HARRIS said that HUDSON would be associated with SERGEANT CAULFIELD in Baton Rouge. SF10

Informant

On 7/2/62, NO 1084-S advised that SERGEANT CAULFIELD returned to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, from Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/31/62. Informant said that CAULFIELD stated that he and JOSE HUDSON met HUNTER O'DELL in Atlanta, O'DELL having flown there from NYC.

informant

NO 1084-S stated that CAULFIELD paid CP dues to O'DELL for several CP members from Louisiana. O'DELL had come to Atlanta regarding organization of the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement. O'DELL thought that if an active

MARTIN LUTHER KING movement could be organized in Louisiana, the State Senatorial District where CAULFIELD resides permanently (Lettsworth, Louisiana), CAULFIELD might be furnished as much as $1,000.00 per month to promote this movement. The funds are to come from the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement and the object is to get every eligible Negro to register to vote. CAULFIELD reportedly met MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., while in Atlanta, and discussed with him the voter registration matter in Louisiana.

On 4/27/62, a pretext telephone call was made to UN 6-2000, which is the NYC listing for the Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING and also the listing for the SCLC at 312 West 125th Street, NYC. The pretext used was that of a person interested in contributing money to the KING committee. The person answering the phone during the conversation identified himself as JACK O'DELL, and furnished the following information:

His office is the Northern Branch of the SCLC. The Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, at 312 West 125th Street, was organized as an "ad hoc" committee to assist in the KING defense, when he was the subject of court action. When the reason for this committee's being in existence was removed, it was formally dissolved. The same personalities them formed the Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle, which is now operated at 312 West 125th Street.

O'DELL stated that it would make no difference as to whether a person contributing money makes out checks payable to the Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, the SCLC or the Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle, because they are all one and the same.

~~SECRET~~

NY 100-149194

informant

On 6/1/61, (CG 5824-S*) advised that HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, who was (a secret) member of the National Committee, CP, USA, has quit the CP and is officially considered by the CP as being out. However, there are no hard feelings existing between O'DELL and the Party and he is still on good terms with the CP and will work with them. SF10

EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED WITH RESPECT TO DISSEMINATION OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN, SINCE BY ITS NATURE IT TENDS TO IDENTIFY (NY 694-S*,) A VALUABLE INFORMANT, AS THE SOURCE THEREOF. UNLESS THIS INFORMATION IS OBTAINED FROM A SOURCE OTHER THAN (NY 694-S*,) IT SHOULD NOT BE INCORPORATED, EVEN IN PARAPHRASED FORM, IN THE INVESTIGATIVE SECTION OF A REPORT.

INFORMANT

Informant

On 7/23/62, (NY 694-S*) stated during a personal contact with GUS HALL, General Secretary of the CP, USA, on that date, HALL advised that HUNTER PITTS O'DELL is still representing the CP, USA and that he is still on the National Committee of the CP, USA. HALL further remarked that O'DELL is a "brain-trust" for LUTHER KING and is doing an excellent job.) SF10

Current investigation in NYC reflects that O'DELL is spending most of his time in the Atlanta area working with the SCLC. He was last reported in the NY area in June, 1962.

INFORMANT

On 2/11/62, (NY 1300-S) made available photographs of material maintained in the office of STANLEY LEVISON, 6 East 39th Street, NYC. Included in these photographs were the following:

1. Two checks, both dated 12/19/61, bearing the printed name of the "Southern Christian Leadership Conference", 312 West 125th Street, NY, NY. These checks

~~SECRET~~

are numbered 397 and 399, one in the amount of $251.90 and one in the amount of $150.00, are marked payable to J. O'DELL, and are signed by STANLEY D. LEVISON.

2. Copy "C" of a Withholding Tax form for 1961, in the name of JOHN HUNTER O'DELL, 312 West 125th Street, NY, NY, Social Security Number 386-14-3707, indicating that he was paid $3,050.00 in 1961 by the SCLC, 312 West 125th Street, NYC.

ELSUR
(NY 3575-S*) advised on 6/20/62, that STANLEY LEVISON stated that in a recent conversation with MARTIN LUTHER KING, KING said he was thinking of getting another administrative assistant. LEVISON stated that in the past LEVISON had not considered it wise for O'DELL to take on such a position, but he is the only one who could do the job and should be considered for it. LEVISON stated as long as O'DELL did not have the title of Executive Director, there would not be "as much lightening flashing around him". O'DELL could be called a coordinator and still fulfill all the duties of Executive Director.

LEVISON stated, according to (ELSUR NY 3575-S*) that KING liked LEVISON's suggestion with respect to O'DELL taking this position, because KING felt that O'DELL must face it sooner or later, stating "that no matter what a man was, if he could stand up now and say he is not connected, then as far as I am concerned, he is eligible to work for me".

INFORMANT
(NY 2783-S) advised on 7/11/61, (INFORMANT FILE # (NY 134-4268A-378)), that HAZEL GRAY is working again at the SCLC, 312 West 125th Street, NYC.

INFORMANT
On 7/8/61, NY 1212-S stated that it had come to his attention that CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT had mentioned that he wanted

to use HAZEL GRAY and her husband, JOHN GRAY, in the Kings County CP organization. The informant stated that LIGHTFOOT highly recommended the GRAYs.

On 3/10/61, MILTON BIRON, Senior Accountant, Comtroller's Office, New York City, Bureau of Excise Taxes, 120 West 32nd Street, made available an application for exemption from the New York City amusement tax, dated 1/23/61, and signed by STANLEY D. LEVISON. The exemption was requested for a "concert" to be given at Carnegie Hall on 1/27/61, for one evening performance.

The name of the applicant was given as the "Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle", 312 West 125th Street, an unincorporated association. It is stated that the applicant is a non-profit educational committee which has registered with the Charities Registration Bureau in Albany and the Department of Welfare in NYC. It says that it employs no professional fund raisers and that neither its officers nor executive directors are paid either salaries or expenses.

The, "Purposes for which applicant was organized", are listed as:

"To provide funds for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to be used for establishment of constitutional rights in the South utilizing voting registration drives, educational meetings, church and synagogue conferences, sit-in techniques, legal actions etc."

The, "Activities of the Applicant", are listed as:

"Mail solicitations, benefits, meetings, educational conferences, church collections."

~~SECRET~~

The, "Source and Disposition of Income", is listed as:

"All income less expenses is transmitted to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference or directly paid out to sources indicated by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING is President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

A "note" attached to the application stated that the committee was created by resolution as an unincorporated association at an organizing meeting held at the home of HARRY BELAFONTE, 300 West End Avenue, in June, 1960.

The application for exemption from the New York City amusement tax was denied by letter 1/31/61, sent to the Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle, 312 West 125th Street, attention of STANLEY D. LEVISON.

NY has considered the above facts and is of the opinion that a Cominfil investigation of the NY Chapter of the SCLC is warranted, due to the dominant CP influence on the executives of the NY Chapter of the SCLC.

NY will conduct no further investigation without prior Bureau authority.

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

November 19, 1975

Director, FBI

2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
(1 - J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Newman

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, requesting access to documents regarding informant matters.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum in response to one of the items in referenced request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum.

Enclosures - 2

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/

62-116395

EHL

Memo being prepared showing exactly what Comm. will have access to. N 11/19/75

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

HAN:tdp (10)

REC-7 62-116395-1164

ST-110

NOTE:

The material to which access is being granted involves Gary Thomas Rowe, a former Bureau informant who furnished information which led to the Federal prosecution on civil rights charges of 3 Klansmen responsible for the killing of Mrs. Viola Luizzo, a civil rights worker, in Lawndes County, Alabama, on 3/25/65. The material involved includes access to that material contained in the informant's field file as well as information contained in informant's file maintained at FBIHQ. ~~The request~~ addressed itself to other matters which are being handled separately, including access to material regarding other informants.

DEC 12 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

~~MAIL ROOM~~ ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 16 1975

2 - Mr. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Newman

62-116395

November 18, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, requesting access to documents regarding the handling of former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe.

These documents have been assembled and are available for review by appropriately cleared SSC staff members at FBI Headquarters.

HAN:tdp (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMO being prepared by LCD dated 11/19/75 showing what documents Comm will have access to. gf

WOC

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1164

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 7, 1975

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

As a follow-up to our briefing of Assistant Director Wannall on November 6 concerning our proposed format and witnesses for public hearings on December 4-5 on the FBI's use of intelligence informants and sources, we would like to make the following requests.

As discussed in our meeting with Mr. Wannall, we invite the Bureau to submit a memorandum on its intelligence informant and source program that could be inserted in the record of the testimony of Bureau representatives at the hearing. This memorandum would enable the Bureau to present to the Select Committee a complete description of its program and to discuss the issues of particular interest to the Committee members. These include, for example, 1) the size, scope and purpose of the program, including an assessment of the program's cost and effectiveness, and the distinctions and relationships between the intelligence informant program and the Bureau's criminal informant activity; 2) the criteria that determine when an informant may be used in an organization or group; and 3) the program's command and control system, including the limits that are placed on the activities of informants and the type of information an informant or source is permitted to report to his handling agent and the Bureau. In addition, the memorandum would discuss possible legislation in the informant area, such as the imposition of a warrant requirement or additional administrative review. To permit the Select Committee members to study this memorandum in advance of the hearing and to discuss it with FBI representatives during their testimony at the public hearing, we request that the memorandum be submitted by November 24.

fwd to AG, cc DAG
11/18/75 HAN: tdp

62-116395-1156

ENCLOSURE

Also I am enclosing requests for documents relating to two of the three former FBI informants who are scheduled to testify on December 4. These requests supplement our document request of August 20, 1975 pertaining to informants (Part IV-4).

In addition, we wish to interview and possibly depose the Special Agents who handled the three former informants (Rowe, Hardy and Cook) who are scheduled to testify at the public hearing on December 4. Because of the limited time remaining before the scheduled hearings, we request that the Special Agents be made available for interviews and depositions as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

John Elliff

John Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc: Paul V. Daly
Office of Congressional Affairs
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DOCUMENT REQUEST

The following documents and materials relating to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., whether in the custody or possession of the FBI Birmingham, Alabama office or elsewhere:

a) All documents and materials reflecting contacts and reports of contacts (and the substance thereof) between Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. and FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

b) All documents and materials reflecting information supplied by Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. to FBI Special Agents (and Bureau Field or Headquarters summaries thereof) from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

c) All documents and materials relating to any guidance, directions, instructions, or suggestions given to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

d) All documents and materials relating to Bureau and Field Office supervision of the handling of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1 1960 to April 1, 1965.

e) All documents and materials relating to payments of money to, or other financial arrangements between, Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., the FBI, and the Justice Department from March 25, 1965 to December 31, 1966.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/19/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

11/7/75 request (Gary Thomas Rowe)

Originating Office: FBI 11 20/A

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 11/25/75

Received by: Sherry Powell

Title: HOM

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1164

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

FOR REVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials made available for review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FBIHQ, regarding the handling of former FBI informant Gary T. Rowe.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~TOP SECRET~~

11/11/75

1 ~~General~~

1 - Followed

11/7/75 [illegible]

for documentation on SD Levison

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
(ATTN: INTD - W. O. CREGAR)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (134-91)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY: 1975

Levison

ReBuphone call of Bureau Supervisor SEYMOUR PHILIP, 11/10/75.

This communication is classified "Top Secret" in accordance with established classification procedures.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies each of 21 communications pertinent to captioned case.

The original recording of this information is contained in 134-91, unless otherwise noted:

1. NYlet to Bu - CPUSA Reserve Fund - 3/16/61
2. NYlet to Bu - CPUSA Reserve Fund - 10/19/61
3. NYmemo to SAC - CPUSA Funds - 11/20/62
4. NYairtel to Bu - STANLEY LEVISON - 1/4/62
5. NYairtel to Bu - M. L. KING - 2/12/62
6. NYmemo to SAC - CPUSA Reserve Funds - 4/20/62
7. NYtel to Bu - M.L. KING - 5/3/62

Of 42 encls. 21 are to remain in file (1 set) Of the other 21 (1 set) 5 used [illegible]

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 - Bureau (Encls. 42) (RM) SSC 16 destroyed.
1 - New York

1073

5 encls furnished [illegible] Maurice all, remainder not used in reply to SSC. See Bulet + LHM to SSC + Dept 11/20/75 JTA:[illegible]

TJD:jir
(4)

Classified by ~~2116~~
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EH

~~TOP SECRET~~

8. NYmemo to SAC - STANLEY LEVISON - 8/30/62

9. NYairtel to Bu - STANLEY LEVISON - 3/21/63

10. NYairtel to Bu - M.L. KING - 6/13/63

11. NYairtel to Bu - CPUSA Negro Question - 7/10/63

12. NYairtel to Bu - M.L. KING - 7/31/63

13. Memo to SAC NY - STANLEY LEVISON - 7/16/63

14. NYairtel to Bu - STANLEY LEVISON - 9/16/63

15. NYlet to Bu - CPUSA Negro Question - 10/18/63

The following are the original documents set forth in the captioned case files:

16. NYairtel to Bu - CPUSA Negro Question - 2/13/64

17. " " " " " " - 2/18/64

18. NYmemo to SAC - STANLEY LEVISON - 4/3/64

19. " " " " " - 4/13/64

20. " " " " " - 4/20/64

21. NYlet to Bu - CIRM - 9/23/64

Concerning the above, it should be noted that due to the top level activity of the source, NY 694-OA, and to the highly sensitive area the source operates in, only oral reports are obtained from the source. These oral reports are not reduced to writing for the sources signature. Also, occasionally information is orally obtained from the source and is originally recorded in the case file of the subject or subject matter.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

NY 134-91

The enclosed represents the best information as obtained from a review of the files of the New York Office of NY 694-OA; STANLEY D. LEVISON and MARTIN L. KING from 1961 - 1965 showing the original recorded information.

TOP SECRET

2 - [illegible]. J. A. Mintz
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - [illegible]r. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General November 18, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

18

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 28, 1975, requesting in part access to cancelled Security Index (SI) cards, delivery of certain materials pertaining to individuals whose identities would be obtained from a review of the cancelled cards, access to other versions of the SI or Reserve Index, and delivery of certain materials from FBI Headquarters files on organizations whose names and file numbers were provided by the SSC.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which constitutes this Bureau's response to the above requests.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (12)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

N

KAM:cap cap
(9)

REC-7 62-116395-1163

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

DEC 12 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

6-ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

JAN 5 - 1976

84 DEC 16 1975

Delivered to Shaheen 11/18/75
Returned 11-20-75 delivered to [illegible] 11/20/75 by Paul F Daly

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

62-116395

November 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 28, 1975, requesting in part:

1. Access to the Security Index (SI) cards recently discovered at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) under the same conditions as the access previously granted to the Administrative Index (ADEX).

2. Delivery of the following materials pertaining to certain individuals on the SI (the names to be supplied following access to the SI cards):

   a. materials reflecting the reasons why the individual was placed on the SI;

   b. materials reflecting any dissemination of information about the individual outside the United States government.

3. Access to any other versions of the SI or the Reserve Index (RI) which may be in the possession of the FBI, including versions compiled by the New York City Field Office.

4. Delivery of materials reflecting the reason why an FBIHQ file was opened and material indicating whether there was subversive or

SEE PAGE 6 for Note's

JAM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

KAM:cap
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED SEE NOTE PAGE 6

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1163

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

extremist activity with respect to the following organizations whose names and FBIHQ file numbers were provided to the Select Committee on October 9, 1975:

a.	Communist Infiltration Council of Jewish Women	100-432543
b.	East Bay Community Forum	100-432848
c.	Knoxville Area Human Relations Council	100-433348
d.	George Orwell Forum Yale University	100-434048
e.	Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs	100-434168
f.	Saugus Unitarian-Universalist Church Forum	100-440365
g.	San Diego Peace Action	100-440530
h.	Universities Committee on the Problems of War and Peace	100-440833
i.	Communist Infiltration of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	100-441132
j.	The Free University at Ann Arbor	100-445323
k.	Champaign-Urbana Council for Discussion on Vietnam	100-446029
l.	Wellsprings Ecumenical Renewal Association	100-453618

Recep 3/11/41, WDC, containing request for info. from NAVY to FBI. Per L. Hendricks, 11/20/75, NIS says OK to diss. to SSC.

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

m.	Northern Virginia Coalition of Citizens Concerned About the ABM-Sponsored Town Meeting at Alexandria, Virginia, June 3, 1969	100-454103
n.	Reservists Against the War	100-469726
o.	Bald Hill Farm Commune	100-472039
p.	Anti-Crosstown Coalition	100-472814
q.	Washington Area Committee for Soviet Jewry	100-480590
r.	Committee for Chilean Democracy	100-481206
s.	National Conference on Amnesty; Information Concerning	100-481516
t.	National Conference on Amnesty; Information Concerning	100-481899
u.	Council for United Civil Rights Leadership	157-972
v.	Canadian Youth Corps	157-1074
w.	Ormondsville Fellowship Club, Inc.	157-5281
x.	Black Student Union, Brevard Junior College, Cocoa, Florida	157-13416
y.	Martin Luther King, Jr., Memorial Center, Inc.	157-13791
z.	Black Student Union University of Nevada Las Vegas, Nevada	157-13994

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

aa.	Greensboro Association of Poor People (GAPP)	157-15692
bb.	American Christian Action Council	157-24293
cc.	National Tenants Organization	157-26335
dd.	South Carolina Council of Human Relations	157-27014
ee.	California Rehabilition Center, Norco, California	157-32882

Reference is further made to our memoranda dated July 17, 1975, and September 25, 1975, which provided background information and documents pertaining to the SI, ADEX, and RI.

As you are aware, a computerized ADEX listing is prepared monthly at FBIHQ. The SI list was prepared in the same manner and, as with the former SI, when a new monthly ADEX list is prepared copies of the old list are destroyed inasmuch as they are outdated and no longer serve a useful purpose. As you have been previously advised, names appearing on the former SI and the ADEX have been printed on 5 X 8 cards with a single name printed on each card. Background information, file numbers, and type of activity in which the individual is engaged are also placed on these cards. As you are aware, approximately 15,000 of these cards, all outdated, have been located as FBIHQ. These cards include some which contain the identity of individuals who were maintained on the Priority III level of the former SI and all ADEX cards deleted or cancelled since its inception.

During the initial period of establishing the ADEX, in order to obviate the need for conducting massive file reviews, the ADEX consisted primarily of the identity of those individuals who had been maintained on the former SI. Although these names were originally placed in this manner on the new ADEX, as cases were reviewed under our then existing reporting procedures, each case was to be reviewed on its own merits utilizing the then current criteria for ADEX to determine whether continued inclusion on the ADEX was warranted. If not, the individual's

name was deleted. As previously indicated, during 1972 the ADEX was evaluated and revised. Following this revision, the number of individuals who were included on the ADEX began to decline and thus the high number of cancelled cards. In accordance with Bureau policy, which was instituted during the SI program, these cancelled cards are maintained at FBIHQ for a period of three years and there is no way to reconstuct a former SI or ADEX list for a particular time period by reviewing these cancelled cards. These cards, however, will reflect the identity of those individuals who have been placed on the SI and the ADEX for the period for which these cards were maintained.

Per your request, these outdated SI and ADEX cards are available for review by appropriate SSC representives at FBIHQ. In this regard, SSC Staff Members Martha Talley and John T. Elliff have had access to these cards on October 30, 1975, and November 7, 1975, respectively.

During Mr. Elliff's review of these cards, the names Shelley Blum, Emanuel James Brisker, Jr., and Gregory Allan Calvert were selected by Mr. Elliff in connection with request number two of your October 28, 1975, letter. Documents requested regarding these individuals are enclosed.

A review of pertinent files at FBIHQ regarding the SI and the RI indicates there are no other versions of the former SI or RI at FBIHQ. Contact was also made with knowledgeable individuals of our New York City Field Office and it was determined these programs had been handled in accordance with then existing FBIHQ policy and no other versions of these programs were compiled by that office.

Materials requested for delivery under item number four of your October 28, 1975, letter are enclosed. In this regard, it is noted the correct FBIHQ file number for the Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs is 100-400394 and the correct file number for the file regarding Communist Infiltration of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is 61-3176. In order to be responsive to your request, pertinent documents of the type desired are being furnished regarding these organizations from these files.

Enclosures (10)

1 - The Attorney General

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE:

During Mr. Elliff's review of the cancelled SI and ADEX cards, he indicated additional access to the cards would be requested to obtain the identity of other individuals besides the three selected by him 11/7/75.

SA James Graham, IS-1 Section, handled the request for documents listed under items 4u through 4ee, all of which pertained to the IS-1 Section.

The matter relating to other versions of the SI and RI compiled by our New York Office were discussed with New York personnel SAC James O. Ingram and Field Supervisor Raymond Ruckel on 11/10/75, and 11/11/75, respectively.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/18/75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

Caption of Document:

10/28/75 request - SI, ADEX

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: P. V. Daly Date: 11/20/75

Received by: Epstein

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1163

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
11/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 10/28/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

S

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

For review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FBIHQ outdated SI and ADEX cards and delivery of materials on three individuals selected by SSC Staff Member Elliff; materials reflecting the reason why an FBI HQ file was opened on various organizations.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

The Attorney General

November 17, 1975

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Reference is made to my letter dated July 1, 1975, which enclosed a memorandum of the same date relating to a request for documentary materials made by the Senate Select Committee (SSC) under the date of May 14, 1975.

The referenced memorandum, on page 1, paragraph 4, refers to a briefing by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the National Security Council, presided over by the President, on November 6, 1958. A further review of our records has determined this briefing by Mr. Hoover was actually furnished to the President and members of his Cabinet on November 6, 1958. Although it is likely members of the National Security Council were present, technically it was a briefing of the President and his Cabinet.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum correcting this technical error and requesting the Committee appropriately change its records.

A copy of the memorandum is provided for your records.

DAG 11-19-75

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

REC-7 62-116395-1162

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

DEC 12 1975

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

DR:lfj
(11)

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 16 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

62-116395

November 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
"HUSTON PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND
OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

COINTELPRO

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

Reference is made to memorandum dated July 1, 1975, which responded to a SSC request under the date of May 14, 1975, for documents relating to this Bureau's former Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros).

Page 1, paragraph 4, of referenced memorandum refers to a briefing by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the National Security Council, presided over by the President, November 6, 1958. Enclosed with the memorandum was a document with a cover page alluding to this briefing of the National Security Council.

A current review of the records of this Bureau has determined the briefing by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on November 6, 1958, was actually furnished to the President and members of his Cabinet. Although it may be presumed that some members of the Cabinet were also members of the National Security Council, it is requested you correct your records to more accurately indicate the true nature of the briefing.

This is also to confirm information orally furnished by Supervisor David Ryan of the FBI to SSC staff member Barbara Banoff on November 13, 1975, at SSC offices. At that time,

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

DR:lfj
(10)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1162

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Cointelpro

Miss Banoff was advised of the above change and was specifically requested to correct pages 47-49 of Special Agent Ryan's deposition to the SSC dated October 21, 1975. It was also requested any other references to the briefing on November 6, 1958, which might appear in the deposition of Special Agent Ryan dated October 16, 1975, and October 21, 1975, be appropriately changed.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

See letter to the Attorney General dated 11/17/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," prepared by DR:lfj.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

5/14/75 request (COINTELPRO)

Originating Office: FBI 11 20/A

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/25/75

Received by: Sherry Towell

Title: HOMU

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHC

[illegible] 116

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Counterintelligence

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Submitting to the SSC corrections to be made on information previously furnished them.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 11/17/75

FROM : F. J. Cassidy

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/CHC

Reference is made to a memorandum dated 11/12/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams, Deputy Associate Director, in which a recommendation was made that the Intelligence Division determine whether there is a memorandum describing a briefing of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark by Mr. Cartha DeLoach, former Assistant to the Director, concerning the Counterintelligence Program.

Mr. DeLoach, during an interview under oath by staff members of the Senate Select Committee on 11/11/75, advised that he had briefed Ramsey Clark regarding the Counterintelligence Program and, when asked whether he had written a memorandum regarding that briefing, advised that he could not specifically recall whether a memorandum was prepared. During the interview by Committee staff members, they advised Mr. DeLoach that they had asked for such documentation from the Bureau, but a memorandum indicating Mr. DeLoach had briefed Ramsey Clark regarding the Counterintelligence Program was not received among the documents furnished by the Bureau.

ST-110 REC-7 62-116395-1160 DEC ~~2~~ 17 1975

This will advise that additional review of Bureau files by personnel of the Analytical Research Unit has failed to disclose any memorandum which describes a briefing of Clark by Mr. DeLoach regarding the Counterintelligence Program.

ACTION:

None. For information.

62-116395
1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

DKP:lfj
(7)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

84 DEC 16 1975

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Paul Daly
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

SAC, Denver (105-4151) 12/1/75

Director, FBI (105-78256)

MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/02 BY SP2ALM/EHL

THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS-INFORMATION
CONCERNING
SENSTUDY-75

RD
21

Enclosed for Denver and Chicago are one copy each of a letter dated 11/14/75 from Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Office of Deputy Attorney General, to John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division, FBI, with enclosed letter to Mr. Shaheen from John T. Elliff, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC).

Denver is requested to immediately prepare a communication including responses to FBI questions 4, 5, 12, 13 and 14 and 19, in addition to conducting indices searches on names listed in question 16.

Chicago is requested to immediately prepare a communication including responses to FBI questions 10, 11 and 18. Include in communication any information relating to Leonard Carlin, Susan Kresge and the World University Service in Chicago considered to be of possible significance to the Bureau in preparing its response to the SSC.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-78256-45

Enclosures - 2

2 - Chicago (105-8544)(Enclosures - 2) 62-116395 -

NOT RECORDED
9 DEC 3 1975

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy-75)

RLM:emj
(11)

SEE NOTE, PAGE TWO

above
1152

DUPLICATE YELLOW

84 DEC 11 1975

Letter to Denver
Re: Thomas Riha
105-78256

NOTE:

The SSC has proposed 19 questions to the FBI and 9 questions to INS relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, in March, 1969. A number of the questions from the Committee require input from the Denver and Chicago Offices.

2 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

The Attorney General November 14, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/eHC

Reference is made to the letter of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated November 4, 1975, setting forth the identities of a number of documents relating to this Bureau's discontinued Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros), which have been previously furnished to the Committee, and requesting these documents be declassified for public hearings.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum which responds to the request of the SSC.

Although this Bureau has declassified the documents as requested by the SSC, you should note that one of these documents consists of excerpts from former FBI Director Hoover's briefing of the President and his Cabinet on November 6, 1958, and a second document is a memorandum to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover from Attorney General Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach dated September 3, 1965. You may desire to clear the declassification of the former with the White House and to afford your consideration to the declassification of the latter which originated within the Department.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

REC-7 62-116395-1160

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

DEC 12 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ENCLOSURE
ENCL. BEHIND FILE

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

DR:lfj (11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

64 DEC 16 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

62-116395

November 14, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC
MDR 16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter of the SSC dated November 4, 1975, requesting certain documents relating to this Bureau's Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros) be declassified for public hearings.

This Bureau has declassified the documents listed in the SSC letter dated November 4, 1975, for utilization at public hearings, provided the excisions which were incorporated in the documents when they were originally referred to you are continued and also with the provision that the following additional excisions are made.

As regards material excerpted from former FBI Director Hoover's "off-the-record" statements, as presented to the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, the following additional material should be excised:

In the material prepared for Fiscal Year (FY) 1959, page 1, paragraph 3 of the text which begins "Through informant coverage..." should be excised.

In the material prepared for testimony for FY 1960, on the second page the paragraph beginning "Although leaders of the Communist Party..." should be excised.

In the material prepared for FY 1961, page 2, the remaining portions of the paragraph beginning "Among these documents was a report..." should be excised. It is noted this paragraph ends with the words "...was written in the Czech language."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

DR:lfj
(10)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI. ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62 116395 - 1160

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

In the FY 1963 material, on page 2, paragraph 1, the sentence beginning with "For example..." and ending "...the Bolshevik Revolution" should be excised.

In the last paragraph on page 2 of this document, the word "key" in line 3 should be excised.

In the enclosure to former Director Hoover's letter to the Honorable Robert F. Kennedy dated January 10, 1961, on page 2 the paragraph which has already been partially excised and which begins "A CP leader..." and which ends "...of the world" should be excised in its entirety. On page 3, the last remaining paragraph which begins "Through our security..." and ends "...aware of its plans" should be excised. On page 4 in the last paragraph, the sentence beginning with "In one phase..." and ending with "...monolithic unity" should be excised.

In the Director's letter to the Attorney General dated September 2, 1965, paragraph 2, the following words or numbers should be excised: "two thousand," "774," and "two each day." These same excisions should be made in the Director's letter to the Honorable Marvin Watson dated September 2, 1965.

With regard to the declassification of item number 1 identified in the SSC letter of November 4, 1975, it should be noted that the briefing by former Director Hoover on November 6, 1958, was afforded the President and his Cabinet rather than the President and the National Security Council.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

See letter to the Attorney General dated 11/14/75, captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," prepared by DR:lfj.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/14/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re SSC req. 11/4/75 Declassification of documents re Bureau's discontinued Counterintelligence Programs.

Originating Office: FBI -11 20 A

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/25/75

Received by: Sherry Towell

Title: AOM

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/GHL

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-116[illegible]

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED 11/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/4/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Counterintelligence

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials previously delivered have been declassified for utilization at public hearing, provided the excisions which were incorporated in the documents when they were originally referred to SSC are continued and also additional excisions were made.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP 2 ALM/EHC

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5. orig

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic

SECRET

The Attorney General

November 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

O

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

[illegible] PVD, 11/12/75

The enclosed memorandum is to report contact between Staff Members of the SSC and the FBI's representatives at the U. S. Embassies, Brasilia, Brazil; and Buenos Aires, Argentina. (S)

An extra copy of the memorandum is provided in the event you wish to furnish it to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

10/30/00 MDR 16
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

RLM:emj
(10)

RLM

REC-7 62-116395-1159

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

edm

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

5-WOC 18 DEC 12 1975

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 DEC 16 1975

SECRET

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

November 11, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: VISITS OF SSC STAFF
MEMBERS TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHES

10/30/00, MDR 16

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/GHZ
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

On September 19, 1975, Mr. David Aaron, an investigator for SSC was briefed at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) in preparation for his planned visit to Brasilia, Brazil, on September 22, 1975, and Buenos Aires, Argentina, on September 25, 1975, in connection with the Committee's inquiry into U. S. intelligence activities. Mr. Aaron was briefed on the overall role and mission of the FBI's Legal Attaches (Legats), and specifically on the activities and functions of the Legats at Brasilia and Buenos Aires. He was advised that Legat, Brasilia, utilized two confidential sources in order to facilitate the prompt coverage of leads in Brazil. He was also told that Legat, Mexico City, and Legat, Brasilia, were the only Legat offices that utilized paid confidential sources. (S)

Legat, Buenos Aires, informed FBIHQ that the U. S. Embassy at Buenos Aires received instructions, classified "Secret," from the U. S. Department of State with regard to the visit of David Aaron, a former U. S. Department of State Foreign Service Officer, and William Truehart, a former U. S. Ambassador, to the U. S. Embassies at Brasilia, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo and the U. S. Consul General in Rio de Janeiro. The

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

RLM:emj
(9)

RLM

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

SEE NOTE, PAGE FOUR

SECRET

~~Classified by 0283~~ WOC
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

WOC

WRW
HEW

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1159

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: VISITS OF SSC STAFF
MEMBERS TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHES

Department of State advised that the primary objective of the visitors was to discuss with the Ambassador and members of his staff the relationships and exercise of authority by the Ambassador of the intelligence activities in the field. The Department of State further advised that operational details, sources and methods were not construed to be legitimate avenues of inquiry by the SSC Staff Members.

Legat, Brasilia, was interviewed on September 22, 1975, by Messrs. Aaron and Truehart, with Aaron being dominant in the interviewing process. The interview was directed mainly toward attempts to elicit examples whereby Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had withheld dissemination of information of interest to other agencies. Inquiries were made concerning CIA activities inside and outside the Embassy. Specific questions were placed with Legat to ascertain if the FBI was involved in Soviet Embassy "walk-ins" as well as recruitment of double agents and CIA-oriented operations. Discussion concerning Legat's role and functions in Brasilia appeared to be routine, with few, if any, pointed questions directed at FBI operations overseas. The subject of two paid confidential sources in Brasilia was briefly discussed and both SSC investigators appeared understanding and in agreement with the necessity of each confidential source to serve FBI's and U. S. Government's best interests in Brazil. The question seemingly bearing the most weight during the interview concerned possible unauthorized activities of CIA and its lack of cooperation and coordination with FBI and the Defense Attache's Office. The duration of the interview was approximately forty-five minutes. (S)

Legat, Buenos Aires, was interviewed by the two SSC Staff Members on September 26, 1975. Again Aaron played the dominant role during interview. He commenced

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: VISITORS OF SSC STAFF
MEMBERS TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHES

the interview by stating that the operations of Legats, Brasilia, and Buenos Aires, were not the type of Legat operations he desired to review, indicating that Mexico City Legat's operations were more of the type of interest to them. Aaron asked pointed questions concerning the mechanics of Legat reporting on intelligence information developed locally to FBIHQ and the local coordination of this information with the Embassy components. Aaron requested the Legat provide him with the general nature of intelligence developed and reported by the Legat to the Embassy and FBIHQ. He was told that generally international and local terrorism were the prime topics of Legat reporting. Inquiry was also made into the reason for FBI expansion of foreign liaison activities in 1970. He was told that the Legat was not personally aware of any special reason other than that the FBI liaison operations required additional personnel and Aaron was referred to FBIHQ for any additional information in this regard. [Legat was asked whether the CIA Station had ever requested Legat to secure data from FBI computer banks on Argentine residents of CIA interest who had previously resided in the U. S. Legat's reply was in the negative. Other questions mainly dealt with cooperation and coordination activities between the FBI and the CIA at the Embassy.] (S) Inquiry was also made into the relationship of the Drug Enforcement Agency and FBI overseas. The interview lasted approximately thirty-five minutes.

Upon arrival in Buenos Aires, Mr. Aaron was suffering from an intestinal problem and remained in his Buenos Aires hotel on September 25, 1975. The Charge D'Affaires hosted a small luncheon for former Ambassador Truchart on that date which Legat, Buenos Aires, attended. Truchart was very open regarding the operations of the SSC

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: VISITORS OF SSC STAFF
MEMBERS TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHES

and stated that he felt the Committee had lost its perspective and that he believed that various Senators were engaging in a game of "one-upmanship" in revealing so-called sensational disclosures of CIA activities. Truchart stated he personally felt that the original purpose of the Committee to afford an objective review of U. S. intelligence operations had been lost.

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" in conformance with the classification applied to information furnished to the U. S. Embassies at Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Montevideo and the U. S. Consul General in Rio de Janerio, by the U. S. Department of State. The information was transmitted by the U. S. Department of State via its Secret Roger Channel. (S)

The details of the interviews are located in Legat, Brasilia, teletype to the Bureau 9/23/75 and Legat, Buenos Aires, teletype to the Bureau 9/26/75, both classified "Secret" and both captioned "Senstudy-75."

Mr. Aaron was briefed at FBIHQ by Section Chief Vadja V. Kolombatovic, Harvey C. Flemister and Robert A. Bermingham of the Liaison Section, Intelligence Division.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☒	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of interview by SSC Staff Members of FBI's representatives at the U.S. Embassies, Brasilia, Brazil and Buenos Aires, Argentina.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Liaison, foreign

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In Brasilia the interview was directed mainly toward attempts to elicit examples whereby CIA had withheld dissemination of information of interest to other agencies. In the Buenos Aires office questions concerning the mechanics of Legat reporting on intellig intelligence information developed locally to FBIHQ and the local coordination of this information with the Embassy components, the general nature of intelligence developed and reported. Inquiry was also made into the reason for FBI expansion of foreign liaison activities in 1970.

62-116395

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Pgd

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

2-Mr. Mintz
(1-Mr. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TOL

DATE: 10/31/75

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/TWP

Memorandum advises concerning proposed SSC hearing on FBI foreign counterintelligence (CI) matters.

On 10/30/75 Mr. John Elliff, SSC Staff Member, met with Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Intelligence Division (INTD). Also present were Section Chiefs W. A. Branigan (CI-1) and W. O. Cregar (CI-2) and Acting Section Chief F. J. Cassidy (IS-3) and Unit Chief E. W. Larson, Training Unit (IS-3). Mr. Elliff advised that the Committee proposed to have an executive session tentatively scheduled for the morning of Friday, 11/14/75, which would deal with foreign CI operations. In addition to representatives from the FBI they envisioned also having present representatives from CIA and the United States military intelligence services. He stated that the session would be scheduled for approximately 2 and one-half hours.

During the conference the following three themes were outlined by Mr. Elliff as the probable areas of discussion:

1. Changes in CI operations during recent years

Items discussed as probably worthy of attention were physical surveillances, the walk-in operations, defection (recruitment-in-place), CI training programs. Also suggested as a prime topic was the future projections concerning administration of foreign CI operations in the United States, i.e., new division for CI work within FBI; separate CI service; or other modifications.

62-116395-1158

REC-7

DEC 12 1975

ST-110

EWL:jvl
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, 11/5/75, Page 4.

84 DEC 18 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2. Counter-subversion

In this category Mr. Elliff indicated a particular interest in foreign influence in domestic groups and the assessment of danger/risk in investigations undertaken to detect such influence. He brought up the disclosures of surveillances by CIA of Americans abroad at the request of the FBI. He also indicated an interest in borderline cases, such as those in which domestic counter-subversion investigations develop a CI aspect, and was particularly interested in the policies and coordinating mechanisms affecting such instances.

3. Positive intelligence collection

In this category Mr. Elliff was interested in the responsibility for collection of positive intelligence within the United States and the apparent gap which existed in this field. He was also interested in situations under which the FBI might target friendly foreign intelligence services in the United States for CI attention.

Considerable discussion was held during the conference during which INTD representatives set forth the FBI's position and experience in the many areas noted. They are being set forth here to illustrate the probable scope and nature of the executive session which is being planned. Further discussions will be held with the SSC staff to clarify these matters and a firmer agenda for the proposed 11/14/75 hearing will be developed.

With respect to the proposed plan to include representatives of CIA and the military intelligence services along with the FBI in the proposed session of 2 and one half hours, it was pointed out to Mr. Elliff that this would not appear to be a very productive procedure. The CI perspectives and responsibilities of CIA and the military services are much more narrow and generally in a completely different context than the CI perspectives and responsibilities of the FBI. These differences, particularly in the short

CONTINUED - OVER

time allotted, appear to represent a disadvantage to all parties concerned, including the Committee. It was pointed out that the FBI, in particular, would have considerable difficulty in presenting a comprehensive and valid picture of its own CI operations under the conditions imposed by such a session. Mr. Elliff, after considering these objections, stated that he could understand the FBI position but was somewhat doubtful considering the pressures under which the Committee was operating that he would be able to alter this situation.

ACTION:

None. For information.

EWL

JAM

wrw

See Addendum
Next Page By
Legal Counsel Div.

Memo Cregar to Mr. Wannall, 10/31/75
Re: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, JCF:mtm, 11/5/75:

This matter will be pursued with Mr. Elliff by the Office of Congressional Affairs.

JAM
JCF

Rescheduled per Daly. to 12/3-4/75 JCF 11/26

JBA
PVM

K

2 Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

Airtel

To: SAC, Washington Field Office 1/23/76

From: Director, FBI (62-116395) — 1158X

SENSTUDY 75
BUDED 1/30/76

Enclosed is a self-explanatory letter from the Attorney General dated 1/12/76.

Joseph Kraft, the subject of the inquiry, is the well-known newspaper columnist and a Washington, D. C. resident. During the past year, information contained in FBI Headquarters files relating to Kraft has been furnished to the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC) pursuant to SSC requests. Kraft and his attorneys have reviewed the material furnished to the SSC regarding him in accordance with an agreement between Kraft and the Attorney General, referred to in paragraph one of the enclosure. As noted in the enclosure, Kraft, as a result of a review of information regarding the burglary of his residence on 9/3/69, raised certain questions.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

WFO should furnish FBIHQ with Xeroxes of all serials in its files which relate to the 9/3/69 burglary except WFO airtel and letter to the Bureau dated 9/4/69 and 10/17/69, respectively, captioned "UNSUB; Burglary of residence of Joseph Kraft, 3021 N. Street N. W., Washington, D. C., Loss of silverware, 9/3/69 in excess of $5,000.00 ITSP (OO:WFO)" file number 87-17564. This material should of course include any serials which would indicate the manner in which the burglary was reported to WFO and how the conversation about the burglary took place.

MDR-14

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/21/02 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

1 - 87-107157

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

TEB:en
(10)

MAILED 10
JAN 23 1976
FBI

WFO

woc

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 FEB 17 1976

GPO 954-546

Airtel to Washington Field Office
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

In addition to the review of all files pertinent to this inquiry, WFO should review the newspaper morgues of daily newspapers published in Washington, D. C., at such time for articles concerning the burglary and which may shed some additional light on this matter.

This matter must be given expeditious attention and results submitted by airtel to reach Bureau by c.o.b. 1/30/76.

NOTE:

Bureau memorandum dated July 23, 1973, referred to in enclosure and to which Kraft raised a question sets forth the information that Kraft advised WFO on 9/4/69 of the burglary of his residence 9/3/69. Kraft now has no recollection of having spoken to the FBI about the burglary. Pertinent FBIHQ main case files on Kraft (62-115682, 65-75629, 87-107157 and 105-68548) were reviewed by Supervisor T. E. Burns in connection with this inquiry. Such review failed to develop required information. Review by WFO as directed within should develop appropriate information necessary to resolve this matter.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. TWL
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Clarence Kelley, Director
FBI

DATE: January 12, 1976

FROM : Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

SUBJECT: Joseph Kraft burglary

Among the documents from Federal Bureau of Investigation files provided to my office under a cover memorandum dated October 7, 1975, there was a memorandum dated July 18, 1973 and titled "Joseph Kraft." This document, along with the others, was provided to Mr. Kraft's attorneys pursuant to the agreement of August 5, 1975, for review before the department furnished it to the Senate Select Committee.

When Mr. Kraft and his attorneys reviewed the July 18, 1973, document they raised a question about a reference on page two of the document which stated:

> "On September 4, 1969, Joseph Kraft advised the Washington Field Office of the FBI that he left his home (3021 N Street, N. W., Washington D. C.) at approximately 9:20 P.M. on September 3, 1969, to visit with former Governor Averell Harriman who resided a few doors from the Kraft residence. At approximately 9:45 P.M. Mrs. Kraft, who was in the second floor bedroom of the residence, came down the stairs and found the door open.
>
> "Subsequently, it was discovered by Mr. and Mrs. Kraft several items of sterling silver were missing from the dining room and the pantry which items, according to the Krafts, had an estimated value of approximately $10,000.
>
> "A crime scene search and processing of the crime scene by the Metropolitan Police Department produced negative results. No forcible entry was noted and Mr. Kraft advised investigative officers of the Metropolitan Police Department that he had probably left the front door ajar when he departed the residence.

62-116395-1158X

FEB 11 1976

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-75629

EXPEDITE PROC
JAN 14 1976

Airtel to WFO
TELtcd 1/23/76.

ORIGINAL AT ARCHIVES
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 342-679
DATE 3-25-95 BY SP12 BTJ

5-8

File 62-116395

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

cc Mainfile on Kraft 65-75629

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

> "On the morning of September 4, 1969, the Metropolitan Police Department was advised by the Washington National Airport Police that some silverware had been found near one of the entrances to the terminal at the Washington National Airport. The silverware was recovered by the Metropolitan Police Department and processed for latent fingerprints without success and the items were returned to Mrs. Kraft upon her identification of the silverware. No suspects were developed by either the FBI or the Metropolitan Police Department in the investigation of the matter."

Mr. Kraft does not recall having spoken to the FBI about the burglary. Documents provided more recently to Mr. Kraft pursuant to the August 5, 1975, agreement do not shed any light on this question.

The incident is curious in that the only reference to it comes in the memorandum of July 18, 1973, discussing a press report about the activities of John D. Erlichman. Could you have someone look into this matter for me? The obvious questions are: What other documents in FBI files say about the September 3, 1969, burglary? What files of the Bureau or its Washington field office indicate about how the conversation about the burglary took place?

1-Mr. [illegible]dams
2-Mr. Mintz
(1-Mr. Hotis)
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Duffin

65-116395

December 2, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR DELIVERY OF MATERIALS
WHICH ARE SUPPLEMENTARY TO PRIOR
SSC REQUESTS OF JULY 28, 1975,
PART 3. D., AUGUST 20, 1975,
PART 3. 1. A. AND SEPTEMBER 18,
1975, PART 1. D. AND PART 2.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 18, 1975, which requested access or delivery of materials, many of which are supplementary to prior SSC requests of July 28, 1975, Part 3. D., and August 20, 1975, Part 3. 1. A.

On October 29, 1975, Mr. Lester Seidel, SSC Staff Member, requested delivery of materials relating to the following categories of SSC request of September 18, 1975:

1. D. Democratic National Convention 1968

Enclosed materials were prepared by or for Marlin Johnson, Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Field Office of the FBI, during the Democratic National Convention.

Information relating to the current location and employment of Marlin Johnson was the subject of SSC request of August 19, 1975, and was furnished to the SSC by FBI memorandum dated September 5, 1975.

2. Files on Warren Commission Critics

Efforts to locate original authority and/or order to provide for dissemination of materials furnished to the SSC under this category on October 7, 1975, have been made without success.

WRW/TWL

WCC

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

JRM:jvl
(9)

62-116[illegible]

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCLOSURE

1157

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/3/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/18/75, requesting delivery of praviously access materials of 7/28/75, Part 3d and 8/20/75, Part 3, 1a

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Surveillance, electronic
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Democratic National Convention 1968. Materials prepared by or for Marlin Johnson, SAC of Chicago Field offic, also current location and employment of Marlin Johnson; efforts to locate original authority and/or order to provide for disseminationof materials relating to files on Warren Commission Critics have been made without success; memorandum dated 2/16/68 relating to Mark Lane, no information relating to origin, authority for preparation or dissemination located.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-[illegible]

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

3791 (6-75)

238-10332

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 7/30/68

asmit the following in ________________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL ________________________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ATTN: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-44963)

SUBJECT: DEMCON

As the Bureau is aware, I am gravely concerned over the potential for serious violence occurring in Chicago during the period of the Democratic Convention, which commences August 26, 1968 and the days immediately preceding this convention. Had the convention occurred within 30 days after the President made his announcement that he was not going to run for reelection and after the Viet Nam peace talks started in Paris, I feel that we might not have had serious violence as these two occurrences took much of the steam out of many of the organizations comprising the "New Left". Their direction at that time was primarily against President JOHNSON and against Viet Nam and much of the steam went out of their programs following these two announcements.

It is our observation, however, that these "New Left" organizations have now had time to redirect their programs and are now concentrating primarily on demonstrations and activities against Vice President HUMPHREY, characterized by them as the "Dump Humphrey Campaign". The fact that the war still continues in Viet Nam, has again given emphasis to the organizations which exist on the basic theme of anti-Viet Nam. I am thinking particularly of such organizations as the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam, Students for Democratic Society, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam and the Youth International Party (Yippies).

3 - Bureau 2 cc's 92 [illegible] Dist [illegible]
1 - Chicago
MWJ:wmn
(4)

REC 43 16 AUG 20 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Approved: ____________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

62-116395-1157

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-8589)

DATE: 8/13/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-44963)

SUBJECT: DEMCON

On August 12, 1968, USA THOMAS A. FORAN contacted SAC, Chicago, advising that WARREN CHRISTOPHER, Deputy U.S. Attorney General, desired to meet with the SAC, Chicago.

As a result of the above request, SAC, Chicago, and Supervisor RICHARD L. STRAIN met briefly with Mr. WARREN CHRISTOPHER and Mr. WES POMEROY of the U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., in the presence of USA FORAN in his offices.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER was most congenial and expressed his high regard for the FBI and asked for a current evaluation of activities in the Chicago area which could possibly affect the Democratic National Convention (DNC) being held the last week of August, 1968. Mr. CHRISTOPHER was advised that all information has been previously furnished to him by letterhead memoranda and was in his possession and he was assured all information coming to our attention would be immediately furnished to the Department and to the USA in Chicago. A brief discussion of current trends followed relative to current intelligence regarding the activities of anti-war and Negro militant organizations which have proposed disruptive tactics at the DNC.

At one point in the discussion mention was made of the fact that the Youth International Party, aka Yippies, was currently holding talks with the city administration in an effort to obtain necessary park permits to have their followers live and sleep in one of the Chicago area parks during the week of the convention and hold a "happening" which the Yippies referred to as the "Festival of Life." During this discussion USA FORAN confidentially advised that when he had received the FBI's notification of the anticipated plans on the part of the Yippies, he had contacted certain city officials known to him and attempted to persuade them against the issuance of such a permit in view of the known moral conduct of such groups. USA FORAN advised he had been assured that such permits would not be granted. He stated these permits have as yet not been granted and that his sources have indicated no serious consideration has been given to the request by responsible Chicago city officials.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

2-Bureau (RM) — 100924

2-Chicago
1-157-2410 DEMCON
RLS:meb
(4)

157-751-423

REC 22

EX-1

62-116395 6

ENCLOSURE

AUG 16 1968

57

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

For the Bureau's information, Sgt. JOSEPH GRUBISIC, Intelligence Section, Chicago PD, advised previously that he had learned from DAVID STAHL of the Mayor's Office, Chicago, that they had received a telephone call, a couple of days ago, from one WES POMEROY of the U.S. Attorney General's Office, to the effect that the Attorney General wanted the Chicago city officials to give every consideration to the granting of the permits requested by the Yippies.

Sgt. GRUBISIC was unable to comment on the feeling of the city administration to this request but was of the opinion that such permits would not be granted as requested. Sgt. GRUBISIC based his opinion on the fact that four representatives of the Yippies, from New York City, had gone to the office of the Deputy Superintendent of the Chicago PD and had requested immunity from arrest for all Yippies during the convention for crimes around the possession of narcotics. The Yippies stated that any arrest would cause the Yippie community to cause large scale riots, and the blame of any riots resulting from such arrests would fall on the Chicago PD.

These representatives of the Yippies were advised in no uncertain terms that the laws of the City of Chicago would be strictly enforced fairly on all persons and that no one would be granted any immunity during this period.

The Bureau's attention is invited to the August 9, 1968, issue of the "Daily World," daily publication of the Communist Party, USA (CP), wherein an article appeared on page one captioned "Rallies Will Ring Demo Convention" written by CARYL DAVIAU, current member, CP of Illinois, in which the reporter indicates that the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam,which is working around the clock to mobilize demonstrations against the convention,has petitioned the Justice Department to investigate the Chicago Police to determine if there is any conspiracy to deprive "us" of our full civil liberties.

Chicago will continue to follow these matters closely and immediately advise the Bureau, and continue to disseminate all information of intelligence collected to interested agencies.

No recommendation is being made nor is Chicago involving itself in any plans affecting the issuance of the abovementioned park permit.

SSC - REQUEST OF 9/18/75
Part I. D

Retain

62-116395-1157

ENCLOSURE

As the Bureau is aware, Chicago is in receipt of information from confidential sources indicating a potential for demonstration arising out of the "New Left" calling for direct confrontation with the Chicago Police Department as a diversionary tactic for a "crash-in" at the convention site. Sources have also reported independent action on the part of individuals to cause some form of "sabotage" activity inside the convention itself. Information received from confidential informants in other divisions indicates attempts on the part of dissident young people not organizationally affiliated with the "New Left", to hire 50 buses out of New York to bring demonstrators to Chicago and a caravan of militant Latin Americans to come from the Miami, Florida area to Chicago for the specific purpose of disrupting the Democratic National Convention.

The Chicago area activists in the Youth International Party are currently planning a "Festival of Lights" in one of the parks on Chicago's lakefront during the period of the Democratic National Convention. This "Festival of Lights" characterized by Chicago area Yippie leadership as being peaceful to show America that there is an alternative to the "festival of death", or the Democratic National Convention. However, sources report that there are elements within the Youth International Party which are calling for direct confrontation with the Chicago Police Department during the "Festival of Lights".

There is a very definite indication that more and more plans are being made by these groups to cause violence and trouble and undoubtedly this will increase even more as we approach the time of the convention. I strongly feel that we must use every possible means at our command to insure that the Director, the President of the United States and other pertinent officials are furnished every possible piece of intelligence information which we can gather from any source.

I am specifically asking for the services of two Special Agents who proved during their assignment in Chicago that they are expecially well qualified to handle informants and make contacts in the "New Left" area. They proved during their assignments in Chicago that they have the knowhow, the interest, the dedication and the personality to be highly successful in

this area. I would like to utilize them specifically to work cases in the "New Left" area, make contacts and would also request authority where necessary to utilize them in undercover work under my personal supervision and guidance. They would be specifically assigned fulltime to solicit information from the leadership of the "New Left" concerning their plans for demonstrations, confrontations and disruptions of the Democratic Convention and matters relating thereto.

I am, therefore, urgently requesting that SA WILLIAM J. DILLON, III, presently assigned to Los Angeles and SA WAYNE F. MANIS, under transer to Anniston, Alabama Resident Agency, be assigned on a temporary basis in Chicago for the above stated purpose from August 15, 1968 through August 31, 1968. Both men, while young in years in the Bureau, demonstrated outstanding judgment and I am convinced that their assignments, as recommended above, would prove to be most beneficial in carrying out our responsibilities in connection with the Democratic Convention.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-8589)

DATE: 8/14/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-44963)

SUBJECT: DEMCON

This will confirm telephonic contact between SAC, Chicago, and Assistant Director N. P. CALLAHAN on August 13, 1968.

As the Bureau is aware, the Democratic National Convention will be held in Chicago from August 26 - 28, 1968. Voluminous information is being received from all offices which requires immediate handling. In addition, tension is growing in the ghetto areas of Chicago particularly the west side, the south side and the near north side. Also, tension has been growing in such Chicago suburban areas as Harvey, Chicago Heights, East Chicago Heights and Maywood. Incidents are occurring every night and throughout the night requiring immediate preparation of teletypes, letterhead memoranda and other communications. It is, therefore, necessary as approved by Mr. CALLAHAN for one and on some shifts two stenographers to be on duty from 4:00 PM to midnight and from midnight to 8:00 AM, seven days a week through August 30, 1968. These stenographers have been selected on a purely voluntary basis. The authority for these special shifts will be considered to expire close of business August 30, 1968, and thereafter we will revert back to the regularly approved stenographic shifts.

② - Bureau
1 - Chicago
MWJ/sff
(3)

REC-63 157-8589

6 AUG 16 1968

62-116395-1157

ENCLOS

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SEP 4 Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : THE FILE (100-44963)

DATE: 8/15/68

FROM : SAC M. W. JOHNSON

SUBJECT: DEMCON

At 9:15 AM today, the Director telephonically contacted me to advise that he had just been in touch with the Vice President of the United States and had just gotten off the phone with the Vice President's Executive Assistant, Mr. WILLIAM CONNELL. Mr. HOOVER stated that the Vice President has requested that we furnish the same type of service in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Chicago as was furnished to the President during the Atlantic City Convention four years ago. This, of course, refers to intelligence information which will be of value to the Vice President and specifically relates to the possibility of demonstrations, violence and related matters. Mr. HOOVER stated that he had advised the Vice President and Mr. CONNELL that this service would be performed and that Mr. CONNELL should contact me for the necessary arrangements.

Mr. HOOVER advised me that Mr. CONNELL is presently in New York and it is not known when he will arrive in Chicago. I advised Mr. HOOVER that his instructions would be followed, that we had set up appropriate arrangements so that we would be in a position to furnish valuable intelligence and that upon Mr. CONNELL's arrival in Chicago, I would immediately contact him and perfect the necessary arrangements.

My secretary has been instructed to notify all switchboard operators, complaint agents and supervisors that any call from Mr. CONNELL should be immediately referred to me when I am in the office or if I am not in the office to determine where I can contact Mr. CONNELL immediately.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MWJ/sff
(1)

100-44963-2302

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED FILED
CHICAGO

62-116395-1159

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
(1 - J.B. Hotis)
November 26, 1975
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Klein

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the November 24, 1975, SSC request forwarded to the Department of Justice by letter dated November 24, 1975, requesting certain documents desired from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of two memoranda in response to this request.

Also enclosed for your records are copies of the memoranda which are being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Your attention is invited to the fact that amongst the documents being furnished to the SSC are communications concerning negotiations between the FBI, former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe and the Department pertaining to financial arrangements with Rowe.

Ltd. to Dept. 11/26/75 PD/

Enclosures -36

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

REC-14 62-116395-1156

EX 104

12 DEC 11 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SK:tdp (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE:

Single copies of the 11/24/75 communications are attached to the file copy of the enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the Senstudy '75 Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Documents pertaining to financial arrangements between the FBI, Rowe and the Department of Justice are being furnished to the SSC for the information of the Committee and the Staff in refuting allegations by Rowe that he was not financially rewarded for his efforts on behalf of the FBI.

1 - Mr. J. B. Ad[illegible]
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. J. E. Morley

November 26, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSC)

RE: MARY JO COOK

Reference is made to letter dated November 18, 1975, to Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, from John Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, requesting a review of documents pertaining to Mary Jo Cook. Reference is also made to letter dated November 24, 1975, to Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination from Mr. Elliff requesting delivery of the documents.

On November 25, 1975, Mr. Robert Kelley, Senate Select Committee Staff Investigator, reviewed these documents and requested a summary be prepared of certain of them. Pursuant to Mr. Kelley's request, enclosed is a summary of the contents of six documents furnished by Mary Jo Cook.

Enclosures - 6

1 - The Attorney General

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2ALM/JEHL

JEM:dew dew
(10)

NOTE:

The above information being furnished to the SSC was prepared pursuant to the requests contained in the letters referred to and at the requests of Robert Kelley, SSC Staff Investigator. The information was taken from informant reports furnished the Buffalo Office by Mary Jo Cook and more precisely from those six reports selected by Mr. Kelley. For ease in reference, the summaries were prepared from informant reports dated as follows:

11/9/73
11/20/73
12/17/73

6/19/74
7/31/74
10/2/74

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

62-116395-11[illegible]

GPO 954-546

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSC)

RE: MARY JO COOK

NOTE CONTINUED:

. The summary of the report dated 6/19/74 has as an attachment a four-page document obtained by Cook captioned "Jury Selection." Mr. Kelley specifically requested this document, which essentially is a treatise on the techniques of selecting a jury most sympathetic to a defendant.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/26/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). Re: Mary Jo Cook & Gary Thomas Rowe. (11/18/75 SSC let & 11/24/75 SSC let)

Originating Office: FBI 5-05

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/28/75

Received by:

Title: Staff Asst.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/26/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/18/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Summary of contents of six documents furnished by Mary Jo Cook.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Agl

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

The following is a summary of a four page report, dated 11/20/73, furnished by Mary Jo Cook, a former FBI informant.

Report concerns a meeting of the VVAW/WSO Steering Committee held 11/10/73. Five identified individuals were present. There was a discussion of finances and some displeasure at the financial record system. Plans for a benefit at a bar were discussed. Information was presented concerning a newsletter to be mailed out which will discuss the VVAW/WSO's position on amnesty, the upgrading of discharges, information about the Women's group and about a strike at a Buffalo firm.

Some objections were raised concerning the wording of some VVAW/WSO objectives.

Plans for a future coalition meeting organized by two individuals were discussed, the same coalition that worked on the Impeach Nixon rally.

Matters concerning possible new members and/or attendees at future meetings were discussed. Plans for a VVAW/WSO team on a television sports quiz show were discussed.

One member raised four criticisms of the VVAW/WSO, all listed.

One member wrote a regional newsletter.

The following is a summary of a 17-page report dated 12/17/73 furnished by Mary Jo Cook, former FBI informant.

A regional conference of the New York/Northern New Jersey Region, VVAW/WSO, was held at a college on 12/8-9/73. 20 listed people attended.

A member reported another individual had supposedly run guns to Cuba.

A member requested information attesting to the bad conditions in a Vietnamese jail.

A member said he had 2600 names on a mailing list.

Old business was discussed.

Changes in one VVAW/WSO objective were turned down.

In other matters, the following was discussed:

Correspondence with prisoners.

Plans for selling the organization's newspaper.

Support for a prison fast.

Approval of amnesty for war resisters.

Impeach Nixon campaign.

U.S. involvement in Korea.

Organization and communication.

Coalition with other groups.

Possible underground VVAW group.

Possible sponsorship of a college lecture.

The VVAW's connection with the Revolutionary Union with some displeasure voiced.

A recent military alert and the possibility of a mail opening and telephone tap alleged.

The general feeling of a future military takeover in the U.S.

Proposed delegates to the National Steering Committee Meeting.

Disapproval of a workshop introduction as "Red-baiting."

Buffalo chapter was considered one of the five strongest chapters in the organization.

Possible VVAW Summer Camp over Labor Day.

Information about members contacting members of other chapters.

Reports were presented from other chapters.

The following is a summary of a five page report, dated 7/19/74, furnished by Mary Jo Cook, former FBI informant.

A meeting of the National Defense Committee of the VVAW/WSO was held on 6/7-9/74 at St. Louis, Missouri. Eleven identified individuals attended.

The purpose was to ascertain the feasibility of setting up a National Defense Committee which would be operational throughout the United States. As concerns VVAW/WSO, the meeting sought to advise members that the organization's Defense Committee will take steps to secure the release or acquittals of any members arrested.

A representative from the National Collective in Chicago talked about the Gainesville 8 in a derogatory manner, implying the Government did not try the Gainesville 8 for purely political reasons, but that the leader and some others planned some kind of illegal activity. He also said if there had been no Agent provocateur there would never have been a trial and that the National Collective would not have permitted violent activity. 17 items were handed out, a large portion of which were reprints from national and "movement" publications covering such topics as how to avoid being questioned by the FBI. One of these, on jury selection, is attached.

Jury selection

The jury element is the people's component in the existing system of criminal justice; it is only quasi-organized and partially managed. The use of systematic jury selection can be an important tool in the practice of people's law, but at present it is being developed and used selectively as a successful foil in cases of overt political attack. The minimal program in jury selection defense work is to secure a group of twelve people who will take their function as jurors seriously and assume that the defendants are innocent until proven guilty. The maximal program is to secure a jury which will acquit the defendants.

Since 1970, serious inroads have been made on the jury system: proposed abolition of 12 - person juries, non-unanimous verdicts, abolition of voir dire of prospective jurors by lawyers, disciplining of 'disruptive' lawyers and other 'reforms' to 'speed up' decision-making. Juries are under attack by the narrow, elite group who seek to rule this country only because this vehicle of the people's power cannot be relied upon to make political prisoners of us all.

Challenging jury composition

18 U.S.C. Sec. 1861 is a federal statute which places an obligation on the courts to assure the right to a jury selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community. Data, gathered from observing juries, which suggests an imbalance can be used as grounds for access to jury selection records. Through a sample of the qualification questionnaires comprising the master Jury Wheel, a demography (the study of the characteristics of a population) of the voter registration list can be determined.

These findings, compared with census demography, will reveal areas of underrepresentation. In the case of the Attica Fair Jury Project, a systematic analysis of jury selection records obtained by court order revealed that third world people are underrepresented by 34.3%, women by 68 %, and people between the ages 21-29 by 83.6%. This study yielded concrete evidence that the Erie County jury system is illegal and unconstitutional, and the system has been challenged on those grounds.

There are four practical advantages to be gained from a jury challenge even if it does not result in the immediate modification of the composition of the master jury wheel which might provide a larger proportion of people from the less authoritarian sectors of the population.

1. pursuing a challenge can gain time for the defense.
2. examination of the jury questionaire and the jury process raises the defenses's consciousness of what the problems are likely to be in jury selection.
3. a challenge introduces some accountability to the jury process and may change the behavior of the jury clerk and/or judge.
4. a verdict for conviction can be overturned and a new trial obtained on the basis of an objection to jury composition and selection, if a later court upholds the jury challenge.

Demographic model of jury selection.

There are three separate elements to the demographic model of jury selection.

1. a survey must be taken of a representative cross-section of the population that may be called for jury service; this is most easily done by telephone.
2. a system for rating prospective jurors on the basis of voir

dire must be established.

3. a net-work of people must be set up to gather outside third-party information to corroborate the results of the survey and voir dire.

The demographic-attitudinal survey is used to obtain precise information on the range of attitudinal patterns prevalent in a given judicial district. At a minimum, the following must be covered: demographic information, (age, sex, race, education, etc.) organizational affiliations, media contact, knowledge of the case, political ideology and attitudes toward core American values, social change, divergent life styles and alternative institutions, and toward the type of defendants and the charges specific to the case. A random sample of any of three groups will give the defense committee the demographic information necessary: 1) those who have already been called for jury duty, 2) the voter registration list, or 3) 1% of a cross-section of the population.

The voir dire ratings are constructed by combining observations of behavior and attitudes expressed during the voir dire. This procedure is still being developed but there seems to be a high correlation between ratings of individual authoritarianism and types composed of demographic variables. For example, in the Rap Brown case, the attitudinal study pin-pointed the most "dangerous" defense juror as a male manager, engineer, government employee, or real estate broker, who was tied into the local establishment, Methodist or [illegible], over 45, and who lived in a rural area or small,

quiet town. His independent authoritarianism rating was very high, just as you would expect from a juror whose values embraced authority, patriotism, conformity, government right or wrong, etc. The authoritarianism ratings can further be used as a reference point to make sense of the body language, costume and verbal ratings. These ratings become even more essential when faced with a limited voir dire.

Schulman stresses that voir dire ratings should be done collectively. Defendants and trial lawyers should participate, but past trials have shown them to have definite problems with objective judgments in this area.

A core of people from a cross-section of the community should be established to obtain information about the people on the venire list so that any inconsistencies between the voir dire ratings and the demographic ratings can be resolved. This can be done by asking 10 people to contact 3 friends, who in turn will contact 3 friends, who in turn etc. This should be done with a clear presentation of the kind of information needed and a clear understanding of what constitutes jury tampering.

The following is a summary of a two-page report dated 7/31/74 furnished by Mary Jo Cook, a former FBI informant.

The report covers the following matters:

It appears as if the Revolutionary Union is making its move and focusing on the upcoming National Conference. An issue of "Winter Soldier" was received and its editorial was an RU editorial.

The VVAW/WSO newsletter arrived from the National Office and listed three possible directions VVAW/WSO can take:

1) Anti-imperialist veteran's organization with the supporters.

2) A veteran's organization for veteran's only.

3) A mass anti-imperialist organization with no base.

A discussion concerning the National Office supporting or becoming aligned with the RU.

The following is a summary of a two page report, dated 10/2/74, furnished by Mary Jo Cook, former FBI informant.

The report is entirely concerned with a demonstration held 9/11/74 in Buffalo protesting the policies of the American Government regarding the overthrow of the Allende Regime in Chile. Eight members of the VVAW/WSO attended, two from the Attica Brothers Legal Defense, one from Youth Against War and Fascism, two from Revolutionary Union, two from Anti-Monopoly Committee, three from Committee for Chilean Democracy, and four from a University in Buffalo.

All of the above attendees were named, either by first or full name. One name was phonetic.

2 - M[illegible] J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Klein

62-116395

November 26, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force (SSC) to the Deputy Attorney General's Office dated November 24, 1975, requesting delivery of certain documents pertaining to Gary Thomas Rowe.

Enclosed with this memorandum are a summary of information supplied by former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe, and other documents relating to the SSC request of November 24, 1975.

In accordance with Mr. Robert Kelley of the SSC Staff, the documents pertaining to the financial arrangements between the FBI, Gary Thomas Rowe and the Department of Justice are not to be made public or used as exhibits in the course of testimony before the SSC.

Enclosures - 10

1 - The Attorney General

SK:tdp/lhb lhb
(9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY GARY THOMAS ROWE WHO WAS AN INFORMANT OF THE FBI FROM MAY, 1960, UNTIL JANUARY, 1966.

I. INFORMANT REPORTS SUBMITTED BY GARY THOMAS ROWE

1. On 5/14/61 Rowe advised that the burning of a bus and the beating of individuals at a bus depot in Alabama during May, 1961, was instituted by a local Ku Klux Klan unit.

2. On 5/17/61 Rowe stated that the Klan would try to intercept a bus which was due to arrive in Birmingham, Alabama, at 11 P.M. on 5/17/61. He further stated that Klansmen should intercept the bus on the highway and give all persons present, whether black or white, an opportunity to get off. They would be allowed to enter privately owned automobiles and have a safe journey to the nearest town. Rowe was advised by another Klansman that those who refused to leave the bus would be beaten.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY 5P2ALM/EHC

3. On June 4, 1962, Rowe furnished copies of five documents expected to be distributed by Klansmen in order to discourage voters from voting for certain candidates who allegedly supported various civil rights groups.

4. During March, 1962, Rowe furnished information regarding a local Klan meeting at which 23

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Klansmen were present. The meeting centered around a Klansman's plan to run for a high state office. Also discussed was another candidate for this office.

5. During July, 1962, Rowe advised that a Klansman told a select group of other Klansmen that "it looks as if the Negroes should be stopped now." This group of Klansmen was told that police officials had promised them protection and that a high state official would pardon them if arrested. This Klansman further advised that if a particular "militant Negro Integrationist" would appear at a certain restaurant with other Negroes he should be attacked and killed. Instructions were also issued by this Klansman that if this "militant Negro Integrationist" did not appear at this restaurant but sent other Negroes to stage a sit-in, then there would be no killing. He stated that these Negroes should be beaten with chains and clubs instead.

6. During October, 1964, Rowe reported on Klan discussions regarding a plan to handle alleged "race mixing" at a local night club. Also discussed was a plan by Klansmen to bomb this night club.

II. BUREAU HANDLING OF INFORMANT

On 4/17/64, the Bureau advised SAC, Birmingham, to immediately instruct Rowe to withdraw from his position as squad leader of an "action squad." SAC, Birmingham, was further advised that in the event Rowe does not desire to withdraw from this leadership position, he should be discontinued as an informant. On 4/18/64, Rowe was advised by the Birmingham Office that he must remove himself as a squad leader of an "action squad." On 5/4/64, the Bureau advised SAC, Birmingham, that "in those cases where you have an informant who is a member of a violent squad...you should insure that the informant understands he is not to direct, lead, or instigate any acts of violence." It was also pointed out that informant should be instructed to avoid participation in any act of violence.

III. KLAN VIOLENCE AT THE BIRMINGHAM BUS DEPOT 5/14/61

By letter from the Bureau to 23 field offices, it was stated that a civil rights organization intended to make a nonviolent attempt to complete integration of bus service and related public accommodations in the South during the month of May.

By internal Bureau memorandum dated 5/13/61, it was noted that information from a confidential informant (Rowe) was received concerning the possibility that local authorities may allow disturbances to generate against above civil rights group on 5/14/61, when they were due to arrive in Birmingham, Alabama. This memorandum shows that appropriate local law enforcement authorities were advised of the potential for violence in Birmingham prior to 5/14/61.

5/26/65

1 - Mr. Boyd

Airtel

EX-100

To: SAC, Birmingham

MDR-16

From: REC 19 Director, FBI (44-28601) - 20

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

ReBuairtel to Birmingham 5/21/65 and SFairtel to Director 5/22/65 captioned "BH 248-R."

ReSFairtel furnished information concerning outstanding indebtedness of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. The financial obligations he has incurred with the banking institutions and with the State of Alabama regarding unpaid sales tax appear to be dormant debts which would not necessarily have to be paid on a current basis as part of his living expenses. Following completion of the trials in this case, consideration will be given by the Bureau to a recommendation of a lump-sum payment which informant might use to help liquidate these obligations.

With reference to the sums owed the power, gas, telephone and realty companies, it is not clear whether these are current monthly expenses to the informant or rather dormant bills. Advise Bureau if these are present expenses to the informant and, if not paid or services discontinued, what parties would be affected.

MAILED 4
MAY 26 1965
COMM-FBI

ReSFairtel reflects informant has advised that the indebtedness with the Boothby Realty Company is accumulating day by day for rent of a residence going back to 2/1/65. The Bureau desires to know the purpose of informant maintaining this residence (presumably in Birmingham) and of informant's

2 - Tampa (44-313)
2 - San Francisco
JJB/ral
(8)
SEE NOTE ON PAGE TWO.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

55 JUN 4 1965

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

intentions to continue to maintain this residence inasmuch as both he and his ex-wife are residing elsewhere.

Informant's ex-wife has obtained employment at a salary of approximately $223 per month. She has fixed obligations that will amount to approximately $424 a month and feels she could better meet her obligations if she were receiving her alimony payments. Mrs. Rowe has stated she is to receive alimony of $115 a month and that her ex-husband is in arrears for a total of $690. The Bureau desires to know what informant's thoughts are as to meeting this obligation to his ex-wife. Also advise if informant considers these payments as necessary monthly obligations that he would meet under normal circumstances.

The Birmingham Office is to give this your immediate attention and promptly advise the Bureau.

NOTE:

The Birmingham Office has pointed out that Rowe has performed an invaluable service to the Bureau and has saved an untold amount of man power and various expenses in connection with the shooting of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo. Informant has been in protective custody of the Bureau since 4/1/65 and not had opportunity to be gainfully employed to meet various obligations. The Birmingham Office has recommended that the Bureau pay informant's outstanding bills in order to continue the excellent relationship developed. We are presently paying him $16 per day subsistence in lieu of expenses which figure was decided upon after discussion with the Department. It is not desired to make a large payment at this time which could be construed as a payment to Rowe for his testimony in the up-coming trials. Birmingham previously requested to submit a detailed accounting of Rowe's debts showing their basis, when contracted and schedule of payments. The information received from the field needs to be further clarified after which time this matter will be discussed with the Department and its views obtained as to whether or not payment of these debts would be judicious at this time.

FBI

Date: 5/21/65

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44-28601)

FROM: SAC, TAMPA (44-313) (P)

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL.;
VIOLA LIUZZO, aka
ET AL. - VICTIMS
CR; EL
(OO:BH)

On 5/20/65, Mrs. DOROTHY M. ROWE again advised that she has not received any alimony payments from her ex-husband since the October, 1964, payment, which means he is in arrears 6 months, total due $690.

Mrs. ROWE will commence work on 5/24/65 at a salary of approximately $57 per week, $228 per month. She has fixed obligations that will amount to approximately $424 per month. She has stated that if she were receiving her alimony payments she could better meet her obligations.

Please advise what you have been able to accomplish re the alimony payments.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

3 - Bureau
2 - Birmingham
2 - Tampa
JEW:cwp
(7)

REC 19

44-28601-30

27
21 MAY 24 1965

C C - Wick

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 5-21-65

FROM : A. Rosen

1- Mr. Sullivan
1- Mr. Belmont
1- Mr. Rosen
1- Mr. Malley
1- Mr. McGowan
1- Mr. Hines

SUBJECT: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

The Birmingham Office has advised that our informant Gary Thomas Rowe has current outstanding debts in the Birmingham, Alabama, area totaling $2350.08, and the SAC, Birmingham recommends that these debts be paid by the Bureau in full.

Birmingham points out that Rowe has performed invaluable service to the Bureau in connection with the case involving the shooting of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, and his services have saved the Bureau an untold amount of Agent manpower and various expenses connected with an extended major investigation. They point out that informant has been in protective custody of the Bureau since 4-1-65, and as such, has not had an opportunity to be gainfully employed in order to meet various financial obligations that he has been meeting in the past. Birmingham points out that it is absolutely imperative to insure the possible success of the next trial tentatively scheduled for September, 1965, that the excellent relationship developed with Rowe must be retained, and to accomplish this Rowe should be free as much as possible from the receipt of bills from various creditors when he is not in a position to make payment.

Birmingham listed outstanding bills of informant Rowe as follows:

Alabama Power Company	$69.16
Southern Bell Telephone Company	38.78
Boothby Realty Company (Apartment)	297.50
State of Alabama (Sales Tax)	266.11
Birmingham Trust National Bank	1,062.00
Sears-Roebuck (Toys)	75.00
Alabama Gas Corporation	29.58
Cousin Joe's Loan Company	60.00
First National Bank of Birmingham	451.95
Total	$2,350.08

REC 28

382

4 JUN 10 1965

Enclosure sent 5-21-65
JWH:mmb
(7)

0 JUN 16 1965

MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/CHC

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL

OBSERVATIONS OF GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

The Bureau is currently paying Gary Thomas Rowe $16.00 per day subsistence in lieu of expenses. This figure was initially decided upon after discussion with the Department, and with the Department's approval, as it was recognized that the informant had to be removed from the Birmingham area for his protection and safety. The Department pointed out that it would not be desirable to make any lump sum or large payment to the informant so long as he might be called upon to testify, as any such large payments might be construed in court as a payment for his testimony, whereas payment of his living expenses can readily be justified as a necessity.

In the trial of subject Collie Leroy Wilkins which began 5-3-65 and resulted in a hung jury, the Bureau was called upon to produce a record of payments to the informant. In a future trial, it is reasonable to expect that we will again be called upon to produce such a record. The payment of Rowe's debts at this time amounting to over two thousand dollars would appear in this record of payments to Rowe, and we certainly could not agree to pay such a large amount at this time without the Department's approval.

With regard to the debts themselves, it would not appear from information furnished by Birmingham that they are all due and payable immediately, as the larger debts to the two banks would probably be payable in monthly installments. We could, with Department's approval, agree to payment of his smaller debts and monthly installments on these larger debts as they come due.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the above, it is recommended that Birmingham be instructed to submit a detailed accounting of Rowe's debts showing their basis, when they were contracted, due dates and a full breakdown of any installment contracts showing detailed schedule of payments. Upon receipt of this information, the matter will be discussed with the Department and their views as to whether or not payment of these debts at this time would be judicious, will be obtained. Airtel attached.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GC RNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Wick
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach

NDR-16

DATE: January 14, 1966

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

FROM : A. Rosen

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines

SUBJECT: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

Bauer

Babcock

In response to the Director's inquiry concerning correspondence relating to the demands made by Gary Thomas Rowe, prior to his testifying in the Federal trial of the three subjects responsible for the shooting of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, the following items are attached:

(1) The teletype from Inspector J. L. McGovern dated 11-28-65, setting forth the substance of the discussion of John Doar, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division with Gary Thomas Rowe concerning demands made by Rowe. The teletype indicates that McGovern was present during Doar's discussion with Rowe and on page six of the teletype McGovern states that although Bureau personnel were present throughout the interviews between Doar and Rowe, Bureau personnel made no assurance, promises, nor commitments to him.

(2) A copy of the teletype from Mr. McGovern dated 11-23-65, which sets forth in detail the demands made by Rowe. Because of the urgency of relaying Rowe's demands to the Department, a Xerox copy of the teletype was prepared deleting the transmittal data at the top of page one and the last paragraph on page one continuing to the top of page two wherein Rowe expressed his confidence in Bureau personnel and felt he had been let down by the Department and does not trust its representatives.

originals deleted, retained, still copies attached

(3) A copy of the memorandum as prepared from McGovern's teletype of 11-23-65 as actually furnished to Mr. John Doar on 11-24-65.

REC-108 44-25601-

(4) Attached is a memorandum from Mr. Rosen to Mr. Belmont dated 11-24-65 recording the discussion of Supervisor J. William Hines with Mr. Doar wherein he was furnished the memorandum (Item 3) and the demands were discussed.

JWH:cry (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

17 JAN 18 1966

Doar indicated in this discussion that the Department would assume responsibility for handling Rowe's demands as noted in paragraph three where he said that he would personally meet with Rowe in Tampa, Florida, and that he, Doar, would make every effort to build Rowe's confidence, resolve the conditions set forth by Rowe, and obtain his testimony.

ACTION:

For your information.

4-3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

6:33 PM EST URGENT 11-28-65 RLS

TO DIRECTOR

FROM TAMPA 281615

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

FROM INSPECTOR J. L. MC GOVERN.

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL, VIOLA LIUZZO-VICTIM, ~~CR-EL,~~ BIRMINGHAM ORIGIN.

RE TAMPA TELEPHONE CALL NOVEMBER 27 LAST.

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN DOAR ARRIVED TAMPA AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 26 AND FOLLOWING BRIEFING CONFERENCE INTERVIEWED GARY THOMAS ROWE AT GREAT LENGTH. INTERVIEW CONCERNED CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ROWE WOULD TESTIFY AS OUTLINED SAN FRANCISCO TELETYPE NOVEMBER 23.

REC 7 44-28601-605

AT OUTSET OF INTERVIEW DOAR INDICATED THAT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FOR ROWE AND FAMILY WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE EMPLOYMENT, RELOCATION AND REIMBURSEMENT FOR INCONVENIENCES SUFFERED BY ROWE AND

12 DEC 2 1965

MR. BELMONT FOR THE DIRECTOR

ove message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

PAGE TWO FROM TAMPA 281615

FAMILY INCLUDING LOSS OF INCOME DURING PERIOD OF RELOCATION.

MR. DOAR POINTED OUT TO ROWE THAT THE CONDITIONS PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED BY ROWE WERE NOT CONSIDERED UNREASONABLE. ALSO INDICATED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DID NOT CONSIDER ROWE'S INABILITY TO IDENTIFY LEROY MOTON AS THE OCCUPANT OF THE CAR WITH MRS. LIUZZO AS BEING HARMFUL TO THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE; IF ROWE FELT MOTON WAS NOT THE NEGRO OCCUPANT, HE SHOULD SO TESTIFY.

MR. DOAR ADVISED ROWE THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE GIVE HIM AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING WHEREBY HE WOULD BE ASSURED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO TESTIFY IN ANY FUTURE PROCEEDINGS REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL TO COMMENCE NOVEMBER 29. MR. DOAR POINTED OUT THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT, IF GIVEN, WOULD BE OF NO VALUE TO ROWE AS IT WOULD BE A WORTHLESS COMMITMENT RELATING TO EVENTS WHICH MIGHT OCCUR IN THE FUTURE AND NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF PRESENT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XX TELETYPE

PAGE THREE FROM TAMPA 281615

THROUGHOUT THE INTERVIEW, ROWE APPEARED TO BE AWARE OF THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT; AND WHILE NOT ANTAGONISTIC, REMAINED ADAMANT IN REFUSING TO CHANGE THE POSITION HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TAKEN IN REFUSING TO TESTIFY UNLESS THE CONDITIONS OUTLINED WERE MET.

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE INTERVIEW BY MR. DOAR, AT WHICH TIME ROWE HAD NOT CHANGED HIS POSITION, HE WAS FURTHER INTERVIEWED AT GREAT LENGTH BY BUREAU PERSONNEL. ROWE FINALLY INDICATED THAT IF IT WERE AGREEABLE TO HIS WIFE, HE WOULD TESTIFY WITHOUT RECEIVING A WRITTEN AGREEMENT RELATING TO FUTURE TESTIMONY PROVIDED HE DID RECEIVE WRITTEN ASSURANCE RELATING TO HIS TESTIMONY WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE LEROY MOTON.

ON THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 27 THE RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH BUREAU PERSONNEL WERE MADE KNOWN TO MR. DOAR, AND THEREAFTER CONTACT WAS MADE WITH ROWE'S WIFE. ROWE

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

4 3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

PAGE FOUR FROM TAMPA 281615

DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH HER HIS CONFERENCE WITH MR DOAR AND SHE INDICATED THAT SHE WOULD BE WILLING TO RELOCATE TOGETHER WITH HER CHILDREN TO AN AREA IN WHICH ROWE HIMSELF WOULD BE RELOCATED.

THIS INFORMATION WAS MADE KNOWN TO MR. DOAR. THEREAFTER, ROUGH DRAFT LETTER OVER THE SIGNATURE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS DELIVERED BY DOAR TO ROWE. THIS LETTER OUTLINED THE FACT THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS AWARE OF THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY ROWE IN THE PAST, THE FACT THAT HIS PUBLIC EXPOSURE HAD RESULTED IN HARDSHIP ON HIM AND HIS FAMILY, WHICH WILL NECESSITATE PERMANENT RELOCATION FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ROWE FAMILY. THE LETTER ALSO INDICATED THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS PREPARED TO ASSIST ROWE IN OBTAINING SUITABLE EMPLOYMENT WITH EITHER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OR ELSEWHERE IN A POSITION FOR WHICH HE IS QUALIFIED AND TO ASSIST HIM IN RELOCATING IN A SECURE PLACE. THE LETTER CONCLUDED WITH THE COMMENT THAT THE ASSISTANCE OUTLINED

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

PAGE FIVE FROM TAMPA 281615

IS NOT CONTINGENT ON HIS PERFORMANCE OF ANY FURTHER SERVICE OR ASSISTANCE WHICH HE MAY GIVE TO THE UNITED STATES AT ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE.

THEREAFTER MR. DOAR PRESENTED TO ROWE A LETTER OVER HIS SIGNATURE AS ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL ASKING THAT ROWE PRESENT HIMSELF AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA BEFORE TRIAL DATE SO THAT THE FACTS TO WHICH ROWE WOULD TESTIFY MAY BE CAREFULLY REVIEWED WITH HIM. THE LETTER POINTS OUT THAT THE FEDERAL TRIAL WILL DIFFER FROM THE PAST STATE PROCEEDINGS INDICATING THAT A CONSPIRACY CASE IS INVOLVED CHARGING THREE DEFENDANTS WITH CONSPIRACY TO INJURE UNITED STATES CITIZENS FOR HAVING EXERCISED CERTAIN FEDERAL RIGHTS. THE LETTER POINTS OUT THAT PROOF IN THE CASE WOULD DEAL PRIMARILY WITH THE EVENTS COMMENCING ON MARCH 21 AND THAT ROWE WILL BE EXPECTED TO BE AS SPECIFIC AND ACCURATE ABOUT DETAILS AS HE CAN TRUTHFULLY BE. THE LETTER INDICATES THAT MR. DOAR IS AWARE THAT ROWE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT LEROY MOTON WAS THE

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

4 3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO ☒ TELETYPE

PAGE SIX FROM TAMPA 281615

NEGRO MALE OCCUPYING THE FRONT SEAT OF THE LIUZZO CAR; AND THAT IF HE WERE ASKED ABOUT THIS, HE SHOULD SAY SO. FURTHER, ROWE'S IDENTIFICATION OF THE PASSENGER IN THE LIUZZO CAR IS IMMATERIAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS PROOF IN THE CASE.

FOLLOWING REVIEW OF THESE LETTERS BY ROWE, IT WAS INDICATED TO HIM THAT THEY WOULD BE DELIVERED IN CARE OF INSPECTOR MC GOVERN AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, AND WOULD BE HELD BY MC GOVERN UNTIL AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF ROWE'S TESTIMONY.

ROWE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS AGREEABLE TO HIM AND INDICATED THAT HE WOULD WILLINGLY APPEAR AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA TO TESTIFY.

ALTHOUGH BUREAU PERSONNEL WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE INTERVIEWS BETWEEN AAG DOAR AND ROWE, BUREAU PERSONNEL MADE NO ASSURANCES, PROMISES, NOR COMMITMENTS TO HIM.

AS MR. DOAR HAS INDICATED DESIRE FOR FURTHER PRE TRIAL CONFERENCES WITH ROWE, ROWE WILL BE TRANSPORTED THIS DATE, NOVEMBER 28 TO MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA BY BUREAU PERSONNEL VIA

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably
cryptographic systems.

4 1 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
DeLoach ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XX TELETYPE

PAGE SEVEN FROM TAMPA 281615

EASTERN AIRLINES FLIGHT 274, DEPARTING TAMPA 12:30 PM. TRANSFER POINT ATLANTA, GEORGIA, DEPARTURE ATLANTA VIA EASTERN AIRLINES FLIGHT 763 AT 2:55 PM EASTERN STANDARD TIME, ARRIVAL MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 2:55 PM CENTRAL STANDARD TIME.

MOBILE HAS BEEN ALERTED AND ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR BUREAU PERSONNEL TO BE PRESENT AT AIRPORT MONTGOMERY TO PROVIDE FULL SECURITY FOR ROWE AND TRANSPORTATION TO MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE WHERE ROWE WILL REMAIN DURING TRIAL COMMENCING NOVEMBER 29.

RECEIVED: 6:54 PM RPT

4

ROSEN

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4 3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Callahan
Contad
Felt
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM xxxRADIO ☐ TELETYPE

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/

R-15
URGENT 11-23-65 9:38 PM
TO DIRECTOR
FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

FROM: INSPECTOR J. L. MC GOVERN

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL; VIOLET LIUZZO-VICTIM. ~~CR-EL.~~
OO: BIRMINGHAM.

REBUTEL CALL TO BIRMINGHAM NOVEMBER 19 LAST.

GARY THOMAS ROWE HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY SINCE LATE EVENING NOVEMBER 20 BY INSPECTOR J. L. MC GOVERN, SA NEIL P. SHANAHAN, AND FREQUENTLY IN PRESENCE OF SAC LYNUM AND SA JAMES G. CARLISLE.

AT OUTSET AND THROUGHOUT INTERVIEWS ROWE HAS BEEN ADAMANT IN HIS REFUSAL TO FURTHER TESTIFY IN THE STATE OF ALABAMA CONCERNING CAPTIONED CASE OR OTHER MATTERS. DURING INTERVIEW ROWE WAS HIGHLY EMOTIONAL, DISTRAUGHT, TEARFUL AND INDICATED THAT HE DOES NOT FEEL THAT HE IS PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF GOING THROUGH WITH ANOTHER TRIAL. HE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF HIS CHILDREN, AS WELL AS HIMSELF, AND COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD NEVER RETURN TO ALABAMA. HE INDICATED THAT SO LONG AS THE THREAT OF FURTHER TESTIMONY HANGS OVER HIM HE CANNOT SECURE REGULAR EMPLOYMENT.

WHILE EXPRESSING A DEEP SENSE OF OBLIGATION TO THE BUREAU AND CONFIDENCE OF BUREAU PERSONNEL, HE INDICATED THAT HE FEELS THAT HE HAS BEEN "LET DOWN" BY THE DEPARTMENT AND DOES NOT TRUST ITS REPRESENTATIVES. HE COMMENTED THAT HE QUESTIONS THE

REC- 18

58

NOV 30 1965

4-3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM XXXXRADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE TWO FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

MOTIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT, AS WELL AS THE STATE PROSECUTORS, EXPRESSING THE OPINION THAT THE MOTIVES ARE POLITICALLY INSPIRED. ALSO INDICATED THAT HE DOES NOT FEEL HIS TESTIMONY WOULD BE OF VALUE, AS HE CANNOT FORESEE ANY POSSIBILITY OF CONVICTION.

IN TAKING THE POSITION THAT HE WOULD NOT VOLUNTARILY RETURN TO ALABAMA TO TESTIFY, HE RECOGNIZED THAT A SUBPOENA COULD BE ISSUED FOR HIM BUT THAT IF ONE WERE ISSUED HE STATED THAT HE WOULD RETURN ONLY IF FORCE WERE USED TO TRANSPORT HIM TO ALABAMA. IF SUCH FORCE WERE USED HE WOULD REFUSE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, EVEN THOUGH HE MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT AND CONFINED TO JAIL.

SHOULD HE BE FORCED TO TESTIFY HE SAID THAT HE WOULD INSURE THAT HIS TESTIMONY WOULD INCLUDE THE FACT THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE WITNESS LEROY MOTON IS THE SAME NEGRO WHO OCCUPIED THE CAR WITH THE VICTIM AT THE TIME OF HER SLAYING.

HE ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT SHOULD HE REFUSE TO TESTIFY THAT HIS SERVICES OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS AND HIS PRIOR TESTIMONY IN THE STATE PROSECUTIONS WOULD BE DISCREDITED.

AFTER DISCUSSION WITH ROWE THIS MORNING, HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD TESTIFY UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

1. THAT THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL GIVE HIM AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING PRIOR TO HIS ENTERING THE STATE OF ALABAMA, WHICH AGREEMENT WOULD PROVIDE THAT HE, ROWE, WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO TESTIFY IN ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS FOLLOWING THE TRIAL AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, TO BE HELD NOVEMBER 29 NEXT, REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THAT TRIAL, NAMELY, ACQUITTAL,

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM XXX RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE THREE FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

HUNG JURY OR CONVICTION.

2. THAT HE HAVE AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THAT HE, ROWE, WOULD BE ASSISTED IN SECURING EMPLOYMENT, EITHER WITH ONI OR THE BORDER PATROL, SUCH EMPLOYMENT TO BE SECURED WITHIN 45 DAYS UPON THE COMPLETION OF THE TRIAL.

3. THAT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD INCLUDE AN ASSURANCE THAT IF HE DID TESTIFY HE WOULD BE ASKED NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING LEROY MOTON.

4. BECAUSE OF HIS CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF HIS CHILDREN, PROVIDING SUCH WOULD BE AGREEABLE WITH HIS WIFE, THAT SHE AND HIS FOUR CHILDREN WOULD BE RELOCATED ~~IN~~ AN AREA IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO WHERE HE WILL BE LOCATED TO AFFORD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FREQUENT VISITS AND TO CHECK ON THEIR SAFETY. ALSO, THAT THE BUREAU WOULD ASSIST HIS WIFE IN SECURING EMPLOYMENT IN THE PLACE OF RELOCATION.

5. PROVIDED SUCH WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO HIS PARENTS AND TO HIS SISTER, THAT THEY, TOO, BE RELOCATED TO THE SAME GENERAL VICINITY AS HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN. BECAUSE HIS FATHER MUST WORK APPROXIMATELY TWO ADDITIONAL YEARS TO SECURE MAXIMUM RETIREMENT ANNUITIES FROM HIS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT, THAT PROVISION BE MADE TO HIS PARENTS FOR ANY MONETARY LOSS OR REDUCTION IN THE RETIREMENT ANNUITY COVERING THE PERIOD FROM DATE OF RELOCATION TO THE DATE ON WHICH MAXIMUM RETIREMENT WOULD ORDINARILY BEGIN.

6. HE RECOGNIZES THAT HIS SERVICES HAVE RESULTED IN A VAST SAVING OF INVESTIGATIVE TIME FROM HIS KNOWLEDGE OF CASES IN WHICH INFORMANTS HAVE BEEN SEVERED THAT HE PROBABLY WOULD

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

4 3 (Rev. 12-13-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM XX RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE FOUR FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

RECEIVE A SUBSTANTIAL SUM AT TIME OF SEVERANCE, ONE FIFTH OF THIS SUM TO BE USED BY HIM TO DEFRAY OUTSTANDING INDEBTEDNESS AND FOUR FIFTHS TO BE SET UP IN TRUST FOR HIS CHILDREN TO BE USED FOR THEIR FUTURE EDUCATION.

7. HE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO VISIT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN OVER THE THANKSGIVING HOLIDAYS.

8. IN THE EVENT OF HIS TESTIMONY, DESIRES TO KNOW PRECISELY THE NATURE OF THE TESTIMONY EXPECTED OF HIM.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. BUREAU IMMEDIATELY ADVISE CONCERNING ROWE'S TRAVEL TO TAMPA, FLORIDA, TO VISIT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN, WHERE HE WOULD REMAIN UNTIL CALLED AS WITNESS, ASSUMING HIS CONDITIONS ARE MET. ROWE INDICATES HE PLANS TO VISIT FAMILY THANKSGIVING IN ANY EVENT.

2. THAT THIS MATTER BE IMMEDIATELY DISCUSSED WITH THE DEPARTMENT, OUTLINING THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF ROWE AND THE CONDITIONS WHICH HE IMPOSES BEFORE TESTIFYING AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA.

3. IT IS FELT THAT MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE MANNER IN WHICH ROWE WOULD APPEAR IN MONTGOMERY, EITHER AS A WILLING WITNESS UNDER THE CONDITIONS OUTLINED ABOVE, OR AS A RELUCTANT AND HOSTILE WITNESS SHOULD HE BE SUBPOENAED AND FORCIBLY TRANSPORTED TO MONTGOMERY. THE RESULTANT PUBLICITY INVOLVING SUCH FORCIBLE TRANSPORTATION WOULD UNQUESTIONABLY HAVE A MOST ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE ENTIRE INFORMANT PROGRAM.

4. THAT IN THE EVENT THE DEPARTMENT IS AGREEABLE TO THE

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4 3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
DeLoach ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM xxx RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE FIVE FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

CONDITIONS OUTLINED, AND PROVIDING ROWE'S TRANSPORTATION TO TAMPA, FLORIDA, IS AUTHORIZED, THAT THE DEPARTMENT MAKE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE TAMPA OFFICE THE AREAS OF TESTIMONY EXPECTED OF ROWE SO THAT THEY MAY BE REVIEWED WITH HIM AND HE MAY HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REFRESH HIS RECOLLECTION.

THE ABOVE IS FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU FOR ITS CONSIDERATION AND THAT OF THE DEPARTMENT. NO PROMISES OF ANY KIND HAVE BEEN MADE TO ROWE, OTHER THAN HIS CONDITIONS WOULD BE FORWARDED FOR CONSIDERATION.

RECEIVED: 9:50 PM RPT

I think some of his conditions are grossly unreasonable.
H

CC-MR. R SEN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

MDR-16

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 11/24/65

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines

Inspector James McGovern, San Francisco, has advised that Gary Thomas Rowe, our informant whose testimony is needed in the Federal civil rights trial of the Liuzzo shooting in Montgomery, Alabama, beginning 11/29/65, had exhibited feelings of reluctance to testify for the Government and set forth certain conditions under which he would agree to testify.

These conditions consist of an agreement from the Attorney General that his testimony would not be required in any future proceedings, that he be assisted in obtaining employment and that some assurances be given him for the future security of his ex-wife and children and parents. He also expressed a desire to visit his wife and children in the Tampa, Florida, area over the Thanksgiving holiday.

Rowe's conditions were discussed in detail with Assistant Attorney General John Doar. Mr. Doar advised that he would discuss these conditions immediately with the Attorney General and requested that we arrange for Rowe to visit with his family in Tampa over Thanksgiving, 11/25/65, and that he would then personally meet with Rowe in Tampa on Saturday morning, 11/27/65. He said that he is planning to try the case personally in Montgomery and that Rowe's testimony is vital to a successful trial. He will make every effort to build Rowe's confidence, resolve the conditions set forth by Rowe and obtain his testimony.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-40 44-28601-599

DEC 1 1965

ACTION:

Inspector McGovern has been telephonically instructed to proceed immediately with Rowe to Tampa where appropriate arrangements will be made for Rowe to meet with Assistant Attorney General Doar on the morning of 11/27/65.

sent

Attached for approval is a teletype to Mobile and Tampa advising them that Inspector McGovern and Rowe are proceeding to Tampa and that a meeting will be arranged in Tampa between Rowe

Enclosure

44-28601-

CONTINUED - OVER

ACTION CONTINUED:

and Assistant Attorney General Doar, 11/27/65. It is noted that Mr. Doar is going to Montgomery, Alabama, on 11/25/65, where he will remain throughout the trial.

FA

Mr. John Doar
Assistant Attorney General

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

Director, FBI
(9)

July 9, 1965

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines

6 -
10 -

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

my

This will confirm a discussion of Mr. J. William Hines of this Bureau with Mr. St. John Barrett of the Department on July 7, 1965, concerning outstanding personal debts of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who furnished the initial information identifying and leading to the indictment of three subjects on charges of shooting Mrs. Viola Liuzzo on March 25, 1965.

Rowe's debts totaling approximately $2,350 consist primarily of personal loans at two banks in Birmingham amounting to about $1,500 and an assessment for Alabama State sales taxes in the amount of $263.50 which resulted from Rowe's operation of a tavern and restaurant from September, 1964, through March, 1965. The business was a losing enterprise and has reverted to its original proprietor. The balance of the debts are to local utility companies and for apartment rental. The utilities have been disconnected and the apartment reclaimed.

MAILED 20
JUL 9 1965
COMM-FBI

On July 7, 1965, Departmental Attorney St. John Barrett advised Mr. Hines that the Department was of the opinion that the Bureau should not assume responsibility for payment of Rowe's personal debts. He stated that if any payment is made to Rowe, it should be for personal services. Any large payment for personal services should not be made until after Rowe has testified at the upcoming trials of the subjects charged with the shooting of Mrs. Liuzzo scheduled for September and October, 1965.

✓

Mr. Barrett's attention was called to the fact that the Alabama State tax authorities had an outstanding assessment against Rowe for State sales taxes in the amount of $263.50. Mr. Barrett stated he was aware of this and that Mr. Paul Johnston, the attorney representing Rowe in the action for legal fees brought against Rowe by Attorney Matt Murphy, had brought this assessment to the Department's attention.

olson
elmont
lohr
eLoach
asper
allahan
onrad
elt
ale
osen
ullivan
avel
rotter
ele. Room
olmes
andy

JWH/pak
(9)   Note on next page.

REC-21   44-[illegible]

EX-113

19 JUL 13 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JUL 16 1965

Mr. John Doar

In view of the Department's opinion, this Bureau will not assume responsibility for payment of any of Rowe's personal debts incurred prior to March 25, 1965, and no lump sum or large payments to Rowe for personal services rendered will be considered without prior approval of the Department. You will be promptly advised of any legal action which may be instituted against Rowe for collection of any of the outstanding debts.

NOTE: See memorandum A. Rosen to Mr. Belmont dated 7/8/65, same caption, JWH/pak.

San Francisco, California
January 14, 1966

I, GARY THOMAS ROWE, on this date, January 14, 1966, have accepted ten thousand dollars cash ($10,000.00) from the undersigned, representatives of the FBI.

This amount has been accepted by me in full and complete satisfaction of services rendered voluntarily to representatives of the FBI up to and including January 14, 1966.

My acceptance of this amount in fulfillment of the above brings to a close a very pleasant relationship which I have enjoyed with representatives of the FBI, who have on all occasions treated me fairly and with the utmost consideration and I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation.

/s/ Gary Thomas Rowe
GARY THOMAS ROWE

Witnessed by: James G. Carlile, Special Agent, FBI
Curtis O. Lynum, Special Agent in Charge, FBI
At San Francisco, California
January 14, 1966

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

November 24, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee letter requesting delivery of certain documents pertaining to Mary Jo Cook and Gary Thomas Rowe. Please prepare an appropriate response.

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/ETH

cc: Paul Daly

1ct to AG 1-DAG
11/24/75 SK:tdp Enc. 36

1-Ad Hoc
11-25-75

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., T
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARI
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 24, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

With respect to the documents pertaining to Mary Jo Cook and Gary Thomas Rowe which the Bureau has made available for review in response to our request, we request that the documents specified by our staff members be delivered to the Committee.

Sincerely,

John Elliff

John Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence
Task Force

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

cc: Paul V. Daly
Office of Congressional Affairs
Federal Bureau of Investigation

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/ETHC

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 11/24/75

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 11/21/75, Inspector John B. Hotis met with Doug Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, concerning Mr. Levi's forthcoming appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Attorney General will have a prepared statement which will probably deal with the future relationship between the Bureau and the Department and the kinds of contacts needed to prevent abuse of authority. Mr. Marvin asked that the Bureau provide the following materials, which will be used in the preparation of a briefing book for Mr. Levi's testimony:

(1) A general synopsis of major areas of the Bureau's activities that have been investigated by the Senate and House Select Committees. Mr. Marvin gave as examples, the "Official and Confidential" files, COINTELPRO, use of informants, and interception of mails. He said the purpose is to identify those topics which have been of primary concern to the Committees. Mr. Marvin asked that the synopses contain a brief statement of the Bureau's position on each of the subjects.

EX-115 REC-9 62-116395-1155

(2) A general statement concerning the organizational structure and functions of the FBI, with particular emphasis on the responsibilities of the Inspection Division. This should include a description of how complaints are received, the review process, and any recent changes in the operations of that Division. In addition, the Attorney General wants a write-up of all investigations of alleged misconduct presently being conducted by the Bureau. He is particularly concerned about any incidents that may have occurred during Mr. Levi's tenure as Attorney General, such as those in Richmond, Detroit, and Houston.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Ash
1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Cochran

1 - Mr. Decker
1 - Mr. Gallagher
1 - Mr. Hoxie
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz

5
1 - Mr. Mooney
1 - Mr. Moore
~~1 - Mr. Walsh~~
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis

LEGAL COUNSEL

DEC 16 1975

JBH:lad (16)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BEFORE THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(3) A history of Congressional oversight of the Bureau. Mr. Marvin asked that we identify those Subcommittees of Congress which have exercised some oversight responsibilities over the Bureau. In particular, he asked that we review appropriations testimony going back to 1955 to determine whether we discussed topics which are presently of concern to the Select Committees. This will be very useful in demonstrating Congressional awareness of these matters. He also asked that we furnish a statement of the Director's position concerning Congressional oversight which he has previously expressed in speeches or testimony before Congress.

(4) A list of major investigative techniques employed by the Bureau, specifying in each case whether we seek Departmental approval. The more obvious examples are electronic surveillance, use of body recorders, pen registers, informants, and photographic surveillances.

(5) A list of any formal or informal proposals which have been made concerning organizational changes of the FBI. Examples are the creation of an Inspector General's Office in the Department or elsewhere having review authority over the FBI, transfer of counterintelligence functions to another agency or the creation of a separate Division within the Bureau for that function, transfer of drug enforcement responsibilities to the Bureau, and the proposed statutory limitation on the term of the office for the Director.

It should be noted that several position papers concerning such topics were prepared at the request of former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray which might be useful in responding to this request.

Although no date has been set for the Attorney General's testimony, it is expected that he will testify after Mr. Kelley's appearance on 12/9/75. In view of the limited time available, Mr. Marvin asked that we expedite the preparation of these materials and furnish them to his office as soon as they are completed. It is requested that these materials be submitted to the Office of Congressional Affairs, when completed, but no later than cob, Friday, 11/28/75. They should be submitted in insert form suitable for inclusion in a letterhead memorandum.

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BEFORE THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Intelligence Division prepare a synopsis of the major topics concerning the Bureau which have been investigated by the Senate and House Select Committees.

(2) That the Administrative Division and the Inspection Division prepare materials concerning the organizational structure and function of the Bureau.

(3) That the Administrative Division in conjunction with the Legal Counsel Division prepare materials concerning Congressional oversight of the Bureau.

(4) That the Intelligence Division and the General and Special Investigative Divisions prepare materials concerning major investigative techniques.

(5) That the Office of Planning and Evaluation prepare materials concerning proposals for organizational changes of the FBI.

(6) In addition to the above specified assignments, it is recommended that every Division review this request and make appropriate recommendations or submit any other materials that might be useful in the preparation of the Attorney General's briefing book.

OK

December 2, 1975

Mr. Al Vecchione
Executive Director
NPACT
955 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024

Senstudy - 1975

Dear Al:

This will confirm our conversation on November 26, 1975, wherein you authorized the Bureau to use a videotape recording of your "live" telecast concerning the appearance of Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams before the Church Committee. You indicated that this was authorized for the exclusive viewing by FBI personnel.

This is to advise you that the videotape of Mr. Adams' testimony is being restricted solely to FBI personnel. We certainly appreciate your consideration in this regard. Thank you for this authority.

Sincerely,

/s/ Don Moore

Donald W. Moore, Jr.
Assistant Director
External Affairs Division

MAILED 7
DEC 3 1975
FBI

REC-9 62-116395-1154

EX 104

DEC 4 1975

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/02 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

1-87

DWM:jo

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

55 DEC 15 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

The Attorney General

November 28, 1975

MD R-14

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/LHC

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 1 requested in SSC letter dated November 7, 1975.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC. Your attention is invited to the fact that included in the materials to be delivered to the SSC is correspondence originated in the Department of Justice.

REC-66 62-116395-1153

Enclosures (2)

2-ENCLOSURE

7 DEC ~~4~~ 8 1975

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

PEN:adn
(9)

NOTE: edm

Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC. Included in materials being furnished the SSC which were located in the files of Mr. Sullivan is a copy of a chronology of events and a summary of information developed concerning the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., by James Earl Ray and a press release concerning Ray made by Attorney General Ramsey Clark on April 18, 1968. Supervisor E. J. McDonough of the General Investigative Division reviewed these items and interposed no objection to the release to the SSC in their entirety.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1153

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/20/00 BY SP2 Alm/EHC

62-116395

November 28, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, and specifically to Item 1 of an accompanying Document Request of same date which requested all materials contained in the files of William C. Sullivan pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) which have not previously been made available to the Committee. Excluded from consideration in connection with this request were any portions containing transcripts or summaries or tapes of electronic surveillances of King.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of materials in response to Item 1 of the Document Request.

With respect to the excisions in materials being delivered herewith, where no notation appears as to reason for excision, the excision was made for the reason that the information actually summarizes or quotes from conversations monitored during electronic surveillances of King. In some cases it can be ascertained precisely what information in these materials came from electronic surveillances of King; however, there exist areas where documentation of the information is not precise and no accurate determination can be made. Therefore, no assurances can be given that portions of the materials being furnished do not contain information developed as a result of electronic surveillances of King.

In addition to materials not being furnished the SSC as stipulated by the SSC is a folder classified "Top Secret" bearing a label captioned "Communications Concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., Volume 1" which was located in the files of Mr. Sullivan. A review of that document indicates it contains information which could result in the identification of confidential sources of this Bureau; data obtained in connection with

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. —
Dep. AD Inv. —
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. —
Comp. Syst. —
Ext. Affairs —
Files & Com. —
Gen. Inv. —
Ident. —
Inspection —
Intell. —
Laboratory —
Plan. & Eval. —
Spec. Inv. —
Training —
Legal Coun. —
Telephone Rm. —
Director Sec'y —

PEN:adn adn
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

62-116395-

NOCBS
PEN

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operation; and other data concerning King which by prior agreement has been excluded from delivery to the SSC (product of electronic surveillances of King).

In view of the above and since most, if not all, of the information contained in this document which does not fit the above exclusions, has previously been furnished the SSC, the document is not being delivered herewith.

1 - The Attorney General

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/28/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/7/75, item 1

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

~~TS~~

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Surveillance, electronic
Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin L. King, Jr and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as they were contained in the files of William C. Sullivan.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/GHL

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

HOUSTUDY/SENSTUDY "JUNE" ENCLOSURE PERMANENT CHARGE OUT FORM

RE - HOUSTUDY 62-116464-

OR

SENSTUDY 62-116395-1153 EBF

NOTE: THIS IS A PERMANENT CHARGE OUT FOR A XEROX COPY/COPIES OF "JUNE" MAIL THAT WAS INCLUDED IN COPIES OF FBI DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY MEMO/LETTER DATED 11-28-75 IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST(S) MADE BY EITHER THE U. S. SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE. THE COPY/COPIES OF THE "JUNE" MAIL DATED AS INDICATED BELOW HAS/HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS ENCLOSURE MATERIAL TO BE FILED IN THE APPROPRIATE HOUSTUDY OR SENSTUDY "JUNE" FILE INDICATED ABOVE, LOCATED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF THE RECORDS SECTION.

DATE(S) OF MAIL: 11-7-75

REMOVED BY: Wardlaw DATE REMOVED: 9-28-76

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

November 25, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. J. Duffin
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the request of the SSC dated November 7, 1975, for delivery of FBI materials.

Attached is a memorandum which is a partial response to items raised in referenced request. Enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JWJ:emg
(10)

ENCLOSURE

REC-41 62-116395-1151

DEC 5 1975

11-25-75 WAD

Deliv[illegible] 11-[illegible]

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/ETH

WRW

JAM

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 11 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

November 25, 1975

1 - Mr. A. J. Duffin
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the November 7, 1975, request by the SSC for delivery of FBI materials.

Item 1 of referenced SSC letter requested the following:

1) All materials pertaining to the opening of mail to or from Gilbert Stuart and Virginia R. Stuart during the years 1960 and 1961, by FBI Agents in or around the cities of New York and Providence, Rhode Island. (This request encompasses materials located in FBI Headquarters, the New York Field Office, and the Resident Agency in Providence, Rhode Island).

Pursuant to your request, the indices and the files of the FBI Headquarters, the New York Office and the Boston Office, which includes the Resident Agency in Providence, Rhode Island, were reviewed for any material pertaining to the opening of mail to or from Gilbert Stuart and Virginia R. Stuart with negative results.

1 - The Attorney General

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

JWJ:emg
(9)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NOTE:

A copy of SSC request dated 11/14/75 is attached. In response to Bureau teletype 11/17/75, New York and Boston teletypes, 11/18/75, advised no information in their files as to any openings of mail to or from the Stuarts.

62-116395- WRW TAL

ENCLOSURE 1151 JAM

JBH

WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated ~~11/25/75~~

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMTE TO STDY GOVMNT OPTNS W?RSPCT TO INTEL ACTVTS. Ref mad to 11/7/75 rqst by SSC for dlvry of matrl Itm 1 of ref let.

Originating Office: FBI 5050

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 11/28/75

Received by:

Title: Staff Assoc

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/25/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

No materials located at FBIHQ, New York Field Office or Providence, R.I., Resident Agency regarding opening of mail to or from Gilbert and Virginia R. Stuart.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

NOV 11 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated November 5, 1975, which was received by this Office on November 10, 1975. Please prepare an appropriate response to the attached request.

cc: Paul Daly

Bob Kelley, SSC, telph. advs. that [illegible] to furnish [illegible] further that [illegible] will [illegible] be affected to respond - if so, will then further from SSC. 5:05 pm 12/9/75

above given to Shaheen telph. 1:30 pm 12/10/75

at 5:20 pm 12/4/75 Kelley called. He said he'd [illegible] meeting [illegible] to him. However [illegible] Kelley will [illegible] this request [illegible] R.

Assigned to R. Hampton 11/11/75

Approx. 11/21/75 spoke to R. Kelley, SSC, who says he not handling but he would have handler call. Tom [illegible] who needs some clarification [illegible] 12/4 Howard [illegible] Call back for R. Kelley [illegible] Call me 3:10 pm 12/4/75

5:15 pm 12/4/75 - again left message at 224-1700 (Kelley in conference) for Kelley to call me. R.

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY 60322 ALM/EHL

62-116395

62-116395-1150

ST 104

REC 31

5 JAN 28 1976

1-Mr. Hore 11-11-75

84 FEB 3 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 5, 1975

NOV 7 1 20 PM '75
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL UNIT

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

This is a supplementary request to our request of August 20, 1975, under Part IV, 3.

> All FBI reports, memoranda, interviews, and all other documents from FBI Agents Frank Watts and Jack Rucker concerning the time period April 1968 from August 1968 concerning Meridian, Mississippi, bombings, meetings with FBI informant Raymond Roberts and members of the Meridian, Mississippi, Police Department involving Thomas A. Tarrants III, Joe Danny Hawkins, Kathy Ainsworth, and other members or alleged members of the Ku Klux Klan.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1150X

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 [redacted] 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM : W. O. Cregar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

2 - Mr. J[redacted]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
(Attn: T. L. Sheer)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
DATE: 11/11/75
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
(Attn: H. A. Newman)
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
(Attn: E. P. Grigalus)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Attached copy of Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter 11/7/75 indicates in last paragraph, page 2, the request of the SSC Staff to interview and possibly depose FBI Agents who have handled three former Bureau informants (Rowe, Hardy and Cooke). At a conference with SSC representatives (details being reported in a separate memorandum from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall), agreements were reached between Bureau and SSC representatives as to the specific Agents the SSC Staff desired to interview. The identities of these Agents are set out below under the headings as to the particular former informants.

Former Informant Mary Jo Cooke
SA Garry George Lash - Assigned Buffalo.

Former Informant Robert Hardy
SA Michael M. Ryman - Assigned Philadelphia Office.
Retired SAC Roy K. Moore - Resides Jackson, Mississippi; employed by Deposit Guaranty National Bank, Jackson 39201.

Former Informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.
Former SA Barrett George Kemp - Resides Saint Marys, Ohio; Attorney at Law, Home Bank Building, Saint Marys, Ohio 45884.
Former SA Byron Edward McFall - Resides Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; employed Special Judge District Court, Seventh Judicial District, State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City 73102.

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/30/00 BY

MDR-16

PERS. REC. UNIT

Enclosure
62-116395
SFP:lhb
(9)

REC-41 62-116395-1150
DEC 1 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

File 62-116395

Former SA James Brooke Blake, Jr. - Employed as Director of Bank Security, Trust Company Bank, Atlanta, Georgia 30302, Business Telephone (404) 588-8216.
SA Neil P. Shanahan - Assigned Philadelphia Office.

For information, interview of former SAC Moore desired by SSC Staff as he was in charge of the Bureau Special "Camden Action" involving use of former informant Hardy (destruction of Selective Service records involved).

The SSC has emphasized desire of very expedite attention to its request relating to interviews of the above personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. All of the foregoing listed current and former employees be released from their confidentiality agreement for purposes of the interviews which are to be confined to their respective handling of the indicated former informants.

2. Upon approval of the above recommendation, and because of the expedite nature of this matter, the Legal Counsel Division will orally advise the SSC (Staff Member Bob Kelley is coordinating for SSC) of the current whereabouts of the above listed and that they have been released from their confidentiality agreement. The addresses as given are the latest available in their personnel files.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

3. Legal Counsel Division will coordinate with Kelley of the SSC the times and places for interviews of incumbent employees. Ph SAC Rosse advised re Kash by PVD 11/20/75
Ph ASAC Laster advised re Shanahan and Ryman 11/20/75 PVD

4. Because of the expedite nature of this matter, Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project has already telephoned the appropriate field offices to have them alert the former employees of possible contact of them by the SSC Staff and that, once so contacted, the former employees may call the Legal Counsel Division collect for further advice. This is in accordance with established procedures.

WRW
HEW

JAM

JBA
PLM

> Telephonic instructions given 11/11/75 to have ex SA's alerted:
SAC Whittaker, OC — Byron McFall.
SAC Dunn, AT — James Blake
SAC Sullivan, Jackson — Roy Moore
Supv. Leroy Davis, CV — Barnett Kemp

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

[illegible]

November 7, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

As a follow-up to our briefing of Assistant Director Wannall on November 6 concerning our proposed format and witnesses for public hearings on December 4-5 on the FBI's use of intelligence informants and sources, we would like to make the following requests.

As discussed in our meeting with Mr. Wannall, we invite the Bureau to submit a memorandum on its intelligence informant and source program that could be inserted in the record of the testimony of Bureau representatives at the hearing. This memorandum would enable the Bureau to present to the Select Committee a complete description of its program and to discuss the issues of particular interest to the Committee members. These include, for example, 1) the size, scope and purpose of the program, including an assessment of the program's cost and effectiveness, and the distinctions and relationships between the intelligence informant program and the Bureau's criminal informant activity; 2) the criteria that determine when an informant may be used in an organization or group; and 3) the program's command and control system, including the limits that are placed on the activities of informants and the type of information an informant or source is permitted to report to his handling agent and the Bureau. In addition, the memorandum would discuss possible legislation in the informant area, such as the imposition of a warrant requirement or additional administrative review. To permit the Select Committee members to study this memorandum in advance of the hearing and to discuss it with FBI representatives during their testimony at the public hearing, we request that the memorandum be submitted by November 24.

1-Ad Hoc
11-10-75

Memo WOCregar to WRWannall
11/11/75
JFP:lhb

S. Phillips

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-1150

Also I am enclosing requests for documents relating to two of the three former FBI informants who are scheduled to testify on December 4. These requests supplement our document request of August 20, 1975 pertaining to informants (Part IV-4).

In addition, we wish to interview and possibly depose the Special Agents who handled the three former informants (Rowe, Hardy and Cook) who are scheduled to testify at the public hearing on December 4. Because of the limited time remaining before the scheduled hearings, we request that the Special Agents be made available for interviews and depositions as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

John Elliff

John Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc: Paul V. Daly
Office of Congressional Affairs
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DOCUMENT REQUEST

1. The following documents and materials relating to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., whether in the custody or possession of the FBI Birmingham, Alabama office or elsewhere:

   a) All documents and materials reflecting contacts and reports of contacts (and the substance thereof) between Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. and FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

   b) All documents and materials reflecting information supplied by Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. to FBI Special Agents (and Bureau Field or Headquarters summaries thereof) from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

   c) All documents and materials relating to any guidance, directions, instructions, or suggestions given to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

   d) All documents and materials relating to Bureau and Field Office supervision of the handling of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

   e) All documents and materials relating to payments of money to, or other financial arrangements between, Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., the FBI, and the Justice Department - from March 25, 1965 to December 31, 1966.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1150

FBI

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2625
24 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

1 Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director, Senate Select Committee [on intelligence] as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

Jack E Thomas
Jack E. Thomas
Major General, USAF (Ret.)
Chief, Coordination Staff/ICS

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP3 ALM/LEHC

Attachment

1 - ENCLOSURE

ST-110

REC-41 62-116395-1149

3 DEC 9 1975

[illegible] DIA [illegible]

62-116395

5-Ew

84 DEC 11 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Aaron, David [1]	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
der, William [1]	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badg
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara	*	B 6/26	12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Betts, Richard K.	*	B 7/1	8-15-47	Pa.	016-38-2619	
Binkin, Martin	*	B 8/5	5-6-28	Mo.	498-20-5633	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
oomfield, Beth Susan	*	B 7/14(H, G, K)	12-23-51	Ohio	256-92-0341	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Bramble, Anne Harriet Owens	*	B 10/30	12-15-36	Md.	219-34-2005	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Brown, Maxine	*	B 6/26	8-8-28	Ida.	568-40-3123	

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1140

All Footnotes at the end.

24 NOV 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Bushong, David	*	B 71/4	8-10-47	Ohio	289-40-1203	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
[illegible]esnick, Barbara	*	B 7/14	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
Culbreth, Elizabeth	*	B 7/2	6-23-42	NC	240-64-9040	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17(Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Davis, Spencer	*	B 10/1	5-3-10		575-10-3539	
Dawson, Thomas	*	B 6/26	9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeMarco, James	*	B 6/26	3-12-43	W. Va.	286-36-9097	
Dennin, Joseph Francis	*	B 6/23	6-9-43	NY	567-62-5353	
DeOreo, Mary	*	B 6/26	6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
DeTemple, Mary	*	B 7/29	6-16-25	Wisc.	394-20-5968	
[illegible]Genova, Joseph E.	*	B 6/26	2-22-45	Del.	222-28-5430	
Dick, James	*	B 6/26	7-25-47	Mass.	029-36-6745	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Donock, Mary Jane[2]			9-12-23	W. Va.	235-22-9235	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel	*	B 7/14	8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor	*	B 6/26	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
Erno, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	

24 NOV 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Fiske, Marie Waite	*		1-21-40	Wisc.	395-34-5646	
Ford, Harold	*	B 6/26	3-23-21	Cal.	550-16-4630	
Fortman, Bernard Louis[3]			12-5-25	Md.	216-20-2565	
Fortman, Donald Thomas[3]			8-31-33	Md.	213-30-8943	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
Grant, Bruce	*	B 7/2	6-16-16	Neb.	507-20-1311	
Greissing, Edward	*	B 7/14	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Hanback, Sara Susan			2-4-46	W. Va.	215-46-3141	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Harris, Susan			3-30-49	Ky.	225-64-8706	
Harris, William R.[4]	already	Briefed	7-30-41		128-32-2350	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691	
Herbst, Deborah	*	B 10/1	2-18-50		227-74-5904	
Herrington, Arthur[5]	*	B 9/15	3-24-31	D. C.	304-28-8364	
Hodges, Paulette	*	B 7/29	4-17-43	Okla.	224-60-2495	
Horowitz, Anne	*		4-17-40	NY	147-46-1050	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	
Iverson, Portia	*	B 7/14	10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	
Jefferson, Arthur M.	*	B 6/26	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
nson, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
Johnston, James	*	B 7/29	1-6-44	Kan.	495-46-9594	
Karalekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kayden, Jeffrey	*	B 7/14	3-22-51	NY	065-40-7277	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles[1]	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge
Kirchheimer, Joseph			6-3-17	Ill.	359-03-7843	
Koppal, Diane	*	B 6/26	6-24-48	NC	219-48-0018	

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Koscis, Susan	*	B 9/17	11-5-49	NY	051-42-2418	
Krauss, George Henry Jr.[3]			9-9-16	Colo.	385-01-1876	
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles[1]	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen	*	B 8/20	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James[1]	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mascioli, Cynthia	*	B 6/26	1-4-51	NY	112-44-7636	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mayo, Betty	*	B 6/26	2-13-22	Ohio	277-14-4062	
McCorkle, Daniel	*	B 8/20	6-25-55	Ohio	297-56-6722	
McIntyre, Dorothy			5-16-16	Canada	220-48-9104	
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	
Metsky, Ellen Jo	*		9-24-53	N. J.	127-30-3729	
Michel, Paul	*	B 8/14	2-3-41	Pa.	172-34-8584	
Miller, William G.[1]	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	

24 Nov 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
Murphy, Michael	*	B 7/1	10-13-54	Tex.	231-86-8829	
Nash, Dorothy			7-24-12	Wisc.	399-14-4589	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan	*	B 6/26	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Oster, Lynsey Lee			9-14-53	SD	501-68-8908	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.	*	B 6/26	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Piland, Susan			10-5-50	Cal.	557-86-6753	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Postal, Andrew	*	B 7/23	5-11-48	NY	128-40-4695	
Pyle, Christopher	*	B 6/26	11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Ralston, Theodore	*	B 7/23	8-25-48	Wash.	538-48-4673	
Rhea, Gordon	*	B 6/26	3-10-45	Va.	412-74-7901	
[illegible]chard, Eric	*	B 7/10	12-27-49	NY	128-40-7430	
Ricks, Walter	*	B 6/26	12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwartz, Paula	*	B 11/4	9-18-53	D. C.	223-64-1880	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III[1]	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester	*	B 6/26	7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.	*	B 6/26	3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha	*	B 6/26	9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Tascione, Rosemary			6-23-45	NY	085-34-6648	
Theoharis, Athan George			8-3-36	Wisc.	395-32-1273	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
T[illegible]nalonis, Alexandra			6-1-48	Md.	200-38-8408	
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Turner, James	*	B 7/14	6-29-53	Cal.	215-64-7255	
Tschirgi, James 6	*	B 6/26	2-23-25	Wyo.	520-16-7290	
Vance, James	*	B 7/23	4-6-36	Ohio	078-28-3950	
Wallach, Paul	*	B 6/26	5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
White, William	*	B 7/10	8-8-39	Pa.	168-30-9147	
Wides, Burton. Victor [1]	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe	*	B 8/5	12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

Footnotes:

[1] Also briefed on Hx, Mat, Rh & Ke

[2] Detailed from Ward and Paul Reporters

[3] Detailed from General Printing Office

[4] Consultant to SSC, also associated with RAND Corp (has SI, TK BYC)

[5] Has SI, TK, B, G, C, H, R, A, E

[6] Also has A, G, E, K, H, C & R

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 11/26/75

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mrs. Metcalf
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 11/25/75, John T. Elliff, Task Force Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force for the Senate Select Committee, requested the Bureau designate a witness to appear in executive session before the Senate Select Committee on 12/3 or 12/4 in the afternoon to discuss counterintelligence investigations by the Bureau. Elliff stated because of Chairman Frank Church's interest in a study as to whether counterintelligence investigations should be taken out of the FBI and placed in another agency or a separate component of the Justice Department, this particular topic would be the main focal point of the hearing. Elliff stated that the questions asked of the Bureau's witness would deal primarily with the feasibility of removal of counterintelligence out of the FBI including problems of a logistical and practical nature resulting from such a change. Elliff asked that he be advised as to the identity of the Bureau witness as soon as possible.

Inasmuch as the aforementioned topic is a question of policy, the Director may desire to appear or designate a Bureau witness to appear before the Committee in this matter. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, is aware of the aforementioned testimony and the possibility exists that the Department may make a decision with regards to the Bureau's providing a witness concerning this matter.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ST-110

REC-41

62-116395-1148

RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER

5 DEC ~~8~~ 9 1975

PVD:lad LAD
(9)

84 DEC 12 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Director designate the Bureau's witness to appear before captioned Committee.

(2) That the Office of Congressional Affairs advise the Senate Select Committee of the Bureau's decision in this matter.

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/3/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Moore

FROM : Legal Counsel

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

John T. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director of the Senate Select Committee, advised at 9:15 a.m. on 12/3/75 that the following is a statement to be read by Senator Frank Church of that Committee on 12/3/75.

Attorney General Kennedy authorized wiretaps in 1962 on New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin and his secretary and that lasted for about one month. In addition to the wiretap on New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin in 1962, the Committee has received materials from the FBI reflecting authorization by Attorney General Kennedy of a wiretap on a reporter for Newsweek Magazine in 1961 during the investigation of another leak of classified information. Further materials reflected authorization by Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach for a wiretap on the editor of an anti-Communist newsletter in 1965, also during the investigation of a leak of classified information. The Committee has received materials from the FBI reflecting authorization by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy of wiretaps on at least six American citizens, including three Executive Branch officials, a Congressional Staff Member, and two registered lobbying agents for foreign interests. The materials also reflect that these wiretaps relate to an investigation of agents by foreign interests to influence United States economic policies.

Elliff was advised by SA Paul V. Daly of this Division that an impression would be created by the aforementioned statement that this Bureau may have conducted an electronic surveillance on Capitol Hill and that this, of course, was inaccurate. The electronic surveillance concerning the Congressional Staff Member was not located on Congressional property. Elliff agreed with this observation and indicated that he would check the material to insure the electronic surveillance in ~~question was~~ not on Congressional property and as agreed, make a change in the aforementioned statement.

REC-41 62-116395-446

3 DEC 9 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

At 11 35 A today Elliff advised statement change in accordance with above suggestion noted FBI conducted No Electronic surveillance on Capitol Hill

PVD:lad

84 DEC 12 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1146, 1148-1151, 1153-1156, 1157, 1158-1165

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88608 Date: 03-18-2025

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
November 20, 1975
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC requests contained in letter of Senator Frank Church dated November 7, 1975, for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to SSC requests in referenced letter.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL
MDR 16

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JTA:adn
(9)

REC-7 62-116395-1165

NOTE:

A copy of the SSC letter 11/7/75, is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

DEC 12 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Affairs
& Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm.

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

5-Woc 16

DEC 16 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

~~SECRET~~ 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer

62-116395

November 20, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC requests contained in letter of Senator Frank Church dated November 7, 1975, for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials in response to requests contained in the above SSC letter.

The attention of the SSC is invited to FBI memorandum dated November 11, 1975, which referred to a highly sensitive oral briefing furnished to Senator Church and selected members of the SSC Staff by FBI personnel on November 5, 1975. This briefing was intended, in part, to serve in lieu of any written information in response to SSC requests for communications documenting Stanley David Levison as a secret member of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA).

Because of SSC insistence in requesting items to establish factual basis for Levison's secret CPUSA membership, as set forth in referenced SSC letter, our New York office was contacted for documents representing original recordings from Bureau informants concerning Levison. As a result our New York office provided the material which is now being delivered and which has served as a basis for statements in various FBI documents that Levison was a secret member of the CPUSA.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL
ON 10/27/00

JTA:adn
(8)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 2047
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

WOC 16

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

62 116395 - 1165

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ___
Intell. ____
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

ENCLOSURE

It is noted that referenced SSC letter requested unexcised copies of the February 22, and June 12, 1962, communications from New York which appear to have been the "articulated predicates for the 'cominfil' case." The SSC letter did not identify captions of these communications; nor identify any specific "cominfil case." Therefore, we were unable to locate any pertinent documents bearing these dates in our Headquarters files. At a meeting on November 12, 1975, between SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein and representatives of the Intelligence Division of the FBI, it was agreed that the two documents apparently referred to above are New York airtel dated February 12, 1962, captioned "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; SM-C" and New York letter dated August 21, 1962, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; IS-C."

New York airtel dated February 12, 1962, is being delivered with this memorandum among those documents received from our New York office. Excisions in this document are fewer than those made in a copy previously provided the SSC. A copy bearing no or fewer excisions cannot be provided the SSC for reasons made clear during the oral briefing of Senator Church and selected SSC Staff members on November 5, 1975.

It is noted that New York letter dated August 21, 1962, which is being delivered with this memorandum, is not believed to have been previously provided the SSC.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/20/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

11/7/75 request - KING

Originating Office: FBI 2³⁵p

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/26/75

Received by: Lynsey Oster

Title: clk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHK

ENCLOSURE

62 [illegible] 1165

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, J[illegible]ENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 7, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Office of Deputy Attorney General
Room 4313
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/27/00 BY SP2ALM/CKL

Dear Mr. Shaheen:

I want you to know how much I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you and your associates the other day about the Martin Luther King, Jr. case. It was most helpful to have the benefit of the Bureau's knowledge concerning the background of the case, and I can assure you that we will do everything possible to avoid jeopardizing any sensitive FBI sources or ongoing operations.

I do want to reiterate our need for the specific items set forth in earlier document requests which would presumably establish the factual basis for your conclusion as of various dates in 1962, 1963 and 1964 that Stanley Levison was a "secret member of the Communist Party, USA." Of course in the event that there is no particular document in any of those years wherein Levison was so-identified to the FBI, I think it would be helpful for you to let us know so that we may consider our outstanding requests in that context. Finally, of course, we still need unexcised copies of the February 22 and June 12, 1962 communications from New York which appear to have been the articulated predicates for the "cominfil" case.

Once again, I want to thank you for your time and I look forward to hearing from you further on this subject.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

Rept to AG, cc DAG
Encl-2 11/20/75
JTA:adn

RECEIVED
NOV 7 1975
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

62-116395-1165
ENCLOSURE
5.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED 11/20/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/27/00 BY SL2ALM/EHL

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials regarding Martin L. King, Jr., Stanley D. Levison and SCLC. Items to establish factual basis for Levison's secret CP, USA membership was obtained from FBI New York Office and furnished SSC.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER 11-7-75

DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM NEW YORK OFFICE INDICATING CPUSA MEMBERSHIP OF STANLEY DAVID LEVISON

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

18

Retain

62-116395-1165

ENCLOSURE

Ser 1165

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO : SAC (100-111180)

DATE: 4/17/64

FROM : SA JAMES M. KIRBY (414)

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
ON 10/27/00

SUBJECT: STANLEY LEVISON
IS-C

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION (SF10)

On 4/9/64, (NY 694-S* made the following observations with regard to the) CP status of STANLEY LEVISON:

LEVISON has been an important Party member for many years (and never at any time differed with the Party with respect to the Party line. His only difference with the Party has been with respect to the fact that in his opinion the Party was not sufficiently "militant" in defending Negro rights. In this respect, he has been to the "left" of the Party. LEVISON's differences with the Party are merely "tactical." He has never criticized the Party, except with respect to the Party's handling of the Negro question. The fact that he does not accept domination by the Party with regard to the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement should not be construed to mean that he has broken with the Party in all respects. The Party today is as anxious to reestablish friendly relations with LEVISON as it was in the past.)

SF10

(It should be noted that LEVISON never has been officially "drummed out" of the Party, nor has anyone ever criticized him for being opposed to the Party's general principles. It further should be noted that according to the CP Constitution, it would require formal expulsion of LEVISON to state that he is officially out of the Party.

SF10

LEVISON never has said anything reflecting that he does not continue to be a CP member. It should be noted that it would be in the interests of the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement, with which he is associated, if he would publicly repudiate the Party, which he has never done. It should be further noted that in an effort to renew friendly relations)

Classified by 2116
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

JMK:mmd
(1)

100-111180-

SEARCHED........INDEXED........
SERIALIZED........FILED........
APR 17 1964
FBI - NEW YORK

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

with LEVISON, the Party designated BEN DAVIS to contact LEVISON. LEVISON had always expressed the opinion that BEN DAVIS was the only CP functionary who had a sufficiently "militant attitude" as regards CP activities in behalf of the Negro movement. The fact that DAVIS and LEVISON as yet have not met should not be construed to mean that LEVISON has refused to confer with DAVIS. As NY 694-S* understands the situation, DAVIS has been awaiting contact by LEVISON, and LEVISON similarly has been awaiting contact by DAVIS. Each of these individuals is sufficiently egotistical to expect that the other would make the first move in an effort to establish contact. NY 694-S* believes that probably the reason why DAVIS and LEVISON have not met is that arrangements for their meeting were to be made by LEM HARRIS and that HARRIS has not made the proper efforts to effect a meeting between LEVISON and DAVIS.

SF10

NY 694-S* has never obtained any information reflecting that LEVISON has changed his thinking with regard to Marxism. Even though his present estrangement from the Party might be construed as reflecting he is no longer a CP member, there is no reason to come to the conclusion that LEVISON is no longer an ideological Communist.

JACK talked to LEM HARRIS yesterday who said he contacted STAN LEVENSON by phone and was given a cordial hello which was a change from the past when he was cool.

LEM said he had not seen LEVENSON, tried to call him and would like to see him immediately to which LEVENSON said, "I would like very much to see you but I don't have the time now. I'm leaving and packing for a trip. I will be glad to see you in six weeks."

LEVENSON implied that he was going to Ecuador but LEM doesn't know why. There was no anger shown, and LEVENSON will see LEM when he returns in six weeks.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, NEW YORK (100-111180)

DATE: 7/26/63 ~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM : SA FRANCIS T. LEONARD

SUBJECT: STANLEY DAVID LEVISON
IS-C

The following is being submitted as a revised characterization of the subject:

STANLEY LEVISON is a secret member of the Communist Party, United States of America (CPUSA).

NY T-
July 16, 1963

NY T- is (INFORMANT NY 694-S*.)

A three by five card has been prepared containing the above characterization and will be filed in the library of the NYO.

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/EHL
ON 10/27/00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1 - NY (100-111180) (414)
FTL: rmv
(1)

[illegible]
[illegible]

134-91-3849

SEARCHED ______ INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
JUL 26 1963
FBI — NEW YORK

~~Classified by 2116~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FBI
Date: 6/13/63

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (~~100-166670~~) 100-106670

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-136585)

~~TOP~~ SECRET

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING
SM - C
(OO: ATLANTA)

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY OP2ALM/EHL
ON 10/27/00

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION (SFIO)

(Extreme caution must be exercised with respect to dissemination of the information herein inasmuch as, by its nature, said information tends to identify NY 694-S*, a valuable informant, as the source. Unless this information is obtained from a source other than NY 694-S*, it should not be included--even in paraphrased form--in the investigative section of a report.)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

7 - Bureau (~~100-166670~~ 100-106670) (RM)
(1 - 100-392452) (STANLEY LEVISON)
((1 - 100-358916) (HUNTER PITTS O'DELL))
(1 - 157-286) (MARTIN LUTHER KING)
((1 - 100-) (ROY LEVISON))
2 - Atlanta (100-5586) (MARTIN LUTHER KING) (INFO)(RM)
(1 - 157-) (MARTIN LUTHER KING)
SFIO (1 - Chicago (134-46-Inv.) (INFO)(RM))
1 - NY 134-91 (INV.) (41)
1 - NY 100-111180 (STANLEY LEVISON) (414)
(1 - NY 100-91330 (HUNTER PITTS O'DELL) (414))
(1 - NY 100-111203 (ROY LEVISON) (414))
(1 - NY 100-7658 (LEM HARRIS) (414))
1 - NY 157-826 (MARTIN LUTHER KING) (412)
1 - NY 100-136585 (412)

ACB:gmg
(20)

Approved: ______________________ Sent ________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Classified by 2116
Exempt from GDS, Category ____
Date of Declassification Indefinite ____

NY 100-136585

SF10

On 6/13/63, NY 694-S* furnished the following information to SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON:

On 6/12/63, LEMENT HARRIS, CPUSA Reserve Fund functionary, told NY 694-S* that in a recent meeting with STANLEY LEVISON, the latter furnished him the following information:

The LEVISONS, particularly STANLEY, are still MARTIN LUTHER KING's "brain trust"--now more than ever before. This is so despite the fact that at a meeting of STANLEY LEVISON, ROY LEVISON, HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, MARTIN LUTHER KING and "the Attorney General's chief assistant", the Attorney General's assistant, pointing to the LEVISONS and HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, stated to MARTIN LUTHER KING, "These men are Party members; watch out for them."

MARTIN LUTHER KING did not "bat an eyelash" upon hearing the Assistant Attorney General's remark, and after the latter left the meeting, those in the group smiled at each other. STANLEY LEVISON said to KING, at this time, "I congratulate you on the way you acted regarding his warning. You are a real Marxist-Leninist. This is how a true Marxist-Leninist acts."

Everything that KING does he first discusses with STANLEY LEVISON and he accepts LEVISON's advice wholeheartedly. KING also wholeheartedly accepts the advice of HUNTER PITTS O'DELL as regards matters within the latter's local jurisdiction.

MARTIN LUTHER KING was asked by a group of newspaper reporters whether he takes orders from "the Communists", and also, whether he took "orders from STANLEY LEVISON." KING's response was that he took orders only from God.

By reason of the fact that the LEVISONS feel that the Party has done little, if anything, to assist the fight

for civil rights for Negroes, and further, since they feel that the Party, as a result of this "do nothing" attitude, has lost prestige, they will no longer permit the Party to dominate or control their activities in the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement. They are severing themselves, financially and in a disciplinary way, from the Party. The LEVISONS and O'DELL are still Party members, but do not desire to be openly "linked up" with the Party. Although they are "disenchanted" with the Party, they are not quitting the Party. With respect to the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement, they will act on their own initiative, and will not accept instructions from the Party.

SF10

LEM HARRIS then advised that the Party, however, still would like to control the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement. BEN DAVIS has been assigned to be "liaison or intermediary" with the LEVISONS and HUNTER PITTS O'DELL. Whether or not the LEVISONS and O'DELL will maintain liaison regarding matters concerning the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement is a matter for them to decide. In view of LEVISON's statement with respect to advising MARTIN LUTHER KING independently of Party instructions, it would seem that DAVIS may not have any success in maintaining liaison with the LEVISONS and HUNTER PITTS O'DELL. The LEVISONS and O'DELL are aware of the fact that BEN DAVIS has been given this assignment by the Party.

SF10

MARTIN LUTHER KING, according to LEM HARRIS, is referred to by such top Party functionaries as GUS HALL, BEN DAVIS, JIM JACKSON and CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT as a "true, genuine, Marxist-Leninist from the top of his head to the tips of his toes." In the Party, the report is that MARTIN LUTHER KING is following a Marxist-Leninist line.

NY 694-S* advised that he asked LEM HARRIS whether or not, to the latter's knowledge, MARTIN LUTHER KING was a member of the CPUSA. LEM HARRIS replied that he did not know.

SAC, NEW YORK (100-111180) 8/30/62

8/31

SA FRANCIS T. LEONARD (415)

STANLEY LEVISON
IS-C

The following characterization is being submitted for approval with respect to the subject:

NY T- who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on August 28, 1962, that STANLEY LEVISON is a secret member of the Communist Party, United States of America (CP, USA), and (contributes funds to the CP on a regular basis.)

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION

NY T- is (INFORMANT NY 694-S*.)

MDR 16

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHC
ON 10/27/00

① - NY 134-91-INV.) SF10
1 - NY 100-111180 (415)

FTL:gmm
(2)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

X 116

213

FBI

DATE: 2/12/62

Transmit the following via AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100 -)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-136585)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SM-C (OO: Atlanta)

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION (SFIO)

(Extreme caution must be exercised with respect to dissemination of the information herein since, by its nature, it tends to identify NY 694-S*, a valuable informant, as the source thereof. Unless this information is obtained from a source other than NY 694-S*, it should not be incorporated - even in paraphrased form - in the investigative section of a report.)

On 2/12/62, (Informant NY 694-S*) advised SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON as follows:

(In a recent meeting with LEMENT HARRIS, CPUSA functionary associated with the CPUSA Reserve Fund operation, the informant was told by HARRIS that shortly before GUS HALL, CPUSA General Secretary, went to the West Coast, HARRIS transmitted to HALL a "confidential verbal report" on Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, furnished to HARRIS by) STANLEY LEVISON, KING's attorney and advisor, who is a secret member of the CP (and a regular contributor to the CPUSA Rserve Fund. LEVISON's report was as follows:)

SFIO

4-Bureau (100-) (RM)
(1-100-392452) (STANLEY LEVISON)
1-Atlanta (100-) (DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.) (RM)
(1-NY 134-91 (INV.) (41))
1-NY 100-111180 (STANLEY LEVISON) (415)
(1-NY 100-7658 (LEMENT HARRIS) (415))
(1-NY 100-84994 (GUS HALL) (415))
1-NY 100-136585 (412)

SFIO

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
10/31/00

~~SECRET~~

ACB:ume
(11)

~~Classified by 2116~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~SEARCHED....... INDEXED.......~~
~~SERIALIZED....... FILED.......~~

NY 100-136585 SF10

(When Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING was invited to address the AFL-CIO convention some time ago, KING, on LEVISON's advice, first obtained approval to do so from A. PHILLIP RANDOLPH, negro labor leader, who, if he had not been consulted in the matter, might have felt that KING's making a speech at the aforesaid convention was a blow to RANDOLPH's prestige.

KING delivered a remarkably effective speech at the AFL-CIO convention, and, as a result, received invitations from numerous labor leaders, including "MC DONALD of Steel," to address their respective unions. As the outstanding champion of negro rights in the country, KING is a powerful political influence, recognized as such by the higher echelons of the Democratic Party. He has access to Attorney General ROBERT KENNEDY and President KENNEDY, who, politically, need KING, particularly in the South, where in cities like Atlanta and New Orleans the negro vote now constitutes the balance of power, and where KING controls the negro vote.

JAMES HOFFA, Teamsters Union "boss" appreciates the political power of KING, particularly the fact that KING can influence the 90,000 negro members of the Teamsters Union. HOFFA invited KING to address the Teamsters Union, and KING accepted the invitation. Knowing that KING is being deferred to by Attorney General KENNEDY, and President KENNEDY, HOFFA requested KING to contact the Attorney General in an effort to influence the latter "to lay off" HOFFA. KING was inclined to do as HOFFA requested, but LEVISON convinced him that to do so would be politically unwise, inexpedient, and likely to be a "boomerang," since the Attorney General would never accede to such a request, particularly in the case of HOFFA.

LEVISON had to steer KING away from another politically hazardous situation. Some months ago OTTO PREMINGER, Hollywood movie director, entered into negotiations with a KING representative for KING to play a part in a picture which PREMINGER would direct. Although PREMINGER's offer was "tempting," since it meant "fast, easy money" for KING's organization, LEVISON realized that for KING to accept the offer would lower the latter's prestige. After convincing KING of this fact, LEVISON personally telephoned to PREMINGER, telling him that "the deal was off.")

What LEVISON particularly wanted GUS HALL to know is that "KING is a wholehearted Marxist, who has studied it (Marxism), believes in it, and agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly."

GUS HALL, according to HARRIS, was "elated" to receive LEVISON's report on LUTHER KING.

SF10

SSC LETTER 11-7-75

NY LETTER DATED 8-21-62 CAPTIONED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, IS-C"

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

RETAIN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-438794) DATE: 8/21/62

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-149194)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
IS-C

(OO: Atlanta)

ReBulet to Atlanta, 7/20/62, which requested NY to furnish the Bureau and Atlanta with observations and analysis of the extent of CP influence or infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

CONF. SOURCE

On 3/10/61, (ANDREW ANGIOLETTI, Chief Clerk,) Manufacturers Trust Company, 275 West 125th Street, NYC, advised that there is an account maintained at this branch by the SCLC, whose officers are listed as MARTIN LUTHER KING, President; BAYARD RUSTIN, Secretary; and STANLEY D. LEVISON, Assistant Treasurer.

INF.

(CG 5824-S*) on 8/6/57, advised that STANLEY LEVISON and his brother, ROY BENNETT, were active in (CP financial matters and business ventures which contribute to the CP.)

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELL. OPER. (SFIO)

INF

(NY 694-S*) advised in October, 1961, that LEVISON continues to (donate money to the CP, USA.) SFIO

INF

During the period of February 9-15, 1957, (CG 5824-S*) advised that the 16th National Convention, CP, USA, was held in NYC on February 9-12, 1957, and that BAYARD RUSTIN attended some of the convention sessions as a guest.

2-Bureau (100-438794) (RM)
2-Atlanta (100-5718) (RM)
1-New York (100-149194)

~~SECRET~~

EEG:eac
(5)

REC-3

16 AUG 23 1962

~~CLASSIFIED BY 12047~~
~~EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION~~
~~SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652~~
~~EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2~~
~~AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Indefinite~~

Fd to NY
2 - Atlanta
8-29-62

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 Alm/ETC
ON 10/27/00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

informant — informant file #

BA 969-S advised on 11/22/60, (BA 134-13A-615) that at a National Negro Commission meeting held on 11/19, 20/60, at CP Headquarters, 23 West 26th Street, NYC, TED BASSETT, a representative of "The Worker", stated that the CP is now in the process of placing members of the Party in key positions in the SCLC. BASSETT continued by saying that a Western Conference of the Christian Leadership is now being formed and a CP member is the leader in this conference.

informant

NY 694-S* advised on 5/1/62, that on 4/30/62, ISADORE WOFSY, CP, USA fund functionary, said that according to LEM HARRIS, he was told by STANLEY LEVISON that the CP, USA had sent "an experienced, professional, secret organizer" to New Orleans, who would assist the MARTIN LUTHER KING group there in its fight for political equality of Negroes. LEVISON allegedly told HARRIS that he personally, and not the Party, was financing this organizer. SF10

informant — Hosea?

NY 694-S* advised on 5/2/62, that according to LEM HARRIS, the secret CP organizer, whom the CP, USA had sent to New Orleans, was JOSE HUDSON. HARRIS said that HUDSON would be associated with SERGEANT CAULFIELD in Baton Rouge. SF10

informant

On 7/2/62, NO 1084-S advised that SERGEANT CAULFIELD returned to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, from Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/31/62. Informant said that CAULFIELD stated that he and JOSE HUDSON met HUNTER O'DELL in Atlanta, O'DELL having flown there from NYC.

informant

NO 1084-S stated that CAULFIELD paid CP dues to O'DELL for several CP members from Louisiana. O'DELL had come to Atlanta regarding organization of the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement. O'DELL thought that if an active

~~SECRET~~

MARTIN LUTHER KING movement could be organized in Louisiana, the State Senatorial District where CAULFIELD resides permanently (Lettsworth, Louisiana), CAULFIELD might be furnished as much as $1,000.00 per month to promote this movement. The funds are to come from the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement and the object is to get every eligible Negro to register to vote. CAULFIELD reportedly met MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., while in Atlanta, and discussed with him the voter registration matter in Louisiana.

On 4/27/62, a pretext telephone call was made to UN 6-2000, which is the NYC listing for the Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING and also the listing for the SCLC at 312 West 125th Street, NYC. The pretext used was that of a person interested in contributing money to the KING committee. The person answering the phone during the conversation identified himself as JACK O'DELL, and furnished the following information:

His office is the Northern Branch of the SCLC. The Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, at 312 West 125th Street, was organized as an "ad hoc" committee to assist in the KING defense, when he was the subject of court action. When the reason for this committee's being in existence was removed, it was formally dissolved. The same personalities them formed the Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle, which is now operated at 312 West 125th Street.

O'DELL stated that it would make no difference as to whether a person contributing money makes out checks payable to the Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, the SCLC or the Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle, because they are all one and the same.

NY 100-149194

On 6/1/61, informant (CG 5824-S*) advised that HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, who was a secret member of the National Committee, CP, USA, has quit the CP and is officially considered by the CP as being out. However, there are no hard feelings existing between O'DELL and the Party and he is still on good terms with the CP and will work with them. SF10

EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED WITH RESPECT TO DISSEMINATION OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN, SINCE BY ITS NATURE IT TENDS TO IDENTIFY (NY 694-S*,) A VALUABLE INFORMANT, AS THE SOURCE THEREOF. UNLESS THIS INFORMATION IS OBTAINED FROM A SOURCE OTHER THAN (NY 694-S*,) IT SHOULD NOT BE INCORPORATED, EVEN IN PARAPHRASED FORM, IN THE INVESTIGATIVE SECTION OF A REPORT.
INFORMANT

On 7/23/62, Informant (NY 694-S*) stated during a personal contact with GUS HALL, General Secretary of the CP, USA, on that date, HALL advised that HUNTER PITTS O'DELL is still representing the CP, USA and that he is still on the National Committee of the CP, USA. HALL further remarked that O'DELL is a "brain-trust" for LUTHER KING and is doing an excellent job.) SF10

Current investigation in NYC reflects that O'DELL is spending most of his time in the Atlanta area working with the SCLC. He was last reported in the NY area in June, 1962.

On 2/11/62, INFORMANT (NY 1300-S) made available photographs of material maintained in the office of STANLEY LEVISON, 6 East 39th Street, NYC. Included in these photographs were the following:

1. Two checks, both dated 12/19/61, bearing the printed name of the "Southern Christian Leadership Conference", 312 West 125th Street, NY, NY. These checks

are numbered 397 and 399, one in the amount of $251.90 and one in the amount of $150.00, are marked payable to J. O'DELL, and are signed by STANLEY D. LEVISON.

2. Copy "C" of a Withholding Tax form for 1961, in the name of JOHN HUNTER O'DELL, 312 West 125th Street, NY, NY, Social Security Number 386-14-3707, indicating that he was paid $3,050.00 in 1961 by the SCLC, 312 West 125th Street, NYC.

X

(ELSUR NY 3575-S*) advised on 6/20/62, that STANLEY LEVISON stated that in a recent conversation with MARTIN LUTHER KING, KING said he was thinking of getting another administrative assistant. LEVISON stated that in the past LEVISON had not considered it wise for O'DELL to take on such a position, but he is the only one who could do the job and should be considered for it. LEVISON stated as long as O'DELL did not have the title of Executive Director, there would not be "as much lightening flashing around him". O'DELL could be called a coordinator and still fulfill all the duties of Executive Director.

LEVISON stated, according to (ELSUR NY 3575-S*) that KING liked LEVISON's suggestion with respect to O'DELL taking this position, because KING felt that O'DELL must face it sooner or later, stating "that no matter what a man was, if he could stand up now and say he is not connected, then as far as I am concerned, he is eligible to work for me".

(INFORMANT NY 2783-S) advised on 7/11/61, (INFORMANT FILE # (NY 134-4268A-378),) that HAZEL GRAY is working again at the SCLC, 312 West 125th Street, NYC.

On 7/8/61, INFORMANT NY 1212-S stated that it had come to his attention that CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT had mentioned that he wanted

to use HAZEL GRAY and her husband, JOHN GRAY, in the Kings County CP organization. The informant stated that LIGHTFOOT highly recommended the GRAYs.

On 3/10/61, MILTON BIRON, Senior Accountant, Comtroller's Office, New York City, Bureau of Excise Taxes, 120 West 32nd Street, made available an application for exemption from the New York City amusement tax, dated 1/23/61, and signed by STANLEY D. LEVISON. The exemption was requested for a "concert" to be given at Carnegie Hall on 1/27/61, for one evening performance.

The name of the applicant was given as the "Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle", 312 West 125th Street, an unincorporated association. It is stated that the applicant is a non-profit educational committee which has registered with the Charities Registration Bureau in Albany and the Department of Welfare in NYC. It says that it employs no professional fund raisers and that neither its officers nor executive directors are paid either salaries or expenses.

The, "Purposes for which applicant was organized", are listed as:

"To provide funds for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to be used for establishment of constitutional rights in the South utilizing voting registration drives, educational meetings, church and synagogue conferences, sit-in techniques, legal actions etc."

The, "Activities of the Applicant", are listed as:

"Mail solicitations, benefits, meetings, educational conferences, church collections."

The, "Source and Disposition of Income", is listed as:

"All income less expenses is transmitted to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference or directly paid out to sources indicated by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING is President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

A "note" attached to the application stated that the committee was created by resolution as an unincorporated association at an organizing meeting held at the home of HARRY BELAFONTE, 300 West End Avenue, in June, 1960.

The application for exemption from the New York City amusement tax was denied by letter 1/31/61, sent to the Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle, 312 West 125th Street, attention of STANLEY D. LEVISON.

NY has considered the above facts and is of the opinion that a Cominfil investigation of the NY Chapter of the SCLC is warranted, due to the dominant CP influence on the executives of the NY Chapter of the SCLC.

NY will conduct no further investigation without prior Bureau authority.

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

November 19, 1975

2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
(1 - J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Newman

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, requesting access to documents regarding informant matters.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum in response to one of the items in referenced request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/ EHL

Memo being furnished showing exactly what Comm. will have access to. N 11/19/75

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

HAN:tdp (10)

REC-7 62-116395-1164

ST-110

NOTE:

The material to which access is being granted involves Gary Thomas Rowe, a former Bureau informant who furnished information which led to the Federal prosecution on civil rights charges of 3 Klansmen responsible for the killing of Mrs. Viola Luizzo, a civil rights worker, in Lawndes County, Alabama, on 3/25/65. The material involved includes access to that material contained in the informant's field file as well as information contained in informant's file maintained at FBIHQ. ~~The request~~ addressed itself to other matters which are being handled separately, including access to material regarding other informants.

DEC 12 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

~~MAIL ROOM~~ ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 16 1975

2 - Mr. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Newman

62-116395

November 18, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, requesting access to documents regarding the handling of former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe.

These documents have been assembled and are available for review by appropriately cleared SSC staff members at FBI Headquarters.

HAN:tdp (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/21/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

JAM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMO being prepared by LCD dated 11/13/75 showing what documents Comm will have access to. gjf

WOC

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-1164

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 7, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Dear Mike:

As a follow-up to our briefing of Assistant Director Wannall on November 6 concerning our proposed format and witnesses for public hearings on December 4-5 on the FBI's use of intelligence informants and sources, we would like to make the following requests.

As discussed in our meeting with Mr. Wannall, we invite the Bureau to submit a memorandum on its intelligence informant and source program that could be inserted in the record of the testimony of Bureau representatives at the hearing. This memorandum would enable the Bureau to present to the Select Committee a complete description of its program and to discuss the issues of particular interest to the Committee members. These include, for example, 1) the size, scope and purpose of the program, including an assessment of the program's cost and effectiveness, and the distinctions and relationships between the intelligence informant program and the Bureau's criminal informant activity; 2) the criteria that determine when an informant may be used in an organization or group; and 3) the program's command and control system, including the limits that are placed on the activities of informants and the type of information an informant or source is permitted to report to his handling agent and the Bureau. In addition, the memorandum would discuss possible legislation in the informant area, such as the imposition of a warrant requirement or additional administrative review. To permit the Select Committee members to study this memorandum in advance of the hearing and to discuss it with FBI representatives during their testimony at the public hearing, we request that the memorandum be submitted by November 24.

62-116395-1156

Ltr to AG, cc DAG
[illegible] 11/18/75 HAN: tdp

ENCLOSURE

Also I am enclosing requests for documents relating to two of the three former FBI informants who are scheduled to testify on December 4. These requests supplement our document request of August 20, 1975 pertaining to informants (Part IV-4).

In addition, we wish to interview and possibly depose the Special Agents who handled the three former informants (Rowe, Hardy and Cook) who are scheduled to testify at the public hearing on December 4. Because of the limited time remaining before the scheduled hearings, we request that the Special Agents be made available for interviews and depositions as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

John Elliff
John Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc: Paul V. Daly
Office of Congressional Affairs
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DOCUMENT REQUEST

The following documents and materials relating to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., whether in the custody or possession of the FBI Birmingham, Alabama office or elsewhere:

a) All documents and materials reflecting contacts and reports of contacts (and the substance thereof) between Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. and FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

b) All documents and materials reflecting information supplied by Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. to FBI Special Agents (and Bureau Field or Headquarters summaries thereof) from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

c) All documents and materials relating to any guidance, directions, instructions, or suggestions given to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

d) All documents and materials relating to Bureau and Field Office supervision of the handling of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1 1960 to April 1, 1965.

e) All documents and materials relating to payments of money to, or other financial arrangements between, Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., the FBI, and the Justice Department from March 25, 1965 to December 31, 1966.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/19/75

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

11/7/75 request (Gary Thomas Rowe)

Originating Office: FBI 11 20

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 11/25/75

Received by: Sherry Powell

Title: HOM

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1164

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

FOR REVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials made available for review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FBIHQ, regarding the handling of former FBI informant Gary T. Rowe.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-98

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~TOP SECRET~~

11/11/75

T ~~General~~

T - Followed 11/7/75 memo for documentation on SD Levison

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
(ATTN: INTD - W. O.CREGAR)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (134-91)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY: 1975

Stanley Levison

ReBuphone call of Bureau Supervisor SEYMOUR PHILIP, 11/10/75.

This communication is classified "Top Secret" in accordance with established classification procedures.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies each of 21 communications pertinent to captioned case.

The original recording of this information is contained in 134-91, unless otherwise noted:

1. NYlet to Bu - CPUSA Reserve Fund - 3/16/61
2. NYlet to Bu - CPUSA Reserve Fund - 10/19/61
3. NYmemo to SAC - CPUSA Funds - 11/20/62
4. NYairtel to Bu - STANLEY LEVISON - 1/4/62
5. NYairtel to Bu - M. L. KING - 2/12/62
6. NYmemo to SAC - CPUSA Reserve Funds - 4/20/62
7. NYtel to Bu - M.L. KING - 5/3/62

Of 42 encls. 21 are to remain in file (1 set) Of the other 21 (1 set) 5 used + [illegible]

2 - Bureau (Encls. 42)(RM) SSC j16 destroyed.
1 - New York

1073

~~TOP SECRET~~

TJD:jir
(4)

[illegible] manner [illegible]
remainder not used in reply to SSC. See Bulet +
LHM to SSC + Dept 11/20/75 JTA:cah

Classified by ~~2116~~
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification ~~Indefinite~~

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EH

~~TOP SECRET~~

8. NYmemo to SAC - STANLEY LEVISON - 8/30/62
9. NYairtel to Bu - STANLEY LEVISON - 3/21/63
10. NYairtel to Bu - M.L. KING - 6/13/63
11. NYairtel to Bu - CPUSA Negro Question - 7/10/63
12. NYairtel to Bu - M.L. KING - 7/31/63
13. Memo to SAC NY - STANLEY LEVISON - 7/16/63
14. NYairtel to Bu - STANLEY LEVISON - 9/16/63
15. NYlet to Bu - CPUSA Negro Question - 10/18/63

The following are the original documents set forth in the captioned case files:

16. NYairtel to Bu - CPUSA Negro Question - 2/13/64
17. " " " " " " - 2/18/64
18. NYmemo to SAC - STANLEY LEVISON - 4/3/64
19. " " " " " - 4/13/64
20. " " " " " - 4/20/64
21. NYlet to Bu - CIRM - 9/23/64

Concerning the above, it should be noted that due to the top level activity of the source, NY 694-OA, and to the highly sensitive area the source operates in, only oral reports are obtained from the source. These oral reports are not reduced to writing for the sources signature. Also, occasionally information is orally obtained from the source and is originally recorded in the case file of the subject or subject matter.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

NY 134-91

The enclosed represents the best information as obtained from a review of the files of the New York Office of NY 694-OA; STANLEY D. LEVISON and MARTIN L. KING from 1961 - 1965 showing the original recorded information.

TOP SECRET

2 - [illegible]. J. A. Mintz
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - [illegible]r. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General November 18, 1975

Director, FBI

0

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP 2 ALM/EHL

1

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 28, 1975, requesting in part access to cancelled Security Index (SI) cards, delivery of certain materials pertaining to individuals whose identities would be obtained from a review of the cancelled cards, access to other versions of the SI or Reserve Index, and delivery of certain materials from FBI Headquarters files on organizations whose names and file numbers were provided by the SSC.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which constitutes this Bureau's response to the above requests.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (12)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

N

Delivered to Shaheen 11/18/75 [illegible]
Returned 11-20-75 delivered to [illegible] 11/20/75 by Paul F Daly

KAM:cap cap
(9)

REC-7 62-116395-1163

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

DEC 12 1975

FBI/Cm

JAM
5-WOC

6-ENCLOS

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

KAM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 16 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

62-116395

November 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/22/80 BY SP3 ALM/EHC

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 28, 1975, requesting in part:

1. Access to the Security Index (SI) cards recently discovered at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) under the same conditions as the access previously granted to the Administrative Index (ADEX).

2. Delivery of the following materials pertaining to certain individuals on the SI (the names to be supplied following access to the SI cards):

   a. materials reflecting the reasons why the individual was placed on the SI;

   b. materials reflecting any dissemination of information about the individual outside the United States government.

3. Access to any other versions of the SI or the Reserve Index (RI) which may be in the possession of the FBI, including versions compiled by the New York City Field Office.

4. Delivery of materials reflecting the reason why an FBIHQ file was opened and material indicating whether there was subversive or

SEE PAGE 6 for Note

JAM
GK

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

KAM:cap cap
(8)

834
PM

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

NOC 18

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED SEE NOTE PAGE 6

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1163

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

extremist activity with respect to the following organizations whose names and FBIHQ file numbers were provided to the Select Committee on October 9, 1975:

a.	Communist Infiltration Council of Jewish Women	100-432543
b.	East Bay Community Forum	100-432848
c.	Knoxville Area Human Relations Council	100-433348
d.	George Orwell Forum Yale University	100-434048
e.	Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs	100-434168
f.	Saugus Unitarian-Universalist Church Forum	100-440365
g.	San Diego Peace Action	100-440530
h.	Universities Committee on the Problems of War and Peace	100-440833
i.	Communist Infiltration of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	100-441132
j.	The Free University at Ann Arbor	100-445323
k.	Champaign-Urbana Council for Discussion on Vietnam	100-446029
l.	Wellsprings Ecumenical Renewal Association	100-453618

Rerep 3/11/41, WDC, containing request for info. from NAVY to FBI. Per L. Hendricks, 11/20/75, NIS says OK to Diss. to SSC.

m.	Northern Virginia Coalition of Citizens Concerned About the ABM-Sponsored Town Meeting at Alexandria, Virginia, June 3, 1969	100-454103
n.	Reservists Against the War	100-469726
o.	Bald Hill Farm Commune	100-472039
p.	Anti-Crosstown Coalition	100-472814
q.	Washington Area Committee for Soviet Jewry	100-480590
r.	Committee for Chilean Democracy	100-481206
s.	National Conference on Amnesty; Information Concerning	100-481516
t.	National Conference on Amnesty; Information Concerning	100-481899
u.	Council for United Civil Rights Leadership	157-972
v.	Canadian Youth Corps	157-1074
w.	Ormondsville Fellowship Club, Inc.	157-5281
x.	Black Student Union, Brevard Junior College, Cocoa, Florida	157-13416
y.	Martin Luther King, Jr., Memorial Center, Inc.	157-13791
z.	Black Student Union University of Nevada Las Vegas, Nevada	157-13994

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

aa.	Greensboro Association of Poor People (GAPP)	157-15692
bb.	American Christian Action Council	157-24293
cc.	National Tenants Organization	157-26335
dd.	South Carolina Council of Human Relations	157-27014
ee.	California Rehabilition Center, Norco, California	157-32882

Reference is further made to our memoranda dated July 17, 1975, and September 25, 1975, which provided background information and documents pertaining to the SI, ADEX, and RI.

As you are aware, a computerized ADEX listing is prepared monthly at FBIHQ. The SI list was prepared in the same manner and, as with the former SI, when a new monthly ADEX list is prepared copies of the old list are destroyed inasmuch as they are outdated and no longer serve a useful purpose. As you have been previously advised, names appearing on the former SI and the ADEX have been printed on 5 X 8 cards with a single name printed on each card. Background information, file numbers, and type of activity in which the individual is engaged are also placed on these cards. As you are aware, approximately 15,000 of these cards, all outdated, have been located as FBIHQ. These cards include some which contain the identity of individuals who were maintained on the Priority III level of the former SI and all ADEX cards deleted or cancelled since its inception.

During the initial period of establishing the ADEX, in order to obviate the need for conducting massive file reviews, the ADEX consisted primarily of the identity of those individuals who had been maintained on the former SI. Although these names were originally placed in this manner on the new ADEX, as cases were reviewed under our then existing reporting procedures, each case was to be reviewed on its own merits utilizing the then current criteria for ADEX to determine whether continued inclusion on the ADEX was warranted. If not, the individual's

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

name was deleted. As previously indicated, during 1972 the ADEX was evaluated and revised. Following this revision, the number of individuals who were included on the ADEX began to decline and thus the high number of cancelled cards. In accordance with Bureau policy, which was instituted during the SI program, these cancelled cards are maintained at FBIHQ for a period of three years and there is no way to reconstuct a former SI or ADEX list for a particular time period by reviewing these cancelled cards. These cards, however, will reflect the identity of those individuals who have been placed on the SI and the ADEX for the period for which these cards were maintained.

Per your request, these outdated SI and ADEX cards are available for review by appropriate SSC representives at FBIHQ. In this regard, SSC Staff Members Martha Talley and John T. Elliff have had access to these cards on October 30, 1975, and November 7, 1975, respectively.

During Mr. Elliff's review of these cards, the names Shelley Blum, Emanuel James Brisker, Jr., and Gregory Allan Calvert were selected by Mr. Elliff in connection with request number two of your October 28, 1975, letter. Documents requested regarding these individuals are enclosed.

A review of pertinent files at FBIHQ regarding the SI and the RI indicates there are no other versions of the former SI or RI at FBIHQ. Contact was also made with knowledgeable individuals of our New York City Field Office and it was determined these programs had been handled in accordance with then existing FBIHQ policy and no other versions of these programs were compiled by that office.

Materials requested for delivery under item number four of your October 28, 1975, letter are enclosed. In this regard, it is noted the correct FBIHQ file number for the Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs is 100-400394 and the correct file number for the file regarding Communist Infiltration of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is 61-3176. In order to be responsive to your request, pertinent documents of the type desired are being furnished regarding these organizations from these files.

Enclosures (10)

1 - The Attorney General

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE:

During Mr. Elliff's review of the cancelled SI and ADEX cards, he indicated additional access to the cards would be requested to obtain the identity of other individuals besides the three selected by him 11/7/75.

SA James Graham, IS-1 Section, handled the request for documents listed under items 4u through 4ee, all of which pertained to the IS-1 Section.

The matter relating to other versions of the SI and RI compiled by our New York Office were discussed with New York personnel SAC James O. Ingram and Field Supervisor Raymond Ruckel on 11/10/75, and 11/11/75, respectively.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/18/75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

Caption of Document:

10/28/75 request - SI, ADEX

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: P. V. Daly Date: 11/20/75

Received by: Epstein

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1163

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
11/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 10/28/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

For review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FBIHQ outdated SI and ADEX cards and delivery of materials on three individuals selected by SSC Staff Member Elliff; materials reflecting the reason why an FBI HQ file was opened on various organizations.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

The Attorney General

November 17, 1975

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Director, FBI

0

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Reference is made to my letter dated July 1, 1975, which enclosed a memorandum of the same date relating to a request for documentary materials made by the Senate Select Committee (SSC) under the date of May 14, 1975.

The referenced memorandum, on page 1, paragraph 4, refers to a briefing by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the National Security Council, presided over by the President, on November 6, 1958. A further review of our records has determined this briefing by Mr. Hoover was actually furnished to the President and members of his Cabinet on November 6, 1958. Although it is likely members of the National Security Council were present, technically it was a briefing of the President and his Cabinet.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum correcting this technical error and requesting the Committee appropriately change its records.

A copy of the memorandum is provided for your records.

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

REC-7 62-116395-1162

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

DEC 12 1975

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

DR:lfj
(11)

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 16 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

62-116395

November 17, 1975

**UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

**RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
"HUSTON PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND
OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS**

COINTELPRO

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

Reference is made to memorandum dated July 1, 1975, which responded to a SSC request under the date of May 14, 1975, for documents relating to this Bureau's former Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros).

Page 1, paragraph 4, of referenced memorandum refers to a briefing by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the National Security Council, presided over by the President, November 6, 1958. Enclosed with the memorandum was a document with a cover page alluding to this briefing of the National Security Council.

A current review of the records of this Bureau has determined the briefing by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on November 6, 1958, was actually furnished to the President and members of his Cabinet. Although it may be presumed that some members of the Cabinet were also members of the National Security Council, it is requested you correct your records to more accurately indicate the true nature of the briefing.

This is also to confirm information orally furnished by Supervisor David Ryan of the FBI to SSC staff member Barbara Banoff on November 13, 1975, at SSC offices. At that time,

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

DR:lfj
(10)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1162

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Cointelpro

Miss Banoff was advised of the above change and was specifically requested to correct pages 47-49 of Special Agent Ryan's deposition to the SSC dated October 21, 1975. It was also requested any other references to the briefing on November 6, 1958, which might appear in the deposition of Special Agent Ryan dated October 16, 1975, and October 21, 1975, be appropriately changed.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

See letter to the Attorney General dated 11/17/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," prepared by DR:lfj.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/17/75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

Caption of Document:

5/14/75 request (COINTELPRO)

Originating Office: FBI 11 20/A

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/25/75

Received by: Sherry Towell

Title: HOM

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHC

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Counterintelligence

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Submitting to the SSC corrections to be made on information previously furnished them.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 11/17/75

FROM : F. J. Cassidy

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/CHC

Reference is made to a memorandum dated 11/12/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams, Deputy Associate Director, in which a recommendation was made that the Intelligence Division determine whether there is a memorandum describing a briefing of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark by Mr. Cartha DeLoach, former Assistant to the Director, concerning the Counterintelligence Program.

Mr. DeLoach, during an interview under oath by staff members of the Senate Select Committee on 11/11/75, advised that he had briefed Ramsey Clark regarding the Counterintelligence Program and, when asked whether he had written a memorandum regarding that briefing, advised that he could not specifically recall whether a memorandum was prepared. During the interview by Committee staff members, they advised Mr. DeLoach that they had asked for such documentation from the Bureau, but a memorandum indicating Mr. DeLoach had briefed Ramsey Clark regarding the Counterintelligence Program was not received among the documents furnished by the Bureau.

ST-110 REC-7 62-116395-1160 17 1975

This will advise that additional review of Bureau files by personnel of the Analytical Research Unit has failed to disclose any memorandum which describes a briefing of Clark by Mr. DeLoach regarding the Counterintelligence Program.

ACTION:

None. For information.

62-116395
1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

DKP:lfj
(7)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

84 DEC 16 1975

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Paul Daly
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

SAC, Denver (105-4151) 12/1/75

Director, FBI (105-78256)

MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/02 BY SP2ALM/GHL

THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS-INFORMATION
CONCERNING
SENSTUDY-75

Enclosed for Denver and Chicago are one copy each of a letter dated 11/14/75 from Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Office of Deputy Attorney General, to John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division, FBI, with enclosed letter to Mr. Shaheen from John T. Elliff, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC).

Denver is requested to immediately prepare a communication including responses to FBI questions 4, 5, 12, 13 and 14 and 19, in addition to conducting indices searches on names listed in question 16.

Chicago is requested to immediately prepare a communication including responses to FBI questions 10, 11 and 18. Include in communication any information relating to Leonard Carlin, Susan Kresge and the World University Service in Chicago considered to be of possible significance to the Bureau in preparing its response to the SSC.

Enclosures - 2

2 - Chicago (105-8344)(Enclosures - 2)

62-116395 -

NOT RECORDED
9 DEC 3 1975

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy-75)

RLM:emj
(11)

SEE NOTE, PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105- [illegible] 45

above 1152

DUPLICATE YELLOW

84 DEC 11 1975

Letter to Denver
Re: Thomas Riha
105-78256

NOTE:

The SSC has proposed 19 questions to the FBI and 9 questions to INS relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, in March, 1969. A number of the questions from the Committee require input from the Denver and Chicago Offices.

2 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

The Attorney General November 14, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/CHC

Reference is made to the letter of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated November 4, 1975, setting forth the identities of a number of documents relating to this Bureau's discontinued Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros), which have been previously furnished to the Committee, and requesting these documents be declassified for public hearings.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum which responds to the request of the SSC.

Although this Bureau has declassified the documents as requested by the SSC, you should note that one of these documents consists of excerpts from former FBI Director Hoover's briefing of the President and his Cabinet on November 6, 1958, and a second document is a memorandum to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover from Attorney General Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach dated September 3, 1965. You may desire to clear the declassification of the former with the White House and to afford your consideration to the declassification of the latter which originated within the Department.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

REC-7 62-116395-1160

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

DEC 12 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ENCLOSURE
ENC. BEHIND FILE

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

DR:lfj (11)

DELIVERED

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DEC 16 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

62-116395

November 14, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC
MDR 16

Reference is made to the letter of the SSC dated November 4, 1975, requesting certain documents relating to this Bureau's Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros) be declassified for public hearings.

This Bureau has declassified the documents listed in the SSC letter dated November 4, 1975, for utilization at public hearings, provided the excisions which were incorporated in the documents when they were originally referred to you are continued and also with the provision that the following additional excisions are made.

As regards material excerpted from former FBI Director Hoover's "off-the-record" statements, as presented to the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, the following additional material should be excised:

In the material prepared for Fiscal Year (FY) 1959, page 1, paragraph 3 of the text which begins "Through informant coverage..." should be excised.

In the material prepared for testimony for FY 1960, on the second page the paragraph beginning "Although leaders of the Communist Party..." should be excised.

In the material prepared for FY 1961, page 2, the remaining portions of the paragraph beginning "Among these documents was a report..." should be excised. It is noted this paragraph ends with the words "...was written in the Czech language."

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

DR:lfj
(10)

WPW/NEB
LOOC

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI. ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62 116395 - 1160

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

In the FY 1963 material, on page 2, paragraph 1, the sentence beginning with "For example..." and ending "...the Bolshevik Revolution" should be excised.

In the last paragraph on page 2 of this document, the word "key" in line 3 should be excised.

In the enclosure to former Director Hoover's letter to the Honorable Robert F. Kennedy dated January 10, 1961, on page 2 the paragraph which has already been partially excised and which begins "A CP leader..." and which ends "...of the world" should be excised in its entirety. On page 3, the last remaining paragraph which begins "Through our security..." and ends "...aware of its plans" should be excised. On page 4 in the last paragraph, the sentence beginning with "In one phase..." and ending with "...monolithic unity" should be excised.

In the Director's letter to the Attorney General dated September 2, 1965, paragraph 2, the following words or numbers should be excised: "two thousand," "774," and "two each day." These same excisions should be made in the Director's letter to the Honorable Marvin Watson dated September 2, 1965.

With regard to the declassification of item number 1 identified in the SSC letter of November 4, 1975, it should be noted that the briefing by former Director Hoover on November 6, 1958, was afforded the President and his Cabinet rather than the President and the National Security Council.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

See letter to the Attorney General dated 11/14/75, captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," prepared by DR:lfj.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/14/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re SSC req. 11/4/75 Declassification of documents re Bureau's discontinued Counterintelligence Programs.

Originating Office: FBI -11 20 A

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/25/75

Received by: Sherry Towell

Title: AOM

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/GHL

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-116

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/4/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Counterintelligence

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials previously delivered have been declassified for utilization at public hearing, provided the excisions which were incorporated in the documents when they were originally referred to SSC are continued and also additional excisions were made.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP 2 ALM/EHC

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5. pd

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic

SECRET

The Attorney General

November 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

O

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

The enclosed memorandum is to report contact between Staff Members of the SSC and the FBI's representatives at the U. S. Embassies, Brasilia, Brazil; and Buenos Aires, Argentina. (S)

An extra copy of the memorandum is provided in the event you wish to furnish it to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Dated 6/6 HF-j PVD, 11/12/75

10/30/00 MDR 16
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

RLM:emj
(10)

RLM

REC-7 62-116395-1159

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

edm

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

5-WOC

18 DEC 12 1975

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 DEC 16 1975

SECRET

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

November 11, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: VISITS OF SSC STAFF
MEMBERS TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHES

10/30/00, MDR 16

CLASSIFIED BY SP3ALM/GHL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

On September 19, 1975, Mr. David Aaron, an investigator for SSC was briefed at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) in preparation for his planned visit to Brasilia, Brazil, on September 22, 1975, and Buenos Aires, Argentina, on September 25, 1975, in connection with the Committee's inquiry into U. S. intelligence activities. Mr. Aaron was briefed on the overall role and mission of the FBI's Legal Attaches (Legats), and specifically on the activities and functions of the Legats at Brasilia and Buenos Aires. He was advised that Legat, Brasilia, utilized two confidential sources in order to facilitate the prompt coverage of leads in Brazil. He was also told that Legat, Mexico City, and Legat, Brasilia, were the only Legat offices that utilized paid confidential sources. (S)

Legat, Buenos Aires, informed FBIHQ that the U. S. Embassy at Buenos Aires received instructions, classified "Secret," from the U. S. Department of State with regard to the visit of David Aaron, a former U. S. Department of State Foreign Service Officer, and William Truehart, a former U. S. Ambassador, to the U. S. Embassies at Brasilia, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo and the U. S. Consul General in Rio de Janeiro. The

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

RLM:emj
(9)

RLM

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

SEE NOTE, PAGE FOUR

SECRET

Classified by 0283
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

WOC

WRW
HEW

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

62 116395-1159

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: VISITS OF SSC STAFF
MEMBERS TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHES

Department of State advised that the primary objective of the visitors was to discuss with the Ambassador and members of his staff the relationships and exercise of authority by the Ambassador of the intelligence activities in the field. The Department of State further advised that operational details, sources and methods were not construed to be legitimate avenues of inquiry by the SSC Staff Members.

Legat, Brasilia, was interviewed on September 22, 1975, by Messrs. Aaron and Truehart, with Aaron being dominant in the interviewing process. The interview was directed mainly toward attempts to elicit examples whereby Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had withheld dissemination of information of interest to other agencies. Inquiries were made concerning CIA activities inside and outside the Embassy. Specific questions were placed with Legat to ascertain if the FBI was involved in Soviet Embassy "walk-ins" as well as recruitment of double agents and CIA-oriented operations. Discussion concerning Legat's role and functions in Brasilia appeared to be routine, with few, if any, pointed questions directed at FBI operations overseas. The subject of two paid confidential sources in Brasilia was briefly discussed and both SSC investigators appeared understanding and in agreement with the necessity of each confidential source to serve FBI's and U. S. Government's best interests in Brazil. The question seemingly bearing the most weight during the interview concerned possible unauthorized activities of CIA and its lack of cooperation and coordination with FBI and the Defense Attache's Office. The duration of the interview was approximately forty-five minutes.(S)

Legat, Buenos Aires, was interviewed by the two SSC Staff Members on September 26, 1975. Again Aaron played the dominant role during interview. He commenced

the interview by stating that the operations of Legats, Brasilia, and Buenos Aires, were not the type of Legat operations he desired to review, indicating that Mexico City Legat's operations were more of the type of interest to them. Aaron asked pointed questions concerning the mechanics of Legat reporting on intelligence information developed locally to FBIHQ and the local coordination of this information with the Embassy components. Aaron requested the Legat provide him with the general nature of intelligence developed and reported by the Legat to the Embassy and FBIHQ. He was told that generally international and local terrorism were the prime topics of Legat reporting. Inquiry was also made into the reason for FBI expansion of foreign liaison activities in 1970. He was told that the Legat was not personally aware of any special reason other than that the FBI liaison operations required additional personnel and Aaron was referred to FBIHQ for any additional information in this regard. [Legat was asked whether the CIA Station had ever requested Legat to secure data from FBI computer banks on Argentine residents of CIA interest who had previously resided in the U. S. Legat's reply was in the negative. Other questions mainly dealt with cooperation and coordination activities between the FBI and the CIA at the Embassy.] Inquiry was also made into the relationship of the Drug Enforcement Agency and FBI overseas. The interview lasted approximately thirty-five minutes. (S)

Upon arrival in Buenos Aires, Mr. Aaron was suffering from an intestinal problem and remained in his Buenos Aires hotel on September 25, 1975. The Charge D' Affaires hosted a small luncheon for former Ambassador Truchart on that date which Legat, Buenos Aires, attended. Truchart was very open regarding the operations of the SSC

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: VISITORS OF SSC STAFF
MEMBERS TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHES

and stated that he felt the Committee had lost its perspective and that he believed that various Senators were engaging in a game of "one-upmanship" in revealing so-called sensational disclosures of CIA activities. Truchart stated he personally felt that the original purpose of the Committee to afford an objective review of U. S. intelligence operations had been lost.

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" in conformance with the classification applied to information furnished to the U. S. Embassies at Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Montevideo and the U. S. Consul General in Rio de Janerio, by the U. S. Department of State. The information was transmitted by the U. S. Department of State via its Secret Roger Channel. (S)

The details of the interviews are located in Legat, Brasilia, teletype to the Bureau 9/23/75 and Legat, Buenos Aires, teletype to the Bureau 9/26/75, both classified "Secret" and both captioned "Senstudy-75."

Mr. Aaron was briefed at FBIHQ by Section Chief Vadja V. Kolombatovic, Harvey C. Flemister and Robert A. Bermingham of the Liaison Section, Intelligence Division.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☒	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of interview by SSC Staff Members of FBI's representatives at the U.S. Embassies, Brasilia, Brazil and Buenos Aires, Argentina.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Liaison, foreign

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In Brasilia the interview was directed mainly toward attempts to elicit examples whereby CIA had withheld dissemination of information of interest to other agencies. In the Buenos Aires office questions concerning the mechanics of Legat reporting on intellig intelligence information developed locally to FBIHQ and the local coordination of this information with the Embassy components, the general nature of intelligence developed and reported. Inquiry was also made into the reason for FBI expansion of foreign liaison activities in 1970.

62-116395

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Pd

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

2-Mr. Mintz
(1-Mr. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 10/31/75

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM

Memorandum advises concerning proposed SSC hearing on FBI foreign counterintelligence (CI) matters.

On 10/30/75 Mr. John Elliff, SSC Staff Member, met with Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Intelligence Division (INTD). Also present were Section Chiefs W. A. Branigan (CI-1) and W. O. Cregar (CI-2) and Acting Section Chief F. J. Cassidy (IS-3) and Unit Chief E. W. Larson, Training Unit (IS-3). Mr. Elliff advised that the Committee proposed to have an executive session tentatively scheduled for the morning of Friday, 11/14/75, which would deal with foreign CI operations. In addition to representatives from the FBI they envisioned also having present representatives from CIA and the United States military intelligence services. He stated that the session would be scheduled for approximately 2 and one-half hours.

During the conference the following three themes were outlined by Mr. Elliff as the probable areas of discussion:

1. Changes in CI operations during recent years

Items discussed as probably worthy of attention were physical surveillances, the walk-in operations, defection (recruitment-in-place), CI training programs. Also suggested as a prime topic was the future projections concerning administration of foreign CI operations in the United States, i.e., new division for CI work within FBI; separate CI service; or other modifications.

62-116395 - 1158

DEC [illegible] 1975

REC-7

EWL:jvl
(5)

ST-110

CONTINUED - OVER

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION,
11/5/75, Page 4.

8 4 [illegible] 1 8 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: U. S. Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

2. Counter-subversion

In this category Mr. Elliff indicated a particular interest in foreign influence in domestic groups and the assessment of danger/risk in investigations undertaken to detect such influence. He brought up the disclosures of surveillances by CIA of Americans abroad at the request of the FBI. He also indicated an interest in borderline cases, such as those in which domestic counter-subversion investigations develop a CI aspect, and was particularly interested in the policies and coordinating mechanisms affecting such instances.

3. Positive intelligence collection

In this category Mr. Elliff was interested in the responsibility for collection of positive intelligence within the United States and the apparent gap which existed in this field. He was also interested in situations under which the FBI might target friendly foreign intelligence services in the United States for CI attention.

Considerable discussion was held during the conference during which INTD representatives set forth the FBI's position and experience in the many areas noted. They are being set forth here to illustrate the probable scope and nature of the executive session which is being planned. Further discussions will be held with the SSC staff to clarify these matters and a firmer agenda for the proposed 11/14/75 hearing will be developed.

With respect to the proposed plan to include representatives of CIA and the military intelligence services along with the FBI in the proposed session of 2 and one half hours, it was pointed out to Mr. Elliff that this would not appear to be a very productive procedure. The CI perspectives and responsibilities of CIA and the military services are much more narrow and generally in a completely different context than the CI perspectives and responsibilities of the FBI. These differences, particularly in the short

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: U. S. Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

time allotted, appear to represent a disadvantage to all parties concerned, including the Committee. It was pointed out that the FBI, in particular, would have considerable difficulty in presenting a comprehensive and valid picture of its own CI operations under the conditions imposed by such a session. Mr. Elliff, after considering these objections, stated that he could understand the FBI position but was somewhat doubtful considering the pressures under which the Committee was operating that he would be able to alter this situation.

ACTION:

None. For information.

EWL

JAM
JCF

WRW

See Addendum
Next Page By
Legal Counsel Div,

Memo Cregar to Mr. Wannall, 10/31/75
Re: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, JCF:mtm, 11/5/75:

This matter will be pursued with Mr. Elliff by the Office of Congressional Affairs.

Rescheduled to 12/3-4/75
per Daly. JCF 11/26

JAM
JCF

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

Airtel

To: SAC, Washington Field Office 1/23/76

From: Director, FBI (62-116395) — 1158X

SENSTUDY 75
BUDED 1/30/76

Enclosed is a self-explanatory letter from the Attorney General dated 1/12/76.

Joseph Kraft, the subject of the inquiry, is the well-known newspaper columnist and a Washington, D. C. resident. During the past year, information contained in FBI Headquarters files relating to Kraft has been furnished to the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC) pursuant to SSC requests. Kraft and his attorneys have reviewed the material furnished to the SSC regarding him in accordance with an agreement between Kraft and the Attorney General, referred to in paragraph one of the enclosure. As noted in the enclosure, Kraft, as a result of a review of information regarding the burglary of his residence on 9/3/69, raised certain questions.

WFO should furnish FBIHQ with Xeroxes of all serials in its files which relate to the 9/3/69 burglary except WFO airtel and letter to the Bureau dated 9/4/69 and 10/17/69, respectively, captioned "UNSUB; Burglary of residence of Joseph Kraft, 3021 N. Street N. W., Washington, D. C., Loss of silverware, 9/3/69 in excess of $5,000.00 ITSP (OO:WFO)" file number 87-17564. This material should of course include any serials which would indicate the manner in which the burglary was reported to WFO and how the conversation about the burglary took place.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Enclosure

1 - 87-107157

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

TEB:en
(10)

MAILED 10
JAN 23 1976
FBI

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 FEB 1 1976

Airtel to Washington Field Office
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

In addition to the review of all files pertinent to this inquiry, WFO should review the newspaper morgues of daily newspapers published in Washington, D. C., at such time for articles concerning the burglary and which may shed some additional light on this matter.

This matter must be given expeditious attention and results submitted by airtel to reach Bureau by c.o.b. 1/30/76.

NOTE:

Bureau memorandum dated July 23, 1973, referred to in enclosure and to which Kraft raised a question sets forth the information that Kraft advised WFO on 9/4/69 of the burglary of his residence 9/3/69. Kraft now has no recollection of having spoken to the FBI about the burglary. Pertinent FBIHQ main case files on Kraft (62-115682, 65-75629, 87-107157 and 105-68548) were reviewed by Supervisor T. E. Burns in connection with this inquiry. Such review failed to develop required information. Review by WFO as directed within should develop appropriate information necessary to resolve this matter.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Handle plo

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ✓
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs ✓
Files & Com. ✓
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓ TWL
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Clarence Kelley, Director
FBI

DATE: January 12, 1976

FROM : Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

SUBJECT: Joseph Kraft burglary

Among the documents from Federal Bureau of Investigation files provided to my office under a cover memorandum dated October 7, 1975, there was a memorandum dated July 18, 1973 and titled "Joseph Kraft." This document, along with the others, was provided to Mr. Kraft's attorneys pursuant to the agreement of August 5, 1975, for review before the department furnished it to the Senate Select Committee.

When Mr. Kraft and his attorneys reviewed the July 18, 1973, document they raised a question about a reference on page two of the document which stated:

> "On September 4, 1969, Joseph Kraft advised the Washington Field Office of the FBI that he left his home (3021 N Street, N. W., Washington D. C.) at approximately 9:20 P.M. on September 3, 1969, to visit with former Governor Averell Harriman who resided a few doors from the Kraft residence. At approximately 9:45 P.M. Mrs. Kraft, who was in the second floor bedroom of the residence, came down the stairs and found the door open.
>
> "Subsequently, it was discovered by Mr. and Mrs. Kraft several items of sterling silver were missing from the dining room and the pantry which items, according to the Krafts, had an estimated value of approximately $10,000.
>
> "A crime scene search and processing of the crime scene by the Metropolitan Police Department produced negative results. No forcible entry was noted and Mr. Kraft advised investigative officers of the Metropolitan Police Department that he had probably left the front door ajar when he departed the residence.

62-116395-1158X

FEB 11 1976

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-75-629

JAN 14 1976

Airtel to WFO
TEB:ed 1/23/76

ORIGINAL AT ARCHIVES
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-25-95 BY SP12 BTJ/SG 342-679

5-8

File 62-116395

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

cc Mainfile on Kraft 65-75629

5010-110

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

> "On the morning of September 4, 1969, the Metropolitan Police Department was advised by the Washington National Airport Police that some silverware had been found near one of the entrances to the terminal at the Washington National Airport. The silverware was recovered by the Metropolitan Police Department and processed for latent fingerprints without success and the items were returned to Mrs. Kraft upon her identification of the silverware. No suspects were developed by either the FBI or the Metropolitan Police Department in the investigation of the matter."

Mr. Kraft does not recall having spoken to the FBI about the burglary. Documents provided more recently to Mr. Kraft pursuant to the August 5, 1975, agreement do not shed any light on this question.

The incident is curious in that the only reference to it comes in the memorandum of July 18, 1973, discussing a press report about the activities of John D. Erlichman. Could you have someone look into this matter for me? The obvious questions are: What other documents in FBI files say about the September 3, 1969, burglary? What files of the Bureau or its Washington field office indicate about how the conversation about the burglary took place?

1-Mr.[illegible]dams
2-Mr. Mintz
(1-Mr. Hotis)
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Duffin

65-116395

December 2, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR DELIVERY OF MATERIALS
WHICH ARE SUPPLEMENTARY TO PRIOR
SSC REQUESTS OF JULY 28, 1975,
PART 3. D., AUGUST 20, 1975,
PART 3. 1. A. AND SEPTEMBER 18,
1975, PART 1. D. AND PART 2.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 18, 1975, which requested access or delivery of materials, many of which are supplementary to prior SSC requests of July 28, 1975, Part 3. D., and August 20, 1975, Part 3. 1. A.

On October 29, 1975, Mr. Lester Seidel, SSC Staff Member, requested delivery of materials relating to the following categories of SSC request of September 18, 1975:

1. D. Democratic National Convention 1968

Enclosed materials were prepared by or for Marlin Johnson, Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Field Office of the FBI, during the Democratic National Convention.

Information relating to the current location and employment of Marlin Johnson was the subject of SSC request of August 19, 1975, and was furnished to the SSC by FBI memorandum dated September 5, 1975.

2. Files on Warren Commission Critics

Efforts to locate original authority and/or order to provide for dissemination of materials furnished to the SSC under this category on October 7, 1975, have been made without success.

WRW/TWL

WCC

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

JRM:jvl
(9)

62-116

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCLOSURE

1157

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

X DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED 12/3/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

X SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 9/18/75, requesting delivery of praviously access materials of 7/28/75, Part 3d and 8/20/75, Part 3, 1a

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Surveillance, electronic
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Democratic National Convention 1968. Materials prepared by or for Marlin Johnson, SAC of Chicago Field offic, also current location and employment of Marlin Johnson; efforts to locate original authority and/or order to provide for disseminationof materials relating to files on Warren Commission Critics have been made without success; memorandum dated 2/16/68 relating to Mark Lane, no information relating to origin, authority for preparation or dissemination located.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

238-10332

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 7/30/68

asmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ATTN: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-44963)

SUBJECT: DEMCON

As the Bureau is aware, I am gravely concerned over the potential for serious violence occurring in Chicago during the period of the Democratic Convention, which commences August 26, 1968 and the days immediately preceding this convention. Had the convention occurred within 30 days after the President made his announcement that he was not going to run for reelection and after the Viet Nam peace talks started in Paris, I feel that we might not have had serious violence as these two occurrences took much of the steam out of many of the organizations comprising the "New Left". Their direction at that time was primarily against President JOHNSON and against Viet Nam and much of the steam went out of their programs following these two announcements.

It is our observation, however, that these "New Left" organizations have now had time to redirect their programs and are now concentrating primarily on demonstrations and activities against Vice President HUMPHREY, characterized by them as the "Dump Humphrey Campaign". The fact that the war still continues in Viet Nam, has again given emphasis to the organizations which exist on the basic theme of anti-Viet Nam. I am thinking particularly of such organizations as the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam, Students for Democratic Society, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam and the Youth International Party (Yippies).

3 - Bureau 2 cc's 92[illegible] 157-[illegible]
1 - Chicago
MWJ:wmn
(4)

REC 43 16 AUG 20 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

62-116395-1157

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-8589)   DATE: 8/13/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-44963)

SUBJECT: DEMCON

On August 12, 1968, USA THOMAS A. FORAN contacted SAC, Chicago, advising that WARREN CHRISTOPHER, Deputy U.S. Attorney General, desired to meet with the SAC, Chicago.

As a result of the above request, SAC, Chicago, and Supervisor RICHARD L. STRAIN met briefly with Mr. WARREN CHRISTOPHER and Mr. WES POMEROY of the U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., in the presence of USA FORAN in his offices.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER was most congenial and expressed his high regard for the FBI and asked for a current evaluation of activities in the Chicago area which could possibly affect the Democratic National Convention (DNC) being held the last week of August, 1968. Mr. CHRISTOPHER was advised that all information has been previously furnished to him by letterhead memoranda and was in his possession and he was assured all information coming to our attention would be immediately furnished to the Department and to the USA in Chicago. A brief discussion of current trends followed relative to current intelligence regarding the activities of anti-war and Negro militant organizations which have proposed disruptive tactics at the DNC.

At one point in the discussion mention was made of the fact that the Youth International Party, aka Yippies, was currently holding talks with the city administration in an effort to obtain necessary park permits to have their followers live and sleep in one of the Chicago area parks during the week of the convention and hold a "happening" which the Yippies referred to as the "Festival of Life." During this discussion USA FORAN confidentially advised that when he had received the FBI's notification of the anticipated plans on the part of the Yippies, he had contacted certain city officials known to him and attempted to persuade them against the issuance of such a permit in view of the known moral conduct of such groups. USA FORAN advised he had been assured that such permits would not be granted. He stated these permits have as yet not been granted and that his sources have indicated no serious consideration has been given to the request by responsible Chicago city officials.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

2-Bureau (RM)
2-Chicago
1-157-2410 DEMCON
RLS:meb
(4)

100924 9

157-[illegible]-42

REC 22

EX-1

62-116395-6

AUG 16 1968

ENCLOSURE

57

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

For the Bureau's information, Sgt. JOSEPH GRUBISIC, Intelligence Section, Chicago PD, advised previously that he had learned from DAVID STAHL of the Mayor's Office, Chicago, that they had received a telephone call, a couple of days ago, from one WES POMEROY of the U.S. Attorney General's Office, to the effect that the Attorney General wanted the Chicago city officials to give every consideration to the granting of the permits requested by the Yippies.

Sgt. GRUBISIC was unable to comment on the feeling of the city administration to this request but was of the opinion that such permits would not be granted as requested. Sgt. GRUBISIC based his opinion on the fact that four representatives of the Yippies, from New York City, had gone to the office of the Deputy Superintendent of the Chicago PD and had requested immunity from arrest for all Yippies during the convention for crimes around the possession of narcotics. The Yippies stated that any arrest would cause the Yippie community to cause large scale riots, and the blame of any riots resulting from such arrests would fall on the Chicago PD.

These representatives of the Yippies were advised in no uncertain terms that the laws of the City of Chicago would be strictly enforced fairly on all persons and that no one would be granted any immunity during this period.

The Bureau's attention is invited to the August 9, 1968, issue of the "Daily World," daily publication of the Communist Party, USA (CP), wherein an article appeared on page one captioned "Rallies Will Ring Demo Convention" written by CARYL DAVIAU, current member, CP of Illinois, in which the reporter indicates that the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, which is working around the clock to mobilize demonstrations against the convention, has petitioned the Justice Department to investigate the Chicago Police to determine if there is any conspiracy to deprive "us" of our full civil liberties.

Chicago will continue to follow these matters closely and immediately advise the Bureau, and continue to disseminate all information of intelligence collected to interested agencies.

No recommendation is being made nor is Chicago involving itself in any plans affecting the issuance of the abovementioned park permit.

SSC - REQUEST OF 9/18/75
Part I.D

Return

62-116395-1157

ENCLOSURE

As the Bureau is aware, Chicago is in receipt of information from confidential sources indicating a potential for demonstration arising out of the "New Left" calling for direct confrontation with the Chicago Police Department as a diversionary tactic for a "crash-in" at the convention site. Sources have also reported independent action on the part of individuals to cause some form of "sabotage" activity inside the convention itself. Information received from confidential informants in other divisions indicates attempts on the part of dissident young people not organizationally affiliated with the "New Left", to hire 50 buses out of New York to bring demonstrators to Chicago and a caravan of militant Latin Americans to come from the Miami, Florida area to Chicago for the specific purpose of disrupting the Democratic National Convention.

The Chicago area activists in the Youth International Party are currently planning a "Festival of Lights" in one of the parks on Chicago's lakefront during the period of the Democratic National Convention. This "Festival of Lights" characterized by Chicago area Yippie leadership as being peaceful to show America that there is an alternative to the "festival of death", or the Democratic National Convention. However, sources report that there are elements within the Youth International Party which are calling for direct confrontation with the Chicago Police Department during the "Festival of Lights".

There is a very definite indication that more and more plans are being made by these groups to cause violence and trouble and undoubtedly this will increase even more as we approach the time of the convention. I strongly feel that we must use every possible means at our command to insure that the Director, the President of the United States and other pertinent officials are furnished every possible piece of intelligence information which we can gather from any source.

I am specifically asking for the services of two Special Agents who proved during their assignment in Chicago that they are expecially well qualified to handle informants and make contacts in the "New Left" area. They proved during their assignments in Chicago that they have the knowhow, the interest, the dedication and the personality to be highly successful in

this area. I would like to utilize them specifically to work cases in the "New Left" area, make contacts and would also request authority where necessary to utilize them in undercover work under my personal supervision and guidance. They would be specifically assigned fulltime to solicit information from the leadership of the "New Left" concerning their plans for demonstrations, confrontations and disruptions of the Democratic Convention and matters relating thereto.

I am, therefore, urgently requesting that SA WILLIAM J. DILLON, III, presently assigned to Los Angeles and SA WAYNE F. MANIS, under transer to Anniston, Alabama Resident Agency, be assigned on a temporary basis in Chicago for the above stated purpose from August 15, 1968 through August 31, 1968. Both men, while young in years in the Bureau, demonstrated outstanding judgment and I am convinced that their assignments, as recommended above, would prove to be most beneficial in carrying out our responsibilities in connection with the Democratic Convention.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-8589)

DATE: 8/14/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-44963)

SUBJECT: DEMCON

This will confirm telephonic contact between SAC, Chicago, and Assistant Director N. P. CALLAHAN on August 13, 1968.

As the Bureau is aware, the Democratic National Convention will be held in Chicago from August 26 - 28, 1968. Voluminous information is being received from all offices which requires immediate handling. In addition, tension is growing in the ghetto areas of Chicago particularly the west side, the south side and the near north side. Also, tension has been growing in such Chicago suburban areas as Harvey, Chicago Heights, East Chicago Heights and Maywood. Incidents are occurring every night and throughout the night requiring immediate preparation of teletypes, letterhead memoranda and other communications. It is, therefore, necessary as approved by Mr. CALLAHAN for one and on some shifts two stenographers to be on duty from 4:00 PM to midnight and from midnight to 8:00 AM, seven days a week through August 30, 1968. These stenographers have been selected on a purely voluntary basis. The authority for these special shifts will be considered to expire close of business August 30, 1968, and thereafter we will revert back to the regularly approved stenographic shifts.

2 - Bureau
1 - Chicago
MWJ/sff
(3)

REC-63 157-8589

6 AUG 16 1968

62-116395-1157

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : THE FILE (100-44963)

DATE: 8/15/68

FROM : SAC M. W. JOHNSON

SUBJECT: DEMCON

At 9:15 AM today, the Director telephonically contacted me to advise that he had just been in touch with the Vice President of the United States and had just gotten off the phone with the Vice President's Executive Assistant, Mr. WILLIAM CONNELL. Mr. HOOVER stated that the Vice President has requested that we furnish the same type of service in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Chicago as was furnished to the President during the Atlantic City Convention four years ago. This, of course, refers to intelligence information which will be of value to the Vice President and specifically relates to the possibility of demonstrations, violence and related matters. Mr. HOOVER stated that he had advised the Vice President and Mr. CONNELL that this service would be performed and that Mr. CONNELL should contact me for the necessary arrangements.

Mr. HOOVER advised me that Mr. CONNELL is presently in New York and it is not known when he will arrive in Chicago. I advised Mr. HOOVER that his instructions would be followed, that we had set up appropriate arrangements so that we would be in a position to furnish valuable intelligence and that upon Mr. CONNELL's arrival in Chicago, I would immediately contact him and perfect the necessary arrangements.

My secretary has been instructed to notify all switchboard operators, complaint agents and supervisors that any call from Mr. CONNELL should be immediately referred to me when I am in the office or if I am not in the office to determine where I can contact Mr. CONNELL immediately.

MWJ/sff
(1)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100-44963-2302

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
FILED
CHICAGO

62-116395-1159

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
(1 - J.B. Hotis)
November 26, 1975
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Klein

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Reference is made to the November 24, 1975, SSC request forwarded to the Department of Justice by letter dated November 24, 1975, requesting certain documents desired from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of two memoranda in response to this request.

Also enclosed for your records are copies of the memoranda which are being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Your attention is invited to the fact that amongst the documents being furnished to the SSC are communications concerning negotiations between the FBI, former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe and the Department pertaining to financial arrangements with Rowe.

Enclosures -36

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

REC-14 62-116395-1156

EX 104

12 DEC 11 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Attached to Dept. 11/26/75 PD/[illegible]

SK:tdp (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE:

Single copies of the 11/24/75 communications are attached to the file copy of the enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the Senstudy '75 Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Documents pertaining to financial arrangements between the FBI, Rowe and the Department of Justice are being furnished to the SSC for the information of the Committee and the Staff in refuting allegations by Rowe that he was not financially rewarded for his efforts on behalf of the FBI.

1 - Mr. J. B. Ad[illegible]
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. J. E. Morley

November 26, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSC)

RE: MARY JO COOK

Reference is made to letter dated November 18, 1975, to Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, from John Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, requesting a review of documents pertainingto Mary Jo Cook. Reference is also made to letter dated November 24, 1975, to Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination from Mr. Elliff requesting delivery of the documents.

On November 25, 1975, Mr. Robert Kelley, Senate Select Committee Staff Investigator, reviewed these documents and requested a summary be prepared of certain of them. Pursuant to Mr. Kelley's request, enclosed is a summary of the contents of six documents furnished by Mary Jo Cook.

Enclosures - 6

1 - The Attorney General

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2ALM JEHL

JEM:dew dew
(10)

NOTE:

The above information being furnished to the SSC was prepared pursuant to the requests contained in the letters referred to and at the requests of Robert Kelley, SSC Staff Investigator. The information was taken from informant reports furnished the Buffalo Office by Mary Jo Cook and more precisely from those six reports selected by Mr. Kelley. For ease in reference, the summaries were prepared from informant reports dated as follows:

11/9/73
11/20/73
12/17/73

6/19/74
7/31/74
10/2/74

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1151

GPO 954-546

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSC)

RE: MARY JO COOK

NOTE CONTINUED:

. The summary of the report dated 6/19/74 has as an attachment a four-page document obtained by Cook captioned "Jury Selection." Mr. Kelley specifically requested this document, which essentially is a treatise on the techniques of selecting a jury most sympathetic to a defendant.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/26/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). Re: Mary Jo Cook & Gary Thomas Rowe. (11/18/75 SSC let & 11/24/75 SSC let)

Originating Office: FBI 505

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/28/75

Received by:

Title: Staff Assist

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
11/26/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/18/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Summary of contents of six documents furnished by Mary Jo Cook.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Apd

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

The following is a summary of a four page report, dated 11/20/73, furnished by Mary Jo Cook, a former FBI informant.

Report concerns a meeting of the VVAW/WSO Steering Committee held 11/10/73. Five identified individuals were present. There was a discussion of finances and some displeasure at the financial record system. Plans for a benefit at a bar were discussed. Information was presented concerning a newsletter to be mailed out which will discuss the VVAW/WSO's position on amnesty, the upgrading of discharges, information about the Women's group and about a strike at a Buffalo firm.

Some objections were raised concerning the wording of some VVAW/WSO objectives.

Plans for a future coalition meeting organized by two individuals were discussed, the same coalition that worked on the Impeach Nixon rally.

Matters concerning possible new members and/or attendees at future meetings were discussed. Plans for a VVAW/WSO team on a television sports quiz show were discussed.

One member raised four criticisms of the VVAW/WSO, all listed.

One member wrote a regional newsletter.

The following is a summary of a 17-page report dated 12/17/73 furnished by Mary Jo Cook, former FBI informant.

A regional conference of the New York/Northern New Jersey Region, VVAW/WSO, was held at a college on 12/8-9/73. 20 listed people attended.

A member reported another individual had supposedly run guns to Cuba.

A member requested information attesting to the bad conditions in a Vietnamese jail.

A member said he had 2600 names on a mailing list.

Old business was discussed.

Changes in one VVAW/WSO objective were turned down.

In other matters, the following was discussed:

Correspondence with prisoners.

Plans for selling the organization's newspaper.

Support for a prison fast.

Approval of amnesty for war resisters.

Impeach Nixon campaign.

U.S. involvement in Korea.

Organization and communication.

Coalition with other groups.

Possible underground VVAW group.

Possible sponsorship of a college lecture.

The VVAW's connection with the Revolutionary Union with some displeasure voiced.

A recent military alert and the possibility of a mail opening and telephone tap alleged.

The general feeling of a future military takeover in the U.S.

Proposed delegates to the National Steering Committee Meeting.

Disapproval of a workshop introduction as "Red-baiting."

Buffalo chapter was considered one of the five strongest chapters in the organization.

Possible VVAW Summer Camp over Labor Day.

Information about members contacting members of other chapters.

Reports were presented from other chapters.

The following is a summary of a five page report, dated 7/19/74, furnished by Mary Jo Cook, former FBI informant.

A meeting of the National Defense Committee of the VVAW/WSO was held on 6/7-9/74 at St. Louis, Missouri. Eleven identified individuals attended.

The purpose was to ascertain the feasibility of setting up a National Defense Committee which would be operational throughout the United States. As concerns VVAW/WSO, the meeting sought to advise members that the organization's Defense Committee will take steps to secure the release or acquittals of any members arrested.

A representative from the National Collective in Chicago talked about the Gainesville 8 in a derogatory manner, implying the Government did not try the Gainesville 8 for purely political reasons, but that the leader and some others planned some kind of illegal activity. He also said if there had been no Agent provocateur there would never have been a trial and that the National Collective would not have permitted violent activity. 17 items were handed out, a large portion of which were reprints from national and "movement" publications covering such topics as how to avoid being questioned by the FBI. One of these, on jury selection, is attached.

Jury selection

The jury element is the people's component in the existing system of criminal justice; it is only quasi-organized and partially managed. The use of systematic jury selection can be an important tool in the practice of people's law, but at present it is being developed and used selectively as a successful foil in cases of overt political attack. The minimal program in jury selection defense work is to secure a group of twelve people who will take their function as jurors seriously and assume that the defendants are innocent until proven guilty. The maximal program is to secure a jury which will acquit the defendants.

Since 1970, serious inroads have been made on the jury system: proposed abolition of 12 - person juries, non-unanimous verdicts, abolition of voir dire of prospective jurors by lawyers, disciplining of 'disruptive' lawyers and other 'reforms' to 'speed up' decision-making. Juries are under attack by the narrow, elite group who seek to rule this country only because this vehicle of the people's power cannot be relied upon to make political prisoners of us all.

Challenging jury composition

18 U.S.C. Sec. 1861 is a federal statute which places an obligation on the courts to assure the right to a jury selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community. Data, gathered from observing juries, which suggests an imbalance can be used as grounds for access to jury selection records. Through a sample of the qualification questionnaires comprising the master Jury Wheel, a demography (the study of the characteristics of a population) of the voter registration list can be determined.

These findings, compared with census demography, will reveal areas of underrepresentation. In the case of the Attica Fair Jury Project, a systematic analysis of jury selection records obtained by court order revealed that third world people are underrepresented by 34.3%, women by 68 %, and people between the ages 21-29 by 83.6%. This study yielded concrete evidence that the Erie County jury system is illegal and unconstitutional, and the system has been challenged on those grounds.

There are four practical advantages to be gained from a jury challenge even if it does not result in the immediate modification of the composition of the master jury wheel which might provide a larger proportion of people from the less authoritarian sectors of the population.

1. pursuing a challenge can gain time for the defense.
2. examination of the jury questionaire and the jury process raises the defenses's consciousness of what the problems are likely to be in jury selection.
3. a challenge introduces some accountability to the jury process and may change the behavior of the jury clerk and/or judge.
4. a verdict for conviction can be overturned and a new trial obtained on the basis of an objection to jury composition and selection, if a later court upholds the jury challenge.

Demographic model of jury selection.

There are three separate elements to the demographic model of jury selection.

1. a survey must be taken of a representative cross-section of the population that may be called for jury service; this is most easily done by telephone.
2. a system for rating prospective jurors on the basis of voir

dire must be established.

3. a net-work of people must be set up to gather outside third-party information to corroborate the results of the survey and voir dire.

The demographic-attitudinal survey is used to obtain precise information on the range of attitudinal patterns prevalent in a given judicial district. At a minimum, the following must be covered: demographic information, (age, sex, race, education, etc.) organizational affiliations, media contact, knowledge of the case, political ideology and attitudes toward core American values, social change, divergent life styles and alternative institutions, and toward the type of defendants and the charges specific to the case. A random sample of any of three groups will give the defense committee the demographic information necessary: 1) those who have already been called for jury duty, 2) the voter registration list, or 3) 1% of a cross-section of the population.

The voir dire ratings are constructed by combining observations of behavior and attitudes expressed during the voir dire. This procedure is still being developed but there seems to be a high correlation between ratings of individual authoritarianism and types composed of demographic variables. For example, in the Rap Brown case, the attitudinal study pin-pointed the most "dangerous" defense juror as a male manager, engineer, government employee, or real estate broker, who [illegible] tied into the local establishment, Methodist or [illegible]al, over 45, and who lived in a rural area or small,

quiet town. His independent authoritarianism rating was very high, just as you would expect from a juror whose values embraced authority, patriotism, conformity, government right or wrong, etc. The authoritarianism ratings can further be used as a reference point to make sense of the body language, costume and verbal ratings. These ratings become even more essential when faced with a limited voir dire.

Schulman stresses that voir dire ratings should be done collectively. Defendants and trial lawyers should participate, but past trials have shown them to have definite problems with objective judgments in this area.

A core of people from a cross-section of the community should be established to obtain information about the people on the venire list so that any inconsistencies between the voir dire ratings and the demographic ratings can be resolved. This can be done by asking 10 people to contact 3 friends, who in turn will contact 3 friends, who in turn etc. This should be done with a clear presentation of the kind of information needed and a clear understanding of what constitutes jury tampering.

The following is a summary of a two-page report dated 7/31/74 furnished by Mary Jo Cook, a former FBI informant.

The report covers the following matters:

It appears as if the Revolutionary Union is making its move and focusing on the upcoming National Conference. An issue of "Winter Soldier" was received and its editorial was an RU editorial.

The VVAW/WSO newsletter arrived from the National Office and listed three possible directions VVAW/WSO can take:

1) Anti-imperialist veteran's organization with the supporters.

2) A veteran's organization for veteran's only.

3) A mass anti-imperialist organization with no base.

A discussion concerning the National Office supporting or becoming aligned with the RU.

The following is a summary of a two page report, dated 10/2/74, furnished by Mary Jo Cook, former FBI informant.

The report is entirely concerned with a demonstration held 9/11/74 in Buffalo protesting the policies of the American Government regarding the overthrow of the Allende Regime in Chile. Eight members of the VVAW/WSO attended, two from the Attica Brothers Legal Defense, one from Youth Against War and Fascism, two from Revolutionary Union, two from Anti-Monopoly Committee, three from Committee for Chilean Democracy, and four from a University in Buffalo.

All of the above attendees were named, either by first or full name. One name was phonetic.

2 - M[illegible] J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Klein

62-116395

November 26, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force (SSC) to the Deputy Attorney General's Office dated November 24, 1975, requesting delivery of certain documents pertaining to Gary Thomas Rowe.

Enclosed with this memorandum are a summary of information supplied by former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe, and other documents relating to the SSC request of November 24, 1975.

In accordance with Mr. Robert Kelley of the SSC Staff, the documents pertaining to the financial arrangements between the FBI, Gary Thomas Rowe and the Department of Justice are not to be made public or used as exhibits in the course of testimony before the SSC.

Enclosures - 10

1 - The Attorney General

SK:tdp/1hb lhb
(9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY GARY THOMAS ROWE WHO WAS AN INFORMANT OF THE FBI FROM MAY, 1960, UNTIL JANUARY, 1966.

I. INFORMANT REPORTS SUBMITTED BY GARY THOMAS ROWE

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY 5P2ALM/EHC

1. On 5/14/61 Rowe advised that the burning of a bus and the beating of individuals at a bus depot in Alabama during May, 1961, was instituted by a local Ku Klux Klan unit.

2. On 5/17/61 Rowe stated that the Klan would try to intercept a bus which was due to arrive in Birmingham, Alabama, at 11 P.M. on 5/17/61. He further stated that Klansmen should intercept the bus on the highway and give all persons present, whether black or white, an opportunity to get off. They would be allowed to enter privately owned automobiles and have a safe journey to the nearest town. Rowe was advised by another Klansman that those who refused to leave the bus would be beaten.

3. On June 4, 1962, Rowe furnished copies of five documents expected to be distributed by Klansmen in order to discourage voters from voting for certain candidates who allegedly supported various civil rights groups.

4. During March, 1962, Rowe furnished information regarding a local Klan meeting at which 23

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Klansmen were present. The meeting centered around a Klansman's plan to run for a high state office. Also discussed was another candidate for this office.

5. During July, 1962, Rowe advised that a Klansman told a select group of other Klansmen that "it looks as if the Negroes should be stopped now." This group of Klansmen was told that police officials had promised them protection and that a high state official would pardon them if arrested. This Klansman further advised that if a particular "militant Negro Integrationist" would appear at a certain restaurant with other Negroes he should be attacked and killed. Instructions were also issued by this Klansman that if this "militant Negro Integrationist" did not appear at this restaurant but sent other Negroes to stage a sit-in, then there would be no killing. He stated that these Negroes should be beaten with chains and clubs instead.

6. During October, 1964, Rowe reported on Klan discussions regarding a plan to handle alleged "race mixing" at a local night club. Also discussed was a plan by Klansmen to bomb this night club.

II. BUREAU HANDLING OF INFORMANT

On 4/17/64, the Bureau advised SAC, Birmingham, to immediately instruct Rowe to withdraw from his position as squad leader of an "action squad." SAC, Birmingham, was further advised that in the event Rowe does not desire to withdraw from this leadership position, he should be discontinued as an informant. On 4/18/64, Rowe was advised by the Birmingham Office that he must remove himself as a squad leader of an "action squad." On 5/4/64, the Bureau advised SAC, Birmingham, that "in those cases where you have an informant who is a member of a violent squad...you should insure that the informant understands he is not to direct, lead, or instigate any acts of violence." It was also pointed out that informant should be instructed to avoid participation in any act of violence.

III. KLAN VIOLENCE AT THE BIRMINGHAM BUS DEPOT 5/14/61

By letter from the Bureau to 23 field offices, it was stated that a civil rights organization intended to make a nonviolent attempt to complete integration of bus service and related public accommodations in the South during the month of May.

By internal Bureau memorandum dated 5/13/61, it was noted that information from a confidential informant (Rowe) was received concerning the possibility that local authorities may allow disturbances to generate against above civil rights group on 5/14/61, when they were due to arrive in Birmingham, Alabama. This memorandum shows that appropriate local law enforcement authorities were advised of the potential for violence in Birmingham prior to 5/14/61.

5/26/65

1 - Mr. Boyd

Airtel

EX-100

REC 19

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

To: SAC, Birmingham

From: Director, FBI (44-28601) - 20

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

ReBuairtel to Birmingham 5/21/65 and SFairtel to Director 5/22/65 captioned "BH 248-R."

ReSFairtel furnished information concerning outstanding indebtedness of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. The financial obligations he has incurred with the banking institutions and with the State of Alabama regarding unpaid sales tax appear to be dormant debts which would not necessarily have to be paid on a current basis as part of his living expenses. Following completion of the trials in this case, consideration will be given by the Bureau to a recommendation of a lump-sum payment which informant might use to help liquidate these obligations.

With reference to the sums owed the power, gas, telephone and realty companies, it is not clear whether these are current monthly expenses to the informant or rather dormant bills. Advise Bureau if these are present expenses to the informant and, if not paid or services discontinued, what parties would be affected.

MAILED 4
MAY 26 1965
COMM-FBI

ReSFairtel reflects informant has advised that the indebtedness with the Boothby Realty Company is accumulating day by day for rent of a residence going back to 2/1/65. The Bureau desires to know the purpose of informant maintaining this residence (presumably in Birmingham) and of informant's...

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

2 - Tampa (44-313)
2 - San Francisco
JJB/ral
(8)
SEE NOTE ON PAGE TWO.

58 JUN 4 1965

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

intentions to continue to maintain this residence inasmuch as both he and his ex-wife are residing elsewhere.

Informant's ex-wife has obtained employment at a salary of approximately $228 per month. She has fixed obligations that will amount to approximately $424 a month and feels she could better meet her obligations if she were receiving her alimony payments. Mrs. Rowe has stated she is to receive alimony of $115 a month and that her ex-husband is in arrears for a total of $690. The Bureau desires to know what informant's thoughts are as to meeting this obligation to his ex-wife. Also advise if informant considers these payments as necessary monthly obligations that he would meet under normal circumstances.

The Birmingham Office is to give this your immediate attention and promptly advise the Bureau.

NOTE:

The Birmingham Office has pointed out that Rowe has performed an invaluable service to the Bureau and has saved an untold amount of man power and various expenses in connection with the shooting of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo. Informant has been in protective custody of the Bureau since 4/1/65 and not had opportunity to be gainfully employed to meet various obligations. The Birmingham Office has recommended that the Bureau pay informant's outstanding bills in order to continue the excellent relationship developed. We are presently paying him $16 per day subsistence in lieu of expenses which figure was decided upon after discussion with the Department. It is not desired to make a large payment at this time which could be construed as a payment to Rowe for his testimony in the up-coming trials. Birmingham previously requested to submit a detailed accounting of Rowe's debts showing their basis, when contracted and schedule of payments. The information received from the field needs to be further clarified after which time this matter will be discussed with the Department and its views obtained as to whether or not payment of these debts would be judicious at this time.

FBI

Date: 5/21/65

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44-28601)

FROM: SAC, TAMPA (44-313) (P)

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL.;
VIOLA LIUZZO, aka
ET AL. - VICTIMS
CR; EL
(OO:BH)

On 5/20/65, Mrs. DOROTHY M. ROWE again advised that she has not received any alimony payments from her ex-husband since the October, 1964, payment, which means he is in arrears 6 months, total due $690.

Mrs. ROWE will commence work on 5/24/65 at a salary of approximately $57 per week, $228 per month. She has fixed obligations that will amount to approximately $424 per month. She has stated that if she were receiving her alimony payments she could better meet her obligations.

Please advise what you have been able to accomplish re the alimony payments.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

3 - Bureau
2 - Birmingham
2 - Tampa
JEW:cwp
(7)

REC- 19

44-28601-30

21 MAY 24 1965
27

C C - Wick

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 5-21-65

FROM : A. Rosen

1- Mr. Sullivan
1- Mr. Belmont
1- Mr. Rosen
1- Mr. Malley
1- Mr. McGowan
1- Mr. Hines

SUBJECT: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL -
VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

The Birmingham Office has advised that our informant Gary Thomas Rowe has current outstanding debts in the Birmingham, Alabama, area totaling $2350.08, and the SAC, Birmingham recommends that these debts be paid by the Bureau in full.

Birmingham points out that Rowe has performed invaluable service to the Bureau in connection with the case involving the shooting of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, and his services have saved the Bureau an untold amount of Agent manpower and various expenses connected with an extended major investigation. They point out that informant has been in protective custody of the Bureau since 4-1-65, and as such, has not had an opportunity to be gainfully employed in order to meet various financial obligations that he has been meeting in the past. Birmingham points out that it is absolutely imperative to insure the possible success of the next trial tentatively scheduled for September, 1965, that the excellent relationship developed with Rowe must be retained, and to accomplish this Rowe should be free as much as possible from the receipt of bills from various creditors when he is not in a position to make payment.

Birmingham listed outstanding bills of informant Rowe as follows:

Alabama Power Company	$69.16
Southern Bell Telephone Company	38.78
Boothby Realty Company (Apartment)	297.50
State of Alabama (Sales Tax)	266.11
Birmingham Trust National Bank	1,062.00
Sears-Roebuck (Toys)	75.00
Alabama Gas Corporation	29.58
Cousin Joe's Loan Company	60.00
First National Bank of Birmingham	451.95
Total	$2,350.08

REC 28

382

4 JUN 10 1965

Enclosure sent 5-21-65

JWH:mmb
(7)

0 JUN 16 1965

MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 [illegible] m/cnc

OBSERVATIONS OF GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

The Bureau is currently paying Gary Thomas Rowe $16.00 per day subsistence in lieu of expenses. This figure was initially decided upon after discussion with the Department, and with the Department's approval, as it was recognized that the informant had to be removed from the Birmingham area for his protection and safety. The Department pointed out that it would not be desirable to make any lump sum or large payment to the informant so long as he might be called upon to testify, as any such large payments might be construed in court as a payment for his testimony, whereas payment of his living expenses can readily be justified as a necessity.

In the trial of subject Collie Leroy Wilkins which began 5-3-65 and resulted in a hung jury, the Bureau was called upon to produce a record of payments to the informant. In a future trial, it is reasonable to expect that we will again be called upon to produce such a record. The payment of Rowe's debts at this time amounting to over two thousand dollars would appear in this record of payments to Rowe, and we certainly could not agree to pay such a large amount at this time without the Department's approval.

With regard to the debts themselves, it would not appear from information furnished by Birmingham that they are all due and payable immediately, as the larger debts to the two banks would probably be payable in monthly installments. We could, with Department's approval, agree to payment of his smaller debts and monthly installments on these larger debts as they come due.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the above, it is recommended that Birmingham be instructed to submit a detailed accounting of Rowe's debts showing their basis, when they were contracted, due dates and a full breakdown of any installment contracts showing detailed schedule of payments. Upon receipt of this information, the matter will be discussed with the Department and their views as to whether or not payment of these debts at this time would be judicious, will be obtained. Airtel attached.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Wick
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach

MDR-16

DATE: January 14, 1966

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/

FROM : A. Rosen

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines

SUBJECT: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

In response to the Director's inquiry concerning correspondence relating to the demands made by Gary Thomas Rowe, prior to his testifying in the Federal trial of the three subjects responsible for the shooting of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, the following items are attached:

(1) The teletype from Inspector J. L. McGovern dated 11-23-65, setting forth the substance of the discussion of John Doar, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division with Gary Thomas Rowe concerning demands made by Rowe. The teletype indicates that McGovern was present during Doar's discussion with Rowe and on page six of the teletype McGovern states that although Bureau personnel were present throughout the interviews between Doar and Rowe, Bureau personnel made no assurance, promises, nor commitments to him.

(2) A copy of the teletype from Mr. McGovern dated 11-23-65, which sets forth in detail the demands made by Rowe. Because of the urgency of relaying Rowe's demands to the Department, a Xerox copy of the teletype was prepared deleting the transmittal data at the top of page one and the last paragraph on page one continuing to the top of page two wherein Rowe expressed his confidence in Bureau personnel and felt he had been let down by the Department and does not trust its representatives.

(3) A copy of the memorandum as prepared from McGovern's teletype of 11-23-65 as actually furnished to Mr. John Doar on 11-24-65.

REC-108 44-25601-

(4) Attached is a memorandum from Mr. Rosen to Mr. Belmont dated 11-24-65 recording the discussion of Supervisor J. William Hines with Mr. Doar wherein he was furnished the memorandum (Item 3) and the demands were discussed.

JWH:cry (6)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

17 JAN 18 1966

Rosen to DeLoach Memorandum
RE: EUGENE THOMAS

Doar indicated in this discussion that the Department would assume responsibility for handling Rowe's demands as noted in paragraph three where he said that he would personally meet with Rowe in Tampa, Florida, and that he, Doar, would make every effort to build Rowe's confidence, resolve the conditions set forth by Rowe, and obtain his testimony.

ACTION:

For your information.

4-3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

6:33 PM EST URGENT 11-28-65 RLS

TO DIRECTOR

MDR-16

FROM TAMPA 281615

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

FROM INSPECTOR J. L. MC GOVERN.

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL, VIOLA LIUZZO-VICTIM, ~~CR-EL,~~

BIRMINGHAM ORIGIN.

RE TAMPA TELEPHONE CALL NOVEMBER 27 LAST.

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN DOAR ARRIVED TAMPA AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 26 AND FOLLOWING BRIEFING CONFERENCE INTERVIEWED GARY THOMAS ROWE AT GREAT LENGTH. INTERVIEW CONCERNED CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ROWE WOULD TESTIFY AS OUTLINED SAN FRANCISCO TELETYPE NOVEMBER 23.

REC 7 44-28601-605

AT OUTSET OF INTERVIEW DOAR INDICATED THAT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FOR ROWE AND FAMILY WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE EMPLOYMENT, RELOCATION AND REIMBURSEMENT FOR INCONVENIENCES SUFFERED BY ROWE AND

12 DEC 2 1965

MR. BELMONT FOR THE DIRECTOR

6-Dec

ove message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

PAGE TWO FROM TAMPA 281615

FAMILY INCLUDING LOSS OF INCOME DURING PERIOD OF RELOCATION.

MR. DOAR POINTED OUT TO ROWE THAT THE CONDITIONS PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED BY ROWE WERE NOT CONSIDERED UNREASONABLE. ALSO INDICATED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DID NOT CONSIDER ROWE'S INABILITY TO IDENTIFY LEROY MOTON AS THE OCCUPANT OF THE CAR WITH MRS. LIUZZO AS BEING HARMFUL TO THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE; IF ROWE FELT MOTON WAS NOT THE NEGRO OCCUPANT, HE SHOULD SO TESTIFY.

MR. DOAR ADVISED ROWE THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE GIVE HIM AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING WHEREBY HE WOULD BE ASSURED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO TESTIFY IN ANY FUTURE PROCEEDINGS REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL TO COMMENCE NOVEMBER 29. MR. DOAR POINTED OUT THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT, IF GIVEN, WOULD BE OF NO VALUE TO ROWE AS IT WOULD BE A WORTHLESS COMMITMENT RELATING TO EVENTS WHICH MIGHT OCCUR IN THE FUTURE AND NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF PRESENT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

(Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XX TELETYPE

PAGE THREE FROM TAMPA 281615

THROUGHOUT THE INTERVIEW, ROWE APPEARED TO BE AWARE OF THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT; AND WHILE NOT ANTAGONISTIC, REMAINED ADAMANT IN REFUSING TO CHANGE THE POSITION HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TAKEN IN REFUSING TO TESTIFY UNLESS THE CONDITIONS OUTLINED WERE MET.

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE INTERVIEW BY MR. DOAR, AT WHICH TIME ROWE HAD NOT CHANGED HIS POSITION, HE WAS FURTHER INTERVIEWED AT GREAT LENGTH BY BUREAU PERSONNEL. ROWE FINALLY INDICATED THAT IF IT WERE AGREEABLE TO HIS WIFE, HE WOULD TESTIFY WITHOUT RECEIVING A WRITTEN AGREEMENT RELATING TO FUTURE TESTIMONY PROVIDED HE DID RECEIVE WRITTEN ASSURANCE RELATING TO HIS TESTIMONY WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE LEROY MOTON.

ON THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 27 THE RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH BUREAU PERSONNEL WERE MADE KNOWN TO MR. DOAR, AND THEREAFTER CONTACT WAS MADE WITH ROWE'S WIFE. ROWE

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

4 3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
DeLoach ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

PAGE FOUR FROM TAMPA 281615

DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH HER HIS CONFERENCE WITH MR DOAR AND SHE INDICATED THAT SHE WOULD BE WILLING TO RELOCATE TOGETHER WITH HER CHILDREN TO AN AREA IN WHICH ROWE HIMSELF WOULD BE RELOCATED.

THIS INFORMATION WAS MADE KNOWN TO MR. DOAR. THEREAFTER, ROUGH DRAFT LETTER OVER THE SIGNATURE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS DELIVERED BY DOAR TO ROWE. THIS LETTER OUTLINED THE FACT THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS AWARE OF THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY ROWE IN THE PAST, THE FACT THAT HIS PUBLIC EXPOSURE HAD RESULTED IN HARDSHIP ON HIM AND HIS FAMILY, WHICH WILL NECESSITATE PERMANENT RELOCATION FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ROWE FAMILY. THE LETTER ALSO INDICATED THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS PREPARED TO ASSIST ROWE IN OBTAINING SUITABLE EMPLOYMENT WITH EITHER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OR ELSEWHERE IN A POSITION FOR WHICH HE IS QUALIFIED AND TO ASSIST HIM IN RELOCATING IN A SECURE PLACE. THE LETTER CONCLUDED WITH THE COMMENT THAT THE ASSISTANCE OUTLINED

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably [illegible] Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Contad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

PAGE FIVE FROM TAMPA 281615

IS NOT CONTINGENT ON HIS PERFORMANCE OF ANY FURTHER SERVICE OR ASSISTANCE WHICH HE MAY GIVE TO THE UNITED STATES AT ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE.

THEREAFTER MR. DOAR PRESENTED TO ROWE A LETTER OVER HIS SIGNATURE AS ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL ASKING THAT ROWE PRESENT HIMSELF AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA BEFORE TRIAL DATE SO THAT THE FACTS TO WHICH ROWE WOULD TESTIFY MAY BE CAREFULLY REVIEWED WITH HIM. THE LETTER POINTS OUT THAT THE FEDERAL TRIAL WILL DIFFER FROM THE PAST STATE PROCEEDINGS INDICATING THAT A CONSPIRACY CASE IS INVOLVED CHARGING THREE DEFENDANTS WITH CONSPIRACY TO INJURE UNITED STATES CITIZENS FOR HAVING EXERCISED CERTAIN FEDERAL RIGHTS. THE LETTER POINTS OUT THAT PROOF IN THE CASE WOULD DEAL PRIMARILY WITH THE EVENTS COMMENCING ON MARCH 21 AND THAT ROWE WILL BE EXPECTED TO BE AS SPECIFIC AND ACCURATE ABOUT DETAILS AS HE CAN TRUTHFULLY BE. THE LETTER INDICATES THAT MR. DOAR IS AWARE THAT ROWE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT LEROY MOTON WAS THE

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

4 3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XX TELETYPE

PAGE SIX FROM TAMPA 281615

NEGRO MALE OCCUPYING THE FRONT SEAT OF THE LIUZZO CAR; AND THAT IF HE WERE ASKED ABOUT THIS, HE SHOULD SAY SO. FURTHER, ROWE'S IDENTIFICATION OF THE PASSENGER IN THE LIUZZO CAR IS IMMATERIAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS PROOF IN THE CASE.

FOLLOWING REVIEW OF THESE LETTERS BY ROWE, IT WAS INDICATED TO HIM THAT THEY WOULD BE DELIVERED IN CARE OF INSPECTOR MC GOVERN AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, AND WOULD BE HELD BY MC GOVERN UNTIL AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF ROWE'S TESTIMONY.

ROWE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS AGREEABLE TO HIM AND INDICATED THAT HE WOULD WILLINGLY APPEAR AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA TO TESTIFY.

ALTHOUGH BUREAU PERSONNEL WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE INTERVIEWS BETWEEN AAG DOAR AND ROWE, BUREAU PERSONNEL MADE NO ASSURANCES, PROMISES, NOR COMMITMENTS TO HIM.

AS MR. DOAR HAS INDICATED DESIRE FOR FURTHER PRE TRIAL CONFERENCES WITH ROWE, ROWE WILL BE TRANSPORTED THIS DATE, NOVEMBER 28 TO MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA BY BUREAU PERSONNEL VIA

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably *cryptographic systems.*

4-3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XX TELETYPE

PAGE SEVEN FROM TAMPA 281615

EASTERN AIRLINES FLIGHT 274, DEPARTING TAMPA 12:30 PM. TRANSFER POINT ATLANTA, GEORGIA, DEPARTURE ATLANTA VIA EASTERN AIRLINES FLIGHT 763 AT 2:55 PM EASTERN STANDARD TIME, ARRIVAL MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 2:55 PM CENTRAL STANDARD TIME.

MOBILE HAS BEEN ALERTED AND ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR BUREAU PERSONNEL TO BE PRESENT AT AIRPORT MONTGOMERY TO PROVIDE FULL SECURITY FOR ROWE AND TRANSPORTATION TO MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE WHERE ROWE WILL REMAIN DURING TRIAL COMMENCING NOVEMBER 29.

RECEIVED: 6:54 PM RPT

ROSEN

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4 3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Callahan
Contad
Felt
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM xxxRADIO ☐ TELETYPE

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2 ALM

R-15
URGENT 11-23-65 9:38 PM
TO DIRECTOR
FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

FROM: INSPECTOR J. L. MC GOVERN

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL; VIOLET LIUZZO-VICTIM. ~~CR-EL~~.
OO: BIRMINGHAM.

REBUTEL CALL TO BIRMINGHAM NOVEMBER 19 LAST.

GARY THOMAS ROWE HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY SINCE LATE EVENING NOVEMBER 20 BY INSPECTOR J. L. MC GOVERN, SA NEIL P. SHANAHAN, AND FREQUENTLY IN PRESENCE OF SAC LYNUM AND SA JAMES G. CARLISLE.

AT OUTSET AND THROUGHOUT INTERVIEWS ROWE HAS BEEN ADAMANT IN HIS REFUSAL TO FURTHER TESTIFY IN THE STATE OF ALABAMA CONCERNING CAPTIONED CASE OR OTHER MATTERS. DURING INTERVIEW ROWE WAS HIGHLY EMOTIONAL, DISTRAUGHT, TEARFUL AND INDICATED THAT HE DOES NOT FEEL THAT HE IS PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF GOING THROUGH WITH ANOTHER TRIAL. HE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF HIS CHILDREN, AS WELL AS HIMSELF, AND COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD NEVER RETURN TO ALABAMA. HE INDICATED THAT SO LONG AS THE THREAT OF FURTHER TESTIMONY HANGS OVER HIM HE CANNOT SECURE REGULAR EMPLOYMENT.

WHILE EXPRESSING A DEEP SENSE OF OBLIGATION TO THE BUREAU AND CONFIDENCE OF BUREAU PERSONNEL, HE INDICATED THAT HE FEELS THAT HE HAS BEEN "LET DOWN" BY THE DEPARTMENT AND DOES NOT TRUST ITS REPRESENTATIVES. HE COMMENTED THAT HE QUESTIONS THE

REC- 18

58

NOV 30 1965

4-3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM XXXXRADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE TWO FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

MOTIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT, AS WELL AS THE STATE PROSECUTORS, EXPRESSING THE OPINION THAT THE MOTIVES ARE POLITICALLY INSPIRED. ALSO INDICATED THAT HE DOES NOT FEEL HIS TESTIMONY WOULD BE OF VALUE, AS HE CANNOT FORESEE ANY POSSIBILITY OF CONVICTION.

IN TAKING THE POSITION THAT HE WOULD NOT VOLUNTARILY RETURN TO ALABAMA TO TESTIFY, HE RECOGNIZED THAT A SUBPOENA COULD BE ISSUED FOR HIM BUT THAT IF ONE WERE ISSUED HE STATED THAT HE WOULD RETURN ONLY IF FORCE WERE USED TO TRANSPORT HIM TO ALABAMA. IF SUCH FORCE WERE USED HE WOULD REFUSE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, EVEN THOUGH HE MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT AND CONFINED TO JAIL.

SHOULD HE BE FORCED TO TESTIFY HE SAID THAT HE WOULD INSURE THAT HIS TESTIMONY WOULD INCLUDE THE FACT THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE WITNESS LEROY MOTON IS THE SAME NEGRO WHO OCCUPIED THE CAR WITH THE VICTIM AT THE TIME OF HER SLAYING.

HE ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT SHOULD HE REFUSE TO TESTIFY THAT HIS SERVICES OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS AND HIS PRIOR TESTIMONY IN THE STATE PROSECUTIONS WOULD BE DISCREDITED.

AFTER DISCUSSION WITH ROWE THIS MORNING, HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD TESTIFY UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

1. THAT THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL GIVE HIM AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING PRIOR TO HIS ENTERING THE STATE OF ALABAMA, WHICH AGREEMENT WOULD PROVIDE THAT HE, ROWE, WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO TESTIFY IN ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS FOLLOWING THE TRIAL AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, TO BE HELD NOVEMBER 29 NEXT, REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THAT TRIAL, NAMELY, ACQUITTAL,

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM XXX RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE THREE FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

HUNG JURY OR CONVICTION.

2. THAT HE HAVE AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THAT HE, ROWE, WOULD BE ASSISTED IN SECURING EMPLOYMENT, EITHER WITH ONI OR THE BORDER PATROL, SUCH EMPLOYMENT TO BE SECURED WITHIN 45 DAYS UPON THE COMPLETION OF THE TRIAL.

3. THAT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD INCLUDE AN ASSURANCE THAT IF HE DID TESTIFY HE WOULD BE ASKED NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING LEROY MOTON.

4. BECAUSE OF HIS CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF HIS CHILDREN, PROVIDING SUCH WOULD BE AGREEABLE WITH HIS WIFE, THAT SHE AND HIS FOUR CHILDREN WOULD BE RELOCATED ~~IN~~ AN AREA IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO WHERE HE WILL BE LOCATED TO AFFORD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FREQUENT VISITS AND TO CHECK ON THEIR SAFETY. ALSO, THAT THE BUREAU WOULD ASSIST HIS WIFE IN SECURING EMPLOYMENT IN THE PLACE OF RELOCATION.

5. PROVIDED SUCH WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO HIS PARENTS AND TO HIS SISTER, THAT THEY, TOO, BE RELOCATED TO THE SAME GENERAL VICINITY AS HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN. BECAUSE HIS FATHER MUST WORK APPROXIMATELY TWO ADDITIONAL YEARS TO SECURE MAXIMUM RETIREMENT ANNUITIES FROM HIS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT, THAT PROVISION BE MADE TO HIS PARENTS FOR ANY MONETARY LOSS OR REDUCTION IN THE RETIREMENT ANNUITY COVERING THE PERIOD FROM DATE OF RELOCATION TO THE DATE ON WHICH MAXIMUM RETIREMENT WOULD ORDINARILY BEGIN.

6. HE RECOGNIZES THAT HIS SERVICES HAVE RESULTED IN A VAST SAVING OF INVESTIGATIVE TIME FROM HIS KNOWLEDGE OF CASES IN WHICH INFORMANTS HAVE BEEN SEVERED THAT HE PROBABLY WOULD

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM XX RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE FOUR FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

RECEIVE A SUBSTANTIAL SUM AT TIME OF SEVERANCE, ONE FIFTH OF THIS SUM TO BE USED BY HIM TO DEFRAY OUTSTANDING INDEBTEDNESS AND FOUR FIFTHS TO BE SET UP IN TRUST FOR HIS CHILDREN TO BE USED FOR THEIR FUTURE EDUCATION.

7. HE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO VISIT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN OVER THE THANKSGIVING HOLIDAYS.

8. IN THE EVENT OF HIS TESTIMONY, DESIRES TO KNOW PRECISELY THE NATURE OF THE TESTIMONY EXPECTED OF HIM.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. BUREAU IMMEDIATELY ADVISE CONCERNING ROWE'S TRAVEL TO TAMPA, FLORIDA, TO VISIT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN, WHERE HE WOULD REMAIN UNTIL CALLED AS WITNESS, ASSUMING HIS CONDITIONS ARE MET. ROWE INDICATES HE PLANS TO VISIT FAMILY THANKSGIVING IN ANY EVENT.

2. THAT THIS MATTER BE IMMEDIATELY DISCUSSED WITH THE DEPARTMENT, OUTLINING THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF ROWE AND THE CONDITIONS WHICH HE IMPOSES BEFORE TESTIFYING AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA.

3. IT IS FELT THAT MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE MANNER IN WHICH ROWE WOULD APPEAR IN MONTGOMERY, EITHER AS A WILLING WITNESS UNDER THE CONDITIONS OUTLINED ABOVE, OR AS A RELUCTANT AND HOSTILE WITNESS SHOULD HE BE SUBPOENAED AND FORCIBLY TRANSPORTED TO MONTGOMERY. THE RESULTANT PUBLICITY INVOLVING SUCH FORCIBLE TRANSPORTATION WOULD UNQUESTIONABLY HAVE A MOST ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE ENTIRE INFORMANT PROGRAM.

4. THAT IN THE EVENT THE DEPARTMENT IS AGREEABLE TO THE

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4-3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM xxx RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE FIVE FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

CONDITIONS OUTLINED, AND PROVIDING ROWE'S TRANSPORTATION TO TAMPA, FLORIDA, IS AUTHORIZED, THAT THE DEPARTMENT MAKE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE TAMPA OFFICE THE AREAS OF TESTIMONY EXPECTED OF ROWE SO THAT THEY MAY BE REVIEWED WITH HIM AND HE MAY HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REFRESH HIS RECOLLECTION.

THE ABOVE IS FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU FOR ITS CONSIDERATION AND THAT OF THE DEPARTMENT. NO PROMISES OF ANY KIND HAVE BEEN MADE TO ROWE, OTHER THAN HIS CONDITIONS WOULD BE FORWARDED FOR CONSIDERATION.

RECEIVED: 9:50 PM RPT

I think some of his conditions are grossly unreasonable.

H

CC-MR. ROSEN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/KHL

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 11/24/65

FROM : A. Rosen

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines

SUBJECT: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

Inspector James McGovern, San Francisco, has advised that Gary Thomas Rowe, our informant whose testimony is needed in the Federal civil rights trial of the Liuzzo shooting in Montgomery, Alabama, beginning 11/29/65, had exhibited feelings of reluctance to testify for the Government and set forth certain conditions under which he would agree to testify.

These conditions consist of an agreement from the Attorney General that his testimony would not be required in any future proceedings, that he be assisted in obtaining employment and that some assurances be given him for the future security of his ex-wife and children and parents. He also expressed a desire to visit his wife and children in the Tampa, Florida, area over the Thanksgiving holiday.

Rowe's conditions were discussed in detail with Assistant Attorney General John Doar. Mr. Doar advised that he would discuss these conditions immediately with the Attorney General and requested that we arrange for Rowe to visit with his family in Tampa over Thanksgiving, 11/25/65, and that he would then personally meet with Rowe in Tampa on Saturday morning, 11/27/65. He said that he is planning to try the case personally in Montgomery and that Rowe's testimony is vital to a successful trial. He will make every effort to build Rowe's confidence, resolve the conditions set forth by Rowe and obtain his testimony.

REC-40 44-28601-599

ACTION:

DEC 1 1965

Inspector McGovern has been telephonically instructed to proceed immediately with Rowe to Tampa where appropriate arrangements will be made for Rowe to meet with Assistant Attorney General Doar on the morning of 11/27/65.

sent

Attached for approval is a teletype to Mobile and Tampa advising them that Inspector McGovern and Rowe are proceeding to Tampa and that a meeting will be arranged in Tampa between Rowe

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Enclosure

44-28601-163

DEC 2

CONTINUED - OVER

ACTION CONTINUED:

and Assistant Attorney General Doar, 11/27/65. It is noted that Mr. Doar is going to Montgomery, Alabama, on 11/25/65, where he will remain throughout the trial.

FA

Mr. John Doar
Assistant Attorney General

July 9, 1965

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/LRB

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines

6 -
10 -

Director, FBI
(9)

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

MJA

This will confirm a discussion of Mr. J. William Hines of this Bureau with Mr. St. John Barrett of the Department on July 7, 1965, concerning outstanding personal debts of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who furnished the initial information identifying and leading to the indictment of three subjects on charges of shooting Mrs. Viola Liuzzo on March 25, 1965.

Rowe's debts totaling approximately $2,350 consist primarily of personal loans at two banks in Birmingham amounting to about $1,500 and an assessment for Alabama State sales taxes in the amount of $268.50 which resulted from Rowe's operation of a tavern and restaurant from September, 1964, through March, 1965. The business was a losing enterprise and has reverted to its original proprietor. The balance of the debts are to local utility companies and for apartment rental. The utilities have been disconnected and the apartment reclaimed.

MAILED 20
JUL 9 1965
COMM-FBI

On July 7, 1965, Departmental Attorney St. John Barrett advised Mr. Hines that the Department was of the opinion that the Bureau should not assume responsibility for payment of Rowe's personal debts. He stated that if any payment is made to Rowe, it should be for personal services. Any large payment for personal services should not be made until after Rowe has testified at the upcoming trials of the subjects charged with the shooting of Mrs. Liuzzo scheduled for September and October, 1965.

Mr. Barrett's attention was called to the fact that the Alabama State tax authorities had an outstanding assessment against Rowe for State sales taxes in the amount of $268.50. Mr. Barrett stated he was aware of this and that Mr. Paul Johnston, the attorney representing Rowe in the action for legal fees brought against Rowe by Attorney Matt Murphy, had brought this assessment to the Department's attention.

olson
elmont
ohr
eLoach
asper
allahan
onrad
elt
ale
osen
ullivan
avel
rotter
ele. Room
olmes
andy

JWH/pak
(9)

Note on next page.

REC-21
44-
EX-113
19 JUL 13 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Mr. John Doar

In view of the Department's opinion, this Bureau will not assume responsibility for payment of any of Rowe's personal debts incurred prior to March 25, 1965, and no lump sum or large payments to Rowe for personal services rendered will be considered without prior approval of the Department. You will be promptly advised of any legal action which may be instituted against Rowe for collection of any of the outstanding debts.

NOTE: See memorandum A. Rosen to Mr. Belmont dated 7/8/65, same caption, JWH/pak.

San Francisco, California
January 14, 1966

I, GARY THOMAS ROWE, on this date, January 14, 1966, have accepted ten thousand dollars cash ($10,000.00) from the undersigned, representatives of the FBI.

This amount has been accepted by me in full and complete satisfaction of services rendered voluntarily to representatives of the FBI up to and including January 14, 1966.

My acceptance of this amount in fulfillment of the above brings to a close a very pleasant relationship which I have enjoyed with representatives of the FBI, who have on all occasions treated me fairly and with the utmost consideration and I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation.

/s/ Gary Thomas Rowe
GARY THOMAS ROWE

Witnessed by:
James G. Carlisle, Special Agent, FBI
Curtis O. Lynum, Special Agent in Charge, FBI
At San Francisco, California
January 14, 1966

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

November 24, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee letter requesting delivery of certain documents pertaining to Mary Jo Cook and Gary Thomas Rowe. Please prepare an appropriate response.

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/ETH

cc: Paul Daly

1cc to AG 1-DAG
11/24/75 sk:tdp Enc. 36

1-Ad Hoc
11-25-75

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., T[illegible]
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARI[illegible]
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS[illegible] MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 24, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

With respect to the documents pertaining to Mary Jo Cook and Gary Thomas Rowe which the Bureau has made available for review in response to our request, we request that the documents specified by our staff members be delivered to the Committee.

Sincerely,

John Elliff

John Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence
Task Force

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

cc: Paul V. Daly
Office of Congressional Affairs
Federal Bureau of Investigation

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

MDR-16

DATE: 11/24/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 11/21/75, Inspector John B. Hotis met with Doug Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, concerning Mr. Levi's forthcoming appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Attorney General will have a prepared statement which will probably deal with the future relationship between the Bureau and the Department and the kinds of contacts needed to prevent abuse of authority. Mr. Marvin asked that the Bureau provide the following materials, which will be used in the preparation of a briefing book for Mr. Levi's testimony:

(1) A general synopsis of major areas of the Bureau's activities that have been investigated by the Senate and House Select Committees. Mr. Marvin gave as examples, the "Official and Confidential" files, COINTELPRO, use of informants, and interception of mails. He said the purpose is to identify those topics which have been of primary concern to the Committees. Mr. Marvin asked that the synopses contain a brief statement of the Bureau's position on each of the subjects.

EX-115 REC-9 62-116395-1155

(2) A general statement concerning the organizational structure and functions of the FBI, with particular emphasis on the responsibilities of the Inspection Division. This should include a description of how complaints are received, the review process, and any recent changes in the operations of that Division. In addition, the Attorney General wants a write-up of all investigations of alleged misconduct presently being conducted by the Bureau. He is particularly concerned about any incidents that may have occurred during Mr. Levi's tenure as Attorney General, such as those in Richmond, Detroit, and Houston.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Ash
1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Cochran

1 - Mr. Decker
1 - Mr. Gallagher
1 - Mr. Hoxie
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz

5

1 - Mr. Mooney
1 - Mr. Moore
~~1 - Mr. Walsh~~
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis

LEGAL COUNSEL

DEC 1 6 1975

JBH:lad (5) (16)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

(3) A history of Congressional oversight of the Bureau. Mr. Marvin asked that we identify those Subcommittees of Congress which have exercised some oversight responsibilities over the Bureau. In particular, he asked that we review appropriations testimony going back to 1955 to determine whether we discussed topics which are presently of concern to the Select Committees. This will be very useful in demonstrating Congressional awareness of these matters. He also asked that we furnish a statement of the Director's position concerning Congressional oversight which he has previously expressed in speeches or testimony before Congress.

(4) A list of major investigative techniques employed by the Bureau, specifying in each case whether we seek Departmental approval. The more obvious examples are electronic surveillance, use of body recorders, pen registers, informants, and photographic surveillances.

(5) A list of any formal or informal proposals which have been made concerning organizational changes of the FBI. Examples are the creation of an Inspector General's Office in the Department or elsewhere having review authority over the FBI, transfer of counterintelligence functions to another agency or the creation of a separate Division within the Bureau for that function, transfer of drug enforcement responsibilities to the Bureau, and the proposed statutory limitation on the term of the office for the Director.

It should be noted that several position papers concerning such topics were prepared at the request of former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray which might be useful in responding to this request.

Although no date has been set for the Attorney General's testimony, it is expected that he will testify after Mr. Kelley's appearance on 12/9/75. In view of the limited time available, Mr. Marvin asked that we expedite the preparation of these materials and furnish them to his office as soon as they are completed. It is requested that these materials be submitted to the Office of Congressional Affairs, when completed, but no later than cob, Friday, 11/28/75. They should be submitted in insert form suitable for inclusion in a letterhead memorandum.

CONTINUED - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Intelligence Division prepare a synopsis of the major topics concerning the Bureau which have been investigated by the Senate and House Select Committees.

(2) That the Administrative Division and the Inspection Division prepare materials concerning the organizational structure and function of the Bureau.

(3) That the Administrative Division in conjunction with the Legal Counsel Division prepare materials concerning Congressional oversight of the Bureau.

(4) That the Intelligence Division and the General and Special Investigative Divisions prepare materials concerning major investigative techniques.

(5) That the Office of Planning and Evaluation prepare materials concerning proposals for organizational changes of the FBI.

(6) In addition to the above specified assignments, it is recommended that every Division review this request and make appropriate recommendations or submit any other materials that might be useful in the preparation of the Attorney General's briefing book.

OK

December 2, 1975

Mr. Al Vecchione
Executive Director
NPACT
955 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024

Senstudy - 1975

Dear Al:

This will confirm our conversation on November 26, 1975, wherein you authorized the Bureau to use a videotape recording of your "live" telecast concerning the appearance of Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams before the Church Committee. You indicated that this was authorized for the exclusive viewing by FBI personnel.

This is to advise you that the videotape of Mr. Adams' testimony is being restricted solely to FBI personnel. We certainly appreciate your consideration in this regard. Thank you for this authority.

Sincerely,

/s/ Don Moore

Donald W. Moore, Jr.
Assistant Director
External Affairs Division

MAILED 7
DEC 3 1975
FBI

REC-9 62-116395-1154

EX 104

DEC 4 1975

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/02 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

1-87

DWM:jo

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

55 DEC 15 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

The Attorney General

November 28, 1975

MD R-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/CHC

5

Director, FBI

9

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 1 requested in SSC letter dated November 7, 1975.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC. Your attention is invited to the fact that included in the materials to be delivered to the SSC is correspondence originated in the Department of Justice.

REC-66 62-116395-1153

Enclosures (2)

2-ENCLOSURE

7 DEC ~~4~~ 8 1975

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

PEN:adn
(9)

NOTE:

Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC. Included in materials being furnished the SSC which were located in the files of Mr. Sullivan is a copy of a chronology of events and a summary of information developed concerning the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., by James Earl Ray and a press release concerning Ray made by Attorney General Ramsey Clark on April 18, 1968. Supervisor E. J. McDonough of the General Investigative Division reviewed these items and interposed no objection to the release to the SSC in their entirety.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

62-116395

November 28, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, and specifically to Item 1 of an accompanying Document Request of same date which requested all materials contained in the files of William C. Sullivan pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) which have not previously been made available to the Committee. Excluded from consideration in connection with this request were any portions containing transcripts or summaries or tapes of electronic surveillances of King.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of materials in response to Item 1 of the Document Request.

With respect to the excisions in materials being delivered herewith, where no notation appears as to reason for excision, the excision was made for the reason that the information actually summarizes or quotes from conversations monitored during electronic surveillances of King. In some cases it can be ascertained precisely what information in these materials came from electronic surveillances of King; however, there exist areas where documentation of the information is not precise and no accurate determination can be made. Therefore, no assurances can be given that portions of the materials being furnished do not contain information developed as a result of electronic surveillances of King.

In addition to materials not being furnished the SSC as stipulated by the SSC is a folder classified "Top Secret" bearing a label captioned "Communications Concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., Volume 1" which was located in the files of Mr. Sullivan. A review of that document indicates it contains information which could result in the identification of confidential sources of this Bureau; data obtained in connection with

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

PEN:adn adn
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

62-116395 [illegible]

NOCPS
PEN

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operation; and other data concerning King which by prior agreement has been excluded from delivery to the SSC (product of electronic surveillances of King).

In view of the above and since most, if not all, of the information contained in this document which does not fit the above exclusions, has previously been furnished the SSC, the document is not being delivered herewith.

1 - The Attorney General

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/28/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 11/7/75, item 1

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

~~TS~~

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Surveillance, electronic
Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials relating to Martin L. King, Jr and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as they were contained in the files of William C. Sullivan.

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/GHL

62-116395
FMK: fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-A

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

HOUSTUDY/SENSTUDY "JUNE" ENCLOSURE PERMANENT CHARGE OUT FORM

RE - HOUSTUDY 62-116464-

OR

SENSTUDY 62-116395-1153 EBF

NOTE: THIS IS A PERMANENT CHARGE OUT FOR A XEROX COPY/COPIES OF "JUNE" MAIL THAT WAS INCLUDED IN COPIES OF FBI DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY MEMO/LETTER DATED 11-28-75 IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST(S) MADE BY EITHER THE U. S. SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE. THE COPY/COPIES OF THE "JUNE" MAIL DATED AS INDICATED BELOW HAS/HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS ENCLOSURE MATERIAL TO BE FILED IN THE APPROPRIATE HOUSTUDY OR SENSTUDY "JUNE" FILE INDICATED ABOVE, LOCATED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF THE RECORDS SECTION.

DATE(S) OF MAIL: 11-7-75

REMOVED BY: Wardlaw DATE REMOVED: 9-28-76

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

November 25, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. J. Duffin
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the request of the SSC dated November 7, 1975, for delivery of FBI materials.

Attached is a memorandum which is a partial response to items raised in referenced request. Enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JWJ:emg
(10)

ENCLOSURE

REC-41 62-116395-1151

DEC 5 1975

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/ETH
WRW

JAM

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 11 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

November 25, 1975

1 - Mr. A. J. Duffin
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the November 7, 1975, request by the SSC for delivery of FBI materials.

Item 1 of referenced SSC letter requested the following:

1) All materials pertaining to the opening of mail to or from Gilbert Stuart and Virginia R. Stuart during the years 1960 and 1961, by FBI Agents in or around the cities of New York and Providence, Rhode Island. (This request encompasses materials located in FBI Headquarters, the New York Field Office, and the Resident Agency in Providence, Rhode Island).

Pursuant to your request, the indices and the files of the FBI Headquarters, the New York Office and the Boston Office, which includes the Resident Agency in Providence, Rhode Island, were reviewed for any material pertaining to the opening of mail to or from Gilbert Stuart and Virginia R. Stuart with negative results.

1 - The Attorney General

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

JWJ:emg
(9)

NOTE:

A copy of SSC request dated 11/14/75 is attached. In response to Bureau teletype 11/17/75, New York and Boston teletypes, 11/18/75, advised no information in their files as to any openings of mail to or from the Stuarts.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

62-116395 - WRW TAL

JBH

WOC

ENCLOSURE 1151 JAN

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/25/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMTE TO STDY GOVMNT OPTNS W?RSPCT TO INTEL ACTVTS. Ref mad to 11/7/75 rqst by SSC for dlvry of matrl Itm 1 of ref let.

Originating Office: FBI 5050

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 11/28/75

Received by:

Title: Staff Associate

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
11/25/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

x	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 11/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

No materials located at FBIHQ, New York Field Office or Providence, R.I., Resident Agency regarding opening of mail to or from Gilbert and Virginia R. Stuart.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

NOV 11 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated November 5, 1975, which was received by this Office on November 10, 1975. Please prepare an appropriate response to the attached request.

cc: Paul Daly

Bob Kelley, SSC telephonically adv. that answers are not [illegible] further [illegible] itself [illegible] will [illegible] be affected to respond - if so, will hear further from SSC. 5:05 pm 12/9/75

above given to Shaheen telephonically. 1:30 pm 12/10/75

Assigned to R. Hampton 11/11/75

Approx. 11/21/75 spoke to R. Kelley, SSC, who says he not handling but he would have handler call [illegible] who needed something [illegible] Howard [illegible] Call [illegible] for R. Kelley 3:10 pm 12/[illegible]

5:15 pm 12/4/75 - again left message at 224-1700 (Kelley in conference) for Kelley to call me

At 5:25 pm 12/4/75 Kelley called. He said he'd [illegible] to staff member John [illegible] referred [illegible] [illegible] 11/21/75 for [illegible] [illegible] Kelley will check [illegible] this request [illegible]

MDR-16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY 6P2 ALM/EHL

62-116395
62-116395-1150

ST 104

REC-31

5 JAN 30 1976

1 - [illegible] 11-11-75

84 FEB 3 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 5, 1975

Nov 7 1 20 PM '75
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL UNIT

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

This is a supplementary request to our request of August 20, 1975, under Part IV, 3.

> All FBI reports, memoranda, interviews, and all other documents from FBI Agents Frank Watts and Jack Rucker concerning the time period April 1968 from August 1968 concerning Meridian, Mississippi, bombings, meetings with FBI informant Raymond Roberts and members of the Meridian, Mississippi, Police Department involving Thomas A. Tarrants III, Joe Danny Hawkins, Kathy Ainsworth, and other members or alleged members of the Ku Klux Klan.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1150X

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

[redacted]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

2 - Mr. J[redacted]A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
(Attn: T. L. Sheer)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 11/11/75

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
(Attn: H. A. Newman)
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
(Attn: E. P. Grigalus)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Attached copy of Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter 11/7/75 indicates in last paragraph, page 2, the request of the SSC Staff to interview and possibly depose FBI Agents who have handled three former Bureau informants (Rowe, Hardy and Cooke). At a conference with SSC representatives (details being reported in a separate memorandum from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall), agreements were reached between Bureau and SSC representatives as to the specific Agents the SSC Staff desired to interview. The identities of these Agents are set out below under the headings as to the particular former informants.

Former Informant Mary Jo Cooke

SA Garry George Lash - Assigned Buffalo.

Former Informant Robert Hardy

SA Michael M. Ryman - Assigned Philadelphia Office.
Retired SAC Roy K. Moore - Resides Jackson, Mississippi; employed by Deposit Guaranty National Bank, Jackson 39201.

Former Informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.

Former SA Barrett George Kemp - Resides Saint Marys, Ohio; Attorney at Law, Home Bank Building, Saint Marys, Ohio 45884.
Former SA Byron Edward McFall - Resides Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; employed Special Judge District Court, Seventh Judicial District, State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City 73102.

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/LEHC

PERS. REC. UNIT

Enclosure
62-116395

REC-41 62-116395-1150

DEC 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

SFP:lhb lhb
(9)

File 62-116395

84 DEC 11 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

Former SA James Brooke Blake, Jr. - Employed as Director of Bank Security, Trust Company Bank, Atlanta, Georgia 30302, Business Telephone (404) 588-8216.
SA Neil P. Shanahan - Assigned Philadelphia Office.

For information, interview of former SAC Moore desired by SSC Staff as he was in charge of the Bureau Special "Camden Action" involving use of former informant Hardy (destruction of Selective Service records involved).

The SSC has emphasized desire of very expedite attention to its request relating to interviews of the above personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. All of the foregoing listed current and former employees be released from their confidentiality agreement for purposes of the interviews which are to be confined to their respective handling of the indicated former informants.

2. Upon approval of the above recommendation, and because of the expedite nature of this matter, the Legal Counsel Division will orally advise the SSC (Staff Member Bob Kelley is coordinating for SSC) of the current whereabouts of the above listed and that they have been released from their confidentiality agreement. The addresses as given are the latest available in their personnel files.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

3. Legal Counsel Division will coordinate with Kelley of the SSC the times and places for interviews of incumbent employees. By SAC Rosse advised re Kash by pvD 11/20/75
Ph ASAC Laster advised re Shanahan and Ryman 11/20/75 pvD

4. Because of the expedite nature of this matter, Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project has already telephoned the appropriate field offices to have them alert the former employees of possible contact of them by the SSC Staff and that, once so contacted, the former employees may call the Legal Counsel Division collect for further advice. This is in accordance with established procedures.

WRW
JAM
JBA
PLM

> Telephonic instructions given 11/11/75 to have ex SA's alerted:
SAC Whittaker, OC — Byron McFall.
SAC Dunn, AT — James Blake
SAC Sullivan, Jackson — Roy Moore
Supv. Leroy Davis, CV — Barnett Kemp

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

[illegible]

November 7, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

As a follow-up to our briefing of Assistant Director Wannall on November 6 concerning our proposed format and witnesses for public hearings on December 4-5 on the FBI's use of intelligence informants and sources, we would like to make the following requests.

As discussed in our meeting with Mr. Wannall, we invite the Bureau to submit a memorandum on its intelligence informant and source program that could be inserted in the record of the testimony of Bureau representatives at the hearing. This memorandum would enable the Bureau to present to the Select Committee a complete description of its program and to discuss the issues of particular interest to the Committee members. These include, for example, 1) the size, scope and purpose of the program, including an assessment of the program's cost and effectiveness, and the distinctions and relationships between the intelligence informant program and the Bureau's criminal informant activity; 2) the criteria that determine when an informant may be used in an organization or group; and 3) the program's command and control system, including the limits that are placed on the activities of informants and the type of information an informant or source is permitted to report to his handling agent and the Bureau. In addition, the memorandum would discuss possible legislation in the informant area, such as the imposition of a warrant requirement or additional administrative review. To permit the Select Committee members to study this memorandum in advance of the hearing and to discuss it with FBI representatives during their testimony at the public hearing, we request that the memorandum be submitted by November 24.

1-Ad Hoc
11-10-75

Memo WOCregar to WRWannall
11/11/75 FJP:lhb

S. Phillips

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-1150

Also I am enclosing requests for documents relating to two of the three former FBI informants who are scheduled to testify on December 4. These requests supplement our document request of August 20, 1975 pertaining to informants (Part IV-4).

In addition, we wish to interview and possibly depose the Special Agents who handled the three former informants (Rowe, Hardy and Cook) who are scheduled to testify at the public hearing on December 4. Because of the limited time remaining before the scheduled hearings, we request that the Special Agents be made available for interviews and depositions as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

John Elliff

John Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc: Paul V. Daly
Office of Congressional Affairs
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DOCUMENT REQUEST

1. The following documents and materials relating to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., whether in the custody or possession of the FBI Birmingham, Alabama office or elsewhere:

a) All documents and materials reflecting contacts and reports of contacts (and the substance thereof) between Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. and FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

b) All documents and materials reflecting information supplied by Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. to FBI Special Agents (and Bureau Field or Headquarters summaries thereof) from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

c) All documents and materials relating to any guidance, directions, instructions, or suggestions given to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

d) All documents and materials relating to Bureau and Field Office supervision of the handling of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

e) All documents and materials relating to payments of money to, or other financial arrangements between, Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., the FBI, and the Justice Department - from March 25, 1965 to December 31, 1966.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1150

FBI

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2625
24 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee [on intelligence] as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

1✓

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/LTHC

Jack E. Thomas
Jack E. Thomas
Major General, USAF (Ret.)
Chief, Coordination Staff/ICS

Attachment

ST-110

1 - ENCLOSURE

REC-41 62-116395-1149

3 DEC 9 1975

62-116395

5-Ewf

84 DEC 11 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Aaron, David [1]	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
der, William [1]	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badg
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara	*	B 6/26	12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Betts, Richard K.	*	B 7/1	8-15-47	Pa.	016-38-2619	
Binkin, Martin	*	B 8/5	5-6-28	Mo.	498-20-5633	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
oomfield, Beth Susan	*	B 7/14(H, G, K)	12-23-51	Ohio	256-92-0341	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Bramble, Anne Harriet Owens	*	B 10/30	12-15-36	Md.	219-34-2005	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Brown, Maxine	*	B 6/26	8-8-28	Ida.	568-40-3123	

62-116395-1146

ENCLOSURE

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/ETC

All Footnotes at the end.

24 NOV 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Bushong, David	*	B 71/4	8-10-47	Ohio	289-40-1203	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
esnick, Barbara	*	B 7/14	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
Culbreth, Elizabeth	*	B 7/2	6-23-42	NC	240-64-9040	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17(Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Davis, Spencer	*	B 10/1	5-3-10		575-10-3539	
Dawson, Thomas	*	B 6/26	9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeMarco, James	*	B 6/26	3-12-43	W. Va.	286-36-9097	
Dennin, Joseph Francis	*	B 6/23	6-9-43	NY	567-62-5353	
DeOreo, Mary	*	B 6/26	6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
DeTemple, Mary	*	B 7/29	6-16-25	Wisc.	394-20-5968	
Genova, Joseph E.	*	B 6/26	2-22-45	Del.	222-28-5430	
Dick, James	*	B 6/26	7-25-47	Mass.	029-36-6745	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Donock, Mary Jane[2]			9-12-23	W. Va.	235-22-9235	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel	*	B 7/14	8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor	*	B 6/26	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
Erno, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	

24 NOV 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	 Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Fiske, Marie Waite	*		1-21-40	Wisc.	395-34-5646	
Ford, Harold	*	B 6/26	3-23-21	Cal.	550-16-4630	
Fortman, Bernard Louis[3]			12-5-25	Md.	216-20-2565	
Fortman, Donald Thomas[3]			8-31-33	Md.	213-30-8943	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
Grant, Bruce	*	B 7/2	6-16-16	Neb.	507-20-1311	
Greissing, Edward	*	B 7/14	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Hanback, Sara Susan			2-4-46	W. Va.	215-46-3141	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Harris, Susan			3-30-49	Ky.	225-64-8706	
Harris, William R.[4]	already	Briefed	7-30-41		128-32-2350	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691	
Herbst, Deborah	*	B 10/1	2-18-50		227-74-5904	
Herrington, Arthur[5]	*	B 9/15	3-24-31	D. C.	304-28-8364	
Hodges, Paulette	*	B 7/29	4-17-43	Okla.	224-60-2495	
Horowitz, Anne	*		4-17-40	NY	147-46-1050	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	
Iverson, Portia	*	B 7/14	10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	
Jefferson, Arthur M.	*	B 6/26	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
[illegible]nson, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
Johnston, James	*	B 7/29	1-6-44	Kan.	495-46-9594	
Karalekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kayden, Jeffrey	*	B 7/14	3-22-51	NY	065-40-7277	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles[1]	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge
Kirchheimer, Joseph			6-3-17	Ill.	359-03-7843	
Koppal, Diane	*	B 6/26	6-24-48	NC	219-48-0018	

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Koscis, Susan	*	B 9/17	11-5-49	NY	051-42-2418	
Krauss, George Henry Jr.[3]			9-9-16	Colo.	385-01-1876	
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles[1]	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen	*	B 8/20	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James[1]	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mascioli, Cynthia	*	B 6/26	1-4-51	NY	112-44-7636	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mayo, Betty	*	B 6/26	2-13-22	Ohio	277-14-4062	
McCorkle, Daniel	*	B 8/20	6-25-55	Ohio	297-56-6722	
McIntyre, Dorothy			5-16-16	Canada	220-48-9104	
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	
Metsky, Ellen Jo	*		9-24-53	N. J.	127-30-3729	
Michel, Paul	*	B 8/14	2-3-41	Pa.	172-34-8584	
Miller, William G.[1]	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	

24 Nov 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
Murphy, Michael	*	B 7/1	10-13-54	Tex.	231-86-8829	
Nash, Dorothy			7-24-12	Wisc.	399-14-4589	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan	*	B 6/26	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Oster, Lynsey Lee			9-14-53	SD	501-68-8908	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.	*	B 6/26	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Piland, Susan			10-5-50	Cal.	557-86-6753	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Postal, Andrew	*	B 7/23	5-11-48	NY	128-40-4695	
Pyle, Christopher	*	B 6/26	11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Ralston, Theodore	*	B 7/23	8-25-48	Wash.	538-48-4673	
Rhea, Gordon	*	B 6/26	3-10-45	Va.	412-74-7901	
chard, Eric	*	B 7/10	12-27-49	NY	128-40-7430	
Ricks, Walter	*	B 6/26	12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwartz, Paula	*	B 11/4	9-18-53	D. C.	223-64-1880	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III[1]	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester	*	B 6/26	7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.	*	B 6/26	3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha	*	B 6/26	9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Tascione, Rosemary			6-23-45	NY	085-34-6648	
Theoharis, Athan George			8-3-36	Wisc.	395-32-1273	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
T[illegible]nalonis, Alexandra			6-1-48	Md.	200-38-8408	
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Turner, James	*	B 7/14	6-29-53	Cal.	215-64-7255	
Tschirgi, James 6	*	B 6/26	2-23-25	Wyo.	520-16-7290	
Vance, James	*	B 7/23	4-6-36	Ohio	078-28-3950	
Wallach, Paul	*	B 6/26	5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
White, William	*	B 7/10	8-8-39	Pa.	168-30-9147	
Wides, Burton. Victor[1]	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe	*	B 8/5	12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

Footnotes:

[1] Also briefed on Hx, Mat, Rh & Ke

[2] Detailed from Ward and Paul Reporters

[3] Detailed from General Printing Office

[4] Consultant to SSC, also associated with RAND Corp (has SI, TK BYC)

[5] Has SI, TK, B, G, C, H, R, A, E

6. Also has A, G, E, K, H, C & R

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 11/26/75

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mrs. Metcalf
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

On 11/25/75, John T. Elliff, Task Force Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force for the Senate Select Committee, requested the Bureau designate a witness to appear in executive session before the Senate Select Committee on 12/3 or 12/4 in the afternoon to discuss counterintelligence investigations by the Bureau. Elliff stated because of Chairman Frank Church's interest in a study as to whether counterintelligence investigations should be taken out of the FBI and placed in another agency or a separate component of the Justice Department, this particular topic would be the main focal point of the hearing. Elliff stated that the questions asked of the Bureau's witness would deal primarily with the feasibility of removal of counterintelligence out of the FBI including problems of a logistical and practical nature resulting from such a change. Elliff asked that he be advised as to the identity of the Bureau witness as soon as possible.

Inasmuch as the aforementioned topic is a question of policy, the Director may desire to appear or designate a Bureau witness to appear before the Committee in this matter. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, is aware of the aforementioned testimony and the possibility exists that the Department may make a decision with regards to the Bureau's providing a witness concerning this matter.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ST-110

REC-41

62-116395-1148

RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER

PVD:lad LAD
(9)

5 DEC ~~8~~ 9 1975

84 DEC 12 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Director designate the Bureau's witness to appear before captioned Committee.

(2) That the Office of Congressional Affairs advise the Senate Select Committee of the Bureau's decision in this matter.

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/3/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Moore

FROM : Legal Counsel

MDR-16

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

John T. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director of the Senate Select Committee, advised at 9:15 a.m. on 12/3/75 that the following is a statement to be read by Senator Frank Church of that Committee on 12/3/75.

Attorney General Kennedy authorized wiretaps in 1962 on New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin and his secretary and that lasted for about one month. In addition to the wiretap on New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin in 1962, the Committee has received materials from the FBI reflecting authorization by Attorney General Kennedy of a wiretap on a reporter for Newsweek Magazine in 1961 during the investigation of another leak of classified information. Further materials reflected authorization by Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach for a wiretap on the editor of an anti-Communist newsletter in 1965, also during the investigation of a leak of classified information. The Committee has received materials from the FBI reflecting authorization by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy of wiretaps on at least six American citizens, including three Executive Branch officials, a Congressional Staff Member, and two registered lobbying agents for foreign interests. The materials also reflect that these wiretaps relate to an investigation of agents by foreign interests to influence United States economic policies.

Elliff was advised by SA Paul V. Daly of this Division that an impression would be created by the aforementioned statement that this Bureau may have conducted an electronic surveillance on Capitol Hill and that this, of course, was inaccurate. The electronic surveillance concerning the Congressional Staff Member was not located on Congressional property. Elliff agreed with this observation and indicated that he would check the material to insure the electronic surveillance in question was not on Congressional property and as agreed, make a change in the aforementioned statement.

3 DEC 9 1975

REC-41 62-116395-1146

RECOMMENDATION:

ST-110

For information.

At 11 35/A today Elliff advised statement change in accordance with above suggestion noted FBI conducted no electronic surveillance on Capitol Hill

PVD:lad

84 DEC 12 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1146, 1148-1151, 1153-1156, 1157, 1158-1165

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88296 Date: 2025

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

November 20, 1975

1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC requests contained in letter of Senator Frank Church dated November 7, 1975, for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to SSC requests in referenced letter.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL
MDR 16

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JTA:adn
(9)

REC-7 62 - 116395 - 1165

NOTE:

A copy of the SSC letter 11/7/75, is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

DEC 12 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

5-Woc 16

Affairs
& Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 DEC 16 1975

~~SECRET~~ 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer

62-116395

November 20, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC requests contained in letter of Senator Frank Church dated November 7, 1975, for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials in response to requests contained in the above SSC letter.

The attention of the SSC is invited to FBI memorandum dated November 11, 1975, which referred to a highly sensitive oral briefing furnished to Senator Church and selected members of the SSC Staff by FBI personnel on November 5, 1975. This briefing was intended, in part, to serve in lieu of any written information in response to SSC requests for communications documenting Stanley David Levison as a secret member of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA).

Because of SSC insistence in requesting items to establish factual basis for Levison's secret CPUSA membership, as set forth in referenced SSC letter, our New York office was contacted for documents representing original recordings from Bureau informants concerning Levison. As a result our New York office provided the material which is now being delivered and which has served as a basis for statements in various FBI documents that Levison was a secret member of the CPUSA.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG MDR 16

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL
ON 10/27/00

JTA:adn
(8)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 2047
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

WOC/16

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

62-116395-1165

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

It is noted that referenced SSC letter requested unexcised copies of the February 22, and June 12, 1962, communications from New York which appear to have been the "articulated predicates for the 'cominfil' case." The SSC letter did not identify captions of these communications; nor identify any specific "cominfil case." Therefore, we were unable to locate any pertinent documents bearing these dates in our Headquarters files. At a meeting on November 12, 1975, between SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein and representatives of the Intelligence Division of the FBI, it was agreed that the two documents apparently referred to above are New York airtel dated February 12, 1962, captioned "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; SM-C" and New York letter dated August 21, 1962, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; IS-C."

New York airtel dated February 12, 1962, is being delivered with this memorandum among those documents received from our New York office. Excisions in this document are fewer than those made in a copy previously provided the SSC. A copy bearing no or fewer excisions cannot be provided the SSC for reasons made clear during the oral briefing of Senator Church and selected SSC Staff members on November 5, 1975.

It is noted that New York letter dated August 21, 1962, which is being delivered with this memorandum, is not believed to have been previously provided the SSC.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/20/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

11/7/75 request - KING

Originating Office: FBI 235p

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/26/75

Received by: Lynsey Oster

Title: clk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHK

ENCLOSURE

62 [illegible] 1165

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, J[illegible]NN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 7, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Office of Deputy Attorney General
Room 4313
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Dear Mr. Shaheen:

I want you to know how much I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you and your associates the other day about the Martin Luther King, Jr. case. It was most helpful to have the benefit of the Bureau's knowledge concerning the background of the case, and I can assure you that we will do everything possible to avoid joepardizing any sensitive FBI sources or ongoing operations.

I do want to reiterate our need for the specific items set forth in earlier document requests which would presumably establish the factual basis for your conclusion as of various dates in 1962, 1963 and 1964 that Stanley Levison was a "secret member of the Communist Party, USA." Of course in the event that there is no particular document in any of those years wherein Levison was so-identified to the FBI, I think it would be helpful for you to let us know so that we may consider our outstanding requests in that context. Finally, of course, we still need unexcised copies of the February 22 and June 12, 1962 communications from New York which appear to have been the articulated predicates for the "cominfil" case.

Once again, I want to thank you for your time and I look forward to hearing from you further on this subject.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

Rept to AG, cc DAG
Encl-2 11/20/75
JTA:adn

RECEIVED
NOV 7 1975

62-116395-1165
5.
ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/20/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/27/00 BY SL2ALM/EHL

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 11/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

S

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Intelligence collection
Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials regarding Martin L. King, Jr., Stanley D. Levison and SCLC. Items to establish factual basis for Levison's secret CP, USA membership was obtained from FBI New York Office and furnished SSC.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER 11-7-75

DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM NEW YORK OFFICE INDICATING CPUSA MEMBERSHIP OF STANLEY DAVID LEVISON

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

18

Retain

62-116375-1165

ENCLOSURE

Sec 1165

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO : SAC (100-111180)

DATE: 4/17/64

FROM : SA JAMES M. KIRBY (414)

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
ON 10/27/00

SUBJECT: STANLEY LEVISON
IS-C

On 4/9/64, (SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION (SFIO) ~~NY 694-S*~~ made the following observations with regard to the) CP status of STANLEY LEVISON:

SFIO

LEVISON has been an important Party member for many years (and never at any time differed with the Party with respect to the Party line. His only difference with the Party has been with respect to the fact that in his opinion the Party was not sufficiently "militant" in defending Negro rights. In this respect, he has been to the "left" of the Party. LEVISON's differences with the Party are merely "tactical." He has never criticized the Party, except with respect to the Party's handling of the Negro question. The fact that he does not accept domination by the Party with regard to the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement should not be construed to mean that he has broken with the Party in all respects. The Party today is as anxious to reestablish friendly relations with LEVISON as it was in the past.)

SFIO

(It should be noted that LEVISON never has been officially "drummed out" of the Party, nor has anyone ever criticized him for being opposed to the Party's general principles. It further should be noted that according to the CP Constitution, it would require formal expulsion of LEVISON to state that he is officially out of the Party.

LEVISON never has said anything reflecting that he does not continue to be a CP member. It should be noted that it would be in the interests of the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement, with which he is associated, if he would publicly repudiate the Party, which he has never done. It should be further noted that in an effort to renew friendly relations)

~~Classified by 2116~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

JMK:mmd
(1)

100-111180-[illegible]

SEARCHED........INDEXED........
SERIALIZED........FILED........
APR 17 1964
FBI - NEW YORK

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

with LEVISON, the Party designated BEN DAVIS to contact LEVISON. LEVISON had always expressed the opinion that BEN DAVIS was the only CP functionary who had a sufficiently "militant attitude" as regards CP activities in behalf of the Negro movement. The fact that DAVIS and LEVISON as yet have not met should not be construed to mean that LEVISON has refused to confer with DAVIS. As NY 694-S* understands the situation, DAVIS has been awaiting contact by LEVISON, and LEVISON similarly has been awaiting contact by DAVIS. Each of these individuals is sufficiently egotistical to expect that the other would make the first move in an effort to establish contact. NY 694-S* believes that probably the reason why DAVIS and LEVISON have not met is that arrangements for their meeting were to be made by LEM HARRIS and that HARRIS has not made the proper efforts to effect a meeting between LEVISON and DAVIS.

SF10

NY 694-S* has never obtained any information reflecting that LEVISON has changed his thinking with regard to Marxism. Even though his present estrangement from the Party might be construed as reflecting he is no longer a CP member, there is no reason to come to the conclusion that LEVISON is no longer an ideological Communist.

JACK talked to LEM HARRIS yesterday who said he contacted STAN LEVENSON by phone and was given a cordial hello which was a change from the past when he was cool.

LEM said he had not seen LEVENSON, tried to call him and would like to see him immediately to which LEVENSON said, "I would like very much to see you but I don't have the time now. I'm leaving and packing for a trip. I will be glad to see you in six weeks."

LEVENSON implied that he was going to Ecuador but LEM doesn't know why. There was no anger shown, and LEVENSON will see LEM when he returns in six weeks.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, NEW YORK (100-111180) DATE: 7/26/63 ~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM : SA FRANCIS T. LEONARD

SUBJECT: STANLEY DAVID LEVISON
IS-C

The following is being submitted as a revised characterization of the subject:

STANLEY LEVISON is a secret member of the Communist Party, United States of America (CPUSA).

NY T-
July 16, 1963

NY T- is (INFORMANT NY 694-S*.)

A three by five card has been prepared containing the above characterization and will be filed in the library of the NYO.

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/EHL
ON 10/27/00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1-NY (100-111180) (414)
FTL: rmv
(1)

134-91-3849

[illegible]

[redacted]
Classified by ~~2116~~
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification ~~Indefinite~~

SEARCHED ______ INDEXED ______
SERIALIZED ______ FILED ______
JUL [illegible] 1963
FBI — NEW YORK

~~TOP SECRET~~

FBI
Date: 6/13/63

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (~~100-166670~~) 100-106670

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-136585)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING
SM - C
(OO: ATLANTA)

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY ~~OPZALM/EHL~~
ON 10/27/00

(SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION (SF10)

(Extreme caution must be exercised with respect to dissemination of the information herein inasmuch as, by its nature, said information tends to identify NY 694-S*, a valuable informant, as the source. Unless this information is obtained from a source other than NY 694-S*, it should not be included--even in paraphrased form--in the investigative section of a report.)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

7 - Bureau (~~100-166670~~) (RM) 100-106670
(1 - 100-392452) (STANLEY LEVISON)
((1 - 100-358916) (HUNTER PITTS O'DELL))
(1 - 157-286) (MARTIN LUTHER KING)
((1 - 100-) (ROY LEVISON))
2 - Atlanta (100-5586) (MARTIN LUTHER KING) (INFO)(RM)
(1 - 157-) (MARTIN LUTHER KING)
SF10 (1 - Chicago (134-46-Inv.) (INFO)(RM))
1 - NY 134-91 (INV.) (41)
1 - NY 100-111180 (STANLEY LEVISON) (414)
(1 - NY 100-91330 (HUNTER PITTS O'DELL) (414))
(1 - NY 100-111203 (ROY LEVISON) (414))
(1 - NY 100-7658 (LEM HARRIS) (414))
1 - NY 157-826 (MARTIN LUTHER KING) (412)
1 - NY 100-136585 (412)

ACB:gmg
(20)

Approved: ______________________ Sent ________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classified by~~ 2116
~~Exempt from GDS, Category~~ 2
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

SF10

On 6/13/63, NY 694-S* furnished the following information to SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON:

On 6/12/63, LEMENT HARRIS, CPUSA Reserve Fund functionary, told NY 694-S* that in a recent meeting with STANLEY LEVISON, the latter furnished him the following information:

The LEVISONS, particularly STANLEY, are still MARTIN LUTHER KING's "brain trust"--now more than ever before. This is so despite the fact that at a meeting of STANLEY LEVISON, ROY LEVISON, HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, MARTIN LUTHER KING and "the Attorney General's chief assistant", the Attorney General's assistant, pointing to the LEVISONS and HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, stated to MARTIN LUTHER KING, "These men are Party members; watch out for them."

MARTIN LUTHER KING did not "bat an eyelash" upon hearing the Assistant Attorney General's remark, and after the latter left the meeting, those in the group smiled at each other. STANLEY LEVISON said to KING, at this time, "I congratulate you on the way you acted regarding his warning. You are a real Marxist-Leninist. This is how a true Marxist-Leninist acts."

Everything that KING does he first discusses with STANLEY LEVISON and he accepts LEVISON's advice wholeheartedly. KING also wholeheartedly accepts the advice of HUNTER PITTS O'DELL as regards matters within the latter's local jurisdiction.

MARTIN LUTHER KING was asked by a group of newspaper reporters whether he takes orders from "the Communists", and also, whether he took "orders from STANLEY LEVISON." KING's response was that he took orders only from God.

By reason of the fact that the LEVISONS feel that the Party has done little, if anything, to assist the fight

SF10 for civil rights for Negroes, and further, since they feel that the Party, as a result of this "do nothing" attitude, has lost prestige, they will no longer permit the Party to dominate or control their activities in the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement. They are severing themselves, financially and in a disciplinary way, from the Party. The LEVISONS and O'DELL are still Party members, but do not desire to be openly "linked up" with the Party. Although they are "disenchanted" with the Party, they are not quitting the Party. With respect to the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement, they will act on their own initiative, and will not accept instructions from the Party.

LEM HARRIS then advised that the Party, however, still would like to control the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement. BEN DAVIS has been assigned to be "liaison or intermediary" with the LEVISONS and HUNTER PITTS O'DELL. Whether or not the LEVISONS and O'DELL will maintain liaison regarding matters concerning the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement is a matter for them to decide. In view of LEVISON's statement with respect to advising MARTIN LUTHER KING independently of Party instructions, it would seem that DAVIS may not have any success in maintaining liaison with the LEVISONS and HUNTER PITTS O'DELL. The LEVISONS and O'DELL are aware of the fact that BEN DAVIS has been given this assignment by the Party. SF10

MARTIN LUTHER KING, according to LEM HARRIS, is referred to by such top Party functionaries as GUS HALL, BEN DAVIS, JIM JACKSON and CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT as a "true, genuine, Marxist-Leninist from the top of his head to the tips of his toes." In the Party, the report is that MARTIN LUTHER KING is following a Marxist-Leninist line.

NY 694-S* advised that he asked LEM HARRIS whether or not, to the latter's knowledge, MARTIN LUTHER KING was a member of the CPUSA. LEM HARRIS replied that he did not know.

SAC, NEW YORK (100-111180) 8/30/62

8/31

SA FRANCIS T. LEONARD (415)

STANLEY LEVISON
IS-C

The following characterization is being submitted for approval with respect to the subject:

NY T- who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on August 28, 1962, that STANLEY LEVISON is a secret member of the Communist Party, United States of America (CP, USA), and (contributes funds to the CP on a regular basis.) SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION

NY T- is (INFORMANT NY 694-S*.)

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHC
ON 10/27/00

1 - NY 134-91-INV.) SF10
1 - NY 100-111180 (415)

FTL: gmm
(2)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

2116

2/13

FBI

DATE: 2/12/62

Transmit the following via AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100 -)

SECRET

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-136585)

SUBJECT: DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SM-C (OO: Atlanta)

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION (SFIO)

(Extreme caution must be exercised with respect to dissemination of the information herein since, by its nature, it tends to identify NY 694-S*, a valuable informant, as the source thereof. Unless this information is obtained from a source other than NY 694-S*, it should not be incorporated - even in paraphrased form - in the investigative section of a report.)

On 2/12/62, (Informant NY 694-S*) advised SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON as follows:

SFIO

(In a recent meeting with LEMENT HARRIS, CPUSA functionary associated with the CPUSA Reserve Fund operation, the informant was told by HARRIS that shortly before GUS HALL, CPUSA General Secretary, went to the West Coast, HARRIS transmitted to HALL a "confidential verbal report" on Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, furnished to HARRIS by) STANLEY LEVISON, KING's attorney and advisor, who is a secret member of the CP (and a regular contributor to the CPUSA Rserve Fund. LEVISON's report was as follows:)

4-Bureau (100-) (RM)
(1-100-392452) (STANLEY LEVISON)
1-Atlanta (100-) (DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.) (RM)
(1-NY 134-91 (INV.) (41))
1-NY 100-111180 (STANLEY LEVISON) (415)
(1-NY 100-7658 (LEMENT HARRIS) (415))
(1-NY 100-84994 (GUS HALL) (415))
1-NY 100-136585 (412)

SFIO

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/EHL
10/31/00

SECRET

ACB:ume
(11)

Classified by 2116
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEARCHED...... INDEXED......
SERIALIZED...... FILED......

SF10

(When Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING was invited to address the AFL-CIO convention some time ago, KING, on LEVISON's advice, first obtained approval to do so from A. PHILLIP RANDOLPH, negro labor leader, who, if he had not been consulted in the matter, might have felt that KING's making a speech at the aforesaid convention was a blow to RANDOLPH's prestige.

KING delivered a remarkably effective speech at the AFL-CIO convention, and, as a result, received invitations from numerous labor leaders, including "MC DONALD of Steel," to address their respective unions. As the outstanding champion of negro rights in the country, KING is a powerful political influence, recognized as such by the higher echelons of the Democratic Party. He has access to Attorney General ROBERT KENNEDY and President KENNEDY, who, politically, need KING, particularly in the South, where in cities like Atlanta and New Orleans the negro vote now constitutes the balance of power, and where KING controls the negro vote.

JAMES HOFFA, Teamsters Union "boss" appreciates the political power of KING, particularly the fact that KING can influence the 90,000 negro members of the Teamsters Union. HOFFA invited KING to address the Teamsters Union, and KING accepted the invitation. Knowing that KING is being deferred to by Attorney General KENNEDY, and President KENNEDY, HOFFA requested KING to contact the Attorney General in an effort to influence the latter "to lay off" HOFFA. KING was inclined to do as HOFFA requested, but LEVISON convinced him that to do so would be politically unwise, inexpedient, and likely to be a "boomerang," since the Attorney General would never accede to such a request, particularly in the case of HOFFA.

LEVISON had to steer KING away from another politically hazardous situation. Some months ago OTTO PREMINGER, Hollywood movie director, entered into negotiations with a KING representative for KING to play a part in a picture which PREMINGER would direct. Although PREMINGER's offer was "tempting," since it meant "fast, easy money" for KING's organization, LEVISON realized that for KING to accept the offer would lower the latter's prestige. After convincing KING of this fact, LEVISON personally telephoned to PREMINGER, telling him that "the deal was off.")

(What LEVISON particularly wanted GUS HALL to knew is that "KING is a wholehearted Marxist, who has studied it (Marxism), believes in it, and agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly."

GUS HALL, according to HARRIS, was "elated" to receive LEVISON's report on LUTHER KING.)

SF10

SSC LETTER 11-7-75

NY LETTER DATED 8-21-62 CAPTIONED "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, IS-C"

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM /EHL

RETAIN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-438794) DATE: 8/21/62

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-149194)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE
(SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
IS-C

(OO: Atlanta)

ReBulet to Atlanta, 7/20/62, which requested NY to furnish the Bureau and Atlanta with observations and analysis of the extent of CP influence or infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

CONF. SOURCE

On 3/10/61,(ANDREW ANGIOLETTI, Chief Clerk,) Manufacturers Trust Company, 275 West 125th Street, NYC, advised that there is an account maintained at this branch by the SCLC, whose officers are listed as MARTIN LUTHER KING, President; BAYARD RUSTIN, Secretary; and STANLEY D. LEVISON, Assistant Treasurer.

INF.

(CG 5824-S*) on 8/6/57, advised that STANLEY LEVISON and his brother, ROY BENNETT, were active in (CP financial matters and business ventures which contribute to the CP.)

SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELL. OPER. (SFIO)

INF

(NY 694-S*) advised in October, 1961, that LEVISON continues to (donate money to the CP, USA.) SFIO

INF

During the period of February 9-15, 1957, (CG 5824-S*) advised that the 16th National Convention, CP, USA, was held in NYC on February 9-12, 1957, and that BAYARD RUSTIN attended some of the convention sessions as a guest.

2-Bureau (100-438794) (RM)
2-Atlanta (100-5718) (RM)
1-New York (100-149194)

EEG:eac
(5)

~~SECRET~~

100-438794-4

REC-3

16 AUG 23 1962

CLASSIFIED BY 12047
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Indefinite

MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2 ALM/EHC
ON 10/27/00

Fil to NY
2 - Atlanta
8-29-62

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

informant — informant file #

(BA 969-S) advised on 11/22/60, ((BA 134-13A-615)) that at a National Negro Commission meeting held on 11/19, 20/60, at CP Headquarters, 23 West 26th Street, NYC, TED BASSETT, a representative of "The Worker", stated that the CP is now in the process of placing members of the Party in key positions in the SCLC. BASSETT continued by saying that a Western Conference of the Christian Leadership is now being formed and a CP member is the leader in this conference.

informant

(NY 694-S*) advised on 5/1/62, that on 4/30/62, (ISADORE WOFSY, CP, USA fund functionary, said that according to LEM HARRIS, he was told by STANLEY LEVISON that the CP, USA had sent "an experienced, professional, secret organizer" to New Orleans, who would assist the MARTIN LUTHER KING group there in its fight for political equality of Negroes. LEVISON allegedly told HARRIS that he personally, and not the Party, was financing this organizer.) SF10

informant — Hosea?

(NY 694-S*) advised on 5/2/62, that according to (LEM HARRIS, the secret CP organizer, whom the CP, USA had sent to New Orleans, was JOSE HUDSON. HARRIS said that HUDSON would be associated with SERGEANT CAULFIELD in Baton Rouge.) SF10

Informant

On 7/2/62, (NO 1084-S) advised that SERGEANT CAULFIELD returned to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, from Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/31/62. Informant said that CAULFIELD stated that he and JOSE HUDSON met HUNTER O'DELL in Atlanta, O'DELL having flown there from NYC.

informant

(NO 1084-S) stated that CAULFIELD paid CP dues to O'DELL for several CP members from Louisiana. O'DELL had come to Atlanta regarding organization of the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement. O'DELL thought that if an active

MARTIN LUTHER KING movement could be organized in Louisiana, the State Senatorial District where CAULFIELD resides permanently (Lettsworth, Louisiana), CAULFIELD might be furnished as much as $1,000.00 per month to promote this movement. The funds are to come from the MARTIN LUTHER KING movement and the object is to get every eligible Negro to register to vote. CAULFIELD reportedly met MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., while in Atlanta, and discussed with him the voter registration matter in Louisiana.

On 4/27/62, a pretext telephone call was made to UN 6-2000, which is the NYC listing for the Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING and also the listing for the SCLC at 312 West 125th Street, NYC. The pretext used was that of a person interested in contributing money to the KING committee. The person answering the phone during the conversation identified himself as JACK O'DELL, and furnished the following information:

His office is the Northern Branch of the SCLC. The Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, at 312 West 125th Street, was organized as an "ad hoc" committee to assist in the KING defense, when he was the subject of court action. When the reason for this committee's being in existence was removed, it was formally dissolved. The same personalities them formed the Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle, which is now operated at 312 West 125th Street.

O'DELL stated that it would make no difference as to whether a person contributing money makes out checks payable to the Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, the SCLC or the Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle, because they are all one and the same.

NY 100-149194

informant

On 6/1/61, CG 5824-S* advised that HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, who was a secret member of the National Committee, CP, USA, has quit the CP and is officially considered by the CP as being out. However, there are no hard feelings existing between O'DELL and the Party and he is still on good terms with the CP and will work with them. SF10

EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED WITH RESPECT TO DISSEMINATION OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN, SINCE BY ITS NATURE IT TENDS TO IDENTIFY NY 694-S*, A VALUABLE INFORMANT, AS THE SOURCE THEREOF. UNLESS THIS INFORMATION IS OBTAINED FROM A SOURCE OTHER THAN NY 694-S*, IT SHOULD NOT BE INCORPORATED, EVEN IN PARAPHRASED FORM, IN THE INVESTIGATIVE SECTION OF A REPORT.

INFORMANT

Informant

On 7/23/62, NY 694-S* stated during a personal contact with GUS HALL, General Secretary of the CP, USA, on that date, HALL advised that HUNTER PITTS O'DELL is still representing the CP, USA and that he is still on the National Committee of the CP, USA. HALL further remarked that O'DELL is a "brain-trust" for LUTHER KING and is doing an excellent job. SF10

Current investigation in NYC reflects that O'DELL is spending most of his time in the Atlanta area working with the SCLC. He was last reported in the NY area in June, 1962.

INFORMANT

On 2/11/62, NY 1300-S made available photographs of material maintained in the office of STANLEY LEVISON, 6 East 39th Street, NYC. Included in these photographs were the following:

1. Two checks, both dated 12/19/61, bearing the printed name of the "Southern Christian Leadership Conference", 312 West 125th Street, NY, NY. These checks

are numbered 397 and 399, one in the amount of $251.90 and one in the amount of $150.00, are marked payable to J. O'DELL, and are signed by STANLEY D. LEVISON.

2. Copy "C" of a Withholding Tax form for 1961, in the name of JOHN HUNTER O'DELL, 312 West 125th Street, NY, NY, Social Security Number 386-14-3707, indicating that he was paid $3,050.00 in 1961 by the SCLC, 312 West 125th Street, NYC.

ELSUR
(NY 3575-S*) advised on 6/20/62, that STANLEY LEVISON stated that in a recent conversation with MARTIN LUTHER KING, KING said he was thinking of getting another administrative assistant. LEVISON stated that in the past LEVISON had not considered it wise for O'DELL to take on such a position, but he is the only one who could do the job and should be considered for it. LEVISON stated as long as O'DELL did not have the title of Executive Director, there would not be "as much lightening flashing around him". O'DELL could be called a coordinator and still fulfill all the duties of Executive Director.

ELSUR
LEVISON stated, according to (NY 3575-S*) that KING liked LEVISON's suggestion with respect to O'DELL taking this position, because KING felt that O'DELL must face it sooner or later, stating "that no matter what a man was, if he could stand up now and say he is not connected, then as far as I am concerned, he is eligible to work for me".

INFORMANT | IN INFORMANT FILE #
(NY 2783-S) advised on 7/11/61, ((NY 134-4268A-378)), that HAZEL GRAY is working again at the SCLC, 312 West 125th Street, NYC.

INFORMANT
On 7/8/61, NY 1212-S stated that it had come to his attention that CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT had mentioned that he wanted

to use HAZEL GRAY and her husband, JOHN GRAY, in the Kings County CP organization. The informant stated that LIGHTFOOT highly recommended the GRAYs.

On 3/10/61, MILTON BIRON, Senior Accountant, Comtroller's Office, New York City, Bureau of Excise Taxes, 120 West 32nd Street, made available an application for exemption from the New York City amusement tax, dated 1/23/61, and signed by STANLEY D. LEVISON. The exemption was requested for a "concert" to be given at Carnegie Hall on 1/27/61, for one evening performance.

The name of the applicant was given as the "Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle", 312 West 125th Street, an unincorporated association. It is stated that the applicant is a non-profit educational committee which has registered with the Charities Registration Bureau in Albany and the Department of Welfare in NYC. It says that it employs no professional fund raisers and that neither its officers nor executive directors are paid either salaries or expenses.

The, "Purposes for which applicant was organized", are listed as:

"To provide funds for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to be used for establishment of constitutional rights in the South utilizing voting registration drives, educational meetings, church and synagogue conferences, sit-in techniques, legal actions etc."

The, "Activities of the Applicant", are listed as:

"Mail solicitations, benefits, meetings, educational conferences, church collections."

The, "Source and Disposition of Income", is listed as:

"All income less expenses is transmitted to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference or directly paid out to sources indicated by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING is President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

A "note" attached to the application stated that the committee was created by resolution as an unincorporated association at an organizing meeting held at the home of HARRY BELAFONTE, 300 West End Avenue, in June, 1960.

The application for exemption from the New York City amusement tax was denied by letter 1/31/61, sent to the Committee to Aid the Southern Freedom Struggle, 312 West 125th Street, attention of STANLEY D. LEVISON.

NY has considered the above facts and is of the opinion that a Cominfil investigation of the NY Chapter of the SCLC is warranted, due to the dominant CP influence on the executives of the NY Chapter of the SCLC.

NY will conduct no further investigation without prior Bureau authority.

The Attorney General

November 19, 1975

2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
(1 - J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Newman

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, requesting access to documents regarding informant matters.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum in response to one of the items in referenced request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Memo being prepared showing exactly what Comm. will have access to. N 11/19/75

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

HAN:tdp (10)

REC-7 62-116395-1164

ST-110

NOTE:

The material to which access is being granted involves Gary Thomas Rowe, a former Bureau informant who furnished information which led to the Federal prosecution on civil rights charges of 3 Klansmen responsible for the killing of Mrs. Viola Luizzo, a civil rights worker, in Lawndes County, Alabama, on 3/25/65. The material involved includes access to that material contained in the informant's field file as well as information contained in informant's file maintained at FBIHQ. ~~The request~~ addressed itself to other matters which are being handled separately, including access to material regarding other informants.

DEC 12 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 16 1975

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Newman

62-116395

November 18, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, requesting access to documents regarding the handling of former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe.

These documents have been assembled and are available for review by appropriately cleared SSC staff members at FBI Headquarters.

HAN:tdp (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

JAM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MEMO being prepared by LCD dated 11/13/75 showing what documents Comm will have access to. gf

WOC

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-1164

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 7, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Dear Mike:

As a follow-up to our briefing of Assistant Director Wannall on November 6 concerning our proposed format and witnesses for public hearings on December 4-5 on the FBI's use of intelligence informants and sources, we would like to make the following requests.

As discussed in our meeting with Mr. Wannall, we invite the Bureau to submit a memorandum on its intelligence informant and source program that could be inserted in the record of the testimony of Bureau representatives at the hearing. This memorandum would enable the Bureau to present to the Select Committee a complete description of its program and to discuss the issues of particular interest to the Committee members. These include, for example, 1) the size, scope and purpose of the program, including an assessment of the program's cost and effectiveness, and the distinctions and relationships between the intelligence informant program and the Bureau's criminal informant activity; 2) the criteria that determine when an informant may be used in an organization or group; and 3) the program's command and control system, including the limits that are placed on the activities of informants and the type of information an informant or source is permitted to report to his handling agent and the Bureau. In addition, the memorandum would discuss possible legislation in the informant area, such as the imposition of a warrant requirement or additional administrative review. To permit the Select Committee members to study this memorandum in advance of the hearing and to discuss it with FBI representatives during their testimony at the public hearing, we request that the memorandum be submitted by November 24.

62-116395-1156

Fwd to AG, cc DAG 11/18/75 HAN: tdp

ENCLOSURE

Also I am enclosing requests for documents relating to two of the three former FBI informants who are scheduled to testify on December 4. These requests supplement our document request of August 20, 1975 pertaining to informants (Part IV-4).

In addition, we wish to interview and possibly depose the Special Agents who handled the three former informants (Rowe, Hardy and Cook) who are scheduled to testify at the public hearing on December 4. Because of the limited time remaining before the scheduled hearings, we request that the Special Agents be made available for interviews and depositions as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

John Elliff

John Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc: Paul V. Daly
Office of Congressional Affairs
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DOCUMENT REQUEST

The following documents and materials relating to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., whether in the custody or possession of the FBI Birmingham, Alabama office or elsewhere:

a) All documents and materials reflecting contacts and reports of contacts (and the substance thereof) between Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. and FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

b) All documents and materials reflecting information supplied by Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. to FBI Special Agents (and Bureau Field or Headquarters summaries thereof) from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

c) All documents and materials relating to any guidance, directions, instructions, or suggestions given to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

d) All documents and materials relating to Bureau and Field Office supervision of the handling of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1 1960 to April 1, 1965.

e) All documents and materials relating to payments of money to, or other financial arrangements between, Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., the FBI, and the Justice Department from March 25, 1965 to December 31, 1966.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/19/75

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

11/7/75 request (Gary Thomas Rowe)

Originating Office: FBI 11/20/7

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 11/25/75

Received by: Sherry Towell

Title: HOM

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/27/00 BY SP3ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1164

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

FOR REVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials made available for review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FBIHQ, regarding the handling of former FBI informant Gary T. Rowe.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~TOP SECRET~~

11/11/75

/ ~~General~~

T - Folder ref

11/7/75 [illegible] for documentation on SD Levison

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
(ATTN: INTD - W. O.CREGAR)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (134-91)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY: 1975

Levison

ReBuphone call of Bureau Supervisor SEYMOUR PHILIP, 11/10/75.

This communication is classified "Top Secret" in accordance with established classification procedures.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies each of 21 communications pertinent to captioned case.

The original recording of this information is contained in 134-91, unless otherwise noted:

1. NYlet to Bu - CPUSA Reserve Fund - 3/16/61
2. NYlet to Bu - CPUSA Reserve Fund - 10/19/61
3. NYmemo to SAC - CPUSA Funds - 11/20/62
4. NYairtel to Bu - STANLEY LEVISON - 1/4/62
5. NYairtel to Bu - M. L. KING - 2/12/62
6. NYmemo to SAC - CPUSA Reserve Funds - 4/20/62
7. NYtel to Bu - M.L. KING - 5/3/62

Of 42 encls. 21 are to remain in file (1 set) Of the other 21 (1 set) 5 used [illegible] SSC j16 destroyed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 - Bureau (Encls. 42) (RM)
1 - New York

1073

[illegible] pertinent [illegible] of manner are remainder not used in reply to SSC. See Bulet + LHM to SSC + Dept 11/20/75 JTA: [illegible]

TJD:jir
(4)

MDR 16

Classified by ~~2116~~
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification ~~Indefinite~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EH

8. NYmemo to SAC - STANLEY LEVISON - 8/30/62

9. NYairtel to Bu - STANLEY LEVISON - 3/21/63

10. NYairtel to Bu - M.L. KING - 6/13/63

11. NYairtel to Bu - CPUSA Negro Question - 7/10/63

12. NYairtel to Bu - M.L. KING - 7/31/63

13. Memo to SAC NY - STANLEY LEVISON - 7/16/63

14. NYairtel to Bu - STANLEY LEVISON - 9/16/63

15. NYlet to Bu - CPUSA Negro Question - 10/18/63

The following are the original documents set forth in the captioned case files:

16. NYairtel to Bu - CPUSA Negro Question - 2/13/64

17. " " " " " " - 2/18/64

18. NYmemo to SAC - STANLEY LEVISON - 4/3/64

19. " " " " " - 4/13/64

20. " " " " " - 4/20/64

21. NYlet to Bu - CIRM - 9/23/64

Concerning the above, it should be noted that due to the top level activity of the source, NY 694-OA, and to the highly sensitive area the source operates in, only oral reports are obtained from the source. These oral reports are not reduced to writing for the sources signature. Also, occasionally information is orally obtained from the source and is originally recorded in the case file of the subject or subject matter.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

NY 134-91

The enclosed represents the best information as obtained from a review of the files of the New York Office of NY 694-OA; STANLEY D. LEVISON and MARTIN L. KING from 1961 - 1965 showing the original recorded information.

TOP SECRET

2 - [illegible]. J. A. Mintz
([illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - [illegible]r. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General — November 18, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 28, 1975, requesting in part access to cancelled Security Index (SI) cards, delivery of certain materials pertaining to individuals whose identities would be obtained from a review of the cancelled cards, access to other versions of the SI or Reserve Index, and delivery of certain materials from FBI Headquarters files on organizations whose names and file numbers were provided by the SSC.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which constitutes this Bureau's response to the above requests.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (12)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
    Special Counsel for
    Intelligence Coordination

Delivered to Shaheen 11/18/75 ...
Returned 11-20-75 delivered to Epstein 11/20/75 by Paul V. Daly

KAM:cap
(9)

REC-7 62-116375-1163

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

DEC 12 1975

6-ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___ MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 16 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

62-116395

November 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 28, 1975, requesting in part:

1. Access to the Security Index (SI) cards recently discovered at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) under the same conditions as the access previously granted to the Administrative Index (ADEX).

2. Delivery of the following materials pertaining to certain individuals on the SI (the names to be supplied following access to the SI cards):

   a. materials reflecting the reasons why the individual was placed on the SI;

   b. materials reflecting any dissemination of information about the individual outside the United States government.

3. Access to any other versions of the SI or the Reserve Index (RI) which may be in the possession of the FBI, including versions compiled by the New York City Field Office.

4. Delivery of materials reflecting the reason why an FBIHQ file was opened and material indicating whether there was subversive or

SEE PAGE 6 for Note

JAM

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

KAM:cap cap
(8)

834 Cm

NDC 18

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED SEE NOTE PAGE 6

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1163

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

extremist activity with respect to the following organizations whose names and FBIHQ file numbers were provided to the Select Committee on October 9, 1975:

a.	Communist Infiltration Council of Jewish Women	100-432543
b.	East Bay Community Forum	100-432848
c.	Knoxville Area Human Relations Council	100-433348
d.	George Orwell Forum Yale University	100-434048
e.	Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs	100-434168
f.	Saugus Unitarian-Universalist Church Forum	100-440365
g.	San Diego Peace Action	100-440530
h.	Universities Committee on the Problems of War and Peace	100-440833
i.	Communist Infiltration of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	100-441132
j.	The Free University at Ann Arbor	100-445323
k.	Champaign-Urbana Council for Discussion on Vietnam	100-446029
l.	Wellsprings Ecumenical Renewal Association	100-453618

Remp 3/11/41, WDC, containing request for info. from NAVY to FBI. Per L. Hendrick, 11/20/75, NIS says OK to Diss. to SSC.

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

m.	Northern Virginia Coalition of Citizens Concerned About the ABM-Sponsored Town Meeting at Alexandria, Virginia, June 3, 1969	100-454103
n.	Reservists Against the War	100-469726
o.	Bald Hill Farm Commune	100-472039
p.	Anti-Crosstown Coalition	100-472814
q.	Washington Area Committee for Soviet Jewry	100-480590
r.	Committee for Chilean Democracy	100-481206
s.	National Conference on Amnesty; Information Concerning	100-481516
t.	National Conference on Amnesty; Information Concerning	100-481899
u.	Council for United Civil Rights Leadership	157-972
v.	Canadian Youth Corps	157-1074
w.	Ormondsville Fellowship Club, Inc.	157-5281
x.	Black Student Union, Brevard Junior College, Cocoa, Florida	157-13416
y.	Martin Luther King, Jr., Memorial Center, Inc.	157-13791
z.	Black Student Union University of Nevada Las Vegas, Nevada	157-13994

aa.	Greensboro Association of Poor People (GAPP)	157-15692
bb.	American Christian Action Council	157-24293
cc.	National Tenants Organization	157-26335
dd.	South Carolina Council of Human Relations	157-27014
ee.	California Rehabilition Center, Norco, California	157-32882

Reference is further made to our memoranda dated July 17, 1975, and September 25, 1975, which provided background information and documents pertaining to the SI, ADEX, and RI.

As you are aware, a computerized ADEX listing is prepared monthly at FBIHQ. The SI list was prepared in the same manner and, as with the former SI, when a new monthly ADEX list is prepared copies of the old list are destroyed inasmuch as they are outdated and no longer serve a useful purpose. As you have been previously advised, names appearing on the former SI and the ADEX have been printed on 5 X 8 cards with a single name printed on each card. Background information, file numbers, and type of activity in which the individual is engaged are also placed on these cards. As you are aware, approximately 15,000 of these cards, all outdated, have been located as FBIHQ. These cards include some which contain the identity of individuals who were maintained on the Priority III level of the former SI and all ADEX cards deleted or cancelled since its inception.

During the initial period of establishing the ADEX, in order to obviate the need for conducting massive file reviews, the ADEX consisted primarily of the identity of those individuals who had been maintained on the former SI. Although these names were originally placed in this manner on the new ADEX, as cases were reviewed under our then existing reporting procedures, each case was to be reviewed on its own merits utilizing the then current criteria for ADEX to determine whether continued inclusion on the ADEX was warranted. If not, the individual's

name was deleted. As previously indicated, during 1972 the ADEX was evaluated and revised. Following this revision, the number of individuals who were included on the ADEX began to decline and thus the high number of cancelled cards. In accordance with Bureau policy, which was instituted during the SI program, these cancelled cards are maintained at FBIHQ for a period of three years and there is no way to reconstuct a former SI or ADEX list for a particular time period by reviewing these cancelled cards. These cards, however, will reflect the identity of those individuals who have been placed on the SI and the ADEX for the period for which these cards were maintained.

Per your request, these outdated SI and ADEX cards are available for review by appropriate SSC representives at FBIHQ. In this regard, SSC Staff Members Martha Talley and John T. Elliff have had access to these cards on October 30, 1975, and November 7, 1975, respectively.

During Mr. Elliff's review of these cards, the names Shelley Blum, Emanuel James Brisker, Jr., and Gregory Allan Calvert were selected by Mr. Elliff in connection with request number two of your October 28, 1975, letter. Documents requested regarding these individuals are enclosed.

A review of pertinent files at FBIHQ regarding the SI and the RI indicates there are no other versions of the former SI or RI at FBIHQ. Contact was also made with knowledgeable individuals of our New York City Field Office and it was determined these programs had been handled in accordance with then existing FBIHQ policy and no other versions of these programs were compiled by that office.

Materials requested for delivery under item number four of your October 28, 1975, letter are enclosed. In this regard, it is noted the correct FBIHQ file number for the Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs is 100-400394 and the correct file number for the file regarding Communist Infiltration of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is 61-3176. In order to be responsive to your request, pertinent documents of the type desired are being furnished regarding these organizations from these files.

Enclosures (10)

1 - The Attorney General

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE:

During Mr. Elliff's review of the cancelled SI and ADEX cards, he indicated additional access to the cards would be requested to obtain the identity of other individuals besides the three selected by him 11/7/75.

SA James Graham, IS-1 Section, handled the request for documents listed under items 4u through 4ee, all of which pertained to the IS-1 Section.

The matter relating to other versions of the SI and RI compiled by our New York Office were discussed with New York personnel SAC James O. Ingram and Field Supervisor Raymond Ruckel on 11/10/75, and 11/11/75, respectively.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/18/75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

Caption of Document:

10/28/75 request - SI, ADEX

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: P. V. Daly Date: 11/20/75

Received by: Epstein

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP 3 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1163

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
11/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 10/28/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

For review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FBIHQ outdated SI and ADEX cards and delivery of materials on three individuals selected by SSC Staff Member Elliff; materials reflecting the reason why an FBI HQ file was opened on various organizations.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

The Attorney General

November 17, 1975

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHV

Reference is made to my letter dated July 1, 1975, which enclosed a memorandum of the same date relating to a request for documentary materials made by the Senate Select Committee (SSC) under the date of May 14, 1975.

The referenced memorandum, on page 1, paragraph 4, refers to a briefing by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the National Security Council, presided over by the President, on November 6, 1958. A further review of our records has determined this briefing by Mr. Hoover was actually furnished to the President and members of his Cabinet on November 6, 1958. Although it is likely members of the National Security Council were present, technically it was a briefing of the President and his Cabinet.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum correcting this technical error and requesting the Committee appropriately change its records.

A copy of the memorandum is provided for your records.

DAG 11-19-75

62-116009

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

REC-7 62-116395-1162

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

DEC 12 1975

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

DR:lfj
(11)

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 16 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

62-116395 November 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
"HUSTON PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND
OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

COINTELPRO

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

Reference is made to memorandum dated July 1, 1975, which responded to a SSC request under the date of May 14, 1975, for documents relating to this Bureau's former Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros).

Page 1, paragraph 4, of referenced memorandum refers to a briefing by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the National Security Council, presided over by the President, November 6, 1958. Enclosed with the memorandum was a document with a cover page alluding to this briefing of the National Security Council.

A current review of the records of this Bureau has determined the briefing by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on November 6, 1958, was actually furnished to the President and members of his Cabinet. Although it may be presumed that some members of the Cabinet were also members of the National Security Council, it is requested you correct your records to more accurately indicate the true nature of the briefing.

This is also to confirm information orally furnished by Supervisor David Ryan of the FBI to SSC staff member Barbara Banoff on November 13, 1975, at SSC offices. At that time,

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

DR:lfj
(10)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1162

Cointelpro

Miss Banoff was advised of the above change and was specifically requested to correct pages 47-49 of Special Agent Ryan's deposition to the SSC dated October 21, 1975. It was also requested any other references to the briefing on November 6, 1958, which might appear in the deposition of Special Agent Ryan dated October 16, 1975, and October 21, 1975, be appropriately changed.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

See letter to the Attorney General dated 11/17/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," prepared by DR:lfj.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/17/75

Caption of Document:
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
5/14/75 request (COINTELPRO)

Originating Office: FBI 11 20/7

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/25/75

Received by: Sherry Towell

Title: HOMU

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHC

[illegible] 116

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 5/14/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Counterintelligence

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Submitting to the SSC corrections to be made on information previously furnished them.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 11/17/75

FROM : F. J. Cassidy

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP2ALM/ETC

Reference is made to a memorandum dated 11/12/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams, Deputy Associate Director, in which a recommendation was made that the Intelligence Division determine whether there is a memorandum describing a briefing of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark by Mr. Cartha DeLoach, former Assistant to the Director, concerning the Counterintelligence Program.

Mr. DeLoach, during an interview under oath by staff members of the Senate Select Committee on 11/11/75, advised that he had briefed Ramsey Clark regarding the Counterintelligence Program and, when asked whether he had written a memorandum regarding that briefing, advised that he could not specifically recall whether a memorandum was prepared. During the interview by Committee staff members, they advised Mr. DeLoach that they had asked for such documentation from the Bureau, but a memorandum indicating Mr. DeLoach had briefed Ramsey Clark regarding the Counterintelligence Program was not received among the documents furnished by the Bureau.

ST-110 REC-7 62-116395-[illegible] 1975

This will advise that additional review of Bureau files by personnel of the Analytical Research Unit has failed to disclose any memorandum which describes a briefing of Clark by Mr. DeLoach regarding the Counterintelligence Program.

62-116009

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ACTION:

None. For information.

62-116395
1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

DKP:lfj
(7)

84 DEC 16 1975

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Paul Daly
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

SAC, Denver (105-4151) 12/1/75

Director, FBI (105-78256)

MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/02 BY SP2ALM/EHL

THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS-INFORMATION
CONCERNING
SENSTUDY-75

ED
21

Enclosed for Denver and Chicago are one copy each of a letter dated 11/14/75 from Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Office of Deputy Attorney General, to John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division, FBI, with enclosed letter to Mr. Shaheen from John T. Elliff, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC).

Denver is requested to immediately prepare a communication including responses to FBI questions 4, 5, 12, 13 and 14 and 19, in addition to conducting indices searches on names listed in question 16.

Chicago is requested to immediately prepare a communication including responses to FBI questions 10, 11 and 18. Include in communication any information relating to Leonard Carlin, Susan Kresge and the World University Service in Chicago considered to be of possible significance to the Bureau in preparing its response to the SSC.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-78256-45

Enclosures - 2

2 - Chicago (105-3344)(Enclosures - 2) 62-116395 —

NOT RECORDED
9 DEC 3 1975

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy-75)

RLM:emj
(11)

SEE NOTE, PAGE TWO

above
1152

DUPLICATE YELLOW

84 DEC 11 1975

Letter to Denver
Re: Thomas Riha
105-78256

NOTE:

The SSC has proposed 19 questions to the FBI and 9 questions to INS relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, in March, 1969. A number of the questions from the Committee require input from the Denver and Chicago Offices.

2 - Mr. [illegible]. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

The Attorney General

November 14, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/CHC

Reference is made to the letter of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated November 4, 1975, setting forth the identities of a number of documents relating to this Bureau's discontinued Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros), which have been previously furnished to the Committee, and requesting these documents be declassified for public hearings.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum which responds to the request of the SSC.

Although this Bureau has declassified the documents as requested by the SSC, you should note that one of these documents consists of excerpts from former FBI Director Hoover's briefing of the President and his Cabinet on November 6, 1958, and a second document is a memorandum to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover from Attorney General Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach dated September 3, 1965. You may desire to clear the declassification of the former with the White House and to afford your consideration to the declassification of the latter which originated within the Department.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

REC-7 62-116395-1160

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

DEC 12 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ENCLOSURE
ENCL. BEHIND FILE

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

DR:lfj (11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

DEC 16 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

62-116395

November 14, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

Reference is made to the letter of the SSC dated November 4, 1975, requesting certain documents relating to this Bureau's Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros) be declassified for public hearings.

This Bureau has declassified the documents listed in the SSC letter dated November 4, 1975, for utilization at public hearings, provided the excisions which were incorporated in the documents when they were originally referred to you are continued and also with the provision that the following additional excisions are made.

As regards material excerpted from former FBI Director Hoover's "off-the-record" statements, as presented to the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, the following additional material should be excised:

In the material prepared for Fiscal Year (FY) 1959, page 1, paragraph 3 of the text which begins "Through informant coverage..." should be excised.

In the material prepared for testimony for FY 1960, on the second page the paragraph beginning "Although leaders of the Communist Party..." should be excised.

In the material prepared for FY 1961, page 2, the remaining portions of the paragraph beginning "Among these documents was a report..." should be excised. It is noted this paragraph ends with the words "...was written in the Czech language."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

DR:lfj
(10)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-1160

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

In the FY 1963 material, on page 2, paragraph 1, the sentence beginning with "For example..." and ending "...the Bolshevik Revolution" should be excised.

In the last paragraph on page 2 of this document, the word "key" in line 3 should be excised.

In the enclosure to former Director Hoover's letter to the Honorable Robert F. Kennedy dated January 10, 1961, on page 2 the paragraph which has already been partially excised and which begins "A CP leader..." and which ends "...of the world" should be excised in its entirety. On page 3, the last remaining paragraph which begins "Through our security..." and ends "...aware of its plans" should be excised. On page 4 in the last paragraph, the sentence beginning with "In one phase..." and ending with "...monolithic unity" should be excised.

In the Director's letter to the Attorney General dated September 2, 1965, paragraph 2, the following words or numbers should be excised: "two thousand," "774," and "two each day." These same excisions should be made in the Director's letter to the Honorable Marvin Watson dated September 2, 1965.

With regard to the declassification of item number 1 identified in the SSC letter of November 4, 1975, it should be noted that the briefing by former Director Hoover on November 6, 1958, was afforded the President and his Cabinet rather than the President and the National Security Council.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

See letter to the Attorney General dated 11/14/75, captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," prepared by DR:lfj.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/14/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re SSC req. 11/4/75 Declassification of documents re Bureau's discontinued Counterintelligence Programs.

Originating Office: FBI - 11 20 A

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/25/75

Received by: Sherry Towell

Title: AOM

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/GHL

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-116[illegible]

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/4/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Counterintelligence

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials previously delivered have been declassified for utilization at public hearing, provided the excisions which were incorporated in the documents when they were originally referred to SSC are continued and also additional excisions were made.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-rqd

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic

SECRET

The Attorney General

November 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

[illegible] PVD, 11/12/75

The enclosed memorandum is to report contact between Staff Members of the SSC and the FBI's representatives at the U. S. Embassies, Brasilia, Brazil; and Buenos Aires, Argentina. (S)

An extra copy of the memorandum is provided in the event you wish to furnish it to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

10/30/00 MDR 16
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

RLM:emj
(10)

RLM

REC-7 62-116395-1159

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

5 - WOC 18 DEC 12 1975

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 16 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SECRET

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

November 11, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: VISITS OF SSC STAFF
MEMBERS TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHES

10/30/00, MDR 16

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/GHL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

On September 19, 1975, Mr. David Aaron, an investigator for SSC was briefed at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) in preparation for his planned visit to Brasilia, Brazil, on September 22, 1975, and Buenos Aires, Argentina, on September 25, 1975, in connection with the Committee's inquiry into U. S. intelligence activities. Mr. Aaron was briefed on the overall role and mission of the FBI's Legal Attaches (Legats), and specifically on the activities and functions of the Legats at Brasilia and Buenos Aires. He was advised that Legat, Brasilia, utilized two confidential sources in order to facilitate the prompt coverage of leads in Brazil. He was also told that Legat, Mexico City, and Legat, Brasilia, were the only Legat offices that utilized paid confidential sources. (S)

Legat, Buenos Aires, informed FBIHQ that the U. S. Embassy at Buenos Aires received instructions, classified "Secret," from the U. S. Department of State with regard to the visit of David Aaron, a former U. S. Department of State Foreign Service Officer, and William Truehart, a former U. S. Ambassador, to the U. S. Embassies at Brasilia, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo and the U. S. Consul General in Rio de Janeiro. The

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

RLM:emj
(9)

RLM

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

SEE NOTE, PAGE FOUR

SECRET

Classified by 0283 WOC
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

WOC

WRW
HEU

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1159

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: VISITS OF SSC STAFF
MEMBERS TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHES

Department of State advised that the primary objective of the visitors was to discuss with the Ambassador and members of his staff the relationships and exercise of authority by the Ambassador of the intelligence activities in the field. The Department of State further advised that operational details, sources and methods were not construed to be legitimate avenues of inquiry by the SSC Staff Members.

Legat, Brasilia, was interviewed on September 22, 1975, by Messrs. Aaron and Truehart, with Aaron being dominant in the interviewing process. The interview was directed mainly toward attempts to elicit examples whereby Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had withheld dissemination of information of interest to other agencies. Inquiries were made concerning CIA activities inside and outside the Embassy. Specific questions were placed with Legat to ascertain if the FBI was involved in Soviet Embassy "walk-ins" as well as recruitment of double agents and CIA-oriented operations. Discussion concerning Legat's role and functions in Brasilia appeared to be routine, with few, if any, pointed questions directed at FBI operations overseas. The subject of two paid confidential sources in Brasilia was briefly discussed and both SSC investigators appeared understanding and in agreement with the necessity of each confidential source to serve FBI's and U. S. Government's best interests in Brazil. The question seemingly bearing the most weight during the interview concerned possible unauthorized activities of CIA and its lack of cooperation and coordination with FBI and the Defense Attache's Office. The duration of the interview was approximately forty-five minutes. (S)

Legat, Buenos Aires, was interviewed by the two SSC Staff Members on September 26, 1975. Again Aaron played the dominant role during interview. He commenced

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: VISITORS OF SSC STAFF
MEMBERS TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHES

the interview by stating that the operations of Legats, Brasilia, and Buenos Aires, were not the type of Legat operations he desired to review, indicating that Mexico City Legat's operations were more of the type of interest to them. Aaron asked pointed questions concerning the mechanics of Legat reporting on intelligence information developed locally to FBIHQ and the local coordination of this information with the Embassy components. Aaron requested the Legat provide him with the general nature of intelligence developed and reported by the Legat to the Embassy and FBIHQ. He was told that generally international and local terrorism were the prime topics of Legat reporting. Inquiry was also made into the reason for FBI expansion of foreign liaison activities in 1970. He was told that the Legat was not personally aware of any special reason other than that the FBI liaison operations required additional personnel and Aaron was referred to FBIHQ for any additional information in this regard. [Legat was asked whether the CIA Station had ever requested Legat to secure data from FBI computer banks on Argentine residents of CIA interest who had previously resided in the U. S. Legat's reply was in the negative. Other questions mainly dealt with cooperation and coordination activities between the FBI and the CIA at the Embassy.] Inquiry was also made (S) into the relationship of the Drug Enforcement Agency and FBI overseas. The interview lasted approximately thirty-five minutes.

Upon arrival in Buenos Aires, Mr. Aaron was suffering from an intestinal problem and remained in his Buenos Aires hotel on September 25, 1975. The Charge D' Affaires hosted a small luncheon for former Ambassador Truchart on that date which Legat, Buenos Aires, attended. Truchart was very open regarding the operations of the SSC

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: VISITORS OF SSC STAFF
MEMBERS TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHES

and stated that he felt the Committee had lost its perspective and that he believed that various Senators were engaging in a game of "one-upmanship" in revealing so-called sensational disclosures of CIA activities. Truchart stated he personally felt that the original purpose of the Committee to afford an objective review of U. S. intelligence operations had been lost.

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" in conformance with the classification applied to information furnished to the U. S. Embassies at Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Montevideo and the U. S. Consul General in Rio de Janerio, by the U. S. Department of State. The information was transmitted by the U. S. Department of State via its Secret Roger Channel. (S)

The details of the interviews are located in Legat, Brasilia, teletype to the Bureau 9/23/75 and Legat, Buenos Aires, teletype to the Bureau 9/26/75, both classified "Secret" and both captioned "Senstudy-75."

Mr. Aaron was briefed at FBIHQ by Section Chief Vadja V. Kolombatovic, Harvey C. Flemister and Robert A. Bermingham of the Liaison Section, Intelligence Division.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
11/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of interview by SSC Staff Members of FBI's representatives at the U.S. Embassies, Brasilia, Brazil and Buenos Aires, Argentina.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Liaison, foreign

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In Brasilia the interview was directed mainly toward attempts to elicit examples whereby CIA had withheld dissemination of information of interest to other agencies. In the Buenos Aires office questions concerning the mechanics of Legat reporting on intellig intelligence information developed locally to FBIHQ and the local coordination of this information with the Embassy components, the general nature of intelligence developed and reported. Inquiry was also made into the reason for FBI expansion of foreign liaison activities in 1970.

62-116395

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Pgd

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

2-Mr. Mintz
(1-Mr. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 10/31/75

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/

Memorandum advises concerning proposed SSC hearing on FBI foreign counterintelligence (CI) matters.

On 10/30/75 Mr. John Elliff, SSC Staff Member, met with Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Intelligence Division (INTD). Also present were Section Chiefs W. A. Branigan (CI-1) and W. O. Cregar (CI-2) and Acting Section Chief F. J. Cassidy (IS-3) and Unit Chief E. W. Larson, Training Unit (IS-3). Mr. Elliff advised that the Committee proposed to have an executive session tentatively scheduled for the morning of Friday, 11/14/75, which would deal with foreign CI operations. In addition to representatives from the FBI they envisioned also having present representatives from CIA and the United States military intelligence services. He stated that the session would be scheduled for approximately 2 and one-half hours.

During the conference the following three themes were outlined by Mr. Elliff as the probable areas of discussion:

1. Changes in CI operations during recent years

Items discussed as probably worthy of attention were physical surveillances, the walk-in operations, defection (recruitment-in-place), CI training programs. Also suggested as a prime topic was the future projections concerning administration of foreign CI operations in the United States, i.e., new division for CI work within FBI; separate CI service; or other modifications.

62-116395-1158

DEC 1 1975

REC-7

ST-110

EWL:jvl
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION,
11/5/75, Page 4.

84 1 8 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2. Counter-subversion

In this category Mr. Elliff indicated a particular interest in foreign influence in domestic groups and the assessment of danger/risk in investigations undertaken to detect such influence. He brought up the disclosures of surveillances by CIA of Americans abroad at the request of the FBI. He also indicated an interest in borderline cases, such as those in which domestic counter-subversion investigations develop a CI aspect, and was particularly interested in the policies and coordinating mechanisms affecting such instances.

3. Positive intelligence collection

In this category Mr. Elliff was interested in the responsibility for collection of positive intelligence within the United States and the apparent gap which existed in this field. He was also interested in situations under which the FBI might target friendly foreign intelligence services in the United States for CI attention.

Considerable discussion was held during the conference during which INTD representatives set forth the FBI's position and experience in the many areas noted. They are being set forth here to illustrate the probable scope and nature of the executive session which is being planned. Further discussions will be held with the SSC staff to clarify these matters and a firmer agenda for the proposed 11/14/75 hearing will be developed.

With respect to the proposed plan to include representatives of CIA and the military intelligence services along with the FBI in the proposed session of 2 and one half hours, it was pointed out to Mr. Elliff that this would not appear to be a very productive procedure. The CI perspectives and responsibilities of CIA and the military services are much more narrow and generally in a completely different context than the CI perspectives and responsibilities of the FBI. These differences, particularly in the short

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: U. S. Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

time allotted, appear to represent a disadvantage to all parties concerned, including the Committee. It was pointed out that the FBI, in particular, would have considerable difficulty in presenting a comprehensive and valid picture of its own CI operations under the conditions imposed by such a session. Mr. Elliff, after considering these objections, stated that he could understand the FBI position but was somewhat doubtful considering the pressures under which the Committee was operating that he would be able to alter this situation.

ACTION:

None. For information.

JAM

EwL

See Addendum
Next Page By
Legal Counsel Div,

Memo Cregar to Mr. Wannall, 10/31/75
Re: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, JCF:mtm, 11/5/75:

This matter will be pursued with Mr. Elliff by the Office of Congressional Affairs.

JAM
JCF

Rescheduled to 12/3-4/75
per Daly. JCF 11/26

JBA
PVM

K

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

Airtel

To: SAC, Washington Field Office 1/23/76

From: Director, FBI (62-116395) — 1158X

SENSTUDY 75
BUDED 1/30/76

Enclosed is a self-explanatory letter from the Attorney General dated 1/12/76.

Joseph Kraft, the subject of the inquiry, is the well-known newspaper columnist and a Washington, D. C. resident. During the past year, information contained in FBI Headquarters files relating to Kraft has been furnished to the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC) pursuant to SSC requests. Kraft and his attorneys have reviewed the material furnished to the SSC regarding him in accordance with an agreement between Kraft and the Attorney General, referred to in paragraph one of the enclosure. As noted in the enclosure, Kraft, as a result of a review of information regarding the burglary of his residence on 9/3/69, raised certain questions.

WFO should furnish FBIHQ with Xeroxes of all serials in its files which relate to the 9/3/69 burglary except WFO airtel and letter to the Bureau dated 9/4/69 and 10/17/69, respectively, captioned "UNSUB; Burglary of residence of Joseph Kraft, 3021 N. Street N. W., Washington, D. C., Loss of silverware, 9/3/69 in excess of $5,000.00 ITSP (OO:WFO)" file number 87-17564. This material should of course include any serials which would indicate the manner in which the burglary was reported to WFO and how the conversation about the burglary took place.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/02 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Enclosure

1 - 87-107157

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

TEB:en
(10)

MAILED 10
JAN 23 1976
FBI

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 FEB 1 1976

GPO 954-546

Airtel to Washington Field Office
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

In addition to the review of all files pertinent to this inquiry, WFO should review the newspaper morgues of daily newspapers published in Washington, D. C., at such time for articles concerning the burglary and which may shed some additional light on this matter.

This matter must be given expeditious attention and results submitted by airtel to reach Bureau by c.o.b. 1/30/76.

NOTE:

Bureau memorandum dated July 23, 1973, referred to in enclosure and to which Kraft raised a question sets forth the information that Kraft advised WFO on 9/4/69 of the burglary of his residence 9/3/69. Kraft now has no recollection of having spoken to the FBI about the burglary. Pertinent FBIHQ main case files on Kraft (62-115682, 65-75629, 87-107157 and 105-68548) were reviewed by Supervisor T. E. Burns in connection with this inquiry. Such review failed to develop required information. Review by WFO as directed within should develop appropriate information necessary to resolve this matter.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓ TWL
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Clarence Kelley, Director
FBI

DATE: January 12, 1976

FROM : Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

SUBJECT: Joseph Kraft burglary

Among the documents from Federal Bureau of Investigation files provided to my office under a cover memorandum dated October 7, 1975, there was a memorandum dated July 18, 1973 and titled "Joseph Kraft." This document, along with the others, was provided to Mr. Kraft's attorneys pursuant to the agreement of August 5, 1975, for review before the department furnished it to the Senate Select Committee.

When Mr. Kraft and his attorneys reviewed the July 18, 1973, document they raised a question about a reference on page two of the document which stated:

> "On September 4, 1969, Joseph Kraft advised the Washington Field Office of the FBI that he left his home (3021 N Street, N. W., Washington D. C.) at approximately 9:20 P.M. on September 3, 1969, to visit with former Governor Averell Harriman who resided a few doors from the Kraft "residence. At approximately 9:45 P.M. Mrs. Kraft, who was in the second floor bedroom of the residence, came down the stairs and found the door open.
>
> "Subsequently, it was discovered by Mr. and Mrs. Kraft several items of sterling silver were missing from the dining room and the pantry which items, according to the Krafts, had an estimated value of approximately $10,000.
>
> "A crime scene search and processing of the crime scene by the Metropolitan Police Department produced negative results. No forcible entry was noted and Mr. Kraft advised investigative officers of the Metropolitan Police Department that he had probably left the front door ajar when he departed the residence.

62-116395-1158X

FEB 11 1976

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-75629

5-8

File 62-116395

cc Mainfile on Kraft 65-75629

Airtel to WFO
TEBIED 1/23/76

ORIGINAL AT ARCHIVES
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-25-95 BY SP12 BT?/SO 342-679

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP-2 ALM/EHL

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

> "On the morning of September 4, 1969, the Metropolitan Police Department was advised by the Washington National Airport Police that some silverware had been found near one of the entrances to the terminal at the Washington National Airport. The silverware was recovered by the Metropolitan Police Department and processed for latent fingerprints without success and the items were returned to Mrs. Kraft upon her identification of the silverware. No suspects were developed by either the FBI or the Metropolitan Police Department in the investigation of the matter."

Mr. Kraft does not recall having spoken to the FBI about the burglary. Documents provided more recently to Mr. Kraft pursuant to the August 5, 1975, agreement do not shed any light on this question.

The incident is curious in that the only reference to it comes in the memorandum of July 18, 1973, discussing a press report about the activities of John D. Erlichman. Could you have someone look into this matter for me? The obvious questions are: What other documents in FBI files say about the September 3, 1969, burglary? What files of the Bureau or its Washington field office indicate about how the conversation about the burglary took place?

1-Mr.[illegible]dams
2-Mr. Mintz
(1-Mr. Hotis)
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Duffin

65-116395

December 2, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR DELIVERY OF MATERIALS WHICH ARE SUPPLEMENTARY TO PRIOR SSC REQUESTS OF JULY 28, 1975, PART 3. D., AUGUST 20, 1975, PART 3. 1. A. AND SEPTEMBER 18, 1975, PART 1. D. AND PART 2.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 18, 1975, which requested access or delivery of materials, many of which are supplementary to prior SSC requests of July 28, 1975, Part 3. D., and August 20, 1975, Part 3. 1. A.

On October 29, 1975, Mr. Lester Seidel, SSC Staff Member, requested delivery of materials relating to the following categories of SSC request of September 18, 1975:

1. D. Democratic National Convention 1968

Enclosed materials were prepared by or for Marlin Johnson, Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Field Office of the FBI, during the Democratic National Convention.

Information relating to the current location and employment of Marlin Johnson was the subject of SSC request of August 19, 1975, and was furnished to the SSC by FBI memorandum dated September 5, 1975.

2. Files on Warren Commission Critics

Efforts to locate original authority and/or order to provide for dissemination of materials furnished to the SSC under this category on October 7, 1975, have been made without success.

WRW/TWL

WOC

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

JRM:jvl
(9)

62-116

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCLOSURE

1157

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

12/3/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/18/75, requesting delivery of previously access materials of 7/28/75, Part 3d and 8/20/75, Part 3, 1a

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Surveillance, electronic
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Democratic National Convention 1968. Materials prepared by or for Marlin Johnson, SAC of Chicago Field offic, also current location and employment of Marlin Johnson; efforts to locate original authority and/or order to provide for disseminationof materials relating to files on Warren Commission Critics have been made without success; memorandum dated 2/16/68 relating to Mark Lane, no information relating to origin, authority for preparation or dissemination located.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

3791 (6-75)

238-10332

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 7/30/68

asmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ATTN: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-44963)

SUBJECT: DEMCON

As the Bureau is aware, I am gravely concerned over the potential for serious violence occurring in Chicago during the period of the Democratic Convention, which commences August 26, 1968 and the days immediately preceding this convention. Had the convention occurred within 30 days after the President made his announcement that he was not going to run for reelection and after the Viet Nam peace talks started in Paris, I feel that we might not have had serious violence as these two occurrences took much of the steam out of many of the organizations comprising the "New Left". Their direction at that time was primarily against President JOHNSON and against Viet Nam and much of the steam went out of their programs following these two announcements.

It is our observation, however, that these "New Left" organizations have now had time to redirect their programs and are now concentrating primarily on demonstrations and activities against Vice President HUMPHREY, characterized by them as the "Dump Humphrey Campaign". The fact that the war still continues in Viet Nam, has again given emphasis to the organizations which exist on the basic theme of anti-Viet Nam. I am thinking particularly of such organizations as the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam, Students for Democratic Society, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam and the Youth International Party (Yippies).

3 - Bureau 2cc's 922-DS1 157- [illegible]
1 - Chicago
MWJ:wmn
(4)

REC 43 16 AUG 20 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

62-116395-1157

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-8589)   DATE: 8/13/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-44963)

SUBJECT: DEMCON

On August 12, 1968, USA THOMAS A. FORAN contacted SAC, Chicago, advising that WARREN CHRISTOPHER, Deputy U.S. Attorney General, desired to meet with the SAC, Chicago.

As a result of the above request, SAC, Chicago, and Supervisor RICHARD L. STRAIN met briefly with Mr. WARREN CHRISTOPHER and Mr. WES POMEROY of the U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., in the presence of USA FORAN in his offices.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER was most congenial and expressed his high regard for the FBI and asked for a current evaluation of activities in the Chicago area which could possibly affect the Democratic National Convention (DNC) being held the last week of August, 1968. Mr. CHRISTOPHER was advised that all information has been previously furnished to him by letterhead memoranda and was in his possession and he was assured all information coming to our attention would be immediately furnished to the Department and to the USA in Chicago. A brief discussion of current trends followed relative to current intelligence regarding the activities of anti-war and Negro militant organizations which have proposed disruptive tactics at the DNC.

At one point in the discussion mention was made of the fact that the Youth International Party, aka Yippies, was currently holding talks with the city administration in an effort to obtain necessary park permits to have their followers live and sleep in one of the Chicago area parks during the week of the convention and hold a "happening" which the Yippies referred to as the "Festival of Life." During this discussion USA FORAN confidentially advised that when he had received the FBI's notification of the anticipated plans on the part of the Yippies, he had contacted certain city officials known to him and attempted to persuade them against the issuance of such a permit in view of the known moral conduct of such groups. USA FORAN advised he had been assured that such permits would not be granted. He stated these permits have as yet not been granted and that his sources have indicated no serious consideration has been given to the request by responsible Chicago city officials.

100-924 9

157-[illegible]-425

2-Bureau (RM)
2-Chicago
  1-157-2410 DEMCON
RLS:meb
(4)

REC 22
EX-1
62-116395-6
AUG 16 1968
ENCLOSURE
157

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

For the Bureau's information, Sgt. JOSEPH GRUBISIC, Intelligence Section, Chicago PD, advised previously that he had learned from DAVID STAHL of the Mayor's Office, Chicago, that they had received a telephone call, a couple of days ago, from one WES POMEROY of the U.S. Attorney General's Office, to the effect that the Attorney General wanted the Chicago city officials to give every consideration to the granting of the permits requested by the Yippies.

Sgt. GRUBISIC was unable to comment on the feeling of the city administration to this request but was of the opinion that such permits would not be granted as requested. Sgt. GRUBISIC based his opinion on the fact that four representatives of the Yippies, from New York City, had gone to the office of the Deputy Superintendent of the Chicago PD and had requested immunity from arrest for all Yippies during the convention for crimes around the possession of narcotics. The Yippies stated that any arrest would cause the Yippie community to cause large scale riots, and the blame of any riots resulting from such arrests would fall on the Chicago PD.

These representatives of the Yippies were advised in no uncertain terms that the laws of the City of Chicago would be strictly enforced fairly on all persons and that no one would be granted any immunity during this period.

The Bureau's attention is invited to the August 9, 1968, issue of the "Daily World," daily publication of the Communist Party, USA (CP), wherein an article appeared on page one captioned "Rallies Will Ring Demo Convention" written by CARYL DAVIAU, current member, CP of Illinois, in which the reporter indicates that the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, which is working around the clock to mobilize demonstrations against the convention, has petitioned the Justice Department to investigate the Chicago Police to determine if there is any conspiracy to deprive "us" of our full civil liberties.

Chicago will continue to follow these matters closely and immediately advise the Bureau, and continue to disseminate all information of intelligence collected to interested agencies.

No recommendation is being made nor is Chicago involving itself in any plans affecting the issuance of the abovementioned park permit.

SSC - REQUEST OF 9/18/75
Part I.D

Return

62-116395-1157
ENCLOSURE

As the Bureau is aware, Chicago is in receipt of information from confidential sources indicating a potential for demonstration arising out of the "New Left" calling for direct confrontation with the Chicago Police Department as a diversionary tactic for a "crash-in" at the convention site. Sources have also reported independent action on the part of individuals to cause some form of "sabotage" activity inside the convention itself. Information received from confidential informants in other divisions indicates attempts on the part of dissident young people not organizationally affiliated with the "New Left", to hire 50 buses out of New York to bring demonstrators to Chicago and a caravan of militant Latin Americans to come from the Miami, Florida area to Chicago for the specific purpose of disrupting the Democratic National Convention.

The Chicago area activists in the Youth International Party are currently planning a "Festival of Lights" in one of the parks on Chicago's lakefront during the period of the Democratic National Convention. This "Festival of Lights" characterized by Chicago area Yippie leadership as being peaceful to show America that there is an alternative to the "festival of death", or the Democratic National Convention. However, sources report that there are elements within the Youth International Party which are calling for direct confrontation with the Chicago Police Department during the "Festival of Lights".

There is a very definite indication that more and more plans are being made by these groups to cause violence and trouble and undoubtedly this will increase even more as we approach the time of the convention. I strongly feel that we must use every possible means at our command to insure that the Director, the President of the United States and other pertinent officials are furnished every possible piece of intelligence information which we can gather from any source.

I am specifically asking for the services of two Special Agents who proved during their assignment in Chicago that they are expecially well qualified to handle informants and make contacts in the "New Left" area. They proved during their assignments in Chicago that they have the knowhow, the interest, the dedication and the personality to be highly successful in

this area. I would like to utilize them specifically to work cases in the "New Left" area, make contacts and would also request authority where necessary to utilize them in under-cover work under my personal supervision and guidance. They would be specifically assigned fulltime to solicit information from the leadership of the "New Left" concerning their plans for demonstrations, confrontations and disruptions of the Democratic Convention and matters relating thereto.

I am, therefore, urgently requesting that SA WILLIAM J. DILLON, III, presently assigned to Los Angeles and SA WAYNE F. MANIS, under transer to Anniston, Alabama Resident Agency, be assigned on a temporary basis in Chicago for the above stated purpose from August 15, 1968 through August 31, 1968. Both men, while young in years in the Bureau, demonstrated outstanding judgment and I am convinced that their assignments, as recommended above, would prove to be most beneficial in carrying out our responsibilities in connection with the Democratic Convention.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-8589)

DATE: 8/14/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-44963)

SUBJECT: DEMCON

This will confirm telephonic contact between SAC, Chicago, and Assistant Director N. P. CALLAHAN on August 13, 1968.

As the Bureau is aware, the Democratic National Convention will be held in Chicago from August 26 - 28, 1968. Voluminous information is being received from all offices which requires immediate handling. In addition, tension is growing in the ghetto areas of Chicago particularly the west side, the south side and the near north side. Also, tension has been growing i such Chicago suburban areas as Harvey, Chicago Heights, East Chicago Heights and Maywood. Incidents are occurring every night and throughout the night requiring immediate preparation of teletypes, letterhead memoranda and other communications. It is, therefore, necessary as approved by Mr. CALLAHAN for one and on some shifts two stenographers to be on duty from 4:00 PM to midnight and from midnight to 8:00 AM, seven days a week through August 30, 1968. These stenographers have been selected on a purely voluntary basis. The authority for these special shifts will be considered to expire close of business August 30, 1968, and thereafter we will revert back to the regularly approved stenographic shifts.

REC-63 157-8589

2 - Bureau
1 - Chicago
MWJ/sff
(3)

6 AUG 16 1968

62-116395-1157

ENCLOS

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : THE FILE (100-44963)

DATE: 8/15/68

FROM : SAC M. W. JOHNSON

SUBJECT: DEMCON

At 9:15 AM today, the Director telephonically contacted me to advise that he had just been in touch with the Vice President of the United States and had just gotten off the phone with the Vice President's Executive Assistant, Mr. WILLIAM CONNELL. Mr. HOOVER stated that the Vice President has requested that we furnish the same type of service in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Chicago as was furnished to the President during the Atlantic City Convention four years ago. This, of course, refers to intelligence information which will be of value to the Vice President and specifically relates to the possibility of demonstrations, violence and related matters. Mr. HOOVER stated that he had advised the Vice President and Mr. CONNELL that this service would be performed and that Mr. CONNELL should contact me for the necessary arrangements.

Mr. HOOVER advised me that Mr. CONNELL is presently in New York and it is not known when he will arrive in Chicago. I advised Mr. HOOVER that his instructions would be followed, that we had set up appropriate arrangements so that we would be in a position to furnish valuable intelligence and that upon Mr. CONNELL's arrival in Chicago, I would immediately contact him and perfect the necessary arrangements.

My secretary has been instructed to notify all switchboard operators, complaint agents and supervisors that any call from Mr. CONNELL should be immediately referred to me when I am in the office or if I am not in the office to determine where I can contact Mr. CONNELL immediately.

MWJ/sff
(1)

100-44963-2302

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
FILED
CHICAGO

62-116395-1159

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
(1 - J.B. Hotis)
November 26, 1975
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Klein

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the November 24, 1975, SSC request forwarded to the Department of Justice by letter dated November 24, 1975, requesting certain documents desired from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of two memoranda in response to this request.

Also enclosed for your records are copies of the memoranda which are being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Your attention is invited to the fact that amongst the documents being furnished to the SSC are communications concerning negotiations between the FBI, former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe and the Department pertaining to financial arrangements with Rowe.

Ack. to Dept. 11/26/75 PD/B

Enclosures -36

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

REC-14 62-116395-1156

EX 104

12 DEC 11 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SK:tdp (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE:

Single copies of the 11/24/75 communications are attached to the file copy of the enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the Senstudy '75 Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Documents pertaining to financial arrangements between the FBI, Rowe and the Department of Justice are being furnished to the SSC for the information of the Committee and the Staff in refuting allegations by Rowe that he was not financially rewarded for his efforts on behalf of the FBI.

1 - Mr. J. B. Ad[illegible]
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. J. E. Morley

November 26, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSC)

RE: MARY JO COOK

Reference is made to letter dated November 18, 1975, to Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, from John Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, requesting a review of documents pertaining to Mary Jo Cook. Reference is also made to letter dated November 24, 1975, to Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination from Mr. Elliff requesting delivery of the documents.

On November 25, 1975, Mr. Robert Kelley, Senate Select Committee Staff Investigator, reviewed these documents and requested a summary be prepared of certain of them. Pursuant to Mr. Kelley's request, enclosed is a summary of the contents of six documents furnished by Mary Jo Cook.

Enclosures - 6

1 - The Attorney General

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2ALM JEHL

JEM:dew dew
(10)

NOTE:

The above information being furnished to the SSC was prepared pursuant to the requests contained in the letters referred to and ~~af~~ the requests of Robert Kelley, SSC Staff Investigator. The information was taken from informant reports furnished the Buffalo Office by Mary Jo Cook and more precisely from those six reports selected by Mr. Kelley. For ease in reference, the summaries were prepared from informant reports dated as follows:

11/9/73
11/20/73
12/17/73

6/19/74
7/31/74
10/2/74

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1151

GPO 954-546

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSC)

RE: MARY JO COOK

NOTE CONTINUED:

. The summary of the report dated 6/19/74 has as an attachment a four-page document obtained by Cook captioned "Jury Selection." Mr. Kelley specifically requested this document, which essentially is a treatise on the techniques of selecting a jury most sympathetic to a defendant.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/26/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). Re: Mary Jo Cook & Gary Thomas Rowe. (11/18/75 SSC let & 11/24/75 SSC let)

Originating Office: FBI 505

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 11/28/75

Received by:

Title: Staff Assist

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/26/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 11/18/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Summary of contents of six documents furnished by Mary Jo Cook.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-Agd

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

The following is a summary of a four page report, dated 11/20/73, furnished by Mary Jo Cook, a former FBI informant.

Report concerns a meeting of the VVAW/WSO Steering Committee held 11/10/73. Five identified individuals were present. There was a discussion of finances and some displeasure at the financial record system. Plans for a benefit at a bar were discussed. Information was presented concerning a newsletter to be mailed out which will discuss the VVAW/WSO's position on amnesty, the upgrading of discharges, information about the Women's group and about a strike at a Buffalo firm.

Some objections were raised concerning the wording of some VVAW/WSO objectives.

Plans for a future coalition meeting organized by two individuals were discussed, the same coalition that worked on the Impeach Nixon rally.

Matters concerning possible new members and/or attendees at future meetings were discussed. Plans for a VVAW/WSO team on a television sports quiz show were discussed.

One member raised four criticisms of the VVAW/WSO, all listed.

One member wrote a regional newsletter.

The following is a summary of a 17-page report dated 12/17/73 furnished by Mary Jo Cook, former FBI informant.

A regional conference of the New York/Northern New Jersey Region, VVAW/WSO, was held at a college on 12/8-9/73. 20 listed people attended.

A member reported another individual had supposedly run guns to Cuba.

A member requested information attesting to the bad conditions in a Vietnamese jail.

A member said he had 2600 names on a mailing list.

Old business was discussed.

Changes in one VVAW/WSO objective were turned down.

In other matters, the following was discussed:

Correspondence with prisoners.

Plans for selling the organization's newspaper.

Support for a prison fast.

Approval of amnesty for war resisters.

Impeach Nixon campaign.

U.S. involvement in Korea.

Organization and communication.

Coalition with other groups.

Possible underground VVAW group.

Possible sponsorship of a college lecture.

The VVAW's connection with the Revolutionary Union with some displeasure voiced.

A recent military alert and the possibility of a mail opening and telephone tap alleged.

The general feeling of a future military takeover in the U.S.

Proposed delegates to the National Steering Committee Meeting.

Disapproval of a workshop introduction as "Red-baiting."

Buffalo chapter was considered one of the five strongest chapters in the organization.

Possible VVAW Summer Camp over Labor Day.

Information about members contacting members of other chapters.

Reports were presented from other chapters.

The following is a summary of a five page report, dated 7/19/74, furnished by Mary Jo Cook, former FBI informant.

A meeting of the National Defense Committee of the VVAW/WSO was held on 6/7-9/74 at St. Louis, Missouri. Eleven identified individuals attended.

The purpose was to ascertain the feasibility of setting up a National Defense Committee which would be operational throughout the United States. As concerns VVAW/WSO, the meeting sought to advise members that the organization's Defense Committee will take steps to secure the release or acquittals of any members arrested.

A representative from the National Collective in Chicago talked about the Gainesville 8 in a derogatory manner, implying the Government did not try the Gainesville 8 for purely political reasons, but that the leader and some others planned some kind of illegal activity. He also said if there had been no Agent provocateur there would never have been a trial and that the National Collective would not have permitted violent activity. 17 items were handed out, a large portion of which were reprints from national and "movement" publications covering such topics as how to avoid being questioned by the FBI. One of these, on jury selection, is attached.

Jury selection

The jury e[illegible]ment is the people's comp[illegible]ent in the existing system of criminal justice; it is only quasi-organized and partially managed. The use of systematic jury selection can be an important tool in the practice of people's law, but at present it is being developed and used selectively as a successful foil in cases of overt political attack. The minimal program in jury selection defense work is to secure a group of twelve people who will take their function as jurors seriously and assume that the defendants are innocent until proven guilty. The maximal program is to secure a jury which will acquit the defendants.

Since 1970, serious inroads have been made on the jury system: proposed abolition of 12 - person juries, non-unanimous verdicts, abolition of voir dire of prospective jurors by lawyers, disciplining of 'disruptive' lawyers and other 'reforms' to 'speed up' decision-making. Juries are under attack by the narrow, elite group who seek to rule this country only because this vehicle of the people's power cannot be relied upon to make political prisoners of us all.

Challenging jury composition

18 U.S.C. Sec. 1861 is a federal statute which places an obligation on the courts to assure the right to a jury selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community. Data, gathered from observing juries, which suggests an imbalance can be used as grounds for access to jury selection records. Through [illegible]ample of the qualification questionnaires comprising the Master Jury Wheel, a demography (the study of the characteristics of a population) of the voter registration list can be determined.

These findings, compared with census demography, will reveal areas of underrepresentation. In the case of the Attica Fair Jury Project, a systematic analysis of jury selection records obtained by court order revealed that third world people are underrepresented by 34.3%, women by 68 %, and people between the ages 21-29 by 83.6%. This study yielded concrete evidence that the Erie County jury system is illegal and unconstitutional, and the system has been challenged on those grounds.

There are four practical advantages to be gained from a jury challenge even if it does not result in the immediate modification of the composition of the master jury wheel which might provide a larger proportion of people from the less authoritarian sectors of the population.

1. pursuing a challenge can gain time for the defense.
2. examination of the jury questionaire and the jury process raises the defenses's consciousness of what the problems are likely to be in jury selection.
3. a challenge introduces some accountability to the jury process and may change the behavior of the jury clerk and/or judge.
4. a verdict for conviction can be overturned and a new trial obtained on the basis of an objection to jury composition and selection, if a later court upholds the jury challenge.

Demographic model of jury selection.

There are three separate elements to the demographic model of jury selection.

1. a survey must be taken of a representative cross-section of the population that may be called for jury service; this is most easily done by telephone.
2. a system for rating prospective jurors on the basis of voir

dire must be established.

3. a net-work of people must be set up to gather outside third-party information to corroborate the results of the survey and voir dire.

The demographic-attitudinal survey is used to obtain precise information on the range of attitudinal patterns prevalent in a given judicial district. At a minimum, the following must be covered: demographic information, (age, sex, race, education, etc.) organizational affiliations, media contact, knowledge of the case, political ideology and attitudes toward core American values, social change, divergent life styles and alternative institutions, and toward the type of defendants and the charges specific to the case. A random sample of any of three groups will give the defense committee the demographic information necessary: 1) those who have already been called for jury duty, 2) the voter registration list, or 3) 1% of a cross-section of the population.

The voir dire ratings are constructed by combining observations of behavior and attitudes expressed during the voir dire. This procedure is still being developed but there seems to be a high correlation between ratings of individual authoritarianism and types composed of demographic variables. For example, in the Rap Brown case, the attitudinal study pin-pointed the most "dangerous" defense juror as a male manager, engineer, government employee, or real estate broker, [illegible] into the local establishment, Methodist or [illegible], over 45, and who lived in a rural area or small,

quiet town. His Independent authoritarianism rating was very high, just as you would expect from a juror whose values embraced authority, patriotism, conformity, government right or wrong, etc. The authoritarianism ratings can further be used as a reference point to make sense of the body language, costume and verbal ratings. These ratings become even more essential when faced with a limited voir dire.

Schulman stresses that voir dire ratings should be done collectively. Defendants and trial lawyers should participate, but past trials have shown them to have definite problems with objective judgments in this area.

A core of people from a cross-section of the community should be established to obtain information about the people on the venire list so that any inconsistencies between the voir dire ratings and the demographic ratings can be resolved. This can be done by asking 10 people to contact 3 friends, who in turn will contact 3 friends, who in turn etc. This should be done with a clear presentation of the kind of information needed and a clear understanding of what constitutes jury tampering.

The following is a summary of a two-page report dated 7/31/74 furnished by Mary Jo Cook, a former FBI informant.

The report covers the following matters:

It appears as if the Revolutionary Union is making its move and focusing on the upcoming National Conference. An issue of "Winter Soldier" was received and its editorial was an RU editorial.

The VVAW/WSO newsletter arrived from the National Office and listed three possible directions VVAW/WSO can take:

1) Anti-imperialist veteran's organization with the supporters.

2) A veteran's organization for veteran's only.

3) A mass anti-imperialist organization with no base.

A discussion concerning the National Office supporting or becoming aligned with the RU.

The following is a summary of a two page report, dated 10/2/74, furnished by Mary Jo Cook, former FBI informant.

The report is entirely concerned with a demonstration held 9/11/74 in Buffalo protesting the policies of the American Government regarding the overthrow of the Allende Regime in Chile. Eight members of the VVAW/WSO attended, two from the Attica Brothers Legal Defense, one from Youth Against War and Fascism, two from Revolutionary Union, two from Anti-Monopoly Committee, three from Committee for Chilean Democracy, and four from a University in Buffalo.

All of the above attendees were named, either by first or full name. One name was phonetic.

2 - M[illegible] J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Klein

62-116395

November 26, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force (SSC) to the Deputy Attorney General's Office dated November 24, 1975, requesting delivery of certain documents pertaining to Gary Thomas Rowe.

Enclosed with this memorandum are a summary of information supplied by former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe, and other documents relating to the SSC request of November 24, 1975.

In accordance with Mr. Robert Kelley of the SSC Staff, the documents pertaining to the financial arrangements between the FBI, Gary Thomas Rowe and the Department of Justice are not to be made public or used as exhibits in the course of testimony before the SSC.

Enclosures - 10

1 - The Attorney General

SK:tdp/1hb lhb
(9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY GARY THOMAS ROWE WHO WAS AN INFORMANT OF THE FBI FROM MAY, 1960, UNTIL JANUARY, 1966.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BY 5P2ALM/EHC

I. INFORMANT REPORTS SUBMITTED BY GARY THOMAS ROWE

1. On 5/14/61 Rowe advised that the burning of a bus and the beating of individuals at a bus depot in Alabama during May, 1961, was instituted by a local Ku Klux Klan unit.
2. On 5/17/61 Rowe stated that the Klan would try to intercept a bus which was due to arrive in Birmingham, Alabama, at 11 P.M. on 5/17/61. He further stated that Klansmen should intercept the bus on the highway and give all persons present, whether black or white, an opportunity to get off. They would be allowed to enter privately owned automobiles and have a safe journey to the nearest town. Rowe was advised by another Klansman that those who refused to leave the bus would be beaten.
3. On June 4, 1962, Rowe furnished copies of five documents expected to be distributed by Klansmen in order to discourage voters from voting for certain candidates who allegedly supported various civil rights groups.
4. During March, 1962, Rowe furnished information regarding a local Klan meeting at which 23

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Klansmen were present. The meeting centered around a Klansman's plan to run for a high state office. Also discussed was another candidate for this office.

5. During July, 1962, Rowe advised that a Klansman told a select group of other Klansmen that "it looks as if the Negroes should be stopped now." This group of Klansmen was told that police officials had promised them protection and that a high state official would pardon them if arrested. This Klansman further advised that if a particular "militant Negro Integrationist" would appear at a certain restaurant with other Negroes he should be attacked and killed. Instructions were also issued by this Klansman that if this "militant Negro Integrationist" did not appear at this restaurant but sent other Negroes to stage a sit-in, then there would be no killing. He stated that these Negroes should be beaten with chains and clubs instead.

6. During October, 1964, Rowe reported on Klan discussions regarding a plan to handle alleged "race mixing" at a local night club. Also discussed was a plan by Klansmen to bomb this night club.

II. BUREAU HANDLING OF INFORMANT

On 4/17/64, the Bureau advised SAC, Birmingham, to immediately instruct Rowe to withdraw from his position as squad leader of an "action squad." SAC, Birmingham, was further advised that in the event Rowe does not desire to withdraw from this leadership position, he should be discontinued as an informant. On 4/18/64, Rowe was advised by the Birmingham Office that he must remove himself as a squad leader of an "action squad." On 5/4/64, the Bureau advised SAC, Birmingham, that "in those cases where you have an informant who is a member of a violent squad...you should insure that the informant understands he is not to direct, lead, or instigate any acts of violence." It was also pointed out that informant should be instructed to avoid participation in any act of violence.

III. KLAN VIOLENCE AT THE BIRMINGHAM BUS DEPOT 5/14/61

By letter from the Bureau to 23 field offices, it was stated that a civil rights organization intended to make a nonviolent attempt to complete integration of bus service and related public accommodations in the South during the month of May.

By internal Bureau memorandum dated 5/13/61, it was noted that information from a confidential informant (Rowe) was received concerning the possibility that local authorities may allow disturbances to generate against above civil rights group on 5/14/61, when they were due to arrive in Birmingham, Alabama. This memorandum shows that appropriate local law enforcement authorities were advised of the potential for violence in Birmingham prior to 5/14/61.

4

5/26/65

1 - Mr. Boyd

Airtel

EX-100

To: SAC, Birmingham

MDR-16

From: Director, FBI (44-28601)

REC 19

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

ReBuairtel to Birmingham 5/21/65 and SFairtel to Director 5/22/65 captioned "BH 248-R."

ReSFairtel furnished information concerning outstanding indebtedness of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. The financial obligations he has incurred with the banking institutions and with the State of Alabama regarding unpaid sales tax appear to be dormant debts which would not necessarily have to be paid on a current basis as part of his living expenses. Following completion of the trials in this case, consideration will be given by the Bureau to a recommendation of a lump-sum payment which informant might use to help liquidate these obligations.

With reference to the sums owed the power, gas, telephone and realty companies, it is not clear whether these are current monthly expenses to the informant or rather dormant bills. Advise Bureau if these are present expenses to the informant and, if not paid or services discontinued, what parties would be affected.

MAILED 4
MAY 26 1965
COMM-FBI

ReSFairtel reflects informant has advised that the indebtedness with the Boothby Realty Company is accumulating day by day for rent of a residence going back to 2/1/65. The Bureau desires to know the purpose of informant maintaining this residence (presumably in Birmingham) and of informant's...

2 - Tampa (44-313)
2 - San Francisco
JJB/ral
(8)
SEE NOTE ON PAGE TWO.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

55 JUN 4 1965

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

intentions to continue to maintain this residence inasmuch as both he and his ex-wife are residing elsewhere.

Informant's ex-wife has obtained employment at a salary of approximately $223 per month. She has fixed obligations that will amount to approximately $424 a month and feels she could better meet her obligations if she were receiving her alimony payments. Mrs. Rowe has stated she is to receive alimony of $115 a month and that her ex-husband is in arrears for a total of $690. The Bureau desires to know what informant's thoughts are as to meeting this obligation to his ex-wife. Also advise if informant considers these payments as necessary monthly obligations that he would meet under normal circumstances.

The Birmingham Office is to give this your immediate attention and promptly advise the Bureau.

NOTE:

The Birmingham Office has pointed out that Rowe has performed an invaluable service to the Bureau and has saved an untold amount of man power and various expenses in connection with the shooting of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo. Informant has been in protective custody of the Bureau since 4/1/65 and not had opportunity to be gainfully employed to meet various obligations. The Birmingham Office has recommended that the Bureau pay informant's outstanding bills in order to continue the excellent relationship developed. We are presently paying him $16 per day subsistence in lieu of expenses which figure was decided upon after discussion with the Department. It is not desired to make a large payment at this time which could be construed as a payment to Rowe for his testimony in the up-coming trials. Birmingham previously requested to submit a detailed accounting of Rowe's debts showing their basis, when contracted and schedule of payments. The information received from the field needs to be further clarified after which time this matter will be discussed with the Department and its views obtained as to whether or not payment of these debts would be judicious at this time.

FBI

Date: 5/21/65

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44-28601)

FROM: SAC, TAMPA (44-313) (P)

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL.;
VIOLA LIUZZO, aka
ET AL. - VICTIMS
CR; EL
(OO:BH)

On 5/20/65, Mrs. DOROTHY M. ROWE again advised that she has not received any alimony payments from her ex-husband since the October, 1964, payment, which means he is in arrears 6 months, total due $690.

Mrs. ROWE will commence work on 5/24/65 at a salary of approximately $57 per week, $228 per month. She has fixed obligations that will amount to approximately $424 per month. She has stated that if she were receiving her alimony payments she could better meet her obligations.

Please advise what you have been able to accomplish re the alimony payments.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

3 - Bureau
2 - Birmingham
2 - Tampa
JEW:cwp
(7)

REC- 19

44-28601-30

27
21 MAY 24 1965

CC • Wick

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : A. Rosen

DATE: 5-21-65

1- Mr. Sullivan
1- Mr. Belmont
1- Mr. Rosen
1- Mr. Malley
1- Mr. McGowan
1- Mr. Hines

SUBJECT: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL -
VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

The Birmingham Office has advised that our informant Gary Thomas Rowe has current outstanding debts in the Birmingham, Alabama, area totaling $2350.08, and the SAC, Birmingham recommends that these debts be paid by the Bureau in full.

Birmingham points out that Rowe has performed invaluable service to the Bureau in connection with the case involving the shooting of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, and his services have saved the Bureau an untold amount of Agent manpower and various expenses connected with an extended major investigation. They point out that informant has been in protective custody of the Bureau since 4-1-65, and as such, has not had an opportunity to be gainfully employed in order to meet various financial obligations that he has been meeting in the past. Birmingham points out that it is absolutely imperative to insure the possible success of the next trial tentatively scheduled for September, 1965, that the excellent relationship developed with Rowe must be retained, and to accomplish this Rowe should be free as much as possible from the receipt of bills from various creditors when he is not in a position to make payment.

Birmingham listed outstanding bills of informant Rowe as follows:

Alabama Power Company	$69.16
Southern Bell Telephone Company	38.78
Boothby Realty Company (Apartment)	297.50
State of Alabama (Sales Tax)	266.11
Birmingham Trust National Bank	1,062.00
Sears-Roebuck (Toys)	75.00
Alabama Gas Corporation	29.58
Cousin Joe's Loan Company	60.00
First National Bank of Birmingham	451.95
Total	$2,350.08

REC 28

382

4 JUN 10 1965

Enclosure sent 5-21-65
JWH:mmb
(7)

0 JUN 16 1965

MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/CHC

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL

OBSERVATIONS OF GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

The Bureau is currently paying Gary Thomas Rowe $16.00 per day subsistence in lieu of expenses. This figure was initially decided upon after discussion with the Department, and with the Department's approval, as it was recognized that the informant had to be removed from the Birmingham area for his protection and safety. The Department pointed out that it would not be desirable to make any lump sum or large payment to the informant so long as he might be called upon to testify, as any such large payments might be construed in court as a payment for his testimony, whereas payment of his living expenses can readily be justified as a necessity.

In the trial of subject Collie Leroy Wilkins which began 5-3-65 and resulted in a hung jury, the Bureau was called upon to produce a record of payments to the informant. In a future trial, it is reasonable to expect that we will again be called upon to produce such a record. The payment of Rowe's debts at this time amounting to over two thousand dollars would appear in this record of payments to Rowe, and we certainly could not agree to pay such a large amount at this time without the Department's approval.

With regard to the debts themselves, it would not appear from information furnished by Birmingham that they are all due and payable immediately, as the larger debts to the two banks would probably be payable in monthly installments. We could, with Department's approval, agree to payment of his smaller debts and monthly installments on these larger debts as they come due.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the above, it is recommended that Birmingham be instructed to submit a detailed accounting of Rowe's debts showing their basis, when they were contracted, due dates and a full breakdown of any installment contracts showing detailed schedule of payments. Upon receipt of this information, the matter will be discussed with the Department and their views as to whether or not payment of these debts at this time would be judicious, will be obtained. Airtel attached.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Wick
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach   DATE: January 14, 1966

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM

FROM : A. Rosen

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines

SUBJECT: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

In response to the Director's inquiry concerning correspondence relating to the demands made by Gary Thomas Rowe, prior to his testifying in the Federal trial of the three subjects responsible for the shooting of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, the following items are attached:

(1) The teletype from Inspector J. L. McGovern dated 11-28-65, setting forth the substance of the discussion of John Doar, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division with Gary Thomas Rowe concerning demands made by Rowe. The teletype indicates that McGovern was present during Doar's discussion with Rowe and on page six of the teletype McGovern states that although Bureau personnel were present throughout the interviews between Doar and Rowe, Bureau personnel made no assurance, promises, nor commitments to him.

(2) A copy of the teletype from Mr. McGovern dated 11-23-65, which sets forth in detail the demands made by Rowe. Because of the urgency of relaying Rowe's demands to the Department, a Xerox copy of the teletype was prepared deleting the transmittal data at the top of page one and the last paragraph on page one continuing to the top of page two wherein Rowe expressed his confidence in Bureau personnel and felt he had been let down by the Department and does not trust its representatives.

(3) A copy of the memorandum as prepared from McGovern's teletype of 11-23-65 as actually furnished to Mr. John Doar on 11-24-65.

REC-108 44-25601-

(4) Attached is a memorandum from Mr. Rosen to Mr. Belmont dated 11-24-65 recording the discussion of Supervisor J. William Hines with Mr. Doar wherein he was furnished the memorandum (Item 3) and the demands were discussed.

JWH:cry (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

17 JAN 18 1966

Rosen to DeLoach Memorandum
RE: EUGENE THOMAS

Doar indicated in this discussion that the Department would assume responsibility for handling Rowe's demands as noted in paragraph three where he said that he would personally meet with Rowe in Tampa, Florida, and that he, Doar, would make every effort to build Rowe's confidence, resolve the conditions set forth by Rowe, and obtain his testimony.

ACTION:

For your information.

4-3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

6:33 PM EST URGENT 11-28-65 RLS

TO DIRECTOR

MDR-16

FROM TAMPA 281615

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

FROM INSPECTOR J. L. MC GOVERN.

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL, VIOLA LIUZZO-VICTIM, ~~CR-EL,~~ BIRMINGHAM ORIGIN.

RE TAMPA TELEPHONE CALL NOVEMBER 27 LAST.

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN DOAR ARRIVED TAMPA AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 26 AND FOLLOWING BRIEFING CONFERENCE INTERVIEWED GARY THOMAS ROWE AT GREAT LENGTH. INTERVIEW CONCERNED CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ROWE WOULD TESTIFY AS OUTLINED SAN FRANCISCO TELETYPE NOVEMBER 23.

REC 11 44-28601-605

AT OUTSET OF INTERVIEW DOAR INDICATED THAT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FOR ROWE AND FAMILY WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE EMPLOYMENT, RELOCATION AND REIMBURSEMENT FOR INCONVENIENCES SUFFERED BY ROWE AND

12 DEC 2 1965

MR. BELMONT FOR THE DIRECTOR

above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

4-1 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

PAGE TWO FROM TAMPA 281615

FAMILY INCLUDING LOSS OF INCOME DURING PERIOD OF RELOCATION.

MR. DOAR POINTED OUT TO ROWE THAT THE CONDITIONS PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED BY ROWE WERE NOT CONSIDERED UNREASONABLE. ALSO INDICATED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DID NOT CONSIDER ROWE'S INABILITY TO IDENTIFY LEROY MOTON AS THE OCCUPANT OF THE CAR WITH MRS. LIUZZO AS BEING HARMFUL TO THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE; IF ROWE FELT MOTON WAS NOT THE NEGRO OCCUPANT, HE SHOULD SO TESTIFY.

MR. DOAR ADVISED ROWE THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE GIVE HIM AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING WHEREBY HE WOULD BE ASSURED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO TESTIFY IN ANY FUTURE PROCEEDINGS REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL TO COMMENCE NOVEMBER 29. MR. DOAR POINTED OUT THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT, IF GIVEN, WOULD BE OF NO VALUE TO ROWE AS IT WOULD BE A WORTHLESS COMMITMENT RELATING TO EVENTS WHICH MIGHT OCCUR IN THE FUTURE AND NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF PRESENT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO ☒ TELETYPE

PAGE THREE FROM TAMPA 281615

THROUGHOUT THE INTERVIEW, ROWE APPEARED TO BE AWARE OF THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT; AND WHILE NOT ANTAGONISTIC, REMAINED ADAMANT IN REFUSING TO CHANGE THE POSITION HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TAKEN IN REFUSING TO TESTIFY UNLESS THE CONDITIONS OUTLINED WERE MET.

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE INTERVIEW BY MR. DOAR, AT WHICH TIME ROWE HAD NOT CHANGED HIS POSITION, HE WAS FURTHER INTERVIEWED AT GREAT LENGTH BY BUREAU PERSONNEL. ROWE FINALLY INDICATED THAT IF IT WERE AGREEABLE TO HIS WIFE, HE WOULD TESTIFY WITHOUT RECEIVING A WRITTEN AGREEMENT RELATING TO FUTURE TESTIMONY PROVIDED HE DID RECEIVE WRITTEN ASSURANCE RELATING TO HIS TESTIMONY WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE LEROY MOTON.

ON THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 27 THE RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH BUREAU PERSONNEL WERE MADE KNOWN TO MR. DOAR, AND THEREAFTER CONTACT WAS MADE WITH ROWE'S WIFE. ROWE

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

PAGE FOUR FROM TAMPA 281615

DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH HER HIS CONFERENCE WITH MR DOAR AND SHE INDICATED THAT SHE WOULD BE WILLING TO RELOCATE TOGETHER WITH HER CHILDREN TO AN AREA IN WHICH ROWE HIMSELF WOULD BE RELOCATED.

THIS INFORMATION WAS MADE KNOWN TO MR. DOAR. THEREAFTER, ROUGH DRAFT LETTER OVER THE SIGNATURE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS DELIVERED BY DOAR TO ROWE. THIS LETTER OUTLINED THE FACT THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS AWARE OF THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY ROWE IN THE PAST, THE FACT THAT HIS PUBLIC EXPOSURE HAD RESULTED IN HARDSHIP ON HIM AND HIS FAMILY, WHICH WILL NECESSITATE PERMANENT RELOCATION FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ROWE FAMILY. THE LETTER ALSO INDICATED THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS PREPARED TO ASSIST ROWE IN OBTAINING SUITABLE EMPLOYMENT WITH EITHER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OR ELSEWHERE IN A POSITION FOR WHICH HE IS QUALIFIED AND TO ASSIST HIM IN RELOCATING IN A SECURE PLACE. THE LETTER CONCLUDED WITH THE COMMENT THAT THE ASSISTANCE OUTLINED

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XXX TELETYPE

PAGE FIVE FROM TAMPA 281615

IS NOT CONTINGENT ON HIS PERFORMANCE OF ANY FURTHER SERVICE OR ASSISTANCE WHICH HE MAY GIVE TO THE UNITED STATES AT ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE.

THEREAFTER MR. DOAR PRESENTED TO ROWE A LETTER OVER HIS SIGNATURE AS ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL ASKING THAT ROWE PRESENT HIMSELF AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA BEFORE TRIAL DATE SO THAT THE FACTS TO WHICH ROWE WOULD TESTIFY MAY BE CAREFULLY REVIEWED WITH HIM. THE LETTER POINTS OUT THAT THE FEDERAL TRIAL WILL DIFFER FROM THE PAST STATE PROCEEDINGS INDICATING THAT A CONSPIRACY CASE IS INVOLVED CHARGING THREE DEFENDANTS WITH CONSPIRACY TO INJURE UNITED STATES CITIZENS FOR HAVING EXERCISED CERTAIN FEDERAL RIGHTS. THE LETTER POINTS OUT THAT PROOF IN THE CASE WOULD DEAL PRIMARILY WITH THE EVENTS COMMENCING ON MARCH 21 AND THAT ROWE WILL BE EXPECTED TO BE AS SPECIFIC AND ACCURATE ABOUT DETAILS AS HE CAN TRUTHFULLY BE. THE LETTER INDICATES THAT MR. DOAR IS AWARE THAT ROWE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT LEROY MOTON WAS THE

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

4 3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XX TELETYPE

PAGE SIX FROM TAMPA 281615

NEGRO MALE OCCUPYING THE FRONT SEAT OF THE LIUZZO CAR; AND THAT IF HE WERE ASKED ABOUT THIS, HE SHOULD SAY SO. FURTHER, ROWE'S IDENTIFICATION OF THE PASSENGER IN THE LIUZZO CAR IS IMMATERIAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS PROOF IN THE CASE.

FOLLOWING REVIEW OF THESE LETTERS BY ROWE, IT WAS INDICATED TO HIM THAT THEY WOULD BE DELIVERED IN CARE OF INSPECTOR MC GOVERN AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, AND WOULD BE HELD BY MC GOVERN UNTIL AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF ROWE'S TESTIMONY.

ROWE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS AGREEABLE TO HIM AND INDICATED THAT HE WOULD WILLINGLY APPEAR AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA TO TESTIFY.

ALTHOUGH BUREAU PERSONNEL WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE INTERVIEWS BETWEEN AAG DOAR AND ROWE, BUREAU PERSONNEL MADE NO ASSURANCES, PROMISES, NOR COMMITMENTS TO HIM.

AS MR. DOAR HAS INDICATED DESIRE FOR FURTHER PRE TRIAL CONFERENCES WITH ROWE, ROWE WILL BE TRANSPORTED THIS DATE, NOVEMBER 28 TO MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA BY BUREAU PERSONNEL VIA

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably *cryptographic systems.*

4 3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO XX TELETYPE

PAGE SEVEN FROM TAMPA 281615

EASTERN AIRLINES FLIGHT 274, DEPARTING TAMPA 12:30 PM. TRANSFER POINT ATLANTA, GEORGIA, DEPARTURE ATLANTA VIA EASTERN AIRLINES FLIGHT 763 AT 2:55 PM EASTERN STANDARD TIME, ARRIVAL MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 2:55 PM CENTRAL STANDARD TIME.

MOBILE HAS BEEN ALERTED AND ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR BUREAU PERSONNEL TO BE PRESENT AT AIRPORT MONTGOMERY TO PROVIDE FULL SECURITY FOR ROWE AND TRANSPORTATION TO MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE WHERE ROWE WILL REMAIN DURING TRIAL COMMENCING NOVEMBER 29.

RECEIVED: 6:54 PM RPT

4

ROSEN

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4-3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM xxxRADIO ☐ TELETYPE

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/

R-15
URGENT 11-23-65 9:38 PM
TO DIRECTOR
FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

FROM: INSPECTOR J. L. MC GOVERN

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL; VIOLET LIUZZO-VICTIM. ~~CR-EL.~~
OO: BIRMINGHAM.

REBUTEL CALL TO BIRMINGHAM NOVEMBER 19 LAST.

GARY THOMAS ROWE HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY SINCE LATE EVENING NOVEMBER 20 BY INSPECTOR J. L. MC GOVERN, SA NEIL P. SHANAHAN, AND FREQUENTLY IN PRESENCE OF SAC LYNUM AND SA JAMES G. CARLISLE.

AT OUTSET AND THROUGHOUT INTERVIEWS ROWE HAS BEEN ADAMANT IN HIS REFUSAL TO FURTHER TESTIFY IN THE STATE OF ALABAMA CONCERNING CAPTIONED CASE OR OTHER MATTERS. DURING INTERVIEW ROWE WAS HIGHLY EMOTIONAL, DISTRAUGHT, TEARFUL AND INDICATED THAT HE DOES NOT FEEL THAT HE IS PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF GOING THROUGH WITH ANOTHER TRIAL. HE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF HIS CHILDREN, AS WELL AS HIMSELF, AND COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD NEVER RETURN TO ALABAMA. HE INDICATED THAT SO LONG AS THE THREAT OF FURTHER TESTIMONY HANGS OVER HIM HE CANNOT SECURE REGULAR EMPLOYMENT.

WHILE EXPRESSING A DEEP SENSE OF OBLIGATION TO THE BUREAU AND CONFIDENCE OF BUREAU PERSONNEL, HE INDICATED THAT HE FEELS THAT HE HAS BEEN "LET DOWN" BY THE DEPARTMENT AND DOES NOT TRUST ITS REPRESENTATIVES. HE COMMENTED THAT HE QUESTIONS THE

58

REC- 18

NOV 30 1965

11/2/65

4-3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM XXXXRADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE TWO FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

MOTIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT, AS WELL AS THE STATE PROSECUTORS, EXPRESSING THE OPINION THAT THE MOTIVES ARE POLITICALLY INSPIRED. ALSO INDICATED THAT HE DOES NOT FEEL HIS TESTIMONY WOULD BE OF VALUE, AS HE DANNOT FORESEE ANY POSSIBILITY OF CONVICTION.

IN TAKING THE POSITION THAT HE WOULD NOT VOLUNTARILY RETURN TO ALABAMA TO TESTIFY, HE RECOGNIZED THAT A SUBPOENA COULD BE ISSUED FOR HIM BUT THAT IF ONE WERE ISSUED HE STATED THAT HE WOULD RETURN ONLY IF FORCE WERE USED TO TRANSPORT HIM TO ALABAMA. IF SUCH FORCE WERE USED HE WOULD REFUSE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, EVEN THOUGH HE MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT AND CONFINED TO JAIL.

SHOULD HE BE FORCED TO TESTIFY HE SAID THAT HE WOULD INSURE THAT HIS TESTIMONY WOULD INCLUDE THE FACT THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE WITNESS LEROY MOTON IS THE SAME NEGRO WHO OCCUPIED THE CAR WITH THE VICTIM AT THE TIME OF HER SLAYING.

HE ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT SHOULD HE REFUSE TO TESTIFY THAT HIS SERVICES OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS AND HIS PRIOR TESTIMONY IN THE STATE PROSECUTIONS WOULD BE DISCREDITED.

AFTER DISCUSSION WITH ROWE THIS MORNING, HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD TESTIFY UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

1. THAT THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL GIVE HIM AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING PRIOR TO HIS ENTERING THE STATE OF ALABAMA, WHICH AGREEMENT WOULD PROVIDE THAT HE, ROWE, WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO TESTIFY IN ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS FOLLOWING THE TRIAL AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, TO BE HELD NOVEMBER 29 NEXT, REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THAT TRIAL, NAMELY, ACQUITTAL,

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM XXX RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE THREE FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

HUNG JURY OR CONVICTION.

2. THAT HE HAVE AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THAT HE, ROWE, WOULD BE ASSISTED IN SECURING EMPLOYMENT, EITHER WITH ONI OR THE BORDER PATROL, SUCH EMPLOYMENT TO BE SECURED WITHIN 45 DAYS UPON THE COMPLETION OF THE TRIAL.

3. THAT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD INCLUDE AN ASSURANCE THAT IF HE DID TESTIFY HE WOULD BE ASKED NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING LEROY MOTON.

4. BECAUSE OF HIS CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF HIS CHILDREN, PROVIDING SUCH WOULD BE AGREEABLE WITH HIS WIFE, THAT SHE AND HIS FOUR CHILDREN WOULD BE RELOCATED ~~IN~~ AN AREA IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO WHERE HE WILL BE LOCATED TO AFFORD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FREQUENT VISITS AND TO CHECK ON THEIR SAFETY. ALSO, THAT THE BUREAU WOULD ASSIST HIS WIFE IN SECURING EMPLOYMENT IN THE PLACE OF RELOCATION.

5. PROVIDED SUCH WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO HIS PARENTS AND TO HIS SISTER, THAT THEY, TOO, BE RELOCATED TO THE SAME GENERAL VICINITY AS HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN. BECAUSE HIS FATHER MUST WORK APPROXIMATELY TWO ADDITIONAL YEARS TO SECURE MAXIMUM RETIREMENT ANNUITIES FROM HIS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT, THAT PROVISION BE MADE TO HIS PARENTS FOR ANY MONETARY LOSS OR REDUCTION IN THE RETIREMENT ANNUITY COVERING THE PERIOD FROM DATE OF RELOCATION TO THE DATE ON WHICH MAXIMUM RETIREMENT WOULD ORDINARILY BEGIN.

6. HE RECOGNIZES THAT HIS SERVICES HAVE RESULTED IN A VAST SAVING OF INVESTIGATIVE TIME FROM HIS KNOWLEDGE OF CASES IN WHICH INFORMANTS HAVE BEEN SEVERED THAT HE PROBABLY WOULD

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably

4 3 (Rev. 12-13-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM XX RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

RECEIVE A SUBSTANTIAL SUM AT TIME OF SEVERANCE, ONE FIFTH OF THIS SUM TO BE USED BY HIM TO DEFRAY OUTSTANDING INDEBTEDNESS AND FOUR FIFTHS TO BE SET UP IN TRUST FOR HIS CHILDREN TO BE USED FOR THEIRUFUTURE EDUCATION.

7. HE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO VISIT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN OVER THE THANKSGIVING HOLIDAYS.

8. IN THE EVENT OF HIS TESTIMONY, DESIRES TO KNOW PRECISELY THE NATURE OF THE TESTIMONY EXPECTED OF HIM.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. BUREAU IMMEDIATELY ADVISE CONCERNING ROWE'S TRAVEL TO TAMPA, FLORIDA, TO VISIT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN, WHERE HE WOULD REMAIN UNTIL CALLED AS WITNESS, ASSUMING HIS CONDITIONS ARE MET. ROWE INDICATES HE PLANS TO VISIT FAMILY THANKSGIVING IN ANY EVENT.

2. THAT THIS MATTER BE IMMEDIATELY DISCUSSED WITH THE DEPARTMENT, OUTLINING THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF ROWE AND THE CONDITIONS WHICH HE IMPOSES BEFORE TESTIFYING AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA.

3. IT IS FELT THAT MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE MANNER IN WHICH ROWE WOULD APPEAR IN MONTGOMERY, EITHER AS A WILLING WITNESS UNDER THE CONDITIONS OUTLINED ABOVE, OR AS A RELUCTANT AND HOSTILE WITNESS SHOULD HE BE SUBPOENAED AND FORCIBLY TRANSPORTED TO MONTGOMERY. THE RESULTANT PUBLICITY INVOLVING SUCH FORCIBLE TRANSPORTATION WOULD UNQUESTIONABLY HAVE A MOST ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE ENTIRE INFORMANT PROGRAM.

4. THAT IN THE EVENT THE DEPARTMENT IS AGREEABLE TO THE

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM xxxRADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE FIVE FROM SAN FRANCISCO 232211

CONDITIONS OUTLINED, AND PROVIDING ROWE'S TRANSPORTATION TO TAMPA, FLORIDA, IS AUTHORIZED, THAT THE DEPARTMENT MAKE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE TAMPA OFFICE THE AREAS OF TESTIMONY EXPECTED OF ROWE SO THAT THEY MAY BE REVIEWED WITH HIM AND HE MAY HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REFRESH HIS RECOLLECTION.

THE ABOVE IS FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU FOR ITS CONSIDERATION AND THAT OF THE DEPARTMENT. NO PROMISES OF ANY KIND HAVE BEEN MADE TO ROWE, OTHER THAN HIS CONDITIONS WOULD BE FORWARDED FOR CONSIDERATION.

RECEIVED: 9:50 PM RPT

I think some of his conditions are grossly unreasonable.

CC-MR. ROSEN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/KHL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : A. Rosen

DATE: 11/24/65

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines

SUBJECT: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

Inspector James McGovern, San Francisco, has advised that Gary Thomas Rowe, our informant whose testimony is needed in the Federal civil rights trial of the Liuzzo shooting in Montgomery, Alabama, beginning 11/29/65, had exhibited feelings of reluctance to testify for the Government and set forth certain conditions under which he would agree to testify.

These conditions consist of an agreement from the Attorney General that his testimony would not be required in any future proceedings, that he be assisted in obtaining employment and that some assurances be given him for the future security of his ex-wife and children and parents. He also expressed a desire to visit his wife and children in the Tampa, Florida, area over the Thanksgiving holiday.

Rowe's conditions were discussed in detail with Assistant Attorney General John Doar. Mr. Doar advised that he would discuss these conditions immediately with the Attorney General and requested that we arrange for Rowe to visit with his family in Tampa over Thanksgiving, 11/25/65, and that he would then personally meet with Rowe in Tampa on Saturday morning, 11/27/65. He said that he is planning to try the case personally in Montgomery and that Rowe's testimony is vital to a successful trial. He will make every effort to build Rowe's confidence, resolve the conditions set forth by Rowe and obtain his testimony.

REC-40 44-28601-599

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ACTION:

DEC 1 1965

Inspector McGovern has been telephonically instructed to proceed immediately with Rowe to Tampa where appropriate arrangements will be made for Rowe to meet with Assistant Attorney General Doar on the morning of 11/27/65.

sent

Attached for approval is a teletype to Mobile and Tampa advising them that Inspector McGovern and Rowe are proceeding to Tampa and that a meeting will be arranged in Tampa between Rowe

Enclosure

44-28601-

DEC 2

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL

ACTION CONTINUED:

and Assistant Attorney General Doar, 11/27/65. It is noted that Mr. Doar is going to Montgomery, Alabama, on 11/25/65, where he will remain throughout the trial.

FA

Mr. John Doar
Assistant Attorney General

July 9, 1965

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/CR

Director, FBI
(9)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines

6 -
10 -

EUGENE THOMAS, ET AL;
VIOLA LIUZZO, ET AL - VICTIMS
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

This will confirm a discussion of Mr. J. William Hines of this Bureau with Mr. St. John Barrett of the Department on July 7, 1965, concerning outstanding personal debts of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who furnished the initial information identifying and leading to the indictment of three subjects on charges of shooting Mrs. Viola Liuzzo on March 25, 1965.

Rowe's debts totaling approximately $2,350 consist primarily of personal loans at two banks in Birmingham amounting to about $1,500 and an assessment for Alabama State sales taxes in the amount of $268.50 which resulted from Rowe's operation of a tavern and restaurant from September, 1964, through March, 1965. The business was a losing enterprise and has reverted to its original proprietor. The balance of the debts are to local utility companies and for apartment rental. The utilities have been disconnected and the apartment reclaimed.

MAILED 23
JUL 9 1965
COMM-FBI

On July 7, 1965, Departmental Attorney St. John Barrett advised Mr. Hines that the Department was of the opinion that the Bureau should not assume responsibility for payment of Rowe's personal debts. He stated that if any payment is made to Rowe, it should be for personal services. Any large payment for personal services should not be made until after Rowe has testified at the upcoming trials of the subjects charged with the shooting of Mrs. Liuzzo scheduled for September and October, 1965.

Mr. Barrett's attention was called to the fact that the Alabama State tax authorities had an outstanding assessment against Rowe for State sales taxes in the amount of $268.50. Mr. Barrett stated he was aware of this and that Mr. Paul Johnston, the attorney representing Rowe in the action for legal fees brought against Rowe by Attorney Matt Murphy, had brought this assessment to the Department's attention.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JWH/pak
(9)

Note on next page.

REC- 21
EX-113
19 JUL 13 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Mr. John Doar

In view of the Department's opinion, this Bureau will not assume responsibility for payment of any of Rowe's personal debts incurred prior to March 25, 1965, and no lump sum or large payments to Rowe for personal services rendered will be considered without prior approval of the Department. You will be promptly advised of any legal action which may be instituted against Rowe for collection of any of the outstanding debts.

NOTE: See memorandum A. Rosen to Mr. Belmont dated 7/8/65, same caption, JWH/pak.

San Francisco, California
January 14, 1966

I, GARY THOMAS ROWE, on this date, January 14, 1966, have accepted ten thousand dollars cash ($10,000.00) from the undersigned, representatives of the FBI.

This amount has been accepted by me in full and complete satisfaction of services rendered voluntarily to representatives of the FBI up to and including January 14, 1966.

My acceptance of this amount in fulfillment of the above brings to a close a very pleasant relationship which I have enjoyed with representatives of the FBI, who have on all occasions treated me fairly and with the utmost consideration and I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation.

/s/ Gary Thomas Rowe
GARY THOMAS ROWE

Witnessed by: James G. Carlisle, Special Agent, FBI
Curtis O. Lynum, Special Agent in Charge, FBI

At San Francisco, California
January 14, 1966

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

November 24, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee letter requesting delivery of certain documents pertaining to Mary Jo Cook and Gary Thomas Rowe. Please prepare an appropriate response.

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/ETH

cc: Paul Daly

1st to AG 1-DAG Enc 36
11/24/75 sk:tdp

1-Ad Hoc
11-25-75

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., T[illegible]
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARI[illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS [illegible] MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 24, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

With respect to the documents pertaining to Mary Jo Cook and Gary Thomas Rowe which the Bureau has made available for review in response to our request, we request that the documents specified by our staff members be delivered to the Committee.

Sincerely,

John Elliff

John Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence
Task Force

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

cc: Paul V. Daly
Office of Congressional Affairs
Federal Bureau of Investigation

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 11/24/75

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 11/21/75, Inspector John B. Hotis met with Doug Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, and Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, concerning Mr. Levi's forthcoming appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Attorney General will have a prepared statement which will probably deal with the future relationship between the Bureau and the Department and the kinds of contacts needed to prevent abuse of authority. Mr. Marvin asked that the Bureau provide the following materials, which will be used in the preparation of a briefing book for Mr. Levi's testimony:

(1) A general synopsis of major areas of the Bureau's activities that have been investigated by the Senate and House Select Committees. Mr. Marvin gave as examples, the "Official and Confidential" files, COINTELPRO, use of informants, and interception of mails. He said the purpose is to identify those topics which have been of primary concern to the Committees. Mr. Marvin asked that the synopses contain a brief statement of the Bureau's position on each of the subjects.

EX-115 REC-9 62-116395-1155

(2) A general statement concerning the organizational structure and functions of the FBI, with particular emphasis on the responsibilities of the Inspection Division. This should include a description of how complaints are received, the review process, and any recent changes in the operations of that Division. In addition, the Attorney General wants a write-up of all investigations of alleged misconduct presently being conducted by the Bureau. He is particularly concerned about any incidents that may have occurred during Mr. Levi's tenure as Attorney General, such as those in Richmond, Detroit, and Houston.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Ash
1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Decker
1 - Mr. Gallagher
1 - Mr. Hoxie
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Mooney
1 - Mr. Moore
~~1 - Mr. Walsh~~
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis

LEGAL COUNSEL

DEC 16 1975

JBH:lad (16)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

(3) A history of Congressional oversight of the Bureau. Mr. Marvin asked that we identify those Subcommittees of Congress which have exercised some oversight responsibilities over the Bureau. In particular, he asked that we review appropriations testimony going back to 1955 to determine whether we discussed topics which are presently of concern to the Select Committees. This will be very useful in demonstrating Congressional awareness of these matters. He also asked that we furnish a statement of the Director's position concerning Congressional oversight which he has previously expressed in speeches or testimony before Congress.

(4) A list of major investigative techniques employed by the Bureau, specifying in each case whether we seek Departmental approval. The more obvious examples are electronic surveillance, use of body recorders, pen registers, informants, and photographic surveillances.

(5) A list of any formal or informal proposals which have been made concerning organizational changes of the FBI. Examples are the creation of an Inspector General's Office in the Department or elsewhere having review authority over the FBI, transfer of counterintelligence functions to another agency or the creation of a separate Division within the Bureau for that function, transfer of drug enforcement responsibilities to the Bureau, and the proposed statutory limitation on the term of the office for the Director.

It should be noted that several position papers concerning such topics were prepared at the request of former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray which might be useful in responding to this request.

Although no date has been set for the Attorney General's testimony, it is expected that he will testify after Mr. Kelley's appearance on 12/9/75. In view of the limited time available, Mr. Marvin asked that we expedite the preparation of these materials and furnish them to his office as soon as they are completed. It is requested that these materials be submitted to the Office of Congressional Affairs, when completed, but no later than cob, Friday, 11/28/75. They should be submitted in insert form suitable for inclusion in a letterhead memorandum.

CONTINUED - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Intelligence Division prepare a synopsis of the major topics concerning the Bureau which have been investigated by the Senate and House Select Committees.

(2) That the Administrative Division and the Inspection Division prepare materials concerning the organizational structure and function of the Bureau.

(3) That the Administrative Division in conjunction with the Legal Counsel Division prepare materials concerning Congressional oversight of the Bureau.

(4) That the Intelligence Division and the General and Special Investigative Divisions prepare materials concerning major investigative techniques.

(5) That the Office of Planning and Evaluation prepare materials concerning proposals for organizational changes of the FBI.

(6) In addition to the above specified assignments, it is recommended that every Division review this request and make appropriate recommendations or submit any other materials that might be useful in the preparation of the Attorney General's briefing book.

OK

December 2, 1975

Mr. Al Vecchione
Executive Director
NPACT
955 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024

Senstudy - 1975

Dear Al:

This will confirm our conversation on November 26, 1975, wherein you authorized the Bureau to use a videotape recording of your "live" telecast concerning the appearance of Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams before the Church Committee. You indicated that this was authorized for the exclusive viewing by FBI personnel.

This is to advise you that the videotape of Mr. Adams' testimony is being restricted solely to FBI personnel. We certainly appreciate your consideration in this regard. Thank you for this authority.

Sincerely,

/s/ Don Moore

Donald W. Moore, Jr.
Assistant Director
External Affairs Division

MAILED 7
DEC 3 1975
FBI

REC-9 62-116395-1154

EX 104

DEC 4 1975

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/02 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

1:87
DWM:jo

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

55 DEC 15 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

The Attorney General

November 28, 1975

MD R-16

5

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/LHC

9

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 1 requested in SSC letter dated November 7, 1975.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC. Your attention is invited to the fact that included in the materials to be delivered to the SSC is correspondence originated in the Department of Justice.

REC-66 62-116395-1153

Enclosures (2)

2-ENCLOSURE

7 DEC ~~4~~ 8 1975

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

PEN:adn
(9)

NOTE:

Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC. Included in materials being furnished the SSC which were located in the files of Mr. Sullivan is a copy of a chronology of events and a summary of information developed concerning the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., by James Earl Ray and a press release concerning Ray made by Attorney General Ramsey Clark on April 18, 1968. Supervisor E. J. McDonough of the General Investigative Division reviewed these items and interposed no objection to the release to the SSC in their entirety.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1153

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/20/00 BY SP8 ABM/EHC

62-116395

November 28, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, and specifically to Item 1 of an accompanying Document Request of same date which requested all materials contained in the files of William C. Sullivan pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) which have not previously been made available to the Committee. Excluded from consideration in connection with this request were any portions containing transcripts or summaries or tapes of electronic surveillances of King.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of materials in response to Item 1 of the Document Request.

With respect to the excisions in materials being delivered herewith, where no notation appears as to reason for excision, the excision was made for the reason that the information actually summarizes or quotes from conversations monitored during electronic surveillances of King. In some cases it can be ascertained precisely what information in these materials came from electronic surveillances of King; however, there exist areas where documentation of the information is not precise and no accurate determination can be made. Therefore, no assurances can be given that portions of the materials being furnished do not contain information developed as a result of electronic surveillances of King.

In addition to materials not being furnished the SSC as stipulated by the SSC is a folder classified "Top Secret" bearing a label captioned "Communications Concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., Volume 1" which was located in the files of Mr. Sullivan. A review of that document indicates it contains information which could result in the identification of confidential sources of this Bureau; data obtained in connection with

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

PEN:adn adn
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

62-116395 [illegible]

PEN

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operation; and other data concerning King which by prior agreement has been excluded from delivery to the SSC (product of electronic surveillances of King).

In view of the above and since most, if not all, of the information contained in this document which does not fit the above exclusions, has previously been furnished the SSC, the document is not being delivered herewith.

1 - The Attorney General

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/28/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 11/7/75, item 1

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

~~TS~~

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Surveillance, electronic
Information handling

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials relating to Martin L. King, Jr and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as they were contained in the files of William C. Sullivan.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/GHC

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OUSTUDY/SENSTUDY "JUNE" ENCLOSURE PERMANENT CHARGE OUT FORM

RE - HOUSTUDY 62-116464-

OR

SENSTUDY 62-116395-1153 EBF

NOTE: THIS IS A PERMANENT CHARGE OUT FOR A XEROX COPY/COPIES OF "JUNE" MAIL THAT WAS INCLUDED IN COPIES OF FBI DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY MEMO/LETTER DATED 11-28-75 IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST(S) MADE BY EITHER THE U. S. SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE. THE COPY/COPIES OF THE "JUNE" MAIL DATED AS INDICATED BELOW HAS/HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS ENCLOSURE MATERIAL TO BE FILED IN THE APPROPRIATE HOUSTUDY OR SENSTUDY "JUNE" FILE INDICATED ABOVE, LOCATED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF THE RECORDS SECTION.

DATE(S) OF MAIL: 11-7-75

REMOVED BY: Wardlaw DATE REMOVED: 9-28-76

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

November 25, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. J. Duffin
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the request of the SSC dated November 7, 1975, for delivery of FBI materials.

Attached is a memorandum which is a partial response to items raised in referenced request. Enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JWJ:emg
(10)

ENCLOSURE

REC-41 62-116395-1151

DEC 5 1975

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/ETH
WRW

JAM

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 DEC 11 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

November 25, 1975

1 - Mr. A. J. Duffin
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the November 7, 1975, request by the SSC for delivery of FBI materials.

Item 1 of referenced SSC letter requested the following:

1) All materials pertaining to the opening of mail to or from Gilbert Stuart and Virginia R. Stuart during the years 1960 and 1961, by FBI Agents in or around the cities of New York and Providence, Rhode Island. (This request encompasses materials located in FBI Headquarters, the New York Field Office, and the Resident Agency in Providence, Rhode Island).

Pursuant to your request, the indices and the files of the FBI Headquarters, the New York Office and the Boston Office, which includes the Resident Agency in Providence, Rhode Island, were reviewed for any material pertaining to the opening of mail to or from Gilbert Stuart and Virginia R. Stuart with negative results.

1 - The Attorney General

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

JWJ:emg
(9)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NOTE:

A copy of SSC request dated 11/14/75 is attached. In response to Bureau teletype 11/17/75, New York and Boston teletypes, 11/18/75, advised no information in their files as to any openings of mail to or from the Stuarts.

62-116395 - WRW/TAL
JBH
WOC

ENCLOSURE 1151

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 11/25/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMTE TO STDY GOVMNT OPTNS W?RSPCT TO INTEL ACTVTS. Ref mad to 11/7/75 rqst by SSC for dlvry of matrl Itm 1 of ref let.

Originating Office: FBI 5050

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 11/28/75

Received by:

Title: Staff Assoc

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/25/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 11/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

No materials located at FBIHQ, New York Field Office or Providence, R.I., Resident Agency regarding opening of mail to or from Gilbert and Virginia R. Stuart.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

NOV 11 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated November 5, 1975, which was received by this Office on November 10, 1975. Please prepare an appropriate response to the attached request.

cc: Paul Daly

Bob Kelley, SSC, teleph. adv. that answers are not to [illegible] further [illegible] that it is [illegible] will respond - if so, will [illegible] from SSC. 5:05 pm 12/9/75

above given to Shaheen telephonically. 1:30 pm 12/10/75

Assigned to R. Hampton 11/11/75

Approx. 11/21/75 spoke to R. Kelley, SSC, who says he not handling but he would have handler call [illegible] who needs [illegible] [illegible] Called [illegible] for R. Kelley 3:10 pm 12/[illegible]

5:15 pm 12/4/75 - again left message at 224-1700 (Kelley in conference) for Kelley to call me

at 5:25 pm 12/4/75 Kelley called. He said he'd [illegible] [illegible] to Staff member John [illegible] referred [illegible] to the Dept. 11/21/75 [illegible] [illegible] Kelley will [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

1 - Mr. [illegible]
11-11-75

MDR-16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY 6P2 ALM/EHL

62-116395

62-116395-1150

ST 104

REC-31

5 JAN 23 1976

84 FEB 3 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 5, 1975

NOV 7 1 20 PM '75
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL UNIT

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

This is a supplementary request to our request of August 20, 1975, under Part IV, 3.

> All FBI reports, memoranda, interviews, and all other documents from FBI Agents Frank Watts and Jack Rucker concerning the time period April 1968 from August 1968 concerning Meridian, Mississippi, bombings, meetings with FBI informant Raymond Roberts and members of the Meridian, Mississippi, Police Department involving Thomas A. Tarrants III, Joe Danny Hawkins, Kathy Ainsworth, and other members or alleged members of the Ku Klux Klan.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1150X

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 [redacted] 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

2 - Mr. J [redacted] A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
(Attn: T. L. Sheer)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 11/11/75

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
(Attn: H. A. Newman)
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
(Attn: E. P. Grigalus)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Attached copy of Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter 11/7/75 indicates in last paragraph, page 2, the request of the SSC Staff to interview and possibly depose FBI Agents who have handled three former Bureau informants (Rowe, Hardy and Cooke). At a conference with SSC representatives (details being reported in a separate memorandum from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall), agreements were reached between Bureau and SSC representatives as to the specific Agents the SSC Staff desired to interview. The identities of these Agents are set out below under the headings as to the particular former informants.

1063
JEH

Former Informant Mary Jo Cooke

SA Garry George Lash - Assigned Buffalo.

Former Informant Robert Hardy

SA Michael M. Ryman - Assigned Philadelphia Office.
Retired SAC Roy K. Moore - Resides Jackson, Mississippi; employed by Deposit Guaranty National Bank, Jackson 39201.

Former Informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr.

Former SA Barrett George Kemp - Resides Saint Marys, Ohio; Attorney at Law, Home Bank Building, Saint Marys, Ohio 45884.
Former SA Byron Edward McFall - Resides Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; employed Special Judge District Court, Seventh Judicial District, State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City 73102.

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

2 -

PERS. REC. UNIT

Enclosure
62-116395

REC-41 62-116395 - DEC 1 1975 1150

CONTINUED - OVER

SFP:1hb lhb
(9)

File 62-116395

5

84 DEC 1 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

Former SA James Brooke Blake, Jr. - Employed as Director of Bank Security, Trust Company Bank, Atlanta, Georgia 30302, Business Telephone (404) 588-8216.

SA Neil P. Shanahan - Assigned Philadelphia Office.

For information, interview of former SAC Moore desired by SSC Staff as he was in charge of the Bureau Special "Camden Action" involving use of former informant Hardy (destruction of Selective Service records involved).

The SSC has emphasized desire of very expedite attention to its request relating to interviews of the above personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. All of the foregoing listed current and former employees be released from their confidentiality agreement for purposes of the interviews which are to be confined to their respective handling of the indicated former informants.

2. Upon approval of the above recommendation, and because of the expedite nature of this matter, the Legal Counsel Division will orally advise the SSC (Staff Member Bob Kelley is coordinating for SSC) of the current whereabouts of the above listed and that they have been released from their confidentiality agreement. The addresses as given are the latest available in their personnel files.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

3. Legal Counsel Division will coordinate with Kelley of the SSC the times and places for interviews of incumbent employees. Ph SAC Rosse advised re Kash by PVD 11/20/75
Ph ASAC Laster advised re Shanahan and Rynman 11/20/75 PVD

4. Because of the expedite nature of this matter, Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project has already telephoned the appropriate field offices to have them alert the former employees of possible contact of them by the SSC Staff and that, once so contacted, the former employees may call the Legal Counsel Division collect for further advice. This is in accordance with established procedures.

JAM

WRW

JBA
PLM

Telephonic instructions given 11/11/75 to have ex SA's alerted:
SAC Whittaker, OC — Byron McFall.
SAC Dunn, AT — James Blake
SAC Sullivan, Jackson — Roy Moore
Supv. Leroy Davis, CV — Barnett Kemp

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 7, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

As a follow-up to our briefing of Assistant Director Wannall on November 6 concerning our proposed format and witnesses for public hearings on December 4-5 on the FBI's use of intelligence informants and sources, we would like to make the following requests.

As discussed in our meeting with Mr. Wannall, we invite the Bureau to submit a memorandum on its intelligence informant and source program that could be inserted in the record of the testimony of Bureau representatives at the hearing. This memorandum would enable the Bureau to present to the Select Committee a complete description of its program and to discuss the issues of particular interest to the Committee members. These include, for example, 1) the size, scope and purpose of the program, including an assessment of the program's cost and effectiveness, and the distinctions and relationships between the intelligence informant program and the Bureau's criminal informant activity; 2) the criteria that determine when an informant may be used in an organization or group; and 3) the program's command and control system, including the limits that are placed on the activities of informants and the type of information an informant or source is permitted to report to his handling agent and the Bureau. In addition, the memorandum would discuss possible legislation in the informant area, such as the imposition of a warrant requirement or additional administrative review. To permit the Select Committee members to study this memorandum in advance of the hearing and to discuss it with FBI representatives during their testimony at the public hearing, we request that the memorandum be submitted by November 24.

1-Ad Hoc
11-10-75

Memo WOCregar to WRWannall
11/11/75 SJP:lhb

S. Phillips

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-1150

Also I am enclosing requests for documents relating to two of the three former FBI informants who are scheduled to testify on December 4. These requests supplement our document request of August 20, 1975 pertaining to informants (Part IV-4).

In addition, we wish to interview and possibly depose the Special Agents who handled the three former informants (Rowe, Hardy and Cook) who are scheduled to testify at the public hearing on December 4. Because of the limited time remaining before the scheduled hearings, we request that the Special Agents be made available for interviews and depositions as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

John Elliff

John Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc: Paul V. Daly
Office of Congressional Affairs
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DOCUMENT REQUEST

1. The following documents and materials relating to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., whether in the custody or possession of the FBI Birmingham, Alabama office or elsewhere:

   a) All documents and materials reflecting contacts and reports of contacts (and the substance thereof) between Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. and FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

   b) All documents and materials reflecting information supplied by Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. to FBI Special Agents (and Bureau Field or Headquarters summaries thereof) from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

   c) All documents and materials relating to any guidance, directions, instructions, or suggestions given to Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

   d) All documents and materials relating to Bureau and Field Office supervision of the handling of Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr. by FBI Special Agents from January 1, 1960 to April 1, 1965.

   e) All documents and materials relating to payments of money to, or other financial arrangements between, Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., the FBI, and the Justice Department - from March 25, 1965 to December 31, 1966.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1150

FBI

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2625
24 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee [on intelligence] as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

Jack E. Thomas
Jack E. Thomas
Major General, USAF (Ret.)
Chief, Coordination Staff/ICS

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP3 ALM/LEHC

Attachment

1 - ENCLOSURE

ST-110

REC-41 62-116395-1149

3 DEC 9 1975

62-116395

5-Ewf

84 DEC 11 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Aaron, David [1]	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
der, William [1]	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badg
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara	*	B 6/26	12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Betts, Richard K.	*	B 7/1	8-15-47	Pa.	016-38-2619	
Binkin, Martin	*	B 8/5	5-6-28	Mo.	498-20-5633	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
oomfield, Beth Susan	*	B 7/14(H, G, K)	12-23-51	Ohio	256-92-0341	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Bramble, Anne Harriet Owens	*	B 10/30	12-15-36	Md.	219-34-2005	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Brown, Maxine	*	B 6/26	8-8-28	Ida.	568-40-3123	

62-116395-1140

ENCLOSURE

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

All Footnotes at the end.

24 NOV 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Bushong, David	*	B 71/4	8-10-47	Ohio	289-40-1203	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
[illegible]esnick, Barbara	*	B 7/14	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
Culbreth, Elizabeth	*	B 7/2	6-23-42	NC	240-64-9040	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17(Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Davis, Spencer	*	B 10/1	5-3-10		575-10-3539	
Dawson, Thomas	*	B 6/26	9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeMarco, James	*	B 6/26	3-12-43	W. Va.	286-36-9097	
Dennin, Joseph Francis	*	B 6/23	6-9-43	NY	567-62-5353	
DeOreo, Mary	*	B 6/26	6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
DeTemple, Mary	*	B 7/29	6-16-25	Wisc.	394-20-5968	
[illegible]Genova, Joseph E.	*	B 6/26	2-22-45	Del.	222-28-5430	
Dick, James	*	B 6/26	7-25-47	Mass.	029-36-6745	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Donock, Mary Jane 2			9-12-23	W. Va.	235-22-9235	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel	*	B 7/14	8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor	*	B 6/26	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
Erno, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	

24 NOV 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Fiske, Marie Waite	*		1-21-40	Wisc.	395-34-5646	
Ford, Harold	*	B 6/26	3-23-21	Cal.	550-16-4630	
Fortman, Bernard Louis[3]			12-5-25	Md.	216-20-2565	
Fortman, Donald Thomas[3]			8-31-33	Md.	213-30-8943	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
[illegible]ant, Bruce	*	B 7/2	6-16-16	Neb.	507-20-1311	
Greissing, Edward	*	B 7/14	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Hanback, Sara Susan			2-4-46	W. Va.	215-46-3141	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Harris, Susan			3-30-49	Ky.	225-64-8706	
Harris, William R.[4]	already	Briefed	7-30-41		128-32-2350	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691	
Herbst, Deborah	*	B 10/1	2-18-50		227-74-5904	
Herrington, Arthur[5]	*	B 9/15	3-24-31	D. C.	304-28-8364	
Hodges, Paulette	*	B 7/29	4-17-43	Okla.	224-60-2495	
Horowitz, Anne	*		4-17-40	NY	147-46-1050	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	
Iverson, Portia	*	B 7/14	10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	
Jefferson, Arthur M.	*	B 6/26	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
[illegible]nson, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
Johnston, James	*	B 7/29	1-6-44	Kan.	495-46-9594	
Karalekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kayden, Jeffrey	*	B 7/14	3-22-51	NY	065-40-7277	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles[1]	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge
Kirchheimer, Joseph			6-3-17	Ill.	359-03-7843	
Koppal, Diane	*	B 6/26	6-24-48	NC	219-48-0018	

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Koscis, Susan	*	B 9/17	11-5-49	NY	051-42-2418	
Krauss, George Henry Jr.[3]			9-9-16	Colo.	385-01-1876	
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles[1]	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen	*	B 8/20	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James[1]	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mascioli, Cynthia	*	B 6/26	1-4-51	NY	112-44-7636	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mayo, Betty	*	B 6/26	2-13-22	Ohio	277-14-4062	
McCorkle, Daniel	*	B 8/20	6-25-55	Ohio	297-56-6722	
McIntyre, Dorothy			5-16-16	Canada	220-48-9104	
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	
Metsky, Ellen Jo	*		9-24-53	N. J.	127-30-3729	
Michel, Paul	*	B 8/14	2-3-41	Pa.	172-34-8584	
Miller, William G.[1]	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	

24 NO [illegible]

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
Murphy, Michael	*	B 7/1	10-13-54	Tex.	231-86-8829	
Nash, Dorothy			7-24-12	Wisc.	399-14-4589	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan	*	B 6/26	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Oster, Lynsey Lee			9-14-53	SD	501-68-8908	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.	*	B 6/26	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Piland, Susan			10-5-50	Cal.	557-86-6753	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Postal, Andrew	*	B 7/23	5-11-48	NY	128-40-4695	
Pyle, Christopher	*	B 6/26	11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Ralston, Theodore	*	B 7/23	8-25-48	Wash.	538-48-4673	
Rhea, Gordon	*	B 6/26	3-10-45	Va.	412-74-7901	
chard, Eric	*	B 7/10	12-27-49	NY	128-40-7430	
Ricks, Walter	*	B 6/26	12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwartz, Paula	*	B 11/4	9-18-53	D. C.	223-64-1880	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III[1]	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester	*	B 6/26	7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.	*	B 6/26	3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha	*	B 6/26	9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Tascione, Rosemary			6-23-45	NY	085-34-6648	
Theoharis, Athan George			8-3-36	Wisc.	395-32-1273	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert.			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
T[illegible]nalonis, Alexandra			6-1-48	Md.	200-38-8408	
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Turner, James	*	B 7/14	6-29-53	Cal.	215-64-7255	
Tschirgi, James 6	*	B 6/26	2-23-25	Wyo.	520-16-7290	
Vance, James	*	B 7/23	4-6-36	Ohio	078-28-3950	
Wallach, Paul	*	B 6/26	5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Name	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
White, William	*	B 7/10	8-8-39	Pa.	168-30-9147	
Wides, Burton. Victor [1]	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe	*	B 8/5	12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

Footnotes:

[1] Also briefed on Hx, Mat, Rh & Ke

[2] Detailed from Ward and Paul Reporters

[3] Detailed from General Printing Office

[4] Consultant to SSC, also associated with RAND Corp (has SI, TK BYC)

[5] Has SI, TK, B, G, C, H, R, A, E

[6] Also has A, G, E, K, H, C & R

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 11/26/75

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mrs. Metcalf
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 11/25/75, John T. Elliff, Task Force Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force for the Senate Select Committee, requested the Bureau designate a witness to appear in executive session before the Senate Select Committee on 12/3 or 12/4 in the afternoon to discuss counterintelligence investigations by the Bureau. Elliff stated because of Chairman Frank Church's interest in a study as to whether counterintelligence investigations should be taken out of the FBI and placed in another agency or a separate component of the Justice Department, this particular topic would be the main focal point of the hearing. Elliff stated that the questions asked of the Bureau's witness would deal primarily with the feasibility of removal of counterintelligence out of the FBI including problems of a logistical and practical nature resulting from such a change. Elliff asked that he be advised as to the identity of the Bureau witness as soon as possible.

Inasmuch as the aforementioned topic is a question of policy, the Director may desire to appear or designate a Bureau witness to appear before the Committee in this matter. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, is aware of the aforementioned testimony and the possibility exists that the Department may make a decision with regards to the Bureau's providing a witness concerning this matter.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ST-110

REC-41

62-116395-1148

RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER

PVD:lad
(9)

5 DEC 9 1975

84 DEC 12 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Director designate the Bureau's witness to appear before captioned Committee.

(2) That the Office of Congressional Affairs advise the Senate Select Committee of the Bureau's decision in this matter.

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 12/3/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Moore

FROM : Legal Counsel

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

John T. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director of the Senate Select Committee, advised at 9:15 a.m. on 12/3/75 that the following is a statement to be read by Senator Frank Church of that Committee on 12/3/75.

Attorney General Kennedy authorized wiretaps in 1962 on New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin and his secretary and that lasted for about one month. In addition to the wiretap on New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin in 1962, the Committee has received materials from the FBI reflecting authorization by Attorney General Kennedy of a wiretap on a reporter for Newsweek Magazine in 1961 during the investigation of another leak of classified information. Further materials reflected authorization by Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach for a wiretap on the editor of an anti-Communist newsletter in 1965, also during the investigation of a leak of classified information. The Committee has received materials from the FBI reflecting authorization by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy of wiretaps on at least six American citizens, including three Executive Branch officials, a Congressional Staff Member, and two registered lobbying agents for foreign interests. The materials also reflect that these wiretaps relate to an investigation of agents by foreign interests to influence United States economic policies.

Elliff was advised by SA Paul V. Daly of this Division that an impression would be created by the aforementioned statement that this Bureau may have conducted an electronic surveillance on Capitol Hill and that this, of course, was inaccurate. The electronic surveillance concerning the Congressional Staff Member was not located on Congressional property. Elliff agreed with this observation and indicated that he would check the material to insure the electronic surveillance in ~~question was~~ not on Congressional property and as agreed, make a change in the aforementioned statement.

3 DEC 9 1975

REC-41 62-116395-446

RECOMMENDATION:

ST-110

For information.

At 11 35 A today Elliff advised statement change in accordance with above suggestion noted FBI conducted No Electronic Surveillance on Capitol Hill

PVD:lad

84 DEC 12 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10239-10171
RECORD SERIES: MX
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 105-3702-464

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: TRENT, ROLAND E.
TO: LEG, MX
TITLE:

DATE: 03/13/1964
PAGES: 4
SUBJECT: LHO, POST-RP, ASSOC, BKG, LIAISON WITH MX AUTHORITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 12/17/1998
UPDATE DATE: 02/14/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Legat, Mexico (105-3702)

DATE: 3-13-64

(9803 RAD/gcl 10/4/93 JFK) 05 RmB/KSR 1-25-94 JFK

9-8-93

Classified by 9803 RDD/KSR
Declassify on: OADR

Re: JF-16

FROM : SA Roland E. Trent

SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
IS-R-Cuba

Re: [Allegation of PEDRO GUTIERREZ VALENCIA] ~~C~~(U)

On 3-13-64, MARGARITA MUNGUIA, Vasa Section, U.S. Embassy, Mexico, D.F., made available visa file data concerning ERNESTO MITRANI LEVY, holder of Cuban passport No. 26367, issued in December, 1959, with expiration date in 1964. ~~C~~(U)

Addresses for this individual were given as Miguel Aleman #259, Apartment #301, ~~XXXXXX~~ Colonia Roma, Mexico, D.F., and Calle Arellano Esquina "C", #269, Havana, Cuba. ~~C~~(U)

MITRANI's date of birth is shown as December 29, 1936, at Havana, Cuba, and he is further described as fair complexion, 5' 7"; 176 lbs.; Cuban national, no scars of marks, brown hair and green eyes. The visa file data also shows MITRANI to be of Turkish extraction. ~~C~~(U)

MITRANI secured a one entry B-2 visa on 1-27-61 valid through 4-27-61, for the alleged purpose of a pleasure trip to Los Angeles, California. ~~C~~(U)

The visa file card contains a photograph of ERNESTO MITRANI and this card indicated his employment as of January, 1961, as a merchant and manufacturer of plastics. ~~C~~(U)

The application made by MITRANI as the U.S. Embassy, Mexico, D.F. in January, 1961, was for a non-immigrant visa to visit the U.S. ~~C~~(U)

5/6/85
~~Classified by 3042 PNT/AHR~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

RET

~~CLASS. & EXT. BY SP3JFK/RH/AHR 7-5-79~~
~~REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2~~
~~DATE OF REVIEW 3-13-84~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE.

105-3702-464

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED *M* FILED *M*
MAR 17 1964
LEGAL ATTACHE - MEXICO

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED - JBH 9/29/93
(9803 RAD/gcl 10/4/93 JFK)

SECRET

— 1 —

9/8/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mlc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK)

SECRET

The following information is classified "SECRET" and not to be further disseminated without specific authority of the CIA, [Mexico City Station] ~~X~~ (~~S~~)

As of 7-6-61 one E. MITRANI was working in the Cuban Consulate, Mexico, D.F., [and had reportedly offered to cooperate with anti-Castro persons in Mexico, D.F] (S)

The E. MITRANI, mentioned above was subsequently identified as ERNESTO MITRANI. (~~S~~)(U)

ERNESTO MITRANI aka E. Mitrani, mentioned above, was subsequently identified as ERNESTO MITRANI LEVY, who in about December, 1959 was employed as an "Auxiliary Consular Clerk" in the Cuban Embassy, Mexico, D.F. [ERNESTO MITRANI LEVY had reportedly been helpful to anti-CASTRO forces in Mexico.] (~~S~~)

JOSE ANTONIO PORTUONDO

On October 24, 1960, MITRANI received a telegram recalling him to Havana, Cuba; however, he did not want to return to Cuba, and reportedly went to the then Ambassador PORTUONDO, and explained that he planned on marrying a Mexican girl; that his father had offered him employment in Mexico, and for these reasons he did not want to return to Cuba. PORTUONDO reportedly counseled XXXXXX MITRANI to write to the Cuban Foreign Office in Havana and explain his problem, which xx MITRANI reportedly did. At that time MITRANI was the holder of Cuban Diplomatic passport No. 480 and also held a regular passport. (~~S~~)(U)

MITRANI reportedly had arrived in Mexico on December 15, 1959; he was a bachelor at the time of his arrival, and his father was reportedly engaged in business in Mexico. His residence in about 1960 was given as residing at the corner of Avenida Insurgentes Sur and Viaducto Miguel Aleman, Mexico, D.F., telephone No. 11-96-11. The telephone and address data was as of 10-24-60 (~~S~~)(U)

insert

MITRANI was reportedly in contact with the USIA, U.S. Embassy, Mexico, D.F., in 1960 in regard to his desire to remain in Mexico, [and MITRANI was reportedly told that a visa toenter the U.S. would be arranged for him if he would publically denounce the Cuban regime] (S)

MITRANI reportedly never publically denounced the Cuban regime although CIA file data reflects that someone wrote to the Cuban Embassy in 1960 stating that MITRANI was a "spy" and cooperating with anti-CASTRO forces. (S)

MITRANI reportedly acting as a "cut-out" supplied one report to the CIA, Mexico City station x which was submitted on or about 8-13-62. (S)

The CIA, [Mexico, City Station] has no data on file concerning MITRANI since 8-13-62. (~~S~~)

Above CIA data secured from DAVID PHILLIPS. ~~X~~ (~~S~~)(U)

~~[illegible]~~

— 2 —

SECRET

Secret

1 MC File review concerning ERNESTO MITRANI revealed the following:

2 MC File 105-1713, Ser. 18, Pg. 3, and Ser. 19, (Bufile 105-89084) entitled "COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS, FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA" contains letterhead memorandum dated 10-24-60, which indicates that ERNESTO MITRANI LEVI was then an Assistant Consul, Cuban Embassy, Mexico, D.F. classied "SECRET" from
8 CIA, Mexico City Station. (S)

9 MC File 109-70, Ser. 850, (BUfile 109-12-210) enttiled "FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS -CUBA". Report of SA JOSEPH T. GENCO, 1-12-61, at Mexico, D.F., contains information from PSI FELIX VALDES (MC File 134-612AA that (FNU) MITRANI, an assistant in the Cuban Consulate, Mexico, D.F., was contemplating defecting and leaving his position. As of 1-5-61, according to the
15 PSI, MITRANI was reportedly still working at the Cuban Consulate. (U)

Secret.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

552 THRU 567

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

①

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓ W
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 8/1/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Personnel File - Fred J. Cassidy
1 - Personnel File - Richard W. Held
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Loch Johnson, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee, requested that SA Fred J. Cassidy be made available for an interview concerning his knowledge of the "Houston Plan." Johnson indicated that this would be a Staff interview. SA Cassidy is currently on annual leave and Johnson was advised of this. He requested that he be notified when Cassidy would be available for interview.

Staff Member Lester B. Seidel requested that Richard W. Held be made available for Staff interview. He indicated that this particular interview would be with regards to COINTELPRO against the Black Panther Party and the Bureau's investigation of the Black Panther Party. Seidel is currently conducting interviews on the West Coast and the details concerning the time of the interview have not been established.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

EX-101 REC-56 62-116395-567

(1) That SAs Held and Cassidy be released from existing employment agreement for purposes of this Senate Select Committee interview. Both in Intell Div

AUG 27 1975

5

Cassidy has
been interviewed

(2) That an Intelligence Division representative be made available to accompany SAs Cassidy and Held for consultation during interview when final details are arranged. (The Intelligence Division Agent will not be present during the interview but merely available for consultation.)

PVD:lad
(9)

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

8 AUG 28 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

AUG 20 1975

TO: John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 8/20

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Three Specific Requests from SSC as They Relate to Item 4 of the August 13, 1975, Letter from Elliff

Reference is made to a letter dated August 13, 1975, from John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee to me, a copy of which was sent to you earlier and attached to my memorandum dated August 15, 1975.

On August 20, 1975, Mike Epstein of the SSC staff orally requested delivery of three specific documents, access to which were embraced generally by Item 4 of the August 13, letter. These documents are:

(1) A June 7, 1961, memorandum from Courtney Evans to Bureau Agent Belmont
(2) A routing or "buck slip" dated June 3, 1961, from the Attorney General to Evans bearing the notation "pursue vigorously".
(3) A May 22, 1961, memorandum from Director Hoover to the Attorney General.

Delivered to SHAHEEN 8/21/75 By P. V. Daly EWF

EX-101

REC-56 62-116395-566

Please arrange for the delivery of these documents to me as soon as possible. Indeed, I should appreciate their receipt by this Office by tomorrow, August 21, 1975. If such information will permit you to expedite compliance with this priority request, Bureau Agent Cassidy knows of these documents and the SSC's special interest in them.

9 AUG 27 1975

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/CHC

File 62-116395
5-Eid

84 AUG 28 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TOP SECRET

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 8/18/75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. S. Mignosa
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff
1 - Mr. C. H. McCarthy

FROM : S. S. Mignosa SSM

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Reference is made to memorandum dated 7/24/75, captioned as above, which requested review, assessment and recommendations pertaining to the contents of pages extracted from a 693-page CIA document in order to fully identify the subject matter and to assess whether FBI operations were compromised.

Section CI-3 conducted the following review and makes the assessment pertinent thereto:

RE: Page 00026, "Siesta" and pages 00059-61, captioned "Subject: General: Office of Security Survey." (S)

This matter concerns Orlando Nunez-Toro (Bufile 105-141367), a United States citizen of Cuban extraction, who was suspected by CIA of attempting to recruit for intelligence purposes CIA personnel, one Miss Deborah Fitzgerald. By letter dated 8/4/70, the first communication to the FBI by CIA relating to Toro-Nunez and Fitzgerald, the FBI was requested to advise whether it interposed any objections to CIA investigative action CIA deemed necessary to explore questions raised by the association of Nunez-Toro and Fitzgerald with CIA employees. (S)

EX-101 REC-56 62-116395-565

In response to that inquiry, FBIHQ advised CIA by letter dated 8/14/70, that the FBI interposed no objection to CIA investigation for such a purpose. At the same time, CIA was specifically requested to provide the FBI with any information developed relating to FBI internal security responsibilities.

10/19/00, MDR 16

62-116395

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

9 AUG 27 1975

CHM:cla cla
(6)

TOP SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

Classified by 6098 CHM
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

5-TM

84 AUG 28 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

CIA communicated with FBIHQ by letters dated 7/6/71 and 2/24/72, concerning the Nunez-Toro and Deborah Fitzgerald matter, requesting each time records review of Bureau files of numerous individuals of interest to CIA. On each occasion CIA was provided with the results of such checks. However, by letter dated 3/2/72, FBIHQ responded to CIA letter dated 2/24/72, by stating, "We have made a study of our file concerning this matter (Nunez-Toro and Fitzgerald) and a detailed review of the referenced material. At the present time, it appears the paramount concern is whether Nunez and Deborah Jane Fitzgerald are obtaining intelligence information concerning your Agency, and you have established a network of sources to cover that aspect. As you indicate, there is no specific evidence that Nunez or Fitzgerald has any connection with a hostile intelligence service or a foreign government. We, therefore, will defer to your Agency until completion of your investigation or the development of information showing they are engaged in subversive activities within our primary jurisdiction." (S)

The FBI did not conduct an internal security-type investigation regarding the relationship of Nunez-Toro and Fitzgerald. The FBI did conduct an internal security-type investigation of Nunez-Toro in 1965 as a result of his reported disaffection for the United States while living abroad. [We reopened that investigation in 1969 when it was reported that Nunez-Toro communicated with the Cuban Embassy, Ottawa, Canada. That investigation was closed when it was established his family desired to return to Cuba and his contact was in that regard.] (S)

A review of FBIHQ files ~~contain~~ revealed no information that any FBI employee was knowledgeable, before or after the fact, of a surreptitious entry on the part of CIA personnel, into the premises of Nunez-Toro and Deborah Fitzgerald. That surreptitious entry by CIA personnel into the premises of Nunez-Toro and Fitzgerald located in Fairfax, Virginia, received considerable publicity recently, when it was alleged that Fairfax police assisted the CIA during the entry. (S)

ASSESSMENT:

No compromise of an on-going FBI operation.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

RE: Page 00026, "Paragon." (S)

[This matter pertains to an alleged plot in 1972-73 to assassinate former Vice President Spiro Agnew and the Director of CIA by using two Latin American revolutionaries. A CIA informant abroad reported that one Elizabeth Boynton Millard, a New York City resident known for her Communist associations and her involvement with Latin-American revolutionaries, was scheduled "to finger" top United States Officials for assassination. The plot was allegedly conceived some time prior to 8/19/72, in Chile and was to be carried out sometime between 10/25/72 through 11/7/72.] (S) The FBI investigated this plot thoroughly and closed its investigation on 2/2/73, when it was concluded that none of the individuals reportedly involved had any connection with such activity.

ASSESSMENT:

No compromise of an on-going FBI operation.

RE: Page 00282, "28 October 1970."

During October, 1970, United States Government officials, including Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, who was then assigned to The White House, received cryptograms indicating bombings would occur in various cities of the United States on 11/29/70. The Soviet Military Attache, Washington, D. C., received a similar cryptogram reporting United States - Chinese activities against Russia. The sender of the cryptograms was identified and during our investigation other government agencies, including CIA, were requested to furnish the original cryptograms for fingerprint examination.

ASSESSMENT:

No compromise.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

RE: Pages 00290, 00292, 00295, 00310.

The contents of these pages concern the Daniel Ellsberg matter, all of which is of a public nature.

ASSESSMENT:

No compromise.

RE: Pages 00334, 00361-363, 00368, 00371, 00373, 00376-379, 00384, 00385, 00468-470 and 00615.

The contents of these pages concern the "Chilean Project." On 4/16/71, CIA proposed technical penetration of the Chilean Embassy, Washington, D. C., to collect foreign intelligence data and to compromise classified encrypted diplomatic traffic. CIA proposed that access be made through one of their covert contacts. The FBI declined. The Attorney General then requested FBI cooperation. On 5/13/71, a memorandum was sent to the Department of State for approval of that operation and such approval was obtained on 5/17/71. On 7/14/71, the Attorney General authorized activation of the microphone installation at the Chilean Embassy until 10/8/71. CIA requested continuation as the expiration date approached and on 10/15/71, the Attorney General authorized such continuation. The technical surveillance was discontinued as noted in memorandum to the Attorney General and CIA dated 2/7/72. The surveillance was reactivated on 12/27/72, and was eventually discontinued on 2/22/73. (S)

On 6/19/73, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force requested FBI investigation of the alleged burglary of the Chilean Embassy, Washington, D. C., on or about 5/13/72. The Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C., conducted an investigation of that incident and submitted a complete report to the Office of the United States Attorney. That report was in the possession of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force and on 10/30/73, that Force advised the FBI that no additional investigation was desired. There is no connection between the "Chilean Project" and the alleged burglary of the Chilean Embassy on or about 5/13/72. (S)

CONTINUED - OVER

ASSESSMENT:

[The above information refers to our special coverage of the Chilean Embassy which was discontinued in February, 1973, and has not been operational since that time.] Possession of such information by the Senate Committee will not interfere with any on-going FBI investigation. All activities engaged in by the FBI in connection with this project were conducted on the instruction of Attorney General Mitchell. (S)

RE: Page 00361, captioned "Memorandum for: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee.

In addition to the "Chilean Project," the contents of this page also refer to FBI technical coverage of diplomatic establishments of Israel. It is pointed out that Watergate Defendant James McCord telephoned the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C., after his arrest, believing that his conversation would be overheard and he would be able to challenge tainted evidence. The date of his telephone call to the Embassy of Israel is not known but it is pointed out that our technical coverage of the Embassy of Israel was discontinued on 10/16/72, at the specific request of Secretary of State William Rogers. This matter is also public knowledge.

ASSESSMENT:

No compromise of FBI operations.

RE: Pages 00457 and 00458, concerning Item Number 3.

According to CIA, this matter involved surreptitious entries by CIA into a French diplomatic establishment, Washington, D. C., during the early 1960's. As is evident from reading Item number 3, there is no FBI involvement in or knowledge of such activities by CIA. (S)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

It is pointed out that Philippe Thyraud De Vosjoli (Bufile 64-33606) a former attache of the French Embassy, Washington, D. C., and a former French Intelligence officer, cooperated with CIA and provided CIA with information in 1963 that French intelligence planned to engage in intelligence activities in the United States. This information was thereafter transmitted to the FBI. It is believed that De Vosjoli is identical with either Iden-122 or Iden-124 mentioned in Item number 3. (S)

ASSESSMENT:

There is no compromise of an on-going FBI operation.

RE: Pages 00591-00593, captioned ["MHCHAOS Program."] (S)

This CIA program involved the clandestine collection abroad of information relating to foreign efforts to support and influence domestic United States extremism. The foreign-oriented activity in the United States was of two types; first, selected FBI informants who traveled abroad in connection with their extremist activity and their resultant debriefing by CIA with the cooperation of the FBI. Second, FBI sources with existing extremist credentials who were offered to CIA for dispatching abroad to collect information responsive to CIA requirements. (S)

There has been no compromise of such FBI informants and sources.

ASSESSMENT:

No compromise of any on-going FBI operation.

ACTION:

For information and referral to Senstudy Group.

CNM TJM

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FBI

AUG 21 1975

TO: John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 8/20.

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter dated August 19, 1975, from the Senate Select Committee requesting the names and addresses of various former and present Agents of the Bureau. Please arrange for compliance with this request as soon as possible.

The Department has determined that SSC staff interviews with these present and former agents would not interfere with any current criminal investigation by the Department and will so advise the Select Committee when the requested information is transmitted.

REC-56

EX-101

62-116395-564

9 AUG 27 1975

ENCLOSURE

MDR-14

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

Treat as Original

cc Ad Hoc

62-116395

5-8

84 AUG 28 1975

AUG 21 1975

TO: John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter dated August 19, 1975, from the Senate Select Committee requesting the names and addresses of various former and present Agents of the Bureau. Please arrange for compliance with this request as soon as possible.

The Department has determined that SSC staff interviews with these present and former agents would not interfere with any current criminal investigation by the Department and will so advise the Select Committee when the requested information is transmitted.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 19, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Dear Mike:

The Select Committee, as you know, is investigating the FBI's relationship to mail opening activities. The Committee staff desires to interview all present or former Special Agents of the FBI who were responsible for supervising the communications between the FBI and the CIA with regard to this activity. Therefore, I am hereby requesting the names and present assignment and/or whereabouts of these Special Agents. Furthermore, please provide the current addresses and office assignments of all Special Agents with the surname "McDougal" who were assigned to the New York City area in 1971, and the names and current addresses of all SACs and ASACs for years 1959 to 1966 in the following field offices: New York, Boston, Washington, Detroit, Seattle, Los Angeles, Miami, and San Francisco.

In addition, please advise me as to whether Committee staff interviews of these Special Agents would interfere with the current criminal investigation into these matters by the Justice Department. This request is pursuant to the special procedure to which we have agreed.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
AUG 19 1975

62-116395-564

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A D -Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 21 1975
TELETYPE

NR010 AT CODE

9:45 PM URGENT AUGUST 21, 1975 SSP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL TO ATLANTA, AUGUST 14, 1975, AND ATLANTA TEL TO BUREAU, AUGUST 15, 1975.

FORMER SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, MARIETTA, GEORGIA, ADVISED THIS DATE HE HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY PAUL WALLACH, SSC STAFF MEMBER, WHO HAS ARRANGED AN INTERVIEW WITH GAMBER IN THE ATLANTA AREA AT TEN A.M., SEPTEMBER 2, 1975. SA GAMBER INTENDS TO CONTACT THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL BY COLLECT CALL AUGUST 22, 1975.

E N D

SJP FBIHQ CLR

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2ALM/EHU

Edw F. Gamber

62-116395-563

EX-101
REC-56

9 AUG 27 1975

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

84 AUG 29 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO :J. B. Adams

DATE:7/29/75

1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

FROM :Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/EH

See me pls.
1) attitude
2) Congress action
K

On 7/25/75 at the request of Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordinator Michael Shaheen in the Department, a meeting was held between representatives of the FBI (SAs Paul V. Daly and John Thomas), representatives of the Senate Select Committee (John T. Elliff, Task Force head of the Domestic Task Force, Mark Gitenstein) and Michael Shaheen of the Department. At this meeting Mr. Shaheen advised that the proposed procedures concerning the handlings of requests for documents by the Senate Select Committee had been approved by the Attorney General and in the Senate Select Committee. (A copy is attached.)

Shaheen and Elliff indicated the purpose in meeting on the 25th along with an anticipated meeting on Monday, 7/28/75, was to assist the SSC in the planning of a superseding request in accordance with the newly established procedures concerning document requests. Both Shaheen and Elliff expressed concern at this time that the schedules set forth in the new agreement was such that in many instances the Bureau would not be able to respond in time to meet the deadlines. Additionally, Shaheen expressed concern that the provisions require that the Attorney General adjudicate any question as to the necessity of furnishing a document to the Committee and to make such a decision within 24 hours would be very burdensome.

Messrs. Elliff and Shaheen were advised by SA Daly that this would be true, pointing out that in many instances files are not readily available because of FOIA requests, needs of the Bureau's ongoing investigations and law suits in which it was necessary to view particular files. It was also pointed out that many of the requests of the Senate Select Committee necessitate the review of a number of files and/or numerous volumes of a particular file all of which are not necessarily available immediately. Mr. Shaheen advised that it was the Attorney General's desire that Senate Select Committee requests take precedence over all other matters including the Freedom of Information. It was pointed out to Mr. Shaheen that our responses to Freedom of Information Act are under deadline by law and; if

Enclosure

ST 110 REC-41 62-116395-562

CONTINUED - OVER

25 1975

PVD:lad
(8)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

this were to be the Attorney General's feelings, he should advise this Bureau in writing so that we would be in a position to use this statement of policy should this question arise during litigation. It was pointed out that in many areas of possible abuse set forth by the Senate Select Committee we have pending FOIA requests and/or litigation which require the availability of those files for responses.

Elliff indicated that it was the Committee's desire in their forthcoming superseding request to request material that had been previously furnished the Committee with the understanding that there would be less excisions made in compliance with the new agreement. He inquired as to whether the Bureau could advise him as to what material previously furnished was readily retrievable and could be furnished in accordance with a new request. He was advised by SAs Daly and Thomas that it was not possible at this time to give him a response, however, we would endeavor to make an analysis of prior requests to obtain this information and have it available for the meeting Monday, 7/28/75.

A general discussion was had concerning the new agreement especially concerning the type of material which might properly be excised and third agency problems. It was generally agreed upon that not only the identity of informants be excised but also information which might disclose the identity of informants might also be properly excised. Elliff indicated that the Committee did not wish to see many items referred to the Attorney General as is called for by the agreement for his decision and would rather at least on a preliminary basis where it was a question of the propriety of the excision that the discussion be held with ~~he~~ him or one of his representatives before such a referral was made. Shaheen also indicated a desire that the referrals to the Attorney General be kept to a minimum. Regarding the "Third Agency" problems which are not addressed in the agreement there was no final decision arrived at. Elliff and Shaheen were under the impression that the clauses referring to foreign intelligence operations or foreign intelligence sources would handle this problem. They were advised that this was not the case. This was not true since even in these instances Senators on the Committee are given access after the Attorney General has made a determination that material involved "pecularily sensitive foreign intelligence sources or pecularily sensitive ongoing foreign

CONTINUED - OVER

intelligence operations." It was pointed out that this would require that many documents be referred to the Attorney General for his determination which would be contrary to Messrs. Elliff's and Shaheen's desires.

The meeting was held 7/28/75, Messrs. Gitenstein and Elliff of the Committee, Michael Shaheen and Steven K. Blackhurst of the Department, and SAs Paul V. Daly, Seymor Phillips and Elmer Larson were in attendance. Regarding the "Third Agency" rule problem, we advised the Department and the Committee that we would continue to abide by this rule. The Committee presented a request dated July 28, 1975, captioned "Superseding Request for FBI Materials." This document amounted to a recapitulation of prior requests made by the Committee with a schedule for delivery set forth in accordance with the established guidelines for the production of documents. An item-by-item analysis of the request contained in the document was had and where necessary modifications concerning scheduled responses was made. It was obvious the intent of the Committee in making the superseding request was to have more documents made available in the Committee offices and also to have less excisions made on documents previously furnished the Committee based on prior requests. We were requested by Shaheen to prepare as soon as possible correspondence to the Attorney General setting forth instances where the deadlines set by the Committee could not be made. This prompted the provisions in the guidelines for the production of documents which require the Attorney General to notify the Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman within 24 hours of any expected delay beyond 96 hours of the request.

RECOMMENDATION:

Action. For information.

Request being handled separately -

JBA/R.J

Pen

wRW

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader* will submit periodically a list of materials, pertaining to the inquiry being conducted under S.R. 21, to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. Any questions as to the scope, specificity, or meaning of any portion of such list shall be identified by the Special Counsel and discussed at the time of acceptance of the list, between the DTFL and the Special Counsel.

The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within ~~48~~ 96 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of ~~the~~ each request, of any delay beyond ~~48~~ 96 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

---

* Wherever used herein, the term Domestic Task Force Leader (DTFL) is understood to include the Staff Director, Chief Counsel and the Minority Counsel of the Senate Select Committee.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-562

These procedures shall apply to all matters covered by paragraph 1. In the event of a specific problem arising with the applicability of these procedures to any matters in current litigation or any matters in which criminal prosecution is pending, or any matter which the Attorney General shall specifically designate as extraordinarily sensitive, a special procedure shall be undertaken.* Such specific problem areas shall be identified by the Attorney General to the Chairman and Vice Chairman by letter upon consideration of the lists submitted pursuant to this provision. The special procedure to be followed shall be proposed, defined, adopted, and followed after consideration by the SSC of the specific problem area and pertinent inquiry and discussion at the staff level.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader requests access to materials, rather than delivery to the SSC.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources or peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operations.

---

* No restriction of currently operational arrangements is intended under this provision.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the identities of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identities to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(d) As to other information which would identify persons, as sources, who have provided or continue to provide information to the FBI, and as to whose identity the FBI has undertaken an obligation of confidentiality, the Committee and its staff shall preserve the confidentiality and shall make no use* which would impair the confidentiality of this class of information to which access has been given, unless the identity of the individual as a source has already been made known to the Committee, or unless such information appears in materials which have been screened by the FBI as provided in paragraph 6 below.

---

* Examples of prohibited use are:

(1) interviews of the source, as source

(2) interviews or inquiries that would disclose the fact that the identity of a confidential source was made known to the staff.

(3) public disclosure.

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources ~~and~~/or sensitive ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials in issue will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of material screened by the FBI, as provided in (6) above, without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only if such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171, during normal FBI business hours; upon reasonable notice, special arrangements may be made for access at other times.

(9) These procedures are adopted subject to satisfactory experience in implementation. If after a fair trial the procedures herein do not operate suitably in the view of either the SSC or the Attorney General, the procedures may be unilaterally set aside by either the SSC or the Attorney General and other appropriate and suitable methods of procedure undertaken.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Walsh
DATE: July 24, 1975

FROM : S. R. Burns SRB

Sen Study 75

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REVIEW OF PORTIONS OF BUREAU MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/ETC

Intelligence Division has requested the Administrative Division to review Sections 10 and 12 (copies attached) of the Manual of Rules and Regulations for any possible excisions or problems in furnishing this material to the committee and to furnish the results of the review to Legal Counsel, attention Dennis R. Dickson.

Section 10, pertaining to Appeals and Grievances, and Section 12, Transfers-Resignations, have been reviewed and no problems can be foreseen and no excisions are necessary. In this regard, it is noted that Part I, Section 10, Appeals and Grievances, needs to be revised to set forth the current appeal rights of nonveterans. Attached is memorandum recommending a Manual revision be approved pointing out that under current procedure, final action in disciplinary matters involving cases of nonveterans up to and including dismissal is taken by the Assistant Director, Administrative Division, with the employee having the right to appeal this action to the Director.

There was some question under Section 12 dealing with transfers to foreign assignments wherein it is set out that Chief Clerks should be afforded training in maintenance, consolidation, and destruction of files, whether this information should be furnished. This was discussed with Deputy Assistant Director, Homer R. Hauer, Files and Communications Division, who advised there is nothing objectionable to this reference regarding destruction of files and the reference of same need not be excised.

Under Section 12, dealing with foreign assignments, information is set out regarding people being transferred to such assignments receiving training on coding equipment, the AFSAM-7. This was questioned as to whether it should be excised. Alvin C. Frank, Section Chief, Communications Section, advised this information need not be excised as the mere reference to AFSAM coding equipment is not objectionable.

REC 52 · 62-116395-561

ST 110

4-

3 - Legal Counsel (Attention: Mr. Hampton)
TEA:mba/tmc (5)
1 - Intelligence Division

AUG 6 1975

(OVER)

AUG 28 1975

F203

3-

It should also be noted that certain Manual changes are being recommended in connection with Section 12, in relation to absences for maternity purposes. In Section 12, page 10, we are recommending that the phrase "absence for maternity reasons" be used in all instances where we have previously used the phrase "maternity leave." These recommended revisions have already been approved and are being processed. In Section 12, page 8, we are recommending a revision indicating that employees resigning for maternity purposes can utilize accrued sick leave during their period of incapacitation and are not setting out specific time elements as previously utilized. Memorandum is attached recommending this change.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be furnished to Intelligence Division, with three copies to Legal Counsel Division, setting forth that the Administrative Division has no objection to the material set out in Sections 10 and 12, including proposed revisions, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations being referred for review.

aw ✓

WOC
TJM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Walsh

DATE: July 22, 1975

FROM : S. R. Burns SRB

SUBJECT: NONVETERAN APPEAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT TO MANUAL OF RULES
AND REGULATIONS

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

The purpose of this memorandum is to update Part I, Section 10, Appeals and Grievances, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations to set forth the current appeal rights of nonveterans.

Attached is the proposed change pointing out that final action in disciplinary matters involving cases of nonveterans up to and including dismissal is taken by the Assistant Director, Administrative Division. The nonveteran employee may appeal the action taken by the Assistant Director, Administrative Division, to the Director.

It is recommended that one copy of the attached be referred to the Intelligence Division and three copies to Legal Counsel Division for inclusion in Section 10 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations as this material is being referred to the Senate Select Committee for review along with other sections of the Manual. The Committee can be advised that the Manuals are constantly being updated and the attached change is currently effective and will appear in the next revision of the Manual.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached Manual revision be approved and made effective immediately and that the copies, attached, be disseminated to Intelligence Division and Legal Counsel Division in view of material being furnished to the Senate Select Committee.

Enc.

1 - Intelligence Division
1 - Legal Counsel
(4)

62-116395-

July 23, 1975

PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Part I, Section 10, Appeals and Grievances

G. NONVETERANS' APPEAL RIGHTS

Recommendations for administrative action following inquiry by a field office, headquarters division, and possibly including the FBI Inspection Division staff, where serious charges may result, are forwarded to the Personnel Section of the Administrative Division. The matter is reviewed and a decision recommended. The Assistant Director of the Administrative Division, following his review of the matter, determines what final action is to be taken up to and including dismissal. The employee may appeal this final action to the Director.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Walsh

DATE: July 23, 1975

FROM : S. Ray Burns

SUBJECT: PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

R. G. Hunsinger memorandum to Mr. Walsh dated April 3, 1975 authorized changes in "Maternity Leave Policy."

Proposed changes in the Manual of Rules and Regulations were handled under the date of May 23, 1975, concerning changes in Maternity Leave Policy, in addition to previous changes there is attached a revision for your approval.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached be sent and forwarded to the Training Division for handling.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Enclosure
HS:ced
(3)

1 - Mr. Woodworth

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-561

July 23, 1975

PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF RULES AND REGUALTIONS

Part I, Section 12, Page 8, 4b(2) should read as follows:

(2) Employees resigning for maternity purposes Generally, an employee resigning for maternity purposes is paid for accrued sick leave for period of incapacitation and resignation will become effective upon expiration of accrued sick leave. Note: In order for employee to be paid for sick leave..................

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Walsh

DATE: July 22, 1975

FROM : S. R. Burns

SUBJECT: NONVETERAN APPEAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT TO MANUAL OF RULES
AND REGULATIONS

The purpose of this memorandum is to update Part I, Section 10, Appeals and Grievances, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations to set forth the current appeal rights of nonveterans.

Attached is the proposed change pointing out that final action in disciplinary matters involving cases of nonveterans up to and including dismissal is taken by the Assistant Director, Administrative Division. The nonveteran employee may appeal the action taken by the Assistant Director, Administrative Division, to the Director.

It is recommended that one copy of the attached be referred to the Intelligence Division and three copies to Legal Counsel Division for inclusion in Section 10 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations as this material is being referred to the Senate Select Committee for review along with other sections of the Manual. The Committee can be advised that the Manuals are constantly being updated and the attached change is currently effective and will appear in the next revision of the Manual.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached Manual revision be approved and made effective immediately and that the copies, attached, be disseminated to Intelligence Division and Legal Counsel Division in view of material being furnished to the Senate Select Committee.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2[redacted]/EHL

Enc.

1 - Intelligence Division
1 - Legal Counsel
TEA:mba/liv (4)

July 23, 1975

PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Part I, Section 10, Appeals and Grievances

G. NONVETERANS' APPEAL RIGHTS

Recommendations for administrative action following inquiry by a field office, headquarters division, and possibly including the FBI Inspection Division staff, where serious charges may result, are forwarded to the Personnel Section of the Administrative Division. The matter is reviewed and a decision recommended. The Assistant Director of the Administrative Division, following his review of the matter, determines what final action is to be taken up to and including dismissal. The employee may appeal this final action to the Director.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Walsh DATE: July 23, 1975

FROM : S. Ray Burns

SUBJECT: PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

R. G. Hunsinger memorandum to Mr. Walsh dated April 3, 1975 authorized changes in "Maternity Leave Policy."

Proposed changes in the Manual of Rules and Regulations were handled under the date of May 23, 1975, concerning changes in Maternity Leave Policy, in addition to previous changes there is attached a revision for your approval.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached be sent and forwarded to the Training Division for handling.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 [illegible]/EHL

Enclosure

HS:ced
(3)

1 - Mr. Woodworth

July 23, 1975

PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF RULES AND REGUALTIONS

Part I, Section 12, Page 8, 4b(2) should read as follows:

(2) Employees resigning for maternity purposes Generally, an employee resigning for maternity purposes is paid for accrued sick leave for period of incapacitation and resignation will become effective upon expiration of accrued sick leave. Note: In order for employee to be paid for sick leave..................

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

NR002 SE CODE

4:21 PM NITEL 8/18/75 SLA

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG [illegible] 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SEATTLE (134-1177)

JEFFREY PAUL DESMOND, AKA, INFORMATION CONCERNING. OO: SEATTLE.

RE SEATTLE AIRTEL TO BUREAU, JANUARY 21, 1972, AND SEATTLE NITEL TO BUREAU, JULY 8, 1975, CAPTIONED "SENSTUDY 1975".

FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, DAILY SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, NEWSPAPER, ON INSTANT DATE CARRIED AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "BOMB-CASE FIGURE 'ASSASSINATED' HERE". THIS ARTICLE QUOTED SEATTLE POLICE CHIEF ROBERT HANSON AS SAYING THAT SUBJECT WAS FOUND DEAD IN HIS APARTMENT WITH A SINGLE BULLET WOUND IN HIS CHEST, AND THIS HAD AN APPEARANCE OF BEING A FLAT OUT ASSASSINATION.

THE SAME ARTICLE STATED THAT DESMOND IN PAST HAD CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN RECRUITED BY THE FBI TO HELP THEM APPREHEND BOMBERS AND THE FBI DENIED DESMOND'S STATEMENT.

SEATTLE HAS AGAIN ANSWERED PRESS QUERIES WITH THE SAME DENIAL THAT DESMOND EVER WORKED AS AN INFORMANT FOR THE FBI.

COPY OF ARTICLE BEING SENT TO BUREAU UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

END

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-114657

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/28/81 BY SP-1-CSK/UP

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 AUG 1975

Records
Pls place
cc into
62-116395

5-WNP

84 AUG 28 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 8/7/75

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243) (P)

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF SA WALLACE E. WARD BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Re Bureau teletype to Los Angeles dated 7/31/75, captioned SENSTUDY 75.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and seven copies of a letterhead memorandum concerning the above interview.

Do Not Diss

This LHM superseded by LHM 8/15/75 per instructions SAC Rampton, [illegible] Wannall 8/15/75

REC-56

-560

EX-104

ENCLOSURE

12 AUG 14 1975

62-116395-4063

2 - Bureau (Enc. 8)
2 - Los Angeles 5-Destroyed

MDR-16

wew/pml/jer
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/17/00 BY SP9 ALM/EHL

FIVE

84 AUG 26 1975

Approved: RMB Special Agent in Charge

Sent ____________ M Per ____________

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1975

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF SA WALLACE E. WARD BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 5, 1975, Special Agent (SA) Wallace E. Ward was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel at Los Angeles Headquarters regarding Cointelpro/Black Panther Party. The interview lasted from 9:12 a.m., to 9:22 a.m.

Seidel asked how long SA Ward has been a Special Agent with the FBI, and SA Ward responded nine years. He further requested previous offices SA Ward had been assigned to, and SA Ward responded Cincinnati, Ohio. Seidel advised the Bureau informed him that SA Ward had been assigned Cointelpro/Black Panther Party in June, 1969. Seidel requested to know what work SA Ward had been assigned before this, to which SA Ward responded he could not remember, but believed general criminal work.

Seidel requested to know what specific instructions were issued with regard to operating Cointelpro/Black Panther Party. SA Ward advised that due to his employment agreement, the sensitive nature of the Bureau work, and the possible overlap of Bureau investigation, he did not feel he could respond to any further questions. The official interview was terminated at this point.

SA Ward was advised by Mr. Seidel that the interview was voluntary but SA Ward was not advised of his rights in this matter.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Do Not Dis

1*

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2ALM/EHU

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-560

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 8/18/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY 3P2

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

WRW

At the request of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), we recently furnished to it superseded material dated back to 1960 and relating to various sections of the Manual of Instructions, including Section 87. In furnishing this material, we did not furnish the various cover sheets relating to the many revisions since 1960.

We have received a telephonic request from Miss Martha Talley of the SSC Staff for additional information which would help her to better understand the various revisions to Section 87. She also specifically desired a copy of page 1 of that Section as it existed on 1/1/60.

We have secured the various cover sheets for the many revisions, as well as a copy of page 1 which bears the revision date of 8/13/56 and which, according to Mrs. Alene T. Smith of the Training Division, was the page 1 in force as of 1/1/60.

In order to comply with the request of Miss Talley, it is not believed necessary to obtain from the SSC a formal, written request; neither is it believed necessary to transmit the requested material by formal correspondence to the SSC through the Attorney General.

EX 104 REC-56 62-116395-559

ACTION: Attached to Supervisor P. V. Daly's copy of this memorandum is the material which it is requested he furnish to Miss Talley. Attached to this memorandum is a file copy of the page 1 alluded to above. Mrs. Smith has available in the Training Division duplicate copies of the cover sheets referred to above.

ENCLOSURE

AUG 25 1975

Enclosure

62-116395

SFP:lhb lhb (7)

84 AUG 26 1975

a. STATUTES
Title 18, USC, §§ 953, 2383-2385, 2387-2390, (formerly §§ 4-11, 13, Title 18, and §§ 33-35, 37, Title 50, USC), effective 9-1-48. Violations occurring
[prior to 9-1-48 should be considered under former code sections.
[[Sections 2384 and 2385 were amended 7-24-56 to increase maximum penalties
[(Public Law 766).

[§ 2384. Seditious conspiracy - (A representative trial under this section
[involved 28 members of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. The trials
[were held in September 1954 and February 1955 in the U. S. District Court,
[Southern District of New York, and resulted in 27 convictions. Sentences
[imposed ranged from 1½ years to six years.)

["If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject
[to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down,
[or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy
[war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force
[to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States,
[or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States
[contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more
[than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."]

§ 2385. Advocating overthrow of Government - Smith Act of 1940
(Prosecutions under the Smith Act have been primarily instituted against a number of Communist Party functionaries for conspiracy to violate the provision of Title 18, USC, section 2385, set out below under the elements as 1a, but there have been several individual functionaries indicted, tried and convicted under provision 1c, (4) and (5) below, which is commonly known as the "Membership Provision" of the Smith Act of 1940.)

"Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District, or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government; or
"Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or
"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof—
["Shall be fined not more than[$20,000]or imprisoned not more than[twenty] years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction."

[["If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section,
[each shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
[years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States
[or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his
[conviction."]

1. Elements of section 2385
   There are three possible violations involved in section 2385.
   a. Advocated, abetted, advised, or taught
      (1) The person, knowingly or willfully
      (2) Advocated, abetted, advised, or taught the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the U.S., or the government of any state, territory, district or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM

62-116395-559

ENCLOSURE
8-13-56

CODE TELETYPE 2 - Mr. J. A. ~~Mintz~~ NITEL

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
AUGUST 20, 1975
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

TO SAC BALTIMORE

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975, FURNISHING BACKGROUND CONCERNING SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND BUREAU'S DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH IT; AND BUTEL MAY 28, 1975, CONCERNING CERTAIN FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES WHO IT WAS BELIEVED MIGHT BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF.

A RECENT REQUEST OF THE SSC INDICATES IT MAY INTERVIEW FORMER SPECIAL AGENTS GEORGE A. BERLEY, 4116 DUNNEL LANE, KENSINGTON, MARYLAND 20795, AND JOSEPH M. ENGLISH, 18 EASTMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND 20901. SUBJECT MATTER OF INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN.

IMMEDIATELY HAVE BERLEY AND ENGLISH CONTACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPE MAY 28. SUTEL IN ABOVE CAPTION RESULTS OF CONTACTS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC
MDR-16

EX 104 REC-56 62-116395-557

1 - 67-245562 (Personnel file Former SA George A. Berley)

1 - 67-295922 (Personnel file Former SA Joseph M. English)

SFP:dmt
(9)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 20 1975
TELETYPE

AUG 22 1975

NOTE:
The alerting of these retired Special Agents ~~is in~~ in accordance with procedures we have been following. All information necessary to the Baltimore Office for the contacts was incorporated in the referenced 5/28/75 teletype.

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Secly

84 AUG 26 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO : 1975 O - 569

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]NN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

FBI

August 20, 1975

MDR-16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/DHL

Senstudy - '75

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is an additional request for FBI materials in seven parts, requested for delivery or access by August 26, 1975 (Part I), August 29, 1975 (Parts II and III), September 4, 1975 (Parts IV and V), and under Special Procedures (Parts VI and VII).

Please note that a few items are given earlier deadlines than we discussed yesterday. These include Part II, items 5 and 6, and Part IV, item 7. Please let me know if alternate deadlines should be set for these materials.

I also hope you will expedite the requests made in my letters to you yesterday, especially the request for names of agents in connection with mail openings. This latter request should be considered a request for delivery by August 25, 1975, although I hope we can have it by the end of the week.

REC-56 62-116395-556

Thanks for your cooperation in this matter.

EX-104

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ENCLOSURE

9 AUG 22 1975

RECEIVED
AUG 20 1975

Treat as Original
62-116395

5-P

84 AUG 26 1975

August 20, 1975

REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

Part I -- requested for delivery by August 26, 1975

1. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and implementation of SAC letter 70-48 dated September 15, 1970, which authorized development of Security Informants between the ages of 18 and 21.

2. Materials pertaining to a two-day conference held at FBI headquarters on September 17-18, 1970, with racial supervisors from 39 field offices plus two legal attaches, including the initiation of the conference, the subjects discussed, and any advice or instructions to the field related thereto.

3. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and implementation of decision in 1970 to grant approvals for Special Agents in Charge on their own initiative to authorize use of concealed recording devices by a Special Agent or proven source in covering public appearances by black and New Left extremists except where such appearances are at educational institutions.

4. Materials pertaining to the Attorney General's testimony on February 27, 1975, regarding "types of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past." (This material was previously made available for review per III. D. of your letter of August 1, 1975. Delivery is now requested.)

5. All SAC letters and SAC memoranda previously made available for access by SSC staff at FBIHQ. (Cf., Part IV, item 3.)

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

62-116395-556

ENCLOSURE

6. Materials pertaining to the furnishing of information to the White House in February 1970 and March 1970 regarding the role of Klan organizations in mailing letters to the President protesting school desegregation.

7. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and periodic review of the preparation and dissemination by the Research Section of the Intelligence Division of the following:

   a. CINAL, a periodic intelligence letter summarizing significant items of interest in the security field;

   b. "The Extremist Speaks", a monthly compilation which shows the extremist views of right, left, and racially oriented groups and individuals;

   c. "Special Report, Nationwide Civil Disturbances", an extensive brief prepared at the request of Vice President Agnew;

   d. "Stop the Bombing Campaign: A Communist Cause", a study prepared at the request of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board;

   e. A secret paper for the U. S. Intelligence Board analyzing "Racism, Radicalism, and Nationalism in the Caribbean";

   f. "FBI Summary of Extremist Acitivities", a weekly summary of racial extremist activities.

8. Materials pertaining to the origins, contents, and maintenance of additions to, and periodic review of, the National Security File maintained by the FBI laboratory.

9. All materials pertaining to Project HUNTER, including, but not limited to, all memoranda discussing the origins, approval, implementation, and periodic review of the requests by the FBI for the opening of mail by the CIA in connection with this project and any other CIA mail intercept activity; and all materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and implementation of the requests by the FBI for CIA mail intercepts directed at the

following: SNCC, Institute for Policy Studies, Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, and Jeremy Stone.

10. Copies of the 90-day status letters on COINTELPRO activities submitted by the Chicago FBI field office to the Bureau.

11. Last known address of former FBI clerical employee Katherine Osborn Jensen.

12. Present office of assignment or last known address of the following present or former Special Agents:

    a. John Kleinkauf;

    b. William Forsythe;

    c. James Bland;

    d. Paul Cox;

    e. Theodore P. Rosack;

    f. Robert Denz;

    g. Fred Fox.

Part II -- requested for access by August 29, 1975

1. Materials pertaining to the dispatch of an FBI informant to attend the World Conference on Vietnam in Stockholm, Sweden, in November 1970, and the dispatch of this informant to any other such conference(s) abroad.

2. All materials included in the "Brief for Director's Use in Connection with Attorney General's Staff Conference" for the year 1970 and any other years for which such briefs were prepared.

3. Materials pertaining to the origins in 1954 and the expansion in 1955, 1959, 1962, 1963, and 1970 of the program entitled "Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries (Bufile 65-63113)", and any periodic review thereof.

4. Materials reflecting the information supplied by, and Bureau supervision of the handling of, William O'Neal, known to the SSC to have been an informant within the Chicago Black Panther Party, including the log of contacts with O'Neal kept by Special Agent Roy Martin Mitchell.

5. All materials submitted by the FBI to the Department of Justice in the course of the investigation leading to the presentation of evidence in 1969 to the federal grand jury regarding the shootings of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark in Chicago on December 4, 1969.

6. Materials, including inspection, investigative, and special inquiry reports and personnel records, pertaining to former Special Agent (FNU) "Jack" Freedman, now retired, who was at one time assigned to the New York City field office of the FBI.

Part III -- requested for delivery by August 29, 1975

1. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, preparation, and dissemination by the Racial Reporting Unit of the Intelligence Division in 1970-71 of the following:

    a. A special paper for the Vice President concerning racial disturbances in Mississippi and Georgia;

    b. A detailed account of advance information concerning the potential for violence in support of the Black Panther Party in New Haven, Connecticut.

2. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, preparation, and dissemination by the New Left Reporting Unit in 1970 of a library of "hand out" material on the New Left for dissemination on a high level to government officials and responsible citizens.

3. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and implementation of the following airtels and letters to field offices pertaining to the New Left movement:

    a. Airtel dated 10/23/68 instructing the field to expand its Key Activist programs;

    b. Airtel dated 10/28/68 instituting a program to obtain a comprehensive study of the whole New Left movement;

    c. Letter dated 11/5/68 instructing the field to conduct a detailed survey of "underground" newspapers;

    d. Airtel dated 3/10/69 requesting information about statements by Key Activists;

    e. Airtel dated 3/16/70 instituting a survey of financial support given to New Left groups;

    f. Airtel dated 3/19/70 instructing the field to locate New Left communes and identify participants;

    g. Teletype to all SACs dated 4/17/70 defining a commune and instructing the field to develop informant coverage of all communes;

6

h. Airtel dated 5/13/70 instructing each office to submit monthly reports on informant coverage used against communes;

i. Airtel dated 5/15/70 forwarding copy of departmental letter concerning campus disorders;

j. Airtel to select offices dated 8/20/70 instructing them to submit handwriting specimens of each Key Activist to be placed in the National Security File maintained by the laboratory.

k. SAC letter 70-48(B) dated 9/15/70 instructing the field to develop new informants to infiltrate communes and the staffs of underground newspapers;

l. SAC letter 70-57(C) dated 10/13/70 discussing briefings of local law enforcement officials regarding New Left extremism;

m. Airtel dated 11/4/70 instructing the field to investigate all members of SDS and to consider each for the Security Index.

4. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and periodic review of the establishment of the Black Nationalists Photographic Album on March 8, 1969, and to the origins and approval of dissemination of the Black Nationalists Photographic Album to other agencies.

5. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and periodic review of the preparation of a monthly Racial Calendar by the Racial Intelligence Section of the Intelligence Division.

6. Materials pertaining to the FBI's receipt of and response to directives of the Department in 1953 and thereafter, including letter from the Department dated July 28, 1966, requesting information of the Nation of Islam.

7. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and periodic review of the program entitled "Communist Influence on Racial Groups (Bufile 100-442529)".

8. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to the establishment of a special unit to handle Communist influence in racial matters in 1963 or 1964.

9. All memoranda and other materials which pertain to the assignment of Special Agent Seymour Philips to head the unit identified in item 7 above.

10. All memoranda and other material which pertain to the assignment of Special Agents Theodore P. Rosack and Richard Bates to the unit identified in item 7 above.

11. All memoranda and other materials relating to the reassignment of Special Agent Seymour Philips out of the special unit identified in item 7 above.

12. All memoranda and other materials analyzing or reporting the Communist Party's participation in and/or influence on the March on Washington.

13. All memoranda and other materials reflecting an analysis of the Communist Party's influence in racial matters which were written subsequent to the March on Washington.

14. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and periodic review of the "Key Black Extremist Program".

15. Materials pertaining to the proposal, consideration by the Executive Conference on October 29, 1970, and approval of a program to conduct a survey of black student unions, including instructions sent to the field on November 4, 1970, to implement this program.

16. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and periodic review of the Ghetto Informant Program instituted October 11, 1967, and justified by memorandum of G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan dated July 17, 1970.

17. Materials pertaining to requests by the Intelligence Division for placing name stops in the Identification Division and for placing names in the stop file of the NCIC Unit, during or after 1970, where such requests relate to persons other than fugitives.

18. Materials pertaining to the use by the FBI Intelligence Division in 1970 of carefully controlled contacts with the Commission on Campus Unrest to secure a copy of their report in advance in order to ensure that there were no unfavorable comments concerning the FBI.

Part IV -- requested for access by September 4, 1975

1. Materials pertaining to all actions undertaken by the FBI, in connection with COINTELPRO or otherwise, to encourage tension between the Chicago Black Panther Party and Chicago youth gangs.

2. All materials pertaining to the opening and maintenance of a Bureau file, if any, on the following persons and organizations, including material reflecting the decision to open the file, the information compiled in the file, and any other Bureau activity related to the subject and recorded in the file:

   a. Legion of Justice;

   b. Thomas Sutton;

   c. Thomas Stewart;

   d. Steve Sedlacko;

   e. Jerry Gaisor;

   f. Orville Brettman;

   g. Chicago Black Panther Party;

   h. Fred Hampton;

   i. Jesse Jackson;

   j. Chicago Urban League;

   k. Renault Robinson;

   l. Father George Clements;

   m. The Woodlawn Organization;

   n. Black Strategy Center;

   o. Black Peace Stone Rangers;

   p. Rev. Arthur Brazier;

   q. Archie Hargraves.

3. The following materials pertaining to FBI activities in Mississippi:

   a. All materials reflecting contacts and reports of contacts (and the substance thereof) between and/or among the FBI, the Meridian, Mississippi, or Jackson, Mississippi, police, and A. I. Botnick, from September 1, 1967, to March 31, 1970.

   b. All materials reflecting contacts between the FBI and Tom Hendricks, from May 1, 1968, to August 31, 1968.

   c. All materials reflecting the information supplied by, and Bureau supervision of the handling of, Alton Wayne Roberts, Raymond Roberts, and Gordon Clark, known to the SSC to have been informants, from May 1, 1968, to August 31, 1968.

   d. All materials pertaining to FBI activities with regard to Thomas A. Tarrants, including all communications with other law enforcement agencies and private individuals or groups relating thereto, during April - September 1968.

   e. All materials pertaining to the events in Meridian, Mississippi, in June 1968 which resulted in the shootings of Thomas A. Tarrants and Kathy Ainsworth.

4. All materials reflecting the information supplied by, and Bureau supervision of the handling of, the following persons known to the SSC to have been FBI informants:

   a. Robert Hardy;

   b. Terry Norman;

   c. Douglas Durham;

   d. Larry Grantwohl;

   e. Mary Jo Cooke;

f. Joseph Burton;*

g. Thomas Tongyai;

h. Howard Berry Godfrey;

i. Harry and Jill Schafer;*

j. William DuValle;

k. Charles Grimm;

l. Boyd F. Douglas;

m. David Sannes.

5. All materials pertaining to the activities and decisions of the FBI leading to the arrest by the FBI of persons in 1971 in Camden, New Jersey, later prosecuted in the case of United States v. Briggs.

6. All materials pertaining to FBI activity with regard to the Secret Army Organization in the San Diego, California, area.

7. All annual inspection reports for the Intelligence Division beginning with the earliest available and including the year 1972-1975.

---

* Please also include all materials relating to travel by any of these individuals outside the United States for, on behalf of, or at the request of the FBI.

Part V -- requested for delivery by September 4, 1975

1. All materials pertaining to the referring of information by the Los Angeles field office of the FBI in 1973 to the Los Angeles district office of the Internal Revenue Service with regard to Bella Stumbo and Della (LNU) and the allegation that Bella Stumbo had been using the false name of Della (LNU) to conceal income.

2. Materials pertaining to a "no contact list", and any other similar matters such as SAC letter 66-78 dated December 15, 1966, reflecting that Courtney Evans is a person not to be contacted.

3. A list of all "control files", "set-up files", and "functional files" maintained by the FBI Intelligence Division.

Part VI -- materials to be coordinated with response under special procedures for electronic surveillance and surreptitious entry

Materials pertaining to FBI electronic surveillance policy, as listed below, and any other materials logically related thereto (based on analysis of materials in "Black Notebook"):

a. Memorandum of W. C. Sullivan dated September 25, 1964, which is referenced in the first sentence of the September 30, 1964, memorandum from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont captioned "Confidential Informant and Similar Types of Coverage".

b. Follow-up memorandum which is referenced in the "Action" section of the September 30, 1964, memorandum from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont captioned "Confidential Informant and Similar Types of Coverage".

c. All memoranda and other materials which reflect responses to or implementation of President Johnson's June 30, 1965, "Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies" pertaining to electronic surveillance.

d. All memoranda and other materials which reflect consultations between FBI officials and the Attorney General as required in the penultimate paragraph of President Johnson's June 30, 1965, "Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies" pertaining to electronic surveillance.

e. All memoranda and other materials reflecting a March 30, 1965, conversation between Director Hoover and Attorney General Katzenbach as referenced in the last paragraph of the March 30, 1965, memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General pertaining to "proper controls over wiretapping and the installation of microphones".

f. All memoranda and other materials reflecting procedure which was "set up" as referred to in the March 30, 1965, memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General pertaining to "proper controls over wiretapping and the installation of microphones".

g. All memoranda and other materials which reflect the "various recent conversations" between the Director and the Attorney General, as referenced in the first sentence of the September 14, 1965, memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General concerning "special investigative techniques".

h. All memoranda and other materials which reflect the following actions referred to in the September 14, 1965, memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General concerning "special investigative techniques":

(1) "the Federal Bureau of Investigation has severely restricted and, in many instances, eliminated the use of special investigative techniques in carrying out our investigative work."

(2) "we have discontinued completely the use of microphones."

(3) "I have further cut down on wiretaps."

(4) "I have further refused to authorize any mail covers, trash covers, or the use of the polygraph in our cases."

(5) "I have instructed that such (portable) recorders not be used by the FBI."

i. Memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated September 23, 1964, which is referenced in the first sentence of the September 27, 1964, memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director captioned "Special Investigative Techniques".

j. All memoranda and other materials reflecting recisions, modification, or changes with respect to the eliminations or restrictions reflected in the September 14, 1965, memorandum described in paragraph h above, and which recisions, modifications, or changes resulted from the September 27, 1964, memorandum described in paragraph i above.

k. All internal FBI memoranda pertaining to the implementation of the June 16, 1967, "Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies" from Attorney General Clark.

l. All internal FBI memoranda pertaining to the implementation of the October 16, 1972, "Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies" from Attorney General Kleindienst.

m. Any communications between the Justice Department and the FBI regarding the "new standards and guidelines for use of electronic surveillance . . ." referred to by Attorney General Richardson in his September 12, 1973, letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright.

n. All internal FBI memoranda pertaining to the implementation of the standards and guidelines referred to in item m above.

Part VII -- materials covered by procedures for the Martin Luther King case

1. Contents of the OC file labeled Martin Luther King, Jr. which was designated as File #100 by the Inspection Division, including note dated December 10, 1965, to Mr. Hoover; routing slip dated July 22, 1969, to Miss Gandy; memorandum dated June 10, 1969, from the Director to the Attorney General; and Serial Removal Charge-Out dated December 13, 1973.

2. Serials 100-106670-253 and 100-106670-255.

3. Any FBI materials which would establish what was originally attached to the December 10, 1965, note to Mr. Hoover which appears on OC File #100.

4. Identification of the FBI personnel whose names appear in the lower left-hand corner of the December 10, 1965, note to Mr. Hoover which appears in OC File #100, together with their present offices of assignment or last known address.

5. Identification of the FBI employee who entered the name "Martin Luther King, Jr." on the December 10, 1965, note to Mr. Hoover which appears in OC File #100.

6. Identification of the FBI employee who entered the names "Martin Luther King, Jr." and "Nicholas deB. Katzenbach" on the July 22, 1969, note to Miss Gandy which appears in OC File #100.

7. All materials which reflect the circumstances surrounding the xeroxing of three copies of the December 10, 1965, memorandum to Mr. Hoover on June 30, 1966, as reflected on the copy of the note which appears in OC File #100.

8. All memoranda and other materials prior to October 7, 1963, which pertain in any way to electronic surveillance or proposals for electronic surveillance of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and/or Martin Luther King, Jr.

9. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting correspondence, communications and/or contacts between FBI headquarters personnel and FBI field office personnel with respect to feasibility, installation, initiation, continuation, authorization, re-authorization, and termination of and disposition of tapes with respect to each of the electronic surveillances identified in the FBI's July 24, 1975, memorandum attached to your letter of August 11, 1975, which responded to Item III. G. of my July 28, 1975, request.

10. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting authorization or articulation of the procedure identified in the last paragraph of page 6 of the FBI memorandum referred to in item 9 above, to wit, "authorization for utilizing a misur was made by the FBI Director or his designees".

11. All memoranda and other materials which pertain to photographic or covert optical surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr.

12. All memoranda and other materials which reflect information received from the Central Intelligence Agency concerning Dr. King.

13. All memoranda and other materials reflecting advance information received by the FBI that Dr. King would be meeting with Stanley Levison in any of the cities and on any of the dates upon which any of the microphone surveillances of Dr. King were operational.

14. All memoranda and other materials reflecting (as the result of information obtained from physical surveillance or live sources) that Dr. King did in fact meet Mr. Levison in any of the cities and on any of the dates upon which any of the microphone surveillances of Dr. King were operational.

15. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to the transmittal of tape recordings of King surveillances from the Intelligence Division, or any persons therein, to the Laboratory Division, or persons therein, or vice versa.

16. All memoranda and any other materials* which related to:

a. The preparation and/or dissemination of a "composite" tape (or copies thereof) which contained any or all parts of any tapes which resulted from electronic surveillance of Dr. King.

b. The preparation of any transcripts of any or all parts of any tapes which resulted from electronic surveillance of Dr. King.

c. The mailing of any tapes which resulted from electronic surveillance of Dr. King and/or any other materials to Dr. King, Mrs. King, and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

d. The playing of any tapes which resulted from electronic surveillance of Dr. King, or offers to play such tapes, or the displaying or dissemination of transcripts of such tapes, or offers to display or disseminate such transcripts, to persons not employed by the FBI.

---

* The Committee is not requesting tapes or transcripts.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Attorney General

August 15, 1975

Director, REC-56 62-116395-555

EX 104

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of former FBI Special Agent Theodore A. King. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-526234 (Personnel File Former SA Theodore A. King)

SFP:lhb lhb
(10)

2 ENCLOSURE

edm

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 SEP 4 1975

8:30 PM

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

August 15, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SPECIAL
AGENT (SA) THEODORE A. KING BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

On August 11, 1975, Theodore A. King, Director of Security, Southern Bell Telephone Company, Atlanta, Georgia, voluntarily advised the Atlanta Field Office of the FBI that he was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein in the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, D. C., on August 7, 1975, between 10:00 and 10:45 a.m. Theodore A. King served in the FBI as an SA from May 3, 1954, until March 18, 1960, when he resigned. It appears from the details of the interview, as set out below, that Theodore A. King was interviewed as an official of the Southern Bell Telephone Company and not as a former FBI SA.

The following are the details of the interview as furnished by Theodore A. King:

At the beginning of the interview, which was not under oath, King was furnished a form "warning" him of his rights, which he signed. Epstein was the only other individual present during the interview. Epstein stated the interview concerned the activities of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) during the early 1960's. Epstein asked the name of the employee in the telephone company who was the contact with the FBI in the 1960's and King advised it was Charles Eberhart. King explained he took over the Security Division of the Southern Bell Telephone Company in 1961, and he handled the contacts with the FBI after that time. King stated that Alden Miller was the contact man at the FBI at the time.

8

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-526234 (Personnel File Former SA Theodore A. King)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

SEP:lhh (9)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

King was asked if he provided assistance to the FBI on national security information at any time and he stated he did not recall.

King was asked if the Southern Bell Telephone Company provided any leased cable or leased line to the FBI at any time and King stated he did not recall. King stated he had several conversations with FBI individuals regarding the procedure for obtaining leased lines and he advised them to follow the normal channels through the company to make application for leased lines the same as any other customer.

King was asked if any other Agent might have had contact with the telephone company in connection with obtaining leased lines and he stated it was entirely possible.

King was asked if he could recall any leased lines being obtained under fictitious names and he advised he knew of none.

King was asked if he was ever given any names or numbers to furnish information regarding, and he stated that he did not recall. He was asked if he ever received any request in writing regarding such and he stated he knew of none.

King was asked if he assisted in any way in furnishing information about the telephone services of Martin Luther King, Jr., or the SCLC and he advised he could not recall.

King was asked if he knew Martin Luther King, Jr., or the SCLC was under investigation at the time, and he stated he did not know it for a fact.

King was asked if the Southern Bell Telephone Company had any written policy about giving out information at the time and he replied there was no written policy until after 1968, which stated in substance that no information would be given out without a subpoena.

NOTE:

Information reported herein taken from Atlanta teletype, dated 8/11/75, captioned "Senstudy 75."

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
8/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former Special Agent of the FBI Theodore A. King

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King Jr.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5. WOC

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-555

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 11 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 009 AT CODE

5:55 PM NITEL AUGUST 11, 1975 SSP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTN: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION AND INTD, (W.O. CREGAR)

SENSTUDY '75

ON AUGUST 11, 1975, THEODORE A. KING, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, AND FORMER FBI AGENT, ADVISED HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF MEMBER MICHAEL EPSTEIN IN THE EVERETT DIRKSEN OFFICE BUILDING IN WASHINGTON, D.C., ON AUGUST 7, 1975, BETWEEN 10:00 AM AND 10:45 AM, AT WHICH TIME THE FOLLOWING TRANSPIRED:

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INTERVIEW, WHICH WAS NOT UNDER OATH, KING WAS FURNISHED A FORM WARNING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS, WHICH HE SIGNED. EPSTEIN WAS THE ONLY OTHER INDIVIDUAL PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW. EPSTEIN STATED THE INTERVIEW CONCERNED THE ACTIVITIES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) DURING THE EARLY 1960'S. EPSTEIN ASKED THE NAME OF THE EMPLOYEE IN THE TELEPHONE COMPANY WHO WAS THE CONTACT WITH THE FBI IN THE 1960'S AND KING ADVISED IT WAS CHARLES EBERHART. KING EXPLAINED HE TOOK OVER THE SECURITY DIVISION OF THE SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY IN 1961, AND HE HANDLED THE CONTACTS WITH THE FBI AFTER THAT TIME. KING STATED THAT ALDEN MILLER WAS THE CONTACT MAN AT THE FBI AT THE TIME.

REC-56 62-116395-5

AUG 22 1975

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

LEGAL COUNSEL

KING WAS ASKED IF HE PROVIDED ASSISTANCE TO THE FBI ON NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AT ANY TIME AND HE STATED HE DID NOT RECALL.

KING WAS ASKED IF THE SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY PROVIDED ANY LEASED CABLE OR LEASED LINE TO THE FBI AT ANY TIME AND KING STATED HE DID NOT RECALL. KING STATED HE HAD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH FBI INDIVIDUALS REGARDING THE PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING LEASED LINES AND HE ADVISED THEM TO FOLLOW THE NORMAL CHANNELS THROUGH THE COMPANY TO MAKE APPLICATION FOR LEASED LINES THE SAME AS ANY OTHER CUSTOMER.

KING WAS ASKED IF ANY OTHER AGENT MIGHT HAVE HAD CONTACT WITH THE TELEPHONE COMPANY IN CONNECTION WITH OBTAINING LEASED LINES AND HE STATED IT WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE.

KING WAS ASKED IF HE COULD RECALL ANY LEASED LINES BEING OBTAINED UNDER FICTITIOUS NAMES AND HE ADVISED HE KNEW OF NONE.

KING WAS ASKED IF HE WAS EVER GIVEN ANY NAMES OR NUMBERS TO FURNISH INFORMATION REGARDING, AND HE STATED THAT HE DID NOT RECALL. HE WAS ASKED IF HE EVER RECEIVED ANY REQUEST IN WRITING REGARDING SUCH AND HE STATED HE KNEW OF NONE.

KING WAS ASKED IF HE ASSISTED IN ANY WAY IN FURINSHING INFORMATION ABOUT THE TELEPHONE SERVICE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. OR THE SCLC AND HE ADVISED HE COULD NOT RECALL.

KING WAS ASKED IF HE KNEW MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. OR THE SCLC WAS UNDER INVESTIGATION AT THE TIME, AND HE STATED HE DID NOT KNOW IT FOR A FACT.

KING WAS ASKED IF THE SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY HAD ANY WRITTEN POLICY ABOUT GIVING OUT INFORMATION AT THE TIME AND HE REPLIED THERE WAS NO WRITTEN POLICY UNTIL AFTER 1968, WHICH STATED IN SUBSTANCE THAT NO INFORMATION WOULD BE GIVEN OUT WITHOT A SUBPOENA.]

E N D

SJP FBIHQ CLR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 8/15/75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC/EJ

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

Bureau letter to the Attorney General with enclosed memorandum, both dated 8/7/75 and captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," advised that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) had requested the current address of former Special Agent (SA) Thomas J. Smith so that he may be interviewed with regard to his knowledge concerning the "Huston Plan." Referenced LHM furnished the SSC with the current address of SA Smith as 3410 Memphis Lane, Bowie, Maryland 20715.

The note to referenced memorandum advised that an attempt was made to telephonically contact SA Smith at the above residence at which time it was ascertained that SA Smith was out of town and not expected to return until sometime in the future. A message was left for SA Smith to contact FBI Headquarters upon his return.

On August 14, 1975, SA Smith telephonically contacted SA Thomas J. McNiff at FBI Headquarters. SA Smith was advised that the SSC had inquired as to his current address as they desired to interview him with regard to his knowledge concerning the "Huston Plan." He was advised that upon being contacted by the SSC, he should immediately advise the Legal Counsel Division in order to secure a release from his employment agreement. He was also advised that should he so desire, a Bureau Agent would be available upon his request for counseling purposes during the interview. It was also pointed out to Mr. Smith that during the interview, there were certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to

62-116395-554

AUG 22 1975

62-116395

EX 104

REC-56

1 - 67-449472 (Personnel File Former SA Thomas J. Smith)

TJM:lhb lhb
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 AUG 28 1975

answer questions, namely: information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Mr. Smith expressed his appreciation for the information and concluded by saying that upon being contacted by the SSC, he would advise this Bureau of the date of the anticipated interview and his decision as to whether or not he would request that a Bureau Agent be made available for consultation.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. Above for information.

TJM

wRW

JBA
PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 8/12/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Memorandum outlines problem area with respect to confidentiality of FBI sources which we have encountered in the Senate Select Committee (SSC) investigation.

In their investigation of COINTELPRO, SSC has been given access to material from which we excised only informants and potential informants as defined in Manual of Instructions. When such material was requested for delivery, we have excised identities of all individuals to whom we have incurred an obligation to protect their identity and relationship with the FBI. SSC has objected to these more extensive excisions in delivered material, claiming the agreed-upon procedures do not allow us such latitude. This was not our understanding of the agreement.

As a result of this impasse, on morning of 8/8/75, the Director and other FBI representatives met with the Attorney General (AG) and the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) in an attempt to resolve the question. The AG deferred a decision at that time pending the receipt of certain requested information concerning the general COINTELPRO operation. Later that date, Mr. John Elliff, SSC, contacted SAs William O. Cregar and Elmer W. Larson of the Senstudy Project, INTD, and stated the DAG had suggested he attempt to get together with Bureau representatives and reach some sort of compromise or accommodation in this area.

REC-56 62-116395-553
9 AUG 22 1975
EX 104

During the afternoon of 8/8/75, Messrs. ~~Cregar,~~ Larson and Elliff conferred at length. Mr. Elliff indicated he felt it was imperative that a certain number of individuals,

62-116396

EWL:lhb lhb
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 AUG 26 1975

who had cooperated with the FBI in the COINTELPRO operations, be interviewed by SSC Representatives so that a more accurate picture could be obtained concerning possible harm to COINTELPRO targets. He indicated there was a deadline set for completion of COINTELPRO phase of SSC investigation and time did not allow for extensive interviews; however, he estimated that given no deadline a maximum of 36 such contacts would be made and, in view of the deadline, 8 to 12 interviews of the type indicated to be more realistic. Mr. Elliff isolated three cases which he suggested might most easily lend themselves to a compromise on this point and suggested they be considered by the Bureau. If the Bureau saw fit to agree in these instances, he suggested further deliberations be made to select further cases in which the cooperative sources' identities could be made available to the SSC.

SAs Cregar and Larson emphasized to Elliff that the principle involved here was not whether or not the cooperative source was of great and current value to the FBI but that the issue was the FBI's obligation to the source to protect the confidentiality of the relationship. While professing to acknowledge the validity of the Bureau position in this regard, Elliff, nonetheless, was adamant in his standing that the SSC be allowed to contact these sources without the FBI first contacting them to ascertain their amenability to such interview. It was stressed to Elliff that prior contact of these sources by the FBI would be mutually advantageous since it would satisfy FBI obligation to the source and, if the source then agreed to interview, would provide the SSC with a forth-coming cooperative witness. Finally, after much discussion, Elliff suggested that the three cases presented by him be approved and following this he would be willing to consider negotiation concerning further disclosures of identifies of sources based on FBI proposal of prior contact. The three cases proposed by Elliff are briefly set out below:

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

1. In 1969, an Assistant State Attorney General, an established source of the Albuquerque Office, requested public source information concerning an individual in New Mexico who was a candidate for appointment to a pollution commission. We were able to furnish such information reflecting the subject's affiliation with the Students for a Democratic Society. SSC indicated they desire to interview our source.

2. In 1966, we furnished information to a California State Alcohol Beverage Control Commission agent that liquor was to be sold at a political fund-raising party. SSC desires to interview this source.

3. In 1968, the editor of a Tucson, Arizona, newspaper contacted our resident agency in Tucson and requested pertinent background data concerning some of the activists in various anti-draft, anti-Vietnam and similar groups in the Tucson area who had been receiving considerable publicity of late. Authority was granted to furnish public source data to the newspaper man. SSC now wishes to identify this contact and interview him.

On 8/12/75, the Director was advised of the proposal by Mr. Elliff. The Director indicated he desired to adhere to the current policy of not divulging identity of sources with whom the FBI has a confidential relationship; however, he extended an invitation for Mr. Elliff to meet with him on 8/18/75 at 4:00 p.m., for further discussion of this issue. During the morning of 8/12/75, the Director's position and invitation was conveyed to Mr. Elliff by SA Cregar. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Elliff called back to advise that he appreciated the invitation but that in his view the meeting would merely contribute to further delay and that he planned to contact

CONTINUED - OVER

Mr. Michael E. Shaheen of the DAG's staff and press for him to advise the AG and ask him to resolve the issue as soon as possible.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For Information.

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. C. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

Mr. W. R. Wannall

8/11/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

A. B. Fulton

MDR-16

COINTELPROS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

This is to identify 66 serials, copies of which were furnished to John Elliff, staff member of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), on 8/5/75 for retention in SSC offices.

Barbara Banoff, a staff member of SSC, requested 47 of the copies on 8/1/75 and 19 on 8/4/75. The requests were submitted by her based on copies which were previously reviewed by staff members in room 4171, JEH. Subsequent to the request for delivery of specific serials to SSC offices, they were re-excised to insure information which would tend to identify sensitive sources was deleted. Excisions in each serial, prior to being made available for delivery, was approved by appropriate Section Chief. Elliff accepted delivery from Section Chief Cregar and signed both attached lists indicating receipt.

Attached are 29 copies of serials requested on 8/1/75 which were delivered to Elliff on 8/5/75. Other copies which were delivered are not attached since no additional excisions were made other than those made in the initial project for review only. Excised copies of those serials were previously designated for the Cointelpro file. A second list is attached which contains ten copies of serials requested on 8/4/75 and delivered to Elliff on 8/5/75. Nine copies which were delivered are not attached since there was no additional excising.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures
62-116009

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
1 - 100-449698 (New Left)
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)
1 - 100-448006 (Black Extremist)

DKP:lfj
(12)

62-116395-
NOT [illegible]
170 SEP 2 1975

SEP [illegible] 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

P

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. H. N. Bassett
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher

DATE: 7/21/75

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. E. McHale
1 - Mr. J. W. Hines
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection RW
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This recommends representatives of Special and General Investigative Divisions review material from inspection reports which may be requested by the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to determine whether any excisions would be necessary before it is made available to the SSC.

By letter dated 5/14/75, the SSC, Appendix B, Item I, Number 5, requested access to annual inspection reports and related surveys for the past 10 years with respect to the Intelligence Division and 10 field offices. At a conference between members of the SSC Staff and representatives of the Department of Justice and the FBIHQ Senstudy staff, 5/30/75, it was agreed that in response to the above request we would make available to the SSC Staff, for review at FBIHQ, copies of the reports of the two inspections conducted of the Domestic Intelligence Division in 1971 and the inspection of the San Francisco Office during October, 1970.

EX 104 REC-56 62-116395-552

These reports have been reviewed by both the Intelligence and Inspection Divisions and necessary excisions agreed upon. The SSC Staff is being notified by LHM 7/22/75, transmitted through the Attorney General by letter dated 7/22/75, that excised copies of the aforementioned three reports are available for review in Room 4171 JEH. The LHM alerts the Committee to the fact that all portions of the San Francisco report which pertain solely to criminal matters, without security ramifications, have been removed from that report but can be made available for review should the SSC

8 AUG 22 1975

62-116395

NDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

J. Thomas

JPT:lhb lhb
(12)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE ADDENDUM OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION PAGE 3

84 AUG 26 1975

determine that such material is pertinent to its mandate by making a written request for access to it. The criminal portions removed are attached to the tickler copies of this memorandum designated for Messrs. Cleveland and Gallagher, as they relate to matters within their Divisions' purview. It has been our experience that the SSC generally does request to see or obtain material not furnished during responses to an initial request. Therefore, it would be prudent for representatives of the General and Special Investigative Divisions to, at this time, review the material attached to Messrs. Cleveland and Gallagher's ticklers and make a determination as to whether any excisions must be made before review by the SSC Staff, should same be requested. Generally, under current ground rules, only material which would identify sensitive sources, including cooperative foreign agencies, or violate the Third Agency Rule, may be excised. Inquiries regarding current ground rules may be made by the Senstudy representatives of the General and Special Investigative Divisions of Supervisor J. P. Thomas, Room 4063 JEH, Extension 4636.

ACTION:

It is recommended that the material attached to the ticklers of Messrs. Cleveland and Gallagher be reviewed as indicated above and returned to Mr. Thomas with any necessary excisions underlined in red by 7/24/75.

RJG

WRW

bam

ADDENDUM SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION WPB:bam 7/24/75

The attached portion of the October, 1970 Inspection Report of the San Francisco Office has been received and in the event it is furnished to the Senate Select Committee, it is felt that those portions bracketed or underlined in red should be excised. The pages containing material to be excised are as follows:

[redacted], 179, 181, [redacted] 209, 211, 222, [redacted]

Rev. 8/17/70

CRIMINAL INFORMANTS

4-H

INSPECTOR A.C. LARSON During the inspection your Criminal Informant Program will be evaluated as to productivity and numerical progress as well as from a program development standpoint.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

GENERAL

1. Identify supervisor and coordinator.

2. Are any Agents assigned exclusively to this program? If so, identify.

3. Prepare a tabulation showing the number of CIs and Potential Criminal Informants (PCIs) now as compared to last inspection. Tabulation should also include number of CIs and PCIs in headquarters city and each Resident Agency. Show numerical and percentage gain or loss.

4. Prepare tabulation showing Agent participation in program using format set forth below:

    a. Identify Agents spending 50% or more of time on criminal-type investigative matters, who have been so engaged for past year or longer, who do not have currently assigned qualified CI personally developed by that Agent.

    b. Length of time such Agent assigned to criminal-type investigations.

    c. If necessary to clarify, set forth nature of assignments such as general criminal, accounting, or other, together with percentage of time devoted.

SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
4-H

OCT 16 1970

62-116395-552

d. Those Agents identified in #a above, who have developed qualified CIs in past five years but because of transfer, reassignment, or discontinuance of informant do not now have assigned a CI (furnish dates of development, discontinuance or reassignment).

e. Number of PCIs currently assigned to Agents identified in #a above.

Name	Years on Criminal Work	Nature of Assignment and % (If Needed)	Date Last CI Developed	Date Disc., Reassigned, etc.	No. PCIs Now Assigned

5. Show payments to informants and compare with last inspection.

6. Identify any informants to be contacted by only one Agent. Set forth justification for this procedure.

7. What procedures and controls exist dealing with informant contacts after hours?

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

1. Briefly state overall objectives of your Criminal Informant Program. To what extent do your criminal desk supervisors participate in this program? (Do not include Criminal Intelligence Desks -- separate survey.)

2. Do you have standards or requirements by which you judge Agent's participation in program? Include specific comments regarding first-office Agents, Agents transferred in since last inspection, Agents assigned to your Division for more than one year.

3. a. List by supervisory desks handling criminal classifications, specific headquarters target areas (either geographically or by classification) selected for informant development efforts. Identify several for each desk and include examples for each criminal classification handled. Identify Agents specifically assigned to develop informants in each of above listed areas. Identify by file number informants developed.

151

b. Same for each Resident Agency.

4. In order to maintain stability of your program and to insure CIs and PCIs are not "turned over" for turnovers sake, do you require Agents to submit a newly developed CI or PCI at time closing or discontinuing memoranda are submitted on old ones?

✓ 5. What administrative procedures do you have to insure your substantive supervisors are aware of and participate in informant program? Do they approve both opening and closing memoranda? Are they aware of productivity of CIs and PCIs handled by Agents assigned to their squads? How? Do you maintain a record of productivity by desk?

6. How often is Criminal Informant Program discussed by supervisors at squad conferences?

✓ 7. Do you keep statistics by Resident Agency (or road trip territory) on productivity of informants? Do you feel your informant coverage in each Resident Agency (road trip) is adequate? Where are the weaknesses? Handle each individually.

✓ 8. Do you feel your informant coverage in headquarters city is adequate? Break down by squad giving consideration to types of classifications handled by each.

✓ 9. What administrative devices do you employ to follow Agents working criminal cases in headquarters city and in Resident Agencies to be certain each is making maximum contributions to the Criminal Informant Program?

10. What steps are taken to eliminate the carrying of PCIs in a pending status for over one year, when during that time they have been unable to produce sufficient information to qualify as criminal informants?

11. Racial and ghetto informants have proven to be of valuable assistance in solution of numerous criminal cases. What provisions have you made to make these sources available to Agents working criminal work? How and to whom do they submit their requests for contact with these informants?

Criminal Informants

12. How much use is made of your Criminal Informant Index, broken down geographically and by type of information for purpose of directing certain inquiries to logical informants? Document.

Comments of SAC requested.

4 - H

SAC GEBHARDT:
(10/21/70)
JTM:mer

1. ASAC JAMES T. MORELAND
SA STANLEY J. HENNESSY

2. No

3.

OCATION	SYMBOL INFORMANTS				POTENTIAL INFORMANTS				TOTALS			
	6/69	10/70	Diff	%	6/69	10/70	Diff	%	6/69	10/70	Diff	%
eadquarters	75	74	-1	-1.3	175	176	+1	+.57	250	250	-	-
erkeley	4	6	+2	+50	5	10	+5	+100	9	16	+7	+77.8
ureka	3	2	-1	-33.3	1	2	+1	+100	4	4	-	-
ayward	6	7	+1	+16.6	9	9	-	-	15	16	+1	+6.7
onterey	5	5	-	-0-	3	8	+5	+166.6	8	13	+5	+62.5
akland	22	21	-1	-4.5	35	31	-4	-11.4	57	52	-5	-8.7
alo Alto	2	3	+1	+50	5	8	+3	+60	7	11	+4	+57.1
ichmond	4	4	-	-0-	7	7	-	-	11	11	-	-0-
alinas	2	3	+1	+50	7	4	-3	-42.8	9	7	-2	-22.2
an Jose	9	9	-	-0-	20	27	+7	+35	29	36	+7	+24.1
an Mateo	3	6	+3	+100	4	15	+11	+275	7	21	+14	+200
an Rafael	2	3	+1	+50	7	5	-2	-28.6	9	8	-1	-11.1
anta Cruz	2	3	+1	+50	3	6	+3	+100	5	9	+4	+80
anta Rosa	4	3	-1	-25	4	4	-	-	8	7	-1	-12.5
alnut Creek	5	6	+1	+20	3	5	+2	+66.7	8	11	+3	+37.5
otals	148	155	+7	+4.73	288	317	+29	+10.07	436	472	+36	+8.3

4.

Name	Years on Criminal Work	Nature of Assignment	Date Last Developed CI	Date Disc. Reassigned Etc.	Number of PCIs Assigned
MALOY	2 1/2 Assigned San Francisco 6/16/69	Selective Service Matters	None	None	4
WOLFARTH	10, Assigned San Francisco 7/14/69	ITSP, Fraud By Wire	1969	R - 7/69	5
MAVITY	2 1/2	88s Top Ten Program Relief Supv.	4/69	C - 8/69	3

5. Comparative Disbursements

Month	8/1/68 through 5/69	6/1/69 through 9/70
June		1517.91
July		1787.00
August	845.00	1676.10
September	755.00	1520.00
October	1715.00	2233.00
November	1095.00	1670.00
December	1510.00	2623.60
January	1270.00	1138.00
February	1215.40	1510.00
March	1300.00	2397.00
April	2520.00	1460.00
May	2514.40	1303.00
June, 1970		1308.00
July, 1970		1703.00
August, 1970		1195.00
September, 1970		1248.00
	$14,739.80	$26,289.61

6. None

7. Agents contacting informants outside of normal working hours obtained supervisory approval for these contacts prior to making them and make appropriate notations on their #3 cards. Supervisors thereafter, during file reviews with Agents, check with them regarding those contacts and spot-check informant files to insure after-hour contacts were made and appropriately recorded.

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

1. The overall objectives of the criminal informant program are to develop high quality informants who are in a position to furnish valuable information on a continuing basis.

Criminal desk supervisors participate in the program by remaining alert to the necessity of having good informant coverage in the criminal classifications which are covered by their respective desks. The supervisor is also required to approve any expenditure made to an informant for information or services concerning any case handled on his desk and in this way will be aware of the progress of the program as it relates to their desk. The supervisors also follow the Agents' activities in this regard on an individual basis to insure that they are fully participating in the informant program.

2. The San Francisco Office does have standards which requires all Agents assigned one year or more to this division should conform to and that is they should have a minimum of four PCIs or one CI and two PCIs or two CIs assigned at any one time. This, of course, is by no means considered a maximum and many Agents participate more fully in the program.

There are currently no first office agents assigned to this division and when an Agent is transferred to this division and assigned to criminal work he is expected to show some progress by the end of sixty days and within one year he is expected to be in compliance with the above standards.

3. A.

DESK 1

Accounting Matters
Supervisor H. ERNEST WOODBY

DESK 7

Applicant Matters
Supervisor ROBERT D. ROBY

These two desks are being handled as one unit inasmuch as the only true criminal classification handled by both desks are deserter fugitive cases, which are split alphabetically between the desks.

SA HENRY L. GAIDIS is the only agent who spends more than fifty per cent of his time on Squad 1 on deserter matters and SA FRANCIS J. O'HARA is the only agent on Squad 7 who spends more than fifty per cent of his time on these matters.

156.

SAs GAIDIS and O'HARA have been specifically assigned to develop informants who can give coverage in fugitive deserter matters and they have concentrated their efforts in specific areas where deserters are most likely to be found, as set forth below:

137-5670	South of Market Street Area
137-5355	North Beach Area
137-5094	Tenderloin and North Beach Areas (homosexuals)
137-5477	Tenderloin and North Beach Areas (homosexuals)
137-5738	Haight - Ashbury and the Fillmore (Negro ghetto area)

DESK 2

Bank Robberies - Major Case
Supervisor BRYON C. WHEELER

Special Agents assigned to Squad 2 have been instructed to continually be alert to develop top quality informants in order to carry out the responsibilities in their investigative fields. The work on the squad is broken down into two major categories, the first of which includes bank robberies and kidnappings. Agents specifically assigned to develop informants in this field are SAs MONTE A. HALL, FRANCIS J. COLLOPPY, JR., THOMAS J. PADDEN, ARDEN F. KEITH, ELDEN LOEFFELHOLZ, and WILLIAM R. tenBENSEL. The following informants have been developed in this field:

137-5473
137-2686
137-2961
137-2864
137-4999
137-4290
137-5308
137-1934

137-4867
137-4680
137-5260

The second major category handled on this desk is the 88 - Fugitive cases and agents specifically assigned to develop informants in this field are SAs RICHARD C. DU BRUILLE, CLARENCE A. BROM and MICHAEL G. KEALEY. The following informants have been developed in this regard:

137-5469
137-5426
137-4294

DESK 3

General Criminal Desk
Supervisor MORRIS M. DE JEAN

The main criminal classifications handled by this desk are ITSMV, Theft or Destruction of Government Property, Crime on Government Reservations, Crime on the High Seas, Probation and Parole Violators, Bond Default Fugitives, and Crime Aboard Aircraft and Air Piracy.

It is noted there are several major military installations within Headquarters City, including the Presidio and the U. S. Naval Shipyard at Hunters Point, as well as numerous Government buildings.

In the ITSMV field SAs DANIEL J. BUCKLEY and EDWARD C. SAUER have been assigned to develop informants and in this regard the following have been developed:

137-470
137-3528

The fugitive classifications handled off this desk are distributed among the various members of the squad and in these classifications SAs BERLYN H. CLOW, JAMES E. TARLETON, JR. and GARY D. MINYEN have been specifically assigned to develop informants and the following are informants developed in this regard:

137-5291
137-2164
137-5425

Regarding the Government reservations, it is noted that specific liaison assignments have been made in regard to these but inasmuch as persons normally contacted on these bases are Government employees contacted on an official basis, they are not considered appropriate for development as CIs and are bound to furnish information as part of their duties. It is noted, however, that the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard is in a predominantly Negro area and two PRIs, 170-845 and 170-241, are under development at that location by SAs assigned to this squad.

Regarding the air piracy and crime aboard aircraft violations, it is noted all major airports are located within Resident Agency territories and coverage at these locations will be covered there.

DESK 5

TFIS and ITSP Matters
Supervisor GLENN A. HARTER

A major category on this desk is civil rights matters but inasmuch as this classification does not lend itself to the development of informants it will not be covered in this write-up.

In TFIS matters the following agents have been assigned these cases and have been instructed to develop informants in this field: SAs F. STEPHEN OSBORN, DAVID C. SUMMING, JAMES R. ECHOLS, RALPH V. FINK, STEPHEN L. JENKS, and MARSHALL H. FELDMAN. In this regard the following informants have been developed:

137-5202
137-5538
137-5358
137-4826

The following agents handle primarily ITSP matters and have been instructed to develop informants in this regard: SAs ELLSWORTH F. HEMINGWAY, FREDERICK A. GROS, and EARL W. BAKER. In addition, a major source of information in this field was developed by SA JOSEPH T. FOX, JR., who was recently transferred to the Hayward Resident Agency, and is still contacted by SA FOX. The following are informants developed in this field:

137-1966
137-5547
137-5168
137-4458

DESK 6

Selective Service Matters
Supervisor RAY M. ANDRESS

It is noted all agents assigned to this desk work Selective Service matters and have been instructed to develop informants that will be of assistance in this classification.

It is also pointed out that this desk has numerous subjects that fall in the radical left and Black militant category. Anytime these subjects, when interviewed, appear to be cooperative in any degree their names and addresses are furnished to the appropriate desk for consideration as development to an informant.

Members of this squad continually endeavor to develop informants in Black neighborhoods, homosexual hangouts, and cheap hotel areas where most fugitive Selective Service subjects are located.

The following informants have been developed in this regard:

137-4948
137-4876
137-139

It is noted a number of agents on this squad are recent transferees into this office and there is a total of thirty PCIs currently under development by members of this squad.

B.

BERKELEY RA

The Berkeley RA encompasses a large populous metropolitan area and its primary investigative problems lie in the security field. There are four agents assigned to the

Berkeley RA handling primarily criminal matters and they are SAs WILLIAM H. SMITH, JR., TUVAL V. FARQUHAR, ROBERT F. PEVAHOUSE and LEON H. BLAKENEY.

Due to the varied nature of the criminal work existing in the Berkeley RA and the relatively small area covered by the Berkeley RA, no specific targets have been designated for informant development, but all agents working criminal matters are constantly alert to the necessity of having good informant coverage. The following informants have been developed:

137-4547
137-3910
137-4723
137-5238
137-109

EUREKA RA

The Eureka RA is a one-man RA handled by SA RICHARD GUY MILLER and covers Humboldt and Del Norte County, which are both rural in nature. All classifications in this territory are handled by SA MILLER and in view of the nature of the RA, no specific targets have been designated for informant coverage. Two informants have been developed in this territory and give general criminal coverage. They are as follows:

137-2613
137-3685

HAYWARD RA

The Hayward RA covers the southern half of Alameda County and has been a rapidly expanding RA in population and has developed into a large trucking area with a population of approximately half a million people.

The major criminal problems in this RA have been TFIS and ITSMV violations.

In this regard, SA SAMUEL A. MILLER has been specifically directed to develop informants covering TFIS violations and SA PAUL M. CARPER, JR. has been directed to develop informants in the ITSMV field.

The following informants have been developed in this regard:

137-5402
137-5011
137-5175

The remaining informants in this RA furnish general information regarding criminal and fugitive matters.

MONTEREY RA

The Monterey RA covers a territory that is rural in nature and its main industry is tourism and agriculture. There are four agents assigned to the Monterey RA which handle primarily criminal classifications and they are SAs FRANK W. MITCHELL, WARREN A. COOK, MAX H. FISCHER and LESLIE L. VANNATTA. Two problems exist in the Monterey RA territory and they are a large hippie-type population residing within the RA territory and the town of Seaside, California, is basically a Negro ghetto type area. The agents assigned to criminal work have been instructed to establish as much coverage as possible in these two areas and the following two informants have been developed in this regard:

137-5255
137-5778

The major criminal classifications worked in this RA are Selective Service matters, deserter matters, theft and destruction of Government properties matters, crime on Government reservations (it is noted Fort Ord, a major Army camp, is located within the RA territory), with a sprinkling of other criminal classifications. The following three informants provide general criminal coverage for the entire RA territory:

137-4008
137-3258
137-4601

162.

OAKLAND RA

The Oakland RA covers the northern half of Alameda County and is the largest RA, personnel wise, within the San Francisco Division. In this regard, its problems, as related to criminal investigations, are very much the same as Headquarters City.

The following is a list of agents working criminal matters who have been assigned to develop informants in the specific classifications they primarily are responsible for, along with a list of informants developed for coverage in these files:

Bank robberies and major case matters are handled by SAs DONALD F. HALLAHAN and WILLIAM P. O'CONNELL. The following are informants developed in this regard:

137-2752
137-3121
137-213

In ITSMV, DGP, CGR, air piracy and aircraft hijacking matters the agents handling them are SAs DAVID ROBERT EVANS, THOMAS C. MC GEE and CHARLES SPYROPOULOS. The following is a list of informants developed in this regard:

137-5470
137-5161
137-5235
137-5326
137-5073

Handling TFIS and ITSP matters are SAs EWING H. RAUCH, JR. and R. JAMES WILLIAMS. In this regard, they have developed the following informants:

137-3515
137-4674
137-5480
137-4497
137-5088

Agents handling Selective Service matters and deserter matters are SAs ROBERT M. LEONARD, DONALD E. LOVEJOY, GEORGE W. SMITH and GEORGE P. WILLIAMS, JR. In this regard, the following informants have been developed:

137-5342
137-1667

PALO ALTO RA

The Palo Alto RA is basically a metropolitan area and its investigative problems are primarily in the security field. The agents working the criminal classifications in the Palo Alto RA are SAs TROY F. WILDER and JEAN G. HUGHES. There have been no specific target areas assigned in Palo Alto due to the general nature of the criminal assignments given these two resident agents. The following informants have been developed, giving general criminal coverage to the territory covered by the Palo Alto RA:

137-1807
137-5031
137-5518
137-5815
137-975

RICHMOND RA

The Richmond RA covers northwestern Contra Costa County with its basic population located in the City of Richmond itself. As related to criminal investigations, its one problem area in the Richmond RA is the Negro ghetto area located in North Richmond. There are two agents working criminal matters in this RA, GERARD JAMES NORTON and RICHARD L. WEAVER. Inasmuch as the above-mentioned ghetto area is their primary problem area, they have been instructed to develop informants, giving as much coverage as possible for this area. In this regard, the following informants have been developed:

137-2818
137-5287
137-2575
137-5091

164.

SALINAS RA

The Salinas RA is a two-man RA working primarily criminal matters. The territory is rural in nature and its primary industry is agriculture.

In view of the nature of the territory no specific target areas have been designated and SAs THOMAS P. DOWD and CARL A. GOSTING have developed the following informants which provide general criminal coverage in their territory:

137-5452
137-5099
137-5594

SAN JOSE RA

The San Jose RA territory covers a large metropolitan area with a population in excess of 800,000 people. Eight of the ten SAs assigned to this RA handle criminal case assignments at least fifty per cent of the time.

There has been a high incidence of bank robberies in the territory and specific efforts have been made to develop informants by SAs WILLIAM N. KIDWELL, JR. and FRANCIS M. CONNOLLY which would provide information in this regard and they have developed the following informants:

137-4215
137-5350

The remainder of the criminal work in the RA is general in nature and no specific assignments have been made to develop informants and no agent has been specifically assigned to the development of informants in the RA. In addition to the above informants, there are five other symbol informants furnishing general criminal information and three informants furnishing information in the criminal intelligence field.

165.

SAN MATEO RA

The San Mateo RA covers a large metropolitan area, including the San Francisco International Airport. There is a large volume of work at this airport and SAs WAYNE J. MORRISON, JOHN F. BRESLIN and EDWARD C. SERNETT have been instructed specifically to develop informants providing coverage of criminal matters relating to it. In this regard, the following two informants have been developed:

137-5204
137-5501

There have been no other specific targets picked for development of informants in the RA territory and in addition to the above two informants there are four other informants furnishing general criminal information within the territory.

SAN RAFAEL RA

The San Rafael RA territory includes Marin and Napa Counties. All criminal work in Marin is handled by SA DAVID D. THOMAS and one problem has been the City of Sausalito, which has a large hippie population, and specific efforts have been made to develop an informant who could provide information concerning this element, and in this respect, SA THOMAS has the following informant:

137-5396

In addition to this informant SA THOMAS has an informant providing general criminal information in Marin City, California, which is a Negro ghetto area. This informant is 137-3167.

SA ELWIN N. WEGNER handles all criminal work in Napa County, which is basically rural in nature and no specific target areas have been picked for this county. It is noted, however, SA WEGNER has developed an informant providing general criminal coverage for the City of Napa and this informant is 137-5421.

166.

SANTA CRUZ RA

The Santa Cruz RA is a three-man RA with two agents, PATRICK J. HAGGERTY, JR. and JOSEPH A. DUSHEK, handling the criminal work in this area. The territory covered by this RA is basically rural in nature and no specific targets have been picked for this territory. It is noted, however, three CIs are currently being handled in this RA and in addition, they have a symbol racial informant and a top echelon criminal informant target. These informants are as follows:

137-4132
137-5651
137-5280
137-5112
170-613

SANTA ROSA RA

Criminal matters in the Santa Rosa RA are handled by SAs WILLARD E. BASEMAN and DOUGLAS R. AHLSTROM.

The Santa Rosa RA covers three rural counties of Sonoma, Mendocino and Lake, comprising some 7000 square miles in area. The bulk of criminal activity is located in and around the headquarter city of Santa Rosa, California (Sonoma County). Informant coverage has been established in the legalized cardrooms and night clubs in this area.

Coverage in the counties of Mendocino and Lake is limited to the close personal relationship with deputy sheriffs that cover the remote areas of these counties, which principal industries are logging and ranching.

There are no principal targets for informant development, such as shipping companies, railroads, airports, or large industries. Coverage has been established in gambling, 137-3976 and 137-4486. In night clubs, coverage has been established with females, 137-5819 and 137-5818, both of whom are furnishing quality information and will be converted as CIs.

167

In deserter and Selective Service matters, hippie coverage is maintained in Guerneville, California (Sonoma County) through 137-5462. This latter town is largely a summer resort town for the area, but does have a hippie population in the winter months as well. Also, in the Indian and Mexican deserter fugitive matters, 137-1412 gives coverage to the skid row section of Santa Rosa, California.

WALNUT CREEK RA

Criminal investigations in the Walnut Creek RA are handled by SAs RUDOLPH H. MANCINI and FRANKLIN S. BURROUGHS.

This RA covers a territory which consists of several large "bedroom" communities and a large section that is rural in nature.

The only problem high crime rate area in the territory is the City of Pittsburg, which is a Negro ghetto-type area and specific efforts have been made to develop informant coverage in this area. The following informants have been developed and furnish general criminal and racial information for the Pittsburg area:

137-674
137-5079

In addition, the RA handles four other informants and they are:

137-3135
137-5395
137-3529
137-4685

4. Yes, in line with the answer to question two above, agents are expected to submit a replacement at the earliest possible date.

5. Supervisors participate in the informant program in that they must approve all expenditures to informants furnishing information in classifications handled on their respective

desks. In this way they are aware of the productivity of the informant program as it concerns them. Also, if there is any particular problem concerning the handling of a particular informant, a supervisor is expected to assist and give guidance to the agent handling this particular informant. Supervisors are also regularly reminded of the importance of the informant program at supervisors' conferences and follow their individual agents to insure that they are fully participating.

Supervisors in this office are not required to approve either closing or opening memoranda on informant files. No record is kept of productivity of informants by desks, however, this information is readily available through the monthly statistical letter submitted on informant production inasmuch as each statistic is reported by classification.

6. Agents are reminded of the criminal informant program and their responsibility to participate in it at each biweekly squad conference.

7. Informant statistics are not kept by RA or road trip territory, however, this information would be available if it were necessary to obtain it by review of the particular informant files that are providing coverage in these areas. Our informant coverage in each RA area is considered adequate at this time and no particular weaknesses are noted. However, efforts are made on a continuing basis to try to improve coverage in all areas.

8. It is felt that informant coverage at Headquarters City is adequate at this time, but as indicated in number seven above, a continuing effort is made to improve this coverage.

Regarding the coverage provided by each criminal desk, it is noted that as of October 12, 1970, the following CIs and PCIs are being handled off the respective desks:

169

CIs	PCIs
Desk 1	
3	2
Desk 2	
15	14
Desk 3	
7	17
Desk 5	
11	27
Desk 7	
2	3
Desk 6	
3	30

The classifications handled by the above listed desks are set forth in question three above.

9. Administrative devices used to make certain agents are making maximum contributions to the criminal informant program are that the agents are followed on an individual basis through file reviews and supervisor conferences to insure they are meeting the criteria as set forth in question number two above. The criminal informant files are also specifically reviewed on a semi-annually basis at the time the semi-annual LHMs are submitted to the Bureau. It is also noted files are checked at the time they are posted on a continuing basis.

10. Informant files are reviewed at the end of the first year they have been opened on an individual basis and if they have been unproductive the agent is advised to close the case and replace the PCI with anew one.

170.

If the PCI has been productive the agent handling him is advised to convert him to a criminal informant. If it is a questionable matter it is discussed with the agent handling the PCI on an individual basis and a decision is reached in this matter inasmuch as the agent is in a better position to make the judgement as to the potential of this particular PCI.

11. All agents in the San Francisco Division are aware of the racial and ghetto informant program through participation. If an agent has a case that he feels warrants contacting of ghetto informants he will dictate a memorandum setting forth specifically that they should be contacted by the particular agents handling them.

12. No actual record is kept of how much use is made of the geographical criminal informant index. However, it has proved to be a valuable tool in determining who the logical informants are to contact in any given situation. This has saved many investigative hours by making easily available to each agent the particular type of informant coverage he might need.

4-H

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON
10/27/70
LSM/jb

#mDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

All criminal informant (CI) files and a representative number of potential criminal informant (PCI) files were reviewed during this inspection. Following review, a memorandum disclosing the rating afforded in each file has been forwarded to you for inclusion in the respective file.

Your office is currently operating 145 CIs as compared to 141 CIs being operated at the time of the last inspection. There is also an increase in the number of PCIs under development at this time to 271 as opposed to 250 under development during the last inspection. These figures do not include Top Echelon informants or targets for development which are commented on separately under the Criminal Intelligence Program. This represents a slight increase in the number of CIs and a more substantial increase in the number of PCIs under development. However, there is a slight decrease in two large metropolitan areas, namely, San Francisco and Oakland, which though slight represents a static situation as to increasing coverage in these areas. The Oakland Resident Agency has also recorded a decrease in the number of PCIs under development. In analyzing the coverage in the resident agencies, it was noted that Monterey, Richmond and San Jose have the same coverage from CIs as during the last inspection although Monterey and San Jose have shown a substantial increase in the number of PCIs being handled. PCIs under development in Salinas and San Rafael are down somewhat, although this too in part is off-set by the increase in the number of CIs being operated. In view of the Bureau's increased responsibilities, it is absolutely essential that a strong criminal informant program be maintained and in fact expanded if the Bureau is to meet these increased responsibilities.

QUALITY

All of the CI files were reviewed during this inspection and the following ratings were given to the CIs presently being operated by this office:

177

Excellent	14
Very Good	36
Good	78
Fair	12
Poor	3
Not Rated	2
Total	145

The two files which were not rated are SF 3308-C, SF file 137-5342 (Bufile 137-22463) and SF 2290-C, SF file 137-213 (Bufile 137-3071). Because SF 3308-C furnishes information principally as a result of his employment in the U.S. Army, Personnel Center, Oakland, California Army Base, this informant should be discontinued as a CI and converted to a Confidential Source. SF 2290-C was recently reopened on the basis of having provided a service to Department of Justice attorneys and the Bureau but has furnished no criminal information for an extended period of time and had been in a closed status since 3/10/69. This informant should also be discontinued as a CI and considered as a Confidential Source. You should appropriately advise the Bureau that this action has been taken.

The following informants have been rated Fair and they should be given specific assignments for a period of 90 days in an attempt to improve their productivity. At the end of that period of time you should advise the Bureau of reasons for continuing them as informants or that they are being discontinued.

Symbol Number	San Francisco File Number	Bufile Number
SF 3258-C	137-4999	137-21270
SF 2712-C	137-3352	137-10786
SF 3320-C	137-5425	137-22726
SF 3119-C	137-4547	137-18815
SF 2966-C	137-4265	137-15784
SF 3313-C	137-5168	137-22503
SF 3348-C	137-5594	137-23437
SF 2684-C	137-2613	137-10351
SF 3303-C	137-5161	137-22387
SF 3095-C	137-4080	137-18823
SF 3072-C	137-4674	137-17879
SF 2793-C	137-3135	137-9744

173.

The following informants were rated Poor and should be closed immediately:

Symbol Number	San Francisco File Number	Bufile Number
SF 3226-C	137-4427	137-20833
SF 3166-C	137-5091	137-19341
SF 3257-C	137-4888	137-21264

A representative number of PCIs were reviewed and were rated as follows:

Excellent	4
Very Good	10
Good	31
Poor	1
Insufficient Data to Rate	37
	83

The following PCIs have been under development for a period in excess of one year and should be closely followed and directed for a period of 90 days in an attempt to qualify them as CIs. If at the end of that time they have not furnished sufficient information to qualify as CIs they should be closed.

137-5486
137-5483
137-5474

File 137-5485 has also been open for a period in excess of a year. This PCI has furnished no information since September 1969. This file should be closed. This PCI was rated "Poor."

AGENT PARTICIPATION

You have indicated Special Agents JAMES P. MALOY, CARLTON H. WOLFARTH and GARY N. MAVITY have spent 50% or more of their time on criminal type investigative matters during thepast year but do not currently have assigned a qualified CI personally developed by them. Further comment is being set forth later in this addendum concerning these Agents.

PAYMENTS

A review of payments indicates that your office paid an average of $1,473.98 a month to informants during the period immediately preceding the last inspection. For the period immediately preceding this inspection, an average of $1,643.10 was paid to informants each month. A spot check of payments made to CIs and PCIs indicated value was being received for the money paid. You should insure that your personnel are alert to the use of monetary payments to enlist the further cooperation of informants by compensating them for expenses incurred in pursuit of information for this Bureau and as compensation for their effort on the Bureau's behalf. You should continue to closely evaluate informant payments to insure that value is received for money paid.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

According to Bureau records your office shows increases in 4 of the 8 statistical accomplishments attributable to informants and it is noted that these increases have occurred in matters concerned directly with FBI investigations.

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

You have indicated a rather extensive involvement of supervisory personnel in directing informant development to those areas of responsibility coming within the scope of their respective desks. Referring to Government reservations and military installations, you indicated you do not consider Government employees appropriate for development as CIs as they are bound to furnish information as part of their duties. Your attention is specifically directed to

175.

Section 108, I-12, Volume 4, Manual of Instructions, which states informants should be developed on Government reservations and military installations when warranted. In view of the large installations located within your territory, it is suggested you identify particular areas of these installations wherein informant coverage would be logical and productive and give consideration to pinpointing such areas for development.

You have also indicated that Supervisors approve payments to informants and in this way are also aware of the productivity of the informant program. However, it is noted that approval of payments provides a rather limited assessment of the productivity of informants and points out the need for a continuing evaluation of respective coverage. Supervisors must constantly be alert to identify specific areas in which informant coverage would be logical and productive.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

You should give consideration to the development of informants on Government reservations and military installations as suggested by the Manual of Instructions.

In a number of instances, it was noted there was no follow-up on incomplete information furnished by informants. In such instances, the informant was not recontacted any sooner than required by the 30 day contact rule, which would indicate a lack of direction of the informant to further develop information of interest. The need to give informants direction to develop information to the point it can be considered useful and valuable should be brought to the attention of all appropriate investigative personnel.

There were few instances noted during review of the CI files wherein FD-302's had been utilized in recording informant information. It is recognized that much information regarding fugitives and possible suspects does not require

171

such recording but in view of the recent passage of Senate Bill 30 which will greatly expand the opportunity to utilize informant information, you should make certain all personnel are aware of those instances in which informant information should be recorded on an FD-302 and the proper method for so recording it.

Numerous areas have been identified in your territory as being the habitat of ethnic, ghetto and hippie elements, many with a high incidence of crime. To provide a better over-all view of the coverage in San Francisco and the heavily populated East Bay area and to facilitate a more convenient, ready reference for the agents of your office to this information, you should consider preparing a large wall map of the San Francisco - East Bay area and placing it in a central secure position in the office. In addition to criminal informants, you should include the location in which racial and ghetto informants will logically be able to furnish information and you should identify the location of all these informants on the map with an appropriate locator reference to an index showing the agent to whom the informant is assigned and the coverage which informant can be expected to provide.

EXPLANATIONS REQUESTED

Explanations are requested from SA's JAMES P. MALOY, CARLTON H. WOLFARTH and GARY N. MAVITY as to why they have not developed a qualified criminal informant during the past year.

Comments of SAC, ASAC and SA STANLEY J. HENNESSY requested.

SA STANLEY J. HENNESSY, ASAC JAMES T. MORELAND AND SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT: The Inspector's analysis of the Criminal Informant Program has been reviewed by each of us. It has been the goal of this office to develop quality informants that can furnish information concerning violations within the jurisdiction of the Bureau. As noted by the Inspector, we have increased our

177.

number of CI'S since the last inspection and have increased the number of PCI'S since the last inspection. We have also increased our payments to informants and no instances have been found where we did not get value received from these payments to informants. We have achieved excellent statistics from them as indicated by the fact that at the close of the last fiscal year we were ahead in all eight categories of informant accomplishments. This is our continuing goal and we will make every effort to surpass these accomplishments in the coming months. The observations, instructions and suggestions of the Inspector will be immediately complied with and this program will continue to receive close supervision in order to get maximum results in connection with our work.

178.

SA JAMES P. MALOY: Since my assignment to the San Francisco
10/28/70 Office, I have developed 4 PCI's. I am presently handling 4 PCI's. One PCI, STEVE VINSON (137-5565) can be qualified as a CI as soon as additional background information is obtained. I will immediately develop this background information and he will be qualified as a CI. In SF 25-75571 PCI Steve Vinson (137-5565) furnished information on which investigating Agents located and interviewed subject (Mosely). In 25-7475 PCI Steve Vinson (137-5565) furnished information on which investigating Agents located the subject (Malagone). PCI Vinson is in a position to furnish information on Deserters, SSA fugitives, hippies and narcotics. In 25-73123 PCI Jay Wilson (137-5790) furnished information re fugitive Jonathan Pitts. In 25-72710 PCI Dewey A. Parker (137-5566) furnished information which resulted in the location of subject Arsene Joseph St. Amand, Jr. I recognize the importance of the Bureau's informant program and will make every effort to develop other CI's.

SA GARY [illegible] MAVITY:
10/28/70.
GNM:jl

In the period of time I have been assigned to criminal work I have handled a number of PCIs with a view to the qualification of them as approved Criminal Informants. In the past year since I last had an approved Criminal Informant I have handled several PCIs including one who previously was the prime factor in the apprehension of a Bureau fugitive wanted for the murder of a police officer. This PCI has since furnished information of value which was relayed to the local police in a burglary case. He has been given the assignment to develop further information concerning local suspects in the handling of stolen merchandise from this and other burglaries.

In the past year I have been unable to devote a great deal of time to the development of this and other PCIs due to having been utilized as Relief Supervisor in the absence of the regular supervisor and because of the time necessary to prepare and present lectures at police schools on legal matters.

I am aware of the importance of the Criminal Informant Program and will continue efforts to develop a qualified Criminal Informant and expect to qualify the above-mentioned PCI in the very near future.

SA CARLTON H. WOLFARTH: I am extremely aware of the need to
10/28/70 develop CIs and have had a total of
CHW:ekk nine PCIs in San Francisco during the
time I have been in San Francisco.

I arrived in the San Francisco Division, 7/13/69, on transfer from the Chicago Division. It is to be noted that I developed CG 7215C in 1967. This informant had either worked for or was close to the top men of organized crime in Chicago, Miami and New Orleans. At one time, through a court order, this informant was wired with a microphone and tape recorder so information could be obtained in an Obstruction of Justice case. I had at least one other informant while I was handling the above informant, and handled both until leaving Chicago.

The potential of the four PCIs which I opened on 8/24/70 and the one which I opened 10/19/70 appears promising and it is anticipated that at least one will develop into a CI in the near future.

My assignments in San Francisco have been mainly ITSP - FBW investigations which are complicated and involve reviewing records and interviews with banks, brokerage house and other business officials. I had one excellent opportunity to develop a good CI when LOUIS MARDER, Las Vegas furnished me on 2/27/70 and 3/2/70 the original information which led to the recovery of $650,000 worth of Avco Thrift Certificates at Las Vegas. MARDER as recently as 10/27/70, furnished me valuable information. He cannot be developed into a CI because he lives in Las Vegas and is under Federal indictment in Miami.

I am sorry that this delinquency on my part happened. It is regretted and I will not let it happen again.

181.

#mol 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 BY SP2 ALM/TTG

Rev. 8/24/70

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES

4-M-3

INSPECTOR AC LARSON

Please furnish data requested below. If a question is not applicable, so indicate.

PART A. GENERAL

1. Brief summary of commercial or continuing types of lucrative crime in your territory such as organized illegal gambling, loan sharking (shylocking), labor racketeering, planned bankruptcy fraud, et cetera.

2. A brief analysis any corruption in law enforcement or among political officials who tend to control law enforcement.

3. Assess level of your informant and other coverage relied upon in making responses to paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. What progress have you made in penetration of racketeering operations since last inspection? To what extent has your Criminal Intelligence Program been expanded since last inspection?

5. Set forth total Agent days spent on Organized Crime and Gambling Programs in last six months and if less than previous six months explain. How many Agents are assigned full time to these programs? Describe allocation of manpower (headquarters and resident agencies) and outline your plans for allocation of manpower in future (headquarters and resident agencies). Outline supervisory responsibility and functions in these programs.

SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION

4-M-3

OCT 16 1970

203

6. Tabulate by months since last inspection the number of origin cases opened in classifications 92, 143, 144, 162, 165, 166, 168, 172, and 179.

7. Set forth accomplishments including convictions since last inspection as a result of Criminal Intelligence and Inter-State Gambling Programs in your territory. Separately set forth cases pending prosecutive action.

8. While prosecution of underworld leaders and associates is a prime objective, a continuing flow of basic intelligence on organized criminal activities and general crime picture in your area is necessary to future success of your program. Briefly describe examples of intelligence accomplishments which enable you to stay abreast of these conditions.

9. Cite examples of dissemination to other agencies, Federal, state or local, which have resulted in disruption of organized crime.

PART B. GAMBLING MATTERS

1. Identify leading gambling operators in your division.

2. Indicate types of gambling prevalent in your division and whether under hoodlum control.

3. What is extent of gambling in your division? Furnish data available with respect to monthly or annual handle.

4. Advise how sports line is received or formed in your division as well as how gambling operators are receiving early race results.

5. What progress have you made in penetration of illegal gambling operations since your last inspection?

6. By letter to SAC, Albany, 1/27/70, captioned "Gambling Investigations Under Proposed S 30, Organized Crime Control Act, 1970, IGA Activities," the Bureau issued

204

instructions regarding the investigation of gambling matters. How have you complied with those instructions? Be as brief as possible; however, be specific.

PART C. TOP-ECHELON INFORMANT MATTERS

In providing information called for below, bear in mind that a top-echelon informant can be qualified on the basis of regularly providing productive information on local gambling matters even if not tied into La Cosa Nostra.

1. Show number and location of top-echelon informants at time of last inspection and now. If decrease, explain. Identify by symbol number top-echelon informants developed since last inspection. List targets for development in TECIP and show location. What are your plans for increasing coverage?

2. Identify Agents working full time or almost full time in Organized Crime and Gambling Programs who have not thus far developed a top-echelon informant and explain why not.

PART D.

(Provide response only if applicable to your territory, i.e. presence of La Cosa Nostra or major hoodlum activity.)

1. Identify organized criminal groups (e.g. La Cosa Nostra) present in your division. Explain briefly manner in which such group or groups, control any or all of operations outlined in Part A, paragraph 1. Identify leadership element. Break down your response by headquarters city and resident agency territories.

2. What is estimated La Cosa Nostra membership in your territory and how many have been identified. Of the La Cosa Nostra members within your division, how many

have been identified by sources of your office? What are your plans for effecting identification of other La Cosa Nostra members residing in your territory? Has your intelligence developed any indication of a change in leadership or operations of La Cosa Nostra in your division? If so, advise of your contemplated action with respect to this situation.

3. Identify by symbol number any top-echelon criminal informants who are members of La Cosa Nostra or other organized criminal groups in your territory. Outline your prospects for development of additional informants of this type.

PART E. TITLE III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968

1. Are Agents handling Criminal Intelligence Program investigations thoroughly familiar with all aspects of Title III?

2. Have any Title III requests been initiated since last inspection? Identify files.

3. Identify files wherein investigative efforts are being made to justify Title III requests.

Comments of SAC requested.

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES

PART A. GENERAL

1. The commercial or lucrative type of criminal activity in the San Francisco Division continues to be predominantly confined to the areas as noted below. Exhaustive and probative investigation and close liaison with local state and Federal agencies to date has revealed no evidence of an organized criminal group controlling these activities in and San Francisco or Resident Agency territories. Investigation contacts with informants and other sources of information have failed to reveal the existence of any organized illegal gambling, loan sharking (Shylocking), labor racketeering or planned bankruptcy frauds.

A. Local bookmaking involving horse and sport bets conducted by numerous local independent bookmakers, some of whom have established "lay-off" arrangements among themselves.

B. Prostitution activity primarily in the "Tenderloin" section of San Francisco involving out-of-town businessmen, tourists, and servicemen with prostitutes, most of whom are working for unorganized negro "pimps".

C. Narcotic activity and related crimes usually involving thefts and frauds near universities, military installations, and "hippie" or Bohemian sections of cities within the division.

2. This office continues to enjoy an excellent relationship with the San Francisco Police Department and its official personnel. Cooperation and excellent relationships

207.

are known to exist between all Resident Agencies and the local law enforcement agencies in their territories. No evidence or information has been made available to this office to indicate that there is any corruption in law enforcement in this division.

As the Bureau is well aware, Mayor JOSEPH LAWRENCE ALIOTO was the Subject of anti-racketeering investigation by this office several years ago, however, this matter has been closed. ALIOTO prior to assuming the position of Mayor of the City of San Francisco was a prominent and well known attorney, particularly in the field of anti-trust matters. He is known to have been the attorney for TONY LIMA, a former "Boss" of the LCN in San Francisco. He also represented a number of other LCN figures and their associates.

Prior investigation revealed that the cousin of ALIOTO's father, JOHN ALIOTO, was the former "Boss" of the Milwaukee LCN Family. JOHN ALIOTO attended the inauguration of Mayor ALIOTO at San Francisco in January 1968.

As a result of an article published in "Look" magazine, September 23, 1969, linking ALIOTO with many LCN figures, ALIOTO filed a $12.5 million libel suit against "Look" magazine and the authors of this article, RICHARD CARLSON and LANCE BRISSON.

On May 15, 1970, Federal Judge BRUCE THOMPSON declared a mistrial in San Francisco on this suit in that the jury was unable to agree on the key issue of whether the article linking ALIOTO with the "Mafia" was published with "malice and reckless disregard for the facts." The jurors told newsmen that the article was defamatory to ALIOTO and that at least 50 per cent of the 27 points were indeed untrue. There was no agreement as to whether the falsehoods and the article's general claim that ALIOTO was "enmeshed in a web of alliances" with the "Mafia" represented "malice and reckless disregard for the facts." U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that such a finding is essential to a libel judgment sought by a public official.

208

57

SAC R. E. GEBHARDT
10/22/70

On August 5, 1970, RUDOLPH RAPALE, brother-in-law of Mayor ALIOTO, filed a $2 million libel suit against "Look" magazine and CARLSON and BRISSON. This article referred to a trip by PAPALE to Mexico during which PAPALE met with FRANK BOMPENSIERO, "CAPO", of the Los Angeles Family of the LCN residing in San Diego to discuss a lard selling permit in Mexico for a company of which PAPALE was former president.

On September 5, 1970, it was reported that retrial of the ALIOTO $12.5 million libel suit against "Look" was tentatively reset for May 3, 1971.

3. San Francisco top level informants currently being handled consist of four members of the LCN and seixn TE informants in the gambling and related criminal fields. Our LCN TE informants and ten PC target informants report on LCN activities of the San Francisco and San Jose Families as well as LCN activities in other divisions. Our other TE informants and our 36 PC target informants regularly report on matters involving bookmaking, prostitution, pornography and other criminal matters. [As an indication of the level of our informant coverage since last inspection, SF 2689-C-TE assumed the position of "Boss" of the San Francisco LCN Family.] These informants due to their positions and locations have made it possible to obtain top level information necessary to provide coverage for Items 1 and 2.

4. Since last inspection extensive investigation as well as informant coverage led to the first ITAR conviction prosecutions ever in the San Francisco Division (see Item 7 below).

Investigation in the case CARL EZEKIAL ECKSTIN, ITWI, case developed a "shakedown" by ECKSTIN against local bookmaker VICTOR ROMOLO. This matter arose out of the failure of ROMOLO to pay a bookmaking debt owed ECKSTIN. SALVATORE VINCENT "BILL" BONANNO, JOSEPH BONANNO, JR., MAURICE PATRICK HARTIGAN and MARTIN CHEIPETZ CARSON acting as agents for ECKSTIN attempted to collect the $1,600 gambling debt and during contacts with ROMOLO threatened him with physical harm

209

if he failed to pay the debt. This case is currently under investigation with the matter being presented to the Federal Grand Jury at San Francisco for violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 894, Extortionate Credit Transaction Statute.

It should be pointed out that "BILL" BONANNO and JOSEPH BONANNO, JR. are the sons of JOSEPH BONANNO, SR., a "Commission" member of the LCN in the United States.

The aforementioned Subjects are also involved in a separate ECT case involving the shakedown and threats to do bodily harm to WILLIAM JOSEPH ELLIS. This matter is presently under investigation and will be presented to the Federal Grand Jury, San Francisco immediately upon completion of Grand Jury action in the ECKSTIN ECT case.

Since last inspection investigation has continued in regard to GUISEPPI CONFORTE, the reported Vice Lord, State of Nevada, who for years has headed up a major prostitution operation. Through extensive investigation and the placement of SF 3239-C-TE and SF 3369-C, this organization has been completely penetrated identifying his lieutenants and scope of operation. As a result of the above, it has been determined that CONFORTE's operation has spread to the State of Hawaii being controlled there by one of his top lieutenants, TOMMY SEALE. San Francisco has under preparation an affidavit for a request of a Title 3 electronic surveillance on the phones utilized by this organization in Honolulu. This Title 3 affidavit has been prepared with the assistance of Departmental Attorney at San Francisco and who has discussed same with the Organized Crime Section, Department of Justice, who has advised that upon completion of current investigation in Honolulu the affidavit should be immediately submitted for approval.

As another example of the progress made in the penetration of the racketeering operation since the last inspection information was received that HARRY JOHN JOHNSON and ALAN "SUITCASE" FIDLER, two Boston "hit men" received a contract, reportedly by a printer, to travel to San Francisco and "straighten somebody out over a union matter." JOHNSON, a former resident of San Francisco, is known as a former associate of JACK GOLDBERGER, top local Teamster official

210.

and reportedly JIMMY HOFFA's special West Coast representative. JOHNSON and FIDLER travelled to San Francisco from Boston in January, 1970 and through surveillance and subsequent intensive investigation it was determined that they met with one GEORGE R. DUNCAN, International Representative, International Typographers Union (ITU). It was determined that shortly prior to the travel of JOHNSON and FIDLER to the San Francisco area a strike situation existed at the San Rafael "Independent Journal" newspaper involving the ITU. Through cooperation and liaison with local law enforcement, JOHNSON and FIDLER were arrested near San Rafael, California and found to be in possession of handguns and mace. Shortly after the return of JOHNSON and FIDLER to the Boston area, an individual who had knowledge that they had been given this contract was found murdered in Boston and on his body were found the names and telephone numbers of JOHNSON and FIDLER. Through these efforts the attempt by JOHNSON and FIDLER to perform the conditions of the contract were thwarted. In addition, this matter is being considered by Departmental Attorney for possible Federal Grand Jury presentation.

Another example of progress made in the penetration in the field of intelligence and organized crime in this area resulted when through information furnished by top echelon informants revealing the presence of ALATADENO JAMES FRATIANNO residing in the San Francisco territory. Through investigation and surveillances conducted FRATIANNO was subsequently contacted and was developed as a top echelon target of this division. Frequent contacts were conducted with FRATIANNO and extensive cooperation was obtained from him concerning organized crime. FRATIANNO was identified as a member of the Los Angeles Family of the LCN and during August, 1970 was indicted by Federal Grand Jury convening in San Francisco for two counts of violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 894, ECT. Although presently incarcerated FRATIANNO is being contacted periodically as a target in an effort to continue development of his cooperation.

Increase in penetration of racketeering operations since last inspection is evidenced by the above examples as well as the statistical accomplishments reported hereinafter.

211.

40

5. Total Agent days spent on organized crime an gambling program in last six months was 2,370 days, 3 hours. The total for the prior six months was 2,356 days, 4 hours.

There are 19 Agents working full time on the CIP, 14 in Headquarters City and 5 in RA's.

The following Special Agents are assigned full time to the CIP Squad:

Supervisor - CHARLES N. HINER

Squad Assignments

TECIP - LOWELL S. LAWRENCE, Coordinator
CHARLES E. GALVIN

IGA - BERNARD A. FEENEY, Coordinator
JAMES F. BLANTON
THOMAS J. A. HENRY
GEORGE B. JARVIS, JR.
JOHN G. REDMOND

ITAR - PROSTITUTION - COSBY J. MORGAN, Coordinator
EDWIN K. TANAKA
PETER K. STACKHOUSE

CIP-AR - FRANK UNDERWOOD, III, Coordinator
JOHN CONNOLLY, JR.
J. TIMOTHY LANN
DAVID J. SARGENT

Berkeley RA - GEORGE R. ZEIGLER

Oakland RA - RUSSELL J. HUCKABY

San Jose RA - JOHN M. PAGE
JOSEPH CHIARAMONTE

Walnut Creek RA - RUDOLPH H. MANCINI

Manpower for the program is constantly being re-evaluated for maximum effectiveness and efficiency both in

Headquarters City and Resident Agencies. Manpower will be allocated in the future according to the demands of the investigative matters to be conducted.

6. Tabulation by months since last inspection, of the number of origin cases opened in the following classifications:

		92	143	144	162	165	166	168	172	179
1969	July	10	0	0	1	15	22	0	0	0
	August	4	0	0	0	11	8	0	0	0
	September	27	0	0	0	19	34	1	0	0
	October	12	1	0	0	23	30	0	0	0
	November	28	0	0	0	54	26	0	0	1
	December	14	0	0	0	8	29	0	0	0
1970	January	15	4	0	1	30	29	0	0	0
	February	23	1	0	2	30	31	0	0	1
	March	17	1	0	22	5	30	0	0	0
	April	14	0	0	1	4	26	0	0	0
	May	16	0	0	11	3	33	0	0	0
	June	17	0	0	15	17	41	0	0	0
	July	8	0	0	4	10	47	0	0	0
	August	4	0	0	6	16	30	1	0	0
	September	16	0	0	2	13	58	0	0	1
	TOTALS	225	7	0	65	258	474	2	0	3

7. Since the last inspection seven convictions have been reported as a result of Criminal Intelligence and Interstate Gambling Programs as indicated below:

Caption	Bufile	SF File	Convictions
HULLEN HOWARD WATKINS, aka; GAIL KRISTINE WATKINS ET AL - VICTIMS ITAR - PROSTITUTION; WSTA	166-3994	166-846	2
THOMAS HENRY SZYMANSKI, aka; DONNA MARIE STEVENSON ET AL - VICTIMS ITAR - PROSTITUTION; WSTA	166-3664	166-615	1
EDWARD ADOLPH BARDYSZEWSKI, aka TFIS; AR	92-11801	92-1180	1
CHARLES PRITCHETT, aka; IVAR ARNOLD KVALNES, aka ITAR - GAMBLING; CGR - GAMBLING	166-4217	166-949	2
JACK GLENN KNOPFER; EUGENE DE POLO ITGD	143-1138	143-54	1

Prosecutive action is pending in the below listed cases:

Caption	Bufile	SF File	Potential Convictions
ALADENA T. FRATIANNO, aka AR; ECT	92-3899	92-271	1
JACK GLENN KNOPFER; EUGENE DE POLO ITGD	143-1138	143-54	1
MILTON GOLDMAN, aka ITSP; AR	92-10419	92-715	1

214.

The following additional convictions were reported by CIP Squad:

Caption	Bufile	SF File	Convictions
JOSEPH ALEX RUDY, aka; DONALD NASON - VICTIM EXTORTION - CONTEMPT OF COURT	9-50141	9-2315	1
TERRY LEE GREENFIELD; UNITED AIRLINES, SFIA - VICTIM EXTORTION	9-51445	9-2375	1
MYRTLE ALICE HALL, aka LMRDA - IM	159-3071	159-267	1
JOHN REED COX, aka; FLOREDIA ALLEAN SAVAGE - VICTIM EXTORTION	9-49946	9-2303	1

Prosecutive action is pending in the below listed cases:

Caption	Bufile	SF File	Potential Convictions
FRED JOE THORNTON, aka; ERMA SCOTT, aka - VICTIM EXTORTION	9-51238	9-2363	1
SUZANNE HONEY STOUGHTON, aka-Fug. LMRDA - IM	159-3044	159-264	1
TED CECIL SURRIDGE LMRDA - IM	159-2972	159-259	1
ROBERT WILLIAM WARD; SHIRLEY OWDEN - VICTIM EXTORTION	9-51212	9-2362	1

215.

8. Subsequent to the submission of last inspection report, through information by top echelon informants this office, information has been developed that SF 2689-C-TE has assumed the position of "Boss" of the San Francisco LCN Family.

SF 2656-PC has reported to the return to the San Jose area of STEFANO ZOCCOLI, Consiglieri of the San Jose LCN Family from Los Angeles where he had been residing for the past year.

During November 1969, SF 2656-PC reported that GEORGE ADRAGNA, a member of Western Pennsylvania Family of the LCN was coming to the San Jose area to live. Subsequently, SF 2656-PC and SF 2689-C-TE reported that ADRAGNA's membership had been transferred to the San Jose LCN Family and he is currently residing in the San Jose area.

Subsequent to the submission of last inspection report SF 2689-C-TE reported that JAMES FRATIANNO, a member of the Los Angeles LCN Family had moved into the San Francisco area where he remained until August when he commenced serving a prison sentence executed by the State of California.

During October, 1969, information was received indicating that JERRY LISNER, major bookmaker, Los Angeles, California was in contact with JOHN CASTELLI, bookmaker, Oakland, California. The purpose of this contact was for LISNER to establish a base of operation, particularly bookmaking, for his criminal activities in the San Francisco area. Investigation subsequently established that LISNER and others commenced a bookmaking operation in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties, East Bay Area, using as its front A-1 TV Service, Oakland, which is owned by JOHN CASTELLI. Following extensive investigation in cooperation with the Oakland Police Department, no evidence was developed to indicate any violation of Federal statutes. On November 22, 1969, the Oakland and Berkeley, California Police Departments simultaneously arrested SALVATORE J. BERNICE, JOHN TRAPPS and two other associates who were engaged in LISNER's bookmaking operation. These arrests resulted in a breakup in the entire bookmaking operation and subsequently during February, 1970 LISNER returned to the Los Angeles, California area.

In July, 1970, information was made available to the San Mateo Police Department which led to the arrest of WALTER DALY, PAULA DALY and SABRINA DUNN. These individuals were arrested for prostitution, conspiracy, maintaining a disorderly house and being an inmate in a disorderly house. These arrests were a direct result of informant information and investigation conducted by the San Francisco Office which revealed no Federal violation and therefore was referred to local authorities. This operation was determined to be a $90,000 a year "high class" call girl service and from this five other call girl services were uncovered, all local in nature in San Francisco. Intelligence information concerning these operations has been furnished the San Francisco Police Department and are being followed closely by the San Francisco Office.

9. Results of dissemination of information resulting in disruption of organized crime since the last inspection are illustrated by the following statistical accomplishments:

Raids	12
Individuals Arrested	39
Convictions	38
Amount of money seized	$5,829.00
Total "handle" - bookmaking	$895,000.00

Prior to the last inspection, these accomplishments were as follows:

Raids	10
Individuals Arrested	24
Convictions	10
Amount of money seized	$5,198.00
Total "handle" - bookmaking	$575,500.00

In addition to the foregoing, as a result of information furnished by SF 2956-C-TE and SF 3036-PC, CHARLES FRANCIS LEAHY, JR., Major San Francisco Bookmaker, was arrested on August 4, 1970, by the San Francisco Police Department on charges of bookmaking and ex-convict in possession of firearm. Trial date was initially set for September 22, 1970 in Municipal Court, San Francisco, however, has been set over until October 28, 1970.

218.

PART B: GAMBLING MATTERS

1. In the San Francisco Division there appears to be two gambling operators that lead all others in terms of handle, volume, coverage, number of accounts, and number of employees. These operators are CARL EZEKIAL ECKSTEIN and CHARLES FRANCIS LEAHY, JR., both of whom are based in San Francisco. While they both handle substantial individual accounts, ECKSTEIN and LEAHY are primarily associated with and rely on lessor local bookmakers for "action."

CARL EZEKIAL ECKSTEIN, age 40 years, has been engaged in gambling activities most of his adult life. ECKSTEIN was formerly associated with TONY RUIZ and other San Francisco bookmakers, but in the last year ECKSTEIN has set up his own independent operation. ECKSTEIN has been arrested on several occasions on charges of bookmaking but has never been convicted of this violation. In 1965 ECKSTEIN was convicted for failure to pay Federal wagering tax, which conviction was subsequently overturned. Details regarding his current operation are set forth below in Paragraph 3.

CHARLES FRANCIS LEAHY, JR., a native San Franciscan, in his middle 40's, has been engaged in bookmaking activities throughout his adult life. He was convicted in United States District Court, San Francisco, in 1961 for arrest on 9/28/60 for violation of Title 26, Section 7203, U.S. Code, failure to report and pay wagering tax, and was sentenced to six months in jail and five years probation. Subsequent to his incarceration, LEAHY moved to Medford, Oregon. He returned to the San Francisco area in the Spring of 1969 and resumed his bookmaking activities. During his absence from San Francisco, his ex-brother-in-law, KENNETH JOSEPH ZAHND, reportedly handled his, LEAHY's, bookmaking operation. LEAHY was recently arrested by the San Francisco Police Department on local bookmaking charges and is currently awaiting trial.

2. The types of gambling prevalent in the San Francisco Division are primarily wagering on horse races and sporting events. In addition, small numbers betting with a weekly drawing take place usually in the Spanish-speaking communities. There are also legal and illegal card games operating usually in low-income commercial neighborhoods. Gambling in the division is conducted by individual operators who are independent of each other, except for layoff purposes with respect to bookmaking and there are no indications of hoodlum control over any of these activities.

3. Concerning the extent of gambling in this division, bookmakers ECKSTEIN and LEAHY, named in Paragraph 1 above, operate in the following manner. Both are in daily contact with their accounts located in the Bay area which include other bookmakers for layoff purposes, split bookmakers, and numerous individual bettors.

Bets are placed with these operations generally at locations to which the general public has access, such as bars, restaurants, coffee shops, and other small shops. The "action" received at these business locations are in turn called in to a phone spot operated by a bookmaker who has a gambling relationship with the operator of the business.

ECKSTEIN normally operates with six employees, including two phone men, a bookkeeper, a pay & collect man, and two runners. In addition, he utilizes several split bookmakers as employees. The principal bookmakers and split bookmakers-involved in the ECKSTEIN bookmaking operations are THEODORE CHALMIS, ALBERT DiGERONIMO, ELBERT HEDRICK, MANNY PRONGOS, and ALBERT CARLSON. ECKSTEIN's monthly handle based on informant data, evidence seized by the San Francisco Police Department during recent bookmaking raids, and interviews of bettors is estimated to be approximately $50,000 for horse bets. His sports "action" varies with the season of the year and bettor interests in particular sporting events; however, ECKSTEIN's handle for sports action is estimated to be $40,000 per month.

LEAHY's operation normally consists of a separate phone man for horse racing action and sports bets, at least two pay & collect men, and several runners operating in the vicinity of three San Francisco bars in which LEAHY reportedly has a hidden interest. The persons believed to be associated with LEAHY as bookmakers and/or split bookmakers are ROBERT MAGIDSON, ATTILIO SPAGNUOLA, VICTOR FORNER, KENNETH ZAHND, MORRIS COOPER, and ALBERT CARLSON.

With respect to LEAHY's handle it is to be noted that a review of records seized at the time of his arrest on 8/4/70 discloses a daily handle for horse action in the approximate amount of $2,000 or approximately $50,000 per month. Data regarding LEAHY's sports handle is incomplete but it is estimated that this handle is comparable to that of ECKSTEIN.

Based on a review of available gambling records seized by local authorities on lessor local bookmakers, it is estimated that they have a monthly handle of approximately $25,000 each. Investigation, including contacts with informants and local authorities, indicates there are approximately 20-30 lessor bookmakers operating in the San Francisco Division on any given day. Accordingly, it would appear that the monthly handle for the San Francisco Division is in the approximate amount of one million dollars.

4. Sports line is formed by local bookmakers who receive an early opinion line from sports services located in Los Angeles, California, operated either by GERALD KILLGORE, DOMINICK "SONNY" DeFALCO, or FRANK MILANO. Upon receipt of this line information, the local bookmaker will make his own adjustments, if necessary, to suit his particular situation. In addition, the local major newspapers in this division publish line information on a daily basis prior to a particular sporting event.

Early race results are currently being furnished to local bookmakers by JERI GORDON MATZA who openly operates a sports service at 225 Kearny Street, San Francisco. Investigation has determined that MATZA receives race results by calling either California Turf, Los Angeles, a horse race results business operated by FRANK MILANO, or J & K Sports Journal, North Hollywood, California, operated by GERALD KILLGORE.

5. Since the last inspection, the San Francisco Office has developed SF 2661-C-TE, [who is a key operator within the ECKSTEIN bookmaking organization.] SF 3036-PC, who was targeted at time of last inspection, has been developed to the point where he furnishes detailed information on a weekly basis regarding the LEAHY bookmaking organization. This target is a split bookmaker handling sports "action" for the LEAHY organization. As a result of information furnished by SF 3036-PC and SF 3237-C-TE, LEAHY was arrested by the San Francisco Police Department on 8/4/70 on charges of bookmaking and convict in possession of a weapon.

SF 3090-PC was targeted at the time of the last inspection; however, during the past several months, he has furnished extensive information regarding several large bookmaking operations.

SF 3387-C was developed since the last inspection and was responsible for the initial information and identification of a major bookmaking operation in the East Bay area, including Oakland, California, and Naval Air Station, Alameda, California. The informant's information led to the arrest and subsequent conviction of the two major operators within the organization in United States District Court, San Francisco. In addition, based on informant's information and investigation by this office, there were two arrests and convictions effected by local authorities, Oakland.

222.

51

As a result of extensive investigation in the ECKSTEIN ITWI case, a "shakedown" on the part of ECKSTEIN against a local bookmaker was developed. This investigation has resulted in two major ECT cases involving non-payment of bookmaking debts which are currently under investigation and before the Federal Grand Jury at San Francisco. To date, eight local bookmakers have appeared before the Federal Grand Jury and others will be called. This has had a disruptive effect among bookmakers and has created an atmosphere of distrust.

6. Pursuant to instructions set forth in Bureau letter to SAC Albany 1/27/70 regarding gambling investigations under proposed SB30, a review of gambling cases was undertaken. It should be pointed out that during the past three years, it has been the policy of the San Francisco Office to closely follow the activities of local gambling organizations and/or subjects in an attempt to develop any indication of a Federal gambling violation. Per instructions additional 162 and 165 cases have been opened and investigated. Specifically since 2/1/70, sixty-three 162 cases and ninety-eight 165 cases have been opened.

PART C. TOP-ECHELON INFORMANT MATTERS

1. At the time of the last inspection, San Francisco had 7 top-echelon (TE) criminal informants. Of those 7, 4 were LCN members:

SF-2550-C-TE, San Jose "family"
SF-2745-C-TE, San Jose "family"
SF-2689-C-TE, San Francisco "family"
SF-3208-C-TE, New York "family"
SF-2956-C-TE, San Francisco
SF-3058-C-TE, San Francisco
SF-3237-C-TE, San Francisco

Since the last inspection, this office has developed three additional TE informants:

SF-2661-C-TE, San Francisco
SF-3300-C-TE, San Francisco
SF-3239-C-TE, San Francisco

At the time of the last inspection, San Francisco had under development a total of 39 PC informant targets.

Targets currently under development are as follows:

LCN Members - 10

SF-2501-PC, San Francisco
SF-2874-PC, San Mateo
SF-3013-PC, Monterey
SF-2545-PC, San Francisco
SF-2582-PC, San Jose
SF-2630-PC, San Francisco
SF-2886-PC, San Jose
SF-3132-PC, San Francisco
SF-3141-PC, San Francisco
SF-3242-PC, San Jose

19

Associates of LCN Members - 5

SF-2656-PC, San Jose
SF-3123-PC, Oakland
SF-3241-PC, San Jose
SF-3385-PC, San Francisco
SF-3288-PC, " "

Gambling and General Criminal Field - 31

SF-2500-PC, San Francisco
SF-2845-PC, " "
SF-2927-PC, " "
SF-3036-PC, Oakland
SF-3061-PC, San Francisco
SF-3090-PC, " "
SF-3112-PC, " "
SF-3135-PC, Oakland
SF-3144-PC, San Francisco
SF-3178-PC, " "
SF-3235-PC, " "
SF-3243-PC, " "
SF-3245-PC, " "
SF-3251-PC, " "
SF-3132-PC, " "
SF-3290-PC, " "
SF SF-3291-PC, " "
SF-3310-PC, " "
SF-3318-PC, " "
SF-3338-PC, " "
SF-3324-PC, " "
SF-3333-PC, " "
SF-3336-PC, " "
SF-3347-PC, " "
SF-3351-PC, " "
SF-3350-PC, " "
SF-3355-PC, " "
SF-3385-PC, " "
SF-3349-PC, " "
SF-3234-PC, " "
SF-3356-PC, Santa Cruz

225.

The San Francisco Division has under development a total of 46 PC targets in San Francisco and RA territories. The TECIP continues to be intensified for development of additional targets and information received regarding subjects of AR, ITAR and gambling investigations, as well as information received by our informants, is carefully evaluated for possible selection of potential targets under this program.

2.

Agents	Targets Assigned
JAMES F. BLANTON	2
JOSEPH CHIARAMONTE	2
THOMAS J. A. HENRY	4
RUSSELL J. HUCKABY	3
J. TIMOTHY LANN	2
JOHN M. PAGE	4
JOHN G. REDMOND	1
DAVID J. SARGENT	1
FRANK UNDERWOOD, III	2
GEORGE R. ZEIGLER	2

It should be noted that SA's LANN and SARGENT were assigned to Squad #4 handling CIP matters subsequent to the last inspection. All agents on this squad are well aware and constantly apprised of the importance of the TECIP and efforts will continue to insure that each agent will develop a TE informant.

21

PART D.

1. The La Cosa Nostra (LCN) continues to exist in the Northern California area and includes a San Francisco "family" and a San Jose "family." There are currently 8 members of the San Francisco "family" residing in this division and 19 members of the San Jose "family" residing in this division. In addition, there are two members of the San Francisco "family" residing in the Sacramento Division, one member in the Los Angeles Division, one in the Chicago Division and two members presently residing in Italy. There are currently 3 members of the San Jose "family" residing in the Sacramento Division and one in the Las Vegas Division. All of these members have been identified as members of the San Francisco or San Jose "families by TE informants of the San Francisco Division.

Four top echelon informants of this division who are members of LCN "families" have failed to indicate that the LCN "families" of this division register any control over gambling, narcotics, prostitution or any other organized illegal activity within this division.

The present leadership of the San Francisco "family" has recently been assumed by ANTHONY LIMA, who took over this position when the previous "boss", JAMES JOSEPH LANZA, stepped down in his favor. The "underboss" of the San Francisco "family" is GASPARE "BILL" SCIORTINO and this "family" has one Capo de Decina, VINCENZO INFUSINO, who resides in Modesto, California, in the Sacramento Division.

The leadership of the San Jose "family" remains the same as at the time of the last inspection report with JOSEPH CERRITO, the "boss," PHILIPPO OCTAVIO MORICI and STEFANO ZOCCOLI, Consiglieris, and one Capo de Decina, EMANUEL FIGLIA. No appointment has been made to the position of "underboss" since the death of the previous "underboss," CHARLES CARBONE, in 1967.

2. There are presently 8 members of the San Francisco "family" and 19 members of the San Jose "family" residing in this territory. All of these members have been identified by TE criminal informants of this division.

TE informants of this office who are members of the LCN or associates of members of the LCN have been alerted to continue to furnish information and identities of any individuals

22

who are associated with the LCN in this territory. SF-2689-C-TE has indicated that the recruits are the "second army" of the LCN and to be aware of and on top of activities of the LCN, it is necessary to identify these recruits. Since the last inspection, TE informants have identified an additional 11 recruits of the San Francisco and San Jose "families" residing in this territory or in the Sacramento territory.

As has been reported above, TE informant of this office reported the change in leadership of the "boss" of the San Francisco "family" when JAMES LANZA stepped down in favor of ANTHONY LIMA.

In addition, informants of this office reported the return to the San Jose area of Consiglieri STEFANO ZOCCOLI, who has been residing in the Los Angeles territory.

3. The following TE criminal informants are members of the LCN in the San Francisco territory:

SF-2550-C-TE
SF-2689-C-TE
SF-2745-C-TE
SF-3208-C-TE

Agents of the San Francisco Division currently involved in the development of TE criminal informants and in AR investigations are contacting the following PC targets who are members of the LCN in this territory in an effort to develop their cooperation:

SF-2545-PC
SF-2501-PC
SF-2630-PC
SF-2874-PC
SF-3013-PC
SF-2582-PC
SF-2886-PC
SF-3132-PC
SF-3141-PC
SF-3242-PC

Of the above LCN member targets, SF-2501-PC, SF-2874-PC and SF-3141-PC, in contacts to date, have furnished some cooperation and it is felt that with continued contacts, these targets offer excellent potential. In addition, from contacts to date, SF-2[illegible] and SF-3013-PC have also expressed some cooperation and it is felt offer good potential as targets under the TECIP.

228.

PART E. TITLE III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968

1. All agents assigned to Squad #4, handling CIP matters, are thoroughly familiar with all aspects of Title III.

2. Yes. See 3. below.

3. Since the last inspection, extensive investigation, as previously reported herein, has been conducted in the GIUSEPPE CONFORTE; ETAL case. During recent weeks, an affidavit for a Title III electronics surveillance has been prepared with the assistance of the Departmental attorney at San Francisco. This case, as well as the affidavit, has been discussed with the Organized Crime Section, Department of Justice, by the Departmental attorney and it is agreed that upon completion of investigation currently being conducted by the Honolulu Office, these results should be added to the affidavit and immediately submitted to the Bureau and the Department for approval.

ADDENDUM.
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON:
10/27/70
OFL:dp

The following comments are based on a review of information of pending files and interviews with appropriate personnel:

LA COSA NOSTRA (LCN)

Investigation by your office revealed the existence of two LCN "families" within your territory. Membership within these "families" total 64 individuals. Your investigation revealed neither "family" is considered to be very strong and has little or no illegal operations being conducted on a day to day basis.

One "family" is centered in the San Francisco area and has for the past few years been headed by James Lanza, an attendee at the Apalachin meeting in 1957. Lanza has recently stepped down as boss of the San Francisco "family" and has been replaced by Toni Lima. Your investigation reveals that Lima's leadership has not been approved by the "commission." You should follow this matter closely so you will be in a position to know all activities relating to this change in position.

The second "family" is centered in the San Jose area and is headed by boss Joe Cerrito. This "family" exhibits little enthusiasm for illegal operations. You should closely follow the activities of members of this "family" to insure that any illegal operations are immediately known to your office.

Organized Crime

Although prostitution, gambling and narcotic activities exist within your division, there is no indication from your investigations that these operations are controlled by either the LCN or other organized groups. Your investigations should be continually pursued with vigor in order that your office will be aware of any illegal operations within your division. This is particularly true in regard to gambling activities in view of the recent passage of Senate Bill 30.

As you are aware provisions of Senate Bill 30 made it a Federal crime in certain gambling operations and it will not be necessary to prove interstate aspects of the gambling activity.

Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program (TECIP)

The following is an analysis of your Top Echelon Informant Program at this time as compared with the last inspection:

Rating	Last Inspection	Present Inspection
Excellent	4	3
Very Good	2	3
Good	1	3
Fair	0	1
Poor	0	0
Insufficient Data to Rate	0	0
Totals	7	10

It is noted your office has penetrated the LCN "families" in both San Jose and San Francisco through the development of member informants. This is very noteworthy and you are encouraged to make certain that your member informants are utilized to the best advantage of the Bureau. Also, it is noteworthy that you have increased your TE coverage from 7 to 10 since the last inspection.

SF 3058-C-TE (San Francisco file 137-4670; Bureau file 137-17455) was rated fair because of a lack of productivity. You should follow instructions issued in Bureau letter dated July 14, 1970 and if this informant is unproductive for four months subsequent to the receipt of that letter the informant should be closed.

Although SF 2745-C-TE (San Francisco file 137-3456; Bureau file 137-11174) was rated good, his progress should be closely followed. Although he is noted to be a member informant the file indicates he is very sick with varicose veins and is very old. The majority of information furnished by this source has been of a nature of past activities and little present information is being furnished by him. You should endeavor to have him furnish more productive recent informant or give consideration to concentrate on a more productive source.

231.

A review of your file 137-5207, Bureau file 137-20313 concerning SF 3208-C-TE indicates the source was last contacted on June 26, 1970. The file indicates this source sold his business and left for Los Angeles and this information was learned by your office on August 13, 1970. The file also indicates this TE left the New York area because of being a victim of a shylock loan. In view of this information you should closely follow this informant's activities and be circumspect in dealing with the informant to prevent any possible embarrassing situation from arising.

The following is a rating of the PCs and a comparison with the ratings at the time of the last inspection:

Rating	Last Inspection	Present Inspection
Excellent	0	1
Very Good	6	7
Good	11	24
Fair	1	3
Poor	1	1
Insufficient Data to Rate	20	10
Totals	39	46

It is very encouraging to note that you have increased your targets from 39 from the time of the last inspection to 46 at the time of this inspection. You are encouraged to continue this most desirable trend.

SF 2123-PC (San Francisco file 137-4945; Bureau file 137-11841) was rated fair. This target was opened on April 8, 1968 and was last contacted on October 10, 1969. You advised that contact is being held in abeyance pending a surveillance which was conducted by the Oakland Police Department in early 1970. In view of the length of time since this case was opened and the length of time since this target was contacted he was rated fair.

SF 2630-PC (San Francisco file 137-2967; Bureau file 137-9023) was rated fair. By letter dated December 10, 1968 the Bureau advised that this target was over two years old and that you should consider deleting within four months if he was unproductive. This informant was also rated fair during the last inspection because of lack of productivity.

The only reason this informant is being classified fair, instead of poor is because information contained in your letter to the Bureau dated September 18, 1970 wherein your informant reported information was furnished by a TE to the effect that the present "boss" of the San Francisco LCN "family" had been discussing leadership of the San Francisco LCN with the target. You are instructed that in the event he does not furnish valuable positive information within 90 days he should be closed and a more suitable target developed.

SF 3061-PC (San Francisco file 137-4768; Bureau file 137-17558) was also rated fair. This target along with the other two targets rated fair should be closely followed for 90 days and be given specific assignments during that period of time. In the event they are unproductive they should be closed.

SF 2582-PC (San Francisco file 137-2698; Bureau file 137-8249) was rated poor and should be closed.

In regard to your PCs, the following specific instructions are being furnished you:

SF 2656-PC (San Francisco file 137-3086; Bureau file 137-9425) was rated good because of his being close to San Jose LCN member Dominick Anzalone and Pittsburgh LCN member George Adragna who recently moved to San Jose. He is also close to LCN "recruit" Vito Adragna. It is noted that this target has been opened for a period of more than one year and has been furnishing general rather than any specific information. You should encourage this informant to furnish some specific information concerning these people who he is close to in order that he may be retained as a target of your office.

SF 3318-PC (San Francisco file 137-5545; Bureau file 137-22526) has been a target of your office since December 26, 1969. Unless your office is in possession of some specific information to the contrary he should be immediately interviewed to determine whether he will be cooperative with your office.

233.

60

SF 3135-PC (San Francisco file 137-5010; Bureau file 137-19079) was opened on May 17, 1968. During the two inspections since he was opened this PC was rated Unsufficient Data to Rate. On November 20, 1969 you advised that an interview of this PC was being held in abeyance pending an investigation by the Oakland, California Police Department. The file indicates that that investigation was completed on August 6, 1970 with your target paying a $125 fine. On August 19, 1970 you advised that interview of the target was being delayed pending further investigation. You are instructed that this interview should be immediately conducted in order to determine if this target will be cooperative with your office.

SF 3297-PC (San Francisco file 137-5457; Bureau file 137-22106) was opened on October 17, 1969. The file indicates that this target has never been interviewed and you indicate that contact with the target is being delayed until a more logical area of vulnerability is developed. Inasmuch as this target is over one year old it is felt that sufficient information should be developed so that your office might approach this target to determine if he will be cooperative with your office.

SF 3192-PC (San Francisco file 137-5016; Bureau file 137-10982) was opened on May 21, 1968. SF 3110-PC (San Francisco file 137-2182; Bureau file 137-22452) has been opened since December 8, 1969. It would appear that sufficient time has elapsed in order for your office to develop background information so that an interview of these targets can be conducted. You should without further delay interview these targets to determine if they will be cooperative and if not you should consider closing and finding more suitable targets for development.

Information you furnished indicates there are ten SAs who are working either exclusively or virtually exclusively on the CIP and IGA program who have not developed TEs. Although all ten Agents have PCs their progress should be closely followed to insure their participation in the development of TEs. In this regard you may desire to reiterate provisions of the Manual of Instructions to the Agents on the program concerning the qualifications of TE informants.

All Agents are to be reminded that in dealing with informants, they are to be particularly alert and not leave themselves open for criticism or false accusations. The importance of having an alternate contacting Agent or another Agent along during the course of certain interviews is advisable in case any compromising situation is attempted.

With the recent enactment of Senate Bill 30 you should concentrate on increasing your informant coverage in the areas covered by this legislation. Also in regard to the passage of Senate Bill 30 dealing with gambling, which you are aware does not now require interstate activity, you should not overlook the utilization of your racial informants to furnish information to your office concerning gambling activities. Other divisions of the Bureau have been particularly successful in coordinating the information from racial informants in to the CIP and IGA programs.

Statistical Accomplishments

During the fiscal year (fy) you recorded two convictions in the CIP-IGA category. During the fy 1970 your office had three convictions. During the first three months of fy 1971 you have recorded one conviction in this category.

According to the information furnished by your office you have four cases pending prosecution, two of which are in the 159 (LMRDA-IM) category and two are in the 92 (Anti-Racketeering) category. Only one of these cases is in the CIP-IGA program. A review of your files indicates that in file 179-24 in a case captioned JAMES FRATIANNO, EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTION (ECT), the subject was indicted under Title 18, Section 894 of the U.S. Code. Your office was working the case under Anti-Racketeering classification and the file was opened after the ECT indictment.

In regard to the possible statistical accomplishments, from the above file it would appear the local office of the United States Attorney will seek indictments under the ECT statute. A review of your cases in this category reveal only three Office of Origin cases. The files also indicate instances wherein there are shylocking activities among the gamblers where there are large debts outstanding. A review of your

235.

file 165-100 on Kenneth Joseph Zahnd, aka; Morris Cooper, ITWI, indicates the local office of the United States Attorney appears to be in no rush to seek Grand Jury indictments on gambling matters. If the local office of the United States Attorney will entertain prosecution under ECT and is in no rush to seek indictments under the gambling statute, you should review at squad conferences with Agents assigned to the program provisions of SAC letter 68-46 dated August 20, 1968 wherein provisions of the ECT statute are set forth.

In relation to statistical accomplishments, prior experience has shown a direct relationship between Office of Origin cases in a particular classification and statistical accomplishments. As of September 30, 1970 your monthly administrative report reflects the following Office of Origin cases in the categories enumerated:

Classification	Office of Origin Cases
92	22
143	0
144	0
162	22
165	50
166	128
168	0
172	1
179	2

A review of the monthly administrative reports since the last inspection indicates your office of origin cases has remained fairly constant since the last inspection. With the increase of manpower on this program and the addition of informant development since the last inspection it is anticipated that your office should be in position at this point to begin to show results in regard to the statistical accomplishment phase of this program.

Supervision And Manpower

The CIP and IGA program is supervised by Supervisor Charles N. Hiner. Discussions with Supervisor Hiner and personnel assigned to the program indicate a very enthusiastic approach to the problems involved in this program.

236.

Immediately prior to the last inspection, by letter May 29, 1970 captioned "CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL MANPOWER," you advised the Bureau of the addition of ten Agents to be assigned exclusively to this program. Your success since that time has been noted by the addition of one conviction in 1970 vs. 1969. Also you have added three TEs to the program and seven additional PCs. This is to your credit and you are encouraged to continue this favorable trend. However, the collection of intelligence information, though very important, is only one phase of this program. The other phase of the program which must receive close supervision and personal attention is the obtaining of convictions to fulfill the Bureau's responsibility toward statistical accomplishments.

In regard to statistical accomplishments, other divisions of the Bureau have been very successful in the utilization of Title 3. The utilization of Title 3 requires extensive use of manpower and if the Title 3 you are presently awaiting approval is approved you should judiciously use manpower in the operation of the Title 3 installation.

In regard to the utilization of manpower, it is imperative that all Agents assigned to this program show the necessary zeal to accomplish the desired results of intelligence information and statistical accomplishments. In the event any Agents assigned to the program fail to show the necessary enthusiasm consideration should be given to the reassignment of those Agents to other squads.

Administration And Files

Several instances were noted wherein the "pink sheet" were not completed although the informant files have been opened for a considerable period of time. The following are instances of this:

137-2341
137-5545
137-5651
137-5688
137-5650
137-5597
137-5323

137-5457
137-3813
137-3241
137-5293
137-5423

237.

There were four instances wherein you were instructed during the last inspection to complete the pink sheet and although 14 months have passed since last inspection these pink sheets have not been completed. While failure to complete the pink sheet when instructed does not necessarily indicate an Agent's enthusiasm in working this program, it does not show the desired attitude. These four instances are as follows:

137-4768
137-5015
137-4945
137-5016

A review of your 162 files indicates several instances wherein Bureau instructions were not followed. These Bureau instructions were set forth in Bureau airtel dated April 2, 1969, captioned "INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITY MATTERS." This is found in your file 162-00-21. Briefly, these instructions stated that the 162 classification should be reserved for "intelligence-type" inquiries and that substantive cases should be opened under the proper classification. These files which were opened on individual gamblers were as follows:

162-897
162-896
162-893
162-885
162-883
162-902
162-903
162-892
162-899
162-733
162-900

A review of your 166 files indicates cases which appear to be of dubious prosecutive potential and you should closely follow these cases to insure that when it is determined they are of no intelligence or prosecutive value these cases should be immediately closed. Instances are as follows:

238.

166-1628
166-1510
166-1491
166-1550
166-1551
166-1633
166-1632
166-1631
166-1623
166-1624
166-1625
166-1627
166-1630
166-1607
166-1610
166-1653
166-1652
166-1650
166-1635
166-1634
166-1646
166-1648
166-1649
166-1667
166-1614
166-1615
166-1616
166-1571
166-1572
166-1567
166-1575
166-1576

Dissemination

Your office has been very successful in obtaining favorable results in dissemination of information to local law enforcement agencies concerning local violations developed during the investigation. You are encouraged to continue this favorable trend; however, you should bear in mind that violations that were strictly local in nature previously may now be covered by the recent enactment of Senate Bill 30. Those which are determined to be Federal violations, of course, should be prosecuted in Federal court.

New Legislation

A review of your files indicates you have complied with Bureau letter dated January 27, 1970, concerning the then proposed Senate Bill 30. You should closely follow guidelines formulated by the Bureau in regard to this new legislation in order that your office will be abreast of the latest information so that the Bureau's responsibilities in the organized crime field can be fulfilled.

Observations and Instructions

(1) Provisions of Title 3, the Extortionate Credit Transaction statute and of the Manual of Instructions concerning the qualification of TEs should be reiterated to all Agents on the program at squad conferences.

(2) You should stress to all Agents on the program the necessity of developing quality TEs.

239.

68

(3) You should stress the necessity of proper utilization of Title 3 installations as other field divisions have been very successful in this regard in obtaining a backlog of potential statistical accomplishments.

(4) You should concentrate on quality cases which have prosecutive potential which will obtain the desired statistical accomplishments.

(5) You should keep abreast of policy in regard to new Senate Bill 30 so that the Bureau's responsibility in this regard can be fulfilled.

Comments of Supervisor HINER and SAC requested.

SUPERVISOR CHARLES ~~N.~~ A HINER AND
SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT

Inspector's in-depth analysis and favorable comments regarding positive results achieved in the Criminal Intelligence Program are appreciated. You are assured the observation and comments will be closely followed and implemented.

SELECTIVE SERVICE MATTERS 4-M-5

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: The following comments, observations, recommendations and instructions are being made after an in-depth review of a representative number of your Selective Service Act matter cases and administrative files along with conversations with supervisory and Agent personnel and review of the answers to questions in a separate yellow (4-M-5):

The San Francisco area is a haven to draft dodgers and this undesirable situation will not be reversed until we make this area unattractive for "bums,""hippies," and members of white and black extremist groups who come to San Francisco in order to avoid the draft. Several obstacles must be surmounted in order to reverse this undesirable situation. The indifferent attitude that the judges have displayed to date must be reversed towards a tough handling of Selective Service Act violators. Supervisory and Agent personnel must maintain an aggressive attitude and continue to be a leader in streamlining processing procedures by the United States Attorney's Office and various Selective Service Boards to insure that these violators are promptly prosecuted in the courts. Every technique available to the Bureau should be used to get the judges, United States Attorney and public riled up about this ridiculous situation. Aggravated violators should be put in jail.

There are 2,983 "hippie-type" communes in the San Francisco Division comprising in excess of 20,000 population. 1,050 of these communes are located in the Berkeley and Oakland areas comprising in excess of 10,000 population and 43 communes are known to be violently oriented. Your office has eight subjects who have committed Selective Service Act violations that are members of white and black extremist groups. Every effort should be made to take these individuals out of circulation by placing them in jail. Information concerning their activities with extremist groups should be furnished to the probation officers so that they can so inform the judges in their presentencing report. All Agents handling Racial Matters and Selective Service Act matters should be periodically reminded to be on the alert

SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
4-M-5
10/28/70
OLD:lcj/dp

to identify members of the Black Panther Party, Students for a Democratic Society, and other members of extremist groups who are in violation of Selective Service Act matters. These should be promptly discussed with the United States Attorney for expeditious handling.

There are several reasons why the draft dodgers come to this area to beat the draft, however, the six most important reasons are as follows:

1. Nation-wide publicity during the last three years concerning San Francisco being a haven for draft dodgers.

2. The apathetic attitude of the United States District Judges. Sentences have been very light and many decisions were adverse due to technical grounds which made prosecution of additional cases difficult.

3. Large panel of attorneys, most, if not all, of them of civil liberties inclination, was formed a few years ago in San Francisco under the auspices of the U. S. District Court for the purpose of defending Selective Service Act violators. The attorneys are appointed from this panel, by the court, when a man cannot afford his own attorney. The expenses for the violators' defense are paid out of the U. S. Legal Assistance or Public Defender Fund in San Francisco. Many of these attorneys have not only defended inductees who refused to step forward for induction, but have furnished legal advice and assistance to various Resistance movements in the area.

4. The Resistance, a loose organization in various colleges throughout the United States, has counsellors who assist registrants in deciding what their rights and possibilities are under the Act. The Resistance has several offices in various parts of Berkeley, Oakland and San Francisco where men can go for advice.

242

4 M-5

5. Investigations have developed strong indications that there is a loosely organized movement by registrants to deliberately crowd the court calendars in San Francisco to make the reaching of any one man as slow as possible. This will also give the violator the opportunity of getting the indictment against him dismissed alleging that the defendent cannot receive a speedy trial.

6. The former United States Attorney had on his staff an assistant handling 25 cases who had never served in the Armed Forces and was outwardly sympathetic towards the Selective Service Act violators. The new United States Attorney has a good attitude towards the prosecution of these violators, however, he has not completely replaced the staff of the old United States Attorney.

A major portion of the Selective Service Act violations in the San Francisco Division pertains to the inductees failing to step forward to be sworn into the Armed Forces, thereby refusing induction. The Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station located in Oakland, California handles all inductions for Northern California and part of Nevada and handles approximately five per cent of all inductions in the United States.

Approximately 38 per cent of all refusals for induction into the Armed Forces arise at Oakland, according to the Department of the Army statistics. Many registrants from all over the United States come to the San Francisco area for the specific purpose of having their local draft board changed to this area, and after meeting all other requirements for induction, refuse to step forward to be inducted knowing that they will have two years or longer of freedom due to the slow handling of these cases by the Selective Service Board, United States Attorney's Office and the courts. San Francisco has several cases where the violations are over two years old in which no prosecutive action has been taken.

It is evident from the backlog of cases awaiting trial (414), backlog of cases awaiting prosecutive action by the Federal Grand Jury (749) and the fact that these violations are being received by your office at the average rate of 175 cases per month, that something must be done to get these cases before the courts. The most aggravated cases should be singled out and tried first, particularly those individuals who are members of extremist groups. Experience has shown that after several subjects have received rigid sentences, and a widely publicized trial, that many subjects enter guilty pleas hoping for lesser sentences by avoiding the Government the expense of a trial.

It is recognized the San Francisco Division has been most forcefully making every effort to expedite the handling of these cases, particularly through the judiciary. Indications are that the relatively newly appointed United States Attorney is sympathetic and receptive to the problem and is making an effort to diminish the backlog of cases awaiting Grand Jury presentations, but it is recognized once an indictment is returned, it is then up to the judiciary to proceed through the final step, to which they have not been particularly receptive. They have not responded enthusiastically to handling these matters in Federal Court.

It is obvious the Federal Judges in Northern California (San Francisco Division) have resisted any and all pressures brought to bear upon them concerning this problem. In my analysis of this situation, I have determined that the United States Attorney's Office, personnel of the FBI, and Selective Service personnel have all attempted to influence the Judges in handling these matters more expeditiously to no avail. Furthermore, within recent months there has been wide-spread nation-wide publicity relative to their coddling and minimizing this particular problem. This apparently has had no effect upon them. It would, therefore, appear that the various Federal Judges will not react to this problem unless some superior influential individual or group can forcefully bring this matter to their attention, particularly if such individual or group is one which the Federal Judges would respect. The obvious answer is the Administrator of the Courts for the Federal Judicial System in Washington, D.C. and/or Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, WARREN BURGER.

You are, therefore, instructed to suggest to the Bureau that the contents of the letterhead memorandum setting forth this overall problem be brought to the attention of the Attorney General with the further suggestion that the Attorney General bring this matter to the attention of the Administrator of the Courts of the Federal Judicial System and/or Chief Justice BURGER for his analysis and information, and the further suggestion he may desire to communicate with the Chief Federal Judge in San Francisco relative to these matters.

SAC, ASAC, Supervisory and Agent personnel should take advantage of every opportunity to personally discuss this aggravated situation with the United States Attorney, Selective Service Board officials, SAC contacts and other prominent individuals to get them riled up about this ridiculous situation. Insure that continuous close liaison is maintained by supervisory and Agent personnel with United States Attorney's Office and various local draft board officials to insure that these cases are promptly processed and prosecuted.

Your office in April, 1969 suggested to the former United States Attorney that arresting several inductees on the spot might have a favorable effect upon lowering the rate of refusals at the Oakland Induction Center. The only objection given by the former United States Attorney was that the case of the registrant must be presented to the Federal Grand Jury within two weeks after arrest. Due to your effective liaison, most of the "bottlenecks" have been worked out between the Selective Service Board and United States Attorney's Office in which these arrests can now be effected. You should be alert to members of extremist groups who will fail to step forward at the time of their induction and appropriately arrange with the United States Attorney for authority to arrest these individuals on the spot. You should insure that such arrests are given adequate press coverage. Such plans should be brought to the attention of the Bureau for their consideration in making a national press release, if warranted.

You must closely coordinate Selective Service Act cases with Agents handling extremist groups such as the Black Panther Party, Weatherman, SDS, etc. These files should be cross-referenced by appropriate memoranda.

245.

Statistical Accomplishments and Administrative Handling of Cases

As of 9/30/70, you had 1,873 origin Selective Service matters (1,799 active and 74 inactive). Between March and September 1970 you received 1,186 Selective Service Act matters for investigation, an average of 169 (1,186 - 7) per month. As of 10/23/70, 1,163 of the origin cases were completed. 749 cases are awaiting the United States Attorney's (USA) prosecutive decision, and 414 cases involve indictments of subjects and are awaiting trial. The case load is split about in half between Headquarters City and Resident Agents. 17 Agents are assigned to Squad 6 who handle only Selective Service Act (SSA) matters and their informants. One Agent has been on extended sick leave. Approximately 18 Resident Agents spend between 60 to 100% of their time on Selective Service Act matters. During the fiscal year 1970, ending 6/30/70, you recorded 74 convictions and for the first four months of fiscal year 1971, ending 9/30/70, you have recorded 9 convictions.

The procedures followed by your office concerning the immediate handling of subjects who refuse to step forward at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station, Oakland, California, appear to save Agent time and Government expense and should be continued. It is noted, however, that several months elapse between the time the Subject is interviewed and the time the United States Attorney makes his prosecutive decision since he insists that the Selective Service file be processed and forwarded to his office by the State Director of the Selective Service Board. You should have Headquarters city Agents continue close liaison with Selective Service Boards and the United States Attorney's Office to insure that these cases receive expeditious processing and are presented to the Federal Grand Jury at an early date.

Current administrative procedures being followed in these refusal type cases are as follows:

The Induction Officer at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station, Oakland, California, calls an Oakland Agent when there is going to be one or more inductees who will refuse to submit to induction. Inductions are handled on a Wednesday of each week. The Special Agent witnesses the refusal, conducts a short interview of the Subject, and in almost every instance secures an admission from the Subject that he knew he was violating the law and that he had thought

246.

about this matter carefully before refusing to step forward. The Agent during this interview obtains the Subject's current address which is generally different from the one he furnished the Selective Service Board. The Agent places the Subject on notice as to what probably will occur as to an indictment, summons, etc. The Subject is cautioned to remain in touch with his Local Draft Board in order to avoid being a Bureau fugitive.

A case is immediately opened and assigned to the Oakland Agent who prepares a report. Information copies of the report are furnished to the local USA, San Francisco and the field office and the USA covering the Subject's draft board when located in another division. It is the USA's opinion (San Francisco) that the refusal to step forward takes precedence over any prior delinquencies and will be handled by the USA, San Francisco. Instructions are given in leads to Headquarters city Agents and/or auxiliary offices to closely follow the Local Board to insure that all pertinent information regarding the Subject is promptly furnished to the USA, San Francisco.

In order to streamline the administrative handling of these matters as well as keeping the Bureau fully informed of the activity you are taking in these matters to insure prompt prosecutive handling, the following instructions should be followed:

All refusal cases and all other cases in which the investigation is completed should be reassigned to three or four Headquarters city Agents. These Agents will have the responsibility of getting these cases to the Federal Grand Jury and on the trial calendar. Those cases in which the subject becomes a fugitive should be reassigned to another case Agent.

At the present time there are 1163 cases pending prosecutive action. In order to eliminate status letters and reports to the Bureau in these type cases, the following procedures should be followed.

Memos to the SAC should be placed in individual files to keep them from becoming delinquent. When the Subject is indicted the Bureau should be immediately advised in each individual case. Beginning 10/30/70 and continuing on the 15th and 30th of each subsequent month, you are to advise the Bureau, by letter, entitled "SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT MATTERS, SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION" of the activity conducted,

247.

which would include the total number of cases presented to the Federal Grand Jury during the prior two week period, identifying each case by San Francisco file number, Bureau file number and title; the number of cases completed and awaiting Federal Grand Jury action; number of new cases received for investigation and general comments concerning the attitude of the USA's Office and U.S. District Courts concerning these matters. Also you should comment on any favorable publicity being given these matters by the local press media.

In the refusal cases the Bureau should be specifically advised of the status of a case within five months after the violation. The USA should be requested to advise of the prosecutive action he intends to take in each case and this information reported in the individual file.

It is felt that better liaison can be maintained with the USA's Office when only two or three Special Agents present these cases in a group thereby eliminating 30 to 35 different Agents presenting their cases separately. The Bureau will be kept advised on a semi-monthly basis of the activities of your office in getting these SSA matters through the courts. The above procedures will eliminate the dictation and typing of approximately 750 pages each month.

There are a sufficient number of SSA cases in Berkeley, Oakland, San Jose and San Francisco for your consideration of having a Special Clerk handle the review of Selective Service Board records. You should closely review these situations in these particular areas and if warranted recommendations for hiring Special Clerks.

Comments of SAC requested.

SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT
(10/29/70)
Supervisor RAY M. ANDRESS

The inspector's instructions will be followed.

248.

17

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM

Administrative Handling of Theft From Interstate Shipment Cases in the San Francisco Division

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: During the course of the inspection of the San Francisco Office a review was made of 140 Theft From Interstate Shipment cases. Instances were noted wherein Bureau Regulations concerning the handling of these cases were not followed. Set forth below are instances noted during this review:

In the following cases, it was noted the amount involved appeared to be a minor amount and there appeared to be no aggravating circumstances concerning these violations. In some instances concerning the cases which originated at the San Francisco Airport, it was noted the file indicated there was a possibility of an individual at the airport being involved in the theft. However, it is felt it is not necessary to keep open all the minor cases in order to determine which, if any, employees at the airport may be involved. These cases where minor amounts are involved are as follows:

15-11816
-11977
-11987
-11988
-11989
-11990
-11991
-11993
-11995
-11814
-11946
-11945
-11944
-11947
-11927
-11941
-11926
-11940
-11824
-11992
-11902

SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
10/28/70
OFL:st

249

-11996
-11994
-11953
-11925
-11923

The FBI Handbook, Part III, Chapter 73, Paragraph F, Page 192, states as follows:

> "If complaint is received involving a minor Theft From Interstate Shipment where there are no known aggravating or unusual circumstances, immediately present facts to USA for prosecutive opinion. If USA will not consider Federal prosecution, conduct no investigation, advise complainant, and, where appropriate, refer matter to law enforcement agency having jurisdiction. Confirm to USA and complainant in writing opinion and action taken."

None of the aforementioned cases reviewed indicate you are referring minor violations to the U. S. Attorney to determine if he would prosecute in the event a subject was identified.

There were numerous incidents wherein information had been received and the file contained no FD-302s and no indication that the FD-302s had been dictated.

The following is a list of these files which includes only those files wherein the case is at least 15 calendar days old. These files are identified as follows:

15-11918
-11980
-11816
-12010
-12011
-12013
-12017
-11814
-11947
-11837
-11831
-11983
-11902

250.

-11939
-12006
-11973
-11933
-11969
-12003
-12000
-11999
-11998
-11954
-11925
-11923

The Manual of Rules and Regulations, Section 4, Paragraph C2b and c, provide as follows:

(b) "Information not in a signed statement received from a witness and concerning which the witness may testify" should be reported on the Form FD-302.

(c) "Information which may be the subject matter of testimony of a Bureau Agent" should be reported on the Form FD-302.

Four instances were noted wherein serial numbers have been obtained and, although sufficient time had lapsed, the serial numbers had not been entered into NCIC. These cases are as follows:

15-12006
-11994
-11965
-11877

The Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 3, Paragraph F, Page 31 and following pages lists the procedures for entering serial numbers of stolen items into NCIC.

In your file 15-11918 a case was opened wherein the opening memo states there is no Federal violation involved. The alleged purpose of opening this case is because the person who is responsible for this theft may have been involved in a theft wherein FBI jurisdiction was apparent.

Explanations Requested

Supervisor GLENN A. HARTER is requested to explain the following:

251.

1) Why, in his supervision of these matters, he failed to insure that cases involving minor thefts were immediately presented to the U. S. Attorney for prosecutive opinion in accordance with existing Bureau instructions.

2) Why, in his overall supervision, he failed to detect that FD-302s were not prepared in the aforementioned cases.

3) Why he failed to detect that serial numbers in the aforementioned cases were not entered into NCIC.

4) Why a case was opened on 15-11918 when the opening serial indicated no Federal law had been violated.

Comments of SAC requested.

252.

SUPERVISOR GLENN A. HARTER: 1) This office received a
10/28/70 letter from the U.S. Attorney dated 6/24/69 wherein the U.S. Attorney advised that they would not undertake prosecution of minor theft cases. The letter set the guide as those cases of value of less than $100. This office has been following the interpretation of minor thefts as those having a value of less than $100. It was the judgment of this office that about all of the airport thefts involved amounts in excess of $100. It appears that an average loss at the airport would average an estimated $250, it being noted that the airline companies currently are paying up to $500 per bag. Therefore, these cases were not judged to be minor cases and had not been discussed with the U.S. Attorney as their value exceeded $100. In following this policy San Francisco believed that they were in compliance with Section 94 of the Manual regarding presentation of minor cases to the US. Attorney. In the future this office will immediately present cases of the type cited by the Inspector to the U.S. Attorney before any investigation is conducted and will consider suitcase type thefts as minor cases.

2)Submission of FD 302s. Regarding the fact that I had not detected that FD 302s were not included in the 25 files listed by the Inspector, I would like to explain that 13 of these files were opened after September 22 and I had not reviewed any of these files as yet on tickler and thereby would not have had an opportunity to detect the fact that the FD 302 was not listed. The remaining files have not all been available for review at this time but it is obvious that some of these files did not have FD 302s prepared promptly.

3)NCIC Entries. Three of the four files listed where NCIC entries had not been made had not as yet been reviewed on ticklers since they had been received in this office. One of the four files, 15-11994, reflects a suitcase claim check number which is not suitable for entry into the NCIC.

4) File 15-11981 was recommended to be opened by the case Agent as he felt that this shipment involved personnel and circumstances which would be logically worked in connection with other existing TFIS cases and that it might be a lever for possible informant development. The Agent hoped to work this case even though it was not a Federal violation and obtain an

253.

82

informant and utilizing the Subject's complicity in the case as a possible lever. It was believed that he could obtain a criminal informant.

I regret very much that it was necessary for the Inspector to call to my attention the matters referred to in this administrative write-up. I will take the necessary action to insure that minor cases are immediately presented to the U.S. Attorney, that FD 302s are immediately prepared, that NCIC numbers be immediately entered where pertinent so that it will not be necessary for these matters to be called to my attention again.

254.

SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT: The USA advised this office by letter dated 7/16/69 that the FBI should no longer present minor theft cases to the USA's office and that these cases should be deferred to local courts. The office has followed the policy set down by the USA and has utilized his guideline of $100 as a minor case. In view of his policy, the office has not been receiving minor theft cases, as the local business community has been made aware of the policy of the USA and has not been referring minor cases to the office.

Occasionally some minor case is received from someone not aware of the policy of the USA's office in not prosecuting cases having a value of less than $100. In the future when a complaint is received regarding a minor theft, the case will be immediately presented to the USA and after his declination, the office will advise the complainant and the USA's office in writing and where appropriate, refer the complaint to the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the violation. This procedure will be in line with the requirements in the Manual of Inspection, Section 94.

255.

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: In regard to your answer to this write-up, the following is pointed out to you:

1. Your answer implies the inspector indicated that all suitcase-type thefts are minor thefts. This is completely inaccurate as each case, whether it be a suitcase or otherwise, has to be judged on the merits of the individual case. In the review of 140 cases there was not one single instance wherein the United States Attorney had been consulted to determine if the case was a minor amount and he would not entertain prosecution even if the subject were identified.

2. Concerning the submissions of FD-302's to the file, the following is a tabulation of cases over two months old in which no FD-302 is in the file:

FILE NUMBER	DATE OPENED
15-11918	8/14/70
15-11816	7/6/70
15-11814	7/2/70
15-11947	8/26/70
15-11818	7/10/70
15-11902	8/25/70
15-11939	8/28/70
15-11933	8/21/70

Although the remainder of the 25 files pointed out to you did not contain FD-302's and the files had not come up on ticklers for your review, it is apparent with this number of files without FD-302's the Agents are not receiving adequate instructions in conferences concerning proper preparing of FD-302's in TFIS cases.

256.

3. Although it was pointed out to you wherein NCIC entries on serial numbers had not come up for administrative review, it is apparent that several Agents on your squad have not been properly instructed in the necessity of immediately entering serial numbers into NCIC. It should not be necessary for you to have to remind Agents on your squad on a periodic file review of the necessity of entering serial numbers into NCIC. They should not wait an extended period of time to enter these numbers in NCIC, but the serial numbers should be entered immediately after they are obtained.

4. File 15-11981 was of a purely local nature and should have been worked out of the related Federal violation case rather than open a separate TFIS case wherein no Federal jurisdiction was indicated in the opening serial.

Supervisor HARTER and SAC note.

257.

CASE SUGGESTION WRITE-UP

JEREMIAH JOSEPH SULLIVAN, Jr.
SSN 4-30-46-219
SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT
SF file 25-66962
Bufile 25-555242
OO: San Francisco

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: This is a pending case, opened on 3/16/67, assigned to SA GERARD JAMES NORTON of the Richmond, California, Resident Agency. It is supervised by SA RAY M. ANDRESS.

A review of this file reveals the Subject was declared delinquent by Local Board #30, Richmond, California, on 3/9/67, for failure to report for induction on 8/17/66. The whereabouts of the Subject have been unknown since 3/16/67, and considerable investigation has been conducted to locate him. Information was developed in March, 1970, that Subject was possibly in Canada and a friend of Subject's mother advised in September, 1970, that the Subject is in Canada, but that his mother does not have an address for him. The Subject is reported to telephone his mother on occasions. Other neighbors and police have reported Subject to be in Canada at the present time.

In view of the above, the following action should be promptly initiated in an effort to ascertain the location of the Subject:

1. Prepare a letterhead memorandum, in accordance with instructions set forth in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, page 14 (2) (a) I and SAC letter #70-27, dated 5/19/70, in order that information regarding the Subject may be furnished to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
10/20/70
ALA:lcj

294.

2. Place stop notices with the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

3. Place stop, under Subject's name, with the FBI Identification Division.

4. Place stop notices with the appropriate FBI Border Offices.

5. Check toll telephone calls on Subject's parents.

If the objective of this case is obtained, either directly or indirectly as a result of this suggestion memorandum, advise the Bureau by routing slip, attention: The Inspection Division.

Comments of SA GERARD JAMES NORTON, Supervisor RAY M. ANDRESS, and SAC requested.

SA GERARD JAMES NORTON: Inspector's comments are appreciated
10/22/70 and recommendations will be done immediately.

SUPERVISOR RAY M. ANDRESS: This will be followed closely to insure that Inspector's suggestions are carried out.

SAC GEBHARDT: Inspector's comments appreciated. This will be done.

295.

CASE SUGGESTION WRITE-UP

RAND N. DODD
SSAN 548 62 8438 A
ASN 28 189 434
FUGITIVE DESERTER
SF 42-44226
BU 42-284756
OO: SAN FRANCISCO

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: This is a pending case in the San Francisco Office which was opened in July 1969 and is presently assigned to SA JEAN G. HUGHES. It is supervised by SA H. ERNEST WOODBY.

Extended investigation has been conducted since inception of this case in the neighborhood of Subject's parents, 1132 South Sage Court, Sunnyvale, California. When case was initiated, it was determined Subject's family had moved from 870 El Camino, Mountain View, California, the address shown on Subject's DD 553 in 12/68 which was prior to Subject's reported absence from the military in 4/69. Subject's parents have appeared to be cooperative and although present neighbors of Subject's parents are not well acquainted with the Subject, they are cooperative and a neighborhood source has been established.

Subject entered military service in 9/66 at San Jose, California, at which time he was approximately 20 years of age. Since initiation of this investigation, additional past residences have been developed for Subject's parents at 278 Lassen Avenue, Mountain View, California in 9/63; 620 East Mauded Avenue, Sunnyvale, California in 7/68 and 1390 Latham Street, Mountain View, in 7/68. A neighbor has indicated Subject may have a brother but could furnish no specific information concerning his identity. Attempts to establish residence at the Latham Street address have been negative. Mail returned to the U.S. Army addressed to the Latham Street address indicated a possible residence of Apartment 101, 1617 Pine Street, San Francisco, California. Investigation has also indicated past employment for the Subject at Channing House, Palo Alto, California, for a period not stated.

In view of the fact Subject had already entered military service before his parents moved to their current address, it is suggested investigation be concentrated in

San Francisco Inspection
10/22/70
LSM/jb

the following areas to develop background and associates of Subject which may be of assistance in determining his present whereabouts and causing his apprehension:

1. Re-interview parents specifically concerning the identity of any possible brothers or sisters or other close relatives Subject might logically contact.

2. Conduct in depth investigation in areas of family's former residences, correlating this inquiry with results of re-interview of parents, to develop former employments or associates of Subject who may be able to furnish information concerning his present whereabouts.

3. Conduct inquiry at Pine Street address in San Francisco to develop background information of possible assistance in this investigation.

4. Check records at Channing House, Palo Alto, to determine if Subject formerly employed there and for possible leads to associates of Subject, such as listed references or indicated residences.

5. Conduct appropriate credit and criminal checks at Palo Alto and San Francisco.

6. Inasmuch as Subject has been absent for a period in excess of one year, consideration should be given to contacting Baltimore Source 4 should the above leads be unproductive.

If the objective of this case is achieved, either directly or indirectly as a result of this suggestion memorandum, advise the Bureau immediately by routing slip, attention Inspection Division.

Comments of SA JEAN G. HUGHES, Supervisor H. ERNEST WOODBY and SAC requested.

SA JEAN G. HUGHES: The above points have been noted and the investigation will be conducted.
(10/23/70)

SUPERVISOR H. ERNEST WOODBY: The suggestions of the Inspector are appreciated and immediate steps will be taken to carry them out.
(10/23/70)

SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT: I concur with the Inspector's comments.
(10/23/70)

298.

CASE SUGGESTION WRITE-UP

LEE EDWARD BECKHUSEN
SSAN 565-86-4805A
ASN US 56843058
FUGITIVE DESERTER
SF File 42-44534
Bufile 42-279118

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: This is a pending case, San Francisco origin, which was opened 8/4/69. The case had been assigned to SA STEVEN R. BROWN since 3/27/70, and is supervised on the desk of SA H. ERNEST WOODBY.

Subject declared deserter by U.S. Army 2/9/69. On 9/18/69, his mother, MARY BECKHUSEN, advised that the Subject lived with her until June, 1969, and since that time, had stayed with different friends in the Oakland-Berkeley area. Mrs. BECKHUSEN provided a list of other relatives of the Subject. She stated that she had seen the Subject approximately three weeks prior to that date.

On 11/18/69, Mrs. BECKHUSEN advised that she had not seen her son for several months and that he had called her from Death Valley, California, approximately one month prior to that date.

It is suggested that the following investigation be considered at this time:

1. Conduct thorough neighborhood investigation in vicinity of Subject's residence, 949 Madison Street, Albany, California.

2. Attempt to establish reliable neighborhood source who will report the Subject's presence in the event he is staying at or returns to his home address.

3. Interview Subject's brother, LYNN BECKHUSEN, and attempt to determine identity of friends in Oakland-Berkeley area.

San Francisco Inspection
10/23/70
BDW/lla

299.

4. Interview Subject's brother, LAWRIN BECKHUSEN, who resides on Fairview Street, Oakland.

5. Consider contacting Baltimore CS-4 for information regarding the Subject's employment.

These leads should not be considered all inclusive and case agent should conduct a thorough file review to insure that all logical investigation is being conducted in an effort to locate the Subject.

If the objective of the case is attained, either directly or indirectly as a result of this suggestion memorandum, advise the Bureau immediately by routing slip, attention: Inspection Division.

Comments of SA STEVEN R. BROWN, Supervisor H. ERNEST WOODBY and SAC requested.

SRB

SA STEVEN R. BROWN: The above points have been noted and this, as well as other logical investigation will be conducted.
10/24/70

Supervisor H. ERNEST WOODBY: The suggestions of the Inspector are appreciated and immediate steps will be taken to carry them out.
10/24/70

SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT: I concur with the Inspector's comments.
10/24/70

300.

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

BOND DEFAULT MATTERS

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: As of 10/1/70, the San Francisco Office had 48 bond default matters under investigation. This volume of cases presents a fertile field for increased convictions under the Bond Default classification.

An in depth survey conducted by the Inspection Division disclosed that there has been a significant increase in cases received by the FBI for investigation subsequent to the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1966. This Act liberalized bail and bond procedures in Federal cases whereby subjects were to be considered for release on their own personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond in contrast to previous procedures which required a specific bond, creating an excellent opportunity for us to achieve statistical accomplishments. The ratio of convictions to the number of cases investigated in bond default matters is one of the highest of any violation handled by the Bureau.

One of our offices, namely San Diego, has been responsible for the most significant portion of the Bureau's convictions in bond default matters as a result of effective liaison with the U. S. Attorney, who felt that an indictment obtained under bond default was more easily proven than the substantive offense. When a subject is apprehended, the sentence is, in part, influenced by the U. S. Attorney, who informs the court the length of time the subject's apprehension has been sought by the Bureau. A number of these cases have arisen through charges of narcotics and smuggling of merchandise and aliens across the border. Subjects were brought before a magistrate, and rather than pleading guilty, subjects obtained a court appointed attorney and entered a not guilty plea. They were released then on either personal recognizance or a minimum bond until their scheduled appearance. When the subject failed to appear in court, a bench warrant was issued, San Diego opened a case, and usually within 30 days an indictment was secured under bond default.

SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
10/23/70
WAK:kah

Although San Francisco is not a border office, it is a great port of entry, both by sea and air, and many of the same type cases utilized by San Diego for obtaining a bond default indictment should be available to San Francisco.

As you are aware, convictions are becoming more difficult to obtain because of the court's interpretation of the law in many classifications. Bond default matters present an excellent opportunity to increase your conviction rate, therefore, it is suggested that through your liaison with the U. S. Attorney, point out to him the possibilities for an increase in convictions under the Bond Default Statute.

The necessity to establish effective liaison with the U. S. Attorney in bond default matters was set out in SAC Letter 70-13 dated 3/17/70.

If an increase in cases and convictions is obtained as a result of this Suggestion Memorandum, advise the Bureau by routing slip, attention Inspection Division.

Comments of Supervisor DE JEAN and SAC GEBHARDT requested.

SUPERVISOR MORRIS M. DE JEAN: 10/26/70: Close liaison will continue to be maintained with the United States Attorney's office and all avenues of potential convictions will be vigorously pursued to increase the statistical accomplishments in the San Francisco Division.

SAC GEBHARDT: 10/26/70: This matter will be followed and the Inspection Division will be advised if an increase in cases and convictions is obtained.

302.

SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP

ROGER WILLIAM EPPERLEY
SSN 4-4-49-18
SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT
OO: San Francisco
San Francisco File 25-77034

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: This is a closed case which was opened in the San Francisco Office 4/21/70, and closed 6/15/70. At that time, case was assigned to SA ROBERT M. LEONARD and supervised by SA RAY M. ANDRESS. The case was reopened 8/26/70, and assigned to SA RICHARD G. MILLER and supervised by Relief Supervisor RICHARD E. LUEBBEN on the desk of SA ANDRESS. Case was again closed 9/3/70.

The case was initially opened on the basis of a copy of a letter directed to Local Board 4, Eureka, California, from the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station, Oakland. The letter indicated that the Subject reported for induction 4/14/70, was found qualified, but left the building prior to induction. Case was closed 6/15/70, on basis of a memorandum from SA ROBERT M. LEONARD wherein it was pointed out that the violation was not such as to be reported to the U. S. Attorney by the Selective Service System.

Case was reopened 8/26/70, on receipt of a request for investigation from the U. S. Attorney, San Francisco, and assigned to SA RICHARD G. MILLER. Review of the file indicates that Subject was interviewed by SA MILLER 9/1/70, at which time he indicated he would agree to induction.

U. S. Attorney declined prosecution and a closing report was submitted 9/3/70, with copy to U. S. Attorney and San Francisco Office. This report was signed by SA RICHARD E. LUEBBEN. This report contains FD 302 (interview report form) wherein interview of Subject was recorded. The FD 302 fails to indicate that the Subject was advised of the identity of SA MILLER or the nature of the inquiry.

SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
10/26/70
BDW:sad

Agents' handbook, Part II, Page 12 and 12B, instructs that at the beginning of an interview with any known Subject of a Bureau case the Subject be advised of the name and official identify of the interviewing agent and the nature of the inquiry. The fact that the Subject was so advised is to be recorded in the opening paragraph of the FD 302.

EXPLANATIONS REQUESTED:

SA MILLER is requested to explain his failure to advise the Subject of his name and official identity and the nature of the inquiry and to record on FD 302 that this was done.

Relief Supervisor LUEBBEN is requested to explain his failure to detect this delinquency at the time he approved the report on 9/3/70.

Comments of SA ANDRESS and SAC requested.

SA RICHARD GUY MILLER:
10/27/70

At the beginning of the interview at the Humboldt County Jail, Eureka, California, I exhibited my FBI credentials to the subject and advised him of the nature of the inquiry. I apparently inadvertently failed to record this in the opening paragraph of the FD 302 and on review of this FD 302 I inadvertently failed to note this had been omitted from the FD 302. Care will be exercised in the future to insure this does not reoccur.

SA RICHARD E. LUEBBEN:
10/27/70

I was Relief Supervisor on Desk #6 in the absence of the regular supervisor and due to the exceptionally high volume of mail handled by this desk I inadvertently failed to note the above omission from FD 302 of SA MILLER dated 9/1/70 when the report was signed out by me. Every effort will be made in the future to avoid a repitition of this delinquency.

SA RAYMOND M. ANDRESS:
10/27/70

In reference to the report of SA RICHARD GU MILLER signed out by SA LUEBBEN on 9/3/70, SA LUEBBEN was one of the Relief Supervisors during my extended sick leave during this period. SA LUEBBEN is a experienced Relief Supervisor and supervises the desk in a very efficient and commendable manner. Due to the exceptionally heavy volume of mail during this time, he inadvertently overlooked the omission in the FD 302 of SA MILLER. The importance of advising Bureau subjects the identity of Agents and nature of interview will be discussed with the Relief Supervisors periodically and will be followed closely to insure this does not reoccur.

SAC GEBHARDT: Above delinquencies noted and will be followed
10/27/70 closely to insure this does not occur again.

310.

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: There is no Seat of Government culpability in this matter as this error or delinquency could only be detected through a review of the field office file.

SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP

WILLIAM JOSEPH LAPUZZA, AKA.
NSN B 61 78 34
FUDE
OO: OMAHA
OM 42-8670
SF 42-44333
BU 42-285245

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: This is a pending case in the San Francisco Office opened on 7/24/69, assigned to SA JEAN G. HUGHES and reassigned on 12/8/69, to SA KENNETH W. SHEETS. Case is supervised by SA ROBERT D. ROBY.

Review of the file indicates the Subject together with two other Navy deserters had lived in a hippie commune in the San Jose area during August of 1969. Investigation has determined that he has used narcotics and has associated with hippie-type individuals until the present time.

During 8/70, investigation was conducted in San Jose and investigation determined that one JOAN BAUER was also residing in a hippie fashion and was acquainted with the Subject of this investigation as well as the other two Navy deserters.

On 8/13/70, JOAN C. BAUER was interviewed at which time she stated she is employed at National Aeronautics Space Agency (NASA), Ames Research Center, as a secretary at Moffett Field, a Navy installation. During the course of this interview, she stated she was living with a male individual in a common-law relationship. She had formerly considered herself a member of a "family" of hippies including the Subject and another Navy deserter. At the time of interview she advised that the members of this hippie "family" received mail at her address and the reason for maintaining the address is to receive food stamps for this hippie "family" living in a commune style. She stated she occasionally picks up their mail at her home and admitted on occasion taking the mail to them when she visits the "family". This interview was conducted at Moffett Field. The information concerning BAUER was orally disseminated to the Security Officer, NASA, Ames Research Center, on 8/13/70.

San Francisco Inspection
10/23/70
JHO/lla

The Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part 2, Section 5, Page 7, indicates that Bureau policy under Executive Order 10450 is to furnish the Civil Service Commission all pertinent identifiable, derogatory non-subversive information relative to employees of the Executive Branch of the government. This is normally accomplished by including such information in letterhead memorandum form and transmitting same to the Bureau for appropriate dissemination.

INSTRUCTIONS

Immediately handle this matter in accordance with Bureau instructions cited above.

EXPLANATIONS REQUESTED

1. SA KENNETH W. SHEETS is requested to explain why he neglected to forward to the Bureau in letterhead memorandum form the information developed concerning JOAN C. BAUER, as required by existing Bureau instructions.

2. Supervisor ROBERT D. ROBY is requested to explain why, in his over-all supervision of this case, he did not detect this error as set out above.

Comments of SAC requested.

SA SHEETS: JOAN C. BAUER advised at the outset of the interview on 8/13/70 that she could consider herself a member of the communal "family", however, this became a matter of interpretation during the course of interview and eventually she denied she was a member of the "family" or commune. She admitted visiting people connected with the commune and associating with them, even to the extent of allowing some of these individuals to use her address for the purpose of receiving mail and food stamps.

This matter was discussed at length with Security Officer RALPH MAINES and JOHN VAN ETTEN, Head of Security at NASA, Moffett Field, California. They made no statement as to what action they intended to take.

I realize now that I should have also prepared a letterhead memorandum for dissemination to NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. I regret not having done so and in the future will insure that such matters are promptly disseminated.

312.

SUPERVISOR ROBERT D. ROBY: On 9/30/70 I approved a communication prepared by SA SHEETS to office of origin incorporating interview of JOAN C. BAUER, referred to above. At the time, my primary attention was directed toward information furnished in the substantive fugitive investigation and I failed to consider the nature of BAUER's employment. I agree that the information pointed out by the Inspector should have been furnished to the Bureau in letterhead memorandum form for dissemination at the Seat of Government. Letterhead memorandum has now been prepared and forwarded to the Bureau. I regret my oversight in this instance and will be alert for similar situations in the future to insure that all data which should be disseminated by letterhead memorandum is promptly submitted.

SAC GEBHARDT: Letterhead memorandum should have been prepared at the time of the initial interview with JOAN C. BAUER. I will continue to emphasize the necessity of prompt dissemination of information obtained during our investigations which may be of interest to other governmental agencies.

102

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: There is no Seat of Government culpability in this matter as this error or delinquency could only be detected through a review of the field office file.

SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP

JIMMY LA VERNE BUSHBAUM,
ALSO KNOWN AS
JAMES L. BUSHBAUM - FUGITIVE
UFAC - MURDER
OO: LOS ANGELES
SF 88-9478
LA 88-11640
BU 88-35799

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: This case was opened in 9/65 with San Francisco as Office of Origin. Bureau changed Office of Origin to Los Angeles 7/19/66. Case has been opened periodically in San Francisco Division to cover leads. Case reopened 5/4/70 and assigned to SA DOUGLAS R. AHLSTROM. Case is supervised by SA BRYON C. WHEELER. Case was closed (RUC) on 10/15/70.

Subject escaped from custody at San Quentin Prison 9/16/65. Authorized complaint filed 10/21/65 before U.S. Commissioner, San Francisco, California. Bureau changed Office of Origin to Los Angeles because Subject's relatives and friends live in the Los Angeles area and all logical leads had been coveredin the San Francisco Division.

Los Angeles by letter dated 4/24/70 requested the San Francisco Office to identify the holders of two telephone numbers concerning long-distance telephone calls from home telephone of Mrs. MARLYS CONNOLLY, Rialto, California. San Francisco by letter dated 6/30/70 identified one telephone number registered to the Subject's sister, Mrs. MELVIN GLAZE of Point Arena and subsequent contact with Mrs. GLAZE failed to develop any information concerning the Subject. No investigatic was conducted to identify holder of telephone number 933-8871 at Walnut Creek, California between 5/4/70 (date case reopened) and 10/15/70 (date case RUCed).

INSTRUCTION:

Immediately reopen this case and conduct logical investigation requested in Los Angeles letter dated 4/24/70.

San Francisco Inspection
10/26/70
WAK/jb

EXPLANATIONS REQUESTED:

SA DOUGLAS R. AHLSTROM is requested to explain why he failed to detect the lead at Walnut Creek had not been covered before the case was closed on 10/15/70.

Field Supervisor BRYON C. WHEELER is requested to explain why he failed to assign a lead to a Walnut Creek Resident Agent to conduct an investigation to identify the holder of the telephone number and why he failed to insure that this investigation had been conducted before he approved the closing of this case (San Francisco letter to Los Angeles dated 10/15/70).

Comments of SAC requested.

SA DOUGLAS R. AHLSTROM: The writer was of the impression that the lead at Walnut Creek to identify a telephone subscriber had been covered and reported at the time the case was RUC'd on 10/15/70. The writer did not have the file available as the RUC communication was submitted from the Santa Rosa Residence Agency and was therefore unable to make a thorough review of the file. Steps will be taken to make certain this does not recur in the future.

SUPERVISOR BRYON C. WHEELER: The lead to check out a telephone number at Walnut Creek was inadvertently overlooked at the time the case was reopened and assigned to SA AHLSTROM. Upon receipt of the RUC communication closing the case on 10/15/70, the fact that the Walnut Creek lead had not been covered was overlooked. Efforts will be made to make certain this does not recur in the future. Case reopened.

SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT: The above write-up and explanations have been noted. It will be stressed among Special Agent and Supervisory personnel in this office the importance of guarding against a situation of this kind happening in the future.

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: There is no Seat of Government culpability in this matter as this error or delinquency could only be detected through a review of the field office file.

106

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

477 THRU 1ST NR 497

3RD NR 497 THRU 499

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/28/75

FROM : R. L. Shackelford

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Reference is made to W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum dated 7/24/75, captioned as above. This memorandum advised CIA had prepared a document citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities may have exceeded its legal mandate. Portions of this CIA document were furnished this Bureau and referenced memorandum requested documents pertaining to a particular Bureau division and/or Intelligence Division section be reviewed to identify the subject matter and make an assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation is involved. Those portions of the CIA document pertaining to the IS-2 Section of the Intelligence Division are pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203, 330, and 482.

A review has been made of the material, supra, and the following comments apply:

Pages 29, 30, under the heading "Merrimac," refer to recruitment and handling of "several Agents" to covertly monitor dissident groups in the Washington area and states one was so successful the "Agent" was turned over to the FBI. We have no idea who the "Agent" was and in absence of identifying information no compromise exists to Bureau operations.

REC-102 62-116395-499

Page 171 refers to CIA producing a document titled "Restless Youth" in two versions. The version dealing with radical students in America was sent only to the President and two other high officials. Page 171, itself, in no way compromises Bureau operations.

14 AUG 11 1975

Pages 190, 191, also deal with the "Restless Youth" document, which disclose the document only went to ~~nine~~ readers, "a copy may be in the Johnson Library," and refers to updating of the document. These pages, themselves, in no way compromise Bureau operations.

62-116395

KAM:lm
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 AUG 13 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

Pages 193, 194, refer to CIA participation in preparation of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the foreign connections of U. S. organizations and activists involved in the anti-war movement. Reference is made to collecting information from their own sources "and through liaison with the FBI." A reference is also made to primary source of information being "sensitive intercepts produced by NSA." While these pages do not directly compromise Bureau operations, disclosure of NSA intercepts could well indirectly adversely affect Bureau operations by disclosure of sensitive techniques which produce extremely valuable information to the intelligence community, of which the FBI is a part.

Pages 197, 198, refer to the response to an inquiry as to involvement in domestic affairs by the Director, Central Reference Service, CIA, and in no way compromises Bureau operations.

Page 203 refers to a similar response by Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, CIA, and includes a reference to their monitoring foreign broadcasts of Jane Fonda and Ramsey Clark and furnishing transcripts at the request of the FBI and Department of Justice for consideration for possible trial use. There is no compromise of Bureau operations involved as this was to be evidence in a public trial and would have required CIA personnel to publicly testify.

Page 330 again makes reference to "Restless Youth" and use of FBI reports. It also refers to a 1967 CIA study of "SDS and its foreign ties." The page, itself, does not compromise Bureau operations.

Page 482 refers to a "project MPLODESTAR," which involved manipulation of assets against targets in the "leftist and communist milieu in various parts of the world." Comments include "each case is cleared with the FBI..." The page itself does not compromise Bureau operations.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

ACTION:

None. For information.

Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the information contained therein should be closely guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know basis.

KAM ABG EP/GL wRW

JBB/PLM

KI

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Cochran

DATE: 7/28/75

FROM : T. F. Kelleher TK

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide an assessment of the accuracy and possible damage that might be suffered by the Bureau by the release of information to the Senate Select Committee by CIA as set forth in Cregar to Wannall memorandum dated 7/24/75 captioned as above.

Attached are separate commentaries relating to items appearing on corresponding page numbers in the CIA document.

It is to be noted that no written record or personal recollection could be located concerning item 7, page 00118 relating to the purchase of cameras.

Attached are nine pages containing the results of the requested assessment. Copies of these assessments have also been made for each designated copy of this memorandum.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosures

TJM

REC- 102

62-116395-498

PLM

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. McNiff

~~SECRET~~

14 AUG 11 1975

TFK:eb
(4)

TK/TJM

Classified by 129
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DOWNGRADED TO
SECRET
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-1-11

5

84 AUG 13 1975

RE: SENSTUDY

The following are comments prepared by the Radio Engineering Section of the FBI Laboratory and relate to copies of excerpted pages from a report written by the Central Intelligence Agency. Comments are keyed to page numbers which appear in the lower right-hand corner of each sheet.

1. Page 00112

Paragraph b. refers to FBI purchases of television equipment and is accurate as to equipment obtained. According to Bureau records, Purchase Order #21100 was issued to CIA on 4/11/73 and was amended 9/24/73. The items were 1 each WTC-20 @ $18,300 and 1 each WTC-23 @ $18,600. Purchase Order #21469 dated 5/1/73 was issued to CIA for 2 each lens systems totaling $11,200.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

2. Page 00118

Item 9 lists 50 "Actuators, Recorders." This entry is partially correct.

Bureau records show that Purchase Order #8989 was issued to CIA on 11/17/71 for 30 each QTC-11s at $488.25, and 20 each QTC-12As at $236.25.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

Item 11 lists 1 "Camera, Video." This entry could refer to that transaction detailed in Purchase Order #18301 issued to CIA on 11/27/72 for 1 each WTC-20 camera in the amount of $18,400. Tubes installed in these cameras were of the type mentioned under Item 12 and 13 below.

Item 12 lists 1 "Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent of WL 30691." This entry is accurate.

62-116395-498

ENCLOSURE

Purchase Order #16555 was issued to CIA on 9/21/72 in the amount of $4,639. The video tube was for use in a closed circuit television camera.

Item 13 lists 2 "Tube, Image, WL 30691" as having been furnished the FBI on 3/26/71 at a cost of $4,607 each. This entry is probably a duplication of Item 4 on page 0019. Bureau records show that Purchase Order #5450 dated 5/21/71 was issued to CIA for this equipment for use in CCTV cameras. No purchase order to support two such acquisitions (March and May) could be located.

Item 14 lists 2 "Cameras, Television" at a unit cost of $18,300. This entry probably refers to that equipment acquired under Purchase Order #21100 and is detailed in Paragraph b. page 00112, above.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

3. Page 00119

Item 2 lists 25 "Actuators, Recorders." The entry is accurate.

Purchase Order #17204 was issued to CIA on 10/18/72 for 25 each QTC-11s @ $591.94. This equipment is identical to that obtained on Purchase Order #8989 mentioned above.

Item 3 lists "Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance" etc., and is a duplication of Item 12 on page 00118. Note identical dates.

Item 4 lists "Tube, Image, WL 30691" and is believed to refer to the transaction carried as Item 13 on page 00118.

Items 5, 6, and 7 list "Transmitters, Module, Plug-In, and Power Supply - UWP-39A." These entries are essentially accurate.

Purchase Order #4203 was issued to CIA on 4/6/71 for 2 each transmitters SRT-67 @ $1372.35; 1 each transmitter QRT-10A @3160.33; 1 each module QWT-18 @ $1247.40; and, 1 each power supply UWP-39A @ $538.65.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

4. Page 00221

Item (A) is believed to be accurate and in the absence of additional detail no serious damage would be suffered by release of this information.

Item (B) is accurate and as long as target is not specifically identified no serious damage should be incurred. It should be recognized, however, that although the concept of intercepting cryptographic machine emanations would come as no surprise to those familiar with intelligence work, confirmation of a functioning system could encourage implementation of countermeasures which would deprive the U.S. of invaluable information.

Item (C) is accurate except that the equipment has not been operated for some time. Without specific identification no serious damage would result from disclosure of this information.

Item (D) is inaccurate to the extent that it states that "installation is not fully operational because the full complement of personnel have not yet arrived." Aside from that, disclosure of information could lead the knowledgeable foreign government to be certain of Bureau's participation and take whatever diplomatic steps they felt necessary. Decision to withhold is an operational/political one rather than one which would affect technical capabilities and, therefore, the Laboratory is making no recommendations in this regard.

5. Page 00222

Item (E) is accurate and entirely too revealing. If there is any way this item can be deleted from material yet to be given to anyone outside the intelligence community, it should be done. As written, it suggests a concerted effort toward a penetration to be attempted in the future. Disclosure of this information could easily negate millions of dollars already spent and literally years of work already performed - the largest single project ever undertaken by this Bureau. In view of our responsibilities in the counter-intelligence field, the FBI, as well as the intelligence community, and perhaps the free world as well, would suffer incalculable harm from release of this information. It would also be appropriate for the Intelligence Division to comment on this item.

Item (F) is accurate and, although its disclosure is confirmatory no serious technical damage would result from its disclosure. To our knowledge, there has been no diplomatic protest, disclosure could precipitate such protest. Intelligence Division may wish to comment regarding this possibility.

Item (G) asserts that in one case it is known that CIA equipment was used against a "domestic target." This is insufficient information to identify this matter.

ARABIC LINGUISTS

(Item 6, pgs. 182 & 202) X

With regard to press allegations concerning the use of polygraph, it was noted that during July 1971 the President was alleged to be furious with unauthorized disclosure of classified information relative to the SALT Talks as disclosed in the New York Times. The President directed a sweeping investigation to determine the source of the disclosure and this was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and others of the White House Staff.

A subsequent article in the Washington Post dated September 3, 1971 stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT Talks in July. This statement is not accurate and the Director of the FBI (J. Edgar Hoover) denied this allegation in a letter to the Washington Post and said that the polygraph examinations had been conducted by another agency.

As noted in the CIA notes in fact, it was CIA that conducted the polygraph examination in conjunction with the State Department and the FBI was not involved in any way in these polygraph examinations. It is recalled that FBI officials had been called to a White House meeting headed by Mr. Krogh in which it was indicated we might have to conduct some polygraph examinations and were so alerted. A subsequent call from the White House to the FBI instructed that the FBI polygraph examinations would not be required.

In view of above, it does not appear the FBI would incur any damage to its reputation or recognized use of the polygraph in carefully selected criminal and security matters in which we have jurisdiction.

X

POLYGRAPH
(Item 7, pgs 65-67) X SECRET

In regard to the CIA notes concerning the subject of the lending of Arabic linguists to the FBI, the following is noted:

The FBI's linguistic capacity is limited to those foreign languages in which translators can be fully utilized on a full-time basis. When we need translations of foreign language material beyond our normal translation capacity, we turn to the governmental linguistic community for assistance. Such help has been obtained in the past from such agencies as the Library of Congress, Voice of America, Foreign Service Institute, Defense Language Institute, CIA, NSA, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U. S. Information Agency and Smithsonian Institution. On occasions, we have also turned to private citizens for help in very unique situations involving exotic or rare languages.

The massacre of the Israeli athletes in Munich at the 1972 Summer Olympics and other Arab terrorist acts fomented a situation involving the national security of the United States. The FBI needed immediate assistance in the Arabic language field. A program was immediately instituted to hire our own Arabic translators and, in the interim period, CIA lent to our Washington Field Office the necessary Arabic translators to fulfill our responsibilities.

The opening of the People's Republic of China Liaison Office in Washington also created a need in the Washington Field Office for Chinese translators with special talents. Two such translators were borrowed from CIA and one of them became an FBI employee for a short time following his retirement from CIA.

All arrangements for the loan of Arabic and Chinese linguists from CIA were effected by the Intelligence Division and the Washington Field Office through their liaison with CIA, and the FBI Laboratory was not directly involved.

In summary, the CIA notes are accurate. It is not believed, however, that the FBI would incur any embarrassment or damages as a result of this interagency cooperation.

X SECRET

SECRET

DISCUSSIONS ON IMAGERY ENHANCEMENT TECHNIQUES

Item 8, (Pg. 00234)

Current personnel are unable to verify or disclaim contact with CIA regarding this photographic technique.

In all likelihood, this contact was made in conjunction with our continuing technical liaison with other Federal agencies.

This consultation was entirely proper and made to augment the Bureau's capabilities in this area. No deleterious effect can be seen as a result of exposure of this information.

SECRET

PURCHASE OF CAMERAS

(Item 7, Pg. 00118)

Based on the information furnished, no written record or personal recollection of current employees can attest to or disclaim ~~the~~ whether "20 camera sets" at a unit cost of $656 were purchased from CIA.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

PURCHASE OF CAMERAS

(Item 8, Pg. 00118)

The F. B. I., by purchase order #1793 dated 1/20/72, contracted for the purchase of 10 Tessina cameras on a transfer of funds basis arranged as a result of our liaison with the Technical Services Division of CIA. Cost of these cameras amounted to $7,000.

The Tessina camera is a small, sophisticated camera which is employed in concealment devices needed for photographic surveillances.

Although the exact nature of the concealment devices we employ is not publicized, the disclosure of the fact that we purchased cameras suitable for this use is not considered inimical to our operations.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

FBI

SECRET

0

August 4, 1975

Senstudy-75

REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

I. Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 18, 1975:

A. The notebook or binder containing materials on FBI legal authority and maintained in the Office of the Special Counsel.

B. Materials pertaining to FBI-CIA relations in 1970 previously made accessible at FBIHQ in excised form; unexcised versions of the memoranda bearing the item-number designations 8, 9, 30, 32, and 37.

C. "Foreign Operations Policy Manual," previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

(8-15-75) — D. The following materials maintained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files and designated "non-derogatory," previously examined by SSC staff:

1. Agreement Between FBI and Secret Service;
2. Attorney General - Submission of Memoranda by FBI;
3. "Black Bag" Jobs;
4. Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence Coverage;
5. Intelligence Coverage - Domestic and Foreign;
6. Directives (60);
7. Cook, Fred (52).

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
9 AUG 6 1975

E. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the individuals whose names are underscored on the attached list (slightly expanded from previous access request).

F. Inspection Reports on the Intelligence Division and the San Francisco Field Office, as currently sanitized.

-5 Phillips

Rec'd from Senate Select Committee

84 AUG 6 1975

II. Newly requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 15, 1975:

A. All of Section 8 of the Manual of Instructions.

B. Sections 1, 6, 7H, 7J, 8L, and 14 F of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

C. Superseding versions of Section 6 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

D. The following materials referred to in memoranda previously delivered to SSC regarding FBI Legal Attaches:

1. Memoranda of W. C. Sullivan of June 7, 1971, and June 16, 1971;

2. Memoranda of Mr. Wannall of May 27, 1971, and May 28, 1971;

3. Letter of Hoover to the President dated September 21, 1970;

4. Memorandum of W. C. Sullivan dated September 22, 1970;

5. Memorandum of Mr. Brennan dated September 21, 1970;

6. Memorandum of Mr. Child of May 23, 1969;

7. Recommendations of Dalby, Felt, and Beaver upon the recommendation made in memorandum of Sullivan of June 7, 1971;

8. Materials pertaining to conversations between the President and Hoover regarding foreign liaison operations in September 1970;

9. Materials pertaining to conversations between Dr. Kissinger and Hoover in December 1970;

10. Materials pertaining to communications between the FBI and the State Department regarding foreign liaison operations in 1970;

11. Materials pertaining to a conference with the President regarding foreign liaison operations in June 1971;

12. Material pertaining to an inspection of all FBI foreign liaison posts conducted in 1971 pursuant to instructions from Hoover to Assistant Director Ponder in charge of inspections.

E. Materials pertaining to the origin, operation, and termination of the Mass Media Program implemented by the former FBI Crime Records Division.

F. Materials pertaining to the establishment and functions of the FBI External Affairs Division.

G. "Guide to Indexing" and "Rules Pertaining to the General Index", cited at p. 14, Volume 1, of the Classifying Instructor's Guide.

H. "The Standard Sub List".

I. The following materials pertaining to Project INLET:

  1. Materials reflecting approval of the Project on or about November 20, 1969.

  2. Inspection Report referred to in SAC Memorandum of December 26, 1972.

  ~~3. Any materials pertaining to recommendations that the Project be terminated~~.

  4. Letter from FBI to Congressman Les Aspin in 1973 regarding the Project.

J. Materials pertaining to the policies and procedures of the FBI for the use of FBI agents for so-called "undercover" activity.

III. Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by August 18, 1975:

A. The following materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro Agnew:

1. All materials pertaining to the authorization or re-authorization by the President or the Attorney General of technical surveillance of the South Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C. in 1968.

2. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault in November 1968.

3. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Vice Presidential candidate Spirto T. Agnew in November 1968.

4. All materials summarizing the results of technical or physical surveillance, including incidental overhearings, and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.

5. All materials pertaining to White House instructions to the FBI for the handling of the summary letters described in item 4 above.

6. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary letters described in item 4 above.

7. The current addresses of the following former Special Agents, who may have participated in the technical or physical surveillance or "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault or Spiro T. Agnew:

   a. Phil Claridge

   b. William Jackson

B. The following materials pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Radford:

1. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillances of Yeoman Charles E. Radford from December 1971 to June 1972.

2. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of two close personal friends of Yeoman Radford one retired from the Navy, the other a State Department employee, from January to April 1972.

3. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of Yeoman Radford's step-father in Oregon from February to April 1972.

4. All materials summarizing the results of the technical surveillances described in items 1 through 3 above.

5. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary described in item 4 above.

C. With respect to surreptitious entries carried out by the FBI from January 1, 1960 to the present, all materials pertaining to the following:

1. The date, place, target, and purpose of each entry;

2. The request and authorization for each entry including the identities of the agencies and/or individuals who requested and/or authorized the entry;

3. The procedures and methods used for the conduct of each entry;

4. The results of each entry, including the information obtained and the identities of

the agencies and/or individuals to whom the information was disseminated.

D. Materials pertaining to any jurisdictional agreements, agreements of coordination, or other agreements between the FBI and any other federal, state or local agency with regard to the conduct of and dissemination of information from surreptitious entries.

E. The performance ratings (Form FD 185) of the following current or former FBI employees;

1. George Berley
2. Wilfred Bergeron
3. William D. Campbell
4. Richard Suter
5. William Tucker
6. Terry O'Connor
7. Joseph English

F. The current office assignment or last known address of the individuals listed in E. above.

G. The following materials pertaining to NSA watch list activity, reportedly in operation from late 1967 through 1973, which involved the monitoring of international communications that were addressed to, or from, or included the names of persons on a changing "watch list:"](S)

1. All materials pertaining to the proposing, approving, putting names on, executing, evaluating, or terminating the watch list activity;
2. All materials (including correspondence) sent by the FBI to the National Security Agency or any other entity in the Department of Defense listing names for the watch list or otherwise commenting on the activity;

3. Any internal FBI materials produced as part of the activity;

4. Any NSA or Department of Defense materials (including correspondence and reports) regarding the watch list activity sent to the FBI.

H. Materials pertaining to the authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. (CIRCA 1969)

I. "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".

J. Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-In (also known as "Earth Day"), April 22, 1970.

K. Philadelphia FBI Field Office file number 100-51132 (Women's Liberation). (1970-72)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 30 1975

~~TELETYPE~~

~~SECRET~~

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

~~12-19-88 Classified by SPLAG/GM Declassify on: OADR # 293030~~

WDC

NR014 PH CODE

940 PM NITEL JULY 30, 1975 DCC

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PHILADELPHIA (62-0-23222)

SENSTUDY

RE PHILADELPHIA NITEL TO DIRECTOR, JULY 29, 1975, BUREAU PHONE CALL TO PHILADELPHIA AND PHILADELPHIA PHONE CALL TO THE BUREAU, JULY 30, 1975.

ON JULY 30, 1975, ROBERT THWEAT, U.S. NAVY COMMANDER, RETIRED, ADVISED HE HAD NO PERSONAL OBJECTION TO HIS NAME BEING DIVULGED. HOWEVER, THWEAT ADVISED THAT HIS SOURCE IS A RELATIVE AND THAT ONCE THWEAT'S NAME IS DIVULGED IT WOULD IMMEDIATELY IDENTIFY HIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

THWEAT ADVISED HIS SOURCE HAD RELATED TO HIM THAT ONE DANIEL O'FLAHERTY, WHO IS EMPLOYED WITH THE CHURCH COMMITTEE, HAD REMOVED FROM HIS WORK AREA BY HIDING UNDERNEATH HIS SHIRT A CIA MEMORANDUM CONTAINING DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON SENATOR HENRY JACKSON. O'FLAHERTY THEN XEROXED THE MEMORANDUM. THE DATE FOR THIS OCCURRENCE IS NOT KNOWN TO THWEAT. O'FLAHERTY THEN PROVIDED A COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM TO AN UNKNOWN PERSON FOR SUBSEQUENT TRANSMITTAL TO SENATOR MORRIS UDALL. THWEAT ADVISED HIS SOURCE

memo Mr. Cregar to Mr. Wannall
8/11/75 [illegible]

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-75563

FOI/PA # 293030
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
E.O. # 12356
DATE 12-19-88 INITIALS GM

S1 IS [CIA](S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
170 AUG 12 1975

~~SECRET~~

84 AUG 13 1975

SECRET

STATED THAT O'FLAHERTY HAD PERSONALLY RELATED THIS INFORMATION TO THE SOURCE. HE FURTHER STATED THAT O'FLAHERTY HAD RELATED TO THE SOURCE THAT HE, O'FLAHERTY, HAD ALSO TOLD A FORMER ASSOCIATE, MR. KATZ, CURRENTLY A PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VANDERBILT, NASHVILLE, TENN., OF HIS, O'FLAHERTY'S, ACTION. KATZ HAD VOICED A DISPLEASURE AS TO O'FLAHERTY'S ACTION AND DID NOT APPROVE OF HIS ACTION.

[THE CAPTIONED MEMORANDUM DEALT WITH CIA POSSIBLE USE OF DEROGATORY INFORMATION TO DETERMINE THE DIRECTION SENATOR JACKSON WOULD TAKE IN FUTURE ACTIONS HE MIGHT ENCOUNTER WHICH WOULD INVOLVE CIA ACTIVITY.] (1)(S) THWEAT T DOES NOT KNOW IF HIS SOURCE HAS SEEN XEROXED MEMORANDUM. THWEAT HIMSELF HAS NOT SEEN THE MEMORANDUM.

THWEAT ADVISED HE WILL RECONTACT HIS SOURCE AND ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE SOURCE TO COME FORWARD AND REVEAL HIS IDENTITY AND BE COOPERATIVE IN ANY INVESTIGATION. THWEAT FEELS THIS WILL PROBABLY BE THE RESULT OF HIS RECONTACT IN AS MUCH AS SOURCE HAS EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPROVAL OF O'FLAHERTY'S ACTIONS.

PHILA DIV. WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THWEAT AND ADVISE BUREAU.

END

SJP FBIHQ CLR

SECRET

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/14/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP4 ALM/MLP
MDR-16

Removed By 7 9 AUG 1 4 1975

File Number 62-116395-497

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 7/24/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

WRW
RLL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
(ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR)

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

Enclosed are the original and seven copies of seven LHM's prepared at Atlanta and captioned "U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)," subcaptioned and dated as follows:

1. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) W. John Benton by SSC Staff Members" - 7/22/75;
2. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) O. Richard Hamilton by SSC Staff Members" - 7/22/75;
3. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Robert W. Thomson by SSC Staff Members" - 7/22/75;
4. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Donald P. Burgess by SSC Staff Members" - 7/23/75;
5. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Alden F. Miller by SSC Staff Members" - 7/23/75;
6. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Charles T. Haynes by SSC Staff Members" - 7/23/75;
7. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Edward A. Shea by SSC Staff Members" - 7/24/75.

REC-102 62-116395-496

JUL 26 1975

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

The FBI representative who was available ~~in the~~ Atlanta FBI Office for consultation during the interviews was Bureau Supervisor SEYMOR F. PHILLIPS.

2-Bureau (Enc. 56)
1-Atlanta
CTH:rrl (3)

Approved: ______________ Sent AUG 8 1975 M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

84 AUG 13 1975

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Atlanta, Georgia

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 22, 1975

#moel6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-20-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by SA W. John Benton concerning an interview of him by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The interview of SA W. John Benton began at 9:45 A. M. and terminated at 10:32 A. M., July 22, 1975. At the outset of the interview no mention was made of SA Benton's rights by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo.

SA Benton was asked how long he had served with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). SA Benton advised from December, 1956 to the present time.

SA Benton was asked what offices he had been assigned to. SA Benton advised the FBI Identification Division, Washington, D. C.; the Atlanta Field Division, Atlanta, Georgia; FBI Agents Training at Washington, D. C.; Oklahoma City Field Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Indianapolis Field Division, Indianapolis, Indiana; and the Knoxville Field Division, Knoxville, Tennessee, having current assignment in the Chattanooga Resident Agency, Chattanooga, Tennessee.

SA Benton was asked how long he had been assigned at Chattanooga, Tennessee. SA Benton advised from March 15, 1974 to the present date.

- -

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-496

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Benton was asked the period of time he was assigned to the Atlanta Field Division. SA Benton advised from 1959 until August 22, 1966.

SA Benton was asked during what period of time he was assigned to the King investigation. SA Benton advised from his best recollection during the year 1964. SA Benton was asked if he conducted any investigation regarding the King case prior to his assignment during 1964 and SA Benton answered in the negative.

SA Benton was asked what his job responsibilities were concerning the monitoring of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) headquarters and King telephones. SA Benton advised his job responsibilities dealt with the monitoring of incoming and outgoing telephone calls.

SA Benton was asked what did he do when receiving or intercepting incoming or outgoing calls. SA Benton advised a written log was maintained of incoming and outgoing calls and only the pertinent facts of the calls were written on the log. SA Benton further advised the incoming and outgoing calls were tape recorded. SA Benton was asked how many telephones were monitored at the SCLC headquarters and at the King residence. SA Benton advised he did not recall the exact number of telephone lines monitored; however, there were several lines.

SA Benton was asked the names of Agents assigned with him to monitor telephone calls. SA Benton advised his best recollection was that SA Hamilton, SA Burgess and SA Thomsom were assigned at the location during the period SA Benton monitored the telephones.

SA Benton was asked the location of the plant, the floor and room number where the plant was located. SA Benton advised the plant was located in an apartment building directly across the street from the FBI Atlanta Field Division, and he does not recall the floor or room number of the plant.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Benton was asked who directed him to monitor the telephones. SA Benton advised the Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Joseph K. Ponder, directed him to his job assignment on the King investigation.

SA Benton was asked what did he do with the logs and tapes at the end of each day's work. SA Benton advised the logs and tapes were handled by other Special Agents of the FBI assigned to the case.

SA Benton was asked who the supervising or case Agent was in the King investigation. SA Benton advised SA Robert Nichols was the case Agent in charge of the King investigation.

SA Benton was asked how many squads were located in the Atlanta Division at the time the telephones were being monitored. SA Benton advised there were four squads in the Atlanta Division at that time. SA Benton was asked which squad handled the investigation of the King matter and SA Benton advised the Number 3 Squad handled the King investigation.

SA Benton was asked who furnished supplies such as tapes and logs to the plant where the monitoring took place. SA Benton advised the supplies were brought to the location by other Special Agents assigned to the case.

SA Benton was asked what happened to the tapes and logs at the end of the day or when a day's work was completed. SA Benton advised to his best knowledge the tapes and logs were turned over to the supervising Agent of the case.

SA Benton was asked whether he dictated any daily summaries or memoranda regarding the monitoring of the telephones. SA Benton advised that he did not dictate any summaries or memoranda at any time regarding the monitoring of the telephones.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Benton was asked who handled the repairs of the equipment if there was a malfunction of the equipment. SA Benton advised the equipment and any repairs to the equipment was handled by SA Miller who was assigned to the Atlanta Field Division.

SA Benton was asked how many files were involved in the King investigation. SA Benton advised to his best recollection there was only one file involved. SA Benton was asked if there were other files where investigation was being conducted regarding SCLC and SCLC members other than the King file. SA Benton advised he did not have any knowledge of any other FBI investigations regarding SCLC or SCLC members.

SA Benton was asked who were some of the named individuals that he was told to listen for and the basis for listening for these particular individuals. SA Benton advised he was instructed to monitor incoming and outgoing calls and that to the best of his knowledge several individuals were of interest to the investigation. These individuals were Stan Levison, Harry Wachtel, Ralph Helstein and Hunter Pitts O'Dell. SA Benton was asked why these individuals or any other named individuals might be of interest to the FBI. SA Benton advised the FBI had developed information that certain individuals that had contact with Martin Luther King, Jr. and SCLC headquarters were either sympathizers to the Communist Party of the United States or possibly members of the Communist Party of the United States.

SA Benton was asked if he received any mail at the plant where the telephones were monitored and if there was a mail box in the apartment complex where mail could be received. SA Benton advised he did not receive any mail at the apartment complex and did not have any knowledge of any mail boxes.

SA Benton was asked if there was a telephone located at the plant and if this telephone was assigned an FBI telephone number. SA Benton advised there was one telephone at the plant and he does not recall the telephone number or in what name this telephone number was assigned.

SA Benton was asked what name the apartment was rented in and who paid the apartment rent. SA Benton advised he did not have any knowledge as to the name the apartment was rented in and he did not know who paid the rent on the apartment.

SA Benton was asked who cleaned up the apartment since it was their understanding that this location was manned by Agents 24 hours a day. SA Benton advised the apartment complex was kept in a clean and orderly manner by Agents assigned to the monitoring operations. SA Benton was asked to give a description of the layout of the apartment. SA Benton advised the apartment contained a kitchen, a living room, a bedroom, and one bathroom.

SA Benton was asked which room the monitoring took place in and SA Benton advised the equipment was located in the bedroom of the apartment.

SA Benton was asked if he had knowledge of any telephone calls intercepted of high elected Government officials and the approximate date these calls might have been intercepted. SA Benton advised to the best of his recollection and while assigned to the monitoring operation there was one telephone call intercepted of a high elected Government official. SA Benton was asked the name of the Government official and the parties involved in the telephone conversation. SA Benton advised the intercepted telephone call was between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Martin Luther King, Jr. SA Benton was asked when this telephone conversation took place and SA Benton advised it took place sometime in 1964 to the best of his recollection. (At no time did SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo ask the contents of the telephone conversation between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Martin Luther King, Jr.)

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Benton was asked if he had any knowledge of any telephone calls intercepted between Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Attorney General of the United States during the period of time he monitored the telephone. SA Benton advised he did not have any knowledge of any calls intercepted between Martin Luther King and the Attorney General of the United States.

SA Benton was asked if he had any knowledge of any telephone calls to the Democratic Convention in 1964 by Martin Luther King, Jr. that were intercepted during the monitoring operation. SA Benton advised he did not have any knowledge of any intercepted calls made by Martin Luther King to the Democratic Convention during 1964.

SA Benton was asked at the time he was assigned to the monitoring of the King telephones by the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta Field Division did he question his assignment. SA Benton advised absolutely not.

SA Benton was asked that during the period he monitored the King telephones did he ask to be relieved of his assignment. SA Benton answered absolutely not.

SA Benton was asked at this time does he question his assignment to the monitoring of the King telephones and SA Benton answered absolutely not.

The interview was terminated at 10:32 A. M. this date, July 22, 1975.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Atlanta, Georgia

July 22, 1975

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-20-01 BY SP2-ALM/JTG

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by SA O. Richard Hamilton concerning an interview of him by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The above-mentioned interview commenced at 10:38 a.m. and concluded at 11:54 a.m. SA Hamilton was not advised of his rights by the SSC Staff Members. The following information is not necessarily in chronological order.

Regarding the period of time of SA Hamilton's FBI employment and period of assignment in Atlanta, Georgia, SA Hamilton advised he became a Special Agent in September, 1951, and has been assigned to the Atlanta Office since February, 1961. SA Hamilton was questioned regarding the period of time he was assigned to the Security Squad in Atlanta. SA Hamilton advised that according to his best recollection, he was assigned to the Security Squad shortly after his arrival in Atlanta in 1961, and continued that assignment until approximately sometime in 1962. At that time he was assigned to a road

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-496

ENCLOSURE

---

trip involving investigations of any FBI matter occurring within that road trip and such assignments were not necessarily connected with the Security Squad. SA Hamilton advised he was reassigned to the Security Squad in Atlanta during the Spring or early Summer of 1964 or 1965, and he believed that, according to his best recollection, this was in 1964.

The SSC Staff Members questioned SA Hamilton as to what, if any, assignment he had regarding the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., or with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). SA Hamilton advised that upon his reassignment to the Security Squad, he was assigned to monitor a wiretap on SCLC and on the residence of King. The Staff Members inquired as to the number of lines monitored and as to the location of the technical installation. SA Hamilton recalled that lines on the SCLC switchboard and SCLC Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS) as well as the residence telephone of King were monitored. The Staff Members inquired whether tapes of conversations were made from the technical installation and SA Hamilton replied that occasionally when it was necessary to record more than one telephone conversation occurring at the same time, that he occasionally would tape one conversation while preparing a handwritten log of another, that thereafter the conversation recorded on tape was reduced to a handwritten log when time permitted. The Staff Members asked what was done with the recorded tapes following the completion of the recording and Hamilton advised that when the conversation had been reduced to writing on a log and the tape was used up, that as best as he could recall, the tape was erased and then reused. The Staff Members asked whether such tapes were reviewed by other FBI personnel and SA Hamilton stated he could not recall any situation where this occurred. The Staff Members inquired as to whether such tapes were further maintained or placed

---

somewhere else and SA Hamilton replied he was not aware of any instance where this was done. The Staff Members asked to whom the case on King was assigned and who was the supervisor of the squad at the time that SA Hamilton was assigned to the monitoring of the installation. They were advised the agent assigned to the case was former SA Robert Nichols and the supervisor was Charles Harding. At that point the Staff Members inquired as to who was the supervisor of the Security Squad when SA Hamilton was first assigned to Atlanta and who were the succeeding supervisors on that squad. They were advised that Mr. Henry Rowse was the supervisor when Hamilton was first assigned to Atlanta and that upon Rowse's transfer to FBI Headquarters, Harding became the supervisor. Thereafter, in approximately 1968, Charles Haynes replaced Harding as supervisor of the Security Squad in Atlanta. The Staff Members inquired as to the reason for the replacement of Harding by Haynes. Hamilton advised that was an administrative decision made by FBI Headquarters and since that did not relate to the investigation pertaining to Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr., he would respectfully decline to discuss that matter. The Staff Members subsequently asked if SA Nichols was subsequently assigned to the Valdosta, Georgia, Resident Agency of the Atlanta Office and, then transferred to another field office. SA Hamilton advised that was correct. The Staff Members inquired as to the reason for SA Nichols' transfer to another field office, to which SA Hamilton replied he felt that question did not relate to the investigation of King and involved an administrative decision by FBI Headquarters; and, therefore, declined to answer.

The Staff Members, after being advised by SA Hamilton that he was assigned to monitoring the technical installation for a period of approximately four months, inquired as to whether he was ever subsequently assigned to any investigation relating to King or SCLC. Hamilton advised the case concerning SCLC was assigned to him upon the retirement of former SA Alan Sentinella in approximately 1970. The Staff Members inquired as to the period of time thereafter that SCLC remained under investigation and what basis if any there was for closing the case. SA Hamilton pointed out that since the reassignment of the case to him occurred after the death of King, he felt that question did not directly relate to the investigation of King and that prior to furnishing an answer to that question, he felt he should confer with a FBI Headquarters representative who was then present in the Atlanta Office of the FBI. The Staff Members advised they did desire an answer to that question and approved of a consultation between SA Hamilton and the FBI Headquarters representative. SA Hamilton conferred with the FBI Headquarters representative then in the Atlanta Office of the FBI and it was agreed the question regarding the closing of SCLC and the assignment of that case to SA Hamilton was outside the parameter of the authority given to SA Hamilton by FBI Headquarters regarding discussion of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. However, in the spirit of cooperation, it was agreed that SA Hamilton would answer the question of the Staff Members in this regard. Thereafter, SA Hamilton advised the FBI investigation regarding SCLC was closed about 1972 or 1973 since a review of the case file failed to reflect any influence by individuals or organizations having affiliations with communist background. In view of that, it was felt the SCLC case should be closed.

The Staff Members inquired as to who made the decision regarding closing of SCLC and whether the matter was first discussed with FBI Headquarters or other individuals within the Atlanta Office of the FBI or if it was a decision made by SA Hamilton alone. Hamilton advised that as he recalled, he reviewed the SCLC case file from that time to a substantial period in the past and that he recommended to the supervisor of the Security

Squad that the case be closed since there had been no known communist influence upon the activities of the SCLC organization for a long period of time. In response to the mechanics of closing the case they were advised that SA Hamilton dictated a letter to FBI Headquarters from the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta Office, advising that a review of the file reflected no communist influence upon the activities of SCLC and that unless advised to the contrary by FBI Headquarters, the case was being closed. The Staff Members asked if a form letter was used whereby blanks were filled in and they were advised this was not the case. The Staff Members inquired if FBI Headquarters agreed with the closing and SA Hamilton advised that to his knowledge, no communication was thereafter received from Headquarters which would disagree with the closing of that case. The Staff Members inquired as to whether SA Hamilton or anyone in Atlanta conferred with any persons in the New York Office of the FBI prior to closing the case and SA Hamilton advised that to his knowledge this did not occur. The Staff Members then inquired as to the basis for closing the case on SCLC as compared with the basis for opening the case originally. Hamilton advised he did not specifically recall the wording of any communications upon which the case was originally opened, however, a review of the case at the time it was closed did not indicate that SCLC might be involved in any activities which could constitute a violation of the Internal Security Statutes. The Staff Members inquired as to whether the investigation was based upon the Smith Act and SA Hamilton stated he did not recall specifically seeing the words "Smith Act", however, FBI investigations regarding communist influence was based upon the communist goal of forceable overthrow of the U.S. Government.

The Staff Members asked if, after the death of King, whether Stanley Levison was in contact with Reverend

Ralph Abernathy, President of SCLC. They were advised by Hamilton that that question was not related to the FBI's investigation of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr., and he would decline to discuss that matter without further consultation with FBI Headquarters representative in the Atlanta Office. The Staff Members did not ask that Hamilton then discuss that point with the Headquarters representative.

The Staff Members inquired as to the identities of other FBI personnel assigned to the monitoring of the technical installation and SA Hamilton advised he recalled that at that time SA Robert Thomson and SA John Benton were assigned to monitoring, however, SA Hamilton could not recall the identities of other agents assigned during the period of time he was assigned to the monitoring of the installation. Staff Members inquired as to the reason for SA Hamilton being removed from the assignment of monitoring the installation and Hamilton replied that he requested he be removed for the purpose of being reassigned to security investigative matters. Hamilton stated that shortly after discussing this desire with Supervisor Harding, he was taken off the assignment and was given other investigative assignments. They inquired as to whether Hamilton questioned the propriety of the technical installation regarding King and SCLC and Hamilton replied that he did not question such propriety. The Staff Members inquired as to the names Hamilton was instructed to listen for on the installation and Hamilton replied he recalls being instructed to listen for conversations of individuals by the names of Stanley Levison and Harry Wachtel. They asked if he was instructed to listen for conversations of individuals by the names of Helstein and O'Dell. Hamilton advised the name Helstein was familiar although he could not recall specific instructions regarding him but recalled that he was instructed and did listen for conversations of Hunter Pitts O'Dell.

Staff Members asked whether the Atlanta FBI Office maintained subfiles regarding Doctor Martin Luther

King, Jr., or SCLC or whether the Atlanta Office or FBI Headquarters maintained a JUNE file regarding King. SA Hamilton advised he could not recall the maintaining of subfiles and could not recall a JUNE file relating to King. They asked if the FBI maintained a case regarding Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., and SA Hamilton advised he could not recall at this time whether such a file was maintained on Mrs. King.

During the interview the Staff Members asked who handled the arrangements for renting the apartment where the technical installation was located and where it was located. Hamilton advised the installation was located in an apartment at 300 West Peachtree Street, but he could not recall in which apartment it was located. They inquired as to the identities of the individuals who handled the rental and who made the rent payments and SA Hamilton advised he did not know that information. They asked whether or not FBI inspectors ever inspected the installation or if during the course of an inspection of the FBI Office in Atlanta whether they visited the installation. Hamilton advised he was not aware of any inspection of the installation or visit of it by inspectors.

The Staff Members asked if Hamilton could recall any contact with King by any political personalities, public officials, or officeholders, to which Hamilton replied he could not at that time recall any such contacts.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Atlanta, Georgia

July 22, 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-20-01 BY SP2 ALM/JG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ROBERT W. THOMSON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by SA Robert W. Thomson concerning an interview of him by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

No mention was made at the outset of this interview by either Michael Epstein or Mary DeOreo as to any Constitutional rights of SA Thomson.

The interview commenced at approximately 3:15 P. M. and was terminated at approximately 3:32 P. M. Set forth as follows are the results of this interview which are not necessarily in chronological order:

SA Thomson was requested to furnish the approximate date of his assignment to Atlanta as well as his assignment to other divisions. SA Thomson advised that he entered on duty with the FBI in July, 1947, and was assigned to FBI Headquarters, New York City and Albany, New York as both a clerical employee and as a special employee. SA Thomson was appointed an Agent in 1962 and was assigned to the Little Rock Office until approximately the middle of May, 1964, when he was assigned to the Atlanta Office.

SA Thomson was asked if he worked security matters in Little Rock, which was answered no and he was then asked if his assignment upon reporting to Atlanta was in the security

62-116395-496

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

---

field. SA Thomson advised that he was assigned to the security squad and upon questioning stated that the nature of this security assignment was to monitor the telephones of Martin Luther King, Jr., both at his residence and his office. SA Thomson advised that he continued in this assignment until approximately August, 1964, when he was transferred to the Columbus, Georgia, Resident Agency.

SA Thomson was asked the reason for his transfer from Little Rock to Atlanta and thereafter to the Columbus, Georgia, Resident Agency, at which time SA Thomson replied that both transfers were routine transfers, the transfer to Columbus due to the fact an opening had been created in the Resident Agency.

SA Thomson further advised that in 1969 he was transferred from the Columbus, Georgia, Resident Agency back to Atlanta, Georgia and that for a short period of time in 1971 was assigned to security work in the Atlanta Office.

SA Thomson was asked that upon his return to Atlanta and engaged in security work in 1971, if he was aware of any pending investigation concerning SCLC and SA Thomson advised he could not recall any investigation of SCLC but could state that he was not involved in any if there was such an investigation.

SA Thomson was asked if he had any knowledge as to when this telephone monitoring of Martin Luther King was instituted or when it was discontinued. SA Thomson replied that he had no such knowledge.

SA Thomson was further questioned as to what pertinent instructions were furnished him in regard to his monitoring of Marting Luther King's telephones and who gave these instructions. SA Thomson advised that the supervisor at that time was Special Agent Charles S. Harding and that SA Thomson was advised that the monitoring of these telephones was being done because of national security and information was to be obtained concerning King's contacts and associates, and the reason for such contacts.

SA Thomson was questioned if he ever questioned himself at any time as to the morality or justification for this monitoring. SA Thomson replied that after having only worked on such monitoring for two months he had no question in his mind as to the reason for this telephone monitoring.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ROBERT W. THOMSON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Thomson was asked how many telephone lines were monitored or if he knew the exact location of the telephones being monitored at which time SA Thomson stated he could not recall exactly how many telephones were being monitored but that they were at the residence of Martin Luther King and SCLC, and that he could not furnish the addresses of either of these locations. In addition, SA Thomson was asked if he typed logs or handwrote them. SA Thomson replied that he utilized both methods.

SA Thomson was asked if he was furnished any list of names of certain individuals to be on the lookout for in contacts by Martin Luther King. SA Thomson stated he could not recall any such list. In addition, when asked where the physical location of this telephone monitoring was accomplished, SA Thomson advised that it was at the Peachtree Towers Apartments but that he could not furnish the exact room or floor utilized.

SA Thomson was asked if he ever highlighted or placed additional emphasis on any of the telephone calls that he monitored. SA Thomson replied that no such emphasis was placed on any such call, and when asked if SA Thomson prepared any other forms or memoranda or communications regarding any of the telephone calls, he monitored, SA Thomson replied in the negative.

SA Thomson was asked if he could recall Martin Luther King or any of the other persons monitored being in any telephone contact with any public officials. SA Thomson replied that he could not specifically recall any such telephone conversations, however, during the time SA Thomson was assigned these monitoring duties Martin Luther King was traveling to other cities and it is entirely possible that Martin Luther King could have been in contact with some officials.

SA Thomson was asked for the identities of other persons also assigned monitoring duties during the time he was so engaged. SA Thomson stated that he recalled that SAs John Benton, O. Richard Hamilton, Don Burgess and Brian O'Shea also were engaged in monitoring of the telephones.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ROBERT W. THOMSON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Thomson was asked if any stenographic personnel were utilized at the monitoring site. SA Thomson replied in the negative.

SA Thomson was asked for the procedure utilized in handling the logs and tapes used to record the telephone conversations. SA Thomson stated that to the best of his recollection the logs were delivered by the Agent on duty each morning to the office and that the tapes were utilized over and over again for recording telephone calls.

At this point both Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo stated that they had no further questions of SA Thomson and the interview was concluded.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Atlanta, Georgia

July 23, 1975

7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-20-01 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

#MDR16

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by SA Donald P. Burgess concerning an interview of him by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The interview of SA Donald P. Burgess commenced at approximately 3:45 P.M. and terminated at approximately 4:45 P.M. At no time during the interview was any mention made to SA Burgess regarding his rights by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo.

The results of this interview will not necessarily be in chronological order, but will be to the best recollection of SA Burgess.

At the outset of the interview, SA Burgess was asked when he was assigned to the Atlanta Office of the FBI and SA Burgess replied to the best of his recollection it was at the end of July or the first part of August, 1964. SA Burgess was also asked how long he had been in the FBI, to which he replied since January, 1951.

SA Burgess was asked what his duties were and to what squad he was assigned when he first arrived in the Atlanta Division of the FBI. SA Burgess advised he had been

---

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-111395-496

immediately assigned to the Security Squad. In reply to a question as to what type of investigations he handled, SA Burgess replied that he was mainly involved in civil rights type investigations.

Mr. Epstein asked SA Burgess when he was assigned to monitoring the telephone tap of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. SA Burgess replied to the best of his recollection he was assigned to these duties from the end of November, 1965, until sometime in June, 1966. SA Burgess was asked if he could pin down exactly the date of his assignment to this monitoring duty and SA Burgess replied that he recalled the general time period quite well as he had recently undergone surgery before this assignment and after extensive sick leave, went almost immediately on the monitoring duty.

Mr. Epstein asked SA Burgess what his understanding was as to why this telephone tap on Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. was being used. SA Burgess replied that it was his understanding and recollection that three or four individuals who had heavy and extensive Communist Party or Marxist affiliations and connections had an inordinate influence and control over Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. insofar as policies, objectives and activities of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). SA Burgess replied it was his understanding that these three or four aforementioned individuals' influence over King extended so far as preparing his speeches and public statements and that it was also his understanding that the Attorney General at the time the telephone tap was instituted, Robert Kennedy, had approved of and insisted upon this investigative technique.

SA Burgess was then asked if he thought the telephone tap on Doctor King was justified and SA Burgess replied that he thought it was fully justified in light of the time and circumstances and the position of Doctor King.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Burgess was then asked about the personal type information regarding personal misconduct, whether or not he felt the collecting of this type of information was justified. SA Burgess replied that information regarding personal misconduct or immoral activities on the part of King was not the prime purpose or interest of the telephone monitoring, but that he did feel that evidence of gross personal misconduct and completely amoral activities was significant in this particular case, bearing in mind the original justification for the telephone monitor and the fact that Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. was a moral leader of world stature and a religious personality. SA Burgess said that he therefore felt a complete double standard of personal conduct as opposed to public image was significant inasmuch as such behavior would make Doctor King subject to pressure or blackmail by the worst criminal or subversive elements in our society.

SA Burgess was asked if the type of information regarding Doctor King's personal misconduct was disseminated to other agencies or the press and SA Burgess replied that he did not know. SA Burgess was asked if he ever disseminated any information regarding the personal misconduct on the part of Doctor King to the press or others, and SA Burgess replied he had not.

Mr. Epstein said that he assumed that SA Burgess was aware of some of the allegations that had appeared in the press regarding FBI dissemination of this type of information, and SA Burgess replied that he was aware of some of these allegations but he had no specific knowledge regarding these matters.

SA Burgess was asked if he ever reviewed the communications regarding Doctor King based upon information monitored, and SA Burgess replied that he merely recorded the results of the interception of telephone conversations.

SA Burgess was then asked for the physical location from which the telephones were monitored and if this physical location was an apartment in the Peachtree Towers. SA Burgess replied in the affirmative, but said he could not recall the exact apartment number or the floor on which it was located.

SA Burgess was asked if the apartment from which the telephones were monitored was a one or two bedroom apartment and if he knew any of the neighbors or if he recalled maid service to the apartment. SA Burgess replied that he believed it was a one bedroom apartment, did not recall any of the neighbors and insofar as he recalled, there was no maid or janitorial service.

In response to a question as to where the monitoring equipment was located, SA Burgess replied to his recollection it was in the bedroom of the apartment.

SA Burgess was asked if inspectors were at the apartment and if odd-hour shifts were maintained. SA Burgess advised that he recalled that odd-hour shifts were maintained, but he did not recall any inspection of the apartment.

Mr. Epstein asked SA Burgess if he recalled what his duties were prior to the time that he was assigned to the aforementioned monitoring and SA Burgess replied, general security work and particularly civil rights cases which included the observation of civil rights demonstrations in various locations.

Mr. Epstein then asked about general policy regarding observation of demonstrations, whether it came from Washington or originated in the field, and whether the instructions to observe demonstrations came by SAC letter to the field. SA Burgess replied that insofar as he knew it was the general policy of the Bureau for a number of years to observe at any type of demonstration involving civil rights type matters where the possibility of violence existed so that firsthand observation of any possible violation of Federal statutes could be had by impartial observers, and that any subsequent investigation would not be dependent upon the sometimes impassioned observations of persons on either side of a controversial issue.

At this point in the conversation, Mr. Epstein was reminded by SA Burgess that the purpose of the interview was the investigation of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mr. Epstein replied that he was interested in observations of civil rights matters insofar as Doctor King was involved.

SA Burgess replied that the only specific demonstration or civil rights activity he recalled in which he acted as an observer where Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. or SCLC was involved was in Americus, Georgia, in 1965, and he could recall very little regarding this matter.

SA Burgess was asked at one point during the interview if, during the time he served as a monitor on the telephone tap of Doctor King, there was a tap on SNCC. SA Burgess replied that he had no recollection of a telephone tap on SNCC, (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee).

Mr. Epstein asked why SA Burgess was removed from monitoring telephones mentioned above. SA Burgess said that it was at his request as he had completely recovered from a debilitating illness and was very frankly quite bored with an inactive assignment.

Mr. Epstein asked if SA Burgess remained on the Security Squad in the Atlanta Office and what type of cases he handled after that period. SA Burgess replied that he did remain on the Security Squad until December, 1966 or January, 1967, and that he had handled general security matters, but not the investigation of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr.

Mr. Epstein asked why SA Burgess was reassigned and was advised it was a routine administrative reassignment.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

Mr. Epstein then asked SA Burgess if he was quite certain of his period of assignment to monitoring the telephones of Doctor King and SA Burgess replied that he was virtually certain that assignment to these duties was from within ten days before or after Thanksgiving, 1965, until sometime during June, 1966, because of the aforementioned surgery approximately six weeks prior to his assignment on these duties.

Mr. Epstein asked if SA Burgess could ascertain the date of his surgery from his doctor or hospital records. SA Burgess replied that surgery had taken place at St. Joseph's Infirmary immediately adjacent to the FBI office and he would attempt to ascertain the date. Mr. Epstein asked if SA Burgess would be willing to telephone the hospital at that time in an attempt to verify this date. SA Burgess replied that old hospital records are sometimes difficult to locate and from experience, it would probably take two or three days.

In response to a question as to whether anyone else immediately available could recall the date of this surgery, SA Burgess replied that his wife might recall. Mr. Epstein then asked SA Burgess if he would be willing to telephone his wife in an attempt to determine the date of his surgery. At that point in the interview, SA Burgess did telephone his wife who informed SA Burgess that she thought SA Burgess had undergone surgery during mid-September, 1965. This was communicated to Mr. Epstein.

Mr. Epstein also asked SA Burgess whether or not any record in the Atlanta Office would pin down the exact dates of his assignment to monitor the King telephones. SA Burgess replied that he knew of no such record.

Mr. Epstein asked if an annual fitness or performance report would show his assignment at that time, and SA Burgess replied that he believed these performance reports merely stated general assignments, such as general security, etc., and the location of these reports were unknown to him. Mr. Epstein asked if SA Burgess had seen his annual performance reports and SA Burgess replied that he had.

At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Epstein asked if he might have SA Burgess' home telephone number and if he might call him at a later date to obtain from SA Burgess the date of the aforementioned surgery, if SA Burgess was able to ascertain this date. SA Burgess did furnish Mr. Epstein his home telephone number and advised he would attempt to determine the date of this surgery.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 23, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-26-01 BY SP2 ALM/JMS

#moc16

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by SA Alden F. Miller concerning an interview of him by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The interview of SA Alden F. Miller commenced at 4:50 P. M. and was terminated at 5:29 P. M., July 22, 1975, with the statement that consideration would be given overnight as to whether additional questions would be directed on the following morning to SA Miller. At the outset Staff Member Michael Epstein advised SA Miller of his rights, stating he did not have to answer any questions, that he had the right to legal counsel, and further, that anything he said might be used in a criminal proceeding against him.

The following questions and the responses of SA Miller to these questions are set forth hereinafter in narrative form to the best of his recollection, utilizing verbiage nearly as possible synonymous with statements made. The context of this question and answer interrogation is not necessarily in chronological order. All questions were directed to SA Miller by Staff Member Michael Epstein.

SA Miller was asked concerning his employment and assignment to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Atlanta Office. SA Miller replied that he first was assigned to the Atlanta Office in 1947, was transferred to New York

---

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-496

ENCLOSURE

in 1948, and returned to the Atlanta Office in 1951. SA Miller was further asked when he was assigned to the Security Squad in the Atlanta FBI Office, to which he replied June of 1951. Inquiry was further made as to whether still assigned to the Security Squad and SA Miller replied that as of March, 1975, he was no longer assigned security matters and that he was presently assigned to work in conjunction with the General Accounting Office review of matters in the Atlanta Office.

SA Miller was asked when a technical installation or telephone tap was placed on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and Martin Luther King. SA Miller replied that it was impossible for him at this date to recall specifically when such an installation was made, but by citing civil rights activities with particular emphasis in Albany, Georgia, in 1962, was reasonably sure that the technical installation was made sometime subsequent to that date. When asked how long the technical installation remained in effect, SA Miller replied that he could not recall the exact duration of the telephone tap, however, was of the opinion it was in effect for several years, possibly three. When asked what telephone facilities were covered, SA Miller replied that telephone service to the offices of SCLC and to the residence of Martin Luther King were covered in this telephone tap.

SA Miller was asked what was the justification or purpose of this technical installation, to which he replied that it was to determine the degree of subversive influence, if any, over the activities of the SCLC sponsored civil rights demonstrations and programs.

Inquiry was made as to who instructed the installation of such technical coverage and SA Miller replied that he undoubtedly received these instructions from his immediate supervisor and/or the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta Office at that time. When asked whether these instructions were written or verbal, SA Miller replied that he could not specifically recall, but was reasonably sure that if written they would have also been discussed verbally, both with his supervisor and the Special Agent in Charge.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Miller was asked whether a feasibility study was made prior to the actual installation or a survey conducted. SA Miller replied that he did not recall at this late date whether such a feasibility study was made prior to the installation. SA Miller was asked whether if such a study or survey was made whether it was reviewed by high officials prior to ordering such an installation. SA Miller replied that he did not specifically recall whether such a review as that was made on a feasibility or survey, as if this were done, it would have been done in Washington, and SA Miller would not have been in a position to know of such a review.

SA Miller was asked in making the telephone tap did the Atlanta Office have sufficient equipment here and if not, where did we get such equipment to make this installation. SA Miller replied that the Atlanta Office did not have equipment available for such an installation and at this date it is unknown where the equipment came from, however, a request for such equipment would have been made of FBI Headquarters in Washington, D. C. SA Miller was asked whether he dealt with the phone company in conjunction with this installation and he replied that he undoubtedly had requested line information which relates to pair and cable data for phones to be covered in this technical installation. Inquiry was made of SA Miller as to the identity of the person at the Southern Bell Telephone Company who provided such information and it was stated that at this late date it was impossible to say definitely who furnished this data as the phone company during this era was in the process of setting up a security office who would normally provide such information under the proper circumstances and that if such an office were then in existence Mr. Theodore King would have provided the line information desired.

SA Miller was asked whether leased lines were obtained from the phone company in conjunction with this installation, to which he replied he did not specifically recall whether leased lines were utilized or whether other telephone service was ordered with subsequent adaptation enabling the use of this service for the technical installation.

SA Miller was asked whether charges were incurred for such service, to which he replied payments were made for all services rendered by the Southern Bell Telephone Company, whether it be leased lines or other telephone-type service. SA Miller was asked whether he had issued the orders for leased lines or other service and if so, what name was utilized in issuing such orders, to which SA Miller replied that if leased lines or other service was ordered through the Security Office of Southern Bell Telephone Company, that he had ordered same, however, he could not recall at this time the name utilized for such service.

SA Miller was asked further did he issue the order for having a private working number installed in the monitoring plant, to which he replied he could not recall whether such an order was issued or given by him and if it was, whether it was done through the Security Office or done in a routine fashion like any person requesting normal telephone service.

SA Miller was asked if he recalled where the technical installations were made, to which he replied he did recall and could point out the locations, however, could not recall the addresses of these locations. SA Miller was asked the location of the monitoring point, to which he replied an apartment in an apartment building located diagonally across the street from the Federal Building housing the offices of the FBI.

SA Miller was asked whether he was responsible for renting the apartment which was used for monitoring this technical installation, to which he replied he did not think that he was, but was of the opinion that the case Agent rented the apartment. SA Miller was asked where in the apartment building was the apartment located, to which he replied he could only recall it was in the upper portion of the building, probably above the tenth or twelfth floor and that it was located immediately adjacent to a wire closet. SA Miller was asked the cover name used in renting this apartment, to which he replied at this late date he could not recall the exact name utilized, but was of the opinion

---

it was some sort of engineering company, but at any rate, it would have been the same name utilized in requesting telephone service. SA Miller was asked further whether the owners of this building and top management were cognizant of the real identity of the renters of this apartment, to which he replied he had no way of knowing but was of the opinion for security reasons no one knew or was aware that this apartment was being utilized by the FBI.

SA Miller was asked further whether he had anything to do with the installation of utilities and furnishing of this apartment used in the monitoring operation, to which he replied he had nothing to do with this other than the installation of certain wooden shelves utilized for equipment necessary to such monitoring and neither did he have anything to do as it related to the utilities.

SA Miller was asked whether he ever actually monitored this installation, to which he replied that on several occasions when regular monitors were ill and there were other technical needs at the facility, he would serve as a monitor. SA Miller was asked whether he had ever furnished supplies to this facility, to which he replied the only kind of supplies he would have taken to the facility were those necessary to insure a trouble free technical monitoring. SA Miller was specifically asked whether he ever replenished the supplies or tapes for recording purposes, to which he replied he did not recall such, other than at the initial inception when a sufficient supply of tapes were made available and these tapes were used over and over.

SA Miller was asked specifically whether he ever made any technical installation on phone service at the Ebenezer Baptist Church, the church where Martin Luther King was on the staff, to which he replied that no such installation to his knowledge was ever made. SA Miller further informed that he did not know whether city police authorities or state authorities had made such an installation and further, he was not in a position to be aware of any such activities on the part of these law enforcement agencies.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Miller was asked whether he had ever discussed Martin Luther King with Eugene Patterson, Editor of the Atlanta Constitution, to which he replied that to the best of his knowledge he had never discussed this matter with Mr. Patterson. SA Miller did point out that he was acquainted with Mr. Patterson professionally and socially as previous investigations had brought him in contact with Mr. Patterson and that they were both members of the same church and served jointly on various committees and boards for several years. SA Miller replied further that during this era Mr. Patterson may have directed questions to him regarding Martin Luther King, as it was a timely subject and one receiving considerable newspaper publicity; however, all such inquiries were parried or handled in a non-committal and non-revealing manner. SA Miller further replied that numerous civil rights cases were being conducted by the Atlanta Office of the FBI, which was public knowledge and subject of news coverage by the newspaper of which Mr. Patterson served as Editor, however, to the best of SA Miller's knowledge no revelation was made indicating the FBI had an unusual interest in the activities of Martin Luther King. SA Miller further advised that even though socially acquainted with Mr. Patterson, he did not agree with Mr. Patterson's publicly espoused political position on many and varied interests of the times.

SA Miller was specifically asked that while the Staff Member did not desire to place SA Miller in a bind, did a superior of his at any time ever instruct him to contact Eugene Patterson regarding Martin Luther King, to which SA Miller replied that at no time had any superior of his, or for that matter, any other FBI employee, ever ask that Eugene Patterson be contacted in regard to Martin Luther King.

The interview was terminated at 5:29 P. M. with Mr. Epstein stating that he would like to think overnight regarding the questions and answers as set forth above and would on the following morning advise as to whether he desired to ask additional questions.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

On the morning of July 23, 1975, Mr. Epstein communicated to SA Miller that no further questioning of SA Miller was necessary.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Atlanta, Georgia

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 23, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 BY SP2ALM/JFG
#mor16

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
CHARLES T. HAYNES BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by SA Charles T. Haynes concerning an interview of him by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The interview of SA Haynes started at 11:57 A. M., was discontinued for lunch from 1:32 P. M. until 2:34 P. M., and was terminated at 3:10 P. M. Epstein asked all of the questions during the interview. Haynes was not advised of his rights or of the purpose of the interview. Early in the interview, Haynes informed Epstein he was under the impression the purpose of the interview was to obtain information regarding Martin Luther King, Jr., and Epstein confirmed this explaining King, the SCLC* and the marches were so closely related it was necessary to go into some of these things.

Epstein asked Haynes his title and was informed Haynes is a Special Agent Supervisor in the Atlanta Office of the FBI, supervising the Number 3 Squad which is generally known as the security squad. He asked when Haynes became a supervisor and was informed he was appointed in August, 1968. Epstein asked who served as supervisor of the squad prior to Haynes and was advised SA Charles S. Harding, now retired,

* Southern Christian Leadership Conference

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

(-) 116395-496

ENCLOSURE

preceded Haynes as supervisor. He asked why Harding was replaced and Haynes stated it was a decision made by the Bureau which was an administrative matter and not pertinent to the inquiry regarding Martin Luther King, Jr. Epstein did not pursue this question any further.

Epstein asked when the investigation regarding King started and if there was a file open prior to the time the investigation was authorized. Haynes replied he did not know when the file was opened or when the investigation was authorized. Haynes was asked when the technical coverage regarding King was instituted and when it was discontinued, and he replied to the best of his knowledge it was instituted during about November, 1963, and Haynes monitored it until about January 4, 1964, when Haynes became ill from a kidney stone attack, thereafter entering the hospital in Atlanta on January 8, 1964. Epstein asked Haynes if he returned to monitoring the surveillance later and Haynes replied that he did not return to the assignment on a full-time basis, but probably relieved other individuals monitoring several times during a period which may have continued as long as a year.

Epstein asked when the King case was closed and Haynes replied he did not know, but felt sure it was sometime prior to April, 1968. Haynes was asked who made the decision to close the file, and he stated he did not know. Epstein asked when the SCLC case was closed and Haynes stated he did not recall, but did remember that SCLC activity "wound down" considerably prior to King's death, and even more so after King's death to the point that the information did not warrant maintaining the file in a pending status. When asked who gave instructions to close the file, Haynes stated that he did not recall but that it was possible that the Atlanta Office took the action closing the file, and it was even possible that Haynes may have approved such action administratively; however, he does not recall.

Epstein asked if it would be customary for New York to send Atlanta any information they received regarding Stanley Levison and if so what file it would be put in. It was explained to Epstein it would be necessary to know the nature of such information before answering such a question, however, since Atlanta did not have any pending investigation regarding Levison or SCLC there would be no reason for New York to send any information regarding Levison to Atlanta unless they had some reason to request information concerning some pending investigation. Epstein pressed the question of whether New York would continue to send Atlanta information concerning Levison and he was informed, based on information available at Atlanta, there was no reason for New York to send the information to Atlanta regarding Levison, without requesting investigation; however, it was possible that they may have some reason for having sent information to Atlanta for informational purposes.

Epstein asked where the monitoring of the King technical surveillance was conducted and he was advised by Haynes it was conducted in the Peachtree Towers Building. He asked the room number and Haynes replied he did not recall the room number but did recall it was on one of the upper floors of the building. He asked who made the installation and handled the contact with the telephone company, and Haynes replied he did not know, that the equipment was in the apartment when Haynes was instructed to report there for the monitoring assignment. Epstein asked who else was present in the apartment at the time and was advised that SA Alden F. Miller was present, connected the equipment and instructed Haynes in the operation of the equipment. In response to the question of other Agents monitoring the technical surveillance at the time, Haynes stated to the best of his knowledge he was probably the first Agent to monitor the surveillance, with the technical assistance of SA Miller.

Epstein asked the name of the person who rented the apartment at the Peachtree Towers and Haynes replied he did not know. He asked if such information was available in the files of the Atlanta Office and Haynes replied he did not know, explaining that such information may have been made a matter of record, and yet may not have been made a matter of record. Epstein stated that at this point he would stop the questioning in order for Haynes to go upstairs to the FBI Office and review the files to determine whether or not such information was in the files. Haynes explained that such a project would probably entail extensive file review in order to state whether such information was, or was not, in the file. Epstein asked if Haynes could have someone else conduct the necessary file review regarding this matter, at which time Haynes replied he would request a break at this point to consult with an FBIHQ representative in the FBI Office. After consulting with the FBIHQ representative for approximately five minutes, Haynes returned to Senator Talmadge's office and informed Epstein that the clearance for the interview was based on what Haynes could remember regarding King and not on information from the files. Epstein was advised that any request by him for information from the files should be submitted in writing in the usual manner. Epstein did not pursue this matter any further.

Epstein asked if Haynes knew Bill Sullivan and if he recalled him coming to Atlanta. Haynes replied that he did know Sullivan and recalled him coming to Atlanta in the 1960's at least on one occasion and possibly twice. Haynes explained he recalled Sullivan coming to Atlanta in the early or middle 1960's in connection with a regional type FBI conference regarding developing and handling of informants in Klan organizations, and possibly a second visit at a later time, but no other details were recalled.

Epstein asked Haynes if he knew of any instance where an Agent in Atlanta furnished any information regarding King or the SCLC to the news media and Haynes replied he did not.

Epstein asked if Atlanta had a COINTELPRO file regarding King or the SCLC and Haynes advised it did not. Haynes was asked if he knew of any COINTELPRO information regarding King or the SCLC and Haynes stated he did not. When asked where such material would be filed, Haynes stated that since he knew of none he did not know where it would be filed. When asked if such information could be in the case file, Haynes advised it was possible.

Epstein asked if the Atlanta Office participated in the COINTELPRO retrieval project and was advised by Haynes he thought so; however, Haynes was not familiar enough with the particular project he had in mind to be sure. Haynes explained he had in mind a project around the first of 1975, which had to do with declassifying certain previously identified COINTELPRO correspondence and subsequently classifying some material also connected with COINTELPRO. Epstein wanted to know if any COINTELPRO information regarding King or SCLC was included in this information and he was informed Haynes had no knowledge of such, but the details of the project were handled by another Agent under Haynes' supervision. Haynes was requested to identify the Agent and replied he would have to have a few minutes to consult with an FBIHQ representative in the FBI Office prior to answering this question. Epstein contacted the FBIHQ representative in the Atlanta Office telephonically, requesting him to come down to Senator Talmadge's office and conferred with him for approximately five minutes, during which time Haynes was not present. At the conclusion of this conference, upon advice of the FBIHQ representative Haynes informed Epstein the Agent who handled the above-mentioned project was SA Edward A. Shea.

Epstein terminated the interview at 3:10 P. M.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Atlanta, Georgia

July 24, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JK
#mo816

7

6

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by SA Edward A. Shea concerning an interview of him by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took place on July 23, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The interview of SA Edward A. Shea by the two SSC Staff Members commenced at 9:35 A. M. and ended at 10:37 A. M.

At the beginning of the interview no mention was made of SA Edward A. Shea's rights by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo.

The following information was furnished to these two SSC Staff Members and it is not necessarily in chronological order:

At the outset of the interview, SA Shea was questioned about his service in the Bureau, type work he did, etc., and SA Shea indicated that he had been in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a Special Agent for almost 25 years, having entered the Bureau in March, 1951; after an initial assignment at Richmond, Virginia, SA Shea was transferred to Cleveland, Ohio, where he was assigned to the security squad. SA Shea remained in Cleveland for 20 years doing security work for practically the entire time. In May, 1972, SA Shea was transferred to the Atlanta Division and once again was assigned to security work, which assignment has continued to the present time.

- -

62-116395-496

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

SA Shea was then asked by Mr. Epstein about a review project he had handled earlier in the year pertaining to the Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) in the Atlanta Division and what it involved.

SA Shea mentioned that in approximately the latter part of December, 1974, or early January, 1975, he had been assigned to handle a project dealing with COINTELPRO in the Atlanta Office.

FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) had sent out communications to various field offices around the latter part of December, 1974, or early January, 1975, relative to the COINTELPRO-Hate Groups, Black Nationalist Hate Groups, New Left, and Communist Party, U. S. of America (CP,USA). In these communications FBIHQ had indicated it was in receipt of a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for documents relating to the COINTELPRO. As a result, FBIHQ had reviewed its files on COINTELPRO and classified various documents. FBIHQ listed these documents in work papers which were sent out to the various field offices, including Atlanta, as enclosures to the FBIHQ communications. These work papers listed documents that were to be classified in each office and recipients were instructed to review the work papers to make sure all copies of these documents classified by FBIHQ were so classified in the field office files on COINTELPRO. These work papers showed the classification assigned to the particular document, the identifying number of the classifying officer, the exemption category and the date it was classified by FBIHQ.

In addition, these FBIHQ communications instructed the recipient field offices to review its various COINTELPRO files, such as the ones on the Hate Groups, Black Nationalist Hate Groups, etc. to insure that all other documents in these files which were classifiable were so classified. These were to include memoranda and letters to other offices, etc. The office that originated the communication had the responsibility of notifying other recipients of these communications so their copies could also be classified.

Based on these FBIHQ communications, SA Shea, who handled this project by himself, located all the documents listed in the FBIHQ work papers and classified them according to the information set out in the work papers.

In addition, SA Shea also reviewed each of the Atlanta COINTELPRO files on the categories previously mentioned, for any further documents that should be classified.

SA Shea recalled that in this part of the review he did locate various documents in these files which he felt required classification.

SA Shea could not recall any specific documents that he so classified but did remember classifying a number of documents in the COINTELPRO-Hate Group file and COINTELPRO-CP,USA file. These documents selected by SA Shea were then classified, and copies designated for any other Atlanta files were then located and classified; in addition, FBIHQ and other field offices that had been furnished copies of these documents were then notified by Atlanta to locate their copies of these documents and classify them according to information furnished by Atlanta.

SA Shea pointed out to the SSC Staff Members that he recalled that subsequently FBIHQ had sent back communications to Atlanta relative to documents SA Shea had classified in both the COINTELPRO-Hate Group and COINTELPRO-CP,USA files. FBIHQ instructed that all those classified by SA Shea in the COINTELPRO-Hate Group file be declassified as they did not warrant classification and also a number in the COINTELPRO-CP,USA file also were to be declassified, which was done by SA Shea.

The SSC Staff Members then inquired if during this review of the COINTELPRO files, whether SA Shea had noted any COINTELPRO actions, any recommended actions, or any COINTELPRO suggestions which were directed against Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Coretta King or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). SA Shea indicated that in carrying out this project, his purpose was first to locate the COINTELPRO documents listed by FBIHQ in their work papers and classify them; next he was also to review the Atlanta COINTELPRO files to see if any other COINTELPRO documents prepared by Atlanta required classification.

In handling this project, SA Shea was primarily interested in classifying the documents in these COINTELPRO files and little notice was made of any specific COINTELPRO actions actually being recommended in these documents. SA Shea pointed out that in his review he did not recall any COINTELPRO action that had been directed or recommended against Reverend King, his wife, Coretta, or SCLC.

SA Shea was then questioned as to whether he could recall in his review, having to classify any Atlanta COINTELPRO document in which a copy may have been designated for the case file on SCLC, and SA Shea indicated that he could not recall or remember anything specific on this.

Mr. Epstein then inquired if the Atlanta Office had any COINTELPRO files which only pertained to organizations, in which all information relative to a particular organization like the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), or the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) would be located. SA Shea indicated there was no such specific breakdown in the Atlanta COINTELPRO files as they were set up under broad group categories, such as Hate Groups, Black Hate Groups, New Left, etc.

Mr. Epstein then asked if SA Shea had ever been involved in handling any COINTELPRO matters when he was assigned to the Cleveland Office or whether the Cleveland Office ever had any COINTELPRO actions against Reverend King or SCLC. SA Shea indicated that he understood that the questioning of him would be limited to his review of the Atlanta COINTELPRO files earlier in the year, for the classification purposes; SA Shea suggested that this should be discussed with the FBIHQ representative, who was in the Atlanta Office at the time, to resolve this; however, Mr. Epstein did not pursue this.

Mr. Epstein then inquired, that prior to the FBI instituting the COINTELPRO, and prior to the various field offices setting up COINTELPRO files, if some Agent made a suggestion about a counterintelligence action, would such a suggestion, say in the form of a memorandum or letter, be placed in the case file of the organization or the individual against whom the action was being directed. SA Shea indicated he had no knowledge of any such suggestions ever being made in the form of memoranda, letters, etc., suggesting a counterintelligence action being directed against anyone or any organization prior to the institution of the actual COINTELPRO by FBIHQ.

Mr. Epstein then asked, if when FBIHQ instituted the COINTELPRO and the various field offices set up COINTELPRO files, was there any retrieval of any documents made from any files dating back prior to the commencement of COINTELPRO, that were then placed in any of Atlanta's COINTELPRO files. SA Shea indicated that in his review of the various COINTELPRO files earlier in the year, he had not noted any such indication of this.

Mr. Epstein then asked if SA Shea was aware of any review program dealing with COINTELPRO in which any documents were removed from COINTELPRO files. SA Shea stated emphatically that there was no program to ever remove any documents dealing with COINTELPRO from Atlanta's COINTELPRO files or from any Atlanta files.

On several occasions during the interview of SA Shea, Mr. Epstein would come back to his line of questioning about SA Shea's review of the COINTELPRO files earlier in the year and whether SA Shea could recall any COINTELPRO action or COINTELPRO suggested action against Reverend King, Mrs. King or SCLC. SA Shea on each occasion pointed out that he could not recall seeing any documents in any of the COINTELPRO files which related to any such action directed against the Kings or SCLC.

Mr. Epstein on one occasion asked SA Shea if, during the time he had been assigned to the Atlanta Office, he had ever hear of any COINTELPRO action, or any suggested action, directed against Reverend King, his wife, or SCLC, and SA Shea replied that he had not.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

Mr. Epstein also asked if SA Shea was aware of any COINTELPRO action or recommended action being made after FBIHQ has discontinued the COINTELPRO, and SA Shea indicated he knew of no actions or recommendations being made.

During the interview, Mr. Epstein did most of the questioning and Mrs. DeOreo took extensive notes; both SSC Staff Members were pleasant and cordial during the entire interview, which ended at approximately 10:37 A. M.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Evol. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 7/8/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM FORMER ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES A. WILDEROTTER, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Justice Department

At 3:05 p.m. on July 8, 1975, I met with Deputy Attorney General Tyler and advised him of the fact that Mr. Wilderotter had furnished certain materials to the Bureau at the time of his transfer to the White House. I told him that Mr. Wilderotter requested an inventory be prepared of the materials in order to assure their appropriate disposition and that such an inventory was prepared. I told him that the Attorney General was advised by memorandum dated June 26, 1975, with a copy designated for the Deputy, each of which enclosed a copy of the inventory. I explained that I took a copy of the inventory to Mr. Wilderotter and requested him to mark thereon his suggestions as to the disposition of each item.

I suggested that some of the items appearing on the inventory could be material pertinent to the current inquiries by the Senate Select Committee and to conversations recently had with the Deputy Attorney General concerning official and confidential files maintained by Mr. Hoover. I told the Deputy that my purpose in bringing this matter to his personal attention was to emphasize my concern that the Department would be aware of the existence and location of the material listed in the inventory and of our interest in having materials returned to the Department or otherwise disposed of at the earliest possible date.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-55047

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. McDermott (Attn: Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. Mintz

REC-107 62-55047-2169

JUL 14 1975

JAM:mfd
(4)

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 3 1976

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 ALM/TAM/C
MDR-16

JUL 17 1975

LEGAL

57

S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Inventory of Documents Received
from Former Associate DAG Wilderotter, etc.

The Deputy requested a copy of the inventory marked by Mr. Wilderotter and I furnished a Xerox copy of the original. He said that he would discuss this matter with K. William O'Connor and that he would contact me to discuss further the disposition of the materials presently being held by the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Attorney General

August 4, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS [illegible]
DATE 2-20-81 SPU/JOMW
6076

Enclosed are two copies each of seven memoranda, each reporting the results of an interview of an FBI Special Agent (SA) by Staff Members of the SSC. One set of these memoranda is for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

All the interviews took place at Atlanta, Georgia, and all the SAs, except W. John Benton, are assigned to the Atlanta Field Office (FO) of the FBI. Benton is assigned to the Knoxville FO and traveled to Atlanta for the interview at the request of the SSC.

MAILED 7
AUG 4 1975
FBI

Except for the interview of SA Edward A. Shea, all the interviews were arranged on advance notice of the SSC given to the FBI on July 17, 1975. The SSC request for interview of Shea was made on July 22, 1975. REC-102 62-116395-49

UNREC COPY FILED IN

Prior to all these interviews, these SAs were informed by an FBI representative that they were being released from any applicable employment agreement for purpose of the SSC interview concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. It was explained to all that they had the right to counsel; however, the FBI was unable to provide private counsel. They were all told that there were certain privileged areas concerning which they would not be required to answer questions. These areas concerned information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ~~ongoing~~

9 AUG 8 1975

ENCLOSURE
62-116395

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

SFP:lhb lhb
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

JAH
WOC

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 AUG 14 1975

FBI investigations; and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. They were all also informed that an FBI representative would be available in the Atlanta FO for consultation purposes should such a need arise. This procedure, as explained to these SAs, provides that if a question arose during the interview in one of the areas set out above, the SA had the privilege, before replying, of consulting with the FBI representative. The representative did not accompany these Agents to the interviews but was available in the Atlanta FO located in the same building where the interviews took place. Instances of the use of this representative for consultation purposes are indicated in the appropriate memoranda being furnished.

Enclosures (14)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
                Special Counsel for
                  Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

The FBI representative referred to above was Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project who, on prior approval, traveled to Atlanta for the dual function of giving the SAs on-the-scene advice on behalf of the Legal Counsel Division and to be available for consultation purposes as indicated. It should be noted that it was necessary during the course of some of the interviews for the SA to consult with Phillips as to whether certain information was to be furnished the interviewers and, notably in respect to SA Charles T. Haynes, consultation resulted in our refusal to at this time acquiesce to a request for information from Atlanta FO files. Also, the interview of Haynes late afternoon 7/22/75 resulted in a request for interview of Shea which was arranged on the scene and took place morning of 7/23/75--details of clearance for this covered

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3

NOTE CONTINUED:

in 7/24/75 memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall captioned "Senstudy 75." LHMs were prepared by the seven SAs at Atlanta on instructions of Phillips and submitted to Headquarters by Atlanta airtel 7/24/75 under "Senstudy 75" caption. Copies of airtel and LHMs will be placed in personnel files of respective SAs.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/4/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of [illegible] interviews by SSC Staff Members of incumbent FBI Special Agents W. John Benton, O. Richard Hamilton, Robert W. Thomson, Donald P. Burgess, Alden F. Miller, Charles J. Haynes, Edward A. Shea.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Surveillance, electronic
Intelligence collection
Intelligence activities, domestic
Organization and staffing

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference, COINTELPRO, Stanley Levison

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395-495

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 8/1/75

1 - Personnel File - Seymor Phillips
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Michael Epstein, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee, requested that Staff interview be arranged with Seymor Phillips concerning the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King. He requested the interview be held at 10 a.m., 8/1/75. He was advised that this was not possible and that sometime next week would be more acceptable. It was agreed that the interview would be conducted at 10 a.m. on Monday, 8/4/75.

In view of the ongoing discussions between the Department, representatives of the King family, and the Senate Select Committee concerning Committee access to information concerning Martin Luther King, Michael Shaheen was contacted concerning this interview.

It was pointed out to Mr. Shaheen that Mr. Phillips had a great deal of knowledge concerning the King investigation and it could be assumed that information would be disclosed during interview which might contravene an agreement with the King family should such an agreement become perfected. Since the Department was to meet with representatives of the King family and Senate Select Committee members on 7/31/75, it was suggested that any decision concerning Mr. Phillips' interview be held in abeyance pending a resolution of this problem. Shaheen agreed.

Shaheen subsequently advised SA Daly that the meeting with the King family representatives, Senate Select Committee representatives and the Department had not resulted in an agreement. He said he had discussed the pending interview of Mr. Phillips with the Committee Staff representatives and they said they would furnish guidelines concerning the topics to be covered during the interview. Shaheen indicated these guidelines would be consistent with the King family's concerns regarding the production of information from Bureau files concerning King.

REC-102 62-116395-494

9 AUG 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MF
MDR-16

JBH/PV
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

FIVE

84 AUG 11 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Steven Blackhurst, Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, later advised Inspector Hotis that SA Phillips could discuss any aspect of the investigation other than information developed through wiretaps or microphone surveillance. Mr. Epstein assured him that he was not interested in the substance of any conversation that might have been overheard, but would inquire into such procedural matters as the number of wiretaps installed and the identity of persons who authorized them.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That SA Phillips be released from existing employment agreement for purposes of this interview, consistent with the above limitations.

(2) That an Intelligence Division representative be available but not present during the interview of SA Phillips in the event that questions arise concerning the proper scope of the interview.

I don't feel this is necessary WRW

WRW

↑ agree JBA PEM

OK

MPC

JBH/JDM

#MDR6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 BY SP-2 ~~ALK~~ ITG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

U ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Louisville, Kentucky

March 20, 1973

Pages 1-5 of LHM, dated 3/20/73, at Louisville.
Serial 7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF

MDR-16

Page 2 of AT dated 3/20/73, from SAC, Louisville, to Acting Director, FBI.

Robert Chilton;
Luther C. Fonner, Jr.;
Jack Ferguson;
Reed McWhorter;
Fred McWhorter;
Walter "Dee" Huddleston

Mr. Edward M. Steutermann, 1211 Commonwealth Building, Louisville, Kentucky, was interviewed by a representative of the FBI on February 6, 1973. In this interview, Mr. Steutermann stated the information that he provided to United States Attorney Long concerning this matter had been furnished to him originally, in part, by former Kentucky Governor and then candidate for the office of United States Senator, Louie B. Nunn. Mr. Steutermann recalled that Mr. Nunn at the time was running against Walter "Dee" Huddleston, now incumbent United States Senator, for a seat in the United States Senate.

Mr. Steutermann further [redacted]

Page 2 of LHM, dated 2/7/73 at Louisville.
Serial 5

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
March 22, 1973

At the specific direction of the Department, limited investigation has been conducted of an allegation of Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering - Bribery involving the application for a state bank charter in Albany, Kentucky. The U. S. Attorney informed that Walter "Dee" Huddleston, U. S. Senator, was approached in February, 1972, by certain individuals seeking a charter for a bank [redacted]

ARW:bja

WVC

JEK

3/23
11:34A

Note from Special Investigative Division, dated 3/22/73, stapled to top of Airtel from SAC, Louisville to Acting Director, dated 3/20/73.

Robert Chilton;
Luther C. Fonner, Jr.;

Page 3 of LHM dated 2/7/73, at Louisville.
Serial 5

capacity to function for the Commissioner of Banking and Securities. Mr. Mc Neely stated the Bank of Clinton County, Inc., Albany, Kentucky, was granted a state bank charter on March 21, 1973.

[redacted]

appear from information developed during the interview of Willis G. Moremen and a review of the Kentucky Revised Statutes pertaining to banks and trust companies set forth in Appendix A that the authority to approve a state bank charter is held only by the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner of the State Department of Banking and Securities.

Page 4 of LHM, dated 4/27/73, at Louisville.
Serial 9

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT **SECRET**

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 8/6/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This is to record identities of Staff Members of the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC) who have had access to FBI materials pursuant to SSC requests.

On 7/28/75, SSC delivered a "superceding request" for various materials. In partial compliance with that request, SSC Staff has been given access for review to the following:

Item	Subject	Staff Member	Date
III B & C	O & C Files	Mark Gitenstein	7/31-8/1/75
III D	Abuse areas	" "	8/6/75
III E	SAC lets & memos	" "	8/4/75
IV C	Foreign Operations Policy Manual	John Elliff	8/4/75
IV D	5-yr. INTD Budget Projection	" "	8/5/75
IV G	INLET material	" "	8/4-5/75
IV H	Insp. Div. material re O & C files	Mark Gitenstein	7/31/75 -
IV F	Surreptitious Entry Chilean Embassy (S)	John Elliff	8/5/75

REC- 102 62-116395-493

9 AUG 8 1975

Regarding the 5/14/75 SSC request, Appendix B, I, 6, Mark Gitenstein on 7/30/75 reviewed inspection reports ~~of~~ [redacted] Domestic Intelligence Division, January and September, 1971,

62-116395

JPT:lhb|hb
(4)

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY SP2AHM/LMF
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
MOR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

CONTINUED - OVER

84 AUG 11 1975

SECRET

and of San Francisco Division, October, 1970, and Dan Dwyer reviewed Records Section Classifying Unit Guides (9 volumes) on 7/31/75 and 8/1/75.

Jim Dick reviewed materials regarding Photo and Physical Surveillance on 7/25/75.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

JPT

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. McDermott DATE: August 1, 1975

FROM : J. C. Farrington

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY U. S. SENATOR WALTER D. HUDDLESTON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MEMBER TO REVIEW HIS FBI FILES

On July 21, 1975, the Attorney General determined there should be a disclosure of material in the files, with certain exceptions (for details see J. B. Adams to Callahan memorandum dated July 24, 1975, captioned "Request by various Senators on Senate Select Committee to Review their FBI files").

On August 1, 1975, Senator Huddleston and Departmental Attorney, Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counselor for Intelligence Coordination, were with James B. Adams, Assistant to the Director, Deputy Associate Director in his office from approximately 10:30 a.m. to 11:05 a.m. During this time Senator Huddleston reviewed the following FBI material pertaining to himself.

94-1-676-300
94-67291
166-5980

ORIGINAL FILED IN 94-67291

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Wannall
Attention: Mr. W. Cregar

Enclosures (6)

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

INITIALED ON ORIGINAL

INITIALED ON ORIGINAL

9 AUG 6 1975

FIVE

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 AUG 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF

MOR-16

84 AUG 6 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

J. C. Farrington to Mr. McDermott Memo
REQUEST BY U. S. SENATOR WALTER D. HUDDLESTON
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MEMBER
TO REVIEW HIS FBI FILES

Portions of file 166-5980 were masked out. As these masks will be removed, a Xerox of the pertinent portion of the respective documents have been made for record purposes and attached to this memorandum. The Senator did not wish to remove the masking which identifies the sources.

Senator Huddleston inquired if Boggs or Karem, former employees who had been fired, had anything to do with bribery allegation (166-5980) against him. File 166-5980 was reviewed on 8/1/75, and there was no mention of Boggs or Karem in file. — Senator advised 8/1 [illegible]

ACTION:

For information concerning request of Senator Huddleston.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

July 30, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Hampton

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is in response to SSC letter dated July 3, 1975, requesting copies of all communications from the FBI Director and/or other Headquarters personnel to more than one FBI field office and/or to all Agents in those offices regarding the activities of the SSC.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which constitutes our response to this request. A copy of the memorandum and the enclosures is being provided for your records.

Sensitive information pertaining to electronic surveillance contained in FBIHQ teletype of June 13, 1975, (attached) was not excised pursuant to advice received from Mr. K. William O'Connor of your Department during consultation with a representative of this Bureau on July 24, 1975. The June 13, 1975, FBIHQ teletype (attached) has been sanitized only to the extent that the terms "mail surveillance" and "source" were substituted for wording which could tend to identify specific sensitive sources.

62-116395-492

Enclosures (19)

REC- 102

9 AUG 8 1975

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 ENCLOSURE

RDH:mjg
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMK
MDR-16

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WRW

WOC

JM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

✓ W. O. CREGAR 4063

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 AUG 11 1975

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The enclosures constitute all of the communications that have been sent by FBIHQ to all SACs or more than one office regarding the SSC.

Supervisor J. P. Thomas, CI-2, INTD, consulted with K. William O'Connor, regarding possible excisions to 6/13 and 18/75 teletypes, to protect electronic surveillance and mail surveillance operations. O'Connor advised that the material should be given to the SSC. He was informed that this would be noted in our memorandum to the Attorney General and he assented to this. Subsequently, Mr. Adams instructed that the code names of the mail surveillances should be deleted.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Hampton

62-116395

July 30, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: COMMUNICATIONS FROM FBI
HEADQUARTERS TO FBI FIELD OFFICES
AND AGENTS CONCERNING THE SSC

Reference is made to the letter from the captioned Committee dated July 8, 1975, which contained their request for copies of all communications from the FBI Director and/or other FBI Headquarters personnel to more than one FBI field office and/or to all Agents in those offices regarding the activities of the SSC.

Pursuant to your request, copies of the following communications are enclosed for you:

1) Teletype dated January 29, 1975, from Director, FBI, to all Special Agents in Charge (SACs) and all Legal Attaches (Legats).

2) Teletype dated March 24, 1975, from Director, FBI, to all SACs.

3) Teletype dated May 2, 1975, from Director, FBI, to all SACs.

4) Teletype dated May 2, 1975, from Director, FBI, to SACs, Alexandria, Baltimore, New Haven, Newark and Omaha.

5) Teletype dated May 28, 1975, from Director, FBI, to SACs, Alexandria, Atlanta, Baltimore, Charlotte, Chicago, Kansas City, Little Rock, Newark, Omaha, Philadelphia, Portland, Phoenix, Tampa and Washington Field.

6) Teletype dated May 20, 1975, from Director, FBI, to all SACs.

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

RDH:mjg
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2006 BY SP2 nm/[illegible]

MOR-1662 116395 - 492

WRW

RDH

TJM

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Communications from FBI
Headquarters to FBI Field Offices
and Agents Concerning the SSC

7) Teletype dated June 13, 1975, from Director, FBI, to SACs, Detroit, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Sacramento and Washington Field.

8) Teletype dated June 18, 1975, from Director, FBI, to SACs, New York, Boston, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, San Francisco, Seattle and Washington Field.

9) Memorandum To All Employees dated May 28, 1975, from Director, FBI, regarding interviews of FBI employees.

Enclosures (9)

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated ~~7/28/75~~ 7/30/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee Re: Communications from FBI Headquarters to FBI Field Offices and Agents Concerning the SSC.

Originating Office: FBI 3 10 PM

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec Sec

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/17/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf

MOR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
7/30/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 7/8/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Forwarding to the Committee all communications from the FBI Director and/or other FBI Headquarters personnel to more than one FBI field office and/or to all Agents in those offices regarding the activities of the SSC

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5/Woc/B

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2006 BY SP2alm/lhs
MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

1-29-75

TO ALL SACS AND ALL LEGATS

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

DESTRUCTION OF FIELD FILES AND RECORDS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPOSED INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPCT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAVE REQUESTED THE BUREAU NOT TO DESTROY, REMOVE FROM OUR POSSESSION OR CONTROL, OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OR PERMIT DISPOSAL OF ANY RECORDS OR DOCUMENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE A BEARING ON SUBJECTS UNDER INVESTIGATION. ACCORDINGLY, UPON RECEIPT OF THIS COMMUNICATION, RECIPIENTS ARE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE ANY RECORDS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY STATUTE OR REGULATIONS. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS MATTER WILL BE ISSUED UPON RECEIPT.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 SP2 ALM/MJC
MOR-16

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

3-24-75

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/17/2000 BY SP2am/lmf
MDR-16

SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

5/2/75

TO SACS ALL OFFICES

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENSTUDY 75

PERSONAL ATTENTION

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK TO INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

PROTECTED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL. YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

5/2/75

TO SACS ALEXANDRIA
BALTIMORE
NEW HAVEN
NEWARK
OMAHA

PERSONAL ATTENTION

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENSTUDY 75

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES. THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS ALREADY INTERVIEWED SOME FORMER EMPLOYEES. NEWARK TELETYPE APRIL 30 LAST "ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY; 1964 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NOMINATING CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY," REPORTED ADVICE FROM FORMER SPECIAL AGENT JOHN P. DEVLIN THAT HE HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED BY MICHAEL T. EPSTEIN, SSC STAFF MEMBER, CONCERNING DEVLIN'S PART

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2Am/lmf
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

IN FBI'S ACTIVITIES AT DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, AUGUST 22-28, 1964.

SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL SQUAD AT ATLANTIC CITY, AUGUST, 1964. EACH OF THESE FORMER AGENTS IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT THEY MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF. THEY ARE NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO BE ADVISED OF THE AREA WHICH MAY BE COVERED IN ANY INTERVIEW OF THEM BY THE SSC. THEY SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS, THEY CAN REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER AGENTS TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN THE EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER AGENT NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

NEWARK SHOULD INCLUDE RECONTACT WITH DEVLIN FOR PURPOSE INDICATED ABOVE AND ALSO FURNISH BUREAU ANY INFORMATION DEVLIN MAY HAVE FURNISHED YOUR OFFICE IN ADDITION TO THAT IN YOUR TELETYPE.

TELETYPE TO SACs, ALEXANDRIA ET AL
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ALEXANDRIA: HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1643 NORTH VAN DORN, ALEXANDRIA. WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 8338 WAGON WHEEL ROAD, ALEXANDRIA

BALTIMORE: DONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASE

NEW HAVEN: HOBSON H. ADCOCK, 65 GLENBROOK ROAD, STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT.

NEWARK: LEO THOMAS CLARK, 1421 ATLANTIC AVENUE, ATLANTIC CITY. JOHN PATRICK DEVLIN, 39 BENNINGTON ROAD, LIVINGSTON, NEW JERSEY. HOWARD J. WILSON, 30 CAMPBELL ROAD, SHORT HILLS, NEW JERSEY.

OMAHA: JOHN J. QUINN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, JOHNSTON, IOWA

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

5/28/75

TO SACS ALEXANDRIA
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
KANSAS CITY
LITTLE ROCK
NEWARK
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PORTLAND
PHOENIX
TAMPA
WFO

PERSONAL ATTENTION

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

REC-100

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKNOWN. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALEXANDRIA: COURTLAND J. JONES, 6607 N. 29TH STREET, ARLINGTON, VA.; ROBERT G. KUNKEL, SAC; BERNARD A. WELLS, 5311 MONTGOMERY STREET, SPRINGFIELD, VA.

ATLANTA: ALDEN F. MILLER

BALTIMORE: ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDNOR ROAD, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND; STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAL LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND; ROBERT H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND

CHARLOTTE: JOSEPH A. SIZOO, 84A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PINES ~~PE~~ NORTH CAROLINA

CHICAGO: OLGA CIESA, 10409 S. INDIANA AVENUE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

KANSAS CITY: BILL D. WILLIAMS, SAC

LITTLE ROCK: JOHN J. CREAMER, JR., ASAC

NEWARK: JOHN J. CONNOLLY; RITA AGNES AMBROSIO, 1604 JOHN STREET, FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY; RALPH W. BACHMAN, 610 NORWOOD DRIVE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY; KARL L. BROUSE,

5 BURRINGTON GORGE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY.

OMAHA: ROBERT L. TAGG

PHILADELPHIA: JOHN B. MEADE

PORTLAND: LEO B. APP, JR.; EDGAR O. INGALLS

PHOENIX: MILDRED E. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE, YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA

TAMPA: MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6509 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BEACH, FLORIDA

WFO: JAMES J. GAFFNEY; ELMER L. TODD

ROME: THOMAS J. BIAMONTE; JOSEPH C. MICHELA; HELEN C. SPEAR
COPY TO ROME, WITH ITS EMPLOYEES NAMED, BY MAIL.

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

TO ALL SACS MAY ~~19,~~ 20 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY - 75.

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR, IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE. UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL INFORMATION FURNISHED.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/17/2000 BY

MDR-16

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

TO SACS DETROIT
HONOLULU
LOS ANGELES
MILWAUKEE
SACRAMENTO
WFO

JUNE 13, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENSTUDY 75

IN CONNECTION WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST, FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY RETURN TELETYPE ATTENTION INTD - W. O. CREGAR.

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INDICES AT FBIHQ DO NOT INDICATE OVERHEARS ON KNOWN TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS ON MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. FOR FOLLOWING DATES AND LOCATIONS:

WIRETAPS

APRIL 24 - 26, 1964
HYATT HOUSE MOTEL
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

JULY 7 - 9, 1964
HYATT HOUSE MOTEL
LOS ANGELES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MICROPHONES

JANUARY 5 - 8, 1964
WILLARD HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

JANUARY 27, 1964
SHROEDER HOTEL
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

FEBRUARY 18 - 20, 1964
HILTON HAWAIIAN VILLAGE
HONOLULU, HAWAII

FEBRUARY 20 - 21, 1964
AMBASSADOR HOTEL
LOS ANGELES

FEBRUARY 22 - 24, 1964
HYATT HOUSE MOTEL
LOS ANGELES

MARCH 19 - 20, 1964
STATLER HOTEL
DETROIT, MICHIGAN

APRIL 23 - 24, 1964
SENATOR HOTEL
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

JULY 7 - 9, 1964
HYATT HOUSE MOTEL
LOS ANGELES

PAGE THREE

OFFICES REVIEW ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INDICES AND FURNISH FBIHQ FIRST DATE THAT KING WAS OVERHEARD ON ABOVE TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS. IF HE WAS NOT HEARD, SO ADVISE.

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

[redacted]

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2006 BY 5P2 ALM/LMF
MOR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [redacted] MAIL SURVEILLANCE. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [redacted] MAIL SURVEILLANCE. NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [redacted] MAIL SURVEILLANCE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [redacted] MAIL SURVEILLANCE.

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND MAIL SURVEILLANCE. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SOURCE [redacted] RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

[redacted]

Unexcised copy

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

[redacted]

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2ALM/DAL

MDR-16

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [redacted]. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [redacted]. NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [redacted]. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [redacted]

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND [redacted]. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM [redacted] RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

[redacted]

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

1-75

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO ALL EMPLOYEES

RE: INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES

All employees are advised that Congress is conducting an inquiry into activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Congressional staff members are conducting interviews of former and current FBI employees. This Bureau has pledged its cooperation with the Congress.

You are reminded of the FBI Employment Agreement (copy attached) with which you agreed to comply during your employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

Also, you are reminded of Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 16.22 (copy attached), which reads as follows:

"No employee or former employee of the Department of Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority, produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General in accordance with Section 16.24."

Also, you are reminded of Department of Justice Order Number 116-56, dated May 15, 1956, (copy attached) which, among other things, requires an employee upon the completion of his testimony to prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony.

Our cooperative efforts, of course, must be consistent with the above cited authority. Therefore, if you are contacted for purpose of interview or testimony you are to request approval as required by the Employment Agreement and await authorization before furnishing information, testimony, or record material.

CMKelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosures (3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MF

MDR-16

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure or production of national security information, other classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is in a better position than I to make that determination;

(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

____
(Signature)

____
(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

________________, 19 ____, by _____________________________
(Signature)

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

January 18, 1973

ORDER NO.501-73

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Title 28—JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Chapter I—Department of Justice

[Order 501-73]

PART 16—PRODUCTION OR DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL OR INFORMATION

Subpart B—Production or Disclosure in Response to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other Authorities

This order delegates to certain Department of Justice officials the authority to approve the production or disclosure of material or information contained in Department files, or information or material acquired by a person while employed by the Department. It applies where a subpena, order or other demand of a court or other authority, such as an administrative agency, is issued for the production or disclosure of such information.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 5 U.S.C. 301, Subpart B of Part 16 of Chapter I of Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, is revised, and its provisions renumbered, to read as follows:

Subpart B—Production or Disclosure in Response to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other Authorities

Sec.
16.21 Purpose and scope.
16.22 Production or disclosure prohibited unless approved by appropriate Department official.
16.23 Procedure in the event of a demand for production or disclosure.
16.24 Final action by the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General.
.6.25 Procedure where a Department decision concerning a demand is not made prior to the time a response to the demand is required.
6.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse ruling.

AUTHORITY: 28 U.S.C. 509, 510 and 5 U.S.C. 301.

Subpart B—Production or Disclosure in Response to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other Authorities

§ 16.21 Purpose and scope.

(a) This subpart sets forth the procedures to be followed when a subpena, order, or other demand (hereinafter referred to as a "demand") of a court or other authority is issued for the production or disclosure of (1) any material contained in the files of the Department, (2) any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department, or (3) any information or material acquired by any person while such person was an employee of the Department as a part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status.

(b) For purposes of this subpart, the term "employee of the Department" includes all officers and employees of the United States appointed by, or subject to the supervision, jurisdiction, or control of, the Attorney General of the United States, including U.S. attorneys, U.S. marshals, and members of the staffs of those officials.

§ 16.22 Production or disclosure prohibited unless approved by appropriate Department official.

No employee or former employee of the Department of Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority, produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General in accordance with § 16.24.

§ 16.23 Procedure in the event of a demand for production or disclosure.

(a) Whenever a demand is made upon an employee or former employee of the Department for the production of material or the disclosure of information described in § 16.21(a), he shall immediately notify the U.S. attorney for the district where the issuing authority is located. The U.S. attorney shall immediately request instructions from the appropriate Department official, as designated in paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) The Department officials authorized to approve production or disclosure under this subpart are:

(1) In the event that the case or other matter which gave rise to the demanded material or information is or, if closed, was within the cognizance of a division of the Department, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of that division. This authority may be redelegated to Deputy Assistant Attorneys General.

(2) In instances of demands that are not covered by paragraph (b)(1) of this section:

INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

(i) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, if the demand is one made on an employee or former employee of that Bureau for information or if the demand calls for the production of material from the files of that Bureau, and

(ii) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons, if the demand is one made on an employee or former employee of that Bureau for information or if the demand calls for the production of material from the files of that Bureau.

(3) In instances of demands that are not covered by paragraph (b) (1) or (2) of this section, the Deputy Attorney General.

(c) If oral testimony is sought by the demand, an affidavit, or, if that is not feasible, a statement by the party seeking the testimony or his attorney, setting forth a summary of the testimony desired, must be furnished for submission by the U.S. attorney to the appropriate Department official.

§ 16.24 Final action by the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General.

(a) If the appropriate Department official, as designated in § 16.23(b), approves a demand for the production of material or disclosure of information, he shall so notify the U.S. attorney and such other persons as circumstances may warrant.

(b) If the appropriate Department official, as designated in § 16.23(b), decides not to approve a demand for the production of material or disclosure of information, he shall immediately refer the demand to the Attorney General for decision. Upon such referral, the Attorney General shall make the final decision and give notice thereof to the U.S. attorney and such other persons as circumstances may warrant.

§ 16.25 Procedure where a Department decision concerning a demand is not made prior to the time a response to the demand is required.

If response to the demand is required before the instructions from the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General are received, the U.S. attorney or other Department attorney designated for the purpose shall appear with the employee or former employee of the Department upon whom the demand has been made, and shall furnish the court or other authority with a copy of the regulations contained in this subpart and inform the court or other authority that the demand has been, or is being, as the case may be, referred for the prompt consideration of the appropriate Department official and shall respectfully request the court or authority to stay the demand pending receipt of the requested instructions.

§ 16.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse ruling.

If the court or other authority declines to stay the effect of the demand in response to a request made in accordance with § 16.25 pending receipt of instructions, or if the court or other authority rules that the demand must be complied with irrespective of instructions not to produce the material or disclose the information sought, in accordance with § 16.24, the employee or former employee upon whom the demand has been made shall respectfully decline to comply with the demand. "United States ex rel Touhy v. Ragen," 340 U.S. 462.

Dated: January 11, 1973.

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST,
Attorney General.

[FR Doc.73-1071 Filed 1-17-73;8:45 am]

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 15, 1956

ORDER NO. 116-56

It is the policy of the Department of Justice to extend the fullest possible cooperation to congressional committees requesting information from departmental files, interviews with department employees, testimony of department personnel, or testimony of Federal prisoners. The following procedures are prescribed in order to effectuate this policy on a basis which will be mutually satisfactory to the congressional committees and to the Department. [This order supersedes the Deputy Attorney General's Memorandum No. 5, dated March 23, 1953, and his Memorandum No. 97, dated August 5, 1954. It formalizes the Attorney General's press release of November 5, 1953, establishing procedures to permit committees of the Congress and their authorized representatives to interview and to take sworn testimony from Federal prisoners. It supplements Order No. 3229 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953, and Order No. 3464, Supplement No. 4 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953 (with Memorandum of "Authorization Under Order No. 3464 Supplement No. 4 (Revised)" dated January 13, 1953), insofar as said orders have reference to procedures to be followed in the Department's relations with congressional committees. In support of this order, reference should be had to the President's letter dated May 17, 1954, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Attorney General's Memorandum which accompanied it.]

A. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM DEPARTMENT FILES

1. Congressional committee requests for the examination of files or other confidential information should be reduced to writing, signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General, who is responsible for the coordination of our liaison with Congress and congressional committees. The request shall state the specific information sought as well as the specific objective for which it is sought. The Deputy Attorney General will forward the request to the appropriate division where a reply will be prepared and returned for the Deputy Attorney General's signature and dispatch to the chairman of the committee.

2. If the request concerns a closed case, i. e., one in which there is no litigation or administrative action pending or contemplated, the file may be made available for review in the Department, in the presence of the official or employee having custody thereof. The following procedure shall be followed in such cases:

a. The reply letter will advise the committee that the file is available for examination and set forth the name, telephone extension number, and room number of the person who will have custody of the file to be reviewed;

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAK
mor-16

b. Before making the file available to the committee representative all reports and memoranda from the FBI as well as investigative reports from any other agency, will be removed from the file and not be made available for examination; provided however that if the committee representative states that it is essential that information from the FBI reports and memoranda be made available, he will be advised that the request will be considered by the Department. Thereafter a summary of the contents of the FBI reports and memoranda involved will be prepared which will not disclose investigative techniques, the identity of confidential informants, or other matters which might jeopardize the investigative operations of the FBI. This summary will be forwarded by the division to the FBI with a request for advice as to whether the FBI has any objection to examination of such summary by the committee representative. The file will not be physically relinquished from the custody of the Department. If the committee representative desires to examine investigative reports from other government agencies, contained in the files of the Department, he will be advised to direct his request to the agency whose reports are concerned.

3. If the request concerns an open case, i. e., one which litigation or administrative action is pending or contemplated, the file may not be made available for examination by the committee's representative. The following procedure shall be followed:

a. The reply letter should advise the committee that its request concerns a case in which litigation or administrative action is pending or contemplated, and state that the file cannot be made available until the case is completed; and

b. Should briefly set forth the status of the case in as much detail as is practicable and prudent without jeopardizing the pending contemplated litigation or administrative action.

B. REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL

1. Requests for interviews with departmental personnel regarding any official matters within the Department should be reduced to writing, signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General. When the approval of the Deputy Attorney General is given, the employee is expected to discuss such matters freely and cooperatively with the representative, subject to the limitations prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;

2. Upon the completion of the interview with the committee representative the employee will prepare a summary of it for the file, with a copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

C. EMPLOYEES TESTIFYING BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

1. When an employee is requested to testify before a congressional committee regarding official matters within the Department the Deputy Attorney General shall be promptly informed. When the Deputy Attorney General's approval is given the employee is expected to testify freely subject to limitations prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;

2. An employee subpoenaed to testify before a congressional committee on official matters within the Department shall promptly notify the Deputy Attorney General. In general he shall be guided in testifying by Order 3229 (Revised) and the President's letter of May 17, 1954, cited at the beginning of this Order.

3. Upon the completion of his testimony the employee will prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony with a copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

D. REQUESTS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES FOR THE TESTIMONY OF FEDERAL PRISONERS

Because of the custodial hazards involved and the extent to which their public testimony may affect the discipline and well-being of the institution, it is the policy of the Department not to deliver Federal prisoners outside the penal institution in which they are incarcerated for the purpose of being interviewed or examined under oath by congressional committees. However, when it appears that no pending investigation or legal proceeding will be adversely affected thereby and that the public interest will not be otherwise adversely affected, Federal prisoners may be interviewed or examined under oath by congressional committees in the institution in which they are incarcerated under the following procedures, and with the specific advance approval of the Deputy Attorney General.

1. Arrangements for interviewing and taking of sworn testimony from a Federal prisoner by a committee of the Congress or the authorized representatives of such a committee shall be made in the form of a written request by the chairman of the committee to the Deputy Attorney General.

2. Such written request shall be made at least ten (10) days prior to the requested date for the interview and the taking of testimony and shall be accompanied by written evidence that authorization for the interview or the taking of sworn testimony was approved by vote of the committee. Such request shall contain a statement of the purpose and the subjects upon which the prisoner will be interrogated as well as the names of all persons other than the representatives of the Department of Justice who will be present.

3. A member of the interested committee of the Congress shall be present during the entire time of the interrogation.

4. The warden of the penal institution in which the Federal prisoner is incarcerated shall, at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to the time at which the interview takes place, advise the Federal prisoner concerned of the proposed interview or taking of sworn testimony; and shall further advise that he is under the same, but no greater obligation to answer than any other witness who is not a prisoner.

5. The warden of the penal institution shall have complete authority in conformity with the requirements of security and the maintenance of discipline to limit the number of persons who will be present at the interview and taking of testimony.

6. The warden or his authorized representative shall be present at the interview and at the taking of testimony and the Department of Justice shall have the right to have one of its representatives present throughout the interview and taking of testimony.

7. The committee shall arrange to have a stenographic transcript made of the entire proceedings at committee expense and shall furnish a copy of the transcript to the Department of Justice.

E. OBSERVERS IN ATTENDANCE AT COMMITTEE HEARINGS

In order that the Department may be kept currently advised in matters within its responsibility, and in order that the Deputy Attorney General may properly coordinate the Department's liaison with Congress and its committees, each division that has an observer in attendance at a congrssional hearing, will have the observer prepare a written summary of the proceeding which should be sent to the division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

/s/ Herbert Brownell, Jr.

Attorney General

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz

July 25, 1975

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from John T. Elliff, dated July 23, 1975, requesting that a list of knowledgeable individuals, who were contacted by the Inspection Division of this Bureau during its inquiry into the "official and confidential" files be forwarded to the Senate Select Committee.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum, with enclosure , which is in response to the aforementioned request.

A copy of this memorandum, with enclosure , is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (4)

REC- 102

62-116395

62-116395-491

9 AUG 8 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

4 ENCLOSURE

7/30/75 [illegible] Please [illegible] call RTT

to O'Connor's office 7/29/75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

PVD:dkg (11)

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP9 ALM/MF
#MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE: By letterhead memorandum dated 7-16-75 we made available to the Committee a summary of the Inspection Division inquiry into the "official and confidential" files, along with making available in Bureau space a list of people knowledgeable concerning the "official and confidential" files who were contacted during the Inspection Division inquiry. We have now been requested to forward this list to the Committee's offices. It would appear to resist this request would not be in the best interests of the Bureau. Especially in view of the Department's prior reluctance to resist requests of this Committee.

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

July 25, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: "OFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL" FILES

Reference is made to a letter from John T. Elliff, dated July 23, 1975, requesting that a list of knowledgeable individuals, who were contacted by the Inspection Division of this Bureau during its inquiry into the "official and confidential" files be forwarded to the Senate Select Committee.

In response to the aforementioned request, we are attaching a copy of the list of knowledgeable individuals who were contacted during the Inspection Division inquiry concerning the "official and confidential" files.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2001 BY SP2[illegible]

MOR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

dkg

PVD:dkg (12)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 23, 1975

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Reference is made to your letter of July 21, 1975, providing a copy of the report of the Inspection Division inquiry dated July 3, 1975, and offering access to a list of knowledgeable individuals on the matter of the disposition of the so-called "official and confidential" files. Please provide the Committee for use in its offices the list of knowledgeable individuals now available for review by Committee staff in the FBI building.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2006 BY SP2ALM/lml
#MDR-16

62-116395-491

Name	Assignment May, 1972	Current Assignment	Address (Former Employees)
Adams, A. D., Jr.	Director's Office	Out of Service	3280th Student Squadron, Lackla Air Force Base, Texas
Baker, Betty, Mrs.		Messenger - Courier Unit Supervisor	
Battle, Joseph E., SA	Washington Field	Washington Field	
Bear, Gloria L.		Supply Supervisor	
Brocksieck, Louis, E., SA	Director's Office (Clerk)	Chicago	
Brandt, Earl T.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	1109 Logan Avenue, Tyrone, Pennsylvania
Brennan, Daniel J.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	501 Brooklyn Boulevard, Sea Gir New Jersey
Brown, Louis, Jr.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Campbell, Wason G.	Director's Office	Out of Service	206 East Broad Street, Greenfie Tennessee
Canday, Tommie R.	Security Patrol	Security Patrol	
Carey, Charles L.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Carey, Clyde C.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	4254 East Capitol Street, Apt. 2 Washington, D. C.
Cassidy, Edward, Jr.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Cheshier, Jerry Wayne	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Corbin, Donald F.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Special Clerk (Washington Field)	
Codi, Anthony A.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Cox, Fred	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	

62-116395-H91

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY [illegible]
#MDR-16

Crawford, James E.	Chauffeur	Out of Service	9727 Mt. Piscah, Apt. 604 Silver Spring, Maryland
Crookston, James	Messenger Unit	Service Unit	
Cundy, Wanda M., Mrs.	Secretary	Out of Service	3051 Brinkley Road, Apt. 101 Temple Hills, Maryland
Dembnicki, Paul E., SA	Director's Office (Clerk)	Boston	
Dowling, Joseph E., SA	Special Agent (Washington Field)	Washington Field	
Downing, Phyllis, Miss	Secretary	Director's Office	
Dudney, Thomas Barden	Washington Field (Chief Clerk)	Chief Clerk (Washington Field)	
Dunphy, John P.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section (Section Chief)	
Durrer, Virginia, Miss	File Locate Unit	General Index Unit	
Felt, W. Mark	Director's Office	Out of Service	3216 Wynford Drive, Fairfax, Virgin
Fields, Annie	Housekeeper	Out of Service	4936 30th Place, N. W. Washington, D. C.
Gandy, Helen W., Miss	Director's Office	Out of Service	4801 Connecticut Ave., N. W., Apt. Washington, D. C.
Gerrity, Edward J., SA	Director's Office (Clerk)	Boston	
Gregory, Darwin M.	Mechanical Section (Section Chief)	Out of Service	5714 Belfast Lane, Springfield, Virgi
Gunsser, Albert P.		Out of Service	401 Sligo Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland
Haisten, James A.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Clerk	
Hereford, Douglas	Security Patrol	Out of Service	6201 Cheryl Drive, Falls Church, Virginia
Holmes, Edna M., Miss	Director's Office	Out of Service	2600 North Fillmore Street, Arlington, Virginia

Hughes, Brent H.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section	
Isner, James D.	Messenger Unit	Correlation Unit	
Jones, Robert B.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Director's Office (Clerk)	
Koerner, Julian A.	Security Patrol Clerk	New York (Special Agent)	
Kuhn, Daniel F.		Supervisor	
Kunkel, Robert G., SAC	SAC (Washington Field)	SAC (Alexandria)	
Lockhart, Lois W.	Supply Supervisor	Contract Specialist	
Lovelace, James	Security Patrol Clerk	Philadelphia (Special Agent)	
Lovelace, Melvian	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section	
Lyles, Everett A.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	4561 North Capitol Street, N. W Washington, D. C.
Marsden, Robert B.	Mechanical Section (Supervisor)	Mechanical Section (Supervisor)	
McCord, Ruth, Miss	Director's Office	Director's Office	
McMichael, G. Speights	Procurement Section	Procurement Section	
Metcalf, Erma, Mrs.	Director's Office	Director's Office	
Mohr, John P.	Director's Office	Out of Service	3427 North Edison, Arlington, Virginia
Mooney, Nancy A., Miss	Director's Office	Director's Office	
Moten, Thomas E., SA	Chauffeur	Chauffeur	
Ness, Ronald H.	File Delivery Unit	Out of Service	3410 Manis Road, Clinton, Maryland
[illegible] Beverly, Mrs.	Filing Unit	Mail Room	

O'Haver, Robert R.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section	
Page, Thomas L., SA	Clerk	Indianapolis (Special Agent)	
Peffer, Kenneth Lee	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section	
Peterson, Jesse T., Jr.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
P[illegible]yton, F. Thomas	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section	
Pickering, Michael Wilmer	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	Rt. 1, Box 85, Clatskanie, Oregon
Powell, Excell		Out of Service	1454 Montana Ave., N.E. Washington, D. C.
Randolph, George W.	Security Patrol	Security Patrol	
Riddles, Richard E.	Security Patrol	Philadelphia (Special Agent)	
Ruegsegger, Hugh D.	Security Patrol	Quantico (Special Agent)	
Ryan, Edward F.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section	
S[illegible]bol, Robert J.	Security Patrol	Indianapolis (Special Agent)	
Schaeffer, Raymond H.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section	
Shaffer, Kenneth	Washington Field (Clerk)	Washington Field (Clerk)	
Shields, Carolyn	Messenger Unit	Records Unit	
Shoaff, Clark S., SA		Quantico (Special Agent)	
Singleton, Robert	File Unit	File Unit	
Skillman, Dorothy S., Mrs.	Director's Office	Out of Service	429 N. Street, S.W., Apt S700 Washington, D. C.
	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section-Quantico	

Smith, Thomas J.	Research Section	Out of Service	3410 Memphis Lane, Bowie, Maryland
Smith, Ursula, Miss	Director's Office	Out of Service	11 North Garfield, Arlington, Virginia
Soyars, William B.	Assistant Director	Out of Service	12 Green Winged Teal Road, Amelia Island Plantation, Amelia, Florida
Stewart, Alfred LaFornia	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	Rt. 2, Box 164, Statesboro, Georgia
Sullivan, Cornelius G.		ASAC (Washington Field)	
Thompson, Ronald E.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Director's Office (Clerk)	
Thrun, Robert W.	Security Patrol	Quantico (Special Agent)	
Tice, Alvin L.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Tietgen, Gladys M.		Director's Office	
Tschudy, Carol, Miss	Director's Office	Administrative Assistant	
Underwood, Thomas E.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	12019 Center Hill Street, Wheaton, Mayland
V[illegible], Helen, Miss	Director's Office	Administrative Assistant	
Walp, Shirley, Miss	Messenger Unit	Teletype Unit	
Washington, William H.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Windear, Ralph A.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Winters, Lawrence E.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Director's Office (Clerk)	
Banwarth, Robert F.		Exhibits Section	

Benedict, James P.		Filing Unit
Booch, James D.		Exhibits Section
Brady, Lawrence W.		Filing Unit
Dalton, Terry A.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Doxzen, Mildred, Mrs.		Filing Unit
Fox, Wayne M.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Greene, Edgar G.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Hewett, Bernice R.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Larson, Fredrick A.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Massie, Laurence M.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Nash, William H.	Exhibits Section	

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: US Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated July 25, 1975

Caption of Document: "Official and Confidential Files"

Originating Office: FBI

2:20 p

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor, Jr. Date: 7/30/75

Received by: Thelle Zimmerman

Title: Asst Clerk.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 am/lmf
#MDR-16

62-116395-491

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
7/25/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒	SSC
☐	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosure

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 7/23/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating Procedures

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

List of knowledgeable individuals who were contacted during the Inspection Division inquiry concerning the "Official and Confidential" files.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 AIM [illegible]
#MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

5' wolf 8

62-116395
FMK:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-491

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
#MDR-16

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

5

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Personnel File - Richard D. Cotter
1 - Personnel File - Thomas J. Smith
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : J. B. Adams

DATE: 7/29/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 7/28/75, Loch Johnson requested that former employees Richard D. Cotter and Thomas J. Smith be made available for interview and/or their current address be made available to the Committee so they may arrange interviews. The topic of the interview is to be their knowledge concerning the Houston Plan. Both Cotter and Smith were formerly employed in the Intelligence Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Cotter and Smith be released from employment agreement for purposes of an interview by the Senate Select Committee concerning the Houston Plan.

(2) That the Intelligence Division arrange to have Cotter and Smith contacted to advise them of the Senate Select Committee's interest in interviewing them and of the fact that should an interview take place, the Bureau will, if requested, make available an Agent for consultation during interview, and insure they are advised that the Bureau Agent will not be actually present during the interview.

REC- 102

62-116395-490

(3) Prepare the necessary communication so that the Senate Select Committee is advised of the location ~~of former~~ SAs Cotter and Smith.

9 AUG 8 197

8/7/75

PVD:lad
(8)

PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2006 BY SP2ALM/MLF
#MDR-16

5-TJM

8 4 1 1 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - J. B. Adams
3 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
(1 - P. V. Daly)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/29/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC/LES

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - V. V. Kolombatovic
1 - L. A. Crescioli

This is to advise that Special Agent-Liaison Officer L. A. Crescioli has been requested to appear for informal staff interview by the Senate Select Committee (SSC) 7/30/75.

On 7/28/75 Mr. James Dick, Staff member, SSC, requested that Liaison Officer Crescioli appear on 7/30/75 for informal staff interview to be conducted by Mr. Dick and Mr. Paul Wallach, both SSC Staff members. According to Mr. Dick, the interview will concern the general liaison responsibilities of Liaison Officer Crescioli with the Headquarters Office of the Inspection Service, U. S. Postal Service (USPS).

Upon learning on the above occasion that Crescioli assumed the USPS Headquarters liaison post in November, 1974, Mr. Dick inquired as to Crescioli's predecessor and was provided the name of Mr. Francis X. O'Neill (currently assigned as ASAC, New Haven Office). Mr. Dick was aware of the fact that at an earlier period SA L. F. Schwartz handled liaison with USPS.

D

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Liaison Officer Crescioli be released from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

REC-102 62-116395-489

2. Inasmuch as Mr. Dick has advised that this is to be a "non-abuse" type interview, it is recommended that a representative of the Intelligence Division be designated to be present during SA Crescioli's interview.

AUG 8 1975

WRW/TAL

JBA
PLM

1 - Personnel file of SA Louis A. Crescioli

LAC:pld
(10)

LAC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2ALM/JMF
MOR-16

TJM

AUG 11 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. Gallagher

DATE: 7/28/75

FROM : L. E. Rhyne

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Gallagher
1 - Mr. Rhyne
1 - Mr. Rosenquist
1 - Mr. Wannall
(ATTN: T. J. McNiff, Rm 4063 JEH)

Reference is made to memorandum of Mr. Cregar to Mr. Wannall dated 7/24/75, relating to certain pages of a CIA document. Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, 155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180, 181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354 of this document were reviewed and disclosure of this information to the Senate Select Committee will not compromise or otherwise damage an ongoing investigation presently being conducted by the FBI.

Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the information contained therein should be closely guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know basis.

GDR/brb brb
(5)

TJM

REC-102

62-116395-488

9 AUG 8 1975

...MATION CONTAINED
...UNCLASSIFIED
10/11/2000 BY SP2 ALW/lmf
#m DR-46

79 AUG 14 1975

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following by Facsimile — PLAINTEXT

Priority ____________

[illegible]
To: KANSAS CITY

Date:

From: SAC LOS ANGELES

Time: Transmitted -

Subject:

Received -

☐ Fingerprint Cards ☐ Fingerprint Record ☐ Map ☒ Newspaper clipping ☐ Photograph

☐ Vehicle Description ☐ Other ____________

☐ Sketch ☐ [illegible]

Special handling instructions: (HAND CARRY TO DIRECTOR.)

ASST DIR. MINTZ RECOMMENDS DIRECTOR PERSONALLY CALL ATTORNEY GENERAL.

Approved: CWA

Senstudy - '75

D

Assoc. Dir. ✓
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ✓
Comp. Syst. ✓
Ext. Affairs ✓
Files & Com. ✓
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training ✓
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

REC- 102

62-116395-487

16 AUG 7 1975

File

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 ALM/DMF
#MDR-16

2 ENCLOSURE

84 AUG 1 1 1975

FBI: Missing the Point

So many disclosures have surfaced so rapidly that the public may have become inured to still more revelations about improper activities of government intelligence agencies. Yet the admissions and comments Monday by FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley should not be permitted to pass unnoticed:

—The FBI for many years engaged in "national security" burglaries, and, presumably, foreign embassies in Washington were among the targets.

—The FBI still compiles "personal behavior" information on government officials, including members of Congress and prominent private citizens.

In defending the burglaries, Kelley said: "I am convinced that in these matters where there might be some criticism there is an underlying intent to do that which is good for the nation. I have not come across any activities which I would construe as being illegal or being directed toward personal gain or to enhance the personal reputation of anyone."

I spoke of past [illegible]

This analysis, even if accurate—which is doubtful—betrays a misunderstanding of the responsibilities of an agency like the FBI in a democratic society.

A warning some 20 years ago by Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter goes to the heart of the problem. Frankfurter said, "The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority."

Of special significance was Kelley's revelation that the FBI continues to collect personal information on congressmen and others who are not under criminal investigation. His explanation was nothing less than astonishing. He said such information, which includes sex and drinking habits, "might very well be helpful to us in later investigations." Of course it might, but that tactic is the very essence of a police state.

I said "receives"

The bureau, Kelley said, is drawing guidelines, in cooperation with the Justice Department, to control the collection of "personal behavior" information not related to criminal investigations. No guidelines are necessary, because no American citizen should be the target of such an investigation.

I did not say this. It is their conclusion

"I have not reviewed files to find out about reporters, congressmen or other public figures," Kelley said, but here again he was wide of the mark. The discretion or lack of it, or the good intention of an FBI director or lack of it, does not meet the issue. Such files should not exist.

See pg 23 for my statement

After the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Agencies completes its investigation, Congress must redefine the roles of the FBI, the CIA and other elements of the intelligence community, which includes thousands of employes and which spends $5 billion to $8 billion a year. Their secret operations, and the manpower and billions they command, give them vast power. That power must be brought under firm control.

Some mechanism must be devised that is more effective than the present oversight committees of Congress, which, based on their record, could be more accurately dubbed the "overlook" committees of Congress.

See pg. 22 for info volunteered

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2ALM/MF
#MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-487

NEWS CONFERENCE OF CLARENCE M. KELLEY
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JULY 14, 1975

MR. KELLEY: Good morning. I have very few statements to make as an opening. I just want to say that this is a further attempt on my part to be a little more available. Frankly, it is something which I hope we can continue and I have not in the past been premeditatively evasive nor reluctant to appear before you. But, frankly, I've been pretty busy with a number of other things. I want to let you know that we're continuing our efforts to try to improve the rapport between us. We will continue to do some things and hopefully, in the future we can get together more frequently on the basis of some of our past meetings which I think have been very fruitful. So now I'll throw it open for questions and these lights are a little bit strong but I'll try to be able to identify you. Do you have any questions?

QUESTION: Do you have any evidence, sir, or any information leading you to suspect any CIA Agents have been planted in any manner or form in any executive agencies for the purpose of transmitting evidence back to the CIA about that agency?

MR. KELLEY: I have no evidence whatsoever brought to my attention and I certainly know of none.

QUESTION: Sir, do you have ongoing programs trying to check out that sort of thing? Do you look for it?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
#MDR-16

62-116395 — 487

ENCLOSURE

MR. KELLEY: We have no ongoing programs whatsoever and have had no reports that it has occurred and this is something new to us.

QUESTION: Sir, there have been complaints repeatedly in recent days from Congressmen and Senators on the Hill who are charged with investigating the FBI and its domestic surveillance in past years that they are not getting the information that they need. We heard from Senator Church maybe yesterday. Can you respond to that?

MR. KELLEY: The allegation has been made to the effect that the FBI is dragging its feet, so to speak, and slow to respond to the requests of the Church committee for information relative to past abuses by the FBI in the intelligence field and it's even been said from time to time that this reluctance is reflective of an effort to preserve the image of Mr. Hoover. First, I want you to know that in giving instructions in this matter, it has been consistently my policy to say that we should be completely candid and forthright. And we should respond in whatever manner we can consistent, of course, with some restrictions--those being a matter of confidentiality and right to privacy. Insofar as dragging our feet, the letter which was sent to us was dated May 14, 1975. We immediately embarked on a program to try to respond. In May, 1975, I remember it was the last half of May, we devoted 323 man days to try to respond and to date have added another over 400 hours and it's a total dedication of personnel--of 102 of our people. We have 102 people who are responding to this request. The reason why it has taken this much time and this great amount of manpower is that we must go through all of this material very carefully to preserve, of course, the privacy of those who may be mentioned and also to assure that matters of grave import are no so disclosed. We are trying at best we can to resolve in favor of making them available. I think this number 102 is very significant inasmuch as in the work of the Freedom of Information, there are also over 102, about 105 people, dedicated to fulfilling our obligations there. So, we have almost 210 people engaged in these two enterprises and this has a great impact upon our capabilities. Does that answer your question?

QUESTION: Can you tell us why Senator Church would be complaining?

MR. KELLEY: Why he what?

QUESTION: Why he would be complaining?

MR. KELLEY: No sir, I don't know. Some of these things, of course, may be thought to be too slow and it's thought perhaps that all you have to do is to remove the material from the file and send it on up. We have already submitted a great deal of it and intend within the next 10 days to complete the entire matter.

QUESTION: Is in any of that material now in the Justice Department awaiting approval of the Attorney General?

MR. KELLEY: Yes, some of it is in the hands of the Department ready to be transmitted. That's our first step--after we make our survey, to ship it over to them, they review it and then send it on through.

QUESTION: Well, has it been there for a while?

MR. KELLEY: I can't tell you exactly what length of time but I can say that within about 10 days, we'll have ours completed and you can gage thereafter what type of delay is experienced through the Department.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, Senator Church says that you won't allow him and his staff to interview FBI Agents and that's one of the complaints he makes about the lack of cooperation. Is that true that you will not allow the Senate staff to interview FBI Agents?

MR. KELLEY: We have gone through a procedure whereby ex-FBI Agents may have available to them our people in order to consult with them as to any matter which might be thought to violative of some of the confidentiality provisions; and we have not, to my knowledge, denied the right of anyone presently employed to be interviewed with, of course again, the requirements that if they want to consult with us they may do so.

QUESTION: Well, in other words, you're saying that FBI Agents can be interviewed by the Senate staff. Is that correct?

MR. KELLEY: Let me just check that. Mr. Mintz, is that correct? Have we denied any?

MR. MINTZ: We have not denied any. We've not indicated to anyone we would not let them be interviewed.

QUESTION: What was that Mr. Kelley, about ex--I didn't understand, about ex-FBI Agents?

MR. KELLEY: Ex-FBI Agents, when called, and we're advised, are informed that one of our people can be present outside the interview room for consultation by that interviewee with our people to determine whether or not a certain question is beyond the purview of his capability, and we do not say to him that he cannot answer but we do say here are the rules, the regulations, the law and you can be guided in accordance with your own dictates. But we make available to him a consultant, so to speak.

QUESTION: Is that a requirement or..?

MR. KELLEY: That's an agreement between us.

QUESTION: In other words, when an ex-Agent goes up, he has to have somebody?

MR. KELLEY: No sir, he does not have to have but we inform him that he may have if he so desires.

QUESTION: During your confirmation hearings two years ago, you advocated or said that you would like to see more Congressional oversight of the FBI. You think now that there's too much, just about right, or not enough oversight?

MR. KELLEY: It is true that I said during my confirmation that I do not object to FBI Congressional oversight. One has been established and I have met with them on several occasions to set an oversight committee. There is also a House so-called oversight committee--it's the House Judiciary Committee--there are others who may by virtue of their jurisdiction feel that they, too, have oversight. We do no oppose House oversight. Frankly, I would like to have a joint committee of oversight so that we can know precisely to whom we should report and they, in turn, know precisely to whom any oversight problems can be referred. Basically, in other words, I do not object to oversight--I do think that it would be much better if we could have it well-structured so that it will be clearly understood by all parties concerned as to what they are going to do and how they are to do it.

QUESTION:	Mr. Kelley, do you feel the oversight being conducted now between the Senate and House is probing too deeply into the FBI--do you feel that any of the operations of the FBI have been hurt by the investigations going on now?
MR. KELLEY:	I do not construe the activities of the oversight groups as having delved too deeply into the work of the FBI. We do on occasion feel that perhaps some matters need protection, particularly those involving national security, but I have no objection in the exchange in oversight groups of any matter in which we are engaged. I think, as a matter of fact, that this is a proper balance insofar as keeping us in line and I also welcome it inasmuch as it gives us an opportunity to explain just what and how we do things. I do not object to the exchange, in other words.
QUESTION:	Mr. Kelley, you said that you're not attempting to preserve the image of J. Edgar Hoover and, apparently, you know what will be in the information that is to go out of your office in 10 days. Can you tell us, when that information gets up to the Hill and assuming it's made public, are there going to be some more bomb shells about the FBI that we haven't heard about or is this all information which has generally been made public?
MR. KELLEY:	I don't know of any bomb shells, so to speak. In the news media, there have been many things discussed, many reports made, and in those matters I think that just about everything that we know about has been already, at least to

some extent, discussed and, to some extent, publicized. I am convinced that in these matters where there might be some criticism, there is an underlying intent to do that which is good for the Nation. I have not come across any activities which I would construe as being illegal, being directed toward personal gain or to enhance the reputation of anyone. I see nothing untoward in these activities, in other words, as they will be reviewed by the various groups.

QUESTION: Now, Mr. Kelley, Mr. Sullivan said about a week ago, that he assumed there had been some national security break-ins over the years and I'm just wondering if there have been national security break-ins, say in the last five years, roughly what number are we talking about and why aren't they illegal? What's the legal authority?

MR. KELLEY: There have been statements made about surreptitious entries and the latest was that statement made by Mr. Sullivan who just retired as the Assistant Director in Charge of the Los Angeles Office; and there have been, of course, reports in the media that the Department of Justice has been inquiring into allegations that our people have engaged in surreptitious entries or, as they are sometimes termed, burglaries. Yes, the FBI has conducted surreptitious entries in securing information relative to the security of the Nation. However, in 1966, all such activity was terminated with the exception of a small amount of actions which were conducted in connection with foreign counterintelligence investigations which we felt had a grave impact upon the security of the Nation. And again, as I just said, I feel that the FBI personnel participating in or approving such activities acted in good faith with the belief that national security interests were paramount and their actions were reasonable. I'm always mindful of a story I heard many years ago about two neighbors who started some arguments which, obviously, were going to terminate into difficulties. One of the neighbors started a campaign to build himself up with shadowboxing, punching the bag and so forth, and it appeared very likely that he was going to be in pretty good shape in order to beat up his neighbor and so the neighbor, thereafter, concerned as to what would happen to him, started to defend himself. You don't wait until the climax which could be the putsch--you start preparing yourself and so I think that the FBI and its officials construed this as paramount again in the protection of the country.

QUESTION: You said that in 1966, there were a small amount of burglaries. I'm just wondering how small is small and who gave the OK. Did this come from President Johnson or President Nixon or was this a decision made by Attorney General....

MR. KELLEY: This matter will be discussed in subsequent hearings and in reports, and further than what I have stated, I cannot comment.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, were these directed against Americans or foreign persons?

MR. KELLEY: I would prefer not at this point to make any comments further and particularly not in particularity as to who may have been the ones against whom they were directed.

QUESTION: Well, were they all conducted in this country or were some conducted overseas?

MR. KELLEY: I know of none overseas.

QUESTION: Sir, going back to prior to 1966, why was the procedure changed in 1966?

MR. KELLEY: By virtue of the feeling of Mr. Hoover that, under the then-prevailing philosophy and the feeling that possibly in the context of the times, this was not a viable procedure--they were stopped. It was Mr. Hoover's decision.

QUESTION: Sir, can we infer that there were quite a number, a large number, of burglaries prior to 1966, but fewer since then?

MR. KELLEY: You cannot infer anything because I have not told you of any number. I can only say that they were stopped in 1966. As to the number, I cannot actually tell you how many nor can I say that it's quite a number or very few.

QUESTION: Why can't you tell us the number?

ANSWER: Because we're going to make reports to our Congressional groups and to the Department of Justice and, frankly, I can't tell you the number myself. We don't have any....

QUESTION: They did not entirely stop in 1966? There were some that did get, you say, a small number after 1966?

ANSWER: There may have been some after 1966 which were, of course, in the field of foreign counterintelligence, and such that it would make a grave impact on our....

QUESTION: Before that, they were not with the field of foreign counterintelligence?

ANSWER: Oh, yes, there were some in that field also.

QUESTION: There were others that were not in the field of foreign counterintelligence before 1966?

ANSWER: You recall that I said in the context of the time, it may well have been that prior to that time national security or counterintelligence or whatever terminology you might want to use could have included other areas. But, then you began to compartmentize various types of activities and then it became evident that the area of foreign counterintelligence national security certainly should be differentiated from domestic security.

QUESTION: But, Mr. Kelley, what policy have you followed in the time that you have been Director? Is this type of activity, has it been permitted? Is it policy now to conduct this kind of activity?

ANSWER: I have not had a single request to conduct such activity since I have been made Director. If ever anything of this type comes up, and I can't foresee this need, but, if it ever did come up and it became a matter of grave concern, a matter which is to be solved only through such activity, I would present it to the Attorney General and would be guided by his opinion as to such activity. Frankly, I have not had any such request since I have come aboard.

QUESTION: Is that in the foreign field, Mr. Kelley. Is that limited to the foreign field when you say such activity?

ANSWER: Yes, sir. Foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, national security, whatever terminology you want to use.

QUESTION: Back prior to 1966, were any of those in say organized crime investigations?

ANSWER: I know of none.

QUESTION: Would you characterize, Mr. Kelley, what areas they were in, please. What areas the pre-1966 burglaries took place? Characterize the kinds of investigations they concern?

ANSWER: I can not at this point characterize them because I just don't know how they were to be characterized. But, it could be that, I would guess, that the great majority of them are what we now term counter-foreign, counterintelligence, or national security. I would say that in all probability the geat majority of them were in that area. That's where the grave concern is.

QUESTION: Have you reviewed them from a legal point of view to determine whether any of them at all were conducted without proper legal authority?

ANSWER: We have discussed them with the Department, and will place them in their hands and they will make such a review.

QUESTION: I wanted to ask you if this goes back to World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War or all of them?

ANSWER: They will go back to World War II, I'm confident.

QUESTION: Is it possible to get court authorization by warrant or whatever means for surreptitious entry as distinguished from an ordinary search warrant?

ANSWER: Inherent in the request for a microphone installation there is a matter of surreptitious entry. So, therein you have a natural concomitant. You do have that permission. There is some dictum to indicate, at present, that this may be brought up later. But, I know of no authorization which can be obtained per se for a surreptitious entry. And, at this point, of course, the feeling is that these confined as they are to foreign counterintelligence it flows from presidential authority as it applies also to the warrantless wiretaps.

QUESTION: Weren't the civil rights groups, Mr. Kelley, among some of the organizations who were burglarized?

ANSWER: I'm not going to say anything about where they were, or against which organizations they were directed, only to say that they were, Mr. Nelson, and I hope that will satisfy you, and I hope that if there is any revelation to be made later that they can be as complete as possible because, again, we feel that the intent was a very good one and there was no illegality concerned. And the impact of it was to protect the country.

QUESTION: Sir, how can you say that there was no illegality concerned if the Constitution says that you have to have a search warrant to make an entry and without, as I understand it, even checking this with the Attorney General, these Agents burglarized private premises?

ANSWER: The resolution of the problem which you now present is up to the Department and the courts, and I, of course, will not engage in anything except to say that in the defense of the men who authorized and participated, that they had this intent and within every criminal violation there is a necessity that there be the ingredient of intent and there was none here as far as I can determine.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, would you say, sir, that most of these requests for surreptitious entry flowed from presidential authority? Is that what you said, sir?

ANSWER: No, I did not say that. I did not give a complete outline as to what the authorization was. And, this again will be a matter which will be discussed in the reviews of the Department and the various Congressional committees.

QUESTION: Sir, would you say that the Cubans who burglarized Daniel Elzberg's psychiatrist's office should not have been convicted then since they thought that they were on a national security mission? They didn't intend to violate any laws. That was their testimony.

ANSWER: I have no judgment insofar as that because my province is in presenting the facts and for the review and determination by the courts and if such an inference was made it was not intended by me to give them any sanctuary. I'm trying to keep in the area of our facts and that particular thing as to whether or not they had any intent or whether or not it is a viable defense is up to the courts.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, did you twice mention that you expect some resolution to this question in the courts? How is it going to get into the courts?

ANSWER: I don't know. It possibly will be some sort of a defense, rather some sort of a presentation to the courts by the Attorney General. He has indicated that perhaps this being a Constitutional question--it being a matter of the executive privilege of the presidential power--that it might well be necessary to have such a review to determine.

QUESTION: Were all of these break-ins conducted with the permission of either the Attorney General or the President at the time? Or were there any that were conducted without such approval?

ANSWER: I cannot, at this point, give you any particulars about the program. I just say, as I did before, and this....

QUESTION: Because you don't know or because you're withholding comment?

ANSWER: I'm withholding comment.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, I'm still unclear about distinction between break-ins before 1966 and afterward. Is the reduction in number the only change that was made or was there change in the limitations on the targets that were used?

ANSWER: There was a change insofar as the targets just being in the subsequent area confined to those matters which were concerned in foreign counterintelligence.

QUESTION: You imply then that the others concern domestic security or did it go beyond that?

ANSWER: This implication is yours, Mr. Rogers, but....

QUESTION: I'm trying to recall what you said initially.

ANSWER: I said that..., the question was asked me whether I included domestic intelligence, and I said I was confident that the great majority was in the area of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence, whatever you want to call it. And there may have been. I don't know.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, you said that you have not received a request for any type of activities such as this since you have been in office. When did the last one take place?

ANSWER: I do not know. I do not know.

QUESTION: Will the material you turn over to the Church Committee include full details of everyone of the break-ins?

ANSWER: It will be a matter which will be completely presented to the Attorney General, and, insofar as full disclosure by him, that's a question which only he can answer. We will report those about which we know.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, you said it was also for the good of the country that Agents send letters to school boards and principals and others to damage the reputation of people working who have had connections with groups the FBI had infiltrated. Was that also for the good of the country?

ANSWER: Your statement, was that also for the good of the country to do that, to damage the reputation, was not the issue. As you pose your question, you answered substantially my response that would be made. Yes, I think that the purpose here was to do something that would ultimately end to the benefit of the Nation. In other words, I think in the so-called COINTEL Program, which you mentioned, that the intent there was one which had adequate basis. As to the programs, now, individually activities within those programs may be suspect. I have said and repeated that some of those activities I would not feel are proper today. I wasn't there during the time that all of these programs were developed, nor certainly the approval of the various activities within those programs. Were I to have been there, there is some that perhaps I might have said, "No I don't think this is proper." I have the benefit of hindsight. I have the benefit of experience in local law enforcement which, I think, prepares me to better understand perhaps the impact of some of these types of things. They are not at all unknown in the field of law enforcement. In some degree or another almost all the law enforcement has engaged in some similar types of activities. Not perhaps to the sophistication as the COINTEL Program, but the context of the time is felt necessary in the present day. We realize that different standards should be applied and they are and we do not engage in those activities now. Since April, 1971, we cut them off.

> (NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS AND EDITORS: The preceding comment by Mr. Kelley concerning local police use of efforts similar to COINTELPRO may be open to misinterpretation. At his direction the FBI later issued his clarifying statement: "I had in mind that law enforcement agencies have used methods designed to create disunity among the criminal element, particularly in organized crime and hoodlum gangs. Probably most common was labeling a crime figure as a police informant to discredit and destroy his criminal influence. These activities to pit one crime figure against another have achieved success in neutralizing the criminal element.")

QUESTION: You said that you disagreed with some of the activities, that they were not proper programs. Alright, does that mean that there are variations of COINTEL Programs still going on?

ANSWER: In the first place, we deliniate certain programs. That's the overall structure of the full system. Within each of these programs there were some activities, individual activities. I feel that the setup of the programs certainly was directed properly, that is, with the intent to preserve the Nation. Insofar as some individual activities, yes, I feel that some were, in today's context particularly, imprudent and that they were not, again in the present context, the type of thing that certainly I would approve. Be that as it may, we stopped them in 1971 and we have no intention to continue them.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley?

ANSWER: Yes, sir, Joe?

QUESTION: When you were an Agent did you engage in any break-ins or were you aware of any break-ins?

ANSWER: Insofar as the matter which you are now discussing, I think that we can give substantially the same answer to this. This is a matter which is being investigated by the Department and is being investigated by the various committees, particularly the Select Committee of Congress and, I'm not saying that Clarence Kelley engaged in such activites, or did not engage in these activities. I'm merely saying that these have been presented for review and they will, thereafter, be discussed at some length and any publicity that might be given them will be that which will be given by those more knowledgeable than I.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, to your knowledge have any members of the FBI been involved in the planning or execution of assassinations?

ANSWER: No, sir. I know of none.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, how about the break-in of embassies here in Washington. Have any members of the FBI gained surreptitious entry into any embassies in Washington?

ANSWER: Without naming or designating victims or institutions, I can only say that there were a few concerned with counterintelligence--foreign in nature--subsequent to 1966. Further then that I cannot say.

QUESTION: A few is 10, 20, 100? When you say few, I'm sure that I'm lost as to how few is a few.

ANSWER: Not many.

QUESTION: Was a lot of this done in Washington as opposed to other cities in the country?

ANSWER: There were not a lot, I'm confident of that. And, frankly, I don't think that all of the few were confined to Washington, D. C., but I can't tell you absolutely that that is true.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, were any of these done in conjunction with the CIA? With their knowledge?

ANSWER: I know of none. Now, subsequently, perhaps there may have been information which did go to them but, not insofar as the origin of the information, I'm confident of that. We were not in partnership with CIA.

QUESTION: How about the NSA? Were there any of these break-ins done to help benefit the NSA in its code-breaking programs?

ANSWER: That is a matter which will be developed and will be presented and, it's better for them to comment then I.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, the Rockefeller Commission report said that, in discussing the CIA's mail cover operations, said the FBI only learned about this about five years after it was in the works. In 1958, I believe. Mr. Colby's report to the President said the FBI knew about it from its conception. Which is correct?

ANSWER: It is my understanding it was 1968.

QUESTION: 1958?

ANSWER: 1968. Wait a minute, 1958, 1958. That's right, 1958.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, in the last 50 years, as I understand it from FBI officials, there has never been an FBI Agent prosecuted for any kind of corruption or crime in connection with his official duties. Is there any agreement with the Justice Department either in writing or any other kind of agreement not to prosecute people who may stray from or commit crimes but, rather to handle it with internal discipline?

ANSWER: Mr. Kelly, spelled K-E-L-L-Y, there is no such agreement. I would not abide by such an agreement. I vehemently oppose any such arrangement and would not operate under such arrangement. No, there is none. Yes, anyone that, within the FBI, will be prosecuted if there is evidence leading to that conclusion. I can assure you absolutely that this is my policy, is the policy of the Bureau, and that we will pursue them as vigorously as we possibly can. There's nothing worse in my estimation than the betrayal of trust and that's what we have when one of your own people defects and gives sanctuary and assistance to the crminal world.

QUESTION: How do you account than for the fact that there has been no one who has strayed across the line in all these years? It's almost unhuman.

ANSWER: Well, I appreciate your compliment, Mr. Kelly, which I agree with, there has been none. There have been, of course, some allegations made from time to time, all of which have been pursued and found to be groundless. I think that it's inherent in an organization which is closely scrutinized, an organization which has a strong inspection system but, more than anything else, is the choice of people who are not susceptible to this type of thing. Unquestionably, in such a screening process some might get through. But, than, within the FBI is a built-in system which further prevents this possibility and that is a tremendous pride in this very matter. That is, that there has been no corruption. And, I am confident that Agents working with one another, although, will, of course, on occasion be sympathetic to an Agent who possibly may be drinking too much or may possibly, for other reasons in the area the morals might digress to some extent, they absolutely will not countenance corruption or defection to the criminal element or otherwise contaminate that splendid reputation of the Bureau. It's a unique situation. It's difficult for some to understand. But, it's a built-in barrier to an extension of this type of activity and, something of which we will have tremendous pride and I personally would not hesitate one second to pursue any allegations such as this, feeling that although it may get wide publicity, although it may, to some extent, harm the credibility of the FBI, it must be done. And, I assure you, will be done. Unusual perhaps, but nonetheless, it is present and we will persist with this type of activity. We don't ask our Agents to squeel on one another, we point out the splendid reputation that is inherent within our tradition and is one of the finest traditions you can possibly build.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, earlier you spoke of the advantages and limitations of hindsight. After having examined the records of the break-ins and other surreptitious activity, you observed that you thought it was well intentioned, I believe, in most cases. Did you also observe that there was any gross misuse of authority in the process of that?

MR. KELLEY: I do not note in these activities any gross misuse of authority. I see a consistent thread of well-intentioned activities. Perhaps now in the present society, and in the context of now and in those times, I do not feel that it was a corruption of the trust that has been placed in us. As now we have determined a valuation that perhaps could be wrong, but in those days there was no intention to engage in activities which were prohibited, illegal, or otherwise wrong.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, why wouldn't an act like the bugging of Martin Luther King's hotel room have been a betrayal of trust? These Agents took an oath under the Constitution and that was prohibited by Federal law at that time.

MR. KELLEY: There have been a number of articles written about this situation. In reviewing this situation, I feel that the authority stemmed from the proper source. It was a matter which was construed in those times as of considerable concern to the country, and the FBI acted in accordance with the request which was made that it be installed.

You say that it was a matter which was then a violation of the law. Within the warrantless wiretaps under ordinary circumstances they could conceivably be construed as a violation, but under the umbrella of the protection of the country they have been authorized, so I don't subscribe to the feeling that they knowingly, in such an installation, vilated the law with the intent to violate the law.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, do you still--does the FBI still--compile personal information on the personal behavior of Members of Congress, members of the press, and other people?

MR. KELLEY: The FBI receives a great deal of information from time to time. We are charged when we have a complaint to write up that complaint. We feel that not only are we following the archival rules that such must be recorded, but also we feel in discharge of our duties we should record it because such information might well dovetail with some investigation that we are conducting. People come to us to tell about these things for reasons--not just to spill out gossip and rumor and to possibly put someone on the spot. We inform them, for example, at the time they submit this information a record will be made of this but if it is outside the jurisdiction of the FBI we so state. They know before they leave, for example, that nothing will be done about it other than to record it.

QUESTION: But it is put in the files?

MR. KELLEY: Yes, it is put in the files. Yes sir.

QUESTION: Whether it has to do with sex activities, or drinking too much, or what have you?

MR. KELLEY: The allegations within the complaint are put into the complaint and are put into the file no matter what they might be. Yes.

QUESTION: Government officials, Members of Congress and the press, and what have you?

MR. KELLEY: Yes sir. The Department of Justice and the Bureau are now engaged in a mutual venture to set up guidelines as to our activity in this regard. We will abide by those guidelines. We do want it known, however, that some of this information might very well be helpful to us in later investigations. The abuse is the publication of this information, and I know of no abuse, Jack, which we can point to.

QUESTION: Has it been used at times to try to get a person's job?

MR. KELLEY: I know of none.

QUESTION: You know of none?

MR. KELLEY: Now you say to try to get a person's job? Now I don't know of all of the activities that we're involved in--and I say to you, Jack, that yes there have been some accounts as to this effect. I feel that actually were there any such activity it was on the basis of a feeling that these things were true and that they were of such importance that they should be passed on. Some of these, of course, are in the COINTEL Program. I was not privy to some of these allegations. I assure you that this will not continue to the present time. I have been asked what about your own feeling about such information. Since I have arrived I have not had a bit of gossip or a bit of rumor sent to me and this is over two years. I have not reviewed files to find out about reporters, Congressmen or other public figures. I do not subscribe to that type of thing. I have a file on me. It is a quite lengthy file. It includes the investigation conducted about me at the time I was being considered. I understand it is quite voluminous. I assure you that I have not read that file. I do not know who made complimentary statements about me. I don't know who made derogatory statements. Perhaps, maybe, some of you may have made such statements. I don't want to be colored in my opinion about you by some statements which you may have made in good faith, and I think this substantially is what it is all about. The confidentiality and the privacy of individuals. If you, Joe Lastelic, want to make a statement about me, you should. I think you should be given that right, and I think that the proper forum is in one of confidentiality. I have not read those so-called gossip, rumor, or other objectionable types of materials. I am not going to read them, and I certainly do not sponsor any move to revive anything such as may have once existed.

QUESTION: Those files will remain? Rumors, gossips--gossip, whatever is in it?

MR. KELLEY: Yes sir.

QUESTION: You said that you don't question the motives of people who come in to give you information. Do you ever check out the information that was given to you about the people?

MR. KELLEY: If it is within our jurisdiction and makes allegations which may mount into a violation, yes, we check them out. But a mere allegation that so and so is a sex deviate or that he is going around conducting himself other than in a gentlemanly manner and so forth, no, we do not just on the bare gossip stage check that out.

QUESTION: But, nevertheless, that remains in file. You don't check that out, that remains in the person's file unevaluated and raw. Is that correct?

MR. KELLEY: That's right. Now the implication is that you should possibly clear the man. In so doing you would, of course, be violating your charter which is that you do not investigate matters of this type. You might also by virture of this give it some degree of statute by investigating it. But more than anything else if we have no business in it we shouldn't be checking it out and we do not.

QUESTION: If you have no business in it, why are you in it at all?

MR. KELLEY: We did not enter into it.

QUESTION: Is this a file that is a part of the FBI records?

MR. KELLEY: Yes sir.

QUESTION: You won't always be the FBI Director?

MR. KELLEY: That's right. I am confident of that. I am with you a thousand percent.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, can you tell us when you first learned of the files that Mr. Hoover kept that were called his confidential or OC files and whether or not anyone within the Bureau knew about those files and failed to tell you about them?

MR. KELLEY: Jack, that's a long answer, but I will try to brief it. I first learned of the possibility that these files existed in January, 1974. I then was presented a list of some of the files and called in one of the Assistant Directors and said what is this all about. Should they be integrated into the general file system, and I mean by that that we have a general file system. We have a section of our files which are kept in a separate room because we don't want everyone to have the capability of going into them. The man who was charged with the responsibility of looking into this then within a few months retired. The next stimulation of this situation arose after a statement appeared in the paper mentioning these files and we immediately talked about this. Still I did not look at the files. I then instructed that our Inspection Division go over them and make a listing of them, categorizing them. Some of them, of course, were purely administrative, some included information as outlined by Mr. Levi. Such a listing was made and was turned over to the Department. Thereafter Mr. Silberman looked them over and thereafter Mr Levi looked them over and I made a rather cursory check of them myself. Why did I not look these files over in the first place? I did not construe them as being within the realm of the so-called dossiers that had been mentioned before and during, certainly, my confirmation. I said I did not subscribe to the preparation or retention of dossiers on Congressmen nor members of the Senate. I still persist in that and we have not. My references were about those which were declared improper during Mr. Gray's administration and they were at that time stopped. These were dossiers that were prepared on candidates for Members of Congress and those who failed in their venture were destroyed. Those which were successful were put into the general files. We no longer do that and frankly, in my opinion, this is what was referred to. I feel that these files should be maintained confidential. I still have not given them a close review. I have not done so for the very reason as I mentioned about my own file. I don't think it will benefit me to go over them. Under archival rules they must be preserved. In the guidelines which are to be established, I will welcome any reasonable guideline which says we either do or do not preserve them. I am anxious for us to do our work the way it should be done. More than that, I cannot say.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, there have been suggestions that your absences from Washington for family reasons have prevented you from getting the kind of control of the Bureau that you would have if you were here all the time. I am wondering how you respond to that kind of suggestion?

MR. KELLEY: My response is that I feel that I have been able to maintain control. I am certainly in constant touch. I have telephone calls that are relayed to me when I have made such trips. I am confident that the executive staff of this Bureau is solidly behind me. I say this inasmuch as I have somewhat a feeling such as may be implied in your question. I must as a result of conditions that you know about make these trips. If I feel that in so doing it will endanger my administrative control and my capability of doing that which I think should be done, I will leave.

There is no question whatsoever because that which I say applies to others should also apply to me. But, I do feel that I have control of the organization. I have known of no disruptive tactics that might have been launched to unseat me and again were there any evidence of that and found, in my opinion, to be one which is well grounded, I would immediately leave.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, if I can return for the moment to the subject of break-ins. You said that conditions of national security and foreign intelligence--there may have been other areas. I wonder if you can be a little clearer on whether there were any break-ins that were not related to foreign intelligence or national security?

MR. KELLEY: I know of none.

Thank you Mr. Kelley.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar WOC

DATE: 7/28/75

FROM : A. B. Fulton

1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Fulton
1-Mr. McCaffrey

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Re Senstudy 75 memorandum dated 7/24/75.

Pages 521-522, Item 5 and Item 6, of a CIA memorandum entitled, "Items For Possible Use in Briefing the DCI," contain references to CIA participation in FBI training and FBI participation in CIA training. Comments appear below in regard to each item.

Item 5. It is true that since late 1972 CIA has participated in numerous foreign counterintelligence (CI) in-services put on by Intelligence Division (INTD). CIA has participated in all seven of our basic CI schools held to date.

It should be noted that CIA's input into these programs has been highly valuable and productive and is designed to give FBI Agents a better insight into the Soviet, Satellite and Chicom target based on CIA's overseas experience against these targets. Two of the lectures usually given at these courses include the structure, function and role of CIA, and the structure, function and role of the Domestic Collection Division and the Foreign Resources Division.

These lectures have been beneficial in teaching our Special Agents about the mutually complimentary roles of CIA overseas and the FBI in the United States in working against hostile intelligence targets.

CIA officers who lecture to our classes have been careful to emphasize CIA's experience against these hostiles from an overseas perspective and their overseas experiences.

REC-102 62-116[illegible]-486

CIA's presentations can in no way be interpreted as being an attempt on their part to teach us how to work CI in the United States, nor does CIA attempt to persuade our Special Agents to adopt CIA overseas methods or tactics to United States conditions.

9 AUG 8

JWM:jvl
(4)

CONTINUED - OVER

5-[illegible]

84 AUG 13 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: Senstudy 75

Item 6. Three Special Agents, Neil Rice, Larry McWilliams, and John McCaffrey, attended this Soviet Operations course at CIA Headquarters. The course ran from May 14 to May 25, 1973. Special Agent McCaffrey only attended one week while Rice and McWilliams attended for two weeks.

The primary reason for FBI inclusion in this course was because, at that time, the three Special Agents were members of the new Training Unit, INTD, and we were seeking educational guidance and ideas for our basic CI courses then under development. We benefited from this course because we borrowed a few educational ideas and techniques from CIA's method of handling its course.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/30/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Attached is a "Superceding Request For FBI Materials," dated 7/28/75, which was received from Mr. John Elliff, SSC Staff Representative, on the afternoon of 7/28/75.

This request is in the form of six categories (Roman numerals I through VI), the first four requested by Friday, 8/1/75, and the latter two by Friday, 8/8/75.

Set forth is a brief description of the separate categories with comments under each, where applicable:

I. Materials to which the Committee Staff has been given prior access and now requests delivery.

II. Outstanding previously requested materials for delivery to the Committee.

REC-88

Item E. pertaining to mail surveillances is being deferred pending receipt of guidelines from the Department of Justice since there is a problem with possible future litigation in the areas of mail opening and intercept. The Department, by letter from the Director 7/29/75, was advised of our position in this matter.

Item H. refers to materials pertaining to COINTELPRO. During discussions on 7/28/75, the Committee Staff decided to defer the deadline for this material for 8/8/75.

Enclosure

62-116395

EWL:lhb
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF

CONTINUED - OVER

34 AUG 6 1975

MOR-16

III. Outstanding previously requested materials to be made available for access by SSC Staff at JEH Building.

> Items G., H., and I. in this category pertain to information developed through investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. SSC Staff Representatives on 7/28/75 advised that an agreement is pending but not yet finalized between the Committee and attorneys representing Mrs. King which would govern the type of information to be furnished the Committee in these categories. We are deferring processing of the requested materials until an agreement is reached so that guidelines may be furnished us. The Attorney General has been advised of our position in a letter of 7/29/75.

IV. Newly requested materials for access by SSC Staff at JEH Building.

> Items A. and B. in this category were deferred until 8/8/75 by Committee Staff in conference on 7/28/75.

V. Outstanding previously requested materials for delivery to the Committee.

> In this category Item B. is being handled by the Department of Justice. Items A., C., ~~D.~~, D., E., and F., have been substantially complied with and Item G. is in preparation.

VI. Outstanding previously requested materials for access at JEH Building.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

A conference was held on the morning of 7/29/75 by Senstudy Project personnel with all Intelligence Division personnel involved in the Senstudy effort. Appropriate assignments were made or confirmed. A conference is scheduled for the afternoon of 7/30/75 to check progress and identify any special problems. It appears at this time that we will be able to meet the deadline of 8/1/75 for designated materials in categories I. through IV., as well as the deadline of 8/8/75 for designated materials in categories V. and VI.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Phillips

July 28, 1975 SECRET

SUPERCEDING REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

I. Materials to which the Committee staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

A. FBI file #100-00

B. FBI Inspection Guidelines - F. Knipfel adv. 7/29 to furnish by 7/30.

C. Index to all SAC Memoranda and SAC letters

D. Petersen Committee Report on COINTELPRO, including all appendices and case summaries (names of authors of analytical appendices may be deleted)

E. All sections of FBI Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations previously made accessible at FBIHQ (including Manual of Instructions Sections 105, 107, and 130)

F. All superceding sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

G. Titles and number of FBI Field Office Agents. - 3/19/76 - Request Item II - TPC

H. FBI Forms previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/LMF
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
MDR-16
10/13/2000

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

II. Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

A. Immediate and continuous delivery/access to underlying materials pertaining to specific COINTELPRO operations, as listed previously and subsequently by SSC staff.

B. Underlying materials pertaining to mail covers, proffered by Special Counsel in letter of July 15, 1975.

C. Materials pertaining to the "Huston Plan" requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, items 2-3, 5, 7, 9-12.

D. Materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966 of the investigative techniques referred to in President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 1 (with specific reference to surreptitious entry and mail surveillance).

E. Materials pertaining to mail surveillance, including mail covers, mail opening, and mail intercept, requested in letter of June 13, 1975.

F. Sections 8A, 8B, 8P, and 8Q of the Manual of Instructions, and Sections 10 and 12 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, requested in letter of July 8, 1975.

G. Communications regarding the activities of SSC which have been addressed from the FBI Director and/or other FBIHQ personnel to more than one field office and/or to all agents in those field offices, requested in letter of July 8, 1975.

8/8/75

H. Materials pertaining to COINTELPRO operations directed against the Black Panther Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s in San Francisco-Oakland Los Angeles, and San Diego, California, requested in letter of June 30, 1975 (list of persons contacted not to include persons in their capacity as sources).

SECRET

III. Outstanding previously requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975.

A. Materials pertaining to the reported investigation of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969, other than the "logs" of any surveillance. w/ Daly re clearance re secret aspects

Mintz/Daly

B. Materials contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do not contain derogatory information about individuals, requested in part on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 22. Mallett (Helgeson)

[illegible]

C. Access via agreed procedure to certain information regarding materials contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do contain derogatory information about individuals. Mallett (Helgeson)

D. Materials, including inspection reports or related surveys, which pertain to the Attorney General's testimony on February 27, 1975, regarding the "types of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past," requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 23. Mallett ([illegible])

Ready for review E. SAC letters and SAC memoranda, requested in memo of June 17, 1975.

F. Materials pertaining to surveillance at the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 1964, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, items 7a, 7b, 8, 16. Feathergill

G. Materials pertaining to electronic surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, items 5, 6a, 6b, 6c. Shea

H. Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of July 8, 1975. Shea

I. Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of July 14, 1975. Shea

[illegible] SSC [illegible]

SECRET

Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

A. Abstracts of Executive Conference memoranda from January 1, 1960, to the present Burns

B. The so-called "Papich Committee Report" on FBI-CIA coordination prepared in 1966. Nolan

C. The Manual ~~of Instructions and/or Rules and Regulations~~ for the Legal Attaches ("Foreign Operations Manual?") Moore

D. The annual five-year budget projections of the FBI Intelligence Division from 1970 to the present. Moore (from Adm. Div.)

~~E. The annual FBI Intelligence Division budget requests from 1970 to the present.~~

F. Materials pertaining to any surreptitious entries considered, proposed, or conducted by the FBI [at the Chilean Embassy from January 1, 1970,] until the present. (S) [illegible]

G. All project INLET letters prepared for and disseminated to the President, the Attorney General, or any other recipient during the period 1969 through 1973. Mintz

H. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the following individuals: (See O.C. Witness list) Mintz, Heim

I. Control file for the year 1971 for the Mass Media Program. Johnson (Ryan)

SECRET

OC WITNESS LIST

S.A. Battle
James Crawford
Joseph Dowling
Thomas Dudney
John Dunphy
Mark Felt
Annie Fields
Helen Gandy
Albert Gunser
Robert Kunkel
Irma Metcalf
John Mohr
Tom Payton
Kenneth Peffer
Jessie Peterson
S.A. Clark Shoaff
Kenneth Shoffer
Dorothy Skillman
Raymond Smith
Carol Tschudy
Ralph Windear

SECRET

SECRET

V. Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:

A. Materials relating to the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the so-called "ELSUR" electronic surveillance index, requested in part on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 2. R. Rosen
Has gone for delivery to SSC

B. Materials and/or information pertaining to warrantless electronic surveillance for national security purposes requested in letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General, dated July 7, 1975. Dept's baby

C. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to surreptitious entry, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. has gone to Dept. for delivery to SSC

D. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to [incommunicado interrogation, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4.] (S) Kaiser
has gone to Dept. suggesting briefing

E. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. Daly
gone to Dept. for delivery to SSC

F. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to the use of informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. gone to Dept. for delivery to SSC

G. Materials pertaining to Morris Starsky, Evelyn Rose Sell, Maude Adams White Wilkerson, and Martha L. Shockey, requested in letter of July 1, 1975 (list of persons contacted not to include persons in their capacity as sources). [illegible]-Hall

SECRET

VI. Outstanding previously requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:

A. A list of all warrantless electronic surveillances identified by subject and target which were instituted or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request of the FBI from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 3. [illegible]

B. All written justifications for the specific authorizations by the Attorney General for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975. [illegible]

C. All materials reflecting the denial by the Attorney General of specific requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975. [illegible]

D. Materials pertaining to the use of warrantless electronic surveillance and other controversial intelligence techniques against plaintiffs in certain pending civil suits, listed in letter of June 23, 1975. Dept.

E. Materials pertaining to ["SCOPE" and Operation ORKID requested in letter of July 14, 1975] (S) Hampton to Dept for delivery 4/SSC - (affects Hampton)

F. Materials pertaining to "notional" organizations and to the general subject of fictitious and cover organizations (political, commercial, or other), requested in letter of July 14, 1975. Ryan

G. Materials pertaining to FBI activities with respect to the Ku Klux Klan, requested in letter of July 14, 1965. Klan

H. Materials pertaining to the origins and conduct of the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic of 1965, as requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 28. at White House Hampton

SECRET

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General July 29, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a request for FBI materials dated July 28, 1975, received from SSC Staff Representatives John Elliff and Mark Gitenstein during the afternoon of July 28, 1975. This request is categorized under six sections, Roman numerals I through VI. The first four categories require delivery/access by August 1, 1975, and the latter two categories by August 8, 1975.

We have completed our initial review of this overall request and anticipate we will be able to comply with the designated deadlines with the following exceptions:

II. E. With respect to the request pertaining to mail surveillance, including mail covers, mail opening and mail intercept, we are deferring action pending receipt of guidelines from the Department of Justice, and it is suggested that the deadline for this request be deferred to some future date consistent with the Department's decision in this matter.

III. G. H. and I. These requests deal with information developed through investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. It is our understanding that an agreement is pending but not yet finalized by the SSC and attorneys representing Mrs. King which would delineate type of information to be furnished in these categories. Upon receipt of guidelines, we are prepared to process this material on an expedite basis and furnish to the Committee within one week of such notification.

Delivered to [illegible] office 7-31-75

62-116396

EWL:lhb
(8)

REC-34 62-116395- 485

X-105

17 AUG 5 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

84 AUG 11 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

23 JEH

It should be emphasized that the above exceptions are the result of a preliminary review of the request. It is possible that unforeseen problems might arise during our continuing research in the various areas of the request which will make it necessary to extend the deadlines; however, we do not anticipate such problems at this time and should they arise, you will be immediately advised. Also, we are mindful of the request by the SSC Staff for a partial proffer of materials and will attempt to comply whenever circumstances allow.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: K. William O'Connor
                Special Counsel for
                  Intelligence Coordination

GH8

CODE TELETYPE

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
NITEL
3- Mr. J. A. Mintz
JULY 31, 1975
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

TO SACS LOS ANGELES
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL JULY 30, 1975.

REPORTING PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW RELATIVE TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF INTERVIEWS OF PRESENT AND FORMER SAS:

FOR INCUMBENTS: IMMEDIATELY AFTER INTERVIEW PREPARE LHM REPORTING AS DETAILED AS POSSIBLE QUESTIONS ASKED AND REPLIES GIVEN. INCLUDE WHETHER OR NOT INTERVIEWEE'S RIGHTS WERE EXPLAINED TO HIM; DURATION OF INTERVIEW; AND IF IT WAS NECESSARY FOR INTERVIEWEE TO CONSULT WITH BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE, SO STATE. ALSO INCLUDE ADVICE GIVEN TO INTERVIEWEE BY BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE AS TO RIGHT TO COUNSEL, PRIVILEGED AREAS, CONSULTATION PRIVILEGES, AND PARAMETERS OF INTERVIEW, ALL AS DISCUSSED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE. LHM SHOULD BEAR DUAL CAPTION: "U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)"; "INTERVIEW OF SA (INSERT NAME) BY SSC STAFF MEMBER." SUBMIT ORIGINAL AND SEVEN COPIES OF EACH LHM TO BUREAU BY COVER AIRTEL, ATTENTION INTD W.O. CREGAR.

62-116395-484

REC-88

9 AUG 6 1975

SFP:mjg MJG
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 31 1975
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

W.O. CREGAR
4053

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

FOR FORMER SAS: ANY FORMER SA WHO HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED AND VOLUNTEERS TO FURNISH RESULTS (NOTE THAT SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE SOLICITED BY FBI BUT MERELY ACCEPTED WHEN OFFERED) SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER INTERVIEW AND LHM PREPARED AND SUBMITTED IN LINE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR INCUMBENTS. SECOND HEADING OF LHM SHOULD USE TERM "FORMER SA."

NOTE:

Referenced Bureau teletype alerted appropriate offices to tentative schedule of SSC Staff Member for interviews re Cointelpro/BPP. The teletype advised of Director's waiver from employment agreements and issued other necessary instructions for briefing of personnel in advance. Instant teletype necessary for reporting instructions and is in line with procedure we have been following for other similar interviews, reporting of which has been mainly by HQ personnel.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/30/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Attached is a "Superceding Request For FBI Materials," dated 7/28/75, which was received from Mr. John Elliff, SSC Staff Representative, on the afternoon of 7/28/75.

This request is in the form of six categories (Roman numerals I through VI), the first four requested by Friday, 8/1/75, and the latter two by Friday, 8/8/75.

Set forth is a brief description of the separate categories with comments under each, where applicable:

I. Materials to which the Committee Staff has been given prior access and now requests delivery.

II. Outstanding previously requested materials for delivery to the Committee.

REC-88 62-116395-483

Item E. pertaining to mail surveillances is being deferred pending receipt of guidelines from the Department of Justice since there is a problem with possible future litigation in the areas of mail opening and intercept. The Department, by letter from the Director 7/29/75, was advised of our position in this matter.

AUG 6 1975

Item H. refers to materials pertaining to COINTELPRO. During discussions on 7/28/75, the Committee Staff decided to defer the deadline for this material for 8/8/75.

5-H-8

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 ALM/

EWL:lhb lhb
(6)

MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 AUG 6 1975

III. Outstanding previously requested materials to be made available for access by SSC Staff at JEH Building.

> Items G., H., and I. in this category pertain to information developed through investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. SSC Staff Representatives on 7/28/75 advised that an agreement is pending but not yet finalized between the Committee and attorneys representing Mrs. King which would govern the type of information to be furnished the Committee in these categories. We are deferring processing of the requested materials until an agreement is reached so that guidelines may be furnished us. The Attorney General has been advised of our position in a letter of 7/29/75.

IV. Newly requested materials for access by SSC Staff at JEH Building.

> Items A. and B. in this category were deferred until 8/8/75 by Committee Staff in conference on 7/28/75.

V. Outstanding previously requested materials for delivery to the Committee.

> In this category Item B. is being handled by the Department of Justice. Items A., C., ~~D.,~~ D., E., and F., have been substantially complied with and Item G. is in preparation.

VI. Outstanding previously requested materials for access at JEH Building.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

A conference was held on the morning of 7/29/75 by Senstudy Project personnel with all Intelligence Division personnel involved in the Senstudy effort. Appropriate assignments were made or confirmed. A conference is scheduled for the afternoon of 7/30/75 to check progress and identify any special problems. It appears at this time that we will be able to meet the deadline of 8/1/75 for designated materials in categories I. through IV., as well as the deadline of 8/8/75 for designated materials in categories V. and VI.

ACTION:

None. For information.

JAM

wRW

PLM

SECRET Phillips

July 28, 1975

SUPERCEDING REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

I. Materials to which the Committee staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

A. FBI file #100-00

B. FBI Inspection Guidelines - F. [illegible] adv. 7/29 to furnish by 7/30.

C. Index to all SAC Memoranda and SAC letters

D. Petersen Committee Report on COINTELPRO, including all appendices and case summaries (names of authors of analytical appendices may be deleted)

E. All sections of FBI Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations previously made accessible at FBIHQ (including Manual of Instructions Sections 105, 107, and 130)

F. All superceding sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

G. Titles and number of FBI Field Office Agents. - 3/19/75 Request Item III - TPC

H. FBI Forms previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 [illegible] lmf
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
MDR-16
10/13/2000

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-483

SECRET

II. Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

A. Immediate and continuous delivery/access to underlying materials pertaining to specific COINTELPRO operations, as listed previously and subsequently by SSC staff.

B. Underlying materials pertaining to mail covers, proffered by Special Counsel in letter of July 15, 1975.

C. Materials pertaining to the "Huston Plan" requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, items 2-3, 5, 7, 9-12.

D. Materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966 of the investigative techniques referred to in President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 1 (with specific reference to surreptitious entry and mail surveillance).

E. Materials pertaining to mail surveillance, including mail covers, mail opening, and mail intercept, requested in letter of June 13, 1975.

F. Sections 8A, 8B, 8P, and 8Q of the Manual of Instructions, and Sections 10 and 12 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, requested in letter of July 8, 1975.

G. Communications regarding the activities of SSC which have been addressed from the FBI Director and/or other FBIHQ personnel to more than one field office and/or to all agents in those field offices, requested in letter of July 8, 1975.

8/8/75

H. Materials pertaining to COINTELPRO operations directed against the Black Panther Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s in San Francisco-Oakland Los Angeles, and San Diego, California, requested in letter of June 30, 1975 (list of persons contacted not to include persons in their capacity as sources).

SECRET

Expd III. Outstanding previously requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975.

A. Materials pertaining to the reported investigation of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969, other than the "logs" of any surveillance. ✓w/ Daly re clearance re sealed aspects — Mallett/Daly

to assist [illegible]

B. Materials contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do not contain derogatory information about individuals, requested in part on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 22. Mallett (Helgeson)

C. Access via agreed procedure to certain information regarding materials contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do contain derogatory information about individuals. Mallett (Helgeson)

D. Materials, including inspection reports or related surveys, which pertain to the Attorney General's testimony on February 27, 1975, regarding the "types of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past," requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 23. Mallett (Daly/ [illegible])

Ready for review E. SAC letters and SAC memoranda, requested in memo of June 17, 1975.

F. Materials pertaining to surveillance at the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 1964, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, items 7a, 7b, 8, 16. Flathiger

deferring & pending receipt of guidelines from SSC ([illegible])

G. Materials pertaining to electronic surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, items 5, 6a, 6b, 6c. Shea

H. Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of July 8, 1975. Shea

I. Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of July 14, 1975. Shea

SECRET

IV. Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

8/1/75

A. Abstracts of Executive Conference memoranda from January 1, 1960, to the present Burns

B. The so-called "Papich Committee Report" on FBI-CIA coordination prepared in 1966. Nolan

C. The Manual ~~of Instructions and/or Rules and Regulations~~ for the Legal Attaches ("Foreign Operations Manual") Moore

D. The annual five-year budget projections of the FBI Intelligence Division from 1970 to the present. Moore (from Adm. Div.)

~~E. The annual FBI Intelligence Division budget requests from 1970 to the present.~~

F. Materials pertaining to any surreptitious entries considered, proposed, or conducted by the FBI [at the Chilean Embassy from January 1, 1970, until the present.] (S) Ogleby

G. All project INLET letters prepared for and disseminated to the President, the Attorney General, or any other recipient during the period 1969 through 1973. Mullett

H. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the following individuals: (See O.C. Witness list) Walbert (Halgren)

I. Control file for the year 1971 for the Mass Media Program. Johnson (Ryan)

SECRET

SECRET

OC WITNESS LIST

S.A. Battle
James Crawford
Joseph Dowling
Thomas Dudney
John Dunphy
Mark Felt
Annie Fields
Helen Gandy
Albert Gunser
Robert Kunkel
Irma Metcalf
John Mohr
Tom Payton
Kenneth Peffer
Jessie Peterson
S.A. Clark Shoaff
Kenneth Shoffer
Dorothy Skillman
Raymond Smith
Carol Tschudy
Ralph Windear

SECRET

[illegible]

V. Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:

A. Materials relating to the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the so-called "ELSUR" electronic surveillance index, requested in part on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 2. R. Ross
Has gone for delivery to SSC

B. Materials and/or information pertaining to warrantless electronic surveillance for national security purposes requested in letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General, dated July 7, 1975. Dept's baby

C. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to surreptitious entry, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. has gone to Dept. for delivery to SSC

D. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to [incommunicado interrogation, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4.](S) Larson
has gone to Dept. suggesting briefing

E. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. Daly
gone to Dept for delivery to SSC

F. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to the use of informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. gone to Dept. for delivery to SSC

G. Materials pertaining to Morris Starsky, Evelyn Rose Sell, Maude Adams White Wilkerson, and Martha L. Shockey, requested in letter of July 1, 1975 (list of persons contacted not to include persons in their capacity as sources). Mendenhall

SECRET

misc VI. Outstanding previously requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:

A. A list of all warrantless electronic surveillances identified by subject and target which were instituted or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request of the FBI from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 3. Burns/Daley

B. All written justifications for the specific authorizations by the Attorney General for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975. Burns/Daley

C. All materials reflecting the denial by the Attorney General of specific requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975. Burns/Daley

D. Materials pertaining to the use of warrantless electronic surveillance and other controversial intelligence techniques against plaintiffs in certain pending civil suits, listed in letter of June 23, 1975. Dept.

E. Materials pertaining to ["SCOPE" and Operation ORKID requested in letter of July 14, 1975.] (S) Hampton to Dept for deliv. to SSC - (different language)

F. Materials pertaining to "notional" organizations and to the general subject of fictitious and cover organizations (political, commercial, or other), requested in letter of July 14, 1975. Ryan

G. Materials pertaining to FBI activities with respect to the Ku Klux Klan, requested in letter of July 14, 1965. Shea

H. Materials pertaining to the origins and conduct of the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic of 1965, as requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 28. Hampton at White House

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. Walsh

DATE: July 29, 1975

FROM : S. R. Burns

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

The Department of Justice (DOJ) received a letter dated July 24, 1975, directed to K. William O'Conner, Esq., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, requesting that the DOJ provide the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities with a list of all Special Agents assigned to the New York City area in the mid-1960's who had the surname "Kehoe". The unit to which they were assigned and their current addresses were also requested. The letter, which has been forwarded to us for our response, was signed by John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force.

The purpose of this memo is to recommend that the attached memorandum from the Director enclosing a memorandum for the SSC be approved and forwarded to the Attorney General. The memo for the SSC advises (1) that there were two Special Agents, Francis Joseph Kehoe and James Patrick Kehoe, assigned to the New York City area in the mid-1960's who have the surname "Kehoe" (2) that both were assigned to the investigation of Soviet espionage matters and (3) that both are currently employed as Special Agents of the FBI with business address as follows:

REC-88

62-116395-482

Francis Joseph Kehoe
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Gateway I, Market Street
Newark, New Jersey 07101

James Patrick Kehoe
Federal Bureau of Investigation
201 East 69th Street
New York, New York 10021

9 AUG 6 1975

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/13/2000 BY SP8 ALM/JMT

MDR-16

Enc.
DCT:pms (7)
2 - Mr. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Midkiff

cc's to 6 files & men

(OVER)

84 AUG 7 1975

Memo Burns to Walsh
Re: United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect To Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Review of our in-service and out-of-service records failed to indicate any other current or former FBI Agents with the surname "Kehoe" who were assigned to the New York Office in the 1960's. Francis Joseph Kehoe, EOD 12-10-51, GS-13, $26,905, married with six children, was assigned to New York City from 1952 until 10-15-74 when he was transferred to Newark where he is currently assigned. During all of the 1960's he was assigned to the investigation of Soviet espionage matters. James Patrick Kehoe, EOD 3-26-51, GS-13, $27,632, married with one child, has been assigned to New York City since 1953. Prior to the 1960's through the present he has been assigned to the investigation of Soviet espionage matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached memo from the Director to the Attorney General enclosing the attached memo to the SSC be approved and forwarded to the Attorney General.

WOC/TJM TJJ/JJF EW/RGH

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/29/75

1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. WOC
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

To advise review of pages 188, 189, 283 and 330 of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document which Senate Select Committee has had access to and which reportedly makes reference to extremely sensitive Bureau operations determined such pages do not compromise or damage FBI operations or sources which relate to IS-1 Section. The CIA document is fully identified in memorandum from Mr. W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 7/24/75 under instant caption.

Re page 188

This page reveals CIA began to follow Caribbean black radicalism in earnest in 1968 and as a result CIA's Directorate of Intelligence published studies on 8/6/69 and 6/12/70. This page revealed in each of these studies there was a single paragraph devoted to ties with U. S. black power movement and primarily concerned visits of Stokely Carmichael and other U. S. black power activists to the Caribbean. The second study was to pay special attention to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in U. S. This page reveals these studies did not provide meaningful evidence of important links between militant blacks in the U. S. and the Caribbean.

REC-88 62-116395-481

These CIA studies were furnished FBI, see serials 157-8415-247 and 190-12-324-257. The 8/6/69 study revealed the Jamaican Government had officially banned the travel to Jamaica by Stokely Carmichael, H. "Rap" Brown and James Forman. These individuals were not further identified and no additional information was set forth in that study concerning their possible travel to Jamaica.

9 AUG 6 1975

WHA:adn
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

8 4 [illegible] 6 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY 75

The study on page 13 reports "Unlike its fairly frequent contacts with Black Panthers and other radicals in the U. S., the Castro Regime seems to have refrained from more than occasional communications and expressions of moral support for the Caribbean groups." No specific data is set forth regarding contacts between Black Panthers and other radicals in the U. S. and the Castro Regime. Paragraph number 33 on page 13 of this study notes that the extent of relations between black power groups in the Caribbean and similar organizations in the U. S. is vague. Activities of "the more activist Negro leaders in the U. S. such as Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad have been followed closely in Jamaica and other places. There have been visits by Carmichael and other U. S. black power exponents to some of the Caribbean Islands." The study notes these visits have been limited in the past two or three years because of a ban on the travel of certain U. S. Negro spokesmen by the Governments of Jamaica, Antigua and Trinidad-Tobago. The study notes the latter government had refused to permit Carmichael to enter the country despite the fact that he is a native of Trinidad.

The 6/12/70 study on page seven noted that available evidence suggested that contact between Caribbean groups and the black power movement in the U. S. is infrequent. It reported there was a two-way flow of visitors including occasional speaking tours by Carmichael and one or two other radicals. It was presumed that exchanges of views and sharing of information occurred but the study noted there was no firm evidence of funding or direction by U. S. groups.

There is no data on page 188 or published in the two CIA studies which would compromise or damage FBI operations or sources.

Re page 189

This page indicates that for several months in the first half of 1968 the Caribbean branch (apparently of the Director of Current Intelligence, CIA) wrote periodic typescript memoranda on Carmichael's travel abroad during a period when he had dropped out of public view. This page indicates that it was felt these memoranda were for internal CIA use only although a copy of one such memorandum was inadvertently sent to the FBI.

Bureau file 100-446080 contains numerous communications from CIA concerning Stokely Carmichael's activities and travel during late 1967 and early 1968. These memoranda included data concerning Cuban Intelligence Service contacts with Carmichael and his travel, including trips to North Vietnam and Algeria.

It is probable these memoranda were furnished FBI due to our interest in establishing the degree of foreign influence or funding in relation to Carmichael's activities in the U. S.

Data on page 189 and in the memoranda furnished by CIA concerning Carmichael's whereabouts during this period does not compromise or damage FBI operations or informants.

Re page 283

This page noted under date of 12/10/70 that "DDI" noted press accounts of Director Hoover's 11/19/70 statement reported that the Black Panthers are supported by terrorist organizations. This page reveals that someone with CIA had examined FBI's related files and also those of CIA and could locate no indication of any relationship between FEDAYEEN and the Black Panthers. This page revealed a CIA employee provided "Director," probably the CIA Director, with a memorandum on this topic.

FBI Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1970 released 10/30/70 revealed the Black Panther Party (BPP) ideology showed an increasing emphasis on the teachings and writings of the Premier of North Korea; that BPP spokesmen repeatedly confirmed their belief in Marxism-Leninism; that the international influence of BPP grew with support groups being organized in foreign countries; and a BPP international staff was operating in Algeria. The Annual Report revealed the head of the BPP International Staff had established a relationship with Al Fatah, the Arab guerrilla organization, which relationship had manifested an outpouring of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist propaganda in the BPP newspaper.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY 75

Since the reference to Mr. Hoover's statement concerning support being received by the BPP has been made public, the data on page 283 would not damage or compromise FBI operations or sources.

Re page 330

The three paragraphs under the caption "Black Radicalism" on this page briefly summarized the data reported by CIA on page 188. Data on this page does not compromise or damage FBI operations or sources.

ACTION:

For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

July 21, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter from the Committee to the Attorney General dated May 14, 1975, which contains request for certain information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a "~~Secret~~" memorandum, which responds to a request from the Committee. A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

EWL:lhb lhb
(9)

REC-88

62-116395-480

9 AUG 6 1975

Assoc. Dir. 3
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Evol.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMG
MDR-16

WRW

EWL/8

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

WOC

4063

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 AUG 6 1975

SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

July 21, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INCOMMUNICADO INTERROGATION

Reference is made to your request to the Attorney General by letter dated May 14, 1975, with specific reference to Appendix A, Request Number 5, g., as well as Appendix B, Request Number 4, a and b. In general, these two requests refer to information concerning the use of certain techniques by the FBI in performance of its investigative responsibilities. The purpose of this memorandum is to respond to information requested concerning the technique referred to as "Incommunicado Interrogation."(S)

For your information, this technique has been used by the FBI on extremely rare occasions during the period of approximately 1959 to 1963. In each instance when this technique was used, the subjects were known, prior to interviews, to be illegally in the United States and to have been associated with the Soviet Intelligence Services as illegal officers/agents. (S)

In view of the extremely sensitive nature, it is requested that any further details concerning the limited use of this technique be given in an oral briefing before properly cleared members of the Committee's Staff who are assigned to this matter. At that time, they will be given access to necessary documentation.(S)

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/LMT
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
MDR-16

1 - The Attorney General

EWL:lhb lhb
(8)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

~~Classified by 6283~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 1

8 AM
REC 70 62-116395-480

EWL
WRW

GPO 954-546

SECRET

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 2)

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7/[illegible]/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Re: Incommunicado Interrogation. (Appendix A, Req No. 5, g., & Appendix B, Req No. 4, a & b.)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller Date: Aug 1, 1975

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

SECRET

2 ENCLOSURE
62-116395-480

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: SECRET FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/21/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

[SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix A, #5,g and Appendix B, #4, a and b.](S)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

[Intelligence Collection](S)

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

[Due to extremely sensitive nature referred to as "Incommunicado Interrogation", it is requested that any further details concerning the limited use of this technique be given in an oral brifing before properly cleared members of the SSC](S)

62-116395

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/lmf
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
MOR-16

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5, woc

SECRET

TREAT AS YELLOW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-480

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - [illegible]r. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

July 18, 1975

1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

Director, FBI 62-116395-479

REC-88

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letters dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, and June 13, 1975, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum containing responses to some of the requests. A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JPL:cml
(10)

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

WOC

JAM
270

8 AUG 6 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

W.O. CREGAR
4063 JSN

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

62-116395

July 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE COMMITTEE'S PRIOR REQUESTS

FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (POLICIES AND PROCEDURES)

Reference is made to SSC letters dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, and June 13, 1975.

The letter of June 13, 1975, amplified a request made by letter dated May 14, 1975, with reference to Item 5b in Appendix A and Item 4 in Appendix B concerning the FBI's legal authority regarding the technique referred to as all forms of mail surveillance including mail covers and opening mail.

In view of the statement on page 3, of the letter dated July 15, 1975, from Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, to Mr. John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force of the SSC, we are withholding documentation relating to the opening of mail.

With regard to mail covers, they are placed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Section 861 of the U. S. Postal Service Manual.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

JPL:cml MDR-16
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-4849

WOC

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Documents pertaining to the Committee's prior request

Further documents pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice (policies and procedures)

NOTE:

The letter referred to from K. William O'Connor to John T. Elliff pointed out on page 3 as follows: "documentation relating to the opening of mail will be withheld at present due to ongoing investigations."

OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

June 16, 1975

TO: Paul Daly

FROM: MES Mike Shaheen

The attached is for your attention, action and response.

Please keep me advised as to the currency of the Bureau's contemplated response. Discuss problems as soon as possible.

Thanks.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 13, 1975

Mr. K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Sec'y '75

fext to AG w/LHM
7/18/75
JPL/cml

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

In amplification of Item 4, Appendix B of the Committee's document request to the Attorney General dated May 14, 1975, I am making the following requests pertaining to the technique referred to as "mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail" and the utilization of this technique "in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities:"

REC-88 62-116395-429

AUG 6 1975

(1) For all incidents of mail opening or mail intercept by or on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from January 1, 1960, until the present, please state the physical location where the opening or intercept was conducted, the names of the individuals who participated in the opening or intercept, ~~the type of~~ mail opened or intercepted, and the purpose of the opening or intercept.

(2) For all incidents of mail covers that were physically conducted by FBI employees, whether alone or in cooperation with Postal Service employees, from January 1, 1960, until the present, please state the physical location where the cover was conducted, the names of the individuals who participated in the cover, the type of mail covered, and the purpose of the cover.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MOF

2 ENCLOSURE

MOR-16

Cy to Perm. Dep.y

To Mr.

By Hand
Recd OC 6/13/75
5 28 PM

JPL:cml 7/15/75

(3) Please provide all documents and memoranda which discuss, refer, or relate to the origins, authorizations, conduct and termination of, and policies and procedures for, the mail openings, intercepts, and covers identified above.

I would appreciate it if you would treat the requests delineated above with the highest priority.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director,
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

JTE:bcm

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7/18/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee Re: Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice (Policies and Procedures) Appendix A, Item 5b and Appendix B, Item 4.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: [illegible] Miller Date: Aug 1, 1975

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SPA AM/UMF
MDR-16

62-116395-479

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N : SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
7/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letters 3/14/75 and 6/13/75
Appendix A, item 5b, Appendix B, item 4

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Mail covers placed in accordance with guidelines set forth in Section 861 of the U.S. Postal Service Manual. We are withholding documentation relating to the opening of mail

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SPO bum/lmf
MDR-16

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5 WOC 18

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395-479

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 7/18/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY

Removed By 79 AUG 7 1975

File Number 62-116395-478

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns, Jr.

The Attorney General July 18, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices the SSC requested certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum containing a response to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-83

62-116395-499

AUG 18 1975

TEB:lek lek
(9)

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10 [illegible] BY [illegible]
MDR-16

AUG 6 1975 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

W. O. C.

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns, Jr.

62-116395

July 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
(Appendix B, Part I, Item 1.a.)

Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI; to our memorandum captioned as above dated June 4, 1975; and to the undated note from SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein to William O. Cregar of this Bureau attaching a list of Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Memoranda and Letters selected for review at FBI Headquarters by the SSC Staff.

Pursuant to the request to review selected SAC Letters and Memoranda identified in the attachment to the above referenced note, we currently have such material available for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MMF
MDR-16

TEB:lek lck
(8) ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-477

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Re: Further Documents Pertaining to the
FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures
(Appendix B, Part I, Item 1.a.)

NOTE:

The material to be reviewed consists of clean Xerox copies of the approximately 335 selected SAC Letters and Memoranda. Each of the SAC Letters and Memoranda was reviewed by the following Divisional representatives who cleared such material for review by the SSC Staff with respect to their Division's interests: Identification - J. T. Stewart, Training - J. E. Reilly, Administrative - F. Woodworth, Files and Communications - H. R. Hauer, General Investigative - J. W. Hines, Laboratory - R. F. Petty, External Affairs - D. L. Divan, Special Investigative - J. E. McHale, Inspection - F. B. Griffith, Legal Counsel - P. V. Daly, Computer Systems - C. D. Neudorfer. INTD reviewers who cleared the above material with respect to INTD interests for reviewing by the SSC Staff were: J. W. Johnson (1971 - 1972), H. W. Dare (1962 - 1966), R. D. Hampton (1968 - 1973 - 1974 - 1975), R. L. Moore (1964 - 1965 - 1967), K. A. Mendenhall (1960 - 1969), and T. E. Burns, Jr. (1961 - 1963 - 1970). Excisions were made in the material by the above INTD personnel with regard to protection of sources, third agency considerations and with respect to sensitive methods and techniques. Since the material is to be reviewed at FBI Headquarters and in order to expedite the process of making the material available and avoid unnecessary extensive effort, the various SAC Letters and Memoranda have not been classified nor have they been excised with regard to privacy considerations in all instances. The SSC Staff representative(s) will be orally advised of the above at the time of their review at FBI Headquarters. Should the SSC Staff seek certain specific copies of the SAC Letters or Memoranda, those items selected will then be appraised with regard to classification and privacy considerations, prior to furnishing any copies to the SSC Staff for their off-premises perusal. None reviewed pertained to OPE responsibilities.

Dir let and LHM to AG 7/18/75

5/14/75 request, Appendix B, Part I, Item la

Re SAC memos and lets selected for review at FBIHQS

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

To: Bill Cregar

From: Mark Gitenstein

Bill, attached you will find the list of SAC memos and letters which we have selected for review at FBI headquarters.

SAC MEMOS & LETTERS

1960

60-A	1/15
60-B	1/22
60-C	1/25
60/9	2/9
60-10	2/16
60-D	2/29
60-11	2/19
60-12	2/23
60-14	3/8
60-16	3/22
60-E	4/27
60-F	5/10
60-30	6/21
60-G	7/1
60-32	6/28
60-33	7/5
60-34	7/12
60-H	8/1
60-36	7/19
60-38	8/2
60-I	8/17
60-43	9/13
60-41	8/23
60-44	9/29
60-45	9/27
60-J	10/20
60-51	11/1
60-54	11/22
60-k	1/13
60-56	12/6
60-59	12/20

1961

61-A	1/23
61-5	1/24
61-8	2/21
61-10	3/1
61-12	3/7
61-13	3/14
61-18	4/4
61-19	4/5
61-24	4/27
61-28	5/23
61/29	5/29
61-31	6/6
61-C	6/19
61-33	6/20
61-34	6/21
61-37	7/11
61-38	7/18
61/39	7/25
61-D	7/24
61-42	8/18
61-47	9/5
61-55	9/26
61-56	not dated
61-62	10/24
61-E	10/26
61-F	11/7
61-G	11/29
61-71	12/19

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/2000 BY SP6ALM/LMT
MDR-16

5-8

1962

62-A	1/8	62-22	4/17	62-47	9/7
62-12	2/14	62-E	4/26	62-55	10/3
62-11	2/13	62-27	5/8	62-58	10/16
62-B		62-F	5/9	62-H-J-I-K	
62-C	2/19	62-32	6/5	62-61	
62-16	3/8	62-G	7/27	62-66	10/26
62-20	4/3	62-33	6/12	62-70	12/11
62-21	4/10	62-34	6/19	62-72	12/26

1963

63-4	1/23	63-14	3/19	63-39	8/6
63-A	1/30	63-E	3/27	63-44	9/4
63-6	1/29	63-F & G		63-47	9/19
63-B	2/27	63-27	6/11	63-50	10/1
63-C	3/6	63-26	5/28	63-I	10/23
		63-30	6/25	63-59	12/10
63-D	3/25	63-35	7/19	63-61	
63-13	3/12	63-H	7/27		

1964

64-4 & 5		64-B	4/1	64-39	7/3
64-3	1/14	64-23	4/28	64-43	8/25
64-A	1/24	64-24	5/5	64-48	9/29
64-13	2/27	64-C	5/20	64-F	10/26
64-20	4/7	64-D	6/22	64-52	10/27
64-21	4/14	64-E	7/6	64-G	11/25

1965

	65-8	65-41	65-50
	65-10	65-40	65-54
5/4	65-A	65-D	65-53
5/11	65-B	65-C	65-58
	65-31	65-44	65-68
	65-36	65-E	65-63
	65-37	65-47	

1966

66-4	1/13	66-41	7/5	66-68	11/1
66-8	2/1	66-A	7/22	66-72	11/15
66-10	2/15	66-44	7/18	66-73	11/22
66-19	3/29	66-45	7/19	66-77	12/13
66-27	5/3	66-50	8/9	66-76	12/7
66-34	6/7	66-56	9/9	66-78	
66-35	6/14	66-61	10/4	66-79	12/15
66-33	6/31	66-63	10/11	66-80	12/20
66-30	6/21				

1967

67-3	1/10	67-23	4/25	67-50	8/21
67-5	1/19	67-24	5/2	67-52	8/29
67-6	1/24	67-25	5/9	67-56	9/12
67-8	1/31	67-27		67-62	10/17
67-10	2/1	67-29	5/24	67-63	10/24
67-11	2/7	67-38	6/27	67-65	10/31
67-12	2/14	67-40	7/11	67-66	11/7
67-13	2/21	67-42	7/25	67-70	11/28
67-14	2/28	67-43	8/1	67-71	12/5
67-17	3/21	67-A	8/8	67-74	12/19
67-20	4/7	67-47	8/4		

1968

68-4	1/9	68-25	4/30	68-40	7/16
68-5	1/16	68-26	5/1	68-41	7/23
68-9	1/31	68-30	5/21	68-51	9/3
68-14	2/20	68-32	6/4	68-52	9/10
68-16	3/12	68-34	6/11	68-54	9/20
68-18	3/19	68-36	6/21	68-55	9/20
68-20	3/26	68-38	7/2	68-63	11/5
68-21	4/2	68-39	7/9	68-68	11/26
68-22	4/9				

1969

69-4	1/14	69-30	5/27	69-51	9/15
69-5	1/21	69-31	6/3	69-55	9/26
69-7	1/28	69-34	6/24	69-58	10/7
69-14	2/25	69-36	7/1	69-63	10/22
69-15	3/4	69-37	7/8	69-67	11/10
69-16	3/11	69-43	8/13	69-69	11/18
69-22	4/8	69-44	8/19	69-73	12/9
69-27	5/6	69-45	8/26	69-76	12/23
69-28	5/13	69-46	9/5		

1970

70-4	1/27	70-21	4/2	70-43	8/17
70-6	2/3	70-26	5/12	70-45	8/27
70-9	2/17	70-29	5/26	70-46	9/1
70-11	3/3	70-30	6/2	70-48	9/15
70-13	3/17	70-33	6/16	70-61	11/3
70-15	3/24	70-36	7/14	70-64	11/10
70-17	3/31	70-38	7/28	70-72	12/29
70-18	4/7	70-40	8/4		

1971

71-3	1/19	71-20	5/11	71-37	8/10
71-4	1/26	71-21	5/18	71-39	8/17
71-A	2/18	71-24	6/8	71-41	8/24
71-10	3/9	71-28	6/22	71-46	9/21
71-11	3/16	71-30	7/6	71-51	10/19
71-17	4/27	71-34	7/20	71-B	11/8
71-19	5/4	71-36	8/3	71-61	12/28

1972

72-1	1/4	72-21	4/18	14-72	8/1
72-3	1/11	memo 1-72	5/23	15-72	8/8
72-6	1/26	memo 5/72	6/13	21-72	9/12
72-10	2/22	memo 11/72	7/11	22-72	9/19
72-17	3/21	13/72	7/25	25-72	10/10

1973

10-73	3/6	18-73	4/24	31-73	7/31
12-73	3/13	25-73	6/5	53-75	11/23

1974

5-74	1/29	32-74	6/25	50-74	10/17
8-74	2/19	35-74	7/16	52-74	11/5
13-74	3/12	39-74	8/13	56-74	11/26
22-74	4/30	49-74	10/15	55/74	12/10

1975

5-75	1/28	18-75	4/22	21-75	5/13

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7/16/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee to study Govt Operations. Re; Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Dept. of Justice; Policies and Procedures. (5/14/75 request, App.B, Part 1, Item 1.a., SAC memos and lets

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Danny Miller Date: Aug 1, 1975

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/10/2000 BY SP2 AVM/LMF
MDR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

FOR REVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix B, Part I, Item 1a

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Made available for SSC review at FBIHQ selected SAC Letters and Memoranda

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5-Wol8

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

951-953, 954-963, 964, 965-971

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

DO NOT DESTROY
FOIPA# N/A

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 10, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. E. F. Glenn

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#mDR16
10/18/00 SP2ALM/JJ6

10-17-75

Reference is made to the September 8, 1975, SSC request forwarded to the Department of Justice by letter dated September 9, 1975, listing certain documents and other information desired from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum in response to some of the requests.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which is being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

REC-114 62-116395-951

62-116395

OCT 30 1975

10/17/75

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

6-ENCLOSURE

ENCL BEHIND FILE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

EFG:eks
(10)

EFG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

WRW/TCL

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 OCT 30 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE:

Single copies of the 9/8 and 9/9/75, communications are attached to the file copy of the enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

2 - Mr. [redacted]. A. Mintz
(1 [redacted] Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. E. F. Glenn

62-116395

October 10, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16
10/12/00 SP2 ALM/JTE

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General's Office dated September 9, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 8, 1975, SSC requests and specifically to the following Items in those requests: Items 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35.

Item 22 requested all materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964, memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

No separate materials reflecting approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in his November 22 and 27 memoranda to Mr. Belmont could be located. At September 17, 1975, conference with SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein, it was pointed out that the approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations in his memoranda were the initials of the officials on the communication up to and including Mr. Tolson.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW/TWL

EFG:eks
(9) EFG

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

WOC

JBA

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395 - 951

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Item 23 requested all materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

No materials could be located reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and/or between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's memorandum to Mr. Belmont, November 27, 1964. It may be assumed that the contacts were either verbal or by routing slip transmission which in either case are not recorded.

Item 25 requested all materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

All documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. are printed documents. Other than the documents themselves, no records exist indicating that these documents were printed or the number of copies printed.

Item 26 requested an identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

There were no attachments to the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

Item 27 requested all materials reflecting that:
a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and
b. "the Director agreed,"
that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr., be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's

February 29, 1968, memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr.; Security Matter - C."

No materials could be located reflecting that "Mr. Tolson has suggested" and "the Director agreed."

Item 30 requested all materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965, memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr.; Security Matter - C."

No materials could be located reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)."

Item 31 requested all materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's January 16, 1964, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

No materials could be located indicating that Eugene Patterson was contacted by FBI personnel concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Item 33 requested all materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta Field Office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government

with representatives of (the Atlanta) Office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964, letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

This Item has been responded to under Item 19 of SSC request dated July 8, 1975.

Item 34 requested all materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964, letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

The only other material responsive to this request has already been furnished to the SSC (e.g.) Sullivan to Belmont memorandum December 24, 1963, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C," which has been separately submitted by the FBI in response to Item 19 of the SSC request July 8, 1975.

1 - The Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 11 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

N
9/11

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: (1) Senate Select Committee Request
(2) Deputy Attorney General Letter to Senator Church

(1) Attached for your attention and as prompt a response as possible is a letter from the SSC with annexations which request certain materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. As you know, requests for materials as they relate to King are, by recent designation of the Committee Chairman, "high priority".

X (2) Also attached for forwarding is a copy of a letter sent by the Deputy Attorney General to Chairman Church concerning a matter of interest to Messrs. Bill Cregar and Nick Callahan of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

#MDR 16
10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/JJG

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-951

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 9, 1975

#MORI6

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a list of FBI materials, delivery of which is requested ~~by September 15, 1975.~~ according to agreed priorities. JTE

X I would also appreciate your making available for Committee staff access, all Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1963. Upon examination of these files, delivery thereafter will be orally requested for specific items in accordance with the provisions of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department which governs Committee requests for materials.

N/O per Bergman

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

Receipt of material covered by Fonda case subpoena hereby acknowledged.
JTE

RECEIVED
SEP 9 1975

62-116395-757

September 8, 1975

DOCUMENT REQUEST

1. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of the informant) of the 2/12/62 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, FBI, subject "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C (00: Atlanta)." NP

2. All materials reflecting the steps taken by the FBI which "prevent(ed) the CPUSA from seizing control of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People," as stated in the last paragraph of page 4 of the enclosure captioned "Communist Party USA" which was attached to Director Hoover's January 10, 1961 letter to Robert Kennedy. Check? p. NOT OURS

✓3. Reports which were submitted by the Atlanta and New York field offices pursuant to the following instructions which were contained in the second paragraph of page 1 of the February 27, 1962 letter from the FBI Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C, Office of Origin: Atlanta," (a copy of which was disseminated to the New York field office: Nugent NP

> * New York and Atlanta are instructed to review their files and prepare a report suitable for dissemination which will include all information of a security nature plus complete background data.

4. The "Bureau letters to Atlanta, 7/20/62, to Mobile, 7/20/62, and to Savannah, 9/17/62" which are referenced in the first paragraph of the 10/11/62 memorandum from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C, (00:Atlanta)." NP

5. The "Correspondence received from the Atlanta and New York Offices" as indicated in the first sentence of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C". NP

6. All materials reflecting instructions issued to the New York and Atlanta field offices "to furnish the Bureau recommendations concerning a communist infilitration investigation of (SCLC) and the recommendations received from those two field offices for a "communist infiltration investigation of SCLC", as indicated in the second paragraph of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C". P SPECIFY TIME FRAME

#MOE16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-951

7. The "necessary Manual changes" which were "attached for approval" to Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist."

NP

8. All materials which support the following statement of Director Hoover which was noted on Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist":

P More specific

> Just a few weeks ago you contended that the Communist influence in the racial movement was ineffective and infinitesimal.

9. The September 5, 1963 letterhead memorandum to the Attorney General and "the related prior memoranda" which are referred to in the first paragraph of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell."

NP

10. The July 3, 1963 letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Hunter Pitts O'Dell which was attached to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

NP

11. All materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

?NP

12. The "Brief on the above-captioned matter and subsequent memoranda on the same subject matter" which are referred to in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

O.K. but need to discuss subsequent memoranda

13. The "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1953" and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956" which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

1963?

14. All materials reflecting or pertaining to Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney Committee", as referred to in his February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning a 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, as well as an unexcised copy of the February 5 memorandum.

NP

15. All materials which reflect the basis for the following statements which are contained in Mr. Baumgardner's May 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Internal Security Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, Administrative Matter":

Married ?

a. "About three months prior to the March on Washington (8/28/63), we intensified our investigation concerning communist influence into the racial movement. . . .";

b. "Martin Luther King, head of SCLC, has challenged the Bureau on this point."

16. All materials reflecting the "previous arrangements" referred to in the November 18, 1964 memorandum from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, subject "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director, 10:00 a.m., 11/18/64 (10:05 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.)"

? contained 7/8

NP

17. All materials reflecting, concerning, or pertaining to:

a. "(S)tatements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Georgia, at the time he highly criticized the FBI. His statements were made on 11/18/62 during an interview in the Robing Room of the Riverside Church in New York City where King had just preached a sermon." (This quotation is taken from the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of the 11/19/64 memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. DeLoach captioned "Director's Briefing of Women Reporters on 11/18/64")

NR

b. Comments, responses, and recommendations made, inspections conducted, and/or any other actions taken as a result of the statements of Dr. King which are described in Item 17.a. above.

Coordination Inspection Div ?

TIME FRAME

18. Identification of the author of the notation "Being Handled, 11/20/64, D" which appears at the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters."

[illegible]

Wick

19. All materials reflecting the manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "(b)eing handled" as noted on the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters," together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom. P

20. The response to John Doar's August 19, 1964 letter to Mr. James R. Malley which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. NP

21. The division and section assignment of James R. Malley as of August 19, 1964. NP

Coord w Adm Div

22. All materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964 memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." PREV. HANDLED 7/14

23. All materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." P HANDLED

24. The table of contents page(s) and/or chapter or section headings of:

    a. The article captioned "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" which was attached to Mr. Sullivan's 10/15/63 memorandum to Mr. Belmont under the same caption. NP

    b. The paper which was the up-to-date revision of the article described in Item 24 (a) above and which paper was attached to Mr. Sullivan's November 22, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

    c. The memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which was transmitted with the December 21, 1964 letter from Director Hoover to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.

d. The document which was the "current revision of the previous analysis captioned 'Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis'" and which document was enclosed with Mr. Brennan's April 10, 1967 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Communist Influence in Racial Matters - A Current Analysis."

e. The "current study" entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr. - A Current Analysis" which was enclosed with Director Hoover's March 14, 1968 letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall.

? 25. All materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a. - e. above. (Do not supply the documents themselves.)

? What mean

26. An identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24 a. - e. above. (Do not supply the attachments themselves.)

27. All materials reflecting that:

?

a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and

b. "the Director agreed,"

that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr. be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's 2/29/68 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

Klein 28. All materials which reflect any recommendations for, and/or decisions relating to, the sending of Director Hoover's August 25, 1967 letter to specified field offices captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Internal Security."

CointelPro Ryan?

Klein 29. All materials reflecting the approval of proposals contained in Mr. G. C. Moore's February 29, 1968 memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence."

Ryan?

30. All materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965 memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

31. All materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's 1/16/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C.")

32. All materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position at that time (the end of a 90-day period, or sooner if conditions permit) to take further action against King and the SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau," as promised in Mr. Sullivan's December 24, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

33. All materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta field office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government with representatives of (the Atlanta) office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

to #16

34. All materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

35. All materials comprising the "separate correspondence" between FBI Headquarters and the Atlanta field office concerning the "specific matters dealt with in Atlanta's letter (of 4/14/64)" as indicated in the Director's 4/24/64 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

Search to end

36. The communication from the Atlanta field office to FBI Headquarters by which "this publication has previously been furnished to the Bureau on 6/26/64," as stated in the second paragraph of page 3 of the 7/7/64 letter from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, IS-C."

Deegan's Office

37. The "separate correspondence" by which the Atlanta field office was "directed to furnish the Bureau available information concerning the alleged escapades of (the Reverend Ralph) Abernathy, including the obtaining of official court records," as referred to in the Director's July 23, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

38. The letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers which was originally attached to Mr. Sullivan's 11/27/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement -- A Current Analysis." (See note on 11/27/64 memorandum indicating that the letter was "revised.")

39. "The letter" which is the subject of the first and second paragraphs of Director Hoover's February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning his 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, and which letter the Director told the Attorney General, he would "check on" and any other materials relating to "the letter".

P 40. All materials concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. being named "Man of the Year" by Time Magazine in December 1963 - January 1964.

P 41. All materials concerning or pertaining to Dr. King's Papal audience in Rome in September 1964.

P 42. Speech delivered by Director Hoover at Loyola College in November 1964, and all materials pertaining thereto.

43. All Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") from 1963 until 1968 for:

NP

- a. William D. Campbell, and
- b. John Matter.

P ATLANTA

45. All materials reflecting, concerning or pertaining to electronic surveillance, feasibility studies or surveys, physical surveillance, or photographic surveillances, and/or any proposals, recommendations or discussions of any of the foregoing surveillances, studies or surveys, with respect to Dr. King's "hideaway", or Fred Bennett's apartment, or premises located at 3006 Delmar Lane, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia, or with respect to any other premises, apartment, or "hideaway", used, owned, or leased by Dr. King or Fred Bennett.

Klem

Cointel Pro Ryan?

46. The following materials which are referred to in the October 9, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C":

a. "NYlet 9/26/62";
b. "further steps to carry out this counterintelligence plan will be handled at the Bureau";
c. "memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption dated October 8, 1962, ARW:cdb."

X

47. The "ATairtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated 4/1/64 captioned "CPUSA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C" and "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C", which are referenced in the 4/13/64 Airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York and Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal SEcurity - C (Negro Question).

48. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of informants) of the 8/15/66 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, subject "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Secuirty - C (Stanley David Levison.)"

49. The Memorandum which "the Director had noted" as referred to in the NOTE at the bottom of the 4/13/65 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, subject "Communist Party, USA Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Nicholas A. Kourambis) (Negro Question)."

Klein Cointelpro Ryan?

50. All materials reflecting "comments" and "specific recommendations" submitted by the Atlanta, Chicago, and New York field offices as the result of the instructions contained in the last paragraph of the May 18, 1967 letter from the Director the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Martin Luther King)."

Klein Cointelpro Ryan?

51. All materials reflecting the product of the "comprehensive review of Levison's Bureau case file" as indicated in the NOTE on the 7/1S/66 airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Stanley David Levison)."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document: Re 9/9/75 request materials pertaining to King and SCLC. Items 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

62-116395-951

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/8/75, items 16 thru 27 and 30 thru 35.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

~~TS~~

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTF

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr. and Southern Christian Leadership Conference: November 18, 1964 memorandum regarding "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director; Statements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Ga., at the time he highly criticized the FBI; Identification of the author of a notation and initals on a 11/20/64 memorandum; manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "being handled" together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom; response which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party; where an Special Agent was assigned as of 8/19/64; Materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position in in 90 days time to take further action against King and SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau" as reflected in 12/24/63 memorandum, subject CP, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters.

62-116395

TREAT AS YELLOW 5-WOC

8

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

3791 (6

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 17 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

M 9/16

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request Dated September 12, 1975

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting various materials and information relating to mail interception. Please prepare an appropriate response to that part of the SSC letter which is directed to the FBI.

cc: Paul Daly

#MD016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALM/JRG

Ltr + Lhm to AG partial Lhm to SSC
10/17/75 LED/sw

ENCLOSURE

REC-114 62-116395-952

21 OCT 30 1975

1-Ad Hoc

62-116395

84 NOV 3 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 12, 1975

#MDR 16 --
10/12/00 SE-2 ALM/JTG.

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a request for Department of Justice and FBI materials.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff jm
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
SEP 12 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-952

1. All materials reflecting Justice Department knowledge of mail opening by FBI or CIA employees prior to December 1, 1974.

2. With respect to letters written by the following individuals or organizations addressed to third parties, and to letters written by third parties addressed to the following individuals or organizations, copies of which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI, including field offices, the following questions are asked:

   a. What are the dates of such letters?

   b. What are the names and addresses of the senders?

   c. What are the names and addresses of the addressees?

   List of individuals and organizations:

   1. Angela Davis

   2. Jeremy Stone

   3. Jane Fonda

   4. Ralph Abernathy

   5. Steven Slepian

   6. Jack Nelson

   7. Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D. C.

3. All materials pertaining to the acquisition by the FBI of all letters referred to in item 2 above. In the response to this item, priority consideration should be given to the following letter:

   Date: March 25, 1970
   Name and Address of Sender: Jane Fonda
   10744 Chalon Road
   West Los Angeles, California
   Name and Address of Addressee: Leo Matarasso
   29 Rue de Touron
   Paris 5, France

#MDR16
10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/BTG

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-152

Mr. J. B. Adams 10/17/75

Legal Counsel

HOUSTUDY
SENSTUDY — 75

On the late afternoon of October 11, 1975, Douglas Marvin, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, called me and requested that the Attorney General be furnished a brief statement concerning FBI relationships with the Senate Select Committee and the House Select Committee for inclusion in a statement being prepared for submission to the White House. Mr. Marvin said that the Attorney General's intention was to bring together anticipated problems concerning the two committees in the hope that a means for resolving these matters might be found.

I discussed this request with Mr. Jenkins in the absence of Mr. Callahan and I returned Mr. Marvin's call and dictated to the Attorney General's secretary. I requested her to furnish me with a copy of the dictation. Attached is the page furnished by the Attorney General's secretary which I received on October 15, 1975.

This matter was brought to the attention of the Executives Conference on October 14, 1975.

#MDR16
10/12/00 SP2ALM/JTG

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

62-116-5[illegible]

NOT RECORDED
46 OCT 30 1975

JAM:mfd
(8)

ENCLOSURE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

84 OCT 30 1975

FBI Relationships with the Senate and House Select Committees

Senate Select Committee

FBI relationships with the Senate Select Committee generally have been harmonious with responses to the Committee requests delivered promptly. When difficulties have occurred they have been overcome by negotiation and tolerance on both sides. Future difficulties that may be confronted and require similar resolution include the scope of any public hearing regarding electronic surveillance of foreign nationals or their agents and establishments.

House Select Committee

In the past the FBI has experienced the following difficulties with the House Select Committee:

(1) It has held public hearings which were orchestrated to present adverse views without an opportunity for prepared rebuttal, such as occurred on October 9, 1975, regarding electronic surveillance matters;

(2) It has demanded delivery of documents on unreasonably short notice considering the time necessary to locate and prepare for delivery the enormous quantity of documents called for;

(3) It has interviewed employees, former employees and confidential sources of the FBI without first advising the FBI of the proposed interview and has demanded the appearance of agents below the policy-making level.

#M0016
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP-2 ALM/TC

A large number of documents dealing with electronic surveillance conducted without a warrant between 1970 and July 30, 1975, were furnished to the Committee on Friday, October 10, 1975. Certain excisions in these documents were made and it remains to be seen whether the Committee will accept the determinations made as to what types of information, e.g., identities of subjects who were monitored, should have been excised.

The overriding concern for the future is the need to establish an understanding on both sides of the policies to be followed by each in responding to the Committee's mandate. General agreement to specified operating procedures would alleviate the suspicion on the part of the Committee and the fear of Committee ~~re~~sponsibility on the part of the FBI. irre

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP2ALM/TTB

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10/20/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

During the discussion on 10/20/75 concerning the forthcoming testimony of Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, Mr. Wannall mentioned to the Senate Select Committee Staff Members present (John T. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, Michael Epstein, and Mark Gitenstein) that in view of the fact these hearings would be open to the public the Committee would not be fully briefed concerning the background involved in the Bureau mail opening programs because of the sensitivity involved. Elliff indicated that he was in agreement and that he would contact F. A. O. Schwartz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, to see if executive session testimony could be arranged. Elliff subsequently telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and advised him that Mr. Wannall could testify in executive session on mail openings in the late afternoon on 10/21/75 at approximately 4:30 p.m. subject to the approval of the Senators.

After consultation with Assistant Director Wannall, Elliff was advised that this would be acceptable and that Mr. Wannall would appear for executive session testimony concerning mail openings if the Senators agree to accept executive session testimony.*

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, was advised of the possible executive session testimony and interposed no objection to the Bureau giving such testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

REC-114 62-116395-953

*Section Chief
W.A. Branigan
will accompany
Wannall

PVD:lad
(8)

PVD

PVD

WRW

84 OCT 30 1975

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 10-20-75 James Dick, staff member for captioned Committee, who is in charge of the hearings on mail openings, advised the public session is to be held on 10-24-75 and furnished a copy of what that Committee considers to be the issues raised by the Bureau's mail opening programs. (Copy is attached.) Additionally, he advised that the Committee plans to refer to the eight Bureau mail opening programs by numerical code names in their public hearing. He furnished the following code numbers with the Bureau code name:

Code name #1 - Z-Coverage
Code name #2 - Sam Survey
Code name #3 - Gus Survey
Code name #4 - Sun Survey
Code name #5 - Joe Survey
Code name #6 - Chiprop Survey
Code name #7 - Chiclet Survey
Code name #8 - Chican Survey

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/20/00 BY SP2ALM/TAM
#MDR16

Dick advised that this will be used by the Senators during the hearing and that Mr. Wannall and Mr. Branigan, who will tesitfy, should be familiar with these numerical definitions.

REC-114

62-7-5-954

RECOMMENDATION:

Intelligence Division should review the attached issue paper presented by the Committee to be familiar with the questions raised by the Bureau's mail opening programs as seen by the Committee.

21 OCT 30 1975

Enclosure

3 8

JAM

PVD:dkg (8)

84 NOV 3 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI #m0816
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Issues

The following issues are among those which are raised by the FBI mail opening programs and the FBI's cooperation in CIA's New York intercept project:

(1) Whether mail opening as an investigative technique should ever, under carefully circumscribed regulations and with proper authorization, be sanctioned in the counter-espionage field. The FBI mail opening programs raise this issue with more force than the CIA programs since, in general, the FBI programs were more circumscribed, more tightly controlled, and more focused than the CIA programs. The FBI programs were also very successful in achieving their counter-espionage goals. Mail opening does represent an extremely valuable ~~menas~~ means of intercepting the communications link in espionage communications. On the other hand, the sanctity of the mails is an established tradition in the United States, and it is doubtful that any selection criteria could be sufficiently precise to allow for the opening of only mail to or from illegal agents.

(2) Whether the mail openings that did occur were properly authorized. It is clear that FBI Director Hoover personally approved the majority of the mail opening programs. The one which was implemented without Headquarters approval was terminated shortly after it came to the attention of Headquarters. It does not appear, however, that any Attorney General ever authorized these programs or that the exact nature and full scope of the programs was even brought to the attention of any Attorney General, even though opportunities existed to do so. Similarly, despite frequent contacts with the Postal Inspection Service regarding the implementation of these programs, no Chief Postal Inspector was ever informed that the FBI contemplated the actual opening of mail.

(3) Whether the legal implications of the mail openings were adequately considered. There is no evidence that legal considerations were discussed after 1951, and there is evidence that Headquarters personnel who ran the programs either considered them illegal or ignored the legal implications entirely.

(4) Whether the mail opening programs were adequately controlled to ensure that they remained focused on counter-espionage matters. As noted above, the programs did generate some information regarding domestic organizations and criminal activity, although the primary purpose always remained in the counter-espionage field. The fact

ENCLOSURE

62

that these programs did generate such information apparently came as a surprise to the Headquarters officials who ran the programs and the obvious questions are whether this was permitted or encouraged, and, if neither, how it could have happened.

(5) Whether the selection of names for inclusion on the CIA's Watch List in the Hunter Project was sufficiently controlled and limited. Because the FBI requested the CIA for information on categories such as peace organizations and on specific individuals and groups involved in the peace and women's movement, a serious question is raised whether there was sufficient restraint on the use of this source.

NOTE: As discussed in the FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS summary, several of the FBI mail opening programs utilized, as selection criteria, various "indicators" which, with some accuracy, identified letters sent by or addressed to foreign illegal agents. The fact of these indicators has been made public by FBI officials in recent weeks. But: these indicators are still felt to be valid and the FBI has no reason to believe that they are not still being used. It is recommended, therefore, that the Committee avoid questions which would require in response an elaboration of the nature of these indicators.

~~TOP SECRET~~

STAFF MEMORANDUM

EXECUTIVE SESSION ON FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS

FBI Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and William Branigan, Chief of the Soviet Section of the FBI Counterintelligence Branch, have requested an opportunity to appear before the Select Committee in executive session to discuss classified aspects of the FBI mail opening programs. Both of them will be witnesses at the public hearing on FBI mail openings on Friday.

The Committee staff has agreed that the public hearing will not disclose the following aspects of FBI mail openings:

1. The identity of the foreign nations involved, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba, Mexico, Hong Kong, Japan, most Western European countries, and several Central and Latin American countries.

2. The fact the mail to and from the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet United Nations Mission, the Cuban United Nations Mission, other Soviet-bloc Embassies was selectively opened. (S)

3. The "indicators" used as criteria for selective opening of mail screened in several other programs designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States. (The fact that there were "indicators," but not their nature, may be disclosed publicly.)

4. The identities of specific individuals and groups whose mail was opened either by the FBI or by the CIA at the request of the FBI. (FBI officials will state publicly that some of these, especially in the category "peace and protest groups," were not adequately justified.) Some of these included:

   Leonard Bernstein
   Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam
   Jeremy Stone
   Cambridge Center for Study of Public Policy

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-7-11

TOP SECRET

The following are questions which cannot be discussed in public hearings because of this agreement. They should be raised at this executive session:

1. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail openings aimed at mail to and from the [Soviet and Soviet-bloc embassies?] (X)

2. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail opening programs using "indicators" and designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States? [(Soviet and Cuban)] (X)

3. What was the actual intelligence value of the material supplied to the FBI by the CIA from its mail opening operation?

4. How good are the "indicators" in selecting mail of foreign intelligence agents only and not mail of American citizens or others who are not foreign agents?

5. What standards were used for opening mail to and from Communist China, and what was the intelligence value of these programs?

6. Do FBI counterespionage officials desire to resume any mail opening programs, with proper authorization from Congress and the Attorney General?

7. How do the benefits of mail opening compare with the benefits of warrantless electronic surveillance currently used by the FBI for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes?

Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service / Washington, D.C. 20224

Commissioner

REC-114 OCT 20 1975

#MDR 16

10/12/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

Mr. William Creager
Section Chief, CI-2
Federal Bureau of Investigation
John Edgar Hoover Building
Room 4123
Washington, D. C. 20535

Dear Mr. Creager:

Representatives of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who have been reviewing files of our former Special Service Staff, have asked for copies of the enclosed two FBI reports relating to Nathanial Walter, Junior.

I would appreciate your letting me know as soon as reasonably convenient whether the FBI has any objection to our providing the Staff with copies of the reports.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Thomas V Glynn

Thomas V. Glynn
Assistant to the Commissioner

OK for Dissemination to the [illegible] SSC. 10/21/75 GTT

Glynn advised 10/22/75 WOB

Enclosures

copy to: Mr. Arthur Jefferson
Senate Select Committee Staff

File 62-116395

ENCLOSURE

REC-114

62-116395-955

OCT 30 1975

84 OCT 30 1975

[illegible]

F ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIO

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-3597

Chicago, Illinois
November /0, 1971

U

NATHANIEL WALTER JUNIOR

Nathaniel Walter Junior has been identified as a member of the Black Panther Party (BPP).

The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government.

Junior appeared in United States District Court, Chicago, Illinois, on January 18, 1971, and entered a plea of guilty on Federal Firearms charges against him, as well as on a bail jumping charge. On February 5, 1971, United States District Judge Sam J. Perry, Chicago, Illinois, sentenced Junior to three years probation on the above charges.

On September 28, 1971, Junior was interviewed by a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Junior advised that he was no longer a member of the BPP, having resigned as a result of a dispute with Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Illinois BPP, regarding the unauthorized use of Panther funds by Rush. He further alienated himself with the BPP when, in January, 1971, he refused to repay the BPP $1,500.00 that had been paid as bail to secure his release from jail on the aforementioned charges.

Junior furnished the following information concerning his activities with the BPP:

He originally joined the BPP at the invitation of Fred Hampton, in the Fall of 1968. Hampton at the time was the Chairman of the Illinois BPP and was subsequently

#MDR16

INFORMATION CONTAINED
IS UNCLASSIFIED
10/12/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

62-116395-955

ENCLOSURE

slain by Cook County States Attorney Officers, December 4, 1969, who at the time were executing a search warrant in Chicago, Illinois.

While in the party, Junior held the title of Field Secretary and was privy to administrative matters relating to the BPP. On two occasions he traveled out of the state on party business, once to BPP National Headquarters for the purpose of meeting the National Staff, and to Washington, D. C., to attend the Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention (RPCC).

The RPCC, held August 7, 1970, at Howard University, Washington, D. C., was organized by the BPP to structure "a constitution that will guarantee us the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; a constitution that serves the people instead of a constitution that serves the ruling class".

In early 1969, Junior negotiated to purchase a quantity of weapons from an undercover United States Treasury Agent, for the BPP and as a result was arrested on a Federal Firearms charge. While out of jail on this charge, Junior learned that he had been indicted and decided to jump bond and leave the country.

Junior left the country for Canada, through the aid of persons connected with the draft resistence movement, and who did not know of his pending criminal charges or his affiliation with the BPP. He declined to identify these persons who aided in his leaving the country or those who aided him in Canada.

The BPP in no way aided him in leaving the country, nor did they provide him any financial assistance while he was a fugitive and for this he is bitter.

Junior decided to leave Canada and return to Chicago for the purpose of surrendering to face trial on the Federal Firearms Act charge, because of his parents' poor health.

Upon his return, he learned the BPP was no longer functioning on a democratic basis but was now being dominated by Bobby Rush, Illinois Minister of Defense. Junior sought to bring the party back to its former state, by calling for reforms and reorganization, which was resisted by Rush and he was subsequently removed from the Central Staff and he resigned from the party in September, 1970.

He is in no way involved with the BPP, or other extremist activities, at this time nor does he have any plans to resume his association with the BPP, as he feels "The BPP and other organizations are being duped by white intellectual revolutionary hobbyists, who are taking advantage of the hopelessness and frustrations of the Black community to exercise their theories on political and social democracy."

Junior claims to have no knowledge of any BPP underground, now or in the past, but admits that preliminary discussion regarding an underground cell of the BPP was had in the early development of the Illinois BPP, but that plan like most others never got off the ground.

The BPP was, and is, a big disappointment to Junior in that they departed from their original concept of neighborhood protection against police brutality, to one of international identification with communism. He maintained his association with the BPP in spite of this change in philosophy because of his respect and confidence in Fred Hampton, who rationalized that in order to further the cause of neighborhood control they'd need the financing and good will of governments oppose to people oppression, no matter where these people were.

Junior feels that the BPP is dead in Illinois and blames its demise to its identification with communism and coalitions with white revolutionary groups.

He has three things to show for his membership in the BPP; (1) probation on the Federal Firearms charge, (2) three years probation on State narcotics case (which he claims was a frame by police, but to which he entered a plea, "as part of a deal", at the urgency of his BPP attorney); and (3) an outstanding

indictment with the State of Illinois charging he and fourteen others with kidnaping and related crimes. Junior advised that this was another case of police harassment of the BPP, and another example of how the BPP has lost its attractiveness to people in Chicago. Of the sixteen people who were originally charged in the kidnapping case, including the deceased Hampton, only two of those, Yvonne King, and Billy Brooks, continue as members of the BPP.

Junior claims to have no contact with any members or former members of the BPP, except when the persons charged with the kidnaping report for trial every month. Junior cites the numerous continuances of the kidnaping case as an example of white hobbyists playing with young black revolutionary hopefuls. To him the continuances represent a conspiracy on the part of the BPP attorneys and the States Attorney's Office, as on alternate months they ask that the case be continued and neither ever objects. If he could afford it he would not avail himself of the BPP attorney's services.

Junior is required to report to his probation officer twice per month and is not allowed to travel outside the State of Illinois, without prior permission.

Logical sources, in positions to know, advise that Junior is not now active with the BPP, and has not been so in more than a year.

On October 29, 1971, the FBI recontacted Junior and learned that his pending kidnaping case was continued from October 26, 1971, until November 30, 1971.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
June 9, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. 157-3597

NATHANIEL WALTER JUNIOR

Nathaniel Walter Junior has been identified as a former member of the Black Panther Party (BPP), who during the time he was a BPP member was indicted on state charges of kidnaping and related crimes, with other BPP members, on June 8, 1969, by the Illinois Cook County Grand Jury.

> The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government.

The case against Junior, and the other BPP members indicte with him, has never come to trial having been continued numerous times.

On May 10, 1972, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed Junior as he appeared in State Court, and the case was continued until June 15, 1972.

Reliable confidential sources advise that Junior is not a BPP member, nor does he associate with the membership of this organization.

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALM/BTG

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

62-116395-955

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. W. [illegible] Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

Mr. W. R. Wannall

10/22/75

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

F. J. Cassidy

#MDR16

[illegible] DATE 10-13-00 SP2 ALM/JTG

COINTELPROS

This is to identify two serials, copies of which were furnished to Barbara Banoff of the staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) for retention in the Committee's files.

Banoff on 10/10/75 requested copies of a memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Belmont dated 3/30/60 and a letter to the New York Office and 15 other offices dated 3/31/60, both captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program," be furnished to the Committee. Banoff stated she believed these documents had previously been requested but she was unable to locate them in the Committee files. She said she desired to have these documents because they set forth a logical program by which the FBI made an effort to prevent the Communist Party from infiltrating legitimate mass organizations. As an aside, she stated she thought the FBI was successful in this effort, indicating she felt the technique was worthy and proper.

Copies of the above two documents were made available to a SSC representative on 10/22/75. Copies of the documents together with a cover page indicating their receipt are attached. No excisions were required in these documents.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures
62-116009

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy) - 7
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 OCT 31 1975

DR:lfj
(3)

4 NOV 4 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 10/23/75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum advises that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) intends to release to the press copies of eight FBI documents (attached). The release of these documents is scheduled for 10/24/75, following the appearance of Assistant Directors Wannall and Mintz and Section Chief Branigan before the SSC.

These documents were made available to the SSC responsive to specific requests. They have been excised and declassified where necessary. With regard to dissemination of FBI documents to the Select Committees of Congress, both the White House and the Department have held that, once a document has been excised, declassified and furnished to either Select Committee of Congress, it is that Committee's property to do with whatever that Committee deems appropriate. However, we do have an understanding with the Committee that allows for more extensive excisions once the Committee decides to make documents available to the press. Personnel in the Senstudy Project have reviewed the attached eight documents and have made additional excisions which are acceptable to the SSC. These excisions are designed to protect Bureau sources, targets and, where possible, the identity of Bureau personnel.

REC-114 62-116395-956

The contents of the documents that will be made available generally portray the Bureau in a favorable light. They highlight: (1) tight supervision and control of the mail intercept programs; (2) general objectives of the program; (3) accomplishments; and (4) Departmental officials' knowledge of the existence of some of these programs.

OCT 30 1975

Enclosures

62-116395

WOC:lhb lhb
(6)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

84 OCT 30 1975

Of course, it would be desirable if no documents were released by the SSC; however, Mr. Elliff advises that the senators are desirous of furnishing some documents to the press. If, in fact, Bureau documents have to be released, it appears that the ones the SSC plans to use are favorable to the Bureau.

For the information of Bureau officials reviewing the attached documents, no excisions have been made; however, the brackets in red ink show what information will be obliterated from the documents prior to their release to the press.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 2/27/65

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: THE LONG COMMITTEE

Tolson
Belmont
Callahan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele Room
Holmes
Gandy

The Attorney General called on the morning of February 27, 1965, to advise he wanted to consult with the Bureau on certain problems raised by the Long Committee, which is exploring the use of mail covers, et cetera. He noted there was a possible problem concerning Chief Inspector Montague's testimony and whether it was necessary for Montague to change his testimony. Also, he felt that Internal Revenue Service had been using investigative techniques which they should not use and this could pose a problem. He said that the President had asked him to coordinate with all executive agencies concerning the problems raised by the Long Committee.

Inspector Moore and I met with the Attorney General i his office this afternoon. Mr. Courtney Evans was present. I told the Attorney General that in Montague's testimony he was told by Attorney Fensterwald that if any of the questions had national security implications Montague should not answer them. Consequently, Montague was estopped from doing other than answe in the negative when asked questions touching on national security. With this interpretation, it was questionable whethe an attempt should be made to change or explain Montague's testimony, particularly in view of the obvious lack of judgment on the part of Fensterwald and the desire of Long for publicity I made it clear to the Attorney General that from our dealings with Montague, he was a man of integrity and sacrificed his personal desires for the welfare of the country and had coopera fully with us. The Attorney General said he had no intention of changing one word of Montague's testimony, but he was considering advising Long and Fensterwald that there were extreme delicate national security matters touching on the area being covered by the committee and there could be exceptions to the answers given in the testimony when they touched on such sensitive security matters. He said further that he contemplat seeing Senator Long and impressing on him that the committee would not want to stumble by mistake into an area of extreme interest to the national security as they nearly did in a matte

REC- 56

1 - Mr. Tolson
2 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Moore

CONTINUED - OVER

EX-114

25 MAR 12 1965

4096

MAR 15 1965

50 MAR 16 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/

#moe16

[illegible]

affecting CIA. (Apparently CIA got wind of some inquiries by the committee relative to their secret operation and went to the committee and warned them off.) Katzenbach contemplates asking for a list of the witnesses who will appear before the committee together with a brief summary of the expected testimony. On the basis of this, he will be able to advise Senator Long when he should steer clear of a sensitive area.

I told Mr. Katzenbach that I certainly agree that this matter should be controlled at the committee level but that I felt pressure would have to be applied so that the personal interest of Senator Long became involved rather than on any ideological basis. Mr. Katzenbach said that he had already talked to Vice President Humphrey about Fensterwald, who he considered a wild man, and that Humphrey had promised to talk to Long concerning Fensterwald. Katzenbach said that in addition to the Vice President he might have to resort to pressure from the President himself, although he would prefer to work it out without resorting to the President. He indicated there was no one on the committee itself who could be helpful and that he did not expect any help from Senator Eastland.

Mr. Katzenbach said that he expected troublefrom the possible activities of IRS and the military in the investigative field; that if some of these matters are uncovered before the committee they will tend to undermine the restricted and tightly controlled operations of the Bureau. I told him that our operations are tightly controlled and particularly in the delicate areas of concern, we restrict ourselves to important security matters.

Mr. Katzenbach said he was going to see Senator Long on Monday and wanted to know if the Bureau would like someone to go along with him. I told him no.

ACTION:

Mr. Katzenbach said he would advise us of the results of his conversation with Long. He also asked that I advise the Director of our discussion and I told him I would.

I called Mr. DeLoach and briefed him on this problem in order that he might contact Senator Eastland in an effort to warn the Long Committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense. (Of couse I made no mention of such a contact to the Attorney General.) Mr. DeLoach advised that Senator Eastland is in Mississippi and he will contact him upon his return Monday.

I don't see what all
the excitement is about.
I would have no hesitation
in discontinuing all tech-
niques - technical coverage,
microphones, trash covers,
mail covers etc. While it
might handicap us I d
they are as valuable as
believe & none warrant
being used to justify

8:40 AM   March 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/MG

[illegible] Committee Judiciary

The Attorney General called and advised that he had talked to Senator Long last night. Senator Long's committee is looking into mail covers et cetera. The Attorney General stated he thought somebody had already spoken to Senator Long as he said he did not want to get into any national security area and was willing to take steps not to do this. The Attorney General stated that Mr. Fensterwald was present for part of the meeting and Fensterwald had said that he had some possible witnesses who are former Bureau Agents and if they were asked if mail was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General stated that before they are called, he would like to know who they are and whether they were ever involved in any program touching on national security and if not, it is their own business, but if they were, we would want to know. The Attorney General stated the Senator promised that he would have a chance to look at the names if he wanted to, personally and confidentially, and the list would have any names involving national security deleted and he would tell the Senator how many but no more.

The Attorney General stated that the Postmaster General is going down there this morning himself which he, the Attorney General, thought would be helpful to Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department.

The Attorney General stated that Senator Long also said he is not going to propose legislation to abolish mail covers as he thought they served a useful purpose but he did think that control should be tightened. I stated I thought there was great laxity in the matter of mail covers and the matter of tapping telephones.

I stated I have always been of the view and recommended back when Tom Clark was Attorney General that no agency of the Government should tap a telephone except with the written approval of the Attorney General. I stated

REC- 38 62-[illegible]-41

8 MAR 3 1965

XEROX JEH:edm (10)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale 4
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

57 MAR 3-1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

there would then be in one place a list of all phone taps and the purpose and reason for them. I stated that it is a fact, insofar as I am concerned, that I am the only head of an agency who does not have authority to tap telephones. I stated that I know that subordinates down the line in some agencies will tap phones without the knowledge of the chief of the agency and there is grave suspicion in Washington by some newspapermen that their phones have been tapped by agencies of the Government trying to find out where they are getting their information. I stated I have always been opposed to the law whereby it is necessary to get the authority of a court to tap phones because of the composition of some of our courts and the employees thereof, but I have always felt that the President should issue an Executive Order confidentially to all agencies that all phone tapping be discontinued except when specifically approved by the Attorney General so there would be in one place a list and then if any committee in Congress got on the warpath, the Attorney General would have a list he could vouch for as being the only phones tapped by the Government. The Attorney General stated that made sense. I stated many agencies are opposed because they realize there would be a marked restriction. I stated we only have 45 phone taps, which is a low number for a country the size of ours and the area we have to cover. The Attorney General stated no one has any idea how many phone taps the whole Government has.

I stated there is also a school being conducted in California by a private organization which instructs the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service in the matter of phone tapping and they have sent their own personnel there to be trained. I stated Internal Revenue has also from time to time hired private outside phone tappers to do their tapping. I stated it is that type of thing if there were a real investigation which would come out. The Attorney General commented that he would not guarantee some of it won't come out. I stated I was amazed when I learned of the school in California as I saw a reference to it in the newspaper and wanted to know what it was and what officers attended. I stated we have our own instructors and do it ourselves.

I stated I thought the Attorney General had made good headway with Senator Long. The Attorney General stated he thought it would be helpful, but his

problem is that he thinks the Senator is fine but he does not think that Fensterwald is as straightforward, or to put it another way that Fensterwald is smart and devious and the Senator is straightforward and not very bright and that is the problem. I stated I thought that Fensterwald is trying to get publicity for the Senator. The Attorney General stated the Senator said he did not want to get into this and he would give him, the Attorney General, the names and a summary of the testimony and told Fensterwald to do so, but he, the Attorney General, can't say Fensterwald is going to do it; that he will on some but he did not know that he would on all. I stated I had no faith or confidence in Fensterwald and neither did Senator Eastland. The Attorney General stated that Senator Eastland may have already talked to Senator Long or else the Vice President, but somebody had waked him up. I stated Senator Eastland said he would do it Wednesday, but he may have called him.

The Attorney General stated that is where it stands now and we shall see what happens.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11 42 AM
DATE 3-2-65
BY

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN DATE: October 2, 1964

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

SUBJECT: [redacted] CODE WORD
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. J.P.Mohr
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D.E.Moore
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Litrento

Prior memoranda have advised of the starting of the trial of the Soviet illegal agents in this case, Mr. and Mrs. Robert K. Baltch, in the Eastern District of New York and motions by defense counsel regarding the nature of evidence to be submitted in this case.

The Judge originally denied the motions, but Assistant Attorney General Yeagley has advised that USA Hoey in answering questions by the Judge gave answers which were too broad and which the Government cannot support and therefore it is necessary for the Government to make additional statements to Judge Dooling who is sitting in this case in the Eastern District of New York. My memorandum of September 30, 1964, advised that while we were not aware of the contents of the conversations between USA Hoey and Judge Dooling, we had no objections to Yeagley's proposed amending statement as it was correct.

Subsequently on the afternoon of 10-1-64, Departmental Attorneys Thomas K. Hall and Kevin Maroney advised Supervisor Litrento and myself that USA Hoey's statement to Judge Dooling was unfortunate because it was too broad. They believe that the Judge's query pertained to any tainted source at the Baltch residence and was confined to eavesdropping devices, but that Hoey in his answer had not confined the answer to the residence or to eavesdropping, either of which would perhaps have prevented the current problem. (No information obtained from wiretaps or microphones is contemplated to be used in this case and the only tainted source is a mail intercept which did not take place anywhere near the residence).

Subsequently on the evening of 10-1-64, Mr. Hall advised that he had just learned that apparently Hoey in his discussions with the court had stated, or at least indicated, there was no microphone involved in this case and, of course, this was incorrect and the Department felt the record had to be corrected. He

DEM:td (8)

Classified By 4041
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC- 15

EX- 117

OCT 19 1964

~~SECRET~~

Soviet Section

58 OCT 21 1964

~~SECRET~~

MR. SULLIVAN - MR. MOORE
[redacted] ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

asked if the Bureau had any objection and was advised in the negative. This morning Mr. Hall called to advise that USA Hoey had now requested advice as to what answer could be given the court should he be asked (1) if there was a wiretap involved in this case and (2) if there was a mail intercept in this case. After checking, I called Hall back and said that we would leave the answer to #1 up to the Department, but that if the Department saw necessary, the Bureau would not object. However, with regard to #2, under no circumstances is the Bureau willing to admit that a mail intercept was utilized and Hall said he would pass this information on to Hoey and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley who is in New York.

[illegible]

Hall advised that he had discussed this case with Acting Attorney General Katzenbach this morning and Katzenbach was of the opinion that the Department must be candid with the Judge. He said Katzenbach recognized the problems, but felt that in view of the value of the case, an effort should be made to go ahead with the trial even if it might be necessary drop the overt act where our tainted source is involved, and proceed on a general conspiracy basis with the recognition that the verdict might be against us, but we would have revealed the Soviet espionage activities to the people. Hall said he was passing on the Acting Attorney General's comments to Assistant Attorney General Yeagley. Hall said that the motions of defense counsel and the complications with regard to the answers may eventually force the Government to drop the prosecution. He said in view of the many facets involved, he did not feel there was any reason to agree to a pre-trial hearing on the issue of tainted source if this should be required by the court, and rather than do this, they are prepared to drop the espionage charges and attempt to proceed on lesser grounds.

ACTION

SAC Schmit, NYO, was advised of the above developments and requested to keep in close touch with Yeagley in New York and you will be kept advised of developments.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. SULLIVAN

DATE: 8-14-64

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Taylor 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Branigan

FROM : MR. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: DOSNAR
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

The captioned code word covers our investigation of the unknown subject at San Diego, California who offered to sell information concerning Sonar to the Soviets for $60,000.

BACKGROUND:

Information concerning this first came to our attention on 7-17-64 when our highly confidential coverage detected a letter addressed to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, postmarked 7-16-64 at San Diego, California. We followed up on this by inserting a message in a San Diego newspaper indicating that we were interested in the offer. The unsub then telephonically contacted an Agent of the Washington Field Office at the telephone number furnished him in the message in the personal column of the San Diego newspaper. Thereafter, we intercepted a telephone call that the subject made to the Soviet Embassy during which he attempted to verify that he was dealing with Soviet citizens. Acting on the subject's instructions, a package containing a camera suitable for document photography and $500 was dispatched by United Airlines air freight from Washington to San Diego during the early morning of 8-13-64.

In the meantime, another resident of San Diego, one R. Tobin, advised our office there that he had been engaged by an unidentified individual to pick up a package at United Airlines Freight Terminal which he was to subsequently turn over and for which he would be paid $20.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:

According to SAC C. Williams, an Agent of the San Diego Office posing as R. Tobin in the latter's automobile picked up the package at 8 p.m., PDT, and, thereafter, proceeded as he had been instructed to a drive-in in the San Diego area. SAC Williams advised that the coverage by San Diego Agents at the Air Freight Terminal uncovered a suspect who appeared to be closely observing

WAB:BST:hrt
(8)

REC- 38 - 65953 -

CONTINUED - OVER

EX-108

10 AUG 19 1964

65 AUG 21 1964

Tobin's automobile and who, thereafter, surveilled the automobile to the area of the drive-in.

After waiting the agreed time, our Agent proceeded to a parking lot adjacent to a church about one mile further down the highway. Shortly after the Agent arrived, he was approached by the suspect who inquired "Are you Tobin?" Thereafter, the suspect claimed to be a messenger who had been engaged to pick up the package. He did deliver an envelope to our Agent which contained the $20 agreed to. At this point, the Agent, posing as Tobin identified himself and requested that the suspect identify himself and voluntarily accompany him to the San Diego Office.

The suspect, who has now been identified as the subject, is Perry A. Chandelaine, 3231 Par Drive, La Mesa, California. He is a Grade 13 engineer at the Navy Electronics Laboratory, San Diego. This laboratory does all the training and electronics work and research, including Sonar, for the Navy in the San Diego area. In this connection, the subject claimed that he had access to information classified "Confidential." He has been a Government employee in excess of ten years and is the father of ten children.

In May, 1952, subject was an applicant for the position of Special Agent with this Bureau. Apparently during the interview it was determined the applicant's father was killed by the police in Chicago in 1932 when caught stealing butter from a boxcar. He had been arrested for selling whiskey prior to that in Wisconsin. Applicant was considered very nervous and had a vagotomy operation for a nervous disorder performed in 1947. Applicant had an ulcer which caused his discharge from the service and which still, at that time, gave him trouble. He was unfavorably recommended for employment.

According to SAC Williams, the subject readily acknowledged that he was in real deep trouble and claimed that his wife was also knowledgeable concerning his activities. Subject freely admitted contacting the Soviets and offering to sell information to them. However, the subject steadfastly maintained that he was a patriotic American, a Catholic and one who hated the Russians and that he was endeavoring to get all out of them that he could and he then intended to turn whatever he obtained over to ONI.

Subject's wife was invited to the office and she confirmed that earlier in the evening the subject had apprised her of his activities and gave her a letter which was addressed to ONI and which she was to mail upon receipt of a phone call from him. This

CONTINUED - OVER

letter was mailed by her when she was contacted by the subject who was at that time in the San Diego Office. Subject and his wife both furnished signed statements.

Thereafter, the facts in this case were presented to Mr. Thomas K. Hall of the Internal Security Division of the Department who advised that in view of the illegal source of the original information and all that flowed from it, he could not authorize the filing of a complaint charging the subject with an attempt to commit espionage. ONI was immediately advised both at San Diego and at Washington concerning the identity of the subject and the facts admitted by him. This was done in the event the Navy could institute some action. Upon completion of the signing of the statements, subject and his wife were permitted to return to their residence since no prosecutive action could be taken.

ACTION:

The investigation at San Diego is continuing, the completed results of which will be furnished to the Navy so it can institute administrative proceedings against him. The facts will, likewise, be furnished to the Internal Security Division of the Department which has requested them.

WCS

8/14

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 31, 1970

1 - Mr. J.P. Lee
1 - Mr. A.P. Litrento

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG #MDR16
ON 11/28/00

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

This is to consider recommendation of the New York Office that the Sam Survey Program be reinstituted.

BACKGROUND:

Sam Survey was a successful program operated between 1959 and 1966, which involved screening of air mail destined for selected European countries and cities by our Agent personnel in an effort to detect Soviet illegal agent mail. This program was made possible through the confidential cooperation of highly placed postal officials. In 1961 we identified, through this program, the [redacted] in New York City [redacted] In addition, [redacted], we uncovered [redacted] which had operated in the [redacted] for a certain period and then shifted its activities to the [redacted]. [redacted] In July, 1966, this program was discontinued.

Foreign Intelligence Project

RECOMMENDATION OF NEW YORK:

New York points out that although ample evidence indicates the presence of a substantial number of Soviet illegals, the Bureau has been unsuccessful in locating any in recent years; that various programs and projects put into operation have been unsuccessful. Further, it is its contention that the illegal's most vulnerable area is still his letter writing and that this is the area we have the best chance by far to locate and identify illegals. Therefore, New York wishes to submit for the Bureau's consideration the reinstitution of Sam Survey. If this is not possible, it recommends that the Bureau consider requesting CIA or postal authorities to take over this program.

REC- 65-65[illegible]

Enclosure

65-65884

APL:tdp (6)

10 APR 7 1970

CONTINUED - OVER

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category [illegible]
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SAM SURVEY
65-65884

OBSERVATIONS:

It is agreed that the problem to locate Soviet illegals has assumed serious proportions and that the resumption of this program could be of inestimable value to the Bureau in meeting its responsibilities in that regard. However, present Bureau policy precludes the use of this technique. For this reason, it is not believed that we consider reinstitution of this program directly or through CIA or postal authorities.

ACTION:

New York is being advised that the reinstitution of Sam Survey Program either directly or through CIA or postal authorities is not advisable at this time.

Absolutely right. H.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP-2ALM/AG

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

C. D. B
G. C. M
Griffith

On January 15, 1969, Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The Hunter project for which we have given the designation of Bureau Informant 200 essentially consists of specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia. If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the Soviet Union it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.)

File in (105-93089)

ACTION:

REC 102

105-93089 - 90

The above information is being directed ~~to~~ the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - Liaison
1 - S. J. Papich

18 FEB 5 1969

SJP:clb
(6)

Stops not warranted on black extremists at this time
J. D. 1/31/69

[illegible]

5-Papich

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Director, FBI (65-67003)

DATE: 1/31/62

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (105-11581)

SUBJECT: (GUS SURVEY
ESPIONAGE - R)

Re San Francisco letter to Director 1/11/62 advising San Francisco survey would run through February 9, 1962.

As of 1/28/62, a total of about [1,764,440] letters has been surveyed in 46 days.

Fifty-one cases have been opened to determine whether recipient might be (Soviet) illegal agent. Thirty-two cases have been closed when subjects appeared to be legitimate residents.

San Francisco does not at this time recommend continuance of this survey beyond February 9, 1962. Upon completion of authorized period and evaluation of investigations resulting therefrom, a further recommendation will be made as to reinstituting this program.

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/tlf
ON 11/28/00

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED)
1 - San Francisco
RES:lg
(3)

~~Classified by 6283~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

REC- 31 ([illegible] -19)

EX. - 107

12 FEB 5 1962

F146

65 FEB 12 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DATE: 11/2/62

1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Stewart

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

This is to advise you that on 10/31/62 representatives of this Bureau conferred with CIA representatives James Hunt, John Mertz and Thomas Chalmers at CIA concerning "Project Hunter." At this conference our observations concerning Hunter material furnished since our last conference on 2/13/62 were given CIA. In addition, we advised CIA specifically of certain Hunter items which were of no interest to us and of certain Hunter items which were of interest to us. These items were set forth in memorandum form and furnished to CIA; a copy of same is attached.

5

CIA advised that its "Hunter-Don" coverage was being operated seven days a week until November 15. This concentrated coverage is for the purpose of determining if there is any illegal agent traffic. After November 15 all Hunter coverage can be expected to be reduced until after the Christmas mail rush has subsided.

The CIA representatives were very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and with the attention afforded it by us. They are very cooperative in that they are willing to focus their attention on any particular phase of coverage we suggest for our own benefit. For CIA's interest we furnished them a copy of the attached memorandum of our analysis of typical information furnished by Bureau Informant 200 of interest to us.

ACTION:

None. Above data furnished for your information.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/JG

WDS (WDS)

WDS:jes
(4)

105-93089

Enclosure

REC 35

(105-93089-54)

7 NOV 5 1962

ENCLOSURE

EX-118

10-30-62

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

After an extensive review of 2500 Hunter Reports since our last memo captioned as above and dated 8/21/62, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project Hunter as it related to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense involved in the preparation of such material.

I Traffic Which Holds No Interest:

1. Soviet-bloc immigrants desiring to repatriate to USSR. These people are interviewed by INS and INS refers anything of interest to us.

2. Americans traveling to the USSR as such travel is permissible and several hundred people a year visit the USSR while on tour abroad as well as Soviets returning to visit relatives. We, of course, have an interest in such travel involving people on the CIA Watch List, known Communist Party members, and suspected intelligence agents.

3. U. S. professors in Academic Research corresponding with each other. It is not likely if U. S. professor is passing any data he would identify himself at the same time.

II Traffic of Specific Interest:

1. All data re Cuba. This serves to identify pro-Castro followers in the U. S.

2. All data re U. S. Cubans in contact with Cubans attending Friendship University in Moscow.

3. All material emanating from Puerto Rico of an Anti-U. S. nature and pro-Soviet.

4. Data re U. S. peace groups going to Russia and while in Russia.

5. Data indicating death of any U. S. Communist abroad.

6. Data re Maurice Hyman Halperin(now in Cuba); Helen Kagen Pozner; Miriam Zeitlin Seborer, Oscar and Stuart Seborer(All in Russia); Max, Celia and Rose Seborer(New York); Noah and Anna Sparer Seborer (Mexico).

7. Any data on Alfred Slesinger operator Modern Photo Shop, 865 3rd Avenue, New York City(wife Kitty), residence 1860 Grand Concourse, Bronx, New York.

105-93089-547

9

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

8. Any traffic from or to U. S. Students in Moscow or to U. S. persons who were former students in Moscow.

9. Any traffic between U. S. persons who are with a current exposition or a previous exposition in the USSR.

4-528

62-116395-957

CHANGED TO

62-117604-X1

JUN 3 1977

ft/dsk

#MDR16 ON THIS FORM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALK/JTG

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. William O. Cregar
Section Chief, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20535

The attached letter from NSA, dated 21 October 1975, forwarded two ~~letters~~ to me which are responsive to a request for information from the Senate Select Committee.

We would like to provide your 26 September 1973 letter to the Committee; however, since the letter originated with your agency, coordination prior to release under the Third Agency Rule is necessary. Please provide your comments concerning this release action at your earliest convenience.

Thomas K. Latimer
Thomas K. Latimer
The Special Assistant

Attachment

DOD was preliminarily advised FBI has already furnished SSC our letter of 9/26/73 & interpose no objection to DOD's giving SSC a copy. 10/29/75 WOC

EX 103

REC-24 62-116395-958

21 OCT 31 1975

62-116395

508588

5-USO

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/00 BY SP-8 ALM/JTC
#MDR16

ENCLOSURE

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-1-11

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

84 NOV 6 1975 ~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

● ~~TOP SECRET~~ ●

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: N1221
21 October 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Watch List Correspondence

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-8-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTC

1. As a part of the recent request by the Senate Select Committee, we reviewed our files to see if there were any responses to General Allen's letter of September 17, 1973 which requested recertification of "Watch Lists." At that time we did not find any responses. We recently checked with the FBI and Secret Service and discovered that there were in fact responses. The Secret Service, by letter dated 21 September 1973, did in fact recertify a "Watch List" containing U.S. names, however, NSA has not accepted the U.S. names.

2. Inclosed are copies of the FBI and Secret Service letters. Request you forward these to the Senate Select Committee with the above comments.

DAVID D. LOWMAN
Special Assistant
to the Director
for Congressional Reviews

Approved by
LEW ALLEN, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

2 Incls:
a/s

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-1-11

Classified by DIRNSA/CHCSS (NSA/CSSM 123-2).
Exempt from GDS, EO 11652, Cat 2
Declassify Upon Notification by the Originator

62-116395-954

~~ENCLOSURE~~

DOWNGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL
UPON REMOVAL OF INCLS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~[illegible]~~

September 26, 1973

BY LIAISON

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2RLM/JT6
ON 11-8-00

Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr.
Director
National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

Dear General Allen:

I am in receipt of your letter of September 17, 1973, concerning the necessity for a mutual review of our policies with respect to the compilation and maintenance of the Watch List. I share your concern and fully agree that we should review our procedures to assure that our authorities, particularly in light of recent court decisions, are not exceeded.

As you are aware, however, the Department of Justice in filing affidavits with the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, in the case of United States versus William Ayers, et al., which case involved the Students for a Democratic Society, an organization included on the Watch List, took the position that the intercepts obtained by your agency were lawful and not within the disclosure requirements of the court.

We are instituting a review of our procedures but feel that any decision reached respecting the Watch List should await the final ruling of the court.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classified by Director, FBI~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

62-116395-958

ENCLOSURE

Incl 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr.

It is our desire to cooperate with you fully in any measures you deem necessary to protect your valuable SIGINT sources.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

DATE: 10/22/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 10/22/75, Barbara Banoff, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, requested that former SAs George C. Moore and Fred H. Baumgardner be made available for deposition concerning their knowledge of COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATION:

That former SAs Moore and Baumgardner be released from their existing employment agreements and the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations for purposes of deposition.

OK

REC-30 62-116395-959

1 - Personnel File - George C. Moore
1 - Personnel File - Fred H. Baumgardner

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

lad
(10)

84 NOV 11 1975

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10/28/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 10/24/75, Les Seidel and Martha Talley, Senate Select Committee Staff Members, requested that former SAC Marlin Johnson and former SA Carl Hennrich be made available for Staff interview. The topic of the interview for former SAC Johnson will be his knowledge of the 1968 Convention and the topic of interview for former SA Hennrich will be his knowledge of the Emergency Detention Plan.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich be released from their existing employment agreements for purposes of interview by the Senate Select Committee.

(2) That the Intelligence Division determine the current whereabouts of former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich and advise them of the request.

(3) That the Legal Counsel Division will orally advise the Senate Select Committee of the current whereabouts of former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich.

P.U. Daly furnished whereabouts of Johnson + Hennrich as in personnel files 10/29/75

SAC Held, CG, teleph. instructed to alert Johnson + Sutel. 12 noon 10/29/75

1 - Personnel File - Marlin Johnson
1 - Personnel File - Carl Hennrich

SALAW, in absence of SAC, RH, teleph. instr. to alert Hennrich + Sutel 11:45 AM. 10/29/75

REC-30
ST-111

62-116395-960

15 NOV 4 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

OK

lad
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
10/12/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. J. B. ADAMS

DATE: 10/21/75

FROM : MR. W. R. WANNALL

#MDR16 SP-2ALM/JTG
10-12-00

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY -75

On October 21, 1975, from approximately 2:15 p.m. to 3:35 p.m., Section Chief William A. Branigan, CI-1 Section, Intelligence Division; Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division; and myself appeared at an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to discuss classified aspects of the Bureau's various mail intercept programs. Present were Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee; Senators Mondale, Goldwater, P. A. Hart, Huddleston, and Schweiker; as well as various members of the staff of the Select Committee.

Generally speaking, the reception by the Chairman and the various Senators, as well as members of the staff, was a friendly one. No antagonism was shown to the Bureau representatives, and the Senators by their questions indicated a desire to help the Bureau in our foreign counterintelligence operations.

At the request of the Chairman, the eight separate mail intercept surveys were explained to the Committee, including the length of time that these surveys were in operation and the value that was derived from them.

During the hearing we were supplied with a copy of a Staff Memorandum which outlined various aspects of our operations which would not be disclosed during a public hearing. The Staff Memorandum also outlined certain questions which could not be discussed at a public hearing and suggested that these questions be raised at the Executive Session. A copy of the Staff Memorandum is attached for your information.

Enclosure

ST-111 REC-30 62-116395-961

CONTINUED - OVER

WAB:hke
(6)

1 - ENCLOSURE

1-Mr. J. B. Adams
1-Mr. J. A. Mintz
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1-Mr. W. A. Branigan

~~TOP SECRET~~

15 NOV 4 1975

Classified by 2355
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 2

5-Ew8

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 NOV 5 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

RECEIVED
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE DIV.
OCT 30 | 07 PM 1975

Memorandum from Mr. W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: Senstudy

At the conclusion of the hearing, considerable questions were asked concerning legislation or direction which would be necessary from The Congress to permit the Bureau to carry out mail opening programs which were productive in their results and which would not at the same time invade the privacy of innocent American citizens.

ACTION:

This is submitted for your information.

WAR

ADDENDUM BY LEGAL COUNSEL 10/23/75, JAM:mfd

I answered the Committee's questions described in the last paragraph of this memorandum by explaining to them that in a security case we would find it most difficult to meet the 4th Amendment standard of probable cause in order to obtain a search warrant. for mail. If we are to be required to obtain warrants prior to obtaining mail and if we are to be successful, a lower standard of probable cause such as is permissible in administrative searches such as those conducted by Health Inspectors would be necessary. In answer to a specific question I explained that the Supreme Court has ruled that mail is protected absolutely by the 4th Amendment.

JAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SAB/SBS
Date 8-1-11

STAFF MEMORANDUM

EXECUTIVE SESSION ON FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS

FBI Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and William Branigan, Chief of the Soviet Section of the FBI Counterintelligence Branch, have requested an opportunity to appear before the Select Committee in executive session to discuss classified aspects of the FBI mail opening programs. Both of them will be witnesses at the public hearing on FBI mail openings on Friday.

The Committee staff has agreed that the public hearing will not disclose the following aspects of FBI mail openings:

1. The identity of the foreign nations involved, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba, Mexico, Hong Kong, Japan, most Western European countries, and several Central and Latin American countries.

2. The fact the mail to and from the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet United Nations Mission, the Cuban United Nations Mission, other Soviet-bloc Embassies was selectively opened. (S)

3. The "indicators" used as criteria for selective opening of mail screened in several other programs designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States. (The fact that there were "indicators," but not their nature, may be disclosed publicly.)

4. The identities of specific individuals and groups whose mail was opened either by the FBI or by the CIA at the request of the FBI. (FBI officials will state publicly that some of these, especially in the category "peace and protest groups," were not adequately justified.) Some of these included:

   Leonard Bernstein
   Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam
   Jeremy Stone
   Cambridge Center for Study of Public Policy

62-116395-961

ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~

The following are questions which cannot be discussed in public hearings because of this agreement. They should be raised at this executive session:

1. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail openings aimed at mail to and from the [Soviet and Soviet-bloc embassies?] ~~(S)~~
2. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail opening programs using "indicators" and designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States? [(Soviet and Cuban)] ~~(S)~~
3. What was the actual intelligence value of the material supplied to the FBI by the CIA from its mail opening operation?
4. How good are the "indicators" in selecting mail of foreign intelligence agents only and not mail of American citizens or others who are not foreign agents?
5. What standards were used for opening mail to and from Communist China, and what was the intelligence value of these programs?
6. Do FBI counterespionage officials desire to resume any mail opening programs, with proper authorization from Congress and the Attorney General?
7. How do the benefits of mail opening compare with the benefits of warrantless electronic surveillance currently used by the FBI for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes?

T-General

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MR. J. B. ADAMS ~~TOP SECRET~~ 10/21/75

Index
1) Mail Opening
2) Hearing Procedure
WOC

MR. W. R. WANNALL

SENSTUDY

On October 21, 1975, from approximately 2:15 p.m. to 3:35 p.m., Section Chief William A. Branigan, CI-1 Section, Intelligence Division; Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division; and myself appeared at an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to discuss classified aspects of the Bureau's various mail intercept programs. Present were Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee; Senators Mondale, Goldwater, P. A. Hart, Huddleston, and Schweiker; as well as various members of the staff of the Select Committee.

Generally speaking, the reception by the Chairman and the various Senators, as well as members of the staff, was a friendly one. No antagonism was shown to the Bureau representatives, and the Senators by their questions indicated a desire to help the Bureau in our foreign counterintelligence operations.

At the request of the Chairman, the eight separate mail intercept surveys were explained to the Committee, including the length of time that these surveys were in operation and the value that was derived from them.

During the hearing we were supplied with a copy of a Staff Memorandum which outlined various aspects of our operations which would not be disclosed during a public hearing. The Staff Memorandum also outlined certain questions which could not be discussed at a public hearing and suggested that these questions be raised at the Executive Session. A copy of the Staff Memorandum is attached for your information.

Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

WAB:hke
(6)

~~TOP SECRET~~

1-Mr. J. B. Adams
1-Mr. J. A. Mintz
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1-Mr. W. A. Branigan

Classified by 2355
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

961

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

The Attorney General

October 14, 1975

Director, FBI

11/8/00
#mDe16

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/tfG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated August 27, 1975, with an attached request for FBI materials dated August 26, 1975, and my letter dated September 24, 1975, captioned as above.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum responsive to the request of the Committee for delivery of materials pertaining to requests by the Bureau for national security mail covers from 1971 through 1975.

Referenced September 24, 1975, letter forwarded material initially located in response to the Committee's request. The enclosed memorandum forwards the remaining documents which were located.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished to you for your records.

Enclosures - 2 ENCLOSURE REC-30 62-116395-962

15 NOV 4 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

edm

RHR:jmn/lfj
(9)

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

84 NOV 5 1975

U. S. Senate Select Committee On
Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Soviet Military Office, 2552 Belmont Road, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Commercial Counselor, 1706 16th Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Information Department, 1706 18th Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Consular Office, 1609 Decatur Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

1 - The Attorney General

2 - Mr. J.[illegible]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

62-116395

October 14, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO REQUESTS
FOR MAIL COVERS MADE BY THE BUREAU
FROM 1971 THROUGH 1975

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2[illegible]

Reference is made to SSC letter dated August 27, 1975, with attached request dated August 26, 1975.

Part I, item 3. e. requests: "All materials pertaining to requests by the Bureau for special mail covers from 1971 through 1975 which have not been previously delivered to the Senate Select Committee. This request encompasses all special mail covers which have been terminated, regardless of whether the investigation for which the special mail cover was requested is active or inactive."

By memorandum dated September 24, 1975, captioned as above, you were furnished documents pertaining to this request. Additional materials have been located and will be delivered with this document.

These materials are comprised of letters to the Postal Service requesting mail covers and where utilized supportive memoranda. The materials pertain to terminated mail covers in national security matters of a domestic security nature as opposed to foreign related counterintelligence operations.

1 - The Attorney General

WOC

RHR:jmn/lfj
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-914

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Re: Documents Pertaining to Requests for Mail
Covers Made by the Bureau from 1971
Through 1975

NOTE:

Materials furnished in response to this request were obtained by review of all abstracts regarding communications to the Postal Service requesting mail covers. Since 1971, all national security mail covers have been requested by means of a letter to the Chief Postal Inspector, Postal Service. The materials being furnished only encompass investigative matters involving domestic security cases wherein the mail cover has been terminated whether the investigation is pending or closed. The materials are comprised of copies of the letters to the Postal Service and supportive memoranda where used in lieu of notes. These materials were reviewed and, where necessary, excisions made. By memorandum 9/24/75, the SSC was furnished the bulk of such documents located at that time. The documents being furnished now are those which could not be immediately located. All domestic mail cover requests which were located by means of the abstract review have now been furnished to the SSC.

By oral agreement with the SSC staff, only domestic security mail covers were required to be furnished.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/14/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re 8/26/75 request Part I, Item 3e concerning special mail covers.

Originating Office: FBI 930

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP2ALM/[illegible]

[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 8/26/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

C

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Information handling

#MDR16
[illegible]
10/12/00 SP2 ALM/[illegible]

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

More materials pertaining to mail cover requests made by the FBI from 1971 thru 1975.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIAL LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

woc/18

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - [illegible]. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

The Attorney General

October 15, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDR16
10-13-00 SP2ALM/TG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a request from SSC dated September 4, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI concerning the obtaining of income tax information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with respect to 140 individuals and/or organizations.

By letter dated September 23, 1975, the SSC requested specific information with respect to only nine individuals of the original 140 individuals and/or organizations.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum which furnishes additional material to supplement the memorandum dated September 29, 1975, previously furnished to SSC.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

10-15-75 PWD/[illegible]
Delivered to AG

REC-30 62-116395-963

JWJ:cml
(9)

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

3 - ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

JBA
PLM

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 NOV 13 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

October 15, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC request dated September 4, 1975, and SSC request dated September 23, 1975, requesting documents and certain information pertaining to the obtaining of income tax information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

Nine documents containing supplemental material relating to Robert M. Shelton and Charles C. Kissinger are being delivered with this memorandum.

This material supplements documents, previously furnished SSC by memorandum dated September 29, 1975, and completes the review of the entire case files of the nine individuals requested by the SSC.

1 - The Attorney General

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/FTG

62-116395

JWJ:cml
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

WPW/TWL

JBA
PLM

62-116395-963

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Re: United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect To Intelligence Activities (SSC)

NOTE:

This memorandum and memorandum dated 9/29/75 furnishes complete response to SSC requests of 9/4/75 and 9/23/75 relating to origination and use of information of an income tax nature by the FBI. The material being furnished was reviewed by SA R. D. Shea, IS-1 and SA L. E. Dean, IS-2.

Copies of nine documents are being retained in instant file.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/15/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/23/75 request and 9/4/75

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller Date: 10/20/75

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDE16

10-13-00 SP-2ALM/JTG

62-116395-918

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 9/23/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Treasury Department - Internal Revenue Service

#mDR16

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/116

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Information furnished concerning obtaining of income tax information from Internal Revenue Service with respect to specific individuals and/or organizations.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

52W0q6

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

5

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Senate Select Committee (SSC) requests dated September 4, 1975, and September 23, 1975. Attached material completes response to SSC requests.

#MDE16
10/13/00 SP2ALM/JTG

RETAIN

62-1 [illegible]

913 963
X

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (157-9-4) DATE: 11-7-64

FROM : SAC, Birmingham (157-835)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTS

The Bureau is requested to consider securing copies of income tax returns for the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN; ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON, 1708 - 15th Street, East, Tuscaloosa, Ala., or the ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE, a name by which the UKA is sometimes known.

Inquiry at the banks in Tuscaloosa has failed to reveal any accounts in the name of the UKA or ROBERT M. SHELTON, except a small personal account of SHELTON at the First National Bank of Tuscaloosa. Informants have advised that SHELTON is paid probably $8,000 per year for his work as Imperial Wizard. This money is sent in monthly to UKA headquarters in Tuscaloosa by the individual Klaverns and presumably put in some bank.

An examination of pertinent income tax returns might furnish information concerning the financial standing of SHELTON and UKA which could be used in this program.

d

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

157-9-4-6

1812 A.B

REC-61

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Birmingham
CBS:mfl
(4)

NOV 9 1964

EX-102

memo B'ghm to Sell 11/18/64 DK: lat: JH
Grc.

56 DEC 2 1964

5

Mr. W. C. Sullivan 11/12/64

F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Ryan

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(ROBERT M. SHELTON)
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.)

Robert Marvin Shelton is a full-time paid employee of the United Klans of America, Incorporated (UKA), Knights of the Ku Klux Klan with the title Imperial Wizard. He is probably the most influential and well-known Klansman in the United States. We are endeavoring as a counterintelligence technique to develop information discrediting Shelton or embarrassing to the UKA.

Through analysis of the income tax returns we may be able to determine secret sources of Shelton's income or depository used by him for the Klan organization. There is a possibility that he is misappropriating funds. We also have information Shelton has been on the payroll of a Mobile, Alabama, engineering firm as a public relations man.

In the event we determine such information we will consider exposing Shelton within the Klan organization, publicly or by furnishing information to the Internal Revenue Service.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended the Liaison Section obtain from the Internal Revenue Service two uncertified copies each of the Federal tax returns filed by Shelton and the UKA for the past five years. Attached is a memorandum for the use of the Liaison Section.

157-9-6
(1) - 157-552 (Shelton)

Enclosure

DRL:lat:lta
(7)

NOT RECORDED
170 NOV 30 1964

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

6

SAC, Birmingham (157-[illegible])

2/23/65

Director, FBI (157-9-4)

1 - Mr. Gray
2 - Mr. Ryan

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.)
(ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON)

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

ReBUlet 11/7/64.

Attached are Xerox copies of Federal income tax returns filed by Robert M. and Betty Lou Shelton for the years 1959-63 inclusive. Also attached are Xerox copies of United States corporation tax returns filed by Robert M. Shelton as a corporate officer of the United Klans of America, Inc. (UKA), for the years 1961 (year ending 6/30/62) and 1963 (year ending 6/30/64) as well as a statement of no tax liability for the year ending 6/30/63. Information set forth in these tax returns is for lead purposes only and should not be set forth in the details of any investigative report.

The following comments and investigative instructions are noted in connection with these tax returns:

1. The individual returns filed jointly by Shelton and his wife during the period 1959 through 1963 indicate Shelton's occupation to be "salesman" and "manager" and in no instance do they indicate any employment or association with the Klan. This is in conflict with the corporate returns filed by Shelton for the UKA where he indicates his position as "Imperial Wizard" or "President."

2. Shelton's return for 1959 indicates it was prepared by Ed F. Allen, Jr., Certified Public Accountant, Post Office Box [illegible], Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The form and typing on the other tax returns, both corporate and individual, indicate a strong likelihood these too were prepared by Allen. You should review your files and conduct necessary investigation to determine if Allen is active in connection with financial matters relating to the Klan.

Enclosures - 8

157-[illegible]

1 - 157-552 (Shelton)
1 - 157-370 (UKA)

DUPLICATE YELLOW

NOT RECORDED
202 FEB 24 1965

15

ORIGINAL FILED IN

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

3. In no instance in his individual tax returns does Shelton indicate the receipt of income for his position of Imperial Wizard or President of the UKA. However, his returns do indicate he has received some salary payments from such sources as "Tex Harris," "J.H. Mason," "Alabama Tire Company," "J & H Transport Co.," and "Tom & Johnson Elec. Svc." Inasmuch as your informants have advised Shelton spends almost all his time on Klan business and is paid almost $10,000 annually by the Klan, it would appear these salary sources are covers for payments made to him to compensate for his Klan employment. Necessary investigation should be conducted to resolve the true source of Shelton's income.

4. Shelton's return for 1960 shows other income received from a wrestling enterprise in Nashville, Tennessee. This source of income should also be checked to determine its legitimacy. It is possible Shelton's relationship with this enterprise also represents a cover for Klan activity or that the payments made to him were for efforts in behalf of the Klan.

5. In no instance does Shelton indicate any interest or dividend income. It is known he has a bank account at the First National Bank of Tuscaloosa. An attempt should be made to determine if he has failed to report interest actually earned. It is also noted the corporate returns filed by the UKA do not in any instance indicate interest received.

6. Shelton's return for 1963 lists other income of $500 as received from "Commissions - Dixie Engineering Co." Your attention is directed to an editorial that appeared in the Tuscaloosa "News," edition of 6/12/64, wherein it is indicated Shelton had been listed on the payroll of a Mobile engineering firm as a public relations man. Investigation should be conducted to determine Shelton's relationship with the Dixie Engineering Co. and also whether this company had a contract involving the use of Federal and/or state funds.

7. The corporate returns of the UKA, as filed by Shelton, in no instance indicate salary payments although both Shelton and his wife have been reported by your informants as full-time employees.

8. The gross income of Shelton and his wife for the year 1963 totals $1,076. This amount does not appear to be sufficient to support a family of five. All possible efforts should be made to develop evidence indicating Shelton is withholding or concealing income.

This investigation should be afforded prompt and continuing attention and the Bureau must be advised of all pertinent developments.

When all possible leads have been developed a blind memorandum should be prepared setting forth Shelton's background and current position with the Klan and all data probative of a possible violation of Internal Revenue laws. The Bureau will make this information available to appropriate Internal Revenue Service officials at the Seat of Government.

SENSITIVE CASE REPORT

(Route in Sequence) To:
☐ District Director — District
☐ ARC- Southeast Regional Office — Division
☐ Director
☐ National Office

INSTRUCTIONS [illegible] through channels to ARC concerned in an original and three copies. For detailed instructions, see RC SE Memorandum No. 12-18.

1. NAME OF CASE OR IDENTIFICATION OF SITUATION

Robert M. Shelton
Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2ALM/tlG #MDE16

a. CLASS OF TAX: Income Tax
b. TAXABLE PERIOD: 1963, 1964
c. AMOUNT OF TAX: $ Unknown
d. DOCKET NO., IF ANY:

2. PRINCIPAL ISSUES INVOLVED

Diverting Klan money to personal use.

3. REASONS FOR SENSITIVITY

Taxpayer is the Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, K.K.K., Inc. He is presently being investigated by the House Un-American Activities Committee of Congress. He and the Klan have had national publicity as a result of the Congressional hearings and civil rights activities in the South.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

157-5

NOT RECORDED

8 FEB 23 1966

4. ACTION TAKEN OR PROPOSED

The taxpayer has been contacted by Revenue Agent John H. Murrell on two occasions prior to referral to the Intelligence Division. He has indicated he will cooperate with the examining agents as soon as his records are released by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

This case was referred to the Intelligence Division only a few days ago; therefore, a realistic estimate of the completion date will not be practicable until at least next month.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SUBMITTED BY (Originator's Signature)	TITLE Special Agent	POST OF DUTY Birmingham	DATE 1-17-66
REVIEWED (District Director's Signature)	DISTRICT Birmingham		DATE JAN 1 8
REVIEWED (ARC's Signature)	TITLE ARC - INTELLIGENCE		DATE JAN 2

U. S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT

RC SE FORM - 19 (4-59)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Ryan

ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

Robert Marvin Shelton, born June 13, 1929, married, two children, resides at 17[illegible] Street, East, Tuscaloosa, Alabama. He is presently employed with the title Imperial Wizard by the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Suite 401, Alston Building, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, at a reported annual salary of eight thousand dollars. The United Klans of America, Inc., is sometimes known as the Alabama Rescue Service.

It is requested two uncertified copies each of the Federal tax returns filed by Shelton and the United Klans of America, Inc., for the past five years be made available.

DR:lat:ltl
(8)

① - 157-552 (Shelton)

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JTC

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: 6/26/67

P. D. Putnam

ROBERT SHELTON
INTERNAL SECURITY - X

At the request of the Internal Security Section, Mr. William Parker, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), was contacted on 6/23/67 to determine the status of the IRS case on Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America.

Parker advised that IRS had initiated investigation of Shelton for possible tax evasion for the years 1963 through 1965. This case is still under investigation but indications are that Shelton owes no income taxes for 1963 and 1965 and owes $100 in taxes for the year 1964. According to Parker, it appears that the criminal tax investigation of Shelton will be closed and the case will be referred to the Audit Division of IRS for civil disposition.

ACTION:

For information.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Putnam

PDP:rab
(5)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

54

REC 6

JUN 30 1967

#MDE16

TION CONTAINED
UNCLASSIFIED
10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JT6

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP2ALM/JJG

Intelligence Division
P. O. Box 1631
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

JUL 8 1967

District Director, Internal Revenue Service
Attention: Chief, Intelligence Division
Birmingham, Alabama

In re: ROBERT M. SHELTON
18 Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama 35476
63-64-037-1-1
Final

and

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC.
18 Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama 35476
63-73-022-1-1
Final

Representative: None

ST-103

REC-61

55

This report relates to the alleged evasion of income taxes for the years 1963 and 1964 by ROBERT M. SHELTON and the alleged wilful failure to file 1961 and 1963 corporate returns by the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC. It was also alleged that SHELTON diverted KLAN funds to his personal use. SHELTON has been Imperial Wizard of the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC. since 1961. He maintains an office for himself and the KLAN in his residence at 18 Lake Sherwood, Northport, Alabama 35476. He received mail for himself, the KLAN, and ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE at P. O. Box 2369, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401. ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE is a cover name for the KLAN organization in Alabama. He filed his individual income tax returns involved with the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama.

AUG 9 1967

Revenue Agent Wade Hutchinson, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, cooperated in the joint investigation. This case has been classified as sensitive.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION:

The investigation originated as a referral from Audit Division. It was alleged that SHELTON received $4,000.00 from DIXIE ENGINEERING COMPANY of Mobile, Alabama, during the years 1963 and 1964 and reported only $2,000.00 from this source during the aforementioned years. It was further alleged that SHELTON travels in a late model Cadillac, dresses well and recently built a new house while reporting very nominal amounts of income on his tax returns.

In respect to the KLAN, it was alleged that no corporate returns were filed for the years 1961 and 1963 and that corporate funds were being diverted to the personal use of corporate officers.

KU KLUX KLAN organizations were the subject of an investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee during the years 1965 and 1966. SHELTON was tried and convicted on a Contempt of Congress charge for refusing to testify and produce KLAN records before this committee. He was given the maximum sentence, one year in prison and $1,000 fine, on October 16, 1966. SHELTON's conviction is presently on appeal.

Evidence was offered before the House Un-American Activities Committee alleging SHELTON signed checks on the KLAN bank account in Tuscaloosa, payable to cash, aggregating $5,600.00, which were cashed at grocery stores and service stations; and that he allegedly paid for automobiles and a diamond ring with KLAN funds. SHELTON refused to confirm or deny these allegations when testifying before the Congressional Committee.

EXTENT AND RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION:

1. I obtained photostats of INVISIBLE EMPIRE, UNITED KLANS, KNIGHTS KU KLUX KLAN OF AMERICA, INC., incorporation papers from IMPERIAL WIZARD ROBERT SHELTON. They disclose incorporation date of February 20, 1961, in Fulton County, Georgia. The general purpose of the corporation, according to these papers, is: "to teach patriotism, to support the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and to maintain the liberty bequeathed to us by our forefathers, and to preserve the American way of life."

2. I obtained SHELTON's tax returns from the files of the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama. They disclose adjusted gross income as follows:

Year	Adjusted Gross Income
1961	$ 5,600.00
1962	4,200.00
1963	1,875.00
1964	3,576.62
1965	4,663.23
1966	10,031.21

Shelton claimed a standard deduction on each of the returns and they were filed timely and the tax paid which was shown to be due thereon.

3. I obtained KLAN tax returns from the files of the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama. They disclose gross receipts and taxable income as follows:

FYE	Gross Receipts	Taxable Income
6/30/62	$ 2,980.05	$ -0-
6/30/64	7,415.63	-0-
6/30/65	13,487.60	741.09
6/30/66	75,168.12	7,135.01

SHELTON gives President JOHNSON credit for increasing gross receipts of the KLAN from $7,415.00 in 1964 to $75,168.12 in 1966. He stated that every time "LBJ" gets on television and condemns the KLAN, he gets a flood of membership applications. He also stated that the publicity he received during the House Un-American Activities Committee hearing in 1965 and 1966 got him many new members.

4. Revenue Agent HUTCHINSON and I interviewed SHELTON on seven different occasions between April 5, 1967 and May 17, 1967. He instructed his wife, BETTY LOU SHELTON, and KLAN BOOKKEEPER, MRS. MELVIN SEXTON, to cooperate with us and make available all records of financial transactions of the KLAN. SHELTON stated that:

a. He did not furnish books and records of the KLAN to the House Un-American Activities Committee because his attorney advised him he could not waive his immunity on part of his records or on part of his testimony. He either had to take the "Fifth Amendment" all the way or disclose confidential records of KLAN membership which he had taken an oath not to disclose.

b. The books and records of the KLAN are audited at least once a year by KLAN EXAMINERS. The results of this examination is reported on the annual corporate income tax return.

c. The KLAN is a tax exempt organization and should not be required to file tax returns. SHELTON exhibited a letter from the State of Alabama Revenue Department which stated that, "The UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., is exempt from Alabama income tax and as long as it is operated not for profit and not for the gain of any individual it will not be necessary that corporate income tax returns be filed."

SHELTON acknowledged he had never applied for exempt status for the KLAN for Federal tax purposes because he would have to disclose information regarding KLAN membership which he was not at liberty to disclose.

d. SHELTON stated that the KLAN is on a "Form System." Each Klavern (Unit) prepares a Monthly Financial Report in triplicate and sends one copy to the Imperial Office in Tuscaloosa, one copy to the State Klan Office and retains one copy for the local unit file. This form lists the following financial information from each unit, each month:

63-65-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

FINANCIAL RECORD OF UNIT

Balance as per bank statement for last month or cash on hand $____
Minus outstanding checks including ones to Imperial & state $____
Plus outstanding deposits $____
Balance in bank or cash on hand as per this report $____

Monies Received During This Month

KLECTOKON FEE $____
MONTHLY DUES $____
RALLY COLLECTIONS $____
SPECIAL PROJECT $____
OTHER INCOME $____
(ITEMIZE)____
TOTAL INCOME $____

Monies Paid Out During This Month

IMPERIAL TAX $____
STATE TAX $____
OTHER STATE DUES $____
RENT OR BUILDING PAYMENT $____
LIGHTS $____
WATER $____
GAS $____
OTHER EXPENDITURES (ITEMIZE) $____
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $____

e. SHELTON stated that he was authorized by the KLAN to draw $15,000.00 per year salary but 1966 was the first year the KLAN was financially able to pay him the full $15,000.00. Prior to 1966, his salary was determined at the end of each year by aggregating his withdrawals from the KLAN, reduced by the amount of documentation for travel and other KLAN expenses he had turned in during the year.

f. SHELTON converted his carport into an office and moved the KLAN office from the Alston Building in Tuscaloosa into his space May 1, 1966. The KLAN pays SHELTON $35.00 per month rent and $15.00 per month on his utilities.

g. SHELTON maintains that four of the eight $500.00 checks he received from DIXIE ENGINEERING COMPANY bounced. The reason the four $500.00 items do not show on his bank statements as a debit to the account was the balances at the time the checks were returned were less than $500.00 and he picked up the checks with cash or with another check from DIXIE ENGINEERING.

h. KLAN checks were made payable to "Cash" because just any one would not cash a KLAN check. When he left Tuscaloosa on KLAN business he never knew where he would be able to cash a check so he would make the check payable to cash and cash the check at some grocery store or service station where he was known. The amounts were charged to him on the KLAN books and he brought back gas tickets, motel bills, invoices, etc., to account for the

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

money spent. SHELTON stated that he travels 90,000 to 110,000 miles per year on KLAN business. He traveled 120,000 miles by automobile during the year 1966 on KLAN business.

5. Revenue Agent Hutchinson and I examined the KLAN's bank statements, cancelled checks, deposit tickets and cash receipts and disbursements books for FYE 6/30/62 through FYE 6/30/66. Receipts and expenses per books substantially reconciled with receipts and expenses per returns. For the four year period, net income was overstated on returns by $48.10. The 1963 corporate return filed by the KLAN was never located. We worked with a Profit and Loss Statement located in the KLAN file for that year which showed receipts of $3,879.44, disbursements of $3,634.89 and taxable income of $240.49. SHELTON claims he recalls mailing the 1963 return to the District Director in Birmingham. Mrs. CAROL LONG, KLAN BOOKKEEPER during this period, recalls preparing the return and giving it to SHELTON to sign and mail. Receipts during the period 2/20/61 to 6/30/61, the first four months of operation of the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, were negligible and were included in receipts for the FYE 6/30/62.

6. Revenue Agent Hutchinson analyzed all checks written to cash and examined the supporting documents. Checks to cash totaled:

Year	Total	
1961	$ 156.18	
1962	184.92	
1963	1,033.75	
1964	5,104.69	
1965	11,787.45	$18,266.99

Checks written to cash and not supported by documentation were reported by SHELTON as income on his individual income tax return. Numerous checks to cash were signed by SHELTON and cosigned by T.M. MONTGOMERY or JAMES HENDRIX. It was brought out during the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings that T.M. MONTGOMERY was signed by CAROL LONG, KLAN BOOKKEEPER, and JAMES HENDRIX was signed by SHELTON's wife, BETTY LOU. SHELTON acknowledged that the MONTGOMERY and HENDRIX names on the checks were KLAN code names for MRS. LONG and MRS. SHELTON and that the names and signatures were on file at the bank. This information was corroborated by FIRST NATIONAL BANK VICE PRESIDENT J. H. PERDUE.

7. Receipts per monthly reports of various KLAN UNITS were compared with total receipts per return for FYE 6/30/64 and 6/30/65. Total receipts per reports and total receipts per returns were as follows:

Year	Receipts per Reports	Receipts per Returns	Variance
6/30/64	$ 5,557.25	$ 7,415.63	$1,858.38
6/30/65	17,552.40	18,487.60	935.20
	$23,109.65	$25,903.23	$2,793.58

The variance between receipts per reports and receipts per return consisted mainly of monies which came in without a report and anonymous contributions.

8. Monthly reports of various KLAN UNITS were pulled at random from six different states. The reports were traced individually to Cash Receipts Journal, to deposit tickets and to bank statements, without discrepancy.

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

9. Photostats of several thousand checks from various KLAN UNITS, payable to SHELTON or ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE, were secured from the House Un-American Activities Committee file. I found only one of these checks which was not endorsed "For deposit only" to ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE account in Tuscaloosa. A check dated 3/28/64 payable to ROBERT M. SHELTON, in amount of $50.00, on the account of WHITE PATRIOTS, P. O. Box 7094, Montgomery, Alabama, was endorsed by SHELTON and THE AUTO-RITE STORE in Tuscaloosa. The amount was entered in receipts on the KLAN books as a donation from WHITE PATRIOTS of Montgomery. SHELTON stated that the $50.00 was for four recaps on his automobile which was used for KLAN business.

10. Transcript of the testimony of ERNEST H. MERRIWETHER, President, DIXIE ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Mobile, Alabama, was secured from the House Un-American Activities Committee file together with photostats of eight $500.00 checks payable to SHELTON during 1963 and 1964. MERRIWETHER was not contacted personally on advice of U. S. Attorney ROBERT JANSEN, Southern Judicial District of Alabama. MERRIWETHER has several tax suits pending in Mobile at present.

MERRIWETHER testified that he paid SHELTON the following checks:

Date	Amount	
7/14/63	$500.00	
9/24/63	500.00	
11/6/63	500.00	
11/13/63	500.00	$2,000.00
1/8/64	$500.00	
2/13/64	500.00	
3/13/64	500.00	
4/22/64	500.00	$2,000.00

SHELTON reported $500.00 from this source on his 1963 return and $1,500.00 on his 1964 return. He contends four of the $500.00 checks "bounced." The ledger sheets on his personal account at the FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF TUSCALOOSA and the deposit tickets to this account disclosed eight $500.00 deposits to the account from DIXIE ENGINEERING and only one debit to the account for $500.00 for a returned DIXIE ENGINEERING check.

D. L. THOMAS, accountant for DIXIE ENGINEERING, stated that all eight checks to SHELTON were posted to their disbursements journal and postings to this journal were made from checks after they cleared the bank.

The eight checks in question were written on six different bank accounts. The banks were contacted and their records indicate all eight checks were eventually paid. However, SHELTON's five exemptions and a standard deduction for the year 1963 will offset his reported income plus the additional $1,500.00 on his 1963 return. The additional $500.00 in 1964 is more than

offset by unclaimed depreciation on his automobile for that year. He will owe a small amount of self-employment tax on the unreported net amounts.

11. Revenue Agent Hutchinson and I examined SHELTON's account at LORCH's DIAMOND SHOP in Tuscaloosa from opening purchase on 6/11/62 to date. The diamond ring alleged to have been purchased with KLAN funds during the years 1964 and 1965 was purchased June 11, 1962 by MRS. SHELTON for $339.60, which amount includes carrying charges. She paid $30.00 per month on this account until November 8, 1963, at which time the account was paid in full. The checks drawn on the KLAN account to LORCH's DIAMOND SHOP during the years 1964 and 1965 were payments on an Invicta Tape Recorder purchased on 5/18/64 for $62.95 and a Webcor Recorder purchased on same date for $167.00. These items were purchased for the KLAN and charged to his account, according to SHELTON, because LORCH's would not extend credit to the KLAN.

12. Sales Invoice from STANSELL PONTIAC-CADILLAC COMPANY, 2115 15th Street, Tuscaloosa, shows the Cadillac purchased by SHELTON to be a used 1961 CADILLAC purchased on November 18, 1964, for $612.00 cash and a trade-in of a 1963 Pontiac Grand Prix. SHELTON said he traded the 1963 Pontiac on a 1961 Cadillac because the Pontiac had over 100,000 miles on it. The KLAN made three payments on the Pontiac for SHELTON but none on the Cadillac. A check was issued on the KLAN account on 6/15/63 to STANSELL PONTIAC-CADILLAC COMPANY for $277.66 and another check to the same company on 9/27/63 for $136.33. SHELTON failed to include these payments in income for the year 1963 and did not claim any depreciation on the Pontiac for that year.

13. SHELTON purchased his residence in Northport, Alabama, in April, 1966. The property was purchased from Lake Real Estate Company in Tuscaloosa for $20,876.47. He paid $11,000.00 down and assumed a $1,000.00 second mortgage held by Lake Real Estate Company. Balance of $8,876.47 was financed at FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

SHELTON acquired the $11,000.00 down payment by selling his residence at 1703 East 15th Street in Tuscaloosa for $5,000.00 and drew $6,000.00 accrued salary from the KLAN, which was included on his W-2 statement from the KLAN for the year 1966.

In June, 1966, SHELTON purchased the adjoining lot to his home for $1,500.00. This amount was raised by selling various books at KLAN rallys and through the mail. A separate record was kept by MRS. SHELTON of this income and was reported on SHELTON's 1966 income tax return.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The investigation disclosed that: (1) Substantially all checks received by the KLAN are deposited to the KLAN account in Tuscaloosa; (2) Currency received and cash donations are recorded on the KLAN books as receipts; (3) Checks drawn on the KLAN account payable to cash are substantiated by

receipts and invoices; (4) there is no indication of income being received by the KLAN and not posted to their books; (5) controversial receipts by SHELTON from DIXIE ENGINEERING are offset by his exemptions and allowable depreciation on his automobile; (6) allegations that SHELTON purchased a diamond ring and a Cadillac automobile with KLAN funds are negated by available evidence, and (7) failure to file 1961 and 1963 returns by the KLAN resulted in no injury to the government.

I recommend that this case be closed in the Intelligence Division files because of lack of criminal prosecution potential and referred back to the Audit Division for such action as they deem appropriate. Audit Group Supervisor G. D. Grim advises he has no objection to this proposed withdrawal.

(signed) R. S. Phillips

Robert S. Phillips
Special Agent

APPROVED:

(Signed) Floyd D. Moore

Chief, Intelligence Division
Birmingham District
P. O. Box 1631
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : **Mr. W. C. Sullivan** DATE: 6/15/70

FROM : **G. C. Moore**

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
--RM

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. J. V. Walsh
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson

The Birmingham Office has requested Bureau to secure copies of 1969 Income Tax Return for United Klans of America, Inc. (UKA), the Alabama Rescue Service, a name by which the UKA is sometimes known, and Robert Marvin Shelton, Imperial Wizard of UKA. Birmingham desires to review these returns for information concerning financial standing of UKA and Shelton and any information which might be of assistance in instituting counterintelligence measures.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Liaison Section obtain from Internal Revenue Service ~~two~~ ~~certified~~ copies each of 1969 Income Tax Return filed by Shelton, the UKA and/or Alabama Rescue Service. Attached is a memorandum for use of Liaison Section.

Enclosure

HEH:cae/mkz
(7)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY 5P-2ALM/116

REC-77 157-9-4-151

25 JUN 23 1970

58 JUL 1 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1-Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1-Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1-Mr. G. C. Moore
1-Liaison Section
1-Mr. J. V. Walsh
1-Mr. H. E. Helgeson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG
#MDR16

June 16, 1970

ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON
UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

Robert Marvin Shelton, Social Security Number 424-34-0016, resides Number 18, Lake Sherwood, Star Route, Northport, Alabama. His wife is Betty Lou Shelton. He is employed as the Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

The United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, sometimes known as the Alabama Rescue Service, is located in Northport, Alabama.

Please furnish two ~~certified~~ copies each of the 1969 Federal Tax Return filed by Shelton; the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and/or the Alabama Rescue Service.

HEH:jlm
(9)

It is requested no investigation of subject be instituted solely on the basis of the above information.

NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 6-15-70, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of Hate Groups, RM," prepared by HEH:cae/mkz.

Delivered [illegible] 6-22-70 to IRS

REC-35

EX-109

25 JUN 22 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5 JUL [illegible] 1970 TELETYPE UNIT ☐

US Treasury Department

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: JUL 2 1968

In reply refer to: CP:C:D

Honorable J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

In re: Charles Clark Kissinger, Jr.
6306 North Lakewood Avenue or
5401 South Ellis Avenue
Chicago, Illinois

C. Clark Kissinger Jr

In response to your request of May 31, 1968, we are enclosing a copy of the income tax return of Charles C. and Judy J. Kissinger, 6306 N. Lakewood, Chicago, Illinois 60626 (SSN: 355-34-0441 and SSN: 352-32-2937, respectively), for the year 1966.

Persons having access to this document should be cautioned as to the confidentiality of the information contained therein and as to the penalty provisions of Section 7213 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 1905, Title 18, United States Code, regarding the unauthorized disclosure of such information.

Judy J. Kissinger

We will write you concerning the 1967 return as soon as possible.

EX-110 REC 37

Very truly yours,

100-441138-26

16 JUL 11 1968

D. W. Bacon

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

1D

Enclosure

[illegible]

#MDR16

10/13/00.

SP2 ALM/JTG

54 JUL 22 1968

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

M) 137 26

ENCLOSURE
1

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

6306 N. Lakewood
Chicago, Ill. 60626
April 17, 1967

District Director
Internal Revenue Service
Chicago, Ill. 60602

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is our 1967 income tax return. Salary for which there is no W-2 forms comes from several short or part time jobs which did not withhold.

Just as last year we cannot, of course, voluntarily pay our tax so long as the war in Vietnam continues. Should the government run short of funds in the meantime we suggest repeal of the oil depletion allowance or any other of the tax breaks for the wealthy.

Sincerely yours,

C. Clark Kissinger
Judy Jo Kissinger

C. Clark Kissinger
Judy Jo Kissinger

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JTB

26

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice

FMDR16

10-13-00 SP2ALM/JTG

62-116395

October 14, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General's Office dated September 9, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 8, 1975, SSC requests and specifically to the following Items in those requests: Items 8, 9, 11, 13 and 14.

Relative to Item 8, upon review of the file the only information located which is suggestive of being that to which Mr. Hoover referred in his written statement on the Baumgardner September 16, 1963, memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, is the prior memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan August 23, 1963. That document was previously furnished under Item 12 of this request.

Although there is no way of knowing just what Mr. Hoover was referring to with his statement, the August 23, 1963, memorandum summarizes a detailed memorandum which was attached to it and advises of Communist Party, USA, efforts being discontinued because of being "ineffective." Mr. Hoover wrote a comment on the August 23, 1963, memorandum to the effect that he could not ignore certain matters as having only "infinitestimal" effect on the efforts to exploit the American Negro by the communists.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

JDP:lek|lek
(9) ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

JBA

WOC

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-11[illegible] 964

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Item 11 requested all materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963, memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell." An extensive review has been conducted of all logical files, abstracts and indices in an effort to find documents relating specifically to such conversations described in the request. The attached materials represent the only documents located that appear to be related in any manner to these conversations.

Item 13 requested the "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1953," and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956," which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page two of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

These two documents have been located. The 1953 document captioned "The Communist Party and the Negro" is a 103-page study of the interest and activities of the Communist Party, USA, in Negro-related causes and covers the years 1919-1952. The October, 1956, study is entitled "The Communist Party and the Negro, 1953--1956" and it supplements the 1953 study, and consists of 57 pages. SA Elmer W. Larson, Jr., discussed this matter with Mr. Michael Epstein of the SSC Staff on October 8, 1975. Mr. Epstein agreed that these documents need not be delivered at this time. It was agreed that the documents will be made available for access. If upon review copies are desired they will be provided. (66-04-1775; 100-3-75-1270)

1 - The Attorney General

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 9, 1975

#MDR16
[illegible] DATE 10/13/00 SP2ALM/TG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a list of FBI materials, delivery of which is requested ~~by September 15, 1975~~. according to agreed priorities. JTE

I would also appreciate your making available for Committee staff access, all Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1963. Upon examination of these files, delivery thereafter will be orally requested for specific items in accordance with the provisions of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department which governs Committee requests for materials.

r/o. per [illegible]

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

let to AG 1-DAC
JDP/let 10/14/75 Enc. 2

Receipt of material
Covered by Fonda case
subpoena hereby acknowledged.
JTE

RECEIVED
SEP 9 1975

62-11637 [illegible] 164 8

ENCLOSURE

September 8, 1975

DOCUMENT REQUEST

1. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of the informant) of the 2/12/62 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, ~~FBI,~~ subject "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C (00: Atlanta)." NP

2. All materials reflecting the steps taken by the FBI which "prevent(ed) the CPUSA from seizing control of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People," as stated in the last paragraph of page 4 of the enclosure captioned "Communist Party USA" which was attached to Director Hoover's January 10, 1961 letter to Robert Kennedy. Such? P. NOT OURS

✓3. Reports which were submitted by the Atlanta and New York field offices pursuant to the following instructions which were contained in the second paragraph of page 1 of the February 27, 1962 letter from the FBI Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C, Office of Origin: Atlanta," (a copy of which was disseminated to the New York field office: Hugent NP

> New York and Atlanta are instructed to review their files and prepare a report suitable for dissemination which will include all information of a security nature plus complete background data.

4. The "Bureau letters to Atlanta, 7/20/62, to Mobile, 7/20/62, and to Savannah, 9/17/62" which are referenced in the first paragraph of the 10/11/62 memorandum from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C, (00:Atlanta)." NP

5. The "Correspondence received from the Atlanta and New York Offices" as indicated in the first sentence of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C". NP

6. All materials reflecting instructions issued to the New York and Atlanta field offices "to furnish the Bureau recommendations concerning a communist infilitration investigation of (SCLC) and the recommendations received from those two field offices for a "communist infiltration investigation of SCLC", as indicated in the second paragraph of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C". P SPECIFY TIME FRAME

#mDE16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2ALM/ldb

7. The "necessary Manual changes" which were "attached for approval" to Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist."

NP

8. All materials which support the following statement of Director Hoover which was noted on Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist":

P more specific

> Just a few weeks ago you contended that the Communist influence in the racial movement was ineffective and infinitesimal.

9. The September 5, 1963 letterhead memorandum to the Attorney General and "the related prior memoranda" which are referred to in the first paragraph of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell."

NP

10. The July 3, 1963 letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Hunter Pitts O'Dell which was attached to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

NP

11. All materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

?NP

12. The "Brief on the above-captioned matter and subsequent memoranda on the same subject matter" which are referred to in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

o.k. but need to discuss subsequent memoranda

13. The "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1958" and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956" which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

1963?

14. All materials reflecting or pertaining to Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney Committee", as referred to in his February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning a 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, as well as an unexcised copy of the February 5 memorandum. NP

15. All materials which reflect the basis for the following statements which are contained in Mr. Baumgardner's May 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Internal Security Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, Administrative Matter": Married ?

a. "About three months prior to the March on Washington (8/28/63), we intensified our investigation concerning communist influence into the racial movement. . . .";

b. "Martin Luther King, head of SCLC, has challenged the Bureau on this point."

16. ? contained 7/18 NP All materials reflecting the "previous arrangements" referred to in the November 18, 1964 memorandum from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, subject "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director, 10:00 a.m., 11/18/64 (10:05 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.)"

17. All materials reflecting, concerning, or pertaining to:

a. "(S)tatements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Georgia, at the time he highly criticized the FBI. His statements were made on 11/18/62 during an interview in the Robing Room of the Riverside Church in New York City where King had just preached a sermon." (This quotation is taken from the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of the 11/19/64 memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. DeLoach captioned "Director's Briefing of Women Reporters on 11/18/64") D R

b. Comments, responses, and recommendations made, inspections conducted, and/or any other actions taken as a result of the statements of Dr. King which are described in Item 17.a. above. Coordinated Inspection Div? TIME IN/ME

18. Identification of the author of the notation "Being Handled, 11/20/64, D" which appears at the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters." Nizgal Wick

19. All materials reflecting the manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "(b)eing handled" as noted on the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters," together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom.

P

20. The response to John Doar's August 19, 1964 letter to Mr. James R. Malley which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

NP

21. The division and section assignment of James R. Malley as of August 19, 1964.

NP

Coord W Adm Div

22. All materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964 memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

PREV. HANDLED 7/14

23. All materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

P HANDLED

24. The table of contents page(s) and/or chapter or section headings of:

a. The article captioned "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" which was attached to Mr. Sullivan's 10/15/63 memorandum to Mr. Belmont under the same caption.

NP

b. The paper which was the up-to-date revision of the article described in Item 24 (a) above and which paper was attached to Mr. Sullivan's November 22, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

c. The memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which was transmitted with the December 21, 1964 letter from Director Hoover to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.

d. The document which was the "current revision of the previous analysis captioned 'Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis'" and which document was enclosed with Mr. Brennan's April 10, 1967 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Communist Influence in Racial Matters - A Current Analysis."

e. The "current study" entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr. - A Current Analysis" which was enclosed with Director Hoover's March 14, 1968 letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall.

? 25. All materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a. - e. above. (Do not supply the documents themselves.)

?. What mean

26. An identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24 a. - e. above. (Do not supply the attachments themselves.)

? 27. All materials reflecting that:

a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and

b. "the Director agreed,"

that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr. be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's 2/29/68 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

Klein 28. All materials which reflect any recommendations for, and/or decisions relating to, the sending of Director Hoover's August 25, 1967 letter to specified field offices captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Internal Security."

Cointelpro Ryan?

Klein 29. All materials reflecting the approval of proposals contained in Mr. G. C. Moore's February 29, 1968 memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence."

Ryan?

30. All materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965 memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

31. All materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's 1/16/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C.")

32. All materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position at that time (the end of a 90-day period, or sooner if conditions permit) to take further action against King and the SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau," as promised in Mr. Sullivan's December 24, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

33. All materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta field office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government with representatives of (the Atlanta) office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

to #16

34. All materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

35. All materials comprising the "separate correspondence" between FBI Headquarters and the Atlanta field office concerning the "specific matters dealt with in Atlanta's letter (of 4/14/64)" as indicated in the Director's 4/24/64 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

Search to end

36. The communication from the Atlanta field office to FBI Headquarters by which "this publication has previously been furnished to the Bureau on 6/26/64," as stated in the second paragraph of page 3 of the 7/7/64 letter from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, IS-C."

Deegan's Office

37. The "separate correspondence" by which the Atlanta field office was "directed to furnish the Bureau available information concerning the alleged escapades of (the Reverend Ralph) Abernathy, including the obtaining of official court records," as referred to in the Director's July 23, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

38. The letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers which was originally attached to Mr. Sullivan's 11/27/64 memorand m to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement -- A Current Analysis.". (See note on 11/27/64 memorandum indicating that the letter was "revised.")

?

39. "The letter" which is the subject of the first and second paragraphs of Director Hoover's February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning his 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, and which letter the Director told the Attorney General, he would "check on" and any other materials relating to "the letter".

P 40. All materials concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. being named "Man of the Year" by Time Magazine in December 1963 - January 1964.

P 41. All materials concerning or pertaining to Dr. King's Papal audience in Rome in September 1964.

P 42. Speech delivered by Director Hoover at Loyola College in November 1964, and all materials pertaining thereto.

NP 43. All Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") from 1963 until 1968 for:

a. William D. Campbell, and
b. John Matter.

P ATLANTA

45. All materials reflecting, concerning or pertaining to electronic surveillance, feasibility studies or surveys, physical surveillance, or photographic surveillances, and/or any proposals, recommendations or discussions of any of the foregoing surveillances, studies or surveys, with respect to Dr. King's "hideaway", or Fred Bennett's apartment, or premises located at 3006 Delmar Lane, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia, or with respect to any other premises, apartment, or "hideaway", used, owned, or leased by Dr. King or Fred Bennett.

Klein

CointelPro Ryan?

46. The following materials which are referred to in the October 9, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C":

a. "NYlet 9/26/62";
b. "further steps to carry out this counterintelligence plan will be handled at the Bureau";
c. "memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption dated October 8, 1962, ARW:cdb."

47. The "ATairtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated 4/1/64 captioned "CPUSA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C" and "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C", which are referenced in the 4/13/64 Airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York and Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal SEcurity - C (Negro Question).

48. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of informants) of the 8/15/66 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, subject "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Secuirty - C (Stanley David Levison.)"

49. The Memorandum which "the Director had noted" as referred to in the NOTE at the bottom of the 4/13/65 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, subject "Communist Party, USA Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Nicholas A. Kourambis) (Negro Question)."

Klein
Cointel Pro
Ryan?

50. All materials reflecting "comments" and "specific recommendations" submitted by the Atlanta, Chicago, and New York field offices as the result of the instructions contained in the last paragraph of the May 18, 1967 letter from the Director the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Martin Luther King)." !

Klein
Cointel Pro
Ryan?

51. All materials reflecting the product of the "comprehensive review of Levison's Bureau case file" as indicated in the NOTE on the 7/18/66 airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Stanley David Levison)."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/14/75

Caption of Document:
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/8/75 request, Items 8,9,11,13
and 14

Originating Office: FBI 9/30

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title: [illegible]

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16
[illegible] 10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/HG

X

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-964

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/8/75, items 8,9,11,13 and 14

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

~~TS~~

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials pertaining to Martin Luther King,Jr. and SCLS: As they relate to CP, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters and Hunter Pitts O'Dell; Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney committee".

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW 5-WOC/8

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 9

[illegible]

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2ALM/JT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/lb/6
#MDR16

The Attorney General

September 5, 1963

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Bland
- 1 - Mr. Reddy
- 1 - Mr. Shubatt

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

In my letter dated August 20, 1963, information was set forth regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell's possible association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and information regarding Reverend King's statement indicating O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on Reverend King's staff.

On August 30, 1963, at 7:25 P.M., O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau entering the building located at 312 West 125th Street, New York, New York. O'Dell remained in the building in excess of one hour. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference occupies one of the several offices which are located in that building.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

100-358916

REC 46

58

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

19 SEP 6 1963

SEP 23 AM '63

ST-108

MAILED 25
SEP 5 - 1963
COMM-FBI

WFS:erc
(14)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

347

SEP 6 - 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General August 20, 1963

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY 3657 VRF LNG
ON 11-1-82

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Reddy

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

In my letter dated August 2, 1963, information was set forth regarding a United Press International release issued on July 29, 1963, at Atlanta, Georgia, reporting that the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had agreed to submit to Attorney General Eugene Cook of Georgia an affidavit explaining the employment in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) of a man linked by Congressional committees with the Communist Party. The release stated that King sent an attorney to Cook's office to determine what the Attorney General wanted in connection with his inquiry into the relationship with the SCLC of Jack O'Dell. The release concluded with the statement "King said last week O'Dell had worked for SCLC on two occasions but his connections with the integration organization were severed for good last June 26." It is noted that the subject is also known as Jack O'Dell.

On August 16, 1963, a confidential source of the Bureau advised that King had been alerted by his assistant, Wyatt Tee Walker, to an article appearing in the Atlanta "Constitution" on August 16, 1963, regarding King's association with O'Dell. Walker told King that the article referred to a letter written by Georgia Attorney General Cook in which Cook stated that O'Dell is a known communist and in which Cook demanded an explanation from King as to why O'Dell was placed on King's staff.

MAILED 6
AUG 20 1963
COMM-FBI

King instructed Walker to reply to Cook's letter by stating that O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on King's staff. Cook was to be further advised that O'Dell came to him, King, through the Democratic Party of the Bronx, New York, and that King "has nothing to hide."

REC-45
100-358916 — 252

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

EBR:erc
(13)

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

AUG 22 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Confidential~~" because it contains information, the disclosure of which might reveal the source and adversely affect the national defense. The source is NY 4099-S*.

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/

#M 0216

The Attorney General

August 2, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Reference is made to my letter dated July 31, 1963, concerning an article in the July 25, 1963, issue of the Atlanta, Georgia, "Constitution" regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell and entitled "Onetime Communist Organizer Heads Rev. King's Office in N.Y." My letter concluded that a telephone call to the office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in New York City on July 30, 1963, resulted in a statement by an unidentified female employee that Hunter Pitts O'Dell was no longer employed by the SCLC.

A United Press International release issued on July 30, 1963, at Atlanta, Georgia, reported that the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had agreed to submit to Georgia Attorney General Eugene Cook an affidavit explaining the employment in the SCLC of a man linked by Congressional committees with the Communist Party. The release states that King sent an attorney to Cook's office to determine what the Attorney General wanted in connection with his inquiry into the relationship with the SCLC of Jack O'Dell. The release further states that "King said last week O'Dell had worked for SCLC on two occasions but his connections with the integration organization were severed for good last June 26."

For your additional information in this regard, investigation by this Bureau's New York Office has developed information that, on July 2, 1963, and July 19, 1963, one "J. H. O'Dell" was the payee of checks in the amounts of $333.62 and $2,372.96, respectively, drawn by the SCLC. These checks were deposited to the account of Hunter Pitts O'Dell in a New York City bank.

On July 19, 1963, Charles Finnerty, Supervisor of the E. J. Creeden Company, 118 East 25th Street, New York City, the company which provides mailing service

REC-4
100-358916 — 251

(SEE NOTE PAGE THREE)

FJB:erc
(13)

RECD-READING ROOM
AUG 7 12 39 PM '63
FBI

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

for the SCLC, was advised by O'Dell that he, O'Dell, had a big mailing list coming up in August. Finnerty asked O'Dell to submit written instructions but O'Dell replied that he would get together with Finnerty when Finnerty returned from vacation on August 5, 1963. Finnerty had previously on July 17, 1963, telephoned and spoken to O'Dell at the New York Office of the SCLC.

On July 22, 1963, O'Dell visited the offices of the Creeden Company and turned over to Mrs. Dorothy Creeden, the company's secretary, a check for $200 to be credited to the account of the SCLC at the Creeden Company.

On July 31, 1963, a pretext telephone call to the New York Office of the SCLC was answered by a person identifying herself as Ruth Bailey. When asked if Hunter Pitts O'Dell was still employed by the SCLC, Ruth Bailey stated that she was not in a position to say. It is known that Ruth Bailey has been employed in the New York Office of the SCLC for some time; nevertheless, she commented to the person making the telephone call that she had not been employed by the SCLC very long.

Also on July 31, 1963, O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau's New York Office entering the premises at 312 West 125th Street, New York City, which house the New York Office of the SCLC. O'Dell remained for several minutes and then returned to his residence.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

The Attorney General

NOTE:

In view of current controversy regarding whether or not Hunter Pitts O'Dell, who was elected to the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959, under an alias, is still employed by the SCLC, the New York Office is under instructions to endeavor to definitely resolve this question. We will furnish any pertinent information developed to the Attorney General.

The Attorney General July 31, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/BS

110616

There is attached for your consideration a copy of a letter dated July 27, 1963, received from Senator Richard B. Russell, together with a copy of the July 25, 1963, article in the Atlanta, Georgia, "Constitution" entitled "Onetime Communist Organizer Heads Rev. King's Office in N.Y." I have advised Senator Russell by letter of this date that, in line with Departmental policy, I am referring his letter to you.

You have been kept advised by communications, the latest of which was dated July 17, 1963, captioned "Request From Senator Monroney Concerning Racial Agitation," of Hunter Pitts O'Dell's association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition, copies of investigative reports concerning O'Dell have been submitted to the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice on a continuing basis. The last such report submitted was dated June 28, 1963, at New York, New York.

For your further information, a telephone call to the office of the SCLC in New York City on July 30, 1963, resulted in a statement by an unidentified female employee that Hunter Pitts O'Dell was no longer employed by the SCLC.

MAILED 25
AUG 2 - 1963
COMM-FBI

Enclosures - 2
REC- 25
100-358916 - 250

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosures - 2)

EX-103
1 - Mr. Burke Marshall (Enclosures - 2)
Assistant Attorney General

AUG 9 1963

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____

NOTE:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same subject, dated 7/30/63, FBR:DB:erc:pw.

FBR:dfm:erc

(15) *This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

The Attorney General

REC- 42

ST-116

Director, FBI 57-6-133

July 17, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. M. A. Jones
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Section tickler
1 - Mr. Garner

REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONRONEY
CONCERNING CURRENT RACIAL AGITATION

#MORI6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP JALM/JJG
ON 11-8-00

For your information, there is enclosed a copy of a letter dated July 12, 1963, received from Senator A. S. Mike Monroney which is self-explanatory. I have advised Senator Monroney by letter of this date that, in line with Departmental policy, I am referring his letter to you.

In substance, the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) is not able to assume a role of leadership in the racial unrest at this time. However, the Party is attempting to exploit the current racial situation through propaganda and participation in demonstrations and other activities wherever possible. Through these tactics, the Party hopes ultimately to progress from its current supporting role to a position of decisive leadership.

Much of the CPUSA's hope to play a more decisive role is linked with Stanley Levison's role as an advisor to Martin Luther King. Party officials regard Levison, a secret member of the CPUSA, as being engaged in the most important work in the Party today because of his association with King. Levison has reportedly stated that "King is a wholehearted Marxist who has studied it (Marxism), believes in it, agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly." Levison is reputed to have written the speech which King delivered at the convention of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) in Florida in December, 1961.

When King indicated in June, 1962, that he wanted another administrative assistant, Levison recommended Hunter Pitts O'Dell, who had been elected to the National Committee of the CPUSA in December, 1959, under the pseudonym Cornelius James. King adopted Levison's suggestion and employed O'Dell in his organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). When the press identified O'Dell as a communist in [illegible], 1962, King announced that O'Dell had resigned from the SCLC. However, O'Dell continues to associate with King to this

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Sasser
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NOTE: See memorandum, Smith to Sullivan, 7/17/63, RSG:JMS/aab:jdi, re: SENATOR A. S. MIKE MONRONEY, REQUEST FOR DIRECTOR'S VIEWS RE CURRENT RACIAL AGITATION.

RSG:JMS/jdd:aab
(15)

SEE NOTE ON PAGE THREE RE CLASSIFICATION

27 AUG 1963

7-17-63

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

Recently, information received indicates that, while Levison still retains his strong communist convictions and still acts as an effective Party advisor to King, he is becoming critical of the Party's role in the relationship. He believes the Party has lost prestige among Negroes lately because it has not been sufficiently aggressive and effective in promoting civil rights for the Negro and otherwise actively immersing itself in Negro causes.

King reportedly attended a Labor Day weekend seminar in 1957 at the Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee. According to a publication circulated concerning this meeting by the Georgia Commission of Education, which allegedly has an undercover agent in attendance, the meeting was held to discuss methods and tactics for precipitating racial strife and disturbances. While CPUSA members were on the school staff and the school followed the policy of welcoming communist students, the CPUSA was not in control of the school.

See memo Bland to Sullivan 7-11-63

In June, 1960, the SCLC was reported to have ~~[illegible]~~ solicited funds from the Soviet and Czechoslovakian Embassies and the Rumanian Legation in Washington, D. C. Same caption

In recent years, King has signed a petition urging abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and petitions requesting the release of two imprisoned Communist Party leaders.

NAACP officials are aware that the NAACP is a communist target. As a result, the NAACP has taken a firm stand against communism and has warned its branches to be constantly alert against communist efforts to infiltrate them. The constitution of the NAACP contains an anticommunist clause which prohibits membership in the organization by known Communist Party members.

There is no indication that any of the key figures of the NAACP are or have been members of the Communist Party. Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, has been strongly anticommunist and has endeavored to keep the NAACP free of communists.

The following national officers of the NAACP had communist front affiliations--in no instance extensive--a number of years ago, but none is known to have been a Communist Party member: Arthur Spingarn, President; Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood, Chairman of the Board of Directors; and Robert L. Carter, General Counsel.

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

There is no evidence that any of the following top leaders of CORE are or have been Communist Party members: James L. Farmer, National Director; James T. McCain, ~~Field~~ Director; and Gordon R. Carey, Director, Program and Training Department. Carey was one of the founders of the Conference of Young Socialists (CYS) in 1957 and was a member at large of the Executive Committee of CYS. The CYS was controlled by the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party, which has been designated as subversive pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Full details of the activities related herein previously have been furnished for the Department's files in individual reports and related communications.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General - Enclosures (2)

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall - Enclosures (2)
Assistant Attorney General

Note: This letter is classified ~~Secret~~ inasmuch as it contains information from highly sensitive sources, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the Nation and have an adverse effect upon the national defense interests of the country.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

July 9, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

#mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG
ON 11-8-00

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell, dated June 28, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

The symbol T-1 in this report relates to an informant in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. The symbol T-2 was not used and T-3 through T-6 relate to confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE:

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report also so classified.

REC- 72 - 244

11 JUL 11 1963

MAILED 6
JUL 9 - 1963
COMM-FBI

EX-114

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes

DR:mjh
(5)

JUL 16 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

April 12, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

#m0el6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]
ON 11-8-00

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated April 1, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1 in this report is a source in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-2 and T-6 are informants who are furnishing information of extreme value and who are not available for interview or testimony. T-3, T-4, and T-5 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

2 - New York (100-91330)

ATTENTION: SAC, NEW YORK:

There is no objection to your submitting future reports on a 90-day basis. However, any data developed indicative of Communist Party membership on the part of the subject or any contact by him with members of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, should immediately be brought to the attention of the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination.

-241

NOTE ON YELLOW:

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified "Confidential."

-116
REC 9
APR 15 1963

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DR:cah:eeb (6)

CONFIDENTIAL

MAILED 25
APR [illegible]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

55 APR 1[illegible] 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

March 6, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

C

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated February 15, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual. Each report is accompanied by an informant evaluation memorandum also dated February 15, 1963.

T-1, T-2 and T-3 in this report are sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-4 is an informant who is furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony. T-5, T-6 and T-7 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 4

100-358916

1 - New York (100-91330)

DECLASSIFIED BY ~~SP-2 ALM~~ 3716 #ND216
ON 11-8-00

C

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom would adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is so classified.

DR:bgc
(5)

REC- 63 100-358916 - 251

MAILED 25
MAR 6 - 1963
COMM-FBI

19 MAR 7 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

F73

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

February 5, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Reddy

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reference is made to your inquiry of Mr. Alex Rosen of this Bureau regarding the current Communist Party membership of Hunter Pitts O'Dell.

We have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party.

This information is, of course, highly sensitive and confidential.

REC- 63

100-358916 — 234

See cover memo Rosen to Belmont 2/5/63, same re.

mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/[illegible]
ON 11-8-00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

EBR:mtb/kmo
(10)

Memo delivered to AAG Marshall 2/6/63 at 10:[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 2/5/63

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2 ALM

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division has asked that we give him a statement concerning the Communist Party affiliation of Hunter Pitts O'Dell. We have called to his attention current reports which have been furnished to the Security Division, Attention Mr. Walter Yeagley, concerning O'Dell's activities.

Marshall was interested in O'Dell's association with Rev. Martin Luther King and he was given a copy of a report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated 12/20/62 at New York, which was classified "Confidential", which had been disseminated to Walter Yeagley of the Security Division. This report reflected the current association of O'Dell and the organization of Rev. King, namely, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition to the above we also furnished him a copy of a memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated 12/6/62 and another dated 1/23/63, pertaining to O'Dell.

Marshall stated that upon review of the above information which was furnished to him, he would like to have a statement from the FBI concerning the present Communist affiliation of O'Dell, particularly, whether O'Dell actually is a member of the Communist Party at this time.

I advised Marshall that an appropriate memorandum would be prepared and furnished to him concerning his request. There is attached hereto a memorandum which has been prepared by the Security Division indicating that we have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party. It is being pointed out that this information is highly sensitive and confidential.

Enclosure (1)

REC- 63 100-3-116-234

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

AR:mpd (8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memo to Mr. Belmont from A. Rosen
Re: Hunter Pitts O'Dell

By way of background, Marshall indicated that the basis for his request stems from the necessity of having to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to O'Dell. He stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to adequately handle this inquiry.

ACTION:

If approved, attached memorandum to Burke Marshall will be handed to him. It is brief and specifically points out the need to treat this information as highly sensitive and confidential.

Delivered
2/6/63 dwd

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-1-82 BY 362 VRT

The Attorney General January 23, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Reddy

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

On December 6, 1962, you were furnished information indicating that despite the Reverend Martin Luther King's statement of October 31, 1962, that Hunter Pitts O'Dell had resigned his position with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), O'Dell had continued to represent himself as being affiliated with the New York Office of the SCLC and, during late November and early December, 1962, was actively engaged in the work of this organization. Reverend King's public statement of October 31, 1962, was occasioned by an editorial in the October 25, 1962, edition of the "Augusta Chronicle," Augusta, Georgia, which identified O'Dell as a concealed member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, who was employed by the SCLC under the alias Jack H. O'Dell.

I thought you would be interested in the fact that on three occasions during early January, 1963, O'Dell registered at an apartment in Atlanta, Georgia, as J. H. O'Dell. On each occasion, O'Dell represented himself as being with the New York Office of the SCLC. When checking out on January 7, 1963, O'Dell requested that the bill be charged to the SCLC. An inquiry by the manager resulted in telephonic confirmation from the Atlanta Office of the SCLC that that organization would pay O'Dell's bill. Also, on January 10, 1963, O'Dell, Reverend Martin Luther King and eight other officials of the SCLC traveled together via Delta Airlines from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia.

MAILED 2

REC-9

100-358916 - 232

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE TWO

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

EBR:erc
(13)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

In addition, a source who has requested that his identity be concealed has reported that at an SCLC conference at Nashville, Tennessee, during the latter part of December, 1962, a representative of the SCLC admitted that O'Dell continues to be involved with the SCLC in New York City in a fund-raising capacity although he is not currently on the SCLC payroll.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption, dated January 22, 1963, EBR:erc.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

January 4, 1963

1 - Mr. Ryan

Director, FBI

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY 5P2ALM/ZTG
ON 11-8-00

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated December 20, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1, T-2, and T-3 were used in this report to conceal the identity of three sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-4 is an informant who is furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony. T-5, T-6, and T-7 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE ON YELLOW:

This letter is classified "~~Confidential~~" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of which could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified "Confidential."

REC-67 - 227

19 JAN 7 1963

EX. - 116

DR:fjh
(5)

CONFIDENTIAL

MAILED 27
JAN [illegible] - 1963
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

December 6, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2 ALM/ES

#MDR16

MAILED 2
DEC 5 1962
COMM-FBI

On November 2, 1962, I forwarded to you a copy of an editorial that appeared in the October 25, 1962, edition of the "Augusta Chronicle," Augusta, Georgia. This editorial identified Hunter Pitts O'Dell, a concealed member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, as employed under the alias Jack H. O'Dell in the capacity of "Acting Executive Director" for the Reverend Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Subsequently, various newspapers contained accounts of a statement issued by the Reverend Martin Luther King on or about October 31, 1962, wherein it was stated O'Dell had resigned from his position with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Reverend Martin Luther King is quoted in this statement as denying knowledge of the communist affiliations of O'Dell and further describing allegations that O'Dell was the Southeastern Director of his organization as false in that O'Dell functioned "purely as a technician with 90 per cent of his work taking place in the North..." King further stated that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference has a policy "that no person of known communist affiliation can serve on the staff, executive board or its membership at large."

I thought you would be interested in the fact that our New York Office has developed information that on November 23, 1962, O'Dell identified himself as affiliated with the New York office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and during late November and early December, 1962, he was actively engaged in New York City in the work of this organization.

REC'D-READING ROOM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC- 5

100-358916

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-nel without the express approval of the FBI.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE 2

DR:bgc (13)

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NOTE ON YELLOW:

O'Dell was elected under the pseudonym Cornelius James to the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959.

The Attorney General November 2, 1962

Director, FBI

5-1
2-1
Encl
2-1

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
EDITORIAL FROM OCTOBER 25, 1962,
ISSUE OF AUGUSTA CHRONICLE
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA

I thought you would be interested in the enclosed editorial relating to O'Dell's relationship with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Enclosure

1 - The Deputy Attorney General - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Evans - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Belmont - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Sullivan - Enclosure
1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

NOTE: O'Dell was elected under the pseudonym Cornelius James to the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959. Since his association with the National Committee is set forth in the editorial, he is not being further characterized in this memorandum.

JH:mlw
(10)

JH/KMW

MCT-42

100 -

NOV. 8 1962

REC- 21

MAILED 19
NOV 2 1962
COMM-FBI

ENCLOSURE

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1 - Mr. Ryan

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

November 19, 1962

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated November 5, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual. Each report is accompanied by an informant evaluation memorandum also dated November 5, 1962.

The Symbols T-1 and T-4 in this report relate to sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-2, T-5 and T-6 are confidential investigative techniques. T-3 is a confidential informant furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony.

Enc. (4)

#MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTE
ON 11-8-00

100-358916 - 214

REC- 123

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE ON YELLOW: This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified ~~"Confidential."~~

DR/ejl
(5)

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MAILED 8
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

53 NOV 29 1962

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

October 4, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated September 19, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1, T-3, T-5 and T-6 were utilized in this report to protect sources in whom the Department has not previously expressed an interest. T-2 and T-4 are confidential informants furnishing information of extreme value who are not available for interview or testimony. T-7, T-8 and T-9 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

1 - New York (100-91330)

#MDE16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG
ON 12-8-00

MAILED 30
OCT 4 1962
COMM-FBI

NOTE ON YELLOW:

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which are also classified ~~"Confidential."~~

DR:cdb
(5)

REC- 27

210

19 OCT 5 1962

OCT 4 3 30 PM '62

OCT 3 3 08 PM '62

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

9

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 11

62 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont DATE: September 20, 1963

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL;
STANLEY LEVISON;
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN
THE NEGRO MOVEMENT

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall telephoned and advised that on instructions of the Attorney General he wanted to clear with us the rough draft of a memorandum which he was going to send to the Bureau. As a matter of fact, the Attorney General has approved the rough draft contingent upon our approval.

The proposed memorandum, a copy of which is attached, relates to Hunter Pitts O'Dell and Stanley Levison and action taken to advise Dr. Martin Luther King and his immediate associates of the communist activities on the part of O'Dell and Levison. Marshall states that some time ago it was not felt wise, in view of the position of the FBI informant, for Marshall to say that he knew O'Dell to be under communist control. Instead, he informed Dr. King and two of his immediate associates that O'Dell was believed by many people to have had communist connections and his association with Dr. King's organization was not in its best interest.

Subsequently, on June 22, 1963, according to Marshall's proposed memorandum, he brought this matter very explicitly to Dr. King's attention. Later that same date, both the Attorney General and the President, separately, strongly urged Dr. King that there should be no further connection between O'Dell and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Thereafter, the Attorney General and Marshall received copies of a letter dated July 3, 1963, from Dr. King to O'Dell. In this letter King makes reference to a resignation which O'Dell submitted some months ago which was accepted because of the SCLC's firm policy that no communist or communist sympathizer would be on the staff. Dr. King's letter continues by noting an investigation

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland

CAE:vap
(7)

100- -270
REC 102
OCT 8 1963
XEROX
OCT 9 1963
ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/8/00 BY

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

had been conducted but they were unable to discover any present connections with the Communist Party by O'Dell.

King further tells O'Dell that the situation is such that the organization cannot even afford the risk of impressions about communist inspiration and therefore O'Dell's temporary resignation is being made permanent.

Mr. Marshall's proposed memorandum also advises that he informed Dr. King on June 22, 1963, Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party. This action was taken on direction of the Attorney General and the President. Marshall had previously warned Dr. King about any association with Levison. This was the first indication given him of firm information Levison was under communist control.

Sensitive foreign intelligence operation

As a matter of background, our early information concerning the communist connections involved here came from ~~one of our two most highly placed communist informants (NY694-S*)~~. To protect ~~this most valuable informant~~ we insisted Levison and O'Dell not be informed by King we had positive information of their communist connections.

Subsequently, with the passage of time so that the risk to the informant was not jeopardized, the Director in a personal conversation with the Attorney General on June 17, 1963, agreed Dr. Martin Luther King could be informed that he should get rid of Levison and O'Dell because they are members of the Communist Party. It was on the basis of this advice from the Director that action was taken by the Attorney General and the President.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN:

While Mr. Marshall's proposed memorandum does not spell out the sequence of events here in detail, his summary is nevertheless accurate and it is therefore believed we should inform Mr. Marshall that he should feel free, of course, to submit the memorandum as he drafted it. If approved, Mr. Marshall will be so advised telephonically.

Handled 9-20-63

Form No. G-11
(Ed. 3-9-61)

From
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Deputy Attorney General ☐
Solicitor General ☐
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Tax ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Civil ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Lands ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Legal Counsel ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights ☒
Administrative Assistant Attorney General ☐
Director, FBI ☐
Director, Bureau of Prisons ☐
Director, Office of Alien Property ☐
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization ☐
Pardon Attorney ☐
Parole Board ☐
Board of Immigration Appeals ☐
Special Assistant for Public Information ☐
Records Administration Office ☐

For the attention of Burke Marshall

REMARKS: I think this is fine, but before we send it, I would want it cleared with Courtney. Will you handle this?

RFK

1742

#mo016

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY 5P2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100 - 355716 - 220

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

12 September 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Attached is a draft memorandum on Hunter Pitts O'Dell and the most recent documents. It could be expanded in detail but contains the essentials. I did not refer to the warning Harris Wofford gave to Dr. King at our suggestion in 1961 while Harris was at the White House because I do not know exactly what was said to King.

BM

I think this is fine but before we send it I would want it cleared with Courtney - Will you handle this

PERSONAL &
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE
RECEIVED
SEP 12 1963
ATTORNEY GENERAL

#mD216
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

96

100-358716-270

DRAFT - 9/12/63

TO: J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

SUBJECT: Hunter Pitts O'Dell

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM 1 STG

This relates to your letterhead memorandum of September 5 to the Attorney General, relating to Hunter Pitts O'Dell and the related prior memoranda. I appreciate your having sent copies of these to me.

This matter had been brought to the attention of Dr. King some time ago by me, but in accordance with conversations which the Attorney General had with Courtney Evans, it was not felt to be wise in view of the sources of the Bureau's information to state that I knew O'Dell to be under Communist control at any time. I did inform Dr. King and two members of his organization -- Reverend Andrew Young and Reverend Wyatt Walker -- some time ago -- that since O'Dell was believed by many people to have had Communist connections, his association with their organization was not in the best interests of the organization.

3

At that time, inconclusive steps were taken to remove O'Dell, and his job with the Southern Christian

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Leadership Conference was changed. In response to direct questions whether I had hard evidence of O'Dell's Communist connections, however, I replied that I was not in a position to give any.

Following further conversations with Mr. Evans in June, however, I brought the matter to the attention of Dr. King very explicitly in my office on the morning of June 22 prior to a scheduled meeting which Dr. King had with the President. This was done at the direction of the Attorney General. Later that morning both the Attorney General and the President separately strongly urged Dr. King thatthere should be no further connection between O'Dell and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Dr. King stated that the connection would be ended. Thereafter, theAttorney General and I both received copies of the attached letter, dated July 3, 1963, from Dr. King to O'Dell.

On the same occasion, I also informed Dr.King that our information was that Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party. This was also done after conversations with Mr. Evans prior to the meeting with Dr. King, and was done at the direction of the Attorney

4

General and the President. Prior to that time, again based upon talks between the Attorney General and Mr. Evans at which I was present, it had been decided that it was not in the best interest of the United States to inform Dr.King that we had any firm information that Levison was under Communist control. I had, however, on a previous occasion, warned Dr. King about any association with Levison, basing the warning upon doubts about Levison's loyalty to the United States.

I thought you should have this additional information for your file.

BM

5

The Attorney General September 5, 1963

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

In my letter dated August 20, 1963, information was set forth regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell's possible association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and information regarding Reverend King's statement indicating O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on Reverend King's staff.

On August 30, 1963, at 7:25 P.M., O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau entering the building located at 312 West 125th Street, New York, New York. O'Dell remained in the building in excess of one hour. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference occupies one of the several offices which are located in that building.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

100-358916

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

(1) - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI

28

100-3529[illegible]-220

Dr. King

JBURN AVE., N. E.
NTA 3, GEORGIA
PHONE 524-1378

Southern Christian Leadership Conference

Martin Luther King Jr., *President*
Wyatt Tee Walker, *Executive Director*

July 3, 1963

Burke
AM

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SPJ ALM

Attorney General Robert Kennedy
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kennedy:

Dr. King asked me to send you the enclosed copy of a letter which he has just sent to Mr. Jack O'Dell.

Sincerely yours,

Dora McDonald

(Miss) D. McDonald
Secretary

enc

File

OFFICE OF THE
RECEIVED
JUL 8 1963
ATTORNEY GENERAL

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100-358716-270

July 3, 1963

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/TG

①

Mr. Jack H. O'Dell
488 St. Nicholas Avenue
Apartment 5-S
New York, New York

Dear Jack:

Several months ago you submitted your resignation pending an investigation of your alleged affiliation with the Communist party, as was suggested by an article to this effect in the Birmingham and New Orleans newspapers. We accepted this temporary resignation because of SCLC's firm policy that no Communist nor Communist sympathizer can be on our staff or in our membership. We felt that it was imperative to conduct an immediate investigation. As you know, we conducted what we felt to be a thorough inquiry into these charges and were unable to discover any present connections with the Communist party on your part.

The situation in our country is such, however, that any allusion to the left brings forth an emotional response which would seem to indicate that SCLC and the Southern Freedom Movement are Communist inspired. In these critical times we cannot afford to risk any such impressions. We, therefore, have decided in our Administrative Committee, that we should request you to make your temporary resignation permanent.

We certainly appreciate the years of unselfish service which you have put into our New York Office, and regret the necessity of your departure. Certainly, yours is a significant sacrifice commensurate with the sufferings in jail and through loss of jobs under racist intimidation. We all pray for the day when our nation may be truly the land of the free.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100-358916-270

Mr. O'Dell
July 3, 1963
Page Two

May God bless you and continue to inspire you in the service of your fellowman.

Sincerely yours,

Martin Luther King, Jr.

Km

10

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

334 Auburn Avenue, N.E.
Atlanta 3, Georgia

ATLANTA, GA.
10 PM
5 JUL
1963

ATLANTA
JUL 3 '63
GA.
U.S. POSTAGE
05
P.B. METER
384681

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2AL m/2716

#mDe16

Attorney General Robert Kennedy

Department of Justice

Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL

31.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOV T

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: 7/19/63

FROM : C. A. Evans

#mpe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2ALM/ks

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
~~Mr.~~ Evans
Mr. McGowan
Mr. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: RACIAL SITUATION

In talking with the Attorney General and Assistant AG Marshall, of the Civil Rights Division, reference was made to our earlier conversation concerning Congressional requests which had been received by the Director, relating to alleged communist influence in the racial demonstrations. The Department's original position was that there was no immediate urgency in recontacting Senator Monroney, in view of recent contacts had with him by Departmental representatives. Today, I pointed out that these requests should not be allowed to remain unresolved too long.

Assistant AG Marshall advised that he had drafted a proposed letter to be used in replying to these Congressional requests, since he had ascertained that a written reply is desired, particularly by Senator Monroney. In his letter Marshall proposes to paraphrase the President's statement at his press conference on 7/17/63. Marshall's letter will, of course, make no reference to the President's statement, but merely indicate that this is the conclusion, predicated upon reports and other information supplied to the Department.

In those instances where the Department is dealing with a Member of Congress believed to be trustworthy, Marshall plans to deliver his letters personally and to explain that the classified nature of the reports precludes the furnishing of specific information in writing or in testimony. Marshall feels that he can talk confidentially in this way to Senator Magnuson and thus forestall any requests for further information. It was noted that, as a result of the Director's conversation with the Attorney General, Marshall had spoken with Martin Luther King about the dangers of his associating with Stanley Levison and accepting assistance from him. It was, therefore, believed that since this may get back to Members of Congress, Marshall should talk with the individual Senators, where this can be done on a confidential basis.

Marshall said he would, of course, keep us advised of the results of his contacts in this regard.

REC-35

JUL 30 1963

CAE:CSH (7)

177

32

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2 ALM/PAJ/76

1

2:35 p.m.   June 17, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. DE LOACH
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN

The Attorney General called and advised he would like to have Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall talk to Martin Luther King and tell King he has to get rid of Levison and O'Dell, that he should not have any contact with them directly or indirectly. The Attorney General inquired if King could be told these persons are communists without exposing the informant.

I advised the Attorney General I thought he could make the statement that they are members of the Communist Party without exposing the informant. I pointed out that, if King continues this association, he is going to hurt his own cause as there are more and more communists trying to take advantage of the hate movement and bigots down South who are against integration are beginning to charge King is tied in with communists. I stated I thought Marshall could very definitely say this association is rather widely known and, with things crystallizing for them now, nothing could be worse than for King to be associated with it.

100-106670-150

REC-64

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JUN 19 1963

JEH:rm (9)

1 - Miss Holmes

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 5:50 PM
DATE 6-17-63
BY

67 JUN 20 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont DATE: May 31, 1963

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING
RACIAL MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2ALM/MDL16

ELSUR

SA Don Roney of the New York Office advised that NY 3810-S* on 5/30/63 furnished information concerning a conversation on that date between Martin Luther King and Stanley Levison, who has been a secret Communist Party member and has contributed funds to the Communist Party on a regular basis. King stated that he had requested a conference with the President and the Attorney General because King thought that now was a good time for such a conference. Levison agreed. Levison stated that there has never been an Administration in this country that has been as worried about the Negro problem as the present one. Levison continued that this is brought about by the Administration's concern with the common market problem in Europe. It was Levison's opinion that United States prestige is very important at this time and the inability to control the racial situation was making it more difficult. It was Levison's opinion that the needs of the President are so great that he is all ready for a different policy if it can bring about the kind of controlled situation that he feels he needs.

King and Levison agreed that the situation has to be kept moving so that the President will have to look for an alternative. The President can then be presented with certain alternatives. This will benefit the President, for then his problem, fear of violence, will be done away with. It was Levison's thought that the President is all ready to make a change. A conference now would be fruitful, but if a conference cannot be worked out, then the movement must be enlarged. King stated that he would like to put so much pressure on the President that he would have to sign an Executive Order making segregation unconstitutional.

Levison said that the method of negotiating used in Birmingham will set the pattern for a whole series of southern cities. That is, you come in with a package, come up with demands, discuss them and come out with a victory. You ask for more than you expect to get. The goals of the movement, according to Levison, are desegregation, jobs and the right to vote. The

REC-72 132

1 - Mr. Mohr 1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach 1 - Mr. Sullivan

ST-102 11 JUN 13 1963 34

XEROX JUN 18 1963

CLM:cag (10)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is ~~limited~~ to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

XEROX JAN 17 1964

UNRECORDED

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING

methods to get them are direct action, nonviolence, and negotiations.

ACTION:

This information is being brought to the attention of the Attorney General and the Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President, by letter presently being prepared. [illegible] today [illegible]

[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM 1116 #MDR16
ON 11-8-00

May 31, 1963

TT6 -

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

5/31/63
delivered
via liaison
OSHB

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that on May 30, 1963, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley Levison held a discussion concerning a conference which Reverend Mr. King reportedly has requested with the President and the Attorney General.

Levison and Reverend Mr. King agreed that this is a good time for such a conference and Levison stated that no Administration has ever been as worried about the Negro problem as is the present Administration. Levison added that this is based upon the Administration's concern with the problems arising from the Common Market in Europe. Levison expressed the opinion that the prestige of the United States is very important at this time and that inability to control the racial situation makes the Administration's task more difficult. He also said that the President is ready for a different policy if it can bring about the kind of controlled situation that he feels he needs.

Reverend Mr. King and Levison agreed that it was necessary to keep the situation moving so that the President will be forced to look for an alternative. It was stated that the President can then be presented with certain alternatives which will benefit the Administration as the President's fear of violence will be done away with. Levison expressed the thought that the President is ready to make a change and that a conference at this time would be fruitful. He added that if a conference cannot be worked out, then the movement must be enlarged. Reverend Mr. King said

ED COPY FILED IN

100-106670-129

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

WLM:cag:mpd (14)

XEROX
JUN 5 1963

2 JUN 7 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

REC-120

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19 JUN 4 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

he would like to put so much pressure on the President that he will have to sign an Executive Order making segregation unconstitutional.

Levison stated that the method of negotiation used in Birmingham, Alabama, will set the pattern for a series of Southern cities. He explained this method by stating that you come in with a package, come up with demands, discuss them and come out with a victory, and that in doing so you ask for more than you expect to get. He described the goals of the movement as desegregation, jobs and the right to vote. He described the methods of obtaining these goals as being direct action, nonviolence and negotiation.

As previously mentioned to you, another source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in March, 1963, that Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party, United States of America, who contributes to the Communist Party on a regular basis.

I advised the Attorney General of the above information and he suggested that the President should see this letter.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE: This memorandum is being classified "Confidential" because it contains information from a source, the unauthorized disclosure of which would seriously impair the investigation of the Communist Party, USA, and such impairment could have an adverse effect upon the national defense interests of the country.

SECRET

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

February 5, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Reddy

C

Reference is made to your inquiry of Mr. Alex Rosen of this Bureau regarding the current Communist Party membership of Hunter Pitts O'Dell.

We have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party.

This information is, of course, highly sensitive and confidential.

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible] ON 11-8-00

REC- 63

100-358916 - 234

FEB 8 3 22 PM '63
REC'D - ROSEN

See cover memo Rosen to Belmont 2/5/63, same re.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

EBR:mtb/kmo
(10)

memo delivered to AAG Marshall's O 2/6/63 at 10:50 AM clm

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

30 FEB 18 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 2/5/63

FROM : A. Rosen

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY [illegible]

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division has asked that we give him a statement concerning the Communist Party affiliation of Hunter Pitts O'Dell. We have called to his attention current reports which have been furnished to the Security Division, Attention Mr. Walter Yeagley, concerning O'Dell's activities.

Marshall was interested in O'Dell's association with Rev. Martin Luther King and he was given a copy of a report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated 12/20/62 at New York, which was classified "Confidential", which had been disseminated to Walter Yeagley of the Security Division. This report reflected the current association of O'Dell and the organization of Rev. King, namely, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition to the above we also furnished him a copy of a memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated 12/6/62 and another dated 1/23/63, pertaining to O'Dell.

Marshall stated that upon review of the above information which was furnished to him, he would like to have a statement from the FBI concerning the present Communist affiliation of O'Dell, particularly, whether O'Dell actually is a member of the Communist Party at this time.

I advised Marshall that an appropriate memorandum would be prepared and furnished to him concerning his request. There is attached hereto a memorandum which has been prepared by the Security Division indicating that we have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party. It is being pointed out that this information is highly sensitive and confidential.

Enclosure (1)

REC- 63 100-358916-234

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

13 FEB 18 1963

AR:mpd (8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

By way of background, Marshall indicated that the basis for his request stems from the necessity of having to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to O'Dell. He stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to adequately handle this inquiry.

ACTION:

If approved, attached memorandum to Burke Marshall will be handed to him. It is brief and specifically points out the need to treat this information as highly sensitive and confidential.

Delivered
2/6/63 clw

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES G[illegible]N

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : A. Rosen

DATE: 2/4/63

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, aka Jack
SECURITY MATTER - C

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division called to state that he will have to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to Jack Hunter O'Dell.

noted

By way of background, he stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to talk to King about O'Dell.

Before Marshall can do this he states he would like to have whatever background information we have on O'Dell. In this regard, it is noted that O'Dell is supposed to be a member of the Communist Party and has in the past been associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. This is King's organization. We have in the past furnished information to the Department concerning O'Dell and his association with Rev. King.

Marshall should be furnished with memoranda which have heretofore been given to the Security Division. It is understood that a report of O'Dell's activities is also available and has been furnished to the Security Division but has not been given to the Civil Rights Division. It would appear that Marshall is entitled to this information if he is to properly evaluate O'Dell's background.

Marshall has asked for a summary on O'Dell. If such is not readily available, copies of material previously furnished to the Department would seem to suffice. He stated he has been in touch with the Attorney General on this matter and is anxious to have it handled as soon as possible.

AR:mpd (6)

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

REC-35

ST-112

100-[illegible]-36

FEB 7 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62 FEB 11 1963

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

January 31, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen, Attention: Lavin
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Forsyth

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - C

In response to your inquiry of Assistant Director Courtney A. Evans on January 30, 1963, you are advised that Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., accompanied by Hunter Pitts O'Dell and eight other officials of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), arrived in Savannah, Georgia, aboard Delta Airlines Flight Number 427 in the early morning of January 10, 1963. This group was met at the Savannah air terminal by Stanley Levison and the entire group departed Savannah in two automobiles.

Levison departed Savannah by train en route to New York City on the evening of January 11, 1963, while King, O'Dell and three other officials of the SCLC held reservations with the Delta Airlines for the morning of January 12, 1963. King, in a party of five, departed Savannah en route to Atlanta on Delta Airlines Flight Number 422 on the morning of January 12, 1963.

100-106670

REC- 22

EX-102

19 FEB 1 1963

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2

RECD-READING ROOM

JAN 31 11 10 AM '63

FBI

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Levison, a secret member of the CP, and O'Dell, a concealed member of the National Committee of the CP, are not characterized in the body of the letter as they have been characterized in previous communications to the Department. AAG Marshall requested advice as to whether there was any information available indicating a meeting between the individuals referred to above had occurred as scheduled. We are not in possession of any information as to the nature of the meeting involved other than the statement by Levison that it was to be a "closeted review of where they are--a critical review," which information is in the possession of Marshall.

TDR:mea
(11) mea

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MAILED 25
JAN 31 1963
COMM-FBI

FEB 5 1963

RECEIVED-DIRECT

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 14

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 PLM/JSS

62-116395-964
ENCLOSURE

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Mr. Callahan____
Mr. Conrad____
Mr. DeLoach____
Mr. Evans____
Mr. Gale____
Mr. Rosen____
Mr. Sullivan____
Mr. Tavel____
Mr. Trotter____
Tele. Room____
Miss Holmes____
Miss Gandy____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
DATE: 1/22/64

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
NEGRO QUESTION
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Rogers
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

Pursuant to a request from the Director, there is attached a summary of information concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., which clearly demonstrates the communist influence upon him as well as his moral degeneracy.

This information, which is "~~TOP SECRET,~~" is for possible use by the Director in his appearance before the House Appropriations Committee. It will be noted that a portion of the attached material is marked "OBSCENE."

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information and use of the Director.

Enc.

100-3-116

SFP:eeb/erc
(8)

WCS

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

42

The racial unrest in the United States is currently the target for a determined concentration of communist effort. Long-range communist strategy includes the establishment of a Negro-labor coalition which the communists hope to be able to manipulate, as a powerful political-action weapon. They aim, thus, to provoke class struggle and promote legislation which can serve as a step toward a communist system of government. This constitutes a serious national security problem, since the individual playing a most dominant role as a leading spokesman for the estimated 20 million Negroes in this country today is knowingly, willingly, and regularly cooperating with and taking guidance from communists. An in-depth view of this individual, Martin Luther King, Jr., will serve to illustrate how he functions as a channel through which communist efforts are being directed against the Negroes and, therefore, against this country. It depicts, too, a Moral degenerate [redacted] of such magnitude as to blaspheme the title of "Reverend" which he carries.

King — The Communist Pawn

King, who is a copastor with his father of the Ebenezer Baptist Church, Atlanta, Georgia, and the recipient of Bachelor of Divinity and Doctor of Philosophy Degrees, is considered and described within the Communist Party-USA (CPUSA) as a Marxist. sensitive foreign intelligence operation

#MDE16 DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/776 ON 11-2-00

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

He has been closely aligned with communists for several years and has shown not only a willingness, but at times even an eagerness, to associate and confer with communist leaders and to work closely with and rely upon the advice and guidance of dedicated communists -- this despite the fact that they have been reliably identified to him as such. In February, 1962, Stanley David Levison, a secret Communist Party (CP) member, passed the word to the Party's General Secretary, Gus Hall, that "King is a wholehearted Marxist who has studied it (Marxism), believes in it, agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly."

Levison -- Key Communist Directing King

Levison, one of the individuals exerting the most influence upon King and who has greatly facilitated King's rise to prominence, is a shrewd, dedicated communist and is known as such by King. Since the late 1940's Levison has played a highly clandestine role in which he was entrusted by the Party to raise and handle secret funds used to finance some of the Party's activities. In 1961 Levison was Assistant Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which is headed by King.

Sensitive foreign intelli
operation

Since 195[illegible] Levison has expended much effort in King's behalf in such activities as: actively involving himself in fund-raising drives for King; serving as King's legal counsel in selected matters; preparing speech material for King; assisting in the mechanics of some demonstrations in which King was involved; guiding King as to acceptance or rejection of public appearances and speaking commitments; and helping King with matters related to the latter's writings.

King's Reliance on O'Dell, A National Party Functionary

Another key communist through whom the Party exerts influence on King is Hunter Pitts O'Dell who, at the Party's last National Convention in 1959, was elected a member of its second highest governing body, the National Committee. His election was under a pseudonym. In 1960, while working as an assistant to the Party's National Secretary for the South, James Jackson, O'Dell also began to work actively in support of King's movement. In June, 1962, King sought Levison's counsel concerning the addition of an administrative assistant to King's staff. As a result of Levison's recommendation of O'Dell, the latter associated himself with the SCLC in Atlanta, Georgia, under the name J. H. O'Dell and also served the SCLC in its New York office. In October, 1962, several newspaper articles exposed O'Dell's connection with the SCLC and his communist affiliations, as a result of which King announced O'Dell's temporary resignation pending an inquiry.

This "temporary resignation" consisted of O'Dell's return to New York City where he continued to perform services for the SCLC until July, 1963, [redacted]

Jones — The Intermediary

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Despite the great pains being taken by the principals involved to keep the King-Levison connection secret, Bureau agents have observed them together on three different occasions since November, 1963.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Homosexual Rustin -- Liaison With Communist Party-USA

Rustin himself is an interesting link in the King "combine." He has long been inclined toward homosexual activities and in 1953 was sentenced to serve 60 days for offering to engage in an act of sex perversion of a homosexual nature, which he admitted. Rustin has also publicly admitted affiliations with the communist movement in the late 1930's and was one of a select group of observers permitted to attend the Party's 16th National Convention in 1957. He also has maintained contact with the Party's National Secretary, Benjamin J. Davis,

[redacted]

[redacted] Much of the Party's influence in the Negro field to date has been clandestine in nature. If the Party fully implements its current plans, we may expect to see more open and aggressive actions in its attempts to further influence, infiltrate, dominate and recruit the American Negro — just one more step in its ultimate goal of establishing a communist state within our boundaries.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[JFK

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

END: ~~TOP SECRET~~ - OFF THE RECORD

End

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 10, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice

#mDF16

10/13/00 SP-2ALM/JTG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter of September 29, 1975, listing certain documents and other information desired from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum in response to some of the requests.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JDM:lek (10) lek

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

DELIVERED TO [illegible] 10-10-75
[illegible] TO [illegible] 10-13-75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training ____
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

10 - ENCLOSURE

REC-30

ST-111

62-116395 - 965

15 NOV 4 1975

84 NOV 5 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
FBI
OCT 10 11 05 AM '75

RECEIVED
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE DIV.
OCT 9 10 15 AM 1975

RECEIVED
OCT 9 3 10 PM '75
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

RECEIVED
OCT 10 1 48 AM 1975
LEGAL COUNSEL

OCT 10 9 06 AM '75
REC'D
CORRESPONDENCE REVIEW
FBI

The Attorney General

NOTE:

A copy of SSC letter 9/29/75 is attached to the file copy of the enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice
October 10, 1975

62-116395

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP2ALM/JHG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General dated September 29, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 29, 1975, request, and specifically to the following items in that request: Items 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18.

Concerning Item 18 in which you requested all versions of Section 122 of the Manual of Instructions which were in effect from 1955 through 1965, we have determined Section 122 was created by Manual of Instructions Revision Number 185, dated February 6, 1959, and was subsequently revised on July 30, 1959. Copies of these two revisions are being furnished in response to Item 18. You have previously been furnished all subsequent revisions.

1 - The Attorney General

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395 - 3rd 965

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]N.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 29, 1975

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/TTB

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
  Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Enclosed is a document request for materials pertaining to the King matter.

I would like to set October 6, 1975 as a deadline for delivery of all outstanding previously-requested documents pertaining to the King matter and October 13, 1975 for delivery of all documents requested on the attached list.

I would also appreciate your arranging a briefing for Mike Epstein for sometime this week by knowledgable FBI personnel concerning:

A. The present location and organization of any files and materials which were found to be in William C. Sullivan's Bureau office when he was denied further access thereto in or about September 1971; and

B. A description of the contents of such files and materials.

Finally, we would like to have access to the Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1962. The materials in these "DJ" files will be reviewed pursuant to the terms of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department, i.e., subsequent to review of such files certain items will be orally designated to be screened for delivery.

SEP

Sincerely,

62-116395 965

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ENCLOSURE

KING DOCUMENT REQUEST

1.

(DELETED)

Call Dunn in Atlanta

T. Seabury

2. All materials relating to rental or other arrangements made by the FBI for the use of an apartment or premises located in the Peachtree Towers, Atlanta, Georgia, as a listening post, as well as all materials relating to the termination of such arrangements, use, and/or occupancy.

call file

3. Access to all Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") for Special Agent Alden F. Miller for the years 1960-1968.

all file → WFO & Lab

4. Any materials reflecting dates upon which Special Agent William D. Campbell, while attached to the Washington Field Office, was on special or temporary assignment at FBI Headquarters (Laboratory or Intelligence Division), between January 1, 1964 and the date of his transfer to the Laboratory Division at FBI Headquarters.

5. Materials which would reflect the authority and instructions issued for FBI personnel to surveil, monitor, investigate and/or report on civil rights demonstrations, protests, rallies, or marches which involved Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference prior to October 23, 1962.

6. Materials reflecting authority for and instructions issued prior to October 23, 1962, with respect to developing "any information. . . concerning the SCLC relating to racial matters (which) must be reported under the racial matters caption," and the maintenance of "a separate file on SCLC relating to racial incidents (157-632)." (See first paragraph on page 2 of October 23, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security - C")

Nugent

7. All materials reflecting proposals, recommendations or decisions to include Martin Luther King on the Security, Reserve, Rabble-Rouser, and/or Agitator Index or list, and/or his designation as a Key Activist, Key Black Extremists, Top Functionary and/or Key Figure.

8. All materials from August 28, 1963 to December 31, 1964 which pertain to the distribution by the United States Information Agency of a film of the march on Washington, including such materials as concern or reflect contacts or correspondence between the FBI and the USIA or between the FBI and the White House concerning such film.

9. SAC Letter No. 59-2, dated 1/13/59, including the Security letter attached thereto pertaining to Racial Matters.

10. The Manual changes referred to in the Racial Matters section of the Security letter identified in Item 9 above.

11. Memorandum from Mr. Rosen to the Director, dated 1/7/59 captioned "Racial Matters" that is referenced in the proposed letter to all SAC/s which was typed on 1/7/59 and which became the Racial Matters section of Item 9 above.

ok 12. Memorandum dated February 11, 1960, from W. B. Wette (WETTE) to A. Rosen, captioned "Racial Matters." Manual Has

Call EXTEN

ok 13. Airtel to all offices dated February 12, 1960, captioned "Racial Matters." Manual has

ok 14. Memorandum dated June 26, 1963, from Mr. Rosen to Mr. Belmont, captioned "Racial Matters." Manual has

ok 15. Airtel dated June 27, 1963 from the Director to all continental offices, captioned "Racial Matters." Manual has

ok 16. Memorandum dated January 23, 1959, from Mr. Rosen to the Director, captioned "Bombing Matters or Racial Matters (New Classification)." Manual has

ok 17. SAC letter sent on 1/28/59 which was attached to the memorandum identified in Item 16 above. Enc 2/13/59 Manual

18. All versions of Section 122 of the Manual of Instructions which were in effect from 1955 through 1965. Manual

19. All materials reflecting correspondence, contacts, or communications, or proposed correspondence contacts, or communications, between FBI personnel and:

Tunstall

A. Samuel Riley Pierce, Jr.

B. Dr. Frank R. Barnett

(See memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, dated January 8, 1964, captioned "Samuel Riley Pierce, Jr., 280 Park Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.")

20. All materials reflecting correspondence between any FBI headquarters personnel and former Chief of Police Jenkins, Atlanta, Georgia, concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference from January 1, 1960 through April 1968.

21. All materials pertaining to (a) the nomination, and (b) the selection, of Martin Luther King, Jr., for the Nobel Prize.

Seems that we answered a similar ? previously B.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document:
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/29/75 request, Items 12,13,14,15, 16, and 17 and 18

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by:
Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/TAG

62-116395-965

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 9/29/75, items 12 thru 18

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
[illegible]
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/lr/TG

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr and Southern Christian Leadership Conference: Various memoranda captioned "Racial Matters or Bombing Matters; SAC letter 1/28/59; Manual section 122.

62-116395

FMK:fmk

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

51W0 C/B

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

Tolson

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director DATE: January 23, 1959

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: BOMBING MATTERS OR RACIAL MATTERS (NEW CLASSIFICATION)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/TTE

#mDR16

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The attached SAC Letter is to inform the field of the new classification to be used in connection with correspondence carrying the character racial matters or bombing matters. This classification will be used in opening new cases carrying racial matters or bombing matters. It will not be necessary for either the field or the Bureau to change the classification number of existing cases or correspondence.

The Records Branch has been consulted and is agreeable to the new classification "157." New sections and changes for manuals and handbooks are being prepared and will be forwarded to the field.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached SAC Letter be approved and forwarded.

1 - Inspector H. L. Edwards

Enclosure sent
1-28-59

FHF:bhg
(6)

REC- 13

52 FEB 11 1959

23 JAN 30 1959

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SSC REQUEST 9/29/75
ITEM 17

#MR216
10/13/00 SP2 ALM) #16

Sir.965

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed January 23, 1959)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

6 F.

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: BOMBING MATTERS
OR RACIAL MATTERS
(NEW CLASSIFICATION)

#mDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Dear Sir:

All correspondence and new cases opened under ~~carrying~~ the character bombing matters or racial matters should ~~also~~ carry the classification "157." It will not be necessary to change the classification number of ~~existing cases or~~ correspondence. relating to existing cases.

New sections and changes for manuals and handbook are being prepared and will be forwarded to your office.

This information should be brought to the attention of all personnel handling this type of investigation and they should become thoroughly familiar with the new manual sections, manual changes and handbook changes when they are received in your office.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

66-04-3825

ENCLOSURE

10

(E) BOMBING MATTERS OR RACIAL MATTERS (NEW CLASSIFICATION) -- All correspondence and new cases opened under the character bombing matters or racial matters should carry the classification "157." It will not be necessary to change the classification number of correspondence relating to existing cases.

New sections and changes for manuals and handbook are being prepared and will be forwarded to your office.

This information should be brought to the attention of all personnel handling this type of investigation and they should become thoroughly familiar with the new manual sections, manual changes and handbook changes when they are received in your office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (B)'

SSC REQUEST 9/29/75
ITEM 18

Sel 1965

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JFG

February 6, 1959

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
REVISION NUMBER 185

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages for inclusion in the Manual of Instructions. Revisions may be noted by brackets. The dates appearing at the bottom of the pages indicate the dates of revisions. The old corresponding pages should be removed from the Manual and destroyed. The Special Agent in Charge has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

Volume II
  Table of Contents - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

  Section 23 - (New section)
    Pages ~~1~~ and 2
    ~~Page 3~~

Volume III
  Section 87 - Pages ~~89 and 90~~ iwl
    (Delete pages 88a and 88b)

Volume IV
  Table of Contents - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

  Section 122 - (New section)
    ~~Pages 1~~ and 2
    ~~Page 3~~

Index - ~~Pages 5 and 6~~
  Pages ~~31 and 32~~
  Pages ~~39 and 40~~

FMDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JJG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (10)

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

SECTION 114. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS

A. Statutes and Elements.................................. 1
B. Departmental Instructions.............................. 1
C. Possible Violations (Not All-Inclusive)............ 1
D. Pertinent Court Decisions............................. 2
E. Policy... 2
F. Investigative Procedure............................... 3
G. Venue... 3
H. Classification.. 3
I. Character.. 3
J. Penalties - Maximum.................................... 3

SECTION 115. INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS

A. Statute... 1
B. Violation.. 1
C. Investigative Procedure............................... 2
D. Venue... 2
E. Classification.. 2
F. Character.. 2

SECTION 116. MISCELLANEOUS - CIVIL SUITS

A. Background.. 1
B. Policy... 1
C. Classification.. 1
D. Character.. 1

SECTION 117. DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES

A. Statutes.. 1
B. Violations... 3
C. Venue... 3
D. Policy... 4
E. Investigative Procedure............................... 4
F. Prosecution... 5
G. Classification.. 5
H. Character.. 5

SECTION 118. SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT

A. Statutes.. 1
B. Elements.. 1
C. Policy... 2
D. Venue... 3
E. Classification.. 3
F. Character.. 3

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

SECTION 119. INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 1
C. Policy and Procedures 1
D. Venue 1
E. Classification 1
F. Character 1

SECTION 120. AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 2
C. Investigative Procedure 2
D. Venue 2
E. Classification 3
F. Character 3

SECTION 121. WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 1
C. Department Instructions 1
D. Investigative Procedure 1
E. Classification 1
F. Character 1
G. Penalty 1

SECTION 122. RACIAL MATTERS

A. Investigations of Klan-Type Organizations, Hate Organizations, and Associated Individuals 1
B. Classification 3
C. Character 3

INDEX

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

A. INVESTIGATIONS OF KLAN-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS, HATE ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS

1. While these are considered criminal investigations, they are considered delicate in nature and require the application of the restrictions necessary in conducting security-type investigations. Therefore, the investigations and reports are to be handled in accordance with the general rules applying to security-type investigations.
2. Caution
   Extreme care must be exercised to insure that in every instance there is a proper basis for investigation. Sound judgment must be used to avoid investigation of organizations or individuals that merely sponsor unpopular causes or propaganda but do not meet the standards outlined under item 3a below. The Bureau must insure that there will be no justifiable basis for any charge that these investigations infringe upon constitutional freedoms of speech, press, or assemblage.
3. Investigations
   a. Investigation is confined to those organizations or associated individuals that either:
      (1) Have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450
      (2) Have not been designated under Executive Order 10450 but there is an actual or alleged affiliation or subsidiary relation with a designated organization
      (3) Have adopted a policy or have allegedly adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution
      (4) Have allegedly committed acts of violence
      (5) Have actually or allegedly committed violations of laws within the Bureau's jurisdiction
   b. During the investigation of Klan-type organizations and hate organizations, the following information should be obtained:
      (1) Organization structure
         (a) Headquarters
         (b) Officers
         (c) Location of klaverns or local chapters
      (2) Objectives
      (3) Publications and propaganda
      (4) Finances
      (5) Activity of klaverns or local chapters
         (a) Name and address
         (b) Officers
         (c) Estimated membership and recruiting activities
         (d) Meetings
            I. Date
            II. Type (open or closed)
            III. Place
            IV. Estimated attendance
   c. Follow through public source material and established sources activities of organizations which do not qualify for investigation under above standards. Initiate investigation upon receipt of information which brings organization within investigative criteria and at the same time advise Bureau this action taken and basis therefor.
   d. Conduct no investigation regarding individual acts of violence allegedly or actually committed by an organization in absence of information indicating violation within Bureau's jurisdiction. However, concerning each such incident, the following information should be obtained through informants and sources in connection with investigations of such organizations:

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(1) Which group involved
(2) Whether action taken was on initiative of individual members or with knowledge or approval of leadership

In initial communication reporting violent act, advise if there is or is not indication of organization participation.

If act of violence is a criminal violation over which Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation; if the act of violence is a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

e. Agents are not to attend functions or rallies of any Klan or hate group although open to the public.

f. These investigations must be both vigorous and incisive. The fundamental objective is to identify those who may be engaged or responsible for acts of violence, and care must be taken to avoid becoming involved in widespread, nebulous investigation which does not go to the heart of the problem at hand. When a case is opened, it should receive immediate continuous attention until the initial allegation is resolved. The case should be promptly closed if it is definitely determined that it does not fall within the criteria set out in item 3a above.

g. Individual cases should be opened on officers, leaders, and active workers in these organizations to determine whether they have been involved in acts of violence or have a definite potential for future acts of violence. Good judgment and discretion must be exercised in the case of prominent individuals who may be dupes of such organizations and who may hold nominal office. Immediately advise the Bureau when investigation of a prominent person is contemplated; and if there is any question as to whether there is sufficient probable cause to fully justify investigation, no investigation should be conducted without Bureau approval.

h. Names of members in attendance at meetings should not be set out in investigative reports but should be indexed from informant reports. Names of new members should be furnished the Bureau by letter for indexing purposes.

4. Informants and interviews

a. In order that the Bureau may discharge its responsibilities, it is mandatory that information be obtained regarding all pertinent Klan or hate organization activities. In this regard it is necessary that informants be developed in all such organizations which meet the criteria set forth in 3a above. Efforts in this regard must be discreet.

b. Preliminary interviews with rank-and-file members of an organization and other individuals not connected with such organizations conducted solely for the purpose of determining the attitude of the individual may be authorized by the SAC. To obtain authority from the SAC, credit, arrest, informant, and indices checks should be made and a memorandum prepared for the SAC setting forth this information so that he may make a decision regarding the propriety of the interview. Officials of local groups or national officers are not to be interviewed without prior Bureau authority. Likewise where a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, and the like,

[specific Bureau authority must be obtained. Two Agents should be
[present when an organization official is interviewed and, if possible,
[two Agents should be present at interviews with organization members.
[During such an interview, no attempt should be made to develop the
[individual as an informant; but if he is cooperative and has a
[potential for development as an informant, complete background infor-
[mation should be obtained and specific Bureau authority requested
[to develop him as an informant.
[c. Bureau authority not necessary prior to interview with organization
[members in criminal- or applicant-type cases; however, interview
[should be confined to subject matter of inquiry, unless data
[concerning organization volunteered by interviewee.
[d. Submit by September 15 and March 15 each year letter captioned
["Semiannual listing of Klan and hate organizations and informant
[coverage," Bureau file #157-1, containing:
[(1) Names of Klan and hate organizations active in your territory
[(2) Coverage of each Klan broken down by klaverns and each hate
[organization broken down into local chapters showing identities
[of informants and sources reporting on each
[(3) Estimated membership by klaverns or chapters and basis for
[estimate

[B. CLASSIFICATION - 157

[C. CHARACTER - RACIAL MATTERS]

July 30, 1959

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
REVISION NUMBER 196

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages for inclusion in the Manual of Instructions. Revisions may be noted by brackets. The dates appearing at the bottom of the pages indicate the dates of revisions. The old corresponding pages should be removed from the Manual and destroyed. The Special Agent in Charge has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

Volume I
  Section 7 - Pages ~~7-11 and 12~~
    Pages ~~19 and 20~~
    ~~Pages 21 and 22~~

Volume II
  Section 23 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
    Pages ~~3 and 4~~

  Section 42 - Page ~~1~~

Volume III
  Section 66 - Page ~~7~~ ✓
    Pages 7a and 8 ✓

  Section 87 - ~~Pages 33 and 34~~
    Pages ~~53 and 54~~

Volume IV
  Section 102 - Pages ~~23 and 24~~

  Section 105 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

  Section 108 - ~~Pages 7 and 8~~
    ~~Pages 11 and 12~~
    Page ~~13~~

  Section 122 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~ ✓
    Pages ~~3 and 4~~
    Pages ~~5 and 6~~
    Page ~~7~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

A. INVESTIGATIONS OF KLAN-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS, HATE ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS

1. While these are considered criminal investigations, they are considered delicate in nature and require the application of the restrictions necessary in conducting security-type investigations. Therefore, the investigations and reports are to be handled in accordance with the general rules applying to security-type investigations.

2. Caution

Extreme care must be exercised to insure that in every instance there is a proper basis for investigation. Sound judgment must be used to avoid investigation of organizations or individuals that merely sponsor unpopular causes or propaganda but do not meet the standards outlined under item 3a below. The Bureau must insure that there will be no justifiable basis for any charge that these investigations infringe upon constitutional freedoms of speech, press, or assemblage.

3. Investigations

a. Investigation is confined to those organizations or associated individuals that either:
- (1) Have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450
- (2) Have not been designated under Executive Order 10450 but there is an actual or alleged affiliation or subsidiary relation with a designated organization
- (3) Have adopted a policy or have allegedly adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution
- (4) Have allegedly committed acts of violence
- (5) Have actually or allegedly committed violations of laws within the Bureau's jurisdiction

b. During the investigation of Klan-type organizations and hate organizations, the following information should be obtained:
- (1) Organization structure
  - (a) Headquarters
  - (b) Officers
  - (c) Location of klaverns or local chapters
- (2) Objectives
- (3) Publications and propaganda
- (4) Finances
- (5) Activity of klaverns or local chapters
  - (a) Name and address
  - (b) Officers
  - (c) Estimated membership and recruiting activities
  - (d) Meetings
    - I. Date
    - II. Type (open or closed)
    - III. Place
    - IV. Estimated attendance

c. Follow through public source material and established sources activities of organizations which do not qualify for investigation under above standards. Initiate investigation upon receipt of information which brings organization within investigative criteria and at the same time advise Bureau this action taken and basis therefor.

d. Conduct no investigation regarding individual acts of violence allegedly or actually committed by an organization in absence of information indicating violation within Bureau's jurisdiction. However, concerning each such incident, the following information should be obtained through informants and sources in connection with investigations of such organizations:

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

(1) Which group involved
(2) Whether action taken was on initiative of individual members or with knowledge or approval of leadership

In initial communication reporting violent act, advise if there is or is not indication of organization participation.

If act of violence is a criminal violation over which Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation; if the act of violence is a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

e. Agents are not to attend functions or rallies of any Klan or hate group although open to the public.

f. These investigations must be both vigorous and incisive. The fundamental objective is to identify those who may be engaged or responsible for acts of violence, and care must be taken to avoid becoming involved in widespread, nebulous investigation which does not go to the heart of the problem at hand. When a case is opened, it should receive immediate continuous attention until the initial allegation is resolved. The case should be promptly closed if it is definitely determined that it does not fall within the criteria set out in item 3a above.

g. Individual cases should be opened on officers, leaders, and active workers in these organizations to determine whether they have been involved in acts of violence or have a definite potential for future acts of violence. [Wholesale investigations of individuals of these organizations should not be conducted and investigations of individual members should be initiated only on a most selective basis. Individuals investigated should be those who are key personnel who actually formulate and carry out the organization's policy and not those individuals who merely attend meetings on a regular basis. If there is any question as to whether such an investigation should be initiated, the facts should be presented to the Bureau for its consideration.]

Immediately advise the Bureau when investigation of a prominent person is contemplated; and if there is any question as to whether there is sufficient probable cause to fully justify investigation, no investigation should be conducted without Bureau approval.

[The Bureau should be advised by letter of the information obtained, together with a statement as to whether the individual warrants inclusion on the potential bombing suspects list of your office. If investigation indicates that the individual should not be included, the case may then be closed administratively. If the subject is included on the list, the matter should be handled in accordance with instructions set forth in section 23, volume II, of this manual concerning bombing matters.]

h. Names of members in attendance at meetings should not be set out in investigative reports but should be indexed from informant's [statements.] Names of new members should be furnished the Bureau by letter for indexing purposes.

4. Informants and interviews

a. In order that the Bureau may discharge its responsibilities, it is mandatory that information be obtained regarding all pertinent Klan or hate organization activities. In this regard it is necessary that informants be developed in all such organizations which meet the criteria set forth in 3a above. Efforts in this regard must be discreet.

b. Preliminary interviews with rank-and-file members of an organization and other individuals not connected with such organizations conducted solely for the purpose of determining the attitude of the individual may be authorized by the SAC. To obtain authority from the SAC, credit, arrest, informant, and indices checks should be made and a memorandum prepared for the SAC setting forth this information so that he may make a decision regarding the propriety of the interview. Officials of local groups or national officers are not to be interviewed without prior Bureau authority. Likewise where a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, and the like, specific Bureau authority must be obtained. Two Agents should be present when an organization official is interviewed and, if possible, two Agents should be present at interviews with organization members. During such an interview, no attempt should be made to develop the individual as an informant; but if he is cooperative and has a potential for development as an informant, complete background information should be obtained and specific Bureau authority requested to develop him as an informant.

c. Bureau authority not necessary prior to interview with organization members in criminal- or applicant-type cases; however, interview should be confined to subject matter of inquiry, unless data concerning organization volunteered by interviewee.

[d. Original and one copy of semiannual letter captioned "Klan Organizations, Hate Organizations and Racial Informants, Racial Matters, Bombing Matters," to be submitted according to schedule set out below. Where there is no pertinent activity or information, a negative statement should be made.

January 1 and July 1	January 15 and July 15
Albany	Birmingham
Albuquerque	Boston
Atlanta	Butte
Baltimore	Chicago
February 1 and August 1	February 15 and August 15
Buffalo	Cincinnati
Charlotte	Detroit
Dallas	El Paso
Denver	Kansas City
March 1 and September 1	March 15 and September 15
Cleveland	Houston
Indianapolis	Louisville
Jacksonville	Milwaukee
Los Angeles	New Orleans

April 1 and October 1

Memphis
Newark
New Haven
Oklahoma City
St. Louis

April 15 and October 15

Omaha
Phoenix
New York
Knoxville

May 1 and November 1

Miami
Norfolk
Philadelphia
Portland
San Antonio

May 15 and November 15

Little Rock
Pittsburgh
Salt Lake City
San Diego

June 1 and December 1

Mobile
Richmond
Springfield
San Francisco

June 15 and December 15

Seattle
Savannah
Minneapolis
Washington Field

e. The semiannual letter should not be disseminated outside the Bureau, should be given proper security in field office, and should contain following information. Where there is no pertinent activity or information, a negative statement should be made.

(1) Klan Organizations, Hate Organizations, and Informant coverage
  (a) Names of Klan and hate organizations active in your territory
  (b) Coverage of each Klan broken down by Klaverns and each hate organization broken down into local chapters showing identities of informants and sources reporting on each
  (c) Estimated membership by Klavern or chapter and basis for estimate

(2) Racial informants by geographic location
List the following under headquarters city and each resident agency within your division:
  (a) Symbol numbers of all racial informants with indications as to which are regularly paid
  (b) List of names or symbol numbers of all approved potential racial informants indicating those regularly paid
  (c) List of name or symbol number of each confidential source indicating those which are regularly paid

(3) Individuals under pending investigation
List of individuals being investigated under provisions of section 23, volume II and section 122, volume IV, of this Manual, other than potential bombing suspects.

(4) Potential Bombing Suspects
List of potential bombing suspects of your office including description, basis of selection, and other areas in which individual should be considered as suspect.

[B. GENERAL RACIAL MATTERS

[1. Jurisdiction

[The Bureau does not have investigative jurisdiction over such general racial matters, as race riots, civil demonstrations, and similar developments except in instances in which the action is a violation of statute over which the Bureau has jurisdiction or some subversive influence is at work. Insofar as Federal jurisdiction in general racial matters is concerned, U. S. Army regulations place responsibility upon the Army to keep advised of any developments of a civil disturbance nature which may require the rendering of assistance to civil authorities or the intervention of Federal troops. OSI and ONI have collateral responsibility under Army in such matters and copies of pertinent documents disseminated to Army concerning such matter should be furnished to OSI and ONI.

[2. Policy

[a. As an intelligence function the Bureau does have the responsibility of advising appropriate Government agencies and officials on both a national and local level of all pertinent information obtained concerning such incidents. In this connection it is the personal responsibility of each SAC to make the necessary arrangements to

insure that all developments of this type occurring within his territory are promptly reported to his office and upon receipt thereof furnished to the Bureau by whatever form of communication is warranted under the circumstances.

b. Since the Bureau does not have investigative jurisdiction in general racial matters, no open investigation is to be conducted concerning general racial matters as such.

c. In instances in which civil rights may be involved or in which a racial incident may involve an act which constitutes a criminal violation over which the Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation. Likewise, if the incident involves a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

d. In instances in which some subversive influence is determined to be at work, be guided by instructions pertaining to investigation of the specific subversive influence involved.

e. CAUTION. By their very nature racial matters are extremely delicate and great care must be exercised in the approach to such matters.

3. Procedures

a. Information dealing with general racial matters, such as proposed or actual activities of individuals, officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc., in the racial field, must be furnished to the Bureau expeditiously by whatever means of communication is warranted by the specific nature of the information and the circumstances involved.

b. Pertinent information bearing on general racial matters which would not otherwise be available to interested Government agencies, such as that obtained through sources and informants, and which is of such a nature that it would normally be furnished to the Bureau by letter or airtel must be transmitted to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. In general, pertinent information bearing on general racial matters appearing in newspapers or publications need not be furnished to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. In such instances merely submit copies of pertinent newspaper articles and publications to the Bureau. Of course, if such data is clearly of a nature as to require contacts with appropriate sources, such as information of unusual local or national importance, submit same expeditiously in form suitable for dissemination. Concisely summarize the pertinent article and include therein the results of contacts with appropriate sources.

c. Maintain contact with pertinent informants and sources and keep Bureau and local intelligence agencies advised of any additional pertinent developments. Unless circumstances clearly indicate necessity for more expeditious handling, furnish such additional data to the Bureau promptly in form suitable for dissemination.

d. In many instances situations involving members of the Negro and Caucasian races result in violations of criminal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. While such matters are to be handled in accordance with instructions pertaining to the substantive violation involved, the Bureau has the additional responsibility of disseminating pertinent information concerning any racial aspects of such situations to appropriate Government officials and agencies that do not ordinarily receive reports in criminal matters. Therefore, the submission of a report concerning the criminal violation involved alone is insufficient. In general, pertinent data concerning the racial situation involved must be submitted immediately to Bureau in form suitable for dissemination in order that it may reach interested agencies as soon as possible.

[e. Where information is received in connection with racial matters indicating that individuals or organizations have resorted to or contemplate resorting to violence, you must

(1) Immediately advise the Bureau of full facts by expeditious means depending upon urgency of circumstances

(2) Immediately advise appropriate law enforcement agency having jurisdiction in the matter unless it is already cognizant. If a compelling reason exists for not so advising the pertinent law enforcement agency, such as the possibility of exposing the informant furnishing the information, immediately furnish the Bureau with full facts. Include therein recommendations as to what other trustworthy local or state law enforcement agencies or officials may be used as intermediaries through whom the information in question may be furnished to the law enforcement agency actually having jurisdiction in such a manner as to fully protect the specific informant and the Bureau as the source thereof.

(3) Immediately advise the local office of military intelligence

(4) Contact all appropriate informants and sources to determine if they possess any additional pertinent data concerning the matter and instruct them to be alert for and to promptly furnish to you any such pertinent data obtained.

(5) Prepare and submit pertinent data to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. Include in the communication the results of contacts with appropriate sources and informants; the time and date that local agencies were advised; and the identities of the individuals so advised. (Where information is furnished to an intermediary official or law enforcement agency and not to the agency actually having jurisdiction, set forth in the cover page the reasons for such procedure.) Submit communication same day original information received except where original information is received after normal working hours, when communication is to be submitted beginning of next workday.

(6) Maintain contact with pertinent informants and sources and keep Bureau, pertinent local law enforcement agency, and local intelligence agencies advised of any additional pertinent developments as they occur. Unless circumstances clearly indicate necessity for more expeditious handling, furnish such additional data to Bureau and intelligence agencies in form suitable for dissemination.

[C. CLASSIFICATION - 157

[D. CHARACTER - RACIAL MATTERS. If it relates to general racial matters, "Racial Matters" followed by name of community and/or state to which information relates.]

2 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

The Attorney General

October 10, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDE16

10/13/00 SP2ALM/JG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC request dated October 2, 1975. Attached is the original of a memorandum, with enclosures, responding to request Number 1 in referenced communication.

A copy of the memorandum is also being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (5)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

EWL:lhb lhb
(9)

REC-30 62-116395-966

3-ENCLOSURE ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 NOV 7 1975

GPO 974-546

1

2 - Mr. J[illegible]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

62-116395

October 10, 1975

#MOR16

SP-2ALM/JF/6

10/13/00

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to letter from Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC Staff to Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, dated October 2, 1975, which attached request for FBI and Department of Justice materials.

Request Number 1 related to all material pertaining to a meeting among Mr. D. E. Moore, Mr. A. H. Belmont and Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach on or about February 27, 1965, regarding FBI mail intercept operations. The following documents are enclosed responsive to this request:

1. Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Tolson, subject "The Long Committee," dated February 27, 1965.

2. Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, et al., from Mr. Hoover, dated March 1, 1965.

3. Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, et al., from Mr. Hoover, dated March 2, 1965.

Request Number 2 in attachment to referenced letter is receiving expeditious attention and will be responded to as soon as possible.

Enclosures (3)

1 - The Attorney General

EWL:lhb lhb
(8)

WOC

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

62-116395-966

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECT[illegible]
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF C[illegible]EL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United State[illegible] Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 2, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached are requests for FBI and Department of Justice materials. Please consider these to be priority requests.

ZTE 407

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc Paul V. Daly

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/ERS
#MDE16

1st to AG 1-DAC
EWL:lhb 10/10/75 Enc. 5

1-Ad Hoc
10-2-75

62-116395-966

Additional Requests Regarding FBI Mail Intercepts

1. All material pertaining to a meeting between Mr. D. E. Moore, Mr. A. H. Belmont, and Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach on or about February 27, 1965 regarding FBI mail intercept operations.

2. All material pertaining to an FBI mail opening project in regard to a suspected Soviet or Soviet-bloc illegal agent who resided in Riverside, California and occurred for approximately four to eight weeks in autumn of 1961 or 1962. Mail was allegedly opened in the FBI resident office in Riverside.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATE[illegible] G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Callahan
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 2/27/65

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: THE LONG COMMITTEE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE BY

The Attorney General called on the morning of February 27, 1965, to advise he wanted to consult with the Bureau on certain problems raised by the Long Committee, which is exploring the use of mail covers, et cetera. He noted there was a possible problem concerning Chief Inspector Montague's testimony and whether it was necessary for Montague to change his testimony. Also, he felt that Internal Revenue Service had been using investigative techniques which they should not use and this could pose a problem. He said that the President had asked him to coordinate with all executive agencies concerning the problems raised by the Long Committee.

Inspector Moore and I met with the Attorney General in his office this afternoon. Mr. Courtney Evans was present. I told the Attorney General that in Montague's testimony he was told by Attorney Fensterwald that if any of the questions had national security implications Montague should not answer them. Consequently, Montague was estopped from doing other than answer in the negative when asked questions touching on national security. With this interpretation, it was questionable whether an attempt should be made to change or explain Montague's testimony, particularly in view of the obvious lack of judgment on the part of Fensterwald and the desire of Long for publicity. I made it clear to the Attorney General that from our dealings with Montague, he was a man of integrity and sacrificed his personal desires for the welfare of the country and had cooperate fully with us. The Attorney General said he had no intention of changing one word of Montague's testimony, but he was considering advising Long and Fensterwald that there were extreme delicate national security matters touching on the areas being covered by the committee and there could be exceptions to the answers given in the testimony when they touched on such sensitive security matters. He said further that he contemplate seeing Senator Long and impressing on him that the committee would not want to stumble by mistake into an area of extreme interest to the national security as they nearly did in a matter

REC- 56

1 - Mr. Tolson
2 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Moore

CONTINUED - OVER

25 MAR 12 1965

EX-114

4091

50 MAR 16 1965

MAR 15 1965

AHB:gjf

#mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ATS
ON 11-14-00

affecting CIA. (Apparently CIA got wind of some inquiries by the committee relative to their secret operation and went to the committee and warned them off.) Katzenbach contemplates asking for a list of the witnesses who will appear before the committee together with a brief summary of the expected testimony. On the basis of this, he will be able to advise Senator Long when he should steer clear of a sensitive area.

I told Mr. Katzenbach that I certainly agree that this matter should be controlled at the committee level but that I felt pressure would have to be applied so that the personal interest of Senator Long became involved rather than on any ideological basis. Mr. Katzenbach said that he had already talked to Vice President Humphrey about Fensterwald, who he considered a wild man, and that Humphrey had promised to talk to Long concerning Fensterwald. Katzenbach said that in addition to the Vice President he might have to resort to pressure from the President himself, although he would prefer to work it out without resorting to the President. He indicated there was no one on the committee itself who could be helpful and that he did not expect any help from Senator Eastland.

Mr. Katzenbach said that he expected trouble from the possible activities of IRS and the military in the investigative field; that if some of these matters are uncovered before the committee they will tend to undermine the restricted and tightly controlled operations of the Bureau. I told him that our operations are tightly controlled and particularly in the delicate areas of concern, we restrict ourselves to important security matters.

Mr. Katzenbach said he was going to see Senator Long on Monday and wanted to know if the Bureau would like someone to go along with him. I told him no.

ACTION:

Mr. Katzenbach said he would advise us of the results of his conversation with Long. He also asked that I advise the Director of our discussion and I told him I would.

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: The Long Committee

I called Mr. DeLoach and briefed him on this problem in order that he might contact Senator Eastland in an effort to warn the Long Committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense. (Of couse I made no mention of such a contact to the Attorney General.) Mr. DeLoach advised that Senator Eastland is in Mississippi and he will contact him upon his return Monday.

I don't see what all
the excitement is about.
I would have no hesitan
in discontinuing all tech
ques – technical coverag
microphones trash co
mail covers etc. While
might handicap us I d
they are as valuable as
believe & none warrant
being used to justify

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

4:07 PM

March 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

Senate Committee on Judiciary

B.C.

Edward V.

I called the Attorney General and told him I wanted to let him know that I had talked to Senator James Eastland today, in regard to the hearings before the Long Committee concerning mail covers, et cetera. I stated Senator Eastland is in Mississippi today but he is going to see Senator Long not later than Wednesday morning to caution him that this fellow Fensterwald must not go into the kind of questioning he made of Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department. The Attorney General stated he was going to see Senator Long himself and asked if I thought he ought to wait until after Senator Eastland talks to Senator Long. I stated the timing might be well if he did wait as Eastland assured me he will see Long not later than Wednesday and then if he, the Attorney General, could see Long sometime Wednesday, it would probably tie it down once and for all as there are no hearings until Wednesday anyway. The Attorney General stated he thought they were having a hearing tomorrow, but he would check. I stated if there is a hearing tomorrow, then I would be inclined for the Attorney General to see Senator Long now and if it is not before Wednesday, then I think he should let Senator Eastland see what he can do. I stated Senator Eastland thoroughly understands the matter and said he does not intend to have that gone into and that obviously Fensterwald is getting in over his head and that has to be stopped. BERNHARD

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

REC- 44

62-99323-

RECORDED COPY FILED IN [illegible]

MAR 8 1965

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 4 15 PM
DATE 3-1-65
BY [illegible]

JEH:edm ((10)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1 XEROX
MAR 9 1965

9:40 AM

March 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

#mDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/BG

Senate Committee on Judiciary

62-35533-
62-111343
62-110030-
62-117290-

The Attorney General called and advised that he had talked to Senator Long last night. Senator Long's committee is looking into mail covers et cetera. The Attorney General stated he thought somebody had already spoken to Senator Long as he said he did not want to get into any national security area and was willing to take steps not to do this. The Attorney General stated that Mr. Fensterwald was present for part of the meeting and Fensterwald had said that he had some possible witnesses who are former Bureau Agents and if they were asked if mail was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General stated that before they are called, he would like to know who they are and whether they were ever involved in any program touching on national security and if not, it is their own business, but if they were, we would want to know. The Attorney General stated the Senator promised that he would have a chance to look at the names if he wanted to, personally and confidentially, and the list would have any names involving national security deleted and he would tell the Senator how many but no more.

The Attorney General stated that the Postmaster General is going down there this morning himself which he, the Attorney General, thought would be helpful to Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department.

The Attorney General stated that Senator Long also said he is not going to propose legislation to abolish mail covers as he thought they served a useful purpose but he did think that control should be tightened. I stated I thought there was great laxity in the matter of mail covers and the matter of tapping telephones.

I stated I have always been of the view and recommended back when Tom Clark was Attorney General that no agency of the Government should tap a telephone except with the written approval of the Attorney General. I stated

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen 4
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

REC- 38 62-72158-41

XEROX JEH:edm (10)

3 MAR 3 1965

MAR 3 1965 MAR 3 - 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

there would then be in one place a list of all phone taps and the purpose and reason for them. I stated that it is a fact, insofar as I am concerned, that I am the only head of an agency who does not have authority to tap telephones. I stated that I know that subordinates down the line in some agencies will tap phones without the knowledge of the chief of the agency and there is grave suspicion in Washington by some newspapermen that their phones have been tapped by agencies of the Government trying to find out where they are getting their information. I stated I have always been opposed to the law whereby it is necessary to get the authority of a court to tap phones because of the composition of some of our courts and the employees thereof, but I have always felt that the President should issue an Executive Order confidentially to all agencies that all phone tapping be discontinued except when specifically approved by the Attorney General so there would be in one place a list and then if any committee in Congress got on the warpath, the Attorney General would have a list he could vouch for as being the only phones tapped by the Government. The Attorney General stated that made sense. I stated many agencies are opposed because they realize there would be a marked restriction. I stated we only have 45 phone taps, which is a low number for a country the size of ours and the area we have to cover. The Attorney General stated no one has any idea how many phone taps the whole Government has.

I stated there is also a school being conducted in California by a private organization which instructs the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service in the matter of phone tapping and they have sent their own personnel there to be trained. I stated Internal Revenue has also from time to time hired private outside phone tappers to do their tapping. I stated it is that type of thing if there were a real investigation which would come out. The Attorney General commented that he would not guarantee some of it won't come out. I stated I was amazed when I learned of the school in California as I saw a reference to it in the newspaper and wanted to know what it was and what officers attended. I stated we have our own instructors and do it ourselves.

I stated I thought the Attorney General had made good headway with Senator Long. The Attorney General stated he thought it would be helpful, but his

problem is that he thinks the Senator is fine but he does not think that Fensterwald is as straightforward, or to put it another way that Fensterwald is smart and devious and the Senator is straightforward and not very bright and that is the problem. I stated I thought that Fensterwald is trying to get publicity for the Senator. The Attorney General stated the Senator said he did not want to get into this and he would give him, the Attorney General, the names and a summary of the testimony and told Fensterwald to do so, but he, the Attorney General, can't say Fensterwald is going to do it; that he will on some but he did not know that he would on all. I stated I had no faith or confidence in Fensterwald and neither did Senator Eastland. The Attorney General stated that Senator Eastland may have already talked to Senator Long or else the Vice President, but somebody had waked him up. I stated Senator Eastland said he would do it Wednesday, but he may have called him.

The Attorney General stated that is where it stands now and we shall see what happens.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11 42 AM
DATE 3-2-65
BY

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re 10/2/75 request Item 1 concerning meeting among Moore, Belmont and Katzenbach on FBI mail intercept operations.

Originating Office: FBI 705

Delivered by: Richard T. [illegible] Date: 10/10/75

Received by: James V. Dick

Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

[illegible] 10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-966

ENCLOSURE

6

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED 10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 10/2/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JB

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Three communications pertaining to a meeting regarding FBI mail intercept operations.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-woc/18

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 15, 1975

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDE16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/20/00 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the October 7, 1975, request of the SSC wherein certain enclosed documents relating to mail intercept programs were submitted for declassification.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which transmits the documents enclosed with referenced letter. These documents have been excised in accordance with an agreement between representatives of the FBI and Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC. These documents, in their excised form, are declassified and are available to the SSC for whatever use the Committee deems appropriate.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum effecting the transmittal of the documents to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

ST-111

62-116395 3-ENCLOSURE

REC-30

62-[illegible]-967

15 NOV 4 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

WOC:lhb|hb
(8)

NOTE:

The documents enclosed with referenced letter concern the Hunter Project; Z Coverage; CHIPROP Survey; SAM Survey; GUS Survey; CHICAN Survey; JOE Survey and the CHICLET Survey. These documents have been reviewed by personnel of the Intelligence

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

84 NOV 5 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395 October 15, 1975

#mDR16
AL 10/13/00 SP2ALM/JTG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Domestic Intelligence Task Force Director, SSC, to the Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, dated October 7, 1975, wherein certain documents relating to mail intercept programs were enclosed. Referenced letter requested these documents be appropriately excised for future use at public hearings of the SSC.

This letterhead memorandum transmits to the SSC copies of these documents appropriately excised and, where necessary, declassified. The documents are being transmitted to the SSC for whatever use the Committee deems appropriate.

1 - The Attorney General

WOC:lhb lhb
(7) ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

JBH
Pen

62-116395-967

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE CONTINUED:

Division and have been appropriately excised for use by the Committee at public hearings to be scheduled starting 10/21/75. In excising these documents they have been accordingly declassified removing any and all information to sensitive sources, identities of target countries and Agent personnel.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 7, 1975

#mDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The enclosed documents relating to mail intercept programs are submitted for declassification by the Department of Justice and the FBI. Portions of these documents which reveal sensitive sources or on-going operations should be appropriately excised for use at public hearings.

A list of these documents is also attached. Those documents which are followed by an asterisk on this list do not appear to be classified, but are nonetheless included because their contents are similar in nature to those documents which are classified.

These documents should be declassified by Tuesday, October 14, to allow sufficient preparation time for the mail hearings, which are now scheduled to begin on Tuesday, October 21.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Paul Daly

62-116395-967

ENCLOSURE

c: Paul Daly

#MDR/6

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/20/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

HUNTER PROJECT

1. Belmont to Boardman - 1/22/58*
2. Belmont to Boardman - 2/6/58*
3. Angleton (CIA) to Director, FBI - 2/6/58
4. Branigan to Belmont - 4/21/58*
5. D.E. Moore to Belmont - 3/10/61*
6. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 6/9/61*
7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/25/61, with attached blind memo "Re: Project Hunter," dated 8/21/61*
8. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 11/2/62, with attached blind memo "Re: Project Hunter," dated 10/30/62*
9. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 3/27/63*
10. Triplett to Branigan - 8/24/66*
11. Papich to D.J. Brennan - 1/16/69*
12. Routing slip to Angleton (CIA) from J. Edgar Hoover, dated 3/10/72, with attached blind memo "Re: Project Hunter," dated 3/10/72
13. Branigan to E.S. Miller - 2/15/73*

Z-COVERAGE

1. Turner to Hennrich - 6/25/51

CHIPROP SURVEY

1. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 9/4/56
2. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 3/11/60
3. Donahoe to W.C. Sullivan - 9/15/61
4. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 9/14/62
5. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 9/20/62

Chiprop Survey, cont'd

6. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 6/28/63
7. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 5/25/65
8. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 1/18/66

SAM SURVEY

1. Director, FBI to SAC, New York - 7/11/60
2. Branigan to Belmont - 2/28/61
3. Branigan to Belmont - 5/25/61
4. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/4/61
5. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 8/29/61
6. Branigan to Sullivan - 8/31/61
7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/11/62
8. Director, FBI to SAC, Los Angeles - 1/21/63
9. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/8/64
10. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/15/66
11. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 3/31/70

GUS SURVEY

1. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 9/20/61
2. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 10/2/61
3. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 10/18/61
4. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 12/13/61
5. Director, FBI to SAC, New York - 12/26/61
6. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 1/31/62
7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/3/62

CHICAN SURVEY

1. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 1/19/61
2. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 2/3/61
3. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 2/28/61
4. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 11/27/61

JOE SURVEY

1. Director, FBI to SAC, Miami - 12/21/62*
2. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 2/5/64*
3. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 6/25/65*
4. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 7/22/66*

CHICLET SURVEY

1. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 11/20/63
2. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 4/29/64
3. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 5/22/64
4. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 5/25/64
5. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 5/19/66*

BALTCH CASE

1. D.E. Moore to W.C. Sullivan - 10/2/64

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/15/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
10/7/75 request

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: W O Cregar Date: 10-15-75

Received by: Michael Murphy

Title: Asst Security Dir.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

10-13-00 SP2 ALM/JG

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 10/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

ALL [illegible] #mdr16
10-13-00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Documents furnished relating to mail intercept program. These documents, previously reviewed at FBIHQ, and now are delivered properly excised for public hearings.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Rev "Abstracts" in Records, this memo dated 11/4/75.
7/19/76

TO: Mr. Cregar

RE: SENSTUDY '75

Re formal request dated 8/4/75 from Senate Select Committee Item ~~III.(1)~~ V, "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".

This is newly requested material.

Arrangements have been made with the property management office to have a copy of this handbook delivered to Mr. Cregar Room 4171 JEH.

It can be shown to a representative of the SS Committee and a Laboratory representative will be made available to assist in the review.

If this manual is requested and given to SSC, a memorandum to the Administrative Division is required to remove it from Mr. Cregar's inventory of personal property.

WEH
W. E. Harward
Radio Engineering Section
Laboratory Division

Returned to Adm. Div. & removed from Cregar's pers. prop. invt. 7/19/76

REC-30 62-116395-968

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2ALM/MG

84 NOV 5 1975

Retyped page(s) [redacted] of memo [redacted] to

dated re:

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

October 15, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

Director, FBI

#MDR16

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

10-13-00 SP-2 ALM/jtb

In accordance with an agreement reached during a meeting on July 30, 1975, among Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Deputy Assistant Director H. E. Helgeson, Section Chiefs R. L. Shackelford and J. G. Deegan, all of this Bureau, and SSC Staff members Mark H. Gitenstein, Mary DeOreo, and John T. Elliff, the FBI was to furnish to the SSC Staff members examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

In addition, the SSC inquired as to the number of persons included in the Extremist Photograph Album (EPA) as of July 30, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum disclosing that the pertinent documents are available to SSC Staff members for access regarding the preliminary inquiries, investigation of an infiltrated organization and the EPA. A copy is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (~~2~~ 3) ENCLOSURE
62-116395

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RDS:adn
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC-30

ST-111

62-116395-969

15 NOV 4 1975

84 NOV 5 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE:

Copies of unexcised and excised documents (where necessary) that are available for access to SSC members are being maintained by the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Memorandum from J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, 8/18/75, "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)" (attached) recommended, and the Director approved, the granting of SSC Staff access to this material.

5/10

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

62-116395

October 15, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

As a result of a conference held on July 30, 1975, among Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Deputy Assistant Director H. E. Helgeson, Section Chiefs R. L. Shackelford and J. G. Deegan, all of this Bureau, and SSC Staff members Mark H. Gitenstein, Mary DeOreo, and John T. Elliff, it was agreed to furnish to SSC Staff members access to examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

In addition, the SSC inquired as to the number of persons included in the Extremist Photograph Album.

Purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the pertinent documents responsive to the agreement are available for access to the appropriately cleared members of the SSC Staff in Room 4171 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

1 - The Attorney General
RDS:adn/klm
(8)

MDR16

1013-00 SP-2 ALM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

WOC
Enf

JBA
PVM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-969

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 15

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/8/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC). (7/30/75 Oral Request SSC Extremist Photo Album.)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 10-15-75

Received by: James Dick

Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16
SP-2ALM/jfg
10-13-00

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

FOR REVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC 7/30/75 Oral Request

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16

[illegible] 10-13-00 SP-2ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

As the result of a conference held 7/30/75, documents pertaining to the Extremist Photograph Album, have been made available for review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FBIHQ, also examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WDC

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. Hotis)

The Attorney General

October 17, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar (Enclosures)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2ALM/

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 8, 1975, requesting all materials pertaining to the decisional process which preceded and resulted in the Bureau's request to the Central Intelligence Agency to place each of the following names on the Hunter Mail watch list: Derk Bodde, "National Guardian," Leonard Bernstein, National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and "Ramparts" Magazine.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff of the SSC in an effort to clarify a similar request. Elliff made recommendations for handling that request which are being followed at this time.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which constitute the Bureau's response to the current request.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (40)

62-116395

EX-106

62-116395-910

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

3 - ENCLOSURE

15 NOV 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JCF:rsm (9)

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 NOV 12 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar (Enclosures)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/MG

62-116395

October 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 8, 1975, requesting all materials pertaining to the decisional process which preceded and resulted in the Bureau's request to the Central Intelligence Agency to place each of the following names on the Hunter Mail watch list:

1) "National Guardian"
2) Derk Bodde
3) Leonard Bernstein
4) National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
5) "Ramparts"

Knowledge of the Hunter Mail watch list was limited within the Bureau to Supervisors at FBI Headquarters. When a Supervisor desired to place a name on the watch list, he would prepare a 3 x 5 card which included:

a) the name and address of the individual or organization,
b) the duration of the request, and
c) the treatment to be given to any mail located.

No date was placed on the card, however, the cards were numbered consecutively. The request was then forwarded through liaison representatives to the Central Intelligence Agency. No other documents were prepared concerning the consideration, recommendation and proposal of these requests.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff of the SSC concerning a similar request. As a result, Elliff requested the following information concerning each of these requests:

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JCF:rsm

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

62-116395 -

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

ENCLOSURE

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

a) a copy of the request and any other document in the Hunter Mail file in which the FBI mentions or shows results obtained from the specific request,

b) the approximate date of the request, and

c) the apparent basis for the request, or in the case of an investigation instituted after the effective date of the Hunter Mail project, the basis for the investigation.

The following summaries and enclosures constitute the Bureau's response to this request.

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

1) "National Guardian"

a) documents - The "National Guardian" was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 117 (Exhibit A-1). On April 20, 1962, a list of names to remain on the watch list was prepared and the "National Guardian" was included (Exhibit A-2). On October 25, 1966, a similar list was prepared (Exhibit A-3). The "National Guardian" was mentioned in a memorandum dated August 21, 1964, concerning data obtained from the Hunter Mail project during the past year (Exhibit A-4).

b) date - Request number 117 was made between August 18, 1961, and April 20, 1962. As indicated above, the "National Guardian" was included on a list of names to remain on the watch list on April 20, 1962. It was not on a similar list of names as of August 18, 1961.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file on the "National Guardian" is dated August 13, 1948, and reports the publication on August 1, 1948, of the "National Gazette Weekly," forerunner of the "National Guardian." During 1961 and 1962, the "National Guardian" sponsored tours of Eastern Europe, including Russia (Exhibits A-5 and 6).

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

2) Derk Bodde

a) documents - No Hunter Mail request was located for Bodde. He was, however, included in a list of names to remain on the watch list which was prepared on April 20, 1962 (Exhibit A-2).

b) date - Bodde was most likely placed on the watch list in 1960. As indicated above, Bodde was included on a list of names to remain on the watch list on April 20, 1962; however, there are no documents in the file dated in 1961 and 1962. He did travel to Russia during 1960.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file on Bodde is dated February 5, 1952. A review of the documents for the period after the Hunter program was instituted failed to locate any document recommending him for inclusion on the watch list. The investigation had been placed in a closed status until information was received that Bodde was scheduled to attend the International Orientalist Congress in Moscow during August, 1960 (Exhibits B-1 and 2).

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

3) Leonard Bernstein

a) documents - No Hunter Mail request was located for Bernstein. He was, however, included in a list of names to be removed from the watch list which was prepared on April 20, 1962 (Exhibit A-2).

b) date - Bernstein was most likely placed on the watch list in 1959, since he went to Russia during that year. On April 20, 1962, he was included on a list of names to be removed from the watch list.

c) basis - Since no Hunter Mail request was located, there is no background information available concerning the Leonard Bernstein who was placed on the watch list. A review of Bureau files for individuals named Leonard Bernstein does indicate, however, that the only Leonard Bernstein who travelled to Russia or had any Soviet contacts was Leonard Bernstein, born August 25, 1918 (the prominent conductor and composer). The first item in the Bureau file concerning Bernstein is dated March 2, 1949. A review of documents in this file from the beginning of the Hunter program in 1958 until April 20, 1962, the date on which his name was removed from the watch list, failed to locate a request that he be included in the Hunter program. However, information concerning him, compiled in response to a request from another government agency in December, 1958, did indicate that Bernstein planned to visit Russia during March, 1959 (Exhibits C-1 and 2).

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

4) National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC)

a) documents - The NMC was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 193 (Exhibit D-1). The NMC was mentioned in a memorandum dated August 28, 1969, concerning data obtained from the Hunter Mail project during the past year (Exhibit D-2).

b) date - This request was most likely made between January 16, 1969, and August 28, 1969. No investigation was conducted concerning the NMC until September, 1966 (Exhibit D-3). The request, however, was probably not made until after January 15, 1969, the date that a CIA representative suggested the Bureau use the Hunter project for development of leads in the New Left field (Exhibit D-4). Request number 233 was mentioned in a memorandum concerning results from the Hunter Mail program which was dated August 28, 1969.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file concerning the NMC is a communication dated September 14, 1966, which indicates that a group known as the November 8th Ad Hoc Committee had been formed at Cleveland, Ohio. By communication dated September 20, 1966, FBI Headquarters instructed the New York and Cleveland Division to keep abreast of the plans of this Committee to sponsor demonstrations during November, 1966 (Exhibit D-3). By communication dated July 28, 1967, FBI Headquarters instructed the New York Division to prepare a report concerning the same organization which had become known as the NMC (Exhibit D-5). The name NMC was used until approximately August, 1969, when an allegedly new organization known as the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam was formed.

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

5) "Ramparts"

a) documents - "Ramparts" was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 105 (Exhibit E-1).

b) date - This request was also most likely made between January 16, 1969, and August 28, 1969.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file concerning "Ramparts" is dated October 22, 1964; however, no active investigation was authorized at that time. Investigation was authorized in May, 1967, based on a request received from the Department of Justice (Exhibits E-2 and 3). No request to include "Ramparts" on the Hunter Mail watch list was located; however, a document dated October 17, 1968, does indicate that "Ramparts" furnished a list of names, probably their mailing list, to the Soviets (Exhibit E-4).

Enclosures (19)

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENSTE SELECT COMMITTEE.
10/8/75 Requestx

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller Date: 10/20/75

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#mDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

62-116395-970

8

ENCLOSURE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT	☐ BRIEFING	☐ INTERVIEW	☐ TESTIMONY	☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 10/8/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Information handling

mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Material furnished regarding placing of individuals and/or organizations on the Hunter Mail watch list: a copy of the request and any document which mentions or shows results obtained from the specific request, the approximate date of the request and apparent basis for the request.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW 5-WOC/

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2ALM/tal TG

~~5-88 (2-28-58)~~

1. Name "NATIONAL GUARDIAN"
WEEKLY GUARDIAN ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address 197 East Fourth Street and
133 West 72nd Street
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
New York, New York, USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☒ Watch List Until canceled.
Duration

HUNTER Request No.
117

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395-970

A-1

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

1 - D. E. Moore
1 - Branigan
1 - Litrento
1 - Papich
1 - Stewart

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : D. E. Moore

DATE: 4/20/62

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/tbs

In order to insure that Project Hunter will continue to operate under maximum economy and efficiency, we have advised CIA at a recent conference we would review Bureau Informant 200 material received and advise CIA whether or not we desired to continue to receive material on persons whose names appear on the attached list.

The interested Supervisor should, accordingly, indicate by writing "yes" or "no" to the right of his subject's name whether or not he desires Bureau Informant 200 to discontinue furnishing data on each of his respective subjects.

The attached lists were compiled from a review of the Project Hunter card box indices maintained by Supervisor W. D. Stewart as an administrative aid for routing purposes. The names of subjects on whom we have received no material for the past year do not appear on the attached lists. They have been weeded out separately along with other subjects who have been relatively inactive.

The results of this survey will be forwarded via Liaison to CIA for appropriate action.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memo and its attachment be routed to the interested Supervisor for a determination as to the continuation of receiving Bureau Informant 200 material on his respective subject.

That the results of this survey be forwarded via Liaison to CIA for appropriate action.

105-93089

Enclosure

WDS:blv
(6)

ENCLOSURE

[illegible] was forwarded on 4/30/62 to CIA via Liaison. WRL 4/30/62. CIA was advised this review was conducted in accordance with our discussion at most recent conference so that we may each continue to operate under maximum economy.

As a result of our survey, we will discontinue on 97 of the 200 persons on

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

REC-13

50

17 MAY 2 1962

A-25

SUBJECT	DISCONTINUE		SUPERVISOR
	YES	NO	
NATIONAL GUARDIAN		✓	R.J.RAMPTON
BODDE, DERK		No	J.V.BAKER
BERNSTEIN, LEONARD	✓		W.P.JONES

(Names of other individuals and organizations)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE I[illegible]OPE

1 - M. E. Triplett

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. A. Branigan WAB

FROM : M. E. Triplett

DATE: October 25, 1966

Project Hunter

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

The attached list of numbered and unnumbered Hunter Stops was received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the request to advise whether we still desired that the subjects be retained on the Watch List. A check of Bureau records revealed that some of these names had already been canceled, Names on this list were referred to the Special Agent Supervisor interested in the matter and numbers were assigned to unnumbered stops we desire to retain on the Watch List.

On October 21, 1966, a complete list of stops was referred to the Liaison Section for delivery to Mr. Worth of CIA. A copy of this list is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached lists be filed in order that they will be available for future reference.

Enclosures - 2
105-93089
MET:met
(2)

REC- 58

105-9[illegible]57-79

OCT 26 1966

EX-108

2 ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

A-3

~~SECRET~~ October 21, 1966

HUNTER STOPS - NUMBERED

117. National Guardian; Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.

Bureau Listings Numbered

Received from Jerry Worth. C.I.A

22 NAT'L GUARDIAN NYC (-)

(Names of other individuals and organizations)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : W.A. Branigan

FROM : M.E. Triplett

DATE: August 21, 1964

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

1 - Branigan
1 - A.P. Litrento
1 - S. Papich
1 - Triplett

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

REC- 40

105-93089-70

A detailed analysis of data received from Bureau Informant 200 during the past year is attached.

ACTION:

11 SEP 2 1964

None. This is for your information.

ENCLOSURE

105-93089

File in 105-93089

SOVIET SECTION

A-4

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Data of Special Interest:

Typical Data Furnished by Bureau Informant 200 During Past Year:

offer of Andrew Jacob Steiger, American correspondent in U.S.S.R., to work for Security Index subject Russell Arthur Nixon of the "National Guardian";

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

#-MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JG

100-357044

New York, New York
July 24, 1961

Re: "National Guardian,"
Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.;
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

Reference is made to memorandum at New York, entitled as above, dated May 22, 1961.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished on July 17, 1961, a revised schedule of the "National Guardian" European tour, July 28 - August 20, 1961.

The schedule of this tour is as follows:

FROM	TO	Via CARRIER	FLIGHT NO.	DATE
Idlewild	Copenhagen	Scandinavian Airlines (SAS)	912	7/28
Copenhagen	Stockholm	SAS	508	7/31
Stockholm	Helsinki	SAS	728	7/31
Helsinki	Moscow	Aeroflot	108	7/31
Moscow	Kiev	Aeroflot	open	
Kiev	Prague	Aeroflot	211	8/17
Prague	Copenhagen	Malev (Hungarian Airlines)	380	8/20
Copenhagen	Idlewild	SAS	919	8/20

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

This document contains neither
recomme[illegible] conclusions
of the [illegible] property
of the [illegible] to your
agency [illegible] are
not [illegible] outside
[illegible]

A-5

Re: "National Guardian,"
Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.;
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of January 2, 1957, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., contains the following concerning the "National Guardian":

"National Guardian

"1. 'Established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a "progressive" weekly. *** Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia.'
(Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 'Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell,' August 25, 1956, p. 12)"

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New York, New York
April 6, 1962

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Bufile 100-357044

Re: "National Guardian";
Weekly Guardian Associates, Incorporated
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

The April 9, 1962 issue of the "National Guardian," page 6, contained an announcement of the Guardian's "1962 Tour of Eastern Europe". This tour, of 23 days duration, is to leave New York Friday, August 3, 1962, and is to return on Sunday, August 26, 1962. The tour will visit Bucharest, Budapest, Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad. The announcement states that the tour will also visit Poland or Czechoslovakia. The price of the tour will be $1295.00, and those interested are instructed to forward a $100.00 deposit to "Guardian Tours", 197 East 4th Street, New York 9, New York.

A characterization of the "National Guardian" is attached.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

10

A-6

100-357044-469

APPENDIX

Re: "National Guardian";
Weekly Guardian Associates, Incorporated
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

Dec 1, 1961

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., contains the following concerning the "National Guardian":

> "National Guardian
>
> "1. 'established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a "progressive" weekly. * * * Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia.' (Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 'Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell,' August 25, 1956, p. 12)"

100-357044-469

1 - Mr. Glascock
1 - Mr. Schultz

SAC, Philadelphia (100-21984) May 10, 1960

Director, FBI (100-387911) PERSONAL ATTENTION

FoIPA 228590
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/15/83 BY SP/GSK/gjt

DR. DERK BODDE
SECURITY MATTER - C

Information has been received from Bureau Informant 200, a most reliable and sensitive source, that the subject has been in direct contact with Dr. S. L. Tikhvinsky, Institute of Sinology, Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The subject is among 15 American orientalists who have been selected through the American Council of Learned Societies to attend the International Orientalist Congress in Moscow, Russia, during August. This group will not only attend the Congress, but also will spend an entire month in the Soviet Union studying what is being done there in the fields of the respective individuals. The members of this group will come as delegates either of the American Oriental Society or the Association for Asian Studies, and will do so under financial grants made through the American Council of Learned Societies.

(Information concerning other individuals)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Philadelphia and Boston should immediately take appropriate action as provided for in SAC Letter 59-58 (G) concerning Security Investigations - Individuals Traveling Abroad.

EX 104 100-387911-17

You are cautioned that the information obtained by Bureau Informant 200 is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau and should not be set forth in any investigative report. Information from this source should be utilized for lead purposes only. You must avoid any statement

MAILED 8
MAY 10 1960
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Trotter
Sullivan

1 - Philadelphia (100-38026)
2 - Boston (100-19891)
(123-2092)

B-1

Letter to SAC, Philadelphia
RE: DR. DERK BODDE
100-387911

regarding the scope of coverage in effect in this instance, and under no circumstances are the subject or any unauthorized persons to become aware that we have knowledge of this information.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

None of the afore-mentioned individuals are on the Security Index, and none are currently subjects of Bureau investigations.

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Rushing

100-337911

Date: July 25, 1960

To: Office of Security
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: MR. [illegible]
SECURITY MATTER - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-00 BY SP2 ALM/ #16
#MDR16

Records of the Passport Office, Department of State, indicate that [illegible] was issued Passport Number [illegible] on April 16, 1958, renewed April 8, 1960. In his application for renewal of the passport, [illegible] indicated that he planned to depart from the United States in late July, 1960. He indicated that he planned to visit England, Holland, France, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden. He further indicated that he is a delegate to the International Orientalist Congress to be held in Moscow, Russia, August [illegible]-16, 1960.

Reports containing the results of a security investigation of [illegible] have previously been forwarded to your office. Copies of these reports are being forwarded to the Central Intelligence Agency under separate cover.

The Legal Attaches in London, Paris, and Bonn have been requested to arrange for the receipt of any information concerning the subject's activities that may come to the attention of the security services in the areas covered by these Legal Attaches. I would appreciate the receipt of any information that may come to your attention regarding [illegible]'s activities in the Soviet Union and in Czechoslovakia.

EX-105 REC- 82 100-337911-60

19 JUL 26 1960

BY COURI
88 JUL 26
COMM-FBI

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans
1 - London (See note page 2)
1 - Paris (See note page 2)
1 - Bonn (See note page 2)
1 - Philadelphia (See note page 2)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)
TDR/baw
(11)

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan

B-2

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Office of Security
Department of State

NOTE LEGATS, LONDON, PARIS, AND BONN, AND SAC, PHILADELPHIA:

Subject's name is not included in the Security Index. He is employed as a professor of Chinese studies at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and resides at 29 West Phil-Ellena Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Bodde was born 3-9-09 in Marshfield, Massachusetts.

Bodde has, in the past, been identified with numerous Communist Party front organizations. He is an outspoken advocate for recognition of the Chinese communist regime.

You should alert your sources for receipt of any information that may come to their attention regarding Bodde's activities while travelling abroad. The above information may be furnished your sources.

Philadelphia should arrange to be advised of the subject's return and thereafter promptly notify the Bureau in order that the stops may be cancelled.

R/S shows
Legat London
9/9/60 - Info
furnt MI-5 by
Legat 8-10-60

~~CONFIDENTIA~~

MAILED
DEC 2 1958
NAME CHECK

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-3 BTJ/TS
ON 11-2-99 APP#94-2233
PER DRC dtd 8-27-99

December 23, 1958

LEONARD BERNSTEIN - Security
Born: August 25, 1918
Lawrence, Massachusetts

You are referred to information previously furnished to your agency on January 28 and November 10, 1955, concerning Leonard Bernstein. For your additional information, there is enclosed a copy of a memorandum dated May 27, 1958, concerning the captioned individual. (100-360261-41,49,55)

In August, 1958, a confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that Leonard Bernstein had been in contact with Tamara Yurevna Mamedova. The August, 1958, "Diplomatic List" reflects Tamara Y. Mamedova to be a second secretary at the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (USSR). In June, 1958, a confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that Tamara Mamedova was employed in the Cultural Division of the Soviet Embassy. As part of her duties the informant stated that Mamedova handled inquiries from the public concerning the Cultural Exchange Program between the USSR and the United States and assisted in arrangements for appearances of groups from both countries under the auspices of that program.

In his contact with Mamedova, the confidential informant stated that Leonard Bernstein indicated that he would accept an invitation to visit the USSR and stated that he would be able to go during the first two weeks of March, 1959. He expressed a desire to conduct some orchestras while in the USSR. (105-53022-328)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

The foregoing information is furnished to you as a result of your request for an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or a nonclearance of the individual involved. This information is loaned for your use and is not to be disseminated outside of your agency.

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____

Enclosure.
Orig and one to USIA
Req rec'd: 12/8/58
B. V. Gronquist/ckb
(4)

EX. - 12A
REC- 66
15-56

NOTE: Memo classified confidential inasm
as enclosed report is so classified.

DEC 24 1958

C-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

NY 100-99895

New York, New York
May 27, 1958

DECLASSIFIED BY 9803RDD/LMB
ON 5/20/93

Re: Leonard Bernstein, with aliases

On June 30, 1950, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that in 1945 when the committee to aid Ben Davis was being considered, both Ben Davis and Jack Stachel described Leonard Bernstein to the source as an adherent of the Communist Party. This source stated that other Communist Party functionaries had also described Leonard Bernstein as a Communist. The source advised that in 1945 Jack Stachel informed him that Bernstein had agreed to submit to Communist discipline. This source advised on December 9, 1954 that he has no direct personal knowledge of Bernstein's willingness to submit to Communist discipline.

Ben Davis and Jack Stachel were members of the National Board of the Communist Party who were tried and convicted in 1949 for violation of the Smith Act of 1940.

Leonard Bernstein, by notarized affidavit dated August 3, 1953, submitted in connection with his application for passport, stated "...although I have never, to my knowledge, been accused of being a member of the Communist Party, I wish to take advantage of this opportunity to affirm under oath that I am not now or at any time ever been a member of the Communist Party or the Communist Political Association. I have never knowingly engaged in activities which supported the Communist movement under circumstances which would warrant the conclusion that I engaged in such activities as a result of direction, domination or control exercised over me by the Communist movement..."

In February, 1958, a source of unknown reliability, but who is acquainted with the subject, advised that he believed Leonard Bernstein to be a Communist. This source based this belief on the way Bernstein talks, that is, that he has continually made anti-American and pro-Russian statements. Source was unable to furnish any specific details pertaining thereto.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

AGENCY 100-71914
REQ. REC'D 12-1-[illegible]
REP'T. FORW. 12-[illegible]-56
BY [illegible]

CRB (c-6)
AGENCY State (c-11h)
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. 6-3-58
HOW FORW. L/S
BY

14

COPIES DESTROYED
391 FEB 20 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-360261-55

C-2

CONFIDENTIAL

All organizations mentioned hereafter have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450, unless otherwise described.

The House Committee on Un-American Activities review of the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace held March 25,26,27,1949, which conference was arranged by the National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions, reflected Leonard Bernstein was affiliated with the following organizations:

American Council for a Democratic Greece
American Youth for Democracy
Committee For a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
Civil Rights Congress
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
National Negro Congress

The National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions was cited in the aforementioned review as a Communist front.

Records of the Bureau of Special Services, New York City Police Department, reflect that Bernstein was a member of the Council on African Affairs, Incorporated, as of February 3, 1948.

The "New York Times", issue of March 3, 1945, contained an advertisment by the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade entitled "For America's Sake-Break With Franco Spain" wherein Bernstein was listed as a sponsor.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised during 1946 that Leonard Bernstein was identified on a letterhead of the American Committee for Spanish Freedom dated January 21, 1946, as being one of the sponsors of this organization.

The "Daily Worker" issue of May 16, 1946, page four column three, lists Leonard Bernstein as a conductor and composer and one of the endorsers of the Three Day Tag Drive of the American Committee for Yugoslav Relief.

29

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/tfg

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address Any office in the U.S. - National
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
headquarters are in New York, New York.
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☐ Watch List Duration until canceled

HUNTER Request No. 193

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

16
D-1

3

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Miss Triplett

Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TO : W. A. Branigan

FROM : W. E. Triplett

DATE: August 28, 1969

File in:
105-93089

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

A more detailed analysis of material received is attached.

ACTION: None. This is furnished for your information.

Enclosure

WET:met

D-2

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Items are received on repatriates, deportees, defectors, U.S. citizens who went to USSR for permanent residence because of marriage or family and individuals born in U.S. who were taken there when children. Most of this material is of limited value but all individuals are included on CIA's "defector list." However, items are of value when they pertain to individuals known to have been espionage agents or to have subversive relatives in U.S. For example, items on Harry Eisman, deported from U.S. over 30 years ago, have contained little information of interest until recently. Friends asked Eisman to see the Glass family when they visited the USSR. When he entertained the family, the daughter was greatly influenced by his colorful description of his radical activities in New York schools. (Identifies confidential source)

Prudence Glass has been maintaining contact with Eisman since her return and recently informed him of her plans to marry Bob (evidently Robert Steven Greenblatt, key activist), leader and organizer of one of the largest marches sponsored by National Mobilization Committee to End War in Vietnam. She informed him of their plans to move to Georgia where she hoped to work "in the underground." We had no previous information indicating that she had any connection whatsoever with any organization or Greenblatt or of Greenblatt's plans to leave New York. Additional information has revealed that Eisman, who had reportedly fallen from graces of Soviets, appears to have regained their confidence, sees numerous U.S. travelers and communists and lectures at an unidentified special school on youth activities in U.S.,

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

#mdr16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM 1676

SAC, New York

9/20/66

Director, FBI

1 - Wells

NOVEMBER 8TH AD HOC COMMITTEE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

ReCVairtel 9/14/66.

New York is designated office of origin in this matter. Through informants and sources, keep abreast of the plans of this Committee to sponsor demonstrations 11/5-8/66. Keep the Bureau advised of all developments.

1 - Cleveland

BAW:pdb (5)

NOTE:

Captioned group was formed at Cleveland, Ohio, during a conference of peace groups on 9/10-11/66. Its purpose is to organize demonstrations protesting the Vietnam war on 11/5-8/66. A. J. Muste, New York City, a prominent pacifist, is Chairman of the Committee. Cleveland airtel asks that New York be made origin due to this fact.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAILED 9
SEP 20 1966
COMM-FBI

REC 26

62-111111-2

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room

39

EX-106

70 SEP 28 1966

NO SEP 21 1966

D-3

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/18

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

C.D.B.

On January 15, 1969, Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The Hunter project for which we have given the designation of Bureau Informant 200 essentially consists of specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia. If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the Soviet Union, it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.)

ACTION:

REC 102

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - Liaison
1 - S. J. Papich

18 FEB 5 1969

SJP:clb
(6)

Stops not warranted on black extremists at this time
1/31/69

D-4

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/SF16

SAC, New York (100-158914) 7/28/67

Director, FBI (62-111181) 1 - Mr. B.A. Wells

NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

You are to prepare a report concerning captioned group. Inasmuch as other Government agencies have shown an interest in its activities and due to the fact it is sponsoring a massive demonstration at Washington, D. C., on 10/21/67, furnish 11 copies of this report to the Bureau. Also furnish copies to Washington Field Office.

BAW:jes
(4)

NOTE:

Captioned group, formerly known as the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, includes members of the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party among its sponsors. It sponsored massive demonstrations against the war in Vietnam at New York City, and San Francisco, California, on 4/15/67 and is organizing a massive demonstration at Washington, D. C., on 10/21/67. We have had it under investigation for the past months. A report should now be prepared so that we will have it for ready reference.

REC 23 62-111181-854

EX 101

MAILED 12
JUL 27 1967
COMM-FBI

19 JUL 28 1967

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

D-5

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name RAMPARTS
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address
201 Broadway
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
San Francisco, California, USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment
Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☑ Watch List Duration Until canceled

HUNTER Request No. 195

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

20

E-1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/9/67

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

SUBJECT: "RAMPARTS"
IS - C
Bufile 100-445393
SF 157-459

ROBERT SCHEER
SM - SWP
REGISTRATION ACT
Bufile 105-106720
SF 100-46832

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-80 BY hlc

105

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Re Bulet to San Francisco, 5/8/67, under the caption of "Ramparts" and Bulet to San Francisco, 5/5/67, under the caption "ROBERT SCHEER, SM-SWP; REGISTRATION ACT."

na

San Francisco is requesting clarification on which instruction in referenced letters will prevail in the investigation of "Ramparts" magazine.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

REC 27

100-445393-45

13 MAY 10 1967

④ - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco (1 - 157-459)
(1 - 100-46832)

EJO/jr
(6)

Let to SF 5/18/67 "Ramparts"

① INTR Sec.
② SUB CONTROL

21

E-2

1 - Mr. Shaw
1 - Mr. Wells

SAC, San Francisco (157-459) 5-18-67

Director, FBI (100-445393)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-80 BY

"RAMPARTS"
IS - C

Reurlet 5-9-67 and Bulet 5-5-67.

Inasmuch as the Department has authorized an investigation of "Ramparts," you are to follow the instructions set out in Bulet 5-5-67. The investigation of "Ramparts" is to be conducted separately from the investigation of Robert Scheer.

Of particular interest in your investigation is the extent of Communist Party or other subversive influence in "Ramparts."

Submit a report to the Bureau by 6-17-67. Include your recommendation as to whether further investigation is warranted. This investigation must be conducted discreetly due to the possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau.

BAW:mh (5)

NOTE:

"Ramparts" is a leftist publication which has been highly critical of U.S. foreign policy. It is self-described by one of its editors as an "intellectual muckraker." Robert Scheer, one of its editors, is presently under investigation on a Registration Act matter. By letter dated 4-26-67 the Department requested further investigation concerning Scheer and "Ramparts." Due to the sensitivity of investigating a magazine, we have previously refused permission to the San Francisco Office to check the bank account of "Ramparts." However, in view of the Department's request (which has been furnished to San Francisco), we should open an investigation of "Ramparts."

MAILED 2
MAY 18 1967
COMM-FBI

EX-110 REC- 59

MAY 18 1967

olson
eLeach
lohr
ick
asper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sul
T
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

52 MAY 25 1967

E-3

STATES DEPARTMENT CE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D.C. 20535
October 17, 1968

~~SECRET~~

11-20-00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JRG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[GEORGIY I. ISACHENKO
INTERNAL SECURITY - R] ~~(S)~~

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on October 15, 1968 that ~~(S)~~ [Georgiy I. Isachenko] had been informed that "Ramparts" Magazine had not received the list of names and addresses from the Soviets in return for the list that had been furnished by "Ramparts" to the Soviets. [Isachenko] was to check into this situation in an attempt to clear up this misunderstanding. The source was of the opinion that the list referred to pertained to mailing lists maintained by "Ramparts", and the [Soviet Information Department, Washington, D.C.] ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

The current "Diplomatic List," published by the United States Department of State reflects that Georgiy I. Isachenko is the Information Counselor of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Washington, D.C. ~~(S)~~

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

GROUP
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

100-44539

E-4

1 - Mr. [illegible]. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General October 20, 1975

Director, FBI 62-116395-970X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16
10-13-00 SP2ALM/JG

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, to Mr. John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated October 17, 1975, and captioned "Senate Select Committee Request." This communication enclosed a letter to the Attorney General from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, SSC, dated October 15, 1975.

In Senator Church's letter he advised of the intention of the SSC Staff to interview some nine FBI sources who had cooperated with this Bureau in the course of certain COINTELPRO operations. The Senator stated that he hoped there would be no objection to conducting these interviews but that, if such objections were raised, he be contacted by Tuesday, October 21, 1975.

It is noted that the issue raised in Senator Church's letter is not new. During August, 1975, SSC Staff Member John T. Elliff proposed interviews of this type and, at that time, this Bureau objected on the principle of the FBI's obligation to protect the confidentiality of relationship with our sources. As a result of this objection, a conference was held between yourself and Senator Church on the evening of August 14, 1975. It is our understanding that an agreement was reached whereby the Committee would attempt a limited number of interviews of individuals whose identities and/or

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

62-116395
EWL:lhb lhb
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

JAM

5-153

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

4063JSH

84 FEB 18 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

relationship with the FBI has been protected. However, as a condition precedent to such interviews, the FBI was to be allowed to contact such individuals to inform them of the proposed interview and to determine whether they would be receptive to such an interview. Senator Church concurred in this arrangement; however, subsequently on August 18, 1975, Mr. Elliff advised that Senator Church had reconsidered his agreement to the aforementioned procedures as a result of persuasion by the SSC Staff. Elliff, at that time, indicated a letter recording Senator Church's change of attitude had been drafted. To date, no such formal acknowledgement has been received by this Bureau and no interviews have been attempted in the interim.

In his October 15, 1975, communication, Senator Church again raises this issue. Although he does note that the matter was originally discussed with you "some weeks ago," he makes no mention of the agreement reached at that time. Apparently, as some sort of precedent, he does cite the fact that the FBI did make available for use and interview the names of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) personnel who cooperated with the FBI in certain COINTELPRO activities. We do not consider release of these identities on our part to be a concession with respect to confidentiality of sources in general since we specifically stipulated that we considered IRS personnel to be U. S. Government officials acting in their capacity as such.

It is clear that the merits of this issue have not changed since the agreement reached between yourself and Senator Church on August 14, 1975. I feel very strongly that the issue of confidentiality of sources is vital to the continuing effectiveness and integrity of the FBI in its investigative operations. I, therefore, strongly urge that should you concur in the need on the part of the Committee to conduct the interviews which they propose, that the agreement of prior

contact by the FBI with these individuals be insisted upon as a condition to such interviews to insure their amenability and uphold the obligation of confidentiality which the FBI has assumed.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
        Special Counsel for
          Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 10/20/75, and prepared by EWL:lhb.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

OCT 17 1975

# m DL16
10-13-00 SP2 ALM/JTG

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: O Senate Select Committee Request

Attached for your immediate attention and comments is a letter from the Senate Select Committee which is self-explanatory and which raises anew an issue previously addressed by the Bureau, with the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and this Office. Please note that Chairman Church asks the Attorney General to advise him of our position by Tuesday, October 21, 1975.

REC-100

62-116395-970X

FEB 6 1976

2 - ENCLOSURE

Let to AG 10/21/75
EWL/[illegible]

5 - [illegible] Slip

LEGAL COUNSEL

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 15, 1975

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
OCT 15 1975

#MDE16

16-13-00 SP-2 ALM/276

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The Select Committee is presently investigating the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation carried on as part of the COINTELPRO program. We appreciate the cooperation of the FBI and the Justice Department in making materials available to us in this area. However, one problem remains to be resolved. The Committee believes its staff must contact and interview certain persons who received information from the FBI in the course of COINTELPRO operations. The FBI has withheld the names of such persons from the Committee's use on the grounds that they were FBI "sources".

The Committee wishes to stress that it is not interested in questioning these persons about any role as a "source", but rather as a recipient of information from the FBI. Indeed, in many instances we would not have been aware that the individual was a "source" had not the FBI excised the name from the materials delivered to us. Nevertheless, to minimize any incidental deleterious effects on legitimate FBI operations, the Committee has selected a very limited number of persons whom we desire to contact and interview. (See attached list and materials.)

As you will recall, we originally discussed this matter with you some weeks ago. Since then the Committee has had an opportunity to consider the issue more fully in the light of our experience with other investigations. For example, our inquiry into the relationships between the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service clearly showed the

62-116395-970X

ENCLOSURE

need to use the names of IRS personnel who cooperated with the FBI in certain COINTELPRO activities. Those names were made available to us for our use.

As I am sure you can appreciate, what is at stake here is the investigation of serious breaches of the security and confidentiality of information obtained by the FBI. Such information was apparently disclosed or "leaked" for the purpose of disruption. The full extent of such disclosures in many of the cases, such as the efforts to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., is still unknown. Surely, it would be incongruous for an inquiry into these matters to be impaired on the grounds of the FBI's interest in preserving confidentiality.

The Committee has a clear mandate and a firm commitment to investigate allegations that the FBI attempted to harass and discredit individuals. The integrity of this investigation depends upon our ability to conduct interviews without the appearance of outside interference. Therefore, we hope you have no objection to our conducting the interviews of the persons on the attached list, but if you do, please contact me by Tuesday, October 21.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP-2ALM/JTG

Tampa

Excision (name unknown) Tampa television producer or newsman. Furnished public source data and lead material concerning black nationalist groups, particularly Junta of Militant Organizations, for a television "special".

Chicago

Excision (a Mr. Jones - newspaper unknown) newspaper reporter furnished public source data and other lead material for an article on the Nation of Islam, particularly its business interests.

New York

Excision (known to be Surrogate Edward S. Silver) probate judge contacted by Bureau to determine how to prevent large bequest from going to CPUSA.

Jackson

Excision (known to be Jimmy Ward) newspaperman used to plant Bureau-authored letter and answer in column re Nation of Islam.

Pittsburgh I

Excision (known to be Richard Larry) official of Mellon Foundation used in several counterintelligence programs involving foundation funding and contacts.

Pittsburgh II

Excision (known to be Sherley Uhl) newspaperman used in several counterintelligence programs of which the documents attached are one example.

Miami

Excision (known to be Gene Struhl) news director furnished public source information and other lead material with which to produce four separate documentaries which "showed the extremist groups involved in their true light."

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-970X

San Francisco

Excision (known to be Kevin Crowley) agent of California Alcoholic Beverage Control Board asked to raid a Democratic party fund raiser.

Minneapolis

Excision (known to be Fred Carey) Director of Security at Honeywell, Inc. and former Special Agent furnished information on plans of a group of Honeywell stockholders to appear at annual stockholders meeting to protest war production.

J. A. Mintz
- Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Dean

The Attorney General October 17, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MORI 6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 12, 1975, requesting dates of letters, names and addresses of senders and addressees on copies of letters which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI which were written or received by Angela Davis, Jeremy Stone, Jane Fonda, Ralph Abernathy, Steven Slepian, Jack Nelson, and the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D. C., as well as all materials pertaining to the acquisition of these letters by the FBI.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, in an effort to clarify the referenced request. As a result of this meeting Mr. Elliff requested the following information in FBI files concerning the individuals listed in referenced request:

1. Dates, names and addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from the above-listed persons which were obtained without the knowledge of those persons, and the source of these letters.

2. Basis of the FBI's subversive investigation of each subject.

EX-115 REC 17 62-116395 - 971

3. Approximate date each of the above-listed persons' names was entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and documents concerning continuation of each person's name on that list.

[illegible]
15 NOV 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___ 62-116395
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___ LED:en
Files & Com. ___ (9)
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

3 - ENCLOSURE
ENCL BEHIND FILE

84 NOV 6 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - J. A. Mintz
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Dean

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
#MDR 16

October 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 12, 1975, requesting:

(1) Dates of letters.

(2) Names and addresses of the senders.

(3) Names and addresses of the addressees.

(4) All materials pertaining to the acquisition by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of all letters written by the following individuals or organizations addressed to third parties and letters written by third parties addressed to the following individuals or organizations, copies of which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI:

Angela Davis

Jeremy Stone

Jane Fonda

Ralph Abernathy

Steven Slepian

Jack Nelson

Institute for Policy Studies,
Washington, D. C.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, concerning referenced request. As a result of this meeting, Mr. Elliff requested the following information from FBI files on individuals listed in referenced request:

1. Dates, names and addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from the above-listed individuals which were obtained by the FBI without the knowledge of the above individuals, and the source of these letters.

2. The basis for the FBI's subversive investigation of each above-listed person.

62-116395-941

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

LED:en
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which constitutes the Bureau's response to the above request.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

3. Approximate date that the name of each of the above listed persons was entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and any documents concerning continuation of their names on that list.

The following information constitutes the FBI's response to this request:

With regard to request number one above, FBI files contain no letter to or from Ralph Abernathy which was provided without his knowledge.

ANGELA DAVIS

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
None shown	Angela Davis	George Jackson	An official of the California State Attorney General's Office
1/24/73	International Friendship Club, Planeta-Kid; School #36, Kirovabad, Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR	Angela Davis, North Palo Alto, Holding Facility 270, 270 Grant Street, Palo Alto, California	Hunter Program

JEREMY J. STONE

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
1/14/71	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone	Mr. Frank M. Steadman General Counsel C & P Telephone Co. 1710 H. Street, N.W. Washington, D. C.	An official of the C & P Telephone Co.

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
4/20/66	Jeremy J. Stone	Dr. L. N. Kutakov Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations, 136 E. 67th Street, New York, New York	Z Coverage
5/24/68	Jeremy J. Stone 1788 Danbury Road Claremont, Calif.	Nina I. Shakhova Perekopskaya Vlitsa, 17, Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, I-209	Hunter Program
5/12/69	Jeremy J. Stone Washington, D. C.	Shakhova, N. 17 Perekopskaya Street Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program
1/2/68	Vladimir D. Kazakevich P. O. Box 346 Moscow, K-9	Dr. Jeremy Stone 1788 Danbury Road Claremont, Calif.	Hunter Program
1/13/68	Jeremy J. Stone	V. D. Kazakevich P. O. Box 346 Moscow K-9, USSR	Hunter Program
8/9/69	Jeremy J. Stone 264A G. Street, S. W. Washington, D. C. 20024	Shakhova, Nina 17 Perekopskaya St., Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program
2/15/70	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone Federation of American Scientist, Washington, D. C.	Chamkrelidze, R. V. Moscow V-333	Hunter Program

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
2/15/70	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone International Affairs fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C.	Yevtvshenko, Yeugeniy Moscow, USSR	Hunter Program
2/15/70	Jeremy J. Stone Executive Council Member and Delegate at large, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, D. C.	Muravyev, Dmitry Secretary General, Institute of Soviet American Relations Moscow, USSR	Hunter Program
5/19/70	Jeremy J. Stone 264A G. St., N. W. Washington, D. C.	Shakhova, Nina I. 17 Perekopskaya St. Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program
JANE FONDA			
1/8/73	Jeff Stein	Jane Fonda	A local investigative agency which advises letter was legally obtained but requests identity be concealed to protect its source.
9/6/7	Jack Mabley Associate Editor Chicago Tribune, 435 N. Michigan Chicago, Illinois	Jane Fonda	
11/13/72	Pham Thanh Van, Expert De La Delegation, Du Government Revolutionaire Provisoire, De La Republique Du Sud Viet Nam, A La Conference De Paris, Sur Le Viet Nam	Jane Fonda	

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
12/13/72	Jostein Nyhamar Chairman of the North Vietnam Movement in Norway	Jane Fonda Care of Maslansky, Roros, Turisthotell, 7460 Roros	Same as above
1/28/73	Rebane, J. Oru 7-3 Vilyandi, Estonia, USSR	Jane Fonda c/o Chartwell-French-Perenchin 9720 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly Hills, California	Hunter Program
STEVEN SLEPIAN			
5/25/70	Steven Slepian 319 Elm Drive C Madison, Wisconsin	David Slepian Delegate to Popov Exchange, c/o Intourist, Moscow USSR	Hunter Program
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES			
8/17/70	Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) (Marcus G. Raskin)	Xerox Corporation Rochester, N. Y.	An official of Xerox Corporation
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Granite City Steel Public Relations Dept., Granite City, Illinois	An official of Granite City Steel
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Corning Glass Works Corning, N. Y.	An official of Corning Glass Works
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Hewlett-Packard Company, Palo Alto, California	Third Agency
None shown	Marcus G. Raskin	Center for Constitutional Rights, 588 9th Avenue, New York, N. Y.	Informant

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

With regard to request number two:

No subversive investigation has been conducted by the FBI concerning Jack Nelson or Steven Slepian.

Copies of communications concerning the FBI's initiation of subversive investigations of Jane Fonda, Angela Davis and Ralph Abernathy are being delivered with this memorandum.

Materials concerning the FBI's initiation of subversive investigations of Jeremy J. Stone and Institute for Policy Studies have been previously submitted in the FBI's memorandum to the SSC dated October 7, 1975.

With regard to request number three:

No information is contained in FBI files indicating Jane Fonda, Ralph Abernathy, Jack Nelson or Steven Slepian were entered on the Hunter Mail watch list as the result of a request by the FBI. Information concerning Jeremy Stone and Institute for Policy Studies has been previously submitted in the FBI's memorandum dated October 7, 1975.

No Hunter Mail watch list information was requested or received concerning Ralph Abernathy or Jack Nelson.

Angela Davis was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 250. No information concerning the date this request was made is contained in FBI files.

The only record maintained by the FBI concerning the Hunter Mail watch list request for Angela Davis is included in the Angela Davis material being delivered herewith.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC). (SSC letter dated 9/12/75.)

Originating Office: FBI 1 20

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Date: 10/22/75

Received by: A H Hatry

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-911

ENCLOSURE

2

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)
Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)
SSC letter 9/12/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)
Intelligence collection
Information handling

#mDe16
ALL I[illegible] [illegible]SIF[illegible]
10/13/06 SP2 ALM/JHS

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Dates, names, addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from various individuals which were obtained by the FBI without the knowledge of the individuals, and the source of these letters, the basis for the subversive investigation, date and name of each entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and any documents concerning continuation of their names on the list.

62-116395

FMK: fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/TTG

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST 9/12/75

62-116395-971

[illegible]

ANGELA DAVIS

#-NDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

#mD216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2ALM/TG

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name DAVIS, ANGELA YVONNE
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address 1919 Oregon St.
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
Berkeley, California USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents

☐ One-Time Check ☒ Watch List Duration Until Canceled

HUNTER Request No. 250

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5

LOS ANGELES	LOS ANGELES	4/15/69	1/6/69 - 2/29/69

ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, aka Tamu

WILLIAM H. SNELL | yfs

SM - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JG
#MDR16

REFERENCES: New York (100-80641) airtel to Bureau (100-3-69) dated 12/10/68 captioned "CP-USA Organization, IS - C".
Los Angeles letter to Bureau dated 3/23/69.
Los Angeles letter to Bureau dated 3/27/69.
Bureau FD-01 to Los Angeles dated 3/27/69.

- P -

ENCLOSURES:

TO BUREAU

Two copies FD-376.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Two copies FD-122 recommending that DAVIS be included in the Security Index, Priority III, sent to Bureau 4/15/69.

(5) - Bureau (100-439922)
1 - Secret Service, Los Angeles
2 - Boston (RM)
2 - San Diego (100-14064) (RM)
3 - Los Angeles (157-2325)

COPIES DESTROYED
333 NOV 12 1970

10 REC- 87

12 APR 18 1969

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADD. DISSEMINATION.

Copy to SS
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 4/21/69
by

RAC + SS with slip

routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 4/23/76
by

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Instant report is being submitted instead of LHM as per FD-01 dated 3/27/69 to facilitate handling.

An extra copy of this report with appropriate FD-376 and photograph for Secret Service are being furnished the Bureau in the event DAVIS is included in the Security Index. Los Angeles has prepared an extra copy of the report and FD-376 with photograph and will furnish to Secret Service, Los Angeles on Bureau approval.

No interview with DAVIS is being recommended. DAVIS is presently living with DEACON ALEXANDER (STANLEY SAMUEL ALEXANDER), Los Angeles file 100-70526, Bureau file 157-10023 currently on the Los Angeles Security Index and the Los Angeles Agitator Index. It is felt an interview would result in possible embarrassment to the Bureau.

This report is being classified ~~Confidential~~ because it contains information from informants which if disclosed could reasonably result in their disclosure and compromise their future effectiveness.

Records of the Jefferson County Board of Health, Bureau of Records and Vital Statistics, Birmingham, Alabama, were viewed by the Birmingham Division.

Records of the Drivers License Section, California Department of Motor Vehicles, were caused to be reviewed by IC FREDERICK M. FREEMAN, Sacramento Division, with negative results.

Records of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office were reviewed by IC MERTON R. ANDERSON.

Records of the Los Angeles Police Department were reviewed by IC MILLARD T. ANDERSON.

Records of the Los Angeles Traffic Court were reviewed by Special Employee GAREY D. POWELL.

Records of the Retail Merchants Credit Association, Los Angeles, California, were reviewed by IC BERNARD P. BLAIS.

Records of the Los Angeles County Voters Registration were reviewed by Special Employee GAREY D. POWELL.

LEADS

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA: Will upon Bureau approval include DAVIS in the Security Index, and disseminate copy of this report to Secret Service.

BOSTON

AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS: Will submit results of investigation per referenced letter dated 3/27/69.

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA: Will submit results of investigation per referenced letter dated 3/27/69.

INFORMANTS

SOURCE	LOCATION
LA T-1 Records Clerk UCSD San Diego, California	157-2325-11
LA T-2 SOURCE	157-2325-13

LA T-3 *	157-2325-55 Orally to SA CHARLES K. JOHNSON on 3/29/69 134-1210A-563 -599
LA T-4 *	157-2325-16
LA T-5 *	134-2004A-582
LA T-6 *	134-1606A-621
LA T-7 *	Orally to SA DAVID R. PENDER on 12/4/68 134-107A-732 through 740
LA T-8 *	134-262A-766 through 804
LA T-9 *	134-195A-985 through 1020
LA T-10 *	Orally to SA THEODORE J. A'HEARN on 7/23/68 134-2702A-618
LA T-11 *	134-37A-915 through 1003
LA T-12 *	134-66A-1544 through 1546

*INFORMANT SYMBOL NUMBERS

LA T-13
INFORMANT #. 134-202A-714

LA T-14
SOURCE

157-2325-13

FD-376 (Rev. 4-25-68)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

LA 157-2325

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

April 15, 1969

ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS
Also known as
Tamu

#mrc\6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG
ON 11-16-00

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.
2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.
3. ☒ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.
4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.
5. ☐ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:
    - (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
    - (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
    - (c) ☐ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.
6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☒ enclosed ☐ is not available
☐ may be available through ______________________

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s) (1)
U. S. Secret Service, Los Angeles (RM)

Enclosure(s) *(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)*

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy to: 1 - Secret Service, Los Angeles (RM)

Report of: WILLIAM H. SNELL
Date: 4/15/69
Office: Los Angeles, California

Field Office File #: 157-2325
Bureau File #: 100-439922

Title: ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS ✓

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/LETG
ON 11-16-00

Character: SECURITY MATTER - C

Synopsis: ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, also known as "Tamu", resides at 1107-1/2 West 87th Street, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS is presently unemployed. Background data is being set out. On 6/21/68, DAVIS was elected as a staff member of the Los Angeles Chapter of SNCC. DAVIS dropped out of SNCC and joined the Communist Party. DAVIS is a member of the Che Lumumba Club, Moranda Smith Section, SCDCP. DAVIS' activities in connection with the SCDCP are set out. Description data set forth.

- P -

DETAILS:

Investigation in this matter was predicated upon receipt of information from LA T-3 that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS was a member of the Communist Party in 1969.

BACKGROUND

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

BIRTH DATA AND CITIZENSHIP

On January 30, 1969, records of the Jefferson County Board of Health, Bureau of Records and Vital Statistics, 1912 Eighth Avenue South, Birmingham, Alabama, reflected that under Birth Certificate number 3737026 for the year 1944, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS was born January 26, 1944, the daughter of BENJAMIN FRANK DAVIS and SALLYE MARGURITE BELL. X

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

EDUCATION

LA T-1 (6/6/68)

DAVIS attended graduate school in 1968 in the Philosophy Department at the University of California, San Diego. DAVIS supposedly attended Brandeis University, Boston, Massachusetts from the period 1961 to 1965.

IDENTIFICATION RECORD

The following is an identification record furnished by the FBI Identification Division:

I 1 (Rev. 9-30-63)

[illegible]N[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT O[illegible]US[illegible]CE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVE[illegible]GATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

2-6-69

J. Edgar Hoo
Direct

The following FBI record, NUMBER NONE ASSIGNED, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ON

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
PD San Diego Calif	Angela Yvonne Davis #282660	10-5-67	1-blocking entrance to pub bldg 2-disobey peace officer 3-disturb peace	rel 849(b) PC detenti only not a arrest

Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. Where final disposition [illegible] shown or further explanation of charge is desired, communicate with agency contributing those fingerprints.
Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being [illegible] with subject of this record.

ARREST RECORD

Records at the following agencies were reviewed and reflected no identifiable record on DAVIS:

Los Angeles Sheriff's Office
Los Angeles, California
April 1, 1969

Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles, California
April 1, 1969

Los Angeles Traffic Court
Los Angeles, California
March 27, 1969

LA T-2 (3/13/68)

Source advised that on March 13, 1968, ANGELA DAVIS was interviewed by the Los Angeles Police Department as a burglary suspect but was released without arrest.

CREDIT RECORD

On April 1, 1969, the Retail Merchants Credit Association, Los Angeles, California, records were reviewed which reflected no identifiable record on DAVIS.

VOTERS REGISTRATION RECORD

On April 1, 1969, the records of the Los Angeles County Voters Registration, Los Angeles, California, were reviewed revealing that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS registered in the Democratic Party on March 5, 1968.

RESIDENCE AND EMPLOYMENT

LA T-3 (3/21/69)

Source advised that DAVIS resides at 1107 1/2 West 87th Street, Los Angeles, California with DEACON ALEXANDER (STANLEY SAMUEL ALEXANDER), Negro youth organizer for the Southern California District Communist Party (SCDCP). Source stated that DAVIS is not employed at the present time but that she is traveling periodically between Los Angeles and San Diego.

CONNECTIONS WITH THE LOS ANGELES STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (LASNCC)(See appendix)

LA T-4 (7/3/68)

On June 21, 1968, the Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, (LASNCC) held a reorganizational meeting at its headquarters, 1914 West Jefferson, Los Angeles, California at which time new Los Angeles SNCC officers were elected. ANGELA DAVIS was elected a staff member of the editorial staff.

LA T-5 (5/16/68)
LA T-6 (6/3/68)

On May 12, 1968, ANGELA DAVIS was a special guest speaker at the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles (See appendix) located at 2936 West Eighth Street, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS spoke on some of SNCC's major projects.

On June 2, 1968, Sergeant DAVID KENT, Intelligence Unit, New Orleans Police Department, furnished miscellaneous papers on the Los Angeles SNCC. Among these papers was a letter headed "Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee Liberation School" addressed to brothers and sisters and signed by one ANGELA DAVIS, Coordinator. The letter stated that conventional education has failed to meet the needs of Black people in this country and that there is need to create educational structures which will respond to Black people's needs.

LA T-7 (12/4/68)

On December 4, 1968, source advised that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS had dropped out of the LASNCC and had joined the SCDCP.

CONNECTIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY

MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

LA T-3 (3/29/69)

On March 29, 1969, source advised that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS is a member in good standing of the Che Lumumba Club, Moranda Smith Section (MSS) SCDCP, Los Angeles, California.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT SCDCP MEETINGS

LA T-8 (8/1/68)
LA T-9 (8/1/68)

On July 21, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general membership meeting of the SCDCP at 7213 Beverly Boulevard, Los Angeles. Topic of discussion centered around the need for political reorganization of the working class.

LA T-10 (8/9/68)

On July 23, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a staff meeting of the SCDCP at 1254 East Manchester, Los Angeles, California.

LA T-8 (11/14/68)

On November 8, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general membership meeting of the SCDCP held at 7213 Beverly

Boulevard, Los Angeles. The speaker was GUS HALL, Chairman, Communist Party, USA, (CP, USA).

On November 7, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general meeting of the SCDCP at 7213 Beverly Boulevard. The speaker was GUS HALL, Chairman of the CP, USA.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT CLUB
MEETINGS OF THE SCDCP

LA T-3 (7/24/68)
LA T-8 (7/29/68)
LA T-11 (8/6/68)

On July 18, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP held at 2138 Third Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around politics.

LA T-7 (7/30/68)
LA T-12 (8/2/68)

On July 28, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Cyril Briggs Club, MSS, SCDCP at 3048 South Victoria Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around capitalism in other foreign countries and racism.

LA T-3 (8/6/68)

On July 31, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. Topic of discussion was a report from the SCDCP and various committee reports.

LA T-11 (12/10/68)

On November 25, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue. Topic of discussion centered around racism.

LA T-10 (1/9/69)
LA T-11 (1/28/69)

On December 5, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. The topic of discussion centered around Communist Party youth action in the community.

LA T-11 (1/29/69)
LA T-13 (1/29/69)

On January 16, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 1048 Oxford Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around racism.

LA T-3 (2/6/69)
LA T-11 (2/14/69)

On January 30, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. DAVIS advised that she is dissatisfied with the Black people's progress in the community.

LA T-3 (3/29/69)

On March 29, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP at 1048 South Oxford, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS paid $14.00 for club dues.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT
A MEETING OF THE NEGRO
MEMBERS OF THE SCDCP

LA T-8 (8/12/68)
LA T-9 (8/12/68)
LA T-12 (8/14/68)

On August 4, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of all Negro members of the SCDCP at 5731 South St. Andrews Place, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around the election campaigns, working class trade unions, and building of the Communist Party.

ACTIVITIES FOR THE FURTHERANCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

LA T-8 (10/17/68)
LA T-11 (10/17/68)

On October 13, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended the annual People's World (PW) banquet held at the Miramar Hotel, Wilshire and Ocean Avenue in Santa Monica, California. Topic of discussion centered around problems of the Mexican-American.

The PW is a West Coast Weekly Communist newspaper.

LA T-8 (2/18/69)
LA T-9 (2/18/69)

On February 9, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended the 31st Anniversary Celebration of the PW held at the Alexandria Hotel, Fifth and Spring Streets, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion was student unrest.

MISCELLANEOUS

LA T-14 (7/24/68)

On 7/24/68, source was shown a photograph of ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS taken 10/5/67. Source stated that the woman in the photograph strongly resembles the woman who, on 9/11/67 with a male companion, purchased a shotgun at Sportstown, 2673 La Cienega, Los Angeles. Source added that if the woman in the photo is about 5'7", 135 pounds, and has pierced ears, she is almost certainly the woman who assisted in purchasing the shotgun.

DESCRIPTION

The following is a description of ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS as obtained from LA T-2, LA T-3 and Los Angeles County Voters Registration files:

Name	ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, aka Tamu
Sex	Female
Race	Negro
Height	5' 8"
Weight	145
Date of Birth	January 26, 1944
Place of Birth	Birmingham, Alabama
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Education	Attended Brandeis University Boston, Massachusetts between 1961 to 1965. Graduate student, Department of Philosophy, University of California at San Diego, 1968.
Residence	1107 1/2 West 87th Street Los Angeles, California
Previous residences	6250 South Venice Los Angeles, California 536 Rushville La Jolla, California

1

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH OF LOS ANGELES

A source advised on May 8, 1968, that the premises of the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles, 2936 West 8th Street, Los Angeles, California, have been utilized for meetings by Communist Party members and sympathizers over a period of years. Speakers and lecturers at the church frequently espouse Communist causes or follow the Communist Party line. Communist front group literature is distributed at the church. The church is used by some Communist Party members for "mass concentration" work.

This same infiltration extends to adjuncts of the church such as the Unitarian Public Forum and the Fellowship for Social Justice, formerly known as the Unitarian-Universalist Fellowship for Social Justice.

STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN has been minister of the church since 1948.

Reverend STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN is described in the Fourth Report, Un-American Activities Committee in California, 1948, Page 115, as a very active "Communist fronter" and connected with numerous "Communist front organizations and activities".

Membership in the First Unitarian Church does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

APPENDIX

1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX

LOS ANGELES STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE

A source advised in July, 1968, that the Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (LA-SNCC), headquartered at 7406 South Western Avenue, Los Angeles, California, is not a membership organization but a loose-knit agency composed of young militant, black nationalists from South Los Angeles who have eliminated all Caucasians from their ranks and have initiated a program against the draft, the war in Vietnam and discrimination and have proposed a revolutionary program utilizing armed force, political and economic action to obtain their goals. LA-SNCC is an arm of the National Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee organization headquartered at Atlanta, Georgia, and with the naming of LA-SNCC Director RONALD LEROY WILKINS as Deputy Director of SNCC for the West Coast, the affinity between the National and Local organization will be more harmonious.

The above source advised that at a meeting of LA-SNCC leaders on March 22, 1968, the group indicated it was necessary for all SNCC personnel to be armed in order to shoot "pig cops" when they are stopped in South Los Angeles.

A source, in May, 1968, indicated that LA-SNCC leadership has encouraged all associates of LA-SNCC to obtain arms and to be armed at all times.

On April 5, 1968, four LA-SNCC officers were arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department at LA-SNCC headquarters in possession of two fully loaded .30 caliber M-1 carbines and one .12 gauge shotgun, pump action, with four rounds of 00 gauge buckshot. On May 4, 1968, five LA-SNCC officers were arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department for possession of loaded firearms.

On May 14, 1968, then Director JOHN FLOYD and three Security Officers, LA-SNCC, were arrested by the New Orleans Police Department for possession of stolen property. New Orleans Police Department found four automatic weapons in attache cases carried by the above persons. They also obtained material concerning instructions in the making of Molotov cocktails, bombs and booby traps for sabotage in guerilla-type warfare. This literature was published in Communist China.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
April 15, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS

Character SECURITY MATTER - C

Reference Report of SA WILLIAM H. SNELL dated
and captioned as above at Los Angeles.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside

JANE FONDA

#m0e16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/MG

SAC, Los Angeles 6/25/70

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. R. L. Strain
1 - Mr. J. F. Morrissey
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

JANE FONDA
SM - ANA

#m8e16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2AUM [illegible]

A review of available information concerning captioned individual indicates that she has been extremely active in the antidraft and anti-Vietnam movement; has made sizable contributions to black extremist groups, and has, by her actions and statements in general, indicated anarchistic tendencies and a definite propensity for fomenting violence endangering the internal security of this country.

If you have not already done so, you should initiate a security-type investigation of captioned individual in accordance with instructions contained in the Manual of Instructions, Section 87D, relating to such matters. The purpose of your investigation is to determine the extent of subject's anarchistic tendencies, a resolution of all ramifications regarding her association with various aspects of the New Left movement and black extremist groups and to ascertain if indeed her actions do pose a definite threat to the security of this country. In view of subject's position of prominence in the theatrical field, your investigation must be handled by a mature and experienced agent. No action should be taken which could result in embarrassment to the Bureau.

MAILED 5
JUN 24 1970
COMM-FBI

Results of the above investigation should be furnished the Bureau in report form, accompanied by recommendations as to whether or not subject's name should be considered for inclusion on the Security Index.

REC 10 [illegible] — [illegible]

For your information, the Denver Office is origin in the Sedition investigation of the subject, Denver file 14-86, Bufile 14-3037. Denver is requested to furnish the Los Angeles Office with a copy of all pertinent information concerning the subject.

2 - Denver

22 JUN 25 1970

(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
[illegible]

60 JUL 1 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

NOTE:

A current Sedition investigation is underway concerning the subject as a result of statements attributed to her wherein she advocated servicemen receive a dishonorable discharge rather than going to Vietnam. She has appeared on and been excluded from numerous military installations as a result of her anti-Vietnam activities. She has been associated with the Women's Strike for Peace, the Movement for a Democratic Military, the Vietnam Moratorium Committee and has made sizable contributions to the Malcolm X Organization of Afro-American Unity and the Black Panther Party.

RALPH ABERNATHY

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 [illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
ATLANTA	ATLANTA	5/28/68	5/10/68 - 5/24/68

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY	SA ALAN G. SENTINELLO	sja
	CHARACTER OF CASE RACIAL MATTERS	

#mde16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2ALM/TAG

NON PROSECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

LEADS:

CHICAGO, NEW YORK, AND WFO DIVISIONS (INFORMATION)

Information copies of this report furnished Chicago, New York, and WFO because of subject's frequent presence in those cities.

ATLANTA DIVISION

AT ATLANTA, GEORGIA.

Will follow and report pertinent activity of subject.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED						ACQUITTALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

8-Bureau (RM)
1-111th MIG, Fort Mc Pherson (RM)
1-NIS, Charleston, S. C. (RM)
1-Secret Service, Atlanta (RM)

REC-25

MAY 29 1968

Cover Page B
3-Atlanta (157-257)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	ICC	NISP,	Intu;	S.S.
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.	6/5/68			
How Fwd.	LHS			
By	ccg lci			

Notations

RACIAL

CC TO: CIA
REQ. REC'D 5-27
JUN 2 1969
ANS. BY: WFW SAC

Re: Abernathy

79 JUN 7 - 1968

TCC/m 806 98D

Copies:

1-Chicago (Info) (RM)
1-New York (Info) (RM)
1-WFO (Info) (RM)

INFORMANTS:

AT-T-1 is AT-1387-R

Instant Report
134-389A-228
134-389A-229
134-389A-230
134-389A-262
134-389A-429
134-389A-430
134-389A-508
134-389A-538
134-389A-576
134-389A-577
134-389A-834
134-389A-834
134-389A-1043
134-389A-1069
170-290A-421
170-290A-424

AT-T-2 is anonymous source of WFO (WFO letter 6/28/60 "Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.")

AT-T-3 is THOMAS P. MONAHAN, JR., New Orleans, Louisiana. (By request)

AT-T-4 is NY-3810-S*.

AT-T-5 is former AT-1380-S*.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Atlanta has not conducted active investigation of subject.

B
(COVER PAGE)

AT 157-257

By separate communication subject has been recommended for inclusion in Agitator Index.

This report has been classified "Secret" because it utilized information from NY-694-S*. Information furnished by AT-1387-R (AT-T-1) must be classified ~~Confidential~~.

C*
(COVER PAGE)

FD-376 (Rev. 8-1-66)

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

May 24, 1968

DECLASSIFIED BY ~~SP2ALM/JFG~~ mDR16
ON 11-13-00

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.
2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.
3. ☐ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.
4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.
5. ☒ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:
   - (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
   - (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
   - (c) ☒ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.
6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☐ enclosed ☐ is not available
☒ may be available through FBI, Atlanta

~~SECRET~~

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s)
U. S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Georgia
(Registered Mail)

Enclosure(s)

(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

Copy to: 1 - 111th MIG, Region V, Fort Mc Pherson, Georgia
1 - NIS, Charleston U. S. Naval Base, Charleston, S. C.
1 - Secret Service, Atlanta, Georgia

Report of: SA ALAN G. SENTINELLA **Office:** Atlanta, Georgia

Date: May 24, 1968

Field Office File #: 157-257 **Bureau File #:**

Title: RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG #MDR16
ON 11-13-00

Character: RACIAL MATTERS

Synopsis: Subject born 3/11/26, Linden, Alabama, resides 690 Laverne Drive, NW, Atlanta, Georgia, serves as pastor West Hunter Street Baptist Church and serves as President Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Served in U. S. Army 8/12/44 - 10/27/45, honorable discharge, ASN 349 94 505. Credit satisfactory. Atlanta PD records reflect three traffic violations. In connection with SCLC matters, subject has been in contact with individuals having prior CP membership or affiliation. Description set forth.

- P* -

DETAILS:

I. BACKGROUND

A. BIRTH

The 1964 "yearbook" published by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), 334 Auburn Avenue, NE, Atlanta, reflected RALPH D. ABERNATHY was born March 11, 1926 at Linden, Alabama.

B. CITIZENSHIP

By virtue of his birth, ABERNATHY is an American citizen.

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967—O—273-878

C. EDUCATION

The 1964 SCLC "yearbook", supra, reflects ABERNATHY is a graduate of Alabama State College, Montgomery, Alabama.

The January 21, 1967 - January 27, 1967, edition of the "Chicago Defender", a weekly Chicago, Illinois, newspaper on Page 20, published an article entitled "The New Covenant Sunday - SCLC Leader to Speak". This article reflected ABERNATHY previously attended Atlanta University and was the recipient of a Doctor of Law (LLD) from Allen University.

D. EMPLOYMENT

On May 17, 1968, Mr. JOHN A. RITTER, Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, Inc., advised IC MARION W. DAVIS his records reflect RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY was employed from 1951 to 1961 as pastor of the First Baptist Church, 347 North Ripley Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Since 1961 Abernathy has been employed as pastor of the West Hunter Street Baptist Church, 775 Hunter Street, SW, Atlanta, Georgia. These records also indicate that since 1961 ABERNATHY has held the office of Secretary-Treasurer SCLC.

As of May 20, 1968, ABERNATHY continued to be employed as pastor of the aforementioned church and to also serve SCLC on a full-time basis as President.

AT-T-1, 5/68

E. AFFILIATION

Mr. JAMES R. WOOD, Director of Public Relations, SCLC, on May 2, 1961 furnished a SCLC brochure which set forth the history of this organization and biographical data concerning several individuals

in connection therewith. This brochure reflected that ABERNATHY at that time served as President of the Montgomery (Alabama) Improvement Association.

F. RESIDENCE

Records of the Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, supra, reflected ABERNATHY resided at 76 Cerro Street, SW, Atlanta from 1961 until 1967. His current residence is 690 Laverne Drive, NW, Atlanta.

In having his current residence constructed, ABERNATHY as of early 1967 had incurred substantial expense.

G. MARITAL STATUS

The January 21, 1967-January 27, 1967, issue of the "Chicago Defender", supra, reflected ABERNATHY was married to JUANITA ABERNATHY, Nee JONES.

H. MILITARY SERVICE

Mrs. THELMA TURNER, Georgia State Driver's License Bureau, Atlanta, advised IC MARION W. DAVIS on May 17, 1968, that her records reflect ABERNATHY was inducted into the United States Army at Fort Benning, Georgia, on August 12, 1944. He received an honorable discharge October 27, 1945 at Foster General Hospital, Jackson, Mississippi. His Army Serial Number was 349 94 505. On March 22, 1966, ABERNATHY was issued a new State of Georgia Veteran's Driver's License number V-018805.

I. CREDIT

Records of the Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, supra, reflected ABERNATHY has a satisfactory credit rating. These records contain a report dated February 20, 1962, from the Montgomery, Alabama Credit Bureau indicating that as of February 2, 1961, ABERNATHY

was the defendant in a slander action brought by one L. B. SULLIVAN seeking $500,000 damages. This matter was still pending as of February 20, 1962.

J. ARRESTS

On May 17, 1968, Mr. JOHN TALLENT, Station Captain's Office, Atlanta Police Department, Atlanta, advised IC MARION W. DAVIS he could not locate a record identifiable with ABERNATHY.

Miss JO PRESSLEY, Identification Division, Atlanta Police Department, on May 20, 1968, advised her records reflect ABERNATHY was arrested as follows:

Date	Charge	Disposition
March 28, 1963	Red Light	Fined $20; City of Atlanta Municipal Court
September 13, 1963	Red Light	Fined $30; City of Atlanta Municipal Court
November 17, 1964	Lane Ordinance	Fined $25; City of Atlanta Municipal Court

II. ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT

Unless indicated otherwise activities referred to took place in Atlanta, Georgia.

Characterizations of individuals and organizations where available are set forth in the appendix section of this report.

On July 6, 1965, Rev. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., President, SCLC, conferred with ANDREW J. YOUNG, Executive Vice-President, SCLC; RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL, Program Director, SCLC; HARRY WACHTEL and ABERNATHY regarding the recent arrest in Selma, Alabama, of a Rev. REESE affiliated with SCLC, who had been accused of embezzling

funds of the Dallas County, Alabama Voter's League.

AT-T-1, 7/65

Rev. KING called a conference on February 12, 1966 of SCLC officers and other individuals for the purpose of examining the immediate financial condition of SCLC and endeavoring to determine methods of increasing the organization's income. ABERNATHY attended this conference as did RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL, HOSEA WILLIAMS, Director of Voter Registration and Political Education, SCLC, JUNIUS GRIFFIN, Director of Public Relations, SCLC, CLARENCE JONES and STANLEY LEVISON. LEVISON took an active part throughout this meeting.

AT-T-1, 2/66

On March 16, 1966, JAMES HARRISON, Comptroller, SCLC explained to STANLEY LEVISON various problems experienced by the SCLC Finance Office and the fact that ABERNATHY as Treasurer of SCLC appeared reluctant to act on suggestions to solve some of these problems. LEVISON told HARRISON he appreciated the problems experienced by the Finance Office and assured him he would discuss the matter with ABERNATHY in order that ABERNATHY would take necessary action.

AT-T-1, 3/66

On June 13, 1966, Rev. KING conducted a conference of SCLC officers and other individuals for the purpose of examining the current financial status of SCLC and ascertaining methods of reducing the expenses of the organization. ABERNATHY attended this conference at which CLARENCE JONES, STANLEY LEVISON, and HARRY WACHTEL were also present and took an active part. RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL and HOSEA WILLIAMS each attended portions of this conference.

AT-T-1, 6/66

ABERNATHY on July 7, 1966, reviewed financial contributions recently received by SCLC from the general

public and noted that these contributions averaged approximately $1200 per day. He explained to several employees of the SCLC Finance . Office he thought these contributions were the result of a spontaneous reaction by the public to the recent shooting of JAMES H. MEREDITH in Mississippi rather than the solicitation efforts on the part of STANLEY LEVISON.

AT-T-1, 7/66

Rev. KING on July 25, 1966, reminded ABERNATHY they were to attend a meeting of the Executive Board of the American Foundation on Non-Violence (AFN) to be held July 26-27, . 1966 in New York City. KING said HARRY WACHTEL would also attend this meeting.

AT-T-1, 7/66

AFN is a tax arm of SCLC located in New York City of which HARRY WACHTEL serves as Executive Director.

AT-T-1, 7/66

On August 9, 1966, ABERNATHY attended a meeting of the SCLC Executive Board held as part of the tenth annual SCLC Convention August 8-11/1966, in Jackson, Mississippi. During this meeting a discussion ensued concerning the desirability of SCLC's retaining the services of HOSEA WILLIAMS, because of current publicity suggesting involvement of WILLIAMS with one HAROLD BELTON ANDREWS, who was convicted in July, 1966 in the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, on a charge of Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Motor Vehicle. In response to this discussion, ABERNATHY said he and Rev. KING were of the opinion that SCLC was sorely in need of the continued services of an individual possessing the energy and resourcefulness of WILLIAMS,

and therefore felt SCLC should retain WILLIAMS.

AT-T-1, 8/66

At the aforementioned meeting of the SCLC Executive Board, ABERNATHY explained that in the early part of 1967, SCLC would engage in a fund raising activity which would involve Rev. KING's making a "pilgrimage to the Holy Land". He said this activity had been proposed by a travel agency (not identified) and STANLEY LEVISON and HARRY WACHTEL had previously been requested by SCLC to ascertain the feasibility of this proposal and recommended SCLC proceed therewith.

AT-T-1, 8/66

ABERNATHY was present November 22, 1966 at a meeting of the SCLC Executive Staff which Rev. KING called for the purpose of considering methods of raising funds for SCLC. JUNIUS GRIFFIN and HOSEA WILLIAMS attended part of this meeting. STANLEY LEVISON attended the entire meeting and actively participated.

AT-T-1, 11/66.

During the latter part of January, 1967, officers of SCLC met in Chicago, Illinois, to discuss lack of progress in SCLC's voter registration drive in that city. In attendance at this meeting was ABERNATHY, HOSEA WILLIAMS, and STANELY LEVISON. LEVISON and WILLIAMS during the meeting became involved in a heated argument regarding SCLC's support of the voter registration drive. As a result of this argument, WILLIAMS left the meeting stating he was resigning from SCLC. ABERNATHY pleaded with WILLIAMS not to resign to which WILLIAMS eventually agreed.

AT-T-1, 2/67

On February 10, 1967, ABERNATHY requested HARRY WACHTEL to forward $5,000 of AFN funds to SCLC to assist the organization with its payroll obligations

as of the middle of February, 1967.

AT-T-1, 2/67

On February 7, 1968, Rev. KING and ABERNATHY and several executive officers of SCLC including HOSEA WILLIAMS and JAMES BEVEL, former Director of Direct Action, SCLC met in Washington, D. C. with STOKELY CARMICHAEL of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The purpose of the meeting was to afford SCLC opportunity to request SNCC not to interfere with SCLC's pending Poor People's Campaign (PPC).

AT-T-1, 2/68

On March 13, 1968, a meeting of several officers of SCLC including Rev. KING and ABERNATHY was held for the purpose of discussing problems relating to certain procedures utilized by the Southern Christian Leadership Foundation (SCLF) as indicated by a recent Internal Revenue Service audit of the SCLF. On March 14, 1968, STANLEY LEVISON met with the same individuals to further discuss these problems.

AT-T-1, 3/68

The SCLF is a tax arm of SCLC.

AT-T-1, 3/68

On April 5, 1968, the Executive Staff of SCLC met for the purpose of resolving several matters relating to the death of Rev. KING the previous day. One of the matters resolved was that ABERNATHY would assume leadership of the organization. HARRY BELAFONTE and STANLEY LEVISON, and HARRY WACHTEL attended this meeting.

AT-T-1, 4/68

As of April 22, 1968, SCLC elected to pay ABERNATHY $6,000 annually to cover personal expenses incurred by him as President of SCLC. A decision was also made by SCLC to employ an Assistant Pastor of the West Hunter Street Baptist Church in order that

ABERNATHY might devote sufficient time to his duties with SCLC. These decisions were made by a committee of several SCLC executive officers. Also serving on this committee was HARRY BELAFONTE, STANLEY LEVISON and HARRY WACHTEL.

AT-T-1, 5/68

In connection with the PPC, SCLC contemplates holding a massive demonstration in Washington, D. C., on May 30, 1968 and anticipates 300,000 people will participate therein. During the middle of May, 1968, SCLC intended to request BAYARD RUSTIN to serve as organizer and coordinator of this demonstration. ABERNATHY advised the SCLC staff that RUSTIN had apologized to him for his recent criticism of the PPC and inquired how he might assist in the PPC.

AT-T-1, 5/68

In June, 1960, the "Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.," "The Struggle for Freedom in the South" and the "Southern Christian Leadership Conference Student Defense Fund' in a combined appeal solicited funds from the Soviet Embassy, Czechoslovakian Embassy and the Rumanian Legation all in Washington, D. C. These organizations appealed for assistance in defending the Southern Negroes, who were risking their career, facing jail terms and death in their struggle to make the United States totally democratic. This appeal for contributions was made under six names, one of which was Rev. RALPH D. ABERNATHY, Treasurer, SCLC.

AT-T-2, 6/60

On August 18, 1961 a news release type communication issued by the "Carl Braden Clemency Appeal Committee" was distributed by the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF). This communication revealed that on August 18, 1961 a delegation of Southern Integration Leaders would take petitions, signed by over

18,000 leaders in the field of Human Rights representing over 50 states of the United States to President JOHN F. KENNEDY requesting him to free CARL BRADEN. According to the communication, ABERNATHY was chairman of this delegation.

AT-T-3, 8/61

ABERNATHY on June 9, 1963, conferred with Rev. KING, CLARENCE JONES, and STANLEY LEVISON as to methods of dramatizing a proposed march on Washington, D. C., intending to pressure Congress into enacting Civil Rights legislation.

AT-T-3, 6/63

During the early part of May, 1968, ABERNATHY informed STANLEY LEVISON he was scheduled to speak on May 31, 1968, at commencement exercises of Alabama State College. ABERNATHY requested LEVISON prepare a speech for him to utilize on this occasion and LEVISON agreed to do so.

AT-T-4, 5/68

On May 5, 1968, ABERNATHY discussed with STANLEY LEVISON a proposal that SCLC become a membership organization and conduct a membership drive. They agreed the time was appropriate for implementation of a membership drive.

AT-T-4, 5/68

STANLEY LEVISON on May 7, 1968, advised WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD, Executive Director, SCLC, he would be unable to meet with him and ABERNATHY on May 8, 1968, as previously arranged for the purpose of discussing how operations of SCLC could be made more efficient.

AT-T-4, 5/68

The May 9, 1968, final edition of the Atlanta

Journal, a daily Atlanta newspaper, Page 2A, published an article entitled, "ABERNATHY Says Soul Force, March to Solve Ills of Poor". This article revealed that on May 8, 1968, ABERNATHY addressed the weekly forum of the Atlanta Hungry Club on the theme, "The Poor People's Campaign, A Memorial to Dr. KING". ABERNATHY declared that the PPC was neither begging nor threatening violence but demanding "with a thrust from a non-violent sword".

The above article indicated that on May 8, 1968, ABERNATHY flew to Atlanta from Montgomery, Alabama, to deliver this speech and immediately after left for Birmingham, Alabama.

On May 9, 1968, WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD, informed STANLEY LEVISON that ABERNATHY wished him to express his appreciation to LEVISON for preparing a speech he delivered in Atlanta on May 8, 1968.

AT-T-4, 5/68

In early May, 1968, STANLEY LEVISON complained to WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD it was imperative that ABERNATHY operate SCLC with a firm hand and not spend all his time making public appearances. LEVISON cautioned that if ABERNATHY did not do so, he would find HARRY BELAFONTE and himself reluctant to assist him and SCLC.

AT-T-4, 5/68

On November 17, 1964, DORA E. MC DONALD, Secretary to the President, SCLC, made necessary travel arrangements for Rev. KING and other persons to travel to Oslo, Norway in connection with the presentation of the Nobel Prize to KING. According to the arrangements made by MC DONALD, ABERNATHY was to travel in a group of persons which included BAYARD RUSTIN, LAWRENCE REDDICK, HARRY WACHTEL, and LEONORA WACHTEL.

AT-T-5, 11/64

Rev. KING on May 26, 1966, informed ANDREW J. YOUNG, that a Whitehouse Conference on Civil Rights was to be held June 1-2, 1966. He said in addition to himself and YOUNG, ABERNATHY and RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL would attend this conference.

AT-T-5, 5/66

III. MISCELLANEOUS

The April 10, 1965 edition of the "Philadelphia Evening Bulletin" a daily Philadelphia, Pennsylvania newspaper on Page 3 published an article, "Get Ready - We're Coming, Rev. KING's Aide Tells City." According to the article, ABERNATHY spoke on April 9, 1965, at the Bright Hope Baptist Church, Philadelphia. During his speech ABERNATHY pleaded for a negotiated peace in Vietnam and urged the admission of Red China to the United Nations. He endeavored to explain this did not mean he was giving into Communist philosophy.

On October 13, 1966, the Atlanta Journal on Page 25 of its final edition published an article entitled, "KING,' Aides Confer, Discuss Black Power." The article reflected Rev. KING had called a meeting of "top SCLC leaders" to discuss the topic of "Black Power" and future programs of SCLC. According to JUNIUS GRIFFIN the meeting commenced on the evening of October 12, 1966, and was expected to terminate late in the afternoon of October 13 or early October 14, 1966, and "involved eight members of SCLC's Research Committee". The article indicated GRIFFIN named those in attendance at this meeting as ABERNATHY, JAMES BEVEL, MRS. DOROTHY COTTON, Director of Citizenship, SCLC, "New York attorneys," CLARENCE JONES, STANLEY LEVISON, HARRY WACHTEL, RALPH HELSTEIN, "International President of the Packing House Workers" and BAYARD RUSTIN.

The Atlanta Journal on Page 6A of its final edition December 29, 1967, published an article captioned, "KING's Aide Plans World Peace Trip". This article revealed that on January 3, 1968, ABERNATHY would embark on a trip "meet with heads of state, religious and

community leaders in Geneva, Rome, Istanbul, Tel Aviv, Jersuleum, Saigon, Kyoto, Tokyo, and Honolulu". He would also, according to the article, attend a meeting of the International Inter-Religious Symposium on Peace, January 14-17, 1968, in New Delhi, India.

On May 10, 1968, the Atlanta Constitution, a daily Atlanta newspaper, on Page 1 published an article captioned, "Marchers for the Poor Mass Here" bylined ALEX COFFIN. According to this article, ABERNATHY addressed PPC members in Atlanta on the night of May 9, 1968, regarding the PPC. He promised a non-violent crusade but stated, "I don't want anyone to expect me to be MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. . . . I say to the nation, to the United States, with RALPH ABERNATHY, You've got hell on your hands".

IV. DESCRIPTION

The following descriptive data was compiled from information reflected by records of the agencies referred to above.

Name	RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Date of birth	March 11, 1926 Linden, Alabama
Height	5' 8"
Weight	180 pounds
Build	Stocky
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Complexion	Dark
Address	690 Laverne Drive, NW Atlanta, Georgia
Occupation	Minister Pastor of West Hunter Street Baptist Church, Atlanta, Georgia President, SCLC

Marital status	Married JUANITA ABERNATHY Nee JONES
Dependants	Three children
Military service	United States Army August 12, 1944 - October 27, 1945
Army Serial Number	349 04 505

APPENDIX

INDIVIDUALS

HARRY BELAFONTE

On October 28, 1958, a confidential source advised that according to JEAN SMITH, Secretary at Communist Party Headquarters, New York, HARRY BELAFONTE had been a member of the Young Communist League (YCL) before coming into prominence as an entertainer.

The YCL has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

JAMES BEVEL

BEVEL, in early March, 1966 was observed to be present at the offices of the West Side W.E.B. DuBois Club in Chicago (DCC). Discussion took place at this time centering around reaction to a recent notification that the Attorney General of the United States intended to label the DuBois Clubs as a Communist front. BEVEL, in conversation, stated that he would have ignored this notification, and kept about the work in which he was engaged. He felt that if the DuBois Clubs have a real program of help for the people, then people would answer for the clubs despite any labels applied to them.

Most present agreed that the attack on the DuBois Clubs was a part of the plan by the "establishment" to undermine the civil rights movement. They felt that the recent hearings into Klan activities in this country was only a beginning which would lead to a full attack on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the real target. One of those present stated during the course of this discussion that he was not a Communist, and to this BEVEL was overheard to reply that every thinking American should be. He stated that Negroes have not begun to read yet, but when they do, they will all be socialists.

RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL

On February 26, 1953, a confidential source advised RANDOLPH BLACKWELL had been a member of the Communist Party in the District of Columbia.

A confidential source advised that RANDOLPH BLACKWELL attended a Labor Youth League convention on August 13, 1950, at the Algonquin Club, 1430 Fayetteville Street, Durham, North Carolina.

The Labor Youth League has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CARL and ANNE BRADEN

Mrs. ALBERTA AHEARN, 2311 Payne Street, Louisville, Kentucky, a self-admitted former member of the Communist Party (CP), Louisville, Kentucky, in testifying on December 11 and 13, 1954, in Jefferson County, Kentucky Criminal Court, in a state sedition prosecution against CARL JAMES BRADEN, identified BRADEN and his wife, ANNE BRADEN, as having been known to her as members of the CP, Louisville, Kentucky, from January, 1951, to shortly prior to the time of her testimony.

The Courier - Journal, Louisville, Kentucky, a newspaper of general circulation, on February 3, 1959, reported that CARL BRADEN had been sentenced to one year in prison on a charge of contempt of Congress on February 2, 1959, in Atlanta, Georgia. The story noted that he had been convicted under this charge on January 21, 1959, and that the charge arose from his refusal to answer questions before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

The Louisville Times, Louisville, Kentucky, a newspaper of general circulation, on February 27, 1961, reported that the United States Supreme Court had, on that date, affirmed the contempt of Congress conviction of BRADEN.

The Courier - Journal on May 2, 1961, reported that CARL BRADEN had surrendered to the United States Marshal at Atlanta, Georgia, on May 1, 1961, to begin serving a one-year prison sentence for contempt of Congress.

The Courier - Journal, on February 2, 1962, reported that CARL BRADEN had been released from the Federal Prison Camp at Allenwood, Pennsylvania, on February 1, 1962. BRADEN indicated that he would return to his home, Louisville, Kentucky.

On August 30, 1963, a confidential source advised that CARL BRADEN and his wife, ANNE BRADEN, continue to reside at 4403 Virginia Avenue and are still employed as Field Secretaries for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF).

BENJAMIN J. DAVIS

A confidential source advised on January 21, 1964, that as of that date, BENJAMIN J. DAVIS was National Secretary of the CP, USA.

"The New York Times," August 24, 1964, page 27, column 4, reports that BENJAMIN J. DAVIS, National Secretary, CP, USA, died in New York City on the night of August 22, 1964.

JULIUS GRIFFIN

Source, in June 1964, made available a flyer distributed by the Militant Labor Forum, announcing a party scheduled for May 30, 1964, at 116 University Place, New York City, which was for the purpose of welcoming home the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) presidential candidate. Scheduled to participate in a symposium at this affair was one JULIUS GRIFFIN, author of "New York Times Series on Harlem Hate Gangs." This symposium was described as relating to "What's Behind Harlem Hate Gang Scare?"

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

RALPH HELSTEIN

A confidential source advised on June 16, 1964, that RALPH HELSTEIN resides at 5806 South Blackstone Avenue, Chicago, and is the International President of the United Packinghouse Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, with offices at 608 South Dearborn Street, Chicago.

A confidential source advised in November, 1953, that he was recently advised that HELSTEIN was registered in the Communist Party about 1946, that he (HELSTEIN) joined under pressure and remained in the Party organizationally only a few months.

A confidential source advised on June 20, 1956, that RALPH HELSTEIN, 603 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, was a member of the National Lawyers Guild.

CLARENCE JONES

CLARENCE JONES is the General Counsel for the Gandhi Society for Human Rights, 15 East 40th Street, New York City.

A confidential source advised on February 26, 1957, that he had identified a photograph of CLARENCE JONES as a person whom he knew during late 1953 or early 1954 to be a member of, and in a position of leadership in, the Labor Youth League.

KING, MARTIN LUTHER, JR.

A Communist Party functionary described MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. as a confirmed Marxist in February, 1962.

25

STANLEY LEVISON

A confidential source advised in April, 1964, that STANLEY LEVISON was a secret member of the Communist Party (CP), USA, in July, 1963. In late 1963, and early 1964, he criticized the CP for not being sufficiently militant in the civil rights struggle. LEVISON was described by certain CP leaders as being to the "left" of the CP in his position in civil rights. LEVISON's differences with the CP, however, are merely tactical and he continues his ideological adherence to Communism.

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL

In July, 1962, HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, also known as JACK H. O'DELL, was considered by the Communist Party, USA, as a member of its National Committee.

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL told EDWINA SMITH December 27, 1963, he would not go back to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference on the same basis because he is now a "left person" and if they cannot accept him the way he is then they will have to forget about him.

LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK

LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK is Professor of Social Sciences at Coppin State College, Baltimore, Maryland. He currently resides at 3704 Winterbourne Road, Baltimore, Maryland.

On September 17, 1943, a confidential source advised she had learned that Dr. REDDICK, who was then Director of the Schomburg Library, 103 W. 135th Street, New York City, was one of the most important unpublicized members of the Communist Party (CP). She stated that REDDICK seemed to be a source of information in regard to socialism and communism in the United States and the Soviet Union.

A confidential source on March 23, 1951, said that he met LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK in 1945, through EUGENE GORDON, a staff member of the "Daily Worker" and that both GORDON and BENJAMIN J. DAVIS advised him that LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK was at that time a member of the CP. The source also said that REDDICK was an instructor at the George Washington Carver School.

The "Daily Worker" was an east coast communist newspaper, which suspended publication on January 13, 1958.

The George Washington Carver School has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On February 5 and 11, 1954, LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK was interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Atlanta, Georgia. He, at that time, stated that he was not, and had never been, a member of, or a sympathizer with, the Communist Party.

On January 21, 1964, a confidential source advised that on January 18, 1964, Dr. LAWRENCE REDDICK visited with BENJAMIN J. DAVIS at the home of JACOB GREEN, State Chairman of the CP in Maryland. During conversation between REDDICK and DAVIS, it was mentioned that they had attended school together in Georgia and REDDICK commented that if he had stayed with DAVIS, he would have also joined the CP.

BAYARD RUSTIN

In "The Saturday Evening Post," issue of July 11 - 18, 1964, page 76, BAYARD RUSTIN is the subject of a feature article captioned: "The Lone Wolf of Civil Rights." In it, RUSTIN is said to have come to New York in 1938, as an organizer for the Young Communist League (YCL), and as such, he had the job of recruiting students for the "Party." Furthermore, the article reports that during his first years in New York, RUSTIN gave most of his earnings to the "Party." He reportedly left the "Party" in 1941, the article states.

The "Daily Worker," February 11. 1957, page 1, column 2, reported that BAYARD RUSTIN, Executive Secretary, War Resisters League, was an observer at the 16th National Convention of the Communist Party, United States of America, (CP, USA), held in New York City, on February 9 - 12, 1957.

A confidential source advised on September 20, 1963, that during a meeting of the National Board, CP, USA, on that date, BENJAMIN J. DAVIS remarked that, "RUSTIN calls me constantly--openly."

A confidential source advised on February 19, 20, 1964, that BAYARD RUSTIN contacted BENJAMIN J. DAVIS on those dates and sought his advice as to how he could escape from a speaking engagement to which he was committed. On the latter contact, DAVIS told RUSTIN that he was working on his request and had contacted friends who had contacts with the group to which RUSTIN was to speak.

HARRY WACHTEL

HARRY WACHTEL is the Executive Vice President of the Gandhi Society for Human Rights, 15 East 40th Street, New York, New York. He resides at 29 Split Rock Drive, King Point, Long Island, New York.

A confidential source furnished information in December, 1949, that HARRY H. WACHTEL, 41 Broad Street, New York, New York, was on the list of individuals carried as active members of the National Lawyers Guild.

On March 5, 1944, a confidential source furnished information which revealed that the name HARRY WACHTEL was on the list of names, significance not known, which was maintained at the Headquarters of the Kings County Communist Party at 26 Court Street, Brooklyn, New York.

Regarding HARRY WACHTEL's wife, LEONORA, it is noted that the same confidential source furnished information on March 5, 1944, which revealed her name and address were on a list of names of newly-elected officers of the Bath Beach Club of the Kings County Communist Party.

HOSEA WILLIAMS

During October, 1964, a confidential source advised that on October 3, 1964, RUTH BAILEY, then an employee of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, (SCLC), Harlem, New York Office, while discussing several SCLC personalities with one CONNIE CAMPBELL, referred to WILLIAMS. BAILEY said WILLIAMS had mentioned to her (date not specified) that on a prior occasion (date not specified) HUNTER PITTS O'DELL had told him more about politics than he could read.

ORGANIZATIONS

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF CHICAGO (DCC)

On May 3, 1965, a source advised that on June 30, 1964, a group of young people who attended the founding convention of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) met in Chicago and adopted a statement of purpose and constitution forming the DCC as an affiliate of the national DCA.

A second source advised on May 1, 1967, that DCA chartered clubs in the Chicago area are the West Side DCC and the North Side DCC, neither of which currently maintain a headquarters. There is no central headquarters for the DCC and there are no unchartered clubs in this area.

The second source advised that the majority of DCC members are also members of the CP.

During the past year DCC activity has been almost nonexistent.

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates were told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention.

The second source advised in September, 1966, that MIKE ZAGARELL, CPUSA Youth Director, stated that in Negro communities the Party still supported the plan to build "left" socialist centers and to solidify the Party base through the DCA. This source also advised in September, 1966, that DANIEL RUBIN, CPUSA National Organizational Secretary, stated the Party believes the DCA should have a working-class outlook and be a mass organization favorable to socialism, socialist countries and Marxism, and in April, 1967, advised that GUS HALL, CPUSA General Secretary, indicated the DCA primary emphasis should be on developing mass resistance to the draft.

A third source advised in September, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER was elected chairman of the DCA on September 10, 1967, at the Third National Convention of the DCA held in New York, New York, from September 8-10, 1967.

A fourth source advised during August, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER is a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

A fifth source advised on September 21, 1967, that the headquarters of the DCA is located at 34 West 17th Street, New York, New York.

GANDHI SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

The Gandhi Society for Human Rights was formed for the purpose of developing a philosophy and technique of non-violent civil rights protests. It is a non-action organization and makes no attempt to influence legislation nor participate in demonstrations. The Society furnishes legal assistance in certain civil rights cases. The organization was incorporated June 14, 1962.

THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of January 2, 1957, to supersede Guide published on May 14, 1951, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., contains the following information concerning "The National Lawyers Guild:"

1. Cited as a Communist front.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311, on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 149).

2. Cited as a Communist front which "is the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party, its front organizations and controlled unions" and which "since its inception has never failed to rally to the legal defense of the Communist Party and individual members thereof, including known espionage agents." (Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 3123 on the National Lawyers Guild, September 21, 1950, originally released September 17, 1950.)

3. "To defend the cases of Communist lawbreakers, fronts have been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the confines of the Communist Party itself. Among these organizations are the *** National Lawyers Guild. When the Communist Party itself is under fire these offer a bulwark of protection."

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91).

~~SECRET~~

AT 157-257

1 SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

"The Southern Patriot," a monthly publication, shows that it is published by the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF).

"The Southern Patriot" was cited as an "organ" of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 592, June 12, 1947.

The SCHW was cited as a communist front by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 592, June 12, 1947.

An amendment to the charter of the SCHW dated April 26, 1946, changed the name of that organization to the SCEF, and listed its purpose as being to improve the educational and cultural standards of the Southern people in accordance with the highest American democratic institutions, traditions, and ideals.

The SCEF is self-described as having deep roots in the South where it began as the educational wing of the SCHW, organized in 1938 to work for economic and political reform. When the SCHW disbanded in the late 1940's, SCEF continued as an independent organization, rallying support for integration and democracy and helping to stimulate and nurture new movements of the early 1960's. The SCEF maintained headquarters in Louisiana for twenty years, but in 1966 moved its headquarters to Louisville, Kentucky.

A source advised on March 2, 1961, that CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT, a Communist Party Functionary, stated at a meeting of the Communist Party in Baltimore, Maryland, on February 25, 1961, that the Communist Party is not connected with any progressive movement but indirectly they do have some influence in the SCEF.

~~SECRET~~

37*

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-257

Atlanta, Georgia
May 24, 1968

Title	Ralph David Abernathy
Character	Racial Matters
Reference	Report of SA ALAN G. SENTINELLA at Atlanta dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

951-953, 954-963, 964, 965-971

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

DO NOT
DESTROY
FOIPA# N/A

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 10, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. E. F. Glenn

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16
10/18/00 SP2ALM/JTB

10-17-75

Reference is made to the September 8, 1975, SSC request forwarded to the Department of Justice by letter dated September 9, 1975, listing certain documents and other information desired from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum in response to some of the requests.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which is being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

REC-114 62-116395-951

62-116395

OCT 30 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

6-ENCLOSURE

ENCL BEHIND FILE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

EFG:eks
(10)

EFG

WRW/TJL

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 OCT 30 1975

NOTE:

Single copies of the 9/8 and 9/9/75, communications are attached to the file copy of the enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

2 - Mr. [redacted]. A. Mintz
(1 [redacted] Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. E. F. Glenn

62-116395

October 10, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#mDR16
10/12/00 SP2ALM/JTG

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General's Office dated September 9, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 8, 1975, SSC requests and specifically to the following Items in those requests: Items 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35.

Item 22 requested all materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964, memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

No separate materials reflecting approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in his November 22 and 27 memoranda to Mr. Belmont could be located. At September 17, 1975, conference with SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein, it was pointed out that the approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations in his memoranda were the initials of the officials on the communication up to and including Mr. Tolson.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

EFG:eks ebs
(9) EFG

JGA

WRW TWL

WOC

JBA

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395 - 951

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Item 23 requested all materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

No materials could be located reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and/or between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's memorandum to Mr. Belmont, November 27, 1964. It may be assumed that the contacts were either verbal or by routing slip transmission which in either case are not recorded.

Item 25 requested all materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

All documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. are printed documents. Other than the documents themselves, no records exist indicating that these documents were printed or the number of copies printed.

Item 26 requested an identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

There were no attachments to the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

Item 27 requested all materials reflecting that:
a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and
b. "the Director agreed,"
that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr., be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's

February 29, 1968, memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr.; Security Matter - C."

No materials could be located reflecting that "Mr. Tolson has suggested" and "the Director agreed."

Item 30 requested all materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965, memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr.; Security Matter - C."

No materials could be located reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)."

Item 31 requested all materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's January 16, 1964, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

No materials could be located indicating that Eugene Patterson was contacted by FBI personnel concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Item 33 requested all materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta Field Office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government

with representatives of (the Atlanta) Office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964, letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

This Item has been responded to under Item 19 of SSC request dated July 8, 1975.

Item 34 requested all materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964, letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

The only other material responsive to this request has already been furnished to the SSC (e.g.) Sullivan to Belmont memorandum December 24, 1963, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C," which has been separately submitted by the FBI in response to Item 19 of the SSC request July 8, 1975.

1 - The Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 11 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

9/11

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: (1) Senate Select Committee Request
(2) Deputy Attorney General Letter to Senator Church

(1) Attached for your attention and as prompt a response as possible is a letter from the SSC with annexations which request certain materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. As you know, requests for materials as they relate to King are, by recent designation of the Committee Chairman, "high priority".

(2) Also attached for forwarding is a copy of a letter sent by the Deputy Attorney General to Chairman Church concerning a matter of interest to Messrs. Bill Cregar and Nick Callahan of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

#MDR 16
10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-951

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 9, 1975

#MOR16
FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2ALM/JAG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a list of FBI materials, delivery of which is requested ~~by September 15, 1975.~~ according to agreed priorities, JTE.

N/O
per Bergman

I would also appreciate your making available for Committee staff access, all Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1963. Upon examination of these files, delivery thereafter will be orally requested for specific items in accordance with the provisions of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department which governs Committee requests for materials.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

Receipt of material
covered by Fonda case
subpoena hereby acknowledged.
JTE.

RECEIVED
SEP 9 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-757

September 8, 1975

DOCUMENT REQUEST

1. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of the informant) of the 2/12/62 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, FBI, subject "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C (00: Atlanta)."

NP

2. All materials reflecting the steps taken by the FBI which "prevent(ed) the CPUSA from seizing control of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People," as stated in the last paragraph of page 4 of the enclosure captioned "Communist Party USA" which was attached to Director Hoover's January 10, 1961 letter to Robert Kennedy.

Check? p. NOT OURS

✓3. Reports which were submitted by the Atlanta and New York field offices pursuant to the following instructions which were contained in the second paragraph of page 1 of the February 27, 1962 letter from the FBI Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C, Office of Origin: Atlanta," (a copy of which was disseminated to the New York field office:

Nugent

NP

> "New York and Atlanta are instructed to review their files and prepare a report suitable for dissemination which will include all information of a security nature plus complete background data.

4. The "Bureau letters to Atlanta, 7/20/62, to Mobile, 7/20/62, and to Savannah, 9/17/62" which are referenced in the first paragraph of the 10/11/62 memorandum from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C, (00:Atlanta)."

NP

5. The "Correspondence received from the Atlanta and New York Offices" as indicated in the first sentence of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C".

NP

6. All materials reflecting instructions issued to the New York and Atlanta field offices "to furnish the Bureau recommendations concerning a communist infilitration investigation of (SCLC) and the recommendations received from those two field offices for a "communist infiltration investigation of SCLC", as indicated in the second paragraph of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C".

P
SPECIFY: TIME FRAME

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-951

7. The "necessary Manual changes" which were "attached for approval" to Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist."

NP

8. All materials which support the following statement of Director Hoover which was noted on Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist":

P MORE SPECIFIC

> Just a few weeks ago you contended that the Communist influence in the racial movement was ineffective and infinitesimal.

9. The September 5, 1963 letterhead memorandum to the Attorney General and "the related prior memoranda" which are referred to in the first paragraph of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell."

NP

10. The July 3, 1963 letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Hunter Pitts O'Dell which was attached to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

NP

11. All materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

?NP

12. The "Brief on the above-captioned matter and subsequent memoranda on the same subject matter" which are referred to in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

O.K. BUT NEED TO DISCUSS SUBSEQUENT MEMORANDA

13. The "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1953" and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956" which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

1963?

14. All materials reflecting or pertaining to Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney Committee", as referred to in his February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning a 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, as well as an unexcised copy of the February 5 memorandum. NP

15. All materials which reflect the basis for the following statements which are contained in Mr. Baumgardner's May 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Internal Security Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, Administrative Matter": ? Married ?

   a. "About three months prior to the March on Washington (8/28/63), we intensified our investigation concerning communist influence into the racial movement. . . .";

   b. "Martin Luther King, head of SCLC, has challenged the Bureau on this point."

16. All materials reflecting the "previous arrangements" referred to in the November 18, 1964 memorandum from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, subject "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director, 10:00 a.m., 11/18/64 (10:05 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.)" ? contacted 7/8 NP

17. All materials reflecting, concerning, or pertaining to:

   a. "(S)tatements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Georgia, at the time he highly criticized the FBI. His statements were made on 11/18/62 during an interview in the Robing Room of the Riverside Church in New York City where King had just preached a sermon." (This quotation is taken from the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of the 11/19/64 memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. DeLoach captioned "Director's Briefing of Women Reporters on 11/18/64.") NR

   b. Comments, responses, and recommendations made, inspections conducted, and/or any other actions taken as a result of the statements of Dr. King which are described in Item 17.a. above. coordination Inspection Div? TIME FRAME

18. Identification of the author of the notation "Being Handled, 11/20/64, D" which appears at the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters." Nugent Wick

19. All materials reflecting the manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "(b)eing handled" as noted on the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters," together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom. P

20. The response to John Doar's August 19, 1964 letter to Mr. James R. Malley which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. NP

21. The division and section assignment of James R. Malley as of August 19, 1964. NP

Covd w/ Adm Div

22. All materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964 memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." PREV. HANDLED 7/14

23. All materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." P HANDLED

24. The table of contents page(s) and/or chapter or section headings of:

   a. The article captioned "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" which was attached to Mr. Sullivan's 10/15/63 memorandum to Mr. Belmont under the same caption. NP

   b. The paper which was the up-to-date revision of the article described in Item 24 (a) above and which paper was attached to Mr. Sullivan's November 22, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

   c. The memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which was transmitted with the December 21, 1964 letter from Director Hoover to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.

d. The document which was the "current revision of the previous analysis captioned 'Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis'" and which document was enclosed with Mr. Brennan's April 10, 1967 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Communist Influence in Racial Matters - A Current Analysis."

e. The "current study" entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr. - A Current Analysis" which was enclosed with Director Hoover's March 14, 1968 letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall.

? 25. All materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a. - e. above. (Do not supply the documents themselves.)

?, What mean

26. An identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24 a. - e. above. (Do not supply the attachments themselves.)

27. All materials reflecting that:

?

a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and

b. "the Director agreed,"

that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr. be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's 2/29/68 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

Klein 28. All materials which reflect any recommendations for, and/or decisions relating to, the sending of Director Hoover's August 25, 1967 letter to specified field offices captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Internal Security."

Cointel Pro
Ryan?

Klein 29. All materials reflecting the approval of proposals contained in Mr. G. C. Moore's February 29, 1968 memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence."

Ryan?

30. All materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965 memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

31. All materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's 1/16/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C.")

32. All materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position at that time (the end of a 90-day period, or sooner if conditions permit) to take further action against King and the SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau," as promised in Mr. Sullivan's December 24, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

33. All materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta field office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government with representatives of (the Atlanta) office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

to #16

34. All materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

35. All materials comprising the "separate correspondence" between FBI Headquarters and the Atlanta field office concerning the "specific matters dealt with in Atlanta's letter (of 4/14/64)" as indicated in the Director's 4/24/64 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

Search to end

36. The communication from the Atlanta field office to FBI Headquarters by which "this publication has previously been furnished to the Bureau on 6/26/64," as stated in the second paragraph of page 3 of the 7/7/64 letter from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, IS-C."

Deegan's Office

37. The "separate correspondence" by which the Atlanta field office was "directed to furnish the Bureau available information concerning the alleged escapades of (the Reverend Ralph) Abernathy, including the obtaining of official court records," as referred to in the Director's July 23, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

38. The letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers which was originally attached to Mr. Sullivan's 11/27/64 memorand m to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement -- A Current Analysis." (See note on 11/27/64 memorandum indicating that the letter was "revised.")

39. "The letter" which is the subject of the first and second paragraphs of Director Hoover's February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning his 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, and which letter the Director told the Attorney General, he would "check on" and any other materials relating to "the letter".

P 40. All materials concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. being named "Man of the Year" by Time Magazine in December 1963 - January 1964.

P 41. All materials concerning or pertaining to Dr. King's Papal audience in Rome in September 1964.

P 42. Speech delivered by Director Hoover at Loyola College in November 1964, and all materials pertaining thereto.

43. All Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") from 1963 until 1968 for:

NP

a. William D. Campbell, and
b. John Matter.

P
ATLANTA

45. All materials reflecting, concerning or pertaining to electronic surveillance, feasibility studies or surveys, physical surveillance, or photographic surveillances, and/or any proposals, recommendations or discussions of any of the foregoing surveillances, studies or surveys, with respect to Dr. King's "hideaway", or Fred Bennett's apartment, or premises located at 3006 Delmar Lane, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia, or with respect to any other premises, apartment, or "hideaway", used, owned, or leased by Dr. King or Fred Bennett.

Klem
Cointelpro
Ryan?

46. The following materials which are referred to in the October 9, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C":

a. "NYlet 9/26/62";
b. "further steps to carry out this counterintelligence plan will be handled at the Bureau";
c. "memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption dated October 8, 1962, ARW:cdb."

47. The "ATairtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated 4/1/64 captioned "CPUSA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C" and "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C", which are referenced in the 4/13/64 Airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York and Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal SEcurity - C (Negro Question).

48. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of informants) of the 8/15/66 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, subject "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Secuirty - C (Stanley David Levison.)"

49. The Memorandum which "the Director had noted" as referred to in the NOTE at the bottom of the 4/13/65 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, subject "Communist Party, USA Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Nicholas A. Kourambis) (Negro Question)."

Klein
Cointelpro
Ryan?

50. All materials reflecting "comments" and "specific recommendations" submitted by the Atlanta, Chicago, and New York field offices as the result of the instructions contained in the last paragraph of the May 18, 1967 letter from the Director the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Martin Luther King)."

Klein
Cointelpro
Ryan?

51. All materials reflecting the product of the "comprehensive review of Levison's Bureau case file" as indicated in the NOTE on the 7/18/66 airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Stanley David Levison)."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document: Re 9/9/75 request materials pertaining to King and SCLC. Items 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/BS

62-116395-951

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/8/75, items 16 thru 27 and 30 thru 35.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

~~TS~~

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/KTE

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr. and Southern Christian Leadership Conference: November 18, 1964 memorandum regarding "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director; Statements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Ga., at the time he highly criticized the FBI; Identification of the author of a notation and initals on a 11/20/64 memorandum; manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "being handled" together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom; response which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party; where an Special Agent was assigned as of 8/19/64; Materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position in in 90 days time to take further action against King and SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau" as reflected in 12/24/63 memorandum, subject CP, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters.

62-116395

TREAT AS YELLOW 5-WO(

8

3791 FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

T. J. J.
9/17/75

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 17 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 9/16

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request Dated September 12, 1975

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting various materials and information relating to mail interception. Please prepare an appropriate response to that part of the SSC letter which is directed to the FBI.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALM/JRG

cc: Paul Daly

Ltr + Lhm to AG prepd Lhm to SSC
10/17/75 LED/em

ENCLOSURE

REC-114 62-116395-952

21 OCT 30 1975

1-Ad Hoc

62-116395

84 NOV 3 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 12, 1975

#MDR16 --
10/12/00 SE-2ALM/JTB

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a request for Department of Justice and FBI materials.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff jr
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
SEP 12 1975

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-952

1. All materials reflecting Justice Department knowledge of mail opening by FBI or CIA employees prior to December 1, 1974.

2. With respect to letters written by the following individuals or organizations addressed to third parties, and to letters written by third parties addressed to the following individuals or organizations, copies of which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI, including field offices, the following questions are asked:

   a. What are the dates of such letters?

   b. What are the names and addresses of the senders?

   c. What are the names and addresses of the addressees?

   List of individuals and organizations:

   1. Angela Davis
   2. Jeremy Stone
   3. Jane Fonda
   4. Ralph Abernathy
   5. Steven Slepian
   6. Jack Nelson
   7. Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D. C.

3. All materials pertaining to the acquisition by the FBI of all letters referred to in item 2 above. In the response to this item, priority consideration should be given to the following letter:

   Date: March 25, 1970
   Name and Address of Sender: Jane Fonda
   10744 Chalon Road
   West Los Angeles, California
   Name and Address of Addressee: Leo Matarasso
   29 Rue de Touron
   Paris 5, France

#mDR16
10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/BTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-152

Mr. J. B. Adams 10/17/75

Legal Counsel

HOUSTUDY
SENSTUDY -75

On the late afternoon of October 11, 1975, Douglas Marvin, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, called me and requested that the Attorney General be furnished a brief statement concerning FBI relationships with the Senate Select Committee and the House Select Committee for inclusion in a statement being prepared for submission to the White House. Mr. Marvin said that the Attorney General's intention was to bring together anticipated problems concerning the two committees in the hope that a means for resolving these matters might be found.

I discussed this request with Mr. Jenkins in the absence of Mr. Callahan and I returned Mr. Marvin's call and dictated to the Attorney General's secretary. I requested her to furnish me with a copy of the dictation. Attached is the page furnished by the Attorney General's secretary which I received on October 15, 1975.

This matter was brought to the attention of the Executives Conference on October 14, 1975.

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP2ALM/JTG

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Caly
1 - Mr. Mintz

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 OCT 30 1975

JAM:mfd
(8)

ENCLOSURE

84 OCT 30 1975

FBI Relationships with the Senate and House Select Committees

Senate Select Committee

FBI relationships with the Senate Select Committee generally have been harmonious with responses to the Committee requests delivered promptly. When difficulties have occurred they have been overcome by negotiation and tolerance on both sides. Future difficulties that may be confronted and require similar resolution include the scope of any public hearing regarding electronic surveillance of foreign nationals or their agents and establishments.

House Select Committee

In the past the FBI has experienced the following difficulties with the House Select Committee:

(1) It has held public hearings which were orchestrated to present adverse views without an opportunity for prepared rebuttal, such as occurred on October 9, 1975, regarding electronic surveillance matters;

(2) It has demanded delivery of documents on unreasonably short notice considering the time necessary to locate and prepare for delivery the enormous quantity of documents called for;

(3) It has interviewed employees, former employees and confidential sources of the FBI without first advising the FBI of the proposed interview and has demanded the appearance of agents below the policy-making level.

#M0016
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP-2 ALM/TJ6

A large number of documents dealing with electronic surveillance conducted without a warrant between 1970 and July 30, 1975, were furnished to the Committee on Friday, October 10, 1975. Certain excisions in these documents were made and it remains to be seen whether the Committee will accept the determinations made as to what types of information, e.g., identities of subjects who were monitored, should have been excised.

The overriding concern for the future is the need to establish an understanding on both sides of the policies to be followed by each in responding to the Committee's mandate. General agreement to specified operating procedures would alleviate the suspicion on the part of the Committee and the fear of Committee ~~re~~esponsibility on the part of the FBI.
irre

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO :Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10/20/75

FROM :Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP2ALM/JTB

During the discussion on 10/20/75 concerning the forthcoming testimony of Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, Mr. Wannall mentioned to the Senate Select Committee Staff Members present (John T. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, Michael Epstein, and Mark Gitenstein) that in view of the fact these hearings would be open to the public the Committee would not be fully briefed concerning the background involved in the Bureau mail opening programs because of the sensitivity involved. Elliff indicated that he was in agreement and that he would contact F. A. O. Schwartz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, to see if executive session testimony could be arranged. Elliff subsequently telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and advised him that Mr. Wannall could testify in executive session on mail openings in the late afternoon on 10/21/75 at approximately 4:30 p.m. subject to the approval of the Senators.

After consultation with Assistant Director Wannall, Elliff was advised that this would be acceptable and that Mr. Wannall would appear for executive session testimony concerning mail openings if the Senators agree to accept executive session testimony.*

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, was advised of the possible executive session testimony and interposed no objection to the Bureau giving such testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

REC-114 62-116395-953

*Section Chief W.A. Branigan will accompany Wannall

PVD:lad
(8)

PVD

PVD

WRW

84 OCT 30 1975

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 10-20-75 James Dick, staff member for captioned Committee, who is in charge of the hearings on mail openings, advised the public session is to be held on 10-24-75 and furnished a copy of what that Committee considers to be the issues raised by the Bureau's mail opening programs. (Copy is attached.) Additionally, he advised that the Committee plans to refer to the eight Bureau mail opening programs by numerical code names in their public hearing. He furnished the following code numbers with the Bureau code name:

Code name #1 - Z-Coverage
Code name #2 - Sam Survey
Code name #3 - Gus Survey
Code name #4 - Sun Survey
Code name #5 - Joe Survey
Code name #6 - Chiprop Survey
Code name #7 - Chiclet Survey
Code name #8 - Chican Survey

Dick advised that this will be used by the Senators during the hearing and that Mr. Wannall and Mr. Branigan, who will tesitfy, should be familiar with these numerical definitions.

RECOMMENDATION:

Intelligence Division should review the attached issue paper presented by the Committee to be familiar with the questions raised by the Bureau's mail opening programs as seen by the Committee.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/20/00 BY SP2ALM/dcg

#MD816

REC-114

62-116395-954

21 OCT 30 1975

Enclosure

PVD:dkg (8)

JAM

84 NOV 3 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI #M0016
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

Issues

The following issues are among those which are raised by the FBI mail opening programs and the FBI's cooperation in CIA's New York intercept project:

(1) Whether mail opening as an investigative technique should ever, under carefully circumscribed regulations and with proper authorization, be sanctioned in the counter-espionage field. The FBI mail opening programs raise this issue with more force than the CIA programs since, in general, the FBI programs were more circumscribed, more tightly controlled, and more focused than the CIA programs. The FBI programs were also very successful in achieving their counter-espionage goals. Mail opening does represent an extremely valuable ~~menas~~ means of intercepting the communications link in espionage communications. On the other hand, the sanctity of the mails is an established tradition in the United States, and it is doubtful that any selection criteria could be sufficiently precise to allow for the opening of only mail to or from illegal agents.

(2) Whether the mail openings that did occur were properly authorized. It is clear that FBI Director Hoover personally approved the majority of the mail opening programs. The one which was implemented without Headquarters approval was terminated shortly after it came to the attention of Headquarters. It does not appear, however, that any Attorney General ever authorized these programs or that the exact nature and full scope of the programs was even brought to the attention of any Attorney General, even though opportunities existed to do so. Similarly, despite frequent contacts with the Postal Inspection Service regarding the implementation of these programs, no Chief Postal Inspector was ever informed that the FBI contemplated the actual opening of mail.

(3) Whether the legal implications of the mail openings were adequately considered. There is no evidence that legal considerations were discussed after 1951, and there is evidence that Headquarters personnel who ran the programs either considered them illegal or ignored the legal implications entirely.

(4) Whether the mail opening programs were adequately controlled to ensure that they remained focused on counter-espionage matters. As noted above, the programs did generate some information regarding domestic organizations and criminal activity, although the primary purpose always remained in the counter-espionage field. The fact

ENCLOSURE

62

that these programs did generate such information apparently came as a surprise to the Headquarters officials who ran the programs and the obvious questions are whether this was permitted or encouraged, and, if neither, how it could have happened.

(5) Whether the selection of names for inclusion on the CIA's Watch List in the Hunter Project was sufficiently controlled and limited. Because the FBI requested the CIA for information on categories such as peace organizations and on specific individuals and groups involved in the peace and women's movement, a serious question is raised whether there was sufficient restraint on the use of this source.

NOTE: As discussed in the FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS summary, several of the FBI mail opening programs utilized, as selection criteria, various "indicators" which, with some accuracy, identified letters sent by or addressed to foreign illegal agents. The fact of these indicators has been made public by FBI officials in recent weeks. But: these indicators are still felt to be valid and the FBI has no reason to believe that they are not still being used. It is recommended, therefore, that the Committee avoid questions which would require in response an elaboration of the nature of these indicators.

T~~O~~P SE~~C~~RET

STAFF MEMORANDUM

EXECUTIVE SESSION ON FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS

FBI Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and William Branigan, Chief of the Soviet Section of the FBI Counterintelligence Branch, have requested an opportunity to appear before the Select Committee in executive session to discuss classified aspects of the FBI mail opening programs. Both of them will be witnesses at the public hearing on FBI mail openings on Friday.

The Committee staff has agreed that the public hearing will not disclose the following aspects of FBI mail openings:

1. The identity of the foreign nations involved, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba, Mexico, Hong Kong, Japan, most Western European countries, and several Central and Latin American countries.

2. The fact the mail to and from the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet United Nations Mission, the Cuban United Nations Mission, other Soviet-bloc Embassies was selectively opened. (S)

3. The "indicators" used as criteria for selective opening of mail screened in several other programs designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States. (The fact that there were "indicators," but not their nature, may be disclosed publicly.)

4. The identities of specific individuals and groups whose mail was opened either by the FBI or by the CIA at the request of the FBI. (FBI officials will state publicly that some of these, especially in the category "peace and protest groups," were not adequately justified.) Some of these included:

   Leonard Bernstein
   Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam
   Jeremy Stone
   Cambridge Center for Study of Public Policy

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-7-11

The following are questions which cannot be discussed in public hearings because of this agreement. They should be raised at this executive session:

1. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail openings aimed at mail to and from the [Soviet and Soviet-bloc embassies?] (X)

2. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail opening programs using "indicators" and designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States? [(Soviet and Cuban)] (X)

3. What was the actual intelligence value of the material supplied to the FBI by the CIA from its mail opening operation?

4. How good are the "indicators" in selecting mail of foreign intelligence agents only and not mail of American citizens or others who are not foreign agents?

5. What standards were used for opening mail to and from Communist China, and what was the intelligence value of these programs?

6. Do FBI counterespionage officials desire to resume any mail opening programs, with proper authorization from Congress and the Attorney General?

7. How do the benefits of mail opening compare with the benefits of warrantless electronic surveillance currently used by the FBI for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes?

Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service / Washington, D.C. 20224

Commissioner

REC-114 OCT 20 1975

Mr. William Creager
Section Chief, CI-2
Federal Bureau of Investigation
John Edgar Hoover Building
Room 4123
Washington, D. C. 20535

#MDR 16
10/13/00 SP2 ALM/TG

Dear Mr. Creager:

Representatives of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who have been reviewing files of our former Special Service Staff, have asked for copies of the enclosed two FBI reports relating to Nathanial Walter, Junior.

ILL

I would appreciate your letting me know as soon as reasonably convenient whether the FBI has any objection to our providing the Staff with copies of the reports.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Thomas V. Glynn

Thomas V. Glynn
Assistant to the Commissioner

OK for Dissemination to the SSC. 10/21/75. GTT

Glynn advised 10/22/75 WOB

Enclosures

File 62-116395

copy to: Mr. Arthur Jefferson
Senate Select Committee Staff

ENCLOSURE

REC-114

62-116395-955

OCT 30 1975

[illegible] Tunstall [illegible] 10/20/75

84 OCT 30 1975

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

F ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois
November 10, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-3597

U

NATHANIEL WALTER JUNIOR

Nathaniel Walter Junior has been identified as a member of the Black Panther Party (BPP).

> The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government.

Junior appeared in United States District Court, Chicago, Illinois, on January 18, 1971, and entered a plea of guilty on Federal Firearms charges against him, as well as on a bail jumping charge. On February 5, 1971, United States District Judge Sam J. Perry, Chicago, Illinois, sentenced Junior to three years probation on the above charges.

On September 28, 1971, Junior was interviewed by a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Junior advised that he was no longer a member of the BPP, having resigned as a result of a dispute with Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Illinois BPP, regarding the unauthorized use of Panther funds by Rush. He further alienated himself with the BPP when, in January, 1971, he refused to repay the BPP $1,500.00 that had been paid as bail to secure his release from jail on the aforementioned charges.

Junior furnished the following information concerning his activities with the BPP:

He originally joined the BPP at the invitation of Fred Hampton, in the Fall of 1968. Hampton at the time was the Chairman of the Illinois BPP and was subsequently

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-955

ENCLOSURE

slain by Cook County States Attorney Officers, December 4, 1969, who at the time were executing a search warrant in Chicago, Illinois.

While in the party, Junior held the title of Field Secretary and was privy to administrative matters relating to the BPP. On two occasions he traveled out of the state on party business, once to BPP National Headquarters for the purpose of meeting the National Staff, and to Washington, D. C., to attend the Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention (RPCC).

The RPCC, held August 7, 1970, at Howard University, Washington, D. C., was organized by the BPP to structure "a constitution that will guarantee us the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; a constitution that serves the people instead of a constitution that serves the ruling class".

In early 1969, Junior negotiated to purchase a quantity of weapons from an undercover United States Treasury Agent, for the BPP and as a result was arrested on a Federal Firearms charge. While out of jail on this charge, Junior learned that he had been indicted and decided to jump bond and leave the country.

Junior left the country for Canada, through the aid of persons connected with the draft resistence movement, and who did not know of his pending criminal charges or his affiliation with the BPP. He declined to identify these persons who aided in his leaving the country or those who aided him in Canada.

The BPP in no way aided him in leaving the country, nor did they provide him any financial assistance while he was a fugitive and for this he is bitter.

Junior decided to leave Canada and return to Chicago for the purpose of surrendering to face trial on the Federal Firearms Act charge, because of his parents' poor health.

Upon his return, he learned the BPP was no longer functioning on a democratic basis but was now being dominated by Bobby Rush, Illinois Minister of Defense. Junior sought to bring the party back to its former state, by calling for reforms and reorganization, which was resisted by Rush and he was subsequently removed from the Central Staff and he resigned from the party in September, 1970.

He is in no way involved with the BPP, or other extremist activities, at this time nor does he have any plans to resume his association with the BPP, as he feels "The BPP and other organizations are being duped by white intellectual revolutionary hobbyists, who are taking advantage of the hopelessness and frustrations of the Black community to exercise their theories on political and social democracy."

Junior claims to have no knowledge of any BPP underground, now or in the past, but admits that preliminary discussion regarding an underground cell of the BPP was had in the early development of the Illinois BPP, but that plan like most others never got off the ground.

The BPP was, and is, a big disappointment to Junior in that they departed from their original concept of neighborhood protection against police brutality, to one of international identification with communism. He maintained his association with the BPP in spite of this change in philosophy because of his respect and confidence in Fred Hampton, who rationalized that in order to further the cause of neighborhood control they'd need the financing and good will of governments oppose to people oppression, no matter where these people were.

Junior feels that the BPP is dead in Illinois and blames its demise to its identification with communism and coalitions with white revolutionary groups.

He has three things to show for his membership in the BPP; (1) probation on the Federal Firearms charge, (2) three years probation on State narcotics case (which he claims was a frame by police, but to which he entered a plea, "as part of a deal", at the urgency of his BPP attorney); and (3) an outstanding

indictment with the State of Illinois charging he and fourteen others with kidnaping and related crimes. Junior advised that this was another case of police harassment of the BPP, and another example of how the BPP has lost its attractiveness to people in Chicago. Of the sixteen people who were originally charged in the kidnapping case, including the deceased Hampton, only two of those, Yvonne King, and Billy Brooks, continue as members of the BPP.

Junior claims to have no contact with any members or former members of the BPP, except when the persons charged with the kidnaping report for trial every month. Junior cites the numerous continuances of the kidnaping case as an example of white hobbyists playing with young black revolutionary hopefuls. To him the continuances represent a conspiracy on the part of the BPP attorneys and the States Attorney's Office, as on alternate months they ask that the case be continued and neither ever objects. If he could afford it he would not avail himself of the BPP attorney's services.

Junior is required to report to his probation officer twice per month and is not allowed to travel outside the State of Illinois, without prior permission.

Logical sources, in positions to know, advise that Junior is not now active with the BPP, and has not been so in more than a year.

On October 29, 1971, the FBI recontacted Junior and learned that his pending kidnaping case was continued from October 26, 1971, until November 30, 1971.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois
June 9, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-3597

NATHANIEL WALTER JUNIOR

Nathaniel Walter Junior has been identified as a former member of the Black Panther Party (BPP), who during the time he was a BPP member was indicted on state charges of kidnaping and related crimes, with other BPP members, on June 8, 1969, by the Illinois Cook County Grand Jury.

The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government.

The case against Junior, and the other BPP members indicte with him, has never come to trial having been continued numerous times.

On May 10, 1972, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed Junior as he appeared in State Court, and the case was continued until June 15, 1972.

Reliable confidential sources advise that Junior is not a BPP member, nor does he associate with the membership of this organization.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALM/BTG

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

62-116395-955

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

Mr. W. R. Wannall

10/22/75

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

F. J. Cassidy

#MDR16

[illegible]
10-13-00 SP2 ALM/JTG

COINTELPROS

This is to identify two serials, copies of which were furnished to Barbara Banoff of the staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) for retention in the Committee's files.

Banoff on 10/10/75 requested copies of a memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Belmont dated 3/30/60 and a letter to the New York Office and 15 other offices dated 3/31/60, both captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program," be furnished to the Committee. Banoff stated she believed these documents had previously been requested but she was unable to locate them in the Committee files. She said she desired to have these documents because they set forth a logical program by which the FBI made an effort to prevent the Communist Party from infiltrating legitimate mass organizations. As an aside, she stated she thought the FBI was successful in this effort, indicating she felt the technique was worthy and proper.

Copies of the above two documents were made available to a SSC representative on 10/22/75. Copies of the documents together with a cover page indicating their receipt are attached. No excisions were required in these documents.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures
62-116009

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 OCT 31 1975

DR:lfj
(3)

4 NOV 4 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 10/23/75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum advises that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) intends to release to the press copies of eight FBI documents (attached). The release of these documents is scheduled for 10/24/75, following the appearance of Assistant Directors Wannall and Mintz and Section Chief Branigan before the SSC.

These documents were made available to the SSC responsive to specific requests. They have been excised and declassified where necessary. With regard to dissemination of FBI documents to the Select Committees of Congress, both the White House and the Department have held that, once a document has been excised, declassified and furnished to either Select Committee of Congress, it is that Committee's property to do with whatever that Committee deems appropriate. However, we do have an understanding with the Committee that allows for more extensive excisions once the Committee decides to make documents available to the press. Personnel in the Senstudy Project have reviewed the attached eight documents and have made additional excisions which are acceptable to the SSC. These excisions are designed to protect Bureau sources, targets and, where possible, the identity of Bureau personnel.

REC-114 62-116395-956

The contents of the documents that will be made available generally portray the Bureau in a favorable light. They highlight: (1) tight supervision and control of the mail intercept programs; (2) general objectives of the program; (3) accomplishments; and (4) Departmental officials' knowledge of the existence of some of these programs.

61 OCT 30 1975

Enclosures
62-116395
WOC:lhb lhb
(6)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

84 OCT 30 1975

Of course, it would be desirable if no documents were released by the SSC; however, Mr. Elliff advises that the senators are desirous of furnishing some documents to the press. If, in fact, Bureau documents have to be released, it appears that the ones the SSC plans to use are favorable to the Bureau.

For the information of Bureau officials reviewing the attached documents, no excisions have been made; however, the brackets in red ink show what information will be obliterated from the documents prior to their release to the press.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 2/27/65

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: THE LONG COMMITTEE

Tolson
Belmont
Callahan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele Room
Holmes
Gandy

The Attorney General called on the morning of February 27, 1965, to advise he wanted to consult with the Bureau on certain problems raised by the Long Committee, which is exploring the use of mail covers, et cetera. He noted there was a possible problem concerning Chief Inspector Montague's testimony and whether it was necessary for Montague to change his testimony. Also, he felt that Internal Revenue Service had been using investigative techniques which they should not use and this could pose a problem. He said that the President had asked him to coordinate with all executive agencies concerning the problems raised by the Long Committee.

Inspector Moore and I met with the Attorney General i his office this afternoon. Mr. Courtney Evans was present. I told the Attorney General that in Montague's testimony he was told by Attorney Fensterwald that if any of the questions had national security implications Montague should not answer them. Consequently, Montague was estopped from doing other than answe in the negative when asked questions touching on national security. With this interpretation, it was questionable whethe an attempt should be made to change or explain Montague's testimony, particularly in view of the obvious lack of judgment on the part of Fensterwald and the desire of Long for publicity I made it clear to the Attorney General that from our dealings with Montague, he was a man of integrity and sacrificed his personal desires for the welfare of the country and had coopera fully with us. The Attorney General said he had no intention of changing one word of Montague's testimony, but he was considering advising Long and Fensterwald that there were extreme delicate national security matters touching on the area being covered by the committee and there could be exceptions to the answers given in the testimony when they touched on such sensitive security matters. He said further that he contemplat seeing Senator Long and impressing on him that the committee would not want to stumble by mistake into an area of extreme interest to the national security as they nearly did in a matte

REC- 56

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - Mr. Tolson
2 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Moore

25 MAR 12 1965

EX-114

MAR 15 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2-ALM/EST

#moe 16

[illegible]

affecting CIA. (Apparently CIA got wind of some inquiries by the committee relative to their secret operation and went to the committee and warned them off.) Katzenbach contemplates asking for a list of the witnesses who will appear before the committee together with a brief summary of the expected testimon
On the basis of this, he will be able to advise Senator Long when he should steer clear of a sensitive area.

I told Mr. Katzenbach that I certainly agree that this matter should be controlled at the committee level but that I felt pressure would have to be applied so that the personal interest of Senator Long became involved rather than on any ideological basis. Mr. Katzenbach said that he had already talked to Vice President Humphrey about Fensterwald, who he considered a wild man, and that Humphrey had promised to talk to Long concerning Fensterwald. Katzenbach said that in addition to the Vice President he might have to resort to pressure from the President himself, although he would prefer to work it out without resorting to the President. He indicated there was no one on the committee itself who could be helpful and that he did not expect any help from Senator Eastland.

Mr. Katzenbach said that he expected troublefrom the possible activities of IRS and the military in the investigative field; that if some of these matters are uncovered before the committee they will tend to undermine the restricted and tightly controlled operations of the Bureau. I told him that our operations are tightly controlled and particularly in the delicate areas of concern, we restrict ourselves to important security matters.

Mr. Katzenbach said he was going to see Senator Long on Monday and wanted to know if the Bureau would like someone to go along with him. I told him no.

ACTION:

Mr. Katzenbach said he would advise us of the results of his conversation with Long. He also asked that I advise the Director of our discussion and I told him I would.

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: The Long Committee

I called Mr. DeLoach and briefed him on this problem in order that he might contact Senator Eastland in an effort to warn the Long Committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense. (Of couse I made no mention of such a contact to the Attorney General.) Mr. DeLoach advised that Senator Eastland is in Mississippi and he will contact him upon his return Monday.

I don't see what all
the excitement is about.
I would have no hesitation
in discontinuing all techni-
ques — technical coverage,
microphones, trash co[illegible]
mail covers etc. While it
might handicap us, I doubt
they are as valuable as [illegible]
believe & none warrant
being used to justify [illegible]

9:40 AM March 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/16

Sen. Comm. Judiciary

The Attorney General called and advised that he had talked to Senator Long last night. Senator Long's committee is looking into mail covers et cetera. The Attorney General stated he thought somebody had already spoken to Senator Long as he said he did not want to get into any national security area and was willing to take steps not to do this. The Attorney General stated that Mr. Fensterwald was present for part of the meeting and Fensterwald had said that he had some possible witnesses who are former Bureau Agents and if they were asked if mail was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General stated that before they are called, he would like to know who they are and whether they were ever involved in any program touching on national security and if not, it is their own business, but if they were, we would want to know. The Attorney General stated the Senator promised that he would have a chance to look at the names if he wanted to, personally and confidentially, and the list would have any names involving national security deleted and he would tell the Senator how many but no more.

The Attorney General stated that the Postmaster General is going down there this morning himself which he, the Attorney General, thought would be helpful to Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department.

The Attorney General stated that Senator Long also said he is not going to propose legislation to abolish mail covers as he thought they served a useful purpose but he did think that control should be tightened. I stated I thought there was great laxity in the matter of mail covers and the matter of tapping telephones.

I stated I have always been of the view and recommended back when Tom Clark was Attorney General that no agency of the Government should tap a telephone except with the written approval of the Attorney General. I stated

REC-38 62-[illegible]-41

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

XEROX JEH:edm (10)

MAR 3 1965

MAR 3 - 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

8

there would then be in one place a list of all phone taps and the purpose and reason for them. I stated that it is a fact, insofar as I am concerned, that I am the only head of an agency who does not have authority to tap telephones. I stated that I know that subordinates down the line in some agencies will tap phones without the knowledge of the chief of the agency and there is grave suspicion in Washington by some newspapermen that their phones have been tapped by agencies of the Government trying to find out where they are getting their information. I stated I have always been opposed to the law whereby it is necessary to get the authority of a court to tap phones because of the composition of some of our courts and the employees thereof, but I have always felt that the President should issue an Executive Order confidentially to all agencies that all phone tapping be discontinued except when specifically approved by the Attorney General so there would be in one place a list and then if any committee in Congress got on the warpath, the Attorney General would have a list he could vouch for as being the only phones tapped by the Government. The Attorney General stated that made sense. I stated many agencies are opposed because they realize there would be a marked restriction. I stated we only have 45 phone taps, which is a low number for a country the size of ours and the area we have to cover. The Attorney General stated no one has any idea how many phone taps the whole Government has.

I stated there is also a school being conducted in California by a private organization which instructs the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service in the matter of phone tapping and they have sent their own personnel there to be trained. I stated Internal Revenue has also from time to time hired private outside phone tappers to do their tapping. I stated it is that type of thing if there were a real investigation which would come out. The Attorney General commented that he would not guarantee some of it won't come out. I stated I was amazed when I learned of the school in California as I saw a reference to it in the newspaper and wanted to know what it was and what officers attended. I stated we have our own instructors and do it ourselves.

I stated I thought the Attorney General had made good headway with Senator Long. The Attorney General stated he thought it would be helpful, but his

March 2, 1965

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, DeLoach

problem is that he thinks the Senator is fine but he does not think that Fensterwald is as straightforward, or to put it another way that Fensterwald is smart and devious and the Senator is straightforward and not very bright and that is the problem. I stated I thought that Fensterwald is trying to get publicity for the Senator. The Attorney General stated the Senator said he did not want to get into this and he would give him, the Attorney General, the names and a summary of the testimony and told Fensterwald to do so, but he, the Attorney General, can't say Fensterwald is going to do it; that he will on some but he did not know that he would on all. I stated I had no faith or confidence in Fensterwald and neither did Senator Eastland. The Attorney General stated that Senator Eastland may have already talked to Senator Long or else the Vice President, but somebody had waked him up. I stated Senator Eastland said he would do it Wednesday, but he may have called him.

The Attorney General stated that is where it stands now and we shall see what happens.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11 42 AM
DATE 3-2-65
BY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: October 2, 1964

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. J.P.Mohr
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D.E.Moore
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Litrento

SUBJECT: [redacted] CODE WORD
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

Prior memoranda have advised of the starting of the trial of the Soviet illegal agents in this case, Mr. and Mrs. Robert K. Baltch, in the Eastern District of New York and motions by defense counsel regarding the nature of evidence to be submitted in this case.

The Judge originally denied the motions, but Assistant Attorney General Yeagley has advised that USA Hoey in answering questions by the Judge gave answers which were too broad and which the Government cannot support and therefore it is necessary for the Government to make additional statements to Judge Dooling who is sitting in this case in the Eastern District of New York. My memorandum of September 30, 1964, advised that while we were not aware of the contents of the conversations between USA Hoey and Judge Dooling, we had no objections to Yeagley's proposed amending statement as it was correct.

Subsequently on the afternoon of 10-1-64, Departmental Attorneys Thomas K. Hall and Kevin Maroney advised Supervisor Litrento and myself that USA Hoey's statement to Judge Dooling was unfortunate because it was too broad. They believe that the Judge's query pertained to any tainted source at the Baltch residence and was confined to eavesdropping devices, but that Hoey in his answer had not confined the answer to the residence or to eavesdropping, either of which would perhaps have prevented the current problem. (No information obtained from wiretaps or microphones is contemplated to be used in this case and the only tainted source is a mail intercept which did not take place anywhere near the residence).

Subsequently on the evening of 10-1-64, Mr. Hall advised that he had just learned that apparently Hoey in his discussions with the court had stated, or at least indicated, there was no microphone involved in this case and, of course, this was incorrect and the Department felt the record had to be corrected. He

DEM:td (8)

Classified By 4041
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC- 15
EX- 117
OCT 19 1964
~~SECRET~~
Soviet Section

58 OCT 21 1964

~~SECRET~~

MR. SULLIVAN - MR. MOORE
[redacted] ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

asked if the Bureau had any objection and was advised in the negative. This morning Mr. Hall called to advise that USA Hoey had now requested advice as to what answer could be given the court should he be asked (1) if there was a wiretap involved in this case and (2) if there was a mail intercept in this case. After checking, I called Hall back and said that we would leave the answer to #1 up to the Department, but that if the Department saw necessary, the Bureau would not object. However, with regard to #2, under no circumstances is the Bureau willing to admit that a mail intercept was utilized and Hall said he would pass this information on to Hoey and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley who is in New York. [illegible]

Hall advised that he had discussed this case with Acting Attorney General Katzenbach this morning and Katzenbach was of the opinion that the Department must be candid with the Judge. He said Katzenbach recognized the problems, but felt that in view of the value of the case, an effort should be made to go ahead with the trial even if it might be necessary drop the overt act where our tainted source is involved, and proceed on a general conspiracy basis with the recognition that the verdict might be against us, but we would have revealed the Soviet espionage activities to the people. Hall said he was passing on the Acting Attorney General's comments to Assistant Attorney General Yeagley. Hall said that the motions of defense counsel and the complications with regard to the answers may eventually force the Government to drop the prosecution. He said in view of the many facets involved, he did not feel there was any reason to agree to a pre-trial hearing on the issue of tainted source if this should be required by the court, and rather than do this, they are prepared to drop the espionage charges and attempt to proceed on lesser grounds.

ACTION

SAC Schmit, NYO, was advised of the above developments and requested to keep in close touch with Yeagley in New York and you will be kept advised of developments.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

TO : MR. SULLIVAN

DATE: 8-14-64

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Taylor 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Branigan

FROM : MR. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: DOSNAR
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

The captioned code word covers our investigation of the unknown subject at San Diego, California who offered to sell information concerning Sonar to the Soviets for $60,000.

BACKGROUND:

Information concerning this first came to our attention on 7-17-64 when our highly confidential coverage detected a letter addressed to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, postmarked 7-16-64 at San Diego, California. We followed up on this by inserting a message in a San Diego newspaper indicating that we were interested in the offer. The unsub then telephonically contacted an Agent of the Washington Field Office at the telephone number furnished him in the message in the personal column of the San Diego newspaper. Thereafter, we intercepted a telephone call that the subject made to the Soviet Embassy during which he attempted to verify that he was dealing with Soviet citizens. Acting on the subject's instructions, a package containing a camera suitable for document photography and $500 was dispatched by United Airlines air freight from Washington to San Diego during the early morning of 8-13-64.

In the meantime, another resident of San Diego, one R. Tobin, advised our office there that he had been engaged by an unidentified individual to pick up a package at United Airlines Freight Terminal which he was to subsequently turn over and for which he would be paid $20.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:

According to SAC C. Williams, an Agent of the San Diego Office posing as R. Tobin in the latter's automobile picked up the package at 8 p.m., PDT, and, thereafter, proceeded as he had been instructed to a drive-in in the San Diego area. SAC Williams advised that the coverage by San Diego Agents at the Air Freight Terminal uncovered a suspect who appeared to be closely observing

WAB:BST:hrt
(8)

REC- 38

CONTINUED - OVER

EX-108

65 AUG 21 1964

10 AUG 19 1964

Tobin's automobile and who, thereafter, surveilled the automobile to the area of the drive-in.

After waiting the agreed time, our Agent proceeded to a parking lot adjacent to a church about one mile further down the highway. Shortly after the Agent arrived, he was approached by the suspect who inquired "Are you Tobin?" Thereafter, the suspect claimed to be a messenger who had been engaged to pick up the package. He did deliver an envelope to our Agent which contained the $20 agreed to. At this point, the Agent, posing as Tobin, identified himself and requested that the suspect identify himself and voluntarily accompany him to the San Diego Office.

The suspect, who has now been identified as the subject, is Perry A. Chandelaine, 3231 Par Drive, La Mesa, California. He is a Grade 13 engineer at the Navy Electronics Laboratory, San Diego. This laboratory does all the training and electronics work and research, including Sonar, for the Navy in the San Diego area. In this connection, the subject claimed that he had access to information classified "Confidential." He has been a Government employee in excess of ten years and is the father of ten children.

In May, 1952, subject was an applicant for the position of Special Agent with this Bureau. Apparently during the interview it was determined the applicant's father was killed by the police in Chicago in 1932 when caught stealing butter from a boxcar. He had been arrested for selling whiskey prior to that in Wisconsin. Applicant was considered very nervous and had a vagotomy operation for a nervous disorder performed in 1947. Applicant had an ulcer which caused his discharge from the service and which still, at that time, gave him trouble. He was unfavorably recommended for employment.

According to SAC Williams, the subject readily acknowledged that he was in real deep trouble and claimed that his wife was also knowledgeable concerning his activities. Subject freely admitted contacting the Soviets and offering to sell information to them. However, the subject steadfastly maintained that he was a patriotic American, a Catholic and one who hated the Russians and that he was endeavoring to get all out of them that he could and he then intended to turn whatever he obtained over to ONI.

Subject's wife was invited to the office and she confirmed that earlier in the evening the subject had apprised her of his activities and gave her a letter which was addressed to ONI and which she was to mail upon receipt of a phone call from him. This

CONTINUED - OVER

letter was mailed by her when she was contacted by the subject who was at that time in the San Diego Office. Subject and his wife both furnished signed statements.

Thereafter, the facts in this case were presented to Mr. Thomas K. Hall of the Internal Security Division of the Department who advised that in view of the illegal source of the original information and all that flowed from it, he could not authorize the filing of a complaint charging the subject with an attempt to commit espionage. ONI was immediately advised both at San Diego and at Washington concerning the identity of the subject and the facts admitted by him. This was done in the event the Navy could institute some action. Upon completion of the signing of the statements, subject and his wife were permitted to return to their residence since no prosecutive action could be taken.

ACTION:

The investigation at San Diego is continuing, the completed results of which will be furnished to the Navy so it can institute administrative proceedings against him. The facts will, likewise, be furnished to the Internal Security Division of the Department which has requested them.

WCS

8/14

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 31, 1970

1 - Mr. J.P. Lee
1 - Mr. A.P. Litrento

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG #MDR16
ON 11/28/00

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

This is to consider recommendation of the New York Office that the Sam Survey Program be reinstituted.

BACKGROUND:

Sam Survey was a successful program operated between 1959 and 1966, which involved screening of air mail destined for selected European countries and cities by our Agent personnel in an effort to detect Soviet illegal agent mail. This program was made possible through the confidential cooperation of highly placed postal officials. In 1961 we identified, through this program, the [redacted] in New York City [redacted]. In addition, [redacted], we uncovered [redacted] which had operated in the [redacted] for a certain period and then shifted its activities to the [redacted]. [redacted] In July, 1966, this program was discontinued.

Foreign Intelligence Project

RECOMMENDATION OF NEW YORK:

New York points out that although ample evidence indicates the presence of a substantial number of Soviet illegals, the Bureau has been unsuccessful in locating any in recent years; that various programs and projects put into operation have been unsuccessful. Further, it is its contention that the illegal's most vulnerable area is still his letter writing and that this is the area we have the best chance by far to locate and identify illegals. Therefore, New York wishes to submit for the Bureau's consideration the reinstitution of Sam Survey. If this is not possible, it recommends that the Bureau consider requesting CIA or postal authorities to take over this program.

REC-

65-65

Enclosure

65-65884

APL:tdp (6)

10 APR 7 1970

CONTINUED - OVER

Classified by
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SAM SURVEY
65-65884

OBSERVATIONS:

It is agreed that the problem to locate Soviet illegals has assumed serious proportions and that the resumption of this program could be of inestimable value to the Bureau in meeting its responsibilities in that regard. However, present Bureau policy precludes the use of this technique. For this reason, it is not believed that we consider reinstitution of this program directly or through CIA or postal authorities.

ACTION:

New York is being advised that the reinstitution of Sam Survey Program either directly or through CIA or postal authorities is not advisable at this time.

absolutely right.
H.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP-2ALM/TG

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

C.D.B.
G.C.M.

On January 15, 1969, Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The Hunter project for which we have given the designation of Bureau Informant 200 essentially consists of specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia. If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the Soviet Union it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.)

File in (105-93089)

ACTION:

REC 102

105-93089 - 90

The above information is being directed ~~to~~ the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - Liaison
1 - S. J. Papich

SJP:clb
(6)

18 FEB 5 1969

Stops not warranted on black extremists at this time
JED 1/31/69

DOWN STAIRS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Director, FBI (65-67003)

DATE: 1/31/62

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (105-11581)

SUBJECT: (GUS SURVEY
ESPIONAGE - R)

Re San Francisco letter to Director 1/11/62 advising San Francisco survey would run through February 9, 1962.

As of 1/28/62, a total of about 1,764,440 letters has been surveyed in 46 days.

Fifty-one cases have been opened to determine whether recipient might be Soviet illegal agent. Thirty-two cases have been closed when subjects appeared to be legitimate residents.

San Francisco does not at this time recommend continuance of this survey beyond February 9, 1962. Upon completion of authorized period and evaluation of investigations resulting therefrom, a further recommendation will be made as to reinstituting this program.

Lead

#mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/116
ON 11/28/00

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
1 - San Francisco
RES:lg
(3)

~~Classified by 6283~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

REC- 31 (65-[illegible]-19)

EX. - 107

12 FEB 5 1962

F146

65 FEB 12 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Malone ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/2/62

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Stewart

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

This is to advise you that on 10/31/62 representatives of this Bureau conferred with CIA representatives James Hunt, John Mertz and Thomas Chalmers at CIA concerning "Project Hunter." At this conference our observations concerning Hunter material furnished since our last conference on 2/13/62 were given CIA. In addition, we advised CIA specifically of certain Hunter items which were of no interest to us and of certain Hunter items which were of interest to us. These items were set forth in memorandum form and furnished to CIA; a copy of same is attached.

5

CIA advised that its "Hunter-Don" coverage was being operated seven days a week until November 15. This concentrated coverage is for the purpose of determining if there is any illegal agent traffic. After November 15 all Hunter coverage can be expected to be reduced until after the Christmas mail rush has subsided.

The CIA representatives were very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and with the attention afforded it by us. They are very cooperative in that they are willing to focus their attention on any particular phase of coverage we suggest for our own benefit. For CIA's interest we furnished them a copy of the attached memorandum of our analysis of typical information furnished by Bureau Informant 200 of interest to us.

ACTION:

None. Above data furnished for your information.

WDS

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/JG

WDS:jes
(4)

105-93089

Enclosure

REC 35

105-93089-54

7 NOV 5 1962

ENCLOSURE

EX-118

10-30-62

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

After an extensive review of 2500 Hunter Reports since our last memo captioned as above and dated 8/21/62, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project Hunter as it related to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense involved in the preparation of such material.

I Traffic Which Holds No Interest:

1. Soviet-bloc immigrants desiring to repatriate to USSR. These people are interviewed by INS and INS refers anything of interest to us.

2. Americans traveling to the USSR as such travel is permissible and several hundred people a year visit the USSR while on tour abroad as well as Soviets returning to visit relatives. We, of course, have an interest in such travel involving people on the CIA Watch List, known Communist Party members, and suspected intelligence agents.

3. U. S. professors in Academic Research corresponding with each other. It is not likely if U. S. professor is passing any data he would identify himself at the same time.

II Traffic of Specific Interest:

1. All data re Cuba. This serves to identify pro-Castro followers in the U. S.

2. All data re U. S. Cubans in contact with Cubans attending Friendship University in Moscow.

3. All material emanating from Puerto Rico of an Anti-U. S. nature and pro-Soviet.

4. Data re U. S. peace groups going to Russia and while in Russia.

5. Data indicating death of any U. S. Communist abroad.

6. Data re Maurice Hyman Halperin(now in Cuba); Helen Kagen Pozner; Miriam Zeitlin Seborer, Oscar and Stuart Seborer(All in Russia); Max, Celia and Rose Seborer(New York); Noah and Anna Sparer Seborer (Mexico).

7. Any data on Alfred Slesinger operator Modern Photo Shop, 865 3rd Avenue, New York City(wife Kitty), residence 1860 Grand Concourse, Bronx, New York.

105-93089-547

9

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

8. Any traffic from or to U. S. Students in Moscow or to U. S. persons who were former students in Moscow.

9. Any traffic between U. S. persons who are with a current exposition or a previous exposition in the USSR.

4-528

62-116395-957

CHANGED TO

62-117604-X1

#MDR16 ON THIS FORM
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2ALK/JG

JUN 3 1977

ft/dsk

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. William O. Cregar
Section Chief, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20535

The attached letter from NSA, dated 21 October 1975, forwarded two ~~letters~~ to me which are responsive to a request for information from the Senate Select Committee.

We would like to provide your 26 September 1973 letter to the Committee; however, since the letter originated with your agency, coordination prior to release under the Third Agency Rule is necessary. Please provide your comments concerning this release action at your earliest convenience.

Thomas K. Latimer
Thomas K. Latimer
The Special Assistant

Attachment

DOD was previously advised FBI has already furnished SSC our letter of 9/26/73 & interpose no objection to DOD's giving SSC a copy. 10/29/75 WOC

EX 103

62-116395-958

REC-24

21 OCT 31 1975

62-116395

508588

5-UOG

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTC #MDR16

2 ENCLOSURE

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-1-11

84 NOV 6 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: N1221
21 October 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-2-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

#MDR16

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Watch List Correspondence

1. As a part of the recent request by the Senate Select Committee, we reviewed our files to see if there were any responses to General Allen's letter of September 17, 1973 which requested recertification of "Watch Lists." At that time we did not find any responses. We recently checked with the FBI and Secret Service and discovered that there were in fact responses. The Secret Service, by letter dated 21 September 1973, did in fact recertify a "Watch List" containing U.S. names, however, NSA has not accepted the U.S. names.

2. Inclosed are copies of the FBI and Secret Service letters. Request you forward these to the Senate Select Committee with the above comments.

DAVID D. LOWMAN
Special Assistant
to the Director
for Congressional Reviews

Approved by ____________________
LEW ALLEN, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

2 Incls:
a/s

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-1-11

Classified by DIRNSA/CHCSS (NSA/CSSM 123-2)
Exempt from GDS, EO 11652, Cat 2
Declassify Upon Notification by the Originator

62-116395-954

ENCLOSURE

DOWNGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL
UPON REMOVAL OF INCLS

~~TOP SECRET~~

[illegible]

September 26, 1973

BY LIAISON

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTS
ON 11-8-00

Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr.
Director
National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

Dear General Allen:

I am in receipt of your letter of September 17, 1973, concerning the necessity for a mutual review of our policies with respect to the compilation and maintenance of the Watch List. I share your concern and fully agree that we should review our procedures to assure that our authorities, particularly in light of recent court decisions, are not exceeded.

As you are aware, however, the Department of Justice in filing affidavits with the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, in the case of United States versus William Ayers, et al., which case involved the Students for a Democratic Society, an organization included on the Watch List, took the position that the intercepts obtained by your agency were lawful and not within the disclosure requirements of the court.

We are instituting a review of our procedures but feel that any decision reached respecting the Watch List should await the final ruling of the court.

20 OCT 1973

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classified by Director, FBI~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

62-116395-958

ENCLOSURE

Encl 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr.

It is our desire to cooperate with you fully in any measures you deem necessary to protect your valuable SIGINT sources.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM :Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
DATE: 10/22/75
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

On 10/22/75, Barbara Banoff, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, requested that former SAs George C. Moore and Fred H. Baumgardner be made available for deposition concerning their knowledge of COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATION:

That former SAs Moore and Baumgardner be released from their existing employment agreements and the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations for purposes of deposition.

OK

REC-30 62-116395-959

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

1 - Personnel File - George C. Moore
1 - Personnel File - Fred H. Baumgardner

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

lad
(10)

84 NOV 11 1975

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10/28/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

On 10/24/75, Les Seidel and Martha Talley, Senate Select Committee Staff Members, requested that former SAC Marlin Johnson and former SA Carl Hennrich be made available for Staff interview. The topic of the interview for former SAC Johnson will be his knowledge of the 1968 Convention and the topic of interview for former SA Hennrich will be his knowledge of the Emergency Detention Plan.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich be released from their existing employment agreements for purposes of interview by the Senate Select Committee.

(2) That the Intelligence Division determine the current whereabouts of former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich and advise them of the request.

(3) That the Legal Counsel Division will orally advise the Senate Select Committee of the current whereabouts of former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich.

P.U. Daly furnished whereabouts of Johnson + Hennrich as in personnel files 10/29/75
SAC Held, CG, teleph. instructed to alert Johnson + Sutel. 12 noon 10/29/75

1 - Personnel File - Marlin Johnson
1 - Personnel File - Carl Hennrich

SALAW, in absence of SAC, RH, teleph. instr. to alert Hennrich + Sutel 11:45 AM. 10/29/75

REC-30
ST-111

62-116395-960

15 NOV 4 1975

OK

lad
(10)

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
10/12/00 SP2 Alm/lsl
FM DR16

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. J. B. ADAMS

DATE: 10/21/75

FROM : MR. W. R. WANNALL

#MDL16 5P-2ALM/JTG
10-12-00

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY -75

On October 21, 1975, from approximately 2:15 p.m. to 3:35 p.m., Section Chief William A. Branigan, CI-1 Section, Intelligence Division; Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division; and myself appeared at an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to discuss classified aspects of the Bureau's various mail intercept programs. Present were Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee; Senators Mondale, Goldwater, P. A. Hart, Huddleston, and Schweiker; as well as various members of the staff of the Select Committee.

Generally speaking, the reception by the Chairman and the various Senators, as well as members of the staff, was a friendly one. No antagonism was shown to the Bureau representatives, and the Senators by their questions indicated a desire to help the Bureau in our foreign counterintelligence operations.

At the request of the Chairman, the eight separate mail intercept surveys were explained to the Committee, including the length of time that these surveys were in operation and the value that was derived from them.

During the hearing we were supplied with a copy of a Staff Memorandum which outlined various aspects of our operations which would not be disclosed during a public hearing. The Staff Memorandum also outlined certain questions which could not be discussed at a public hearing and suggested that these questions be raised at the Executive Session. A copy of the Staff Memorandum is attached for your information.

Enclosure

ST-111 REC-30 62-116395-961

CONTINUED - OVER

WAB:hke
(6)

1 - ENCLOSURE

1-Mr. J. B. Adams
1-Mr. J. A. Mintz
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1-Mr. W. A. Branigan

~~TOP SECRET~~

15 NOV 4 1975

Classified by 2355
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 2

5-Ew8

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 NOV [illegible] 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

RECEIVED
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE DIV.
OCT 30 07 PM 1975

Memorandum from Mr. W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: Senstudy

At the conclusion of the hearing, considerable questions were asked concerning legislation or direction which would be necessary from The Congress to permit the Bureau to carry out mail opening programs which were productive in their results and which would not at the same time invade the privacy of innocent American citizens.

ACTION:

This is submitted for your information.

WAK

WRW/TJM

ADDENDUM BY LEGAL COUNSEL 10/23/75, JAM:mfd

I answered the Committee's questions described in the last paragraph of this memorandum by explaining to them that in a security case we would find it most difficult to meet the 4th Amendment standard of probable cause in order to obtain a search warrant. for mail. If we are to be required to obtain warrants prior to obtaining mail and if we are to be successful, a lower standard of probable cause such as is permissible in administrative searches such as those conducted by Health Inspectors would be necessary. In answer to a specific question I explained that the Supreme Court has ruled that mail is protected absolutely by the 4th Amendment.

Rm

Pm

JAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SAB/SBS
Date 8-1-11

STAFF MEMORANDUM

EXECUTIVE SESSION ON FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS

FBI Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and William Branigan, Chief of the Soviet Section of the FBI Counterintelligence Branch, have requested an opportunity to appear before the Select Committee in executive session to discuss classified aspects of the FBI mail opening programs. Both of them will be witnesses at the public hearing on FBI mail openings on Friday.

The Committee staff has agreed that the public hearing will not disclose the following aspects of FBI mail openings:

1. The identity of the foreign nations involved, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba, Mexico, Hong Kong, Japan, most Western European countries, and several Central and Latin American countries.

2. The fact the mail to and from the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet United Nations Mission, the Cuban United Nations Mission, other Soviet-bloc Embassies was selectively opened. (S)

3. The "indicators" used as criteria for selective opening of mail screened in several other programs designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States. (The fact that there were "indicators," but not their nature, may be disclosed publicly.)

4. The identities of specific individuals and groups whose mail was opened either by the FBI or by the CIA at the request of the FBI. (FBI officials will state publicly that some of these, especially in the category "peace and protest groups," were not adequately justified.) Some of these included:

   Leonard Bernstein
   Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam
   Jeremy Stone
   Cambridge Center for Study of Public Policy

62-116395-961

ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~

The following are questions which cannot be discussed in public hearings because of this agreement. They should be raised at this executive session:

1. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail openings aimed at mail to and from the [Soviet and Soviet-bloc embassies?] ~~(S)~~
2. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail opening programs using "indicators" and designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States? [(Soviet and Cuban)] ~~(S)~~
3. What was the actual intelligence value of the material supplied to the FBI by the CIA from its mail opening operation?
4. How good are the "indicators" in selecting mail of foreign intelligence agents only and not mail of American citizens or others who are not foreign agents?
5. What standards were used for opening mail to and from Communist China, and what was the intelligence value of these programs?
6. Do FBI counterespionage officials desire to resume any mail opening programs, with proper authorization from Congress and the Attorney General?
7. How do the benefits of mail opening compare with the benefits of warrantless electronic surveillance currently used by the FBI for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes?

T-General

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MR. J. B. ADAMS ~~TOP SECRET~~ 10/21/75

MR. W. R. WANNALL

Index
1) Mail Opening
2) Hearing Procedures
WOC

SENSTUDY

On October 21, 1975, from approximately 2:15 p.m. to 3:35 p.m., Section Chief William A. Branigan, CI-1 Section, Intelligence Division; Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division; and myself appeared at an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to discuss classified aspects of the Bureau's various mail intercept programs. Present were Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee; Senators Mondale, Goldwater, P. A. Hart, **Huddleston**, and Schweiker; as well as various members of the staff of the Select Committee.

Generally speaking, the reception by the Chairman and the various Senators, as well as members of the staff, was a friendly one. No antagonism was shown to the Bureau representatives, and the Senators by their questions indicated a desire to help the Bureau in our foreign counterintelligence operations.

At the request of the Chairman, the eight separate mail intercept surveys were explained to the Committee, including the length of time that these surveys were in operation and the value that was derived from them.

During the hearing we were supplied with a copy of a Staff Memorandum which outlined various aspects of our operations which would not be disclosed during a public hearing. The Staff Memorandum also outlined certain questions which could not be discussed at a public hearing and suggested that these questions be raised at the Executive Session. A copy of the Staff Memorandum is attached for your information.

Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

WAB:hke
(6)

~~TOP SECRET~~

1-Mr. J. B. Adams
1-Mr. J. A. Mintz
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1-Mr. W. A. Branigan

Classified by 2355
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

961

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

The Attorney General

October 14, 1975

11/8/00
#mDE16

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/176
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated August 27, 1975, with an attached request for FBI materials dated August 26, 1975, and my letter dated September 24, 1975, captioned as above.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum responsive to the request of the Committee for delivery of materials pertaining to requests by the Bureau for national security mail covers from 1971 through 1975.

Referenced September 24, 1975, letter forwarded material initially located in response to the Committee's request. The enclosed memorandum forwards the remaining documents which were located.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished to you for your records.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Enclosures - 2 ENCLOSURE

REC-30 62-116395-962

15 NOV 4 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

RHR:jmn/lfj
(9)

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

84 NOV 5 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

GPO

U. S. Senate Select Committee On
Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Soviet Military Office, 2552 Belmont Road, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Commercial Counselor, 1706 16th Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Information Department, 1706 18th Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Consular Office, 1609 Decatur Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

1 - The Attorney General

2 - Mr. J. [illegible]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

62-116395

October 14, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO REQUESTS
FOR MAIL COVERS MADE BY THE BUREAU
FROM 1971 THROUGH 1975

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2

Reference is made to SSC letter dated August 27, 1975, with attached request dated August 26, 1975.

Part I, item 3. e. requests: "All materials pertaining to requests by the Bureau for special mail covers from 1971 through 1975 which have not been previously delivered to the Senate Select Committee. This request encompasses all special mail covers which have been terminated, regardless of whether the investigation for which the special mail cover was requested is active or inactive."

By memorandum dated September 24, 1975, captioned as above, you were furnished documents pertaining to this request. Additional materials have been located and will be delivered with this document.

These materials are comprised of letters to the Postal Service requesting mail covers and where utilized supportive memoranda. The materials pertain to terminated mail covers in national security matters of a domestic security nature as opposed to foreign related counterintelligence operations.

1 - The Attorney General

RHR:jmn/lfj
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-914

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Re: Documents Pertaining to Requests for Mail
Covers Made by the Bureau from 1971
Through 1975

NOTE:

Materials furnished in response to this request were obtained by review of all abstracts regarding communications to the Postal Service requesting mail covers. Since 1971, all national security mail covers have been requested by means of a letter to the Chief Postal Inspector, Postal Service. The materials being furnished only encompass investigative matters involving domestic security cases wherein the mail cover has been terminated whether the investigation is pending or closed. The materials are comprised of copies of the letters to the Postal Service and supportive memoranda where used in lieu of notes. These materials were reviewed and, where necessary, excisions made. By memorandum 9/24/75, the SSC was furnished the bulk of such documents located at that time. The documents being furnished now are those which could not be immediately located. All domestic mail cover requests which were located by means of the abstract review have now been furnished to the SSC.

By oral agreement with the SSC staff, only domestic security mail covers were required to be furnished.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/14/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re 8/26/75 request Part I, Item 3e concerning special mail covers.

Originating Office: FBI 930

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP2ALM/ftb

[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 8/26/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

C

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Information handling

#MDR16
[illegible]
10/12/00 SP2 ALM/tfb

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

More materials pertaining to mail cover requests made by the FBI from 1971 thru 1975.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIAL LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

woc/18

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - [illegible]. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

The Attorney General

October 15, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDR16

10-13-00 SP2ALM/JTG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a request from SSC dated September 4, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI concerning the obtaining of income tax information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with respect to 140 individuals and/or organizations.

By letter dated September 23, 1975, the SSC requested specific information with respect to only nine individuals of the original 140 individuals and/or organizations.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum which furnishes additional material to supplement the memorandum dated September 29, 1975, previously furnished to SSC.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Delivered to AG 10-15-75

REC-30 62-116395-963

JWJ:cml
(9)

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

3 - ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 NOV 13 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

October 15, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC request dated September 4, 1975, and SSC request dated September 23, 1975, requesting documents and certain information pertaining to the obtaining of income tax information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

Nine documents containing supplemental material relating to Robert M. Shelton and Charles C. Kissinger are being delivered with this memorandum.

This material supplements documents, previously furnished SSC by memorandum dated September 29, 1975, and completes the review of the entire case files of the nine individuals requested by the SSC.

1 - The Attorney General

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/ITG

62-116395

JWJ:cml
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___ ←
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

WPW/TWL

62-116395-963

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Re: United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect To Intelligence Activities (SSC)

NOTE:

This memorandum and memorandum dated 9/29/75 furnishes complete response to SSC requests of 9/4/75 and 9/23/75 relating to origination and use of information of an income tax nature by the FBI. The material being furnished was reviewed by SA R. D. Shea, IS-1 and SA L. E. Dean, IS-2.

Copies of nine documents are being retained in instant file.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/15/75

Caption of Document: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/23/75 request and 9/4/75

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller Date: 10/20/75

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDE16

10-13-00 SP-2 RLM/TTG

62-116395-[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 9/23/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Treasury Department - Internal Revenue Service

#mDR16

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Information furnished concerning obtaining of income tax information from Internal Revenue Service with respect to specific individuals and/or organizations.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

S2W96

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

5

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Senate Select Committee (SSC) requests dated September 4, 1975, and September 23, 1975. Attached material completes response to SSC requests.

#MDE16

10/13/00 SP2 ALM JFG

RETAIN

62-1 [illegible]

913 963

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **Director, FBI (157-9-4)** DATE: **11-7-64**

FROM : **SAC, Birmingham (157-835)**

SUBJECT: **COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM**
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTE

The Bureau is requested to consider securing copies of income tax returns for the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN; ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON, 1708 - 15th Street, East, Tuscaloosa, Ala., or the ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE, a name by which the UKA is sometimes known.

Inquiry at the banks in Tuscaloosa has failed to reveal any accounts in the name of the UKA or ROBERT M. SHELTON, except a small personal account of SHELTON at the First National Bank of Tuscaloosa. Informants have advised that SHELTON is paid probably $8,000 per year for his work as Imperial Wizard. This money is sent in monthly to UKA headquarters in Tuscaloosa by the individual Klaverns and presumably put in some bank.

An examination of pertinent income tax returns might furnish information concerning the financial standing of SHELTON and UKA which could be used in this program.

d

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

157-9-4-6

1812 d. B

REC-61

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Birmingham
CBS:mfl
(4)

NOV 9 1964

EX-102

memo B'gham to Sect 11/18/64 DK:lal:jH
Enc.

56 DEC 2 1964

5

Mr. W. C. Sullivan 11/12/64

F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Ryan

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(ROBERT M. SHELTON)
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.)

Robert Marvin Shelton is a full-time paid employee of the United Klans of America, Incorporated (UKA), Knights of the Ku Klux Klan with the title Imperial Wizard. He is probably the most influential and well-known Klansman in the United States. We are endeavoring as a counterintelligence technique to develop information discrediting Shelton or embarrassing to the UKA.

Through analysis of the income tax returns we may be able to determine secret sources of Shelton's income or depository used by him for the Klan organization. There is a possibility that he is misappropriating funds. We also have information Shelton has been on the payroll of a Mobile, Alabama, engineering firm as a public relations man.

In the event we determine such information we will consider exposing Shelton within the Klan organization, publicly or by furnishing information to the Internal Revenue Service.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended the Liaison Section obtain from the Internal Revenue Service two uncertified copies each of the Federal tax returns filed by Shelton and the UKA for the past five years. Attached is a memorandum for the use of the Liaison Section.

157-9-6
(1) - 157-552 (Shelton)

Enclosure

DR:lat:ltl
(7)

NOT RECORDED
170 NOV 30 1964

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

6

SAC, Birmingham (157-635)

2/23/65

Director, FBI (157-9-4)

1 - Mr. Gray
2 - Mr. Ryan

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.)
(ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON)

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

ReBHlet 11/7/64.

Attached are Xerox copies of Federal income tax returns filed by Robert M. and Betty Lou Shelton for the years 1959-63 inclusive. Also attached are Xerox copies of United States corporation tax returns filed by Robert M. Shelton as a corporate officer of the United Klans of America, Inc. (UKA), for the years 1961 (year ending 6/30/62) and 1963 (year ending 6/30/64) as well as a statement of no tax liability for the year ending 6/30/63. Information set forth in these tax returns is for lead purposes only and should not be set forth in the details of any investigative report.

The following comments and investigative instructions are noted in connection with these tax returns:

1. The individual returns filed jointly by Shelton and his wife during the period 1959 through 1963 indicate Shelton's occupation to be "salesman" and "manager" and in no instance do they indicate any employment or association with the Klan. This is in conflict with the corporate returns filed by Shelton for the UKA where he indicates his position as "Imperial Wizard" or "President."

2. Shelton's return for 1959 indicates it was prepared by Ed F. Allen, Jr., Certified Public Accountant, Post Office Box 3[illegible], Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The form and typing on the other tax returns, both corporate and individual, indicate a strong likelihood these too were prepared by Allen. You should review your files and conduct necessary investigation to determine if Allen is active in connection with financial matters relating to the Klan.

Enclosures - 8

157-[illegible]

1 - 157-552 (Shelton)
1 - 157-370 (UKA)

DUPLICATE YELLOW

NOT RECORDED
202 FEB 24 1965

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

3. In no instance in his individual tax returns does Shelton indicate the receipt of income for his position of Imperial Wizard or President of the UKA. However, his returns do indicate he has received some salary payments from such sources as "Tex Harris," "J.H. Mason," "Alabama Tire Company," "J & H Equipment Co.," and "Vann & Johnson Misc. Sgr." Inasmuch as your informants have advised Shelton spends almost all his time on Klan business and is paid almost $10,000 annually by the Klan, it would appear these salary sources are covers for payments made to him to compensate for his Klan employment. Necessary investigation should be conducted to resolve the true source of Shelton's income.

4. Shelton's return for 1960 shows other income received from a wrestling enterprise in Nashville, Tennessee. This source of income should also be checked to determine its legitimacy. It is possible Shelton's relationship with this enterprise also represents a cover for Klan activity or that the payments made to him were for efforts in behalf of the Klan.

5. In no instance does Shelton indicate any interest or dividend income. It is known he has a bank account at the First National Bank of Tuscaloosa. An attempt should be made to determine if he has failed to report interest actually earned. It is also noted the corporate returns filed by the UKA do not in any instance indicate interest received.

6. Shelton's return for 1963 lists other income of $500 as received from "Commissions - Dixie Engineering Co." Your attention is directed to an editorial that appeared in the Tuscaloosa "News," edition of 6/12/64, wherein it is indicated Shelton had been listed on the payroll of a Mobile engineering firm as a public relations man. Investigation should be conducted to determine Shelton's relationship with the Dixie Engineering Co. and also whether this company had a contract involving the use of Federal and/or state funds.

7. The corporate returns of the UKA, as filed by Shelton, in no instance indicate salary payments although both Shelton and his wife have been reported by your informants as full-time employees.

8. The gross income of Shelton and his wife for the year 1963 totals $1,075. This amount does not appear to be sufficient to support a family of five. All possible efforts should be made to develop evidence indicating Shelton is withholding or concealing income.

This investigation should be afforded prompt and continuing attention and the Bureau must be advised of all pertinent developments.

When all possible leads have been developed a blind memorandum should be prepared setting forth Shelton's background and current position with the Klan and all data probative of a possible violation of Internal Revenue laws. The Bureau will make this information available to appropriate Internal Revenue Service officials at the Seat of Government.

SENSITIVE CASE REPORT

(Route in Sequence)

To:
☐ District Director — District
☐ ARC- Southeast Regional Office
☐ Director — Division
☐ National Office

INSTRUCTIONS: [illegible] through channels to ARC concerned in an original and three copies. For detailed instructions, see RC SE Memorandum No. 12-18.

1. NAME OF CASE OR IDENTIFICATION OF SITUATION

Robert M. Shelton
Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama

#MDE16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/116

a. CLASS OF TAX
Income Tax

b. TAXABLE PERIOD
1963, 1964

c. AMOUNT OF TAX
$ Unknown

d. DOCKET NO., IF ANY

2. PRINCIPAL ISSUES INVOLVED

Diverting Klan money to personal use.

3. REASONS FOR SENSITIVITY

Taxpayer is the Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, K.K.K., Inc. He is presently being investigated by the House Un-American Activities Committee of Congress. He and the Klan have had national publicity as a result of the Congressional hearings and civil rights activities in the South.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

157-5

NOT RECORDED

8 FEB 23 1966

4. ACTION TAKEN OR PROPOSED

The taxpayer has been contacted by Revenue Agent John H. Murrell on two occasions prior to referral to the Intelligence Division. He has indicated he will cooperate with the examining agents as soon as his records are released by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

This case was referred to the Intelligence Division only a few days ago; therefore, a realistic estimate of the completion date will not be practicable until at least next month.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SUBMITTED BY (Originator's Signature)	TITLE Special Agent	POST OF DUTY Birmingham	DATE 1-17-66
REVIEWED (District Director's Signature)	DISTRICT Birmingham		DATE JAN 18 1966
REVIEWED (ARC's Signature) [illegible]	TITLE ARC - INTELLIGENCE		DATE JAN 2

U. S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT

RC SE FORM - 19 (4-59)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Ryan

ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

Robert Marvin Shelton, born June 13, 1929, married, two children, resides at 1711-11th Street, East, Tuscaloosa, Alabama. He is presently employed with the title Imperial Wizard by the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Suite 401, Alston Building, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, at a reported annual salary of eight thousand dollars. The United Klans of America, Inc., is sometimes known as the Alabama Rescue Service.

It is requested two uncertified copies each of the Federal tax returns filed by Shelton and the United Klans of America, Inc., for the past five years be made available.

DR:lat:ltl
(8)

① - 157-552 (Shelton)

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JF6

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

157-552

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: 6/26/67

FROM : P. D. Putnam

SUBJECT: ROBERT SHELTON
INTERNAL SECURITY - X

At the request of the Internal Security Section, Mr. William Parker, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), was contacted on 6/23/67 to determine the status of the IRS case on Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America.

Parker advised that IRS had initiated investigation of Shelton for possible tax evasion for the years 1963 through 1965. This case is still under investigation but indications are that Shelton owes no income taxes for 1963 and 1965 and owes $100 in taxes for the year 1964. According to Parker, it appears that the criminal tax investigation of Shelton will be closed and the case will be referred to the Audit Division of IRS for civil disposition.

ACTION:

For information.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Putnam

PDP:rab
(5)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

54

REC 6

JUN 30 1967

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/116

#MDR16

DATE 10/13/00 SP2ALM/ff6

Intelligence Division
P. O. Box 1631
Birmingham, Alabama 35201
JUL 8 1967

District Director, Internal Revenue Service
Attention: Chief, Intelligence Division
Birmingham, Alabama

Re re: ROBERT M. SHELTON
18 Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama 35476
63-64-037-1-1
Final

and

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC.
18 Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama 35476
63-73-022-1-1
Final

ST-103

Representative: None

REC- 61

55

This report relates to the alleged evasion of income taxes for the years 1963 and 1964 by ROBERT M. SHELTON and the alleged wilful failure to file 1961 and 1963 corporate returns by the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC. It was also alleged that SHELTON diverted KLAN funds to his personal use. SHELTON has been Imperial Wizard of the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC. since 1961. He maintains an office for himself and the KLAN in his residence at 18 Lake Sherwood, Northport, Alabama 35476. He received mail for himself, the KLAN, and ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE at P. O. Box 2369, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401. ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE is a cover name for the KLAN organization in Alabama. He filed his individual income tax returns involved with the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama.

AUG 9 1967

Revenue Agent Wade Hutchinson, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, cooperated in the joint investigation. This case has been classified as sensitive.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION:

The investigation originated as a referral from Audit Division. It was alleged that SHELTON received $4,000.00 from DIXIE ENGINEERING COMPANY of Mobile, Alabama, during the years 1963 and 1964 and reported only $2,000.00 from this source during the aforementioned years. It was further alleged that SHELTON travels in a late model Cadillac, dresses well and recently built a new house while reporting very nominal amounts of income on his tax returns.

In respect to the KLAN, it was alleged that no corporate returns were filed for the years 1961 and 1963 and that corporate funds were being diverted to the personal use of corporate officers.

KU KLUX KLAN organizations were the subject of an investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee during the years 1965 and 1966. SHELTON was tried and convicted on a Contempt of Congress charge for refusing to testify and produce KLAN records before this committee. He was given the maximum sentence, one year in prison and $1,000 fine, on October 14, 1966. SHELTON's conviction is presently on appeal.

Evidence was offered before the House Un-American Activities Committee alleging SHELTON signed checks on the KLAN bank account in Tuscaloosa, payable to cash, aggregating $5,600.00, which were cashed at grocery stores and service stations; and that he allegedly paid for automobiles and a diamond ring with KLAN funds. SHELTON refused to confirm or deny these allegations when testifying before the Congressional Committee.

EXTENT AND RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION:

1. I obtained photostats of INVISIBLE EMPIRE, UNITED KLANS, KNIGHTS KU KLUX KLAN OF AMERICA, INC., incorporation papers from IMPERIAL WIZARD ROBERT SHELTON. They disclose incorporation date of February 20, 1961, in Fulton County, Georgia. The general purpose of the corporation, according to these papers, is: "to teach patriotism, to support the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and to maintain the liberty bequeathed to us by our forefathers, and to preserve the American way of life."

2. I obtained SHELTON's tax returns from the files of the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama. They disclose adjusted gross income as follows:

Year	Adjusted Gross Income
1961	$ 5,600.00
1962	4,200.00
1963	1,875.00
1964	3,576.62
1965	4,663.23
1966	10,031.21

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

Shelton claimed a standard deduction on each of the returns and they were filed timely and the tax paid which was shown to be due thereon.

3. I obtained KLAN tax returns from the files of the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama. They disclose gross receipts and taxable income as follows:

FYR	Gross Receipts	Taxable Income
6/30/62	$ 2,980.05	$ -0-
6/30/64	7,415.63	-0-
6/30/65	13,487.60	741.09
6/30/66	75,168.12	7,135.01

SHELTON gives President JOHNSON credit for increasing gross receipts of the KLAN from $7,415.00 in 1964 to $75,168.12 in 1966. He stated that every time "LBJ" gets on television and condemns the KLAN, he gets a flood of membership applications. He also stated that the publicity he received during the House Un-American Activities Committee hearing in 1965 and 1966 got him many new members.

4. Revenue Agent HUTCHINSON and I interviewed SHELTON on seven different occasions between April 5, 1967 and May 17, 1967. He instructed his wife, BETTY LOU SHELTON, and KLAN BOOKKEEPER, MRS. MELVIN SEXTON, to cooperate with us and make available all records of financial transactions of the KLAN. SHELTON stated that:

a. He did not furnish books and records of the KLAN to the House Un-American Activities Committee because his attorney advised him he could not waive his immunity on part of his records or on part of his testimony. He either had to take the "Fifth Amendment" all the way or disclose confidential records of KLAN membership which he had taken an oath not to disclose.

b. The books and records of the KLAN are audited at least once a year by KLAN EXAMINERS. The results of this examination is reported on the annual corporate income tax return.

c. The KLAN is a tax exempt organization and should not be required to file tax returns. SHELTON exhibited a letter from the State of Alabama Revenue Department which stated that, "The UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., is exempt from Alabama income tax and as long as it is operated not for profit and not for the gain of any individual it will not be necessary that corporate income tax returns be filed."

SHELTON acknowledged he had never applied for exempt status for the KLAN for Federal tax purposes because he would have to disclose information regarding KLAN membership which he was not at liberty to disclose.

d. SHELTON stated that the KLAN is on a "Form System." Each Clavern (Unit) prepares a Monthly Financial Report in triplicate and sends one copy to the Imperial Office in Tuscaloosa, one copy to the State Klan Office and retains one copy for the local unit file. This form lists the following financial information from each unit, each month:

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

FINANCIAL RECORD OF UNIT

Balance as per bank statement for last month or cash on hand $_____
Minus outstanding checks including ones to Imperial & state $_____
Plus outstanding deposits $_____
Balance in bank or cash on hand as per this report $_____

Monies Received During This Month	Monies Paid Out During This Month
KLECTOKON FEE $_____	IMPERIAL TAX $_____
MONTHLY DUES $_____	STATE TAX $_____
RALLY COLLECTIONS $_____	OTHER STATE DUES $_____
SPECIAL PROJECT $_____	RENT OR BUILDING PAYMENT $_____
OTHER INCOME $_____	LIGHTS $_____
(ITEMIZE)_____	WATER $_____
	GAS $_____
	OTHER EXPENDITURES (ITEMIZE)$_____
TOTAL INCOME $_____	TOTAL EXPENDITURES $_____

e. SHELTON stated that he was authorized by the KLAN to draw $15,000.00 per year salary but 1966 was the first year the KLAN was financially able to pay him the full $15,000.00. Prior to 1966, his salary was determined at the end of each year by aggregating his withdrawals from the KLAN, reduced by the amount of documentation for travel and other KLAN expenses he had turned in during the year.

f. SHELTON converted his carport into an office and moved the KLAN office from the Alston Building in Tuscaloosa into his space May 1, 1966. The KLAN pays SHELTON $35.00 per month rent and $15.00 per month on his utilities.

g. SHELTON maintains that four of the eight $500.00 checks he received from DIXIE ENGINEERING COMPANY bounced. The reason the four $500.00 items do not show on his bank statements as a debit to the account was the balances at the time the checks were returned were less than $500.00 and he picked up the checks with cash or with another check from DIXIE ENGINEERING.

h. KLAN checks were made payable to "Cash" because just any one would not cash a KLAN check. When he left Tuscaloosa on KLAN business he never knew where he would be able to cash a check so he would make the check payable to cash and cash the check at some grocery store or service station where he was known. The amounts were charged to him on the KLAN books and he brought back gas tickets, motel bills, invoices, etc., to account for the

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

money spent. SHELTON stated that he travels 90,000 to 110,000 miles per year on KLAN business. He traveled 120,000 miles by automobile during the year 1966 on KLAN business.

5. Revenue Agent Hutchinson and I examined the KLAN's bank statements, cancelled checks, deposit tickets and cash receipts and disbursements books for FYE 6/30/62 through FYE 6/30/66. Receipts and expenses per books substantially reconciled with receipts and expenses per returns. For the four year period, net income was overstated on returns by $48.10. The 1963 corporate return filed by the KLAN was never located. We worked with a Profit and Loss Statement located in the KLAN file for that year which showed receipts of $3,879.44, disbursements of $3,634.89 and taxable income of $240.49. SHELTON claims he recalls mailing the 1963 return to the District Director in Birmingham. Mrs. CAROL LONG, KLAN BOOKKEEPER during this period, recalls preparing the return and giving it to SHELTON to sign and mail. Receipts during the period 2/20/61 to 6/30/61, the first four months of operation of the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, were negligible and were included in receipts for the FYE 6/30/62.

6. Revenue Agent Hutchinson analyzed all checks written to cash and examined the supporting documents. Checks to cash totaled:

Year	Total	
1961	$ 156.18	
1962	184.92	
1963	1,033.75	
1964	5,104.69	
1965	11,787.45	$18,266.99

Checks written to cash and not supported by documentation were reported by SHELTON as income on his individual income tax return. Numerous checks to cash were signed by SHELTON and cosigned by T.M. MONTGOMERY or JAMES HENDRIX. It was brought out during the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings that T.M. MONTGOMERY was signed by CAROL LONG, KLAN BOOKKEEPER, and JAMES HENDRIX was signed by SHELTON's wife, BETTY LOU. SHELTON acknowledged that the MONTGOMERY and HENDRIX names on the checks were KLAN code names for MRS. LONG and MRS. SHELTON and that the names and signatures were on file at the bank. This information was corroborated by FIRST NATIONAL BANK VICE PRESIDENT J. H. PERDUE.

7. Receipts per monthly reports of various KLAN UNITS were compared with total receipts per return for FYE 6/30/64 and 6/30/65. Total receipts per reports and total receipts per returns were as follows:

Year	Receipts per Reports	Receipts per Returns	Variance
6/30/64	$ 5,557.25	$ 7,415.63	$1,858.38
6/30/65	17,552.40	18,487.60	935.20
	$23,109.65	$25,903.23	$2,793.58

The variance between receipts per reports and receipts per return consisted mainly of monies which came in without a report and anonymous contributions.

8. Monthly reports of various KLAN UNITS were pulled at random from six different states. The reports were traced individually to Cash Receipts Journal, to deposit tickets and to bank statements, without discrepancy.

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

9. Photostats of several thousand checks from various KLAN UNITS, payable to SHELTON or ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE, were secured from the House Un-American Activities Committee file. I found only one of these checks which was not endorsed "For deposit only" to ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE account in Tuscaloosa. A check dated 3/28/64 payable to ROBERT M. SHELTON, in amount of $50.00, on the account of WHITE PATRIOTS, P. O. Box 7094, Montgomery, Alabama, was endorsed by SHELTON and THE AUTO-RITE STORE in Tuscaloosa. The amount was entered in receipts on the KLAN books as a donation from WHITE PATRIOTS of Montgomery. SHELTON stated that the $50.00 was for four recaps on his automobile which was used for KLAN business.

10. Transcript of the testimony of ERNEST H. MERRIWETHER, President, DIXIE ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Mobile, Alabama, was secured from the House Un-American Activities Committee file together with photostats of eight $500.00 checks payable to SHELTON during 1963 and 1964. MERRIWETHER was not contacted personally on advice of U. S. Attorney ROBERT JANSEN, Southern Judicial District of Alabama. MERRIWETHER has several tax suits pending in Mobile at present.

MERRIWETHER testified that he paid SHELTON the following checks:

Date	Amount	
7/14/63	$500.00	
9/24/63	500.00	
11/6/63	500.00	
11/13/63	500.00	$2,000.00
1/8/64	$500.00	
2/13/64	500.00	
3/13/64	500.00	
4/22/64	500.00	$2,000.00

SHELTON reported $500.00 from this source on his 1963 return and $1,500.00 on his 1964 return. He contends four of the $500.00 checks "bounced." The ledger sheets on his personal account at the FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF TUSCALOOSA and the deposit tickets to this account disclosed eight $500.00 deposits to the account from DIXIE ENGINEERING and only one debit to the account for $500.00 for a returned DIXIE ENGINEERING check.

D. L. THOMAS, accountant for DIXIE ENGINEERING, stated that all eight checks to SHELTON were posted to their disbursements journal and postings to this journal were made from checks after they cleared the bank.

The eight checks in question were written on six different bank accounts. The banks were contacted and their records indicate all eight checks were eventually paid. However, SHELTON's five exemptions and a standard deduction for the year 1963 will offset his reported income plus the additional $1,500.00 on his 1963 return. The additional $500.00 in 1964 is more than

offset by unclaimed depreciation on his automobile for that year. He will owe a small amount of self-employment tax on the unreported net amounts.

11. Revenue Agent Hutchinson and I examined SHELTON's account at LORCH's DIAMOND SHOP in Tuscaloosa from opening purchase on 6/11/62 to date. The diamond ring alleged to have been purchased with KLAN funds during the years 1964 and 1965 was purchased June 11, 1962 by MRS. SHELTON for $339.60, which amount includes carrying charges. She paid $30.00 per month on this account until November 8, 1963, at which time the account was paid in full. The checks drawn on the KLAN account to LORCH's DIAMOND SHOP during the years 1964 and 1965 were payments on an Invicta Tape Recorder purchased on 5/18/64 for $62.95 and a Webcor Recorder purchased on same date for $167.00. These items were purchased for the KLAN and charged to his account, according to SHELTON, because LORCH's would not extend credit to the KLAN.

12. Sales Invoice from STANSELL PONTIAC-CADILLAC COMPANY, 2115 15th Street, Tuscaloosa, shows the Cadillac purchased by SHELTON to be a used 1961 CADILLAC purchased on November 18, 1964, for $612.00 cash and a trade-in of a 1963 Pontiac Grand Prix. SHELTON said he traded the 1963 Pontiac on a 1961 Cadillac because the Pontiac had over 100,000 miles on it. The KLAN made three payments on the Pontiac for SHELTON but none on the Cadillac. A check was issued on the KLAN account on 6/15/63 to STANSELL PONTIAC-CADILLAC COMPANY for $277.66 and another check to the same company on 9/27/63 for $136.33. SHELTON failed to include these payments in income for the year 1963 and did not claim any depreciation on the Pontiac for that year.

13. SHELTON purchased his residence in Northport, Alabama, in April, 1966. The property was purchased from Lake Real Estate Company in Tuscaloosa for $20,876.47. He paid $11,000.00 down and assumed a $1,000.00 second mortgage held by Lake Real Estate Company. Balance of $8,876.47 was financed at FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

SHELTON acquired the $11,000.00 down payment by selling his residence at 1703 East 15th Street in Tuscaloosa for $5,000.00 and drew $6,000.00 accrued salary from the KLAN, which was included on his W-2 statement from the KLAN for the year 1966.

In June, 1966, SHELTON purchased the adjoining lot to his home for $1,500.00. This amount was raised by selling various books at KLAN rallys and through the mail. A separate record was kept by MRS. SHELTON of this income and was reported on SHELTON's 1966 income tax return.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The investigation disclosed that: (1) Substantially all checks received by the KLAN are deposited to the KLAN account in Tuscaloosa; (2) Currency received and cash donations are recorded on the KLAN books as receipts; (3) Checks drawn on the KLAN account payable to cash are substantiated by

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

receipts and invoices; (4) there is no indication of income being received by the KLAN and not posted to their books; (5) controversial receipts by SHELTON from DIXIE ENGINEERING are offset by his exemptions and allowable depreciation on his automobile; (6) allegations that SHELTON purchased a diamond ring and a Cadillac automobile with KLAN funds are negated by available evidence, and (7) failure to file 1961 and 1963 returns by the KLAN resulted in no injury to the government.

I recommend that this case be closed in the Intelligence Division files because of lack of criminal prosecution potential and referred back to the Audit Division for such action as they deem appropriate. Audit Group Supervisor G. D. Grim advises he has no objection to this proposed withdrawal.

(signed) R. S. Phillips

Robert S. Phillips
Special Agent

APPROVED:

(Signed) Floyd D. Moore

Chief, Intelligence Division
Birmingham District
P. O. Box 1631
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6/15/70

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
--RM

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. J. V. Walsh
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson

The Birmingham Office has requested Bureau to secure copies of 1969 Income Tax Return for United Klans of America, Inc. (UKA), the Alabama Rescue Service, a name by which the UKA is sometimes known, and Robert Marvin Shelton, Imperial Wizard of UKA. Birmingham desires to review these returns for information concerning financial standing of UKA and Shelton and any information which might be of assistance in instituting counterintelligence measures.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Liaison Section obtain from Internal Revenue Service two ~~certified~~ copies each of 1969 Income Tax Return filed by Shelton, the UKA and/or Alabama Rescue Service. Attached is a memorandum for use of Liaison Section.

Enclosure

HEH:cae/mkz
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY 5P-2 ALM/116
#MDR16

REC-77 157-9-4-151

25 JUN 23 1970

58 JUL 1 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1-Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1-Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1-Mr. G. C. Moore
1-Liaison Section
1-Mr. J. V. Walsh
1-Mr. H. E. Helgeson

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

June 16, 1970

ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON
UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

Robert Marvin Shelton, Social Security Number 424-34-0016, resides Number 18, Lake Sherwood, Star Route, Northport, Alabama. His wife is Betty Lou Shelton. He is employed as the Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

The United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, sometimes known as the Alabama Rescue Service, is located in Northport, Alabama.

Please furnish two ~~certified~~ copies each of the 1969 Federal Tax Return filed by Shelton; the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and/or the Alabama Rescue Service.

HEH:jlm
(9)

It is requested no investigation of subject be instituted solely on the basis of the above information.

NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 6-15-70, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of Hate Groups, RM," prepared by HEH:cae/mkz.

to IRS

REC-35

EX-109

25 JUN 22 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5 JUL 30 1970 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

US Tre ury Department

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, D.C. 20224

Date: JUL 2 1968

In reply refer to: CP:C:D

Honorable J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

In re: Charles Clark Kissinger, Jr.
6306 North Lakewood Avenue or
5401 South Ellis Avenue
Chicago, Illinois

C. Clark Kissinger Jr.

In response to your request of May 31, 1968, we are enclosing a copy of the income tax return of Charles C. and Judy J. Kissinger, 6306 N. Lakewood, Chicago, Illinois 60626 (SSN: 355-34-0441 and SSN: 352-32-2937, respectively), for the year 1966.

Persons having access to this document should be cautioned as to the confidentiality of the information contained therein and as to the penalty provisions of Section 7213 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 1905, Title 18, United States Code, regarding the unauthorized disclosure of such information. Judy J. Kissinger

We will write you concerning the 1967 return as soon as possible.

EX-110 REC 37 100-441158-26

16 JUL 11 1968

Very truly yours,

D. W. Bacon

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

E

10

Enclosure

#MDR16

10/13/00. SP2 ALM/JTG

13

54 JUL 22 1968

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

[illegible] 26

ENCLOSURE
1

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

6306 N. Lakewood
Chicago, Ill. 60626
April 17, 1967

District Director
Internal Revenue Service
Chicago, Ill. 60602

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is our 1967 income tax return. Salary for which there is no W-2 forms comes from several short or part time jobs which did not withhold.

Just as last year we cannot, of course, voluntarily pay our tax so long as the war in Vietnam continues. Should the government run short of funds in the meantime we suggest repeal of the oil depletion allowance or any other of the tax breaks for the wealthy.

Sincerely yours,

C. Clark Kissinger
Judy Jo Kissinger

C. Clark Kissinger
Judy Jo Kissinger

#mDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/716

26

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice

FMDR16

62-116395

10-13-00 SP2ALM/JJG

October 14, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General's Office dated September 9, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 8, 1975, SSC requests and specifically to the following Items in those requests: Items 8, 9, 11, 13 and 14.

Relative to Item 8, upon review of the file the only information located which is suggestive of being that to which Mr. Hoover referred in his written statement on the Baumgardner September 16, 1963, memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, is the prior memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan August 23, 1963. That document was previously furnished under Item 12 of this request.

Although there is no way of knowing just what Mr. Hoover was referring to with his statement, the August 23, 1963, memorandum summarizes a detailed memorandum which was attached to it and advises of Communist Party, USA, efforts being discontinued because of being "ineffective." Mr. Hoover wrote a comment on the August 23, 1963, memorandum to the effect that he could not ignore certain matters as having only "infinitestimal" effect on the efforts to exploit the American Negro by the communists.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

JDP:lek|lek
(9) ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

WOC

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED JBA

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-11 - 964

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Item 11 requested all materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963, memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell." An extensive review has been conducted of all logical files, abstracts and indices in an effort to find documents relating specifically to such conversations described in the request. The attached materials represent the only documents located that appear to be related in any manner to these conversations.

Item 13 requested the "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1953," and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956," which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page two of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

These two documents have been located. The 1953 document captioned "The Communist Party and the Negro" is a 103-page study of the interest and activities of the Communist Party, USA, in Negro-related causes and covers the years 1919-1952. The October, 1956, study is entitled "The Communist Party and the Negro, 1953--1956" and it supplements the 1953 study, and consists of 57 pages. SA Elmer W. Larson, Jr., discussed this matter with Mr. Michael Epstein of the SSC Staff on October 8, 1975. Mr. Epstein agreed that these documents need not be delivered at this time. It was agreed that the documents will be made available for access. If upon review copies are desired they will be provided. (66-04-1775; 100-3-75-1270)

1 - The Attorney General

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 9, 1975

#MDR16
DATE 10/13/00 SP2ALM/TG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a list of FBI materials, delivery of which is requested ~~by September 15, 1975~~. according to agreed priorities. JTE

I would also appreciate your making available for Committee staff access, all Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1963. Upon examination of these files, delivery thereafter will be orally requested for specific items in accordance with the provisions of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department which governs Committee requests for materials.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

per [illegible]

let to AG 1-DAC
JDP:let 10/14/75 Enc. 2

Receipt of material
covered by Fonda case
subpoena hereby acknowledged.

62-1163[illegible]-967

8

RECEIVED
SEP 9 1975

ENCLOSURE

September 8, 1975

DOCUMENT REQUEST

1. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of the informant) of the 2/12/62 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, ~~FBI,~~ subject "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C (00: Atlanta)."

NP

2. All materials reflecting the steps taken by the FBI which "prevent(ed) the CPUSA from seizing control of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People," as stated in the last paragraph of page 4 of the enclosure captioned "Communist Party USA" which was attached to Director Hoover's January 10, 1961 letter to Robert Kennedy.

Jack? P. NOT OURS

3. Reports which were submitted by the Atlanta and New York field offices pursuant to the following instructions which were contained in the second paragraph of page 1 of the February 27, 1962 letter from the FBI Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C, Office of Origin: Atlanta," (a copy of which was disseminated to the New York field office:

> New York and Atlanta are instructed to review their files and prepare a report suitable for dissemination which will include all information of a security nature plus complete background data.

Hugent

NP

4. The "Bureau letters to Atlanta, 7/20/62, to Mobile, 7/20/62, and to Savannah, 9/17/62" which are referenced in the first paragraph of the 10/11/62 memorandum from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C, (00:Atlanta)."

NP

5. The "Correspondence received from the Atlanta and New York Offices" as indicated in the first sentence of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C".

NP

6. All materials reflecting instructions issued to the New York and Atlanta field offices "to furnish the Bureau recommendations concerning a communist infilitration investigation of (SCLC) and the recommendations received from those two field offices for a "communist infiltration investigation of SCLC", as indicated in the second paragraph of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C".

P SPECIFY TIME FRAME

#mDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2ALM/HTG

3

7. The "necessary Manual changes" which were "attached for approval" to Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist."

NP

8. All materials which support the following statement of Director Hoover which was noted on Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist":

P MORE SPECIFIC

> Just a few weeks ago you contended that the Communist influence in the racial movement was ineffective and infinitesimal.

9. The September 5, 1963 letterhead memorandum to the Attorney General and "the related prior memoranda" which are referred to in the first paragraph of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell."

NP

10. The July 3, 1963 letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Hunter Pitts O'Dell which was attached to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

NP

11. All materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

?NP

12. The "Brief on the above-captioned matter and subsequent memoranda on the same subject matter" which are referred to in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

O.K. BUT NEED TO DISCUSS SUBSEQUENT MEMORANDA

13. The "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1958" and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956" which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

1963?

14. All materials reflecting or pertaining to Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney Committee", as referred to in his February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning a 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, as well as an unexcised copy of the February 5 memorandum.

NP

15. All materials which reflect the basis for the following statements which are contained in Mr. Baumgardner's May 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Internal Security Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, Administrative Matter":

Married ?

a. "About three months prior to the March on Washington (8/28/63), we intensified our investigation concerning communist influence into the racial movement. . . .";

b. "Martin Luther King, head of SCLC, has challenged the Bureau on this point."

16. All materials reflecting the "previous arrangements" referred to in the November 18, 1964 memorandum from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, subject "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director, 10:00 a.m., 11/18/64 (10:05 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.)"

? contacted 7/8
NP

17. All materials reflecting, concerning, or pertaining to:

a. "(S)tatements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Georgia, at the time he highly criticized the FBI. His statements were made on 11/18/62 during an interview in the Robing Room of the Riverside Church in New York City where King had just preached a sermon." (This quotation is taken from the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of the 11/19/64 memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. DeLoach captioned "Director's Briefing of Women Reporters on 11/18/64")

R

b. Comments, responses, and recommendations made, inspections conducted, and/or any other actions taken as a result of the statements of Dr. King which are described in Item 17.a. above.

coordinated Inspection Div ?
Time Frame

18. Identification of the author of the notation "Being Handled, 11/20/64, D" which appears at the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters."

Nagel
Wick

19. All materials reflecting the manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "(b)eing handled" as noted on the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters," together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom.

P

20. The response to John Doar's August 19, 1964 letter to Mr. James R. Malley which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

NP

21. The division and section assignment of James R. Malley as of August 19, 1964.

NP

Coord W/ Adm Div

22. All materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964 memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

PREV. HANDLED 7/14

23. All materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

P HANDLED

24. The table of contents page(s) and/or chapter or section headings of:

   a. The article captioned "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" which was attached to Mr. Sullivan's 10/15/63 memorandum to Mr. Belmont under the same caption.

   NP

   b. The paper which was the up-to-date revision of the article described in Item 24 (a) above and which paper was attached to Mr. Sullivan's November 22, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

   c. The memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which was transmitted with the December 21, 1964 letter from Director Hoover to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.

d. The document which was the "current revision of the previous analysis captioned 'Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis'" and which document was enclosed with Mr. Brennan's April 10, 1967 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Communist Influence in Racial Matters - A Current Analysis."

e. The "current study" entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr. - A Current Analysis" which was enclosed with Director Hoover's March 14, 1968 letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall.

? 25. All materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a. - e. above. (Do not supply the documents themselves.)

?. What mean

26. An identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24 a. - e. above. (Do not supply the attachments themselves.)

? 27. All materials reflecting that:

a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and

b. "the Director agreed,"

that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr. be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's 2/29/68 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

Klein 28. All materials which reflect any recommendations for, and/or decisions relating to, the sending of Director Hoover's August 25, 1967 letter to specified field offices captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Internal Security."

CointelPro Ryan?

Klein 29. All materials reflecting the approval of proposals contained in Mr. G. C. Moore's February 29, 1968 memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence."

Ryan?

30. All materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965 memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

31. All materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's 1/16/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C.")

32. All materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position at that time (the end of a 90-day period, or sooner if conditions permit) to take further action against King and the SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau," as promised in Mr. Sullivan's December 24, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

33. All materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta field office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government with representatives of (the Atlanta) office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

to #16

34. All materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

35. All materials comprising the "separate correspondence" between FBI Headquarters and the Atlanta field office concerning the "specific matters dealt with in Atlanta's letter (of 4/14/64)" as indicated in the Director's 4/24/64 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

Search to end 36. The communication from the Atlanta field office to FBI Headquarters by which "this publication has previously been furnished to the Bureau on 6/26/64," as stated in the second paragraph of page 3 of the 7/7/64 letter from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, IS-C."

Deegan's Office 37. The "separate correspondence" by which the Atlanta field office was "directed to furnish the Bureau available information concerning the alleged escapades of (the Reverend Ralph) Abernathy, including the obtaining of official court records," as referred to in the Director's July 23, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

38. The letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers which was originally attached to Mr. Sullivan's 11/27/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement -- A Current Analysis." (See note on 11/27/64 memorandum indicating that the letter was "revised.")

? 39. "The letter" which is the subject of the first and second paragraphs of Director Hoover's February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning his 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, and which letter the Director told the Attorney General, he would "check on" and any other materials relating to "the letter".

P 40. All materials concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. being named "Man of the Year" by Time Magazine in December 1963 - January 1964.

P 41. All materials concerning or pertaining to Dr. King's Papal audience in Rome in September 1964.

P 42. Speech delivered by Director Hoover at Loyola College in November 1964, and all materials pertaining thereto.

NP 43. All Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") from 1963 until 1968 for:

   a. William D. Campbell, and
   b. John Matter.

P ATLANTA

45. All materials reflecting, concerning or pertaining to electronic surveillance, feasibility studies or surveys, physical surveillance, or photographic surveillances, and/or any proposals, recommendations or discussions of any of the foregoing surveillances, studies or surveys, with respect to Dr. King's "hideaway", or Fred Bennett's apartment, or premises located at 3006 Delmar Lane, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia, or with respect to any other premises, apartment, or "hideaway", used,owned, or leased by Dr. King or Fred Bennett.

Klein

Cointel Pro Ryan?

46. The following materials which are referred to in the October 9, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C":

a. "NYlet 9/26/62";
b. "further steps to carry out this counterintelligence plan will be handled at the Bureau";
c. "memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption dated October 8, 1962, ARW:cdb."

47. The "ATairtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated 4/1/64 captioned "CPUSA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C" and "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C", which are referenced in the 4/13/64 Airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York and Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal SEcurity - C (Negro Question).

48. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of informants) of the 8/15/66 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, subject "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Secuirty - C (Stanley David Levison.)"

49. The Memorandum which "the Director had noted" as referred to in the NOTE at the bottom of the 4/13/65 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, subject "Communist Party, USA Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Nicholas A. Kourambis) (Negro Question)."

Klein
Cointelpro
Ryan?

50. All materials reflecting "comments" and "specific recommendations" submitted by the Atlanta, Chicago, and New York field offices as the result of the instructions contained in the last paragraph of the May 18, 1967 letter from the Director the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Martin Luther King)."

!

Klein
Cointelpro
Ryan?

51. All materials reflecting the product of the "comprehensive review of Levison's Bureau case file" as indicated in the NOTE on the 7/18/66 airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Stanley David Levison)."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/14/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/8/75 request, Items 8,9,11,13
and 14

Originating Office: FBI 9/30

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/HG

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-964

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/8/75, items 8,9,11,13 and 14

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

~~TS~~

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and SCLS: As they relate to CP, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters and Hunter Pitts O'Dell; Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney committee".

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 9

#MDR 16
10/13/00 SP-2ALM/JT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #mdr16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

The Attorney General

September 5, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Reddy
1 - Mr. Shubatt

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

In my letter dated August 20, 1963, information was set forth regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell's possible association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and information regarding Reverend King's statement indicating O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on Reverend King's staff.

On August 30, 1963, at 7:25 P.M., O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau entering the building located at 312 West 125th Street, New York, New York. O'Dell remained in the building in excess of one hour. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference occupies one of the several offices which are located in that building.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

100-358916

REC 46

ST-108

258

19 SEP 6 1963

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

MAILED 25
SEP 5 - 1963
COMM-FBI

WFS:erc
(14)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

347

SEP 6 - 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General August 20, 1963

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY 3657VRF LNG
ON 11-1-82

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Reddy

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

In my letter dated August 2, 1963, information was set forth regarding a United Press International release issued on July 29, 1963, at Atlanta, Georgia, reporting that the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had agreed to submit to Attorney General Eugene Cook of Georgia an affidavit explaining the employment in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) of a man linked by Congressional committees with the Communist Party. The release stated that King sent an attorney to Cook's office to determine what the Attorney General wanted in connection with his inquiry into the relationship with the SCLC of Jack O'Dell. The release concluded with the statement "King said last week O'Dell had worked for SCLC on two occasions but his connections with the integration organization were severed for good last June 26." It is noted that the subject is also known as Jack O'Dell.

On August 16, 1963, a confidential source of the Bureau advised that King had been alerted by his assistant, Wyatt Tee Walker, to an article appearing in the Atlanta "Constitution" on August 16, 1963, regarding King's association with O'Dell. Walker told King that the article referred to a letter written by Georgia Attorney General Cook in which Cook stated that O'Dell is a known communist and in which Cook demanded an explanation from King as to why O'Dell was placed on King's staff.

MAILED 6
AUG 20 1963
COMM-FBI

King instructed Walker to reply to Cook's letter by stating that O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on King's staff. Cook was to be further advised that O'Dell came to him, King, through the Democratic Party of the Bronx, New York, and that King "has nothing to hide."

REC- 45
100-358916 — 252

EBR:erc
(13)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

AUG 22 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Confidential~~" because it contains information, the disclosure of which might reveal the source and adversely affect the national defense. The source is NY 4099-S*.

CONFIDENTIAL

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/

The Attorney General August 2, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Reference is made to my letter dated July 31, 1963, concerning an article in the July 25, 1963, issue of the Atlanta, Georgia, "Constitution" regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell and entitled "Onetime Communist Organizer Heads Rev. King's Office in N.Y." My letter concluded that a telephone call to the office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in New York City on July 30, 1963, resulted in a statement by an unidentified female employee that Hunter Pitts O'Dell was no longer employed by the SCLC.

A United Press International release issued on July 29, 1963, at Atlanta, Georgia, reported that the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had agreed to submit to Georgia Attorney General Eugene Cook an affidavit explaining the employment in the SCLC of a man linked by Congressional committees with the Communist Party. The release states that King sent an attorney to Cook's office to determine what the Attorney General wanted in connection with his inquiry into the relationship with the SCLC of Jack O'Dell. The release further states that "King said last week O'Dell had worked for SCLC on two occasions but his connections with the integration organization were severed for good last June 26."

For your additional information in this regard, investigation by this Bureau's New York Office has developed information that, on July 2, 1963, and July 19, 1963, one "J. H. O'Dell" was the payee of checks in the amounts of $333.62 and $2,372.96, respectively, drawn by the SCLC. These checks were deposited to the account of Hunter Pitts O'Dell in a New York City bank.

On July 19, 1963, Charles Finnerty, Supervisor of the E. J. Creeden Company, 118 East 25th Street, New York City, the company which provides mailing service

REC-4
100-358916 — 251

AUG 7 12 39 PM '63
RECD-READING ROOM
FBI

SENT

(SEE NOTE PAGE THREE)

FJB:erc
(13)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

for the SCLC, was advised by O'Dell that he, O'Dell, had a big mailing list coming up in August. Finnerty asked O'Dell to submit written instructions but O'Dell replied that he would get together with Finnerty when Finnerty returned from vacation on August 5, 1963. Finnerty had previously on July 17, 1963, telephoned and spoken to O'Dell at the New York Office of the SCLC.

On July 22, 1963, O'Dell visited the offices of the Creeden Company and turned over to Mrs. Dorothy Creeden, the company's secretary, a check for $200 to be credited to the account of the SCLC at the Creeden Company.

On July 31, 1963, a pretext telephone call to the New York Office of the SCLC was answered by a person identifying herself as Ruth Bailey. When asked if Hunter Pitts O'Dell was still employed by the SCLC, Ruth Bailey stated that she was not in a position to say. It is known that Ruth Bailey has been employed in the New York Office of the SCLC for some time; nevertheless, she commented to the person making the telephone call that she had not been employed by the SCLC very long.

Also on July 31, 1963, O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau's New York Office entering the premises at 312 West 125th Street, New York City, which houses the New York Office of the SCLC. O'Dell remained for several minutes and then returned to his residence.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

The Attorney General

NOTE:

In view of current controversy regarding whether or not Hunter Pitts O'Dell, who was elected to the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959, under an alias, is still employed by the SCLC, the New York Office is under instructions to endeavor to definitely resolve this question. We will furnish any pertinent information developed to the Attorney General.

The Attorney General July 31, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/

NW 6416

There is attached for your consideration a copy of a letter dated July 27, 1963, received from Senator Richard B. Russell, together with a copy of the July 25, 1963, article in the Atlanta, Georgia, "Constitution" entitled "Onetime Communist Organizer Heads Rev. King's Office in N.Y." I have advised Senator Russell by letter of this date that, in line with Departmental policy, I am referring his letter to you.

You have been kept advised by communications, the latest of which was dated July 17, 1963, captioned "Request From Senator Monroney Concerning Racial Agitation," of Hunter Pitts O'Dell's association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition, copies of investigative reports concerning O'Dell have been submitted to the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice on a continuing basis. The last such report submitted was dated June 28, 1963, at New York, New York.

For your further information, a telephone call to the office of the SCLC in New York City on July 30, 1963, resulted in a statement by an unidentified female employee that Hunter Pitts O'Dell was no longer employed by the SCLC.

MAILED 25
AUG 2 - 1963
COMM-FBI

Enclosures - 2
REC- 25
100-358916 - 250

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosures - 2)

EX-103
1 - Mr. Burke Marshall (Enclosures - 2)
Assistant Attorney General

AUG 9 1963

NOTE:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same subject, dated 7/30/63, FBR:DB;erc:pw.

FBR:dfm:erc

(15) *This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside ~~your~~ Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee ~~and the~~ content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of ~~the~~ FBI.*

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SENT [illegible]

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

The Attorney General

REC- 42

ST-110

Director, FBI

57-6-133

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

July 17, 1963

1 - Mr. M. A. Jones
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Section tickler
1 - Mr. Garner

REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONRONEY
CONCERNING CURRENT RACIAL AGITATION

#mORI6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP JALM/JJG
ON 11-8-00

For your information, there is enclosed a copy of a letter dated July 12, 1963, received from Senator A. S. Mike Monroney which is self-explanatory. I have advised Senator Monroney by letter of this date that, in line with Departmental policy, I am referring his letter to you.

In substance, the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) is not able to assume a role of leadership in the racial unrest at this time. However, the Party is attempting to exploit the current racial situation through propaganda and participation in demonstrations and other activities wherever possible. Through these tactics, the Party hopes ultimately to progress from its current supporting role to a position of decisive leadership.

Much of the CPUSA's hope to play a more decisive role is linked with Stanley Levison's role as an advisor to Martin Luther King. Party officials regard Levison, a secret member of the CPUSA, as being engaged in the most important work in the Party today because of his association with King. Levison has reportedly stated that "King is a wholehearted Marxist who has studied it (Marxism), believes in it, agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly." Levison is reputed to have written the speech which King delivered at the convention of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) in Florida in December, 1961.

When King indicated in June, 1962, that he wanted another administrative assistant, Levison recommended Hunter Pitts O'Dell, who had been elected to the National Committee of the CPUSA in December, 1959, under the pseudonym Cornelius James. King accepted Levison's suggestion and employed O'Dell in his organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). [illegible] identified O'Dell as a communist in [illegible], 1962, King announced that O'Dell had resigned from the SCLC. However, O'Dell continues to associate with King to this

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NOTE: See memorandum, Smith to Sullivan, 7/17/63, RSG:JMS/aab:jdd, re: SENATOR A. S. MIKE MONRONEY, REQUEST FOR DIRECTOR'S VIEWS RE CURRENT RACIAL AGITATION.

RSG:JMS/jdd:aab
(15)

SEE NOTE ON PAGE THREE RE CLASSIFICATION

27 AUG 1963

7-17-63

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

Recently, information received indicates that, while Levison still retains his strong communist convictions and still acts as an effective Party advisor to King, he is becoming critical of the Party's role in the relationship. He believes the Party has lost prestige among Negroes lately because it has not been sufficiently aggressive and effective in promoting civil rights for the Negro and otherwise actively immersing itself in Negro causes.

King reportedly attended a Labor Day weekend seminar in 1957 at the Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee. According to a publication circulated concerning this meeting by the Georgia Commission of Education, which allegedly had an undercover agent in attendance, the meeting was held to discuss methods and tactics for precipitating racial strife and disturbances. While CPUSA members were on the school staff and the school followed the policy of welcoming communist students, the CPUSA was not in control of the school.

In June, 1960, the SCLC was reported to have ~~[illegible]~~ solicited funds from the Soviet and Czechoslovakian Embassies and the Rumanian Legation in Washington, D. C.

See memo Blond to Sullivan 7-1-63 Same caption

In recent years, King has signed a petition urging abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and petitions requesting the release of two imprisoned Communist Party leaders.

NAACP officials are aware that the NAACP is a communist target. As a result, the NAACP has taken a firm stand against communism and has warned its branches to be constantly alert against communist efforts to infiltrate them. The constitution of the NAACP contains an anticommunist clause which prohibits membership in the organization by known Communist Party members.

There is no indication that any of the key figures of the NAACP are or have been members of the Communist Party. Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, has been strongly anticommunist and has endeavored to keep the NAACP free of communists.

The following national officers of the NAACP had communist front affiliations--in no instance extensive--a number of years ago, but none is known to have been a Communist Party member: Arthur Spingarn, President; Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood, Chairman of the Board of Directors; and Robert L. Carter, General Counsel.

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

There is no evidence that any of the following top leaders of CORE are or have been Communist Party members: James L. Farmer, National Director; James T. McCain, ~~Field~~ Director; and Gordon R. Carey, Director, Program and Training Department. Carey was one of the founders of the Conference of Young Socialists (CYS) in 1957 and was a member at large of the Executive Committee of CYS. The CYS was controlled by the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party, which has been designated as subversive pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Full details of the activities related herein previously have been furnished for the Department's files in individual reports and related communications.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General - Enclosures (2)

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall - Enclosures (2)
Assistant Attorney General

Note: This letter is classified ~~Secret~~ inasmuch as it contains information from highly sensitive sources, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the Nation and have an adverse effect upon the national defense interests of the country.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

July 9, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM [illegible]
ON 11-8-00

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell, dated June 28, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

The symbol T-1 in this report relates to an informant in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. The symbol T-2 was not used and T-3 through T-6 relate to confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE:

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report also so classified.

REC- 72 244

JUL 11 1963

MAILED 6
JUL 9 - 1963
COMM-FBI

EX-114

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes

DR:mjh
(3)

60 JUL 16 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

April 12, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

FM 0016
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ [illegible]
ON 11-8-00

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated April 1, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1 in this report is a source in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-2 and T-6 are informants who are furnishing information of extreme value and who are not available for interview or testimony. T-3, T-4, and T-5 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

2 - New York (100-91330)

ATTENTION: SAC, NEW YORK:

There is no objection to your submitting future reports on a 90-day basis. However, any data developed indicative of Communist Party membership on the part of the subject or any contact by him with members of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, should immediately be brought to the attention of the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

-116

REC 9

APR 15 1963

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified "Confidential."

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DR:cah:eeb (6)

CONFIDENTIAL

MAILED 25

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

55 APR 1[illegible] 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

March 6, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

C

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated February 15, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual. Each report is accompanied by an informant evaluation memorandum also dated February 15, 1963.

T-1, T-2 and T-3 in this report are sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-4 is an informant who is furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony. T-5, T-6 and T-7 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 4

100-358916

1 - New York (100-91330)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/1T6 #MDR16
ON 11-8-00

C

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom would adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is so classified.

DR:bgc
(5)

REC- 63 100-358916-251

MAILED 25
MAR 6 - 1963
COMM-FBI

19 MAR 7 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

F73

14

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

Director, FBI

February 5, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Reddy

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reference is made to your inquiry of Mr. Alex Rosen of this Bureau regarding the current Communist Party membership of Hunter Pitts O'Dell.

We have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party.

This information is, of course, highly sensitive and confidential.

REC- 63

100-358916 - 234

See cover memo Rosen to Belmont 2/5/63, same re.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/MDR16
ON 11-8-00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

EBR:mtb/kmo
(10)

memo delivered to AAG Marshall 2/6/63 at 10 [illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 2/5/63

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTS

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division has asked that we give him a statement concerning the Communist Party affiliation of Hunter Pitts O'Dell. We have called to his attention current reports which have been furnished to the Security Division, Attention Mr. Walter Yeagley, concerning O'Dell's activities.

Marshall was interested in O'Dell's association with Rev. Martin Luther King and he was given a copy of a report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated 12/20/62 at New York, which was classified "Confidential", which had been disseminated to Walter Yeagley of the Security Division. This report reflected the current association of O'Dell and the organization of Rev. King, namely, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition to the above we also furnished him a copy of a memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated 12/6/62 and another dated 1/23/63, pertaining to O'Dell.

Marshall stated that upon review of the above information which was furnished to him, he would like to have a statement from the FBI concerning the present Communist affiliation of O'Dell, particularly, whether O'Dell actually is a member of the Communist Party at this time.

I advised Marshall that an appropriate memorandum would be prepared and furnished to him concerning his request. There is attached hereto a memorandum which has been prepared by the Security Division indicating that we have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party. It is being pointed out that this information is highly sensitive and confidential.

Enclosure (1)

REC- 63 100-3-116-234

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

AR:mpd (8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memo to Mr. Belmont from A. Rosen
Re: Hunter Pitts O'Dell

By way of background, Marshall indicated that the basis for his request stems from the necessity of having to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to O'Dell. He stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to adequately handle this inquiry.

ACTION:

If approved, attached memorandum to Burke Marshall will be handed to him. It is brief and specifically points out the need to treat this information as highly sensitive and confidential.

Delivered
2/6/63 [illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-1-82 BY 362

The Attorney General

January 23, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Reddy

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

On December 6, 1962, you were furnished information indicating that despite the Reverend Martin Luther King's statement of October 31, 1962, that Hunter Pitts O'Dell had resigned his position with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), O'Dell had continued to represent himself as being affiliated with the New York Office of the SCLC and, during late November and early December, 1962, was actively engaged in the work of this organization. Reverend King's public statement of October 31, 1962, was occasioned by an editorial in the October 25, 1962, edition of the "Augusta Chronicle," Augusta, Georgia, which identified O'Dell as a concealed member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, who was employed by the SCLC under the alias Jack H. O'Dell.

I thought you would be interested in the fact that on three occasions during early January, 1963, O'Dell registered at an apartment in Atlanta, Georgia, as J. H. O'Dell. On each occasion, O'Dell represented himself as being with the New York Office of the SCLC. When checking out on January 7, 1963, O'Dell requested that the bill be charged to the SCLC. An inquiry by the manager resulted in telephonic confirmation from the Atlanta Office of the SCLC that that organization would pay O'Dell's bill. Also, on January 10, 1963, O'Dell, Reverend Martin Luther King and eight other officials of the SCLC traveled together via Delta Airlines from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia.

MAILED 2

REC-9

100-358916 - 232

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE TWO

EBR:erc
(13)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

In addition, a source who has requested that his identity be concealed has reported that at an SCLC conference at Nashville, Tennessee, during the latter part of December, 1962, a representative of the SCLC admitted that O'Dell continues to be involved with the SCLC in New York City in a fund-raising capacity although he is not currently on the SCLC payroll.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption, dated January 22, 1963, EBR:erc.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

January 4, 1963

1 - Mr. Ryan

Director, FBI

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/LZG
ON 11-8-00

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated December 20, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1, T-2, and T-3 were used in this report to conceal the identity of three sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-4 is an informant who is furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony. T-5, T-6, and T-7 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE ON YELLOW:

This letter is classified "~~Confidential~~" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified "Confidential."

REC-67 - 227

19 JAN 7 1963

EX. - 116

DR:fjh
(5)

CONFIDENTIAL

MAILED 27
JAN [illegible] - 1963
COMM-FBI

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General December 6, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2 ALM

MAILED 2
DEC 5 - 1962
COMM-FBI

REC'D-READING ROOM

On November 2, 1962, I forwarded to you a copy of an editorial that appeared in the October 25, 1962, edition of the "Augusta Chronicle," Augusta, Georgia. This editorial identified Hunter Pitts O'Dell, a concealed member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, as employed under the alias Jack H. O'Dell in the capacity of "Acting Executive Director" for the Reverend Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Subsequently, various newspapers contained accounts of a statement issued by the Reverend Martin Luther King on or about October 31, 1962, wherein it was stated O'Dell had resigned from his position with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Reverend Martin Luther King is quoted in this statement as denying knowledge of the communist affiliations of O'Dell and further describing allegations that O'Dell was the Southeastern Director of his organization as false in that O'Dell functioned "purely as a technician with 90 per cent of his work taking place in the North..." King further stated that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference has a policy "that no person of known communist affiliation can serve on the staff, executive board or its membership at large."

I thought you would be interested in the fact that our New York Office has developed information that on November 23, 1962, O'Dell identified himself as affiliated with the New York office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and during late November and early December, 1962, he was actively engaged in New York City in the work of this organization.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC- 5

100-358916

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-nel without the express approval of the FBI.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE 2

DR:bgc (13)

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

NOTE ON YELLOW:

O'Dell was elected under the pseudonym Cornelius James to the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959.

The Attorney General　　　　　　　　　　November 2, 1962

Director, FBI

5-1
2-1
Encl.
2-1

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
EDITORIAL FROM OCTOBER 25, 1962,
ISSUE OF AUGUSTA CHRONICLE
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA

I thought you would be interested in the enclosed editorial relating to O'Dell's relationship with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Enclosure

1 - The Deputy Attorney General - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Evans - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Belmont - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Sullivan - Enclosure
1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2 ALM/FTG

NOTE: O'Dell was elected under the pseudonym Cornelius James to the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959. Since his association with the National Committee is set forth in the editorial, he is not being further characterized in this memorandum.

JH:mlw
(10)

JH/RMW

MCT-42

100-

NOV. 8 1962

REC-21

MAILED 19
NOV 2 1962
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1 - Mr. Ryan

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

November 19, 1962

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated November 5, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual. Each report is accompanied by an informant evaluation memorandum also dated November 5, 1962.

The Symbols T-1 and T-4 in this report relate to sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-2, T-5 and T-6 are confidential investigative techniques. T-3 is a confidential informant furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony.

Enc. (4)

#MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/LTE
ON 11-8-00

100-358916 - 214

REC- 123

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE ON YELLOW: This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified ~~"Confidential."~~

DR/ejl
(5)

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MAILED 8
COMM-FBI

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

53 NOV 29 1962

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

October 4, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated September 19, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1, T-3, T-5 and T-6 were utilized in this report to protect sources in whom the Department has not previously expressed an interest. T-2 and T-4 are confidential informants furnishing information of extreme value who are not available for interview or testimony. T-7, T-8 and T-9 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

1 - New York (100-91330)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG
ON 12-8-00

MAILED 30
OCT 4 1962
COMM-FBI

NOTE ON YELLOW:

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which are also classified ~~"Confidential."~~

DR:cdb
(5)

REC- 27

210

19 OCT 5 1962

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

9

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 11

62 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: September 20, 1963

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL;
STANLEY LEVISON;
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN
THE NEGRO MOVEMENT

8-1
enc
8-7,8

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall telephoned and advised that on instructions of the Attorney General he wanted to clear with us the rough draft of a memorandum which he was going to send to the Bureau. As a matter of fact, the Attorney General has approved the rough draft contingent upon our approval.

The proposed memorandum, a copy of which is attached, relates to Hunter Pitts O'Dell and Stanley Levison and action taken to advise Dr. Martin Luther King and his immediate associates of the communist activities on the part of O'Dell and Levison. Marshall states that some time ago it was not felt wise, in view of the position of the FBI informant, for Marshall to say that he knew O'Dell to be under communist control. Instead, he informed Dr. King and two of his immediate associates that O'Dell was believed by many people to have had communist connections and his association with Dr. King's organization was not in its best interest.

Subsequently, on June 22, 1963, according to Marshall's proposed memorandum, he brought this matter very explicitly to Dr. King's attention. Later that same date, both the Attorney General and the President, separately, strongly urged Dr. King that there should be no further connection between O'Dell and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Thereafter, the Attorney General and Marshall received copies of a letter dated July 3, 1963, from Dr. King to O'Dell. In this letter King makes reference to a resignation which O'Dell submitted some months ago which was accepted because of the SCLC's firm policy that no communist or communist sympathizer would be on the staff. Dr. King's letter continues by noting an investigation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2 ALM

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland

CAE:vap
(7)

100- -270

REC 102

OCT 8 1963

ENCLOSURE

XEROX
OCT 9 1963

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

had been conducted but they were unable to discover any present connections with the Communist Party by O'Dell.

King further tells O'Dell that the situation is such that the organization cannot even afford the risk of impressions about communist inspiration and therefore O'Dell's temporary resignation is being made permanent.

Mr. Marshall's proposed memorandum also advises that he informed Dr. King on June 22, 1963, Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party. This action was taken on direction of the Attorney General and the President. Marshall had previously warned Dr. King about any association with Levison. This was the first indication given him of firm information Levison was under communist control.

Sensitive foreign intelligence operation

As a matter of background, our early information concerning the communist connections involved here came from ~~one of our two most highly placed communist informants (NY694-S*)~~. To protect ~~this most valuable informant~~ we insisted Levison and O'Dell not be informed by King we had positive information of their communist connections.

Subsequently, with the passage of time so that the risk to the informant was not jeopardized, the Director in a personal conversation with the Attorney General on June 17, 1963, agreed Dr. Martin Luther King could be informed that he should get rid of Levison and O'Dell because they are members of the Communist Party. It was on the basis of this advice from the Director that action was taken by the Attorney General and the President.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN:

While Mr. Marshall's proposed memorandum does not spell out the sequence of events here in detail, his summary is nevertheless accurate and it is therefore believed we should inform Mr. Marshall that he should feel free, of course, to submit the memorandum as he drafted it. If approved, Mr. Marshall will be so advised telephonically.

Handled 9-20-63

Form No. G-11
(Ed. 3-9-61)

From

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Deputy Attorney General	☐
Solicitor General	☐
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Tax	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Civil	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Lands	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Legal Counsel	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights	☒
Administrative Assistant Attorney General	☐
Director, FBI	☐
Director, Bureau of Prisons	☐
Director, Office of Alien Property	☐
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization	☐
Pardon Attorney	☐
Parole Board	☐
Board of Immigration Appeals	☐
Special Assistant for Public Information	☐
Records Administration Office	☐

For the attention of Burke Marshall

REMARKS: I think this is fine, but before we send it, I would want it cleared with Courtney. Will you handle this?

RFK

1742

#MD016

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY 5P2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100-358716-220

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY [illegible]RAL

12 September 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Attached is a draft memorandum on Hunter Pitts O'Dell and the most recent documents. It could be expanded in detail but contains the essentials. I did not refer to the warning Harris Wofford gave to Dr. King at our suggestion in 1961 while Harris was at the White House because I do not know exactly what was said to King.

I think this is fine but before we send it I would want it cleared with Courtney - Will you handle this

BM

PERSONAL &
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE
RECEIVED
SEP 12 1963
ATTORNEY GENERAL

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

96

100-358716-270

DRAFT - 9/12/63

TO: J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

SUBJECT: Hunter Pitts O'Dell

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 Alm 1 sts

This relates to your letterhead memorandum of September 5 to the Attorney General, relating to Hunter Pitts O'Dell and the related prior memorandum. I appreciate your having sent copies of these to me.

This matter had been brought to the attention of Dr. King some time ago by me, but in accordance with conversations which the Attorney General had with Courtney Evans, it was not felt to be wise in view of the sources of the Bureau's information to state that I knew O'Dell to be under Communist control at any time. I did inform Dr. King and two members of his organization -- Reverend Andrew Young and Reverend Wyatt Walker -- some time ago -- that since O'Dell was believed by many people to have had Communist connections, his association with their organization was not in the best interests of the organization.

3

At that time, inconclusive steps were taken to remove O'Dell, and his job with the Southern Christian

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

27

-220

Leadership Conference was changed. In response to direct questions whether I had hard evidence of O'Dell's Communist connections, however, I replied that I was not in a position to give any.

Following further conversations with Mr. Evans in June, however, I brought the matter to the attention of Dr. King very explicitly in my office on the morning of June 22 prior to a scheduled meeting which Dr. King had with the President. This was done at the direction of the Attorney General. Later that morning both the Attorney General and the President separately strongly urged Dr. King thatthere should be no further connection between O'Dell and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Dr. King stated that the connection would be ended. Thereafter, theAttorney General and I both received copies of the attached letter, dated July 3, 1963, from Dr. King to O'Dell.

On the same occasion, I also informed Dr.King that our information was that Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party. This was also done after conversations with Mr. Evans prior to the meeting with Dr. King, and was done at the direction of the Attorney

4

General and the President. Prior to that time, again based upon talks between the Attorney General and Mr. Evans at which I was present, it had been decided that it was not in the best interest of the United States to inform Dr.King that we had any firm information that Levison was under Communist control. I had, however, on a previous occasion, warned Dr. King about any association with Levison, basing the warning upon doubts about Levison's loyalty to the United States.

I thought you should have this additional information for your file.

BM

5

The Attorney General September 5, 1963

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

In my letter dated August 20, 1963, information was set forth regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell's possible association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and information regarding Reverend King's statement indicating O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on Reverend King's staff.

On August 30, 1963, at 7:25 P.M., O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau entering the building located at 312 West 125th Street, New York, New York. O'Dell remained in the building in excess of one hour. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference occupies one of the several offices which are located in that building.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

100-358916

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

(1) - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI

28

100-3527-220

Dr. King

JBURN AVE., N. E.
NTA 3, GEORGIA
PHONE 524-1378

Southern Christian Leadership Conference

Martin Luther King Jr., *President*
Wyatt Tee Walker, *Executive Director*

July 3, 1963

Burke

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SPJ ALM/JTG

Attorney General Robert Kennedy
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kennedy:

Dr. King asked me to send you the enclosed copy of a letter which he has just sent to Mr. Jack O'Dell.

Sincerely yours,

Dora McDonald

(Miss) D. McDonald
Secretary

enc

File

OFFICE OF THE
RECEIVED
JUL 8 1963
ATTORNEY GENERAL

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100-358716-270

July 3, 1963

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

(1)

Mr. Jack H. O'Dell
488 St. Nicholas Avenue
Apartment 5-S
New York, New York

Dear Jack:

Several months ago you submitted your resignation pending an investigation of your alleged affiliation with the Communist party, as was suggested by an article to this effect in the Birmingham and New Orleans newspapers. We accepted this temporary resignation because of SCLC's firm policy that no Communist nor Communist sympathizer can be on our staff or in our membership. We felt that it was imperative to conduct an immediate investigation. As you know, we conducted what we felt to be a thorough inquiry into these charges and were unable to discover any present connections with the Communist party on your part.

The situation in our country is such, however, that any allusion to the left brings forth an emotional response which would seem to indicate that SCLC and the Southern Freedom Movement are Communist inspired. In these critical times we cannot afford to risk any such impressions. We, therefore, have decided in our Administrative Committee, that we should request you to make your temporary resignation permanent.

We certainly appreciate the years of unselfish service which you have put into our New York Office, and regret the necessity of your departure. Certainly, yours is a significant sacrifice commensurate with the sufferings in jail and through loss of jobs under racist intimidation. We all pray for the day when our nation may be truly the land of the free.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100-35-716-270

Mr. O'Dell
July 3, 1963
Page Two

May God bless you and continue to inspire you in the service of your fellowman.

Sincerely yours,

Martin Luther King, Jr.

Km

334 Auburn Avenue, N.E.
Atlanta 3, Georgia

NTA, GA.
PM
5 JUL
1963

ATLANTA
JUL 3 '63
GA.
U.S. POSTAGE
05
P.B. 384661

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2AL mn/lr/16

mde16

Attorney General Robert Kennedy
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL

10

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

31.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOV[illegible]T

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
[illegible]
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: 7/19/63

FROM : C. A. Evans

#mpe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2ALM/LG

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
~~Mr.~~ Evans
Mr. McGowan
Mr. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: RACIAL SITUATION

In talking with the Attorney General and Assistant AG Marshall, of the Civil Rights Division, reference was made to our earlier conversation concerning Congressional requests which had been received by the Director, relating to alleged communist influence in the racial demonstrations. The Department's original position was that there was no immediate urgency in recontacting Senator Monroney, in view of recent contacts had with him by Departmental representatives. Today, I pointed out that these requests should not be allowed to remain unresolved too long.

Assistant AG Marshall advised that he had drafted a proposed letter to be used in replying to these Congressional requests, since he had ascertained that a written reply is desired, particularly by Senator Monroney. In his letter Marshall proposes to paraphrase the President's statement at his press conference on 7/17/63. Marshall's letter will, of course, make no reference to the President's statement, but merely indicate that this is the conclusion, predicated upon reports and other information supplied to the Department.

In those instances where the Department is dealing with a Member of Congress believed to be trustworthy, Marshall plans to deliver his letters personally and to explain that the classified nature of the reports precludes the furnishing of specific information in writing or in testimony. Marshall feels that he can talk confidentially in this way to Senator Magnuson and thus forestall any requests for further information. It was noted that, as a result of the Director's conversation with the Attorney General, Marshall had spoken with Martin Luther King about the dangers of his associating with Stanley Levison and accepting assistance from him. It was, therefore, believed that since this may get back to Members of Congress, Marshall should talk with the individual Senators, where this can be done on a confidential basis.

Marshall said he would, of course, keep us advised of the results of his contacts in this regard.

REC-35

JUL 30 1963

CAE:CSH (7)

177

32

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2 ALM/
FMDE/6 276

2:35 p.m. June 17, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. DE LOACH
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN

The Attorney General called and advised he would like to have Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall talk to Martin Luther King and tell King he has to get rid of Levison and O'Dell, that he should not have any contact with them directly or indirectly. The Attorney General inquired if King could be told these persons are communists without exposing the informant.

I advised the Attorney General I thought he could make the statement that they are members of the Communist Party without exposing the informant. I pointed out that, if King continues this association, he is going to hurt his own cause as there are more and more communists trying to take advantage of the hate movement and bigots down South who are against integration are beginning to charge King is tied in with communists. I stated I thought Marshall could very definitely say this association is rather widely known and, with things crystalizing for them now, nothing could be worse than for King to be associated with it.

100-106670-150

Very truly yours,

REC-84

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JUN 19 1963

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JEH:rm (9)

1 - Miss Holmes

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 5:50 PM
DATE 6-17-63
BY

67 JUN 20 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: May 31, 1963

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING
RACIAL MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2ALM/MJG

ELSUR

SA Don Roney of the New York Office advised that NY 3810-S* on 5/30/63 furnished information concerning a conversation on that date between Martin Luther King and Stanley Levison, who has been a secret Communist Party member and has contributed funds to the Communist Party on a regular basis. King stated that he had requested a conference with the President and the Attorney General because King thought that now was a good time for such a conference. Levison agreed. Levison stated that there has never been an Administration in this country that has been as worried about the Negro problem as the present one. Levison continued that this is brought about by the Administration's concern with the common market problem in Europe. It was Levison's opinion that United States prestige is very important at this time and the inability to control the racial situation was making it more difficult. It was Levison's opinion that the needs of the President are so great that he is all ready for a different policy if it can bring about the kind of controlled situation that he feels he needs.

King and Levison agreed that the situation has to be kept moving so that the President will have to look for an alternative. The President can then be presented with certain alternatives. This will benefit the President, for then his problem, fear of violence, will be done away with. It was Levison's thought that the President is all ready to make a change. A conference now would be fruitful, but if a conference cannot be worked out, then the movement must be enlarged. King stated that he would like to put so much pressure on the President that he would have to sign an Executive Order making segregation unconstitutional.

Levison said that the method of negotiating used in Birmingham will set the pattern for a whole series of southern cities. That is, you come in with a package, come up with demands, discuss them and come out with a victory. You ask for more than you expect to get. The goals of the movement, according to Levison, are desegregation, jobs and the right to vote. The

REC- 72 100- 132

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

ST-102

11 JUN 13 1963

34

NOT RECORDED

XEROX JUN 18 1963

XEROX 1964

CLM:cag (10)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

methods to get them are direct action, nonviolence, and negotiations.

ACTION:

This information is being brought to the attention of the Attorney General and the Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President, by letter presently being prepared. [illegible] today [illegible]

[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#MDR16 DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/1116
ON 11-8-00

May 31, 1963 TG-

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

5/31/63
delivered
via liaison
OS+B

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that on May 30, 1963, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley Levison held a discussion concerning a conference which Reverend Mr. King reportedly has requested with the President and the Attorney General.

Levison and Reverend Mr. King agreed that this is a good time for such a conference and Levison stated that no Administration has ever been as worried about the Negro problem as is the present Administration. Levison added that this is based upon the Administration's concern with the problems arising from the Common Market in Europe. Levison expressed the opinion that the prestige of the United States is very important at this time and that inability to control the racial situation makes the Administration's task more difficult. He also said that the President is ready for a different policy if it can bring about the kind of controlled situation that he feels he needs.

Reverend Mr. King and Levison agreed that it was necessary to keep the situation moving so that the President will be forced to look for an alternative. It was stated that the President can then be presented with certain alternatives which will benefit the Administration as the President's fear of violence will be done away with. Levison expressed the thought that the President is ready to make a change and that a conference at this time would be fruitful. He added that if a conference cannot be worked out, then the movement must be enlarged. Reverend Mr. King said

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

WLM:cag:mpd (14)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

REC-120

100-106670-129

XEROX
JUN 7 1963
JUN 5 1963

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 JUN 4 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ED COPY FILED IN

he would like to put so much pressure on the President that he will have to sign an Executive Order making segregation unconstitutional.

Levison stated that the method of negotiation used in Birmingham, Alabama, will set the pattern for a series of Southern cities. He explained this method by stating that you come in with a package, come up with demands, discuss them and come out with a victory, and that in doing so you ask for more than you expect to get. He described the goals of the movement as desegregation, jobs and the right to vote. He described the methods of obtaining these goals as being direct action, nonviolence and negotiation.

As previously mentioned to you, another source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in March, 1963, that Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party, United States of America, who contributes to the Communist Party on a regular basis.

I advised the Attorney General of the above information and he suggested that the President should see this letter.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE: This memorandum is being classified "Confidential" because it contains information from a source, the unauthorized disclosure of which would seriously impair the investigation of the Communist Party, USA, and such impairment could have an adverse effect upon the national defense interests of the country.

SECRET

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

February 5, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Reddy

Director, FBI

C

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reference is made to your inquiry of Mr. Alex Rosen of this Bureau regarding the current Communist Party membership of Hunter Pitts O'Dell.

We have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party.

This information is, of course, highly sensitive and confidential.

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible] ON 11-6-00

REC- 63

100-358916 - 234

FEB 8 3 22 PM '63
REC'D - ROSEN

See cover memo Rosen to Belmont 2/5/63, same re.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

EBR:mtb/kmo
(10)

memo delivered to AAG Marshall's office 2/6/63 at 10:51 AM

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

FEB 8 1963
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVER ENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 2/5/63

FROM : A. Rosen

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division has asked that we give him a statement concerning the Communist Party affiliation of Hunter Pitts O'Dell. We have called to his attention current reports which have been furnished to the Security Division, Attention Mr. Walter Yeagley, concerning O'Dell's activities.

Marshall was interested in O'Dell's association with Rev. Martin Luther King and he was given a copy of a report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated 12/20/62 at New York, which was classified "Confidential", which had been disseminated to Walter Yeagley of the Security Division. This report reflected the current association of O'Dell and the organization of Rev. King, namely, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition to the above we also furnished him a copy of a memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated 12/6/62 and another dated 1/23/63, pertaining to O'Dell.

Marshall stated that upon review of the above information which was furnished to him, he would like to have a statement from the FBI concerning the present Communist affiliation of O'Dell, particularly, whether O'Dell actually is a member of the Communist Party at this time.

I advised Marshall that an appropriate memorandum would be prepared and furnished to him concerning his request. There is attached hereto a memorandum which has been prepared by the Security Division indicating that we have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party. It is being pointed out that this information is highly sensitive and confidential.

Enclosure (1)

REC- 63 100-358916-234

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

18 FEB 13 1963

AR:mpd (8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

By way of background, Marshall indicated that the basis for his request stems from the necessity of having to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to O'Dell. He stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to adequately handle this inquiry.

ACTION:

If approved, attached memorandum to Burke Marshall will be handed to him. It is brief and specifically points out the need to treat this information as highly sensitive and confidential.

Delivered 2/6/63 clw

R

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES C N

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 2/4/63

FROM : A. Rosen

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/00 BY SP2 ALM/TS

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, aka Jack
SECURITY MATTER - C

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division called to state that he will have to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to Jack Hunter O'Dell.

noted

By way of background, he stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to talk to King about O'Dell.

Before Marshall can do this he states he would like to have whatever background information we have on O'Dell. In this regard, it is noted that O'Dell is supposed to be a member of the Communist Party and has in the past been associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. This is King's organization. We have in the past furnished information to the Department concerning O'Dell and his association with Rev. King.

Marshall should be furnished with memoranda which have heretofore been given to the Security Division. It is understood that a report of O'Dell's activities is also available and has been furnished to the Security Division but has not been given to the Civil Rights Division. It would appear that Marshall is entitled to this information if he is to properly evaluate O'Dell's background.

Marshall has asked for a summary on O'Dell. If such is not readily available, copies of material previously furnished to the Department would seem to suffice. He stated he has been in touch with the Attorney General on this matter and is anxious to have it handled as soon as possible.

AR:mpd (6)

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

REC-35

ST-112

100- 6 36

FEB 7 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62 FEB 11 1963

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

January 31, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen, Attention: Lavin
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Forsyth

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - C

In response to your inquiry of Assistant Director Courtney A. Evans on January 30, 1963, you are advised that Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., accompanied by Hunter Pitts O'Dell and eight other officials of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), arrived in Savannah, Georgia, aboard Delta Airlines Flight Number 427 in the early morning of January 10, 1963. This group was met at the Savannah air terminal by Stanley Levison and the entire group departed Savannah in two automobiles.

Levison departed Savannah by train en route to New York City on the evening of January 11, 1963, while King, O'Dell and three other officials of the SCLC held reservations with the Delta Airlines for the morning of January 12, 1963. King, in a party of five, departed Savannah en route to Atlanta on Delta Airlines Flight Number 422 on the morning of January 12, 1963.

100-106670

REC'D-READING ROOM
JAN 31 11 10 AM '63

REC- 22

EX-102

19 FEB 1 1963

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Levison, a secret member of the CP, and O'Dell, a concealed member of the National Committee of the CP, are not characterized in the body of the letter as they have been characterized in previous communications to the Department. AAG Marshall requested advice as to whether there was any information available indicating a meeting between the individuals referred to above had occurred as scheduled. We are not in possession of any information as to the nature of the meeting involved other than the statement by Levison that it was to be a "closeted review of where they are--a critical review," which information is in the possession of Marshall.

TDR:mea
(11) mea

MAILED 25
JAN 31 1963
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FEB 5 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 14

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2-PLM/JFK16

62-116395-964
ENCLOSURE

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Mr. Callahan____
Mr. Conrad____
Mr. DeLoach____
Mr. Evans____
Mr. Gale____
Mr. Rosen____
Mr. Sullivan____
Mr. Tavel____
Mr. Trotter____
Tele. Room____
Miss Holmes____
Miss Gandy____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 1/22/64

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
NEGRO QUESTION
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Rogers
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

Pursuant to a request from the Director, there is attached a summary of information concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., which clearly demonstrates the communist influence upon him as well as his moral degeneracy.

This information, which is "~~TOP SECRET,~~" is for possible use by the Director in his appearance before the House Appropriations Committee. It will be noted that a portion of the attached material is marked "OBSCENE."

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information and use of the Director.

Enc.

100-3-116

SFP:eeb/erc
(8)

WCS

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

42

The racial unrest in the United States is currently the target for a determined concentration of communist effort. Long-range communist strategy includes the establishment of a Negro-labor coalition which the communists hope to be able to manipulate, as a powerful political-action weapon. They aim, thus, to provoke class struggle and promote legislation which can serve as a step toward a communist system of government. This constitutes a serious national security problem, since the individual playing a most dominant role as a leading spokesman for the estimated 20 million Negroes in this country today is knowingly, willingly, and regularly cooperating with and taking guidance from communists. An in-depth view of this individual, Martin Luther King, Jr., will serve to illustrate how he functions as a channel through which communist efforts are being directed against the Negroes and, therefore, against this country. It depicts, too, a Moral degenerate [redacted] of such magnitude as to blaspheme the title of "Reverend" which he carries.

King — The Communist Pawn

King, who is a copastor with his father of the Ebenezer Baptist Church, Atlanta, Georgia, and the recipient of Bachelor of Divinity and Doctor of Philosophy Degrees, is considered and described within the Communist Party-USA (CPUSA) as a Marxist. sensitive foreign intelligence operation

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG ON 11-8-00 #MDE16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

He has been closely aligned with communists for several years and has shown not only a willingness, but at times even an eagerness, to associate and confer with communist leaders and to work closely with and rely upon the advice and guidance of dedicated communists -- this despite the fact that they have been reliably identified to him as such. In February, 1962, Stanley David Levison, a secret Communist Party (CP) member, passed the word to the Party's General Secretary, Gus Hall, that "King is a wholehearted Marxist who has studied it (Marxism), believes in it, agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly."

Levison -- Key Communist Directing King

Levison, one of the individuals exerting the most influence upon King and who has greatly facilitated King's rise to prominence, is a shrewd, dedicated communist and is known as such by King. Since the late 1940's Levison has played a highly clandestine role in which he was entrusted by the Party to raise and handle secret funds used to finance some of the Party's activities. In 1961 Levison was Assistant Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which is headed by King.

Sensitive foreign intelli
operation

Since 195[illegible] Levison has expended m[illegible]h effort in King's behalf in such activities as: actively involving himself in fund-raising drives for King; serving as King's legal counsel in selected matters; preparing speech material for King; assisting in the mechanics of some demonstrations in which King was involved; guiding King as to acceptance or rejection of public appearances and speaking commitments; and helping King with matters related to the latter's writings.

King's Reliance on O'Dell, A National Party Functionary

Another key communist through whom the Party exerts influence on King is Hunter Pitts O'Dell who, at the Party's last National Convention in 1959, was elected a member of its second highest governing body, the National Committee. His election was under a pseudonym. In 1960, while working as an assistant to the Party's National Secretary for the South, James Jackson, O'Dell also began to work actively in support of King's movement. In June, 1962, King sought Levison's counsel concerning the addition of an administrative assistant to King's staff. As a result of Levison's recommendation of O'Dell, the latter associated himself with the SCLC in Atlanta, Georgia, under the name J. H. O'Dell and also served the SCLC in its New York office. In October, 1962, several newspaper articles exposed O'Dell's connection with the SCLC and his communist affiliations, as a result of which King announced O'Dell's temporary resignation pending an inquiry.

This "temporary resignation" consisted of O'Dell's return to New York City where he continued to perform services for the SCLC until July, 1963, [redacted]

Jones — The Intermediary

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Despite the great pains being taken by the principals involved to keep the King-Levison connection secret, Bureau agents have observed them together on three different occasions since November, 1963.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Homosexual Rustin -- Liaison With Communist Party-USA

Rustin himself is an interesting link in the King "combine." He has long been inclined toward homosexual activities and in 1953 was sentenced to serve 60 days for offering to engage in an act of sex perversion of a homosexual nature, which he admitted. Rustin has also publicly admitted affiliations with the communist movement in the late 1930's and was one of a select group of observers permitted to attend the Party's 16th National Convention in 1957. He also has maintained contact with the Party's National Secretary, Benjamin J. Davis, [redacted]

[redacted] Much of the Party's influence in the Negro field to date has been clandestine in nature. If the Party fully implements its current plans, we may expect to see more open and aggressive actions in its attempts to further influence, infiltrate, dominate and recruit the American Negro — just one more step in its ultimate goal of establishing a communist state within our boundaries.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[JFK

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

END: ~~TOP SECRET~~ - OFF THE RECORD

End

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 10, 1975

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice

Director, FBI

#MDF16

10/13/00 SP2ALM/JTG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DELIVERED TO SHAHEEN 10-10-75 JAD
DELIVERED TO COMMITTEE 10-13-75

Reference is made to SSC letter of September 29, 1975, listing certain documents and other information desired from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum in response to some of the requests.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JDM:lek (10) lek

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

10 - ENCLOSURE

OCT 10 1975

ST-111

REC-30

62-116395-965

15 NOV 4 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 NOV 5 1975

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
FBI

OCT 10 11 05 AM '75

RECEIVED
OCT 10 1 48 AM 1975
LE A [illegible] UNSEL

RECEIVED
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE DIV.
OCT 9 3 10 PM '75

RECEIVED
OCT 9 10 15 AM 1975
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

OCT 10 9 06 AM '75
REC'D
CORRESPONDENCE REVIEW
FBI

The Attorney General

NOTE:

A copy of SSC letter 9/29/75 is attached to the file copy of the enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice
October 10, 1975

62-116395

#MDR 16

SP2ALM/LHG

10/13/00

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General dated September 29, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 29, 1975, request, and specifically to the following items in that request: Items 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18.

Concerning Item 18 in which you requested all versions of Section 122 of the Manual of Instructions which were in effect from 1955 through 1965, we have determined Section 122 was created by Manual of Instructions Revision Number 185, dated February 6, 1959, and was subsequently revised on July 30, 1959. Copies of these two revisions are being furnished in response to Item 18. You have previously been furnished all subsequent revisions.

1 - The Attorney General

WRW/TOL

JBA/pm

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395 — 965

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 29, 1975

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/TTB

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Enclosed is a document request for materials pertaining to the King matter.

I would like to set October 6, 1975 as a deadline for delivery of all outstanding previously-requested documents pertaining to the King matter and October 13, 1975 for delivery of all documents requested on the attached list.

I would also appreciate your arranging a briefing for Mike Epstein for sometime this week by knowledgable FBI personnel concerning:

A. The present location and organization of any files and materials which were found to be in William C. Sullivan's Bureau office when he was denied further access thereto in or about September 1971; and

B. A description of the contents of such files and materials.

Finally, we would like to have access to the Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1962. The materials in these "DJ" files will be reviewed pursuant to the terms of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department, i.e., subsequent to review of such files certain items will be orally designated to be screened for delivery.

SEP

Sincerely,

62-116395-965

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ENCLOSURE

KING DOCUMENT REQUEST

1.

(DELETED)

Call Dunn in Atlanta

F. Seaburgh

2. All materials relating to rental or other arrangements made by the FBI for the use of an apartment or premises located in the Peachtree Towers, Atlanta, Georgia, as a listening post, as well as all materials relating to the termination of such arrangements, use, and/or occupancy.

call file

3. Access to all Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") for Special Agent Alden F. Miller for the years 1960-1968.

call → file

WFO & Lab

4. Any materials reflecting dates upon which Special Agent William D. Campbell, while attached to the Washington Field Office, was on special or temporary assignment at FBI Headquarters (Laboratory or Intelligence Division), between January 1, 1964 and the date of his transfer to the Laboratory Division at FBI Headquarters.

5. Materials which would reflect the authority and instructions issued for FBI personnel to surveil, monitor, investigate and/or report on civil rights demonstrations, protests, rallies, or marches which involved Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference prior to October 23, 1962.

6. Materials reflecting authority for and instructions issued prior to October 23, 1962, with respect to developing "any information. . . concerning the SCLC relating to racial matters (which) must be reported under the racial matters caption," and the maintenance of "a separate file on SCLC relating to racial incidents (157-632)." (See first paragraph on page 2 of October 23, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security - C")

Nugent

7. All materials reflecting proposals, recommendations or decisions to include Martin Luther King on the Security, Reserve, Rabble-Rouser, and/or Agitator Index or list, and/or his designation as a Key Activist, Key Black Extremists, Top Functionary and/or Key Figure.

8. All materials from August 28, 1963 to December 31, 1964 which pertain to the distribution by the United States Information Agency of a film of the march on Washington, including such materials as concern or reflect contacts or correspondence between the FBI and the USIA or between the FBI and the White House concerning such film.

9. SAC Letter No. 59-2, dated 1/13/59, including the Security letter attached thereto pertaining to Racial Matters.

10. The Manual changes referred to in the Racial Matters section of the Security letter identified in Item 9 above.

11. Memorandum from Mr. Rosen to the Director, dated 1/7/59 captioned "Racial Matters" that is referenced in the proposed letter to all SAC/s which was typed on 1/7/59 and which became the Racial Matters section of Item 9 above.

ok 12. Memorandum dated February 11, 1960, from W. B. Wette (WETTE) to A. Rosen, captioned "Racial Matters." Mannie HAS

Call EXTEN

ok 13. Airtel to all offices dated February 12, 1960, captioned "Racial Matters." Mannie HAS

ok 14. Memorandum dated June 26, 1963, from Mr. Rosen to Mr. Belmont, captioned "Racial Matters." Mannie has

ok 15. Airtel dated June 27, 1963 from the Director to all continental offices, captioned "Racial Matters." Mannie has

ok 16. Memorandum dated January 23, 1959, from Mr. Rosen to the Director, captioned "Bombing Matters or Racial Matters (New Classification)." Mannie has

ok 17. SAC letter sent on 1/28/59 which was attached to the memorandum identified in Item 16 above. Enc 2/13/59 Mannie

18. All versions of Section 122 of the Manual of Instructions which were in effect from 1955 through 1965. Mannie

19. All materials reflecting correspondence, contacts, or communications, or proposed correspondence contacts, or communications, between FBI personnel and:

Tunstall

A. Samuel Riley Pierce, Jr.

B. Dr. Frank R. Barnett

(See memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, dated January 8, 1964, captioned "Samuel Riley Pierce, Jr., 280 Park Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.")

20. All materials reflecting correspondence between any FBI headquarters personnel and former Chief of Police Jenkins, Atlanta, Georgia, concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference from January 1, 1960 through April 1968.

21. All materials pertaining to (a) the nomination, and (b) the selection, of Martin Luther King, Jr., for the Nobel Prize.

Seems that we answered a similar ? previously. B

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/29/75 request, Items 12,13,14,15,
16, and 17 and 18

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by:

Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JG

62-116395-965

3

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 9/29/75, items 12 thru 18

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16

[illegible] 10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/[illegible]TG

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr and Southern Christian Leadership Conference: Various memoranda captioned "Racial Matters or Bombing Matters; SAC letter 1/28/59; Manual section 122.

62-116395

FMK:fmk

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

51W0 C/B

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

Tolson

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: BOMBING MATTERS OR RACIAL MATTERS (NEW CLASSIFICATION)

DATE: January 23, 1959

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JTE

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The attached SAC Letter is to inform the field of the new classification to be used in connection with correspondence carrying the character racial matters or bombing matters. This classification will be used in opening new cases carrying racial matters or bombing matters. It will not be necessary for either the field or the Bureau to change the classification number of existing cases or correspondence.

The Records Branch has been consulted and is agreeable to the new classification "157." New sections and changes for manuals and handbooks are being prepared and will be forwarded to the field.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached SAC Letter be approved and forwarded.

1 - Inspector H. L. Edwards

Enclosure sent

FHF:bhg
(6)

REC- 13

52 FEB 11 1959

23 JAN 30 1959

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SSC REQUEST 9/29/75
ITEM 17

#m2016
10/13/00 SP2 ALM) #16

Sic.965

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed January 23, 1959)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

G.F.

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: BOMBING MATTERS
OR RACIAL MATTERS
(NEW CLASSIFICATION)

#MDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Dear Sir:

All correspondence and new cases opened under ~~carrying~~ the character bombing matters or racial matters should ~~also~~ carry the classification "157." It will not be necessary to change the classification number of ~~existing cases or~~ correspondence. relating to existing cases.

New sections and changes for manuals and handbook are being prepared and will be forwarded to your office.

This information should be brought to the attention of all personnel handling this type of investigation and they should become thoroughly familiar with the new manual sections, manual changes and handbook changes when they are received in your office.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

66-04-3825

ENCLOSURE

16

(E) BOMBING MATTERS OR RACIAL MATTERS (NEW CLASSIFICATION) -- All correspondence and new cases opened under the character bombing matters or racial matters should carry the classification "157." It will not be necessary to change the classification number of correspondence relating to existing cases.

New sections and changes for manuals and handbook are being prepared and will be forwarded to your office.

This information should be brought to the attention of all personnel handling this type of investigation and they should become thoroughly familiar with the new manual sections, manual changes and handbook changes when they are received in your office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (B)

SSC REQUEST 9/29/75
ITEM 18

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/TTG

Sel 1965

February 6, 1959

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
REVISION NUMBER 185

Obsolete

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages for inclusion in the Manual of Instructions. Revisions may be noted by brackets. The dates appearing at the bottom of the pages indicate the dates of revisions. The old corresponding pages should be removed from the Manual and destroyed. The Special Agent in Charge has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

Volume II
Table of Contents - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Section 23 - (New section)
Pages ~~1 and 2~~
~~Page 3~~

Volume III
Section 87 - Pages ~~89 and 90~~ iwl
(Delete pages 88a and 88b)

Volume IV
Table of Contents - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 122 - (New section)
~~Pages 1~~ and 2
~~Page 3~~

Index - ~~Pages 5 and 6~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~

FMDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (10)

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

SECTION 114. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS

A. Statutes and Elements 1
B. Departmental Instructions 1
C. Possible Violations (Not All-Inclusive) 1
D. Pertinent Court Decisions 2
E. Policy 2
F. Investigative Procedure 3
G. Venue 3
H. Classification 3
I. Character 3
J. Penalties - Maximum 3

SECTION 115. INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS

A. Statute 1
B. Violation 1
C. Investigative Procedure 2
D. Venue 2
E. Classification 2
F. Character 2

SECTION 116. MISCELLANEOUS - CIVIL SUITS

A. Background 1
B. Policy 1
C. Classification 1
D. Character 1

SECTION 117. DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES

A. Statutes 1
B. Violations 3
C. Venue 3
D. Policy 4
E. Investigative Procedure 4
F. Prosecution 5
G. Classification 5
H. Character 5

SECTION 118. SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 1
C. Policy 2
D. Venue 3
E. Classification 3
F. Character 3

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

SECTION 119. INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 1
C. Policy and Procedures 1
D. Venue 1
E. Classification 1
F. Character 1

SECTION 120. AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 2
C. Investigative Procedure 2
D. Venue 2
E. Classification 3
F. Character 3

SECTION 121. WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 1
C. Department Instructions 1
D. Investigative Procedure 1
E. Classification 1
F. Character 1
G. Penalty 1

SECTION 122. RACIAL MATTERS

A. Investigations of Klan-Type Organizations, Hate Organizations, and Associated Individuals 1
B. Classification 3
C. Character 3

INDEX

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

A. INVESTIGATIONS OF KLAN-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS, HATE ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS

1. While these are considered criminal investigations, they are considered delicate in nature and require the application of the restrictions necessary in conducting security-type investigations. Therefore, the investigations and reports are to be handled in accordance with the general rules applying to security-type investigations.
2. Caution
   Extreme care must be exercised to insure that in every instance there is a proper basis for investigation. Sound judgment must be used to avoid investigation of organizations or individuals that merely sponsor unpopular causes or propaganda but do not meet the standards outlined under item 3a below. The Bureau must insure that there will be no justifiable basis for any charge that these investigations infringe upon constitutional freedoms of speech, press, or assemblage.
3. Investigations
   a. Investigation is confined to those organizations or associated individuals that either:
      (1) Have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450
      (2) Have not been designated under Executive Order 10450 but there is an actual or alleged affiliation or subsidiary relation with a designated organization
      (3) Have adopted a policy or have allegedly adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution
      (4) Have allegedly committed acts of violence
      (5) Have actually or allegedly committed violations of laws within the Bureau's jurisdiction
   b. During the investigation of Klan-type organizations and hate organizations, the following information should be obtained:
      (1) Organization structure
         (a) Headquarters
         (b) Officers
         (c) Location of klaverns or local chapters
      (2) Objectives
      (3) Publications and propaganda
      (4) Finances
      (5) Activity of klaverns or local chapters
         (a) Name and address
         (b) Officers
         (c) Estimated membership and recruiting activities
         (d) Meetings
            I. Date
            II. Type (open or closed)
            III. Place
            IV. Estimated attendance
   c. Follow through public source material and established sources activities of organizations which do not qualify for investigation under above standards. Initiate investigation upon receipt of information which brings organization within investigative criteria and at the same time advise Bureau this action taken and basis therefor.
   d. Conduct no investigation regarding individual acts of violence allegedly or actually committed by an organization in absence of information indicating violation within Bureau's jurisdiction. However, concerning each such incident, the following information should be obtained through informants and sources in connection with investigations of such organizations:

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(1) Which group involved
(2) Whether action taken was on initiative of individual members or with knowledge or approval of leadership

In initial communication reporting violent act, advise if there is or is not indication of organization participation.

If act of violence is a criminal violation over which Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation; if the act of violence is a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

e. Agents are not to attend functions or rallies of any Klan or hate group although open to the public.

f. These investigations must be both vigorous and incisive. The fundamental objective is to identify those who may be engaged or responsible for acts of violence, and care must be taken to avoid becoming involved in widespread, nebulous investigation which does not go to the heart of the problem at hand. When a case is opened, it should receive immediate continuous attention until the initial allegation is resolved. The case should be promptly closed if it is definitely determined that it does not fall within the criteria set out in item 3a above.

g. Individual cases should be opened on officers, leaders, and active workers in these organizations to determine whether they have been involved in acts of violence or have a definite potential for future acts of violence. Good judgment and discretion must be exercised in the case of prominent individuals who may be dupes of such organizations and who may hold nominal office. Immediately advise the Bureau when investigation of a prominent person is contemplated; and if there is any question as to whether there is sufficient probable cause to fully justify investigation, no investigation should be conducted without Bureau approval.

h. Names of members in attendance at meetings should not be set out in investigative reports but should be indexed from informant reports. Names of new members should be furnished the Bureau by letter for indexing purposes.

4. Informants and interviews

a. In order that the Bureau may discharge its responsibilities, it is mandatory that information be obtained regarding all pertinent Klan or hate organization activities. In this regard it is necessary that informants be developed in all such organizations which meet the criteria set forth in 3a above. Efforts in this regard must be discreet.

b. Preliminary interviews with rank-and-file members of an organization and other individuals not connected with such organizations conducted solely for the purpose of determining the attitude of the individual may be authorized by the SAC. To obtain authority from the SAC, credit, arrest, informant, and indices checks should be made and a memorandum prepared for the SAC setting forth this information so that he may make a decision regarding the propriety of the interview. Officials of local groups or national officers are not to be interviewed without prior Bureau authority. Likewise where a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, and the like,

[specific Bureau authority must be obtained. Two Agents should be
[present when an organization official is interviewed and, if possible,
[two Agents should be present at interviews with organization members.
[During such an interview, no attempt should be made to develop the
[individual as an informant; but if he is cooperative and has a
[potential for development as an informant, complete background infor-
[mation should be obtained and specific Bureau authority requested
[to develop him as an informant.

[c. Bureau authority not necessary prior to interview with organization
[members in criminal- or applicant-type cases; however, interview
[should be confined to subject matter of inquiry, unless data
[concerning organization volunteered by interviewee.

[d. Submit by September 15 and March 15 each year letter captioned
["Semiannual listing of Klan and hate organizations and informant
[coverage," Bureau file #157-1, containing:
[(1) Names of Klan and hate organizations active in your territory
[(2) Coverage of each Klan broken down by klaverns and each hate
[organization broken down into local chapters showing identities
[of informants and sources reporting on each
[(3) Estimated membership by klaverns or chapters and basis for
[estimate

[B. CLASSIFICATION - 157

[C. CHARACTER - RACIAL MATTERS]

July 30, 1959

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
REVISION NUMBER 196

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages for inclusion in the Manual of Instructions. Revisions may be noted by brackets. The dates appearing at the bottom of the pages indicate the dates of revisions. The old corresponding pages should be removed from the Manual and destroyed. The Special Agent in Charge has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

Volume I
  Section 7 - Pages ~~7-11 and 12~~
    Pages ~~19 and 20~~
    ~~Pages 21 and 22~~

Volume II
  Section 23 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
    Pages ~~3 and 4~~

  Section 42 - Page ~~1~~

Volume III
  Section 66 - Page ~~7~~ ✓
    Pages 7a and 8 ✓

  Section 87 - ~~Pages 33 and 34~~
    Pages ~~53 and 54~~

Volume IV
  Section 102 - Pages ~~23 and 24~~

  Section 105 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

  Section 108 - ~~Pages 7 and 8~~
    ~~Pages 11 and 12~~
    Page ~~13~~

  Section 122 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~ ✓
    Pages ~~3 and 4~~
    Pages ~~5 and 6~~
    Page ~~7~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

A. INVESTIGATIONS OF KLAN-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS, HATE ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS

1. While these are considered criminal investigations, they are considered delicate in nature and require the application of the restrictions necessary in conducting security-type investigations. Therefore, the investigations and reports are to be handled in accordance with the general rules applying to security-type investigations.
2. Caution
   Extreme care must be exercised to insure that in every instance there is a proper basis for investigation. Sound judgment must be used to avoid investigation of organizations or individuals that merely sponsor unpopular causes or propaganda but do not meet the standards outlined under item 3a below. The Bureau must insure that there will be no justifiable basis for any charge that these investigations infringe upon constitutional freedoms of speech, press, or assemblage.
3. Investigations
   a. Investigation is confined to those organizations or associated individuals that either:
      (1) Have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450
      (2) Have not been designated under Executive Order 10450 but there is an actual or alleged affiliation or subsidiary relation with a designated organization
      (3) Have adopted a policy or have allegedly adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution
      (4) Have allegedly committed acts of violence
      (5) Have actually or allegedly committed violations of laws within the Bureau's jurisdiction
   b. During the investigation of Klan-type organizations and hate organizations, the following information should be obtained:
      (1) Organization structure
         (a) Headquarters
         (b) Officers
         (c) Location of klaverns or local chapters
      (2) Objectives
      (3) Publications and propaganda
      (4) Finances
      (5) Activity of klaverns or local chapters
         (a) Name and address
         (b) Officers
         (c) Estimated membership and recruiting activities
         (d) Meetings
            I. Date
            II. Type (open or closed)
            III. Place
            IV. Estimated attendance
   c. Follow through public source material and established sources activities of organizations which do not qualify for investigation under above standards. Initiate investigation upon receipt of information which brings organization within investigative criteria and at the same time advise Bureau this action taken and basis therefor.
   d. Conduct no investigation regarding individual acts of violence allegedly or actually committed by an organization in absence of information indicating violation within Bureau's jurisdiction. However, concerning each such incident, the following information should be obtained through informants and sources in connection with investigations of such organizations:

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(1) Which group involved
(2) Whether action taken was on initiative of individual members or with knowledge or approval of leadership

In initial communication reporting violent act, advise if there is or is not indication of organization participation.

If act of violence is a criminal violation over which Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation; if the act of violence is a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

e. Agents are not to attend functions or rallies of any Klan or hate group although open to the public.

f. These investigations must be both vigorous and incisive. The fundamental objective is to identify those who may be engaged or responsible for acts of violence, and care must be taken to avoid becoming involved in widespread, nebulous investigation which does not go to the heart of the problem at hand. When a case is opened, it should receive immediate continuous attention until the initial allegation is resolved. The case should be promptly closed if it is definitely determined that it does not fall within the criteria set out in item 3a above.

g. Individual cases should be opened on officers, leaders, and active workers in these organizations to determine whether they have been involved in acts of violence or have a definite potential for future acts of violence. [Wholesale investigations of individuals of these organizations should not be conducted and investigations of individual members should be initiated only on a most selective basis. Individuals investigated should be those who are key personnel who actually formulate and carry out the organization's policy and not those individuals who merely attend meetings on a regular basis. If there is any question as to whether such an investigation should be initiated, the facts should be presented to the Bureau for its consideration.]

Immediately advise the Bureau when investigation of a prominent person is contemplated; and if there is any question as to whether there is sufficient probable cause to fully justify investigation, no investigation should be conducted without Bureau approval.

[The Bureau should be advised by letter of the information obtained, together with a statement as to whether the individual warrants inclusion on the potential bombing suspects list of your office. If investigation indicates that the individual should not be included, the case may then be closed administratively. If the subject is included on the list, the matter should be handled in accordance with instructions set forth in section 23, volume II, of this manual concerning bombing matters.]

h. Names of members in attendance at meetings should not be set out in investigative reports but should be indexed from informant's [statements.] Names of new members should be furnished the Bureau by letter for indexing purposes.

4. Informants and interviews

a. In order that the Bureau may discharge its responsibilities, it is mandatory that information be obtained regarding all pertinent Klan or hate organization activities. In this regard it is necessary that informants be developed in all such organizations which meet the criteria set forth in 3a above. Efforts in this regard must be discreet.

b. Preliminary interviews with rank-and-file members of an organization and other individuals not connected with such organizations conducted solely for the purpose of determining the attitude of the individual may be authorized by the SAC. To obtain authority from the SAC, credit, arrest, informant, and indices checks should be made and a memorandum prepared for the SAC setting forth this information so that he may make a decision regarding the propriety of the interview. Officials of local groups or national officers are not to be interviewed without prior Bureau authority. Likewise where a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, and the like, specific Bureau authority must be obtained. Two Agents should be present when an organization official is interviewed and, if possible, two Agents should be present at interviews with organization members. During such an interview, no attempt should be made to develop the individual as an informant; but if he is cooperative and has a potential for development as an informant, complete background information should be obtained and specific Bureau authority requested to develop him as an informant.

c. Bureau authority not necessary prior to interview with organization members in criminal- or applicant-type cases; however, interview should be confined to subject matter of inquiry, unless data concerning organization volunteered by interviewee.

[d. Original and one copy of semiannual letter captioned "Klan Organizations, Hate Organizations and Racial Informants, Racial Matters, Bombing Matters," to be submitted according to schedule set out below. Where there is no pertinent activity or information, a negative statement should be made.

January 1 and July 1	January 15 and July 15
Albany	Birmingham
Albuquerque	Boston
Atlanta	Butte
Baltimore	Chicago
February 1 and August 1	**February 15 and August 15**
Buffalo	Cincinnati
Charlotte	Detroit
Dallas	El Paso
Denver	Kansas City
March 1 and September 1	**March 15 and September 15**
Cleveland	Houston
Indianapolis	Louisville
Jacksonville	Milwaukee
Los Angeles	New Orleans

April 1 and October 1	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	Omaha
Newark	Phoenix
New Haven	New York
Oklahoma City	Knowville
St. Louis	

May 1 and November 1	May 15 and November 15
Miami	Little Rock
Norfolk	Pittsburgh
Philadelphia	Salt Lake City
Portland	San Diego
San Antonio	

June 1 and December 1	June 15 and December 15
Mobile	Seattle
Richmond	Savannah
Springfield	Minneapolis
San Francisco	Washington Field

e. The semiannual letter should not be disseminated outside the Bureau, should be given proper security in field office, and should contain following information. Where there is no pertinent activity or information, a negative statement should be made.

(1) Klan Organizations, Hate Organizations, and Informant coverage
   (a) Names of Klan and hate organizations active in your territory
   (b) Coverage of each Klan broken down by Klaverns and each hate organization broken down into local chapters showing identities of informants and sources reporting on each
   (c) Estimated membership by Klavern or chapter and basis for estimate

(2) Racial informants by geographic location
List the following under headquarters city and each resident agency within your division:
   (a) Symbol numbers of all racial informants with indications as to which are reqularly paid
   (b) List of names or symbol numbers of all approved potential racial informants indicating those regularly paid
   (c) List of name or symbol number of each confidential source indicating those which are reqularly paid

(3) Individuals under pending investigation
List of individuals being investigated under provisions of section 23, volume II and section 122, volume IV, of this Manual, other than potential bombing suspects.

(4) Potential Bombing Suspects
List of potential bombing suspects of your office including description, basis of selection, and other areas in which individual should be considered as suspect.

[B. GENERAL RACIAL MATTERS
[1. Jurisdiction
[The Bureau does not have investigative jurisdiction over such general
[racial matters, as race riots, civil demonstrations, and similar
[developments except in instances in which the action is a violation of
[statute over which the Bureau has jurisdiction or some subversive
[influence is at work. Insofar as Federal jurisdiction in general racial
[matters is concerned, U. S. Army regulations place responsibility upon
[the Army to keep advised of any developments of a civil disturbance
[nature which may require the rendering of assistance to civil authorities
[or the intervention of Federal troops. OSI and ONI have collateral
[responsibility under Army in such matters and copies of pertinent
[documents disseminated to Army concerning such matter should be furnished
[to OSI and ONI.
[2. Policy
[a. As an intelligence function the Bureau does have the responsibility
[of advising appropriate Government agencies and officials on both
[a national and local level of all pertinent information obtained
[concerning such incidents. In this connection it is the personal
[responsibility of each SAC to make the necessary arrangements to

insure that all developments of this type occurring within his territory are promptly reported to his office and upon receipt thereof furnished to the Bureau by whatever form of communication is warranted under the circumstances.

b. Since the Bureau does not have investigative jurisdiction in general racial matters, no open investigation is to be conducted concerning general racial matters as such.

c. In instances in which civil rights may be involved or in which a racial incident may involve an act which constitutes a criminal violation over which the Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation. Likewise, if the incident involves a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

d. In instances in which some subversive influence is determined to be at work, be guided by instructions pertaining to investigation of the specific subversive influence involved.

e. CAUTION. By their very nature racial matters are extremely delicate and great care must be exercised in the approach to such matters.

3. Procedures

a. Information dealing with general racial matters, such as proposed or actual activities of individuals, officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc., in the racial field, must be furnished to the Bureau expeditiously by whatever means of communication is warranted by the specific nature of the information and the circumstances involved.

b. Pertinent information bearing on general racial matters which would not otherwise be available to interested Government agencies, such as that obtained through sources and informants, and which is of such a nature that it would normally be furnished to the Bureau by letter or airtel must be transmitted to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. In general, pertinent information bearing on general racial matters appearing in newspapers or publications need not be furnished to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. In such instances merely submit copies of pertinent newspaper articles and publications to the Bureau. Of course, if such data is clearly of a nature as to require contacts with appropriate sources, such as information of unusual local or national importance, submit same expeditiously in form suitable for dissemination. Concisely summarize the pertinent article and include therein the results of contacts with appropriate sources.

c. Maintain contact with pertinent informants and sources and keep Bureau and local intelligence agencies advised of any additional pertinent developments. Unless circumstances clearly indicate necessity for more expeditious handling, furnish such additional data to the Bureau promptly in form suitable for dissemination.

d. In many instances situations involving members of the Negro and Caucasian races result in violations of criminal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. While such matters are to be handled in accordance with instructions pertaining to the substantive violation involved, the Bureau has the additional responsibility of disseminating pertinent information concerning any racial aspects of such situations to appropriate Government officials and agencies that do not ordinarily receive reports in criminal matters. Therefore, the submission of a report concerning the criminal violation involved alone is insufficient. In general, pertinent data concerning the racial situation involved must be submitted immediately to Bureau in form suitable for dissemination in order that it may reach interested agencies as soon as possible.

[e. Where information is received in connection with racial matters indicating that individuals or organizations have resorted to or contemplate resorting to violence, you must

(1) Immediately advise the Bureau of full facts by expeditious means depending upon urgency of circumstances

(2) Immediately advise appropriate law enforcement agency having jurisdiction in the matter unless it is already cognizant. If a compelling reason exists for not so advising the pertinent law enforcement agency, such as the possibility of exposing the informant furnishing the information, immediately furnish the Bureau with full facts. Include therein recommendations as to what other trustworthy local or state law enforcement agencies or officials may be used as intermediaries through whom the information in question may be furnished to the law enforcement agency actually having jurisdiction in such a manner as to fully protect the specific informant and the Bureau as the source thereof.

(3) Immediately advise the local office of military intelligence

(4) Contact all appropriate informants and sources to determine if they possess any additional pertinent data concerning the matter and instruct them to be alert for and to promptly furnish to you any such pertinent data obtained.

(5) Prepare and submit pertinent data to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. Include in the communication the results of contacts with appropriate sources and informants; the time and date that local agencies were advised; and the identities of the individuals so advised. (Where information is furnished to an intermediary official or law enforcement agency and not to the agency actually having jurisdiction, set forth in the cover page the reasons for such procedure.) Submit communication same day original information received except where original information is received after normal working hours, when communication is to be submitted beginning of next workday.

(6) Maintain contact with pertinent informants and sources and keep Bureau, pertinent local law enforcement agency, and local intelligence agencies advised of any additional pertinent developments as they occur. Unless circumstances clearly indicate necessity for more expeditious handling, furnish such additional data to Bureau and intelligence agencies in form suitable for dissemination.

[C. CLASSIFICATION - 157

[D. CHARACTER - RACIAL MATTERS. If it relates to general racial matters, "Racial Matters" followed by name of community and/or state to which information relates.]

2 - Mr. [redacted] A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

The Attorney General

October 10, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDE16

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

10/13/00 SP-2ALM/JB

Reference is made to SSC request dated October 2, 1975. Attached is the original of a memorandum, with enclosures, responding to request Number 1 in referenced communication.

A copy of the memorandum is also being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (5)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
        Special Counsel for
        Intelligence Coordination

EWL:lhb lhb
(9)

REC-30 62-116395-966

3 - ENCLOSURE ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 NOV 7 1975

GPO 954-546

1

2 - Mr. J[illegible]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

62-116395

October 10, 1975

#MDR16
SP.2ALM/JF16
10/13/00

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to letter from Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC Staff to Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, dated October 2, 1975, which attached request for FBI and Department of Justice materials.

Request Number 1 related to all material pertaining to a meeting among Mr. D. E. Moore, Mr. A. H. Belmont and Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach on or about February 27, 1965, regarding FBI mail intercept operations. The following documents are enclosed responsive to this request:

1. Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Tolson, subject "The Long Committee," dated February 27, 1965.

2. Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, et al., from Mr. Hoover, dated March 1, 1965.

3. Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, et al., from Mr. Hoover, dated March 2, 1965.

Request Number 2 in attachment to referenced letter is receiving expeditious attention and will be responded to as soon as possible.

Enclosures (3)

1 - The Attorney General

EWL:lhb lhb
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

62-116395-966

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-545

WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECT[illegible]
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF CO[illegible]SEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United State[illegible] Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 2, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached are requests for FBI and Department of Justice materials. Please consider these to be priority requests.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc Paul V. Daly

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/ERS
#MDE16

1st to AG 1-DAC
EWL:lhb 10/10/75 Enc. 5

1-Ad ~~Hoc~~
10-2-75

62-116395-966

ENCLOSURE

Additional Requests Regarding FBI Mail Intercepts

1. All material pertaining to a meeting between Mr. D. E. Moore, Mr. A. H. Belmont, and Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach on or about February 27, 1965 regarding FBI mail intercept operations.

2. All material pertaining to an FBI mail opening project in regard to a suspected Soviet or Soviet-bloc illegal agent who resided in Riverside, California and occurred for approximately four to eight weeks in autumn of 1961 or 1962. Mail was allegedly opened in the FBI resident office in Riverside.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Callahan
Felt
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 2/27/65

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: THE LONG COMMITTEE

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE BY~~

The Attorney General called on the morning of February 27, 1965, to advise he wanted to consult with the Bureau on certain problems raised by the Long Committee, which is exploring the use of mail covers, et cetera. He noted there was a possible problem concerning Chief Inspector Montague's testimony and whether it was necessary for Montague to change his testimony. Also, he felt that Internal Revenue Service had been using investigative techniques which they should not use and this could pose a problem. He said that the President had asked him to coordinate with all executive agencies concerning the problems raised by the Long Committee.

Inspector Moore and I met with the Attorney General in his office this afternoon. Mr. Courtney Evans was present. I told the Attorney General that in Montague's testimony he was told by Attorney Fensterwald that if any of the questions had national security implications Montague should not answer them. Consequently, Montague was estopped from doing other than answer in the negative when asked questions touching on national security. With this interpretation, it was questionable whether an attempt should be made to change or explain Montague's testimony, particularly in view of the obvious lack of judgment on the part of Fensterwald and the desire of Long for publicity. I made it clear to the Attorney General that from our dealings with Montague, he was a man of integrity and sacrificed his personal desires for the welfare of the country and had cooperate fully with us. The Attorney General said he had no intention of changing one word of Montague's testimony, but he was considering advising Long and Fensterwald that there were extreme delicate national security matters touching on the areas being covered by the committee and there could be exceptions to the answers given in the testimony when they touched on such sensitive security matters. He said further that he contemplates seeing Senator Long and impressing on him that the committee would not want to stumble by mistake into an area of extreme interest to the national security as they nearly did in a matter

REC- 56

1 - Mr. Tolson
2 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Moore

CONTINUED - OVER

25 MAR 12 1965

EX-114

4091

5 MAR 16 1965

MAR 15 1965

AHB:gjf

#mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/lrs
ON 11-14-00

affecting CIA. (Apparently CIA got wind of some inquiries by the committee relative to their secret operation and went to the committee and warned them off.) Katzenbach contemplates asking for a list of the witnesses who will appear before the committee together with a brief summary of the expected testimony. On the basis of this, he will be able to advise Senator Long when he should steer clear of a sensitive area.

I told Mr. Katzenbach that I certainly agree that this matter should be controlled at the committee level but that I felt pressure would have to be applied so that the personal interest of Senator Long became involved rather than on any ideological basis. Mr. Katzenbach said that he had already talked to Vice President Humphrey about Fensterwald, who he considered a wild man, and that Humphrey had promised to talk to Long concerning Fensterwald. Katzenbach said that in addition to the Vice President he might have to resort to pressure from the President himself, although he would prefer to work it out without resorting to the President. He indicated there was no one on the committee itself who could be helpful and that he did not expect any help from Senator Eastland.

Mr. Katzenbach said that he expected troublefrom the possible activities of IRS and the military in the investigative field; that if some of these matters are uncovered before the committee they will tend to undermine the restricted and tightly controlled operations of the Bureau. I told him that our operations are tightly controlled and particularly in the delicate areas of concern, we restrict ourselves to important security matters.

Mr. Katzenbach said he was going to see Senator Long on Monday and wanted to know if the Bureau would like someone to go along with him. I told him no.

ACTION:

Mr. Katzenbach said he would advise us of the results of his conversation with Long. He also asked that I advise the Director of our discussion and I told him I would.

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: The Long Committee

I called Mr. DeLoach and briefed him on this problem in order that he might contact Senator Eastland in an effort to warn the Long Committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense. (Of couse I made no mention of such a contact to the Attorney General.) Mr. DeLoach advised that Senator Eastland is in Mississippi and he will contact him upon his return Monday.

I dont see what all
the excitement is about.
I would have no hesitance
in discontinuing all te
ques – technical coverage
microphones, trash co
mail covers etc. While
might handicap us I d
they are as valuable as
believe & none warrant
being used to justify

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2ALM/KAG

4:07 PM

March 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

Senate Committee on Judiciary

B.C.

Edward V.

I called the Attorney General and told him I wanted to let him know that I had talked to Senator James Eastland today, in regard to the hearings before the Long Committee concerning mail covers, et cetera. I stated Senator Eastland is in Mississippi today but he is going to see Senator Long not later than Wednesday morning to caution him that this fellow Fensterwald must not go into the kind of questioning he made of Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department. The Attorney General stated he was going to see Senator Long himself and asked if I thought he ought to wait until after Senator Eastland talks to Senator Long. I stated the timing might be well if he did wait as Eastland assured me he will see Long not later than Wednesday and then if he, the Attorney General, could see Long sometime Wednesday, it would probably tie it down once and for all as there are no hearings until Wednesday anyway. The Attorney General stated he thought they were having a hearing tomorrow, but he would check. I stated if there is a hearing tomorrow, then I would be inclined for the Attorney General to see Senator Long now and if it is not before Wednesday, then I think he should let Senator Eastland see what he can do. I stated Senator Eastland thoroughly understands the matter and said he does not intend to have that gone into and that obviously Fensterwald is getting in over his head and that has to be stopped. BERNHARD

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-44
62-99323-

MAR 8 1965

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JEH:edm (10)

245

MAR 10 1965 edm

SENT FROM D.O.
TIME 4 15 PM
DATE 3-1-65
BY

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1 XEROX
MAR 9 1965

9:40 AM March 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2-ALM/DG
#MDE16

Senate Committee on Judiciary

62-[illegible]
62-[illegible]
62-[illegible]

The Attorney General called and advised that he had talked to Senator Long last night. Senator Long's committee is looking into mail covers et cetera. The Attorney General stated he thought somebody had already spoken to Senator Long as he said he did not want to get into any national security area and was willing to take steps not to do this. The Attorney General stated that Mr. Fensterwald was present for part of the meeting and Fensterwald had said that he had some possible witnesses who are former Bureau Agents and if they were asked if mail was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General stated that before they are called, he would like to know who they are and whether they were ever involved in any program touching on national security and if not, it is their own business, but if they were, we would want to know. The Attorney General stated the Senator promised that he would have a chance to look at the names if he wanted to, personally and confidentially, and the list would have any names involving national security deleted and he would tell the Senator how many but no more.

The Attorney General stated that the Postmaster General is going down there this morning himself which he, the Attorney General, thought would be helpful to Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department.

The Attorney General stated that Senator Long also said he is not going to propose legislation to abolish mail covers as he thought they served a useful purpose but he did think that control should be tightened. I stated I thought there was great laxity in the matter of mail covers and the matter of tapping telephones.

I stated I have always been of the view and recommended back when Tom Clark was Attorney General that no agency of the Government should tap a telephone except with the written approval of the Attorney General. I stated

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen 4
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

XEROX JEH:edm (10)

REC-38 62-[illegible]-41

8 MAR 3 1965

MAR 3 1965

MAR 3-1965
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

there would then be in one place a list of all phone taps and the purpose and reason for them. I stated that it is a fact, insofar as I am concerned, that I am the only head of an agency who does not have authority to tap telephones. I stated that I know that subordinates down the line in some agencies will tap phones without the knowledge of the chief of the agency and there is grave suspicion in Washington by some newspapermen that their phones have been tapped by agencies of the Government trying to find out where they are getting their information. I stated I have always been opposed to the law whereby it is necessary to get the authority of a court to tap phones because of the composition of some of our courts and the employees thereof, but I have always felt that the President should issue an Executive Order confidentially to all agencies that all phone tapping be discontinued except when specifically approved by the Attorney General so there would be in one place a list and then if any committee in Congress got on the warpath, the Attorney General would have a list he could vouch for as being the only phones tapped by the Government. The Attorney General stated that made sense. I stated many agencies are opposed because they realize there would be a marked restriction. I stated we only have 45 phone taps, which is a low number for a country the size of ours and the area we have to cover. The Attorney General stated no one has any idea how many phone taps the whole Government has.

I stated there is also a school being conducted in California by a private organization which instructs the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service in the matter of phone tapping and they have sent their own personnel there to be trained. I stated Internal Revenue has also from time to time hired private outside phone tappers to do their tapping. I stated it is that type of thing if there were a real investigation which would come out. The Attorney General commented that he would not guarantee some of it won't come out. I stated I was amazed when I learned of the school in California as I saw a reference to it in the newspaper and wanted to know what it was and what officers attended. I stated we have our own instructors and do it ourselves.

I stated I thought the Attorney General had made good headway with Senator Long. The Attorney General stated he thought it would be helpful, but his

problem is that he thinks the Senator is fine but he does not think that Fensterwald is as straightforward, or to put it another way that Fensterwald is smart and devious and the Senator is straightforward and not very bright and that is the problem. I stated I thought that Fensterwald is trying to get publicity for the Senator. The Attorney General stated the Senator said he did not want to get into this and he would give him, the Attorney General, the names and a summary of the testimony and told Fensterwald to do so, but he, the Attorney General, can't say Fensterwald is going to do it; that he will on some but he did not know that he would on all. I stated I had no faith or confidence in Fensterwald and neither did Senator Eastland. The Attorney General stated that Senator Eastland may have already talked to Senator Long or else the Vice President, but somebody had waked him up. I stated Senator Eastland said he would do it Wednesday, but he may have called him.

The Attorney General stated that is where it stands now and we shall see what happens.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11 42 AM
DATE 3-2-65
BY

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re 10/2/75 request Item 1 concerning meeting among Moore, Belmont and Katzenbach on FBI mail intercept operations.

Originating Office: FBI 70

Delivered by: Richard J. [illegible] Date: 10/10/75

Received by: James V. Dick

Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

[illegible] INFORMATION CONTAINED [illegible]
10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-966

ENCLOSURE

6

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED 10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 10/2/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Intelligence collection

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JH

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Three communications pertaining to a meeting regarding FBI mail intercept operations.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WOC/8

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. [illegible]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 15, 1975

Director, FBI

#mDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/20/00 BY SP2ALM/JLG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the October 7, 1975, request of the SSC wherein certain enclosed documents relating to mail intercept programs were submitted for declassification.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which transmits the documents enclosed with referenced letter. These documents have been excised in accordance with an agreement between representatives of the FBI and Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC. These documents, in their excised form, are declassified and are available to the SSC for whatever use the Committee deems appropriate.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum effecting the transmittal of the documents to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

ST-111

62-116395 3-ENCLOSURE

REC-30

62-116395-967

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

15 NOV 4 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

WOC:lhb|hb
(8)

NOTE:

The documents enclosed with referenced letter concern the Hunter Project; Z Coverage; CHIPROP Survey; SAM Survey; GUS Survey; CHICAN Survey; JOE Survey and the CHICLET Survey. These documents have been reviewed by personnel of the Intelligence

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

84 NOV 5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395 — October 15, 1975

#MDR16

AL 10/13/00 SP2ALM/TG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Domestic Intelligence Task Force Director, SSC, to the Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, dated October 7, 1975, wherein certain documents relating to mail intercept programs were enclosed. Referenced letter requested these documents be appropriately excised for future use at public hearings of the SSC.

This letterhead memorandum transmits to the SSC copies of these documents appropriately excised and, where necessary, declassified. The documents are being transmitted to the SSC for whatever use the Committee deems appropriate.

1 - The Attorney General

WOC:lhb lhb
(7) ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-967

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

Division and have been appropriately excised for use by the Committee at public hearings to be scheduled starting 10/21/75. In excising these documents they have been accordingly declassified removing any and all information to sensitive sources, identities of target countries and Agent personnel.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 7, 1975

#MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The enclosed documents relating to mail intercept programs are submitted for declassification by the Department of Justice and the FBI. Portions of these documents which reveal sensitive sources or on-going operations should be appropriately excised for use at public hearings.

A list of these documents is also attached. Those documents which are followed by an asterisk on this list do not appear to be classified, but are nonetheless included because their contents are similar in nature to those documents which are classified.

These documents should be declassified by Tuesday, October 14, to allow sufficient preparation time for the mail hearings, which are now scheduled to begin on Tuesday, October 21.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Paul Daly

62-116395-967

ENCLOSURE

c: Paul Daly

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/20/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

HUNTER PROJECT

1. Belmont to Boardman - 1/22/58*

2. Belmont to Boardman - 2/6/58*

3. Angleton (CIA) to Director, FBI - 2/6/58

4. Branigan to Belmont - 4/21/58*

5. D.E. Moore to Belmont - 3~~4~~/10/61*

6. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 6/9/61*

7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/25/61, with attached blind
memo "Re: Project Hunter,"
dated 8/21/61*

8. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 11/2/62, with attached blind
memo "Re: Project Hunter,"
dated 10/30/62*

9. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 3/27/63*

10. Triplett to Branigan - 8/24/66*

11. Papich to D.J. Brennan - 1/16/69*

12. Routing slip to Angleton (CIA) from J. Edgar Hoover, dated
3/10/72, with attached blind
memo "Re: Project Hunter,"
dated 3/10/72

13. Branigan to E.S. Miller - 2/15/73*

Z-COVERAGE

1. Turner to Hennrich - 6/25/51

CHIPROP SURVEY

1. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 9/4/56

2. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 3/11/60

3. Donahoe to W.C. Sullivan - 9/15/61

4. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 9/14/62

5. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 9/20/62

Chiprop Survey, cont'd

6. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 6/28/63
7. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 5/25/65
8. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 1/18/66

SAM SURVEY

1. Director, FBI to SAC, New York - 7/11/60
2. Branigan to Belmont - 2/28/61
3. Branigan to Belmont - 5/25/61
4. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/4/61
5. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 8/29/61
6. Branigan to Sullivan - 8/31/61
7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/11/62
8. Director, FBI to SAC, Los Angeles - 1/21/63
9. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/8/64
10. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/15/66
11. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 3/31/70

GUS SURVEY

1. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 9/20/61
2. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 10/2/61
3. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 10/18/61
4. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 12/13/61
5. Director, FBI to SAC, New York - 12/26/61
6. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 1/31/62
7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/3/62

CHICAN SURVEY

1. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 1/19/61
2. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 2/3/61
3. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 2/28/61
4. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 11/27/61

JOE SURVEY

1. Director, FBI to SAC, Miami - 12/21/62*
2. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 2/5/64*
3. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 6/25/65*
4. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 7/22/66*

CHICLET SURVEY

1. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 11/20/63
2. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 4/29/64
3. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 5/22/64
4. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 5/25/64
5. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 5/19/66*

BALTCH CASE

1. D.E. Moore to W.C. Sullivan - 10/2/64

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/15/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
10/7/75 request

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: T.W. Cregar Date: 10·15·75

Received by: Michael Murphy

Title: Asst Security Dir.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

10-13-00 SP2 ALM/HG

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 10/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16
10-13-00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Documents furnished relating to mail intercept program. These documents, previously reviewed at FBIHQ, and now are delivered properly excised for public hearings.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Per "Abstracts" in Records, this memo dated 11/4/75. 7/19/76

TO: Mr. ~~Cregar~~ Ewl

RE: SENSTUDY '75

Re formal request dated 8/4/75 from Senate Select Committee Item ~~III.(1)~~ V, "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".

This is newly requested material.

Arrangements have been made with the property management office to have a copy of this handbook delivered to Mr. Cregar Room 4171 JEH.

It can be shown to a representative of the SS Committee and a Laboratory representative will be made available to assist in the review.

If this manual is requested and given to SSC, a memorandum to the Administrative Division is required to remove it from Mr. Cregar's inventory of personal property.

WEH

W. E. Harward
Radio Engineering Section
Laboratory Division

Returned to Adm. Div. & removed from Cregar's pers. prop. invt. 7/19/76

REC-30 62-116395-968

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2ALM/TG

84 NOV 5 1975

Retyped page(s) [redacted] of memo [redacted] to ______ dated ______ re: ______

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

October 15, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

EMDR16

10-13-00 SP-2 ALM/3/16

In accordance with an agreement reached during a meeting on July 30, 1975, among Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Deputy Assistant Director H. E. Helgeson, Section Chiefs R. L. Shackelford and J. G. Deegan, all of this Bureau, and SSC Staff members Mark H. Gitenstein, Mary DeOreo, and John T. Elliff, the FBI was to furnish to the SSC Staff members examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

In addition, the SSC inquired as to the number of persons included in the Extremist Photograph Album (EPA) as of July 30, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum disclosing that the pertinent documents are available to SSC Staff members for access regarding the preliminary inquiries, investigation of an infiltrated organization and the EPA. A copy is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (~~2~~ 3) ENCLOSURE
62-116395

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RDS:adn
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

REC-30

62-116395-969

ST-111

ENCLOSURE

15 NOV 4 1975

84 NOV 5 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE:

Copies of unexcised and excised documents (where necessary) that are available for access to SSC members are being maintained by the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Memorandum from J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, 8/18/75, "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)" (attached) recommended, and the Director approved, the granting of SSC Staff access to this material.

5/10

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

62-116395

October 15, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

As a result of a conference held on July 30, 1975, among Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Deputy Assistant Director H. E. Helgeson, Section Chiefs R. L. Shackelford and J. G. Deegan, all of this Bureau, and SSC Staff members Mark H. Gitenstein, Mary DeOreo, and John T. Elliff, it was agreed to furnish to SSC Staff members access to examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

In addition, the SSC inquired as to the number of persons included in the Extremist Photograph Album.

Purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the pertinent documents responsive to the agreement are available for access to the appropriately cleared members of the SSC Staff in Room 4171 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

1 - The Attorney General
RDS:adn/klm
(8)

MDR16

10-13-00 SP-2 ALM/JHB

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

WOC
Enf

JBA
PW

62-116395-969

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 15

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/8/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC). (7/30/75 Oral Request SSC Extremist Photo Album.)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 10-18-75

Received by: James Dick

Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16
SP-2ALM/HG
10-13-00

[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

FOR REVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC 7/30/75 Oral Request

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16

[illegible]
10-13-00 SP-2ALM/LG/TG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

As the result of a conference held 7/30/75, documents pertaining to the Extremist Photograph Album, have been made available for review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FBIHQ, also examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WDC

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. Hotis)

The Attorney General

October 17, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar (Enclosures)

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 8, 1975, requesting all materials pertaining to the decisional process which preceded and resulted in the Bureau's request to the Central Intelligence Agency to place each of the following names on the Hunter Mail watch list: Derk Bodde, "National Guardian," Leonard Bernstein, National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and "Ramparts" Magazine.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff of the SSC in an effort to clarify a similar request. Elliff made recommendations for handling that request which are being followed at this time.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which constitute the Bureau's response to the current request.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (40)

62-116395

EX-106

62-116395-990

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

3 - ENCLOSURE

15 NOV 5 1975

JCF:rsm (9)

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 NOV 12 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar (Enclosures)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/MF/GG

62-116395

October 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 8, 1975, requesting all materials pertaining to the decisional process which preceded and resulted in the Bureau's request to the Central Intelligence Agency to place each of the following names on the Hunter Mail watch list:

1) "National Guardian"
2) Derk Bodde
3) Leonard Bernstein
4) National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
5) "Ramparts"

Knowledge of the Hunter Mail watch list was limited within the Bureau to Supervisors at FBI Headquarters. When a Supervisor desired to place a name on the watch list, he would prepare a 3 x 5 card which included:

a) the name and address of the individual or organization,
b) the duration of the request, and
c) the treatment to be given to any mail located.

No date was placed on the card, however, the cards were numbered consecutively. The request was then forwarded through liaison representatives to the Central Intelligence Agency. No other documents were prepared concerning the consideration, recommendation and proposal of these requests.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff of the SSC concerning a similar request. As a result, Elliff requested the following information concerning each of these requests:

JBA/PLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JCF:rsm

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

62-116395 - 971

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

a) a copy of the request and any other document in the Hunter Mail file in which the FBI mentions or shows results obtained from the specific request,

b) the approximate date of the request, and

c) the apparent basis for the request, or in the case of an investigation instituted after the effective date of the Hunter Mail project, the basis for the investigation.

The following summaries and enclosures constitute the Bureau's response to this request.

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

1) "National Guardian"

a) documents - The "National Guardian" was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 117 (Exhibit A-1). On April 20, 1962, a list of names to remain on the watch list was prepared and the "National Guardian" was included (Exhibit A-2). On October 25, 1966, a similar list was prepared (Exhibit A-3). The "National Guardian" was mentioned in a memorandum dated August 21, 1964, concerning data obtained from the Hunter Mail project during the past year (Exhibit A-4).

b) date - Request number 117 was made between August 18, 1961, and April 20, 1962. As indicated above, the "National Guardian" was included on a list of names to remain on the watch list on April 20, 1962. It was not on a similar list of names as of August 18, 1961.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file on the "National Guardian" is dated August 13, 1948, and reports the publication on August 1, 1948, of the "National Gazette Weekly," forerunner of the "National Guardian." During 1961 and 1962, the "National Guardian" sponsored tours of Eastern Europe, including Russia (Exhibits A-5 and 6).

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

2) Derk Bodde

a) documents - No Hunter Mail request was located for Bodde. He was, however, included in a list of names to remain on the watch list which was prepared on April 20, 1962 (Exhibit A-2).

b) date - Bodde was most likely placed on the watch list in 1960. As indicated above, Bodde was included on a list of names to remain on the watch list on April 20, 1962; however, there are no documents in the file dated in 1961 and 1962. He did travel to Russia during 1960.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file on Bodde is dated February 5, 1952. A review of the documents for the period after the Hunter program was instituted failed to locate any document recommending him for inclusion on the watch list. The investigation had been placed in a closed status until information was received that Bodde was scheduled to attend the International Orientalist Congress in Moscow during August, 1960 (Exhibits B-1 and 2).

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

3) Leonard Bernstein

a) documents - No Hunter Mail request was located for Bernstein. He was, however, included in a list of names to be removed from the watch list which was prepared on April 20, 1962 (Exhibit A-2).

b) date - Bernstein was most likely placed on the watch list in 1959, since he went to Russia during that year. On April 20, 1962, he was included on a list of names to be removed from the watch list.

c) basis - Since no Hunter Mail request was located, there is no background information available concerning the Leonard Bernstein who was placed on the watch list. A review of Bureau files for individuals named Leonard Bernstein does indicate, however, that the only Leonard Bernstein who travelled to Russia or had any Soviet contacts was Leonard Bernstein, born August 25, 1918 (the prominent conductor and composer). The first item in the Bureau file concerning Bernstein is dated March 2, 1949. A review of documents in this file from the beginning of the Hunter program in 1958 until April 20, 1962, the date on which his name was removed from the watch list, failed to locate a request that he be included in the Hunter program. However, information concerning him, compiled in response to a request from another government agency in December, 1958, did indicate that Bernstein planned to visit Russia during March, 1959 (Exhibits C-1 and 2).

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

4) National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC)

a) documents - The NMC was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 193 (Exhibit D-1). The NMC was mentioned in a memorandum dated August 28, 1969, concerning data obtained from the Hunter Mail project during the past year (Exhibit D-2).

b) date - This request was most likely made between January 16, 1969, and August 28, 1969. No investigation was conducted concerning the NMC until September, 1966 (Exhibit D-3). The request, however, was probably not made until after January 15, 1969, the date that a CIA representative suggested the Bureau use the Hunter project for development of leads in the New Left field (Exhibit D-4). Request number 233 was mentioned in a memorandum concerning results from the Hunter Mail program which was dated August 28, 1969.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file concerning the NMC is a communication dated September 14, 1966, which indicates that a group known as the November 8th Ad Hoc Committee had been formed at Cleveland, Ohio. By communication dated September 20, 1966, FBI Headquarters instructed the New York and Cleveland Division to keep abreast of the plans of this Committee to sponsor demonstrations during November,1966 (Exhibit D-3). By communication dated July 28, 1967, FBI Headquarters instructed the New York Division to prepare a report concerning the same organization which had become known as the NMC (Exhibit D-5). The name NMC was used until approximately August, 1969, when an allegedly new organization known as the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam was formed.

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

5) "Ramparts"

a) documents - "Ramparts" was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 105 (Exhibit E-1).

b) date - This request was also most likely made between January 16, 1969, and August 28, 1969.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file concerning "Ramparts" is dated October 22, 1964; however, no active investigation was authorized at that time. Investigation was authorized in May, 1967, based on a request received from the Department of Justice (Exhibits E-2 and 3). No request to include "Ramparts" on the Hunter Mail watch list was located; however, a document dated October 17, 1968, does indicate that "Ramparts" furnished a list of names, probably their mailing list, to the Soviets (Exhibit E-4).

Enclosures (19)

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENSTE SELECT COMMITTEE.
10/8/75 Requestx

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller Date: 10/20/75

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

62-116395-970

ENCLOSURE

8

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 10/8/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

S

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Intelligence collection
Information handling

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Material furnished regarding placing of individuals and/or organizations on the Hunter Mail watch list: a copy of the request and any document which mentions or shows results obtained from the specific request, the approximate date of the request and apparent basis for the request.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIAL LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW 5-WOC/[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

b

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2ALM/tal 16

5-88 (2-28-58)

1. Name "NATIONAL GUARDIAN"
WEEKLY GUARDIAN ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address 197 East Fourth Street and
133 West 72nd Street
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
New York, New York, USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☒ Watch List Duration Until canceled.

HUNTER Request No. 117

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395-970

A-1

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - D. E. Moore
1 - Branigan
1 - Litrento
1 - Papich
1 - Stewart

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : D. E. Moore

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DATE: 4/20/62

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/

MDR16

In order to insure that Project Hunter will continue to operate under maximum economy and efficiency, we have advised CIA at a recent conference we would review Bureau Informant 200 material received and advise CIA whether or not we desired to continue to receive material on persons whose names appear on the attached list.

The interested Supervisor should, accordingly, indicate by writing "yes" or "no" to the right of his subject's name whether or not he desires Bureau Informant 200 to discontinue furnishing data on each of his respective subjects.

The attached lists were compiled from a review of the Project Hunter card box indices maintained by Supervisor W. D. Stewart as an administrative aid for routing purposes. The names of subjects on whom we have received no material for the past year do not appear on the attached lists. They have been weeded out separately along with other subjects who have been relatively inactive.

The results of this survey will be forwarded via Liaison to CIA for appropriate action.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memo and its attachment be routed to the interested Supervisor for a determination as to the continuation of receiving Bureau Informant 200 material on his respective subject.

That the results of this survey be forwarded via Liaison to CIA for appropriate action.

105-93089

Enclosure

WDS:blv
(6)

[illegible] was forwarded on 4/30/62 to CIA via Liaison. WRL 4/30/62. CIA was advised this review was conducted in accordance with our discussion at most recent conference so that we may each continue to operate under maximum economy.

ENCLOSURE

As a result of our survey, we will discontinue on 97 of the 200 persons on

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

REC- 13

50

17 MAY 2 1962

A-25

SUBJECT	DISCONTINUE		SUPERVISOR
	YES	NO	
NATIONAL GUARDIAN		✓	R.J.RAMPTON
BODDE, DERK		No	J.V.BAKER
BERNSTEIN, LEONARD	✓		W.P.JONES

(Names of other individuals and organizations)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - M. E. Triplett

Tolson	
DeLoach	
Mohr	
Wick	
Casper	
Callahan	
Conrad	
Felt	
Gale	
Rosen	
Sullivan	
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Holmes	
Gandy	

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: October 25, 1966

FROM : M. E. Triplett

Project Hunter

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

The attached list of numbered and unnumbered Hunter Stops was received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the request to advise whether we still desired that the subjects be retained on the Watch List. A check of Bureau records revealed that some of these names had already been canceled. Names on this list were referred to the Special Agent Supervisor interested in the matter and numbers were assigned to unnumbered stops we desire to retain on the Watch List.

On October 21, 1966, a complete list of stops was referred to the Liaison Section for delivery to Mr. Worth of CIA. A copy of this list is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached lists be filed in order that they will be available for future reference.

Enclosures - 2
105-93089
MET:met
(2)

REC- 58

105-9[illegible]57-79

OCT 26 1966

EX-108

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

A-3

~~SECRET~~ October 21, 1966

HUNTER STOPS - NUMBERED

117. National Guardian; Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.

Bureau Listings Numbered

Received from Jerry Worth. C.I.A

22 NAT'L GUARDIAN NYC (-)

(Names of other individuals and organizations)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - Branigan
1 - A.P. Litrento

TO : W.A. Branigan

DATE: August 21, 1964

1 - S. Papich
1 - Triplett

FROM : M.E. Triplett

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

REC- 40

105-93089-70

A detailed analysis of data received from Bureau Informant 200 during the past year is attached.

ACTION:

11 SEP 2 1964

None. This is for your information.

ENCLOSURE

105-93089

File in 105-93089

SOVIET SECTION

A-4

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Data of Special Interest:

Typical Data Furnished by Bureau Informant 200 During Past Year:

offer of Andrew Jacob Steiger, American correspondent in U.S.S.R., to work for Security Index subject Russell Arthur Nixon of the "National Guardian";

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

#-MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JG

100-357044

New York, New York
July 24, 1961

Re: "National Guardian,"
Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.;
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

Reference is made to memorandum at New York, entitled as above, dated May 22, 1961.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished on July 17, 1961, a revised schedule of the "National Guardian" European tour, July 28 - August 20, 1961.

The schedule of this tour is as follows:

FROM	TO	Via CARRIER	FLIGHT NO.	DATE
Idlewild	Copenhagen	Scandinavian Airlines (SAS)	912	7/28
Copenhagen	Stockholm	SAS	508	7/31
Stockholm	Helsinki	SAS	728	7/31
Helsinki	Moscow	Aeroflot	108	7/31
Moscow	Kiev	Aeroflot	open	
Kiev	Prague	Aeroflot	211	8/17
Prague	Copenhagen	Malev (Hungarian Airlines)	380	8/20
Copenhagen	Idlewild	SAS	919	8/20

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

This document contains neither
recomme[illegible] conclusions
of the [illegible] property
of the [illegible] to your
[illegible] are
not [illegible] outside
[illegible].

A-5

Re: "National Guardian,"
Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.;
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of January 2, 1957, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., contains the following concerning the "National Guardian":

"National Guardian

"1. 'Established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a "progressive" weekly. *** Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia.'
(Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 'Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell,' August 25, 1956, p. 12)"

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

New York, New York
April 6, 1962

Bufile 100-357044

Re: "National Guardian";
Weekly Guardian Associates, Incorporated
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

The April 9, 1962 issue of the "National Guardian," page 6, contained an announcement of the Guardian's "1962 Tour of Eastern Europe". This tour, of 23 days duration, is to leave New York Friday, August 3, 1962, and is to return on Sunday, August 26, 1962. The tour will visit Bucharest, Budapest, Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad. The announcement states that the tour will also visit Poland or Czechoslovakia. The price of the tour will be $1295.00, and those interested are instructed to forward a $100.00 deposit to "Guardian Tours", 197 East 4th Street, New York 9, New York.

A characterization of the "National Guardian" is attached.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

10

A-6

100-357044-467

APPENDIX

Re: "National Guardian";
Weekly Guardian Associates, Incorporated
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

Dec 1, 1961

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., contains the following concerning the "National Guardian":

> "National Guardian
>
> "1. 'established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a "progressive" weekly. * * * Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia.' (Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 'Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell,' August 25, 1956, p. 12)"

100-357044-469

1 - Mr. Glascock
1 - Mr. Schultz

SAC, Philadelphia (100-21984) May 10, 1960

Director, FBI (100-387911) PERSONAL ATTENTION

FoIPA 228590
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/15/83 BY SP/GSK/gt

DR. DERK BODDE
SECURITY MATTER - C

Information has been received from Bureau Informant 200, a most reliable and sensitive source, that the subject has been in direct contact with Dr. S. L. Tikhvinsky, Institute of Sinology, Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The subject is among 15 American orientalists who have been selected through the American Council of Learned Societies to attend the International Orientalist Congress in Moscow, Russia, during August. This group will not only attend the Congress, but also will spend an entire month in the Soviet Union studying what is being done there in the fields of the respective individuals. The members of this group will come as delegates either of the American Oriental Society or the Association for Asian Studies, and will do so under financial grants made through the American Council of Learned Societies.

(Information concerning other individuals)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the F. I.

MAILED 8
MAY 10 1960
COMM-FBI

Philadelphia and Boston should immediately take appropriate action as provided for in SAC Letter 59-58 (G) concerning Security Investigations - Individuals Traveling Abroad.

EX 104 100-387911-17

You are cautioned that the information obtained by Bureau Informant 200 is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau and should not be set forth in any investigative report. Information from this source should be utilized for lead purposes only. You must avoid any statement

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
[illegible]
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan

1 - Philadelphia (100-38026)
2 - Boston (100-19891)
(123-2092)

B-1

Letter to SAC, Philadelphia
RE: DR. DERK BODDE
100-387911

regarding the scope of coverage in effect in this instance, and under no circumstances are the subject or any unauthorized persons to become aware that we have knowledge of this information.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

None of the afore-mentioned individuals are on the Security Index, and none are currently subjects of Bureau investigations.

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Rushing

100-337911

Date: July 25, 1960

To: Office of Security
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: MR. [illegible]
SECURITY MATTER - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-00 BY SP2 ALM/TJG
#MDR16

Records of the Passport Office, Department of State, indicate that Mark [illegible] was issued Passport Number [illegible] on April 16, 1958, renewed April 8, 1960. In his application for renewal of the passport, [illegible] indicated that he planned to depart from the United States in late July, 1960. He indicated that he planned to visit England, Holland, France, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden. He further indicated that he is a delegate to the International Orientalist Congress to be held in Moscow, Russia, August [illegible]-16, 1960.

Reports containing the results of a security investigation of [illegible] have previously been forwarded to your office. Copies of these reports are being forwarded the Central Intelligence Agency under separate cover.

The Legal Attaches in London, Paris, and Bonn have been requested to arrange for the receipt of any information concerning the subject's activities that may come to the attention of the security services in the areas covered by these Legal Attaches. I would appreciate the receipt of any information that may come to your attention regarding [illegible]'s activities in the Soviet Union and in Czechoslovakia.

EX-105 REC-82 100-337911-60

19 JUL 26 1960

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans
1 - London (See note page 2)
1 - Paris (See note page 2)
1 - Bonn (See note page 2)
1 - Philadelphia (See note page 2)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)
TDR/baw
(11)

88 JUL 26
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

B-2

Office of Security
Department of State

NOTE LEGATS, LONDON, PARIS, AND BONN, AND SAC, PHILADELPHIA:

Subject's name is not included in the Security Index. He is employed as a professor of Chinese studies at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and resides at 29 West Phil-Ellena Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Bodde was born 3-9-09 in Marshfield, Massachusetts.

Bodde has, in the past, been identified with numerous Communist Party front organizations. He is an outspoken advocate for recognition of the Chinese communist regime.

You should alert your sources for receipt of any information that may come to their attention regarding Bodde's activities while travelling abroad. The above information may be furnished your sources.

Philadelphia should arrange to be advised of the subject's return and thereafter promptly notify the Bureau in order that the stops may be cancelled.

R/S shows
Legat London
9/9/60 - info
furn. MI-5 by
Legat 8-10-60

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAILED
DEC 2 1958
NAME CHECK

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-3 BTJ/15
ON 11-2-99 APP#94-2233
PER DRC dtd 8-27-99

December 23, 1958

LEONARD BERNSTEIN
Born: August 25, 1918
Lawrence, Massachusetts

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

You are referred to information previously furnished to your agency on January 28 and November 10, 1955, concerning Leonard Bernstein. For your additional information, there is enclosed a copy of a memorandum dated May 27, 1958, concerning the captioned individual. (100-360261-41,49,55)

In August, 1958, a confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that Leonard Bernstein had been in contact with Tamara Yurevna Mamedova. The August, 1958, "Diplomatic List" reflects Tamara Y. Mamedova to be a second secretary at the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (USSR). In June, 1958, a confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that Tamara Mamedova was employed in the Cultural Division of the Soviet Embassy. As part of her duties the informant stated that Mamedova handled inquiries from the public concerning the Cultural Exchange Program between the USSR and the United States and assisted in arrangements for appearances of groups from both countries under the auspices of that program.

In his contact with Mamedova, the confidential informant stated that Leonard Bernstein indicated that he would accept an invitation to visit the USSR and stated that he would be able to go during the first two weeks of March, 1959. He expressed a desire to conduct some orchestras while in the USSR. (105-53022-328)

K

The foregoing information is furnished to you as a result of your request for an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or a nonclearance of the individual involved. This information is loaned for your use and is not to be disseminated outside of your agency.

15-56

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____

Enclosure.
Orig and one to USIA
Req rec'd: 12/8/58
B. V. Gronquist/ckb
(4)

EX. - 12A REC- 66

DEC 24 1958

NOTE: Memo classified "Confidential" inasmuch as enclosed report is so classified.

C-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

NY 100-99895

New York, New York
May 27, 1958

ECLASSIFIED BY 9803RDD/LMB
ON 5/20/93

Re: Leonard Bernstein, with aliases

On June 30, 1950, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that in 1945 when the committee to aid Ben Davis was being considered, both Ben Davis and Jack Stachel described Leonard Bernstein to the source as an adherent of the Communist Party. This source stated that other Communist Party functionaries had also described Leonard Bernstein as a Communist. The source advised that in 1945 Jack Stachel informed him that Bernstein had agreed to submit to Communist discipline. This source advised on December 9, 1954 that he has no direct personal knowledge of Bernstein's willingness to submit to Communist discipline.

Ben Davis and Jack Stachel were members of the National Board of the Communist Party who were tried and convicted in 1949 for violation of the Smith Act of 1940.

Leonard Bernstein, by notarized affidavit dated August 3, 1953, submitted in connection with his application for passport, stated "...although I have never, to my knowledge, been accused of being a member of the Communist Party, I wish to take advantage of this opportunity to affirm under oath that I am not now or at any time ever been a member of the Communist Party or the Communist Political Association. I have never knowingly engaged in activities which supported the Communist movement under circumstances which would warrant the conclusion that I engaged in such activities as a result of direction, domination or control exercised over me by the Communist movement..."

In February, 1958, a source of unknown reliability, but who is acquainted with the subject, advised that he believed Leonard Bernstein to be a Communist. This source based this belief on the way Bernstein talks, that is, that he has continually made anti-American and pro-Russian statements. Source was unable to furnish any specific details pertaining thereto.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

AGENCY 100-71914
REQ. REC'D 12-1-[illegible]
REP'T. FORW. 12-[illegible]-56
BY [illegible]

CRB (c-6)
AGENCY State (c-114)
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. 6-3-58
HOW FORW. [illegible]
BY [illegible]

14

COPIES DESTROYED
391 FEB 20 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-36026-55

C-2

CONFIDENTIAL

All organizations mentioned hereafter have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450, unless otherwise described.

The House Committee on Un-American Activities review of the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace held March 25,26,27,1949, which conference was arranged by the National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions, reflected Leonard Bernstein was affiliated with the following organizations:

American Council for a Democratic Greece
American Youth for Democracy
Committee For a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
Civil Rights Congress
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
National Negro Congress

The National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions was cited in the aforementioned review as a Communist front.

Records of the Bureau of Special Services, New York City Police Department, reflect that Bernstein was a member of the Council on African Affairs, Incorporated, as of February 3, 1948.

The "New York Times", issue of March 3, 1945, contained an advertisment by the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade entitled "For America's Sake-Break With Franco Spain" wherein Bernstein was listed as a sponsor.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised during 1946 that Leonard Bernstein was identified on a letterhead of the American Committee for Spanish Freedom dated January 21, 1946, as being one of the sponsors of this organization.

The "Daily Worker" issue of May 16, 1946, page four column three, lists Leonard Bernstein as a conductor and composer and one of the endorsers of the Three Day Tag Drive of the American Committee for Yugoslav Relief.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address Any office in the U.S. - National
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
headquarters are in New York, New York.
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☑ Watch List Until canceled
Duration

HUNTER Request No. 193

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

16
D-1

3

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Miss Triplett

Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TO : W. A. Branigan

FROM : W. E. Triplett MET

DATE: August 28, 1969

File in: 105-93089

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

A more detailed analysis of material received is attached.

ACTION: None. This is furnished for your information.

Enclosure
MET:met

D-2

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Items are received on repatriates, deportees, defectors, U.S. citizens who went to USSR for permanent residence because of marriage or family and individuals born in U.S. who were taken there when children. Most of this material is of limited value but all individuals are included on CIA's "defector list." However, items are of value when they pertain to individuals known to have been espionage agents or to have subversive relatives in U.S. For example, items on Harry Eisman, deported from U.S. over 30 years ago, have contained little information of interest until recently. Friends asked Eisman to see the Glass family when they visited the USSR. When he entertained the family, the daughter was greatly influenced by his colorful description of his radical activities in New York schools. (Identifies confidential source)

Prudence Glass has been maintaining contact with Eisman since her return and recently informed him of her plans to marry Bob (evidently Robert Steven Greenblatt, key activist), leader and organizer of one of the largest marches sponsored by National Mobilization Committee to End War in Vietnam. She informed him of their plans to move to Georgia where she hoped to work "in the underground." We had no previous information indicating that she had any connection whatsoever with any organization or Greenblatt or of Greenblatt's plans to leave New York. Additional information has revealed that Eisman, who had reportedly fallen from graces of Soviets, appears to have regained their confidence, sees numerous U.S. travelers and communists and lectures at an unidentified special school on youth activities in U.S.,

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

#mdr16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/1216

SAC, New York

9/20/66

Director, FBI

NOVEMBER 8TH AD HOC COMMITTEE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

1 - Wells

ReCVairtel 9/14/66.

New York is designated office of origin in this matter. Through informants and sources, keep abreast of the plans of this Committee to sponsor demonstrations 11/5-8/66. Keep the Bureau advised of all developments.

1 - Cleveland

BAW:pdb (5)

NOTE:

Captioned group was formed at Cleveland, Ohio, during a conference of peace groups on 9/10-11/66. Its purpose is to organize demonstrations protesting the Vietnam war on 11/5-8/66. A. J. Muste, New York City, a prominent pacifist, is Chairman of the Committee. Cleveland airtel asks that New York be made origin due to this fact.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAILED 9
SEP 20 1966
COMM-FBI

REC 26

62-111111-2B

17

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room

39

EX-106

70 SEP 28 1966

NO SEP 21 1966

D-3

33

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTC

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

C. D. B.
G. C. M.
Griffith

On January 15, 1969, Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The Hunter project for which we have given the designation of Bureau Informant 200 essentially consists of specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia. If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the Soviet Union, it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.)

REC 102

105-[illegible] 90

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

18 FEB 5 1969

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - Liaison
1 - S. J. Papich

SJP:clb
(6)

Stops not warranted on black extremists at this time
1/31/69

DOWN
STAMP

D-4

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ~~ALM~~ #MDR16

SAC, New York (100-158914) 7/28/67

Director, FBI (62-111181) 1 - Mr. B.A. Wells

NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

You are to prepare a report concerning captioned group. Inasmuch as other Government agencies have shown an interest in its activities and due to the fact it is sponsoring a massive demonstration at Washington, D. C., on 10/21/67, furnish 11 copies of this report to the Bureau. Also furnish copies to Washington Field Office.

BAW:jes
(4)

NOTE:

Captioned group, formerly known as the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, includes members of the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party among its sponsors. It sponsored massive demonstrations against the war in Vietnam at New York City, and San Francisco, California, on 4/15/67 and is organizing a massive demonstration at Washington, D. C., on 10/21/67. We have had it under investigation for the past months. A report should now be prepared so that we will have it for ready reference.

REC 23 62-111181-854

EX 101

MAILED 12
JUL 27 1967
COMM-FBI

19 JUL 28 1967

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
T

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

4

D-5

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name RAMPARTS
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address 201 Broadway
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
San Francisco, California, USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☑ Watch List Duration Until canceled

HUNTER Request No. 195

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

E-1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/9/67

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

SUBJECT: "RAMPARTS"
IS - C
Bufile 100-445393
SF 157-459

ROBERT SCHEER
SM - SWP
REGISTRATION ACT
Bufile 105-106720
SF 100-46832

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 7-17-80 klc

105

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Re Bulet to San Francisco, 5/8/67, under the caption of "Ramparts" and Bulet to San Francisco, 5/5/67, under the caption "ROBERT SCHEER, SM-SWP; REGISTRATION ACT."

San Francisco is requesting clarification on which instruction in referenced letters will prevail in the investigation of "Ramparts" magazine.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

REC 23

100-445393-45

13 MAY 10 1967

④ - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco (1 - 157-459)
(1 - 100-46832)
EJO/jr
(6)

Let to SF re "Ramparts", 5/18/67

① INTR SEC.
② SUBVERSIVE CONTROL

21

E-2

1 - Mr. Shaw
1 - Mr. Wells

SAC, San Francisco (157-459) 5-18-67

Director, FBI (100-445393)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-80 BY

"RAMPARTS"
IS - C

Reurlet 5-9-67 and Bulet 5-5-67.

Inasmuch as the Department has authorized an investigation of "Ramparts," you are to follow the instructions set out in Bulet 5-5-67. The investigation of "Ramparts" is to be conducted separately from the investigation of Robert Scheer.

Of particular interest in your investigation is the extent of Communist Party or other subversive influence in "Ramparts."

Submit a report to the Bureau by 6-17-67. Include your recommendation as to whether further investigation is warranted. This investigation must be conducted discreetly due to the possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau.

BAW:mh (5)

NOTE:

"Ramparts" is a leftist publication which has been highly critical of U.S. foreign policy. It is self-described by one of its editors as an "intellectual muckraker." Robert Scheer, one of its editors, is presently under investigation on a Registration Act matter. By letter dated 4-26-67 the Department requested further investigation concerning Scheer and "Ramparts." Due to the sensitivity of investigating a magazine, we have previously refused permission to the San Francisco Office to check the bank account of "Ramparts." However, in view of the Department's request (which has been furnished to San Francisco), we should open an investigation of "Ramparts."

MAILED 2
MAY 18 1967
COMM-FBI

EX-110 REC- 59

MAY 18 1967

olson
eLeach
lohr
ick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Trotter

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

52 MAY 25 1967

E-3

~~SECRET~~

STATES DEPARTMENT [illegible] CE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI[illegible]

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D.C. 20535
October 17, 1968

11-20-00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTS
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

GEORGIY I. ISACHENKO
INTERNAL SECURITY - R (S)

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on October 15, 1968 that Georgiy I. Isachenko had been informed that "Ramparts" Magazine had not received the list of names and addresses from the Soviets in return for the list that had been furnished by "Ramparts" to the Soviets. Isachenko was to check into this situation in an attempt to clear up this misunderstanding. The source was of the opinion that the list referred to pertained to mailing lists maintained by "Ramparts", and the Soviet Information Department, Washington, D.C. ~~(S)~~

The current "Diplomatic List," published by the United States Department of State reflects that Georgiy I. Isachenko is the Information Counselor of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Washington, D.C. ~~(S)~~

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

100-445391

E-4

1 - Mr. [illegible]. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General
October 20, 1975

Director, FBI 62-116395-970X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16
10-13-00 SP2ALM/JG

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, to Mr. John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated October 17, 1975, and captioned "Senate Select Committee Request." This communication enclosed a letter to the Attorney General from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, SSC, dated October 15, 1975.

In Senator Church's letter he advised of the intention of the SSC Staff to interview some nine FBI sources who had cooperated with this Bureau in the course of certain COINTELPRO operations. The Senator stated that he hoped there would be no objection to conducting these interviews but that, if such objections were raised, he be contacted by Tuesday, October 21, 1975.

It is noted that the issue raised in Senator Church's letter is not new. During August, 1975, SSC Staff Member John T. Elliff proposed interviews of this type and, at that time, this Bureau objected on the principle of the FBI's obligation to protect the confidentiality of relationship with our sources. As a result of this objection, a conference was held between yourself and Senator Church on the evening of August 14, 1975. It is our understanding that an agreement was reached whereby the Committee would attempt a limited number of interviews of individuals whose identities and/or

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

62-116395

EWL:1hb lhb
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

JAM

5-103

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

4063JSH

84 FEB 18 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

relationship with the FBI has been protected. However, as a condition precedent to such interviews, the FBI was to be allowed to contact such individuals to inform them of the proposed interview and to determine whether they would be receptive to such an interview. Senator Church concurred in this arrangement; however, subsequently on August 18, 1975, Mr. Elliff advised that Senator Church had reconsidered his agreement to the aforementioned procedures as a result of persuasion by the SSC Staff. Elliff, at that time, indicated a letter recording Senator Church's change of attitude had been drafted. To date, no such formal acknowledgement has been received by this Bureau and no interviews have been attempted in the interim.

In his October 15, 1975, communication, Senator Church again raises this issue. Although he does note that the matter was originally discussed with you "some weeks ago," he makes no mention of the agreement reached at that time. Apparently, as some sort of precedent, he does cite the fact that the FBI did make available for use and interview the names of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) personnel who cooperated with the FBI in certain COINTELPRO activities. We do not consider release of these identities on our part to be a concession with respect to confidentiality of sources in general since we specifically stipulated that we considered IRS personnel to be U. S. Government officials acting in their capacity as such.

It is clear that the merits of this issue have not changed since the agreement reached between yourself and Senator Church on August 14, 1975. I feel very strongly that the issue of confidentiality of sources is vital to the continuing effectiveness and integrity of the FBI in its investigative operations. I, therefore, strongly urge that should you concur in the need on the part of the Committee to conduct the interviews which they propose, that the agreement of prior

contact by the FBI with those individuals be insisted upon as a condition to such interviews to insure their amenability and uphold the obligation of confidentiality which the FBI has assumed.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
               Special Counsel for
                 Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 10/20/75, and prepared by EWL:lhb.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

OCT 17 1975

#m DL16
10-13-00 SP2 ALM/JTG

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached for your immediate attention and comments is a letter from the Senate Select Committee which is self-explanatory and which raises anew an issue previously addressed by the Bureau, with the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and this Office. Please note that Chairman Church asks the Attorney General to advise him of our position by Tuesday, October 21, 1975.

REC-100

62-116395-970X

FEB 6 1976

2 - ENCLOSURE

Let to AG 10/21/75
EWL/[illegible]

5-

LEGAL COUNSEL

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 15, 1975

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
OCT 15 1975

#mDE16

16-13-00 SP.2 ALM/2T6

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The Select Committee is presently investigating the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation carried on as part of the COINTELPRO program. We appreciate the cooperation of the FBI and the Justice Department in making materials available to us in this area. However, one problem remains to be resolved. The Committee believes its staff must contact and interview certain persons who received information from the FBI in the course of COINTELPRO operations. The FBI has withheld the names of such persons from the Committee's use on the grounds that they were FBI "sources".

The Committee wishes to stress that it is not interested in questioning these persons about any role as a "source", but rather as a recipient of information from the FBI. Indeed, in many instances we would not have been aware that the individual was a "source" had not the FBI excised the name from the materials delivered to us. Nevertheless, to minimize any incidental deleterious effects on legitimate FBI operations, the Committee has selected a very limited number of persons whom we desire to contact and interview. (See attached list and materials.)

As you will recall, we originally discussed this matter with you some weeks ago. Since then the Committee has had an opportunity to consider the issue more fully in the light of our experience with other investigations. For example, our inquiry into the relationships between the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service clearly showed the

62-116395-970X

ENCLOSURE

need to use the names of IRS personnel who cooperated with the FBI in certain COINTELPRO activities. Those names were made available to us for our use.

As I am sure you can appreciate, what is at stake here is the investigation of serious breaches of the security and confidentiality of information obtained by the FBI. Such information was apparently disclosed or "leaked" for the purpose of disruption. The full extent of such disclosures in many of the cases, such as the efforts to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., is still unknown. Surely, it would be incongruous for an inquiry into these matters to be impaired on the grounds of the FBI's interest in preserving confidentiality.

The Committee has a clear mandate and a firm commitment to investigate allegations that the FBI attempted to harass and discredit individuals. The integrity of this investigation depends upon our ability to conduct interviews without the appearance of outside interference. Therefore, we hope you have no objection to our conducting the interviews of the persons on the attached list, but if you do, please contact me by Tuesday, October 21.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP-2ALM 1716

Tampa

Excision (name unknown) Tampa television producer or newsman. Furnished public source data and lead material concerning black nationalist groups, particularly Junta of Militant Organizations, for a television "special".

Chicago

Excision (a Mr. Jones - newspaper unknown) newspaper reporter furnished public source data and other lead material for an article on the Nation of Islam, particularly its business interests.

New York

Excision (known to be Surrogate Edward S. Silver) probate judge contacted by Bureau to determine how to prevent large bequest from going to CPUSA.

Jackson

Excision (known to be Jimmy Ward) newspaperman used to plant Bureau-authored letter and answer in column re Nation of Islam.

Pittsburgh I

Excision (known to be Richard Larry) official of Mellon Foundation used in several counterintelligence programs involving foundation funding and contacts.

Pittsburgh II

Excision (known to be Sherley Uhl) newspaperman used in several counterintelligence programs of which the documents attached are one example.

Miami

Excision (known to be Gene Struhl) news director furnished public source information and other lead material with which to produce four separate documentaries which "showed the extremist groups involved in their true light."

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-970X

San Francisco

Excision (known to be Kevin Crowley) agent of California Alcoholic Beverage Control Board asked to raid a Democratic party fund raiser.

Minneapolis

Excision (known to be Fred Carey) Director of Security at Honeywell, Inc. and former Special Agent furnished information on plans of a group of Honeywell stockholders to appear at annual stockholders meeting to protest war production.

J. A. Mintz
- Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Dean

The Attorney General October 17, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 12, 1975, requesting dates of letters, names and addresses of senders and addressees on copies of letters which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI which were written or received by Angela Davis, Jeremy Stone, Jane Fonda, Ralph Abernathy, Steven Slepian, Jack Nelson, and the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D. C., as well as all materials pertaining to the acquisition of these letters by the FBI.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, in an effort to clarify the referenced request. As a result of this meeting Mr. Elliff requested the following information in FBI files concerning the individuals listed in referenced request:

1. Dates, names and addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from the above-listed persons which were obtained without the knowledge of those persons, and the source of these letters.

2. Basis of the FBI's subversive investigation of each subject.

EX-115 REC 17 62-116395 971

3. Approximate date each of the above-listed persons' names was entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and documents concerning continuation of each person's name on that list.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___ 62-116395
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___ LED:en
Files & Com. ___ (9)
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

[illegible]
15 NOV 5 1975

3 - ENCLOSURE
ENCL BEHIND FILE

5-

84 NOV 6 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Dean

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

October 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 12, 1975, requesting:

(1) Dates of letters.

(2) Names and addresses of the senders.

(3) Names and addresses of the addressees.

(4) All materials pertaining to the acquisition by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of all letters written by the following individuals or organizations addressed to third parties and letters written by third parties addressed to the following individuals or organizations, copies of which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI:

Angela Davis	Steven Slepian
Jeremy Stone	Jack Nelson
Jane Fonda	Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D. C.
Ralph Abernathy	

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, concerning referenced request. As a result of this meeting, Mr. Elliff requested the following information from FBI files on individuals listed in referenced request:

1. Dates, names and addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from the above-listed individuals which were obtained by the FBI without the knowledge of the above individuals, and the source of those letters.

2. The basis for the FBI's subversive investigation of each above-listed person.

62-116395-941

LED:en
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which constitutes the Bureau's response to the above request.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
        Special Counsel for
        Intelligence Coordination

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

3. Approximate date that the name of each of the above listed persons was entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and any documents concerning continuation of their names on that list.

The following information constitutes the FBI's response to this request:

With regard to request number one above, FBI files contain no letter to or from Ralph Abernathy which was provided without his knowledge.

ANGELA DAVIS

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
None shown	Angela Davis	George Jackson	An official of the California State Attorney General's Office
1/24/73	International Friendship Club, Planeta-Kid; School #36, Kirovabad, Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR	Angela Davis, North Palo Alto, Holding Facility 270, 270 Grant Street, Palo Alto, California	Hunter Program
JEREMY J. STONE			
1/14/71	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone	Mr. Frank M. Steadman General Counsel C & P Telephone Co. 1710 H. Street, N.W. Washington, D. C.	An official of the C & P Telephone Co.

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
4/20/66	Jeremy J. Stone	Dr. L. N. Kutakov Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations, 136 E. 67th Street, New York, New York	Z Coverage
5/24/68	Jeremy J. Stone 1788 Danbury Road Claremont, Calif.	Nina I. Shakhova Perekopskaya Vlitsa, 17, Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, I-209	Hunter Program
5/12/69	Jeremy J. Stone Washington, D. C.	Shakhova, N. 17 Perekopskaya Street Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program
1/2/68	Vladimir D. Kazakevich P. O. Box 346 Moscow, K-9	Dr. Jeremy Stone 1788 Danbury Road Claremont, Calif.	Hunter Program
1/13/68	Jeremy J. Stone	V. D. Kazakevich P. O. Box 346 Moscow K-9, USSR	Hunter Program
8/9/69	Jeremy J. Stone 264A G. Street, S. W. Washington, D. C. 20024	Shakhova, Nina 17 Perekopskaya St., Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program
2/15/70	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone Federation of American Scientist, Washington, D. C.	Chamkrelidze, R. V. Moscow V-333	Hunter Program

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
2/15/70	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone International Affairs fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C.	Yevtvshenko, Yeugeniy Moscow, USSR	Hunter Program
2/15/70	Jeremy J. Stone Executive Council Member and Delegate at large, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, D. C.	Muravyev, Dmitry Secretary General, Institute of Soviet American Relations Moscow, USSR	Hunter Program
5/19/70	Jeremy J. Stone 266A G. St., N. W. Washington, D. C.	Shakhova, Nina I. 17 Perekopskaya St. Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program
JANE FONDA			
1/8/73	Jeff Stein	Jane Fonda	A local investigative agency which advises letter was legally obtained but requests identity be concealed to protect its source.
9/6/7	Jack Mabley Associate Editor Chicago Tribune, 435 N. Michigan Chicago, Illinois	Jane Fonda	
11/13/72	Pham Thanh Van, Expert De La Delegation, Du Government Revolutionaire Provisoire, De La Republique Du Sud Viet Nam, A La Conference De Paris, Sur Le Viet Nam	Jane Fonda	

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
12/13/72	Jostein Nyhamar Chairman of the North Vietnam Movement in Norway	Jane Fonda Care of Maslansky, Roros, Turisthotell, 7460 Roros	Same as above
1/28/73	Rebane, J. Oru 7-3 Vilyandi, Estonia, USSR	Jane Fonda c/o Chartwell- French-Perenchin 9720 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly Hills, California	Hunter Program
STEVEN SLEPIAN			
5/25/70	Steven Slepian 319 Elm Drive C Madison, Wisconsin	David Slepian Delegate to Popov Exchange, c/o Intourist, Moscow USSR	Hunter Program
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES			
8/17/70	Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) (Marcus G. Raskin)	Xerox Corporation Rochester, N. Y.	An official of Xerox Corporation
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Granite City Steel Public Relations Dept., Granite City, Illinois	An official of Granite City Steel
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Corning Glass Works Corning, N. Y.	An official of Corning Glass Works
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Hewlett-Packard Company, Palo Alto, California	Third Agency
None shown	Marcus G. Raskin	Center for Constitutional Rights, 580 9th Avenue, New York, N. Y.	Informant

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

With regard to request number two:

No subversive investigation has been conducted by the FBI concerning Jack Nelson or Steven Slepian.

Copies of communications concerning the FBI's initiation of subversive investigations of Jane Fonda, Angela Davis and Ralph Abernathy are being delivered with this memorandum.

Materials concerning the FBI's initiation of subversive investigations of Jeremy J. Stone and Institute for Policy Studies have been previously submitted in the FBI's memorandum to the SSC dated October 7, 1975.

With regard to request number three:

No information is contained in FBI files indicating Jane Fonda, Ralph Abernathy, Jack Nelson or Steven Slepian were entered on the Hunter Mail watch list as the result of a request by the FBI. Information concerning Jeremy Stone and Institute for Policy Studies has been previously submitted in the FBI's memorandum dated October 7, 1975.

No Hunter Mail watch list information was requested or received concerning Ralph Abernathy or Jack Nelson.

Angela Davis was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 250. No information concerning the date this request was made is contained in FBI files.

The only record maintained by the FBI concerning the Hunter Mail watch list request for Angela Davis is included in the Angela Davis material being delivered herewith.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC). (SSC letter dated 9/12/75.)

Originating Office: FBI 1 20

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Date: 10/22/75

Received by: A H Hatry

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JT/JG

62-116395-911

ENCLOSURE

2

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/12/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Information handling

#mde16
ALL I[illegible] SIF[illegible]
10/13/06 SP2 ALM/JG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Dates, names, addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from various individuals which were obtained by the FBI without the knowledge of the individuals, and the source of these letters, the basis for the subversive investigation, date and name of each entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and any documents concerning continuation of their names on the list.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/TFG

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST 9/12/75

62-116395-971

[illegible]

ANGELA DAVIS

#-NDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/TAG

#mD216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2ALM/TG

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name DAVIS, ANGELA YVONNE
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address
1919 Oregon St.
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
Berkeley, California USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment
Photograph outside and contents

☐ One-Time Check ☒ Watch List Duration Until Canceled

HUNTER Request No.
250

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5

LOS ANGELES | LOS ANGELES | 4/15/69 | 1/6/69 - 2/29/69

ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, aka Tamu

WILLIAM H. SNELL | yfs

SM - C

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/00 BY SP2ALM/JG

REFERENCES: New York (100-80641) airtel to Bureau (100-3-69) dated 12/10/68 captioned "CP-USA Organization, IS - C". Los Angeles letter to Bureau dated 3/23/69. Los Angeles letter to Bureau dated 3/27/69. Bureau FD-01 to Los Angeles dated 3/27/69.

- P -

ENCLOSURES:

TO BUREAU

Two copies FD-376.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Two copies FD-122 recommending that DAVIS be included in the Security Index, Priority III, sent to Bureau 4/15/69.

(5) - Bureau (100-439922)
1 - Secret Service, Los Angeles
2 - Boston (RM)
2 - San Diego (100-14064) (RM)
3 - Los Angeles (157-2325)

COPIES DESTROYED
333 NOV 12 1970

REC- 87
10

12 APR 18 1969

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADD. DISSEMINATION.

Copy to [illegible] by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 4/17/69
by [illegible]

RC & SS with slip

routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 4/23/76
by [illegible]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Instant report is being submitted instead of LHM as per FD-01 dated 3/27/69 to facilitate handling.

An extra copy of this report with appropriate FD-376 and photograph for Secret Service are being furnished the Bureau in the event DAVIS is included in the Security Index. Los Angeles has prepared an extra copy of the report and FD-376 with photograph and will furnish to Secret Service, Los Angeles on Bureau approval.

No interview with DAVIS is being recommended. DAVIS is presently living with DEACON ALEXANDER (STANLEY SAMUEL ALEXANDER), Los Angeles file 100-70526, Bureau file 157-10023 currently on the Los Angeles Security Index and the Los Angeles Agitator Index. It is felt an interview would result in possible embarrassment to the Bureau.

This report is being classified ~~Confidential~~ because it contains information from informants which if disclosed could reasonably result in their disclosure and compromise their future effectiveness.

Records of the Jefferson County Board of Health, Bureau of Records and Vital Statistics, Birmingham, Alabama, were viewed by the Birmingham Division.

Records of the Drivers License Section, California Department of Motor Vehicles, were caused to be reviewed by IC FREDERICK M. FREEMAN, Sacramento Division, with negative results.

Records of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office were reviewed by IC MERTON R. ANDERSON.

Records of the Los Angeles Police Department were reviewed by IC MILLARD T. ANDERSON.

Records of the Los Angeles Traffic Court were reviewed by Special Employee GAREY D. POWELL.

Records of the Retail Merchants Credit Association, Los Angeles, California, were reviewed by IC BERNARD P. BLAIS.

Records of the Los Angeles County Voters Registration were reviewed by Special Employee GAREY D. POWELL.

LEADS

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA: Will upon Bureau approval include DAVIS in the Security Index, and disseminate copy of this report to Secret Service.

BOSTON

AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS: Will submit results of investigation per referenced letter dated 3/27/69.

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA: Will submit results of investigation per referenced letter dated 3/27/69.

INFORMANTS

SOURCE	LOCATION
LA T-1 Records Clerk UCSD San Diego, California	157-2325-11
LA T-2 SOURCE	157-2325-13

LA T-3 *	157-2325-55 Orally to SA CHARLES K. JOHNSON on 3/29/69 134-1210A-563 -599
LA T-4 *	157-2325-16
LA T-5 *	134-2004A-582
LA T-6 *	134-1606A-621
LA T-7 *	Orally to SA DAVID R. PENDER on 12/4/68 134-107A-732 through 740
LA T-8 *	134-262A-766 through 804
LA T-9 *	134-195A-985 through 1020
LA T-10 *	Orally to SA THEODORE J. A'HEARN on 7/23/68 134-2702A-618
LA T-11 *	134-37A-915 through 1003
LA T-12 *	134-66A-1544 through 1546

*INFORMANT SYMBOL NUMBERS

LA 157-2325

LA T-13
INFORMANT #. 134-202A-714

LA T-14
SOURCE

157-2325-13

- E* -
COVER PAGE

FD-376 (Rev. 4-25-68)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

LA 157-2325

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS
Also known as
Tamu

April 15, 1969

#mor16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM lZTG
ON 11-16-00

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.

2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.

3. ☒ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.

4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.

5. ☐ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:

   (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
   (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
   (c) ☐ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.

6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☒ enclosed ☐ is not available
☐ may be available through ______

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s) (1)
U. S. Secret Service, Los Angeles (RM)

Enclosure(s) *(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)*

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy to: 1 - Secret Service, Los Angeles (RM)

Report of: WILLIAM H. SNELL
Date: 4/15/69
Office: Los Angeles, California

Field Office File #: 157-2325
Bureau File #: 100-439922

Title: ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ETG
ON 11-16-00

Character: SECURITY MATTER - C

Synopsis: ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, also known as "Tamu", resides at 1107-1/2 West 87th Street, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS is presently unemployed. Background data is being set out. On 6/21/68, DAVIS was elected as a staff member of the Los Angeles Chapter of SNCC. DAVIS dropped out of SNCC and joined the Communist Party. DAVIS is a member of the Che Lumumba Club, [illegible] Smith Section, SCDCP. DAVIS' activities in connection with the SCDCP are set out. Description data set forth.

- P -

DETAILS:

Investigation in this matter was predicated upon receipt of information from LA T-3 that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS was a member of the Communist Party in 1969.

BACKGROUND

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

BIRTH DATA AND CITIZENSHIP

On January 30, 1969, records of the Jefferson County Board of Health, Bureau of Records and Vital Statistics, 1912 Eighth Avenue South, Birmingham, Alabama, reflected that under Birth Certificate number 3737026 for the year 1944, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS was born January 26, 1944, the daughter of BENJAMIN FRANK DAVIS and SALLYE MARGURITE BELL.

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

EDUCATION

LA T-1 (6/6/68)

DAVIS attended graduate school in 1968 in the Philosophy Department at the University of California, San Diego. DAVIS supposedly attended Brandeis University, Boston, Massachusetts from the period 1961 to 1965.

IDENTIFICATION RECORD

The following is an identification record furnished by the FBI Identification Division:

1 1 (Rev. 9 30 63)

2-6-69

[illegible]N[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT O[illegible]US[illegible]CE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INV[illegible]GATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2053

J. Edgar Hoover
Direct

The following FBI record, NUMBER NONE ASSIGNED , is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ON

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
PD San Diego Calif	Angela Yvonne Davis #282660	10-5-67	1-blocking entrance to pub bldg 2-disobey peace officer 3-disturb peace	rel 849(b) PC detenti only not a arrest

- 3 -

Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. Where final disposition is not shown or further explanation of charge is desired, communicate with agency contributing those fingerprints.

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

ARREST RECORD

Records at the following agencies were reviewed and reflected no identifiable record on DAVIS:

Los Angeles Sheriff's Office
Los Angeles, California
April 1, 1969

Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles, California
April 1, 1969

Los Angeles Traffic Court
Los Angeles, California
March 27, 1969

LA T-2 (3/13/68)

Source advised that on March 13, 1968, ANGELA DAVIS was interviewed by the Los Angeles Police Department as a burglary suspect but was released without arrest.

CREDIT RECORD

On April 1, 1969, the Retail Merchants Credit Association, Los Angeles, California, records were reviewed which reflected no identifiable record on DAVIS.

VOTERS REGISTRATION RECORD

On April 1, 1969, the records of the Los Angeles County Voters Registration, Los Angeles, California, were reviewed revealing that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS registered in the Democratic Party on March 5, 1968.

RESIDENCE AND EMPLOYMENT

LA T-3 (3/21/69)

Source advised that DAVIS resides at 1107 1/2 West 87th Street, Los Angeles, California with DEACON ALEXANDER (STANLEY SAMUEL ALEXANDER), Negro youth organizer for the Southern California District Communist Party (SCDCP). Source stated that DAVIS is not employed at the present time but that she is traveling periodically between Los Angeles and San Diego.

CONNECTIONS WITH THE LOS ANGELES STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (LASNCC)(See appendix)

LA T-4 (7/3/68)

On June 21, 1968, the Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, (LASNCC) held a reorganizational meeting at its headquarters, 1914 West Jefferson, Los Angeles, California at which time new Los Angeles SNCC officers were elected. ANGELA DAVIS was elected a staff member of the editorial staff.

LA T-5 (5/16/68)
LA T-6 (6/3/68)

On May 12, 1968, ANGELA DAVIS was a special guest speaker at the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles (See appendix) located at 2936 West Eighth Street, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS spoke on some of SNCC's major projects.

On June 2, 1968, Sergeant DAVID KENT, Intelligence Unit, New Orleans Police Department, furnished miscellaneous papers on the Los Angeles SNCC. Among these papers was a letter headed "Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee Liberation School" addressed to brothers and sisters and signed by one ANGELA DAVIS, Coordinator. The letter stated that conventional education has failed to meet the needs of Black people in this country and that there is need to create educational structures which will respond to Black people's needs.

LA T-7 (12/4/68)

On December 4, 1968, source advised that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS had dropped out of the LASNCC and had joined the SCDCP.

CONNECTIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY

MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

LA T-3 (3/29/69)

On March 29, 1969, source advised that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS is a member in good standing of the Che Lumumba Club, Moranda Smith Section (MSS) SCDCP, Los Angeles, California.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT SCDCP MEETINGS

LA T-8 (8/1/68)
LA T-9 (8/1/68)

On July 21, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general membership meeting of the SCDCP at 7213 Beverly Boulevard, Los Angeles. Topic of discussion centered around the need for political reorganization of the working class.

LA T-10 (8/9/68)

On July 23, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a staff meeting of the SCDCP at 1254 East Manchester, Los Angeles, California.

LA T-8 (11/14/68)

On November 8, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general membership meeting of the SCDCP held at 7213 Beverly

Boulevard, Los Angeles. The speaker was GUS HALL, Chairman, Communist Party, USA, (CP, USA).

On November 7, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general meeting of the SCDCP at 7213 Beverly Boulevard. The speaker was GUS HALL, Chairman of the CP, USA.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT CLUB MEETINGS OF THE SCDCP

LA T-3 (7/24/68)
LA T-8 (7/29/68)
LA T-11 (8/6/68)

On July 18, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP held at 2138 Third Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around politics.

LA T-7 (7/30/68)
LA T-12 (8/2/68)

On July 28, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Cyril Briggs Club, MSS, SCDCP at 3048 South Victoria Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around capitalism in other foreign countries and racism.

LA T-3 (8/6/68)

On July 31, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. Topic of discussion was a report from the SCDCP and various committee reports.

LA T-11 (12/10/68)

On November 25, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue. Topic of discussion centered around racism.

LA T-10 (1/9/69)
LA T-11 (1/28/69)

On December 5, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. The topic of discussion centered around Communist Party youth action in the community.

LA T-11 (1/29/69)
LA T-13 (1/29/69)

On January 16, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 1048 Oxford Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around racism.

LA T-3 (2/6/69)
LA T-11 (2/14/69)

On January 30, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. DAVIS advised that she is dissatisfied with the Black people's progress in the community.

LA T-3 (3/29/69)

On March 29, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP at 1048 South Oxford, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS paid $14.00 for club dues.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT
A MEETING OF THE NEGRO
MEMBERS OF THE SCDCP

LA T-8 (8/12/68)
LA T-9 (8/12/68)
LA T-12 (8/14/68)

On August 4, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of all Negro members of the SCDCP at 5731 South St. Andrews Place, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around the election campaigns, working class trade unions, and building of the Communist Party.

ACTIVITIES FOR THE FURTHERANCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

LA T-8 (10/17/68)
LA T-11 (10/17/68)

On October 13, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended the annual People's World (PW) banquet held at the Miramar Hotel, Wilshire and Ocean Avenue in Santa Monica, California. Topic of discussion centered around problems of the Mexican-American.

The PW is a West Coast Weekly Communist newspaper.

LA T-8 (2/18/69)
LA T-9 (2/18/69)

On February 9, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended the 31st Anniversary Celebration of the PW held at the Alexandria Hotel, Fifth and Spring Streets, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion was student unrest.

MISCELLANEOUS

LA T-14 (7/24/68)

On 7/24/68, source was shown a photograph of ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS taken 10/5/67. Source stated that the woman in the photograph strongly resembles the woman who, on 9/11/67 with a male companion, purchased a shotgun at Sportstown, 2673 La Cienega, Los Angeles. Source added that if the woman in the photo is about 5'7", 135 pounds, and has pierced ears, she is almost certainly the woman who assisted in purchasing the shotgun.

DESCRIPTION

The following is a description of ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS as obtained from LA T-2, LA T-3 and Los Angeles County Voters Registration files:

Name	ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, aka Tamu
Sex	Female
Race	Negro
Height	5' 8"
Weight	145
Date of Birth	January 26, 1944
Place of Birth	Birmingham, Alabama
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Education	Attended Brandeis University Boston, Massachusetts between 1961 to 1965. Graduate student, Department of Philosophy, University of California at San Diego, 1968.
Residence	1107 1/2 West 87th Street Los Angeles, California
Previous residences	6250 South Venice Los Angeles, California 536 Rushville La Jolla, California

1

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH OF LOS ANGELES

A source advised on May 8, 1968, that the premises of the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles, 2936 West 8th Street, Los Angeles, California, have been utilized for meetings by Communist Party members and sympathizers over a period of years. Speakers and lecturers at the church frequently espouse Communist causes or follow the Communist Party line. Communist front group literature is distributed at the church. The church is used by some Communist Party members for "mass concentration" work.

This same infiltration extends to adjuncts of the church such as the Unitarian Public Forum and the Fellowship for Social Justice, formerly known as the Unitarian-Universalist Fellowship for Social Justice.

STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN has been minister of the church since 1948.

Reverend STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN is described in the Fourth Report, Un-American Activities Committee in California, 1948, Page 115, as a very active "Communist fronter" and connected with numerous "Communist front organizations and activities".

Membership in the First Unitarian Church does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

APPENDIX

1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX

LOS ANGELES STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE

A source advised in July, 1968, that the Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (LA-SNCC), headquartered at 7406 South Western Avenue, Los Angeles, California, is not a membership organization but a loose-knit agency composed of young militant, black nationalists from South Los Angeles who have eliminated all Caucasians from their ranks and have initiated a program against the draft, the war in Vietnam and discrimination and have proposed a revolutionary program utilizing armed force, political and economic action to obtain their goals. LA-SNCC is an arm of the National Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee organization headquartered at Atlanta, Georgia, and with the naming of LA-SNCC Director RONALD LEROY WILKINS as Deputy Director of SNCC for the West Coast, the affinity between the National and Local organization will be more harmonious.

The above source advised that at a meeting of LA-SNCC leaders on March 22, 1968, the group indicated it was necessary for all SNCC personnel to be armed in order to shoot "pig cops" when they are stopped in South Los Angeles.

A source, in May, 1968, indicated that LA-SNCC leadership has encouraged all associates of LA-SNCC to obtain arms and to be armed at all times.

On April 5, 1968, four LA-SNCC officers were arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department at LA-SNCC headquarters in possession of two fully loaded .30 caliber M-1 carbines and one .12 gauge shotgun, pump action, with four rounds of 00 gauge buckshot. On May 4, 1968, five LA-SNCC officers were arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department for possession of loaded firearms.

On May 14, 1968, then Director JOHN FLOYD and three Security Officers, LA-SNCC, were arrested by the New Orleans Police Department for possession of stolen property. New Orleans Police Department found four automatic weapons in attache cases carried by the above persons. They also obtained material concerning instructions in the making of Molotov cocktails, bombs and booby traps for sabotage in guerilla-type warfare. This literature was published in Communist China.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Los Angeles, California
April 15, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS

Character SECURITY MATTER - C

Reference Report of SA WILLIAM H. SNELL dated and captioned as above at Los Angeles.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside

JANE FONDA

#m0e16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/MTG

SAC, Los Angeles 6/25/70

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. R. L. Strain
1 - Mr. J. F. Morrissey
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

#m9816

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM

JANE FONDA
SM - ANA

A review of available information concerning captioned individual indicates that she has been extremely active in the antidraft and anti-Vietnam movement; has made sizable contributions to black extremist groups, and has, by her actions and statements in general, indicated anarchistic tendencies and a definite propensity for fomenting violence endangering the internal security of this country.

If you have not already done so, you should initiate a security-type investigation of captioned individual in accordance with instructions contained in the Manual of Instructions, Section 87D, relating to such matters. The purpose of your investigation is to determine the extent of subject's anarchistic tendencies, a resolution of all ramifications regarding her association with various aspects of the New Left movement and black extremist groups and to ascertain if indeed her actions do pose a definite threat to the security of this country. In view of subject's position of prominence in the theatrical field, your investigation must be handled by a mature and experienced agent. No action should be taken which could result in embarrassment to the Bureau.

MAILED 5
JUN 24 1970
COMM-FBI

Results of the above investigation should be furnished the Bureau in report form, accompanied by recommendations as to whether or not subject's name should be considered for inclusion on the Security Index.

REC 10 [illegible] 150273

For your information, the Denver Office is origin in the Sedition investigation of the subject, Denver file 14-66, Bufile 14-3697. Denver is requested to furnish the Los Angeles Office with a copy of all pertinent information concerning the subject.

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale

2 - Denver

22 JUN 25 1970

(3)

[illegible] JUL 1 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Letter to SAC, Los Angeles
RE: JANE FONDA

NOTE:

A current Sedition investigation is underway concerning the subject as a result of statements attributed to her wherein she advocated servicemen receive a dishonorable discharge rather than going to Vietnam. She has appeared on and been excluded from numerous military installations as a result of her anti-Vietnam activities. She has been associated with the Women's Strike for Peace, the Movement for a Democratic Military, the Vietnam Moratorium Committee and has made sizable contributions to the Malcolm X Organization of Afro-American Unity and the Black Panther Party.

RALPH ABERNATHY

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
ATLANTA	ATLANTA	5/28/68	5/10/68 - 5/24/68	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY		SA ALAN G. SENTINELLO		sja
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		RACIAL MATTERS		

#MDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JLG

NON PROSECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

LEADS:

CHICAGO, NEW YORK, AND WFO DIVISIONS (INFORMATION)

Information copies of this report furnished Chicago, New York, and WFO because of subject's frequent presence in those cities.

ATLANTA DIVISION

AT ATLANTA, GEORGIA.

Will follow and report pertinent activity of subject.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					TOTAL	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED: SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

(8)-Bureau (RM)
1-111th MIG, Fort Mc Pherson (RM)
1-NIS, Charleston, S. C. (RM)
1-Secret Service, Atlanta (RM)

REC-25

MAY 29 1968

Cover Page B
3-Atlanta (157-257)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	1CC	112 ASP	IDIU;	S.S.
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.	6/5/68			
How Fwd.	RS			
By	ceg lci			

Notations

CC TO: CIA
REQ. REC'D 5-27
JUN 2 1969
ANS. BY: WFO SAC

Re: Abernathy

79 JUN 7 - 1968

806 98D

AT 157-257

Copies:

1-Chicago (Info) (RM)
1-New York (Info) (RM)
1-WFO (Info) (RM)

INFORMANTS:

AT-T-1 is AT-1387-R

Instant Report
134-389A-228
134-389A-229
134-389A-230
134-389A-232
134-389A-429
134-389A-430
134-389A-508
134-389A-538
134-389A-576
134-389A-577
134-389A-834
134-389A-834
134-389A-1043
134-389A-1069
170-290A-421
170-290A-424

AT-T-2 is anonymous source of WFO (WFO letter 6/28/60 "Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.")

AT-T-3 is THOMAS P. MONAHAN, JR., New Orleans, Louisiana. (By request)

AT-T-4 is NY-3810-S*.

AT-T-5 is former AT-1380-S*.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Atlanta has not conducted active investigation of subject.

B
(COVER PAGE)

AT 157-257

By separate communication subject has been recommended for inclusion in Agitator Index.

This report has been classified "Secret" because it utilized information from NY-694-S*. Information furnished by AT-1387-R (AT-T-1) must be classified ~~Confidential~~.

C*
(COVER PAGE)

r, FD-376 (Rev. 8-1-66)

~~SECRET~~

UN[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]STICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

May 24, 1968

mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG
ON 11-13-00

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.
2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.
3. ☐ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.
4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.
5. ☒ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:
    - (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
    - (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
    - (c) ☒ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.
6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☐ enclosed ☐ is not available
☒ may be available through FBI, Atlanta

~~SECRET~~

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s)
U. S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Georgia
(Registered Mail)

Enclosure(s)

(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

Copy to: 1 - 111th MIG, Region V, Fort Mc Pherson, Georgia
1 - NIS, Charleston U. S. Naval Base, Charleston, S. C.
1 - Secret Service, Atlanta, Georgia

Report of: SA ALAN G. SENTINELLA **Office:** Atlanta, Georgia

Date: May 24, 1968

Field Office File #: 157-257 **Bureau File #:**

Title: RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG #MDR16
ON 11-13-00

Character: RACIAL MATTERS

Synopsis:

Subject born 3/11/26, Linden, Alabama, resides 690 Laverne Drive, NW, Atlanta, Georgia, serves as pastor West Hunter Street Baptist Church and serves as President Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Served in U. S. Army 8/12/44 - 10/27/45, honorable discharge, ASN 349 94 505. Credit satisfactory. Atlanta PD records reflect three traffic violations. In connection with SCLC matters, subject has been in contact with individuals having prior CP membership or affiliation. Description set forth.

- P* -

DETAILS:

I. BACKGROUND

A. BIRTH

The 1964 "yearbook" published by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), 334 Auburn Avenue, NE, Atlanta, reflected RALPH D. ABERNATHY was born March 11, 1926 at Linden, Alabama.

B. CITIZENSHIP

By virtue of his birth, ABERNATHY is an American citizen.

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

☆ U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967-O-273-878

C. EDUCATION

The 1964 SCLC "yearbook", supra, reflects ABERNATHY is a graduate of Alabama State College, Montgomery, Alabama.

The January 21, 1967 - January 27, 1967, edition of the "Chicago Defender", a weekly Chicago, Illinois, newspaper on Page 20, published an article entitled "The New Covenant Sunday - SCLC Leader to Speak". This article reflected ABERNATHY previously attended Atlanta University and was the recipient of a Doctor of Law (LLD) from Allen University.

D. EMPLOYMENT

On May 17, 1968, Mr. JOHN A. RITTER, Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, Inc., advised IC MARION W. DAVIS his records reflect RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY was employed from 1951 to 1961 as pastor of the First Baptist Church, 347 North Ripley Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Since 1961 Abernathy has been employed as pastor of the West Hunter Street Baptist Church, 775 Hunter Street, SW, Atlanta, Georgia. These records also indicate that since 1961 ABERNATHY has held the office of Secretary-Treasurer SCLC.

As of May 20, 1968, ABERNATHY continued to be employed as pastor of the aforementioned church and to also serve SCLC on a full-time basis as President.

AT-T-1, 5/68

E. AFFILIATION

Mr. JAMES R. WOOD, Director of Public Relations, SCLC, on May 2, 1961 furnished a SCLC brochure which set forth the history of this organization and biographical data concerning several individuals

in connection therewith. This brochure reflected that ABERNATHY at that time served as President of the Montgomery (Alabama) Improvement Association.

F. RESIDENCE

Records of the Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, supra, reflected ABERNATHY resided at 76 Cerro Street, SW, Atlanta from 1961 until 1967. His current residence is 690 Laverne Drive, NW, Atlanta.

In having his current residence constructed, ABERNATHY as of early 1967 had incurred substantial expense.

G. MARITAL STATUS

The January 21, 1967-January 27, 1967, issue of the "Chicago Defender", supra, reflected ABERNATHY was married to JUANITA ABERNATHY, Nee JONES.

H. MILITARY SERVICE

Mrs. THELMA TURNER, Georgia State Driver's License Bureau, Atlanta, advised IC MARION W. DAVIS on May 17, 1968, that her records reflect ABERNATHY was inducted into the United States Army at Fort Benning, Georgia, on August 12, 1944. He received an honorable discharge October 27, 1945 at Foster General Hospital, Jackson, Mississippi. His Army Serial Number was 349 94 505. On March 22, 1966, ABERNATHY was issued a new State of Georgia Veteran's Driver's License number V-018805.

I. CREDIT

Records of the Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, supra, reflected ABERNATHY has a satisfactory credit rating. These records contain a report dated February 20, 1962, from the Montgomery, Alabama Credit Bureau indicating that as of February 2, 1961, ABERNATHY

was the defendant in a slander action brought by one L. B. SULLIVAN seeking $500,000 damages. This matter was still pending as of February 20, 1962.

J. ARRESTS

On May 17, 1968, Mr. JOHN TALLENT, Station Captain's Office, Atlanta Police Department, Atlanta, advised IC MARION W. DAVIS he could not locate a record identifiable with ABERNATHY.

Miss JO PRESSLEY, Identification Division, Atlanta Police Department, on May 20, 1968, advised her records reflect ABERNATHY was arrested as follows:

Date	Charge	Disposition
March 28, 1963	Red Light	Fined $20; City of Atlanta Municipal Court
September 13, 1963	Red Light	Fined $30; City of Atlanta Municipal Court
November 17, 1964	Lane Ordinance	Fined $25; City of Atlanta Municipal Court

II. ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT

Unless indicated otherwise activities referred to took place in Atlanta, Georgia.

Characterizations of individuals and organizations where available are set forth in the appendix section of this report.

On July 6, 1965, Rev. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., President, SCLC, conferred with ANDREW J. YOUNG, Executive Vice-President, SCLC; RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL, Program Director, SCLC; HARRY WACHTEL and ABERNATHY regarding the recent arrest in Selma, Alabama, of a Rev. REESE affiliated with SCLC, who had been accused of embezzling

funds of the Dallas County, Alabama Voter's League.

AT-T-1, 7/65

Rev. KING called a conference on February 12, 1966 of SCLC officers and other individuals for the purpose of examining the immediate financial condition of SCLC and endeavoring to determine methods of increasing the organization's income. ABERNATHY attended this conference as did RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL, HOSEA WILLIAMS, Director of Voter Registration and Political Education, SCLC, JUNIUS GRIFFIN, Director of Public Relations, SCLC, CLARENCE JONES and STANLEY LEVISON. LEVISON took an active part throughout this meeting.

AT-T-1, 2/66

On March 16, 1966, JAMES HARRISON, Comptroller, SCLC explained to STANLEY LEVISON various problems experienced by the SCLC Finance Office and the fact that ABERNATHY as Treasurer of SCLC appeared reluctant to act on suggestions to solve some of these problems. LEVISON told HARRISON he appreciated the problems experienced by the Finance Office and assured him he would discuss the matter with ABERNATHY in order that ABERNATHY would take necessary action.

AT-T-1, 3/66

On June 13, 1966, Rev. KING conducted a conference of SCLC officers and other individuals for the purpose of examining the current financial status of SCLC and ascertaining methods of reducing the expenses of the organization. ABERNATHY attended this conference at which CLARENCE JONES, STANLEY LEVISON, and HARRY WACHTEL were also present and took an active part. RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL and HOSEA WILLIAMS each attended portions of this conference.

AT-T-1, 6/66

ABERNATHY on July 7, 1966, reviewed financial contributions recently received by SCLC from the general

public and noted that these contributions averaged approximately $1200 per day. He explained to several employees of the SCLC Finance . Office he thought these contributions were the result of a spontaneous reaction by the public to the recent shooting of JAMES H. MEREDITH in Mississippi rather than the solicitation efforts on the part of STANLEY LEVISON.

AT-T-1, 7/66

Rev. KING on July 25, 1966, reminded ABERNATHY they were to attend a meeting of the Executive Board of the American Foundation on Non-Violence (AFN) to be held July 26-27, . 1966 in New York City. KING said HARRY WACHTEL would also attend this meeting.

AT-T-1, 7/66

AFN is a tax arm of SCLC located in New York City of which HARRY WACHTEL serves as Executive Director.

AT-T-1, 7/66

On August 9, 1966, ABERNATHY attended a meeting of the SCLC Executive Board held as part of the tenth annual SCLC Convention August 8-11/1966, in Jackson, Mississippi. During this meeting a discussion ensued concerning the desirability of SCLC's retaining the services of HOSEA WILLIAMS, because of current publicity suggesting involvement of WILLIAMS with one HAROLD BELTON ANDREWS, who was convicted in July, 1966 in the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, on a charge of Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Motor Vehicle. In response to this discussion, ABERNATHY said he and Rev. KING were of the opinion that SCLC was sorely in need of the continued services of an individual possessing the energy and resourcefulness of WILLIAMS,

and therefore felt SCLC should retain WILLIAMS.

AT-T-1, 8/66

At the aforementioned meeting of the SCLC Executive Board, ABERNATHY explained that in the early part of 1967, SCLC would engage in a fund raising activity which would involve Rev. KING's making a "pilgrimage to the Holy Land". He said this activity had been proposed by a travel agency (not identified) and STANLEY LEVISON and HARRY WACHTEL had previously been requested by SCLC to ascertain the feasibility of this proposal and recommended SCLC proceed therewith.

AT-T-1, 8/66

ABERNATHY was present November 22, 1966 at a meeting of the SCLC Executive Staff which Rev. KING called for the purpose of considering methods of raising funds for SCLC. JUNIUS GRIFFIN and HOSEA WILLIAMS attended part of this meeting. STANLEY LEVISON attended the entire meeting and actively participated.

AT-T-1, 11/66.

During the latter part of January, 1967, officers of SCLC met in Chicago, Illinois, to discuss lack of progress in SCLC's voter registration drive in that city. In attendance at this meeting was ABERNATHY, HOSEA WILLIAMS, and STANELY LEVISON. LEVISON and WILLIAMS during the meeting became involved in a heated argument regarding SCLC's support of the voter registration drive. As a result of this argument, WILLIAMS left the meeting stating he was resigning from SCLC. ABERNATHY pleaded with WILLIAMS not to resign to which WILLIAMS eventually agreed.

AT-T-1, 2/67

On February 10, 1967, ABERNATHY requested HARRY WACHTEL to forward $5,000 of AFN funds to SCLC to assist the organization with its payroll obligations

as of the middle of February, 1967.

AT-T-1, 2/67

On February 7, 1968, Rev. KING and ABERNATHY and several executive officers of SCLC including HOSEA WILLIAMS and JAMES BEVEL, former Director of Direct Action, SCLC met in Washington, D. C. with STOKELY CARMICHAEL of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The purpose of the meeting was to afford SCLC opportunity to request SNCC not to interfere with SCLC's pending Poor People's Campaign (PPC).

AT-T-1, 2/68

On March 13, 1968, a meeting of several officers of SCLC including Rev. KING and ABERNATHY was held for the purpose of discussing problems relating to certain procedures utilized by the Southern Christian Leadership Foundation (SCLF) as indicated by a recent Internal Revenue Service audit of the SCLF. On March 14, 1968, STANLEY LEVISON met with the same individuals to further discuss these problems.

AT-T-1, 3/68

The SCLF is a tax arm of SCLC.

AT-T-1, 3/68

On April 5, 1968, the Executive Staff of SCLC met for the purpose of resolving several matters relating to the death of Rev. KING the previous day. One of the matters resolved was that ABERNATHY would assume leadership of the organization. HARRY BELAFONTE and STANLEY LEVISON, and HARRY WACHTEL attended this meeting.

AT-T-1, 4/68

As of April 22, 1968, SCLC elected to pay ABERNATHY $6,000 annually to cover personal expenses incurred by him as President of SCLC. A decision was also made by SCLC to employ an Assistant Pastor of the West Hunter Street Baptist Church in order that

ABERNATHY might devote sufficient time to his duties with SCLC. These decisions were made by a committee of several SCLC executive officers. Also serving on this committee was HARRY BELAFONTE, STANLEY LEVISON and HARRY WACHTEL.

AT-T-1, 5/68

In connection with the PPC, SCLC contemplates holding a massive demonstration in Washington, D. C., on May 30, 1968 and anticipates 300,000 people will participate therein. During the middle of May, 1968, SCLC intended to request BAYARD RUSTIN to serve as organizer and coordinator of this demonstration. ABERNATHY advised the SCLC staff that RUSTIN had apologized to him for his recent criticism of the PPC and inquired how he might assist in the PPC.

AT-T-1, 5/68

In June, 1960, the "Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.," "The Struggle for Freedom in the South" and the "Southern Christian Leadership Conference Student Defense Fund' in a combined appeal solicited funds from the Soviet Embassy, Czechoslovakian Embassy and the Rumanian Legation all in Washington, D. C. These organizations appealed for assistance in defending the Southern Negroes, who were risking their career, facing jail terms and death in their struggle to make the United States totally democratic. This appeal for contributions was made under six names, one of which was Rev. RALPH D. ABERNATHY, Treasurer, SCLC.

AT-T-2, 6/60

On August 18, 1961 a news release type communication issued by the "Carl Braden Clemency Appeal Committee" was distributed by the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF). This communication revealed that on August 18, 1961 a delegation of Southern Integration Leaders would take petitions, signed by over

18,000 leaders in the field of Human Rights representing over 50 states of the United States to President JOHN F. KENNEDY requesting him to free CARL BRADEN. According to the communication, ABERNATHY was chairman of this delegation.

AT-T-3, 8/61

ABERNATHY on June 9, 1963, conferred with Rev. KING, CLARENCE JONES, and STANLEY LEVISON as to methods of dramatizing a proposed march on Washington, D. C., intending to pressure Congress into enacting Civil Rights legislation.

AT-T-3, 6/63

During the early part of May, 1968, ABERNATHY informed STANLEY LEVISON he was scheduled to speak on May 31, 1968, at commencement exercises of Alabama State College. ABERNATHY requested LEVISON prepare a speech for him to utilize on this occasion and LEVISON agreed to do so.

AT-T-4, 5/68

On May 5, 1968, ABERNATHY discussed with STANLEY LEVISON a proposal that SCLC become a membership organization and conduct a membership drive. They agreed the time was appropriate for implementation of a membership drive.

AT-T-4, 5/68

STANLEY LEVISON on May 7, 1968, advised WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD, Executive Director, SCLC, he would be unable to meet with him and ABERNATHY on May 8, 1968, as previously arranged for the purpose of discussing how operations of SCLC could be made more efficient.

AT-T-4, 5/68

The May 9, 1968, final edition of the Atlanta

Journal, a daily Atlanta newspaper, Page 2A, published an article entitled, "ABERNATHY Says Soul Force, March to Solve Ills of Poor". This article revealed that on May 8, 1968, ABERNATHY addressed the weekly forum of the Atlanta Hungry Club on the theme, "The Poor People's Campaign, A Memorial to Dr. KING". ABERNATHY declared that the PPC was neither begging nor threatening violence but demanding "with a thrust from a non-violent sword".

The above article indicated that on May 8, 1968, ABERNATHY flew to Atlanta from Montgomery, Alabama, to deliver this speech and immediately after left for Birmingham, Alabama.

On May 9, 1968, WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD, informed STANLEY LEVISON that ABERNATHY wished him to express his appreciation to LEVISON for preparing a speech he delivered in Atlanta on May 8, 1968.

AT-T-4, 5/68

In early May, 1968, STANLEY LEVISON complained to WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD it was imperative that ABERNATHY operate SCLC with a firm hand and not spend all his time making public appearances. LEVISON cautioned that if ABERNATHY did not do so, he would find HARRY BELAFONTE and himself reluctant to assist him and SCLC.

AT-T-4, 5/68

On November 17, 1964, DORA E. MC DONALD, Secretary to the President, SCLC, made necessary travel arrangements for Rev. KING and other persons to travel to Oslo, Norway in connection with the presentation of the Nobel Prize to KING. According to the arrangements made by MC DONALD, ABERNATHY was to travel in a group of persons which included BAYARD RUSTIN, LAWRENCE REDDICK, HARRY WACHTEL, and LEONORA WACHTEL.

AT-T-5, 11/64

Rev. KING on May 26, 1966, informed ANDREW J. YOUNG, that a Whitehouse Conference on Civil Rights was to be held June 1-2, 1966. He said in addition to himself and YOUNG, ABERNATHY and RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL would attend this conference.

AT-T-5, 5/66

III. MISCELLANEOUS

The April 10, 1965 edition of the "Philadelphia Evening Bulletin" a daily Philadelphia, Pennsylvania newspaper on Page 3 published an article, "Get Ready - We're Coming, Rev. KING's Aide Tells City." According to the article, ABERNATHY spoke on April 9, 1965, at the Bright Hope Baptist Church, Philadelphia. During his speech ABERNATHY pleaded for a negotiated peace in Vietnam and urged the admission of Red China to the United Nations. He endeavored to explain this did not mean he was giving into Communist philosophy.

On October 13, 1966, the Atlanta Journal on Page 25 of its final edition published an article entitled, "KING, Aides Confer, Discuss Black Power." The article reflected Rev. KING had called a meeting of "top SCLC leaders" to discuss the topic of "Black Power" and future programs of SCLC. According to JUNIUS GRIFFIN the meeting commenced on the evening of October 12, 1966, and was expected to terminate late in the afternoon of October 13 or early October 14, 1966, and "involved eight members of SCLC's Research Committee". The article indicated GRIFFIN named those in attendance at this meeting as ABERNATHY, JAMES BEVEL, MRS. DOROTHY COTTON, Director of Citizenship, SCLC, "New York attorneys" CLARENCE JONES, STANLEY LEVISON, HARRY WACHTEL, RALPH HELSTEIN, "International President of the Packing House Workers" and BAYARD RUSTIN.

The Atlanta Journal on Page 6A of its final edition December 29, 1967, published an article captioned, "KING's Aide Plans World Peace Trip". This article revealed that on January 3, 1968, ABERNATHY would embark on a trip "meet with heads of state, religious and

community leaders in Geneva, Rome, Istanbul, Tel Aviv, Jersuleum, Saigon, Kyoto, Tokyo, and Honolulu". He would also, according to the article, attend a meeting of the International Inter-Religious Symposium on Peace, January 14-17, 1968, in New Delhi, India.

On May 10, 1968, the Atlanta Constitution, a daily Atlanta newspaper, on Page 1 published an article captioned, "Marchers for the Poor Mass Here" bylined ALEX COFFIN. According to this article, ABERNATHY addressed PPC members in Atlanta on the night of May 9, 1968, regarding the PPC. He promised a non-violent crusade but stated, "I don't want anyone to expect me to be MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. . . . I say to the nation, to the United States, with RALPH ABERNATHY, You've got hell on your hands".

IV. DESCRIPTION

The following descriptive data was compiled from information reflected by records of the agencies referred to above.

Name	RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Date of birth	March 11, 1926 Linden, Alabama
Height	5' 8"
Weight	180 pounds
Build	Stocky
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Complexion	Dark
Address	690 Laverne Drive, NW Atlanta, Georgia
Occupation	Minister Pastor of West Hunter Street Baptist Church, Atlanta, Georgia President, SCLC

Marital status	Married JUANITA ABERNATHY Nee JONES
Dependants	Three children
Military service	United States Army August 12, 1944 - October 27, 1945
Army Serial Number	349 94 505

AT 157-257

APPENDIX

INDIVIDUALS

HARRY BELAFONTE

On October 28, 1958, a confidential source advised that according to JEAN SMITH, Secretary at Communist Party Headquarters, New York, HARRY BELAFONTE had been a member of the Young Communist League (YCL) before coming into prominence as an entertainer.

The YCL has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

JAMES BEVEL

BEVEL, in early March, 1966 was observed to be present at the offices of the West Side W.E.B. DuBois Club in Chicago (DCC). Discussion took place at this time centering around reaction to a recent notification that the Attorney General of the United States intended to label the DuBois Clubs as a Communist front. BEVEL, in conversation, stated that he would have ignored this notification, and kept about the work in which he was engaged. He felt that if the DuBois Clubs have a real program of help for the people, then people would answer for the clubs despite any labels applied to them.

Most present agreed that the attack on the DuBois Clubs was a part of the plan by the "establishment" to undermine the civil rights movement. They felt that the recent hearings into Klan activities in this country was only a beginning which would lead to a full attack on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the real target. One of those present stated during the course of this discussion that he was not a Communist, and to this BEVEL was overheard to reply that every thinking American should be. He stated that Negroes have not begun to read yet, but when they do, they will all be socialists.

RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL

On February 26, 1953, a confidential source advised RANDOLPH BLACKWELL had been a member of the Communist Party in the District of Columbia.

A confidential source advised that RANDOLPH BLACKWELL attended a Labor Youth League convention on August 13, 1950, at the Algonquin Club, 1430 Fayetteville Street, Durham, North Carolina.

The Labor Youth League has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CARL and ANNE BRADEN

Mrs. ALBERTA AHEARN, 2311 Payne Street, Louisville, Kentucky, a self-admitted former member of the Communist Party (CP), Louisville, Kentucky, in testifying on December 11 and 13, 1954, in Jefferson County, Kentucky Criminal Court, in a state sedition prosecution against CARL JAMES BRADEN, identified BRADEN and his wife, ANNE BRADEN, as having been known to her as members of the CP, Louisville, Kentucky, from January, 1951, to shortly prior to the time of her testimony.

The Courier - Journal, Louisville, Kentucky, a newspaper of general circulation, on February 3, 1959, reported that CARL BRADEN had been sentenced to one year in prison on a charge of contempt of Congress on February 2, 1959, in Atlanta, Georgia. The story noted that he had been convicted under this charge on January 21, 1959, and that the charge arose from his refusal to answer questions before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

The Louisville Times, Louisville, Kentucky, a newspaper of general circulation, on February 27, 1961, reported that the United States Supreme Court had, on that date, affirmed the contempt of Congress conviction of BRADEN.

The Courier - Journal on May 2, 1961, reported that CARL BRADEN had surrendered to the United States Marshal at Atlanta, Georgia, on May 1, 1961, to begin serving a one-year prison sentence for contempt of Congress.

The Courier - Journal, on February 2, 1962, reported that CARL BRADEN had been released from the Federal Prison Camp at Allenwood, Pennsylvania, on February 1, 1962. BRADEN indicated that he would return to his home, Louisville, Kentucky.

On August 30, 1963, a confidential source advised that CARL BRADEN and his wife, ANNE BRADEN, continue to reside at 4403 Virginia Avenue and are still employed as Field Secretaries for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF).

BENJAMIN J. DAVIS

A confidential source advised on January 21, 1964, that as of that date, BENJAMIN J. DAVIS was National Secretary of the CP, USA.

"The New York Times," August 24, 1964, page 27, column 4, reports that BENJAMIN J. DAVIS, National Secretary, CP, USA, died in New York City on the night of August 22, 1964.

JULIUS GRIFFIN

Source, in June 1964, made available a flyer distributed by the Militant Labor Forum, announcing a party scheduled for May 30, 1964, at 116 University Place, New York City, which was for the purpose of welcoming home the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) presidential candidate. Scheduled to participate in a symposium at this affair was one JULIUS GRIFFIN, author of "New York Times Series on Harlem Hate Gangs." This symposium was described as relating to "What's Behind Harlem Hate Gang Scare?"

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

RALPH HELSTEIN

A confidential source advised on June 16, 1964, that RALPH HELSTEIN resides at 5806 South Blackstone Avenue, Chicago, and is the International President of the United Packinghouse Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, with offices at 608 South Dearborn Street, Chicago.

A confidential source advised in November, 1953, that he was recently advised that HELSTEIN was registered in the Communist Party about 1946, that he (HELSTEIN) joined under pressure and remained in the Party organizationally only a few months.

A confidential source advised on June 20, 1956, that RALPH HELSTEIN, 603 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, was a member of the National Lawyers Guild.

CLARENCE JONES

CLARENCE JONES is the General Counsel for the Gandhi Society for Human Rights, 15 East 40th Street, New York City.

A confidential source advised on February 26, 1957, that he had identified a photograph of CLARENCE JONES as a person whom he knew during late 1953 or early 1954 to be a member of, and in a position of leadership in, the Labor Youth League.

KING, MARTIN LUTHER, JR.

A Communist Party functionary described MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. as a confirmed Marxist in February, 1962.

25

STANLEY LEVISON

A confidential source advised in April, 1964, that STANLEY LEVISON was a secret member of the Communist Party (CP), USA, in July, 1963. In late 1963, and early 1964, he criticized the CP for not being sufficiently militant in the civil rights struggle. LEVISON was described by certain CP leaders as being to the "left" of the CP in his position in civil rights. LEVISON's differences with the CP, however, are merely tactical and he continues his ideological adherence to Communism.

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL

In July, 1962, HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, also known as JACK H. O'DELL, was considered by the Communist Party, USA, as a member of its National Committee.

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL told EDWINA SMITH December 27, 1963, he would not go back to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference on the same basis because he is now a "left person" and if they cannot accept him the way he is then they will have to forget about him.

LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK

LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK is Professor of Social Sciences at Coppin State College, Baltimore, Maryland. He currently resides at 3704 Winterbourne Road, Baltimore, Maryland.

On September 17, 1943, a confidential source advised she had learned that Dr. REDDICK, who was then Director of the Schomburg Library, 103 W. 135th Street, New York City, was one of the most important unpublicized members of the Communist Party (CP). She stated that REDDICK seemed to be a source of information in regard to socialism and communism in the United States and the Soviet Union.

A confidential source on March 23, 1951, said that he met LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK in 1945, through EUGENE GORDON, a staff member of the "Daily Worker" and that both GORDON and BENJAMIN J. DAVIS advised him that LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK was at that time a member of the CP. The source also said that REDDICK was an instructor at the George Washington Carver School.

The "Daily Worker" was an east coast communist newspaper, which suspended publication on January 13, 1958.

The George Washington Carver School has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On February 5 and 11, 1954, LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK was interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Atlanta, Georgia. He, at that time, stated that he was not, and had never been, a member of, or a sympathizer with, the Communist Party.

On January 21, 1964, a confidential source advised that on January 18, 1964, Dr. LAWRENCE REDDICK visited with BENJAMIN J. DAVIS at the home of JACOB [illegible], State Chairman of the CP in Maryland. During conversation between REDDICK and DAVIS, it was mentioned that they had attended school together in Georgia and REDDICK commented that if he had stayed with DAVIS, he would have also joined the CP.

BAYARD RUSTIN

In "The Saturday Evening Post," issue of July 11 - 18, 1964, page 76, BAYARD RUSTIN is the subject of a feature article captioned: "The Lone Wolf of Civil Rights." In it, RUSTIN is said to have come to New York in 1938, as an organizer for the Young Communist League (YCL), and as such, he had the job of recruiting students for the "Party." Furthermore, the article reports that during his first years in New York, RUSTIN gave most of his earnings to the "Party." He reportedly left the "Party" in 1941, the article states.

The "Daily Worker," February 11. 1957, page 1, column 2, reported that BAYARD RUSTIN, Executive Secretary, War Resisters League, was an observer at the 16th National Convention of the Communist Party, United States of America, (CP, USA), held in New York City, on February 9 - 12, 1957.

A confidential source advised on September 20, 1963, that during a meeting of the National Board, CP, USA, on that date, BENJAMIN J. DAVIS remarked that, "RUSTIN calls me constantly--openly."

A confidential source advised on February 19, 20, 1964, that BAYARD RUSTIN contacted BENJAMIN J. DAVIS on those dates and sought his advice as to how he could escape from a speaking engagement to which he was committed. On the latter contact, DAVIS told RUSTIN that he was working on his request and had contacted friends who had contacts with the group to which RUSTIN was to speak.

HARRY WACHTEL

HARRY WACHTEL is the Executive Vice President of the Gandhi Society for Human Rights, 15 East 40th Street, New York, New York. He resides at 29 Split Rock Drive, King Point, Long Island, New York.

A confidential source furnished information in December, 1949, that HARRY H. WACHTEL, 41 Broad Street, New York, New York, was on the list of individuals carried as active members of the National Lawyers Guild.

On March 5, 1944, a confidential source furnished information which revealed that the name HARRY WACHTEL was on the list of names, significance not known, which was maintained at the Headquarters of the Kings County Communist Party at 26 Court Street, Brooklyn, New York.

Regarding HARRY WACHTEL's wife, LEONORA, it is noted that the same confidential source furnished information on March 5, 1944, which revealed her name and address were on a list of names of newly-elected officers of the Bath Beach Club of the Kings County Communist Party.

HOSEA WILLIAMS

During October, 1964, a confidential source advised that on October 3, 1964, RUTH BAILEY, then an employee of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, (SCLC), Harlem, New York Office, while discussing several SCLC personalities with one CONNIE CAMPBELL, referred to WILLIAMS. BAILEY said WILLIAMS had mentioned to her (date not specified) that on a prior occasion (date not specified) HUNTER PITTS O'DELL had told him more about politics than he could read.

ORGANIZATIONS

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS
OF CHICAGO (DCC)

On May 3, 1965, a source advised that on June 30, 1964, a group of young people who attended the founding convention of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) met in Chicago and adopted a statement of purpose and constitution forming the DCC as an affiliate of the national DCA.

A second source advised on May 1, 1967, that DCA chartered clubs in the Chicago area are the West Side DCC and the North Side DCC, neither of which currently maintain a headquarters. There is no central headquarters for the DCC and there are no unchartered clubs in this area.

The second source advised that the majority of DCC members are also members of the CP.

During the past year DCC activity has been almost nonexistent.

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates were told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention.

The second source advised in September, 1966, that MIKE ZAGARELL, CPUSA Youth Director, stated that in Negro communities the Party still supported the plan to build "left" socialist centers and to solidify the Party base through the DCA. This source also advised in September, 1966, that DANIEL RUBIN, CPUSA National Organizational Secretary, stated the Party believes the DCA should have a working-class outlook and be a mass organization favorable to socialism, socialist countries and Marxism, and in April, 1967, advised that GUS HALL, CPUSA General Secretary, indicated the DCA primary emphasis should be on developing mass resistance to the draft.

A third source advised in September, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER was elected chairman of the DCA on September 10, 1967, at the Third National Convention of the DCA held in New York, New York, from September 8-10, 1967.

A fourth source advised during August, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER is a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

A fifth source advised on September 21, 1967, that the headquarters of the DCA is located at 34 West 17th Street, New York, New York.

GANDHI SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

The Gandhi Society for Human Rights was formed for the purpose of developing a philosophy and technique of non-violent civil rights protests. It is a non-action organization and makes no attempt to influence legislation nor participate in demonstrations. The Society furnishes legal assistance in certain civil rights cases. The organization was incorporated June 14, 1962.

THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of January 2, 1957, to supersede Guide published on May 14, 1951, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., contains the following information concerning "The National Lawyers Guild:"

1. Cited as a Communist front.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311, on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 149).

2. Cited as a Communist front which "is the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party, its front organizations and controlled unions" and which "since its inception has never failed to rally to the legal defense of the Communist Party and individual members thereof, including known espionage agents." (Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 3123 on the National Lawyers Guild, September 21, 1950, originally released September 17, 1950.)

3. "To defend the cases of Communist lawbreakers, fronts have been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the confines of the Communist Party itself. Among these organizations are the *** National Lawyers Guild. When the Communist Party itself is under fire these offer a bulwark of protection."

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91).

1 SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

"The Southern Patriot," a monthly publication, shows that it is published by the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF).

"The Southern Patriot" was cited as an "organ" of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 592, June 12, 1947.

The SCHW was cited as a communist front by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 592, June 12, 1947.

An amendment to the charter of the SCHW dated April 26, 1946, changed the name of that organization to the SCEF, and listed its purpose as being to improve the educational and cultural standards of the Southern people in accordance with the highest American democratic institutions, traditions, and ideals.

The SCEF is self-described as having deep roots in the South where it began as the educational wing of the SCHW, organized in 1938 to work for economic and political reform. When the SCHW disbanded in the late 1940's, SCEF continued as an independent organization, rallying support for integration and democracy and helping to stimulate and nurture new movements of the early 1960's. The SCEF maintained headquarters in Louisiana for twenty years, but in 1966 moved its headquarters to Louisville, Kentucky.

A source advised on March 2, 1961, that CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT, a Communist Party functionary, stated at a meeting of the Communist Party in Baltimore, Maryland, on February 25, 1961, that the Communist Party is not connected with any progressive movement but indirectly they do have some influence in the SCEF.

[illegible] 323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-257

Atlanta, Georgia
May 24, 1968

Title	Ralph David Abernathy
Character	Racial Matters
Reference	Report of SA ALAN G. SENTINELLA at Atlanta dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

951-953, 954-963, 964, 965-971

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

DO NOT
DESTROY
FOIPA# N/A

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General October 10, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. E. F. Glenn

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#mDR16
10/18/00 SP2ALM/jj16

10-17-75

Reference is made to the September 8, 1975, SSC request forwarded to the Department of Justice by letter dated September 9, 1975, listing certain documents and other information desired from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum in response to some of the requests.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which is being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

REC-114 62-116395-951

62-116395

OCT 30 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

6-ENCLOSURE

ENC. BEHIND FILE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

EFG:eks
(10)

EFG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

WRW/TJL

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 OCT 30 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Single copies of the 9/8 and 9/9/75, communications are attached to the file copy of the enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

2 - Mr. [illegible]. A. Mintz
(1 [illegible]Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. E. F. Glenn

62-116395

October 10, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#mDR16
10/12/00 SP2 ALM/JG

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General's Office dated September 9, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 8, 1975, SSC requests and specifically to the following Items in those requests: Items 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35.

Item 22 requested all materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964, memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

No separate materials reflecting approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in his November 22 and 27 memoranda to Mr. Belmont could be located. At September 17, 1975, conference with SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein, it was pointed out that the approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations in his memoranda were the initials of the officials on the communication up to and including Mr. Tolson.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW/TWL

EFG:eks
(9)
EFG

~~TOP~~ ~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

WOC

JBA

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-951

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Item 23 requested all materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

No materials could be located reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and/or between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's memorandum to Mr. Belmont, November 27, 1964. It may be assumed that the contacts were either verbal or by routing slip transmission which in either case are not recorded.

Item 25 requested all materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

All documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. are printed documents. Other than the documents themselves, no records exist indicating that these documents were printed or the number of copies printed.

Item 26 requested an identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

There were no attachments to the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

Item 27 requested all materials reflecting that:

a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and
b. "the Director agreed,"
that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr., be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's

February 29, 1968, memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr.; Security Matter - C."

No materials could be located reflecting that "Mr. Tolson has suggested" and "the Director agreed."

Item 30 requested all materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965, memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr.; Security Matter - C."

No materials could be located reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)."

Item 31 requested all materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's January 16, 1964, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

No materials could be located indicating that Eugene Patterson was contacted by FBI personnel concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Item 33 requested all materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta Field Office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government

with representatives of (the Atlanta) Office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964, letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

This Item has been responded to under Item 19 of SSC request dated July 8, 1975.

Item 34 requested all materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964, letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

The only other material responsive to this request has already been furnished to the SSC (e.g.) Sullivan to Belmont memorandum December 24, 1963, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C," which has been separately submitted by the FBI in response to Item 19 of the SSC request July 8, 1975.

1 - The Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 11 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

N
9/11

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: (1) Senate Select Committee Request
(2) Deputy Attorney General Letter to Senator Church

(1) Attached for your attention and as prompt a response as possible is a letter from the SSC with annexations which request certain materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. As you know, requests for materials as they relate to King are, by recent designation of the Committee Chairman, "high priority".

(2) Also attached for forwarding is a copy of a letter sent by the Deputy Attorney General to Chairman Church concerning a matter of interest to Messrs. Bill Cregar and Nick Callahan of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

#MDR 16
10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-951

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 9, 1975

#MOR16
FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2ALM/JG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a list of FBI materials, delivery of which is requested ~~by September 15, 1975~~. according to agreed priorities. JTE

I would also appreciate your making available for Committee staff access, all Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1963. Upon examination of these files, delivery thereafter will be orally requested for specific items in accordance with the provisions of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department which governs Committee requests for materials.

N/O per Bergman

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

Receipt of material covered by Fonda case subpoena hereby acknowledged.
JTE

RECEIVED
SEP 9 1975

62-116395-757

September 8, 1975

DOCUMENT REQUEST

1. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of the informant) of the 2/12/62 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, FBI, subject "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C (00: Atlanta)." NP

2. All materials reflecting the steps taken by the FBI which "prevent(ed) the CPUSA from seizing control of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People," as stated in the last paragraph of page 4 of the enclosure captioned "Communist Party USA" which was attached to Director Hoover's January 10, 1961 letter to Robert Kennedy. Jack? P. NOT OURS

✓3. Reports which were submitted by the Atlanta and New York field offices pursuant to the following instructions which were contained in the second paragraph of page 1 of the February 27, 1962 letter from the FBI Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C, Office of Origin: Atlanta," (a copy of which was disseminated to the New York field office: Nugent NP

> *– New York and Atlanta are instructed to review their files and prepare a report suitable for dissemination which will include all information of a security nature plus complete background data.

4. The "Bureau letters to Atlanta, 7/20/62, to Mobile, 7/20/62, and to Savannah, 9/17/62" which are referenced in the first paragraph of the 10/11/62 memorandum from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C, (00:Atlanta)." NP

5. The "Correspondence received from the Atlanta and New York Offices" as indicated in the first sentence of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C". NP

6. All materials reflecting instructions issued to the New York and Atlanta field offices "to furnish the Bureau recommendations concerning a communist infilitration investigation of (SCLC) and the recommendations received from those two field offices for a "communist infiltration investigation of SCLC", as indicated in the second paragraph of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C". P SPECIFY TIME FRAME

#MDE16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-951

7. The "necessary Manual changes" which were "attached for approval" to Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist."

NP

8. All materials which support the following statement of Director Hoover which was noted on Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist":

P MORE SPECIFIC

> Just a few weeks ago you contended that the Communist influence in the racial movement was ineffective and infinitesimal.

9. The September 5, 1963 letterhead memorandum to the Attorney General and "the related prior memoranda" which are referred to in the first paragraph of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell."

NP

10. The July 3, 1963 letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Hunter Pitts O'Dell which was attached to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

NP

11. All materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

?NP

12. The "Brief on the above-captioned matter and subsequent memoranda on the same subject matter" which are referred to in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

O.K. BUT NEED TO DISCUSS SUBSEQUENT MEMORANDA

13. The "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1953" and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956" which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

1963?

14. All materials reflecting or pertaining to Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney Committee", as referred to in his February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning a 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, as well as an unexcised copy of the February 5 memorandum.

NP

15. All materials which reflect the basis for the following statements which are contained in Mr. Baumgardner's May 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Internal Security Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, Administrative Matter":

↑ Married ?

a. "About three months prior to the March on Washington (8/28/63), we intensified our investigation concerning communist influence into the racial movement. . . .";

b. "Martin Luther King, head of SCLC, has challenged the Bureau on this point."

16. All materials reflecting the "previous arrangements" referred to in the November 18, 1964 memorandum from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, subject "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director, 10:00 a.m., 11/18/64 (10:05 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.)"

? contacted 7/8 NP

17. All materials reflecting, concerning, or pertaining to:

a. "(S)tatements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Georgia, at the time he highly criticized the FBI. His statements were made on 11/18/62 during an interview in the Robing Room of the Riverside Church in New York City where King had just preached a sermon." (This quotation is taken from the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of the 11/19/64 memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. DeLoach captioned "Director's Briefing of Women Reporters on 11/18/64")

R

b. Comments, responses, and recommendations made, inspections conducted, and/or any other actions taken as a result of the statements of Dr. King which are described in Item 17.a. above.

Coordination Inspection Div ? TIME FRAME

18. Identification of the author of the notation "Being Handled, 11/20/64, D" which appears at the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters."

Nugent / Wick

P 19. All materials reflecting the manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "(b)eing handled" as noted on the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters," together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom.

NP 20. The response to John Doar's August 19, 1964 letter to Mr. James R. Malley which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

NP 21. The division and section assignment of James R. Malley as of August 19, 1964. Coord w/ Adm Div

PREV. HANDLED 7/14 22. All materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964 memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

P HANDLED 23. All materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

24. The table of contents page(s) and/or chapter or section headings of:

   a. NP The article captioned "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" which was attached to Mr. Sullivan's 10/15/63 memorandum to Mr. Belmont under the same caption.

   b. The paper which was the up-to-date revision of the article described in Item 24 (a) above and which paper was attached to Mr. Sullivan's November 22, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

   c. The memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which was transmitted with the December 21, 1964 letter from Director Hoover to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.

d. The document which was the "current revision of the previous analysis captioned 'Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis'" and which document was enclosed with Mr. Brennan's April 10, 1967 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Communist Influence in Racial Matters - A Current Analysis."

e. The "current study" entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr. - A Current Analysis" which was enclosed with Director Hoover's March 14, 1968 letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall.

? 25. All materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a. - e. above. (Do not supply the documents themselves.) ?. What mean

26. An identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24 a. - e. above. (Do not supply the attachments themselves.)

27. All materials reflecting that:

? a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and

b. "the Director agreed,"

that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr. be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's 2/29/68 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

Klein 28. All materials which reflect any recommendations for, and/or decisions relating to, the sending of Director Hoover's August 25, 1967 letter to specified field offices captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Internal Security." Cointel Pro Ryan?

Klein 29. All materials reflecting the approval of proposals contained in Mr. G. C. Moore's February 29, 1968 memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence." Ryan?

30. All materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965 memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

31. All materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's 1/16/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C.")

32. All materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position at that time (the end of a 90-day period, or sooner if conditions permit) to take further action against King and the SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau," as promised in Mr. Sullivan's December 24, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

33. All materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta field office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government with representatives of (the Atlanta) office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

to #16

34. All materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

35. All materials comprising the "separate correspondence" between FBI Headquarters and the Atlanta field office concerning the "specific matters dealt with in Atlanta's letter (of 4/14/64)" as indicated in the Director's 4/24/64 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

Search to end

36. The communication from the Atlanta field office to FBI Headquarters by which "this publication has previously been furnished to the Bureau on 6/26/64," as stated in the second paragraph of page 3 of the 7/7/64 letter from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, IS-C."

Deegan's Office

37. The "separate correspondence" by which the Atlanta field office was "directed to furnish the Bureau available information concerning the alleged escapades of (the Reverend Ralph) Abernathy, including the obtaining of official court records," as referred to in the Director's July 23, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

38. The letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers which was originally attached to Mr. Sullivan's 11/27/64 memorand m to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement -- A Current Analysis." (See note on 11/27/64 memorandum indicating that the letter was "revised.")

39. "The letter" which is the subject of the first and second paragraphs of Director Hoover's February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning his 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, and which letter the Director told the Attorney General, he would "check on" and any other materials relating to "the letter".

P 40. All materials concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. being named "Man of the Year" by Time Magazine in December 1963 - January 1964.

P 41. All materials concerning or pertaining to Dr. King's Papal audience in Rome in September 1964.

P 42. Speech delivered by Director Hoover at Loyola College in November 1964, and all materials pertaining thereto.

43. All Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") from 1963 until 1968 for:

NP

a. William D. Campbell, and
b. John Matter.

P
ATLANTA

45. All materials reflecting, concerning or pertaining to electronic surveillance, feasibility studies or surveys, physical surveillance, or photographic surveillances, and/or any proposals, recommendations or discussions of any of the foregoing surveillances, studies or surveys, with respect to Dr. King's "hideaway", or Fred Bennett's apartment, or premises located at 3006 Delmar Lane, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia, or with respect to any other premises, apartment, or "hideaway", used, owned, or leased by Dr. King or Fred Bennett.

Klem
Cointelpro
Ryan?

46. The following materials which are referred to in the October 9, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C":
    a. "NYlet 9/26/62";
    b. "further steps to carry out this counterintelligence plan will be handled at the Bureau";
    c. "memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption dated October 8, 1962, ARW:cdb."

X

47. The "ATairtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated 4/1/64 captioned "CPUSA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C" and "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C", which are referenced in the 4/13/64 Airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York and Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal SEcurity - C (Negro Question).

48. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of informants) of the 8/15/66 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, subject "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Secuirty - C (Stanley David Levison.)"

49. The Memorandum which "the Director had noted" as referred to in the NOTE at the bottom of the 4/13/65 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, subject "Communist Party, USA Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Nicholas A. Kourambis) (Negro Question)."

Klein Cointel Pro Ryan?

50. All materials reflecting "comments" and "specific recommendations" submitted by the Atlanta, Chicago, and New York field offices as the result of the instructions contained in the last paragraph of the May 18, 1967 letter from the Director the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Martin Luther King)."

Klein Cointel Pro Ryan?

51. All materials reflecting the product of the "comprehensive review of Levison's Bureau case file" as indicated in the NOTE on the 7/18/66 airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Stanley David Levison)."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document: Re 9/9/75 request materials pertaining to King and SCLC. Items 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/1886

62-116395-951

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/8/75, items 16 thru 27 and 30 thru 35.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

~~TS~~

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/STE

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr. and Southern Christian Leadership Conference: November 18, 1964 memorandum regarding "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director; Statements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Ga., at the time he highly criticized the FBI; Identification of the author of a notation and initals on a 11/20/64 memorandum; manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "being handled" together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom; response which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party; where an Special Agent was assigned as of 8/19/64; Materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position in in 90 days time to take further action against King and SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau" as reflected in 12/24/63 memorandum, subject CP, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters.

62-116395

TREAT AS YELLOW 5-W0(18

3791 (6-76) FMK:fmk (4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

T-F-J [illegible] 9/12/75

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 17 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 9/16

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request Dated September 12, 1975

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting various materials and information relating to mail interception. Please prepare an appropriate response to that part of the SSC letter which is directed to the FBI.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALM/JRG

cc: Paul Daly

Ltr + Clm to AG mntl Clm to SSC 10/17/75 LED/sw

ENCLOSURE

REC-114 62-116395-952

21 OCT 30 1975

1-Ad Hoc

62-116395

84 NOV 3 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 12, 1975

#MDR16 --
10/12/00 SE-2ALM/JTG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a request for Department of Justice and FBI materials.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff jm
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
SEP 12 1975
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-952

1. All materials reflecting Justice Department knowledge of mail opening by FBI or CIA employees prior to December 1, 1974.

2. With respect to letters written by the following individuals or organizations addressed to third parties, and to letters written by third parties addressed to the following individuals or organizations, copies of which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI, including field offices, the following questions are asked:

   a. What are the dates of such letters?

   b. What are the names and addresses of the senders?

   c. What are the names and addresses of the addressees?

   List of individuals and organizations:

   1. Angela Davis
   2. Jeremy Stone
   3. Jane Fonda
   4. Ralph Abernathy
   5. Steven Slepian
   6. Jack Nelson
   7. Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D. C.

3. All materials pertaining to the acquisition by the FBI of all letters referred to in item 2 above. In the response to this item, priority consideration should be given to the following letter:

   Date: March 25, 1970
   Name and Address of Sender: Jane Fonda
   10744 Chalon Road
   West Los Angeles, California
   Name and Address of Addressee: Leo Matarasso
   29 Rue de Touron
   Paris 5, France

#mDE16

10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-752

Mr. J. B. Adams 10/17/75

Legal Counsel

HOUSTUDY
SENSTUDY -75

On the late afternoon of October 11, 1975, Douglas Marvin, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, called me and requested that the Attorney General be furnished a brief statement concerning FBI relationships with the Senate Select Committee and the House Select Committee for inclusion in a statement being prepared for submission to the White House. Mr. Marvin said that the Attorney General's intention was to bring together anticipated problems concerning the two committees in the hope that a means for resolving these matters might be found.

I discussed this request with Mr. Jenkins in the absence of Mr. Callahan and I returned Mr. Marvin's call and dictated to the Attorney General's secretary. I requested her to furnish me with a copy of the dictation. Attached is the page furnished by the Attorney General's secretary which I received on October 15, 1975.

This matter was brought to the attention of the Executives Conference on October 14, 1975.

#MORI6
10/12/00 SP-2ALM/JTG

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(8)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 OCT 30 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN

84 OCT 30 1975

FBI Relationships with the Senate and House Select Committees

Senate Select Committee

FBI relationships with the Senate Select Committee generally have been harmonious with responses to the Committee requests delivered promptly. When difficulties have occurred they have been overcome by negotiation and tolerance on both sides. Future difficulties that may be confronted and require similar resolution include the scope of any public hearing regarding electronic surveillance of foreign nationals or their agents and establishments.

House Select Committee

In the past the FBI has experienced the following difficulties with the House Select Committee:

(1) It has held public hearings which were orchestrated to present adverse views without an opportunity for prepared rebuttal, such as occurred on October 9, 1975, regarding electronic surveillance matters;

(2) It has demanded delivery of documents on unreasonably short notice considering the time necessary to locate and prepare for delivery the enormous quantity of documents called for;

(3) It has interviewed employees, former employees and confidential sources of the FBI without first advising the FBI of the proposed interview and has demanded the appearance of agents below the policy-making level.

A large number of documents dealing with electronic surveillance conducted without a warrant between 1970 and July 30, 1975, were furnished to the Committee on Friday, October 10, 1975. Certain excisions in these documents were made and it remains to be seen whether the Committee will accept the determinations made as to what types of information, e.g., identities of subjects who were monitored, should have been excised.

The overriding concern for the future is the need to establish an understanding on both sides of the policies to be followed by each in responding to the Committee's mandate. General agreement to specified operating procedures would alleviate the suspicion on the part of the Committee and the fear of Committee ~~re~~esponsibility on the part of the FBI.
irre

#M006/6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10/20/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP2ALM/JTB

During the discussion on 10/20/75 concerning the forthcoming testimony of Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, Mr. Wannall mentioned to the Senate Select Committee Staff Members present (John T. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, Michael Epstein, and Mark Gitenstein) that in view of the fact these hearings would be open to the public the Committee would not be fully briefed concerning the background involved in the Bureau mail opening programs because of the sensitivity involved. Elliff indicated that he was in agreement and that he would contact F. A. O. Schwartz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, to see if executive session testimony could be arranged. Elliff subsequently telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and advised him that Mr. Wannall could testify in executive session on mail openings in the late afternoon on 10/21/75 at approximately 4:30 p.m. subject to the approval of the Senators.

After consultation with Assistant Director Wannall, Elliff was advised that this would be acceptable and that Mr. Wannall would appear for executive session testimony concerning mail openings if the Senators agree to accept executive session testimony.*

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, was advised of the possible executive session testimony and interposed no objection to the Bureau giving such testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

REC-114 62-116395-953

*Section Chief
W.A. Branigan
will accompany
Wannall

PVD:lad
(8)

PVD
PVD
WRW

8 [illegible]T 30 1975

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 10-20-75 James Dick, staff member for captioned Committee, who is in charge of the hearings on mail openings, advised the public session is to be held on 10-24-75 and furnished a copy of what that Committee considers to be the issues raised by the Bureau's mail opening programs. (Copy is attached.) Additionally, he advised that the Committee plans to refer to the eight Bureau mail opening programs by numerical code names in their public hearing. He furnished the following code numbers with the Bureau code name:

Code name #1 - Z-Coverage
Code name #2 - Sam Survey
Code name #3 - Gus Survey
Code name #4 - Sun Survey
Code name #5 - Joe Survey
Code name #6 - Chiprop Survey
Code name #7 - Chiclet Survey
Code name #8 - Chican Survey

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/20/00 BY SP2ALM/
#MD816

Dick advised that this will be used by the Senators during the hearing and that Mr. Wannall and Mr. Branigan, who will tesitfy, should be familiar with these numerical definitions.

REC-114

62-?-954

RECOMMENDATION:

Intelligence Division should review the attached issue paper presented by the Committee to be familiar with the questions raised by the Bureau's mail opening programs as seen by the Committee.

21 OCT 30 1975

3

Enclosure

JAM

PVD:dkg (8)

84 NOV 3 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI #mori6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

Issues

The following issues are among those which are raised by the FBI mail opening programs and the FBI's cooperation in CIA's New York intercept project:

(1) Whether mail opening as an investigative technique should ever, under carefully circumscribed regulations and with proper authorization, be sanctioned in the counter-espionage field. The FBI mail opening programs raise this issue with more force than the CIA programs since, in general, the FBI programs were more circumscribed, more tightly controlled, and more focused than the CIA programs. The FBI programs were also very successful in achieving their counter-espionage goals. Mail opening does represent an extremely valuable ~~menas~~ means of intercepting the communications link in espionage communications. On the other hand, the sanctity of the mails is an established tradition in the United States, and it is doubtful that any selection criteria could be sufficiently precise to allow for the opening of only mail to or from illegal agents.

(2) Whether the mail openings that did occur were properly authorized. It is clear that FBI Director Hoover personally approved the majority of the mail opening programs. The one which was implemented without Headquarters approval was terminated shortly after it came to the attention of Headquarters. It does not appear, however, that any Attorney General ever authorized these programs or that the exact nature and full scope of the programs was even brought to the attention of any Attorney General, even though opportunities existed to do so. Similarly, despite frequent contacts with the Postal Inspection Service regarding the implementation of these programs, no Chief Postal Inspector was ever informed that the FBI contemplated the actual opening of mail.

(3) Whether the legal implications of the mail openings were adequately considered. There is no evidence that legal considerations were discussed after 1951, and there is evidence that Headquarters personnel who ran the programs either considered them illegal or ignored the legal implications entirely.

(4) Whether the mail opening programs were adequately controlled to ensure that they remained focused on counter-espionage matters. As noted above, the programs did generate some information regarding domestic organizations and criminal activity, although the primary purpose always remained in the counter-espionage field. The fact

ENCLOSURE

62

G-7

that these programs did generate such information apparently came as a surprise to the Headquarters officials who ran the programs and the obvious questions are whether this was permitted or encouraged, and, if neither, how it could have happened.

(5) Whether the selection of names for inclusion on the CIA's Watch List in the Hunter Project was sufficiently controlled and limited. Because the FBI requested the CIA for information on categories such as peace organizations and on specific individuals and groups involved in the peace and women's movement, a serious question is raised whether there was sufficient restraint on the use of this source.

NOTE: As discussed in the FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS summary, several of the FBI mail opening programs utilized, as selection criteria, various "indicators" which, with some accuracy, identified letters sent by or addressed to foreign illegal agents. The fact of these indicators has been made public by FBI officials in recent weeks. But: these indicators are still felt to be valid and the FBI has no reason to believe that they are not still being used. It is recommended, therefore, that the Committee avoid questions which would require in response an elaboration of the nature of these indicators.

T~~O~~P SE~~C~~RET

STAFF MEMORANDUM

EXECUTIVE SESSION ON FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS

FBI Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and William Branigan, Chief of the Soviet Section of the FBI Counterintelligence Branch, have requested an opportunity to appear before the Select Committee in executive session to discuss classified aspects of the FBI mail opening programs. Both of them will be witnesses at the public hearing on FBI mail openings on Friday.

The Committee staff has agreed that the public hearing will not disclose the following aspects of FBI mail openings:

1. The identity of the foreign nations involved, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba, Mexico, Hong Kong, Japan, most Western European countries, and several Central and Latin American countries.

2. The fact the mail to and from the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet United Nations Mission, the Cuban United Nations Mission, other Soviet-bloc Embassies was selectively opened. (S)

3. The "indicators" used as criteria for selective opening of mail screened in several other programs designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States. (The fact that there were "indicators," but not their nature, may be disclosed publicly.)

4. The identities of specific individuals and groups whose mail was opened either by the FBI or by the CIA at the request of the FBI. (FBI officials will state publicly that some of these, especially in the category "peace and protest groups," were not adequately justified.) Some of these included:

   Leonard Bernstein
   Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam
   Jeremy Stone
   Cambridge Center for Study of Public Policy

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-7-11

The following are questions which cannot be discussed in public hearings because of this agreement. They should be raised at this executive session:

1. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail openings aimed at mail to and from the [Soviet and Soviet-bloc embassies?]
2. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail opening programs using "indicators" and designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States? [(Soviet and Cuban)]
3. What was the actual intelligence value of the material supplied to the FBI by the CIA from its mail opening operation?
4. How good are the "indicators" in selecting mail of foreign intelligence agents only and not mail of American citizens or others who are not foreign agents?
5. What standards were used for opening mail to and from Communist China, and what was the intelligence value of these programs?
6. Do FBI counterespionage officials desire to resume any mail opening programs, with proper authorization from Congress and the Attorney General?
7. How do the benefits of mail opening compare with the benefits of warrantless electronic surveillance currently used by the FBI for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes?

Department of the Treasury / Internal Revenue Service / Washington, D.C. 20224

Commissioner

REC-114 OCT 20 1975

#MDR 16

10/12/00 SP2 ALM/TG

Mr. William Creager
Section Chief, CI-2
Federal Bureau of Investigation
John Edgar Hoover Building
Room 4123
Washington, D. C. 20535

Dear Mr. Creager:

Representatives of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who have been reviewing files of our former Special Service Staff, have asked for copies of the enclosed two FBI reports relating to Nathanial Walter, Junior.

I would appreciate your letting me know as soon as reasonably convenient whether the FBI has any objection to our providing the Staff with copies of the reports.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Thomas V. Glynn

Thomas V. Glynn
Assistant to the Commissioner

OK for Dissemination to the [illegible] SSC. 10/21/75. GTT

Glynn advised 10/22/75 WOB

Enclosures

copy to: Mr. Arthur Jefferson
Senate Select Committee Staff

File 62-116395

ENCLOSURE

[illegible] Tunstall [illegible] x [illegible] 10/20/75

REC-114

62-116395-955

OCT 30 1975

84 OCT 30 1975

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

F[illegible]ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-3597

Chicago, Illinois
November 10, 1971

U

NATHANIEL WALTER JUNIOR

Nathaniel Walter Junior has been identified as a member of the Black Panther Party (BPP).

> The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government.

Junior appeared in United States District Court, Chicago, Illinois, on January 18, 1971, and entered a plea of guilty on Federal Firearms charges against him, as well as on a bail jumping charge. On February 5, 1971, United States District Judge Sam J. Perry, Chicago, Illinois, sentenced Junior to three years probation on the above charges.

On September 28, 1971, Junior was interviewed by a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Junior advised that he was no longer a member of the BPP, having resigned as a result of a dispute with Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Illinois BPP, regarding the unauthorized use of Panther funds by Rush. He further alienated himself with the BPP when, in January, 1971, he refused to repay the BPP $1,500.00 that had been paid as bail to secure his release from jail on the aforementioned charges.

Junior furnished the following information concerning his activities with the BPP:

He originally joined the BPP at the invitation of Fred Hampton, in the Fall of 1968. Hampton at the time was the Chairman of the Illinois BPP and was subsequently

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

62-116395-955

ENCLOSURE

slain by Cook County States Attorney Officers, December 4, 1969, who at the time were executing a search warrant in Chicago, Illinois.

While in the party, Junior held the title of Field Secretary and was privy to administrative matters relating to the BPP. On two occasions he traveled out of the state on party business, once to BPP National Headquarters for the purpose of meeting the National Staff, and to Washington, D. C., to attend the Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention (RPCC).

The RPCC, held August 7, 1970, at Howard University, Washington, D. C., was organized by the BPP to structure "a constitution that will guarantee us the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; a constitution that serves the people instead of a constitution that serves the ruling class".

In early 1969, Junior negotiated to purchase a quantity of weapons from an undercover United States Treasury Agent, for the BPP and as a result was arrested on a Federal Firearms charge. While out of jail on this charge, Junior learned that he had been indicted and decided to jump bond and leave the country.

Junior left the country for Canada, through the aid of persons connected with the draft resistence movement, and who did not know of his pending criminal charges or his affiliation with the BPP. He declined to identify these persons who aided in his leaving the country or those who aided him in Canada.

The BPP in no way aided him in leaving the country, nor did they provide him any financial assistance while he was a fugitive and for this he is bitter.

Junior decided to leave Canada and return to Chicago for the purpose of surrendering to face trial on the Federal Firearms Act charge, because of his parents' poor health.

Upon his return, he learned the BPP was no longer functioning on a democratic basis but was now being dominated by Bobby Rush, Illinois Minister of Defense. Junior sought to bring the party back to its former state, by calling for reforms and reorganization, which was resisted by Rush and he was subsequently removed from the Central Staff and he resigned from the party in September, 1970.

He is in no way involved with the BPP, or other extremist activities, at this time nor does he have any plans to resume his association with the BPP, as he feels "The BPP and other organizations are being duped by white intellectual revolutionary hobbyists, who are taking advantage of the hopelessness and frustrations of the Black community to exercise their theories on political and social democracy."

Junior claims to have no knowledge of any BPP underground, now or in the past, but admits that preliminary discussion regarding an underground cell of the BPP was had in the early development of the Illinois BPP, but that plan like most others never got off the ground.

The BPP was, and is, a big disappointment to Junior in that they departed from their original concept of neighborhood protection against police brutality, to one of international identification with communism. He maintained his association with the BPP in spite of this change in philosophy because of his respect and confidence in Fred Hampton, who rationalized that in order to further the cause of neighborhood control they'd need the financing and good will of governments oppose to people oppression, no matter where these people were.

Junior feels that the BPP is dead in Illinois and blames its demise to its identification with communism and coalitions with white revolutionary groups.

He has three things to show for his membership in the BPP; (1) probation on the Federal Firearms charge, (2) three years probation on State narcotics case (which he claims was a frame by police, but to which he entered a plea, "as part of a deal", at the urgency of his BPP attorney); and (3) an outstanding

indictment with the State of Illinois charging he and fourteen others with kidnaping and related crimes. Junior advised that this was another case of police harassment of the BPP, and another example of how the BPP has lost its attractiveness to people in Chicago. Of the sixteen people who were originally charged in the kidnapping case, including the deceased Hampton, only two of those, Yvonne King, and Billy Brooks, continue as members of the BPP.

Junior claims to have no contact with any members or former members of the BPP, except when the persons charged with the kidnaping report for trial every month. Junior cites the numerous continuances of the kidnaping case as an example of white hobbyists playing with young black revolutionary hopefuls. To him the continuances represent a conspiracy on the part of the BPP attorneys and the States Attorney's Office, as on alternate months they ask that the case be continued and neither ever objects. If he could afford it he would not avail himself of the BPP attorney's services.

Junior is required to report to his probation officer twice per month and is not allowed to travel outside the State of Illinois, without prior permission.

Logical sources, in positions to know, advise that Junior is not now active with the BPP, and has not been so in more than a year.

On October 29, 1971, the FBI recontacted Junior and learned that his pending kidnaping case was continued from October 26, 1971, until November 30, 1971.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois
June 9, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. 157-3597

NATHANIEL WALTER JUNIOR

Nathaniel Walter Junior has been identified as a former member of the Black Panther Party (BPP), who during the time he was a BPP member was indicted on state charges of kidnaping and related crimes, with other BPP members, on June 8, 1969, by the Illinois Cook County Grand Jury.

> The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government.

The case against Junior, and the other BPP members indicte with him, has never come to trial having been continued numerous times.

On May 10, 1972, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed Junior as he appeared in State Court, and the case was continued until June 15, 1972.

Reliable confidential sources advise that Junior is not a BPP member, nor does he associate with the membership of this organization.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALM/BTB

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

62-116395-955

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

Mr. W. R. Wannall

10/22/75

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

F. J. Cassidy

#MDR16

10-13-00 SP2 ALM/JTG

COINTELPROS

This is to identify two serials, copies of which were furnished to Barbara Banoff of the staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) for retention in the Committee's files.

Banoff on 10/10/75 requested copies of a memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Belmont dated 3/30/60 and a letter to the New York Office and 15 other offices dated 3/31/60, both captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program," be furnished to the Committee. Banoff stated she believed these documents had previously been requested but she was unable to locate them in the Committee files. She said she desired to have these documents because they set forth a logical program by which the FBI made an effort to prevent the Communist Party from infiltrating legitimate mass organizations. As an aside, she stated she thought the FBI was successful in this effort, indicating she felt the technique was worthy and proper.

Copies of the above two documents were made available to a SSC representative on 10/22/75. Copies of the documents together with a cover page indicating their receipt are attached. No excisions were required in these documents.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures
62-116009

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)

DR:lfj
(3)

62-1163

NOT RECORDED
46 OCT 31 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN

4 NOV 4 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

DATE: 10/23/75

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP-2ALM/JTG

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum advises that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) intends to release to the press copies of eight FBI documents (attached). The release of these documents is scheduled for 10/24/75, following the appearance of Assistant Directors Wannall and Mintz and Section Chief Branigan before the SSC.

These documents were made available to the SSC responsive to specific requests. They have been excised and declassified where necessary. With regard to dissemination of FBI documents to the Select Committees of Congress, both the White House and the Department have held that, once a document has been excised, declassified and furnished to either Select Committee of Congress, it is that Committee's property to do with whatever that Committee deems appropriate. However, we do have an understanding with the Committee that allows for more extensive excisions once the Committee decides to make documents available to the press. Personnel in the Senstudy Project have reviewed the attached eight documents and have made additional excisions which are acceptable to the SSC. These excisions are designed to protect Bureau sources, targets and, where possible, the identity of Bureau personnel.

REC-114 62-116395-956

The contents of the documents that will be made available generally portray the Bureau in a favorable light. They highlight: (1) tight supervision and control of the mail intercept programs; (2) general objectives of the program; (3) accomplishments; and (4) Departmental officials' knowledge of the existence of some of these programs.

OCT 30 1975

Enclosures

62-116395

WOC:lhb lhb
(6)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

84 OCT 30 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

Of course, it would be desirable if no documents were released by the SSC; however, Mr. Elliff advises that the senators are desirous of furnishing some documents to the press. If, in fact, Bureau documents have to be released, it appears that the ones the SSC plans to use are favorable to the Bureau.

For the information of Bureau officials reviewing the attached documents, no excisions have been made; however, the brackets in red ink show what information will be obliterated from the documents prior to their release to the press.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Callahan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Tolson DATE: 2/27/65

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: THE LONG COMMITTEE

The Attorney General called on the morning of February 27, 1965, to advise he wanted to consult with the Bureau on certain problems raised by the Long Committee, which is exploring the use of mail covers, et cetera. He noted there was a possible problem concerning Chief Inspector Montague's testimony and whether it was necessary for Montague to change his testimony. Also, he felt that Internal Revenue Service had been using investigative techniques which they should not use and this could pose a problem. He said that the President had asked him to coordinate with all executive agencies concerning the problems raised by the Long Committee.

Inspector Moore and I met with the Attorney General i his office this afternoon. Mr. Courtney Evans was present. I told the Attorney General that in Montague's testimony he was told by Attorney Fensterwald that if any of the questions had national security implications Montague should not answer them. Consequently, Montague was estopped from doing other than answe in the negative when asked questions touching on national security. With this interpretation, it was questionable whethe an attempt should be made to change or explain Montague's testimony, particularly in view of the obvious lack of judgment on the part of Fensterwald and the desire of Long for publicity I made it clear to the Attorney General that from our dealings with Montague, he was a man of integrity and sacrificed his personal desires for the welfare of the country and had coopera fully with us. The Attorney General said he had no intention of changing one word of Montague's testimony, but he was considering advising Long and Fensterwald that there were extreme delicate national security matters touching on the area being covered by the committee and there could be exceptions to the answers given in the testimony when they touched on such sensitive security matters. He said further that he contemplat seeing Senator Long and impressing on him that the committee would not want to stumble by mistake into an area of extreme interest to the national security as they nearly did in a matte

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/
#MDE 16

1 - Mr. Tolson
2 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Moore

REC- 56

CONTINUED - OVER

EX-114

25 MAR 12 1965

[illegible]

affecting CIA. (Apparently CIA got wind of some inquiries by the committee relative to their secret operation and went to the committee and warned them off.) Katzenbach contemplates asking for a list of the witnesses who will appear before the committee together with a brief summary of the expected testimon On the basis of this, he will be able to advise Senator Long when he should steer clear of a sensitive area.

I told Mr. Katzenbach that I certainly agree that this matter should be controlled at the committee level but that I felt pressure would have to be applied so that the personal interest of Senator Long became involved rather than on any ideological basis. Mr. Katzenbach said that he had already talked to Vice President Humphrey about Fensterwald, who he considered a wild man, and that Humphrey had promised to talk to Long concerning Fensterwald. Katzenbach said that in addition to the Vice President he might have to resort to pressure from the President himself, although he would prefer to work it out without resorting to the President. He indicated there was no one on the committee itself who could be helpful and that he did not expect any help from Senator Eastland.

Mr. Katzenbach said that he expected troublefrom the possible activities of IRS and the military in the investigative field; that if some of these matters are uncovered before the committee they will tend to undermine the restricted and tightly controlled operations of the Bureau. I told him that our operations are tightly controlled and particularly in the delicate areas of concern, we restrict ourselves to important security matters.

Mr. Katzenbach said he was going to see Senator Long on Monday and wanted to know if the Bureau would like someone to go along with him. I told him no.

ACTION:

Mr. Katzenbach said he would advise us of the results of his conversation with Long. He also asked that I advise the Director of our discussion and I told him I would.

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: The Long Committee

I called Mr. DeLoach and briefed him on this problem in order that he might contact Senator Eastland in an effort to warn the Long Committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense. (Of couse I made no mention of such a contact to the Attorney General.) Mr. DeLoach advised that Senator Eastland is in Mississippi and he will contact him upon his return Monday.

I don't see what all
the excitement is about.
I would have no hesitan
in discontinuing all techni-
ques — technical coverag
microphones, trash co
mail covers etc. While it
might handicap us I doubt
they are as valuable as
believe & none warrant
being used to justify

9:40 AM

March 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/TTG

Sen. Committee on Judiciary

The Attorney General called and advised that he had talked to Senator Long last night. Senator Long's committee is looking into mail covers et cetera. The Attorney General stated he thought somebody had already spoken to Senator Long as he said he did not want to get into any national security area and was willing to take steps not to do this. The Attorney General stated that Mr. Fensterwald was present for part of the meeting and Fensterwald had said that he had some possible witnesses who are former Bureau Agents and if they were asked if mail was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General stated that before they are called, he would like to know who they are and whether they were ever involved in any program touching on national security and if not, it is their own business, but if they were, we would want to know. The Attorney General stated the Senator promised that he would have a chance to look at the names if he wanted to, personally and confidentially, and the list would have any names involving national security deleted and he would tell the Senator how many but no more.

The Attorney General stated that the Postmaster General is going down there this morning [illegible] which he, the Attorney General, thought would be helpful to Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department.

The Attorney General stated that Senator Long also said he is not going to propose legislation to abolish mail covers as he thought they served a useful purpose but he did think that control should be tightened. I stated I thought there was great laxity in the matter of mail covers and the matter of tapping telephones.

I stated I have always been of the view and recommended back when Tom Clark was Attorney General that no agency of the Government should tap a telephone except with the written approval of the Attorney General. I stated

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale 4
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

XEROX JEH:edm (10)

REC- 38 62-

9 MAR 3 1965

MAR 3 - 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

8

there would then be in one place a list of all phone taps and the purpose and reason for them. I stated that it is a fact, insofar as I am concerned, that I am the only head of an agency who does not have authority to tap telephones. I stated that I know that subordinates down the line in some agencies will tap phones without the knowledge of the chief of the agency and there is grave suspicion in Washington by some newspapermen that their phones have been tapped by agencies of the Government trying to find out where they are getting their information. I stated I have always been opposed to the law whereby it is necessary to get the authority of a court to tap phones because of the composition of some of our courts and the employees thereof, but I have always felt that the President should issue an Executive Order confidentially to all agencies that all phone tapping be discontinued except when specifically approved by the Attorney General so there would be in one place a list and then if any committee in Congress got on the warpath, the Attorney General would have a list he could vouch for as being the only phones tapped by the Government. The Attorney General stated that made sense. I stated many agencies are opposed because they realize there would be a marked restriction. I stated we only have 45 phone taps, which is a low number for a country the size of ours and the area we have to cover. The Attorney General stated no one has any idea how many phone taps the whole Government has.

I stated there is also a school being conducted in California by a private organization which instructs the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service in the matter of phone tapping and they have sent their own personnel there to be trained. I stated Internal Revenue has also from time to time hired private outside phone tappers to do their tapping. I stated it is that type of thing if there were a real investigation which would come out. The Attorney General commented that he would not guarantee some of it won't come out. I stated I was amazed when I learned of the school in California as I saw a reference to it in the newspaper and wanted to know what it was and what officers attended. I stated we have our own instructors and do it ourselves.

I stated I thought the Attorney General had made good headway with Senator Long. The Attorney General stated he thought it would be helpful, but his

problem is that he thinks the Senator is fine but he does not think that Fensterwald is as straightforward, or to put it another way that Fensterwald is smart and devious and the Senator is straightforward and not very bright and that is the problem. I stated I thought that Fensterwald is trying to get publicity for the Senator. The Attorney General stated the Senator said he did not want to get into this and he would give him, the Attorney General, the names and a summary of the testimony and told Fensterwald to do so, but he, the Attorney General, can't say Fensterwald is going to do it; that he will on some but he did not know that he would on all. I stated I had no faith or confidence in Fensterwald and neither did Senator Eastland. The Attorney General stated that Senator Eastland may have already talked to Senator Long or else the Vice President, but somebody had waked him up. I stated Senator Eastland said he would do it Wednesday, but he may have called him.

The Attorney General stated that is where it stands now and we shall see what happens.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11 42 AM
DATE 3-2-65
BY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: October 2, 1964

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. J.P. Mohr
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D.E. Moore
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Litrento

SUBJECT: [redacted] CODE WORD
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

Prior memoranda have advised of the starting of the trial of the Soviet illegal agents in this case, Mr. and Mrs. Robert K. Baltch, in the Eastern District of New York and motions by defense counsel regarding the nature of evidence to be submitted in this case.

The Judge originally denied the motions, but Assistant Attorney General Yeagley has advised that USA Hoey in answering questions by the Judge gave answers which were too broad and which the Government cannot support and therefore it is necessary for the Government to make additional statements to Judge Dooling who is sitting in this case in the Eastern District of New York. My memorandum of September 30, 1964, advised that while we were not aware of the contents of the conversations between USA Hoey and Judge Dooling, we had no objections to Yeagley's proposed amending statement as it was correct.

Subsequently on the afternoon of 10-1-64, Departmental Attorneys Thomas K. Hall and Kevin Maroney advised Supervisor Litrento and myself that USA Hoey's statement to Judge Dooling was unfortunate because it was too broad. They believe that the Judge's query pertained to any tainted source at the Baltch residence and was confined to eavesdropping devices, but that Hoey in his answer had not confined the answer to the residence or to eavesdropping, either of which would perhaps have prevented the current problem. (No information obtained from wiretaps or microphones is contemplated to be used in this case and the only tainted source is a mail intercept which did not take place anywhere near the residence).

Subsequently on the evening of 10-1-64, Mr. Hall advised that he had just learned that apparently Hoey in his discussions with the court had stated, or at least indicated, there was no microphone involved in this case and, of course, this was incorrect and the Department felt the record had to be corrected. He

DEM:td (8)

Classified By 4041
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC- 15

EX-117

OCT 19 1964

Soviet Section

SECRET

58 OCT 21 1964

~~SECRET~~

MR. SULLIVAN - MR. MOORE
[redacted] ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

asked if the Bureau had any objection and was advised in the negative. This morning Mr. Hall called to advise that USA Hoey had now requested advice as to what answer could be given the court should he be asked (1) if there was a wiretap involved in this case and (2) if there was a mail intercept in this case. After checking, I called Hall back and said that we would leave the answer to #1 up to the Department, but that if the Department saw necessary, the Bureau would not object. However, with regard to #2, under no circumstances is the Bureau willing to admit that a mail intercept was utilized and Hall said he would pass this information on to Hoey and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley who is in New York.

[illegible]

Hall advised that he had discussed this case with Acting Attorney General Katzenbach this morning and Katzenbach was of the opinion that the Department must be candid with the Judge. He said Katzenbach recognized the problems, but felt that in view of the value of the case, an effort should be made to go ahead with the trial even if it might be necessary drop the overt act where our tainted source is involved, and proceed on a general conspiracy basis with the recognition that the verdict might be against us, but we would have revealed the Soviet espionage activities to the people. Hall said he was passing on the Acting Attorney General's comments to Assistant Attorney General Yeagley. Hall said that the motions of defense counsel and the complications with regard to the answers may eventually forcethe Government to drop the prosecution. He said in view of the many facets involved, he did not feel there was any reason to agree to a pre-trial hearing on the issue of tainted source if this should be required by the court, and rather than do this, they are prepared to drop the espionage charges and attempt to proceed on lesser grounds.

ACTION

SAC Schmit, NYO, was advised of the above developments and requested to keep in close touch with Yeagley in New York and you will be kept advised of developments.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. SULLIVAN

DATE: 8-14-64

FROM : MR. BRANIGAN

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Taylor 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Branigan

SUBJECT: DOSNAR
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

The captioned code word covers our investigation of the unknown subject at San Diego, California who offered to sell information concerning Sonar to the Soviets for $60,000.

BACKGROUND:

Information concerning this first came to our attention on 7-17-64 when our highly confidential coverage detected a letter addressed to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, postmarked 7-16-64 at San Diego, California. We followed up on this by inserting a message in a San Diego newspaper indicating that we were interested in the offer. The unsub then telephonically contacted an Agent of the Washington Field Office at the telephone number furnished him in the message in the personal column of the San Diego newspaper. Thereafter, we intercepted a telephone call that the subject made to the Soviet Embassy during which he attempted to verify that he was dealing with Soviet citizens. Acting on the subject's instructions, a package containing a camera suitable for document photography and $500 was dispatched by United Airlines air freight from Washington to San Diego during the early morning of 8-13-64.

In the meantime, another resident of San Diego, one R. Tobin, advised our office there that he had been engaged by an unidentified individual to pick up a package at United Airlines Freight Terminal which he was to subsequently turn over and for which he would be paid $20.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:

According to SAC C. Williams, an Agent of the San Diego Office posing as R. Tobin in the latter's automobile picked up the package at 8 p.m., PDT, and, thereafter, proceeded as he had been instructed to a drive-in in the San Diego area. SAC Williams advised that the coverage by San Diego Agents at the Air Freight Terminal uncovered a suspect who appeared to be closely observing

WAB:BST:hrt
(8)

REC- 38 65-[illegible]

CONTINUED - OVER

EX-108

10 AUG 19 1964

65 AUG 21 1964

Tobin's automobile and who, thereafter, surveilled the automobile to the area of the drive-in.

After waiting the agreed time, our Agent proceeded to a parking lot adjacent to a church about one mile further down the highway. Shortly after the Agent arrived, he was approached by the suspect who inquired "Are you Tobin?" Thereafter, the suspect claimed to be a messenger who had been engaged to pick up the package. He did deliver an envelope to our Agent which contained the $20 agreed to. At this point, the Agent, posing as Tobin, identified himself and requested that the suspect identify himself and voluntarily accompany him to the San Diego Office.

The suspect, who has now been identified as the subject, is Perry A. Chandelaine, 3231 Par Drive, La Mesa, California. He is a Grade 13 engineer at the Navy Electronics Laboratory, San Diego. This laboratory does all the training and electronics work and research, including Sonar, for the Navy in the San Diego area. In this connection, the subject claimed that he had access to information classified "Confidential." He has been a Government employee in excess of ten years and is the father of ten children.

In May, 1952, subject was an applicant for the position of Special Agent with this Bureau. Apparently during the interview it was determined the applicant's father was killed by the police in Chicago in 1932 when caught stealing butter from a boxcar. He had been arrested for selling whiskey prior to that in Wisconsin. Applicant was considered very nervous and had a vagotomy operation for a nervous disorder performed in 1947. Applicant had an ulcer which caused his discharge from the service and which still, at that time, gave him trouble. He was unfavorably recommended for employment.

According to SAC Williams, the subject readily acknowledged that he was in real deep trouble and claimed that his wife was also knowledgeable concerning his activities. Subject freely admitted contacting the Soviets and offering to sell information to them. However, the subject steadfastly maintained that he was a patriotic American, a Catholic and one who hated the Russians and that he was endeavoring to get all out of them that he could and he then intended to turn whatever he obtained over to ONI.

Subject's wife was invited to the office and she confirmed that earlier in the evening the subject had apprised her of his activities and gave her a letter which was addressed to ONI and which she was to mail upon receipt of a phone call from him. This

CONTINUED - OVER

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SULLIVAN
RE: DOSNAR

letter was mailed by her when she was contacted by the subject who was at that time in the San Diego Office. Subject and his wife both furnished signed statements.

Thereafter, the facts in this case were presented to Mr. Thomas K. Hall of the Internal Security Division of the Department who advised that in view of the illegal source of the original information and all that flowed from it, he could not authorize the filing of a complaint charging the subject with an attempt to commit espionage. ONI was immediately advised both at San Diego and at Washington concerning the identity of the subject and the facts admitted by him. This was done in the event the Navy could institute some action. Upon completion of the signing of the statements, subject and his wife were permitted to return to their residence since no prosecutive action could be taken.

ACTION:

The investigation at San Diego is continuing, the completed results of which will be furnished to the Navy so it can institute administrative proceedings against him. The facts will, likewise, be furnished to the Internal Security Division of the Department which has requested them.

8/14

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan

Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 31, 1970

1 - Mr. J.P. Lee
1 - Mr. A.P. Litrento

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG #MDR16
ON 11/28/05

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

This is to consider recommendation of the New York Office that the Sam Survey Program be reinstituted.

BACKGROUND:

Sam Survey was a successful program operated between 1959 and 1966, which involved screening of air mail destined for selected European countries and cities by our Agent personnel in an effort to detect Soviet illegal agent mail. This program was made possible through the confidential cooperation of highly placed postal officials. In 1961 we identified, through this program, the [redacted] in New York City [redacted] In addition, [redacted], we uncovered [redacted] which had operated in the [redacted] for a certain period and then shifted its activities to the [redacted]. [redacted] In July, 1966, this program was discontinued.

Foreign Intelligence Project

RECOMMENDATION OF NEW YORK:

New York points out that although ample evidence indicate the presence of a substantial number of Soviet illegals, the Bureau has been unsuccessful in locating any in recent years; that various programs and projects put into operation have been unsuccessful. Further, it is its contention that the illegal's most vulnerable area is still his letter writing and that this is the area we have the best chance by far to locate and identify illegals. Therefore, New York wishes to submit for the Bureau's consideration the reinstitution of Sam Survey. If this is not possible, it recommends that the Bureau consider requesting CIA or postal authorities to take over this program.

REC-
65-65884-

Enclosure

10 APR 7 1970

65-65884
APL:tdp (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

Classified by
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SAM SURVEY
65-65884

OBSERVATIONS:

It is agreed that the problem to locate Soviet illegals has assumed serious proportions and that the resumption of this program could be of inestimable value to the Bureau in meeting its responsibilities in that regard. However, present Bureau policy precludes the use of this technique. For this reason, it is not believed that we consider reinstitution of this program directly or through CIA or postal authorities.

ACTION:

New York is being advised that the reinstitution of Sam Survey Program either directly or through CIA or postal authorities is not advisable at this time.

Absolutely right.
H.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/14/00 BY SP-2ALM

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

C. D. B

On January 15, 1969, Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The Hunter project for which we have given the designation of Bureau Informant 200 essentially consists of specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia. If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the Soviet Union it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.)

File in (105-93089)

ACTION:

REC 102

105-93089 - 90

The above information is being directed ~~to~~ the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - Liaison
1 - S. J. Papich

18 FEB 5 1969

SJP:clb
(6)

Stops not warranted on black extremists at this time
J.D. 1/31/69

DOWN STAIRS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Director, FBI (65-67003)

DATE: 1/31/62

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (105-11581)

SUBJECT: GUS SURVEY
ESPIONAGE - R

Re San Francisco letter to Director 1/11/62 advising San Francisco survey would run through February 9, 1962.

As of 1/28/62, a total of about 1,764,440 letters has been surveyed in 46 days.

Fifty-one cases have been opened to determine whether recipient might be Soviet illegal agent. Thirty-two cases have been closed when subjects appeared to be legitimate residents.

San Francisco does not at this time recommend continuance of this survey beyond February 9, 1962. Upon completion of authorized period and evaluation of investigations resulting therefrom, a further recommendation will be made as to reinstituting this program.

#mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/I16
ON 11/28/00

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
1 - San Francisco
RES:lg
(3)

~~Classified by 6283~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

REC- 31 (65-[illegible]-19)

EX. - 107

12 FEB 5 1962

F146

65 FEB 12 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DATE: 11/2/62

1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Stewart

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

This is to advise you that on 10/31/62 representatives of this Bureau conferred with CIA representatives James Hunt, John Mertz and Thomas Chalmers at CIA concerning "Project Hunter." At this conference our observations concerning Hunter material furnished since our last conference on 2/13/62 were given CIA. In addition, we advised CIA specifically of certain Hunter items which were of no interest to us and of certain Hunter items which were of interest to us. These items were set forth in memorandum form and furnished to CIA; a copy of same is attached.

5

CIA advised that its "Hunter-Don" coverage was being operated seven days a week until November 15. This concentrated coverage is for the purpose of determining if there is any illegal agent traffic. After November 15 all Hunter coverage can be expected to be reduced until after the Christmas mail rush has subsided.

The CIA representatives were very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and with the attention afforded it by us. They are very cooperative in that they are willing to focus their attention on any particular phase of coverage we suggest for our own benefit. For CIA's interest we furnished them a copy of the attached memorandum of our analysis of typical information furnished by Bureau Informant 200 of interest to us.

ACTION:

None. Above data furnished for your information.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/MG

WDS (WAB)

WDS:jes
(4)

105-93089

Enclosure

REC 35

(105-93089-54)

NOV 5 1962

ENCLOSURE

EX-118

10-30-62

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

After an extensive review of 2500 Hunter Reports since our last memo captioned as above and dated 8/21/62, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project Hunter as it related to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense involved in the preparation of such material.

I Traffic Which Holds No Interest:

1. Soviet-bloc immigrants desiring to repatriate to USSR. These people are interviewed by INS and INS refers anything of interest to us.

2. Americans traveling to the USSR as such travel is permissible and several hundred people a year visit the USSR while on tour abroad as well as Soviets returning to visit relatives. We, of course, have an interest in such travel involving people on the CIA Watch List, known Communist Party members, and suspected intelligence agents.

3. U. S. professors in Academic Research corresponding with each other. It is not likely if U. S. professor is passing any data he would identify himself at the same time.

II Traffic of Specific Interest:

1. All data re Cuba. This serves to identify pro-Castro followers in the U. S.

2. All data re U. S. Cubans in contact with Cubans attending Friendship University in Moscow.

3. All material emanating from Puerto Rico of an Anti-U. S. nature and pro-Soviet.

4. Data re U. S. peace groups going to Russia and while in Russia.

5. Data indicating death of any U. S. Communist abroad.

6. Data re Maurice Hyman Halperin(now in Cuba); Helen Kagen Pozner; Miriam Zeitlin Seborer, Oscar and Stuart Seborer(All in Russia); Max, Celia and Rose Seborer(New York); Noah and Anna Sparer Seborer (Mexico).

7. Any data on Alfred Slesinger operator Modern Photo Shop, 865 3rd Avenue, New York City(wife Kitty), residence 1860 Grand Concourse, Bronx, New York.

105-93089-547

9

8. Any traffic from or to U. S. Students in Moscow or to U. S. persons who were former students in Moscow.

9. Any traffic between U. S. persons who are with a current exposition or a previous exposition in the USSR.

4-528

62-116395-957

CHANGED TO

62-117604-X1

JUN 3 1977

ft/dsk

#MDR16 ON THIS FORM
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. William O. Cregar
Section Chief, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20535

The attached letter from NSA, dated 21 October 1975, forwarded two ~~letters~~ to me which are responsive to a request for information from the Senate Select Committee.

We would like to provide your 26 September 1973 letter to the Committee; however, since the letter originated with your agency, coordination prior to release under the Third Agency Rule is necessary. Please provide your comments concerning this release action at your earliest convenience.

Thomas K. Latimer
Thomas K. Latimer
The Special Assistant

Attachment

Preliminarily advised [illegible] DOD
FBI has already furnished SSC our letter of
9/26/73 & interposed no objection
for DOD to give SSC a copy
10/29/75
WOC

EX 103

REC-24 62-116395-958

21 OCT 31 1975

62-116395

508588

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTC

#MDR16

ENCLOSURE

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-1-11

84 NOV 6 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: N1221
21 October 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Watch List Correspondence

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-2-00 BY SP-2 ALM/BJS

1. As a part of the recent request by the Senate Select Committee, we reviewed our files to see if there were any responses to General Allen's letter of September 17, 1973 which requested recertification of "Watch Lists." At that time we did not find any responses. We recently checked with the FBI and Secret Service and discovered that there were in fact responses. The Secret Service, by letter dated 21 September 1973, did in fact recertify a "Watch List" containing U.S. names, however, NSA has not accepted the U.S. names.

2. Inclosed are copies of the FBI and Secret Service letters. Request you forward these to the Senate Select Committee with the above comments.

DAVID D. LOWMAN
Special Assistant
to the Director
for Congressional Reviews

Approved by
LEW ALLEN, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

2 Incls:
a/s

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-1-11

Classified by DIRNSA/CHCSS (NSA/CSSM 123-2)
Exempt from GDS, EO 11652, Cat 2
Declassify Upon Notification by the Originator

62-116395-954

ENCLOSURE

DOWNGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL
UPON REMOVAL OF INCLS

~~TOP SECRET~~

[illegible]

September 26, 1973

BY LIAISON

Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr.
Director
National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2RLM/JTG
ON 11-8-00

Dear General Allen:

I am in receipt of your letter of September 17, 1973, concerning the necessity for a mutual review of our policies with respect to the compilation and maintenance of the Watch List. I share your concern and fully agree that we should review our procedures to assure that our authorities, particularly in light of recent court decisions, are not exceeded.

As you are aware, however, the Department of Justice in filing affidavits with the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, in the case of United States versus William Ayers, et al., which case involved the Students for a Democratic Society, an organization included on the Watch List, took the position that the intercepts obtained by your agency were lawful and not within the disclosure requirements of the court.

We are instituting a review of our procedures but feel that any decision reached respecting the Watch List should await the final ruling of the court.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified by Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

62-116395-958

ENCLOSURE

Incl 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr.

It is our desire to cooperate with you fully in any measures you deem necessary to protect your valuable SIGINT sources.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
DATE: 10/22/75
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 10/22/75, Barbara Banoff, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, requested that former SAs George C. Moore and Fred H. Baumgardner be made available for deposition concerning their knowledge of COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATION:

That former SAs Moore and Baumgardner be released from their existing employment agreements and the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations for purposes of deposition.

OK

REC-30 62-116395-959

1 - Personnel File - George C. Moore ST-111
1 - Personnel File - Fred H. Baumgardner

15 NOV 4 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

lad
(10)

84 11 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10/28/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 10/24/75, Les Seidel and Martha Talley, Senate Select Committee Staff Members, requested that former SAC Marlin Johnson and former SA Carl Hennrich be made available for Staff interview. The topic of the interview for former SAC Johnson will be his knowledge of the 1968 Convention and the topic of interview for former SA Hennrich will be his knowledge of the Emergency Detention Plan.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich be released from their existing employment agreements for purposes of interview by the Senate Select Committee.

(2) That the Intelligence Division determine the current whereabouts of former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich and advise them of the request.

(3) That the Legal Counsel Division will orally advise the Senate Select Committee of the current whereabouts of former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich.

P.U. Daly furnished whereabouts of Johnson + Hennrichs as in personnel files 10/29/75

SAC Held, CG, teleph. instructed to alert Johnson + Sutel. 12 noon 10/29/75

1 - Personnel File - Marlin Johnson
1 - Personnel File - Carl Hennrich

SALAW, in absence of SAC, RH, teleph. instr. to alert Hennrichs + Sutel 11:45 Am. 10/29/75

REC-30
ST-111

62-116395-960

15 NOV 4 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

lad
(10)

OK

[illegible] CONTAINED FM DR16
10/12/00 SP2 Alm/LBT/6

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO : MR. J. B. ADAMS

DATE: 10/21/75

FROM : MR. W. R. WANNALL

#MDL16 SP-2ALM/TG
10-12-00

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY -75

On October 21, 1975, from approximately 2:15 p.m. to 3:35 p.m., Section Chief William A. Branigan, CI-1 Section, Intelligence Division; Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division; and myself appeared at an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to discuss classified aspects of the Bureau's various mail intercept programs. Present were Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee; Senators Mondale, Goldwater, P. A. Hart, Huddleston, and Schweiker; as well as various members of the staff of the Select Committee.

Generally speaking, the reception by the Chairman and the various Senators, as well as members of the staff, was a friendly one. No antagonism was shown to the Bureau representatives, and the Senators by their questions indicated a desire to help the Bureau in our foreign counterintelligence operations.

At the request of the Chairman, the eight separate mail intercept surveys were explained to the Committee, including the length of time that these surveys were in operation and the value that was derived from them.

During the hearing we were supplied with a copy of a Staff Memorandum which outlined various aspects of our operations which would not be disclosed during a public hearing. The Staff Memorandum also outlined certain questions which could not be discussed at a public hearing and suggested that these questions be raised at the Executive Session. A copy of the Staff Memorandum is attached for your information.

62-116395-961

Enclosure

ST-111 REC-30

CONTINUED - OVER

WAB:hke
(6)

1 - ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~

15 NOV 4 1975

1-Mr. J. B. Adams
1-Mr. J. A. Mintz
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1-Mr. W. A. Branigan

Classified by 2355
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 2

5-Enc

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 NOV 5 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

RECEIVED
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE DIV.
OCT 30 1 07 PM 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum from Mr. W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: Senstudy

At the conclusion of the hearing, considerable questions were asked concerning legislation or direction which would be necessary from The Congress to permit the Bureau to carry out mail opening programs which were productive in their results and which would not at the same time invade the privacy of innocent American citizens.

ACTION:

This is submitted for your information.

ADDENDUM BY LEGAL COUNSEL 10/23/75, JAM:mfd

I answered the Committee's questions described in the last paragraph of this memorandum by explaining to them that in a security case we would find it most difficult to meet the 4th Amendment standard of probable cause in order to obtain a search warrant. for mail. If we are to be required to obtain warrants prior to obtaining mail and if we are to be successful, a lower standard of probable cause such as is permissible in administrative searches such as those conducted by Health Inspectors would be necessary. In answer to a specific question I explained that the Supreme Court has ruled that mail is protected absolutely by the 4th Amendment.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SAB/SBS
Date 8-1-11

STAFF MEMORANDUM

EXECUTIVE SESSION ON FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS

FBI Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and William Branigan, Chief of the Soviet Section of the FBI Counterintelligence Branch, have requested an opportunity to appear before the Select Committee in executive session to discuss classified aspects of the FBI mail opening programs. Both of them will be witnesses at the public hearing on FBI mail openings on Friday.

The Committee staff has agreed that the public hearing will not disclose the following aspects of FBI mail openings:

1. The identity of the foreign nations involved, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba, Mexico, Hong Kong, Japan, most Western European countries, and several Central and Latin American countries.

2. The fact the mail to and from the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet United Nations Mission, the Cuban United Nations Mission, other Soviet-bloc Embassies was selectively opened. (S)

3. The "indicators" used as criteria for selective opening of mail screened in several other programs designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States. (The fact that there were "indicators," but not their nature, may be disclosed publicly.)

4. The identities of specific individuals and groups whose mail was opened either by the FBI or by the CIA at the request of the FBI. (FBI officials will state publicly that some of these, especially in the category "peace and protest groups," were not adequately justified.) Some of these included:

    Leonard Bernstein
    Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam
    Jeremy Stone
    Cambridge Center for Study of Public Policy

62-116395-961

ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~

The following are questions which cannot be discussed in public hearings because of this agreement. They should be raised at this executive session:

1. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail openings aimed at mail to and from the [Soviet and Soviet-bloc embassies?] (X)

2. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail opening programs using "indicators" and designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States? [(Soviet and Cuban)] (X)

3. What was the actual intelligence value of the material supplied to the FBI by the CIA from its mail opening operation?

4. How good are the "indicators" in selecting mail of foreign intelligence agents only and not mail of American citizens or others who are not foreign agents?

5. What standards were used for opening mail to and from Communist China, and what was the intelligence value of these programs?

6. Do FBI counterespionage officials desire to resume any mail opening programs, with proper authorization from Congress and the Attorney General?

7. How do the benefits of mail opening compare with the benefits of warrantless electronic surveillance currently used by the FBI for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes?

T-General

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MR. J. B. ADAMS ~~TOP SECRET~~ 10/21/75

Index

1) Mail Opening
2) Hearing Procedure

WOC

MR. W. R. WANNALL

SENSTUDY

On October 21, 1975, from approximately 2:15 p.m. to 3:35 p.m., Section Chief William A. Branigan, CI-1 Section, Intelligence Division; Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division; and myself appeared at an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to discuss classified aspects of the Bureau's various mail intercept programs. Present were Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee; Senators Mondale, Goldwater, P. A. Hart, Huddleston, and Schweiker; as well as various members of the staff of the Select Committee.

Generally speaking, the reception by the Chairman and the various Senators, as well as members of the staff, was a friendly one. No antagonism was shown to the Bureau representatives, and the Senators by their questions indicated a desire to help the Bureau in our foreign counterintelligence operations.

At the request of the Chairman, the eight separate mail intercept surveys were explained to the Committee, including the length of time that these surveys were in operation and the value that was derived from them.

During the hearing we were supplied with a copy of a Staff Memorandum which outlined various aspects of our operations which would not be disclosed during a public hearing. The Staff Memorandum also outlined certain questions which could not be discussed at a public hearing and suggested that these questions be raised at the Executive Session. A copy of the Staff Memorandum is attached for your information.

Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

WAB:hke
(6)

1-Mr. J. B. Adams
1-Mr. J. A. Mintz
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1-Mr. W. A. Branigan

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified by 2355
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

961

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

The Attorney General

October 14, 1975

11/8/00
#mDe16

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/1176
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated August 27, 1975, with an attached request for FBI materials dated August 26, 1975, and my letter dated September 24, 1975, captioned as above.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum responsive to the request of the Committee for delivery of materials pertaining to requests by the Bureau for national security mail covers from 1971 through 1975.

Referenced September 24, 1975, letter forwarded material initially located in response to the Committee's request. The enclosed memorandum forwards the remaining documents which were located.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished to you for your records.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Enclosures - 2 ENCLOSURE REC-30

62-116395-962

15 NOV 4 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

edm

RHR:jmn/lfj
(9)

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

84 NOV 5 1975

GPO

U. S. Senate Select Committee On
Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Soviet Military Office, 2552 Belmont Road, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Commercial Counselor, 1706 16th Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Information Department, 1706 18th Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Consular Office, 1609 Decatur Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

1 - The Attorney General

2 - Mr. J. [illegible]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

62-116395 October 14, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2

#MDR16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO REQUESTS
FOR MAIL COVERS MADE BY THE BUREAU
FROM 1971 THROUGH 1975

Reference is made to SSC letter dated August 27, 1975, with attached request dated August 26, 1975.

Part I, item 3. e. requests: "All materials pertaining to requests by the Bureau for special mail covers from 1971 through 1975 which have not been previously delivered to the Senate Select Committee. This request encompasses all special mail covers which have been terminated, regardless of whether the investigation for which the special mail cover was requested is active or inactive."

By memorandum dated September 24, 1975, captioned as above, you were furnished documents pertaining to this request. Additional materials have been located and will be delivered with this document.

These materials are comprised of letters to the Postal Service requesting mail covers and where utilized supportive memoranda. The materials pertain to terminated mail covers in national security matters of a domestic security nature as opposed to foreign related counterintelligence operations.

1 - The Attorney General

RHR:jmn/lfj
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-914

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Re: Documents Pertaining to Requests for Mail
Covers Made by the Bureau from 1971
Through 1975

NOTE:

Materials furnished in response to this request were obtained by review of all abstracts regarding communications to the Postal Service requesting mail covers. Since 1971, all national security mail covers have been requested by means of a letter to the Chief Postal Inspector, Postal Service. The materials being furnished only encompass investigative matters involving domestic security cases wherein the mail cover has been terminated whether the investigation is pending or closed. The materials are comprised of copies of the letters to the Postal Service and supportive memoranda where used in lieu of notes. These materials were reviewed and, where necessary, excisions made. By memorandum 9/24/75, the SSC was furnished the bulk of such documents located at that time. The documents being furnished now are those which could not be immediately located. All domestic mail cover requests which were located by means of the abstract review have now been furnished to the SSC.

By oral agreement with the SSC staff, only domestic security mail covers were required to be furnished.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/14/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re 8/26/75 request Part I, Item 3e concerning special mail covers.

Originating Office: FBI 930

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title: [illegible]

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP2ALM/[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 8/26/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

C

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Information handling

#MDR16
[illegible]
10/12/00 SP2 ALM

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

More materials pertaining to mail cover requests made by the FBI from 1971 thru 1975.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIAL LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC/8

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
[illegible] Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - [illegible]. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

October 15, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

#MDR16

10-13-00 SP2ALM/JTG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a request from SSC dated September 4, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI concerning the obtaining of income tax information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with respect to 140 individuals and/or organizations.

By letter dated September 23, 1975, the SSC requested specific information with respect to only nine individuals of the original 140 individuals and/or organizations.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum which furnishes additional material to supplement the memorandum dated September 29, 1975, previously furnished to SSC.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

10-15-75 PWD/JW

Delivered to AG

REC-30 62-116395-963

JWJ:cml
(9)

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

3 - ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 NOV 13 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

October 15, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC request dated September 4, 1975, and SSC request dated September 23, 1975, requesting documents and certain information pertaining to the obtaining of income tax information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

Nine documents containing supplemental material relating to Robert M. Shelton and Charles C. Kissinger are being delivered with this memorandum.

This material supplements documents, previously furnished SSC by memorandum dated September 29, 1975, and completes the review of the entire case files of the nine individuals requested by the SSC.

1 - The Attorney General

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/TTG

62-116395

JWJ:cml
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WPW/TWL

62-116395-963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Re: United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect To Intelligence Activities (SSC)

NOTE:

This memorandum and memorandum dated 9/29/75 furnishes complete response to SSC requests of 9/4/75 and 9/23/75 relating to origination and use of information of an income tax nature by the FBI. The material being furnished was reviewed by SA R. D. Shea, IS-1 and SA L. E. Dean, IS-2.

Copies of nine documents are being retained in instant file.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/15/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/23/75 request and 9/4/75

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller Date: 10/20/75

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR 16

10-13-00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-918

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 9/23/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Treasury Department - Internal Revenue Service

#mori6

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JJG

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Information furnished concerning obtaining of income tax information from Internal Revenue Service with respect to specific individuals and/or organizations.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

52W0g6

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

5

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Senate Select Committee (SSC) requests dated September 4, 1975, and September 23, 1975. Attached material completes response to SSC requests.

#MDE16

10/13/00 SP2 Alm/JTG

RETAIN

62-1 [illegible] 963

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **Director, FBI (157-9-4)** DATE: **11-7-64**

FROM : **SAC, Birmingham (157-835)**

SUBJECT: **COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS**

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/ITE

The Bureau is requested to consider securing copies of income tax returns for the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN; ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON, 1708 - 15th Street, East, Tuscaloosa, Ala., or the ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE, a name by which the UKA is sometimes known.

Inquiry at the banks in Tuscaloosa has failed to reveal any accounts in the name of the UKA or ROBERT M. SHELTON, except a small personal account of SHELTON at the First National Bank of Tuscaloosa. Informants have advised that SHELTON is paid probably $8,000 per year for his work as Imperial Wizard. This money is sent in monthly to UKA headquarters in Tuscaloosa by the individual Klaverns and presumably put in some bank.

An examination of pertinent income tax returns might furnish information concerning the financial standing of SHELTON and UKA which could be used in this program.

d

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

157-9-4-6

REC-61

1812 d. B

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Birmingham
CBS:mfl
(4)

B NOV 9 1964

EX-102

memo B'gham to Sect. OK. Lat'. JH
11/18/64
Gnc.

56 DEC 2 1964

5

Mr. W. C. Sullivan 11/12/64

F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Ryan

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(ROBERT M. SHELTON)
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.)

Robert Marvin Shelton is a full-time paid employee of the United Klans of America, Incorporated (UKA), Knights of the Ku Klux Klan with the title Imperial Wizard. He is probably the most influential and well-known Klansman in the United States. We are endeavoring as a counterintelligence technique to develop information discrediting Shelton or embarrassing to the UKA.

Through analysis of the income tax returns we may be able to determine secret sources of Shelton's income or depository used by him for the Klan organization. There is a possibility that he is misappropriating funds. We also have information Shelton has been on the payroll of a Mobile, Alabama, engineering firm as a public relations man.

In the event we determine such information we will consider exposing Shelton within the Klan organization, publicly or by furnishing information to the Internal Revenue Service.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended the Liaison Section obtain from the Internal Revenue Service two uncertified copies each of the Federal tax returns filed by Shelton and the UKA for the past five years. Attached is a memorandum for the use of the Liaison Section.

157-9-6
(1) - 157-552 (Shelton)

Enclosure

DR:lat:ltl
(7)

NOT RECORDED
170 NOV 30 1964

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

6

SAC, Birmingham (157-635)

2/23/65

Director, FBI (157-9-4)

1 - Mr. Gray
2 - Mr. Ryan

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.)
(ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON)

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

ReBHlet 11/7/64.

Attached are Xerox copies of Federal income tax returns filed by Robert M. and Patty Lou Shelton for the years 1959-63 inclusive. Also attached are Xerox copies of United States corporation tax returns filed by Robert M. Shelton as a corporate officer of the United Klans of America, Inc. (UKA), for the years 1961 (year ending 6/30/62) and 1963 (year ending 6/30/64) as well as a statement of no tax liability for the year ending 6/30/63. Information set forth in these tax returns is for lead purposes only and should not be set forth in the details of any investigative report.

The following comments and investigative instructions are noted in connection with these tax returns:

1. The individual returns filed jointly by Shelton and his wife during the period 1959 through 1963 indicate Shelton's occupation to be "salesman" and "manager" and in no instance do they indicate any employment or association with the Klan. This is in conflict with the corporate returns filed by Shelton for the UKA where he indicates his position as "Imperial Wizard" or "President."

2. Shelton's return for 1959 indicates it was prepared by Ed F. Allen, Jr., Certified Public Accountant, Post Office Box 311, Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The form and typing on the other tax returns, both corporate and individual, indicate a strong likelihood these too were prepared by Allen. You should review your files and conduct necessary investigation to determine if Allen is active in connection with financial matters relating to the Klan.

Enclosures - 8

157-552-

1 - 157-552 (Shelton)
1 - 157-370 (UKA)

DUPLICATE YELLOW

NOT RECORDED
202 FEB 24 1965

15

ORIGINAL FILED IN

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Letter to Birmingham
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
157-9-4

3. In no instance in his individual tax returns does Shelton indicate the receipt of income for his position of Imperial Wizard or President of the UKA. However, his returns do indicate he has received some salary payments from such sources as "Tom Harris," "J.H. Mason," "Alabama Tire Company," "J & H Transport Co.," and "Tonn & Johnson Elec. Svc." Inasmuch as your informants have advised Shelton spends almost all his time on Klan business and is paid almost $10,000 annually by the Klan, it would appear these salary sources are covers for payments made to him to compensate for his Klan employment. Necessary investigation should be conducted to resolve the true source of Shelton's income.

4. Shelton's return for 1960 shows other income received from a wrestling enterprise in Nashville, Tennessee. This source of income should also be checked to determine its legitimacy. It is possible Shelton's relationship with this enterprise also represents a cover for Klan activity or that the payments made to him were for efforts in behalf of the Klan.

5. In no instance does Shelton indicate any interest or dividend income. It is known he has a bank account at the First National Bank of Tuscaloosa. An attempt should be made to determine if he has failed to report interest actually earned. It is also noted the corporate returns filed by the UKA do not in any instance indicate interest received.

6. Shelton's return for 1963 lists other income of $500 as received from "Commissions - Dixie Engineering Co." Your attention is directed to an editorial that appeared in the Tuscaloosa "News," edition of 9/12/64, wherein it is indicated Shelton had been listed on the payroll of a Mobile engineering firm as a public relations man. Investigation should be conducted to determine Shelton's relationship with the Dixie Engineering Co. and also whether this company had a contract involving the use of Federal and/or state funds.

7. The corporate returns of the UKA, as filed by Shelton, in no instance indicate salary payments although both Shelton and his wife have been reported by your informants as full-time employees.

9. The gross income of Shelton and his wife for the year 1963 totals $1,075. This amount does not appear to be sufficient to support a family of five. All possible efforts should be made to develop evidence indicating Shelton is withholding or concealing income.

This investigation should be afforded prompt and continuing attention and the Bureau must be advised of all pertinent developments.

When all possible leads have been developed a blind memorandum should be prepared setting forth Shelton's background and current position with the Klan and all data probative of a possible violation of Internal Revenue laws. The Bureau will make this information available to appropriate Internal Revenue Service officials at the Seat of Government.

SENSITIVE CASE REPORT

(Route in Sequence) To:

☐ District Director — District
☐ ARC- Southeast Regional Office
☐ Director — Division
☐ National Office

INSTRUCTIONS [illegible] through channels to ARC concerned in an original and three copies. For detailed instructions, see RC SE Memorandum No. 12-18.

1. NAME OF CASE OR IDENTIFICATION OF SITUATION

Robert M. Shelton
Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama

#MDE16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/tlG

a. CLASS OF TAX
Income Tax

b. TAXABLE PERIOD
1963, 1964

c. AMOUNT OF TAX
$ Unknown

d. DOCKET NO., IF ANY

2. PRINCIPAL ISSUES INVOLVED

Diverting Klan money to personal use.

3. REASONS FOR SENSITIVITY

Taxpayer is the Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, K.K.K., Inc. He is presently being investigated by the House Un-American Activities Committee of Congress. He and the Klan have had national publicity as a result of the Congressional hearings and civil rights activities in the South.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

157-5

NOT RECORDED
8 FEB 23 1966

4. ACTION TAKEN OR PROPOSED

The taxpayer has been contacted by Revenue Agent John H. Murrell on two occasions prior to referral to the Intelligence Division. He has indicated he will cooperate with the examining agents as soon as his records are released by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

This case was referred to the Intelligence Division only a few days ago; therefore, a realistic estimate of the completion date will not be practicable until at least next month.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SUBMITTED BY *(Originator's Signature)*	TITLE Special Agent	POST OF DUTY Birmingham	DATE 1-17-66
REVIEWED *(District Director's Signature)*	DISTRICT Birmingham		DATE JAN 18 1966
REVIEWED *(ARC's Signature)* [illegible]	TITLE [illegible] INTELLIGENCE		DATE JAN 2

U. S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT

RC SE FORM - 19 (4-59)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Ryan

ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

Robert Marvin Shelton, born June 13, 1929, married, two children, resides at 1711-14th Street, East, Tuscaloosa, Alabama. He is presently employed with the title Imperial Wizard by the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Suite 401, Alston Building, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, at a reported annual salary of eight thousand dollars. The United Klans of America, Inc., is sometimes known as the Alabama Rescue Service.

It is requested two uncertified copies each of the Federal tax returns filed by Shelton and the United Klans of America, Inc., for the past five years be made available.

DR:lat:ltl
(8)

① - 157-552 (Shelton)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JT6

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

157-552
ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Mohr ____
Wick ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: 6/26/67

P. D. Putnam

ROBERT SHELTON
INTERNAL SECURITY - X

At the request of the Internal Security Section, Mr. William Parker, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), was contacted on 6/23/67 to determine the status of the IRS case on Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America.

Parker advised that IRS had initiated investigation of Shelton for possible tax evasion for the years 1963 through 1965. This case is still under investigation but indications are that Shelton owes no income taxes for 1963 and 1965 and owes $100 in taxes for the year 1964. According to Parker, it appears that the criminal tax investigation of Shelton will be closed and the case will be referred to the Audit Division of IRS for civil disposition.

ACTION:

For information.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Putnam

PDP:rab
(5)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

54

REC 6

JUN 30 1967

#MDR16

ION CONTAINED
UNCLASSIFIED
10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JT6

#MDR16

DATE 10/13/00 SP2ALM/JTG

Intelligence Division
P. O. Box 1631
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

JUL 8 1967

District Director, Internal Revenue Service
Attention: Chief, Intelligence Division
Birmingham, Alabama

Re re: ROBERT M. SHELTON
18 Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama 35476
63-64-037-1-1
Final

and

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC.
18 Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama 35476
63-73-022-1-1
Final

ST-103

Representative: None

REC-61

55

This report relates to the alleged evasion of income taxes for the years 1963 and 1964 by ROBERT M. SHELTON and the alleged wilful failure to file 1961 and 1963 corporate returns by the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC. It was also alleged that SHELTON diverted KLAN funds to his personal use. SHELTON has been Imperial Wizard of the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC. since 1961. He maintains an office for himself and the KLAN in his residence at 18 Lake Sherwood, Northport, Alabama 35476. He received mail for himself, the KLAN, and ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE at P. O. Box 2369, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401. ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE is a cover name for the KLAN organization in Alabama. He filed his individual income tax returns involved with the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama.

AUG 9 1967

Revenue Agent Wade Hutchinson, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, cooperated in the joint investigation. This case has been classified as sensitive.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION:

The investigation originated as a referral from Audit Division. It was alleged that SHELTON received $4,000.00 from DIXIE ENGINEERING COMPANY of Mobile, Alabama, during the years 1963 and 1964 and reported only $2,000.00 from this source during the aforementioned years. It was further alleged that SHELTON travels in a late model Cadillac, dresses well and recently built a new house while reporting very nominal amounts of income on his tax returns.

In respect to the KLAN, it was alleged that no corporate returns were filed for the years 1961 and 1963 and that corporate funds were being diverted to the personal use of corporate officers.

KU KLUX KLAN organizations were the subject of an investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee during the years 1965 and 1966. SHELTON was tried and convicted on a Contemptof Congress charge for refusing to testify and produce KLAN records before this committee. He was given the maximum sentence, one year in prison and $1,000 fine, on October 14, 1966. SHELTON's conviction is presently on appeal.

Evidence was offered before the House Un-American Activities Committee alleging SHELTON signed checks on the KLAN bank account in Tuscaloosa, payable to cash, aggregating $5,600.00, which were cashed at grocery stores and service stations; and that he allegedly paid for automobiles and a diamond ring with KLAN funds. SHELTON refused to confirm or deny these allegations when testifying before the Congressional Committee.

EXTENT AND RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION:

1. I obtained photostats of INVISIBLE EMPIRE, UNITED KLANS, KNIGHTS KU KLUX KLAN OF AMERICA, INC., incorporation papers from IMPERIAL WIZARD ROBERT SHELTON. They disclose incorporation date of February 20, 1961, in Fulton County, Georgia. The general purpose of the corporation, according to these papers, is: "to teach patriotism, to support the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and to maintain the liberty bequeathed to us by our forefathers, and to preserve the American way of life."

2. I obtained SHELTON's tax returns from the files of the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama. They disclose adjusted gross income as follows:

Year	Adjusted Gross Income
1961	$ 5,600.00
1962	4,200.00
1963	1,875.00
1964	3,576.62
1965	4,663.23
1966	10,031.21

Shelton claimed a standard deduction on each of the returns and they were filed timely and the tax paid which was shown to be due thereon.

3. I obtained KLAN tax returns from the files of the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama. They disclose gross receipts and taxable income as follows:

FYE	Gross Receipts	Taxable Income
6/30/62	$ 2,980.05	$ -0-
6/30/64	7,415.63	-0-
6/30/65	13,487.60	741.09
6/30/66	75,168.12	7,135.01

SHELTON gives President JOHNSON credit for increasing gross receipts of the KLAN from $7,415.00 in 1964 to $75,168.12 in 1966. He stated that every time "LBJ" gets on television and condemns the KLAN, he gets a flood of membership applications. He also stated that the publicity he received during the House Un-American Activities Committee hearing in 1965 and 1966 got him many new members.

4. Revenue Agent HUTCHINSON and I interviewed SHELTON on seven different occasions between April 5, 1967 and May 17, 1967. He instructed his wife, BETTY LOU SHELTON, and KLAN BOOKKEEPER, MRS. MELVIN SEXTON, to cooperate with us and make available all records of financial transactions of the KLAN. SHELTON stated that:

a. He did not furnish books and records of the KLAN to the House Un-American Activities Committee because his attorney advised him he could not waive his immunity on part of his records or on part of his testimony. He either had to take the "Fifth Amendment" all the way or disclose confidential records of KLAN membership which he had taken an oath not to disclose.

b. The books and records of the KLAN are audited at least once a year by KLAN EXAMINERS. The results of this examination is reported on the annual corporate income tax return.

c. The KLAN is a tax exempt organization and should not be required to file tax returns. SHELTON exhibited a letter from the State of Alabama Revenue Department which stated that, "The UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., is exempt from Alabama income tax and as long as it is operated not for profit and not for the gain of any individual it will not be necessary that corporate income tax returns be filed."

SHELTON acknowledged he had never applied for exempt status for the KLAN for Federal tax purposes because he would have to disclose information regarding KLAN membership which he was not at liberty to disclose.

d. SHELTON stated that the KLAN is on a "Form System." Each Klavern (Unit) prepares a Monthly Financial Report in triplicate and sends one copy to the Imperial Office in Tuscaloosa, one copy to the State Klan Office and retains one copy for the local unit file. This form lists the following financial information from each unit, each month:

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

FINANCIAL RECORD OF UNIT

Balance as per bank statement for last month or cash on hand $_____
Minus outstanding checks including ones to Imperial & state $_____
Plus outstanding deposits $_____
Balance in bank or cash on hand as per this report $_____

Monies Received During This Month	Monies Paid Out During This Month
KLECTOKON FEE $_____	IMPERIAL TAX $_____
MONTHLY DUES $_____	STATE TAX $_____
RALLY COLLECTIONS $_____	OTHER STATE DUES $_____
SPECIAL PROJECT $_____	RENT OR BUILDING PAYMENT $_____
OTHER INCOME $_____	LIGHTS $_____
(ITEMIZE)_____	WATER $_____
	GAS $_____
	OTHER EXPENDITURES (ITEMIZE)$_____
TOTAL INCOME $_____	TOTAL EXPENDITURES $_____

e. SHELTON stated that he was authorized by the KLAN to draw $15,000.00 per year salary but 1966 was the first year the KLAN was financially able to pay him the full $15,000.00. Prior to 1966, his salary was determined at the end of each year by aggregating his withdrawals from the KLAN, reduced by the amount of documentation for travel and other KLAN expenses he had turned in during the year.

f. SHELTON converted his carport into an office and moved the KLAN office from the Alston Building in Tuscaloosa into his space May 1, 1966. The KLAN pays SHELTON $35.00 per month rent and $15.00 per month on his utilities.

g. SHELTON maintains that four of the eight $500.00 checks he received from DIXIE ENGINEERING COMPANY bounced. The reason the four $500.00 items do not show on his bank statements as a debit to the account was the balances at the time the checks were returned were less than $500.00 and he picked up the checks with cash or with another check from DIXIE ENGINEERING.

h. KLAN checks were made payable to "Cash" because just any one would not cash a KLAN check. When he left Tuscaloosa on KLAN business he never knew where he would be able to cash a check so he would make the check payable to cash and cash the check at some grocery store or service station where he was known. The amounts were charged to him on the KLAN books and he brought back gas tickets, motel bills, invoices, etc., to account for the

money spent. SHELTON stated that he travels 90,000 to 110,000 miles per year on KLAN business. He traveled 120,000 miles by automobile during the year 1966 on KLAN business.

5. Revenue Agent Hutchinson and I examined the KLAN's bank statements, cancelled checks, deposit tickets and cash receipts and disbursements books for FYE 6/30/62 through FYE 6/30/66. Receipts and expenses per books substantially reconciled with receipts and expenses per returns. For the four year period, net income was overstated on returns by $48.10. The 1963 corporate return filed by the KLAN was never located. We worked with a Profit and Loss Statement located in the KLAN file for that year which showed receipts of $3,879.44, disbursements of $3,634.89 and taxable income of $240.49. SHELTON claims he recalls mailing the 1963 return to the District Director in Birmingham. Mrs. CAROL LONG, KLAN BOOKKEEPER during this period, recalls preparing the return and giving it to SHELTON to sign and mail. Receipts during the period 2/20/61 to 6/30/61, the first four months of operation of the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, were negligible and were included in receipts for the FYE 6/30/62.

6. Revenue Agent Hutchinson analyzed all checks written to cash and examined the supporting documents. Checks to cash totaled:

Year	Total	
1961	$ 156.18	
1962	184.92	
1963	1,033.75	
1964	5,104.69	
1965	11,787.45	$18,266.99

Checks written to cash and not supported by documentation were reported by SHELTON as income on his individual income tax return. Numerous checks to cash were signed by SHELTON and cosigned by T.M. MONTGOMERY or JAMES HENDRIX. It was brought out during the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings that T.M. MONTGOMERY was signed by CAROL LONG, KLAN BOOKKEEPER, and JAMES HENDRIX was signed by SHELTON's wife, BETTY LOU. SHELTON acknowledged that the MONTGOMERY and HENDRIX names on the checks were KLAN code names for MRS. LONG and MRS. SHELTON and that the names and signatures were on file at the bank. This information was corroborated by FIRST NATIONAL BANK VICE PRESIDENT J. H. PERDUE.

7. Receipts per monthly reports of various KLAN UNITS were compared with total receipts per return for FYE 6/30/64 and 6/30/65. Total receipts per reports and total receipts per returns were as follows:

Year	Receipts per Reports	Receipts per Returns	Variance
6/30/64	$ 5,557.25	$ 7,415.63	$1,858.38
6/30/65	17,552.40	18,487.60	935.20
	$23,109.65	$25,903.23	$2,793.58

The variance between receipts per reports and receipts per return consisted mainly of monies which came in without a report and anonymous contributions.

8. Monthly reports of various KLAN UNITS were pulled at random from six different states. The reports were traced individually to Cash Receipts Journal, to deposit tickets and to bank statements, without discrepancy.

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

9. Photostats of several thousand checks from various KLAN UNITS, payable to SHELTON or ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE, were secured from the House Un-American Activities Committee file. I found only one of these checks which was not endorsed "For deposit only" to ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE account in Tuscaloosa. A check dated 3/28/64 payable to ROBERT M. SHELTON, in amount of $50.00, on the account of WHITE PATRIOTS, P. O. Box 7094, Montgomery, Alabama, was endorsed by SHELTON and THE AUTO-RITE STORE in Tuscaloosa. The amount was entered in receipts on the KLAN books as a donation from WHITE PATRIOTS of Montgomery. SHELTON stated that the $50.00 was for four recaps on his automobile which was used for KLAN business.

10. Transcript of the testimony of ERNEST N. MERRIWETHER, President, DIXIE ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Mobile, Alabama, was secured from the House Un-American Activities Committee file together with photostats of eight $500.00 checks payable to SHELTON during 1963 and 1964. MERRIWETHER was not contacted personally on advice of U. S. Attorney ROBERT JANSEN, Southern Judicial District of Alabama. MERRIWETHER has several tax suits pending in Mobile at present.

MERRIWETHER testified that he paid SHELTON the following checks:

Date	Amount	
7/14/63	$500.00	
9/24/63	500.00	
11/6/63	500.00	
11/13/63	500.00	$2,000.00
1/8/64	$500.00	
2/13/64	500.00	
3/13/64	500.00	
4/22/64	500.00	$2,000.00

SHELTON reported $500.00 from this source on his 1963 return and $1,500.00 on his 1964 return. He contends four of the $500.00 checks "bounced." The ledger sheets on his personal account at the FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF TUSCALOOSA and the deposit tickets to this account disclosed eight $500.00 deposits to the account from DIXIE ENGINEERING and only one debit to the account for $500.00 for a returned DIXIE ENGINEERING check.

D. L. THOMAS, accountant for DIXIE ENGINEERING, stated that all eight checks to SHELTON were posted to their disbursements journal and postings to this journal were made from checks after they cleared the bank.

The eight checks in question were written on six different bank accounts. The banks were contacted and their records indicate all eight checks were eventually paid. However, SHELTON's five exemptions and a standard deduction for the year 1963 will offset his reported income plus the additional $1,500.00 on his 1963 return. The additional $500.00 in 1964 is more than

offset by unclaimed depreciation on his automobile for that year. He will owe a small amount of self-employment tax on the unreported net amounts.

11. Revenue Agent Hutchinson and I examined SHELTON's account at LORCH's DIAMOND SHOP in Tuscaloosa from opening purchase on 6/11/62 to date. The diamond ring alleged to have been purchased with KLAN funds during the years 1964 and 1965 was purchased June 11, 1962 by MRS. SHELTON for $339.60, which amount includes carrying charges. She paid $30.00 per month on this account until November 8, 1963, at which time the account was paid in full. The checks drawn on the KLAN account to LORCH's DIAMOND SHOP during the years 1964 and 1965 were payments on an Invicta Tape Recorder purchased on 5/18/64 for $62.95 and a Webcor Recorder purchased on same date for $167.00. These items were purchased for the KLAN and charged to his account, according to SHELTON, because LORCH's would not extend credit to the KLAN.

12. Sales Invoice from STANSELL PONTIAC-CADILLAC COMPANY, 2115 15th Street, Tuscaloosa, shows the Cadillac purchased by SHELTON to be a used 1961 CADILLAC purchased on November 18, 1964, for $612.00 cash and a trade-in of a 1963 Pontiac Grand Prix. SHELTON said he traded the 1963 Pontiac on a 1961 Cadillac because the Pontiac had over 100,000 miles on it. The KLAN made three payments on the Pontiac for SHELTON but none on the Cadillac. A check was issued on the KLAN account on 6/15/63 to STANSELL PONTIAC-CADILLAC COMPANY for $277.66 and another check to the same company on 9/27/63 for $136.33. SHELTON failed to include these payments in income for the year 1963 and did not claim any depreciation on the Pontiac for that year.

13. SHELTON purchased his residence in Northport, Alabama, in April, 1966. The property was purchased from Lake Real Estate Company in Tuscaloosa for $20,876.47. He paid $11,000.00 down and assumed a $1,000.00 second mortgage held by Lake Real Estate Company. Balance of $8,876.47 was financed at FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

SHELTON acquired the $11,000.00 down payment by selling his residence at 1703 East 15th Street in Tuscaloosa for $5,000.00 and drew $6,000.00 accrued salary from the KLAN, which was included on his W-2 statement from the KLAN for the year 1966.

In June, 1966, SHELTON purchased the adjoining lot to his home for $1,500.00. This amount was raised by selling various books at KLAN rallys and through the mail. A separate record was kept by MRS. SHELTON of this income and was reported on SHELTON's 1966 income tax return.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The investigation disclosed that: (1) Substantially all checks received by the KLAN are deposited to the KLAN account in Tuscaloosa; (2) Currency received and cash donations are recorded on the KLAN books as receipts; (3) Checks drawn on the KLAN account payable to cash are substantiated by

receipts and invoices; (4) there is no indication of income being received by the KLAN and not posted to their books; (5) controversial receipts by SHELTON from DIXIE ENGINEERING are offset by his exemptions and allowable depreciation on his automobile; (6) allegations that SHELTON purchased a diamond ring and a Cadillac automobile with KLAN funds are negated by available evidence, and (7) failure to file 1961 and 1963 returns by the KLAN resulted in no injury to the government.

I recommend that this case be closed in the Intelligence Division files because of lack of criminal prosecution potential and referred back to the Audit Division for such action as they deem appropriate. Audit Group Supervisor G. D. Grim advises he has no objection to this proposed withdrawal.

(signed) R. S. Phillips

Robert S. Phillips
Special Agent

APPROVED:

(Signed) Floyd D. Moore

Chief, Intelligence Division
Birmingham District
P. O. Box 1631
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6/15/70

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
--RM

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. J. V. Walsh
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson

The Birmingham Office has requested Bureau to secure copies of 1969 Income Tax Return for United Klans of America, Inc. (UKA), the Alabama Rescue Service, a name by which the UKA is sometimes known, and Robert Marvin Shelton, Imperial Wizard of UKA. Birmingham desires to review these returns for information concerning financial standing of UKA and Shelton and any information which might be of assistance in instituting counterintelligence measures.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Liaison Section obtain from Internal Revenue Service two ~~certified~~ copies each of 1969 Income Tax Return filed by Shelton, the UKA and/or Alabama Resoue Service. Attached is a memorandum for use of Liaison Section.

Enclosure

HEH:cae/mkz
(7)

REC-77 157-9-4-151

25 JUN 23 1970

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY 5P-2 ALM/176

58 JUL 1 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1-Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1-Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1-Mr. G. C. Moore
1-Liaison Section
1-Mr. J. V. Walsh
1-Mr. H. E. Helgeson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG
#MDR16

June 16, 1970

ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON
UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

Robert Marvin Shelton, Social Security Number 424-34-0016, resides Number 18, Lake Sherwood, Star Route, Northport, Alabama. His wife is Betty Lou Shelton. He is employed as the Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

The United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, sometimes known as the Alabama Rescue Service, is located in Northport, Alabama.

Please furnish two ~~certified~~ copies each of the 1969 Federal Tax Return filed by Shelton; the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and/or the Alabama Rescue Service.

HEH:jlm
(9)

It is requested no investigation of subject be instituted solely on the basis of the above information.

NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 6-15-70, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of Hate Groups, RM," prepared by HEH:cae/mkz.

REC-35

EX-109

25 JUN 22 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5 JUL 1970

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

US Treasury Department

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, D.C. 20224

Date: JUL 2 1968

In reply refer to: CP:C:D

Honorable J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

In re: Charles Clark Kissinger, Jr.
6306 North Lakewood Avenue or
5401 South Ellis Avenue
Chicago, Illinois

C. Clark Kissinger
Kissinger Jr.

In response to your request of May 31, 1968, we are enclosing a copy of the income tax return of Charles C. and Judy J. Kissinger, 6306 N. Lakewood, Chicago, Illinois 60626 (SSN: 355-34-0441 and SSN: 352-32-2937, respectively), for the year 1966.

Persons having access to this document should be cautioned as to the confidentiality of the information contained therein and as to the penalty provisions of Section 7213 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 1905, Title 18, United States Code, regarding the unauthorized disclosure of such information.

Judy J. Kissinger

We will write you concerning the 1967 return as soon as possible.

EX-110 REC 37

Very truly yours,

100-[illegible]-26

16 JUL 11 1968

D. W. Bacon

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

Enclosure

E

#MDR16

10/13/00

SP2 ALM/JTG

54 JUL 22 1968

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

AmDR16

SP-8 ALM 1376

16113100

141-127-26

ENCLOSURE

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

6306 N. Lakewood
Chicago, Ill. 60626
April 17, 1967

District Director
Internal Revenue Service
Chicago, Ill. 60602

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is our 1967 income tax return. Salary for which there is no W-2 forms comes from several short or part time jobs which did not withhold.

Just as last year we cannot, of course, voluntarily pay our tax so long as the war in Vietnam continues. Should the government run short of funds in the meantime we suggest repeal of the oil depletion allowance or any other of the tax breaks for the wealthy.

Sincerely yours,

C. Clark Kissinger
Judy Jo Kissinger
C. Clark Kissinger
Judy Jo Kissinger

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JF6

26

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice

FMDR16

62-116395

10-13-00 SP2ALM/JTG

October 14, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General's Office dated September 9, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 8, 1975, SSC requests and specifically to the following Items in those requests: Items 8, 9, 11, 13 and 14.

Relative to Item 8, upon review of the file the only information located which is suggestive of being that to which Mr. Hoover referred in his written statement on the Baumgardner September 16, 1963, memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, is the prior memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan August 23, 1963. That document was previously furnished under Item 12 of this request.

Although there is no way of knowing just what Mr. Hoover was referring to with his statement, the August 23, 1963, memorandum summarizes a detailed memorandum which was attached to it and advises of Communist Party, USA, efforts being discontinued because of being "ineffective." Mr. Hoover wrote a comment on the August 23, 1963, memorandum to the effect that he could not ignore certain matters as having only "infinitestimal" effect on the efforts to exploit the American Negro by the communists.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

JDP:lek|ck
(9) ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

WOC

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-11[illegible] 964

Item 11 requested all materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963, memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell." An extensive review has been conducted of all logical files, abstracts and indices in an effort to find documents relating specifically to such conversations described in the request. The attached materials represent the only documents located that appear to be related in any manner to these conversations.

Item 13 requested the "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1953," and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956," which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page two of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

These two documents have been located. The 1953 document captioned "The Communist Party and the Negro" is a 103-page study of the interest and activities of the Communist Party, USA, in Negro-related causes and covers the years 1919-1952. The October, 1956, study is entitled "The Communist Party and the Negro, 1953--1956" and it supplements the 1953 study, and consists of 57 pages. SA Elmer W. Larson, Jr., discussed this matter with Mr. Michael Epstein of the SSC Staff on October 8, 1975. Mr. Epstein agreed that these documents need not be delivered at this time. It was agreed that the documents will be made available for access. If upon review copies are desired they will be provided. (66-04-1775; 100-3-75-1270)

1 - The Attorney General

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 9, 1975

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP2ALM/PG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a list of FBI materials, delivery of which is requested ~~by September 15, 1975~~. according to agreed priorities, JTE

I would also appreciate your making available for Committee staff access, all Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1963. Upon examination of these files, delivery thereafter will be orally requested for specific items in accordance with the provisions of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department which governs Committee requests for materials.

per r/o Dempsey

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

let to AG 1-DAC
JDP/let 10/14/75 Enc. 2

Receipt of material
covered by Finder case
subpoena hereby acknowledged.
JTE

RECEIVED
SEP 9 1975

62-116395-967

ENCLOSURE

September 8, 1975

DOCUMENT REQUEST

1. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of the informant) of the 2/12/62 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, FBI, subject "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C (00: Atlanta)."

NP

2. All materials reflecting the steps taken by the FBI which "prevent(ed) the CPUSA from seizing control of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People," as stated in the last paragraph of page 4 of the enclosure captioned "Communist Party USA" which was attached to Director Hoover's January 10, 1961 letter to Robert Kennedy.

Such? P. NOT OURS

✓3\. Reports which were submitted by the Atlanta and New York field offices pursuant to the following instructions which were contained in the second paragraph of page 1 of the February 27, 1962 letter from the FBI Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C, Office of Origin: Atlanta," (a copy of which was disseminated to the New York field office:

Urgent

NP

> New York and Atlanta are instructed to review their files and prepare a report suitable for dissemination which will include all information of a security nature plus complete background data.

4. The "Bureau letters to Atlanta, 7/20/62, to Mobile, 7/20/62, and to Savannah, 9/17/62" which are referenced in the first paragraph of the 10/11/62 memorandum from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C, (00:Atlanta)."

NP

5. The "Correspondence received from the Atlanta and New York Offices" as indicated in the first sentence of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C".

NP

6. All materials reflecting instructions issued to the New York and Atlanta field offices "to furnish the Bureau recommendations concerning a communist infilitration investigation of (SCLC) and the recommendations received from those two field offices for a "communist infiltration investigation of SCLC", as indicated in the second paragraph of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C".

P SPECIFY TIME FRAME

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2ALM/ITG

3

NP 7. The "necessary Manual changes" which were "attached for approval" to Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist."

P MORE SPECIFIC 8. All materials which support the following statement of Director Hoover which was noted on Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist":

> Just a few weeks ago you contended that the Communist influence in the racial movement was ineffective and infinitesimal.

NP 9. The September 5, 1963 letterhead memorandum to the Attorney General and "the related prior memoranda" which are referred to in the first paragraph of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell."

NP 10. The July 3, 1963 letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Hunter Pitts O'Dell which was attached to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

?NP 11. All materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

O.K. BUT NEED TO DISCUSS SUBSEQUENT MEMORANDA 12. The "Brief on the above-captioned matter and subsequent memoranda on the same subject matter" which are referred to in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

1963? 13. The "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1958" and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956" which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

14. All materials reflecting or pertaining to Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney Committee", as referred to in his February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning a 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, as well as an unexcised copy of the February 5 memorandum.

NP

15. All materials which reflect the basis for the following statements which are contained in Mr. Baumgardner's May 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Internal Security Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, Administrative Matter":

Married ?

a. "About three months prior to the March on Washington (8/28/63), we intensified our investigation concerning communist influence into the racial movement. . . .";

b. "Martin Luther King, head of SCLC, has challenged the Bureau on this point."

16. All materials reflecting the "previous arrangements" referred to in the November 18, 1964 memorandum from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, subject "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director, 10:00 a.m., 11/18/64 (10:05 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.)"

? contained 7/8
NP

17. All materials reflecting, concerning, or pertaining to:

a. "(S)tatements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Georgia, at the time he highly criticized the FBI. His statements were made on 11/18/62 during an interview in the Robing Room of the Riverside Church in New York City where King had just preached a sermon." (This quotation is taken from the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of the 11/19/64 memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. DeLoach captioned "Director's Briefing of Women Reporters on 11/18/64")

R

b. Comments, responses, and recommendations made, inspections conducted, and/or any other actions taken as a result of the statements of Dr. King which are described in Item 17.a. above.

Coordination X Inspection Div ?
Time Frame

18. Identification of the author of the notation "Being Handled, 11/20/64, D" which appears at the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters."

[illegible] Wick

19. All materials reflecting the manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "(b)eing handled" as noted on the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters," together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom.

P

20. The response to John Doar's August 19, 1964 letter to Mr. James R. Malley which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

NP

21. The division and section assignment of James R. Malley as of August 19, 1964.

NP

Coord W/ Adm Div

22. All materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964 memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

PREV. HANDLED 7/14

23. All materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

P HANDLED

24. The table of contents page(s) and/or chapter or section headings of:

a. The article captioned "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" which was attached to Mr. Sullivan's 10/15/63 memorandum to Mr. Belmont under the same caption.

NP

b. The paper which was the up-to-date revision of the article described in Item 24 (a) above and which paper was attached to Mr. Sullivan's November 22, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

c. The memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which was transmitted with the December 21, 1964 letter from Director Hoover to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.

d. The document which was the "current revision of the previous analysis captioned 'Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis'" and which document was enclosed with Mr. Brennan's April 10, 1967 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Communist Influence in Racial Matters - A Current Analysis."

e. The "current study" entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr. - A Current Analysis" which was enclosed with Director Hoover's March 14, 1968 letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall.

25. All materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a. - e. above. (Do not supply the documents themselves.)

?. What mean

26. An identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24 a. - e. above. (Do not supply the attachments themselves.)

?

27. All materials reflecting that:

a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and

b. "the Director agreed,"

that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr. be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's 2/29/68 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

Klein 28. All materials which reflect any recommendations for, and/or decisions relating to, the sending of Director Hoover's August 25, 1967 letter to specified field offices captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Internal Security."

Cointelpro
Ryan?

Klein 29. All materials reflecting the approval of proposals contained in Mr. G. C. Moore's February 29, 1968 memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence."

Ryan?

30. All materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965 memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

31. All materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's 1/16/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C.")

32. All materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position at that time (the end of a 90-day period, or sooner if conditions permit) to take further action against King and the SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau," as promised in Mr. Sullivan's December 24, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

33. All materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta field office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government with representatives of (the Atlanta) office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

to #16

34. All materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

[illegible]

35. All materials comprising the "separate correspondence" between FBI Headquarters and the Atlanta field office concerning the "specific matters dealt with in Atlanta's letter (of 4/14/64)" as indicated in the Director's 4/24/64 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

Search to end

36. The communication from the Atlanta field office to FBI Headquarters by which "this publication has previously been furnished to the Bureau on 6/26/64," as stated in the second paragraph of page 3 of the 7/7/64 letter from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, IS-C."

Deegan's Office

37. The "separate correspondence" by which the Atlanta field office was "directed to furnish the Bureau available information concerning the alleged escapades of (the Reverend Ralph) Abernathy, including the obtaining of official court records," as referred to in the Director's July 23, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

38. The letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers which was originally attached to Mr. Sullivan's 11/27/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement -- A Current Analysis." (See note on 11/27/64 memorandum indicating that the letter was "revised.")

39. "The letter" which is the subject of the first and second paragraphs of Director Hoover's February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning his 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, and which letter the Director told the Attorney General, he would "check on" and any other materials relating to "the letter".

P 40. All materials concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. being named "Man of the Year" by Time Magazine in December 1963 - January 1964.

P 41. All materials concerning or pertaining to Dr. King's Papal audience in Rome in September 1964.

P 42. Speech delivered by Director Hoover at Loyola College in November 1964, and all materials pertaining thereto.

NP 43. All Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") from 1963 until 1968 for:

a. William D. Campbell, and
b. John Matter.

P ATLANTA

45. All materials reflecting, concerning or pertaining to electronic surveillance, feasibility studies or surveys, physical surveillance, or photographic surveillances, and/or any proposals, recommendations or discussions of any of the foregoing surveillances, studies or surveys, with respect to Dr. King's "hideaway", or Fred Bennett's apartment, or premises located at 3006 Delmar Lane, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia, or with respect to any other premises, apartment, or "hideaway", used, owned, or leased by Dr. King or Fred Bennett.

Klein

Cointelpro Ryan?

46. The following materials which are referred to in the October 9, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C":

a. "NYlet 9/26/62";
b. "further steps to carry out this counterintelligence plan will be handled at the Bureau";
c. "memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption dated October 8, 1962, ARW:cdb."

X

47. The "ATairtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated 4/1/64 captioned "CPUSA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C" and "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C", which are referenced in the 4/13/64 Airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York and Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal SEcurity - C (Negro Question).

48. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of informants) of the 8/15/66 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, subject "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Secuirty - C (Stanley David Levison.)"

49. The Memorandum which "the Director had noted" as referred to in the NOTE at the bottom of the 4/13/65 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, subject "Communist Party, USA Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Nicholas A. Kourambis) (Negro Question)."

Klein Cointelpro Ryan?

50. All materials reflecting "comments" and "specific recommendations" submitted by the Atlanta, Chicago, and New York field offices as the result of the instructions contained in the last paragraph of the May 18, 1967 letter from the Director the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Martin Luther King)."

!

Klein Cointelpro Ryan?

51. All materials reflecting the product of the "comprehensive review of Levison's Bureau case file" as indicated in the NOTE on the 7/18/66 airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Stanley David Levison)."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/14/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/8/75 request, Items 8,9,11,13
and 14

Originating Office: FBI 930 A

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/KKG

X

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-964

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED 10/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 9/8/75, items 8,9,11,13 and 14

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

~~TS~~

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials pertaining to Martin Luther King,Jr. and SCLC: As they relate to CP, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters and Hunter Pitts O'Dell; Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney committee".

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW 5-W06/8

3791 (6-75) CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 9

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2ALM/JT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/KSR #MDR16

The Attorney General

September 5, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Reddy
1 - Mr. Shubatt

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

In my letter dated August 20, 1963, information was set forth regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell's possible association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and information regarding Reverend King's statement indicating O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on Reverend King's staff.

On August 30, 1963, at 7:25 P.M., O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau entering the building located at 312 West 125th Street, New York, New York. O'Dell remained in the building in excess of one hour. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference occupies one of the several offices which are located in that building.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

100-358916

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

REC 46

158

19 SEP 6 1963

ST-108

MAILED 25
SEP 5 - 1963
COMM-FBI

WFS:erc
(14)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

347

SEP 6 - 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General — August 20, 1963

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY 3657 VRF LAG
ON 11-1-82

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Reddy

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

In my letter dated August 2, 1963, information was set forth regarding a United Press International release issued on July 29, 1963, at Atlanta, Georgia, reporting that the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had agreed to submit to Attorney General Eugene Cook of Georgia an affidavit explaining the employment in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) of a man linked by Congressional committees with the Communist Party. The release stated that King sent an attorney to Cook's office to determine what the Attorney General wanted in connection with his inquiry into the relationship with the SCLC of Jack O'Dell. The release concluded with the statement "King said last week O'Dell had worked for SCLC on two occasions but his connections with the integration organization were severed for good last June 26." It is noted that the subject is also known as Jack O'Dell.

On August 16, 1963, a confidential source of the Bureau advised that King had been alerted by his assistant, Wyatt Tee Walker, to an article appearing in the Atlanta "Constitution" on August 16, 1963, regarding King's association with O'Dell. Walker told King that the article referred to a letter written by Georgia Attorney General Cook in which Cook stated that O'Dell is a known communist and in which Cook demanded an explanation from King as to why O'Dell was placed on King's staff.

MAILED 6
AUG 20 1963
COMM-FBI

King instructed Walker to reply to Cook's letter by stating that O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on King's staff. Cook was to be further advised that O'Dell came to him, King, through the Democratic Party of the Bronx, New York, and that King "has nothing to hide."

REC-45
100-358916 — 252

EBR:erc
(13)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

AUG 22 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Confidential~~" because it contains information, the disclosure of which might reveal the source and adversely affect the national defense. The source is NY 4099-S*.

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/
#m DR16

The Attorney General August 2, 1963

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Bland
- 1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Reference is made to my letter dated July 31, 1963, concerning an article in the July 25, 1963, issue of the Atlanta, Georgia, "Constitution" regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell and entitled "Onetime Communist Organizer Heads Rev. King's Office in N.Y." My letter concluded that a telephone call to the office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in New York City on July 30, 1963, resulted in a statement by an unidentified female employee that Hunter Pitts O'Dell was no longer employed by the SCLC.

A United Press International release issued on July 29, 1963, at Atlanta, Georgia, reported that the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had agreed to submit to Georgia Attorney General Eugene Cook an affidavit explaining the employment in the SCLC of a man linked by Congressional committees with the Communist Party. The release states that King sent an attorney to Cook's office to determine what the Attorney General wanted in connection with his inquiry into the relationship with the SCLC of Jack O'Dell. The release further states that "King said last week O'Dell had worked for SCLC on two occasions but his connections with the integration organization were severed for good last June 26."

For your additional information in this regard, investigation by this Bureau's New York Office has developed information that, on July 2, 1963, and July 19, 1963, one "J. H. O'Dell" was the payee of checks in the amounts of $333.62 and $2,372.96, respectively, drawn by the SCLC. These checks were deposited to the account of Hunter Pitts O'Dell in a New York City bank.

On July 19, 1963, Charles Finnerty, Supervisor of the E. J. Creeden Company, 118 East 25th Street, New York City, the company which provides mailing service

AUG 7 12 39 PM '63
REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI

REC-4
100-358916 — 251

SENT

(SEE NOTE PAGE THREE)

FJB:erc
(13)

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Casper
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. DeLoach
- Mr. Evans
- Mr. Gale
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Miss Holmes
- Miss Gandy

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

for the SCLC, was advised by O'Dell that he, O'Dell, had a big mailing list coming up in August. Finnerty asked O'Dell to submit written instructions but O'Dell replied that he would get together with Finnerty when Finnerty returned from vacation on August 5, 1963. Finnerty had previously on July 17, 1963, telephoned and spoken to O'Dell at the New York Office of the SCLC.

On July 22, 1963, O'Dell visited the offices of the Creeden Company and turned over to Mrs. Dorothy Creeden, the company's secretary, a check for $200 to be credited to the account of the SCLC at the Creeden Company.

On July 31, 1963, a pretext telephone call to the New York Office of the SCLC was answered by a person identifying herself as Ruth Bailey. When asked if Hunter Pitts O'Dell was still employed by the SCLC, Ruth Bailey stated that she was not in a position to say. It is known that Ruth Bailey has been employed in the New York Office of the SCLC for some time; nevertheless, she commented to the person making the telephone call that she had not been employed by the SCLC very long.

Also on July 31, 1963, O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau's New York Office entering the premises at 312 West 125th Street, New York City, which house the New York Office of the SCLC. O'Dell remained for several minutes and then returned to his residence.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

NOTE:

In view of current controversy regarding whether or not Hunter Pitts O'Dell, who was elected to the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959, under an alias, is still employed by the SCLC, the New York Office is under instructions to endeavor to definitely resolve this question. We will furnish any pertinent information developed to the Attorney General.

The Attorney General July 31, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland 1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/EKS
M 0616

There is attached for your consideration a copy of a letter dated July 27, 1963, received from Senator Richard D. Russell, together with a copy of the July 25, 1963, article in the Atlanta, Georgia, "Constitution" entitled "Onetime Communist Organizer Heads Rev. King's Office in N.Y." I have advised Senator Russell by letter of this date that, in line with Departmental policy, I am referring his letter to you.

You have been kept advised by communications, the latest of which was dated July 17, 1963, captioned "Request From Senator Monroney Concerning Racial Agitation," of Hunter Pitts O'Dell's association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition, copies of investigative reports concerning O'Dell have been submitted to the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice on a continuing basis. The last such report submitted was dated June 28, 1963, at New York, New York.

For your further information, a telephone call to the office of the SCLC in New York City on July 30, 1963, resulted in a statement by an unidentified female employee that Hunter Pitts O'Dell was no longer employed by the SCLC.

MAILED 25
AUG 2 - 1963
COMM-FBI

Enclosures - 2
REC- 25
100-358916 - 250

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosures - 2)
EX-103 1 - Mr. Burke Marshall (Enclosures - 2)
Assistant Attorney General

AUG 9 1963

NOTE:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same subject, dated 7/30/63, FBR:DB:erc:pw.

FBR:dfm:erc

(15) *This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

The Attorney General

REC- 42

ST-110 Director, FBI 57-6-133

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

July 17, 1963

1 - Mr. M. A. Jones
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Section tickler
1 - Mr. Garner

REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONRONEY
CONCERNING CURRENT RACIAL AGITATION

#mori6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP I ALM/JJG
ON 11-8-00

For your information, there is enclosed a copy of a letter dated July 12, 1963, received from Senator A. S. Mike Monroney which is self-explanatory. I have advised Senator Monroney by letter of this date that, in line with Departmental policy, I am referring his letter to you.

In substance, the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) is not able to assume a role of leadership in the racial unrest at this time. However, the Party is attempting to exploit the current racial situation through propaganda and participation in demonstrations and other activities wherever possible. Through these tactics, the Party hopes ultimately to progress from its current supporting role to a position of decisive leadership.

Much of the CPUSA's hope to play a more decisive role is linked with Stanley Levison's role as an advisor to Martin Luther King. Party officials regard Levison, a secret member of the CPUSA, as being engaged in the most important work in the Party today because of his association with King. Levison has reportedly stated that "King is a wholehearted Marxist who has studied it (Marxism), believes in it, agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly." Levison is reputed to have written the speech which King delivered at the convention of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) in Florida in December, 1961.

When King indicated in June, 1962, that he wanted another administrative assistant, Levison recommended Hunter Pitts O'Dell, who had been elected to the National Committee of the CPUSA in December, 1959, under the pseudonym Cornelius James. King accepted Levison's suggestion and employed O'Dell in his organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). [illegible] identified O'Dell as a communist [illegible], 1963, King announced that O'Dell had resigned from the SCLC. However, O'Dell continues to associate with King to this

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NOTE: See memorandum, Smith to Sullivan, 7/17/63, RSG:JMS/aab:jdd, re: SENATOR A. S. MIKE MONRONEY, REQUEST FOR DIRECTOR'S VIEWS RE CURRENT RACIAL AGITATION.

RSG:JMS/jdd:aab
(15)

SEE NOTE ON PAGE THREE RE CLASSIFICATION

27 AUG 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI
REC'D
7-17-63

The Attorney General

Recently, information received indicates that, while Levison still retains his strong communist convictions and still acts as an effective Party advisor to King, he is becoming critical of the Party's role in the relationship. He believes the Party has lost prestige among Negroes lately because it has not been sufficiently aggressive and effective in promoting civil rights for the Negro and otherwise actively immersing itself in Negro causes.

King reportedly attended a Labor Day weekend seminar in 1957 at the Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee. According to a publication circulated concerning this meeting by the Georgia Commission of Education, which allegedly has an undercover agent in attendance, the meeting was held to discuss methods and tactics for precipitating racial strife and disturbances. While CPUSA members were on the school staff and the school followed the policy of welcoming communist students, the CPUSA was not in control of the school.

See memo Bland to Sullivan 7-11-63

In June, 1960, the SCLC was reported to have solicited ~~[illegible]~~ funds from the Soviet and Czechoslovakian Embassies and the Rumanian Legation in Washington, D. C. Same caption

In recent years, King has signed a petition urging abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and petitions requesting the release of two imprisoned Communist Party leaders.

NAACP officials are aware that the NAACP is a communist target. As a result, the NAACP has taken a firm stand against communism and has warned its branches to be constantly alert against communist efforts to infiltrate them. The constitution of the NAACP contains an anticommunist clause which prohibits membership in the organization by known Communist Party members.

There is no indication that any of the key figures of the NAACP are or have been members of the Communist Party. Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, has been strongly anticommunist and has endeavored to keep the NAACP free of communists.

The following national officers of the NAACP had communist front affiliations--in no instance extensive--a number of years ago, but none is known to have been a Communist Party member: Arthur Spingarn, President; Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood, Chairman of the Board of Directors; and Robert L. Carter, General Counsel.

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

There is no evidence that any of the following top leaders of CORE are or have been Communist Party members: James L. Farmer, National Director; James T. McCain, ~~Field~~ Director; and Gordon R. Carey, Director, Program and Training Department. Carey was one of the founders of the Conference of Young Socialists (CYS) in 1957 and was a member at large of the Executive Committee of CYS. The CYS was controlled by the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party, which has been designated as subversive pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Full details of the activities related herein previously have been furnished for the Department's files in individual reports and related communications.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General - Enclosures (2)

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall - Enclosures (2)
Assistant Attorney General

Note: This letter is classified ~~Secret~~ inasmuch as it contains information from highly sensitive sources, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the Nation and have an adverse effect upon the national defense interests of the country.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

July 9, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

#m DR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/216
ON 11-8-00

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell, dated June 28, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

The symbol T-1 in this report relates to an informant in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. The symbol T-2 was not used and T-3 through T-6 relate to confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE:

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report also so classified.

REC- 72 - 244

JUL 11 1963

MAILED 6
JUL 9 - 1963
COMM-FBI

EX-114

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes

DR:mjh
(3)

60 JUL 16 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

April 12, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

#mDE16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JG
ON 11-8-00

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated April 1, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1 in this report is a source in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-2 and T-6 are informants who are furnishing information of extreme value and who are not available for interview or testimony. T-3, T-4, and T-5 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

2 - New York (100-91330)

ATTENTION: SAC, NEW YORK:

There is no objection to your submitting future reports on a 90-day basis. However, any data developed indicative of Communist Party membership on the part of the subject or any contact by him with members of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, should immediately be brought to the attention of the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination.

-116 — 24

REC 9

NOTE ON YELLOW:

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified "Confidential."

APR 15 1963

DR:cah:eeb (6)

CONFIDENTIAL

MAILED 25
APR 1 [illegible] 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

55 APR 1 [illegible] 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

March 6, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated February 15, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual. Each report is accompanied by an informant evaluation memorandum also dated February 15, 1963.

T-1, T-2 and T-3 in this report are sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-4 is an informant who is furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony. T-5, T-6 and T-7 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 4

100-358916

1 - New York (100-91330)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/176 #MDR16
ON 11-8-00

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom would adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is so classified.

DR:bgc
(5)

REC-63 100-358916-251

MAILED 25
MAR 6 - 1963
COMM-FBI

19 MAR 7 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson ______
Belmont ______
Mohr ______
Casper ______
Callahan ______
Conrad ______
DeLoach ______
Evans ______
Gale ______
Rosen ______
Sullivan ______
Tavel ______
Trotter ______
Tele. Room ______
Holmes ______
Gandy ______

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

F73

14

KR

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

Director, FBI

February 5, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Reddy

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reference is made to your inquiry of Mr. Alex Rosen of this Bureau regarding the current Communist Party membership of Hunter Pitts O'Dell.

We have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party.

This information is, of course, highly sensitive and confidential.

REC- 63

100-358916 - 234

See cover memo Rosen to Belmont 2/5/63, same re.

#mDR16 DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTB ON 11-8-00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

EBR:mtb/kmo
(10)

memo delivered to AAG Marshall 2/6/63 at 10:[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 2/5/63

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2 ALM/TB

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division has asked that we give him a statement concerning the Communist Party affiliation of Hunter Pitts O'Dell. We have called to his attention current reports which have been furnished to the Security Division, Attention Mr. Walter Yeagley, concerning O'Dell's activities.

Marshall was interested in O'Dell's association with Rev. Martin Luther King and he was given a copy of a report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated 12/20/62 at New York, which was classified "Confidential", which had been disseminated to Walter Yeagley of the Security Division. This report reflected the current association of O'Dell and the organization of Rev. King, namely, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition to the above we also furnished him a copy of a memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated 12/6/62 and another dated 1/23/63, pertaining to O'Dell.

Marshall stated that upon review of the above information which was furnished to him, he would like to have a statement from the FBI concerning the present Communist affiliation of O'Dell, particularly, whether O'Dell actually is a member of the Communist Party at this time.

I advised Marshall that an appropriate memorandum would be prepared and furnished to him concerning his request. There is attached hereto a memorandum which has been prepared by the Security Division indicating that we have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party. It is being pointed out that this information is highly sensitive and confidential.

Enclosure (1)

REC- 63 100-35[illegible]-234

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

AR:mpd (8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memo to Mr. Belmont from A. Rosen
Re: Hunter Pitts O'Dell

By way of background, Marshall indicated that the basis for his request stems from the necessity of having to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to O'Dell. He stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to adequately handle this inquiry.

ACTION:

If approved, attached memorandum to Burke Marshall will be handed to him. It is brief and specifically points out the need to treat this information as highly sensitive and confidential.

Delivered 2/6/63

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-1-82 BY 362 VRT

The Attorney General

January 23, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Reddy

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

On December 6, 1962, you were furnished information indicating that despite the Reverend Martin Luther King's statement of October 31, 1962, that Hunter Pitts O'Dell had resigned his position with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), O'Dell had continued to represent himself as being affiliated with the New York Office of the SCLC and, during late November and early December, 1962, was actively engaged in the work of this organization. Reverend King's public statement of October 31, 1962, was occasioned by an editorial in the October 25, 1962, edition of the "Augusta Chronicle," Augusta, Georgia, which identified O'Dell as a concealed member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, who was employed by the SCLC under the alias Jack H. O'Dell.

I thought you would be interested in the fact that on three occasions during early January, 1963, O'Dell registered at an apartment in Atlanta, Georgia, as J. H. O'Dell. On each occasion, O'Dell represented himself as being with the New York Office of the SCLC. When checking out on January 7, 1963, O'Dell requested that the bill be charged to the SCLC. An inquiry by the manager resulted in telephonic confirmation from the Atlanta Office of the SCLC that that organization would pay O'Dell's bill. Also, on January 10, 1963, O'Dell, Reverend Martin Luther King and eight other officials of the SCLC traveled together via Delta Airlines from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia.

MAILED 2

REC 9

100-358916 - 232

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE TWO

17

EBR:erc
(13)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

In addition, a source who has requested that his identity be concealed has reported that at an SCLC conference at Nashville, Tennessee, during the latter part of December, 1962, a representative of the SCLC admitted that O'Dell continues to be involved with the SCLC in New York City in a fund-raising capacity although he is not currently on the SCLC payroll.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
    Assistant Attorney General

NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption, dated January 22, 1963, EBR:erc.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

January 4, 1963

1 - Mr. Ryan

Director, FBI

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ZTG
ON 11-8-00

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated December 20, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1, T-2, and T-3 were used in this report to conceal the identity of three sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-4 is an informant who is furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony. T-5, T-6, and T-7 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE ON YELLOW:

This letter is classified "~~Confidential~~" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified "Confidential."

REC-67 - 227

19 JAN 7 1963

EX. - 116

Tolson ____ DR:fjh
Belmont ____ (5)
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MAILED 27
JAN 3 - 1963
COMM-FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General December 6, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

On November 2, 1962, I forwarded to you a copy of an editorial that appeared in the October 25, 1962, edition of the "Augusta Chronicle," Augusta, Georgia. This editorial identified Hunter Pitts O'Dell, a concealed member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, as employed under the alias Jack H. O'Dell in the capacity of "Acting Executive Director" for the Reverend Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Subsequently, various newspapers contained accounts of a statement issued by the Reverend Martin Luther King on or about October 31, 1962, wherein it was stated O'Dell had resigned from his position with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Reverend Martin Luther King is quoted in this statement as denying knowledge of the communist affiliations of O'Dell and further describing allegations that O'Dell was the Southeastern Director of his organization as false in that O'Dell functioned "purely as a technician with 90 per cent of his work taking place in the North..." King further stated that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference has a policy "that no person of known communist affiliation can serve on the staff, executive board or its membership at large."

I thought you would be interested in the fact that our New York Office has developed information that on November 23, 1962, O'Dell identified himself as affiliated with the New York office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and during late November and early December, 1962, he was actively engaged in New York City in the work of this organization.

REC- 5

100-358916

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

DR:bgc (13)

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King)

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE 2

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MAILED 2
DEC 5 1962
COMM-FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY

#MOR16

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC'D READING ROOM

NOTE ON YELLOW:

O'Dell was elected under the pseudonym Cornelius James to the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959.

The Attorney General November 2, 1962

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
EDITORIAL FROM OCTOBER 25, 1962,
ISSUE OF AUGUSTA CHRONICLE
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA

I thought you would be interested in the enclosed editorial relating to O'Dell's relationship with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Enclosure

1 - The Deputy Attorney General - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Evans - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Belmont - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Sullivan - Enclosure
1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/FTG

NOTE: O'Dell was elected under the pseudonym Cornelius James to the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959. Since his association with the National Committee is set forth in the editorial, he is not being further characterized in this memorandum.

JH:mlw
(10)

100 -

NOV 8 1962

REC- 21

MAILED 19
NOV 2 1962
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1 - Mr. Ryan

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

November 19, 1962

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated November 5, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual. Each report is accompanied by an informant evaluation memorandum also dated November 5, 1962.

The Symbols T-1 and T-4 in this report relate to sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-2, T-5 and T-6 are confidential investigative techniques. T-3 is a confidential informant furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony.

Enc. (4)

#MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/LBE
ON 11-8-00

100-358916 -214

REC- 123

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE ON YELLOW: This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified ~~"Confidential."~~

DR/ejl
(5)

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAILED 8
COMM-FBI

53 NOV 29 1962

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

October 4, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated September 19, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1, T-3, T-5 and T-6 were utilized in this report to protect sources in whom the Department has not previously expressed an interest. T-2 and T-4 are confidential informants furnishing information of extreme value who are not available for interview or testimony. T-7, T-8 and T-9 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

1 - New York (100-91330)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG ON 12-8-00

MAILED 30
OCT 4 1962
COMM-FBI

NOTE ON YELLOW:

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which are also classified ~~"Confidential."~~

DR:cdb
(5)

REC- 27

210

19 OCT 5 1962

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 11

62 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: September 20, 1963

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL;
STANLEY LEVISON;
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN
THE NEGRO MOVEMENT

8-1
enc
8-7,8

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall telephoned and advised that on instructions of the Attorney General he wanted to clear with us the rough draft of a memorandum which he was going to send to the Bureau. As a matter of fact, the Attorney General has approved the rough draft contingent upon our approval.

The proposed memorandum, a copy of which is attached, relates to Hunter Pitts O'Dell and Stanley Levison and action taken to advise Dr. Martin Luther King and his immediate associates of the communist activities on the part of O'Dell and Levison. Marshall states that some time ago it was not felt wise, in view of the position of the FBI informant, for Marshall to say that he knew O'Dell to be under communist control. Instead, he informed Dr. King and two of his immediate associates that O'Dell was believed by many people to have had communist connections and his association with Dr. King's organization was not in its best interest.

Subsequently, on June 22, 1963, according to Marshall's proposed memorandum, he brought this matter very explicitly to Dr. King's attention. Later that same date, both the Attorney General and the President, separately, strongly urged Dr. King that there should be no further connection between O'Dell and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Thereafter, the Attorney General and Marshall received copies of a letter dated July 3, 1963, from Dr. King to O'Dell. In this letter King makes reference to a resignation which O'Dell submitted some months ago which was accepted because of the SCLC's firm policy that no communist or communist sympathizer would be on the staff. Dr. King's letter continues by noting an investigation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2 ALM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-

Enclosure

REC 102

ENCLOSURE

OCT 8 1963

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland

XEROX

OCT 9 1963

CAE:vap
(7)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

had been conducted but they were unable to discover any present connections with the Communist Party by O'Dell.

King further tells O'Dell that the situation is such that the organization cannot even afford the risk of impressions about communist inspiration and therefore O'Dell's temporary resignation is being made permanent.

Mr. Marshall's proposed memorandum also advises that he informed Dr. King on June 22, 1963, Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party. This action was taken on direction of the Attorney General and the President. Marshall had previously warned Dr. King about any association with Levison. This was the first indication given him of firm information Levison was under communist control.

Sensitive foreign intelligence operation

As a matter of background, our early information concerning the communist connections involved here came from ~~one of our two most highly placed communist informants (NY694-S*)~~. To protect ~~this most valuable informant~~ we insisted Levison and O'Dell not be informed by King we had positive information of their communist connections.

Subsequently, with the passage of time so that the risk to the informant was not jeopardized, the Director in a personal conversation with the Attorney General on June 17, 1963, agreed Dr. Martin Luther King could be informed that he should get rid of Levison and O'Dell because they are members of the Communist Party. It was on the basis of this advice from the Director that action was taken by the Attorney General and the President.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN:

While Mr. Marshall's proposed memorandum does not spell out the sequence of events here in detail, his summary is nevertheless accurate and it is therefore believed we should inform Mr. Marshall that he should feel free, of course, to submit the memorandum as he drafted it. If approved, Mr. Marshall will be so advised telephonically.

Handled 9-20-63

Form No. G-11
(Ed. 3-9-61)

From

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Deputy Attorney General ☐
Solicitor General ☐
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Tax ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Civil ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Lands ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Legal Counsel ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security ☐
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights ☒
Administrative Assistant Attorney General ☐
Director, FBI ☐
Director, Bureau of Prisons ☐
Director, Office of Alien Property ☐
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization ☐
Pardon Attorney ☐
Parole Board ☐
Board of Immigration Appeals ☐
Special Assistant for Public Information ☐
Records Administration Office ☐

For the attention of Burke Marshall

REMARKS: I think this is fine, but before we send it, I would want it cleared with Courtney. Will you handle this?

RFK

1742

#MD016

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY 5P2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100 - 355716 - 220

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

12 September 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Attached is a draft memorandum on Hunter Pitts O'Dell and the most recent documents. It could be expanded in detail but contains the essentials. I did not refer to the warning Harris Wofford gave to Dr. King at our suggestion in 1961 while Harris was at the White House because I do not know exactly what was said to King.

BM

I think this is fine but before we send it I would want it cleared with Courtney - Will you handle this

PERSONAL &
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE
RECEIVED
SEP 12 1963
ATTORNEY GENERAL

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

96

100-358916-270

DRAFT - 9/12/63

TO: J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

SUBJECT: Hunter Pitts O'Dell

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM 1 JTG

This relates to your letterhead memorandum of September 5 to the Attorney General, relating to Hunter Pitts O'Dell and therelated prior memorandum. I appreciate yourhaving sent copies of these to me.

This matter had been brought to the attention of Dr. King some time ago by me, but in accordance with conversations which the Attorney General had with Courtney Evans, it was not felt to be wise in view of the sources of the Bureau's information to state that I knew O'Dell to be under Communist control at any time. I did inform Dr. King and two members of his organization -- Reverend Andrew Young and Reverend Wyatt Walker -- some time ago -- that since O'Dell was believed by many people to have had Communist connections, his association with their organization was not in the best interests of the organization.

3

At that time, inconclusive steps were taken to remove O'Dell, and his job with the Southern Christian

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

27

220

Leadership Conference was changed. In response to direct questions whether I had hard evidence of O'Dell's Communist connections, however, I replied that I was not in a position to give any.

Following further conversations with Mr. Evans in June, however, I brought the matter to the attention of Dr. King very explicitly in my office on the morning of June 22 prior to a scheduled meeting which Dr. King had with the President. This was done at the direction of the Attorney General. Later that morning both the Attorney General and the President separately strongly urged Dr. King thatthere should be no further connection between O'Dell and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Dr. King stated that the connection would be ended. Thereafter, theAttorney General and I both received copies of the attached letter, dated July 3, 1963, from Dr. King to O'Dell.

On the same occasion, I also informed Dr.King that our information was that Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party. This was also done after conversations with Mr. Evans prior to the meeting with Dr. King, and was done at the direction of the Attorney

4

General and the President. Prior to that time, again based upon talks between the Attorney General and Mr. Evans at which I was present, it had been decided that it was not in the best interest of the United States to inform Dr.King that we had any firm information that Levison was under Communist control. I had, however, on a previous occasion, warned Dr. King about any association with Levison, basing the warning upon doubts about Levison's loyalty to the United States.

I thought you should have this additional information for your file.

BM

5

The Attorney General September 5, 1963

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

In my letter dated August 20, 1963, information was set forth regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell's possible association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and information regarding Reverend King's statement indicating O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on Reverend King's staff.

On August 30, 1963, at 7:25 P.M., O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau entering the building located at 312 West 125th Street, New York, New York. O'Dell remained in the building in excess of one hour. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference occupies one of the several offices which are located in that building.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

100-358916

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

(1) - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI

28

100-3527[illegible] - 220

Dr. King

UBURN AVE., N. E.
NTA 3, GEORGIA
PHONE 524-1378

Southern Christian Leadership Conference

Martin Luther King Jr., *President*
Wyatt Tee Walker, *Executive Director*

July 3, 1963

Burke
AM

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SPJ ALM/[illegible]

Attorney General Robert Kennedy
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kennedy:

Dr. King asked me to send you the enclosed copy of a letter which he has just sent to Mr. Jack O'Dell.

Sincerely yours,

Dora McDonald

(Miss) D. McDonald
Secretary

enc

File

OFFICE OF THE
RECEIVED
JUL 8 1963
ATTORNEY GENERAL

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100-358716-270

July 3, 1963

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/LTG

(1)

Mr. Jack H. O'Dell
488 St. Nicholas Avenue
Apartment 5-S
New York, New York

Dear Jack:

Several months ago you submitted your resignation pending an investigation of your alleged affiliation with the Communist party, as was suggested by an article to this effect in the Birmingham and New Orleans newspapers. We accepted this temporary resignation because of SCLC's firm policy that no Communist nor Communist sympathizer can be on our staff or in our membership. We felt that it was imperative to conduct an immediate investigation. As you know, we conducted what we felt to be a thorough inquiry into these charges and were unable to discover any present connections with the Communist party on your part.

The situation in our country is such, however, that any allusion to the left brings forth an emotional response which would seem to indicate that SCLC and the Southern Freedom Movement are Communist inspired. In these critical times we cannot afford to risk any such impressions. We, therefore, have decided in our Administrative Committee, that we should request you to make your temporary resignation permanent.

We certainly appreciate the years of unselfish service which you have put into our New York Office, and regret the necessity of your departure. Certainly, yours is a significant sacrifice commensurate with the sufferings in jail and through loss of jobs under racist intimidation. We all pray for the day when our nation may be truly the land of the free.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100-358716-270

May God bless you and continue to inspire you in the service of your fellowman.

Sincerely yours,

Martin Luther King, Jr.

Km

334 Auburn Avenue, N.E.
Atlanta 3, Georgia

ATLANTA, GA.
PM
5 JUL
1963

ATLANTA
JUL 3-'63
GA.

U.S. POSTAGE
05
P.B. 384881
METER

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 AL m/lzk

#MDR16

Attorney General Robert Kennedy

Department of Justice

Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL

10

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

31.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOV T

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: 7/19/63

FROM : C. A. Evans

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2ALM/

#MDE 16

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Evans
Mr. McGowan
Mr. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: RACIAL SITUATION

In talking with the Attorney General and Assistant AG Marshall, of the Civil Rights Division, reference was made to our earlier conversation concerning Congressional requests which had been received by the Director, relating to alleged communist influence in the racial demonstrations. The Department's original position was that there was no immediate urgency in recontacting Senator Monroney, in view of recent contacts had with him by Departmental representatives. Today, I pointed out that these requests should not be allowed to remain unresolved too long.

Assistant AG Marshall advised that he had drafted a proposed letter to be used in replying to these Congressional requests, since he had ascertained that a written reply is desired, particularly by Senator Monroney. In his letter Marshall proposes to paraphrase the President's statement at his press conference on 7/17/63. Marshall's letter will, of course, make no reference to the President's statement, but merely indicate that this is the conclusion, predicated upon reports and other information supplied to the Department.

In those instances where the Department is dealing with a Member of Congress believed to be trustworthy, Marshall plans to deliver his letters personally and to explain that the classified nature of the reports precludes the furnishing of specific information in writing or in testimony. Marshall feels that he can talk confidentially in this way to Senator Magnuson and thus forestall any requests for further information. It was noted that, as a result of the Director's conversation with the Attorney General, Marshall had spoken with Martin Luther King about the dangers of his associating with Stanley Levison and accepting assistance from him. It was, therefore, believed that since this may get back to Members of Congress, Marshall should talk with the individual Senators, where this can be done on a confidential basis.

Marshall said he would, of course, keep us advised of the results of his contacts in this regard.

REC-35

JUL 30 1963

CAE:CSH (7)

177

32

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1

2:35 p.m.　　　　　　　　June 17, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. DE LOACH
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/00 BY SP-2 ALM

The Attorney General called and advised he would like to have Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall talk to Martin Luther King and tell King he has to get rid of Levison and O'Dell, that he should not have any contact with them directly or indirectly. The Attorney General inquired if King could be told these persons are communists without exposing the informant.

I advised the Attorney General I thought he could make the statement that they are members of the Communist Party without exposing the informant. I pointed out that, if King continues this association, he is going to hurt his own cause as there are more and more communists trying to take advantage of the hate movement and bigots down South who are against integration are beginning to charge King is tied in with communists. I stated I thought Marshall could very definitely say this association is rather widely known and, with things crystalizing for them now, nothing could be worse than for King to be associated with it.

100-106670-150

Very truly yours,

REC 84

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JUN 19 1963

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JEH:rm (9)

1 - Miss Holmes

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 5:50 PM
DATE 6-17-63
BY

67 JUN 20 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: May 31, 1963

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING
RACIAL MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2ALM/116

ELSUR

SA Don Roney of the New York Office advised that NY 3810-S* on 5/30/63 furnished information concerning a conversation on that date between Martin Luther King and Stanley Levison, who has been a secret Communist Party member and has contributed funds to the Communist Party on a regular basis. King stated that he had requested a conference with the President and the Attorney General because King thought that now was a good time for such a conference. Levison agreed. Levison stated that there has never been an Administration in this country that has been as worried about the Negro problem as the present one. Levison continued that this is brought about by the Administration's concern with the common market problem in Europe. It was Levison's opinion that United States prestige is very important at this time and the inability to control the racial situation was making it more difficult. It was Levison's opinion that the needs of the President are so great that he is all ready for a different policy if it can bring about the kind of controlled situation that he feels he needs.

King and Levison agreed that the situation has to be kept moving so that the President will have to look for an alternative. The President can then be presented with certain alternatives. This will benefit the President, for then his problem, fear of violence, will be done away with. It was Levison's thought that the President is all ready to make a change. A conference now would be fruitful, but if a conference cannot be worked out, then the movement must be enlarged. King stated that he would like to put so much pressure on the President that he would have to sign an Executive Order making segregation unconstitutional.

Levison said that the method of negotiating used in Birmingham will set the pattern for a whole series of southern cities. That is, you come in with a package, come up with demands, discuss them and come out with a victory. You ask for more than you expect to get. The goals of the movement, according to Levison, are desegregation, jobs and the right to vote. The

REC-72 132

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

ST-102

11 JUN 13 1963

34

XEROX

CLM:cag (10)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

XEROX
1964

UNRECORDED

methods to get them are direct action, nonviolence, and negotiations.

ACTION:

This information is being brought to the attention of the Attorney General and the Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President, by letter presently being prepared. [illegible] today [illegible]

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM 1116
ON 11-8-00

May 31, 1963

BY COURIER SERVICE

-T6-

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

5/31/63
delivered
via liaison
OSHB

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that on May 30, 1963, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley Levison held a discussion concerning a conference which Reverend Mr. King reportedly has requested with the President and the Attorney General.

ED COPY FILED IN

Levison and Reverend Mr. King agreed that this is a good time for such a conference and Levison stated that no Administration has ever been as worried about the Negro problem as is the present Administration. Levison added that this is based upon the Administration's concern with the problems arising from the Common Market in Europe. Levison expressed the opinion that the prestige of the United States is very important at this time and that inability to control the racial situation makes the Administration's task more difficult. He also said that the President is ready for a different policy if it can bring about the kind of controlled situation that he feels he needs.

Reverend Mr. King and Levison agreed that it was necessary to keep the situation moving so that the President will be forced to look for an alternative. It was stated that the President can then be presented with certain alternatives which will benefit the Administration as the President's fear of violence will be done away with. Levison expressed the thought that the President is ready to make a change and that a conference at this time would be fruitful. He added that if a conference cannot be worked out, then the movement must be enlarged. Reverend Mr. King said

100-106670-129

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

WLM:cag:mpd (14)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2 REC-120

XEROX

JUN 5 1963

2 JUN 7 1963

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 JUN 4 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

he would like to put so much pressure on the President that he will have to sign an Executive Order making segregation unconstitutional.

Levison stated that the method of negotiation used in Birmingham, Alabama, will set the pattern for a series of Southern cities. He explained this method by stating that you come in with a package, come up with demands, discuss them and come out with a victory, and that in doing so you ask for more than you expect to get. He described the goals of the movement as desegregation, jobs and the right to vote. He described the methods of obtaining these goals as being direct action, nonviolence and negotiation.

As previously mentioned to you, another source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in March, 1963, that Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party, United States of America, who contributes to the Communist Party on a regular basis.

I advised the Attorney General of the above information and he suggested that the President should see this letter.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE: This memorandum is being classified "Confidential" because it contains information from a source, the unauthorized disclosure of which would seriously impair the investigation of the Communist Party, USA, and such impairment could have an adverse effect upon the national defense interests of the country.

SECRET

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

February 5, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Reddy

C

Reference is made to your inquiry of Mr. Alex Rosen of this Bureau regarding the current Communist Party membership of Hunter Pitts O'Dell.

We have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party.

This information is, of course, highly sensitive and confidential.

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible] ON 11-8-00

REC- 63

100-358916 - 234

FEB 6 3 22 PM '63

REC'D - ROSEN

See cover memo Rosen to Belmont 2/5/63, same re.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

EBR:mtb/kmo
(10)

Memo delivered to AAG Marshall's office 2/6/63 at 10:[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FEB 18 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVER ENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont DATE: 2/5/63

FROM : A. Rosen

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division has asked that we give him a statement concerning the Communist Party affiliation of Hunter Pitts O'Dell. We have called to his attention current reports which have been furnished to the Security Division, Attention Mr. Walter Yeagley, concerning O'Dell's activities.

Marshall was interested in O'Dell's association with Rev. Martin Luther King and he was given a copy of a report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated 12/20/62 at New York, which was classified "Confidential", which had been disseminated to Walter Yeagley of the Security Division. This report reflected the current association of O'Dell and the organization of Rev. King, namely, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition to the above we also furnished him a copy of a memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated 12/6/62 and another dated 1/23/63, pertaining to O'Dell.

Marshall stated that upon review of the above information which was furnished to him, he would like to have a statement from the FBI concerning the present Communist affiliation of O'Dell, particularly, whether O'Dell actually is a member of the Communist Party at this time.

I advised Marshall that an appropriate memorandum would be prepared and furnished to him concerning his request. There is attached hereto a memorandum which has been prepared by the Security Division indicating that we have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party. It is being pointed out that this information is highly sensitive and confidential.

Enclosure (1)

REC- 63 100-358916-234

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

18 FEB 13 1963

AR:mpd (8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

By way of background, Marshall indicated that the basis for his request stems from the necessity of having to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to O'Dell. He stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to adequately handle this inquiry.

ACTION:

If approved, attached memorandum to Burke Marshall will be handed to him. It is brief and specifically points out the need to treat this information as highly sensitive and confidential.

Delivered 2/6/63 clw

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES C N

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 2/4/63

FROM : A. Rosen

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/00 BY SP2 ALM/JT6

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, aka Jack
SECURITY MATTER - C

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division called to state that he will have to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to Jack Hunter O'Dell.

noted

By way of background, he stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to talk to King about O'Dell.

Before Marshall can do this he states he would like to have whatever background information we have on O'Dell. In this regard, it is noted that O'Dell is supposed to be a member of the Communist Party and has in the past been associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. This is King's organization. We have in the past furnished information to the Department concerning O'Dell and his association with Rev. King.

Marshall should be furnished with memoranda which have heretofore been given to the Security Division. It is understood that a report of O'Dell's activities is also available and has been furnished to the Security Division but has not been given to the Civil Rights Division. It would appear that Marshall is entitled to this information if he is to properly evaluate O'Dell's background.

Marshall has asked for a summary on O'Dell. If such is not readily available, copies of material previously furnished to the Department would seem to suffice. He stated he has been in touch with the Attorney General on this matter and is anxious to have it handled as soon as possible.

AR:mpd (6)

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

REC-35

ST-112

100- 6 36

FEB 7 1963

62 FEB 11 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

January 31, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen, Attention: Lavin
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Forsyth

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - C

In response to your inquiry of Assistant Director Courtney A. Evans on January 30, 1963, you are advised that Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., accompanied by Hunter Pitts O'Dell and eight other officials of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), arrived in Savannah, Georgia, aboard Delta Airlines Flight Number 427 in the early morning of January 10, 1963. This group was met at the Savannah air terminal by Stanley Levison and the entire group departed Savannah in two automobiles.

Levison departed Savannah by train en route to New York City on the evening of January 11, 1963, while King, O'Dell and three other officials of the SCLC held reservations with the Delta Airlines for the morning of January 12, 1963. King, in a party of five, departed Savannah en route to Atlanta on Delta Airlines Flight Number 422 on the morning of January 12, 1963.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/[illegible] BY SP-2[illegible]

REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI
JAN 31 11 10 AM '63

100-106670

REC- 22

EX-102

19 FEB 1 1963

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Levison, a secret member of the CP, and O'Dell, a concealed member of the National Committee of the CP, are not characterized in the body of the letter as they have been characterized in previous communications to the Department. AAG Marshall requested advice as to whether there was any information available indicating a meeting between the individuals referred to above had occurred as scheduled. We are not in possession of any information as to the nature of the meeting involved other than the statement by Levison that it was to be a "closeted review of where they are--a critical review," which information is in the possession of Marshall.

TDR:mea
(11)
mea

MAILED 25
JAN 31 1963
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

FEB 5 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 14

MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 PLM/TS

62-116395-964

ENCLOSURE

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Mr. Callahan____
Mr. Conrad____
Mr. DeLoach____
Mr. Evans____
Mr. Gale____
Mr. Rosen____
Mr. Sullivan____
Mr. Tavel____
Mr. Trotter____
Tele. Room____
Miss Holmes____
Miss Gandy____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
NEGRO QUESTION
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

DATE: 1/22/64

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Rogers
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

Pursuant to a request from the Director, there is attached a summary of information concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., which clearly demonstrates the communist influence upon him as well as his moral degeneracy.

This information, which is "~~TOP SECRET,~~" is for possible use by the Director in his appearance before the House Appropriations Committee. It will be noted that a portion of the attached material is marked "OBSCENE."

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information and use of the Director.

Enc.

100-3-116

SFP:eeb/erc
(8)

WCS

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

42

The racial unrest in the United States is currently the target for a determined concentration of communist effort. Long-range communist strategy includes the establishment of a Negro-labor coalition which the communists hope to be able to manipulate, as a powerful political-action weapon. They aim, thus, to provoke class struggle and promote legislation which can serve as a step toward a communist system of government. This constitutes a serious national security problem, since the individual playing a most dominant role as a leading spokesman for the estimated 20 million Negroes in this country today is knowingly, willingly, and regularly cooperating with and taking guidance from communists. An in-depth view of this individual, Martin Luther King, Jr., will serve to illustrate how he functions as a channel through which communist efforts are being directed against the Negroes and, therefore, against this country. It depicts, too, a Moral degenerate [redacted] of such magnitude as to blaspheme the title of "Reverend" which he carries.

King — The Communist Pawn

King, who is a copastor with his father of the Ebenezer Baptist Church, Atlanta, Georgia, and the recipient of Bachelor of Divinity and Doctor of Philosophy Degrees, is considered and described within the Communist Party-USA (CPUSA) as a Marxist. sensitive foreign intelligence operation

#MDE16
DECLASSIFIED BY SPA ALM/ZTG
ON 11-2-00

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

He has been closely aligned with communists for several years and has shown not only a willingness, but at times even an eagerness, to associate and confer with communist leaders and to work closely with and rely upon the advice and guidance of dedicated communists -- this despite the fact that they have been reliably identified to him as such. In February, 1962, Stanley David Levison, a secret Communist Party (CP) member, passed the word to the Party's General Secretary, Gus Hall, that "King is a wholehearted Marxist who has studied it (Marxism), believes in it, agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly."

Levison -- Key Communist Directing King

Levison, one of the individuals exerting the most influence upon King and who has greatly facilitated King's rise to prominence, is a shrewd, dedicated communist and is known as such by King. Since the late 1940's Levison has played a highly clandestine role in which he was entrusted by the Party to raise and handle secret funds used to finance some of the Party's activities. In 1961 Levison was Assistant Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which is headed by King.

Sensitive foreign intell
operation

Since 195[illegible] Levison has expended m[illegible]h effort in King's behalf in such activities as: actively involving himself in fund-raising drives for King; serving as King's legal counsel in selected matters; preparing speech material for King; assisting in the mechanics of some demonstrations in which King was involved; guiding King as to acceptance or rejection of public appearances and speaking commitments; and helping King with matters related to the latter's writings.

King's Reliance on O'Dell, A National Party Functionary

Another key communist through whom the Party exerts influence on King is Hunter Pitts O'Dell who, at the Party's last National Convention in 1959, was elected a member of its second highest governing body, the National Committee. His election was under a pseudonym. In 1960, while working as an assistant to the Party's National Secretary for the South, James Jackson, O'Dell also began to work actively in support of King's movement. In June, 1962, King sought Levison's counsel concerning the addition of an administrative assistant to King's staff. As a result of Levison's recommendation of O'Dell, the latter associated himself with the SCLC in Atlanta, Georgia, under the name J. H. O'Dell and also served the SCLC in its New York office. In October, 1962, several newspaper articles exposed O'Dell's connection with the SCLC and his communist affiliations, as a result of which King announced O'Dell's temporary resignation pending an inquiry.

This "temporary resignation" consisted of O'Dell's return to New York City where he continued to perform services for the SCLC until July, 1963, [redacted]

Jones — The Intermediary

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Despite the great pains being taken by the principals involved to keep the King-Levison connection secret, Bureau agents have observed them together on three different occasions since November, 1963.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Homosexual Rustin -- Liaison With Communist Party-USA

Rustin himself is an interesting link in the King "combine." He has long been inclined toward homosexual activities and in 1953 was sentenced to serve 60 days for offering to engage in an act of sex perversion of a homosexual nature, which he admitted. Rustin has also publicly admitted affiliations with the communist movement in the late 1930's and was one of a select group of observers permitted to attend the Party's 16th National Convention in 1957. He also has maintained contact with the Party's National Secretary, Benjamin J. Davis, [redacted]

[redacted]

Much of the Party's influence in the Negro field to date has been clandestine in nature. If the Party fully implements its current plans, we may expect to see more open and aggressive actions in its attempts to further influence, infiltrate, dominate and recruit the American Negro — just one more step in its ultimate goal of establishing a communist state within our boundaries.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[JFK

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

END: ~~TOP SECRET~~ - OFF THE RECORD

End

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 10, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice

#mDF16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

10/13/00 SP2ALM/JTG

DELIVERED TO [illegible] 10-10-75 [illegible]
DELIVERED TO CCN [illegible] 10-13-75

Reference is made to SSC letter of September 29, 1975, listing certain documents and other information desired from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum in response to some of the requests.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JDM:lek (10) lek

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

10 - ENCLOSURE

REC-30 62-116395-965

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

84 NOV 25 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
FBI
OCT 10 11 05 AM '75

RECEIVED
OCT 10 1 48 AM 1975
LEGAL COUNSEL

RECEIVED
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE DIV.
OCT 9 3 10 PM '75

RECEIVED
OCT 9 10 15 AM 1975
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

OCT 10 9 06 AM '75
REC'D
CORRESPONDENCE REVIEW
FBI

The Attorney General

NOTE:

A copy of SSC letter 9/29/75 is attached to the file copy of the enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

62-116395

#MDR16

SP2ALM/LHG 10/13/00

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice
October 10, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General dated September 29, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 29, 1975, request, and specifically to the following items in that request: Items 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18.

Concerning Item 18 in which you requested all versions of Section 122 of the Manual of Instructions which were in effect from 1955 through 1965, we have determined Section 122 was created by Manual of Instructions Revision Number 185, dated February 6, 1959, and was subsequently revised on July 30, 1959. Copies of these two revisions are being furnished in response to Item 18. You have previously been furnished all subsequent revisions.

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ___
Intell. ____
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ____
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395 - 965

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]N.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 29, 1975

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/TTB

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Enclosed is a document request for materials pertaining to the King matter.

I would like to set October 6, 1975 as a deadline for delivery of all outstanding previously-requested documents pertaining to the King matter and October 13, 1975 for delivery of all documents requested on the attached list.

I would also appreciate your arranging a briefing for Mike Epstein for sometime this week by knowledgable FBI personnel concerning:

A. The present location and organization of any files and materials which were found to be in William C. Sullivan's Bureau office when he was denied further access thereto in or about September 1971; and

B. A description of the contents of such files and materials.

Finally, we would like to have access to the Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1962. The materials in these "DJ" files will be reviewed pursuant to the terms of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department, i.e., subsequent to review of such files certain items will be orally designated to be screened for delivery.

Sincerely,

62-116395 - 965

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ENCLOSURE

KING DOCUMENT REQUEST

1.

(DELETED)

Call Dunn in Atlanta

To Seabury

2. All materials relating to rental or other arrangements made by the FBI for the use of an apartment or premises located in the Peachtree Towers, Atlanta, Georgia, as a listening post, as well as all materials relating to the termination of such arrangements, use, and/or occupancy.

call file

3. Access to all Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") for Special Agent Alden F. Miller for the years 1960-1968.

call → file

WFO & LAB

4. Any materials reflecting dates upon which Special Agent William D. Campbell, while attached to the Washington Field Office, was on special or temporary assignment at FBI Headquarters (Laboratory or Intelligence Division), between January 1, 1964 and the date of his transfer to the Laboratory Division at FBI Headquarters.

5. Materials which would reflect the authority and instructions issued for FBI personnel to surveil, monitor, investigate and/or report on civil rights demonstrations, protests, rallies, or marches which involved Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference prior to October 23, 1962.

6. Materials reflecting authority for and instructions issued prior to October 23, 1962, with respect to developing "any information. . . concerning the SCLC relating to racial matters (which) must be reported under the racial matters caption," and the maintenance of "a separate file on SCLC relating to racial incidents (157-632)." (See first paragraph on page 2 of October 23, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security - C")

Nugent

7. All materials reflecting proposals, recommendations or decisions to include Martin Luther King on the Security, Reserve, Rabble-Rouser, and/or Agitator Index or list, and/or his designation as a Key Activist, Key Black Extremists, Top Functionary and/or Key Figure.

8. All materials from August 28, 1963 to December 31, 1964 which pertain to the distribution by the United States Information Agency of a film of the march on Washington, including such materials as concern or reflect contacts or correspondence between the FBI and the USIA or between the FBI and the White House concerning such film.

9. SAC Letter No. 59-2, dated 1/13/59, including the Security letter attached thereto pertaining to Racial Matters.

10. The Manual changes referred to in the Racial Matters section of the Security letter identified in Item 9 above.

11. Memorandum from Mr. Rosen to the Director, dated 1/7/59 captioned "Racial Matters" that is referenced in the proposed letter to all SAC/s which was typed on 1/7/59 and which became the Racial Matters section of Item 9 above.

ok 12. Memorandum dated February 11, 1960, from W. B. Wette (WETTE) to A. Rosen, captioned "Racial Matters." Maurice Has

Call EXTEN

ok 13. Airtel to all offices dated February 12, 1960, captioned "Racial Matters." Maurice has

ok ✓ 14. Memorandum dated June 26, 1963, from Mr. Rosen to Mr. Belmont, captioned "Racial Matters." Maurice has

ok 15. Airtel dated June 27, 1963 from the Director to all continental offices, captioned "Racial Matters." Maurice has

ok ✓ 16. Memorandum dated January 23, 1959, from Mr. Rosen to the Director, captioned "Bombing Matters or Racial Matters (New Classification)." Maurice has

ok 17. SAC letter sent on 1/28/59 which was attached to the memorandum identified in Item 16 above. Inc 2/13/59 Maurice

18. All versions of Section 122 of the Manual of Instructions which were in effect from 1955 through 1965. Maurice

19. All materials reflecting correspondence, contacts, or communications, or proposed correspondence contacts, or communications, between FBI personnel and:

Tunstall

A. Samuel Riley Pierce, Jr.

B. Dr. Frank R. Barnett

(See memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, dated January 8, 1964, captioned "Samuel Riley Pierce, Jr., 280 Park Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.")

20. All materials reflecting correspondence between any FBI headquarters personnel and former Chief of Police Jenkins, Atlanta, Georgia, concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference from January 1, 1960 through April 1968.

21. All materials pertaining to (a) the nomination, and (b) the selection, of Martin Luther King, Jr., for the Nobel Prize.

Seems that we answered a similar ? previously. B

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/29/75 request, Items 12,13,14,15, 16, and 17 and 18

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: ________ Date: 10/17/75

Received by: ________

Title: ________

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-965

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/29/75, items 12 thru 18

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16
ALL [illegible]
[illegible] 10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/[illegible]TG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr and Southern Christian Leadership Conference: Various memoranda captioned "Racial Matters or Bombing Matters; SAC letter 1/28/59; Manual section 122.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

51W0 (/8

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

Tolson

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : A. Rosen

DATE: January 23, 1959

SUBJECT: BOMBING MATTERS
OR RACIAL MATTERS
(NEW CLASSIFICATION)

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/TTE

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The attached SAC Letter is to inform the field of the new classification to be used in connection with correspondence carrying the character racial matters or bombing matters. This classification will be used in opening new cases carrying racial matters or bombing matters. It will not be necessary for either the field or the Bureau to change the classification number of existing cases or correspondence.

The Records Branch has been consulted and is agreeable to the new classification "157." New sections and changes for manuals and handbooks are being prepared and will be forwarded to the field.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached SAC Letter be approved and forwarded.

1 - Inspector H. L. Edwards

Enclosure sent
1-30-59

FHF:bhg
(6)

REC- 13

52 FEB 11 1959

23 JAN 30 1959

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SSC REQUEST 9/29/75
ITEM 17

#m2016
10/13/00 SP2 ALM) #16

Sir. 965

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed January 23, 1959)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

6.F.

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: BOMBING MATTERS
OR RACIAL MATTERS
(NEW CLASSIFICATION)

#mDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Dear Sir:

All correspondence and new cases opened under ~~carrying~~ the character bombing matters or racial matters should ~~also~~ carry the classification "157." It will not be necessary to change the classification number of ~~existing cases or~~ correspondence. relating to existing cases.

New sections and changes for manuals and handbook are being prepared and will be forwarded to your office.

This information should be brought to the attention of all personnel handling this type of investigation and they should become thoroughly familiar with the new manual sections, manual changes and handbook changes when they are received in your office.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

66-04-3825

ENCLOSURE

10

(E) BOMBING MATTERS OR RACIAL MATTERS (NEW CLASSIFICATION) -- All correspondence and new cases opened under the character bombing matters or racial matters should carry the classification "157." It will not be necessary to change the classification number of correspondence relating to existing cases.

New sections and changes for manuals and handbook are being prepared and will be forwarded to your office.

This information should be brought to the attention of all personnel handling this type of investigation and they should become thoroughly familiar with the new manual sections, manual changes and handbook changes when they are received in your office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (B)

SSC REQUEST 9/29/75
ITEM 18

Sel 1965

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JFG

February 6, 1959

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
REVISION NUMBER 185

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages for inclusion in the Manual of Instructions. Revisions may be noted by brackets. The dates appearing at the bottom of the pages indicate the dates of revisions. The old corresponding pages should be removed from the Manual and destroyed. The Special Agent in Charge has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

Volume II
Table of Contents - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Section 23 - (New section)
Pages ~~1~~ and 2
~~Page 3~~

Volume III
Section 87 - Pages ~~89 and 90~~ iwl
(Delete pages 88a and 88b)

Volume IV
Table of Contents - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 122 - (New section)
~~Pages 1~~ and 2
~~Page 3~~

Index - ~~Pages 5 and 6~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JJG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (10)

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

SECTION 114. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS

A. Statutes and Elements 1
B. Departmental Instructions 1
C. Possible Violations (Not All-Inclusive) 1
D. Pertinent Court Decisions 2
E. Policy 2
F. Investigative Procedure 3
G. Venue 3
H. Classification 3
I. Character 3
J. Penalties - Maximum 3

SECTION 115. INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS

A. Statute 1
B. Violation 1
C. Investigative Procedure 2
D. Venue 2
E. Classification 2
F. Character 2

SECTION 116. MISCELLANEOUS - CIVIL SUITS

A. Background 1
B. Policy 1
C. Classification 1
D. Character 1

SECTION 117. DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES

A. Statutes 1
B. Violations 3
C. Venue 3
D. Policy 4
E. Investigative Procedure 4
F. Prosecution 5
G. Classification 5
H. Character 5

SECTION 118. SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 1
C. Policy 2
D. Venue 3
E. Classification 3
F. Character 3

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

SECTION 119. INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 1
C. Policy and Procedures 1
D. Venue 1
E. Classification 1
F. Character 1

SECTION 120. AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 2
C. Investigative Procedure 2
D. Venue 2
E. Classification 3
F. Character 3

SECTION 121. WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 1
C. Department Instructions 1
D. Investigative Procedure 1
E. Classification 1
F. Character 1
G. Penalty 1

SECTION 122. RACIAL MATTERS

A. Investigations of Klan-Type Organizations, Hate Organizations, and Associated Individuals 1
B. Classification 3
C. Character 3

INDEX

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

A. INVESTIGATIONS OF KLAN-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS, HATE ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS

1. While these are considered criminal investigations, they are considered delicate in nature and require the application of the restrictions necessary in conducting security-type investigations. Therefore, the investigations and reports are to be handled in accordance with the general rules applying to security-type investigations.
2. Caution
   Extreme care must be exercised to insure that in every instance there is a proper basis for investigation. Sound judgment must be used to avoid investigation of organizations or individuals that merely sponsor unpopular causes or propaganda but do not meet the standards outlined under item 3a below. The Bureau must insure that there will be no justifiable basis for any charge that these investigations infringe upon constitutional freedoms of speech, press, or assemblage.
3. Investigations
   a. Investigation is confined to those organizations or associated individuals that either:
      (1) Have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450
      (2) Have not been designated under Executive Order 10450 but there is an actual or alleged affiliation or subsidiary relation with a designated organization
      (3) Have adopted a policy or have allegedly adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution
      (4) Have allegedly committed acts of violence
      (5) Have actually or allegedly committed violations of laws within the Bureau's jurisdiction
   b. During the investigation of Klan-type organizations and hate organizations, the following information should be obtained:
      (1) Organization structure
         (a) Headquarters
         (b) Officers
         (c) Location of klaverns or local chapters
      (2) Objectives
      (3) Publications and propaganda
      (4) Finances
      (5) Activity of klaverns or local chapters
         (a) Name and address
         (b) Officers
         (c) Estimated membership and recruiting activities
         (d) Meetings
            I. Date
            II. Type (open or closed)
            III. Place
            IV. Estimated attendance
   c. Follow through public source material and established sources activities of organizations which do not qualify for investigation under above standards. Initiate investigation upon receipt of information which brings organization within investigative criteria and at the same time advise Bureau this action taken and basis therefor.
   d. Conduct no investigation regarding individual acts of violence allegedly or actually committed by an organization in absence of information indicating violation within Bureau's jurisdiction. However, concerning each such incident, the following information should be obtained through informants and sources in connection with investigations of such organizations:

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(1) Which group involved
(2) Whether action taken was on initiative of individual members or with knowledge or approval of leadership

In initial communication reporting violent act, advise if there is or is not indication of organization participation.

If act of violence is a criminal violation over which Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation; if the act of violence is a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

e. Agents are not to attend functions or rallies of any Klan or hate group although open to the public.

f. These investigations must be both vigorous and incisive. The fundamental objective is to identify those who may be engaged or responsible for acts of violence, and care must be taken to avoid becoming involved in widespread, nebulous investigation which does not go to the heart of the problem at hand. When a case is opened, it should receive immediate continuous attention until the initial allegation is resolved. The case should be promptly closed if it is definitely determined that it does not fall within the criteria set out in item 3a above.

g. Individual cases should be opened on officers, leaders, and active workers in these organizations to determine whether they have been involved in acts of violence or have a definite potential for future acts of violence. Good judgment and discretion must be exercised in the case of prominent individuals who may be dupes of such organizations and who may hold nominal office. Immediately advise the Bureau when investigation of a prominent person is contemplated; and if there is any question as to whether there is sufficient probable cause to fully justify investigation, no investigation should be conducted without Bureau approval.

h. Names of members in attendance at meetings should not be set out in investigative reports but should be indexed from informant reports. Names of new members should be furnished the Bureau by letter for indexing purposes.

4. Informants and interviews

a. In order that the Bureau may discharge its responsibilities, it is mandatory that information be obtained regarding all pertinent Klan or hate organization activities. In this regard it is necessary that informants be developed in all such organizations which meet the criteria set forth in 3a above. Efforts in this regard must be discreet.

b. Preliminary interviews with rank-and-file members of an organization and other individuals not connected with such organizations conducted solely for the purpose of determining the attitude of the individual may be authorized by the SAC. To obtain authority from the SAC, credit, arrest, informant, and indices checks should be made and a memorandum prepared for the SAC setting forth this information so that he may make a decision regarding the propriety of the interview. Officials of local groups or national officers are not to be interviewed without prior Bureau authority. Likewise where a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, and the like,

specific Bureau authority must be obtained. Two Agents should be present when an organization official is interviewed and, if possible, two Agents should be present at interviews with organization members. During such an interview, no attempt should be made to develop the individual as an informant; but if he is cooperative and has a potential for development as an informant, complete background information should be obtained and specific Bureau authority requested to develop him as an informant.

c. Bureau authority not necessary prior to interview with organization members in criminal- or applicant-type cases; however, interview should be confined to subject matter of inquiry, unless data concerning organization volunteered by interviewee.

d. Submit by September 15 and March 15 each year letter captioned "Semiannual listing of Klan and hate organizations and informant coverage," Bureau file #157-1, containing:

(1) Names of Klan and hate organizations active in your territory
(2) Coverage of each Klan broken down by klaverns and each hate organization broken down into local chapters showing identities of informants and sources reporting on each
(3) Estimated membership by klaverns or chapters and basis for estimate

[B. CLASSIFICATION - 157

[C. CHARACTER - RACIAL MATTERS]

July 30, 1959

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
REVISION NUMBER 196

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages for inclusion in the Manual of Instructions. Revisions may be noted by brackets. The dates appearing at the bottom of the pages indicate the dates of revisions. The old corresponding pages should be removed from the Manual and destroyed. The Special Agent in Charge has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

Volume I
Section 7 - Pages ~~7-11 and 12~~
Pages ~~19 and 20~~
~~Pages 21 and 22~~

Volume II
Section 23 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Section 42 - Page ~~1~~

Volume III
Section 66 - Page ~~7~~ ✓
Pages 7a and 8 ✓

Section 87 - ~~Pages 33 and 34~~
Pages ~~53 and 54~~

Volume IV
Section 102 - Pages ~~23 and 24~~

Section 105 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Section 108 - ~~Pages 7 and 8~~
~~Pages 11 and 12~~
Page ~~13~~

Section 122 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~ ✓
Pages ~~3 and 4~~
Pages ~~5 and 6~~
Page ~~7~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

A. INVESTIGATIONS OF KLAN-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS, HATE ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS

1. While these are considered criminal investigations, they are considered delicate in nature and require the application of the restrictions necessary in conducting security-type investigations. Therefore, the investigations and reports are to be handled in accordance with the general rules applying to security-type investigations.
2. Caution
   Extreme care must be exercised to insure that in every instance there is a proper basis for investigation. Sound judgment must be used to avoid investigation of organizations or individuals that merely sponsor unpopular causes or propaganda but do not meet the standards outlined under item 3a below. The Bureau must insure that there will be no justifiable basis for any charge that these investigations infringe upon constitutional freedoms of speech, press, or assemblage.
3. Investigations
   a. Investigation is confined to those organizations or associated individuals that either:
      (1) Have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450
      (2) Have not been designated under Executive Order 10450 but there is an actual or alleged affiliation or subsidiary relation with a designated organization
      (3) Have adopted a policy or have allegedly adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution
      (4) Have allegedly committed acts of violence
      (5) Have actually or allegedly committed violations of laws within the Bureau's jurisdiction
   b. During the investigation of Klan-type organizations and hate organizations, the following information should be obtained:
      (1) Organization structure
         (a) Headquarters
         (b) Officers
         (c) Location of klaverns or local chapters
      (2) Objectives
      (3) Publications and propaganda
      (4) Finances
      (5) Activity of klaverns or local chapters
         (a) Name and address
         (b) Officers
         (c) Estimated membership and recruiting activities
         (d) Meetings
            I. Date
            II. Type (open or closed)
            III. Place
            IV. Estimated attendance
   c. Follow through public source material and established sources activities of organizations which do not qualify for investigation under above standards. Initiate investigation upon receipt of information which brings organization within investigative criteria and at the same time advise Bureau this action taken and basis therefor.
   d. Conduct no investigation regarding individual acts of violence allegedly or actually committed by an organization in absence of information indicating violation within Bureau's jurisdiction. However, concerning each such incident, the following information should be obtained through informants and sources in connection with investigations of such organizations:

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(1) Which group involved
(2) Whether action taken was on initiative of individual members or with knowledge or approval of leadership

In initial communication reporting violent act, advise if there is or is not indication of organization participation.

If act of violence is a criminal violation over which Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation; if the act of violence is a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

e. Agents are not to attend functions or rallies of any Klan or hate group although open to the public.

f. These investigations must be both vigorous and incisive. The fundamental objective is to identify those who may be engaged or responsible for acts of violence, and care must be taken to avoid becoming involved in widespread, nebulous investigation which does not go to the heart of the problem at hand. When a case is opened, it should receive immediate continuous attention until the initial allegation is resolved. The case should be promptly closed if it is definitely determined that it does not fall within the criteria set out in item 3a above.

g. Individual cases should be opened on officers, leaders, and active workers in these organizations to determine whether they have been involved in acts of violence or have a definite potential for future acts of violence. [Wholesale investigations of individuals of these organizations should not be conducted and investigations of individual members should be initiated only on a most selective basis. Individuals investigated should be those who are key personnel who actually formulate and carry out the organization's policy and not those individuals who merely attend meetings on a regular basis. If there is any question as to whether such an investigation should be initiated, the facts should be presented to the Bureau for its consideration.]

Immediately advise the Bureau when investigation of a prominent person is contemplated; and if there is any question as to whether there is sufficient probable cause to fully justify investigation, no investigation should be conducted without Bureau approval.

[The Bureau should be advised by letter of the information obtained, together with a statement as to whether the individual warrants inclusion on the potential bombing suspects list of your office. If investigation indicates that the individual should not be included, the case may then be closed administratively. If the subject is included on the list, the matter should be handled in accordance with instructions set forth in section 23, volume II, of this manual concerning bombing matters.]

h. Names of members in attendance at meetings should not be set out in investigative reports but should be indexed from informant's [statements.] Names of new members should be furnished the Bureau by letter for indexing purposes.

4. Informants and interviews
   a. In order that the Bureau may discharge its responsibilities, it is mandatory that information be obtained regarding all pertinent Klan or hate organization activities. In this regard it is necessary that informants be developed in all such organizations which meet the criteria set forth in 3a above. Efforts in this regard must be discreet.
   b. Preliminary interviews with rank-and-file members of an organization and other individuals not connected with such organizations conducted solely for the purpose of determining the attitude of the individual may be authorized by the SAC. To obtain authority from the SAC, credit, arrest, informant, and indices checks should be made and a memorandum prepared for the SAC setting forth this information so that he may make a decision regarding the propriety of the interview. Officials of local groups or national officers are not to be interviewed without prior Bureau authority. Likewise where a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, and the like, specific Bureau authority must be obtained. Two Agents should be present when an organization official is interviewed and, if possible, two Agents should be present at interviews with organization members. During such an interview, no attempt should be made to develop the individual as an informant; but if he is cooperative and has a potential for development as an informant, complete background information should be obtained and specific Bureau authority requested to develop him as an informant.
   c. Bureau authority not necessary prior to interview with organization members in criminal- or applicant-type cases; however, interview should be confined to subject matter of inquiry, unless data concerning organization volunteered by interviewee.
   [d. Original and one copy of semiannual letter captioned "Klan Organizations, Hate Organizations and Racial Informants, Racial Matters, Bombing Matters," to be submitted according to schedule set out below. Where there is no pertinent activity or information, a negative statement should be made.

January 1 and July 1	January 15 and July 15
Albany	Birmingham
Albuquerque	Boston
Atlanta	Butte
Baltimore	Chicago
February 1 and August 1	**February 15 and August 15**
Buffalo	Cincinnati
Charlotte	Detroit
Dallas	El Paso
Denver	Kansas City
March 1 and September 1	**March 15 and September 15**
Cleveland	Houston
Indianapolis	Louisville
Jacksonville	Milwaukee
Los Angeles	New Orleans

April 1 and October 1	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	Omaha
Newark	Phoenix
New Haven	New York
Oklahoma City	Knowville
St. Louis	
May 1 and November 1	**May 15 and November 15**
Miami	Little Rock
Norfolk	Pittsburgh
Philadelphia	Salt Lake City
Portland	San Diego
San Antonio	
June 1 and December 1	**June 15 and December 15**
Mobile	Seattle
Richmond	Savannah
Springfield	Minneapolis
San Francisco	Washington Field

e. The semiannual letter should not be disseminated outside the Bureau, should be given proper security in field office, and should contain following information. Where there is no pertinent activity or information, a negative statement should be made.

(1) Klan Organizations, Hate Organizations, and Informant coverage
  (a) Names of Klan and hate organizations active in your territory
  (b) Coverage of each Klan broken down by Klaverns and each hate organization broken down into local chapters showing identities of informants and sources reporting on each
  (c) Estimated membership by Klavern or chapter and basis for estimate

(2) Racial informants by geographic location
List the following under headquarters city and each resident agency within your division:
  (a) Symbol numbers of all racial informants with indications as to which are reqularly paid
  (b) List of names or symbol numbers of all approved potential racial informants indicating those regularly paid
  (c) List of name or symbol number of each confidential source indicating those which are reqularly paid

(3) Individuals under pending investigation
List of individuals being investigated under provisions of section 23, volume II and section 122, volume IV, of this Manual, other than potential bombing suspects.

(4) Potential Bombing Suspects
List of potential bombing suspects of your office including description, basis of selection, and other areas in which individual should be considered as suspect.

[B. GENERAL RACIAL MATTERS
[1. Jurisdiction
[The Bureau does not have investigative jurisdiction over such general racial matters, as race riots, civil demonstrations, and similar developments except in instances in which the action is a violation of statute over which the Bureau has jurisdiction or some subversive influence is at work. Insofar as Federal jurisdiction in general racial matters is concerned, U. S. Army regulations place responsibility upon the Army to keep advised of any developments of a civil disturbance nature which may require the rendering of assistance to civil authorities or the intervention of Federal troops. OSI and ONI have collateral responsibility under Army in such matters and copies of pertinent documents disseminated to Army concerning such matter should be furnished to OSI and ONI.
[2. Policy
[a. As an intelligence function the Bureau does have the responsibility of advising appropriate Government agencies and officials on both a national and local level of all pertinent information obtained concerning such incidents. In this connection it is the personal responsibility of each SAC to make the necessary arrangements to

insure that all developments of this type occurring within his territory are promptly reported to his office and upon receipt thereof furnished to the Bureau by whatever form of communication is warranted under the circumstances.

b. Since the Bureau does not have investigative jurisdiction in general racial matters, no open investigation is to be conducted concerning general racial matters as such.

c. In instances in which civil rights may be involved or in which a racial incident may involve an act which constitutes a criminal violation over which the Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation. Likewise, if the incident involves a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

d. In instances in which some subversive influence is determined to be at work, be guided by instructions pertaining to investigation of the specific subversive influence involved.

e. CAUTION. By their very nature racial matters are extremely delicate and great care must be exercised in the approach to such matters.

3. Procedures

a. Information dealing with general racial matters, such as proposed or actual activities of individuals, officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc., in the racial field, must be furnished to the Bureau expeditiously by whatever means of communication is warranted by the specific nature of the information and the circumstances involved.

b. Pertinent information bearing on general racial matters which would not otherwise be available to interested Government agencies, such as that obtained through sources and informants, and which is of such a nature that it would normally be furnished to the Bureau by letter or airtel must be transmitted to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. In general, pertinent information bearing on general racial matters appearing in newspapers or publications need not be furnished to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. In such instances merely submit copies of pertinent newspaper articles and publications to the Bureau. Of course, if such data is clearly of a nature as to require contacts with appropriate sources, such as information of unusual local or national importance, submit same expeditiously in form suitable for dissemination. Concisely summarize the pertinent article and include therein the results of contacts with appropriate sources.

c. Maintain contact with pertinent informants and sources and keep Bureau and local intelligence agencies advised of any additional pertinent developments. Unless circumstances clearly indicate necessity for more expeditious handling, furnish such additional data to the Bureau promptly in form suitable for dissemination.

d. In many instances situations involving members of the Negro and Caucasian races result in violations of criminal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. While such matters are to be handled in accordance with instructions pertaining to the substantive violation involved, the Bureau has the additional responsibility of disseminating pertinent information concerning any racial aspects of such situations to appropriate Government officials and agencies that do not ordinarily receive reports in criminal matters. Therefore, the submission of a report concerning the criminal violation involved alone is insufficient. In general, pertinent data concerning the racial situation involved must be submitted immediately to Bureau in form suitable for dissemination in order that it may reach interested agencies as soon as possible.

[e. Where information is received in connection with racial matters indicating that individuals or organizations have resorted to or contemplate resorting to violence, you must

(1) Immediately advise the Bureau of full facts by expeditious means depending upon urgency of circumstances

(2) Immediately advise appropriate law enforcement agency having jurisdiction in the matter unless it is already cognizant. If a compelling reason exists for not so advising the pertinent law enforcement agency, such as the possibility of exposing the informant furnishing the information, immediately furnish the Bureau with full facts. Include therein recommendations as to what other trustworthy local or state law enforcement agencies or officials may be used as intermediaries through whom the information in question may be furnished to the law enforcement agency actually having jurisdiction in such a manner as to fully protect the specific informant and the Bureau as the source thereof.

(3) Immediately advise the local office of military intelligence

(4) Contact all appropriate informants and sources to determine if they possess any additional pertinent data concerning the matter and instruct them to be alert for and to promptly furnish to you any such pertinent data obtained.

(5) Prepare and submit pertinent data to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. Include in the communication the results of contacts with appropriate sources and informants; the time and date that local agencies were advised; and the identities of the individuals so advised. (Where information is furnished to an intermediary official or law enforcement agency and not to the agency actually having jurisdiction, set forth in the cover page the reasons for such procedure.) Submit communication same day original information received except where original information is received after normal working hours, when communication is to be submitted beginning of next workday.

(6) Maintain contact with pertinent informants and sources and keep Bureau, pertinent local law enforcement agency, and local intelligence agencies advised of any additional pertinent developments as they occur. Unless circumstances clearly indicate necessity for more expeditious handling, furnish such additional data to Bureau and intelligence agencies in form suitable for dissemination.

[C. CLASSIFICATION - 157

[D. CHARACTER - RACIAL MATTERS. If it relates to general racial matters, "Racial Matters" followed by name of community and/or state to which information relates.]

2 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

The Attorney General

October 10, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDE16

10/13/00 SP2ALM/JB

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC request dated October 2, 1975. Attached is the original of a memorandum, with enclosures, responding to request Number 1 in referenced communication.

A copy of the memorandum is also being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (5)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

EWL:lhb lhb
(9)

REC-30 62-116395-966

3-ENCLOSURE ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 NOV 7 1975

GPO 954-546

1

2 - Mr. J[illegible]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

62-116395

October 10, 1975

#MDR16
SP-2 ALM/JF16
10/13/00

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to letter from Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC Staff to Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, dated October 2, 1975, which attached request for FBI and Department of Justice materials.

Request Number 1 related to all material pertaining to a meeting among Mr. D. E. Moore, Mr. A. H. Belmont and Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach on or about February 27, 1965, regarding FBI mail intercept operations. The following documents are enclosed responsive to this request:

1. Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Tolson, subject "The Long Committee," dated February 27, 1965.

2. Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, et al., from Mr. Hoover, dated March 1, 1965.

3. Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, et al., from Mr. Hoover, dated March 2, 1965.

Request Number 2 in attachment to referenced letter is receiving expeditious attention and will be responded to as soon as possible.

Enclosures (3)

1 - The Attorney General

EWL:lhb lhb
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

62-116395-966

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-545

WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECT[illegible]
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF CO[illegible]EL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United State[illegible] Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 2, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached are requests for FBI and Department of Justice materials. Please consider these to be priority requests.

DTE 407

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc Paul V. Daly

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/JR
#MDE16

let to AG 1-DAG
EWL:lhb 10/10/75 Enc. 5

1-Ad ~~Hoc~~
10-2-75

62-116395-966

ENCLOSURE

Additional Requests Regarding FBI Mail Intercepts

1. All material pertaining to a meeting between Mr. D. E. Moore, Mr. A. H. Belmont, and Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach on or about February 27, 1965 regarding FBI mail intercept operations.

2. All material pertaining to an FBI mail opening project in regard to a suspected Soviet or Soviet-bloc illegal agent who resided in Riverside, California and occurred for approximately four to eight weeks in autumn of 1961 or 1962. Mail was allegedly opened in the FBI resident office in Riverside.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Callahan
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 2/27/65

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: THE LONG COMMITTEE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE BY

The Attorney General called on the morning of February 27, 1965, to advise he wanted to consult with the Bureau on certain problems raised by the Long Committee, which is exploring the use of mail covers, et cetera. He noted there was a possible problem concerning Chief Inspector Montague's testimony and whether it was necessary for Montague to change his testimony. Also, he felt that Internal Revenue Service had been using investigative techniques which they should not use and this could pose a problem. He said that the President had asked him to coordinate with all executive agencies concerning the problems raised by the Long Committee.

Inspector Moore and I met with the Attorney General in his office this afternoon. Mr. Courtney Evans was present. I told the Attorney General that in Montague's testimony he was told by Attorney Fensterwald that if any of the questions had national security implications Montague should not answer them. Consequently, Montague was estopped from doing other than answering in the negative when asked questions touching on national security. With this interpretation, it was questionable whether an attempt should be made to change or explain Montague's testimony, particularly in view of the obvious lack of judgment on the part of Fensterwald and the desire of Long for publicity. I made it clear to the Attorney General that from our dealings with Montague, he was a man of integrity and sacrificed his personal desires for the welfare of the country and had cooperated fully with us. The Attorney General said he had no intention of changing one word of Montague's testimony, but he was considering advising Long and Fensterwald that there were extreme delicate national security matters touching on the areas being covered by the committee and there could be exceptions to the answers given in the testimony when they touched on such sensitive security matters. He said further that he contemplates seeing Senator Long and impressing on him that the committee would not want to stumble by mistake into an area of extreme interest to the national security as they nearly did in a matter

REC- 56

1 - Mr. Tolson
2 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Moore

CONTINUED - OVER

25 MAR 12 1965

EX-114

4091

50 MAR 16 1965

MAR 15 1965

AHB:gjf

#mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]
ON 11-14-00

affecting CIA. (Apparently CIA got wind of some inquiries by the committee relative to their secret operation and went to the committee and warned them off.) Katzenbach contemplates asking for a list of the witnesses who will appear before the committee together with a brief summary of the expected testimony. On the basis of this, he will be able to advise Senator Long when he should steer clear of a sensitive area.

I told Mr. Katzenbach that I certainly agree that this matter should be controlled at the committee level but that I felt pressure would have to be applied so that the personal interest of Senator Long became involved rather than on any ideological basis. Mr. Katzenbach said that he had already talked to Vice President Humphrey about Fensterwald, who he considered a wild man, and that Humphrey had promised to talk to Long concerning Fensterwald. Katzenbach said that in addition to the Vice President he might have to resort to pressure from the President himself, although he would prefer to work it out without resorting to the President. He indicated there was no one on the committee itself who could be helpful and that he did not expect any help from Senator Eastland.

Mr. Katzenbach said that he expected troublefrom the possible activities of IRS and the military in the investigative field; that if some of these matters are uncovered before the committee they will tend to undermine the restricted and tightly controlled operations of the Bureau. I told him that our operations are tightly controlled and particularly in the delicate areas of concern, we restrict ourselves to important security matters.

Mr. Katzenbach said he was going to see Senator Long on Monday and wanted to know if the Bureau would like someone to go along with him. I told him no.

ACTION:

Mr. Katzenbach said he would advise us of the results of his conversation with Long. He also asked that I advise the Director of our discussion and I told him I would.

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: The Long Committee

I called Mr. DeLoach and briefed him on this problem in order that he might contact Senator Eastland in an effort to warn the Long Committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense. (Of couse I made no mention of such a contact to the Attorney General.) Mr. DeLoach advised that Senator Eastman is in Mississippi and he will contact him upon his return Monday.

I don't see what all
the excitement is about.
I would have no hesitan
in discontinuing all tech
niques — technical coverag
microphones, trash cov
mail covers etc. While
might handicap us I d
they are as valuable as
believe & none warrant
being used to justify

#mdr16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2ALM/HAB

4:07 PM

March 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

pkw

SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

B.C.
EDWARD V.

I called the Attorney General and told him I wanted to let him know that I had talked to Senator James Eastland today, in regard to the hearings before the Long Committee concerning mail covers, et cetera. I stated Senator Eastland is in Mississippi today but he is going to see Senator Long not later than Wednesday morning to caution him that this fellow Fensterwald must not go into the kind of questioning he made of Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department. The Attorney General stated he was going to see Senator Long himself and asked if I thought he ought to wait until after Senator Eastland talks to Senator Long. I stated the timing might be well if he did wait as Eastland assured me he will see Long not later than Wednesday and then if he, the Attorney General, could see Long sometime Wednesday, it would probably tie it down once and for all as there are no hearings until Wednesday anyway. The Attorney General stated he thought they were having a hearing tomorrow, but he would check. I stated if there is a hearing tomorrow, then I would be inclined for the Attorney General to see Senator Long now and if it is not before Wednesday, then I think he should let Senator Eastland see what he can do. I stated Senator Eastland thoroughly understands the matter and said he does not intend to have that gone into and that obviously Fensterwald is getting in over his head and that has to be stopped. BERNHARD

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

REC- 44
62-99323-

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

MAR 8 1965

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 4:15 PM.
DATE 3-1-65
BY

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JEH:edm (10)

MAR 10 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1 XEROX
MAR 9 1965

9:40 AM

March 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

#mDe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/BS/G

Senate Committee on Judiciary

62-[illegible]-
62-118043-
62-[illegible]-

The Attorney General called and advised that he had talked to Senator Long last night. Senator Long's committee is looking into mail covers et cetera. The Attorney General stated he thought somebody had already spoken to Senator Long as he said he did not want to get into any national security area and was willing to take steps not to do this. The Attorney General stated that Mr. Fensterwald was present for part of the meeting and Fensterwald had said that he had some possible witnesses who are former Bureau Agents and if they were asked if mail was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General stated that before they are called, he would like to know who they are and whether they were ever involved in any program touching on national security and if not, it is their own business, but if they were, we would want to know. The Attorney General stated the Senator promised that he would have a chance to look at the names if he wanted to, personally and confidentially, and the list would have any names involving national security deleted and he would tell the Senator how many but no more.

The Attorney General stated that the Postmaster General is going down there this morning himself which he, the Attorney General, thought would be helpful to Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department.

The Attorney General stated that Senator Long also said he is not going to propose legislation to abolish mail covers as he thought they served a useful purpose but he did think that control should be tightened. I stated I thought there was great laxity in the matter of mail covers and the matter of tapping telephones.

I stated I have always been of the view and recommended back when Tom Clark was Attorney General that no agency of the Government should tap a telephone except with the written approval of the Attorney General. I stated

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen 4
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

XEROX JEH:edm (10)

MAR 3 1965

MAR 3 - 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC- 38 62-[illegible]-41

8 MAR 3 1965

there would then be in one place a list of all phone taps and the purpose and reason for them. I stated that it is a fact, insofar as I am concerned, that I am the only head of an agency who does not have authority to tap telephones. I stated that I know that subordinates down the line in some agencies will tap phones without the knowledge of the chief of the agency and there is grave suspicion in Washington by some newspapermen that their phones have been tapped by agencies of the Government trying to find out where they are getting their information. I stated I have always been opposed to the law whereby it is necessary to get the authority of a court to tap phones because of the composition of some of our courts and the employees thereof, but I have always felt that the President should issue an Executive Order confidentially to all agencies that all phone tapping be discontinued except when specifically approved by the Attorney General so there would be in one place a list and then if any committee in Congress got on the warpath, the Attorney General would have a list he could vouch for as being the only phones tapped by the Government. The Attorney General stated that made sense. I stated many agencies are opposed because they realize there would be a marked restriction. I stated we only have 45 phone taps, which is a low number for a country the size of ours and the area we have to cover. The Attorney General stated no one has any idea how many phone taps the whole Government has.

I stated there is also a school being conducted in California by a private organization which instructs the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service in the matter of phone tapping and they have sent their own personnel there to be trained. I stated Internal Revenue has also from time to time hired private outside phone tappers to do their tapping. I stated it is that type of thing if there were a real investigation which would come out. The Attorney General commented that he would not guarantee some of it won't come out. I stated I was amazed when I learned of the school in California as I saw a reference to it in the newspaper and wanted to know what it was and what officers attended. I stated we have our own instructors and do it ourselves.

I stated I thought the Attorney General had made good headway with Senator Long. The Attorney General stated he thought it would be helpful, but his

problem is that he thinks the Senator is fine but he does not think that Fensterwald is as straightforward, or to put it another way that Fensterwald is smart and devious and the Senator is straightforward and not very bright and that is the problem. I stated I thought that Fensterwald is trying to get publicity for the Senator. The Attorney General stated the Senator said he did not want to get into this and he would give him, the Attorney General, the names and a summary of the testimony and told Fensterwald to do so, but he, the Attorney General, can't say Fensterwald is going to do it; that he will on some but he did not know that he would on all. I stated I had no faith or confidence in Fensterwald and neither did Senator Eastland. The Attorney General stated that Senator Eastland may have already talked to Senator Long or else the Vice President, but somebody had waked him up. I stated Senator Eastland said he would do it Wednesday, but he may have called him.

The Attorney General stated that is where it stands now and we shall see what happens.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11 42 AM
DATE 3-2-65
BY

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re 10/2/75 request Item 1 concerning meeting among Moore, Belmont and Katzenbach on FBI mail intercept operations.

Originating Office: FBI 70

Delivered by: Richard [illegible] Date: 10/10/75

Received by: James V. Dick

Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

[illegible] CONTAINED [illegible]

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-966

ENCLOSURE

6

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 10/2/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Intelligence collection

#MDR16

[illegible]

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/[illegible]

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Three communications pertaining to a meeting regarding FBI mail intercept operations.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WOC/8

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. [illegible]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 15, 1975

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/20/00 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible] #MDE16

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the October 7, 1975, request of the SSC wherein certain enclosed documents relating to mail intercept programs were submitted for declassification.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which transmits the documents enclosed with referenced letter. These documents have been excised in accordance with an agreement between representatives of the FBI and Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC. These documents, in their excised form, are declassified and are available to the SSC for whatever use the Committee deems appropriate.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum effecting the transmittal of the documents to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

ST-111

62-116395 3- ENCLOSURE

REC-30

62- [illegible] -967

15 NOV 4 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

WOC:lhb|hb
(8)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.

NOTE:

The documents enclosed with referenced letter concern the Hunter Project; Z Coverage; CHIPROP Survey; SAM Survey; GUS Survey; CHICAN Survey; JOE Survey and the CHICLET Survey. These documents have been reviewed by personnel of the Intelligence

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

84 NOV 5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395 October 15, 1975

#MDR16
AL 10/13/00 SP2ALM/JG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Domestic Intelligence Task Force Director, SSC, to the Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, dated October 7, 1975, wherein certain documents relating to mail intercept programs were enclosed. Referenced letter requested these documents be appropriately excised for future use at public hearings of the SSC.

This letterhead memorandum transmits to the SSC copies of these documents appropriately excised and, where necessary, declassified. The documents are being transmitted to the SSC for whatever use the Committee deems appropriate.

1 - The Attorney General

WOC:lhb lhb
(7) ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-967

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

Division and have been appropriately excised for use by the Committee at public hearings to be scheduled starting 10/21/75. In excising these documents they have been accordingly declassified removing any and all information to sensitive sources, identities of target countries and Agent personnel.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 7, 1975

#mDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 AlM/JTG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The enclosed documents relating to mail intercept programs are submitted for declassification by the Department of Justice and the FBI. Portions of these documents which reveal sensitive sources or on-going operations should be appropriately excised for use at public hearings.

A list of these documents is also attached. Those documents which are followed by an asterisk on this list do not appear to be classified, but are nonetheless included because their contents are similar in nature to those documents which are classified.

These documents should be declassified by Tuesday, October 14, to allow sufficient preparation time for the mail hearings, which are now scheduled to begin on Tuesday, October 21.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Paul Daly

62-116395-967

ENCLOSURE

c: Paul Daly

#MDR/6

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/20/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

HUNTER PROJECT

1. Belmont to Boardman - 1/22/58*
2. Belmont to Boardman - 2/6/58*
3. Angleton (CIA) to Director, FBI - 2/6/58
4. Branigan to Belmont - 4/21/58*
5. D.E. Moore to Belmont - ~~4~~3/10/61*
6. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 6/9/61*
7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/25/61, with attached blind memo "Re: Project Hunter," dated 8/21/61*
8. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 11/2/62, with attached blind memo "Re: Project Hunter," dated 10/30/62*
9. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 3/27/63*
10. Triplett to Branigan - 8/24/66*
11. Papich to D.J. Brennan - 1/16/69*
12. Routing slip to Angleton (CIA) from J. Edgar Hoover, dated 3/10/72, with attached blind memo "Re: Project Hunter," dated 3/10/72
13. Branigan to E.S. Miller - 2/15/73*

Z-COVERAGE

1. Turner to Hennrich - 6/25/51

CHIPROP SURVEY

1. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 9/4/56
2. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 3/11/60
3. Donahoe to W.C. Sullivan - 9/15/61
4. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 9/14/62
5. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 9/20/62

Chiprop Survey, cont'd

6. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 6/28/63
7. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 5/25/65
8. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 1/18/66

SAM SURVEY

1. Director, FBI to SAC, New York - 7/11/60
2. Branigan to Belmont - 2/28/61
3. Branigan to Belmont - 5/25/61
4. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/4/61
5. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 8/29/61
6. Branigan to Sullivan - 8/31/61
7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/11/62
8. Director, FBI to SAC, Los Angeles - 1/21/63
9. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/8/64
10. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/15/66
11. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 3/31/70

GUS SURVEY

1. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 9/20/61
2. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 10/2/61
3. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 10/18/61
4. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 12/13/61
5. Director, FBI to SAC, New York - 12/26/61
6. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 1/31/62
7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/3/62

CHICAN SURVEY

1. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 1/19/61
2. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 2/3/61
3. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 2/28/61
4. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 11/27/61

JOE SURVEY

1. Director, FBI to SAC, Miami - 12/21/62*
2. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 2/5/64*
3. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 6/25/65*
4. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 7/22/66*

CHICLET SURVEY

1. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 11/20/63
2. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 4/29/64
3. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 5/22/64
4. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 5/25/64
5. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 5/19/66*

BALTCH CASE

1. D.E. Moore to W.C. Sullivan - 10/2/64

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/15/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
10/7/75 request

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: TW Cregar Date: 10-15-75

Received by: Michael [illegible]

Title: Asst Security Dir.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

10-13-00 SP2 ALM/HG

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: **FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 10/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

ALL [illegible] #MDR16
10-13-00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Documents furnished relating to mail intercept program. These documents, previously reviewed at FBIHQ, and now are delivered properly excised for public hearings.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

TO: Mr. Earl Cregar

RE: SENSTUDY '75

Per "Abstracts" in Records, this memo dated 11/4/75. 7/19/76 B

Re formal request dated 8/4/75 from Senate Select Committee Item ~~III. (1)~~ V, "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".

This is newly requested material.

Arrangements have been made with the property management office to have a copy of this handbook delivered to Mr. Cregar Room 4171 JEH.

It can be shown to a representative of the SS Committee and a Laboratory representative will be made available to assist in the review.

If this manual is requested and given to SSC, a memorandum to the Administrative Division is required to remove it from Mr. Cregar's inventory of personal property.

WEH

W. E. Harward
Radio Engineering Section
Laboratory Division

Returned to Adm. Div. & removed from Cregar's pers. prop. invt. 7/19/76 B

REC-30 62-116395-968

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

84 NOV 5 1975

Retyped page(s) [redacted] of memo [redacted] to

dated re:

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

October 15, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

EMDR16

10-13-00 SP-2 ALM/sts

In accordance with an agreement reached during a meeting on July 30, 1975, among Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Deputy Assistant Director H. E. Helgeson, Section Chiefs R. L. Shackelford and J. G. Deegan, all of this Bureau, and SSC Staff members Mark H. Gitenstein, Mary DeOreo, and John T. Elliff, the FBI was to furnish to the SSC Staff members examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

In addition, the SSC inquired as to the number of persons included in the Extremist Photograph Album (EPA) as of July 30, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum disclosing that the pertinent documents are available to SSC Staff members for access regarding the preliminary inquiries, investigation of an infiltrated organization and the EPA. A copy is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (~~2~~ 3) ENCLOSURE
62-116395

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RDS:adn
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC-30 62-116395-969

ST-111

ENCLOSURE

15 NOV 4 1975

84 NOV 5 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE:

Copies of unexcised and excised documents (where necessary) that are available for access to SSC members are being maintained by the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Memorandum from J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, 8/18/75, "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)" (attached) recommended, and the Director approved, the granting of SSC Staff access to this material.

5/10

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

62-116395

October 15, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

As a result of a conference held on July 30, 1975, among Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Deputy Assistant Director H. E. Helgeson, Section Chiefs R. L. Shackelford and J. G. Deegan, all of this Bureau, and SSC Staff members Mark H. Gitenstein, Mary DeOreo, and John T. Elliff, it was agreed to furnish to SSC Staff members access to examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

In addition, the SSC inquired as to the number of persons included in the Extremist Photograph Album.

Purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the pertinent documents responsive to the agreement are available for access to the appropriately cleared members of the SSC Staff in Room 4171 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

1 - The Attorney General
RDS:adn/klm
(8)

MDR 16

1013-00 SP-2 ALM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

WOC

62-116395-969

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 15

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/8/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC). (7/30/75 Oral Request SSC Extremist Photo Album.)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 10-18-75

Received by: James Dick

Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16
SP-2ALM/HG
10-13-00

[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

FOR REVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC 7/30/75 Oral Request

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16

10-13-00 SP-2ALM/GTG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

As the result of a conference held 7/30/75, documents pertaining to the Extremist Photograph Album, have been made available for review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FBIHQ, also examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WDC

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. Hotis)

The Attorney General

October 17, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar (Enclosures)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 8, 1975, requesting all materials pertaining to the decisional process which preceded and resulted in the Bureau's request to the Central Intelligence Agency to place each of the following names on the Hunter Mail watch list: Derk Bodde, "National Guardian," Leonard Bernstein, National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and "Ramparts" Magazine.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff of the SSC in an effort to clarify a similar request. Elliff made recommendations for handling that request which are being followed at this time.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which constitute the Bureau's response to the current request.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (40)

62-116395

EX-106

62-116395-910

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

3 - ENCLOSURE

15 NOV 5 1975

JCF:rsm (9)

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 NOV 12 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar (Enclosures)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/MC

62-116395

October 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 8, 1975, requesting all materials pertaining to the decisional process which preceded and resulted in the Bureau's request to the Central Intelligence Agency to place each of the following names on the Hunter Mail watch list:

1) "National Guardian"
2) Derk Bodde
3) Leonard Bernstein
4) National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
5) "Ramparts"

Knowledge of the Hunter Mail watch list was limited within the Bureau to Supervisors at FBI Headquarters. When a Supervisor desired to place a name on the watch list, he would prepare a 3 x 5 card which included:

a) the name and address of the individual or organization,
b) the duration of the request, and
c) the treatment to be given to any mail located.

No date was placed on the card, however, the cards were numbered consecutively. The request was then forwarded through liaison representatives to the Central Intelligence Agency. No other documents were prepared concerning the consideration, recommendation and proposal of these requests.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff of the SSC concerning a similar request. As a result, Elliff requested the following information concerning each of these requests:

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep. AD Adm. —
Dep. AD Inv. —
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

JCF:rsm

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

62-116395-97

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

a) a copy of the request and any other document in the Hunter Mail file in which the FBI mentions or shows results obtained from the specific request,

b) the approximate date of the request, and

c) the apparent basis for the request, or in the case of an investigation instituted after the effective date of the Hunter Mail project, the basis for the investigation.

The following summaries and enclosures constitute the Bureau's response to this request.

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

1) "National Guardian"

a) documents - The "National Guardian" was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 117 (Exhibit A-1). On April 20, 1962, a list of names to remain on the watch list was prepared and the "National Guardian" was included (Exhibit A-2). On October 25, 1966, a similar list was prepared (Exhibit A-3). The "National Guardian" was mentioned in a memorandum dated August 21, 1964, concerning data obtained from the Hunter Mail project during the past year (Exhibit A-4).

b) date - Request number 117 was made between August 18, 1961, and April 20, 1962. As indicated above, the "National Guardian" was included on a list of names to remain on the watch list on April 20, 1962. It was not on a similar list of names as of August 18, 1961.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file on the "National Guardian" is dated August 13, 1948, and reports the publication on August 1, 1948, of the "National Gazette Weekly," forerunner of the "National Guardian." During 1961 and 1962, the "National Guardian" sponsored tours of Eastern Europe, including Russia (Exhibits A-5 and 6).

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

2) Derk Bodde

a) documents - No Hunter Mail request was located for Bodde. He was, however, included in a list of names to remain on the watch list which was prepared on April 20, 1962 (Exhibit A-2).

b) date - Bodde was most likely placed on the watch list in 1960. As indicated above, Bodde was included on a list of names to remain on the watch list on April 20, 1962; however, there are no documents in the file dated in 1961 and 1962. He did travel to Russia during 1960.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file on Bodde is dated February 5, 1952. A review of the documents for the period after the Hunter program was instituted failed to locate any document recommending him for inclusion on the watch list. The investigation had been placed in a closed status until information was received that Bodde was scheduled to attend the International Orientalist Congress in Moscow during August, 1960 (Exhibits B-1 and 2).

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

3) Leonard Bernstein

a) documents - No Hunter Mail request was located for Bernstein. He was, however, included in a list of names to be removed from the watch list which was prepared on April 20, 1962 (Exhibit A-2).

b) date - Bernstein was most likely placed on the watch list in 1959, since he went to Russia during that year. On April 20, 1962, he was included on a list of names to be removed from the watch list.

c) basis - Since no Hunter Mail request was located, there is no background information available concerning the Leonard Bernstein who was placed on the watch list. A review of Bureau files for individuals named Leonard Bernstein does indicate, however, that the only Leonard Bernstein who travelled to Russia or had any Soviet contacts was Leonard Bernstein, born August 25, 1918 (the prominent conductor and composer). The first item in the Bureau file concerning Bernstein is dated March 2, 1949. A review of documents in this file from the beginning of the Hunter program in 1958 until April 20, 1962, the date on which his name was removed from the watch list, failed to locate a request that he be included in the Hunter program. However, information concerning him, compiled in response to a request from another government agency in December, 1958, did indicate that Bernstein planned to visit Russia during March, 1959 (Exhibits C-1 and 2).

4) National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC)

a) documents - The NMC was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 193 (Exhibit D-1). The NMC was mentioned in a memorandum dated August 28, 1969, concerning data obtained from the Hunter Mail project during the past year (Exhibit D-2).

b) date - This request was most likely made between January 16, 1969, and August 28, 1969. No investigation was conducted concerning the NMC until September, 1966 (Exhibit D-3). The request, however, was probably not made until after January 15, 1969, the date that a CIA representative suggested the Bureau use the Hunter project for development of leads in the New Left field (Exhibit D-4). Request number 233 was mentioned in a memorandum concerning results from the Hunter Mail program which was dated August 28, 1969.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file concerning the NMC is a communication dated September 14, 1966, which indicates that a group known as the November 8th Ad Hoc Committee had been formed at Cleveland, Ohio. By communication dated September 20, 1966, FBI Headquarters instructed the New York and Cleveland Divisions to keep abreast of the plans of this Committee to sponsor demonstrations during November, 1966 (Exhibit D-3). By communication dated July 28, 1967, FBI Headquarters instructed the New York Division to prepare a report concerning the same organization which had become known as the NMC (Exhibit D-5). The name NMC was used until approximately August, 1969, when an allegedly new organization known as the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam was formed.

5) "Ramparts"

a) documents - "Ramparts" was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 105 (Exhibit E-1).

b) date - This request was also most likely made between January 16, 1969, and August 28, 1969.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file concerning "Ramparts" is dated October 22, 1964; however, no active investigation was authorized at that time. Investigation was authorized in May, 1967, based on a request received from the Department of Justice (Exhibits E-2 and 3). No request to include "Ramparts" on the Hunter Mail watch list was located; however, a document dated October 17, 1968, does indicate that "Ramparts" furnished a list of names, probably their mailing list, to the Soviets (Exhibit E-4).

Enclosures (19)

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENSTE SELECT COMMITTEE.
10/8/75 Requestx

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller Date: 10/20/75

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#mDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

62-116395-970

8

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 10/8/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

S

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Intelligence collection
Information handling

mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2ALM

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Material furnished regarding placing of individuals and/or organizations on the Hunter Mail watch list: a copy of the request and any document which mentions or shows results obtained from the specific request, the approximate date of the request and apparent basis for the request.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIAL LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW 5-WOC/

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

D

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2ALM/TG

5-88 (2-28-58)

1. Name "NATIONAL GUARDIAN"
WEEKLY GUARDIAN ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address 197 East Fourth Street and
133 West 72nd Street
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
New York, New York, USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☒ Watch List Until canceled.
Duration

HUNTER Request No.
117

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395-970

A-17

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - D. E. Moore
1 - Branigan
1 - Litrento
1 - Papich
1 - Stewart

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : D. E. Moore

DATE: 4/20/62

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/TB
IT MDR16

In order to insure that Project Hunter will continue to operate under maximum economy and efficiency, we have advised CIA at a recent conference we would review Bureau Informant 200 material received and advise CIA whether or not we desired to continue to receive material on persons whose names appear on the attached list.

The interested Supervisor should, accordingly, indicate by writing "yes" or "no" to the right of his subject's name whether or not he desires Bureau Informant 200 to discontinue furnishing data on each of his respective subjects.

The attached lists were compiled from a review of the Project Hunter card box indices maintained by Supervisor W. D. Stewart as an administrative aid for routing purposes. The names of subjects on whom we have received no material for the past year do not appear on the attached lists. They have been weeded out separately along with other subjects who have been relatively inactive.

The results of this survey will be forwarded via Liaison to CIA for appropriate action.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memo and its attachment be routed to the interested Supervisor for a determination as to the continuation of receiving Bureau Informant 200 material on his respective subject.

That the results of this survey be forwarded via Liaison to CIA for appropriate action.

105-93089

Enclosure

WDS:blv
(6)

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

[illegible] was forwarded on 4/30/62 to CIA via Liaison. WRL 4/30/62. CIA was advised this review was conducted in accordance with our discussion at most recent conference so that we may each continue to operate under maximum economy.

As a result of our survey, we will discontinue on 97 of the 200 persons on

REC- 13 50

17 MAY 2 1962

A-25

SUBJECT	DISCONTINUE YES	 NO	SUPERVISOR
NATIONAL GUARDIAN		✓	R.J.RAMPTON
BODDE, DERK		No	J.V.BAKER
BERNSTEIN, LEONARD	✓		W.P.JONES

(Names of other individuals and organizations)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Mohr ____
Wick ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

1 - M. E. Triplett

TO : W. A. Branigan WAB

DATE: October 25, 1966

FROM : M. E. Triplett

Project Hunter

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

The attached list of numbered and unnumbered Hunter Stops was received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the request to advise whether we still desired that the subjects be retained on the Watch List. A check of Bureau records revealed that some of these names had already been canceled. Names on this list were referred to the Special Agent Supervisor interested in the matter and numbers were assigned to unnumbered stops we desire to retain on the Watch List.

On October 21, 1966, a complete list of stops was referred to the Liaison Section for delivery to Mr. Worth of CIA. A copy of this list is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached lists be filed in order that they will be available for future reference.

Enclosures - 2
105-93089
MET:met
(2)

REC- 58

105-9[illegible]57-79

ENCLOSURE

EX-108

OCT 26 1966

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

A-3

~~SECRET~~ October 21, 1966

HUNTER STOPS - NUMBERED

117. National Guardian; Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.

Bureau Listings	Numbered
22 NAT'L GUARDIAN NYC	(-)

Received from Jerry Worth. C.I.A

(Names of other individuals and organizations)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

1 - Branigan
1 - A.P. Litrento

TO : W.A. Branigan

DATE: August 21, 1964

1 - S. Papich
1 - Triplett

FROM : M.E. Triplett

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

REC- 40

105-93089-70

A detailed analysis of data received from Bureau Informant 200 during the past year is attached.

ACTION:

11 SEP 2 1964

None. This is for your information.

ENCLOSURE

105-93089

File in 105-93089

SOVIET SECTION

A-4

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Data of Special Interest:

Typical Data Furnished by Bureau Informant 200 During Past Year:

offer of Andrew Jacob Steiger, American correspondent in U.S.S.R., to work for Security Index subject Russell Arthur Nixon of the "National Guardian";

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

#-MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JG

100-357044

New York, New York
July 24, 1961

Re: "National Guardian,"
Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.;
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

Reference is made to memorandum at New York, entitled as above, dated May 22, 1961.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished on July 17, 1961, a revised schedule of the "National Guardian" European tour, July 28 - August 20, 1961.

The schedule of this tour is as follows:

FROM	TO	Via CARRIER	FLIGHT NO.	DATE
Idlewild	Copenhagen	Scandinavian Airlines (SAS)	912	7/28
Copenhagen	Stockholm	SAS	508	7/31
Stockholm	Helsinki	SAS	728	7/31
Helsinki	Moscow	Aeroflot	108	7/31
Moscow	Kiev	Aeroflot	open	
Kiev	Prague	Aeroflot	211	8/17
Prague	Copenhagen	Malev (Hungarian Airlines)	380	8/20
Copenhagen	Idlewild	SAS	919	8/20

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

This document contains neither
recomme[illegible] conclusions
of the [illegible] property
of the [illegible] to your
agency; [illegible] are
not [illegible] outside
your [illegible]

A-5

Re: "National Guardian,"
Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.;
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of January 2, 1957, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., contains the following concerning the "National Guardian":

> "National Guardian
>
> "1. 'Established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a "progressive" weekly. *** Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia.'
> (Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 'Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell,' August 25, 1956, p. 12)"

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

New York, New York
April 6, 1962

Bufile 100-357044

Re: "National Guardian";
Weekly Guardian Associates, Incorporated
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

The April 9, 1962 issue of the "National Guardian," page 6, contained an announcement of the Guardian's "1962 Tour of Eastern Europe". This tour, of 23 days duration, is to leave New York Friday, August 3, 1962, and is to return on Sunday, August 26, 1962. The tour will visit Bucharest, Budapest, Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad. The announcement states that the tour will also visit Poland or Czechoslovakia. The price of the tour will be $1295.00, and those interested are instructed to forward a $100.00 deposit to "Guardian Tours", 197 East 4th Street, New York 9, New York.

A characterization of the "National Guardian" is attached.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

10
A-6

100-357044-469

APPENDIX

Re: "National Guardian";
Weekly Guardian Associates, Incorporated
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

Dec 1, 1961

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., contains the following concerning the "National Guardian":

> "National Guardian
>
> "1. 'established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a "progressive" weekly. * * * Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia.' (Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 'Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell,' August 25, 1956, p. 12)"

35 7044 - 469

1 - Mr. Glascock
1 - Mr. Schultz

SAC, Philadelphia (100-21984)	May 10, 1960

Director, FBI (100-387911)	PERSONAL ATTENTION

FoIPA 228590
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/15/83 BY SP/GSK/gbt

DR. DERK BODDE
SECURITY MATTER - C

Information has been received from Bureau Informant 200, a most reliable and sensitive source, that the subject has been in direct contact with Dr. S. L. Tikhvinsky, Institute of Sinology, Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The subject is among 15 American orientalists who have been selected through the American Council of Learned Societies to attend the International Orientalist Congress in Moscow, Russia, during August. This group will not only attend the Congress, but also will spend an entire month in the Soviet Union studying what is being done there in the fields of the respective individuals. The members of this group will come as delegates either of the American Oriental Society or the Association for Asian Studies, and will do so under financial grants made through the American Council of Learned Societies.

(Information concerning other individuals)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the F. I

MAILED 8
MAY 10 1960
COMM-FBI

Philadelphia and Boston should immediately take appropriate action as provided for in SAC Letter 59-58 (G) concerning Security Investigations - Individuals Traveling Abroad.

EX 104	100-387911-17

You are cautioned that the information obtained by Bureau Informant 200 is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau and should not be set forth in any investigative report. Information from this source should be utilized for lead purposes only. You must avoid any statement

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Trotter
Sullivan

1 - Philadelphia (100-38026)
2 - Boston (100-19891)
(123-2092)

B-1

COPY FILED IN

Letter to SAC, Philadelphia
RE: DR. DERK BODDE
100-387911

regarding the scope of coverage in effect in this instance, and under no circumstances are the subject or any unauthorized persons to become aware that we have knowledge of this information.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

None of the afore-mentioned individuals are on the Security Index, and none are currently subjects of Bureau investigations.

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Rushing

100-337911

Date: July 25, 1960

To: Office of Security
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: MR. [illegible]
SECURITY MATTER - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-00 BY SP2 ALM/jg
#MDR16

Records of the Passport Office, Department of State, indicate that Mark [illegible] was issued Passport Number [illegible] on April 18, 1958, renewed April 8, 1960. In his application for renewal of the passport, [illegible] indicated that he planned to depart from the United States in late July, 1960. He indicated that he planned to visit England, Holland, France, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden. He further indicated that he is a delegate to the International Orientalist Congress to be held in Moscow, Russia, August 9-16, 1960.

Reports containing the results of a security investigation of [illegible] have previously been forwarded to your office. Copies of these reports are being forwarded to the Central Intelligence Agency under separate cover.

The Legal Attaches in London, Paris, and Bonn have been requested to arrange for the receipt of any information concerning the subject's activities that may come to the attention of the security services in the areas covered by these Legal Attaches. I would appreciate the receipt of any information that may come to your attention regarding [illegible]'s activities in the Soviet Union and in Czechoslovakia.

BY COU
88 JUL 26
COMM-FBI

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

EX-105 REC-82 100-337911-60

19 JUL 26 1960

1 - Director
1 - Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans
1 - London (See note page 2)
1 - Paris (See note page 2)
1 - Bonn (See note page 2)
1 - Philadelphia (See note page 2)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)
TDR/baw
(11)

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan

B-2

Office of Security
Department of State

NOTE LEGATS, LONDON, PARIS, AND BONN, AND SAC, PHILADELPHIA:

Subject's name is not included in the Security Index. He is employed as a professor of Chinese studies at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and resides at 29 West Phil-Ellena Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Bodde was born 3-9-09 in Marshfield, Massachusetts.

Bodde has, in the past, been identified with numerous Communist Party front organizations. He is an outspoken advocate for recognition of the Chinese communist regime.

You should alert your sources for receipt of any information that may come to their attention regarding Bodde's activities while travelling abroad. The above information may be furnished your sources.

Philadelphia should arrange to be advised of the subject's return and thereafter promptly notify the Bureau in order that the stops may be cancelled.

R/S shows
Legat London
9/9/60 - Info
sent MI-5 by
Legat 8-10-60

~~CONFIDENTIA~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-3 BTJ/TS
ON 11-2-99 APP#94-2233
PER DRC dtd 8-27-99

MAILED
DEC 2 1958
NAME CHECK

December 23, 1958

LEONARD BERNSTEIN
Born: August 25, 1918
Lawrence, Massachusetts

You are referred to information previously furnished to your agency on January 28 and November 10, 1955, concerning Leonard Bernstein. For your additional information, there is enclosed a copy of a memorandum dated May 27, 1958, concerning the captioned individual. (100-360261-41,49,55)

In August, 1958, a confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that Leonard Bernstein had been in contact with Tamara Yurevna Mamedova. The August, 1958, "Diplomatic List" reflects Tamara Y. Mamedova to be a second secretary at the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (USSR). In June, 1958, a confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that Tamara Mamedova was employed in the Cultural Division of the Soviet Embassy. As part of her duties the informant stated that Mamedova handled inquiries from the public concerning the Cultural Exchange Program between the USSR and the United States and assisted in arrangements for appearances of groups from both countries under the auspices of that program.

In his contact with Mamedova, the confidential informant stated that Leonard Bernstein indicated that he would accept an invitation to visit the USSR and stated that he would be able to go during the first two weeks of March, 1959. He expressed a desire to conduct some orchestras while in the USSR. (105-53022-328)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

The foregoing information is furnished to you as a result of your request for an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or a nonclearance of the individual involved. This information is loaned for your use and is not to be disseminated outside of your agency.

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____

Enclosure.
Orig and one to USIA
Req rec'd: 12/8/58
B. V. Gronquist/ckb
(4)

EX. - 12A
REC- 66

NOTE: Memo classified DEC 24 1958 confidential inasmu as enclosed report is so classified.

15-56

C-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

NY 100-99895

New York, New York
May 27, 1958

DECLASSIFIED BY 9803RDD/LMB
ON 5/20/93

Re: Leonard Bernstein, with aliases

On June 30, 1950, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that in 1945 when the committee to aid Ben Davis was being considered, both Ben Davis and Jack Stachel described Leonard Bernstein to the source as an adherent of the Communist Party. This source stated that other Communist Party functionaries had also described Leonard Bernstein as a Communist. The source advised that in 1945 Jack Stachel informed him that Bernstein had agreed to submit to Communist discipline. This source advised on December 9, 1954 that he has no direct personal knowledge of Bernstein's willingness to submit to Communist discipline.

Ben Davis and Jack Stachel were members of the National Board of the Communist Party who were tried and convicted in 1949 for violation of the Smith Act of 1940.

Leonard Bernstein, by notarized affidavit dated August 3, 1953, submitted in connection with his application for passport, stated "...although I have never, to my knowledge, been accused of being a member of the Communist Party, I wish to take advantage of this opportunity to affirm under oath that I am not now or at any time ever been a member of the Communist Party or the Communist Political Association. I have never knowingly engaged in activities which supported the Communist movement under circumstances which would warrant the conclusion that I engaged in such activities as a result of direction, domination or control exercised over me by the Communist movement..."

In February, 1958, a source of unknown reliability, but who is acquainted with the subject, advised that he believed Leonard Bernstein to be a Communist. This source based this belief on the way Bernstein talks, that is, that he has continually made anti-American and pro-Russian statements. Source was unable to furnish any specific details pertaining thereto.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

AGENCY [illegible]
REQ. REC'D [illegible]
REP'T. FORW. [illegible]
BY [illegible]

CRB (C-6)
AGENCY [illegible]
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. [illegible]
HOW FORW. [illegible]
BY [illegible]

14

COPIES DESTROYED
391 FEB 20 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-360261-55

C-2

CONFIDENTIAL

All organizations mentioned hereafter have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450, unless otherwise described.

The House Committee on Un-American Activities review of the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace held March 25,26,27,1949, which conference was arranged by the National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions, reflected Leonard Bernstein was affiliated with the following organizations:

American Council for a Democratic Greece
American Youth for Democracy
Committee For a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
Civil Rights Congress
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
National Negro Congress

The National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions was cited in the aforementioned review as a Communist front.

Records of the Bureau of Special Services, New York City Police Department, reflect that Bernstein was a member of the Council on African Affairs, Incorporated, as of February 3, 1948.

The "New York Times", issue of March 3, 1945, contained an advertisment by the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade entitled "For America's Sake-Break With Franco Spain" wherein Bernstein was listed as a sponsor.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised during 1946 that Leonard Bernstein was identified on a letterhead of the American Committee for Spanish Freedom dated January 21, 1946, as being one of the sponsors of this organization.

The "Daily Worker" issue of May 16, 1946, page four column three, lists Leonard Bernstein as a conductor and composer and one of the endorsers of the Three Day Tag Drive of the American Committee for Yugoslav Relief.

29

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address Any office in the U.S. - National
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
headquarters are in New York, New York.
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☑ Watch List Duration until canceled

HUNTER Request No. 193

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

16
D-1

3'

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Miss Triplett

Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TO : W. A. Branigan

FROM : W. E. Triplett

DATE: August 28, 1969

File in:
105-93089

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

A more detailed analysis of material received is attached.

ACTION: None. This is furnished for your information.

Enclosure
WET:met

D-2

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Items are received on repatriates, deportees, defectors, U.S. citizens who went to USSR for permanent residence because of marriage or family and individuals born in U.S. who were taken there when children. Most of this material is of limited value but all individuals are included on CIA's "defector list." However, items are of value when they pertain to individuals known to have been espionage agents or to have subversive relatives in U.S. For example, items on Harry Eisman, deported from U.S. over 30 years ago, have contained little information of interest until recently. Friends asked Eisman to see the Glass family when they visited the USSR. When he entertained the family, the daughter was greatly influenced by his colorful description of his radical activities in New York schools. (Identifies confidential source)

Prudence Glass has been maintaining contact with Eisman since her return and recently informed him of her plans to marry Bob (evidently Robert Steven Greenblatt, key activist), leader and organizer of one of the largest marches sponsored by National Mobilization Committee to End War in Vietnam. She informed him of their plans to move to Georgia where she hoped to work "in the underground." We had no previous information indicating that she had any connection whatsoever with any organization or Greenblatt or of Greenblatt's plans to leave New York. Additional information has revealed that Eisman, who had reportedly fallen from graces of Soviets, appears to have regained their confidence, sees numerous U.S. travelers and communists and lectures at an unidentified special school on youth activities in U.S.,

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/JEC

SAC, New York

9/20/66

Director, FBI

NOVEMBER 8TH AD HOC COMMITTEE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

1 - Wells

ReCVairtel 9/14/66.

New York is designated office of origin in this matter. Through informants and sources, keep abreast of the plans of this Committee to sponsor demonstrations 11/5-8/66. Keep the Bureau advised of all developments.

1 - Cleveland

BAW:pdb (5)

NOTE:

Captioned group was formed at Cleveland, Ohio, during a conference of peace groups on 9/10-11/66. Its purpose is to organize demonstrations protesting the Vietnam war on 11/5-8/66. A. J. Muste, New York City, a prominent pacifist, is Chairman of the Committee. Cleveland airtel asks that New York be made origin due to this fact.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAILED 9
SEP 20 1966
COMM-FBI

REC 26

62-111181-28

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room

EX-106

NO SEP 21 1966

D-3

70 SEP 28 1966

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/1816

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

On January 15, 1969, Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The Hunter project for which we have given the designation of Bureau Informant 200 essentially consists of specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia. If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the Soviet Union, it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.)

ACTION:

REC 102

105-[illegible] 90

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

18 FEB 5 1969

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - Liaison
1 - S. J. Papich

SJP:clb
(6)

Stops not warranted
on black extremists
at this time
1/31/69

D-4

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/~~[illegible]~~ #MDR16

SAC, New York (100-158914) 7/28/67

Director, FBI (62-111181) 1 - Mr. B.A. Wells

NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

You are to prepare a report concerning captioned group. Inasmuch as other Government agencies have shown an interest in its activities and due to the fact it is sponsoring a massive demonstration at Washington, D. C., on 10/21/67, furnish 11 copies of this report to the Bureau. Also furnish copies to Washington Field Office.

BAW:jes
(4)

NOTE:

Captioned group, formerly known as the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, includes members of the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party among its sponsors. It sponsored massive demonstrations against the war in Vietnam at New York City, and San Francisco, California, on 4/15/67 and is organizing a massive demonstration at Washington, D. C., on 10/21/67. We have had it under investigation for the past months. A report should now be prepared so that we will have it for ready reference.

4

REC 23 62-111181-854

EX 101

MAILED 12
JUL 27 1967
COMM-FBI

19 JUL 28 1967

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

D-5

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name RAMPARTS
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address
(Apt. No.) 201 Broadway (No. and Name of Street)
San Francisco, California, USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☑ Watch List Duration until canceled

HUNTER Request No. 195

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

20

E-1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/9/67

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

SUBJECT: "RAMPARTS"
IS - C
Bufile 100-445393
SF 157-459

ROBERT SCHEER
SM - SWP
REGISTRATION ACT
Bufile 105-106720
SF 100-46832

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-80 klc

105

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Re Bulet to San Francisco, 5/8/67, under the caption of "Ramparts" and Bulet to San Francisco, 5/5/67, under the caption "ROBERT SCHEER, SM-SWP; REGISTRATION ACT."

San Francisco is requesting clarification on which instruction in referenced letters will prevail in the investigation of "Ramparts" magazine.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

REC 23

100-445393-45

13 MAY 10 1967

④ - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco (1 - 157-459)
(1 - 100-46832)

EJO/jr
(6)

Let to SF 5/18/67 "Ramparts"

① INTRoSec.
② SUBV CONTROL

21

E-2

1 - Mr. Shaw
1 - Mr. Wells

SAC, San Francisco (157-459) 5-18-67

Director, FBI (100-445393)

"RAMPARTS"
IS - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-80 BY

Reurlet 5-9-67 and Bulet 5-5-67.

Inasmuch as the Department has authorized an investigation of "Ramparts," you are to follow the instructions set out in Bulet 5-5-67. The investigation of "Ramparts" is to be conducted separately from the investigation of Robert Scheer.

Of particular interest in your investigation is the extent of Communist Party or other subversive influence in "Ramparts."

Submit a report to the Bureau by 6-17-67. Include your recommendation as to whether further investigation is warranted. This investigation must be conducted discreetly due to the possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau.

BAW:mh (5)

NOTE:

"Ramparts" is a leftist publication which has been highly critical of U.S. foreign policy. It is self-described by one of its editors as an "intellectual muckraker." Robert Scheer, one of its editors, is presently under investigation on a Registration Act matter. By letter dated 4-26-67 the Department requested further investigation concerning Scheer and "Ramparts." Due to the sensitivity of investigating a magazine, we have previously refused permission to the San Francisco Office to check the bank account of "Ramparts." However, in view of the Department's request (which has been furnished to San Francisco), we should open an investigation of "Ramparts."

MAILED 2
MAY 1 8 1967
COMM-FBI

EX-110 REC- 59

MAY 18 1967

olson
eLoach
lohr
lick
Jasper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Trotter

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62 MAY 25 1967

E-3

~~SECRET~~

STATES DEPARTMENT (. CE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI

Washington, D.C. 20535

October 17, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

11-20-00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTK
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[GEORGIY I. ISACHENKO
INTERNAL SECURITY - R] (S)

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on October 15, 1968 that (S) [Georgiy I. Isachenko] had been informed that "Ramparts" Magazine had not received the list of names and addresses from the Soviets in return for the list that had been furnished by "Ramparts" to the Soviets. [Isachenko] was to check into this situation in an attempt to clear up this misunderstanding. The source was of the opinion that the list referred to pertained to mailing lists maintained by "Ramparts", and the [Soviet Information Department, Washington, D.C.] (S) (S)

The current "Diplomatic List," published by the United States Department of State reflects that Georgiy I. Isachenko is the Information Counselor of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Washington, D.C. (S)

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

GROU
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

100-445391

E-4

1 - Mr. [illegible]. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 20, 1975

Director, FBI 62-116395-970X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16
10-13-00 SP2ALM/JFG

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, to Mr. John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated October 17, 1975, and captioned "Senate Select Committee Request." This communication enclosed a letter to the Attorney General from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, SSC, dated October 15, 1975.

In Senator Church's letter he advised of the intention of the SSC Staff to interview some nine FBI sources who had cooperated with this Bureau in the course of certain COINTELPRO operations. The Senator stated that he hoped there would be no objection to conducting these interviews but that, if such objections were raised, he be contacted by Tuesday, October 21, 1975.

It is noted that the issue raised in Senator Church's letter is not new. During August, 1975, SSC Staff Member John T. Elliff proposed interviews of this type and, at that time, this Bureau objected on the principle of the FBI's obligation to protect the confidentiality of relationship with our sources. As a result of this objection, a conference was held between yourself and Senator Church on the evening of August 14, 1975. It is our understanding that an agreement was reached whereby the Committee would attempt a limited number of interviews of individuals whose identities and/or

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___ 62-116395
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___ EWL:lhb lhb
Laboratory ___ (9)
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

JAM

5-103

4063JBH

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 FEB 18 1976

relationship with the FBI has been protected. However, as a condition precedent to such interviews, the FBI was to be allowed to contact such individuals to inform them of the proposed interview and to determine whether they would be receptive to such an interview. Senator Church concurred in this arrangement; however, subsequently on August 18, 1975, Mr. Elliff advised that Senator Church had reconsidered his agreement to the aforementioned procedures as a result of persuasion by the SSC Staff. Elliff, at that time, indicated a letter recording Senator Church's change of attitude had been drafted. To date, no such formal acknowledgement has been received by this Bureau and no interviews have been attempted in the interim.

In his October 15, 1975, communication, Senator Church again raises this issue. Although he does note that the matter was originally discussed with you "some weeks ago," he makes no mention of the agreement reached at that time. Apparently, as some sort of precedent, he does cite the fact that the FBI did make available for use and interview the names of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) personnel who cooperated with the FBI in certain COINTELPRO activities. We do not consider release of these identities on our part to be a concession with respect to confidentiality of sources in general since we specifically stipulated that we considered IRS personnel to be U. S. Government officials acting in their capacity as such.

It is clear that the merits of this issue have not changed since the agreement reached between yourself and Senator Church on August 14, 1975. I feel very strongly that the issue of confidentiality of sources is vital to the continuing effectiveness and integrity of the FBI in its investigative operations. I, therefore, strongly urge that should you concur in the need on the part of the Committee to conduct the interviews which they propose, that the agreement of prior

contact by the FBI with those individuals be insisted upon as a condition to such interviews to insure their amenability and uphold the obligation of confidentiality which the FBI has assumed.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
        Special Counsel for
          Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 10/20/75, and prepared by EWL:lhb.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

OCT 17 1975

m DR16
SR 2 ALM 1976
10-13-00

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M.E. FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached for your immediate attention and comments is a letter from the Senate Select Committee which is self-explanatory and which raises anew an issue previously addressed by the Bureau, with the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and this Office. Please note that Chairman Church asks the Attorney General to advise him of our position by Tuesday, October 21, 1975.

REC-100

62-116395-970X

FEB 6 1976

2 - ENCLOSURE

Let to AG 10/21/75
EWL/[illegible]

cc: Paul Daly

5 - [illegible]

LEGAL COUNSEL

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 15, 1975

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
OCT 15 1975

#mDE16

16-13-00 SP-2 ALM 1976

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The Select Committee is presently investigating the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation carried on as part of the COINTELPRO program. We appreciate the cooperation of the FBI and the Justice Department in making materials available to us in this area. However, one problem remains to be resolved. The Committee believes its staff must contact and interview certain persons who received information from the FBI in the course of COINTELPRO operations. The FBI has withheld the names of such persons from the Committee's use on the grounds that they were FBI "sources".

The Committee wishes to stress that it is not interested in questioning these persons about any role as a "source", but rather as a recipient of information from the FBI. Indeed, in many instances we would not have been aware that the individual was a "source" had not the FBI excised the name from the materials delivered to us. Nevertheless, to minimize any incidental deleterious effects on legitimate FBI operations, the Committee has selected a very limited number of persons whom we desire to contact and interview. (See attached list and materials.)

As you will recall, we originally discussed this matter with you some weeks ago. Since then the Committee has had an opportunity to consider the issue more fully in the light of our experience with other investigations. For example, our inquiry into the relationships between the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service clearly showed the

62-116395-970X

ENCLOSURE

need to use the names of IRS personnel who cooperated with the FBI in certain COINTELPRO activities. Those names were made available to us for our use.

As I am sure you can appreciate, what is at stake here is the investigation of serious breaches of the security and confidentiality of information obtained by the FBI. Such information was apparently disclosed or "leaked" for the purpose of disruption. The full extent of such disclosures in many of the cases, such as the efforts to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., is still unknown. Surely, it would be incongruous for an inquiry into these matters to be impaired on the grounds of the FBI's interest in preserving confidentiality.

The Committee has a clear mandate and a firm commitment to investigate allegations that the FBI attempted to harass and discredit individuals. The integrity of this investigation depends upon our ability to conduct interviews without the appearance of outside interference. Therefore, we hope you have no objection to our conducting the interviews of the persons on the attached list, but if you do, please contact me by Tuesday, October 21.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP-2ALM/TTG

Tampa

Excision (name unknown) Tampa television producer or newsman. Furnished public source data and lead material concerning black nationalist groups, particularly Junta of Militant Organizations, for a television "special".

Chicago

Excision (a Mr. Jones - newspaper unknown) newspaper reporter furnished public source data and other lead material for an article on the Nation of Islam, particularly its business interests.

New York

Excision (known to be Surrogate Edward S. Silver) probate judge contacted by Bureau to determine how to prevent large bequest from going to CPUSA.

Jackson

Excision (known to be Jimmy Ward) newspaperman used to plant Bureau-authored letter and answer in column re Nation of Islam.

Pittsburgh I

Excision (known to be Richard Larry) official of Mellon Foundation used in several counterintelligence programs involving foundation funding and contacts.

Pittsburgh II

Excision (known to be Sherley Uhl) newspaperman used in several counterintelligence programs of which the documents attached are one example.

Miami

Excision (known to be Gene Struhl) news director furnished public source information and other lead material with which to produce four separate documentaries which "showed the extremist groups involved in their true light."

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-970X

San Francisco

Excision (known to be Kevin Crowley) agent of California Alcoholic Beverage Control Board asked to raid a Democratic party fund raiser.

Minneapolis

Excision (known to be Fred Carey) Director of Security at Honeywell, Inc. and former Special Agent furnished information on plans of a group of Honeywell stockholders to appear at annual stockholders meeting to protest war production.

J. A. Mintz
- Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Dean

The Attorney General

October 17, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/MJG

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 12, 1975, requesting dates of letters, names and addresses of senders and addressees on copies of letters which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI which were written or received by Angela Davis, Jeremy Stone, Jane Fonda, Ralph Abernathy, Steven Slepian, Jack Nelson, and the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D. C., as well as all materials pertaining to the acquisition of these letters by the FBI.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, in an effort to clarify the referenced request. As a result of this meeting Mr. Elliff requested the following information in FBI files concerning the individuals listed in referenced request:

1. Dates, names and addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from the above-listed persons which were obtained without the knowledge of those persons, and the source of these letters.

2. Basis of the FBI's subversive investigation of each subject.

EX-115 REC 17 62-116395 971

3. Approximate date each of the above-listed persons' names was entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and documents concerning continuation of each person's name on that list.

62-116395

LED:en
(9)

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED
15 NOV 5 1975

3 - ENCLOSURE
ENCL BEHIND FILE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

84 NOV 6 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Dean

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

October 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 12, 1975, requesting:

(1) Dates of letters.

(2) Names and addresses of the senders.

(3) Names and addresses of the addressees.

(4) All materials pertaining to the acquisition by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of all letters written by the following individuals or organizations addressed to third parties and letters written by third parties addressed to the following individuals or organizations, copies of which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI:

Angela Davis
Jeremy Stone
Jane Fonda
Ralph Abernathy

Steven Slepian
Jack Nelson
Institute for Policy Studies,
Washington, D. C.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, concerning referenced request. As a result of this meeting, Mr. Elliff requested the following information from FBI files on individuals listed in referenced request:

1. Dates, names and addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from the above-listed individuals which were obtained by the FBI without the knowledge of the above individuals, and the source of these letters.

2. The basis for the FBI's subversive investigation of each above-listed person.

62-116395-941

LED:en
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which constitutes the Bureau's response to the above request.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

3. Approximate date that the name of each of the above listed persons was entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and any documents concerning continuation of their names on that list.

The following information constitutes the FBI's response to this request:

With regard to request number one above, FBI files contain no letter to or from Ralph Abernathy which was provided without his knowledge.

ANGELA DAVIS

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
None shown	Angela Davis	George Jackson	An official of the California State Attorney General's Office
1/24/73	International Friendship Club, Planeta-Kid; School #36, Kirovabad, Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR	Angela Davis, North Palo Alto, Holding Facility 270, 270 Grant Street, Palo Alto, California	Hunter Program

JEREMY J. STONE

1/14/71	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone	Mr. Frank M. Steadman General Counsel C & P Telephone Co. 1710 H. Street, N.W. Washington, D. C.	An official of the C & P Telephone Co.

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
4/20/66	Jeremy J. Stone	Dr. L. N. Kutakov Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations, 136 E. 67th Street, New York, New York	Z Coverage
5/24/68	Jeremy J. Stone 1788 Danbury Road Claremont, Calif.	Nina I. Shakhova Perekopskaya Vlitsa, 17, Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, I-209	Hunter Program
5/12/69	Jeremy J. Stone Washington, D. C.	Shakhova, N. 17 Perekopskaya Street Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program
1/2/68	Vladimir D. Kazakevich P. O. Box 346 Moscow, K-9	Dr. Jeremy Stone 1788 Danbury Road Claremont, Calif.	Hunter Program
1/13/68	Jeremy J. Stone	V. D. Kazakevich P. O. Box 346 Moscow K-9, USSR	Hunter Program
8/9/69	Jeremy J. Stone 264A G. Street, S. W. Washington, D. C. 20024	Shakhova, Nina 17 Perekopskaya St., Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program
2/15/70	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone Federation of American Scientist, Washington, D. C.	Chamkrelidze, R. V. Moscow V-333	Hunter Program

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
2/15/70	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone International Affairs fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C.	Yevtvshenko, Yeugeniy Moscow, USSR	Hunter Program
2/15/70	Jeremy J. Stone Executive Council Member and Delegate at large, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, D. C.	Moravyev, Dmitry Secretary General, Institute of Soviet American Relations Moscow, USSR	Hunter Program
5/19/70	Jeremy J. Stone 264A G. St., N. W. Washington, D. C.	Shakhova, Nina I. 17 Perekopskaya St. Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program

JANE FONDA

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
1/8/73	Jeff Stein	Jane Fonda	A local investigative agency which advises letter was legally obtained but requests identity be concealed to protect its source.
9/6/7	Jack Mabley Associate Editor Chicago Tribune, 435 N. Michigan Chicago, Illinois	Jane Fonda	
11/13/72	Pham Thanh Van, Expert De La Delegation, Du Government Revolutionaire Provisoire, De La Republique Du Sud Viet Nam, A La Conference De Paris, Sur Le Viet Nam	Jane Fonda	

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
12/13/72	Jostein Nyhamar Chairman of the North Vietnam Movement in Norway	Jane Fonda Care of Maslansky, Roros, Turisthotell, 7460 Roros	Same as above
1/28/73	Rebane, J. Oru 7-3 Vilyandi, Estonia, USSR	Jane Fonda c/o Chartwell-French-Perenchio 9720 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly Hills, California	Hunter Program
STEVEN SLEPIAN			
5/25/70	Steven Slepian 319 Elm Drive C Madison, Wisconsin	David Slepian Delegate to Popov Exchange, c/o Intourist, Moscow USSR	Hunter Program
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES			
8/17/70	Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) (Marcus G. Raskin)	Xerox Corporation Rochester, N. Y.	An official of Xerox Corporation
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Granite City Steel Public Relations Dept., Granite City, Illinois	An official of Granite City Steel
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Corning Glass Works Corning, N. Y.	An official of Corning Glass Works
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Hewlett-Packard Company, Palo Alto, California	Third Agency
None shown	Marcus G. Raskin	Center for Constitutional Rights, 530 9th Avenue, New York, N. Y.	Informant

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

With regard to request number two:

No subversive investigation has been conducted by the FBI concerning Jack Nelson or Steven Slepian.

Copies of communications concerning the FBI's initiation of subversive investigations of Jane Fonda, Angela Davis and Ralph Abernathy are being delivered with this memorandum.

Materials concerning the FBI's initiation of subversive investigations of Jeremy J. Stone and Institute for Policy Studies have been previously submitted in the FBI's memorandum to the SSC dated October 7, 1975.

With regard to request number three:

No information is contained in FBI files indicating Jane Fonda, Ralph Abernathy, Jack Nelson or Steven Slepian were entered on the Hunter Mail watch list as the result of a request by the FBI. Information concerning Jeremy Stone and Institute for Policy Studies has been previously submitted in the FBI's memorandum dated October 7, 1975.

No Hunter Mail watch list information was requested or received concerning Ralph Abernathy or Jack Nelson.

Angela Davis was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 250. No information concerning the date this request was made is contained in FBI files.

The only record maintained by the FBI concerning the Hunter Mail watch list request for Angela Davis is included in the Angela Davis material being delivered herewith.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC). (SSC letter dated 9/12/75.)

Originating Office: FBI 1 20 P

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Date: 10/22/75

Received by: A H Hatcy

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JT/6

62-116395-911

ENCLOSURE

2

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/12/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Information handling

#mde16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/06 BY SP2 ALM/JG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Dates, names, addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from various individuals which were obtained by the FBI without the knowledge of the individuals, and the source of these letters, the basis for the subversive investigation, date and name of each entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and any documents concerning continuation of their names on the list.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

b

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/TFG

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST 9/12/75

62-116395-971

[illegible]

ANGELA DAVIS

#-NDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2 ALM

#MD216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2ALM/EG

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name DAVIS, ANGELA YVONNE
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address 1919 Oregon St.
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
Berkeley, California USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents

☐ One-Time Check ☒ Watch List Duration Until Canceled

HUNTER Request No. 250

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5

LOS ANGELES | LOS ANGELES | 4/15/69 | 1/6/69 - 2/29/69

ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, aka
Tamu

WILLIAM H. SNELL | yfs

SM - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/00 BY SP2ALM/LG
#MDR16

REFERENCES: New York (100-80641) airtel to Bureau (100-3-69) dated 12/10/68 captioned "CP-USA Organization, IS - C".
Los Angeles letter to Bureau dated 3/23/69.
Los Angeles letter to Bureau dated 3/27/69.
Bureau FD-01 to Los Angeles dated 3/27/69.

- P -

ENCLOSURES:

TO BUREAU

Two copies FD-376.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Two copies FD-122 recommending that DAVIS be included in the Security Index, Priority III, sent to Bureau 4/15/69.

(5) - Bureau (100-439922)
1 - Secret Service, Los Angeles
2 - Boston (RM)
2 - San Diego (100-14064) (RM)
3 - Los Angeles (157-2325)

COPIES DESTROYED
333 NOV 12 1970

10 REC- 87

APR 18 1969

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR
ADD. DISSEMINATION.

Copy to [illegible]
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date [illegible]
by [illegible]

RC & SS with slip

routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 4/23/76
by [illegible]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Instant report is being submitted instead of LHM as per FD-01 dated 3/27/69 to facilitate handling.

An extra copy of this report with appropriate FD-376 and photograph for Secret Service are being furnished the Bureau in the event DAVIS is included in the Security Index. Los Angeles has prepared an extra copy of the report and FD-376 with photograph and will furnish to Secret Service, Los Angeles on Bureau approval.

No interview with DAVIS is being recommended. DAVIS is presently living with DEACON ALEXANDER (STANLEY SAMUEL ALEXANDER), Los Angeles file 100-70526, Bureau file 157-10023 currently on the Los Angeles Security Index and the Los Angeles Agitator Index. It is felt an interview would result in possible embarrassment to the Bureau.

This report is being classified ~~Confidential~~ because it contains information from informants which if disclosed could reasonably result in their disclosure and compromise their future effectiveness.

Records of the Jefferson County Board of Health, Bureau of Records and Vital Statistics, Birmingham, Alabama, were viewed by the Birmingham Division.

Records of the Drivers License Section, California Department of Motor Vehicles, were caused to be reviewed by IC FREDERICK M. FREEMAN, Sacramento Division, with negative results.

Records of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office were reviewed by IC MERTON R. ANDERSON.

Records of the Los Angeles Police Department were reviewed by IC MILLARD T. ANDERSON.

Records of the Los Angeles Traffic Court were reviewed by Special Employee GAREY D. POWELL.

Records of the Retail Merchants Credit Association, Los Angeles, California, were reviewed by IC BERNARD P. BLAIS.

Records of the Los Angeles County Voters Registration were reviewed by Special Employee GAREY D. POWELL.

LEADS

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA: Will upon Bureau approval include DAVIS in the Security Index, and disseminate copy of this report to Secret Service.

BOSTON

AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS: Will submit results of investigation per referenced letter dated 3/27/69.

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA: Will submit results of investigation per referenced letter dated 3/27/69.

INFORMANTS

SOURCE	LOCATION
LA T-1 Records Clerk UCSD San Diego, California	157-2325-11
LA T-2 SOURCE	157-2325-13

LA T-3 *	157-2325-55 Orally to SA CHARLES K. JOHNSON on 3/29/69 134-1210A-563 -599
LA T-4 *	157-2325-16
LA T-5 *	134-2004A-582
LA T-6 *	134-1606A-621
LA T-7 *	Orally to SA DAVID R. PENDER on 12/4/68 134-107A-732 through 740
LA T-8 *	134-262A-766 through 804
LA T-9 *	134-195A-985 through 1020
LA T-10 *	Orally to SA THEODORE J. A'HEARN on 7/23/68 134-2702A-618
LA T-11 *	134-37A-915 through 1003
LA T-12 *	134-66A-1544 through 1546

*INFORMANT
SYMBOL NUMBERS

LA T-13
INFORMANT #. 134-202A-714

LA T-14
SOURCE

157-2325-13

- E -
COVER PAGE

FD-376 (Rev. 4-25-68)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

LA 157-2325

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS
Also known as
Tamu

April 15, 1969

#mrc16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JZ/G
ON 11-16-00

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.

2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.

3. ☒ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.

4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.

5. ☐ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:
   - (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
   - (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
   - (c) ☐ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.

6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☒ enclosed ☐ is not available
☐ may be available through ____________________

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s) (1)
U. S. Secret Service, Los Angeles (RM)

Enclosure(s) *(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)*

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy to: 1 - Secret Service, Los Angeles (RM)

Report of: WILLIAM H. SNELL
Date: 4/15/69
Office: Los Angeles, California

Field Office File #: 157-2325
Bureau File #: 100-439922

Title: ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ETG
ON 11-16-00

Character: SECURITY MATTER - C

Synopsis: ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, also known as "Tamu", resides at 1107-1/2 West 87th Street, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS is presently unemployed. Background data is being set out. On 6/21/68, DAVIS was elected as a staff member of the Los Angeles Chapter of SNCC. DAVIS dropped out of SNCC and joined the Communist Party. DAVIS is a member of the Che Lumumba Club, Norenda Smith Section, SCDCP. DAVIS' activities in connection with the SCDCP are set out. Description data set forth.

- P -

DETAILS:

Investigation in this matter was predicated upon receipt of information from LA T-3 that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS was a member of the Communist Party in 1969.

BACKGROUND

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

BIRTH DATA AND CITIZENSHIP

On January 30, 1969, records of the Jefferson County Board of Health, Bureau of Records and Vital Statistics, 1912 Eighth Avenue South, Birmingham, Alabama, reflected that under Birth Certificate number 3737026 for the year 1944, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS was born January 26, 1944, the daughter of BENJAMIN FRANK DAVIS and SALLYE MARGURITE BELL.

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

EDUCATION

LA T-1 (6/6/68)

DAVIS attended graduate school in 1968 in the Philosophy Department at the University of California, San Diego. DAVIS supposedly attended Brandeis University, Boston, Massachusetts from the period 1961 to 1965.

IDENTIFICATION RECORD

The following is an identification record furnished by the FBI Identification Division:

I-1 (Rev. 9-30-63)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

2-6-69

J. Edgar Hoover
Direct

The following FBI record, NUMBER NONE ASSIGNED , is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ON

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
PD San Diego Calif	Angela Yvonne Davis #282660	10-5-67	1-blocking entrance to pub bldg 2-disobey peace officer 3-disturb peace	rel 849(b) PC detenti only not a arrest

---

Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. Where final disposition is not shown or further explanation of charge is desired, communicate with agency contributing those fingerprints.

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

ARREST RECORD

Records at the following agencies were reviewed and reflected no identifiable record on DAVIS:

Los Angeles Sheriff's Office
Los Angeles, California
April 1, 1969

Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles, California
April 1, 1969

Los Angeles Traffic Court
Los Angeles, California
March 27, 1969

LA T-2 (3/13/68)

Source advised that on March 13, 1968, ANGELA DAVIS was interviewed by the Los Angeles Police Department as a burglary suspect but was released without arrest.

CREDIT RECORD

On April 1, 1969, the Retail Merchants Credit Association, Los Angeles, California, records were reviewed which reflected no identifiable record on DAVIS.

VOTERS REGISTRATION RECORD

On April 1, 1969, the records of the Los Angeles County Voters Registration, Los Angeles, California, were reviewed revealing that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS registered in the Democratic Party on March 5, 1968.

RESIDENCE AND EMPLOYMENT

LA T-3 (3/21/69)

Source advised that DAVIS resides at 1107 1/2 West 87th Street, Los Angeles, California with DEACON ALEXANDER (STANLEY SAMUEL ALEXANDER), Negro youth organizer for the Southern California District Communist Party (SCDCP). Source stated that DAVIS is not employed at the present time but that she is traveling periodically between Los Angeles and San Diego.

CONNECTIONS WITH THE LOS ANGELES STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (LASNCC)(See appendix)

LA T-4 (7/3/68)

On June 21, 1968, the Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, (LASNCC) held a reorganizational meeting at its headquarters, 1914 West Jefferson, Los Angeles, California at which time new Los Angeles SNCC officers were elected. ANGELA DAVIS was elected a staff member of the editorial staff.

LA T-5 (5/16/68)
LA T-6 (6/3/68)

On May 12, 1968, ANGELA DAVIS was a special guest speaker at the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles (See appendix) located at 2936 West Eighth Street, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS spoke on some of SNCC's major projects.

On June 2, 1968, Sergeant DAVID KENT, Intelligence Unit, New Orleans Police Department, furnished miscellaneous papers on the Los Angeles SNCC. Among these papers was a letter headed "Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee Liberation School" addressed to brothers and sisters and signed by one ANGELA DAVIS, Coordinator. The letter stated that conventional education has failed to meet the needs of Black people in this country and that there is need to create educational structures which will respond to Black people's needs.

LA T-7 (12/4/68)

On December 4, 1968, source advised that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS had dropped out of the LASNCC and had joined the SCDCP.

CONNECTIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY

MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

LA T-3 (3/29/69)

On March 29, 1969, source advised that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS is a member in good standing of the Che Lumumba Club, Moranda Smith Section (MSS) SCDCP, Los Angeles, California.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT SCDCP MEETINGS

LA T-8 (8/1/68)
LA T-9 (8/1/68)

On July 21, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general membership meeting of the SCDCP at 7213 Beverly Boulevard, Los Angeles. Topic of discussion centered around the need for political reorganization of the working class.

LA T-10 (8/9/68)

On July 23, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a staff meeting of the SCDCP at 1254 East Manchester, Los Angeles, California.

LA T-8 (11/14/68)

On November 8, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general membership meeting of the SCDCP held at 7213 Beverly

Boulevard, Los Angeles. The speaker was GUS HALL, Chairman, Communist Party, USA, (CP, USA).

On November 7, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general meeting of the SCDCP at 7213 Beverly Boulevard. The speaker was GUS HALL, Chairman of the CP, USA.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT CLUB MEETINGS OF THE SCDCP

LA T-3 (7/24/68)
LA T-8 (7/29/68)
LA T-11 (8/6/68)

On July 18, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP held at 2138 Third Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around politics.

LA T-7 (7/30/68)
LA T-12 (8/2/68)

On July 28, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Cyril Briggs Club, MSS, SCDCP at 3048 South Victoria Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around capitalism in other foreign countries and racism.

LA T-3 (8/6/68)

On July 31, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. Topic of discussion was a report from the SCDCP and various committee reports.

LA T-11 (12/10/68)

On November 25, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue. Topic of discussion centered around racism.

LA T-10 (1/9/69)
LA T-11 (1/28/69)

On December 5, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. The topic of discussion centered around Communist Party youth action in the community.

LA T-11 (1/29/69)
LA T-13 (1/29/69)

On January 16, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 1048 Oxford Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around racism.

LA T-3 (2/6/69)
LA T-11 (2/14/69)

On January 30, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. DAVIS advised that she is dissatisfied with the Black people's progress in the community.

LA T-3 (3/29/69)

On March 29, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP at 1048 South Oxford, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS paid $14.00 for club dues.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT
A MEETING OF THE NEGRO
MEMBERS OF THE SCDCP

LA T-8 (8/12/68)
LA T-9 (8/12/68)
LA T-12 (8/14/68)

On August 4, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of all Negro members of the SCDCP at 5731 South St. Andrews Place, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around the election campaigns, working class trade unions, and building of the Communist Party.

ACTIVITIES FOR THE FURTHERANCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

LA T-8 (10/17/68)
LA T-11 (10/17/68)

On October 13, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended the annual People's World (PW) banquet held at the Miramar Hotel, Wilshire and Ocean Avenue in Santa Monica, California. Topic of discussion centered around problems of the Mexican-American.

The PW is a West Coast Weekly Communist newspaper.

LA T-8 (2/18/69)
LA T-9 (2/18/69)

On February 9, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended the 31st Anniversary Celebration of the PW held at the Alexandria Hotel, Fifth and Spring Streets, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion was student unrest.

MISCELLANEOUS

LA T-14 (7/24/68)

On 7/24/68, source was shown a photograph of ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS taken 10/5/67. Source stated that the woman in the photograph strongly resembles the woman who, on 9/11/67 with a male companion, purchased a shotgun at Sportstown, 2673 La Cienega, Los Angeles. Source added that if the woman in the photo is about 5'7", 135 pounds, and has pierced ears, she is almost certainly the woman who assisted in purchasing the shotgun.

DESCRIPTION

The following is a description of ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS as obtained from LA T-2, LA T-3 and Los Angeles County Voters Registration files:

Name	ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, aka Tamu
Sex	Female
Race	Negro
Height	5' 8"
Weight	145
Date of Birth	January 26, 1944
Place of Birth	Birmingham, Alabama
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Education	Attended Brandeis University Boston, Massachusetts between 1961 to 1965. Graduate student, Department of Philosophy, University of California at San Diego, 1968.
Residence	1107 1/2 West 87th Street Los Angeles, California
Previous residences	6250 South Venice Los Angeles, California 536 Rushville La Jolla, California

1

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH OF LOS ANGELES

A source advised on May 8, 1968, that the premises of the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles, 2936 West 8th Street, Los Angeles, California, have been utilized for meetings by Communist Party members and sympathizers over a period of years. Speakers and lecturers at the church frequently espouse Communist causes or follow the Communist Party line. Communist front group literature is distributed at the church. The church is used by some Communist Party members for "mass concentration" work.

This same infiltration extends to adjuncts of the church such as the Unitarian Public Forum and the Fellowship for Social Justice, formerly known as the Unitarian-Universalist Fellowship for Social Justice.

STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN has been minister of the church since 1948.

Reverend STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN is described in the Fourth Report, Un-American Activities Committee in California, 1948, Page 115, as a very active "Communist fronter" and connected with numerous "Communist front organizations and activities".

Membership in the First Unitarian Church does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

APPENDIX

1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX

LOS ANGELES STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE

A source advised in July, 1968, that the Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (LA-SNCC), headquartered at 7406 South Western Avenue, Los Angeles, California, is not a membership organization but a loose-knit agency composed of young militant, black nationalists from South Los Angeles who have eliminated all Caucasians from their ranks and have initiated a program against the draft, the war in Vietnam and discrimination and have proposed a revolutionary program utilizing armed force, political and economic action to obtain their goals. LA-SNCC is an arm of the National Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee organization headquartered at Atlanta, Georgia, and with the naming of LA-SNCC Director RONALD LEROY WILKINS as Deputy Director of SNCC for the West Coast, the affinity between the National and Local organization will be more harmonious.

The above source advised that at a meeting of LA-SNCC leaders on March 22, 1968, the group indicated it was necessary for all SNCC personnel to be armed in order to shoot "pig cops" when they are stopped in South Los Angeles.

A source, in May, 1968, indicated that LA-SNCC leadership has encouraged all associates of LA-SNCC to obtain arms and to be armed at all times.

On April 5, 1968, four LA-SNCC officers were arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department at LA-SNCC headquarters in possession of two fully loaded .30 caliber M-1 carbines and one .12 gauge shotgun, pump action, with four rounds of 00 gauge buckshot. On May 4, 1968, five LA-SNCC officers were arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department for possession of loaded firearms.

On May 14, 1968, then Director JOHN FLOYD and three Security Officers, LA-SNCC, were arrested by the New Orleans Police Department for possession of stolen property. New Orleans Police Department found four automatic weapons in attache cases carried by the above persons. They also obtained material concerning instructions in the making of Molotov cocktails, bombs and booby traps for sabotage in guerilla-type warfare. This literature was published in Communist China.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Los Angeles, California
April 15, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS

Character SECURITY MATTER - C

Reference Report of SA WILLIAM H. SNELL dated and captioned as above at Los Angeles.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside

JANE FONDA

moe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/TG

SAC, Los Angeles

6/25/70

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. R. L. Strain
1 - Mr. J. F. Morrissey
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

#m9816

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2AVM

JANE FONDA
SM - ANA

A review of available information concerning captioned individual indicates that she has been extremely active in the antidraft and anti-Vietnam movement; has made sizable contributions to black extremist groups, and has, by her actions and statements in general, indicated anarchistic tendencies and a definite propensity for fomenting violence endangering the internal security of this country.

If you have not already done so, you should initiate a security-type investigation of captioned individual in accordance with instructions contained in the Manual of Instructions, Section 87D, relating to such matters. The purpose of your investigation is to determine the extent of subject's anarchistic tendencies, a resolution of all ramifications regarding her association with various aspects of the New Left movement and black extremist groups and to ascertain if indeed her actions do pose a definite threat to the security of this country. In view of subject's position of prominence in the theatrical field, your investigation must be handled by a mature and experienced agent. No action should be taken which could result in embarrassment to the Bureau.

MAILED 5
JUN 24 1970
COMM-FBI

Results of the above investigation should be furnished the Bureau in report form, accompanied by recommendations as to whether or not subject's name should be considered for inclusion on the Security Index.

REC 10 [illegible]

For your information, the Denver Office is origin in the Sedition investigation of the subject, Denver file 14-66, Bufile 14-3097. Denver is requested to furnish the Los Angeles Office with a copy of all pertinent information concerning the subject.

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen

2 - Denver

22 JUN 25 1970

(3)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

60 JUL 1 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

NOTE:

A current Sedition investigation is underway concerning the subject as a result of statements attributed to her wherein she advocated servicemen receive a dishonorable discharge rather than going to Vietnam. She has appeared on and been excluded from numerous military installations as a result of her anti-Vietnam activities. She has been associated with the Women's Strike for Peace, the Movement for a Democratic Military, the Vietnam Moratorium Committee and has made sizable contributions to the Malcolm X Organization of Afro-American Unity and the Black Panther Party.

RALPH ABERNATHY

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/HG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
ATLANTA	ATLANTA	5/28/68	5/10/68 - 5/24/68

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY	SA ALAN G. SENTINELLO	sja
	CHARACTER OF CASE	
	RACIAL MATTERS	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2ALM/TMG #MDE16

NON PROSECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

LEADS:

CHICAGO, NEW YORK, AND WFO DIVISIONS (INFORMATION)

Information copies of this report furnished Chicago, New York, and WFO because of subject's frequent presence in those cities.

ATLANTA DIVISION

AT ATLANTA, GEORGIA.

Will follow and report pertinent activity of subject.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED							ACQUITTALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES			PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED: SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

(8)-Bureau (RM)
1-111th MIG, Fort Mc Pherson (RM)
1-NIS, Charleston, S. C. (RM)
1-Secret Service, Atlanta (RM)

Cover Page B
3-Atlanta (157-257)

REC-25

8 MAY 29 1968

Notations

RACIAL

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	CC 112 ISP,	IDIU;	S.S.	
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.	6/5/68			
How Fwd.	L/S			
By	ccg lci			

CC TO: CIA
REQ. REC'D 5-27
JUN 2 1969
ANS. BY: WFO SAC

Re: Abernathy

79 JUN 7 - 1968 RCC-MM 806 98D.

Copies:

1-Chicago (Info) (RM)
1-New York (Info) (RM)
1-WFO (Info) (RM)

INFORMANTS:

	Instant Report
AT-T-1 is AT-1387-R	134-389A-228 134-389A-229 134-389A-230 134-389A-262 134-389A-429 134-389A-430 134-389A-508 134-389A-538 134-389A-576 134-389A-577 134-389A-834 134-389A-834 134-389A-1043 134-389A-1069 170-290A-421 170-290A-424

AT-T-2 is anonymous source of WFO (WFO letter 6/28/60 "Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.")

AT-T-3 is THOMAS P. MONAHAN, JR., New Orleans, Louisiana. (By request)

AT-T-4 is NY-3810-S*.

AT-T-5 is former AT-1380-S*.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Atlanta has not conducted active investigation of subject.

AT 157-257

By separate communication subject has been recommended for inclusion in Agitator Index.

This report has been classified "Secret" because it utilized information from NY-694-S*. Information furnished by AT-1387-R (AT-T-1) must be classified ~~Confidential~~.

C*
(COVER PAGE)

FD-376 (Rev. 8-1-66)

~~SECRET~~

U[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]STICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

May 24, 1968

DECLASSIFIED BY ~~SP2 ALM/JTG~~ mDR16
ON 11-13-00

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.
2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.
3. ☐ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.
4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.
5. ☒ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:
   - (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
   - (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
   - (c) ☒ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.
6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☐ enclosed ☐ is not available
☒ may be available through FBI, Atlanta

~~SECRET~~

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s)
U. S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Georgia
(Registered Mail)

Enclosure(s)

(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

Copy to: 1 - 111th MIG, Region V, Fort Mc Pherson, Georgia
1 - NIS, Charleston U. S. Naval Base, Charleston, S. C.
1 - Secret Service, Atlanta, Georgia

Report of: SA ALAN G. SENTINELLA Office: Atlanta, Georgia
Date: May 24, 1968

Field Office File #: 157-257 Bureau File #:

Title: RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ZTG #MDR16
ON 11-13-00

Character: RACIAL MATTERS

Synopsis: Subject born 3/11/26, Linden, Alabama, resides 690 Laverne Drive, NW, Atlanta, Georgia, serves as pastor West Hunter Street Baptist Church and serves as President Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Served in U. S. Army 8/12/44 - 10/27/45, honorable discharge, ASN 349 94 505. Credit satisfactory. Atlanta PD records reflect three traffic violations. In connection with SCLC matters, subject has been in contact with individuals having prior CP membership or affiliation. Description set forth.

- P* -

DETAILS:

I. BACKGROUND

A. BIRTH

The 1964 "yearbook" published by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), 334 Auburn Avenue, NE, Atlanta, reflected RALPH D. ABERNATHY was born March 11, 1926 at Linden, Alabama.

B. CITIZENSHIP

By virtue of his birth, ABERNATHY is an American citizen.

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967-O-273-878

C. EDUCATION

The 1964 SCLC "yearbook", supra, reflects ABERNATHY is a graduate of Alabama State College, Montgomery, Alabama.

The January 21, 1967 - January 27, 1967, edition of the "Chicago Defender", a weekly Chicago, Illinois, newspaper on Page 20, published an article entitled "The New Covenant Sunday - SCLC Leader to Speak". This article reflected ABERNATHY previously attended Atlanta University and was the recipient of a Doctor of Law (LLD) from Allen University.

D. EMPLOYMENT

On May 17, 1968, Mr. JOHN A. RITTER, Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, Inc., advised IC MARION W. DAVIS his records reflect RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY was employed from 1951 to 1961 as pastor of the First Baptist Church, 347 North Ripley Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Since 1961 Abernathy has been employed as pastor of the West Hunter Street Baptist Church, 775 Hunter Street, SW, Atlanta, Georgia. These records also indicate that since 1961 ABERNATHY has held the office of Secretary-Treasurer SCLC.

As of May 20, 1968, ABERNATHY continued to be employed as pastor of the aforementioned church and to also serve SCLC on a full-time basis as President.

AT-T-1, 5/68

E. AFFILIATION

Mr. JAMES R. WOOD, Director of Public Relations, SCLC, on May 2, 1961 furnished a SCLC brochure which set forth the history of this organization and biographical data concerning several individuals

in connection therewith. This brochure reflected that ABERNATHY at that time served as President of the Montgomery (Alabama) Improvement Association.

F. RESIDENCE

Records of the Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, supra, reflected ABERNATHY resided at 76 Cerro Street, SW, Atlanta from 1961 until 1967. His current residence is 690 Laverne Drive, NW, Atlanta.

In having his current residence constructed, ABERNATHY as of early 1967 had incurred substantial expense.

G. MARITAL STATUS

The January 21, 1967-January 27, 1967, issue of the "Chicago Defender", supra, reflected ABERNATHY was married to JUANITA ABERNATHY, Nee JONES.

H. MILITARY SERVICE

Mrs. THELMA TURNER, Georgia State Driver's License Bureau, Atlanta, advised IC MARION W. DAVIS on May 17, 1968, that her records reflect ABERNATHY was inducted into the United States Army at Fort Benning, Georgia, on August 12, 1944. He received an honorable discharge October 27, 1945 at Foster General Hospital, Jackson, Mississippi. His Army Serial Number was 349 94 505. On March 22, 1966, ABERNATHY was issued a new State of Georgia Veteran's Driver's License number V-018805.

I. CREDIT

Records of the Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, supra, reflected ABERNATHY has a satisfactory credit rating. These records contain a report dated February 20, 1962, from the Montgomery, Alabama Credit Bureau indicating that as of February 2, 1961, ABERNATHY

was the defendant in a slander action brought by one L. B. SULLIVAN seeking $500,000 damages. This matter was still pending as of February 20, 1962.

J. ARRESTS

On May 17, 1968, Mr. JOHN TALLENT, Station Captain's Office, Atlanta Police Department, Atlanta, advised IC MARION W. DAVIS he could not locate a record identifiable with ABERNATHY.

Miss JO PRESSLEY, Identification Division, Atlanta Police Department, on May 20, 1968, advised her records reflect ABERNATHY was arrested as follows:

Date	Charge	Disposition
March 28, 1963	Red Light	Fined $20; City of Atlanta Municipal Court
September 13, 1963	Red Light	Fined $30; City of Atlanta Municipal Court
November 17, 1964	Lane Ordinance	Fined $25; City of Atlanta Municipal Court

II. ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT

Unless indicated otherwise activities referred to took place in Atlanta, Georgia.

Characterizations of individuals and organizations where available are set forth in the appendix section of this report.

On July 6, 1965, Rev. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., President, SCLC, conferred with ANDREW J. YOUNG, Executive Vice-President, SCLC; RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL, Program Director, SCLC; HARRY WACHTEL and ABERNATHY regarding the recent arrest in Selma, Alabama, of a Rev. REESE affiliated with SCLC, who had been accused of embezzling

funds of the Dallas County, Alabama Voter's League.

AT-T-1, 7/65

Rev. KING called a conference on February 12, 1966 of SCLC officers and other individuals for the purpose of examining the immediate financial condition of SCLC and endeavoring to determine methods of increasing the organization's income. ABERNATHY attended this conference as did RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL, HOSEA WILLIAMS, Director of Voter Registration and Political Education, SCLC, JUNIUS GRIFFIN, Director of Public Relations, SCLC, CLARENCE JONES and STANLEY LEVISON. LEVISON took an active part throughout this meeting.

AT-T-1, 2/66

On March 16, 1966, JAMES HARRISON, Comptroller, SCLC explained to STANLEY LEVISON various problems experienced by the SCLC Finance Office and the fact that ABERNATHY as Treasurer of SCLC appeared reluctant to act on suggestions to solve some of these problems. LEVISON told HARRISON he appreciated the problems experienced by the Finance Office and assured him he would discuss the matter with ABERNATHY in order that ABERNATHY would take necessary action.

AT-T-1, 3/66

On June 13, 1966, Rev. KING conducted a conference of SCLC officers and other individuals for the purpose of examining the current financial status of SCLC and ascertaining methods of reducing the expenses of the organization. ABERNATHY attended this conference at which CLARENCE JONES, STANLEY LEVISON, and HARRY WACHTEL were also present and took an active part. RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL and HOSEA WILLIAMS each attended portions of this conference.

AT-T-1, 6/66

ABERNATHY on July 7, 1966, reviewed financial contributions recently received by SCLC from the general

public and noted that these contributions averaged approximately $1200 per day. He explained to several employees of the SCLC Finance Office he thought these contributions were the result of a spontaneous reaction by the public to the recent shooting of JAMES H. MEREDITH in Mississippi rather than the solicitation efforts on the part of STANLEY LEVISON.

AT-T-1, 7/66

Rev. KING on July 25, 1966, reminded ABERNATHY they were to attend a meeting of the Executive Board of the American Foundation on Non-Violence (AFN) to be held July 26-27, 1966 in New York City. KING said HARRY WACHTEL would also attend this meeting.

AT-T-1, 7/66

AFN is a tax arm of SCLC located in New York City of which HARRY WACHTEL serves as Executive Director.

AT-T-1, 7/66

On August 9, 1966, ABERNATHY attended a meeting of the SCLC Executive Board held as part of the tenth annual SCLC Convention August 8-11/1966, in Jackson, Mississippi. During this meeting a discussion ensued concerning the desirability of SCLC's retaining the services of HOSEA WILLIAMS, because of current publicity suggesting involvement of WILLIAMS with one HAROLD BELTON ANDREWS, who was convicted in July, 1966 in the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, on a charge of Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Motor Vehicle. In response to this discussion, ABERNATHY said he and Rev. KING were of the opinion that SCLC was sorely in need of the continued services of an individual possessing the energy and resourcefulness of WILLIAMS,

and therefore felt SCLC should retain WILLIAMS.

AT-T-1, 8/66

At the aforementioned meeting of the SCLC Executive Board, ABERNATHY explained that in the early part of 1967, SCLC would engage in a fund raising activity which would involve Rev. KING's making a "pilgrimage to the Holy Land". He said this activity had been proposed by a travel agency (not identified) and STANLEY LEVISON and HARRY WACHTEL had previously been requested by SCLC to ascertain the feasibility of this proposal and recommended SCLC proceed therewith.

AT-T-1, 8/66

ABERNATHY was present November 22, 1966 at a meeting of the SCLC Executive Staff which Rev. KING called for the purpose of considering methods of raising funds for SCLC. JUNIUS GRIFFIN and HOSEA WILLIAMS attended part of this meeting. STANLEY LEVISON attended the entire meeting and actively participated.

AT-T-1, 11/66.

During the latter part of January, 1967, officers of SCLC met in Chicago, Illinois, to discuss lack of progress in SCLC's voter registration drive in that city. In attendance at this meeting was ABERNATHY, HOSEA WILLIAMS, and STANELY LEVISON. LEVISON and WILLIAMS during the meeting became involved in a heated argument regarding SCLC's support of the voter registration drive. As a result of this argument, WILLIAMS left the meeting stating he was resigning from SCLC. ABERNATHY pleaded with WILLIAMS not to resign to which WILLIAMS eventually agreed.

AT-T-1, 2/67

On February 10, 1967, ABERNATHY requested HARRY WACHTEL to forward $5,000 of AFN funds to SCLC to assist the organization with its payroll obligations

as of the middle of February, 1967.

AT-T-1, 2/67

On February 7, 1968, Rev. KING and ABERNATHY and several executive officers of SCLC including HOSEA WILLIAMS and JAMES BEVEL, former Director of Direct Action, SCLC met in Washington, D. C. with STOKELY CARMICHAEL of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The purpose of the meeting was to afford SCLC opportunity to request SNCC not to interfere with SCLC's pending Poor People's Campaign (PPC).

AT-T-1, 2/68

On March 13, 1968, a meeting of several officers of SCLC including Rev. KING and ABERNATHY was held for the purpose of discussing problems relating to certain procedures utilized by the Southern Christian Leadership Foundation (SCLF) as indicated by a recent Internal Revenue Service audit of the SCLF. On March 14, 1968, STANLEY LEVISON met with the same individuals to further discuss these problems.

AT-T-1, 3/68

The SCLF is a tax arm of SCLC.

AT-T-1, 3/68

On April 5, 1968, the Executive Staff of SCLC met for the purpose of resolving several matters relating to the death of Rev. KING the previous day. One of the matters resolved was that ABERNATHY would assume leadership of the organization. HARRY BELAFONTE and STANLEY LEVISON, and HARRY WACHTEL attended this meeting.

AT-T-1, 4/68

As of April 22, 1968, SCLC elected to pay ABERNATHY $6,000 annually to cover personal expenses incurred by him as President of SCLC. A decision was also made by SCLC to employ an Assistant Pastor of the West Hunter Street Baptist Church in order that

ABERNATHY might devote sufficient time to his duties with SCLC. These decisions were made by a committee of several SCLC executive officers. Also serving on this committee was HARRY BELAFONTE, STANLEY LEVISON and HARRY WACHTEL.

AT-T-1, 5/68

In connection with the PPC, SCLC contemplates holding a massive demonstration in Washington, D. C., on May 30, 1968 and anticipates 300,000 people will participate therein. During the middle of May, 1968, SCLC intended to request BAYARD RUSTIN to serve as organizer and coordinator of this demonstration. ABERNATHY advised the SCLC staff that RUSTIN had apologized to him for his recent criticism of the PPC and inquired how he might assist in the PPC.

AT-T-1, 5/68

In June, 1960, the "Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.," "The Struggle for Freedom in the South" and the "Southern Christian Leadership Conference Student Defense Fund' in a combined appeal solicited funds from the Soviet Embassy, Czechoslovakian Embassy and the Rumanian Legation all in Washington, D. C. These organizations appealed for assistance in defending the Southern Negroes, who were risking their career, facing jail terms and death in their struggle to make the United States totally democratic. This appeal for contributions was made under six names, one of which was Rev. RALPH D. ABERNATHY, Treasurer, SCLC.

AT-T-2, 6/60

On August 18, 1961 a news release type communication issued by the "Carl Braden Clemency Appeal Committee" was distributed by the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF). This communication revealed that on August 18, 1961 a delegation of Southern Integration Leaders would take petitions, signed by over

18,000 leaders in the field of Human Rights representing over 50 states of the United States to President JOHN F. KENNEDY requesting him to free CARL BRADEN. According to the communication, ABERNATHY was chairman of this delegation.

AT-T-3, 8/61

ABERNATHY on June 9, 1963, conferred with Rev. KING, CLARENCE JONES, and STANLEY LEVISON as to methods of dramatizing a proposed march on Washington, D. C., intending to pressure Congress into enacting Civil Rights legislation.

AT-T-3, 6/63

During the early part of May, 1968, ABERNATHY informed STANLEY LEVISON he was scheduled to speak on May 31, 1968, at commencement exercises of Alabama State College. ABERNATHY requested LEVISON prepare a speech for him to utilize on this occasion and LEVISON agreed to do so.

AT-T-4, 5/68

On May 5, 1968, ABERNATHY discussed with STANLEY LEVISON a proposal that SCLC become a membership organization and conduct a membership drive. They agreed the time was appropriate for implementation of a membership drive.

AT-T-4, 5/68

STANLEY LEVISON on May 7, 1968, advised WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD, Executive Director, SCLC, he would be unable to meet with him and ABERNATHY on May 8, 1968, as previously arranged for the purpose of discussing how operations of SCLC could be made more efficient.

AT-T-4, 5/68

The May 9, 1968, final edition of the Atlanta

Journal, a daily Atlanta newspaper, Page 2A, published an article entitled, "ABERNATHY Says Soul Force, March to Solve Ills of Poor". This article revealed that on May 8, 1968, ABERNATHY addressed the weekly forum of the Atlanta Hungry Club on the theme, "The Poor People's Campaign, A Memorial to Dr. KING". ABERNATHY declared that the PPC was neither begging nor threatening violence but demanding "with a thrust from a non-violent sword".

The above article indicated that on May 8, 1968, ABERNATHY flew to Atlanta from Montgomery, Alabama, to deliver this speech and immediately after left for Birmingham, Alabama.

On May 9, 1968, WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD, informed STANLEY LEVISON that ABERNATHY wished him to express his appreciation to LEVISON for preparing a speech he delivered in Atlanta on May 8, 1968.

AT-T-4, 5/68

In early May, 1968, STANLEY LEVISON complained to WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD it was imperative that ABERNATHY operate SCLC with a firm hand and not spend all his time making public appearances. LEVISON cautioned that if ABERNATHY did not do so, he would find HARRY BELAFONTE and himself reluctant to assist him and SCLC.

AT-T-4, 5/68

On November 17, 1964, DORA E. MC DONALD, Secretary to the President, SCLC, made necessary travel arrangements for Rev. KING and other persons to travel to Oslo, Norway in connection with the presentation of the Nobel Prize to KING. According to the arrangements made by MC DONALD, ABERNATHY was to travel in a group of persons which included BAYARD RUSTIN, LAWRENCE REDDICK, HARRY WACHTEL, and LEONORA WACHTEL.

AT-T-5, 11/64

Rev. KING on May 26, 1966, informed ANDREW J. YOUNG, that a Whitehouse Conference on Civil Rights was to be held June 1-2, 1966. He said in addition to himself and YOUNG, ABERNATHY and RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL would attend this conference.

AT-T-5, 5/66

III. MISCELLANEOUS

The April 10, 1965 edition of the "Philadelphia Evening Bulletin" a daily Philadelphia, Pennsylvania newspaper on Page 3 published an article, "Get Ready - We're Coming, Rev. KING's Aide Tells City." According to the article, ABERNATHY spoke on April 9, 1965, at the Bright Hope Baptist Church, Philadelphia. During his speech ABERNATHY pleaded for a negotiated peace in Vietnam and urged the admission of Red China to the United Nations. He endeavored to explain this did not mean he was giving into Communist philosophy.

On October 13, 1966, the Atlanta Journal on Page 25 of its final edition published an article entitled, "KING,' Aides Confer, Discuss Black Power." The article reflected Rev. KING had called a meeting of "top SCLC leaders" to discuss the topic of "Black Power" and future programs of SCLC. According to JUNIUS GRIFFIN the meeting commenced on the evening of October 12, 1966, and was expected to terminate late in the afternoon of October 13 or early October 14, 1966, and "involved eight members of SCLC's Research Committee". The article indicated GRIFFIN named those in attendance at this meeting as ABERNATHY, JAMES BEVEL, MRS. DOROTHY COTTON, Director of Citizenship, SCLC, "New York attorneys," CLARENCE JONES, STANLEY LEVISON, HARRY WACHTEL, RALPH HELSTEIN, "International President of the Packing House Workers" and BAYARD RUSTIN.

The Atlanta Journal on Page 6A of its final edition December 29, 1967, published an article captioned, "KING's Aide Plans World Peace Trip". This article revealed that on January 3, 1968, ABERNATHY would embark on a trip "meet with heads of state, religious and

community leaders in Geneva, Rome, Istanbul, Tel Aviv, Jersuleum, Saigon, Kyoto, Tokyo, and Honolulu". He would also, according to the article, attend a meeting of the International Inter-Religious Symposium on Peace, January 14-17, 1968, in New Delhi, India.

On May 10, 1968, the Atlanta Constitution, a daily Atlanta newspaper, on Page 1 published an article captioned, "Marchers for the Poor Mass Here" bylined ALEX COFFIN. According to this article, ABERNATHY addressed PPC members in Atlanta on the night of May 9, 1968, regarding the PPC. He promised a non-violent crusade but stated, "I don't want anyone to expect me to be MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. . . . I say to the nation, to the United States, with RALPH ABERNATHY, You've got hell on your hands".

IV. DESCRIPTION

The following descriptive data was compiled from information reflected by records of the agencies referred to above.

Name	RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Date of birth	March 11, 1926 Linden, Alabama
Height	5' 8"
Weight	180 pounds
Build	Stocky
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Complexion	Dark
Address	690 Laverne Drive, NW Atlanta, Georgia
Occupation	Minister Pastor of West Hunter Street Baptist Church, Atlanta, Georgia President, SCLC

Marital status	Married JUANITA ABERNATHY Nee JONES
Dependants	Three children
Military service	United States Army August 12, 1944 - October 27, 1945
Army Serial Number	349 04 505

APPENDIX

INDIVIDUALS

HARRY BELAFONTE

On October 28, 1958, a confidential source advised that according to JEAN SMITH, Secretary at Communist Party Headquarters, New York, HARRY BELAFONTE had been a member of the Young Communist League (YCL) before coming into prominence as an entertainer.

The YCL has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

JAMES BEVEL

BEVEL, in early March, 1966 was observed to be present at the offices of the West Side W.E.B. DuBois Club in Chicago (DCC). Discussion took place at this time centering around reaction to a recent notification that the Attorney General of the United States intended to label the DuBois Clubs as a Communist front. BEVEL, in conversation, stated that he would have ignored this notification, and kept about the work in which he was engaged. He felt that if the DuBois Clubs have a real program of help for the people, then people would answer for the clubs despite any labels applied to them.

Most present agreed that the attack on the DuBois Clubs was a part of the plan by the "establishment" to undermine the civil rights movement. They felt that the recent hearings into Klan activities in this country was only a beginning which would lead to a full attack on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the real target. One of those present stated during the course of this discussion that he was not a Communist, and to this BEVEL was overheard to reply that every thinking American should be. He stated that Negroes have not begun to read yet, but when they do, they will all be socialists.

RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL

On February 26, 1953, a confidential source advised RANDOLPH BLACKWELL had been a member of the Communist Party in the District of Columbia.

A confidential source advised that RANDOLPH BLACKWELL attended a Labor Youth League convention on August 13, 1950, at the Algonquin Club, 1430 Fayetteville Street, Durham, North Carolina.

The Labor Youth League has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CARL and ANNE BRADEN

Mrs. ALBERTA AHEARN, 2311 Payne Street, Louisville, Kentucky, a self-admitted former member of the Communist Party (CP), Louisville, Kentucky, in testifying on December 11 and 13, 1954, in Jefferson County, Kentucky Criminal Court, in a state sedition prosecution against CARL JAMES BRADEN, identified BRADEN and his wife, ANNE BRADEN, as having been known to her as members of the CP, Louisville, Kentucky, from January, 1951, to shortly prior to the time of her testimony.

The Courier - Journal, Louisville, Kentucky, a newspaper of general circulation, on February 3, 1959, reported that CARL BRADEN had been sentenced to one year in prison on a charge of contempt of Congress on February 2, 1959, in Atlanta, Georgia. The story noted that he had been convicted under this charge on January 21, 1959, and that the charge arose from his refusal to answer questions before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

The Louisville Times, Louisville, Kentucky, a newspaper of general circulation, on February 27, 1961, reported that the United States Supreme Court had, on that date, affirmed the contempt of Congress conviction of BRADEN.

The Courier - Journal on May 2, 1961, reported that CARL BRADEN had surrendered to the United States Marshal at Atlanta, Georgia, on May 1, 1961, to begin serving a one-year prison sentence for contempt of Congress.

The Courier - Journal, on February 2, 1962, reported that CARL BRADEN had been released from the Federal Prison Camp at Allenwood, Pennsylvania, on February 1, 1962. BRADEN indicated that he would return to his home, Louisville, Kentucky.

On August 30, 1963, a confidential source advised that CARL BRADEN and his wife, ANNE BRADEN, continue to reside at 4403 Virginia Avenue and are still employed as Field Secretaries for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF).

BENJAMIN J. DAVIS

A confidential source advised on January 21, 1964, that as of that date, BENJAMIN J. DAVIS was National Secretary of the CP, USA.

"The New York Times," August 24, 1964, page 27, column 4, reports that BENJAMIN J. DAVIS, National Secretary, CP, USA, died in New York City on the night of August 22, 1964.

JULIUS GRIFFIN

Source, in June 1964, made available a flyer distributed by the Militant Labor Forum, announcing a party scheduled for May 30, 1964, at 116 University Place, New York City, which was for the purpose of welcoming home the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) presidential candidate. Scheduled to participate in a symposium at this affair was one JULIUS GRIFFIN, author of "New York Times Series on Harlem Hate Gangs." This symposium was described as relating to "What's Behind Harlem Hate Gang Scare?"

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

RALPH HELSTEIN

A confidential source advised on June 16, 1964, that RALPH HELSTEIN resides at 5806 South Blackstone Avenue, Chicago, and is the International President of the United Packinghouse Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, with offices at 608 South Dearborn Street, Chicago.

A confidential source advised in November, 1953, that he was recently advised that HELSTEIN was registered in the Communist Party about 1946, that he (HELSTEIN) joined under pressure and remained in the Party organizationally only a few months.

A confidential source advised on June 20, 1956, that RALPH HELSTEIN, 603 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, was a member of the National Lawyers Guild.

CLARENCE JONES

CLARENCE JONES is the General Counsel for the Gandhi Society for Human Rights, 15 East 40th Street, New York City.

A confidential source advised on February 26, 1957, that he had identified a photograph of CLARENCE JONES as a person whom he knew during late 1953 or early 1954 to be a member of, and in a position of leadership in, the Labor Youth League.

KING, MARTIN LUTHER, JR.

A Communist Party functionary described MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. as a confirmed Marxist in February, 1962.

STANLEY LEVISON

A confidential source advised in April, 1964, that STANLEY LEVISON was a secret member of the Communist Party (CP), USA, in July, 1963. In late 1963, and early 1964, he criticized the CP for not being sufficiently militant in the civil rights struggle. LEVISON was described by certain CP leaders as being to the "left" of the CP in his position in civil rights. LEVISON's differences with the CP, however, are merely tactical and he continues his ideological adherence to Communism.

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL

In July, 1962, HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, also known as JACK H. O'DELL, was considered by the Communist Party, USA, as a member of its National Committee.

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL told EDWINA SMITH December 27, 1963, he would not go back to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference on the same basis because he is now a "left person" and if they cannot accept him the way he is then they will have to forget about him.

LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK

LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK is Professor of Social Sciences at Coppin State College, Baltimore, Maryland. He currently resides at 3704 Winterbourne Road, Baltimore, Maryland.

On September 17, 1943, a confidential source advised she had learned that Dr. REDDICK, who was then Director of the Schomburg Library, 103 W. 135th Street, New York City, was one of the most important unpublicized members of the Communist Party (CP). She stated that REDDICK seemed to be a source of information in regard to socialism and communism in the United States and the Soviet Union.

A confidential source on March 23, 1951, said that he met LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK in 1945, through EUGENE GORDON, a staff member of the "Daily Worker" and that both GORDON and BENJAMIN J. DAVIS advised him that LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK was at that time a member of the CP. The source also said that REDDICK was an instructor at the George Washington Carver School.

The "Daily Worker" was an east coast communist newspaper, which suspended publication on January 13, 1958.

The George Washington Carver School has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On February 5 and 11, 1954, LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK was interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Atlanta, Georgia. He, at that time, stated that he was not, and had never been, a member of, or a sympathizer with, the Communist Party.

On January 21, 1964, a confidential source advised that on January 18, 1964, Dr. LAWRENCE REDDICK visited with BENJAMIN J. DAVIS at the home of JACOB [illegible], State Chairman of the CP in Maryland. During conversation between REDDICK and DAVIS, it was mentioned that they had attended school together in Georgia and REDDICK commented that if he had stayed with DAVIS, he would have also joined the CP.

BAYARD RUSTIN

In "The Saturday Evening Post," issue of July 11 - 18, 1964, page 76, BAYARD RUSTIN is the subject of a feature article captioned; "The Lone Wolf of Civil Rights." In it, RUSTIN is said to have come to New York in 1938, as an organizer for the Young Communist League (YCL), and as such, he had the job of recruiting students for the "Party." Furthermore, the article reports that during his first years in New York, RUSTIN gave most of his earnings to the "Party." He reportedly left the "Party" in 1941, the article states.

The "Daily Worker," February 11. 1957, page 1, column 2, reported that BAYARD RUSTIN, Executive Secretary, War Resisters League, was an observer at the 16th National Convention of the Communist Party, United States of America, (CP, USA), held in New York City, on February 9 - 12, 1957.

A confidential source advised on September 20, 1963, that during a meeting of the National Board, CP, USA, on that date, BENJAMIN J. DAVIS remarked that, "RUSTIN calls me constantly--openly."

A confidential source advised on February 19, 20, 1964, that BAYARD RUSTIN contacted BENJAMIN J. DAVIS on those dates and sought his advice as to how he could escape from a speaking engagement to which he was committed. On the latter contact, DAVIS told RUSTIN that he was working on his request and had contacted friends who had contacts with the group to which RUSTIN was to speak.

HARRY WACHTEL

HARRY WACHTEL is the Executive Vice President of the Gandhi Society for Human Rights, 15 East 40th Street, New York, New York. He resides at 29 Split Rock Drive, King Point, Long Island, New York.

A confidential source furnished information in December, 1949, that HARRY H. WACHTEL, 41 Broad Street, New York, New York, was on the list of individuals carried as active members of the National Lawyers Guild.

On March 5, 1944, a confidential source furnished information which revealed that the name HARRY WACHTEL was on the list of names, significance not known, which was maintained at the Headquarters of the Kings County Communist Party at 26 Court Street, Brooklyn, New York.

Regarding HARRY WACHTEL's wife, LEONORA, it is noted that the same confidential source furnished information on March 5, 1944, which revealed her name and address were on a list of names of newly-elected officers of the Bath Beach Club of the Kings County Communist Party.

HOSEA WILLIAMS

During October, 1964, a confidential source advised that on October 3, 1964, RUTH BAILEY, then an employee of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, (SCLC), Harlem, New York Office, while discussing several SCLC personalities with one CONNIE CAMPBELL, referred to WILLIAMS. BAILEY said WILLIAMS had mentioned to her (date not specified) that on a prior occasion (date not specified) HUNTER PITTS O'DELL had told him more about politics than he could read.

ORGANIZATIONS

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS
OF CHICAGO (DCC)

On May 3, 1965, a source advised that on June 30, 1964, a group of young people who attended the founding convention of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) met in Chicago and adopted a statement of purpose and constitution forming the DCC as an affiliate of the national DCA.

A second source advised on May 1, 1967, that DCA chartered clubs in the Chicago area are the West Side DCC and the North Side DCC, neither of which currently maintain a headquarters. There is no central headquarters for the DCC and there are no unchartered clubs in this area.

The second source advised that the majority of DCC members are also members of the CP.

During the past year DCC activity has been almost nonexistent.

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates were told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention.

The second source advised in September, 1966, that MIKE ZAGARELL, CPUSA Youth Director, stated that in Negro communities the Party still supported the plan to build "left" socialist centers and to solidify the Party base through the DCA. This source also advised in September, 1966, that DANIEL RUBIN, CPUSA National Organizational Secretary, stated the Party believes the DCA should have a working-class outlook and be a mass organization favorable to socialism, socialist countries and Marxism, and in April, 1967, advised that GUS HALL, CPUSA General Secretary, indicated the DCA primary emphasis should be on developing mass resistance to the draft.

A third source advised in September, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER was elected chairman of the DCA on September 10, 1967, at the Third National Convention of the DCA held in New York, New York, from September 8-10, 1967.

A fourth source advised during August, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER is a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

A fifth source advised on September 21, 1967, that the headquarters of the DCA is located at 34 West 17th Street, New York, New York.

GANDHI SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

The Gandhi Society for Human Rights was formed for the purpose of developing a philosophy and technique of non-violent civil rights protests. It is a non-action organization and makes no attempt to influence legislation nor participate in demonstrations. The Society furnishes legal assistance in certain civil rights cases. The organization was incorporated June 14, 1962.

THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of January 2, 1957, to supersede Guide published on May 14, 1951, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., contains the following information concerning "The National Lawyers Guild:"

1. Cited as a Communist front.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311, on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 149).

2. Cited as a Communist front which "is the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party, its front organizations and controlled unions" and which "since its inception has never failed to rally to the legal defense of the Communist Party and individual members thereof, including known espionage agents." (Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 3123 on the National Lawyers Guild, September 21, 1950, originally released September 17, 1950.)

3. "To defend the cases of Communist lawbreakers, fronts have been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the confines of the Communist Party itself. Among these organizations are the *** National Lawyers Guild. When the Communist Party itself is under fire these offer a bulwark of protection."

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91).

1 SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

"The Southern Patriot," a monthly publication, shows that it is published by the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF).

"The Southern Patriot" was cited as an "organ" of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 592, June 12, 1947.

The SCHW was cited as a communist front by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 592, June 12, 1947.

An amendment to the charter of the SCHW dated April 26, 1946, changed the name of that organization to the SCEF, and listed its purpose as being to improve the educational and cultural standards of the Southern people in accordance with the highest American democratic institutions, traditions, and ideals.

The SCEF is self-described as having deep roots in the South where it began as the educational wing of the SCHW, organized in 1938 to work for economic and political reform. When the SCHW disbanded in the late 1940's, SCEF continued as an independent organization, rallying support for integration and democracy and helping to stimulate and nurture new movements of the early 1960's. The SCEF maintained headquarters in Louisiana for twenty years, but in 1966 moved its headquarters to Louisville, Kentucky.

A source advised on March 2, 1961, that CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT, a Communist Party Functionary, stated at a meeting of the Communist Party in Baltimore, Maryland, on February 25, 1961, that the Communist Party is not connected with any progressive movement but indirectly they do have some influence in the SCEF.

L 323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Atlanta, Georgia
May 24, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-257

Title	Ralph David Abernathy
Character	Racial Matters
Reference	Report of SA ALAN G. SENTINELLA at Atlanta dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

951-953, 954-963, 964, 965-971

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

DO NOT DESTROY
FOIPA# N/A

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 10, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. E. F. Glenn

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16

10/18/00 SP2ALM/JJB

10-17-75

Reference is made to the September 8, 1975, SSC request forwarded to the Department of Justice by letter dated September 9, 1975, listing certain documents and other information desired from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum in response to some of the requests.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which is being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

REC-114 62-116395-951

62-116395

OCT 30 1975

10/17/75

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

6-ENCLOSURE

ENCL BEHIND FILE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

EFG:eks
(10)

EFG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 OCT 30 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Single copies of the 9/8 and 9/9/75, communications are attached to the file copy of the enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

2 - Mr.[illegible]. A. Mintz
(1[illegible]Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. E. F. Glenn

62-116395

October 10, 1975

#mDR16
10/12/00 SP2 ALW/JTE

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General's Office dated September 9, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 8, 1975, SSC requests and specifically to the following Items in those requests: Items 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35.

Item 22 requested all materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964, memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

No separate materials reflecting approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in his November 22 and 27 memoranda to Mr. Belmont could be located. At September 17, 1975, conference with SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein, it was pointed out that the approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations in his memoranda were the initials of the officials on the communication up to and including Mr. Tolson.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

EFG:eks
(9)

EFG

WRW TWL

WOC

JBA

~~TOP~~ SE~~C~~RET MATERIAL ATTACHED

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-951

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Item 23 requested all materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

No materials could be located reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and/or between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's memorandum to Mr. Belmont, November 27, 1964. It may be assumed that the contacts were either verbal or by routing slip transmission which in either case are not recorded.

Item 25 requested all materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

All documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. are printed documents. Other than the documents themselves, no records exist indicating that these documents were printed or the number of copies printed.

Item 26 requested an identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

There were no attachments to the documents identified in Item 24. a.-e. above.

Item 27 requested all materials reflecting that:
a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and
b. "the Director agreed,"
that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr., be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's

February 29, 1968, memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr.; Security Matter - C."

No materials could be located reflecting that "Mr. Tolson has suggested" and "the Director agreed."

Item 30 requested all materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965, memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr.; Security Matter - C."

No materials could be located reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)."

Item 31 requested all materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's January 16, 1964, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

No materials could be located indicating that Eugene Patterson was contacted by FBI personnel concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Item 33 requested all materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta Field Office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government

with representatives of (the Atlanta) Office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964, letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

This Item has been responded to under Item 19 of SSC request dated July 8, 1975.

Item 34 requested all materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964, letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C."

The only other material responsive to this request has already been furnished to the SSC (e.g.) Sullivan to Belmont memorandum December 24, 1963, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters; Internal Security - C," which has been separately submitted by the FBI in response to Item 19 of the SSC request July 8, 1975.

1 - The Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 11 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

9/11

SUBJECT: (1) Senate Select Committee Request
(2) Deputy Attorney General Letter to Senator Church

(1) Attached for your attention and as prompt a response as possible is a letter from the SSC with annexations which request certain materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. As you know, requests for materials as they relate to King are, by recent designation of the Committee Chairman, "high priority".

(2) Also attached for forwarding is a copy of a letter sent by the Deputy Attorney General to Chairman Church concerning a matter of interest to Messrs. Bill Cregar and Nick Callahan of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

#MDR 16

10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-951

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 9, 1975

#MOR16
FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a list of FBI materials, delivery of which is requested ~~by September 15, 1975.~~ according to agreed priorities. JTE.

N/O per Bergman

X I would also appreciate your making available for Committee staff access, all Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1963. Upon examination of these files, delivery thereafter will be orally requested for specific items in accordance with the provisions of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department which governs Committee requests for materials.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
SEP 9 1975

Receipt of material
covered by Fonda case
subpoena hereby acknowledged.
JTE.

62-116395-757

September 8, 1975

DOCUMENT REQUEST

1. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of the informant) of the 2/12/62 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, FBI, subject "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C (00: Atlanta)." NP

2. All materials reflecting the steps taken by the FBI which "prevent(ed) the CPUSA from seizing control of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People," as stated in the last paragraph of page 4 of the enclosure captioned "Communist Party USA" which was attached to Director Hoover's January 10, 1961 letter to Robert Kennedy. Jack? P. NOT OURS

✓3. Reports which were submitted by the Atlanta and New York field offices pursuant to the following instructions which were contained in the second paragraph of page 1 of the February 27, 1962 letter from the FBI Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C, Office of Origin: Atlanta," (a copy of which was disseminated to the New York field office: Nugent NP

> New York and Atlanta are instructed to review their files and prepare a report suitable for dissemination which will include all information of a security nature plus complete background data.

4. The "Bureau letters to Atlanta, 7/20/62, to Mobile, 7/20/62, and to Savannah, 9/17/62" which are referenced in the first paragraph of the 10/11/62 memorandum from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C, (00:Atlanta)." NP

5. The "Correspondence received from the Atlanta and New York Offices" as indicated in the first sentence of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C". NP

6. All materials reflecting instructions issued to the New York and Atlanta field offices "to furnish the Bureau recommendations concerning a communist infilitration investigation of (SCLC) and the recommendations received from those two field offices for a "communist infiltration investigation of SCLC", as indicated in the second paragraph of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C". P SPECIFY TIME FRAME

#MOE16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-951

7. The "necessary Manual changes" which were "attached for approval" to Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist."

NP

8. All materials which support the following statement of Director Hoover which was noted on Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist":

P more specific

> Just a few weeks ago you contended that the Communist influence in the racial movement was ineffective and infinitesimal.

9. The September 5, 1963 letterhead memorandum to the Attorney General and "the related prior memoranda" which are referred to in the first paragraph of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell."

NP

10. The July 3, 1963 letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Hunter Pitts O'Dell which was attached to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

NP

11. All materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

?NP

12. The "Brief on the above-captioned matter and subsequent memoranda on the same subject matter" which are referred to in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

O.K. but need to discuss subsequent memoranda

13. The "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1953" and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956" which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

1963?

14. All materials reflecting or pertaining to Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney Committee", as referred to in his February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning a 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, as well as an unexcised copy of the February 5 memorandum.

NP

15. All materials which reflect the basis for the following statements which are contained in Mr. Baumgardner's May 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Internal Security Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, Administrative Matter":

Married ?

a. "About three months prior to the March on Washington (8/28/63), we intensified our investigation concerning communist influence into the racial movement. . . .";

b. "Martin Luther King, head of SCLC, has challenged the Bureau on this point."

16. All materials reflecting the "previous arrangements" referred to in the November 18, 1964 memorandum from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, subject "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director, 10:00 a.m., 11/18/64 (10:05 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.)"

? contacted 7/8

NP

17. All materials reflecting, concerning, or pertaining to:

a. "(S)tatements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Georgia, at the time he highly criticized the FBI. His statements were made on 11/18/62 during an interview in the Robing Room of the Riverside Church in New York City where King had just preached a sermon." (This quotation is taken from the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of the 11/19/64 memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. DeLoach captioned "Director's Briefing of Women Reporters on 11/18/64.")

NP

b. Comments, responses, and recommendations made, inspections conducted, and/or any other actions taken as a result of the statements of Dr. King which are described in Item 17.a. above.

Coordination Inspection Div ?

TIME FRAME

18. Identification of the author of the notation "Being Handled, 11/20/64, D" which appears at the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters."

Nugent

Wick

19. All materials reflecting the manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "(b)eing handled" as noted on the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters," together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom. P

20. The response to John Doar's August 19, 1964 letter to Mr. James R. Malley which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. NP

21. The division and section assignment of James R. Malley as of August 19, 1964. NP

Coord W Adm Div

22. All materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964 memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." PREV. HANDLED 7/14

23. All materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." P HANDLED

24. The table of contents page(s) and/or chapter or section headings of:

    a. The article captioned "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" which was attached to Mr. Sullivan's 10/15/63 memorandum to Mr. Belmont under the same caption. NP

    b. The paper which was the up-to-date revision of the article described in Item 24 (a) above and which paper was attached to Mr. Sullivan's November 22, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

    c. The memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which was transmitted with the December 21, 1964 letter from Director Hoover to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.

d. The document which was the "current revision of the previous analysis captioned 'Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis'" and which document was enclosed with Mr. Brennan's April 10, 1967 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Communist Influence in Racial Matters - A Current Analysis."

e. The "current study" entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr. - A Current Analysis" which was enclosed with Director Hoover's March 14, 1968 letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall.

? 25. All materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a. - e. above. (Do not supply the documents themselves.)

? What mean

26. An identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24 a. - e. above. (Do not supply the attachments themselves.)

27. All materials reflecting that:

?

a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and

b. "the Director agreed,"

that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr. be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's 2/29/68 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

Klein 28. All materials which reflect any recommendations for, and/or decisions relating to, the sending of Director Hoover's August 25, 1967 letter to specified field offices captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Internal Security."

Cointel Pro
Ryan?

Klein 29. All materials reflecting the approval of proposals contained in Mr. G. C. Moore's February 29, 1968 memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence."

Ryan?

30. All materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965 memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

31. All materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's 1/16/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C.")

32. All materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position at that time (the end of a 90-day period, or sooner if conditions permit) to take further action against King and the SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau," as promised in Mr. Sullivan's December 24, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

33. All materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta field office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government with representatives of (the Atlanta) office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

to #16 ↑

34. All materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

35. All materials comprising the "separate correspondence" between FBI Headquarters and the Atlanta field office concerning the "specific matters dealt with in Atlanta's letter (of 4/14/64)" as indicated in the Director's 4/24/64 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

Seaborn to end

36. The communication from the Atlanta field office to FBI Headquarters by which "this publication has previously been furnished to the Bureau on 6/26/64," as stated in the second paragraph of page 3 of the 7/7/64 letter from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, IS-C."

Deegan's Office

37. The "separate correspondence" by which the Atlanta field office was "directed to furnish the Bureau available information concerning the alleged escapades of (the Reverend Ralph) Abernathy, including the obtaining of official court records," as referred to in the Director's July 23, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

38. The letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers which was originally attached to Mr. Sullivan's 11/27/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement -- A Current Analysis." (See note on 11/27/64 memorandum indicating that the letter was "revised.")

39. "The letter" which is the subject of the first and second paragraphs of Director Hoover's February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning his 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, and which letter the Director told the Attorney General, he would "check on" and any other materials relating to "the letter".

P

40. All materials concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. being named "Man of the Year" by Time Magazine in December 1963 - January 1964.

P

41. All materials concerning or pertaining to Dr. King's Papal audience in Rome in September 1964.

P

42. Speech delivered by Director Hoover at Loyola College in November 1964, and all materials pertaining thereto.

43. All Forms FD.185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") from 1963 until 1968 for:

NP

   a. William D. Campbell, and
   b. John Matter.

P
ATLANTA

45. All materials reflecting, concerning or pertaining to electronic surveillance, feasibility studies or surveys, physical surveillance, or photographic surveillances, and/or any proposals, recommendations or discussions of any of the foregoing surveillances, studies or surveys, with respect to Dr. King's "hideaway", or Fred Bennett's apartment, or premises located at 3006 Delmar Lane, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia, or with respect to any other premises, apartment, or "hideaway", used, owned, or leased by Dr. King or Fred Bennett.

Klein
Cointel Pro
Ryan?

46. The following materials which are referred to in the October 9, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C":

a. "NYlet 9/26/62";
b. "further steps to carry out this counterintelligence plan will be handled at the Bureau";
c. "memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption dated October 8, 1962, ARW:cdb."

X

47. The "ATairtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated 4/1/64 captioned "CPUSA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C" and "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C", which are referenced in the 4/13/64 Airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York and Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal SEcurity - C (Negro Question).

48. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of informants) of the 8/15/66 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, subject "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Secuirty - C (Stanley David Levison.)"

49. The Memorandum which "the Director had noted" as referred to in the NOTE at the bottom of the 4/13/65 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, subject "Communist Party, USA Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Nicholas A. Kourambis) (Negro Question)."

Klein Cointelpro Ryan?

50. All materials reflecting "comments" and "specific recommendations" submitted by the Atlanta, Chicago, and New York field offices as the result of the instructions contained in the last paragraph of the May 18, 1967 letter from the Director the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Martin Luther King)."

Klein Cointelpro Ryan?

51. All materials reflecting the product of the "comprehensive review of Levison's Bureau case file" as indicated in the NOTE on the 7/18/66 airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counter-intelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Stanley David Levison)."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document: Re 9/9/75 request materials pertaining to King and SCLC. Items 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

62-116395-951

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/8/75, items 16 thru 27 and 30 thru 35.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

~~TS~~

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/ATF

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr. and Southern Christian Leadership Conference: November 18, 1964 memorandum regarding "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director; Statements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Ga., at the time he highly criticized the FBI; Identification of the author of a notation and initals on a 11/20/64 memorandum; manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "being handled" together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom; response which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party; where an Special Agent was assigned as of 8/19/64; Materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position in in 90 days time to take further action against King and SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau" as reflected in 12/24/63 memorandum, subject CP, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters.

62-116395

TREAT AS YELLOW 5-WO(18

3791 (6 FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 17 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 9/16

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request Dated September 12, 1975

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting various materials and information relating to mail interception. Please prepare an appropriate response to that part of the SSC letter which is directed to the FBI.

cc: Paul Daly

Ltr + LHM to AG pntl LHM to SSC
10/17/75 LED/sw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALM/JRG
#MDR16

ENCLOSURE

REC-114 62-116395-952

21 OCT 30 1975

1-Ad Hoc

62-116395

84 NOV 3 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 12, 1975

#MDR16 --
10/12/00 SE-2ALM/JFK

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a request for Department of Justice and FBI materials.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff jm
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
SEP 12 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-952

1. All materials reflecting Justice Department knowledge of mail opening by FBI or CIA employees prior to December 1, 1974.

2. With respect to letters written by the following individuals or organizations addressed to third parties, and to letters written by third parties addressed to the following individuals or organizations, copies of which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI, including field offices, the following questions are asked:

   a. What are the dates of such letters?

   b. What are the names and addresses of the senders?

   c. What are the names and addresses of the addressees?

   List of individuals and organizations:

   1. Angela Davis
   2. Jeremy Stone
   3. Jane Fonda
   4. Ralph Abernathy
   5. Steven Slepian
   6. Jack Nelson
   7. Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D. C.

3. All materials pertaining to the acquisition by the FBI of all letters referred to in item 2 above. In the response to this item, priority consideration should be given to the following letter:

   Date: March 25, 1970
   Name and Address of Sender: Jane Fonda
   10744 Chalon Road
   West Los Angeles, California
   Name and Address of Addressee: Leo Matarasso
   29 Rue de Touron
   Paris 5, France

#MDR16
10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-152

Mr. J. B. Adams 10/17/75

Legal Counsel

HOUSTUDY
SENSTUDY -75

On the late afternoon of October 11, 1975, Douglas Marvin, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, called me and requested that the Attorney General be furnished a brief statement concerning FBI relationships with the Senate Select Committee and the House Select Committee for inclusion in a statement being prepared for submission to the White House. Mr. Marvin said that the Attorney General's intention was to bring together anticipated problems concerning the two committees in the hope that a means for resolving these matters might be found.

I discussed this request with Mr. Jenkins in the absence of Mr. Callahan and I returned Mr. Marvin's call and dictated to the Attorney General's secretary. I requested her to furnish me with a copy of the dictation. Attached is the page furnished by the Attorney General's secretary which I received on October 15, 1975.

This matter was brought to the attention of the Executives Conference on October 14, 1975.

#MORI6
10/12/00 SP-2ALM/JTG

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

62-116-595
NOT RECORDED
46 OCT 30 1975

JAM:mfd
(8)

ENCLOSURE

84 OCT 30 1975

FBI Relationships with the Senate and House Select Committees

Senate Select Committee

FBI relationships with the Senate Select Committee generally have been harmonious with responses to the Committee requests delivered promptly. When difficulties have occurred they have been overcome by negotiation and tolerance on both sides. Future difficulties that may be confronted and require similar resolution include the scope of any public hearing regarding electronic surveillance of foreign nationals or their agents and establishments.

House Select Committee

In the past the FBI has experienced the following difficulties with the House Select Committee:

(1) It has held public hearings which were orchestrated to present adverse views without an opportunity for prepared rebuttal, such as occurred on October 9, 1975, regarding electronic surveillance matters;

(2) It has demanded delivery of documents on unreasonably short notice considering the time necessary to locate and prepare for delivery the enormous quantity of documents called for;

(3) It has interviewed employees, former employees and confidential sources of the FBI without first advising the FBI of the proposed interview and has demanded the appearance of agents below the policy-making level.

#M00/6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP-2 ALM/TB

A large number of documents dealing with electronic surveillance conducted without a warrant between 1970 and July 30, 1975, were furnished to the Committee on Friday, October 10, 1975. Certain excisions in these documents were made and it remains to be seen whether the Committee will accept the determinations made as to what types of information, e.g., identities of subjects who were monitored, should have been excised.

The overriding concern for the future is the need to establish an understanding on both sides of the policies to be followed by each in responding to the Committee's mandate. General agreement to specified operating procedures would alleviate the suspicion on the part of the Committee and the fear of Committee ~~re~~sponsibility on the part of the FBI.
irre

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
~~1 - Mr. Daly~~

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO :Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10/20/75

FROM :Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP2ALM/TTB

During the discussion on 10/20/75 concerning the forthcoming testimony of Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, Mr. Wannall mentioned to the Senate Select Committee Staff Members present (John T. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, Michael Epstein, and Mark Gitenstein) that in view of the fact these hearings would be open to the public the Committee would not be fully briefed concerning the background involved in the Bureau mail opening programs because of the sensitivity involved. Elliff indicated that he was in agreement and that he would contact F. A. O. Schwartz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, to see if executive session testimony could be arranged. Elliff subsequently telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and advised him that Mr. Wannall could testify in executive session on mail openings in the late afternoon on 10/21/75 at approximately 4:30 p.m. subject to the approval of the Senators.

After consultation with Assistant Director Wannall, Elliff was advised that this would be acceptable and that Mr. Wannall would appear for executive session testimony concerning mail openings if the Senators agree to accept executive session testimony.*

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, was advised of the possible executive session testimony and interposed no objection to the Bureau giving such testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

REC-114 62-116395-953

*Section Chief W.R. Branigan will accompany Wannall

PVD:lad
(8)

PVD

WRW

8 4 OCT 30 1975

5010-108
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10-21-75

1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

On 10-20-75 James Dick, staff member for captioned Committee, who is in charge of the hearings on mail openings, advised the public session is to be held on 10-24-75 and furnished a copy of what that Committee considers to be the issues raised by the Bureau's mail opening programs. (Copy is attached.) Additionally, he advised that the Committee plans to refer to the eight Bureau mail opening programs by numerical code names in their public hearing. He furnished the following code numbers with the Bureau code name:

Code name #1 - Z-Coverage
Code name #2 - Sam Survey
Code name #3 - Gus Survey
Code name #4 - Sun Survey
Code name #5 - Joe Survey
Code name #6 - Chiprop Survey
Code name #7 - Chiclet Survey
Code name #8 - Chican Survey

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/20/00 BY SP2 ALM/

Dick advised that this will be used by the Senators during the hearing and that Mr. Wannall and Mr. Branigan, who will tesitfy, should be familiar with these numerical definitions.

REC-114

62-116395-954

RECOMMENDATION:

Intelligence Division should review the attached issue paper presented by the Committee to be familiar with the questions raised by the Bureau's mail opening programs as seen by the Committee.

21 OCT 30 1975

Enclosure

JAM

PVD:dkg (8)

84 NOV 3 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI #MORI6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/

Issues

The following issues are among those which are raised by the FBI mail opening programs and the FBI's cooperation in CIA's New York intercept project:

(1) Whether mail opening as an investigative technique should ever, under carefully circumscribed regulations and with proper authorization, be sanctioned in the counter-espionage field. The FBI mail opening programs raise this issue with more force than the CIA programs since, in general, the FBI programs were more circumscribed, more tightly controlled, and more focused than the CIA programs. The FBI programs were also very successful in achieving their counter-espionage goals. Mail opening does represent an extremely valuable means ~~menas~~ of intercepting the communications link in espionage communications. On the other hand, the sanctity of the mails is an established tradition in the United States, and it is doubtful that any selection criteria could be sufficiently precise to allow for the opening of only mail to or from illegal agents.

(2) Whether the mail openings that did occur were properly authorized. It is clear that FBI Director Hoover personally approved the majority of the mail opening programs. The one which was implemented without Headquarters approval was terminated shortly after it came to the attention of Headquarters. It does not appear, however, that any Attorney General ever authorized these programs or that the exact nature and full scope of the programs was even brought to the attention of any Attorney General, even though opportunities existed to do so. Similarly, despite frequent contacts with the Postal Inspection Service regarding the implementation of these programs, no Chief Postal Inspector was ever informed that the FBI contemplated the actual opening of mail.

(3) Whether the legal implications of the mail openings were adequately considered. There is no evidence that legal considerations were discussed after 1951, and there is evidence that Headquarters personnel who ran the programs either considered them illegal or ignored the legal implications entirely.

(4) Whether the mail opening programs were adequately controlled to ensure that they remained focused on counter-espionage matters. As noted above, the programs did generate some information regarding domestic organizations and criminal activity, although the primary purpose always remained in the counter-espionage field. The fact

ENCLOSURE

62

G-7

that these programs did generate such information apparently came as a surprise to the Headquarters officials who ran the programs and the obvious questions are whether this was permitted or encouraged, and, if neither, how it could have happened.

(5) Whether the selection of names for inclusion on the CIA's Watch List in the Hunter Project was sufficiently controlled and limited. Because the FBI requested the CIA for information on categories such as peace organizations and on specific individuals and groups involved in the peace and women's movement, a serious question is raised whether there was sufficient restraint on the use of this source.

NOTE: As discussed in the FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS summary, several of the FBI mail opening programs utilized, as selection criteria, various "indicators" which, with some accuracy, identified letters sent by or addressed to foreign illegal agents. The fact of these indicators has been made public by FBI officials in recent weeks. But: these indicators are still felt to be valid and the FBI has no reason to believe that they are not still being used. It is recommended, therefore, that the Committee avoid questions which would require in response an elaboration of the nature of these indicators.

~~TOP SECRET~~

STAFF MEMORANDUM

EXECUTIVE SESSION ON FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS

FBI Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and William Branigan, Chief of the Soviet Section of the FBI Counterintelligence Branch, have requested an opportunity to appear before the Select Committee in executive session to discuss classified aspects of the FBI mail opening programs. Both of them will be witnesses at the public hearing on FBI mail openings on Friday.

The Committee staff has agreed that the public hearing will not disclose the following aspects of FBI mail openings:

1. The identity of the foreign nations involved, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba, Mexico, Hong Kong, Japan, most Western European countries, and several Central and Latin American countries.

2. The fact the mail to and from the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet United Nations Mission, the Cuban United Nations Mission, other Soviet-bloc Embassies was selectively opened. (S)

3. The "indicators" used as criteria for selective opening of mail screened in several other programs designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States. (The fact that there were "indicators," but not their nature, may be disclosed publicly.)

4. The identities of specific individuals and groups whose mail was opened either by the FBI or by the CIA at the request of the FBI. (FBI officials will state publicly that some of these, especially in the category "peace and protest groups," were not adequately justified.) Some of these included:

   Leonard Bernstein
   Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam
   Jeremy Stone
   Cambridge Center for Study of Public Policy

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-7-11

TOP SECRET

The following are questions which cannot be discussed in public hearings because of this agreement. They should be raised at this executive session:

1. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail openings aimed at mail to and from the [Soviet and Soviet-bloc embassies?] (X)

2. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail opening programs using "indicators" and designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States? [(Soviet and Cuban)] (X)

3. What was the actual intelligence value of the material supplied to the FBI by the CIA from its mail opening operation?

4. How good are the "indicators" in selecting mail of foreign intelligence agents only and not mail of American citizens or others who are not foreign agents?

5. What standards were used for opening mail to and from Communist China, and what was the intelligence value of these programs?

6. Do FBI counterespionage officials desire to resume any mail opening programs, with proper authorization from Congress and the Attorney General?

7. How do the benefits of mail opening compare with the benefits of warrantless electronic surveillance currently used by the FBI for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes?

Department of the Treasury / Internal Revenue Service / Wa[illegible]ington, D.C. 20224

Commissioner

~~REC-114~~ OCT 20 1975

#MDR 16

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

Mr. William Creager
Section Chief, CI-2
Federal Bureau of Investigation
John Edgar Hoover Building
Room 4123
Washington, D. C. 20535

Dear Mr. Creager:

Representatives of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who have been reviewing files of our former Special Service Staff, have asked for copies of the enclosed two FBI reports relating to Nathanial Walter, Junior.

ILL

I would appreciate your letting me know as soon as reasonably convenient whether the FBI has any objection to our providing the Staff with copies of the reports.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Thomas Glynn

Thomas V. Glynn
Assistant to the Commissioner

OK for Dissemination to the agencies SSC. 10/21/75. GTT

Glynn advised 10/22/75 WOB

Enclosures

File 62-116395

copy to: Mr. Arthur Jefferson
Senate Select Committee Staff

ENCLOSURE

REC-114

62-116395-955

31 OCT 30 1975

84 OCT 30 1975

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois
November 10, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-3597

U

NATHANIEL WALTER JUNIOR

Nathaniel Walter Junior has been identified as a member of the Black Panther Party (BPP).

> The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government.

Junior appeared in United States District Court, Chicago, Illinois, on January 18, 1971, and entered a plea of guilty on Federal Firearms charges against him, as well as on a bail jumping charge. On February 5, 1971, United States District Judge Sam J. Perry, Chicago, Illinois, sentenced Junior to three years probation on the above charges.

On September 28, 1971, Junior was interviewed by a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Junior advised that he was no longer a member of the BPP, having resigned as a result of a dispute with Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Illinois BPP, regarding the unauthorized use of Panther funds by Rush. He further alienated himself with the BPP when, in January, 1971, he refused to repay the BPP $1,500.00 that had been paid as bail to secure his release from jail on the aforementioned charges.

Junior furnished the following information concerning his activities with the BPP:

He originally joined the BPP at the invitation of Fred Hampton, in the Fall of 1968. Hampton at the time was the Chairman of the Illinois BPP and was subsequently

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

62-116395-955

ENCLOSURE

slain by Cook County States Attorney Officers, December 4, 1969, who at the time were executing a search warrant in Chicago, Illinois.

While in the party, Junior held the title of Field Secretary and was privy to administrative matters relating to the BPP. On two occasions he traveled out of the state on party business, once to BPP National Headquarters for the purpose of meeting the National Staff, and to Washington, D. C., to attend the Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention (RPCC).

The RPCC, held August 7, 1970, at Howard University, Washington, D. C., was organized by the BPP to structure "a constitution that will guarantee us the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; a constitution that serves the people instead of a constitution that serves the ruling class".

In early 1969, Junior negotiated to purchase a quantity of weapons from an undercover United States Treasury Agent, for the BPP and as a result was arrested on a Federal Firearms charge. While out of jail on this charge, Junior learned that he had been indicted and decided to jump bond and leave the country.

Junior left the country for Canada, through the aid of persons connected with the draft resistence movement, and who did not know of his pending criminal charges or his affiliation with the BPP. He declined to identify these persons who aided in his leaving the country or those who aided him in Canada.

The BPP in no way aided him in leaving the country, nor did they provide him any financial assistance while he was a fugitive and for this he is bitter.

Junior decided to leave Canada and return to Chicago for the purpose of surrendering to face trial on the Federal Firearms Act charge, because of his parents' poor health.

Upon his return, he learned the BPP was no longer functioning on a democratic basis but was now being dominated by Bobby Rush, Illinois Minister of Defense. Junior sought to bring the party back to its former state, by calling for reforms and reorganization, which was resisted by Rush and he was subsequently removed from the Central Staff and he resigned from the party in September, 1970.

He is in no way involved with the BPP, or other extremist activities, at this time nor does he have any plans to resume his association with the BPP, as he feels "The BPP and other organizations are being duped by white intellectual revolutionary hobbyists, who are taking advantage of the hopelessness and frustrations of the Black community to exercise their theories on political and social democracy."

Junior claims to have no knowledge of any BPP underground, now or in the past, but admits that preliminary discussion regarding an underground cell of the BPP was had in the early development of the Illinois BPP, but that plan like most others never got off the ground.

The BPP was, and is, a big disappointment to Junior in that they departed from their original concept of neighborhood protection against police brutality, to one of international identification with communism. He maintained his association with the BPP in spite of this change in philosophy because of his respect and confidence in Fred Hampton, who rationalized that in order to further the cause of neighborhood control they'd need the financing and good will of governments oppose to people oppression, no matter where these people were.

Junior feels that the BPP is dead in Illinois and blames its demise to its identification with communism and coalitions with white revolutionary groups.

He has three things to show for his membership in the BPP; (1) probation on the Federal Firearms charge, (2) three years probation on State narcotics case (which he claims was a frame by police, but to which he entered a plea, "as part of a deal", at the urgency of his BPP attorney); and (3) an outstanding

indictment with the State of Illinois charging he and fourteen others with kidnaping and related crimes. Junior advised that this was another case of police harassment of the BPP, and another example of how the BPP has lost its attractiveness to people in Chicago. Of the sixteen people who were originally charged in the kidnapping case, including the deceased Hampton, only two of those, Yvonne King, and Billy Brooks, continue as members of the BPP.

Junior claims to have no contact with any members or former members of the BPP, except when the persons charged with the kidnaping report for trial every month. Junior cites the numerous continuances of the kidnaping case as an example of white hobbyists playing with young black revolutionary hopefuls. To him the continuances represent a conspiracy on the part of the BPP attorneys and the States Attorney's Office, as on alternate months they ask that the case be continued and neither ever objects. If he could afford it he would not avail himself of the BPP attorney's services.

Junior is required to report to his probation officer twice per month and is not allowed to travel outside the State of Illinois, without prior permission.

Logical sources, in positions to know, advise that Junior is not now active with the BPP, and has not been so in more than a year.

On October 29, 1971, the FBI recontacted Junior and learned that his pending kidnaping case was continued from October 26, 1971, until November 30, 1971.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois

June 9, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. 157-3597

NATHANIEL WALTER JUNIOR

Nathaniel Walter Junior has been identified as a former member of the Black Panther Party (BPP), who during the time he was a BPP member was indicted on state charges of kidnaping and related crimes, with other BPP members, on June 8, 1969, by the Illinois Cook County Grand Jury.

> The BPP is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government.

The case against Junior, and the other BPP members indicted with him, has never come to trial having been continued numerous times.

On May 10, 1972, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed Junior as he appeared in State Court, and the case was continued until June 15, 1972.

Reliable confidential sources advise that Junior is not a BPP member, nor does he associate with the membership of this organization.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALM/BTG

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

62-116395-955

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

Mr. W. R. Wannall

10/22/75

F. J. Cassidy

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

#MDR16

COINTELPROS

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 10-13-00 [illegible] SP2 ALM/JJG

This is to identify two serials, copies of which were furnished to Barbara Banoff of the staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) for retention in the Committee's files.

Banoff on 10/10/75 requested copies of a memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Belmont dated 3/30/60 and a letter to the New York Office and 15 other offices dated 3/31/60, both captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program," be furnished to the Committee. Banoff stated she believed these documents had previously been requested but she was unable to locate them in the Committee files. She said she desired to have these documents because they set forth a logical program by which the FBI made an effort to prevent the Communist Party from infiltrating legitimate mass organizations. As an aside, she stated she thought the FBI was successful in this effort, indicating she felt the technique was worthy and proper.

Copies of the above two documents were made available to a SSC representative on 10/22/75. Copies of the documents together with a cover page indicating their receipt are attached. No excisions were required in these documents.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures
62-116009

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)

DR:lfj
(3)

62-1163

NOT RECORDED
46 OCT 31 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN

4 NOV 4 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 10/23/75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP-2ALM/JTG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum advises that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) intends to release to the press copies of eight FBI documents (attached). The release of these documents is scheduled for 10/24/75, following the appearance of Assistant Directors Wannall and Mintz and Section Chief Branigan before the SSC.

These documents were made available to the SSC responsive to specific requests. They have been excised and declassified where necessary. With regard to dissemination of FBI documents to the Select Committees of Congress, both the White House and the Department have held that, once a document has been excised, declassified and furnished to either Select Committee of Congress, it is that Committee's property to do with whatever that Committee deems appropriate. However, we do have an understanding with the Committee that allows for more extensive excisions once the Committee decides to make documents available to the press. Personnel in the Senstudy Project have reviewed the attached eight documents and have made additional excisions which are acceptable to the SSC. These excisions are designed to protect Bureau sources, targets and, where possible, the identity of Bureau personnel.

REC-114 62-116395-956

The contents of the documents that will be made available generally portray the Bureau in a favorable light. They highlight: (1) tight supervision and control of the mail intercept programs; (2) general objectives of the program; (3) accomplishments; and (4) Departmental officials' knowledge of the existence of some of these programs.

OCT 30 1975

Enclosures
62-116395
WOC:lhb lhb
(6)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

84 OCT 30 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

Of course, it would be desirable if no documents were released by the SSC; however, Mr. Elliff advises that the senators are desirous of furnishing some documents to the press. If, in fact, Bureau documents have to be released, it appears that the ones the SSC plans to use are favorable to the Bureau.

For the information of Bureau officials reviewing the attached documents, no excisions have been made; however, the brackets in red ink show what information will be obliterated from the documents prior to their release to the press.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Tavel
Trotter
Tele Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 2/27/65

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: THE LONG COMMITTEE

The Attorney General called on the morning of February 27, 1965, to advise he wanted to consult with the Bureau on certain problems raised by the Long Committee, which is exploring the use of mail covers, et cetera. He noted there was a possible problem concerning Chief Inspector Montague's testimony and whether it was necessary for Montague to change his testimony. Also, he felt that Internal Revenue Service had been using investigative techniques which they should not use and this could pose a problem. He said that the President had asked him to coordinate with all executive agencies concerning the problems raised by the Long Committee.

Inspector Moore and I met with the Attorney General i his office this afternoon. Mr. Courtney Evans was present. I told the Attorney General that in Montague's testimony he was told by Attorney Fensterwald that if any of the questions had national security implications Montague should not answer them. Consequently, Montague was estopped from doing other than answe in the negative when asked questions touching on national security. With this interpretation, it was questionable whethe an attempt should be made to change or explain Montague's testimony, particularly in view of the obvious lack of judgment on the part of Fensterwald and the desire of Long for publicity I made it clear to the Attorney General that from our dealings with Montague, he was a man of integrity and sacrificed his personal desires for the welfare of the country and had coopera fully with us. The Attorney General said he had no intention of changing one word of Montague's testimony, but he was considering advising Long and Fensterwald that there were extreme delicate national security matters touching on the area being covered by the committee and there could be exceptions to the answers given in the testimony when they touched on such sensitive security matters. He said further that he contemplat seeing Senator Long and impressing on him that the committee would not want to stumble by mistake into an area of extreme interest to the national security as they nearly did in a matte

REC- 56

1 - Mr. Tolson
2 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Moore

CONTINUED - OVER

EX-114

25 MAR 12 1965

MAR 15 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/EH/S

#moe16

[illegible]

affecting CIA. (Apparently CIA got wind of some inquiries by the committee relative to their secret operation and went to the committee and warned them off.) Katzenbach contemplates asking for a list of the witnesses who will appear before the committee together with a brief summary of the expected testimony. On the basis of this, he will be able to advise Senator Long when he should steer clear of a sensitive area.

I told Mr. Katzenbach that I certainly agree that this matter should be controlled at the committee level but that I felt pressure would have to be applied so that the personal interest of Senator Long became involved rather than on any ideological basis. Mr. Katzenbach said that he had already talked to Vice President Humphrey about Fensterwald, who he considered a wild man, and that Humphrey had promised to talk to Long concerning Fensterwald. Katzenbach said that in addition to the Vice President he might have to resort to pressure from the President himself, although he would prefer to work it out without resorting to the President. He indicated there was no one on the committee itself who could be helpful and that he did not expect any help from Senator Eastland.

Mr. Katzenbach said that he expected troublefrom the possible activities of IRS and the military in the investigative field; that if some of these matters are uncovered before the committee they will tend to undermine the restricted and tightly controlled operations of the Bureau. I told him that our operations are tightly controlled and particularly in the delicate areas of concern, we restrict ourselves to important security matters.

Mr. Katzenbach said he was going to see Senator Long on Monday and wanted to know if the Bureau would like someone to go along with him. I told him no.

ACTION:

Mr. Katzenbach said he would advise us of the results of his conversation with Long. He also asked that I advise the Director of our discussion and I told him I would.

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: The Long Committee

I called Mr. DeLoach and briefed him on this problem in order that he might contact Senator Eastland in an effort to warn the Long Committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense. (Of couse I made no mention of such a contact to the Attorney General.) Mr. DeLoach advised that Senator Eastland is in Mississippi and he will contact him upon his return Monday.

I don't see what all
the excitement is about.
I would have no hesitan
in discontinuing all tech-
ques — technical coverag
microphones, trash co
mail covers etc. While
might handicap us I d
they are as valuable as
believe & none warrant
being used to [illegible]

8:40 AM March 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/JK

The Attorney General called and advised that he had talked to Senator Long last night. Senator Long's committee is looking into mail covers et cetera. The Attorney General stated he thought somebody had already spoken to Senator Long as he said he did not want to get into any national security area and was willing to take steps not to do this. The Attorney General stated that Mr. Fensterwald was present for part of the meeting and Fensterwald had said that he had some possible witnesses who are former Bureau Agents and if they were asked if mail was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General stated that before they are called, he would like to know who they are and whether they were ever involved in any program touching on national security and if not, it is their own business, but if they were, we would want to know. The Attorney General stated the Senator promised that he would have a chance to look at the names if he wanted to, personally and confidentially, and the list would have any names involving national security deleted and he would tell the Senator how many but no more.

The Attorney General stated that the Postmaster General is going down there this morning [illegible] which he, the Attorney General, thought would be helpful to Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department.

The Attorney General stated that Senator Long also said he is not going to propose legislation to abolish mail covers as he thought they served a useful purpose but he did think that control should be tightened. I stated I thought there was great laxity in the matter of mail covers and the matter of tapping telephones.

I stated I have always been of the view and recommended back when Tom Clark was Attorney General that no agency of the Government should tap a telephone except with the written approval of the Attorney General. I stated

Committee Judiciary

REC- 38 62-[illegible]

8 MAR 3 1965

JEH:edm (10)
XEROX

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAR 3-1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

there would then be in one place a list of all phone taps and the purpose and reason for them. I stated that it is a fact, insofar as I am concerned, that I am the only head of an agency who does not have authority to tap telephones. I stated that I know that subordinates down the line in some agencies will tap phones without the knowledge of the chief of the agency and there is grave suspicion in Washington by some newspapermen that their phones have been tapped by agencies of the Government trying to find out where they are getting their information. I stated I have always been opposed to the law whereby it is necessary to get the authority of a court to tap phones because of the composition of some of our courts and the employees thereof, but I have always felt that the President should issue an Executive Order confidentially to all agencies that all phone tapping be discontinued except when specifically approved by the Attorney General so there would be in one place a list and then if any committee in Congress got on the warpath, the Attorney General would have a list he could vouch for as being the only phones tapped by the Government. The Attorney General stated that made sense. I stated many agencies are opposed because they realize there would be a marked restriction. I stated we only have 45 phone taps, which is a low number for a country the size of ours and the area we have to cover. The Attorney General stated no one has any idea how many phone taps the whole Government has.

I stated there is also a school being conducted in California by a private organization which instructs the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service in the matter of phone tapping and they have sent their own personnel there to be trained. I stated Internal Revenue has also from time to time hired private outside phone tappers to do their tapping. I stated it is that type of thing if there were a real investigation which would come out. The Attorney General commented that he would not guarantee some of it won't come out. I stated I was amazed when I learned of the school in California as I saw a reference to it in the newspaper and wanted to know what it was and what officers attended. I stated we have our own instructors and do it ourselves.

I stated I thought the Attorney General had made good headway with Senator Long. The Attorney General stated he thought it would be helpful, but his

problem is that he thinks the Senator is fine but he does not think that Fensterwald is as straightforward, or to put it another way that Fensterwald is smart and devious and the Senator is straightforward and not very bright and that is the problem. I stated I thought that Fensterwald is trying to get publicity for the Senator. The Attorney General stated the Senator said he did not want to get into this and he would give him, the Attorney General, the names and a summary of the testimony and told Fensterwald to do so, but he, the Attorney General, can't say Fensterwald is going to do it; that he will on some but he did not know that he would on all. I stated I had no faith or confidence in Fensterwald and neither did Senator Eastland. The Attorney General stated that Senator Eastland may have already talked to Senator Long or else the Vice President, but somebody had waked him up. I stated Senator Eastland said he would do it Wednesday, but he may have called him.

The Attorney General stated that is where it stands now and we shall see what happens.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11 42 AM
DATE 3-2-65
BY

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: October 2, 1964

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. J.P.Mohr
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D.E.Moore
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Litrento

SUBJECT: [redacted] CODE WORD
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

Prior memoranda have advised of the starting of the trial of the Soviet illegal agents in this case, Mr. and Mrs. Robert K. Baltch, in the Eastern District of New York and motions by defense counsel regarding the nature of evidence to be submitted in this case.

The Judge originally denied the motions, but Assistant Attorney General Yeagley has advised that USA Hoey in answering questions by the Judge gave answers which were too broad and which the Government cannot support and therefore it is necessary for the Government to make additional statements to Judge Dooling who is sitting in this case in the Eastern District of New York. My memorandum of September 30, 1964, advised that while we were not aware of the contents of the conversations between USA Hoey and Judge Dooling, we had no objections to Yeagley's proposed amending statement as it was correct.

Subsequently on the afternoon of 10-1-64, Departmental Attorneys Thomas K. Hall and Kevin Maroney advised Supervisor Litrento and myself that USA Hoey's statement to Judge Dooling was unfortunate because it was too broad. They believe that the Judge's query pertained to any tainted source at the Baltch residence and was confined to eavesdropping devices, but that Hoey in his answer had not confined the answer to the residence or to eavesdropping, either of which would perhaps have prevented the current problem. (No information obtained from wiretaps or microphones is contemplated to be used in this case and the only tainted source is a mail intercept which did not take place anywhere near the residence).

Subsequently on the evening of 10-1-64, Mr. Hall advised that he had just learned that apparently Hoey in his discussions with the court had stated, or at least indicated, there was no microphone involved in this case and, of course, this was incorrect and the Department felt the record had to be corrected. He

REC- 15

EX- 117

OCT 19 1964

Soviet Sect

DEM:td (8)

Classified By 4041
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

58 OCT 21 1964

~~SECRET~~

MR. SULLIVAN - MR. MOORE
[redacted] ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

asked if the Bureau had any objection and was advised in the negative. This morning Mr. Hall called to advise that USA Hoey had now requested advice as to what answer could be given the court should he be asked (1) if there was a wiretap involved in this case and (2) if there was a mail intercept in this case. After checking, I called Hall back and said that we would leave the answer to #1 up to the Department, but that if the Department saw necessary, the Bureau would not object. However, with regard to #2, under no circumstances is the Bureau willing to admit that a mail intercept was utilized and Hall said he would pass this information on to Hoey and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley who is in New York. [illegible]

Hall advised that he had discussed this case with Acting Attorney General Katzenbach this morning and Katzenbach was of the opinion that the Department must be candid with the Judge. He said Katzenbach recognized the problems, but felt that in view of the value of the case, an effort should be made to go ahead with the trial even if it might be necessary drop the overt act where our tainted source is involved, and proceed on a general conspiracy basis with the recognition that the verdict might be against us, but we would have revealed the Soviet espionage activities to the people. Hall said he was passing on the Acting Attorney General's comments to Assistant Attorney General Yeagley. Hall said that the motions of defense counsel and the complications with regard to the answers may eventually force the Government to drop the prosecution. He said in view of the many facets involved, he did not feel there was any reason to agree to a pre-trial hearing on the issue of tainted source if this should be required by the court, and rather than do this, they are prepared to drop the espionage charges and attempt to proceed on lesser grounds.

ACTION

SAC Schmit, NYO, was advised of the above developments and requested to keep in close touch with Yeagley in New York and you will be kept advised of developments.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Taylor 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Branigan

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. SULLIVAN

DATE: 8-14-64

FROM : MR. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: DOSNAR
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

The captioned code word covers our investigation of the unknown subject at San Diego, California who offered to sell information concerning Sonar to the Soviets for $60,000.

BACKGROUND:

Information concerning this first came to our attention on 7-17-64 when our highly confidential coverage detected a letter addressed to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, postmarked 7-16-64 at San Diego, California. We followed up on this by inserting a message in a San Diego newspaper indicating that we were interested in the offer. The unsub then telephonically contacted an Agent of the Washington Field Office at the telephone number furnished him in the message in the personal column of the San Diego newspaper. Thereafter, we intercepted a telephone call that the subject made to the Soviet Embassy during which he attempted to verify that he was dealing with Soviet citizens. Acting on the subject's instructions, a package containing a camera suitable for document photography and $500 was dispatched by United Airlines air freight from Washington to San Diego during the early morning of 8-13-64.

In the meantime, another resident of San Diego, one R. Tobin, advised our office there that he had been engaged by an unidentified individual to pick up a package at United Airlines Freight Terminal which he was to subsequently turn over and for which he would be paid $20.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:

According to SAC C. Williams, an Agent of the San Diego Office posing as R. Tobin in the latter's automobile picked up the package at 8 p.m., PDT, and, thereafter, proceeded as he had been instructed to a drive-in in the San Diego area. SAC Williams advised that the coverage by San Diego Agents at the Air Freight Terminal uncovered a suspect who appeared to be closely observing

WAB:BST:hrt
(8)

REC- 38 [illegible] - 65[illegible]

CONTINUED - OVER

EX-108

10 AUG 19 1964

65 AUG 21 1964

Tobin's automobile and who, thereafter, surveilled the automobile to the area of the drive-in.

After waiting the agreed time, our Agent proceeded to a parking lot adjacent to a church about one mile further down the highway. Shortly after the Agent arrived, he was approached by the suspect who inquired "Are you Tobin?" Thereafter, the suspect claimed to be a messenger who had been engaged to pick up the package. He did deliver an envelope to our Agent which contained the $20 agreed to. At this point, the Agent, posing as Tobin, identified himself and requested that the suspect identify himself and voluntarily accompany him to the San Diego Office.

The suspect, who has now been identified as the subject, is Perry A. Chandelaine, 3231 Par Drive, La Mesa, California. He is a Grade 13 engineer at the Navy Electronics Laboratory, San Diego. This laboratory does all the training and electronics work and research, including Sonar, for the Navy in the San Diego area. In this connection, the subject claimed that he had access to information classified "Confidential." He has been a Government employee in excess of ten years and is the father of ten children.

In May, 1952, subject was an applicant for the position of Special Agent with this Bureau. Apparently during the interview it was determined the applicant's father was killed by the police in Chicago in 1932 when caught stealing butter from a boxcar. He had been arrested for selling whiskey prior to that in Wisconsin. Applicant was considered very nervous and had a vagotomy operation for a nervous disorder performed in 1947. Applicant had an ulcer which caused his discharge from the service and which still, at that time, gave him trouble. He was unfavorably recommended for employment.

According to SAC Williams, the subject readily acknowledged that he was in real deep trouble and claimed that his wife was also knowledgeable concerning his activities. Subject freely admitted contacting the Soviets and offering to sell information to them. However, the subject steadfastly maintained that he was a patriotic American, a Catholic and one who hated the Russians and that he was endeavoring to get all out of them that he could and he then intended to turn whatever he obtained over to ONI.

Subject's wife was invited to the office and she confirmed that earlier in the evening the subject had apprised her of his activities and gave her a letter which was addressed to ONI and which she was to mail upon receipt of a phone call from him. This

CONTINUED - OVER

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SULLIVAN
RE: DOSNAR

letter was mailed by her when she was contacted by the subject who was at that time in the San Diego Office. Subject and his wife both furnished signed statements.

Thereafter, the facts in this case were presented to Mr. Thomas K. Hall of the Internal Security Division of the Department who advised that in view of the illegal source of the original information and all that flowed from it, he could not authorize the filing of a complaint charging the subject with an attempt to commit espionage. ONI was immediately advised both at San Diego and at Washington concerning the identity of the subject and the facts admitted by him. This was done in the event the Navy could institute some action. Upon completion of the signing of the statements, subject and his wife were permitted to return to their residence since no prosecutive action could be taken.

ACTION:

The investigation at San Diego is continuing, the completed results of which will be furnished to the Navy so it can institute administrative proceedings against him. The facts will, likewise, be furnished to the Internal Security Division of the Department which has requested them.

WCS

8/14

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan

[illegible]
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 31, 1970

1 - Mr. J.P. Lee
1 - Mr. A.P. Litrento

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG
ON 11/28/00
#MDR16

SUBJECT: SAM SURVEY
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

This is to consider recommendation of the New York Office that the Sam Survey Program be reinstituted.

BACKGROUND:

Sam Survey was a successful program operated between 1959 and 1966, which involved screening of air mail destined for selected European countries and cities by our Agent personnel in an effort to detect Soviet illegal agent mail. This program was made possible through the confidential cooperation of highly placed postal officials. In 1961 we identified, through this program, the [redacted] in New York City [redacted]. In addition, [redacted], we uncovered [redacted] which had operated in the [redacted] for a certain period and then shifted its activities to the [redacted]. [redacted] In July, 1966, this program was discontinued.

Foreign Intelligence Project

RECOMMENDATION OF NEW YORK:

New York points out that although ample evidence indicate the presence of a substantial number of Soviet illegals, the Bureau has been unsuccessful in locating any in recent years; that various programs and projects put into operation have been unsuccessful. Further, it is its contention that the illegal's most vulnerable area is still his letter writing and that this is the area we have the best chance by far to locate and identify illegals. Therefore, New York wishes to submit for the Bureau's consideration the reinstitution of Sam Survey. If this is not possible, it recommend that the Bureau consider requesting CIA or postal authorities to take over this program.

[illegible]

REC-
65-65[illegible]

Enclosure

10 APR 7 1970

65-65884
APL:tdp (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

Classified by
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

6

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SAM SURVEY
65-65884

OBSERVATIONS:

It is agreed that the problem to locate Soviet illegals has assumed serious proportions and that the resumption of this program could be of inestimable value to the Bureau in meeting its responsibilities in that regard. However, present Bureau policy precludes the use of this technique. For this reason, it is not believed that we consider reinstitution of this program directly or through CIA or postal authorities.

ACTION:

New York is being advised that the reinstitution of Sam Survey Program either directly or through CIA or postal authorities is not advisable at this time.

absolutely right.
H.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/00 BY SP-2ALM/HG

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

C. D. B.
G. C. M.
Griffith

On January 15, 1969, Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The Hunter project for which we have given the designation of Bureau Informant 200 essentially consists of specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia. If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the Soviet Union it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.)

File in (105-93089)

ACTION:

REC 102

105-93089 - 90

The above information is being directed ~~to~~ the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - Liaison
1 - S. J. Papich

18 FEB 5 1969

SJP:clb
(6)

Stops not warranted on black extremists at this time
JED 1/31/69

S. Papich

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Director, FBI (65-67003) DATE: 1/31/62

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (105-11581)

SUBJECT: GUS SURVEY
ESPIONAGE - R

Re San Francisco letter to Director 1/11/62 advising San Francisco survey would run through February 9, 1962.

As of 1/28/62, a total of about 1,764,440 letters has been surveyed in 46 days.

Fifty-one cases have been opened to determine whether recipient might be Soviet illegal agent. Thirty-two cases have been closed when subjects appeared to be legitimate residents.

San Francisco does not at this time recommend continuance of this survey beyond February 9, 1962. Upon completion of authorized period and evaluation of investigations resulting therefrom, a further recommendation will be made as to reinstituting this program.

#mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/lll6
ON 11/28/00

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
1 - San Francisco
RES:lg
(3)

~~Classified by 6283~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

REC- 31 (65-[illegible]-19)

EX. - 107

12 FEB 5 1962

F146

65 FEB 12 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DATE: 11/2/62

1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Stewart

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

This is to advise you that on 10/31/62 representatives of this Bureau conferred with CIA representatives James Hunt, John Mertz and Thomas Chalmers at CIA concerning "Project Hunter." At this conference our observations concerning Hunter material furnished since our last conference on 2/13/62 were given CIA. In addition, we advised CIA specifically of certain Hunter items which were of no interest to us and of certain Hunter items which were of interest to us. These items were set forth in memorandum form and furnished to CIA; a copy of same is attached.

5

CIA advised that its "Hunter-Don" coverage was being operated seven days a week until November 15. This concentrated coverage is for the purpose of determining if there is any illegal agent traffic. After November 15 all Hunter coverage can be expected to be reduced until after the Christmas mail rush has subsided.

The CIA representatives were very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and with the attention afforded it by us. They are very cooperative in that they are willing to focus their attention on any particular phase of coverage we suggest for our own benefit. For CIA's interest we furnished them a copy of the attached memorandum of our analysis of typical information furnished by Bureau Informant 200 of interest to us.

ACTION:

None. Above data furnished for your information.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/JG

WDS (WHB)

WDS:jes
(4)

105-93089

Enclosure

REC 35

(105-93089-54)

7 NOV 5 1962

ENCLOSURE

EX-118

10-30-62

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

After an extensive review of 2500 Hunter Reports since our last memo captioned as above and dated 8/21/62, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project Hunter as it related to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense involved in the preparation of such material.

I Traffic Which Holds No Interest:

1. Soviet-bloc immigrants desiring to repatriate to USSR. These people are interviewed by INS and INS refers anything of interest to us.

2. Americans traveling to the USSR as such travel is permissible and several hundred people a year visit the USSR while on tour abroad as well as Soviets returning to visit relatives. We, of course, have an interest in such travel involving people on the CIA Watch List, known Communist Party members, and suspected intelligence agents.

3. U. S. professors in Academic Research corresponding with each other. It is not likely if U. S. professor is passing any data he would identify himself at the same time.

II Traffic of Specific Interest:

1. All data re Cuba. This serves to identify pro-Castro followers in the U. S.

2. All data re U. S. Cubans in contact with Cubans attending Friendship University in Moscow.

3. All material emanating from Puerto Rico of an Anti-U. S. nature and pro-Soviet.

4. Data re U. S. peace groups going to Russia and while in Russia.

5. Data indicating death of any U. S. Communist abroad.

6. Data re Maurice Hyman Halperin(now in Cuba); Helen Kagen Pozner; Miriam Zeitlin Seborer, Oscar and Stuart Seborer(All in Russia); Max, Celia and Rose Seborer(New York); Noah and Anna Sparer Seborer (Mexico).

7. Any data on Alfred Slesinger operator Modern Photo Shop, 865 3rd Avenue, New York City(wife Kitty), residence 1860 Grand Concourse, Bronx, New York.

105-93089-547

9

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

8. Any traffic from or to U. S. Students in Moscow or to U. S. persons who were former students in Moscow.

9. Any traffic between U. S. persons who are with a current exposition or a previous exposition in the USSR.

4-528

62-116395-957

CHANGED TO

62-117604-X1

JUN 3 1977

ft/dsk

#MDR16 ON THIS FORM
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. William O. Cregar
Section Chief, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20535

The attached letter from NSA, dated 21 October 1975, forwarded two ~~letters~~ to me which are responsive to a request for information from the Senate Select Committee.

We would like to provide your 26 September 1973 letter to the Committee; however, since the letter originated with your agency, coordination prior to release under the Third Agency Rule is necessary. Please provide your comments concerning this release action at your earliest convenience.

Thomas K. Latimer
Thomas K. Latimer
The Special Assistant

Attachment

DOD was
preliminarily advised FBI has already
furnished SSC our letter of 9/26/73 & interposes no objection
for DOD to give SSC a copy.
10/29/75
WOC

EX 103

REC-24 62-116395-958

21 OCT 31 1975

62-116395

508588

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTC
#MDR16

ENCLOSURE

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-1-11

84 NOV 6 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: N1221
21 October 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Watch List Correspondence

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-8-00 BY SP-8 ALM/STS

1. As a part of the recent request by the Senate Select Committee, we reviewed our files to see if there were any responses to General Allen's letter of September 17, 1973 which requested recertification of "Watch Lists." At that time we did not find any responses. We recently checked with the FBI and Secret Service and discovered that there were in fact responses. The Secret Service, by letter dated 21 September 1973, did in fact recertify a "Watch List" containing U.S. names, however, NSA has not accepted the U.S. names.

2. Inclosed are copies of the FBI and Secret Service letters. Request you forward these to the Senate Select Committee with the above comments.

DAVID D. LOWMAN
Special Assistant
to the Director
for Congressional Reviews

Approved by ______________________
LEW ALLEN, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

2 Incls:
a/s

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-1-11

Classified by DIRNSA/CHCSS (NSA/CSSM 123-2)
Exempt from GDS, EO 11652, Cat 2
Declassify Upon Notification by the Originator

62-116395-954

ENCLOSURE

DOWNGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL
UPON REMOVAL OF INCLS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

September 26, 1973

BY LIAISON

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTG
ON 11-8-00

Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr.
Director
National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

Dear General Allen:

I am in receipt of your letter of September 17, 1973, concerning the necessity for a mutual review of our policies with respect to the compilation and maintenance of the Watch List. I share your concern and fully agree that we should review our procedures to assure that our authorities, particularly in light of recent court decisions, are not exceeded.

As you are aware, however, the Department of Justice in filing affidavits with the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, in the case of United States versus William Ayers, et al., which case involved the Students for a Democratic Society, an organization included on the Watch List, took the position that the intercepts obtained by your agency were lawful and not within the disclosure requirements of the court.

We are instituting a review of our procedures but feel that any decision reached respecting the Watch List should await the final ruling of the court.

20 OCT 1973

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classified by Director, FBI~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

62-116395-958

ENCLOSURE

Encl 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr.

It is our desire to cooperate with you fully in any measures you deem necessary to protect your valuable SIGINT sources.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

TO :Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10/22/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM :Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

On 10/22/75, Barbara Banoff, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, requested that former SAs George C. Moore and Fred H. Baumgardner be made available for deposition concerning their knowledge of COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATION:

That former SAs Moore and Baumgardner be released from their existing employment agreements and the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations for purposes of deposition.

OK

SP2ALM/7/76

10/12/00

REC-30 62-116395-959

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

1 - Personnel File - George C. Moore
1 - Personnel File - Fred H. Baumgardner

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

lad 4D
(10)

84 NOV 11 1975

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10/28/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 10/24/75, Les Seidel and Martha Talley, Senate Select Committee Staff Members, requested that former SAC Marlin Johnson and former SA Carl Hennrich be made available for Staff interview. The topic of the interview for former SAC Johnson will be his knowledge of the 1968 Convention and the topic of interview for former SA Hennrich will be his knowledge of the Emergency Detention Plan.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich be released from their existing employment agreements for purposes of interview by the Senate Select Committee.

(2) That the Intelligence Division determine the current whereabouts of former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich and advise them of the request.

(3) That the Legal Counsel Division will orally advise the Senate Select Committee of the current whereabouts of former SAC Johnson and former SA Hennrich.

P.U. Daly furnished whereabouts of Johnson + Hennrich as in personnel files 10/29/75
SAC Held, CG, teleph. instructed to alert Johnson + Sutel. 12 noon 10/29/75

1 - Personnel File - Marlin Johnson
1 - Personnel File - Carl Hennrich

SALAW, in absence of SAC, RH, teleph. instr. to alert Hennrich + Sutel 11:45 AM. 10/29/75

REC-30
ST-111
62-116395-960

15 NOV 4 1975

lad
(10)

OK

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
10/12/00 SP2 ALM/LRT76 FM DR16

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. J. B. ADAMS

DATE: 10/21/75

FROM : MR. W. R. WANNALL

#MDR16 SP-2ALM|TG
10-12-00

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY -75

On October 21, 1975, from approximately 2:15 p.m. to 3:35 p.m., Section Chief William A. Branigan, CI-1 Section, Intelligence Division; Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division; and myself appeared at an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to discuss classified aspects of the Bureau's various mail intercept programs. Present were Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee; Senators Mondale, Goldwater, P. A. Hart, Huddleston, and Schweiker; as well as various members of the staff of the Select Committee.

Generally speaking, the reception by the Chairman and the various Senators, as well as members of the staff, was a friendly one. No antagonism was shown to the Bureau representatives, and the Senators by their questions indicated a desire to help the Bureau in our foreign counterintelligence operations.

At the request of the Chairman, the eight separate mail intercept surveys were explained to the Committee, including the length of time that these surveys were in operation and the value that was derived from them.

During the hearing we were supplied with a copy of a Staff Memorandum which outlined various aspects of our operations which would not be disclosed during a public hearing. The Staff Memorandum also outlined certain questions which could not be discussed at a public hearing and suggested that these questions be raised at the Executive Session. A copy of the Staff Memorandum is attached for your information.

Enclosure

ST-111 REC-30 62-116395-961

CONTINUED - OVER

WAB:hke
(6)

1 - ENCLOSURE

1-Mr. J. B. Adams
1-Mr. J. A. Mintz
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1-Mr. W. A. Branigan

~~TOP SECRET~~

15 NOV 4 1975

Classified by 2355
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 2

5-Ew8

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 NOV 5 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

RECEIVED
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE DIV.
OCT 30 07 PM 1975

Memorandum from Mr. W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: Senstudy

At the conclusion of the hearing, considerable questions were asked concerning legislation or direction which would be necessary from The Congress to permit the Bureau to carry out mail opening programs which were productive in their results and which would not at the same time invade the privacy of innocent American citizens.

ACTION:

This is submitted for your information.

WAR

ADDENDUM BY LEGAL COUNSEL 10/23/75, JAM:mfd

I answered the Committee's questions described in the last paragraph of this memorandum by explaining to them that in a security case we would find it most difficult to meet the 4th Amendment standard of probable cause in order to obtain a search warrant. for mail. If we are to be required to obtain warrants prior to obtaining mail and if we are to be successful, a lower standard of probable cause such as is permissible in administrative searches such as those conducted by Health Inspectors would be necessary. In answer to a specific question I explained that the Supreme Court has ruled that mail is protected absolutely by the 4th Amendment.

JAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per 60324 UCBAW/SAB/SBS
Date 8-1-11

STAFF MEMORANDUM

EXECUTIVE SESSION ON FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS

FBI Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and William Branigan, Chief of the Soviet Section of the FBI Counterintelligence Branch, have requested an opportunity to appear before the Select Committee in executive session to discuss classified aspects of the FBI mail opening programs. Both of them will be witnesses at the public hearing on FBI mail openings on Friday.

The Committee staff has agreed that the public hearing will not disclose the following aspects of FBI mail openings:

1. The identity of the foreign nations involved, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba, Mexico, Hong Kong, Japan, most Western European countries, and several Central and Latin American countries.

2. The fact the mail to and from the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet United Nations Mission, the Cuban United Nations Mission, other Soviet-bloc Embassies was selectively opened. (S)

3. The "indicators" used as criteria for selective opening of mail screened in several other programs designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States. (The fact that there were "indicators," but not their nature, may be disclosed publicly.)

4. The identities of specific individuals and groups whose mail was opened either by the FBI or by the CIA at the request of the FBI. (FBI officials will state publicly that some of these, especially in the category "peace and protest groups," were not adequately justified.) Some of these included:

    Leonard Bernstein
    Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam
    Jeremy Stone
    Cambridge Center for Study of Public Policy

62-116395-961

ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~

The following are questions which cannot be discussed in public hearings because of this agreement. They should be raised at this executive session:

1. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail openings aimed at mail to and from the [Soviet and Soviet-bloc embassies?] (~~S~~)

2. What was the actual intelligence value of FBI mail opening programs using "indicators" and designed to detect illegal foreign intelligence agents in the United States? [(Soviet and Cuban)] (~~S~~)

3. What was the actual intelligence value of the material supplied to the FBI by the CIA from its mail opening operation?

4. How good are the "indicators" in selecting mail of foreign intelligence agents only and not mail of American citizens or others who are not foreign agents?

5. What standards were used for opening mail to and from Communist China, and what was the intelligence value of these programs?

6. Do FBI counterespionage officials desire to resume any mail opening programs, with proper authorization from Congress and the Attorney General?

7. How do the benefits of mail opening compare with the benefits of warrantless electronic surveillance currently used by the FBI for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes?

T-General

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MR. J. B. ADAMS ~~TOP SECRET~~ 10/21/75

MR. W. R. WANNALL

Index

1) Mail Opening

2) Hearing Procedure

WOC

SENSTUDY

On October 21, 1975, from approximately 2:15 p.m. to 3:35 p.m., Section Chief William A. Branigan, CI-1 Section, Intelligence Division; Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division; and myself appeared at an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to discuss classified aspects of the Bureau's various mail intercept programs. Present were Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee; Senators Mondale, Goldwater, P. A. Hart, Huddleston, and Schweiker; as well as various members of the staff of the Select Committee.

Generally speaking, the reception by the Chairman and the various Senators, as well as members of the staff, was a friendly one. No antagonism was shown to the Bureau representatives, and the Senators by their questions indicated a desire to help the Bureau in our foreign counterintelligence operations.

At the request of the Chairman, the eight separate mail intercept surveys were explained to the Committee, including the length of time that these surveys were in operation and the value that was derived from them.

During the hearing we were supplied with a copy of a Staff Memorandum which outlined various aspects of our operations which would not be disclosed during a public hearing. The Staff Memorandum also outlined certain questions which could not be discussed at a public hearing and suggested that these questions be raised at the Executive Session. A copy of the Staff Memorandum is attached for your information.

Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

WAB:hke
(6)

~~TOP SECRET~~

1-Mr. J. B. Adams
1-Mr. J. A. Mintz
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall
(1)-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1-Mr. W. A. Branigan

Classified by 2355
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

961

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
~~SECRET~~ 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

The Attorney General

October 14, 1975

Director, FBI

11/8/00
#mDe16

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated August 27, 1975, with an attached request for FBI materials dated August 26, 1975, and my letter dated September 24, 1975, captioned as above.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum responsive to the request of the Committee for delivery of materials pertaining to requests by the Bureau for national security mail covers from 1971 through 1975.

Referenced September 24, 1975, letter forwarded material initially located in response to the Committee's request. The enclosed memorandum forwards the remaining documents which were located.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished to you for your records.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Enclosures - 2 ENCLOSURE REC-30 62-116395-962

15 NOV 4 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

edm

RHR:jmn/lfj
(9)

110C

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

84 NOV 5 1975

GPO [illegible]

U. S. Senate Select Committee On
Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Soviet Military Office, 2552 Belmont Road, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Commercial Counselor, 1706 16th Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Information Department, 1706 18th Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

Soviet Consular Office, 1609 Decatur Street, N. W., mail cover conducted at Cleveland Park Post Office. ~~(S)~~

1 - The Attorney General

2 - Mr. J. [illegible]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

62-116395 October 14, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2[illegible]

#MDR16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO REQUESTS
FOR MAIL COVERS MADE BY THE BUREAU
FROM 1971 THROUGH 1975

Reference is made to SSC letter dated August 27, 1975, with attached request dated August 26, 1975.

Part I, item 3. e. requests: "All materials pertaining to requests by the Bureau for special mail covers from 1971 through 1975 which have not been previously delivered to the Senate Select Committee. This request encompasses all special mail covers which have been terminated, regardless of whether the investigation for which the special mail cover was requested is active or inactive."

By memorandum dated September 24, 1975, captioned as above, you were furnished documents pertaining to this request. Additional materials have been located and will be delivered with this document.

These materials are comprised of letters to the Postal Service requesting mail covers and where utilized supportive memoranda. The materials pertain to terminated mail covers in national security matters of a domestic security nature as opposed to foreign related counterintelligence operations.

1 - The Attorney General

WOC

RHR:jmn/lfj
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-91

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Re: Documents Pertaining to Requests for Mail
Covers Made by the Bureau from 1971
Through 1975

NOTE:

Materials furnished in response to this request were obtained by review of all abstracts regarding communications to the Postal Service requesting mail covers. Since 1971, all national security mail covers have been requested by means of a letter to the Chief Postal Inspector, Postal Service. The materials being furnished only encompass investigative matters involving domestic security cases wherein the mail cover has been terminated whether the investigation is pending or closed. The materials are comprised of copies of the letters to the Postal Service and supportive memoranda where used in lieu of notes. These materials were reviewed and, where necessary, excisions made. By memorandum 9/24/75, the SSC was furnished the bulk of such documents located at that time. The documents being furnished now are those which could not be immediately located. All domestic mail cover requests which were located by means of the abstract review have now been furnished to the SSC.

By oral agreement with the SSC staff, only domestic security mail covers were required to be furnished.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/14/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re 8/26/75 request Part I, Item 3e concerning special mail covers.

Originating Office: FBI 930A

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

10/12/00 SP2ALM/[illegible]

[illegible] - 912

...LOSURE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 8/26/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

C

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Information handling

#MDR16
[illegible]
10/12/00 SP2 ALM/ALG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

More materials pertaining to mail cover requests made by the FBI from 1971 thru 1975.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIAL LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

woc/8

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - [illegible]. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

October 15, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

#MDR16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

16-13-00 SP2ALM/776

Reference is made to a request from SSC dated September 4, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI concerning the obtaining of income tax information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with respect to 140 individuals and/or organizations.

By letter dated September 23, 1975, the SSC requested specific information with respect to only nine individuals of the original 140 individuals and/or organizations.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum which furnishes additional material to supplement the memorandum dated September 29, 1975, previously furnished to SSC.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

10-15-75 pvd/slm

Delivered to AG

REC-30 62-116395-963

JWJ:cml
(9)

3 - ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JBA
PLM

84 NOV 13 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

October 15, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC request dated September 4, 1975, and SSC request dated September 23, 1975, requesting documents and certain information pertaining to the obtaining of income tax information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

Nine documents containing supplemental material relating to Robert M. Shelton and Charles C. Kissinger are being delivered with this memorandum.

This material supplements documents, previously furnished SSC by memorandum dated September 29, 1975, and completes the review of the entire case files of the nine individuals requested by the SSC.

1 - The Attorney General

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/TTG

62-116395

JWJ:cml
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

WPW/TWL

62-116395-963

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Re: United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect To Intelligence Activities (SSC)

NOTE:

This memorandum and memorandum dated 9/29/75 furnishes complete response to SSC requests of 9/4/75 and 9/23/75 relating to origination and use of information of an income tax nature by the FBI. The material being furnished was reviewed by SA R. D. Shea, IS-1 and SA L. E. Dean, IS-2.

Copies of nine documents are being retained in instant file.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/15/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/23/75 request and 9/4/75

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller Date: 10/20/75

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#mDE16

10-13-00 SP-2RLM/116

62-116395-918

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 9/23/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Treasury Department - Internal Revenue Service

#mDR16

10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/116

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Information furnished concerning obtaining of income tax information from Internal Revenue Service with respect to specific individuals and/or organizations.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

52W96

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

5

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Senate Select Committee (SSC) requests dated September 4, 1975, and September 23, 1975. Attached material completes response to SSC requests.

#MDE16

10/13/00 SP2 ALM JTG

RETAIN

62-1 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

92 3963 X

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (157-9-4) DATE: 11-7-64

FROM : SAC, Birmingham (157-835)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTE

The Bureau is requested to consider securing copies of income tax returns for the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN; ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON, 1708 - 15th Street, East, Tuscaloosa, Ala., or the ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE, a name by which the UKA is sometimes known.

Inquiry at the banks in Tuscaloosa has failed to reveal any accounts in the name of the UKA or ROBERT M. SHELTON, except a small personal account of SHELTON at the First National Bank of Tuscaloosa. Informants have advised that SHELTON is paid probably $8,000 per year for his work as Imperial Wizard. This money is sent in monthly to UKA headquarters in Tuscaloosa by the individual Klaverns and presumably put in some bank.

An examination of pertinent income tax returns might furnish information concerning the financial standing of SHELTON and UKA which could be used in this program.

d

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

157-9-4-6

REC-61

1812 d.B

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Birmingham
CBS:mfl
(4)

9 NOV 9 1964

EX-102

memo B'gham to Sect. OK. lat. JH
11/18/64
Snc.

56 DEC 2 1964

5

Mr. W. C. Sullivan 12/12/64

F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Ryan

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(ROBERT M. SHELTON)
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Robert Marvin Shelton is a full-time paid employee of the United Klans of America, Incorporated (UKA), Knights of the Ku Klux Klan with the title Imperial Wizard. He is probably the most influential and well-known Klansman in the United States. We are endeavoring as a counterintelligence technique to develop information discrediting Shelton or embarrassing to the UKA.

Through analysis of the income tax returns we may be able to determine secret sources of Shelton's income or depository used by him for the Klan organization. There is a possibility that he is misappropriating funds. We also have information Shelton has been on the payroll of a Mobile, Alabama, engineering firm as a public relations man.

In the event we determine such information we will consider exposing Shelton within the Klan organization, publicly or by furnishing information to the Internal Revenue Service.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended the Liaison Section obtain from the Internal Revenue Service two uncertified copies each of the Federal tax returns filed by Shelton and the UKA for the past five years. Attached is a memorandum for the use of the Liaison Section.

157-9-6
(1) - 157-552 (Shelton)

Enclosure

DR:lat:lcl
(7)

NOT RECORDED
170 [illegible] 1964

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

6

SAC, Birmingham (157-635)

2/23/65

Director, FBI (157-9-4)

1 - Mr. Gray
2 - Mr. Ryan

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.)
(ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON)

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

ReBUlet 11/7/64.

Attached are Xerox copies of Federal income tax returns filed by Robert M. and Betty Lou Shelton for the years 1959-63 inclusive. Also attached are Xerox copies of United States corporation tax returns filed by Robert M. Shelton as a corporate officer of the United Klans of America, Inc. (UKA), for the years 1961 (year ending 6/30/62) and 1963 (year ending 6/30/64) as well as a statement of no tax liability for the year ending 6/30/63. Information set forth in these tax returns is for lead purposes only and should not be set forth in the details of any investigative report.

The following comments and investigative instructions are noted in connection with these tax returns:

1. The individual returns filed jointly by Shelton and his wife during the period 1959 through 1963 indicate Shelton's occupation to be "salesman" and "manager" and in no instance do they indicate any employment or association with the Klan. This is in conflict with the corporate returns filed by Shelton for the UKA where he indicates his position as "Imperial Wizard" or "President."

2. Shelton's return for 1959 indicates it was prepared by Ed F. Allen, Jr., Certified Public Accountant, Post Office Box [illegible], Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The form and typing on the other tax returns, both corporate and individual, indicate a strong likelihood these too were prepared by Allen. You should review your files and conduct necessary investigation to determine if Allen is active in connection with financial matters relating to the Klan.

Enclosures - 8

1 - 157-552 (Shelton)
1 - 157-370 (UKA)

157-552-

NOT RECORDED
202 FEB 24 1965

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

3. In no instance in his individual tax returns does Shelton indicate the receipt of income for his position of Imperial Wizard or President of the UKA. However, his returns do indicate he has received some salary payments from such sources as "Tom Harris," "J.H. Mason," "Alabama Tire Company," "J & H Transport Co.," and "Vann & Johnson Lbr. Co." Inasmuch as your informants have advised Shelton spends almost all his time on Klan business and is paid almost $10,000 annually by the Klan, it would appear these salary sources are covers for payments made to him to compensate for his Klan employment. Necessary investigation should be conducted to resolve the true source of Shelton's income.

4. Shelton's return for 1960 shows other income received from a wrestling enterprise in Nashville, Tennessee. This source of income should also be checked to determine its legitimacy. It is possible Shelton's relationship with this enterprise also represents a cover for Klan activity or that the payments made to him were for efforts in behalf of the Klan.

5. In no instance does Shelton indicate any interest or dividend income. It is known he has a bank account at the First National Bank of Tuscaloosa. An attempt should be made to determine if he has failed to report interest actually earned. It is also noted the corporate returns filed by the UKA do not in any instance indicate interest received.

6. Shelton's return for 1963 lists other income of $500 as received from "Commissions - Dixie Engineering Co." Your attention is directed to an editorial that appeared in the Tuscaloosa "News," edition of 9/12/64, wherein it is indicated Shelton had been listed on the payroll of a Mobile engineering firm as a public relations man. Investigation should be conducted to determine Shelton's relationship with the Dixie Engineering Co. and also whether this company had a contract involving the use of Federal and/or state funds.

7. The corporate returns of the UKA, as filed by Shelton, in no instance indicate salary payments although both Shelton and his wife have been reported by your informants as full-time employees.

8. The gross income of Shelton and his wife for the year 1963 totals $1,070. This amount does not appear to be sufficient to support a family of five. All possible efforts should be made to develop evidence indicating Shelton is withholding or concealing income.

This investigation should be afforded prompt and continuing attention and the Bureau must be advised of all pertinent developments.

When all possible leads have been developed a blind memorandum should be prepared setting forth Shelton's background and current position with the Klan and all data probative of a possible violation of Internal Revenue laws. The Bureau will make this information available to appropriate Internal Revenue Service officials at the Seat of Government.

SENSITIVE CASE REPORT

(Route in Sequence)
To:
☐ District Director — District
☐ ARC- Southeast Regional Office
☐ Director — Division
☐ National Office

INSTRUCTIONS [illegible] through channels to ARC concerned in an original and three copies. For detailed instructions, see RC SE Memorandum No. 12-18.

1. NAME OF CASE OR IDENTIFICATION OF SITUATION

Robert M. Shelton
Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama

#MDE16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/116

a. CLASS OF TAX: Income Tax
b. TAXABLE PERIOD: 1963, 1964
c. AMOUNT OF TAX: $ Unknown
d. DOCKET NO., IF ANY:

2. PRINCIPAL ISSUES INVOLVED

Diverting Klan money to personal use.

3. REASONS FOR SENSITIVITY

Taxpayer is the Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, K.K.K., Inc. He is presently being investigated by the House Un-American Activities Committee of Congress. He and the Klan have had national publicity as a result of the Congressional hearings and civil rights activities in the South.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

157-5

NOT RECORDED
8 FEB 23 1966

4. ACTION TAKEN OR PROPOSED

The taxpayer has been contacted by Revenue Agent John H. Murrell on two occasions prior to referral to the Intelligence Division. He has indicated he will cooperate with the examining agents as soon as his records are released by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

This case was referred to the Intelligence Division only a few days ago; therefore, a realistic estimate of the completion date will not be practicable until at least next month.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SUBMITTED BY (Originator's Signature)	TITLE Special Agent	POST OF DUTY Birmingham	DATE 1-17-66
REVIEWED (District Director's Signature)	DISTRICT Birmingham		DATE JAN 18 1966
REVIEWED (ARC's Signature) [illegible]	TITLE ARC - INTELLIGENCE		DATE JAN 2

U. S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT

RC SE FORM - 19 (4-59)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Ryan

ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

Robert Marvin Shelton, born June 13, 1929, married, two children, resides at 17[illegible]-14th Street, East, Tuscaloosa, Alabama. He is presently employed with the title Imperial Wizard by the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Suite 401, Alston Building, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, at a reported annual salary of eight thousand dollars. The United Klans of America, Inc., is sometimes known as the Alabama Rescue Service.

It is requested two uncertified copies each of the Federal tax returns filed by Shelton and the United Klans of America, Inc., for the past five years be made available.

DR:lat:ltl
(8)

① - 157-552 (Shelton)

#MPR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JF16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Mohr ____
Wick ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: 6/26/67

FROM : P. D. Putnam

SUBJECT: ROBERT SHELTON
INTERNAL SECURITY - X

At the request of the Internal Security Section, Mr. William Parker, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), was contacted on 6/23/67 to determine the status of the IRS case on Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America.

Parker advised that IRS had initiated investigation of Shelton for possible tax evasion for the years 1963 through 1965. This case is still under investigation but indications are that Shelton owes no income taxes for 1963 and 1965 and owes $100 in taxes for the year 1964. According to Parker, it appears that the criminal tax investigation of Shelton will be closed and the case will be referred to the Audit Division of IRS for civil disposition.

ACTION:

For information.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Putnam

PDP:rab
(5)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

54

REC 6

JUN 30 1967

#MDL16

...TION CONTAINED
UNCLASSIFIED
10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTB

#MDR16
[illegible] 10/13/00 SP2ALM/176

Intelligence Division
P. O. Box 1631
Birmingham, Alabama 35201
JUL 8 1967

District Director, Internal Revenue Service
Attention: Chief, Intelligence Division
Birmingham, Alabama

Re re: ROBERT M. SHELTON
18 Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama 35476
63-64-037-1-1
Final

and

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC.
18 Lake Sherwood
Northport, Alabama 35476
63-73-022-1-1
Final

Representative: None

ST-103

REC-61

55

This report relates to the alleged evasion of income taxes for the years 1963 and 1964 by ROBERT M. SHELTON and the alleged wilful failure to file 1961 and 1963 corporate returns by the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC. It was also alleged that SHELTON diverted KLAN funds to his personal use. SHELTON has been Imperial Wizard of the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, K.K.K., INC. since 1961. He maintains an office for himself and the KLAN in his residence at 18 Lake Sherwood, Northport, Alabama 35476. He received mail for himself, the KLAN, and ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE at P. O. Box 2369, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401. ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE is a cover name for the KLAN organization in Alabama. He filed his individual income tax returns involved with the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama.

AUG 9 1967

Revenue Agent Wade Hutchinson, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, cooperated in the joint investigation. This case has been classified as sensitive.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION:

The investigation originated as a referral from Audit Division. It was alleged that SHELTON received $4,000.00 from DIXIE ENGINEERING COMPANY of Mobile, Alabama, during the years 1963 and 1964 and reported only $2,000.00 from this source during the aforementioned years. It was further alleged that SHELTON travels in a late model Cadillac, dresses well and recently built a new house while reporting very nominal amounts of income on his tax returns.

In respect to the KLAN, it was alleged that no corporate returns were filed for the years 1961 and 1963 and that corporate funds were being diverted to the personal use of corporate officers.

KU KLUX KLAN organizations were the subject of an investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee during the years 1965 and 1966. SHELTON was tried and convicted on a Contempt of Congress charge for refusing to testify and produce KLAN records before this committee. He was given the maximum sentence, one year in prison and $1,000 fine, on October 16, 1966. SHELTON's conviction is presently on appeal.

Evidence was offered before the House Un-American Activities Committee alleging SHELTON signed checks on the KLAN bank account in Tuscaloosa, payable to cash, aggregating $5,600.00, which were cashed at grocery stores and service stations; and that he allegedly paid for automobiles and a diamond ring with KLAN funds. SHELTON refused to confirm or deny these allegations when testifying before the Congressional Committee.

EXTENT AND RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION:

1. I obtained photostats of INVISIBLE EMPIRE, UNITED KLANS, KNIGHTS KU KLUX KLAN OF AMERICA, INC., incorporation papers from IMPERIAL WIZARD ROBERT SHELTON. They disclose incorporation date of February 20, 1961, in Fulton County, Georgia. The general purpose of the corporation, according to these papers, is: "to teach patriotism, to support the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and to maintain the liberty bequeathed to us by our forefathers, and to preserve the American way of life."

2. I obtained SHELTON's tax returns from the files of the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama. They disclose adjusted gross income as follows:

Year	Adjusted Gross Income
1961	$ 5,600.00
1962	4,200.00
1963	1,875.00
1964	3,576.62
1965	4,663.23
1966	10,051.21

Shelton claimed a standard deduction on each of the returns and they were filed timely and the tax paid which was shown to be due thereon.

3. I obtained KLAN tax returns from the files of the District Director, Birmingham, Alabama. They disclose gross receipts and taxable income as follows:

FYE	Gross Receipts	Taxable Income
6/30/62	$ 2,980.05	$ -0-
6/30/64	7,415.63	-0-
6/30/65	13,487.60	741.09
6/30/66	75,168.12	7,135.01

SHELTON gives President JOHNSON credit for increasing gross receipts of the KLAN from $7,415.00 in 1964 to $75,168.12 in 1966. He stated that every time "LBJ" gets on television and condemns the KLAN, he gets a flood of membership applications. He also stated that the publicity he received during the House Un-American Activities Committee hearing in 1965 and 1966 got him many new members.

4. Revenue Agent HUTCHINSON and I interviewed SHELTON on seven different occasions between April 5, 1967 and May 17, 1967. He instructed his wife, BETTY LOU SHELTON, and KLAN BOOKKEEPER, MRS. MELVIN SEXTON, to cooperate with us and make available all records of financial transactions of the KLAN. SHELTON stated that:

a. He did not furnish books and records of the KLAN to the House Un-American Activities Committee because his attorney advised him he could not waive his immunity on part of his records or on part of his testimony. He either had to take the "Fifth Amendment" all the way or disclose confidential records of KLAN membership which he had taken an oath not to disclose.

b. The books and records of the KLAN are audited at least once a year by KLAN EXAMINERS. The results of this examination is reported on the annual corporate income tax return.

c. The KLAN is a tax exempt organization and should not be required to file tax returns. SHELTON exhibited a letter from the State of Alabama Revenue Department which stated that, "The UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., is exempt from Alabama income tax and as long as it is operated not for profit and not for the gain of any individual it will not be necessary that corporate income tax returns be filed."

SHELTON acknowledged he had never applied for exempt status for the KLAN for Federal tax purposes because he would have to disclose information regarding KLAN membership which he was not at liberty to disclose.

d. SHELTON stated that the KLAN is on a "Form System." Each Klavern (Unit) prepares a Monthly Financial Report in triplicate and sends one copy to the Imperial Office in Tuscaloosa, one copy to the State Klan Office and retains one copy for the local unit file. This form lists the following financial information from each unit, each month:

63-65-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

FINANCIAL RECORD OF UNIT

Balance as per bank statement for last month or cash on hand $______
Minus outstanding checks including ones to Imperial & state $______
Plus outstanding deposits $______
Balance in bank or cash on hand as per this report $______

Monies Received During This Month

KLECTOKON FEE $____________
MONTHLY DUES $____________
RALLY COLLECTIONS $____________
SPECIAL PROJECT $____________
OTHER INCOME $____________
(ITEMIZE)____________
TOTAL INCOME $____________

Monies Paid Out During This Month

IMPERIAL TAX $____________
STATE TAX $____________
OTHER STATE DUES $____________
RENT OR BUILDING PAYMENT $____________
LIGHTS $____________
WATER $____________
GAS $____________
OTHER EXPENDITURES (ITEMIZE)$______
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $____________

e. SHELTON stated that he was authorized by the KLAN to draw $15,000.00 per year salary but 1966 was the first year the KLAN was financially able to pay him the full $15,000.00. Prior to 1966, his salary was determined at the end of each year by aggregating his withdrawals from the KLAN, reduced by the amount of documentation for travel and other KLAN expenses he had turned in during the year.

f. SHELTON converted his carport into an office and moved the KLAN office from the Alston Building in Tuscaloosa into his space May 1, 1966. The KLAN pays SHELTON $35.00 per month rent and $15.00 per month on his utilities.

g. SHELTON maintains that four of the eight $500.00 checks he received from DIXIE ENGINEERING COMPANY bounced. The reason the four $500.00 items do not show on his bank statements as a debit to the account was the balances at the time the checks were returned were less than $500.00 and he picked up the checks with cash or with another check from DIXIE ENGINEERING.

h. KLAN checks were made payable to "Cash" because just any one would not cash a KLAN check. When he left Tuscaloosa on KLAN business he never knew where he would be able to cash a check so he would make the check payable to cash and cash the check at some grocery store or service station where he was known. The amounts were charged to him on the KLAN books and he brought back gas tickets, motel bills, invoices, etc., to account for the

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

money spent. SHELTON stated that he travels 90,000 to 110,000 miles per year on KLAN business. He traveled 120,000 miles by automobile during the year 1966 on KLAN business.

5. Revenue Agent Hutchinson and I examined the KLAN's bank statements, cancelled checks, deposit tickets and cash receipts and disbursements books for FYE 6/30/62 through FYE 6/30/66. Receipts and expenses per books substantially reconciled with receipts and expenses per returns. For the four year period, net income was overstated on returns by $48.10. The 1963 corporate return filed by the KLAN was never located. We worked with a Profit and Loss Statement located in the KLAN file for that year which showed receipts of $3,879.44, disbursements of $3,634.89 and taxable income of $240.49. SHELTON claims he recalls mailing the 1963 return to the District Director in Birmingham. Mrs. CAROL LONG, KLAN BOOKKEEPER during this period, recalls preparing the return and giving it to SHELTON to sign and mail. Receipts during the period 2/20/61 to 6/30/61, the first four months of operation of the UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, were negligible and were included in receipts for the FYE 6/30/62.

6. Revenue Agent Hutchinson analyzed all checks written to cash and examined the supporting documents. Checks to cash totaled:

Year	Total	
1961	$ 156.18	
1962	184.92	
1963	1,033.75	
1964	5,104.69	
1965	11,787.45	$18,266.99

Checks written to cash and not supported by documentation were reported by SHELTON as income on his individual income tax return. Numerous checks to cash were signed by SHELTON and cosigned by T.M. MONTGOMERY or JAMES HENDRIX. It was brought out during the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings that T.M. MONTGOMERY was signed by CAROL LONG, KLAN BOOKKEEPER, and JAMES HENDRIX was signed by SHELTON's wife, BETTY LOU. SHELTON acknowledged that the MONTGOMERY and HENDRIX names on the checks were KLAN code names for MRS. LONG and MRS. SHELTON and that the names and signatures were on file at the bank. This information was corroborated by FIRST NATIONAL BANK VICE PRESIDENT J. H. PERDUE.

7. Receipts per monthly reports of various KLAN UNITS were compared with total receipts per return for FYE 6/30/64 and 6/30/65. Total receipts per reports and total receipts per returns were as follows:

Year	Receipts per Reports	Receipts per Returns	Variance
6/30/64	$ 5,557.25	$ 7,415.63	$1,858.38
6/30/65	17,552.40	18,487.60	935.20
	$23,109.65	$25,903.23	$2,793.58

The variance between receipts per reports and receipts per return consisted mainly of monies which came in without a report and anonymous contributions.

8. Monthly reports of various KLAN UNITS were pulled at random from six different states. The reports were traced individually to Cash Receipts Journal, to deposit tickets and to bank statements, without discrepancy.

63-64-037-1-1
63-73-022-1-1

9. Photostats of several thousand checks from various KLAN UNITS, payable to SHELTON or ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE, were secured from the House Un-American Activities Committee file. I found only one of these checks which was not endorsed "For deposit only" to ALABAMA RESCUE SERVICE account in Tuscaloosa. A check dated 3/28/64 payable to ROBERT M. SHELTON, in amount of $50.00, on the account of WHITE PATRIOTS, P. O. Box 7094, Montgomery, Alabama, was endorsed by SHELTON and THE AUTO-RITE STORE in Tuscaloosa. The amount was entered in receipts on the KLAN books as a donation from WHITE PATRIOTS of Montgomery. SHELTON stated that the $50.00 was for four recaps on his automobile which was used for KLAN business.

10. Transcript of the testimony of ERNEST N. MERRIWETHER, President, DIXIE ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Mobile, Alabama, was secured from the House Un-American Activities Committee file together with photostats of eight $500.00 checks payable to SHELTON during 1963 and 1964. MERRIWETHER was not contacted personally on advice of U. S. Attorney ROBERT JANSEN, Southern Judicial District of Alabama. MERRIWETHER has several tax suits pending in Mobile at present.

MERRIWETHER testified that he paid SHELTON the following checks:

Date	Amount	
7/14/63	$500.00	
9/24/63	500.00	
11/6/63	500.00	
11/13/63	500.00	$2,000.00
1/8/64	$500.00	
2/13/64	500.00	
3/13/64	500.00	
4/22/64	500.00	$2,000.00

SHELTON reported $500.00 from this source on his 1963 return and $1,500.00 on his 1964 return. He contends four of the $500.00 checks "bounced." The ledger sheets on his personal account at the FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF TUSCALOOSA and the deposit tickets to this account disclosed eight $500.00 deposits to the account from DIXIE ENGINEERING and only one debit to the account for $500.00 for a returned DIXIE ENGINEERING check.

D. L. THOMAS, accountant for DIXIE ENGINEERING, stated that all eight checks to SHELTON were posted to their disbursements journal and postings to this journal were made from checks after they cleared the bank.

The eight checks in question were written on six different bank accounts. The banks were contacted and their records indicate all eight checks were eventually paid. However, SHELTON's five exemptions and a standard deduction for the year 1963 will offset his reported income plus the additional $1,500.00 on his 1963 return. The additional $500.00 in 1964 is more than

offset by unclaimed depreciation on his automobile for that year. He will owe a small amount of self-employment tax on the unreported net amounts.

11. Revenue Agent Hutchinson and I examined SHELTON's account at LORCH's DIAMOND SHOP in Tuscaloosa from opening purchase on 6/11/62 to date. The diamond ring alleged to have been purchased with KLAN funds during the years 1964 and 1965 was purchased June 11, 1962 by MRS. SHELTON for $339.60, which amount includes carrying charges. She paid $30.00 per month on this account until November 8, 1963, at which time the account was paid in full. The checks drawn on the KLAN account to LORCH's DIAMOND SHOP during the years 1964 and 1965 were payments on an Invicta Tape Recorder purchased on 5/18/64 for $62.95 and a Webcor Recorder purchased on same date for $167.00. These items were purchased for the KLAN and charged to his account, according to SHELTON, because LORCH's would not extend credit to the KLAN.

12. Sales Invoice from STANSELL PONTIAC-CADILLAC COMPANY, 2115 15th Street, Tuscaloosa, shows the Cadillac purchased by SHELTON to be a used 1961 CADILLAC purchased on November 18, 1964, for $612.00 cash and a trade-in of a 1963 Pontiac Grand Prix. SHELTON said he traded the 1963 Pontiac on a 1961 Cadillac because the Pontiac had over 100,000 miles on it. The KLAN made three payments on the Pontiac for SHELTON but none on the Cadillac. A check was issued on the KLAN account on 6/15/63 to STANSELL PONTIAC-CADILLAC COMPANY for $277.66 and another check to the same company on 9/27/63 for $136.33. SHELTON failed to include these payments in income for the year 1963 and did not claim any depreciation on the Pontiac for that year.

13. SHELTON purchased his residence in Northport, Alabama, in April, 1966. The property was purchased from Lake Real Estate Company in Tuscaloosa for $20,876.47. He paid $11,000.00 down and assumed a $1,000.00 second mortgage held by Lake Real Estate Company. Balance of $8,876.47 was financed at FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

SHELTON acquired the $11,000.00 down payment by selling his residence at 1703 East 15th Street in Tuscaloosa for $5,000.00 and drew $6,000.00 accrued salary from the KLAN, which was included on his W-2 statement from the KLAN for the year 1966.

In June, 1966, SHELTON purchased the adjoining lot to his home for $1,500.00. This amount was raised by selling various books at KLAN rallys and through the mail. A separate record was kept by MRS. SHELTON of this income and was reported on SHELTON's 1966 income tax return.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The investigation disclosed that: (1) Substantially all checks received by the KLAN are deposited to the KLAN account in Tuscaloosa; (2) Currency received and cash donations are recorded on the KLAN books as receipts; (3) Checks drawn on the KLAN account payable to cash are substantiated by

receipts and invoices; (4) there is no indication of income being received by the KLAN and not posted to their books; (5) controversial receipts by SHELTON from DIXIE ENGINEERING are offset by his exemptions and allowable depreciation on his automobile; (6) allegations that SHELTON purchased a diamond ring and a Cadillac automobile with KLAN funds are negated by available evidence, and (7) failure to file 1961 and 1963 returns by the KLAN resulted in no injury to the government.

I recommend that this case be closed in the Intelligence Division files because of lack of criminal prosecution potential and referred back to the Audit Division for such action as they deem appropriate. Audit Group Supervisor G. D. Grin advises he has no objection to this proposed withdrawal.

(signed) R. S. Phillips

Robert S. Phillips
Special Agent

APPROVED:

(Signed) Floyd D. Moore

Chief, Intelligence Division
Birmingham District
P. O. Box 1631
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6/15/70

FROM : G. C. Moore

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. J. V. Walsh
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
—RM

The Birmingham Office has requested Bureau to secure copies of 1969 Income Tax Return for United Klans of America, Inc. (UKA), the Alabama Rescue Service, a name by which the UKA is sometimes known, and Robert Marvin Shelton, Imperial Wizard of UKA. Birmingham desires to review these returns for information concerning financial standing of UKA and Shelton and any information which might be of assistance in instituting counterintelligence measures.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Liaison Section obtain from Internal Revenue Service two ~~certified~~ copies each of 1969 Income Tax Return filed by Shelton, the UKA and/or Alabama Rescue Service. Attached is a memorandum for use of Liaison Section.

Enclosure

HEH:cae/mkz
(7)

REC-71 157-9-4-151

25 JUN 23 1970

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY 5P-2ALM/116

58 JUL 1 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1-Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1-Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1-Mr. G. C. Moore
1-Liaison Section
1-Mr. J. V. Walsh
1-Mr. H. E. Helgeson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2ALM/JTG
#MDR16

June 16, 1970

ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON
UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

Robert Marvin Shelton, Social Security Number 424-34-0016, resides Number 18, Lake Sherwood, Star Route, Northport, Alabama. His wife is Betty Lou Shelton. He is employed as the Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

The United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, sometimes known as the Alabama Rescue Service, is located in Northport, Alabama.

Please furnish two ~~certified~~ copies each of the 1969 Federal Tax Return filed by Shelton; the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and/or the Alabama Rescue Service.

HEH:jlm
(9)

It is requested no investigation of subject be instituted solely on the basis of the above information.

NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 6-15-70, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of Hate Groups, RM," prepared by HEH:cae/mkz.

Delivered [illegible] to [illegible] IRS 6-[illegible]-70

REC-35

EX-109

25 JUN 22 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

US Treasury Department

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date: JUL 2 1968

In reply refer to: CP:C:D

Honorable J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

In re: Charles Clark Kissinger, Jr.
6306 North Lakewood Avenue or
5401 South Ellis Avenue
Chicago, Illinois

C. Clark Kissinger Jr

In response to your request of May 31, 1968, we are enclosing a copy of the income tax return of Charles C. and Judy J. Kissinger, 6306 N. Lakewood, Chicago, Illinois 60626 (SSN: 355-34-0441 and SSN: 352-32-2937, respectively), for the year 1966.

Persons having access to this document should be cautioned as to the confidentiality of the information contained therein and as to the penalty provisions of Section 7213 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 1905, Title 18, United States Code, regarding the unauthorized disclosure of such information. Judy J. Kissinger

We will write you concerning the 1967 return as soon as possible.

EX-110 REC 37 100-441138-26

16 JUL 11 1968

Very truly yours,

D. W. Bacon

D. W. Bacon
Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance)

Enclosure

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

54 JUL 22 1968

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

MD 127 26

ENCLOSURE
1

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

6306 N. Lakewood
Chicago, Ill. 60626
April 17, 1967

District Director
Internal Revenue Service
Chicago, Ill. 60602

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is our 1967 income tax return. Salary for which there is no W-2 forms comes from several short or part time jobs which did not withhold.

Just as last year we cannot, of course, voluntarily pay our tax so long as the war in Vietnam continues. Should the government run short of funds in the meantime we suggest repeal of the oil depletion allowance or any other of the tax breaks for the wealthy.

Sincerely yours,

C. Clark Kissinger
Judy Jo Kissinger

C. Clark Kissinger
Judy Jo Kissinger

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JFK

26

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice

FMDR16

10-13-00 SP2ALM/JTG

62-116395

October 14, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General's Office dated September 9, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 8, 1975, SSC requests and specifically to the following Items in those requests: Items 8, 9, 11, 13 and 14.

Relative to Item 8, upon review of the file the only information located which is suggestive of being that to which Mr. Hoover referred in his written statement on the Baumgardner September 16, 1963, memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, is the prior memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan August 23, 1963. That document was previously furnished under Item 12 of this request.

Although there is no way of knowing just what Mr. Hoover was referring to with his statement, the August 23, 1963, memorandum summarizes a detailed memorandum which was attached to it and advises of Communist Party, USA, efforts being discontinued because of being "ineffective." Mr. Hoover wrote a comment on the August 23, 1963, memorandum to the effect that he could not ignore certain matters as having only "infinitestimal" effect on the efforts to exploit the American Negro by the communists.

JDP:lek|ek
(9) ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-964

JBA
PVS

WOC

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Item 11 requested all materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963, memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell." An extensive review has been conducted of all logical files, abstracts and indices in an effort to find documents relating specifically to such conversations described in the request. The attached materials represent the only documents located that appear to be related in any manner to these conversations.

Item 13 requested the "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1953," and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956," which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page two of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963, memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

These two documents have been located. The 1953 document captioned "The Communist Party and the Negro" is a 103-page study of the interest and activities of the Communist Party, USA, in Negro-related causes and covers the years 1919-1952. The October, 1956, study is entitled "The Communist Party and the Negro, 1953--1956" and it supplements the 1953 study, and consists of 57 pages. SA Elmer W. Larson, Jr., discussed this matter with Mr. Michael Epstein of the SSC Staff on October 8, 1975. Mr. Epstein agreed that these documents need not be delivered at this time. It was agreed that the documents will be made available for access. If upon review copies are desired they will be provided. (66-04-1775; 100-3-75-1270)

1 - The Attorney General

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 9, 1975

#MDR16
DATE 10/13/00 SP2ALM/MG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached is a list of FBI materials, delivery of which is requested ~~by September 15, 1975~~. according to agreed priorities. JTE

I would also appreciate your making available for Committee staff access, all Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1963. Upon examination of these files, delivery thereafter will be orally requested for specific items in accordance with the provisions of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department which governs Committee requests for materials.

per r/o [illegible]

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

1st to AC 1-DAC
JDP/let 10/14/75 Enc. 2

Receipt of material
covered by Fonda case
subpoena hereby acknowledged.
JTE

62-1163[illegible]-964

RECEIVED
SEP 9 1975

ENCLOSURE

September 8, 1975

DOCUMENT REQUEST

1. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of the informant) of the 2/12/62 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, FBI, subject "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C (00: Atlanta)."

NP

2. All materials reflecting the steps taken by the FBI which "prevent(ed) the CPUSA from seizing control of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People," as stated in the last paragraph of page 4 of the enclosure captioned "Communist Party USA" which was attached to Director Hoover's January 10, 1961 letter to Robert Kennedy.

Jack? P. NOT OURS

✓3. Reports which were submitted by the Atlanta and New York field offices pursuant to the following instructions which were contained in the second paragraph of page 1 of the February 27, 1962 letter from the FBI Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C, Office of Origin: Atlanta," (a copy of which was disseminated to the New York field office:

August

NP

> New York and Atlanta are instructed to review their files and prepare a report suitable for dissemination which will include all information of a security nature plus complete background data.

4. The "Bureau letters to Atlanta, 7/20/62, to Mobile, 7/20/62, and to Savannah, 9/17/62" which are referenced in the first paragraph of the 10/11/62 memorandum from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C, (00:Atlanta)."

NP

5. The "Correspondence received from the Atlanta and New York Offices" as indicated in the first sentence of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C".

NP

6. All materials reflecting instructions issued to the New York and Atlanta field offices "to furnish the Bureau recommendations concerning a communist infilitration investigation of (SCLC) and the recommendations received from those two field offices for a "communist infiltration investigation of SCLC", as indicated in the second paragraph of Mr. Baumgardner's October 22, 1962 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security-C".

P SPECIFY TIME FRAME

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2ALM/lt6

3

7. The "necessary Manual changes" which were "attached for approval" to Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist."

NP

8. All materials which support the following statement of Director Hoover which was noted on Mr. Baumgardner's September 16, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-Communist":

P MORE SPECIFIC

> Just a few weeks ago you contended that the Communist influence in the racial movement was ineffective and infinitesimal.

9. The September 5, 1963 letterhead memorandum to the Attorney General and "the related prior memoranda" which are referred to in the first paragraph of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell."

NP

10. The July 3, 1963 letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Hunter Pitts O'Dell which was attached to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

NP

11. All materials reflecting or pertaining to conversations between Courtney Evans and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, and/or between Mr. Evans and the Attorney General, as described in Assistant Attorney General Marshall's September 20, 1963 memorandum to the Director captioned "Hunter Pitts O'Dell".

?NP

12. The "Brief on the above-captioned matter and subsequent memoranda on the same subject matter" which are referred to in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

O.K. BUT NEED TO DISCUSS SUBSEQUENT MEMORANDA

13. The "detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1958" and the "analysis in this same field prepared by the Bureau in 1956" which are referred to in the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of Mr. Sullivan's September 25, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C."

1963?

14. All materials reflecting or pertaining to Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney Committee", as referred to in his February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning a 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, as well as an unexcised copy of the February 5 memorandum. NP

15. All materials which reflect the basis for the following statements which are contained in Mr. Baumgardner's May 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Internal Security Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, Administrative Matter": Married ?

a. "About three months prior to the March on Washington (8/28/63), we intensified our investigation concerning communist influence into the racial movement. . . .";

b. "Martin Luther King, head of SCLC, has challenged the Bureau on this point."

16. All materials reflecting the "previous arrangements" referred to in the November 18, 1964 memorandum from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, subject "Sarah McClendon, Background Briefing Sessions Group, Appointment with the Director, 10:00 a.m., 11/18/64 (10:05 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.)" ? contacted 7/8 NP

17. All materials reflecting, concerning, or pertaining to:

a. "(S)tatements made by Martin Luther King concerning the situation in Albany, Georgia, at the time he highly criticized the FBI. His statements were made on 11/18/62 during an interview in the Robing Room of the Riverside Church in New York City where King had just preached a sermon." (This quotation is taken from the penultimate paragraph of page 2 of the 11/19/64 memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. DeLoach captioned "Director's Briefing of Women Reporters on 11/18/64") R

b. Comments, responses, and recommendations made, inspections conducted, and/or any other actions taken as a result of the statements of Dr. King which are described in Item 17.a. above. Coordinated Inspection Div ? TIME FRAME

18. Identification of the author of the notation "Being Handled, 11/20/64, D" which appears at the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters." Nugent Wick

19. All materials reflecting the manner in which Director Hoover's notation was "(b)ing handled" as noted on the bottom of page 4 of Mr. Rosen's November 20, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Telegram from Martin Luther King, Jr., dated November 19, 1964, Civil Rights Matters," together with all materials reflecting what steps were taken and by whom.

P

20. The response to John Doar's August 19, 1964 letter to Mr. James R. Malley which requested a name check with respect to persons who were delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

NP

21. The division and section assignment of James R. Malley as of August 19, 1964.

NP

Coord W/ Adm Div

22. All materials which reflect approval of Mr. Sullivan's recommendations which were contained in the latter's November 22 and 27, 1964 memoranda to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

PREV. HANDLED 7/14

23. All materials reflecting contacts or communications between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mohr, and between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. DeLoach, as described in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

P HANDLED

24. The table of contents page(s) and/or chapter or section headings of:

a. The article captioned "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" which was attached to Mr. Sullivan's 10/15/63 memorandum to Mr. Belmont under the same caption.

NP

b. The paper which was the up-to-date revision of the article described in Item 24 (a) above and which paper was attached to Mr. Sullivan's November 22, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

c. The memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which was transmitted with the December 21, 1964 letter from Director Hoover to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.

d. The document which was the "current revision of the previous analysis captioned 'Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis'" and which document was enclosed with Mr. Brennan's April 10, 1967 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Communist Influence in Racial Matters - A Current Analysis."

e. The "current study" entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr. - A Current Analysis" which was enclosed with Director Hoover's March 14, 1968 letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall.

? 25. All materials reflecting the printing of any of the documents identified in Item 24. a. - e. above. (Do not supply the documents themselves.)

?. What mean

26. An identification of any materials (e.g. transcripts) which were attached to any of the documents identified in Item 24 a. - e. above. (Do not supply the attachments themselves.)

? 27. All materials reflecting that:

a. "Mr. Tolson has suggested," and

b. "the Director agreed,"

that "the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr. be brought up to date as reflected in the first paragraph of Mr. Moore's 2/29/68 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

Klein 28. All materials which reflect any recommendations for, and/or decisions relating to, the sending of Director Hoover's August 25, 1967 letter to specified field offices captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Internal Security."

Cointelpro Ryan?

Klein 29. All materials reflecting the approval of proposals contained in Mr. G. C. Moore's February 29, 1968 memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence."

Ryan?

30. All materials reflecting that "(w) ith Bureau approval, (William C. Sullivan) had previously given (Ralph) McGill some of the basic facts concerning King's connections with communism and his (deleted)," as indicated in Mr. Sullivan's January 21, 1965 memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont, subject "Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - C."

31. All materials reflecting contact by Special Agent Alden F. Miller or by any FBI Headquarters officials with Eugene Patterson concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., as proposed by Special Agent Miller in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sullivan on January 15, 1964. (See Mr. Sullivan's 1/16/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C.")

32. All materials reflecting the "further recommendation as to whether we are in a position at that time (the end of a 90-day period, or sooner if conditions permit) to take further action against King and the SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau," as promised in Mr. Sullivan's December 24, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

33. All materials reflecting "the suggestion recently made by (the Atlanta field office) that another conference be held at the Seat of Government with representatives of (the Atlanta) office and the New York Office," as indicated in the second paragraph of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

to #16

34. All materials reflecting recommendations for, and approval of, the sending of the Director's April 1, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

35. All materials comprising the "separate correspondence" between FBI Headquarters and the Atlanta field office concerning the "specific matters dealt with in Atlanta's letter (of 4/14/64)" as indicated in the Director's 4/24/64 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

Search to end 36. The communication from the Atlanta field office to FBI Headquarters by which "this publication has previously been furnished to the Bureau on 6/26/64," as stated in the second paragraph of page 3 of the 7/7/64 letter from the SAC, Atlanta, to the FBI Director, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, IS-C."

Deegan's Office 37. The "separate correspondence" by which the Atlanta field office was "directed to furnish the Bureau available information concerning the alleged escapades of (the Reverend Ralph) Abernathy, including the obtaining of official court records," as referred to in the Director's July 23, 1964 letter to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C."

38. The letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers which was originally attached to Mr. Sullivan's 11/27/64 memorandum to Mr. Belmont, subject "Communism and the Negro Movement -- A Current Analysis." (See note on 11/27/64 memorandum indicating that the letter was "revised.")

39. "The letter" which is the subject of the first and second paragraphs of Director Hoover's February 5, 1964 memorandum concerning his 9:51 a.m. telephone call from the Attorney General, and which letter the Director told the Attorney General, he would "check on" and any other materials relating to "the letter".

P 40. All materials concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. being named "Man of the Year" by Time Magazine in December 1963 - January 1964.

P 41. All materials concerning or pertaining to Dr. King's Papal audience in Rome in September 1964.

P 42. Speech delivered by Director Hoover at Loyola College in November 1964, and all materials pertaining thereto.

NP 43. All Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") from 1963 until 1968 for:

a. William D. Campbell, and
b. John Matter.

P ATLANTA

45. All materials reflecting, concerning or pertaining to electronic surveillance, feasibility studies or surveys, physical surveillance, or photographic surveillances, and/or any proposals, recommendations or discussions of any of the foregoing surveillances, studies or surveys, with respect to Dr. King's "hideaway", or Fred Bennett's apartment, or premises located at 3006 Delmar Lane, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia, or with respect to any other premises, apartment, or "hideaway", used, owned, or leased by Dr. King or Fred Bennett.

Klein

Cointelpro Ryan?

46. The following materials which are referred to in the October 9, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C":

a. "NYlet 9/26/62";
b. "further steps to carry out this counterintelligence plan will be handled at the Bureau";
c. "memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption dated October 8, 1962, ARW:cdb."

47. The "ATairtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated 4/1/64 captioned "CPUSA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security-C" and "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C", which are referenced in the 4/13/64 Airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York and Atlanta, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal SEcurity - C (Negro Question).

48. An unexcised copy (except for the identity of informants) of the 8/15/66 airtel from the SAC, New York, to the Director, subject "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Secuirty - C (Stanley David Levison.)"

49. The Memorandum which "the Director had noted" as referred to in the NOTE at the bottom of the 4/13/65 letter from the Director to the SAC, New York, subject "Communist Party, USA Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Nicholas A. Kourambis) (Negro Question)."

Klein Cointelpro Ryan?

50. All materials reflecting "comments" and "specific recommendations" submitted by the Atlanta, Chicago, and New York field offices as the result of the instructions contained in the last paragraph of the May 18, 1967 letter from the Director the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Martin Luther King)."

Klein Cointelpro Ryan?

51. All materials reflecting the product of the "comprehensive review of Levison's Bureau case file" as indicated in the NOTE on the 7/18/66 airtel from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Stanley David Levison)."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/14/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/8/75 request, Items 8,9,11,13
and 14

Originating Office: FBI 9 30

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Jr. Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/HG

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-964

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/8/75, items 8,9,11,13 and 14

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

~~TS~~

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/JFG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials pertaining to Martin Luther King,Jr. and SCLC: As they relate to CP, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters and Hunter Pitts O'Dell; Director Hoover's "off the record" discussion before "the Rooney committee".

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW 5-Wolf

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

5

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 9

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2ALM/JT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/KS/6
#MDR16

The Attorney General

September 5, 1963

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Bland
- 1 - Mr. Reddy
- 1 - Mr. Shubatt

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

In my letter dated August 20, 1963, information was set forth regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell's possible association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and information regarding Reverend King's statement indicating O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on Reverend King's staff.

On August 30, 1963, at 7:25 P.M., O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau entering the building located at 312 West 125th Street, New York, New York. O'Dell remained in the building in excess of one hour. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference occupies one of the several offices which are located in that building.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

100-358916

REC 46

258

- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General
- 1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
  Assistant Attorney General

19 SEP 6 1963

ST-108

MAILED 25
SEP 5 - 1963
COMM-FBI

WFS:erc
(14)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

347

SEP 6 - 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General August 20, 1963

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY 3657 VRF LAG
ON 11-1-82

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Reddy

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE

In my letter dated August 2, 1963, information was set forth regarding a United Press International release issued on July 29, 1963, at Atlanta, Georgia, reporting that the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had agreed to submit to Attorney General Eugene Cook of Georgia an affidavit explaining the employment in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) of a man linked by Congressional committees with the Communist Party. The release stated that King sent an attorney to Cook's office to determine what the Attorney General wanted in connection with his inquiry into the relationship with the SCLC of Jack O'Dell. The release concluded with the statement "King said last week O'Dell had worked for SCLC on two occasions but his connections with the integration organization were severed for good last June 26." It is noted that the subject is also known as Jack O'Dell.

On August 16, 1963, a confidential source of the Bureau advised that King had been alerted by his assistant, Wyatt Tee Walker, to an article appearing in the Atlanta "Constitution" on August 16, 1963, regarding King's association with O'Dell. Walker told King that the article referred to a letter written by Georgia Attorney General Cook in which Cook stated that O'Dell is a known communist and in which Cook demanded an explanation from King as to why O'Dell was placed on King's staff.

MAILED 6
AUG 20 1963
COMM-FBI

King instructed Walker to reply to Cook's letter by stating that O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on King's staff. Cook was to be further advised that O'Dell came to him, King, through the Democratic Party of the Bronx, New York, and that King "has nothing to hide."

REC- 45

100-358916 — 252

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

EBR:erc
(13)

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

57 AUG 22 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Confidential~~" because it contains information, the disclosure of which might reveal the source and adversely affect the national defense. The source is NY 4099-S*.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/
#m DR16

The Attorney General   August 2, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Reference is made to my letter dated July 31, 1963, concerning an article in the July 25, 1963, issue of the Atlanta, Georgia, "Constitution" regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell and entitled "Onetime Communist Organizer Heads Rev. King's Office in N.Y." My letter concluded that a telephone call to the office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in New York City on July 30, 1963, resulted in a statement by an unidentified female employee that Hunter Pitts O'Dell was no longer employed by the SCLC.

A United Press International release issued on July 29, 1963, at Atlanta, Georgia, reported that the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had agreed to submit to Georgia Attorney General Eugene Cook an affidavit explaining the employment in the SCLC of a man linked by Congressional committees with the Communist Party. The release states that King sent an attorney to Cook's office to determine what the Attorney General wanted in connection with his inquiry into the relationship with the SCLC of Jack O'Dell. The release further states that "King said last week O'Dell had worked for SCLC on two occasions but his connections with the integration organization were severed for good last June 26."

For your additional information in this regard, investigation by this Bureau's New York Office has developed information that, on July 2, 1963, and July 19, 1963, one "J. H. O'Dell" was the payee of checks in the amounts of $333.62 and $2,372.96, respectively, drawn by the SCLC. These checks were deposited to the account of Hunter Pitts O'Dell in a New York City bank.

On July 19, 1963, Charles Finnerty, Supervisor of the E. J. Creeden Company, 118 East 25th Street, New York City, the company which provides mailing service

REC-4
100-358916 — 251

(SEE NOTE PAGE THREE)

FJB:erc
(13)

REC'D-READING ROOM
AUG 7 12 39 PM '63
FBI

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

for the SCLC, was advised by O'Dell that he, O'Dell, had a big mailing list coming up in August. Finnerty asked O'Dell to submit written instructions but O'Dell replied that he would get together with Finnerty when Finnerty returned from vacation on August 5, 1963. Finnerty had previously on July 17, 1963, telephoned and spoken to O'Dell at the New York Office of the SCLC.

On July 22, 1963, O'Dell visited the offices of the Creeden Company and turned over to Mrs. Dorothy Creeden, the company's secretary, a check for $200 to be credited to the account of the SCLC at the Creeden Company.

On July 31, 1963, a pretext telephone call to the New York Office of the SCLC was answered by a person identifying herself as Ruth Bailey. When asked if Hunter Pitts O'Dell was still employed by the SCLC, Ruth Bailey stated that she was not in a position to say. It is known that Ruth Bailey has been employed in the New York Office of the SCLC for some time; nevertheless, she commented to the person making the telephone call that she had not been employed by the SCLC very long.

Also on July 31, 1963, O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau's New York Office entering the premises at 312 West 125th Street, New York City, which house the New York Office of the SCLC. O'Dell remained for several minutes and then returned to his residence.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

NOTE:

In view of current controversy regarding whether or not Hunter Pitts O'Dell, who was elected to the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959, under an alias, is still employed by the SCLC, the New York Office is under instructions to endeavor to definitely resolve this question. We will furnish any pertinent information developed to the Attorney General.

The Attorney General July 31, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland 1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

MM016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2 ALM/KS

There is attached for your consideration a copy of a letter dated July 27, 1963, received from Senator Richard B. Russell, together with a copy of the July 25, 1963, article in the Atlanta, Georgia, "Constitution" entitled "Onetime Communist Organizer Heads Rev. King's Office in N.Y." I have advised Senator Russell by letter of this date that, in line with Departmental policy, I am referring his letter to you.

You have been kept advised by communications, the latest of which was dated July 17, 1963, captioned "Request From Senator Monroney Concerning Racial Agitation," of Hunter Pitts O'Dell's association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition, copies of investigative reports concerning O'Dell have been submitted to the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice on a continuing basis. The last such report submitted was dated June 28, 1963, at New York, New York.

For your further information, a telephone call to the office of the SCLC in New York City on July 30, 1963, resulted in a statement by an unidentified female employee that Hunter Pitts O'Dell was no longer employed by the SCLC.

MAILED 25
AUG 2 - 1963
COMM-FBI

Enclosures - 2
REC- 25
100-358916 - 250

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosures - 2)

EX-103
1 - Mr. Burke Marshall (Enclosures - 2)
Assistant Attorney General

AUG 9 1963

NOTE:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same subject, dated 7/30/63, FBR:DB:erc:pw.

FBR:dfm:erc

(15)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

REC- 42

ST-110

Director, FBI

57-6-133

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

July 17, 1963

1 - Mr. M. A. Jones
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Section tickler
1 - Mr. Garner

REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONRONEY
CONCERNING CURRENT RACIAL AGITATION

#mori6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP JALM/JTG
ON 11-8-00

For your information, there is enclosed a copy of a letter dated July 12, 1963, received from Senator A. S. Mike Monroney which is self-explanatory. I have advised Senator Monroney by letter of this date that, in line with Departmental policy, I am referring his letter to you.

In substance, the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) is not able to assume a role of leadership in the racial unrest at this time. However, the Party is attempting to exploit the current racial situation through propaganda and participation in demonstrations and other activities wherever possible. Through these tactics, the Party hopes ultimately to progress from its current supporting role to a position of decisive leadership.

Much of the CPUSA's hope to play a more decisive role is linked with Stanley Levison's role as an advisor to Martin Luther King. Party officials regard Levison, a secret member of the CPUSA, as being engaged in the most important work in the Party today because of his association with King. Levison has reportedly stated that "King is a wholehearted Marxist who has studied it (Marxism), believes in it, agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly." Levison is reputed to have written the speech which King delivered at the convention of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) in Florida in December, 1961.

When King indicated in June, 1962, that he wanted another administrative assistant, Levison recommended Hunter Pitts O'Dell, who had been elected to the National Committee of the CPUSA in December, 1959, under the pseudonym Cornelius James. King adopted Levison's suggestion and employed O'Dell in his organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). When the press identified O'Dell as a communist in late [illegible], 1962, King announced that O'Dell had resigned from the SCLC. However, O'Dell continues to associate with King to this

NOTE: See memorandum, Smith to Sullivan, 7/17/63, RSG:JMS/aab:jdi, re: SENATOR A. S. MIKE MONRONEY, REQUEST FOR DIRECTOR'S VIEWS RE CURRENT RACIAL AGITATION.

RSG:JMS/jdd:aab
(15)

SEE NOTE ON PAGE THREE RE CLASSIFICATION

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

27 AUG 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC'D-7-17-63

The Attorney General

Recently, information received indicates that, while Levison still retains his strong communist convictions and still acts as an effective Party advisor to King, he is becoming critical of the Party's role in the relationship. He believes the Party has lost prestige among Negroes lately because it has not been sufficiently aggressive and effective in promoting civil rights for the Negro and otherwise actively immersing itself in Negro causes.

King reportedly attended a Labor Day weekend seminar in 1957 at the Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee. According to a publication circulated concerning this meeting by the Georgia Commission of Education, which allegedly has an undercover agent in attendance, the meeting was held to discuss methods and tactics for precipitating racial strife and disturbances. While CPUSA members were on the school staff and the school followed the policy of welcoming communist students, the CPUSA was not in control of the school.

See memo Bland to Sullivan 7-1-63

In June, 1960, the SCLC was reported to have ~~[illegible]~~ solicited funds from the Soviet and Czechoslovakian Embassies and the Rumanian Legation in Washington, D. C. Same caption

In recent years, King has signed a petition urging abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and petitions requesting the release of two imprisoned Communist Party leaders.

NAACP officials are aware that the NAACP is a communist target. As a result, the NAACP has taken a firm stand against communism and has warned its branches to be constantly alert against communist efforts to infiltrate them. The constitution of the NAACP contains an anticommunist clause which prohibits membership in the organization by known Communist Party members.

There is no indication that any of the key figures of the NAACP are or have been members of the Communist Party. Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, has been strongly anticommunist and has endeavored to keep the NAACP free of communists.

The following national officers of the NAACP had communist front affiliations--in no instance extensive--a number of years ago, but none is known to have been a Communist Party member: Arthur Spingarn, President; Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood, Chairman of the Board of Directors; and Robert L. Carter, General Counsel.

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

There is no evidence that any of the following top leaders of CORE are or have been Communist Party members: James L. Farmer, National Director; James T. McCain, ~~Field~~ Director; and Gordon R. Carey, Director, Program and Training Department. Carey was one of the founders of the Conference of Young Socialists (CYS) in 1957 and was a member at large of the Executive Committee of CYS. The CYS was controlled by the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party, which has been designated as subversive pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Full details of the activities related herein previously have been furnished for the Department's files in individual reports and related communications.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General - Enclosures (2)

1 - Mr. Burke Marshall - Enclosures (2)
Assistant Attorney General

Note: This letter is classified ~~Secret~~ inasmuch as it contains information from highly sensitive sources, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the Nation and have an adverse effect upon the national defense interests of the country.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

July 9, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

#mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM 1216
ON 11-8-00

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell, dated June 28, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

The symbol T-1 in this report relates to an informant in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. The symbol T-2 was not used and T-3 through T-6 relate to confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE:

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report also so classified.

REC-72 - 244

11 JUL 11 1963

MAILED 6
JUL 9 - 1963
COMM-FBI

EX-114

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes

DR:mjh
(5)

JUL 16 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

April 12, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

[illegible]
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]
ON 11-8-00

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated April 1, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1 in this report is a source in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-2 and T-6 are informants who are furnishing information of extreme value and who are not available for interview or testimony. T-3, T-4, and T-5 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

2 - New York (100-91330)

ATTENTION: SAC, NEW YORK:

There is no objection to your submitting future reports on a 90-day basis. However, any data developed indicative of Communist Party membership on the part of the subject or any contact by him with members of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, should immediately be brought to the attention of the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination.

-116

REC 9

ABR 15 1963

NOTE ON YELLOW:

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified "Confidential."

DR:cah:eeb (6)

CONFIDENTIAL

MAILED 25
APR 1[illegible] 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

55 APR 1[illegible] 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

March 6, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated February 15, 1963, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual. Each report is accompanied by an informant evaluation memorandum also dated February 15, 1963.

T-1, T-2 and T-3 in this report are sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-4 is an informant who is furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony. T-5, T-6 and T-7 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 4

100-358916

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG #MDR16
ON 11-8-00

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom would adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is so classified.

DR:bgc
(5)

REC- 63 100-358916-231

19 MAR 7 1963

MAILED 25
MAR 6 - 1963
COMM-FBI

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP 1
Excluded from [illegible]omatic
downgrading
declassif[illegible]

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

Director, FBI

February 5, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Reddy

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reference is made to your inquiry of Mr. Alex Rosen of this Bureau regarding the current Communist Party membership of Hunter Pitts O'Dell.

We have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party.

This information is, of course, highly sensitive and confidential.

REC-63

100-358916 — 234

See cover memo Rosen to Belmont 2/5/63, same re.

#MDR16 DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTB
ON 11-8-00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

EBR:mtb/kmo
(10)

Memo delivered to AAG Marshall 2/6/63 at 10 [illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 2/5/63

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP-2 ALM

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division has asked that we give him a statement concerning the Communist Party affiliation of Hunter Pitts O'Dell. We have called to his attention current reports which have been furnished to the Security Division, Attention Mr. Walter Yeagley, concerning O'Dell's activities.

Marshall was interested in O'Dell's association with Rev. Martin Luther King and he was given a copy of a report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated 12/20/62 at New York, which was classified "Confidential", which had been disseminated to Walter Yeagley of the Security Division. This report reflected the current association of O'Dell and the organization of Rev. King, namely, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition to the above we also furnished him a copy of a memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated 12/6/62 and another dated 1/23/63, pertaining to O'Dell.

Marshall stated that upon review of the above information which was furnished to him, he would like to have a statement from the FBI concerning the present Communist affiliation of O'Dell, particularly, whether O'Dell actually is a member of the Communist Party at this time.

I advised Marshall that an appropriate memorandum would be prepared and furnished to him concerning his request. There is attached hereto a memorandum which has been prepared by the Security Division indicating that we have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party. It is being pointed out that this information is highly sensitive and confidential.

Enclosure (1)

REC- 63

100-3-116-234

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

AR:mpd (8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memo to Mr. Belmont from A. Rosen
Re: Hunter Pitts O'Dell

By way of background, Marshall indicated that the basis for his request stems from the necessity of having to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to O'Dell. He stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to adequately handle this inquiry.

ACTION:

If approved, attached memorandum to Burke Marshall will be handed to him. It is brief and specifically points out the need to treat this information as highly sensitive and confidential.

Delivered 2/6/63 dlw

OK. H.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-1-82 BY 362 VRT

The Attorney General

January 23, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Reddy

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

On December 6, 1962, you were furnished information indicating that despite the Reverend Martin Luther King's statement of October 31, 1962, that Hunter Pitts O'Dell had resigned his position with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), O'Dell had continued to represent himself as being affiliated with the New York Office of the SCLC and, during late November and early December, 1962, was actively engaged in the work of this organization. Reverend King's public statement of October 31, 1962, was occasioned by an editorial in the October 25, 1962, edition of the "Augusta Chronicle," Augusta, Georgia, which identified O'Dell as a concealed member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, who was employed by the SCLC under the alias Jack H. O'Dell.

I thought you would be interested in the fact that on three occasions during early January, 1963, O'Dell registered at an apartment in Atlanta, Georgia, as J. H. O'Dell. On each occasion, O'Dell represented himself as being with the New York Office of the SCLC. When checking out on January 7, 1963, O'Dell requested that the bill be charged to the SCLC. An inquiry by the manager resulted in telephonic confirmation from the Atlanta Office of the SCLC that that organization would pay O'Dell's bill. Also, on January 10, 1963, O'Dell, Reverend Martin Luther King and eight other officials of the SCLC traveled together via Delta Airlines from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia.

MAILED 2

REC-9

100-358916 - 232

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE TWO

17

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

EBR:erc
(13)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

In addition, a source who has requested that his identity be concealed has reported that at an SCLC conference at Nashville, Tennessee, during the latter part of December, 1962, a representative of the SCLC admitted that O'Dell continues to be involved with the SCLC in New York City in a fund-raising capacity although he is not currently on the SCLC payroll.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption, dated January 22, 1963, EBR:erc.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

January 4, 1963

1 - Mr. Ryan

Director, FBI

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/ZZG
ON 11-8-00

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated December 20, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1, T-2, and T-3 were used in this report to conceal the identity of three sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-4 is an informant who is furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony. T-5, T-6, and T-7 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE ON YELLOW:

This letter is classified "~~Confidential~~" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified "Confidential."

REC-67 - 227

19 JAN 7 1963

EX. - 116

DR:fjh
(5)

CONFIDENTIAL

MAILED 27
JAN 4 - 1963
COMM-FBI

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General December 6, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2 ALM/lms

MAILED 2
DEC 5 - 1962
COMM-FBI

On November 2, 1962, I forwarded to you a copy of an editorial that appeared in the October 25, 1962, edition of the "Augusta Chronicle," Augusta, Georgia. This editorial identified Hunter Pitts O'Dell, a concealed member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, as employed under the alias Jack H. O'Dell in the capacity of "Acting Executive Director" for the Reverend Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Subsequently, various newspapers contained accounts of a statement issued by the Reverend Martin Luther King on or about October 31, 1962, wherein it was stated O'Dell had resigned from his position with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Reverend Martin Luther King is quoted in this statement as denying knowledge of the communist affiliations of O'Dell and further describing allegations that O'Dell was the Southeastern Director of his organization as false in that O'Dell functioned "purely as a technician with 90 per cent of his work taking place in the North..." King further stated that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference has a policy "that no person of known communist affiliation can serve on the staff, executive board or its membership at large."

I thought you would be interested in the fact that our New York Office has developed information that on November 23, 1962, O'Dell identified himself as affiliated with the New York office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and during late November and early December, 1962, he was actively engaged in New York City in the work of this organization.

REC-5
100-358916

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person- nel without the express approval of the FBI.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE 2

DR:bgc (13)

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC'D-READING ROOM

NOTE ON YELLOW:

O'Dell was elected under the pseudonym Cornelius James to the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959.

The Attorney General

November 2, 1962

Director, FBI

5-1
2-1
Encl
2-1

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
EDITORIAL FROM OCTOBER 25, 1962,
ISSUE OF AUGUSTA CHRONICLE
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA

I thought you would be interested in the enclosed editorial relating to O'Dell's relationship with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Enclosure

1 - The Deputy Attorney General - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Evans - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Belmont - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Sullivan - Enclosure
1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/TG

NOTE: O'Dell was elected under the pseudonym Cornelius James to the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, in December, 1959. Since his association with the National Committee is set forth in the editorial, he is not being further characterized in this memorandum.

JH:mlw
(10)

JH/mlw

MCT-42

100-

NOV 8 1962

REC- 21

MAILED 19
NOV 2 1962
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1 - Mr. Ryan

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

November 19, 1962

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated November 5, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual. Each report is accompanied by an informant evaluation memorandum also dated November 5, 1962.

The Symbols T-1 and T-4 in this report relate to sources in whom the Department has not yet expressed an interest. T-2, T-5 and T-6 are confidential investigative techniques. T-3 is a confidential informant furnishing information of extreme value and who is not available for interview or testimony.

Enc. (4)

#MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/LTE
ON 11-8-00

100-358916 - 214

REC- 123

1 - New York (100-91330)

NOTE ON YELLOW: This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which is also classified ~~"Confidential."~~

DR/ejl
(5)

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MAILED 8
[illegible]
COMM-FBI

53 NOV 29 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

October 4, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Ryan

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Attached are two copies of the report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated September 19, 1962, at New York, New York, on the captioned individual.

T-1, T-3, T-5 and T-6 were utilized in this report to protect sources in whom the Department has not previously expressed an interest. T-2 and T-4 are confidential informants furnishing information of extreme value who are not available for interview or testimony. T-7, T-8 and T-9 are confidential investigative techniques.

Enclosures - 2

100-358916

1 - New York (100-91330)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG #MDE16
ON 12-8-00

MAILED 30
OCT 4 1962
COMM-FBI

NOTE ON YELLOW:

This letter is classified "Confidential" since it pertains to possible prosecutive plans involving current informants, the exposure of whom could adversely affect the national defense and because it transmits copies of a report which are also classified ~~"Confidential."~~

DR:cdb
(5)

REC- 27

210

19 OCT 5 1962

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

9

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 11

62 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : C. A. Evans

DATE: September 20, 1963

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL;
STANLEY LEVISON;
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN
THE NEGRO MOVEMENT

8-1
Enc
8-7,8

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall telephoned and advised that on instructions of the Attorney General he wanted to clear with us the rough draft of a memorandum which he was going to send to the Bureau. As a matter of fact, the Attorney General has approved the rough draft contingent upon our approval.

The proposed memorandum, a copy of which is attached, relates to Hunter Pitts O'Dell and Stanley Levison and action taken to advise Dr. Martin Luther King and his immediate associates of the communist activities on the part of O'Dell and Levison. Marshall states that some time ago it was not felt wise, in view of the position of the FBI informant, for Marshall to say that he knew O'Dell to be under communist control. Instead, he informed Dr. King and two of his immediate associates that O'Dell was believed by many people to have had communist connections and his association with Dr. King's organization was not in its best interest.

Subsequently, on June 22, 1963, according to Marshall's proposed memorandum, he brought this matter very explicitly to Dr. King's attention. Later that same date, both the Attorney General and the President, separately, strongly urged Dr. King that there should be no further connection between O'Dell and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Thereafter, the Attorney General and Marshall received copies of a letter dated July 3, 1963, from Dr. King to O'Dell. In this letter King makes reference to a resignation which O'Dell submitted some months ago which was accepted because of the SCLC's firm policy that no communist or communist sympathizer would be on the staff. Dr. King's letter continues by noting an investigation

100-[illegible]-270

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

REC-102

OCT 8 1963

XEROX

OCT 9 1963

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CAE:vap
(7)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

had been conducted but they were unable to discover any present connections with the Communist Party by O'Dell.

King further tells O'Dell that the situation is such that the organization cannot even afford the risk of impressions about communist inspiration and therefore O'Dell's temporary resignation is being made permanent.

Mr. Marshall's proposed memorandum also advises that he informed Dr. King on June 22, 1963, Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party. This action was taken on direction of the Attorney General and the President. Marshall had previously warned Dr. King about any association with Levison. This was the first indication given him of firm information Levison was under communist control.

Sensitive foreign intelligence operation

As a matter of background, our early information concerning the communist connections involved here came from ~~one of our two most highly placed communist informants (NY694-S*)~~. To protect ~~this most valuable informant~~ we insisted Levison and O'Dell not be informed by King we had positive information of their communist connections.

Subsequently, with the passage of time so that the risk to the informant was not jeopardized, the Director in a personal conversation with the Attorney General on June 17, 1963, agreed Dr. Martin Luther King could be informed that he should get rid of Levison and O'Dell because they are members of the Communist Party. It was on the basis of this advice from the Director that action was taken by the Attorney General and the President.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN:

While Mr. Marshall's proposed memorandum does not spell out the sequence of events here in detail, his summary is nevertheless accurate and it is therefore believed we should inform Mr. Marshall that he should feel free, of course, to submit the memorandum as he drafted it. If approved, Mr. Marshall will be so advised telephonically.

Handled 9-20-63

Form No. G-11
(Ed. 3-9-61)

From
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Deputy Attorney General	☐
Solicitor General	☐
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Tax	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Civil	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Lands	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Legal Counsel	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security	☐
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights	☒
Administrative Assistant Attorney General	☐
Director, FBI	☐
Director, Bureau of Prisons	☐
Director, Office of Alien Property	☐
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization	☐
Pardon Attorney	☐
Parole Board	☐
Board of Immigration Appeals	☐
Special Assistant for Public Information	☐
Records Administration Office	☐

For the attention of Burke Marshall

REMARKS: I think this is fine, but before we send it, I would want it cleared with Courtney. Will you handle this?

RFK

1742

#MD216

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY 5P2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100 - 355716 - 220

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

12 September 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Attached is a draft memorandum on Hunter Pitts O'Dell and the most recent documents. It could be expanded in detail but contains the essentials. I did not refer to the warning Harris Wofford gave to Dr. King at our suggestion in 1961 while Harris was at the White House because I do not know exactly what was said to King.

BM

I think this is fine but before we send it I would want it cleared with Courtney - Will you handle this

PERSONAL &
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE
RECEIVED
SEP 12 1963
ATTORNEY GENERAL

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

96

100-358716-270

DRAFT - 9/12/63

TO: J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

SUBJECT: Hunter Pitts O'Dell

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 AIM 1-316

This relates to your letterhead memorandum of September 5 to the Attorney General, relating to Hunter Pitts O'Dell and the related prior memoranda. I appreciate your having sent copies of these to me.

This matter had been brought to the attention of Dr. King some time ago by me, but in accordance with conversations which the Attorney General had with Courtney Evans, it was not felt to be wise in view of the sources of the Bureau's information to state that I knew O'Dell to be under Communist control at any time. I did inform Dr. King and two members of his organization -- Reverend Andrew Young and Reverend Wyatt Walker -- some time ago -- that since O'Dell was believed by many people to have had Communist connections, his association with their organization was not in the best interests of the organization.

3

At that time, inconclusive steps were taken to remove O'Dell, and his job with the Southern Christian

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Leadership Conference was changed. In response to direct questions whether I had hard evidence of O'Dell's Communist connections, however, I replied that I was not in a position to give any.

Following further conversations with Mr. Evans in June, however, I brought the matter to the attention of Dr. King very explicitly in my office on the morning of June 22 prior to a scheduled meeting which Dr. King had with the President. This was done at the direction of the Attorney General. Later that morning both the Attorney General and the President separately strongly urged Dr. King thatthere should be no further connection between O'Dell and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Dr. King stated that the connection would be ended. Thereafter, theAttorney General and I both received copies of the attached letter, dated July 3, 1963, from Dr. King to O'Dell.

On the same occasion, I also informed Dr.King that our information was that Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party. This was also done after conversations with Mr. Evans prior to the meeting with Dr. King, and was done at the direction of the Attorney

4

General and the President. Prior to that time, again based upon talks between the Attorney General and Mr. Evans at which I was present, it had been decided that it was not in the best interest of the United States to inform Dr.King that we had any firm information that Levison was under Communist control. I had, however, on a previous occasion, warned Dr. King about any association with Levison, basing the warning upon doubts about Levison's loyalty to the United States.

I thought you should have this additional information for your file.

BM

The Attorney General September 5, 1963

Director, FBI

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

In my letter dated August 28, 1963, information was set forth regarding Hunter Pitts O'Dell's possible association with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and information regarding Reverend King's statement indicating O'Dell, as of June 26, 1963, was no longer on Reverend King's staff.

On August 30, 1963, at 7:25 P.M., O'Dell was observed by Special Agents of this Bureau entering the building located at 312 West 125th Street, New York, New York. O'Dell remained in the building in excess of one hour. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference occupies one of the several offices which are located in that building.

We will continue to furnish you any pertinent information developed regarding this matter.

100-358916

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

(1) - Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI

28

100-35271-270

Dr. King

UBURN AVE., N.E.
NTA 3, GEORGIA
PHONE 524-1378

Southern Christian Leadership Conference

Martin Luther King Jr., *President*
Wyatt Tee Walker, *Executive Director*

July 3, 1963

Burke
AM

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SPJ ALM/JTG

Attorney General Robert Kennedy
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kennedy:

Dr. King asked me to send you the enclosed copy of a letter which he has just sent to Mr. Jack O'Dell.

Sincerely yours,

Dora McDonald

(Miss) D. McDonald
Secretary

enc

File

OFFICE OF THE
RECEIVED
JUL 8 1963
ATTORNEY GENERAL

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100-358716-270

July 3, 1963

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2ALM/LTG

(1)

Mr. Jack H. O'Dell
488 St. Nicholas Avenue
Apartment 5-S
New York, New York

Dear Jack:

Several months ago you submitted your resignation pending an investigation of your alleged affiliation with the Communist party, as was suggested by an article to this effect in the Birmingham and New Orleans newspapers. We accepted this temporary resignation because of SCLC's firm policy that no Communist nor Communist sympathizer can be on our staff or in our membership. We felt that it was imperative to conduct an immediate investigation. As you know, we conducted what we felt to be a thorough inquiry into these charges and were unable to discover any present connections with the Communist party on your part.

The situation in our country is such, however, that any allusion to the left brings forth an emotional response which would seem to indicate that SCLC and the Southern Freedom Movement are Communist inspired. In these critical times we cannot afford to risk any such impressions. We, therefore, have decided in our Administrative Committee, that we should request you to make your temporary resignation permanent.

We certainly appreciate the years of unselfish service which you have put into our New York Office, and regret the necessity of your departure. Certainly, yours is a significant sacrifice commensurate with the sufferings in jail and through loss of jobs under racist intimidation. We all pray for the day when our nation may be truly the land of the free.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

100-358716-270 33

Mr. O'Dell
July 3, 1963
Page Two

May God bless you and continue to inspire you in the service of your fellowman.

Sincerely yours,

Martin Luther King, Jr.

Km

334 Auburn Avenue, N.E.
Atlanta 3, Georgia

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2AL M/D216

#MD216

NTA, GA.
10 PM
5 JUL
1963

ATLANTA GA.
JUL 3 '63

U.S. POSTAGE
05
P.B. 384681

Attorney General Robert Kennedy

Department of Justice

Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL

10

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

31.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOV T

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
DeLoach
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: 7/19/63

FROM : C. A. Evans

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2ALM/ISC

#MDE 16

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
~~Mr.~~ Evans
Mr. McGowan
Mr. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: RACIAL SITUATION

In talking with the Attorney General and Assistant AG Marshall, of the Civil Rights Division, reference was made to our earlier conversation concerning Congressional requests which had been received by the Director, relating to alleged communist influence in the racial demonstrations. The Department's original position was that there was no immediate urgency in recontacting Senator Monroney, in view of recent contacts had with him by Departmental representatives. Today, I pointed out that these requests should not be allowed to remain unresolved too long.

Assistant AG Marshall advised that he had drafted a proposed letter to be used in replying to these Congressional requests, since he had ascertained that a written reply is desired, particularly by Senator Monroney. In his letter Marshall proposes to paraphrase the President's statement at his press conference on 7/17/63. Marshall's letter will, of course, make no reference to the President's statement, but merely indicate that this is the conclusion, predicated upon reports and other information supplied to the Department.

In those instances where the Department is dealing with a Member of Congress believed to be trustworthy, Marshall plans to deliver his letters personally and to explain that the classified nature of the reports precludes the furnishing of specific information in writing or in testimony. Marshall feels that he can talk confidentially in this way to Senator Magnuson and thus forestall any requests for further information. It was noted that, as a result of the Director's conversation with the Attorney General, Marshall had spoken with Martin Luther King about the dangers of his associating with Stanley Levison and accepting assistance from him. It was, therefore, believed that since this may get back to Members of Congress, Marshall should talk with the individual Senators, where this can be done on a confidential basis.

Marshall said he would, of course, keep us advised of the results of his contacts in this regard.

REC-35

JUL 30 1963

CAE:CSH (7)

177

32

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1

2:35 p.m. June 17, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. DE LOACH
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP-2ALM/
#MDR-16

The Attorney General called and advised he would like to have Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall talk to Martin Luther King and tell King he has to get rid of Levison and O'Dell, that he should not have any contact with them directly or indirectly. The Attorney General inquired if King could be told these persons are communists without exposing the informant.

I advised the Attorney General I thought he could make the statement that they are members of the Communist Party without exposing the informant. I pointed out that, if King continues this association, he is going to hurt his own cause as there are more and more communists trying to take advantage of the hate movement and bigots down South who are against integration are beginning to charge King is tied in with communists. I stated I thought Marshall could very definitely say this association is rather widely known and, with things crystalizing for them now, nothing could be worse than for King to be associated with it.

100-106670-150

Very truly yours,

REC-64

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JUN 19 1963

E

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JEH:rm (9)

1 - Miss Holmes

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 5:50 PM
DATE 6-17-63
BY

67 JUN 20 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont DATE: May 31, 1963

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING
RACIAL MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2ALM/JW #MDL16

ELSUR

SA Don Roney of the New York Office advised that NY 3810-S* on 5/30/63 furnished information concerning a conversation on that date between Martin Luther King and Stanley Levison, who has been a secret Communist Party member and has contributed funds to the Communist Party on a regular basis. King stated that he had requested a conference with the President and the Attorney General because King thought that now was a good time for such a conference. Levison agreed. Levison stated that there has never been an Administration in this country that has been as worried about the Negro problem as the present one. Levison continued that this is brought about by the Administration's concern with the common market problem in Europe. It was Levison's opinion that United States prestige is very important at this time and the inability to control the racial situation was making it more difficult. It was Levison's opinion that the needs of the President are so great that he is all ready for a different policy if it can bring about the kind of controlled situation that he feels he needs.

King and Levison agreed that the situation has to be kept moving so that the President will have to look for an alternative. The President can then be presented with certain alternatives. This will benefit the President, for then his problem, fear of violence, will be done away with. It was Levison's thought that the President is all ready to make a change. A conference now would be fruitful, but if a conference cannot be worked out, then the movement must be enlarged. King stated that he would like to put so much pressure on the President that he would have to sign an Executive Order making segregation unconstitutional.

Levison said that the method of negotiating used in Birmingham will set the pattern for a whole series of southern cities. That is, you come in with a package, come up with demands, discuss them and come out with a victory. You ask for more than you expect to get. The goals of the movement, according to Levison, are desegregation, jobs and the right to vote. The

REC- 72 132

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

ST-102

11 JUN 13 1963

34

XEROX

CLM:cag (10)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

XEROX
JAN [illegible] 1964

UNRECORDED

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING

methods to get them are direct action, nonviolence, and negotiations.

ACTION:

This information is being brought to the attention of the Attorney General and the Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President, by letter presently being prepared. [illegible] today [illegible]

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 5P-2 ALM 1116 #MDR16
ON 11-8-00

May 31, 1963 TG -

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

5/31/63
delivered
via liaison
OS+B

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that on May 30, 1963, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley Levison held a discussion concerning a conference which Reverend Mr. King reportedly has requested with the President and the Attorney General.

Levison and Reverend Mr. King agreed that this is a good time for such a conference and Levison stated that no Administration has ever been as worried about the Negro problem as is the present Administration. Levison added that this is based upon the Administration's concern with the problems arising from the Common Market in Europe. Levison expressed the opinion that the prestige of the United States is very important at this time and that inability to control the racial situation makes the Administration's task more difficult. He also said that the President is ready for a different policy if it can bring about the kind of controlled situation that he feels he needs.

Reverend Mr. King and Levison agreed that it was necessary to keep the situation moving so that the President will be forced to look for an alternative. It was stated that the President can then be presented with certain alternatives which will benefit the Administration as the President's fear of violence will be done away with. Levison expressed the thought that the President is ready to make a change and that a conference at this time would be fruitful. He added that if a conference cannot be worked out, then the movement must be enlarged. Reverend Mr. King said

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Casper ✓
Callahan
Conrad ✓
DeLoach ✓
Evans ✓
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

WLM:cag:mpd (14)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

REC- 120

100-106670-129

XEROX
JUN 7 1963

JUN 5 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19 JUN 4 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

he would like to put so much pressure on the President that he will have to sign an Executive Order making segregation unconstitutional.

Levison stated that the method of negotiation used in Birmingham, Alabama, will set the pattern for a series of Southern cities. He explained this method by stating that you come in with a package, come up with demands, discuss them and come out with a victory, and that in doing so you ask for more than you expect to get. He described the goals of the movement as desegregation, jobs and the right to vote. He described the methods of obtaining these goals as being direct action, nonviolence and negotiation.

As previously mentioned to you, another source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in March, 1963, that Stanley Levison was a secret member of the Communist Party, United States of America, who contributes to the Communist Party on a regular basis.

I advised the Attorney General of the above information and he suggested that the President should see this letter.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE: This memorandum is being classified "Confidential" because it contains information from a source, the unauthorized disclosure of which would seriously impair the investigation of the Communist Party, USA, and such impairment could have an adverse effect upon the national defense interests of the country.

SECRET

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

February 5, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Reddy

Director, FBI

C

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

DECLASSIFIED BY 5K2 ALM/LRS
ON 11-8-00

Reference is made to your inquiry of Mr. Alex Rosen of this Bureau regarding the current Communist Party membership of Hunter Pitts O'Dell.

We have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party.

This information is, of course, highly sensitive and confidential.

REC- 63

100-358916 - 234

See cover memo Rosen to Belmont 2/5/63, same re.

FEB 6 3 22 PM '63
REC'D - ROSEN

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

EBR:mtb/kmo
(10)

Memo delivered to AAG Marshall's office 2/6/63 at 10:15 AM

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

30 FEB 7 1963
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVER ENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 2/5/63

FROM : A. Rosen

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY [illegible]

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division has asked that we give him a statement concerning the Communist Party affiliation of Hunter Pitts O'Dell. We have called to his attention current reports which have been furnished to the Security Division, Attention Mr. Walter Yeagley, concerning O'Dell's activities.

Marshall was interested in O'Dell's association with Rev. Martin Luther King and he was given a copy of a report of Special Agent James F. O'Connell dated 12/20/62 at New York, which was classified "Confidential", which had been disseminated to Walter Yeagley of the Security Division. This report reflected the current association of O'Dell and the organization of Rev. King, namely, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In addition to the above we also furnished him a copy of a memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated 12/6/62 and another dated 1/23/63, pertaining to O'Dell.

Marshall stated that upon review of the above information which was furnished to him, he would like to have a statement from the FBI concerning the present Communist affiliation of O'Dell, particularly, whether O'Dell actually is a member of the Communist Party at this time.

I advised Marshall that an appropriate memorandum would be prepared and furnished to him concerning his request. There is attached hereto a memorandum which has been prepared by the Security Division indicating that we have developed evidence through our coverage of the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which indicates that as of July, 1962, Party leaders considered O'Dell to be a member of the Party. It is being pointed out that this information is highly sensitive and confidential.

Enclosure (1)

REC- 63 100-358916-234

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

13 FEB 13 1963

AR:mpd (8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

By way of background, Marshall indicated that the basis for his request stems from the necessity of having to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to O'Dell. He stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to adequately handle this inquiry.

ACTION:

If approved, attached memorandum to Burke Marshall will be handed to him. It is brief and specifically points out the need to treat this information as highly sensitive and confidential.

Delivered 2/6/63 clw

R

OK.

H

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES C N

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 2/4/63

FROM : A. Rosen

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/00 BY SP2 ALM/TF6

SUBJECT: HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, aka Jack
SECURITY MATTER - C

LAVIN

Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division called to state that he will have to talk with Rev. Martin Luther King with reference to Jack Hunter O'Dell.

note

By way of background, he stated that an inquiry has been received from King about O'Dell and apparently the Department wants to be able to talk to King about O'Dell.

Before Marshall can do this he states he would like to have whatever background information we have on O'Dell. In this regard, it is noted that O'Dell is supposed to be a member of the Communist Party and has in the past been associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. This is King's organization. We have in the past furnished information to the Department concerning O'Dell and his association with Rev. King.

Marshall should be furnished with memoranda which have heretofore been given to the Security Division. It is understood that a report of O'Dell's activities is also available and has been furnished to the Security Division but has not been given to the Civil Rights Division. It would appear that Marshall is entitled to this information if he is to properly evaluate O'Dell's background.

Marshall has asked for a summary on O'Dell. If such is not readily available, copies of material previously furnished to the Department would seem to suffice. He stated he has been in touch with the Attorney General on this matter and is anxious to have it handled as soon as possible.

AR:mpd (6)

REC- 35

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

ST-112

100- 6 36

FEB 7 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62 FEB 11 1963

Mr. Burke Marshall
Assistant Attorney General

January 31, 1963

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen, Attention: Lavin
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Forsyth

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - C

In response to your inquiry of Assistant Director Courtney A. Evans on January 30, 1963, you are advised that Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., accompanied by Hunter Pitts O'Dell and eight other officials of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), arrived in Savannah, Georgia, aboard Delta Airlines Flight Number 427 in the early morning of January 10, 1963. This group was met at the Savannah air terminal by Stanley Levison and the entire group departed Savannah in two automobiles.

Levison departed Savannah by train en route to New York City on the evening of January 11, 1963, while King, O'Dell and three other officials of the SCLC held reservations with the Delta Airlines for the morning of January 12, 1963. King, in a party of five, departed Savannah en route to Atlanta on Delta Airlines Flight Number 422 on the morning of January 12, 1963.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/00 BY SP-2ALM/JT

REC'D-READING ROOM
JAN 31 11 10 AM '63
FBI

100-106670

REC- 22

19 FEB 1 1963

EX-102

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Levison, a secret member of the CP, and O'Dell, a concealed member of the National Committee of the CP, are not characterized in the body of the letter as they have been characterized in previous communications to the Department. AAG Marshall requested advice as to whether there was any information available indicating a meeting between the individuals referred to above had occurred as scheduled. We are not in possession of any information as to the nature of the meeting involved other than the statement by Levison that it was to be a "closeted review of where they are--a critical review," which information is in the possession of Marshall.

TDR:mea
(11) mea

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAILED 25
JAN 31 1963
COMM-FBI

RECEIVED-DIRECT

FEB 5 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SSC REQUEST 9/8/75
ITEM 14

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-00 BY SP2 PLM/SF6
MDR16

62-116395-964
ENCLOSURE

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Mr. Callahan____
Mr. Conrad____
Mr. DeLoach____
Mr. Evans____
Mr. Gale____
Mr. Rosen____
Mr. Sullivan____
Mr. Tavel____
Mr. Trotter____
Tele. Room____
Miss Holmes____
Miss Gandy____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
DATE: 1/22/64

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
NEGRO QUESTION
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Rogers
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

Pursuant to a request from the Director, there is attached a summary of information concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., which clearly demonstrates the communist influence upon him as well as his moral degeneracy.

This information, which is "~~TOP SECRET,~~" is for possible use by the Director in his appearance before the House Appropriations Committee. It will be noted that a portion of the attached material is marked "OBSCENE."

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information and use of the Director.

Enc.

100-3-116

SFP:eeb/erc
(8)

WCS

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

42

The racial unrest in the United States is currently the target for a determined concentration of communist effort. Long-range communist strategy includes the establishment of a Negro-labor coalition which the communists hope to be able to manipulate, as a powerful political-action weapon. They aim, thus, to provoke class struggle and promote legislation which can serve as a step toward a communist system of government. This constitutes a serious national security problem, since the individual playing a most dominant role as a leading spokesman for the estimated 20 million Negroes in this country today is knowingly, willingly, and regularly cooperating with and taking guidance from communists. An in-depth view of this individual, Martin Luther King, Jr., will serve to illustrate how he functions as a channel through which communist efforts are being directed against the Negroes and, therefore, against this country. It depicts, too, a MoRAL degenerate [redacted] of such magnitude as to blaspheme the title of "Reverend" which he carries.

King — The Communist Pawn

King, who is a copastor with his father of the Ebenezer Baptist Church, Atlanta, Georgia, and the recipient of Bachelor of Divinity and Doctor of Philosophy Degrees, is considered and described within the Communist Party-USA (CPUSA) as a Marxist. sensitive foreign intelligence operation(s)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/TTS ON 11-2-00 #MDE16

JB

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

He has been closely aligned with communists for several years and has shown not only a willingness, but at times even an eagerness, to associate and confer with communist leaders and to work closely with and rely upon the advice and guidance of dedicated communists -- this despite the fact that they have been reliably identified to him as such. ~~In February, 1962, Stanley David Levison, a secret Communist Party (CP) member, passed the word to the Party's General Secretary, Gus Hall, that "King is a wholehearted Marxist who has studied it (Marxism), believes in it, agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly."~~

Levison -- Key Communist Directing King

Levison, one of the individuals exerting the most influence upon King and who has greatly facilitated King's rise to prominence, is a shrewd, dedicated communist and is known as such by King. ~~Since the late 1940's Levison has played a highly clandestine role in which he was entrusted by the Party to raise and handle secret funds used to finance some of the Party's activities.~~ In 1961 Levison was Assistant Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which is headed by King.

Sensitive foreign intellig
operation

Since 195[illegible] Levison has expended much effort in King's behalf in such activities as: actively involving himself in fund-raising drives for King; serving as King's legal counsel in selected matters; preparing speech material for King; assisting in the mechanics of some demonstrations in which King was involved; guiding King as to acceptance or rejection of public appearances and speaking commitments; and helping King with matters related to the latter's writings.

King's Reliance on O'Dell, A National Party Functionary

Another key communist through whom the Party exerts influence on King is Hunter Pitts O'Dell who, at the Party's last National Convention in 1959, was elected a member of its second highest governing body, the National Committee. His election was under a pseudonym. In 1960, while working as an assistant to the Party's National Secretary for the South, James Jackson, O'Dell also began to work actively in support of King's movement. In June, 1962, King sought Levison's counsel concerning the addition of an administrative assistant to King's staff. As a result of Levison's recommendation of O'Dell, the latter associated himself with the SCLC in Atlanta, Georgia, under the name J. H. O'Dell and also served the SCLC in its New York office. In October, 1962, several newspaper articles exposed O'Dell's connection with the SCLC and his communist affiliations, as a result of which King announced O'Dell's temporary resignation pending an inquiry.

This "temporary resignation" consisted of O'Dell's return to New York City where he continued to perform services for the SCLC until July, 1963, [redacted]

Jones — The Intermediary

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Despite the great pains being taken by the principals involved to keep the King-Levison connection secret, Bureau agents have observed them together on three different occasions since November, 1963.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Homosexual Rustin -- Liaison With Communist Party-USA

Rustin himself is an interesting link in the King "combine." He has long been inclined toward homosexual activities and in 1953 was sentenced to serve 60 days for offering to engage in an act of sex perversion of a homosexual nature, which he admitted. Rustin has also publicly admitted affiliations with the communist movement in the late 1930's and was one of a select group of observers permitted to attend the Party's 16th National Convention in 1957. He also has maintained contact with the Party's National Secretary, Benjamin J. Davis,

[redacted]

[redacted]

Much of the Party's influence in the Negro field to date has been clandestine in nature. If the Party fully implements its current plans, we may expect to see more open and aggressive actions in its attempts to further influence, infiltrate, dominate and recruit the American Negro — just one more step in its ultimate goal of establishing a communist state within our boundaries.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[JFK

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

END: ~~TOP SECRET~~ - OFF THE RECORD

End

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 10, 1975

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice

Director, FBI

#mDF16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

10/13/00 SP2ALM/JTG

DELIVERED TO [illegible] 10-10-75
[illegible] TO [illegible] 10-13-75

Reference is made to SSC letter of September 29, 1975, listing certain documents and other information desired from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum in response to some of the requests.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JDM:lek (10) lek

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

10 - ENCLOSURE

ST-111

REC-30

62-116395 - 965

15 NOV 4 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 NOV 25 1975

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
FBI
OCT 10 11 05 AM '75

RECEIVED
OCT 10 1 48 AM 1975
LEGAL COUNSEL

RECEIVED
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE DIV.
OCT 9 3 10 PM '75

RECEIVED
OCT 9 10 15 AM 1975
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

OCT 10 9 06 AM '75
REC'D
CORRESPONDENCE REVIEW
FBI

The Attorney General

NOTE:

A copy of SSC letter 9/29/75 is attached to the file copy of the enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. D. Maurice

62-116395

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP2ALM/LHG

October 10, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to the Deputy Attorney General dated September 29, 1975, requesting delivery of FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the September 29, 1975, request, and specifically to the following items in that request: Items 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18.

Concerning Item 18 in which you requested all versions of Section 122 of the Manual of Instructions which were in effect from 1955 through 1965, we have determined Section 122 was created by Manual of Instructions Revision Number 185, dated February 6, 1959, and was subsequently revised on July 30, 1959. Copies of these two revisions are being furnished in response to Item 18. You have previously been furnished all subsequent revisions.

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395 - 965

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., [illegible]N.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 29, 1975

#MDR16
SP-2 ALM/TTB
10/13/00

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Enclosed is a document request for materials pertaining to the King matter.

I would like to set October 6, 1975 as a deadline for delivery of all outstanding previously-requested documents pertaining to the King matter and October 13, 1975 for delivery of all documents requested on the attached list.

I would also appreciate your arranging a briefing for Mike Epstein for sometime this week by knowledgable FBI personnel concerning:

A. The present location and organization of any files and materials which were found to be in William C. Sullivan's Bureau office when he was denied further access thereto in or about September 1971; and

B. A description of the contents of such files and materials.

Finally, we would like to have access to the Department of Justice files pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for the year 1962. The materials in these "DJ" files will be reviewed pursuant to the terms of the procedural agreement between the Committee and the Department, i.e., subsequent to review of such files certain items will be orally designated to be screened for delivery.

SEP

Sincerely,

62-116395 - 965

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ENCLOSURE

KING DOCUMENT REQUEST

1.

(DELETED)

Call Dunn in Atlanta

F. Seabury

2. All materials relating to rental or other arrangements made by the FBI for the use of an apartment or premises located in the Peachtree Towers, Atlanta, Georgia, as a listening post, as well as all materials relating to the termination of such arrangements, use, and/or occupancy.

call file

3. Access to all Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") for Special Agent Alden F. Miller for the years 1960-1968.

call → file

WFO + Lab

4. Any materials reflecting dates upon which Special Agent William D. Campbell, while attached to the Washington Field Office, was on special or temporary assignment at FBI Headquarters (Laboratory or Intelligence Division), between January 1, 1964 and the date of his transfer to the Laboratory Division at FBI Headquarters.

5. Materials which would reflect the authority and instructions issued for FBI personnel to surveil, monitor, investigate and/or report on civil rights demonstrations, protests, rallies, or marches which involved Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference prior to October 23, 1962.

6. Materials reflecting authority for and instructions issued prior to October 23, 1962, with respect to developing "any information. . . concerning the SCLC relating to racial matters (which) must be reported under the racial matters caption," and the maintenance of "a separate file on SCLC relating to racial incidents (157-632)." (See first paragraph on page 2 of October 23, 1962 letter from the Director to the SAC, Atlanta, captioned "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security - C")

Nugent

7. All materials reflecting proposals, recommendations or decisions to include Martin Luther King on the Security, Reserve, Rabble-Rouser, and/or Agitator Index or list, and/or his designation as a Key Activist, Key Black Extremists, Top Functionary and/or Key Figure.

8. All materials from August 28, 1963 to December 31, 1964 which pertain to the distribution by the United States Information Agency of a film of the march on Washington, including such materials as concern or reflect contacts or correspondence between the FBI and the USIA or between the FBI and the White House concerning such film.

9. SAC Letter No. 59-2, dated 1/13/59, including the Security letter attached thereto pertaining to Racial Matters.

10. The Manual changes referred to in the Racial Matters section of the Security letter identified in Item 9 above.

11. Memorandum from Mr. Rosen to the Director, dated 1/7/59 captioned "Racial Matters" that is referenced in the proposed letter to all SAC/s which was typed on 1/7/59 and which became the Racial Matters section of Item 9 above.

ok 12. Memorandum dated February 11, 1960, from W. B. Wette (WETTE) to A. Rosen, captioned "Racial Matters." Mannie HAS

Call EXTEN

ok 13. Airtel to all offices dated February 12, 1960, captioned "Racial Matters." Mannie has

ok ✓ 14. Memorandum dated June 26, 1963, from Mr. Rosen to Mr. Belmont, captioned "Racial Matters." Mannie has

ok 15. Airtel dated June 27, 1963 from the Director to all continental offices, captioned "Racial Matters." Mannie has

ok ✓ 16. Memorandum dated January 23, 1959, from Mr. Rosen to the Director, captioned "Bombing Matters or Racial Matters (New Classification)." Mannie has

ok 17. SAC letter sent on 1/28/59 which was attached to the memorandum identified in Item 16 above. Enc 2/13/59 Mannie

18. All versions of Section 122 of the Manual of Instructions which were in effect from 1955 through 1965. Mannie

19. All materials reflecting correspondence, contacts, or communications, or proposed correspondence contacts, or communications, between FBI personnel and:

Tunstall

A. Samuel Riley Pierce, Jr.

B. Dr. Frank R. Barnett

(See memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, dated January 8, 1964, captioned "Samuel Riley Pierce, Jr., 280 Park Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.")

20. All materials reflecting correspondence between any FBI headquarters personnel and former Chief of Police Jenkins, Atlanta, Georgia, concerning or pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference from January 1, 1960 through April 1968.

21. All materials pertaining to (a) the nomination, and (b) the selection, of Martin Luther King, Jr., for the Nobel Prize.

Seems that we answered a similar ? previously S.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
9/29/75 request, Items 12,13,14,15, 16, and 17 and 18

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 10/17/75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JG

62-116395-965

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 9/29/75, items 12 thru 18

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16

[illegible] 10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/TG

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr and Southern Christian Leadership Conference: Various memoranda captioned "Racial Matters or Bombing Matters; SAC letter 1/28/59; Manual section 122.

62-116395

FMK:fmk

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

51W0 C/B

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

Tolson

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: January 23, 1959

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: BOMBING MATTERS
OR RACIAL MATTERS
(NEW CLASSIFICATION)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/IJE
#MDR16

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The attached SAC Letter is to inform the field of the new classification to be used in connection with correspondence carrying the character racial matters or bombing matters. This classification will be used in opening new cases carrying racial matters or bombing matters. It will not be necessary for either the field or the Bureau to change the classification number of existing cases or correspondence.

The Records Branch has been consulted and is agreeable to the new classification "157." New sections and changes for manuals and handbooks are being prepared and will be forwarded to the field.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached SAC Letter be approved and forwarded.

1 - Inspector H. L. Edwards

Enclosure sent

FHF:bhg
(6)

REC- 13

52 FEB 11 1959

23 JAN 30 1959

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SSC REQUEST 9/29/75
ITEM 17

#m2016

10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JJB

Sec.965

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed January 23, 1959)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

6 F.

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: BOMBING MATTERS
OR RACIAL MATTERS
(NEW CLASSIFICATION)

#MDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Dear Sir:

All correspondence and new cases opened under ~~carrying~~ the character bombing matters or racial matters should ~~also~~ carry the classification "157." It will not be necessary to change the classification number of ~~existing cases or~~ correspondence. relating to existing cases.

New sections and changes for manuals and handbook are being prepared and will be forwarded to your office.

This information should be brought to the attention of all personnel handling this type of investigation and they should become thoroughly familiar with the new manual sections, manual changes and handbook changes when they are received in your office.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

66-04-3825

ENCLOSURE

10

(E) BOMBING MATTERS OR RACIAL MATTERS (NEW CLASSIFICATION) -- All correspondence and new cases opened under the character bombing matters or racial matters should carry the classification "157." It will not be necessary to change the classification number of correspondence relating to existing cases.

New sections and changes for manuals and handbook are being prepared and will be forwarded to your office.

This information should be brought to the attention of all personnel handling this type of investigation and they should become thoroughly familiar with the new manual sections, manual changes and handbook changes when they are received in your office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (B)'

SSC REQUEST 9/29/75
ITEM 18

Sel 1965

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP-2 ALM/FTG

February 6, 1959

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
REVISION NUMBER 185

RE: . REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages for inclusion in the Manual of Instructions. Revisions may be noted by brackets. The dates appearing at the bottom of the pages indicate the dates of revisions. The old corresponding pages should be removed from the Manual and destroyed. The Special Agent in Charge has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

Volume II
Table of Contents - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

Section 23 - (New section)
Pages ~~1 and 2~~
~~Page 3~~

iwl

Volume III
Section 87 - Pages ~~89 and 90~~
(Delete pages 88a and 88b)

Volume IV
Table of Contents - Pages ~~5 and 6~~

Section 122 - (New section)
~~Pages 1~~ and 2
~~Page 3~~

Index - ~~Pages 5 and 6~~
Pages ~~31 and 32~~
Pages ~~39 and 40~~

FMDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (10)

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

SECTION 114. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS

A. Statutes and Elements 1
B. Departmental Instructions 1
C. Possible Violations (Not All-Inclusive) 1
D. Pertinent Court Decisions 2
E. Policy 2
F. Investigative Procedure 3
G. Venue 3
H. Classification 3
I. Character 3
J. Penalties - Maximum 3

SECTION 115. INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS

A. Statute 1
B. Violation 1
C. Investigative Procedure 2
D. Venue 2
E. Classification 2
F. Character 2

SECTION 116. MISCELLANEOUS - CIVIL SUITS

A. Background 1
B. Policy 1
C. Classification 1
D. Character 1

SECTION 117. DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES

A. Statutes 1
B. Violations 3
C. Venue 3
D. Policy 4
E. Investigative Procedure 4
F. Prosecution 5
G. Classification 5
H. Character 5

SECTION 118. SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 1
C. Policy 2
D. Venue 3
E. Classification 3
F. Character 3

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

SECTION 119. INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 1
C. Policy and Procedures 1
D. Venue 1
E. Classification 1
F. Character 1

SECTION 120. AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 2
C. Investigative Procedure 2
D. Venue 2
E. Classification 3
F. Character 3

SECTION 121. WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

A. Statutes 1
B. Elements 1
C. Department Instructions 1
D. Investigative Procedure 1
E. Classification 1
F. Character 1
G. Penalty 1

SECTION 122. RACIAL MATTERS

A. Investigations of Klan-Type Organizations, Hate Organizations, and Associated Individuals 1
B. Classification 3
C. Character 3

INDEX

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

A. INVESTIGATIONS OF KLAN-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS, HATE ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS

1. While these are considered criminal investigations, they are considered delicate in nature and require the application of the restrictions necessary in conducting security-type investigations. Therefore, the investigations and reports are to be handled in accordance with the general rules applying to security-type investigations.
2. Caution
   Extreme care must be exercised to insure that in every instance there is a proper basis for investigation. Sound judgment must be used to avoid investigation of organizations or individuals that merely sponsor unpopular causes or propaganda but do not meet the standards outlined under item 3a below. The Bureau must insure that there will be no justifiable basis for any charge that these investigations infringe upon constitutional freedoms of speech, press, or assemblage.
3. Investigations
   - a. Investigation is confined to those organizations or associated individuals that either:
     - (1) Have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450
     - (2) Have not been designated under Executive Order 10450 but there is an actual or alleged affiliation or subsidiary relation with a designated organization
     - (3) Have adopted a policy or have allegedly adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution
     - (4) Have allegedly committed acts of violence
     - (5) Have actually or allegedly committed violations of laws within the Bureau's jurisdiction
   - b. During the investigation of Klan-type organizations and hate organizations, the following information should be obtained:
     - (1) Organization structure
       - (a) Headquarters
       - (b) Officers
       - (c) Location of klaverns or local chapters
     - (2) Objectives
     - (3) Publications and propaganda
     - (4) Finances
     - (5) Activity of klaverns or local chapters
       - (a) Name and address
       - (b) Officers
       - (c) Estimated membership and recruiting activities
       - (d) Meetings
         - I. Date
         - II. Type (open or closed)
         - III. Place
         - IV. Estimated attendance
   - c. Follow through public source material and established sources activities of organizations which do not qualify for investigation under above standards. Initiate investigation upon receipt of information which brings organization within investigative criteria and at the same time advise Bureau this action taken and basis therefor.
   - d. Conduct no investigation regarding individual acts of violence allegedly or actually committed by an organization in absence of information indicating violation within Bureau's jurisdiction. However, concerning each such incident, the following information should be obtained through informants and sources in connection with investigations of such organizations:

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(1) Which group involved
(2) Whether action taken was on initiative of individual members or with knowledge or approval of leadership

In initial communication reporting violent act, advise if there is or is not indication of organization participation.

If act of violence is a criminal violation over which Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation; if the act of violence is a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

e. Agents are not to attend functions or rallies of any Klan or hate group although open to the public.

f. These investigations must be both vigorous and incisive. The fundamental objective is to identify those who may be engaged or responsible for acts of violence, and care must be taken to avoid becoming involved in widespread, nebulous investigation which does not go to the heart of the problem at hand. When a case is opened, it should receive immediate continuous attention until the initial allegation is resolved. The case should be promptly closed if it is definitely determined that it does not fall within the criteria set out in item 3a above.

g. Individual cases should be opened on officers, leaders, and active workers in these organizations to determine whether they have been involved in acts of violence or have a definite potential for future acts of violence. Good judgment and discretion must be exercised in the case of prominent individuals who may be dupes of such organizations and who may hold nominal office. Immediately advise the Bureau when investigation of a prominent person is contemplated; and if there is any question as to whether there is sufficient probable cause to fully justify investigation, no investigation should be conducted without Bureau approval.

h. Names of members in attendance at meetings should not be set out in investigative reports but should be indexed from informant reports. Names of new members should be furnished the Bureau by letter for indexing purposes.

4. Informants and interviews

a. In order that the Bureau may discharge its responsibilities, it is mandatory that information be obtained regarding all pertinent Klan or hate organization activities. In this regard it is necessary that informants be developed in all such organizations which meet the criteria set forth in 3a above. Efforts in this regard must be discreet.

b. Preliminary interviews with rank-and-file members of an organization and other individuals not connected with such organizations conducted solely for the purpose of determining the attitude of the individual may be authorized by the SAC. To obtain authority from the SAC, credit, arrest, informant, and indices checks should be made and a memorandum prepared for the SAC setting forth this information so that he may make a decision regarding the propriety of the interview. Officials of local groups or national officers are not to be interviewed without prior Bureau authority. Likewise where a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, and the like,

[specific Bureau authority must be obtained. Two Agents should be present when an organization official is interviewed and, if possible, two Agents should be present at interviews with organization members. During such an interview, no attempt should be made to develop the individual as an informant; but if he is cooperative and has a potential for development as an informant, complete background information should be obtained and specific Bureau authority requested to develop him as an informant.

c. Bureau authority not necessary prior to interview with organization members in criminal- or applicant-type cases; however, interview should be confined to subject matter of inquiry, unless data concerning organization volunteered by interviewee.

d. Submit by September 15 and March 15 each year letter captioned "Semiannual listing of Klan and hate organizations and informant coverage," Bureau file #157-1, containing:

(1) Names of Klan and hate organizations active in your territory

(2) Coverage of each Klan broken down by klaverns and each hate organization broken down into local chapters showing identities of informants and sources reporting on each

(3) Estimated membership by klaverns or chapters and basis for estimate

[B. CLASSIFICATION - 157

[C. CHARACTER - RACIAL MATTERS]

July 30, 1959

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
REVISION NUMBER 196

RE: REVISED PAGES

There are enumerated below pages for inclusion in the Manual of Instructions. Revisions may be noted by brackets. The dates appearing at the bottom of the pages indicate the dates of revisions. The old corresponding pages should be removed from the Manual and destroyed. The Special Agent in Charge has the responsibility for the appropriate destruction of these old pages.

Volume I
  Section 7 - Pages ~~7-11 and 12~~
    Pages ~~19 and 20~~
    ~~Pages 21 and 22~~

Volume II
  Section 23 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~
    Pages ~~3 and 4~~

  Section 42 - Page ~~1~~

Volume III
  Section 66 - Page ~~7~~ ✓
    Pages 7a and 8 ✓

  Section 87 - ~~Pages 33 and 34~~
    Pages ~~53 and 54~~

Volume IV
  Section 102 - Pages ~~23 and 24~~

  Section 105 - Pages ~~3 and 4~~

  Section 108 - ~~Pages 7 and 8~~
    ~~Pages 11 and 12~~
    Page ~~13~~

  Section 122 - Pages ~~1 and 2~~ ✓
    Pages ~~3 and 4~~
    Pages ~~5 and 6~~
    Page ~~7~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (19)

A. INVESTIGATIONS OF KLAN-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS, HATE ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS

1. While these are considered criminal investigations, they are considered delicate in nature and require the application of the restrictions necessary in conducting security-type investigations. Therefore, the investigations and reports are to be handled in accordance with the general rules applying to security-type investigations.
2. Caution
   Extreme care must be exercised to insure that in every instance there is a proper basis for investigation. Sound judgment must be used to avoid investigation of organizations or individuals that merely sponsor unpopular causes or propaganda but do not meet the standards outlined under item 3a below. The Bureau must insure that there will be no justifiable basis for any charge that these investigations infringe upon constitutional freedoms of speech, press, or assemblage.
3. Investigations
   a. Investigation is confined to those organizations or associated individuals that either:
      (1) Have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450
      (2) Have not been designated under Executive Order 10450 but there is an actual or alleged affiliation or subsidiary relation with a designated organization
      (3) Have adopted a policy or have allegedly adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution
      (4) Have allegedly committed acts of violence
      (5) Have actually or allegedly committed violations of laws within the Bureau's jurisdiction
   b. During the investigation of Klan-type organizations and hate organizations, the following information should be obtained:
      (1) Organization structure
         (a) Headquarters
         (b) Officers
         (c) Location of klaverns or local chapters
      (2) Objectives
      (3) Publications and propaganda
      (4) Finances
      (5) Activity of klaverns or local chapters
         (a) Name and address
         (b) Officers
         (c) Estimated membership and recruiting activities
         (d) Meetings
            I. Date
            II. Type (open or closed)
            III. Place
            IV. Estimated attendance
   c. Follow through public source material and established sources activities of organizations which do not qualify for investigation under above standards. Initiate investigation upon receipt of information which brings organization within investigative criteria and at the same time advise Bureau this action taken and basis therefor.
   d. Conduct no investigation regarding individual acts of violence allegedly or actually committed by an organization in absence of information indicating violation within Bureau's jurisdiction. However, concerning each such incident, the following information should be obtained through informants and sources in connection with investigations of such organizations:

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(1) Which group involved
(2) Whether action taken was on initiative of individual members or with knowledge or approval of leadership

In initial communication reporting violent act, advise if there is or is not indication of organization participation.

If act of violence is a criminal violation over which Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation; if the act of violence is a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

e. Agents are not to attend functions or rallies of any Klan or hate group although open to the public.

f. These investigations must be both vigorous and incisive. The fundamental objective is to identify those who may be engaged or responsible for acts of violence, and care must be taken to avoid becoming involved in widespread, nebulous investigation which does not go to the heart of the problem at hand. When a case is opened, it should receive immediate continuous attention until the initial allegation is resolved. The case should be promptly closed if it is definitely determined that it does not fall within the criteria set out in item 3a above.

g. Individual cases should be opened on officers, leaders, and active workers in these organizations to determine whether they have been involved in acts of violence or have a definite potential for future acts of violence. [Wholesale investigations of individuals of these organizations should not be conducted and investigations of individual members should be initiated only on a most selective basis. Individuals investigated should be those who are key personnel who actually formulate and carry out the organization's policy and not those individuals who merely attend meetings on a regular basis. If there is any question as to whether such an investigation should be initiated, the facts should be presented to the Bureau for its consideration.]

Immediately advise the Bureau when investigation of a prominent person is contemplated; and if there is any question as to whether there is sufficient probable cause to fully justify investigation, no investigation should be conducted without Bureau approval.

[The Bureau should be advised by letter of the information obtained, together with a statement as to whether the individual warrants inclusion on the potential bombing suspects list of your office. If investigation indicates that the individual should not be included, the case may then be closed administratively. If the subject is included on the list, the matter should be handled in accordance with instructions set forth in section 23, volume II, of this manual concerning bombing matters.]

h. Names of members in attendance at meetings should not be set out in investigative reports but should be indexed from informant's [statements.] Names of new members should be furnished the Bureau by letter for indexing purposes.

4. Informants and interviews
   a. In order that the Bureau may discharge its responsibilities, it is mandatory that information be obtained regarding all pertinent Klan or hate organization activities. In this regard it is necessary that informants be developed in all such organizations which meet the criteria set forth in 3a above. Efforts in this regard must be discreet.
   b. Preliminary interviews with rank-and-file members of an organization and other individuals not connected with such organizations conducted solely for the purpose of determining the attitude of the individual may be authorized by the SAC. To obtain authority from the SAC, credit, arrest, informant, and indices checks should be made and a memorandum prepared for the SAC setting forth this information so that he may make a decision regarding the propriety of the interview. Officials of local groups or national officers are not to be interviewed without prior Bureau authority. Likewise where a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, and the like, specific Bureau authority must be obtained. Two Agents should be present when an organization official is interviewed and, if possible, two Agents should be present at interviews with organization members. During such an interview, no attempt should be made to develop the individual as an informant; but if he is cooperative and has a potential for development as an informant, complete background information should be obtained and specific Bureau authority requested to develop him as an informant.
   c. Bureau authority not necessary prior to interview with organization members in criminal- or applicant-type cases; however, interview should be confined to subject matter of inquiry, unless data concerning organization volunteered by interviewee.
   [d. Original and one copy of semiannual letter captioned "Klan Organizations, Hate Organizations and Racial Informants, Racial Matters, Bombing Matters," to be submitted according to schedule set out below. Where there is no pertinent activity or information, a negative statement should be made.

January 1 and July 1

Albany
Albuquerque
Atlanta
Baltimore

January 15 and July 15

Birmingham
Boston
Butte
Chicago

February 1 and August 1

Buffalo
Charlotte
Dallas
Denver

February 15 and August 15

Cincinnati
Detroit
El Paso
Kansas City

March 1 and September 1

Cleveland
Indianapolis
Jacksonville
Los Angeles

March 15 and September 15

Houston
Louisville
Milwaukee
New Orleans

April 1 and October 1	April 15 and October 15
Memphis	Omaha
Newark	Phoenix
New Haven	New York
Oklahoma City	Knowvile
St. Louis	

May 1 and November 1	May 15 and November 15
Miami	Little Rock
Norfolk	Pittsburgh
Philadelphia	Salt Lake City
Portland	San Diego
San Antonio	

June 1 and December 1	June 15 and December 15
Mobile	Seattle
Richmond	Savannah
Springfield	Minneapolis
San Francisco	Washington Field

e. The semiannual letter should not be disseminated outside the Bureau, should be given proper security in field office, and should contain following information. Where there is no pertinent activity or information, a negative statement should be made.

(1) Klan Organizations, Hate Organizations, and Informant coverage
 (a) Names of Klan and hate organizations active in your territory
 (b) Coverage of each Klan broken down by Klaverns and each hate organization broken down into local chapters showing identities of informants and sources reporting on each
 (c) Estimated membership by Klavern or chapter and basis for estimate

(2) Racial informants by geographic location
 List the following under headquarters city and each resident agency within your division:
 (a) Symbol numbers of all racial informants with indications as to which are reqularly paid
 (b) List of names or symbol numbers of all approved potential racial informants indicating those regularly paid
 (c) List of name or symbol number of each confidential source indicating those which are reqularly paid

(3) Individuals under pending investigation
 List of individuals being investigated under provisions of section 23, volume II and section 122, volume IV, of this Manual, other than potential bombing suspects.

(4) Potential Bombing Suspects
 List of potential bombing suspects of your office including description, basis of selection, and other areas in which individual should be considered as suspect.

[B. GENERAL RACIAL MATTERS

1. Jurisdiction

The Bureau does not have investigative jurisdiction over such general racial matters, as race riots, civil demonstrations, and similar developments except in instances in which the action is a violation of statute over which the Bureau has jurisdiction or some subversive influence is at work. Insofar as Federal jurisdiction in general racial matters is concerned, U. S. Army regulations place responsibility upon the Army to keep advised of any developments of a civil disturbance nature which may require the rendering of assistance to civil authorities or the intervention of Federal troops. OSI and ONI have collateral responsibility under Army in such matters and copies of pertinent documents disseminated to Army concerning such matter should be furnished to OSI and ONI.

2. Policy

a. As an intelligence function the Bureau does have the responsibility of advising appropriate Government agencies and officials on both a national and local level of all pertinent information obtained concerning such incidents. In this connection it is the personal responsibility of each SAC to make the necessary arrangements to

insure that all developments of this type occurring within his territory are promptly reported to his office and upon receipt thereof furnished to the Bureau by whatever form of communication is warranted under the circumstances.

b. Since the Bureau does not have investigative jurisdiction in general racial matters, no open investigation is to be conducted concerning general racial matters as such.

c. In instances in which civil rights may be involved or in which a racial incident may involve an act which constitutes a criminal violation over which the Bureau has jurisdiction, be guided by instructions concerning the specific violation. Likewise, if the incident involves a bombing or attempted bombing having religious or racial aspects or involving a religious or educational institution, be guided by the specific instructions relating to bombings and attempted bombings.

d. In instances in which some subversive influence is determined to be at work, be guided by instructions pertaining to investigation of the specific subversive influence involved.

e. CAUTION. By their very nature racial matters are extremely delicate and great care must be exercised in the approach to such matters.

3. Procedures

a. Information dealing with general racial matters, such as proposed or actual activities of individuals, officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc., in the racial field, must be furnished to the Bureau expeditiously by whatever means of communication is warranted by the specific nature of the information and the circumstances involved.

b. Pertinent information bearing on general racial matters which would not otherwise be available to interested Government agencies, such as that obtained through sources and informants, and which is of such a nature that it would normally be furnished to the Bureau by letter or airtel must be transmitted to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. In general, pertinent information bearing on general racial matters appearing in newspapers or publications need not be furnished to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. In such instances merely submit copies of pertinent newspaper articles and publications to the Bureau. Of course, if such data is clearly of a nature as to require contacts with appropriate sources, such as information of unusual local or national importance, submit same expeditiously in form suitable for dissemination. Concisely summarize the pertinent article and include therein the results of contacts with appropriate sources.

c. Maintain contact with pertinent informants and sources and keep Bureau and local intelligence agencies advised of any additional pertinent developments. Unless circumstances clearly indicate necessity for more expeditious handling, furnish such additional data to the Bureau promptly in form suitable for dissemination.

d. In many instances situations involving members of the Negro and Caucasian races result in violations of criminal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. While such matters are to be handled in accordance with instructions pertaining to the substantive violation involved, the Bureau has the additional responsibility of disseminating pertinent information concerning any racial aspects of such situations to appropriate Government officials and agencies that do not ordinarily receive reports in criminal matters. Therefore, the submission of a report concerning the criminal violation involved alone is insufficient. In general, pertinent data concerning the racial situation involved must be submitted immediately to Bureau in form suitable for dissemination in order that it may reach interested agencies as soon as possible.

[e. Where information is received in connection with racial matters indicating that individuals or organizations have resorted to or contemplate resorting to violence, you must

(1) Immediately advise the Bureau of full facts by expeditious means depending upon urgency of circumstances

(2) Immediately advise appropriate law enforcement agency having jurisdiction in the matter unless it is already cognizant. If a compelling reason exists for not so advising the pertinent law enforcement agency, such as the possibility of exposing the informant furnishing the information, immediately furnish the Bureau with full facts. Include therein recommendations as to what other trustworthy local or state law enforcement agencies or officials may be used as intermediaries through whom the information in question may be furnished to the law enforcement agency actually having jurisdiction in such a manner as to fully protect the specific informant and the Bureau as the source thereof.

(3) Immediately advise the local office of military intelligence

(4) Contact all appropriate informants and sources to determine if they possess any additional pertinent data concerning the matter and instruct them to be alert for and to promptly furnish to you any such pertinent data obtained.

(5) Prepare and submit pertinent data to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination. Include in the communication the results of contacts with appropriate sources and informants; the time and date that local agencies were advised; and the identities of the individuals so advised. (Where information is furnished to an intermediary official or law enforcement agency and not to the agency actually having jurisdiction, set forth in the cover page the reasons for such procedure.) Submit communication same day original information received except where original information is received after normal working hours, when communication is to be submitted beginning of next workday.

(6) Maintain contact with pertinent informants and sources and keep Bureau, pertinent local law enforcement agency, and local intelligence agencies advised of any additional pertinent developments as they occur. Unless circumstances clearly indicate necessity for more expeditious handling, furnish such additional data to Bureau and intelligence agencies in form suitable for dissemination.

[C. CLASSIFICATION - 157

[D. CHARACTER - RACIAL MATTERS. If it relates to general racial matters, "Racial Matters" followed by name of community and/or state to which information relates.]

2 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

The Attorney General October 10, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDE16

10/13/00 SP2ALM/JB

Reference is made to SSC request dated October 2, 1975. Attached is the original of a memorandum, with enclosures, responding to request Number 1 in referenced communication.

A copy of the memorandum is also being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (5)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

EWL:lhb lhb
(9)

REC-30 62-116395-966

15 NOV 4 1975

3-ENCLOSURE ST-111

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 NOV 7 1975

GPO 954-546

1

2 - Mr. J[illegible]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

62-116395

October 10, 1975

#MDR16

SP-2ALM/JTK

A 10/13/00

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to letter from Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC Staff to Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, dated October 2, 1975, which attached request for FBI and Department of Justice materials.

Request Number 1 related to all material pertaining to a meeting among Mr. D. E. Moore, Mr. A. H. Belmont and Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach on or about February 27, 1965, regarding FBI mail intercept operations. The following documents are enclosed responsive to this request:

1. Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Tolson, subject "The Long Committee," dated February 27, 1965.

2. Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, et al., from Mr. Hoover, dated March 1, 1965.

3. Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, et al., from Mr. Hoover, dated March 2, 1965.

Request Number 2 in attachment to referenced letter is receiving expeditious attention and will be responded to as soon as possible.

Enclosures (3)

1 - The Attorney General

WOC

EWL:lhb lhb
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

62-116395-966

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECT[illegible]
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF CO[illegible]EL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United State[illegible] Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 2, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Attached are requests for FBI and Department of Justice materials. Please consider these to be priority requests.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc Paul V. Daly

~~?TE~~ 4027

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

#mDE16

let to AG 1-DAG
EWL:lhb 10/10/75 Enc. 5

1-Ad Hoc
10-2-75

62-116395-966

8

ENCLOSURE

Additional Requests Regarding FBI Mail Intercepts

1. All material pertaining to a meeting between Mr. D. E. Moore, Mr. A. H. Belmont, and Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach on or about February 27, 1965 regarding FBI mail intercept operations.

2. All material pertaining to an FBI mail opening project in regard to a suspected Soviet or Soviet-bloc illegal agent who resided in Riverside, California and occurred for approximately four to eight weeks in autumn of 1961 or 1962. Mail was allegedly opened in the FBI resident office in Riverside.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Callahan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 2/27/65

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: THE LONG COMMITTEE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE BY

The Attorney General called on the morning of February 27, 1965, to advise he wanted to consult with the Bureau on certain problems raised by the Long Committee, which is exploring the use of mail covers, et cetera. He noted there was a possible problem concerning Chief Inspector Montague's testimony and whether it was necessary for Montague to change his testimony. Also, he felt that Internal Revenue Service had been using investigative techniques which they should not use and this could pose a problem. He said that the President had asked him to coordinate with all executive agencies concerning the problems raised by the Long Committee.

Inspector Moore and I met with the Attorney General in his office this afternoon. Mr. Courtney Evans was present. I told the Attorney General that in Montague's testimony he was told by Attorney Fensterwald that if any of the questions had national security implications Montague should not answer them. Consequently, Montague was estopped from doing other than answer in the negative when asked questions touching on national security. With this interpretation, it was questionable whether an attempt should be made to change or explain Montague's testimony, particularly in view of the obvious lack of judgment on the part of Fensterwald and the desire of Long for publicity. I made it clear to the Attorney General that from our dealings with Montague, he was a man of integrity and sacrificed his personal desires for the welfare of the country and had cooperate fully with us. The Attorney General said he had no intention of changing one word of Montague's testimony, but he was considering advising Long and Fensterwald that there were extreme delicate national security matters touching on the areas being covered by the committee and there could be exceptions to the answers given in the testimony when they touched on such sensitive security matters. He said further that he contemplate seeing Senator Long and impressing on him that the committee would not want to stumble by mistake into an area of extreme interest to the national security as they nearly did in a matter

REC- 56

1 - Mr. Tolson
2 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Moore

CONTINUED - OVER

25 MAR 12 1965

EX-114

4091

50 MAR 16 1965

MAR 15 1965

AHB:gjf

#mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/lt
ON 11-14-00

affecting CIA. (Apparently CIA got wind of some inquiries by the committee relative to their secret operation and went to the committee and warned them off.) Katzenbach contemplates asking for a list of the witnesses who will appear before the committee together with a brief summary of the expected testimony. On the basis of this, he will be able to advise Senator Long when he should steer clear of a sensitive area.

I told Mr. Katzenbach that I certainly agree that this matter should be controlled at the committee level but that I felt pressure would have to be applied so that the personal interest of Senator Long became involved rather than on any ideological basis. Mr. Katzenbach said that he had already talked to Vice President Humphrey about Fensterwald, who he considered a wild man, and that Humphrey had promised to talk to Long concerning Fensterwald. Katzenbach said that in addition to the Vice President he might have to resort to pressure from the President himself, although he would prefer to work it out without resorting to the President. He indicated there was no one on the committee itself who could be helpful and that he did not expect any help from Senator Eastland.

Mr. Katzenbach said that he expected troublefrom the possible activities of IRS and the military in the investigative field; that if some of these matters are uncovered before the committee they will tend to undermine the restricted and tightly controlled operations of the Bureau. I told him that our operations are tightly controlled and particularly in the delicate areas of concern, we restrict ourselves to important security matters.

Mr. Katzenbach said he was going to see Senator Long on Monday and wanted to know if the Bureau would like someone to go along with him. I told him no.

ACTION:

Mr. Katzenbach said he would advise us of the results of his conversation with Long. He also asked that I advise the Director of our discussion and I told him I would.

I called Mr. DeLoach and briefed him on this problem in order that he might contact Senator Eastland in an effort to warn the Long Committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense. (Of couse I made no mention of such a contact to the Attorney General.) Mr. DeLoach advised that Senator Eastland is in Mississippi and he will contact him upon his return Monday.

I don't see what all
the excitement is about.
I would have no hesitan
in discontinuing all techn
ques — technical coverag
microphones trash co
mail covers etc. While
might handicap us I do
they are as valuable as [illegible]
believe & none warrant
being used to justify [illegible]

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

4:07 PM

March 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

Senate Committee on Judiciary

B.C.

Edward V.

RECORDED COPY FILED IN [illegible]

I called the Attorney General and told him I wanted to let him know that I had talked to Senator James Eastland today, in regard to the hearings before the Long Committee concerning mail covers, et cetera. I stated Senator Eastland is in Mississippi today but he is going to see Senator Long not later than Wednesday morning to caution him that this fellow Fensterwald must not go into the kind of questioning he made of Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department. The Attorney General stated he was going to see Senator Long himself and asked if I thought he ought to wait until after Senator Eastland talks to Senator Long. I stated the timing might be well if he did wait as Eastland assured me he will see Long not later than Wednesday and then if he, the Attorney General, could see Long sometime Wednesday, it would probably tie it down once and for all as there are no hearings until Wednesday anyway. The Attorney General stated he thought they were having a hearing tomorrow, but he would check. I stated if there is a hearing tomorrow, then I would be inclined for the Attorney General to see Senator Long now and if it is not before Wednesday, then I think he should let Senator Eastland see what he can do. I stated Senator Eastland thoroughly understands the matter and said he does not intend to have that gone into and that obviously Fensterwald is getting in over his head and that has to be stopped. BERNHARD

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

REC- 44
62-99328-

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 415 PM
DATE 3-1-65
BY [illegible]

MAR 8 1965

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JEH:edm (10)

10 MAR 1965, edm

1 XEROX
MAR 9 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

9:40 AM

March 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. DE LOACH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #mDe16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2-ALM/BS/G

62-75333-1
62-81143-1
62-100930-1
62-17

Senate Committee on Judiciary

The Attorney General called and advised that he had talked to Senator Long last night. Senator Long's committee is looking into mail covers et cetera. The Attorney General stated he thought somebody had already spoken to Senator Long as he said he did not want to get into any national security area and was willing to take steps not to do this. The Attorney General stated that Mr. Fensterwald was present for part of the meeting and Fensterwald had said that he had some possible witnesses who are former Bureau Agents and if they were asked if mail was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General stated that before they are called, he would like to know who they are and whether they were ever involved in any program touching on national security and if not, it is their own business, but if they were, we would want to know. The Attorney General stated the Senator promised that he would have a chance to look at the names if he wanted to, personally and confidentially, and the list would have any names involving national security deleted and he would tell the Senator how many but no more.

The Attorney General stated that the Postmaster General is going down there this morning himself which he, the Attorney General, thought would be helpful to Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department.

The Attorney General stated that Senator Long also said he is not going to propose legislation to abolish mail covers as he thought they served a useful purpose but he did think that control should be tightened. I stated I thought there was great laxity in the matter of mail covers and the matter of tapping telephones.

I stated I have always been of the view and recommended back when Tom Clark was Attorney General that no agency of the Government should tap a telephone except with the written approval of the Attorney General. I stated

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen 4
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

XEROX JEH:edm (10)

MAR 3 1965

MAR 3 - 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC- 38 62-77258-41

8 MAR 3 1965

there would then be in one place a list of all phone taps and the purpose and reason for them. I stated that it is a fact, insofar as I am concerned, that I am the only head of an agency who does not have authority to tap telephones. I stated that I know that subordinates down the line in some agencies will tap phones without the knowledge of the chief of the agency and there is grave suspicion in Washington by some newspapermen that their phones have been tapped by agencies of the Government trying to find out where they are getting their information. I stated I have always been opposed to the law whereby it is necessary to get the authority of a court to tap phones because of the composition of some of our courts and the employees thereof, but I have always felt that the President should issue an Executive Order confidentially to all agencies that all phone tapping be discontinued except when specifically approved by the Attorney General so there would be in one place a list and then if any committee in Congress got on the warpath, the Attorney General would have a list he could vouch for as being the only phones tapped by the Government. The Attorney General stated that made sense. I stated many agencies are opposed because they realize there would be a marked restriction. I stated we only have 45 phone taps, which is a low number for a country the size of ours and the area we have to cover. The Attorney General stated no one has any idea how many phone taps the whole Government has.

I stated there is also a school being conducted in California by a private organization which instructs the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service in the matter of phone tapping and they have sent their own personnel there to be trained. I stated Internal Revenue has also from time to time hired private outside phone tappers to do their tapping. I stated it is that type of thing if there were a real investigation which would come out. The Attorney General commented that he would not guarantee some of it won't come out. I stated I was amazed when I learned of the school in California as I saw a reference to it in the newspaper and wanted to know what it was and what officers attended. I stated we have our own instructors and do it ourselves.

I stated I thought the Attorney General had made good headway with Senator Long. The Attorney General stated he thought it would be helpful, but his

March 2, 1965

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, DeLoach

problem is that he thinks the Senator is fine but he does not think that Fensterwald is as straightforward, or to put it another way that Fensterwald is smart and devious and the Senator is straightforward and not very bright and that is the problem. I stated I thought that Fensterwald is trying to get publicity for the Senator. The Attorney General stated the Senator said he did not want to get into this and he would give him, the Attorney General, the names and a summary of the testimony and told Fensterwald to do so, but he, the Attorney General, can't say Fensterwald is going to do it; that he will on some but he did not know that he would on all. I stated I had no faith or confidence in Fensterwald and neither did Senator Eastland. The Attorney General stated that Senator Eastland may have already talked to Senator Long or else the Vice President, but somebody had waked him up. I stated Senator Eastland said he would do it Wednesday, but he may have called him.

The Attorney General stated that is where it stands now and we shall see what happens.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11 42 AM
DATE 3-2-65
BY

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/10/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES re 10/2/75 request Item 1 concerning meeting among Moore, Belmont and Katzenbach on FBI mail intercept operations.

Originating Office: FBI 705

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Date: 10/10/75

Received by: James V. Dick

Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

[illegible] INFORMATION CONTAINED [illegible] 10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-966

ENCLOSURE

6

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/10/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 10/2/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Intelligence collection

[illegible]

#MDR16
10/13/00 SP2 ALM/JH6

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Three communications pertaining to a meeting regarding FBI mail intercept operations.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WOC/8

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. [illegible]. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 15, 1975

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/20/00 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible] #MDR16

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the October 7, 1975, request of the SSC wherein certain enclosed documents relating to mail intercept programs were submitted for declassification.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which transmits the documents enclosed with referenced letter. These documents have been excised in accordance with an agreement between representatives of the FBI and Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC. These documents, in their excised form, are declassified and are available to the SSC for whatever use the Committee deems appropriate.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum effecting the transmittal of the documents to the SSC.

Del. to Shaheen 10/17/75 [illegible]

Enclosures (2)

ST-111

62-116395 3-ENCLOSURE

REC-30

62-116395-967

15 NOV 4 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

WOC:lhb|hb
(8)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.

NOTE:

The documents enclosed with referenced letter concern the Hunter Project; Z Coverage; CHIPROP Survey; SAM Survey; GUS Survey; CHICAN Survey; JOE Survey and the CHICLET Survey. These documents have been reviewed by personnel of the Intelligence

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

84 NOV 5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395 #mDR16

October 15, 1975

AL 10/13/00 SP2ALM/JG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Domestic Intelligence Task Force Director, SSC, to the Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, dated October 7, 1975, wherein certain documents relating to mail intercept programs were enclosed. Referenced letter requested these documents be appropriately excised for future use at public hearings of the SSC.

This letterhead memorandum transmits to the SSC copies of these documents appropriately excised and, where necessary, declassified. The documents are being transmitted to the SSC for whatever use the Committee deems appropriate.

1 - The Attorney General

WOC:lhb lhb
(7)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-967

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

Division and have been appropriately excised for use by the Committee at public hearings to be scheduled starting 10/21/75. In excising these documents they have been accordingly declassified removing any and all information to sensitive sources, identities of target countries and Agent personnel.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 7, 1975

#MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The enclosed documents relating to mail intercept programs are submitted for declassification by the Department of Justice and the FBI. Portions of these documents which reveal sensitive sources or on-going operations should be appropriately excised for use at public hearings.

A list of these documents is also attached. Those documents which are followed by an asterisk on this list do not appear to be classified, but are nonetheless included because their contents are similar in nature to those documents which are classified.

These documents should be declassified by Tuesday, October 14, to allow sufficient preparation time for the mail hearings, which are now scheduled to begin on Tuesday, October 21.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Paul Daly

62-116395-967

ENCLOSURE

c: Paul Daly

#MDR/6

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/20/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

HUNTER PROJECT

1. Belmont to Boardman - 1/22/58*
2. Belmont to Boardman - 2/6/58*
3. Angleton (CIA) to Director, FBI - 2/6/58
4. Branigan to Belmont - 4/21/58*
5. D.E. Moore to Belmont - ~~4~~3/10/61*
6. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 6/9/61*
7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/25/61, with attached blind memo "Re: Project Hunter," dated 8/21/61*
8. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 11/2/62, with attached blind memo "Re: Project Hunter," dated 10/30/62*
9. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 3/27/63*
10. Triplett to Branigan - 8/24/66*
11. Papich to D.J. Brennan - 1/16/69*
12. Routing slip to Angleton (CIA) from J. Edgar Hoover, dated 3/10/72, with attached blind memo "Re: Project Hunter," dated 3/10/72
13. Branigan to E.S. Miller - 2/15/73*

Z-COVERAGE

1. Turner to Hennrich - 6/25/51

CHIPROP SURVEY

1. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 9/4/56
2. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 3/11/60
3. Donahoe to W.C. Sullivan - 9/15/61
4. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 9/14/62
5. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 9/20/62

Chiprop Survey, cont'd

6. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 6/28/63
7. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 5/25/65
8. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 1/18/66

SAM SURVEY

1. Director, FBI to SAC, New York - 7/11/60
2. Branigan to Belmont - 2/28/61
3. Branigan to Belmont - 5/25/61
4. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/4/61
5. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 8/29/61
6. Branigan to Sullivan - 8/31/61
7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/11/62
8. Director, FBI to SAC, Los Angeles - 1/21/63
9. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/8/64
10. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 4/15/66
11. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 3/31/70

GUS SURVEY

1. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 9/20/61
2. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 10/2/61
3. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 10/18/61
4. SAC, New York to Director, FBI - 12/13/61
5. Director, FBI to SAC, New York - 12/26/61
6. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 1/31/62
7. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan - 8/3/62

CHICAN SURVEY

1. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 1/19/61
2. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 2/3/61
3. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 2/28/61
4. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 11/27/61

JOE SURVEY

1. Director, FBI to SAC, Miami - 12/21/62*
2. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 2/5/64*
3. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 6/25/65*
4. SAC, Miami to Director, FBI - 7/22/66*

CHICLET SURVEY

1. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 11/20/63
2. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 4/29/64
3. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan - 5/22/64
4. Director, FBI to SAC, San Francisco - 5/25/64
5. SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI - 5/19/66*

BALTCH CASE

1. D.E. Moore to W.C. Sullivan - 10/2/64

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/15/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
10/7/75 request

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: TWCreagar Date: 10-15-75 /

Received by: Michael Murphy /

Title: Asst Security Dir /

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

10-13-00 SP2 ALM/HG

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 10/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Information handling
Intelligence collection

ALL [illegible] #MD216
10-13-00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Documents furnished relating to mail intercept program. These documents, previously reviewed at FBIHQ, and now are delivered properly excised for public hearings.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Pro "Abstracts" in Records, this memo dated 11/4/75.
7/19/76

TO: Mr. Cregar

RE: SENSTUDY '75

Re formal request dated 8/4/75 from Senate Select Committee Item ~~III.(1)~~ V, "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".

This is newly requested material.

Arrangements have been made with the property management office to have a copy of this handbook delivered to Mr. Cregar Room 4171 JEH.

It can be shown to a representative of the SS Committee and a Laboratory representative will be made available to assist in the review.

If this manual is requested and given to SSC, a memorandum to the Administrative Division is required to remove it from Mr. Cregar's inventory of personal property.

W. E. Harward
Radio Engineering Section
Laboratory Division

Returned to Adm. Div. & removed from Cregar's pers. prop. invt. 7/19/76

REC-30 62-116395-968

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

#MDR16

[illegible] DATE 10-1300 SP2ALM/116

84 NOV 5 1975

Retyped page(s) [redacted] of memo [redacted] to ____

dated ____ re: ____

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

October 15, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

Director, FBI

#MDR16

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

10-13-00 SP-2 ALM/sf

In accordance with an agreement reached during a meeting on July 30, 1975, among Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Deputy Assistant Director H. E. Helgeson, Section Chiefs R. L. Shackelford and J. G. Deegan, all of this Bureau, and SSC Staff members Mark H. Gitenstein, Mary DeOreo, and John T. Elliff, the FBI was to furnish to the SSC Staff members examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

In addition, the SSC inquired as to the number of persons included in the Extremist Photograph Album (EPA) as of July 30, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum disclosing that the pertinent documents are available to SSC Staff members for access regarding the preliminary inquiries, investigation of an infiltrated organization and the EPA. A copy is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (~~2~~ 3) ENCLOSURE
62-116395

1 - Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RDS:adn
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

REC 30

62-116395-969

ST-111

15 NOV 4 1975

84 NOV 5 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE:

Copies of unexcised and excised documents (where necessary) that are available for access to SSC members are being maintained by the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Memorandum from J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, 8/18/75, "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)" (attached) recommended, and the Director approved, the granting of SSC Staff access to this material.

5/10

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

62-116395

October 15, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

As a result of a conference held on July 30, 1975, among Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Deputy Assistant Director H. E. Helgeson, Section Chiefs R. L. Shackelford and J. G. Deegan, all of this Bureau, and SSC Staff members Mark H. Gitenstein, Mary DeOreo, and John T. Elliff, it was agreed to furnish to SSC Staff members access to examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

In addition, the SSC inquired as to the number of persons included in the Extremist Photograph Album.

Purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the pertinent documents responsive to the agreement are available for access to the appropriately cleared members of the SSC Staff in Room 4171 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building.

1 - The Attorney General
RDS:adn/klm
(8)

MDR16

1013-00 SP-2 ALM/TAB

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

WOC
Enr

JBA
PVH

62-116395-969

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 15

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/8/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC). (7/30/75 Oral Request SSC Extremist Photo Album.)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul L Daly Date: 10-18-75

Received by: James Dick

Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

SP-2ALM/HG

10-13-00

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

FOR REVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC 7/30/75 Oral Request

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

#MDR16

ALL I[illegible]
[illegible] 10-13-00 SP-2ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

As the result of a conference held 7/30/75, documents pertaining to the Extremist Photograph Album, have been made available for review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FBIHQ, also examples of investigations pertaining to preliminary inquiries and an infiltrated organization.

62-116395
FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. Hotis)

The Attorney General

October 17, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar (Enclosures)

Director, FBI

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2ALM/

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 8, 1975, requesting all materials pertaining to the decisional process which preceded and resulted in the Bureau's request to the Central Intelligence Agency to place each of the following names on the Hunter Mail watch list: Derk Bodde, "National Guardian," Leonard Bernstein, National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and "Ramparts" Magazine.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff of the SSC in an effort to clarify a similar request. Elliff made recommendations for handling that request which are being followed at this time.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which constitute the Bureau's response to the current request.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (40)

62-116395

EX-106

62-116395-910

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

3 - ENCLOSURE

15 NOV 5 1975

JCF:rsm (9)

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

838-WOC/18

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 NOV 12 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar (Enclosures)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/MJG

62-116395

October 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated October 8, 1975, requesting all materials pertaining to the decisional process which preceded and resulted in the Bureau's request to the Central Intelligence Agency to place each of the following names on the Hunter Mail watch list:

1) "National Guardian"
2) Derk Bodde
3) Leonard Bernstein
4) National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
5) "Ramparts"

Knowledge of the Hunter Mail watch list was limited within the Bureau to Supervisors at FBI Headquarters. When a Supervisor desired to place a name on the watch list, he would prepare a 3 x 5 card which included:

a) the name and address of the individual or organization,
b) the duration of the request, and
c) the treatment to be given to any mail located.

No date was placed on the card, however, the cards were numbered consecutively. The request was then forwarded through liaison representatives to the Central Intelligence Agency. No other documents were prepared concerning the consideration, recommendation and proposal of these requests.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff of the SSC concerning a similar request. As a result, Elliff requested the following information concerning each of these requests:

JCF:rsm

JBA/PLM

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

62-116395 -

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

ENCLOSURE

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

a) a copy of the request and any other document in the Hunter Mail file in which the FBI mentions or shows results obtained from the specific request,

b) the approximate date of the request, and

c) the apparent basis for the request, or in the case of an investigation instituted after the effective date of the Hunter Mail project, the basis for the investigation.

The following summaries and enclosures constitute the Bureau's response to this request.

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

1) "National Guardian"

a) documents - The "National Guardian" was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 117 (Exhibit A-1). On April 20, 1962, a list of names to remain on the watch list was prepared and the "National Guardian" was included (Exhibit A-2). On October 25, 1966, a similar list was prepared (Exhibit A-3). The "National Guardian" was mentioned in a memorandum dated August 21, 1964, concerning data obtained from the Hunter Mail project during the past year (Exhibit A-4).

b) date - Request number 117 was made between August 18, 1961, and April 20, 1962. As indicated above, the "National Guardian" was included on a list of names to remain on the watch list on April 20, 1962. It was not on a similar list of names as of August 18, 1961.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file on the "National Guardian" is dated August 13, 1948, and reports the publication on August 1, 1948, of the "National Gazette Weekly," forerunner of the "National Guardian." During 1961 and 1962, the "National Guardian" sponsored tours of Eastern Europe, including Russia (Exhibits A-5 and 6).

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

2) Derk Bodde

a) documents - No Hunter Mail request was located for Bodde. He was, however, included in a list of names to remain on the watch list which was prepared on April 20, 1962 (Exhibit A-2).

b) date - Bodde was most likely placed on the watch list in 1960. As indicated above, Bodde was included on a list of names to remain on the watch list on April 20, 1962; however, there are no documents in the file dated in 1961 and 1962. He did travel to Russia during 1960.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file on Bodde is dated February 5, 1952. A review of the documents for the period after the Hunter program was instituted failed to locate any document recommending him for inclusion on the watch list. The investigation had been placed in a closed status until information was received that Bodde was scheduled to attend the International Orientalist Congress in Moscow during August, 1960 (Exhibits B-1 and 2).

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

3) Leonard Bernstein

a) documents - No Hunter Mail request was located for Bernstein. He was, however, included in a list of names to be removed from the watch list which was prepared on April 20, 1962 (Exhibit A-2).

b) date - Bernstein was most likely placed on the watch list in 1959, since he went to Russia during that year. On April 20, 1962, he was included on a list of names to be removed from the watch list.

c) basis - Since no Hunter Mail request was located, there is no background information available concerning the Leonard Bernstein who was placed on the watch list. A review of Bureau files for individuals named Leonard Bernstein does indicate, however, that the only Leonard Bernstein who travelled to Russia or had any Soviet contacts was Leonard Bernstein, born August 25, 1918 (the prominent conductor and composer). The first item in the Bureau file concerning Bernstein is dated March 2, 1949. A review of documents in this file from the beginning of the Hunter program in 1958 until April 20, 1962, the date on which his name was removed from the watch list, failed to locate a request that he be included in the Hunter program. However, information concerning him, compiled in response to a request from another government agency in December, 1958, did indicate that Bernstein planned to visit Russia during March, 1959 (Exhibits C-1 and 2).

4) National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC)

a) documents - The NMC was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 193 (Exhibit D-1). The NMC was mentioned in a memorandum dated August 28, 1969, concerning data obtained from the Hunter Mail project during the past year (Exhibit D-2).

b) date - This request was most likely made between January 16, 1969, and August 28, 1969. No investigation was conducted concerning the NMC until September, 1966 (Exhibit D-3). The request, however, was probably not made until after January 15, 1969, the date that a CIA representative suggested the Bureau use the Hunter project for development of leads in the New Left field (Exhibit D-4). Request number 233 was mentioned in a memorandum concerning results from the Hunter Mail program which was dated August 28, 1969.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file concerning the NMC is a communication dated September 14, 1966, which indicates that a group known as the November 8th Ad Hoc Committee had been formed at Cleveland, Ohio. By communication dated September 20, 1966, FBI Headquarters instructed the New York and Cleveland Divisions to keep abreast of the plans of this Committee to sponsor demonstrations during November, 1966 (Exhibit D-3). By communication dated July 28, 1967, FBI Headquarters instructed the New York Division to prepare a report concerning the same organization which had become known as the NMC (Exhibit D-5). The name NMC was used until approximately August, 1969, when an allegedly new organization known as the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam was formed.

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

5) "Ramparts"

a) documents - "Ramparts" was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 105 (Exhibit E-1).

b) date - This request was also most likely made between January 16, 1969, and August 28, 1969.

c) basis - The first item in the Bureau file concerning "Ramparts" is dated October 22, 1964; however, no active investigation was authorized at that time. Investigation was authorized in May, 1967, based on a request received from the Department of Justice (Exhibits E-2 and 3). No request to include "Ramparts" on the Hunter Mail watch list was located; however, a document dated October 17, 1968, does indicate that "Ramparts" furnished a list of names, probably their mailing list, to the Soviets (Exhibit E-4).

Enclosures (19)

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENSTE SELECT COMMITTEE.
10/8/75 Requestx

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller Date: 10/20/75

Received by: Ben Marshall

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]16

62-116395-970

ENCLOSURE

8

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

10/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 10/8/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Information handling

mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2ALM

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Material furnished regarding placing of individuals and/or organizations on the Hunter Mail watch list: a copy of the request and any document which mentions or shows results obtained from the specific request, the approximate date of the request and apparent basis for the request.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIAL LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW 5-WOC/

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

b

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2ALM/TG

5-88 (2-28-58)

1. Name "NATIONAL GUARDIAN"
WEEKLY GUARDIAN ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address 197 East Fourth Street and
133 West 72nd Street
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
New York, New York, USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☒ Watch List Duration Until canceled.

HUNTER Request No.
117

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395-970

A-13

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - D. E. Moore
1 - Branigan
1 - Litrento
1 - Papich
1 - Stewart

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : D. E. Moore

DATE: 4/20/62

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible] MDR16

In order to insure that Project Hunter will continue to operate under maximum economy and efficiency, we have advised CIA at a recent conference we would review Bureau Informant 200 material received and advise CIA whether or not we desired to continue to receive material on persons whose names appear on the attached list.

The interested Supervisor should, accordingly, indicate by writing "yes" or "no" to the right of his subject's name whether or not he desires Bureau Informant 200 to discontinue furnishing data on each of his respective subjects.

The attached lists were compiled from a review of the Project Hunter card box indices maintained by Supervisor W. D. Stewart as an administrative aid for routing purposes. The names of subjects on whom we have received no material for the past year do not appear on the attached lists. They have been weeded out separately along with other subjects who have been relatively inactive.

The results of this survey will be forwarded via Liaison to CIA for appropriate action.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memo and its attachment be routed to the interested Supervisor for a determination as to the continuation of receiving Bureau Informant 200 material on his respective subject.

That the results of this survey be forwarded via Liaison to CIA for appropriate action.

105-93089

Enclosure

WDS:blv
(6)

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

The [illegible] was furnished on 4/30/62 to CIA via Liaison. WRP 4/30/62 CIA was advised this review was conducted in accordance with our discussion at most recent conference so that we may each eliminate unnecessary [illegible]

As a result of our survey, we will discontinue on 97 of the 200 persons on [illegible]

REC- 13

50

17 MAY 2 1962

A-25

SUBJECT	DISCONTINUE YES	 NO	SUPERVISOR
NATIONAL GUARDIAN		✓	R.J.RAMPTON
BODDE, DERK		No	J.V.BAKER
BERNSTEIN, LEONARD	✓		W.P.JONES

(Names of other individuals and organizations)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - M. E. Triplett

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: October 25, 1966

FROM : M. E. Triplett

Project Hunter

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

The attached list of numbered and unnumbered Hunter Stops was received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the request to advise whether we still desired that the subjects be retained on the Watch List. A check of Bureau records revealed that some of these names had already been canceled. Names on this list were referred to the Special Agent Supervisor interested in the matter and numbers were assigned to unnumbered stops we desire to retain on the Watch List.

On October 21, 1966, a complete list of stops was referred to the Liaison Section for delivery to Mr. Worth of CIA. A copy of this list is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached lists be filed in order that they will be available for future reference.

Enclosures - 2
105-93089
MET:met
(2)

REC- 58

105-9[illegible]57-79

EX-108

OCT 26 1966

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

A-3

~~SECRET~~ October 21, 1966

HUNTER STOPS - NUMBERED

117. National Guardian; Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.

Bureau Listings Numbered

Received from Jerry Worth. C I A

22 Nat'l Guardian NYC (-)

(Names of other individuals and organizations)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - Branigan
1 - A.P. Litrento

TO : W.A. Branigan

DATE: August 21, 1964

1 - S. Papich
1 - Triplett

FROM : W.E. Triplett

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

REC- 40

105-93089-70

A detailed analysis of data received from Bureau Informant 200 during the past year is attached.

ACTION:

11 SEP 2 1964

None. This is for your information.

ENCLOSURE

105-93089

File in 105-93089

SOVIET SECTION

A-4

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Data of Special Interest:

Typical Data Furnished by Bureau Informant 200 During Past Year:

offer of Andrew Jacob Steiger, American correspondent in U.S.S.R., to work for Security Index subject Russell Arthur Nixon of the "National Guardian";

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2ALM/JG

100-357044

New York, New York
July 24, 1961

Re: "National Guardian,"
Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.;
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

Reference is made to memorandum at New York, entitled as above, dated May 22, 1961.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished on July 17, 1961, a revised schedule of the "National Guardian" European tour, July 28 - August 20, 1961.

The schedule of this tour is as follows:

FROM	TO	Via CARRIER	FLIGHT NO.	DATE
Idlewild	Copenhagen	Scandinavian Airlines (SAS)	912	7/28
Copenhagen	Stockholm	SAS	508	7/31
Stockholm	Helsinki	SAS	728	7/31
Helsinki	Moscow	Aeroflot	108	7/31
Moscow	Kiev	Aeroflot	open	
Kiev	Prague	Aeroflot	211	8/17
Prague	Copenhagen	Malev (Hungarian	380	8/20
Copenhagen	Idlewild	SAS Airlines)	919	8/20

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

This document contains neither
recomme[illegible] conclusions
of the [illegible] property
of the [illegible] to your
agency[illegible] are
not [illegible] outside
[illegible].

A-5

Re: "National Guardian,"
Weekly Guardian Associates, Inc.;
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of January 2, 1957, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., contains the following concerning the "National Guardian":

> "National Guardian
>
> "1. 'Established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a "progressive" weekly. *** Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia.'
> (Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 'Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell,' August 25, 1956, p. 12)"

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

#mDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

New York, New York
April 6, 1962

Bufile 100-357044

Re: "National Guardian";
Weekly Guardian Associates, Incorporated
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

The April 9, 1962 issue of the "National Guardian," page 6, contained an announcement of the Guardian's "1962 Tour of Eastern Europe". This tour, of 23 days duration, is to leave New York Friday, August 3, 1962, and is to return on Sunday, August 26, 1962. The tour will visit Bucharest, Budapest, Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad. The announcement states that the tour will also visit Poland or Czechoslovakia. The price of the tour will be $1295.00, and those interested are instructed to forward a $100.00 deposit to "Guardian Tours", 197 East 4th Street, New York 9, New York.

A characterization of the "National Guardian" is attached.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

10

A-6

100-357044-467

APPENDIX

Re: "National Guardian";
Weekly Guardian Associates, Incorporated
Internal Security - C
Internal Security Act of 1950

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

Dec 1, 1961

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., contains the following concerning the "National Guardian":

> "National Guardian
>
> "1. 'established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a "progressive" weekly. * * * Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia.' (Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 'Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell,' August 25, 1956, p. 12)"

[illegible] 357044-469

1 - Mr. Glascock
1 - Mr. Schultz

SAC, Philadelphia (100-21984) May 10, 1960

Director, FBI (100-387911) PERSONAL ATTENTION

Fo IPA 228590
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/15/83 BY SP/GSK/gjt

DR. DERK BODDE
SECURITY MATTER - C

Information has been received from Bureau Informant 200, a most reliable and sensitive source, that the subject has been in direct contact with Dr. S. L. Tikhvinsky, Institute of Sinology, Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The subject is among 15 American orientalists who have been selected through the American Council of Learned Societies to attend the International Orientalist Congress in Moscow, Russia, during August. This group will not only attend the Congress, but also will spend an entire month in the Soviet Union studying what is being done there in the fields of the respective individuals. The members of this group will come as delegates either of the American Oriental Society or the Association for Asian Studies, and will do so under financial grants made through the American Council of Learned Societies.

(Information concerning other individuals)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the F. I

MAILED 8
MAY 10 1960
COMM-FBI

Philadelphia and Boston should immediately take appropriate action as provided for in SAC Letter 59-58 (G) concerning Security Investigations - Individuals Traveling Abroad.

EX 104 100-[illegible]-17

You are cautioned that the information obtained by Bureau Informant 200 is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau and should not be set forth in any investigative report. Information from this source should be utilized for lead purposes only. You must avoid any statement

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
[illegible]
[illegible]
Trotter
Sullivan

1 - Philadelphia (100-38026)
2 - Boston (100-19891)
(123-2092)

B-1

Letter to SAC, Philadelphia
RE: DR. DERK BODDE
100-387911

regarding the scope of coverage in effect in this instance, and under no circumstances are the subject or any unauthorized persons to become aware that we have knowledge of this information.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

None of the afore-mentioned individuals are on the Security Index, and none are currently subjects of Bureau investigations.

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Rushing

100-337911

Date: July 25, 1960

To: Office of Security
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: MR. [illegible]
SECURITY MATTER - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-15-00 BY SP2 ALM/176 #MDR16

Records of the Passport Office, Department of State, indicate that [illegible] was issued Passport Number [illegible] on April [illegible], 195[illegible], renewed April 8, 1960. In his application for renewal of the passport, [illegible] indicated that he planned to depart from the United States in late July, 1960. He indicated that he planned to visit England, Holland, France, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden. He further indicated that he is a delegate to the International Orientalist Congress to be held in Moscow, Russia, August 9-16, 1960.

Reports containing the results of a security investigation of [illegible] have previously been forwarded to your office. Copies of these reports are being forwarded to the Central Intelligence Agency under separate cover.

The Legal Attaches in London, Paris, and Bonn have been requested to arrange for the receipt of any information concerning the subject's activities that may come to the attention of the security services in the areas covered by these Legal Attaches. I would appreciate the receipt of any information that may come to your attention regarding [illegible]'s activities in the Soviet Union and in Czechoslovakia.

88 JUL 26 COMM-FBI

EX-105 REC-82 100-337911-60

19 JUL 26 1960

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans
1 - London (See note page 2)
1 - Paris (See note page 2)
1 - Bonn (See note page 2)
1 - Philadelphia (See note page 2)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)
TDR/baw
(11)

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan

B-2

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Office of Security
Department of State

NOTE LEGATS, LONDON, PARIS, AND BONN, AND SAC, PHILADELPHIA:

Subject's name is not included in the Security Index. He is employed as a professor of Chinese studies at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and resides at 29 West Phil-Ellena Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Bodde was born 3-9-09 in Marshfield, Massachusetts.

Bodde has, in the past, been identified with numerous Communist Party front organizations. He is an outspoken advocate for recognition of the Chinese communist regime.

You should alert your sources for receipt of any information that may come to their attention regarding Bodde's activities while travelling abroad. The above information may be furnished your sources.

Philadelphia should arrange to be advised of the subject's return and thereafter promptly notify the Bureau in order that the stops may be cancelled.

R/S shows
Legat London
9/9/60 - Info
sent MI-5 by
Legat 8-10-60

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAILED
DEC 2 1953
NAME CHECK

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-3 BTJ/TS
ON 11-2-99 APP# 94-2233
PER DRC dtd 8-27-99

December 23, 1958

LEONARD BERNSTEIN
Born: August 25, 1918
Lawrence, Massachusetts

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

You are referred to information previously furnished to your agency on January 28 and November 10, 1955, concerning Leonard Bernstein. For your additional information, there is enclosed a copy of a memorandum dated May 27, 1958, concerning the captioned individual. (100-360261-41,49,55)

In August, 1958, a confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that Leonard Bernstein had been in contact with Tamara Yurevna Mamedova. The August, 1958, "Diplomatic List" reflects Tamara Y. Mamedova to be a second secretary at the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (USSR). In June, 1958, a confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that Tamara Mamedova was employed in the Cultural Division of the Soviet Embassy. As part of her duties the informant stated that Mamedova handled inquiries from the public concerning the Cultural Exchange Program between the USSR and the United States and assisted in arrangements for appearances of groups from both countries under the auspices of that program.

In his contact with Mamedova, the confidential informant stated that Leonard Bernstein indicated that he would accept an invitation to visit the USSR and stated that he would be able to go during the first two weeks of March, 1959. He expressed a desire to conduct some orchestras while in the USSR. (105-53022-328)

The foregoing information is furnished to you as a result of your request for an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or a nonclearance of the individual involved. This information is loaned for your use and is not to be disseminated outside of your agency.

1-56

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____

Enclosure.
Orig and one to USIA
Req rec'd: 12/8/58
B. V. Gronquist/ckb
(4)

EX. - 12A
REC- 66

NOTE: Memo classified confidential inasmu
as enclosed report is so classified.

C-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

NY 100-99895

New York, New York
May 27, 1958

DECLASSIFIED BY 9803RDD/LMB
ON 5/20/93

Re: Leonard Bernstein, with aliases

On June 30, 1950, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that in 1945 when the committee to aid Ben Davis was being considered, both Ben Davis and Jack Stachel described Leonard Bernstein to the source as an adherent of the Communist Party. This source stated that other Communist Party functionaries had also described Leonard Bernstein as a Communist. The source advised that in 1945 Jack Stachel informed him that Bernstein had agreed to submit to Communist discipline. This source advised on December 9, 1954 that he has no direct personal knowledge of Bernstein's willingness to submit to Communist discipline.

Ben Davis and Jack Stachel were members of the National Board of the Communist Party who were tried and convicted in 1949 for violation of the Smith Act of 1940.

Leonard Bernstein, by notarized affidavit dated August 3, 1953, submitted in connection with his application for passport, stated "...although I have never, to my knowledge, been accused of being a member of the Communist Party, I wish to take advantage of this opportunity to affirm under oath that I am not now or at any time ever been a member of the Communist Party or the Communist Political Association. I have never knowingly engaged in activities which supported the Communist movement under circumstances which would warrant the conclusion that I engaged in such activities as a result of direction, domination or control exercised over me by the Communist movement..."

In February, 1958, a source of unknown reliability, but who is acquainted with the subject, advised that he believed Leonard Bernstein to be a Communist. This source based this belief on the way Bernstein talks, that is, that he has continually made anti-American and pro-Russian statements. Source was unable to furnish any specific details pertaining thereto.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

AGENCY 100-7191?
REQ. REC'D [illegible]
REP'T. FORW. [illegible]
BY [illegible]

CRB (C-6)
AGENCY State (C-11h)
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. [illegible]
HOW FORW. [illegible]
BY [illegible]

14

COPIES DESTROYED
391 FEB 20 197[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-360261-55

C-2

CONFIDENTIAL

NY 100-99895

All organizations mentioned hereafter have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450, unless otherwise described.

The House Committee on Un-American Activities review of the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace held March 25,26,27,1949, which conference was arranged by the National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions, reflected Leonard Bernstein was affiliated with the following organizations:

American Council for a Democratic Greece
American Youth for Democracy
Committee For a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
Civil Rights Congress
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
National Negro Congress

The National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions was cited in the aforementioned review as a Communist front.

Records of the Bureau of Special Services, New York City Police Department, reflect that Bernstein was a member of the Council on African Affairs, Incorporated, as of February 3, 1948.

The "New York Times", issue of March 3, 1945, contained an advertisment by the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade entitled "For America's Sake-Break With Franco Spain" wherein Bernstein was listed as a sponsor.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised during 1946 that Leonard Bernstein was identified on a letterhead of the American Committee for Spanish Freedom dated January 21, 1946, as being one of the sponsors of this organization.

The "Daily Worker" issue of May 16, 1946, page four column three, lists Leonard Bernstein as a conductor and composer and one of the endorsers of the Three Day Tag Drive of the American Committee for Yugoslav Relief.

29

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/HTF/

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address Any office in the U.S. - National
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
headquarters are in New York, New York.
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☐ Watch List until canceled
Duration

HUNTER Request No. 193

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

16
D-1

3

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Miss Triplett

Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TO : W. A. Branigan

FROM : W. E. Triplett

DATE: August 28, 1969

File in: 105-93089

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

A more detailed analysis of material received is attached.

ACTION: None. This is furnished for your information.

Enclosure
MET:met

D-2

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Items are received on repatriates, deportees, defectors, U.S. citizens who went to USSR for permanent residence because of marriage or family and individuals born in U.S. who were taken there when children. Most of this material is of limited value but all individuals are included on CIA's "defector list." However, items are of value when they pertain to individuals known to have been espionage agents or to have subversive relatives in U.S. For example, items on Harry Eisman, deported from U.S. over 30 years ago, have contained little information of interest until recently. Friends asked Eisman to see the Glass family when they visited the USSR. When he entertained the family, the daughter was greatly influenced by his colorful description of his radical activities in New York schools. (Identifies confidential source)

Prudence Glass has been maintaining contact with Eisman since her return and recently informed him of her plans to marry Bob (evidently Robert Steven Greenblatt, key activist), leader and organizer of one of the largest marches sponsored by National Mobilization Committee to End War in Vietnam. She informed him of their plans to move to Georgia where she hoped to work "in the underground." We had no previous information indicating that she had any connection whatsoever with any organization or Greenblatt or of Greenblatt's plans to leave New York. Additional information has revealed that Eisman, who had reportedly fallen from graces of Soviets, appears to have regained their confidence, sees numerous U.S. travelers and communists and lectures at an unidentified special school on youth activities in U.S.,

(Information concerning other individuals and organizations)

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2ALM/JETG

SAC, New York

9/20/66

Director, FBI

1 - Wells

NOVEMBER 8TH AD HOC COMMITTEE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

ReCVairtel 9/14/66.

New York is designated office of origin in this matter. Through informants and sources, keep abreast of the plans of this Committee to sponsor demonstrations 11/5-8/66. Keep the Bureau advised of all developments.

1 - Cleveland

BAW:pdb (5)

NOTE:

Captioned group was formed at Cleveland, Ohio, during a conference of peace groups on 9/10-11/66. Its purpose is to organize demonstrations protesting the Vietnam war on 11/5-8/66. A. J. Muste, New York City, a prominent pacifist, is Chairman of the Committee. Cleveland airtel asks that New York be made origin due to this fact.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAILED 9
SEP 20 1966
COMM-FBI

REC 26

62-111111-2

17

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room

39

EX-106

NO SEP 21 1966

70 SEP 28 1966

D-3

33

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

C.D.B.

G.C.M.

On January 15, 1969, Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The Hunter project for which we have given the designation of Bureau Informant 200 essentially consists of specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia. If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the Soviet Union, it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.)

ACTION:

REC 102

105-[illegible] 90

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - Liaison
1 - S. J. Papich

18 FEB 5 1969

SJP:clb
(6)

Stops not warranted on black extremists at this time
GCM 1/31/69

D-4

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/MDR16

SAC, New York (100-158914) 7/28/67

Director, FBI (62-111181) 1 - Mr. B.A. Wells

NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

You are to prepare a report concerning captioned group. Inasmuch as other Government agencies have shown an interest in its activities and due to the fact it is sponsoring a massive demonstration at Washington, D. C., on 10/21/67, furnish 11 copies of this report to the Bureau. Also furnish copies to Washington Field Office.

BAW:jes
(4)

NOTE:

Captioned group, formerly known as the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, includes members of the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party among its sponsors. It sponsored massive demonstrations against the war in Vietnam at New York City, and San Francisco, California, on 4/15/67 and is organizing a massive demonstration at Washington, D. C., on 10/21/67. We have had it under investigation for the past months. A report should now be prepared so that we will have it for ready reference.

4

REC 23 62-111181-854

EX 101

MAILED 12
JUL 27 1967
COMM-FBI

19 JUL 28 1967

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

D-5

HMDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name
RAMPARTS
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address
201 Broadway
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
San Francisco, California, USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment
Photograph outside and contents.

☐ One-Time Check ☑ Watch List
Duration until canceled

HUNTER Request No.
195

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

20
E-1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/9/67

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

SUBJECT: "RAMPARTS"
IS - C
Bufile 100-445393
SF 157-459

ROBERT SCHEER
SM - SWP
REGISTRATION ACT
Bufile 105-106720
SF 100-46832

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-17-80 klc

105

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Re Bulet to San Francisco, 5/8/67, under the caption of "Ramparts" and Bulet to San Francisco, 5/5/67, under the caption "ROBERT SCHEER, SM-SWP; REGISTRATION ACT."

San Francisco is requesting clarification on which instruction in referenced letters will prevail in the investigation of "Ramparts" magazine.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

REC 23

100-44[illegible]-45

13 MAY 10 1967

④ - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco (1 - 157-459)
(1 - 100-46832)
EJO/jr
(6)

Let to SF re "Ramparts" 5/18/67

57

① INT SEC.
② SUB CONTROL

21

E-2

1 - Mr. Shaw
1 - Mr. Wells

SAC, San Francisco (157-459) 5-18-67

Director, FBI (100-445393)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-80 BY

"RAMPARTS"
IS - C

Reurlet 5-9-67 and Bulet 5-5-67.

Inasmuch as the Department has authorized an investigation of "Ramparts," you are to follow the instructions set out in Bulet 5-5-67. The investigation of "Ramparts" is to be conducted separately from the investigation of Robert Scheer.

Of particular interest in your investigation is the extent of Communist Party or other subversive influence in "Ramparts."

Submit a report to the Bureau by 6-17-67. Include your recommendation as to whether further investigation is warranted. This investigation must be conducted discreetly due to the possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau.

BAW:mh (5)

NOTE:

"Ramparts" is a leftist publication which has been highly critical of U.S. foreign policy. It is self-described by one of its editors as an "intellectual muckraker." Robert Scheer, one of its editors, is presently under investigation on a Registration Act matter. By letter dated 4-26-67 the Department requested further investigation concerning Scheer and "Ramparts." Due to the sensitivity of investigating a magazine, we have previously refused permission to the San Francisco Office to check the bank account of "Ramparts." However, in view of the Department's request (which has been furnished to San Francisco), we should open an investigation of "Ramparts."

MAILED 2
MAY 18 1967
COMM-FBI

REC- 59

EX-110

MAY 18 1967

4

olson
eLoach
lohr
lick
:asper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Trotter

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

52 MAY 25 1967

E-3

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

STATES DEPARTMENT [illegible] CE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D.C. 20535
October 17, 1968

11-20-00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/TK
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

GEORGIY I. ISACHENKO
INTERNAL SECURITY - R (S)

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on October 15, 1968 that ~~(S)~~ Georgiy I. Isachenko had been informed that "Ramparts" Magazine had not received the list of names and addresses from the Soviets in return for the list that had been furnished by "Ramparts" to the Soviets. Isachenko was to check into this situation in an attempt to clear up this misunderstanding. ~~(S)~~ The source was of the opinion that the list referred to pertained to mailing lists maintained by "Ramparts", and the Soviet Information Department, Washington, D.C. ~~(S)~~

The current "Diplomatic List," published by the United States Department of State reflects that Georgiy I. Isachenko is the Information Counselor of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Washington, D.C. ~~(S)~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

100-445391

E-4

1 - Mr. [illegible]. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

October 20, 1975

Director, FBI 62-116395-970X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16

10-13-00 SP2ALM/JG

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, to Mr. John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated October 17, 1975, and captioned "Senate Select Committee Request." This communication enclosed a letter to the Attorney General from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, SSC, dated October 15, 1975.

In Senator Church's letter he advised of the intention of the SSC Staff to interview some nine FBI sources who had cooperated with this Bureau in the course of certain COINTELPRO operations. The Senator stated that he hoped there would be no objection to conducting these interviews but that, if such objections were raised, he be contacted by Tuesday, October 21, 1975.

It is noted that the issue raised in Senator Church's letter is not new. During August, 1975, SSC Staff Member John T. Elliff proposed interviews of this type and, at that time, this Bureau objected on the principle of the FBI's obligation to protect the confidentiality of relationship with our sources. As a result of this objection, a conference was held between yourself and Senator Church on the evening of August 14, 1975. It is our understanding that an agreement was reached whereby the Committee would attempt a limited number of interviews of individuals whose identities and/or

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___ 62-116395
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___ EWL:lhb lhb
Laboratory ___ (9)
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

JAM

5-1[illegible]

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 FEB 18 1976

relationship with the FBI has been protected. However, as a condition precedent to such interviews, the FBI was to be allowed to contact such individuals to inform them of the proposed interview and to determine whether they would be receptive to such an interview. Senator Church concurred in this arrangement; however, subsequently on August 18, 1975, Mr. Elliff advised that Senator Church had reconsidered his agreement to the aforementioned procedures as a result of persuasion by the SSC Staff. Elliff, at that time, indicated a letter recording Senator Church's change of attitude had been drafted. To date, no such formal acknowledgement has been received by this Bureau and no interviews have been attempted in the interim.

In his October 15, 1975, communication, Senator Church again raises this issue. Although he does note that the matter was originally discussed with you "some weeks ago," he makes no mention of the agreement reached at that time. Apparently, as some sort of precedent, he does cite the fact that the FBI did make available for use and interview the names of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) personnel who cooperated with the FBI in certain COINTELPRO activities. We do not consider release of these identities on our part to be a concession with respect to confidentiality of sources in general since we specifically stipulated that we considered IRS personnel to be U. S. Government officials acting in their capacity as such.

It is clear that the merits of this issue have not changed since the agreement reached between yourself and Senator Church on August 14, 1975. I feel very strongly that the issue of confidentiality of sources is vital to the continuing effectiveness and integrity of the FBI in its investigative operations. I, therefore, strongly urge that should you concur in the need on the part of the Committee to conduct the interviews which they propose, that the agreement of prior

contact by the FBI with those individuals be insisted upon as a condition to such interviews to insure their amenability and uphold the obligation of confidentiality which the FBI has assumed.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
                Special Counsel for
                  Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 10/20/75, and prepared by EWL:lhb.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

OCT 17 1975

m DL 16
10-13-00 SP 2 ALM/JG

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M.L. FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: (U) Senate Select Committee Request

Attached for your immediate attention and comments is a letter from the Senate Select Committee which is self-explanatory and which raises anew an issue previously addressed by the Bureau, with the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and this Office. Please note that Chairman Church asks the Attorney General to advise him of our position by Tuesday, October 21, 1975.

REC-100

62-116395-970X

FEB 6 1976

Let to AG 10/21/75
EWL/[illegible]

2 - ENCLOSURE

5- [illegible] Flip

cc: Paul Daly

LEGAL COUNSEL

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 15, 1975

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
OCT 15 1975

#mDE16

16-13-00 SP-2 ALM 1976

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The Select Committee is presently investigating the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation carried on as part of the COINTELPRO program. We appreciate the cooperation of the FBI and the Justice Department in making materials available to us in this area. However, one problem remains to be resolved. The Committee believes its staff must contact and interview certain persons who received information from the FBI in the course of COINTELPRO operations. The FBI has withheld the names of such persons from the Committee's use on the grounds that they were FBI "sources".

The Committee wishes to stress that it is not interested in questioning these persons about any role as a "source", but rather as a recipient of information from the FBI. Indeed, in many instances we would not have been aware that the individual was a "source" had not the FBI excised the name from the materials delivered to us. Nevertheless, to minimize any incidental deleterious effects on legitimate FBI operations, the Committee has selected a very limited number of persons whom we desire to contact and interview. (See attached list and materials.)

As you will recall, we originally discussed this matter with you some weeks ago. Since then the Committee has had an opportunity to consider the issue more fully in the light of our experience with other investigations. For example, our inquiry into the relationships between the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service clearly showed the

62-116395-970

ENCLOSURE

need to use the names of IRS personnel who cooperated with the FBI in certain COINTELPRO activities. Those names were made available to us for our use.

As I am sure you can appreciate, what is at stake here is the investigation of serious breaches of the security and confidentiality of information obtained by the FBI. Such information was apparently disclosed or "leaked" for the purpose of disruption. The full extent of such disclosures in many of the cases, such as the efforts to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., is still unknown. Surely, it would be incongruous for an inquiry into these matters to be impaired on the grounds of the FBI's interest in preserving confidentiality.

The Committee has a clear mandate and a firm commitment to investigate allegations that the FBI attempted to harass and discredit individuals. The integrity of this investigation depends upon our ability to conduct interviews without the appearance of outside interference. Therefore, we hope you have no objection to our conducting the interviews of the persons on the attached list, but if you do, please contact me by Tuesday, October 21.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

#MDR16

10/13/00 SP-2ALM/JTG

Tampa

Excision (name unknown) Tampa television producer or newsman. Furnished public source data and lead material concerning black nationalist groups, particularly Junta of Militant Organizations, for a television "special".

Chicago

Excision (a Mr. Jones - newspaper unknown) newspaper reporter furnished public source data and other lead material for an article on the Nation of Islam, particularly its business interests.

New York

Excision (known to be Surrogate Edward S. Silver) probate judge contacted by Bureau to determine how to prevent large bequest from going to CPUSA.

Jackson

Excision (known to be Jimmy Ward) newspaperman used to plant Bureau-authored letter and answer in column re Nation of Islam.

Pittsburgh I

Excision (known to be Richard Larry) official of Mellon Foundation used in several counterintelligence programs involving foundation funding and contacts.

Pittsburgh II

Excision (known to be Sherley Uhl) newspaperman used in several counterintelligence programs of which the documents attached are one example.

Miami

Excision (known to be Gene Struhl) news director furnished public source information and other lead material with which to produce four separate documentaries which "showed the extremist groups involved in their true light."

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-970X

San Francisco

Excision (known to be Kevin Crowley) agent of California Alcoholic Beverage Control Board asked to raid a Democratic party fund raiser.

Minneapolis

Excision (known to be Fred Carey) Director of Security at Honeywell, Inc. and former Special Agent furnished information on plans of a group of Honeywell stockholders to appear at annual stockholders meeting to protest war production.

J. A. Mintz
- Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Dean

The Attorney General

October 17, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/TAG

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 12, 1975, requesting dates of letters, names and addresses of senders and addressees on copies of letters which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI which were written or received by Angela Davis, Jeremy Stone, Jane Fonda, Ralph Abernathy, Steven Slepian, Jack Nelson, and the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D. C., as well as all materials pertaining to the acquisition of these letters by the FBI.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, in an effort to clarify the referenced request. As a result of this meeting Mr. Elliff requested the following information in FBI files concerning the individuals listed in referenced request:

1. Dates, names and addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from the above-listed persons which were obtained without the knowledge of those persons, and the source of these letters.

2. Basis of the FBI's subversive investigation of each subject.

EX-115 REC 17 62-116395-971

3. Approximate date each of the above-listed persons' names was entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and documents concerning continuation of each person's name on that list.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___ 62-116395
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___ LED:en
Files & Com. ___ (9)
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

15 NOV 5 1975

3 - ENCLOSURE
ENCL BEHIND FILE

84 NOV 6 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - J. A. Mintz
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Dean

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/JG

October 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 12, 1975, requesting:

(1) Dates of letters.

(2) Names and addresses of the senders.

(3) Names and addresses of the addressees.

(4) All materials pertaining to the acquisition by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of all letters written by the following individuals or organizations addressed to third parties and letters written by third parties addressed to the following individuals or organizations, copies of which are now or have been in the possession of the FBI:

Angela Davis
Jeremy Stone
Jane Fonda
Ralph Abernathy

Steven Slepian
Jack Nelson
Institute for Policy Studies,
Washington, D. C.

On October 1, 1975, representatives of the FBI met with John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, concerning referenced request. As a result of this meeting, Mr. Elliff requested the following information from FBI files on individuals listed in referenced request:

1. Dates, names and addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from the above-listed individuals which were obtained by the FBI without the knowledge of the above individuals, and the source of these letters.

2. The basis for the FBI's subversive investigation of each above-listed person.

62-116395-911

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

LED:en
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which constitutes the Bureau's response to the above request.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
               Special Counsel for
                 Intelligence Coordination

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

3. Approximate date that the name of each of the above listed persons was entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and any documents concerning continuation of their names on that list.

The following information constitutes the FBI's response to this request:

With regard to request number one above, FBI files contain no letter to or from Ralph Abernathy which was provided without his knowledge.

ANGELA DAVIS

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
None shown	Angela Davis	George Jackson	An official of the California State Attorney General's Office
1/24/73	International Friendship Club, Planeta-Kid; School #36, Kirovabad, Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR	Angela Davis, North Palo Alto, Holding Facility 270, 270 Grant Street, Palo Alto, California	Hunter Program

JEREMY J. STONE

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
1/14/71	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone	Mr. Frank M. Steadman General Counsel C & P Telephone Co. 1710 H. Street, N.W. Washington, D. C.	An official of the C & P Telephone Co.

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
4/20/66	Jeremy J. Stone	Dr. L. N. Kutakov Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations, 136 E. 67th Street, New York, New York	Z Coverage
5/24/68	Jeremy J. Stone 1788 Danbury Road Claremont, Calif.	Nina I. Shakhova Perekopskaya Vlitsa, 17, Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, I-209	Hunter Program
5/12/69	Jeremy J. Stone Washington, D. C.	Shakhova, N. 17 Perekopskaya Street Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program
1/2/68	Vladimir D. Kazakevich P. O. Box 346 Moscow, K-9	Dr. Jeremy Stone 1788 Danbury Road Claremont, Calif.	Hunter Program
1/13/68	Jeremy J. Stone	V. D. Kazakevich P. O. Box 346 Moscow K-9, USSR	Hunter Program
8/9/69	Jeremy J. Stone 264A G. Street, S. W. Washington, D. C. 20024	Shakhova, Nina 17 Perekopskaya St., Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program
2/15/70	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone Federation of American Scientist, Washington, D. C.	Chamkrelidze, R. V. Moscow V-333	Hunter Program

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
2/15/70	Dr. Jeremy J. Stone International Affairs fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C.	Yevtvshenko, Yeugeniy Moscow, USSR	Hunter Program
2/15/70	Jeremy J. Stone Executive Council Member and Delegate at large, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, D. C.	Muravyev, Dmitry Secretary General, Institute of Soviet American Relations Moscow, USSR	Hunter Program
5/19/70	Jeremy J. Stone 266A G. St., N. W. Washington, D. C.	Shakhova, Nina I. 17 Perekopskaya St. Section 5, Apt. 398 Moscow, M-209	Hunter Program

JANE FONDA

1/8/73	Jeff Stein	Jane Fonda	A local investigative agency which advises letter was legally obtained but requests identity be concealed to protect its source.
9/6/72	Jack Mabley Associate Editor Chicago Tribune, 435 N. Michigan Chicago, Illinois	Jane Fonda	
11/13/72	Pham Thanh Van, Expert De La Delegation, Du Government Revolutionaire Provisoire, De La Republique Du Sud Viet Nam, A La Conference De Paris, Sur Le Viet Nam	Jane Fonda	

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DATE	SENDER	ADDRESSEE	SOURCE
12/13/72	Jostein Nyhamar Chairman of the North Vietnam Movement in Norway	Jane Fonda Care of Maslansky, Roros, Turisthotell, 7460 Roros	Same as above
1/28/73	Rebane, J. Oru 7-3 Vilyandi, Estonia, USSR	Jane Fonda c/o Chartwell-French-Perenchin 9720 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly Hills, California	Hunter Program
STEVEN SLEPIAN			
5/25/70	Steven Slepian 319 Elm Drive C Madison, Wisconsin	David Slepian Delegate to Popov Exchange, c/o Intourist, Moscow USSR	Hunter Program
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES			
8/17/70	Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) (Marcus G. Raskin)	Xerox Corporation Rochester, N. Y.	An official of Xerox Corporation
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Granite City Steel Public Relations Dept., Granite City, Illinois	An official of Granite City Steel
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Corning Glass Works Corning, N. Y.	An official of Corning Glass Works
8/17/70	IPS (Marcus G. Raskin)	Hewlett-Packard Company, Palo Alto, California	Third Agency
None shown	Marcus G. Raskin	Center for Constitutional Rights, 588 9th Avenue, New York, N. Y.	Informant

Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

With regard to request number two:

No subversive investigation has been conducted by the FBI concerning Jack Nelson or Steven Slepian.

Copies of communications concerning the FBI's initiation of subversive investigations of Jane Fonda, Angela Davis and Ralph Abernathy are being delivered with this memorandum.

Materials concerning the FBI's initiation of subversive investigations of Jeremy J. Stone and Institute for Policy Studies have been previously submitted in the FBI's memorandum to the SSC dated October 7, 1975.

With regard to request number three:

No information is contained in FBI files indicating Jane Fonda, Ralph Abernathy, Jack Nelson or Steven Slepian were entered on the Hunter Mail watch list as the result of a request by the FBI. Information concerning Jeremy Stone and Institute for Policy Studies has been previously submitted in the FBI's memorandum dated October 7, 1975.

No Hunter Mail watch list information was requested or received concerning Ralph Abernathy or Jack Nelson.

Angela Davis was the subject of Hunter Mail request number 250. No information concerning the date this request was made is contained in FBI files.

The only record maintained by the FBI concerning the Hunter Mail watch list request for Angela Davis is included in the Angela Davis material being delivered herewith.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 10/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC). (SSC letter dated 9/12/75.)

Originating Office: FBI 120

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Date: 10/22/75

Received by: A H Hatry

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG #MDR16

62-116395-911

ENCLOSURE

2

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
10/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 9/12/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Information handling

#mde16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JMS

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Dates, names, addresses of senders and addressees of letters to or from various individuals which were obtained by the FBI without the knowledge of the individuals, and the source of these letters, the basis for the subversive investigation, date and name of each entered on the Hunter Mail watch list and any documents concerning continuation of their names on the list.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

b

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JJG

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST 9/12/75

62-116395-971

[illegible]

ANGELA DAVIS

NDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

#MD216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2ALM/TG

5-88 (2-20-58)

1. Name DAVIS, ANGELA YVONNE
(Last) (First) (Middle)

2. Address 1919 Oregon St.
(Apt. No.) (No. and Name of Street)
Berkeley, California USA
(City) (State) (Country)

3. Treatment Photograph outside and contents

☐ One-Time Check ☒ Watch List Duration Until Canceled

HUNTER Request No. 250

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5

LOS ANGELES	LOS ANGELES	4/15/69	1/6/69 - 2/29/69	yfs

ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, aka
Tamu

WILLIAM H. SNELL

SM - C

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/00 BY SP2ALM/

REFERENCES: New York (100-80641) airtel to Bureau (100-3-69) dated 12/10/68 captioned "CP-USA Organization, IS - C".
Los Angeles letter to Bureau dated 3/23/69.
Los Angeles letter to Bureau dated 3/27/69.
Bureau FD-01 to Los Angeles dated 3/27/69.

- P -

ENCLOSURES:

TO BUREAU

Two copies FD-376.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Two copies FD-122 recommending that DAVIS be included in the Security Index, Priority III, sent to Bureau 4/15/69.

- 5 - Bureau (100-439922)
- 1 - Secret Service, Los Angeles
- 2 - Boston (RM)
- 2 - San Diego (100-14064) (RM)
- 3 - Los Angeles (157-2325)

COPIES DESTROYED

334 NOV 12 1970

10 REC. 87

12 APR 18 1969

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADD. DISSEMINATION.

Copy to
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 4/28/69
by

RHQ + SS with slip

routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 4/23/76
by

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Instant report is being submitted instead of LHM as per FD-01 dated 3/27/69 to facilitate handling.

An extra copy of this report with appropriate FD-376 and photograph for Secret Service are being furnished the Bureau in the event DAVIS is included in the Security Index. Los Angeles has prepared an extra copy of the report and FD-376 with photograph and will furnish to Secret Service, Los Angeles on Bureau approval.

No interview with DAVIS is being recommended. DAVIS is presently living with DEACON ALEXANDER (STANLEY SAMUEL ALEXANDER), Los Angeles file 100-70526, Bureau file 157-10023 currently on the Los Angeles Security Index and the Los Angeles Agitator Index. It is felt an interview would result in possible embarrassment to the Bureau.

This report is being classified ~~Confidential~~ because it contains information from informants which if disclosed could reasonably result in their disclosure and compromise their future effectiveness.

Records of the Jefferson County Board of Health, Bureau of Records and Vital Statistics, Birmingham, Alabama, were viewed by the Birmingham Division.

Records of the Drivers License Section, California Department of Motor Vehicles, were caused to be reviewed by IC FREDERICK M. FREEMAN, Sacramento Division, with negative results.

Records of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office were reviewed by IC MERTON R. ANDERSON.

Records of the Los Angeles Police Department were reviewed by IC MILLARD T. ANDERSON.

Records of the Los Angeles Traffic Court were reviewed by Special Employee GAREY D. POWELL.

Records of the Retail Merchants Credit Association, Los Angeles, California, were reviewed by IC BERNARD P. BLAIS.

Records of the Los Angeles County Voters Registration were reviewed by Special Employee GAREY D. POWELL.

LEADS

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA: Will upon Bureau approval include DAVIS in the Security Index, and disseminate copy of this report to Secret Service.

BOSTON

AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS: Will submit results of investigation per referenced letter dated 3/27/69.

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA: Will submit results of investigation per referenced letter dated 3/27/69.

INFORMANTS

SOURCE	LOCATION
LA T-1 Records Clerk UCSD San Diego, California	157-2325-11
LA T-2 SOURCE	157-2325-13

LA T-3 *	157-2325-55 Orally to SA CHARLES K. JOHNSON on 3/29/69 134-1210A-563 -599
LA T-4 *	157-2325-16
LA T-5 *	134-2004A-582
LA T-6 *	134-1606A-621
LA T-7 *	Orally to SA DAVID R. PENDER on 12/4/68 134-107A-732 through 740
LA T-8 *	134-262A-766 through 804
LA T-9 *	134-195A-985 through 1020
LA T-10 *	Orally to SA THEODORE J. A'HEARN on 7/23/68 134-2702A-618
LA T-11 *	134-37A-915 through 1003
LA T-12 *	134-66A-1544 through 1546

*INFORMANT
SYMBOL NUMBERS

LA 157-2325

LA T-13
INFORMANT #. 134-202A-714

LA T-14
SOURCE

157-2325-13

- E* -
COVER PAGE

FD-376 (Rev. 4-25-68)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

LA 157-2325

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS
Also known as
Tamu

April 15, 1969

#mmR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ZTG
ON 11-16-00

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.
2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.
3. ☒ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.
4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.
5. ☐ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:
    - (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
    - (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
    - (c) ☐ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.
6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☒ enclosed ☐ is not available
☐ may be available through ______________________

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s) (1)
U. S. Secret Service, Los Angeles (RM)

Enclosure(s) *(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)*

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy to: 1 - Secret Service, Los Angeles (RM)

Report of: WILLIAM H. SNELL
Date: 4/15/69
Office: Los Angeles, California

Field Office File #: 157-2325
Bureau File #: 100-439922

Title: ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/LETG
ON 11-16-00

Character: SECURITY MATTER - C

Synopsis: ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, also known as "Tamu", resides at 1107-1/2 West 87th Street, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS is presently unemployed. Background data is being set out. On 6/21/68, DAVIS was elected as a staff member of the Los Angeles Chapter of SNCC. DAVIS dropped out of SNCC and joined the Communist Party. DAVIS is a member of the Che Lumumba Club, [illegible] Smith Section, SCDCP. DAVIS' activities in connection with the SCDCP are set out. Description data set forth.

- P -

DETAILS:

Investigation in this matter was predicated upon receipt of information from LA T-3 that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS was a member of the Communist Party in 1969.

BACKGROUND

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

BIRTH DATA AND CITIZENSHIP

On January 30, 1969, records of the Jefferson County Board of Health, Bureau of Records and Vital Statistics, 1912 Eighth Avenue South, Birmingham, Alabama, reflected that under Birth Certificate number 3737026 for the year 1944, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS was born January 26, 1944, the daughter of BENJAMIN FRANK DAVIS and SALLYE MARGURITE BELL.

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to [illegible] not to be [illegible]

EDUCATION

LA T-1 (6/6/68)

DAVIS attended graduate school in 1968 in the Philosophy Department at the University of California, San Diego. DAVIS supposedly attended Brandeis University, Boston, Massachusetts from the period 1961 to 1965.

IDENTIFICATION RECORD

The following is an identification record furnished by the FBI Identification Division:

1-1 (Rev. 9-30-63)

N[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT O[illegible]US[illegible]CE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INV[illegible]GATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2053

2-6-69

J. Edgar Hoover
Direct

The following FBI record, NUMBER NONE ASSIGNED , is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ON

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
PD San Diego Calif	Angela Yvonne Davis #282660	10-5-67	1-blocking entrance to pub bldg 2-disobey peace officer 3-disturb peace	rel 849(b) PC detenti only not a arrest

Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. Where final disposition is not shown or further explanation of charge is desired, communicate with agency contributing those fingerprints.

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.

ARREST RECORD

Records at the following agencies were reviewed and reflected no identifiable record on DAVIS:

Los Angeles Sheriff's Office
Los Angeles, California
April 1, 1969

Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles, California
April 1, 1969

Los Angeles Traffic Court
Los Angeles, California
March 27, 1969

LA T-2 (3/13/68)

Source advised that on March 13, 1968, ANGELA DAVIS was interviewed by the Los Angeles Police Department as a burglary suspect but was released without arrest.

CREDIT RECORD

On April 1, 1969, the Retail Merchants Credit Association, Los Angeles, California, records were reviewed which reflected no identifiable record on DAVIS.

VOTERS REGISTRATION RECORD

On April 1, 1969, the records of the Los Angeles County Voters Registration, Los Angeles, California, were reviewed revealing that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS registered in the Democratic Party on March 5, 1968.

RESIDENCE AND EMPLOYMENT

LA T-3 (3/21/69)

Source advised that DAVIS resides at 1107 1/2 West 87th Street, Los Angeles, California with DEACON ALEXANDER (STANLEY SAMUEL ALEXANDER), Negro youth organizer for the Southern California District Communist Party (SCDCP). Source stated that DAVIS is not employed at the present time but that she is traveling periodically between Los Angeles and San Diego.

CONNECTIONS WITH THE LOS ANGELES STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (LASNCC)(See appendix)

LA T-4 (7/3/68)

On June 21, 1968, the Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, (LASNCC) held a reorganizational meeting at its headquarters, 1914 West Jefferson, Los Angeles, California at which time new Los Angeles SNCC officers were elected. ANGELA DAVIS was elected a staff member of the editorial staff.

LA T-5 (5/16/68)
LA T-6 (6/3/68)

On May 12, 1968, ANGELA DAVIS was a special guest speaker at the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles (See appendix) located at 2936 West Eighth Street, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS spoke on some of SNCC's major projects.

On June 2, 1968, Sergeant DAVID KENT, Intelligence Unit, New Orleans Police Department, furnished miscellaneous papers on the Los Angeles SNCC. Among these papers was a letter headed "Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee Liberation School" addressed to brothers and sisters and signed by one ANGELA DAVIS, Coordinator. The letter stated that conventional education has failed to meet the needs of Black people in this country and that there is need to create educational structures which will respond to Black people's needs.

LA T-7 (12/4/68)

On December 4, 1968, source advised that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS had dropped out of the LASNCC and had joined the SCDCP.

CONNECTIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY

MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

LA T-3 (3/29/69)

On March 29, 1969, source advised that ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS is a member in good standing of the Che Lumumba Club, Moranda Smith Section (MSS) SCDCP, Los Angeles, California.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT SCDCP MEETINGS

LA T-8 (8/1/68)
LA T-9 (8/1/68)

On July 21, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general membership meeting of the SCDCP at 7213 Beverly Boulevard, Los Angeles. Topic of discussion centered around the need for political reorganization of the working class.

LA T-10 (8/9/68)

On July 23, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a staff meeting of the SCDCP at 1254 East Manchester, Los Angeles, California.

LA T-8 (11/14/68)

On November 8, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general membership meeting of the SCDCP held at 7213 Beverly

Boulevard, Los Angeles. The speaker was GUS HALL, Chairman, Communist Party, USA, (CP, USA).

On November 7, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a general meeting of the SCDCP at 7213 Beverly Boulevard. The speaker was GUS HALL, Chairman of the CP, USA.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT CLUB MEETINGS OF THE SCDCP

LA T-3 (7/24/68)
LA T-8 (7/29/68)
LA T-11 (8/6/68)

On July 18, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP held at 2138 Third Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around politics.

LA T-7 (7/30/68)
LA T-12 (8/2/68)

On July 28, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Cyril Briggs Club, MSS, SCDCP at 3048 South Victoria Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around capitalism in other foreign countries and racism.

LA T-3 (8/6/68)

On July 31, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. Topic of discussion was a report from the SCDCP and various committee reports.

LA T-11 (12/10/68)

On November 25, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue. Topic of discussion centered around racism.

LA T-10 (1/9/69)
LA T-11 (1/28/69)

On December 5, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. The topic of discussion centered around Communist Party youth action in the community.

LA T-11 (1/29/69)
LA T-13 (1/29/69)

On January 16, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 1048 Oxford Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around racism.

LA T-3 (2/6/69)
LA T-11 (2/14/69)

On January 30, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP, at 2128 Third Avenue, Los Angeles. DAVIS advised that she is dissatisfied with the Black people's progress in the community.

LA T-3 (3/29/69)

On March 29, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of the Che Lumumba Club, MSS, SCDCP at 1048 South Oxford, Los Angeles, California. DAVIS paid $14.00 for club dues.

DAVIS' ATTENDANCE AT
A MEETING OF THE NEGRO
MEMBERS OF THE SCDCP

LA T-8 (8/12/68)
LA T-9 (8/12/68)
LA T-12 (8/14/68)

On August 4, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended a meeting of all Negro members of the SCDCP at 5731 South St. Andrews Place, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion centered around the election campaigns, working class trade unions, and building of the Communist Party.

ACTIVITIES FOR THE FURTHERANCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

LA T-8 (10/17/68)
LA T-11 (10/17/68)

On October 13, 1968, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended the annual People's World (PW) banquet held at the Miramar Hotel, Wilshire and Ocean Avenue in Santa Monica, California. Topic of discussion centered around problems of the Mexican-American.

The PW is a West Coast Weekly Communist newspaper.

LA T-8 (2/18/69)
LA T-9 (2/18/69)

On February 9, 1969, ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS attended the 31st Anniversary Celebration of the PW held at the Alexandria Hotel, Fifth and Spring Streets, Los Angeles, California. Topic of discussion was student unrest.

MISCELLANEOUS

LA T-14 (7/24/68)

On 7/24/68, source was shown a photograph of ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS taken 10/5/67. Source stated that the woman in the photograph strongly resembles the woman who, on 9/11/67 with a male companion, purchased a shotgun at Sportstown, 2673 La Cienega, Los Angeles. Source added that if the woman in the photo is about 5'7", 135 pounds, and has pierced ears, she is almost certainly the woman who assisted in purchasing the shotgun.

DESCRIPTION

The following is a description of ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS as obtained from LA T-2, LA T-3 and Los Angeles County Voters Registration files:

Name	ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS, aka Tamu
Sex	Female
Race	Negro
Height	5' 8"
Weight	145
Date of Birth	January 26, 1944
Place of Birth	Birmingham, Alabama
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Education	Attended Brandeis University Boston, Massachusetts between 1961 to 1965. Graduate student, Department of Philosophy, University of California at San Diego, 1968.
Residence	1107 1/2 West 87th Street Los Angeles, California
Previous residences	6250 South Venice Los Angeles, California 536 Rushville La Jolla, California

1

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH OF LOS ANGELES

A source advised on May 8, 1968, that the premises of the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles, 2936 West 8th Street, Los Angeles, California, have been utilized for meetings by Communist Party members and sympathizers over a period of years. Speakers and lecturers at the church frequently espouse Communist causes or follow the Communist Party line. Communist front group literature is distributed at the church. The church is used by some Communist Party members for "mass concentration" work.

This same infiltration extends to adjuncts of the church such as the Unitarian Public Forum and the Fellowship for Social Justice, formerly known as the Unitarian-Universalist Fellowship for Social Justice.

STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN has been minister of the church since 1948.

Reverend STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN is described in the Fourth Report, Un-American Activities Committee in California, 1948, Page 115, as a very active "Communist fronter" and connected with numerous "Communist front organizations and activities".

Membership in the First Unitarian Church does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

APPENDIX

1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX

LOS ANGELES STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE

A source advised in July, 1968, that the Los Angeles Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (LA-SNCC), headquartered at 7406 South Western Avenue, Los Angeles, California, is not a membership organization but a loose-knit agency composed of young militant, black nationalists from South Los Angeles who have eliminated all Caucasians from their ranks and have initiated a program against the draft, the war in Vietnam and discrimination and have proposed a revolutionary program utilizing armed force, political and economic action to obtain their goals. LA-SNCC is an arm of the National Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee organization headquartered at Atlanta, Georgia, and with the naming of LA-SNCC Director RONALD LEROY WILKINS as Deputy Director of SNCC for the West Coast, the affinity between the National and Local organization will be more harmonious.

The above source advised that at a meeting of LA-SNCC leaders on March 22, 1968, the group indicated it was necessary for all SNCC personnel to be armed in order to shoot "pig cops" when they are stopped in South Los Angeles.

A source, in May, 1968, indicated that LA-SNCC leadership has encouraged all associates of LA-SNCC to obtain arms and to be armed at all times.

On April 5, 1968, four LA-SNCC officers were arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department at LA-SNCC headquarters in possession of two fully loaded .30 caliber M-1 carbines and one .12 gauge shotgun, pump action, with four rounds of 00 gauge buckshot. On May 4, 1968, five LA-SNCC officers were arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department for possession of loaded firearms.

On May 14, 1968, then Director JOHN FLOYD and three Security Officers, LA-SNCC, were arrested by the New Orleans Police Department for possession of stolen property. New Orleans Police Department found four automatic weapons in attache cases carried by the above persons. They also obtained material concerning instructions in the making of Molotov cocktails, bombs and booby traps for sabotage in guerilla-type warfare. This literature was published in Communist China.

APPENDIX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California

April 15, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Title ANGELA YVONNE DAVIS

Character SECURITY MATTER - C

Reference Report of SA WILLIAM H. SNELL dated and captioned as above at Los Angeles.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside

JANE FONDA

#moe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/TG

SAC, Los Angeles 6/25/70

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. R. L. Strain
1 - Mr. J. F. Morrissey
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

#m&R16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2ALM

JANE FONDA
SM - ANA

A review of available information concerning captioned individual indicates that she has been extremely active in the antidraft and anti-Vietnam movement; has made sizable contributions to black extremist groups, and has, by her actions and statements in general, indicated anarchistic tendencies and a definite propensity for fomenting violence endangering the internal security of this country.

If you have not already done so, you should initiate a security-type investigation of captioned individual in accordance with instructions contained in the Manual of Instructions, Section 87D, relating to such matters. The purpose of your investigation is to determine the extent of subject's anarchistic tendencies, a resolution of all ramifications regarding her association with various aspects of the New Left movement and black extremist groups and to ascertain if indeed her actions do pose a definite threat to the security of this country. In view of subject's position of prominence in the theatrical field, your investigation must be handled by a mature and experienced agent. No action should be taken which could result in embarrassment to the Bureau.

MAILED 5
JUN 24 1970
COMM-FBI

Results of the above investigation should be furnished the Bureau in report form, accompanied by recommendations as to whether or not subject's name should be considered for inclusion on the Security Index.

REC 10 [illegible] [illegible] — [illegible]

For your information, the Denver Office is origin in the Sedition investigation of the subject, Denver file 14-CG, Bufile 14-3037. Denver is requested to furnish the Los Angeles Office with a copy of all pertinent information concerning the subject.

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan

2 - Denver

22 JUN 25 1970

(3)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

60 JUL 1 1970

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Letter to SAC, Los Angeles
RE: JANE FONDA

NOTE:

A current Sedition investigation is underway concerning the subject as a result of statements attributed to her wherein she advocated servicemen receive a dishonorable discharge rather than going to Vietnam. She has appeared on and been excluded from numerous military installations as a result of her anti-Vietnam activities. She has been associated with the Women's Strike for Peace, the Movement for a Democratic Military, the Vietnam Moratorium Committee and has made sizable contributions to the Malcolm X Organization of Afro-American Unity and the Black Panther Party.

RALPH ABERNATHY

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
ATLANTA	ATLANTA	5/28/68	5/10/68 - 5/24/68

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY	SA ALAN G. SENTINELLO	sja
	CHARACTER OF CASE RACIAL MATTERS	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/JHG
#MD616

NON PROSECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

LEADS:

CHICAGO, NEW YORK, AND WFO DIVISIONS (INFORMATION)

Information copies of this report furnished Chicago, New York, and WFO because of subject's frequent presence in those cities.

ATLANTA DIVISION

AT ATLANTA, GEORGIA.

Will follow and report pertinent activity of subject.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐YES ☐NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐YES ☐NO

APPROVED

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

8-Bureau (RM)
1-111th MIG, Fort Mc Pherson (RM)
1-NIS, Charleston, S. C. (RM)
1-Secret Service, Atlanta (RM)

REC-25

MAY 29 1968

Cover Page B
3-Atlanta (157-257)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	112 SP,	Intell;	S.S.	
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.	6/5/68			
How Fwd.		LHS		
By	ccy	lci		

Notations

CC TO: CIA
REQ. REC'D 5-27
JUN 2 1969
ANS. BY: WFO SAC

Re: Abernathy

79 JUN 7 - 1968

Copies:

1-Chicago (Info) (RM)
1-New York (Info) (RM)
1-WFO (Info) (RM)

INFORMANTS:

AT-T-1 is AT-1387-R

Instant Report
134-389A-228
134-389A-229
134-389A-230
134-389A-232
134-389A-429
134-389A-430
134-389A-508
134-389A-538
134-389A-576
134-389A-577
134-389A-834
134-389A-834
134-389A-1043
134-389A-1069
170-290A-421
170-290A-424

AT-T-2 is anonymous source of WFO (WFO letter 6/28/60 "Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.")

AT-T-3 is THOMAS P. MONAHAN, JR., New Orleans, Louisiana. (By request)

AT-T-4 is NY-3810-S*.

AT-T-5 is former AT-1380-S*.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Atlanta has not conducted active investigation of subject.

AT 157-257

By separate communication subject has been recommended for inclusion in Agitator Index.

This report has been classified "Secret" because it utilized information from NY-694-S*. Information furnished by AT-1387-R (AT-T-1) must be classified ~~Confidential~~.

C*
(COVER PAGE)

FD-376 (Rev. 8-1-66)

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

May 24, 1968

DECLASSIFIED BY ~~SP2 ALM/JFK~~ mDR16
ON 11-13-00

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.
2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.
3. ☐ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.
4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.
5. ☒ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:
    - (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
    - (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
    - (c) ☒ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.
6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☐ enclosed ☐ is not available
☒ may be available through FBI, Atlanta

SECRET

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s)
U. S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Georgia
(Registered Mail)

Enclosure(s)

(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

Copy to: 1 - 111th MIG, Region V, Fort Mc Pherson, Georgia
1 - NIS, Charleston U. S. Naval Base, Charleston, S. C.
1 - Secret Service, Atlanta, Georgia

Report of: SA ALAN G. SENTINELLA Office: Atlanta, Georgia

Date: May 24, 1968

Field Office File #: 157-257 Bureau File #:

Title: RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ZTG
ON 11-13-00

Character: RACIAL MATTERS

Synopsis:

Subject born 3/11/26, Linden, Alabama, resides 690 Laverne Drive, NW, Atlanta, Georgia, serves as pastor West Hunter Street Baptist Church and serves as President Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Served in U. S. Army 8/12/44 - 10/27/45, honorable discharge, ASN 349 94 505. Credit satisfactory. Atlanta PD records reflect three traffic violations. In connection with SCLC matters, subject has been in contact with individuals having prior CP membership or affiliation. Description set forth.

- P* -

DETAILS:

I. BACKGROUND

A. BIRTH

The 1964 "yearbook" published by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), 334 Auburn Avenue, NE, Atlanta, reflected RALPH D. ABERNATHY was born March 11, 1926 at Linden, Alabama.

B. CITIZENSHIP

By virtue of his birth, ABERNATHY is an American citizen.

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

☆ U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967-O-273-878

C. EDUCATION

The 1964 SCLC "yearbook", supra, reflects ABERNATHY is a graduate of Alabama State College, Montgomery, Alabama.

The January 21, 1967 - January 27, 1967, edition of the "Chicago Defender", a weekly Chicago, Illinois, newspaper on Page 20, published an article entitled "The New Covenant Sunday - SCLC Leader to Speak". This article reflected ABERNATHY previously attended Atlanta University and was the recipient of a Doctor of Law (LLD) from Allen University.

D. EMPLOYMENT

On May 17, 1968, Mr. JOHN A. RITTER, Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, Inc., advised IC MARION W. DAVIS his records reflect RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY was employed from 1951 to 1961 as pastor of the First Baptist Church, 347 North Ripley Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Since 1961 Abernathy has been employed as pastor of the West Hunter Street Baptist Church, 775 Hunter Street, SW, Atlanta, Georgia. These records also indicate that since 1961 ABERNATHY has held the office of Secretary-Treasurer SCLC.

As of May 20, 1968, ABERNATHY continued to be employed as pastor of the aforementioned church and to also serve SCLC on a full-time basis as President.

AT-T-1, 5/68

E. AFFILIATION

Mr. JAMES R. WOOD, Director of Public Relations, SCLC, on May 2, 1961 furnished a SCLC brochure which set forth the history of this organization and biographical data concerning several individuals

in connection therewith. This brochure reflected that ABERNATHY at that time served as President of the Montgomery (Alabama) Improvement Association.

F. RESIDENCE

Records of the Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, supra, reflected ABERNATHY resided at 76 Cerro Street, SW, Atlanta from 1961 until 1967. His current residence is 690 Laverne Drive, NW, Atlanta.

In having his current residence constructed, ABERNATHY as of early 1967 had incurred substantial expense.

G. MARITAL STATUS

The January 21, 1967-January 27, 1967, issue of the "Chicago Defender", supra, reflected ABERNATHY was married to JUANITA ABERNATHY, Nee JONES.

H. MILITARY SERVICE

Mrs. THELMA TURNER, Georgia State Driver's License Bureau, Atlanta, advised IC MARION W. DAVIS on May 17, 1968, that her records reflect ABERNATHY was inducted into the United States Army at Fort Benning, Georgia, on August 12, 1944. He received an honorable discharge October 27, 1945 at Foster General Hospital, Jackson, Mississippi. His Army Serial Number was 349 94 505. On March 22, 1966, ABERNATHY was issued a new State of Georgia Veteran's Driver's License number V-018805.

I. CREDIT

Records of the Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, supra, reflected ABERNATHY has a satisfactory credit rating. These records contain a report dated February 20, 1962, from the Montgomery, Alabama Credit Bureau indicating that as of February 2, 1961, ABERNATHY

was the defendant in a slander action brought by one L. B. SULLIVAN seeking $500,000 damages. This matter was still pending as of February 20, 1962.

J. ARRESTS

On May 17, 1968, Mr. JOHN TALLENT, Station Captain's Office, Atlanta Police Department, Atlanta, advised IC MARION W. DAVIS he could not locate a record identifiable with ABERNATHY.

Miss JO PRESSLEY, Identification Division, Atlanta Police Department, on May 20, 1968, advised her records reflect ABERNATHY was arrested as follows:

Date	Charge	Disposition
March 28, 1963	Red Light	Fined $20; City of Atlanta Municipal Court
September 13, 1963	Red Light	Fined $30; City of Atlanta Municipal Court
November 17, 1964	Lane Ordinance	Fined $25; City of Atlanta Municipal Court

II. ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT

Unless indicated otherwise activities referred to took place in Atlanta, Georgia.

Characterizations of individuals and organizations where available are set forth in the appendix section of this report.

On July 6, 1965, Rev. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., President, SCLC, conferred with ANDREW J. YOUNG, Executive Vice-President, SCLC; RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL, Program Director, SCLC; HARRY WACHTEL and ABERNATHY regarding the recent arrest in Selma, Alabama, of a Rev. REESE affiliated with SCLC, who had been accused of embezzling

funds of the Dallas County, Alabama Voter's League.

AT-T-1, 7/65

Rev. KING called a conference on February 12, 1966 of SCLC officers and other individuals for the purpose of examining the immediate financial condition of SCLC and endeavoring to determine methods of increasing the organization's income. ABERNATHY attended this conference as did RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL, HOSEA WILLIAMS, Director of Voter Registration and Political Education, SCLC, JUNIUS GRIFFIN, Director of Public Relations, SCLC, CLARENCE JONES and STANLEY LEVISON. LEVISON took an active part throughout this meeting.

AT-T-1, 2/66

On March 16, 1966, JAMES HARRISON, Comptroller, SCLC explained to STANLEY LEVISON various problems experienced by the SCLC Finance Office and the fact that ABERNATHY as Treasurer of SCLC appeared reluctant to act on suggestions to solve some of these problems. LEVISON told HARRISON he appreciated the problems experienced by the Finance Office and assured him he would discuss the matter with ABERNATHY in order that ABERNATHY would take necessary action.

AT-T-1, 3/66

On June 13, 1966, Rev. KING conducted a conference of SCLC officers and other individuals for the purpose of examining the current financial status of SCLC and ascertaining methods of reducing the expenses of the organization. ABERNATHY attended this conference at which CLARENCE JONES, STANLEY LEVISON, and HARRY WACHTEL were also present and took an active part. RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL and HOSEA WILLIAMS each attended portions of this conference.

AT-T-1, 6/66

ABERNATHY on July 7, 1966, reviewed financial contributions recently received by SCLC from the general

public and noted that these contributions averaged approximately $1200 per day. He explained to several employees of the SCLC Finance . Office he thought these contributions were the result of a spontaneous reaction by the public to the recent shooting of JAMES H. MEREDITH in Mississippi rather than the solicitation efforts on the part of STANLEY LEVISON.

AT-T-1, 7/66

Rev. KING on July 25, 1966, reminded ABERNATHY they were to attend a meeting of the Executive Board of the American Foundation on Non-Violence (AFN) to be held July 26-27, . 1966 in New York City. KING said HARRY WACHTEL would also attend this meeting.

AT-T-1, 7/66

AFN is a tax arm of SCLC located in New York City of which HARRY WACHTEL serves as Executive Director.

AT-T-1, 7/66

On August 9, 1966, ABERNATHY attended a meeting of the SCLC Executive Board held as part of the tenth annual SCLC Convention August 8-11/1966, in Jackson, Mississippi. During this meeting a discussion ensued concerning the desirability of SCLC's retaining the services of HOSEA WILLIAMS, because of current publicity suggesting involvement of WILLIAMS with one HAROLD BELTON ANDREWS, who was convicted in July, 1966 in the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, on a charge of Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Motor Vehicle. In response to this discussion, ABERNATHY said he and Rev. KING were of the opinion that SCLC was sorely in need of the continued services of an individual possessing the energy and resourcefulness of WILLIAMS,

and therefore felt SCLC should retain WILLIAMS.

AT-T-1, 8/66

At the aforementioned meeting of the SCLC Executive Board, ABERNATHY explained that in the early part of 1967, SCLC would engage in a fund raising activity which would involve Rev. KING's making a "pilgrimage to the Holy Land". He said this activity had been proposed by a travel agency (not identified) and STANLEY LEVISON and HARRY WACHTEL had previously been requested by SCLC to ascertain the feasibility of this proposal and recommended SCLC proceed therewith.

AT-T-1, 8/66

ABERNATHY was present November 22, 1966 at a meeting of the SCLC Executive Staff which Rev. KING called for the purpose of considering methods of raising funds for SCLC. JUNIUS GRIFFIN and HOSEA WILLIAMS attended part of this meeting. STANLEY LEVISON attended the entire meeting and actively participated.

AT-T-1, 11/66.

During the latter part of January, 1967, officers of SCLC met in Chicago, Illinois, to discuss lack of progress in SCLC's voter registration drive in that city. In attendance at this meeting was ABERNATHY, HOSEA WILLIAMS, and STANELY LEVISON. LEVISON and WILLIAMS during the meeting became involved in a heated argument regarding SCLC's support of the voter registration drive. As a result of this argument, WILLIAMS left the meeting stating he was resigning from SCLC. ABERNATHY pleaded with WILLIAMS not to resign to which WILLIAMS eventually agreed.

AT-T-1, 2/67

On February 10, 1967, ABERNATHY requested HARRY WACHTEL to forward $5,000 of AFN funds to SCLC to assist the organization with its payroll obligations

as of the middle of February, 1967.

AT-T-1, 2/67

On February 7, 1968, Rev. KING and ABERNATHY and several executive officers of SCLC including HOSEA WILLIAMS and JAMES BEVEL, former Director of Direct Action, SCLC met in Washington, D. C. with STOKELY CARMICHAEL of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The purpose of the meeting was to afford SCLC opportunity to request SNCC not to interfere with SCLC's pending Poor People's Campaign (PPC).

AT-T-1, 2/68

On March 13, 1968, a meeting of several officers of SCLC including Rev. KING and ABERNATHY was held for the purpose of discussing problems relating to certain procedures utilized by the Southern Christian Leadership Foundation (SCLF) as indicated by a recent Internal Revenue Service audit of the SCLF. On March 14, 1968, STANLEY LEVISON met with the same individuals to further discuss these problems.

AT-T-1, 3/68

The SCLF is a tax arm of SCLC.

AT-T-1, 3/68

On April 5, 1968, the Executive Staff of SCLC met for the purpose of resolving several matters relating to the death of Rev. KING the previous day. One of the matters resolved was that ABERNATHY would assume leadership of the organization. HARRY BELAFONTE and STANLEY LEVISON, and HARRY WACHTEL attended this meeting.

AT-T-1, 4/68

As of April 22, 1968, SCLC elected to pay ABERNATHY $6,000 annually to cover personal expenses incurred by him as President of SCLC. A decision was also made by SCLC to employ an Assistant Pastor of the West Hunter Street Baptist Church in order that

ABERNATHY might devote sufficient time to his duties with SCLC. These decisions were made by a committee of several SCLC executive officers. Also serving on this committee was HARRY BELAFONTE, STANLEY LEVISON and HARRY WACHTEL.

AT-T-1, 5/68

In connection with the PPC, SCLC contemplates holding a massive demonstration in Washington, D. C., on May 30, 1968 and anticipates 300,000 people will participate therein. During the middle of May, 1968, SCLC intended to request BAYARD RUSTIN to serve as organizer and coordinator of this demonstration. ABERNATHY advised the SCLC staff that RUSTIN had apologized to him for his recent criticism of the PPC and inquired how he might assist in the PPC.

AT-T-1, 5/68

In June, 1960, the "Committee to Defend MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.," "The Struggle for Freedom in the South" and the "Southern Christian Leadership Conference Student Defense Fund' in a combined appeal solicited funds from the Soviet Embassy, Czechoslovakian Embassy and the Rumanian Legation all in Washington, D. C. These organizations appealed for assistance in defending the Southern Negroes, who were risking their career, facing jail terms and death in their struggle to make the United States totally democratic. This appeal for contributions was made under six names, one of which was Rev. RALPH D. ABERNATHY, Treasurer, SCLC.

AT-T-2, 6/60

On August 18, 1961 a news release type communication issued by the "Carl Braden Clemency Appeal Committee" was distributed by the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF). This communication revealed that on August 18, 1961 a delegation of Southern Integration Leaders would take petitions, signed by over

18,000 leaders in the field of Human Rights representing over 50 states of the United States to President JOHN F. KENNEDY requesting him to free CARL BRADEN. According to the communication, ABERNATHY was chairman of this delegation.

AT-T-3, 8/61

ABERNATHY on June 9, 1963, conferred with Rev. KING, CLARENCE JONES, and STANLEY LEVISON as to methods of dramatizing a proposed march on Washington, D. C., intending to pressure Congress into enacting Civil Rights legislation.

AT-T-3, 6/63

During the early part of May, 1968, ABERNATHY informed STANLEY LEVISON he was scheduled to speak on May 31, 1968, at commencement exercises of Alabama State College. ABERNATHY requested LEVISON prepare a speech for him to utilize on this occasion and LEVISON agreed to do so.

AT-T-4, 5/68

On May 5, 1968, ABERNATHY discussed with STANLEY LEVISON a proposal that SCLC become a membership organization and conduct a membership drive. They agreed the time was appropriate for implementation of a membership drive.

AT-T-4, 5/68

STANLEY LEVISON on May 7, 1968, advised WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD, Executive Director, SCLC, he would be unable to meet with him and ABERNATHY on May 8, 1968, as previously arranged for the purpose of discussing how operations of SCLC could be made more efficient.

AT-T-4, 5/68

The May 9, 1968, final edition of the Atlanta

Journal, a daily Atlanta newspaper, Page 2A, published an article entitled, "ABERNATHY Says Soul Force, March to Solve Ills of Poor". This article revealed that on May 8, 1968, ABERNATHY addressed the weekly forum of the Atlanta Hungry Club on the theme, "The Poor People's Campaign, A Memorial to Dr. KING". ABERNATHY declared that the PPC was neither begging nor threatening violence but demanding "with a thrust from a non-violent sword".

The above article indicated that on May 8, 1968, ABERNATHY flew to Atlanta from Montgomery, Alabama, to deliver this speech and immediately after left for Birmingham, Alabama.

On May 9, 1968, WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD, informed STANLEY LEVISON that ABERNATHY wished him to express his appreciation to LEVISON for preparing a speech he delivered in Atlanta on May 8, 1968.

AT-T-4, 5/68

In early May, 1968, STANLEY LEVISON complained to WILLIAM A. RUTHERFORD it was imperative that ABERNATHY operate SCLC with a firm hand and not spend all his time making public appearances. LEVISON cautioned that if ABERNATHY did not do so, he would find HARRY BELAFONTE and himself reluctant to assist him and SCLC.

AT-T-4, 5/68

On November 17, 1964, DORA E. MC DONALD, Secretary to the President, SCLC, made necessary travel arrangements for Rev. KING and other persons to travel to Oslo, Norway in connection with the presentation of the Nobel Prize to KING. According to the arrangements made by MC DONALD, ABERNATHY was to travel in a group of persons which included BAYARD RUSTIN, LAWRENCE REDDICK, HARRY WACHTEL, and LEONORA WACHTEL.

AT-T-5, 11/64

Rev. KING on May 26, 1966, informed ANDREW J. YOUNG, that a Whitehouse Conference on Civil Rights was to be held June 1-2, 1966. He said in addition to himself and YOUNG, ABERNATHY and RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL would attend this conference.

AT-T-5, 5/66

III. MISCELLANEOUS

The April 10, 1965 edition of the "Philadelphia Evening Bulletin" a daily Philadelphia, Pennsylvania newspaper on Page 3 published an article, "Get Ready - We're Coming, Rev. KING's Aide Tells City." According to the article, ABERNATHY spoke on April 9, 1965, at the Bright Hope Baptist Church, Philadelphia. During his speech ABERNATHY pleaded for a negotiated peace in Vietnam and urged the admission of Red China to the United Nations. He endeavored to explain this did not mean he was giving into Communist philosophy.

On October 13, 1966, the Atlanta Journal on Page 25 of its final edition published an article entitled, "KING,' Aides Confer, Discuss Black Power." The article reflected Rev. KING had called a meeting of "top SCLC leaders" to discuss the topic of "Black Power" and future programs of SCLC. According to JUNIUS GRIFFIN the meeting commenced on the evening of October 12, 1966, and was expected to terminate late in the afternoon of October 13 or early October 14, 1966, and "involved eight members of SCLC's Research Committee". The article indicated GRIFFIN named those in attendance at this meeting as ABERNATHY, JAMES BEVEL, MRS. DOROTHY COTTON, Director of Citizenship, SCLC, "New York attorneys," CLARENCE JONES, STANLEY LEVISON, HARRY WACHTEL, RALPH HELSTEIN, "International President of the Packing House Workers" and BAYARD RUSTIN.

The Atlanta Journal on Page 6A of its final edition December 29, 1967, published an article captioned, "KING's Aide Plans World Peace Trip". This article revealed that on January 3, 1968, ABERNATHY would embark on a trip "meet with heads of state, religious and

community leaders in Geneva, Rome, Istanbul, Tel Aviv, Jersuleum, Saigon, Kyoto, Tokyo, and Honolulu". He would also, according to the article, attend a meeting of the International Inter-Religious Symposium on Peace, January 14-17, 1968, in New Delhi, India.

On May 10, 1968, the Atlanta Constitution, a daily Atlanta newspaper, on Page 1 published an article captioned, "Marchers for the Poor Mass Here" bylined ALEX COFFIN. According to this article, ABERNATHY addressed PPC members in Atlanta on the night of May 9, 1968, regarding the PPC. He promised a non-violent crusade but stated, "I don't want anyone to expect me to be MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. . . . I say to the nation, to the United States, with RALPH ABERNATHY, You've got hell on your hands".

IV. DESCRIPTION

The following descriptive data was compiled from information reflected by records of the agencies referred to above.

Name	RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Date of birth	March 11, 1926 Linden, Alabama
Height	5' 8"
Weight	180 pounds
Build	Stocky
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Complexion	Dark
Address	690 Laverne Drive, NW Atlanta, Georgia
Occupation	Minister Pastor of West Hunter Street Baptist Church, Atlanta, Georgia President, SCLC

AT 157-257

Marital status	Married JUANITA ABERNATHY Nee JONES
Dependants	Three children
Military service	United States Army August 12, 1944 - October 27, 1945
Army Serial Number	349 94 505

APPENDIX

INDIVIDUALS

HARRY BELAFONTE

On October 28, 1958, a confidential source advised that according to JEAN SMITH, Secretary at Communist Party Headquarters, New York, HARRY BELAFONTE had been a member of the Young Communist League (YCL) before coming into prominence as an entertainer.

The YCL has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

1

JAMES BEVEL

BEVEL, in early March, 1966 was observed to be present at the offices of the West Side W.E.B. DuBois Club in Chicago (DCC). Discussion took place at this time centering around reaction to a recent notification that the Attorney General of the United States intended to label the DuBois Clubs as a Communist front. BEVEL, in conversation, stated that he would have ignored this notification, and kept about the work in which he was engaged. He felt that if the DuBois Clubs have a real program of help for the people, then people would answer for the clubs despite any labels applied to them.

Most present agreed that the attack on the DuBois Clubs was a part of the plan by the "establishment" to undermine the civil rights movement. They felt that the recent hearings into Klan activities in this country was only a beginning which would lead to a full attack on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the real target. One of those present stated during the course of this discussion that he was not a Communist, and to this BEVEL was overheard to reply that every thinking American should be. He stated that Negroes have not begun to read yet, but when they do, they will all be socialists.

RANDOLPH T. BLACKWELL

On February 26, 1953, a confidential source advised RANDOLPH BLACKWELL had been a member of the Communist Party in the District of Columbia.

A confidential source advised that RANDOLPH BLACKWELL attended a Labor Youth League convention on August 13, 1950, at the Algonquin Club, 1430 Fayetteville Street, Durham, North Carolina.

The Labor Youth League has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CARL and ANNE BRADEN

Mrs. ALBERTA AHEARN, 2311 Payne Street, Louisville, Kentucky, a self-admitted former member of the Communist Party (CP), Louisville, Kentucky, in testifying on December 11 and 13, 1954, in Jefferson County, Kentucky Criminal Court, in a state sedition prosecution against CARL JAMES BRADEN, identified BRADEN and his wife, ANNE BRADEN, as having been known to her as members of the CP, Louisville, Kentucky, from January, 1951, to shortly prior to the time of her testimony.

The Courier - Journal, Louisville, Kentucky, a newspaper of general circulation, on February 3, 1959, reported that CARL BRADEN had been sentenced to one year in prison on a charge of contempt of Congress on February 2, 1959, in Atlanta, Georgia. The story noted that he had been convicted under this charge on January 21, 1959, and that the charge arose from his refusal to answer questions before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

The Louisville Times, Louisville, Kentucky, a newspaper of general circulation, on February 27, 1961, reported that the United States Supreme Court had, on that date, affirmed the contempt of Congress conviction of BRADEN.

The Courier - Journal on May 2, 1961, reported that CARL BRADEN had surrendered to the United States Marshal at Atlanta, Georgia, on May 1, 1961, to begin serving a one-year prison sentence for contempt of Congress.

The Courier - Journal, on February 2, 1962, reported that CARL BRADEN had been released from the Federal Prison Camp at Allenwood, Pennsylvania, on February 1, 1962. BRADEN indicated that he would return to his home, Louisville, Kentucky.

On August 30, 1963, a confidential source advised that CARL BRADEN and his wife, ANNE BRADEN, continue to reside at 4403 Virginia Avenue and are still employed as Field Secretaries for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF).

BENJAMIN J. DAVIS

A confidential source advised on January 21, 1964, that as of that date, BENJAMIN J. DAVIS was National Secretary of the CP, USA.

"The New York Times," August 24, 1964, page 27, column 4, reports that BENJAMIN J. DAVIS, National Secretary, CP, USA, died in New York City on the night of August 22, 1964.

JULIUS GRIFFIN

Source, in June 1964, made available a flyer distributed by the Militant Labor Forum, announcing a party scheduled for May 30, 1964, at 116 University Place, New York City, which was for the purpose of welcoming home the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) presidential candidate. Scheduled to participate in a symposium at this affair was one JULIUS GRIFFIN, author of "New York Times Series on Harlem Hate Gangs." This symposium was described as relating to "What's Behind Harlem Hate Gang Scare?"

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

RALPH HELSTEIN

A confidential source advised on June 16, 1964, that RALPH HELSTEIN resides at 5806 South Blackstone Avenue, Chicago, and is the International President of the United Packinghouse Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, with offices at 608 South Dearborn Street, Chicago.

A confidential source advised in November, 1953, that he was recently advised that HELSTEIN was registered in the Communist Party about 1946, that he (HELSTEIN) joined under pressure and remained in the Party organizationally only a few months.

A confidential source advised on June 20, 1956, that RALPH HELSTEIN, 603 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, was a member of the National Lawyers Guild.

CLARENCE JONES

CLARENCE JONES is the General Counsel for the Gandhi Society for Human Rights, 15 East 40th Street, New York City.

A confidential source advised on February 26, 1957, that he had identified a photograph of CLARENCE JONES as a person whom he knew during late 1953 or early 1954 to be a member of, and in a position of leadership in, the Labor Youth League.

KING, MARTIN LUTHER, JR.

A Communist Party functionary described MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. as a confirmed Marxist in February, 1962.

25

STANLEY LEVISON

A confidential source advised in April, 1964, that STANLEY LEVISON was a secret member of the Communist Party (CP), USA, in July, 1963. In late 1963, and early 1964, he criticized the CP for not being sufficiently militant in the civil rights struggle. LEVISON was described by certain CP leaders as being to the "left" of the CP in his position in civil rights. LEVISON's differences with the CP, however, are merely tactical and he continues his ideological adherence to Communism.

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL

In July, 1962, HUNTER PITTS O'DELL, also known as JACK H. O'DELL, was considered by the Communist Party, USA, as a member of its National Committee.

HUNTER PITTS O'DELL told [illegible] SMITH December 27, 1963, he would not go back to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference on the same basis because he is now a "left person" and if they cannot accept him the way he is then they will have to forget about him.

LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK

LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK is Professor of Social Sciences at Coppin State College, Baltimore, Maryland. He currently resides at 3704 Winterbourne Road, Baltimore, Maryland.

On September 17, 1943, a confidential source advised she had learned that Dr. REDDICK, who was then Director of the Schomburg Library, 103 W. 135th Street, New York City, was one of the most important unpublicized members of the Communist Party (CP). She stated that REDDICK seemed to be a source of information in regard to socialism and communism in the United States and the Soviet Union.

A confidential source on March 23, 1951, said that he met LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK in 1945, through EUGENE GORDON, a staff member of the "Daily Worker" and that both GORDON and BENJAMIN J. DAVIS advised him that LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK was at that time a member of the CP. The source also said that REDDICK was an instructor at the George Washington Carver School.

The "Daily Worker" was an east coast communist newspaper, which suspended publication on January 13, 1958.

The George Washington Carver School has been designated by the U. S. Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On February 5 and 11, 1954, LAWRENCE DUNBAR REDDICK was interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Atlanta, Georgia. He, at that time, stated that he was not, and had never been, a member of, or a sympathizer with, the Communist Party.

On January 21, 1964, a confidential source advised that on January 18, 1964, Dr. LAWRENCE REDDICK visited with BENJAMIN J. DAVIS at the home of JACOB GREEN, State Chairman of the CP in Maryland. During conversation between REDDICK and DAVIS, it was mentioned that they had attended school together in Georgia and REDDICK commented that if he had stayed with DAVIS, he would have also joined the CP.

BAYARD RUSTIN

In "The Saturday Evening Post," issue of July 11 - 18, 1964, page 76, BAYARD RUSTIN is the subject of a feature article captioned: "The Lone Wolf of Civil Rights." In it, RUSTIN is said to have come to New York in 1938, as an organizer for the Young Communist League (YCL), and as such, he had the job of recruiting students for the "Party." Furthermore, the article reports that during his first years in New York, RUSTIN gave most of his earnings to the "Party." He reportedly left the "Party" in 1941, the article states.

The "Daily Worker," February 11. 1957, page 1, column 2, reported that BAYARD RUSTIN, Executive Secretary, War Resisters League, was an observer at the 16th National Convention of the Communist Party, United States of America, (CP, USA), held in New York City, on February 9 - 12, 1957.

A confidential source advised on September 20, 1963, that during a meeting of the National Board, CP, USA, on that date, BENJAMIN J. DAVIS remarked that, "RUSTIN calls me constantly--openly."

A confidential source advised on February 19, 20, 1964, that BAYARD RUSTIN contacted BENJAMIN J. DAVIS on those dates and sought his advice as to how he could escape from a speaking engagement to which he was committed. On the latter contact, DAVIS told RUSTIN that he was working on his request and had contacted friends who had contacts with the group to which RUSTIN was to speak.

HARRY WACHTEL

HARRY WACHTEL is the Executive Vice President of the Gandhi Society for Human Rights, 15 East 40th Street, New York, New York. He resides at 29 Split Rock Drive, King Point, Long Island, New York.

A confidential source furnished information in December, 1949, that HARRY H. WACHTEL, 41 Broad Street, New York, New York, was on the list of individuals carried as active members of the National Lawyers Guild.

On March 5, 1944, a confidential source furnished information which revealed that the name HARRY WACHTEL was on the list of names, significance not known, which was maintained at the Headquarters of the Kings County Communist Party at 26 Court Street, Brooklyn, New York.

Regarding HARRY WACHTEL's wife, LEONORA, it is noted that the same confidential source furnished information on March 5, 1944, which revealed her name and address were on a list of names of newly-elected officers of the Bath Beach Club of the Kings County Communist Party.

HOSEA WILLIAMS

During October, 1964, a confidential source advised that on October 3, 1964, RUTH BAILEY, then an employee of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, (SCLC), Harlem, New York Office, while discussing several SCLC personalities with one CONNIE CAMPBELL, referred to WILLIAMS. BAILEY said WILLIAMS had mentioned to her (date not specified) that on a prior occasion (date not specified) HUNTER PITTS O'DELL had told him more about politics than he could read.

ORGANIZATIONS

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF CHICAGO (DCC)

On May 3, 1965, a source advised that on June 30, 1964, a group of young people who attended the founding convention of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) met in Chicago and adopted a statement of purpose and constitution forming the DCC as an affiliate of the national DCA.

A second source advised on May 1, 1967, that DCA chartered clubs in the Chicago area are the West Side DCC and the North Side DCC, neither of which currently maintain a headquarters. There is no central headquarters for the DCC and there are no unchartered clubs in this area.

The second source advised that the majority of DCC members are also members of the CP.

During the past year DCC activity has been almost nonexistent.

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates were told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention.

The second source advised in September, 1966, that MIKE ZAGARELL, CPUSA Youth Director, stated that in Negro communities the Party still supported the plan to build "left" socialist centers and to solidify the Party base through the DCA. This source also advised in September, 1966, that DANIEL RUBIN, CPUSA National Organizational Secretary, stated the Party believes the DCA should have a working-class outlook and be a mass organization favorable to socialism, socialist countries and Marxism, and in April, 1967, advised that GUS HALL, CPUSA General Secretary, indicated the DCA primary emphasis should be on developing mass resistance to the draft.

A third source advised in September, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER was elected chairman of the DCA on September 10, 1967, at the Third National Convention of the DCA held in New York, New York, from September 8-10, 1967.

A fourth source advised during August, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER is a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

A fifth source advised on September 21, 1967, that the headquarters of the DCA is located at 34 West 17th Street, New York, New York.

GANDHI SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

The Gandhi Society for Human Rights was formed for the purpose of developing a philosophy and technique of non-violent civil rights protests. It is a non-action organization and makes no attempt to influence legislation nor participate in demonstrations. The Society furnishes legal assistance in certain civil rights cases. The organization was incorporated June 14, 1962.

THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of January 2, 1957, to supersede Guide published on May 14, 1951, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., contains the following information concerning "The National Lawyers Guild:"

1. Cited as a Communist front.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311, on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 149).

2. Cited as a Communist front which "is the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party, its front organizations and controlled unions" and which "since its inception has never failed to rally to the legal defense of the Communist Party and individual members thereof, including known espionage agents." (Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 3123 on the National Lawyers Guild, September 21, 1950, originally released September 17, 1950.)

3. "To defend the cases of Communist lawbreakers, fronts have been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the confines of the Communist Party itself. Among these organizations are the *** National Lawyers Guild. When the Communist Party itself is under fire these offer a bulwark of protection."

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91).

1 SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

"The Southern Patriot," a monthly publication, shows that it is published by the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF).

"The Southern Patriot" was cited as an "organ" of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 592, June 12, 1947.

The SCHW was cited as a communist front by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 592, June 12, 1947.

An amendment to the charter of the SCHW dated April 26, 1946, changed the name of that organization to the SCEF, and listed its purpose as being to improve the educational and cultural standards of the Southern people in accordance with the highest American democratic institutions, traditions, and ideals.

The SCEF is self-described as having deep roots in the South where it began as the educational wing of the SCHW, organized in 1938 to work for economic and political reform. When the SCHW disbanded in the late 1940's, SCEF continued as an independent organization, rallying support for integration and democracy and helping to stimulate and nurture new movements of the early 1960's. The SCEF maintained headquarters in Louisiana for twenty years, but in 1966 moved its headquarters to Louisville, Kentucky.

A source advised on March 2, 1961, that CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT, a Communist Party Functionary, stated at a meeting of the Communist Party in Baltimore, Maryland, on February 25, 1961, that the Communist Party is not connected with any progressive movement but indirectly they do have some influence in the SCEF.

[illegible] 323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-257

Atlanta, Georgia
May 24, 1968

Title	Ralph David Abernathy
Character	Racial Matters
Reference	Report of SA ALAN G. SENTINELLA at Atlanta dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

1-50

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/10/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ... ON 11-7-00

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Cregar

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, (hereafter referred to as the Group), held on 3/7/75.

The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees.

At the meeting of the Group on 3/7/75 the following items were discussed:

Congressman Robert McClory has been designated as the minority leader of the House Select Committee. Copies of the annexes prepared by various members of the Intelligence Community have been delivered to both the majority and minority leader of the House Select Committee. Congressman McClory is very security conscious, is concerned that sensitive relationships are not inadvertently disclosed during forthcoming hearings and according to Mr. John Clarke appears to have no questions regarding FBI authority to engage in domestic surveillances. CIA has prepared a draft letter to Senator Church releasing CIA employees from any obligations imposed upon them by CIA's Secrecy Agreement (draft copy furnished the Legal Counsel Division). Prior to releasing the letter to Senator Church, CIA is having it reviewed by the White House to determine if they have any objections to its content.

REC-37 62-116395-50

CIA anticipates that staff employees of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will have direct access to CIA buildings but will not have direct access to CIA files or CIA personnel. Arrangements for the staff of the SSC to interview CIA personnel will be made through Mr. John Clarke.

APR 7 1975

WOC:ebc
(17)

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

APR 11 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

LEGAL COUNSEL

3/10/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, and Mr. John Warner, General Counsel, CIA, will have a meeting with the Counsel of the SSC on Tuesday, 3/11/75, to work out precise wording for a Secrecy Agreement that all members of the SSC staff have agreed to sign.

On 3/10/75 the staff of the SSC will convene to develop a list of requirements that they expect to levy on all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. Hopefully Mr. Clarke will have some information on these requirements prior to the time they are levied on the individual agencies.

As a result of Mr. Colby's appearance before the House Government Information in Individual Rights Subcommittee, Government Operations Committee, 3/5/75, CIA is getting many, many, calls from Senators and Congressmen asking how they can find out whether CIA has a file on them and what its contents are. Mr. Clarke noted that members of the Group should anticipate receiving similar calls from Congressmen. (U)

Mr. Hank Knocke, who heads up the CIA task force responsive to the Rockefeller Commission, advised that staff members of the Rockefeller Commission have been issued CIA badges, occupy CIA office space, and have authority to personally contact any CIA employee without clearing such contact with CIA officials. In addition, the Rockefeller Commission staff employees have been granted access to CIA files. After reviewing these files, if the staff decides to make certain portions of the files a matter of official Commission business, CIA has a right to excise the names of any sensitive sources. In the event information contained in these files originates with another Agency of the Government CIA has insisted and the staff concurs that the originating Agency must be consulted before such information can be released to the staff. (U)

Mr. Knocke also advised that it is his understanding that both Mr. Kelley and Mr. Colby will receive in the mail shortly a request from the Commission to prepare a joint response covering the activities of foreign intelligence officials in the U. S. (U)

~~CONF~~

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

CONFIDENTIAL

CIA as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community is concerned over requests received ~~by~~ from Morton Halperin under the Freedom of Information Act. Treasury, National Security Council, Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA, State Department and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), have received requests from Halperin. According to Mr. Clarke, a meeting will be convened by the OMB involving interested parties in an effort to coordinate a response. Mr. Colby, in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence, is very concerned that in responding to Halperin's requests one Agency does not deny providing information to Halperin that another Agency expects to give Halperin. To date the Bureau has not received a request from Halperin under the Freedom of Information Act. ~~(C)~~ (U)

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WRW/TJL

This may possibly be considered a conspiracy to deny FOI rights. We should avoid all such implications. K

Noted & Cregar & Legal Counsel people advised 3/14/75 JCF

CONFIDENTIAL

Assistant Attorney General for Administration March 7, 1975

Nicholas P. Callahan
Associate Director, FBI

SENSTUDY 75

INQUIRY BY GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) AND THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (OMB) CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

APPROPRIATIONS - 1974

On the afternoon of March 7, 1975, Mr. James F. Hoobler, Director, Management Programs and Budget Staff, furnished a copy of a memorandum from GAO to the Deputy Director of the OMB which requested information concerning appropriations, outlays and legislative authority for such appropriations and expenditures.

With regard to the FBI's Intelligence Division, a response was requested concerning the amounts of budget authority for fiscal years 1974 and 1975 and actual outlays for fiscal year 1974; an indication of where in the Federal budget these amounts or any portion of them appear; any language in the budget which explains or indicates the purpose or purposes for which such amounts will be spent; and the legislative authority for each of the listed appropriations and expenditures.

EX 104

The FBI does not receive budget authority or account for budget outlays specifically for internal security or intelligence activities or for any organizational component handling such matters. The FBI's budget request for funds to handle internal security or intelligence matters is set forth under the budget activity "Security and Criminal Investigations." Based on manpower utilization surveys which have been conducted, it is estimated that approximately 28 percent of the FBI's resources go to support activities under the supervision of the Intelligence Division. It is estimated, therefore, that in the fiscal year 1974 the FBI's budget authority contained funds amounting to some $91 million and that it had outlays of about $83 million to support these activities. The amount contained in the FBI's budget authority for the fiscal year 1975 is estimated to be $102 million.

The purposes for which these funds are expended are set forth in justification material accompanying budget estimates submitted to the Cong

62-116395-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP2

Original Filed in 66-19125-94

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Spec. Inv.

LCG:jmb

2 ENCLOSURE

See designated and note on page two....

NOT RECORDED
MAY 1 1975

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Assistant Attorney General for Administration

In the FBI's material for fiscal years 1974 and 1975 these purposes are set forth under the section "Objective" and they are captioned "Domestic Intelligence" and "Coordination and Dissemination of Security Data." Additional data is furnished in each of those years under the section "Status of Base Program" and is captioned "Internal Security Operations."

The legislative authority for the appropriation and expenditures for the fiscal year 1974 is contained in the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1974 (Public Law 93-162). The legislative authority for fiscal year 1975 is contained in the Appropriation Act for the same agencies (Public Law 93-433).

1 - Mr. James F. Hoobler, Director
Management Programs and Budget Staff

1 - Mr. Wannall - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Moore - Enclosure

NOTE: The attached inquiry from GAO is being coordinated by the OMB. It was received by us from the Department at 1:14 p.m., 3/7/75, with a request that the information be furnished by the close of business the same date.

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ROUTE SLIP

TO Mr. Hoobler

Take necessary action ☐
Approval or signature ☐
Comment ☐
Prepare reply ☐
Discuss with me ☐
For your information ☐
See remarks below ☐

FROM Jim Purcell Jim Purcell DATE 3-7-75

REMARKS

Mr. Hoobler:

Will you please provide the requested information indicated by Mr. Scantleburg's memo of February 24 pertaining to the FBI. Item "8" which refers to the FBI Internal Security Division should be interpreted as the FBI's Intelligence Division.

I would appreciate having this information, if possible, by close of business, today.

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP-2 ALM/LRG

OMB FORM 4
REV AUG 70

62-116395-
ENCLOSURE

[illegible] 28 1975

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOU NTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

DIVISION OF FINANCIAL AND
GENERAL MANAGEMENT STUDIES

FEB 24 1975

Mr. Paul H. O'Neill
Deputy Director
Office of Management and Budget

Dear Mr. O'Neill:

We have recently received a request from a Member of the Senate Budget Committee for our assistance in obtaining budget data with respect to various intelligence activities of the Federal Government. We have the budget data that is publicly available. However, as you are aware, most of the requested information is not readily available and is usually provided to the Congress in limited briefings. We have discussed this matter with representatives of the Senate Budget Committee and it is their desire to obtain the requested data by other than oral briefings.

The request involves amounts of budget authority for fiscal years 1974 and 1975 by each of the following agencies, and the actual outlays by each such agency during FY 1974.

1. Central Intelligence Agency
2. National Security Agency
3. Defense Intelligence Agency
4. Army Intelligence
5. Naval Intelligence
6. Air Force Intelligence (including the National Reconnaissance Office)
7. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
8. Federal Bureau of Investigation Internal Security Division

62-116395-
ENCLOSURE
6

9. Atomic Energy Commission Division of Intelligence

10. Treasury Department Intelligence Division

The Committee would also like to know the following:

> "Where in the federal budget does each or any portion of the above-mentioned amounts appear? Indicate to the closest possible degree of specificity, designating such amounts by the accounts or line items, or combinations of accounts or line items, under which the amounts are included, and any language in the budget which explains or indicates the purpose or purposes for which such amounts will be spent.
>
> "What is the legislative authority for each of the above-listed appropriations and expenditures?"

We would appreciate your reviewing these items and responding at your earliest convenience. We have advised members of your staff of this request. We will be happy to work directly with your staff to meet this congressional need. To the extent that any of this information is not available, we will need, in writing, the legislative citations or precedents for not supplying the data.

Sincerely yours,

DL Scantlebury

D. L. Scantlebury
Director

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

(Senstudy - 75)

Mr. Kelley asked that in connection with future testimony we prepare two papers. ① One is to be a dissertation about our procedures in opening and closing domestic security cases, including the application of criteria for opening such cases and determining how long the cases should remain in a pending status. ② The second paper is to involve the jurisdiction of the President to authorize unusual investigative techniques in foreign intelligence investigations such as wiretaps, microphones and surreptitious entries. This should include a definition of his Constitutional powers and the derivative authority invested in the Attorney General and the FBI.

In connection with these two papers, it is desired that there be coordination between the Intelligence Division, Legal Counsel Division and writers in the External Affairs Division, who should participate in the basic research and discussions and prepare the final paper outlining the research and analysis of the other two divisions.

Mr. Kelley's purpose is to have papers available on various topics such as this which reduce technical dissertations to a style which can be used for argumentative purposes in an easily understood form. The types of questions he receives generally do not require a highly technical response but a concise presentation of the issues involved and the propriety of our procedures.

ACTION:

For information.

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
46 APR 17 1975
MAR 28 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116395-22

JBA:ams
(6)
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

① To Haddock, Divs & Legal [illegible] Divs
② Whitley, Divs & G. [illegible] Divn

84 APR 18 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP-2ALM/JFG

SUBJECT: HOUSE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE
THE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE
HEARING, MARCH 5, 1975

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

This Committee which is chaired by Congresswoman Bella S. Abzug (D-N.Y.) convened on March 5th to hear testimony from Director of the CIA, William E. Colby. It was brought out at the hearing that the Central Intelligence Agency had furnished information in their files pertaining to Congresswoman Abzug the previous evening, March 4th, with the exception of information which could not be disclosed without compromising a sensitive source or intelligence gathering procedure. Director Colby also advised Congresswoman Abzug in response to her inquiry that the source of some items that she was in receipt of had been concealed because it was from another agency. Colby did not disclose the identity of that agency.

Congresswoman Abzug asked Colby, and he agreed to communicate with that agency and have them contact Congresswoman Abzug concerning the aforementioned information. By way of background according to a memorandum captioned "Bella S. Abzug (D-N.Y.)," dated 3-4-75, the CIA asked for and received permission from this Bureau to release ~~the~~ PORTION OF contents of unclassified reports furnished the CIA by the FBI and could be furnished by the CIA to Congresswoman Abzug. From the remarks made by Director Colby, it would appear that the topic of discussion between Congresswoman Abzug and Director Colby pertained to these documents and that we can expect some communication from the CIA in accordance with Congresswoman Abzug's request.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

REC-46 62-116395-216

During the question and answer portion of Director Colby's testimony, Director Colby stated that the CIA would obtain information pertaining to American citizens in only two instances in the future. (1) Information developed incidental to their surveillance of a foreign target.

21 APR 1 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. McCreight
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Hotis

PVD:dkg (8)

62-116395
NOT RECORDED

MAY 28 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Subcommittee on Government
Individual Rights 3/5

APR 5 1975

MAY 28 1975

(2) Investigations conducted pursuant to FBI requests. He was asked what the CIA's response would be to an improper request for investigation concerning American citizens. He indicated that they would refuse such a request and had done so in the past. The implication being from the context of the question that the FBI had made an improper request of the CIA.

In view of the wide scope of authority enjoyed by Congresswoman Abzug's Committee and the realistic expectation the FBI will have to testify before this Committee, it would be to our advantage for the Intelligence Division, through liaison, with the Central Intelligence Agency to obtain a transcript of this Committee hearing so that same might be reviewed and possible questions contained therein concerning FBI investigations be analyzed and responses prepared.

RECOMMENDATION:

Intelligence Division take action in line with the above.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2ALM/HS

Assoc. Dir. ✓
Dep. A.D. Adm.
Dep. A.D. Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs ✓
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection ✓
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

In Our Opinion

Assign Congress To Hunt Bombers

Here we go again.

The bombing of a State Department restroom and followup phone call from someone calling itself the "Weather Underground" is reminiscent of times past.

The bombers are apparently protesting any economic aid to non-Communists in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

There's a certain irony in the timing. At the very moment the CIA and FBI are being raked over the coals by self-righteous members of Congress, a radical group like the ones under surveillance in the late '60s and early '70s pulls off a terrorist act.

We wouldn't blame the FBI for turning the investigation of the latest bombing over to the congressional committee investigating government surveillance. Let the legislators handle it.

Some measure of watchfulness must be maintained over agencies like the FBI and CIA. The repugnant aspect of it all is congressmen leading the media bandwagon to roast the agencies.

Many of these congressmen and senators knew bloody well what these agencies were doing in years past, but never raised a whisper, let alone a howl. Now, with home-grown terrorism seemingly behind us, the legislators play dumb and feign shock or outrage over what they call "disturbing revelations."

You can bet if a bomb went off in the Senate or House chambers, Congress would call out the FBI, CIA and any other agency versed in intelligence gathering.

What's more, the legislators would wonder why the FBI and CIA couldn't immediately produce the 10 most likely suspects.

"Where's your surveillance mechanism," some senator would demand.

What we have, folks, is Congress at its hypocritical worst.

Senstudy-75

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)
Pg. 4
The Star Beacon
Ashtabula, Ohio

ate: 1-30-75
dition:
uthor:
ditor: Don Rowley
itle: Miscellaneous

haracter:
or
ssification: Public relation Matters
mitting Office: Cleveland
☐ Being Investigated

CV 80-0

62-116395-A

NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 28 1975

F-32
0 MAR 31 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/21/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/00 BY SP-2ALM/STC
#MDR 16

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the evening of 3/20/75.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). In attendance were Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; Deputy AG Laurence Silberman; Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI, as well as officials from Defense, Treasury and the Energy Research and Development Administration (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission).

The meeting was called to have all agencies identify (1) Types of information that could not be disclosed to Congressional Committees, (2) Types of information the disclosure of which was arguable, and (3) Types of information that could be disclosed to Congressional Committees. The FBI was asked to lead off the presentation. The Group was informed that we were reluctant to discuss sensitive matters in such a large group and we asked that the Group be reduced to a select few people who would have to have knowledge of sensitive FBI operations. After some discussion, the White House agreed this was a good procedure and it now appears that Mr. Buchen of the White House, one of his associates and probably Mr. Silberman will arrange at some future date to discuss the sensitive type information embraced in the above three questions. No definite date was set for this review and presumably either Mr. Clarke's office or Mr. Silberman will be in contact with the Bureau regarding this.

REC-28 62-116395-49

Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by Mr. Clarke which attempts to outline a course the DCI can take ~~in coordinating~~ inquiries from the Senate and House Select Committees. Although

APR 9 1975

Enclosure
WOC:ebc
(17)

CONTINUED - OVER

APR 16 1975

this paper was on the agenda for this meeting, it was never discussed because of the length of meeting, concluding at approximately 8:30 p.m. Following the meeting, Assistant Director Mintz and Mr. Cregar had a discussion with Mr. Wilderotter. During this discussion Mr. Mintz pointed out to Mr. Wilderotter that it was imperative that this Executive Committee clearly define how responses to the Select Committees would be coordinated and how matters dealing with policy would be cleared with the White House. Mr. Wilderotter described the following procedure. All questions received by agencies of the Intelligence Community from Select Committees would be furnished to Mr. Clarke. As a matter of fact, Mr. Wilderotter advised a copy of the questions received by the Department from the Senate Select Committee requiring responses from the FBI had already been turned over to Mr. Clarke by Mr. Wilderotter. Upon receipt of a copy of such questions, Mr. Clarke would review them and attempt to identify which questions involve policy matters of interest to the White House. He would then inform all agencies involved in such a response that such a question involved policy. Those agencies would be obliged to discuss the response between themselves and arrive at a coordinated answer. That answer would then be furnished to Mr. Clarke who would in turn make a decision as to whether it should go forward to the White House forresolution. Answers to questions which did not involve policy matters would also have to be furnished to Mr. Clarke to insure that there was some coordinating mechanism in the Community and to insure that this mechanism was in possession of all questions and all answers which might be provided the Select Committees.

Mr. Mintz made it quite clear to Mr. Wilderotter that this was not the Bureau's understanding of how the coordination process would work and was of the belief that no other agency represented on the Executive Committee was aware of this procedure. Mr. Wilderotter was asked to develop such a procedure for presentation to the Group to insure everybody was in agreement as to how this process would work.

On the morning of 3/21/75, Mr. Clarke advised that as a result of the meeting during the evening of 3/20/75 he was completely confused and was at a loss as to how the coordination process was going to work. He advised Mr. Cregar that he would

CONTINUED - OVER

attempt to get some clarification and hopefully be in a position to provide some information as to how the White House, Mr. Silberman and Mr. Wilderotter wanted to proceed.

It is the opinion of both Mr. Mintz and Mr. Wannall that the Bureau must immediately set up a Task Force to handle the tremendous amount of information that will be required from the FBI, including the coordination of our responses with other agencies who might be involved in such an answer, as well as to insure that both the Department of Justice and the White House are fully informed. We can anticipate very short deadlines and requests for information that are not readily retrievable from Bureau records without considerable research involving several divisions in the Bureau.

ACTION:

That a Task Force be immediately created within the Bureau to facilitate the collation of information as well as the coordination of such information responsive to the requests we can anticipate receiving from Select Committees of the Congress.

Tol

Memo for prod. Cregar to Wannall 3/27/75 wrd/bcw

wRW

Note: Principal responsibility for the Task Force would be the Intelligence Division in terms of personnel and collection and review of information and documents, however, an individual should be designated in each other division as contacts to handle receipt of requests of the division and to expedite responses from his division. Those designated should be briefed as to the roles of the Senate and House Select Committees and the urgency of the requests anticipated. Files Div. should consider development of special services that would assist in this effort. Legal Counsel will continue to deal with the committees and help elsewhere as necessary.

It appears we are gearing ourselves to quick response - Why can't we get an agreement as to a reasonable response time -

PLM

FBI.

Mr Cregar

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

20 March 1975

This represents a working paper. It attempts to outline a course the DCI can take in dealing with the Senate/House Select Committees' inquiries. The details herein have not yet been discussed or coordinated with representatives of the Ad Hoc Group of USIB.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

Will also plan to table at
5 PM session today

ACTION

#MDR16
9/26/00 SP-2 ALM/STG

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-49

A. RESPONSIBILITIES AND SUPPORT

In treating with Congressional inquiries, the Director of Central Intelligence will provide leadership to the Intelligence Community. The Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, supported by the Intelligence Community Staff, will provide the principal staff direction and congressional liaison for the DCI in these matters. He will serve as a focal point for coordination among Community entities and assure communication with the Executive Office as appropriate. The IC Staff with the assistance of USIB Agencies will provide legal, security, substantive, and registry support structured so as to assure appropriate support to the DCI and the Intelligence Community. The AD/DCI/IC will chair an Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of USIB as a principal mechanism for exchanging information and coordinating USIB activities with respect to the inquiry where needed. The AD/DCI/IC and the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group will establish periodic and special time sensitive reporting to keep the DCI, the USIB principals, and involved Executive Branch agencies advised on USIB Agencies' liaison relationships with the Select Committees and on substantive exchanges in response to Select Committee inquiries. Where useful, common standards and procedures will be developed by the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group.

B. COORDINATION

1. Physical security is proceeding well. The Chairman of the Security Committee of USIB has been assigned as the principal Intelligence Community officer on physical security and clearance matters. Agreements have been reached with the Senate Select Committee on physical security standards. These standards have been provided to the House Select Committee Staff. The Senate has arranged for central facilities which meet the physical security standards and has appointed a full-time security officer who will provide certification of personnel clearances. The House at the present time is not planning central facilities and we understand will be dispersed in at least three different locations.

Discussion of classified information will occur outside of the security-approved Committee rooms and particularly in the offices of the members of the Select Committee. Agreement has been reached that the FBI will approach the House and Senate Staff Directors and offer technical sweep services for the Congressional offices involved.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-44

2. Personnel security investigations on Select Committee Staff are under way by the FBI. It is understood that upon completion of Staff investigations, the Select Committee Chairman will certify to the DCI the Top Secret clearances of Committee Staff. The DCI, through his Intelligence Community Staff, will pass along the certification to the security elements of the respective agencies. Compartmented clearance arrangements and certification also have been agreed with the Senate Select Committee Staff. Similar arrangements have been discussed with the House Select Committee Staff.

3. Secrecy agreements for the Senate Select Committee Staff employees are being drafted and the AD/DCI/IC, supported by the CIA General Counsel and the Associate Deputy Attorney General, will negotiate similar arrangements with the House. The DCI policy is to insist upon secrecy agreements.

4. Arrangements will be established by the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for the recording of documents, testimony and transcripts, and for procedures to protect sources and methods which may be contained in the material flowing to the Select Committees from all agencies. A central index service will be provided by the Intelligence Community Staff to serve the DCI and USIB Agencies. The following describes the general content of this central index.

a. All requests received by USIB Agencies from the Select Committees. ✓

b. All other communications from Select Committees on subject of interest to more than one agency. ✓

c. Reports and responses by other non-intelligence elements of the Executive Branch (if desired by those elements).

d. Identification of document responses provided to the requests and listing of subjects covered. ✓

e. Prepared statements and transcripts of testimony made to Select Committees. ✓

f. Selective material released or denied under the Freedom of Information legislation which relates to subjects of interest to the Select Committees.

Under this concept, all USIB Agencies would have a reporting responsibility to keep the central index current. Procedures will be developed. All agencies would retain responsibility for the physical possession and accessibility of their documents. The third agency rule will apply in providing documents to the Select Committees.

C. PROTECTION AND HANDLING OF MATERIALS

1. It is suggested that in general there are four levels of security applied to documents supplied to the Committees.

a. The bulk of historical data, organizational directives, budgets, cash flow, command and control procedures, etc. should be made available to the Committees on request and transmitted by the agencies concerned directly to the Select Committees. This material will be under the control of the Select Committees. It should be properly classified as appropriate to assure downgrading under the Freedom of Information Act is consistent with the judgment of the originating agency. The agencies will inform the central registry of the IC Staff of such transmissions and provide a description of the materials. The record file will be maintained by the originating agency so that it may be retrieved if necessary for use by authorized persons.

b. A second level of material will involve more sensitive data where sanitization or compartmented arrangements may be desired. Agencies will be responsible for these determinations. The IC Staff and the USIB Security Committee will develop general guidelines for application of sanitization procedures. Emphasis will be placed on protecting sources and methods while providing meaningful response and documentation to the Select Committees. The record copy of all such material will be available in the originating agencies. The existence of the original file and its sanitized version and location will be recorded with the registry. Keys to sanitized versions will be held by the agencies concerned.

c. A third type of material will be made available to Select Committee members or staff at the originating agency or if desirable at a central point to be determined. (Facilities for a central reading room can be established by the IC Staff, if desired.) This material would be provided in the presence of an authorized representative of the originating agency. These "fondling" files may have specific limiations placed upon them by the agencies concerned. Where such search limitations are determined, they should be consistent with the agreements contained in the DCI letter to Senator Church or with ground rules agreed among responsible agencies or with the Select Committees. The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group provides one forum for such determinations where interagency discussions are useful.

A fourth type of material for numerous reasons will not be available to Select Committee Staff in its raw form, e.g., memoranda to or from the President, especially sensitive matters where Executive Branch prerogatives are involved. This material can be used to prepare briefs or provide briefings to Select Committee Staff or members bur specific documentations normally will not be provided. If such briefs or briefings do not satisfy the Select Committees, negotiations will be undertaken with the Committees. The DCI should be kept advised in all such instances. Normally, if after negotiations there is provision of raw data, such data will be hand-carried to the Committees and read by the Committee or Staff members in the presence of an authorized representative of the originating agency as in c. above. This shall be made a matter of record by memorandum of the originating agency to the DCI and recorded in the IC registry along with the ground rules negotiated with the committees and the agencies in their negotiations. These ground rules will normally be an agenda item on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group agenda.

2. Testimony given in informal interview with Select Committee Staff will be recorded normally in a memorandum of record and filed in the agency concerned. Employees not wishing to report such testimony are free from doing so. Notification will be given to the IC central index of the existence of the file, its location and access rules. To the degree possible, the registry will cross-reference all materials provided the Committees and will prepare current reports on such materials.

D. LEGAL SUPPORT AND QUALITY CONTROLS

1. The Intelligence Community Staff has several lawyers who will be assigned to provide support to legal matters relating to this inquiry. The leader of this group will be expected to have regular consultation with the

General Counsels of all USIB Agencies and the Department of Justice, the NSC, the OMB, and other Executive Branch elements involved in the inquiry. Since the inquiry can result in the introduction of legislation, the IC Staff lawyers will also provide to the DCI appropriate legal briefs for his use. The recording of these briefs will also be made by the central index. The lawyers will also assist the DCI and USIB in ensuring that the Select Committees' procedures are developed in consideration of the legal and constitutional position of the USIB agencies and employees thereof.

2. We can anticipate the Select Committees will have 40-50 staff personnel involved in the inquiries and that they will normally proceed directly to the agencies concerned within their functional areas of interest. Cross agency activity coordination and substantive comparisons will occur within the Select Committees' staffs. It is in the interest of the USIB Agencies to assure equally good coordination between and among the members and Executive Branch elements as appropriate in the material and testimony provided and that a general quality control of the product is exercised. The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group provides the forum for keeping USIB Agencies informed on responses provided in the course of the inquiry and avoiding surprise. Further, the IC Staff will establish a small quality control and evaluative function and be alert to the indicators available as the investigations proceed of potential actions or further inquiries that could derive from materials or testimony provided by the various agencies.

3. There will be a range of "skeletons" and allegations which may surface in the course of the inquiry. USIB Agencies will seek to assure that all the facts are found and addressed so as to be responsive to the Select Committee inquiry and in consideration of the Administration.

E. ALLEGATIONS AND PUBLICITY

1. The nature of the investigation will undoubtedly continue to afford considerable public discourse. Many press allegations will cause further inquiry. A system to check the veracity of such allegations should be established by each USIB Agency. The IC Staff will also undertake to monitor press allegations and discuss them with the agencies involved as appropriate.

2. Senator Church intends to provide the press with commentary on selective testimony or facts pertaining to the inquiry. He has advised that he will clear with the Director these releases to avoid inadvertent disclosure harmful to U.S. intelligence agencies. Review of such releases will be undertaken by the IC Staff in concert with appropriate agencies.

3. In preparing statements or testimony to be given in open or closed hearings, senior intelligence officials should avail themselves of all previous related testimony or material furnished by other sources.

4. The DCI, through his IC Staff, will assure regular consultation with Executive Branch agencies on press matters and take steps to foster good communication between USIB entities and political officials.

Notification of all inquiries from press officials to intelligence agencies concerned should be provided to the IC Staff and a record of these inquiries maintained in the central registry.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N.P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J.B. Adams

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall WRW/TJM

DATE: March 27, 1975

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : W.O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This memorandum is responsive to a request by the Director, that is, "It appears we are gearing ourselves to quick responses--why can't we get an agreement as to a reasonable response time?"

Memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall, dated 3/21/75, captioned as above, described in considerable detail problems concerned with coordinating responses to the Select Committees of Congress. One of the significant problems is the very short deadlines we anticipate receiving from the Select Committees.

Responsive to the Director's question, should we get unreasonable deadlines from the Select Committees requiring extensive file reviews, our legislative liaison will personally contact Senator Church or Congressman Nedzi, pointing out to them the problems attendant to the short deadline and ~~requesting~~ negotiating an extension in order that we may be completely responsive to their requests.

ACTION:

REC-28 62-116395-48

21 APR ~~8~~ 9 1975

For the Director's information.

WOC:bcw
(17)

bcw

OK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG #MDR16

PLM

WRW

54APR [illegible]

5-WO6

#MOR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/TAG

62-1395 47

DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

August 24, 1936.

#MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG
ON 9/25/00

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

O ROOSEVELT

This morning, in accordance with the request of the President conveyed to me personally by him last Wednesday in New York City, I called at the White House at 9:15 and was with the President until 10:15.

He was desirous of discussing the question of the subversive activities in the United States, particularly Fascism and Communism. He had previously received the memorandum which I had prepared covering my conversation with General Smedley Butler and the effort of Father Coughlin to have General Butler head an expedition to Mexico. I informed the President concerning certain recent developments in the Communist activities in the country, particularly the efforts of the Bridges organization in San Francisco and their progressive control of the shipping on the Pacific Coast, the Gulf Coast and their recent expansion to shipping operations on the Atlantic Coast. I told him that while their contract will expire on September 30, 1936, they are endeavoring to have it temporarily extended until April 1, 1937, in order to conform to the same date that the United Mine Workers' contract expires, which organization is headed by John L. Lewis. I told him that the Bridges organization was practically controlled by Communists and that the Communists had now decided to make very definite plans to get control of the Lewis organization.

I called his attention to the activities of the Newspaper Guild headed by Heywood Broun, which has strong Communistic leanings, and which has been responsible for putting out of operation the Seattle Post Intelligencer. I told him that my information was that the Communists had planned to get control of these three groups and by doing so they would be able at any time to paralyze the country in that they could stop all shipping in and out through the Bridges organization; stop the operation of industry through the Mining Union of Lewis; and stop publication of any newspapers of the country through the Newspaper Guild.

I also related to him the activities which have recently occurred within Governmental service inspired by Communists, particularly in some of the Departments and in the National Labor Relations Board.

I likewise informed him that I had received information to the effect that the Communist Internationale in Moscow has recently issued instructions for all Communists in the United States to vote for President Roosevelt for reelection and against Governor Landon because of the fact that Governor Landon is opposed to class warfare.

The President stated that he had been considerably concerned about the movements of the Communists and of Fascism in the United States and that while the Secret Service of the Treasury Department had assured him that they had informants in every Communist group, he believed that if that was true it was solely for the purpose of getting any information upon plots upon his life, whereas what he was interested in was obtaining a broad picture of the general movement and its activities as may affect the economic and political life of the country as a whole. I told him that there is at the present time no governmental organization which is getting any so-called "general intelligence information" upon this subject. He inquired what suggestions I might offer relative to this matter. I told him that the appropriation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation contains a provision that it might investigate any matters referred to it by the Department of State and that if the State Department should ask for us to conduct such an investigation we could do so under our present authority in the appropriation already granted. He stated that he is reluctant to have a formal request come through the State Department because of the many leaks therein, but that what he would do would be to put a handwritten memorandum of his own in his safe in the White House, stating he had instructed the Secretary of State to request this information to be obtained by the Department of Justice. He stated he would have the Secretary of State at the White House tomorrow afternoon, and asked me to call at the White House at 1:45 p.m. to see him, the President, and the Secretary of State, at which time the matter could be further discussed and an oral request could be made of me by the Secretary of State for investigation so as to avoid any possibility of any leak.

He suggested that I endeavor to coordinate any investigation along similar lines which might be made by the Military or Naval Intelligence Services. He stated that the Secret Service was not being brought in on this investigation as they should confine themselves strictly to the matter of protecting his life and the survey which he desired to have made was on a much broader field.

John Edgar Hoover.

JOHN EDGAR
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

#MDR16 DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM 1776
9-26-00

August 25, 1936.

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

Today, in line with the request of the President, I called at the White House at 1:45 p.m., and present at the conference were the President, the Secretary of State and myself. The President related to the Secretary of State his concern relative to Communist activities in this country, as well as Fascist activities. He stated that he was very desirous of having a survey made of these conditions and informed the Secretary of State that this survey could be made by the Department of Justice if the Secretary of State requested the Department to conduct the inquiry, as under the Appropriation Act this Bureau would have authority to make such investigation if asked to do so by the Secretary of State. The President pointed out that both of these movements were international in scope and that Communism particularly was directed from Moscow, and that there had been certain indications that Oumansky, attached to the Russian Soviet Embassy, was a leading figure in some of the activities in this country, so consequently, it was a matter which fell within the scope of foreign affairs over which the State Department would have a right to request an inquiry to be made.

The Secretary of State inquired if a request should be made in writing. The President indicated that it should not be since he desired the matter to be handled quite confidentially and that it would be sufficient that the President, the Secretary of State and I should be the ones aware of this request.

The Secretary of State asked that the investigation be made and then made several suggestions - one, relative to the making of a protest, either formally or informally, to the Russian Government relative to its interference with affairs in this country. Discussion was also had as to the information obtained indicating that the Third Internationale had indicated preference for Roosevelt as against Landon. It was the opinion of the President that some statement should be made along this line by the Attorney General at an early date. The President asked that I speak to the Attorney General, upon his return to the city, about this matter, and he suggested to the Secretary of State that he talk over the technique to be followed in this particular aspect, with the Attorney General.

John Edgar Hoover.

x Subversive activities Investigations

[illegible]

62-116395—47

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

September 14, 1967

101 # MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/TFG

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Although the bulk of criminal offenses occurring in the course of recent riots have been local rather than federal in nature, the question as to whether there was an organization which (a) had made advanced plans for, and (b) was active during any of the riots in the summer of 1967 is one that cannot always be readily resolved by local authorities. In view of the seriousness of the riot activity across the country, it is most important that you use the maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon the question as to whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy by any group of whatever size, effectiveness or affiliation, to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.

In this connection the following federal statutes could be applicable depending, of course, upon the factual situation that develops:

Title 18, USC, Section 2383, which proscribes the inciting or engaging in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States.

Title 18, USC, Section 2384, which proscribes conspiring to overthrow or to destroy by force the Government of the United States or to oppose by force the authority thereof or by force to prevent, hinder or delay the execution of any law of the United States.

Title 18, USC, Section 2385, which proscribes, inter alia, advocacy of overthrowing the Government of the United States or the Government of any state, territory, District or possession thereof, or the Government of any political subdivision therein by force or violence.

Activities Affecting Armed Forces, 18 USC 2388

Selective Service, 50 USC (App.) 462

Travel and Interstate Transportation,
18 USC 1952 (Arson)
18 USC 831-33 (Explosive)

Assault and Killing of Federal Officers and Employees, 18 USC 111, 114 and 2231

Destruction of Government Property, 18 USC 1361 et al.

Federal Firearms Act, 15 USC 901-909

Crimes on Federal Reservations, 18 USC 13, 81 et al.

I appreciate that the Bureau has constantly been alert to this problem and is currently submitting intelligence reports to us about riots and about the activity of certain groups and individuals before, during and after a riot. Indeed, the President has said both publicly and privately that the FBI is conducting extensive and comprehensive investigations of these matters.

There persists, however, a widespread belief that there is more organized activity in the riots than we presently know about. We must recognize, I believe, that this is a relatively new area of investigation and intelligence reporting for the FBI and the Department of Justice. We have not heretofore had to deal with the possibility of an organized pattern of violence, constituting a violation of federal law, by a group of persons who make the urban ghetto their base of operation and whose activities may not have been regularly monitored by existing intelligence sources.

In these circumstances, we must be certain that every attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon these problems; to take every step possible to determine whether the rioting is pre-planned or organized; and, if so, to determine the identity of the people and interests involved; and to deter this activity by prompt and vigorous legal action.

As a part of the broad investigation which must necessarily be conducted, it is requested that all available information be reported and analyzed regarding each sniper caught in any riot or extremist activity and regarding those arrested during the course of a riot or significant racial disturbances who were not residents of the general area. Moreover, sources or informants in black nationalist organizations, SNCC and other less publicized groups should be developed and expanded to determine the size and purpose of these groups and their relationship to other groups, and also to determine the whereabouts of persons who might be involved in instigating riot activity in violation of federal law. Further, we need to investigate fully allegations of conspiratorial activity that come to our attention from outside sources such as those reported regarding Newark in Life Magazine for July 28, 1967, and those regarding the Detroit riot which were furnished to the Department by Walter Sheridan of the National Broadcasting Company (summary of latter is attached).

Ramsey Clark
RAMSEY CLARK
Attorney General

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

DIRECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 15, 1953

"On September 6, 1939, January 8, 1943, and July 24, 1950, Presidential Directives were issued requesting all enforcement officers, both Federal and State, to report promptly all information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation is charged with investigating all violations of the Atomic Energy Act, including the illegal export or import of fissionable material, the illegal possession or transportation of fissionable material and the illegal production, transfer, or possession of any equipment or device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy as a military weapon. 'Fissionable material' means plutonium, uranium-235 or other material which the Atomic Energy Commission has determined to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through nuclear chain reaction. I am requesting that all enforcement officers, both Federal and State, report all information relating to violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals likewise report all such information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the same manner."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FBI DR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/ETB

July 24, 1950

INFORMATION RELATING TO DOMESTIC ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND RELATED MATTERS

On September 6, 1939 and January 8, 1943 a Presidential Directive was issued providing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters. It was pointed out that the investigations must be conducted in a comprehensive manner on a National basis and all information carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion. I should like to again call the attention of all Enforcement Officers, both Federal and State, to the request that they report all information in the above enumerated fields promptly to the nearest Field Representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is charged with the responsibility of correlating this material and referring matters which are under the jurisdiction of any other Federal Agency with responsibilities in this field to the appropriate agency.

I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals likewise report all such information relating to espionage, sabotage and subversive activities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this same manner.

Harry Truman

REPORT SECURITY MATTERS TO FBI

"On September 6, 1939, I issued a directive providing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations, pointing out that the investigations must be conducted in a comprehensive manner, on a national basis, and all information carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility. I then requested all police officers, sheriffs, and other law enforcement officers in the United States, promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any such information.

"I am again calling the attention of all enforcement officers to the request that they report all such information promptly to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is charged with the responsibility of correlating this material and referring matters which are under the jurisdiction of any other Federal agency with responsibilities in this field to the appropriate agency.

"I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals likewise report all such information relating to espionage and related matters to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the same manner.

"I am confident that all law enforcement officers, who are now rendering such invaluable assistance toward the success of the internal safety of our country will cooperate in this matter."

Franklin D Roosevelt

January 8, 1943

mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-25-00 BY SP2 ALM/TG

DIRECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 6, 1939

"The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.

"This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and effective manner on a national basis, and all information must be carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility.

"To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs, and all other law enforcement officers in the United States promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any information obtained by them relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws."

187 # MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY 5PJ ALM/JTG

JEH:HCD

#mDe16 SP-2 ALM/JG
9-25-00

September 10, 1936.

Strictly Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TAMM

In talking with the Attorney General today concerning the radical situation, I informed him of the conference which I had with the President on September 1, 1936, at which time the Secretary of State was present, and at which time the Secretary of State, at the President's suggestion, requested of me, the representative of the Department of Justice, to have investigation made of the subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism. I transmitted this request to the Attorney General, and the Attorney General verbally directed me to proceed with this investigation and to coordinate, as the President suggested, information upon these matters in the possession of the Military Intelligence Division, the Naval Intelligence Division, and the State Department. This, therefore, is the authority upon which to proceed in the conduct of this investigation, which should, of course, be handled in a most discreet and confidential manner.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover,
Director.

The Attorney General

April 4, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes an initial response to the various requests set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (10)

EWL:jvl
(5)

9/25/00 SP-2 ALM/JHS

REC-23

2-ENCLOSURE

ST-112

APR 8 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

70 APR 17 1975

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

#mDe16
9/25/00 - SP2 Atm/dt6

April 4, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached are various documents which constitute an initial and partial response to the Committee's request. These documents are described as follows:

1. A memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, dated September 14, 1967.

2. Two FBI memoranda recording instructions received from President Franklin D. Roosevelt by FBI Director Hoover concerning FBI investigations of subversive activities and which indicate meetings between President Roosevelt and Director Hoover on August 24 and 25, 1936.

3. A memorandum from Director Hoover to FBI Associate Director E. A. Tamm, dated September 10, 1936.

4. Presidential directives dated September 6, 1939; January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures (8)

1 - The Attorney General

EWL:jvl
(5)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

62-116395-47

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-545

The Attorney General

March 31, 1975

REC-46

Director, FBI [illegible] -461

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

1 - Mr. N.P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J.B. Adams
1 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar

Reference is made to a telephone conversation between Associate Deputy Attorney General James A. Wilderotter and Inspector John B. Hotis on March 25, 1975.

This will confirm the authorization provided by Mr. Wilderotter to Mr. Hotis with regard to permitting CIA to furnish a memorandum dated February 7, 1966, entitled "CIA Operations in the United States," to the staff of the Senate Select Committee.

It is our understanding that Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee, telephonically contacted Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and requested a copy of the above-described memorandum.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

#MPR16

9/25/00 SP2 ALW/JJ16

WOC:bcw
(9)

bcw

NOTE:

See memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall, dated 3/24/75, captioned "Senstudy 75," prepared by WOC:ebc.

MAILED 6
MAR 31 1975
FBI

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

WRW/Tmr

PLM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]MENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. WOC Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 3/24/75

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ACM/dfb
#mbr16

This memorandum reports that on the morning of 3/24/75 Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, telephonically advised Section Chief William O. Cregar, the Bureau's representative on this Group, that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) has requested a copy of the 2/7/66 FBI - CIA Understanding, entitled "CIA operations in the United States."

We have previously received requests from the House Appropriations Committee as well as the Rockefeller Commission for copies of the FBI - CIA Understanding dated 2/7/66. In both instances, Deputy AG Laurence Silberman authorized the release of the FBI - CIA Understanding to the House Appropriations Committee as well as the Rockefeller Commission.

On the morning of 3/24/75 Mr. John Clarke telephonically advised that CIA has received a request from the SSC to provide the SSC with a copy of the FBI - CIA Understanding. Inasmuch as we have previously provided a copy of this Understanding to another Congressional committee, it would appear that we have no choice but to furnish a copy of this Understanding to the SSC; however, clearance should be obtained from Deputy AG Silberman.

Inasmuch as a timely response to the SSC is desired, it would appear reasonable for the Legal Counsel Division to telephonically inquire from Mr. Silberman whether he interposes any objection to CIA furnishing a copy of the Understanding to the SSC. If oral authority is obtained, the Intelligence Division will confirm such authority from the Deputy AG in writing.

REC-46 62-116395-46
42

APR 1 1975

ACTION:

If approved, the Legal Counsel Division will attempt to obtain Mr. Silberman's authority for FBI to advise CIA that this Bureau interposes no objection to CIA furnishing a copy of the FBI - CIA Understanding dated 2/7/66 to the SSC staff. This authority will be confirmed in writing if granted.

[illegible] advised OK to SSC 3/25/75 WOC

WOC:ebc
(5) ebc

PLM

On 3/25/75, Assoc Deputy AG James Wilderotter authorized dissemination of FBI-CIA memorandum of Understanding dtd 2/7/66 to SSC.
WOC

LEGAL COUNSEL

[illegible]NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC[illegible]
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

#MDR16
9/25/00 SP2 ALM/11G

20 March 1975

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

(Ocsenctly MIS

Dear Mr. Kelley:

Thank you for forwarding me a copy of your letter to Bill Cotter covering postal-related matters which might come up in the Select Committees' review of U.S. intelligence. I have passed this communication to John Clarke and can reaffirm that John will be in touch with Bill as these matters evolve. I want to assure that subjects dealing with any postal relationships are properly coordinated.

I am furnishing Mr. Cotter with a copy of this letter.

Sincerely,

Bill

W. E. Colby
Director

cc: Mr. Cotter

EXP. PROC.
MAR 21 1975

REC-19 EX-110

62-116395-45

APR 1 1975

58 APR 8 1975

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

#MDR 16

9/25/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
3-24-75
MAR 25 1975
7:10 pm 12:50 A.M.
TELETYPE

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

0 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - Each Assistant Director

62-116395-44

NOTE: By letter dated 3/19/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, made an initial request for data concerning the FBI's legal authority, jurisdictional agreements, organization and staffing, policies and procedures and studies and reports concerning internal security and counterintelligence activities. It is necessary to contact the field offices to obtain specific information concerning the current agent staff assigned to these matters.

MAR 26 1975

DWA:jmb

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/18/75

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP2
#MDR16

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, (hereafter referred to as the Group), held on 3/14/75.

The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees.

At a meeting of the Group on 3/14/75 the following items were discussed:

Freedom of Information:

Mr. Clarke asked all agencies to report on the volume of requests that are received under the Freedom of Information Act. The CIA representative pointed out that as of 3/10/75 CIA had received 93 requests. Since 3/10/75 the requests are averaging approximately 50 per day. The National Security Agency has received approximately 35 requests. None of the other agencies reported any high volume of requests and those requests that had been received did not impact on the Intelligence Community.

EX 104

REC-38 62-116395-43

Security Arrangements:

CIA's Director of Security, Mr. Charles Kane, and the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee, Mr. Donald E. Moore, have met with Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Officer for the Senate Select Committee (SSC), and are encouraged by the physical and document security arrangements the SSC intends to employ. Attached is a letter from Senator Church to Mr. Colby expressing Senator Church's appreciation for the help provided by Mr. Colby's staff in developing security precautions.

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(7)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

The FBI - CIA 1966 Understanding:

Mr. Clarke advised that the Rockefeller Commission requested a copy of the FBI - CIA Understanding of 1966 and inquired whether one could be made available to the Commission. I advised Mr. Clarke that we had made the 1966 Understanding available to Congressional committees and I saw no reason why a copy of the Understanding could not be furnished to the Rockefeller Commission but I would have to defer to Deputy AG Silberman (also in attendance). Mr. Silberman said by all means we would have to respond to the Rockefeller Commission and he authorized Clarke to furnish a copy of the Understanding to the Rockefeller Commission.

Clearances for Staff Members of the SSC:

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter to the Staff Director of the SSC from Mr. Clarke outlining procedures for the certification of clearances granted to SSC staff members. As an enclosure to this attachment is a suggested format which the SSC could use in certifying that staff members who have received a security investigation by the FBI meet the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret." A second enclosure to Clarke's letter to Miller contains a copy of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14 which sets up the Uniform Personnel Security Standards and Practices Governing Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information. Clearances for access to compartmented information are the responsibility of CIA and such clearances will be issued to select members of the SSC on a "need-to-know" basis.

Staff Members on Whom Substantial Derogatory Information is Developed:

Mr. Clarke asked if I could describe for the Group what procedures had been worked out with Senator Church when information was developed of a significant derogatory nature regarding potential staff employees. I advised the Group that upon such a determination a Bureau official would bring the

CONTINUED - OVER

written results of the investigation personally to the attention of Senator Church or his Staff Director. Following that a copy of this investigation would be made available to Mr. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence and that Senator Church or the Staff Director would welcome any comments from Mr. Colby as to the security ramifications attendant to the employment of this person. Mr. Clarke agreed this was a very desirable procedure and the Group fully endorsed this arrangement.

Organization of the SSC:

Attached is Mr. Clarke's understanding of how the SSC will be organized. It is noted it will be broken down into four Task Forces, each with a Task Force Director, a lawyer or lawyers assigned, each with several researchers. As noted from this enclosure, Task Force three concerns domestic activities including the FBI and those parts of the CIA that relate to domestic matters. Army counterintelligence activities may also come under the cognizance of this Task Force. Staffing for Task Force number three is still in process and no Task Force Director has yet been appointed.

CIA Secrecy Agreement and Employee Bulletin:

Attached hereto is a letter to Senator Church from Mr. Colby designed to relieve current CIA employees from any obligation of secrecy. It is noted all CIA employees sign a Secrecy Agreement as a prerequisite to employment. Also attached is a copy of an Employee Bulletin, dated 3/12/75, advising CIA employees as to the procedures he should follow if he is selected to be interviewed by a member of the SSC or its staff. It is to be noted that both the Employee Bulletin and Colby's letter to Senator Church were reviewed by the White House and the Department of Justice.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

CIA Requirements Received from the SSC:

Attached herewith is a letter from Senator Church to Mr. Colby enclosing the initial request for CIA documents for transmittal to the SSC. According to Mr. Clarke, it is his understanding that similar requests if not already received are being prepared by the SSC for other members of the Group.

Executive Session:

At the conclusion of the formal meeting, Mr. Clarke asked for an executive meeting to include the following persons: Deputy AG Laurence Silberman, Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter; Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; Mr. Chamberlain, Inspector General, CIA; Mr. Thomas Latimer, Department of Defense and myself.

According to Mr. Clarke the purpose of this meeting was to develop strategy as to how the Group would respond to the anticipated requests from the SSC. Both Mr. Buchen of the White House and Mr. Silberman,acting in his capacity as the President's Counsel for Congressional Inquiries, insisted that all requests as well as the responses to all such requests be coordinated through the above Group. Much discussion was had as to how this could be accomplished. No definitive decision was arrived at. However, it was agreed that the CIA would prepare a paper outlining how they would respond to the questions that they had already received, defining the level of response, the area of coordination and identification of sensitive problems. It was not quite clear to the Group as to exactly what form CIA's paper would take. It was proposed by Mr. Buchen and agreed that the same Executive Group would meet at CIA Headquarters on 3/19/75 to review the paper developed by CIA.

In view of the various legal questions involved and because of the direct involvement of Congressional committees, the question of the Bureau's representation was discussed with Mr. Adams. It was agreed that in addition to Mr. Cregar, the Bureau would be represented by Assistant Director Mintz. This proposal was discussed with Mr. Clarke and he readily agreed that certainly Mr. Mintz' presence would be a valuable asset to the Group.

CONTINUED - OVER

As a result, Mr. Mintz and Mr. Cregar will attend the meeting of the Group on Wednesday, 3/19/75, at CIA Headquarters, at 10:30 a.m.

Senator Towers had requested the Bureau to conduct a counteraudio sweep of his personal office inasmuch as he anticipated having sensitive conversations in his office concerning the business of the SSC. Mr. Cregar was asked to raise the question of a counteraudio sweep during the executive session to get an expression from the Group as to whether counteraudio sweeps should be done. Both Mr. Silberman and Mr. Buchen felt it was desirable to conduct such sweeps and strongly recommended that they be done. No commitment was made as to who would do the sweeps at the time. However, after consultation with Assistant Directors Wannall and White, Mr. Adams and Mr. Callahan, it was agreed that the Bureau should do the sweeps inasmuch as it was a domestic matter. Mr. White indicated that he did have the personnel and the equipment to conduct such sweeps. As a result of that decision Mr. Clarke was telephonically advised that the Bureau would conduct counteraudio sweeps of the personal offices of both the Senate and House Select Committees providing such was in accord with the desires of both Committees. Our Legislative Liaison is currently contacting both Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi to confirm that both Committees desire this counteraudio check. It is to be noted that these sweeps will not include the outer offices of the Senators or Congressmen and will not include the offices of the employees of both staffs.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMA[illegible]
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAI[illegible]

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAK[illegible]R., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry
75-1266

Ad Hoc Staff
75-103

March 12, 1975

#MDR16
[illegible] UNCLA[illegible] 11-7-00 [illegible] SP-2ALM/776

Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Colby:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, I want to thank your for your letter of March 11, and the copy of the Employee Bulletin you have issued to all CIA employees. As we jointly recognize, in order for the Committee to carry out a thorough inquiry, in accordance with the mandate contained in S. Res. 21, the Agency's full cooperation will be necessary. Your recognition that our mandate authorizes all, past and present, agency employees to cooperate fully, and without impediment due to secrecy agreements, will serve to facilitate our expeditious collection of material relative to that mandate.

I particularly appreciate your statement recognizing our security precautions. As you know, your staff was very helpful to the Committee's staff in designing those precautions.

The Staff Director and the Chief Counsel will, under the direction of the Committee, notify Mr. John Clarke of the members of the Committee who have been designated to carry out studies, inquiries and investigations required to meet the tasks specified in S. Res. 21.

It is the Committee's understanding that the members of the Committee and designated staff will have access to any and all information which the Committee determines is necessary for its inquiry. We recognize, however, that the Committee inquiry may touch on sensitive areas, such as the identity of CIA personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations whose disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the event that the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive areas, which matters we have already discussed in our meeting of February 27, we should discuss jointly, and as you suggest quickly, what procedures might be followed should the Committee decide it requires more information in these specific areas.

I welcome these first steps in close cooperation and hope that it forecasts an expeditious and thorough inquiry that will result in the strengthening of our nation's intelligence activities under the law.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

CONFIDENTIAL

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

13 March 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP2 ALM/ZTG
#EDDR16

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Bill:

Following up on our brief discussion Tuesday on the clearances of Committee Staff, I thought it might be helpful to outline a procedure which you may consider reasonable to use.

As I understand your current ground rules, you are submitting your staff applicants to the FBI for full field security investigation and on report from the Bureau, under the authority of Senate Resolution 21, the Chairman and/or the Committee will take action to grant or deny clearance.

The next step requires a notification to the Director of Central Intelligence of the Chairman's decision and certification of the clearances granted. I've attached a suggested format for this which you could use. On receipt of the certification we will advise the USIB security elements of the people so certified.

I also promised to go over with you the range of compartmented clearances that exist and I am prepared to do that when we next get together. You will recall these are the clearances for which you will want to determine the "need-to-know" for selected members of your staff. We need to establish agreed procedures here as well. Access to this information requires that an individual meet security standards set forth in DCID 1/14, a copy of which is attached.

Classified by 006805
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of E.O. 11652, Exemption
Category: 5B (1), (2), (3) or (4)
Declassified only on approval of the
Director of Central Intelligence

62-116395-43

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions.

ENCLOSURE

This document may be
downgraded to Unclassified
when enclosure is detached.

CONFIDENTIAL

I would like to suggest that you appoint a member of your staff - say, Ben Marshall - as a focal point for handling compartmented information access approvals and assign him the responsibility of insuring that these security standards are met by persons selected to participate in this sensitive area.

The CIA operates a Compartmented Information Branch as a service of common concern to the intelligence community which records the names of all individuals in the Government with access to compartmented information. Your personnel would be similarly recorded which would considerably ease the access certifications to all organizations for the duration of your inquiry.

As indicated, I am prepared to discuss this with you at any time.

Sincerely,

John

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachments:
1 - DCID 1/14
2 - Suggested Format

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/14

UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PRACTICES GOVERNING ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION[1]

(Effective 1 July 1968*)

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 1 (New Series, revised 4 March 1964), paragraph 2, subparagraph a. (5) and in order to ensure uniform protection of sensitive compartmented information, the following personnel security standards and practices are established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, Government consultants, and employees of Government contractors who require access to sensitive compartmented information or to information which reveals the manner, methods and operational details by which sensitive compartmented information is collected. The standards and practices established herein are to be considered minimal and the departments and agencies may establish internally such additional security steps as may be considered necessary and appropriate to ensure that effective security is maintained. Access to sensitive compartmented information shall be under the strictest application of the "need-to-know" principle and in full accordance with the existing authorities and regulations which govern access thereto.

Purpose

1. The continued protection of sensitive compartmented information within any one participating agency or among Government contractors affects and is a matter of serious security concern to all participating agencies. The provisions of this Directive shall apply to all persons under the jurisdiction or cognizance of the Executive Branch, without regard to civilian or military status, form of employment, official rank or position, or length of service. The establishment of uniform personnel security standards and practices as well as continuing security programs should enhance the security protection of such information and at the same time facilitate the security certification process among

---

[1] The term "Sensitive compartmented information" as used in this Directive is intended to include all information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section 11, Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

* This directive supersedes DCID 1/14, approved 23 June 1967.

#mDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-7-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ENCLOSURE

COPY № 301

62-116395-43

The following Staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

[illegible]

Government departments and agencies when access to sensitive compartmented information is required.

2. Individuals who do not meet the minimum security criteria contained herein and who are, therefore, denied access to sensitive compartmented information shall not, solely for this reason, be considered ineligible for access to other classified information. However, individuals whose access to sensitive compartmented information has been authorized as an exception granted in accordance with paragraph 5, shall not solely for that reason be considered eligible for access to other classified information.

Personnel Security Approval Criteria

3. Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know basis for access to sensitive compartmented information are as follows:

a. The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discretion and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.

b. Except where there is a compelling need and a determination has been made by competent authority as described in paragraph 5 below that every reasonable assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances the security risk is negligible.

(1) Both the individual and the members of his immediate family shall be U.S. citizens. For these purposes, "immediate family" is defined as including the individual's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters and children.

(2) The members of the individual's family and those persons to whom he is bound by affection or obligation should neither be subject to physical, mental and other forms of duress by a foreign power nor advocate the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States nor the alteration of the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

4. When there is compelling need to grant access to sensitive compartmented information prior to completion of the full prescribed investigation, such investigative checks as are immediately possible shall be made at once, and shall include a personal interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel whenever feasible. Access in such cases shall be strictly controlled, and the full prescribed investigation and final evaluation shall be completed at the earliest practicable moment.

Exceptions

5. The exceptions to paragraph 3.b. (1) (2) above may be granted only by the Senior Intelligence Officer of the parent organization represented on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), including military departments, or his designee, unless such authority has been specifically

delegated to the head of an office or organization as set forth in interdepartmental agreements. All exceptions granted will be a common sense determination based on all available information, and shall be recorded by the agency making the exception. In those cases in which the individual has lived outside of the United States for a substantial period of his life, a thorough assessment of the adequacy of the investigation in terms of fulfillment of the minimum investigative requirements, and a judicious review of the information therein must be made before an exception is considered.

Investigative Requirements

6. The investigation conducted on an individual under consideration for access to sensitive compartmented information shall be thorough and shall be designed to develop information as to whether the individual clearly meets the above Personnel Security Approval Criteria.

7. The investigation shall be accomplished through personal interviews by trained investigative personnel and shall establish affirmatively to the adjudicating agency complete continuity of identity to include birth, residences, education, emloyments and military service. Where the circumstances of a case indicate, the investigation shall exceed the basic requirements set out below to ensure that those responsible for adjudicating access eligibility have in their possession all the relevant facts available.

8. During the course of the investigation the individual shall furnish a signed personal history statement and a certificate of non-affiliation with those organizations designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450. Fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be obtained. Photographs of the individual shall also be obtained where additional corroboration of identity is required.

9. The individual under investigation shall be given a personal interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel whenever feasible.

10. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows:

a. Verification of date and place of birth and citizenship of the individual.

b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including submission of fingerprint charts, and other national agencies as appropriate. An additional check of Immigration and Naturalization Service records shall be made if members of the individual's immediate family are other than United States citizens by birth.

c. Local checks in all areas of the United States where the individual has resided for at least six (6) months during the past fifteen years

For Committee guidance in their determinations on clearances for compartmented access!

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

or since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period. Such period of coverage shall include the following:

< (1) Check of police and credit records. > where feasible?

(2) Interviews with neighbors at present residence regardless of duration and, to the extent considered to be productive and practical, any other address at which the individual has resided.

d. Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen years or since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period. Personal interviews with supervisors and co-workers who had personal contact with the individual shall be accomplished to the extent possible and practical.

e. Attendance at institutes of higher learning or at the most recently attended secondary school shall be verified in all instances. During these inquiries collateral verification of prior educational records shall be made and personal interviews with faculty members who had personal contact with the individual shall be accomplished to the extent possible and practical.

f. Review of appropriate military records.

g. Interviews with a sufficient number of personal references given by the individual and with a minimum of two other persons who can furnish information on the basis of personal knowledge concerning the individual's character, discretion and loyalty.

h. When employment, education or residence, except U.S. Government service, has occurred overseas during the past fifteen years, or since age eighteen, a check of the records will be made at the Passport Office/Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency and other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop informants who knew the individual overseas in order to cover employment, education or residence during this period.

i. The spouse of the individual and members of the immediate family shall be investigated to the extent necessary and appropriate to permit affirmative determination by the adjudicating agency that the provisions of paragraph 3, Personnel Security Approval Criteria, above, are met. In all cases, the spouse shall be checked through the subversive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other national agencies, as appropriate.

Previous Investigation

11. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within the past five years which substantially meets the above minimum standards, it may serve as a basis for granting access approval provided a review of the personnel and security files does not reveal substantive changes in the individual's security eligibility. If a previous investigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards or if it is more than five years

old, a current investigation shall be required but may be limited to that necessary to bring the individual's file up to date in accordance with the investigative requirements set forth in paragraph 4, above. Should new information be developed during the current investigation which bears unfavorably upon the individual's activities covered by the previous investigation, the current inquiries shall be expanded as necessary to develop full details of this new information.

Evaluation

12. The evaluation of the information developed by investigation on an individual's loyalty and suitability shall be performed by analysts of broad knowledge, good judgment and wide experience in security and counterintelligence. When all other information developed on an individual is favorable, a minor investigative requirement which has not been met will not preclude favorable adjudication. In all evaluations the protection of the national interest is paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to sensitive compartmented information shall be resolved in favor of the national security. The ultimate determination of whether the granting of access is clearly consistent with the interests of national security shall be an over-all common sense determination based on all available information.

Security Programs

13. In order to facilitate the attainment of the highest standard of personnel security and to augment both the access approval criteria and the investigative requirements established by this Directive, member departments and agencies shall institute continuing Security Programs for all individuals having access to compartmented information. In addition to security indoctrinations, these programs shall be tailored to create mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will escape notice or be left unresolved which brings into question an individual's loyalty and integrity or suggests the possibility of his being subject to undue influence or duress through foreign relationships or exploitable personal conduct. When an individual is assigned to perform sensitive compartmented work requiring access to sensitive compartmented information and operations, the department, agency or Government program to which he is assigned shall assume a continuing security and counterintelligence responsibility for that individual throughout the period of his assignment.

14. The Security Programs shall include the following:

a. Security Education Programs to ensure that individuals who are granted access to sensitive compartmented information are initially and periodically thereafter indoctrinated as to its unique sensitivity and that they understand their personal responsibility for its protection. These indoctrinations should be conducted by individuals having

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

extensive background and experience regarding the nature and special vulnerabilities of the particular type of compartmented information involved.

b. Security Supervisory Programs to ensure that supervisory personnel recognize and discharge their special responsibility for maintaining the security of sensitive information. Such programs shall provide practical guidance as to indicators which may signal matters of security concern. Specific instructions concerning reporting procedures shall be disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective action to safeguard the security of the United States as well as to provide all necessary help to the individual concerned to neutralize his vulnerability.

c. Security Review Programs to ensure that appropriate security authorities invariably receive and exchange, in a timely manner, all information bearing on the security posture of persons having access to sensitive information. Personnel history information shall be kept current. Security and related files shall be kept under continuing review. Departments and agencies shall develop security programs under which at intervals no greater than 5 years, checks are made with the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as all relevant police and credit sources and, where feasible, each individual is given a personal interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel.

15. Whenever indicated during the course of these Security Programs, appropriate investigations shall be conducted on a timely basis. In the absence of such indication the tempo of additional investigation shall be tailored by the adjudicating agency to the circumstances surrounding the individual under consideration as well as the breadth of knowledge and degree of sensitivity involved in his access. The investigation shall be sufficient in scope to ensure that continued utilization of the individual in activities requiring sensitive compartmented information is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

Effective Date

16. This Directive declares the policy of USIB concerning Uniform Personnel Security Standards and Practices for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information. This policy shall become effective as soon as practicable after approval of this Directive but in no case later than 1 July 1968. Existing directives,[2] regulations, agreements, and such other references governing access to sensitive compartmented information as defined herein shall be revised accordingly.

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

---

[2] These include pertinent provisions of the Clearance Standards and Investigation and Evaluation sections of DCID 6/3.

This is a preliminary view and is provided as a report for information to the Ad Hoc Group.

#m9e16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP2 ALM/gfs

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-2-00 BY SP-2 ALM 1376

The Organization of the Senate Select Committee - Rough Structure

The Committee will organize into four Task Forces - each with a Task Force Director, each with a lawyer or lawyers assigned and each with several researchers. Total professionals - 30/40.

Task Force One - Foreign Intelligence

This will deal with the CIA as a line Agency and with the institution of the Director of Central Intelligence in his responsibility under NSCID #1. USIB intelligence entities, i.e., State, Treasury, AEC and the military establishments collecting, processing or producing foreign intelligence will be reviewed in this context as well. CIA covert action is also covered here.

They plan to begin with basic papers being prepared on USIB agencies - their missions, functions, organizations and general contribution so as to provide the Committee with a "sound understanding on the role, nature, performance and structure of intelligence looking toward legislation which would address national intelligence needs, and provide adequate oversight of national and defense intelligence entities and their relationships in foreign policy generally." William Bator is designated the Task Force Director.

Task Force Two - Military Intelligence

This Task Force will deal with the organizational entities within the Department of Defense collecting, processing, or producing intelligence including the DIA, the Services Agencies, and the National Security Agency, the NRO, and other collection entities such as AEDS, Attaches, etc. The interrelationships between Task Force One and Task Force Two according to the Staff Director will be accommodated by regular communication among the Select Committee staff and be addressed by the Committee in the broader context of considering possible legislation for alternative structures. The staffing for this Task Force is still in process and no Task Force Director has yet been appointed.

Task Force Three - Domestic Activities

This Task Force will concern itself with intelligence organizations engaged in domestic activities and including the FBI, those parts of the CIA that relate to domestic matters, and possibly Army counterintelligence activities. The staffing for this Task Force is still in process and no Task Force Director has yet been appointed.

Task Force Four - Executive Branch Command and Control

This Task Force will be concerned with the tasking of the intelligence community - its oversight, the use of intelligence, and the adequacy thereof and mesh with the DCI's role as principal intelligence advisor to the President. It will treat with the National Security Council's activities, functions, and structure. It will address the variety of sub-committees thereunder as well as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). David Aaron will be the Task Force Director. Note: Covert Action direction and oversight is also included herein.

The Staff Director has indicated that the Committee is interested in dealing with Agencies and documents therefrom in the most efficient fashion consistent with security and economy of time. He is not committed at this time to any particular procedure. He has stated a desire to work selectively inside the Agencies where access and screening of selective records could take place. He wishes to avoid shipping in loads of data to the Committee.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 MAR 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

The Honorable Frank Church
Chairman
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter will confirm and reduce to writing some of the matters agreed upon at our recent meeting.

At the outset, I should like to express my deep personal appreciation for the candor and helpfulness of you and Senator Tower in that meeting and for your sensitivity to the respective responsibilities under our Constitutional framework of the Select Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency in the area of your review. For my part, I should like to renew again, for myself and the CIA, my promise of cooperation with respect to the important work of the Select Committee. In my judgment, a spirit of good faith and cooperative effort is not only necessary to enable your Committee to discharge its responsibilities fully and expeditiously, but is indeed in the best interests of the intelligence community as well. I am convinced that a responsible and thorough review of U.S. intelligence activities will serve to vindicate the CIA and enhance the public's understanding of the important contribution that the intelligence efforts of this nation can make toward the goal of preserving and strengthening our democracy.

ENCLOSURE
62-116395---

I am particularly appreciative of your recognition that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence activities must receive special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee in the course of your work. As we discussed, such matters as the identities of our sensitive sources, the material provided to us by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain of our employees who could be targets of kidnapping or assassination, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with U.S. intelligence, and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems, should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from the risk of exposure. We should also work together to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals. Where these kinds of considerations are present, I anticipate that appropriate understandings can be arrived at to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time to satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of our activities.

As I stated to you, employees of the Central Intelligence Agency will be available to the Select Committee for staff interviews and for testimony. As we have discussed, this might require, in some circumstances, special arrangements to protect the identity of particular employees whose physical safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure. I anticipate that suitable safeguards can be established to avoid such dangers. I assume the Committee will make its own arrangements with respect to ex-employees as to whom I no longer have the authority to direct their cooperation. However, I am available for whatever assistance I can provide in this regard.

As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are required to sign a secrecy agreement when they enter on duty. This is a condition of employment, and it requires that they keep forever secret all classified information gained during the course of their employment. The secrecy agreement further requires that they may not disclose classified information, either orally or by publication, without prior authorization from the Director of Central Intelligence. Under the secrecy agreement, an employee's obligations with respect to the protection of classified information continue after his employment with the CIA has been terminated.

It is my desire that the secrecy agreements signed by our employees shall not impair the necessary work of the Select Committee. To accomplish this, and in recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Select Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated staff members will constitute an authorized provision of information within the meaning of the secrecy agreements. This letter may be used to indicate such authorization for any Agency employee or ex-employee to furnish information to the Select Committee or appropriate staff members on matters which would otherwise be covered by their secrecy agreement, but which are not among the particularly sensitive matters such as mentioned above. With respect to those particularly sensitive matters, different procedures are obviously necessary. Accordingly, where any matter included in these sensitive categories would be involved in responding to the Committee, the employee should express his concern and, if possible, propose a way of responding to the Committee without exposing such sensitive details. If the Committee believes that a disclosure of those aspects is nevertheless necessary, the matter will be discussed between the Committee and the Agency. I am prepared to consult with the Committee at any time to avoid difficulties in this area and quickly determine together the appropriate course of action to be taken.

With the good faith evident in our discussions on these matters, I believe that these arrangements will enable me to discharge my responsibilities to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, while at the same time to provide the Select Committee with all the information it needs to accomplish its task.

As we have agreed, it is in the national interest as well as that of the Select Committee and the U.S. intelligence community to ensure that your review proceed as smoothly and as expeditiously as possible. Toward that end, I have instructed all CIA personnel to respond in a spirit of cooperation.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby
Director

EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP2 ALM/JMG

No. 442 | 12 March 1975

Senate Select Committee To Review U.S. Intelligence Activities

Senate Resolution 21 established a Select Committee of the Senate to review U.S. intelligence activities. The Resolution calls for a comprehensive review of the total U.S. intelligence effort and is not restricted to the recent charges and allegations against CIA alone. Consequently, it is likely to be far-ranging in its impact.

It is in all of our interests to see that the Select Committee receives full understanding of our activities and their contribution to the country as expeditiously as possible. I have every confidence that the inquiry will be responsible, and constructive, and will produce new understanding of, and improvements in, the American intelligence system.

It is with this conviction that I have pledged my personal cooperation and that of the CIA. I have advised Senators Church and Tower, the Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman, that employees of the CIA will be available to the Select Committee for Staff interviews and for testimony. We are working with the Committee Staff to design procedures to facilitate their work in examining topics of concern.

Attached to this bulletin is a letter which I have sent to Senator Church. To facilitate the necessary work of the Committee and in recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated Staff members will constitute authorized provision of information within the meaning of the Secrecy Agreements signed by each CIA employee, subject to the special procedures and limitations set forth in the letter regarding particularly sensitive matters. Senator Church has agreed that reference to sensitive data in any Committee report will be subject to consultation between the Committee and the Agency.

The cooperative spirit of our relationship with the Committee and its Staff must at the same time take account of the rights of Agency employees. The Committee Staff has agreed to advise employees of their Constitutional rights at the beginning of any interview or other appearance.

When a current Agency employee is selected to be interviewed by the Select Committee Staff, the Staff Director or Chief Counsel will normally notify Mr. John M. Clarke, who is my principal liaison with the Committee and its Staff. Mr. Clarke, in turn, will notify the employee. The purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the work of the Committee. It is intended to allow time for the employee to gain general legal guidance if he wants it, and to obtain security guidance from an appropriate senior officer.

My own belief is that after a careful review of all U.S. intelligence activities, the Committee will address needed legislative changes and will reaffirm their confidence in the importance and contribution of U.S. intelligence programs.

W. E. Colby
Director

Attachment: a/s

DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIR[illegible]

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAK[illegible]R., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWAT[illegible]ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry
75-1265

Ad Hoc Staff
75-104

March 12, 1975

#MD016
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-2-00 BY SP2 ALM/ZTG

Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Colby:

Enclosed is an initial request for documents approved by the Committee at its meeting this afternoon.

Our respective staffs have discussed the request in its draft form and I trust that they will continue to work together in the spirit of mutual cooperation which we both recognize is necessary to ensure a thorough and expeditious investigation.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Frank Church
Chairman

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-42

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-43

March 12, 1975

REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

4moR16
[illegible] 11-7-00 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

TO: The Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

Guidelines

1. The attached request is not intended to call for a general file search of the Agency. Rather it is intended to call for various significant documents available in the upper levels of the Agency. Without foreclosing any further file review that may seem appropriate to agency personnel familiar with agency files, we would suggest the following offices (current and past files) as likely sources for initial review:

(i) The U.S. Intelligence Board staff and ICS
(ii) Offices of the Director and the Deputy Director/CIA
(iii) Offices of the General Counsel and Legislative Counsel/CIA
(iv) Offices of the Comptroller, Inspector General, Historical Studies, and Finance/CIA

2. The requests are addressed to the Director, both in his capacity as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and as Director of Central Intelligence and Chief Executive of the United States Intelligence Board.

3. Rather than waiting until all materials are available, it would be helpful if any particular group is produced when ready.

4. As previously discussed, please advise if there are categories of material where it would be appropriate for Committee staff members to review called for material on the Agency premises in order to cull out the most pertinent materials.

5. The request covers documents in the covered offices wherever originated (including other departments or agencies). If any document referred to is believed by the Agency to be in the possession only of another agency or department, advice to that effect plus an indication that the Agency would not object to its being made available to the Committee, would facilitate an expeditious inquiry.

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

I. OUTSTANDING RE[illegible]ESTS

The Agency has agreed to provide the Committee with (1) charts indicating the organizational history of the CIA; (2) identification of headquarters personnel; and (3) budgetary and cash flow information. The following is a further elaboration of the kind of material in each of these categories which is necessary for the Committee's basic understanding of the Agency:

A. Organization Charts and Personnel - The charts reflecting CIA organizational history down to the Branch level should be accompanied by annotations or a narrative explaining when particular units were formed, merged, expanded or abolished. The narrative should also indicate any changes in lines of authority, reporting responsibilities, and functions for each unit. Changes in unit designation which were not accompanied by substantive changes should be noted.

The charts should include the organization and staffing arrangements of the USIB, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and its predecessors, and the Forty Committee and its predecessors.

The identification of personnel should include all officials and supervisors down to the Branch Chief and Deputy Branch Chief level, and to the executive assistants for the directors or deputy directors of all Divisions, Offices and Staffs and similar assistants for any officials above those levels.

B. Budget and Cash Flow - The budgetary information should include both the budgets proposed to OMB and the final budgets approved. The cash flow data should include the funds actually appropriated, their location in the appropriations for other Departments and agencies, and an indication of whether funds transferred from particular agencies are earmarked for particular uses within the CIA.

II. SPECIAL REPORTS OR STUDIES

The following are requested in their unexpurgated form (at the highest level of classification) with all appendices, annexes and transmittal documents:

1. The Dulles, Correa, Jackson Report on the Intelligence Community
2. 1949 and 1955 Hoover Commissions, Intelligence Task Force Reports
3. 1953 Historical Study of the Expenditure of Confidential Funds prepared by the General Counsel's Office.
4. 1954 General Doolittle Report on the CIA
5. 1960 Bureau of The Budget study of intelligence activities
6. 1961 Taylor Report on covert action and the intelligence community
7. 1962 Organizational study of the CIA initiated by John A. McCone
8. 1964 Study by John A. Bross, Frederick Nolting and Major General John Reynolds
9. 1965 Study of CIA initiated by Admiral Raborn
10. 1965 Study for the Director on CIA air propriataries
11. 1967 Internal CIA study for the Director on CIA activities at educational facilities in the United States
12. 1967 Katzenbach Study (with John Gardner and Richard Helms) on CIA domestic activity
13. 1967 Cunningham Study on the intelligence community
14. 1967 (or 1968) Eaton Committee Report for the DCI on NSA and the National Intelligence Resources Board Study for DCI on NSA
15. 1967 (or 1968) report for DCI by the Senior Executive Group on the intelligence community
16. 1970 Study under Admiral Wilfred McNeil on CIA Financial procedures
17. 1971 OMB study under James Schlesinger of the intelligence community
18. Executive Order of November 5, 1971 restructuring the intelligence community
19. 1973 CIA internal review prepared for James Schlesinger on the CIA
20. Additional studies specified in Appendix D of book furnished the Committee staff on March 5, 1975

III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND OPERATING PROCEDURES

A. Legal Authority

1. All files dealing with the history of the 1949 CIA Act and the CIA sections of the 1947 National Security Act.

2. All agreements on jurisdiction or operational authority between the CIA and other U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
3. All legal opinions, memoranda or other materials analyzing the 1947 and 1949 Acts, Executive Orders or National Security Intelligence Directives in regard to:
   (a) the authority of CIA to conduct covert actions
   (b) the authority of CIA to conduct particular categories of activity, or specific activities, within the U.S., including without limitation:
      (i) the collection or maintenance of information or files on U.S. citizens;
      (ii) the conduct of domestic surveillance on U.S. citizens or foreign nationals;
      (iii) the organization and operation of proprietary organizations
   (c) the appropriate scope or application of the agreements requested in #2 supra, including documents prepared in connection with their negotiation
   (d) the applicability to CIA of restrictions placed by Congress on the use of funds included in appropriations from which CIA funds are transferred
   (e) the generation or use of funds from any source other than appropriations transferred to CIA, and the investment for profit of funds from any source
4. All legal opinions, memoranda or other material analyzing the desireability or effect of legislation proposed or considered to alter the authority of the DCI or the nature, structure or powers of the Agency in areas other than employee compensation and benefits or headquarters construction. This should include analyses of the CIA amendment to the 1974 Military Aid Act, whether prepared before or after its adoption.
5. All Director Central Intelligence Directives ("DCIDS")

B. Operating Procedures

1. An index of all major directives, guidelines, regulations, manuals or similar materials which prescribe or explain authorization and reporting procedures
2. Directives, guidelines, manuals or similar materials describing the various filing systems of the Agency
3. Specifically, all directives, guidelines, manuals or other materials prescribing or explaining procedures to be followed and the authorization and documentation required in connection with covert operations, including without limitation:
   (a) field or headquarters initiation of proposals
   (b) planning and modification of proposals
   (c) approval for commencement, continuation or renewal, and termination
   (d) field reports on the conduct or results of operations
   (e) evaluations following operations

   The materials should indicate the criteria which determine the level of authorization required--Division Director, Deputy Director for Operations, DCI or Forty Committee--for a particular operation. They should also indicate the procedures and documentation involved in CIA inter-agency staff coordination and CIA staffing for the review by the principals on the Forty Committee. To the extent the procedures described differ from those previously in effect, furnish earlier directives, guidelines, manuals or similar material regarding such previous procedures and provide a narrative description of how and when these procedures have changed from 1948 to present.

   (Request #3 is confined to procedures so that the Committee can subsequently better understand CIA operations in the covert action area.)

C. Financial Procedures

In addtion to budgetary and cash flow figures, the Committee will need explanatory information to understand the financial operations of CIA. This request consists of all directives, guidelines, manuals and other materials governing or describing:

1. Procedures for preparing and discussing budgets with OMB, including identification of the documents involved in the process
2. The general procedures for expenditure approval, accounting or auditing which are used either within the CIA or in connection with Executive or Congressional oversight
3. All special procedures for expenditure approval, accounting or auditing in regard to particular funds or types of activity, e.g., proprietary organizations, currency transactions, or the discretionary fund of the Director.

4. All Bureau of the Budget and OMB examiners' reports on the Agency, and all memoranda and reports provided by the Intelligence Community Staff to OMB

D. All Annual Reports of the Inspector General and all Inspector General reports for the past five years on all components of the Agency.

E. The Agency's "Allegations and Responses" files

IV. DIRECTOR COLBY'S JANUARY 15, 1975 TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

All materials reviewed or used by the Office of the Director in preparation for Director Colby's testimony on January 15, 1975 before the Senate Appropriations Committee, including materials referred to in such testimony, (a representative list of which has been furnished to Central Intelligence Agency staff by the Senate Select Committee staff).

IV. DIRECTOR COLBY'S PUBLIC SENATE TESTIMONY ON DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Reference is made to Director Colby's public testimony on January 15, 1975 before the Senate Appropriations Committee, in which Director Colby identified several documents basic to an understanding of the Agency's domestic operations. The following requests are based on that testimony. Parenthetical page references after each request indicate the page of Director Colby's testimony where the the items requested were identified.

1. The directive or other documents establishing the Domestic Operations Division, defining its authority and stating its missions; all subsequent directives or other documents revising its authority or missions; (p.13)
2. The directive or other documents in 1972 redesignating the Domestic Operations Division the Foreign Resources Division; (p.13)
3. The directive or other documents defining the authority of the "cover and commercial staff" and stating its missions (p.13)
4. The directive or other documents establishing on August 15, 1967, a unit within the Counterintelligence Office "to look into the possibility of foreign links to American dissident elements," or defining the units authority and stating its missions; (p. 19)
5. The August 29, 1967 letter from the Executive Director to the Kerner Commission; The September 1, 1967 reply of the DCI to the Kerner Commission and all attachments thereto; (p.19)
6. The directive or other documents establishing CIA participation in "an interagency program in support of the National Commission, among others." (p.20)
7. The document resulting from the DCI's review of the unit created on August 15,1967 in which he concluded it was proper,"while strictly observing statutory and de facto proscriptions on Agency domestic involvement;" (p.20)
8. The directive or documents governing CIA participation in the preparation of the Ad Hoc Interagency Committee Plan (the "Huston Plan"), and the directive or documents governing CIA participation in the Interagency Evaluation Committee when the Huston Plan was abandoned. (p.20-21)
9. The document authorizing the operation in which "the Agency recruited or inserted about a dozen individuals into American dissident circles in order to establish their credentials for operations abroad; (p.22)
10. The 1973 directive limiting the program described in request #9; (p.22)
11. The directive or other documents which in march 1974 terminated the program described in request #9 (p. 22)
12. The directive or other documents authorizing the elimination from files of material Americans generated from the program descscribed in request #9; (p.23)
13. The directive or document authorizing the destruction- in March 1974 of the IDIU tape listing of 10,000 Americans received by CIA in May 1970; (p.23)
14. The directive orother documents authorizing the program to insert agents into dissident organizations in the D.C. area to protect CIA installations, personnel, and information.; if a new unit was established within the Office of Security to operate this program, the directive ~~or other~~ documents establishing the new unit, definiting its authority or stating its missions. (p.23)
14. The directive or other documents terminating the program described in request #14 (p.24)
15. Indicate all lists "developed at various times in the past ... which do appear questionable under CIA's authority" (do not supply lists); (p.26)
16. All "current directives" prohibiting maintainance of the kinds of lists described in request # 15; (p.26)
17. May 9, 1973 directive requesting employees to report questionable activity; all written responses and all other documents reflecting oral responses to this; (p. 27)
18. The documents prepared for or constituting the "internal review" which resulted from the responses described in Request # 17; (p. 27)
19. All documents containing "policy determinations and guidance that (Agency) activities remain within proper limits "issued in August 1973; (p.27)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-43

20. The directive[illegible] other documents establishin[illegible]any mail inspection programs with[illegible] the CIA or at its direction b[illegible]een 1953 and February,1973;(p.
21. The directive or other document terminating mail inspection programs in February, 1973; (p.32)

22. The documents prepared for the review of CIA assistance to other federal, state and local government components; all documents terminating or modifying such assistance as a result of that review; (p.33)
23. All directives subsequent to the directive of May 9, 1973 which similarly requested employees to report questionable activity; all written responses and all other documents reflecting oral responses to such directives; (p.34)
24. All internal regulations,policy statements or similar documents pursuant to the recommendations of the Katzenbacj task force in 1967. (p.35)
25. The Presidential Directive of October 9, 1974 regarding reorganization of the intelligence community.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 2-20-75

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM [illegible]

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 2-19-75 Inspector Bowers talked with William Miller, Staff Director of captioned Committee. Miller was asked if the Committee had established a possible timetable concerning hearings. He stated they are "months" away from formal hearings but that they expect to begin taking testimony in closed sessions to "build a record" in about two weeks.

Miller said these sessions will be conducted by a Member of the Committee but will basically involve questioning of various agency officials, not at the Director level, to provide basic information about the administrative structure, legal basis, objectives and mission, and budget of the various agencies in which the Committee will have an interest. Miller was requested to give us specific notification as far in advance as possible concerning such testimony sessions so that we would have sufficient time to prepare the necessary material. Miller said this would be done.

Miller stated he would doubt that the Director would be needed for any testimony for some time unless the Director wishes to be involved in the early stages of providing basic information.

It seems apparent that the Committee still is uncertain of its course of action. Miller commented that the Committee will probably follow much the same procedure as used in the impeachment hearings where extensive testimony was taken in closed sessions and used by the Members and staff to prepare for the later public hearings. It seems apparent that John Doar and his staff who worked on the impeachment hearings will play a major role in the Select Committee operations. Doar and a number of his former impeachment staff members already are working with the Select Committee group.

62-1163[illegible]-42
REC-35
ST-112
25
MAR [illegible] 1975

To date, we have received 13 requests from the Select Committee for investigations of potential staff people in connection with the clearance of these people by CIA following certification by the Committee. These investigations are being handled by the Special Investigative Division on a two-week deadline basis.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

LEG[illegible]

[illegible] APR [illegible] 1975

DWB:kjs (8)

62-116395-42X

CHANGED TO

62-116464-1

JUN 12 1975

Hmk / cz

#MDR16 ON THIS FORM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/dfG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/14/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-25-00 BY SP2 ALM/STB

During a meeting attended by Section Chief Cregar, Intelligence Division, on March 14, 1975, it was approved by the Deputy Attorney General and Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President, and concurred in by William Colby, Director of CIA, that the Chairman of the two captioned committees should be approached and asked whether they would make a Committee request for the offices of members to be examined for any electronic surveillance devices. Offices occupied by staff members would not be included in their proposed search.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Legal Analysis Office will contact Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi to inquire ~~if~~ they, acting as Chairman of their respective committees, would make a committee request for such a search to be conducted. If requested by Chairman we propose FBI to handle survey.
JMA

JMA

JBA

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. White
- 1 - Mr. Farrington
- 1 - Mr. Bowers
- 1 - Mr. Hotis
- 1 - Mr. Mintz

K

W

JAM:mfd

EX-101

REC-23

Legal Counsel
WOE/dp

62-116395-41

MAR 21 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116464
~~UNRECORDED COPY FILED~~
cc destroyed 5/1/95

56 MAR 31 1975

MAR 27 1975

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 2-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/JJG

Sew 39

Reference McDermott to Jenkins memorandum of 1-31-75 recommending contact with Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) concerning the procedure for clearing staff personnel for captioned Committee.

Contact was made with the Senator's office on the morning of 2-6-75 to arrange an appointment. The Senator's secretary advised that his schedule was so crowded that it would be impossible for him to discuss this matter for several days. She said he requested that we discuss this situation with William Miller, who the Senator intends to have head the Select Committee staff.

Miller was contacted on the morning of 2-6-75 by Inspector Bowers, accompanied by Inspector Hotis. It was explained to him that the FBI has no authority to issue clearances as such but that in conference with Central Intelligence Agency officials it had been agreed that the FBI will investigate prospective staff personnel, furnish results of the investigation to Senator Church as the Select Committee Chairman, and CIA will issue actual clearances based on certification from Church. Miller agreed to this procedure. He was furnished a small supply of SF 86, Security Investigation Data for Sensitive Position forms. It was pointed out to him these forms should be filled out in complete detail and furnished to us along with a current set of fingerprints. It was suggested the applicants for these positions be fingerprinted by the Capitol Police Department.

EX-110 REC-71 62-116395-40

Miller stated they would need results of these investigations as soon as possible and after some discussion he agreed that a two week deadline would be reasonable. It was suggested to him that in cases involving clerical-type personnel that perhaps a longer deadline might be in order, and he said he would keep this in mind. It was pointed out to Miller that results of the investigations will be furnished to Senator Church personally. He also was advised that representatives of various intelligence agencies currently are drawing up proposed guidelines to suggest to the Committee for use in determining whether or not an

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Bowers

DWB:kjs (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

11-88

58 MAR 4 1975

applicant qualifies for security clearance as well as proposed guidelines to deal with the maintenance of classified material received by the Committee. He was told someone will be in touch with Senator Church regarding this in the near future.

Miller stated that the Committee is going to set up offices in the auditorium of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, the same space used by the Senate Watergate Committee. This space currently is being altered to meet Committee requirements.

Miller stated that the Committee probably will bring on board as staff personnel most of the "security team" used by the House Judiciary Committee during the impeachment hearings. He said this group has a proven track record with respect to leaks of information since all leaks resulting from the impeachment proceedings have been traced to Members following hearings rather than staff personnel. This is the group headed by former Assistant Attorney General John Doar, and Miller indicated Doar will play a major role on the Senate Select Committee staff.

Miller will furnish Bowers the completed SF 86 forms and fingerprint cards on proposed staff personnel as soon as possible and these will be furnished directly to Assistant Director Cleveland for handling. This matter already has been discussed with Mr. Cleveland.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

DWM

OK

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES G[illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Jenkins

DATE: 1-31-75

FROM : J. J. McDermott

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JG

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

We have received the enclosed letter dated 1-29-75 from Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) writing in his capacity as the Chairman of the recently established Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Senator states that to carry out the task of the Committee, it will be necessary for the Members and designated staff to have access to the most sensitive classified material. He said the Committee is in the process of gathering a staff, adding that it is likely many members of the staff will not have current security clearances. He stated he would be most grateful if the FBI could expedite clearances on designated staff so that work can proceed as expeditiously as possible. He points out the standard clearance agreed upon during debate on the resolution creating the Committee would be the equivalent of a "Q" clearance.

William E. Colby, as Director of Central Intelligence, is coordinating the compilation from various agencies of the intelligence community suggested guidelines dealing with clearances and the handling of security information to be presented for consideration to the Select Committee. FBI representatives from the Intelligence Division have been participating in this matter.

EX-110 REC-70 62-116395-39

This matter was discussed with Mr. Mintz and Mr. Adams, and it was agreed that the Intelligence Division representative should explore with CIA whether or not that agency would agree to issue clearances for the Select Committee staff if the FBI handled the investigations. Section Chief William O. Cregar took this matter up on the afternoon of 1-30-75 with John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence. Cregar advised Clarke had obtained Colby's agreement to the following procedure. The FBI will handle investigations of potential staff members named by the Select Committee. Results of the investigations would be furnished to Church as Chairman of the Select Committee and the Committee would determine whether or not the individual meets the necessary criteria for clearance. Following such certification by the Committee, CIA would issue the appropriate clearance. A Sub Group of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community was to meet on 1-31-75 to draw up proposed guidelines to be presented to the

MAR 20 1975

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Callahan - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Adams - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enclosure
1 - Mr. McDermott - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Bowers - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enclosure

DWB:kjs (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

Committee regarding the storage of information and the clearance of the staff. This group consists of representatives from the FBI, CIA, NSA, and Atomic Energy Commission. These guidelines, once approved by the Select Committee, would be followed in determining whether or not potential staff members should receive clearances.

Cregar said there is no objections to the FBI discussing the foregoing procedure--FBI investigation, Select Committee certification, followed by issuance of clearance by CIA-with Senator Church. Senator Church will be told at the same time that proposed guidelines regarding a clearance decision will be presented to him as soon as they are compiled.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Inspector Bowers acknowledge the 1/29/75 letter and inform Senator Church of the above procedure and work out with him appropriate arrangements for the referral of potential staff members to us for investigation.

OK

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
CO-CHAIRMEN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.
CLAIBORNE PELL, R.I. JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.
ADLAI E. STEVENSON III, ILL. CLIFFORD P. HANSEN, WYO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
THOMAS A. DINE, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

United States Senate
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 242, 93D CONGRESS)
ROOM 252, RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Info

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ✓
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

January 29, 1975 ack + handle K

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Dear Mr. Kelley:

The Senate, on January 27, created a Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to All Intelligence Activities. I am confident that the Federal Bureau of Investigation will make every effort to assist the Select Committee in its work, and I look forward to working together with you in completing this important task.

In order to carry out the necessary tasks mandated by the vote of the Senate, it will be necessary for Senators and designated staff to have access to the most sensitive classified material. The Select Committee is now in the process of bringing together a staff to assist in carrying out its work. In this regard, it is likely that many members of the staff who will be hired will not have current security clearances.

On behalf of the Select Committee, I would be most grateful to you if you could expedite, as a priority matter, clearances on designated staff so that the work of the committee can proceed as expeditiously as possible. In debate, prior to passage of S. Res. 21, the standard of clearance agreed upon by the Senate was equivalent to the standard applicable to a "Q" clearance.

EX-PROC. JAN 29 1975

1/3-19

62-116395-38

REC-78

MAR 20 1975

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Frank Church
(D- IDAHO)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Ltr Donnell to Jenkins
1-31-75 DWB/kejs

57 APR 1 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/14/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Reference is made to memorandum of W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 3/10/75, captioned as above. Page three of that memorandum referred to the CIA, as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community, being concerned over the request received for access to their files by Morton Halperin under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). It was also noted that the Bureau had not received a request as of that time from Halperin under the FOIA.

The Department has now referred over to us today, 3/14/75, a request from Mr. Halperin to "inspect and, if I choose, to copy files marked 'Official and Confidential' or 'OC' kept in the private office of J. Edgar Hoover." This request is being processed in the FOIA Unit.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. Cregar

JCF:ms (17)

JCF

EX-110

REC-10

62-116395-37

MAR 21 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 HM/TG

#11-DR16

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/

DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar wob

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of conversations with Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry, referred to hereafter as the Group, reporting steps taken to insure that Mr. William Cotter, Chief Postal Inspector, is invited to any discussions of the Group wherein the question of opening U. S. mail is addressed in the context of Congressional hearings.

In a memorandum to Mr. Adams and Mr. Wannall, dated 3/4/75, Mr. Kelley reported the results of his meeting with Mr. Cotter on that date. Cotter advised the Director that the Postmaster General has become alarmed about the opening of mail by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Mr. Cotter asked the Director if the FBI knew this was going on and did we actually receive the benefits of it. Mr. Kelley pointed out to Mr. Cotter that the FBI knew of it and did get information on the procedure from CIA.

EX-110

REC-10 62-116395-34

During the course of their conversation, Mr. Kelley told Mr. Cotter that he should be joined in the group of investigative organizations headed by Mr. Colby, Director of CIA, to consider actions in the Select Committee's probe. Mr. Wannall was instructed to make sure the Postal Service is included in the Group.

7 MAR 21 1975

On 3/6/75 Mr. William O. Cregar, the Bureau's representative on this Group, discussed this matter with Mr. John Clarke. Mr. Clarke advised that inasmuch as membership on the Group is made up of United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies and departments he felt most matters discussed at future meetings of the Group would not be of interest to the Postal Service and would be a waste of Mr. Cotter's time. However, he assured Mr. Cregar that should a question involving opening of U. S. mails be addressed by the Group or any questions involving matters of interest to the Postmaster General, he would see to it that Mr. Cotter or his designated representative

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-6-00 BY SP2

#MDR16

Enclosure - Sent 3-13-75 edm
WOC:ebc
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

was invited to the meeting. In addition, Mr. Clarke indicated he would be in telephonic contact with Mr. Cotter to arrange for any discussions Mr. Cotter might desire to have with him.

ACTION:

Pursuant to the Director's instructions, attached is a letter to Mr. Cotter setting forth the arrangements that have been made with Mr. Clarke regarding future attendance of Postal Service representatives at meetings of the Group. A copy of this letter is being furnished to Mr. Colby for his records.

March 13, 1975

BY LIAISON

REC-~~10~~ EX-110 36

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Honorable William J. Cotter
Chief Postal Inspector
U. S. Postal Service
Washington, D. C.

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2ALM/dTG

Dear Bill:

During our meeting in my office on March 4, 1975, we discussed your participation in the group of investigative organizations headed by Mr. William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to consider Community actions resulting from Select Committee probes.

On March 6, 1975, Mr. William O. Cregar, my representative on this Group, discussed the matter with Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community and Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry. Mr. Clarke advised that membership on this Group is made up of representatives from the U. S. Intelligence Board agencies and departments and that the major portion of information discussed at this Group would not involve the Postal Service. However, Mr. Clarke has assured Mr. Cregar that should any questions regarding matters of interest to the Postmaster General be scheduled for discussion before this Group, he would see to it that your office is so advised in order that either you or your designated representative can attend the meeting. In addition, Mr. Clarke indicated he would be in telephonic contact with you to arrange for any discussions you might desire to have with him.

original of letter delivered to Chief [illegible] 3/14/75 LAC

cc of letter delivered to CIA [illegible] 3/14/75

LFS/LAC

WOC:ebc
(7)

JAA

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Honorable William J. Cotter

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Colby for his records.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

1 - Honorable William E. Colby (BY LIAISON)
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

NOTE:

See memo W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 3/7/75, captioned "SENSTUDY 75," prepared by WOC:ebc.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. MINTZ
Attention: Legislative Matters Section

DATE: 3/17/75

FROM : R. J. GALLAGHER

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

In reference to memorandum from Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams dated 3/12/75, SA Johnny L. Evans will be the contact and coordinator for OPE in regard to the captioned matter. Mr. Evans' extension is 2854.

OPE has no input into captioned matter at this time.

JLE:DW
(6)
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Gallagher
1 - Mr. Matheson
1 - Mr. Colwell
1 - Mr. Evans

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-25-00 BY SP2 ALM/116

EX-110

REC-10 62-116395-35

21 MAR 21 1975

70 MAR 27 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES O[illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 2-14-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75
LETTER FROM SENATORS MANSFIELD AND SCOTT
RE DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS
JANUARY 27, 1975

Hotis/TBH

In a letter to Mr. Kelley dated 1-27-75, Senators Mike Mansfield (D - Mont.) and Hugh Scott (R - Pa.) requested we not destroy any documents or files that may be of interest to the Senate in the forthcoming hearings on intelligence activities.

A memorandum from H. R. Hauer to Mr. LaPrade dated 1-31-75 captioned "Destruction of Files and Records, Files and Communications Division," pointed out that our destruction program is governed by the Federal Records Act of 1950 and regulations of the National Archives and Records Service. Our current practice is to destroy files over 25 years old relating to subversive activities which are based on unsubstantiated allegations and have not resulted in prosecution. Criminal files over 10 years old are reduced to microfilm and the paper records are destroyed. In addition, all duplicate copies of communications are destroyed when they no longer serve a useful purpose. The Files and Communications Division asked the Legal Counsel Division to determine whether the Senators' request applied to our current destruction program. Mr. Callahan noted "Discuss with SSC staff."

EX-110 REC-10 62-116395-34

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

DATE 8/22/02 BY SP[illegible]

On 2-10-75 Inspector J. B. Hotis, Legal Counsel Division, met with William G. Miller, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Acdivities, concerning this matter. Miller was told that our destruction program has been suspended until we can determine whether any documents are involved that might be of interest to the Committee. Miller said he doubted that the Committee would inquire into intelligence matters that were over 25 years old but asked that we withhold destruction of files until he consulted with Senator Church. He said he would contact us later this week.

MAR 18 1975

Enclosures (2) - Sent 2-19-75

1 - Mr. Callahan	1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Adams	1 - Mr. Ash
1 - Mr. Jenkins	1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz	1 - Mr. Bowers
1 - Mr. Farrington	1 - Mr. Hotis

MAR 25 1975

57 MAR 27 1975

TBH:mbk (11)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY
Letter from Senators Mansfield and Scott
Re Destruction of Records; 1-27-75

Attached are letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott acknowledging their letter to the Director and advising them that we have suspended our destruction program until the matter is clarified.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott be sent.

DWM

per

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/10/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP-2 ALM/

Fmp R16

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ✓
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This reports information received telephonically from Mr. Robert Gambino, Office of Security, CIA, on the morning of 3/1/75.

According to Mr. Gambino, a CIA officer employed by CIA's Office of Security, Mr. Richard Kuh, has been called to testify before the Rockefeller Commission on 3/3/75. The purpose of this testimony is to discuss CIA's recruitment of approximately 10 dissidents. The dissidents were to be infiltrated into extremist and revolutionary groups active in the Washington, D. C., area in 1967 in order that CIA could obtain firsthand knowledge as to whether any of these extremist or revolutionary groups were planning any physical damage or attack on CIA installations throughout the Washington, D. C., area.

In preparation for this testimony CIA was reviewing all records in their Office of Security. In this connection they came across a note from CIA Security Officer Paul Gaynor reflecting a conversation he had with myself. During that time I had liaison responsibilities with CIA's Office of Security. The note, signed by Paul Gaynor, read as follows: "Discussed with William O. Cregar, FBI, 4/4-6/67. Says go ahead after conferring with Mr. William Sullivan, Assistant Director, FBI. 'They never heard of this matter.'" Copies of this note are being furnished to the Rockefeller Commission contemporaneous with Kuh's testimony.

I have reviewed all possible Bureau records in an effort to locate any memoranda that might have been prepared. I have found no such memoranda and am inclined to believe that I did not make a record of my conversation with Mr. Gaynor in view of the quotation, "They never heard of this matter."

REC-9 62-116395-33

WOC:ebc
(6)

EX-112

MAR 18 1975

CONTINUED ~~OVER~~

70 MAR 25 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Although I have no specific recollection of the conversation with Mr. Gaynor, I do have some recollection that such a conversation did take place with him as well as with Mr. Osborn, the Director of Security, CIA. This is somewhat reinforced by the fact that I can recall CIA and specifically Mr. Osborn was concerned about the security of CIA's installations. There was considerable campus unrest during this period of time. I can recall CIA recruiters were attacked and beaten. As a matter of fact, I am almost sure that CIA's recruiters were forced off campus and did potential employees' interviews in Federal buildings. Recognizing that both Osborn, as the Director of Security, and CIA generally were very security conscious, I can understand and believe it was probably likely that the Office of Security, CIA, began to plan the security and physical protection of all their offices throughout the U. S. The fact is that approximately one and one-half years after my reported conversation with Mr. Gaynor one of CIA's offices in Ann Arbor, Michigan, was bombed, resulting in the now famous Keith decision. In the interim Martin Luther King was assassinated 4/4/68 and parts of the District were burned; Resurrection City existed during May and June, 1968. All of these events remind one of the situation that existed at that time and helps me at least put into perspective why CIA's Office of Security was concerned about the security of their installations.

Although I cannot recall the specific conversation with Mr. Gaynor, I did periodically speak to him during my eight-year liaison assignment. Had I received such a request as reported on Mr. Gaynor's note, I would have discussed it with the Assistant Director at that time. It is likely that Mr. Sullivan who was then the Assistant Director would have reacted as reported in Gaynor's quotation. I say this because if the facts are true, no operational activity to collect intelligence was envisioned. CIA merely proposed to place assets in a position to know if any violent activity was planned against CIA establishments and the Bureau was merely interposing no objections to such activity on the part of CIA.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

I have attempted to reconstruct the events in my own mind as well as to view other activities that transpired during the approximately eight years of my liaison assignment. In all honesty I cannot recall any case wherein I was requested or instructed to make an arrangement with CIA without making a specific record of it in Bureau files.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

wRW

Ky

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/JS

On March 12, 1975, Associate Deputy Attorney General Wilderotter advised me that he was just advised that the Senate Committee staff has compiled a lengthy list of requests for documents to be furnished by CIA to the Senate Committee. He said that the list will be submitted to the Committee today for their approval in requesting the material from CIA. He described the list as unrealistic. Mr. Wilderotter said that we may anticipate that the FBI will receive a similar list requesting documents in great detail. He said that his assignment in the Department at the present time is to assist in coordinating the Department responses with the White House in regard to requests from the Senate Committee and he requested me to advise him at once upon receipt of such a request from the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That upon receipt of request from the Senate Committee, as described above, Mr. Wilderotter be immediately informed.

62-116395
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1- Mr. Mintz

REC 68

62-116395-32

MAR 18 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

JAM:mfd
(7)

70 MAR 27 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J.B. Adams
1 - Mr. N.P. Callahan

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: March 5, 1975

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : W.O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/dTG

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group) held on 2/27/75 at CIA Headquarters.

The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board. Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees.

At the meeting of the Group on 2/27/75 several items of interest were discussed, which items are set forth hereinafter.

Mr. Colby, in his role as Director of Central Intelligence, and Mr. Clarke met with Senator Frank Church on the morning of 2/27/75. Church advised that it is not his intention to harass the intelligence community and he hopes to reaffirm to both the Congress and the people of the United States that there is a valid and critical need for intelligence. Church is concerned that no inadvertent disclosures result from these hearings which could prejudice sensitive intelligence community interest. He assured Mr. Colby that he would continue to consult him on any sensitive matters that come before the Committee to avoid such inadvertencies. Senator Church was appreciative of the security guidelines furnished to him for the handling of sensitive information and documents and assured Mr. Colby that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) would abide by these guidelines. With regard to the Secrecy Agreement, which heretofor Senator Church has been somewhat reluctant to have his staff personnel complete, it is now acceptable to the Senator. However, he does want to have the Chief Counsel of the SSC review the Secrecy Agreement and will probably propose certain changes in its wording. (A Secrecy Agreement was developed by a subcommittee of the Group in concert with the Justice Department.)

EX-110

REC 44 62-116395-31

MAR 12 1975

Enclosures

WOC:bcw (16)

CONTINUED - OVER

5-1116

MAR 21 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Senator Church stated that it was the Committee's intention to investigate all agencies' participation in "covert action" with primary emphasis on CIA activities overseas. (Roughly interpreted, this could involve the Bureau's COINTEL Program.) The SSC hopes to avoid any confrontation with any members of the intelligence community over the release of sensitive documents or testimony and it is Senator Church's intention for him and Senator John G. Tower to consult with both the President and the Vice President to resolve this matter. In this regard, Mr. Clarke advised members of the Group that Deputy Attorney General Laurence H. Silberman has been designated by the President to act as his counsel in ~~dealing with both the Senate and the House~~ select committees. It is Mr. Clarke's opinion that Mr. Silberman will act in this capacity only as long as he remains Deputy Attorney General.

It is the feeling of Senator Church at this time that all staff employees of the SSC will be afforded "Q" clearances. (issued by the successor to the Atomic Energy Commission.) However, there is some question as to whether this in fact will be true and Clarke hopes to get further clarification on this point.

Mr. Colby advised Senator Church that CIA requires all employees to sign a CIA secrecy agreement. It is Mr. Colby's intention, as he did in the case of the Rockefeller Commission, to issue an agency notice to all employees releasing them from their obligation under the secrecy agreement in the event an employee is called before the SSC. Additionally, Mr. Colby intends to write a letter to the SSC advising it that he has so relieved CIA employees from this obligation. (Attached is a draft copy of an Agency notice circulated within CIA. Also attached is a copy of the letter Mr. Colby forwarded to the Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller advising the Rockefeller Commission that he was relieving Agency employees from any obligation under the secrecy agreement.)

Inasmuch as the Bureau requires all employees to complete a secrecy agreement, the Intelligence Division believes that the Legal Counsel Division should review what action, if any, the Bureau should take in anticipation of FBI personnel being called to testify.

With regard to deleting the names of Agents and confidential sources from documents furnished to the SSC, Senator Church agreed that this would be acceptable providing he or members of his staff could consult with officials of the submitting agency if it was deemed necessary that the names of Agents or sources had to be revealed.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

During the Colby/Church meeting, Church advised that he anticipates asking all agencies and departments of the intelligence community for the following three items as their initial request: 1) Organizational charts, broken down to a branch level, going back as far as 1947; 2) Copies of all budgets since 1947; and 3) Documents reflecting all cash flows since 1947.

With regard to items 2 and 3, Mr. Clarke indicated that he will seek clarification with regard to budget and cash flow submission and will hopefully have additional information for members of the Group in the near future as to exactly what the SSC desires.

During the course of the meeting of the Group, Mr. Clarke advised that the Bureau should consider advising Mr. Colby of any "bad apples" that are uncovered during the Bureau's investigation of staff personnel. This was not intended to try to eliminate a candidate as a staff employee where there is some derogatory information but if the Bureau develops very substantial information indicating the subject is a definite security risk, it is conceivable that Mr. Colby could at least discuss that individual's possible employment with Senator Church to prevent the Committee from hiring anyone that could later prove embarrassing to the SSC.

Prior to the adjournment of the meeting of the Group, Mr. Clarke queried all members as to what provisions they have made for handling the onslaught of paper and requests he anticipates all agencies will receive from the SSC. As an example, CIA has had to Xerox over 15,000 pages of CIA documents in the last ten days in response to requests from the Rockefeller Commission. Clarke feels strongly that each agency should develop a task force within their ranks supplemented by stenographic personnel to prepare themselves for what he believes will be very extensive requests from the SSC with relatively short deadlines.

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

The matters of interest reported in this memorandum were discussed at Mr. Callahan's conference on 3/3/75 and are being addressed separately in accordance with decisions made at that conference.

Jma wRW

K

DRAFT
22 February 1975

CIA INTERNAL USE
ONLY

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-6-00 BY SP-2 ALM/ZTP

AGENCY NOTICE

As you are aware, the President on 4 January 1975 established a Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States to look into allegations that certain Agency activities conducted within this country exceeded our charter and statutory authority.

Upon completion of its inquiry, the Commission will issue its findings and submit recommendations to the President and to the Director of Central Intelligence.

The President has directed that the Agency extend support and assistance to the Commission, and I have pledged my cooperation to the Commission and its Staff.

I have also told the Commission that any current employee of the Agency is available to the Commission and its Staff for discussions.

The Agency and the Commission Staff have now developed sufficient working experience so that we can design additional procedures to facilitate the Staff's work in examining topics of concern.

All members of the Commission Staff have received security clearances and have been given badges providing them with access to Agency offices in the Washington, D. C. area.

62-116395-31

LOSURE

The Commission Staff will, during their inquiries in CIA Headquarters Area Offices, be given access to Agency files related to the Commission's fields of responsibility. The use of specific sensitive data from these files in any unclassified report by the Commission will be subject to consultation between the Director and the Commission.

To facilitate interviews by the Commission Staff Officers with CIA employees, I have advised the Commission that employees are authorized to furnish classified information with certain exceptions. My letter to the Vice President, the Chairman of the Commission, is attached. It sets forth guidelines for the furnishing of classified information.

The cooperative spirit of our relationship with the Commission and its Staff must at the same time take account of the rights of Agency employees. Like other citizens, they have the right to remain silent. The Commission Staff will advise employees of their rights at the beginning of any interview or other appearance.

My own belief, after careful review of all activities in question, is that legal action will not be taken against individuals. The final decision, however, must rest with the Department of Justice and other legal authorities and risk of such action is a judgment each employee must make for himself.

When a current Agency employee is asked to be interviewed by a member of the Commission Staff, the Staff member should notify Mr. E. H. Knoche who is my assistant in charge of liaison with the Commission and its Staff.

Mr. Knoche, in turn, will ~~advise~~ NOTIFY the employee. ~~that~~ The purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the work of Staff members. It is intended to allow time for the employee to gain general legal guidance if he wants it, and to obtain security guidance from an appropriate senior officer.

Normally, we think an employee would advise his supervisor or other Agency authorities on the nature of the interview. It should be understood, however, that this is not mandatory.

In arranging the interviews, I am acutely aware of the need to avoid the appearance as well as the fact of collusion between Agency and employee. None of us has any intention to fabricate or mislead. I am convinced that being forthcoming~~, while perhaps embarrassing in a few details,~~ will ~~on the whole,~~ vindicate the Agency and its eminent service to our country.

In keeping with my long-standing policy, employees with any knowledge of activities conducted within the United States, now or in the past, which they believe to be of a questionable nature can follow the customary practice within the Agency of calling the matter to my attention or that of the Inspector General. This will ensure my ability to continue to be forthcoming with all those involved in external reviews of Agency activities.

Employees should also feel free to bring any such matters directly to the attention of the Commission or the Commission Staff outside of Agency channels if they so desire. In doing so, however, employees should bear in mind that the Commission's field of interest is CIA activities within this country.

To contact the Commission, employees can call the Executive Director, Mr. David Belin on 456-7010 or the Counsel, Mr. Marvin Gray, Jr., on 456-7014. The mail address is:

Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States
712 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20500

Names of the members of the Commission Staff and their badge numbers are attached.

W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence

COPY

#MD216
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-6-00 BY SP2 ALM/TFB

5 February 1975

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Chairman, Commission on CIA Activities
 Within the United States
712 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Vice President:

As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are required to sign secrecy agreements when they enter on duty. This is a condition of employment, and it requires that they keep forever secret all classified information gained during the course of their employment. The secrecy agreement further requires that they may not disclose classified information in interviews or by publication without prior authorization from the Director of Central Intelligence. There is a provision in the secrecy agreement that the conditions and obligations with respect to the protection of classified information by the agreement continue after employment with the Agency has been terminated.

As I have stated to the Commission, I will make available any employee of this Agency to the Commission for staff interview and for testimony before the Commission. This letter will serve as authorization for any such employees or ex-employees to furnish information as requested by the Commission or its staff on matters that may be classified. As has been discussed with the Commission, there are certain sensitive items which should receive special handling. Such items include names of sources, specific details of technical devices and systems maintained in compartmented channels by the Agency, names of employees, names of persons who may be targets of kidnapping or assassination by foreign intelligence organizations, names of organizations cooperating with the Agency, and detailed information which would pinpoint any of the above. Some information might also conflict with a subject's right of privacy.

62-116395-31

SUB F

COPY

Attachment to Agenc[illegible]otice

[illegible]

BELIN, DAVID W.	A-6442
BAKER, HAROLD A.	A-6428
CARGILL, MASON	A-6439
GELLHORN, ERNEST	A-6429
GRAY, MARVIN L., JR.	A-6444
GREENE, RONALD J.	A-6435
HARDY, TIMOTHY	A-6433
MANFREDI, GEORGE	A-6432
OLSEN, ROBERT	A-6434
ROETHE, JAMES	A-6427
SCHWARZER. WILLIAM	A-4768
WEIDNER, JAMES	A-6447
CLAPPER, PETER	A-6440

There is no purpose here to impede in any way the Commission's investigation. I believe, however, in most cases these specific identifying names and details are not necessary for an understanding of our activities. Where the Commission or the staff believes that specific identification is necessary to the purpose of the testimony or the staff interrogation, the matter will be discussed between the Commission and the Agency, and I will be prepared to consult with you and the Commission to determine the course of action to be taken. Where in the judgment of the employee a specific identification is especially sensitive as outlined in this paragraph, an identity number will be assigned pending resolution of the matter between the Commission and the Agency, and in the meantime the identity will not be divulged by the employee.

I appreciate the cooperation of the Commission and of Agency employees in this regard. I am still responsible under the statute and as a professional for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In many situations the inadvertent disclosure of a name or identification could have serious repercussions, including placing lives in jeopardy, and I cannot in good conscience put such information at risk.

This arrangement of course does not affect the Commission's procedures for advising prospective witnesses of their rights, securing waivers, nor the employee's or ex-employee's right not to answer certain questions if they are concerned that the answers might tend to incriminate them.

Respectfully,

SIGNED

W. E. Colby
Director

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/27/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Bowers
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum recommends that we keep Mr. Colby apprised, as the Director of Central Intelligence, through the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Inquiry of any proposed or completed FBI testimony before congressional committees when such FBI testimony impacts on other members of the Intelligence Community, could result in other members of the Intelligence Community being called to testify, or any questions are asked of the FBI which are of proprietary interest to another agency or department of the Intelligence Community.

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Inquiry, chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before congressional hearings.

At a meeting of the USIB on 2/26/75, Chairman Colby commented on the effective manner in which the Ad Hoc Group was functioning. However, he noted that it is imperative all members of USIB be extremely sensitive to the need for prior coordination to insure that the basic interests of the Intelligence Community are served and that any testimony or documents furnished congressional committees are factual and accurate. He hoped that all members will be made aware of what other members are testifying to before a congressional committee as well as the identity of that congressional committee. Mr. Colby noted that it is highly likely that members of the Intelligence Community will be called before various congressional committees other than the Senate and House Select Committees.

REC-6 62-116395-30

The Intelligence Division believes this type of coordination is vital to insure that one agency's testimony is not in conflict with that of another through misunderstanding

6 MAR 7 1975

62-116395

WOC:ebc
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

CONTINUED - OVER

70 MAR 12 1975

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/TJG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
9-25-00
#MDR16

5

or inadvertency. As an example of this coordination, Mr. Colby has furnished the Bureau and other members of the Intelligence Community the statement he plans to make as the lead-off witness before the Senate Select Committee (SSC). This statement has been reviewed by the Intelligence Division and a memorandum has been prepared which notes that there is nothing objectionable from the Bureau's standpoint in Colby's proposed statement.

A second point Colby made at the USIB meeting was his desire that all members understand that no agency representative should discuss with a congressional committee information or techniques which are of proprietary interest to another agency without prior consultation. This is certainly a valid request and we should concur. As an example, the FBI would not want the National Security Agency to discuss with a congressional committee FBI support of National Security Agency's TELEX effort without first clearing with us. Likewise, the Bureau representative should not discuss National Security Agency's exploitation of teletype traffic furnished to them by the FBI without prior coordination with NSA. Recently a congressional committee asked CIA for copies of any written agreements between FBI and CIA. CIA felt they had no alternative but to provide the committee with copies of the FBI - CIA Understanding dated 2/7/66. However, before doing so CIA did obtain FBI approval.

(S)

ACTION:

If approved, through the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Inquiry, representatives of the Intelligence Division will keep Mr. Colby and the Intelligence Community advised of any FBI testimony before congressional committees wherein such testimony could impact on other members of the Intelligence Community, could result in other members of the Intelligence Community being called to testify, or where questions are asked which are of proprietary interest to another member of the Community.

TJM

Rec. copies of A. M. & opens statement & testimony used 2/27/75 before Edwards' subcommittee be made available to Ad Hoc group. JMA

Done 3/6/75 1:55p

KJ

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 3/4/75

FROM : H.A. Boynton, Jr. HB

1 - Mr. Boynton
1 - Mr. Schwartz

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) EMPLOYEE SECRECY AGREEMENTS

0 Sen. Study - 75

Concerning a news article appearing in the 2/28/75 edition of the Washington Post newspaper (copy attached) entitled "Colby Will Lift CIA Secrecy Pledge to Cooperate With Senate Probe," the Director noted "Can we determine what the agreement includes?"

On 3/4/75 Mr. Steve Kuhn, Office of Security, CIA, advised that all CIA employees prior to commencing employment with that Agency are required to execute an "Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement" and upon terminating their Agency employment are requested to execute a "Termination Secrecy Agreement" (copies of both attached). Briefly, these agreements require that CIA employees keep forever secret all classified information gained during the course of their employment. Both agreements further require that CIA employees may not disclose classified information during interviews or by publication without prior authority from the Director of Central Intelligence. Both agreements specifically set forth that the employee has read the provisions of the espionage laws (Sections 793, 794 and 798 of Title 18, U.S. Code), is aware that unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to the national defense could lead to prosecution and has reviewed the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, which specifically charges the Director of Central Intelligence with protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In this connection, the "Termination Secrecy Agreement" notes that the employee has also read the provisions of Section 1001, Title 18, U.S. Code, and is aware that making a false statement "herein or otherwise" may be punished as a felony. The "Termination Secrecy Agreement" consists of a four-page form, pages three and four of which are entitled "Excerpts From Title 18, United States Code" and specifically sets forth the provisions

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/00 BY SP-2ALM/IRS
#M0216

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-

Enclosures - 4

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

21 MAR 13 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

BPM:tdp (5)

NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 13 1975

233

56 MAR 24 1975

of Sections 793, 794, 798, and 1001. Both Secrecy Agreements also state that the conditions and obligations with respect to the protection of classified information continue after Agency employment has terminated.

The FBI, of course, utilizes Form FD-291 "Employment Agreement," which has been executed by all current employees and must be signed by all new personnel entering on duty, to cover the foregoing situation. The "Employment Agreement" (copy attached) covers essentially the same points noted in the attached CIA Secrecy Agreements. While we do not have an exit secrecy agreement signed by the terminating employee, Form FD-193 "Report of Exit and Separation" requires (under Paragraph D, Page 2) that the exiting employee be cautioned regarding divulging confidential information and reminded that such improper action may violate Department of Justice regulations as well as Federal statutes providing for substantial fines and lengthy imprisonment or both.

ACTION:

Above for information.

BPM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-6-00 BY SP-2ALM/KSR

#mpe16

March 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ADAMS
MR. WANNALL

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
~~Inquiry re Opening of Mail by the~~
Central Intelligence Agency

On March 4, 1975, William Cotter, Chief Postal Inspector, came to see me. He said the Postmaster General has become alarmed about the opening of mail by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for many years. Mr. Cotter went to CIA and received a listing, by year, of the activity in this regard. This list further stimulated the alarm of the Postmaster General.

Mr. Cotter advised that he had known of this project since the 1950s when he was assigned to New York as an Inspector. He said that several of the Postmaster Generals were informed of the project and no protest was made. He said the general feeling was that these were possible enemies of the nation and, therefore, the method was considered as necessary. The present Postmaster General feels the procedure might be highly criticized, and Mr. Cotter came to me to get my assurance no such activity was now going on. I informed him it is not.

Mr. Cotter further asked me if we knew it was going on and did we actually receive the benefits of it. I informed him we knew of it and did get information on the procedure from CIA.

I then told Mr. Cotter I thought he should be joined in the group of investigative organizations, headed by Mr. Colby, Director of CIA, to consider our actions in the Select Committee's probe. Mr. Cotter said they had been invited to the first meeting, but to none since.

Assistant Director Wannall should check to make sure they are included and we should confirm to Mr. Cotter that his organization has been established as a participant.

EX-104 REC-11 62-116395-29

Very truly yours,

C M Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

MAR 7 1975

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 6:00 PM
DATE 3/4/75
BY

54 MAR 1

:. Dir. ____
. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-7-00 BY 39063ELW/BCE/AMW

TO : Mr. White

DATE: February 27, 1975

FROM : J. H. Mortimer

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TAMM
FROM JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1936;
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DATED AUGUST 25, 1936.

~~Security Jurisdiction~~

DC.

On this date, SA Alonzo L. Lacey of the Intelligence Division delivered the above-captioned memoranda to the Laboratory with a request to determine the make of typewriter employed in the preparation of the memoranda and the date of introduction of the type styles employed. The purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether or not the type styles on the typewriters used to write the memoranda were in use on the dates appearing on the memoranda.

It was determined that the "Memorandum For Mr. Tamm from John Edgar Hoover dated September 10, 1936" was prepared on an IBM typewriter equipped with a pica style of type which has been in use since 1930. The typewriting comprising the "Confidential Memorandum by John Edgar Hoover dated August 25, 1936" was determined to have been prepared on a Remington typewriter equipped with an elite style of type that has been in use since October, 1935.

62-116375-

The memoranda were returned to SA Lacey.

RECOMMENDATION:

NOT RECORDED
MAY 2 1975

The result of this examination be forwarded to the Intelligence Division

~~REC-10 62-66727-1841~~

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Lacey
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mortimer
1 - Mr. Oberg

WSO:mrg
(6)

Original Filed In 62-66727-1841

MAY 2 1975

~~15 MAR 5 1975~~

~~57 APR 10 1975~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/14/75

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group) held on the morning of 2/14/75 at CIA Headquarters.

The Group chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various congressional meetings.

At the meeting of the Group on 2/14/75 several items of interest were discussed. They were:

(1) A Secrecy Agreement (copy attached) was presented to Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), with therequest that all staff employees of the Committee, which may number as high as 40, be requested to sign. Miller was rather cool to the suggestion and indicated that the SSC and Senator Church would take it under advisement. It is to be noted that this draft of the Secrecy Agreement was prepared by the Security Committee of USIB in concert with Mr. Kevin T. Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice. Although this was considered the final draft of the Secrecy Agreement, the Treasury representative on the Group was hopeful additional language could be incorporated into the Agreement to cover other than classified information such as the confidentiality of Internal Revenue returns.

(2) Memorandum Cregar to Wannall, dated 2/4/75, advised that Mr. Colby, in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence, had been instructed by the White House to identify what information the Intelligence Community felt could not under any circumstances be discussed with a congressional committee.

REC-40 62-116395-28

Enclosures
62-116395

ENCLOSURE

EX-104

WOC:ebc
(6)

5 FEB 28 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

50 MAR 05 1975

#mde16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM/LR

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116391
62-116395

Attached is a copy of the paper Colby provided to the White House responsive to this request. It does encompass recommendations of member agencies of the Group including the FBI.

At a subsequent meeting Mr. Colby had with unidentified persons at the White House, the above list was discussed. Colby recommended the Intelligence Community had three options to deny a congressional committee sensitive information. They were: (A) to refuse providing sensitive information to a congressional committee and face the possibility of a contempt citation, (B) have the President refuse to authorize the release of such information, presumably through the exercise of Executive Privilege, or (C) the President could call the majority and minority leaders of the congressional committee to the White House, furnish to them the answer to the question with the added caveat that they were the only persons being informed of the answers and, therefore, would be personally accountable for any leak of information. Representatives of the White House were not very enthusiastic to the options put forth by Mr. Colby and indicated that they would be calling a meeting at the White House of senior officials of the Department of Defense, Justice Department, CIA and the FBI to review what position the Intelligence Community should take in responding to a request for extremely sensitive and highly classified information.

(3) Members of the Group were allowed to read an internal memorandum from Mr. David W. Belin, Executive Director of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the U. S. (The Rockefeller Commission), to Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President. This memorandum reports the results of a conversation between Mr. Belin and Mr. William Miller, Chief of Staff for the SSC. The memorandum revealed that Miller believes that within two weeks his staff will be in three-quarters gear. He plans to have a total staff of about 40, 10 to 12 of whom will be lawyers. The initial work of the staff will concentrate on a review of documents, interviews, and what Miller called "depositions." Miller does not plan to have any hearings of the SSC for several months and believes the September deadline could not be met, rather that the investigation would take at least the rest of the year.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

Bellin's memorandum also noted that the thrust of the SSC's investigation will include the whole range of intelligence gathering agencies; will delve into the basic matters of policy, including whether or not there is a need for all of the agencies; what the results are; related public policy matters, as well as rights of privacy.

Miller also advised Bellin that the SSC would operate out of a room referred to as "the auditorium," which Miller thought gave the best security. He said there would be rigid standards imposed to seal off any leaks. These standards would include having everything in a central filing area with a specific check-out system permitted to particular people so that if leaks occurred the source of such leaks could be readily ascertained. Xeroxing would be severely limited. In response to a question from Bellin to Miller as to why the Senate and House did not create a joint Senate/House committee as opposed to individual Senate and House Select Committees, Miller advised that it was too difficult to arrange because of matters of protocol.

It is noted that although a House Select Committee is being formed with basically the same charter as the SSC, no chairman of the House Select Committee has been designated and the Group estimates that it will be a month before the House Select Committee can get started.

ACTION:

For information.

WRW/TCL

SECRECY AGREEMENT

I, ______________________________, in accepting employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure.

I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Select Committee.

It is my understanding that in the course of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to information from departments and agencies of the Government which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the property of the United States of America and I further agree to surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee, any classified material which has come into my possession as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.

I hereby agree that the burden is on me to determine if information is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative.

#MDR16

9-25-00 SP2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-11

I hereby agree that any information learned during my employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is related to intelligence and prepared for publication by me will be submitted to the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative prior to discussing with or showing to any publisher, editor or literary agent for the purpose of determining whether said material contains any classified information as defined in Executive Order 11652. I agree that the Chairman of the Select Committee, President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has the authority to make the final determination as to whether information is classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted.

I have been informed of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 793, 794, 798 and 952; and 50 U.S.C. 783 (b); and 42 U.S.C. 2274; and Executive Order 11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified information, and understand their meaning.

Further, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as the Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified material. I understand that any breach of any part of the obligations in this agreement could subject me to legal and/or administrative action.

I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed on me with respect to the protection of classified information by this agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated.

I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

____
Signature

____
Date

WITNESS:

____
Signature

____
Date

CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT MATTER THAT NEED STRINGENT PROTECTION

I. The names of agents, informants, covert liaison contacts and operations or other identifying characteristics of sensitive clandestine sources

a. Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.

b. Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human source collection (2) employed by the FBI for internal security and counterintelligence purposes.

--The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment or emplacement of personnel within target organizations.

--Specific statements of the use of technical devices in agent operations.

--The total extent of recruitment or investigative effectiveness against any given target organization or individual, or lack thereof.

--Names of selected agency and/or ex-agency employees if revealed would endanger lives, operations or future utility.

--Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.

II. Relationships with Other Intelligence Services

a. Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries.

Classified by 056047
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category:
5B (1), [✓ (2)] (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

7 MOR/16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/6/00 BY SP2 ALM/TZG

62-116395-14

b. Identifying collaborative operations between the United States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaboration or within a jointly targetted third country.

c. The nature of support provided or arrangements with foreign intelligence services supporting US technical collection operations.

d. Material and information provided to the US by a foreign service under conditions of continued secrecy.

III. Cryptologic and Communications Activities

a. Clandestine procurement of foreign cryptologic material.

b. Operations against foreign cryptologic installations.

c. Activities taken with the manufacturers of cryptologic devices in the U.S. and abroad.

d. Product of telephone taps or technical surveillance operations of foreigners or foreign facilities (U.S. and abroad).

e. Success of cryptologic operations against both friendly and unfriendly targets in the U.S. and abroad.

f. Covert signals intelligence collection including (1) assistance arrangements with commercial U.S. and foreign companies (2) taps (3) and from US installations abroad.

g. Collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved.

h. Protective communications security measures.

i. Efforts to collect exotic signals and locate transmissions especially critical to our work in ASW.

IV. Technical Intelligence

a. Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.

b. Details of specific covert communications systems, including secret writing, special agent equipment, etc.

c. Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country.

d. Identification of technical counter-measures techniques.

e. Characterization of emplacement of devices for technical collection of foreign intelligence, including techniques of emplacement.

f. Details of secure U.S. communications systems.

V. Other

a. Reference to covert action operations that would embarrass the U.S. Government or frustrate the purpose of the operation.

b. Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with U.S. and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence operations.

c. Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that provide privileged customers or collaboration or cover for foreign intelligence operations.

d. Names of firms collaborating with U.S. intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).

e. Details of covert contract techniques, covert contractors, and covert tax arrangements.

f. Nature of support to and from other agencies for operations against foreign intelligence targets.

g. The state of our intelligence on Soviet or PRC diplomatic or military intentions toward the United States or on the state of our intelligence on military technologies of these nations.

Mr. W.R. Wannall February 19, 1975

W.O. Cregar

SENSTUDY 75

#mor16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/116

Memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall, dated 2/10/75, recommended that a paper entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished to Mr. Colby in his role as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for inclusion as an annex in a series of annexes Mr. Colby intends to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his appearance as the lead-off witness. This memorandum was approved and the annex entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" was furnished to Mr. Colby for his use.

In anticipation that Mr. Kelley will appear before the SSC, a copy of the annex entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" is being furnished to the Legal Counsel Division for inclusion in the briefing book being prepared for the Director relative to his anticipated appearance before the SSC.

ACTION:

The attached copy of the FBI paper entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished to the Legal Counsel Division for their use in connection with the preparation of a briefing book for the Director's anticipated appearance before the SSC.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar

WOC:bcw (4)

REC 8 62-116395-27X

16 MAY 27 1975

ST 112

Original cannot be located and is not on record. When original is received in Records [illegible] other [illegible] on
5-23-75

84 MAY 30 1975

No indication orig. received in Records 5-23-75

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 2/12/75

FROM : H.A. Boynton, Jr.

1 - Mr. Boynton
1 - Mr. Schwartz

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Pursuant to request of Mr. Adams, Liaison Officer L.F. Schwartz contacted Mr. John Clark of the Intelligence Community Staff on 2/11/75 with regard to suggested security procedures for the handling of classified information by the Select Committee.

Mr. Clark advised that on 2/10/75 he had met personally with Mr. William Miller who has been designated to head the Select Committee Staff. He stated that he discussed with Mr. Miller the proposed guidelines for security and the proposed secrecy agreement for staff members and furnished Miller with copies of both these items. Mr. Clark stated that Miller was generally receptive to the proposed guidelines and felt that they would be acceptable subject to the approval of Senator Church. Mr. Miller was decidedly cool concerning the idea of staff members signing a secrecy agreement but indicated that a final decision regarding this would be made by Senator Church.

Mr. Clark stated that he raised two specific questions which Mr. Colby considers most important with regard to any presentation made to the Select Committee. He advised Miller that the Intelligence Community would desire to not identify specific agents or the details of sensitive operations which might reveal the identities of sensitive sources. Mr. Miller was agreeable to this and foresaw no problem with the Select Committee accepting this proposal. Secondly, Mr. Clark advised Mr. Miller that Mr. Colby, speaking for the Intelligence Community, was opposed to having any dealings with staff members of the various Senators and Representatives other than those assigned to work directly under Mr. Miller as part of the Select Committee Staff. Mr. Miller stated that this was also acceptable to him and he assured Mr. Clark that all of his staff members would be subject to an FBI background investigation and the issuance of a security clearance by CIA.

REC-104
~~62-116395-24~~
62-116395-26X

LFS:tdp (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

5 FEB 24 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/TG

84 MAR 3 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

During the conversation with Mr. Clark he advised further that it is not the intention of Mr. Colby to use as any part of the CIA's defense for alleged domestic activities the allegation that such activities were undertaken because the FBI had failed or was unwilling to carry out its responsibilities in the domestic area. Mr. Clark noted that he is aware that there have been references to such a claim in the newspapers but he assured SA Schwartz that Mr. Colby does not support this position in any way. Mr. Clark volunteered to arrange a personal meeting between Mr. Colby and an appropriate FBI official to discuss this point, if the Bureau so desired.

ACTION:

For information.

WRW/TWL

LFS/uoc WOG

Jma

No Need unless circumstances change. Jma

- 2 -

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/18/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-6-00 BY SP2ALM/TMG #MDR16

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

This memorandum reports that on 2/14/75 Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, telephonically advised Section Chief, W. O. Cregar, the Bureau's representative on this Group, that Mr. Samuel R. Preston, Senior Staff Member of the House Appropriations Committee, requested that CIA provide the House Appropriations Committee with any written agreements between CIA and the FBI.

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the U. S. Intelligence Board. Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various congressional committees.

On the late afternoon of 2/14/75, Mr. John Clarke, telephonically advised Mr. Cregar that he had received a telephone call from Mr. Samuel R. Preston. The purpose of the call was to request any written agreements that existed between the CIA and the FBI. Clarke advised the only written agreement he could identify existing between the FBI and CIA was one dated 2/7/66 (copy attached).

Clarke stated that inasmuch as he had gotten this specific request from Mr. Preston he felt CIA had no alternative but to provide a copy of the Agreement to him. However, Clarke wanted to be sure the FBI concurred in this action.

REC-46 62-116395-27
EX-101

Subsequent to Mr. Clarke's call, Mr. Adams telephonically contacted Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman and explained the problem to him. Mr. Silberman authorized the release of a copy of the FBI - CIA Agreement to Mr. Preston. On the afternoon of 2/14/75 Mr. Cregar advised Mr. Clarke that the FBI interposed no objection to the release of a copy of the 1966 Agreement to Mr. Preston.

FEB 25 1975

Enclosures - Sent 2-20-75
62-116395

WOC:ebc (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

58 MAR 4 1975

1 ENCLOSURE

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

Attached is a memorandum to the Attorney General with a copy for the Deputy Attorney General confirming the conversation between Mr. Adams and Mr. Silberman on the afternoon of 2/14/75.

ACTION:

That the memorandum to the Attorney General be sent.

WRW/tm

Jma

K

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 7, 1966

#MDR16 11-6-00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/1216
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (S)

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (S)

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an (S)

SECRET

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

62-116395-27

ENCLOSURE

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (S)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. (S)

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

1-29-75

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JAN 29 1975

TO ALL SACS AND ALL LEGATS

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

DESTRUCTION OF FIELD FILES AND RECORDS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPOSED INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAVE REQUESTED THE BUREAU NOT TO DESTROY, REMOVE FROM OUR POSSESSION OR CONTROL, OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OR PERMIT DISPOSAL OF ANY RECORDS OR DOCUMENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE A BEARING ON SUBJECTS UNDER INVESTIGATION. ACCORDINGLY, UPON RECEIPT OF THIS COMMUNICATION, RECIPIENTS ARE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE ANY RECORDS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY STATUTE OR REGULATIONS. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS MATTER WILL BE ISSUED UPON RECEIPT.

REC-23 62-111395-26

FEB 28 1975

DATE 8/27/82 SP4GHW/bd

FILE PROCESSED FOR RELEASE
IN CIVIL DISCOVERY
DATE 8/21/78
SEE BUFILE 62-117455

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (sent direct)
1 - Mr. Callahan (sent direct)
1 - Mr. Jenkins (sent direct)
1 - Mr. Adams (sent direct)
1 - Each Assistant Director (sent direct)

PFS:bpr
(19)

NOTE: Reference letter to the Director dated 1-27-75 from Hugh Scott, Republican Leader, and Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, United States Senate.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

INITIALED
5 1975 DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

424381

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. McDermott

EX-101

February 19, 1975

REC-23 / - 11637 - 25

1 - Mr. Ash
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers
1 - Mr. Hotis

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/21/82 BY SP4 ELW/cl

Honorable Hugh Scott
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Scott:

We have received the letter of January 27, 1975, with enclosure, from you and Senator Mike Mansfield which requests that we not destroy or otherwise dispose of any records or documents relating to a forthcoming Senate investigation of intelligence activities.

Our procedures regarding the destruction of documents in our files are governed by the Federal Records Act of 1950 and regulations of the National Archives and Records Service. It is our current policy to destroy all records over twenty-five years old pertaining to subversive activities which were based on unsubstantiated allegations and did not result in prosecutive action. In addition, all criminal files over ten years old are reduced to microfilm and the original records are destroyed. We also destroy the duplicate copies of all documents when these copies no longer serve a useful purpose.

MAILED 6
FEB 19 1975
-FBI

Upon receipt of your letter, we immediately suspended our destruction program and are attempting to determine whether any documents are involved that might relate to matters set out in section 2 of Senate Resolution 21. We also contacted William G. Miller, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, who advised us that he will consult with Senator Church and advise us accordingly.

[illegible] COPY FILED IN

You may be assured that we are taking every possible measure to preserve those records or documents relating to intelligence activities that might be of interest to the Senate. It is certainly our intention to cooperate fully with the Select Committee in this very important inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

FEB 27 1975

DWM

JBH:mbk
(15)

57 MAR 6 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

(See NOTE next page)

GPO

Honorable Hugh Scott
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

NOTE: See memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 2-14-75 captioned "SENSTUDY, Letter from Senators Mansfield and Hugh Scott re Destruction of Records, 1-27-75," JBH:mbk. Neither Senator Mansfield nor Senator Scott is on the Bureau's mailing list.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ✓
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

why send such a letter - Do we need to continue with destruction schedule on basis up-to-date? Seale - K

TO : Mr. LaPrade

DATE: 1-31-75

FROM : H. R. Hauer

SUBJECT: DESTRUCTION OF FILES AND RECORDS
FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

As you are aware, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Republican Leader Hugh Scott, in a letter to the Director dated 1-27-75, requested the Bureau not to destroy, remove from our possession or control, or otherwise dispose or permit the disposal of any records or documents which might have a bearing on subject's under investigation proposed by Senate. Accordingly, Files and Communications Division is holding in abeyance any destruction program previously approved by statute or regulation and has issued instructions to all field offices and Legats to do likewise until clarification of above request is received. Recommend Office of Legal Counsel prepare letter to Senators Mansfield and Scott asking clarification of their request and whether or not it includes existing destruction procedures previously approved by the Archivist of the United States.

Regulations of the National Archives and Records Service (NARS), General Services Administration, which are based on Title 44, Chapter 33, Sections 3301 and 3302, U. S. Code, govern the type of material which we must maintain. NARS regulations also govern what material may be destroyed. Record material is described as including "all books, papers, maps, photographs, or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by an agency of the U. S. Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the information value of data contained therein." Our destruction programs are conducted in compliance with NARS regulations to conserve space and manpower. In those instances where we have more than one copy of a communication, it is our policy to file only the original of the communication and to destroy any copies when they no longer serve a useful purpose. Examples follow:

62-116395-25

REC-23

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8/27/83

21 FEB 28 1975

FEB 2

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Ash

PFS:bpr
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memo Hauer to LaPrade
Re: Destruction of Files and Records
Files and Communications Division

Identification Division has purge-type projects in both the criminal and civil fingerprint files involving the destruction of certain fingerprint cards and related name index cards, primarily duplicate-type cards on persons considered inactive because of age.

Insofar as destruction of material by Files and Communications Division is concerned, files, index cards, and related material over 25 years old maintained at FBI Headquarters pertaining to unfounded allegations of subversive activities, membership in subversive organizations, subversive sympathies and tendencies on the part of individuals and organizations are approved for destruction by NARS when investigations revealed allegations predicated upon rumor, nebulous complaints and nonspecific allegations from which no prosecutive action occurred. Archival authority has been obtained to destroy FBI Headquarters files in connection with Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles cases, Selective Service Act cases, Destruction of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles cases (provided no prosecution results from the inquiries conducted and the case had been closed ten years);

and Archival authority has been obtained for destruction of files at FBI Headquarters in unknown subject cases in which there was no criminal prosecution (no time limit set regarding the destruction of unknown subject cases).

In addition to the above authority for the outright destruction of FBI Headquarters records, Archival authority has also been obtained to microfilm any closed criminal file after the case has been closed for ten or more years. Thereafter, the paper records may be destroyed. We currently have on hand 38,601 index cards to be destroyed which pertain to paper record material which has been destroyed previously under NARS regulations and authority.

In addition, personnel files concerning employees who have been separated more than one year are reviewed and temporary records contained therein which no longer serve a useful purpose are purged and only those permanent records as described in the Federal Personnel Manual are retained in the official personnel folder.

Also files, index cards and related material, over 15 years old, maintained at FBI Headquarters relating to laboratory examinations requested by various local, state and Federal law enforcement organizations in cases other than FBI cases wherein positive identification was not effected are also purged. These files no longer possess sufficient reference or evidentiary value to merit retention.

Administrative and noninvestigative records maintained in the various field offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are purged also. This material is retained in the field offices until necessary action has been taken or it has served its purpose.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Office of Legal Counsel prepare an appropriate reply to Senators Mansfield and Scott to determine if their request not to destroy records and documents was intended to include the destruction programs enumerated above.

Discuss with SSC staff.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. McDermott

EX-105 REC-11 — 116395 — 24 ruary 19, 1975

1 - Mr. Ash
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers
1 - Mr. Hotis

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

We have received the letter of January 27, 1975, with enclosure, from you and Senator Hugh Scott which requests that we not destroy or otherwise dispose of any records or documents relating to a forthcoming Senate investigation of intelligence activities.

Our procedures regarding the destruction of documents in our files are governed by the Federal Records Act of 1950 and regulations of the National Archives and Records Service. It is our current policy to destroy all records over twenty-five years old pertaining to subversive activities which were based on unsubstantiated allegations and did not result in prosecutive action. In addition, all criminal files over ten years old are reduced to microfilm and the original records are destroyed. We also destroy the duplicate copies of all documents when these copies no longer serve a useful purpose.

Upon receipt of your letter, we immediately suspended our destruction program and are attempting to determine whether any documents are involved that might relate to matters set out in section 2 of Senate Resolution 21. We also contacted William G. Miller, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, who advised us that he will consult with Senator Church and advise us accordingly.

You may be assured that we are taking every possible measure to preserve those records or documents relating to intelligence activities that might be of interest to the Senate. It is certainly our intention to cooperate fully with the Select Committee in this very important inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

(See NOTE next page)

ALL I
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/27/85 BY

MAILED 6
FEB 19 1975
FBI

UNRECORDED COPY

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JBH:mbk
(15)

MAR 11 1975

GPO 954-546

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

NOTE: See memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 2-14-75 captioned "SENSTUDY, Letter from Senators Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott re Destruction of Records, 1-27-75," JBH:mbk. Neither Senator Mansfield nor Senator Scott is on the Bureau's mailing list.

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

January 27, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/ETG
MDR 16

Honorable Clarence M. Kelley
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20535

O Senstudy-75

Dear Mr. Director:

As you may be aware, the Senate is to conduct an investigation and study of government operations with respect to intelligence activities. The scope of the investigation is set out in S. Res. 21, a copy of which has been enclosed for your information.

We are writing to request that you not destroy, remove from your possession or control, or otherwise dispose or permit the disposal of any records or documents which might have a bearing on the subjects under investigation, including but not limited to all records or documents pertaining in any way to the matters set out in section 2 of S. Res. 21.

Sincerely yours,

Hugh Scott
HUGH SCOTT, REPUBLICAN LEADER

Mike Mansfield
MIKE MANSFIELD, MAJORITY LEADER

Enclosure

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

NWL
memo Leg Cnsl to
Director 2/13/75 forwarding
letters to Senators Scott & Mansfield
dated 2/19/75 JBH/mlc

ENCLOSURE

EX-105

REC-11

62-11[illegible]-24

2 MAR 4 1975

Read to [illegible] by phone 6 11 pm 1/28/75
and requested no destruction of any Bufiles
until further notice. JM

MAR 7 1975

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

See me pls.

MR. CALLAHAN ________
MR. JENKINS ________
MR. ADAMS ________
MR. ASH ________
MR. BASSETT ________
MR. CLEVELAND ________
MR. DECKER ________
MR. GALLAGHER ________
MR. GEBHARDT ________
MR. JAMIESON ________
MR. LA PRADE ________
MR. MC DERMOTT ________
MR. MINTZ ✓ ________
MR. WALSH ________
MR. WANNALL ________
MR. WHITE ________
MR. COLEMAN ________
MR. REED ________
TELE. ROOM ________
MRS. METCALF ________

① Re scope of inquiry
② Preparation of answers.

memo Leg Coml to all mems 2/13/75
Ltrs to Sen. Mansfield & Scott 2/14/75
JBH/mhh
K

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

G-11 ENCLOSURE 62-116395-24

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM/ATG

Calendar No. 2

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 21

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 21, 1975

MR. PASTORE submitted the following resolution; which was ordered to be placed on the calendar (under general orders)

RESOLUTION

To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study with respect to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government or by any persons, acting individually or in combination with others, with respect to any intelligence activity carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government; be it further

Resolved, That (a) there is hereby established a select

V

REC-11 [illegible]

committee of the Senate which may be called, for convenience of expression, the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities to conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency or by any persons, acting either individually or in combination with others, in carrying out any intelligence or surveillance activities by or on behalf of any agency of the Federal Government.

(b) The select committee created by this resolution shall consist of eleven members of the Senate, six to be appointed by the President of the Senate from the majority members of the Senate upon the recommendation of the majority leader of the Senate, and five minority members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the Senate. For the purposes of paragraph 6 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a Senator as a member, chairman, or vice chairman of the select committee shall not be taken into account.

(c) The majority members of the committee shall select a chairman and the minority members shall select a vice chairman and the committee shall adopt rules and procedures to govern its proceedings. The vice chairman shall preside over meetings of the select committee during the absence of the chairman, and discharge such other responsibilities as may be assigned to him by the select committee or the chairman. Vacancies in the membership of the select committee shall not affect the authority of the remaining members to execute the functions of the select committee and shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments to it are made.

(d) A majority of the members of the select committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but the select committee may affix a lesser number as a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony or depositions.

SEC. 2. The select committee is authorized and directed to do everything necessary or appropriate to make the investigations and study specified in subsection (a) of the first section. Without abridging in any way the authority conferred upon the select committee by the preceding sentence, the Senate further expressly authorizes and directs the select committee to make a complete investigation and study of the activities of any agency or of any and all persons or groups of persons or organizations of any kind which have any tendency to reveal the full facts with respect to the following matters or questions:

(1) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has conducted an illegal domestic intelligence operation in the United States.

(2) The conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other Federal agency.

(3) The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan to apply United States intelligence agency capabilities against individuals or organizations within the United States.

(4) The extent to which the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies coordinate their respective activities, any agreements which govern that coordination, and the extent to which a lack of coordination has contributed to activities or actions which are illegal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or contrary to the intent of Congress.

(5) The extent to which the operation of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence activities and the operation of any other activities within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency conforms to the legislative charter of that Agency and the intent of the Congress.

(6) The past and present interpretation by the Director of Central Intelligence of the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods as it relates to

the provision in section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3)) that "... that the agency shall have no police, subpena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions...."

(7) Nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities.

(8) The need for specific legislative authority to govern the operations of any intelligence agencies of the Federal Government now existing without that explicit statutory authority, including but not limited to agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

The nature and extent to which Federal agencies cooperate and exchange intelligence information and the adequacy of any regulations or statutes which govern such cooperation and exchange of intelligence information.

(9) The extent to which United States intelligence agencies are governed by Executive orders, rules, or regulations either published or secret and the extent to which those Executive orders, rules, or regulations interpret, expand, or are in conflict with specific legislative authority.

(10) The violation or suspected violation of any

State or Federal statute by any intelligence agency or by any person by or on behalf of any intelligence agency of the Federal Government including but not limited to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wiretaps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of the United States mail, or the monitoring of the United States mail.

(11) The need for improved, strengthened, or consolidated oversight of United States intelligence activities by the Congress.

(12) Whether any of the existing laws of the United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities, and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related agencies.

(13) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of expenditure and effort in the collection and processing of intelligence information by United States agencies.

(14) The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in the United States and abroad.

(15) Such other related matters as the committee deems necessary in order to carry out its responsibilities under section (a).

SEC. 3. (a) To enable the select committee to make the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the Senate hereby empowers the select committee as an agency of the Senate (1) to employ and fix the compensation of such clerical, investigatory, legal, technical, and other assistants as it deems necessary or appropriate, but it may not exceed the normal Senate salary schedules; (2) to sit and act at any time or place during sessions, recesses, and adjournment periods of the Senate; (3) to hold hearings for taking testimony on oath or to receive documentary or physical evidence relating to the matters and questions it is authorized to investigate or study; (4) to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance as witnesses of any persons who the select committee believes have knowledge or information concerning any of the matters or questions it is authorized to investigate and study; (5) to require by subpena or order any department, agency, officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, or any private person, firm, or corporation, to produce for its consideration or for use as evidence in its investigation and study any books, checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications, document, papers, physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials relating to any of the matters or questions it is authorized to investigate and study which they or any of them may have in their custody or under their control; (6) to make to the

Senate any recommendations it deems appropriate in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any person to answer questions or give testimony in his character as a witness during his appearance before it or in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government or any person, firm, or corporation to produce before the committee any books, checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications, document, financial records, papers, physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials in obedience to any subpena or order; (7) to take depositions and other testimony on oath anywhere within the United States or in any other country; (8) to procure the temporary or intermittent services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof, in the same manner and under the same conditions as a standing committee of the Senate may procure such services under section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946; (9) to use on a reimbursable basis, with the prior consent of the Committee on Rules and Administration, the services of personnel of any such department or agency; (10) to use on a reimbursable basis or otherwise with the prior consent of the chairman of any subcommittee of any committee of the Senate the facilities or services of any members of the staffs of such other Senate committees or any subcommittees of such other Senate committees whenever the select committee or its chairman deems that such action is necessary or appropriate to enable the select committee to make the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution; (11) to have direct access through the agency of any members of the select committee or any of its investigatory or legal assistants designated by it or its chairman or the ranking minority member to any data, evidence, information, report, analysis, or document or papers, relating to any of the matters or questions which it is authorized and directed to investigate and study in the custody or under the control of any department, agency, officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, including any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States Government having the power under the laws of the United States to investigate any alleged criminal activities or to prosecute persons charged with crimes against the United States and any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States Government having the authority to conduct intelligence or surveillance within or outside the United States, without regard to the jurisdiction or authority of any other Senate committee, which will aid the select committee to prepare for or conduct the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution; and (12) to expend to the extent it determines necessary or appropriate any moneys made available to it by the Senate to perform the duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this resolution and to make the investigation and study it is authorized by this resolution to make.

(b) Subpenas may be issued by the select committee acting through the chairman or any other member designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or other member anywhere within the borders of the United States. The chairman of the select committee, or any other member thereof, is hereby authorized to administer oaths to any witnesses appearing before the committee.

(c) In preparing for or conducting the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the select committee shall be empowered to exercise the powers conferred upon committees of the Senate by section 6002 of title 18, United States Code, or any other Act of Congress regulating the granting of immunity to witnesses.

SEC. 4. The select committee shall have authority to recommend the enactment of any new legislation or the amendment of any existing statute which it considers necessary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the national security, intelligence, or surveillance activities of the United States and to protect the rights of United States citizens with regard to those activities.

SEC. 5. The select committee shall make a final report of the results of the investigation and study conducted by it pursuant to this resolution, together with its findings and its recommendations as to new congressional legislation it deems necessary or desirable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but no later than September 1, 1975. The select committee may also submit to the Senate such interim reports as it considers appropriate. After submission of its final report, the select committee shall have three calendar months to close its affairs, and on the expiration of such three calendar months shall cease to exist.

SEC. 6. The expenses of the select committee through September 1, 1975, under this resolution shall not exceed $750,000 of which amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be available for the procurement of the services of individual consultants or organizations thereof. Such expenses shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the select committee.

Calendar No. 2

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 21

RESOLUTION

To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study with respect to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. PASTORE

JANUARY 21, 1975

Ordered to be placed on the calendar (under general orders)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. TJM
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TJM

DATE: 2/11/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum recommends that a paper entitled "The Role of Counterintelligence" be furnished to Mr. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for inclusion as an annex in a series of annexes Mr. Colby intends to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his appearance as the leadoff witness. The FBI was given the responsibility for preparing this paper by the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees.

Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by the Intelligence Division entitled "The Role of Counterintelligence." It is a basic paper and describes what counterintelligence means from an intelligence community viewpoint. It incorporates a considerable amount of input from the CIA, as well as from the Intelligence Division of the FBI. The paper has been circulated as a draft to representatives of CIA, DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force and NSA, All have concurred in its content and have recommended it be furnished to Mr. Colby for use as an annex in connection with his forthcoming appearance before the SSC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SP 2 [illegible]
#MOR16

ACTION: EX-117 REC-38 62-116395-23

If approved, the paper entitled "The Role of Counterintelligence" will be furnished to Mr. Colby for his use as an annex to his prepared statement before the SSC.

2/14/75
WOC

Enclosures (2) WRW/TJL

WOC:dln
(7)

2 ENCLOSURE

FEB 20 1975

5-WOC

84 MAR 3 1975

4

Fm DOJ6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JG
ON 11/6/00

THE ROLE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Counterintelligence is an integral part of our national defense. By definition and by its very nature counterintelligence is a defensive posture to the extent that it reacts primarily to intelligence initiatives of hostile intelligence services. As any good defense, however, it cannot be static or passive. It is based upon knowledge of this country's adversaries; it seeks out and engages hostile agents and the intelligence services that employ them. The national counterintelligence defense, in other words, requires both sound preventive measures and an energetic and sustained counterattack.

The purpose of defensive and aggressive counterintelligence is to ensure that adversaries who do not want to risk open confrontation cannot attain the same objectives through stealth. In more concrete terms, the purpose of counterintelligence is to identify and neutralize spies and their masters who serve our opponents.

Spycatching, by itself, is not enough, because spies are replaceable. American counterintelligence must also know who sent the spies and who supported and directed their work in this country and in friendly nations. And beyond identifying these agent handlers--the officers of the KGB and other such clandestine communist organizations--our counterintelligence must know how these people are motivated, recruited, trained, structured, rewarded, and punished. We need to know how they communicate with each other--from New York or Washington, for example, to Moscow or Prague. In short, we need to know everything we can find out about them, as individuals and as organizations. And finally, what we know must be shared appropriately with other services equally concerned.

This need is even more acute today than in the 1950s and 1960s. We know from hard experience that the clandestine communist services always increase the range and the intensity of their operations during periods of Western relaxation, when the openness and multiplicity of exchanges provide favorable conditions and opportunities for launching intelligence operations against our country.

62-116395-23

The growth in communist-bloc intelligence representation over the past several years, not only in the United States but also throughout the rest of the world, is statistically and operationally demonstrable. For convenient reference there is attached to this paper a fact sheet documenting this growth based on information recorded by the CIA and FBI. In considering the number of communist-bloc nationals posted to official establishments outside their countries, it is important to recognize that a substantial proportion of these are intelligence officers. These officers have a primary mission to conduct intelligence operations and official duties involved in their cover positions, if required at all, are secondary and serve mainly to legitimize their cover. In the Soviet case, it is an estimate accepted by the United States intelligence community that at least 40 per cent of the officials are intelligence officers. Indeed, some defector sources have estimated that 70 per cent to 80 per cent of Soviet officials have some intelligence connection, although this figure includes officials who act only in a minimal support capacity and only occasionally.

The most effective way to achieve the counterintelligence purpose is to recruit personnel from hostile secret services. It is also the hardest of counterintelligence tasks, a goal usually requiring years of close study and meticulous planning. Even if the effort succeeds, we cannot accept at face value what the penetration source tells us. His reports must be most carefully crosschecked against everything known from all other sources. Otherwise we may be duped by an adversary who uses "our" agent to tell us what he wants us to hear.

If there is no penetration of the adversary, or none at the level of seniority, all the other sources (hostile agents whom we have detected and "doubled," intercepted communications, defectors, etc.) become all the more important.

If counterintelligence is to identify and then contain or control secret action directed against the United States, it must be closely coordinated. The adversary services do not run uncoordinated, haphazard operations against us. All their major programs of espionage, counterespionage, subversion, sabotage, deception, and disinformation are intertwined. For example, a computer program designed to keep track of CIA personnel at home and abroad was planned in the Soviet Union, is maintained in Czechoslovakia, and draws upon information from East Germany, Hungary, and elsewhere. Another example: information from multiple defector sources indicates that the Cuban security service, the DGI, since 1968-69, has agreed to operate against the United States and American intelligence in areas where the Soviets are at an operational disadvantage.

A second reason why United States counterintelligence must be coordinated is the need for effective liaison with counterintelligence services abroad. No one Western service can cope by itself with the worldwide, centrally directed, attack of the Soviets, the bloc (including the Cubans), and the whole array of Communist Party auxiliaries. A counterintelligence defense which stops at a border is no defense at all.

The work within our borders is equally essential to our safety. Because the United States continues to be the main site of hostile clandestine operations, it is also the main site of American counterintelligence.

Both forms of counterintelligence--the security of our own operations and the penetration of operations against us--have to be sustained if the Director of Central Intelligence is to be able to protect United States intelligence methods and sources, as required by law.

Counterintelligence has three values which flow from its functions. The value of its security function is that it prevents our adversaries from gaining information that the United States Government does not want to make public. Counterintelligence cannot perform this security role by rote and routines. And it cannot depend entirely upon guards, safes, and other passive measures. It must be active to prevent the subversion of those people to whom the United States Government has entrusted its classified information. Some of these persons are members in American intelligence and counterintelligence organizations.[1]

It must also prevent leakage of sensitive United States information from foreign services to whom American secrets are necessarily confided as a matter of common concern but which in turn have been penetrated by enemy agents.[2]

The value of what might be called an anticipatory defense is not always evident because when it succeeds, nothing happens. It is like preventive medicine. Its value becomes dramatically clear only when it fails.

The second value of counterintelligence is that it provides information about hostile clandestine intentions and capabilities. This information is the more valuable if our adversaries do not know that we have it.

Finally, the third value of counterintelligence is the large amount of straight intelligence obtained as a by-product by counterintelligence agents in the normal course of their business.

---

[1] Some specific and subsequently publicized examples of Soviet success in the recruitment of American officials, in most cases exposed and frustrated by the FBI, are: Nelson Drummond (1962), Jack Dunlap (1963), William Whelan (1963), Robert Johnson (1965), Herbert Boeckenhaupt (1966), and Ulysis Harris (1967).

[2] There may be cited here some of the completed counter-intelligence cases which resulted in the identification and suppression of high-level Soviet penetrations of Western intelligence services and which were directly attributable to CIA counterintelligence work: George Blake (UK - 1961), Heinz Felfe (West Germany - 1961), Harold Adrian Russell ("Kim") Philby (UK - 1963), George Paques (France - 1964), Giorgio Rinaldi Ghislieri (Italy, Spain - 1967), Yuriy Loginov (South Africa - 1967), Nahit Imre (Turkey - 1968), and Francis Roussilhe (France - 1969).

All United States governmental components have some individual internal responsibility for the security of personnel, records, and physical facilities. Aside from these basic security functions, the overall counterintelligence role in the United States Government is shared by several specific intelligence agencies. The conduct of counterintelligence overseas is one of CIA's original functions flowing from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and specifically spelled out and developed in a series of National Security Council Intelligence Directives. The FBI has the general responsibility for conduct of counterintelligence operations within the United States based on statutory responsibilities (enforcement of espionage, sabotage, neutrality, registration acts, and related matters) as well as a series of Presidential Directives and Attorney General orders.

Success of United States counterintelligence is proportionate to the extent to which it exists as an integrated, unified concept with fullest coordination among the separate agencies. It did not exist as such until World War II; and only small progress was made after that war, despite the National Security Act of 1947. An integrated system first began to take shape in 1958, when the National Security Council moved directly into the problem. Intelligence and counterintelligence directives which established the basic ground rules were formulated and placed in effect. As a result the United States has a set of counterintelligence concepts and precepts that organize our experience and hold us together. Throughout the recent years interagency coordination and cooperation have become a working reality, becoming more and more effective as the level of coordination continues to rise.

The effectiveness of counterintelligence also requires recognition of its separateness as a function. In CIA and elsewhere, before the mid-1950s, counterintelligence was often identified only with security and the ad hoc exchange of limited amounts of information in liaison. It was sometimes regarded as an adjunct to other specialities, usually espionage. This subordination degraded the function to its lowest level, to such necessary but elementary work as nametracing and operational bookkeeping. But these are only the elementary building blocks of the masonry of counterintelligence. If it is restricted to nothing more than that, American counterintelligence will inevitably degenerate to parochialism and departmentalism. It will not be responsive to a central and vital philosophy. It will tend to yield the initiative to the adversary and to the writing of damage reports after we have been hurt instead of seeking the adversary out and engaging him before he can hurt us.

In summary, the value of counterintelligence as an integral part of national defense requires a continuity of doctrine, an organization of experience, and must be sustained by a full-time, experienced cadre of specialists with continuing emphasis on interagency understanding and coordination.

~~SECRET~~

FACT SHEET
COMMUNIST-BLOC INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATION

There are presently 667 intelligence and security services operating throughout the world.

The 13 countries comprising the Soviet Union and other communist states, including Cuba, operate 52 services of domestic and foreign intelligence and security. Some 23 of these work outside their own frontiers. The principal service in action throughout the world against the United States and Americans--which our highest grade documentary sources confirm are termed "The Main Enemy" (Glavny Vrag)--is the Soviet State Security Service (KGB), together with Soviet military intelligence, the GRU, headed by a senior KGB officer.

Soviet intelligence representation in the Free World has been massively increasing for at least the past 16 years, as the following data show:

Year	Persons
1959	1,500
1966	2,490
1971	2,106
January, 1974	3,100 (est.)

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet intelligence services also direct communist parties--or, more accurately, certain sections of and individuals in such parties--for purposes of espionage and subversion abroad. During the period 1969-73, Soviet funding of non-bloc communist parties showed actual and estimated annual costs to be almost $17 million. But we do not have the quality of sources that would guarantee this as anything but a minimal figure.

The scope of the clandestine attack upon the United States is suggested by the number of identifiable recruitment approaches made to Americans by Soviet, bloc, Cuban, and Chinese services during the 9 years from 1965

~~SECRET~~

62-116395-42

through 1973, which totals 742. This averages out to 82 per year, or better than one recruitment attempt per week. These are the things we know. Our primary concerns now are those recruitment approaches that have been successful and where there has been no volunteering of information.

Communist-bloc officials assigned to legal establishments in the United States

Date	Soviets	Other	Total
9/61	333	285	518
9/71	707	459	1,166
1/75	1,078	1,015	2,093

Temporary visitors

	1972	1973	1974
Soviet Commercial Groups	81	370	466
Individuals	641	1,299	1,500
Soviet Special Exchange Groups	330	429	486
Individuals	1,944	2,024	2,683
Visits by Soviet Ships	26	267	219
Crew members	1,300	13,000	Not available

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: February 7, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall

9/25/00 SP2 ALM/JTG
CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
#MDR 16

SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

This communication is Secret - Sensitive since the information herein and in the attachments has been so classified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (S)

On 2/6/75 the writer was furnished the attached material by Mr. William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, during a meeting in his office which was also attended by Lt. General Lew Allen, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA). General Allen was provided copies of the same material. It includes a three-page statement containing a listing of categories of activities of subject matters that require stringent protection during testimony before the captioned Committee by any members of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The FBI had input in connection with the compilation of this information and the material we furnished has been included. (S)

Also among the material is a copy of a statement which Mr. Colby is hopeful of securing permission to present at the very beginning of the Select Committee hearings in order that he can emphasize the importance of and need for intelligence operations, ~~its processes~~, the processes for collection of intelligence, how they are controlled and overseen, why there is an overriding need for secrecy in certain areas and what Congress can do to enhance U.S. intelligence collections. (S)

The third paper lists eleven papers which Mr. Colby intends to turn over to the Committee whether or not he is permitted to make his opening statement. These papers supplement his statement and have been the subject of previous memoranda. The FBI has prepared the last two papers listed and is coordinating with all other interested Intelligence Community members to assure that all of the papers will be in such form as not to conflict with Bureau interests. (S)

EX-117 REC-38 62-116395-22

ENCLOSURE

A review of Mr. Colby's proposed opening statement has been made. Among the highlights are the following: (S)

6 FEB 20 1975

He points out (page 2) that it is important that our intelligence activities be viewed in proper perspective and that the few (S)

Enclosures
WRW:lml (6)
1 - Mr. Callahan (with enclosures)
1 - Mr. Adams (with enclosures)
1 - Mr. Mintz (with enclosures)
1 - Mr. Cregar (with enclosures)
1 - Mr. Wannall (with enclosures)

SECRET - SENSITIVE

84 MAR 3 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

instances of failure or error that may have occurred in the past be understood in context. He states we cannot operate effectively without more precise provisions in the law to protect our secrets. (S)

Referring on page 5 specifically to the FBI, he notes that intelligence collection on a worldwide basis contributes to our internal security. The efforts of foreign nations to penetrate our society and to manipulate our citizens are well documented. There are several hundred foreign members of the KGB and intelligence operatives in this country seeking information about the United States and its plans and their efforts must be met by an intensive counterintelligence effort. He states "Within the United States, this is the function of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Abroad, it is CIA's responsibility to identify the foreign agent before he arrives in America or to learn of the plans of foreign groups to try to subvert our institutions. To this traditional danger has been added a new threat of international terrorism. CIA's foreign and the FBI's domestic intelligence activities have collaborated to frustrate several plans to bring to America and its citizens the kind of hijacking and indiscriminate terrorist bombings that characterize too many areas of the world." (S)

Beginning at page 7, Mr. Colby undertakes to explain the processes of collecting intelligence and on page 10 briefly goes into the roles of the various intelligence components and the legislative bases for their activities. For example, he states the intelligence roles of the other members of the Intelligence Community in part stem from the 1947 Act and in part from separate legislation, such as that charging the FBI with responsibility for internal security, which I consider a correct statement. (S)

On page 11, he notes that all intelligence elements operate within legal authority and are given further direction by the National Security Council, but (page 13) "each of us in the Intelligence Community takes full personal responsibility for the actions recommended or taken in conformance with such general guidance and policy." (S)

He explains the role of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) whose "members are an impressive group of responsible Americans who report their independent views of the accomplishments and weaknesses of the Intelligence Community directly to the President." (S)

Following this, he notes that in addition to responding to various Congressional committees, the National Security Council and the PFIAB, all of which exercise oversight-type functions, the (S) intelligence agencies are exposed to audit-type functions exercised by the Office of Management and Budget, internal audit systems, the General Accounting Office, and the Director of Central Intelligence. (S)

On page 14, after referring to the manner in which the Intelligence Community functions through a series of committees and boards, Mr. Colby states that the work of such committees and boards is limited to foreign intelligence,"as internal security falls solely within the jurisdiction of the FBI. The FBI participates in the Intelligence Community effort, however, so that any contributions that foreign intelligence might make to internal security can be properly handled." (S)

On page 17, Mr. Colby expresses confidence that the American people not only support but insist upon an effective intelligence apparatus to protect their security and intelligence. Thereafter, referring to Congress, on page 17, he states "Just tell us in the intelligence business what the Nation wants and does not want, and we will do our best to satisfy it. But also give us a way openly to change these rules when the Nation expects them to be changed." He then calls upon Congress to organize itself to protect the necessary secrecy of our intelligence operations while exercising its responsibility for oversight. (S)

A review of Mr. Colby's proposed statement has revealed no information which I feel would be objectionable from the Bureau's standpoint.

ACTION:

For the Director's information.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT MATTER THAT NEED STRINGENT PROTECTION

I. The names of agents, informants, covert liaison contacts and operations or other identifying characteristics of sensitive clandestine sources

a. Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.

b. Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human source collection (2) employed by the FBI for internal security and counterintelligence purposes.

--The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment or emplacement of personnel within target organizations.

--Specific statements of the use of technical devices in agent operations.

--The total extent of recruitment or investigative effectiveness against any given target organization or individual, or lack thereof.

--Names of selected agency and/or ex-agency employees if revealed would endanger lives, operations or future utility.

--Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.

II. Relationships with Other Intelligence Services

a. Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries.

Classified by 056047
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category:
5B (1), [✓ (2)] (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

#moe16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-6-00 BY SP2ALM/ZTG

CLOSURE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

62-116395-22

b. Identifying collaborative operations between the United States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaboration or within a jointly targetted third country.

c. The nature of support provided or arrangements with foreign intelligence services supporting US technical collection operations.

d. Material and information provided to the US by a foreign service under conditions of continued secrecy.

III. Cryptologic and Communications Activities

a. Clandestine procurement of foreign cryptologic material.

b. Operations against foreign cryptologic installations.

c. Activities taken with the manufacturers of cryptologic devices in the U.S. and abroad.

d. Product of telephone taps or technical surveillance operations of foreigners or foreign facilities (U.S. and abroad).

e. Success of cryptologic operations against both friendly and unfriendly targets in the U.S. and abroad.

f. Covert signals intelligence collection including (1) assistance arrangements with commercial U.S. and foreign companies (2) taps (3) and from US installations abroad.

g. Collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved.

h. Protective communications security measures.

i. Efforts to collect exotic signals and locate transmissions especially critical to our work in ASW.

IV. Technical Intelligence

a. Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.

b. Details of specific covert communications systems, including secret writing, special agent equipment, etc.

c. Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country.

d. Identification of technical counter-measures techniques.

e. Characterization of emplacement of devices for technical collection of foreign intelligence, including techniques of emplacement.

f. Details of secure U.S. communications systems.

V. Other

a. Reference to covert action operations that would embarrass the U.S. Government or frustrate the purpose of the operation.

b. Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with U.S. and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence operations.

c. Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that provide privileged customers or collaboration or cover for foreign intelligence operations.

d. Names of firms collaborating with U.S. intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).

e. Details of covert contract techniques, covert contractors, and covert tax arrangements.

f. Nature of support to and from other agencies for operations against foreign intelligence targets.

g. The state of our intelligence on Soviet or PRC diplomatic or military intentions toward the United States or on the state of our intelligence on military technologies of these nations.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee

This Committee's inquiry and its conclusions and recommendations can open a new era in American intelligence and even in the intelligence profession worldwide. Historically, the intelligence activities of a state have been considered an essential function, but one conducted outside normal Government processes. Indeed, one foreign official recently expressed some surprise to me that our intelligence rests upon legislation enacted by the Congress and is subject to oversight and annual appropriation by the Congress. He commented that he had always considered it a matter private to the Executive. This Committee's charter demonstrates the contrary in America.

America has made many innovations in the intelligence process, and I believe we have brought ours to the highest peak of efficiency of any intelligence service in the world. Our Government's policies can now be based on factual information and demonstrable analysis rather than on hunches, circumstantial evidence, and overly qualified judgments that alone were available a few years ago.

With the assistance of my Intelligence Community colleagues, I hope to give this Committee the broadest possible look at these intelligence efforts of the United States.

#MORI6

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-6-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-22

I will also offer ideas for improvements that could help us do our job better.

It is important that our intelligence activities be viewed in proper perspective and that the few instances of failure or error that may have occurred in the past be understood in context.

We will welcome clear statements of the authority and mission assigned to American intelligence. I believe the public, including those engaged in the intelligence profession, are entitled to and are prepared to accept clarifications and new definitions. The Congress and the American people do not expect intelligence to be carried on in the shadows of euphemism and ambiguity. Nor can we operate effectively without more precise provisions in the law to protect our secrets. I believe our nation is ready to accept the necessity of reasonable secrecy in our intelligence operations in the same way it accepts the need for secrecy in diplomatic negotiations, in development of war plans, or in protecting newspaper sources.

I. The Importance of Intelligence

Mr. Chairman, American intelligence helps protect our country, it helps maintain peace in the world, and it helps our Government make better decisions affecting the welfare of every one of our citizens. It is not only responsible for warning us of imminent attack by a hostile power, these days it must also look into the future and warn of the research and development of new weapons systems which, unless countered or negotiated away, would affect the security of our citizens ten years hence.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of the contribution of intelligence to our security occurred in 1962 in the Cuban Missile Crisis. But this story began long before in the secret development of the U-2 aircraft to give us access to areas where we had always been blinded. Its flight over Cuba on October 14, 1962, provided the first certain evidence of the deployment of offensive missiles there, but intelligence during that crisis involved far more than the U-2. Through the entire apparatus of intelligence, a close watch was maintained over all the ways in which our national security might have been jeopardized, and it was precisely this centralized analysis of thousands of individual bits of information that provided our Government with reasoned assessments and estimates during the critical days of October 1962. These assessments drew on all types of technical, diplomatic, and military intelligence, and they were substantially assisted by the contribution made by at least one foreign agent who paid for his commitment with his life.

Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Community has not been idle since the development of the U-2, and the improvements that have been made have added a new dimension to the importance of intelligence today--its contribution to the maintenance of peace in the world.

As I believe is well known, the breakthrough in the Strategic Arms Limitations negotiations followed the development of our ability to monitor whether or not the other side is complying with the agreements made. To do so with respect to closed and suspicious societies, intelligence has had to invest hundreds of millions of dollars and heavy doses of imagination and technical genius.

We have not yet convinced all the nations that might pose a threat to us that our system of openness is the best for them as well as for us, so we must depend upon our intelligence to give us the means with which to negotiate with them and, at least, to limit, if not eliminate, the risks we both run in today's world.

The peace-keeping role of intelligence goes beyond strategic arms. There are a number of situations in which our knowledge of some local situation around the world was better than that of the participants. By bringing this knowledge to both sides, or to the one about to make a mistaken military move, intelligence has several times assisted in defusing a potential crisis and thus disproving our own predictions. This is a contribution of which we are proud, for our purpose is not merely to record facts pertaining to foreign situations but to help maintain security and peace as well.

Intelligence likewise contributes to our internal security. The efforts of foreign nations to penetrate our society and to manipulate our citizens are well documented. There are several hundred foreign members of the KGB and intelligence operatives in this country seeking information about the United States and its plans, and their efforts must be met by an intensive counterintelligence effort. Within the United States, this is the function of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Abroad, it is CIA's responsibility to identify the foreign agent before he arrives in America or to learn of the plans of foreign groups to try to subvert our institutions.

To this traditional danger has been added a new threat of international terrorism. CIA's foreign and the FBI's domestic intelligence activities have collaborated to frustrate several plans to bring to America and its citizens the kind of hijacking and indiscriminate terrorist bombings that characterize too many areas of the world. Intelligence has also contributed to the identification of international narcotics traffickers, reducing the threat this pernicious activity poses to the health of our citizens.

Major political and economic decisions are regularly made by our Government and by our Congress with assistance from our intelligence. These decisions range from the appropriate level of our defense budget to economic and monetary policy. In the past several years the Intelligence Community--CIA, and parts of State, and Treasury in particular--has paid considerable attention to international economics and related political issues. The interdependence of the world with respect to energy, food, raw materials, and service industries is increasing at a very rapid rate. The accompanying shifts in economic power and control can require future adjustments of grave importance to our country. American intelligence keeps watch on such foreign activities. Stated another way, it is becoming as important to our national security to watch the machinations of foreign cartel arrangements as to follow Soviet or Chinese missile development. Intelligence is critical to our country's economic negotiations and we are contributing materially.

Mr. Chairman, I indicated at the outset the importance of this Committee's getting a full appreciation for the contribution intelligence is making to our country. But foremost in this process is the Intelligence Community's reputation for objectivity in our intelligence assessments. We do not claim that intelligence analysis provides a scientific procedure for reaching decisions. We do feel it provides an essential mechanism for giving visibility to the issues for the policymaker. Our job is to provide an independent and objective analysis based upon a wide range of confidential sources and technical inputs. The organization of the Intelligence Community is designed to provide this independence and objectivity.

II. The American Intelligence Process

Mr. Chairman, I would like to cover briefly the American intelligence process, as I believe it is grossly misunderstood by many quarters who associate it almost exclusively with the spectacular images of James Bond, Mata Hari, or even Maxwell Smart. American intelligence is first and foremost an intellectual exercise that encompasses the following steps:

1. The collection and assembly of raw information from all sources available to the U.S. Government, ranging from overt news dispatches to data from the most secret technical devices or agents;
2. The assessment of the validity of the raw information;
3. The analysis of the information and the development of objective conclusions and judgments; and
4. The presentation of the findings to policy makers in a clear, succinct, and timely fashion.

The collection process involves acquiring open information wherever this is possible. This information largely comes from abroad but also here in the United States from knowledgeable citizens and Government officers whose missions are well understood and accepted in international life, such as Foreign Service Officers, Defense, Treasury, and even Commercial and Agricultural Attaches. To this is added the information collected by technical means. Today these give us access to areas never before seen. Electronic marvels identify details we never hoped to know, and computers select and store masses of detail never before manageable. These ways to collect are supplemented by clandestine collection for those matters and in those societies where open or technical collection cannot provide the secret war plans, the research idea before it is visible, or a perception of authoritarian political dynamics.

After the material is collected, it must be processed or analyzed. Again the electronic and computer worlds have added new dimensions to our potential to extract valuable information from hitherto incomprehensible indicators, although, alas, the computer has also increased the incomprehensibility of some of the systems we try to identify.

The analytical process is the smallest of our categories of expenditure, but upon the integrity, the objectivity, and the expertise of this body of men and women rests the real fruit of the whole process--reasoned assessments of developments abroad today and in the future.

An essential element of the process is the presentation of intelligence to those who make the decisions for our nation. In our society this is not restricted to the Executive but also includes the Congress and the public. As a consequence, intelligence has endeavored to bring its product to the Congress and even to the public through unclassified publications where possible, through classified testimony in executive session that is later reviewed so we can release all information that does not reveal our sources and methods, and through informal discussion with journalists and the academic community where conclusions can be debated but sources omitted.

In addition, the Department of Defense has regularly made available the results of the intelligence process, the best example perhaps being the way we followed in the news media the development and testing of the generation of Soviet missiles now being deployed. When such material is consciously released, it can be done in a form that allows the Congress and the public to benefit from the conclusions and assessments involved but still protects the sources and methods by which we reach them. Unfortunately, their revelation by individuals without authorization can result in the exposure of the source or technique by which we learn the information.

Mr. Chairman, the National Security Act of 1947 was the foundation stone for this American intelligence process. At that time, intelligence was deemed by our country to be a matter which should be protected from public exposure. Thus, the specifics of the intelligence process and its authorities were deliberately expressed in general language and left by that statute to be specified in classified directives by the National Security Council. The CIA Act of 1949 further recognized the importance of this secrecy to intelligence and specifically exempted the CIA from the publication of the "organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency.

The intelligence roles of the other members of the Intelligence Community in part stem from the 1947 Act and in part from separate legislation, such as that charging the FBI with responsibility for internal security, the AEC, now ERDA, with its security authorities, and other laws such as Public Law 86-36, which provides the National Security Agency the authority to function without disclosing information that would endanger its cryptologic functions. All intelligence elements operate within legal authority. All are given further direction by the National Security Council.

Those Acts, however, were not the end of Congress' role with respect to intelligence. Intelligence operates on annual appropriations, it reports to a variety of Congressional committees, and the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence are appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate after hearings which, in the cases of General Walters and me, included open sessions.

Congress long ago made special arrangements to handle oversight and appropriations for intelligence. The consistent position of the Executive Branch in this regard has been that it would respond to any way in which the Congress organized itself to conduct this oversight and appropriations process. To this, as indicated earlier, I add my own concern that this process be conducted in a manner that preserves the secrecy upon which intelligence must rest.

In tune with the times, we have in more recent years, and not just in my Directorship, become increasingly responsive to Congress both in executive session and in open session. For example, in 1974, I appeared before thirteen committees or subcommittees on twenty-five occasions.

These were supplemented by informal responses or briefings to interested members on a frequent basis. The result has been greater exposure of the substance of our intelligence process to assist Congress in its decisionmaking, as well as a few untoward exposures of our sources and methods. I hope that this Committee sets out clearer arrangements with both houses so that we can make available the substance of our intelligence to assist in your decisionmaking while protecting the intelligence sources and methods.

The Executive Branch directs and supervises the intelligence apparatus to insure that our intelligence agencies work together for the common goal without duplication or bureaucratic conflict. At the head of the structure is, of course, the National Security Council, pursuant to statute. The Council itself has issued general directives to the Intelligence Community, and the subcommittees established under the Council give more frequent guidance and direction to our effort. Certain subcommittees focus on current crises and call for intelligence coverage thereof, certain work on longer term problems that require intelligence analysis, and certain review the work of the Intelligence Community in specified fields. I will not get into the bureaucratic detail necessary to clarify this at this session, although I certainly expect to do so in the future. I would like, however, to state my belief that the Intelligence Community receives appropriate general guidance and direction from the National Security Council and its committees. However, the Intelligence Community itself is responsible for recommending actions needed or for recommending the best way to accomplish the general goals set out by policy leaders. Thus, general policy direction stems from the National Security Council, but each of us in the Intelligence Community takes full personal responsibility for the actions recommended or taken in conformance with such general guidance and policy.

An independent review of the effectiveness of our intelligence effort is conducted by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This Board over the years has had an important role in stimulating and supporting improvements in our intelligence machinery. Its members are an impressive group of responsible Americans who report their independent views of the accomplishments and the weaknesses of the Intelligence Community directly to the President.

Also in the Executive Branch, the Office of Management and Budget conducts through a compartmented unit the same type of budget review of the work of the Intelligence Community as it does of any department.

The Intelligence Community is also subject to intensive audit, both internally within the departments and agencies involved, and to the extent feasible by the General Accounting Office. Even in those areas exempted by law from GAO review, our internal procedures follow the same standards and practices of audit and accounting that apply to the other components of the Government.

Lastly, consistent with the policy outlined in Section 102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence has been charged by the President with providing overall leadership to the Intelligence Community. He has been directed to review all expenditures for foreign intelligence within the Government and make an annual recommendation to the President as to the appropriate level thereof. This charge requires him to insure that the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies give us the best intelligence product at the least cost.

The Intelligence Community functions through a series of committees and boards that bring the different agencies together. I have submitted an annex to this presentation outlining these relationships. The work of these committees and boards is limited to foreign intelligence, as internal security falls solely within the jurisdiction of the FBI. The FBI participates in the Intelligence Community effort, however, so that any contributions that foreign intelligence might make to internal security can be properly handled. I will not take your time here to describe all of these bureaucratic arrangements, but I would like to stress the scope and complexity of the Community so that its individual elements can be understood.

The collection of raw information consumes the highest percentage of the resources devoted to intelligence. Large sums are required for the complex technical systems I mentioned earlier. In addition, the very substantial increases in military and civilian personnel costs over recent years have put a large burden on our intelligence budget despite reductions in personnel. In conformity with the Senate's vote on June 4th, 1974, I do not propose to discuss these figures publicly, but I do believe that you will be impressed with the way the Intelligence Community has increased its productivity over the years and also reduced its size and focused its effort in order to adjust to inflation.

III. The Needs of Intelligence

Mr. Chairman, in recognition of the fundamental purpose of this Select Committee, I indicated early in my statement that I wanted to outline for you some of the ways in which our

Intelligence Community might be improved so as to open a new era in American intelligence. In this context, I believe this Committee may want to focus particularly on the role and procedures of intelligence in the future as well as in the past.

First, Mr. Chairman, I believe it essential to clarify for the Congress and the people of America, as well as the personnel in our Intelligence Community, the authorities, the limitations, and the mission of American intelligence. When President Eisenhower assumed full responsibility for sending a U-2 over the Soviet Union, and President Kennedy for the Bay of Pigs, they repudiated in the name of the American people the old concept of intelligence being disowned. I am confident that our people not only support but insist upon an effective intelligence apparatus to protect their security and welfare. I believe, however, that they want the role of intelligence clearly spelled out, they want controls adequate to prevent abuse, and they also want necessary secrecy protected.

In my confirmation hearing, I suggested the word "foreign" be inserted each time the word "intelligence" appears in the charter of the CIA, to make crystal clear its proper function and to end any possible "gray area" in its authority. Legislation was introduced in the last Congress that would do this and would also clarify the proper role of the Agency within the United States. I welcome such clarification of our authority and any limitation on our activities desired by the people of this country. Just tell us in the intelligence business what the nation wants and does not want, and we will do our best to satisfy it. But also give us a way openly to change these rules when the nation expects them to be changed.

With respect to oversight of our activities, Mr. Chairman, I have described the current procedures. I believe they are sufficient on the Executive side, and I reiterate that the organization of the Congress to carry out its responsibilities is not a matter for my determination or recommendation. I do honestly request and trust, however, that the Congress will organize itself to protect the necessary secrecy of our intelligence operations while exercising its responsibilities for oversight.

Lastly, I most earnestly request of the Congress some improvement in our ability to protect the secrets necessary to effective intelligence operations. The spectacle that we are presenting to the world of being unable to prevent ex-employees from revealing their knowledge of intimate relations with individuals and friendly intelligence services who put their trust in us is raising a substantial question as to our ability to obtain information from such sources in the future. The revelation of our activities from a series of leaks of supposedly secret testimony makes it impossible to contemplate the initiation of sensitive operations today under procedures that require their exposure to a large number of reviewing bodies. The issue of whether we should again adopt Secretary Stimson's view that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail" (and that we live in a world of gentlemen) should be faced squarely and openly by the Congress and not through irresponsible individual exposures.

IV. Cooperation with the Committee

Mr. Chairman, I assure you, as I did on the telephone when you were named, of my most sincere intention to cooperate with you and this Committee in its work. I look forward to your, as well as our, contribution of ideas to the shaping of the new era that American intelligence can have if we do our work well. By my presence here I indicate my intention to be as open and public as I can be during your proceedings. There will be, however, many matters which, I am sure you will agree, can only be handled effectively in executive session. For this purpose, your staffs have been given appropriate clearances by the committee, and I urge that you take steps to insure not only that they will abide by the Committee's rules but also that you have the legal ability similar to the one we use for our employees to require any later exposure of such matters to occur only after you have had a chance to review whether they may improperly reveal sensitive information.

There are some matters, Mr. Chairman, which I am required under the statute and as a professional to protect against any chance of exposure. The names of our agents, the names of many patriotic Americans who have worked with us, and the specifics of a number of our costly and delicate technical systems are so important, Mr. Chairman, that I believe an additional level of secrecy is necessary to protect them. The lives of individuals are at stake, and we cannot put them to risk. There are also cases where the reputations and future prospects of a number of patriotic Americans who have helped or contributed to our intelligence process could be jeopardized if their associations are revealed openly and then twisted in the press through misunderstanding or by hostile opponents. American intelligence cannot hope to have any future if it repudiates the understanding of confidentiality upon which cooperation was extended to it. There are also a range of specific methods for gathering information which needs to be secret. Hundreds of millions of dollars in complex technical equipment can be made worthless if the access it provides to foreign secrets is exposed.

An exposure is a one-time sensation, and American intelligence today is suffering internally and abroad from a series of exposures and sensational exaggerations which have raised questions among many of our foreign individual and official sources, and also among our personnel. Whether the Intelligence Community can continue its contribution to our nation's security and welfare and the maintenance of peace in the world will depend on our ability to conduct this review without further exposures. Thus, I do not propose to provide these details, but if one becomes of particular importance to the work of the Committee, I will certainly consult with you and the ranking minority member to determine the best course of action. I stress this, Mr. Chairman, as we have but one chance to avoid unwarranted disclosures which can ruin the lives or the futures of people and institutions which put their trust in our nation through its intelligence service. I believe that you and the Committee will want to fulfill that trust, and that this Committee's inquiry can be comprehensive and searching without violating it.

Mr. Chairman, I have not discussed the newspaper allegations that led to this Committee's formation. I have reported fully on this to the President, to the President's Commission, and to the Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. I am submitting for the record of this Committee my remarks there and am, of course, prepared to expand on them. I believe it only appropriate here to deny flatly, as I have already, that CIA conducted a "massive illegal domestic intelligence operation."

I have also submitted for the record a number of annexes to this statement, mostly in classified form, in order to set out for the use of the Committee and its staff some further detail about our intelligence apparatus and its work. I am, of course, available for further questioning here today and to cover classfied questions in Executive Session when this may prove to be necessary. I hope that out of the Committee's work will come a better public understanding of the role and functioning of American intelligence today and that the Committee's recommendations for improvements in our authority, procedures, and protection may indeed be looked back on in the future as the initiation of a new era in American intelligence.

We in American intelligence are proud to be of service to our country, and we firmly believe that the personnel of American intelligence, and my predecessors in this post, have served their country well over the years. We are equally convinced that our intelligence profession will serve the country well in the new era of American intelligence being launched by this Committee.

Thank you.

SECRET

LIST OF ANNEXES

		Drafter
A.	The Nature and Purpose of Intelligence	CIA
B.	The Intelligence Process	DIA
C.	Mission and Functions Statements for all Elements of the Intelligence Community	DCI/IC
D.	Intelligence Community Oversight and DCI Role	DCI/IC
E.	Description of Intelligence Community Resources and Capabilities	DCI/IC
F.	A Description of the Committees of the USIB and IRAC	DCI/IC
G.	Intelligence and the Law: Description of Suggested Changes Now Before the Congress	CIA/JUSTICE/ DCI/IC
H.	A Listing of External Reviews of Intelligence Community Agencies	DCI/IC
J.	The Role of Security in CIA and the Intelligence Community	CIA
K.	The Nature and Purpose of Counterintelligence	FBI/CIA
L.	The Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan (Will also cover Intelligence Evaluation Committee and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Unit)	FBI/Justice Dept.

62-116395-29

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-6-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTK
#mDR16

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

Classified by 056047
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category:
5B (1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE

The Attorney General

February 20, 1975

Director, FBI

FmDR 16
9/25/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Reference is made to a telephone conversation between Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman and Mr. James Adams, Deputy Associate Director, FBI, on February 14, 1975.

This will confirm the authorization provided by Mr. Silberman to Mr. Adams with regard to permitting CIA to furnish a memorandum dated February 7, 1966, entitled "Central Intelligence Agency Operations in the United States," to Mr. Samuel R. Preston, Senior Staff Member, House Appropriations Committee. For your information, attached is a copy of this memorandum.

It is our understanding that Mr. Preston telephonically contacted Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and requested all written agreements between the FBI and CIA be furnished him for the use of the House Appropriations Committee.

MAILED 2
FEB 20 1975
FBI

Enclosure

62-116395

REC-59

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)

WOC:ebc
(8)

FEB 21 1975

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. Wannall, dated 2/18/75, captioned "SENSTUDY 75," prepared by WOC:ebc.

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 FEB 20 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 2/7/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS Form
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

Removed By 7 9 MAR 3 1975

File Number 62-116395-20

Permanent Serial Charge Out

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Bassett

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TOL

DATE: 2/7/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Fulton
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett, dated 2/6/75, recommended that Section Chief William O. Cregar, the Bureau's representative on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, be authorized to concur in recommendations dealing with proposals to protect the integrity of classified documents which will necessarily be provided to the Select Committee of the Senate (SCS) during forthcoming hearings. Referenced memorandum was approved subject to a recommended change by Inspector J.E. Herington, Legal Counsel Division.

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community met on the morning of 2/7/75, at which time the above-described Paper was considered. The change of language offered by Inspector Herington was submitted to the Group for consideration and was adopted. No substantive changes in the Paper were made and the over-all Paper was approved.

These security proposals will now be discussed with Senator Church and his staff by Mr. Colby's staff in an effort to insure proper protection of classified documents that might be presented during forthcoming SCS testimony.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

REC-59 62-116395-19

62-116395

EX-112

FEB 19 1975

WOC:ebc
(8)

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/TG

84 FEB 26 1975

NATIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J.B. Adams DATE: 1-24-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FBI OVERSIGHT

On 1-23-75 Tom Hart, Professional Staff Member, Senate Judiciary Committee, advised Inspector John B. Hotis that the creation in the Senate of a Select Committee on Intelligence Operations raises serious questions about the future of the FBI Oversight Subcommittee. The Select Committee will make a final report to the Senate in September, together with recommendations as to any new legislation that might be necessary. It is possible that a new committee dealing solely with the intelligence community may be created or that recommendations will be made that there be stronger oversight by the parent committee.

Hart said that he is troubled over the mounting pressures in the Congress to reduce the power and effectiveness of the Bureau. He feels that is what is behind the "phony stories" that have suddenly been circulating about Bureau files on Congressmen. Even some of the "right wing Republicans," he said, are attempting to capitalize on the controversy, hoping thereby to take some of the criticism away from former President Nixon.

REC 68 62-115675-79

He said that some of the younger Senators are attempting to take over the oversight responsibilities on the grounds that Senators Eastland and McClellan have been overly protective of the Bureau. It is important, therefore, that the Oversight Subcommittee show some immediate activity. As soon as the confirmation hearings on Attorney General Designate Levi are completed, Hart will go to the Rules Committee to get budget approval for the Oversight Subcommittee.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP2 ALM

#MD016

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116395-

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
2 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Congressional Services Unit
1 - Mr. Reed
1 - Mr. Hotis

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
46 FEB 27 1975

EX JAN 31 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

JBH:mbk
(8)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

51 FEB 28 1975

Professor John Elliff and two interns have been preparing materials for the committee regarding the foreign counterintelligence functions of the Bureau and it is expected that hearings will be scheduled in mid-February.

D.C.

Hart added that he does not know who the new members of the Oversight Subcommittee will be at this time. It could include Senators Tunney, Hart, or Kennedy. This determination will be made later this month.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

J. B. ADAMS
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE · FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

2/12/75

Senstudy 75

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep. AD-Adm.
- Dep. AD-Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin.
- Comp. Syst.
- Ext. Affairs
- Files & Com.
- Gen. Inv.
- Ident.
- Inspection ✓
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Plan. & Eval.
- Spec. Inv.
- Training
- Legal Coun.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

TO MR. KELLEY:

The original, after being approv
Mr. Callahan and me, was furnished to Mr
for his use as an annex to his prepared stat
before the Senate Committee.

J. B. ADAMS

JBA:ams

REC-59

62-116395-18

112

FEB 20 1975

5-W06

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/TC
#MDR 16

J. B. ADAMS
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE · FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

2/12/75

Senstudy 75

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep. AD Adm. ——
Dep. AD Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

TO MR. KELLEY:

Attached is a memorandum re
approval of an annex to be furnished to M
entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Hu
Plan." Also enclosed is a proposed anne
Intelligence Evaluation Committee prepa
Department since the Committee was a D
function. Both were prepared from existing records, do not involve any policy statement and, accordingly, upon approval by Mr. Callahan and myself were transmitted to Mr. Colby.

J. B. ADAMS

REC-59 62-116395-17

EX-112 FEB 20 1975

JBA:ams

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

84 FEB 26 1975

#mpe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-25-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
(NO CONTENTS ENCLOSED WHEN REVIEWED)

62 11 15-17

ENVELOPE

EMPTY

Official DocLab Instruction(s) – Revised 10-Apr-2014

January 27, 1975

Honorable John O. Pastore
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Pastore:

I have had an opportunity to read the remarks you made January 21st on the Senate floor when you presented a resolution to establish a select committee to conduct a study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

I want you to know of my sincere appreciation for your very generous comments concerning me and I am pleased by your insistence on a completely fair and objective investigation. I welcome the opportunity to appear before the distinguished members of the Senate to discuss all matters of interest to the committee.

#MDR16

9/25/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

Sincerely yours,
Clarence

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

EX-110

1 - Boston -- Enclosure
1 - Congressional Services Office - Enclosure

JWS:bjy (6)

REC-3 116395-16

JAN 29 1975

1 - ENCLOSURE

MAILED 6
1975
FBI

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

57 FEB [illegible] 1975

JCW

JWF

GPO 954-546

SENATE RESOLUTION 21—R[illegible]LUTION RELATING TO INVES[illegible]IGATION AND STUDY OF GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES—PLACED UNDER "RESOLUTIONS AND MOTIONS OVER, UNDER THE RULE"

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I send to the desk a resolution and ask for its immediate consideration.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection?

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I understand that this is the resolution having to do with the CIA.

Mr. MANSFIELD. With the intelligence community.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. With the intelligence community.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not think we should emphasize the CIA too much, because it is the intelligence community. I think that should be understood.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will report the resolution.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, to establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

Mr. MANSFIELD addressed the Chair.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I have reserved the right to object.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, so that it will be fully understood, that the resolution be read in full.

Mr. PASTORE. That is right.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will report the resolution in full.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

S. Res. 21

Resolved, To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government or by any persons, acting individually or in combination with others, with respect to any intelligence activity carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That (a) there is hereby established a select committee of the Senate which may be called, for convenience of expression, the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities to conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in, by any agency or by any persons, acting either individually or in combination with others, in carrying out any intelligence or surveillance activities by or on behalf of any agency of the Federal Government.

(b) The select committee created by this resolution shall consist of eleven Members of the Senate, six to be appointed by the President of the Senate from the majority Members of the Senate upon the recommendation of the Majority Leader of the Senate, and five minority Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate upon the recommendation of the Minority Leader of the Senate.

For the purposes of paragraph 6 of Rule 25 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, ser[illegible]ice of a Senator as a member, chairman, or vice chairman of the select committee shall not be taken into account.

(c) The majority members of the committee shall select a chairman and the minority members shall select a vice chairman and the committee shall adopt rules and procedures to govern its proceedings. The vice chairman shall preside over meetings of the select committee during the absence of the chairman, and discharge such other responsibilities as may be assigned to him by the select committee or the chairman. Vacancies in the membership of the select committee shall not affect the authority of the remaining members to execute the functions of the select committee and shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments to it are made.

(d) A majority of the members of the select committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but the select committee may affix a lesser number as a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony or depositions.

SEC. 2. The select committee is authorized and directed to do everything necessary or appropriate to make the investigations and study specified in subsection (a) of the first section. Without abridging in any way the authority conferred upon the select committee by the preceding sentence, the Senate further expressly authorizes and directs the select committee to make a complete investigation and study of the activities of any agency or of any and all persons or groups of persons or organizations of any kind which have any tendency to reveal the full facts with respect to the following matters or questions:

(1) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has conducted an illegal domestic intelligence operation in the United States.

(2) The conduct of domestic intelligence or counter-intelligence operations against U.S. citizens by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other Federal agency.

(3) The origin and disposition of the so-called "Huston Plan" to apply United States intelligence agency capabilities against individuals or organizations within the United States.

(4) The extent to which the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies coordinate their respective activities, any agreements which govern that coordination, and the extent to which a lack of coordination has contributed to activities or actions which are illegal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or contrary to the intent of Congress.

(5) The extent to which the operation of domestic intelligence or counter-intelligence activities and the operation of any other activities within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency conforms to the legislative charter of that agency and the intent of the Congress.

(6) The past and present interpretation by the Director of Central Intelligence of the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods as it relates to the provision in section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3)) that ". . . that the agency shall have no police, subpena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions. . . ."

(7) Nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities.

(8) The need for specific legislative authority to govern the operations of any intelligence agencies of the Federal Government now existing without that explicit statutory authority, including but not limited to agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

The nature and extent to which Federal agencies cooperate and exchange intelligence information and the adequacy of any regulations or statutes which govern such cooperation and exchange of intelligence information.

(9) The extent to which United States intelligence agencies are governed by executive orders, rules, or regulations either published or secret and the extent to which those executive orders, rules, or regulations interpret, expand or are in conflict with specific legislative authority.

(10) The violation or suspected violation of any State or Federal statute by any intelligence agency or by any person by or on behalf of any intelligence agency of the Federal Government including but not limited to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wiretaps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of the United States mail, or the monitoring of the United States mail.

(11) The need for improved, strengthened, or consolidated oversight of United States intelligence activities by the Congress.

(12) Whether any of the existing laws of the United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities, and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related agencies.

(13) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of expenditure and effort in the collection and processing of intelligence information by United States agencies.

(14) The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in the United States and abroad.

(15) Such other related matters as the committee deems necessary in order to carry out its responsibilities under section (a).

SEC. 3(a). To enable the select committee to make the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the Senate hereby empowers the select committee as an agency of the Senate (1) to employ and fix the compensation of such clerical, investigatory, legal, technical, and other assistants as it deems necessary or appropriate, but it may not exceed the normal Senate salary schedules; (2) to sit and act at any time or place during sessions, recesses, and adjournment periods of the Senate; (3) to hold hearings for taking testimony on oath or to receive documentary or physical evidence relating to the matters and questions it is authorized to investigate or study; (4) to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance as witnesses of any persons who the select committee believes have knowledge or information concerning any of the matters or questions it is authorized to investigate and study; (5) to require by subpena or order any department, agency, officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, or any private person, firm, or corporation, to produce for its consideration or for use as evidence in its investigation and study any books, checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications, document, papers, physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials relating to any of the matters or questions it is authorized to investigate and study which they or any of them may have in their custody or under their control; (6) to make to the Senate any recommendations it deems appropriate in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any person to answer questions or give testimony in his character as a witness during his appearance before it, or in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government or any person, firm, or corporation to produce before the committee any books, checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications, document, financial records, papers, physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials in obedience to any sub-

#MDR16

SP2 ALM/KTG

9/25/06

ENCLOSURE

98WS

pena or order; (7) to take depos[illegible]s and other testimony on oath anywhere within the United States or in any other country; (8) to procure the temporary or intermittent services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof, in the same manner and under the same conditions as a standing committee of the Senate may procure such services under section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946; (9) to use on a reimbursable basis, with the prior consent of the Committee on Rules and Administration, the services of personnel of any such department or agency; (10) to use on a reimbursable basis or otherwise with the prior consent of the chairman of any subcommittee of any committee of the Senate the facilities or services of any members of the staffs of such other Senate committees or any subcommittees of such other Senate committees whenever the select committee or its chairman deems that such action is necessary or appropriate to enable the select committee to make the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution; (11) to have direct access through the agency of any members of the select committee or any of its investigatory or legal assistants designated by it or its chairman or the ranking minority member to any data, evidence, information, report, analysis, or document or papers relating to any of the matters or questions which it is authorized and directed to investigate and study in the custody or under the cotrol of any department, agency, officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, including any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States Government having the power under the laws of the United States to investigate any alleged criminal activities or to prosecute persons charged with crimes against the United States and any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States Government having the authority to conduct intelligence or surveillance within or outside the United States, without regard to the jurisdiction or authority of any other Senate committee, which will aid the select committee to prepare for or conduct the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution; and (12) to expend to the extent it determines necessary or appropriate any moneys made available to it by the Senate to perform the duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this resolution and to make the investigation and study it is authorized by this resolution to make.

(b) Subpenas may be issued by the select committee acting through the chairman or any other member designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or other member anywhere within the borders of the United States. The chairman of the select committee, or any other member thereof, is hereby authorized to administer oaths to any witnesses appearing before the committee.

(c) In preparing for or conducting the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the select committee shall be empowered to exercise the powers conferred upon committees of the Senate by section 6002 of title 18 of the United States Code or any other Act of Congress regulating the granting of immunity to witnesses.

SEC. 4. The select committee shall have authority to recommend the enactment of any new legislation or the amendment of any existing statute which it considers necessary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the national security, intelligence, or surveillance activities of the United States and to protect the rights of United States citizens with regard to those activities.

SEC. 5. The select committee shall make a final report of the results of the investigation and study conducted by it pursuant to this resolution, together with its findings and its recommendations as to new congressional legislation it deems necessary or desirable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but no later than September 1, 1975. The select committee may also submit to the Senate such interim reports as it considers appropriate. After submission of its final report, the select committee shall have three calendar months to close its affairs, and on the expiration of such three calendar months shall cease to exist.

SEC. 6. The expenses of the select committee through September 1, 1975, under this resolution shall not exceed $750,000 of which amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be available for the procurement of the services of individual consultants or organizations thereof. Such expenses shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the select committee.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the resolution?

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I do so in order, first, to make the point that what we are really trying to do here is agree on a time to vote on this resolution if we can. It may be necessary to object formally to get the matter on the calendar. If so, I will be prepared to object for that purpose.

I am not objecting to the early consideration of the resolution. The distinguished majority leader and I have discussed the possibility of an early vote. I personally am in accord with that.

I should like to ask one question for the benefit of the legislative history: It is my understanding that it would be the intention of the majority that the vice chairman of the committee will be a member of the minority party.

Mr. PASTORE. That is correct, and it is so specified in the resolution.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Texas, if I may, who may also wish to reserve the right to object.

Mr. TOWER. I have nothing to add to what the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania has said, except to express the hope that when the objection is formally raised, we can consent to get the resolution on the calendar as soon as possible; Monday, if possible.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. For the purpose of achieving that, I can object now.

I object.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The objection is heard. The resolution will go over under the rule.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding the objection, the resolution be placed on the calendar at this time to save the time of the Senate. I do so because it is not anticipated at the moment that we will be in tomorrow, and perhaps not on Thursday. We will be in Friday. It is for that reason that I make this unanimous-consent request.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I have no objection.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered. The resolution is placed on the calendar.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I have notified Senators STENNIS and MCCLELLAN of what was going to happen today and have also discussed the matter with the distinguished Republican leader and the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. TOWER.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I do want to say, while the resolution is before the Senate, that there is no intention here to conduct a witch hunt. There is no one in the Senate who has more appreciation or more respect for the necessity for a CIA, a civilian intelligence agency, a military intelligence agency, and an FBI in order to guarantee the security and the survival of this great Republic. But in recent weeks and in recent months there have been charges and counter charges spelled out on the front page of every newspaper in this country. The matter has been discussed over television and radio. The people of America are confused. They are asking themselves, "What is actually happening to these organizations which are essential for the security and the survival of our great Nation?"

In order to clear the air, in order to cleanse whatever abuses there have been in the past, so that we can put these agencies on the right track, so that we can recite, once and for all, the proper parameters within which they can function, I am afraid we will do irreparable harm to the security and the survival of the country unless we do this.

It was for that reason, Mr. President, that I introduced this resolution before the Democratic conference. I made it plain at the time that in my judgment there are no three greater Americans than Colby, Helms, and Kelley. I know all three, I have worked with all three, and I have found them to be distinguished gentlemen who are patriotic and love this country as much as any other Americans, without any doubt at all.

But there has been abuse. They have been influenced in making their judgments, and these influences, I am afraid, have come from on high, may times right out of the Oval Room of the White House, and sometimes from some underlings at the White House.

We had the instance before our committee where Ehrlichman called up the Deputy Director of the CIA and instructed him to give disguise paraphernalia to Mr. Hunt. The question is, Under whose authority? Who was Ehrlichman? Was it within the purview of the statute? Was it in conformity with the charter that established the CIA?

These are questions that have to be resolved, because we want the CIA to be responsive to the President of the United States directly, and not indirectly. We want him to be responsible to the Congress that is responsible, in turn, to the people of this country. It is for that reason that this investigation is being conducted and this resolution is before this body.

It was argued by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi that this falls within the purview and the jurisdiction of his own Armed Services Committee. As a matter of fact, when we talk about jurisdiction, we also have the Foreign Relations Committee, we have the Appropriations Committee, and I do not think we are ever going to get around discussing the question of jurisdiction unless we get it into a select committee. If we get it into the Appropriations Com-

2

mittee or the Armed Services Committee, I am afraid we are going back again to the question of seniority, the seniority complex that has disturbed so many people.

I am not against putting senior Members on this select committee, but we have a wealth, we have a reservoir of competence in this body, of people who have not settled their minds or prejudiced themselves one way or the other. Frankly, I must say, from my own contact with these two agencies, I am a little prejudiced, myself, in favor of the CIA, of military intelligence, and of the FBI. I am chairman of the subcommittee that funds the FBI. In my humble opinion, there is no man I respect more than Clarence Kelley. I think he is a fine American, and I think he is an excellent police officer; no question about it. I have no fault to find with him, and fundamentally, I have no fault to find with anybody, except that we want the right thing done.

We are not going to conduct a witch hunt in this case. We are not out to get anyone's scalp. What we are trying to do is to serve America. This is an open society. Even in an open society, sometimes we have to have a secret organization. The big question is, To whom are they responsible? Who got us into Cambodia? Who got us into Laos? Who got us into the Bay of Pigs? Who got us into Chile? Who got us in all over the world, and under whose authority, and why was not the Congress told?

Here we are; we passed the war powers bill in order to restrict the power to declare war and require that Congress be consulted, and we find now they can do it surreptitiously through the CIA or through some other agency of Government. This is all wrong, Mr. President, and it should be rectified. I hope that the majority leader and the minority leader will pick out competent personnel, of whom we have enough here in the Senate, and that they will conduct a hearing, that they will protect the secrecy of the CIA, the FBI, and the military intelligence, and that they will not spread it out publicly and thus injure this Nation.

I think we have that competence. I think we have the responsibility to do that. And after all, the Armed Services Committee, the Appropriations Committee, and the Foreign Relations Committee are not so sanctified that they are the only ones who can do it.

The only thing I am saying is, let us spread this out. Let us widen our scope, and let us pick out men who will devote themselves to this task, who are not already too much involved with other responsibilities in the Senate, and can get on and do this job that needs to be done, and report back to the people.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. KENNEDY. I wonder if I could direct the Senator's attention to certain provisions of the resolution, and ask his interpretation of such provisions.

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator may.

Mr. KENNEDY. The first resolve clause, refers to establishing a "select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study," and then I draw particular attention to these words, "of Government operations with respect to intelligence activities."

I want to find out from the author of the resolution whether he interprets those particular words to include covert actions as well as literal intelligence-gathering activities, including the full range of Central Intelligence Agency activities such as the paramilitary operations, propaganda, subversion, destabilization, operation of proprietary companies, and counterintelligence. The inquiry would thus include, for example, activities like the secret war in Laos, Operation Phoenix, and destabilization of the Government of Chile.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The 10 minutes of the Senator from Montana has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for an additional 10 minutes, and yield that additional time to the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PASTORE. The answer is "Yes." If they fall within the purview of any of the activities of these agencies; and whether these actions are performed domestically or abroad, the resolution is very specific in that respect. The answer is yes.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator. I believe this is again referred to in subsection 2(14) of the resolution, where it concludes with reference to "the extent and necessity of covert intelligence activities in the United States and abroad.

Mr. PASTORE. That is correct.

Mr. KENNEDY. I bring this up because one might later argue that the resolution does not cover some of the activities the CIA has been involved in because they are not literally "intelligence activities," and therefore that they are not subject to the scope of the resolution.

Mr. PASTORE. No.

Mr. KENNEDY. But quite clearly, as I have listened to the Senator here on the floor and also to his explanation in the caucus, the scope of the resolution covers all of these matters I have just referred to, and they would be so included in the inquiry authorized by the resolution.

Mr. PASTORE. That is correct; and the majority leader will address himself to that point; that this is not to be construed in any limited way, that it has to be given a broad interpretation, and that interpretation will be the interpretation of the committee itself, and of nobody else.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield to the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Serving on the Armed Services Committee, as I do, I can understand the anxiety and the interest of other Members of this body over reports emanating from the New York Times and other newspapers in the country relative to the activities, or at least charged activities, of the CIA.

I expected that such a resolution would be introduced, and I am very glad that it has been introduced, and particularly because my friend, the Senator from Rhode Island, seems to be heading it up.

Now, the point that I am trying to get to is, serving on the Armed Services Committee, there are many times——

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order so that those who wish to can give attention to the debate?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Order.

Mr. GOLDWATER. There are many times, Mr. President, when we are confronted with testimony that we do not want to hear. It is of such a highly classified nature, I do not think, frankly, anyone outside of the intelligence community should hear it.

Now, it is my hope and prayer that during the course of this investigation, first that a proper committee be selected. We do not want to have anyone running for President on this committee, or any other office. We want to have people who are going to be objective and hew to the line.

Mr. PASTORE. That is correct.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Now intelligence is not something that we gather on Americans. It is something we gather on an enemy. Intelligence is a worldwide operation and, I must say, we have already lost from the CIA probably the world's finest intelligence officer, because he was not going to put up with what he thought he would be subjected to in questioning on the CIA.

Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator from Arizona admit that part of that has already been accomplished by the stories that have appeared?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am sorry about what happened.

Mr. PASTORE. Absolutely.

Mr. GOLDWATER. What I want to see prevented is a further diminution of the intelligence forces we have had.

I never worked too closely with intelligence but I have worked close enough to know, though, people in these jobs and in this field are very difficult to come by, they are very sensitive to exposure, and are very sensitive to having their records and discussions brought out in the press.

So I would hope, when the majority leader and minority leader get together to select this committee, that they select a committee that will weigh all of the facts and be particularly careful about what is allowed to leak, because the Watergate leaked like an old sieve, and we sure do not want that to happen in an area as sensitive as intelligence.

I might say that we have gone through a lot of criticism or we have suffered through a lot of criticism in this country in the last several years, criticism of the military. Who is responsible for the military to go to Vietnam? It was not the Pentagon; it was the President of the United States who was the only man who could do it.

Who is responsible for the CIA, FBI, and DIA and others getting into fields I have a feeling they did not want to get into? The President of the United States. Now should we go that high?

3

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/10/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum recommends that a paper entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for inclusion as an annex in a series of annexs Mr. Colby intends to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his appearance as the leadoff witness. The FBI was given the responsibility for preparing this paper by the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI. It is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees.

There are enclosed two papers which will be used as annexs. The first paper, prepared by the Intelligence Division, is entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan." Inasmuch as this paper was prepared by the Bureau, we are asking the Director's clearance for passage to Mr. Colby. The second paper entitled "The Intelligence Evaluation Committee" was prepared by the Justice Department and was submitted to the Bureau for our concurrence as part of the coordinating process.

The paper on the Huston plan represents a detailed chronology of the plan from its inception to its disposition. It is completely footnoted to documents which have been previously furnished to the Committee on the Judiciary. These documents appear in published form in the document entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session Pursuant to H. Res. 803." The paper was reviewed by those members of

Enclosures (2)

62-116395-15

CONTINUED - OVER

REC-18

WOC:dln
(7)

#MDR16

9/25/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

FEB 13 1975

5-WO6

84 FEB 21 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

Ad Hoc group who participated in the development of the plan. No substantive objections were raised regarding the paper and it was recommended the paper be furnished to Mr. Colby for use as an annex.

The second annex entitled "Intelligence Evaluation Committee" prepared by the Department of Justice was provided to the FBI for our review and concurrence. Here again this paper provides a detailed chronology of the origin and disposition of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. It is footnoted to various internal Departmental memoranda which are identified as attachments 1 through 6 to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee paper. This paper was also reviewed by the Ad Hoc group and it was recommended that this paper also be furnished to Mr. Colby for his use as an annex to his opening statement.

ACTION:

Done / 2/11/75 WOP

1. If approved, the paper entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" will be furnished to Mr. Colby.

Done / 2/11/75 WOP

2. Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, will be telephonically advised that the FBI concurs in the paper entitled "Intelligence Evaluation Committee" for use as an annex by Mr. Colby.

WRW / Tcl

[illegible]
MAY [illegible]
GSA GEN. [illegible] NO

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/10/75

FROM W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#mpe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SP2 ALM [illegible]

This memorandum recommends that a paper entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for inclusion as an annex in a series of annexs Mr. Colby intends to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his appearance as the leadoff witness. The FBI was given the responsibility for preparing this paper by the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI. It is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees.

There are enclosed two papers which will be used as annexs. The first paper, prepared by the Intelligence Division, is entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan." Inasmuch as this paper was prepared by the Bureau, we are asking the Director's clearance for passage to Mr. Colby. The second paper entitled "The Intelligence Evaluation Committee" was prepared by the Justice Department and was submitted to the Bureau for our concurrence as part of the coordinating process.

The paper on the Huston plan represents a detailed chronology of the plan from its inception to its disposition. It is completely footnoted to documents which have been previously furnished to the Committee on the Judiciary. These documents appear in published form in the document entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session Pursuant to H. Res. 803." The paper was reviewed by those members of

Enclosures (2)

CONTINUED - OVER

WOC:dln
(7)

Ad Hoc group who participated in the development of the plan. No substantive objections were raised regarding the paper and it was recommended the paper be furnished to Mr. Colby for use as an annex.

The second annex entitled "Intelligence Evaluation Committee" prepared by the Department of Justice was provided to the FBI for our review and concurrence. Here again this paper provides a detailed chronology of the origin and disposition of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. It is footnoted to various internal Departmental memoranda which are identified as attachments 1 through 6 to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee paper. This paper was also reviewed by the Ad Hoc group and it was recommended that this paper also be furnished to Mr. Colby for his use as an annex to his opening statement.

ACTION:

1. If approved, the paper entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" will be furnished to Mr. Colby.

2. Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, will be telephonically advised that the FBI concurs in the paper entitled "Intelligence Evaluation Committee" for use as an annex by Mr. Colby.

WRW

SECRET

#mDR16 11-6-00
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

ORIGIN AND DISPOSITION
OF THE
HUSTON PLAN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

BACKGROUND:

By letter dated 6/20/69 Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, addressed a letter to the Director, FBI, stating that the President had directed that a report on foreign communist support of revolutionary protest movements in the United States be prepared for his study. According to the Huston letter, the President specifically requested that the report draw upon all the sources available to the intelligence community, that it be as detailed as possible, and that the word "support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign communists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protest movements in the United States. The letter stated that on the basis of earlier reports submitted to the President on a more limited aspect of the problem, it was apparent "present" intelligence collection capabilities in the area were inadequate. Huston stated the President wanted to know what resources were currently targeted toward monitoring foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States, how effective they were, what gaps existed in our (U.S.) intelligence because of either inadequate resources or low priority of

SECRET

attention and what steps could be taken, if the President directed, to provide the maximum possible coverage of these activities.

The request was also sent to CIA, NSA and DIA seeking contributions relating to this same problem. Pursuant to the request, the FBI and CIA submitted available information on the matter. These responses were handled unilaterally and without coordination between CIA and FBI.

On 6/5/70 Director Hoover met with President Nixon at which meeting the President appointed him as chairman of a special intelligence committee to coordinate a more effective intelligence-gathering function.[1] He also instructed that the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) were to coordinate their efforts to insure that comprehensive information would be obtained for the President's use which would provide him with a worldwide picture of the efforts of new left and subversive groups in directing dissident activities in the United States. Present at this meeting were CIA Director Richard Helms; Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, NSA; General Donald V. Bennett, DIA; Mr. Tom Charles Huston, White House Staff Assistant;

---

[1] Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session Pursuant to H. Res. 803, "A Resolution Authorizing and Directing the Committee on the Judiciary to Investigate Whether Sufficient Grounds Exist for the House of Representatives to Exercise its Constitutional Power to Impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America," Book VII, Part 1, pg. 375.

Assistant to the President H. R. Haldeman; Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs John D. Ehrlichman and Robert H. Finch, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

An initial meeting of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (AD HOC) was held in Mr. Hoover's office on 6/8/70. This meeting was attended by Mr. Helms, Vice Admiral Gayler, General Bennett and Mr. Huston. Mr. Hoover emphasized the President's keen interest in the problem of intelligence collection and outlined the general objectives to which the Committee was to address itself. He instructed that a working subcommittee be established composed of representatives of all the member agencies which subcommittee was to be headed by FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan.

The first meeting of the working subcommittee was held on 6/9/70. At this meeting Mr. Huston presented the subcommittee with an outline which he stated the President desired the subcommittee to follow in preparing its report. The outline addressed itself mainly to the purpose, procedures and objectives of the subcommittee's review. The following from the outline is quoted:

"PURPOSE:

(A) To define and assess the existing internal security threat.

(B) To evaluate the collection procedures and techniques presently employed and to assess their effectiveness.

(C) To identify gaps in our present collection efforts and recommend steps to close these gaps.

(D) To review current procedures for inter-community coordination and cooperation and to recommend steps to improve these procedures.

(E) To evaluate the timeliness of current intelligence data and to recommend procedures to increase both its timeliness and usefulness.

(F) To assess the priorities presently attached to domestic intelligence collection efforts and to recommend new priorities where appropriate.

PROCEDURES:

(A) Although the sub-committee will be officially constituted within the framework of USIB, it will in fact be an independent, ad hoc, inter-agency working group with a limited mandate.

(B) Operational details will be the responsibility of the chairman. However, the scope and direction of the review will be determined by the White House member.

(C) The sub-committee will submit its reports to the White House and not to USIB. Report will be due by July 1, 1970.

(D) To insure that the President has all the options available for consideration, the WH member may direct detailed interrogatories to individual agencies in order to ascertain facts relevant to policy evaluation by the President. Information resulting from such interrogatories will, if the contributing agency requests, be treated on a confidential basis and not be considered by the sub-committtee as a whole.

OBJECTIVES:

(A) Maximum coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community. The sub-committee may wish to consider the creation of a permanent Domestic Intelligence Operations Board, or some other appropriate mechanism to insure community-wide evaluation of intelligence data.

(B) Higher priority by all intelligence agencies on internal security collection efforts.

(C) Maximum use of all special investigative techniques, including increased agent and informant penetration by both the FBI and CIA.

(D) Clarification of NSA's role in targeting against communication traffic involving U. S. revolutionary leaders and organizations. (S)

(E) Maximum coverage of the overseas activities of revolutionary leaders and of foreign support of U. S. revolutionary activities.

(F) Maximum coverage of campus and student-related activities of revolutionary leaders and groups.

(G) More detailed information about the sources and extent of financial support of revolutionary organizations.

(H) Clarification of the proper domestic intelligence role of the Armed Services.

(I) Development of procedures for translating analyzed intelligence information into a format useful for policy formulation."

At a meeting of the working subcommittee held on 6/23/70 a consensus was reached on a final draft of the Report to be issued by the Interagency Committee. This Report, which was captioned "Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence (AD HOC),"[2] dated June, 1970, and numbering 43 pages was signed and approved by the heads of each member agency at a final meeting of the Committee held in Mr. Hoover's office on 6/25/70.[3] The Report footnoted several objections by the FBI to certain options contained in the Committee's Report.[4] These objections are enumerated in a latter portion of this paper.

---

[2] Ibid., pp. 384-431.

[3] Ibid., pg. 383.

[4] Ibid., pg. 433.

A copy of the "Special Report" was delivered to Mr. Huston at the White House on 6/26/70. The "Special Report" was divided into three main sections: Part One, a summarized estimate of the internal security threat; Part Two, a summary of various operational limitations on certain intelligence collection techniques with cited advantages of maintaining such restrictions as well as the advantages of relaxing them; and Part Three, an evaluation of interagency cooperation with suggested measures to improve the coordination of domestic intelligence collection.

During the first week of July, 1970, Huston sent the "Special Report" to H. R. Haldeman with a memorandum entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection." In his memorandum Huston recommended that the President, from among the options discussed by the "Special Report," select, in most areas discussed, the options relaxing the restraints on intelligence collection.[5]

On 7/14/70 Haldeman sent a memorandum to Huston stating the President had approved Huston's recommendations for relaxing restraints on intelligence collection and requested a formal decision memorandum be prepared.[6]

In a memorandum dated 7/23/70 addressed to the AD HOC Committee agencies with copies for the President and Mr. Haldeman,[7] Mr. Huston advised that the President had carefully studied the "Special Report" and had made certain decisions with respect to issues raised therein. The President's decisions called for a relaxation of certain existing restraints on intelligence coverage including the following: NSCID-6 was to be interpreted [to permit NSA to program for coverage the communications of United States citizens using international facilities;] (S) the intelligence community was directed to intensify electronic surveillance coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a threat to the internal security; restrictions on legal mail coverage were to be removed and restrictions on covert mail coverage relaxed to permit its use on select targets of priority intelligence; restraints on the use of surreptitious entry were to be removed on certain high-priority targets; the coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups was to be increased; [CIA coverage of American students traveling or living abroad was to be increased;] (S) the restrictions on the use of military undercover agents were to be retained; each member agency was to submit a detailed estimate of manpower and monetary needs required to implement the decisions; and a committee consisting of the directors of representative agencies or appropriate alternates was to be constituted effective 8/1/70 to provide evaluation of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, carry out other objectives specified in the Report and perform such other duties as the President should from time to time assign. The Director of the FBI was appointed to serve as chairman of this committee. An attachment to the memorandum from Mr. Huston captioned "Organization and Operations of the Interagency Group on Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security (IAG)" set forth specific composition, operations and duties of this new committee.[8]

---

[5] Ibid., pg. 437.

[6] Ibid., pg. 445.

[7] Ibid., pp. 450, 454.

On receipt of the letter from Mr. Huston the Director, FBI, addressed a letter to the Attorney General dated 7/27/70 pointing out FBI objections to certain of the decisions reported in the Huston letter. Mr. Hoover objected to relaxation of electronic surveillance policy, the implementation of covert mail coverage, the removal of restrictions on the use of surreptitious entry of embassies to obtain cryptographic materials, the removal of controls and restrictions relating to the coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups and the establishment of a permanent Interagency Committee on Domestic Intelligence. The Director stated that in the "Special Report" he had pointed out his opposition to these aspects of the Report and requested of the Attorney General a prompt expression of his views concerning the matter. He noted that no action to implement the instructions contained in Mr. Huston's letter would be taken pending a reply from the Attorney General.

No further action to implement the Huston letter subsequent to the 7/27/70 letter to the Attorney General was instituted by the intelligence community. There is no indication that the Attorney General ever responded to this communication.

---

[8] Ibid., pg. 456.

SECRET

On or about 7/27/70 each recipient agency of the 7/23/70 memorandum received a telephone call from the White House instructing that the memorandum be returned.

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-6-00 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

#MDE16

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE

Introduction

Since its existence was first revealed publicly during the height of the Senate Watergate Committee investigation in 1973, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) has been the object of suspicion and misunderstanding. Unfortunately associated by some politicians and representatives of the media with such things as political spying, illegal electronic surveillance and surreptitious entry, it was nothing more than an effort by the Executive Branch to better coordinate and disseminate intelligence information received by various intelligence and investigative agencies in the Federal Government. While the fact of its existence was kept secret, which may have contributed to the misunderstanding of its purpose and function, the IEC was not an operational entity. That is, it did not conduct its own investigations as did the FBI and other agencies. Nor did it engage in surreptitious entries, wiretapping or other similar activity. It merely received data collected by the agencies represented on the Committee and put this information into one comprehensive report or estimate for dissemination to interested agencies and individuals within the Executive Branch. The Committee was staffed by career personnel and it existed for approximately 18 months.

Origin

In November, 1970, then Attorney General John Mitchell met with John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs; Richard Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General; Jerris Leonard, Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA); Robert Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division; and a consultant from the State of Washington, former State Judge Morell Sharp, to discuss the need for an inter-departmental unit capable of obtaining and evaluating intelligence information from all the resources of the Federal Government relating to the membership, status and activities of militant terrorist groups operating within the United States. The meeting took place on November 10, 1970 in Mr. Mitchell's office and, according to a memorandum dated November 12, prepared by Mr. Mardian, past attempts to elicit such cooperation from interested departments and agencies of the Executive Branch had been unsuccessful. It was decided that Judge Sharp, John Dean, then Counsel to the President, and Mr. Mardian were to contact the heads of various agencies and explain the wishes of the President and seek their advice and cooperation. (See Attachment 1).

According to a memorandum dated December 17, 1970, from Mr. Mardian to the Attorney General, a second meeting of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee took place at 9:00 a.m. in the Executive Office Building, and was attended by Mr. Mardian, Judge Sharp, Mr. Dean, Egil Krogh (Deputy Counsel to the President), Robert Froehlke (Assistant Secretary of Defense), James Angleton (Central Intelligence Agency), Thomas Kelly (Secret Service), Benson Buffham (National Security Agency), George Moore (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and John Doherty (Department of Justice). It was agreed at that meeting that on or before January 6, 1971 the agencies represented would furnish information relating to "organizational targets and intelligence targets." Judge Sharp was to be available on a full-time consulting basis beginning January 11, 1971, and the Committee was to have its next meeting on January 11 at 9:00 a.m. (See Attachment 2).

Judge Sharp attended three meetings of the IEC during its initial stages of development. He did not attend the fourth scheduled meeting on January 25, 1971, at which time Mr. Mardian explained his absence by stating there had been several inquiries by the former Judge's acquaintances in Congress which caused the Attorney General and the White House to be concerned that it would be difficult to maintain appropriate security regarding the Committee's work with Judge Sharp as its head. Mardian stated that at a meeting at the White House on January 21, it was decided that Judge Sharp would be removed from the Committee and assigned other consultant duties with the Justice Department.

Subsequent memoranda revealed that certain individuals were designated by their respective agencies as representatives on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, and by February 10, 1971 a document outlining the authority, mission, membership, staff, procedures and functions and office space and facilities was drafted and presented to each of the member-representatives.

Functions and Purpose

According to the February 10, memorandum, the purpose of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was to provide intelligence estimates to the respective Government departments and agencies on a need-to-know basis, in order to effectively evaluate and anticipate problems for appropriate response to civil disorders. In carrying out this mission, the Committee was to have access to all pertinent intelligence in the possession of the United States Government. The membership was to consist of representatives from the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, and National Security Agency and "when necessary, representatives of other departments and agencies designated by the Committee." 1/

The Committee was to be supported by a permanent staff consisting of representatives from member departments and agencies and headed by an Executive Director appointed by the Committee. The staff was to perform certain functions which included: (1) when requested by the Committee, agency representatives would furnish to the staff all pertinent information relevant to the stated request of the Committee; (2) prepare estimates; (3) report information gaps; (4) recommend subjects for intelligence estimates; (5) prepare relevant studies and reports; and (6) provide for the secrecy of the information received and the protection of all sources of the information. The Department of Justice provided necessary office space, supplies and incidental administrative support. (See Attachment 3).

1/ In his report of January 15, 1975 to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby stated that the State Department was represented on the IEC. It was not. However, at some time after its formation, the Treasury Department appointed a representative to the Committee.

Mr. Hoover initially declined a request from Mr. Mardian to provide staff support, but on May 17, 1971, the Attorney General requested that the FBI provide two agents and one secretary for the permanent working staff of IEC. Mr. Hoover acceded to this request.

Meetings and Reports

John Doherty of the Department of Justice was named as the first Executive Director of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and with the approval of the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, James McGrath, a staff attorney, was assigned as his assistant. Subsequently, Bernard Wells, a former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation replaced Mr. Doherty, who retired from government service, as Executive Director in September, 1971. Weekly meetings were held with representatives of the various agencies and procedures for agency contribution to IEC estimates or reports were adopted. (See Attachment 4).

The first estimate or report prepared and disseminated by the IEC was designated E-1 dated February 18, 1971 entitled "April-May Demonstrations" dealing with the potential for violence during the anti-war demonstrations in Washington and other parts of the country planned for April-May 1971. During the period February 18, 1971 to April 30, 1973, the Committee produced and disseminated 31 estimates or reports dealing with such subjects as anti-war demonstrations, potential for violence in major cities, black power organizations, Arab terrorist groups, prison riots, and related topics. There is attached a complete list of all of the estimates or reports produced and disseminated by the IEC during its existence. (See Attachment 5). The estimates were disseminated to the Counsel to the President; Director, Central Intelligence; Director, National Security Agency; Director, Secret Service; Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Director, Office of Law Enforcement, Treasury Department; the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice; and the Defense Intelligence Agency. No estimates were produced after April 30, 1973. A communication to all interested agencies dated June 11, 1973 pointed out that inasmuch as the end of the war in Vietnam had resulted in the termination of demonstrations which carried a potential for violence, there was no longer any useful function to be served by the IEC and that, effective immediately, the IEC would no longer be in existence.

During July, 1971, Mr. Mardian, at a meeting of the IEC, stated that President Nixon had requested a report regarding the handling of classified information, which was prompted by the Pentagon Papers case. Shortly thereafter, the IEC staff was advised that White House Staff Member Gordon Liddy had been appointed to work with the IEC regarding its study of the handling of classified information and by November, 1971 the IEC completed and disseminated a special report entitled "The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information."

Relationship of the IEC to the "Huston Plan"

In June 1970, J. Edgar Hoover met with President Nixon, at which time Mr. Hoover was appointed chairman of a special committee to coordinate more effectively the intelligence-gathering efforts of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA. The head of each of these agencies was present at a June 5, 1970 meeting with the President, which included White House Staff Assistant Tom C. Huston. Subsequently, a working subcommittee headed by Assistant Director William C. Sullivan of the FBI was formed, and it held a series of meetings beginning June 9, 1970. A final meeting held in late June 1970, a "Special Report" was filed and approved by the head of each member agency.

The "Special Report", which was submitted by Mr. Hoover to the President, was divided into three sections: a summary of the internal security threat; summarized limitations on certain intelligence collection techniques; and, a brief evaluation of interagency cooperation, with suggested measures to improve the coordination of domestic intelligence collection. Mr. Hoover objected to certain options for relaxation of restraints on intelligence gathering. Although President Nixon at first approved the relaxation of certain restraints, this approval was rescinded about five days later.

Inquiries by Various Committees of Congress and Other Entities Into the Operations of the IEC

Since its disclosure, the IEC has been the target of a number of investigations and inquiries, none of which has revealed any illegality or impropriety. The Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (Senate Watergate Committee) interviewed former IEC personnel in 1973, and a member of the Committee staff was offered access to all IEC reports and documents. The final report of the Watergate Committee published in June 1974 makes no reference to any improper or illegal activity by the IEC, but devoted a section to the Huston Plan. (See Attachment 6).

The House Judiciary Committee Investigating the Impeachment of Richard Nixon (Rodino Committee) did not see fit to conduct any investigation of the IEC, and one may conclude that it developed no information which would require scrutiny. The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Ervin Committee), after submitting voluminous questionnaires to the Department of Justice beginning in August, 1973 regarding the activities of the former Internal Security Division, was given complete information and access to all documents relating to the IEC and, to date, has reported no finding of impropriety or illegality.

The Watergate Special Prosecution Force has been given complete access to the documents and records of the Committee and it has conducted interviews of former Committee representatives and staff with no report to the Attorney General of any improper conduct. Moreover, the IEC will continue to be a target of inquiry by the recently formed Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee).

In his testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee, former Counsel to the President, John Dean, testified that "I am unaware of the IEC ever having engaged in any illicit activities or assignments." See, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of the United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 916 (1973).

Attachment 1

Form DJ-150
(Ed. 4-26-65)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : The Attorney General

DATE: 11/12/70

FROM : RCM Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the tentative conclusions reached in the discussion in your office on November 10, 1970, which was attended by yourself, John Ehrlichman, the Deputy Attorney General, Jerris Leonard, Justice Morell Sharp, and Robert Mardian.

1. That there was a need for an inter departmental unit capable of obtaining and evaluating intelligence information from all the resources of the Federal government, relating to membership, status and anticipated activities of militant terrorist groups operating within the United States.

2. That previous attempts to elicit the cooperation of the Departments and Agencies possessing this information have been unsuccessful for numerous reasons and that the most recent attempt failed largely because of the lack of confidence by the Departments and Agencies in the White House representative responsible for contacting them.

3. That Justice Sharp, John Dean, and Robert Mardian be appointed as an ad hoc committee to contact the heads of the affected Departments and Agencies and explain the wishes of the President in this regard, and to seek their advice and enlist their cooperation in this effort. That such contacts would only be made after the heads of the affected Agencies were advised by the White House of the appointment and purposes of the ad hoc committee.

cc - Deputy AG
John Dean
Jerris Leonard

SECRET

4. That the Inter-Departmental Information Unit(IDIU) of the Department of Justice would be used as a cover for the proposed domestic intelligence unit.

5. That Justice Sharp would meet with Jim Devine of the IDIU for the purpose of informing himself as to the character of the IDIU operation and developing with Devine a strategy for the use of the IDIU as the operating entity for the proposed domestic intelligence unit.

Justice Sharp, Dean, and Mardian met on Wednesday, November 11, and reviewed the history of the government's attempt to create a domestic intelligence unit, including the efforts of the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Committee(under the Chairmanship of Director Hoover) that recently made a study of the domestic intelligence gathering process and proposed steps that could be taken to improve that process.

It was generally agreed that, initially, the proposed domestic intelligence unit should limit itself to obtaining and evaluating the available intelligence information from the existing sources of the government and developing a more sophisticated method of collating and evaluating such information.

If you approve the foregoing and will advise us that preliminary contact has been made with the heads of the affected Agencies, we will proceed in accordance with your instructions.

[illegible]
(Ed. 4-26-65)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

SECRET - EYES ONLY

TO : The Attorney General DATE: December 17, 1970

FROM : Robert C. Mardian RCM
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee Meeting

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RECEIVED
DEC 17 1970

The second meeting of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee took place at the hour of 9 AM in the Conference Room of the Vice President, Executive Office Building, on Wednesday, December 16, 1970. Attending were Justice Morell Sharpe, Egil Krogh, John Dean, Robert Froehlke (DOD), James Angleton (CIA), Thomas Kelly (Secret Service), Benson Buffham (NSA), George Moore (FBI), John Doherty (Technical Advisor to the Chairman), and myself.

Assistant Secretary Froehlke explained that he had been requested by Secretary Laird to attend the preliminary meetings and that after he had had an opportunity to brief the designee (probably Colonel Downey) that said designee would attend future meetings. He requested that I meet with him and Don Bennett of the DIA preliminary to Secretary Laird's making any designation. This I agreed to do.

I opened the meeting by briefly outlining the conclusions reached at our first meeting for the benefit of those who were not present. We then discussed how best to approach a solution to the problem and it was unanimously agreed as follows:

> That on or before January 6, 1971, the operative agencies represented would furnish to me under appropriate security measures: (1) organizational targets and (2) intelligence targets (such as the extent and nature of foreign influence on our organization targets and the extent and nature of the financing of our organization targets).

Inspector Moore disclosed that the FBI had compiled a calendar of demonstrations and events planned by certain of the target organizations. He agreed to furnish a copy of the calendar to me and it was agreed that I would circulate the calendar (much of which is public knowledge) under appropriate security measures to ascertain whether or not the other agencies represented were aware of any further planned demonstrations.

We informed the Committee that sufficient space for the evaluation committee had been provided in FOB #7 and that Justice Sharpe would be available on a full-time consulting basis starting on January 11, 1971.

The Committee agreed to have its next meeting on Monday, January 11 at 9 AM, at which time I will have engrossed the submissions of each of the member agencies and further that at the next meeting we would attempt to establish priorities with respect to our intelligence targets.

The meeting adjourned at 11:35 AM.

cc: The Honorable John Ehrlichman
    The Honorable Robert Haldeman

orm DJ-150
Ed. 4-26-65)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DRAFT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

SECRET - EYES ONLY

TO : See Addressees Below

DATE: February 10, 1971

FROM : Robert C. Mardian CCM
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee

I. AUTHORITY:

Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances.

II. MISSION:

To provide intelligence estimates to the responsible Government departments and agencies on a need-to-know basis in order to effectively evaluate and anticipate problems to appropriately respond to civil disorders. In carrying out this mission, the Committee shall have access to all pertinent intelligence in the possession of the United States Government.

III. MEMBERSHIP:

Members of the Committee shall consist of representatives of the following departments and agencies: Department of Defense; Department of Justice; Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Secret Service; National Security Agency, and, when necessary, representatives of other departments or agencies designated by the Committee.

IV. STAFF:

The Committee will be supported by a permanent intelligence estimation staff* consisting of representatives from member departments and agencies and headed by an executive director appointed by the Committee.

---

* The Federal Bureau of Investigation advised it would not provide personnel for this staff.

V. PROCEDURES AND FUNCTIONS:

The permanent staff will perform the following functions:

1. When requested by the Committee, the Departments or Agencies represented shall furnish to the Committee staff all pertinent information relevant to the stated request of the Committee. Such requests for intelligence data shall first be approved by the Committee. The Executive Director of the permanent staff may initiate requests for information from member agencies subject to review and approval by the committee.

2. Prepare estimates from time to time as directed by the Committee.

3. Report information gaps to the Committee as such gaps are identified.

4. Recommend to the Committee no less often than monthly subjects for intelligence estimation.

5. Prepare other relevant studies and reports as directed by the Committee.

6. Provide for the security of information received and the protection of all sources of information.

VI. OFFICE SPACE AND FACILITIES:

The Department of Justice shall provide necessary office space, supplies, and incidental administrative support.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

ADDRESSEES:

Inspector George C. Moore
Mr. Benson Buffham
Mr. Thomas J. Kelley
Colonel John W. Downey
Mr. Richard Ober

SECRET

PROCEDURES FOR THE AGENCIES CONTRIBUTION TO IEC ESTIMATES

1. The INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC) has been charged with the responsibility of providing intelligence estimates to designated Government departments by effectively evaluating and anticipating problems of civil disorder. To evaluate a potential problem it will be necessary for IEC to request each assisting agency to prepare an intelligence analysis. The analysis, in the form of evaluated contributions, will be forwarded to the Executive Director of IEC. These contributions, pursuant to requirements set forth by IEC, will become the basis for the IEC's intelligence estimate of potential problems of civil disorder.

2. The IEC does not desire to receive a voluminous collection of intelligence data from the member agencies. The contribution should be an evaluation of the particular situation based on the data which that agency has in its possession. The IEC Staff may issue GUIDELINES, to assist the five agencies in the preparation of their intelligence contribution. Additionally, such GUIDELINES will be of assistance to IEC in identifying intelligence "gaps" and the basis for making supplemental requests to the individual agency for further intelligence information.

3. The following format will be generally used by the IEC evaluation staff in the preparation of intelligence estimates. It would be of great assistance if the participating agencies would follow the same format when submitting the completed contribution.

FORMAT

1. The Problem
2. Summary
3. Conclusions/Comment
4. Background
5. Discussion

GROUP I

Attachment 5

E-1	April-May Demonstrations
E-2	Likelihood of New Momentum on the Antiwar Activities and Forces in View of the Laos and Cambodian Situation
E-3	Likelihood of Kidnapping of any High U. S. Government Official in the Immediate Future by Political Terrorists
E-4	Calendar of Significant Antiwar Events
E-5	An Assessment of the Antiwar Movement in the U.S.
E-6	An Estimate of JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE (JDL) Planned Activities During Demonstrations Scheduled for Lafayette Park on March 21, 1971
E-7	The Potential for Violence in the Major Cities During Summer 1971
E-8	Proposed Demonstrations in Washington, D. C. (for two week periods, beginning w/April 23 - May 5)
E-9	The Effect of the Death of Francois Duvalier on the Internal Security of the U. S.
E-10	Plans of the PCPJ and NPAC, and any other organizations to Demonstrate at Military Bases on May 16, 1971
E-11	Likelihood of Demonstrations by the PCPJ or any other organization at the NATO Conference on Cities, to be held at Indianapolis, Indiana, on May 26 - 31, 1971
E-12	Intelligence Calendar of Significant Events (Monthly)
E-13	The Planned Disruption at The White House on June 12, 1971
E-14	Antiwar Conferences, June-July 1971, and Their Effect on the Future Activities of the Antiwar Community
E-15	Interrelationship of Black Power Organizations Within the Western Hemisphere

E-16	Interrelationship of Arab Terrorist Groups and U. S. Black Militants
E-17	Jewish Defense League; An Assessment
E-18	October-November Antiwar Offensive
E-19	Prison Riots
E-20	An Assessment of the Communications and Communications Security Capabilities of Violence-Prone Groups Within the United States
E-21	Unauthorized Disclosures
E-22	Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention, San Diego, California
E-23	Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida
E-24	Demonstration and Racial Disturbance Study
E-25	Phone Phreaking
E-26	Militant Left's Involvement in the Labor Movement
E-27	African Liberation Day
E-28	Intelligence Requirements List
E-29	Protest Demonstrations During Presidential Inaugururation Ceremonies
E-30	Foreign Students - Terrorists
E-31	Events and Personalities Attractive to Terrorist Attack

Attachment 6

1. THE HUSTON PLAN

The earliest evidence that this concept of presidential power existed is found in a 1970 top secret document entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection,"[16] and the various memorandums from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman which were first revealed by John Dean.[17] In preparation for his testimony before the Select Committee, Dean placed these papers, some of which bore the highest security classification, in the custody of Chief Judge John Sirica of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. This step was taken by Dean, on the advice of counsel, to avoid violation of any Presidential directive or Federal laws prohibiting release of Government documents affecting national security. After due consideration, Judge Sirica released one copy of these papers to the Department of Justice and one copy to the Select Committee, pursuant to its motion. (*United States* v. *John Doe*, et al., Misc. No. 77–73, May 14, 1973.)

The committee, with the aid of various intelligence agencies, reviewed these documents. While the committee sealed a few items therein, which could involve national security considerations, it concluded that these papers, for the most part, dealt primarily with domestic affairs and were unrelated to national security matters.[18] The papers, as sanitized by the committee, were entered into the committee's record during Dean's testimony.[19]

These papers and the President's own statement of May 22, 1973, disclose that the President approved the use of illegal wiretapping, illegal break-ins and illegal mail covers for domestic intelligence purposes. The President was fully advised of the illegality of these intelligence-gathering techniques prior to approving them. In the top secret document entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection," the recommendation for surreptitious entries (break-ins) contained the following statement under the heading "Rationale":

> Use of this technique is clearly illegal. It amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful

---

[16] Exhibit 35, 3 *Hearings* 1062, 1319.
[17] Exhibits 36–40, 42, 3 *Hearings* 1062, 1324–33, 1338.
[18] 3 *Hearings* 1060, 1062.
[19] Exhibits 35–41, 3 *Hearings* 1062, 1319–37.

tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion.[20]

On July 14, 1970, Haldeman sent a top secret memorandum to Huston, notifying him of the President's approval of the use of burglaries, illegal wiretaps and illegal mail covers for domestic intelligence. In the memorandum, Haldeman stated:

> The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the review, have been approved by the President. He does not, however, want to follow the procedure you outlined on page 4 of your memorandum regarding implementation. He would prefer that *the thing simply be put into motion* on the basis of this approval. The formal official memorandum should, of course, be prepared and that should be the device by which to carry it out . . .[21] [emphasis added]

It appears that the next day, July 15, 1970, Huston prepared a decision memorandum, based on the President's approval, for distribution to the Federal intelligence agencies involved in the plan—the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.[22] In his May 22, 1973, public statement, the President reported that the decision memorandum was circulated to the agencies involved on July 23, 1970. However, the decision memorandum is dated July 15, 1970, indicating that it was forwarded to the agencies on that day or shortly thereafter.[23]

Huston's recommendations were opposed by J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI.[24] Hoover had served as the chairman of a group comprised of the heads of the Federal intelligence agencies formed to study the problems of intelligence-gathering and cooperation among the various intelligence agencies.[25] In his public statement of May 22, 1973, President Nixon stated:

> After reconsideration, however, prompted by the opposition of Director Hoover, the agencies were notified 5 days later, on July 28, that the approval had been rescinded.

Haldeman's testimony is to the same effect.[26] Dean, however, testified that he was not aware of any recision of approval for the plan[27] and there apparently is no written record of a recision on July 28 or any other date. There is, however, clear evidence that, after receipt of the decision memorandum of July 15, 1970, Mr. Hoover did present strong objections concerning the plan to Attorney General Mitchell.[28]

Huston was concerned that Hoover's objections would interfere with the plan's implementation. On August 5, 1970, 8 days *after* the President states he ordered recision, Huston sent Haldeman a lengthy top secret memorandum on the subject, "Domestic Intelligence," which strongly attacked Hoover's objections and made a number of recommendations concerning a forthcoming meeting regarding the plan

among Haldeman, the A
the fact that the plan was
the following language

> At some point, H
> has become totally
> mental to our do
> important to remem
> knows that the Pres
> and Hoover has now
> gets his way, it is goi
> the President. He
> against him. Th
> stand why the AG is
> going to look d
> Bennett, and the mili
> reverse a President
> people worked their
> merits, was a first-rat

It should be noted that
DIA, CIA and the mili
recommendations.

Two days later, on Au
memorandum to Hald
Attorney General and
that the Director (Hoo
and that all intelligence
once."[31] Huston no
coast to vacation for 3
the problems surroundin
be into the new school yea

Later, on September 18,
claims the plan was res
to the Attorney General
our domestic intelligence
added] This memorand
Inter-Agency Domestic
part of the Huston plan.
observed that Hoover was
unit and that it was im
Far from indicating th
mendation to remove res
been withdrawn, Dean, i
General:

> I believe we agree
> any blanket remov
> priate procedure wo
> we need, based on

---

[20] Exhibit 35, 3 *Hearings* 1321.
[21] Exhibit 36, 3 *Hearings* 1324.
[22] *New York Times*, June 7, 1973, p. 36.
[23] *New York Times*, June 7, 1973.
[24] 3 *Hearings* 916.
[25] Appendix of Legal Documents at p. 628.
[26] 7 *Hearings* 2874.
[27] 3 *Hearings* 1066.
[28] 3 *Hearings* 916; 4 *Hearings* 1603.

[29] Exhibit 37, 3 *Hearings*
[30] Exhibit 37, 3 *Hearings*
[31] Exhibit 33, 3 *Hearings*
[32] *Ibid.*

among Haldeman, the Attorney General and Hoover.[29] Indicative of the fact that the plan was still quite alive, but imperiled by Hoover, is the following language in this memorandum:

> At some point, Hoover has to be told who is President. He has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detrimental to our domestic intelligence operations . . . It is important to remember that the entire intelligence community knows that the President made a positive decision to go ahead and Hoover has now succeeded in forcing a review. If he gets his way, it is going to look like he is more powerful than the President. He had his say in the footnotes and RN decided against him. That should close the matter and I can't understand why the AG is a party in reopening it. All of us are going to look damned silly in the eyes of Helms, Gayler, Bennett, and the military chiefs if Hoover can unilaterally reverse a Presidential decision based on a report that many people worked their asses off to prepare and which, on the merits, was a first-rate, objective job.[30]

It should be noted that this memorandum indicates that the NSA, DIA, CIA and the military services basically supported the Huston recommendations.

Two days later, on August 7, 1970, Huston sent a brief, confidential memorandum to Haldeman urging that Haldeman "meet with the Attorney General and secure his support for the President's decision, that the Director (Hoover) be informed that the decision will stand, and that all intelligence agencies are to proceed to implement them at once."[31] Huston noted that: "Mr. Hoover has departed for the west coast to vacation for 3 weeks. If you wait until his return to clear up the problems surrounding our domestic intelligence operations, we will be into the new school year without any preparations."[32]

Later, on September 18, 1970 (almost 2 months after the President claims the plan was rescinded), Dean sent a top secret memorandum to the Attorney General suggesting certain procedures to "*commence our domestic intelligence operation as quickly as possible.*" [emphasis added] This memorandum specifically called for the creation of an Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligence Unit which had been an integral part of the Huston plan. Dean's memorandum to the Attorney General observed that Hoover was strongly opposed to the creation of such a unit and that it was important "to bring the FBI fully on board." Far from indicating that the President's approval of Huston's recommendation to remove restraints on illegal intelligence-gathering had been withdrawn, Dean, in his memorandum, suggested to the Attorney General:

> I believe we agreed that it would be inappropriate to have any blanket removal of restrictions; rather, the most appropriate procedure would be to decide on the type of intelligence we need, based on an assessment of the recommendations of

---

[29] Exhibit 37, 3 *Hearings* 1325–29.
[30] Exhibit 37, 3 *Hearings* 1326.
[31] Exhibit 38, 3 *Hearings* 1330.
[32] *Ibid.*

this unit, and then proceed to *remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence.*[33] [emphasis added]

Dean's memorandum indicated that the creation of the Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligence Unit would go forward and provided recommendations for the choosing of a unit director to serve as a "righthand man" to the Attorney General and for the selection of representatives from the various intelligence agencies who would serve on it. Dean closed his memorandum with the suggestion that the Attorney General call weekly meetings to monitor problems as they emerged and "to make certain that we are *moving this program into implementation as quickly as possible.*"[34] [emphasis added] Recognizing that Hoover was still a problem, Dean added a note to the bottom of his memorandum: "Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that if you would like him to join you in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy to do so."[35]

Hoover, however, never did come completely "on board" and the plan for an Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligence Unit was never implemented. A clue to the fate of the Huston plan is provided by the edited, unauthenticated "Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives by President Richard Nixon", on April 30, 1974, where the following passage appears:

> D. . . . what Bill Sullivan's desire in life is, is to set up a domestic national security intelligence system, a White House program. He says we are deficient. He says we have never been efficient, because Hoover lost his guts several years ago. If you recall he and Tom Huston worked on it. Tom Huston had your instructions to go out and do it and the whole thing just crumbled.
>
> P [Inaudible.][36]

Dean testified that the plan for the creation of an Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligence Unit was the product of White House fear of demonstrations and dissent.[37] Haldeman denied that such an atmosphere of fear existed in the White House.[38] In his statement before the committee, Haldeman gave as the reason for White House interest in improving intelligence-gathering operations the "critical proportions" of the domestic security problem in 1970 as illustrated by "a wave of bombings and explosions, rioting and violence, demonstrations, arson, gun battles and other disruptive activities across the country—on college campuses primarily—but also in other areas."[39] On this issue, Ehrlichman's testimony corroborates Haldeman's.[40]

The Huston recommendations themselves refer to "a major threat to the internal security"[41] and express the belief that "the potential for even greater violence is present and we have a positive obligation to take every step within our power to prevent it . . . for surely drastic violence and disorder threaten the very fabric of our society."[42]

---

[33] Exhibit 41, 3 *Hearings* 1335.
[34] Exhibit 41, 3 *Hearings* 1337.
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] Edited Presidential Conversations, pp. [illegible]23–4.
[37] 3 *Hearings* 916.
[38] 7 *Hearings* 2574.
[39] *Ibid.*
[40] 6 *Hearings* 2512–13.
[41] Exhibit 35, 3 *Hearings* 1319.
[42] Exhibit 37, 3 *Hearings* 1327–28.

The committee notes
Clellan's Permanent
Committee on Governm
1970, indicates that
were significant increas
Government facilities
against law enforcement
Dean testified, howev
not only toward viol
strations and dissent. As

> . . . [D]uring the
> happened to
> White House and
> stretched out in fr
> me to his office
> the sign in the park
> sign had to come
> — Dwi

The committee notes that the evidence presented to Senator McClellan's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, in hearings beginning in July 1970, indicates that, in the several years preceding the hearings, there were significant increases in illegal acts of violence directed against Government facilities and a disturbing number of such acts directed against law enforcement officials.[43]

Dean testified, however, that the White House concern was directed not only toward violent demonstrations, but also to peaceful demonstrations and dissent. As an illustration he said:

> . . . [D]uring the late winter of 1971 . . . the President happened to look out of the windows of the residence of the White House and saw a lone man with a large 10-foot sign stretched out in front of Lafayette Park. Mr. Higby called me to his office to tell me of the President's displeasure with the sign in the park and told me that Mr. Haldeman said the sign had to come down. When I came out of Mr. Higby's office, I ran into Mr. Dwight Chapin who said that he was going to get some "thugs" to remove that man from Lafayette Park. He said it would take him a few hours to get them, but they could do the job.[44]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. BASSETT

DATE: 2/6/75

FROM : F. B. GRIFFITH

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

SENSTUDY 75 is the code word for a new control file for all communications relating to the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to conduct investigation and study of conventional operations with respect to intelligence activities.

Pursuant to recommendation in memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall dated 1/27/75 regarding the SSC, I attended a meeting of the Ad Hoc Security Group of the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) Security Committee at CIA Headquarters on 2/5/75. Security representatives from DIA, NSA and CIA were present at this meeting which was concerned with proposals to protect the integrity of classified documents which will necessarily be provided the SSC during its investigation. Results are set forth below.

Attached are copies of: (1) proposed agreements the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) will be asked to obtain from the SSC; (2) guides for protection of classifed information and of documents furnished the SSC; and (3) proposed secrecy agreement to be executed by SSC staff members and employees. These items were discussed paragraph by paragraph and revisions agreed upon were penciled in. These revised drafts will be discussed at a meeting on 2/7/75 of the Ad Hoc Group of USIB on Congressional Investigations to be attended by Section Chief W. O. Cregar. At this time a final version will be approved for presentment to the DCI.

The registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy referred to on page 2 of the guides was described as a facility geared to handle and account for classified documents to the satisfaction of the intelligence community. It is guarded and has a suitable alarm system.

REC-18 [illegible] -14

The guides include the possibility that agencies presenting testimony may conduct their own security sweeps of the hearing room; calls for a system of document control as well as control from reproduction and destruction of classified material. Consideration of secure transcription procedures is requested with the

Enclosures (3)
1 - Messrs Callahan, Adams, Mintz,
Wannall, Cregar

FBG:njw

84 FEB 24 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

FIVE-WG

Memorandum for Mr. Bassett
Re: SENSTUDY 75

possibility that each agency could provide such service. It might be necessary, however, to provide escort service in the event outside transcribers are utilized. This would entail security of carbons, waste and notes and return of the transcribed testimony to the Committee upon completion. It was also suggested that a security officer be appointed by the SSC who would be a central contact for representatives of agencies falling within the purview of the SSC investigation. Attached material was reviewed by Legal Counsel Division by Inspector J. E. Herington who concurred with the exception of item number 4 of the proposed guidelines dealing with countermeasures of inspections to preclude, ". . . surreptitious use of transmitters and/or unauthorized recording devices similar to the device located in the Rayburn House Office Building on 12 February 1973." He noted this wording could be construed as placing a limitation on what type of device could be prohibited and suggested revising the above phraseology by placing a period after "recording devices" and then stating, "It is noted such a device was located in the . . ."

OBSERVATIONS:

At this time it is unknown if the above-mentioned material will be accepted by the SSC or whether the committee will draw up its own procedures. In any event, the material to be presented will at least serve as a means of calling the Senators' attention to the many faceted program involved in the protection of classified information. It is felt concurrence with the attached material with the suggested observation of the Legal Counsel Division be accepted is to our best interest.

ACTION:

It is recommended Section Chief W. O. Cregar offer the revision referred to above at the meeting on 2/7/75 and be authorized to offer FBI concurrence with this material.

Done 2/7/75 WOC

Info. re: [illegible] Cregar to Wannall 2/7/75 [illegible] WOC

WRW/TAL

1/10

AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES

1. It would be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees, as has been customary in other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, that:

(a) Departments and agencies shall have the right to request that testimony be given only in executive session, that in some instances testimony be "off-the-record" and that certain testimony be heard only by members and in some cases only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(b) Witnesses be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony prior to any publication of it.

(c) The "Third-Agency Rule" is binding upon members of the United States intelligence community and may require witnesses representing one member of the intelligence community to decline to testify concerning matters within the proprietary purview of another community member.

2. It would also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies

#MDR16
9/25/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-17

furnishing documents to the committees be authorized to excise from those documents prior to presentation, the names of their personnel as well as those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy may be jeopardized by disclosure. This would include names of sources or specific information on highly technical devices and operations in keeping with the DCI's responsibilities to protect sources and methods.

3. THAT THE DCI ATTEMPT TO SECURE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES THAT THEY ENTERTAIN AND CONSIDER SECURITY PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED.

GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES

1. Personnel Security Clearances

(a) Background Investigation

It would be desirable for the Select Committees to stipulate that no staff member is to be given access to any classified material, testimony or information received or generated by the committees without prior receipt of a security clearance based on a full field investigation.

(b) Secrecy Agreement

It would be desirable for the Select Committees to require a signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to the committees' staffs. The agreement should include provisions:

1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations is a condition precedent of employment or assignment;

2) Recognizing US Government property rights to classified information;

3) Requiring prior written consent before divulgence of classified information.

4) For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules and obligations contained in the agreement could subject the

#MDR16

[illegible] CONTAINED [illegible] UNCLASSIFIED [illegible] 9-25-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JJG

62-116395-14

signer to administrative and/or legal action under appropriate statutes;

5) That there is no time limit on the terms of the agreement.

2. Physical and Document Security

The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure that the secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be preserved. These rules be made known to the individuals and agencies who will be called upon to present testimony or materials. Among these should be rules on physical security and document security.

(a) Physical Security

It would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following rules related to physical security:

1) All classified material will be stored in safes for safekeeping in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with the regulations of this registry for classified material.

~~2) Material should be stored in safes when not in use.~~

2~~1~~) TWENTY FOUR HOUR Guard protection SUPPLEMENTED BY ANTI-INTRUSION ALARMS should be required on THE STORAGE ~~this~~ area.

3~~2~~) Areas selected for use in closed session should be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons.

4~~3~~) Agencies presenting testimony should be permitted to conduct or arrange with the Sergeant-at-Arms to conduct audio countermeasures inspections to preclude the possibility of surreptitious use of transmitters and/or unauthorized recording devices similar to the device located in the Rayburn House Office Building on 12 February 1973.

5~~4~~) At the end of each session of the Select Committees, the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff officer who will secure any misplaced classified material or waste.

6~~5~~) Areas should be designated in which classified material can be reviewed. These areas should be secure against access by unauthorized personnel. Material should not be removed from these areas for the sake of convenience except when necessary for the work of the committees and should not be transported overnight to the office or residence of personnel of the committees.

(b) Document Security

1) Committees should select and identify a single location/and specific personnel authorized to sign acknowledgement of receipt of classified materials provided ~~by~~ to the committees.

2) A system of document control should be established to permit control of classified documents to provide for accountability. ~~of documents furnished the committee~~.

3) Duplication of documents should be controlled so as to ~~permit~~ require a record of the document reproduced, the number of copies reproduced, and the custodian or receiving personnel. Reproduced classified documents should be subject to the same controls as the original.

4) Appropriate arrangements should be made for the destruction of classified waste.

5) Transcripts. The committees should give consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate security in the transcription of testimony by committee transcribers. The committees may desire to charge each agency presenting testimony with this responsibility. In some, if not all cases, this might include escort of

materials to the place of transcription, the securing of carbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance with committee rules.

6) At the conclusion of the committees' investigations, classified material should be reviewed for ~~the possibility of~~ disposition, ~~by~~ including return to contributors. ~~of material submitted by them.~~

3. Security Officer

It would be desirable if the committees appointed one member of its staff as a security officer with the responsibility of discharging the security rules adopted by the committee and of serving as a point of contact with the departments and agencies of interest to the committee. It would also be desirable if the committee rules required each agency of interest to identify a single point of contact to facilitate provisions of security support required by the committee.

SECRECY AGREEMENT

I, ______________________________, in accepting employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure.

I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Select Committee.

It is my understanding that in the course of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to information from departments and agencies of the Government which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the property of the United States of America and I further agree to surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

62-116395-14

his designees or upon my separation from the Select Committee, any classified material which has come into my possession as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.

I hereby agree that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, writing, conduct, ~~including interviews for radio and television broadcasts~~ or otherwise any classified information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee,without prior written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative.

I hereby agree that any information learned during my employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is related to intelligence and prepared for publications by me will be submitted to the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative prior to discussing with or showing to any publisher, editor or literary agent for the purpose of determining whether said material contains any classified information as defined in Executive Order 11652. I agree that the Chairman of the Select Committee, President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has the authority to make the final determination as to whether information is classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted.

I ~~am acquainted with the relevant portions of~~ have been informed of the provisions of (Insert relevant codes and sections as considered appropriate by the Department of Justice) and understand their meaning.

Further, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as the Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified material. I understand that any breach ~~on~~ of any part of the obligations in this agreement could subject me to legal and/or administrative action.

I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed on me with respect to the protection of classified information by this agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated.

I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

____
Signature

WITNESS:

____
DATE

____
Signature

____

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. N.P. Callahan

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 1/27/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated 1/24/75, entitled "United States Intelligence Board (USIB), Meeting of 1/24/75," recommended that Section Chief William O. Cregar's name be provided to the Deputy Director of the Intelligence Community Staff as a point of contact within the FBI to coordinate matters dealing with the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The mandate of the SSC is to examine the extent of overt and covert intelligence activities in the U.S. and abroad.

On the morning of 1/27/75 Mr. John Clarke, Deputy Director of the Intelligence Community Staff, advised that Mr. Colby believes it is necessary for security representatives of FBI, CIA and National Security Agency (NSA), to meet in order to develop recommendations for the SSC as to how documents and testimony furnished to the SSC will be protected against unauthorized disclosure. In this regard, Mr. Donald E. Moore, former Inspector in the Intelligence Division and currently Chairman of the USIB Security Committee, will function as the USIB representative to this group.

62-116395-13

REC-111

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-107

OBSERVATIONS:

7 FEB 4 1975

According to the Senate Resolution dated 1/21/75 relating to the investigation and study of ~~governmental~~ operations with respect to intelligence activities, the SSC is going to involve all agencies of the Intelligence Community. In anticipation that Bureau representatives will be called to testify and asked to supply some extremely sensitive documents regarding our investigative activity in the U. S., it is believed essential that we have an input into how such documents and testimony are going to be handled by staff personnel of the Committee. Unless we participate in developing security standards, we may find that sensitive documents and testimony that we are called to provide to the Committee cannot be adequately protected from public scrutiny.

WOC:ebc
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/TG

FMDR 16

CONTINUED - OVER

XEROX
FEB 13 1975

FEB 13 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

ACTION:

If approved, Bureau Supervisor Fred B. Griffith, Document Classification and Security Coordinator, be designated as the Bureau representative to meet with the Chairman of the USIB Committee and representatives of NSA and CIA.

WRW/Tul

Arrangements with USIB, NSA, CIA are appropriate as recommended here; however contacts with the Senate committee + staff should be made by liaison established with Congress. Cooperation of Intelligence Div. and Legal Counsel would serve best.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 1/24/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Leavitt
1 - Mr. Mack
1 - Mr. Boynton
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD (USIB) MEETING OF 1/24/75

*MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2

At a meeting of the USIB this morning Chairman Colby spoke briefly about Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) procedures for testifying before the Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) investigating CIA as well as anticipated problems that might arise regarding future testimony at the Senate Select Committee (SSC) whose membership has not yet been announced. According to Colby, the mandate of the SSC is to examine the extent of overt and covert intelligence activities in the U. S. and abroad. Colby advised that the SSC would involve all member agencies and departments of the intelligence community and for that reason he believed the members of the intelligence community should stay in close communication.

As a result of the above, Colby has selected Mr. John Clarke, Deputy Director of the Intelligence Community Staff, to act as a coordinator for the intelligence community to insure close coordination. He requested that all agencies and departments represented on USIB designate one individual in their agency as Clarke's point of contact to insure the close coordination Colby feels will be necessary during future appearances before the SSC. The Intelligence Division believes this is a desirable procedure and recommends that Section Chief William O. Cregar who is the Bureau's alternate member on USIB be designated as the Bureau representative to maintain liaison with Mr. Clarke.

REC-111 62-116395-12

In addition, Colby advised that in his opening statement before the SSC he intends to make a strong pitch for the intelligence community. He proposes to show the value and importance intelligence has played in the past as well as the future; he expects to outline for the SSC how the intelligence business is run and organized. In addition, he proposes in his opening statement to make an appeal for legislation to shore up the protection of sources and methods against planned and calculated leaks of classified information.

12 FEB 5 1975

WOC:ebc
(9)

File 62-116395

CONTINUED - OVER

XEROX
FEB 13 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
BOARD (USIB)
MEETING OF 1/24/75

Colby advised that any examples member agencies or departments could provide CIA wherein the acquisition of intelligence proved useful to the development of U. S. policies or programs would certainly be appreciated. Colby stated that in this regard Mr. John Clarke as the over-all coordinator would be in touch with the designated representatives of USIB departments or agencies to further clarify this point.

With regard to the BRC chaired by Vice President Rockefeller, Colby advised that CIA has already obtained an agreement from that Commission that any documents furnished to the Commission by CIA would have the names of CIA employees and/or CIA sources deleted from the document. The purpose of this deletion was to avoid such names from appearing in press releases. Colby also hopes to obtain the same agreement from the SSC.

The Intelligence Division believes that the Bureau should also attempt to obtain such an agreement from the BRC and the SSC if at some time FBI representatives are called to testify or are called to produce FBI documents. This matter has been discussed with the Office of Legal Counsel and it concurs in this recommendation.

ACTION:

(1) If approved, Section Chief William O. Cregar's name will be provided to Mr. Clarke as his point of contact within the FBI.

WRW/[illegible]

(2) Should Bureau representatives be called to testify before the BRC or the SSC an agreement be obtained to delete any names of FBI employees and/or sources with the understanding that the identities could be made available to either the Commission or Committee if either felt such names were absolutely necessary.

WRW/TWL

The Deputy Attorney General

1-24-75

1 - Mr. Callahan, 5744 JB
1 - Mr. Adams, 5744 JB
1 - Mr. Jenkins, 5744 JB
1 - Mr. McDermott, 5634 JB
1 - Mr. Cleveland, 1742 JB
1 - Mr. Gebhardt, 5012 JEH
1 - Mr. Hetherington

Director, FBI

NAME CHECK REQUESTS MADE BY
U.S. SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.,
FOR THE SELECT SENATE COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

On January 23, 1975, U.S. Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr requested name checks of FBI files be made on four individuals who are to be staff members of the Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies.

In response to Senator Baker's request, attached are four letterhead memoranda pertaining to Ronald David McMahan, Arthur Boggess Calahouse, Jr., Howard Leibengood and Michael J. Madigon for transmittal to the requesting Committee.

Enclosures (4)

UNREC COPY AND ~~COPY~~ Original OF ENCL FILED IN
116-474111-2

Have approved by Dept. AG's
James Wilderotter in Dept. [illegible]
office + delivered for Sen. Baker
[illegible] delivered
2-3-75.
On

MAILED 6
[illegible]
FBI

62-116395-
2-11

REC-111 15 ~~JAN~~ 28 1975

DTP:ysq (10)

NOTE: See J.J. McDermott to Mr. Jenkins memorandum dated 1/23/75 captioned "Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.), Minority Member, Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies, Name Check Request."

4 - ENCLOSURE

#mpk16

9/25/00 SP-2 ALM/MG

XEROX
FEB 13 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1 - Mr. Callahan, 5744 JB
1 - Mr. Adams, 5744 JB
1 - Mr. Jenkins, 5744 JB
1 - Mr. McDermott, 5634 JB
1 - Mr. Cleveland, 1742 JB
1 - Mr. Gebhardt, 5012 JEH
1 - Mr. Hetherington

January 24, 1975

ARTHUR BOGGESS CULAHOUSE, JR.
Born: July 4, 1948
Athens, Tennessee

The central files of the Federal Bureau of investigation and the records of the FBI Identification Division contain no information identifiable with captioned individual.

MDR 16
9/25/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

Original and 1 - Deputy Attorney General

DTP:ysc (10)

NOTE: See J.J. McDermott to Mr. Jenkins memorandum dated 1/23/75 captioned "Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.), Minority Member, Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies, Name Check Request."

DTP

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

62-116395-11

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Callahan, 5744 JB
1 - Mr. Adams, 5744 JB
1 - Mr. Jenkins, 5744 JB
1 - Mr. McDermott, 5634 JB
1 - Mr. Cleveland, 1742 JB
1 - Mr. Gebhardt, 5012 JEH
1 - Mr. Hetherington
January 24, 1975

HOWARD LIEBENGOOD
Born: December 29, 1942
South Bend, Indiana

The central files of the Federal Bureau of investigation and the records of the FBI Identification Division contain no information identifiable with captioned individual.

#MDR16
9/25/00 SP2 ALM/

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Original and 1 - Deputy Attorney General

DTP:ysc (10)

NOTE: See J.J. McDermott to Mr. Jenkins memorandum dated 1/23/75 captioned "Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.), Minority Member, Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies, Name Check Request."

DTP

62-116395 - 11B

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/4/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Fulton
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

SENSTUDY 75 is the code word of a new control file for all communications regarding matters relating to the Select Committee of the Senate (SCS) to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

On 2/4/75 Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry, advised that Mr. Colby has been instructed to have four items prepared for the President's consideration by 2/5/75. They are as follows: (1) an outline as to what Colby plans to say as lead-off witness before the SCS, (2) two lists identifying what information the Intelligence Community feels under no circumstances could be discussed with the SCS as well as what information could be discussed with the SCS under controlled conditions, (3) a set of suggested talking points the President should discuss with the Senate leadership regarding procedures for the proposed hearings, and (4) a list of annexes that Colby plans to provide the Chairmanship of the SCS on the occasion of his initial appearance.

With the Director's approval we have provided Colby with our suggestions relative to items 2 and 3. With regard to item 4 we are preparing two annexes which will be furnished to the Director for his approval prior to furnishing them to Colby.

REC-111 62-116395-10

Mr. Clarke was asked whether the four items to be furnished to the President would also be provided to the Bureau. Clarke assured us that it was his intention to recommend to Colby that material covering items 1, 2, 3 and 4 ~~be furnished~~ to the FBI as well as other members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry and he felt confident that Colby would so order.

FEB 11 1975

62-116395

WOC:ebc
(7) ebc

II mpe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/JHS

CONTINUED - OVER

34

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

Upon receipt of this information from Mr. Clarke it will be submitted to the Director with comments where appropriate for his information.

ACTION:

For information.

WRW/TAL

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

(CI-2) 62-116395 —9

February 3, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

REC-111

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SP-2 [illegible]

The following are deemed to be matters so essential to the security and survival of the nation that they never should be discussed outside the intelligence community, and even within the intelligence community, they should be discussed only on a strict need-to-know basis:

The names and other identifying characteristics of sensitive sources.

Details which would permit opposition assessment of the totality of our effectiveness in the fields of internal security and foreign counterintelligence, including:

The numbers, locations, times, and affiliations of recruitments-in-place of personnel within target organizations.

Specific subjects of highly sophisticated intelligence-gathering techniques.

The total extent of our investigative effectiveness against any given target organization or individual, or the lack thereof.

Intelligence information furnished in confidence by friendly foreign agencies, the disclosure of which could jeopardize operations of those agencies.

ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON

JPT:HFC:bkb
(9)

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall captioned "Select Committee of the Senate",, 2/3/75, prepared by WOC:ebc/bcw.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

REC-111 62-116395-9

February 3, 1975

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Concern for the security and survival of the nation dictates that discussion of details of highly-sophisticated intelligence-gathering techniques and methods employed by the FBI be held only under controlled conditions, such as in Executive Session before only Senators serving as members of the Committee. This includes not only those techniques and methods used in furtherance of FBI responsibilities, but also those utilized in support of missions of other members of the United States intelligence community.

62-116395

ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON

HFC:JPT:dsh
(9)

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 2/3/75, captioned "Select Committee of the Senate," prepared by WOC:ebc/bcw.

#MDR16
9/25/00 SP2ALM/JTG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JPT
HFC

GPO 954

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall WRW

FROM : W.O. Cregar WOC

DATE: 2/3/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Fulton
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: **SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 #MDR16

This memorandum recommends that we provide at Mr. Colby's request two lists: (1) information which the FBI feels under no circumstances could be discussed with the Select Committee of the Senate (SCS) and (2) items of information which could be discussed with the SCS under controlled conditions.

On the afternoon of 2/1/75, Mr. John Clarke, in his role as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry, telephonically advised the Bureau's representative on this Group that a meeting was held at the White House on the morning of 2/1/75. Participants were the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and Dr. Henry Kissinger in his role as advisor to the President on national security affairs. Dr. Kissinger requested Mr. Colby to prepare two lists for the President's consideration. The purpose of these lists was to provide the President with information necessary for him to make a judgment as to whether certain information should be withheld from the SCS on the basis of executive privilege.

As a result of the White House meeting, Mr. Clarke requested the Bureau prepare by the close of business, 2/3/75, two lists: (1) that information proprietary to the FBI which under no circumstances could be discussed with the SCS and as a result would require the denial of such presentation by virtue of executive privilege and (2) a list of information proprietary to the FBI which could be discussed with the SCS under controlled conditions (presumably this means discussed in Executive Session limited to members of the SCS).

REC-111 62-116395-9

Attached herewith are the two lists requested by Mr. Clarke, which will be furnished to Mr. Colby by our liaison representative with CIA.

22 FEB 5 1975

ACTION:

If approved, the attached two lists will be delivered

[redacted]

62-116395 WRW

Enclosures

WOC:ebc/bcw bcw
(7)

5-WOB

[illegible]

OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

January 30, 1975

NOTE TO: William V. Cleveland
Special Investigative Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: James A. Wilderotter
Associate Deputy Attorney General

Senstudy '75

Please handle per our telephone conversation.

Thanks.

Attachment

All 4 items delivered to Sen Baker 2-3-75

62-116395-8

15 FEB 11 1975

REC-111

ENCLOSURE

#MDR16
9/25/00 SP2ALM/TG

File Dur 8/11

34
53 FEB 13 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Deputy Attorney General

DATE: 1-24-75

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: NAME CHECK REQUESTS MADE BY U.S. SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., FOR THE SELECT SENATE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

On January 23, 1975, U.S. Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., requested name checks of FBI files be made on four individuals who are to be staff members of the Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies.

In response to Senator Baker's request, attached are four letterhead memoranda pertaining to Ronald David McMahan, Arthur Boggess Culahouse, Jr., Howard Leibengood and Michael J. Madigan for transmittal to the requesting Committee.

Enclosures (4)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

FBI-35

62-116395-8

ENCLOSURE

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The Deputy Attorney General 1-24-75

Director, FBI

NAME CHECK REQUESTS MADE BY
U.S. SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.,
FOR THE SELECT SENATE COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

On January 23, 1975, U.S. Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., requested name checks of FBI files be made on four individuals who are to be staff members of the Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies.

In response to Senator Baker's request, attached are four letterhead memoranda pertaining to Ronald David McMahan, Arthur Boggess Culahouse, Jr., Howard Leibengood and Michael J. Madigan for transmittal to the requesting Committee.

Enclosures (4)

#mdr16
SP-2 ALM 1176
9/25/00

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 2-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATOR FRANK CHURCH
CHAIRMAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
MEETING WITH THE DIRECTOR
11:30 A.M., FEBRUARY 6, 1975

At 2:50 p.m., 2-3-75, Bill Miller, Counsel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, advised Inspector John B. Hotis that Senator Frank Church (D - Idaho), Chairman of the Committee, would like to meet with Mr. Kelley at his earliest convenience.

The meeting is an informal one and no other members of the Committee will be present. The purpose is merely to get acquainted and discuss in general terms what the Committee hopes to accomplish. Senator Church also wants to assure Mr. Kelley that it is not his intention to undermine public confidence in the intelligence agencies of the United States. But the Committee wants to ascertain whether these agencies are being run with integrity and in a manner which is consistent with national goals.

The only time this week which is mutually convenient to Mr. Kelley and Senator Church is Thursday, 2-6-75, at 11:30 a.m. This has been verified by Mrs. Metcalf and approved by the Director. Mr. Adams will accompany the Director to this meeting. Mr. Miller has been advised and he will inform us as to the precise location of the meeting.

MCT-12
CH 45

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

REC-111

62-116395-7

FEB 7 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mrs. Metcalf
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Telephone Room
1 - Mr. Hotis

JBH:mbk
(8)

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTB

LEGAL COUNSEL

FEB 7 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 2/3/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Fulton
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

This memorandum recommends that Mr. Colby, in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence, be furnished two write-ups for inclusion as annexes in a briefing book he plans to provide the Select Committee of the Senate (SCS) on the occasion of his appearance as the lead-off witness before this Committee. The write-ups are: (1) the role of counterintelligence and (2) the origin and disposition of the "Huston Plan."

A previous memorandum was approved that Section Chief William O. Cregar be designated as the point of contact within the FBI to coordinate matters dealing with future testimony before the SCS. Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, has been designated as the coordinator for the Intelligence Community. The points of contact under Mr. Clarke's auspices have been given the title of Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry.

On 1/31/75 Clarke held a second meeting of this Group wherein he reiterated that it was Mr. Colby's intention to make a very strong plea for the Intelligence Community as the lead-off witness. In addition, Mr. Colby plans to provide to the SCS a series of annexes, some of which will be classified, which will address some of the issues to be looked into by the SCS. Those issues have been generally identified in Senate Resolution Number 21, dated 1/21/75. Representatives at Mr. Clarke's meeting were asked to prepare certain of these annexes. The FBI was requested to prepare the annex on the role of counterintelligence as well as the annex on the origin and disposition of the "Huston Plan."

REC-111 62-116395-6

The Intelligence Division in responding to the request from Clarke's Group will prepare these two write-ups. It is anticipated that there will be no problems in connection with the write-up on counterintelligence and this is going forward.

8 FEB 11 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

62-116395

WOC:ebc (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

5W06

53 FEB 13 1975

With regard to the origin and disposition of the "Huston Plan," we anticipate having an initial paper ready for discussion with representatives of the National Security Agency (NSA), CIA and the Department of Justice by Wednesday, 2/5/75. This coordination is necessary inasmuch as both CIA and NSA were actively involved in the development of the Plan. The Department's participation is necessary inasmuch as the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC), chaired by the Department, evolved from one of the recommendations set out in the "Huston Plan." Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, is a member of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry and is preparing an input to the "Huston Plan" annex, which input will describe the origin, function and disposition of the IEC.

Prior to releasing these two annexes for Mr. Colby's use, they will be submitted to the Director for his approval.

ACTION:

For information.

WRW/

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

January 29, 1975

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

REC-111 62-116395-5

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

With regard to legislation proposed by the FBI, a letter was sent to the Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, on August 29, 1974, strongly recommending that consideration be given to a legislative proposal that would authorize the Government to conduct court-approved electronic surveillances in domestic security cases. This recommendation was based on the Supreme Court decision which held that electronic surveillances conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive violated the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and our opinion that the current standards imposed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1970 would be ineffective techniques in domestic intelligence investigations.

In another legislative bill pending in the United States Senate, Senate Bill S3001, although the FBI was not the sponsor of the bill it has a particular interest in its passage both for internal security and foreign counterintelligence considerations. This bill would make it a Federal offense to obtain, produce, sell or utilize false documentation.

Of possible interest, in recognition of questions which have been voiced as to the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence investigations and in order to cover any possible gap between statutory authority and Executive authority necessary to protect the national security, this Bureau submitted to the Attorney General in August, 1973, a proposal for an Executive Order

SPB AM/JTG

9/25/00
#MDR16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON

HFC:JPT:dmt/jlb
(9)

~~SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Classified by 6875 JPT
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

HFC
JPT

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

~~SECRET~~

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

to establish both authoritative and definitive guidelines for the FBI in this area. The proposed order took cognizance of the constitutional responsibility of the President to defend the Constitution and the Government; of continuing threats to domestic tranquility and the general welfare; of existing statutes relating to national security and public safety; and of the President's need for intelligence information. The proposed Executive Order included an order by the President that "The Attorney General prepare and issue guidelines, conforming to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis intelligence information essential to the execution of laws pertaining to subversive activity and other such activity affecting the national security, domestic tranquility, and general welfare of the United States."

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall 1/28/75, prepared by WOC/ebc, captioned as above.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

REC-11 62-116395-5

January 29, 1975

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

11/6/00 #mDR16
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

The FBI has the exclusive responsibility for protection of the internal security of the United States. As regards foreign counterintelligence activities in the United States, the FBI, as a member of the United States intelligence community, not only has the function of detecting and neutralizing hostile intelligence activities, but is a producer of positive intelligence information of value to the United States Government.

The FBI's foreign counterintelligence operations not only thwart the efforts of hostile intelligence services but contribute to the overall knowledge and effectiveness of the United States intelligence community. Since 1950, more than 110 Soviet-bloc intelligence officers and/or agents have been removed from their official positions within the United States or excluded from entry or reentry into the United States as a result of FBI investigative efforts. Some noteworthy examples of the FBI's contribution in this area and of the types of hostile activity which challenge our intelligence community follow:

In 1962 the FBI was successful in terminating an operation which was begun in 1960 when the Soviet intelligence services attempted to develop an agent of influence in American politics. A Soviet intelligence officer employed at the United Nations Secretariat cultivated a New York law student and eventually offered to finance this individual's campaign as a candidate for the New York State Assembly. The FBI terminated this operation by exposing it and the Soviet departed the United States and will not be permitted to return. (S)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON

HFC:JPT:dsh
(9)

SECRET JPT

SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR

~~Classified by 6078~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

HFC
JPT

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In July, 1966, a Czech intelligence officer assigned to the Czech Embassy in Washington, D. C., was declared persona non grata following an FBI operation which balked his plans to place an electronic listening device in a Department of State office. (S)

In 1967 a Soviet-bloc diplomat defected to the United States. The history of Soviet-bloc espionage is colored with the efforts of their services to prevent defections and take reprisals against those who throw off the communist yoke. In 1969 the FBI detected a plot by hostile intelligence against the aforementioned defector who was residing in the United States. The FBI determined that the hostile service had recruited two individuals during visits by them to their foreign homeland and assigned them to locate and photograph the defector. The immigrants confessed their assignments against the defector and a stern warning was issued by the Department of State to the offending nation that such incidents would not be tolerated in the future. (S)

On February 7, 1970, a Soviet national employed at the United Nations Secretariat was arrested on espionage charges in Seattle, Washington. He had been dispatched to the United States undercover as a translator at the United Nations, but his primary job was to collect classified documents about United States western air defense from an agent the Soviets believed they had developed, but who actually was a double agent under FBI control. The complaint against this Soviet was dismissed with the provision that he depart the United States by February 17, 1970. (S)

On February 14, 1972, another Soviet national who was dispatched to the United States under the cover of translator at the United Nations, was arrested outside of a restaurant on Long Island in the process of receiving classified documents pertaining to a jet fighter airplane being built for the United States Navy. Again, an FBI double agent was involved. (S)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On July 21, 1973, a Soviet diplomat assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., was detained in New York City in the process of meeting with a member of the United States military. The United States military man was arrested on charges of espionage and upon establishing the fact that he had diplomatic immunity, the Soviet was permitted to depart the United States on August 15, 1973. By this arrest the FBI prevented the transmission to the Soviet Government of over 1,000 classified documents weighing nearly 40 pounds and encompassing information from the entire United States intelligence community. (S)

During 1973 three highly explosive devices were located in the vicinity of three Israeli-connected business establishments in New York City. The explosive devices fortunately failed to detonate, thus saving possibly hundreds of lives. FBI investigation identified an Iraqi national who had entered the United States on a visitor's visa during the early part of 1973 as the individual who planted these devices. It was later developed that the Iraqi national was a known member of the Black September Organization, which is the secret terrorist wing of Al Fatah. The Iraqi national was indicted in Eastern District New York on May 17, 1973, on one count, and in Southern District New York on May 23, 1973, on two counts of violations of Title 18, Section 844i. (S)

Industrial espionage by hostile intelligence services, which causes a drain of valuable technology from the United States, is of increasing concern to the United States intelligence community. In August, 1973, a Soviet-bloc industrial representative, who had entered the United States ostensibly for commercial purposes just a few days before, was arrested by FBI Agents following an attempt to steal a secret glass process from the Ford Motor Company. The process reportedly cost over one million dollars to develop. (S)

SECRET

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Another example of investigations dealing with communist officials permanently assigned to the United States was the attempt by another Soviet diplomat during 1971 to penetrate the secure voice communications system of the Presidential command plane, as well as the secure voice communications system between The White House and Number 10 Downing Street. This operation also failed because of FBI counterintelligence efforts. (S)

An attempt of the Soviets to penetrate United States policy-making and legislative organs came to the attention of the FBI during the latter part of 1973 when a Soviet intelligence officer contacted an aid to a United States legislator. During this same period the FBI learned that an individual connected with the Communist Party of the United States had been encouraged to move to the Washington, D. C., area to gather all available information concerning this same legislator. Coincidental with this display of interest in the particular legislator, it was learned that the wife of another Soviet intelligence officer attempted to gather all information available concerning this legislator through the New York Times Information Bank.* (S)

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 1/28/75, captioned as above, prepared by WOC:ebc.

* [illegible], Sterling Munro, Adm. Asst. to Sen. H. M. Jackson, advised Insp. D. W. Bowers that the Senator not only had no objection to use of this material concerning him, but thought it was a good idea.
1/30/75

SECRET

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

January 29, 1975

REC-111 62-111-3[illegible]-5

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Inasmuch as the captioned Committee, to be referred to hereinafter as the SSC, will, of necessity, be concerned in part with highly sensitive information relating to national security, this Bureau suggests that agreement of the SSC be sought for the adoption of the following security measures and procedures, both in the interests of national security and of protection of privacy of individuals:

In the resolution establishing the SSC it was established that no employee of the SSC or person performing tasks for the SSC on a contractual basis should be given access to classified material unless appropriately cleared for access to such material by the SSC. It was indicated that the type of clearance would be commensurate with the type of information to be made available to such persons under conditions agreed upon by the SSC. In this regard it would be desirable for the SSC to stipulate that no staff member who is to be given access to any material, testimony, or information received or generated by the committee other than that which is, in essence, public information be granted such access without prior receipt of a security clearance based on a full field investigation. Consideration might also be given by the SSC to assuring itself that its members are appropriately cleared to receive all material to which they may have access.

The SSC should adopt rules to insure that the secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be preserved and that these rules be made known to the individuals and agencies who will be called upon to present testimony or materials.

ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED TO DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON

JPT:bkb bkb
(9)

#MDR16
9/25/00 SP-2 ALM/JTB

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

JPT

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

It should be stipulated that those agencies which will present documents to the committee be authorized to excise from those documents, prior to their presentation, the names of their personnel as well as those of any other individuals whose safety or individual privacy might be jeopardized by unauthorized disclosure of their identities.

It should be stipulated that, as has been customary in other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, witnesses shall have the right to request that testimony be given in executive session, that in some instances testimony be "off the record," and that certain testimony be heard only by members of the SSC.

It should further be stipulated that witnesses be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony prior to any publication of it.

It should be understood by the committee that the "Third Agency Rule," binding upon members of the United States intelligence community, may oblige a witness representing one member of the intelligence community to decline to testify concerning matters within the proprietary purview of another community member.

It is the intention of this Bureau to cooperate fully with the SSC. It will be requested that in attempting to satisfy requirements of the SSC we be afforded sufficient time to research these requirements in order to insure that our answers will be totally responsive and accurate.

Provision should be made for the safeguarding of information and documentary materials received or generated by the SSC, consistent with their substance, and, at the conclusion of the Committee's investigation and study, for secure disposition of such records, including return to contributors of materials submitted by them.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, 1/28/75, prepared by WOC/cbc, captioned as above.

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395-5

January 29, 1975

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

REC-111

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

There have been public charges that the FBI has operated for 50 years without oversight or any external controls. This is not accurate. In the Congress, several bodies have had jurisdiction over matters affecting FBI programs and activities. These include the Appropriations Committees of both Houses, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and on Administrative Practice and Procedure, a special Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Surveillances, the House Judiciary Committee, the former House Committee on Internal Security, the Government Operations Committees of both the House and Senate and the Senate Subcommittee on FBI Oversight.

During 1972 the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, with the full cooperation of the FBI, conducted detailed and extensive examination of the FBI's activities as a member of the United States intelligence community.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 created a Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. That committee made inquiries of members of the intelligence community regarding the role of intelligence as it affects the conduct of our foreign policy. In its research the committee looked into certain pertinent FBI activities and had contact with FBI representatives both in the United States and abroad.

By direction of Chairman Peter Rodino and the House of Representatives' Judiciary Committee, the General Accounting Office (GAO) is currently reviewing the domestic intelligence operations of the FBI, concentrating on policies, programs, procedures and case management.

ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED TO DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON

JPT:jlb jlb
(9)

#MDR16
9/25/00 SP2ALM/TG

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

H+C
JPT

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

GAO's audit is covering Headquarters and ten of the FBI's field offices where a representative number of the Bureau's domestic investigations are conducted.

__NOTE__:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, 1/28/75, captioned as above, prepared by WOC:ebc.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓ TJL
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TJL

DATE: 1/28/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2ALM/TFC

SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

① Senate Select Committee To Conduct An Investigation and Study of Governmental Operations With Respect to Intell. Activities

This memorandum recommends that the original and one copy of four memoranda (copies attached) be furnished to Mr. William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, for his consideration at the time of his forthcoming appearance before the Select Committee of the Senate.

Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated 1/27/75, captioned as above, advised that Mr. Colby anticipates being called as the first witness before the Select Committee of the Senate responsible for examining the extent of overt and covert intelligence activities in the U. S. and abroad. In connection with this appearance, Colby has indicated that he intends to make a very strong pitch for the Intelligence Community and has asked all agencies and departments of the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) to provide him with memoranda on the following four subjects: (1) examples of how the FBI in its counterintelligence role has materially benefited the U. S. Government, (2) ground rules that the FBI believes should be discussed with the Committee in order to insure that innocent persons are not maligned and sources and methods of investigation are protected, and (3) a chronology of independent boards or commissions which have examined the efficacy and authority of the FBI, and (4) any pending or proposed legislation involving internal security matters submitted by the FBI.

Attached are copies of four memoranda prepared by the Intelligence Division which we propose to deliver to Mr. Colby before the close of business, 1/29/75.

File 62-116395

ACTION:

If approved, the original and one copy of each of the four memoranda will be delivered to Mr. Colby's office on the afternoon of 1/29/75, by liaison.

REC-111 62-116395-5

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(6)

Delivered original + cc by TML
to Colby's office,
SA [illegible] 1/29/75
WOP

OK

18 FEB 6 1975

5-9-75

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Each Assistant Director

1 - Each Section Chief, INTD

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ✓
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/3/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Senate Select Committee

PURPOSE:

This recommends code word "SENSTUDY 75" be adopted as title of new control file for communications regarding subject.

On 1/21/75 the U. S. Senate reported Senate Resolution 21 to establish captioned committee. The Committee will look into operations of members of the U. S. intelligence community including the FBI. The Committee is being chaired by Senator Frank Church of Idaho. We have already received and responded to requests from the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry for information to be used by Mr. William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, in preparing for his anticipated initial appearance before the committee. The Ad Hoc Group is composed of representatives of U. S. Intelligence Board member agencies and departments to deal with "SENSTUDY 75."

For administrative convenience, as well as economy, it is suggested that copies of all communications and material dealing with the activities of the committee be placed in a new control file, 62-116395, and that the code word "SENSTUDY 75" be adopted as a brief title for internal communications relating to this matter. FBIHQ indices contain no references to that code word.

62-116395

REC-111 62-116395-4

MCT-10

JPT:bkb
(24)

CH 42

CONTINUED - OVER

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2ALM/JJG

53 FEB 3 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senate Select Committee To Conduct An Investigation
And Study of Governmental Operations With Respect
To Intelligence Activities

ACTION:

With your approval, the Files and Communications Division will establish file 62-116395 under the caption "SENSTUDY 75" as a repository for communications dealing with this matter.

WRW/TEL

JPT

Jma

OK

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

January 30, 1975

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE

On January 21, 1975, Resolution 21 established a Select Committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

Mr. William Colby, in his role as Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), has advised that he anticipates being called as the first witness before the Select Committee of the Senate. In his opening remarks it is Mr. Colby's intention to make a strong presentation on behalf of the Intelligence Community highlighting some of its outstanding contributions. In addition, he expects to show that the Community has over the years been subject to scrutiny by Government commissions and boards.

In furtherance of a coordinated effort to insure those agencies and departments of the Intelligence Community are portrayed in a most favorable light Mr. Colby has requested points of contact be established in each USIB agency or department. Mr. John H. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, is Mr. Colby's personal representative to insure a proper coordinated effort.

In anticipation that the Intelligence Evaluation Committee which was chaired by the Department of Justice might be the subject of the Select Committee's interest, it is our understanding that Mr. Clarke will be in contact with your office.

MAILED 6
JAN 30 1975
FBI

#mDR16
9/25/00 SP2ALM/MG

REC-11 62-116395-3

MCT-10

CH 42

13 FEB 3 1975

WCC:ebc
(9)

SEE NOTE ~~PAGE TWO~~

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

Attached is a list of those individuals representing the USIB who have been designated as points of contact in their respective agencies or departments for Mr. Clarke.

Enclosure

1 - The Deputy Attorney General - Enclosure

NOTE:

Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated 1/27/75, captioned "Select Committee of the Senate," recommended that Section Chief William O. Cregar's name be provided Mr. Clarke as the Bureau's point of contact. The Intelligence Division is currently preparing memoranda for Mr. Colby's consideration in anticipation of his appearance before the Senate Select Committee. Such memoranda, of course, will be furnished to the Director for his approval prior to being furnished to Mr. Colby.

Dr. John M. Clarke	IC Staff	143ext5477
Mr. William McAfee	State	101ext21504
Mr. Benson K. Buffham	NSA	(9)688-7222
Mr. Kenneth Geisen	DIA	11ext75101
Mr. J. Foster Collins	Treasury	184ext2421
Mr. Merrill T. Kelly	Army	11ext78419
Captain Donald S. Jones	Navy	11ext53737
Colonel Jerry D. Alderson	Air Force	11ext50006
Mr. William O. Cregar	FBI	175ext4612
Dr. Charles Cook	SAFSS	11ext78531
Mr. Hank Knoche	CIA	143ext4086
Mr. John Warner	CIA	143ext6111
Mr. George Cary	CIA	143ext6121
Mrs. Patricia Taylor	IC Staff	143ext4401

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/00 BY SP2 ALM/116
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-3

1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Congressional Services

The Deputy Attorney General

January 24, 1975

1 - Mr. Cleveland

Director, FBI

SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
MINORITY MEMBER
SELECT SENATE COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
NAME CHECK REQUEST

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM/J76

This is to confirm a conversation between you and Deputy Associate Director Adams on January 23, 1975, wherein you authorized the FBI to honor name check requests on staff employees received from the Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies. You were advised that we presently have a request in this connection from Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., for name checks on four potential staff employees.

Senator Baker had also indicated to the FBI that he had no idea as to who would have the responsibility of conducting the background investigations which must be conducted, and this is to confirm your approval that we contact Director William E. Colby of the Central Intelligence Agency regarding their desires in this matter since they normally handle background checks of staff employees of committees receiving sensitive information concerning Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI normally handles such background investigations on staff employees of committees receiving sensitive FBI information. Following discussions with Mr. Colby, contact will be had with the Chairman of the Select Senate Committee in order to ascertain which agency should conduct the required background investigations.

REC-111

62-116395-2

21 ~~JAN 31 1975~~

MAILED 2
JAN 24 1975
FBI

JBA:ams
(9)

ir.
D Adm.
D Inv.
r.:
Syst.
airs
Com.
ction
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
gal Coun.
elephone Rm.
ector Sec'y

73 FEB 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. JENKINS

DATE: 1-23-75

FROM : J. J. MC DERMOTT

SUBJECT: SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. (R-Tenn.)
MINORITY MEMBER
SELECT SENATE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
NAME CHECK REQUEST

SA Richard T. Taylor, Jr., WFO, telephoned Inspector Quinn in my office this morning to advise that he had been contacted by Senator Baker requesting name checks on three individuals who are to be staff members of captioned committee. In this regard, Baker indicated that he anticipated that the committee would request full field investigations on all staff members of this committee.

Baker advised that the three names he provided will be among the ten staffers that the minority representation on the committee will have. The three are as follows:

RONALD DAVID MC MAHAN
DOB: 6-22-38, Knoxville, Tennessee
SSN #408-58-9952
Residence: 1904 Whipping Post Way, Vienna, Virginia

ARTHUR BOGGESS CULAHOUSE, JR.
DOB: 7-4-48, Athens, Tennessee
SSN #415-78-7202
Residence: 1015 E Street, S. E., Washington, D. C.

HOWARD LEIBENGOOD
DOB: 12-29-42, South Bend, Indiana
SSN #307-44-9707
Residence: 6304 Wildwood Valley Drive,
Brentwood, Tennessee
Formerly a staff member of the Select Committee
to Investigate Presidential Campaign Activities

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
9/25/00 BY SP-2ALM/dG

MCT 12 REC-19 62-116375-

Baker stated that he would appreciate the results of these name checks as soon as possible since it is anticipated that the select panel will be receiving materials on or about Tuesday of next week (1-28-75).

CH 45

21 JAN 31 1975

GTQ:crt (6)
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Congressional Services Office

(OVER.)

53 FEB 3 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Jenkins
Re: SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

Baker indicated to Taylor that he has no idea as to who will have the responsibility of conducting the background investigations but he would hope that the staff members would have "Q" clearances or the type of clearances afforded Atomic Energy Commission.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be approved and referred to the General Investigative Division for appropriate action in line with Senator Baker's request.

ADDENDUM: G. T. QUINN/crt 1-23-75

SA Taylor called back at 2:00 p.m. and requested that the following individual also be subjected to a name check for Senator Baker:

MICHAEL J. MADIGAN
DOB: 4-18-43, Washington, D. C.
SSN #042-34-3797
Residence: 256 School Street, Acton, Massachusetts

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-25-00 BY SP2-ALM/[illegible]

#MDR16

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Assoc. Dir. ✓
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs ✓
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Fulton

No domestic spies?

Allegations and disclosures about CIA and FBI surveillance of Americans within U.S. borders have been interpreted by some as a type of domestic spying that could have a chilling effect on the exercise of political expression. One response has been that all domestic intelligence operations should be eliminated. Recent events show this would be a non-solution, a patent overreaction.

Most public opinion and most judicial opinion, we suspect, would not consider it an invasion of constitutional rights of privacy if the FBI infiltrated or otherwise kept an eye on activities of the Weathermen. That organization not long ago expressed itself by taking credit for a bomb explosion in the State Department and for placing another explosive device at the Armed Forces Induction Center in Oakland, Calif.

Should members of Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN), the Puerto Rican nationalist group that claimed responsibility for the Jan. 24 bombing — three men killed, many injured — at New York's historic Fraunces Tavern's annex, be exempted from monitoring by federal police because the act was supposedly politically inspired? By some remote logic, FALN believes that bombing Wall Street restaurants will bring independence to Puerto Rico.

The question answers itself: Society has the right and the obligation to protect itself. These were acts of terrorism, whether or not motivated by political aims. Imperiling innocent people to enforce points of view that have been repudiated by a free, open political process is blackmail. And blackmail cannot become integral to any long-sustainable political system.

The Weathermen and FALN, as well as any other organization that indicates it will use extra-legal methods to voice dissent, should not be freed from fear of domestic spying.

The answer is not to eliminate all domestic political surveillance. It is to set the conditions, and they should be rigid, under which domestic spying will be tolerated and under which abuse by federal agents of such infrequently granted authority will be met with stern penalties.

Sen's Study - '75

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

Editorial

A26 THE OREGONIAN
PORTLAND, OREGON

2-14-75

Date: 2-14-75
Edition:
Author:
Editor: J. Richard Nokes
Title:
CIA; FBI
EDITORIAL
Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: Portland
☐ Being Investigated

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 27 1975

REC-6

EX-112

56 MAR 31 1975

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ✓

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SPJ ALM/JJ6

Senate And The CIA

The special committee the U. S. Senate is forming to look into charges of illegal spying on Americans by the CIA, the FBI or other agencies can do a lot of good—or harm.

If the committee conducts a sober and responsible inquiry it can determine if the CIA did in fact overstep the law against domestic espionage and what corrective measures, if any, are needed.

If, however, the committee conducts a Watergate-style probe, complete with televised hearings and sensationalized leaks, it can severely damage the nation's foreign policy and intelligence capability.

★ ★ ★

Incidentally, by voting in caucus 45-7 to establish the special committee, Senate Democrats delivered a rebuff, which seems to be unjustified, to President Ford and the commission headed by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller which Mr. Ford named to investigate the CIA.

The Democrats implicitly stated by their vote that they did not trust the Rockefeller commission to perform an objective inquiry.

That amounts to prejudicial prejudgement. The Rockefeller panel should be given a chance to do its job. Then if it does come up with a whitewash, the criticism would be in order.

★ ★ ★

Meanwhile, the investigation into illegal spying widened after the FBI confirmed its files contain some information on the personal behavior of some congressmen. Included are references to their "loyalty, character or reputation."

Many congressmen are indignant about this. But they should restrain their outrage.

For unlike the CIA, the FBI does have the duty of conducting domestic investigations—and there are times when members of Congress are proper objects of FBI interest.

Every so often, for example, a congressman turns out to be a crook. And in such instances the laws he violates are usually federal ones.

So the FBI, as the federal government's investigatory agency, should not be barred from keeping records on any suspects, even if they happen to be congressmen.

★ ★ ★

Some people, of course, react with knee-jerk fashion any time they hear of the FBI keeping files on anybody. They immediately begin screaming about "police state" tactics.

Well, no American citizen in his right mind should defend police-state actions by any agency.

But agencies like the FBI and the CIA are essential, considering the kind of world we live in. So we dare not emasculate them to the point where they won't be able to perform their necessary functions.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

24 The Pittsburgh Press
Pittsburgh, Pa.

Date: 1/23/75
Edition: Final
Author:
Editor: JOHN TROAN
Title: MISC INFO

Character: 80-861
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: Pittsburgh
☐ Being Investigated

O

Senstudy-75

Ack- letter to Troan 1/31/75 DLD:mbr

62-116395-A

NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 28 1975

58 MAR 28 1975

G.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FBI Chief Looked for Skeletons in Closets of Famous

WASHINGTON — The files went to the Oval Office under J. Edgar Hoover's familiar "I thought you *might* be interested in knowing" heading. And what they contained was always interesting — to say the least.

From one of the most proficient information-gathering machines in existence — the FBI — J. Edgar Hoover compiled explicit tales of human weakness in high places: Illicit sex, drunkeness, homosexuality, marital problems.

If any president who received such information from Hoover — and all are said to have — ever rebuked him for his efforts, it remained as secret as the contents of the memos themselves. Most were dutifully grateful.

Old FBI hands say Hoover began compiling information on public figures, including congressmen, very early in his 30-year reign.

By the early 1950s field agents were under a standing directive to forward biographical information on newly elected congressmen or executive branch appointees to Washington for the benefit of bureau officials who had to deal with them.

As far as it is known, there never were any specific orders, official or unofficial, for FBI agents to solicit information of an intimate personal nature.

But one former assistant FBI director recalled recently: "It was understood that Hoover was interested in such material. Some agents who might come across a little smut in the course of an investigation would simply ignore it and not forward it. But others saw it as a chance to gain favor and deliberately went out of their way to get more."

Hoover's penchant for ferreting out the skeltons in the closets of the famous was as well known outside the agency as within. The absence of protest against it until now indicates that the threat that those files might be bared may well have been the major source of Hoover's power.

"I can't really say how much of the information ever was used," said one former high-ranking bureau official. "But I am convinced that many a politician shied away from confrontations with the director because he did not know what Hoover had on him."

THE COMING congressional investigations may not verify the existence of secret. The official bureau position is that the information is stored in bits and pieces and was only pulled together when needed.

But there are witnesses who can swear that such dossiers existed, perhaps in Hoover's personal files which have either been destroyed or removed from the bureau. And they were readily accessible to presidents.

"I have personally carried files to the White House dozens of times and delivered them to a secretary," said a former FBI-White House liaison during the Johnson administration. "That was the president could truthfully say he had never talked to the FBI on a particular matter."

WHILE THE ultimate abuse of the FBI occurred under Richard Nixon, most present and former FBI officials say President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had a private telephone line to the home of assistant director Cartha D. DeLoach, did not hesitate to use Hoover's bureau for political purposes.

For example, Johnson requested complete bureau investigations of both Sen. Spiro Agnew, after he became vice-president-elect in 1968.

Johnson justified the Goldwater request, one ex-FBI official reported, by pointing out that Goldwater was a reserve major general in the Air Force and "had more secrets than we do at the White House."

In 1964 Johnson sent an entire team of agents headed by DeLoach to the Atlantic City Democratic convention to do a little spying on friends of Robert F. Kennedy, whom he feared might be plotting to take the nomination away from him.

And a decade before, it was Hoover's FBI that supplied Sen. Joseph McCarthy with much of the ammunition in his now discredited pursuit of alleged communists.

More than one president, FBI officials agree, used the agency to gather information on personal enemies, including elected officials.

Roosevelt, for instance loosed the FBI on foes of his lend-lease program. Johnson frequently passed information along to allies on Capitol Hill who could stun a Johnson opponent by casually dropping a juicy tidbit of gossip from his FBI file.

Although never documented, it was widely believed in Washington that Johnson amused himself with bedside reading of what J. Edgar was finding out about others.

House Speaker Carl Albert, who like everyone else heard rumors that the FBI had a thick file on his personal life, wrote Hoover and asked him about it. Hoover responded equivocally that no such file existed.

7 C MAR 27 1975

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

6B
DETROIT FREE PRESS
DETROIT, MICHIGAN

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/JH

Sen Study -75

Date: 1/30/75
Edition:
Author:
Editor: JOSEPH H. STROUD
Title:

62-116395-A

Character:
or
NOT RECORDED
Classification:
46 MAR 27 1975
Submitting Office: DETROIT
☐ Being Investigated

File — 5

The existence of such files was not ~~publicly~~ acknowledged until 1973, after Hoover's death, when the Senate was considering the appointment of L. Patrick Gray as his successor.

Then acting director, Gray told the Senate Judiciary Committee he had seen files so hot there was no way of destroying them without risking hurt to some subjects.

Saying he would like to burn them, Gray said the law gives the National Archives final say over the documents.

Subsequent news stories disclosed the existence of files on Sen. Edward Kennedy then House Majority Leader Hale Boggs, an~~d several~~ others.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

151 THRU 163

164 THRU 188

190 THRU 208

210 THRU 219

220, 221

2ND NR 221 THRU 230

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/2/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

At 2:30 p.m. on June 2, 1975, a conference was held with the Deputy Attorney General attended by K. William O'Connor, Kevin Maroney, Philip White, and Robert McDermott of the Department. Bureau representatives were Mr. Callahan, Mr. Adams, Mr. Wannall and me.

Mr. O'Connor discussed the request by the Senate Select Committee for access to the 39 page report by former Assistant Attorney General Petersen concerning COINTELPRO. Though objections were presented by the Bureau representatives that the report should not be furnished to the Committee, and its enclosures, particularly the legal memoranda should not be made available, the Deputy Attorney General decided and instructed that the 39 page report should be made available to John Elliff on Tuesday, June 3, 1975, for his review, at which time he would be permitted to take notes, but he would not be furnished a copy of the document. The Deputy further instructed that should Mr. Elliff request the attachments to the report, Mr. O'Connor should offer as an alternative the memoranda which initiated each of the COINTELPROs.

EX-105 REC-20 62-116395-220

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Upon our return to the Bureau, Mr. Adams requested that the Intelligence Division undertake an analysis of each of the summaries which were attached to the Petersen report in order to make a damage assessment based on factors that would affect current Bureau operations should they be revealed to the Committee. He also requested that ~~this information~~ be compiled and available to brief the Deputy Attorney General as to the difficulties that would be involved upon disclosure.

JUN 10 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. David Ryan
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116009

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Intelligence Division analyze the summaries for purposes of a damage assessment.

2. That the Intelligence Division be prepared to furnish a briefing to the Deputy Attorney General as to the damage assessment.

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/28/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO: Director, FBI (62-116395)
(Attention: INTD - W. O. Cregar)

FROM: SAC, Atlanta (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

Re Bureau airtel to Atlanta 5/23/75.

Material enclosed with referenced airtel was hand-delivered to former SA, ALAN G. SENTINELLA, 5/27/75, and same was returned by SENTINELLA to Atlanta Division same day.

Enclosed is the material furnished by SENTINELLA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

detached & filed w/ yellow of LHM 5/22/75

5-B

62-116395-229

REC-100

17 JUN 16 1975

2-Bureau (Enc.)
1-Atlanta
WKD:rrl
(3)

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________

Special Agent in Charge

JUN 17 1975

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident ____
Inspection ____
Int. II. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 5 1975
TELETYPE

NR 011 NK CODE

4:00PM 6/5/75 IMMEDIATE RXG

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

ATT: W. O. GREGAR, INTD

FROM NEWARK (62-3971)

SENSTUDY 75

RE TELCON BUREAU SUPERVISOR ROBERT SHEA AND ASAC HERBERT D. CLOUGH, JR., JUNE 5, 1975.

THOROUGH REVIEW OF FILES CAPTIONED "DISRUPTION OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION; INFORMATION CONCERNING"; "SPECIAL SQUAD AT DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION , ATLANTIC CITY, N.J., AUGUST 22-28, 1964"; "DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, AUGUST 24-28, 1964" AND JUNE FILES DOES NOT REVEAL ANY MEMORANDA, LETTERS OR OTHER TYPE COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED BY FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, LEO T. CLARK.

END

MWW FBI WASH DC CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC-100

62-116395-228

JUN 16 1975

CC - Gregar

84 JUN 17 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 3, 1975

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.
   Stanley David Levison

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired SA, FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: Bureau file 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/12/75

5. INTERVIEWER: Mr. Lester B. Seidel, SSC Staff Member

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT:

Witness was questioned and furnished information concerning the former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley David Levison.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

62-116395

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC-100

62-116395-227

17 JUN 16 1975

84 JUN 17 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2190

10 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

Harriet Merritt for
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN [illegible]
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RU

Attachment

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-226

NOT RECORDED

17 JUN 16 1975

file 62-116395

FIVE

84 JUN 19 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

10 JUN 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
Bader, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara			12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
Chesnick, Barbara			4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	

HEREIN
DATE 1-14-01 BY SP2ALM/lcw

62-116395-226

ENCLOSURE

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17 (Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Dawson, Thomas			9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeOreo, Mary			6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel			8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor			3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
Ernö, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
Greissing, Edward			11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF Badge
Iverson, Portia			10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
Karalekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan			11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.			6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Pyle, Christopher			11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Ricks, Walter			12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Seidel, Lester			7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.			3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha			9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Wallach, Paul			5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

1 - D. W. Moore
(Attn: J.M. Murphy)
1 - J. A. Mintz
(Attn: Legal Analysis Section)
1 - W. R. Wannall

May 9, 1975

Sr. Study - '75

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - R. W. Held

Honorable Charles E. Wiggins
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Wiggins:

Reference is made to your letter dated April 9, 1975, enclosing a resolution adopted by the State Bar of California condemning the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for placing an informant on the staff of a legal service agency to communicate information learned in that capacity to the FBI and our response dated April 28, 1975.

Contact with the State Bar of California has enabled us to identify the situation to which they were referring.

Between April, 1968, and November, 1968, one Rudolph Leamer Muse was operated as an informant by our New Orleans, Louisiana, Division. Muse furnished information regarding black extremist activities and he was paid for services rendered. Muse was unemployed when initially volunteering his assistance to the FBI and subsequently, on May 10, 1968, began working as an investigator for the New Orleans Legal Assistance Corps (NOLAC), an organization funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Information in the files of our New Orleans Division indicates during June, 1968, Muse advised it had become necessary to tell his supervisor at NOLAC of his relationship with the FBI. His supervisor became aware of Muse's association with black nationalist groups and attempted to discharge him. To avoid discharge, Muse told his supervisor he was cooperating with the FBI. Subsequently Muse's supervisor from NOLAC contacted the New Orleans Division and advised he wanted to assure the FBI that the relationship between

4

190-3145-7

ORIGINAL FILED IN

MAILED 6
MAY 14 1975
FBI

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

REC 62-116395

ST 104

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 16 1975

19 MAY 16 1975

RWH:cah (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

MAIL ROOM ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2ALM/RW

FLM

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JUN 17 1975

Muse and the FBI would be maintained by him and would go no further. Muse's supervisor said he was cognizant of the importance of Muse's cooperation with the FBI remaining confidential.

The New Orleans Division of the FBI never conducted any investigation regarding NOLAC and Muse never furnished information concerning its activities.

I hope this information will clarify the issue for you. If I may be of further assistance in this matter, please contact me.

A copy of this letter is being provided to the State Bar of California.

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

1 - State Bar of California
601 McAllister Street
San Francisco, California 94102

Honorable Charles E. Wiggins

NOTE:

The resolution of the State Bar of California (SBC) referred to above did not identify the specific incident in which they were interested so Congressman Wiggins' letter was acknowledged and we indicated additional details would follow. On 4/25/75 San Francisco advised the basis for the SBC resolution was articles contained in the 2/7/75 issues of the San Francisco Examiner and Oakland Tribune. In these articles Muse was not mentioned by name but the details corresponded with his case. On 4/28/75 Supervisor Ernest Wall, New Orleans, advised Muse was identified by name in articles concerning this incident in the 2/2/75 issue of the New Orleans Times Picayune and the 2/25/75 issue of the New Orleans States Item. Since Muse revealed his relationship with the FBI and has been publicly identified by name and appears to be no privacy issue or need to protect the confidentiality of our files, Congressman Wiggins should be advised of the complete details in this matter. As the SBC urged issues such as this be considered by the select committees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, a copy of this communication is being furnished for the information of the Legal Analysis Section and Project Senstudy 75 in Division 5.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-8-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth in summary form the requests we have received from various Committees in Congress and the status of our replies.

I. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

We have substantially complied with the request of this Committee contained in their letter of 3-19-75. The remaining aspects of this request involve a decision by the State Department concerning the release of exhibits contained in a study on FBI jurisdiction, a decision by the Department relating to COINTELPRO and our recommendation that one particular document not be furnished the Committee.

We are in receipt of a request by memorandum dated 4-30-75 from the SSC. This request generally relates to Sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Manual of Instructions, and the various divisions having responsibilities and interest in the Sections requested, are in the process of preparing the necessary responses.

We received a request by letter dated 4-28-75 from the Committee concerning allegations of our possible involvement in the removal of documents from the residence of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover. Our response has been prepared and it is anticipated it will be furnished the Department in the near future.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
170 JUN 3 1975

MAY 23 1975

66-2725-171

ORIGINAL FILED IN

II. Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee

We have complied with those aspects of the request contained in this Committee's letter of 4-10-75, pertaining to photographic surveillance and indexing procedures. We anticipate our response to their requests relating to our authority to collect, retain and disseminate information will be furnished in the immediate future.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

58 JUN 6 1975

PVD:dkg (6)

102

CONTINUED - OVER

We also received a request from this Committee by letter dated 4-22-75, relating to our procedures of handling Freedom of Information Act requests and an inquiry by letter dated 4-25-75 regarding our alleged involvement in the removal of documents from the residence of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover. We have prepared responses to both requests. The response concerning the Freedom of Information Act has been furnished the Department for approval and furnishing to the Committee; the response relating to removal of documents has been prepared and is in the process of being approved by the Bureau.

III. Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate Judiciary Committee

We received a request by letter dated 4-28-75 for information relating to terrorist incidents. We have prepared and furnished a response to this request.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

PVD JBH/PVD

PVM

ATTENDEES

USIB AD HOC COORDINATING GROUP ON CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

Wednesday, 4 June 1975, at 1000 hours
DCI Conference Room (7D64)

Dr. John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

Mr. J. J. Hitchcock
State

Mr. David Lowman
NSA

Mr. J. Foster Collins
Treasury

Mr. Leon F. Schwartz
FBI

Mr. Robert Upchurch
ERDA

RADM Donald P. Harvey, USN
Mr. John Brock
Captain William Quisenberry
DIA

Captain L. C. Martinez
Navy

Lt. Col. Harold Coyle
Rep. for Deputy Under
Secretary of the Air Force

Mr. Walter Elder
CIA

Mrs. Harriett D. Mowitt
Exec Sec to the Ad Hoc Group
ICS

Mr. Donald E. Moore
Chairman, USIB Security
Committee

Mr. Merrill T. Kelly
Army

Colonel Jerry D. Alderson, Jr.
Air Force

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/RW

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

DCI/IC-75-0608
6 June 1975

Senstudy-75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals ~~of the USIB~~ Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Ninth Meeting, 4 June 1975

1. A meeting of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group was held on 4 June 1975 at 10:00 a.m. A list of attendees is attached.

2. The meeting was opened by Dr. Clarke who described the current activities of the Senate Select Committee in accelerating their official interviews with knowledgeable officials across the Community and the criticality of firming up agreements on how these interviews are to be handled. This has not been forthcoming despite White House interest. House Select Committee procedure is not yet clear.

3. The second item raised by the Chairman was the list of category II "abuses" which had been developed at the direction of the Policy Steering Group. The set developed was the result of discussions with Mr. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee, who plans to present a complete list of "category II" items to the Committee on Friday, 6 June. At that point, it is expected "notices" would go out to the Community agencies advising them so that agreed interview procedures will apply. It is also anticipated that the presence of private as well as Agency counsel will be addressed. The Policy Steering Group has accepted the principle of dealing with these identified "category II" subjects by assigning responsibility for gathering of comprehensive and paper preparation to specific individuals within the Community agencies. Dr. Clarke is the focal point for gathering the names of individuals who will assume these responsibilities. To date, individuals had been named for all subjects except those to be handled by CIA.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 16 1975

file-62-116395

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

84 JUN 17 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

4. In addition to the "category II" items, there are a number of additional subjects largely geographic in nature for which the DCI feels CIA should assume responsibility for preparing comprehensive papers. In view of the apparent adversary relationship between the Senate Select Committee Staff and the agencies under investigation, it may be that preparation of papers dealing comprehensively with specific subjects will deflect some of this cross-agency probing and result in a positive solution to problems before they arise.

5. The Chairman reminded the group of the responsibility which exists to keep Mr. Cotter of the Post Office Department informed on matters resulting from the Congressional investigations which will clearly impact on his agency's affairs. At present, the cross-agency character of the interviews now under way indicate a possible communication gap in adequately coordinating on postal matters.

6. The Chairman explained the DCI's action taken in late May to separate the responsibility for CIA's response to the Congressional Select Committees from those responsibilities of the IC Staff. Both Dr. Clarke and Mr. Elder emphasized the very close relationship which exists in the two efforts. Mr. Elder will represent CIA at all USIB Ad Hoc sessions henceforth.

7. The Chairman questioned Mr. Elder, the CIA representative, whether or not the Senate Select Committee had yet furnished the Agency with a list of subjects with which they plan to deal in depth. Mr. Elder reported they have not yet done so, but it is apparent that three items are of priority interest at the moment: assassinations, the Phoenix program, and covert action; that it appears clear the Committee is currently pursuing the question of authorities, approvals, and support from other agencies.

8. The 27 May request addressed to the DCI covering materials under the jurisdiction of a number of Community agencies was provided to the members of the Ad Hoc Group. Dr. Clarke indicated he was seeking policy guidance on selected items in the request which dealt with Community product such as NIE etc. He noted the 27 May request indicated identical letters were being forwarded to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Copies have been sent to all USIB Ad Hoc members, the NSC and the White House.

9. Copies of a memorandum which set forth the action items resulting from the Policy Steering Group session of last week were provided to the Ad Hoc members for their information.

10. Mr. Elder reported that the House Committee has indicated to CIA its intent to concentrate on specific issues, but as of now are not adequately organized to be specific in their requests. The one extant request forwarded to the CIA was posing some problems because of the lack of cleared personnel, approved storage facilities, and determinations on the ultimate disposition of records. The Chairman noted that concurrent with this meeting, a meeting of Community legal representatives was taking place with the purpose of commenting on the House Select Committee's proposed security regulations which have not yet been adopted.

11. CIA reported its success with the provision of a reading room for SSC Staff at CIA headquarters. State reported there were no comparable facilities anticipated there. Defense has provided badges to Staff members and reading facilities are available. The same accessability of materials is true at NSA and FBI.

12. The last subject on the agenda was the implementation of the Community Central Index. In the material provided to the group was a letter reaffirming the purposes of the Central Index and a list of 40 key words to be used in identifying material furnished the Index. A printout of the Index content was provided to the group as a review document only. The final format of such periodic reports has not yet been refined. Group members are encouraged to comment if they detect any problems with items in the printout. Forms for inputting information to the Central Index were also provided to the Group. This is a service of common concern which will assure the uniformity of information received and should serve to lighten the workload of the individual agencies. The telephone number of Mrs. Young of the Central Index was provided for agencies' convenience in accessing the Index information.

Harriett D. Mowitt /km

Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff 6

DCI/IC-75-0116
6 June 1975

Senstudy-75

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1. The following list includes subjects to be covered by the Agencies concerned:

Assassinations	White House	Mr. Wilderotter IDS 145-7094
Drug Abuse	CIA	Not yet designated
Political Abuses (1964)	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609
Domestic Surveillance	Justice	John Martin IDS 187-4555
Electronic Surveillance and Warrantless Wiretap	Justice	George Calhoun IDS 187-4401
Use of Notional Organizations	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609
Use of Proprietary Organizations	CIA	Not yet designated
Mail Cover and Intercept	Justice	Phil White IDS 187-4674
Watch List	DoD	Benson Buffham, NSA 688-7222
Army Surveillance	DoD	Dr. David Cooke 695-4436

File 62-116395

62-116395-

S-W06

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 13 1975

84 JUN 13 1975

The individuals named on this list are those designated by the Agencies as having prime responsibility for preparing the paper. The papers should be delivered in two copies directly to the Associate Counsel to the President, Mr. James Wilderotter, Room 182, Old Executive Office Building, by the Agencies. In the course of the next week, a meeting will be called for Mr. Wilderotter to meet with the individuals designated on this list. Each Agency will also be responsible for naming a person to work with each Task Force leader where it is appropriate to the subject matter. In the interim, Task Force leaders should deal directly with the following people with respect to individual Agency responsibilities:

DCI/Intelligence Community	John Clarke IDS 143-5477
CIA	E. Henry Knoche IDS 143-4086
Defense	Tom Latimer IDS 11-54221
State	William Hyland IDS 101-20342
Treasury	William Morell IDS 184-2536
Justice	William O'Connor IDS 187-5211
FBI	William Cregar IDS 175-4636

2. The CIA has been coordinating internally the DCI's letter to the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and this letter should be available for Community review and consideration soon. Distribution of this letter will be made sometime prior to a meeting of the General Counsels chaired by Mr. Wilderotter to go over details of the letter and coordinate on the final language. This arrangement is consistent with agreements reached in our meeting on 3 June 1975.

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Distribution:
1 - Mr. Wilderotter
1 - Mr. Latimer
1 - Mr. Hyland
1 - Mr. Morell
1 - Mr. O'Connor
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - Mrs. Mowitt/Executive Secretary of Steering Group (IDS 143-4055)

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY PLAZA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/14/01 BY [illegible]

Special Agent Seymor Phillips
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

6

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw eKW
(13)

For info only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR-Dept. of Justice. -11/22/76 -JKB

Delivered 5/23/75 to K W O'

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP16SK/RG

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training ____
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC-100

62-116395-225

17 JUN 16 1975

84 JUN 17 1975

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

62-116395

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S.F.Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP1G5149

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is the verbatim text of a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella who served as an SA of the FBI from July 12, 1948, until his retirement March 22, 1971. He is presently employed as Director of Safety, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia.

"Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

"Interview by Lester B. Siedel, (sic), representative of Senate Select Committee of Alan G. Sentinella. Interview commenced 12:24pm, terminated 2:20pm. Siedel at the outset identified self via credential as representative of aforementioned Committee.

"Mr. Siedel introduced by writer to Mr. Seymor Phillips of the FBI. The writer explained to Siedel that following his telephone conversation, 5/9/75, during which he stated he was interested in discussing matters related to the King and Levison cases it was felt that such discussion might involve issues currently sensitive to the Bureau. Accordingly the Atlanta Office was contacted and subsequently the writer was contacted by Robert Olmert of the Bureau. Mr. Olmert advised that if it was desired the Bureau would make available a representative not for the purpose of participating in the interview but to be available for advice. The

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw ekw
(13)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOS.

SEE NOTE PAGE TEN

62-116395-225

GPO 954-546

writer stated he was interested in obtaining such assistance. Accordingly during the morning of 5/12/75 Mr. Seymor Phillips contacted the writer.

"This is dictated immediately following interview by Siedel. No effort is herein made to follow the chronology of questions presented by Siedel. During the interview no notes or recording were made by writer. Will use "Q" for question and "A" for answer. Questions (Q) were asked by Siedel and answers (A) were given by writer.

"A: Was it correct that matters concerning the King investigation were discussed openly over coffee by members of the Atlanta field office?

"A: Matters relating to the King investigation were discussed by individuals concerned therewith. I have no recollection during the period I was connected with the investigation that it was discussed by everybody like the previous night's ballgame might have been.

"Q: Shortly after King received the Nobel Prize did a Bureau official William Sullivan come to Atlanta?

"A: It is my recollection King received the Nobel Prize sometime before the case was assigned to me. I do not remember if Bureau official William Sullivan visited Atlanta.

"Q: Did Sullivan have any contact with Ralph McGill concerning King?

"A: I do not know.

"Q: Were taps (telephone) and bugs (microphone) used by Atlanta in connection with King?

"A: A tap (telephone) was utilized re King at his SCLC office and his residence.

"Q: When were the bugs (microphone) utilized?

"A: There were none.

"Q: What was the purpose of the investigation of King?

"A: To determine whether King and/or SCLC were influenced by persons or groups having communist tendencies.

"Q: Did you feel the investigation was worthwhile?

"A: I don't recall that I ever asked myself that question. It was an assignment made by my employer and my responsibility to handle it.

"Q: How did other agents feel about the illegal use of these taps?

"A: The taps were not illegal. They were obtained through the authority of the Attorney General.

"Q: Did any agents express the opinion that these investigations were improper?

"A: I do not recall specifically although Mr. Murtaugh (sic) may well have so stated.

"Q: What electronic surveillance was used concerning Levison?

"A: I do not know. Levison resided in New York City.

"Q: Was Levison covered by the tap on King?

"A: Only to the extent that he was in contact with King. There was no tap on Levison per se in Atlanta.

"Q: Was there any physical surveillance of King?

"A: I do not recall any physical surveillance of King as such. There was surveillance conducted of individuals in contact with King and consequently King would obviously have been physically surveilled. But such surveillance was not on King directly.

"Q. Did you participate in these surveillances?

"A: Yes on several occasions.

"Q: How many occasions?

"A: I cannot recall.

"Q: How long were you in Atlanta?

"A: August 1960 - March 1971.

"Q: What other offices did you serve in and when?

"A: Baltimore, September 1948 - January 1949; Buffalo, January 1949 - August 1960; Atlanta, August 1960 - March 1971.

"Q: Where were you born?

"A: London, England.

"Q: How long did you live there?

"A: 9 years.

"Q: Where did you live first when in this country?

"A: In New Jersey approximately one year. I spent most of my growing up time in Iowa.

"Q: You entered the Bureau July 1948 and left in March 1971?

"A: That is correct.

"Q: When was the King and SCLC case assigned to you?

"A: I believe it was the early part or spring of 1965.

"Q: How long had the investigation been going on before you got the case?

"A: I really am not sure - possibly a year; it might have been longer.

"A: How long did the investigation continue?

"A: I cannot actually recall.

"Q: Was it still going on when you left the Bureau?

"A: Yes, regarding the SCLC.

"Q: How long after King's death did the tap remain?

"A: I cannot be sure. It seems as though it was discontinued a short time after, however I believe it continued for a longer period of time on the SCLC.

"Q: Did you have any contact with news media or clergy regarding King, SCLC, or Levison?

"A: No.

"Q: What relationship was there with the Atlanta Police Department and what electronic surveillance did it have of King, SCLC, or Levison?

"A: Throughtout my entire period as agent in Atlanta I never had any information as to what electronic surveillance may have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison there was no discussion to my knowledge of these matters with the Atlanta Police Department. Generally speaking the rapport with the police department was good.

"Q: Did you monitor the taps on King, SCLC?

"A: No.

"Q: What squad were you assigned to in the Atlanta Office?

"A: Security. More correctly it was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad.

"Q: Who else was assigned to this squad? Was there a man named Harding?

"A: Yes.

"Q: What was his first name?

"A: Charles.

"A: Who else was assigned?

"A: Your friend Murtaugh, a Richard Davis.

"At this point the writer stated he preferred not to name additional personnel simply because he did not wish to feel that they might subsequently be interviewed as a result. The writer stated he was confident that Siedel or his agency had already been furnished all of these names by Mr. Murtaugh. He was informed that in the writer's opinion the Bureau was fully able and capable of furnishing this information. Siedel opined it would be a waste of government money to subpoena the writer to Washington in order to obtain these names.

"Q: Did you develop any evidence relating to Levison's CP connections?

"A: No.

"Q: Did you read reports from New York regarding Levison?

"A: Yes.

"Q: Did those reports set forth information from taps and bugs?

"A: The reports did not state source of information.

"Q: Did you know the information came from taps (or bugs)?

"A: I did not know directly but presumed that it did.

"Q: What type of work was the Security Squad in Atlanta concerned with?

"A: That squad primarily handled matters in the security category, racial matters, and also civil rights matters.

"Q: What kind of matters constituted racial matters besides SCLC?

"A: The investigation of SCLC was not a racial matter. It was concerned with possible communist influence of the organization. The Ku Klux Klan was a racial matter because it involved pressures between white and black persons.

"Q: What organizations or individuals were investigated in the security category?

"A: I have had no contact with Bureau matters for over four years. At this time I have no knowledge what effect my answer to your question might have upon the current status of any matter of concern to the Bureau.

"Siedel essentially repeated his question and endeavored to explain that he had no desire to affect the Bureau's investigative status.

"The writer advised his answer to the question remained as above. At this point Siedel suggested the writer might wish to consult Mr. Phillips which was done.

"Writer consulted privately with Phillips. After which Phillips entered the writer's office and told Siedel that if he was seeking the Bureau's policy relative to security, racial and civil rights investigations, same was in the Bureau's manuals available to the Committee. At this point Siedel said he was not after policy but names of specific persons and organizations the writer would now recall were under investigation.

"The writer restated former answer to this question and explained to Siedel that he did not consider himself so

naive to suppose that any of the information given to Siedel would not at some future time appear in print. To which Siedel stated he would not be personally responsible therefore. Siedel was informed the writer was not necessarily stating he would be personally responsible therefore. Siedel pointed out that he could not require a different answer to this question at the present time but went on to explain the writer could be subpoenaed for this purpose for open or closed testimony.

"Q: During the course of these investigations did you ever alter or fabricate any document previously prepared?

"A: No.

"Q: Do you know of such having been done in the Atlanta Office?

"A: No.

"Q: Do you know of a tape recording pertaining to King which was sent to Mrs. King?

"A: Not during that period. It seems I might have heard such an allegation but there has been so much material news media wise the past year or two, I actually cannot be sure whether I read of such an allegation or might have heard it said. In any case so far as I am concerned it was hearsay.

"Q: What was your participation in COINTELPRO investigations and what did they cover while you were in the Atlanta Office?

"A: I left the Bureau over four years ago and have absolutely no knowledge of what might be the present status of any investigation by the Bureau past or present. I feel very strongly that any answer I might give could conceivably adversely effect the Bureau's investigative position. For this reason I decline to discuss this matter.

Siedel stated the Bureau had recently stated it had discontinued COINTELPRO. The writer advised he was not aware of this; that his answer above remained the same.

"Q: Do you know of any effort by the Bureau to influence a political campaign?

"A: No."

In addition to the foregoing verbatim statement, Sentinella also voluntarily furnished to the FBI several observations, the following of which may be of interest:

"1. Siedel obviously was attempting to verify allegations made by other individuals.

"2. All of his questions appeared to have been previously prepared in writing.

"3. At one point he commented he was conducting this interview for a colleague (not named).

"4. Siedel did not appear satisfied with the results of the interview. It is presumed he considers the writer's cooperation to be minimal.

"5. As Siedel prepared to depart he was informed that during 23 years as an agent the writer suffered some adverse administrative action; that these ultimately proved to be experiences from which the writer profited. He was told the writer had "no axe to grind" regarding the Bureau and no intent or desire to accomplish any questionable literary fame."

The individual who interviewed Sentinella was SSC Staff Member Lester B. Seidel, not Siedel, as indicated in Sentinella's statement.

The King referred to in Sentinella's statement is the late Martin Luther King, Jr., subject of prior investigation by the FBI. The Levison referred to is Stanley David Levison, also subject of prior FBI investigation. The SCLC referred to is the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, an organization which was headed by King. The Murtaugh referred to is Arthur Leo Murtagh who was an SA of the FBI from April 16, 1951, until his retirement on September 25, 1971.

NOTE:

Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentinella's verbatim statement and from a separate statement containing his observations, both of which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The procedure of furnishing the AG an extra copy for forwarding to Wilderotter has been established through liaison by P. V. Daly of the Legal Counsel's Office with the AG's Office.

Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

Interview by Lester B. Siedel, (sic), representative of Senate Select Committee of Alan G. Sentinella. Interview commenced 12:24pm, terminated 2:20pm. Siedel at the outset identified self via credential as representative of aforementioned Committee.

Mr. Siedel introduced by writer to Mr. Seymor Phillips of the FBI. The writer explained to Siedel that following his telephone conversation, 5/9/75, during which he stated he was interested in discussing matters related to the King and Levison cases it was felt that such discussion might involve issues currently sensitive to the Bureau. Accordingly the Atlanta Office was contacted and subsequently the writer was contacted by Robert Olmert of the Bureau. Mr. Olmert advised that if it was desired the Bureau would make available a representative not for the purpose of participating in the interview but to be available for advice. The writer stated he was interested in obtaining such assistance. Accordingly during the morning of 5/12/75 Mr. Seymor Phillips contacted the writer.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/14/84 BY SP2

This is dictated immediately following interview by Siedel. No effort is herein made to follow the chronology of questions presented by Siedel. During the interview no notes or recording were made by writer. Will use "Q" for question and "A" for answer. Questions (Q) were asked by Siedel and answers (A) were given by writer.

A: Was it correct that matters concerning the King investigation were discussed openly over coffee by members of the Atlanta field office?

A: Matters relating to the King investigation were discussed by individuals concerned therewith. I have no recollection during the period I was connected with the investigation that it was discussed by everybody like the previous night's ballgame might have been.

Encl. for AF w/ 2441 5/22/75
SFP/ekw

62-116395-225

Q: Shortly after King received the Nobel Prize did a Bureau official William Sullivan come to Atlanta?

A: It is my recollection King received the Nobel Prize sometime before the case was assigned to me. I do not remember if Bureau official William Sullivan visited Atlanta.

Q: Did Sullivan have any contact with Ralph McGill concerning King?

A: I do not know.

Q: Were taps (telephone) and bugs (microphone) used by Atlanta in connection with King?

A: A tap (telephone) was utilized re King at his SCLC office and his residence.

Q: When were the bugs (microphone) utilized?

A: There were none.

Q: What was the purpose of the investigation of King?

A: To determine whether King and/or SCLC were influenced by persons or groups having communist tendencies.

Q: Did you feel the investigation was worthwhile?

A: I don't recall that I ever asked myself that question. It was an assignment made by my employer and my responsibility to handle it.

Q: How did other agents feel about the illegal use of these taps?

A: The taps were not illegal. They were obtained through the authority of the Attorney General.

Q: Did any agents express the opinion that these investigations were improper?

A: I do not recall specifically although Mr. Murtaugh may well have so stated.

Q: What electronic surveillance was used concerning Levison?

A: I do not know. Levison resided in New York City.

Q: Was Levison covered by the tap on King?

A: Only to the extent that he was in contact with King. There was no tap on Levison per se in Atlanta.

Q: Was there any physical surveillance of King?

A: I do not recall any physical surveillance of King as such. There was surveillance conducted of individuals in contact with King and consequently King would obviously have been physically surveilled. But such surveillance was not on King directly.

Q: Did you participate in these surveillances?

A: Yes on several occasions.

Q: How many occasions?

A: I cannot recall.

Q: How long were you in Atlanta?

A: August 1960 - March 1971.

Q: What other offices did you serve in and when?

A: Baltimore, September 1948 - January 1949; Buffalo, January 1949 - August 1960; Atlanta, August 1960 - March 1971.

Q: Where were you born?

A: London, England.

Q: How long did you live there?

A: 9 years.

Q: Where did you live first when in this country?

A: In New Jersey approximately one year. I spent most of my growing up time in Iowa.

Q: You entered the Bureau July 1948 and left in March 1971?

A: That is correct.

Q: When was the King and SCLC case assigned to you?

A: I believe it was the early part or spring of 1965.

Q: How long had the investigation been going on before you got the case?

A: I really am not sure - possibly a year; it might have been longer.

A: How long did the investigation continue?

A: I cannot actually recall.

Q: Was it still going on when you left the Bureau?

A: Yes, regarding the SCLC.

Q: How long after King's death did the tap remain?

A: I cannot be sure. It seems as though it was discontinued a short time after, however I believe it continued for a longer period of time on the SCLC.

Q: Did you have any contact with news media or clergy regarding King, SCLC, or Levison?

A: No.

Q: What relationship was there with the Atlanta Police Department and what electronic surveillance did it have of King, SCLC, or Levison?

A: Throughtout my entire period as agent in Atlanta I never had any information as to what electronic surveillance may have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison there was no discussion to my knowledge of these matters with the Atlanta Police Department. Generally speaking the rapport with the police department was good.

Q: Did you monitor the taps on King, SCLC?

A: No.

Q: What squad were you assigned to in the Atlanta Office?

A: Security. More correctly it was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad.

Q: Who else was assigned to this squad? Was there a man named Harding?

A: Yes.

Q: What was his first name?

A: Charles.

A: Who else was assigned?

A: Your friend Murtaugh, a Richard Davis.

At this point the writer stated he preferred not to name additional personnel simply because he did not wish to feel that they might subsequently be interviewed as a result. The writer stated he was confident that Siedel or his agency had already been furnished all of these names by Mr. Murtaugh. He was informed that in the writer's opinion the Bureau was fully able and capable of furnishing this information. Siedel opined it would be a waste of government money to subpoena the writer to Washington in order to obtain these names.

Q: Did you develop any evidence relating to Levison's CP connections?

A: No.

Q: Did you read reports from New York regarding Levison?

A: Yes.

Q: Did these reports set forth information from taps and bugs?

A: The reports did not state source of information.

Q: Did you know the information came from taps (or bugs)?

A: I did not know directly but presumed that it did.

Q: What type of work was the Security Squad in Atlanta concerned with?

A: That squad primarily handled matters in the security category, racial matters, and also civil rights matters.

Q: What kind of matters constituted racial matters besides SCLC?

A: The investigation of SCLC was not a racial matter. It was concerned with possible communist influence of the organization. The Ku Klux Klan was a racial matter because it involved pressures between white and black persons.

Q: What organizations or individuals were investigated in the security category?

A: I have had no contact with Bureau matters for over four years. At this time I have no knowledge what effect my answer to your question might have upon the current status of any matter of concern to the Bureau.

Siedel essentially repeated his question and endeavored to explain that he had no desire to affect the Bureau's investigative status.

The writer advised his answer to the question remained as above. At this point Siedel suggested the writer might wish to consult Mr. Phillips which was done.

Writer consulted privately with Phillips. After which Phillips entered the writer's office and told Siedel that if he was seeking the Bureau's policy relative to security, racial and civil rights investigations, same was in the Bureau's manuals available to the Committee. At this point Siedel said he was not after policy but names of specific persons and organizations the writer would now recall were under investigation.

The writer restated former answer to this question and explained to Siedel that he did not consider himself so naive to suppose that any of the information given to Siedel would not at some future time appear in print. To which Siedel stated he would not be personally responsible therefore. Siedel was informed the writer was not necessarily stating he would be personally responsible therefore. Siedel pointed out that he could not require a different answer to this question at the present time but went on to explain the writer

could be subpoenaed for this purpose for open or closed testimony.

Q: During the course of these investigations did you ever alter or fabricate any document previously prepared?

A: No.

Q: Do you know of such having been done in the Atlanta Office?

A: No.

Q: Do you know of a tape recording pertaining to King which was sent to Mrs. King?

A: Not during that period. It seems I might have heard such an allegation but there has been so much material news media wise the past year or two, I actually cannot be sure whether I read of such an allegation or might have heard it said. In any case so far as I am concerned it was hearsay.

Q: What was your participation in COINTELPRO investigations and what did they cover while you were in the Atlanta Office?

A: I left the Bureau over four years ago and have absolutely no knowledge of what might be the present status of any investigation by the Bureau past or present. I feel very strongly that any answer I might give could conceivably adversely effect the Bureau's investigative position. For this reason I decline to discuss this matter.

Siedel stated the Bureau had recently stated it had discontinued COINTELPRO. The writer advised he was not aware of this; that his answer above remained the same.

Q: Do you know of any effort by the Bureau to influence a political campaign?

A: No.

Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

WRITER'S OBSERVATIONS

1. Siedel obviously was attempting to verify allegations made by other individuals.

2. All of his questions appeared to have been previously prepared in writing.

3. At one point he commented he was conducting this interview for a colleague (not named).

4. Siedel did not appear satisfied with the results of the interview. It is presumed he considers the writer's cooperation to be minimal.

5. As Siedel prepared to depart he was informed that during 23 years as an agent the writer suffered some adverse administrative action; that these ultimately proved to be experiences from which the writer profited. He was told the writer had "no axe to grind" regarding the Bureau and no intent or desire to accomplish any questionable literary fame."

6. Upon departing Siedel inquired as to the proximity of the Equitable Building (office building) and the First National Bank of Atlanta (also office building). Any significance to these locations was not apparent to the writer. When informed that banking hours terminated at 4:00pm Siedel made no comment.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 22 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR004 AP PLAIN

6:03PM NITEL 5-22-75 FXH

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ALBUQUERQUE (66-1029)

SENSTUDY 1975.

REMYTELCALL, MAY 22, 1975.

ON MAY 21, 1975, SAM PAPICH, DIRECTOR, NEW MEXICO GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME (FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, FBI), ADVISED HE IS TO APPEAR BEFORE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., ON THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1975.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

EX-108

REC-25 62-116395-224

JUN 10 1975

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Records

cc 67-176751 (Papich)

RKL X RCX
JUN 16 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

JUN 23 1975

On this envelope

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/lcw

62-116395-223

ENCLOSURE

FD-291 (Rev. 11-1-73)

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure or production of national security information, other classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is in a better position than I to make that determination;

(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-29-01 BY SP2ALM/Ru

____
(Signature)

____
(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

_______________, 19 ____, by _______________________________.
(Signature)

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1970
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F.P.M. CHAPTER 295
61-107

OMB APPROVAL NO. 50-R0118

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

(Position to which appointed) ____________________

(Date of appointment) ____________________

JUSTICE	FBI	WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Department or agency)	(Bureau or division)	(Place of employment)

I, ____________________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing this appointment.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

____
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn (or affirmed) before me this ______ day of ____________ A.D. 19____,

at ____________ (City) WASHINGTON, D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

____
(Signature of officer)

Commission expires ____________________
(If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown)

____
(Title)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U.S.C. 2903. The words "So help me God" in the oath and the word "swear" wherever it appears above should be stricken out when the appointee elects to affirm rather than swear to the affidavits; only these words may be stricken and only when the appointee elects to affirm the affidavits.*

GPO : 1970 O - 408-925

3-26 (Rev. 3-20-64)

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

(Place) ____________________

(Date) ____________________

Dear Sir:

Having received an appointment for a position as Special Agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, I hereby **agree and affirm** that I shall be governed by the following **conditions:**

1. I am required to proceed at my own expense to Washington, D. C., where I shall take the oath of office and enter on duty.

2. That my appointment is a probationary one.

3. That I shall remain on duty for a minimum period of three years, contingent upon a satisfactory work record.

4. That my retention in the Federal Bureau of Investigation is dependent upon the performance of satisfactory services, and if my services are deemed unsatisfactory it is understood that my employment may be discontinued at any time and that I shall not receive transportation to my home, or to any other point, at Government expense.

5. I may be sent to any part of the continental or territorial United States that the exigencies of the Bureau's work may require; that my headquarters may be fixed in some jurisdiction other than that in which I have heretofore resided; that my headquarters may be changed as the work of the Bureau may require and that no transfer will be made from one station to another for personal reasons.

6. That the **confidential character** of the relations of the employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the public is fully understood by me, and that the **strictly confidential character** of **any and all information secured by me,** in connection directly or indirectly with my work as a Special Agent, or the work of other employees of which I may become cognizant, is fully understood by me, and that **neither during my tenure of service** with the Federal Bureau of Investigation **nor at any other time shall I violate this confidence,** and **I agree and affirm** that I shall **not divulge** any information of any kind or character whatsoever that may become known to me, to persons **not officially entitled** thereto at any time.

I understand all of the foregoing and the conditions specified herein are agreeable to me **without reservation of any kind. I agree and affirm** that I shall abide by the foregoing conditions, and I am fully cognizant that the provisions mentioned above are to be complied with by me and they are a **part of my appointment.**

Very truly yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

FD-375 (Rev. 8-28-72)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Date:

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20535

TRAINING AGREEMENT

In consideration for the following specialized training which will result in considerable time and expense to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), I, ______________________________, agree to remain in the service of the FBI (or Department of Justice, as to final item below) for the time specified, contingent upon my maintaining a satisfactory work record.

☐ So that I may receive training in **classifying, searching, and filing of fingerprints,** I agree to remain in the service of the FBI performing fingerprint duties for at least one year from this date. I understand that I may be assigned, consistent with the demands of the service, to work at night.

☐ So that I may receive training in ☐ **stenographic** ☐ **typing skills,** I agree to remain in the FBI for a minimum of one year after completion of training. In addition, I agree to accept any assignment in any division at FBIHQ or Washington Field Office consistent with such needs for my services.

☐ So that I may receive training in ☐ **automatic data processing equipment** ☐ **cryptanalytics,** I agree to remain in the FBI one year after completion of formal training.

☐ So that I may receive training in a **foreign language,** I agree to remain in the FBI for three years after I successfully complete this training.

☐ So that I may receive **advanced training in maintenance and repair of FM radio equipment,** I agree to remain in the service of the FBI for at least one year following completion of the training.

☐ So that I may receive training under the Government Employees Training Act to be given me at ______________________________, I agree to remain in the Department of Justice for a minimum of ______________________________ after completion of training. If I voluntarily leave the Department before expiration of that period, I will pay the Government the amount of the additional expenses paid by it for the above-mentioned training.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-29-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

____
Signature

Application for Employment
FD-140 (Rev. 10-16-73)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date

NOTICE: Application must be typewritten or clearly printed in black ink. All questions must be answered, if applicable. If not, indicate NA (not applicable). Applications which are not complete and legible will not be considered. If space provided is not sufficient for complete answers, or you wish to furnish additional information, attach sheets of the same size as this application, and number answers to correspond with questions.

Check Position Applied For:

☐ Special Agent
☐ Special Agent (Accountant)
☐ Radio Maintenance Technician *
☐ Laboratory Aid or Technician
☐ Translator
☐ Nurse
☐ Clerk-Stenographer
☐ Clerk-Typist
☐ Clerk (See Item 4, page 2 on Fingerprint Clerk position)
☐ Other ____________

* Applicants for this position must complete "Questionnaire for Radio Maintenance Technician Position."

1. PERSONAL HISTORY

a. Name in full (Last, first, middle)

b. Social Security Number

c. List all other names you have used including nicknames; if female, furnish maiden name. If you have ever used any surnames other than your true name, during what period and under what circumstances were these names used? If you have ever legally changed your name, give date, place, and court.

d. Birth date (Month, day, year)

Place of birth

e. Are you a U. S. citizen? ☐ Yes ☐ No Naturalized? ☐ Yes ☐ No Derivative? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Naturalization # ____________ ____________ Place ____________ Date ____________ Court

Explain derivative citizenship ____________

2. MARITAL STATUS

☐ Single ☐ Married ____________ Date ____________ Place of Marriage ____________ No. of Children ____________

☐ Widowed ☐ Divorced ☐ Separated ____________ Date ____________ Place of Divorce or Legal Separation ____________ Court (See Section 13k)

3. RESIDENCES

a. Present Residence Address: (Apartment, street, city, state, zip code)

Telephone Numbers:
Residence ____________
Business ____________

b. Complete address to which you wish mail or telegram sent (include zip code and telephone number if different from above)

c. List chronologically ALL of your residences in the past 10 years (include addresses while attending school if away from home and all military addresses including any off military base).

Dates						Apt. #	Street Address	City	State
From			To						
Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo	Day	Yr.				

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is an equal opportunity employer.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

4. AVAILABILITY OF APPLICANT

a. Have you previously submitted an application for employment with the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
☐ No ☐ Yes Date ________ Place ________________

b. Are you willing to proceed to Washington, D. C., or other duty station, at your own expense? ☐ Yes ☐ No

c. Will you accept a lesser position if no vacancy exists or you fail to qualify for the position sought? ☐ Yes ☐ No

d. Are you interested in appointment as Fingerprint Clerk GS 3 at Washington, D. C.?
☐ Yes ☐ No You must understand that regardless of preference, appointment may be as Fingerprint Clerk GS 3 or Clerk GS 2 since assignments must be based on qualifications of appointees and vacancies.

e. If appointed to a clerical position, I am willing to serve a minimum period of one year. ☐ Yes ☐ No

f. If appointed as a Special Agent or Radio Maintenance Technician, are you willing and prepared to accept assignment or transfer to any part of the United States or Puerto Rico for either temporary or permanent duration? ☐ Yes ☐ No

g. If appointed as a Special Agent, I agree to serve a minimum period of three years and completely understand that I must be available for assignment wherever my services are needed. ☐ Yes ☐ No

h. Earliest date available for employment.

i. How much notice of reporting date do you need?

5. EDUCATION

a. Name of School	Location	Dates From Mo.	Day	Yr.	To Mo.	Day	Yr.	Course Pursued	Degrees or Diplomas
High Schools									
Colleges									
Graduate School									
Miscellaneous									

b. Were you ever dismissed from a school, or was any disciplinary action including scholastic probation ever taken against you during your scholastic career?

☐ No ☐ Yes ________________ ________ ________________
School Date Type of Action

c. **List awards, honors, citations, positions held in school organizations, athletic endeavors, and any other special recognition you received while attending school.**

d. **List any special abilities, interests, sports or hobbies with degree of proficiency.**

e. Indicate your proficiency in each phase of each **foreign language** listed as "slight," "good," "fluent."

Name of Language	Speak	Understand	Read	Write

f. **Are you a member of the bar?**
☐ No ☐ Yes Date(s) ________________ State(s) ________________

g. **Are you a certified public accountant?**
☐ No ☐ Yes Date(s) ________________ State(s) ________________

h. **Are you a licensed automobile operator?**
☐ No ☐ Yes State(s) ________________

Driver's License # ________________

6. EMPLOYMENT

List chronologically all employments, including summer and part-time employments while attending school. All time must be accounted for. **If unemployed for a period, indicate, setting forth dates of unemployment.**

Name and Address of Employer	Dates From Mo.	Day	Yr.	To Mo.	Day	Yr.	Salary	Position and Kind of Work	Name of Supervisor	Reason for Leaving
a. Name										
Address										
City & State										

6. EMPLOYMENT

List chronologically all employments, including summer and part-time employments while attending school. All time must be accounted for. **If unemployed for a period, indicate, setting forth dates of unemployment.**

Name and Address of Employer	Dates						Salary	Position and Kind of Work	Name of Supervisor	Reason for Leaving
	From			To						
	Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Yr.				
b. Name Address City & State										
c. Name Address City & State										
d. Name Address City & State										
e. Name Address City & State										
f. Name Address City & State										

g. Have you ever been dismissed or asked to resign from any employment or position you have held? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Employer's Name ______________________ Date __________ Reason ______________________

h. Are you now or have you ever been employed by an agency of the Federal Government? (Include part-time employment.) ☐ No ☐ Yes

From __________ To __________ Agency ______________________ Location ______________________

i. Do you have any sources of income other than your salary or that of your spouse? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Specify each with amount ______________________

7. MILITARY RECORD

a. Are you registered for Selective Service? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Selective Service # __________ Lottery #__________ Local Board # __________ City __________ State __________

b. What is your current classification?

Have you received any notice indicating you may be called into the Armed Forces in the near future? ☐ No ☐ Yes

If so, give approximate date.

c. If ever classified 1–Y (registrant qualified for military service only in time of war or national emergency) or 4–F (registrant not qualified for any military service), furnish reasons.

d. Have you ever served on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Highest rank attained __________ Date commissioned, if applicable __________

e. Branch of military service

f. Serial number

g. Dates of active duty (month, day & year)

From To

h. Type of Discharge

Basis for Discharge

i. Member of Reserve? ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ Ready ☐ Standby

Service Branch ______________________

j. Was any type of disciplinary action taken against you in the service? ☐ No ☐ Yes Nature of:	k. National Guard ☐ Present ☐ Former ☐ None If you attend drills, meetings, or camps, give name of unit and location. Summer camp attendance: From ________ To ________ Where ________

l. Do you claim veterans preference? ☐ No ☐ Yes Basis: ☐ Active duty between 12-7-41 and 7-1-55 ☐ Active duty subsequent to 1-31-55 in excess of 180 consecutive days ☐ Service-connected disability ☐ Wife ☐ Widow ☐ Mother

8. REFERENCES

Give three references (not relatives, former or present employers, fellow employees or school teachers) who are responsible adults of reputable standing in their communities, such as property owners, business or professional men or women including your physician, if you have one, **who have known you well for at least five years**, preferably those who have known you during the past five years. If retired, give former occupation.

Complete name		Addresses: Residence ________
No. yrs. acq.	Occupation	Business ________
Complete name		Addresses: Residence ________
No. yrs. acq.	Occupation	Business ________
Complete name		Addresses: Residence ________
No. yrs. acq.	Occupation	Business ________

Give three social acquaintances in your own age group including both sexes.

Complete name		Addresses: Residence ________
No. yrs. acq.	School or Occupation	School or Business ________
Complete name		Addresses: Residence ________
No. yrs. acq.	School or Occupation	School or Business ________
Complete name		Addresses: Residence: ________
No. yrs. acq.	School or Occupation	School or Business ________

9. FOREIGN TRAVEL - (MILITARY SERVICE, RESIDENCE, VISIT)

a. Have you ever visited or resided in any foreign country (including travel in the Armed Forces of the U. S.)? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Passport # ________ Date issued ________ Place issued ________

Countries Visited	Dates						Reason for Travel
	From			To			
	Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Yr.	

b. Have you ever served in the Armed Forces of a foreign country? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(Specify countries; dates)

c. Do you or any members of your immediate family, including in-laws, have any relatives now residing outside the United States (except those in the Armed Forces of the United States or those employed by the United States Government living abroad)? ☐ No ☐ Yes. If so, list below and furnish degree of association and contact you and members of your immediate family have with these relatives.

Name	Relation	Age	City	Country	Citizen of what Country

10. CREDIT RECORD

a. Has your credit record ever been considered unsatisfactory, or have you ever been refused credit? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If "yes," give dates, places, names of creditors and circumstances.)

b. Are you indebted to anyone? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(List any debt over $100. Also list any debt, regardless of the amount, where payment is past due.)

Creditor	Address	Amount	Loan or Acct. #

11. COURT RECORD

a. Have you ever been arrested or charged with any violation including traffic, but not parking tickets? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(List all such matters even if not formally charged, or no court appearance, or found not guilty, or matter settled by payment of fine or forfeiture of collateral.)

Date	Place and Department	Charge	Final disposition	Details

b. Has any member of your family or close relative (including in-laws) ever been arrested for other than traffic violations? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Name	Relation	Date	Place	Charge	Final Disposition

c. Have you ever been a plaintiff or defendant in a court action including divorce actions? ☐ No ☐ Yes (Give date, place, court, names of parties involved, nature of action, and final disposition.)

12. ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP

a. Are you now, or have you ever been a member of any club, society or organization? ☐ No ☐ Yes. If yes, list below, do not abbreviate.

Name	City and State	Former	Present (List position held and extent of activity)

b. Are you now, or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., or any communist or fascist organization? ☐ No ☐ Yes

c. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If answer to any of these is "Yes," explain fully.)

13. RELATIVES

All applicants must give complete information concerning their relatives. If you have been married more than once, give the requested information concerning each former husband or wife. Furnish similar information, including date and place of action, for any members of your immediate family who have been divorced. Even though a relative is deceased, give all the information requested, and indicate last residence and year of death. Include stepbrothers and sisters, half brothers and sisters. If you or your spouse have stepparents, legal guardians or others who have reared you instead of your parents, the requested information should be furnished concerning them, as well as your real parents. If you are engaged to be married or contemplating marriage in the near future, complete information must be included under sections c, h, i and j regarding your future husband or wife and future in-laws, and clearly show that such relationship is a future one.

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address		Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
a. Father Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
b. Mother (Include maiden name) Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
c. Wife or Husband (If wife, include maiden name) Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
d. Children Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
Name Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
Name Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
e. **Brothers** Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
f. **Sisters** Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
g. **Wives (including maiden names) and Husbands of Brothers & Sisters** Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
g. Wives and Husbands of Brothers & Sisters (Continued) Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
h. Father-in-law Address Birth date Place of birth		
i. Mother-in-law (Include maiden name) Address Birth date Place of birth		
j. Brothers & Sisters of your Husband or Wife Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
j. Brothers & Sisters of your Husband or Wife (Continued) Address Birth date Place of birth		
k. Other relatives with whom you have resided for an extended period of time (indicate relation, including name and present location of ex-spouses) Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		

14. RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY THE GOVERNMENT

List the complete names of any of your close relatives (including in-laws) who are employed in the Federal Government.

Complete Name	Relation	Agency by which Employed	Location

15. FRIENDS OR ACQUAINTANCES EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Complete Name	Location	Length of Acquaintance

16. RELATIVES FORMERLY EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Complete Name under which Employed	Current Address	Relationship

ALL APPLICANTS

Attach an unmounted full face photograph of yourself, not larger than 2¾ x 2½ inches. Print your name plainly on the back of the photograph. The photograph must have been taken not more than 3 months prior to the date of this application.

17. PHYSICAL DATA

a. Height without shoes Weight without clothes	b. Do you now have or have you ever had any of the following: nervous, mental, or emotional disorder of any sort; tuberculosis; epilepsy, fainting spells or severe headaches; diabetes; ulcers; rheumatic fever or heart disease; or asthma? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes" identify, describe, and give dates)

c. Do you now have or have you ever had any chronic or serious illnesses; or have you ever had any serious operations or injuries? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes" describe and give dates)

d. Have you ever been hospitalized? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Dates			Hospital	Location	Reason
Mo.	Day	Yr.			

e. Describe any past or present physical handicap, defect, or disability not previously covered, but including extent of defective vision, if any, with and without glasses (Snellen) and deficiencies in color vision and hearing.

f. How many days have you lost from work or school due to illness during the past five years?	Nature of illness(es)

g. Have you ever received, is there pending, have you applied for, or do you intend to apply for pension or compensation for existing disability? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes," specify what kind, granted by whom, and what amount, when, why. If applicable, include Veterans' Administration claim number.)

h. Special Agent Applicants Only: Do you have any physical defects such as, but not limited to, a bone, joint, or other deformity or loss of finger, which would preclude unrestricted, regular participation in all phases of the FBI's firearms training, physical training and defensive tactics? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes" describe)

I understand that all appointments are probationary for a period of one year during which I must demonstrate my fitness for continued employment by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I also understand that, in many parts of the Bureau, it has been necessary to establish regular night and midnight shifts in view of which I must be available for such assignments as the needs might require. I further understand that any appointment tendered me will be contingent upon the results of a complete character and fitness investigation, and I am aware that wilfully withholding information or making false statements on this application will be the basis for dismissal from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and constitutes a violation of Section 1001, Title 18, U. S. Code. I agree to these conditions and I hereby certify that all statements made by me on this application are true and complete, to the best of my knowledge.

Signature of Applicant as Usually Written (Do not use nickname)

GPO: 1974 - 538-864

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/4/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt. Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities; Re:Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance;Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs; Policies and Procedures

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6/9/75

Received by: Mark Gitenstein

Title: Prof. Staff member

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh

The Attorney General

June 4, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and enclosures which constitute a partial response covering a number of the requests set forth in referenced letter and its appendices. A copy of this memorandum and of the enclosures thereto are submitted for your records.

Enclosures - 12

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-100 62-116395-323

SFP:FMK:rbs/fmk
(10)

17 JUN 13 1975

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 16 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr[illegible].A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395 June 4, 1975

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

OTHER SPECIFIC FBI PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, and appendices thereto, which requested certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendices C and D contain requests for the current office of assignment or last known address for a number of FBI employees. Set out below under appropriate headings relating to the specific request headings and numbers is the desired information, as well as information concerning the tenure of FBI service of all the employees involved.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/lew

Appendix C - Item 30

a.) Leo Badgley App, Jr.
Entered on duty (EOD) as Special Agent (SA), June 17, 1957
Assigned Portland Field Office (FO) since December 1, 1959

b.) Edgar O. Ingalls, Jr. (Ingles on your request)
EOD as SA, March 21, 1966
Assigned Portland FO since August 7, 1970

Appendix D - Item 11

a.) Robert L. Tagg
EOD as SA, November 8, 1950
Assigned Omaha FO since January 19, 1973

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-283

SFP:FMK:rbs/fmk
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 5

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

b.) John D. Meade
EOD as SA, January 29, 1951
Assigned Philadelphia FO since January 17, 1966

c.) Bill D. Williams (Billie on your request)
EOD as SA, February 4, 1952
Assigned Special Agent in Charge, Kansas City FO
since December 17, 1974

d.) John J. Creamer, Jr.
EOD as SA, September 13, 1954
Assigned Assistant Special Agent in Charge,
Little Rock FO since May 1, 1975

e.) John J. Connolly
EOD as SA, July 7, 1947
Assigned Newark FO since March 30, 1963

f.) Marjorie Ann Mierzejewski (Miermejewski on your request)
EOD June 26, 1961
Assigned Newark FO since June 26, 1961

g.) Mary Ann Elizabeth Massa (Mass_ on your request)
EOD June 27, 1955
Assigned Newark FO since June 27, 1955

Appendix D - Item 12

a.) Harold P. Leinbaugh (Lingbaugh on your request)
EOD as SA, October 20, 1947
Retired February 16, 1973, from FBI Headquarters
Last known address 1160 Wimbledon Drive,
McLean, Virginia 22101

b.) Elmer Lee Todd
EOD as SA, December 11, 1950
Assigned Washington Field Office since January 31, 1955

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Appendix D - Item 13

Rita Agnes Ambrosio
EOD July 19, 1939
Retired December 28, 1973
Last known address 1604 John Street, Fort Lee, New Jersey 07024

Thomas Jack Biamonte
EOD as SA, July 6, 1953
Assigned Rome 9/28/62

Olga Ciosa
EOD September 20, 1943
Resigned November 29, 1965
Last known address 10409 South Indiana Avenue, Chicago,
Illinois 60628

Theodore Andrew Korontjis
EOD as SA, June 30, 1952
Assigned FBI Headquarters since March 15, 1975

Joseph C. Nichols
EOD as SA, July 2, 1951
Assigned Rome 5/26/63 to 9/1/65 and 12/14/70 to present

Mildred E. Rick
EOD July 8, 1940
Retired June 28, 1974
Last known address 11030 113th Drive, Youngtown, Arizona 85363

Helen C. Spear
EOD April 23, 1951
Assigned Rome 5/6/62 to 1/12/67 and 4/23/71 to present

Appendix D - Item 18

a.) Robert G. Kunkel
EOD as SA, July 11, 1949
Assigned Special Agent in Charge, Alexandria FO,
since March 22, 1974

b.) Courtland J. Jones
EOD as SA, October 6, 1941
Retired September 30, 1974
Last known address 6607 North 29th Street,
Arlington, Virginia 22213

c.) Ernest H. Belter
EOD as SA, July 19, 1943
Retired January 29, 1973
Last known address 616 Ednor Road, Silver Spring,
Maryland 20904

d.) James J. Gaffney
EOD as SA, March 5, 1951
Assigned Washington Field Office since January 29, 1962

Appendix D - Item 19

a.) Joseph A. Sizoo
EOD as SA, November 1, 1938
Retired May 19, 1972
Last known address 844 Pine Crescent, Whispering Pines,
North Carolina 28389

b.) Michael Joseph Rozamus
EOD as SA, November 3, 1947
Retired June 12, 1970
Last known address 6509 Gulf Drive, Holmes Beach,
Florida 33510

c.) Sterling B. Donahoe (Donahue on your request)
EOD as SA, January 6, 1941, Retired 6/29/73
Last known address 2813 Spiral Lane, Bowie, Maryland 20715

d.) Bernard A. Wells, Jr.
EOD as SA, June 6, 1949
Retired July 30, 1971
Last known address 5311 Montgomery Street,
Springfield, Virginia 22151

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

c.) Robert H. Haynes
EOD as SA, October 16, 1950
Retired March 28, 1975
Last known address 205 Northmoor Drive,
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901

Appendix D - Item 20

Alden F. Miller (Alan on your request)
EOD as SA, March 31, 1947
Assigned Atlanta FO since June 21, 1951

Appendix B, Item I-8 requested a sample of the confidentiality statement which FBI personnel are required to sign along with any other employment agreements currently in use. Attached are copies of the following documents responsive to this request:

1.) FD-291 Employment Agreement

2.) Standard Form 61 Appointment Affidavits

3.) 3-26 Form letter from FBI Special Agent appointee to FBI

4.) FD-375 Training Agreement

5.) FD-140 Application for Employment

Enclosures - 5
1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Samples of the five forms currently in use furnished by Administrative Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: June 2, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

On the morning of May 30, 1975, Mr. Robert Nichols (SA-Retired), and SA John Dennis Miller, Legal Analysis Office, met in Miller's office, prior to Nichol's appointment for interview by members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee.

Miller gave Nichols a copy of the Committee's rules at approximately 8:35 a.m. after Nichols stated he had not been given a copy by anyone else. He advised Nichols that nothing Miller was about to say was intended to or should be interpreted as an order or suggestion to be uncooperative with the Senate Select Committee or its staff.

Miller then advised Nichols he had the right to be represented by an attorney; if he is unable to retain an attorney, he should so advise the Committee staff and ask them to assist him in securing counsel; and the FBI could not provide the services of an attorney. Nichols said he understood.

REC-100 62-116395-222

Miller then escorted Nichols to the JEH Building where he met SAs Paul V. Daly and Seymor F. Phillips.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information

13
5 JUN ~~10~~ 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Personnel File 67-414885
(Former SA Robert Nichols)

LEGAL COUNSEL

JDM:eek
(8)

JBH

84 JUN 13 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-23-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

On the evening of 5-20-75 Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Conner telephonically advised SA Paul V. Daly of the Legal Counsel Division that the Department had reached a decision concerning the scope of testimony to be allowed in the Senate Select Committee interview of former SA Alan G. Sentinella. We previously had informed the Department that Mr. Sentinella was to testify pursuant to a subpoena before this Committee and that Department of Justice Order 501-73 requires we obtain Departmental approval before testimony may be given. We also informed the Department that Lester B. Seidel , staff member of the Senate Select Committee, had advised SA Daly that the scope of the intended interview of Sentinella would include knowledge Sentinella may have concerning the investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Mr. Seidel also indicated that they would interview Sentinella concerning his activities between the years 1960 to 1971.

Mr. O'Conner advised SA Daly that the decision of Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler; Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, and Associate Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott was that Sentinella was released insofar as the Department was concerned to only discuss three areas, those areas being the FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and SCLC. He was to advise the Committee that he was not permitted to go outside of these three areas because of instructions from the Department of Justice which instructions were issued pursuant to Department of Justice Order 501-73.

On 5-21-75 former SA Sentinella was advised of the Departmental restrictions on the information he could furnish the Committee by SA Daly, and he was accompanied by SA Daly to the Senate Select Committee office located in G308 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Sentinella's interview was scheduled for 9:30 a.m. Mr. Seidel met Mr. Sentinella and at 9:31 a.m. furnished Mr. Sentinella a copy of the Rules of Procedure for

REC-100

62-116395

62-116395-22

17 JUN 13 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
PVD:kjs (8)

1 - Personnel File of Former Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella (67-432832)
1 - Mr. Daly

84 JUN 13 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. At the same time, former SA Sentinella was furnished forms which Seidel requested he fill out at that time. Seidel also made reference to Sentinella's Fifth Amendment rights but did not specify or spell out his rights.

It was brought to Mr. Seidel 's attention by SA Daly that the Rules adopted by the Senate Select Committee called for a witness to be given copies of the Rules 24 hours prior to his appearance before the Committee and that these Rules are important for a potential witness to have knowledge of prior to his being interviewed since they contain a list of rights and privileges which a witness is entitled to. It was also brought to Mr. Seidel 's attention that despite the fact that the interview was to be initiated at 10 a.m. (initially the interview was scheduled for 9:30 a.m., however, upon arrival former SA Sentinella was advised it would not be held until 10 a.m.) with Mr. Sentinella being required to fill out forms, he would have very little opportunity to review and digest the Rules of the Committee.

Mr. Seidel was also advised of the restrictions placed on the area which former SA Sentinella could respond to by the Department of Justice. Mr. Seidel specifically requested that he be allowed to ask questions concerning "COINTELPRO." He was advised that this was not within the scope of the Department's release for Sentinella unless such information may have been related to the investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, or SCLC.

SA Daly also explained to John Elliff, Task Force Head for the Committee on Domestic Intelligence Matters, the circumstances surrounding the failure to provide a copy of the Rules 24 hours prior to interview and of the lack of specificity of Mr. Seidel as to areas in which Mr. Sentinella would be interviewed. Mr. Elliff apologized for the oversight of the Committee in complying with its Rules and assured SA Daly this would not happen again. In addition, he was advised that the Rules of the Committee provide that witnesses would have a reasonable opportunity to inspect and correct their testimony, however, the Rules provide that a witness must inspect his testimony in the office of the Committee. It was pointed out to Mr. Elliff that such procedures were unreasonable in that in Mr. Sentinella's instance, he would have to travel from Atlanta to Washington, D. C., to review the transcript of his testimony at his own expense. Mr. Elliff indicated that he believed other arrangements concerning this particular aspect of the Rules could and would be worked out.

CONTINUED - OVER

Mr. Sentinella at the conclusion of his testimony advised SA Daly, who was not present at the testimony, that the Committee adhered to the restrictions placed on his testimony by the Attorney General with one possible exception. They asked Mr. Sentinella if while he was working in Atlanta his squad investigated the "Klan" and "SNCC" (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee). Sentinella advised he did not raise an objection to this question because he felt the deviation from the Departmental restrictions was very slight, and our investigations of these matters were well known.

On the afternoon of 5-21-75 K. William O'Conner inquired of SA Daly how the interview went and he was generally advised of the facts surrounding the interview, including the fact that former SA Sentinella was not furnished a copy of the Rules until immediately preceding the interview. Mr. O'Conner inquired as to whether the Senator (Senator Robert Morgan [D-N.C.]) remained during the taking of testimony from Mr. Sentinella, and he was advised that according to Sentinella, Senator Morgan departed approximately five minutes after placing Mr. Sentinella under oath.

Mr. O'Conner expressed his displeasure at the way the Committee operated and indicated he was going to discuss this matter with Deputy Attorney General Tyler.

Subsequently, on 5-21-75 O'Conner indicated he had been in contact with James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President, and Deputy Attorney General Tyler, and they want the Bureau to prepare a letter protesting the Committee's handling of the interview of Sentinella and of the fact that they violated Rules which were adopted by that Committee, specifically the Rules requiring Mr. Sentinella be furnished a copy of the Committee Rules 24 hours prior to giving testimony to the Committee, failure to be specific concerning the areas to be covered by Sentinella's testimony, the general manner in which the rights of Sentinella were explained to him, and the fact that Senator Morgan departed from the Committee session after giving the oath. O'Conner explained in this regard Deputy Attorney General Tyler feels that this is in contravention of the Rules of the Committee, and he questions whether an executive session of the Committee being held to hear such testimony can continue in the absence of a Senate Committee Member. He requested this letter be directed to Senator Church. He was advised that such a letter could only be prepared after approval had been obtained from proper Bureau authorities, and it was also pointed out to Mr. O'Conner that we had orally protested this matter to Mr. Elliff of the Committee and Mr. Seidel , and he was apprised of Elliff's statement that such mistakes would not be repeated in the future. It was pointed out to Mr. O'Conner

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

that the Bureau had furnished former SA Sentinella a detailed briefing of his rights and a briefing as to what was contained in the Rules of the Committee prior to his interview. Mr. O'Conner again requested that we prepare a letter protesting this matter.

It is not felt that a letter concerning this particular matter should be directed to Senator Church in view of Mr. Elliff's statement that this incident will not be repeated in the future. It is felt that our oral protest to the Committee is sufficient at this point, especially inasmuch as they accepted the limitations placed on the testimony of former SA Sentinella by the Department. It would appear we could expect to achieve very little by sending such a letter at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we orally advise Mr. O'Conner the Bureau does not feel a letter should be directed to the Committee concerning this particular incident.

By FBI

PVD JBH/PVD

Done. 5/22/75 and 5/23/75. See my memo. 5/23/75.

Per We should not object if Dept. prepare a letter.

6/3/75

OGC 75-20

Rec'd from Ad Hoc Comm 6/10/75

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

MAY 30 1975

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Senstudy-75

Dear Senator Church:

It is my understanding that the continuing efforts of staff members of the Executive and Legislative Branches to prepare standard guidelines for witness interview procedures are continuing this week. While that process continues, the Department of Justice is, of course, continuing to cooperate in an ad hoc and responsive manner. In order to ensure our attention to these cooperative efforts, I have designated K. William O'Connor as Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination and as such he will be the principle liaison officer of DOJ in this effort. I understand that your Chief Counsel and members of his staff are now dealing with Mr. O'Connor in the execution of their responsibilities.

In the meantime, in an effort to expedite the cooperative provision of appropriate information to SSC, it would be most helpful if the Committee Staff would ensure that the Department of Justice is advised, in advance of Committee Staff contact with FBI employees and former employees, of the name of the witness and the scope of the prospective interview. This would facilitate the interview process, since it would make it possible to ensure that appropriate instructions are issued to the witness under 28 CFR 16.22, and would permit early decision upon the release of any applicable secrecy agreements.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

cc: ✓John Warner

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 13 1975

file in
62-116395

[illegible]

84 JUN 13 1975

In the same vein, I should like to invite your attention to some procedural matters surrounding recent witness presentation before the Committee. It appears, from reports which I have received, that two former FBI agents who recently appeared, did not receive copies of the Committee's Rules of Procedures until immediately before appearance before the Committee; and that the scope of their proposed testimony was defined with somewhat less than optimum precision for pre-clearance. Some procedural problems are almost inevitable, especially in the early stages of hearings. I know that you share my interest in assuring that full procedural due process is unequivocally provided to all witnesses who testify before the Committee or are interviewed by Committee Staff. In calling this matter to your attention I seek your support in restricting such problems to a minimum and prospectively avoiding others of like kind.

Sincerely,

Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee has advised that if the Bureau's response to a Committee request concerning the Democratic Convention in Atlantic City in 1964 is sufficiently informative it may not be necessary to interview Bureau personnel concerning this matter and to recommend that an expeditious effort be made to furnish a summary concerning the Atlantic City investigation be made available along with certain documents concerning this matter.

By way of background, we have received a request dated 5-14-75 pertaining to many items, among which was information concerning the Bureau's activities in Atlantic City in 1964 at the Democratic National Convention. At a meeting on 5-30-75 it was pointed out to the Committee that certain aspects of their May 14, 1975, request were particularly burdensome, would in some instances invade privacy and for other reasons was most difficult. During this meeting which was attended by Mark Gitenstein, staff member of the Committee; John Elliff, Task Force Director; representatives of the Bureau; and K. William O'Conner, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, the Committee representatives indicated that subject to the Senate Committee's approval they would accept some sort of summary with regard to their request in Appendix D, Item 8 of the May 14, 1975, request. This item pertains to the Bureau's activities in Atlantic City.

We have had former Agents interviewed concerning this matter, a request has been made to interview two Bureau secretaries, and the Committee has indicated they intend to interview as many as five additional Bureau Agents concerning this matter. In conversation with K. William O'Conner, he mentioned that the Committee had specifically informed him that if the Bureau's response was informative enough concerning

62-116395

REC. 102

62-116395-330

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz

Daly

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

5 JUN 10 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 1975

RVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

the Atlantic City matter, they would not interview the two Bureau secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski. (The request concerning the interview of these Bureau employees, who are Newark Office employees, is the subject of a separate memorandum captioned and dated same.) He requested SA Paul V. Daly to contact Mark Gitenstein in an effort to determine what type of response the Committee expected concerning the Atlantic City incident.

On 6-4-75, SA Daly contacted Mr. Gitenstein and Mr. Gitenstein advised that the Committee knew of the existence of certain memoranda and in particular a memorandum from former Assistant to the Director C. D. DeLoach reporting a conversation with the President requesting Bureau coverage at the Convention. Gitenstein stated that with regard to the Atlantic City incident, if a summary was prepared concerning this incident which would in general show the types of people whose conversations were monitored, the type of information collected, and the type of information disseminated along with furnishing the Committee certain important documents that it would not be necessary to interview Bureau personnel. He indicated among the documents they would expect to be furnished would be the DeLoach memorandum along with other "benign" documents which would not involve a privacy consideration or other considerations which might preclude their being made available to the Committee. Gitenstein indicated that it is the Committee's feeling that information of a political nature such as the credentials argument at the Convention was collected and furnished to the White House and that the collection and dissemination of this information is not apparently in concert with the ostensive purpose of electronic surveillance. He felt that the summary need not and should not identify individuals monitored but rather describe them such as a senator or some other descriptive phrase to describe the individual whose conversation might have been monitored. He said as to the verification of the information contained in the summary with the information in the files, that subject will be addressed by the Committee at a later time.

Gitenstein again mentioned that if such information was furnished by the Bureau, their need to interview employees would be muted as what they are attempting to learn through interview of Agents involved would have already been furnished by the Bureau. He volunteered that the Committee is relatively well informed concerning this particular matter. It is obvious from the specific mention of the DeLoach memorandum along with other observations and statements he made that this could well be true.

CONTINUED - OVER

It is realized that the White House has requested that a paper be prepared which would include the Atlantic City incident; however, K. William O'Connor indicated that he had conversed with Mr. James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President, and that Wilderotter had advised that document requests pertaining to Atlantic City or any other topic which will be addressed in a paper should be responded to and response should not be delayed.

It would appear to be advantageous to the Bureau to attempt to comply with the summary request along with furnishing certain documents concerning Atlantic City on an expeditious basis as opposed to the Committee continuing to conduct interviews of current and former Bureau personnel. If this type of arrangement can be worked out in this particular incident which the Committee characterizes as an abuse, it might lend itself to a similar arrangement in other areas.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division expeditiously prepare a summary in line with the above concerning the Atlantic City incident along with furnishing the important documents concerning this incident.

pvD JBH/pvD

This is being done
WRW

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 14 1975
TELETYPE

REC-117

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 007 SF CODE

5:13 PM NITEL 5/14/75 MCC

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM SAN FRANCISCO

ATTN LEGAL COUNSEL

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED MAY 2, 1975, ABOVE CAPTION.

ON MAY 14, 1975, LESTER B. SEIDEL, INVESTIGATOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, WASHINGTON, D.C., TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE AND REQUESTED THE IDENTITY OF THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE OF THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE IN 1970. HE WAS ADVISED THAT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE CHARLES W. BATES SERVED IN THAT CAPACITY FROM JANUARY, 1970, THROUGH APRIL, 1970; THAT FORMER SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE HARRY J. MORGAN (NOW RETIRED) SERVED FROM APRIL, 1970, THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1970; AND THAT ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT E. GEBHARDT SERVED AS SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE FROM SEPTEMBER, 1970, THROUGH NOVEMBER, 1972.

REC-117

62-116395-219

SEIDEL DID NOT INDICATE THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF HIS INQUIRY OTHER THAT IT WAS CONNECTED WITH THE COMMITTEE WITH WHICH HE IS AFFILIATED.

ABOVE BEING FURNISHED FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU.

END

[illegible]
SFO/cmc

HOLD

CC Div 11

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY [illegible]

1 - M[illegible] J. B. Adams
1 - [illegible] T. J. Jenkins
1 - Each Assistant Director

CODE TELETYPE NITEL Hot file

REC-112

TO ALL SACS MAY ~~19~~ 20, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395) 219 PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY - 75.

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR, IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE. UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL INFORMATION FURNISHED.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 20 1975
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

SFP:cmc
(19)

LAF 1045 pm JBA

NOTE:

Referenced teletype alerted field to work of the Senate and House Select Committees and Bureau's handling of its requests. Also, it pointed out FBI has pledged full cooperation with Committees. San Francisco teletype 5/14/75 advised that on that day Lester B. Seidel, Investigator, Senate Select Committee, telephonically sought and was furnished identities of SACs in San Francisco in 1970. Seidel did not indicate specific nature of his inquiries. Considering the publicity being afforded the work of the Committee, it is not inconceivable some unauthorized persons may attempt to obtain information from the FBI particularly at field level, under guise of one of the Committees. It is therefore believed this teletype to all SACs is desirable as a cautionary measure.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

84 JUN 11 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

S.F. Phillips

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

June 5, 1975

LEGAL DIVISION

Attached teletype advises former Agent Richard H. Davis, Atlanta Office, had been contacted by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member (FNU) Epstein in an attempt by Epstein to arrange an interview concerning Bureau investigation of Martin Luther King. On the night of 6-4-75, Michael Epstein, Staff Member SSC advised SA Paul V. Daly that he had contacted former Agent Davis to arrange interview concerning Bureau investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and Southern Leadership Christian Conference (SLCC). Epstein stated Davis refused to submit to interview since he was bound by an employment secrecy agreement and needed necessary clearance from Bureau. He told Epstein that he would not contact Bureau for such clearance. Epstein requested Bureau release Davis from the agreement for purposes of this interview which will be a staff interview in Atlanta.

Legal Division recommends Davis be released from security agreement for purposes of this interview and to answer questions concerning the King, Levison, and SLCC investigations. If approved, we will separately advise Davis through Atlanta Office of this decision, and give him pertinent briefing.

1 - Intelligence Division
1 - Administrative Division
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. Daly

WRW

PVD JEY/PVD

PVD:eek
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 05 1975
ms
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR 025 AT CODED

8:08 PM NITEL JUNE 4, 1975 JWS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTN: INTD W. D. CREGAR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RJ

SENSTUDY '75.

ON 6/4/75, FORMER AGENT RICHARD H. DAVIS, 1147 WILD CREEK TRAIL, N. E., ATLANTA, GA., ADVISED HE WAS CONTACTED THIS DATE BY (FNU) EPSTEIN WHOM HE BELIEVED WAS CALLING FROM WASHINGTON, D. C. DAVIS STATED HE FEELS EPSTEIN IS A MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE SINCE INQUIRY CONCERNED DAVIS' KNOWLEDGE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING CASE. EPSTEIN STATED HE WISHED TO INTERVIEW DAVIS EITHER IN ATLANTA OR WASHINGTON, D. C.; HOWEVER, DAVIS SAID THAT NO DEFINITE ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE DURING CONVERSATION OTHER THAN HE WOULD CONTACT EPSTEIN AS TO APPROPRIATE DATE FOR INTERVIEW IN ATLANTA.

REC-111 62-116395-218

DAVIS WAS INFORMED HE COULD CONTACT THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL COLLECT FOR ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER. DAVIS STATED HE WOULD DO SO.

7 JUN 16 1975

END

HOLD

84 JUN 11 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-30-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of an executive meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community on 5-28-75. The meeting was chaired by William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence. Also present were: Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President, James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, Section Chief William O. Cregar, Inspector John B. Hotis, and senior officials of the State Department, National Security Agency, Office of Management and Budget, Defense Department, and the Treasury Department.

Hotis

The following matters of interest were discussed at the meeting:

House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Mr. Colby said he met earlier this week with Chairman Nedzi of the House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, John L. Boos, Chief Counsel, and A. Searle Field, Committee Staff Director. He said they seemed interested in the relationship which had developed between the Senate Committee and CIA and asked where he thought the Senate inquiry was going. They also discussed procedures regarding access to documents and witnesses and requested they be furnished some basic materials concerning the CIA's authority to conduct intelligence investigations. They also requested that the Committee be provided with all the materials requested by the Senate Select Committee. Colby pointed out that the House Resolution (H-Res. 138) which established the Select Committee prohibits the disclosure of information outside the Committee without Committee approval. There is some question, however, whether this Resolution can supersede Rule 11 of the Rules of the House of Representatives

REC-112 62-116395-217

5 JUN 11 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Hotis
JBH:dkg (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 11 1975

which provides that members of the House shall have access to all Committee records. He said Congressman Robert N. Giaimo (D-Conn.) has indicated that he will not accept any limitations on access. Colby said he will appear in an open session before the Committee sometime in the next few weeks to discuss, in general terms, the agency's position on collection of intelligence information.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Mr. Wilderotter said that F. A. O. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, has agreed to identify in advance specific allegations of abuse that will be reviewed by the Committee. Wilderotter said he will then appoint a task force or some other coordinating mechanism within the executive branch to examine each of these areas in depth. The purpose will be to develop an executive department brief on each subject which can be used to respond to Committee requests. He felt that this might enable the Administration to gain the initiative on these issues and perhaps limit the Committee's inquiries to the boundaries set forth in the Senate Resolution. He asked that the agencies make an effort to identify abuse subjects so that the White House can pull together all the information available on each topic. He said it is already clear that the Committee will examine such subjects as assassinations and the CIA's role in the internal affairs of Chile and the Dominican Republic.

Mr. E. H. Knoche, Assistant to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, reported that Mr. Colby has made three appearances before the Senate Select Committee and on each occasion discussed assassination matters. Mr. Colby will meet with the Committee three times next week, and it is expected that he will be asked about the Phoenix program and the covert activities of the CIA including political, counterintelligence, and clandestine intelligence collection. The Committee will trace the agency's operations back to the 1947 directive in an effort to determine how they relate to policy objectives of the Government.

Mr. William G. Hyland, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, said the Committee has requested position papers on the Department's activities in Laos and Chile and to explain of the Department's approach to covert action and whether it was a supplement or instrument of policy. Mr. Hyland raised the question of whether the agencies had any moral obligation to advise former employees that documents were now being

CONTINUED - OVER

made available to Congress. He felt that they should be given an opportunity to review these files prior to interview in order to refresh their memories. Mr. Wilderotter agreed and said that each agency should adopt a similar policy.

Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI, asked whether anyone knew what John Elliff hoped to accomplish as Director of the Task Force on Domestic Intelligence. We pointed out that his earlier writings would indicate that he intends to draft an intelligence charter for the FBI, and perhaps the entire intelligence community. Elliff has made a comprehensive study over the past several years of the Bureau's internal security intelligence functions, including sources of the FBI's authority and the legal restrictions of its operations. This was the subject of a paper he submitted at the Princeton Conference in 1971, and he has since called for the establishment of legal standards for the Bureau's collection, retention, and dissemination of intelligence information.

Mr. Buchen then requested that the FBI draft a proposed intelligence charter for the Bureau. He felt that it would be helpful for the Administration to have a proposal available which it might use to counter any recommendations made by the Committee. At the end of the meeting Mr. Wilderotter asked that a second paper be prepared reviewing all of Mr. Elliff's articles on the subject of domestic intelligence with the view toward identifying those issues which seem to be of major importance.

With regard to Mr. Buchen's request, we feel that it would be inappropriate for the Bureau to draft an intelligence charter for the executive branch. It is the responsibility of the White House and other consumers of intelligence to define their needs and propose appropriate operating authority. We also question the utility of reviewing Professor Elliff's writings on the domestic intelligence functions. We feel a better course of action at this point is simply to ask Mr. Elliff to define the goals and objectives of his task force. He has always been very candid and forthright and we have no reason to think that he would be reluctant to discuss the matter with us. In addition, it is likely his views on the intelligence function differ from those expressed in his earlier articles, and it is best to get his current thinking on the problem. If this approach proves unsuccessful, we can then resort to a review of his written materials.

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memorandum
Re: SENSTUDY 75

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Legal Counsel Division advise Mr. Wilderotter that we feel it is inappropriate for the Bureau to draft an intelligence charter ~~of~~ for the FBI and recommend that the White House draft a statement of its intelligence needs.

(2) That Legal Counsel Division contact Mr. Elliff and attempt to determine what his goals and objectives are as Director of the Task Force on Domestic Intelligence.

PVD

JBH/PVD

PLM

wRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. J. B. Adams~~
1 - ~~Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~(1 - Mr. Hotis)~~

DATE: 6/6/75

1 - ~~Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. H. W. Dare
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This records the results of contact with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning release to Senate Select Committee (SSC) of two documents pertaining to Appendix C, Paragraph 24 of the SSC request to the Department of 5/14/75, which requested "all memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of 'notional' Marxist-Leninist organizations withinthe United States."

No information has been developed indicating this Bureau conferred with CIA regarding the establishment or creation of a Bureau-sponsored "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization. Although the FBI did, in fact, direct several such organizations, no information has been developed indicating the FBI consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.

In one instance, CIA advised in 2/70 it had established a notional organization with post office box addresses in Boston, Massachusetts and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This notional organization, to be known as the Union for the Revolution, had the objective of developing penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. It was CIA's intention to circulate propaganda from the post office boxes in anticipation of interesting Arab groups. Thereafter, it was CIA's plan to use its personnel under "suitable" cover to contact the Arab groups. (See memorandum dated 2/13/70, captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-2, copy attached.)

62-116395-216

REC. 112

By letterhead memorandum dated 3/23/70, the FBI indicated information had been received indicating the Union for the Revolution had been in contact with a domestic Marxist-Leninist organization requesting literature. This memorandum set forth an analysis of a "Statement of the Union for the Revolution" indicating the document lacked credibility as a revolutionary document. (LHM dated 3/23/70, captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-4, copy attached.)

62-116395

ENCLOSURE

5 JUN 11 1975

LFS:mjg
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

5-606

84 JUN 11 1975

On 6/6/75, Mr. Walter Elder, CIA, advised that CIA had no objection to the LHM dated 3/23/70, being furnished to the SSC. With regard to the memorandum from Mr. Papich to Mr. Brennan dated 2/13/70, Mr. Elder requested that the name of the CIA representative who furnished the information in the memorandum be deleted from line one of the memorandum prior to its being furnished to the SSC. Provided this is done, CIA has no objection to this memorandum being furnished to the SSC. He suggested that when the name is deleted, it be replaced with the phrase "A CIA officer."

ACTION:

To record CIA's clearance of the above-described documents.

SECRET

Appendix C, III, 24

Please provide: all memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts, or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States.

No information has been developed indicating this Bureau conferred with CIA regarding the establishment or creation of a Bureau-sponsored "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization. Although the FBI did, in fact, direct several such organizations, no information has been developed indicating the FBI consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.

In one instance, CIA advised in 2/70 it had established a notional organization with post office box addresses in Boston, Massachusetts, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This notional organization, to be known as the Union for the Revolution, had the objective of developing penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. It was CIA's intention to circulate propaganda from the post office boxes in anticipation of interesting Arab groups. Thereafter, it was CIA's plan to use its personnel under "suitable" cover to contact the Arab groups. (See memorandum dated 2/13/70 captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-2, copy attached.)

By letterhead memorandum dated 3/23/70, the FBI indicated information had been received indicating the Union for the Revolution had been in contact with a domestic Marxist-Leninist organization requesting literature. This memorandum set forth an analysis of a "Statement of the Union for the Revolution" indicating the document lacked credibility as a revolutionary document. (LHM dated 3/23/70 captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-4, copy attached.)

As the Union for the Revolution was strictly a creation of CIA, it is recommended before any information be disseminated outside the FBI relating to this organization, clearance be obtained through CIA.

Prepared by SA David
Ryan, IS-3, 5/28/75

SECRET

Classified by 4375
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-216

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/4/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2

At 4:55 p.m. on June 4, 1975, Daniel M. Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he has not as yet been contacted by the Senate Select Committee staff for interview but it was his intention to call Mark Gitenstein to discuss further his interview by the Committee. Mr. Armstrong inquired as to whether the Bureau has any objections to his discussing the two subject areas previously described by Mr. Gitenstein. Those areas were Armstrong's knowledge of the Bureau's Intelligence Division activities as a result of his employment in the FBI, and his knowledge of the possibility of the Bureau getting an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters.

I advised Mr. Armstrong that to the extent that the interview would concern those two subjects, the Bureau would have no objection and he could consider his secrecy agreement waived, but only to that extent. Mr. Armstrong inquired as to whether there were any particular problems with information he furnished to me on May 28, 1975. I told him that the waiver of the agreement was conditioned on the one limitation that he would not furnish information that would identify informants, compromise current investigations, or on-going programs, or reveal other sensitive matters which should be reserved for the information of members of the Committee or the Chairman of the Committee.

I told Mr. Armstrong that the Bureau would have available during his interview, though not present at the interview, a representative who would provide him with counsel as to any problems concerning subjects he may be reluctant to discuss with the Committee representative. I explained that the FBI representative was not intended to inhibit any

REC 112

62-116395-215

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

5 JUN 11 1975

JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 11 1975

interview he might have, but was there for the purpose of expediting the interview by resolving questions concerning information he was authorized to furnish.

Mr. Armstrong said he fully understood and that he would advise me in the event an interview was scheduled.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Cochran

DATE: 5/19/75

FROM : W. E. Harward WEH

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEYS - SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Rememos Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams dated 4/9/75 and 4/25/75, concerning above-captioned matter, copies attached.

Liaison with Capitol Hill by the Office of Legal Counsel resulted in an arrangement whereby Laboratory representatives could meet with those members of the Capitol Police Force handling security surveys for the U. S. Congress. Laboratory personnel met with members of the Capitol Police Force on 5/6/75 and 5/8/75 at their headquarters, 331 First Street, NE, Washington, D. C. At the meeting on 5/6/75 an examination of their survey equipment revealed that it was adequate, however it did not meet the level of sophistication or quality available at the present state of the art. Further discussion revealed that the training received by members of the police force handling their responsibility was limited.

On 5/8/75 Laboratory Supervisors Wilbur G. Stevens and Joseph B. Parsons met with Chief James M. Powell and some of his staff members which included Deputy Chief Garner, Captain Brannon, Head of the Investigative Unit, and Lieutenant Bell, Head of the Bomb Disposal Unit. The discussion at this meeting centered around steps which could be taken to update their present security survey equipment as well as additional measures which could be put into practice to enhance their technical expertise in this area. Laboratory personnel furnished them with the names of manufacturers of additional survey equipment as well as suggestions as to the establishment of an in-house training program.

Enclosures (2)

ST-101
REC-59
62-116395-214

1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Bowers, Room 4509 JB)
1 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. Cregar, Room 4123 JEH)
1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Harward
1 - Mr. Stevens

CONTINUED - OVER

5 MAY 30 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

JUN 9 19

1 MS

WGS:bms
(8)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

57 J... 12 1975

F416

Memorandum W. E. Harward to Mr. Cochran
RE: SECURITY SURVEYS - SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT

At the conclusion of this conference, Chief Powell expressed his sincere appreciation to the Bureau for the excellent help and guidance extended to him and his staff in this matter of mutual interest, and expressed the hope that he could call on us again in the event he or his staff needed to tap our resevoir of knowledge. The Chief was assured that we would be available if needed in this capacity.

It appears that the Capitol Police Force has been forced into the untenable position of handling this responsibility for the Congress, and as a result are attempting to establish some degree of self-reliance and outward credibility being completely inexperienced in this area of technical expertise. Because of this, it is felt that the Bureau should move cautiously in any continuing liaison with the Capitol Police concerning security survey matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that any continuing liaison with the Capitol Hill Police Force be handled by mature and experienced Special Agent Supervisors, who are completely familiar with security survey matters.

WRW/TWL

TK

PLM

Mr. J. B. Adams 4-8-76

Legal Counsel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rr

During various contacts with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, and Congressman Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), Chairman of the House Select Committee, the question has come up regarding the need for a check of the private offices of individual Committee Members to ensure the absence of any electronic listening devices. The Committee personnel have been told that we consider this absolutely essential and they agreed.

In exploring this matter, it was determined that the Capitol Police Department recently has established a special unit to handle all types of security problems within the Capitol Hill complex, including checks for electronic listening devices. Personnel of this unit have received extensive training, some from CIA. The operations of the unit are controlled through the Sergeants at Arms of the House and Senate.

This matter has been discussed with Robert Hough, Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Hough advised that the special unit already has conducted complete security surveys of the new office space of the Senate Select Committee and certainly will perform any other checks of this type needed by the Committee or its individual Members. He said, in fact, that since they now have this capability they would oppose any outside agency coming on to the Hill to perform this function. Hough said he already has been in contact with Miller regarding the necessary security checks and stated he will let us know when the offices of the Senate Select Committee/Members have been checked. He said their rules require specific requests from the individual Members in writing.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. [illegible]
1 - Mr. [illegible]
1 - Mr. [illegible]

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Powers

62-116395-214

[illegible] (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

This matter was discussed with Congressman Nedzi on 4-9-75, and he stated he would promptly contact Mr. Harding to work out the necessary arrangements for security checks needed by his Committee and its Members. Harding has promised to let us know when the checks of the House Select Committee Members have been completed.

All contacts concerning this matter have been handled by Inspector Bowers who will continue to follow this situation with Senate Sergeant at Arms, William H. Wannall, or his Deputy; House Sergeant at Arms Harding; Mr. Miller of the Senate Select Committee; and Congressman Nedzi.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WOC:ekw 4/14/75

On 4/11/75 the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community was apprised of the discussions with Mr. Robert Hough, the Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and with Mr. Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Although the Executive Committee would have preferred the FBI to conduct audio sweeps, they interposed no objection to the sweeps being handled by the Capitol Police Department. Mr. Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, requested, however, that both Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding be requested to periodically advise the FBI as to the sweeps of Committee space for electronic listening devices. Specifically, Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding should be asked to furnish the FBI the following: How frequently they will conduct a counteraudio sweep, what offices will be swept, will the results of such sweeps be furnished the FBI, and will the FBI be immediately notified should the Capitol Police locate an electronic listening device?

RAINEY

Mr. J. B. Adams 4-25-75

Legal Counsel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams memorandum of 4-9-75 to which the Intelligence Division placed an addendum dated 4-14-75 showing that Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, had requested that the Sergeants at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives keep the Bureau advised regarding checks made for electronic listening devices in the offices of captioned Select Committees.

This was discussed on 4-23-75 by Inspector Bowers with Senate Sergeant at Arms William Wannall and his Deputy, Robert Hough. They were amenable to notifying us concerning the checks they make of Senate Select Committee space and the offices of the Members of this Committee. Hough was designated by Wannall to handle this matter. Hough advised that the special Capitol Police unit had made a check of Room S148 in the Capitol on that date (4-23-75) prior to a meeting of the Senate Select Committee in that room and found nothing. Hough stated they have received no requests whatever to make any checks of the offices of individual Committee Members. He said he had discussed this matter with William Miller, Staff Director of the Select Committee, and Miller indicated it would be taken up with the Committee but he has heard nothing further from him.

On 4-24-75 Bowers discussed this matter with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives. Harding stated he has had no requests for any checks of the Members' offices or

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

62-116395-214

DWB:ejs (9) CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

space of the House Select Committee since the Committee really has not begun to function as yet. He said he has discussed this matter with Committee Chairman Lucien Nedzi, and he certainly will give us complete accounting of checks they make of this Committee's space and the space of the individual Members of the Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

4-528

62-116395-213

CHANGED TO

62-116464-4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

JUN 12 1975

Hmk / cz

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/23/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES OR FORMER EMPLOYEES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Hotis

At the Executives Conference on May 22, 1975, I presented for discussion the question of the procedures to be followed when former employees or current employees of the Bureau are contacted for interview by staff representatives of the Senate Select Committee, or are called for testimony pursuant to a subpoena issued by the Committee. I explained the background including the numerous attempts to arrive at a working arrangement with the Committee in terms of stated guidelines and that all such efforts in the past had proven unworkable.

I pointed out that when presented with the proposal that an agency representative be present during interviews, the Committee met and voted unanimously to reject that proposal. The issue of whether the agency representative would be present during the interview therefore is a stumbling block to the development of a reasonable procedure to be followed by the Committee and by our present and former employees. I requested the authority of the Executives Conference and approval of the Director to waive the requirement that a Bureau representative be present during interviews and following a vote such approval was given.

I then requested authority to undertake the development of a working understanding with the Committee in behalf of the Bureau by which we would be given notice of the identities of persons to be interviewed prior to interview or testimony, that we would be advised of the subject matter of the

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
JAM:mfd

REC-100

62-116395-282

CONTINUED - OVER

17 JUN 10 1975

84 JUN 11 1975

interview or testimony, and afforded an opportunity to discuss with the witness those areas of the proposed interview or testimony which would require no special arrangements and those areas which would require the information possessed by the witness to be furnished to members of the Committee or to the Chairman exclusively.

We also wanted an opportunity prior to interview to furnish the witnesses information concerning their Constitutional rights, their rights pursuant to the Committee's rules, and to advise them concerning the extent to which they were released from obligations of secrecy made to the FBI, and to the procedures necessary to obtain authority of the Department to respond to a subpoena.

Following discussion and vote this matter also was approved.

Pursuant to such authority, I met with K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, from approximately 4:00 p.m. to 5:20 p.m. on May 22, 1975, accompanied by Inspector John B. Hotis. I explained to Mr. O'Connor that the Director was desirous of having the Committee understand that the FBI wanted to be cooperative to the extent that it was possible and consistent with the need to protect the identities of informants, sensitive sources of information and methods, on-going investigations and other current operations and personal privacy. Because of this view of the Director and the Bureau, we desired to make known to the Committee the fact that we would not insist on the presence of a Bureau representative during actual interviews or testimony of present or former employees, but we would want an understanding with the Committee and the Committee staff that the Bureau would be given prior notice of the identities of proposed witnesses, the subject matter of the proposed interview or testimony, and an opportunity prior to interview or testimony for the Bureau to consult with the employee in order to release him from his obligations of secrecy to the extent possible for purposes of the interview or testimony.

I restated our position that we were not endeavoring to deter testimony rather we were attempting to facilitate testimony under reasonable conditions and we felt that these matters should be discussed with the Committee. I told Mr. O'Connor that we were aware of the numerous discussions, proposals and conferences that have been held in an effort to establish specific formal guidelines with the Committee, but that all such efforts in behalf of the White House staff and the intelligence community at

CONTINUED - OVER

large have not been successful. I told him that therefore we felt it would be appropriate for the FBI to express our view to the Committee because interviews of FBI personnel and former employees have been conducted and are scheduled in the near future.

Mr. O'Connor said that he understood the Director's view that he desired to cooperate with the Committee and he felt that such cooperation could be negotiated if we were to offer the Committee as trading material COINTELPRO files. I told Mr. O'Connor that we were not going to negotiate an understanding concerning witness interview procedures on the basis of trading any of our files. He then suggested that we negotiate the May 14, 1975, letter which was addressed to the Attorney General by Senator Church and use that negotiation as a basis for trading with the Committee to develop workable guidelines. I again told Mr. O'Connor that I considered the question of procedural arrangements for witness interviews to be a very broad question and one that went far beyond the requests in the May 14, 1975, letter. I told him that I felt confident that the May 14, 1975, letter would be followed by perhaps an even longer letter with more requests and that such matters should be negotiated individually.

Mr. O'Connor then said that it was his strong view that a letter should be addressed to the Committee complaining of the treatment of FBI witnesses, particularly regarding violations of the Committee's own rules in that it appeared that during recent interviews the Committee had not furnished witness a copy of the rules in sufficient time and the treatment by staff representatives (& the Committee staff) of witnesses had been improper.

I told Mr. O'Connor that I thought that our efforts to develop a working relationship with the Committee could be seriously impaired at this time should a protest letter be sent to Senator Church because a formal communication of that nature would require some reaction on the part of the Committee and I could see no benefit to our present efforts to establish procedures by which we could reasonably cooperate with the Committee.

Mr. O'Connor then suggested that a letter might be addressed to Senator Church which described our concern that in the absence of reasonable procedures witnesses' rights might be impaired and that for that

CONTINUED - OVER

reason and for the reason that the Director desired to be cooperative with the Committee, we would request a meeting with Senator Church and Senator Tower to arrive at an understanding as to procedures. I told Mr. O'Connor that I would consider such a letter and he said he would discuss the matter with the Deputy Attorney General and with James Wilderotter at the White House.

At approximately 9:05 a.m. on May 23, 1975, Mr. O'Connor called me and said that he had discussed the matter with Mr. Wilderotter and the Deputy Attorney General. He said that both had agreed that it was inopportune at this time to seek special guidelines for interviews of FBI personnel and former personnel with the Committee. He said that a meeting has been scheduled for Tuesday, May 27, 1975, at noon in a final effort to resolve an understanding with Committee representatives. He said at the present time it is proposed that the meeting be attended by Wilderotter and Roderick Hills, representing the White House; Hoffman, representing the Defense Department; Warner, representing CIA; and O'Connor representing the Justice Department. Committee representatives would be Schwarz, Chief Counsel, and John Elliff. He said that at this time it was his thought that the Deputy Attorney General and I should not attend the meeting. He gave as his reasoning the thought that "should something go wrong" the Deputy Attorney General could disassociate himself from any agreement arrived at, and that I would similarly be in a position of saying that we have not been a party to the agreement.

I reminded Mr. O'Connor that meetings have been held frequently in the past and that tentative understandings made at such meetings have disappeared shortly after the meeting was concluded. I told him that was significant to us because we now understand that two more former employees of the FBI have been contacted and may be interviewed in the near future. I told him that former SA Sam Papich and former Agent Nichols have been contacted. I told him that the extent to which we should release these two former employees from their obligation of secrecy could not be intelligently evaluated unless we knew the subject matter of the interviews and that we plan to contact the Committee to inquire as to the subject matter. I pointed out to him that such pending interviews make it imperative for the FBI to consider action in addition to meetings that may be planned to discuss guidelines.

CONTINUED _ OVER

Mr. O'Connor asked that we not contact the Committee directly at this time, but that we allow him to call John Elliff and Schwarz to request that he be advised of the identity of all proposed FBI witnesses and of the subject matter of the proposed interviews, and that such interviews or testimony not go forward pending developments of an agreement on guidelines. O'Connor promised that he would make the contact promptly and advise me today of the results. I agreed to withhold our contact pending receipt of the information from him.

Mr. O'Connor then insisted that a letter be prepared for the Attorney General to send to Senator Church pointing out the failure of the Committee to afford complete protection of the rights of witnesses. I declined to undertake that responsibility and I told him the reason was that a formal document addressed to the Chairman of the Committee would tend to impair our efforts to negotiate with the Committee and certainly would be untimely in view of the conference he described as being scheduled for next Tuesday at noon.

Mr. O'Connor then said he would hate to have to tell the Deputy Attorney General that the FBI declined to prepare such a draft. I told him that not only would I not mind him telling the Deputy Attorney General, but I wished he would tell the Deputy Attorney General and explain my reason for not sending such a formal letter addressed to Senator Church at this time. Mr. O'Connor said that "well everyone else agrees to the letter," and I told him the FBI does not agree.

Mr. O'Connor said that if he was going to have to draft the letter for the Attorney General's signature, he would do it, but that he would need the information concerning the interviews of former SA Devlin and former SA Sentinella. I told Mr. O'Connor that the information concerning Sentinella was en route to him already and that we would endeavor to furnish him as promptly as possible any additional information available to us concerning these interviews.

At 11:13 a.m. on May 23, 1975, Mr. O'Connor called me and said that he had just concluded a conversation with John Elliff during which Elliff agreed that in regard to the scheduled interview of former SA Sam Papich on May 29, 1975, at 9:00 a.m., he would furnish us the substance of the

CONTINUED - OVER

questions to be asked Mr. Papich. He said that Elliff was agreeable to an informal arrangement under which the FBI would not require the presence of a Bureau representative at such interviews, but would expect to receive the identity of persons to be interviewed plus a statement as to the subject matter of the interview. Elliff then proceeded to identify as those persons scheduled for interview as William Turner, who will be interviewed today or this weekend by Mike Epstein at San Francisco, and "Chick" Brennan, who was interviewed yesterday, May 22, 1975, by Mark Gitenstein and who may be interviewed again today.

As to the interview of Sam Papich, Elliff said that the interview would concern:

1. A liaison agreement between the FBI and CIA;

2. The abolition of Papich's liaison responsibilities in 1970;

3. Dissatisfaction by the FBI with the Huston Plan;

4. The views in the White House regarding the intelligence community and the FBI with reference to a conversation Elliff had with Mr. Wannall and Mr. Cregar on May 22, 1975;

5. A detailed follow-up on the discussions with Mr. Wannall;.

6. A copy of the Huston Plan and certain minutes taken of meetings at which the Huston Plan was discussed. These minutes allegedly were made by William Cregar;

7. The matter raised with Paul Daly on May 22, 1975. (Mr. Daly recalled that Mr. Elliff discussed an incident concerning the CIA and the FBI which occurred at Denver, Colorado.)

Mr. O'Connor said that an interview proposed with former SA Nichols has been postponed indefinitely according to Elliff because of Nichols' unavailability.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee

Mr. O'Connor noted that even though formal current rules have not been agreed upon with the Committee, it appears that Elliff's cooperation in furnishing the above information indicates a willingness to abide by the terms and conditions that I had requested Mr. O'Connor to seek in behalf of the FBI.

In this developing cooperation with Elliff, it is my opinion that we should not participate in the conference at noon on Tuesday, May 27, 1975, at which time the broad proposals by Wilderotter will be discussed. It is to the interest of the FBI to develop a cooperative attitude on the part of Elliff and his staff and that is being accomplished.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6-2-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, advised that he desired the Bureau to continue practice of furnishing communications setting forth the contents of interviews of former and current employees where such information is available. He also requested that the Bureau continue to furnish an extra copy for James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President.

HOT

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD

JBH/PVD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-00 BY SP2

REC-100 62-116395-211

17 JUN 10 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(7)

84 JUN 11 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

At 10:37 a.m. on May 28, 1975, former FBI employee Daniel M. (Mac) Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he has received information that the Senate Select Committee may contact him for purpose of interview. He requested my advice as to what his response should be. I told Mr. Armstrong that he should be aware of any secrecy agreements he may have signed while an employee of the FBI and he should be aware of the Attorney General Order 501-73. I told him the Director was interested in being as candid as possible with the Committee and that we would be willing to release him from his agreement to the extent it would be possible to do so consistent with the needs of on-going investigations and the sensitivity of the particular information. involved. I told him that should he receive a request for interview or subpoena, it would be appropriate for him to inquire as to the general areas of discussion proposed for the interview and to request the Director to release him from the secrecy agreement concerning those areas.

Mr. Armstrong said that if he was contacted, he would respond according to the advice furnished him.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/rlw

PLM

REC-100 62-116395-210

17 JUN 10 1975

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(7)

84 JUN 11 1975

[redacted]

PERS. REC. UNIT

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 05 1975
TELETYPE

NR 10 PH PLAIN

610 PM 6-5-75 NITEL MCA

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: PHILADELPHIA (62-0-23222)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL, MAY 28, 1975.

SA JOHN B. MEADE ADVISED TELEPHONICALLY MAY 29, 1975 RE CONTENTS OF RENITEL.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

(Meade)

REC-100

62-116395-208

cc 67

84 JUN 11 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 0 5 1975

TELETYPE

~~NR011 CE PLAIN~~

~~8:33PM~~ NITEL JUNE 5, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM CHARLOTTE (62-4093)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUNITEL MAY 29, 1975.

MR. JOSEPH A. SIZOO, 84 A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PINES, NC, CONTACTED MAY 29, 1975 PER INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REBUNITEL.

END

~~MEB FBIHQ CLR AND TKS~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Joseph A. Sizoo

REC-100

62-116395-707

JUN 10 1975

cc 671

84 JUN 11 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 29 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 003 PD CODE

1:45 P M URGENT MAY 29, 1975 LJQ

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: PORTLAND (66-0)

ATTENTION: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

SENSTUDY 75.

RE FBIHQ NITEL TO ALEXANDRIA AND OTHER OFFICES, INCLUDING PORTLAND, MAY 28, 1975.

FBIHQ NITEL NAMED SA LEO B. APP, JR., AND SA EDGAR O. INGALLS, BOTH CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO PORTLAND DIVISION, AND NOTED THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC), EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN.

FOR INFORMATION OF FBIHQ, STRONG POSSIBILITY SUBJECT MATTER PERTAINS TO MATTER ENUMERATED IN DETAIL IN PORTLAND TELETYPES TO FBIHQ JANUARY 18, 1973, FEBRUARY 1, 1973, FEBRUARY 5, 1973, PORTLAND AIRTEL TO FBIHQ, JANUARY 19, 1973, IN MATTER ENTITLED "HUNTLY COLLINS, INFORMATION CONCERNING, RESEARCH MATTER," AND FBIHQ TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED FEBRUARY 2, 1973, ENTITLED "FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT, CODE NAME 'INLET', RESEARCH MATTER."

END.

REC-100

62-116395-206

JUN 10 1975

67-423754 (App)

67-623437 (Ingalls)

cc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/REW

84 JUN 11 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 0 5 1975

YPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR004 TP CODE

1:40PM URGENT JUNE 5, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM TAMPA (105-0-1121)

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

RE BUREAU NITEL MAY 28, 1975.

ON JUNE 4, 1975, MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6500 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BEACH, FLORIDA, WAS CONTACTED. MR. ROZAMUS HAD NOT BEEN AVAILABLE FOR CONTACT UNTIL THIS DATE BECAUSE OF TRAVEL. MR. ROZAMUS ADVISED THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BUT HE WAS ALERTED THAT HE MAY BE APPROACHED BY A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF. MR. ROZAMUS WAS ADVISED OF THE CONTENTS OF REBUNITEL CONCERNING THE FACT THAT HE MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT DURING INTERVIEW IN THE EVENT QUESTIONS ARE ASKED RELATING TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS. MR. ROZAMUS WAS ALSO ADVISED THAT AS A PRELUDE TO THE INTERVIEW HE MAY CONTACT THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL. HE WAS ADVISED THAT THE BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE WAS NOT INTENDED

END PAGE ONE

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORD UNIT

67-424444 Rozamus

REC-103

62-116395-805

JUN 10 1975

84 JUN 11 1975

PAGE TWO

TO IMPEDE THE WORK OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE BUT WAS DONE AS A COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. MR. ROZAMUS ADVISED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THIS AND FULLY APPRECIATED THE BUREAU'S EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD. MR. ROZAMUS FURTHER ADVISED THAT HE WOULD NOTIFY THE TAMPA OFFICE IN THE EVENT THAT HE IS CONTACTED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE.

END

RECD THREE

DCW FBIHQ CL CLR

cc. Putman

Airtel

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
6/2/75

To: Legat, Rome

From: Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. Kolombatovic
PERSONAL ATTENTION
(Route through for review)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SENSTUDY 75

Enclosed is a copy of Bureau teletype 5/28/75 to selected SACs and one copy each of Bureau teletypes 5/2 and 20/75 to all SACs, latter two teletypes for background information concerning captioned matter.

You will note that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) is interested in the whereabouts of some current employees of your office, including yourself. For your additional information, an SSC Staff Member recently inquired of a former Bureau official concerning communications sent to Legat, Rome, in 1964 concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and concerning the name of the Legat at Rome in 1964. (It was the erroneous recollection of the former Bureau official that Armand Cammarota was the Legat in Rome in 1964).

REC-100 62-116395-204

Handle all inquiries from the SSC in accordance with the enclosed instructions.

Enclosures - 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/JEW

JUN 3 1975

SFP:ekw EKW
(10)

MAILED 20
JUN 2 1975
FBI

NOTE: Enclosed 5/2/75 tel to all offices gave general background as to Senstudy 75 and alerted field that former and incumbent employees might be contacted for interview by SSC Staff. Enclosed 5/20/75 tel alerted all SACs to possible inquiries made of field offices and action to take if contacted. SSC letter 5/14/75 enclosed a request for names and current office assignments or last known addresses of all FBI employees assigned Rome, 1964. Three employees then assigned there are still in Rome and their names are included in the copy of the 5/28/75 teletype being sent Rome. That teletype included instructions for selected offices to alert additional 1964 Rome employees who are now assigned elsewhere or no longer with FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

PLM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 11 1975

GPO 931-546

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 05 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 005 NK CODE

12:00PM IMMEDIATE JUNE 5, 1975 JCG

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM NEWARK (66-3971)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL MAY 28, 1975.

FORMER AND PRESENT EMPLOYEES LISTED IN RE BUTEL HAVE BEEN CONTACTED AND ALERTED TO POSSIBILITY OF INTERVIEWS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS SET OUT IN BUTEL MADE KNOWN TO THESE EMPLOYEES, NONE OF WHOM HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF AS YET.

BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED SHOULD THEY CONTACT THIS OFFICE RE SUCH SSC CONTACT.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/rew

PLS HOLD HAVE ONE MORE Y FOR YOU

REC-100

62-116395-203

3 JUN 9 1975

5

79 JUN 10 1975

C.C. Putman

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

At 11:44 a.m. on June 5, 1975, Daniel M. Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he is scheduled to be interviewed at 10:00 a.m. on June 6, 1975, in Room 308 of the New Senate Office Building by Mark Gitenstein. He requested a Bureau representative to be available forc consultation during the interview. I told Mr. Armstrong that I would make appropriate arrangements and that the individual who would be available would contact him to make necessary arrangements prior to the interview.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an appropriate representative to contact Mr. Armstrong (telephone number 632-6990) and to accompany him to the above-described interview.

WRW/TU

PLM

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1- Mr. Mintz

REC-100

62-116395-202

3 JUN 9 1975

JAM:mfd
(7)

79 JUN 10 1975

1 - M[illegible] J. J. McDermott
(A[illegible]: H. R. Hauer)
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. M. Mooney
(Attn: J. E. Reilly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

May 22, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. H. W. Dare, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum dated May 22, 1975, "RE: FILING SYSTEM," one copy of a document captioned "FBI Indexing Procedures" which concerns the FBI's filing system and one copy each of 13 Tables of Contents for FBI forms.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (30)

62-116395

HWD/SFP:cmc
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY [illegible]

3- ENCLOSURE

delivered 5/28

delivered 5/29 to Committee by [illegible]

62-116395-201

ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM

3 JUN 9 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

17 JUN 10 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

[redacted]

1 - M[illegible] J. J. McDermott
(A[illegible]n: H. R. Hauer)
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. M. Mooney
(Attn: J. E. Reilly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. H. W. Dare, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: FILING SYSTEM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and the appendices thereto, which contained requests for documents and other information from the FBI.

In connection with Part four, concerning the FBI's filing system and printed forms utilized by this Bureau, enclosed are copies of the following:

1. Undated nine-page memorandum captioned "FBI Indexing Procedures."

2. One copy each of 13 Tables of Contents concerning forms utilized by this Bureau.

Concerning the FBI's filing system and the Committee's requests for a so-called "Clerk's Manual;" and for a list of FBI classifications used in its filing system, it will be noted that the nine-page memorandum contains the list of classifications. With respect to the so-called "Clerk's Manual," the Files and Communications Division of the FBI maintains detailed instructions which are followed by its employees in classifying mail for indexing. It is not known whether such instructions are what is referred to by the Committee as the "Clerk's Manual." These instructions consist of nine volumes of material. Because of their bulkiness and because it is not clear whether this material would serve the Committee's purpose, it is not being furnished at this time. However, it will be available for review at FBI Headquarters by the Committee Staff.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PLM

HWD/SFP:cmc
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

ENCLOSURE

FILING SYSTEM

The following will explain the Tables of Contents concerning FBI forms which are being furnished in lieu of the actual forms at this time. This procedure is being followed because the forms number nearly 2,000 and many will probably be of no interest to the Committee. If the Committee will review these Tables of Contents and advise which forms it desires to see, appropriate steps will then be taken to make them available to the Committee Staff. The Tables of Contents headed "FBI Form Book" lists all FBI FD (Field Division) forms which are in use throughout the field. The remaining Tables of Contents list those forms applicable to the work of specific FBI Divisions at Headquarters. For example, forms with the prefix "1" are used in Division One (Identification); those with prefix "2" are used in Division Two (Training); etc. There are no forms peculiar to Divisions 11 (Legal Counsel) and 13 (Office of Planning and Evaluation). Those forms with prefix "0" (omnibus) are for use by two or more Divisions at Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Clearance for making these Tables of Contents available was obtained from the Training Division for the FD forms and from each Division for its applicable forms. The Files and Communications Division has cleared the paper "FBI Indexing Procedures."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/22/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Filing System

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 5/29/75 @ 2P

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/18/01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395- 201

ENCLOSURE

4-528

62-116395-200

CHANGED TO

62-116464-5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

JUN 12 1975

Hmk / cz

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 5/12/75

FROM : H.C. Flemister, Jr.

SUBJECT: CLEARANCE OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE (IIC) FOR RELEASE TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

The following is to record the clearance of certain documents prepared by the IIC and, in some instances, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) for release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC).

The SSC has been furnished a paper prepared by the Intelligence Division which was a position paper on the FBI's jurisdiction in internal security matters, intelligence and counterintelligence investigations. This paper was dated 2/13/75 and set forth information taken from certain documents or parts of documents by the IIC and, in some instances, the ICIS. All of these documents have been cleared for passage to the SSC by the following members of the IIC, as well as Mr. William Wark, Executive Secretary of the ICIS:

> Mr. Rowland Morrow, Director, Defense Investigative Programs Office; Mr. Merrill Kelly, Deputy Director of Operations, ACSI, U. S. Army; Colonel Leo Olsen, OSI, U. S. Air Force; Mr. Jack Donnelly, Naval Investigative Service.

Mr. Wark advised he did not feel it necessary to clear documents through the Attorney General since they pertain to IIC matters which were merely concurred in by ICIS.

Copies of the documents involved are attached and are as follows:

Enclosures

CONTINUED - OVER

JRW:tdp (7)
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Fulton (Lacey)
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Wagoner

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
191 JUN 4 1975

5 MAY 1975

4843

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

JUN 10 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: CLEARANCE OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
(IIC) FOR RELEASE TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

(1) Excerpt from report on the status of the Internal Security Program of the U. S. as of 6/30/58 dated 8/27/58, prepared by the IIC and the ICIS.

(2) Department of Justice memorandum dated 3/5/64 to Former Director Hoover setting forth new charter for the IIC under Attorney General supervision.

(3) Excerpt from report on the Internal Security Program dated 3/5/54, prepared by the IIC and the ICIS.

(4) Letter from Former Director Hoover, Chairman, IIC, to the Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, The White House, dated 7/25/61 and its enclosure of 7/25/61, prepared by the IIC.

(5) Memorandum from NSC Representative on Internal Security J. Patrick Coyne to Former Director Hoover dated 11/6/50 and letter to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC, dated 11/8/50 from Former Director Hoover, Chairman, IIC, and its enclosure.

ACTION:

None. For information.

WOC

JBA

1 - Mr. ~~J. B. Adams~~
1 - Mr. A. Mintz (J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. [redacted] R. Wannall
1 - Mr. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

TO SAC EL PASO (62-1957) JUNE 3, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (105-78256)

THOMAS RIHA; MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING.

REEPAIRTEL, MAY 8, 1970.

IMMEDIATELY CONTACT DR. JOSEPH SMILEY TO DETERMINE IF CONTENTS OF AIRTEL CAN BE FURNISHED CONFIDENTIALLY TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IF SMILEY HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT RELEASE OF INTERVIEW TO THIS COMMITTEE ASCERTAIN UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS, IF ANY, HE WOULD AGREE TO SUCH RELEASE. SUTEL ATTENTION W. O. CREGAR.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 3 1975
155p

TELETYPE

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 5 1975

105-78256-43

ORIGINAL FILED IN

RLM:jmn jmn
(7)

NOTE:

The Senate Select Committee has expressed an urgent interest in the details of any FBI investigation concerning the disappearance of Thomas Riha, former Professor at University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, in March, 1969. The Bureau conducted no investigation regarding the disappearance. There was considerable publicity with reference to a statement made by Dr. Smiley, then President of the university, that he had been informed by a Government official that Riha "was alive and well" Smiley was interviewed by the El Paso Office. Smiley furnished information in the strictest of confidence, not to be disseminated to any outside agency, regarding his contacts with a CIA representative in Boulder after the Riha disappearance. It was the CIA official who told him that Riha was alive and well. Without the Smiley interview our response to the Senate Select Committee has an obvious gap. If the Committee calls any witnesses in the Riha matter Dr. Smiley would be one of the most logical persons to call. The passage of time and other factors may have brought about a change in the mind of Dr. Smiley regarding the necessity to keep the information furnished by him in a confidential relationship with the Bureau and it is believed he should be given the opportunity to either reinforce his request for confidentiality or release the Bureau from the restriction he imposed.

RLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

8 JUN 5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

RECORDS
CC-62-116395
(SENSTUDY 75)

GPO 954-546

1 - [illegible]r. J. B. Adams
1 - [illegible] J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General May 22, 1975

Director, FBI

REC- 102

Encl.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning the interview by Senator Walter F. Mondale of the Senate Select Committee as well as members of its staff of retired FBI Special Agent John P. Devlin. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - 67-220521 (Personnel File for SA John P. Devlin)

WOC:cmc
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

NOTE:

The furnishing of the LHM to the Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to Wilderotter is the same procedure we have followed in the past regarding the interviews of former FBI employees by the SSC Staff.

ENCLOSURE

5/22/75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC-102

62-116395 Encl

JUN 6 1975

84 JUN 6 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395 May 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE AND STAFF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-2001 BY SP2ALM/RW

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by retired SA John P. Devlin following his voluntary appearance before Senator Mondale and Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on May 19, 1975. Devlin's appearance followed an interview of him by Senate Select Committee Staff Member Michael T. Epstein on April 25, 1975. A memorandum reporting the results of the April 25, 1975, interview was forwarded to the Attorney General as an enclosure to my letter to the Attorney General dated May 8, 1975, entitled "United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities."

On May 19, 1975, Devlin was interviewed by Senator Mondale; SSC Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.; Assistant Minority Counsel Charles Kirbow; and Epstein. The interview was conducted in a building across the street from the Dirksen Building in Washington, D. C., and lasted from approximately 2:00 p.m. to 3:20 p.m. Devlin was not subpoenaed to appear but appeared voluntarily. He was placed under oath by Senator Mondale.

At the outset of the interview Devlin was advised of his rights; that he could be represented by counsel and that if he had none, but desired counsel, the Committee Staff would attempt to provide one for him. At the conclusion of the interview he was thanked but given no indication as to whether he would be called to testify before the SSC.

1 - 67-220521 (Personnel File for SA John P. Devlin)

WOC:cmc cmc
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-199

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Re: Interview of Retired Special Agent (SA)
by Senator Walter F. Mondale and
Staff Members of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC)

Following being advised of his rights, Devlin was asked who sent him to Atlantic City and why he was sent. He advised he received his instructions from Special Agent in Charge Ralph Bachman through Devlin's supervisor, SA Vincent Murphy. It is to be noted here that upon being interviewed by Epstein on April 25, 1975, Devlin had indicated he had received his instructions through his supervisor, SA William Gagnon. Devlin corrected this mistake during the interview of May 19, 1975. As to why he was sent, Devlin advised that as a sound man of the Newark Office he was sent to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to install a technical surveillance on Martin Luther King, Jr., who occupied a room at the Claridge Hotel in that city. Devlin was asked whether the monitoring plant for the electronic surveillance was located in the same hotel. Upon being advised it was the interviewers' desire to know whether the location of the plant at the Claridge Hotel was also designed to serve as a physical lookout on King's room, Devlin advised he was not aware that the FBI employed a physical lookout on King's hotel room. Devlin was also asked whether he installed a microphone in the room of King. He advised that he had not because it was not technically feasible. Also of concern to those interviewing Devlin on May 19, was whether he had personal knowledge as to whether the Attorney General had approved the electronic surveillance on King's telephone. Devlin replied he had no personal knowledge but assumed such authority had been obtained by his supervisor. Devlin was also asked if he could recall any conversations over King's phone which were monitored. Devlin replied that the only recollection he had involved conversations between King and his wife wherein they discussed her plans to travel to Atlantic City. Additionally, he did recall conversations involving the noted entertainer, Mehalia Jackson, who was appearing at that time in Atlantic City. Devlin could not recall the substance of the conversation with Jackson. He was also asked whether he retained or possessed any

Re: Interview of Retired Special Agent (SA)
by Senator Walter F. Mondale and
Staff Members of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC)

notes regarding the activity that occurred in Atlantic City during the Democratic Party Nominating Convention during the summer of 1964. Devlin advised that he did not retain any notes but subsequent to the original contact of him by Epstein, Devlin called SA John Connelly of the FBI Office in Newark in an effort to review any available material that might refresh his recollection. Connelly advised Devlin that all materials and notes retained by the Newark Office were forwarded to FBI Headquarters. This information was conveyed to the interviewers on the occasion of the May 19, 1975, interview.

Devlin also was asked if he ever questioned the technical coverage of King inasmuch as it appeared to be for political rather than security reasons. Devlin replied that he had no reason to question the technical coverage of King. He also was asked if he personally met with Mr. Cartha DeLoach of the FBI while both were in Atlantic City. Devlin advised he could not recall whether he actually met DeLoach, pointing out that SA Billie D. Williams was assigned the liaison responsibility with DeLoach.

Devlin was asked whether he had contacted the FBI following his original interview by Epstein on April 25, 1975. Devlin advised he had reported the interview by Epstein to the FBI Office in Newark, New Jersey. He further advised that subsequent to this, he received a call from Newark Assistant Special Agent in Charge Herbert Clough who informed him that should he be contacted in the future, and should he feel he needed to consult with FBI officials, he could call the Legal Counsel Division, FBI Headquarters, in Washington, D. C., collect, for such consultation. Senator Mondale desired to know who Devlin saw upon his arrival in Washington, D. C., on the morning of May 19, 1975, and specifically what instructions he received from the FBI. Devlin advised Senator Mondale that

Re: Interview of Retired Special Agent (SA)
by Senator Walter F. Mondale and
Staff Members of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC)

upon arrival in Washington, D. C., he reported to Inspector John Hotis of the Legal Counsel Division and Paul V. Daly of the FBI at which time he was advised of what obligations he had to the Attorney General as a former employee of the FBI to protect information obtained by virtue of his former employment in the FBI. Subsequent to Devlin's meeting with Mr. Hotis and Mr. Daly, he spent the remainder of the morning with SA William O. Cregar. Mondale desired to know specifically what Devlin and Cregar discussed. Devlin advised that other than discussing mutual friendships in the FBI, Cregar advised of what Cregar's role would be in accompanying him to the interview and specifically that Devlin could feel free to ask for the opportunity to consult with Cregar during the interview if the line of inquiry could possibly reveal the identity of sources, sensitive methods or investigative techniques, information derived from third agencies, or information which could adversely affect sensitive ongoing investigations.

NOTE:

Original and one copy to the Attorney General (AG) for forwarding the copy of the memorandum to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. The information contained herein was orally furnished to SA W. O. Cregar by former SA Devlin following his interview of May 19, 1975.

~~1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall~~

June 4, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired Special Agent of FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: Bureau file 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/19/75

5. INTERVIEWERS: Senator Walter F. Mondale of the SSC; SSC Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.; SSC Assistant Minority Counsel Charles Kirbow; and SSC Staff Member Michael T. Epstein.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT: Witness was interviewed under oath, although he did not appear under subpoena, as a follow-up to an earlier interview of him by an SSC Staff Member. His testimony concerned his participation in the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395

SFP:ekw
(6)

Delivered 6/5/75

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC-102

62-116395-198

17 JUN 6 1975

84 JUN 6 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975

Intelligence Community Staff

Senstudy - '75

Mr. William O. Cregar
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4123
J. Edgar Hoover Building

Dear Bill:

Attached is a letter to the Chairman of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, signed by the DCI on 29 May 1975. It deals with the custody for and access to certain particularly sensitive material. This is an effective arrangement for the protection of special matters.

Sincerely,

John

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

62-116395

Enclosure:
As Stated

REC- 102

62-116395-197

17 JUN 6 1975

84 JUN 6 1975

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry
75-6430/1

OLC 75-1163

29 MAY 1975

Honorable John O. Pastore, Chairman
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my letter to you on 20 May 1975 I requested your assistance in making the Joint Committee's secure storage facilities available for the retention of certain sensitive material to which access is needed by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Those arrangements have been made with Mr. George Murphy and with the Select Committee. I want to thank you for making the facilities available and for permitting Mr. Murphy to be the custodian of the material.

A further need has now arisen for the same kind of arrangement for the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Again I would be very grateful to you and Mr. Murphy if a similar arrangement could be made for the members of the House Committee and members of the Committee staff designated for access to such material by mutual agreement of Chairman Nedzi and myself.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - ER
1 - Mr. Clarke
1 - Select Committee
1 - OLC Chrono
1 - JCAE File

62-116395-197
ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: May 23, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975

Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Intelligence Task Force Director of captioned Committee advised that they were in receipt of a letter from the U. S. Postal Service informing the Committee an inquiry concerning the identity of all mail covers placed by the FBI since 1960, should be directed to the FBI.

Elliff inquired as to whether a letter from the Committee concerning this particular request should be directed to the Bureau or Attorney General. He was instructed the request should be directed to the Attorney General. Elliff said that he would direct such a letter to the Attorney General making a request concerning mail covers in the near future.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Intelligence, Special Investigative and General Investigative Divisions should gather necessary material so that the appropriate response might be prepared.

PVD JBH/PVD

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Cleveland
1-Mr. Gebhardt
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly

PLM

REC- 102

62-116395-196

PVD:lgp
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY

17 JUN 6 1975

11-

84 JUN 6 1975

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. J.C. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 21, 1975

1 - Mr. P. T. Blake

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Two of the documents requested were the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) dated June, 1970, and the original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. With respect to the original report on COINTELPRO activities, pursuant to the conversation between Mr. John C. Keeney, Department of Justice, and Special Agent James C. Farrington, FBI Headquarters, on March 27, 1975, it was agreed the Department would await receipt of the Bureau's opinion prior to formulating its response to Senator Church's request for the 39-page Petersen report on COINTELPRO.

The 39-page COINTELPRO report, as well as all but one of Exhibits A through P attached thereto, contains matters relating to the internal deliberations of Department and FBI representatives who constituted the study Committee headed by former Assistant Attorney General Petersen. It is, therefore, suggested that if it is decided the report should be made available to Senator Church, it be done with the provision it not be made public.

EX 104 REC-59 62-116395-195

MAY 1 1975

Concerning the exhibits referred to in the text of the report: Exhibits A through L are summaries and memoranda prepared by the FBI or by Department attorneys based on their review of FBI material, and some of these are classified "Secret"; Exhibits M and N are legal memoranda prepared by Department attorneys in connection with the study Committee inquiry; Exhibit P is a work paper prepared by the FBI setting

ENCLOSURE

EWL:glw/jvl
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 11 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Delivered to Jack Fuller, Atty Gen's Office, 5:30 pm 4/22/75 JBH

GPO 954-546

forth overall recommendations relating to counterintelligence activity. All of these exhibits are in the nature of deliberative, internal work papers wherein opinions were freely expressed because they were not prepared with the idea in mind of publication, and it would appear they would be exempt from disclosure even if the report itself is furnished to Senator Church.

It is, therefore, recommended that, due to the above considerations, those exhibits prepared by the FBI not be furnished to Senator Church if you do decide to give him the report. It is felt the Department should determine if those exhibits prepared solely by the Department, such as Exhibits M and N, should be furnished to the Senator, but it is our recommendation that they not be for the same reasons as stated above.

Exhibit O is a press release dated December 7, 1973, which, of course, is already public source in nature.

You will recall that then Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman, in testimony before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary as to why this 39-page report should not be furnished to that Committee stated, "...if we had thought it was appropriate to release the full discussion we would have done so at the time. There are a lot of internal working documents in the Justice Department which go to the making of a final report. This is the Attorney General's report."

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which sets forth the status of their request for the two documents. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures - 2

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. J.C. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. T. Blake

April 21, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

One of the requests, under V., A., was the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) dated June, 1970. This is the so-called "Huston Report" and was prepared for the White House. Under the circumstances, this request has been referred to the White House.

Under V., B., a request was made for the original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Since that report is the property of the Department of Justice, the request has been referred to that Department.

1 - The Attorney General

EWL:glw/jvl jvl
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/CW

Jck

WFW/TJL

JBA
TJM

6/3/75
P.V. Daly advised LHM
not delivered to SSC as Dept is
preparing its own reply. SSC
was orally advised of contents
by Daly. TJM

[illegible] 6/11/75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ORIGINAL

Delivered to Jack Fuller, Atty Gen's off,
5:30 pm, 4/22/75 JBH

EWL

62-116395-195

GPO 954-546

PERS. REC. UNIT

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General

May 23, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. V. Daly

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by Staff Members of captioned Committee of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director of the FBI. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

WOC:ekw ekw
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC-180 62-116395-194

17 JUN 5 1975

2 ENCLOSURE

to Wilderotter
5/27/75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 5 1975

U.S.F. [illegible] - 400 JEH (Lost)

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

62-116395

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. P. V. Daly
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE
DIRECTOR JOHN P. MOHR BY SSC STAFF
MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-81 BY SP2 ALM/RW

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Mohr following his interview by representatives of the Staff of the SSC in Washington, D. C., on May 9, 1975.

Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Lester B. Seidel, and Thomas Dawson from approximately 10:20 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. He was not placed under oath and he was not advised of his rights or that he could be represented by personal counsel.

At the outset of the interview, it was apparent that its purpose was to assist the SSC Staff Members in trying to understand how the flow of mail proceeded in the FBI under Mr. Hoover's directorship. For example, Mr. Mohr was shown FBI documents relating to the Socialist Workers Party as well as COINTELPRO documents which were obtained by Mr. Carl Stern under the Freedom of Information Act. No substantive questions were directed to Mr. Mohr regarding these documents but were shown to him in order that Mr. Mohr might identify who the final authority was in approving such documents.

In addition to the above, the Staff Members asked Mr. Mohr to explain the difference between an SAC Letter and a letter to all SACs. They also asked Mr. Mohr if the Bureau maintained a separate file on all SAC Letters.

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

WOC:ekw ekw
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

194

PO 954-546

Mr. Mohr was also questioned about the procedures he followed in securing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's office after Mr. Hoover's death. Mr. Mohr told the Staff Members that the article which appeared in "The Washington Star" by columnist Jeremiah O'Leary was an accurate recording of what took place following Mr. Hoover's death. The Staff Members requested Mr. Mohr review in considerable detail exactly what he did to secure Mr. Hoover's office following his death.

The question of former Associate Director Clyde Tolson's will was also raised by Staff Members. Mr. Mohr advised the interviewers that Hillory Tolson, brother of Clyde Tolson, had not decided at that time whether he was going to contest the will.

Mr. Mohr was also asked about the whereabouts of Miss Helen Gandy, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Hoover. He advised that he did know her whereabouts and telephone number but promised he would not reveal them to anyone. Mr. Mohr was asked whether Miss Gandy would agree to being interviewed by Staff Members of the SSC. He advised that he would attempt to persuade Miss Gandy to agree to being interviewed on the condition he be allowed to be present during the entire interview. The Staff Members interposed no objection to that arrangement and Mr. Mohr indicated that he would advise Mr. Gitenstein of Miss Gandy's desires under the conditions stipulated above.

On May 12, 1975, Mr. Mohr telephonically advised that he recalled some additional topics covered during the interview of May 9, 1975, which he desired to furnish to the FBI. Specifically, Mr. Mohr recalled that he was asked if he knew who prepared the "surreptitious letters" the Bureau had mailed in the Socialist Workers Party case. Mr. Mohr advised the Staff Members that he did not know but presumed these letters were prepared in the Document Section of the FBI Laboratory.

Mr. Mohr also recalled that during his interview of May 9, 1975, he had advised Miss Gandy had turned over to Mr. Mark Felt of the FBI the official and confidential files of Mr. Hoover which amounted to one-half a file drawer. Subsequently, Mr. Mohr learned from Miss Gandy that the official and confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt amounted to one and one-half file drawers. This information was subsequently furnished to Mr. Gitenstein by Mr. Mohr. On that occasion, Mr. Gitenstein asked Mr. Mohr whether an itemized list of the official and confidential files was made and if so where the list was. Mohr told Gitenstein that he was sure a list was made and that in all probability the list accompanied the official and confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt by Miss Gandy.

In addition to the above, Mr. Mohr on May 12, 1975, recalled that Gitenstein asked about a requirement of all Bureau employees to turn over any confidential files in their possession ordered by Mr. Hoover following the revelation that former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had turned over certain confidential files to former Assistant Attorney General Mardian. Mr. Mohr advised Gitenstein that Mr. Hoover had in fact levied such a requirement on Bureau officials and that all confidential files were to be turned over to Mr. Felt along with a memorandum explaining the nature of these files. Gitenstein asked Mohr where these memoranda would be filed. Mohr responded by saying he presumed they were confidential memoranda and would have gone with the confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt by Bureau officials maintaining such files.

NOTE: The original and one copy of this LHM is being furnished to the Attorney General. The copy is to be forwarded by the Attorney General to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. The information herein was taken from two memoranda, Cregar to Wannall, dated 5/9 and 12/75 entitled "Senstudy 75."

~~1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
June 2, 1975 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1. SUBJECT: FBI mail flow procedures and other miscellaneous matters.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired Special Agent, FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/9/75

5. INTERVIEWERS: SSC Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Lester B. Seidel, and Thomas Dawson.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT: The witness was questioned and furnished information concerning procedures relating to the flow of mail at FBI Headquarters and other miscellaneous matters such as the difference between an SAC Letter and a letter to all SACs.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395
SFP:ekw ekw
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN
1-19-01 SP2ALM/RW

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

REC-100

62-116395-193

JUN 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-29-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, K. William O'Connor requested on 5-28-75, that he be given the opportunity to review summaries of the five recently uncovered COINTELPRO programs. O'Connor stated that in view of captioned Committee's request concerning COINTELPRO and his position of being in charge of Bureau and Departmental responses to Committee requests, he felt that it would be advantageous for him to be generally aware of the contents of the five newly uncovered programs. Mr. O'Connor stated he had previously reviewed the other COINTELPRO programs. [while in Civil Rights Division]

RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. O'Connor be allowed to review the five recently uncovered COINTELPRO programs.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE [illegible] BY [illegible]

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Ryan
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

REC-100

62-116395-192

PVD:eek
(8)

JUN 5 1975

FIVE

84 JUN 5 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TJL

DATE: 5/22/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Sev142

Reference is made to my memorandum dated 5/19/75 advising of the receipt of a letter from the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to the Attorney General dated 5/14/75, appending requests for additional documents and other information.

Specific attention is invited to Appendix A, item number 5, which requests:

"All Memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use the following techniques to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities (see letter from the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General dated April 23, 1975):

a. All forms of electronic surveillance, including consensual electronic surveillance;

b. All forms of mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail;

c. Surreptitious entry;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

d. All forms of physical surveillance, including agent infiltration, observation, photography, and remote viewing and sensing devices;

e. Informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems;

f. Obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information;

g. Incommunicado interrogation;

REC-100 62-116395-191

62-116395

17 JUN 5 1975

EWL:cmc cmc
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 5 1975

FIVE

h. Maintenance of files and records;

i. Dissemination of information from files and records;

j. So-called "COINTELPRO" techniques and methods, including all forms of organizational 'disruption.'"

Appendix B, item number 4, requests:

"For each of the techniques described in Item 5 of Appendix A above, all memoranda and other materials relating to:

a. The original decision to utilize the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

b. The policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities."

It would appear appropriate that response to Appendix A, item number 5, be prepared by the Legal Counsel Division. It is also apparent that response to Appendix B, item number 4, should be closely coordinated although responsibility for research in this area would appear to fall more logically within the Intelligence Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Legal Counsel Division assume responsibility for preparing response contained in Appendix A, Item number 5.

CONTINUED - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS - CONTINUED

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY - 75
62-116395

RECOMMENDATIONS - CONTINUED:

2. Intelligence Division will assume responsibility for preparing response to item number 4, Appendix B, with input from the Legal Counsel Division.

EWL

WRW

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 3, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) and its enclosures described below.

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Some of the enclosures to the LHM classified "Top Secret."

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have 6.0

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: The LHM refers to a prior LHM furnished to the SSC enclosing a copy of "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75 and noted that certain exhibits were extracted prior to dissemination due to Third Agency Rule considerations. LHM advised that those considerations had been resolved and that the exhibits were being furnished with the LHM.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75. Response pertains to Part I of the SSC original letter of request dated 3/19/75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SRALM/RU

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/20/75

REC-10 62-116395-190

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: Third Agency Rule clearances obtained.

17 JUN 5 1975

62-116395
SFP:ekw (4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
gal Coun. ___
lephone Rm. ___
ector Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
(A[illegible]n: J. W. Hines)
2 - Le[illegible]al Counsel Division
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General

May 29, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices A thru D requesting certain documents and other information.

Under item 26 of Appendix C, a request is made for "All reports prepared by the Office of Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice pursuant to the request in September 1974 of the Attorney General and/or Deputy Attorney General pertaining to the so-called 'Wounded Knee' case and any other so-called 'political trial' or other prosecutions brought by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division."

Under item 27 of Appendix C request is made of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for "All memoranda or other materials prepared by the FBI relating to the reports described in Item 26."

The Department is requested to advise this Bureau if reports which are requested in Appendix C under item 26 with respect to the "'Wounded Knee' case" were furnished to the FBI. If such reports were furnished please advise under what captions and dates these reports were submitted and identify by captions and dates all FBI communications on which your reports were based. If these reports were not furnished this Bureau please provide copies to us when you identify the FBI communications as requested herein.

REC-100 62-116395-188

You are also requested to provide to this Bureau copies of those reports, including sufficient information identifying FBI communications on which they were based, which will be furnished the Senate Select Committee per its request for "any other so-called 'political trial' or other prosecutions brought by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division."

1/10

17 JUN 5 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

62-116395

KAM:cmc
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

KAM

1975 JUN 5
MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

-4063

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

Inasmuch as this Bureau's response to item 27 of Appendix C enclosed with referenced letter depends on your response to item 26, you are requested to furnish the desired information as soon as possible in order that we may comply with the Senate Select Committee request. Since all reports requested under item 26 were prepared by the Department this Bureau will take no action to provide copies of these reports to the Committee.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: K. William O'Connor
               Special Counsel for
                 Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

Until such time as we determine what information will be furnished the Senate Select Committee by the Department under item 26 mentioned above we believe our response on item 27 to the Senate Select Committee should be delayed. This will enable us to provide material requested by the Senate Select Committee which will correspond to information being provided by the Department.

Trial material relating to Wounded-Knee case was handled by the General Investigative Division and this part of the request is being coordinated with SA J. C. Gordon who supervised the Wounded-Knee case. Upon receipt of requested information from the Department, General Investigative Division will be notified so an appropriate response may be compiled regarding Wounded-Knee matter. Intelligence Division will conduct necessary reviews for information pertaining to other prosecutions by "Special Litigation Section" of the Department.

DCI/IC 75-2008

29 MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Certification of Clearances for Classified Information and Compartmented Information of Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee

Senstudy -'75

1. Arrangements have been made so that the Compartmented Information Branch (CIB) of CIA will maintain, as a matter of common concern, an up-to-date listing of all staff members of the Senate Select Committee who have been certified by the Committee for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET and also those who have been certified and briefed for compartmented information.

2. CIB will attempt to keep this listing in a current status and telephone inquiries can be made by calling 351-5507 (IDS 143-5507) during the hours 0800 to 1730 Monday through Friday. Periodically, a current listing of the individuals certified will be disseminated to members of the USIB Ad Hoc Group.

3. It is contemplated this same procedure will be followed for the House Select Committee when certification of clearances are received from this Committee and you will be advised when such procedure is instituted.

62-116395

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

NOT RECORDED
12 JUL 25 1975

Records Pls. file
62-116395

5-8

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. Adams DATE: 5/21/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

At approximately 9:00 a.m. on May 21, 1975, retired Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella appeared in my office prior to his appointment to receive a subpoena and to testify at 9:30 a.m. on 5/21/75 at Washington, D.C., before the Senate Select Committee. I told Mr. Sentinella that it would not be possible for me to furnish him personal counsel prior to or during his testimony, however I felt it was appropriate for me to furnish him certain information. I told Mr. Sentinella that he was entitled to be represented by a personal counsel of his own choice at any time and that if he chose to secure the services of a private attorney he was at liberty to do so.

I also told Mr. Sentinella that under the rules of the Senate Select Committee (Rule 6.4), a witness may be accompanied by counsel during testimony and a witness who is unable to obtain counsel may inform the Committee of that fact and the Committee is obliged to endeavor to obtain voluntary counsel for the witness. I told him that the rules further provide that the failure to obtain counsel would not excuse him from appearing and testifying.

I asked Mr. Sentinella whether he had been given any advice by the Committee concerning his right to counsel and whether he had received a copy of the Committee's rules as required by regulations in the rules (Rule 6.1). Mr. Sentinella said that he had not been so advised and he had not been given a copy of the rules by any representative of the Committee.

I told Mr. Sentinella that as to matters other than the presence of personal counsel, no understanding had been reached with the Committee.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

REC-102

62-116395-181

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

10 MAY 27 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 5 1975

I further explained to him that the Attorney General Order relating to responses to subpoenas would apply to him and that we had been advised that the Department had approved a waiver of the Attorney General Order limitation permitting his testimony, but only as to matters concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, including related matters. I told Mr. Sentinella that should the questioning involve other areas and he was in doubt as to his authorization to respond, he could request an opportunity to consult with the Department to secure approval for his testimony consistent with the terms of the Attorney General Order. I also reminded Mr. Sentinella that a representative of the FBI would be available during his testimony for such consultation as he felt might be necessary. I told him that SA Paul Daly would be available for that purpose.

I told Mr. Sentinella that our concern is not that matters of historical fact might be revealed, but that testimony which might be required of him could impair the Bureau's current efforts to discharge its responsibilities. I explained that in specific terms what this meant was that information that would identify sensitive sources, techniques or methods, or that would identify confidential informants, or would expose current investigative operations should be reserved for members of the Committee or perhaps the Chairman of the Committee depending upon the sensitivity of the particular information. I advised him that in the event such matters are involved in the questioning he could request consultation and that arrangements could be made for the answers to be supplied under appropriately limited conditions. I told Mr. Sentinella that as to other areas of possible testimony, the Bureau would impose no request that he decline to answer questions.

Mr. Sentinella advised me that he understood the matters I had explained to him and that he did not at this time feel the need of personal counsel because he said that he did not regard the appearance as one in the nature of a grand jury appearance. I told Mr. Sentinella that he should be aware that his testimony would be given under oath and in the event he made a statement that was self-incriminatory, it could be used against him. I reminded him I was not advising him in order to deter him from furnishing testimony, but only telling him of the protections he has under the

CONTINUED - OVER

Constitution against self-incrimination. He said he would keep that matter in mind.

Mr. Sentinella said that he would like to volunteer the results of his interview at the conclusion of the interview and he also would like to have an opportunity to review a transcript of the testimony for accuracy.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 16 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 019 SF PLAIN

7:09PM NITEL MAY 16, 1975 KEK

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395) (ATTN: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL)

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SENSTUDY, 1975

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL OFFICES MAY 2, 1975.

ON MAY 16, 1975, FORMER SAN FRANCISCO SUPERVISOR DAVID E. TODD CALLED AND ADVISED HE HAD RECEIVED CALL FROM LESTER SEIDEL, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, WANTING TO INTERVIEW TODD RE DOMESTIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, SPECIFICALLY, BLACK PANTHER PARTY. TODD SAID HE WANTED TO BE COOPERATIVE BUT WAS APPREHENSIVE REGARDING DIVULGING INFORMATION AS A RESULT OF HIS FBI EMPLOYMENT. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO IMMEDIATELY CALL COLLECT THE OFFICE OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL AT FBIHQ. HE SAID HE WOULD DO THIS.

TODD ALSO ADVISED THAT SEIDEL HAD TOLD HIM THE COMMITTEE ALSO WANTED TO INTERVIEW FORMER SAN FRANCISCO SUPERVISOR ALBERT P. CLARK.

END

EX 104

REC 67

62-116395-186

17 MAY 28 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/RU

LEC

CC ~~Sen~~ 102

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 29 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR005 AX CODE

3:20 AM URGENT MAY 29, 1975 DKL

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-217) (RUC) 1 PAGE

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA, MAY 28, 1975. Sew 178

ON MAY 29, 1975, FORMER EMPLOYEES COURTLAND J. JONES AND BERNARD A. WELLS WERE CONTACTED BY ASAC MICHAEL A. MORROW, IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, AND FURNISHED INFORMATION SET OUT IN REFERENCED TELETYPE.

END

HOLD

RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RL

REC-100

62-116395-185

Records
cc 67-155313 (Jones)
67-436022 (Wells)

PERS. REC. UNIT

5-P

84 JUN 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 BA CODED

7:49 PM NITEL 5/30/75 JAN

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: BALTIMORE (66-3127)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL MAY 28, 1975. Ser 178

THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS WERE CONTACTED ON THE INDICATED DATES BY THE ASAC AND INSTRUCTIONS INRETEL FOLLOWED.

NONE OF THEM HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF TO DATE, AND EACH STATED THEY WOULD CONTACT THE FBI SHOULD THEY BE CONTACTED IN THE FUTURE.

MAY 29, 1975 - ROBERT H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND.

MAY 30, 1975 - ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDNOR ROAD, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND.

MAY 30, 1975 - STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAL LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND.

END

REC-100

62-116395-184

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Records:
CC-67-140656 (Belter)
67-438869 (Haynes)
67-177725 (Donahoe)

5-(1)

84 JUN 5 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975
DW
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	✓
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

NR 096 CG CODE

727PM NITEL 5/30/75 EMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM CHICAGO

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL MAY 28, 1975. Lew 178

PURSUANT TO BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, MISS OLGA CIESA WAS CONTACTED BY SAC, CHICAGO, ON MAY 30, 1975 REGARDING CAPTIONED MATTER. SHE STATED SHE STILL RESIDES 10409 SOUTH INDIANA AVENUE, CHICAGO, AND IS STILL EMPLOYED AS AN EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AT THE FIRM OF ERNST AND ERNST, ATTORNEYS, IN CHICAGO.

MISS CIESA WAS ADVISED THAT THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAD MADE INQUIRY AS TO HER LAST KNOWN ADDRESS, INDICATING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MAY DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HER. SHE WAS FURTHER ADVISED THAT IN THE EVENT SHE IS INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME ANY QUESTIONS WERE ASKED RELATIVE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS; ETC., SHE COULD REQUEST THE ASSISTANCE OF AN AGENT TO BE PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW.

5-28

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

(019 a Ciesa)

REC-100

62-116395-183

JUN 4 1975

cc 671

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 5 1975

SHE WAS FURTHER ADVISED THAT IF AFTER THE INTERVIEW THERE WERE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PRESENTED A QUESTION IN HER MIND SHE COULD CONTACT THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION IN WASHINGTON, D.C., COLLECT, FOR ANY ASSISTANCE THAT DIVISION COULD AFFORD HER.

MISS CIFSA WAS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WOULD DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HER AND ADVISED THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY SHE WOULD ASK FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF AN AGENT PRIOR TO ANSWERING ANY QUESTIONS THEY MAY PROPOSE TO HER. SHE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT SHE MIGHT INADVERTENTLY DISCLOSE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND AS A RESULT WOULD FEEL MUCH MORE SECURE WERE AN AGENT PRESENT TO ADVISE HER.

IN THE EVENT CONTACT IS MADE THE BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED.

END

HOLD

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

NR033 OM CODE

5:33PM NITEL 5/30/75 SKH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: OMAHA (62-3439) (P)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL, MAY 28, 1975. Ser 178

SA ROBERT L. TAGG, WHO IS CURRENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY AND CURRENTLY ASSIGNED AS SENIOR RESIDENT AGENT, LINCOLN, NEBRASKA, RESIDENT AGENCY, ADVISED OF CONTENTS IN RE TELETYPE. SHOULD SA TAGG BE CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, THE BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED IEDIA.

END.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

REC-100

62-116395-182

17 JUN 4 1975

Recs (Tagg)

cc 67-

PERS. REC. UNIT

5-

84 JUN 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Cregar

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 30 1975
TELETYPE

NR07 PX CODE

317PM MAY 30, 1975 URGENT WRC

TO: DIRECTOR

MINNEAPOLIS (PERSONAL ATTENTION)

FROM: PHOENIX (62-2033) 3P

SENSTUDY 75

Ser 198

REBUNITEL DATED MAY 28, 1975 AND PHOENIX TELCALL TO MINNEAPOLIS MAY 30, 1975.

FOR INFORMATION OF MINNEAPOLIS FOLLOWING IS BEING SET FORTH:

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

REC-100 62-116395-181

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE

17 JUN 4 1975

END PAGE ONE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Records

(mildred) RISK

5-0 8

cc 67

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 5 1975

SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKNOWN. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

END PAGE TWO

PHOENIX: MILDRED E. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE,
YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA

INVESTIGATION AT YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA HAS DISCLOSED THAT MILDRED E. RISK IS NOW RESIDING WITH HER SISTER, MRS. W.A. HILLS, TEN MILE LAKE, HACKENSACK, MINNESOTA, RR 2, TELEPHONE NUMBER 218-547-3048, AND WILL BE THERE UNTIL FALL OF THIS YEAR WHEN SHE WILL RETURN TO ARIZONA.

MINNEAPOLIS HANDLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS.

END

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 29 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR002 AT CODE

9:53 PM NITEL MAY 29,1975 WCG

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA AND OTHER OFFICES, MAY 28, 1975.

SA ALDEN F. MILLER, ATLANTA DIVISION, ALERTED TO POSSIBILITY OF CONTACT BY SSC. SA MILLER HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED TO DATE. IN THE EVENT CONTACT, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION WILL BE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THROUGH THE SAC.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Records
cc 67-415968 (Alden Miller)

REC-100

62-116395-180

PERS. REC. UNIT

17 JUN 4 1975

84 JUN 5 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

REC-100

NR009 AT CODE

8:58 PM NITEL MAY 30,1975 WCG

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTENTION: INTD - W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

DURING A MEETING WITH REGINALD MURPHY, EDITOR, THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, MAY 29,1975, MURPHY IN GENERAL CONVERSATION ADVISED SAC, ATLANTA, THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, D. C., SEEKING AN INTERVIEW WITH HIM. MURPHY SAID HE HAD AGREED TO A MEETING WITH A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, NAME NOT STATED, AND DID SO SOMETIME APPARENTLY WITHIN THE LAST WEEK. MURPHY INDICATED THE INTERVIEW CONCERNED MARTIN LUTHER KING. MURPHY VOLUNTEERED HE WAS UNABLE TO ANSWER MANY OF THE QUESTIONS ASKED SINCE HE WAS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE EVENTS AND THAT SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS HE WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT ARE NOW DECEASED. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO FORMER EDITOR, RALPH MC GILL, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, NOW DECEASED, AND INDICATED THAT THE INQUIRY CONCERNED INFORMATION IT WAS FELT COULD BE PROVIDED BY MC GILL. MURPHY WAS NEVER SPECIFIC IN HIS CONVERSATION AND NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS

END PAGE ONE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-106670-

Records
cc 100-106670 (King)

REC-100

62-116395-179

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JAM/cu
6072

17 JUN 4 1975

84 JUN 4 1975

PAGE TWO (AT 62-2854)

SINCE IT WAS OBVIOUS HE DID NOT WISH TO EXPAND ON THE COMMENTS MADE BY HIM.

MURPHY INDICATED ALSO THAT THE PERSON OR PERSONS INTERVIEWING HIM FELT HE, MURPHY, SHOULD HAVE SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND HE IS NOT SURE HE WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THEM THAT HE DID NOT. FROM THE COMMENTS MADE BY MURPHY, IT WAS THE IMPRESSION OF THE SAC THAT MURPHY WAS PRESSED FOR DETAILS WHICH HE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE.

END

FBIHQ FLC CLR TKS

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

5/28/75

TO SACS ALEXANDRIA
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
KANSAS CITY
LITTLE ROCK
NEWARK
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PORTLAND
PHOENIX
TAMPA
WFO

1 - Mr. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

REBuTEL MAY 2, 1975. See 93

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

REC-100

62-116395-178

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE

1 - ROME (BY MAIL)

17 JUN 4 1975

SFP:ekw EKW
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 29 1975
215 PM SLP
TELETYPE

84 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKNOWN. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALEXANDRIA: COURTLAND J. JONES, 6607 N. 29TH STREET, ARLINGTON, VA.; ROBERT G. KUNKEL, SAC; BERNARD A. WELLS, 5311 MONTGOMERY STREET, SPRINGFIELD, VA.

ATLANTA: ALDEN F. MILLER

BALTIMORE: ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDNOR ROAD, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND; STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAL LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND; ROBERT H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND

CHARLOTTE: JOSEPH A. SIZOO, 84A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PINES, NORTH CAROLINA

CHICAGO: OLGA CIESA, 10409 S. INDIANA AVENUE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

KANSAS CITY: BILL D. WILLIAMS, SAC

LITTLE ROCK: JOHN J. CREAMER, JR., ASAC

NEWARK: JOHN J. CONNOLLY; RITA AGNES AMBROSIO, 1604 JOHN STREET, FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY; RALPH W. BACHMAN, 610 NORWOOD DRIVE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY; KARL L. BROUSE,

5 BURRINGTON GORGE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY.

OMAHA: ROBERT L. TAGG

PHILADELPHIA: JOHN B. MEADE

PORTLAND: LEO B. APP, JR.; EDGAR O. INGALLS

PHOENIX: MILDRED E. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE, YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA

TAMPA: MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6509 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BEACH, FLORIDA

WFO: JAMES J. GAFFNEY; ELMER L. TODD

ROME: THOMAS J. BIAMONTE; JOSEPH C. MICHELA; HELEN C. SPEAR
COPY TO ROME, WITH ITS EMPLOYEES NAMED, BY MAIL.

NOTE: May 14, 1975, SSC letter and appendices requested current whereabouts individuals named herein. Also included herein names of Bachman and Brouse who were SAC and ASAC respectively in Newark Office pertinent period inasmuch as one request from SSC was for memoranda from former SA Leo T. Clark to Newark SAC and ASAC. SSC request named several additional former employees who were previously alerted by tel to selected officers 5/2/75. Another 5/2/75 tel, to all offices, referenced herein, gave field general background re Senstudy 75. By separate airtel to Rome we are forwarding copy of instant tel as well as copies of prior pertinent tels. The caution taken herein in alerting former employees as well as incumbents is same we took previously by 5/2/75 tel to selected SACs. After dispatch instant tel, copies will be filed in personnel files of all named herein. One of the 1964 Rome employees was Theodore A. Korontjis, currently assigned INTD, who will be appropriately informed orally concerning this matter.

Korontjis informed
5/29/75 B

2 - [illegible] J. A. Mintz
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General May 20, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/ra

Reference is made to memorandum and appendices thereto, from the Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, requesting documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number three of referenced communication requests that a Senate Select Committee Staff Representative be authorized to examine certain portions of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, (MRR), at the FBI Offices. The material requested, MRR Part I, Section nine; Part II, Sections one thru nine, has been segregated and is available for examination at FBI Headquarters.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum advising the Senate Select Committee that the above requested material is presently available for examination at FBI Headquarters.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

TEB:cmc
(8)

Delivered to O'Connell Dep't 5/20 returned 5/21
Delivered to Berg of Committee By RTT 5/22/75

REC-100

62-116395-177

17 JUN 4 1975

2 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Inspection ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

[redacted]

2 - [redacted]. J. A. Mintz
([redacted] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

62-116395 May 20, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Reference is made to memorandum, with attached appendices, dated April 30, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Pursuant to your request to review the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations Part I, Section nine; and Part II, Sections one thru nine, we currently have such material available for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

TEB:cmc
(8)

NOTE:

The MRR sections described above have been reviewed by the appropriate FBIHQ Divisions and approved for examination in their entirety by Committee Staff Members with the following exceptions: MRR, Section 3, page 15 (j).(1) The phrase "Baltimore Source 4" has been deleted; Section 4, page 6, 20. The phrase "i.e., selective service records in other than selective service cases, Baltimore Confidential Source 4 information, etc." has been deleted. Excisions will be explained to Committee reviewers at the time of review by indicating the excisions related to sensitive confidential sources and have been made in order to protect sources' identity. These sources will not be further identified to Committee members nor will the term "Baltimore Source 4" be utilized.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-177

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

NOTE CONTINUED:

The MRR sections to be made available are described by number and heading as follows:

Part I

Section 9 - Disciplinary Matters

Part II

Section 1 - Authority--Training--Submission of Information

Section 2 - Supervision--Availability-Resident Agencies

Section 3 - Administration of Offices

Section 4 - Communications

Section 5 - Dissemination of Information

Section 6 - Publications, Press, and Public Contacts

Section 7 - Payments--Property

Section 8 - Miscellaneous Regulations

Section 9 - Classification--Character--Copies--Abbreviations.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/20/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Manual of Rules and Regulations

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor, Jr. Date: 5/22/75 @ 1^{20} PM

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-177

ENCLOSURE

May 30, 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions Not Previously Furnished.

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: LHM refers to a request of the SSC for review privileges of certain designated Sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions. The LHM advises that all but one of the requested Sections is being made available for review at FBI Headquarters and that the excluded Section will be made available for review after clearance by other interested agencies as it involves third agency considerations.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. Reply refers to Part 2 of the request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/19/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

Third agency considerations involved in one of the Manual Sections requested by the SSC.

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)
62-116395

REC-100

62-116395 - 176

Delivered 6/17/75

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/lew

17 JUN 4 1975

WB

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2-Mr.S.F.Phillips

May 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: LHM refers to a request of the SSC for review privileges of certain designated Sections of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations. The LHM advises that the desired Sections are being made available for review at FBI Headquarters.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. Reply pertains to Part 3 of the SSC request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/20/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395.

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/PW

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)

62-116395

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Delivered 6/5/75 FS

62-116395-175

REC-100

17 JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 4 1975

GPO 931-546

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

The Attorney General

May 19, 1975

1 - Mr. D. R. Dickson

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from the Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a partial response to the request set forth in referenced memorandum. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

A copy of the memorandum for the Committee is being provided for your records.

[illegible] 5/21 [illegible] 5/21 [illegible] 5/22 [illegible]

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

DRD:lfj
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY [illegible]

REC-100

62-116395-174

ENCL BEHIND FILE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Legal Counsel Division
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. D. R. Dickson

62-116395 May 19, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Part 2 of the request concerned Sections of the Manual of Instructions Not Previously Produced. Pursuant to your request, Sections 4, 8R, 19, 23, 27, 28, 29, 75, 78, 90, 103, 134, 136, 144, and 146 are now available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstien, or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

Section 102, which you requested, is not available for review at this time because this Section involves third agency considerations. When this Section has been cleared by the other interested agencies for review, you will be immediately advised.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL [illegible]
HERE[illegible]
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/jw

DRD:cmc
(9)

NOTE:

Section 4 coordinated with SA James E. Reilly, Division 2; Section 8R, with SA Charles D. Neudorfer, Division 12; Sections 19 and 90 with SA J. D. Domzalski, Division 9; Sections 27, 28, 29, 78, 134, and 144 with SA J. William Hines, Division 6; Sections 23, 75, 136, and 146 with SA D. R. Dickson, Division 5; Sections 102 and 103 with SA. R. L. Moore, Division 5. Section 102 being coordinated by SA L. F. Schwartz with other interested Government agencies.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-754

DRD

Sections of the Manual of
Instructions Not Previously Furnished

NOTE CONTINUED:

Listed below are the above-mentioned Sections and their subjects.

Section	Subject
4	Surveillances and Raids
8R	Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division
19	Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Agencies
23	Bomb Threats Explosives and Incendiary Devices
27	Civil Rights
28	Civil Rights Act of 1964
29	Conspiracy
75	Neutrality Matters
78	Passports and Visas
90	Selective Service Act
102	Coordination with Other Government Agencies
103	Foreign Police Cooperation
134	Assaulting the President of the United States and Threats to the President of the United States
136	Antiriot Laws
144	Police Killings
146	Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RR

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/19/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committe to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Sections of the MOI not previously Furnished

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 5/22/75 @ 1:20 PM

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-174

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins - Enc
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams - Enc
1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott - Enc
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore - Enc
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

May 13, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis - Enc
1 - Mr. P. V. Daly - Enc
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall - Enc
(Attn: W. O. Cregar)

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to the letter from the captioned Committee dated April 28, 1975, addressed to the Honorable Edward H. Levi, Attorney General, requesting information concerning the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum in response to the aforementioned request. A copy is enclosed for your records.

For your information, we did furnish empty boxes for the use of former Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, John P. Mohr, at the residence of the late Director, J. Edgar Hoover, subsequent to the death of Mr. Tolson. This material was brought to the residence by a clerical employee who merely deposited the material and left the residence. While we have no direct knowledge as to what material was removed from the residence, Mr. Mohr was contacted to determine the source and accuracy of the story contained in "Periscope" section of the April 28, 1975, issue of *Newsweek*, at which time he advised us that "furnishings" at the home had been removed by members of the family and the housekeeper. We have not contacted former employees concerning this request. Our contact with Mr. Mohr was prior to the date of this request.

Enclosures (2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/PW

PVD:eek
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-116395-73

REC-100

17 JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

10/5

Letter from Director, FBI to Attorney General
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE: By memorandum dated May 2, 1975, from Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams, each Assistant Director was requested to advise whether they or personnel in their divisions had any knowledge relating to the allegation that the FBI directed or participated in the removal of documents from the late Director's residence. The Alexandria and Washington field offices were separately requested to respond to this allegation. The responses were negative. External Affairs, by memo from D. W. Moore to Mr. Jenkins dated May 5, 1975, captioned Clyde A. Tolson, former Associate Director; advised that a clerk brought packaging material to the residence at the request of former Assistant to the Director, John P..Mohr. This memo indicated that the clerk deposited the material and left. He did not participate in the packing, etc., of documents.

May 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REQUEST PERTAINING TO DOCUMENTS REMOVED FROM RESIDENCE OF FORMER DIRECTOR J. EDGAR HOOVER

Reference is made to letter dated April 28, 1975, to the Attorney General from Chairman of captioned Committee which contained a request for certain information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has not removed, nor caused to be removed, documents from the residence of former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover, subsequent to the death of Mr. Clyde A. Tolson, former Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It is our understanding, however, that former Assistant to the Director, John P. Mohr, may have some knowledge as to what material may have been removed from the residence after Mr. Tolson's death.

1-Mr. T. J. Jenkins (Detached)
1-Mr. J. B. Adams (Detached)
1-Mr. J. J. McDermott (Detached)
1-Mr. D. W. Moore (Detached)
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall (Detached)
(W. O. Cregar)
1- Mr. J. A. Mintz (Detached)
1-Mr. J. B. Hotis (Detached)
1-Mr. P. V. Daly (Detached)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/lw

PVD:lgp
(11)

62-116395-173

ENCLOSURE

3-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☐ LHM ☒ Memo ☐ Report dated 5-9-75

Caption of Document: Request Pertaining to Documents Removed from Residence of Former Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 5/21/75 @ 3^{10}p

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-173

ENCLOSURE

June 3, 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) enclosing a copy of a memorandum dated November 1, 1974, from the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, Glen E. Pommerening to the Director of the FBI, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program, Executive Order 10450."

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

The LHM refers to a request of the SSC for certain documents. The LHM serves as a cover communication for the aforementioned 11/1/74 memorandum which contains certain supplemental instructions the Department of Justice furnished the FBI with regard to Executive Order 11785 amending Executive Order 10450. The instructions concerned the FBI's conduct of intelligence-type investigations.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75 The response pertains to Part I of the SSC letter of request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/16/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

62-116395
SFP:ekw (4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

REC-100

62-116395-172

17 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 2, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

In response to a request from the SSC for certain documents and other information from the FBI concerning its policies and procedures, the LHM advised that the FBI was deferring action on one document to the U. S. Department of Justice inasmuch as that document originated with that Department. The document involved was a memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated 5/20/54.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75. Pertains to Part IV of request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

REC-100 62-116395-671

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/18/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

12 JUN 4 1975

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

Delivered 6/4/75

62-116395
SFP:ekw (4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RU

GPO 954-546

84 JUN 4 1975

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. J. C. Farrington

The Attorney General

May 6, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ~~ACTIVITIES~~

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which responds to a specific request by the Committee for a position paper dated July 31, 1972, concerning the "Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

You will note that the position taken by the FBI is that the requested position paper of July 31, 1972, is an internal deliberative document which is the direct basis for a formal statement on FBI authority to conduct internal security investigations embodied in a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973. On this basis we are stating in our response to the Committee that we feel it inappropriate that the July 31, 1972, paper be made available. We believe that this position is completely sound and a proper precedent to set with respect to the ambit of the Committee's mandate. We also feel that it is consistent with the position which has been expressed by you.

Note this never appr. for del. to SSC & has been superceded by another LHM to SSC.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

EWL:jvl
(7)

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-5-01 BY

5/8/75

PLM

EWL

WOC

REC-100 62-116395-170

JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. J. C. Farrington
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

May 6, 1975

62-116395

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Under I., Legal Authorities, a general request was made for memoranda discussing the legal authority of the FBI to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence activities. Material responsive to this request was delivered to the Committee during April, 1975. Included in this material was a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973, captioned "Scope of FBI Jurisdiction and Authority in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." This memorandum contained a lengthy and comprehensive discussion concerning the authority of the FBI to conduct investigations in the general internal security area.

Not deliv. to SSC

Since the receipt of the above-mentioned material the Committee has indicated a specific interest in a position paper dated July 31, 1972, discussing the "Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." This paper has been located and subjected to intensive review. It has been found that the July 31, 1972, position paper contains the internal deliberations which form the direct basis for the memorandum to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973. In view of these circumstances and particularly because the July 31, 1972, paper is considered to be an internal deliberative document, it is not considered appropriate that it should be made available to the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

PLM WRW EWL WOC

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

EWL:jvl
(7)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

-116395-170

GPO 954-546

June 2, 1975 2 - Mr.S.F.Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Filing System

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) with enclosures described below

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: SSC requested information concerning the FBI's filing system and copies of printed forms used by the FBI. The LHM served as a cover communication to furnish to the SSC an undated nine-page memorandum entitled "FBI Indexing Procedures." The SSC was also advised that there was available nine volumes of material containing detailed instructions followed by FBI employees in classifying mail for indexing; and that the nine volumes would be available for review at FBI Headquarters by the SSC Staff. Also furnished the SSC was one copy each of 13 Tables of Contents concerning forms used by the FBI. The various types of forms in use were explained in the LHM and the SSC was invited to choose those forms it desired to see, after which steps would be taken to make them available to the SSC Staff.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. The response is to Part IV of the SSC request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/22/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

SFP:ekw (4)

62-116395

REC-100

62-116395-169

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

17 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 4 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz
(1 [illegible]r. J. B. Hotis [illegible])
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

May 16, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITY

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of the captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration to Clarence M. Kelley, Director FBI, dated November 1, 1974, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program Executive Order 10450."

The instructions contained in the enclosure were the subject of conversation between W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director, and Mr. John Elliff of the Committee, May 5, 1975, at Quantico, Virginia, and are being furnished to the Committee in order to provide further information with respect to your March 19, 1975, request.

62-116395

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

TEB:cmc
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-168

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis [illegible])
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General May 16, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated March 19, 1975, the Senate Select Committee requested certain information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Part I of the Committee's letter pertained to legal authority for investigations.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and a copy of a letter from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration to the Director November 1, 1974, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program Executive Order 10450."

The instructions contained in the enclosed November 1, 1974, communication concern legal authority for investigations and were the subject of discussion between Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee during a conference at Quantico, Virginia, May 5, 1975. The instructions are being furnished to the Committee in an effort to provide more information with respect to the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, referred to above.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosure is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395

3 - Encl.

O'Connor and Returned
Approved 5/20 to [illegible]
5/23/75

TEB:cmc
(8)

REC-104

PLM
62-116395-168

NOTE:

The enclosed Departmental letter contains certain supplemental instructions furnished FBIHQ with regard to Executive Order 11785 amending Executive Order 10450. We

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

17 JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 4 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

are proposing the document be furnished to the Committee as a supplement to material previously furnished the Committee in line with their 3/19/75 request. John Elliff of the Committee evidenced interest in receiving such instructions during a recent conversation with Assistant Director Wannall. We are providing the instructions as a further delineation of our authority in this area.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: NOV 1[illegible] 1974

FROM: Glen E. Pommerening
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

SUBJECT: Federal Employee Security Program
Executive Order 10450

XIII

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP6ALM/RW

This is in response to your memoranda, entitled as above, dated May 8, 1974 and August 19, 1974, directed to the Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division, and referring to problems which have arisen as a result of the promulgation of Executive Order 11785 which amends Executive Order 10450. In view of the involvement of my staff in these matters, I will undertake to answer your questions with the concurrence of the Criminal Division.

As you know this matter has been under continuing review both in the Task Force, chaired by a representative of this office, of working level representatives of various agencies in the security field and is now under study to a lesser degree in Project #10 of the "Domestic Council on Privacy".

You ask that the Department; (a) provide specific instructions to the Bureau to conduct intelligence-type investigations to identify and determine the activities of organizations now described in the amended Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450; (b) furnish guidelines to be used by the Bureau in initiating investigations of individuals under the captioned matter pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and specifically, criteria to be utilized in determining whether available information is a sufficient basis for investigation.

Under the amendment to Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450, we now have only two types of organizations; (1) those which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the constitution or laws of the United States or

any State, (2) or which seek to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof, by unlawful means: (Emphasis added).

Of course, the key words which are underlined indicate that the investigation should be initially based on a possible violation of a federal (such as the Smith Act) or state statute prohibiting unlawful advocacy or the commission of any unlawful act of force or violence. However, in order for the Bureau to detect organizations with a potential of the above nature, it is important that the investigation proceed on the basis of information indicating that the organization may be of the nature mentioned. It is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated, but only that a reasonable evaluation of the available information suggests that the activities of the organization may fall within the proscription of the Order. The most recent example of the type of organization, that you have advised is becoming more prevalent, is the small but dedicated to violence, Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). Organizations of this nature would clearly fall within the Order and should be investigated as soon as information is available indicating their potentiality for violence and of course, if possible, prior to the fulfillment of their purposes.

It is true that Executive Order 11785 eliminated the prior communist, totalitarian, fascist, and subversive characterizations and definitions, but there was no intention of restricting the investigations of such organizations if their programs call for acts of force or violence or the unlawful advocacy of the commission of acts of force or violence in furtherance of these programs.

It is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order but once the investigation reaches a stage that offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the investigation suggests a determination that the organization is engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it should continue.

It follows in answer to your second question that individuals who are active either as members of or as affiliates of

zations described above should be investigated when mation is received indicating their involvement. The yardstick indicated above for organizations in deter- ing whether the investigation should continue, should apply ncerning individuals and when a determination can reasonably e made that the individuals activities, either within the organization or as an individual, do not appear to be in violation of any law, then the investigation should cease.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
on this envelope ~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

8911-8

62-116395-168

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/16/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Re: Legal Authority-Federal Employee Security Program, Executive Order 10450

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor, Jr. Date: 5/21/75 @ 3:10

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-168
ENCLOSURE

4-528

62-116395-167

CHANGED TO

62-116464-6X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

NOV 17 1976

Cons./MMD.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-23-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
DALLAS, TEXAS
11-22-63

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 5-22-75 CIA requested from the FBI copies of photographs of three "bums" who were taken into custody by Dallas authorities on 11-22-63 in the vicinity of the Texas School Book Depository. It has been alleged that the three persons shown in the photographs were E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis, individuals involved in the Watergate incident, and Thomas Arthur Vallee, who was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, several days before the Kennedy assassination based on a threat against the President. Don Donahue, Special Assistant to Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), made available on 9-12-74 to Inspector Bowers a set of the photographs depicting these "bums" which had been furnished to Donahue by one Michael Canfield, and the FBI Laboratory made copies from these prints, the original being returned to Donahue. Donahue requested that his identity be concealed as the source of these photographs. Canfield was supposed to furnish a set of these photographs to Washington Field Office but it has been determined he never did so.

At Mr. Adams' instructions, Bowers contacted Donahue on 5-22-75 and advised him of the CIA request for a set of these photographs. Donahue was told that if he has no objections we intend to furnish CIA a set of the pictures with the statement that the originals were obtained from an individual who requested his identity be concealed. Donahue stated that was quite satisfactory to him, adding that if it becomes necessary he would agree to his identity being disclosed as the source of these pictures.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-109060-7193

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 2 1975

MAY 30 1975

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Bowers

DWB:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)
DATE 8/5/94

LEGAL COUNSEL

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: ASSASSINATION OF JOHN FITZGERALD
KENNEDY
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Appropriate personnel of the General Investigative, Intelligence, and Laboratory Divisions were telephonically advised of the contact with Donahue late on 5-22-75 and the Intelligence Division arranged that date to provide a set of the photographs to CIA.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Given to F. Janaly to
hand carry to CIA 5/22/75

Hoc Staff
75-817

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

21 May 1975

Senate Cy. '75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : IC Staff Verification of Clearances

Attached is an updated list of the security clearances provided to the Senate Select Committee Staff members. You will note there has been a significant increase since our last listing.

Updated information will be provided to you as this information changes.

Harriett Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: a/s

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-05-01 BY SP2ALM/CW

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
3 JUL 24 1975

ENCLOSURE

Records - please
file 62-116395

5-8

84 JUL 29 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

21 MAY 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE DESIGNATED	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE BRIEFED	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	IL	550-44-7971	
Bader, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF-Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara			12-20-45	CAL	561-68-9123	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	CONN	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I	*		7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Brissett, Belva			6-23-41	OK	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*		2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	CAL	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	CAL	567-56-8854	
Chesnik, Barbara			4/18/46	WI	390-46-2235	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17	9-6-43	FL	042-36-9155	TF-Badge
Dawson, Thomas			9-9-52	MINN	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	ILL	351-34-4329	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/25/01 BY

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

21 MAY 1975

	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL	
NAME	**DESIGNATED**	**BRIEFED**	**PLACE OF BIRTH**		**SECURITY NO**	
DeOreo, Mary			6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258	
Dillon, Molly			4-16-51	VA	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel			8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*		6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor			3-10-37	MASS	026-28-6318	
Erno, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*		3-7-46	ALA	420-60-8767	
Greissing, Edward			11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	MD	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF-Badge
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478	
Karalekas, Anne			11-6-46	MA	023-36-4329	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	IND	559-54-1348	

21 MAY 1975

	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL	
NAME	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED			SECURITY NO	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	GA	252-12-5112	TF - Badge
LaVoy, Diane			11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. VA.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF - Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF - Badge
Mecham, Martha Evans	*		2-11-40	CAL	528-48-6848	
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*		10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	
Moore, Janet	*		4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	ILL	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan			11-14-47	CAL	558-74-8394	

21 MAY 1975

	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE					
NAME	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
Peterson, John F.			6-15-41	CAL	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan			10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Pyle, Christopher			11-24-39	Mass	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N.DAK	501-14-4534	
Ricks, Walter			12-27-46	GA	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth [1]	*		10-31-44	CONN	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A.O., III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester			7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	VA	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.			3-3-39	KY	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	MD	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha			9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	IND	313-12-1857	

21 MAY 1975

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED				
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	MD	219-14-5186	
Towell, Mary			4-25-44	TENN	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory			1-21-47	COLO.	524-62-2459	
Truehart, William			12-18-18	VA	225-20-6411	
Wallach, Paul			5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF - Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann[1] 1	*		4-21-51	MASS	017-40-7170	
Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

---

[1] documentation is being forwarded

Calendar No. 174

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21, 1975

15.

Mr. CHURCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. CANNON, without amendment

(Senstudy - 75)

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
6 JUL 28 1975

V

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Pls file 5-8
62-116395

84 JUL 30 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

35

USIB-D-27.10/2
17 May 1975

Hnk)

SENSTUDY '75

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT : Reporting of Interviews with ~~Congressional~~ Investigating Committees or their Staffs

REFERENCE : My Memorandum to Addressees, 10 April 1975, Subject: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence (USIB-D-27.10/1)

1. Reference memorandum reported establishment by the Intelligence Community Staff of a registry for documentation relating to the Congressional investigations, and furnished you with a format for abstracts to be provided to the registry on each formal input to a Select Committee. In addition to having in the registry the abstracts or, as appropriate, the actual papers submitted as documentation to a Select Committee, it is important that we establish a method for reporting on interviews. Accordingly, I am enclosing a proposed format for abstracts to be used for reporting on interviews by Congressional Committee members or staff with your personnel which involve information on Community activities or which, in your judgment, raise the possibility of follow-on queries elsewhere concerning the functioning or activities of the Community.

2. There is no intent to intrude upon matters which are properly each agency's organizational responsibility nor to infringe upon employees' individual rights or security. The interview abstract format does not provide for identification of the person being interviewed. The "File Reference No." entry is for your convenience to indicate where any supporting documentation is located within your own filing system.

Original Filed In 62-80750-5071

5

/ ENCLOSURE

REC-5

~~JUN 3 1975~~

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED

AUG 19 1975

Hnk

AUG 19 1975

3. It is essential that the Intelligence Community be aware of all aspects of the Congressional investigations which involve Community matters, or which may relate to Select Congressional Committee activities being conducted elsewhere in the Community. The availability in the registry of document and interview abstracts should help provide this internal visibility.

W. E. Colby
Chairman

Attachment: as stated

Attachment
USIB-D-27.10/2
17 May 1975

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO DCI/IC SELECT COMMITTEES COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Subject:
2. Witness' Organization:
3. File Reference No.:
4. Date of Interview:
5. Interviewer(s):
6. Classification of Information:
7. Summary of Content: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed, and any conclusions or recommendation)
8. Relation to Intelligence Community Problems: (Identify)

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 5/7/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Schwartz

FROM : H.C. Flemister, Jr.

Senstudy-75

SUBJECT: MORTON HALPERIN
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ✓
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This memorandum sets forth results of Liaison contact with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning Halperin's request to be provided with a copy of a 1948 memorandum of understanding between the FBI and the CIA. Halperin has made this request of both CIA and the Bureau.

On 4/30/75 Mr. James Garrison, CIA, advised that after considerable research in CIA files, the following documents (copies attached) were located which pertain to Halperin's request. Copies have also been located in Bufiles:

(1) Memorandum for the Record dated 9/22/48 entitled "Cooperation and Liaison Between Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Policy Coordination, CIA," which was prepared by CIA and originally classified Top Secret. This document has recently been downgraded by CIA to a classification of Secret.

(2) Letter dated 9/22/48 from Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, to Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant to the Director, FBI, which forwarded as an enclosure the 9/22/48 memorandum described above. This item was also originally classified Top Secret but has been downgraded by CIA to Secret.

62-116395-

JUN 25 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 63-16062-45

NOT RECORDED

46 JUN 30 1975

(3) Letter dated 10/2/48 from J. Edgar Hoover to Wisner which acknowledges that the arrangement set forth in the memorandum of 9/22/48 is satisfactory to the Bureau. This item was not classified in accordance with current classification standards but bears the marking "Personal and Confidential."

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures - 3
LFS:tdp (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

Records

cc in 62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

84 JUL 1 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: MORTON HALPERIN
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST

Mr. Garrison advised that CIA considers items 1 and 2 to be CIA documents and item 3 to be an FBI document containing CIA information. CIA proposes to furnish Halperin declassified copies of items 1 and 2 which have been sanitized in accordance with the brackets on the attached copies. CIA has no objection to the Bureau's furnishing Halperin a copy of item 3 if it is declassified and the CIA information indicated by brackets in the attached copy is excised. Mr. Garrison noted that CIA no longer considers the 9/22/48 memorandum to be operative since CIA's Office of Policy Coordination no longer exists.

Mr. Garrison advised further that with regard to a Senate Select Committee (SSC) request for copies of all agreements between the FBI and the CIA, CIA does not plan to provide the SSC with copies of items 1 and 2 but plans to allow appropriately cleared SSC staff representatives to examine the unsanitized Secret versions of items 1 and 2 at CIA Headquarters. He further advised that CIA would have no objection if the Bureau allows SSC staff representatives to examine item 3 in Bureau space provided it is classified Secret in accordance with CIA's classification of its information. Mr. Garrison requested that if the Bureau decides to provide the SSC with a copy of item 3 for its retention, the document be declassified and sanitized in accordance with the attached copy.

The Intelligence Division has no objection to the FOIA request of Halperin being handled in accordance with the above. Recommendation for handling of the SSC request will be made by separate memorandum.

ACTION:

This memorandum and its attachments should be forwarded to the FOIA Unit of the Files and Communications Division for appropriate handling.

HCF/hb WOC/B WRW JBT

SECRET

C O P Y

DRAFT

22 September 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Cooperation and Liaison Between Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Policy Coordination, CIA

1. This memorandum records an understanding which has been arrived at in conversations between Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Mr. Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director, and Chief of the Office of Policy Coordination, of CIA. The conversations in question were duly authorized by the Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and by the Director and Deputy Director of CIA and were arranged by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on behalf of the White House. The purpose of the understanding is to provide a basis for cooperation and liaison between the FBI and the Office of Policy Coordination, CIA, and the following points summarize the essential elements of the understanding:

a. In view of the distinctive character of the activities of the Office of Policy Coordination, it is considered advisable that separate and direct liaison be established between that office and the FBI. For this purpose the FBI will provide a special liaison officer who will be nominated by the FBI within the near future. (This arrangement has been specifically approved by the Deputy Director, CIA, in the absence of the Director.)

b. It is understood that in the discharge of the duties and obligations laid upon the Office of Policy Coorination by the National Security Council, it is necessary for this Office to have dealings with individuals and groups of foreign nationalities within and without the United States and to sponsor the movement from time to time of such individuals and representatives of such groups between the United States and foreign countries. The Office of Policy Coordination recognizes the primary responsibility of the FBI in the field of United States domestic security, and the FBI acknowledges that it is essential for the Office of Policy Coordination to have direct dealings with the individuals and groups aforementioned.

c. In order that the interests of both parties to this understanding shall be served, it is understood that the Office of Policy Coordination keep the FBI generally informed concerning the extent and character of its dealings with

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
Destroy only with consent of the Historical Staff

owngraded to SECRET per
aul J. Burns 019210

ENCLOSURE 62-116395—

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES

II - Groups and Organizations:

International Peasant Union which is made up of representatives of Polish Agrarian Party; Bulgarian Agrarian Party; Croatian Peasant Party; Hungarian Small Holders Party; Rumanian National Peasant Party; Serbian Agrarian Union and a number of recognized Czechoslovak political leaders.

In view of the highly classified character of our activities, I am sure that you will appreciate the importance of maintaining the maximum security precautions.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

Enclosure - 1

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

22 September 1948

Mr. D. Milton Ladd
Assistant to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Ladd:

Confirming our telephone conversation of today, I am enclosing a draft of a proposed memorandum which I have prepared for the purpose of recording the understanding which has been arrived at between us in regard to the cooperation and liaison between my office and the Bureau. I have endeavored in this draft to set out the essential features of our conversation of yesterday afternoon and I should appreciate your indicating to me any modifications or changes which you may deem necessary or advisable to reflect your recollection and understanding of our conversation. Upon my receipt of your suggested changes, if any, and following any further discussion between us which may be indicated as desirable, I shall prepare this memorandum in final form and furnish to you the original and a copy thereof, with the request that you initial and return to me the copy.

In accordance with the terms of our understanding, I should like to submit to you herewith the names of certain of the individuals and groups with whom it is proposed that my office will have dealings in connection with our authorized activities. From time to time in the future I shall furnish you with additional names. The following are the names:

I - Individuals:

George M. Dimitrov, Exiled Secretary General of Bulgarian Agrarian Party

Stefan Osusky, prominent Czech Refugee leader

Ferenc Nagy, head of Hungarian Small Holders Party

Dr. Vladko Macek, representative of Croatian Peasant Party

Stanislas Mikolajczyk, former Polish Vice Premier

Andre Cretzianu, former Rumanian Cabinet Minister

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
Destroy only with consent

ENCLOSURE 62-116395

Downgraded to SECRET per
Paul J. Burns, 019210

SECRET

foreign individuals and groups within the United States. More specifically the Office of Policy Coordination will, in so far as possible, inform the FBI sufficiently in advance of its proposed dealings with such individuals and groups to enable the FBI to advise the Office of Policy Coordination of any security risks which may be involved in dealing with such individuals and groups and in order to provide the FBI with adequate opportunity to indicate individuals which it is employing for its own purposes in connection with the penetration of foreign groups.

d. There shall be an exchange of information between the FBI and the Office of Policy Coordination concerning the significance, activities, and reliability of such individuals and groups of foreign nationalities within the United States as may be of interest to the Office of Policy Coordination.

F. G. W.

D. M. L.

EYES ALONE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

30 MAY 1975

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0597

Senstudy -75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Department of Defense
Mr. William G. Hyland, Department of State
Mr. E. H. Knoche, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. William O. Cregar, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. William N. Morell, Jr., Department of Treasury
Mr. James G. Poor, Energy Research & Development Administration
Mr. William Nichols, Office of Management and Budget
Mr. John B. Hotis, Department of Justice

SUBJECT : Future Legislation Relative to U.S. Intelligence

Following up on the discussion at yesterday's meeting of the Policy Steering Group, addressees are encouraged to provide to the White House specific suggestions for administrative or legislative action relative to U.S. intelligence programs. Such proposals should be realistic and doable in the near term. Please provide two copies of all suggestions to James Wilderotter, Room 182, Old Executive Office Building by 10 June 1975.

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY

REC-100 62-116395-166

Harriett D. Mowitt

Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

17 JUN 4 1975

file in 62-116395 5.8

84 JUN 4 1975

EYES ALONE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-19-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

K. William O'Conner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, who has recently been designated by the Attorney General to coordinate all responses by the Department to the Senate Select Committee(SSC), advised on the afternoon of 5-19-75 that he had met with Chief Counsel to the SSC F. A. O. Schwarz and John Elliff, who is the head of the task force of the Senate Select Committee on the FBI. O'Conner stated he informed Schwarz and Elliff that he would not make available Bureau secretaries Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski, who are scheduled for interview on Tuesday, 5-20-75, absent an agreement by the Committee that an FBI representative would be allowed to be present during the interview. O'Conner indicated that the Department's stand in this matter regarding the insistence that FBI representatives be present during the interview was backed by the White House, the Attorney General, and the Deputy Attorney General.

By way of background, it should be noted that Mr. O'Conner and Associate Deputy Attorney General McDermott were contacted on 5-14-75, and advised of the requested interview of the two aforementioned employees at which time O'Conner and McDermott did not advise of any way in which the employees could be prevented from consenting to interview. While they were upset at the prospect of service personnel, such as stenographers being interviewed by the Committee, they indicated at that time they could not see any legal leverage which could be used to preclude such interviews. With this decision in mind arrangements were made to make these employees available for interview.

ST-104 REC 12 62-116395-1165

Schwarz told O'Conner he would have to check with the SSC prior to agreeing to allow FBI representatives to be present. O'Conner stated Schwarz was quite upset at the Department's stance in this matter, but indicated he would give O'Conner an answer this evening. O'Conner indicated to Schwarz that the two Bureau employees would be available for interview on the 20th should the Committee agree to the presence of FBI representatives during the interview.

MAY 27 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE ADDENDUM - PAGE 2

O'Conner requested that the Bureau continue with his plan to have both employees available should the interview take place on the 20th.

ACTION:

You will be kept expeditiously advised of all developments concerning this matter.

PVD

JAM
R70

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION 5-19-75 PVD:dkg

At 4:15 p.m. Mr. O'Conner advised that he had just been contacted by F. A. O. Schwarz, and Schwarz stated the Committee's position concerning the presence of FBI representatives during the interview of the two secretaries is unchanged. O'Conner related that he told Schwarz that Departmental position is also unchanged in that there will be no interview unless the Committee relents on this position. O'Conner indicated he would keep the Bureau advised and requested that we continue with our plans to have the secretaries available for interview as Schwarz indicated he would again contact O'Conner regarding this issue.

PVD

JAM
R70

PLM

K

Airtel

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
5/23/75
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

To: SAC, Atlanta

From: Director, FBI (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

Enclosed for immediate hand delivery to former SA Alan G. Sentinella is an original and one copy of a statement he voluntarily dictated to a Bureau secretary 5/21/75 and which was transcribed subsequent to Sentinella's departure from Washington, D. C.

For your information, Sentinella has indicated a desire to review this statement and make any necessary corrections, after which he will furnish you a copy for forwarding to the Bureau which should be by cover airtel immediately after Sentinella makes it available. Direct airtel to Attention, INTD - W. O. Cregar.

Enclosure
SFP:ekw
(6)

NOTE: The statement involved concerns Sentinella's testimony before an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee 5/21/75, contents of which testimony Sentinella indicated to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project he (Sentinella) desired to make available to the Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-05-01 BY

EX 104

REC-7

164

MAILED 8
MAY 23 1975
FBI

5 MAY 27 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/23/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Reference is made to my memorandum dated 5/19/75 which attached a copy of a letter to the Attorney General dated 5/14/75, from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, United States Senate Select Committee (SSC) with appendices A thru D. The memorandum noted the ambiguous nature of some of the SSC requests and that Mr. K. William O'Conner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, who is the Department of Justice coordinator for SSC matters, is presently negotiating the 5/14/75 requests with the SSC Staff.

Even though the negotiations are still under way, we believe that ultimately we will be required to provide substantial responses to the 5/14/75 requests. To this end we have begun to gather together the necessary data from our files in anticipation of the substantial responses we will be required to prepare. The various requests set forth in the May 14, letter have been analyzed and specific assignments made to prepare responses. The primary assignments have been made to representatives of several Sections of the INTD. It is anticipated that in some circumstances it will be necessary for these INTD representatives to convey requests for information and material to other Divisions. When such action is necessary contact will be effected through the designated representatives of the other Headquarters Divisions. A list of such other Divisional representatives is maintained by the SENSTUDY Staff on the basis of designations made to assist in previous SSC requests, and is set forth below.

DIVISION	REPRESENTATIVE	EXTENSION
1-Identification	James T. Stewart	4219
2-Training	James E. Reilly	3472
3-Administrative	Fred Woodworth	4132

REC-100 62-116395-163

JUN 3 1975

62-116395
EWL/SFP:cmc
(17)

CONTINUED - OVER

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-5-01 BY SP2ALM/lcl

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 3 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY - 75
62-116395

4-Files and Communications	Homer R. Hauer	4870
6-General Investigative	J. William Hines	4276
7-Laboratory	John P. Wilgus	~~3721~~ 3463
8-External Affairs	David L. Divan	2535
9-Special Investigative	John E. McHale	2525
10-Inspection	Fred Griffith	2830
11-Legal	Paul V. Daly	2542
12-Computer Systems	Charles D. Neudorfer	3635

The listed individuals are considered to be the permanent representatives to the SENSTUDY project and will be the primary points of contact within the respective Divisions. It is requested that any Division desiring to change the above designations promptly advise SENSTUDY project on extension 4636.

ACTION:

None except where necessary to redesignate Division representatives.

wRW

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/22/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

On 5/21/75, Andy Smith, Supervisor in our Birmingham Office, called Deputy Assistant Director Herington and advised that former SA Robert R. Nichols (EOD: 1/6/47; retired: 5/12/72) had been contacted by the Senate Select Committee for interview. Smith connected Nichols through to Herington, at which time Nichols advised that about ten days ago Lester Seidel of the Senate Select Committee had contacted him. At that time, Nichols was going to Oklahoma City, and has just recently returned home to Birmingham. Nichols stated that at one time he was the case agent in the Atlanta Office on the Martin Luther King investigation, and it was presumed this was the subject matter of the proposed interview.

Nichols was advised that the decision as to whether he would consent to interview was entirely his to make. He was reminded that he had signed a secrecy agreement, and was reminded of the provisions of AG Order 501-73 requiring prior authority from the appropriate Departmental official prior to a current or former employee furnishing information he acquired during the course of his employment. He was also advised that he had a right to be represented by a personal attorney if he desired and that he had all the constitutional rights available to him, the same as any citizen. He was further told that if he desired to have an FBI representative available, but not present during the interview, he could so request, noting that the purpose of the FBI representative would be to counsel him concerning sensitive areas which might be explored.

62-116395-162

REC-107

JUN 3 1975

It was emphasized to Nichols that the FBI would not and could not recommend the course of action he should take ~~and that the~~ decision with regard to this interview was entirely his to make.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Herington

JH:mtm

Records. CC-62-114885 (Nichols)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 12/5/01 BY SP2ALM/RW

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

PERS. REC. UNIT

FIVE

JUN 3 1975

Mr. David E. Todd
20 Cozzolino Drive
Millbrae, CA 94030

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, CA 956
PM
19 MAY
1975

Christmas 10c US

CONQUER
MULTIPLE
SCLEROSIS

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20535

Attention:
Office of the Legal Counsel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/28/01 BY

5-19-75

Attention:

Jack Harrington
Office of the Legal Counsel

Remytelcall 5/16/75

David E. Todd

Senstudy - '75

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

file
62-116395

REC-1 62-116395-161

17 MAY 21 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

LEGAL COUNSEL

Recds
cc 67-177553 (David Todd)

84 JUN 3 1975

May 19, 1975
20 Cozzolino Drive
Millbrae, CA 94030

Mr. Lester B. Seidel
Investigator
Select Committee to Study
 Government Operations with
 Respect to Intelligence Activities
Room 2308
Building 302 - Dirkson Building
Washington, DC 20510

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN [illegible]
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALC/plw

Dear Mr. Seidel:

Reference is made to your telephone call to me on May 16, 1975, in which you advised that the Committee was gathering facts concerning the FBI's various CoIntelPros and in particular, you were looking into the CoIntelPro having to do with the Black Panthers. You inquired if I recalled a letter, which had been made public, dated May 11, 1970, from the Director, FBI, to the SAC, San Francisco, which suggested disruptive techniques against the Black Panthers and which mentioned spurious police or FBI reports. I advised you I had no first hand recollection of having seen such a document at that time, but that I had read a recent news item describing such a document.

You also indicated an interest in the theoretical question as to whether intelligence functions should be divorced from enforcement functions in order to avoid the dilemma of disclosure versus dismissal, and you suggested that my views on this might be helpful in educating the Committee.

For your information, I entered on duty as a Special Agent on January 5, 1942, and retired from the Bureau on December 3, 1971. During the two years immediately preceding my retirement I served as supervisor of a squad of agents which investigated, among other matters, violations and alleged violations of law by the Black Panthers. The only information I have concerning the Black Panthers was learned as a direct result of my official duties. I have made no independent study of them, nor do I have any personal files or written material, either official or otherwise, relating to them.

Since speaking with you, I have reviewed Executive Order #501-73 (28 C.F.R.§§ 16.21, 16.22 and 16.23) which specifies that no employee or former employee of the Department of Justice shall produce any material contained in the files of the Department

161

nor shall he disclose any information acquired in the performance of his official duties without prior approval of the Attorney General or appropriate Departmental official.

From this, I must conclude that I am prohibited from furnishing you or the Committee any information along the lines requested by you unless appropriate authority to do so has first been given by an authorized representative of the Department of Justice.

Very truly yours,

David E Todd

DAVID E. TODD

cc: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20535

SAC
Federal Bureau of Investigation
450 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/20/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/

I received by hand delivery from the Department at 3:06 p.m. on March 20, 1975, the attached copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated March 19, 1975, with its enclosed list of requests being made by the Committee.

FARRINGTON
Hotis

Senator Church requests that the documents involved be supplied to the committee at the earliest opportunity. A review of the requests revealed that the Intelligence Division would have the principal interest in all except request III, A and C, which would be of interest to the Administrative Division. The last item appearing under V, B should be available only through the Criminal Division of the Department or the Attorney General's office.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Intelligence Division and the Administrative Division review the attached request for FBI materials to determine whether we may make a full response to the requests.

62-116395 - 160

EX 104 REC 44

7 APR 22 1975

2. That the required materials be prepared for submission to the Committee and any difficulties be made known at the earliest possible date.

62-116395

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Enc.
1 - Mr. Farrington - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.

OK

LEGAL COUNSEL

JAM:mfd
(7)

84 JUN 3 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

HILIP A. HART, MICH.
ALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
ALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
OBERT MORGAN, N.C.
ARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 19, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on February 26, 1975, to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21. I believe we are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible.

Toward that end we are seeking initial documentation from various agencies whose activities fall within the mandate given us by the Senate. Enclosed with this letter is a copy of an initial request for documents relating to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has been previously discussed with staff representatives of the Bureau. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

We expect to make similar initial requests for documents to other parts of your Department that fall under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

I trust that our respective staffs will continue to work together in the spirit of mutual cooperation which we both recognize is necessary to ensure a thorough and expeditious investigation.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RE

MAR 19 1975

62-116395-160

ENCLOSURE

FIRST REQUEST FOR FBI DOCUMENTS

I. Legal Authorities

All memoranda discussing the legal authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials asserted as sources of such authority. 5

II. Jurisdictional Agreements

All delimitations agreements, jurisdictional agreements, agreements for coordination, and memoranda or understanding, between the FBI and any other Federal departments or agencies, insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5

III. Organization

A. A detailed current organizational chart reflecting all divisions, sections, branches, and units of the FBI, and the subject matters assigned to each by generic and numerical designation. 3

B. A list of names, titles, and offices of assignment of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBI Headquarters, down to and including unit chiefs, together with the number of personnel below the level of unit chief categorized by unit or other office of assignment. 5

C. At the field level, the titles and the number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations, and activities. 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ACM/RW

62-116395-160

ENCLOSURE

IV. Policies and Procedures

A. The table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions, and those portions of the Manual of Instructions which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5 ✓

B. The table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, and those portions of the Manual of Rules and Regulations which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5 ✓

V. Studies and Reports

A. The Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), dated June, 1970. 5

B. The original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Dept.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-15-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Department has named Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Connor of the Civil Rights Division to be responsible for their responses to Congressional Committee requests.

At the request of Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott, SA Paul V. Daly and Inspector John B. Hotis attended a meeting with Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Connor, Assistant to the Attorney General Jack Fuller, and Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott. McDermott announced at the meeting that O'Connor was taking control of the Departmental responses to the Congressional Committees. He noted that the Department has been having some problems keeping track of and inconsistencies in its responses to the various Congressional Committees. Mr. O'Connor was generally briefed as to the status of our responses to Congressional requests and to the Rockefeller Commission. He requested, however, that he be briefed in a more detailed manner in the immediate future.

ACTION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY [illegible]

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

EX 104 REG 44 62-116395-159

MAY 23 1975

PVD:dkg (8)

84 JUN 3 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 8, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : MR. W. WOC CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting between representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff and Bureau officials at Quantico, Virginia, on the evening of 5/5/75.

On 5/5/75 Mr. John Elliff, who heads the task force of the SSC looking into the FBI, met with officials of the Bureau at Quantico. Elliff was accompanied by Mark Gitenstein and Mary DeOreo. FBI officials present were Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Inspectors Thomas W. Leavitt, Hunter E. Helgeson, and John B. Hotis as well as Section Chief William O. Cregar.

At the outset of the meeting, Mr. Elliff provided the Bureau representatives with a memorandum the subject of which was entitled "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated 2/13/75, copy of which is attached. Elliff's memorandum contained a series of questions along with the rationale for these questions which provided the basis for the Quantico meeting. We are not considering these questions a formal request from the Select Committee. Mr. Elliff and the Staff of the Select Committee are aware that formal responses that the Bureau might be expected to provide the Committee can only be predicated on written requests to the Attorney General (AG) from Senator Frank Church or the Committee's Chief Counsel.

It is noted that under paragraph one of Elliff's memorandum he notes the Committee has not been supplied the following documents.

REC 44 62-116395-158

EX 104

(1) A position paper dated 7/31/72.

MAY 23 1975

(2) Appendices I, J, K, M, and P to the Intelligence Division "Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75.

62-116395

Enclosure / ENCLOSURE

WOC:ekw
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 3 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

By memorandum dated 5/6/75, we advised the AG that the requested position paper of 7/31/72 is an internal deliberative document which we feel is inappropriate to furnish the Select Committee. This position is consistent with the position previously expressed by the AG. During the meeting with Elliff he was orally advised of the Bureau's position regarding making the 7/31/72 position paper available to the Select Committee.

The Appendices which have not yet been made available to the Select Committee are being cleared with other agencies under the Third Agency rule requirement and will be made available to the Select Committee once all clearances have been obtained. Elliff was orally apprised of this.

During the course of the meeting, Mr. Elliff stated that he felt the FBI's concerted investigative effort in the early 1960s against the Klan and later our investigative effort arising out of the ghetto riots were justified given the situation at that time. However, he felt the Committee would probably like to do an in-depth case study of both investigations. He asked if the FBI could provide the Committee with copies of all memoranda and documents reflecting the decision making process leading up to the initiation of the major investigative effort against the Klan as well as investigations during and following the ghetto riots. Elliff was advised that we certainly would consider responding following receiptoof a formal written request from Senator Church through the AG. Elliff advised he would prepare such a written request.

The Intelligence Division has already instituted the necessary research in anticipation of this request and will submit recommendations following a completion of this research.

In anticipation of Select Committee hearings which are expected to begin in about one month, Mr. Elliff and Gitenstein expect to start interviews of current Bureau employees in Bureau space during the week of 5/19/75. Mr. Gitenstein will concentrate on the work of the Internal Security Branch of the Intelligence Division and Mr. Elliff on the Counterintelligence Branch. We expect that Mr. Elliff will begin his interviews by meeting with Assistant Director Wannall, Inspector Leavitt and the Section Chiefs of the Counterintelligence Branch.

It is noted that we previously furnished to the Select Committee with the AG's approval one copy each of Sections 87 and 122 of the Manual of Instructions. Section 87 is concerned with investigations of subversive organizations and individuals. Section 122 addresses extremist matters and civil unrest. In his discussion of these two Sections it was readily apparent Mr. Gitenstein had conducted a thorough review. In this regard, he noted a difference in the investigative procedure outlined in these two Sections of the Manual. Mr. Gitenstein was advised that the Intelligence Division had just completed a Manual revision combining these two Sections into one and had submitted it to the Director for his approval. Mr. Gitenstein commented this was an excellent idea to combine these two Sections into one and expressed the hope that the revised Section could be made available to the Committee for its review in anticipation of the forthcoming Committee hearings.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Elliff asked whether the FBI would be willing to meet with the Staff to discuss such sensitive issues as surreptitious entry, the opening of mail, and incommunicado interviews. Elliff was advised that the Bureau was aware of certain allegations that have appeared in the press and felt that any interviews in sensitive areas should be restricted to the Senators on the Committee. Elliff interposed no objection to this suggestion.

The thrust of the meeting gave Bureau officials present the impression that the task force was primarily concerned with identifying what areas of the Bureau's investigative responsibilities needed to be better defined through new legislation. In fact, Elliff solicited the observations of those present as to what the Bureau's needs were in the way of new legislation to permit the Bureau to carry out its internal security responsibilities effectively. He recognized certain limitations involving records of educational institutions, banking institutions, telephone companies and credit establishments currently restrict the Bureau and suggest that some legislation with Congressional oversight should be written to assist the FBI in carrying out its mission.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

ACTION:

(1) We will proceed to meet with Mr. Elliff and Mr. Gitenstein in accordance with their request. It is anticipated that an Intelligence Division official will be present at all such interviews of current Bureau personnel.

(2) That the review of the combined Sections of 87 and 122 by other Divisions of the Bureau be expedited in order that we may be able to provide the Senate Select Committee with this revision on an expedite basis.

OK

PLM

May 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM

From: John Elliff

Subject: "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction"
dated February 13, 1975

1. The following documents directly related to this Position Paper have not been supplied to the Select Committee:

(1) The previous Position Paper, dated July 31, 1972.

(2) Appendices I, J, K, M, and P.

2. Parts I and II discuss the Presidential directives which may serve as the basis for FBI national security intelligence activities. Part IV lists statutes and Executive Orders affecting FBI jurisdiction. There is no mention in Parts I and II of the first Executive Order cited in Part IV. This is Executive Order #11605, dated July 2, 1971, amending Executive Order #10450, of April 27, 1953, relating to security requirements for Government employment.

These Executive Orders have been further amended by a more recent Executive Order of June 4, 1974. This latest order abolished the so-called "Attorney General's List" and revised the criteria for determining the suitability and loyalty of Government employees.

The following questions arise:

(1) In what way, if any, do the Executive Orders relating to employment security provide a legal basis for FBI intelligence activities?

(2) In what way, if any, did the Executive Order of June 4, 1974, affect the legal basis for FBI intelligence activities?

3. The analysis in Parts I and II discusses the legal basis for FBI national security intelligence investigations. There is no specific discussion of other intelligence activities. These other activities are variously described in the attached documents and quoted memoranda. The terms used include "counterespionage" (Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939),

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-158

ENCLOSURE

"to neutralize Communist front and Communist-dominated organizations of the United States" (IIC and ICIS Report to NSC, March 5, 1954), "program designed to intensify any confusion and dissatisfaction among its /Communist Party's/ members" and "counterintelligence operations" (NSC Briefing, November 6, 1958), "action proposals to protect the internal security of the United States" (National Security Action Memorandum 161, June 9, 1962). The term "counterespionage" reappears in several other documents.

These terms seem to refer to activities which have since been labeled COINTELPRO operations. In this regard, it should be noted that Attorney General Saxbe's report of November 18, 1974 on FBI COINTELPRO Activities stated, at p. 20:

> "(2) Espionage or Soviet-Satellite Intelligence
>
> This program, although officially designated a COINTELPRO program, emphasized intelligence gathering and counterintelligence efforts already being pursued in connection with the Bureau's ongoing foreign intelligence responsibilities. It did not curtail any activity or in any way change the scope of counterintelligence efforts already in effect and continuing today. It was primarily intended to inspire initiative and to encourage ingenuity in the Bureau's continuing counterintelligence efforts against hostile foreign intelligence services.
>
> In the interest of the national security, no statistics or examples of the types of actions implemented under this program may appropriately be disclosed."

This passage seems to say that the FBI continues to perform other activities going beyond investigation and directed at hostile foreign intelligence services.

The following questions arise:

(1) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for FBI national security intelligence activities beyond investigations?

(2) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for the COINTELPRO activities which have been discontinued as a matter of policy since 1971?

(3) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for the FBI's continuing counterintelligence efforts against hostile foreign intelligence services?

4. Appendix S includes excerpts from the appropriations testimony of former Director Hoover. The testimony in 1939 and 1941 makes reference to President Roosevelt's Proclamation of National Emergency, September 8, 1939. The following exchange took place at the hearing on February 19, 1941:

> Mr. Ludlow. At the close of the present emergency, when peace comes, it would mean that much of this emergency work necessarily will be discontinued.
>
> Mr. Hoover. That is correct.
>
> Mr. Taber. Is your set-up for the national-defense work separate from the other work?
>
> Mr. Hoover. It is.
>
> Mr. Taber. Is it operated as a separate division?
>
> Mr. Hoover. Yes. In the field our field officials are under instructions to utilize approximately 50 percent of the personnel on national defense work and the other 50 percent on the regular work.
>
> Mr. Taber. But if some rush comes up, you might have to vary that?
>
> Mr. Hoover. That is correct.
>
> Mr. Taber. According to the situation.
>
> Mr. Hoover. According to the emergency that might arise. If the national emergency should terminate, the structure dealing with national defense can immediately be discontinued or very materially curtailed according to the wishes of Congress.

When President Roosevelt issued the Proclamation of National Emergency on September 8, 1939, he accompanied it with Executive Order No. 8247 directing the Attorney General to "increase the personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, in such number, not exceeding 150, as he shall find necessary for the proper performance of the additional duties imposed upon the Department of Justice in connection with the national emergency." At a press conference the same day,

President Roosevelt specifically discussed this Executive Order and the nature of the "additional duties imposed upon the Department of Justice."

> "And the fourth /Executive Order/ relates to what you might say is a combination of neutrality and national defense. It provides for an addition to the personnel of certain investigating agencies of the Government to protect this country against--I suppose the easiest way of putting it is--some of the episodes, some of the things that happened over here in 1914 and 1915 and 1916 and the beginning of 1917, before we got into the war. There was sabotage; there was a great deal of propaganda by both belligerents, and a good many definite plans laid in this country by foreign governments to try to sway American public opinion. We do not have to specify. The older men who are here can remember some of the episodes of that time. It is to guard against that, and against the spread by any foreign nation of propaganda in this country which would tend to be subversive--I believe that is the word--of our form of Government." (1939 Roosevelt Papers 485-486)

The following questions arise:

(1) To what extent, if any, were the Presidential directives of June 26, 1939 and September 6, 1939, based on the emergency powers of the President?

(2) To what extent, if any, was the establishment of the FBI's Intelligence Division in September, 1939, based on the President's Proclamation of National Emergency and Executive Order No. 8247?

(3) To what extent, if any, does Congress have the Constitutional authority to discontinue or curtail the FBI's national security intelligence activities based on the President's emergency powers or on other Constitutional powers of the Executive Branch?

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/16/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At approximately 3:20 PM, former SA David E. Todd (EOD as SA 1/5/42; retirement 12/9/71) called long distance from San Francisco and spoke to Deputy Assistant Director Herington. He said that he had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, Senate Select Committee, who said that he would be on the west coast in the near future and desired to interview Todd concerning FBI policies with regard to investigation of racial matters and our counterintelligence programs against the Black Panthers and other groups. Todd pointed out that he was a former supervisor of the San Francisco Office desk responsible for Black Panther cases. Todd asked what position he should take. He was advised that his decision as to whether or not to be interviewed was entirely his and that the Bureau could not make any suggestion in this regard. It was pointed out that if he decided to be interviewed, we had made arrangements with the Senate Select Committee which would permit a Bureau representative to be available for consultation with regard to matters that might seem sensitive, but that the Bureau representative would not be present during or participate in the actual interview. He was advised further that he had the same rights as any other citizen, namely, the right to personal counsel and any other rights guaranteed him under the Constitution. Pursuant to his request, he was also advised of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 which appears in Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, beginning at Section 16.21, which would require appropriate Departmental approval prior to any current or former employee revealing, pursuant to a subpoena or other demand, any information acquired during the course of the employee's official duties. He was also reminded that all Bureau employees had signed a secrecy agreement.

62-116395-157

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Herington

REC 67

ST-101

MAY 22 1975

JH:mtm
(6)

ALL [illegible] ED
HERE[illegible] IED
DATE 6-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 3 1975

Memo to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY 75

Todd indicated that while he desired to respond as legally required to an official committee inquiry, he would advise Mr. Seidel that he considered himself bound by the Attorney General Order and did not feel that he could reveal official information without approval by the appropriate Department official. Todd was clearly advised that this decision had to be his own and that the FBI could not and would not make any recommendation to him as to the course of action he should take.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GO RNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: 5-8-75

FROM : G. R. Steel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

Reference is made to my ~~letter~~ memo dated 4-3-75 captioned as above (cc attached). Sec 63

This is to advise that as of 5-7-75 we have received and ordered to the field a total of 96 requests from the SSC for investigations of its staff members. An additional case was received on 5-8-75 which is being ordered to the field immediately. As a result of referenced memo, Inspector Bowers contacted the SSC which was in accord with a more realistic deadline on remaining investigations, except "a few" specials which would still be handled on an expedite basis, such as afforded Presidential appointments. Of all cases received to date only six have been designated as nonexpedite.

ST-117

It is noted recent articles in the media have contained criticism of Congressman Lucien Nedzi for delay in staffing the HSC and proceeding with its inquiry. On 3-3-75 Inspector Bowers discussed with the Congressman the mechanics for FBI investigations of the HSC staff. In the intervening period no cases were received except one recent case from the HSC which has been ordered to the field. This concerns Carl Hendrickson Simms, Security Director, HSC, and formerly connected with the House impeachment inquiry. Simms has been in contact with our Project Senstudy 75 group. It is not known when additional investigations will be received from the HSC.

REC-75

62-116395-156

ACTION:

For information.

3 MAY 20 1975

ENCLOSURE
Enc.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)

1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - Mr. Auerswald

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

GRS:dc
-6-

54JUN4 1975

MAY 20 1975

62-116464

SSC folder

Mr. Cleveland 4-3-75

G. R. Steel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

By agreement, the FBI is currently conducting full field investigations regarding SSC staff personnel. These have extremely short (2 week) deadlines which are identical to those afforded Presidential appointments and are, therefore, given preferential treatment in opening, assigning, and following field progress. The Special Inquiry Unit of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry Section, which has about twice its normal case load, is handling these requests. Senator Church, Chairman, SSC, originally estimated that between 35 and 40 staff members would be submitted for investigation. As of today, 4-3-75, we have received requests for 85 such investigations from the SSC and the end does not appear to be in sight. They are received in bunches as many as 6 at a time, which is not the even flow expected and presents an additional burden.

In addition it is expected that similar requests will be forthcoming in the near future from the HSC since we have a similar agreement with it. Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the HSC, has estimated "probably no more than about 25 staff members will be hired." It remains to be seen if this estimate also falls short of actual receipts.

Since there is no charge for these full field investigations they will have to be considered in the budget. It is noted the current charge for a full field investigation, where applicable, is $2028.

ACTION: For information. Since it appears the nucleus of the Committee has been formed, it is suggested Senator Church be contacted and queried regarding a more realistic (30 day) deadline on the remaining investigations concerning future staff members and their replacements.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Walsh

1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
GRS ① - Mr. Steel

GRS:dc
-6-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

62-116395-156

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/2/75

FROM : Mr. H. E. Helgeson

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At about 1 p.m., 5/2/75, ASAC Herbert D. Clough, Newark Division, called to furnish the following information:

The Newark Office had just been contacted by former Bureau Supervisor Dan Brennan, retired, who resides at Sea Girt, New Jersey. Brennan advised that he had been contacted earlier today by Mike Epstein of the Senate Select Committee who desired to talk to Brennan today and an appointment was set up. Epstein was to arrive at Newark around noon and then drive to Sea Girt, about an hour's travel. Based on information furnished at the recent conference in New York, Newark had dispatched an Agent to be present during this interview as requested by Dan Brennan.

After completing my conversation with Clough, I discussed this matter with John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, and it was concluded the Agent from Newark who would be present during the interview should call Office of Legal Counsel, speak to Hotis, and obtain general guidelines for his participation in this interview.

ASAC Clough was recontacted and so instructed. I also asked Clough to get in touch with me later in the day to let me know what transpired.

REC-19 62-116395-155

ST-101

16 MAY 29 1975

ACTION:

For information.

62-116395

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

HEH:mah

PERS/REC UNIT

84 JUN 3 (5) 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Soc'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: May 12, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

Senstudy 75

Hotis

SUBJECT: ISSUE PAPER ON INTELLIGENCE FILES AND PRIVACY

The Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community identified ten issues likely to grow out of the Select Committee's deliberations. The Executive Committee asked the FBI to prepare a paper on one of these topics, Intelligence Files and Privacy. Specifically, the request was for a brief paper which raises the issues observed by the intelligence agencies when intelligence files and privacy are viewed together without suggesting or recommending how the questions should be resolved.

J. D. Miller drafted an outline which was discussed on April 16, 1975, with representatives of the CIA and Departments of Defense and Treasury. On April 21, this outline was presented by Mr. Hotis to the Executive Committee which received it without comment. Mr. Miller then prepared a rough draft which was discussed at a meeting on April 22, with the representatives of the CIA and Department of Treasury.

Mr. Miller's final draft is attached. It discusses both intelligence files and the concept of privacy in general terms before focusing on the issues which present themselves when an effort is made to establish the proper relationship between the two.

Enclosure

REC-37 62-116395-154

ST 114

MAY 20 1975

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Cleveland
1-Mr. Miller

THH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

JDM:lgp
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 29 1975

Memo from Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams
ISSUE PAPER ON INTELLIGENCE FILES AND PRIVACY

RECOMMENDATION:

The issue paper entitled Intelligence Files and Privacy be submitted by Mr. Hotis to the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

WRW/HOL.

JBA/PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - Each Assistant Director-Encs.
1 - Mr. Cregar-Encs.
1 - Mr. Hotis-Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz-Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly-Encs.

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-2-75

FROM : Legal Counsel JM

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES REQUEST OF 4-28-75

REQUEST OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DATED 4-25-75

On 5-2-75, Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, furnished SA Paul V. Daly two requests from Congressional Committees pertaining to an allegation that documents were removed from former Director J. Edgar Hoover's residence in Washington, D. C., following the death of Mr. Clyde Tolson. Attached are copies of each of the captioned requests.

Each Assistant Director is to canvass his Division and furnish on an expedite basis any information they may develop considering this allegation. Responses should be directed to the Legal Analysis Office, Legal Counsel Division, so that the response may be prepared for the appropriate Congressional Committees and forwarded through the Attorney General's office.

REC 8 62-116395-153

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116395-

Also attached for approval is an airtel to the Washington Field Office requesting that an appropriate inquiry be made among Field Office personnel so that these allegations may be responded to.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

MAY 20 1975

(1) That Assistant Directors make appr~~opriate inquiry of~~ personnel concerning the allegations contained in the aforementioned letters and forward results of inquiry to the Legal Analysis Office, Legal Counsel Division, so that responses may be prepared to the Committees' request.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

ENCLOSURE

MAY 27 1975

Enclosures
PVD:dkg (19)

RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 30 1975

(2) The attached airtel to the Washington Field Office be approved and sent making inquiry of that Office concerning allegations contained in the aforementioned letters.

pvd JBH/pvd

not sent. handled by phone JJO

PLM

5/6 -
SAC Kunkel - Alex
SAC Stames - WFO
Advise no personnel
those offices went to
Mr Hoover's home after
Mr Tolson's death and
none involved in transporting
records or any material in
connection w/ this inquiry -
JJO

5/7/75
Tom Feeney Div 3
advised his
Division negative

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 28, 1975

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
APR 30 1975

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Last week's issue of Newsweek, on page 15, states:

> Hoover's Secrets
>
> Following the death last week of Clyde Tolson, J. Edgar Hoover's close friend and No. 2 man at the FBI, two FBI agents reportedly removed some documents from the late director's house in Washington, where Tolson had been living. Officially, the FBI denies taking any such action, and a friend of Tolson's says the only Hoover documents Tolson had were old canceled checks and tax returns. But Newsweek had reported earlier that some of Hoover's private dossiers, including information "very, very damaging" to persons in the Nixon White House, were left in Tolson's custody, and a source told Newsweek this week that the materials were carted away in a truck.

Assuming that the files in question may be part of the so-called "Official and Confidential" files, your testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on February 27, 1975, is instructive. You said that the number of files which you reviewed contained matters relating to "Presidential directives regarding the role of the FBI in the security field" and to the matters related to "domestic

...NTAINED
HERE... ...FIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

MAY 27 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-153

violence", "intelligence activities by hostile nations", "domestic extremist activities", and use of the FBI to gather political intelligence.

Furthermore, at the same time, Director Kelley suggested that materials from the "Official and Confidential" files were taken to Director Hoover's home. He stated:

> Immediately after his death /Mr. Hoover's/ some of his employees, including his personal secretary, went through his files and completed the destruction of the remainder of the files that were purely personal. These were destroyed by shredding. Some I understand were taken out to his home and placed in his home, they being historical I presume to some extent. There is no indication that they were other than personal files.

Please determine for the Select Committee whether any documents were removed from Mr. Tolson's or Mr. Hoover's residence by FBI agents or former FBI agents after Mr. Tolson's death. If agents of the FBI did go to Mr. Hoover's or Mr. Tolson's residence to remove files, please provide the Select Committee with a complete description of the documents taken into custody by the FBI. Were any such documents copies or originals of documents relating to the business of the FBI? If so, please describe the subject matter of each such document. Also indicate the individual within the FBI who has custody over these files. Furthermore, I respectfully request on behalf of the Select Committee that such files not be destroyed or removed from the FBI's custody until further notice.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

PETER W. RODINO, JR. (N.J.), CHAIRMAN

JACK BROOKS, TEX.
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, WIS.
DON EDWARDS, CALIF.
WILLIAM L. HUNGATE, MO.
JOHN CONYERS, JR., MICH.
JOSHUA EILBERG, PA.
WALTER FLOWERS, ALA.
JAMES R. MANN, S.C.
PAUL S. SARBANES, MD.
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, OHIO
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, CALIF.
ROBERT F. DRINAN, MASS.
BARBARA JORDAN, TEX.
RAY THORNTON, ARK.
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, N.Y.
EDWARD MEZVINSKY, IOWA
HERMAN BADILLO, N.Y.
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, KY.
EDWARD W. PATTISON, N.Y.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, N.J.
MARTIN A. RUSSO, ILL.

EDWARD HUTCHINSON, MICH.
ROBERT MC CLORY, ILL.
TOM RAILSBACK, ILL.
CHARLES E. WIGGINS, CALIF.
HAMILTON FISH, JR., N.Y.
M. CALDWELL BUTLER, VA.
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, CALIF.
JOHN M. ASHBROOK, OHIO
HENRY J. HYDE, ILL.
THOMAS N. KINDNESS, OHIO

Congress of the United States
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Telephone: 202-225-3951

GENERAL COUNSEL:
EARL C. DUDLEY, JR.

STAFF DIRECTOR:
GARNER J. CLINE

COUNSEL:
HERBERT FUCHS
WILLIAM P. SHATTUCK
ALAN A. PARKER
JAMES F. FALCO
MAURICE A. BARBOZA
ARTHUR P. ENDRES, JR.
THOMAS W. HUTCHISON
DANIEL L. COHEN
FRANKLIN G. POLK
THOMAS E. MOONEY
MICHAEL W. BLOMMER
ALEXANDER B. COOK
CONSTANTINE J. GEKAS
ALAN F. COFFEY, JR.
KENNETH N. KLEE

April 25, 1975

RECEIVED
MAY 2 1975
O.L.A.

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In the most recent issue, April 28, 1975, of Newsweek's "Periscope" section, it is alleged that following the death of Clyde Tolson, J. Edgar Hoover's close friend and top assistant, FBI agents removed documents from the late FBI Director's house, in which Mr. Tolson had been living. The article further alleges that the documents removed were of the nature of private dossiers.

During the hearing of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, on February 27, 1975, it was asserted that papers delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death were of a purely historical or personal nature. In keeping with the Subcommittee's oversight jurisdiction of the FBI, I respectfully request that the Department of Justice make an independent investigation of the allegations made by the Newsweek writer and report back to the Subcommittee within a reasonable time. This investigation should cover these points:

1. Were any documents or other material removed from the home of the late FBI Director by agents of the FBI, or others under the direction of the FBI or the Department of Justice, after the death of Clyde Tolson?

[illegible]

2. If it is determined that documents or other material were removed, on whose authority was such action initiated?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RL

MAY 21 1975

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-153

3. What was the nature of the material removed?

4. For what purpose were the materials removed?

5. Was it the same material delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death?

6. If it is true that the materials delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death were of an historical or personal nature, and that all or some of these same materials were removed after the death of Clyde Tolson, what legal rationale can be used to give the FBI any interest in, or authority to remove, such documents to their own possession?

Your prompt consideration of this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Don Edwards

Don Edwards
Chairman
Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights

DE:ss

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Don Edwards M.C.

WASHINGTON, D.C.
APR 28
PM
1975
205

ALWAYS
USE ZIP
CODE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-97 BY

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. JENKINS

DATE: 5/5/75

FROM : D.W. MOORE, JR.

SUBJECT: CLYDE A. TOLSON
FORMER ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

The April 28, 1975, issue of "Newsweek" magazine on page 15 under its "Periscope" section, referred to Mr. Tolson's death and claimed that 2 Agents reportedly removed documents from Hoover's residence where Tolson had been living. The article, captioned "Hoover's Secrets," carried the FBI's denial of such action and also stated that a friend of Tolson's said the only Hoover documents Tolson had were old cancelled checks and tax returns. However, the article added that "Newsweek" had reported earlier that some of Hoover's private dossiers, including information "very, very damaging" to persons in the Nixon White House, were left in Tolson's custody. "Newsweek" further claimed that a source advised that the materials were carted away in a truck.

Mr. Kelley has asked of Messrs. Callahan, Jenkins, Adams and Moore, "Do you have any idea where such a story got started? Ky."

My memorandum to you of 4/17/75 captioned as above (copy attached) pointed out that Tony Marro, "Newsweek" reporter, contacted my office that date advising he had heard from a source to the effect that 2 Agents were sent to Tolson's residence the day of his death with a truck and carted away some files which were subsequently brought to the home of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director. Upon checking with Mr. Mohr, Marro was advised there was absolutely no truth to the story. It should be noted that Mr. Mohr also advised at that time that most of the furnishings at Mr. Tolson's home have been removed over the past several months and that there were some associates of the family and Annie, the housekeeper who had stopped by the house on the day of the death with some empty boxes to help remove additional furnishings.

Enc.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RL

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Heim
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt

(CONTINUED)

JMM:jo
(7)

MAY 21 [illegible]

62-116395-153

ENCLOSURE

Moore to Jenkins Memo (cont'd.)
Re: CLYDE A. TOLSON

Based upon a request from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Callahan, a Bureau clerk did go to the residence of Mr. Tolson on the day of his death whereupon he delivered some 24 boxes and 6 rolls of tape. The clerk merely delivered the boxes and tape and then left the residence. We have no idea what was placed in the boxes nor how this story started in the first place.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

MR. JENKINS 4/17/75

D.W. MOORE, JR.

CLYDE A. TOLSON
FORMER FBI ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Tony Marro, "Newsweek" magazine, Washington, D.C., called this morning advising that he had heard from a source who has been reliable in the past, to the effect that two Agents were sent to the home of Clyde Tolson Monday evening, 4/14/75, the day of his death, with a truck and carted away some files which were subsequently brought to the home of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director.

Upon checking with Mr. Mohr, Mr. Marro was advised that there was absolutely no truth to his story. It should be noted that Mr. Mohr advised that most of the furnishings at Mr. Tolson's home have been removed over the past several months and that there were some associates of the family and Annie, the housekeeper, who had stopped by the house sometime Monday with some empty boxes to help remove additional furnishings. As you know, Mr. Mohr is the Administrator of Mr. Tolson's estate and stated that there was simply no truth to the allegation that any Agents had gone to the home in a truck to transfer any files to his residence, as alleged.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Heim
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

JMM:jo
(7)

MAY 27 1975

62-116395-153

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-5-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

By memorandum dated 4-30-75, directed to the Deputy Attorney General and the Director of the FBI, signed by Chief Counsel of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., the SSC had made additional requests of the FBI. Their requests are divided into four separate areas which are as follows: (1) Request for prior changes in the Manual of Instructions, to those sections of the Manual of Instructions which they have already had access to. (2) Request to review certain sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished the Committee. A review of this list discloses generally these sections do not pertain to foreign or domestic intelligence investigations and some do not appear to be within the ambit of Senate Resolution 21 which charters the authority of the SSC. Regarding the sections of the Manual of Instructions, the request stated they would be satisfied with reviewing them at FBI Headquarters. (3) Request certain sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations be made available for review by SSC representatives at FBI Headquarters. As in request #2, some of the sections do not appear to be within the scope of Senate Resolution 21. Among the sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations requested are such sections as those concerning disciplinary matters and administration of offices. (4) A general request concerning the Bureau's filing procedures including information concerning our indexing system, list of classifications used in FBI filing system, and a set of forms used by the Bureau. (Attached is a copy of the memorandum.)

ST 112 REC 8 62-116395-152

It was pointed out regarding this request to senior staff member of the SSC, Mark Gitenstein, that some aspects of this request appear to be outside of the scope of the Committee's authority ~~as set~~ forth in Senate Resolution 21. Gitenstein explained that while this may

MAY 19 1975

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Bassett - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Enc.
1 - Mr. Decker - Enc.
1 - Mr. Gebhardt - Enc.
1 - Mr. McDermott - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mooney - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - ~~Enc.~~
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

PVD:dkg (15)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 30 1975

ENCLOSURE

be technically accurate the Committee felt it was necessary for them to come to a general understanding as to Bureau operations and that this would assist them in their review of FBI operations in the domestic and foreign intelligence areas. Gitenstein also indicated it was the Committee's feeling that Senate Resolution 21 was intended to be construed liberally and that in general it required that the SSC be furnished by the various intelligence agencies that information which would be necessary for them to carry out its mandate. It was also explained to Gitenstein that concerning their requests involving prior changes in various sections of the Manual of Instructions that they had not placed a cutoff date as to how far back the Bureau had to go to comply with this request. Gitenstein indicated that we could use 1-1-60 as the cutoff date.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Recipients review requests pertaining to their Divisions and furnish in memorandum form their response to the Legal Counsel Division.

(2) The Legal Counsel Division will, upon receipt of responses from the interested Divisions, prepare the necessary communication to the Senate Select Committee to be approved by the Attorney General and furnished to the Committee.

PLM

OK

(FAOS--4/30/75)

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL TYLER AND DIRECTOR KELLY

April 30, 1975

This memorandum concerns paragraph IV of the attachment to Senator Church's letter of March 19 to the Attorney General. On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, I would like to request the following:

1. Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instructions. Certain sections of the Manual currently in effect have been produced to us. We had intended by the request to ask for the relevant superseded sections (note the absence of the word "current" in Section IV as compared to Section IIIA) and we did indicate previously to the liaison staff that we were interested in superseded sections. But without regard to that, it is clear from documents such as the Director's letter of August 7, 1973 to the Attorney General that certain superseded sections will be highly relevant in analyzing the question of legal authority, as well as in understanding particular events in earlier years. We would appreciate their being sent to us promptly or if that causes mechanical problems, being able to promptly review them at the FBI in order to select particular portions for copying. At a minimum we would be interested in superseded Manual provisions for the sections set out in Appendix A.

Xerox furnished to K. Wm O'Connor Deputy Asst. to A.G. by SA DALY 5-20-75

Copy to Harriet Mowitt, Ad Hoc Comm. by LFS 5-15-75

62-116395-152

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

2. Sections of the Manual of Instructions Not Previously Produced. Based upon the previous production to us of the table of contents to the Manual of Instructions, we have identified certain additional sections of the Manual which we would like to examine. Rather than having these made available to us in the first instance in our offices, we suggest that they be made available to Mark Gitenstein, and other designated members of the staff, for initial examination at the FBI offices. A listing of those sections is annexed as Appendix B.

3. Manual of Rules and Regulations. Again, based upon the procedure whereby we were first furnished with the table of contents of the Manual of Rules, we have identified those sections which we want to examine initially. To expedite matters, these sections, identified in Appendix C, could be examined by Mr. Gitenstein, or other designated staff members, at the FBI offices.

4. Filing System. It would also be most helpful if you could provide the Committee with any other written materials on administration of any of the filing or information systems, manual or automated, which are used in the course of intelligence or internal security activities. This does not fit within our prior request but should serve to make future requests more focused.

I have in mind specifically any memoranda prepared by the Bureau on its indexing system and the so-called Clerk's Manual,

if such a document exists. Please also provide the Committee with a list of the classifications used in the FBI's filing system as well as a complete set of printed forms used by the Bureau (e.g., FD-165, etc.).

* * * *

We believe that all the foregoing material will help expedite and focus the inquiry. I assume that Mr. Hotis will contact me promptly to arrange for our review of this material.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.,
Chief Counsel,
Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence
Activities

Appendix A

Section	Subject
36	Espionage
84	Registration Act
86	Sabotage
87	Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals
88	Sedition
95	Treason
97	Voorhis Act
105	Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency
107	Internal Security Informants and Confidential Sources; and Foreign Counterintelligence Assets
122	Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest
130	Extremist Informants and Sources

Appendix B

Section	Subject
4	Surveillances and Raids
8R	Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division
19	Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Agencies
23	Bomb Threats Explosives and Incendiary Devices
27	Civil Rights
28	Civil Rights Act of 1964
29	Conspiracy
75	Neutrality Matters
78	Passports and Visas
90	Selective Service Act
102	Coordination with Other Government Agencies
103	Foreign Police Cooperation
134	Assaulting the President of the United States and Threats to the President of the United States
136	Antiriot Laws
144	Police Killings
146	Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States

Appendix C

Part I

Section 9 - Disciplinary Matters

Part II

Section 1 - Authority--Training--Submission of Information

Section 2 - Supervision--Availability-Resident Agencies

Section 3 - Administration of Offices

Section 4 - Communications

Section 5 - Dissemination of Information

Section 6 - Publications, Press, and Public Contacts

Section 7 - Payments--Property

Section 8 - Miscellaneous Regulations

Section 9 - Classification--Character--Copies--Abbreviations

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 4/30/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY '75

Removed By 79 MAY 28 1975

File Number 62-116395-

Permanent Serial Charge Out

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GO NMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4-30-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

Proposed Legislation

Senstudy '75

SUBJECT: H. R. 214; LEGISLATION TO REQUIRE COURT ORDERS FOR THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS BY ELECTRONIC AND OTHER DEVICES, FOR ENTERING RESIDENCES, FOR OPENING MAIL, AND FOR INSPECTION OF CERTAIN RECORDS

Bowers

Reference Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams memorandum, 4-28-75, reporting that the Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management, House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, is going to open hearings concerning captioned bill on 5-6-75, and that the Department of Justice will be requested to provide testimony.

Mike Cavanagh, Assistant on the Subcommittee staff, called Inspector Bowers on 4-29-75 stating the Subcommittee Chairman, Charles Wilson (D-Calif.), had instructed him to request a copy of the Hoover report to the President in June, 1970, on behalf of the Committee on Interagency Intelligence since this report contained information regarding mail openings and possibly mail covers. Cavanagh was advised that we have received prior requests from Congressional committees for this document and all such requests are being referred to the White House. He was told to contact James Wilderotter in the office of the Counsel to the President at the White House. Wilderotter is the individual to whom we have previously referred a similar request for this document from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED

JUL 21 1975

Charles Whitley, Administrative Assistant to Congressman David Henderson (D-N.C.), Chairman of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on 4-30-75 told Bowers that the Postal Facilities Subcommittee had scheduled the hearings regarding this legislation hurriedly after it was determined that the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, Committee on Government Operations, chaired by

ORIGINAL FILED IN

66-2212-23

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Bowers

REC-15

66-2212-23

ST 104

5 JUN 10 1975

DWB:kjs (10)

CONTINUED - over

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

84 JUL 23 1975

Congresswoman Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.), had indicated an interest in holding hearings on this matter. Whitley stated hopefully Abzug's Subcommittee can be precluded from conducting any hearings in this area by virtue of the assertion of authority by the Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

James Wentzel, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, has been alerted to the effect that an invitation will be received by the Department for testimony on this legislation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the General and Special Investigative Divisions and the Intelligence Division promptly begin compiling appropriate information for submission to the Legal Counsel Division which can be submitted to the Department for its use in testifying or can be used as the basis for FBI testimony should the Department request an FBI representative to appear at these hearings.

RFB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TJL

DATE: 4/29/75

1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum records the receipt of two documents furnished to the Bureau as a member of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. These documents were furnished by Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, who is chairman of the Ad Hoc Group.

Attached herewith is a current list of those staff members of the Senate Select Committee who have received security clearances. The Bureau will continue to receive up-dated lists as additional staff members are afforded a security clearance.

Also attached is a copy of the request levied on the Department of State by the Senate Select Committee. A copy of this request was furnished to the Bureau for its information by Mr. Clarke.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Enclosures

WRW/TJL

WOC:lmh lmh
(8)

REC-100 62-116395-151

21 MAY 15 1975

ENCLOSURE

2

84 MAY 27 1975

24 April 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET

	NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
B *	Aaron, David 15/4	8-21-38	IL	550-44-7971	
B *	Bader, William 17/4	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF - Badge
	Baron, Frederick	12-2-47	CONN	494-54-5241	
*	Benz, Charity I.	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
	Brooks, Nancy	2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773	
B *	Carter, Barry 24/4	12-14-42	CAL	567-56-8854	
	Chesnik, Barbara	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
B *	Davis, Lynn 17/4	9-6-43	FL	042-36-9155	TF - Badge
	Dawson, Thomas	9-9-52	MINN	471-60-1688	
	De Oreo, Mary	6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258	
	Dillon, Molly	4-16-51	VA	150-38-4588	
	Dwyer, Daniel	8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792	
	Epstein, Michael Taylor	3-10-37	MASS	026-28-6318	
B *	Fenn, Peter 24/4	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123	
	Gitenstein, Mark Henry	3-7-46	ALA	420-60-8767	
	Greissing, Edward	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
*	Hatry, Audrey Helen	6-10-23	MD	216-14-8691	
*	Inderfurth, Mark	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	
	Johnson, Dorothy	6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413	

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-151

Staff Members of Senate Select Committee cleared, page 2

		NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
		Johnson, Loch	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478	
	*	Kieves, Lawrence	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
B	*	Kirbow, Charles 24/4	10-2-22	GA	252-12-5112	TF - Badge
B	*	Lombard, Charles 24/4	6-2-30	FR	578-44-9471	
		Liebengood, Howard	12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707	
		MacDonald, Naldeen	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
B	*	Madigan, Michael James 15/4	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF - Badge
B	*	Marshall, Benjamin 17/4	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
B	*	Maxwell, Elliot Everett 15/4	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF - Badge
	*	Mecham, Martha Evans	2-11-40	CAL	528-48-6848	
B	*	Miller, William G. 15/4	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
B	*	O'Flaherty, James Daniel 15/4	11-4-42	ILL	239-62-8495	Badge
		Orloff, Jan	11-14-47	CAL	558-74-8394	
		Peterson, John F.	6-15-41	CAL	565-56-7707	
		Pitts, Susan	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
B	*	Romberg, Alan 22/4	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
B	*	Schwarz, Frederick A.O., III 15/4	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
B	*	Shea, Patrick 15/4	2-28-48	UT	528-64-1965	
		Smith, Stephanie	3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476	
B	*	Snider, Lewis Brittle 24/4	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
		Towell, Mary	4-25-44	TN	566-64-7628	
B	*	Wides, Burton Victor 17/4	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF - Badge

* Staff Members who are designated to receive COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION.
B Staff Members briefed on COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION.

4/23/75

Request to the Secretary of State for Documents and Other Material Regarding the Department of State and Intelligence Activities of the United States Government

1. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance or similar material setting forth the relationship of the Department of State to, and its role in, the Intelligence Community and the National Security Council structure, including but not limited to the United States Intelligence Board, the Forty Committee, Washington Special Action Group, Senior Review Group, the Verification Panel, and the Intelligence Committee. Specific descriptive and documentary material covering the nature and extent of the Department's relationship with the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other investigating and intelligence entities should be included, such as the Interagency Evaluation Committee.

2. Organization charts showing which officials represent the Department of State on the various Intelligence Community and NSC committees, and on all other bodies, including subcommittees, whose functions include intelligence activities. Such charts should give the names and titles of officials representing the Department of State in those committees (or their predecessor organizations) going as far back as 1947 or any earlier date which the Department believes relevant. The charts should also include, for the same time frame, the names, titles, and a brief job description of those officials of the Department who provided staff support to the Department's representatives on Intelligence Community and NSC committees or to the committees directly.

3. All regulations, guidance, inter-agency memoranda, delimitations agreements, including other agreements and similar material governing the support which the Department of State provides to or receives from other agencies within the Government, having an intelligence or security or investigative function. This would include, but not be limited to, such matters as administrative support and "cover" provided to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (and its predecessors), communications support, and financial services.

4. Description, including organization chart, of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). This should include, in particular, detailed discussion of the operations of the Directorate for Coordination (INR/DDC) and any predecessor offices, whether in INR, the Under Secretary's office, or elsewhere in the Department. Names of personnel throughout the Directorate for Coordination or its

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-151
ENCLOSURE

predecessors should be listed covering the entire period since that function was developed.

5. Description of the organization and functions of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, and of the Office of Security within the Bureau of Administration, insofar as they relate to liaison or cooperation with any intelligence or domestic investigatory body.

6. All instructions, memoranda or similar documents authorizing the establishment of and detailing the mandate of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (and its Working Group). Also all reports on terrorism by the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (and its Working Group), such as the report by the Secretary of State to the President referred to in the President's Memorandum of September 25, 1972, establishing the Committee.

7. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance, or similar material which sets forth the Department of State's role in establishing or reviewing requirements or proposals for intelligence activity, including intelligence collection, recruitment of agents, political action programs, paramilitary programs, and counterintelligence activities. In addition, a descriptive account of the Department of State's role in establishing or reviewing requirements or proposals for intelligence activity, differentiating the Department's role in intelligence collection, recruitment of agents, political action programs, paramilitary programs, and counterintelligence activities. This should include differentiation between activities within these categories where differences exist.

8. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance, or similar material which sets forth the role and functions of the Department of State in the collection, assessment, production, and dissemination of national intelligence. In addition, a descriptive account of the current role and functions of the Department of State in this regard.

9. All instructions, guidance or similar material defining the authority of U.S. Ambassadors and other Chiefs of Mission to know about and control activities of any U.S. intelligence or investigative agent or entity in the country to which the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is accredited. This should include any limitations upon Ambassadorial control or cognizance of and discussion of any other coordination, monitoring, or other relationships between U.S. missions and the activities of any U.S. intelligence or investigative agent or entity.

10. Any other historical, descriptive or documentary material, studies or reports which the Department believes would be of assistance to the Select Committee in understanding the Department's role in intelligence activities, evaluation and monitoring of those activities, or other matters relevant to the Committee's mandate.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

151 THRU 163

164 THRU 188

190 THRU 208

210 THRU 219

220, 221

2ND NR 221 THRU 230

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88296 Date: 2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/2/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

At 2:30 p.m. on June 2, 1975, a conference was held with the Deputy Attorney General attended by K. William O'Connor, Kevin Maroney, Philip White, and Robert McDermott of the Department. Bureau representatives were Mr. Callahan, Mr. Adams, Mr. Wannall and me.

Mr. O'Connor discussed the request by the Senate Select Committee for access to the 39 page report by former Assistant Attorney General Petersen concerning COINTELPRO. Though objections were presented by the Bureau representatives that the report should not be furnished to the Committee, and its enclosures, particularly the legal memoranda should not be made available, the Deputy Attorney General decided and instructed that the 39 page report should be made available to John Elliff on Tuesday, June 3, 1975, for his review, at which time he would be permitted to take notes, but he would not be furnished a copy of the document. The Deputy further instructed that should Mr. Elliff request the attachments to the report, Mr. O'Connor should offer as an alternative the memoranda which initiated each of the COINTELPROs.

EX-105 REC-20 62-116395-220

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Upon our return to the Bureau, Mr. Adams requested that the Intelligence Division undertake an analysis of each of the summaries which were attached to the Petersen report in order to make a damage assessment based on factors that would affect current Bureau operations should they be revealed to the Committee. He also requested that ~~this information~~ be compiled and available to brief the Deputy Attorney General as to the difficulties that would be involved upon disclosure.

JUN 10 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. David Ryan
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

62-116009

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Intelligence Division analyze the summaries for purposes of a damage assessment.

2. That the Intelligence Division be prepared to furnish a briefing to the Deputy Attorney General as to the damage assessment.

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/28/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO: Director, FBI (62-116395)
(Attention: INTD - W. O. Cregar)

FROM: SAC, Atlanta (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

Re Bureau airtel to Atlanta 5/23/75.

Material enclosed with referenced airtel was hand-delivered to former SA, ALAN G. SENTINELLA, 5/27/75, and same was returned by SENTINELLA to Atlanta Division same day.

Enclosed is the material furnished by SENTINELLA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

detached & filed w/ yellow of LHM 5/22/75

5-B

62-116395-229

REC-100

17 JUN 16 1975

2-Bureau (Enc.)
1-Atlanta
WKD:rrl
(3)

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

84 JUN 17 1975

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 5 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident ____
Inspection ____
Int. II. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 011 NK CODE

4:00PM 6/5/75 IMMEDIATE RXG

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

ATT: W. O. GREGAR, INTD

FROM NEWARK (62-3971)

SENSTUDY 75

RE TELCON BUREAU SUPERVISOR ROBERT SHEA AND ASAC HERBERT D. CLOUGH, JR., JUNE 5, 1975.

THOROUGH REVIEW OF FILES CAPTIONED "DISRUPTION OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION; INFORMATION CONCERNING"; "SPECIAL SQUAD AT DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION , ATLANTIC CITY, N.J., AUGUST 22-28, 1964"; "DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, AUGUST 24-28, 1964" AND JUNE FILES DOES NOT REVEAL ANY MEMORANDA, LETTERS OR OTHER TYPE COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED BY FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, LEO T. CLARK.

END

MWW FBI WASH DC CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC-100

62-116395-228

JUN 16 1975

CC - Gregar

84 JUN 17 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 3, 1975

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.
   Stanley David Levison

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired SA, FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: Bureau file 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/12/75

5. INTERVIEWER: Mr. Lester B. Seidel, SSC Staff Member

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT:

Witness was questioned and furnished information concerning the former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley David Levison.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

SFP:ekw
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

62-116395

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

REC-100

62-116395-227

17 JUN 16 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 17 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2190
10 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

Harriet Merritt for
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN [illegible]
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

Attachment

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-226

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 16 1975

file 62-116395

FIVE

8 4 JUN 19 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

10 JUN 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
Bader, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara			12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
Chesnick, Barbara			4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	

HEREIN
DATE 1-19-07 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-226

ENCLOSURE

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17 (Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Dawson, Thomas			9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeOreo, Mary			6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel			8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor			3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
Ernő, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
Greissing, Edward			11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF Badge
Iverson, Portia			10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	

10 JUN 1975

	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth			
Name	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)			Social Security No.	
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
Karalekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	

10 JUN 1975

	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Name	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan			11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.			6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Pyle, Christopher			11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Ricks, Walter			12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Seidel, Lester			7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.			3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha			9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Wallach, Paul			5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

1 - D. W. Moore
(Attn: J.M. Murphy)
1 - J. A. Mintz
(Attn: Legal Analysis Section)
1 - W. R. Wannall

May 9, 1975

Sr. Study -75

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - R. W. Held

Honorable Charles E. Wiggins
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

170-3145-7

Dear Congressman Wiggins:

Reference is made to your letter dated April 9, 1975, enclosing a resolution adopted by the State Bar of California condemning the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for placing an informant on the staff of a legal service agency to communicate information learned in that capacity to the FBI and our response dated April 28, 1975.

Contact with the State Bar of California has enabled us to identify the situation to which they were referring.

MAILED 6
MAY 14 1975
FBI

Between April, 1968, and November, 1968, one Rudolph Leamer Muse was operated as an informant by our New Orleans, Louisiana, Division. Muse furnished information regarding black extremist activities and he was paid for services rendered. Muse was unemployed when initially volunteering his assistance to the FBI and subsequently, on May 10, 1968, began working as an investigator for the New Orleans Legal Assistance Corps (NOLAC), an organization funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Information in the files of our New Orleans Division indicates during June, 1968, Muse advised it had become necessary to tell his supervisor at NOLAC of his relationship with the FBI. His supervisor became aware of Muse's association with black nationalist groups and attempted to discharge him. To avoid discharge, Muse told his supervisor he was cooperating with the FBI. Subsequently Muse's supervisor from NOLAC contacted the New Orleans Division and advised he wanted to assure the FBI that the relationship between

4

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan & Eval. ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

REC-62-116395
ST 104
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 16 1975
19 MAY 16 1975

cah
RWH:cah (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2ALM/RW

MAIL ROOM ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JUN 17 1975

Honorable Charles E. Wiggins

Muse and the FBI would be maintained by him and would go no further. Muse's supervisor said he was cognizant of the importance of Muse's cooperation with the FBI remaining confidential.

The New Orleans Division of the FBI never conducted any investigation regarding NOLAC and Muse never furnished information concerning its activities.

I hope this information will clarify the issue for you. If I may be of further assistance in this matter, please contact me.

A copy of this letter is being provided to the State Bar of California.

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

1 - State Bar of California
601 McAllister Street
San Francisco, California 94102

NOTE:

The resolution of the State Bar of California (SBC) referred to above did not identify the specific incident in which they were interested so Congressman Wiggins' letter was acknowledged and we indicated additional details would follow. On 4/25/75 San Francisco advised the basis for the SBC resolution was articles contained in the 2/7/75 issues of the San Francisco Examiner and Oakland Tribune. In these articles Muse was not mentioned by name but the details corresponded with his case. On 4/28/75 Supervisor Ernest Wall, New Orleans, advised Muse was identified by name in articles concerning this incident in the 2/2/75 issue of the New Orleans Times Picayune and the 2/25/75 issue of the New Orleans States Item. Since Muse revealed his relationship with the FBI and has been publicly identified by name and appears to be no privacy issue or need to protect the confidentiality of our files, Congressman Wiggins should be advised of the complete details in this matter. As the SBC urged issues such as this be considered by the select committees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, a copy of this communication is being furnished for the information of the Legal Analysis Section and Project Senstudy 75 in Division 5.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-8-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth in summary form the requests we have received from various Committees in Congress and the status of our replies.

I. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

We have substantially complied with the request of this Committee contained in their letter of 3-19-75. The remaining aspects of this request involve a decision by the State Department concerning the release of exhibits contained in a study on FBI jurisdiction, a decision by the Department relating to COINTELPRO and our recommendation that one particular document not be furnished the Committee.

We are in receipt of a request by memorandum dated 4-30-75 from the SSC. This request generally relates to Sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Manual of Instructions, and the various divisions having responsibilities and interest in the Sections requested, are in the process of preparing the necessary responses.

We received a request by letter dated 4-28-75 from the Committee concerning allegations of our possible involvement in the removal of documents from the residence of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover. Our response has been prepared and it is anticipated it will be furnished the Department in the near future.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
170 JUN 3 1975

MAY 23 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2725-171

II. Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee

We have complied with those aspects of the request contained in this Committee's letter of 4-10-75, pertaining to photographic surveillance and indexing procedures. We anticipate our response to their requests relating to our authority to collect, retain and disseminate information will be furnished in the immediate future.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

58 JUN 6 1975

PVD:dkg (6)

102

CONTINUED - OVER

We also received a request from this Committee by letter dated 4-22-75, relating to our procedures of handling Freedom of Information Act requests and an inquiry by letter dated 4-25-75 regarding our alleged involvement in the removal of documents from the residence of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover. We have prepared responses to both requests. The response concerning the Freedom of Information Act has been furnished the Department for approval and furnishing to the Committee; the response relating to removal of documents has been prepared and is in the process of being approved by the Bureau.

III. Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate Judiciary Committee

We received a request by letter dated 4-28-75 for information relating to terrorist incidents. We have prepared and furnished a response to this request.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

PVD JBH/PVD

ATTENDEES

USIB AD HOC COORDINATING GROUP ON CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

Wednesday, 4 June 1975, at 1000 hours
DCI Conference Room (7D64)

Dr. John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

Mr. J. J. Hitchcock
State

Mr. David Lowman
NSA

Mr. J. Foster Collins
Treasury

Mr. Leon F. Schwartz
FBI

Mr. Robert Upchurch
ERDA

RADM Donald P. Harvey, USN
Mr. John Brock
Captain William Quisenberry
DIA

Captain L. C. Martinez
Navy

Lt. Col. Harold Coyle
Rep. for Deputy Under
Secretary of the Air Force

Mr. Walter Elder
CIA

Mrs. Harriett D. Mowitt
Exec Sec to the Ad Hoc Group
ICS

Mr. Donald E. Moore
Chairman, USIB Security
Committee

Mr. Merrill T. Kelly
Army

Colonel Jerry D. Alderson, Jr.
Air Force

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-07 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

DCI/IC-75-0608
6 June 1975

Senstudy-75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals ~~of the USIB~~ Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Ninth Meeting, 4 June 1975

1. A meeting of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group was held on 4 June 1975 at 10:00 a.m. A list of attendees is attached.

2. The meeting was opened by Dr. Clarke who described the current activities of the Senate Select Committee in accelerating their official interviews with knowledgeable officials across the Community and the criticality of firming up agreements on how these interviews are to be handled. This has not been forthcoming despite White House interest. House Select Committee procedure is not yet clear.

3. The second item raised by the Chairman was the list of category II "abuses" which had been developed at the direction of the Policy Steering Group. The set developed was the result of discussions with Mr. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee, who plans to present a complete list of "category II" items to the Committee on Friday, 6 June. At that point, it is expected "notices" would go out to the Community agencies advising them so that agreed interview procedures will apply. It is also anticipated that the presence of private as well as Agency counsel will be addressed. The Policy Steering Group has accepted the principle of dealing with these identified "category II" subjects by assigning responsibility for gathering of comprehensive and paper preparation to specific individuals within the Community agencies. Dr. Clarke is the focal point for gathering the names of individuals who will assume these responsibilities. To date, individuals had been named for all subjects except those to be handled by CIA.

62-116395 —

NOT RECORDED

17 JUN 16 1975

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

File-62-116395

84 JUN 17 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

4. In addition to the "category II" items, there are a number of additional subjects largely geographic in nature for which the DCI feels CIA should assume responsibility for preparing comprehensive papers. In view of the apparent adversary relationship between the Senate Select Committee Staff and the agencies under investigation, it may be that preparation of papers dealing comprehensively with specific subjects will deflect some of this cross-agency probing and result in a positive solution to problems before they arise.

5. The Chairman reminded the group of the responsibility which exists to keep Mr. Cotter of the Post Office Department informed on matters resulting from the Congressional investigations which will clearly impact on his agency's affairs. At present, the cross-agency character of the interviews now under way indicate a possible communication gap in adequately coordinating on postal matters.

6. The Chairman explained the DCI's action taken in late May to separate the responsibility for CIA's response to the Congressional Select Committees from those responsibilities of the IC Staff. Both Dr. Clarke and Mr. Elder emphasized the very close relationship which exists in the two efforts. Mr. Elder will represent CIA at all USIB Ad Hoc sessions henceforth.

7. The Chairman questioned Mr. Elder, the CIA representative, whether or not the Senate Select Committee had yet furnished the Agency with a list of subjects with which they plan to deal in depth. Mr. Elder reported they have not yet done so, but it is apparent that three items are of priority interest at the moment: assassinations, the Phoenix program, and covert action; that it appears clear the Committee is currently pursuing the question of authorities, approvals, and support from other agencies.

8. The 27 May request addressed to the DCI covering materials under the jurisdiction of a number of Community agencies was provided to the members of the Ad Hoc Group. Dr. Clarke indicated he was seeking policy guidance on selected items in the request which dealt with Community product such as NIE etc. He noted the 27 May request indicated identical letters were being forwarded to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Copies have been sent to all USIB Ad Hoc members, the NSC and the White House.

9. Copies of a memorandum which set forth the action items resulting from the Policy Steering Group session of last week were provided to the Ad Hoc members for their information.

10. Mr. Elder reported that the House Committee has indicated to CIA its intent to concentrate on specific issues, but as of now are not adequately organized to be specific in their requests. The one extant request forwarded to the CIA was posing some problems because of the lack of cleared personnel, approved storage facilities, and determinations on the ultimate disposition of records. The Chairman noted that concurrent with this meeting, a meeting of Community legal representatives was taking place with the purpose of commenting on the House Select Committee's proposed security regulations which have not yet been adopted.

11. CIA reported its success with the provision of a reading room for SSC Staff at CIA headquarters. State reported there were no comparable facilities anticipated there. Defense has provided badges to Staff members and reading facilities are available. The same accessability of materials is true at NSA and FBI.

12. The last subject on the agenda was the implementation of the Community Central Index. In the material provided to the group was a letter reaffirming the purposes of the Central Index and a list of 40 key words to be used in identifying material furnished the Index. A printout of the Index content was provided to the group as a review document only. The final format of such periodic reports has not yet been refined. Group members are encouraged to comment if they detect any problems with items in the printout. Forms for inputting information to the Central Index were also provided to the Group. This is a service of common concern which will assure the uniformity of information received and should serve to lighten the workload of the individual agencies. The telephone number of Mrs. Young of the Central Index was provided for agencies' convenience in accessing the Index information.

Harriett D. Mowitt /km

Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0116
6 June 1975

Senstudy-75

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

1. The following list includes subjects to be covered by the Agencies concerned:

Assassinations	White House	Mr. Wilderotter IDS 145-7094
Drug Abuse	CIA	Not yet designated
Political Abuses (1964)	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609
Domestic Surveillance	Justice	John Martin IDS 187-4555
Electronic Surveillance and Warrantless Wiretap	Justice	George Calhoun IDS 187-4401
Use of Notional Organizations	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609
Use of Proprietary Organizations	CIA	Not yet designated
Mail Cover and Intercept	Justice	Phil White IDS 187-4674
Watch List	DoD	Benson Buffham, NSA 688-7222
Army Surveillance	DoD	Dr. David Cooke 695-4436

File 62-116395

62-116395-5-W06

NOT RECORDED

17 JUN 13 1975

84 JUN 13 1975

The individuals named on this list are those designated by the Agencies as having prime responsibility for preparing the paper. The papers should be delivered in two copies directly to the Associate Counsel to the President, Mr. James Wilderotter, Room 182, Old Executive Office Building, by the Agencies. In the course of the next week, a meeting will be called for Mr. Wilderotter to meet with the individuals designated on this list. Each Agency will also be responsible for naming a person to work with each Task Force leader where it is appropriate to the subject matter. In the interim, Task Force leaders should deal directly with the following people with respect to individual Agency responsibilities:

DCI/Intelligence Community	John Clarke IDS 143-5477
CIA	E. Henry Knoche IDS 143-4086
Defense	Tom Latimer IDS 11-54221
State	William Hyland IDS 101-20342
Treasury	William Morell IDS 184-2536
Justice	William O'Connor IDS 187-5211
FBI	William Cregar IDS 175-4636

2. The CIA has been coordinating internally the DCI's letter to the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and this letter should be available for Community review and consideration soon. Distribution of this letter will be made sometime prior to a meeting of the General Counsels chaired by Mr. Wilderotter to go over details of the letter and coordinate on the final language. This arrangement is consistent with agreements reached in our meeting on 3 June 1975.

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Distribution:
1 - Mr. Wilderotter
1 - Mr. Latimer
1 - Mr. Hyland
1 - Mr. Morell
1 - Mr. O'Connor
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - Mrs. Mowitt/Executive Secretary of Steering Group (IDS 143-4055)

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY PLAZA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-01 BY

Special Agent Seymor Phillips
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

6

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw eKW For info only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR-Dept. of Justice. -11/22/76 JKB
(13)

Delivered 5/23/75 to K W O'(mnc
pr

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP16SK/RG

REC-100

62-116395-225

17 JUN 16 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 JUN 17 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

62-116395

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S.F.Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP1GSK/fg

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is the verbatim text of a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella who served as an SA of the FBI from July 12, 1948, until his retirement March 22, 1971. He is presently employed as Director of Safety, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia.

"Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

"Interview by Lester B. Siedel, (sic), representative of Senate Select Committee of Alan G. Sentinella. Interview commenced 12:24pm, terminated 2:20pm. Siedel at the outset identified self via credential as representative of aforementioned Committee.

"Mr. Siedel introduced by writer to Mr. Seymor Phillips of the FBI. The writer explained to Siedel that following his telephone conversation, 5/9/75, during which he stated he was interested in discussing matters related to the King and Levison cases it was felt that such discussion might involve issues currently sensitive to the Bureau. Accordingly the Atlanta Office was contacted and subsequently the writer was contacted by Robert Olmert of the Bureau. Mr. Olmert advised that if it was desired the Bureau would make available a representative not for the purpose of participating in the interview but to be available for advice. The

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw ekw
(13)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOS.

SEE NOTE PAGE TEN

62-116395-225

GPO 954-546

writer stated he was interested in obtaining such assistance. Accordingly during the morning of 5/12/75 Mr. Seymor Phillips contacted the writer.

"This is dictated immediately following interview by Siedel. No effort is herein made to follow the chronology of questions presented by Siedel. During the interview no notes or recording were made by writer. Will use "Q" for question and "A" for answer. Questions (Q) were asked by Siedel and answers (A) were given by writer.

"A: Was it correct that matters concerning the King investigation were discussed openly over coffee by members of the Atlanta field office?

"A: Matters relating to the King investigation were discussed by individuals concerned therewith. I have no recollection during the period I was connected with the investigation that it was discussed by everybody like the previous night's ballgame might have been.

"Q: Shortly after King received the Nobel Prize did a Bureau official William Sullivan come to Atlanta?

"A: It is my recollection King received the Nobel Prize sometime before the case was assigned to me. I do not remember if Bureau official William Sullivan visited Atlanta.

"Q: Did Sullivan have any contact with Ralph McGill concerning King?

"A: I do not know.

"Q: Were taps (telephone) and bugs (microphone) used by Atlanta in connection with King?

"A: A tap (telephone) was utilized re King at his SCLC office and his residence.

"Q: When were the bugs (microphone) utilized?

"A: There were none.

"Q: What was the purpose of the investigation of King?

"A: To determine whether King and/or SCLC were influenced by persons or groups having communist tendencies.

"Q: Did you feel the investigation was worthwhile?

"A: I don't recall that I ever asked myself that question. It was an assignment made by my employer and my responsibility to handle it.

"Q: How did other agents feel about the illegal use of these taps?

"A: The taps were not illegal. They were obtained through the authority of the Attorney General.

"Q: Did any agents express the opinion that these investigations were improper?

"A: I do not recall specifically although Mr. Murtaugh (sic) may well have so stated.

"Q: What electronic surveillance was used concerning Levison?

"A: I do not know. Levison resided in New York City.

"Q: Was Levison covered by the tap on King?

"A: Only to the extent that he was in contact with King. There was no tap on Levison per se in Atlanta.

"Q: Was there any physical surveillance of King?

"A: I do not recall any physical surveillance of King as such. There was surveillance conducted of individuals in contact with King and consequently King would obviously have been physically surveilled. But such surveillance was not on King directly.

"Q. Did you participate in these surveillances?

"A: Yes on several occasions.

"Q: How many occasions?

"A: I cannot recall.

"Q: How long were you in Atlanta?

"A: August 1960 - March 1971.

"Q: What other offices did you serve in and when?

"A: Baltimore, September 1948 - January 1949; Buffalo, January 1949 - August 1960; Atlanta, August 1960 - March 1971.

"Q: Where were you born?

"A: London, England.

"Q: How long did you live there?

"A: 9 years.

"Q: Where did you live first when in this country?

"A: In New Jersey approximately one year. I spent most of my growing up time in Iowa.

"Q: You entered the Bureau July 1948 and left in March 1971?

"A: That is correct.

"Q: When was the King and SCLC case assigned to you?

"A: I believe it was the early part or spring of 1965.

"Q: How long had the investigation been going on before you got the case?

"A: I really am not sure - possibly a year; it might have been longer.

"A: How long did the investigation continue?

"A: I cannot actually recall.

"Q: Was it still going on when you left the Bureau?

"A: Yes, regarding the SCLC.

"Q: How long after King's death did the tap remain?

"A: I cannot be sure. It seems as though it was discontinued a short time after, however I believe it continued for a longer period of time on the SCLC.

"Q: Did you have any contact with news media or clergy regarding King, SCLC, or Levison?

"A: No.

"Q: What relationship was there with the Atlanta Police Department and what electronic surveillance did it have of King, SCLC, or Levison?

"A: Throughtout my entire period as agent in Atlanta I never had any information as to what electronic surveillance may have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison there was no discussion to my knowledge of these matters with the Atlanta Police Department. Generally speaking the rapport with the police department was good.

"Q: Did you monitor the taps on King, SCLC?

"A: No.

"Q: What squad were you assigned to in the Atlanta Office?

"A: Security. More correctly it was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad.

"Q: Who else was assigned to this squad? Was there a man named Harding?

"A: Yes.

"Q: What was his first name?

"A: Charles.

"A: Who else was assigned?

"A: Your friend Murtaugh, a Richard Davis.

"At this point the writer stated he preferred not to name additional personnel simply because he did not wish to feel that they might subsequently be interviewed as a result. The writer stated he was confident that Siedel or his agency had already been furnished all of these names by Mr. Murtaugh. He was informed that in the writer's opinion the Bureau was fully able and capable of furnishing this information. Siedel opined it would be a waste of government money to subpoena the writer to Washington in order to obtain these names.

"Q: Did you develop any evidence relating to Levison's CP connections?

"A: No.

"Q: Did you read reports from New York regarding Levison?

"A: Yes.

"Q: Did these reports set forth information from taps and bugs?

"A: The reports did not state source of information.

"Q: Did you know the information came from taps (or bugs)?

"A: I did not know directly but presumed that it did.

"Q: What type of work was the Security Squad in Atlanta concerned with?

"A: That squad primarily handled matters in the security category, racial matters, and also civil rights matters.

"Q: What kind of matters constituted racial matters besides SCLC?

"A: The investigation of SCLC was not a racial matter. It was concerned with possible communist influence of the organization. The Ku Klux Klan was a racial matter because it involved pressures between white and black persons.

"Q: What organizations or individuals were investigated in the security category?

"A: I have had no contact with Bureau matters for over four years. At this time I have no knowledge what effect my answer to your question might have upon the current status of any matter of concern to the Bureau.

"Siedel essentially repeated his question and endeavored to explain that he had no desire to affect the Bureau's investigative status.

"The writer advised his answer to the question remained as above. At this point Siedel suggested the writer might wish to consult Mr. Phillips which was done.

"Writer consulted privately with Phillips. After which Phillips entered the writer's office and told Siedel that if he was seeking the Bureau's policy relative to security, racial and civil rights investigations, same was in the Bureau's manuals available to the Committee. At this point Siedel said he was not after policy but names of specific persons and organizations the writer would now recall were under investigation.

"The writer restated former answer to this question and explained to Siedel that he did not consider himself so

naive to suppose that any of the information given to Siedel would not at some future time appear in print. To which Siedel stated he would not be personally responsible therefore. Siedel was informed the writer was not necessarily stating he would be personally responsible therefore. Siedel pointed out that he could not require a different answer to this question at the present time but went on to explain the writer could be subpoenaed for this purpose for open or closed testimony.

"Q: During the course of these investigations did you ever alter or fabricate any document previously prepared?

"A: No.

"Q: Do you know of such having been done in the Atlanta Office?

"A: No.

"Q: Do you know of a tape recording pertaining to King which was sent to Mrs. King?

"A: Not during that period. It seems I might have heard such an allegation but there has been so much material news media wise the past year or two, I actually cannot be sure whether I read of such an allegation or might have heard it said. In any case so far as I am concerned it was hearsay.

"Q: What was your participation in COINTELPRO investigations and what did they cover while you were in the Atlanta Office?

"A: I left the Bureau over four years ago and have absolutely no knowledge of what might be the present status of any investigation by the Bureau past or present. I feel very strongly that any answer I might give could conceivably adversely effect the Bureau's investigative position. For this reason I decline to discuss this matter.

Siedel stated the Bureau had recently stated it had discontinued COINTELPRO. The writer advised he was not aware of this; that his answer above remained the same.

"Q: Do you know of any effort by the Bureau to influence a political campaign?

"A: No."

In addition to the foregoing verbatim statement, Sentinella also voluntarily furnished to the FBI several observations, the following of which may be of interest:

"1. Siedel obviously was attempting to verify allegations made by other individuals.

"2. All of his questions appeared to have been previously prepared in writing.

"3. At one point he commented he was conducting this interview for a colleague (not named).

"4. Siedel did not appear satisfied with the results of the interview. It is presumed he considers the writer's cooperation to be minimal.

"5. As Siedel prepared to depart he was informed that during 23 years as an agent the writer suffered some adverse administrative action; that these ultimately proved to be experiences from which the writer profited. He was told the writer had "no axe to grind" regarding the Bureau and no intent or desire to accomplish any questionable literary fame."

The individual who interviewed Sentinella was SSC Staff Member Lester B. Seidel, not Siedel, as indicated in Sentinella's statement.

The King referred to in Sentinella's statement is the late Martin Luther King, Jr., subject of prior investigation by the FBI. The Levison referred to is Stanley David Levison, also subject of prior FBI investigation. The SCLC referred to is the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, an organization which was headed by King. The Murtaugh referred to is Arthur Leo Murtagh who was an SA of the FBI from April 16, 1951, until his retirement on September 25, 1971.

NOTE:

Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentinella's verbatim statement and from a separate statement containing his observations, both of which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The procedure of furnishing the AG an extra copy for forwarding to Wilderotter has been established through liaison by P. V. Daly of the Legal Counsel's Office with the AG's Office.

Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

Interview by Lester B. Siedel, (sic) representative of Senate Select Committee of Alan G. Sentinella. Interview commenced 12:24pm, terminated 2:20pm. Siedel at the outset identified self via credential as representative of aforementioned Committee.

Mr. Siedel introduced by writer to Mr. Seymor Phillips of the FBI. The writer explained to Siedel that following his telephone conversation, 5/9/75, during which he stated he was interested in discussing matters related to the King and Levison cases it was felt that such discussion might involve issues currently sensitive to the Bureau. Accordingly the Atlanta Office was contacted and subsequently the writer was contacted by Robert Olmert of the Bureau. Mr. Olmert advised that if it was desired the Bureau would make available a representative not for the purpose of participating in the interview but to be available for advice. The writer stated he was interested in obtaining such assistance. Accordingly during the morning of 5/12/75 Mr. Seymor Phillips contacted the writer.

This is dictated immediately following interview by Siedel. No effort is herein made to follow the chronology of questions presented by Siedel. During the interview no notes or recording were made by writer. Will use "Q" for question and "A" for answer. Questions (Q) were asked by Siedel and answers (A) were given by writer.

A: Was it correct that matters concerning the King investigation were discussed openly over coffee by members of the Atlanta field office?

A: Matters relating to the King investigation were discussed by individuals concerned therewith. I have no recollection during the period I was connected with the investigation that it was discussed by everybody like the previous night's ballgame might have been.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/14/84 BY

Orig to H.F. w/ 24HA 5/22/75
SFP/sew

62-116395-225

Q: Shortly after King received the Nobel Prize did a Bureau official William Sullivan come to Atlanta?

A: It is my recollection King received the Nobel Prize sometime before the case was assigned to me. I do not remember if Bureau official William Sullivan visited Atlanta.

Q: Did Sullivan have any contact with Ralph McGill concerning King?

A: I do not know.

Q: Were taps (telephone) and bugs (microphone) used by Atlanta in connection with King?

A: A tap (telephone) was utilized re King at his SCLC office and his residence.

Q: When were the bugs (microphone) utilized?

A: There were none.

Q: What was the purpose of the investigation of King?

A: To determine whether King and/or SCLC were influenced by persons or groups having communist tendencies.

Q: Did you feel the investigation was worthwhile?

A: I don't recall that I ever asked myself that question. It was an assignment made by my employer and my responsibility to handle it.

Q: How did other agents feel about the illegal use of these taps?

A: The taps were not illegal. They were obtained through the authority of the Attorney General.

Q: Did any agents express the opinion that these investigations were improper?

A: I do not recall specifically although Mr. Murtaugh may well have so stated.

Q: What electronic surveillance was used concerning Levison?

A: I do not know. Levison resided in New York City.

Q: Was Levison covered by the tap on King?

A: Only to the extent that he was in contact with King. There was no tap on Levison per se in Atlanta.

Q: Was there any physical surveillance of King?

A: I do not recall any physical surveillance of King as such. There was surveillance conducted of individuals in contact with King and consequently King would obviously have been physically surveilled. But such surveillance was not on King directly.

Q: Did you participate in these surveillances?

A: Yes on several occasions.

Q: How many occasions?

A: I cannot recall.

Q: How long were you in Atlanta?

A: August 1960 - March 1971.

Q: What other offices did you serve in and when?

A: Baltimore, September 1948 - January 1949; Buffalo, January 1949 - August 1960; Atlanta, August 1960 - March 1971.

Q: Where were you born?

A: London, England.

Q: How long did you live there?

A: 9 years.

Q: Where did you live first when in this country?

A: In New Jersey approximately one year. I spent most of my growing up time in Iowa.

Q: You entered the Bureau July 1948 and left in March 1971?

A: That is correct.

Q: When was the King and SCLC case assigned to you?

A: I believe it was the early part or spring of 1965.

Q: How long had the investigation been going on before you got the case?

A: I really am not sure - possibly a year; it might have been longer.

A: How long did the investigation continue?

A: I cannot actually recall.

Q: Was it still going on when you left the Bureau?

A: Yes, regarding the SCLC.

Q: How long after King's death did the tap remain?

A: I cannot be sure. It seems as though it was discontinued a short time after, however I believe it continued for a longer period of time on the SCLC.

Q: Did you have any contact with news media or clergy regarding King, SCLC, or Levison?

A: No.

Q: What relationship was there with the Atlanta Police Department and what electronic surveillance did it have of King, SCLC, or Levison?

A: Throughtout my entire period as agent in Atlanta I never had any information as to what electronic surveillance may have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison there was no discussion to my knowledge of these matters with the Atlanta Police Department. Generally speaking the rapport with the police department was good.

Q: Did you monitor the taps on King, SCLC?

A: No.

Q: What squad were you assigned to in the Atlanta Office?

A: Security. More correctly it was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad.

Q: Who else was assigned to this squad? Was there a man named Harding?

A: Yes.

Q: What was his first name?

A: Charles.

A: Who else was assigned?

A: Your friend Murtaugh, a Richard Davis.

At this point the writer stated he preferred not to name additional personnel simply because he did not wish to feel that they might subsequently be interviewed as a result. The writer stated he was confident that Siedel or his agency had already been furnished all of these names by Mr. Murtaugh. He was informed that in the writer's opinion the Bureau was fully able and capable of furnishing this information. Siedel opined it would be a waste of government money to subpoena the writer to Washington in order to obtain these names.

Q: Did you develop any evidence relating to Levison's CP connections?

A: No.

Q: Did you read reports from New York regarding Levison?

A: Yes.

Q: Did these reports set forth information from taps and bugs?

A: The reports did not state source of information.

Q: Did you know the information came from taps (or bugs)?

A: I did not know directly but presumed that it did.

Q: What type of work was the Security Squad in Atlanta concerned with?

A: That squad primarily handled matters in the security category, racial matters, and also civil rights matters.

Q: What kind of matters constituted racial matters besides SCLC?

A: The investigation of SCLC was not a racial matter. It was concerned with possible communist influence of the organization. The Ku Klux Klan was a racial matter because it involved pressures between white and black persons.

Q: What organizations or individuals were investigated in the security category?

A: I have had no contact with Bureau matters for over four years. At this time I have no knowledge what effect my answer to your question might have upon the current status of any matter of concern to the Bureau.

Siedel essentially repeated his question and endeavored to explain that he had no desire to affect the Bureau's investigative status.

The writer advised his answer to the question remained as above. At this point Siedel suggested the writer might wish to consult Mr. Phillips which was done.

Writer consulted privately with Phillips. After which Phillips entered the writer's office and told Siedel that if he was seeking the Bureau's policy relative to security, racial and civil rights investigations, same was in the Bureau's manuals available to the Committee. At this point Siedel said he was not after policy but names of specific persons and organizations the writer would now recall were under investigation.

The writer restated former answer to this question and explained to Siedel that he did not consider himself so naive to suppose that any of the information given to Siedel would not at some future time appear in print. To which Siedel stated he would not be personally responsible therefore. Siedel was informed the writer was not necessarily stating he would be personally responsible therefore. Siedel pointed out that he could not require a different answer to this question at the present time but went on to explain the writer

could be subpoenaed for this purpose for open or closed testimony.

Q: During the course of these investigations did you ever alter or fabricate any document previously prepared?

A: No.

Q: Do you know of such having been done in the Atlanta Office?

A: No.

Q: Do you know of a tape recording pertaining to King which was sent to Mrs. King?

A: Not during that period. It seems I might have heard such an allegation but there has been so much material news media wise the past year or two, I actually cannot be sure whether I read of such an allegation or might have heard it said. In any case so far as I am concerned it was hearsay.

Q: What was your participation in COINTELPRO investigations and what did they cover while you were in the Atlanta Office?

A: I left the Bureau over four years ago and have absolutely no knowledge of what might be the present status of any investigation by the Bureau past or present. I feel very strongly that any answer I might give could conceivably adversely effect the Bureau's investigative position. For this reason I decline to discuss this matter.

Siedel stated the Bureau had recently stated it had discontinued COINTELPRO. The writer advised he was not aware of this; that his answer above remained the same.

Q: Do you know of any effort by the Bureau to influence a political campaign?

A: No.

Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

WRITER'S OBSERVATIONS

1. Siedel obviously was attempting to verify allegations made by other individuals.

2. All of his questions appeared to have been previously prepared in writing.

3. At one point he commented he was conducting this interview for a colleague (not named).

4. Siedel did not appear satisfied with the results of the interview. It is presumed he considers the writer's cooperation to be minimal.

5. As Siedel prepared to depart he was informed that during 23 years as an agent the writer suffered some adverse administrative action; that these ultimately proved to be experiences from which the writer profited. He was told the writer had "no axe to grind" regarding the Bureau and no intent or desire to accomplish any questionable literary fame."

6. Upon departing Siedel inquired as to the proximity of the Equitable Building (office building) and the First National Bank of Atlanta (also office building). Any significance to these locations was not apparent to the writer. When informed that banking hours terminated at 4:00pm Siedel made no comment.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 22 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR004 AP PLAIN

6:03PM NITEL 5-22-75 FXH

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ALBUQUERQUE (66-1029)

SENSTUDY 1975.

REMYTELCALL, MAY 22, 1975.

ON MAY 21, 1975, SAM PAPICH, DIRECTOR, NEW MEXICO GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME (FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, FBI), ADVISED HE IS TO APPEAR BEFORE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., ON THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1975.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

EX-108

REC-25 62-116395-224

JUN 10 1975

IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Records

cc 67-176751 (Papich)

RKL

XEROX
JUN 16 1975

5-608

PERS. REC. UNIT

JUN 0 3 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
On this envelope ~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/rlu

62-116395-223

ENCLOSURE

FD-291 (Rev. 11-1-73)

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure or production of national security information, other classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is in a better position than I to make that determination;

(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

____
(Signature)

____
(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

____________, 19 ____, by ____________________.
(Signature)

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1970
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F.P.M. CHAPTER 295
61-107

OMB APPROVAL NO. 50-R0118

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

(Position to which appointed)	*(Date of appointment)*

JUSTICE	FBI	WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Department or agency)	*(Bureau or division)*	*(Place of employment)*

I, ______________________________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing this appointment.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

____
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn (or affirmed) before me this ______ day of ______________ A.D. 19____,

at ______________ WASHINGTON, D. C.
(City) *(State)*

[SEAL]

____
(Signature of officer)

Commission expires______________
(If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown)

____
(Title)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U.S.C. 2903. The words "So help me God" in the oath and the word "swear" wherever it appears above should be stricken out when the appointee elects to affirm rather than swear to the affidavits; only these words may be stricken and only when the appointee elects to affirm the affidavits.*

GPO : 1970 O - 408-925

3-26 (Rev. 3-20-64)

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

(Place) ______________________

(Date) ______________________

Dear Sir:

Having received an appointment for a position as Special Agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, I hereby **agree and affirm** that I shall be governed by the following **conditions:**

1. I am required to proceed at my own expense to Washington, D. C., where I shall take the oath of office and enter on duty.
2. That my appointment is a probationary one.
3. That I shall remain on duty for a minimum period of three years, contingent upon a satisfactory work record.
4. That my retention in the Federal Bureau of Investigation is dependent upon the performance of satisfactory services, and if my services are deemed unsatisfactory it is understood that my employment may be discontinued at any time and that I shall not receive transportation to my home, or to any other point, at Government expense.
5. I may be sent to any part of the continental or territorial United States that the exigencies of the Bureau's work may require; that my headquarters may be fixed in some jurisdiction other than that in which I have heretofore resided; that my headquarters may be changed as the work of the Bureau may require and that no transfer will be made from one station to another for personal reasons.
6. That the **confidential character** of the relations of the employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the public is fully understood by me, and that the **strictly confidential character** of **any and all information secured by me,** in connection directly or indirectly with my work as a Special Agent, or the work of other employees of which I may become cognizant, is fully understood by me, and that **neither during my tenure of service** with the Federal Bureau of Investigation **nor at any other time shall I violate this confidence,** and **I agree and affirm** that I shall **not divulge** any information of any kind or character whatsoever that may become known to me, to persons **not officially entitled** thereto at any time.

I understand all of the foregoing and the conditions specified herein are agreeable to me **without reservation of any kind. I agree and affirm** that I shall abide by the foregoing conditions, and I am fully cognizant that the provisions mentioned above are to be complied with by me and they are a **part of my appointment.**

Very truly yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

FD-375 (Rev. 8-28-72)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Date:

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20535

TRAINING AGREEMENT

In consideration for the following specialized training which will result in considerable time and expense to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), I, ____, agree to remain in the service of the FBI (or Department of Justice, as to final item below) for the time specified, contingent upon my maintaining a satisfactory work record.

☐ So that I may receive training in **classifying, searching, and filing of fingerprints,** I agree to remain in the service of the FBI performing fingerprint duties for at least one year from this date. I understand that I may be assigned, consistent with the demands of the service, to work at night.

☐ So that I may receive training in ☐ **stenographic** ☐ **typing skills,** I agree to remain in the FBI for a minimum of one year after completion of training. In addition, I agree to accept any assignment in any division at FBIHQ or Washington Field Office consistent with such needs for my services.

☐ So that I may receive training in ☐ **automatic data processing equipment** ☐ **cryptanalytics,** I agree to remain in the FBI one year after completion of formal training.

☐ So that I may receive training in a **foreign language,** I agree to remain in the FBI for three years after I successfully complete this training.

☐ So that I may receive **advanced training in maintenance and repair of FM radio equipment,** I agree to remain in the service of the FBI for at least one year following completion of the training.

☐ So that I may receive training under the Government Employees Training Act to be given me at ______________________________, I agree to remain in the Department of Justice for a minimum of __________________________ after completion of training. If I voluntarily leave the Department before expiration of that period, I will pay the Government the amount of the additional expenses paid by it for the above-mentioned training.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-29-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

____
Signature

Application for Employment
FD-140 (Rev. 10-16-73)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date

NOTICE: Application must be typewritten or clearly printed in black ink. All questions must be answered, if applicable. If not, indicate NA (not applicable). Applications which are not complete and legible will not be considered. If space provided is not sufficient for complete answers, or you wish to furnish additional information, attach sheets of the same size as this application, and number answers to correspond with questions.

Check Position Applied For:

☐ Special Agent
☐ Special Agent (Accountant)
☐ Radio Maintenance Technician *
☐ Laboratory Aid or Technician
☐ Translator
☐ Nurse
☐ Clerk-Stenographer
☐ Clerk-Typist
☐ Clerk (See Item 4, page 2 on Fingerprint Clerk position)
☐ Other ____________

* Applicants for this position must complete "Questionnaire for Radio Maintenance Technician Position."

1. PERSONAL HISTORY

a. Name in full (Last, first, middle)

b. Social Security Number

c. List all other names you have used including nicknames; if female, furnish maiden name. If you have ever used any surnames other than your true name, during what period and under what circumstances were these names used? If you have ever legally changed your name, give date, place, and court.

d. Birth date (Month, day, year)

Place of birth

e. Are you a U. S. citizen? ☐ Yes ☐ No Naturalized? ☐ Yes ☐ No Derivative? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Naturalization # ____________ ____________ Place Date Court

Explain derivative citizenship ____________

2. MARITAL STATUS

☐ Single ☐ Married ____________ Date ____________ Place of Marriage No. of Children ____________

☐ Widowed ☐ Divorced ☐ Separated ____________ Date ____________ Place of Divorce or Legal Separation ____________ Court (See Section 13k)

3. RESIDENCES

a. Present Residence Address: (Apartment, street, city, state, zip code)

Telephone Numbers:
Residence ____________
Business ____________

b. Complete address to which you wish mail or telegram sent (include zip code and telephone number if different from above)

c. List chronologically ALL of your residences in the past 10 years (include addresses while attending school if away from home and all military addresses including any off military base).

Dates						Apt. #	Street Address	City	State
From			To						
Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo	Day	Yr.				

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is an equal opportunity employer.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

4. AVAILABILITY OF APPLICANT

a. Have you previously submitted an application for employment with the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
☐ No ☐ Yes Date ________ Place ____________________

b. Are you willing to proceed to Washington, D. C., or other duty station, at your own expense? ☐ Yes ☐ No

c. Will you accept a lesser position if no vacancy exists or you fail to qualify for the position sought? ☐ Yes ☐ No

d. Are you interested in appointment as Fingerprint Clerk GS 3 at Washington, D. C.?
☐ Yes ☐ No You must understand that regardless of preference, appointment may be as Fingerprint Clerk GS 3 or Clerk GS 2 since assignments must be based on qualifications of appointees and vacancies.

e. If appointed to a clerical position, I am willing to serve a minimum period of one year. ☐ Yes ☐ No

f. If appointed as a Special Agent or Radio Maintenance Technician, are you willing and prepared to accept assignment or transfer to any part of the United States or Puerto Rico for either temporary or permanent duration? ☐ Yes ☐ No

g. If appointed as a Special Agent, I agree to serve a minimum period of three years and completely understand that I must be available for assignment wherever my services are needed. ☐ Yes ☐ No

h. Earliest date available for employment.

i. How much notice of reporting date do you need?

5. EDUCATION

a. Name of School	Location	Dates						Course Pursued	Degrees or Diplomas
		From			To				
		Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Yr.		
High Schools									
Colleges									
Graduate School									
Miscellaneous									

b. Were you ever dismissed from a school, or was any disciplinary action including scholastic probation ever taken against you during your scholastic career?

☐ No ☐ Yes ______________________ School ________ Date ______________________ Type of Action

c. **List awards, honors, citations, positions held in school organizations, athletic endeavors, and any other special recognition you received while attending school.**

d. **List any special abilities, interests, sports or hobbies with degree of proficiency.**

e. Indicate your proficiency in each phase of each **foreign language** listed as "slight," "good," "fluent."

Name of Language	Speak	Understand	Read	Write

f. Are you a **member of the bar?**
☐ No ☐ Yes Date(s) ______________________ State(s) ______________________

g. Are you a **certified public accountant?**
☐ No ☐ Yes Date(s) ______________________ State(s) ______________________

h. Are you a **licensed automobile operator?**
☐ No ☐ Yes State(s) ______________________

Driver's License # ______________________

6. EMPLOYMENT

List chronologically all employments, including summer and part-time employments while attending school. All time must be accounted for. **If unemployed for a period, indicate, setting forth dates of unemployment.**

Name and Address of Employer	Dates						Salary	Position and Kind of Work	Name of Supervisor	Reason for Leaving
	From			To						
	Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Yr.				
a. Name										
Address										
City & State										

6. EMPLOYMENT

List chronologically all employments, including summer and part-time employments while attending school. All time must be accounted for. **If unemployed for a period, indicate, setting forth dates of unemployment.**

Name and Address of Employer	Dates From Mo.	Dates From Day	Dates From Yr.	Dates To Mo.	Dates To Day	Dates To Yr.	Salary	Position and Kind of Work	Name of Supervisor	Reason for Leaving
b. Name										
Address										
City & State										
c. Name										
Address										
City & State										
d. Name										
Address										
City & State										
e. Name										
Address										
City & State										
f. Name										
Address										
City & State										

g. Have you ever been dismissed or asked to resign from any employment or position you have held? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Employer's Name ________________ Date ________ Reason ________________

h. Are you now or have you ever been employed by an agency of the Federal Government? (Include part-time employment.) ☐ No ☐ Yes

From ________ To ________ Agency ________________ Location ________________

i. Do you have any sources of income other than your salary or that of your spouse? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Specify each with amount ________________

7. MILITARY RECORD

a. Are you registered for Selective Service? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Selective Service # ________ Lottery #________ Local Board # ________ City ________________ State ________

b. What is your current classification?

Have you received any notice indicating you may be called into the Armed Forces in the near future? ☐ No ☐ Yes

If so, give approximate date.

c. If ever classified 1-Y (registrant qualified for military service only in time of war or national emergency) or 4-F (registrant not qualified for any military service), furnish reasons.

d. Have you ever served on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Highest rank attained ________________ Date commissioned, if applicable ________

e. Branch of military service

f. Serial number

g. Dates of active duty (month, day & year) From To

h. Type of Discharge

Basis for Discharge

i. Member of Reserve? ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ Ready ☐ Standby

Service Branch ________________

j. Was any type of disciplinary action taken against you in the service?
☐ No ☐ Yes Nature of:

k. National Guard ☐ Present ☐ Former ☐ None
If you attend drills, meetings, or camps, give name of unit and location.
Summer camp attendance: From ____________ To ____________
Where ____________

l. Do you claim veterans preference? ☐ No ☐ Yes Basis: ☐ Active duty between 12-7-41 and 7-1-55 ☐ Active duty subsequent to 1-31-55 in excess of 180 consecutive days ☐ Service-connected disability ☐ Wife ☐ Widow ☐ Mother

8. REFERENCES

Give three references (not relatives, former or present employers, fellow employees or school teachers) who are responsible adults of reputable standing in their communities, such as property owners, business or professional men or women including your physician, if you have one, who have known you well for at least five years, preferably those who have known you during the past five years. If retired, give former occupation.

Complete name
No. yrs. acq. | Occupation
Addresses:
Residence ____________
Business ____________

Complete name
No. yrs. acq. | Occupation
Addresses:
Residence ____________
Business ____________

Complete name
No. yrs. acq. | Occupation
Addresses:
Residence ____________
Business ____________

Give three social acquaintances in your own age group including both sexes.

Complete name
No. yrs. acq. | School or Occupation
Addresses:
Residence ____________
School or Business ____________

Complete name
No. yrs. acq. | School or Occupation
Addresses:
Residence ____________
School or Business ____________

Complete name
No. yrs. acq. | School or Occupation
Addresses:
Residence: ____________
School or Business ____________

9. FOREIGN TRAVEL - (MILITARY SERVICE, RESIDENCE, VISIT)

a. Have you ever visited or resided in any foreign country (including travel in the Armed Forces of the U. S.)? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Passport # ____________ Date issued ____________ Place issued ____________

Countries Visited	Dates						Reason for Travel
	From			To			
	Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Yr.	

b. Have you ever served in the Armed Forces of a foreign country? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(Specify countries; dates)

c. Do you or any members of your immediate family, including in-laws, have any relatives now residing outside the United States (except those in the Armed Forces of the United States or those employed by the United States Government living abroad)? ☐ No ☐ Yes. If so, list below and furnish degree of association and contact you and members of your immediate family have with these relatives.

Name	Relation	Age	City	Country	Citizen of what Country

10. CREDIT RECORD

a. Has your credit record ever been considered unsatisfactory, or have you ever been refused credit? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If "yes," give dates, places, names of creditors and circumstances.)

b. Are you indebted to anyone? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(List any debt over $100. Also list any debt, regardless of the amount, where payment is past due.)

Creditor	Address	Amount	Loan or Acct. #

11. COURT RECORD

a. Have you ever been arrested or charged with any violation including traffic, but not parking tickets? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(List all such matters even if not formally charged, or no court appearance, or found not guilty, or matter settled by payment of fine or forfeiture of collateral.)

Date	Place and Department	Charge	Final disposition	Details

b. Has any member of your family or close relative (including in-laws) ever been arrested for other than traffic violations? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Name	Relation	Date	Place	Charge	Final Disposition

c. Have you ever been a plaintiff or defendant in a court action including divorce actions? ☐ No ☐ Yes (Give date, place, court, names of parties involved, nature of action, and final disposition.)

12. ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP

a. Are you now, or have you ever been a member of any club, society or organization? ☐ No ☐ Yes. If yes, list below, do not abbreviate.

Name	City and State	Former	Present (List position held and extent of activity)

b. Are you now, or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., or any communist or fascist organization? ☐ No ☐ Yes

c. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If answer to any of these is "Yes," explain fully.)

13. RELATIVES

All applicants must give complete information concerning their relatives. If you have been married more than once, give the requested information concerning each former husband or wife. Furnish similar information, including date and place of action, for any members of your immediate family who have been divorced. Even though a relative is deceased, give all the information requested, and indicate last residence and year of death. Include stepbrothers and sisters, half brothers and sisters. If you or your spouse have stepparents, legal guardians or others who have reared you instead of your parents, the requested information should be furnished concerning them, as well as your real parents. If you are engaged to be married or contemplating marriage in the near future, complete information must be included under sections c, h, i and j regarding your future husband or wife and future in-laws, and clearly show that such relationship is a future one.

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials); Complete Address		Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
a. Father Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
b. Mother (Include maiden name) Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
c. Wife or Husband (If wife, include maiden name) Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
d. Children Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
Name Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
Name Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
e. Brothers Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
f. Sisters Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
g. Wives (including maiden names) and Husbands of Brothers & Sisters Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
g. Wives and Husbands of Brothers & Sisters (Continued) Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
h. Father-in-law Address Birth date Place of birth		
i. Mother-in-law (Include maiden name) Address Birth date Place of birth		
j. Brothers & Sisters of your Husband or Wife Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
j. Brothers & Sisters of your Husband or Wife (Continued) Address Birth date Place of birth		
k. Other relatives with whom you have resided for an extended period of time (indicate relation, including name and present location of ex-spouses) Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		

14. RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY THE GOVERNMENT

List the complete names of any of your close relatives (including in-laws) who are employed in the Federal Government.

Complete Name	Relation	Agency by which Employed	Location

15. FRIENDS OR ACQUAINTANCES EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Complete Name	Location	Length of Acquaintance

16. RELATIVES FORMERLY EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Complete Name under which Employed	Current Address	Relationship

ALL APPLICANTS

Attach an unmounted full face photograph of yourself, not larger than 2¾ x 2½ inches. Print your name plainly on the back of the photograph. The photograph must have been taken not more than 3 months prior to the date of this application.

17. PHYSICAL DATA

a. Height without shoes

Weight without clothes

b. Do you now have or have you ever had any of the following: nervous, mental, or emotional disorder of any sort; tuberculosis; epilepsy, fainting spells or severe headaches; diabetes; ulcers; rheumatic fever or heart disease; or asthma? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes" identify, describe, and give dates)

c. Do you now have or have you ever had any chronic or serious illnesses; or have you ever had any serious operations or injuries? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes" describe and give dates)

d. Have you ever been hospitalized? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Dates			Hospital	Location	Reason
Mo.	Day	Yr.			

e. Describe any past or present physical handicap, defect, or disability not previously covered, but including extent of defective vision, if any, with and without glasses (Snellen) and deficiencies in color vision and hearing.

f. How many days have you lost from work or school due to illness during the past five years?

Nature of illness(es)

g. Have you ever received, is there pending, have you applied for, or do you intend to apply for pension or compensation for existing disability? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes," specify what kind, granted by whom, and what amount, when, why. If applicable, include Veterans' Administration claim number.)

h. Special Agent Applicants Only: Do you have any physical defects such as, but not limited to, a bone, joint, or other deformity or loss of finger, which would preclude unrestricted, regular participation in all phases of the FBI's firearms training, physical training and defensive tactics? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes" describe)

I understand that all appointments are probationary for a period of one year during which I must demonstrate my fitness for continued employment by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I also understand that, in many parts of the Bureau, it has been necessary to establish regular night and midnight shifts in view of which I must be available for such assignments as the needs might require. I further understand that any appointment tendered me will be contingent upon the results of a complete character and fitness investigation, and I am aware that wilfully withholding information or making false statements on this application will be the basis for dismissal from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and constitutes a violation of Section 1001, Title 18, U. S. Code. I agree to these conditions and I hereby certify that all statements made by me on this application are true and complete, to the best of my knowledge.

Signature of Applicant as Usually Written (Do not use nickname)

GPO: 1974 - 538-864

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/4/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt. Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities; Re:Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance;Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs; Policies and Procedures

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6/9/75

Received by: Mark Gitenstein

Title: Prof. staff member

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh

The Attorney General

June 4, 1975
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and enclosures which constitute a partial response covering a number of the requests set forth in referenced letter and its appendices. A copy of this memorandum and of the enclosures thereto are submitted for your records.

Enclosures - 12

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-100 62-116395-323

SFP:FMK:rbs/fmk
(10)

17 JUN 13 1975

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

84 JUN 16 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr[illegible].A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

June 4, 1975

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

OTHER SPECIFIC FBI PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, and appendices thereto, which requested certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendices C and D contain requests for the current office of assignment or last known address for a number of FBI employees. Set out below under appropriate headings relating to the specific request headings and numbers is the desired information, as well as information concerning the tenure of FBI service of all the employees involved.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

Appendix C - Item 30

a.) Leo Badgley App, Jr.
Entered on duty (EOD) as Special Agent (SA), June 17, 1957
Assigned Portland Field Office (FO) since December 1, 1959

b.) Edgar O. Ingalls, Jr. (Ingles on your request)
EOD as SA, March 21, 1966
Assigned Portland FO since August 7, 1970

Appendix D - Item 11

a.) Robert L. Tagg
EOD as SA, November 8, 1950
Assigned Omaha FO since January 19, 1973

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-983

SFP:FMK:rbs/fmk
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 5

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

b.) John E. Meade
EOD as SA, January 29, 1951
Assigned Philadelphia FO since January 17, 1966

c.) Bill D. Williams (Billie on your request)
EOD as SA, February 4, 1952
Assigned Special Agent in Charge, Kansas City FO
since December 17, 1974

d.) John J. Creamer, Jr.
EOD as SA, September 13, 1954
Assigned Assistant Special Agent in Charge,
Little Rock FO since May 1, 1975

e.) John J. Connolly
EOD as SA, July 7, 1947
Assigned Newark FO since March 30, 1963

f.) Marjorie Ann Mierzejewski (Miermejewski on your request)
EOD June 26, 1961
Assigned Newark FO since June 26, 1961

g.) Mary Ann Elizabeth Massa (Mass_ on your request)
EOD June 27, 1955
Assigned Newark FO since June 27, 1955

Appendix D - Item 12

a.) Harold P. Leinbaugh (Linebaugh on your request)
EOD as SA, October 20, 1947
Retired February 16, 1973, from FBI Headquarters
Last known address 1160 Wimbledon Drive,
McLean, Virginia 22101

b.) Elmer Lee Todd
EOD as SA, December 11, 1950
Assigned Washington Field Office since January 31, 1955

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Appendix D - Item 13

Rita Agnes Ambrosio
EOD July 19, 1939
Retired December 28, 1973
Last known address 1604 John Street, Fort Lee, New Jersey 07024

Thomas Jack Biamonte
EOD as SA, July 6, 1953
Assigned Rome 9/28/62

Olga Ciesa
EOD September 20, 1943
Resigned November 29, 1965
Last known address 10409 South Indiana Avenue, Chicago,
Illinois 60628

Theodore Andrew Korontjis
EOD as SA, June 30, 1952
Assigned FBI Headquarters since March 15, 1975

Joseph C. Michela
EOD as SA, July 2, 1951
Assigned Rome 5/26/63 to 9/1/65 and 12/14/70 to present

Mildred E. Nick
EOD July 8, 1940
Retired June 28, 1974
Last known address 11030 113th Drive, Youngtown, Arizona 85363

Helen C. Spear
EOD April 23, 1951
Assigned Rome 5/6/62 to 1/12/67 and 4/23/71 to present

Appendix D - Item 10

a.) Robert G. Kunkel
EOD as SA, July 11, 1949
Assigned Special Agent in Charge, Alexandria FO,
since March 22, 1974

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

b.) Courtland J. Jones
EOD as SA, October 6, 1941
Retired September 30, 1974
Last known address 6607 North 29th Street,
Arlington, Virginia 22213

c.) Ernest H. Belter
EOD as SA, July 19, 1943
Retired January 29, 1973
Last known address 616 Ednor Road, Silver Spring,
Maryland 20904

d.) James J. Gaffney
EOD as SA, March 5, 1951
Assigned Washington Field Office since January 29, 1962

Appendix D - Item 19

a.) Joseph A. Sizoo
EOD as SA, November 1, 1938
Retired May 19, 1972
Last known address 84A Pine Crescent, Whispering Pines,
North Carolina 28389

b.) Michael Joseph Rozamus
EOD as SA, November 3, 1947
Retired June 12, 1970
Last known address 6509 Gulf Drive, Holmes Beach,
Florida 33510

c.) Sterling B. Donohoe (Donahue on your request)
EOD as SA, January 6, 1941; Retired 6/29/73
Last known address 2813 Spiral Lane, Bowie, Maryland 20715

d.) Bernard A. Wells, Jr.
EOD as SA, June 6, 1949
Retired July 30, 1971
Last known address 5311 Montgomery Street,
Springfield, Virginia 22151

c.) Robert H. Haynes
EOD as SA, October 16, 1950
Retired March 28, 1975
Last known address 205 Northmoor Drive,
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901

Appendix D - Item 20

Alden F. Miller (Alan on your request)
EOD as SA, March 31, 1947
Assigned Atlanta FO since June 21, 1951

Appendix B, Item I-8 requested a sample of the confidentiality statement which FBI personnel are required to sign along with any other employment agreements currently in use. Attached are copies of the following documents responsive to this request:

1.) FD-291 Employment Agreement

2.) Standard Form 61 Appointment Affidavits

3.) 3-26 Form letter from FBI Special Agent appointee to FBI

4.) FD-375 Training Agreement

5.) FD-140 Application for Employment

Enclosures - 5
1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Samples of the five forms currently in use furnished by Administrative Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: June 2, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

On the morning of May 30, 1975, Mr. Robert Nichols (SA-Retired), and SA John Dennis Miller, Legal Analysis Office, met in Miller's office, prior to Nichol's appointment for interview by members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee.

Miller gave Nichols a copy of the Committee's rules at approximately 8:35 a.m. after Nichols stated he had not been given a copy by anyone else. He advised Nichols that nothing Miller was about to say was intended to or should be interpreted as an order or suggestion to be uncooperative with the Senate Select Committee or its staff.

Miller then advised Nichols he had the right to be represented by an attorney; if he is unable to retain an attorney, he should so advise the Committee staff and ask them to assist him in securing counsel; and the FBI could not provide the services of an attorney. Nichols said he understood.

REC-100 62-116395-222

Miller then escorted Nichols to the JEH Building where he met SAs Paul V. Daly and Seymor F. Phillips.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information

5 JUN ~~10~~ 13 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Personnel File 67-414885
(Former SA Robert Nichols)

LEGAL COUNSEL

JDM:eek
(8)

JBH

84 JUN 13 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-23-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

On the evening of 5-20-75 Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Conner telephonically advised SA Paul V. Daly of the Legal Counsel Division that the Department had reached a decision concerning the scope of testimony to be allowed in the Senate Select Committee interview of former SA Alan G. Sentinella. We previously had informed the Department that Mr. Sentinella was to testify pursuant to a subpoena before this Committee and that Department of Justice Order 501-73 requires we obtain Departmental approval before testimony may be given. We also informed the Department that Lester B. Seidel, staff member of the Senate Select Committee, had advised SA Daly that the scope of the intended interview of Sentinella would include knowledge Sentinella may have concerning the investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Mr. Seidel also indicated that they would interview Sentinella concerning his activities between the years 1960 to 1971.

Mr. O'Conner advised SA Daly that the decision of Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler; Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, and Associate Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott was that Sentinella was released insofar as the Department was concerned to only discuss three areas, those areas being the FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and SCLC. He was to advise the Committee that he was not permitted to go outside of these three areas because of instructions from the Department of Justice which instructions were issued pursuant to Department of Justice Order 501-73.

On 5-21-75 former SA Sentinella was advised of the Departmental restrictions on the information he could furnish the Committee by SA Daly, and he was accompanied by SA Daly to the Senate Select Committee office located in G308 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Sentinella's interview was scheduled for 9:30 a.m. Mr. Seidel met Mr. Sentinella and at 9:31 a.m. furnished Mr. Sentinella a copy of the Rules of Procedure for

REC-100

62-116395

62-116395-22

17 JUN 13 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Personnel File of Former
Special Agent Alan G.
Sentinella (67-432832)
1 - Mr. Daly

84 JUN 13 1975

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. At the same time, former SA Sentinella was furnished forms which Seidel requested he fill out at that time. Seidel also made reference to Sentinella's Fifth Amendment rights but did not specify or spell out his rights.

It was brought to Mr. Seidel 's attention by SA Daly that the Rules adopted by the Senate Select Committee called for a witness to be given copies of the Rules 24 hours prior to his appearance before the Committee and that these Rules are important for a potential witness to have knowledge of prior to his being interviewed since they contain a list of rights and privileges which a witness is entitled to. It was also brought to Mr. Seidel 's attention that despite the fact that the interview was to be initiated at 10 a.m. (initially the interview was scheduled for 9:30 a.m., however, upon arrival former SA Sentinella was advised it would not be held until 10 a.m.) with Mr. Sentinella being required to fill out forms, he would have very little opportunity to review and digest the Rules of the Committee.

Mr. Seidel was also advised of the restrictions placed on the area which former SA Sentinella could respond to by the Department of Justice. Mr. Seidel specifically requested that he be allowed to ask questions concerning "COINTELPRO." He was advised that this was not within the scope of the Department's release for Sentinella unless such information may have been related to the investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, or SCLC.

SA Daly also explained to John Elliff, Task Force Head for the Committee on Domestic Intelligence Matters, the circumstances surrounding the failure to provide a copy of the Rules 24 hours prior to interview and of the lack of specificity of Mr. Seidel as to areas in which Mr. Sentinella would be interviewed. Mr. Elliff apologized for the oversight of the Committee in complying with its Rules and assured SA Daly this would not happen again. In addition, he was advised that the Rules of the Committee provide that witnesses would have a reasonable opportunity to inspect and correct their testimony, however, the Rules provide that a witness must inspect his testimony in the office of the Committee. It was pointed out to Mr. Elliff that such procedures were unreasonable in that in Mr. Sentinella's instance, he would have to travel from Atlanta to Washington, D. C., to review the transcript of his testimony at his own expense. Mr. Elliff indicated that he believed other arrangements concerning this particular aspect of the Rules could and would be worked out.

CONTINUED - OVER

Mr. Sentinella at the conclusion of his testimony advised SA Daly, who was not present at the testimony, that the Committee adhered to the restrictions placed on his testimony by the Attorney General with one possible exception. They asked Mr. Sentinella if while he was working in Atlanta his squad investigated the "Klan" and "SNCC" (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee). Sentinella advised he did not raise an objection to this question because he felt the deviation from the Departmental restrictions was very slight, and our investigations of these matters were well known.

On the afternoon of 5-21-75 K. William O'Conner inquired of SA Daly how the interview went and he was generally advised of the facts surrounding the interview, including the fact that former SA Sentinella was not furnished a copy of the Rules until immediately preceding the interview. Mr. O'Conner inquired as to whether the Senator ('Senator Robert Morgan [D-N.C.]) remained during the taking of testimony from Mr. Sentinella, and he was advised that according to Sentinella, Senator Morgan departed approximately five minutes after placing Mr. Sentinella under oath.

Mr. O'Conner expressed his displeasure at the way the Committee operated and indicated he was going to discuss this matter with Deputy Attorney General Tyler.

Subsequently, on 5-21-75 O'Conner indicated he had been in contact with James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President, and Deputy Attorney General Tyler, and they want the Bureau to prepare a letter protesting the Committee's handling of the interview of Sentinella and of the fact that they violated Rules which were adopted by that Committee, specifically the Rules requiring Mr. Sentinella be furnished a copy of the Committee Rules 24 hours prior to giving testimony to the Committee, failure to be specific concerning the areas to be covered by Sentinella's testimony, the general manner in which the rights of Sentinella were explained to him, and the fact that Senator Morgan departed from the Committee session after giving the oath. O'Conner explained in this regard Deputy Attorney General Tyler feels that this is in contravention of the Rules of the Committee, and he questions whether an executive session of the Committee being held to hear such testimony can continue in the absence of a Senate Committee Member. He requested this letter be directed to Senator Church. He was advised that such a letter could only be prepared after approval had been obtained from proper Bureau authorities, and it was also pointed out to Mr. O'Conner that we had orally protested this matter to Mr. Elliff of the Committee and Mr. Seidel , and he was apprised of Elliff's statement that such mistakes would not be repeated in the future. It was pointed out to Mr. O'Conner

CONTINUED - OVER

that the Bureau had furnished former SA Sentinella a detailed briefing of his rights and a briefing as to what was contained in the Rules of the Committee prior to his interview. Mr. O'Conner again requested that we prepare a letter protesting this matter.

It is not felt that a letter concerning this particular matter should be directed to Senator Church in view of Mr. Elliff's statement that this incident will not be repeated in the future. It is felt that our oral protest to the Committee is sufficient at this point, especially inasmuch as they accepted the limitations placed on the testimony of former SA Sentinella by the Department. It would appear we could expect to achieve very little by sending such a letter at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we orally advise Mr. O'Conner the Bureau does not feel a letter should be directed to the Committee, concerning this particular incident.

By FBI

PVD JBH/PVD

Done. 5/22/75 and 5/23/75. See my memo 5/23/75. JAM

We should not object if Dept. prepares a letter.
Per
JM

6/3/75

OGC 75-20

Rec'd from Ad Hoc Comm 6/10/75

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

MAY 30 1975

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Senstudy-75

Dear Senator Church:

It is my understanding that the continuing efforts of staff members of the Executive and Legislative Branches to prepare standard guidelines for witness interview procedures are continuing this week. While that process continues, the Department of Justice is, of course, continuing to cooperate in an ad hoc and responsive manner. In order to ensure our attention to these cooperative efforts, I have designated K. William O'Connor as Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination and as such he will be the principle liaison officer of DOJ in this effort. I understand that your Chief Counsel and members of his staff are now dealing with Mr. O'Connor in the execution of their responsibilities.

In the meantime, in an effort to expedite the cooperative provision of appropriate information to SSC, it would be most helpful if the Committee Staff would ensure that the Department of Justice is advised, in advance of Committee Staff contact with FBI employees and former employees, of the name of the witness and the scope of the prospective interview. This would facilitate the interview process, since it would make it possible to ensure that appropriate instructions are issued to the witness under 28 CFR 16.22, and would permit early decision upon the release of any applicable secrecy agreements.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RLL

cc: ✓John Warner

Mintz has [illegible] for Bureau [illegible]

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 13 1975

file in 62-116395

84 JUN 13 1975

In the same vein, I should like to invite your attention to some procedural matters surrounding recent witness presentation before the Committee. It appears, from reports which I have received, that two former FBI agents who recently appeared, did not receive copies of the Committee's Rules of Procedures until immediately before appearance before the Committee; and that the scope of their proposed testimony was defined with somewhat less than optimum precision for pre-clearance. Some procedural problems are almost inevitable, especially in the early stages of hearings. I know that you share my interest in assuring that full procedural due process is unequivocally provided to all witnesses who testify before the Committee or are interviewed by Committee Staff. In calling this matter to your attention I seek your support in restricting such problems to a minimum and prospectively avoiding others of like kind.

Sincerely,

Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee has advised that if the Bureau's response to a Committee request concerning the Democratic Convention in Atlantic City in 1964 is sufficiently informative it may not be necessary to interview Bureau personnel concerning this matter and to recommend that an expeditious effort be made to furnish a summary concerning the Atlantic City investigation be made available along with certain documents concerning this matter.

By way of background, we have received a request dated 5-14-75 pertaining to many items, among which was information concerning the Bureau's activities in Atlantic City in 1964 at the Democratic National Convention. At a meeting on 5-30-75 it was pointed out to the Committee that certain aspects of their May 14, 1975, request were particularly burdensome, would in some instances invade privacy and for other reasons was most difficult. During this meeting which was attended by Mark Gitenstein, staff member of the Committee; John Elliff, Task Force Director; representatives of the Bureau; and K. William O'Conner, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, the Committee representatives indicated that subject to the Senate Committee's approval they would accept some sort of summary with regard to their request in Appendix D, Item 8 of the May 14, 1975, request. This item pertains to the Bureau's activities in Atlantic City.

We have had former Agents interviewed concerning this matter, a request has been made to interview two Bureau secretaries, and the Committee has indicated they intend to interview as many as five additional Bureau Agents concerning this matter. In conversation with K. William O'Conner, he mentioned that the Committee had specifically informed him that if the Bureau's response was informative enough concerning

62-116395

REC. 122

62-116395-880

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Daly

5 JUN 10 1975

84 JUN 1975

RVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

the Atlantic City matter, they would not interview the two Bureau secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski. (The request concerning the interview of these Bureau employees, who are Newark Office employees, is the subject of a separate memorandum captioned and dated same.) He requested SA Paul V. Daly to contact Mark Gitenstein in an effort to determine what type of response the Committee expected concerning the Atlantic City incident.

On 6-4-75, SA Daly contacted Mr. Gitenstein and Mr. Gitenstein advised that the Committee knew of the existence of certain memoranda and in particular a memorandum from former Assistant to the Director C. D. DeLoach reporting a conversation with the President requesting Bureau coverage at the Convention. Gitenstein stated that with regard to the Atlantic City incident, if a summary was prepared concerning this incident which would in general show the types of people whose conversations were monitored, the type of information collected, and the type of information disseminated along with furnishing the Committee certain important documents that it would not be necessary to interview Bureau personnel. He indicated among the documents they would expect to be furnished would be the DeLoach memorandum along with other "benign" documents which would not involve a privacy consideration or other considerations which might preclude their being made available to the Committee. Gitenstein indicated that it is the Committee's feeling that information of a political nature such as the credentials argument at the Convention was collected and furnished to the White House and that the collection and dissemination of this information is not apparently in concert with the ostensive purpose of electronic surveillance. He felt that the summary need not and should not identify individuals monitored but rather describe them such as a senator or some other descriptive phrase to describe the individual whose conversation might have been monitored. He said as to the verification of the information contained in the summary with the information in the files, that subject will be addressed by the Committee at a later time.

Gitenstein again mentioned that if such information was furnished by the Bureau, their need to interview employees would be muted as what they are attempting to learn through interview of Agents involved would have already been furnished by the Bureau. He volunteered that the Committee is relatively well informed concerning this particular matter. It is obvious from the specific mention of the DeLoach memorandum along with other observations and statements he made that this could well be true.

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

It is realized that the White House has requested that a paper be prepared which would include the Atlantic City incident; however, K. William O'Connor indicated that he had conversed with Mr. James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President, and that Wilderotter had advised that document requests pertaining to Atlantic City or any other topic which will be addressed in a paper should be responded to and response should not be delayed.

It would appear to be advantageous to the Bureau to attempt to comply with the summary request along with furnishing certain documents concerning Atlantic City on an expeditious basis as opposed to the Committee continuing to conduct interviews of current and former Bureau personnel. If this type of arrangement can be worked out in this particular incident which the Committee characterizes as an abuse, it might lend itself to a similar arrangement in other areas.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division expeditiously prepare a summary in line with the above concerning the Atlantic City incident along with furnishing the important documents concerning this incident.

pvD JBH/pvD

This is being done
WRW

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 14 1975
TELETYPE

REC-117

NR 007 SF CODE

5:13 PM NITEL 5/14/75 MCC

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM SAN FRANCISCO

ATTN LEGAL COUNSEL

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED MAY 2, 1975, ABOVE CAPTION.

ON MAY 14, 1975, LESTER B. SEIDEL, INVESTIGATOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, WASHINGTON, D.C., TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE AND REQUESTED THE IDENTITY OF THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE OF THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE IN 1970. HE WAS ADVISED THAT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE CHARLES W. BATES SERVED IN THAT CAPACITY FROM JANUARY, 1970, THROUGH APRIL, 1970; THAT FORMER SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE HARRY J. MORGAN (NOW RETIRED) SERVED FROM APRIL, 1970, THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1970; AND THAT ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT E. GEBHARDT SERVED AS SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE FROM SEPTEMBER, 1970, THROUGH NOVEMBER, 1972.

REC-117

62-116395-219

SEIDEL DID NOT INDICATE THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF HIS INQUIRY OTHER THAT IT WAS CONNECTED WITH THE COMMITTEE WITH WHICH HE IS AFFILIATED.

ABOVE BEING FURNISHED FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU.

END

[illegible] 5/14/75
SF [illegible] cmc

HOLD

cc Div 11

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1 - M[illegible] J. B. Adams
1 - [illegible] T. J. Jenkins
1 - Each Assistant Director

CODE TELETYPE NITEL Hot

REC 112

TO ALL SACS 219 MAY ~~19~~ 20, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395) PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY - 75.

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR, IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE. UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL INFORMATION FURNISHED.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 20 1975
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

SFP:cmc
(19)

LAF 10:45 PM JBA PM

NOTE:

Referenced teletype alerted field to work of the Senate and House Select Committees and Bureau's handling of its requests. Also, it pointed out FBI has pledged full cooperation with Committees. San Francisco teletype 5/14/75 advised that on that day Lester B. Seidel, Investigator, Senate Select Committee, telephonically sought and was furnished identities of SACs in San Francisco in 1970. Seidel did not indicate specific nature of his inquiries. Considering the publicity being afforded the work of the Committee, it is not inconceivable some unauthorized persons may attempt to obtain information from the FBI particularly at field level, under guise of one of the Committees. It is therefore believed this teletype to all SACs is desirable as a cautionary measure.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 11 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

S.F. Phillips

June 5, 1975

LEGAL DIVISION

Attached teletype advises former Agent Richard H. Davis, Atlanta Office, had been contacted by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member (FNU) Epstein in an attempt by Epstein to arrange an interview concerning Bureau investigation of Martin Luther King. On the night of 6-4-75, Michael Epstein, Staff Member SSC advised SA Paul V. Daly that he had contacted former Agent Davis to arrange interview concerning Bureau investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and Southern Leadership Christian Conference (SLCC). Epstein stated Davis refused to submit to interview since he was bound by an employment secrecy agreement and needed necessary clearance from Bureau. He told Epstein that he would not contact Bureau for such clearance. Epstein requested Bureau release Davis from the agreement for purposes of this interview which will be a staff interview in Atlanta.

Legal Division recommends Davis be released from security agreement for purposes of this interview and to answer questions concerning the King, Levison, and SLCC investigations. If approved, we will separately advise Davis through Atlanta Office of this decision, and give him pertinent briefing.

1 - Intelligence Division
1 - Administrative Division
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. Daly

WRW

PVD

PVD:eek
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 04 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. A.D. Adm.
Dep. A.D. Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 025 AT CODED

8:08 PM NITEL JUNE 4, 1975 JWS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTN: INTD W. D. CREGAR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RU

SENSTUDY '75.

ON 6/4/75, FORMER AGENT RICHARD H. DAVIS, 1147 WILD CREEK TRAIL, N. E., ATLANTA, GA., ADVISED HE WAS CONTACTED THIS DATE BY (FNU) EPSTEIN WHOM HE BELIEVED WAS CALLING FROM WASHINGTON, D. C. DAVIS STATED HE FEELS EPSTEIN IS A MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE SINCE INQUIRY CONCERNED DAVIS' KNOWLEDGE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING CASE. EPSTEIN STATED HE WISHED TO INTERVIEW DAVIS EITHER IN ATLANTA OR WASHINGTON, D. C.; HOWEVER, DAVIS SAID THAT NO ~~DEFINATE~~ DEFINITE ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE DURING CONVERSATION OTHER THAN HE WOULD CONTACT EPSTEIN AS TO APPROPRIATE DATE FOR INTERVIEW IN ATLANTA.

REC-112 62-116395-218

DAVIS WAS INFORMED HE COULD CONTACT THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL COLLECT FOR ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER. DAVIS STATED HE WOULD DO SO.

7 JUN 16 1975

END

HOLD

84 JUN 11 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-30-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of an executive meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community on 5-28-75. The meeting was chaired by William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence. Also present were: Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President, James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, Section Chief William O. Cregar, Inspector John B. Hotis, and senior officials of the State Department, National Security Agency, Office of Management and Budget, Defense Department, and the Treasury Department.

The following matters of interest were discussed at the meeting:

House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Mr. Colby said he met earlier this week with Chairman Nedzi of the House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, John L. Boos, Chief Counsel, and A. Searle Field, Committee Staff Director. He said they seemed interested in the relationship which had developed between the Senate Committee and CIA and asked where he thought the Senate inquiry was going. They also discussed procedures regarding access to documents and witnesses and requested they be furnished some basic materials concerning the CIA's authority to conduct intelligence investigations. They also requested that the Committee be provided with all the materials requested by the Senate Select Committee. Colby pointed out that the House Resolution (H-Res. 138) which established the Select Committee prohibits the disclosure of information outside the Committee without Committee approval. There is some question, however, whether this Resolution can supersede Rule 11 of the Rules of the House of Representatives

REC-112

62-116395-217

5 JUN 11 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Hotis
JBH:dkg (7)

84 JUN 11 1975

which provides that members of the House shall have access to all Committee records. He said Congressman Robert N. Giaimo (D-Conn.) has indicated that he will not accept any limitations on access. Colby said he will appear in an open session before the Committee sometime in the next few weeks to discuss, in general terms, the agency's position on collection of intelligence information.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Mr. Wilderotter said that F. A. O. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, has agreed to identify in advance specific allegations of abuse that will be reviewed by the Committee. Wilderotter said he will then appoint a task force or some other coordinating mechanism within the executive branch to examine each of these areas in depth. The purpose will be to develop an executive department brief on each subject which can be used to respond to Committee requests. He felt that this might enable the Administration to gain the initiative on these issues and perhaps limit the Committee's inquiries to the boundaries set forth in the Senate Resolution. He asked that the agencies make an effort to identify abuse subjects so that the White House can pull together all the information available on each topic. He said it is already clear that the Committee will examine such subjects as assassinations and the CIA's role in the internal affairs of Chile and the Dominican Republic.

Mr. E. H. Knoche, Assistant to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, reported that Mr. Colby has made three appearances before the Senate Select Committee and on each occasion discussed assassination matters. Mr. Colby will meet with the Committee three times next week, and it is expected that he will be asked about the Phoenix program and the covert activities of the CIA including political, counterintelligence, and clandestine intelligence collection. The Committee will trace the agency's operations back to the 1947 directive in an effort to determine how they relate to policy objectives of the Government.

Mr. William G. Hyland, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, said the Committee has requested position papers on the Department's activities in Laos and Chile and to explain of the Department's approach to covert action and whether it was a supplement or instrument of policy. Mr. Hyland raised the question of whether the agencies had any moral obligation to advise former employees that documents were now being

CONTINUED - OVER

made available to Congress. He felt that they should be given an opportunity to review these files prior to interview in order to refresh their memories. Mr. Wilderotter agreed and said that each agency should adopt a similar policy.

Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI, asked whether anyone knew what John Elliff hoped to accomplish as Director of the Task Force on Domestic Intelligence. We pointed out that his earlier writings would indicate that he intends to draft an intelligence charter for the FBI, and perhaps the entire intelligence community. Elliff has made a comprehensive study over the past several years of the Bureau's internal security intelligence functions, including sources of the FBI's authority and the legal restrictions of its operations. This was the subject of a paper he submitted at the Princeton Conference in 1971, and he has since called for the establishment of legal standards for the Bureau's collection, retention, and dissemination of intelligence information.

Mr. Buchen then requested that the FBI draft a proposed intelligence charter for the Bureau. He felt that it would be helpful for the Administration to have a proposal available which it might use to counter any recommendations made by the Committee. At the end of the meeting Mr. Wilderotter asked that a second paper be prepared reviewing all of Mr. Elliff's articles on the subject of domestic intelligence with the view toward identifying those issues which seem to be of major importance.

With regard to Mr. Buchen's request, we feel that it would be inappropriate for the Bureau to draft an intelligence charter for the executive branch. It is the responsibility of the White House and other consumers of intelligence to define their needs and propose appropriate operating authority. We also question the utility of reviewing Professor Elliff's writings on the domestic intelligence functions. We feel a better course of action at this point is simply to ask Mr. Elliff to define the goals and objectives of his task force. He has always been very candid and forthright and we have no reason to think that he would be reluctant to discuss the matter with us. In addition, it is likely his views on the intelligence function differ from those expressed in his earlier articles, and it is best to get his current thinking on the problem. If this approach proves unsuccessful, we can then resort to a review of his written materials.

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memorandum
Re: SENSTUDY 75

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Legal Counsel Division advise Mr. Wilderotter that we feel it is inappropriate for the Bureau to draft an intelligence charter ~~o~~f~~r~~ the FBI and recommend that the White House draft a statement of its intelligence needs.

(2) That Legal Counsel Division contact Mr. Elliff and attempt to determine what his goals and objectives are as Director of the Task Force on Domestic Intelligence.

PVD

JBH/PVD

wRW

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. J. B. Adams~~
1 - ~~Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~(1 - Mr. Hotis)~~

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/6/75

1 - ~~Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. H. W. Dare
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This records the results of contact with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning release to Senate Select Committee (SSC) of two documents pertaining to Appendix C, Paragraph 24 of the SSC request to the Department of 5/14/75, which requested "all memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of 'notional' Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States."

No information has been developed indicating this Bureau conferred with CIA regarding the establishment or creation of a Bureau-sponsored "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization. Although the FBI did, in fact, direct several such organizations, no information has been developed indicating the FBI consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.

In one instance, CIA advised in 2/70 it had established a notional organization with post office box addresses in Boston, Massachusetts and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This notional organization, to be known as the Union for the Revolution, had the objective of developing penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. It was CIA's intention to circulate propaganda from the post office boxes in anticipation of interesting Arab groups. Thereafter, it was CIA's plan to use its personnel under "suitable" cover to contact the Arab groups. (See memorandum dated 2/13/70, captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-2, copy attached.)

62-116395-216

REC. 112

By letterhead memorandum dated 3/23/70, the FBI indicated information had been received indicating the Union for the Revolution had been in contact with a domestic Marxist-Leninist organization requesting literature. This memorandum set forth an analysis of a "Statement of the Union for the Revolution" indicating the document lacked credibility as a revolutionary document. (LHM dated 3/23/70, captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-4, copy attached.)

62-116395

5 JUN 11 1975

LFS:mjg
(8)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 11 1975

On 6/6/75, Mr. Walter Elder, CIA, advised that CIA had no objection to the LHM dated 3/23/70, being furnished to the SSC. With regard to the memorandum from Mr. Papich to Mr. Brennan dated 2/13/70, Mr. Elder requested that the name of the CIA representative who furnished the information in the memorandum be deleted from line one of the memorandum prior to its being furnished to the SSC. Provided this is done, CIA has no objection to this memorandum being furnished to the SSC. He suggested that when the name is deleted, it be replaced with the phrase "A CIA officer."

ACTION:

To record CIA's clearance of the above-described documents.

SECRET

Appendix C, III, 24

Please provide: all memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts, or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States.

No information has been developed indicating this Bureau conferred with CIA regarding the establishment or creation of a Bureau-sponsored "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization. Although the FBI did, in fact, direct several such organizations, no information has been developed indicating the FBI consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.

In one instance, CIA advised in 2/70 it had established a notional organization with post office box addresses in Boston, Massachusetts, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This notional organization, to be known as the Union for the Revolution, had the objective of developing penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. It was CIA's intention to circulate propaganda from the post office boxes in anticipation of interesting Arab groups. Thereafter, it was CIA's plan to use its personnel under "suitable" cover to contact the Arab groups. (See memorandum dated 2/13/70 captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-2, copy attached.)

By letterhead memorandum dated 3/23/70, the FBI indicated information had been received indicating the Union for the Revolution had been in contact with a domestic Marxist-Leninist organization requesting literature. This memorandum set forth an analysis of a "Statement of the Union for the Revolution" indicating the document lacked credibility as a revolutionary document. (LHM dated 3/23/70 captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-4, copy attached.)

As the Union for the Revolution was strictly a creation of CIA, it is recommended before any information be disseminated outside the FBI relating to this organization, clearance be obtained through CIA.

Prepared by SA David
Ryan, IS-3, 5/28/75

SECRET

Classified by 4375
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-216

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010–106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/4/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2

At 4:55 p.m. on June 4, 1975, Daniel M. Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he has not as yet been contacted by the Senate Select Committee staff for interview but it was his intention to call Mark Gitenstein to discuss further his interview by the Committee. Mr. Armstrong inquired as to whether the Bureau has any objections to his discussing the two subject areas previously described by Mr. Gitenstein. Those areas were Armstrong's knowledge of the Bureau's Intelligence Division activities as a result of his employment in the FBI, and his knowledge of the possibility of the Bureau getting an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters.

I advised Mr. Armstrong that to the extent that the interview would concern those two subjects, the Bureau would have no objection and he could consider his secrecy agreement waived, but only to that extent. Mr. Armstrong inquired as to whether there were any particular problems with information he furnished to me on May 28, 1975. I told him that the waiver of the agreement was conditioned on the one limitation that he would not furnish information that would identify informants, compromise current investigations, or on-going programs, or reveal other sensitive matters which should be reserved for the information of members of the Committee or the Chairman of the Committee.

I told Mr. Armstrong that the Bureau would have available during his interview, though not present at the interview, a representative who would provide him with counsel as to any problems concerning subjects he may be reluctant to discuss with the Committee representative. I explained that the FBI representative was not intended to inhibit any

REC 117

62-116395-215

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

5 JUN 11 1975

JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 11 1975

interview he might have, but was there for the purpose of expediting the interview by resolving questions concerning information he was authorized to furnish.

Mr. Armstrong said he fully understood and that he would advise me in the event an interview was scheduled.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

RLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Cochran

DATE: 5/19/75

FROM : W. E. Harward

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEYS - SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Rememos Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams dated 4/9/75 and 4/25/75, concerning above-captioned matter, copies attached.

Liaison with Capitol Hill by the Office of Legal Counsel resulted in an arrangement whereby Laboratory representatives could meet with those members of the Capitol Police Force handling security surveys for the U. S. Congress. Laboratory personnel met with members of the Capitol Police Force on 5/6/75 and 5/8/75 at their headquarters, 331 First Street, NE, Washington, D. C. At the meeting on 5/6/75 an examination of their survey equipment revealed that it was adequate, however it did not meet the level of sophistication or quality available at the present state of the art. Further discussion revealed that the training received by members of the police force handling their responsibility was limited.

On 5/8/75 Laboratory Supervisors Wilbur G. Stevens and Joseph B. Parsons met with Chief James M. Powell and some of his staff members which included Deputy Chief Garner, Captain Brannon, Head of the Investigative Unit, and Lieutenant Bell, Head of the Bomb Disposal Unit. The discussion at this meeting centered around steps which could be taken to update their present security survey equipment as well as additional measures which could be put into practice to enhance their technical expertise in this area. Laboratory personnel furnished them with the names of manufacturers of additional survey equipment as well as suggestions as to the establishment of an in-house training program.

Enclosures (2)

ST-107
REC-59
62-116395-214

1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Bowers, Room 4509 JB)
1 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. Cregar, Room 4123 JEH)
1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Harward
1 - Mr. Stevens

CONTINUED - OVER

5 MAY 30 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

WGS:lms
(8)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

1 ms

57 JUN 12 1975

At the conclusion of this conference, Chief Powell expressed his sincere appreciation to the Bureau for the excellent help and guidance extended to him and his staff in this matter of mutual interest, and expressed the hope that he could call on us again in the event he or his staff needed to tap our resevoir of knowledge. The Chief was assured that we would be available if needed in this capacity.

It appears that the Capitol Police Force has been forced into the untenable position of handling this responsibility for the Congress, and as a result are attempting to establish some degree of self-reliance and outward credibility being completely inexperienced in this area of technical expertise. Because of this, it is felt that the Bureau should move cautiously in any continuing liaison with the Capitol Police concerning security survey matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that any continuing liaison with the Capitol Hill Police Force be handled by mature and experienced Special Agent Supervisors, who are completely familiar with security survey matters.

WRW/TWL

TK

PLM

Mr. J. B. Adams 5-8-75

Legal Counsel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

During various contacts with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, and Congressman Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), Chairman of the House Select Committee, the question has come up regarding the need for a check of the private offices of individual Committee Members to ensure the absence of any electronic listening devices. The Committee personnel have been told that we consider this absolutely essential and they agreed.

In exploring this matter, it was determined that the Capitol Police Department recently has established a special unit to handle all types of security problems within the Capitol Hill complex, including checks for electronic listening devices. Personnel of this unit have received extensive training, some from CIA. The operations of the unit are controlled through the Sergeants at Arms of the House and Senate.

This matter has been discussed with Robert Hough, Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Hough advised that the special unit already has conducted complete security surveys of the new office space of the Senate Select Committee and certainly will perform any other checks of this type needed by the Committee or its individual Members. He said, in fact, that since they now have this capability they would oppose any outside agency coming on to the Hill to perform this function. Hough said he already has been in contact with Miller regarding the necessary security checks and stated he will let us know when the offices of the Senate Select Committee/Members have been checked. He said their rules require specific requests from the individual Members in writing.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. [illegible]
1 - Mr. [illegible]
1 - Mr. [illegible]

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

62-116395-214

[illegible] (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

This matter was discussed with Congressman Nedzi on 4-9-75, and he stated he would promptly contact Mr. Harding to work out the necessary arrangements for security checks needed by his Committee and its Members. Harding has promised to let us know when the checks of the House Select Committee Members have been completed.

All contacts concerning this matter have been handled by Inspector Bowers who will continue to follow this situation with Senate Sergeant at Arms, William Wannall, or his Deputy; House Sergeant at Arms Harding; Mr. Miller of the Senate Select Committee; and Congressman Nedzi.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WOC:ekw 4/14/75

On 4/11/75 the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community was apprised of the discussions with Mr. Robert Hough, the Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and with Mr. Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Although the Executive Committee would have preferred the FBI to conduct audio sweeps, they interposed no objection to the sweeps being handled by the Capitol Police Department. Mr. Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, requested, however, that both Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding be requested to periodically advise the FBI as to the sweeps of Committee space for electronic listening devices. Specifically, Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding should be asked to furnish the FBI the following: How frequently they will conduct a counteraudio sweep, what offices will be swept, will the results of such sweeps be furnished the FBI, and will the FBI be immediately notified should the Capitol Police locate an electronic listening device?

Mr. J. B. Adams 4-25-75

[illegible]

Legal Counsel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM

Reference Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams memorandum of 4-9-75 to which the Intelligence Division placed an addendum dated 4-14-75 showing that Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, had requested that the Sergeants at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives keep the Bureau advised regarding checks made for electronic listening devices in the offices of captioned Select Committees.

This was discussed on 4-23-75 by Inspector Bowers with Senate Sergeant at Arms William Wannall and his Deputy, Robert Hough. They were amenable to notifying us concerning the checks they make of Senate Select Committee space and the offices of the Members of this Committee. Hough was designated by Wannall to handle this matter. Hough advised that the special Capitol Police unit had made a check of Room S145 in the Capitol on that date (4-23-75) prior to a meeting of the Senate Select Committee in that room and found nothing. Hough stated they have received no requests whatever to make any checks of the offices of individual Committee Members. He said he had discussed this matter with William Miller, Staff Director of the Select Committee, and Miller indicated it would be taken up with the Committee but he has heard nothing further from him.

On 4-24-75 Bowers discussed this matter with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives. Harding stated he has had no requests for any checks of the Members' offices or

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

62-116395-214

DWB:kjs (9) CONTINUED - OVER

space of the House Select Committee since the Committee really has not begun to function as yet. He said he has discussed this matter with Committee Chairman Lucien Nedzi, and he certainly will give us complete accounting of checks they make of this Committee's space and the space of the individual Members of the Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

4-528

62-116395-213

CHANGED TO

62-116464-4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

JUN 12 1975

Hmk / cz

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/23/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES OR FORMER EMPLOYEES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Hotis

At the Executives Conference on May 22, 1975, I presented for discussion the question of the procedures to be followed when former employees or current employees of the Bureau are contacted for interview by staff representatives of the Senate Select Committee, or are called for testimony pursuant to a subpoena issued by the Committee. I explained the background including the numerous attempts to arrive at a working arrangement with the Committee in terms of stated guidelines and that all such efforts in the past had proven unworkable.

I pointed out that when presented with the proposal that an agency representative be present during interviews, the Committee met and voted unanimously to reject that proposal. The issue of whether the agency representative would be present during the interview therefore is a stumbling block to the development of a reasonable procedure to be followed by the Committee and by our present and former employees. I requested the authority of the Executives Conference and approval of the Director to waive the requirement that a Bureau representative be present during interviews and following a vote such approval was given.

I then requested authority to undertake the development of a working understanding with the Committee in behalf of the Bureau by which we would be given notice of the identities of persons to be interviewed prior to interview or testimony, that we would be advised of the subject matter of the

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
JAM:mfd

REC-100

62-116395-282

CONTINUED - OVER

17 JUN 10 1975

84 JUN 11 1975

interview or testimony, and afforded an opportunity to discuss with the witness those areas of the proposed interview or testimony which would require no special arrangements and those areas which would require the information possessed by the witness to be furnished to members of the Committee or to the Chairman exclusively.

We also wanted an opportunity prior to interview to furnish the witnesses information concerning their Constitutional rights, their rights pursuant to the Committee's rules, and to advise them concerning the extent to which they were released from obligations of secrecy made to the FBI, and to the procedures necessary to obtain authority of the Department to respond to a subpoena.

Following discussion and vote this matter also was approved.

Pursuant to such authority, I met with K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, from approximately 4:00 p.m. to 5:20 p.m. on May 22, 1975, accompanied by Inspector John B. Hotis. I explained to Mr. O'Connor that the Director was desirous of having the Committee understand that the FBI wanted to be cooperative to the extent that it was possible and consistent with the need to protect the identities of informants, sensitive sources of information and methods, on-going investigations and other current operations and personal privacy. Because of this view of the Director and the Bureau, we desired to make known to the Committee the fact that we would not insist on the presence of a Bureau representative during actual interviews or testimony of present or former employees, but we would want an understanding with the Committee and the Committee staff that the Bureau would be given prior notice of the identities of proposed witnesses, the subject matter of the proposed interview or testimony, and an opportunity prior to interview or testimony for the Bureau to consult with the employee in order to release him from his obligations of secrecy to the extent possible for purposes of the interview or testimony.

I restated our position that we were not endeavoring to deter testimony rather we were attempting to facilitate testimony under reasonable conditions and we felt that these matters should be discussed with the Committee. I told Mr. O'Connor that we were aware of the numerous discussions, proposals and conferences that have been held in an effort to establish specific formal guidelines with the Committee, but that all such efforts in behalf of the White House staff and the intelligence community at

CONTINUED - OVER

large have not been successful. I told him that therefore we felt it would be appropriate for the FBI to express our view to the Committee because interviews of FBI personnel and former employees have been conducted and are scheduled in the near future.

Mr. O'Connor said that he understood the Director's view that he desired to cooperate with the Committee and he felt that such cooperation could be negotiated if we were to offer the Committee as trading material COINTELPRO files. I told Mr. O'Connor that we were not going to negotiate an understanding concerning witness interview procedures on the basis of trading any of our files. He then suggested that we negotiate the May 14, 1975, letter which was addressed to the Attorney General by Senator Church and use that negotiation as a basis for trading with the Committee to develop workable guidelines. I again told Mr. O'Connor that I considered the question of procedural arrangements for witness interviews to be a very broad question and one that went far beyond the requests in the May 14, 1975, letter. I told him that I felt confident that the May 14, 1975, letter would be followed by perhaps an even longer letter with more requests and that such matters should be negotiated individually.

Mr. O'Connor then said that it was his strong view that a letter should be addressed to the Committee complaining of the treatment of FBI witnesses, particularly regarding violations of the Committee's own rules in that it appeared that during recent interviews the Committee had not furnished witness a copy of the rules in sufficient time and the treatment by staff representatives (& the Committee staff) of witnesses had been improper.

I told Mr. O'Connor that I thought that our efforts to develop a working relationship with the Committee could be seriously impaired at this time should a protest letter be sent to Senator Church because a formal communication of that nature would require some reaction on the part of the Committee and I could see no benefit to our present efforts to establish procedures by which we could reasonably cooperate with the Committee.

Mr. O'Connor then suggested that a letter might be addressed to Senator Church which described our concern that in the absence of reasonable procedures witnesses' rights might be impaired and that for that

CONTINUED - OVER

reason and for the reason that the Director desired to be cooperative with the Committee, we would request a meeting with Senator Church and Senator Tower to arrive at an understanding as to procedures. I told Mr. O'Connor that I would consider such a letter and he said he would discuss the matter with the Deputy Attorney General and with James Wilderotter at the White House.

At approximately 9:05 a.m. on May 23, 1975, Mr. O'Connor called me and said that he had discussed the matter with Mr. Wilderotter and the Deputy Attorney General. He said that both had agreed that it was inopportune at this time to seek special guidelines for interviews of FBI personnel and former personnel with the Committee. He said that a meeting has been scheduled for Tuesday, May 27, 1975, at noon in a final effort to resolve an understanding with Committee representatives. He said at the present time it is proposed that the meeting be attended by Wilderotter and Roderick Hills, representing the White House; Hoffman, representing the Defense Department; Warner, representing CIA; and O'Connor representing the Justice Department. Committee representatives would be Schwarz, Chief Counsel, and John Elliff. He said that at this time it was his thought that the Deputy Attorney General and I should not attend the meeting. He gave as his reasoning the thought that "should something go wrong" the Deputy Attorney General could disassociate himself from any agreement arrived at, and that I would similarly be in a position of saying that we have not been a party to the agreement.

I reminded Mr. O'Connor that meetings have been held frequently in the past and that tentative understandings made at such meetings have disappeared shortly after the meeting was concluded. I told him that was significant to us because we now understand that two more former employees of the FBI have been contacted and may be interviewed in the near future. I told him that former SA Sam Papich and former Agent Nichols have been contacted. I told him that the extent to which we should release these two former employees from their obligation of secrecy could not be intelligently evaluated unless we knew the subject matter of the interviews and that we plan to contact the Committee to inquire as to the subject matter. I pointed out to him that such pending interviews make it imperative for the FBI to consider action in addition to meetings that may be planned to discuss guidelines.

CONTINUED _ OVER

Mr. O'Connor asked that we not contact the Committee directly at this time, but that we allow him to call John Elliff and Schwarz to request that he be advised of the identity of all proposed FBI witnesses and of the subject matter of the proposed interviews, and that such interviews or testimony not go forward pending developments of an agreement on guidelines. O'Connor promised that he would make the contact promptly and advise me today of the results. I agreed to withhold our contact pending receipt of the information from him.

Mr. O'Connor then insisted that a letter be prepared for the Attorney General to send to Senator Church pointing out the failure of the Committee to afford complete protection of the rights of witnesses. I declined to undertake that responsibility and I told him the reason was that a formal document addressed to the Chairman of the Committee would tend to impair our efforts to negotiate with the Committee and certainly would be untimely in view of the conference he described as being scheduled for next Tuesday at noon.

Mr. O'Connor then said he would hate to have to tell the Deputy Attorney General that the FBI declined to prepare such a draft. I told him that not only would I not mind him telling the Deputy Attorney General, but I wished he would tell the Deputy Attorney General and explain my reason for not sending such a formal letter addressed to Senator Church at this time. Mr. O'Connor said that "well everyone else agrees to the letter," and I told him the FBI does not agree.

Mr. O'Connor said that if he was going to have to draft the letter for the Attorney General's signature, he would do it, but that he would need the information concerning the interviews of former SA Devlin and former SA Sentinella. I told Mr. O'Connor that the information concerning Sentinella was en route to him already and that we would endeavor to furnish him as promptly as possible any additional information available to us concerning these interviews.

At 11:13 a.m. on May 23, 1975, Mr. O'Connor called me and said that he had just concluded a conversation with John Elliff during which Elliff agreed that in regard to the scheduled interview of former SA Sam Papich on May 29, 1975, at 9:00 a.m., he would furnish us the substance of the

CONTINUED - OVER

questions to be asked Mr. Papich. He said that Elliff was agreeable to an informal arrangement under which the FBI would not require the presence of a Bureau representative at such interviews, but would expect to receive the identity of persons to be interviewed plus a statement as to the subject matter of the interview. Elliff then proceeded to identify as those persons scheduled for interview as William Turner, who will be interviewed today or this weekend by Mike Epstein at San Francisco, and "Chick" Brennan, who was interviewed yesterday, May 22, 1975, by Mark Gitenstein and who may be interviewed again today.

As to the interview of Sam Papich, Elliff said that the interview would concern:

1. A liaison agreement between the FBI and CIA;

2. The abolition of Papich's liaison responsibilities in 1970;

3. Dissatisfaction by the FBI with the Huston Plan;

4. The views in the White House regarding the intelligence community and the FBI with reference to a conversation Elliff had with Mr. Wannall and Mr. Cregar on May 22, 1975;

5. A detailed follow-up on the discussions with Mr. Wannall;.

6. A copy of the Huston Plan and certain minutes taken of meetings at which the Huston Plan was discussed. These minutes allegedly were made by William Cregar;

7. The matter raised with Paul Daly on May 22, 1975. (Mr. Daly recalled that Mr. Elliff discussed an incident concerning the CIA and the FBI which occurred at Denver, Colorado.)

Mr. O'Connor said that an interview proposed with former SA Nichols has been postponed indefinitely according to Elliff because of Nichols' unavailability.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee

Mr. O'Connor noted that even though formal current rules have not been agreed upon with the Committee, it appears that Elliff's cooperation in furnishing the above information indicates a willingness to abide by the terms and conditions that I had requested Mr. O'Connor to seek in behalf of the FBI.

In this developing cooperation with Elliff, it is my opinion that we should not participate in the conference at noon on Tuesday, May 27, 1975, at which time the broad proposals by Wilderotter will be discussed. It is to the interest of the FBI to develop a cooperative attitude on the part of Elliff and his staff and that is being accomplished.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ✓
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory ✓
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-2-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, advised that he desired the Bureau to continue practice of furnishing communications setting forth the contents of interviews of former and current employees where such information is available. He also requested that the Bureau continue to furnish an extra copy for James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President.

HOT

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD

JBH/PVD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-00 BY SP2

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(7)

REC-100 62-116395-211

17 JUN 10 1975

84 JUN 11 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

At 10:37 a.m. on May 28, 1975, former FBI employee Daniel M. (Mac) Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he has received information that the Senate Select Committee may contact him for purpose of interview. He requested my advice as to what his response should be. I told Mr. Armstrong that he should be aware of any secrecy agreements he may have signed while an employee of the FBI and he should be aware of the Attorney General Order 501-73. I told him the Director was interested in being as candid as possible with the Committee and that we would be willing to release him from his agreement to the extent it would be possible to do so consistent with the needs of on-going investigations and the sensitivity of the particular information. involved. I told him that should he receive a request for interview or subpoena, it would be appropriate for him to inquire as to the general areas of discussion proposed for the interview and to request the Director to release him from the secrecy agreement concerning those areas.

Mr. Armstrong said that if he was contacted, he would respond according to the advice furnished him.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/kw

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

PLM

REC-100 62-116395-210

17 JUN 10 197

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(7)

84 JUN 11 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

[redacted]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. [illegible]
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 05 1975
TELETYPE

NR 10 PH PLAIN

610 PM 6-5-75 NITEL MCA

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: PHILADELPHIA (62-0-23222)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL, MAY 28, 1975.

SA JOHN B. MEADE ADVISED TELEPHONICALLY MAY 29, 1975 RE CONTENTS OF RENITEL.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

(Meade)

REC-100

62-116395-208

cc 67

84 JUN 11 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 0 5 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR011 CE PLAIN

8:33PM NITEL JUNE 5, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM CHARLOTTE (62-4093)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUNITEL MAY 29, 1975.

MR. JOSEPH A. SIZOO, 84 A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PINES, NC, CONTACTED MAY 29, 1975 PER INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REBUNITEL.

END

~~MEB FBIHQ CLR AND TKS~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SPOALM/JRW

Joseph A. Sizoo

REC-100

62-116395-707

cc 671

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

84 JUN 11 1975.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 29 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR 003 PD CODE

1:45 P M URGENT MAY 29, 1975 LJQ

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: PORTLAND (66-0)

ATTENTION: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

SENSTUDY 75.

RE FBIHQ NITEL TO ALEXANDRIA AND OTHER OFFICES, INCLUDING PORTLAND, MAY 28, 1975.

FBIHQ NITEL NAMED SA LEO B. APP, JR., AND SA EDGAR O. INGALLS, BOTH CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO PORTLAND DIVISION, AND NOTED THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC), EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN.

FOR INFORMATION OF FBIHQ, STRONG POSSIBILITY SUBJECT MATTER PERTAINS TO MATTER ENUMERATED IN DETAIL IN PORTLAND TELETYPES TO FBIHQ JANUARY 18, 1973, FEBRUARY 1, 1973, FEBRUARY 5, 1973, PORTLAND AIRTEL TO FBIHQ, JANUARY 19, 1973, IN MATTER ENTITLED "HUNTLY COLLINS, INFORMATION CONCERNING, RESEARCH MATTER," AND FBIHQ TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED FEBRUARY 2, 1973, ENTITLED "FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT, CODE NAME 'INLET', RESEARCH MATTER."

END.

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

REC-100

REC-100

62-116395-206

JUN 10 1975

67-423754 (App)

67-623437 (Ingalls)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY [illegible]

84 JUN 11 1975

cc

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 0 5 1975

TELETYPE

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
- Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
  - Admin.
  - Comp. Syst.
  - Ext. Affairs
  - Files & Com.
  - Gen. Inv.
  - Ident.
  - Inspection
  - Intell.
  - Laboratory
  - Plan. & Eval.
  - Spec. Inv.
  - Training
- Legal Coun.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

NR004 TP CODE

1:40PM URGENT JUNE 5, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM TAMPA (105-0-1121)

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

RE BUREAU NITEL MAY 28, 1975.

ON JUNE 4, 1975, MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6500 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BEACH, FLORIDA, WAS CONTACTED. MR. ROZAMUS HAD NOT BEEN AVAILABLE FOR CONTACT UNTIL THIS DATE BECAUSE OF TRAVEL. MR. ROZAMUS ADVISED THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BUT HE WAS ALERTED THAT HE MAY BE APPROACHED BY A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF. MR. ROZAMUS WAS ADVISED OF THE CONTENTS OF REBUNITEL CONCERNING THE FACT THAT HE MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT DURING INTERVIEW IN THE EVENT QUESTIONS ARE ASKED RELATING TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS. MR. ROZAMUS WAS ALSO ADVISED THAT AS A PRELUDE TO THE INTERVIEW HE MAY CONTACT THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL. HE WAS ADVISED THAT THE BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE WAS NOT INTENDED

END PAGE ONE

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

67-424444 Rozamus

REC-100

62-116395-805

JUN 10 1975

84 JUN 11 1975

PAGE TWO

TO IMPEDE THE WORK OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE BUT WAS DONE AS A COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. MR. ROZAMUS ADVISED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THIS AND FULLY APPRECIATED THE BUREAU'S EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD. MR. ROZAMUS FURTHER ADVISED THAT HE WOULD NOTIFY THE TAMPA OFFICE IN THE EVENT THAT HE IS CONTACTED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE.

END

RECD THREE

DCW FBIHQ CL CLR

cc. Putman

Airtel

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
6/2/75

To: Legat, Rome

From: Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. Kolombatovic
PERSONAL ATTENTION
(Route through for review)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SENSTUDY 75

Enclosed is a copy of Bureau teletype 5/28/75 to selected SACs and one copy each of Bureau teletypes 5/2 and 20/75 to all SACs, latter two teletypes for background information concerning captioned matter.

You will note that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) is interested in the whereabouts of some current employees of your office, including yourself. For your additional information, an SSC Staff Member recently inquired of a former Bureau official concerning communications sent to Legat, Rome, in 1964 concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and concerning the name of the Legat at Rome in 1964. (It was the erroneous recollection of the former Bureau official that Armand Cammarota was the Legat in Rome in 1964).

REC-100 62-116395-204

Handle all inquiries from the SSC in accordance with the enclosed instructions.

Enclosures - 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/00 BY SP2ALM/JEW

JUN 3 1975

SFP:ekw EKW
(10)

MAILED 20
JUN 2 1975
FBI

NOTE: Enclosed 5/2/75 tel to all offices gave general background as to Senstudy 75 and alerted field that former and incumbent employees might be contacted for interview by SSC Staff. Enclosed 5/20/75 tel alerted all SACs to possible inquiries made of field offices and action to take if contacted. SSC letter 5/14/75 enclosed a request for names and current office assignments or last known addresses of all FBI employees assigned Rome, 1964. Three employees then assigned there are still in Rome and their names are included in the copy of the 5/28/75 teletype being sent Rome. That teletype included instructions for selected offices to alert additional 1964 Rome employees who are now assigned elsewhere or no longer with FBI.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

PLM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 1 1 1975

GPO 931-546

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 0 5 1975
Dw
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 005 NK CODE

12:00PM IMMEDIATE JUNE 5, 1975 JCG

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM NEWARK (66-3971)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL MAY 28, 1975. Sen 178

FORMER AND PRESENT EMPLOYEES LISTED IN RE BUTEL HAVE BEEN CONTACTED AND ALERTED TO POSSIBILITY OF INTERVIEWS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS SET OUT IN BUTEL MADE KNOWN TO THESE EMPLOYEES, NONE OF WHOM HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF AS YET.

BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED SHOULD THEY CONTACT THIS OFFICE RE SUCH SSC CONTACT.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/rw

PLS HOLD HAVE ONE MORE Y FOR YOU

REC-100

62-116395-203

3 JUN 9 1975

5

79 JUN 10 1975

C.C. Putman

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

At 11:44 a.m. on June 5, 1975, Daniel M. Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he is scheduled to be interviewed at 10:00 a.m. on June 6, 1975, in Room 308 of the New Senate Office Building by Mark Gitenstein. He requested a Bureau representative to be available forc consultation during the interview. I told Mr. Armstrong that I would make appropriate arrangements and that the individual who would be available would contact him to make necessary arrangements prior to the interview.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an appropriate representative to contact Mr. Armstrong (telephone number 632-6990) and to accompany him to the above-described interview.

WPW | TU

PLM

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1- Mr. Mintz

REC-100

62-116395-202

3 JUN 9 1975

JAM:mfd
(7)

79 JUN 10 1975

1 - M[illegible] J. J. McDermott
(A[illegible]n: H. R. Hauer)
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. M. Mooney
(Attn: J. E. Reilly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General May 22, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. H. W. Dare, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum dated May 22, 1975, "RE: FILING SYSTEM," one copy of a document captioned "FBI Indexing Procedures" which concerns the FBI's filing system and one copy each of 13 Tables of Contents for FBI forms.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (30)

62-116395

HWD/SFP:cmc
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

delivered 5/28

delivered 5/29 to Committee by WRW

3- ENCLOSURE

62-116395-201

3 JUN 9 1975

PLM

ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

79 JUN 10 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

[redacted]

1 - M[illegible] J. J. McDermott
(At[illegible]n: H. R. Hauer)
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. M. Mooney
(Attn: J. E. Reilly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. H. W. Dare, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: FILING SYSTEM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and the appendices thereto, which contained requests for documents and other information from the FBI.

In connection with Part four, concerning the FBI's filing system and printed forms utilized by this Bureau, enclosed are copies of the following:

1. Undated nine-page memorandum captioned "FBI Indexing Procedures."

2. One copy each of 13 Tables of Contents concerning forms utilized by this Bureau.

Concerning the FBI's filing system and the Committee's requests for a so-called "Clerk's Manual;" and for a list of FBI classifications used in its filing system, it will be noted that the nine-page memorandum contains the list of classifications. With respect to the so-called "Clerk's Manual," the Files and Communications Division of the FBI maintains detailed instructions which are followed by its employees in classifying mail for indexing. It is not known whether such instructions are what is referred to by the Committee as the "Clerk's Manual." These instructions consist of nine volumes of material. Because of their bulkiness and because it is not clear whether this material would serve the Committee's purpose, it is not being furnished at this time. However, it will be available for review at FBI Headquarters by the Committee Staff.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PWM

HWD/SFP:cmc
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-[illegible]

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

ENCLOSURE

FILING SYSTEM

The following will explain the Tables of Contents concerning FBI forms which are being furnished in lieu of the actual forms at this time. This procedure is being followed because the forms number nearly 2,000 and many will probably be of no interest to the Committee. If the Committee will review these Tables of Contents and advise which forms it desires to see, appropriate steps will then be taken to make them available to the Committee Staff. The Tables of Contents headed "FBI Form Book" lists all FBI FD (Field Division) forms which are in use throughout the field. The remaining Tables of Contents list those forms applicable to the work of specific FBI Divisions at Headquarters. For example, forms with the prefix "1" are used in Division One (Identification); those with prefix "2" are used in Division Two (Training); etc. There are no forms peculiar to Divisions 11 (Legal Counsel) and 13 (Office of Planning and Evaluation). Those forms with prefix "0" (omnibus) are for use by two or more Divisions at Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Clearance for making these Tables of Contents available was obtained from the Training Division for the FD forms and from each Division for its applicable forms. The Files and Communications Division has cleared the paper "FBI Indexing Procedures."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/22/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Filing System

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard [illegible] Date: 5/29/75 @ 2P

Received by: [illegible]

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-201

ENCLOSURE

4-528

62-116395-200

CHANGED TO

62-116464-5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

JUN 12 1975

Hmk/cz

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 5/12/75

FROM : H.C. Flemister, Jr.

SUBJECT: CLEARANCE OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE (IIC) FOR RELEASE TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

The following is to record the clearance of certain documents prepared by the IIC and, in some instances, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) for release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC).

The SSC has been furnished a paper prepared by the Intelligence Division which was a position paper on the FBI's jurisdiction in internal security matters, intelligence and counterintelligence investigations. This paper was dated 2/13/75 and set forth information taken from certain documents or parts of documents by the IIC and, in some instances, the ICIS. All of these documents have been cleared for passage to the SSC by the following members of the IIC, as well as Mr. William Wark, Executive Secretary of the ICIS:

> Mr. Rowland Morrow, Director, Defense Investigative Programs Office; Mr. Merrill Kelly, Deputy Director of Operations, ACSI, U. S. Army; Colonel Leo Olsen, OSI, U. S. Air Force; Mr. Jack Donnelly, Naval Investigative Service.

Mr. Wark advised he did not feel it necessary to clear documents through the Attorney General since they pertain to IIC matters which were merely concurred in by ICIS.

Copies of the documents involved are attached and are as follows:

Enclosures

CONTINUED - OVER

JRW:tdp (7)
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Fulton (Lacey)
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Wagoner

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

4843

NOT RECORDED
191 JUN 4 1975

~~5 MAY 1975~~

66-

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/jlw

5 JUN 10 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: CLEARANCE OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
(IIC) FOR RELEASE TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

(1) Excerpt from report on the status of the Internal Security Program of the U. S. as of 6/30/58 dated 8/27/58, prepared by the IIC and the ICIS.

(2) Department of Justice memorandum dated 3/5/64 to Former Director Hoover setting forth new charter for the IIC under Attorney General supervision.

(3) Excerpt from report on the Internal Security Program dated 3/5/54, prepared by the IIC and the ICIS.

(4) Letter from Former Director Hoover, Chairman, IIC, to the Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, The White House, dated 7/25/61 and its enclosure of 7/25/61, prepared by the IIC.

(5) Memorandum from NSC Representative on Internal Security J. Patrick Coyne to Former Director Hoover dated 11/6/50 and letter to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC, dated 11/8/50 from Former Director Hoover, Chairman, IIC, and its enclosure.

ACTION:

None. For information.

WOC

JBA/pem

1 - Mr. ~~J. B. Adams~~
1 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz (J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. [illegible] R. Wannall
1 - Mr. [illegible] O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

TO SAC EL PASO (62-1957) JUNE 3, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (105-78256)

THOMAS RIHA; MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING.

REEPAIRTEL, MAY 8, 1970.

IMMEDIATELY CONTACT DR. JOSEPH SMILEY TO DETERMINE IF CONTENTS OF AIRTEL CAN BE FURNISHED CONFIDENTIALLY TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IF SMILEY HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT RELEASE OF INTERVIEW TO THIS COMMITTEE ASCERTAIN UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS, IF ANY, HE WOULD AGREE TO SUCH RELEASE. SUTEL ATTENTION W. O. CREGAR.

RLM:jmn jmn
(7)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 3 1975 155p
TELETYPE

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 5 1975

105-78256-43

ORIGINAL FILED IN

NOTE:

The Senate Select Committee has expressed an urgent interest in the details of any FBI investigation concerning the disappearance of Thomas Riha, former Professor at University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, in March, 1969. The Bureau conducted no investigation regarding the disappearance. There was considerable publicity with reference to a statement made by Dr. Smiley, then President of the university, that he had been informed by a Government official that Riha "was alive and well" Smiley was interviewed by the El Paso Office. Smiley furnished information in the strictest of confidence, not to be disseminated to any outside agency, regarding his contacts with a CIA representative in Boulder after the Riha disappearance. It was the CIA official who told him that Riha was alive and well. Without the Smiley interview our response to the Senate Select Committee has an obvious gap. If the Committee calls any witnesses in the Riha matter Dr. Smiley would be one of the most logical persons to call. The passage of time and other factors may have brought about a change in the mind of Dr. Smiley regarding the necessity to keep the information furnished by him in a confidential relationship with the Bureau and it is believed he should be given the opportunity to either reinforce his request for confidentiality or release the Bureau from the restriction he imposed.

RLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

8 JUN 5 1975

RECORDS
CC-62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)

GPO 954-546

1 - [illegible]r. J. B. Adams
1 - [illegible] J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General May 22, 1975

Director, FBI

REC- 102

1 Encl.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning the interview by Senator Walter F. Mondale of the Senate Select Committee as well as members of its staff of retired FBI Special Agent John P. Devlin. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - 67-220521 (Personnel File for SA John P. Devlin)

WOC:cmc
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

NOTE:

The furnishing of the LHM to the Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to Wilderotter is the same procedure we have followed in the past regarding the interviews of former FBI employees by the SSC Staff.

ENCLOSURE

Delivered to
5/22/75

REC-102

62-116395 - [illegible]

JUN 6 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 6 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

5 F [illegible] - 4063 (LNST)

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395 May 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
BY SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE AND
STAFF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-2001 BY SP2ALM/RW

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by retired SA John P. Devlin following his voluntary appearance before Senator Mondale and Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on May 19, 1975. Devlin's appearance followed an interview of him by Senate Select Committee Staff Member Michael T. Epstein on April 25, 1975. A memorandum reporting the results of the April 25, 1975, interview was forwarded to the Attorney General as an enclosure to my letter to the Attorney General dated May 8, 1975, entitled "United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities."

On May 19, 1975, Devlin was interviewed by Senator Mondale; SSC Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.; Assistant Minority Counsel Charles Kirbow; and Epstein. The interview was conducted in a building across the street from the Dirksen Building in Washington, D. C., and lasted from approximately 2:00 p.m. to 3:20 p.m. Devlin was not subpoenaed to appear but appeared voluntarily. He was placed under oath by Senator Mondale.

At the outset of the interview Devlin was advised of his rights; that he could be represented by counsel and that if he had none, but desired counsel, the Committee Staff would attempt to provide one for him. At the conclusion of the interview he was thanked but given no indication as to whether he would be called to testify before the SSC.

1 - 67-220521 (Personnel File for SA John P. Devlin)

WOC:cmc
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-199

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Re: Interview of Retired Special Agent (SA)
by Senator Walter F. Mondale and
Staff Members of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC)

Following being advised of his rights, Devlin was asked who sent him to Atlantic City and why he was sent. He advised he received his instructions from Special Agent in Charge Ralph Bachman through Devlin's supervisor, SA Vincent Murphy. It is to be noted here that upon being interviewed by Epstein on April 25, 1975, Devlin had indicated he had received his instructions through his supervisor, SA William Gagnon. Devlin corrected this mistake during the interview of May 19, 1975. As to why he was sent, Devlin advised that as a sound man of the Newark Office he was sent to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to install a technical surveillance on Martin Luther King, Jr., who occupied a room at the Claridge Hotel in that city. Devlin was asked whether the monitoring plant for the electronic surveillance was located in the same hotel. Upon being advised it was the interviewers' desire to know whether the location of the plant at the Claridge Hotel was also designed to serve as a physical lookout on King's room, Devlin advised he was not aware that the FBI employed a physical lookout on King's hotel room. Devlin was also asked whether he installed a microphone in the room of King. He advised that he had not because it was not technically feasible. Also of concern to those interviewing Devlin on May 19, was whether he had personal knowledge as to whether the Attorney General had approved the electronic surveillance on King's telephone. Devlin replied he had no personal knowledge but assumed such authority had been obtained by his supervisor. Devlin was also asked if he could recall any conversations over King's phone which were monitored. Devlin replied that the only recollection he had involved conversations between King and his wife wherein they discussed her plans to travel to Atlantic City. Additionally, he did recall conversations involving the noted entertainer, Mehalia Jackson, who was appearing at that time in Atlantic City. Devlin could not recall the substance of the conversation with Jackson. He was also asked whether he retained or possessed any

notes regarding the activity that occurred in Atlantic City during the Democratic Party Nominating Convention during the summer of 1964. Devlin advised that he did not retain any notes but subsequent to the original contact of him by Epstein, Devlin called SA John Connelly of the FBI Office in Newark in an effort to review any available material that might refresh his recollection. Connelly advised Devlin that all materials and notes retained by the Newark Office were forwarded to FBI Headquarters. This information was conveyed to the interviewers on the occasion of the May 19, 1975, interview.

Devlin also was asked if he ever questioned the technical coverage of King inasmuch as it appeared to be for political rather than security reasons. Devlin replied that he had no reason to question the technical coverage of King. He also was asked if he personally met with Mr. Cartha DeLoach of the FBI while both were in Atlantic City. Devlin advised he could not recall whether he actually met DeLoach, pointing out that SA Billie D. Williams was assigned the liaison responsibility with DeLoach.

Devlin was asked whether he had contacted the FBI following his original interview by Epstein on April 25, 1975. Devlin advised he had reported the interview by Epstein to the FBI Office in Newark, New Jersey. He further advised that subsequent to this, he received a call from Newark Assistant Special Agent in Charge Herbert Clough who informed him that should he be contacted in the future, and should he feel he needed to consult with FBI officials, he could call the Legal Counsel Division, FBI Headquarters, in Washington, D. C., collect, for such consultation. Senator Mondale desired to know who Devlin saw upon his arrival in Washington, D. C., on the morning of May 19, 1975, and specifically what instructions he received from the FBI. Devlin advised Senator Mondale that

Re: Interview of Retired Special Agent (SA)
by Senator Walter F. Mondale and
Staff Members of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC)

upon arrival in Washington, D. C., he reported to Inspector John Hotis of the Legal Counsel Division and Paul V. Daly of the FBI at which time he was advised of what obligations he had to the Attorney General as a former employee of the FBI to protect information obtained by virtue of his former employment in the FBI. Subsequent to Devlin's meeting with Mr. Hotis and Mr. Daly, he spent the remainder of the morning with SA William O. Cregar. Mondale desired to know specifically what Devlin and Cregar discussed. Devlin advised that other than discussing mutual friendships in the FBI, Cregar advised of what Cregar's role would be in accompanying him to the interview and specifically that Devlin could feel free to ask for the opportunity to consult with Cregar during the interview if the line of inquiry could possibly reveal the identity of sources, sensitive methods or investigative techniques, information derived from third agencies, or information which could adversely affect sensitive ongoing investigations.

NOTE:

Original and one copy to the Attorney General (AG) for forwarding the copy of the memorandum to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. The information contained herein was orally furnished to SA W. O. Cregar by former SA Devlin following his interview of May 19, 1975.

~~1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 4, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired Special Agent of FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: Bureau file 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/19/75

5. INTERVIEWERS: Senator Walter F. Mondale of the SSC; SSC Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.; SSC Assistant Minority Counsel Charles Kirbow; and SSC Staff Member Michael T. Epstein.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT: Witness was interviewed under oath, although he did not appear under subpoena, as a follow-up to an earlier interview of him by an SSC Staff Member. His testimony concerned his participation in the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395

SFP:ekw ERW
(6)

Delivered 6/5/75

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC-102

62-116395-198

17 JUN 6 1975

84 JUN 6 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975

Intelligence Community Staff

Senstudy - '75

Mr. William O. Cregar
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4123
J. Edgar Hoover Building

Dear Bill:

Attached is a letter to the Chairman of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, signed by the DCI on 29 May 1975. It deals with the custody for and access to certain particularly sensitive material. This is an effective arrangement for the protection of special matters.

Sincerely,

62-116395
5-PRS

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Enclosure:
As Stated

REC- 102

62-116395-197

17 JUN 6 1975

84 JUN 6 1975

Executive Registry
75-6430/1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OLC 75-1163

29 MAY 1975

Honorable John O. Pastore, Chairman
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my letter to you on 20 May 1975 I requested your assistance in making the Joint Committee's secure storage facilities available for the retention of certain sensitive material to which access is needed by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Those arrangements have been made with Mr. George Murphy and with the Select Committee. I want to thank you for making the facilities available and for permitting Mr. Murphy to be the custodian of the material.

A further need has now arisen for the same kind of arrangement for the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Again I would be very grateful to you and Mr. Murphy if a similar arrangement could be made for the members of the House Committee and members of the Committee staff designated for access to such material by mutual agreement of Chairman Nedzi and myself.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
- 1 - DCI
- 1 - Mr. Knoche
- 1 - ER
- 1 - Mr. Clarke
- 1 - Select Committee
- 1 - OLC Chrono
- 1 - JCAE File

62-116395-197
ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: May 23, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Intelligence Task Force Director of captioned Committee advised that they were in receipt of a letter from the U. S. Postal Service informing the Committee an inquiry concerning the identity of all mail covers placed by the FBI since 1960, should be directed to the FBI.

Elliff inquired as to whether a letter from the Committee concerning this particular request should be directed to the Bureau or Attorney General. He was instructed the request should be directed to the Attorney General. Elliff said that he would direct such a letter to the Attorney General making a request concerning mail covers in the near future.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Intelligence, Special Investigative and General Investigative Divisions should gather necessary material so that the appropriate response might be prepared.

PVD JBH/PVD

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Cleveland
1-Mr. Gebhardt
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly

PLM

REC-102

62-116395-196

PVD:lgp
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

17 JUN 6 1975

84 JUN 6 1975

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. J.C. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 21, 1975
1 - Mr. P. T. Blake

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Two of the documents requested were the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) dated June, 1970, and the original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. With respect to the original report on COINTELPRO activities, pursuant to the conversation between Mr. John C. Keeney, Department of Justice, and Special Agent James C. Farrington, FBI Headquarters, on March 27, 1975, it was agreed the Department would await receipt of the Bureau's opinion prior to formulating its response to Senator Church's request for the 39-page Petersen report on COINTELPRO.

The 39-page COINTELPRO report, as well as all but one of Exhibits A through P attached thereto, contains matters relating to the internal deliberations of Department and FBI representatives who constituted the study Committee headed by former Assistant Attorney General Petersen. It is, therefore, suggested that if it is decided the report should be made available to Senator Church, it be done with the provision it not be made public.

EX 104 REC-59 62-116395-195 MAY 1 1975

Concerning the exhibits referred to in the text of the report: Exhibits A through L are summaries and memoranda prepared by the FBI or by Department attorneys based on their review of FBI material, and some of these are classified "Secret"; Exhibits M and N are legal memoranda prepared by Department attorneys in connection with the study Committee inquiry; Exhibit P is a work paper prepared by the FBI setting

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

EWL:glw/jvl
(8)

84 JUN 11 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Delivered to Jack Fuller, Atty Gen's Office, 5:30 pm 4/22/75 JBH.

GPO 954-546

forth overall recommendations relating to counterintelligence activity. All of these exhibits are in the nature of deliberative, internal work papers wherein opinions were freely expressed because they were not prepared with the idea in mind of publication, and it would appear they would be exempt from disclosure even if the report itself is furnished to Senator Church.

It is, therefore, recommended that, due to the above considerations, those exhibits prepared by the FBI not be furnished to Senator Church if you do decide to give him the report. It is felt the Department should determine if those exhibits prepared solely by the Department, such as Exhibits M and N, should be furnished to the Senator, but it is our recommendation that they not be for the same reasons as stated above.

Exhibit O is a press release dated December 7, 1973, which, of course, is already public source in nature.

You will recall that then Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman, in testimony before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary as to why this 39-page report should not be furnished to that Committee stated, "...if we had thought it was appropriate to release the full discussion we would have done so at the time. There are a lot of internal working documents in the Justice Department which go to the making of a final report. This is the Attorney General's report."

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which sets forth the status of their request for the two documents. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures - 2

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. J.C. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. T. Blake

April 21, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

One of the requests, under V., A., was the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) dated June, 1970. This is the so-called "Huston Report" and was prepared for the White House. Under the circumstances, this request has been referred to the White House.

Under V., B., a request was made for the original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Since that report is the property of the Department of Justice, the request has been referred to that Department.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-02 BY SP2ALM/RW

EWL:glw/jvl jvl
(8)

Jck

WRW/TJL

JBA
TJM

6/3/75 P.V. Daly advised LHM not delivered to SSC as Dept is preparing its own memo. SSC was orally advised of contents by Daly. TJM

[illegible] INCC [illegible] 6/11/75

Delivered to Jack Fuller, Atty Gen's off,
5:30 pm, 4/22/75 JBH.

EWL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-195

GPO 954-546

PERS. REC. UNIT

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General

May 23, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. V. Daly

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by Staff Members of captioned Committee of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director of the FBI. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

WOC:ekw ekw
(10)

REC-180 62-116395-194

17 JUN 5 1975

ENCLOSURE

5/27/75

HRC

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 5 1975

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr.J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

62-116395

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. P. V. Daly
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE
DIRECTOR JOHN P. MOHR BY SSC STAFF
MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-81 BY SP2ALM/Rw

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Mohr following his interview by representatives of the Staff of the SSC in Washington, D. C., on May 9, 1975.

Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Lester B. Seidel, and Thomas Dawson from approximately 10:20 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. He was not placed under oath and he was not advised of his rights or that he could be represented by personal counsel.

At the outset of the interview, it was apparent that its purpose was to assist the SSC Staff Members in trying to understand how the flow of mail proceeded in the FBI under Mr. Hoover's directorship. For example, Mr. Mohr was shown FBI documents relating to the Socialist Workers Party as well as COINTELPRO documents which were obtained by Mr. Carl Stern under the Freedom of Information Act. No substantive questions were directed to Mr. Mohr regarding these documents but were shown to him in order that Mr. Mohr might identify who the final authority was in approving such documents.

In addition to the above, the Staff Members asked Mr. Mohr to explain the difference between an SAC Letter and a letter to all SACs. They also asked Mr. Mohr if the Bureau maintained a separate file on all SAC Letters.

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

WOC:ekw ekw
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-194

PO 954-546

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JOHN P. MOHR BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

Mr. Mohr was also questioned about the procedures he followed in securing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's office after Mr. Hoover's death. Mr. Mohr told the Staff Members that the article which appeared in "The Washington Star" by columnist Jeremiah O'Leary was an accurate recording of what took place following Mr. Hoover's death. The Staff Members requested Mr. Mohr review in considerable detail exactly what he did to secure Mr. Hoover's office following his death.

The question of former Associate Director Clyde Tolson's will was also raised by Staff Members. Mr. Mohr advised the interviewers that Hillory Tolson, brother of Clyde Tolson, had not decided at that time whether he was going to contest the will.

Mr. Mohr was also asked about the whereabouts of Miss Helen Gandy, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Hoover. He advised that he did know her whereabouts and telephone number but promised he would not reveal them to anyone. Mr. Mohr was asked whether Miss Gandy would agree to being interviewed by Staff Members of the SSC. He advised that he would attempt to persuade Miss Gandy to agree to being interviewed on the condition he be allowed to be present during the entire interview. The Staff Members interposed no objection to that arrangement and Mr. Mohr indicated that he would advise Mr. Gitenstein of Miss Gandy's desires under the conditions stipulated above.

On May 12, 1975, Mr. Mohr telephonically advised that he recalled some additional topics covered during the interview of May 9, 1975, which he desired to furnish to the FBI. Specifically, Mr. Mohr recalled that he was asked if he knew who prepared the "surreptitious letters" the Bureau had mailed in the Socialist Workers Party case. Mr. Mohr advised the Staff Members that he did not know but presumed these letters were prepared in the Document Section of the FBI Laboratory.

Mr. Mohr also recalled that during his interview of May 9, 1975, he had advised Miss Gandy had turned over to Mr. Mark Felt of the FBI the official and confidential files of Mr. Hoover which amounted to one-half a file drawer. Subsequently, Mr. Mohr learned from Miss Gandy that the official and confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt amounted to one and one-half file drawers. This information was subsequently furnished to Mr. Gitenstein by Mr. Mohr. On that occasion, Mr. Gitenstein asked Mr. Mohr whether an itemized list of the official and confidential files was made and if so where the list was. Mohr told Gitenstein that he was sure a list was made and that in all probability the list accompanied the official and confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt by Miss Gandy.

In addition to the above, Mr. Mohr on May 12, 1975, recalled that Gitenstein asked about a requirement of all Bureau employees to turn over any confidential files in their possession ordered by Mr. Hoover following the revelation that former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had turned over certain confidential files to former Assistant Attorney General Mardian. Mr. Mohr advised Gitenstein that Mr. Hoover had in fact levied such a requirement on Bureau officials and that all confidential files were to be turned over to Mr. Felt along with a memorandum explaining the nature of these files. Gitenstein asked Mohr where these memoranda would be filed. Mohr responded by saying he presumed they were confidential memoranda and would have gone with the confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt by Bureau officials maintaining such files.

NOTE: The original and one copy of this LHM is being furnished to the Attorney General. The copy is to be forwarded by the Attorney General to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. The information herein was taken from two memoranda, Cregar to Wannall, dated 5/9 and 12/75 entitled "Senstudy 75."

~~1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
June 2, 1975 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1. SUBJECT: FBI mail flow procedures and other miscellaneous matters.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired Special Agent, FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/9/75

5. INTERVIEWERS: SSC Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Lester B. Seidel, and Thomas Dawson.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT: The witness was questioned and furnished information concerning procedures relating to the flow of mail at FBI Headquarters and other miscellaneous matters such as the difference between an SAC Letter and a letter to all SACs.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395

SFP:ekw ekw
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN
DATE 1-19-01 SP2ALM/RW

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

REC-100

62-116395-193

JUN 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 JUN 5 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 5-29-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, K. William O'Connor requested on 5-28-75, that he be given the opportunity to review summaries of the five recently uncovered COINTELPRO programs. O'Connor stated that in view of captioned Committee's request concerning COINTELPRO and his position of being in charge of Bureau and Departmental responses to Committee requests, he felt that it would be advantageous for him to be generally aware of the contents of the five newly uncovered programs. Mr. O'Connor stated he had previously reviewed the other COINTELPRO programs. [while in Civil Rights Division]

RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. O'Connor be allowed to review the five recently uncovered COINTELPRO programs.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE [illegible] BY [illegible]

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Ryan
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

REC-100

62-116395-192

PVD:eek
(8)

JUN 5 1975

FIVE

84 JUN 5 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TJL

DATE: 5/22/75

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Sen 142

Reference is made to my memorandum dated 5/19/75 advising of the receipt of a letter from the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to the Attorney General dated 5/14/75, appending requests for additional documents and other information.

Specific attention is invited to Appendix A, item number 5, which requests:

"All Memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use the following techniques to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities (see letter from the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General dated April 23, 1975):

a. All forms of electronic surveillance, including consensual electronic surveillance;

b. All forms of mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail;

c. Surreptitious entry;

d. All forms of physical surveillance, including agent infiltration, observation, photography, and remote viewing and sensing devices;

e. Informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems;

f. Obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information;

g. Incommunicado interrogation;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC-100 62-116395-191

62-116395

17 JUN 5 1975

EWL:cmc cmc
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 5 1975

FIVE

h. Maintenance of files and records;

i. Dissemination of information from files and records;

j. So-called "COINTELPRO" techniques and methods, including all forms of organizational 'disruption.'"

Appendix B, item number 4, requests:

"For each of the techniques described in Item 5 of Appendix A above, all memoranda and other materials relating to:

a. The original decision to utilize the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

b. The policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities."

It would appear appropriate that response to Appendix A, item number 5, be prepared by the Legal Counsel Division. It is also apparent that response to Appendix B, item number 4, should be closely coordinated although responsibility for research in this area would appear to fall more logically within the Intelligence Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Legal Counsel Division assume responsibility for preparing response contained in Appendix A, Item number 5.

CONTINUED - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS - CONTINUED

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY - 75
62-116395

RECOMMENDATIONS - CONTINUED:

2. Intelligence Division will assume responsibility for preparing response to item number 4, Appendix B, with input from the Legal Counsel Division.

EWL

wrw

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 3, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) and its enclosures described below.

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Some of the enclosures to the LHM classified "Top Secret."

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have 60

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: The LHM refers to a prior LHM furnished to the SSC enclosing a copy of "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75 and noted that certain exhibits were extracted prior to dissemination due to Third Agency Rule considerations. LHM advised that those considerations had been resolved and that the exhibits were being furnished with the LHM.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75. Response pertains to Part I of the SSC original letter of request dated 3/19/75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SRALM/RW

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/20/75

REC-10 62-116395-190

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: Third Agency Rule clearances obtained.

17 JUN 5 1975

62-116395

SFP:ekw (4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. ____
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
gal Coun. ____
lephone Rm. __
ector Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
(A[illegible]n: J. W. Hines)
2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General

May 29, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE~~
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices A thru D requesting certain documents and other information.

Under item 26 of Appendix C, a request is made for "All reports prepared by the Office of Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice pursuant to the request in September 1974 of the Attorney General and/or Deputy Attorney General pertaining to the so-called 'Wounded Knee' case and any other so-called 'political trial' or other prosecutions brought by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division."

Under item 27 of Appendix C request is made of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for "All memoranda or other materials prepared by the FBI relating to the reports described in Item 26."

The Department is requested to advise this Bureau if reports which are requested in Appendix C under item 26 with respect to the "'Wounded Knee' case" were furnished to the FBI. If such reports were furnished please advise under what captions and dates these reports were submitted and identify by captions and dates all FBI communications on which your reports were based. If these reports were not furnished this Bureau please provide copies to us when you identify the FBI communications as requested herein.

REC-100 62-116395-188

You are also requested to provide to this Bureau copies of those reports, including sufficient information identifying FBI communications on which they were based, which will be furnished the Senate Select Committee per its request for "any other so-called 'political trial' or other prosecutions brought by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division."

10

17 JUN 5 1975

62-116395

KAM:cmc
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

KAM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JUN 5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

-4063

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

Inasmuch as this Bureau's response to item 27 of Appendix C enclosed with referenced letter depends on your response to item 26, you are requested to furnish the desired information as soon as possible in order that we may comply with the Senate Select Committee request. Since all reports requested under item 26 were prepared by the Department this Bureau will take no action to provide copies of these reports to the Committee.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: K. William O'Connor
        Special Counsel for
        Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

Until such time as we determine what information will be furnished the Senate Select Committee by the Department under item 26 mentioned above we believe our response on item 27 to the Senate Select Committee should be delayed. This will enable us to provide material requested by the Senate Select Committee which will correspond to information being provided by the Department.

Trial material relating to Wounded-Knee case was handled by the General Investigative Division and this part of the request is being coordinated with SA J. C. Gordon who supervised the Wounded-Knee case. Upon receipt of requested information from the Department, General Investigative Division will be notified so an appropriate response may be compiled regarding Wounded-Knee matter. Intelligence Division will conduct necessary reviews for information pertaining to other prosecutions by "Special Litigation Section" of the Department.

DCI/IC 75-2008

29 MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Certification of Clearances for Classified Information and Compartmented Information of Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee

Senstudy -'75

1. Arrangements have been made so that the Compartmented Information Branch (CIB) of CIA will maintain, as a matter of common concern, an up-to-date listing of all staff members of the Senate Select Committee who have been certified by the Committee for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET and also those who have been certified and briefed for compartmented information.

2. CIB will attempt to keep this listing in a current status and telephone inquiries can be made by calling 351-5507 (IDS 143-5507) during the hours 0800 to 1730 Monday through Friday. Periodically, a current listing of the individuals certified will be disseminated to members of the USIB Ad Hoc Group.

3. It is contemplated this same procedure will be followed for the House Select Committee when certification of clearances are received from this Committee and you will be advised when such procedure is instituted.

62-116395-

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

NOT RECORDED
12 JUL 25 1975

Records Pls. file
62-116395

5-8

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. Adams
DATE: 5/21/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

At approximately 9:00 a.m. on May 21, 1975, retired Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella appeared in my office prior to his appointment to receive a subpoena and to testify at 9:30 a.m. on 5/21/75 at Washington, D.C., before the Senate Select Committee. I told Mr. Sentinella that it would not be possible for me to furnish him personal counsel prior to or during his testimony, however I felt it was appropriate for me to furnish him certain information. I told Mr. Sentinella that he was entitled to be represented by a personal counsel of his own choice at any time and that if he chose to secure the services of a private attorney he was at liberty to do so.

I also told Mr. Sentinella that under the rules of the Senate Select Committee (Rule 6.4), a witness may be accompanied by counsel during testimony and a witness who is unable to obtain counsel may inform the Committee of that fact and the Committee is obliged to endeavor to obtain voluntary counsel for the witness. I told him that the rules further provide that the failure to obtain counsel would not excuse him from appearing and testifying.

I asked Mr. Sentinella whether he had been given any advice by the Committee concerning his right to counsel and whether he had received a copy of the Committee's rules as required by regulations in the rules (Rule 6.1). Mr. Sentinella said that he had not been so advised and he had not been given a copy of the rules by any representative of the Committee.

I told Mr. Sentinella that as to matters other than the presence of personal counsel, no understanding had been reached with the Committee.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

REC-102

62-116395-181

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

10 MAY 27 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 5 1975

I further explained to him that the Attorney General Order relating to responses to subpoenas would apply to him and that we had been advised that the Department had approved a waiver of the Attorney General Order limitation permitting his testimony, but only as to matters concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, including related matters. I told Mr. Sentinella that should the questioning involve other areas and he was in doubt as to his authorization to respond, he could request an opportunity to consult with the Department to secure approval for his testimony consistent with the terms of the Attorney General Order. I also reminded Mr. Sentinella that a representative of the FBI would be available during his testimony for such consultation as he felt might be necessary. I told him that SA Paul Daly would be available for that purpose.

I told Mr. Sentinella that our concern is not that matters of historical fact might be revealed, but that testimony which might be required of him could impair the Bureau's current efforts to discharge its responsibilities. I explained that in specific terms what this meant was that information that would identify sensitive sources, techniques or methods, or that would identify confidential informants, or would expose current investigative operations should be reserved for members of the Committee or perhaps the Chairman of the Committee depending upon the sensitivity of the particular information. I advised him that in the event such matters are involved in the questioning he could request consultation and that arrangements could be made for the answers to be supplied under appropriately limited conditions. I told Mr. Sentinella that as to other areas of possible testimony, the Bureau would impose no request that he decline to answer questions.

Mr. Sentinella advised me that he understood the matters I had explained to him and that he did not at this time feel the need of personal counsel because he said that he did not regard the appearance as one in the nature of a grand jury appearance. I told Mr. Sentinella that he should be aware that his testimony would be given under oath and in the event he made a statement that was self-incriminatory, it could be used against him. I reminded him I was not advising him in order to deter him from furnishing testimony, but only telling him of the protections he has under the

CONTINUED - OVER

Constitution against self-incrimination. He said he would keep that matter in mind.

Mr. Sentinella said that he would like to volunteer the results of his interview at the conclusion of the interview and he also would like to have an opportunity to review a transcript of the testimony for accuracy.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 16 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR 019 SF PLAIN

7:09PM NITEL MAY 16, 1975 KEK

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395) (ATTN: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL)

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SENSTUDY, 1975

Hotis

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL OFFICES MAY 2, 1975.

ON MAY 16, 1975, FORMER SAN FRANCISCO SUPERVISOR DAVID E. TODD CALLED AND ADVISED HE HAD RECEIVED CALL FROM LESTER SEIDEL, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, WANTING TO INTERVIEW TODD RE DOMESTIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, SPECIFICALLY, BLACK PANTHER PARTY. TODD SAID HE WANTED TO BE COOPERATIVE BUT WAS APPREHENSIVE REGARDING DIVULGING INFORMATION AS A RESULT OF HIS FBI EMPLOYMENT. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO IMMEDIATELY CALL COLLECT THE OFFICE OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL AT FBIHQ. HE SAID HE WOULD DO THIS.

TODD ALSO ADVISED THAT SEIDEL HAD TOLD HIM THE COMMITTEE ALSO WANTED TO INTERVIEW FORMER SAN FRANCISCO SUPERVISOR ALBERT P. CLARK.

END

EX 104

REC 67

62-116395-186

17 MAY 28 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

LEC

CC

102

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 29 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 005 AX CODE

3:20 AM URGENT MAY 29, 1975 DKL

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-217) (RUC) 1 PAGE

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA, MAY 28, 1975. Sew 178

ON MAY 29, 1975, FORMER EMPLOYEES COURTLAND J. JONES AND BERNARD A. WELLS WERE CONTACTED BY ASAC MICHAEL A. MORROW, IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, AND FURNISHED INFORMATION SET OUT IN REFERENCED TELETYPE.

END

HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/R

REC-100

62-116395-185

Records
cc 67-155313 (Jones)
67-436022 (Wells)

PERS. REC. UNIT

5-P

84 JUN 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 BA CODED

7:49 PM NITEL 5/30/75 JAN

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: BALTIMORE (66-3127)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL MAY 28, 1975. Ser 178

THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS WERE CONTACTED ON THE INDICATED DATES BY THE ASAC AND INSTRUCTIONS INRETEL FOLLOWED.

NONE OF THEM HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF TO DATE, AND EACH STATED THEY WOULD CONTACT THE FBI SHOULD THEY BE CONTACTED IN THE FUTURE.

MAY 29, 1975 - ROBERT H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND.

MAY 30, 1975 - ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDNOR ROAD, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND.

MAY 30, 1975 - STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAL LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND.

END

REC-100 62-116395-184

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Records:
CC-67-140656 (Belter)
67-438869 (Haynes)
67-177725 (Donahoe)

84 JUN 5 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975
DW
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 036 CG CODE

727PM NITEL 5/30/75 EMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM CHICAGO

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL MAY 28, 1975.

PURSUANT TO BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, MISS OLGA CIESA WAS CONTACTED BY SAC, CHICAGO, ON MAY 30, 1975 REGARDING CAPTIONED MATTER. SHE STATED SHE STILL RESIDES 13409 SOUTH INDIANA AVENUE, CHICAGO, AND IS STILL EMPLOYED AS AN EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AT THE FIRM OF ERNST AND ERNST, ATTORNEYS, IN CHICAGO.

MISS CIESA WAS ADVISED THAT THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAD MADE INQUIRY AS TO HER LAST KNOWN ADDRESS, INDICATING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MAY DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HER. SHE WAS FURTHER ADVISED THAT IN THE EVENT SHE IS INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME ANY QUESTIONS WERE ASKED RELATIVE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS; ETC., SHE COULD REQUEST THE ASSISTANCE OF AN AGENT TO BE PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW.

5-28

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

(019a Ciesa)

REC-100 62-116395-183

Recorded
cc 671

JUN 4 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 5 1975

SHE WAS FURTHER ADVISED THAT IF AFTER THE INTERVIEW THERE WERE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PRESENTED A QUESTION IN HER MIND SHE COULD CONTACT THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION IN WASHINGTON, D.C., COLLECT, FOR ANY ASSISTANCE THAT DIVISION COULD AFFORD HER.

MISS CIFSA WAS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WOULD DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HER AND ADVISED THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY SHE WOULD ASK FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF AN AGENT PRIOR TO ANSWERING ANY QUESTIONS THEY MAY PROPOSE TO HER. SHE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT SHE MIGHT INADVERTENTLY DISCLOSE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND AS A RESULT WOULD FEEL MUCH MORE SECURE WERE AN AGENT PRESENT TO ADVISE HER.

IN THE EVENT CONTACT IS MADE THE BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED.

END

HOLD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR036 OM CODE

5:33PM NITEL 5/30/75 SKH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: OMAHA (62-3439) (P)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL, MAY 28, 1975.

SA ROBERT L. TAGG, WHO IS CURRENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY AND CURRENTLY ASSIGNED AS SENIOR RESIDENT AGENT, LINCOLN, NEBRASKA, RESIDENT AGENCY, ADVISED OF CONTENTS IN RE TELETYPE. SHOULD SA TAGG BE CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, THE BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED IEDIA.

END.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

REC-100

62-116395-182

17 JUN 4 1975

Records (Tagg)

cc 67-

PERS. REC. UNIT

5-

84 JUN 5 1975

NR07 PX CODE

317PM MAY 30, 1975 URGENT WKC

TO: DIRECTOR

MINNEAPOLIS (PERSONAL ATTENTION)

FROM: PHOENIX (62-2033) 3P

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 30 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

SENSTUDY 75

Ser 118

REBUNITEL DATED MAY 28, 1975 AND PHOENIX TELCALL TO MINNEAPOLIS MAY 30, 1975.

FOR INFORMATION OF MINNEAPOLIS FOLLOWING IS BEING SET FORTH:

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

REC-100 62-116395-181

17 JUN 4 1975

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE

END PAGE ONE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RU

Records

(mildred) RISK

5-108

cc 67

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 5 1975

SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKNOWN. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

END PAGE TWO

PHOENIX: MILDRED E. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE,
YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA

INVESTIGATION AT YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA HAS DISCLOSED THAT MILDRED E. RISK IS NOW RESIDING WITH HER SISTER, MRS. W.A. HILLS, TEN MILE LAKE, HACKENSACK, MINNESOTA, RR 2, TELEPHONE NUMBER 218-547-3048, AND WILL BE THERE UNTIL FALL OF THIS YEAR WHEN SHE WILL RETURN TO ARIZONA.

MINNEAPOLIS HANDLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS.

END

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 29 1975
Dav
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR002 AT CODE

9:53 PM NITEL MAY 29,1975 WCG

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

sw/178

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA AND OTHER OFFICES, MAY 28, 1975.

SA ALDEN F. MILLER, ATLANTA DIVISION, ALERTED TO POSSIBILITY OF CONTACT BY SSC. SA MILLER HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED TO DATE. IN THE EVENT CONTACT, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION WILL BE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THROUGH THE SAC.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Records
cc 67-415968 (Alden Miller)

REC-100

62-116395-180

PERS. REC. UNIT

17 JUN 4 1975

84 JUN 5 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

REC-100

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR009 AT CODE

3:58 PM NITEL MAY 30,1975 WCG

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTENTION: INTD - W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

DURING A MEETING WITH REGINALD MURPHY, EDITOR, THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, MAY 29,1975, MURPHY IN GENERAL CONVERSATION ADVISED SAC, ATLANTA, THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, D. C., SEEKING AN INTERVIEW WITH HIM. MURPHY SAID HE HAD AGREED TO A MEETING WITH A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, NAME NOT STATED, AND DID SO SOMETIME APPARENTLY WITHIN THE LAST WEEK. MURPHY INDICATED THE INTERVIEW CONCERNED MARTIN LUTHER KING. MURPHY VOLUNTEERED HE WAS UNABLE TO ANSWER MANY OF THE QUESTIONS ASKED SINCE HE WAS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE EVENTS AND THAT SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS HE WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT ARE NOW DECEASED. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO FORMER EDITOR, RALPH MC GILL, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, NOW DECEASED, AND INDICATED THAT THE INQUIRY CONCERNED INFORMATION IT WAS FELT COULD BE PROVIDED BY MC GILL. MURPHY WAS NEVER SPECIFIC IN HIS CONVERSATION AND NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS

END PAGE ONE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-10667

Records
cc 100-106670 (King)

REC-100

62-116395-179

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JOM/ew
6072

17 JUN 4 1975

84 JUN 4 1975

SINCE IT WAS OBVIOUS HE DID NOT WISH TO EXPAND ON THE COMMENTS MADE BY HIM.

MURPHY INDICATED ALSO THAT THE PERSON OR PERSONS INTERVIEWING HIM FELT HE, MURPHY, SHOULD HAVE SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND HE IS NOT SURE HE WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THEM THAT HE DID NOT. FROM THE COMMENTS MADE BY MURPHY, IT WAS THE IMPRESSION OF THE SAC THAT MURPHY WAS PRESSED FOR DETAILS WHICH HE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE.

END

FBIHQ FLC CLR TKS

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

5/28/75

TO SACS ALEXANDRIA
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
KANSAS CITY
LITTLE ROCK
NEWARK
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PORTLAND
PHOENIX
TAMPA
WFO

1 - Mr. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr.J.B.Hotis)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REBuTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

REC-100

62-116395-178

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE

1 - ROME (BY MAIL)

17 JUN 4 1975

SFP:ekw EKW
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 28 1975
215 AM SLP
TELETYPE

84 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKNOWN. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALEXANDRIA: COURTLAND J. JONES, 6607 N. 29TH STREET, ARLINGTON, VA.; ROBERT G. KUNKEL, SAC; BERNARD A. WELLS, 5311 MONTGOMERY STREET, SPRINGFIELD, VA.

ATLANTA: ALDEN F. MILLER

BALTIMORE: ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDNOR ROAD, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND; STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAL LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND; ROBERT H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND

CHARLOTTE: JOSEPH A. SIZOO, 84A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PINES, NORTH CAROLINA

CHICAGO: OLGA CIESA, 10409 S. INDIANA AVENUE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

KANSAS CITY: BILL D. WILLIAMS, SAC

LITTLE ROCK: JOHN J. CREAMER, JR., ASAC

NEWARK: JOHN J. CONNOLLY; RITA AGNES AMBROSIO, 1604 JOHN STREET, FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY; RALPH W. BACHMAN, 610 NORWOOD DRIVE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY; KARL L. BROUSE,

5 BURRINGTON GORGE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY.

OMAHA: ROBERT L. TAGG

PHILADELPHIA: JOHN B. MEADE

PORTLAND: LEO B. APP, JR.; EDGAR O. INGALLS

PHOENIX: MILDRED E. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE, YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA

TAMPA: MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6509 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BEACH, FLORIDA

WFO: JAMES J. GAFFNEY; ELMER L. TODD

ROME: THOMAS J. BIAMONTE; JOSEPH C. MICHELA; HELEN C. SPEAR
COPY TO ROME, WITH ITS EMPLOYEES NAMED, BY MAIL.

NOTE: May 14, 1975, SSC letter and appendices requested current whereabouts individuals named herein. Also included herein names of Bachman and Brouse who were SAC and ASAC respectively in Newark Office pertinent period inasmuch as one request from SSC was for memoranda from former SA Leo T. Clark to Newark SAC and ASAC. SSC request named several additional former employees who were previously alerted by tel to selected officers 5/2/75. Another 5/2/75 tel, to all offices, referenced herein, gave field general background re Senstudy 75. By separate airtel to Rome we are forwarding copy of instant tel as well as copies of prior pertinent tels. The caution taken herein in alerting former employees as well as incumbents is same we took previously by 5/2/75 tel to selected SACs. After dispatch instant tel, copies will be filed in personnel files of all named herein. One of the 1964 Rome employees was Theodore A. Korontjis, currently assigned INTD, who will be appropriately informed orally concerning this matter.

Korontjis informed
5/29/75 B

2 - [illegible]. J. A. Mintz
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General May 20, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RA

1158

Reference is made to memorandum and appendices thereto, from the Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, requesting documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number three of referenced communication requests that a Senate Select Committee Staff Representative be authorized to examine certain portions of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, (MRR), at the FBI Offices. The material requested, MRR Part I, Section nine; Part II, Sections one thru nine, has been segregated and is available for examination at FBI Headquarters.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum advising the Senate Select Committee that the above requested material is presently available for examination at FBI Headquarters.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your record.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

TEB:cmc
(8)

Delivered to O'Connor Dept 5/20 ... 5/21 ...
Delivered to Bing of Committee By RTT 5/22/75

REC-10

62-116395-177

17 JUN 4 1975

2 ENCLOSURE

oc. Dir. ___
. AD Adm. ___
AD Inv. ___
Dir.:
n. ___
p. Syst. ___
; Affairs ___
es & Com. ___
Inv. ___
tion ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

4 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

[redacted]

2 - [redacted] J. A. Mintz
- Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

62-116395

May 20, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Reference is made to memorandum, with attached appendices, dated April 30, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Pursuant to your request to review the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations Part I, Section nine; and Part II, Sections one thru nine, we currently have such material available for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:cmc
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

NOTE:

The MRR sections described above have been reviewed by the appropriate FBIHQ Divisions and approved for examination in their entirety by Committee Staff Members with the following exceptions: MRR, Section 3, page 15 (j).(1) The phrase "Baltimore Source 4" has been deleted; Section 4, page 6, 20. The phrase "i.e., selective service records in other than selective service cases, Baltimore Confidential Source 4 information, etc." has been deleted. Excisions will be explained to Committee reviewers at the time of review by indicating the excisions related to sensitive confidential sources and have been made in order to protect sources' identity. These sources will not be further identified to Committee members nor will the term "Baltimore Source 4" be utilized.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE CONTINUED:

The MRR sections to be made available are described by number and heading as follows:

Part I

Section 9 - Disciplinary Matters

Part II

Section 1 - Authority--Training--Submission of Information

Section 2 - Supervision--Availability-Resident Agencies

Section 3 - Administration of Offices

Section 4 - Communications

Section 5 - Dissemination of Information

Section 6 - Publications, Press, and Public Contacts

Section 7 - Payments--Property

Section 8 - Miscellaneous Regulations

Section 9 - Classification--Character--Copies--Abbreviations.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/20/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Manual of Rules and Regulations

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor, Jr. Date: 5/22/75 @ 1 20 PM

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-177

ENCLOSURE

May 30, 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions Not Previously Furnished.

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: LHM refers to a request of the SSC for review privileges of certain designated Sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions. The LHM advises that all but one of the requested Sections is being made available for review at FBI Headquarters and that the excluded Section will be made available for review after clearance by other interested agencies as it involves third agency considerations.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. Reply refers to Part 2 of the request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/19/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

Third agency considerations involved in one of the Manual Sections requested by the SSC.

SFP:ekw EKW
(4)
62-116395

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

REC-100

62-116395-176

Delivered 6/17/75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/lew

17 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

May 30, 1975 2-Mr.S.F.Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: LHM refers to a request of the SSC for review privileges of certain designated Sections of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations. The LHM advises that the desired Sections are being made available for review at FBI Headquarters.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. Reply pertains to Part 3 of the SSC request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/20/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395.

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)

Delivered 6-5-75 HS

Assoc. Dir. ___ 62-116395
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___ **NOTE:** Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

62-116395-175

REC-100

17 JUN 4 1975

84 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 931-546

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

The Attorney General

May 19, 1975

1 - Mr. D. R. Dickson

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from the Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a partial response to the request set forth in referenced memorandum. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

A copy of the memorandum for the Committee is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

DRD:lfj
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY SP2 ALM/RW

5/21

REC-100

62-116395-174

ENCL BEHIND FILE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Legal Counsel Division
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. D. R. Dickson

62-116395

May 19, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Part 2 of the request concerned Sections of the Manual of Instructions Not Previously Produced. Pursuant to your request, Sections 4, 8R, 19, 23, 27, 28, 29, 75, 78, 90, 103, 134, 136, 144, and 146 are now available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstion, or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

Section 102, which you requested, is not available for review at this time because this Section involves third agency considerations. When this Section has been cleared by the other interested agencies for review, you will be immediately advised.

1 - The Attorney General

HERE[illegible]
DATE 1-25-01 SP2ALM

DRD:cmc
(9)

NOTE:

Section 4 coordinated with SA James E. Reilly, Division 2; Section 8R, with SA Charles D. Neudorfer, Division 12; Sections 19 and 90 with SA J. D. Domzalski, Division 9; Sections 27, 28, 29, 78, 134, and 144 with SA J. William Hines, Division 6; Sections 23, 75, 136, and 146 with SA D. R. Dickson, Division 5; Sections 102 and 103 with SA. R. L. Moore, Division 5. Section 102 being coordinated by SA L. F. Schwartz with other interested Government agencies.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

DRD

62-116395

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Sections of the Manual of
Instructions Not Previously Furnished

NOTE CONTINUED:

Listed below are the above-mentioned Sections and their subjects.

Section	Subject
4	Surveillances and Raids
8R	Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division
19	Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Agencies
23	Bomb Threats Explosives and Incendiary Devices
27	Civil Rights
28	Civil Rights Act of 1964
29	Conspiracy
75	Neutrality Matters
78	Passports and Visas
90	Selective Service Act
102	Coordination with Other Government Agencies
103	Foreign Police Cooperation
134	Assaulting the President of the United States and Threats to the President of the United States
136	Antiriot Laws
144	Police Killings
146	Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RR

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/19/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committe to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Sections of the MOI not previously Furnished

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 5/22/75 @ 1:20 PM

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-174

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins - Enc
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams - Enc
1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott - Enc
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore - Enc
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

May 13, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis - Enc
1 - Mr. P. V. Daly - Enc
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall - Enc
(Attn: W. O. Cregar)

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to the letter from the captioned Committee dated April 28, 1975, addressed to the Honorable Edward H. Levi, Attorney General, requesting information concerning the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum in response to the aforementioned request. A copy is enclosed for your records.

For your information, we did furnish empty boxes for the use of former Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, John P. Mohr, at the residence of the late Director, J. Edgar Hoover, subsequent to the death of Mr. Tolson. This material was brought to the residence by a clerical employee who merely deposited the material and left the residence. While we have no direct knowledge as to what material was removed from the residence, Mr. Mohr was contacted to determine the source and accuracy of the story contained in "Periscope" section of the April 28, 1975, issue of Newsweek, at which time he advised us that "furnishings" at the home had been removed by members of the family and the housekeeper. We have not contacted former employees concerning this request. Our contact with Mr. Mohr was prior to the date of this request.

Enclosures (2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY [illegible]

PVD:eek
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-1163[illegible]-173

REC-100

17 JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

NOTE: By memorandum dated May 2, 1975, from Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams, each Assistant Director was requested to advise whether they or personnel in their divisions had any knowledge relating to the allegation that the FBI directed or participated in the removal of documents from the late Director's residence. The Alexandria and Washington field offices were separately requested to respond to this allegation. The responses were negative. External Affairs, by memo from D. W. Moore to Mr. Jenkins dated May 5, 1975, captioned Clyde A. Tolson, former Associate Director; advised that a clerk brought packaging material to the residence at the request of former Assistant to the Director, John P..Mohr. This memo indicated that the clerk deposited the material and left. He did not participate in the packing, etc., of documents.

May 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REQUEST PERTAINING TO DOCUMENTS REMOVED FROM RESIDENCE OF FORMER DIRECTOR J. EDGAR HOOVER

Reference is made to letter dated April 28, 1975, to the Attorney General from Chairman of captioned Committee which contained a request for certain information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has not removed, nor caused to be removed, documents from the residence of former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover, subsequent to the death of Mr. Clyde A. Tolson, former Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It is our understanding, however, that former Assistant to the Director, John P. Mohr, may have some knowledge as to what material may have been removed from the residence after Mr. Tolson's death.

1-Mr. T. J. Jenkins (Detached)
1-Mr. J. B. Adams (Detached)
1-Mr. J. J. McDermott (Detached)
1-Mr. D. W. Moore (Detached)
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall (Detached)
  (W. O. Cregar)
1- Mr. J. A. Mintz (Detached)
1-Mr. J. B. Hotis (Detached)
1-Mr. P. V. Daly (Detached)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM

PVD:lgp
(11)

62-116395-173

ENCLOSURE

3-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☐ LHM ☒ Memo ☐ Report dated 5-9-75

Caption of Document: Request Pertaining to Documents Removed from Residence of Former Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 5/21/75 @ 3:10 p

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-173

ENCLOSURE

June 3, 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) enclosing a copy of a memorandum dated November 1, 1974, from the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, Glen E. Pommerening to the Director of the FBI, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program, Executive Order 10450."

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

The LHM refers to a request of the SSC for certain documents. The LHM serves as a cover communication for the aforementioned 11/1/74 memorandum which contains certain supplemental instructions the Department of Justice furnished the FBI with regard to Executive Order 11785 amending Executive Order 10450. The instructions concerned the FBI's conduct of intelligence-type investigations.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75 The response pertains to Part I of the SSC letter of request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/16/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395
SFP:ekw (4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

REC-100

62-116395-172

17 JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 2, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

In response to a request from the SSC for certain documents and other information from the FBI concerning its policies and procedures, the LHM advised that the FBI was deferring action on one document to the U. S. Department of Justice inasmuch as that document originated with that Department. The document involved was a memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated 5/20/54.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75. Pertains to Part IV of request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

REC-100 62-116395-771

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/18/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

JUN 4 1975

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395
SFP:ekw (4)

Delivered 6/4/75

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
rector Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 4 1975

GPO 954-546

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. J. C. Farrington

The Attorney General

May 6, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which responds to a specific request by the Committee for a position paper dated July 31, 1972, concerning the "Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

You will note that the position taken by the FBI is that the requested position paper of July 31, 1972, is an internal deliberative document which is the direct basis for a formal statement on FBI authority to conduct internal security investigations embodied in a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973. On this basis we are stating in our response to the Committee that we feel it inappropriate that the July 31, 1972, paper be made available. We believe that this position is completely sound and a proper precedent to set with respect to the ambit of the Committee's mandate. We also feel that it is consistent with the position which has been expressed by you.

Note this memo appr. for del. to SSC + has been superseded by another LHM to SSC.

Delivered to AG 5/8/75

Not delivered
5/20/75

Enclosures - 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

62-116395

EWL:jvl
(7)

ENCLOSURE

PLM

EWL

WOC

REC-100 62-116395-170

57 JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. J. C. Farrington
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

May 6, 1975

62-116395

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Under I., Legal Authorities, a general request was made for memoranda discussing the legal authority of the FBI to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence activities. Material responsive to this request was delivered to the Committee during April, 1975. Included in this material was a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973, captioned "Scope of FBI Jurisdiction and Authority in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." This memorandum contained a lengthy and comprehensive discussion concerning the authority of the FBI to conduct investigations in the general internal security area.

Not deliv. to SSC

Since the receipt of the above-mentioned material the Committee has indicated a specific interest in a position paper dated July 31, 1972, discussing the "Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." This paper has been located and subjected to intensive review. It has been found that the July 31, 1972, position paper contains the internal deliberations which form the direct basis for the memorandum to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973. In view of these circumstances and particularly because the July 31, 1972, paper is considered to be an internal deliberative document, it is not considered appropriate that it should be made available to the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

PLM WRW EWL WOC

EWL:jvl
(7)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

- 116395 - 170

GPO 954-546

June 2, 1975 2 - Mr.S.F.Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Filing System

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) with enclosures described below

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: SSC requested information concerning the FBI's filing system and copies of printed forms used by the FBI. The LHM served as a cover communication to furnish to the SSC an undated nine-page memorandum entitled "FBI Indexing Procedures." The SSC was also advised that there was available nine volumes of material containing detailed instructions followed by FBI employees in classifying mail for indexing; and that the nine volumes would be available for review at FBI Headquarters by the SSC Staff. Also furnished the SSC was one copy each of 13 Tables of Contents concerning forms used by the FBI. The various types of forms in use were explained in the LHM and the SSC was invited to choose those forms it desired to see, after which steps would be taken to make them available to the SSC Staff.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. The response is to Part IV of the SSC request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/22/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

SFP:ekw (4)

62-116395

REC-100 62-116395-169

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

17 JUN 4 1975

84 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. [redacted] A. Mintz
(1 r. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

May 16, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITY

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of the captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration to Clarence M. Kelley, Director FBI, dated November 1, 1974, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program Executive Order 10450."

The instructions contained in the enclosure were the subject of conversation between W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director, and Mr. John Elliff of the Committee, May 5, 1975, at Quantico, Virginia, and are being furnished to the Committee in order to provide further information with respect to your March 19, 1975, request.

62-116395

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

TEB:cmc
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

62-116395-168

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General May 16, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated March 19, 1975, the Senate Select Committee requested certain information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Part I of the Committee's letter pertained to legal authority for investigations.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and a copy of a letter from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration to the Director November 1, 1974, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program Executive Order 10450."

The instructions contained in the enclosed November 1, 1974, communication concern legal authority for investigations and were the subject of discussion between Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee during a conference at Quantico, Virginia, May 5, 1975. The instructions are being furnished to the Committee in an effort to provide more information with respect to the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, referred to above.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosure is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395 3 - ENCL

TEB:cmc
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

O'Connor Approved [illegible] Returned [illegible] 5/[illegible]

REC-104 PLM 62-116395-168

NOTE:

The enclosed Departmental letter contains certain supplemental instructions furnished FBIHQ with regard to Executive Order 11785 amending Executive Order 10450. We

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

17 JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 4 1975

NOTE CONTINUED:

are proposing the document be furnished to the Committee as a supplement to material previously furnished the Committee in line with their 3/19/75 request. John Elliff of the Committee evidenced interest in receiving such instructions during a recent conversation with Assistant Director Wannall. We are providing the instructions as a further delineation of our authority in this area.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: NOV 1[illegible] 1974

FROM : Glen E. Pommerening
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

SUBJECT: Federal Employee Security Program
Executive Order 10450

XIII

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SPOALM/RW

This is in response to your memoranda, entitled as above, dated May 8, 1974 and August 19, 1974, directed to the Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division, and referring to problems which have arisen as a result of the promulgation of Executive Order 11785 which amends Executive Order 10450. In view of the involvement of my staff in these matters, I will undertake to answer your questions with the concurrence of the Criminal Division.

As you know this matter has been under continuing review both in the Task Force, chaired by a representative of this office, of working level representatives of various agencies in the security field and is now under study to a lesser degree in Project #10 of the "Domestic Council on Privacy".

You ask that the Department; (a) provide specific instructions to the Bureau to conduct intelligence-type investigations to identify and determine the activities of organizations now described in the amended Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450; (b) furnish guidelines to be used by the Bureau in initiating investigations of individuals under the captioned matter pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and specifically, criteria to be utilized in determining whether available information is a sufficient basis for investigation.

Under the amendment to Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450, we now have only two types of organizations; (1) those which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the constitution or laws of the United States or

any State, (2) or which seek to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof, by unlawful means. (Emphasis added).

Of course, the key words which are underlined indicate that the investigation should be initially based on a possible violation of a federal (such as the Smith Act) or state statute prohibiting unlawful advocacy or the commission of any unlawful act of force or violence. However, in order for the Bureau to detect organizations with a potential of the above nature, it is important that the investigation proceed on the basis of information indicating that the organization may be of the nature mentioned. It is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated, but only that a reasonable evaluation of the available information suggests that the activities of the organization may fall within the proscription of the Order. The most recent example of the type of organization, that you have advised is becoming more prevalent, is the small but dedicated to violence, Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). Organizations of this nature would clearly fall within the Order and should be investigated as soon as information is available indicating their potentiality for violence and of course, if possible, prior to the fulfillment of their purposes.

It is true that Executive Order 11785 eliminated the prior communist, totalitarian, fascist, and subversive characterizations and definitions, but there was no intention of restricting the investigations of such organizations if their programs call for acts of force or violence or the unlawful advocacy of the commission of acts of force or violence in furtherance of these programs.

It is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order but once the investigation reaches a stage that offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the investigation suggests a determination that the organization is engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it should continue.

It follows in answer to your second question that individuals who are active either as members of or as affiliates of

zations described above should be investigated when mation is received indicating their involvement. The yardstick indicated above for organizations in deter- ing whether the investigation should continue, should apply ncerning individuals and when a determination can reasonably e made that the individuals activities, either within the organization or as an individual, do not appear to be in violation of any law, then the investigation should cease.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
on this envelope ~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

8911.8

62-116395-168

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/16/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Legal Authority-Federal Employee Security Program, Executive Order 10450

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor, Jr. Date: 5/21/75 @ 3^{10}

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-168
ENCLOSURE

62-116395-167

CHANGED TO

62-116464-6X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

NOV 17 1976

Cons./MMD.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-23-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
DALLAS, TEXAS
11-22-63

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 5-22-75 CIA requested from the FBI copies of photographs of three "bums" who were taken into custody by Dallas authorities on 11-22-63 in the vicinity of the Texas School Book Depository. It has been alleged that the three persons shown in the photographs were E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis, individuals involved in the Watergate incident, and Thomas Arthur Vallee, who was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, several days before the Kennedy assassination based on a threat against the President. Don Donahue, Special Assistant to Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), made available on 9-12-74 to Inspector Bowers a set of the photographs depicting these "bums" which had been furnished to Donahue by one Michael Canfield, and the FBI Laboratory made copies from these prints, the original being returned to Donahue. Donahue requested that his identity be concealed as the source of these photographs. Canfield was supposed to furnish a set of these photographs to Washington Field Office but it has been determined he never did so.

At Mr. Adams' instructions, Bowers contacted Donahue on 5-22-75 and advised him of the CIA request for a set of these photographs. Donahue was told that if he has no objections we intend to furnish CIA a set of the pictures with the statement that the originals were obtained from an individual who requested his identity be concealed. Donahue stated that was quite satisfactory to him, adding that if it becomes necessary he would agree to his identity being disclosed as the source of these pictures.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-109060-7193

62-111375
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 2 1975

80 MAY 30 1975

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Bowers

DWB:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)
DATE 8/5/94

LEGAL COUNSEL

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: ASSASSINATION OF JOHN FITZGERALD
KENNEDY
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Appropriate personnel of the General Investigative, Intelligence, and Laboratory Divisions were telephonically advised of the contact with Donahue late on 5-22-75 and the Intelligence Division arranged that date to provide a set of the photographs to CIA.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Given to F. Janosky to hand carry to CIA 5/22/75 B

Hoc Staff
75-817

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

21 May 1975

Senstudy '75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : IC Staff Verification of Clearances

Attached is an updated list of the security clearances provided to the Senate Select Committee Staff members. You will note there has been a significant increase since our last listing.

Updated information will be provided to you as this information changes.

Harriett Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: a/s

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-05-01 BY SP2ALM/CW

ENCLOSURE

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
3 JUL 24 1975

Records - please
file 62-116395

5-

84 JUL 29 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

21 MAY 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE DESIGNATED	BRIEFED	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	IL	550-44-7971	
Bader, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF-Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara			12-20-45	CAL	561-68-9123	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	CONN	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I	*		7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Brissett, Belva			6-23-41	OK	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*		2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	CAL	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	CAL	567-56-8854	
Chesnik, Barbara			4/18/46	WI	390-46-2235	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17	9-6-43	FL	042-36-9155	TF-Badge
Dawson, Thomas			9-9-52	MINN	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	ILL	351-34-4329	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-25-01 BY

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

21 MAY 1975

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED				
DeOreo, Mary			6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258	
Dillon, Molly			4-16-51	VA	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel			8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*		6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor			3-10-37	MASS	026-28-6318	
Erno, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*		3-7-46	ALA	420-60-8767	
Greissing, Edward			11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	MD	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF-Badge
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478	
Karalekas, Anne			11-6-46	MA	023-36-4329	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	IND	559-54-1348	

21 MAY 1975

	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
NAME	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED				
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	GA	252-12-5112	TF - Badge
LaVoy, Diane			11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. VA.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF - Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF - Badge
Mecham, Martha Evans	*		2-11-40	CAL	528-48-6848	
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*		10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	
Moore, Janet	*		4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	ILL	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan			11-14-47	CAL	558-74-8394	

21 MAY 1975

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED				
Peterson, John F.			6-15-41	CAL	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan			10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Pyle, Christopher			11-24-39	Mass	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N.DAK	501-14-4534	
Ricks, Walter			12-27-46	GA	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth[1]	*		10-31-44	CONN	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A.O., III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester			7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	VA	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.			3-3-39	KY	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	MD	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha			9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	IND	313-12-1857	

21 MAY 1975

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED				
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	MD	219-14-5186	
Towell, Mary			4-25-44	TENN	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory			1-21-47	COLO.	524-62-2459	
Truehart, William			12-18-18	VA	225-20-6411	
Wallach, Paul			5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF - Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann[1]	*		4-21-51	MASS	017-40-7170	
Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

---

[1] documentation is being forwarded

Calendar No. 174

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

15.

MAY 21, 1975

MR. CHURCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by MR. CANNON, without amendment

(Senstudy - 75)

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
6 JUL 28 1975

V

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Pls file 5-8
62-116395-

84 JUL 30 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

35

USIB-D-27.10/2
17 May 1975

Hmk)

Senstudy 75

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT : Reporting of Interviews with ~~Congressional~~ Investigating Committees or their Staffs

REFERENCE : My Memorandum to Addressees, 10 April 1975, Subject: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence (USIB-D-27.10/1)

Original Filed In 62-80750-5071

1. Reference memorandum reported establishment by the Intelligence Community Staff of a registry for documentation relating to the Congressional investigations, and furnished you with a format for abstracts to be provided to the registry on each formal input to a Select Committee. In addition to having in the registry the abstracts or, as appropriate, the actual papers submitted as documentation to a Select Committee, it is important that we establish a method for reporting on interviews. Accordingly, I am enclosing a proposed format for abstracts to be used for reporting on interviews by Congressional Committee members or staff with your personnel which involve information on Community activities or which, in your judgment, raise the possibility of follow-on queries elsewhere concerning the functioning or activities of the Community.

2. There is no intent to intrude upon matters which are properly each agency's organizational responsibility nor to infringe upon employees' individual rights or security. The interview abstract format does not provide for identification of the person being interviewed. The "File Reference No." entry is for your convenience to indicate where any supporting documentation is located within your own filing system.

/ ENCLOSURE

~~REC-5~~

~~JUN 3 1975~~

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED

AUG 19 1975

Hmk

AUG 19 1975

3. It is essential that the Intelligence Community be aware of all aspects of the Congressional investigations which involve Community matters, or which may relate to Select Congressional Committee activities being conducted elsewhere in the Community. The availability in the registry of document and interview abstracts should help provide this internal visibility.

W. E. Colby
Chairman

Attachment: as stated

Attachment
USIB-D-27.10/2
17 May 1975

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO DCI/IC SELECT COMMITTEES COÖRDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Subject:
2. Witness' Organization:
3. File Reference No.:
4. Date of Interview:
5. Interviewer(s):
6. Classification of Information:
7. Summary of Content: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed, and any conclusions or recommendation)
8. Relation to Intelligence Community Problems: (Identify)

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ✓
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall
DATE: 5/7/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Schwartz

FROM : H.C. Flemister, Jr.

Sinstudy-75

SUBJECT: MORTON HALPERIN
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST

This memorandum sets forth results of Liaison contact with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning Halperin's request to be provided with a copy of a 1948 memorandum of understanding between the FBI and the CIA. Halperin has made this request of both CIA and the Bureau.

On 4/30/75 Mr. James Garrison, CIA, advised that after considerable research in CIA files, the following documents (copies attached) were located which pertain to Halperin's request. Copies have also been located in Bufiles:

(1) Memorandum for the Record dated 9/22/48 entitled "Cooperation and Liaison Between Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Policy Coordination, CIA," which was prepared by CIA and originally classified Top Secret. This document has recently been downgraded by CIA to a classification of Secret.

(2) Letter dated 9/22/48 from Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, to Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant to the Director, FBI, which forwarded as an enclosure the 9/22/48 memorandum described above. This item was also originally classified Top Secret but has been downgraded by CIA to Secret.

62-116395-

ORIGINAL FILED IN
JUN 25 1975

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

(3) Letter dated 10/2/48 from J. Edgar Hoover to Wisner which acknowledges that the arrangement set forth in the memorandum of 9/22/48 is satisfactory to the Bureau. This item ~~was not~~ classified in accordance with current classification standards but bears the marking "Personal and Confidential."

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE

63-16062-45

Enclosures - 3
LFS:tdp (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

Records
cc in 62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/lew

84 JUL 1 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: MORTON HALPERIN
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST

Mr. Garrison advised that CIA considers items 1 and 2 to be CIA documents and item 3 to be an FBI document containing CIA information. CIA proposes to furnish Halperin declassified copies of items 1 and 2 which have been sanitized in accordance with the brackets on the attached copies. CIA has no objection to the Bureau's furnishing Halperin a copy of item 3 if it is declassified and the CIA information indicated by brackets in the attached copy is excised. Mr. Garrison noted that CIA no longer considers the 9/22/48 memorandum to be operative since CIA's Office of Policy Coordination no longer exists.

Mr. Garrison advised further that with regard to a Senate Select Committee (SSC) request forcopies of all agreements between the FBI and the CIA, CIA does not plan to provide the SSC with copies of items 1 and 2 but plans to allow appropriately cleared SSC staff representatives to examine the unsanitized Secret versions of items 1 and 2 at CIA Headquarters. He further advised that CIA would have no objection if the Bureau allows SSC staff representatives to examine item 3 in Bureau space provided it is classified Secret in accordance with CIA's classification of its information. Mr. Garrison requested that if the Bureau decides to provide the SSC with a copy of item 3 for its retention, the document be declassified and sanitized in accordance with the attached copy.

The Intelligence Division has no objection to the FOIA request of Halperin being handled in accordance with the above. Recommendation for handling of the SSC request will be made by separate memorandum.

ACTION:

This memorandum and its attachments should be forwarded to the FOIA Unit of the Files and Communications Division for appropriate handling.

WOC/ WRW

SECRET

C O P Y

D R A F T

22 September 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Cooperation and Liaison Between Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Policy Coordination, CIA

1. This memorandum records an understanding which has been arrived at in conversations between Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Mr. Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director, and Chief of the Office of Policy Coordination, of CIA. The conversations in question were duly authorized by the Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and by the Director and Deputy Director of CIA and were arranged by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on behalf of the White House. The purpose of the understanding is to provide a basis for cooperation and liaison between the FBI and the Office of Policy Coordination, CIA, and the following points summarize the essential elements of the understanding:

a. In view of the distinctive character of the activities of the Office of Policy Coordination, it is considered advisable that separate and direct liaison be established between that office and the FBI. For this purpose the FBI will provide a special liaison officer who will be nominated by the FBI within the near future. (This arrangement has been specifically approved by the Deputy Director, CIA, in the absence of the Director.)

b. It is understood that in the discharge of the duties and obligations laid upon the Office of Policy Coorination by the National Security Council, it is necessary for this Office to have dealings with individuals and groups of foreign nationalities within and without the United States and to sponsor the movement from time to time of such individuals and representatives of such groups between the United States and foreign countries. The Office of Policy Coordination recognizes the primary responsibility of the FBI in the field of United States domestic security, and the FBI acknowledges that it is essential for the Office of Policy Coordination to have direct dealings with the individuals and groups aforementioned.

c. In order that the interests of both parties to this understanding shall be served, it is understood that the Office of Policy Coordination keep the FBI generally informed concerning the extent and character of its dealings with

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
Destroy only with consent of the Historical Staff

owngraded to SECRET per
aul J. Burns 019210

ENCLOSURE 62-116395

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES

II - Groups and Organizations:

International Peasant Union which is made up of representatives of Polish Agrarian Party; Bulgarian Agrarian Party; Croatian Peasant Party; Hungarian Small Holders Party; Rumanian National Peasant Party; Serbian Agrarian Union and a number of recognized Czechoslovak political leaders.

In view of the highly classified character of our activities, I am sure that you will appreciate the importance of maintaining the maximum security precautions.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

Enclosure - 1

[redacted] SECRET

C
O
P
Y

22 September 1948

Mr. D. Milton Ladd
Assistant to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Ladd:

Confirming our telephone conversation of today, I am enclosing a draft of a proposed memorandum which I have prepared for the purpose of recording the understanding which has been arrived at between us in regard to the cooperation and liaison between my office and the Bureau. I have endeavored in this draft to set out the essential features of our conversation of yesterday afternoon and I should appreciate your indicating to me any modifications or changes which you may deem necessary or advisable to reflect your recollection and understanding of our conversation. Upon my receipt of your suggested changes, if any, and following any further discussion between us which may be indicated as desirable, I shall prepare this memorandum in final form and furnish to you the original and a copy thereof, with the request that you initial and return to me the copy.

In accordance with the terms of our understanding, I should like to submit to you herewith the names of certain of the individuals and groups with whom it is proposed that my office will have dealings in connection with our authorized activities. From time to time in the future I shall furnish you with additional names. The following are the names:

I - Individuals:

George M. Dimitrov, Exiled Secretary General of Bulgarian Agrarian Party

Stefan Osusky, prominent Czech Refugee leader

Ferenc Nagy, head of Hungarian Small Holders Party

Dr. Vladko Macek, representative of Croatian Peasant Party

Stanislas Mikolajczyk, former Polish Vice Premier

Andre Cretzianu, former Rumanian Cabinet Minister

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
Destroy only with consent

ENCLOSURE 62-116395

Downgraded to SECRET per
Paul J. Burns, 019210

[redacted] SECRET

foreign individuals and groups within the United States. More specifically the Office of Policy Coordination will, in so far as possible, inform the FBI sufficiently in advance of its proposed dealings with such individuals and groups to enable the FBI to advise the Office of Policy Coordination of any security risks which may be involved in dealing with such individuals and groups and in order to provide the FBI with adequate opportunity to indicate individuals which it is employing for its own purposes in connection with the penetration of foreign groups.

d. There shall be an exchange of information between the FBI and the Office of Policy Coordination concerning the significance, activities, and reliability of such individuals and groups of foreign nationalities within the United States as may be of interest to the Office of Policy Coordination.

F. G. W.

D. M. L.

EYES ALONE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

30 MAY 1975

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0597

Senstudy -75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Department of Defense
Mr. William G. Hyland, Department of State
Mr. E. H. Knoche, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. William O. Cregar, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. William N. Morell, Jr., Department of Treasury
Mr. James G. Poor, Energy Research & Development Administration
Mr. William Nichols, Office of Management and Budget
Mr. John B. Hotis, Department of Justice

SUBJECT : Future Legislation Relative to U.S. Intelligence

Following up on the discussion at yesterday's meeting of the Policy Steering Group, addressees are encouraged to provide to the White House specific suggestions for administrative or legislative action relative to U.S. intelligence programs. Such proposals should be realistic and doable in the near term. Please provide two copies of all suggestions to James Wilderotter, Room 182, Old Executive Office Building by 10 June 1975.

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY

REC-100 62-116395-166

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

17 JUN 4 1975

file in 62-116395 5.8

84 JUN 4 1975

EYES ALONE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-19-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RCW

K. William O'Conner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, who has recently been designated by the Attorney General to coordinate all responses by the Department to the Senate Select Committee(SSC), advised on the afternoon of 5-19-75 that he had met with Chief Counsel to the SSC F. A. O. Schwarz and John Elliff, who is the head of the task force of the Senate Select Committee on the FBI. O'Conner stated he informed Schwarz and Elliff that he would not make available Bureau secretaries Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski, who are scheduled for interview on Tuesday, 5-20-75, absent an agreement by the Committee that an FBI representative would be allowed to be present during the interview. O'Conner indicated that the Department's stand in this matter regarding the insistence that FBI representatives be present during the interview was backed by the White House, the Attorney General, and the Deputy Attorney General.

By way of background, it should be noted that Mr. O'Conner and Associate Deputy Attorney General McDermott were contacted on 5-14-75, and advised of the requested interview of the two aforementioned employees at which time O'Conner and McDermott did not advise of any way in which the employees could be prevented from consenting to interview. While they were upset at the prospect of service personnel, such as stenographers being interviewed by the Committee, they indicated at that time they could not see any legal leverage which could be used to preclude such interviews. With this decision in mind arrangements were made to make these employees available for interview.

ST-104 REC 12 62-116395-1165

Schwarz told O'Conner he would have to check with the SSC prior to agreeing to allow FBI representatives to be present. O'Conner stated Schwarz was quite upset at the Department's stance in this matter, but indicated he would give O'Conner an answer this evening. O'Conner indicated to Schwarz that the two Bureau employees would be available for interview on the 20th should the Committee agree to the presence of FBI representatives during the interview.

MAY 27 1975

1 - Mr. Adams	1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall	1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz	1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE ADDENDUM - PAGE 2

O'Conner requested that the Bureau continue with his plan to have both employees available should the interview take place on the 20th.

ACTION:

You will be kept expeditiously advised of all developments concerning this matter.

JAM
R70

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION 5-19-75 PVD:dkg

At 4:15 p.m. Mr. O'Conner advised that he had just been contacted by F. A. O. Schwarz, and Schwarz stated the Committee's position concerning the presence of FBI representatives during the interview of the two secretaries is unchanged. O'Conner related that he told Schwarz that Departmental position is also unchanged in that there will be no interview unless the Committee relents on this position. O'Conner indicated he would keep the Bureau advised and requested that we continue with our plans to have the secretaries available for interview as Schwarz indicated he would again contact O'Conner regarding this issue.

PVD

JAM
R70

PLM

Airtel

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
5/23/75
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

To: SAC, Atlanta

From: Director, FBI (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

Enclosed for immediate hand delivery to former SA Alan G. Sentinella is an original and one copy of a statement he voluntarily dictated to a Bureau secretary 5/21/75 and which was transcribed subsequent to Sentinella's departure from Washington, D. C.

For your information, Sentinella has indicated a desire to review this statement and make any necessary corrections, after which he will furnish you a copy for forwarding to the Bureau which should be by cover airtel immediately after Sentinella makes it available. Direct airtel to Attention, INTD - W. O. Cregar.

Enclosure
SFP:ekw
(6)

NOTE: The statement involved concerns Sentinella's testimony before an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee 5/21/75, contents of which testimony Sentinella indicated to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project he (Sentinella) desired to make available to the Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-05-01 BY SP2ALM/ew

EX 104

REC-7 62-116395-164

MAILED 8
MAY 23 1975
FBI

5 MAY 27 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/23/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

Reference is made to my memorandum dated 5/19/75 which attached a copy of a letter to the Attorney General dated 5/14/75, from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, United States Senate Select Committee (SSC) with appendices A thru D. The memorandum noted the ambiguous nature of some of the SSC requests and that Mr. K. William O'Conner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, who is the Department of Justice coordinator for SSC matters, is presently negotiating the 5/14/75 requests with the SSC Staff.

Even though the negotiations are still under way, we believe that ultimately we will be required to provide substantial responses to the 5/14/75 requests. To this end we have begun to gather together the necessary data from our files in anticipation of the substantial responses we will be required to prepare. The various requests set forth in the May 14, letter have been analyzed and specific assignments made to prepare responses. The primary assignments have been made to representatives of several Sections of the INTD. It is anticipated that in some circumstances it will be necessary for these INTD representatives to convey requests for information and material to other Divisions. When such action is necessary contact will be effected through the designated representatives of the other Headquarters Divisions. A list of such other Divisional representatives is maintained by the SENSTUDY Staff on the basis of designations made to assist in previous SSC requests, and is set forth below.

DIVISION	REPRESENTATIVE	EXTENSION
1-Identification	James T. Stewart	4219
2-Training	James E. Reilly	3472
3-Administrative	Fred Woodworth	4132

REC-100 62-116395-163

JUN 3 1975

62-116395
EWL/SFP:cmc
(17)

CONTINUED - OVER

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-25-01 BY

PERS REC UNIT

8 4 JUN 3 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY - 75
62-116395

4-Files and Communications	Homer R. Hauer	4870
6-General Investigative	J. William Hines	4276
7-Laboratory	John P. Wilgus	~~3721~~ 3463
8-External Affairs	David L. Divan	2535
9-Special Investigative	John E. McHale	2525
10-Inspection	Fred Griffith	2830
11-Legal	Paul V. Daly	2542
12-Computer Systems	Charles D. Neudorfer	3635

The listed individuals are considered to be the permanent representatives to the SENSTUDY project and will be the primary points of contact within the respective Divisions. It is requested that any Division desiring to change the above designations promptly advise SENSTUDY project on extension 4636.

ACTION:

None except where necessary to redesignate Division representatives.

wRW

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/22/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

On 5/21/75, Andy Smith, Supervisor in our Birmingham Office, called Deputy Assistant Director Herington and advised that former SA Robert R. Nichols (EOD: 1/6/47; retired: 5/12/72) had been contacted by the Senate Select Committee for interview. Smith connected Nichols through to Herington, at which time Nichols advised that about ten days ago Lester Seidel of the Senate Select Committee had contacted him. At that time, Nichols was going to Oklahoma City, and has just recently returned home to Birmingham. Nichols stated that at one time he was the case agent in the Atlanta Office on the Martin Luther King investigation, and it was presumed this was the subject matter of the proposed interview.

Nichols was advised that the decision as to whether he would consent to interview was entirely his to make. He was reminded that he had signed a secrecy agreement, and was reminded of the provisions of AG Order 501-73 requiring prior authority from the appropriate Departmental official prior to a current or former employee furnishing information he acquired during the course of his employment. He was also advised that he had a right to be represented by a personal attorney if he desired and that he had all the constitutional rights available to him, the same as any citizen. He was further told that if he desired to have an FBI representative available, but not present during the interview, he could so request, noting that the purpose of the FBI representative would be to counsel him concerning sensitive areas which might be explored.

62-116395-162

REC-107

JUN 3 1975

It was emphasized to Nichols that the FBI would not and could not recommend the course of action he should take ~~and that the~~ decision with regard to this interview was entirely his to make.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Herington

JH:mtm

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Records. CC-621 414885 (Nichols)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/20/01 BY SP2ALM/RW

PERS. REC. UNIT

FIVE

JUN 3 (7) 1975

Mr. David E. Todd
20 Cozzolino Drive
Millbrae, CA 94030

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, CA 956
PM
19 MAY
1975

Christmas 10c US
Currier and Ives

CONQUER
MULTIPLE
SCLEROSIS

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20535

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-02 BY SP2ALM

Attention:
Office of the Legal Counsel

5-19-75

Attention:

Jack Harrington
Office of the Legal Counsel

Remytelcall 5/16/75

David E. Todd

Senstudy - 75

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-23-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

file
62-116395

REC-1 62-116395-161

17 MAY 21 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

PERS. REC. UNIT

Recds
cc 67-177553 (David Todd)

84 JUN 3 1975

May 19, 1975
20 Cozzolino Drive
Millbrae, CA 94030

Mr. Lester B. Seidel
Investigator
Select Committee to Study
Government Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities
Room 2308
Building 302 - Dirkson Building
Washington, DC 20510

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
[illegible]
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/PLW

Dear Mr. Seidel:

Reference is made to your telephone call to me on May 16, 1975, in which you advised that the Committee was gathering facts concerning the FBI's various CoIntelPros and in particular, you were looking into the CoIntelPro having to do with the Black Panthers. You inquired if I recalled a letter, which had been made public, dated May 11, 1970, from the Director, FBI, to the SAC, San Francisco, which suggested disruptive techniques against the Black Panthers and which mentioned spurious police or FBI reports. I advised you I had no first hand recollection of having seen such a document at that time, but that I had read a recent news item describing such a document.

You also indicated an interest in the theoretical question as to whether intelligence functions should be divorced from enforcement functions in order to avoid the dilemma of disclosure versus dismissal, and you suggested that my views on this might be helpful in educating the Committee.

For your information, I entered on duty as a Special Agent on January 5, 1942, and retired from the Bureau on December 3, 1971. During the two years immediately preceding my retirement I served as supervisor of a squad of agents which investigated, among other matters, violations and alleged violations of law by the Black Panthers. The only information I have concerning the Black Panthers was learned as a direct result of my official duties. I have made no independent study of them, nor do I have any personal files or written material, either official or otherwise, relating to them.

Since speaking with you, I have reviewed Executive Order #501-73 (28 C.F.R.§§ 16.21, 16.22 and 16.23) which specifies that no employee or former employee of the Department of Justice shall produce any material contained in the files of the Department

161

nor shall he disclose any information acquired in the performance of his official duties without prior approval of the Attorney General or appropriate Departmental official.

From this, I must conclude that I am prohibited from furnishing you or the Committee any information along the lines requested by you unless appropriate authority to do so has first been given by an authorized representative of the Department of Justice.

Very truly yours,

David E. Todd

DAVID E. TODD

cc: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20535

SAC
Federal Bureau of Investigation
450 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ✓
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/20/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/

I received by hand delivery from the Department at 3:06 p.m. on March 20, 1975, the attached copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated March 19, 1975, with its enclosed list of requests being made by the Committee.

FARRINGTON
HOTIS
BOWERS

Senator Church requests that the documents involved be supplied to the committee at the earliest opportunity. A review of the requests revealed that the Intelligence Division would have the principal interest in all except request III, A and C, which would be of interest to the Administrative Division. The last item appearing under V, B should be available only through the Criminal Division of the Department or the Attorney General's office.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Intelligence Division and the Administrative Division review the attached request for FBI materials to determine whether we may make a full response to the requests.

62-116395 - 169

EX 104 REC 44

7 APR 22 1975

2. That the required materials be prepared for submission to the Committee and any difficulties be made known at the earliest possible date.

62-116395

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Enc.
1 - Mr. Farrington - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.

OK

LEGAL COUNSEL

JAM:mfd
(7)

84 JUN 3 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

HILIP A. HART, MICH.
ALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
ALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
OBERT MORGAN, N.C.
ARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 19, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on February 26, 1975, to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21. I believe we are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible.

Toward that end we are seeking initial documentation from various agencies whose activities fall within the mandate given us by the Senate. Enclosed with this letter is a copy of an initial request for documents relating to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has been previously discussed with staff representatives of the Bureau. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

We expect to make similar initial requests for documents to other parts of your Department that fall under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

I trust that our respective staffs will continue to work together in the spirit of mutual cooperation which we both recognize is necessary to ensure a thorough and expeditious investigation.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY [illegible]

MAR 19 1975

62-116395-160

ENCLOSURE

FIRST REQUEST FOR FBI DOCUMENTS

I. Legal Authorities

All memoranda discussing the legal authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials asserted as sources of such authority. 5

II. Jurisdictional Agreements

All delimitations agreements, jurisdictional agreements, agreements for coordination, and memoranda or understanding, between the FBI and any other Federal departments or agencies, insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5

III. Organization

A. A detailed current organizational chart reflecting all divisions, sections, branches, and units of the FBI, and the subject matters assigned to each by generic and numerical designation. 3

B. A list of names, titles, and offices of assignment of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBI Headquarters, down to and including unit chiefs, together with the number of personnel below the level of unit chief categorized by unit or other office of assignment. 5

C. At the field level, the titles and the number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations, and activities. 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ACM/RW

62-116395-160

ENCLOSURE

IV. Policies and Procedures

A. The table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions, and those portions of the Manual of Instructions which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5 ✓

B. The table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, and those portions of the Manual of Rules and Regulations which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5 ✓

V. Studies and Reports

A. The Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), dated June, 1970. 5

B. The original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Dept.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-15-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Hotis

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Department has named Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Connor of the Civil Rights Division to be responsible for their responses to Congressional Committee requests.

D.C.

At the request of Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott, SA Paul V. Daly and Inspector John B. Hotis attended a meeting with Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Connor, Assistant to the Attorney General Jack Fuller, and Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott. McDermott announced at the meeting that O'Connor was taking control of the Departmental responses to the Congressional Committees. He noted that the Department has been having some problems keeping track of and inconsistencies in its responses to the various Congressional Committees. Mr. O'Connor was generally briefed as to the status of our responses to Congressional requests and to the Rockefeller Commission. He requested, however, that he be briefed in a more detailed manner in the immediate future.

ACTION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

EX 104

REG 44 62-116395-159

MAY 23 1975

PVD:dkg (8)
dkg

84 JUN 3 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 8, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting between representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff and Bureau officials at Quantico, Virginia, on the evening of 5/5/75.

On 5/5/75 Mr. John Elliff, who heads the task force of the SSC looking into the FBI, met with officials of the Bureau at Quantico. Elliff was accompanied by Mark Gitenstein and Mary DeOreo. FBI officials present were Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Inspectors Thomas W. Leavitt, Hunter E. Helgeson, and John B. Hotis as well as Section Chief William O. Cregar.

At the outset of the meeting, Mr. Elliff provided the Bureau representatives with a memorandum the subject of which was entitled "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated 2/13/75, copy of which is attached. Elliff's memorandum contained a series of questions along with the rationale for these questions which provided the basis for the Quantico meeting. We are not considering these questions a formal request from the Select Committee. Mr. Elliff and the Staff of the Select Committee are aware that formal responses that the Bureau might be expected to provide the Committee can only be predicated on written requests to the Attorney General (AG) from Senator Frank Church or the Committee's Chief Counsel.

It is noted that under paragraph one of Elliff's memorandum he notes the Committee has not been supplied the following documents.

REC 44 62-116395-158

EX 104

(1) A position paper dated 7/31/72.

MAY 23 1975

(2) Appendices I, J, K, M, and P to the Intelligence Division "Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75.

62-116395

Enclosure / ENCLOSURE

WOC:ekw
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-06-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 3 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

By memorandum dated 5/6/75, we advised the AG that the requested position paper of 7/31/72 is an internal deliberative document which we feel is inappropriate to furnish the Select Committee. This position is consistent with the position previously expressed by the AG. During the meeting with Elliff he was orally advised of the Bureau's position regarding making the 7/31/72 position paper available to the Select Committee.

The Appendices which have not yet been made available to the Select Committee are being cleared with other agencies under the Third Agency rule requirement and will be made available to the Select Committee once all clearances have been obtained. Elliff was orally apprised of this.

During the course of the meeting, Mr. Elliff stated that he felt the FBI's concerted investigative effort in the early 1960s against the Klan and later our investigative effort arising out of the ghetto riots were justified given the situation at that time. However, he felt the Committee would probably like to do an in-depth case study of both investigations. He asked if the FBI could provide the Committee with copies of all memoranda and documents reflecting the decision making process leading up to the initiation of the major investigative effort against the Klan as well as investigations during and following the ghetto riots. Elliff was advised that we certainly would consider responding following receiptoof a formal written request from Senator Church through the AG. Elliff advised he would prepare such a written request.

The Intelligence Division has already instituted the necessary research in anticipation of this request and will submit recommendations following a completion of this research.

In anticipation of Select Committee hearings which are expected to begin in about one month, Mr. Elliff and Gitenstein expect to start interviews of current Bureau employees in Bureau space during the week of 5/19/75. Mr. Gitenstein will concentrate on the work of the Internal Security Branch of the Intelligence Division and Mr. Elliff on the Counterintelligence Branch. We expect that Mr. Elliff will begin his interviews by meeting with Assistant Director Wannall, Inspector Leavitt and the Section Chiefs of the Counterintelligence Branch.

It is noted that we previously furnished to the Select Committee with the AG's approval one copy each of Sections 87 and 122 of the Manual of Instructions. Section 87 is concerned with investigations of subversive organizations and individuals. Section 122 addresses extremist matters and civil unrest. In his discussion of these two Sections it was readily apparent Mr. Gitenstein had conducted a thorough review. In this regard, he noted a difference in the investigative procedure outlined in these two Sections of the Manual. Mr. Gitenstein was advised that the Intelligence Division had just completed a Manual revision combining these two Sections into one and had submitted it to the Director for his approval. Mr. Gitenstein commented this was an excellent idea to combine these two Sections into one and expressed the hope that the revised Section could be made available to the Committee for its review in anticipation of the forthcoming Committee hearings.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Elliff asked whether the FBI would be willing to meet with the Staff to discuss such sensitive issues as surreptitious entry, the opening of mail, and incommunicado interviews. Elliff was advised that the Bureau was aware of certain allegations that have appeared in the press and felt that any interviews in sensitive areas should be restricted to the Senators on the Committee. Elliff interposed no objection to this suggestion.

The thrust of the meeting gave Bureau officials present the impression that the task force was primarily concerned with identifying what areas of the Bureau's investigative responsibilities needed to be better defined through new legislation. In fact, Elliff solicited the observations of those present as to what the Bureau's needs were in the way of new legislation to permit the Bureau to carry out its internal security responsibilities effectively. He recognized certain limitations involving records of educational institutions, banking institutions, telephone companies and credit establishments currently restrict the Bureau and suggest that some legislation with Congressional oversight should be written to assist the FBI in carrying out its mission.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

ACTION:

(1) We will proceed to meet with Mr. Elliff and Mr. Gitenstein in accordance with their request. It is anticipated that an Intelligence Division official will be present at all such interviews of current Bureau personnel.

(2) That the review of the combined Sections of 87 and 122 by other Divisions of the Bureau be expedited in order that we may be able to provide the Senate Select Committee with this revision on an expedite basis.

OK

PLM

May 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM

From: John Elliff

Subject: "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction" dated February 13, 1975

1. The following documents directly related to this Position Paper have not been supplied to the Select Committee:

(1) The previous Position Paper, dated July 31, 1972.

(2) Appendices I, J, K, M, and P.

2. Parts I and II discuss the Presidential directives which may serve as the basis for FBI national security intelligence activities. Part IV lists statutes and Executive Orders affecting FBI jurisdiction. There is no mention in Parts I and II of the first Executive Order cited in Part IV. This is Executive Order #11605, dated July 2, 1971, amending Executive Orcer #10450, of April 27, 1953, relating to security requirements for Government employment.

These Executive Orders have been further amended by a more recent Executive Order of June 4, 1974. This latest order abolished the so-called "Attorney General's List" and revised the criteria for determining the suitability and loyalty of Government employees.

The following questions arise:

(1) In what way, if any, do the Executive Orders relating to employment security provide a legal basis for FBI intelligence activities?

(2) In what way, if any, did the Executive Order of June 4, 1974, affect the legal basis for FBI intelligence activities?

3. The analysis in Parts I and II discusses the legal basis for FBI national security intelligence investigations. There is no specific discussion of other intelligence activities. These other activities are variously described in the attached documents and quoted memoranda. The terms used include "counterespionage" (Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939),

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-158

ENCLOSURE

"to neutralize Communist front and Communist-dominated organizations of the United States" (IIC and ICIS Report to NSC, March 5, 1954), "program designed to intensify any confusion and dissatisfaction among its /Communist Party's/ members" and "counterintelligence operations" (NSC Briefing, November 6, 1958), "action proposals to protect the internal security of the United States" (National Security Action Memorandum 161, June 9, 1962). The term "counterespionage" reappears in several other documents.

These terms seem to refer to activities which have since been labeled COINTELPRO operations. In this regard, it should be noted that Attorney General Saxbe's report of November 18, 1974 on FBI COINTELPRO Activities stated, at p. 20:

> "(2) Espionage or Soviet-Satellite Intelligence
>
> This program, although officially designated a COINTELPRO program, emphasized intelligence gathering and counterintelligence efforts already being pursued in connection with the Bureau's ongoing foreign intelligence responsibilities. It did not curtail any activity or in any way change the scope of counterintelligence efforts already in effect and continuing today. It was primarily intended to inspire initiative and to encourage ingenuity in the Bureau's continuing counterintelligence efforts against hostile foreign intelligence services.
>
> In the interest of the national security, no statistics or examples of the types of actions implemented under this program may appropriately be disclosed."

This passage seems to say that the FBI continues to perform other activities going beyond investigation and directed at hostile foreign intelligence services.

The following questions arise:

(1) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for FBI national security intelligence activities beyond investigations?

(2) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for the COINTELPRO activities which have been discontinued as a matter of policy since 1971?

(3) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for the FBI's continuing counterintelligence efforts against hostile foreign intelligence services?

4. Appendix S includes excerpts from the appropriations testimony of former Director Hoover. The testimony in 1939 and 1941 makes reference to President Roosevelt's Proclamation of National Emergency, September 8, 1939. The following exchange took place at the hearing on February 19, 1941:

> Mr. Ludlow. At the close of the present emergency, when peace comes, it would mean that much of this emergency work necessarily will be discontinued.
> Mr. Hoover. That is correct.
> Mr. Taber. Is your set-up for the national-defense work separate from the other work?
> Mr. Hoover. It is.
> Mr. Taber. Is it operated as a separate division?
> Mr. Hoover. Yes. In the field our field officials are under instructions to utilize approximately 50 percent of the personnel on national defense work and the other 50 percent on the regular work.
> Mr. Taber. But if some rush comes up, you might have to vary that?
> Mr. Hoover. That is correct.
> Mr. Taber. According to the situation.
> Mr. Hoover. According to the emergency that might arise. If the national emergency should terminate, the structure dealing with national defense can immediately be discontinued or very materially curtailed according to the wishes of Congress.

When President Roosevelt issued the Proclamation of National Emergency on September 8, 1939, he accompanied it with Executive Order No. 8247 directing the Attorney General to "increase the personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, in such number, not exceeding 150, as he shall find necessary for the proper performance of the additional duties imposed upon the Department of Justice in connection with the national emergency." At a press conference the same day,

President Roosevelt specifically discussed this Executive Order and the nature of the "additional duties imposed upon the Department of Justice."

> "And the fourth /Executive Order/ relates to what you might say is a combination of neutrality and national defense. It provides for an addition to the personnel of certain investigating agencies of the Government to protect this country against--I suppose the easiest way of putting it is--some of the episodes, some of the things that happened over here in 1914 and 1915 and 1916 and the beginning of 1917, before we got into the war. There was sabotage; there was a great deal of propaganda by both belligerents, and a good many definite plans laid in this country by foreign governments to try to sway American public opinion. We do not have to specify. The older men who are here can remember some of the episodes of that time. It is to guard against that, and against the spread by any foreign nation of propaganda in this country which would tend to be subversive--I believe that is the word--of our form of Government." (1939 Roosevelt Papers 485-486)

The following questions arise:

(1) To what extent, if any, were the Presidential directives of June 26, 1939 and September 6, 1939, based on the emergency powers of the President?

(2) To what extent, if any, was the establishment of the FBI's Intelligence Division in September, 1939, based on the President's Proclamation of National Emergency and Executive Order No. 8247?

(3) To what extent, if any, does Congress have the Constitutional authority to discontinue or curtail the FBI's national security intelligence activities based on the President's emergency powers or on other Constitutional powers of the Executive Branch?

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 5/16/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At approximately 3:20 PM, former SA David E. Todd (EOD as SA 1/5/42; retirement 12/9/71) called long distance from San Francisco and spoke to Deputy Assistant Director Herington. He said that he had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, Senate Select Committee, who said that he would be on the west coast in the near future and desired to interview Todd concerning FBI policies with regard to investigation of racial matters and our counterintelligence programs against the Black Panthers and other groups. Todd pointed out that he was a former supervisor of the San Francisco Office desk responsible for Black Panther cases. Todd asked what position he should take. He was advised that his decision as to whether or not to be interviewed was entirely his and that the Bureau could not make any suggestion in this regard. It was pointed out that if he decided to be interviewed, we had made arrangements with the Senate Select Committee which would permit a Bureau representative to be available for consultation with regard to matters that might seem sensitive, but that the Bureau representative would not be present during or participate in the actual interview. He was advised further that he had the same rights as any other citizen, namely, the right to personal counsel and any other rights guaranteed him under the Constitution. Pursuant to his request, he was also advised of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 which appears in Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, beginning at Section 16.21, which would require appropriate Departmental approval prior to any current or former employee revealing, pursuant to a subpoena or other demand, any information acquired during the course of the employee's official duties. He was also reminded that all Bureau employees had signed a secrecy agreement.

62-116395-157

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Herington
JH:mtm
(6)

REC 67

MAY 22 1975

ST-101

ALL [illegible] ED
HERE[illegible]
DATE 6-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 3 1975

Todd indicated that while he desired to respond as legally required to an official committee inquiry, he would advise Mr. Seidel that he considered himself bound by the Attorney General Order and did not feel that he could reveal official information without approval by the appropriate Department official. Todd was clearly advised that this decision had to be his own and that the FBI could not and would not make any recommendation to him as to the course of action he should take.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: 5-8-75

FROM : G. R. Steel GRS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

Reference is made to my ~~letter~~ memo dated 4-3-75 captioned as above (cc attached). Sec 63

This is to advise that as of 5-7-75 we have received and ordered to the field a total of 96 requests from the SSC for investigations of its staff members. An additional case was received on 5-8-75 which is being ordered to the field immediately. As a result of referenced memo, Inspector Bowers contacted the SSC which was in accord with a more realistic deadline on remaining investigations, except "a few" specials which would still be handled on an expedite basis, such as afforded Presidential appointments. Of all cases received to date only six have been designated as nonexpedite.

62-116464

It is noted recent articles in the media have contained criticism of Congressman Lucien Nedzi for delay in staffing the HSC and proceeding with its inquiry. On 3-3-75 Inspector Bowers discussed with the Congressman the mechanics for FBI investigations of the HSC staff. In the intervening period no cases were received except one recent case from the HSC which has been ordered to the field. This concerns Carl Hendrickson Simms, Security Director, HSC, and formerly connected with the House impeachment inquiry. Simms has been in contact with our Project Senstudy 75 group. It is not known when additional investigations will be received from the HSC.

ST-117

REC-75

62-116395-156

ACTION:

For information.

MAY 20 1975

ENCLOSURE

Enc.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - Mr. Auerswald

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

GRS:dc
-6-

54 JUN 4 1975

MAY 20 1975

Auerswald

LEGAL COUN

SSC folder

Mr. Cleveland 4-3-75

G. R. Steel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

By agreement, the FBI is currently conducting full field investigations regarding SSC staff personnel. These have extremely short (2 week) deadlines which are identical to those afforded Presidential appointments and are, therefore, given preferential treatment in opening, assigning, and following field progress. The Special Inquiry Unit of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry Section, which has about twice its normal case load, is handling these requests. Senator Church, Chairman, SSC, originally estimated that between 35 and 40 staff members would be submitted for investigation. As of today, 4-3-75, we have received requests for 85 such investigations from the SSC and the end does not appear to be in sight. They are received in bunches as many as 6 at a time, which is not the even flow expected and presents an additional burden.

In addition it is expected that similar requests will be forthcoming in the near future from the HSC since we have a similar agreement with it. Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the HSC, has estimated "probably no more than about 25 staff members will be hired." It remains to be seen if this estimate also falls short of actual receipts.

Since there is no charge for these full field investigations they will have to be considered in the budget. It is noted the current charge for a full field investigation, where applicable, is $2028.

ACTION: For information. Since it appears the nucleus of the Committee has been formed, it is suggested Senator Church be contacted and queried regarding a more realistic (30 day) deadline on the remaining investigations concerning future staff members and their replacements.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
GRS ① - Mr. Steel

GRS:dc
-6-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY

62-116395-156

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/2/75

FROM : Mr. H. E. Helgeson

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At about 1 p.m., 5/2/75, ASAC Herbert D. Clough, Newark Division, called to furnish the following information:

The Newark Office had just been contacted by former Bureau Supervisor Dan Brennan, retired, who resides at Sea Girt, New Jersey. Brennan advised that he had been contacted earlier today by Mike Epstein of the Senate Select Committee who desired to talk to Brennan today and an appointment was set up. Epstein was to arrive at Newark around noon and then drive to Sea Girt, about an hour's travel. Based on information furnished at the recent conference in New York, Newark had dispatched an Agent to be present during this interview as requested by Dan Brennan.

After completing my conversation with Clough, I discussed this matter with John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, and it was concluded the Agent from Newark who would be present during the interview should call Office of Legal Counsel, speak to Hotis, and obtain general guidelines for his participation in this interview.

ASAC Clough was recontacted and so instructed. I also asked Clough to get in touch with me later in the day to let me know what transpired.

REC-19 62-116395-155

ST-101

16 MAY 29 1975

ACTION:

For information.

62-116395

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12601 BY SP2 ALM/RW

HEH:mah

84 JUN 3 (5) 1975

PERS/REC UNIT

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Soc'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: May 12, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: ISSUE PAPER ON INTELLIGENCE FILES AND PRIVACY

Senstudy 75

Hotis

The Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community identified ten issues likely to grow out of the Select Committee's deliberations. The Executive Committee asked the FBI to prepare a paper on one of these topics, Intelligence Files and Privacy. Specifically, the request was for a brief paper which raises the issues observed by the intelligence agencies when intelligence files and privacy are viewed together without suggesting or recommending how the questions should be resolved.

J. D. Miller drafted an outline which was discussed on April 16, 1975, with representatives of the CIA and Departments of Defense and Treasury. On April 21, this outline was presented by Mr. Hotis to the Executive Committee which received it without comment. Mr. Miller then prepared a rough draft which was discussed at a meeting on April 22, with the representatives of the CIA and Department of Treasury.

Mr. Miller's final draft is attached. It discusses both intelligence files and the concept of privacy in general terms before focusing on the issues which present themselves when an effort is made to establish the proper relationship between the two.

Enclosure

REC-37 62-116395-154

THH

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Cleveland
1-Mr. Miller

ST 114

MAY 20 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-5-01 BY SP2ALM/ku

JDM:lgp
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 29 1975
360

Memo from Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams
ISSUE PAPER ON INTELLIGENCE FILES AND PRIVACY

RECOMMENDATION:

The issue paper entitled Intelligence Files and Privacy be submitted by Mr. Hotis to the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

JBA

JBA/PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Each Assistant Director-Encs.
1 - Mr. Cregar-Encs.
1 - Mr. Hotis-Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz-Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly-Encs.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 5-2-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES REQUEST OF 4-28-75

REQUEST OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DATED 4-25-75

On 5-2-75, Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, furnished SA Paul V. Daly two requests from Congressional Committees pertaining to an allegation that documents were removed from former Director J. Edgar Hoover's residence in Washington, D. C., following the death of Mr. Clyde Tolson. Attached are copies of each of the captioned requests.

Each Assistant Director is to canvass his Division and furnish on an expedite basis any information they may develop considering this allegation. Responses should be directed to the Legal Analysis Office, Legal Counsel Division, so that the response may be prepared for the appropriate Congressional Committees and forwarded through the Attorney General's office.

REC 8 62-116395-153

Also attached for approval is an airtel to the Washington Field Office requesting that an appropriate inquiry be made among Field Office personnel so that these allegations may be responded to.

62-116395-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

RECOMMENDATIONS:

MAY 20 1975

(1) That Assistant Directors make ~~appropriate inquiry of~~ personnel concerning the allegations contained in the aforementioned letters and forward results of inquiry to the Legal Analysis Office, Legal Counsel Division, so that responses may be prepared to the Committees' request.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

ENCLOSURE

MAY 27 1975

Enclosures
PVD:dkg (19)

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 30 1975

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities

(2) The attached airtel to the Washington Field Office be approved and sent making inquiry of that Office concerning allegations contained in the aforementioned letters.

pvd JBH/pvd

not sent - handled by phone JJO

PLM

5/6 -
SAC Kunkel - Alex
SAC Stames - WFO
Advise no personnel
those offices went to
Mr Hoover's home after
Mr Tolson's death
none involved in transporting
records or any material in
connection w/ this inquiry -
JJO

5/7/75
Tom [illegible] Div 3
advised his
Division negative

- 2 -

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRM
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAI

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 28, 1975

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
APR 30 1975

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Last week's issue of Newsweek, on page 15, states:

> Hoover's Secrets
>
> Following the death last week of Clyde Tolson, J. Edgar Hoover's close friend and No. 2 man at the FBI, two FBI agents reportedly removed some documents from the late director's house in Washington, where Tolson had been living. Officially, the FBI denies taking any such action, and a friend of Tolson's says the only Hoover documents Tolson had were old canceled checks and tax returns. But Newsweek had reported earlier that some of Hoover's private dossiers, including information "very, very damaging" to persons in the Nixon White House, were left in Tolson's custody, and a source told Newsweek this week that the materials were carted away in a truck.

Assuming that the files in question may be part of the so-called "Official and Confidential" files, your testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on February 27, 1975, is instructive. You said that the number of files which you reviewed contained matters relating to "Presidential directives regarding the role of the FBI in the security field" and to the matters related to "domestic

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

MAY 27 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-153

violence", "intelligence activities by hostile nations", "domestic extremist activities", and use of the FBI to gather political intelligence.

Furthermore, at the same time, Director Kelley suggested that materials from the "Official and Confidential" files were taken to Director Hoover's home. He stated:

> Immediately after his death /Mr. Hoover's/ some of his employees, including his personal secretary, went through his files and completed the destruction of the remainder of the files that were purely personal. These were destroyed by shredding. Some I understand were taken out to his home and placed in his home, they being historical I presume to some extent. There is no indication that they were other than personal files.

Please determine for the Select Committee whether any documents were removed from Mr. Tolson's or Mr. Hoover's residence by FBI agents or former FBI agents after Mr. Tolson's death. If agents of the FBI did go to Mr. Hoover's or Mr. Tolson's residence to remove files, please provide the Select Committee with a complete description of the documents taken into custody by the FBI. Were any such documents copies or originals of documents relating to the business of the FBI? If so, please describe the subject matter of each such document. Also indicate the individual within the FBI who has custody over these files. Furthermore, I respectfully request on behalf of the Select Committee that such files not be destroyed or removed from the FBI's custody until further notice.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

PETER W. RODINO, JR. (N.J.), CHAIRMAN

JACK BROOKS, TEX.
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, WIS.
DON EDWARDS, CALIF.
WILLIAM L. HUNGATE, MO.
JOHN CONYERS, JR., MICH.
JOSHUA EILBERG, PA.
WALTER FLOWERS, ALA.
JAMES R. MANN, S.C.
PAUL S. SARBANES, MD.
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, OHIO
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, CALIF.
ROBERT F. DRINAN, MASS.
BARBARA JORDAN, TEX.
RAY THORNTON, ARK.
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, N.Y.
EDWARD MEZVINSKY, IOWA
HERMAN BADILLO, N.Y.
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, KY.
EDWARD W. PATTISON, N.Y.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, N.J.
MARTIN A. RUSSO, ILL.

EDWARD HUTCHINSON, MICH.
ROBERT MC CLORY, ILL.
TOM RAILSBACK, ILL.
CHARLES E. WIGGINS, CALIF.
HAMILTON FISH, JR., N.Y.
M. CALDWELL BUTLER, VA.
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, CALIF.
JOHN M. ASHBROOK, OHIO
HENRY J. HYDE, ILL.
THOMAS N. KINDNESS, OHIO

Congress of the United States
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Telephone: 202-225-3951

GENERAL COUNSEL:
EARL C. DUDLEY, JR.

STAFF DIRECTOR:
GARNER J. CLINE

COUNSEL:
HERBERT FUCHS
WILLIAM P. SHATTUCK
ALAN A. PARKER
JAMES F. FALCO
MAURICE A. BARBOZA
ARTHUR P. ENDRES, JR.
THOMAS W. HUTCHISON
DANIEL L. COHEN
FRANKLIN G. POLK
THOMAS E. MOONEY
MICHAEL W. BLOMMER
ALEXANDER B. COOK
CONSTANTINE J. GEKAS
ALAN F. COFFEY, JR.
KENNETH N. KLEE

RECEIVED
MAY 2 1975
O.L.A.

April 25, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In the most recent issue, April 28, 1975, of Newsweek's "Periscope" section, it is alleged that following the death of Clyde Tolson, J. Edgar Hoover's close friend and top assistant, FBI agents removed documents from the late FBI Director's house, in which Mr. Tolson had been living. The article further alleges that the documents removed were of the nature of private dossiers.

During the hearing of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, on February 27, 1975, it was asserted that papers delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death were of a purely historical or personal nature. In keeping with the Subcommittee's oversight jurisdiction of the FBI, I respectfully request that the Department of Justice make an independent investigation of the allegations made by the Newsweek writer and report back to the Subcommittee within a reasonable time. This investigation should cover these points:

1. Were any documents or other material removed from the home of the late FBI Director by agents of the FBI, or others under the direction of the FBI or the Department of Justice, after the death of Clyde Tolson?

[illegible]

2. If it is determined that documents or other material were removed, on whose authority was such action initiated?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RE

MAY 27 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-153

3. What was the nature of the material removed?

4. For what purpose were the materials removed?

5. Was it the same material delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death?

6. If it is true that the materials delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death were of an historical or personal nature, and that all or some of these same materials were removed after the death of Clyde Tolson, what legal rationale can be used to give the FBI any interest in, or authority to remove, such documents to their own possession?

Your prompt consideration of this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Don Edwards

Don Edwards
Chairman
Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights

DE:ss

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Don Edwards

WASHINGTON, D.C.
APR 28
PM
1975
206

ALWAYS
USE ZIP
M.C CODE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-97 BY

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
~~MAY 1962~~ EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES [illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. JENKINS DATE: 5/5/75

FROM : D.W. MOORE, JR.

SUBJECT: CLYDE A. TOLSON
FORMER ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

The April 28, 1975, issue of "Newsweek" magazine on page 15 under its "Periscope" section, referred to Mr. Tolson's death and claimed that 2 Agents reportedly removed documents from Hoover's residence where Tolson had been living. The article, captioned "Hoover's Secrets," carried the FBI's denial of such action and also stated that a friend of Tolson's said the only Hoover documents Tolson had were old cancelled checks and tax returns. However, the article added that "Newsweek" had reported earlier that some of Hoover's private dossiers, including information "very, very damaging" to persons in the Nixon White House, were left in Tolson's custody. "Newsweek" further claimed that a source advised that the materials were carted away in a truck.

Mr. Kelley has asked of Messrs. Callahan, Jenkins, Adams and Moore, "Do you have any idea where such a story got started? Ky."

My memorandum to you of 4/17/75 captioned as above (copy attached) pointed out that Tony Marro, "Newsweek" reporter, contacted my office that date advising he had heard from a source to the effect that 2 Agents were sent to Tolson's residence the day of his death with a truck and carted away some files which were subsequently brought to the home of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director. Upon checking with Mr. Mohr, Marro was advised there was absolutely no truth to the story. It should be noted that Mr. Mohr also advised at that time that most of the furnishings at Mr. Tolson's home have been removed over the past several months and that there were some associates of the family and Annie, the housekeeper who had stopped by the house on the day of the death with some empty boxes to help remove additional furnishings.

Enc.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Heim
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt

(CONTINUED)

JMM:jo
(7)

MAY 21 1975

62-116395-153

ENCLOSURE

Moore to Jenkins Memo (cont'd.)
Re: CLYDE A. TOLSON

Based upon a request from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Callahan, a Bureau clerk did go to the residence of Mr. Tolson on the day of his death whereupon he delivered some 24 boxes and 6 rolls of tape. The clerk merely delivered the boxes and tape and then left the residence. We have no idea what was placed in the boxes nor how this story started in the first place.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

MR. JENKINS 4/17/75

D.W. MOORE, JR.

CLYDE A. TOLSON
FORMER FBI ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Tony Marro, "Newsweek" magazine, Washington, D.C., called this morning advising that he had heard from a source who has been reliable in the past, to the effect that two Agents were sent to the home of Clyde Tolson Monday evening, 4/14/75, the day of his death, with a truck and carted away some files which were subsequently brought to the home of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director.

Upon checking with Mr. Mohr, Mr. Marro was advised that there was absolutely no truth to his story. It should be noted that Mr. Mohr advised that most of the furnishings at Mr. Tolson's home have been removed over the past several months and that there were some associates of the family and Annie, the housekeeper, who had stopped by the house sometime Monday with some empty boxes to help remove additional furnishings. As you know, Mr. Mohr is the Administrator of Mr. Tolson's estate and stated that there was simply no truth to the allegation that any Agents had gone to the home in a truck to transfer any files to his residence, as alleged.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Heim
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

JMM:jo
(7)

MAY 27 1975

62-116395-153

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 5-5-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

By memorandum dated 4-30-75, directed to the Deputy Attorney General and the Director of the FBI, signed by Chief Counsel of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., the SSC had made additional requests of the FBI. Their requests are divided into four separate areas which are as follows: (1) Request for prior changes in the Manual of Instructions, to those sections of the Manual of Instructions which they have already had access to. (2) Request to review certain sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished the Committee. A review of this list discloses generally these sections do not pertain to foreign or domestic intelligence investigations and some do not appear to be within the ambit of Senate Resolution 21 which charters the authority of the SSC. Regarding the sections of the Manual of Instructions, the request stated they would be satisfied with reviewing them at FBI Headquarters. (3) Request certain sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations be made available for review by SSC representatives at FBI Headquarters. As in request #2, some of the sections do not appear to be within the scope of Senate Resolution 21. Among the sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations requested are such sections as those concerning disciplinary matters and administration of offices. (4) A general request conerning the Bureau's filing procedures including information concerning our indexing system, list of classifications used in FBI filing system, and a set of forms used by the Bureau. (Attached is a copy of the memorandum.)

ST 112 REC 8 62-116395-152

It was pointed out regarding this request to senior staff member of the SSC, Mark Gitenstein, that some aspects of this request appear to be outside of the scope of the Committee's authority as set forth in Senate Resolution 21. Gitenstein explained that while this may

MAY 19 1975

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Bassett - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Enc.
1 - Mr. Decker - Enc.
1 - Mr. Gebhardt - Enc.
1 - Mr. McDermott - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mooney - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - ~~Enc.~~
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

PVD:dkg (15)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

8 4 MAY 30 1975

ENCLOSURE

be technically accurate the Committee felt it was necessary for them to come to a general understanding as to Bureau operations and that this would assist them in their review of FBI operations in the domestic and foreign intelligence areas. Gitenstein also indicated it was the Committee's feeling that Senate Resolution 21 was intended to be construed liberally and that in general it required that the SSC be furnished by the various intelligence agencies that information which would be necessary for them to carry out its mandate. It was also explained to Gitenstein that concerning their requests involving prior changes in various sections of the Manual of Instructions that they had not placed a cutoff date as to how far back the Bureau had to go to comply with this request. Gitenstein indicated that we could use 1-1-60 as the cutoff date.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Recipients review requests pertaining to their Divisions and furnish in memorandum form their response to the Legal Counsel Division.

(2) The Legal Counsel Division will, upon receipt of responses from the interested Divisions, prepare the necessary communication to the Senate Select Committee to be approved by the Attorney General and furnished to the Committee.

PLM

OK

(FAOS--4/30/75)

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL TYLER AND DIRECTOR KELLY

April 30, 1975

This memorandum concerns paragraph IV of the attachment to Senator Church's letter of March 19 to the Attorney General. On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, I would like to request the following:

1. Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instructions. Certain sections of the Manual currently in effect have been produced to us. We had intended by the request to ask for the relevant superseded sections (note the absence of the word "current" in Section IV as compared to Section IIIA) and we did indicate previously to the liaison staff that we were interested in superseded sections. But without regard to that, it is clear from documents such as the Director's letter of August 7, 1973 to the Attorney General that certain superseded sections will be highly relevant in analyzing the question of legal authority, as well as in understanding particular events in earlier years. We would appreciate their being sent to us promptly or if that causes mechanical problems, being able to promptly review them at the FBI in order to select particular portions for copying. At a minimum we would be interested in superseded Manual provisions for the sections set out in Appendix A.

Xerox furnished to K. Wm O'Connor Deputy Asst. to A.G. by SA DALY 5-20-75

Copy to Harriet Mowitt, Ad Hoc Comm. by LFS 5-15-75 β

62-116395-152

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

2. Sections of the Manual of Instructions Not Previously Produced. Based upon the previous production to us of the table of contents to the Manual of Instructions, we have identified certain additional sections of the Manual which we would like to examine. Rather than having these made available to us in the first instance in our offices, we suggest that they be made available to Mark Gitenstein, and other designated members of the staff, for initial examination at the FBI offices. A listing of those sections is annexed as Appendix B.

3. Manual of Rules and Regulations. Again, based upon the procedure whereby we were first furnished with the table of contents of the Manual of Rules, we have identified those sections which we want to examine initially. To expedite matters, these sections, identified in Appendix C, could be examined by Mr. Gitenstein, or other designated staff members, at the FBI offices.

4. Filing System. It would also be most helpful if you could provide the Committee with any other written materials on administration of any of the filing or information systems, manual or automated, which are used in the course of intelligence or internal security activities. This does not fit within our prior request but should serve to make future requests more focused.

I have in mind specifically any memoranda prepared by the Bureau on its indexing system and the so-called Clerk's Manual,

if such a document exists. Please also provide the Committee with a list of the classifications used in the FBI's filing system as well as a complete set of printed forms used by the Bureau (e.g., FD-165, etc.).

* * * *

We believe that all the foregoing material will help expedite and focus the inquiry. I assume that Mr. Hotis will contact me promptly to arrange for our review of this material.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.,
Chief Counsel,
Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence
Activities

Appendix A

Section	Subject
36	Espionage
84	Registration Act
86	Sabotage
87	Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals
88	Sedition
95	Treason
97	Voorhis Act
105	Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency
107	Internal Security Informants and Confidential Sources; and Foreign Counterintelligence Assets
122	Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest
130	Extremist Informants and Sources

Appendix B

Section	Subject
4	Surveillances and Raids
8R	Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division
19	Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Agencies
23	Bomb Threats Explosives and Incendiary Devices
27	Civil Rights
28	Civil Rights Act of 1964
29	Conspiracy
75	Neutrality Matters
78	Passports and Visas
90	Selective Service Act
102	Coordination with Other Government Agencies
103	Foreign Police Cooperation
134	Assaulting the President of the United States and Threats to the President of the United States
136	Antiriot Laws
144	Police Killings
146	Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States

Appendix C

Part I

Section 9 - Disciplinary Matters

Part II

Section 1 - Authority--Training--Submission of Information

Section 2 - Supervision--Availability-Resident Agencies

Section 3 - Administration of Offices

Section 4 - Communications

Section 5 - Dissemination of Information

Section 6 - Publications, Press, and Public Contacts

Section 7 - Payments--Property

Section 8 - Miscellaneous Regulations

Section 9 - Classification--Character--Copies--Abbreviations

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 4/30/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY '75

Removed By 79 MAY 28 1975

File Number 62-116395-

Permanent Serial Charge Out

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GO NMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4-30-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

Proposed Legislation

Senstudy '75

SUBJECT: H. R. 214; LEGISLATION TO REQUIRE COURT ORDERS FOR THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS BY ELECTRONIC AND OTHER DEVICES, FOR ENTERING RESIDENCES, FOR OPENING MAIL, AND FOR INSPECTION OF CERTAIN RECORDS

Bowers

66-2272-2356

Reference Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams memorandum, 4-28-75, reporting that the Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management, House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, is going to open hearings concerning captioned bill on 5-6-75, and that the Department of Justice will be requested to provide testimony.

Mike Cavanagh, Assistant on the Subcommittee staff, called Inspector Bowers on 4-29-75 stating the Subcommittee Chairman, Charles Wilson (D-Calif.), had instructed him to request a copy of the Hoover report to the President in June, 1970, on behalf of the Committee on Interagency Intelligence since this report contained information regarding mail openings and possibly mail covers. Cavanagh was advised that we have received prior requests from Congressional committees for this document and all such requests are being referred to the White House. He was told to contact James Wilderotter in the office of the Counsel to the President at the White House. Wilderotter is the individual to whom we have previously referred a similar request for this document from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
46 JUL 21 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Charles Whitley, Administrative Assistant to Congressman David Henderson (D-N.C.), Chairman of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on 4-30-75 told Bowers that the Postal Facilities Subcommittee had scheduled the hearings regarding this legislation hurriedly after it was determined that the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, Committee on Government Operations, chaired by

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall

REC-15 66-2272-2360

1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Bowers

ST 104

5 JUN 10 1975

DWB:kjs (10)

CONTINUED - over

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

8 JUL 23 1975

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: H. R. 214

Congresswoman Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.), had indicated an interest in holding hearings on this matter. Whitley stated hopefully Abzug's Subcommittee can be precluded from conducting any hearings in this area by virtue of the assertion of authority by the Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

James Wentzel, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, has been alerted to the effect that an invitation will be received by the Department for testimony on this legislation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the General and Special Investigative Divisions and the Intelligence Division promptly begin compiling appropriate information for submission to the Legal Counsel Division which can be submitted to the Department for its use in testifying or can be used as the basis for FBI testimony should the Department request an FBI representative to appear at these hearings.

RFB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW|TJL

DATE: 4/29/75

1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum records the receipt of two documents furnished to the Bureau as a member of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. These documents were furnished by Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, who is chairman of the Ad Hoc Group.

Attached herewith is a current list of those staff members of the Senate Select Committee who have received security clearances. The Bureau will continue to receive up-dated lists as additional staff members are afforded a security clearance.

Also attached is a copy of the request levied on the Department of State by the Senate Select Committee. A copy of this request was furnished to the Bureau for its information by Mr. Clarke.

MOR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Enclosures

WRW|TJL

WOC:lmh lmh
(8)

REC-100 62-116395-151

MAY 15 1975

ENCLOSURE

2

84 MAY 27 1975

24 April 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET

	NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
B *	Aaron, David 15/4	8-21-38	IL	550-44-7971	
B *	Bader, William 17/4	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF - Badge
	Baron, Frederick	12-2-47	CONN	494-54-5241	
*	Benz, Charity I.	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
	Brooks, Nancy	2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773	
B *	Carter, Barry 24/4	12-14-42	CAL	567-56-8854	
	Chesnik, Barbara	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
B *	Davis, Lynn 17/4	9-6-43	FL	042-36-9155	TF - Badge
	Dawson, Thomas	9-9-52	MINN	471-60-1688	
	De Oreo, Mary	6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258	
	Dillon, Molly	4-16-51	VA	150-38-4588	
	Dwyer, Daniel	8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792	
	Epstein, Michael Taylor	3-10-37	MASS	026-28-6318	
B *	Fenn, Peter 24/4	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123	
	Gitenstein, Mark Henry	3-7-46	ALA	420-60-8767	
	Greissing, Edward	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
*	Hatry, Audrey Helen	6-10-23	MD	216-14-8691	
*	Inderfurth, Mark	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	
	Johnson, Dorothy	6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413	

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-151

Staff Members of Senate Select Committee cleared, page 2

		NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
		Johnson, Loch	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478	
	*	Kieves, Lawrence	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
3	*	Kirbow, Charles 24/4	10-2-22	GA	252-12-5112	TF - Badge
3	*	Lombard, Charles 24/4	6-2-30	FR	578-44-9471	
		Liebengood, Howard	12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707	
		MacDonald, Naldeen	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
B	*	Madigan, Michael James 15/4	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF - Badge
B	*	Marshall, Benjamin 17/4	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
B	*	Maxwell, Elliot Everett 15/4	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF - Badge
	*	Mecham, Martha Evans	2-11-40	CAL	528-48-6848	
B	*	Miller, William G. 15/4	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
B	*	O'Flaherty, James Daniel 15/4	11-4-42	ILL	239-62-8495	Badge
		Orloff, Jan	11-14-47	CAL	558-74-8394	
		Peterson, John F.	6-15-41	CAL	565-56-7707	
		Pitts, Susan	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
B	*	Romberg, Alan 22/4	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
B	*	Schwarz, Frederick A.O., III 15/4	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
B	*	Shea, Patrick 15/4	2-28-48	UT	528-64-1965	
		Smith, Stephanie	3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476	
B	*	Snider, Lewis Brittle 24/4	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
		Towell, Mary	4-25-44	TN	566-64-7628	
B	*	Wides, Burton Victor 17/4	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF - Badge

* Staff Members who are designated to receive COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION.
B Staff Members briefed on COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION.

4/23/75

Request to the Secretary of State for Documents and Other Material Regarding the Department of State and Intelligence Activities of the United States Government

1. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance or similar material setting forth the relationship of the Department of State to, and its role in, the Intelligence Community and the National Security Council structure, including but not limited to the United States Intelligence Board, the Forty Committee, Washington Special Action Group, Senior Review Group, the Verification Panel, and the Intelligence Committee. Specific descriptive and documentary material covering the nature and extent of the Department's relationship with the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other investigating and intelligence entities should be included, such as the Interagency Evaluation Committee.

2. Organization charts showing which officials represent the Department of State on the various Intelligence Community and NSC committees, and on all other bodies, including subcommittees, whose functions include intelligence activities. Such charts should give the names and titles of officials representing the Department of State in those committees (or their predecessor organizations) going as far back as 1947 or any earlier date which the Department believes relevant. The charts should also include, for the same time frame, the names, titles, and a brief job description of those officials of the Department who provided staff support to the Department's representatives on Intelligence Community and NSC committees or to the committees directly.

3. All regulations, guidance, inter-agency memoranda, delimitations agreements, including other agreements and similar material governing the support which the Department of State provides to or receives from other agencies within the Government, having an intelligence or security or investigative function. This would include, but not be limited to, such matters as administrative support and "cover" provided to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (and its predecessors), communications support, and financial services.

4. Description, including organization chart, of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). This should include, in particular, detailed discussion of the operations of the Directorate for Coordination (INR/DDC) and any predecessor offices, whether in INR, the Under Secretary's office, or elsewhere in the Department. Names of personnel throughout the Directorate for Coordination or its

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-151
ENCLOSURE

predecessors should be listed covering the entire period since that function was developed.

5. Description of the organization and functions of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, and of the Office of Security within the Bureau of Administration, insofar as they relate to liaison or cooperation with any intelligence or domestic investigatory body.

6. All instructions, memoranda or similar documents authorizing the establishment of and detailing the mandate of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (and its Working Group). Also all reports on terrorism by the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (and its Working Group), such as the report by the Secretary of State to the President referred to in the President's Memorandum of September 25, 1972, establishing the Committee.

7. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance, or similar material which sets forth the Department of State's role in establishing or reviewing requirements or proposals for intelligence activity, including intelligence collection, recruitment of agents, political action programs, paramilitary programs, and counterintelligence activities. In addition, a descriptive account of the Department of State's role in establishing or reviewing requirements or proposals for intelligence activity, differentiating the Department's role in intelligence collection, recruitment of agents, political action programs, paramilitary programs, and counterintelligence activities. This should include differentiation between activities within these categories where differences exist.

8. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance, or similar material which sets forth the role and functions of the Department of State in the collection, assessment, production, and dissemination of national intelligence. In addition, a descriptive account of the current role and functions of the Department of State in this regard.

9. All instructions, guidance or similar material defining the authority of U.S. Ambassadors and other Chiefs of Mission to know about and control activities of any U.S. intelligence or investigative agent or entity in the country to which the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is accredited. This should include any limitations upon Ambassadorial control or cognizance of and discussion of any other coordination, monitoring, or other relationships between U.S. missions and the activities of any U.S. intelligence or investigative agent or entity.

10. Any other historical, descriptive or documentary material, studies or reports which the Department believes would be of assistance to the Select Committee in understanding the Department's role in intelligence activities, evaluation and monitoring of those activities, or other matters relevant to the Committee's mandate.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

151 THRU 163

164 THRU 188

190 THRU 208

210 THRU 219

220, 221

2ND NR 221 THRU 230

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88296 Date: 2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/2/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/

At 2:30 p.m. on June 2, 1975, a conference was held with the Deputy Attorney General attended by K. William O'Connor, Kevin Maroney, Philip White, and Robert McDermott of the Department. Bureau representatives were Mr. Callahan, Mr. Adams, Mr. Wannall and me.

Mr. O'Connor discussed the request by the Senate Select Committee for access to the 39 page report by former Assistant Attorney General Petersen concerning COINTELPRO. Though objections were presented by the Bureau representatives that the report should not be furnished to the Committee, and its enclosures, particularly the legal memoranda should not be made available, the Deputy Attorney General decided and instructed that the 39 page report should be made available to John Elliff on Tuesday, June 3, 1975, for his review, at which time he would be permitted to take notes, but he would not be furnished a copy of the document. The Deputy further instructed that should Mr. Elliff request the attachments to the report, Mr. O'Connor should offer as an alternative the memoranda which initiated each of the COINTELPROs.

EX-105 REC-20 62-116395-220

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Upon our return to the Bureau, Mr. Adams requested that the Intelligence Division undertake an analysis of each of the summaries which were attached to the Petersen report in order to make a damage assessment based on factors that would affect current Bureau operations should they be revealed to the Committee. He also requested that ~~this information~~ be compiled and available to brief the Deputy Attorney General as to the difficulties that would be involved upon disclosure.

JUN 10 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. David Ryan
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116009

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Intelligence Division analyze the summaries for purposes of a damage assessment.

2. That the Intelligence Division be prepared to furnish a briefing to the Deputy Attorney General as to the damage assessment.

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/28/75

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO: Director, FBI (62-116395)
(Attention: INTD - W. O. Cregar)

FROM: SAC, Atlanta (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

Re Bureau airtel to Atlanta 5/23/75.

Material enclosed with referenced airtel was hand-delivered to former SA, ALAN G. SENTINELLA, 5/27/75, and same was returned by SENTINELLA to Atlanta Division same day.

Enclosed is the material furnished by SENTINELLA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

detached & filed w/ yellow of LHM 5/22/75

5-B

62-116395-229

REC-100

17 JUN 16 1975

2-Bureau (Enc.)
1-Atlanta
WKD:rrl
(3)

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

JUN 17 1975

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 5 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident ____
Inspection ____
Int. Il. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 011 NK CODE

4:00PM 6/5/75 IMMEDIATE RXG

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

ATT: W. O. GREGAR, INTD

FROM NEWARK (62-3971)

SENSTUDY 75

RE TELCON BUREAU SUPERVISOR ROBERT SHEA AND ASAC HERBERT D. CLOUGH, JR., JUNE 5, 1975.

THOROUGH REVIEW OF FILES CAPTIONED "DISRUPTION OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION; INFORMATION CONCERNING"; "SPECIAL SQUAD AT DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION , ATLANTIC CITY, N.J., AUGUST 22-28, 1964"; "DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, AUGUST 24-28, 1964" AND JUNE FILES DOES NOT REVEAL ANY MEMORANDA, LETTERS OR OTHER TYPE COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED BY FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, LEO T. CLARK.

END

MWW FBI WASH DC CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC-100

62-116395-228

52 JUN 16 1975

CC - Gregar

84 JUN 17 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 3, 1975

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.
   Stanley David Levison

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired SA, FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: Bureau file 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/12/75

5. INTERVIEWER: Mr. Lester B. Seidel, SSC Staff Member

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT:

Witness was questioned and furnished information concerning the former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley David Levison.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rl

Delivered 6/4/75

62-116395

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC-100

62-116395-227

17 JUN 16 1975

84 JUN 17 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2190

10 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

Harriet Merritt for
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN [illegible]
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

Attachment

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-226

NOT RECORDED

17 JUN 16 1975

file 62-116395

FIVE

84 JUN 1 9 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

10 JUN 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
Bader, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara			12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
Chesnick, Barbara			4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/lew

62-116395-226

ENCLOSURE

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17 (Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Dawson, Thomas			9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeOreo, Mary			6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel			8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor			3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
Ernő, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
Greissing, Edward			11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF Badge
Iverson, Portia			10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
Karalekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan			11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.			6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Pyle, Christopher			11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Ricks, Walter			12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Seidel, Lester			7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.			3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha			9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Wallach, Paul			5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

1 - D. W. Moore
(Attn: J.M. Murphy)
1 - J. A. Mintz
(Attn: Legal Analysis
Section)
1 - W. R. Wannall

May 9, 1975

Sec. Study - '75

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - R. W. Held

Honorable Charles E. Wiggins
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Wiggins:

Reference is made to your letter dated April 9, 1975, enclosing a resolution adopted by the State Bar of California condemning the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for placing an informant on the staff of a legal service agency to communicate information learned in that capacity to the FBI and our response dated April 28, 1975.

Contact with the State Bar of California has enabled us to identify the situation to which they were referring.

Between April, 1968, and November, 1968, one Rudolph Leamer Muse was operated as an informant by our New Orleans, Louisiana, Division. Muse furnished information regarding black extremist activities and he was paid for services rendered. Muse was unemployed when initially volunteering his assistance to the FBI and subsequently, on May 10, 1968, began working as an investigator for the New Orleans Legal Assistance Corps (NOLAC), an organization funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Information in the files of our New Orleans Division indicates during June, 1968, Muse advised it had become necessary to tell his supervisor at NOLAC of his relationship with the FBI. His supervisor became aware of Muse's association with black nationalist groups and attempted to discharge him. To avoid discharge, Muse told his supervisor he was cooperating with the FBI. Subsequently Muse's supervisor from NOLAC contacted the New Orleans Division and advised he wanted to assure the FBI that the relationship between

4

MAILED 6
MAY 14 1975
FBI

62-116395-
170-3145-7

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ST 104

REC-33

NOT RECORDED

46 JUN 16 1975

19 MAY 16 1975

cah
RWH:cah (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

FLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2ALM/RW

MAIL ROOM

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JUN 17 1975

Muse and the FBI would be maintained by him and would go no further. Muse's supervisor said he was cognizant of the importance of Muse's cooperation with the FBI remaining confidential.

The New Orleans Division of the FBI never conducted any investigation regarding NOLAC and Muse never furnished information concerning its activities.

I hope this information will clarify the issue for you. If I may be of further assistance in this matter, please contact me.

A copy of this letter is being provided to the State Bar of California.

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

1 - State Bar of California
601 McAllister Street
San Francisco, California 94102

NOTE:

The resolution of the State Bar of California (SBC) referred to above did not identify the specific incident in which they were interested so Congressman Wiggins' letter was acknowledged and we indicated additional details would follow. On 4/25/75 San Francisco advised the basis for the SBC resolution was articles contained in the 2/7/75 issues of the San Francisco Examiner and Oakland Tribune. In these articles Muse was not mentioned by name but the details corresponded with his case. On 4/28/75 Supervisor Ernest Wall, New Orleans, advised Muse was identified by name in articles concerning this incident in the 2/2/75 issue of the New Orleans Times Picayune and the 2/25/75 issue of the New Orleans States Item. Since Muse revealed his relationship with the FBI and has been publicly identified by name and appears to be no privacy issue or need to protect the confidentiality of our files, Congressman Wiggins should be advised of the complete details in this matter. As the SBC urged issues such as this be considered by the select committees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, a copy of this communication is being furnished for the information of the Legal Analysis Section and Project Senstudy 75 in Division 5.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-8-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth in summary form the requests we have received from various Committees in Congress and the status of our replies.

I. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

We have substantially complied with the request of this Committee contained in their letter of 3-19-75. The remaining aspects of this request involve a decision by the State Department concerning the release of exhibits contained in a study on FBI jurisdiction, a decision by the Department relating to COINTELPRO and our recommendation that one particular document not be furnished the Committee.

We are in receipt of a request by memorandum dated 4-30-75 from the SSC. This request generally relates to Sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Manual of Instructions, and the various divisions having responsibilities and interest in the Sections requested, are in the process of preparing the necessary responses.

We received a request by letter dated 4-28-75 from the Committee concerning allegations of our possible involvement in the removal of documents from the residence of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover. Our response has been prepared and it is anticipated it will be furnished the Department in the near future.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
170 JUN 3 1975

MAY 23 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2272-171

II. Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee

We have complied with those aspects of the request contained in this Committee's letter of 4-10-75, pertaining to photographic surveillance and indexing procedures. We anticipate our response to their requests relating to our authority to collect, retain and disseminate information will be furnished in the immediate future.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

58 JUN 6 1975

PVD:dkg (6)

102

CONTINUED - OVER

We also received a request from this Committee by letter dated 4-22-75, relating to our procedures of handling Freedom of Information Act requests and an inquiry by letter dated 4-25-75 regarding our alleged involvement in the removal of documents from the residence of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover. We have prepared responses to both requests. The response concerning the Freedom of Information Act has been furnished the Department for approval and furnishing to the Committee; the response relating to removal of documents has been prepared and is in the process of being approved by the Bureau.

III. Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate Judiciary Committee

We received a request by letter dated 4-28-75 for information relating to terrorist incidents. We have prepared and furnished a response to this request.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

PVD JBH/PVD

PVD

ATTENDEES

USIB AD HOC COORDINATING GROUP ON CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

Wednesday, 4 June 1975, at 1000 hours
DCI Conference Room (7D64)

Dr. John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

Mr. J. J. Hitchcock
State

Mr. David Lowman
NSA

Mr. J. Foster Collins
Treasury

Mr. Leon F. Schwartz
FBI

Mr. Robert Upchurch
ERDA

RADM Donald P. Harvey, USN
Mr. John Brock
Captain William Quisenberry
DIA

Captain L. C. Martinez
Navy

Lt. Col. Harold Coyle
Rep. for Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force

Mr. Walter Elder
CIA

Mrs. Harriett D. Mowitt
Exec Sec to the Ad Hoc Group
ICS

Mr. Donald E. Moore
Chairman, USIB Security Committee

Mr. Merrill T. Kelly
Army

Colonel Jerry D. Alderson, Jr.
Air Force

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-07 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

DCI/IC-75-0608
6 June 1975

Senstudy -75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals ~~of the USIB~~ Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Ninth Meeting, 4 June 1975

1. A meeting of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group was held on 4 June 1975 at 10:00 a.m. A list of attendees is attached.

2. The meeting was opened by Dr. Clarke who described the current activities of the Senate Select Committee in accelerating their official interviews with knowledgeable officials across the Community and the criticality of firming up agreements on how these interviews are to be handled. This has not been forthcoming despite White House interest. House Select Committee procedure is not yet clear.

3. The second item raised by the Chairman was the list of category II "abuses" which had been developed at the direction of the Policy Steering Group. The set developed was the result of discussions with Mr. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee, who plans to present a complete list of "category II" items to the Committee on Friday, 6 June. At that point, it is expected "notices" would go out to the Community agencies advising them so that agreed interview procedures will apply. It is also anticipated that the presence of private as well as Agency counsel will be addressed. The Policy Steering Group has accepted the principle of dealing with these identified "category II" subjects by assigning responsibility for gathering of comprehensive and paper preparation to specific individuals within the Community agencies. Dr. Clarke is the focal point for gathering the names of individuals who will assume these responsibilities. To date, individuals had been named for all subjects except those to be handled by CIA.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
JUN 16 1975

file-62-116395

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

84 JUN 17 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

4. In addition to the "category II" items, there are a number of additional subjects largely geographic in nature for which the DCI feels CIA should assume responsibility for preparing comprehensive papers. In view of the apparent adversary relationship between the Senate Select Committee Staff and the agencies under investigation, it may be that preparation of papers dealing comprehensively with specific subjects will deflect some of this cross-agency probing and result in a positive solution to problems before they arise.

5. The Chairman reminded the group of the responsibility which exists to keep Mr. Cotter of the Post Office Department informed on matters resulting from the Congressional investigations which will clearly impact on his agency's affairs. At present, the cross-agency character of the interviews now under way indicate a possible communication gap in adequately coordinating on postal matters.

6. The Chairman explained the DCI's action taken in late May to separate the responsibility for CIA's response to the Congressional Select Committees from those responsibilities of the IC Staff. Both Dr. Clarke and Mr. Elder emphasized the very close relationship which exists in the two efforts. Mr. Elder will represent CIA at all USIB Ad Hoc sessions henceforth.

7. The Chairman questioned Mr. Elder, the CIA representative, whether or not the Senate Select Committee had yet furnished the Agency with a list of subjects with which they plan to deal in depth. Mr. Elder reported they have not yet done so, but it is apparent that three items are of priority interest at the moment: assassinations, the Phoenix program, and covert action; that it appears clear the Committee is currently pursuing the question of authorities, approvals, and support from other agencies.

8. The 27 May request addressed to the DCI covering materials under the jurisdiction of a number of Community agencies was provided to the members of the Ad Hoc Group. Dr. Clarke indicated he was seeking policy guidance on selected items in the request which dealt with Community product such as NIE etc. He noted the 27 May request indicated identical letters were being forwarded to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Copies have been sent to all USIB Ad Hoc members, the NSC and the White House.

9. Copies of a memorandum which set forth the action items resulting from the Policy Steering Group session of last week were provided to the Ad Hoc members for their information.

10. Mr. Elder reported that the House Committee has indicated to CIA its intent to concentrate on specific issues, but as of now are not adequately organized to be specific in their requests. The one extant request forwarded to the CIA was posing some problems because of the lack of cleared personnel, approved storage facilities, and determinations on the ultimate disposition of records. The Chairman noted that concurrent with this meeting, a meeting of Community legal representatives was taking place with the purpose of commenting on the House Select Committee's proposed security regulations which have not yet been adopted.

11. CIA reported its success with the provision of a reading room for SSC Staff at CIA headquarters. State reported there were no comparable facilities anticipated there. Defense has provided badges to Staff members and reading facilities are available. The same accessability of materials is true at NSA and FBI.

12. The last subject on the agenda was the implementation of the Community Central Index. In the material provided to the group was a letter reaffirming the purposes of the Central Index and a list of 40 key words to be used in identifying material furnished the Index. A printout of the Index content was provided to the group as a review document only. The final format of such periodic reports has not yet been refined. Group members are encouraged to comment if they detect any problems with items in the printout. Forms for inputting information to the Central Index were also provided to the Group. This is a service of common concern which will assure the uniformity of information received and should serve to lighten the workload of the individual agencies. The telephone number of Mrs. Young of the Central Index was provided for agencies' convenience in accessing the Index information.

Harriett D. Mowitt

Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

6

DCI/IC-75-0116
6 June 1975

Senstudy-75

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1. The following list includes subjects to be covered by the Agencies concerned:

Assassinations	White House	Mr. Wilderotter IDS 145-7094
Drug Abuse	CIA	Not yet designated
Political Abuses (1964)	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609
Domestic Surveillance	Justice	John Martin IDS 187-4555
Electronic Surveillance and Warrantless Wiretap	Justice	George Calhoun IDS 187-4401
Use of Notional Organizations	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609
Use of Proprietary Organizations	CIA	Not yet designated
Mail Cover and Intercept	Justice	Phil White IDS 187-4674
Watch List	DoD	Benson Buffham, NSA 688-7222
Army Surveillance	DoD	Dr. David Cooke 695-4436

File 62-116395

62-116395-

5-1006

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 18 1975

84 JUN 13 1975

The individuals named on this list are those designated by the Agencies as having prime responsibility for preparing the paper. The papers should be delivered in two copies directly to the Associate Counsel to the President, Mr. James Wilderotter, Room 182, Old Executive Office Building, by the Agencies. In the course of the next week, a meeting will be called for Mr. Wilderotter to meet with the individuals designated on this list. Each Agency will also be responsible for naming a person to work with each Task Force leader where it is appropriate to the subject matter. In the interim, Task Force leaders should deal directly with the following people with respect to individual Agency responsibilities:

DCI/Intelligence Community	John Clarke IDS 143-5477
CIA	E. Henry Knoche IDS 143-4086
Defense	Tom Latimer IDS 11-54221
State	William Hyland IDS 101-20342
Treasury	William Morell IDS 184-2536
Justice	William O'Connor IDS 187-5211
FBI	William Cregar IDS 175-4636

2. The CIA has been coordinating internally the DCI's letter to the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and this letter should be available for Community review and consideration soon. Distribution of this letter will be made sometime prior to a meeting of the General Counsels chaired by Mr. Wilderotter to go over details of the letter and coordinate on the final language. This arrangement is consistent with agreements reached in our meeting on 3 June 1975.

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Distribution:

1 - Mr. Wilderotter
1 - Mr. Latimer
1 - Mr. Hyland
1 - Mr. Morell
1 - Mr. O'Connor
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - Mrs. Mowitt/Executive Secretary of Steering Group (IDS 143-4055)

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY PLAZA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/01 BY

Special Agent Seymor Phillips
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

6

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw ekw
(13)

For info only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR- Dept. of Justice. -11/22/76 JKB

Delivered 5/23/75 to K W O'Connor

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP16SKRG

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

REC-100

62-116395-225

17 JUN 16 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 17 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

62-116395

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S.F.Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP1GSK/lfg

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is the verbatim text of a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella who served as an SA of the FBI from July 12, 1948, until his retirement March 22, 1971. He is presently employed as Director of Safety, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia.

"Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

"Interview by Lester B. Siedel, (sic), representative of Senate Select Committee of Alan G. Sentinella. Interview commenced 12:24pm, terminated 2:20pm. Siedel at the outset identified self via credential as representative of aforementioned Committee.

"Mr. Siedel introduced by writer to Mr. Seymor Phillips of the FBI. The writer explained to Siedel that following his telephone conversation, 5/9/75, during which he stated he was interested in discussing matters related to the King and Levison cases it was felt that such discussion might involve issues currently sensitive to the Bureau. Accordingly the Atlanta Office was contacted and subsequently the writer was contacted by Robert Olmert of the Bureau. Mr. Olmert advised that if it was desired the Bureau would make available a representative not for the purpose of participating in the interview but to be available for advice. The

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw ekw
(13)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOS.

SEE NOTE PAGE TEN

62-116395-225

GPO 954-546

writer stated he was interested in obtaining such assistance. Accordingly during the morning of 5/12/75 Mr. Seymor Phillips contacted the writer.

"This is dictated immediately following interview by Siedel. No effort is herein made to follow the chronology of questions presented by Siedel. During the interview no notes or recording were made by writer. Will use "Q" for question and "A" for answer. Questions (Q) were asked by Siedel and answers (A) were given by writer.

"A: Was it correct that matters concerning the King investigation were discussed openly over coffee by members of the Atlanta field office?

"A: Matters relating to the King investigation were discussed by individuals concerned therewith. I have no recollection during the period I was connected with the investigation that it was discussed by everybody like the previous night's ballgame might have been.

"Q: Shortly after King received the Nobel Prize did a Bureau official William Sullivan come to Atlanta?

"A: It is my recollection King received the Nobel Prize sometime before the case was assigned to me. I do not remember if Bureau official William Sullivan visited Atlanta.

"Q: Did Sullivan have any contact with Ralph McGill concerning King?

"A: I do not know.

"Q: Were taps (telephone) and bugs (microphone) used by Atlanta in connection with King?

"A: A tap (telephone) was utilized re King at his SCLC office and his residence.

"Q: When were the bugs (microphone) utilized?

"A: There were none.

"Q: What was the purpose of the investigation of King?

"A: To determine whether King and/or SCLC were influenced by persons or groups having communist tendencies.

"Q: Did you feel the investigation was worthwhile?

"A: I don't recall that I ever asked myself that question. It was an assignment made by my employer and my responsibility to handle it.

"Q: How did other agents feel about the illegal use of these taps?

"A: The taps were not illegal. They were obtained through the authority of the Attorney General.

"Q: Did any agents express the opinion that these investigations were improper?

"A: I do not recall specifically although Mr. Murtaugh (sic) may well have so stated.

"Q: What electronic surveillance was used concerning Levison?

"A: I do not know. Levison resided in New York City.

"Q: Was Levison covered by the tap on King?

"A: Only to the extent that he was in contact with King. There was no tap on Levison per se in Atlanta.

"Q: Was there any physical surveillance of King?

"A: I do not recall any physical surveillance of King as such. There was surveillance conducted of individuals in contact with King and consequently King would obviously have been physically surveilled. But such surveillance was not on King directly.

"Q. Did you participate in these surveillances?

"A: Yes on several occasions.

"Q: How many occasions?

"A: I cannot recall.

"Q: How long were you in Atlanta?

"A: August 1960 - March 1971.

"Q: What other offices did you serve in and when?

"A: Baltimore, September 1948 - January 1949; Buffalo, January 1949 - August 1960; Atlanta, August 1960 - March 1971.

"Q: Where were you born?

"A: London, England.

"Q: How long did you live there?

"A: 9 years.

"Q: Where did you live first when in this country?

"A: In New Jersey approximately one year. I spent most of my growing up time in Iowa.

"Q: You entered the Bureau July 1948 and left in March 1971?

"A: That is correct.

"Q: When was the King and SCLC case assigned to you?

"A: I believe it was the early part or spring of 1965.

"Q: How long had the investigation been going on before you got the case?

"A: I really am not sure - possibly a year; it might have been longer.

"A: How long did the investigation continue?

"A: I cannot actually recall.

"Q: Was it still going on when you left the Bureau?

"A: Yes, regarding the SCLC.

"Q: How long after King's death did the tap remain?

"A: I cannot be sure. It seems as though it was discontinued a short time after, however I believe it continued for a longer period of time on the SCLC.

"Q: Did you have any contact with news media or clergy regarding King, SCLC, or Levison?

"A: No.

"Q: What relationship was there with the Atlanta Police Department and what electronic surveillance did it have of King, SCLC, or Levison?

"A: Throughtout my entire period as agent in Atlanta I never had any information as to what electronic surveillance may have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison there was no discussion to my knowledge of these matters with the Atlanta Police Department. Generally speaking the rapport with the police department was good.

"Q: Did you monitor the taps on King, SCLC?

"A: No.

"Q: What squad were you assigned to in the Atlanta Office?

"A: Security. More correctly it was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad.

"Q: Who else was assigned to this squad? Was there a man named Harding?

"A: Yes.

"Q: What was his first name?

"A: Charles.

"A: Who else was assigned?

"A: Your friend Murtaugh, a Richard Davis.

"At this point the writer stated he preferred not to name additional personnel simply because he did not wish to feel that they might subsequently be interviewed as a result. The writer stated he was confident that Siedel or his agency had already been furnished all of these names by Mr. Murtaugh. He was informed that in the writer's opinion the Bureau was fully able and capable of furnishing this information. Siedel opined it would be a waste of government money to subpoena the writer to Washington in order to obtain these names.

"Q: Did you develop any evidence relating to Levison's CP connections?

"A: No.

"Q: Did you read reports from New York regarding Levison?

"A: Yes.

"Q: Did those reports set forth information from taps and bugs?

"A: The reports did not state source of information.

"Q: Did you know the information came from taps (or bugs)?

"A: I did not know directly but presumed that it did.

"Q: What type of work was the Security Squad in Atlanta concerned with?

"A: That squad primarily handled matters in the security category, racial matters, and also civil rights matters.

"Q: What kind of matters constituted racial matters besides SCLC?

"A: The investigation of SCLC was not a racial matter. It was concerned with possible communist influence of the organization. The Ku Klux Klan was a racial matter because it involved pressures between white and black persons.

"Q: What organizations or individuals were investigated in the security category?

"A: I have had no contact with Bureau matters for over four years. At this time I have no knowledge what effect my answer to your question might have upon the current status of any matter of concern to the Bureau.

"Siedel essentially repeated his question and endeavored to explain that he had no desire to affect the Bureau's investigative status.

"The writer advised his answer to the question remained as above. At this point Siedel suggested the writer might wish to consult Mr. Phillips which was done.

"Writer consulted privately with Phillips. After which Phillips entered the writer's office and told Siedel that if he was seeking the Bureau's policy relative to security, racial and civil rights investigations, same was in the Bureau's manuals available to the Committee. At this point Siedel said he was not after policy but names of specific persons and organizations the writer would now recall were under investigation.

"The writer restated former answer to this question and explained to Siedel that he did not consider himself so

naive to suppose that any of the information given to Siedel would not at some future time appear in print. To which Siedel stated he would not be personally responsible therefore. Siedel was informed the writer was not necessarily stating he would be personally responsible therefore. Siedel pointed out that he could not require a different answer to this question at the present time but went on to explain the writer could be subpoenaed for this purpose for open or closed testimony.

"Q: During the course of these investigations did you ever alter or fabricate any document previously prepared?

"A: No.

"Q: Do you know of such having been done in the Atlanta Office?

"A: No.

"Q: Do you know of a tape recording pertaining to King which was sent to Mrs. King?

"A: Not during that period. It seems I might have heard such an allegation but there has been so much material news media wise the past year or two, I actually cannot be sure whether I read of such an allegation or might have heard it said. In any case so far as I am concerned it was hearsay.

"Q: What was your participation in COINTELPRO investigations and what did they cover while you were in the Atlanta Office?

"A: I left the Bureau over four years ago and have absolutely no knowledge of what might be the present status of any investigation by the Bureau past or present. I feel very strongly that any answer I might give could conceivably adversely affect the Bureau's investigative position. For this reason I decline to discuss this matter.

Siedel stated the Bureau had recently stated it had discontinued COINTELPRO. The writer advised he was not aware of this; that his answer above remained the same.

"Q: Do you know of any effort by the Bureau to influence a political campaign?

"A: No."

In addition to the foregoing verbatim statement, Sentinella also voluntarily furnished to the FBI several observations, the following of which may be of interest:

"1. Siedel obviously was attempting to verify allegations made by other individuals.

"2. All of his questions appeared to have been previously prepared in writing.

"3. At one point he commented he was conducting this interview for a colleague (not named).

"4. Siedel did not appear satisfied with the results of the interview. It is presumed he considers the writer's cooperation to be minimal.

"5. As Siedel prepared to depart he was informed that during 23 years as an agent the writer suffered some adverse administrative action; that these ultimately proved to be experiences from which the writer profited. He was told the writer had "no axe to grind" regarding the Bureau and no intent or desire to accomplish any questionable literary fame."

The individual who interviewed Sentinella was SSC Staff Member Lester B. Seidel, not Siedel, as indicated in Sentinella's statement.

The King referred to in Sentinella's statement is the late Martin Luther King, Jr., subject of prior investigation by the FBI. The Levison referred to is Stanley David Levison, also subject of prior FBI investigation. The SCLC referred to is the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, an organization which was headed by King. The Murtaugh referred to is Arthur Leo Murtagh who was an SA of the FBI from April 16, 1951, until his retirement on September 25, 1971.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)

NOTE:

Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentinella's verbatim statement and from a separate statement containing his observations, both of which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The procedure of furnishing the AG an extra copy for forwarding to Wilderotter has been established through liaison by P. V. Daly of the Legal Counsel's Office with the AG's Office.

Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

Interview by Lester B. Siedel, (sic), representative of Senate Select Committee of Alan G. Sentinella. Interview commenced 12:24pm, terminated 2:20pm. Siedel at the outset identified self via credential as representative of aforementioned Committee.

Mr. Siedel introduced by writer to Mr. Seymor Phillips of the FBI. The writer explained to Siedel that following his telephone conversation, 5/9/75, during which he stated he was interested in discussing matters related to the King and Levison cases it was felt that such discussion might involve issues currently sensitive to the Bureau. Accordingly the Atlanta Office was contacted and subsequently the writer was contacted by Robert Olmert of the Bureau. Mr. Olmert advised that if it was desired the Bureau would make available a representative not for the purpose of participating in the interview but to be available for advice. The writer stated he was interested in obtaining such assistance. Accordingly during the morning of 5/12/75 Mr. Seymor Phillips contacted the writer.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/84 BY SP2ALM/ew

This is dictated immediately following interview by Siedel. No effort is herein made to follow the chronology of questions presented by Siedel. During the interview no notes or recording were made by writer. Will use "Q" for question and "A" for answer. Questions (Q) were asked by Siedel and answers (A) were given by writer.

Orig to AAG w/ 2H/M 5/22/75
SFP/skw

A: Was it correct that matters concerning the King investigation were discussed openly over coffee by members of the Atlanta field office?

A: Matters relating to the King investigation were discussed by individuals concerned therewith. I have no recollection during the period I was connected with the investigation that it was discussed by everybody like the previous night's ballgame might have been.

62-116395-225

Q: Shortly after King received the Nobel Prize did a Bureau official William Sullivan come to Atlanta?

A: It is my recollection King received the Nobel Prize sometime before the case was assigned to me. I do not remember if Bureau official William Sullivan visited Atlanta.

Q: Did Sullivan have any contact with Ralph McGill concerning King?

A: I do not know.

Q: Were taps (telephone) and bugs (microphone) used by Atlanta in connection with King?

A: A tap (telephone) was utilized re King at his SCLC office and his residence.

Q: When were the bugs (microphone) utilized?

A: There were none.

Q: What was the purpose of the investigation of King?

A: To determine whether King and/or SCLC were influenced by persons or groups having communist tendencies.

Q: Did you feel the investigation was worthwhile?

A: I don't recall that I ever asked myself that question. It was an assignment made by my employer and my responsibility to handle it.

Q: How did other agents feel about the illegal use of these taps?

A: The taps were not illegal. They were obtained through the authority of the Attorney General.

Q: Did any agents express the opinion that these investigations were improper?

A: I do not recall specifically although Mr. Murtaugh may well have so stated.

Q: What electronic surveillance was used concerning Levison?

A: I do not know. Levison resided in New York City.

Q: Was Levison covered by the tap on King?

A: Only to the extent that he was in contact with King. There was no tap on Levison per se in Atlanta.

Q: Was there any physical surveillance of King?

A: I do not recall any physical surveillance of King as such. There was surveillance conducted of individuals in contact with King and consequently King would obviously have been physically surveilled. But such surveillance was not on King directly.

Q: Did you participate in these surveillances?

A: Yes on several occasions.

Q: How many occasions?

A: I cannot recall.

Q: How long were you in Atlanta?

A: August 1960 - March 1971.

Q: What other offices did you serve in and when?

A: Baltimore, September 1948 - January 1949; Buffalo, January 1949 - August 1960; Atlanta, August 1960 - March 1971.

Q: Where were you born?

A: London, England.

Q: How long did you live there?

A: 9 years.

Q: Where did you live first when in this country?

A: In New Jersey approximately one year. I spent most of my growing up time in Iowa.

Q: You entered the Bureau July 1948 and left in March 1971?

A: That is correct.

Q: When was the King and SCLC case assigned to you?

A: I believe it was the early part or spring of 1965.

Q: How long had the investigation been going on before you got the case?

A: I really am not sure - possibly a year; it might have been longer.

A: How long did the investigation continue?

A: I cannot actually recall.

Q: Was it still going on when you left the Bureau?

A: Yes, regarding the SCLC.

Q: How long after King's death did the tap remain?

A: I cannot be sure. It seems as though it was discontinued a short time after, however I believe it continued for a longer period of time on the SCLC.

Q: Did you have any contact with news media or clergy regarding King, SCLC, or Levison?

A: No.

Q: What relationship was there with the Atlanta Police Department and what electronic surveillance did it have of King, SCLC, or Levison?

A: Throughtout my entire period as agent in Atlanta I never had any information as to what electronic surveillance may have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison there was no discussion to my knowledge of these matters with the Atlanta Police Department. Generally speaking the rapport with the police department was good.

Q: Did you monitor the taps on King, SCLC?

A: No.

Q: What squad were you assigned to in the Atlanta Office?

A: Security. More correctly it was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad.

Q: Who else was assigned to this squad? Was there a man named Harding?

A: Yes.

Q: What was his first name?

A: Charles.

A: Who else was assigned?

A: Your friend Murtaugh, a Richard Davis.

At this point the writer stated he preferred not to name additional personnel simply because he did not wish to feel that they might subsequently be interviewed as a result. The writer stated he was confident that Siedel or his agency had already been furnished all of these names by Mr. Murtaugh. He was informed that in the writer's opinion the Bureau was fully able and capable of furnishing this information. Siedel opined it would be a waste of government money to subpoena the writer to Washington in order to obtain these names.

Q: Did you develop any evidence relating to Levison's CP connections?

A: No.

Q: Did you read reports from New York regarding Levison?

A: Yes.

Q: Did these reports set forth information from taps and bugs?

A: The reports did not state source of information.

Q: Did you know the information came from taps (or bugs)?

A: I did not know directly but presumed that it did.

Q: What type of work was the Security Squad in Atlanta concerned with?

A: That squad primarily handled matters in the security category, racial matters, and also civil rights matters.

Q: What kind of matters constituted racial matters besides SCLC?

A: The investigation of SCLC was not a racial matter. It was concerned with possible communist influence of the organization. The Ku Klux Klan was a racial matter because it involved pressures between white and black persons.

Q: What organizations or individuals were investigated in the security category?

A: I have had no contact with Bureau matters for over four years. At this time I have no knowledge what effect my answer to your question might have upon the current status of any matter of concern to the Bureau.

Siedel essentially repeated his question and endeavored to explain that he had no desire to affect the Bureau's investigative status.

The writer advised his answer to the question remained as above. At this point Siedel suggested the writer might wish to consult Mr. Phillips which was done.

Writer consulted privately with Phillips. After which Phillips entered the writer's office and told Siedel that if he was seeking the Bureau's policy relative to security, racial and civil rights investigations, same was in the Bureau's manuals available to the Committee. At this point Siedel said he was not after policy but names of specific persons and organizations the writer would now recall were under investigation.

The writer restated former answer to this question and explained to Siedel that he did not consider himself so naive to suppose that any of the information given to Siedel would not at some future time appear in print. To which Siedel stated he would not be personally responsible therefore. Siedel was informed the writer was not necessarily stating he would be personally responsible therefore. Siedel pointed out that he could not require a different answer to this question at the present time but went on to explain the writer

could be subpoenaed for this purpose for open or closed testimony.

Q: During the course of these investigations did you ever alter or fabricate any document previously prepared?

A: No.

Q: Do you know of such having been done in the Atlanta Office?

A: No.

Q: Do you know of a tape recording pertaining to King which was sent to Mrs. King?

A: Not during that period. It seems I might have heard such an allegation but there has been so much material news media wise the past year or two, I actually cannot be sure whether I read of such an allegation or might have heard it said. In any case so far as I am concerned it was hearsay.

Q: What was your participation in COINTELPRO investigations and what did they cover while you were in the Atlanta Office?

A: I left the Bureau over four years ago and have absolutely no knowledge of what might be the present status of any investigation by the Bureau past or present. I feel very strongly that any answer I might give could conceivably adversely effect the Bureau's investigative position. For this reason I decline to discuss this matter.

Siedel stated the Bureau had recently stated it had discontinued COINTELPRO. The writer advised he was not aware of this; that his answer above remained the same.

Q: Do you know of any effort by the Bureau to influence a political campaign?

A: No.

Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

WRITER'S OBSERVATIONS

1. Siedel obviously was attempting to verify allegations made by other individuals.

2. All of his questions appeared to have been previously prepared in writing.

3. At one point he commented he was conducting this interview for a colleague (not named).

4. Siedel did not appear satisfied with the results of the interview. It is presumed he considers the writer's cooperation to be minimal.

5. As Siedel prepared to depart he was informed that during 23 years as an agent the writer suffered some adverse administrative action; that these ultimately proved to be experiences from which the writer profited. He was told the writer had "no axe to grind" regarding the Bureau and no intent or desire to accomplish any questionable literary fame."

6. Upon departing Siedel inquired as to the proximity of the Equitable Building (office building) and the First National Bank of Atlanta (also office building). Any significance to these locations was not apparent to the writer. When informed that banking hours terminated at 4:00pm Siedel made no comment.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 22 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR004 AP PLAIN

6:03PM NITEL 5-22-75 FXH

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ALBUQUERQUE (66-1029)

SENSTUDY 1975.

REMYTELCALL, MAY 22, 1975.

ON MAY 21, 1975, SAM PAPICH, DIRECTOR, NEW MEXICO GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME (FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, FBI), ADVISED HE IS TO APPEAR BEFORE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., ON THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1975.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

EX-108

REC-25 62-116395-224

JUN 10 1975

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Records

cc 67-176751 (Papich)

RKL

X ROX
JUN 16 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

JUN 2 3 1975

On this envelope

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/eu

62-116395-223

ENCLOSURE

FD-291 (Rev. 11-1-73)

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure or production of national security information, other classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is in a better position than I to make that determination;

(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-29-01 BY

____
(Signature)

____
(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

________________ , 19 ____ , by ________________________________ .
(Signature)

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1970
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F.P.M. CHAPTER 295
61-107

OMB APPROVAL NO. 50-R0118

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

(*Position to which appointed*) (*Date of appointment*)

JUSTICE FBI WASHINGTON, D. C.

(*Department or agency*) (*Bureau or division*) (*Place of employment*)

I, ______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing this appointment.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

(*Signature of appointee*)

Subscribed and sworn (or affirmed) before me this ______ day of ______ A.D. 19____,

at ______ WASHINGTON, D. C.

(*City*) (*State*)

[SEAL]

(*Signature of officer*)

Commission expires ______
(If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown)

(*Title*)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U.S.C. 2903. The words "So help me God" in the oath and the word "swear" wherever it appears above should be stricken out when the appointee elects to affirm rather than swear to the affidavits; only these words may be stricken and only when the appointee elects to affirm the affidavits.*

GPO : 1970 O - 408-925

3-26 (Rev. 3-20-64)

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

(Place) ______________________

(Date) ______________________

Dear Sir:

Having received an appointment for a position as Special Agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, I hereby **agree and affirm** that I shall be governed by the following **conditions:**

1. I am required to proceed at my own expense to Washington, D. C., where I shall take the oath of office and enter on duty.
2. That my appointment is a probationary one.
3. That I shall remain on duty for a minimum period of three years, contingent upon a satisfactory work record.
4. That my retention in the Federal Bureau of Investigation is dependent upon the performance of satisfactory services, and if my services are deemed unsatisfactory it is understood that my employment may be discontinued at any time and that I shall not receive transportation to my home, or to any other point, at Government expense.
5. I may be sent to any part of the continental or territorial United States that the exigencies of the Bureau's work may require; that my headquarters may be fixed in some jurisdiction other than that in which I have heretofore resided; that my headquarters may be changed as the work of the Bureau may require and that no transfer will be made from one station to another for personal reasons.
6. That the **confidential character** of the relations of the employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the public is fully understood by me, and that the **strictly confidential character** of **any and all information secured by me,** in connection directly or indirectly with my work as a Special Agent, or the work of other employees of which I may become cognizant, is fully understood by me, and that **neither during my tenure of service** with the Federal Bureau of Investigation **nor at any other time shall I violate this confidence,** and **I agree and affirm** that I shall **not divulge** any information of any kind or character whatsoever that may become known to me, to persons **not officially entitled** thereto at any time.

I understand all of the foregoing and the conditions specified herein are agreeable to me **without reservation of any kind. I agree and affirm** that I shall abide by the foregoing conditions, and I am fully cognizant that the provisions mentioned above are to be complied with by me and they are a **part of my appointment.**

Very truly yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

FD-375 (Rev. 8-28-72)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Date:

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20535

TRAINING AGREEMENT

In consideration for the following specialized training which will result in considerable time and expense to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), I, ______________________________, agree to remain in the service of the FBI (or Department of Justice, as to final item below) for the time specified, contingent upon my maintaining a satisfactory work record.

☐ So that I may receive training in **classifying, searching, and filing of fingerprints,** I agree to remain in the service of the FBI performing fingerprint duties for at least one year from this date. I understand that I may be assigned, consistent with the demands of the service, to work at night.

☐ So that I may receive training in ☐ **stenographic** ☐ **typing skills,** I agree to remain in the FBI for a minimum of one year after completion of training. In addition, I agree to accept any assignment in any division at FBIHQ or Washington Field Office consistent with such needs for my services.

☐ So that I may receive training in ☐ **automatic data processing equipment** ☐ **cryptanalytics,** I agree to remain in the FBI one year after completion of formal training.

☐ So that I may receive training in a **foreign language,** I agree to remain in the FBI for three years after I successfully complete this training.

☐ So that I may receive **advanced training in maintenance and repair of FM radio equipment,** I agree to remain in the service of the FBI for at least one year following completion of the training.

☐ So that I may receive training under the Government Employees Training Act to be given me at ______________________________, I agree to remain in the Department of Justice for a minimum of ______________________________ after completion of training. If I voluntarily leave the Department before expiration of that period, I will pay the Government the amount of the additional expenses paid by it for the above-mentioned training.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-29-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

____
Signature

Application for Employment
FD-140 (Rev. 10-16-73)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date

NOTICE: Application must be typewritten or clearly printed in black ink. All questions must be answered, if applicable. If not, indicate NA (not applicable). Applications which are not complete and legible will not be considered. **If space provided is not sufficient for complete answers, or you wish to furnish additional information, attach sheets of the same size as this application, and number answers to correspond with questions.**

Check Position Applied For:

☐ Special Agent
☐ Special Agent (Accountant)
☐ Radio Maintenance Technician*
☐ Laboratory Aid or Technician
☐ Translator
☐ Nurse
☐ Clerk-Stenographer
☐ Clerk-Typist
☐ Clerk (See Item 4, page 2 on Fingerprint Clerk position)
☐ Other ______

* Applicants for this position must complete "Questionnaire for Radio Maintenance Technician Position."

1. PERSONAL HISTORY

a. Name in full (Last, first, middle)

b. Social Security Number

c. List all other names you have used including nicknames; if female, furnish maiden name. If you have ever used any surnames other than your true name, during what period and under what circumstances were these names used? If you have ever legally changed your name, give date, place, and court.

d. Birth date (Month, day, year)

Place of birth

e. Are you a U. S. citizen? ☐ Yes ☐ No Naturalized? ☐ Yes ☐ No Derivative? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Naturalization # ______ ______ Place Date Court

Explain derivative citizenship ______

2. MARITAL STATUS

☐ Single ☐ Married ______ Date ______ Place of Marriage No. of Children ______

☐ Widowed ☐ Divorced ☐ Separated ______ Date ______ Place of Divorce or Legal Separation ______ Court (See Section 13k)

3. RESIDENCES

a. Present Residence Address: (Apartment, street, city, state, zip code)

Telephone Numbers:
Residence ______
Business ______

b. Complete address to which you wish mail or telegram sent (include zip code and telephone number if different from above)

c. List chronologically **ALL** of your residences in the past 10 years (include addresses while attending school if away from home and all military addresses including any off military base).

Dates						Apt. #	Street Address	City	State
From			To						
Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo	Day	Yr.				

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is an equal opportunity employer.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rc

4. AVAILABILITY OF APPLICANT

a. Have you previously submitted an application for employment with the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
☐ No ☐ Yes Date ________ Place ________

b. Are you willing to proceed to Washington, D. C., or other duty station, at your own expense? ☐ Yes ☐ No

c. Will you accept a lesser position if no vacancy exists or you fail to qualify for the position sought? ☐ Yes ☐ No

d. Are you interested in appointment as Fingerprint Clerk GS 3 at Washington, D. C.?
☐ Yes ☐ No You must understand that regardless of preference, appointment may be as Fingerprint Clerk GS 3 or Clerk GS 2 since assignments must be based on qualifications of appointees and vacancies.

e. If appointed to a clerical position, I am willing to serve a minimum period of one year. ☐ Yes ☐ No

f. If appointed as a Special Agent or Radio Maintenance Technician, are you willing and prepared to accept assignment or transfer to any part of the United States or Puerto Rico for either temporary or permanent duration? ☐ Yes ☐ No

g. If appointed as a Special Agent, I agree to serve a minimum period of three years and completely understand that I must be available for assignment wherever my services are needed. ☐ Yes ☐ No

h. Earliest date available for employment.

i. How much notice of reporting date do you need?

5. EDUCATION

a. Name of School	Location	Dates						Course Pursued	Degrees or Diplomas
		From			To				
		Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Yr.		
High Schools									
Colleges									
Graduate School									
Miscellaneous									

b. Were you ever dismissed from a school, or was any disciplinary action including scholastic probation ever taken against you during your scholastic career?

☐ No ☐ Yes ________ School ________ Date ________ Type of Action

c. **List awards, honors, citations, positions held in school organizations, athletic endeavors, and any other special recognition you received while attending school.**

d. **List any special abilities, interests, sports or hobbies with degree of proficiency.**

e. Indicate your proficiency in each phase of each **foreign language** listed as "slight," "good," "fluent."

Name of Language	Speak	Understand	Read	Write

f. Are you a **member of the bar?**
☐ No ☐ Yes Date(s) ________ State(s) ________

g. Are you a **certified public accountant?**
☐ No ☐ Yes Date(s) ________ State(s) ________

h. Are you a **licensed automobile operator?**
☐ No ☐ Yes State(s) ________

Driver's License # ________

6. EMPLOYMENT

List chronologically all employments, including summer and part-time employments while attending school. All time must be accounted for. **If unemployed for a period, indicate, setting forth dates of unemployment.**

Name and Address of Employer	Dates						Salary	Position and Kind of Work	Name of Supervisor	Reason for Leaving
	From			To						
	Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Yr.				
a. Name										
Address										
City & State										

6. EMPLOYMENT

List chronologically all employments, including summer and part-time employments while attending school. All time must be accounted for. **If unemployed for a period, indicate, setting forth dates of unemployment.**

Name and Address of Employer	Dates						Salary	Position and Kind of Work	Name of Supervisor	Reason for Leaving
	From			To						
	Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Yr.				
b. Name Address City & State										
c. Name Address City & State										
d. Name Address City & State										
e. Name Address City & State										
f. Name Address City & State										

g. Have you ever been dismissed or asked to resign from any employment or position you have held? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Employer's Name ______ Date ______ Reason ______

h. Are you now or have you ever been employed by an agency of the Federal Government? (Include part-time employment.) ☐ No ☐ Yes

From ______ To ______ Agency ______ Location ______

i. Do you have any sources of income other than your salary or that of your spouse? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Specify each with amount ______

7. MILITARY RECORD

a. Are you registered for Selective Service? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Selective Service # ______ Lottery # ______ Local Board # ______ City ______ State ______

b. What is your current classification?

Have you received any notice indicating you may be called into the Armed Forces in the near future? ☐ No ☐ Yes

If so, give approximate date.

c. If ever classified 1-Y (registrant qualified for military service only in time of war or national emergency) or 4-F (registrant not qualified for any military service), furnish reasons.

d. Have you ever served on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Highest rank attained ______ Date commissioned, if applicable ______

e. Branch of military service

f. Serial number

g. Dates of active duty (month, day & year)

From To

h. Type of Discharge

Basis for Discharge

i. Member of Reserve? ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ Ready ☐ Standby

Service Branch ______

j. Was any type of disciplinary action taken against you in the service?
☐ No ☐ Yes Nature of:

k. National Guard ☐ Present ☐ Former ☐ None
If you attend drills, meetings, or camps, give name of unit and location.
Summer camp attendance: From ________ To ________
Where ________

l. Do you claim veterans preference? ☐ No ☐ Yes Basis: ☐ Active duty between 12-7-41 and 7-1-55 ☐ Active duty subsequent to 1-31-55 in excess of 180 consecutive days ☐ Service-connected disability ☐ Wife ☐ Widow ☐ Mother

8. REFERENCES

Give three references (not relatives, former or present employers, fellow employees or school teachers) who are responsible adults of reputable standing in their communities, such as property owners, business or professional men or women including your physician, if you have one, who have known you well for at least five years, preferably those who have known you during the past five years. If retired, give former occupation.

Complete name		Addresses: Residence ________
No. yrs. acq.	Occupation	Business ________
Complete name		Addresses: Residence ________
No. yrs. acq.	Occupation	Business ________
Complete name		Addresses: Residence ________
No. yrs. acq.	Occupation	Business ________

Give three social acquaintances in your own age group including both sexes.

Complete name		Addresses: Residence ________
No. yrs. acq.	School or Occupation	School or Business ________
Complete name		Addresses: Residence ________
No. yrs. acq.	School or Occupation	School or Business ________
Complete name		Addresses: Residence: ________
No. yrs. acq.	School or Occupation	School or Business ________

9. FOREIGN TRAVEL - (MILITARY SERVICE, RESIDENCE, VISIT)

a. Have you ever visited or resided in any foreign country (including travel in the Armed Forces of the U. S.)? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Passport # ________ Date issued ________ Place issued ________

Countries Visited	Dates						Reason for Travel
	From			To			
	Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Yr.	

b. Have you ever served in the Armed Forces of a foreign country? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(Specify countries; dates)

c. Do you or any members of your immediate family, including in-laws, have any relatives now residing outside the United States (except those in the Armed Forces of the United States or those employed by the United States Government living abroad)? ☐ No ☐ Yes. If so, list below and furnish degree of association and contact you and members of your immediate family have with these relatives.

Name	Relation	Age	City	Country	Citizen of what Country

10. CREDIT RECORD

a. Has your credit record ever been considered unsatisfactory, or have you ever been refused credit? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If "yes," give dates, places, names of creditors and circumstances.)

b. Are you indebted to anyone? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(List any debt over $100. Also list any debt, regardless of the amount, where payment is past due.)

Creditor	Address	Amount	Loan or Acct. #

11. COURT RECORD

a. Have you ever been arrested or charged with any violation including traffic, but not parking tickets? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(List all such matters even if not formally charged, or no court appearance, or found not guilty, or matter settled by payment of fine or forfeiture of collateral.)

Date	Place and Department	Charge	Final disposition	Details

b. Has any member of your family or close relative (including in-laws) ever been arrested for other than traffic violations? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Name	Relation	Date	Place	Charge	Final Disposition

c. Have you ever been a plaintiff or defendant in a court action including divorce actions? ☐ No ☐ Yes (Give date, place, court, names of parties involved, nature of action, and final disposition.)

12. ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP

a. Are you now, or have you ever been a member of any club, society or organization? ☐ No ☐ Yes. If yes, list below, do not abbreviate.

Name	City and State	Former	Present (List position held and extent of activity)

b. Are you now, or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., or any communist or fascist organization? ☐ No ☐ Yes

c. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If answer to any of these is "Yes," explain fully.)

13. RELATIVES

All applicants must give complete information concerning their relatives. If you have been married more than once, give the requested information concerning each former husband or wife. Furnish similar information, including date and place of action, for any members of your immediate family who have been divorced. Even though a relative is deceased, give all the information requested, and indicate last residence and year of death. Include stepbrothers and sisters, half brothers and sisters. If you or your spouse have stepparents, legal guardians or others who have reared you instead of your parents, the requested information should be furnished concerning them, as well as your real parents. If you are engaged to be married or contemplating marriage in the near future, complete information must be included under sections c, h, i and j regarding your future husband or wife and future in-laws, and clearly show that such relationship is a future one.

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address		Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
a. Father			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
b. Mother (Include maiden name)			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
c. Wife or Husband (If wife, include maiden name)			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
d. Children			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
Name			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
Name			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
e. Brothers Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
f. Sisters Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
g. Wives (including maiden names) and Husbands of Brothers & Sisters Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
g. Wives and Husbands of Brothers & Sisters (Continued) Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
h. Father-in-law Address Birth date Place of birth		
i. Mother-in-law (Include maiden name) Address Birth date Place of birth		
j. Brothers & Sisters of your Husband or Wife Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
j. Brothers & Sisters of your Husband or Wife (Continued) Address Birth date Place of birth		
k. Other relatives with whom you have resided for an extended period of time (indicate relation, including name and present location of ex-spouses) Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		

14. RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY THE GOVERNMENT

List the complete names of any of your close relatives (including in-laws) who are employed in the Federal Government.

Complete Name	Relation	Agency by which Employed	Location

15. FRIENDS OR ACQUAINTANCES EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Complete Name	Location	Length of Acquaintance

16. RELATIVES FORMERLY EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Complete Name under which Employed	Current Address	Relationship

ALL APPLICANTS

Attach an unmounted full face photograph of yourself, not larger than 2¾ x 2½ inches. Print your name plainly on the back of the photograph. The photograph must have been taken not more than 3 months prior to the date of this application.

17. PHYSICAL DATA

a. Height without shoes

Weight without clothes

b. Do you now have or have you ever had any of the following: nervous, mental, or emotional disorder of any sort; tuberculosis; epilepsy, fainting spells or severe headaches; diabetes; ulcers; rheumatic fever or heart disease; or asthma? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes" identify, describe, and give dates)

c. Do you now have or have you ever had any chronic or serious illnesses; or have you ever had any serious operations or injuries? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes" describe and give dates)

d. Have you ever been hospitalized? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Dates			Hospital	Location	Reason
Mo.	Day	Yr.			

e. Describe any past or present physical handicap, defect, or disability not previously covered, but including extent of defective vision, if any, with and without glasses (Snellen) and deficiencies in color vision and hearing.

f. How many days have you lost from work or school due to illness during the past five years?

Nature of illness(es)

g. Have you ever received, is there pending, have you applied for, or do you intend to apply for pension or compensation for existing disability? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes," specify what kind, granted by whom, and what amount, when, why. If applicable, include Veterans' Administration claim number.)

h. Special Agent Applicants Only: Do you have any physical defects such as, but not limited to, a bone, joint, or other deformity or loss of finger, which would preclude unrestricted, regular participation in all phases of the FBI's firearms training, physical training and defensive tactics? ☐ No ☐ Yes (If "yes" describe)

I understand that all appointments are probationary for a period of one year during which I must demonstrate my fitness for continued employment by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I also understand that, in many parts of the Bureau, it has been necessary to establish regular night and midnight shifts in view of which I must be available for such assignments as the needs might require. I further understand that any appointment tendered me will be contingent upon the results of a complete character and fitness investigation, and I am aware that wilfully withholding information or making false statements on this application will be the basis for dismissal from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and constitutes a violation of Section 1001, Title 18, U. S. Code. I agree to these conditions and I hereby certify that all statements made by me on this application are true and complete, to the best of my knowledge.

Signature of Applicant as Usually Written (Do not use nickname)

GPO: 1974 - 538-864

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/4/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt. Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities; Re:Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance;Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs; Policies and Procedures

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6/9/75

Received by:

Title: Prof. staff member

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-[illegible]-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh

The Attorney General

June 4, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and enclosures which constitute a partial response covering a number of the requests set forth in referenced letter and its appendices. A copy of this memorandum and of the enclosures thereto are submitted for your records.

Enclosures - 12

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SFP:FMK:rbs/fmk
(10)

REC-100 62-116395-323

17 JUN 13 1975

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

84 JUN 16 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. [illegible].A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

June 4, 1975

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

OTHER SPECIFIC FBI PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, and appendices thereto, which requested certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendices C and D contain requests for the current office of assignment or last known address for a number of FBI employees. Set out below under appropriate headings relating to the specific request headings and numbers is the desired information, as well as information concerning the tenure of FBI service of all the employees involved.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

Appendix C - Item 30

a.) Leo Badgley App, Jr.
Entered on duty (EOD) as Special Agent (SA), June 17, 1957
Assigned Portland Field Office (FO) since December 1, 1959

b.) Edgar O. Ingalls, Jr. (Ingles on your request)
EOD as SA, March 21, 1966
Assigned Portland FO since August 7, 1970

Appendix D - Item 11

a.) Robert L. Tagg
EOD as SA, November 8, 1950
Assigned Omaha FO since January 19, 1973

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-283

SFP:FMK:rbs/fmk
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 5

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

b.) John D. Meade
EOD as SA, January 29, 1951
Assigned Philadelphia FO since January 17, 1966

c.) Bill D. Williams (Billie on your request)
EOD as SA, February 4, 1952
Assigned Special Agent in Charge, Kansas City FO
since December 17, 1974

d.) John J. Creamer, Jr.
EOD as SA, September 13, 1954
Assigned Assistant Special Agent in Charge,
Little Rock FO since May 1, 1975

e.) John J. Connolly
EOD as SA, July 7, 1947
Assigned Newark FO since March 30, 1963

f.) Marjorie Ann Mierzejewski (Miermejewski on your request)
EOD June 26, 1961
Assigned Newark FO since June 26, 1961

g.) Mary Ann Elizabeth Massa (Mass_ on your request)
EOD June 27, 1955
Assigned Newark FO since June 27, 1955

Appendix D - Item 12

a.) Harold P. Leinbaugh (Linebaugh on your request)
EOD as SA, October 20, 1947
Retired February 16, 1973, from FBI Headquarters
Last known address 1160 Wimbledon Drive,
McLean, Virginia 22101

b.) Elmer Lee Todd
EOD as SA, December 11, 1950
Assigned Washington Field Office since January 31, 1955

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Appendix D - Item 13

Rita Agnes Ambrosio
EOD July 19, 1939
Retired December 28, 1973
Last known address 1604 John Street, Fort Lee, New Jersey 07024

Thomas Jack Biamonte
EOD as SA, July 6, 1953
Assigned Rome 9/28/62

Olga Ciosa
EOD September 20, 1943
Resigned November 29, 1965
Last known address 10409 South Indiana Avenue, Chicago,
Illinois 60628

Theodore Andrew Korontjis
EOD as SA, June 30, 1952
Assigned FBI Headquarters since March 15, 1975

Joseph C. Nichola
EOD as SA, July 2, 1951
Assigned Rome 5/26/63 to 9/1/65 and 12/14/70 to present

Mildred E. Nick
EOD July 8, 1940
Retired June 28, 1974
Last known address 11030 113th Drive, Youngtown, Arizona 85363

Helen C. Spear
EOD April 23, 1951
Assigned Rome 5/6/62 to 1/12/67 and 4/23/71 to present

Appendix D - Item 10

a.) Robert G. Kunkel
EOD as SA, July 11, 1949
Assigned Special Agent in Charge, Alexandria FO,
since March 22, 1974

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

b.) Courtland J. Jones
EOD as SA, October 6, 1941
Retired September 30, 1974
Last known address 6607 North 29th Street,
Arlington, Virginia 22213

c.) Ernest H. Belter
EOD as SA, July 19, 1943
Retired January 29, 1973
Last known address 616 Ednor Road, Silver Spring,
Maryland 20904

d.) James J. Gaffney
EOD as SA, March 5, 1951
Assigned Washington Field Office since January 29, 1962

Appendix D - Item 19

a.) Joseph A. Sizoo
EOD as SA, November 1, 1938
Retired May 19, 1972
Last known address 84A Pine Crescent, Whispering Pines,
North Carolina 28389

b.) Michael Joseph Rozamus
EOD as SA, November 3, 1947
Retired June 12, 1970
Last known address 6509 Gulf Drive, Holmes Beach,
Florida 33510

c.) Sterling B. Donahoe (Donahue on your request)
EOD as SA, January 6, 1941; Retired 6/29/73
Last known address 2813 Spiral Lane, Bowie, Maryland 20715

d.) Bernard A. Wells, Jr.
EOD as SA, June 6, 1949
Retired July 30, 1971
Last known address 5311 Montgomery Street,
Springfield, Virginia 22151

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

c.) Robert H. Haynes
EOD as SA, October 16, 1950
Retired March 28, 1975
Last known address 205 Northmoor Drive,
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901

Appendix D - Item 20

Alden F. Miller (Alan on your request)
EOD as SA, March 31, 1947
Assigned Atlanta FO since June 21, 1951

Appendix B, Item I-8 requested a sample of the confidentiality statement which FBI personnel are required to sign along with any other employment agreements currently in use. Attached are copies of the following documents responsive to this request:

1.) FD-291 Employment Agreement

2.) Standard Form 61 Appointment Affidavits

3.) 3-26 Form letter from FBI Special Agent appointee to FBI

4.) FD-375 Training Agreement

5.) FD-140 Application for Employment

Enclosures - 5
1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Samples of the five forms currently in use furnished by Administrative Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: June 2, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

On the morning of May 30, 1975, Mr. Robert Nichols (SA-Retired), and SA John Dennis Miller, Legal Analysis Office, met in Miller's office, prior to Nichol's appointment for interview by members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee.

Miller gave Nichols a copy of the Committee's rules at approximately 8:35 a.m. after Nichols stated he had not been given a copy by anyone else. He advised Nichols that nothing Miller was about to say was intended to or should be interpreted as an order or suggestion to be uncooperative with the Senate Select Committee or its staff.

Miller then advised Nichols he had the right to be represented by an attorney; if he is unable to retain an attorney, he should so advise the Committee staff and ask them to assist him in securing counsel; and the FBI could not provide the services of an attorney. Nichols said he understood.

REC-100 62-116395-222

Miller then escorted Nichols to the JEH Building where he met SAs Paul V. Daly and Seymor F. Phillips.

RECOMMENDATION:

5 JUN ~~10~~ 13 1975

For information

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Personnel File 67-414885
    (Former SA Robert Nichols)

JDM:eek
(8)

JBH

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 13 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep. AD Adm.
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
  - Admin.
  - Comp. Syst.
  - Ext. Affairs
  - Files & Com.
  - Gen. Inv.
  - Ident.
  - Inspection
  - Intell.
  - Laboratory
  - Legal Coun.
  - Plan. & Eval.
  - Spec. Inv.
  - Training
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-23-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

On the evening of 5-20-75 Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Conner telephonically advised SA Paul V. Daly of the Legal Counsel Division that the Department had reached a decision concerning the scope of testimony to be allowed in the Senate Select Committee interview of former SA Alan G. Sentinella. We previously had informed the Department that Mr. Sentinella was to testify pursuant to a subpoena before this Committee and that Department of Justice Order 501-73 requires we obtain Departmental approval before testimony may be given. We also informed the Department that Lester B. Seidel , staff member of the Senate Select Committee, had advised SA Daly that the scope of the intended interview of Sentinella would include knowledge Sentinella may have concerning the investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Mr. Seidel also indicated that they would interview Sentinella concerning his activities between the years 1960 to 1971.

Mr. O'Conner advised SA Daly that the decision of Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler; Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, and Associate Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott was that Sentinella was released insofar as the Department was concerned to only discuss three areas, those areas being the FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and SCLC. He was to advise the Committee that he was not permitted to go outside of these three areas because of instructions from the Department of Justice which instructions were issued pursuant to Department of Justice Order 501-73.

On 5-21-75 former SA Sentinella was advised of the Departmental restrictions on the information he could furnish the Committee by SA Daly, and he was accompanied by SA Daly to the Senate Select Committee office located in G308 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Sentinella's interview was scheduled for 9:30 a.m. Mr. Seidel met Mr. Sentinella and at 9:31 a.m. furnished Mr. Sentinella a copy of the Rules of Procedure for

REC-100

62-116395-22

17 JUN 13 1975

62-116395

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Personnel File of Former Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella (67-432832)
1 - Mr. Daly

84 JUN 13 1975

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. At the same time, former SA Sentinella was furnished forms which Seidel requested he fill out at that time. Seidel also made reference to Sentinella's Fifth Amendment rights but did not specify or spell out his rights.

It was brought to Mr. Seidel 's attention by SA Daly that the Rules adopted by the Senate Select Committee called for a witness to be given copies of the Rules 24 hours prior to his appearance before the Committee and that these Rules are important for a potential witness to have knowledge of prior to his being interviewed since they contain a list of rights and privileges which a witness is entitled to. It was also brought to Mr. Seidel 's attention that despite the fact that the interview was to be initiated at 10 a.m. (initially the interview was scheduled for 9:30 a.m., however, upon arrival former SA Sentinella was advised it would not be held until 10 a.m.) with Mr. Sentinella being required to fill out forms, he would have very little opportunity to review and digest the Rules of the Committee.

Mr. Seidel was also advised of the restrictions placed on the area which former SA Sentinella could respond to by the Department of Justice. Mr. Seidel specifically requested that he be allowed to ask questions concerning "COINTELPRO." He was advised that this was not within the scope of the Department's release for Sentinella unless such information may have been related to the investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, or SCLC.

SA Daly also explained to John Elliff, Task Force Head for the Committee on Domestic Intelligence Matters, the circumstances surrounding the failure to provide a copy of the Rules 24 hours prior to interview and of the lack of specificity of Mr. Seidel as to areas in which Mr. Sentinella would be interviewed. Mr. Elliff apologized for the oversight of the Committee in complying with its Rules and assured SA Daly this would not happen again. In addition, he was advised that the Rules of the Committee provide that witnesses would have a reasonable opportunity to inspect and correct their testimony, however, the Rules provide that a witness must inspect his testimony in the office of the Committee. It was pointed out to Mr. Elliff that such procedures were unreasonable in that in Mr. Sentinella's instance, he would have to travel from Atlanta to Washington, D. C., to review the transcript of his testimony at his own expense. Mr. Elliff indicated that he believed other arrangements concerning this particular aspect of the Rules could and would be worked out.

Mr. Sentinella at the conclusion of his testimony advised SA Daly, who was not present at the testimony, that the Committee adhered to the restrictions placed on his testimony by the Attorney General with one possible exception. They asked Mr. Sentinella if while he was working in Atlanta his squad investigated the "Klan" and "SNCC" (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee). Sentinella advised he did not raise an objection to this question because he felt the deviation from the Departmental restrictions was very slight, and our investigations of these matters were well known.

On the afternoon of 5-21-75 K. William O'Conner inquired of SA Daly how the interview went and he was generally advised of the facts surrounding the interview, including the fact that former SA Sentinella was not furnished a copy of the Rules until immediately preceding the interview. Mr. O'Conner inquired as to whether the Senator (Senator Robert Morgan [D-N.C.]) remained during the taking of testimony from Mr. Sentinella, and he was advised that according to Sentinella, Senator Morgan departed approximately five minutes after placing Mr. Sentinella under oath.

Mr. O'Conner expressed his displeasure at the way the Committee operated and indicated he was going to discuss this matter with Deputy Attorney General Tyler.

Subsequently, on 5-21-75 O'Conner indicated he had been in contact with James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President, and Deputy Attorney General Tyler, and they want the Bureau to prepare a letter protesting the Committee's handling of the interview of Sentinella and of the fact that they violated Rules which were adopted by that Committee, specifically the Rules requiring Mr. Sentinella be furnished a copy of the Committee Rules 24 hours prior to giving testimony to the Committee, failure to be specific concerning the areas to be covered by Sentinella's testimony, the general manner in which the rights of Sentinella were explained to him, and the fact that Senator Morgan departed from the Committee session after giving the oath. O'Conner explained in this regard Deputy Attorney General Tyler feels that this is in contravention of the Rules of the Committee, and he questions whether an executive session of the Committee being held to hear such testimony can continue in the absence of a Senate Committee Member. He requested this letter be directed to Senator Church. He was advised that such a letter could only be prepared after approval had been obtained from proper Bureau authorities, and it was also pointed out to Mr. O'Conner that we had orally protested this matter to Mr. Elliff of the Committee and Mr. Seidel , and he was apprised of Elliff's statement that such mistakes would not be repeated in the future. It was pointed out to Mr. O'Conner that the Bureau had furnished former SA Sentinella a detailed briefing of his rights and a briefing as to what was contained in the Rules of the Committee prior to his interview. Mr. O'Conner again requested that we prepare a letter protesting this matter.

It is not felt that a letter concerning this particular matter should be directed to Senator Church in view of Mr. Elliff's statement that this incident will not be repeated in the future. It is felt that our oral protest to the Committee is sufficient at this point, especially inasmuch as they accepted the limitations placed on the testimony of former SA Sentinella by the Department. It would appear we could expect to achieve very little by sending such a letter at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we orally advise Mr. O'Conner the Bureau does not feel a letter should be directed to the Committee, concerning this particular incident.

PVD ABH/PVD

By FBI

Done. 5/22/75 and 5/23/75. See my memo. 5/23/75. JBM

We should not object if Dept. prepares a letter.

Pur

JM

6/3/75

OGC 75-20

Rec'd from Ad Hoc Comm 6/10/75

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

MAY 30 1975

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Senstudy-75

Dear Senator Church:

It is my understanding that the continuing efforts of staff members of the Executive and Legislative Branches to prepare standard guidelines for witness interview procedures are continuing this week. While that process continues, the Department of Justice is, of course, continuing to cooperate in an ad hoc and responsive manner. In order to ensure our attention to these cooperative efforts, I have designated K. William O'Connor as Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination and as such he will be the principle liaison officer of DOJ in this effort. I understand that your Chief Counsel and members of his staff are now dealing with Mr. O'Connor in the execution of their responsibilities.

In the meantime, in an effort to expedite the cooperative provision of appropriate information to SSC, it would be most helpful if the Committee Staff would ensure that the Department of Justice is advised, in advance of Committee Staff contact with FBI employees and former employees, of the name of the witness and the scope of the prospective interview. This would facilitate the interview process, since it would make it possible to ensure that appropriate instructions are issued to the witness under 28 CFR 16.22, and would permit early decision upon the release of any applicable secrecy agreements.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

518

cc: ✓John Warner

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 13 1975

file in
62-116395

84 JUN 13 1975

In the same vein, I should like to invite your attention to some procedural matters surrounding recent witness presentation before the Committee. It appears, from reports which I have received, that two former FBI agents who recently appeared, did not receive copies of the Committee's Rules of Procedures until immediately before appearance before the Committee; and that the scope of their proposed testimony was defined with somewhat less than optimum precision for pre-clearance. Some procedural problems are almost inevitable, especially in the early stages of hearings. I know that you share my interest in assuring that full procedural due process is unequivocally provided to all witnesses who testify before the Committee or are interviewed by Committee Staff. In calling this matter to your attention I seek your support in restricting such problems to a minimum and prospectively avoiding others of like kind.

Sincerely,

Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee has advised that if the Bureau's response to a Committee request concerning the Democratic Convention in Atlantic City in 1964 is sufficiently informative it may not be necessary to interview Bureau personnel concerning this matter and to recommend that an expeditious effort be made to furnish a summary concerning the Atlantic City investigation be made available along with certain documents concerning this matter.

By way of background, we have received a request dated 5-14-75 pertaining to many items, among which was information concerning the Bureau's activities in Atlantic City in 1964 at the Democratic National Convention. At a meeting on 5-30-75 it was pointed out to the Committee that certain aspects of their May 14, 1975, request were particularly burdensome, would in some instances invade privacy and for other reasons was most difficult. During this meeting which was attended by Mark Gitenstein, staff member of the Committee; John Elliff, Task Force Director; representatives of the Bureau; and K. William O'Conner, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, the Committee representatives indicated that subject to the Senate Committee's approval they would accept some sort of summary with regard to their request in Appendix D, Item 8 of the May 14, 1975, request. This item pertains to the Bureau's activities in Atlantic City.

We have had former Agents interviewed concerning this matter, a request has been made to interview two Bureau secretaries, and the Committee has indicated they intend to interview as many as five additional Bureau Agents concerning this matter. In conversation with K. William O'Conner, he mentioned that the Committee had specifically informed him that if the Bureau's response was informative enough concerning

62-116395

REC. 102

62-116395-880

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz

Daly

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

5 JUN 10 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 1 1975

RVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

the Atlantic City matter, they would not interview the two Bureau secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski. (The request concerning the interview of these Bureau employees, who are Newark Office employees, is the subject of a separate memorandum captioned and dated same.) He requested SA Paul V. Daly to contact Mark Gitenstein in an effort to determine what type of response the Committee expected concerning the Atlantic City incident.

On 6-4-75, SA Daly contacted Mr. Gitenstein and Mr. Gitenstein advised that the Committee knew of the existence of certain memoranda and in particular a memorandum from former Assistant to the Director C. D. DeLoach reporting a conversation with the President requesting Bureau coverage at the Convention. Gitenstein stated that with regard to the Atlantic City incident, if a summary was prepared concerning this incident which would in general show the types of people whose conversations were monitored, the type of information collected, and the type of information disseminated along with furnishing the Committee certain important documents that it would not be necessary to interview Bureau personnel. He indicated among the documents they would expect to be furnished would be the DeLoach memorandum along with other "benign" documents which would not involve a privacy consideration or other considerations which might preclude their being made available to the Committee. Gitenstein indicated that it is the Committee's feeling that information of a political nature such as the credentials argument at the Convention was collected and furnished to the White House and that the collection and dissemination of this information is not apparently in concert with the ostensive purpose of electronic surveillance. He felt that the summary need not and should not identify individuals monitored but rather describe them such as a senator or some other descriptive phrase to describe the individual whose conversation might have been monitored. He said as to the verification of the information contained in the summary with the information in the files, that subject will be addressed by the Committee at a later time.

Gitenstein again mentioned that if such information was furnished by the Bureau, their need to interview employees would be muted as what they are attempting to learn through interview of Agents involved would have already been furnished by the Bureau. He volunteered that the Committee is relatively well informed concerning this particular matter. It is obvious from the specific mention of the DeLoach memorandum along with other observations and statements he made that this could well be true.

CONTINUED - OVER

It is realized that the White House has requested that a paper be prepared which would include the Atlantic City incident; however, K. William O'Connor indicated that he had conversed with Mr. James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President, and that Wilderotter had advised that document requests pertaining to Atlantic City or any other topic which will be addressed in a paper should be responded to and response should not be delayed.

It would appear to be advantageous to the Bureau to attempt to comply with the summary request along with furnishing certain documents concerning Atlantic City on an expeditious basis as opposed to the Committee continuing to conduct interviews of current and former Bureau personnel. If this type of arrangement can be worked out in this particular incident which the Committee characterizes as an abuse, it might lend itself to a similar arrangement in other areas.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division expeditiously prepare a summary in line with the above concerning the Atlantic City incident along with furnishing the important documents concerning this incident.

pvD JBH/pvD

This is being done
WRW

NR 007 SF CODE

5:13 PM NITEL 5/14/75 MCC

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM SAN FRANCISCO

ATTN LEGAL COUNSEL

SENSTUDY 75

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 14 1975
TELETYPE

REC 112

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED MAY 2, 1975, ABOVE CAPTION.

ON MAY 14, 1975, LESTER B. SEIDEL, INVESTIGATOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, WASHINGTON, D.C., TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE AND REQUESTED THE IDENTITY OF THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE OF THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE IN 1970. HE WAS ADVISED THAT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE CHARLES W. BATES SERVED IN THAT CAPACITY FROM JANUARY, 1970, THROUGH APRIL, 1970; THAT FORMER SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE HARRY J. MORGAN (NOW RETIRED) SERVED FROM APRIL, 1970, THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1970; AND THAT ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT E. GEBHARDT SERVED AS SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE FROM SEPTEMBER, 1970, THROUGH NOVEMBER, 1972.

REC 112

62-116395-219

SEIDEL DID NOT INDICATE THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF HIS INQUIRY OTHER THAT IT WAS CONNECTED WITH THE COMMITTEE WITH WHICH HE IS AFFILIATED.

ABOVE BEING FURNISHED FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU.

END

SF0/cmc

HOLD

CC Div 11

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

5 W06

1 - M[illegible] J. B. Adams
1 - [illegible] T. J. Jenkins
1 - Each Assistant Director

CODE TELETYPE NITEL Hot file

REC. 112

TO ALL SACS 219 MAY ~~19~~ 20, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395) PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY - 75.

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR, IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE. UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL INFORMATION FURNISHED.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 20 1975
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY

SFP:cmc
(19)

LAF 1045 JBA

NOTE:

Referenced teletype alerted field to work of the Senate and House Select Committees and Bureau's handling of its requests. Also, it pointed out FBI has pledged full cooperation with Committees. San Francisco teletype 5/14/75 advised that on that day Lester B. Seidel, Investigator, Senate Select Committee, telephonically sought and was furnished identities of SACs in San Francisco in 1970. Seidel did not indicate specific nature of his inquiries. Considering the publicity being afforded the work of the Committee, it is not inconceivable some unauthorized persons may attempt to obtain information from the FBI particularly at field level, under guise of one of the Committees. It is therefore believed this teletype to all SACs is desirable as a cautionary measure.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

84 JUN 11 1975

S.F. Phillips

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

June 5, 1975

LEGAL DIVISION

Attached teletype advises former Agent Richard H. Davis, Atlanta Office, had been contacted by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member (FNU) Epstein in an attempt by Epstein to arrange an interview concerning Bureau investigation of Martin Luther King. On the night of 6-4-75, Michael Epstein, Staff Member SSC advised SA Paul V. Daly that he had contacted former Agent Davis to arrange interview concerning Bureau investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and Southern Leadership Christian Conference (SLCC). Epstein stated Davis refused to submit to interview since he was bound by an employment secrecy agreement and needed necessary clearance from Bureau. He told Epstein that he would not contact Bureau for such clearance. Epstein requested Bureau release Davis from the agreement for purposes of this interview which will be a staff interview in Atlanta.

Legal Division recommends Davis be released from security agreement for purposes of this interview and to answer questions concerning the King, Levison, and SLCC investigations. If approved, we will separately advise Davis through Atlanta Office of this decision, and give him pertinent briefing.

1 - Intelligence Division
1 - Administrative Division
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. Daly

WRW/ECD

PVD JEY/PVD

PVD:eek
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 04 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR025 AT CODED

8:08 PM NITEL JUNE 4, 1975 JWS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTN: INTD W. D. CREGAR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RG

SENSTUDY '75.

ON 6/4/75, FORMER AGENT RICHARD H. DAVIS, 1147 WILD CREEK TRAIL, N. E., ATLANTA, GA., ADVISED HE WAS CONTACTED THIS DATE BY (FNU) EPSTEIN WHOM HE BELIEVED WAS CALLING FROM WASHINGTON, D. C. DAVIS STATED HE FEELS EPSTEIN IS A MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE SINCE INQUIRY CONCERNED DAVIS' KNOWLEDGE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING CASE. EPSTEIN STATED HE WISHED TO INTERVIEW DAVIS EITHER IN ATLANTA OR WASHINGTON, D. C.; HOWEVER, DAVIS SAID THAT NO DEFINITE ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE DURING CONVERSATION OTHER THAN HE WOULD CONTACT EPSTEIN AS TO APPROPRIATE DATE FOR INTERVIEW IN ATLANTA.

REC-112 62-116395-218

DAVIS WAS INFORMED HE COULD CONTACT THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL COLLECT FOR ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER. DAVIS STATED HE WOULD DO SO.

7 JUN 16 1975

END

HOLD

84 JUN 11 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-30-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of an executive meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community on 5-28-75. The meeting was chaired by William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence. Also present were: Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President, James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, Section Chief William O. Cregar, Inspector John B. Hotis, and senior officials of the State Department, National Security Agency, Office of Management and Budget, Defense Department, and the Treasury Department.

Hotis

The following matters of interest were discussed at the meeting:

House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Mr. Colby said he met earlier this week with Chairman Nedzi of the House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, John L. Boos, Chief Counsel, and A. Searle Field, Committee Staff Director. He said they seemed interested in the relationship which had developed between the Senate Committee and CIA and asked where he thought the Senate inquiry was going. They also discussed procedures regarding access to documents and witnesses and requested they be furnished some basic materials concerning the CIA's authority to conduct intelligence investigations. They also requested that the Committee be provided with all the materials requested by the Senate Select Committee. Colby pointed out that the House Resolution (H-Res. 138) which established the Select Committee prohibits the disclosure of information outside the Committee without Committee approval. There is some question, however, whether this Resolution can supersede Rule 11 of the Rules of the House of Representatives

REC-112

62-116395-217

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Hotis
JBH:dkg (7)

5 JUN 11 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 11 1975

which provides that members of the House shall have access to all Committee records. He said Congressman Robert N. Giaimo (D-Conn.) has indicated that he will not accept any limitations on access. Colby said he will appear in an open session before the Committee sometime in the next few weeks to discuss, in general terms, the agency's position on collection of intelligence information.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Mr. Wilderotter said that F. A. O. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, has agreed to identify in advance specific allegations of abuse that will be reviewed by the Committee. Wilderotter said he will then appoint a task force or some other coordinating mechanism within the executive branch to examine each of these areas in depth. The purpose will be to develop an executive department brief on each subject which can be used to respond to Committee requests. He felt that this might enable the Administration to gain the initiative on these issues and perhaps limit the Committee's inquiries to the boundaries set forth in the Senate Resolution. He asked that the agencies make an effort to identify abuse subjects so that the White House can pull together all the information available on each topic. He said it is already clear that the Committee will examine such subjects as assassinations and the CIA's role in the internal affairs of Chile and the Dominican Republic.

Mr. E. H. Knoche, Assistant to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, reported that Mr. Colby has made three appearances before the Senate Select Committee and on each occasion discussed assassination matters. Mr. Colby will meet with the Committee three times next week, and it is expected that he will be asked about the Phoenix program and the covert activities of the CIA including political, counterintelligence, and clandestine intelligence collection. The Committee will trace the agency's operations back to the 1947 directive in an effort to determine how they relate to policy objectives of the Government.

Mr. William G. Hyland, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, said the Committee has requested position papers on the Department's activities in Laos and Chile and to explain of the Department's approach to covert action and whether it was a supplement or instrument of policy. Mr. Hyland raised the question of whether the agencies had any moral obligation to advise former employees that documents were now being

CONTINUED - OVER

made available to Congress. He felt that they should be given an opportunity to review these files prior to interview in order to refresh their memories. Mr. Wilderotter agreed and said that each agency should adopt a similar policy.

Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI, asked whether anyone knew what John Elliff hoped to accomplish as Director of the Task Force on Domestic Intelligence. We pointed out that his earlier writings would indicate that he intends to draft an intelligence charter for the FBI, and perhaps the entire intelligence community. Elliff has made a comprehensive study over the past several years of the Bureau's internal security intelligence functions, including sources of the FBI's authority and the legal restrictions of its operations. This was the subject of a paper he submitted at the Princeton Conference in 1971, and he has since called for the establishment of legal standards for the Bureau's collection, retention, and dissemination of intelligence information.

Mr. Buchen then requested that the FBI draft a proposed intelligence charter for the Bureau. He felt that it would be helpful for the Administration to have a proposal available which it might use to counter any recommendations made by the Committee. At the end of the meeting Mr. Wilderotter asked that a second paper be prepared reviewing all of Mr. Elliff's articles on the subject of domestic intelligence with the view toward identifying those issues which seem to be of major importance.

With regard to Mr. Buchen's request, we feel that it would be inappropriate for the Bureau to draft an intelligence charter for the executive branch. It is the responsibility of the White House and other consumers of intelligence to define their needs and propose appropriate operating authority. We also question the utility of reviewing Professor Elliff's writings on the domestic intelligence functions. We feel a better course of action at this point is simply to ask Mr. Elliff to define the goals and objectives of his task force. He has always been very candid and forthright and we have no reason to think that he would be reluctant to discuss the matter with us. In addition, it is likely his views on the intelligence function differ from those expressed in his earlier articles, and it is best to get his current thinking on the problem. If this approach proves unsuccessful, we can then resort to a review of his written materials.

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Legal Counsel Division advise Mr. Wilderotter that we feel it is inappropriate for the Bureau to draft an intelligence charter ~~of~~ for the FBI and recommend that the White House draft a statement of its intelligence needs.

(2) That Legal Counsel Division contact Mr. Elliff and attempt to determine what his goals and objectives are as Director of the Task Force on Domestic Intelligence.

PVD

JBH/PVD

WRW

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. J. B. Adams~~
1 - ~~Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~(1 - Mr. Hotis)~~

1 - ~~Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. H. W. Dare
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/6/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This records the results of contact with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning release to Senate Select Committee (SSC) of two documents pertaining to Appendix C, Paragraph 24 of the SSC request to the Department of 5/14/75, which requested "all memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of 'notional' Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States."

No information has been developed indicating this Bureau conferred with CIA regarding the establishment or creation of a Bureau-sponsored "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization. Although the FBI did, in fact, direct several such organizations, no information has been developed indicating the FBI consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.

In one instance, CIA advised in 2/70 it had established a notional organization with post office box addresses in Boston, Massachusetts and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This notional organization, to be known as the Union for the Revolution, had the objective of developing penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. It was CIA's intention to circulate propaganda from the post office boxes in anticipation of interesting Arab groups. Thereafter, it was CIA's plan to use its personnel under "suitable" cover to contact the Arab groups. (See memorandum dated 2/13/70, captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-2, copy attached.)

62-116395-216

REC 102

By letterhead memorandum dated 3/23/70, the FBI indicated information had been received indicating the Union for the Revolution had been in contact with a domestic Marxist-Leninist organization requesting literature. This memorandum set forth an analysis of a "Statement of the Union for the Revolution" indicating the document lacked credibility as a revolutionary document. (LHM dated 3/23/70, captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-4, copy attached.)

62-116395

ENCLOSURE

5 JUN 11 1975

LFS:mjg
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 11 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

On 6/6/75, Mr. Walter Elder, CIA, advised that CIA had no objection to the LHM dated 3/23/70, being furnished to the SSC. With regard to the memorandum from Mr. Papich to Mr. Brennan dated 2/13/70, Mr. Elder requested that the name of the CIA representative who furnished the information in the memorandum be deleted from line one of the memorandum prior to its being furnished to the SSC. Provided this is done, CIA has no objection to this memorandum being furnished to the SSC. He suggested that when the name is deleted, it be replaced with the phrase "A CIA officer."

ACTION:

To record CIA's clearance of the above-described documents.

SECRET

Appendix C, III, 24

Please provide: all memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts, or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States.

No information has been developed indicating this Bureau conferred with CIA regarding the establishment or creation of a Bureau-sponsored "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization. Although the FBI did, in fact, direct several such organizations, no information has been developed indicating the FBI consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.

In one instance, CIA advised in 2/70 it had established a notional organization with post office box addresses in Boston, Massachusetts, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This notional organization, to be known as the Union for the Revolution, had the objective of developing penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. It was CIA's intention to circulate propaganda from the post office boxes in anticipation of interesting Arab groups. Thereafter, it was CIA's plan to use its personnel under "suitable" cover to contact the Arab groups. (See memorandum dated 2/13/70 captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-2, copy attached.)

By letterhead memorandum dated 3/23/70, the FBI indicated information had been received indicating the Union for the Revolution had been in contact with a domestic Marxist-Leninist organization requesting literature. This memorandum set forth an analysis of a "Statement of the Union for the Revolution" indicating the document lacked credibility as a revolutionary document. (LHM dated 3/23/70 captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-4, copy attached.)

As the Union for the Revolution was strictly a creation of CIA, it is recommended before any information be disseminated outside the FBI relating to this organization, clearance be obtained through CIA.

Prepared by SA David
Ryan, IS-3, 5/28/75

SECRET

Classified by 4375
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-216

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/4/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

At 4:55 p.m. on June 4, 1975, Daniel M. Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he has not as yet been contacted by the Senate Select Committee staff for interview but it was his intention to call Mark Gitenstein to discuss further his interview by the Committee. Mr. Armstrong inquired as to whether the Bureau has any objections to his discussing the two subject areas previously described by Mr. Gitenstein. Those areas were Armstrong's knowledge of the Bureau's Intelligence Division activities as a result of his employment in the FBI, and his knowledge of the possibility of the Bureau getting an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters.

I advised Mr. Armstrong that to the extent that the interview would concern those two subjects, the Bureau would have no objection and he could consider his secrecy agreement waived, but only to that extent. Mr. Armstrong inquired as to whether there were any particular problems with information he furnished to me on May 28, 1975. I told him that the waiver of the agreement was conditioned on the one limitation that he would not furnish information that would identify informants, compromise current investigations, or on-going programs, or reveal other sensitive matters which should be reserved for the information of members of the Committee or the Chairman of the Committee.

I told Mr. Armstrong that the Bureau would have available during his interview, though not present at the interview, a representative who would provide him with counsel as to any problems concerning subjects he may be reluctant to discuss with the Committee representative. I explained that the FBI representative was not intended to inhibit any

REC 112

62-116375-215

5 JUN 11 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 11 1975

interview he might have, but was there for the purpose of expediting the interview by resolving questions concerning information he was authorized to furnish.

Mr. Armstrong said he fully understood and that he would advise me in the event an interview was scheduled.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

RLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Cochran

DATE: 5/19/75

FROM : W. E. Harward

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEYS - SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Rememos Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams dated 4/9/75 and 4/25/75, concerning above-captioned matter, copies attached.

Liaison with Capitol Hill by the Office of Legal Counsel resulted in an arrangement whereby Laboratory representatives could meet with those members of the Capitol Police Force handling security surveys for the U. S. Congress. Laboratory personnel met with members of the Capitol Police Force on 5/6/75 and 5/8/75 at their headquarters, 331 First Street, NE, Washington, D. C. At the meeting on 5/6/75 an examination of their survey equipment revealed that it was adequate, however it did not meet the level of sophistication or quality available at the present state of the art. Further discussion revealed that the training received by members of the police force handling their responsibility was limited.

On 5/8/75 Laboratory Supervisors Wilbur G. Stevens and Joseph B. Parsons met with Chief James M. Powell and some of his staff members which included Deputy Chief Garner, Captain Brannon, Head of the Investigative Unit, and Lieutenant Bell, Head of the Bomb Disposal Unit. The discussion at this meeting centered around steps which could be taken to update their present security survey equipment as well as additional measures which could be put into practice to enhance their technical expertise in this area. Laboratory personnel furnished them with the names of manufacturers of additional survey equipment as well as suggestions as to the establishment of an in-house training program.

Enclosures (2)

ST-107
REC-59
62-116395-214

1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Bowers, Room 4509 JB)
1 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. Cregar, Room 4123 JEH)
1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Harward
1 - Mr. Stevens

CONTINUED - OVER

WGS:bms
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

5 MAY 30 1975

JUN 19 19

1 MB

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

57 J... 1975

F416

Memorandum W. E. Harward to Mr. Cochran
RE: SECURITY SURVEYS - SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT

At the conclusion of this conference, Chief Powell expressed his sincere appreciation to the Bureau for the excellent help and guidance extended to him and his staff in this matter of mutual interest, and expressed the hope that he could call on us again in the event he or his staff needed to tap our resevoir of knowledge. The Chief was assured that we would be available if needed in this capacity.

It appears that the Capitol Police Force has been forced into the untenable position of handling this responsibility for the Congress, and as a result are attempting to establish some degree of self-reliance and outward credibility being completely inexperienced in this area of technical expertise. Because of this, it is felt that the Bureau should move cautiously in any continuing liaison with the Capitol Police concerning security survey matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that any continuing liaison with the Capitol Hill Police Force be handled by mature and experienced Special Agent Supervisors, who are completely familiar with security survey matters.

WRW/TWL

TR

PLM

Mr. J. B. Adams 4-8-75

Legal Counsel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/R

During various contacts with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, and Congressman Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), Chairman of the House Select Committee, the question has come up regarding the need for a check of the private offices of individual Committee Members to ensure the absence of any electronic listening devices. The Committee personnel have been told that we consider this absolutely essential and they agreed.

In exploring this matter, it was determined that the Capitol Police Department recently has established a special unit to handle all types of security problems within the Capitol Hill complex, including checks for electronic listening devices. Personnel of this unit have received extensive training, some from CIA. The operations of the unit are controlled through the Sergeants at Arms of the House and Senate.

This matter has been discussed with Robert Hough, Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Hough advised that the special unit already has conducted complete security surveys of the new office space of the Senate Select Committee and certainly will perform any other checks of this type needed by the Committee or its individual Members. He said, in fact, that since they now have this capability they would oppose any outside agency coming on to the Hill to perform this function. Hough said he already has been in contact with Miller regarding the necessary security checks and Miller stated he will let us know when the offices of the Senate Select Committee Members were checked. He said their rules require specific requests from the individual Members in writing.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. [illegible]
1 - Mr. [illegible]
1 - Mr. [illegible]

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

62-116395 - 214

[illegible] (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

This matter was discussed with Congressman Nedzi on 4-9-75, and he stated he would promptly contact Mr. Harding to work out the necessary arrangements for security checks needed by his Committee and its Members. Harding has promised to let us know when the checks of the House Select Committee Members have been completed.

All contacts concerning this matter have been handled by Inspector Bowers who will continue to follow this situation with Senate Sergeant at Arms, William H. Wannall, or his Deputy; House Sergeant at Arms Harding; Mr. Miller of the Senate Select Committee; and Congressman Nedzi.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WOC:ekw 4/14/75

On 4/11/75 the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community was apprised of the discussions with Mr. Robert Hough, the Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and with Mr. Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Although the Executive Committee would have preferred the FBI to conduct audio sweeps, they interposed no objection to the sweeps being handled by the Capitol Police Department. Mr. Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, requested, however, that both Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding be requested to periodically advise the FBI as to the sweeps of Committee space for electronic listening devices. Specifically, Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding should be asked to furnish the FBI the following: How frequently they will conduct a counteraudio sweep, what offices will be swept, will the results of such sweeps be furnished the FBI, and will the FBI be immediately notified should the Capitol Police locate an electronic listening device?

Mr. J. B. Adams 4-25-75

[illegible]

Legal Counsel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/rl

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams memorandum of 4-9-75 to which the Intelligence Division placed an addendum dated 4-14-75 showing that Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, had requested that the Sergeants at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives keep the Bureau advised regarding checks made for electronic listening devices in the offices of captioned Select Committees.

This was discussed on 4-23-75 by Inspector Bowers with Senate Sergeant at Arms William Wannall and his Deputy, Robert Hough. They were amenable to notifying us concerning the checks they make of Senate Select Committee space and the offices of the Members of this Committee. Hough was designated by Wannall to handle this matter. Hough advised that the special Capitol Police unit had made a check of Room S148 in the Capitol on that date (4-23-75) prior to a meeting of the Senate Select Committee in that room and found nothing. Hough stated they have received no requests whatever to make any checks of the offices of individual Committee Members. He said he had discussed this matter with William Miller, Staff Director of the Select Committee, and Miller indicated it would be taken up with the Committee but he has heard nothing further from him.

On 4-24-75 Bowers discussed this matter with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives. Harding stated he has had no requests for any checks of the Members' offices or

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

62-116395-214

DWB:ajs (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

space of the House Select Committee since the Committee really has not begun to function as yet. He said he has discussed this matter with Committee Chairman Lucien Nedzi, and he certainly will give us complete accounting of checks they make of this Committee's space and the space of the individual Members of the Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

4-528

62-116395-213

CHANGED TO

62-116464-4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

JUN 12 1975

Hmk./cz

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5/23/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES OR FORMER EMPLOYEES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/rw

Hotis

At the Executives Conference on May 22, 1975, I presented for discussion the question of the procedures to be followed when former employees or current employees of the Bureau are contacted for interview by staff representatives of the Senate Select Committee, or are called for testimony pursuant to a subpoena issued by the Committee. I explained the background including the numerous attempts to arrive at a working arrangement with the Committee in terms of stated guidelines and that all such efforts in the past had proven unworkable.

I pointed out that when presented with the proposal that an agency representative be present during interviews, the Committee met and voted unanimously to reject that proposal. The issue of whether the agency representative would be present during the interview therefore is a stumbling block to the development of a reasonable procedure to be followed by the Committee and by our present and former employees. I requested the authority of the Executives Conference and approval of the Director to waive the requirement that a Bureau representative be present during interviews and following a vote such approval was given.

I then requested authority to undertake the development of a working understanding with the Committee in behalf of the Bureau by which we would be given notice of the identities of persons to be interviewed prior to interview or testimony, that we would be advised of the subject matter of the

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
JAM:mfd

REC-100 62-116395-282

CONTINUED - OVER

17 JUN 10 1975

84 JUN 11 1975

interview or testimony, and afforded an opportunity to discuss with the witness those areas of the proposed interview or testimony which would require no special arrangements and those areas which would require the information possessed by the witness to be furnished to members of the Committee or to the Chairman exclusively.

We also wanted an opportunity prior to interview to furnish the witnesses information concerning their Constitutional rights, their rights pursuant to the Committee's rules, and to advise them concerning the extent to which they were released from obligations of secrecy made to the FBI, and to the procedures necessary to obtain authority of the Department to respond to a subpoena.

Following discussion and vote this matter also was approved.

Pursuant to such authority, I met with K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, from approximately 4:00 p.m. to 5:20 p.m. on May 22, 1975, accompanied by Inspector John B. Hotis. I explained to Mr. O'Connor that the Director was desirous of having the Committee understand that the FBI wanted to be cooperative to the extent that it was possible and consistent with the need to protect the identities of informants, sensitive sources of information and methods, on-going investigations and other current operations and personal privacy. Because of this view of the Director and the Bureau, we desired to make known to the Committee the fact that we would not insist on the presence of a Bureau representative during actual interviews or testimony of present or former employees, but we would want an understanding with the Committee and the Committee staff that the Bureau would be given prior notice of the identities of proposed witnesses, the subject matter of the proposed interview or testimony, and an opportunity prior to interview or testimony for the Bureau to consult with the employee in order to release him from his obligations of secrecy to the extent possible for purposes of the interview or testimony.

I restated our position that we were not endeavoring to deter testimony rather we were attempting to facilitate testimony under reasonable conditions and we felt that these matters should be discussed with the Committee. I told Mr. O'Connor that we were aware of the numerous discussions, proposals and conferences that have been held in an effort to establish specific formal guidelines with the Committee, but that all such efforts in behalf of the White House staff and the intelligence community at

CONTINUED - OVER

large have not been successful. I told him that therefore we felt it would be appropriate for the FBI to express our view to the Committee because interviews of FBI personnel and former employees have been conducted and are scheduled in the near future.

Mr. O'Connor said that he understood the Director's view that he desired to cooperate with the Committee and he felt that such cooperation could be negotiated if we were to offer the Committee as trading material COINTELPRO files. I told Mr. O'Connor that we were not going to negotiate an understanding concerning witness interview procedures on the basis of trading any of our files. He then suggested that we negotiate the May 14, 1975, letter which was addressed to the Attorney General by Senator Church and use that negotiation as a basis for trading with the Committee to develop workable guidelines. I again told Mr. O'Connor that I considered the question of procedural arrangements for witness interviews to be a very broad question and one that went far beyond the requests in the May 14, 1975, letter. I told him that I felt confident that the May 14, 1975, letter would be followed by perhaps an even longer letter with more requests and that such matters should be negotiated individually.

Mr. O'Connor then said that it was his strong view that a letter should be addressed to the Committee complaining of the treatment of FBI witnesses, particularly regarding violations of the Committee's own rules in that it appeared that during recent interviews the Committee had not furnished witness a copy of the rules in sufficient time and the treatment by staff representatives (& the Committee staff) of witnesses had been improper.

I told Mr. O'Connor that I thought that our efforts to develop a working relationship with the Committee could be seriously impaired at this time should a protest letter be sent to Senator Church because a formal communication of that nature would require some reaction on the part of the Committee and I could see no benefit to our present efforts to establish procedures by which we could reasonably cooperate with the Committee.

Mr. O'Connor then suggested that a letter might be addressed to Senator Church which described our concern that in the absence of reasonable procedures witnesses' rights might be impaired and that for that

CONTINUED - OVER

reason and for the reason that the Director desired to be cooperative with the Committee, we would request a meeting with Senator Church and Senator Tower to arrive at an understanding as to procedures. I told Mr. O'Connor that I would consider such a letter and he said he would discuss the matter with the Deputy Attorney General and with James Wilderotter at the White House.

At approximately 9:05 a.m. on May 23, 1975, Mr. O'Connor called me and said that he had discussed the matter with Mr. Wilderotter and the Deputy Attorney General. He said that both had agreed that it was inopportune at this time to seek special guidelines for interviews of FBI personnel and former personnel with the Committee. He said that a meeting has been scheduled for Tuesday, May 27, 1975, at noon in a final effort to resolve an understanding with Committee representatives. He said at the present time it is proposed that the meeting be attended by Wilderotter and Roderick Hills, representing the White House; Hoffman, representing the Defense Department; Warner, representing CIA; and O'Connor representing the Justice Department. Committee representatives would be Schwarz, Chief Counsel, and John Elliff. He said that at this time it was his thought that the Deputy Attorney General and I should not attend the meeting. He gave as his reasoning the thought that "should something go wrong" the Deputy Attorney General could disassociate himself from any agreement arrived at, and that I would similarly be in a position of saying that we have not been a party to the agreement.

I reminded Mr. O'Connor that meetings have been held frequently in the past and that tentative understandings made at such meetings have disappeared shortly after the meeting was concluded. I told him that was significant to us because we now understand that two more former employees of the FBI have been contacted and may be interviewed in the near future. I told him that former SA Sam Papich and former Agent Nichols have been contacted. I told him that the extent to which we should release these two former employees from their obligation of secrecy could not be intelligently evaluated unless we knew the subject matter of the interviews and that we plan to contact the Committee to inquire as to the subject matter. I pointed out to him that such pending interviews make it imperative for the FBI to consider action in addition to meetings that may be planned to discuss guidelines.

CONTINUED _ OVER

Mr. O'Connor asked that we not contact the Committee directly at this time, but that we allow him to call John Elliff and Schwarz to request that he be advised of the identity of all proposed FBI witnesses and of the subject matter of the proposed interviews, and that such interviews or testimony not go forward pending developments of an agreement on guidelines. O'Connor promised that he would make the contact promptly and advise me today of the results. I agreed to withhold our contact pending receipt of the information from him.

Mr. O'Connor then insisted that a letter be prepared for the Attorney General to send to Senator Church pointing out the failure of the Committee to afford complete protection of the rights of witnesses. I declined to undertake that responsibility and I told him the reason was that a formal document addressed to the Chairman of the Committee would tend to impair our efforts to negotiate with the Committee and certainly would be untimely in view of the conference he described as being scheduled for next Tuesday at noon.

Mr. O'Connor then said he would hate to have to tell the Deputy Attorney General that the FBI declined to prepare such a draft. I told him that not only would I not mind him telling the Deputy Attorney General, but I wished he would tell the Deputy Attorney General and explain my reason for not sending such a formal letter addressed to Senator Church at this time. Mr. O'Connor said that "well everyone else agrees to the letter," and I told him the FBI does not agree.

Mr. O'Connor said that if he was going to have to draft the letter for the Attorney General's signature, he would do it, but that he would need the information concerning the interviews of former SA Devlin and former SA Sentinella. I told Mr. O'Connor that the information concerning Sentinella was en route to him already and that we would endeavor to furnish him as promptly as possible any additional information available to us concerning these interviews.

At 11:13 a.m. on May 23, 1975, Mr. O'Connor called me and said that he had just concluded a conversation with John Elliff during which Elliff agreed that in regard to the scheduled interview of former SA Sam Papich on May 29, 1975, at 9:00 a.m., he would furnish us the substance of the

CONTINUED - OVER

questions to be asked Mr. Papich. He said that Elliff was agreeable to an informal arrangement under which the FBI would not require the presence of a Bureau representative at such interviews, but would expect to receive the identity of persons to be interviewed plus a statement as to the subject matter of the interview. Elliff then proceeded to identify as those persons scheduled for interview as William Turner, who will be interviewed today or this weekend by Mike Epstein at San Francisco, and "Chick" Brennan, who was interviewed yesterday, May 22, 1975, by Mark Gitenstein and who may be interviewed again today.

As to the interview of Sam Papich, Elliff said that the interview would concern:

1. A liaison agreement between the FBI and CIA;

2. The abolition of Papich's liaison responsibilities in 1970;

3. Dissatisfaction by the FBI with the Huston Plan;

4. The views in the White House regarding the intelligence community and the FBI with reference to a conversation Elliff had with Mr. Wannall and Mr. Cregar on May 22, 1975;

5. A detailed follow-up on the discussions with Mr. Wannall;.

6. A copy of the Huston Plan and certain minutes taken of meetings at which the Huston Plan was discussed. These minutes allegedly were made by William Cregar;

7. The matter raised with Paul Daly on May 22, 1975. (Mr. Daly recalled that Mr. Elliff discussed an incident concerning the CIA and the FBI which occurred at Denver, Colorado.)

Mr. O'Connor said that an interview proposed with former SA Nichols has been postponed indefinitely according to Elliff because of Nichols' unavailability.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee

Mr. O'Connor noted that even though formal current rules have not been agreed upon with the Committee, it appears that Elliff's cooperation in furnishing the above information indicates a willingness to abide by the terms and conditions that I had requested Mr. O'Connor to seek in behalf of the FBI.

In this developing cooperation with Elliff, it is my opinion that we should not participate in the conference at noon on Tuesday, May 27, 1975, at which time the broad proposals by Wilderotter will be discussed. It is to the interest of the FBI to develop a cooperative attitude on the part of Elliff and his staff and that is being accomplished.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-2-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, advised that he desired the Bureau to continue practice of furnishing communications setting forth the contents of interviews of former and current employees where such information is available. He also requested that the Bureau continue to furnish an extra copy for James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President.

HOT

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD

JBH/PVD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY [illegible]

REC-100 62-116395-211

17 JUN 10 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(7)

8 4 JUN 1 1 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

At 10:37 a.m. on May 28, 1975, former FBI employee Daniel M. (Mac) Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he has received information that the Senate Select Committee may contact him for purpose of interview. He requested my advice as to what his response should be. I told Mr. Armstrong that he should be aware of any secrecy agreements he may have signed while an employee of the FBI and he should be aware of the Attorney General Order 501-73. I told him the Director was interested in being as candid as possible with the Committee and that we would be willing to release him from his agreement to the extent it would be possible to do so consistent with the needs of on-going investigations and the sensitivity of the particular information. involved. I told him that should he receive a request for interview or subpoena, it would be appropriate for him to inquire as to the general areas of discussion proposed for the interview and to request the Director to release him from the secrecy agreement concerning those areas.

Mr. Armstrong said that if he was contacted, he would respond according to the advice furnished him.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/rlw

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

PLM

REC-100 62-116395-210

17 JUN 10 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(7)

84 JUN 11 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

[redacted]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 05 1975
TELETYPE

NR 10 PH PLAIN

610 PM 6-5-75 NITEL MCA

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: PHILADELPHIA (62-0-23222)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL, MAY 28, 1975.

SA JOHN B. MEADE ADVISED TELEPHONICALLY MAY 29, 1975 RE CONTENTS OF RENITEL.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

(Meade)

REC-100

62-116395-208

cc 67

84 JUN 11 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. WEJ
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 0 5 1975

TELETYPE

NR011 CE PLAIN

8:33PM NITEL JUNE 5, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM CHARLOTTE (62-4093)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUNITEL MAY 29, 1975.

MR. JOSEPH A. SIZOO, 84 A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PINES, NC, CONTACTED MAY 29, 1975 PER INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REBUNITEL.

END

~~MEB FBIHQ CLR AND TKS~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Joseph A. Sizoo

REC-100

62-116395-707

10 1975

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

cc 67

84 JUN 11 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 003 PD CODE

1:45 P M URGENT MAY 29, 1975 LJQ

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: PORTLAND (66-0)

ATTENTION: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

SENSTUDY 75.

RE FBIHQ NITEL TO ALEXANDRIA AND OTHER OFFICES, INCLUDING PORTLAND, MAY 28, 1975.

FBIHQ NITEL NAMED SA LEO B. APP, JR., AND SA EDGAR O. INGALLS, BOTH CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO PORTLAND DIVISION, AND NOTED THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC), EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN.

FOR INFORMATION OF FBIHQ, STRONG POSSIBILITY SUBJECT MATTER PERTAINS TO MATTER ENUMERATED IN DETAIL IN PORTLAND TELETYPES TO FBIHQ JANUARY 18, 1973, FEBRUARY 1, 1973, FEBRUARY 5, 1973, PORTLAND AIRTEL TO FBIHQ, JANUARY 19, 1973, IN MATTER ENTITLED "HUNTLY COLLINS, INFORMATION CONCERNING, RESEARCH MATTER," AND FBIHQ TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED FEBRUARY 2, 1973, ENTITLED "FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT, CODE NAME 'INLET', RESEARCH MATTER."

OPS

END.

REC-100

62-116395-206

JUN 10 1975

67-423754 (App)

67-623437 (Ingalls)

cc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/ew

84 JUN 11 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 0 5 1975
YPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR004 TP CODE

1:40PM URGENT JUNE 5, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM TAMPA (105-0-1121)

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

RE BUREAU NITEL MAY 28, 1975.

ON JUNE 4, 1975, MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6500 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BEACH, FLORIDA, WAS CONTACTED. MR. ROZAMUS HAD NOT BEEN AVAILABLE FOR CONTACT UNTIL THIS DATE BECAUSE OF TRAVEL. MR. ROZAMUS ADVISED THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BUT HE WAS ALERTED THAT HE MAY BE APPROACHED BY A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF. MR. ROZAMUS WAS ADVISED OF THE CONTENTS OF REBUNITEL CONCERNING THE FACT THAT HE MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT DURING INTERVIEW IN THE EVENT QUESTIONS ARE ASKED RELATING TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS. MR. ROZAMUS WAS ALSO ADVISED THAT AS A PRELUDE TO THE INTERVIEW HE MAY CONTACT THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL. HE WAS ADVISED THAT THE BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE WAS NOT INTENDED

END PAGE ONE

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORD UNIT

67-424444 Rozamus

REC-100

62-116395-805

JUN 10 1975

84 JUN 11 1975

PAGE TWO

TO IMPEDE THE WORK OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE BUT WAS DONE AS A COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. MR. ROZAMUS ADVISED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THIS AND FULLY APPRECIATED THE BUREAU'S EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD. MR. ROZAMUS FURTHER ADVISED THAT HE WOULD NOTIFY THE TAMPA OFFICE IN THE EVENT THAT HE IS CONTACTED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE.

END

RECD THREE

DCW FBIHQ CL CLR

cc. Putman

Airtel

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
6/2/75

To: Legat, Rome

From: Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. Kolombatovic
PERSONAL ATTENTION
(Route through for review)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SENSTUDY 75

Enclosed is a copy of Bureau teletype 5/28/75 to selected SACs and one copy each of Bureau teletypes 5/2 and 20/75 to all SACs, latter two teletypes for background information concerning captioned matter.

You will note that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) is interested in the whereabouts of some current employees of your office, including yourself. For your additional information, an SSC Staff Member recently inquired of a former Bureau official concerning communications sent to Legat, Rome, in 1964 concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and concerning the name of the Legat at Rome in 1964. (It was the erroneous recollection of the former Bureau official that Armand Cammarota was the Legat in Rome in 1964).

Handle all inquiries from the SSC in accordance with the enclosed instructions.

REC-100 62-116395-204

JUN 3 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/JEW

Enclosures - 3

SFP:ekw EKW
(10)

MAILED 20
JUN 2 1975
FBI

NOTE: Enclosed 5/2/75 tel to all offices gave general background as to Senstudy 75 and alerted field that former and incumbent employees might be contacted for interview by SSC Staff. Enclosed 5/20/75 tel alerted all SACs to possible inquiries made of field offices and action to take if contacted. SSC letter 5/14/75 enclosed a request for names and current office assignments or last known addresses of all FBI employees assigned Rome, 1964. Three employees then assigned there are still in Rome and their names are included in the copy of the 5/28/75 teletype being sent Rome. That teletype included instructions for selected offices to alert additional 1964 Rome employees who are now assigned elsewhere or no longer with FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

PLM

84 JUN 1 1 1975

GPO 954-546

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 0 5 1975
DCW
TELETYPE

NR 005 NK CODE

12:00PM IMMEDIATE JUNE 5, 1975 JCG

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM NEWARK (66-3971)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL MAY 28, 1975. Sen 178

FORMER AND PRESENT EMPLOYEES LISTED IN RE BUTEL HAVE BEEN CONTACTED AND ALERTED TO POSSIBILITY OF INTERVIEWS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS SET OUT IN BUTEL MADE KNOWN TO THESE EMPLOYEES, NONE OF WHOM HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF AS YET.

BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED SHOULD THEY CONTACT THIS OFFICE RE SUCH SSC CONTACT.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/jfw

PLS HOLD HAVE ONE MORE Y FOR YOU

REC-100

62-116395-203

3 JUN 9 1975

58

79 JUN 10 1975

C.C. Putman

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

At 11:44 a.m. on June 5, 1975, Daniel M. Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he is scheduled to be interviewed at 10:00 a.m. on June 6, 1975, in Room 308 of the New Senate Office Building by Mark Gitenstein. He requested a Bureau representative to be available forc consultation during the interview. I told Mr. Armstrong that I would make appropriate arrangements and that the individual who would be available would contact him to make necessary arrangements prior to the interview.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an appropriate representative to contact Mr. Armstrong (telephone number 632-6990) and to accompany him to the above-described interview.

Frank Schwartz
will handle
WOE

WRW/Tm

PLM

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1- Mr. Mintz

REC-100

62-116395-200

3 JUN 9 1975

JAM:mfd
(7)

79 JUN 10 1975

1 - M[illegible] J. J. McDermott
(A[illegible]: H. R. Hauer)
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. M. Mooney
(Attn: J. E. Reilly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

May 22, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. H. W. Dare, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum dated May 22, 1975, "RE: FILING SYSTEM," one copy of a document captioned "FBI Indexing Procedures" which concerns the FBI's filing system and one copy each of 13 Tables of Contents for FBI forms.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (30)

62-116395

HWD/SFP:cmc
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

delivered 5/28

delivered 5/29 to Committee

62-116395-201

3 JUN 9 1975

PLM

3- ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

17 9 JUN 10 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

[redacted]

1 - M[illegible] J. J. McDermott
(At[illegible]n: H. R. Hauer)
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. M. Mooney
(Attn: J. E. Reilly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. H. W. Dare, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: FILING SYSTEM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/rw

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and the appendices thereto, which contained requests for documents and other information from the FBI.

In connection with Part four, concerning the FBI's filing system and printed forms utilized by this Bureau, enclosed are copies of the following:

1. Undated nine-page memorandum captioned "FBI Indexing Procedures."

2. One copy each of 13 Tables of Contents concerning forms utilized by this Bureau.

Concerning the FBI's filing system and the Committee's requests for a so-called "Clerk's Manual;" and for a list of FBI classifications used in its filing system, it will be noted that the nine-page memorandum contains the list of classifications. With respect to the so-called "Clerk's Manual," the Files and Communications Division of the FBI maintains detailed instructions which are followed by its employees in classifying mail for indexing. It is not known whether such instructions are what is referred to by the Committee as the "Clerk's Manual." These instructions consist of nine volumes of material. Because of their bulkiness and because it is not clear whether this material would serve the Committee's purpose, it is not being furnished at this time. However, it will be available for review at FBI Headquarters by the Committee Staff.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PLM

HWD/SFP:cmc
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

FILING SYSTEM

The following will explain the Tables of Contents concerning FBI forms which are being furnished in lieu of the actual forms at this time. This procedure is being followed because the forms number nearly 2,000 and many will probably be of no interest to the Committee. If the Committee will review these Tables of Contents and advise which forms it desires to see, appropriate steps will then be taken to make them available to the Committee Staff. The Tables of Contents headed "FBI Form Book" lists all FBI FD (Field Division) forms which are in use throughout the field. The remaining Tables of Contents list those forms applicable to the work of specific FBI Divisions at Headquarters. For example, forms with the prefix "1" are used in Division One (Identification); those with prefix "2" are used in Division Two (Training); etc. There are no forms peculiar to Divisions 11 (Legal Counsel) and 13 (Office of Planning and Evaluation). Those forms with prefix "0" (omnibus) are for use by two or more Divisions at Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Clearance for making these Tables of Contents available was obtained from the Training Division for the FD forms and from each Division for its applicable forms. The Files and Communications Division has cleared the paper "FBI Indexing Procedures."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/22/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Filing System

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 5/29/75 @ 2P

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-201

ENCLOSURE

4-528

62-116395-200

CHANGED TO

62-116464-5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

JUN 12 1975

Hmk / cz

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 5/12/75

FROM : H.C. Flemister, Jr.

SUBJECT: CLEARANCE OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE (IIC) FOR RELEASE TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

The following is to record the clearance of certain documents prepared by the IIC and, in some instances, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) for release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC).

The SSC has been furnished a paper prepared by the Intelligence Division which was a position paper on the FBI's jurisdiction in internal security matters, intelligence and counterintelligence investigations. This paper was dated 2/13/75 and set forth information taken from certain documents or parts of documents by the IIC and, in some instances, the ICIS. All of these documents have been cleared for passage to the SSC by the following members of the IIC, as well as Mr. William Wark, Executive Secretary of the ICIS:

> Mr. Rowland Morrow, Director, Defense Investigative Programs Office; Mr. Merrill Kelly, Deputy Director of Operations, ACSI, U. S. Army; Colonel Leo Olsen, OSI, U. S. Air Force; Mr. Jack Donnelly, Naval Investigative Service.

Mr. Wark advised he did not feel it necessary to clear documents through the Attorney General since they pertain to IIC matters which were merely concurred in by ICIS.

Copies of the documents involved are attached and are as follows:

Enclosures

CONTINUED - OVER

JRW:tdp (7)
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Fulton (Lacey)
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Wagoner

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

~~5 MAY 1975~~

NOT RECORDED
191 JUN 4 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-3643-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

5 JUN 10 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: CLEARANCE OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
(IIC) FOR RELEASE TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

(1) Excerpt from report on the status of the Internal Security Program of the U. S. as of 6/30/58 dated 8/27/58, prepared by the IIC and the ICIS.

(2) Department of Justice memorandum dated 3/5/64 to Former Director Hoover setting forth new charter for the IIC under Attorney General supervision.

(3) Excerpt from report on the Internal Security Program dated 3/5/54, prepared by the IIC and the ICIS.

(4) Letter from Former Director Hoover, Chairman, IIC, to the Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, The White House, dated 7/25/61 and its enclosure of 7/25/61, prepared by the IIC.

(5) Memorandum from NSC Representative on Internal Security J. Patrick Coyne to Former Director Hoover dated 11/6/50 and letter to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC, dated 11/8/50 from Former Director Hoover, Chairman, IIC, and its enclosure.

ACTION:

None. For information.

WOC
EWS

JBA
pcm

1 - Mr. ~~J. B. Adams~~
1 - Mr. A. Mintz (J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. [illegible] R. Wannall
1 - Mr. [illegible] O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

TO SAC EL PASO (62-1957) JUNE 3, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (105-78256)

THOMAS RIHA; MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING.

REEPAIRTEL, MAY 8, 1970.

IMMEDIATELY CONTACT DR. JOSEPH SMILEY TO DETERMINE IF CONTENTS OF AIRTEL CAN BE FURNISHED CONFIDENTIALLY TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IF SMILEY HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT RELEASE OF INTERVIEW TO THIS COMMITTEE ASCERTAIN UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS, IF ANY, HE WOULD AGREE TO SUCH RELEASE. SUTEL ATTENTION W. O. CREGAR.

RLM:jmn jmn
(7)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 3 1975 155p
TELETYPE

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 5 1975

105-78256-43

ORIGINAL FILED IN

NOTE:

The Senate Select Committee has expressed an urgent interest in the details of any FBI investigation concerning the disappearance of Thomas Riha, former Professor at University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, in March, 1969. The Bureau conducted no investigation regarding the disappearance. There was considerable publicity with reference to a statement made by Dr. Smiley, then President of the university, that he had been informed by a Government official that Riha "was alive and well" Smiley was interviewed by the El Paso Office. Smiley furnished information in the strictest of confidence, not to be disseminated to any outside agency, regarding his contacts with a CIA representative in Boulder after the Riha disappearance. It was the CIA official who told him that Riha was alive and well. Without the Smiley interview our response to the Senate Select Committee has an obvious gap. If the Committee calls any witnesses in the Riha matter Dr. Smiley would be one of the most logical persons to call. The passage of time and other factors may have brought about a change in the mind of Dr. Smiley regarding the necessity to keep the information furnished by him in a confidential relationship with the Bureau and it is believed he should be given the opportunity to either reinforce his request for confidentiality or release the Bureau from the restriction he imposed.

RLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

8 JUN 5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

RECORDS
CC-62-116395
(SENSTUDY 75)

GPO 954-545

1 - [illegible]r. [illegible]. B. Adams
1 - [illegible] J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

May 22, 1975

Director, FBI

REC- 102

1 Encl.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning the interview by Senator Walter F. Mondale of the Senate Select Committee as well as members of its staff of retired FBI Special Agent John P. Devlin. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - 67-220521 (Personnel File for SA John P. Devlin)

WOC:cmc
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

NOTE:

The furnishing of the LHM to the Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to Wilderotter is the same procedure we have followed in the past regarding the interviews of former FBI employees by the SSC Staff.

ENCLOSURE

Delivered to
5/22/75

REC-102

62-116395-[illegible]

JUN 6 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 6 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

May 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
BY SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE AND
STAFF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-2001 BY SP2ALM/RW

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by retired SA John P. Devlin following his voluntary appearance before Senator Mondale and Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on May 19, 1975. Devlin's appearance followed an interview of him by Senate Select Committee Staff Member Michael T. Epstein on April 25, 1975. A memorandum reporting the results of the April 25, 1975, interview was forwarded to the Attorney General as an enclosure to my letter to the Attorney General dated May 8, 1975, entitled "United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities."

On May 19, 1975, Devlin was interviewed by Senator Mondale; SSC Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.; Assistant Minority Counsel Charles Kirbow; and Epstein. The interview was conducted in a building across the street from the Dirksen Building in Washington, D. C., and lasted from approximately 2:00 p.m. to 3:20 p.m. Devlin was not subpoenaed to appear but appeared voluntarily. He was placed under oath by Senator Mondale.

At the outset of the interview Devlin was advised of his rights; that he could be represented by counsel and that if he had none, but desired counsel, the Committee Staff would attempt to provide one for him. At the conclusion of the interview he was thanked but given no indication as to whether he would be called to testify before the SSC.

1 - 67-220521 (Personnel File for SA John P. Devlin)

WOC:cmc
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-199

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Re: Interview of Retired Special Agent (SA)
by Senator Walter F. Mondale and
Staff Members of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC)

Following being advised of his rights, Devlin was asked who sent him to Atlantic City and why he was sent. He advised he received his instructions from Special Agent in Charge Ralph Bachman through Devlin's supervisor, SA Vincent Murphy. It is to be noted here that upon being interviewed by Epstein on April 25, 1975, Devlin had indicated he had received his instructions through his supervisor, SA William Gagnon. Devlin corrected this mistake during the interview of May 19, 1975. As to why he was sent, Devlin advised that as a sound man of the Newark Office he was sent to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to install a technical surveillance on Martin Luther King, Jr., who occupied a room at the Claridge Hotel in that city. Devlin was asked whether the monitoring plant for the electronic surveillance was located in the same hotel. Upon being advised it was the interviewers' desire to know whether the location of the plant at the Claridge Hotel was also designed to serve as a physical lookout on King's room, Devlin advised he was not aware that the FBI employed a physical lookout on King's hotel room. Devlin was also asked whether he installed a microphone in the room of King. He advised that he had not because it was not technically feasible. Also of concern to those interviewing Devlin on May 19, was whether he had personal knowledge as to whether the Attorney General had approved the electronic surveillance on King's telephone. Devlin replied he had no personal knowledge but assumed such authority had been obtained by his supervisor. Devlin was also asked if he could recall any conversations over King's phone which were monitored. Devlin replied that the only recollection he had involved conversations between King and his wife wherein they discussed her plans to travel to Atlantic City. Additionally, he did recall conversations involving the noted entertainer, Mehalia Jackson, who was appearing at that time in Atlantic City. Devlin could not recall the substance of the conversation with Jackson. He was also asked whether he retained or possessed any

Re: Interview of Retired Special Agent (SA)
by Senator Walter F. Mondale and
Staff Members of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC)

notes regarding the activity that occurred in Atlantic City during the Democratic Party Nominating Convention during the summer of 1964. Devlin advised that he did not retain any notes but subsequent to the original contact of him by Epstein, Devlin called SA John Connelly of the FBI Office in Newark in an effort to review any available material that might refresh his recollection. Connelly advised Devlin that all materials and notes retained by the Newark Office were forwarded to FBI Headquarters. This information was conveyed to the interviewers on the occasion of the May 19, 1975, interview.

Devlin also was asked if he ever questioned the technical coverage of King inasmuch as it appeared to be for political rather than security reasons. Devlin replied that he had no reason to question the technical coverage of King. He also was asked if he personally met with Mr. Cartha DeLoach of the FBI while both were in Atlantic City. Devlin advised he could not recall whether he actually met DeLoach, pointing out that SA Billie D. Williams was assigned the liaison responsibility with DeLoach.

Devlin was asked whether he had contacted the FBI following his original interview by Epstein on April 25, 1975. Devlin advised he had reported the interview by Epstein to the FBI Office in Newark, New Jersey. He further advised that subsequent to this, he received a call from Newark Assistant Special Agent in Charge Herbert Clough who informed him that should he be contacted in the future, and should he feel he needed to consult with FBI officials, he could call the Legal Counsel Division, FBI Headquarters, in Washington, D. C., collect, for such consultation. Senator Mondale desired to know who Devlin saw upon his arrival in Washington, D. C., on the morning of May 19, 1975, and specifically what instructions he received from the FBI. Devlin advised Senator Mondale that

Re: Interview of Retired Special Agent (SA)
by Senator Walter F. Mondale and
Staff Members of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC)

upon arrival in Washington, D. C., he reported to Inspector John Hotis of the Legal Counsel Division and Paul V. Daly of the FBI at which time he was advised of what obligations he had to the Attorney General as a former employee of the FBI to protect information obtained by virtue of his former employment in the FBI. Subsequent to Devlin's meeting with Mr. Hotis and Mr. Daly, he spent the remainder of the morning with SA William O. Cregar. Mondale desired to know specifically what Devlin and Cregar discussed. Devlin advised that other than discussing mutual friendships in the FBI, Cregar advised of what Cregar's role would be in accompanying him to the interview and specifically that Devlin could feel free to ask for the opportunity to consult with Cregar during the interview if the line of inquiry could possibly reveal the identity of sources, sensitive methods or investigative techniques, information derived from third agencies, or information which could adversely affect sensitive ongoing investigations.

NOTE:

Original and one copy to the Attorney General (AG) for forwarding the copy of the memorandum to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. The information contained herein was orally furnished to SA W. O. Cregar by former SA Devlin following his interview of May 19, 1975.

~~1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall~~

June 4, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired Special Agent of FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: Bureau file 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/19/75

5. INTERVIEWERS: Senator Walter F. Mondale of the SSC; SSC Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.; SSC Assistant Minority Counsel Charles Kirbow; and SSC Staff Member Michael T. Epstein.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT: Witness was interviewed under oath, although he did not appear under subpoena, as a follow-up to an earlier interview of him by an SSC Staff Member. His testimony concerned his participation in the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395

SFP:ekw ERW
(6)

Delivered 6/5/75

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC-102

62-116395-198

17 JUN 6 1975

84 JUN 6 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

3 JUN 1975

Senstudy - '75

Mr. William O. Cregar
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4123
J. Edgar Hoover Building

Dear Bill:

Attached is a letter to the Chairman of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, signed by the DCI on 29 May 1975. It deals with the custody for and access to certain particularly sensitive material. This is an effective arrangement for the protection of special matters.

Sincerely,

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Enclosure:
As Stated

62-116395

REC- 102

62-116395-197

17 JUN 6 1975

84 JUN 6 1975

Executive Registry
75-6430/1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OLC 75-1163

29 MAY 1975

Honorable John O. Pastore, Chairman
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my letter to you on 20 May 1975 I requested your assistance in making the Joint Committee's secure storage facilities available for the retention of certain sensitive material to which access is needed by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Those arrangements have been made with Mr. George Murphy and with the Select Committee. I want to thank you for making the facilities available and for permitting Mr. Murphy to be the custodian of the material.

A further need has now arisen for the same kind of arrangement for the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Again I would be very grateful to you and Mr. Murphy if a similar arrangement could be made for the members of the House Committee and members of the Committee staff designated for access to such material by mutual agreement of Chairman Nedzi and myself.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
- 1 - DCI
- 1 - Mr. Knoche
- 1 - ER
- 1 - Mr. Clarke
- 1 - Select Committee
- 1 - OLC Chrono
- 1 - JCAE File

62-116395-197

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: May 23, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975

Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Intelligence Task Force Director of captioned Committee advised that they were in receipt of a letter from the U. S. Postal Service informing the Committee an inquiry concerning the identity of all mail covers placed by the FBI since 1960, should be directed to the FBI.

Elliff inquired as to whether a letter from the Committee concerning this particular request should be directed to the Bureau or Attorney General. He was instructed the request should be directed to the Attorney General. Elliff said that he would direct such a letter to the Attorney General making a request concerning mail covers in the near future.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Intelligence, Special Investigative and General Investigative Divisions should gather necessary material so that the appropriate response might be prepared.

PVD JBH/PVD

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Cleveland
1-Mr. Gebhardt
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly

PLM

REC-102

62-116395-196

PVD:lgp
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY

17 JUN 6 1975

11-

84 JUN 6 1975

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. J.C. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 21, 1975

1 - Mr. P. T. Blake

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Two of the documents requested were the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) dated June, 1970, and the original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. With respect to the original report on COINTELPRO activities, pursuant to the conversation between Mr. John C. Keeney, Department of Justice, and Special Agent James C. Farrington, FBI Headquarters, on March 27, 1975, it was agreed the Department would await receipt of the Bureau's opinion prior to formulating its response to Senator Church's request for the 39-page Petersen report on COINTELPRO.

The 39-page COINTELPRO report, as well as all but one of Exhibits A through P attached thereto, contains matters relating to the internal deliberations of Department and FBI representatives who constituted the study Committee headed by former Assistant Attorney General Petersen. It is, therefore, suggested that if it is decided the report should be made available to Senator Church, it be done with the provision it not be made public.

EX 104

REC-59

62-116395-195

MAY 1 1975

Concerning the exhibits referred to in the text of the report: Exhibits A through L are summaries and memoranda prepared by the FBI or by Department attorneys based on their review of FBI material, and some of these are classified "Secret"; Exhibits M and N are legal memoranda prepared by Department attorneys in connection with the study Committee inquiry; Exhibit P is a work paper prepared by the FBI setting

ENCLOSURE

EWL:glw/jvl
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 11 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Delivered to Jack Fuller, Atty Gen's Office,
5:30 pm 4/22/75 JBH

GPO 954-546

forth overall recommendations relating to counterintelligence activity. All of these exhibits are in the nature of deliberative, internal work papers wherein opinions were freely expressed because they were not prepared with the idea in mind of publication, and it would appear they would be exempt from disclosure even if the report itself is furnished to Senator Church.

It is, therefore, recommended that, due to the above considerations, those exhibits prepared by the FBI not be furnished to Senator Church if you do decide to give him the report. It is felt the Department should determine if those exhibits prepared solely by the Department, such as Exhibits M and N, should be furnished to the Senator, but it is our recommendation that they not be for the same reasons as stated above.

Exhibit O is a press release dated December 7, 1973, which, of course, is already public source in nature.

You will recall that then Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman, in testimony before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary as to why this 39-page report should not be furnished to that Committee stated, "...if we had thought it was appropriate to release the full discussion we would have done so at the time. There are a lot of internal working documents in the Justice Department which go to the making of a final report. This is the Attorney General's report."

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which sets forth the status of their request for the two documents. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures - 2

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. J.C. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. T. Blake

April 21, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

One of the requests, under V., A., was the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) dated June, 1970. This is the so-called "Huston Report" and was prepared for the White House. Under the circumstances, this request has been referred to the White House.

Under V., B., a request was made for the original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Since that report is the property of the Department of Justice, the request has been referred to that Department.

1 - The Attorney General

EWL:glw/jvl jvl
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/ew

WRW/TJL

JBA
TJM

6/3/75
P.V. Daly advised LHM not delivered to SSC in Dept. is preparing its own reply. SSC was orally advised of contents by Daly. TJM

[illegible] 6/11/75

Delivered to Jack Fuller, Atty Gen's off,
5:30 pm, 4/22/75 JBH.

EWL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-195

GPO 954-546

PERS. REC. UNIT

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General

May 23, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. V. Daly

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by Staff Members of captioned Committee of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director of the FBI. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

WOC:ekw ekw
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY [illegible]

REC-180 62-116395-194

17 JUN 5 1975

2 ENCLOSURE

([illegible] to Wilderotter 5/27/75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 5 1975

V.S.F. [illegible] - 4001 JEH (Lost)

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr.J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

62-116395

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. P. V. Daly
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE
DIRECTOR JOHN P. MOHR BY SSC STAFF
MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-81 BY [illegible]

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Mohr following his interview by representatives of the Staff of the SSC in Washington, D. C., on May 9, 1975.

Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Lester B. Seidel, and Thomas Dawson from approximately 10:20 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. He was not placed under oath and he was not advised of his rights or that he could be represented by personal counsel.

At the outset of the interview, it was apparent that its purpose was to assist the SSC Staff Members in trying to understand how the flow of mail proceeded in the FBI under Mr. Hoover's directorship. For example, Mr. Mohr was shown FBI documents relating to the Socialist Workers Party as well as COINTELPRO documents which were obtained by Mr. Carl Stern under the Freedom of Information Act. No substantive questions were directed to Mr. Mohr regarding these documents but were shown to him in order that Mr. Mohr might identify who the final authority was in approving such documents.

In addition to the above, the Staff Members asked Mr. Mohr to explain the difference between an SAC Letter and a letter to all SACs. They also asked Mr. Mohr if the Bureau maintained a separate file on all SAC Letters.

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

WOC:ekw ekw
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

[illegible]-116[illegible] - 194

Mr. Mohr was also questioned about the procedures he followed in securing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's office after Mr. Hoover's death. Mr. Mohr told the Staff Members that the article which appeared in "The Washington Star" by columnist Jeremiah O'Leary was an accurate recording of what took place following Mr. Hoover's death. The Staff Members requested Mr. Mohr review in considerable detail exactly what he did to secure Mr. Hoover's office following his death.

The question of former Associate Director Clyde Tolson's will was also raised by Staff Members. Mr. Mohr advised the interviewers that Hillory Tolson, brother of Clyde Tolson, had not decided at that time whether he was going to contest the will.

Mr. Mohr was also asked about the whereabouts of Miss Helen Gandy, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Hoover. He advised that he did know her whereabouts and telephone number but promised he would not reveal them to anyone. Mr. Mohr was asked whether Miss Gandy would agree to being interviewed by Staff Members of the SSC. He advised that he would attempt to persuade Miss Gandy to agree to being interviewed on the condition he be allowed to be present during the entire interview. The Staff Members interposed no objection to that arrangement and Mr. Mohr indicated that he would advise Mr. Gitenstein of Miss Gandy's desires under the conditions stipulated above.

On May 12, 1975, Mr. Mohr telephonically advised that he recalled some additional topics covered during the interview of May 9, 1975, which he desired to furnish to the FBI. Specifically, Mr. Mohr recalled that he was asked if he knew who prepared the "surreptitious letters" the Bureau had mailed in the Socialist Workers Party case. Mr. Mohr advised the Staff Members that he did not know but presumed these letters were prepared in the Document Section of the FBI Laboratory.

Mr. Mohr also recalled that during his interview of May 9, 1975, he had advised Miss Gandy had turned over to Mr. Mark Felt of the FBI the official and confidential files of Mr. Hoover which amounted to one-half a file drawer. Subsequently, Mr. Mohr learned from Miss Gandy that the official and confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt amounted to one and one-half file drawers. This information was subsequently furnished to Mr. Gitenstein by Mr. Mohr. On that occasion, Mr. Gitenstein asked Mr. Mohr whether an itemized list of the official and confidential files was made and if so where the list was. Mohr told Gitenstein that he was sure a list was made and that in all probability the list accompanied the official and confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt by Miss Gandy.

In addition to the above, Mr. Mohr on May 12, 1975, recalled that Gitenstein asked about a requirement of all Bureau employees to turn over any confidential files in their possession ordered by Mr. Hoover following the revelation that former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had turned over certain confidential files to former Assistant Attorney General Mardian. Mr. Mohr advised Gitenstein that Mr. Hoover had in fact levied such a requirement on Bureau officials and that all confidential files were to be turned over to Mr. Felt along with a memorandum explaining the nature of these files. Gitenstein asked Mohr where these memoranda would be filed. Mohr responded by saying he presumed they were confidential memoranda and would have gone with the confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt by Bureau officials maintaining such files.

NOTE: The original and one copy of this LHM is being furnished to the Attorney General. The copy is to be forwarded by the Attorney General to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. The information herein was taken from two memoranda, Cregar to Wannall, dated 5/9 and 12/75 entitled "Senstudy 75."

~~1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
June 2, 1975 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1. SUBJECT: FBI mail flow procedures and other miscellaneous matters.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired Special Agent, FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/9/75

5. INTERVIEWERS: SSC Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Lester B. Seidel, and Thomas Dawson.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT: The witness was questioned and furnished information concerning procedures relating to the flow of mail at FBI Headquarters and other miscellaneous matters such as the difference between an SAC Letter and a letter to all SACs.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395
SFP:ekw ekw
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN
DATE 1-19-01 SP2ALM/RW

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

REC-100

62-116395-193

JUN 5 1975

8

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 971-546

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-29-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, K. William O'Connor requested on 5-28-75, that he be given the opportunity to review summaries of the five recently uncovered COINTELPRO programs. O'Connor stated that in view of captioned Committee's request concerning COINTELPRO and his position of being in charge of Bureau and Departmental responses to Committee requests, he felt that it would be advantageous for him to be generally aware of the contents of the five newly uncovered programs. Mr. O'Connor stated he had previously reviewed the other COINTELPRO programs. [while in Civil Rights Division]

RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. O'Connor be allowed to review the five recently uncovered COINTELPRO programs.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE [illegible] BY [illegible]

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Ryan
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

REC-100

62-116395-192

JUN 5 1975

FIVE

84 JUN 5 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TJL

DATE: 5/22/75

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

Sen 142

Reference is made to my memorandum dated 5/19/75 advising of the receipt of a letter from the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to the Attorney General dated 5/14/75, appending requests for additional documents and other information.

Specific attention is invited to Appendix A, item number 5, which requests:

"All Memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use the following techniques to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities (see letter from the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General dated April 23, 1975):

a. All forms of electronic surveillance, including consensual electronic surveillance;

b. All forms of mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail;

c. Surreptitious entry;

d. All forms of physical surveillance, including agent infiltration, observation, photography, and remote viewing and sensing devices;

e. Informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems;

f. Obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information;

g. Incommunicado interrogation;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC-100 62-116395-191

17 JUN 5 1975

62-116395

EWL:cmc cmc
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 5 1975

h. Maintenance of files and records;

i. Dissemination of information from files and records;

j. So-called "COINTELPRO" techniques and methods, including all forms of organizational 'disruption.'"

Appendix B, item number 4, requests:

"For each of the techniques described in Item 5 of Appendix A above, all memoranda and other materials relating to:

a. The original decision to utilize the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

b. The policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities."

It would appear appropriate that response to Appendix A, item number 5, be prepared by the Legal Counsel Division. It is also apparent that response to Appendix B, item number 4, should be closely coordinated although responsibility for research in this area would appear to fall more logically within the Intelligence Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Legal Counsel Division assume responsibility for preparing response contained in Appendix A, Item number 5.

CONTINUED - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS - CONTINUED

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY - 75
62-116395

RECOMMENDATIONS - CONTINUED:

2. Intelligence Division will assume responsibility for preparing response to item number 4, Appendix B, with input from the Legal Counsel Division.

EWL

wrw

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 3, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) and its enclosures described below.

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Some of the enclosures to the LHM classified "Top Secret."

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: The LHM refers to a prior LHM furnished to the SSC enclosing a copy of "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75 and noted that certain exhibits were extracted prior to dissemination due to Third Agency Rule considerations. LHM advised that those considerations had been resolved and that the exhibits were being furnished with the LHM.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75. Response pertains to Part I of the SSC original letter of request dated 3/19/75.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/20/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: Third Agency Rule clearances obtained.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

REC-10 62-116395-190

17 JUN 5 1975

62-116395
SFP:ekw (4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. ____
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
gal Coun. ____
lephone Rm. __
ector Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
(Attn: J. W. Hines)
2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General

May 29, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE~~
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices A thru D requesting certain documents and other information.

Under item 26 of Appendix C, a request is made for "All reports prepared by the Office of Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice pursuant to the request in September 1974 of the Attorney General and/or Deputy Attorney General pertaining to the so-called 'Wounded Knee' case and any other so-called 'political trial' or other prosecutions brought by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division."

Under item 27 of Appendix C request is made of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for "All memoranda or other materials prepared by the FBI relating to the reports described in Item 26."

The Department is requested to advise this Bureau if reports which are requested in Appendix C under item 26 with respect to the "'Wounded Knee' case" were furnished to the FBI. If such reports were furnished please advise under what captions and dates these reports were submitted and identify by captions and dates all FBI communications on which your reports were based. If these reports were not furnished this Bureau please provide copies to us when you identify the FBI communications as requested herein.

REC-100 62-116395-188

You are also requested to provide to this Bureau copies of those reports, including sufficient information identifying FBI communications on which they were based, which will be furnished the Senate Select Committee per its request for "any other so-called 'political trial' or other prosecutions brought by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division."

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

62-116395

17 JUN 5 1975

KAM:cmc
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

KAM

JUN 5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

Inasmuch as this Bureau's response to item 27 of Appendix C enclosed with referenced letter depends on your response to item 26, you are requested to furnish the desired information as soon as possible in order that we may comply with the Senate Select Committee request. Since all reports requested under item 26 were prepared by the Department this Bureau will take no action to provide copies of these reports to the Committee.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

Until such time as we determine what information will be furnished the Senate Select Committee by the Department under item 26 mentioned above we believe our response on item 27 to the Senate Select Committee should be delayed. This will enable us to provide material requested by the Senate Select Committee which will correspond to information being provided by the Department.

Trial material relating to Wounded-Knee case was handled by the General Investigative Division and this part of the request is being coordinated with SA J. C. Gordon who supervised the Wounded-Knee case. Upon receipt of requested information from the Department, General Investigative Division will be notified so an appropriate response may be compiled regarding Wounded-Knee matter. Intelligence Division will conduct necessary reviews for information pertaining to other prosecutions by "Special Litigation Section" of the Department.

DCI/IC 75-2008

29 MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Certification of Clearances for Classified Information and Compartmented Information of Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee

Senstudy -'75

1. Arrangements have been made so that the Compartmented Information Branch (CIB) of CIA will maintain, as a matter of common concern, an up-to-date listing of all staff members of the Senate Select Committee who have been certified by the Committee for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET and also those who have been certified and briefed for compartmented information.

2. CIB will attempt to keep this listing in a current status and telephone inquiries can be made by calling 351-5507 (IDS 143-5507) during the hours 0800 to 1730 Monday through Friday. Periodically, a current listing of the individuals certified will be disseminated to members of the USIB Ad Hoc Group.

3. It is contemplated this same procedure will be followed for the House Select Committee when certification of clearances are received from this Committee and you will be advised when such procedure is instituted.

62-116395-

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

NOT RECORDED
12 JUL 25 1975

Records Pls. file
62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. Adams DATE: 5/21/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

At approximately 9:00 a.m. on May 21, 1975, retired Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella appeared in my office prior to his appointment to receive a subpoena and to testify at 9:30 a.m. on 5/21/75 at Washington, D.C., before the Senate Select Committee. I told Mr. Sentinella that it would not be possible for me to furnish him personal counsel prior to or during his testimony, however I felt it was appropriate for me to furnish him certain information. I told Mr. Sentinella that he was entitled to be represented by a personal counsel of his own choice at any time and that if he chose to secure the services of a private attorney he was at liberty to do so.

I also told Mr. Sentinella that under the rules of the Senate Select Committee (Rule 6.4), a witness may be accompanied by counsel during testimony and a witness who is unable to obtain counsel may inform the Committee of that fact and the Committee is obliged to endeavor to obtain voluntary counsel for the witness. I told him that the rules further provide that the failure to obtain counsel would not excuse him from appearing and testifying.

I asked Mr. Sentinella whether he had been given any advice by the Committee concerning his right to counsel and whether he had received a copy of the Committee's rules as required by regulations in the rules (Rule 6.1). Mr. Sentinella said that he had not been so advised and he had not been given a copy of the rules by any representative of the Committee.

I told Mr. Sentinella that as to matters other than the presence of personal counsel, no understanding had been reached with the Committee.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

REC- 102 62-116395-181

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

16 MAY 27 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 5 1975

I further explained to him that the Attorney General Order relating to responses to subpoenas would apply to him and that we had been advised that the Department had approved a waiver of the Attorney General Order limitation permitting his testimony, but only as to matters concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, including related matters. I told Mr. Sentinella that should the questioning involve other areas and he was in doubt as to his authorization to respond, he could request an opportunity to consult with the Department to secure approval for his testimony consistent with the terms of the Attorney General Order. I also reminded Mr. Sentinella that a representative of the FBI would be available during his testimony for such consultation as he felt might be necessary. I told him that SA Paul Daly would be available for that purpose.

I told Mr. Sentinella that our concern is not that matters of historical fact might be revealed, but that testimony which might be required of him could impair the Bureau's current efforts to discharge its responsibilities. I explained that in specific terms what this meant was that information that would identify sensitive sources, techniques or methods, or that would identify confidential informants, or would expose current investigative operations should be reserved for members of the Committee or perhaps the Chairman of the Committee depending upon the sensitivity of the particular information. I advised him that in the event such matters are involved in the questioning he could request consultation and that arrangements could be made for the answers to be supplied under appropriately limited conditions. I told Mr. Sentinella that as to other areas of possible testimony, the Bureau would impose no request that he decline to answer questions.

Mr. Sentinella advised me that he understood the matters I had explained to him and that he did not at this time feel the need of personal counsel because he said that he did not regard the appearance as one in the nature of a grand jury appearance. I told Mr. Sentinella that he should be aware that his testimony would be given under oath and in the event he made a statement that was self-incriminatory, it could be used against him. I reminded him I was not advising him in order to deter him from furnishing testimony, but only telling him of the protections he has under the

CONTINUED - OVER

Constitution against self-incrimination. He said he would keep that matter in mind.

Mr. Sentinella said that he would like to volunteer the results of his interview at the conclusion of the interview and he also would like to have an opportunity to review a transcript of the testimony for accuracy.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 16 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 019 SF PLAIN

7:09PM NITEL MAY 16, 1975 KEK

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395) (ATTN: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL)

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SENSTUDY, 1975

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL OFFICES MAY 2, 1975.

ON MAY 16, 1975, FORMER SAN FRANCISCO SUPERVISOR DAVID E. TODD CALLED AND ADVISED HE HAD RECEIVED CALL FROM LESTER SEIDEL, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, WANTING TO INTERVIEW TODD RE DOMESTIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, SPECIFICALLY, BLACK PANTHER PARTY. TODD SAID HE WANTED TO BE COOPERATIVE BUT WAS APPREHENSIVE REGARDING DIVULGING INFORMATION AS A RESULT OF HIS FBI EMPLOYMENT. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO IMMEDIATELY CALL COLLECT THE OFFICE OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL AT FBIHQ. HE SAID HE WOULD DO THIS.

TODD ALSO ADVISED THAT SEIDEL HAD TOLD HIM THE COMMITTEE ALSO WANTED TO INTERVIEW FORMER SAN FRANCISCO SUPERVISOR ALBERT P. CLARK.

END

EX 104

REC 67

62-116395-186

17 MAY 28 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/RU

LEC

CC

102

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 29 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 005 AX CODE

3:20 AM URGENT MAY 29, 1975 DKL

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-217) (RUC) 1 PAGE

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA, MAY 28, 1975.

ON MAY 29, 1975, FORMER EMPLOYEES COURTLAND J. JONES AND BERNARD A. WELLS WERE CONTACTED BY ASAC MICHAEL A. MORROW, IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, AND FURNISHED INFORMATION SET OUT IN REFERENCED TELETYPE.

END

HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/R

REC-100

62-116395-185

Records
cc 67-155313 (Jones)
67-436022 (Wells)

PERS. REC. UNIT

5-P

84 JUN 5 1975

Assoc Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 BA CODED

7:49 PM NITEL 5/30/75 JAN

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: BALTIMORE (66-3127)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL MAY 28, 1975. Ser 178

THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS WERE CONTACTED ON THE INDICATED DATES BY THE ASAC AND INSTRUCTIONS INRETEL FOLLOWED.

NONE OF THEM HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF TO DATE, AND EACH STATED THEY WOULD CONTACT THE FBI SHOULD THEY BE CONTACTED IN THE FUTURE.

MAY 29, 1975 - ROBERT H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND.

MAY 30, 1975 - ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDNOR ROAD, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND.

MAY 30, 1975 - STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAL LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND.

END

REC-100

62-116395-184

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/Rw

Records:
CC-67-140656 (Belter)
67-438869 (Haynes)
67-177725 (Donahoe)

5-(?)

84 JUN 5 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 30 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 036 CG CODE

727PM NITEL 5/30/75 FMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM CHICAGO

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL MAY 28, 1975.

PURSUANT TO BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, MISS OLGA CIESA WAS CONTACTED BY SAC, CHICAGO, ON MAY 30, 1975 REGARDING CAPTIONED MATTER. SHE STATED SHE STILL RESIDES 10409 SOUTH INDIANA AVENUE, CHICAGO, AND IS STILL EMPLOYED AS AN EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AT THE FIRM OF ERNST AND ERNST, ATTORNEYS, IN CHICAGO.

MISS CIESA WAS ADVISED THAT THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAD MADE INQUIRY AS TO HER LAST KNOWN ADDRESS, INDICATING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MAY DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HER. SHE WAS FURTHER ADVISED THAT IN THE EVENT SHE IS INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME ANY QUESTIONS WERE ASKED RELATIVE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS, ETC., SHE COULD REQUEST THE ASSISTANCE OF AN AGENT TO BE PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW.

5-28

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

(019a Ciesa)

REC-100

62-116395-183

JUN 4 1975

cc 67

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 5 1975

PAGE TWO

SHE WAS FURTHER ADVISED THAT IF AFTER THE INTERVIEW THERE WERE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PRESENTED A QUESTION IN HER MIND SHE COULD CONTACT THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION IN WASHINGTON, D.C., COLLECT, FOR ANY ASSISTANCE THAT DIVISION COULD AFFORD HER.

MISS CIFSA WAS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WOULD DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HER AND ADVISED THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY SHE WOULD ASK FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF AN AGENT PRIOR TO ANSWERING ANY QUESTIONS THEY MAY PROPOSE TO HER. SHE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT SHE MIGHT INADVERTENTLY DISCLOSE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND AS A RESULT WOULD FEEL MUCH MORE SECURE WERE AN AGENT PRESENT TO ADVISE HER.

IN THE EVENT CONTACT IS MADE THE BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED.

END

HOLD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

NR033 OM CODE

5:33PM NITEL 5/30/75 SKH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: OMAHA (62-3439) (P)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL, MAY 28, 1975.

SA ROBERT L. TAGG, WHO IS CURRENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY AND CURRENTLY ASSIGNED AS SENIOR RESIDENT AGENT, LINCOLN, NEBRASKA, RESIDENT AGENCY, ADVISED OF CONTENTS IN RE TELETYPE. SHOULD SA TAGG BE CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, THE BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED IEDIA.

END.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RL

REC-100

62-116395-182

17 JUN 4 1975

Records (Tagg)

cc 67

PERS. REC. UNIT 5

84 JUN 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 30 1975
TELETYPE

NR07 PX CODE

317PM MAY 30, 1975 URGENT WKC

TO: DIRECTOR

MINNEAPOLIS (PERSONAL ATTENTION)

FROM: PHOENIX (62-2033) 3P

SENSTUDY 75

Sec'y 18

REBUNITEL DATED MAY 28, 1975 AND PHOENIX TELCALL TO MINNEAPOLIS MAY 30, 1975.

FOR INFORMATION OF MINNEAPOLIS FOLLOWING IS BEING SET FORTH:

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

REC-100 62-116395-181

17 JUN 4 1975

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE

END PAGE ONE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

RISK

cc 67-

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 5 1975

SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKNOWN. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

END PAGE TWO

PHOENIX: MILDRED E. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE, YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA

INVESTIGATION AT YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA HAS DISCLOSED THAT MILDRED E. RISK IS NOW RESIDING WITH HER SISTER, MRS. W.A. HILLS, TEN MILE LAKE, HACKENSACK, MINNESOTA, RR 2, TELEPHONE NUMBER 218-547-3048, AND WILL BE THERE UNTIL FALL OF THIS YEAR WHEN SHE WILL RETURN TO ARIZONA.

MINNEAPOLIS HANDLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS.

END

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 29 1975
Dcw
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 002 AT CODE

9:53 PM NITEL MAY 29, 1975 WCG

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

Sw/18

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA AND OTHER OFFICES, MAY 28, 1975.

SA ALDEN F. MILLER, ATLANTA DIVISION, ALERTED TO POSSIBILITY OF CONTACT BY SSC. SA MILLER HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED TO DATE. IN THE EVENT CONTACT, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION WILL BE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THROUGH THE SAC.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RU

Records
cc 67-415968 (Alden Miller)

REC-100

62-116395-180

PERS. REC. UNIT

17 JUN 4 1975

84 JUN 5 1975

Assoc Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 30 1975
TELETYPE

REC-100

NR009 AT CODE

8:58 PM NITEL MAY 30,1975 WCG

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTENTION: INTD - W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

DURING A MEETING WITH REGINALD MURPHY, EDITOR, THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, MAY 29,1975, MURPHY IN GENERAL CONVERSATION ADVISED SAC, ATLANTA, THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, D. C., SEEKING AN INTERVIEW WITH HIM. MURPHY SAID HE HAD AGREED TO A MEETING WITH A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, NAME NOT STATED, AND DID SO SOMETIME APPARENTLY WITHIN THE LAST WEEK. MURPHY INDICATED THE INTERVIEW CONCERNED MARTIN LUTHER KING. MURPHY VOLUNTEERED HE WAS UNABLE TO ANSWER MANY OF THE QUESTIONS ASKED SINCE HE WAS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE EVENTS AND THAT SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS HE WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT ARE NOW DECEASED. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO FORMER EDITOR, RALPH MC GILL, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, NOW DECEASED, AND INDICATED THAT THE INQUIRY CONCERNED INFORMATION IT WAS FELT COULD BE PROVIDED BY MC GILL. MURPHY WAS NEVER SPECIFIC IN HIS CONVERSATION AND NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS

END PAGE ONE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-10667

Records
cc 100-106670 (King)

REC-100

62-116395-179

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JOMIW
6072

17 JUN 4 1975

84 JUN 4 1975

SINCE IT WAS OBVIOUS HE DID NOT WISH TO EXPAND ON THE COMMENTS MADE BY HIM.

MURPHY INDICATED ALSO THAT THE PERSON OR PERSONS INTERVIEWING HIM FELT HE, MURPHY, SHOULD HAVE SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND HE IS NOT SURE HE WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THEM THAT HE DID NOT. FROM THE COMMENTS MADE BY MURPHY, IT WAS THE IMPRESSION OF THE SAC THAT MURPHY WAS PRESSED FOR DETAILS WHICH HE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE.

END

FBIHQ FLC CLR TKS

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

5/28/75

TO SACS ALEXANDRIA
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
KANSAS CITY
LITTLE ROCK
NEWARK
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PORTLAND
PHOENIX
TAMPA
WFO

1 - Mr. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr.J.B.Hotis)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/KW

REBuTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

REC-100

62-116395-178

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE

1 - ROME (BY MAIL)

17 JUN 4 1975

SFP:ekw EKW
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 29 1975
215 AM SLP
TELETYPE

84 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO 954-546

SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKNOWN. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALEXANDRIA: COURTLAND J. JONES, 6607 N. 29TH STREET, ARLINGTON, VA.; ROBERT G. KUNKEL, SAC; BERNARD A. WELLS, 5311 MONTGOMERY STREET, SPRINGFIELD, VA.

ATLANTA: ALDEN F. MILLER

BALTIMORE: ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDNOR ROAD, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND; STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAL LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND; ROBERT H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND

CHARLOTTE: JOSEPH A. SIZOO, 84A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PINES, NORTH CAROLINA

CHICAGO: OLGA CIESA, 10409 S. INDIANA AVENUE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

KANSAS CITY: BILL D. WILLIAMS, SAC

LITTLE ROCK: JOHN J. CREAMER, JR., ASAC

NEWARK: JOHN J. CONNOLLY; RITA AGNES AMBROSIO, 1604 JOHN STREET, FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY; RALPH W. BACHMAN, 610 NORWOOD DRIVE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY; KARL L. BROUSE,

5 BURRINGTON GORGE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY.

OMAHA: ROBERT L. TAGG

PHILADELPHIA: JOHN B. MEADE

PORTLAND: LEO B. APP, JR.; EDGAR O. INGALLS

PHOENIX: MILDRED E. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE, YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA

TAMPA: MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6509 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BEACH, FLORIDA

WFO: JAMES J. GAFFNEY; ELMER L. TODD

ROME: THOMAS J. BIAMONTE; JOSEPH C. MICHELA; HELEN C. SPEAR
COPY TO ROME, WITH ITS EMPLOYEES NAMED, BY MAIL.

NOTE: May 14, 1975, SSC letter and appendices requested current whereabouts individuals named herein. Also included herein names of Bachman and Brouse who were SAC and ASAC respectively in Newark Office pertinent period inasmuch as one request from SSC was for memoranda from former SA Leo T. Clark to Newark SAC and ASAC. SSC request named several additional former employees who were previously alerted by tel to selected officers 5/2/75. Another 5/2/75 tel, to all offices, referenced herein, gave field general background re Senstudy 75. By separate airtel to Rome we are forwarding copy of instant tel as well as copies of prior pertinent tels. The caution taken herein in alerting former employees as well as incumbents is same we took previously by 5/2/75 tel to selected SACs. After dispatch instant tel, copies will be filed in personnel files of all named herein. One of the 1964 Rome employees was Theodore A. Korontjis, currently assigned INTD, who will be appropriately informed orally concerning this matter.

Korontjis informed
5/29/75 B

2 - [illegible] J. A. Mintz
([illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General

May 20, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/rc

Reference is made to memorandum and appendices thereto, from the Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, requesting documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number three of referenced communication requests that a Senate Select Committee Staff Representative be authorized to examine certain portions of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, (MRR), at the FBI Offices. The material requested, MRR Part I, Section nine; Part II, Sections one thru nine, has been segregated and is available for examination at FBI Headquarters.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum advising the Senate Select Committee that the above requested material is presently available for examination at FBI Headquarters.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

TEB:cmc
(8)

[illegible] O'Connell Dep't [illegible]
5/20 [illegible] 5/21 [illegible]
Delivered to [illegible]
of Committee By RTT 5/22/75

REC-10

62-116395-177

17 JUN 4 1975

2 ENCLOSURE

oc. Dir.
o. AD Adm.
AD Inv.
Dir.:
n.
p. Syst.
; Affairs
es & Com.
Inv.
tion

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

[redacted]

2 - [redacted]. J. A. Mintz
- Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

62-116395

May 20, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Reference is made to memorandum, with attached appendices, dated April 30, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Pursuant to your request to review the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations Part I, Section nine; and Part II, Sections one thru nine, we currently have such material available for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:cmc
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

NOTE:

The MRR sections described above have been reviewed by the appropriate FBIHQ Divisions and approved for examination in their entirety by Committee Staff Members with the following exceptions: MRR, Section 3, page 15 (j).(1) The phrase "Baltimore Source 4" has been deleted; Section 4, page 6, 20. The phrase "i.e., selective service records in other than selective service cases, Baltimore Confidential Source 4 information, etc." has been deleted. Excisions will be explained to Committee reviewers at the time of review by indicating the excisions related to sensitive confidential sources and have been made in order to protect sources' identity. These sources will not be further identified to Committee members nor will the term "Baltimore Source 4" be utilized.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE CONTINUED:

The MRR sections to be made available are described by number and heading as follows:

Part I

Section 9 - Disciplinary Matters

Part II

Section 1 - Authority--Training--Submission of Information

Section 2 - Supervision--Availability-Resident Agencies

Section 3 - Administration of Offices

Section 4 - Communications

Section 5 - Dissemination of Information

Section 6 - Publications, Press, and Public Contacts

Section 7 - Payments--Property

Section 8 - Miscellaneous Regulations

Section 9 - Classification--Character--Copies--Abbreviations.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/20/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Manual of Rules and Regulations

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor, Jr. Date: 5/22/75 @ 1:20 PM

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-177

ENCLOSURE

May 30, 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions Not Previously Furnished.

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: LHM refers to a request of the SSC for review privileges of certain designated Sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions. The LHM advises that all but one of the requested Sections is being made available for review at FBI Headquarters and that the excluded Section will be made available for review after clearance by other interested agencies as it involves third agency considerations.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. Reply refers to Part 2 of the request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/19/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

Third agency considerations involved in one of the Manual Sections requested by the SSC.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)
62-116395

REC-100

62-116395 - 176

Delivered 6/17/75

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-25-01 BY

17 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

May 30, 1975 2-Mr.S.F.Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: LHM refers to a request of the SSC for review privileges of certain designated Sections of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations. The LHM advises that the desired Sections are being made available for review at FBI Headquarters.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. Reply pertains to Part 3 of the SSC request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/20/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395.

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)

Delivered 6-17-75 HS

62-116395

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

62-116395-175

REC-100

17 JUN 4 1975

1035 8

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 4 1975

GPO 951-546

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

The Attorney General

May 19, 1975

1 - Mr. D. R. Dickson

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from the Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a partial response to the request set forth in referenced memorandum. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

A copy of the memorandum for the Committee is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

DRD:lfj
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY

5/21 [illegible] 5/21 [illegible] 5/22 [illegible]

REC-100

62-116395-174

ENCL BEHIND FILE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Legal Counsel Division
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. D. R. Dickson

62-116395 May 19, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Part 2 of the request concerned Sections of the Manual of Instructions Not Previously Produced. Pursuant to your request, Sections 4, 8R, 19, 23, 27, 28, 29, 75, 78, 90, 103, 134, 136, 144, and 146 are now available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstion, or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

Section 102, which you requested, is not available for review at this time because this Section involves third agency considerations. When this Section has been cleared by the other interested agencies for review, you will be immediately advised.

1 - The Attorney General

HEREIN
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/jw

DRD:cmc
(9)

NOTE:

Section 4 coordinated with SA James E. Reilly, Division 2; Section 8R, with SA Charles D. Neudorfer, Division 12; Sections 19 and 90 with SA J. D. Domzalski, Division 9; Sections 27, 28, 29, 78, 134, and 144 with SA J. William Hines, Division 6; Sections 23, 75, 136, and 146 with SA D. R. Dickson, Division 5; Sections 102 and 103 with SA. R. L. Moore, Division 5. Section 102 being coordinated by SA L. F. Schwartz with other interested Government agencies.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

AJD
JRM
DRD

62-116395-140

Sections of the Manual of
Instructions Not Previously Furnished

NOTE CONTINUED:

Listed below are the above-mentioned Sections and their subjects.

Section	Subject
4	Surveillances and Raids
8R	Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division
19	Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Agencies
23	Bomb Threats Explosives and Incendiary Devices
27	Civil Rights
28	Civil Rights Act of 1964
29	Conspiracy
75	Neutrality Matters
78	Passports and Visas
90	Selective Service Act
102	Coordination with Other Government Agencies
103	Foreign Police Cooperation
134	Assaulting the President of the United States and Threats to the President of the United States
136	Antiriot Laws
144	Police Killings
146	Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RR

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/19/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Sections of the MOI not previously Furnished

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 5/22/75 @ 1:20 PM

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-174

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins - Enc
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams - Enc
1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott - Enc
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore - Enc
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

May 13, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis - Enc
1 - Mr. P. V. Daly - Enc
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall - Enc
(Attn: W. O. Cregar)

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1163

Reference is made to the letter from the captioned Committee dated April 28, 1975, addressed to the Honorable Edward H. Levi, Attorney General, requesting information concerning the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum in response to the aforementioned request. A copy is enclosed for your records.

For your information, we did furnish empty boxes for the use of former Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, John P. Mohr, at the residence of the late Director, J. Edgar Hoover, subsequent to the death of Mr. Tolson. This material was brought to the residence by a clerical employee who merely deposited the material and left the residence. While we have no direct knowledge as to what material was removed from the residence, Mr. Mohr was contacted to determine the source and accuracy of the story contained in "Periscope" section of the April 28, 1975, issue of Newsweek, at which time he advised us that "furnishings" at the home had been removed by members of the family and the housekeeper. We have not contacted former employees concerning this request. Our contact with Mr. Mohr was prior to the date of this request.

Enclosures (2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

PVD:eek
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-116395-173

REC-100

JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Letter from Director, FBI to Attorney General
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE: By memorandum dated May 2, 1975, from Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams, each Assistant Director was requested to advise whether they or personnel in their divisions had any knowledge relating to the allegation that the FBI directed or participated in the removal of documents from the late Director's residence. The Alexandria and Washington field offices were separately requested to respond to this allegation. The responses were negative. External Affairs, by memo from D. W. Moore to Mr. Jenkins dated May 5, 1975, captioned Clyde A. Tolson, former Associate Director; advised that a clerk brought packaging material to the residence at the request of former Assistant to the Director, John P..Mohr. This memo indicated that the clerk deposited the material and left. He did not participate in the packing, etc., of documents.

May 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REQUEST PERTAINING TO DOCUMENTS REMOVED FROM
RESIDENCE OF FORMER DIRECTOR
J. EDGAR HOOVER

Reference is made to letter dated April 28, 1975, to the Attorney General from Chairman of captioned Committee which contained a request for certain information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has not removed, nor caused to be removed, documents from the residence of former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover, subsequent to the death of Mr. Clyde A. Tolson, former Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It is our understanding, however, that former Assistant to the Director, John P. Mohr, may have some knowledge as to what material may have been removed from the residence after Mr. Tolson's death.

1-Mr. T. J. Jenkins (Detached)
1-Mr. J. B. Adams (Detached)
1-Mr. J. J. McDermott (Detached)
1-Mr. D. W. Moore (Detached)
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall (Detached)
(W. O. Cregar)
1- Mr. J. A. Mintz (Detached)
1-Mr. J. B. Hotis (Detached)
1-Mr. P. V. Daly (Detached)

[illegible] CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM

PVD:lgp
(11)

62-116395-173

ENCLOSURE

FD-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☐ LHM ☒ Memo ☐ Report dated 5-9-75

Caption of Document: Request Pertaining to Documents Removed from Residence of Former Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 5/21/75 @ 3^{10}p

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-173

ENCLOSURE

June 3, 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) enclosing a copy of a memorandum dated November 1, 1974, from the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, Glen E. Pommerening to the Director of the FBI, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program, Executive Order 10450."

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

The LHM refers to a request of the SSC for certain documents. The LHM serves as a cover communication for the aforementioned 11/1/74 memorandum which contains certain supplemental instructions the Department of Justice furnished the FBI with regard to Executive Order 11785 amending Executive Order 10450. The instructions concerned the FBI's conduct of intelligence-type investigations.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75 The response pertains to Part I of the SSC letter of request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/16/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. __ 62-116395
Inspection __
Intell. __ SFP:ekw (4)
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

REC-100

62-116395-172

17 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 2, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

In response to a request from the SSC for certain documents and other information from the FBI concerning its policies and procedures, the LHM advised that the FBI was deferring action on one document to the U. S. Department of Justice inasmuch as that document originated with that Department. The document involved was a memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated 5/20/54.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75. Pertains to Part IV of request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

REC-100 62-116395-171

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/18/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

JUN 4 1975

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395
SFP:ekw (4)

Delivered 6/4/75

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
rector Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/R

84 JUN 4 1975

GPO 954-546

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. J. C. Farrington

The Attorney General

May 6, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which responds to a specific request by the Committee for a position paper dated July 31, 1972, concerning the "Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

You will note that the position taken by the FBI is that the requested position paper of July 31, 1972, is an internal deliberative document which is the direct basis for a formal statement on FBI authority to conduct internal security investigations embodied in a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973. On this basis we are stating in our response to the Committee that we feel it inappropriate that the July 31, 1972, paper be made available. We believe that this position is completely sound and a proper precedent to set with respect to the ambit of the Committee's mandate. We also feel that it is consistent with the position which has been expressed by you.

Note this memo appr. for del. to SSC - has been superseded by another LHM to SSC.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

EWL:jvl
(7)

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

Deliv. to Dept 5/8/75

PLM

EWL

WOC

REC-100 62-116395-170

52 JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. J. C. Farrington
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

May 6, 1975

62-116395

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Under I., Legal Authorities, a general request was made for memoranda discussing the legal authority of the FBI to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence activities. Material responsive to this request was delivered to the Committee during April, 1975. Included in this material was a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973, captioned "Scope of FBI Jurisdiction and Authority in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." This memorandum contained a lengthy and comprehensive discussion concerning the authority of the FBI to conduct investigations in the general internal security area.

Not deliv. to SSC

Since the receipt of the above-mentioned material the Committee has indicated a specific interest in a position paper dated July 31, 1972, discussing the "Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." This paper has been located and subjected to intensive review. It has been found that the July 31, 1972, position paper contains the internal deliberations which form the direct basis for the memorandum to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973. In view of these circumstances and particularly because the July 31, 1972, paper is considered to be an internal deliberative document, it is not considered appropriate that it should be made available to the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

ek PLM WRW EWL WOC

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

EWL:jvl
(7)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

116395-170

GPO 954-546

June 2, 1975

2 - Mr.S.F.Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Filing System

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) with enclosures described below

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: SSC requested information concerning the FBI's filing system and copies of printed forms used by the FBI. The LHM served as a cover communication to furnish to the SSC an undated nine-page memorandum entitled "FBI Indexing Procedures." The SSC was also advised that there was available nine volumes of material containing detailed instructions followed by FBI employees in classifying mail for indexing; and that the nine volumes would be available for review at FBI Headquarters by the SSC Staff. Also furnished the SSC was one copy each of 13 Tables of Contents concerning forms used by the FBI. The various types of forms in use were explained in the LHM and the SSC was invited to choose those forms it desired to see, after which steps would be taken to make them available to the SSC Staff.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. The response is to Part IV of the SSC request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/22/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

SFP:ekw (4)

62-116395

REC-100

62-116395-169

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

17 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

8 4 JUN 4 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz
(1 [illegible]r. J. B. Hotis[illegible])
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

May 16, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITY

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of the captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration to Clarence M. Kelley, Director FBI, dated November 1, 1974, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program Executive Order 10450."

The instructions contained in the enclosure were the subject of conversation between W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director, and Mr. John Elliff of the Committee, May 5, 1975, at Quantico, Virginia, and are being furnished to the Committee in order to provide further information with respect to your March 19, 1975, request.

62-116395

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

TEB:cmc
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

62-116395-168

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General May 16, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated March 19, 1975, the Senate Select Committee requested certain information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Part I of the Committee's letter pertained to legal authority for investigations.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and a copy of a letter from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration to the Director November 1, 1974, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program Executive Order 10450."

The instructions contained in the enclosed November 1, 1974, communication concern legal authority for investigations and were the subject of discussion between Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee during a conference at Quantico, Virginia, May 5, 1975. The instructions are being furnished to the Committee in an effort to provide more information with respect to the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, referred to above.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosure is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

TEB:cmc
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

3 - ENCL

O'Connor
Approved
Returned

PLM
REC-100 62-116395-168

NOTE:

The enclosed Departmental letter contains certain supplemental instructions furnished FBIHQ with regard to Executive Order 11785 amending Executive Order 10450. We

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

17 JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 4 1975

NOTE CONTINUED:

are proposing the document be furnished to the Committee as a supplement to material previously furnished the Committee in line with their 3/19/75 request. John Elliff of the Committee evidenced interest in receiving such instructions during a recent conversation with Assistant Director Wannall. We are providing the instructions as a further delineation of our authority in this area.

AL FORM NO. 10
1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: NOV 1 1974

Glen E. Pommerening
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

SUBJECT: Federal Employee Security Program
Executive Order 10450

XIII

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SPOALM/RW

This is in response to your memoranda, entitled as above, dated May 8, 1974 and August 19, 1974, directed to the Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division, and referring to problems which have arisen as a result of the promulgation of Executive Order 11785 which amends Executive Order 10450. In view of the involvement of my staff in these matters, I will undertake to answer your questions with the concurrence of the Criminal Division.

As you know this matter has been under continuing review both in the Task Force, chaired by a representative of this office, of working level representatives of various agencies in the security field and is now under study to a lesser degree in Project #10 of the "Domestic Council on Privacy".

You ask that the Department; (a) provide specific instructions to the Bureau to conduct intelligence-type investigations to identify and determine the activities of organizations now described in the amended Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450; (b) furnish guidelines to be used by the Bureau in initiating investigations of individuals under the captioned matter pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and specifically, criteria to be utilized in determining whether available information is a sufficient basis for investigation.

Under the amendment to Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450, we now have only two types of organizations; (1) those which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the constitution or laws of the United States or

any State, (2) or which seek to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof, by unlawful means. (Emphasis added).

Of course, the key words which are underlined indicate that the investigation should be initially based on a possible violation of a federal (such as the Smith Act) or state statute prohibiting unlawful advocacy or the commission of any unlawful act of force or violence. However, in order for the Bureau to detect organizations with a potential of the above nature, it is important that the investigation proceed on the basis of information indicating that the organization may be of the nature mentioned. It is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated, but only that a reasonable evaluation of the available information suggests that the activities of the organization may fall within the proscription of the Order. The most recent example of the type of organization, that you have advised is becoming more prevalent, is the small but dedicated to violence, Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). Organizations of this nature would clearly fall within the Order and should be investigated as soon as information is available indicating their potentiality for violence and of course, if possible, prior to the fulfillment of their purposes.

It is true that Executive Order 11785 eliminated the prior communist, totalitarian, fascist, and subversive characterizations and definitions, but there was no intention of restricting the investigations of such organizations if their programs call for acts of force or violence or the unlawful advocacy of the commission of acts of force or violence in furtherance of these programs.

It is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order but once the investigation reaches a stage that offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the investigation suggests a determination that the organization is engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it should continue.

It follows in answer to your second question that individuals who are active either as members of or as affiliates of

zations described above should be investigated when mation is received indicating their involvement. The yardstick indicated above for organizations in determing whether the investigation should continue, should apply ncerning individuals and when a determination can reasonably e made that the individuals activities, either within the organization or as an individual, do not appear to be in violation of any law, then the investigation should cease.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
on this envelope ~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

8911-8

62-116395-168

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/16/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Re: Legal Authority-Federal Employee Security Program, Executive Order 10450

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor, Jr. Date: 5/21/75 @ 3P

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-168
ENCLOSURE

4-528

62-116395-167

CHANGED TO

62-116464-6X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

NOV 17 1976

Cons./MMD.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-23-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
DALLAS, TEXAS
11-22-63

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 5-22-75 CIA requested from the FBI copies of photographs of three "bums" who were taken into custody by Dallas authorities on 11-22-63 in the vicinity of the Texas School Book Depository. It has been alleged that the three persons shown in the photographs were E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis, individuals involved in the Watergate incident, and Thomas Arthur Vallee, who was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, several days before the Kennedy assassination based on a threat against the President. Don Donahue, Special Assistant to Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), made available on 9-12-74 to Inspector Bowers a set of the photographs depicting these "bums" which had been furnished to Donahue by one Michael Canfield, and the FBI Laboratory made copies from these prints, the original being returned to Donahue. Donahue requested that his identity be concealed as the source of these photographs. Canfield was supposed to furnish a set of these photographs to Washington Field Office but it has been determined he never did so.

At Mr. Adams' instructions, Bowers contacted Donahue on 5-22-75 and advised him of the CIA request for a set of these photographs. Donahue was told that if he has no objections we intend to furnish CIA a set of the pictures with the statement that the originals were obtained from an individual who requested his identity be concealed. Donahue stated that was quite satisfactory to him, adding that if it becomes necessary he would agree to his identity being disclosed as the source of these pictures.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-109060-7193

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 2 1975

80 MAY 30 1975

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Bowers

DWB:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)
DATE 8/5/94

LEGAL COUNSEL

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: ASSASSINATION OF JOHN FITZGERALD
KENNEDY
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Appropriate personnel of the General Investigative, Intelligence, and Laboratory Divisions were telephonically advised of the contact with Donahue late on 5-22-75 and the Intelligence Division arranged that date to provide a set of the photographs to CIA.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Given to F. Janesly to hand carry to CIA 5/22/75

Hoc Staff
75-817

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

21 May 1975

Senat Cy. '75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : IC Staff Verification of Clearances

Attached is an updated list of the security clearances provided to the Senate Select Committee Staff members. You will note there has been a significant increase since our last listing.

Updated information will be provided to you as this information changes.

Harriett Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: a/s

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/Rcd

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
3 JUL 24 1975

ENCLOSURE

Records - please file 62-116395

5-8

84 JUL 29 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

21 MAY 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE DESIGNATED	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE BRIEFED	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	IL	550-44-7971	
Bader, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF-Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara			12-20-45	CAL	561-68-9123	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	CONN	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I	*		7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Brissett, Belva			6-23-41	OK	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*		2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	CAL	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	CAL	567-56-8854	
Chesnik, Barbara			4/18/46	WI	390-46-2235	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17	9-6-43	FL	042-36-9155	TF-Badge
Dawson, Thomas			9-9-52	MINN	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	ILL	351-34-4329	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/25/01 BY

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

21 MAY 1975

	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH			
NAME	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED			SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
DeOreo, Mary			6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258	
Dillon, Molly			4-16-51	VA	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel			8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*		6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor			3-10-37	MASS	026-28-6318	
Erno, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*		3-7-46	ALA	420-60-8767	
Greissing, Edward			11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	MD	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF-Badge
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478	
Karalekas, Anne			11-6-46	MA	023-36-4329	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	IND	559-54-1348	

21 MAY 1975

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED				
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	GA	252-12-5112	TF - Badge
LaVoy, Diane			11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. VA.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF - Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF - Badge
Mecham, Martha Evans	*		2-11-40	CAL	528-48-6848	
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*		10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	
Moore, Janet	*		4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	ILL	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan			11-14-47	CAL	558-74-8394	

21 MAY 1975

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE DESIGNATED	BRIEFED	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
Peterson, John F.			6-15-41	CAL	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan			10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Pyle, Christopher			11-24-39	Mass	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N.DAK	501-14-4534	
Ricks, Walter			12-27-46	GA	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth[1]	*		10-31-44	CONN	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A.O., III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester			7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	VA	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.			3-3-39	KY	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	MD	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha			9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	IND	313-12-1857	

21 MAY 1975

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED				
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	MD	219-14-5186	
Towell, Mary			4-25-44	TENN	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory			1-21-47	COLO.	524-62-2459	
Truehart, William			12-18-18	VA	225-20-6411	
Wallach, Paul			5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF - Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann[1]	*		4-21-51	MASS	017-40-7170	
Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

---

[1] documentation is being forwarded

Calendar No. 174

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21, 1975

15.

Mr. Church submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. Cannon, without amendment

(Sen study - 75)

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
6 JUL 28 1975

V

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Pls file 5-8
62-116395-

84 JUL 30 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

35

USIB-D-27.10/2
17 May 1975

Hmk

SenStudy 75

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT : Reporting of Interviews with Congressional Investigating Committees or their Staffs

REFERENCE : My Memorandum to Addressees, 10 April 1975, Subject: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence (USIB-D-27.10/1)

Original Filed In 62-116150-5071

1. Reference memorandum reported establishment by the Intelligence Community Staff of a registry for documentation relating to the Congressional investigations, and furnished you with a format for abstracts to be provided to the registry on each formal input to a Select Committee. In addition to having in the registry the abstracts or, as appropriate, the actual papers submitted as documentation to a Select Committee, it is important that we establish a method for reporting on interviews. Accordingly, I am enclosing a proposed format for abstracts to be used for reporting on interviews by Congressional Committee members or staff with your personnel which involve information on Community activities or which, in your judgment, raise the possibility of follow-on queries elsewhere concerning the functioning or activities of the Community.

2. There is no intent to intrude upon matters which are properly each agency's organizational responsibility nor to infringe upon employees' individual rights or security. The interview abstract format does not provide for identification of the person being interviewed. The "File Reference No." entry is for your convenience to indicate where any supporting documentation is located within your own filing system.

~~REC-5~~

1 ENCLOSURE

~~JUN 3 1975~~

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED

AUG 19 1975

Hmk

AUG 19 1975

IB-D-27.10/2
17 May 1975

3. It is essential that the Intelligence Community be aware of all aspects of the Congressional investigations which involve Community matters, or which may relate to Select Congressional Committee activities being conducted elsewhere in the Community. The availability in the registry of document and interview abstracts should help provide this internal visibility.

W. E. Colby
Chairman

Attachment: as stated

Attachment
USIB-D-27.10/2
17 May 1975

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO DCI/IC SELECT COMMITTEES COÖRDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Subject:
2. Witness' Organization:
3. File Reference No.:
4. Date of Interview:
5. Interviewer(s):
6. Classification of Information:
7. Summary of Content: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed, and any conclusions or recommendation)
8. Relation to Intelligence Community Problems: (Identify)

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 5/7/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Schwartz

FROM : H.C. Flemister, Jr.

Senstudy-75

SUBJECT: MORTON HALPERIN
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ✓
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This memorandum sets forth results of Liaison contact with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning Halperin's request to be provided with a copy of a 1948 memorandum of understanding between the FBI and the CIA. Halperin has made this request of both CIA and the Bureau.

On 4/30/75 Mr. James Garrison, CIA, advised that after considerable research in CIA files, the following documents (copies attached) were located which pertain to Halperin's request. Copies have also been located in Bufiles:

(1) Memorandum for the Record dated 9/22/48 entitled "Cooperation and Liaison Between Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Policy Coordination, CIA," which was prepared by CIA and originally classified Top Secret. This document has recently been downgraded by CIA to a classification of Secret.

(2) Letter dated 9/22/48 from Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, to Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant to the Director, FBI, which forwarded as an enclosure the 9/22/48 memorandum described above. This item was also originally classified Top Secret but has been downgraded by CIA to Secret.

62-116395-

JUN 25 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN

63-16062-45

(3) Letter dated 10/2/48 from J. Edgar Hoover to Wisner which acknowledges that the arrangement set forth in the memorandum of 9/22/48 is satisfactory to the Bureau. This item ~~was not~~ classified in accordance with current classification standards but bears the marking "Personal and Confidential."

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures - 3
LFS:tdp (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

Records
cc in 62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-23-01 BY SP2ALM/rlw

84 JUL 1 1975

Mr. Garrison advised that CIA considers items 1 and 2 to be CIA documents and item 3 to be an FBI document containing CIA information. CIA proposes to furnish Halperin declassified copies of items 1 and 2 which have been sanitized in accordance with the brackets on the attached copies. CIA has no objection to the Bureau's furnishing Halperin a copy of item 3 if it is declassified and the CIA information indicated by brackets in the attached copy is excised. Mr. Garrison noted that CIA no longer considers the 9/22/48 memorandum to be operative since CIA's Office of Policy Coordination no longer exists.

Mr. Garrison advised further that with regard to a Senate Select Committee (SSC) request forcopies of all agreements between the FBI and the CIA, CIA does not plan to provide the SSC with copies of items 1 and 2 but plans to allow appropriately cleared SSC staff representatives to examine the unsanitized Secret versions of items 1 and 2 at CIA Headquarters. He further advised that CIA would have no objection if the Bureau allows SSC staff representatives to examine item 3 in Bureau space provided it is classified Secret in accordance with CIA's classification of its information. Mr. Garrison requested that if the Bureau decides to provide the SSC with a copy of item 3 for its retention, the document be declassified and sanitized in accordance with the attached copy.

The Intelligence Division has no objection to the FOIA request of Halperin being handled in accordance with the above. Recommendation for handling of the SSC request will be made by separate memorandum.

ACTION:

This memorandum and its attachments should be forwarded to the FOIA Unit of the Files and Communications Division for appropriate handling.

WOC/ WRN

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

DRAFT

22 September 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Cooperation and Liaison Between Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Policy Coordination, CIA

1. This memorandum records an understanding which has been arrived at in conversations between Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Mr. Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director, and Chief of the Office of Policy Coordination, of CIA. The conversations in question were duly authorized by the Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and by the Director and Deputy Director of CIA and were arranged by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on behalf of the White House. The purpose of the understanding is to provide a basis for cooperation and liaison between the FBI and the Office of Policy Coordination, CIA, and the following points summarize the essential elements of the understanding:

a. In view of the distinctive character of the activities of the Office of Policy Coordination, it is considered advisable that separate and direct liaison be established between that office and the FBI. For this purpose the FBI will provide a special liaison officer who will be nominated by the FBI within the near future. (This arrangement has been specifically approved by the Deputy Director, CIA, in the absence of the Director.)

b. It is understood that in the discharge of the duties and obligations laid upon the Office of Policy Coorination by the National Security Council, it is necessary for this Office to have dealings with individuals and groups of foreign nationalities within and without the United States and to sponsor the movement from time to time of such individuals and representatives of such groups between the United States and foreign countries. The Office of Policy Coordination recognizes the primary responsibility of the FBI in the field of United States domestic security, and the FBI acknowledges that it is essential for the Office of Policy Coordination to have direct dealings with the individuals and groups aforementioned.

c. In order that the interests of both parties to this understanding shall be served, it is understood that the Office of Policy Coordination keep the FBI generally informed concerning the extent and character of its dealings with

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
Destroy only with consent
of the Historical Staff

owngraded to SECRET per
aul J. Burns 019210
Paul J. Burns

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

SECRET

COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES

II - Groups and Organizations:

International Peasant Union which is made up of representatives of Polish Agrarian Party; Bulgarian Agrarian Party; Croatian Peasant Party; Hungarian Small Holders Party; Rumanian National Peasant Party; Serbian Agrarian Union and a number of recognized Czechoslovak political leaders.

In view of the highly classified character of our activities, I am sure that you will appreciate the importance of maintaining the maximum security precautions.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

Enclosure - 1

SECRET

C O P Y

22 September 1948

Mr. D. Milton Ladd
Assistant to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Ladd:

Confirming our telephone conversation of today, I am enclosing a draft of a proposed memorandum which I have prepared for the purpose of recording the understanding which has been arrived at between us in regard to the cooperation and liaison between my office and the Bureau. I have endeavored in this draft to set out the essential features of our conversation of yesterday afternoon and I should appreciate your indicating to me any modifications or changes which you may deem necessary or advisable to reflect your recollection and understanding of our conversation. Upon my receipt of your suggested changes, if any, and following any further discussion between us which may be indicated as desirable, I shall prepare this memorandum in final form and furnish to you the original and a copy thereof, with the request that you initial and return to me the copy.

In accordance with the terms of our understanding, I should like to submit to you herewith the names of certain of the individuals and groups with whom it is proposed that my office will have dealings in connection with our authorized activities. From time to time in the future I shall furnish you with additional names. The following are the names:

I - Individuals:

George M. Dimitrov, Exiled Secretary General of Bulgarian Agrarian Party

Stefan Osusky, prominent Czech Refugee leader

Ferenc Nagy, head of Hungarian Small Holders Party

Dr. Vladko Macek, representative of Croatian Peasant Party

Stanislas Mikolajczyk, former Polish Vice Premier

Andre Cretzianu, former Rumanian Cabinet Minister

ENCLOSURE 62-116395

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
Destroy only with consent [illegible]

Downgraded to SECRET per
Paul J. Burns, 019210

SECRET

foreign individuals and groups within the United States. More specifically the Office of Policy Coordination will, in so far as possible, inform the FBI sufficiently in advance of its proposed dealings with such individuals and groups to enable the FBI to advise the Office of Policy Coordination of any security risks which may be involved in dealing with such individuals and groups and in order to provide the FBI with adequate opportunity to indicate individuals which it is employing for its own purposes in connection with the penetration of foreign groups.

d. There shall be an exchange of information between the FBI and the Office of Policy Coordination concerning the significance, activities, and reliability of such individuals and groups of foreign nationalities within the United States as may be of interest to the Office of Policy Coordination.

F. G. W.

D. M. L.

EYES ALONE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

30 MAY 1975

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0597

Sen study -75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Department of Defense
Mr. William G. Hyland, Department of State
Mr. E. H. Knoche, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. William O. Cregar, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. William N. Morell, Jr., Department of Treasury
Mr. James G. Poor, Energy Research & Development Administration
Mr. William Nichols, Office of Management and Budget
Mr. John B. Hotis, Department of Justice

SUBJECT : Future Legislation Relative to U.S. Intelligence

Following up on the discussion at yesterday's meeting of the Policy Steering Group, addressees are encouraged to provide to the White House specific suggestions for administrative or legislative action relative to U.S. intelligence programs. Such proposals should be realistic and doable in the near term. Please provide two copies of all suggestions to James Wilderotter, Room 182, Old Executive Office Building by 10 June 1975.

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY SP2ALM/PLJ

REC-100 62-116395-166

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

17 JUN 4 1975

file in 62-116395 5,8

84 JUN 4 1975

EYES ALONE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-19-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

K. William O'Conner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, who has recently been designated by the Attorney General to coordinate all responses by the Department to the Senate Select Committee(SSC), advised on the afternoon of 5-19-75 that he had met with Chief Counsel to the SSC F. A. O. Schwarz and John Elliff, who is the head of the task force of the Senate Select Committee on the FBI. O'Conner stated he informed Schwarz and Elliff that he would not make available Bureau secretaries Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski, who are scheduled for interview on Tuesday, 5-20-75, absent an agreement by the Committee that an FBI representative would be allowed to be present during the interview. O'Conner indicated that the Department's stand in this matter regarding the insistence that FBI representatives be present during the interview was backed by the White House, the Attorney General, and the Deputy Attorney General.

By way of background, it should be noted that Mr. O'Conner and Associate Deputy Attorney General McDermott were contacted on 5-14-75, and advised of the requested interview of the two aforementioned employees at which time O'Conner and McDermott did not advise of any way in which the employees could be prevented from consenting to interview. While they were upset at the prospect of service personnel, such as stenographers being interviewed by the Committee, they indicated at that time they could not see any legal leverage which could be used to preclude such interviews. With this decision in mind arrangements were made to make these employees available for interview.

ST-104 REC 12 62-116395-165

Schwarz told O'Conner he would have to check with the SSC prior to agreeing to allow FBI representatives to be present. O'Conner stated Schwarz was quite upset at the Department's stance in this matter, but indicated he would give O'Conner an answer this evening. O'Conner indicated to Schwarz that the two Bureau employees would be available for interview on the 20th should the Committee agree to the presence of FBI representatives during the interview.

MAY 27 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE ADDENDUM - PAGE 2

O'Conner requested that the Bureau continue with his plan to have both employees available should the interview take place on the 20th.

ACTION:

You will be kept expeditiously advised of all developments concerning this matter.

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION 5-19-75 PVD:dkg

At 4:15 p.m. Mr. O'Conner advised that he had just been contacted by F. A. O. Schwarz, and Schwarz stated the Committee's position concerning the presence of FBI representatives during the interview of the two secretaries is unchanged. O'Conner related that he told Schwarz that Departmental position is also unchanged in that there will be no interview unless the Committee relents on this position. O'Conner indicated he would keep the Bureau advised and requested that we continue with our plans to have the secretaries available for interview as Schwarz indicated he would again contact O'Conner regarding this issue.

Airtel

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
5/23/75
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

To: SAC, Atlanta

From: Director, FBI (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

Enclosed for immediate hand delivery to former SA Alan G. Sentinella is an original and one copy of a statement he voluntarily dictated to a Bureau secretary 5/21/75 and which was transcribed subsequent to Sentinella's departure from Washington, D. C.

For your information, Sentinella has indicated a desire to review this statement and make any necessary corrections, after which he will furnish you a copy for forwarding to the Bureau which should be by cover airtel immediately after Sentinella makes it available. Direct airtel to Attention, INTD - W. O. Cregar.

Enclosure
SFP:ekw
(6)

NOTE: The statement involved concerns Sentinella's testimony before an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee 5/21/75, contents of which testimony Sentinella indicated to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project he (Sentinella) desired to make available to the Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-05-01 BY

16 4

EX 104

REC-7 62-116

MAILED 8
MAY 23 1975
FBI

5 MAY 27 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/23/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Reference is made to my memorandum dated 5/19/75 which attached a copy of a letter to the Attorney General dated 5/14/75, from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, United States Senate Select Committee (SSC) with appendices A thru D. The memorandum noted the ambiguous nature of some of the SSC requests and that Mr. K. William O'Conner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, who is the Department of Justice coordinator for SSC matters, is presently negotiating the 5/14/75 requests with the SSC Staff.

Even though the negotiations are still under way, we believe that ultimately we will be required to provide substantial responses to the 5/14/75 requests. To this end we have begun to gather together the necessary data from our files in anticipation of the substantial responses we will be required to prepare. The various requests set forth in the May 14, letter have been analyzed and specific assignments made to prepare responses. The primary assignments have been made to representatives of several Sections of the INTD. It is anticipated that in some circumstances it will be necessary for these INTD representatives to convey requests for information and material to other Divisions. When such action is necessary contact will be effected through the designated representatives of the other Headquarters Divisions. A list of such other Divisional representatives is maintained by the SENSTUDY Staff on the basis of designations made to assist in previous SSC requests, and is set forth below.

DIVISION	REPRESENTATIVE	EXTENSION
1-Identification	James T. Stewart	4219
2-Training	James E. Reilly	3472
3-Administrative	Fred Woodworth	4132

REC-100 62-116395-163

JUN 3 1975

62-116395
EWL/SFP:cmc
(17)

CONTINUED - OVER

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-5-01 BY

PERS REC UNIT

84 JUN 3 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY - 75
62-116395

4-Files and Communications	Homer R. Hauer	4870
6-General Investigative	J. William Hines	4276
7-Laboratory	John P. Wilgus	~~3721~~ 3463
8-External Affairs	David L. Divan	2535
9-Special Investigative	John E. McHale	2525
10-Inspection	Fred Griffith	2830
11-Legal	Paul V. Daly	2542
12-Computer Systems	Charles D. Neudorfer	3635

The listed individuals are considered to be the permanent representatives to the SENSTUDY project and will be the primary points of contact within the respective Divisions. It is requested that any Division desiring to change the above designations promptly advise SENSTUDY project on extension 4636.

ACTION:

None except where necessary to redesignate Division representatives.

wRW

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/22/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

62-116395 JEH

On 5/21/75, Andy Smith, Supervisor in our Birmingham Office, called Deputy Assistant Director Herington and advised that former SA Robert R. Nichols (EOD: 1/6/47; retired: 5/12/72) had been contacted by the Senate Select Committee for interview. Smith connected Nichols through to Herington, at which time Nichols advised that about ten days ago Lester Seidel of the Senate Select Committee had contacted him. At that time, Nichols was going to Oklahoma City, and has just recently returned home to Birmingham. Nichols stated that at one time he was the case agent in the Atlanta Office on the Martin Luther King investigation, and it was presumed this was the subject matter of the proposed interview.

Nichols was advised that the decision as to whether he would consent to interview was entirely his to make. He was reminded that he had signed a secrecy agreement, and was reminded of the provisions of AG Order 501-73 requiring prior authority from the appropriate Departmental official prior to a current or former employee furnishing information he acquired during the course of his employment. He was also advised that he had a right to be represented by a personal attorney if he desired and that he had all the constitutional rights available to him, the same as any citizen. He was further told that if he desired to have an FBI representative available, but not present during the interview, he could so request, noting that the purpose of the FBI representative would be to counsel him concerning sensitive areas which might be explored.

62-116395-162

REC-107

JUN 3 1975

It was emphasized to Nichols that the FBI would not and could not recommend the course of action he should take ~~and that the~~ decision with regard to this interview was entirely his to make.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Herington

JH:mtm

Records. cc-67-414885 (Nichols)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/26/01 BY SP2ALM/RW

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

PERS. REC. UNIT

JUN 3 1975

Mr. David E. Todd
20 Cozzolino Drive
Millbrae, CA 94030

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, CA 956
PM
19 MAY
1975

Christmas 10c US

CONQUER MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20535

Attention:
Office of the Legal Counsel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-30-01 BY

5-19-75

Attention:

Jack Harrington
Office of the Legal Counsel

Remytelcall 5/16/75

David E. Todd

Senstudy - '75

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

file
62-116395

REC-1 62-116395-161

17 MAY 21 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

LEGAL COUNSEL

Recs
cc 67-177553 (David Todd)

84 JUN 3 1975

May 19, 1975
20 Cozzolino Drive
Millbrae, CA 94030

Mr. Lester B. Seidel
Investigator
Select Committee to Study
 Government Operations with
 Respect to Intelligence Activities
Room 2308
Building 302 - Dirkson Building
Washington, DC 20510

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALC/jlw

Dear Mr. Seidel:

Reference is made to your telephone call to me on May 16, 1975, in which you advised that the Committee was gathering facts concerning the FBI's various CoIntelPros and in particular, you were looking into the CoIntelPro having to do with the Black Panthers. You inquired if I recalled a letter, which had been made public, dated May 11, 1970, from the Director, FBI, to the SAC, San Francisco, which suggested disruptive techniques against the Black Panthers and which mentioned spurious police or FBI reports. I advised you I had no first hand recollection of having seen such a document at that time, but that I had read a recent news item describing such a document.

You also indicated an interest in the theoretical question as to whether intelligence functions should be divorced from enforcement functions in order to avoid the dilemma of disclosure versus dismissal, and you suggested that my views on this might be helpful in educating the Committee.

For your information, I entered on duty as a Special Agent on January 5, 1942, and retired from the Bureau on December 3, 1971. During the two years immediately preceding my retirement I served as supervisor of a squad of agents which investigated, among other matters, violations and alleged violations of law by the Black Panthers. The only information I have concerning the Black Panthers was learned as a direct result of my official duties. I have made no independent study of them, nor do I have any personal files or written material, either official or otherwise, relating to them.

Since speaking with you, I have reviewed Executive Order #501-73 (28 C.F.R.§§ 16.21, 16.22 and 16.23) which specifies that no employee or former employee of the Department of Justice shall produce any material contained in the files of the Department

161

nor shall he disclose any information acquired in the performance of his official duties without prior approval of the Attorney General or appropriate Departmental official.

From this, I must conclude that I am prohibited from furnishing you or the Committee any information along the lines requested by you unless appropriate authority to do so has first been given by an authorized representative of the Department of Justice.

Very truly yours,

David E. Todd

DAVID E. TODD

cc: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20535

SAC
Federal Bureau of Investigation
450 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. __
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. __
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. __
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/20/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/

I received by hand delivery from the Department at 3:06 p.m. on March 20, 1975, the attached copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated March 19, 1975, with its enclosed list of requests being made by the Committee.

Farrington
Hotis
Bowers

Senator Church requests that the documents involved be supplied to the committee at the earliest opportunity. A review of the requests revealed that the Intelligence Division would have the principal interest in all except request III, A and C, which would be of interest to the Administrative Division. The last item appearing under V, B should be available only through the Criminal Division of the Department or the Attorney General's office.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Intelligence Division and the Administrative Division review the attached request for FBI materials to determine whether we may make a full response to the requests.

EX 104 REG 44 62-116395 - 169

7 APR 22 1975

2. That the required materials be prepared for submission to the Committee and any difficulties be made known at the earliest possible date.

62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Enc.
1 - Mr. Farrington - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.

OK

LEGAL COUNSEL

JAM:mfd
(7)

84 JUN 3 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

HILIP A. HART, MICH.
ALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
ALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
OBERT MORGAN, N.C.
ARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 19, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on February 26, 1975, to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21. I believe we are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible.

Toward that end we are seeking initial documentation from various agencies whose activities fall within the mandate given us by the Senate. Enclosed with this letter is a copy of an initial request for documents relating to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has been previously discussed with staff representatives of the Bureau. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

We expect to make similar initial requests for documents to other parts of your Department that fall under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

I trust that our respective staffs will continue to work together in the spirit of mutual cooperation which we both recognize is necessary to ensure a thorough and expeditious investigation.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

62-116395-160

ENCLOSURE

FIRST REQUEST FOR FBI DOCUMENTS

I. Legal Authorities

All memoranda discussing the legal authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials asserted as sources of such authority. 5

II. Jurisdictional Agreements

All delimitations agreements, jurisdictional agreements, agreements for coordination, and memoranda or understanding, between the FBI and any other Federal departments or agencies, insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5

III. Organization

A. A detailed current organizational chart reflecting all divisions, sections, branches, and units of the FBI, and the subject matters assigned to each by generic and numerical designation. 3

B. A list of names, titles, and offices of assignment of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBI Headquarters, down to and including unit chiefs, together with the number of personnel below the level of unit chief categorized by unit or other office of assignment. 5

C. At the field level, the titles and the number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations, and activities. 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ACM/RW

62-116395-160

ENCLOSURE

IV. Policies and Procedures

A. The table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions, and those portions of the Manual of Instructions which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5 ✓

B. The table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, and those portions of the Manual of Rules and Regulations which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5 ✓

V. Studies and Reports

A. The Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), dated June, 1970. 5

B. The original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Dept.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-15-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-AD-Adm. ___
Dep.-AD-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Department has named Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Connor of the Civil Rights Division to be responsible for their responses to Congressional Committee requests.

At the request of Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott, SA Paul V. Daly and Inspector John B. Hotis attended a meeting with Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Connor, Assistant to the Attorney General Jack Fuller, and Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott. McDermott announced at the meeting that O'Connor was taking control of the Departmental responses to the Congressional Committees. He noted that the Department has been having some problems keeping track of and inconsistencies in its responses to the various Congressional Committees. Mr. O'Connor was generally briefed as to the status of our responses to Congressional requests and to the Rockefeller Commission. He requested, however, that he be briefed in a more detailed manner in the immediate future.

ACTION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

EX 104

REG 44 62-116395-159

MAY 23 1975

PVD:dkg (8)
dkg

84 JUN 3 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 8, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting between representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff and Bureau officials at Quantico, Virginia, on the evening of 5/5/75.

On 5/5/75 Mr. John Elliff, who heads the task force of the SSC looking into the FBI, met with officials of the Bureau at Quantico. Elliff was accompanied by Mark Gitenstein and Mary DeOreo. FBI officials present were Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Inspectors Thomas W. Leavitt, Hunter E. Helgeson, and John B. Hotis as well as Section Chief William O. Cregar.

At the outset of the meeting, Mr. Elliff provided the Bureau representatives with a memorandum the subject of which was entitled "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated 2/13/75, copy of which is attached. Elliff's memorandum contained a series of questions along with the rationale for these questions which provided the basis for the Quantico meeting. We are not considering these questions a formal request from the Select Committee. Mr. Elliff and the Staff of the Select Committee are aware that formal responses that the Bureau might be expected to provide the Committee can only be predicated on written requests to the Attorney General (AG) from Senator Frank Church or the Committee's Chief Counsel.

It is noted that under paragraph one of Elliff's memorandum he notes the Committee has not been supplied the following documents.

REC 44 62-116395-158

EX 104

(1) A position paper dated 7/31/72.

MAY 23 1975

(2) Appendices I, J, K, M, and P to the Intelligence Division "Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75.

62-116395

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

WOC:ekw
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-06-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 3 1975

By memorandum dated 5/6/75, we advised the AG that the requested position paper of 7/31/72 is an internal deliberative document which we feel is inappropriate to furnish the Select Committee. This position is consistent with the position previously expressed by the AG. During the meeting with Elliff he was orally advised of the Bureau's position regarding making the 7/31/72 position paper available to the Select Committee.

The Appendices which have not yet been made available to the Select Committee are being cleared with other agencies under the Third Agency rule requirement and will be made available to the Select Committee once all clearances have been obtained. Elliff was orally apprised of this.

During the course of the meeting, Mr. Elliff stated that he felt the FBI's concerted investigative effort in the early 1960s against the Klan and later our investigative effort arising out of the ghetto riots were justified given the situation at that time. However, he felt the Committee would probably like to do an in-depth case study of both investigations. He asked if the FBI could provide the Committee with copies of all memoranda and documents reflecting the decision making process leading up to the initiation of the major investigative effort against the Klan as well as investigations during and following the ghetto riots. Elliff was advised that we certainly would consider responding following receiptoof a formal written request from Senator Church through the AG. Elliff advised he would prepare such a written request.

The Intelligence Division has already instituted the necessary research in anticipation of this request and will submit recommendations following a completion of this research.

In anticipation of Select Committee hearings which are expected to begin in about one month, Mr. Elliff and Gitenstein expect to start interviews of current Bureau employees in Bureau space during the week of 5/19/75. Mr. Gitenstein will concentrate on the work of the Internal Security Branch of the Intelligence Division and Mr. Elliff on the Counterintelligence Branch. We expect that Mr. Elliff will begin his interviews by meeting with Assistant Director Wannall, Inspector Leavitt and the Section Chiefs of the Counterintelligence Branch.

It is noted that we previously furnished to the Select Committee with the AG's approval one copy each of Sections 87 and 122 of the Manual of Instructions. Section 87 is concerned with investigations of subversive organizations and individuals. Section 122 addresses extremist matters and civil unrest. In his discussion of these two Sections it was readily apparent Mr. Gitenstein had conducted a thorough review. In this regard, he noted a difference in the investigative procedure outlined in these two Sections of the Manual. Mr. Gitenstein was advised that the Intelligence Division had just completed a Manual revision combining these two Sections into one and had submitted it to the Director for his approval. Mr. Gitenstein commented this was an excellent idea to combine these two Sections into one and expressed the hope that the revised Section could be made available to the Committee for its review in anticipation of the forthcoming Committee hearings.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Elliff asked whether the FBI would be willing to meet with the Staff to discuss such sensitive issues as surreptitious entry, the opening of mail, and incommunicado interviews. Elliff was advised that the Bureau was aware of certain allegations that have appeared in the press and felt that any interviews in sensitive areas should be restricted to the Senators on the Committee. Elliff interposed no objection to this suggestion.

The thrust of the meeting gave Bureau officials present the impression that the task force was primarily concerned with identifying what areas of the Bureau's investigative responsibilities needed to be better defined through new legislation. In fact, Elliff solicited the observations of those present as to what the Bureau's needs were in the way of new legislation to permit the Bureau to carry out its internal security responsibilities effectively. He recognized certain limitations involving records of educational institutions, banking institutions, telephone companies and credit establishments currently restrict the Bureau and suggest that some legislation with Congressional oversight should be written to assist the FBI in carrying out its mission.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

ACTION:

(1) We will proceed to meet with Mr. Elliff and Mr. Gitenstein in accordance with their request. It is anticipated that an Intelligence Division official will be present at all such interviews of current Bureau personnel.

(2) That the review of the combined Sections of 87 and 122 by other Divisions of the Bureau be expedited in order that we may be able to provide the Senate Select Committee with this revision on an expedite basis.

OK

PLM

May 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM

From: John Elliff

Subject: "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction" dated February 13, 1975

1. The following documents directly related to this Position Paper have not been supplied to the Select Committee:

(1) The previous Position Paper, dated July 31, 1972.

(2) Appendices I, J, K, M, and P.

2. Parts I and II discuss the Presidential directives which may serve as the basis for FBI national security intelligence activities. Part IV lists statutes and Executive Orders affecting FBI jurisdiction. There is no mention in Parts I and II of the first Executive Order cited in Part IV. This is Executive Order #11605, dated July 2, 1971, amending Executive Orcer #10450, of April 27, 1953, relating to security requirements for Government employment.

These Executive Orders have been further amended by a more recent Executive Order of June 4, 1974. This latest order abolished the so-called "Attorney General's List" and revised the criteria for determining the suitability and loyalty of Government employees.

The following questions arise:

(1) In what way, if any, do the Executive Orders relating to employment security provide a legal basis for FBI intelligence activities?

(2) In what way, if any, did the Executive Order of June 4, 1974, affect the legal basis for FBI intelligence activities?

3. The analysis in Parts I and II discusses the legal basis for FBI national security intelligence investigations. There is no specific discussion of other intelligence activities. These other activities are variously described in the attached documents and quoted memoranda. The terms used include "counterespionage" (Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939),

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-158

ENCLOSURE

"to neutralize Communist front and Communist-dominated organizations of the United States" (IIC and ICIS Report to NSC, March 5, 1954), "program designed to intensify any confusion and dissatisfaction among its /Communist Party's/ members" and "counterintelligence operations" (NSC Briefing, November 6, 1958), "action proposals to protect the internal security of the United States" (National Security Action Memorandum 161, June 9, 1962). The term "counterespionage" reappears in several other documents.

These terms seem to refer to activities which have since been labeled COINTELPRO operations. In this regard, it should be noted that Attorney General Saxbe's report of November 18, 1974 on FBI COINTELPRO Activities stated, at p. 20:

> "(2) Espionage or Soviet-Satellite Intelligence
>
> This program, although officially designated a COINTELPRO program, emphasized intelligence gathering and counterintelligence efforts already being pursued in connection with the Bureau's ongoing foreign intelligence responsibilities. It did not curtail any activity or in any way change the scope of counterintelligence efforts already in effect and continuing today. It was primarily intended to inspire initiative and to encourage ingenuity in the Bureau's continuing counterintelligence efforts against hostile foreign intelligence services.
>
> In the interest of the national security, no statistics or examples of the types of actions implemented under this program may appropriately be disclosed."

This passage seems to say that the FBI continues to perform other activities going beyond investigation and directed at hostile foreign intelligence services.

The following questions arise:

(1) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for FBI national security intelligence activities beyond investigations?

(2) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for the COINTELPRO activities which have been discontinued as a matter of policy since 1971?

(3) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for the FBI's continuing counterintelligence efforts against hostile foreign intelligence services?

4. Appendix S includes excerpts from the appropriations testimony of former Director Hoover. The testimony in 1939 and 1941 makes reference to President Roosevelt's Proclamation of National Emergency, September 8, 1939. The following exchange took place at the hearing on February 19, 1941:

> Mr. Ludlow. At the close of the present emergency, when peace comes, it would mean that much of this emergency work necessarily will be discontinued.
> Mr. Hoover. That is correct.
> Mr. Taber. Is your set-up for the national-defense work separate from the other work?
> Mr. Hoover. It is.
> Mr. Taber. Is it operated as a separate division?
> Mr. Hoover. Yes. In the field our field officials are under instructions to utilize approximately 50 percent of the personnel on national defense work and the other 50 percent on the regular work.
> Mr. Taber. But if some rush comes up, you might have to vary that?
> Mr. Hoover. That is correct.
> Mr. Taber. According to the situation.
> Mr. Hoover. According to the emergency that might arise. If the national emergency should terminate, the structure dealing with national defense can immediately be discontinued or very materially curtailed according to the wishes of Congress.

When President Roosevelt issued the Proclamation of National Emergency on September 8, 1939, he accompanied it with Executive Order No. 8247 directing the Attorney General to "increase the personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, in such number, not exceeding 150, as he shall find necessary for the proper performance of the additional duties imposed upon the Department of Justice in connection with the national emergency." At a press conference the same day,

President Roosevelt specifically discussed this Executive Order and the nature of the "additional duties imposed upon the Department of Justice."

> "And the fourth /Executive Order/ relates to what you might say is a combination of neutrality and national defense. It provides for an addition to the personnel of certain investigating agencies of the Government to protect this country against--I suppose the easiest way of putting it is--some of the episodes, some of the things that happened over here in 1914 and 1915 and 1916 and the beginning of 1917, before we got into the war. There was sabotage; there was a great deal of propaganda by both belligerents, and a good many definite plans laid in this country by foreign governments to try to sway American public opinion. We do not have to specify. The older men who are here can remember some of the episodes of that time. It is to guard against that, and against the spread by any foreign nation of propaganda in this country which would tend to be subversive--I believe that is the word--of our form of Government." (1939 Roosevelt Papers 485-486)

The following questions arise:

(1) To what extent, if any, were the Presidential directives of June 26, 1939 and September 6, 1939, based on the emergency powers of the President?

(2) To what extent, if any, was the establishment of the FBI's Intelligence Division in September, 1939, based on the President's Proclamation of National Emergency and Executive Order No. 8247?

(3) To what extent, if any, does Congress have the Constitutional authority to discontinue or curtail the FBI's national security intelligence activities based on the President's emergency powers or on other Constitutional powers of the Executive Branch?

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/16/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At approximately 3:20 PM, former SA David E. Todd (EOD as SA 1/5/42; retirement 12/9/71) called long distance from San Francisco and spoke to Deputy Assistant Director Herington. He said that he had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, Senate Select Committee, who said that he would be on the west coast in the near future and desired to interview Todd concerning FBI policies with regard to investigation of racial matters and our counterintelligence programs against the Black Panthers and other groups. Todd pointed out that he was a former supervisor of the San Francisco Office desk responsible for Black Panther cases. Todd asked what position he should take. He was advised that his decision as to whether or not to be interviewed was entirely his and that the Bureau could not make any suggestion in this regard. It was pointed out that if he decided to be interviewed, we had made arrangements with the Senate Select Committee which would permit a Bureau representative to be available for consultation with regard to matters that might seem sensitive, but that the Bureau representative would not be present during or participate in the actual interview. He was advised further that he had the same rights as any other citizen, namely, the right to personal counsel and any other rights guaranteed him under the Constitution. Pursuant to his request, he was also advised of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 which appears in Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, beginning at Section 16.21, which would require appropriate Departmental approval prior to any current or former employee revealing, pursuant to a subpoena or other demand, any information acquired during the course of the employee's official duties. He was also reminded that all Bureau employees had signed a secrecy agreement.

62-116395-157

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Herington

JH:mtm
(6)

REC 67

ST-101

MAY 22 1975

ALL [illegible] ED
HERE[illegible]IED
DATE 6-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 3 1975

Todd indicated that while he desired to respond as legally required to an official committee inquiry, he would advise Mr. Seidel that he considered himself bound by the Attorney General Order and did not feel that he could reveal official information without approval by the appropriate Department official. Todd was clearly advised that this decision had to be his own and that the FBI could not and would not make any recommendation to him as to the course of action he should take.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: 5-8-75

FROM : G. R. Steel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

Reference is made to my ~~letter~~ memo dated 4-3-75 captioned as above (cc attached).

This is to advise that as of 5-7-75 we have received and ordered to the field a total of 96 requests from the SSC for investigations of its staff members. An additional case was received on 5-8-75 which is being ordered to the field immediately. As a result of referenced memo, Inspector Bowers contacted the SSC which was in accord with a more realistic deadline on remaining investigations, except "a few" specials which would still be handled on an expedite basis, such as afforded Presidential appointments. Of all cases received to date only six have been designated as nonexpedite.

It is noted recent articles in the media have contained criticism of Congressman Lucien Nedzi for delay in staffing the HSC and proceeding with its inquiry. On 3-3-75 Inspector Bowers discussed with the Congressman the mechanics for FBI investigations of the HSC staff. In the intervening period no cases were received except one recent case from the HSC which has been ordered to the field. This concerns Carl Hendrickson Simms, Security Director, HSC, and formerly connected with the House impeachment inquiry. Simms has been in contact with our Project Senstudy 75 group. It is not known when additional investigations will be received from the HSC.

ST-117

REC-75 62-116395-156

MAY 20 1975

ACTION:

For information.

ENCLOSURE
Enc.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RCP

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)

1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - Mr. Auerswald

GRS:dc
-6-

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

54 JUN 4 1975

MAY 20 1975

62-116464

SSC folder

Mr. Cleveland 4-3-75

G. R. Steel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

By agreement, the FBI is currently conducting full field investigations regarding SSC staff personnel. These have extremely short (2 week) deadlines which are identical to those afforded Presidential appointments and are, therefore, given preferential treatment in opening, assigning, and following field progress. The Special Inquiry Unit of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry Section, which has about twice its normal case load, is handling these requests. Senator Church, Chairman, SSC, originally estimated that between 35 and 40 staff members would be submitted for investigation. As of today, 4-3-75, we have received requests for 85 such investigations from the SSC and the end does not appear to be in sight. They are received in bunches as many as 6 at a time, which is not the even flow expected and presents an additional burden.

In addition it is expected that similar requests will be forthcoming in the near future from the HSC since we have a similar agreement with it. Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the HSC, has estimated "probably no more than about 25 staff members will be hired." It remains to be seen if this estimate also falls short of actual receipts.

Since there is no charge for these full field investigations they will have to be considered in the budget. It is noted the current charge for a full field investigation, where applicable, is $2028.

ACTION: For information. Since it appears the nucleus of the Committee has been formed, it is suggested Senator Church be contacted and queried regarding a more realistic (30 day) deadline on the remaining investigations concerning future staff members and their replacements.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Walsh

1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
GRS ① - Mr. Steel

GRS:dc
-6-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/JR

(mfr)

62-116395-156

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/2/75

FROM : Mr. H. E. Helgeson

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At about 1 p.m., 5/2/75, ASAC Herbert D. Clough, Newark Division, called to furnish the following information:

The Newark Office had just been contacted by former Bureau Supervisor Dan Brennan, retired, who resides at Sea Girt, New Jersey. Brennan advised that he had been contacted earlier today by Mike Epstein of the Senate Select Committee who desired to talk to Brennan today and an appointment was set up. Epstein was to arrive at Newark around noon and then drive to Sea Girt, about an hour's travel. Based on information furnished at the recent conference in New York, Newark had dispatched an Agent to be present during this interview as requested by Dan Brennan.

After completing my conversation with Clough, I discussed this matter with John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, and it was concluded the Agent from Newark who would be present during the interview should call Office of Legal Counsel, speak to Hotis, and obtain general guidelines for his participation in this interview.

ASAC Clough was recontacted and so instructed. I also asked Clough to get in touch with me later in the day to let me know what transpired.

REC-19 62-116395-155

ST-101

16 MAY 29 1975

ACTION:

For information.

62-116395

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

HEH:mah

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 3 (5) 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: May 12, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

O Senstudy 75

Hotis

SUBJECT: ISSUE PAPER ON INTELLIGENCE FILES AND PRIVACY

The Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community identified ten issues likely to grow out of the Select Committee's deliberations. The Executive Committee asked the FBI to prepare a paper on one of these topics, Intelligence Files and Privacy. Specifically, the request was for a brief paper which raises the issues observed by the intelligence agencies when intelligence files and privacy are viewed together without suggesting or recommending how the questions should be resolved.

J. D. Miller drafted an outline which was discussed on April 16, 1975, with representatives of the CIA and Departments of Defense and Treasury. On April 21, this outline was presented by Mr. Hotis to the Executive Committee which received it without comment. Mr. Miller then prepared a rough draft which was discussed at a meeting on April 22, with the representatives of the CIA and Department of Treasury.

Mr. Miller's final draft is attached. It discusses both intelligence files and the concept of privacy in general terms before focusing on the issues which present themselves when an effort is made to establish the proper relationship between the two.

Enclosure

REC-37 62-116395-154

THH

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Cleveland
1-Mr. Miller

ST 114

MAY 20 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-25-01 BY

JDM:lgp
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 29 1975
360

Memo from Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams
ISSUE PAPER ON INTELLIGENCE FILES AND PRIVACY

RECOMMENDATION:

The issue paper entitled Intelligence Files and Privacy be submitted by Mr. Hotis to the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

JBA/PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

1 - Each Assistant Director-Encs.
1 - Mr. Cregar-Encs.
1 - Mr. Hotis-Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz-Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly-Encs.

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-2-75

FROM : Legal Counsel JM

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
REQUEST OF 4-28-75

REQUEST OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DATED 4-25-75

[illegible]

On 5-2-75, Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, furnished SA Paul V. Daly two requests from Congressional Committees pertaining to an allegation that documents were removed from former Director J. Edgar Hoover's residence in Washington, D. C., following the death of Mr. Clyde Tolson. Attached are copies of each of the captioned requests.

D

Each Assistant Director is to canvass his Division and furnish on an expedite basis any information they may develop considering this allegation. Responses should be directed to the Legal Analysis Office, Legal Counsel Division, so that the response may be prepared for the appropriate Congressional Committees and forwarded through the Attorney General's office.

REC 8 62-116395-153

Also attached for approval is an airtel to the Washington Field Office requesting that an appropriate inquiry be made among Field Office personnel so that these allegations may be responded to.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116395-

MAY 20 1975

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Assistant Directors make ~~appropriate inquiry of~~ personnel concerning the allegations contained in the aforementioned letters and forward results of inquiry to the Legal Analysis Office, Legal Counsel Division, so that responses may be prepared to the Committees' request.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

4 ENCLOSURE

MAY 27 1975

Enclosures
PVD:dkg (19)

RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 30 1975

(2) The attached airtel to the Washington Field Office be approved and sent making inquiry of that Office concerning allegations contained in the aforementioned letters.

pvm JBH/pvm

not sent - handled by phone JJD

PLM

5/6 -
SAC Kunkel - Alex
SAC Stames - WFO
Advise no personnel
these offices went to
Mr Hoover's home after
Mr Tolson's death and
none involved in transporting
records or any material in
connection w/ this inquiry -
JJD

5/7/75
Tom Feeney Div 3
advised his
Division negative

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMA
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIR

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 28, 1975

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
APR 30 1975

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Last week's issue of Newsweek, on page 15, states:

> Hoover's Secrets
>
> Following the death last week of Clyde Tolson, J. Edgar Hoover's close friend and No. 2 man at the FBI, two FBI agents reportedly removed some documents from the late director's house in Washington, where Tolson had been living. Officially, the FBI denies taking any such action, and a friend of Tolson's says the only Hoover documents Tolson had were old canceled checks and tax returns. But Newsweek had reported earlier that some of Hoover's private dossiers, including information "very, very damaging" to persons in the Nixon White House, were left in Tolson's custody, and a source told Newsweek this week that the materials were carted away in a truck.

Assuming that the files in question may be part of the so-called "Official and Confidential" files, your testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on February 27, 1975, is instructive. You said that the number of files which you reviewed contained matters relating to "Presidential directives regarding the role of the FBI in the security field" and to the matters related to "domestic

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

MAY 27 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-153

violence", "intelligence activities by hostile nations", "domestic extremist activities", and use of the FBI to gather political intelligence.

Furthermore, at the same time, Director Kelley suggested that materials from the "Official and Confidential" files were taken to Director Hoover's home. He stated:

> Immediately after his death /Mr. Hoover's/ some of his employees, including his personal secretary, went through his files and completed the destruction of the remainder of the files that were purely personal. These were destroyed by shredding. Some I understand were taken out to his home and placed in his home, they being historical I presume to some extent. There is no indication that they were other than personal files.

Please determine for the Select Committee whether any documents were removed from Mr. Tolson's or Mr. Hoover's residence by FBI agents or former FBI agents after Mr. Tolson's death. If agents of the FBI did go to Mr. Hoover's or Mr. Tolson's residence to remove files, please provide the Select Committee with a complete description of the documents taken into custody by the FBI. Were any such documents copies or originals of documents relating to the business of the FBI? If so, please describe the subject matter of each such document. Also indicate the individual within the FBI who has custody over these files. Furthermore, I respectfully request on behalf of the Select Committee that such files not be destroyed or removed from the FBI's custody until further notice.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

PETER W. RODINO, JR. (N.J.), CHAIRMAN

JACK BROOKS, TEX.
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, WIS.
DON EDWARDS, CALIF.
WILLIAM L. HUNGATE, MO.
JOHN CONYERS, JR., MICH.
JOSHUA EILBERG, PA.
WALTER FLOWERS, ALA.
JAMES R. MANN, S.C.
PAUL S. SARBANES, MD.
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, OHIO
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, CALIF.
ROBERT F. DRINAN, MASS.
BARBARA JORDAN, TEX.
RAY THORNTON, ARK.
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, N.Y.
EDWARD MEZVINSKY, IOWA
HERMAN BADILLO, N.Y.
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, KY.
EDWARD W. PATTISON, N.Y.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, N.J.
MARTIN A. RUSSO, ILL.

EDWARD HUTCHINSON, MICH.
ROBERT MC CLORY, ILL.
TOM RAILSBACK, ILL.
CHARLES E. WIGGINS, CALIF.
HAMILTON FISH, JR., N.Y.
M. CALDWELL BUTLER, VA.
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, CALIF.
JOHN M. ASHBROOK, OHIO
HENRY J. HYDE, ILL.
THOMAS N. KINDNESS, OHIO

Congress of the United States
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Telephone: 202-225-3951

GENERAL COUNSEL:
EARL C. DUDLEY, JR.

STAFF DIRECTOR:
GARNER J. CLINE

COUNSEL:
HERBERT FUCHS
WILLIAM P. SHATTUCK
ALAN A. PARKER
JAMES F. FALCO
MAURICE A. BARBOZA
ARTHUR P. ENDRES, JR.
THOMAS W. HUTCHISON
DANIEL L. COHEN
FRANKLIN G. POLK
THOMAS E. MOONEY
MICHAEL W. BLOMMER
ALEXANDER B. COOK
CONSTANTINE J. GEKAS
ALAN F. COFFEY, JR.
KENNETH N. KLEE

RECEIVED
MAY 2 1975
O.L.A.

April 25, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In the most recent issue, April 28, 1975, of Newsweek's "Periscope" section, it is alleged that following the death of Clyde Tolson, J. Edgar Hoover's close friend and top assistant, FBI agents removed documents from the late FBI Director's house, in which Mr. Tolson had been living. The article further alleges that the documents removed were of the nature of private dossiers.

During the hearing of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, on February 27, 1975, it was asserted that papers delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death were of a purely historical or personal nature. In keeping with the Subcommittee's oversight jurisdiction of the FBI, I respectfully request that the Department of Justice make an independent investigation of the allegations made by the Newsweek writer and report back to the Subcommittee within a reasonable time. This investigation should cover these points:

1. Were any documents or other material removed from the home of the late FBI Director by agents of the FBI, or others under the direction of the FBI or the Department of Justice, after the death of Clyde Tolson?

2. If it is determined that documents or other material were removed, on whose authority was such action initiated?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP3ALM/RC

MAY 27 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-153

3. What was the nature of the material removed?

4. For what purpose were the materials removed?

5. Was it the same material delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death?

6. If it is true that the materials delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death were of an historical or personal nature, and that all or some of these same materials were removed after the death of Clyde Tolson, what legal rationale can be used to give the FBI any interest in, or authority to remove, such documents to their own possession?

Your prompt consideration of this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Don Edwards

Don Edwards
Chairman
Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights

DE:ss

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

WASHINGTON, D.C.
APR 28
PM
1975

Don Edwards
M.C.

ALWAYS
USE ZIP
CODE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-97 BY

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
~~MAY 1962~~ EDITION
GSA GEN REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. JENKINS DATE: 5/5/75

FROM : D.W. MOORE, JR.

SUBJECT: CLYDE A. TOLSON
FORMER ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

The April 28, 1975, issue of "Newsweek" magazine on page 15 under its "Periscope" section, referred to Mr. Tolson's death and claimed that 2 Agents reportedly removed documents from Hoover's residence where Tolson had been living. The article, captioned "Hoover's Secrets," carried the FBI's denial of such action and also stated that a friend of Tolson's said the only Hoover documents Tolson had were old cancelled checks and tax returns. However, the article added that "Newsweek" had reported earlier that some of Hoover's private dossiers, including information "very, very damaging" to persons in the Nixon White House, were left in Tolson's custody. "Newsweek" further claimed that a source advised that the materials were carted away in a truck.

Mr. Kelley has asked of Messrs. Callahan, Jenkins, Adams and Moore, "Do you have any idea where such a story got started? Ky."

My memorandum to you of 4/17/75 captioned as above (copy attached) pointed out that Tony Marro, "Newsweek" reporter, contacted my office that date advising he had heard from a source to the effect that 2 Agents were sent to Tolson's residence the day of his death with a truck and carted away some files which were subsequently brought to the home of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director. Upon checking with Mr. Mohr, Marro was advised there was absolutely no truth to the story. It should be noted that Mr. Mohr also advised at that time that most of the furnishings at Mr. Tolson's home have been removed over the past several months and that there were some associates of the family and Annie, the housekeeper who had stopped by the house on the day of the death with some empty boxes to help remove additional furnishings.

Enc.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Heim
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt

(CONTINUED)

JMM:jo
(7)

MAY 2

62-116395-153

ENCLOSURE

Moore to Jenkins Memo (cont'd.)
Re: CLYDE A. TOLSON

Based upon a request from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Callahan, a Bureau clerk did go to the residence of Mr. Tolson on the day of his death whereupon he delivered some 24 boxes and 6 rolls of tape. The clerk merely delivered the boxes and tape and then left the residence. We have no idea what was placed in the boxes nor how this story started in the first place.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

MR. JENKINS 4/17/75

D.W. MOORE, JR.

CLYDE A. TOLSON
FORMER FBI ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Tony Marro, "Newsweek" magazine, Washington, D.C., called this morning advising that he had heard from a source who has been reliable in the past, to the effect that two Agents were sent to the home of Clyde Tolson Monday evening, 4/14/75, the day of his death, with a truck and carted away some files which were subsequently brought to the home of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director.

Upon checking with Mr. Mohr, Mr. Marro was advised that there was absolutely no truth to his story. It should be noted that Mr. Mohr advised that most of the furnishings at Mr. Tolson's home have been removed over the past several months and that there were some associates of the family and Annie, the housekeeper, who had stopped by the house sometime Monday with some empty boxes to help remove additional furnishings. As you know, Mr. Mohr is the Administrator of Mr. Tolson's estate and stated that there was simply no truth to the allegation that any Agents had gone to the home in a truck to transfer any files to his residence, as alleged.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Heim
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

JMM:jo
(7)

MAY 27 1975

62-116395-153

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-5-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

By memorandum dated 4-30-75, directed to the Deputy Attorney General and the Director of the FBI, signed by Chief Counsel of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., the SSC had made additional requests of the FBI. Their requests are divided into four separate areas which are as follows: (1) Request for prior changes in the Manual of Instructions, to those sections of the Manual of Instructions which they have already had access to. (2) Request to review certain sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished the Committee. A review of this list discloses generally these sections do not pertain to foreign or domestic intelligence investigations and some do not appear to be within the ambit of Senate Resolution 21 which charters the authority of the SSC. Regarding the sections of the Manual of Instructions, the request stated they would be satisfied with reviewing them at FBI Headquarters. (3) Request certain sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations be made available for review by SSC representatives at FBI Headquarters. As in request #2, some of the sections do not appear to be within the scope of Senate Resolution 21. Among the sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations requested are such sections as those concerning disciplinary matters and administration of offices. (4) A general request concerning the Bureau's filing procedures including information concerning our indexing system, list of classifications used in FBI filing system, and a set of forms used by the Bureau. (Attached is a copy of the memorandum.)

ST 112 REC 8 62-116395-152

It was pointed out regarding this request to senior staff member of the SSC, Mark Gitenstein, that some aspects of this request appear to be outside of the scope of the Committee's authority as set forth in Senate Resolution 21. Gitenstein explained that while this may

MAY 19 1975

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Bassett - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Enc.
1 - Mr. Decker - Enc.
1 - Mr. Gebhardt - Enc.
1 - Mr. McDermott - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mooney - Enc.

1 - Mr. Walsh - ~~Enc.~~
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

PVD:dkg (15)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 30 1975 ENCLOSURE

be technically accurate the Committee felt it was necessary for them to come to a general understanding as to Bureau operations and that this would assist them in their review of FBI operations in the domestic and foreign intelligence areas. Gitenstein also indicated it was the Committee's feeling that Senate Resolution 21 was intended to be construed liberally and that in general it required that the SSC be furnished by the various intelligence agencies that information which would be necessary for them to carry out its mandate. It was also explained to Gitenstein that concerning their requests involving prior changes in various sections of the Manual of Instructions that they had not placed a cutoff date as to how far back the Bureau had to go to comply with this request. Gitenstein indicated that we could use 1-1-60 as the cutoff date.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Recipients review requests pertaining to their Divisions and furnish in memorandum form their response to the Legal Counsel Division.

(2) The Legal Counsel Division will, upon receipt of responses from the interested Divisions, prepare the necessary communication to the Senate Select Committee to be approved by the Attorney General and furnished to the Committee.

PLM

OK

(FAOS--4/30/75)

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL TYLER AND DIRECTOR KELLY

April 30, 1975

This memorandum concerns paragraph IV of the attachment to Senator Church's letter of March 19 to the Attorney General. On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, I would like to request the following:

1. Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instructions. Certain sections of the Manual currently in effect have been produced to us. We had intended by the request to ask for the relevant superseded sections (note the absence of the word "current" in Section IV as compared to Section IIIA) and we did indicate previously to the liaison staff that we were interested in superseded sections. But without regard to that, it is clear from documents such as the Director's letter of August 7, 1973 to the Attorney General that certain superseded sections will be highly relevant in analyzing the question of legal authority, as well as in understanding particular events in earlier years. We would appreciate their being sent to us promptly or if that causes mechanical problems, being able to promptly review them at the FBI in order to select particular portions for copying. At a minimum we would be interested in superseded Manual provisions for the sections set out in Appendix A.

Xerox furnished to K. Wm O'Connor Deputy Asst. to A.G. by SA DALY 5-20-75

Copy to Harriet Mowitt, Ad Hoc Comm. by LFS 5-15-75

62-116395-152

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

ENCLOSURE

2. Sections of the Manual of Instructions Not Previously Produced. Based upon the previous production to us of the table of contents to the Manual of Instructions, we have identified certain additional sections of the Manual which we would like to examine. Rather than having these made available to us in the first instance in our offices, we suggest that they be made available to Mark Gitenstein, and other designated members of the staff, for initial examination at the FBI offices. A listing of those sections is annexed as Appendix B.

3. Manual of Rules and Regulations. Again, based upon the procedure whereby we were first furnished with the table of contents of the Manual of Rules, we have identified those sections which we want to examine initially. To expedite matters, these sections, identified in Appendix C, could be examined by Mr. Gitenstein, or other designated staff members, at the FBI offices.

4. Filing System. It would also be most helpful if you could provide the Committee with any other written materials on administration of any of the filing or information systems, manual or automated, which are used in the course of intelligence or internal security activities. This does not fit within our prior request but should serve to make future requests more focused.

I have in mind specifically any memoranda prepared by the Bureau on its indexing system and the so-called Clerk's Manual,

if such a document exists. Please also provide the Committee with a list of the classifications used in the FBI's filing system as well as a complete set of printed forms used by the Bureau (e.g., FD-165, etc.).

* * * *

We believe that all the foregoing material will help expedite and focus the inquiry. I assume that Mr. Hotis will contact me promptly to arrange for our review of this material.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.,
Chief Counsel,
Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence
Activities

Appendix A

Section	Subject
36	Espionage
84	Registration Act
86	Sabotage
87	Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals
88	Sedition
95	Treason
97	Voorhis Act
105	Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency
107	Internal Security Informants and Confidential Sources; and Foreign Counterintelligence Assets
122	Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest
130	Extremist Informants and Sources

Appendix B

Section	Subject
4	Surveillances and Raids
8R	Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division
19	Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Agencies
23	Bomb Threats Explosives and Incendiary Devices
27	Civil Rights
28	Civil Rights Act of 1964
29	Conspiracy
75	Neutrality Matters
78	Passports and Visas
90	Selective Service Act
102	Coordination with Other Government Agencies
103	Foreign Police Cooperation
134	Assaulting the President of the United States and Threats to the President of the United States
136	Antiriot Laws
144	Police Killings
146	Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States

Appendix C

Part I

Section 9 - Disciplinary Matters

Part II

Section 1 - Authority--Training--Submission of Information

Section 2 - Supervision--Availability-Resident Agencies

Section 3 - Administration of Offices

Section 4 - Communications

Section 5 - Dissemination of Information

Section 6 - Publications, Press, and Public Contacts

Section 7 - Payments--Property

Section 8 - Miscellaneous Regulations

Section 9 - Classification--Character--Copies--Abbreviations

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 4/30/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY '75

Removed By 79 MAY 28 1975

File Number 62-116395-

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-30-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

Proposed Legislation

Senstudy '75

SUBJECT: H. R. 214; LEGISLATION TO REQUIRE COURT ORDERS FOR THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS BY ELECTRONIC AND OTHER DEVICES, FOR ENTERING RESIDENCES, FOR OPENING MAIL, AND FOR INSPECTION OF CERTAIN RECORDS

Bowers

Reference Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams memorandum, 4-28-75, reporting that the Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management, House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, is going to open hearings concerning captioned bill on 5-6-75, and that the Department of Justice will be requested to provide testimony.

Mike Cavanagh, Assistant on the Subcommittee staff, called Inspector Bowers on 4-29-75 stating the Subcommittee Chairman, Charles Wilson (D-Calif.), had instructed him to request a copy of the Hoover report to the President in June, 1970, on behalf of the Committee on Interagency Intelligence since this report contained information regarding mail openings and possibly mail covers. Cavanagh was advised that we have received prior requests from Congressional committees for this document and all such requests are being referred to the White House. He was told to contact James Wilderotter in the office of the Counsel to the President at the White House. Wilderotter is the individual to whom we have previously referred a similar request for this document from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUL 21 1975

Charles Whitley, Administrative Assistant to Congressman David Henderson (D-N.C.), Chairman of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on 4-30-75 told Bowers that the Postal Facilities Subcommittee had scheduled the hearings regarding this legislation hurriedly after it was determined that the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, Committee on Government Operations, chaired by

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Bowers

REC-15

66-[illegible] 2360

ST 104

5 JUN 10 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN

66-2[illegible]

DWB:kjs (10)

CONTINUED - over

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

8 JUL 23 1975

Congresswoman Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.), had indicated an interest in holding hearings on this matter. Whitley stated hopefully Abzug's Subcommittee can be precluded from conducting any hearings in this area by virtue of the assertion of authority by the Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

James Wentzel, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, has been alerted to the effect that an invitation will be received by the Department for testimony on this legislation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the General and Special Investigative Divisions and the Intelligence Division promptly begin compiling appropriate information for submission to the Legal Counsel Division which can be submitted to the Department for its use in testifying or can be used as the basis for FBI testimony should the Department request an FBI representative to appear at these hearings.

RFB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW|TJL

DATE: 4/29/75

1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum records the receipt of two documents furnished to the Bureau as a member of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. These documents were furnished by Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, who is chairman of the Ad Hoc Group.

Attached herewith is a current list of those staff members of the Senate Select Committee who have received security clearances. The Bureau will continue to receive up-dated lists as additional staff members are afforded a security clearance.

Also attached is a copy of the request levied on the Department of State by the Senate Select Committee. A copy of this request was furnished to the Bureau for its information by Mr. Clarke.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Enclosures

WRW|TJL

WOC:lmh lmh
(8)

REC-100 62-116395-151

21 MAY 15 1975

ENCLOSURE

2

84 MAY 27 1975

24 April 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET

	NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
B *	Aaron, David 15/4	8-21-38	IL	550-44-7971	
B *	Bader, William 17/4	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF - Badge
	Baron, Frederick	12-2-47	CONN	494-54-5241	
*	Benz, Charity I.	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
	Brooks, Nancy	2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773	
B *	Carter, Barry 24/4	12-14-42	CAL	567-56-8854	
	Chesnik, Barbara	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
B *	Davis, Lynn 17/4	9-6-43	FL	042-36-9155	TF - Badge
	Dawson, Thomas	9-9-52	MINN	471-60-1688	
	De Oreo, Mary	6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258	
	Dillon, Molly	4-16-51	VA	150-38-4588	
	Dwyer, Daniel	8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792	
	Epstein, Michael Taylor	3-10-37	MASS	026-28-6318	
B *	Fenn, Peter \ 24/4	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123	
	Gitenstein, Mark Henry	3-7-46	ALA	420-60-8767	
	Greissing, Edward	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
*	Hatry, Audrey Helen	6-10-23	MD	216-14-8691	
*	Inderfurth, Mark	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	
	Johnson, Dorothy	6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413	

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-151

Staff Members of Senate Select Committee cleared, page 2

		NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
		Johnson, Loch	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478	
	*	Kieves, Lawrence	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
3	*	Kirbow, Charles 24/4	10-2-22	GA	252-12-5112	TF - Badge
3	*	Lombard, Charles 24/4	6-2-30	FR	578-44-9471	
		Liebengood, Howard	12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707	
		MacDonald, Naldeen	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
B	*	Madigan, Michael James 15/4	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF - Badge
B	*	Marshall, Benjamin 17/4	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
B	*	Maxwell, Elliot Everett 15/4	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF - Badge
	*	Mecham, Martha Evans	2-11-40	CAL	528-48-6848	
B	*	Miller, William G. 15/4	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
B	*	O'Flaherty, James Daniel 15/4	11-4-42	ILL	239-62-8495	Badge
		Orloff, Jan	11-14-47	CAL	558-74-8394	
		Peterson, John F.	6-15-41	CAL	565-56-7707	
		Pitts, Susan	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
B	*	Romberg, Alan 22/4	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
B	*	Schwarz, Frederick A.O., III 15/4	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
B	*	Shea, Patrick 15/4	2-28-48	UT	528-64-1965	
		Smith, Stephanie	3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476	
B	*	Snider, Lewis Brittle 24/4	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
		Towell, Mary	4-25-44	TN	566-64-7628	
B	*	Wides, Burton Victor 17/4	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF - Badge

* Staff Members who are designated to receive COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION.
B Staff Members briefed on COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION.

4/23/75

Request to the Secretary of State for Documents and Other Material Regarding the Department of State and Intelligence Activities of the United States Government

1. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance or similar material setting forth the relationship of the Department of State to, and its role in, the Intelligence Community and the National Security Council structure, including but not limited to the United States Intelligence Board, the Forty Committee, Washington Special Action Group, Senior Review Group, the Verification Panel, and the Intelligence Committee. Specific descriptive and documentary material covering the nature and extent of the Department's relationship with the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other investigating and intelligence entities should be included, such as the Interagency Evaluation Committee.

2. Organization charts showing which officials represent the Department of State on the various Intelligence Community and NSC committees, and on all other bodies, including subcommittees, whose functions include intelligence activities. Such charts should give the names and titles of officials representing the Department of State in those committees (or their predecessor organizations) going as far back as 1947 or any earlier date which the Department believes relevant. The charts should also include, for the same time frame, the names, titles, and a brief job description of those officials of the Department who provided staff support to the Department's representatives on Intelligence Community and NSC committees or to the committees directly.

3. All regulations, guidance, inter-agency memoranda, delimitations agreements, including other agreements and similar material governing the support which the Department of State provides to or receives from other agencies within the Government, having an intelligence or security or investigative function. This would include, but not be limited to, such matters as administrative support and "cover" provided to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (and its predecessors), communications support, and financial services.

4. Description, including organization chart, of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). This should include, in particular, detailed discussion of the operations of the Directorate for Coordination (INR/DDC) and any predecessor offices, whether in INR, the Under Secretary's office, or elsewhere in the Department. Names of personnel throughout the Directorate for Coordination or its

MD 2-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/kw

62-116395-151

ENCLOSURE

predecessors should be listed covering the entire period since that function was developed.

5. Description of the organization and functions of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, and of the Office of Security within the Bureau of Administration, insofar as they relate to liaison or cooperation with any intelligence or domestic investigatory body.

6. All instructions, memoranda or similar documents authorizing the establishment of and detailing the mandate of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (and its Working Group). Also all reports on terrorism by the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (and its Working Group), such as the report by the Secretary of State to the President referred to in the President's Memorandum of September 25, 1972, establishing the Committee.

7. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance, or similar material which sets forth the Department of State's role in establishing or reviewing requirements or proposals for intelligence activity, including intelligence collection, recruitment of agents, political action programs, paramilitary programs, and counterintelligence activities. In addition, a descriptive account of the Department of State's role in establishing or reviewing requirements or proposals for intelligence activity, differentiating the Department's role in intelligence collection, recruitment of agents, political action programs, paramilitary programs, and counterintelligence activities. This should include differentiation between activities within these categories where differences exist.

8. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance, or similar material which sets forth the role and functions of the Department of State in the collection, assessment, production, and dissemination of national intelligence. In addition, a descriptive account of the current role and functions of the Department of State in this regard.

9. All instructions, guidance or similar material defining the authority of U.S. Ambassadors and other Chiefs of Mission to know about and control activities of any U.S. intelligence or investigative agent or entity in the country to which the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is accredited. This should include any limitations upon Ambassadorial control or cognizance of and discussion of any other coordination, monitoring, or other relationships between U.S. missions and the activities of any U.S. intelligence or investigative agent or entity.

10. Any other historical, descriptive or documentary material, studies or reports which the Department believes would be of assistance to the Select Committee in understanding the Department's role in intelligence activities, evaluation and monitoring of those activities, or other matters relevant to the Committee's mandate.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

267 THRU 268

268X1

269

269X1 THRU 275

277 THRU 280

282 THRU 288

290 THRU 293

295 THRU 299

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 17, 1975

1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: SUPERSEDED SECTIONS OF THE
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

Reference is made to the SSC memorandum, with attached appendices, dated April 30, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Part one of referenced memorandum requested this Bureau to make available for review various superseded sections of the Manual of Instructions (MOI). Appendix A attached to referenced memorandum set forth the sections requested for review. Mr. Mark Gitenstein, SSC Staff Member, has advised FBI Special Agent Paul V. Daly that revisions to the MOI should cover the period January 1, 1960, to the present.

These superseded sections are now ready for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff. It should be noted that for the period January 1, 1960, to the present, there were no revisions of MOI Sections 95 and 97.

1 - The Attorney General

KAM:sdjs sdjs
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY

MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-299

CLOSURE

KAM

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 17, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a memorandum from the SSC dated April 30, 1975, with attached appendices A thru C requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to SSC is the original of a memorandum which responds to one of the requests contained in above SSC memorandum.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

KAM:sdjs
(9)

REC- 102

62-116395-299

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

PLM

5-8

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JUL 3 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

W. O. CREGAR - 4063 JSH

Re: Superseded Sections of the
Manual of Instructions

NOTE:

Pursuant to a prior SSC request, we furnished them current MOI Sections 36, 84, 86, 87, 88, 95, 97 and 122. Due to the sensitive nature of Sections 105, 107 and 130, these were made available for review only at FBIHQ.

Listed below are the Intelligence Division representatives and the MOI sections reviewed for this project:

Section 36-Espionage	James W. Johnson	CI-1
Section 84-Registration Act	Dennis R. Dickson	CI-3
Section 86-Sabotage	Louis J. Brune	IS-2
Section 87-Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals	William N. Preusse	IS-2
	Thomas J. McNiff	IS-2
Section 88-Sedition	George J. Lex	IS-2
Section 105-Internal Security-Nationalistic Tendency	James W. Johnson	CI-1
	Howard W. Dare, Jr.	CI-2
	Dennis R. Dickson	CI-3
Section 107-Internal Security Informants and Confidential Sources; and Foreign Counterintelligence Assets	Edward P. Grigalus	IS-2
	James W. Johnson	CI-1
	Howard W. Dare, Jr.	CI-2
	Dennis R. Dickson	CI-3
Section 122-Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest	Robert D. Shea	IS-1
Section 130-Extremist Informants and Sources	Robert D. Shea	IS-1

As previously noted, there were no MOI revisions during the period of interest to Section 95-Treason and Section 97-Voorhis Act.

The revisions of the MOI requested by SSC consists of approximately 2,200 pages and is approximately 9" in height. Due to the bulkiness of these revisions, they are not being attached to this memorandum.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instructns Part I SSC memorandum 4/30/75.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 6/20/75 3:10 PM

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/MF
MDR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

C. Benz, Office Manager

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instructions

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part I.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating Procedures

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/BMP
MDR-16

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

At the request of SSC, specified superseded sections of this Bureau's Manual of Instructions, covering the period 1/1/60 to the present, have been made available at FBIHQ for review by SSC Members.

TREAT AS YELLOW

WDC
Encl

5-JM

62-116395

TJM:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

The Attorney General June 17, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter, and appendices thereto, from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum which is responsive to their request.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

[illegible] 1 to O'Conn[illegible] 6/19
delivered to C. [illegible] 6/20/75

RDS:jmn jmn
(9)

REC- 102

62 - 116395 - 298

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]
MDR-16

JUL 2 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

4 JUL 2 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

62-116395

June 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to SSC letter to the Attorney General, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, captioned "Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance," the SSC desired a response to the following request:

Item 15. "All July and August memoranda from former Special Agent (SA) Leo T. Clark to the Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) or the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Newark, New Jersey, Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), captioned 'Protection of the President - White House Inquiry.'"

In regard to the aforementioned, a thorough review of the files of the Newark Office of the FBI did not reveal the existence of a file bearing the caption, "Protection of the President - White House Inquiry." However, this review did disclose the existence of a file bearing the caption, "Protection of the President." A thorough review of this file failed to uncover any memoranda emanating from former SA Leo T. Clark at any time.

In addition, a thorough review of other files maintained at the Newark Office believed relevant to the subject matter of this inquiry, did not reveal any memoranda, letters or other type communications prepared by former SA Clark.

A thorough review of pertinent FBIHQ files discloses no memoranda emanating from former SA Clark regarding this matter.

1 - The Attorney General

RDS:jmn jmn
(8)

TJM

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-116395-798

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

NOTE:

Telephonic instructions were issued to the Newark Office to respond to Item 15, in SSC letter 5/14/75. By airtel dated 5/30/75 and teletype dated 6/5/75, Newark advised that their review regarding Item 15 was negative. Material reviewed at FBIHQ included, the "Disruption of Democratic National Convention; Information Concerning" file; records of the Inspection Division regarding the "Special Squad, Atlantic City, New Jersey, National Convention, August 22-28, 1964," personnel files of former Assistant to the Director DeLoach, Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan, former SA's Leo T. Clark and Frederick Baumgardner. Above material did not make reference to or contain any memoranda prepared by SA Clark regarding the Democratic National Convention held at Atlantic City, New Jersey, from 8/22-28/64. File review conducted by SA Robert D. Shea.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SSC to Study Govt Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 6/20/75 3:10 PM

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY [illegible]
MDR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☒ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

C. BENZ, Office Manager

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix D, Item 15.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Surveillance

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC requested all July and August, 1964, memoranda captioned "Protection of the President - White House Inquiry," prepared by a former Special Agent of our Philadelphia Office. Search of Bureau records failed to uncover the existence of any such documents.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2001 BY SP2ALM/BYP
1MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-TJM

62-116395

TJM:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided; that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

June 17, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

0

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY

MDR-16

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to one of the SSC requests.

There does not appear to be any relation between the elimination of the FBI Crime Records Division and the mandate of the Committee contained in Senate Resolution 21. You may wish to give specific consideration to this observation before approving the forwarding of the enclosed documents to the Committee.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (20)

REC-102 62-116395-292

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

3 JUL 2 1975

c. Dir. ____
. AD Adm. ____
. AD Inv. ____
. Dir.:
min. ____
mp. Syst. ____
. Affairs ____
es & Com. ____
h. Inv. ____
nt. ____
pection ____
ell. ____
aboratory ____
an. & Eval. ____
c. Inv. ____
ining ____
Coun. ____
one Rm. ____
Sec'y ____

RLM:mam
(10)

RLM

1 - ENCLOSURE

PLM

5 - TJM

JUL 3 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

June 17, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND JURISDICTION

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Pursuant to your request in Appendix B, Part II, Item number 15, for all memoranda and other materials relating to the elimination of the FBI Crime Records Division in late 1972 or early 1973, enclosed are copies of nine FBI communications.

Enclosures (9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/RP
MDR-16

1 - The Attorney General

RLM:mam
(9)

NOTE:

The material furnished contains available information with reference to the change in name and later elimination of the Crime Records Division during the period 10/16/72 to 1/3/73. This matter has been coordinated with Mr. David Divan of the External Affairs Division. An extensive search by the Files and Communications Division has failed to locate the 10/4/72 memorandum referenced in M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop memorandum, 10/16/72, and the L. M. Walters memorandum to Mr. Felt, 12/14/72. The letter to Mr. Fletcher Thompson mentioned in the second recommendation, page 3, of the 10/16/72 Jones to Bishop memorandum is a letter of appreciation for the suggestion with reference to the change in name of the Crime Records Division.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. RLM
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RLM

62-116395-241

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/17/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SSC to Study Govt Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Re; Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Dept. of Justice; Organization, Structure, and Jurisdiction.

Originating Office: FBI Appendix B, Part II, Item 15

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Jr. Date: 6/23/75 3:00 PM

Received by: C Berry

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/mjp

MDR-16

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STA[illegible] GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: 10-16-72

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE
CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

By memorandum dated 10-4-72, attached, it was indicated that has suggested a name change for the Crime Records Division to Office of Public Information or some other more meaningful designation.

It was pointed out that suggestion was in line with informal discussions you (Mr. Bishop) have had with members of your staff concerning a possible name change for the Division.

In this connection, Mr. Gray has noted that he "can think of many reasons for changing the name. What have been the nature of the reasons for change discussed?"

With the formation of the Computer Systems Division and the resultant reassignment of the personnel and the work of the Uniform Crime Reporting Section, including the National Crime Information Center/Computerized Criminal Histories file from Crime Records to Computer Systems, the title "Crime Records," as has indicated, is no longer meaningful insofar as the work of this Division is concerned.

"Office of Public Information," which was suggested by would inaccurately reflect the activities and responsibilities of this Division and could result in confusion with the Office of Public Information in the Department of Justice. This, of course, would be undesirable.

Enclosures

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2010 BY SP2ALM/RYJ
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

It is noted that this Division, which is presently comprised of the Crime Research Section, and the Correspondence and Tours Section, is primarily responsible for conducting extensive research pertaining to crime, crime prevention, and other related matters in the law enforcement field. This Division is involved in the review and preparation of replies to correspondence regarding FBI Jurisdiction and operations received from law enforcement, other Government agencies, and the general public in those instances where the Bureau has a responsibility to disseminate such information.

"The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin," which is the official publication of the FBI, is prepared and distributed by Crime Records, as well as numerous pamphlets for the instruction and information of Bureau employees, the law enforcement profession and the general public. This Division is responsible for supervision of tours of Bureau facilities for Government officials, law enforcement authorities, and the general public; directs the program of distributing informative and illustrative material on Bureau fugitives to various media for the purpose of effecting the location and apprehension of these criminals with the help of citizen cooperation;and coordinates and supervises the Bureau's interests in the utilization of radio, television, and publication outlets to enhance the discharge of our responsibilities in the law enforcement field by acquainting the public with the FBI's operations and activities.

In addition, this Division has the custody of a number of research and reference files which are maintained in a current status and which are essential to the Division in the fulfillment of its responsibilities to the Bureau.

Further, this Division supervises the "Ten-Most-Wanted Fugitives" Program, as well as "The FBI" television series, both of which involve research for their sustenance and success.

While it is recognized, based on the foregoing, that this Division is not completely absorbed in research to the exclusion of other activities, "Crime Research"

CONTINUED - OVER

more accurately describes our responsibilities, it is felt, than any other title suggested. It is noted the more likely alternatives discussed were "Research and Information Division" and "Research and Correspondence Division."

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Mr. Gray approve the renaming of the Crime Records Division to Crime Research Division.

Approved. 10/22
11:02A

2. That in line with the foregoing, the attached letter to [redacted] be approved and sent.

10/22
11:02A

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(Typed October 27, 1972)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Memorandum to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: NAME CHANGE OF CRIME RECORDS DIVISION
TO CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

In view of the transfer of the record functions of the Crime Records Division to the Computer Systems Division, I have approved changing the name of the Crime Records Division to the Crime Research Division effective immediately. The Section formerly known as the Crime Research Section has been renamed Research and Service Section. Manual changes are forthcoming.

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2006 BY SPALM/BJP
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : THE ACTING DIRECTOR DATE: 12-1-72

FROM : W. M. FELT

SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION - CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

Pursuant to your instructions, Assistant Director Bishop is being temporarily attached to the Training Division at Quantico for special assignment until the effective date of his retirement, 2-1-73.

Mr. Bishop will be assigned to the research and development of a major case practical problem for use in the National Academy. This is extremely important because our experience indicates that most of the officers attending the Academy are unable to understand and handle the ramifications of major cases. Mr. Bishop, with his extensive field background, plus his familiarity with news media problems, is ideally suited to handle this assignment.

If he has time, Mr. Bishop will also analyze and develop meaningful practical cases which will enable new agents to meet present-day needs.

I have arranged with Mr. Jenkins for suitable office facilities to be used by Mr. Bishop at Quantico and have instructed Bishop to report to Mr. Jenkins on Monday, 12-4-72.

[redacted] is being diverted from his current inspection assignment in the Office of Legal Counsel to begin an immediate survey of the Crime Research Division to determine the feasibility of the transfer of its functions to other divisions or to your office.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SP2ALM/RP
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. FELT

DATE: 12/6/72

FROM : L. M. WALTERS

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL; CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SP2AM
MDR-16

PURPOSE: To recommend immediate supervisory reorganization and transfer of all functions and personnel of the Crime Research Division based on survey and analysis conducted by Inspection Division.

Recommended transfer of functions and related responsibilities together with appropriate personnel as follows:

OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other news media formerly handled by Assistant Director Bishop, his front office Agent personnel and the Administrative Review Unit (Congressional liaison).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concerning press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a commenta liaison with the White House and Department press offices; review of editorials and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible future use from FBIHQ Divisions.

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critical of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs;

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONTINUED - OVER

special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison matters.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

To assume [review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence.] Formerly handled by the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the public and requests for publications).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions; file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requests for publications.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General, Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

Recommended Agent Transfer:

1.

CONTINUED - OVER

TRAINING DIVISION

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI. These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit, Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telephone directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and other officials based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientific magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of a lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing, preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes"; preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenance of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media; day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies; custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin; maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on misquotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and organizations

CONTINUED - OVER

Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-line articles and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials.

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI; analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders, parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile project.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

To assume supervision for [special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities, meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors to the Bureau./ Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formerly handled among the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograph of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the-job training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour areas; prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging publication in their home-town newspapers.

CONTINUED - OVER

Recommended Agent Transfer: [redacted]

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence, compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of background memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informative memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit. (In past years these functions were performed in Name Check Section of General Investigative Division.)

Recommended Agent Transfer: [redacted]

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and dissemination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance of special indices concern distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These functions were formerly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

Recommended Agent Transfer: [redacted]

OBSERVATIONS

Agent personnel and supervisory functions have been analyzed and dealt with in the foregoing proposed reallocations; clerical functions have not. It is suggested that clerical functions and personnel now simply move with the Agent desks and units to which they are attached. Questions of space also have not been covered and it is readily apparent that a substantial portion of the functions and personnel suggested for transfer to Training Division might feasibly operate at Quantico (e. g. Library, Special Productions and Publications Unit). Five units of Training Division are now located at Headquarters and the Research Unit of Research and Service Section proposed herein for transfer to Training Division, likewise should remain at Headquarters. Accordingly [redacted] formerly in the Front Office of Crime Research Division, has been proposed for transfer to Training Division in order to act, during this transition period, as a special coordinator of functions that may be divided between Headquarters and Quantico. No!

The questions of adequacy of clerical personnel, space reallocation, and relocation of units and functions to Quantico demand greater study and inasmuch

Memo for Mr. Felt
Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel;
Crime Research Division

as Training Division is scheduled for regular annual inspection next week, these matters will be gone into in depth in connection with that inspection and coordinated in consultation with Administrative Division. It is the purpose of this memorandum to promptly effect the desired transfers of functions among affected Divisions in order to provide for immediate routing of mail and upper level review and supervision of the work product of all units previously composing Crime Research Division.

[illegible] 12/12 4:30 P

RECOMMENDATION:

That transfers as outlined herein be approved.

ADDENDUM OF W.M. FELT

this appears logical and feasible. If any [illegible] develop we can readjust. I agree that the Research & Service functions, which will [illegible] under [illegible] should be reassigned to the Training Division. I do not believe that this Section should be transferred to Training Division because there is a need for access to [illegible] & other mail and at Headquarters & personnel contacts with the public. Furthermore there is no available space at Quantico except in the Library Building. Accordingly I recommend the Library Building at Quantico be [illegible], that the FBIHQ Library be [illegible] the telephone directories and [illegible] would need to retain at FBIHQ the [illegible] used on a daily basis by the Divisions [illegible] encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis. [illegible] the FBIHQ Library was to [illegible] much more. The space into which the FBIHQ Library [illegible] can be used and in fact is badly needed in the 9th & D Building [illegible] Domestic Intelligence Division which is now crowded. I recommend that you approve now the transfer of functions and that any necessary realignment of personnel be considered in separate memoranda.

[illegible]

(FOREGOING TYPED ON FOLLOWING PAGE)

Agree
Change Administrative Review Unit to Congressional Services Unit
[illegible] 12/12
4:20 P

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 12-6-72 WMF:crt

This appears logical and feasible. If snags develop we can readjust. I agree that the Research and Service functions, which will remain under should be reassigned to the Training Division. I do not believe that this Section should be transferred to Quantico, however, because there is daily need for access to files and other material at Headquarters and occasional contacts with the public. Furthermore, there is no available space at Quantico except in the Library Building. Accordingly, I recommend that the FBIHQ Library be moved into the Library Building at Quantico. We would need to retain at FBIHQ the telephone directories and encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis by other Divisions. The space into which the FBIHQ Library was to have been moved in the 9th and D Building can be used and in fact is badly needed by the Domestic Intelligence Division which is very crowded.

I recommend that you approve now the transfer of functions and that any necessary realignment of personnel be considered by separate memoranda.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. FELT DATE: December 14, 1972

FROM : L. M. WALTERS

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL; CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

per prior approval of Mr. Gray

Effective immediately, all functions and personnel formerly assigned to the Crime Research Division are reassigned as indicated below. Recipient Inspectors, Section and Unit Chiefs promptly report to respective offices of assignment.

Agent personnel are set forth together with assigned functions. Clerical personnel utilized in handling these assignments are to transfer with listed Agents in accordance with the functions formerly handled by them.

OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other news media formerly handled in the Front Office of the Crime Research Division as well as the Administrative Review Unit which has been redesignated as the Congressional Services Unit and will be handled by

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SP2ALM
MDR-16

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concer[illegible] press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a commentator; liaison with the White House and Department press offices; review of editorials and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible future use from FBIHQ Divisions.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Com[illegible] [illegible] limited to official proceedings by your Committee [illegible] may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critic of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs; special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison matters.

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

To assume review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence. Formerly handled b the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the public and requests for publications).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions; file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requests for publications.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General, Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

CONTINUED - OVER

TRAINING DIVISION

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI. These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit, Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telepho directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and other officials based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientifi magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of a lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and disseminatio of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing, preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes"; preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintena of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media; day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and

CONTINUED - OVER

matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin; maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on misquotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and organizations.

Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-line articles and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazin and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials.

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI; analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinen to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders, parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile project.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities, meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitor to the Bureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formerly handled among the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autogra of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the-jo training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour areas; prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging publication in their home-town newspapers.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence, compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of backgrou memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informati memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

[illegible]

To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and dissemination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance of special indices concerning distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These functions were formerly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Administrative Division arrange any necessary realignment of space and handle memoranda instructing transfers.

2. That recipient offices promptly survey clerical functions and responsibilities and submit appropriate recommendations in connection with any needed realignment of clerical personnel; also prepare updated organizational charts.

3. That attached airtel to all offices be approved.

airtel

December 15, 1972

To: SAC, Albany

From: For the Acting Director, FBI
W. Mark Felt
Acting Associate Director

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL; CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2016 BY SP2ALM/BJ

MDR-16

For information of all offices, the functions and personnel formerly assigned to the Crime Research Division have been realigned at FBIHQ.

Mr. Gray has assumed supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other news media.

Remaining functions of the Crime Research Division have been reorganized and assigned as follows:

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director and the FBI and preparation of replies to correspondence.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

Formal liaison with the American Bar Association and other legal organizations.

TRAINING DIVISION

Operation and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest

2 - All Offices

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Gill
2-1
6:06P

in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the Director and other Bureau officials; research for speeches and policy statements of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities, meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors to the Bureau.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

White House name checks and appropriate correspondence; compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of background memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informative memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all available media; prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and dissemination of material concerning fugitives.

Above furnished for guidance in routing communications to FBIHQ.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. FELT DATE: 12/18/72

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL; CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

By memo dated 12/14/72 from Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt the reassignment of Special Agent personnel of the former Crime Research Division to other Offices and Divisions at Headquarters was set forth. The purpose of this memo is to establish what clerical personnel will be assigned to each Office or Division. This information is necessary to effect changes in appropriate records.

For control purposes, each of the listed individuals should advise of the clerical personnel needed to carry out the functions and related responsibilities reassigned to the respective Office or Division. All clerical personnel assigned to the former Crime Research Division must be accounted for. Accordingly, the listed individuals should consult with each other if there is any question concerning assignment, excessive or needed clerical personnel, coordinating information with appropriate Office representative or Division head. Identities, positions and grades should be set forth under the respective Office or Division.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-28-2000 BY SP2ALM
MDR-16

RECOMMENDATION:

That the reassignment of the clerical personnel of the former Crime Research Division be accomplished as set forth above with results furnished to the Administrative Division so that appropriate records can be adjusted.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Felt

DATE: December 21, 1972

FROM : T. J. Jenkins

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

Reference is made to memorandum L. M. Walters to Mr. Felt, dated December 14, 1972, in captioned matter.

Bureau Library at FBI Headquarters

A survey has been made of the library, its books, facility and personnel. At the present time, the library is housed in six rooms in the 4200 corridor at FBI Headquarters and has a staff of the following:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2000 BY SP2ALM/bsp
MDR-16

From a survey of the books, all books can be removed from the library to the library at Quantico with exception to certain reference books and out-of-town telephone directories which are necessary to be maintained at FBI Headquarters for ready-reference purposes by the Bureau staff at Headquarters. From the survey, it was determined these books can be maintained in two rooms presently occupied by the library, thus freeing four rooms as surplus space.

In the library is a lending library which has about 100 members. These members pay $1 every six months for membership dues and have the privilege of using the library. Because of the minor use of this lending library, I am proposing that we phase out this part of the library during the next six months, removing the books at the end of that period to Quantico.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONTINUED - OVER

From the survey, I believe that the two library technicians, who are presently assigned to the library, can handle the remaining reference books and telephone directories and that when l returns to work a decision can be made as to what can be done with her.

Since practically all of the library will be transferred to Quantico, it will be necessary to transfer certain employees of the library unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all the books with the exception of the reference books, lending library, and out-of-town telephone directories be transferred to the Academy at Quantico.

(2) That authority be granted to gradually phase out the lending library over the next six-month period.

(3) That be transferred to Quantico as Assistant Librarian and for lecture purposes at the Academy.

(4) That be transferred to the Academy at Quantico.

(5) That the position of secretary be abolished and that be reassigned.

[redacted]

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division [redacted]

[redacted] (6) That the two library technicians, [redacted], be retained to handle the reference books and telephone directories remaining at FBI Headquarters.

(7) If above transfers are approved, Administrative Division will handle.

Approved. G
12/27
1:18P

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Felt DATE: January 3, 1973

FROM : T. J. Jenkins

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt, dated 12/14/72, in captioned matter. A review has been made of the units assigned to the Training Division from the former Crime Research Division, particularly the Research and Service Section. As you know, , has retired. I believe we can consolidate the Training Programs Processing Section and the Research and Service Section at FBI Headquarters into one section, calling it the Training Programs Processing and Research Section. This would eliminate one section chief.

As you know, we have recommended and it has been approved that the Library in the Crime Research Section be moved to Quantico. It is my proposal that the former Library Unit, what is left of it here at FBI Headquarters, be merged with the Research Unit leaving three units from the former Research and Service Section; namely, the Research Unit; Special Productions Unit and Publications Unit.

I have discussed with Mr. Callahan the transferring of the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters to the Administrative Division and he is agreeable. This would mean an addition to his division of one Special Agent and seven clerical staff. The remaining units presently in the Training Division would remain as is.

This would give the Section Chief of the Training Division stationed at FBI Headquarters a total of 18 Agents and 53 clerks under his supervision. I believe that current Section Chief is capable of handling this assignment as Section Chief, particularly if is retained as Number One Man of the Section. has served as Number One Man in the former Research and Service Section of the Crime Research Division.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SP2ALM/RP
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the old Research and Service Section of the former Crime Research Division be combined with the Training Programs Processing Section of the Training Division and be given the name Training Programs Processing and Research Section.

[redacted]

(2) That the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters be transferred from the Training Division to the Administrative Division.

[redacted]

(3) That [redacted] current Section Chief in the Training Division be ~~retained~~ DESIGNATED as Section Chief. OF THE NEW SECTION

(4) That [redacted] be ~~retained~~ DESIGNATED as Number One Man of this new Section in the Training Division.

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 1-4-73

I am in agreement with the above except for the proposed new name Training Programs Processing and Research Section. I think this sounds pompous and cumbersome. I suggest and Mr. Jenkins has agreed to naming the new section Police Training and Research Section. I recommend approval with this modification.

Approved.
1-4
9:40P

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Felt

DATE: January 3, 1973

FROM : T. J. Jenkins

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt, dated 12/14/72, in captioned matter. A review has been made of the units assigned to the Training Division from the former Crime Research Division, particularly the Research and Service Section. As you know, the Section Chief of that Section, Milton A. Jones, has retired. I believe we can consolidate the Training Programs Processing Section and the Research and Service Section at FBI Headquarters into one section, calling it the Training Programs Processing and Research Section. This would eliminate one section chief.

As you know, we have recommended and it has been approved that the Library in the Crime Research Section be moved to Quantico. It is my proposal that the former Library Unit, what is left of it here at FBI Headquarters, be merged with the Research Unit leaving three units from the former Research and Service Section; namely, the Research Unit, Special Productions Unit and Publications Unit.

I have discussed with Mr. Callahan the transferring of the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters to the Administrative Division and he is agreeable. This would mean an addition to his division of one Special Agent and seven clerical staff. The remaining units presently in the Training Division would remain as is.

This would give the Section Chief of the Training Division stationed at FBI Headquarters a total of 18 Agents and 53 clerks under his supervision. I believe that current Section Chief, T. J. Brownfield, is capable of handling this assignment as Section Chief, particularly if Mr. Lawrence J. Heim is retained as Number One Man of the Section. Mr. Heim has served as Number One Man in the former Research and Service Section of the Crime Research Division.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SP2ALM/bf
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the old Research and Service Section of the former Crime Research Division be combined with the Training Programs Processing Section of the Training Division and be given the name Training Programs Processing and Research Section.

(2) That the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters be transferred from the Training Division to the Administrative Division.

(3) That SA T. J. Brownfield current Section Chief in the Training Division be ~~retained~~ DESIGNATED as Section Chief. OF THE NEW SECTION

(4) That SA Lawrence J. Heim be ~~retained~~ DESIGNATED as Number One Man of this new Section in the Training Division.

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 1-4-73

I am in agreement with the above except for the proposed new name Training Programs Processing and Research Section. I think this sounds pompous and cumbersome. I suggest and Mr. Jenkins has agreed to naming the new section Police Training and Research Section. I recommend approval with this modification.

Approved.

1-4

9:40 P

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC	C. Benz, Office Manager
	HSC	

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix B, Part II, Item 15.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Organization and Staffing

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

At the request of the SSC, documents relating to the elimination of the FBI Crime Records Division in late 1972 were furnished to the SSC for review.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJG
MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC

5-JM

62-116395

TJM:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Felt DATE: December 21, 1972

FROM : T. J. Jenkins

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-26-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJF
MDR-14

Reference is made to memorandum L. M. Walters to Mr. Felt, dated December 14, 1972, in captioned matter.

Bureau Library at FBI Headquarters

A survey has been made of the library, its books, facility and personnel. At the present time, the library is housed in six rooms in the 4200 corridor at FBI Headquarters and has a staff of the following:

Inspector Bernard M. Suttler, GS-16
Librarian Iona ~~G.~~ Swann, GS-9
~~Assistant Librarian Eleanor L. Benish, GS-6~~
Secretary Connie Hutchison, GS-4 (position is GS-5)
3 Librarian Technicians
Alica Brand, GS-4 (on extended leave without pay - due to illness)
Patricia Lauber, GS-3 (GS-4 position)
Ester Villanueva, GS-4

From a survey of the books, all books can be removed from the library to the library at Quantico with exception to certain reference books and out-of-town telephone directories which are necessary to be maintained at FBI Headquarters for ready-reference purposes by the Bureau staff at Headquarters. From the survey, it was determined these books can be maintained in two rooms presently occupied by the library, thus freeing four rooms as surplus space.

In the library is a lending library which has about 100 members. These members pay $1 every six months for membership dues and have the privilege of using the library. Because of the minor use of this lending library, I am proposin that we phase out this part of the library during the next six months, removing the books at the end of that period to Quantico.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

CONTINUED - OVER

From the survey, I believe that the two library technicians, who are presently assigned to the library, can handle the remaining reference books and telephone directories and that when Miss Brand returns to work a decision can be made as to what can be done with her.

Since practically all of the library will be transferred to Quantico, it will be necessary to transfer certain employees of the library unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all the books with the exception of the reference books, lending library, and out-of-town telephone directories be transferred to the Academy at Quantico.

(2) That authority be granted to gradually phase out the lending library over the next six-month period.

(3) That Inspector Bernard M. Suttler be transferred to Quantico as Assistant Librarian and for lecture purposes at the Academy.

(4) That Miss Iona G. Swann and Miss Eleanor L. Benish be transferred to the Academy at Quantico.

(5) That the position of secretary be abolished and that Miss Connie Hutchison be reassigned.

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division

(6) That the two library technicians, Patricia Lauber and Ester Villanueva, be retained to handle the reference books and telephone directories remaining at FBI Headquarters.

(7) If above transfers are approved, Administrative Division will handle.

Approved. G
12/27
1:18P

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Bishop DATE: 10-16-72

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE
CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

By memorandum dated 10-4-72, attached, it was indicated that Fletcher D. Thompson, SAC, Omaha, has suggested a name change for the Crime Records Division to Office of Public Information or some other more meaningful designation.

It was pointed out that Mr. Thompson's suggestion was in line with informal discussions you (Mr. Bishop) have had with members of your staff concerning a possible name change for the Division.

In this connection, Mr. Gray has noted that he "can think of many reasons for changing the name. What have been the nature of the reasons for change discussed?"

With the formation of the Computer Systems Division and the resultant reassignment of the personnel and the work of the Uniform Crime Reporting Section, including the National Crime Information Center/Computerized Criminal Histories file from Crime Records to Computer Systems, the title "Crime Records," as Mr. Thompson has indicated, is no longer meaningful insofar as the work of this Division is concerned.

"Office of Public Information," which was suggested by Mr. Thompson, would inaccurately reflect the activities and responsibilities of this Division and could result in confusion with the Office of Public Information in the Department of Justice. This, of course, would be undesirable.

Enclosures

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY

MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

It is noted that this Division, which is presently comprised of the Crime Research Section, and the Correspondence and Tours Section, is primarily responsible for conducting extensive research pertaining to crime, crime prevention, and other related matters in the law enforcement field. This Division is involved in the review and preparation of replies to correspondence regarding FBI Jurisdiction and operations received from law enforcement, other Government agencies, and the general public in those instances where the Bureau has a responsibility to disseminate such information.

"The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin," which is the official publication of the FBI, is prepared and distributed by Crime Records, as well as numerous pamphlets for the instruction and information of Bureau employees, the law enforcement profession and the general public. This Division is responsible for supervision of tours of Bureau facilities for Government officials, law enforcement authorities, and the general public; directs the program of distributing informative and illustrative material on Bureau fugitives to various media for the purpose of effecting the location and apprehension of these criminals with the help of citizen cooperation;and coordinates and supervises the Bureau's interests in the utilization of radio, television, and publication outlets to enhance the discharge of our responsibilities in the law enforcement field by acquainting the public with the FBI's operations and activities.

In addition, this Division has the custody of a number of research and reference files which are maintained in a current status and which are essential to the Division in the fulfillment of its responsibilities to the Bureau.

Further, this Division supervises the "Ten-Most-Wanted Fugitives" Program, as well as "The FBI" television series, both of which involve research for their sustenance and success.

While it is recognized, based on the foregoing, that this Division is not completely absorbed in research to the exclusion of other activities, "Crime Research"

CONTINUED - OVER

more accurately describes our responsibilities, it is felt, than any other title suggested. It is noted the more likely alternatives discussed were "Research and Information Division" and "Research and Correspondence Division."

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Mr. Gray approve the renaming of the Crime Records Division to Crime Research Division.

Approved. G 10/22
11:02A

2. That in line with the foregoing, the attached letter to Mr. Thompson be approved and sent.

G 10/22
11:02A

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : THE ACTING DIRECTOR DATE: 12-1-72

FROM : W. M. FELT

SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION - CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

Pursuant to your instructions, Assistant Director Bishop is being temporarily attached to the Training Division at Quantico for special assignment until the effective date of his retirement, 2-1-73.

Mr. Bishop will be assigned to the research and development of a major case practical problem for use in the National Academy. This is extremely important because our experience indicates that most of the officers attending the Academy are unable to understand and handle the ramifications of major cases. Mr. Bishop, with his extensive field background, plus his familiarity with news media problems, is ideally suited to handle this assignment.

If he has time, Mr. Bishop will also analyze and develop meaningful practical cases which will enable new agents to meet present-day needs.

I have arranged with Mr. Jenkins for suitable office facilities to be used by Mr. Bishop at Quantico and have instructed Bishop to report to Mr. Jenkins on Monday, 12-4-72.

Inspector Wilburn ~~K.~~ DeBruler is being diverted from his current inspection assignment in the Office of Legal Counsel to begin an immediate survey of the Crime Research Division to determine the feasibility of the transfer of its functions to other divisions or to your office.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY
MJR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. FELT DATE: December 14, 1972

FROM : L. M. WALTERS

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL; CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SP2ACM/BJF
MDR-16

per prior approval of Mr. Gray

Effective immediately/all functions and personnel formerly assigned to the Crime Research Division are reassigned as indicated below. Recipient Inspectors, Section and Unit Chiefs promptly report to respective offices of assignment.

Agent personnel are set forth together with assigned functions. Clerical personnel utilized in handling these assignments are to transfer with listed Agents in accordance with the functions formerly handled by them.

OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

Inspectors James F. Bland, David W. Bowers, Jack E. Herington and SA Harold P. Leinbaugh.

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other news media formerly handled in the Front Office of the Crime Research Division as well as the Administrative Review Unit which has been redesignated as the Congressional Services Unit and will be handled by Inspectors Jack E. Herington and David W. Bowers.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concern press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a commentator; liaison with the White House and Department press offices; review of editorials and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible future use from FBIHQ Divisions.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critical of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs; special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison matters.

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Section Chief Gordon E. Malmfeldt and SAs Homer R. Hauer (Number One Man), Ralph W. Engelmeier, Marion S. Ramey, Paul L. Andrews, John W. Dalseg, Robert C. Dean and Richard E. White.

To assume review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence. Formerly handled by the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the public and requests for publications).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions; file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requests for publications.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

SA James C. Farrington.

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General, Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

CONTINUED - OVER

TRAINING DIVISION

Section Chief Milton A. Jones, Inspectors Bernard M. Suttler and George T. Quinn, and SAs Lawrence J. Heim, John H. Campbell, Edward H. Gooderham, David L. Divan, Carl J. Hall, Louis S. Lear, Donald G. Hanning, Robert B. Davenport, Robert C. Fay, George William Gunn and Fern C. Stukenbroeker.

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI. These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit, Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telephon directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and other officials based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientific magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of a lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing, preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes"; preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenan of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media; day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies; custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and

CONTINUED - OVER

matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin; maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on misquotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and organizations.

Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-line articles and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials.

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI; analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders, parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile project.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

SA William H. Stapleton.

To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities, meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors to the Bureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formerly handled among the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograp of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the-job training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour areas; prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging publication in their home-town newspapers.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

SAs Edward J. Kilday, III, and Anthony Edward Schiappa

CONTINUED - OVER

To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence, compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of backgroun memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informativ memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

SA Thomas B. Coll

To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and dissemination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance of special indices concerning distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These functions were formerly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Administrative Division arrange any necessary realignment of space and handle memoranda instructing transfers.

2. That recipient offices promptly survey clerical functions and responsibilities and submit appropriate recommendations in connection with any needed realignment of clerical personnel; also prepare updated organizational charts.

3. That attached airtel to all offices be approved.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. FELT

DATE: 12/18/72

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL; CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2000 BY SP2 AUM/BJD
MDR-16

By memo dated 12/14/72 from Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt the reassignment of Special Agent personnel of the former Crime Research Division to other Offices and Divisions at Headquarters was set forth. The purpose of this memo is to establish what clerical personnel will be assigned to each Office or Division. This information is necessary to effect changes in appropriate records.

For control purposes, each of the listed individuals should advise of the clerical personnel needed to carry out the functions and related responsibilities reassigned to the respective Office or Division. All clerical personnel assigned to the former Crime Research Division must be accounted for. Accordingly, the listed individuals should consult with each other if there is any question concerning assignment, excessive or needed clerical personnel, coordinating information with appropriate Office representative or Division head. Identities, positions and grades should be set forth under the respective Office or Division.

Inspector James F. Bland, Office of the Acting Director
Section Chief Gordon E. Malmfeldt, Office of the Acting Associate Director
SA James C. Farrington, Office of Legal Counsel
Section Chief Milton A. Jones, Training Division
SA William H. Stapleton, Administrative Division
SA Edward J. Kilday III, General Investigative Division
SA Thomas B. Coll, Special Investigative Division

RECOMMENDATION:

That the reassignment of the clerical personnel of the former Crime Research Division be accomplished as set forth above with results furnished to the Administrative Division so that appropriate records can be adjusted.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. FELT
DATE: 12/6/72

FROM : L. M. WALTERS

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL; CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2000 BY

MDR-16

PURPOSE: To recommend immediate supervisory reorganization and transfer of all functions and personnel of the Crime Research Division based on survey and analysis conducted by Inspection Division.

Recommended transfer of functions and related responsibilities together with appropriate personnel as follows:

OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other news media formerly handled by Assistant Director Bishop, his front office Agent personnel and the Administrative Review Unit (Congressional liaison).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concerning press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a commentato liaison with the White House and Department press offices; review of editorials and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible future use from FBIHQ Divisions.

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critical of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs;

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

CONTINUED - OVER

special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison matters.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

Inspectors James F. Bland, David W. Bowers and Jack E. Herington.

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

To assume [review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence.] Formerly handled by the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the public and requests for publications).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions; file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requests for publications.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

Section Chief Gordon E. Malmfeldt and SAs Homer R. Hauer (Number One Man), Ralph W. Engelmeier, Marion S. Ramey, Paul L. Andrews, John W. Dalseg, Robert C. Dean and Richard E. White.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General, Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

Recommended Agent Transfer:

SA James C. Farrington.

CONTINUED - OVER

TRAINING DIVISION

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI. These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit, Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telephone directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and other officials based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientific magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of a lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing, preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes"; preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenance of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media; day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies; custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin; maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on misquotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and organizations

CONTINUED - OVER

Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-line articles and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials.

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI; analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders, parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile project.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

Section Chief Milton A. Jones, Inspectors Bernard M. Suttler and George T. Quinn and SAs Harold P. Leinbaugh, Lawrence J. Heim, John H. Campbell, Edward H. Gooderham; David L. Divan, Carl J. Hall, Louis S. Lear, Donald C. Hanning, Robert B. Davenport, Robert C. Fay, George William Gunn and Fern C. Stukenbrocker.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

To assume supervision for [special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities, meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors to the Bureau./ Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formerly handled among the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograph of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the-job training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour areas; prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging publication in their home-town newspapers.

CONTINUED - OVER

Recommended Agent Transfer:

SA William H. Stapleton

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence, compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of background memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informative memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit. (In past years these functions were performed in Name Check Section of General Investigative Division.)

Recommended Agent Transfer:

SAs Edward J. Kilday, III, and Anthony Edward Schiappa

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and dissemination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance of special indices concerni distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These functions were formerly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

SA Thomas B. Coll

OBSERVATIONS

Agent personnel and supervisory functions have been analyzed and dealt with in the foregoing proposed reallocations; clerical functions have not. It is suggested that clerical functions and personnel now simply move with the Agent desks and units to which they are attached. Questions of space also have not been covered and it is readily apparent that a substantial portion of the functions and personnel suggested for transfer to Training Division might feasibly operate at Quantico (e. g. Library, Special Productions and Publications Unit). Five units of Training Division are now located at Headquarters and the Research Unit of Research and Service Section proposed herein for transfer to Training Division, likewise should remain at Headquarters. Accordingly, SA Harold P. Leinbaugh, formerly in the Front Office of Crime Research Division, has been proposed for transfer to Training Division in order to act, during this transition period, as a special coordinator of functions that may be divided between Headquarters and Quantico. ? No!

The questions of adequacy of clerical personnel, space reallocation, and relocation of units and functions to Quantico demand greater study and inasmuch

Memorandum for Mr. Felt
Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel;
Crime Research Division

as Training Division is scheduled for regular annual inspection next week, these matters will be gone into in depth in connection with that inspection and coordinated in consultation with Administrative Division. It is the purpose of this memorandum to promptly effect the desired transfers of functions among affected Divisions in order to provide for immediate routing of mail and upper level review and supervision of the work product of all units previously composing Crime Research Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

That transfers as outlined herein be approved.

Approved except that SA Leinbaugh will remain with Front office so that Inspectors Bland & Herington & SA Leinbaugh will remain in place. 6

Addendum of W. M. Felt

This appears logical and feasible. If snags develop we can realign. I agree that the Research & Service functions, which will remain under Section Chief Hilton A. Jones, should be reassigned to the Training Division. I do not believe that this Section should be transferred to Training, however, because there is daily need for access to files & other mat'l at Headquarters & numerous contacts with the public. Furthermore, there is no available space at Quantico except in the Library Building. Accordingly, I recommend that the FBI HQ Library be maintained, the Library Building at Quantico [illegible] the telephone directories and encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis by all Divisions we would need to retain at FBIHQ. The FBIHQ Library was to have been moved to The space into which the FBIHQ Library was to have been moved can be used and in fact is badly needed in the 9th & D Building in the Domestic Intelligence Division which is very crowded. I recommend that you approve now the transfer of functions and that any necessary realignment of personnel be considered in separate memoranda. 7

Agreed
Change Administrative Review Unit to Congressional Services Unit

4-30-8

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 12-6-72 WMF:crt

This appears logical and feasible. If snags develop we can readjust. I agree that the Research and Service functions, which will remain under Section Chief Milton A. Jones, should be reassigned to the Training Division. I do not believe that this Section should be transferred to Quantico, however, because there is daily need for access to files and other material at Headquarters and occasional contacts with the public. Furthermore, there is no available space at Quantico except in the Library Building. Accordingly, I recommend that the FBIHQ Library be moved into the Library Building at Quantico. We would need to retain at FBIHQ the telephone directories and encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis by other Divisions. The space into which the FBIHQ Library was to have been moved in the 9th and D Building can be used and in fact is badly needed by the Domestic Intelligence Division which is very crowded.

I recommend that you approve now the transfer of functions and that any necessary realignment of personnel be considered by separate memoranda.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 17, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JRM/LU
6076

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Ernest H. Belter. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC- 102

62-116395-296

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former SA Ernest H. Belter)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

SFP:lhb lhb
(11)

Hand-delivered by P. V. Daly
6/18/75
PVD/[illegible]

3 JUL 2 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395 June 17, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) ERNEST H.
BELTER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

2.20-81 SP4JAM lk
6076

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished by Mr. Belter to the FBI on June 11, 1975. Belter served in the FBI as an SA from July 19, 1943, until his retirement on January 29, 1973.

On June 10, 1975, Belter was contacted by SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein who requested to interview Belter at the SSC office. On June 11, 1975, Belter was advised by Epstein that the interview would concern Martin Luther King, Jr., and FBI coverage of King at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D. C., some years ago and that the interview would take place at 3:00 p.m. that day, June 11, 1975.

Belter was interviewed by Epstein in SSC quarters during the period of approximately 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. on June 11, 1975. The interview was not under oath and was not pursuant to a subpoena. The details of the interview are set out below, not necessarily in chronological order.

Belter was asked and furnished the period of time he had served in the Washington Field Office (WFO) of the FBI and the date of his retirement. He was asked and furnished information as to his duties in WFO at the time he retired and what they were in 1964. He informed Epstein that he was the Supervisor of a Squad which handled electronic surveillances, including both microphone and telephone surveillances. When

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former SA Ernest H. Belter)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

SFP:lhb lhb (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 5

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

-111375 294

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

he was asked how many men worked under him on his Squad, he told Epstein that he desired to consult with the FBI representative who had accompanied him to the interview but who was not present during the actual interview, that representative remaining in an outer lobby of the SSC quarters. Belter requested this consultation privilege as he believed the question was outside the indicated scope of the interview. Epstein indicated he was withdrawing the question, thus eliminating the necessity for the consultation.

Belter was questioned and furnished information concerning the organization of WFO, from the Special Agent in Charge down to the squad level. Belter indicated that there were several squads handling criminal cases, some handling applicant-type investigations, and other squads handling security work. He indicated that the security squads were under a security coordinator, Ludwig W. R. Oberndorf, now deceased.

Epstein advised Belter that the SSC Staff had read Belter's deposition in the Halperin case. (Morton H. Halperin, et al, vs. Henry A. Kissinger, et al, United States District Court, District of Columbia Civil Action File Number 1187-73.) On the basis of the deposition, Epstein indicated he was familiar with the administrative procedure for instituting telephone surveillances and asked Belter about the administrative procedures for instituting microphone surveillances. It was Belter's reply that the administrative procedures were essentially the same for both types of surveillances.

Epstein then had Belter recite the procedure from when an SA would request from FBI Headquarters by form letter authority for installing a microphone surveillance. Belter told how the Headquarters would first authorize the field to conduct a feasibility survey, results of which would be furnished Headquarters. Thereafter, if the installation was feasible and justified, Headquarters would authorize by correspondence the installation. Epstein asked whether the authorizing communication from Headquarters would mention that the Attorney General (AG) had authorized the surveillance. Belter told Epstein that in recent years he believed that the Bureau communication authorizing a surveillance would indicate that the AG authorization had been obtained; but Belter could not recall whether or not this indication was shown during 1964. Belter also told Epstein that at one time he thought that former FBI Director Hoover did not need to have AG approval in advance for a specific microphone surveillance. Epstein indicated he was already aware of this.

Epstein then inquired concerning a microphone surveillance which the FBI had installed at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D. C., concerning King. Belter was unable to pinpoint when this occurred and told Epstein that he, Belter, was bypassed in practically all matters relating to this surveillance. The entire matter was handled by Security Coordinator Oberndorf and Belter never saw any of the correspondence relating thereto. Belter was only asked to furnish some support personnel from his Squad for the purpose of monitoring the surveillance. In response to further specific questions, Belter advised Epstein that he did not see any correspondence, logs, tapes, or any other material relating to this surveillance.

Epstein inquired about the procedure of an Inspector checking on such a surveillance at the time of a periodic inspection of WFO. He asked if the Inspector would examine the required correspondence relating to all microphone surveillances the office had conducted. Belter replied that an Inspector would look over matters of this nature but that in the case of the King microphone surveillance, as with certain other extremely sensitive ones, Oberndorf would have possession of the correspondence and Belter would be unaware of any examination of such correspondence by an Inspector. Belter explained that this was part of the security precautions taken in highly sensitive matters which were restricted within WFO to a need-to-know basis.

Epstein inquired as to whether Belter knew of any other microphone surveillance on King in the Washington, D. C., area at any time and Belter replied that he did not know of any. Belter was asked if he was aware of any interest or participation by the Washington, D. C., Police Department in the microphone surveillance at the Willard Hotel and he responded that he was not aware of same.

Epstein inquired as to the actual installation of the microphone surveillance at the Willard Hotel and wanted to know who performed the installation. It was Belter's recollection that the installation was made by SA Wilfred Bergeron, probably assisted by SA William D. Campbell. Epstein volunteered the name of SA Richard Suter and this refreshed Belter's recollection to the extent that Belter indicated that Suter also probably assisted. On Epstein's inquiry as to the whereabouts of these three individuals, Belter advised that Bergeron is retired, residing in Bethesda, Maryland; Campbell is assigned at FBI Headquarters; and Suter is assigned to the Houston Field Office.

Epstein inquired whether Bergeron mentioned King's name when Bergeron asked for assistance of support personnel for monitoring purposes and Belter replied that King's name was mentioned.

At the close of the interview, Epstein remarked that, "We may be in touch with you again."

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SA BY SSC

NOTE:

Prior to Belter's interview, he contacted FBIHQ to alert us and ask for assistance in the form of an SA for possible consultation purposes. Belter had been previously alerted by our Baltimore Office, pursuant to Bureau teletype, that he might be contacted by the SSC and that we would assist him on his request. Belter was therefore appropriately briefed by Assistant Director Mintz; as well as Supervisor S. F. Phillips of INTD who accompanied Belter to the interview. Debriefing of Belter as reported herein was by Phillips.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: **FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by an SSC Staff Member of retired FBI Special Agent Ernest H. Belter

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Intelligence activities, domestic
Organization and staffing
Surveillance

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interview covered following topics:

Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Organization of the FBI Washington (D. C.) Field Office,
Administrative procedures of FBI regarding electronic surveillance.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/kg
MDR-16

WOC

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-8

SFP:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. H. N. Bassett

The Attorney General

June 12, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum containing a response to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/bjg
MDR-16

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

TEB:dmt
(11)

REC- 102

62-116395-295

ENCLOSURE

3 JUL 2 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. H. N. Bassett
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

62-116395

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Pursuant to your request in Appendix B, Part I, Item 7, for guidelines used by the FBI Inspection Division for inspecting field offices and for inspecting Divisions of the FBI, we currently have such material available for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:dmt
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJG
MDR-16

NOTE:

See H. N. Bassett memorandum to Mr. Wannall June 2, 1975, captioned "Senstudy 75," wherein the Inspection Division advised it has no objection to a review of the field and headquarters inspection manuals by members of the Committee staff provided the review is conducted in FBI space with an Inspection Division representative present. When SSC review is requested, we will have the Inspection Division representative make the manuals available.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

295

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE CONTINUED:

The FBIHQ and field inspection manuals were reviewed by Special Agent (SA) Thomas E. Burns, Jr. Determination to furnish questionable field inspection manual sections concerning PROSAB (Section 4 J 2.), AFSAM (Section 5 L 10.) and BUPLANS (Section 5 P.) was coordinated with IS - 2 (SA Edward P. Grigalus) and IS - 3 (SA Russell H. Horner) of the Intelligence Division and the Laboratory Division, Cryptanalysis Unit (P. W. Paddock), and it was ascertained there is no objection to a Committee review of these sections.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6-12-75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Policies and Procedures

inating Office: FBI

D red by: Richard L. Taylor, Jr. Date: 16 Jun 75 2 PM

eived by: Sherry Towell

Title: Asst O. Mngr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2010 BY SP2ALM/BP
NDR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

FOR REVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/12/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

Sherry Towell, Assistant Office Manager

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix B, Part I, Item 7.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating Procedures

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

At the request of SSC, material containing the guidelines used by the FBI Inspection Division for inspecting various aspects of the Bureau's operations has been made available at FBIHQ for review by SSC members.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJ
MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC
5-TJM

62-116395

TJM:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 30 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR009 TP CODE

5:30 PM NITEL JUNE 30, 1975 JMM

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: TAMPA (105-0-1121)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUREAU NITEL JUNE 28, 1975.

JAMES E. MC MAHON, 3110 COCOS ROAD, TAMPA, FLORIDA 33618, AND DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY, TAMPA, FLORIDA, WAS CONTACTED ON JUNE 30, 1975, AND ADVISED OF THE CONTENTS OF REFERENCED BUREAU NITEL. MR. MC MAHON ADVISED THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE SAC OF THE TAMPA OFFICE AND WILL CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO ASSIST HIM AS TO HIS OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF FURNISHING INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS AN FBI EMPLOYEE.

END

HOLD

COPY RETAINED IN [illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/bp

MDR-16

(McMahon)

REC-102 62-116395-293

JUL 9 1975

cc 67

84 JUL 2 1975

[illegible]ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[illegible]MMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR008 CG PLAIN

6:15PM NITEL 6/30/75 EMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM CHICAGO (62-6211)

SENSTUDY '75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY
MDR-16

REBUTEL JUNE 28, 1975.

SA JOHN R. BASSETT, CHICAGO DIVISION, HAS BEEN ADVISED OF CONTENTS OF REBUTEL; HOWEVER, IT IS POINTED OUT TO THE BUREAU THAT SA BASSETT HAS BEEN DISPATCHED TO PINE RIDGE, SOUTH DAKOTA, TO ASSIST IN BUREAU SPECIAL RESMURS. AT THIS TIME, CHICAGO HAS NO IDEA WHEN SA BASSETT MAY RETURN.

ABOVE FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU IN EVENT THEY MAY DESIRE TO ADVISE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OF SA BASSETT'S PRESENT UNAVAILABILITY.

END

HOLD

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Ho

REC-102 62-116395-292

3 JUL 2 1975

Records (Bassett)

cc: 67

84 JUL 2 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

52

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/24/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

ORIGINAL ONLY

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-25-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJD MDR-16

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

PURPOSE:

[To advise that CIA has agreed to have Bureau representatives review 693 page CIA document containing information relating to joint ventures, involving CIA and other members of the intelligence community in sensitive matters, and decision of CIA to furnish FBI with copies of any document contained therein having a bearing on FBI activities.]

DETAILS:

[My memorandum to you captioned as above dated 6/20/75, advised that a representative of the Intelligence Community Staff on that date, at FBI Headquarters, briefed appropriate Intelligence Division personnel of the contents of a 693 page document prepared by CIA which contains numerous memoranda relating to a wide variety of operations in which CIA, to some degree, had contact or cooperated with other members of the intelligence community in sensitive matters. You were advised that members of the Senate Select Committee have already had access to, if not actual possession of, this document, and that a number of the operations cited in the document are of extremely sensitive nature involving this Bureau.]

REC-102 62-116395-291
3 JUL 2 1975

[In order to enable this Bureau to ~~be~~ in a position to knowledgeably and accurately reply to SSC inquiries and to fully identify operations listed in the document of interest to this Bureau, contact was initiated with John Clarke, Associate Deputy to Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, for the purpose of obtaining a copy of this document. On 6/23/75, Mr. Clarke advised that CIA Director William Colby authorized the reviewing of this]

62-116395

CONTINUED - OVER

5

TJM:adn

84 JUL 2 1975

UNEXCISED VERSIONS OF DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO SSC

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY
62-116395

[693 page document by Bureau representatives and this Bureau's obtaining a copy of any memorandum contained therein having a bearing on FBI activities.]

As the above authorization appears to be responsive to this Bureau's need for reviewing the document for information having a bearing on this Bureau's operations, arrangements have been effected for Mrs. Harriett Mowitt, Executive Secretary, Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of Intelligence Community, to bring this 693 page document to FBI Headquarters on 6/25/75 for review by selected personnel of the Intelligence Division. Copies will be obtained of any memorandum contained therein believed to have a bearing on any phase of this Bureau's activities.

RECOMMENDATION:

Upon completion of above review you will be advised of pertinent information obtained, accompanied by recommendations as to additional action believed necessary in this matter.

TJM

JBA
PLM

WRW

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0619

18 JUN 1975

Senstudy 75

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Organization for Liaison with Select Committees

The attached CIA Employee Bulletin lays out the DCI's organization for dealing with the Senate and House Select Committees. It is provided to you for information.

John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/BMP

MDR-16

REC- 102 62-116395-290

3 JUL 2 1975

Ho
1 - ENCLOSURE

5:8

File
62-116395

84 JUL 2 1975

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

No. 452

10 June 1975

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. E. H. Knoche has been named the focal point within the Agency for liaison with the Senate and House Select Committees investigating intelligence activities. Mr. John Clarke will continue in his capacity as focal point for the Intelligence Community on that same subject. Any Agency employee contacted directly by a Select Committee staff member should refer the caller to the Select Committee Review Staff under Mr. Knoche, on X4086.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-2000 BY SP2ALM/BMP
MDR-16

DISTRIBUTION: All Employees

62-116395-290

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 28 1975

TELETYPE

Redfield

NR 001 AL CODE

3:47 PM NITEL JUNE 28, 1975 LW

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALBANY (62-2368)

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-2000 BY [illegible]

MDR-16

RE BUTEL JUNE 28, 1975.

ON JUNE 28, 1975, FORMER SA HENRY G. ROWSE, JR., WAS CONTACTED BY ASAC JOHN J. HINCHCLIFFE AND ADVISED CONTENTS RE BUTEL. ROWSE STATED THAT SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY SCC, HE WILL CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION. ROWSE CURRENTLY RESIDING C/O P.O. BOX 65, SHELDON, VT., 05483, TELEPHONE NO. 802-848-7418, OR 73 HIGHLAND AVE., RICHFORD, VT 05476.

62-116395-288

END

LRF FIHQ CLR

REC- 102

3 JUL 1 1975

(Rowse)

cc-61

PERS REC UNIT

84 JUL 1 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 29 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR002 AT CODED

7:44 PM NITEL JUNE 29, 1975 TLL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA

SENSTUDY '75.

RE BUTEL TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES JUNE 28, 1975.

FORMER SA MARION CHEEK CONTACTED BY SAC, ATLANTA, JUNE 29, 1975, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN RE TEL.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJP

MDR-16

TOW FBIHQ CLR

REC- 102

62-116395-287

3 JUL 1 1975

(CHEEK)

cc 67-

PERS REC UNIT

84 JUL 1 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 28 1975
RMS
TELETYPE

NR 002 AT CODE

10:40 AM NITEL JUNE 28, 1975 PG

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES, JUNE 28, 1975.

ALL CURRENT AND FORMER AGENTS WITHIN ATLANTA DIVISION CONTACTED BY SAC, ATLANTA, JUNE 28, 1975, WITH EXCEPTION OF FORMER SA MARION CHEEK AND ADVISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS, RE TEL.

FORMER SA CHEEK CURRENTLY BOATING ON SUWANEE RIVER IN REMOTE AREA, FLORIDA, AND NO POTENTIAL FOR LOCATING UNTIL EVENING OF JUNE 29, 1975, NEXT. CHEEK WILL BE CONTACTED BY SAC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, JUNE 29, 1975, AND BUREAU IMMEDIATELY ADVISED OF CONTACT.

END

LRF FBIHQ CLR

WOB

REC- 102

62-116395-286

3 JUL 1 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-2000 BY SP2ALM/bp
MDR-16

5

84 JUL 1 1975

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 20 1975

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-2000 BY SP2ALM/ljg~~
MDR-16

wdp

Senstudy - '75

TO: Antonin Scalia
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

Douglas R. Marvin
Special Assistant to the
Attorney General

M
6/19

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Deputy Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request: Appendix D, Item 17 - Joseph Kraft

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/lp
MDR-16

The SSC's request of Item 17, Appendix D, seeks "All memoranda and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization and re-authorization by the Attorney General and/or the Director of the FBI for electronic surveillance of Joseph Kraft".

By letter of May 2, 1975, to Kraft's attorney, Lloyd Cutler, the Attorney General gave, inter alia, the following assurances: "Pending further Departmental action relating to the policies which will govern records of the type involved in Mr. Kraft's case, all documents, recordings, or other records of any type in the Department's custody or control which constitute, summarize, or describe the contents of the overhearings obtained as the result of any electronic surveillance directed against Mr. Kraft and members of his family will be placed under seal". (emphasis mine)

REC-102 62-116395-285

It is my view (shared by Mr. O'Connor) and articulated, as well, by Cutler in telephone conversations with me on June 12, and June 16, 1975 (the second call came after Cutler had conferred with Kraft) that the material sought by the Senate Select Committee is distinct from that protected by seal and that, therefore, the requested material be found, reviewed and forwarded to the SSC. (Cutler advised that the Ervin Committee was given same).

May I have your views on this matter?

3 JUL 1 1975

Material responsive to request item 17 appendix D furnished Dept. 6/20/75 for consideration with respect to restrictions noted in above memo.
EWL.

62-116395
5-ent

84 JUL 1 1975

Received by hand delivery from Dept. 5:00 6/20/75. JMM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr

DATE: February 13, 1970

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: UNION FOR REVOLUTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[[redacted], CIA, furnished the following to the Liaison Agent on 2/10/70.](S)

[CIA has established a U.S. based notional organization representing itself as being communist oriented and having the following mailing addresses: P.O. Box 444, Boston, Massachusetts, 02102 and P.O. Box 8272, General Post Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19101. The organization's activity in the U.S. will be restricted to production of propaganda in the form of pamphlets, etc., which material will be mailed to various Left Wing groups in foreign countries. The primary objective of this operation is to develop penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. The organization is completely notional in character in that there will be no offices in the U.S. (only p.o. boxes) and even the officials will bear fictitious names. CIA hopes that once the propaganda begins circulating, Arab groups will become interested and will endeavor to establish contact with "officials" of the organization If this develops, CIA will then proceed to use its own personnel under "suitable" cover to make the contact. From then on CIA will maneuver to penetrate the target group.](S)

[In response to the Liaison Agent's request, CIA will furnish us samples of propaganda. The Agent also asked that we be given copies of communications sent to the mailing addresses by any organizations or individuals. We should have such data so that we can take the necessary investigative action in the event any persons or organizations in the U.S. take an interest in the captioned group. We, of course, will also be interested in international ramifications which could have a bearing on the activities of Left Wing activity in this country. The Agent also asked for the names of the officials which will be related to the Union for Revolution.](S)

[At this stage there does not appear to be any conditions or developments which would have an adverse bearing on our operations or jurisdiction providing that CIA keeps us adequately informed. CIA asks that it be apprised of any information coming to our attention concerning the organization. CIA further requests that its interest not be revealed outside of the Bureau and that this information be handled on a need-to-know basis.](S)

11-15-2000
CLASSIFIED BY SPAACM/bap
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
MDR-16

SJP:wmk
(6)

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

62-116395-284

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

Memorandum to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.
RE: UNION FOR REVOLUTION

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Nationalities Intelligence Section. Liaison will follow in order to obtain samples of the propaganda referred to above and will again reiterate that we be furnished copies of communications transmitted to the mailing addresses. (S)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr DATE: February 13, 1970

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: UNION FOR REVOLUTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[Norman Garrett, CIA, furnished the following to the Liaison Agent on 2/10/70.] (S)

[CIA has established a U.S. based notional organization representing itself as being communist oriented and having the following mailing addresses: P.O. Box 444, Boston, Massachusetts, 02102 and P.O. Box 8272, General Post Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19101. The organization's activity in the U.S. will be restricted to production of propaganda in the form of pamphlets, etc., which material will be mailed to various Left Wing groups in foreign countries. The primary objective of this operation is to develop penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. The organization is completely notional in character in that there will be no offices in the U.S. (only p.o. boxes) and even the officials will bear fictitious names. CIA hopes that once the propaganda begins circulating, Arab groups will become interested and will endeavor to establish contact with "officials" of the organization If this develops, CIA will then proceed to use its own personnel under "suitable" cover to make the contact. From then on CIA will maneuver to penetrate the target group.] (S)

[In response to the Liaison Agent's request, CIA will furnish us samples of propaganda. The Agent also asked that we be given copies of communications sent to the mailing addresses by any organizations or individuals. We should have such data so that we can take the necessary investigative action in the event any persons or organizations in the U.S. take an interest in the captioned group. We, of course, will also be interested in international ramifications which could have a bearing on the activities of Left Wing activity in this country. The Agent also asked for the names of the officials which will be related to the Union for Revolution.] (S)

11-15-2000
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/BRP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
MDR-16

[At this stage there does not appear to be any conditions or developments which would have an adverse bearing on our operations or jurisdiction providing that CIA keeps us adequately informed. CIA asks that it be apprised of any information coming to our attention concerning the organization. CIA further requests that its interest not be revealed outside of the Bureau and that this information be handled on a need-to-know basis.] (S)

SJP:wmk
(6)

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.
RE: UNION FOR REVOLUTION

ACTION:

[The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Nationalities Intelligence Section. Liaison will follow in order to obtain samples of the propaganda referred to above and will again reiterate that we be furnished copies of communications transmitted to the mailing addresses.] (S)

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Other Specific FBI Practices and Procedure
Item #24, Part III, Appendix C

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V. Daly Date: 6/13/75

Received by: John T. Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

O'Connor

6/12

12:30

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJP
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-284

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SECRET

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X SSC
☐ HSC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix C, Part III, Item 24.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"S"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

[COVERT ACTIVITIES] (S)

12-15-2000
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/Bmp
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
MDR-16

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

[With agreement of CIA, SSC was furnished with copy of documents maintained by the Bureau relating to establishment by CIA in this country of a "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization.] (S)

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~DATE 11-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RAJ~~
~~MDR-16~~

Note: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index
in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

1.U.C.
Evd
5-[illegible]

TJM:lhb
(4)

62-116395

TREAT AS YELLOW

SECRET

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-284

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. B. T. Palmer
1 - Mr. H. W. Dare, Jr.
June 11, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from Senate Select Committee, dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and an enclosure which is responsive to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of the memorandum and its enclosure is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY [illegible]
MDR-16

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

Delivered to [illegible] 6/13/75

P. V. Daly
Room 4509 JB

REC- 102

62-116395-284

HWD:prd
(10) prd

Handdelivered
6-12-75 by
P.V. Daly
PVD/bjs

3 JUL 1 1975

ENCLOSURE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. B. T. Palmer
1 - Mr. H. W. Dare, Jr.

62-116395

June 11, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

RE: OTHER SPECIFIC FBI PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated May 14, 1975, and the appendices thereto, which contained requests for information from the FBI concerning all memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts, or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States.

[In response to Item number 24, Part III, Appendix C, enclosed for the Committee is a copy of a memorandum from S. J. Papich to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr., dated February 13, 1970, captioned "Union For Revolution," which sets forth information from CIA advising of the establishment of a "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization by the CIA. Although the FBI did, as noted in other responses to the Committee, establish and direct such notional organizations, no information has been developed indicating the FBI consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.] (S)

11-15-2006
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/BD
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
MDR-16

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RP
ON 11-9-00
MDR-16

1 - The Attorney General

PLM

WRW/TAL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

HWD:prd
(9)
prd

~~SECRET~~
Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

B

HWD

SECRET

62-116395-284

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

NOTE:

[See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 6/6/75, which advised of CIA's clearance to forward memorandum dated 2/13/70 to the Committee. In enclosure dated 2/13/70, the name of the CIA Agent who furnished the information has been excised per CIA's request. Memorandum dated 3/23/70 and captioned "Union For Revolution," mentioned in W. O. Cregar memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 6/6/75 is not being forwarded to the Committee since it is not responsive to the Committee's specific request. That memorandum deals with an evaluation of CIA's notional operation by this Bureau.] (S)

[~~Classified "Secret"~~ in accordance with CIA's classification of its information per Mr. Walt Elder, CIA.] (S)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-9-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

By memorandum dated 6-4-75 you were advised that captioned Committee was preparing what they termed case studies on COINTELPROS in four separate areas. The areas defined were Black Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Mr. Lester B. Seidel advised SA Paul V. Daly 6-9-75 that in addition to the aforementioned areas he also wanted to include the Muhammad Kenyatta case in Philadelphia. As an observation, two of the areas cited by Mr. Seidel are areas where the Bureau currently is facing lawsuits, namely, the Hampton and Kenyatta cases, and a third area is one which we could well be involved in a lawsuit, that being the Starsky case. Mr. Seidel indicated the Bureau can expect correspondence from the Committee concerning these matters.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-24-2000 BY
MDR-16

RECOMMENDATION:

REC- 102 62-116395-283

For information.

~~JUN 24~~

62-116395

PVD JBH (PVD

JBA PLM

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Inspector J. T. Kelly

[redacted]

PVD:kjs (8)

84 JUN 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

6-9-75

TO SAC SAN FRANCISCO

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395) -282

SENSTUDY 75 REC-102

1 - Mr. Wannall
Attn: Cregar
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

THIS IS TO ADVISE YOU THAT PURSUANT TO REQUEST FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC) I HAVE RELEASED YOU AND FORMER SA DAVID E. TODD FROM APPLICABLE EMPLOYEE SECRECY AGREEMENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF A STAFF INTERVIEW BY SSC CONCERNING COINTELPRO AND THE INVESTIGATION AT SAN FRANCISCO OF THE BPP. LESTER B. SEIDEL, STAFF MEMBER OF SSC WILL TRAVEL TO SAN FRANCISCO TO CONDUCT THE INTERVIEWS IN APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS.

AN AGENT WILL BE AVAILABLE DURING INTERVIEW TO ASSIST IN MAKING A DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT A PARTICULAR QUESTION SHOULD BE RESPONDED TO. THIS AGENT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED PRIVATE COUNSEL AND WILL NOT BE PRESENT DURING INTERVIEW.

YOU, AN ASAC, OR SENIOR SUPERVISOR CONTACT FORMER SA DAVID E. TODD TO ADVISE HIM OF THE WAIVER OF THE APPLICABLE SECRECY AGREEMENT AND DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS DESIROUS OF HAVING AN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-2000 BY [illegible]

PVD:eek
(7)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 09 1975
6H10/045
TELETYPE

JB7
Pcm

1BPP-B17

4013
JE 1+

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____

84 JUL 3 1975

[redacted] ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO 954-546

AGENT AVAILABLE DURING INTERVIEW. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION TODD HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN IN CONTACT WITH LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION CONCERNING THIS INTERVIEW AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED CONCERNING HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, ETC.

SUTEL RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH TODD. YOU SHOULD CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING YOUR INTERVIEW.

NOTE:

By memo 6-2-75 captioned as above it was recommended and approved that SAC Charles W. Bates, former SA David E. Todd, and Assistnat Director Robert E. Gebhardt be released from applicable secrecy agreements for purposes of interview by SSC. We are separately advising Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt of this decision.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-2-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Gebhardt

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that Lester B. Seidell, staff member of the Senate Select Committee, has informed us that the Committee intends to interview former SA David E. Todd, SAC Charles W. Bates, and Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt and to request that the aforementioned employees be released from existing employment and/or secrecy agreement for purposes of a staff interview.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-00 BY [illegible]

On the evening of 5-29-75, Lester B. Seidell telephonically advised SA Paul V. Daly of this Division that in accordance with the "guidelines" existing between the Committee and the various intelligence agencies under review, he was giving notice that he as a representative of the Committee was going to San Francisco in approximately two to three weeks, and it was his intention to interview SAC Charles W. Bates, former SA David E. Todd, and former Assistant to the Director Alan H. Belmont. He also requested Assistant Director Gebhardt be made available for staff interview in Washington, D. C. He asked that the Bureau take the necessary steps to release the Agents from any existing employment or secrecy agreements. For the purposes of this interview, he stated he would inquire of each of the interviewees as to their knowledge and participation in counterintelligence activities directed against the Black Panther Party. With regards to this discussion, he specifically mentioned a Bureau airtel to San Francisco dated 5-11-70, titled "Counterintelligence and Special Operations (Research Section)." He stated this document was one of the documents released by the court in the suit by newscaster Carl Stern. He was asked as to whether he could define more precisely the areas to be covered in the interviews and stated he could not inasmuch as he did not know the various aspects of the counterintelligence program against the Black Panther Party in the San Francisco area. Additionally, he advised he was making a request for documents,

REC 102 62-116395-282

6/9/75

3 JUL 1 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - ~~Mr. Hotis~~
1 - Mr. Daly
[redacted]
1 - Personnel File, SAC Charles W. Bates
1 - Personnel File, Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt
1 - Personnel File, former SA David E. Todd

Daly

PVD:dkg (12)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

in writing, which would coincide with the aforementioned topic of interview. He described these interviews as being "abuse" interviews which according to the Committee's understanding precludes the presence of an agency representative during interview. However, an Agent may be available for consultation purposes.

Mr. Seidell was advised by SA Daly that former Assistant to the Director Belmont was in poor health and that before attempting interview of Mr. Belmont, he should ascertain his current physical condition. Mr. Seidell requested SA Daly determine Mr. Belmont's physical condition. Assistant Director Cleveland advised SA Daly on 5-30-75 that Mr. Belmont was very seriously ill and was suffering from the Shy Drager Syndrome. This information was brought to the attention of John Elliff, Task Force Director on Domestic Intelligence Activities of captioned Committee, and Elliff expressed dismay that Seidell had made an inquiry concerning the interview of Belmont. Elliff requested that we not take any action concerning Seidell's request as to Belmont at this time.

Former SA David E. Todd had previously contacted this Division and as set forth in memorandum dated 5-16-75 from Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams, he was advised of his rights, the existence of an employment secrecy agreement sighed by him, of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73, and to his right to a private attorney. He was also advised that an Agent would be made available for consultation during the interview if he so desired. Mr. Todd did not indicate at this point whether he was desirous of having a Bureau representative available for consultation during interview. Todd, according to Seidell, stated he would not consider to be interviewed in the absence of a release of a secrecy agreement by the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That former SA David E. Todd, Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt, and SAC Charles W. Bates be released from their employment and secrecy agreements for purposes of a staff interview concerning our Cointelpro activities against the Black Panther Party.

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

(2) If approved, the employees and former employee will be advised and briefed generally concerning the making available of a Bureau representative for consulation during such an interview and other pertinent matters to be considered during interview.

Teletype to SF 6/9/75

PVD TBH/PVD

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/17/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This is to record meeting of Task Force (TF) leaders with Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, at the Executive Office Building on 6/13/75.

Aforementioned meeting was called and chaired by Mr. Wilderotter, and was attended by representatives of The White House, Justice, Defense, FBI, CIA, and State. Project Manager W. O. Cregar and Supervisor J. P. Thomas, Section CI-2, INTD, represented the FBI.

Mr. Wilderotter reported that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) has agreed to specifically identify a limited number of "abuse areas" which it will investigate from top to bottom. "Notices" should be issued to agencies very shortly defining certain terms and specifying the SSC targets. If these areas can be fully investigated, with assistance of the intelligence community, the SSC agrees to not extend its inquiries beyond the specified areas. If the SSC does so limit its inquiries, this will be to the advantage of the intelligence community in that it will minimize the SSC's straying into various nonpertinent matters; the TFs can present the intelligence community's side on the topics examined; the TFs should be able to expedite the Committee's inquiries and thereby limit the duration of the SSC investigation.

The FBI has responsibility for the TFs on "Political Abuses," TF leader Insp. H. E. Helgeson, and "Use of Notional Organizations," TF leader Supv. J. P. Thomas. We cannot fully address either topic until receiving the SSC notices defining the extent of the proposed inquiries.

Contrary to the initial concept of the TFs, they will not prepare comprehensive papers regarding their topics, but in some areas it may be advantageous for a TF to prepare an "opening statement" type paper for the SSC.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/bjg
ON 10-24-2000
MDR-14

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-280

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395

~~SECRET~~

JPT:bkb bkb
(8)

Classified by 6875 JPT
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

17 JUN 27 1975

5-Ed

84 JUN 27 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

The purpose of the TF and functions of the TF leaders were discussed. Briefly, each TF leader is to become a substantive expert on the particular topic assigned to him (e.g. political abuses), locate all documents, identify potential witnesses, develop strategy for presenting subject matter to the SSC and work to minimize any delays which might be caused by the Third Agency Rule. TF leaders will not themselves be witnesses unless their activities other than as TF leaders are subjects of testimony. TF leaders will, in consultation with legal counsel, define terms pertinent to their topics. They will outline directly to the SSC staff, insofar as the SSC is receptive, the scope and direction of pertinent inquiry, who is and is not competent to testify, what documents are available, and what areas may or may not be pertinent to the Committee's interests. TF leaders will prepare themselves to be able to answer any inquiries from the White House on their topics. Although TF leaders must know the location of all documents pertinent, the documents themselves will be made available to the SSC by the agency having custody of same and each agency may negotiate with the SSC regarding access by the Committee to material on a case by case basis. The agencies will, of course, coordinate first with their own legal counsel and then with the White House before releasing documents.

On sensitive matters, such as notional organizations or proprietary organizations, the SSC has agreed that it will not be necessary for agencies to furnish the names of U. S. citizens and companies who have cooperated with the U. S. unless those persons or companies have received notoriety (e.g. Hughes Tool Company, Sam Giancana). It is reportedly understood that agencies must protect their ongoing operations. Agencies are free to attempt to negotiate with the SSC regarding the extent and form of their responses.

Attached is a copy of an intelligence community staff memorandum 6/10/75 showing the TF assignments and, in the left margin notes as to the agencies expected to have input into each subject.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0119
10 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT : Memorandum dated 6 June 1975 re Task Force Assignments

1. This memorandum is a follow-on to subject memorandum and in addition to completing the principal officer assignments also lists task force members assigned by other agencies:

	Subject	Principal Agency	Principal Officer	Task Force Assignments
CIA State DOD	Assassinations	White House	Mr. Wilderotter IDS 145-7094	James Gardner, State Dept. IDS 101-29034
CIA Army	Drug Abuse (Testing of drugs)	CIA	Sayre Stevens IDS 143-4303	Malcolm Lawrence State Dept. IDS 101-28694
FBI, CIA W. House Dof J	Political Abuses (1964)	FBI	Hunter Helgeson ~~John Thomas~~ ~~324-4609~~ IDS 17✓-488✓ Green ✓303	
ALL	Domestic Surveillance (incl. 17 taps, Huston Plan, etc.)	Justice	John Martin IDS 187-4555	Charles Kane CIA IDS 143-6777 Verne St. Mars State Dept. IDS 101-29448

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-16-2000 BY [illegible]

[illegible]

62-116395-280

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible To Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

SECRET

	Subject	Principal Agency	Principal Officer	Task Force Assignments
FBI CIA(Clarke) DOD	Electronic Surveillance and Warrantless Wiretap	Justice	George Calhoun IDS 187-4401	William Jones State Dept. IDS 101-20370
FBI CIA, DOD	Use of Notional Organizations	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609 IDS 17V-4609 GREEN V303	
FBI CIA	Use of Proprietary Organizations	CIA	Erich Isenstead Green 3140	Lee Peters State Dept. IDS 101-29403
FBI CIA DOD	Mail Cover and Intercept	Justice	Phil White IDS 187-4674	Ernest Tsikerdanos CIA IDS 143-6348
(to be defined by SSC)	Watch List	DoD	Benson Buffham NSA 688-7222	
DOD	Army Surveillance	DoD	Dr. David Cooke 695-4436	

2. The following officers from the Department of State have been named to assist in the CIA preparation of comprehensive papers on the following geographic and subject areas:

Greece	James Gardner IDS 101-29034
Dominican Republic	James Gardner IDS 101-29034
Laos	James Henderson East Asia Bureau
The Congo	Bayard King IDS 101-21504
Indonesia	Patricia Barnett IDS 101-22369

Katzenbach Report
Emerson Brown
IDS 101-21504

3. The proposed DCI's letter to the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence is in final coordination and is expected to be available for Community review shortly. Following this, Mr. Wilderotter will meet with the General Counsels to review and coordinate on the final language.

Harriett Mowitt
Harriett Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

3V1-40VV

cc: Mr. Buchen
Mr. Hills

Distribution:
1 - Mr. Wilderotter
1 - Mr. Latimer
1 - Mr. Hyland
1 - Mr. Morell
1 - Mr. O'Connor
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - Mr. Clarke

4-32 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/12/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-2000 BY
MDR-16

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Removed By 79 JUN 27 1975

File Number 62-116395-279

Permanent Serial Charge Out

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. McDermott-Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall-Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz-Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar-Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis-Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly-Enc.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-11-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 6-10-75, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, furnished Inspector John B. Hotis a copy of a letter from Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) to the Attorney General dated 5-28-75, requesting any files or documents in the Department or the FBI concerning five members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The files requested pertain to Senators Gary Hart (D-Colo.), Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.), Charles McC. Mathias (R-Md.), Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.), and Robert Morgan (D-N.C.). Senator Church emphasized that the request is made pursuant to Senate Resolution 21, which established the Select Committee and not under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Mr. O'Connor also provided a draft of a proposed response to the Senator's letter by the Attorney General. General Levi pledges cooperation in this matter and suggests that the scope of the request should be clarified. He also states that while the request is not made under FOIA, exemptions in the Act indicate the kind of concerns the Committee might want the Department to bring to its attention before disclosure is made. The implication is that certain information in the files, particularly materials which would violate individual privacy may be withheld.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-2000 BY SP2ALM/RJ
MDR-16

It should also be noted that the Attorney General intends to advise Senator Church that he is preparing the necessary materials and asks for early discussions to determine how best to proceed. Accordingly, it is felt that we should promptly review any files that might exist concerning each of the above-named Senators and be prepared to furnish appropriate information to the Attorney General upon request.

RECOMMENDATION:

EX-115 REC-49 62-116395-278

5 MAR 19 1976

That the FOIA Section, Files and Communications Division, institute an immediate review of Bureau files for ~~any documents or~~ other records concerning each of the above-named Senators.

3 ENCLOSURE

acked memo to AG 7/18/75 DRW:MLH

Enclosure
JBH:dkg (8)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

AC 289

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED JUN 10 75 WOC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

'75
[illegible] JUSTICE
[illegible]

May 28, 1975

RECEIVED
JUN 09 1975
O.L.A.

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, we write to request the delivery forthwith to the members whose names are listed in the attachment hereto of any files on them or documents concerning them that are in the possession, custody or control of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This request is made pursuant to the mandate of the Senate, contained in S. Res. 21. That Resolution requires us to investigate the "conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other Federal agency".

One means of accomplishing this objective is to review the material, if any, which the Department of Justice has gathered on members of the United States Senate.

This request is made pursuant to the Committee's mandate and not under the Freedom of Information Act. The exemptions to that Act are designed to allow federal agencies and departments the degree of confidentiality necessary to conduct the ongoing activities of the Executive Branch, not to prevent a duly constituted Congressional Committee from understanding the nature, legality, and propriety of some of those activities. Whether as a matter of agreement between the Committee and the Department some material that may be in any such files should be withheld depends upon an analysis of the weight of the particular reason put forward for the proposed withholding balanced against the Committee's need to exercise its mandate.

FBI

Obviously, material received by the members of the Select

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
8 JUN 6 1975
R.A.O.
RECORD
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-24-2000 BY SP2ACM/BS
MDR-16

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~DATE 10-20-2000 BY SP2ALM/BL~~
~~MDR-16~~

62-116395-116X

ENCLOSURE

Committee would be handled in a secure manner, consistent with the Rules of Procedure of the Committee and other arrangements for the special handling of particularly sensitive material.

We look forward to receiving the material responsive to this request as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower

John G. Tower
Vice Chairman

Select Committee Members Requesting Files

Senator Gary Hart

Senator Walter D. Huddleston

Senator Charles McC. Mathias

Senator Walter F. Mondale

Senator Robert Morgan

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-2000 BY SP2ALM/BMP
MDR-16

62-116395-2761

ENCLOSURE

J. [illegible] for FBI

Dear ____________:

I have just today received your letter dated May 28. It apparently reached the Department of Justice on June 8. It requests "the delivery forthwith to the members whose names are listed in the attachment hereto of any files on them or documents concerning them that are in the possession, custody, or control of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

The Department wants to cooperate with you on this matter. But I think we first ought to clarify the scope of your request. I assume, for example, that your request is not intended to encompass copies of all letters between the members and the Department. I would suggest that we can reach an understanding on issues of this kind by consultations between us.

Your letter says that "Whether as a matter of agreement between the Committee and the Department some material that may be in any such files should be withheld depends upon an analysis of the weight of the particular reason put forward for the proposed withholding balanced against the Committee's need to exercise its mandate."

I take that to mean you would like us to go over the files and to raise with the Committee such problems with disclosure as may or may not exist. I realize this request is

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-2000 BY SP2ACM/BRG
MDR-16

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~DATE 11-24-2000 BY SP2ACM/BJP~~
~~MDR-16~~

62-116395 = 778

ENCLOSURE

not made under the Freedom of Information Act, but as we review the material in the file, exemptions in the act indicate, I think, the kind of concerns the Committee might want the Department to bring to its attention before disclosure is made. For example, if material in a file would violate the privacy of an individual other than the member if it were revealed, would the Committee insist that such material be revealed?

We are beginning to prepare the material so that no time will be wasted, ~~but~~ and I would like discussions to begin quickly so that we can agree on how to proceed. That done, I would think that we could deliver the documents that you have requested.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. B. P. Murphy
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/11/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LEGISLATION

Attached is a copy of a memorandum dated 5/27/75, which was furnished by the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for the Intelligence Community with advice that it had been prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The memorandum analyzes current pending legislation (S. 743, H. R. 141 and H. R. 214) all of which would repeal the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. If passed, such legislation could seriously affect the Bureau and other agencies of the intelligence community.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached memorandum should be forwarded to the Legal Analysis Unit of the Office of Legal Counsel for its use in any analysis that it may be making of the legislation described above.

WRW/TCH

JBA

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJP
MDR-16

REC-100 62-116395-278

6 - KRH S

Enclosure

LFS:mjg
(10)

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

17 JUN 27 1975

84 JUN 27 1975

SECRET

Rec'd from Ad Hoc Comm. 6/10/75 LRS

27 May 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Electronic Surveillance Legislation

1. Over a dozen bills have been introduced in Congress to date aimed at restricting electronic surveillance conducted on national security grounds. Although impelled by concern for the Fourth Amendment rights of American citizens, the major bills in this area (S. 743, H.R. 141, H.R. 214) are characterized by a heavy-handed approach which poses a serious threat to the exploitation of foreign SIGINT sources, both within the United States and overseas. (Signals intelligence subsumes communications intelligence and electronic intelligence.)

2. The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 U.S.C. 2510, *et seq*.) established certain procedures which require the Government to obtain a court order issued on probable cause prior to conducting wire or oral communication interception in the investigation of certain offenses. In section 2511(3) of that Act, Congress specifically disavows any limitation on the constitutional powers of the President in national security matters and recognizes that the President has inherent constitutional authority to engage in certain foreign intelligence activities:

> (n)othing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of the President ... *to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities*. (emphasis added)

The emphasized language implicitly recognizes that foreign intelligence surveillances may be distinguished from national security surveillances aimed at the discovery and prosecution of criminal conspiracies and activity.

3. In reliance on these Presidential powers and congressional recognition thereof, *foreign intelligence* signal and communication interceptions may be conducted within the United States without judicial warrant.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-2000 BY [illegible]
MDR-16

62-116395-278

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

4. Sentiment that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) (quoted above) are incompatible with Fourth Amendment rights has spawned a Senate bill and over a dozen House bills (some of these identical) aimed at closing what the sponsors view as "the national security loophole" in current surveillance laws. A distinctive approach to national security surveillance is taking shape which would prohibit the use of warrantless surveillance for any reason whatsoever, treating national security surveillance under a single rubric, without distinguishing between gathering foreign intelligence on the one hand, and national security surveillances aimed at the discovery and prosecution of criminality, on the other.

(a) S. 743 by Senators Nelson and Kennedy would amend 18 U.S.C. 2510, et seq., as follows: First, repeal 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) thereby withdrawing whatever congressional recognition that section gave the foreign intelligence surveillance powers of the President. Second, prohibit intercepting the communications of an American citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence until a prior judicial warrant is obtained issued on probable cause that a specific crime, e.g., espionage, has been or is about to be committed. Third, prohibit intercepting the communication of a foreign power or its agent until a prior judicial warrant is obtained by establishing probable cause (a) that such interception is necessary to protect the national defense (note narrower standard than national security); (b) that the interception will be consistent with the international obligations of the United States; and (c) that the target is a foreign power or foreign agent. (A foreign agent is defined as any person, not an American citizen or alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, whose activities are intended to serve the interests of a foreign power and to undermine the national defense. Each application for such an interception would be made to the D. C. Federal District Court on personal and written authorization of the President and would provide detailed information on the target, the purposes and justification of the interception.) Upon court approval, only the FBI would be authorized to intercept the communication. Fourth, require that every American citizen targetted be informed of the specifics of the surveillance within a month of the last authorized interception. (This disclosure could be postponed if the Government satisfies the court that the target is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise or that disclosure would endanger national security interests. A foreign power or its agent need not be informed of interceptions.) Fifth, require the Attorney General to report to the Congress, at least quarterly, the details of each interception undertaken on national security grounds, to be filed with the Senate Foreign Relations and Judiciary Committees and the House International Relations and Judiciary Committees.

(b) H. R. 141 by Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, which has legislative jurisdiction for surveillance, is similar to the above bill. It would repeal 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and amend Title 18 to permit communications interception in national security cases only under court order issued on probable cause that an individual has committed one of several enumerated offenses or is engaged in activities intended to serve the interests of a foreign principal and to undermine the national security. (From the language of the bill, it could be argued that the foreign agent's activities would have to constitute a criminal offense before a warrant could be issued.) The bill does not mention the communications of a foreign power. Each application for an interception would have to be authorized by the Attorney General and made to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction. The targetted individual would be informed of the surveillance within ninety days. The President, Attorney General, and all Government agencies would be required to supply Congress, through the Senate Judiciary and Foreign Relations Committees and the House Judiciary and International Relations Committees, any information regarding any interception applied for.

(c) H. R. 214 by Mr. Mosher and seven identical bills co-sponsored by over 70 Congressmen from both parties, would prohibit any interception of communications, surreptitious entry, mail-opening, or the procuring and inspection of records of telephone, bank, credit, medical, or other business or private transactions of any individual without court order issued on probable cause that a crime has been committed. Like S. 743 and H. R. 141, reviewed above, H.R. 214 would repeal 18 U.S.C. 2511(3). Unlike the above bills, H.R. 214 does not provide for non-law enforcement surveillance. It would also strike out provisions for summary procedures for intercepting communications during emergencies and would require that detailed information on each application for a communication interception be reported to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.

5. Intelligence Community Interests: These bills, through imposing judiciary administration over all surveillance, would impair existing responsibility to conduct electronic surveillance in gathering foreign positive intelligence, which now reaches wholly domestic communications, those both transmitted and received within the United States; wholly foreign communications, those both transmitted and received abroad; and transnational communications, international communications received in or transmitted from the United States.

SIGINT provides a broad range of foreign intelligence ranging from early warning indicators to the most mundane information. The importance of any single intercept or series of interceptions cannot be anticipated in advance; therefore, the probable cause standard and the proposed requirements of "particularity" are inappropriate in connection with this method of foreign intelligence collection. (Furthermore, the House bills would impair existing responsibility for using other intelligence gathering techniques against foreign subjects within the United States, e.g., medicepts, photo surveillance, etc.)

6. Effect on Intelligence Community Interests: The bills reviewed above would severely restrict domestic communications interception for foreign intelligence gathering purposes; raise serious questions respecting authority to intercept transnational communications; and would even raise questions concerning the foreign intelligence community's authority to conduct electronic surveillance abroad free from judicial intrusion or other conditions. (Moreover, the House bills would restrict the use of other intelligence gathering techniques against foreign targets within the United States.)

(a) Domestic Electronic Surveillance: An operation mounted against a foreign target within the United States to gather foreign positive intelligence would apparently not meet the court test unless the specific message targetted involved an anticipated, demonstrable and direct threat to the national defense. S. 743 explicitly confers interception authority to the FBI alone. It also explicitly raises the issue of the consistency of surveillance with international obligations, e.g., the Vienna Convention, and thus challenges the position taken by the State Department that no current international obligation precludes targetting foreign facilities within the United States.

(b) Transnational Electronic Surveillance: Proposed legislation would apparently subject the interception of transnational communications from a situs within the United States to the probable cause standard. It could also provide grounds for arguing that interceptions of transnational communications from facilities outside the United States would be subject to the same standard.

(c) Foreign Electronic Surveillance: The bills reviewed above are broadly written and the prohibitions are not expressly limited to the territory of the United States. While the reach of this legislation should be subject to the built-in limitation that the authority of a federal court to issue warrants is confined to its territorial limits, repeal of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and the articulation of probable cause standards for foreign intelligence gathering activities could have a grave impact on overseas intelligence collection by bringing into play a body of exclusionary rule case law (developed in ruling on the admissability in a Federal criminal trial of evidence obtained overseas by electronic surveillance). Suffice it, here, to say that this could result in subjecting overseas foreign intelligence surveillance to the proposed probable cause standards as a test of the "reasonableness" required by Fourth Amendment protections. Moreover, this legislation could raise complex questions in situations where an element of the interception process falls within the jurisdiction of the federal court, e.g., the physical presence of the surveillance device. Even if these bills would not directly affect authority to conduct foreign electronic surveillance, they could ultimately weaken it by raising the opportunity to argue that this authority rests only on three bases--assertion of inherent Presidential intelligence-gathering powers, congressional recognition and judicial acceptance. Repeal of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) may be viewed as weakening the argument that Congress has recognized foreign intelligence gathering authority inherent in the President and delegated to his Executive branch agents.

7. Summary:

--Proposed legislation would repeal 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and would impose judicial administration of a "probable cause" standard over foreign intelligence electronic surveillance. At the very least, this would restrict communications interceptions against foreign targets within the United States to situations involving an anticipated, demonstrable and direct threat to the national defense. Also, this would probably subject the interception of transnational communications, from either an overseas or domestic situs, to the same judicial standards. Finally, this would raise difficult questions concerning the ability of CIA, NSA, and the service cryptologic agencies to conduct electronic surveillance overseas against foreign targets without conforming to the standards of Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" articulated in this legislation. In sum, enactment of proposed legislation would severely restrict the collection and processing of foreign SIGINT and would seriously impair the production of all-source intelligence.

--By repealing 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and by introjecting the judiciary into the field of foreign intelligence gathering, proposed legislation raises a constitutional challenge insofar as it purports to withdraw sanction of and place limitations on the President's inherent power to conduct foreign surveillance. This infringement could undermine the Executive sources of authority upon which the intelligence community depends. To be sure, the proposed requirement of prior judicial authorization of foreign intelligence surveillances is altogether impractical. But the fundamental constitutional objection is that it purports to share Executive authority with judicial officers having no expertise in or responsibility for national security or foreign affairs. The necessity of a foreign intelligence surveillance is simply inappropriate for judicial resolution. It is a matter committed to the Executive branch by the Constitution and an area for which there are no judicially manageable standards. An arrangement by which federal judges decide what foreign intelligence the President may have in his conduct of foreign relations is incompatible with the Chief Executive's inherent foreign intelligence gathering powers. Since this Presidential authority is constitutional in nature and stems from a fundamental separation of governmental powers, a Congressional attempt to require its sharing with the judiciary would certainly lead to protracted constitutional litigation. Moreover, Congress implicitly authorized the use of electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence activities and this legislation would circumscribe the very functions which Congress intended the Agency to perform.

3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General June 4, 1975

1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to my letter dated May 6, 1975, enclosing a memorandum, same date, which proposed that an FBI position paper dated July 31, 1972, be withheld from the Senate Select Committee on the basis that it was considered to be an internal deliberative document.

Reference is also made to a conversation May 28, 1975, between Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Connor and Special Agent Paul V. Daly during which Mr. O'Connor advised that it was the Department of Justice decision to make the July 31, 1972, position paper available to the Senate Select Committee. In view of this decision, we will make this document available for review at FBI Headquarters.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum advising the Committee of the availability of the July 31, 1972, position paper. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2006 BY SP2ALM/PAP
MJR-46

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-277

EWL:ekw/lhb/lhb
(10)

REC-100

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

17 JUN 27 1975

Delivered 6/14/75

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

NOTE:

By memorandum 5/6/75, we advised the AG that the position paper in question was an internal deliberative document which was the direct basis for a formal statement on FBI authority to conduct internal security investigations embodied in a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the AG dated 8/7/73. On this basis, we felt it was inappropriate that the requested position paper be made available to the SSC.

In conversation between Deputy Assistant Attorney General O'Connor and SA Daly, referred to above, O'Connor indicated that it was the decision of the Department to make this paper available to the SSC. Since we have already expressed our position concerning the paper to the AG, it does not appear that there would be any purpose served disputing his decision. However, since it is an internal deliberative document, it is felt that the paper should be made available for review rather than given outright to the SSC. Also, we are setting a condition that no notes be taken during the initial review, subject to negotiation of further requests by the Committee.

3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

62-116395

June 4, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-17-[illegible] BY [illegible]
MDR-16

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Under I., Legal Authorities, a general request was made for memoranda discussing the legal authority of the FBI to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence activities. Material responsive to this request was delivered to the Committee during April, 1975.

Since the receipt of the above-mentioned material, the Committee has indicated a specific interest in a position paper dated July 31, 1972, discussing the "Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." This paper has been located and will be available for review at FBI Headquarters by Mr. John Elliff and/or Mr. Mark Gitenstein of the Committee staff.

Our position is that the July 31, 1972, paper is an internal deliberative document the contents of which were refined in a formal statement on FBI authority to conduct internal security investigations embodied in a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973. A copy of this latter document has been made available to the Committee. Under these circumstances, we would request that the July 31, 1972, document be reviewed in this context and that no notes be taken during this initial review. Should this arrangement be unsatisfactory to the Committee, upon completion of the initial review we will certainly consider any further request for the document in a paraphrase form acceptable to the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

EWL:ekw/lhb lhb
(9)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

[illegible]-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated ~~5/30~~ 6/4/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt. Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Re: Legal Authorities

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: K William O'Connor Rept Date: 6/5/75

Received by: FAO Schwartz

Title: Chief Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2000 BY SP2ALM/MJP
MDR-16

POSITION PAPER

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
SCOPE OF FBI AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION AND RESPONSIBILITY IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-2000 BY SP2ALM/bjg
MDR-16

Thomas J. Smith
Chief, Research Section
Domestic Intelligence Division

July 31, 1972

62-116395-277

ENCLOSURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Background 1
Authority Derived Presidential Directives 2
Authority Conveyed Even Before 1939 Directives. . . 4
Presidential Directives Subsequent to 1939. 6
Implementation of 1939 Directive. 8
Expansion of Authority Contained In 1939 Directive. 10
Directives Supplemented or Superseded by Statutes . 11
Validity of the Smith Act 11
Directives Versus Legislative Enactment 12
Investigations Under Statutory Authority. 15
Preventive Investigations 16
Intelligence Investigations 18
Executive Order 10450 18
Statutory Authority and President's Constitutional Power. 20
Special White House Request 22
Need for Current Executive Order. 23
Development of Investigative Policies 24
Preventive Investigations 26
Intelligence Investigations and Civil Liberty . . . 28
Interpretation of Authority by Substantive Sections 28
Extremist Intelligence Section Views. 28
Nationalities Intelligence Section Views. 30
Internal Security Section Views 32
Revolutionary Activities Section Views. 34
Official Recognition of Intelligence Investigation. 37
Former Study of FBI's Investigative Responsibilities. 37
Recent Executive Intent 39
Conclusions 40
Recommendations 42

SCOPE OF FBI AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION AND RESPONSIBILITY IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

BACKGROUND

Over the past several months there have been an increasing number of public statements made from various quarters questioning or contesting authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations, particularly where there is no clear-cut legislative authority apparent. One of the most searching inquiries was contained in a paper presented by Professor John T. Elliff at a two-day conference at Princeton University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public Justice.

Professor Elliff addressed himself to the matter of FBI authority derived from legislative enactments as opposed to that derived from Presidential directives. He went into some detail in connection with the Presidential directive issued by President Roosevelt in September, 1939, which was subsequently reiterated on three occasions. Elliff questioned whether Roosevelt was even aware that he was shifting FBI authority from congressional enactment to Presidential directive when he issued the September, 1939, directive since he probably assumed he had granted such authority in 1936 when he requested intelligence investigations of fifth columnists. Elliff accused the FBI of magnifying the September, 1939, directive into a definitive order.

Over a long period of time Senator Sam J. Ervin has been probing into the nature and extent of FBI gathering and retention of domestic intelligence information. In April, 1971, Senator Ervin made a request of the Department of Justice to furnish detailed information concerning the Department's (the FBI's) policy and practice on investigating and reporting the political beliefs and activities of persons not under investigation for violating the laws. Of particular interest was specific information on the constitutional authority and power exercised by the Executive Branch to conduct such investigations.

Subsequently, Senator Ervin announced that he intended to propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any person without his consent, unless the Government has reason to believe that person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Other Congressmen have either introduced or announced plans to introduce legislation or resolutions calling for special activities, particularly in the area of domestic intelligence operations.

Based on these developments it became apparent that an in-depth study was in order to clarify any misconceptions which might have grown up concerning the scope of FBI intelligence and investigative authority, particularly where it concerns domestic organizations and/or individuals. A detailed and exhaustive study has now been completed, and the following is the result of that study.

AUTHORITY DERIVED PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES

In the testimony of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on March 2, 1972, under the subject of justifications on page 2 the statement is made that "The FBI's responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field are authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential directives and instructions of the Attorney General. They include investigative jurisdiction over matters relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversion, and related internal security functions. Subjects of investigation include the activities of the Communist Party, USA, communist front groups and other totalitarian organizations, including individuals or groups who are alleged either to seek overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or to conspire against the rights of citizens." Similar language has appeared in Mr. Hoover's testimony in prior years.

It is assumed that the Presidential directives referred to in Mr. Hoover's testimony are (1) Directive dated September 6, 1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15, 1953; (2) Executive Order 10450 dated April 27, 1953 (and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order 11605 dated July 2, 1971).

It is believed that there is a misconception concerning the extent of jurisdiction or authority which was conveyed to the FBI by the Presidential directive dated September 6, 1939. All of the succeeding directives appear to be hinged on the one issued in September, 1939. Therefore, the language of that first directive becomes a very important issue. Perhaps even more important are the circumstances leading up to the issuance of that directive and the intent of the President at the time it was issued.

Prior to the issuance of the September, 1939, directive President Roosevelt issued a statement or confidential directive to the heads of the various Government Departments on June 26, 1939, which stated, "It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The Directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities."

"No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage, except by the three agencies mentioned above."

"I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other investigative agencies than the three named, to refer immediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any data, information or material that may come to their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage."

It is to be noted that in this statement or directive the language, with the exception of the word "counterespionage" deals with matters coming clearly within legislative enactments.

The September, 1939, directive stated, "The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.

"This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and effective manner on a national basis, and all information must be carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion and irresponsiblity.

"To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs, and all other law enforcement officers in the United States promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any information obtained by them relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws."

In this document it is particularly important to note that the language says the FBI is to "take charge of investigations" and not "assume jurisdiction" or "have authority to investigate" matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations. The statutory authority to investigate the enumerated crimes was already present, but the directive fixed responsibility for the FBI to conduct the investigations. In other words, this directive conveyed no authority not already possessed by the FBI by legislative enactment but merely established that no other investigative agency should handle the matters.

The last paragraph of this particular directive, which was actually a request of all local law enforcement agencies, used the words "counterespionage" and "subversive activities." However, the context of the statement appears to merely be designed to broadly define activities which might touch on the national security so that all such matters, irrespective of the legal definition or name, would be turned over to the FBI.

A logical conclusion, based purely on examination of the language used in the September, 1939, directive, is that the directive merely put everyone on notice that the FBI had the responsibility to investigate the statutory crimes named; that it provided no so-called "constitutional" or "executive authority" for the FBI to investigate matters not covered by legislative enactment. This is not to say that the President has no such constitutional authority (he has), but only that it was not exercised here.

As a matter of particular interest, Professor Elliff, in questioning whether President Roosevelt was aware that he was shifting FBI authority from Congressional enactment to Presidential directive since he assumed that he had granted such authority in 1936, was at least half correct. While no shift of authority appears to have occurred as a result of the 1939 directive, we have historical evidence to show that the President instructed the FBI to conduct subversive intelligence-type investigations of radicals in 1936. In this regard, there appears to be little doubt that Roosevelt conveyed some degree of Executive authority to the FBI.

AUTHORITY CONVEYED EVEN BEFORE 1939 DIRECTIVES

Confidential memoranda written by Mr. Hoover in August and September, 1936, clearly reveal that President Roosevelt was very concerned about the subversive activities of fascists and communists in the United States and discussed the matter with Mr. Hoover during personal meetings. These memoranda indicate that President Roosevelt was obviously cognizant of the lack of statutory authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations of fascism and communism. Yet, the President desired the FBI to conduct such investigations. Mr. Hoover pointed out that the FBI appropriation contained a provision for the FBI to conduct such investigations if such matters were referred to it by the Department of State. The President was hesitant of having a formal request come through State Department, however, because of the many leaks in the State Department.

However, during a meeting between the President, Mr. Hoover and the Secretary of State on August 25, 1936, the Secretary of State did ask the FBI to conduct investigations of Fascist and Communist activities, under the provisions of the Appropriations Act. In the discussion preceding the request, however, it must be noted that the President stressed the fact that fascism and communism were international in scope, and that communism in particular was directed from Moscow; that this was a matter which fell within the scope of foreign affairs over which the State Department would have a right to request an inquiry to be made.

According to the information presently available, President Roosevelt agreed to place a handwritten memorandum of his own in the White House safe, concerning the request of the State Department for investigations of fascism and communism. The President asked Mr. Hoover to speak to the Attorney General about the matter and that the Secretary of State also discuss the technique to be followed with the Attorney General. Mr. Hoover recorded that he did inform the Attorney General on September 10, 1936, of a conference he had with the President on September 1, 1936, at which time the Secretary of State was present, and at which time the Secretary of State - at the President' suggestion - requested of Mr. Hoover to have investigations made of the subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism. The Attorney General verbally directed Mr. Hoover to proceed with the investigations and to coordinate these matters in the possession of the Military Intelligence Division, the Naval Intelligence Division, and the State Department. Mr. Hoover considered this the authority upon which to proceed.

The circumstances surrounding the manner in which the President had the State Department request investigation very likely explains why the September, 1939, directive did not contain any language relating to subversive activities. President Roosevelt was fully aware that the FBI was already conducting confidential investigations of the activities of fascists and communists who represetned a threat to the national security at that time. There was obviously a private and understandable confidential agreement between all interested parties, including the other Federal investigative agencies who had an interest. There was no need to mention subversive activities in the first part of the directive since the pertinent Federal agencies were already on notice and local agencies would turn over all matters relating to the national security.

Based on the foregoing, reliance on the September, 1939, directive or even the earlier confidential arrangement worked out by the President, whether considered a Presidential directive, Presidential mandate, or some other manifestation of Executive power, for current investigative authority appears to be unwise. Placing the 1939 directive and the earlier arrangement in their proper perspective is very important. Both were laid in a period when the world was on the brink of World War II. The concern for national security was related to two international movements. There were no laws, such as the Smith Act of 1940 or the Internal Security Act of 1950. Although there were undoubtedly some purely American groups which received no direction or control from abroad, there was no national concern for indigenous anarchists or other groups desiring to overthrow the Government.

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES SUBSEQUENT TO 1939

As mentioned previously, the directive dated September 6, 1939, was reiterated subsequently by directives dated January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953. The directive dated January, 1943, signed by President Roosevelt, was simply a reaffirmation of the earlier 1939 directive and was broadened only to the extent that it called on all patriotic organizations and individuals as well as local law enforcement officers to report information to the FBI. The July, 1950, directive, signed by President Truman, contained the phrase "subversive activities and related matters," which on the surface would indicate that President Truman intended to broaden the scope of authority it might convey to the FBI. However, closer examination reveals that the Truman directive actually misquoted the earlier two directives of President Roosevelt and included the phrase "subversive activities and related matters" which did not appear in the Roosevelt directives.

Since no information is available concerning Executive intent behind the issuance of the 1950 directive, it cannot be determined whether President Truman was aware of the possible additional authority he might have conveyed to the FBI as the result of changing the language of the two prior directives to include the phrase "subversive activities and related matters." The fact of the matter is, the United States was at the time engaged in the "police action" in Korea and there was unquestionably a great deal of domestic subversive activity at the time, most of which could be traced to the Communist Party. We do know that President Truman signed the 1950 directive on the advice of the National Security Council.

There is one document available which tends to reveal the concern President Truman had relative to increased subversive activity involving domestic cases. In a letter dated July 17, 1946, the Attorney General said he felt that in the troubled period in international affairs, accompanied by an increase in subversive activity at home, it was imperative to use special investigative measures (wire taps) in domestic cases. Mr. Truman concurred with the Attorney General and authorized the special investigative measures.

There is one important point, however, which bears on any feelings President Truman might have had on the issue of domestic subversive activity. When the Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950, consisting of two subchapters, Truman vetoed the bill, citing as a reason that Title II of the Bill - The Emergency Detention Act - constituted a threat to the democratic process. In "The American Constitution - Its Origins and Development" by Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harison, the authors declared that President Truman roundly condemned the Internal Security Act as grossly unconstitutional. They said that his veto message called the registration provisions of the law "the greatest danger to freedom of press, speech and assembly since the Sedition Act of 1798." A drastic new sedition statute, derived from the earlier Mundt-Nixon bill which was bottled up in the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1948, was incorporated in the Internal Security Act. Mr. Truman thought the phrase prohibiting a person to "substantially contribute" to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship so vague as to cast grave doubts upon whether it met the standards of accuracy necessary for due process in criminal statutes. These authors did not even touch on the emergency detention subchapter of the Act. The political climate at the time, however, in spite of President Truman's censure and veto, was such that the Internal Security Act was passed over the veto and became law.

While the 1950 directive of President Truman incorrectly stated "On September 6, 1939, and January 8, 1943, a Presidential Directive was issued providing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.," the directive issued by President Eisenhower on December 15, 1953, said nothing about the FBI being responsible for such matters. Rather, the 1953 directive began by stating, "On September 6, 1939, January 8, 1943, and July 24, 1950, Presidential Directives were issued requesting all enforcement officers, both Federal and State, to report promptly all information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

This language can, of course, be interpreted to mean that the FBI is responsible for investigating these matters otherwise the directive would not have noted that enforcement officers were requested to furnish all information to the FBI.

The 1953 directive actually did not reiterate either of the three previous directives except for the language quoted above. Instead, it cited the FBI's responsibility to investigate all violations of the Atomic Energy Act and requested all patriotic organizations and individuals as well as all enforcement officers to report violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

IMPLEMENTATION OF 1939 DIRECTIVE

All of the foregoing documents have obviously been subject to various interpretations. However the language might be interpreted, the September, 1939, directive, was implemented by the FBI and Congress was made fully aware of the extent of investigative activity the FBI was conducting as a result of the directive. In Mr. Hoover's testimony on November 30, 1939, in connection with an emergency supplemental appropriations bill, he said, "In September, 1939, we found it necessary to organize a General Intelligence Division in Washington. The establishment of this division was made necessary by the President's proclamation directing that all complaints of violations of the national defense statutes and proclamations be reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This division now has compiled extensive indices of individuals, groups, and organizations engaged in subversive activities, in espionage activities, or any activities that are possibly detrimental to the internal security of the United States.

"The indexes have been arranged not only alphabetically but also geographically, so that at any time, should we enter into the conflict abroad, we would be able to go into any of these communities and identify individuals and groups who might be a source of grave danger to the security of the country."

During the same testimony Mr. Hoover was asked if any of the funds being requested in the emergency supplemental appropriation would be spent for any of the purposes for which funds were denied at the previous session. Mr. Hoover replied they would not; that the entire sum would be spent for intelligence work.

Subsequently, in June, 1940, Mr. Hoover again testified before a House Subcommittee on Appropriations. At that time he referred to his appearance before the committee the previous fall wherein he testified that authority had been requested to set up a separate division with the FBI to handle national defense matters under an assistant director. Mr Hoover offered a chart showing the organizational structure of five divisions of the Bureau, one of which he referred to as the National Defense Division. He said that this Division would handle and direct all investigations dealing with espionage, sabotage, national defense matters, and violations of neutrality statutues.

Mr. Hoover testified that in line with the President's order of the previous September (September 6, 1939) there had been close coordination of all the intelligence services. He pointed out that the President, on September 6, directed the FBI to coordinate the functions on national defense matters in intelligence work. Mr. Hoover also related that he wanted to refer to a general intelligence index which he had mentioned in previous hearings. He said that that index included the names of persons who might become potential enemies to our national security, such as known espionage agents, known sabotuers, leading members of the Communist Party, and the bund. He explained that this index had been compiled very carefully, and it was confined solely to persons engaged in activities detrimental to the United States.

Later, on February 19, 1941, when Mr. Hoover appeared before Congress in connection with a deficiency appropriations bill for 1941, he went into some detail concerning the activities of the FBI prior to the then national emergency. In response to a question concerning this, Mr. Hoover replied that prior to the emergency our activities covered generally the investigation of all Federal statutes except counterfeiting, narcotics, income tax, and postal violations. FBI jurisdiction, he said, included kidnaping, extortion, bank robbery, white slavery, motor vehicle theft, impersonation of Government officers, frauds against the Government, antitrust investigations, etc.

Mr. Hoover then incorporated into the record a list of major crime laws passed between 1934 and 1941, showing the legislative jurisdiction of the FBI during the period. With the exception of nine of these laws, all dealt with criminal-type violations of law. The exceptions included a prohibition on the exportation of arms and ammunition to Spain during the civil war; the prohibition of making photographs, sketches or maps of vital military and naval defense installations; the Hatch Act, which among other things related to employment of individuals by the Government who were members of political parties advocating the overthrow of the Government; amendment of the act requiring registration of agents of foreign principals; the Neutrality Act of 1939; amendment of the Espionage Act; the Smith Act of 1940; act requiring registration of certain organizations (Voorhis Act); and an amendment to the Sabotage Act. There was a special note listed under the amendment of the act requiring registration of agents of foreign principals. This called attention to the Presidential directive dated September 6, 1939. From this structure inference can be drawn that the directive was related to this amendment.

EXPANSION OF AUTHORITY CONTAINED IN 1939 DIRECTIVE

Further in his testimony Mr. Hoover was asked if any other agencies of the Government were covering the same work that emergency employees of the FBI were covering. He replied that he would like to leave the committee a publication listing the statutes, proclamations and Executive Orders pertaining to national defense matters. He then stated that the President in 1939 directed that all investigations dealing with espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and national defense activities, would be handled by the FBI except those arising within the Army or Navy. He went on to say that other governmental agencies were instructed under this Executive order to report to the FBI any information showing any violation dealing with national defense matters.

No Executive Order could be located which contains the language used by Mr. Hoover in this instance. He might have been referring to either the directive or statement made by President Roosevelt in June, 1939, or the directive dated September 6, 1939. However, the above-quoted language is much broader than used in either of these documents.

In considering the full impact of the June and September, 1939, Presidential directives, and how they subsequently influenced FBI jurisdiction and responsibility, it must be borne in mind that the Nation was at the very brink of World War II. President Roosevelt issued a proclamation on September 8, 1939, declaring that state of national emergency existed in connection with the observance, safeguarding, and enforcement of neutrality, and strengthening of the national defense within the limits of peacetime authorizations. An Executive Order (No.8233) dated September 5, 1939, prescribed regulations governing the enforcement of the neutrality of the United States. The War Department, Navy Department, Treasury and Commerce Departments, and the Governor of the Panama Canal were assigned certain enforcement duties. The Justice Department (FBI) was given responsibility of enforcement of the neutrality of the United States not especially designated to other departments, independent offices and establishments of the United States Government, and prosecution of violations of the neutrality of the U. S.

Unquestionably in time of national emergency the broadest possible interpretation was being applied to every statute, resolution, proclamation, Executive order, Presidential directive or other lawful order or mandate in the interest of the preservation of peace, the national defense and general welfare of the country. Undoubtedly there are many other documents recording Executive intention, Executive instructions concerning broad, sweeping authority for the FBI, which cannot now be found for one reason or another. Certainly there is indication that at least President Roosevelt had more than one conversation with Mr. Hoover concerning the necessity for the FBI to conduct investigations beyond the statutory authority it normally used.

DIRECTIVES SUPPLEMENTED OR SUPERSEDED BY STATUTES

Eventually, however, there were legislative enactments which broadened the scope of our statutory authority, increased our legal jurisdiction and added to our investigative responsibility. Following the September, 1939, directive, which has been used as a source of FBI authority to conduct certain types of domestic intelligence investigations, the Smith Act of 1940 became law. Several successful prosecutions resulted from the Smith Act, although some parts of it were invalidated by the Supreme Court. The revised statute (Title 18, U.S.C. 2385) remains on the books and is enforceable.

Legal Counsel's Office analyzed Title 18, USC 2385, in June, 1972. It was noted that this statute contains the substance of the original Smith Act. The House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary, Report No. 1869, 74th Congress, First Session, made clear the purpose of the original legislation:

"The reported bill is based on the natural right of self-preservation inherent in every government. It simply authorizes the exercise of the power of the government to defend itself against those who seek by force and violence to destroy it." Further clarification of the legislative objective was made by Representative John W. McCormack, who said, "And by the way, this bill is not alone aimed at communists; this bill is aimed at anyone who advocates the overthrow of government by violence and force."

VALIDITY OF THE SMITH ACT

The Supreme Court held in 1951 that teaching the doctrine of forcible overthrow of the United States Government was a violation of the Smith Act where there was a clear and present danger that a substantial public evil would result. The Court further held that the Act did not violate the First Amendment. Chief Justice Vinson, who wrote the majority opinion, used language which must be considered at this time to be very significant in deciding whether the Government may in fact conduct preventive-type investigations in the interest of self-preservation.

Justice Vinson wrote, "The rule we deduce from these cases (a series of earlier Supreme Court decisions - namely the 'question in every case is whether words used are used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.') is that where an offense is specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress terms, a conviction relying upon speech or press as evidence of violation may be sustained only when the speech or publication created a 'clear and present danger' of attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime."

In this case, applying this rule, the court said, "Obviously, these words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid, and the signal is awaited--we must, therefore, reject the contention that success or probability of success is the criterion."

In addition to the Smith Act of 1940, Congress also passed legislation which further increased the authority of the FBI to deal with subversive activities. The Voorhis Act (superseded in 1948 along with original Smith Act) which is now Title 18, USC 2386, provided for registration of organizations subject to foreign control which engage in political activity among other things. The Internal Security Act of 1950 was passed over the veto of President Truman and provided not only a prohibition of conspiracies or attempts to establish a totalitarian dictatorship and a long list of measures having to do with Communist organizations (Control of Subversive Activities) but also for the emergency detention of suspected security risks. Further, in 1954, Congress enacted the Communist Control Act to provide additional investigative authority in dealing with the communist threat to national security.

DIRECTIVES VERSUS LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT

These legislative enactments were unquestionably designed to give the FBI a cloak of statutory authority to investigate not only the communists, which were a grave concern to President Roosevelt when he requested investigations of communism by the FBI in 1936, but also any other group which engages in activity aimed at overthrow of the Government by force or violence. And, whereas President Roosevelt relied on the element of foreign relations and the international character of the fascist and communist movements to have State Deparment make a request for FBI investigation, the statutes referred to above do not require a dependence on foreign elements, notwithstanding the Congressional finding of necessity in connection with the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Communist Control Act of 1954.

The question to be resolved, then, is divided into several interrelated parts. First, if the Presidential directives described heretofore are actually valid. Secondly, assuming that the directives are completely valid, why have they been cited as one of the bases of FBI investigative authority? Thirdly, if, as it appears from the foregoing, the directives are valid, but do not convey the investigative authority we have heretofore contended, what effect will this have on our past and future domestic intelligence investigative activity?

Insofar as the validity of the Presidential directives is concerned, there can be no question but that each directive was issued completely in accord with the President's executive power. The evidence shows that the first directive in September, 1939, was not only implemented with the knowledge of Congress, but by appropriating money to the FBI for its implementation Congress in effect gave the directive the full force of law. None of the directives from September, 1939, to the one issued by President Eisenhower in 1953 have been secret. As a matter of fact, all were directed to the public at large, asking support of local law enforcement officials and patriotic organizations. Numerous times the directives have been cited in FBI appropriations testimony.

The second part of the question becomes more difficult to answer. Over the years, whenever it has been necessary and proper to describe our investigative authority, and this has been a requirement in justifying our annual budget, we have used what we have considered all of the different bases for such authority. Although it now seems obvious that the September, 1939, and July, 1943, directives did not actually order the FBI to take charge of any investigations not actually covered by statute, i.e., espionage, sabotage, and neutrality laws, it did request law enforcement officers to turn over to the nearest representative of the FBI all information relating to subversive activities and counterespionage as well as the three statutory crimes listed. It is apparent that the language here was intended as a catch-all so that law enforcement officers would turn over information of any sort whatsoever if it might affect the national security.

In analyzing the language used in that first directive of September, 1939, everything must be put into its proper perspective. In 1939 the Nation had been conditioned to a state of near-war. From January 30, 1933, when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, through the nonagression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union in August, 1939, the specter of war hung over America. Anti-German, anti-Italian and anti-Soviet sentiment swept over the country. People began to look for spies under their beds. It became very necessary to direct the Nation's energies in that regard into a single channel. We could not have every police officer, sheriff and special deputy sheriff in the country running around investigating spies. By the same token, it was very necessary for the Government's resources to be directed towards identification and neutralization of very real espionage rings and potential saboteurs. The June, 1939, directive assured that the FBI would take charge of domestic internal security instead of several agencies working at cross purposes. The September, 1939, directive placed local law enforcement on notice and simultaneously provided for information of possible value to be funneled to the FBI which was responsible for the coordination and investigation.

The September, 1939, directive, although not conveying any investigative authority to the FBI, did result in an additional workload for the FBI by virtue of the fact that local police and other Federal agencies were referring matters to the FBI for investigative attention which were not previously called to our attention. While some of the matters could be logically fit into one of the statutory crimes of espionage, sabotage or neutrality regulations, others could not be since the original information was often nonspecific or so nebulous that it could be categorized only after some inquiry was made locally.

We were also faced with the reality of war and the fact that Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union had espionage apparatuses directed against the United States. While we might not ordinarily institute an investigation before the commission of a crime, such as the case of a bank robbery, motor vehicle theft, etc., the crimes of espionage and sabotage relate to the national security. It would have not only been folly, it would have been insane to wait until we had evidence of the commission of crimes of espionage or sabotage. Rather than wait until we had a complaint alleging the commission of one of these crimes we went out and conducted intelligence-type investigations to determine if there were espionage rings operating or if there were persons conspiring to sabotage the national defense. So the September, 1939, directive did affect our investigative operations. Not by giving us some new investigative authority, but by assigning us the responsibility of coordinating all investigative activity in this regard. We were, of course, already in the intelligence-gathering business as a result of the confidential arrangement agreed upon in August and September, 1936, among President Roosevelt, Director Hoover, and the Secretary of State.

For these reasons, it can be seen why the FBI used the September, 1939, directive as one of the bases for its investigative authority. The unfortunate thing is that the 1939 directive was never really updated, in spite of the reiterations of 1943, 1950, and 1953. It was really never broadened to incorporate the Executive request made in 1936, and to reflect the Executive intent that became so obvious in the succeeding years up to this very time. It would be very difficult to convince someone examining our legal authority for conducting intelligence-type investigations that we derive any authority, particularly any ? reiterating it. What we have, it appears, is a hold-over or perpetuation of a concept of authority (or better, responsibility) which had some basis in 1939, and perhaps even through the Korean War years, but which has long since ceased to have any bearing on FBI investigative operations.

This leads us to the third part of the question and that is what effect the lack of authority derived from the directives will have on past and future domestic intelligence investigations. Although there is division of opinion by some supervisors and officials in the Domestic Intelligence Division as to how much investigative activity has in the past and will in the future depend on the nebulous authority of the directives in question, examination of all the evidence leads to the conclusion that in the past our investigations have to some degree depended, not on the language of any of the directives, but rather, on the Executive request of President Roosevelt in 1936 andon basic authority derived from the many statutes relating to the national security, both before and after the issuance of all the directives in question.

INVESTIGATIONS UNDER STATUTORY AUTHORITY

Argument has been advanced by some in the Domestic Intelligence Division that it will be impossible to carry out our internal security responsibilities of conducting purely intelligence-type investigations using statutory authority only; that the only way we have been able to do this in the past was from the authority contained in one or more of the directives in question. If this were true, i.e., that we have conducted some investigative activity solely on the basis of the directives, the FBI would be in for a rough time if the efforts on the part of several congressional figures to look into our operations ever come to pass. The fact of the matter is, we have had ample authority to do just what we have done without the directives. Administratively perhaps, we could have been more precise in advertising our investigative jurisdiction and authority. And unquestionably, we could have been more careful in writing reports and other records of our investigative activity to show that our investigations were predicated on information indicating violation or possible violation of statutes.

This brings up another point mentioned by Professor Elliff in his study. Elliff related that the FBI had a policy from Mr. Hoover's appointment as Director until 1936 of "closed end" investigations, but that this policy gave way to intelligence coverage involving continuing investigative activity within a broad range of delegated authority. By "closed end" investigations, Elliff means that a crime was committed, a prosecutive opinion was received, an investigation was conducted, a prosecutive opinion was sought and the case was either prosecuted or closed for want of prosecution. On the other hand, an intelligence-type investigation would involve continuing investigation without any thought of closing the case by virtue of prosecution or inability to prosecute. In a case involving a purely criminal act, it can be seen that a "closed end" investigation is possible. But in the fast-moving world of today, with its organized crime problem tied into space-age concepts even in purely criminal cases, the "closed end" investigation is often far from a reality.

PREVENTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

In analyzing the concept of "closed end" investigations versus continuing intelligence-type investigations, several factors must be considered, especially where the national security is involved. Ordinary criminal acts such as the bank robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, etc., can in no way be compared to crimes involving the national security. Usually we would have no occasion to conduct investigation prior to the commission of any of the above-named crimes. But, a crime against national security is an entirely different matter. No one but a fool or one dedicated to the destruction of democracy would advocate that the Government take no action to prevent a crime which could destroy the Government. In other words, it would be an unusual case to conduct a "closed end" investigation of an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and violence. It would appear that the FBI would have a constitutional obligation to conduct the necessary preventive investigation (intelligence?) to insure that an attempt to overthrow the Government does not occur.

Taking into consideration that any court in the land would take judicial notice that the Soviet Union and its satellites are engaged in espionage directed against the United States and that it employs intelligence-gathering techniques against us, it logically follows that the same courts would take judicial notice that the United States Government would have to employ counter-espionage and counterintelligence methods to combat this threat. It is believed that the same can be said for other situations where the facts are such to lead any prudent and cautious individual to believe that a threat exists to commit sabotage; to incite to insurrection or rebellion; to engage in seditious conspiracy; or to plot the overthrow of the Government. Under such circumstances it would seem that the FBI not only has the duty to conduct investigations to prevent the crimes, but has the obligation to do whatever is necessary within the law to neutralize such threats.

It is true that this type of investigation might be contrary to the established concept of investigating only after there is evidence of crime. It is also true that such investigations might take place over a long period of time without any indication or prospect of presecution. However, as pointed out by Legal Counsel in his memorandum dated 7/14/72 on Wiretapping, that "Running through the whole (decision) is a golden thread of philosophy that when the functions essential to the preservation of a nation itself are at stake, the nation has the power to take the action reasonably necessary to protect itself." While this comment had to do with a particular court decision not related to the national secuirty, it is very apropos. It would be unrealistic to contend that the FBI could only investigate crimes or potential crimes affecting the national security after the crime has been committed. How ludicrous this would be.

Right on point in this regard is another part of the majority opinion upholding the Smith Act convictions in 1951. Chief Justice Vinson wrote, "Likewise we are in accord with... the trial court's finding that the requisite danger existed. The mere fact that from the period of 1945 to 1948 petitioners' activities did not result in the attempt to overthrow the Government by force and violence is, of course, no answer to the fact that there was a group that was ready to make the attempt. The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders, these petitioners, felt the time had come for action, coupled with the inflammable nature of the world conditions, similar uprisings in other countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations with countries with whom the petitioners were in the very least ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were justified on this score.

"And this analysis disposes of the contention that a conspiracy to advocate, as distinguished from advocacy itself, cannot be constitutionally restrained, because it comprises only the preparation. It is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger. (Emphasis mine) If the ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added."

Some might say, "this is all very well and good where prosecutive action is used or intended, but what of the cases where the only purpose of the investigation is to produce intelligence information, with no hope or intent of prosecutive action?" There are unquestionably situations where prosecution would be impossible, but it is doubtful if any situation could be conjured up involving the national security where the elements of one or more statutes would be present to lend statutory authority to an investigation or reason for investigation. ?

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

Recently, in connection with a lawsuit filed by the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee because of investigation by the FBI relative to a huge demonstration in Washington, D. C., the Department of Justice cited Title 28, USC 533, as the lawful authority of the FBI to conduct the investigations in question. The investigation at issue had to do with contacting various transportation facilities in an effort to determine the nature and size of groups traveling to Washington for the demonstration. In a sense, this was purely intelligence-type investigation. The statute cited was nothing more than the statute enabling the Attorney General to direct the FBI to conduct investigations.

This same statute has been cited for other types of investigations where the Department of Justice has requested the FBI to conduct investigations where we might not have clearly seen or understood the underlying authority or reason. It can be seen, however, that under the statutory authority granted to the President in Title 10, USC 331-333, to call up troops to assist local governments to put down an insurrection or restore order, the Attorney General would be within his statutory authority as the President's Chief Legal Advisor to ask the FBI to provide all possible information which might assist the President in making a determination under Title 10. Thus, the FBI would conduct an intelligence-type investigation under the statutory and constitutional authority flowing from the President, through the Attorney General to the FBI. In this case we might not immediately see the potential for prosecutive action, although with the statutes covering antiriot and civil disorder we would no doubt be alert for indications that riots or disorders would occur and that evidence could be collected which would support prosecution. Here, we would be conducting investigation before a violation takes place, not only for the intelligence data needed by the President, but to determine if a Federal violation of law might also occur.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

What other authority is also available to the FBI? We sometimes lump Presidential directives and Executive orders into one category as if they were the same. This is a common practice, even on the Executive level. The Executive orders are numbered, whereas the directives usually are not. From information available it appears that Presidential directives and Executive orders carry equal weight. They take on the force of law if acknowledged by resolution of Congress and are published in the Federal Register. All this leads up to a very significant document which over the years has provided substantial investigative authority to the FBI. It is commonly known as Executive Order 10450, although it has been revised and will be known as Executive Order 11605 if it is ever implemented. Executive Order 10450 is captioned as "Security Requirements for Government Employment" and, as the name implies, is related to employment by the Government of individuals who might constitute a national security risk. This Executive order grew out of Executive Order 9835, dated March 21, 1947, which provided for an investigative procedure affecting persons entering competitive civil service. The order established a Loyalty Review Board and procedures for handling of cases where loyalty of an employee was questioned. Executive Order 9835 followed the establishment of the President's temporary commission on loyalty under Executive Order 9086, dated November 25, 1946. Executive Order 10450, dated April 27, 1953, superseded and revoked Executive Order 9835.

The important thing about these two Executive orders is that the Attorney General was required to furnish the Loyalty Review Board current information concerning the subversive nature of foreign or domestic organizations, including totalitarian groups. Thus, the FBI, acting under lawful authority of the Attorney General, was bound to conduct the necessary investigations to enable the Attorney General to fulfill his responsibility to the Loyalty Review Board. Executive Order 10450, in revoking Executive Order 9835, also disbanded the Loyalty Review Board and provided that the Attorney General would furnish the same information regarding subversive organizations to the head of each department and agency. The Attorney General was also requested to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish and maintain an appropriate employee-security program.

Under Executive Orders 9835 and 10450 the Attorney General had the responsibility to designate organizations as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive, or as having adopted apolicy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means. Under provisions of Executive Order 11605, dated July 2, 1971, the Attorney General still has the responsibility of furnishing names of organizations to the heads of departments and agencies. However, instead of the organizations being designated by the Attorney General, the new Executive Order provides that the Subversive Activities Control Board shall, upon petition of the Attorney General, conduct hearings to make the same determination formerly made by the Attorney General. The new Executive Order also sets up a much broader criteria for establishing the subversive nature of organizations.

Unfortunately, the Subversive Activities Control Board, which was initially established under the Internal Security Act of 1950, is under attack from Congress. Congress refused to provide any funds for the Subversive Activities Control Board after July 1, 1972. There has been indication that Congress may also take steps to repeal the remnants of the Internal Security Act of 1950. Should this happen, we would lose a broad base of current authority for conducting many of our security-type investigations. Executive Order 11605 has not actually been implemented; therefore, we are bound to the provisions of Executive Order 10450. Basically, however, the responsibility under 10450 (or even 11605 if it is ever implemented) falls on the Attorney General, and for this reason the Department of Justice should now provide guidance as to what investigations are required by the FBI to fulfill the Attorney General's obligations under the existing Exeuctive order.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER

What other investigative authority or jurisdiction do we have? Attached to this study is a collection of statutes and documents which grant investigative authority for conducting the various types of investigations falling with the primary supervision of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Included in this collection of laws are statutes such as civil rights statutes, which are the basic responsibility of the General Investigative Division, but which nevertheless convey statutory authority in investigating totalitarian organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan and other hate-type groups. Civil rights statutes might also likely be involved in other situations where organized groups act in such a manner as to deny other persons their constitutional rights. The fraud statutes are included since many groups engage in activities which are covered in one way or another by such statutes. There are, of course, the basic statutes such as espionage, sabotage, treason and foreign agents registration act. But there are statutes, such as inciting to antiriot, and others which cover an extremely broad spectrum of subversive activity. But isn't there some additional authority under the constitutional power of the President to protect the national security?

It was under just such constitutional powers that President Roosevelt requested the FBI to investigate the fascist and communist movement. And, of course, it was under just such constitutional powers that the President authorized the Attorney General to approve without a warrant electronic surveillances on both domestic and foreign organizations engaged in activity detrimental to the national security. However, the Supreme Court has considerably narrowed the President's constitutional authority as a result of the Keith case. In essence, the court stated that insofar as domestic organizations are concerned, the President does not have the power to abrogate the First and Fourth Amendments. In other words, the President cannot order an act (investigation) which would interfere with or abridge the First Amendment rights to assemble or redress grievances, or to enjoy freedom of speech, or the Fourth Amendment rights requiring the issuance of search warrant in connection with the seizure of evidence. ?

The courts have considerably broadened their interpretation of both the First and Fourth Amendments. Civil libertarians have proclaimed that any activity on the part of the Government which might have a "chilling effect" on an individual's legitimate right to dissent constitutes a violation of First Amendment rights. In some cases the courts have adopted this view. By the same token, Fourth Amendment rights have been broadened to include overhearings of conversation, and the issue of invasion of privacy is being raised more and more. With all these factors being considered there are, however, numerous situations bearing on the national security where the President unquestionably has the constitutional authority to have the FBI obtain information which will enable him to fulfill his broad responsibilities under the Constituion. With the exception of the recent Keith decision, the courts have declined to define or circumscribe the President's constitutional power.

Ordinarily, when we speak of the constitutional power of the President we think in terms of a specific order such as a directive or Executive order or some other tangible evidence. However, over the years, beginning with the years preceding World War II, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover established a rapport with the President which resulted in the President making requests of the FBI under his inherent Executive authority. The request made by President Roosevelt in 1936 as described herein is an excellent example of a long series of Presidential requests extending through a long line of Presidents and at least until Mr. Hoover's death. Presidents from Roosevelt to Nixon have confided in Mr. Hoover and sought his advice and product of FBI investigative skill, particularly in matters affecting the national security. One very excellent example of the confidence the President has had in the FBI is the confidential Presidential directive of 1941 instructing that the FBI set up a Special Intelligence Service covering the Western Hemisphere to handle and coordinate all intelligence work within the hemisphere. There are many other examples, but a more recent one is the fact that President Nixon, in spite of responsibility assigned to CIA, asked that the FBI establish Legal Attaches in several countries where there had been a dearth of good intelligence information.

SPECIAL WHITE HOUSE REQUESTS

Over a period of years the President came to rely on the FBI to provide first-hand intelligence information concerning both domestic and foreign situations bearing on policy affecting the national security. As a result of numerous conferences in which the various Presidents outlined to Mr. Hoover their needs for information which would assist him and his staff in their policy decisions, Mr. Hoover instructed that important developments concerning the national defense or which might otherwise be of value to the White House should be reported directly to the President or one of his high-level staff members. In most instances the same information was made available to the Attorney General simultaneously. Over the years it became a common practice for White House staff members to telephone requests for information or investigations to Mr. Hoover's office or the office of one of his officials. Such requests were usually considered as being within the constitutional Executive power, and for the most part such requests were completely legitimate and well within the recognized scope of the FBI investigative authority.

Occasionally, however, requests were made - and complied with - which in retrospect appear to have been beyond any recognized Executive authority. An example is a telephone request to furnish all available information to the White House concerning a forthcoming Earth Day rally in 1970. The rally, which was sponsored by groups concerned with pollution and ecology, attracted the attention of a few subversive elements, but appeared to be very much under the control of the sponsors. Senator Edmund S. Muskie spoke at the rally in Washington, D. C., and Rennie Davis, an antiwar activist with a subversive background, appeared on the same platform with Senator Muskie. A few minor disturbances erupted in some areas, but overall the Earth Day rallies were peaceful and attained their general objective, the calling of attention to environmental problems. Senator Muskie, who learned that the FBI covered the rally in Washington, was incensed that the FBI was involved. We had a poor defense and in this case, at least, it is doubtful that there was any legitimate Executive authority to have the FBI involved. In any event, it would appear that such requests should flow through channels, including the Department of Justice where possible, to assure that unreasonable and improper requests are made for investigative activity.

It is quite understandable that various staff members at the White House have assignments or projects to prepare reports on a wide variety of matters relating to the welfare of the country. It is also quite understandable that such individuals would turn to the FBI to develop information through investigative activity or from its files. However, the fact that the FBI has specific responsibilities and jurisdiction under the law may not be known to these staff members and in their ignorance of the situation they could ask us to engage in activity beyond the scope of our investigative authority.

Over a long period of time the FBI has disseminated information directly to the White House as it was developed when the information had a bearing on national defense or possible foreign policy planning. The White House has come to expect this kind of rapid dissemination. Much of the information disseminated has been of specific interest to the National Security Council of which the President, Vice President and high level members of his staff are members. Even though CIA has the basic responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 to coordinate all intelligence data relating to national defense, the nature of rapid changing situations makes it impractical to disseminate all important intelligence information to the National Security Council via CIA channels. It is not believed that the White House would sit still for the FBI cutting off dissemination on national security information.

NEED FOR CURRENT EXECUTIVE ORDER

Dissemination, however, is but the product of investigative activity. The question, then, is not to whom we should or should not disseminate, but rather when and when not should we investigate. All of which leads to the issue of what constitutes Executive or Presidential authority under the constituion, and how can such a determination be made? Granting that the President does have broad constitutional powers which he can exercise in the interest of national security, how can such power be conveyed to the FBI to cover possible gaps in our statutory authority? It is not believed that individual requests, particularly from lower level White House staff members, actually convey any power of inherent Executive authority, unless such requests may have originated from the President himself. What appears to be sorely needed, then, is a clear-cut memorandum of understanding - possibly in the form of a comprehensive Executive order or Presidential directive - outlining areas of investigative activity required and the investigative product needed by the Executive to fulfill his national security responsibilities.

DEVELOPMENT OF INVESTIGATIVE POLICIES

By examining our investigative policies and procedures over the years it can readily be seen that procedures adopted out of necessity, such as those developing out of the period preceding World War II, in time come to be accepted as gospel both within and outside the FBI. The intelligence-type investigations originally ordered because of circumstances existing in 1936 and even before, continued after World War II, and in reality became necessary again during the Korean War period. And although the actual basis of authority in 1949 and 1950 was not the same as in 1936, we evidently considered it the same and obviously the Department of Justice and White House did also. Even though the Congress provided legislative authority to investigate subversive acts, it appears that we did not feel that the type of investigations necessary could be conducted except under an authority which did not require collection and preservation of evidence with a view of eventual prosecution, but rather to gather information only for the purpose of determining the nature and extent of subversive activity.

This is not to imply that the statutes were not used. On the contrary, the statutes were used and a large number of top level Communist Party functionaries were convicted under the Smith Act, but we still conducted investigations based on what we considered to be authority under constitutional power of the President - investigations which Professor Elliff has called continuing investigative activity within a broad range of delegated authority. While this study has not gone into the procedures and policies developed by the FBI in connection with investigations relating to our Emergency Detention Program, various documents were examined and it is known that this program preceded the Emergency Detention Act, which was a part of the Internal Security Act of 1950. ? A great deal of investigative activity, dating back to the 1930's, was conducted concerning the Security Index, an integral part of the Emergency Detention Program. As a matter of interest, the Emergency Detention Program, which was a program devised to insure that individuals constituting a threat to national security would be arrested and detained in the event of a national emergency. The Department at one point felt that the constitutionality of such a program was highly questionable. However, the program was implemented and was in existence at the time the Internal Security Act of 1950 was passed.

And most curiously of all is the fact that even after the Internal Security Act of 1950 became law, providing a legal basis for the program in existence, it was not until the 1960's that our Emergency Detention Program was switched over from an emergency plan under Presidential powers to the authority vested by statute. Of course, the part of the Internal Security Act authorizing emergency apprehension and detention was repealed in October, 1971. Under the Emergency Detention Program, while it existed, a great deal of continuing investigative activity was conducted concerning thousands of individuals who were believed to represent a threat to the national security in time of national emergency. Some of our investigative practices today are based on criteria authority growing out of the original Emergency Detention Program.

Now this is not to say that the FBI is in a position of having to defend its investigative policies or practices. If there has been but a single thread of continuity running through our investigative practices and procedures over the years it is that the individual's constitutional rights are paramount; that nothing is so important as a citizen's rights under the law. Legal Counsel pointed out an extremely important point last year at the time of the Princeton Conference where a group of FBI critics gathered to expose the FBI's faults. He noted that for years preceding the Miranda decision and the Escobedo decision the FBI had been warning persons of their rights prior to taking any kind of statement. Every Special Agent knows that the first and perhaps most important element in preparing for a prosecution is preserve the individual's rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

The FBI has legally conducted investigations of individuals and organizations whose philosophies include the overthrow or destruction of the United States Government by force or violence. Whether conducted under a Presidential order or statutory authority any such investigations were absolutely necessary and continue to be so. For administrative reasons documents reporting results of investigations often have not always clearly shown the authority, statutory or otherwise. A caption has usually been used for routing and supervisory purposes which is not clearly indicative of the nature or purpose of the investigative activity. Such captions might well be confusing to one not connected with the FBI and they might well lead to the conclusion that investigation was not based on any legal authority. For example, the caption "Security Matter - Miscellaneous" or "Internal Security - Revolutionary Activity" means little to someone outside the FBI. To those in the Domestic Intelligence Divison such designations identify the type of case and supervising unit at Headquarters.

In other words, there has been nothing wrong with the conduct of our investigations. Only those deserving of investigation under statutory provisions have been investigated. While we would have been more precise to predicate our investigations on a specific authority, whether statutory or Executive order (10450), we have not engaged in extra-legal investigative activity simply because we failed to cite any specific authority to conduct the investigation in such a way as to make it a "closed end" investigation such as Professor Elliff described.

PREVENTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

While there has been some disagreement by one or two supervisory personnel in Domestic Intelligence Division as to how long an investigation may be carried on under statutory authority or whether a "preventive" investigation can be carried on under that authority, it is my own contention that intelligence-type investigations can be carried out under statutory authority; that there is no constraint imposed by law governing the length of time in which an investigation can be conducted. There are many reasons why continuing investigative activity would be necessary, even when a statutory violation is involved. In most cases involving the national security a conspiracy of some sort is involved. Conspiracies frequently go on for years. When the preservation of the Government is involved, who is to say that we either prove a conspiracy within a specific period of time or stop investigating.

Whether a conspiracy is evident or not, the FBI would not open an investigation of any type unless information was first received that a violation of Federal law was involved or that the national security was threatened. This is how our so-called intelligence-type investigations are usually started. A citizen, an informant, or a law enforcement officer furnishes information that there is a group in existence which includes in its philosophy an advocacy of overthrow or destruction of the Government of the United States by force or violence. It would appear to be entirely logical that under at least three separate Federal statutes a violation would occur if this group did attempt to overthrow the Government. And the Supreme Court has said that the Government does not have to wait until the putsch is about to be executed and that proof that success or probability of success must be shown.

While the examples cited hereafter might not be good legal analogy, there does not seem to be any reason why the preservation of our Government warrants any less consideration under the law. The courts have upheld cases, such as have been developed in the Washington, D. C., metropolitan area, where a nearby jurisdiction, which prohibits importation of liquor from Washington, sets up a surveillance near the larger purveyors of liquor. When a car bearing Virginia or Maryland license plates is observed to be loading up what is obvioulsy more liquor than can be imported into these states, a surveillance is instituted and when the person drives across the state line he is arrested and charged with violation of state liquor laws. It can be argued that such is possible only because of the broad police powers delegated to the states by the Constitution. Perhaps. But under the same Constitution it would appear that somewhere there is a rationale that if a statute exists prohibiting the overthrow or destruction of our Government, the Government should have the same degree of power to see that persons do not overthrow it.

But the same problem exists in many areas covered by Federal statute. In the narcotics field tremendous intelligence programs are in existence to stop the spiraling increase in drug addiction and traffic in narcotics by organized crime. Even broader intelligence programs are being planned. It is true that violations are occurring. And some arrests are being made as the result of excellent police work following the violations. But the Government is also concerned with preventing drugs from even getting into the United States, and from preventing any that do get here from being sold to our children. So, we are conducting preventive investigations in the narcotics field. We are conducting intelligence-type investigations. Certainly prosecutions will be sought wherever possible, but we are conducting the same type of investigations in the narcotics area as we are in the field of national security. We are doing what has to be done, and the statutes are the basis of what has to be done.

In the field of organized crime we know that the Mafia and the Cosa Nostra have spread like a cancerous growth into the very economy of the Nation. Certainly there are violations of law. Statutes of some sort are usually involved. Many of the statutes involved are outside the primary investigative jurisdiction of the FBI. What has to be done? The individuals controlling the organizations of crime syndicates must be identified and the nature of their activity analyzed to see what - if any - Federal, or even local, crimes are being committed. In other words, we know that syndicated criminals are engaged in crime, yet we do not know exactly what crimes. We are therefore conducting intelligence-type investigations to first identify the criminal and then identify the crime. I fail to see why there isn't a parallel between intelligence-type investigations conducted to prevent criminal depredations on the public at large and the same kind of investigations to protect the Nation from the nihilists, anarchists, terrorists, revolutionaries and other subversives.

While drawing a parallel between criminal investigations and national security investigations, there is no intent here to show that both types of investigative activity can be or should be conducted alike. The two types of activity are as diametrically opposed as the two poles of the earth. One is concerned with the individuals and organizations which are involved purely for financial gain. The other is concerned with the individuals and organizations which are involved purely for ideological and philosophical reasons. There is a vast difference between the two. Intelligence-type investigations are necessary in the field of narcotics and other areas of organized crime and they are conducted without the need for any inherent Executive power being conveyed.

origin to the common-law concept of a sovereign's rights to protect itself to the 1939 et seq, directives and Executive Orders 9835 and 10450. Included in this group were (1) National Association of Black Students (NABS) which originally had as its stated purpose to serve as an information center and communications network for blacks on college campuses. This was in 1969. There was an enormous amount of violence and upheaval on college campuses at that time. Damage and injuries from arson, sabotage and malicious vandalism grew into the millions. In a number of instances black students were in the center of the activity. NABS was considered a potential source of danger during any major strife, particularly since the national coordinator of the group, Gwendolyn Marie Patton, had been a member of an extremist group cited as an extremist group by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The Black Panther Party and other revolutionary-type organizations attempted to organize and penetrate black student groups such as this.

(2) The Center for Black Education (CBE) came under investigation when its founder was determined to be a former member of the Black Panther Party and described as one of the leading black militants in San Francisco prior to his move to Washington, D. C. CBE has been publicly described as an educational institution designed to train technicians who will work to liberate the African people and develop the African world. The CBE has as its goal "the independence of the African People." Members have engaged in firearms training.

(3) The Drum and Spear Bookstore (DSB) in Washington, D. C., opened in 1968 and was publicly described as a retail bookstore having the largest collection of books about Africa, Asia, and the Negro in America. It also had protest literature and books concerning the socio-economic conditions in the U. S. It was determined through investigation that the bookstore was apparently not being used as a front for underground or subversive activity and investigation was closed.

(4) The Congress of African Peoples (CAP) was formed in 1970. It initially advocated the unification of all blacks, the complete rejection of the "white imperialist, capitalist system," the establishment of a black nation, the formation of a National African Party and ultimately a World African Party under the revolutionary ideology of Pan-Africanism.

During a CAP conference in July, 1971, CAP leaders vociferously advocated the need to engage in disruptions as a means of ending "acts detrimental to blacks," the formation of a paramilitary "defense unit," and the establishment of communication lines with other black revolutionary movements abroad. The CAP has established communication links with the Chinese communist diplomatic establishment in Canada.

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS AND CIVIL LIBERTY

One of the biggest distinctions between the criminal and security-type investigations is the fact that national security investigations, which involved the ideological factor, are almost without exception concerned with the concept of political ideology. No matter how radical the political ideology might be, it is nevertheless considered by the people involved - and often by many intellectual idealists - as a right guaranteed under the Constitution. As a result of a great deal of liberal thinking on the part of the civil libertarians and groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), there is a much greater hue and cry when intelligence-type investigations are surfaced and it developed that the purpose of the investigation had something to do with an individual's so-called political beliefs. The potential problem for the FBI in conducting purely intelligence-type investigations, even when based on statutes, is when the investigation broaches or gets real close to rights protected under the First and Fourth Amendments.

As pointed out before, however, the Supreme Court has emphatically stated that the President has no constitutional power to abridge these two Amendments. Therefore, no Executive order, no matter how broadly worded to convey investigative authority for intelligence-type investigations, could enable the FBI to avoid the same pitfalls regarding areas of activity covered by the First and Fourth Amendments. Therefore, even though a definitive Executive order would be desirable from the standpoint of fixing our responsibilities and bridging any gaps between statute and Executive necessity, the FBI would still be in a little better position than it is at the present time under purely statutory authority.

INTERPRETATION OF AUTHORITY BY SUBSTANTIVE SECTIONS

At this point it appears appropriate to introduce comments offered by representatives of the various substantive Sections of the Domestic Intelligence Division as to their interpretation of Executive power flowing from the 1939 et seq, directives and the types of investigative matters that possibly cannot be conducted solely under statutory authority.

EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION VIEWS

The Extremist Intelligence Section described four investigative matters where it appears that investigation, at least initially, would not or could not have been grounded in specific Federal statutes, but where the FBI nevertheless was in a sense fulfilling intelligence responsibility tracing its

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

It is believed that in at least three of the above-described situations the FBI would have been able to conduct investigatons based on statutes relating to advocacy of overthrow of the Government, seditious conspiracy, inciting to insurrection or rebellion, civil disorders, antiriot, neutrality laws (foreign relations) and perhaps sabotage. The questionable case, the Drum and Spear Bookstore, would have probably been brought adequately to our attention from various public sources or through our informant coverage of overall matters affecting the national security.

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION VIEWS

The Nationalities Intelligence Section listed four situations wherein, generally speaking, much of the FBI's investigative activity has not been based on statutory authority, but has been designed to develop intelligence data regarding individuals and organizations which have established themselves as a potential threat to the security and safety of the United States Government or its citizens. Listed are the following:

(1) The Jewish Defense League (JDL). Although involved in terror-type bombings covered by statute, FBI investigation of JDL is also developing information regarding future plans and activities, particularly violent acts against Soviet diplomats and diplomatic establishments and pro-Soviet groups and individuals. In the case of JDL, Department of State has a specific interest from the standpoint of U.S. relations with other countries. Certain of our intelligence-type investigations of JDL are aimed at satisfying State Department requirements.

(2) Al Fatah and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine are two organizations that are well known for violence potential. In light of statements and actions of members and leaders, it is obvious that the FBI should conduct intelligence investigations when these organizations are active in the U.S.

(3) Revolutionary Union and Venceremos Organization are two groups which adhere to a pro-Chinese communist political philosophy and pledge overt action through use of weapons to bring about revolution in this country. With this in mind, we have undertaken intelligence-type investigations to identify those involved who may be responsible for carrying out violence directed against the U. S. Government or the citizens of this country.

(4) Puerto Rican independence groups, specifically those who seek to bring about independent status for Puerto Rico by means of force and violence, are the subject of intelligence-type investigations. No groups seeking independence of Puerto Rico by lawful means are investigated. The violence-prone groups have committed acts ranging from attempted assassination of the President, accompanied by murder, to acts of terrorism involving bombing, arson, and shootings. Much of the violence-prone groups' activity is planned in communist Cuba. Many of the leaders of the violent pro-independence groups are communists or followers of Leninist-Marxist philosophy.

Nationalities Intelligence Section is of the opinion that the aims and activities of the above-mentioned groups and similar organizations border on statutory violations; that while we do not rely on statutory prohibitions for authority to investigate them, it must be recognized that the reason investigations are initiated closely approaches the elements involved in conspiracy violations. Nationalities Intelligence Section opines that if we must look toward actual written authority for this kind of investigation, it appears we must rely on the Executive order (directive?) dated September 6, 1939, and subsequent reaffirmations of that order, noting that the 1939 directive and later supporting directives were published at a time when this country was involved in armed hostilities abroad.

Nationalities Intelligence Section observed that it appears necessary at this time to seek a properly worded Executive order which clearly sets forth the desires of the President in his capacity as the chief administrator of our country. Such an order should carefully distinguish between acts which are clearly opposed to the constitutional basis under which we operate and those which, no matter how unpopular, are nothing more than an expression of ideas. Finally, Nationalities Intelligence suggests that detailed guidelines from the Attorney General should be issued, based on the Executive order or directive.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

While I agree completely with the suggestion that a detailed Presidential order is needed, along with guildelines issued by the Attorney General, I disagree that we cannot investigate the violence-prone Puerto Ricans and the Revolutionary Union and its spin-off, the Venceremos Organization, under existing statutes. I feel also that all we need to cover the JDL and the Arab terrorists like a blanket is a request from the Secretary of State to the Attorney General under the statutory authority relating to foreign relations which has previously been described herein and in accordance with Title 28, USC 533, set forth in the exhibit accompanying this study. Some additional authority is also present, at least for the time being, in Executive Order 10450 (based on Executive Order 9835). Additionally, there is authority, particularly with respect to JDL, under statute having to do with assaulting foreign diplomats.

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION VIEWS

The Internal Security Section pointed out that the security investigations supervised within that Section are conducted within the purview of authority set out in original position paper of the Domestic Intelligence Divison dated May 19, 1972, entitled "Investigations of Subversion," which paper was to have been discussed during meeting of the Bureau's Executive Staff with Mr. Gray at Quantico the last week of May. The position paper was abandoned by Mr. Miller in favor of a different position, the essence of which has been expressed heretofore in this study.

The authority referred to by Internal Security Section essentially is based on both statutory and Presidential documents, including the 1939, et seq, directives. Internal Security pointed out that it should be stated at the outset that while FBI investigations conducted with specific reference to a statute will develop some intelligence it is not possible to base all FBI activities in the collection of intelligence on statutory authority alone. Internal Security further points out that it is true that the initial Presidential directive(s) of 1939 picked up the term "subversive activities" as incidental to their primary thrust, but that it is just as true that President Truman's directive of July 24, 1950, however intentional or unintentional it may have been specifically stated, said that the FBI had charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters. Internal Security feels that whether or not the initial Presidential directives fully embraced the concept of subversive activities would appear irrelevant after such a definitive order signed by Truman. Internal Security Section is of the opinion that whether we had it spelled out beforehand is unimportant because obviously Truman's order of July 24, 1950, made our investigative interest in subversive activities valid at that time.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

Without going into detailed rebuttal here, the Truman directive is discussed in detail heretofore, it must be reiterated that Truman's directive contained a misstatement of fact concerning the previous directives, and I feel that under the magnification of a critical analysis of the Truman directive, particularly by individuals unsympathetic to the FBI, we cannot glibly state that whatever the intention or unintention may have been, Truman signed the order and therefore it made everything fine.

VIEWS CONTINUED

The Internal Security Section believes that reliance on statutory authority alone for the collection of intelligence would severely limit the scope of FBI activities to the detriment of our national security. They feel that a statutory basis must impose reasonable and definable limits and for the most part investigations conducted with regard to statute are "closed end" type. Internal Security points out that we investigate violations or allegations of violations; that we do not investigate indefinitely on the supposition or speculation that by "fishing" we may find somebody who violates a Federal law. Internal Security notes that such a concept is repugnant to the democratic process and clearly indicates a police state mentality. They go on to point out that on the other hand it is also clear that there are some areas -- particularly where the integrity of the Government is at stake -- where we must conduct intelligence-type investigations to detect conspiracies and actual attempts which go to the very heart of the Government's existence.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

Here, again, I must interject with a point of rebuttal. As pointed out before, I feel that investigation under statutory or other legal authority does not require the so-called "closed end" type of investigation in every case. But the most important point I want to bring out is that I cannot see the logic of saying that investigations based on the possibility of violations to destroy the Government (intelligence investigations actually) are repugnant to the democratic process when performed under statutes forbidding such activity and are indicative of a police state mentality, whereas there is nothing repugnant, nothing wrong with conduct the same type of investigations under some nonspecific Presidential power to protect the integrity of the Government. I personally, as a citizen, would rather have a system wherein I could not be investigated unless there was some indication that I was planning to violate the law, or had already done so. As a law-abiding citizen I have no fear of intelligence-type investigations aimed at discovering plots to violate the law. I would have fear of a government system which permitted intelligence investigations based on someone's - anyone's, Presidential or otherwise - interpretation of what an individual may say, do or think. The law is a guideline and states clearly what I may do or not do. Vague interpretations subject to the caprices of undisciplined politicians could result in a virtual police state if the law is not the basis of our investigative activity.

VIEWS CONTINUED

Internal Security Section recognizes that our investigations are conducted under both the authority conferred under Executive orders (10450) and statutes and notes that as a practical matter the statutory provisions cited as a basis for intelligence-type investigative authority must bear a reasonable relationship to the activity investigated and must be brought to a logical conclusion within a reasonable period of time. They also point out that it would be extremely difficult to justify continued investigative interest in a mere member of the Communist Party on the basis of the Smith Act or the Internal Security Act of 1950. It is further pointed out that this points up again the necessity for reliance not only on statutory authority but for the broader intelligence-type authority conferred by Presidentail directives and Executive orders.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES SECTION VIEWS

The Revolutionary Activities Section furnished several specific examples of work of that Section which does not fall within the purview of existing Federal statutes. Included in those examples are the following:

(1) Students for a Democratic Society/Worker Student Alliance (SDS/WSA) is the largest faction of SDS in existence at the present time. It has an estimated membership of 750 members. This group is described as a revolutionary, predominantly campus-based organization dominated and controlled by the communist Progressive Labor Party. The group has engaged in recent widespread anti-Government demonstrations throughout the country which have led to numerous arrests, property damage, and injuries to law enforcement officers. Major purpose of our investigation of SDS/WSA is to obtain intelligence data in order to have a day-to-day appraisal of the strength, dangerousness, and activities of the organization and to keep the Department of Justice and other interested agencies advised.

Revolutionary Activities Section states that authority for investigation of SDS/WSA is based on Executive Order 10450, but that additional authority is derived from Presidential directives dating from September 6, 1939, 28 Code of Federal Regulations 0.85 (d) cites FBI authority to carry out Presidential directives. They also note that "inherent" responsibility of the President derived from the Constitution to "insure domestic tranquility," (Preamble) to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," (Article II, Section 3) and to protect the states against invasion and domestic violence (Article IV, Section 4) provide power to the President.

(2) The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is the international Trotskyist movement founded in the 1920's when Leon Trotsky lost out in a power struggle to Joseph Stalin for control of the international communist movement. The basic philosophy of the SWP is that only violent revolution can destroy capitalism; that all political groups other than their own are counterrevolutionary and must be destroyed. We rely on Executive Order 10450 for investigative authority.

(3) The Venceremos Brigade consists of a loosely knit group of over 1500 individuals who have travelled to Cuba in separate contingents since November, 1969. Positive information has been developed that the organization is being used by various hostile intelligence services for spotting purposes and recruitment of intelligence agents and support personnel. The group is under investigation because it appears to be under the control and domination of a hostile power.

Revolutionary Activities Section states that Presidential directives (supposedly the 1939, et seq directives) have given the FBI responsibility to investigate matters relating to the internal security of the country. They point out that after the first contingent returned to the U.S. in February, 1970, the White House (nonspecific) instructed the Director to conduct an intensive investigation of the group to determine the extent of indoctrination afforded these individuals while in Cuba and to assess their potential dangerousness to the country. In addition, the Department of Justice has requested information to support indicia that members of various contingents have been trained as espionage and intelligence agents for the Cubans and North Koreans and may be operating as such in the U.S.

(4) Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) is a revoluationary antiwar group currently of major concern in view of its potential for violence. The organization is made up of many Vietnam war veterans who have advanced training in explosives and weapons and many have records of narcotics use. One VVAW national coordinator stockpiled arms and ammunition and advocated "political elimination squads." Revolutionary Activities Section relies on the Presidential directives (1939 et seq) and Executive Order 10450 as a basis for investigation in the absence of specific statutory authority.

(5) Weatherman is the name adopted by a group which is a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Government through force and violence. A number of Weatherman leaders are current Bureau fugitives in connection with violations of Federal antiriot laws, Bombing and Gun Law statutes, as well as the Fugitive Felon Act. Revolutionary Activities Section cites as specific authority for investigation

of the Weatherman organization that Presidential directives have instructed the FBI to take charge of investigative work relating to espionage, sabotage and subversive activities and that Executive Order 10450 provides additional authority.

(6) Unaffiliated individuals who are a part of the New Left Movement. Revolutionary Activities Section notes that although the New Left Movement has no definable ideology of its own, it does have strong Marxist, existentialist, nihilist and anarchist overtones. In some instances there are individuals without any organizational affiliation who by their revolutionary activities and statements, establishing a rejection of law and order, reveal the individual to be a potential threat to the security of the U.S. Such individuals do, in fact, engage in violence or unlawful activities and their potential dangerousness to the internal security is clearly demonstrated by their statements, conduct and actions. According to Revolutionary Activities Section, specific authority to conduct our investigations of unaffiliated individuals is derived from Presidential directives of September 6, 1939, through December 15, 1953.

This Section states that in all these examples there is a likelihood that evidence may be developed at some future date that activities of these organizations and individuals constitute violations of specific statutes. It is further stated that our authority to conduct investigations in these cases cannot be based on the speculation that evidence of some violation might be developed; however, until such time as we obtain a substantial allegation that a violation has occurred, we must base our "intelligence" investigations on the Presidential directives and Executive orders issued by the President delineating our responsibility in regard to national security.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

At the risk of being monotonous, there appears to be ample indication here that a great deal of statutory authority is present, but not being cited. The Smith Act of 1940 and other statutes dealing with the national security provide the basis for investigating all of these groups. The espionage statutes serve as basis for investigating the Venceremos Brigade. Certainly the authority conveyed by Executive Order 10450 is not questioned. And in the case of the Weatherman group, the Fugitive Felon Act gives us a tremendous latitude for conducting all the intelligence investigation we may need in an effort to locate the Weatherman fugitives.

OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Although the cold facts indicate that the Presidential directives dating back to 1939 do not convey any authority to the FBI which it did not have already by legislative enactment, it is obvious that intelligence-type investigations are necessary in the protection of the national security. Various documents emphasize the necessity for developing intelligence data. For example, the report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission, 1968) emphasized that law enforcement organizations must develop the means to obtain adequate intelligence for planning purposes and that law enforcement should "gather, evaluate, analyze and disseminate information on potential as well as actual civil disorders."

Similarly, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) took special note of the need for intelligence in effective law enforcement. The Commission stated in its report, "It is an undoubted fact that on some campuses there are men and women who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and sometimes to maim and kill." The report concluded that the best, and sometimes the only, means law enforcement has to thwart or prevent such plots is through "clandestine intelligence work."

A memorandum for the Director of the FBI from Attorney General Ramsey Clark, dated September 14, 1967, stated that "In view of the seriousness of the riot activity across the country, it is most important that you use the maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing on the question as to whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy by any group of whatever size, effectiveness, or affiliation, to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity."

The memorandum went on to state that "In this connection the following federal statutes could be applicable depending, of course, upon the factual situation that develops." Ten Federal statutes were then listed and it is particularly significant to note that the Attorney General was instructing that the FBI collect intelligence information - not on some specific allegation that a crime had been committed, but to determine whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy. In other words, the FBI was instructed by the Attorney General to conduct intelligence investigations to determine if any of the ten Federal laws might have been violated in connection with riot activity.

FORMER STUDY OF FBI'S INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

In an exhaustive study of the "role of the FBI in Clandestine Foreign Intelligence Collection in the United States," conducted and reported in a document dated April 29, 1966, by a committee more commonly referred to as the "Papich Committee" considerable information was brought out concerning the FBI's investigative authority. Of great interest is the impact the National Security Act of 1947 had on the gathering of intelligence in the United States. This Act, which is reported in 50 USC 401 et seq, established the National Security Council (NSC) and under it the Centeral Intelligence Agency (CIA). The legislative history of the Act notes the concern Congress had that CIA could develop into a gestapo if permitted to become operational in the U.S. James Forestal, then Secretary of the Navy, testified in a hearing before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, that "The purposes of the Central Intelligence Agency are limited definitely to purposes outside of this country, except collation of information gathered by other government agencies."

He went on to say, "Regarding domestic operations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is working at all times in collaboration with General Vandenberg (then head of CIA). He relies upon them for domestic activities." The Papich Committee study noted that there is tacit acknowledgement in Section 403 (e) of the National Security Act of 1947 that the FBI gathers information affecting the national security: "That upon the written request of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the FBI shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

The Papich Committee report reveals that there is ample indication that Congress was aware of FBI intelligence functions, particularly with respect to foreign intelligence activity in the U.S. The Executive Branch was obviously depending on the FBI to provide intelligence data which CIA, by law, could not collect in the U.S. A task force headed by General Mark Clark in 1955 took notice of the fact that the FBI dealt in security intelligence. The task force report cited the fact that the FBI was one of four members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), created by the National Secuirty Council, approved by the President, March 23, 1949, to coordinate "the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related matters affecting internal security."

It was noted that the IIC charter did not disturb responsibilities of its member agencies but made mandatory action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete investigative coverage in compliance with the needs of the IIC, which had full responsiblity for coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, etc., affecting internal security.

The task force mentioned above, in commenting on the role of the FBI, noted "The Federal Bureau of Investigation, however, is the recognized center of the domestic aspect of internal security including counterintelligence within the United States and its possessions." It is to be noted that this task force took cognizance of the fact that President Roosevelt as far back as 1939 had directed the FBI to coordinate and conduct domestic counterintelligence activities. (Underlined part taken from Papich Committee report and is not necessarily the actual language used in the task force report. In any event, we know this is a very broad interpretation of the 1939 directive.)

RECENT EXECUTIVE INTENT

Even more recently the White House exhibited its own understanding of the intelligence role and functions delegated to the Attorney General and the FBI. By confidential memorandum from the White House to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury and Commerce; the Attorney General; Director of CIA; Military Representative of the President; Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency; and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, dated June 9, 1962 (National Security Action Memorandum 161), President Kennedy stated that he would look to the Attorney General to take the initiative in the Government in insuring the development of plans, programs, and action proposals to protect the internal security of the United States. This memorandum directed that the two interdepartmental committees concerned with internal security -- the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (Chaired by J. Edgar Hoover) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Chaired by a representative of the Department of Justice) which had been under the supervision of the National Security Council, be transferred to the supervision of the Attorney General.

One of the greatest problems in conducting a study of this type is the location of pertinent documents and material which bear on the issues. We have located copies of the documents related primarily to the heart of this issue, our basic authority in the national security field - namely, the Presidential directives and Executive orders which we have cited in addition to statutes as being our sources of authority - but there may be other very pertinent documents bearing on the Executive intent to have the FBI conduct intelligence-type investigations. A good example is evidence used by the Papich Committee, but not found during this study, which shows that President Roosevelt called a White House conference on May 9, 1934, attended by the Attorney General, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Labor, Director of FBI, and Chief of the U. S. Secret Service to deal with the problem of growth of fascist organizations in the United States. The conference agreed that there should be an investigation of these groups and their activities for intelligence purposes. Since the only Federal law believed applicable at the time was the Immigration Law, the President decided that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service should confer with the Chief of Secret Service and the Director of FBI to work out details of the investigation.

Mr. Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI personnel to conduct an intensive investigation of the Nazi movement. This, evidently, was the first general intelligence investigation made by the Government into fascist activities in this country. But note that this general intelligence investigation was based in law, namely the Immigration Law. We have here an example of the exercise of inherent Executive power tempered by the fact that the Presidential desire for intelligence investigations would be implemented because there was a statute covering the situation. Basically, the same applies to the 1936 arrangement between the President, the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of State. The law permitting the Secretary of State to request the Attorney General to investigate certain matters was the legal basis for the subsequent FBI investigations.

CONCLUSIONS

In summary and conclusion, it is believed that the facts clearly show that while there is a labyrinth of conflicting information and opinions concerning the FBI's authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations in the national security field, there are a few basic points requiring clarification. It is believed that we must first sweep away the myth that the FBI now has any investigative authority based on the Presidential directives dating from 1939, and that any investigative responsibility we derived from those directives is so outdated as to be very questionable if not entirely void. This is, of course, taking into consideration the national situation at the time the directives were individually issued.

Secondly, it is believed that the FBI does have a valid reason to conduct intelligence-type investigations based on the fact that there are laws prohibiting all the various types of subversion truly affecting the national security and that the Government has the right to protect itself from destruction by conducting whatever preventive or intelligence-type investigations are necessary to see that individuals and organizations do not do those things, in violation of the law, which could threaten the national security. Preventive or intelligence-type investigations would include the use of confidential informants and sources of information, the calling on law enforcement officers and patriotic citizens and organizations to furnish all information concerning subversion to the FBI, the collection of overt intelligence data from publications and other public source material, including congressional hearings, and the full scale investigation of allegations received from all sources.

Our intelligence-type investigations, however, should meticulously adhere to guidelines which would clearly prohibit any intrusion or abridgement of an individual's rights guaranteed under the Constitution, particularly the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments. To assure that the proper guidelines are drawn we should request the Department of Justice to issue them and then afford the closest possible supervision of investigation, both in the field and at Headquarters to see that our intelligence investigations are kept within these guidelines. The voicing of this need does not indict our existing guidelines or careful supervision, but merely recommends that our responsibilities be described and, where necessary, circumscribed by the Attorney General whose duty under the law is to supervise our activity.

It appears that the most effective means of laying to rest the persistent complaints of various critics that the FBI engages in political surveillance (investigations) in violation of First and Fourth Amendment rights is to have definitive legislative enactment carefully state what the FBI must do to protect the national security. Such could be resolution or statute, but should cover in complete detail what acts should be investigated by the FBI, and, in particular, that the FBI must conduct preventive or intelligence-type investigations to protect the national security.

Under the political climate existing in the country today, however, the passage of either a statute or a resolution of the type needed is very remote. Because of the misconceptions and misapprehensions surrounding investigations relating to subversion, there is an atmosphere of suspicion in congressional circles that would likely stifle any attempt to formulate any such legislation at this time. We should, however, recommend to the Department that consideration be given immediately to sponsoring some comprehensive legislative enactment along the lines needed.

In the meantime, for the benefit of the FBI, the Department of Justice and the rest of the Executive Branch of Government, including the staff at the White House, it appears that the next best thing is to have a comprehensive Executive order issued, under the inherent Executive power, outlining exactly what responsibilities the FBI has in the protection of the national security and in furnishing the President the data he needs to fulfill his responsibilities under the Constitution.

To be effective such Executive order would have to clearly define the FBI's intelligence collection responsibilities and would necessarily have to contain language which would satisfy the courts that First and Fourth Amendment rights are not being abrogated in any manner. Language in such an order would ideally follow the basic language and purposes of Executive Order 11605, since this deals with virtually every type of subversive activity confronting the country today.

It is finally concluded that this study has shown that the FBI has in the past conducted no intelligence-type investigations which were not permissible under the law, particularly under the concept that intelligence-type or preventive-type investigations are lawful when the product and purpose of the investigation is to prevent a violation of a statute. It is believed, however, that every area of our national security investigations should be reviewed for the purpose of determining what additional constitutional safeguards should be considered. This is particularly true in light of the fact that much of our investigative activity in the past was geared to the Emergency Detention Act, which was repealed in October, 1971. We should make absolutely certain, for example, that the procedures adopted in setting up our Administrative Index, following repeal of the Emergency Detention Act, are not being used to circumvent the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act. In this regard, it is to be noted that a detailed study of the Administrative Index has been underway and is almost complete as of this date.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That upon completion of a final draft of the study dealing with this matter, a letter to the Department be prepared containing the essence of this study, pointing out our findings and requesting (a) The Department's opinion concerning our findings, particularly directives discussed herein; (b) The Department's opinion concerning the legality of intelligence-type or preventive-type investigations based on existing statutes; (c) Requesting the Department to issue comprehensive investigative guidelines for future investigations of the intelligence or preventive type; (d) Requesting the Department to sponsor comprehensive legislation spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of intelligence information relating to the national security; and (e) Requesting the Department to seek a comprehensive Executive order which would cover any possible gaps between statutory authority and Executive necessity in protection of the national security.

2. That a penetrative study be completed at the earliest possible date concerning all our current national security investigative guidelines to insure that every possible safeguard is in effect to protect the individual's rights

protected by the constitution; that the current study of procedures relating to the Administrative Index specifically determine if any procedures are in effect which could be interpreted as a means to circumvent repeal of the Emergency Detention Act.

THOMAS J. SMITH
CHIEF, RESEARCH SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: [illegible]ONS ON REVERSE [illegible]ETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/4/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum advising SSC that a document it desires is available for review only at FBI Headquarters.

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 3/19/75, Part I, Legal Authorities.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*
U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Authorities - legal
Intelligence activities, domestic

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-2000 BY SP2AIM
MDR-16

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Memorandum advises that in response to SSC request for an FBI position paper dated 7/31/72, discussing the "Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations," the paper is being made available for review only at FBI Headquarters and with further condition that no notes be taken during this initial review.

UOC

5/8

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:1hb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 LES

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. __
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : MR. WANNALL

DATE: 6/2/75

FROM : H. N. BASSETT

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

In response to the Church Committee's request for Inspection Division guidelines used for inspecting field offices and divisions (item #7, Appendix B of Senator Church's letter to the Attorney General dated 5/14/75), this Division has no objection to a review of the field and headquarters inspection manuals by Members of Committee Staff, provided the review is conducted in FBI space with an Inspection Division representative present.

1 - Mr. Wannall (Mr. Cregar)
1 - Bufile 62-116395

FBG:wmj
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2000 BY

REC-100

62-116395-275

17 JUN 27 1975

84 JUN 27 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 5/29/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum recommends that Bureau space be provided Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff for review of Bureau material and interviews of Bureau employees.

SSC Staff is in a phase of its inquiry concerning Bureau operations which includes (1) review of considerable FBI material (sections of manuals, forms, SAC memoranda, etc.); (2) interviews of Bureau employees; and (3) briefing of Staff members by Bureau officials and supervisors. For many very sound reasons it would be to the Bureau's distinct advantage to provide limited, but suitable space within the J. Edgar Hoover Building to the SSC Staff. Because we have been able to obtain the Staff's agreement to review much of our material at FBIHQ, rather than its insistence on turning the material over to the Staff, we are in a position of insuring the security of our material by maintaining it in our space at all times. Also, by having the SSC Staff conduct its review of the material in our space, we can have personnel readily available to answer their inquiries, thus precluding the necessity for preparing otherwise needless correspondence and eliminating the necessity for having our personnel present throughout their reviews if they took place elsewhere. Further, from a psychological standpoint, it is to our advantage that our employees be interviewed in our space rather than in SSC offices. Finally, space made available to SSC Staff will also provide a desirable site for the various briefings our people are giving to them. It should be noted that the providing of the space which this memorandum recommends is similar to what we have already done for the General Accounting Office in connection with its audit of our operations.

62-116395

REC-100 62-116395-274

SFP:mjg
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJP
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

JUN ~~24~~ 27 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

Handled 6/20/75 Jee

Space required should be sufficient to accommodate three desks and three chairs plus two or three file cabinets; and including the necessary desks, chairs and cabinets. Space should approximate that currently used to accommodate Section Chief's offices in the INTD.

Because the SSC Staff has already commenced some of its review of Bureau material and has already engaged in some briefings, it is essential that urgent attention be given this request. INTD has already surveyed its space and would be unable to accommodate the need involved.

ACTION:

Upon approval, Administrative Division will immediately take necessary steps to provide for the necessary space and equipment described above.

WRW

Div 5 has located space in their area. Work to be added by GSA
6/11/75

We have initiated space survey to see if there is any space at all we could free up for this purpose.
EW 6/2

OK

- 2 -

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-J.B.Hotis)
(1-Mr.P.V.Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

TO :MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 27, 1975

FROM :MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

INFORMATION CONTAINED
IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting* between Mr. John Elliff, Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff, who is in charge of the task force looking into the FBI, and Messrs. Wannall, Leavitt, Branigan, and Cregar. Purpose of the meeting was to acquaint Elliff with the work of the Counterintelligence Branch in the Intelligence Division.

House Select Committee (HSC)

Elliff advised that the SSC is concerned with how the HSC plans to conduct its probe of the intelligence community. He anticipates HSC may hold hearings very shortly and possibly prior to the time the SSC gets underway. At the present time, Elliff knows of no agreement or plans to provide the HSC with copies of intelligence community documents the SSC has been furnished.

Department of Justice

According to Elliff, Kevin T. Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, has agreed to allow Staff Members of the SSC to review the Department's file on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (this was a Committee chaired by the Department and evolved from one of the recommendations set out in the "Houston Plan." During its existence the Bureau had several representatives assigned to the IEC).

Mr. Maroney has also advised the SSC Staff that in the 1966-67 period the Department of Justice did an extensive study on the legal authority for the conduct of electronic surveillances. Elliff was quite pleased that the Justice Department planned to make this study available for review by Staff Members of the SSC in the Department's Building and expressed the hope that the Bureau would also see fit to allow Staff Members to review research and studies the Bureau might have conducted in the area of sensitive investigative techniques.

OCT 12 2000
LASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

62-116395
WOC:ekw (9)

*5/22/75

REC-100 62-116395-273

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

17 JUN 27 1975

84 JUN 27 1975

Sensitive Investigative Techniques

Mr. Elliff felt that much could be accomplished in responding to the SSC request of 5/14/75 if the Bureau could pull together the basic FBI documents delineating our legal authority to engage in the following investigative techniques.

(1) Electronic surveillances, including consensual electronic surveillances; (2) all forms of mail surveillances including covers and openings; (3) physical surveillances including Special Agent (SA) infiltration of target groups; photography and remote viewing and sensing devices (laser beams); (4) surreptitious entries; (5) incommunicado interrogations; and (6) bank credit, and other personal information.

It was Elliff's opinion that if the Committee could be allowed to review the legal authority for such surveillances along with the documents showing how the decision-making process worked in instituting, approving and discontinuing such operations, much of the misunderstandings some members of the Committee have would be clarified. Elliff also felt a detailed briefing of the Committee with whatever limitations the Bureau desired to place on the number and level of those to be briefed would be extremely helpful in assisting the Committee in developing some authority for the FBI to legally engage in such sensitive activities in the future.

Three Top Priority Items of the SSC

Elliff advised that in his judgment the three top priority items of the SSC regarding the FBI are as follows. (1) Develop legislation to clearly delineate the Bureau's jurisdictional authority in the security and counterintelligence field. (2) Provide the Bureau with some authoritative basis, either statutory or otherwise, to engage in certain counterintelligence activities, i.e., surreptitious entry, electronic surveillances, incommunicado interviews, in national security cases when the need for such activity has been clearly established. (3) To improve the coordination between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community.

Elliff was questioned about the reason for the third priority. He responded by noting that one President (Nixon) had stated that in 1970 there was a breakdown in the relations between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community. Elliff was informed that this was not so, that the discontinuance of a formal liaison relationship with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and subsequently the rest of the intelligence community in 1970 did not mean that there was a breakdown in coordination. Elliff asked why the Bureau discontinued a formal liaison relationship with CIA in early 1970. We briefly reviewed for Elliff the Thomas Riha case pointing out that Mr. Kelley had personally caused a review of that case in an effort to determine whether it, in fact, was the reason for the discontinuance of our liaison relationship with the CIA. Elliff was informed that this was the case. In addition, we discussed with Elliff the 1966 understanding between CIA and the FBI and made it quite clear to him that we felt the relationship with not only CIA but the entire intelligence community was excellent.

Other Matters of Interest

During the course of the briefing, Elliff was shown charts depicting the inordinate increase of Sino-Soviet bloc official presence in the U. S. from 1959 through January, 1975, the growth of the presence of foreign hostile intelligence officials in the U. S. during this same period compared with the static number of SAs we had working against this threat during this same period. Elliff was concerned over the fact that the presence of Sino-Soviet bloc officials as well as the intelligence officers increased substantially while the number of SAs dedicated to counterintelligence investigations remained static. He wondered why this was so. Elliff was advised that it was a question of manpower and priorities. He was told that during the 1959-1975 period there was a considerable demand for the use of SA personnel in the fields of organized crime, civil rights, & ghetto riots. In addition, during that period of time additional investigative responsibilities were placed upon the FBI by virtue of new legislation.

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

Elliff was also interested in knowing whether our legal attaches were operational in the counterintelligence field. He was advised they were not. Elliff also asked whether CIA made available to the FBI their latest technical developments. He was advised that we believed they did.

Finally, Elliff desired to know whether the FBI had received any documents from another Government agency (CIA) wherein the Bureau was requested to surreptitiously enter the Chilean Embassy in Washington, D. C. (S) He was advised that this would have to be researched and that we would be in touch with him on this particular subject.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) We have already begun to examine the material asked for regarding the FBI's legal authority and implication of sensitive investigative techniques. Once examined and analyzed, we will submit recommendations as to how we should proceed taking into consideration the observations and suggestions of Elliff.

(2) We are pulling together the documents regarding the Chilean Embassy episode (S) and with approval will suggest Elliff submit his specific request in writing through the AG.

Elliff advised by SA Daly 6/16/75 wob

K

wrw

PLR

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: June 17, 1975

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Reference is made to memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated June 10, 1975, captioned as above, (copy attached) wherein it was recommended and approved that representatives of the Intelligence Division meet with Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, for the purpose of briefing him concerning the contents of a Bureau letter to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President at the White House, dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed at the Request of the White House."

By way of background, the Senate Select Committee (SSC) has requested certain documents and information relating to the so-called "Kissinger 17." Some of this information has already been prepared and furnished to O'Connor with the caveats that the Government has not publicly admitted to 15 of the coverages involved and some material relating to the remaining two has been impounded by court order due to pending civil suits. The decision was left to the Department as to whether or not material prepared in response to SSC requests should be made available to that Committee. Mr. O'Connor on June 9, 1975, requested of Assistant Director John Mintz a briefing as to the contents of the above July 23, 1974, letter which he believed summarized information available to the Bureau concerning the 17 wire taps.

On June 17, 1975, Special Agents John W. Dalseg and Thomas J. McNiff met with Mr. William O'Connor and the latter's assistant, Michael T. Shaheen, in the office of Mr. O'Connor. After a briefing on the contents of the July 23, 1974, letter Mr. O'Connor concluded that information contained in that letter and its enclosures is too sketchy to enable a knowledgeable determination be made as to whether or not requested material should be released to SSC. Mr. O'Connor stated he believed such a determination could only be made after a review of the entire file relating to the

65-75085

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Enclosure

REC-102

62-116395-272

62-116395

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

17 JUN 26 1975

1 - 65-75085

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/10/82 BY 7858 se/ble/mde

Comp# 87,082

TJM:dmt
(8)

84 JUN 26 1975

"Kissinger 17" and he stated his office would, in the near future, prepare a letter to the Director similarly requesting that Mr. Shaheen or some other designated representative of his staff be granted authority to review the Bureau file concerning the matter in question.

OBSERVATIONS:

During the above conversation Mr. O'Connor appeared to be primarily interested in the completeness of the Bureau file with regard to matters relating to the "Kissinger 17" and to what degree information in this file had been made public. It was explained to Mr. O'Connor, who appeared knowledgeable concerning the history of these documents, that this file contains all communications known to be in existence concerning the "Kissinger 17," but no one can state with certainty, due to the manner in which this material was handled at the specific request of the White House, that the file contains all communications prepared in this matter. With regard to publicity afforded these documents, Mr. O'Connor stated he is familiar with the documents which had been made available to the Department for referral to various Committees and he is familiar with excised versions of these documents which had been published by these Committees. He indicated that the Department's present problem is that no record has been located in the Department to date as to just which material or in what form such material furnished by the Bureau to the Department was subsequently turned over to the Committees by the Department. O'Connor stated it could be embarrassing at this time to make available to the SSC material which had not previously been made available to the Congressional Committees and equally embarrassing to withhold from the SSC material which was previously furnished Congressional Committees.

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

Ews

TJM

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION TJM:lhb 6/19/75

In anticipation of Department's request cited in instant memorandum to review Bureau files concerning the so-called "Kissinger 17," Special Agent (SA) Robert F. Peterson, Office of Legal Counsel, on 6/18/75 contacted Department Attorney Edward Christenbury, who is handling the Halperin Civil Suit, to determine if the United States District Court's (USDC) impoundment would prevent this Bureau making available this file to representatives of the Department. Christenbury, late 6/18/75, advised SA Peterson that he, Christenbury, had contacted plaintiff's (Halperin) attorney, who advised he had no objection to this file being made available to a Department representative for review. Christenbury then attempted to contact USDC Judge John Lewis Smith, who issued the impoundment order in this matter. Christenbury spoke to Judge Smith's law clerk, who advised that in view of the position taken by plaintiff's attorney, he did not believe that Judge Smith would interpose any objection to the Department's anticipated request. The law clerk stated, however, that he would contact Judge Smith at the earliest opportunity to obtain a ruling and would advise Christenbury of the results.

You will be advised of the results when received.

TJM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps. Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(7)

WRW/TM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Comp# 87,082
DATE 5/10/82 BY 2858-SR/dc/mdc

62-116395-272

Phillips

ENCLOSURE

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-18-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

By memo dated 6-10-75, you were advised that K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, requested he be allowed to review a summary prepared concerning the so called "Kissinger 17" wiretaps since the Senate Select Committe had included a request for information concerning them in their letter of May 14, 1975. Mr. O'Connor and his Deputy, Michael Shaheen, reviewed the summaries.

At Mr. O'Connor's request, a conference was held with Messrs O'Connor and Shaheen and SA Robert Peterson, SA Paul V. Daly, Inspector John B. Hotis, and Assistant Director John A. Mintz, present to discuss the SSC request for documents concerning the "Kissinger 17" wiretaps and his concern that the furnishing of such documents might adversely impact on existing litigation involving the Bureau, and may subject the Bureau to additional lawsuits. Most of the documents in question are also under a protective order of the Court in the Halperin Case and therefore, a release must be orchestrated with the Court. Mr. O'Connor suggested that a summary of existing summaries of these wiretaps be prepared by the Department and with the acquiescence of the Court which issued the protective order be made available for review by the Committee in the

1 - Mr. Wannall
    (Attn: Mr. Cregar)
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/BF
MDR-16

REC-102

62-116395-271

PVD:eek
(6)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

17 JUN 26 1975

84 2 6 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Department of Justice. Mr. O'Connor also mentioned that the summary would, of course, have to set forth ~~the~~ sufficient information to allow the Committee to make a determination that the information derived from these wiretaps was not used for political purposes. Mr. Mintz expressed concern that the publication or leaking of information from summaries could expand the number and nature of suits facing the Bureau and suggested the Department should, in obtaining the Court approval for making the summaries available, request the Court to issue appropriate safeguards against publication of such information. Mr. O'Connor stated that such a recommendation to the Court would be proper and that this would be done.

Mr. Mintz told Mr. O'Connor that the Bureau at this time cannot make a commitment to the making available of the summaries to the Committee without further study and approval, and an approval would be sought expeditiously. Additionally, Mr. Mintz requested that the Bureau be given the opportunity to review the summaries prepared by the Department to insure the Bureau's interests are protected.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we notify the Department that we are in agreement concerning the preparation of summaries based on existing summaries of "Kissinger 17" wiretaps with the provision that we be given the opportunity to review these summaries prior to the Department seeking Court approval for making them available.

PVD

WRW WAB

PLM

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

June 9, 1975

1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum containing a response to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

TEB:dmt dmt
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJP
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

REC-102 62-116395 - 270

17 JUN 26 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 26 1975

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. B. Burns

62-116395

June 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/RP
MDR-16

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number 21, Appendix D, requests that with respect to each occasion on which the Director of the FBI testified before the House Appropriations Committee from 1965 until the present, the number of warrantless electronic surveillances in operation be provided for:

(a) The date of such testimony;

(b) 30 days prior to such testimony; and

(c) 30 days subsequent to such testimony.

Set forth below is the number of warrantless electronic surveillances in operation with respect to each occasion on which the Director of the FBI testified before the House Appropriations Committee from 1965 until present. Also set forth for part of 1967 and all of 1968 through 1972 are the number of such warrantless electronic surveillances in operation approximately 30 days prior to such testimony and approximately 30 days subsequent to such testimony. As a result of the manner in which our filing system is presently constituted, statistics covering the period 30 days before the Director's testimony and 30 days following his testimony for the years 1965, 1966 and part of 1967 are not available as a practical matter. Furthermore, the number in operation 30 days

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TEB:dmt
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-270

prior to and 30 days subsequent to the Director's testimony could not be determined in all instances and therefore, the figures provided are for dates as close to the 30-day time frame as practicable.

Finally, the Director ceased testifying before the House Appropriations Committee regarding the number of warrantless electronic surveillances in operation subsequent to his March 2, 1972, appearance and therefore the request is unanswerable with respect to 1973, 1974 and 1975.

BEFORE	DATE OF DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY	AFTER
Retrieval not Practicable (RNP)	March 4, 1965 44	RNP
RNP	February 10, 1966 32	RNP
RNP	February 16, 1967 38	March 13, 1967 42
January 15, 1968 33	February 23, 1968 33	March 22, 1968 33
March 14, 1969 46	April 17, 1969 49	May 15, 1969 50
February 5, 1970 38	March 5, 1970 36	April 6, 1970 37
February 16, 1971 33	March 17, 1971 33	April 17, 1971 40
January 31, 1972 32	March 2, 1972 34	March 31, 1972 35

1 - The Attorney General

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE:

The above material which we are furnishing the Committee was supplied by the Special Records and Related Research Unit of IS - 3 which has responsibility for information in the requested area. Similarly, this Unit determined that the information requested was not retrievable as a practical matter with regard to 1965, 1966 and part of 1967, the 30-day time frame, and for the years 1973, 1974 and 1975.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/9/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt. Operations with Respect to Intelligence activities.Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V. Daly Date: 6-13-75

Received by: John T. Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2000 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]
MDR-16

[illegible]OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC	J. T. Elliff
	HSC	

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 21.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

SURVEILLANCE

[illegible] CONTAINED
IS UNCLASSIFIED
10-17-2000 BY SP2ALM/jp
MDR-16

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Furnishes SSC with number, where available, of warrantless electronic surveillances operated by FBI at time of Director's testimony before House Appropriations Committee, as well as number in effect approximately 30 days prior and subsequent to such testimony.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

5-TJM

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ✓
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 6-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/bf
MDR-16

Mark Gitenstein, staff member of captioned Committee who has been doing an extensive inquiry into the "official and confidential" files reportedly maintained in former Director Hoover's office, telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly 6-5-75 and requested the identities of the employees who had brought the material from the Director's office during May, 1972, to Mr. Hoover's residence and to Mr. Felt's office.

By way of background, Mr. Gitenstein has obtained through interview of Mr. Felt, former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr, and other Bureau personnel familiar with the operations of the Director's office, considerable knowledge concerning the official and confidential files. There is also an extensive request contained in captioned Committee's letter of 5-4-75 pertaining to information surrounding these files. Additionally, we responded to a request of the Committee contained in their letter of 4-28-75 pertaining to the allegation of removal of certain material from Mr. Hoover's residence after the death of former Associate Director Clyde Tolson. We have not, at this point, determined that Bureau documents have been removed from Bureau space to Mr. Hoover's residence or any other place outside the Bureau. However, it is apparent that Mr. Gitenstein has information, or believes he has information, relating to the removal of Bureau documents.

REC-88 62-116395-269X1

Mr. Gitenstein stated he had recontacted former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr on 6-5-75 and Mr. Mohr, in response to Mr. Gitenstein's question, stated that the identities of employees who may have brought material from the Director's office to Mr. Hoover's residence and to Mr. Felt's office subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death could be learned through an inquiry in the Mechanical Section supply room.

62-116395

1 - Mr. Wannall	1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar	1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Bassett	1 - Mr. Daly
2 - Mr. Mintz	

PVD:kjs (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUL 3 1 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

In light of this response, Mr. Gitenstein requested that the Bureau identify the personnel involved and it is his obvious intention that the personnel will be interviewed.

Inasmuch as the Inspection Division is conducting inquiry into this matter, it would appear proper for that Division to determine the identities of such personnel and, if deemed necessary, interview in connection with the current inquiry. It is also believed that while this request is oral in nature from the Committee, we should consider furnishing the information as to the identities of employees to the Committee inasmuch as if we do not respond to the oral request Mr. Gitenstein indicated, because of the Committee's interest in this matter, there would be no problem in his obtaining authority to furnish the request in writing. It is apparent at this point that we would not be able to keep such information from the Committee if such a written request were to be received. Additionally, by responding to the oral request it will encourage the Committee, in the areas they described as "abuse-type," to give us an advance indication as to their inquiries.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Inspection Division make the necessary inquiry concerning the identities of the employees and, if deemed advisable, make available to the Legal Analysis Office that information which will be furnished to the Committee.

WRW/TAL

PVD JBA/PVD

HAS

JBA/PLM

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

The Attorney General

May 29, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning the interview of retired Special Agent Charles D. Brennan by members of the Senate Select Committee Staff. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JRm/[illegible]
6076

WOC:ekw ekw
(10)

NOTE: See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 5/28/75, prepared by WOC:ekw.

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-428100 (Personnel File of Charles D. Brennan)

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

edm

REC-102

116395 - 269

17 JUN 26 1975

84 JUN 26 1975

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

May 29, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JPM/lh
6026

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
CHARLES D. BRENNAN BY STAFF MEMBERS OF
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by retired SA Charles D. Brennan following his voluntary interview by Mark Gitenstein and two other individuals whose names Brennan did not get. Gitenstein as well as the two unnamed individuals identified themselves as Staff Members of the SSC. The interview which took place in Washington, D. C., on May 22, 1975, lasted approximately two hours. Brennan was not provided with a copy of Senate Resolution 21; was not provided with a copy of the Rules of Procedure of the SSC; nor was he advised of his rights including his right to private counsel.

The interview, which was not conducted under oath, covered three specific areas: the organizational structure of the FBI; Martin Luther King, Jr.; and COINTELPRO.

With regard to the organizational structure, they asked Brennan to describe what a unit, section, and division constituted at FBI Headquarters. They showed him several copies of C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan memoranda asking him about specific facts contained in these memoranda. When Brennan failed to have intimate knowledge of the memoranda, they wondered why he had such a poor memory when in fact they were memoranda from him. Brennan then proceeded to explain how such memoranda were prepared. (Memoranda are prepared in the name of the Section Chief, i.e., Brennan to the Assistant Director, i.e., Sullivan, but this does not necessarily mean that Brennan would prepare or even see the memoranda in all instances.)

1 - 67-428100 (Personnel File of Charles D. Brennan)

WOC:ekw (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

GPO 954-546

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF SA CHARLES D. BRENNAN BY SSC

With regard to Martin Luther King, Jr., Brennan advised that he got the impression from the Staff Members they felt the Bureau had an "illegitimate" interest in King. Brennan countered by saying the basis for the FBI interest in King was predicated on the communist influence surrounding King. He was asked if the Bureau employed many wiretaps against King to which he answered that most of the information obtained was derived from live informants.

Relative to the COINTELPRO, Brennan advised the Staff Members he couldn't be very specific regarding COINTELPRO inasmuch as he did not pay too much attention to it. They questioned him about this statement and Brennan stated that when you would compare COINTELPRO to such activities as the Bay of Pigs and the Glomar Explorer, COINTELPRO was "peanuts." Brennan was asked why he didn't recommend COINTELPRO be discontinued to which he replied "If City Hall wants it, you give them what they want."

NOTE: See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 5/28/75, prepared by WOC:ekw.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
5/29/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of interview by SSC Staff Members with former FBI Special Agent Charles D. Brennan.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Organization
Operating procedures

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/pf
MDR-16

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interview covered three specific areas:

1) Organizational structure of FBI
2) Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.
3) FBI's former counterintelligence programs (COINTELPRO).

WOC
5-8

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 2FS

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

DEC 19 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mike FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: House Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the House Select Committee requesting access to certain Bureau information on the U. S. Recording Company. Please prepare an appropriate response.

12/24/75 SA Robt Keelan advises SA Daly has informed HSC that response to all inquiries concerning USRC will be submitted upon completion of internal inquiry. TJM

cc: Paul Daly

REC-100

62-116464-268X1

CO FEB 12 1976

Let to AG 2/3/76 (62-116464)
PVD/[illegible]

Dewey [illegible] Asst. Director advised 12/27/75. Keehan will call [illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY [illegible]
MJF-46

ENCLOSURE
1-Ad Hoc
12-22-75

LEGAL COUNSEL
5- TJM

84 FEB 18 1976

DEC [illegible]

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: House Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the House Select Committee requesting access to certain Bureau information on the U. S. Recording Company. Please prepare an appropriate response.

cc: Paul Daly

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/RP
MDR-16

OTIS G. PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN

ROBERT N. GIAIMO, CONN.
JAMES V. STANTON, OHIO
RONALD V. DELLUMS, CALIF.
MORGAN F. MURPHY, ILL.
LES ASPIN, WIS.
DALE MILFORD, TEX.
PHILIP H. HAYES, IND.
WILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.

ROBERT MC CLORY, ILL.
DAVID C. TREEN, LA.
JAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.
ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WIS.

A. SEARLE FIELD, STAFF DIRECTOR
AARON B. DONNER, COUNSEL

TELEPHONE: (202) 225-9751

Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

December 18, 1975

Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Shaheen:

In order to complete our analysis of the cost of intelligence, we request access to any and all financial analyses compiled by the FBI with regard to transactions between the FBI and the U.S. Recording Company.

Since we are under time constraints, we hope you can provide access to these figures at your earliest possible convenience.

Sincerely,

A. Searle Field

A. Searle Field
Staff Director

ASF/TO/mas

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/AP
MDR-16

RECEIVED
DEC 17 1975
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

ENCLOSURE

62-116464-268X1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 28, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

WRW

L INFORMATION CONTAINED
EREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
TE 2-20-81 SP4 JGM/lc 6076

This memorandum reports the results of a telephonic conversation with former Special Agent (SA) Charles D. Brennan and recommends that the attached letter to the Attorney General with enclosures be sent.

On the morning of 5/23/75 the Department of Justice advised Assistant Director Mintz that former SA Brennan has or was to be interviewed by Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). On that same date I telephonically contacted Mr. Brennan to advise him that the Bureau had been alerted to the fact he was going to be interviewed by the SSC Staff and should he desire, a representative of the Bureau could be available during the interview for consultation. It was made clear to Brennan that the role of the Bureau representative would be to insure that he could consult with the representative at any time during the interview should the line of inquiry reveal; the identity of sensitive FBI sources, methods or sensitive investigative techniques; information derived from third agencies or friendly foreign intelligence services; or any information which Brennan felt could adversely affect sensitive ongoing FBI investigations.

Brennan then changed the conversation to personal chit chat. At what appeared to be the conclusion of the conversation Cregar asked Brennan if he had been contacted by the SSC Staff. Brennan advised that he had received a telephone call earlier in the week inviting him to an interview in Washington, D. C., and in fact was interviewed on 5/22 by SSC Staff Members Mark Gitenstein and two others whose names Brennan did not get.

Brennan showed some concern over the fact that the Staff had invited him to be interviewed earlier in the week but only notified the Department subsequent to his interview. (At the outset of the conversation with Brennan, I had advised him that the SSC had informed the Department which in turn informed the

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-106670-

62-116395
Enclosures - Sent 5-30-75 edm
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-428100 (Personnel File of Charles D. Brennan)
WOC:ekw (8) ekw

REC-102 62-116395-5 268

17 JUN 26 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

JUN 26 1975

Ltr + MM to AG 5/29/75 WOC:ekw

Bureau that he was to be interviewed). Brennan stated he was not furnished a copy of the Senate Resolution or its Rules of Procedures and was not advised of his rights or the fact that he could be represented by counsel. He was not put under oath, and was not given any indication as to the scope of the interview prior to his appearance in Washington. In response to a question by Cregar as to what areas the interview covered, Brennan stated the interview covered three specific topics. (1) The organizational structure of the Bureau; (2) Martin Luther King, Jr.; (3) the COINTELPRO.

With regard to the organizational structure Brennan advised that the Staff Members appear to have little understanding as to the way the Bureau was structured. He stated they had no appreciation of what a unit, section, or division was comprised of. They showed him several copies of memoranda from (Brennan to Sullivan) and proceeded to ask him about the contents of these memoranda. When Brennan was unable to describe the background or details surrounding a specific memorandum, they voiced wonderment as to why he had such little recollection about a memorandum he apparently wrote. Brennan advised the Staff Members that just because the memorandum was written from him to Sullivan did not mean that he necessarily wrote the memorandum or even saw it.

In respecttto Martin Luther King, Jr., Brennan got the impression that the Staff Members believed the Bureau was "illegitimately" interested in King. Brennan advised that he hit back hard on this stating that the Bureau's interest in King was predicated on the communist influence surrounding King. They asked if the Bureau had employed many wiretaps against King. Brennan advised that most of the information obtained on King derived from live informants. Brennan voiced the opinion that the Staff Members were rather disappointed with Brennan's defense of the Bureau in the King investigation.

Staff Members showed some disappointment in Brennan's inability to remember circumstances surrounding COINTELPRO. Brennan responded by saying that he never paid much attention to COINTELPRO and when compared to such activity as to the Bay of Pigs and the Glomar Explorer, the COINTELPRO was "peanuts."

At the conclusion of the conversation, Brennan advised that SSC Staff Members indicated they would want him to return for additional interviews. I advised Brennan that should he receive a subpoena to return or should he be invited to return to Washington, D. C., to be interviewed under oath, it would be wise for him to contact the FBI's Legal Counsel Division for advice to insure that he was in compliance with the Attorney General's order relative to the release of information obtained while an employee of the FBI. Brennan indicated he would contact the Legal Counsel Division should he be contacted by the SSC and would probably ask that a Bureau representative be available for consultation during a subsequent interview or testimony.

ACTION: If approved, the attached letter to the Attorney General and its enclosures reflecting the results of the debriefing of Brennan, be sent.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

1-75

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 28, 1975

Quarterly '75

MEMORANDUM TO ALL EMPLOYEES

RE: INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES

All employees are advised that Congress is conducting an inquiry into activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Congressional staff members are conducting interviews of former and current FBI employees. This Bureau has pledged its cooperation with the Congress.

You are reminded of the FBI Employment Agreement (copy attached) with which you agreed to comply during your employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

Also, you are reminded of Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 16.22 (copy attached), which reads as follows:

"No employee or former employee of the Department of Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority, produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General in accordance with Section 16.24."

Also, you are reminded of Department of Justice Order Number 116-56, dated May 15, 1956, (copy attached) which, among other things, requires an employee upon the completion of his testimony to prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony.

Our cooperative efforts, of course, must be consistent with the above cited authority. Therefore, if you are contacted for purpose of interview or testimony you are to request approval as required by the Employment Agreement and await authorization before furnishing information, testimony, or record material.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-6-2000 BY SP2ALM/bjk
MDR-16

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-02-2077

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 26 1975

2 ENCLOSURE

Enclosures (3)

CM Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

84 JUL 2 1975

FD-291 (Rev. 11-1-73)

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure or production of national security information, other classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is in a better position than I to make that determination;

(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

____
(Signature)

____
(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

______________, 19 ____, by ________________________________.
(Signature)

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

January 18, 1973

ORDER NO.501-73

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Title 28—JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Chapter I—Department of Justice

[Order 501-73]

PART 16—PRODUCTION OR DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL OR INFORMATION

Subpart B—Production or Disclosure in Response to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other Authorities

This order delegates to certain Department of Justice officials the authority to approve the production or disclosure of material or information contained in Department files, or information or material acquired by a person while employed by the Department. It applies where a subpena, order or other demand of a court or other authority, such as an administrative agency, is issued for the production or disclosure of such information.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 5 U.S.C. 301, Subpart B of Part 16 of Chapter I of Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, is revised, and its provisions renumbered, to read as follows:

Subpart B—Production or Disclosure in Response to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other Authorities

Sec.
16.21 Purpose and scope.
16.22 Production or disclosure prohibited unless approved by appropriate Department official.
16.23 Procedure in the event of a demand for production or disclosure.
16.24 Final action by the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General.
.6.25 Procedure where a Department decision concerning a demand is not made prior to the time a response to the demand is required.
6.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse ruling.

AUTHORITY: 28 U.S.C. 509, 510 and 5 U.S.C. 301.

Subpart B—Production or Disclosure in Response to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other Authorities

§ 16.21 Purpose and scope.

(a) This subpart sets forth the procedures to be followed when a subpena, order, or other demand (hereinafter referred to as a "demand") of a court or other authority is issued for the production or disclosure of (1) any material contained in the files of the Department, (2) any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department, or (3) any information or material acquired by any person while such person was an employee of the Department as a part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status.

(b) For purposes of this subpart, the term "employee of the Department" includes all officers and employees of the United States appointed by, or subject to the supervision, jurisdiction, or control of, the Attorney General of the United States, including U.S. attorneys, U.S. marshals, and members of the staffs of those officials.

§ 16.22 Production or disclosure prohibited unless approved by appropriate Department official.

No employee or former employee of the Department of Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority, produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General in accordance with § 16.24.

§ 16.23 Procedure in the event of a demand for production or disclosure.

(a) Whenever a demand is made upon an employee or former employee of the Department for the production of material or the disclosure of information described in § 16.21(a), he shall immediately notify the U.S. attorney for the district where the issuing authority is located. The U.S. attorney shall immediately request instructions from the appropriate Department official, as designated in paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) The Department officials authorized to approve production or disclosure under this subpart are:

(1) In the event that the case or other matter which gave rise to the demanded material or information is or, if closed, was within the cognizance of a division of the Department, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of that division. This authority may be redelegated to Deputy Assistant Attorneys General.

(2) In instances of demands that are not covered by paragraph (b)(1) of this section:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJ

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

(i) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, if the demand is one made on an employee or former employee of that Bureau for information or if the demand calls for the production of material from the files of that Bureau, and

(ii) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons, if the demand is one made on an employee or former employee of that Bureau for information or if the demand calls for the production of material from the files of that Bureau.

(3) In instances of demands that are not covered by paragraph (b) (1) or (2) of this section, the Deputy Attorney General.

(c) If oral testimony is sought by the demand, an affidavit, or, if that is not feasible, a statement by the party seeking the testimony or his attorney, setting forth a summary of the testimony desired, must be furnished for submission by the U.S. attorney to the appropriate Department official.

§ 16.24 Final action by the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General.

(a) If the appropriate Department official, as designated in § 16.23(b), approves a demand for the production of material or disclosure of information, he shall so notify the U.S. attorney and such other persons as circumstances may warrant.

(b) If the appropriate Department official, as designated in § 16.23(b), decides not to approve a demand for the production of material or disclosure of information, he shall immediately refer the demand to the Attorney General for decision. Upon such referral, the Attorney General shall make the final decision and give notice thereof to the U.S. attorney and such other persons as circumstances may warrant.

§ 16.25 Procedure where a Department decision concerning a demand is not made prior to the time a response to the demand is required.

If response to the demand is required before the instructions from the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General are received, the U.S. attorney or other Department attorney designated for the purpose shall appear with the employee or former employee of the Department upon whom the demand has been made, and shall furnish the court or other authority with a copy of the regulations contained in this subpart and inform the court or other authority that the demand has been, or is being, as the case may be, referred for the prompt consideration of the appropriate Department official and shall respectfully request the court or authority to stay the demand pending receipt of the requested instructions.

§ 16.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse ruling.

If the court or other authority declines to stay the effect of the demand in response to a request made in accordance with § 16.25 pending receipt of instructions, or if the court or other authority rules that the demand must be complied with irrespective of instructions not to produce the material or disclose the information sought, in accordance with § 16.24, the employee or former employee upon whom the demand has been made shall respectfully decline to comply with the demand. "United States ex rel Touhy v. Ragen," 340 U.S. 462.

Dated: January 11, 1973.

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST,
Attorney General.

[FR Doc.73-1071 Filed 1-17-73;8:45 am]

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 15, 1956

ORDER NO. 116-56

It is the policy of the Department of Justice to extend the fullest possible cooperation to congressional committees requesting information from departmental files, interviews with department employees, testimony of department personnel, or testimony of Federal prisoners. The following procedures are prescribed in order to effectuate this policy on a basis which will be mutually satisfactory to the congressional committees and to the Department. [This order supersedes the Deputy Attorney General's Memorandum No. 5, dated March 23, 1953; and his Memorandum No. 97, dated August 5, 1954. It formalizes the Attorney General's press release of November 5, 1953, establishing procedures to permit committees of the Congress and their authorized representatives to interview and to take sworn testimony from Federal prisoners. It supplements Order No. 3229 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953, and Order No. 3464, Supplement No. 4 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953 (with Memorandum of "Authorization Under Order No. 3464 Supplement No. 4 (Revised)" dated January 13, 1953), insofar as said orders have reference to procedures to be followed in the Department's relations with congressional committees. In support of this order, reference should be had to the President's letter dated May 17, 1954, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Attorney General's Memorandum which accompanied it.]

A. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM DEPARTMENT FILES

1. Congressional committee requests for the examination of files or other confidential information should be reduced to writing, signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General, who is responsible for the coordination of our liaison with Congress and congressional committees. The request shall state the specific information sought as well as the specific objective for which it is sought. The Deputy Attorney General will forward the request to the appropriate division where a reply will be prepared and returned for the Deputy Attorney General's signature and dispatch to the chairman of the committee.

2. If the request concerns a closed case, i. e., one in which there is no litigation or administrative action pending or contemplated, the file may be made available for review in the Department, in the presence of the official or employee having custody thereof. The following procedure shall be followed in such cases:

    a. The reply letter will advise the committee that the file is available for examination and set forth the name, telephone extension number, and room number of the person who will have custody of the file to be reviewed;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJ
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

b. Before making the file available to the committee representative all reports and memoranda from the FBI as well as investigative reports from any other agency, will be removed from the file and not be made available for examination; provided however that if the committee representative states that it is essential that information from the FBI reports and memoranda be made available, he will be advised that the request will be considered by the Department. Thereafter a summary of the contents of the FBI reports and memoranda involved will be prepared which will not disclose investigative techniques, the identity of confidential informants, or other matters which might jeopardize the investigative operations of the FBI. This summary will be forwarded by the division to the FBI with a request for advice as to whether the FBI has any objection to examination of such summary by the committee representative. The file will not be physically relinquished from the custody of the Department. If the committee representative desires to examine investigative reports from other government agencies, contained in the files of the Department, he will be advised to direct his request to the agency whose reports are concerned.

3. If the request concerns an open case, i. e., one which litigation or administrative action is pending or contemplated, the file may not be made available for examination by the committee's representative. The following procedure shall be followed:

a. The reply letter should advise the committee that its request concerns a case in which litigation or administrative action is pending or contemplated, and state that the file cannot be made available until the case is completed; and

b. Should briefly set forth the status of the case in as much detail as is practicable and prudent without jeopardizing the pending contemplated litigation or administrative action.

B. REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL

1. Requests for interviews with departmental personnel regarding any official matters within the Department should be reduced to writing, signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General. When the approval of the Deputy Attorney General is given, the employee is expected to discuss such matters freely and cooperatively with the representative, subject to the limitations prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;

2. Upon the completion of the interview with the committee representative the employee will prepare a summary of it for the file, with a copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

C. EMPLOYEES TESTIFYING BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

1. When an employee is requested to testify before a congressional committee regarding official matters within the Department the Deputy Attorney General shall be promptly informed. When the Deputy Attorney General's approval is given the employee is expected to testify freely subject to limitations prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;

2. An employee subpoenaed to testify before a congressional committee on official matters within the Department shall promptly notify the Deputy Attorney General. In general he shall be guided in testifying by Order 3229 (Revised) and the President's letter of May 17, 1954, cited at the beginning of this Order.

3. Upon the completion of his testimony the employee will prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony with a copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

D. REQUESTS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES FOR THE TESTIMONY OF FEDERAL PRISONERS

Because of the custodial hazards involved and the extent to which their public testimony may affect the discipline and well-being of the institution, it is the policy of the Department not to deliver Federal prisoners outside the penal institution in which they are incarcerated for the purpose of being interviewed or examined under oath by congressional committees. However, when it appears that no pending investigation or legal proceeding will be adversely affected thereby and that the public interest will not be otherwise adversely affected, Federal prisoners may be interviewed or examined under oath by congressional committees in the institution in which they are incarcerated under the following procedures, and with the specific advance approval of the Deputy Attorney General.

1. Arrangements for interviewing and taking of sworn testimony from a Federal prisoner by a committee of the Congress or the authorized representatives of such a committee shall be made in the form of a written request by the chairman of the committee to the Deputy Attorney General.

2. Such written request shall be made at least ten (10) days prior to the requested date for the interview and the taking of testimony and shall be accompanied by written evidence that authorization for the interview or the taking of sworn testimony was approved by vote of the committee. Such request shall contain a statement of the purpose and the subjects upon which the prisoner will be interrogated as well as the names of all persons other than the representatives of the Department of Justice who will be present.

3. A member of the interested committee of the Congress shall be present during the entire time of the interrogation.

4. The warden of the penal institution in which the Federal prisoner is incarcerated shall, at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to the time at which the interview takes place, advise the Federal prisoner concerned of the proposed interview or taking of sworn testimony; and shall further advise that he is under the same, but no greater obligation to answer than any other witness who is not a prisoner.

5. The warden of the penal institution shall have complete authority in conformity with the requirements of security and the maintenance of discipline to limit the number of persons who will be present at the interview and taking of testimony.

6. The warden or his authorized representative shall be present at the interview and at the taking of testimony and the Department of Justice shall have the right to have one of its representatives present throughout the interview and taking of testimony.

7. The committee shall arrange to have a stenographic transcript made of the entire proceedings at committee expense and shall furnish a copy of the transcript to the Department of Justice.

E. OBSERVERS IN ATTENDANCE AT COMMITTEE HEARINGS

In order that the Department may be kept currently advised in matters within its responsibility, and in order that the Deputy Attorney General may properly coordinate the Department's liaison with Congress and its committees, each division that has an observer in attendance at a congrssional hearing, will have the observer prepare a written summary of the proceeding which should be sent to the division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

/s/ Herbert Brownell, Jr.

Attorney General

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1- Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

TO SAC LOS ANGELES JUNE 17, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116~~2~~395)

SENSTUDY 1975

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST IS BEING MADE IN CONNECTION WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HEARINGS. SUTEL REPLY, ATTENTION INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

DURING A RECENT HEARING, AN SSC STAFF REPRESENTATIVE QUESTIONED A WITNESS WHETHER OR NOT HE KNEW OF MAIL OPENINGS IN LOS ANGELES BY FBI AGENTS RON MASCAR (PHONETIC) AND (FNU, BUT POSSIBLY WILLIAM) MILLER. THE WITNESS REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE ON THIS MATTER AND NEVER HEARD OF THE ABOVE TWO AGENTS.

IT WAS THE WITNESSES' OPINION THAT THE QUESTION MAY HAVE BEEN POSED AS A TEST QUESTION ONLY AND ASKED THAT THE INFORMATION BE CAREFULLY HANDLED BY THE FBI.

SO FBIHQ WILL BE IN POSSESSION OF ALL BACKGROUND INFORMATION UPON WHICH WE MAY BE CALLED TO TESTIFY, LOS ANGELES ADVISE REGARDING ANY DETAILS WHICH MIGHT ILLUMINATE THIS MATTER AND/OR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/PJ
MDR-16

RHR:jmn jmn
(5)

ST-104

REC-56

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-116395-267

3 JUN [illegible] 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 17 1975
2:44 P TTM
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

84 JUN 27 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

IDENTIFY SPECIAL AGENTS CONCERNED. IF SUCH ALLEGED ACTION OCCURRED, ADVISE AS TO ALL DETAILS AND ANY COMMUNICATIONS OR NOTIFICATION TO FBIHQ CONCERNING SAME.

HANDLE ON AN EXPEDITE BASIS.

NOTE:

Inspector John D. Tarpey, U. S. Postal Service advised Liaison Officer L. A. Crescioli of above incident which occurred in connection with Tarpey's 6/10/75 testimony before SSC. Tarpey's testimoney did not touch on any FBI mail cover activities and question was posed to him by SSC staff representative Paul Wallach. Movement Desk was unable to identify Special Agents based upon phonetic spellings. Details of above contained in V. V. Kolombatovic memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 6/16/75, and captioned "John D. Tarpey, Assistant Chief Inspector, Office of Criminal Investigations, U. S. Postal Service, Appearance Before Senate Select Committee (SSC) 6/10/75."

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

301 THRU 308

311 THRU 316

318 THRU 329

331, 332

334 THRU 336

337 THRU 339

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 03-18-2025

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ When Separated
From Accompanying Documents)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-12-2000 BY SP2ALM/bjl
HDR-16

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Senate Select Committee Request for Documents on the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

The Department of State has been asked by the Senate Select Committee investigating intelligence to provide information on the structure and functions of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and its Working Group. Because all of the basic documents concerning the CCT are Presidential, we are forwarding them to you for review for possible release to the Senate Committee.

The relevant documents are:

-- Memorandum for the President from Secretary William P. Rogers on September 18, 1972 (the report referred to in the President's Memorandum of September 25, 1972);

-- Memorandum for the Secretary from President Richard M. Nixon on September 25, 1972; and

-- Six reports to the President from the Chairman of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (the Secretary of State).

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

These documents set forth the basic structure and functions of the Cabinet Committee and its Working Group.

XEROX

JUL 14 1975

JFH

EX-103 REC-5 62-116395-339

There are many functions of the Cabinet Committee and its Working Group discussed in the reports to the President other than the intelligence function being investigated by the Senate Select Committee. We do not see any need for the discussion of these other functions to be withheld from the SSC.

6 JUN 25 1975

~~SECRET~~
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ When Separated
From Accompanying Documents)

5

51 JUL 23 1975

For your convenience we have noted below the sections of the reports to the President that relate to the intelligence aspect of the Cabinet Committee and its Working Group:

-- September 18, 1972 memo - page 2: #2, 3; page 4: #11.

-- November 2, 1972 memo - page 1; page 2; paragraph 3.

-- January 8, 1973 memo - page 1: #3; page 2: #6, 7, 9.

-- March 8, 1973 memo - page 1: #6.

-- March 29, 1973 memo - page 1: paragraph 2; page 2: paragraph 1; page 3: paragraph I.

-- June 27, 1973 memo - page 1: #2, 3; page 2: paragraph 6.

-- February 18, 1975 memo - Page 3: paragraph 3, 5; page 6: paragraph 5, 6; Tab 2 (Guidelines) page 4: paragraph 3; Tab 3 (Procedures) Enclosure #1 page 5: paragraph 4.

In addition to the above documents, we would also plan to provide the Senate Committee with the following narrative statement on the CCT and intelligence:

Begin Statement (CONFIDENTIAL):

With the exception of a weekly publication by the CIA on international terrorism, requested by the Cabinet Committee on January 1, 1973, the intelligence functions of the Cabinet Committee and its Working Group are handled through established interagency channels. The agencies most active in generation and coordination of terrorism information for the Working Group are the CIA, the FBI, NSA, DOD, the Secret Service, the Department of Treasury and the State Department.

These Working Group agencies set their own priorities and parameters concerning intelligence on terrorism matters. From time to time the CIA requests comments from the Working Group on its weekly terrorism reports.

The organization of the Cabinet Committee is delineated in the President's memorandum of September 25, 1972. The Working Group is composed of senior representatives of the ten agencies on the Cabinet Committee and representatives of the following agencies: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Energy Research and Development Administration, Federal Protective Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Metropolitan Police Department, National Security Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Management and Budget, and the United States Information Agency. These additional agencies were invited to participate in the Working Group by the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (S/CCT), in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group.

Under the Working Group there is one formal subgroup, the Behavioral Science Resource Group (BSRG), which is composed of behavioral science experts from the State Department, the CIA, the FBI and USIA. The State Department member chairs BSRG. The Resource Group has a mandate to seek to improve the United States' response to acts of international terrorism through use of behavioral science techniques.

End Statement

George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Memorandum of September 18, 1972
2. Memorandum of September 25, 1972
3. Six Reports to the President

Drafted:S/CCT:JTBrowne:nwh
6/11/75 Ext 20831

Clearance: M - Mr. Eagleburger
INR - Mr. Kirk
S/CCT - Mr. Fearey

1 - Mr. Wannall - enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - enc.

The Deputy Attorney General

June 30, 1975

Director, FBI

62-116395-338

REC-107

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-00 BY SP2ALM/gcp

Reference is made to memorandum of K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, to Mr. John Mintz, Legal Counsel Division of this Bureau, dated June 26, 1975, captioned "DAG Inquiry Re Communication by Former AAG Doar to FBI Regarding Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party Delegation."

Regarding your request contained in referenced communication for the Bureau to locate and furnish certain documents, it is my understanding that you are in possession of the documents requested.

MAILED 6
JUL 1 1975
FBI

In response to your request that we furnish our observations concerning the making of the documents available to former Assistant Attorney General John Doar, may I suggest that this raises an issue which has been discussed in the past by the Bureau and the Department and other Government agencies. This issue to my knowledge has not been resolved. That issue is whether a former employee should be allowed access to documents in the Government's possession to refresh his recollection for possible testimony before the Senate Select Committee. It is this Bureau's position that such documents should not be made available for the aforementioned purpose, and in those instances where a former employee cannot respond accurately to the question of the Senate Select Committee or any other Congressional investigative body, the Committee or Congressional body can be referred to the appropriate bureau or agency which will, if appropriate, furnish the necessary information. I am sure you will understand our concern in this regard insofar as setting a precedent which might serve for future requests of this nature.

1 - Mr. K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Wannall

PVD:ech
(8)

SEE NOTE ON PAGE 2

84 JUL 15 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NOTE: According to referenced communication, Mr. Doar requested to review a communication he caused to be sent while in the Department asking for information concerning the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party Delegation. The Deputy Attorney General had asked that the documentation concerning the request and our response be located and furnished to him. The Department also asked our views as to whether he should be given access to or delivered the documents for the purpose of refreshing Doar's recollection.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 2 6 1975

TO: John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Senstudy-75

SUBJECT: DAG Inquiry Re Communication by Former AAG Doar to FBI Regarding Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party Delegation

(1) The DAG has asked me to request that the Bureau make a file check to determine what, if any, documents may be found in FBI files relating to a request made by Mr. Doar in August 1964 for information and Bureau action regarding members of the subject delegation. It is our understanding that Mr. Doar requested certain information from the FBI regarding this delegation in mid-August 1964; and that some information was delivered to the DOJ (either to Mr. Doar or then DAG Katzenbach) shortly thereafter, in the latter part of August 1964.

(2) It is possible that Mr. Doar may be asked about these matters in connection with the Senate Select Committee inquiry (reference Appendix D, Item 7, 5/14/75 SSC request). The DAG has also asked that, after such documentation as may be developed under (1) above has been located, the Bureau furnish to him its view as to the access/delivery to Mr. Doar of such documentation for the purpose of refreshing his recollection.

(3) An expeditious response to this request will be appreciated.

REC- 107

62-116395-338

14 JUL 10 1975

memo to [illegible] 6/30/75 Legal [illegible]

LEGAL COUNSEL

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/PP
MDR-16

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/11/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

W.O.C.

By letter dated 5/14/75, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Appendix C, Item number 10, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the elimination of the Liaison Section of the FBI in 1970 and its reestablishment in late 1972.

Among the enclosures to our letter to the Attorney General (AG), dated 6/13/75, being proposed for forwarding to the Committee is E. S. Miller memorandum to Mr. Felt, 7/14/72. On page 2 there is information that "our close association with the Chief Postal Inspector and his top officials has resulted in that agency providing support in some of our most delicate intelligence operations looking to the identification of illegal hostile intelligence activities in this country." This could possibly be construed to include opening of mail. It is to be noted that opening of mail by FBI is the subject of a separate SSC request and future correspondence with the SSC, through the AG, will address itself to this subject. Former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague, with whom we have had extensive dealings in the past, is scheduled to appear before the full SSC on 6/12/75 and it is expected that he will be questioned about possible FBI participation in mail openings.

REC-107 62-116395-337

3 JUL 11 1975

RLM:mam
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4ALM/RP
10-16-2000
MDR-16

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

84 JUL 1 1975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Also included in this response is Daniel M. Armstrong III memorandum to L. Patrick Gray III, dated 9/8/72, classified Confidential. This memorandum states that the responsibilities of Legats have increased in recent years to include the collection of political intelligence information for dissemination to Dr. Kissinger and others. This is the HILEV Program. The SSC has requested committee staff access to all indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated by the Intelligence Division from 1960 to present and it is expected that HILEV will be included in the response to this request.

ACTION:

None. For information.

WRW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 12 1975 TMS

TELETYPE

NR 009 SF CODE

9:10 PM NITEL 6/11/75 CJC

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL AND INTD.

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL JUNE 9, 1975.

ON JUNE 11, 1975, FORMER SA DAVID E. TODD ADVISED OF THE WAIVER OF EMPLOYEE SECRECY AGREEMENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF A STAFF INTERVIEW BY SSC WITH HIM. TODD REQUESTED AGENT BE AVAILABLE DURING INTERVIEW TO ASSIST HIM. TODD INDICATED HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY ADVISE THIS OFFICE IF IN RECEIPT OF INFORMATION RE DATE OF INTERVIEW.

SAC, SAN FRANCISCO, WILL CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS INTERVIEW.

END

HOLD PLS

EX-117

5 -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJP
MDR-16

REC-26 62-116395-336

14 JUL 2 1975

56 JUL 17 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: June 2, 1975

3
12 pm
6/24/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 5-30-75, John Elliff, Task Force Director of captioned Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence Activities, and SA Paul V. Daly of this Division discussed the possibility of Elliff and members of his task force, conducting the inquiry into the FBI, having lunch with the Director. Elliff stated he felt that such an arrangement would be very beneficial and indicated that he and four or five staff members would attend such a luncheon.

Schedule late in June K

It would appear that such an arrangement might be beneficial and consideration should be given to arranging a luncheon if the Director's schedule permits.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the luncheon be arranged in line with the above at a time convenient to the Director.

OK PLM

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mrs. Metcalf

EX-117

PVD:eek
(8)

PVD JBH/PVD

REC-24 62-116395-335

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-12-2000 BY SP2ALM/BLP MDR-16

7 JUN 25 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

51 JUL 15 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATE[illegible]MENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-19-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Reference is made to my memo dated 6-2-75, that a luncheon with staff members of the Senate Select Committee Task Force conducting the inquiry into the FBI be held with the Director.

Mr. Kelley approved the recommendation, and Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Head for the Committee, was asked whether he would like to attend a luncheon with Mr. Kelley and he indicated he would, but would have to check with the Committee. Mr. Elliff was advised that the Director's schedule permitted a luncheon be held on June 24, 1975, at 12:30 p.m..

Mr. Elliff stated on 6-18-75, he will attend the luncheon along with the following staff members of the Committe: Lester B. Seidel, John Smith, William Ricks, Michael Epstein, and Mark Gitenstein.

In addition to the staff members, Section Chief William O. Cregar, Inspector John B. Hotis, and SA Paul V. Daly will attend. Assistant Director John A. Mintz will also attend luncheon.

SA Elmer Larson instead of Cregar.
Also Messrs. Adams and Wannall will attend.
elm

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mrs. Metcalf
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJP
MDR-16

REC-26 62-116395-334

EX-117

3 JUN 25 1975

JUL 1 4 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

for denying GAO access to Bureau files. A response has been prepared and furnished the Department.

Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary (Edwards Committee)

The Department has advised the Chief Counsel Alan Parker and Minority Counsel Ken Klee that excised appendices a through e of the Peterson Report on COINTELPRO are available for their review in Department space.

Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights (Abzug's Committee)

By letter dated June 10, and June 16, 1975, we have been requested to furnish complete information concerning practices and procedures, etc., concerning electronic surveillances. Information is being gathered so that appropriate responses may be provided.

Hearings

We are scheduled to testify 7-9-75, before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Judiciary on Terrorism. Testimony for this hearing has been prepared by the Intelligence Division.

We anticipate having to testify before the Post Office, Civil Service Subcommittee on Postal Fees, Mail and Label Management. The necessary materials for the testimony have been gathered and as soon as a request has been received, the testimony will be prepared in final form. The testimony will concern mail covers.

The following Committees have indicated Bureau testimony in the near future:

The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Tunney's Committee); Topic: S. 1427 - S. 1428 (Criminal Justice legislation); Briefing book has been prepared concerning this legislation.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJF
MDR-16

House Judiciary Committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights; Topic: H. R. 61 and H. R. 62 (House version of S. 1427 and S. 1428 (Criminal Justice Legislation).

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities; Topic: Bureau legal authority to conduct domestic and counterintelligence activities. Tentative testimony is scheduled for late June or early July. We will be furnished additional details by the Committee as to the various topics to be covered during this testimony.

The Director along with Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, is scheduled to appear before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil ~~Liabilities,~~ Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the Judiciary Committee (Kastenmier) to testify concerning electronic surveillances, on 6-26-75.

Special Agents Bill D. Williams and Inspector's Aide Edward D. Hagerty have been requested to appear before the Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Jackson's Committee) the topic of their testimony is to be their inquiry into Drug Enforcement Agency at the Departments request. The Department has advised they will make the agents available for testimony on the morning of 6-19-75.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/RP
MDR-16

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-036

2 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Update of Task Force Assignments

REFERENCE: Memos dated 10 and 11 June on subject of Task Force Assignments

1. Listed below are issues being addressed by Task Forces under the direction of Mr. Wilderotter, with additional personnel assignments as noted. This list supersedes the referenced memoranda.

Subject	Principal Agency	Principal Officer	Task Force Assignments
Assassinations	White House	Mr. Wilderotter IDS 145-7094	James Gardner State Dept. IDS 101-29034
Drug Abuse	CIA	Sayre Stevens IDS 143-4303	Malcolm Lawrence State Dept. IDS 101-28694
Political Abuses (1964)	FBI	Hunter Helgeson 324-4885 (Green 5303)	
Domestic Surveillance	Justice	John Martin IDS 187-4555	Charles Kane CIA IDS 143-6777 Verne St. Mars State Dept. IDS 101-29448

REC-84 62-116395-332

3 JUL 10 1975

FIVE

ALL [illegible] DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2ALM/PMG
MDR-16

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Undetermined
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

84 JUL 10 1975 62-116395

~~SECRET~~

Subject	Principal Agency	Principal Officer	Task Force Assignments
Domestic Surveillance (Contd)			J. G. Deegan FBI 324-4646
Electronic Surveillance and Warrantless Wiretap	Justice	George Calhoun IDS 187-4401	William Jones State Dept. IDS 101-20370 J. W. Dalseg FBI 324-4713
Use of National Organizations	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609	
Use of Proprietary Organizations	CIA	Erich Isenstead Green 3140	Lee Peters State Dept. IDS 101-29403 W. A. Branigan FBI 324-4550
Mail Cover and Intercept	Justice	Phil White IDS 187-4674	J. P. Lee FBI 324-4562 Ernest Tsikerdanos CIA IDS 143-6348
Watch List	DoD	Benson Buffham NSA 688-7222	R. L. Shackelford FBI 324-4594
Army Surveillance	DoD	Dr. David Cooke 695-4436	

2. The following officers from the Department of State have been named to assist in the CIA preparation of comprehensive papers on the following geographic and subject areas:

Greece	James Gardner IDS 101-29034
Dominican Republic	James Gardner IDS 101-29034
Laos	James Henderson East Asia Bureau
The Congo	Bayard King IDS 101-21504
Indonesia	Patricia Barnett IDS 101-22369
Katzenbach Report	Emerson Brown IDS 101-21504

Harriett Mowitt

Harriett Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

cc: Mr. Buchen
Mr. Hills

Distribution:
1 - Mr. Wilderotter
1 - Mr. Latimer
1 - Mr. Hyland
1 - Mr. Morell
1 - Mr. O'Connor
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - Mr. Clarke

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall
DATE: 7/2/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY
MDR-16

This morning (7/2/75) Michael Epstein, Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member, advised SA Paul V. Daly, Legal Counsel Division, that he, Epstein, is to interview SA John R. Borys and former Assistant Director Ivan Conrad at 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., respectively, Monday, 7/7/75. Borys is assigned to WFO and Conrad resides 1307 Capulet Court, McLean, Virginia 22101, unlisted telephone number 356-7590. Interviews are to concern the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

These are the latest in a series of interviews regarding the King case being conducted by the SSC Staff of present and former SAs. It is believed that Borys and Conrad should be released from their secrecy agreements to enable them to be interviewed which is the same procedure which we have been taking with the others who have been interviewed. The release from the agreement which we are recommending will, of course, be conditional that the interview relate only to the King matter.

REC-84

RECOMMENDATIONS:

62-116395-33

1. Borys and Conrad be released from their secrecy agreement in order to be interviewed, but only relating to the King case. On approval, Legal Counsel Division will advise them of the release and invite them to consult with the Legal Counsel Division early a.m. 7/7/75 in preparation for the interviews.

62-116395

3 JUL 10 1975

1 - 67- (Personnel File [illegible] SA John R. Borys)
1 - 67- (Personnel File Former Assistant Director Ivan Conrad)

SFP:lhb | hb
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUL 17 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

2. Borys and Conrad, when contacted by the Legal Counsel Division, should be offered the services of a Bureau representative who, if they desire, will accompany them to the interview. This representative, although not actually present during the interview, will be available nearby for consultation purposes should the interview touch upon sensitive, privileged information, such as relating to identities of sources, sensitive techniques and methods, etc. INTD will designate the representative for this purpose.

ADDENDUM: SFP:mjg 7/2/75

Pursuant to request of SA Daly of Legal Counsel Division, SA Borys and former Assistant Director Conrad were telephonically alerted to the planned interviews of them. They were both told that they would be further contacted by the Legal Counsel Division. Conrad specifically requested that his unlisted telephone number not be furnished to the SSC.

S.F. Phillips accompanied Borys 7/7 & will accompany Conrad 7/9 S 7/9/75

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/30/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum records the receipt of the latest request from the Senate Select Committee (SSC).

On the evening of 6/27/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of Justice furnished to Mr. Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division the attached copy of a draft letter to the Attorney General (AG) from Senators Church and Tower along with notifications concerning certain matters currently under investigation by the SSC which relate to the FBI as well as to the Department of Justice.

The latest request which is identified as a draft is broken down into three sections identified as: I. Issues, II. Areas of General Inquiry, and III. Case Studies.

I. Issues

The SSC's inquiry into the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the FBI is designed to examine fundamental issues which bear directly on the adequacy of current legislation and administrative organization and procedure. As a means of examining the issues in the context of actual FBI intelligence operations, the Committee intends to study certain specific topics, some of which are general in nature and others of which involve specific cases, programs or techniques. The specific issues are set out in the attachment under section I. A-F.

II. Areas of General Inquiry

REC-84

62-116395-329

The following contains descriptions of the general areas of inquiry into which the Committee intends to engage:

Enclosures

ALL INFO... HEREIN IS U... DATE 10-13-2000

MDR-16

3 JUL 10 1975

WOC:ebc
(18)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

4 JUL 17 1975

(A) Legal Authority for FBI Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities

(B) Organization and Operation of the FBI Intelligence Division (INTD)

(C) FBI Internal Security Intelligence Operations

(D) FBI and the U. S. Intelligence Community

(E) FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Operations

(F) Inspection Division Investigations

(G) FBI Intelligence Activities and State or Local Law Enforcement Agencies

III. Case Studies

This section contains descriptions of specific cases in which the SSC is interested. The descriptions indicate whether the investigations may concentrate on specific allegations of possible abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe in the words of the Committee improprieties may have occurred.

In this portion of the enclosed request the Committee lists 19 general questions. In addition, under each case study the letter requests additional information and documents.

The case studies in which the Committee is interested are identified as follows:

(A). Electronic Surveillance

1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance
2. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and Leaks
3. Surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr.
4. Surveillance at the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964

(B). Surreptitious Entry

CONTINUED - OVER

(C). Mail Covers and Mail Openings

(D). Other Specific Techniques

(E). COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities

(F). Clandestine Informant Activities

(G). Notional Organizations

(H). Joint FBI - Police Operations

1. The White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi
2. The Black Panther Party, Chicago

(I). The Huston Plan

(J). Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI

The remaining portions of the enclosed letter are directed to the Department of Justice and are not being addressed in this memorandum.

In connection with another Senstudy matter, Section Chief William O. Cregar had a meeting with Mr. John Elliff who is Chief of the*Task Force for the SSC on the morning of 6/30/75. Elliff apologized for the submission of the 6/25/75 draft letter, saying it was forced upon the Committee by the White House. According to Elliff, the SSC has been aware that much of the information requested from the Intelligence Community was being held up by the White House until such time as the SSC identified specific abuses it was interested in investigating. As a result, the attached draft was put together by the SSC to break the logjam. Elliff admitted that much of the information requested in the 6/25/75 draft letter was embodied in the request of 5/14/75. For this reason, Elliff advised he contacted Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, on the morning of 6/30/75 to request a meeting between himself, O'Connor, and Messrs Wannall, Mintz and Cregar. The purpose of the meeting would be to allow Elliff to clarify the draft letter of 6/25/75.

+F.B.I.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

We feel that a meeting with Elliff would be beneficial and plan to meet with him as soon as possible to obtain clarification of this latest SSC request.

JBA/PLM

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BA[illegible], TENN.
BARRY GOLDWA[illegible].
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

D R A F T

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 25, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Enclosed with this letter are notifications concerning certain matters currently under investigation by the Select Committee which relate to government entities under your jurisdiction.

These notifications are submitted pursuant to an agreement between the Committee, the various intelligence entities, and the White House. Pursuant to that agreement, the various entities in the Executive Branch have agreed not only to make available the pertinent witnesses, but also to submit in response all information and material which they possess that is relevant to the areas and cases which the Committee wishes to investigate. The response should include all relevant underlying documentation and other information, including documents which may not have come to the Committee's attention and which the Committee has not specifically requested, and all material relating to any prior Executive Branch inquiry into the matter. In addition, we would welcome a current analysis of the particular questions raised by the Committee and any other observations on the subject that you believe would be helpful.

We welcome the promise of cooperation and full disclosure that underlies that agreement. Success in fulfilling the full disclosure policy contained in the agreement is indispensible to the Committee's analysis and to the formulation of our ultimate findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Within the Committee mandate, contained in S. Res. 21, there are four broad subjects relating to the intelligence community which we are required to investigate and study in order to determine the facts and ultimately to decide whether to make recommendations for legislative or other changes. They are:

FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2000 BY SP7ELM/[illegible]

MDR-16

62-116395-329

ENCLOSURE

1. The structure, performance, and utility of government operations with respect to intelligence activities;

2. Whether certain policies or practices are or are not illegal, unethical, or otherwise improper;

3. Whether there has or has not been excessive duplication or inadequate coordination between and among intelligence agencies and, more generally, the efficiency of intelligence activities; and

4. Whether there has or has not been adequate internal and external control and oversight over the policies and practices of intelligence agencies.

In attempting to find the answers to these fundamental questions, the Committee is proceeding in two ways. First, we are examining intelligence functions broadly as instruments of government policy, giving attention to the authority for particular functions, the problems which intelligence activities are designed to solve, the procedures by which intelligence activities are and have been proposed, approved, executed, evaluated, and terminated, the range and scope of the activities utilized to achieve intelligence objectives, and the propriety and utility of the activities undertaken. Second, we will examine in depth certain specific subjects within the broad topics of investigation. (We would, of course, welcome your suggestion of other cases that would give added insight into intelligence matters under your jurisdiction.) These specific subjects for investigation are not intended to limit the scope contained in the more general questions.

The annexed notifications spell these matters out in greater detail. In addition, they ask certain specific questions, set forth certain previously requested documents not yet received, request additional documents,* and, in some cases, ask for the names and present addresses of persons who have held certain positions. Where appropriate, the subject's description indicates, pursuant to the agreed Outline for Inquiry Procedures, the matter primarily concerns allegations of abuse or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. Finally, the notifications indicate the name(s) of the staff members(s) who, in addition to the Committee's senior staff, will be responsible for the particular matters.

---

* These specific requests are not, of course, intended to limit the agreement to come forward with all relevant information and material, including documents, whether or not they have been brought to the Committee's attention or have been specifically requested by the Committee.

The Committee, in the course of the next few months, will undertake other subjects for investigation as its work proceeds and will notify you as appropriate.

We look forward to your cooperation in these matters.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(Including DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)

Table of Contents

Page

I. Issues

II. Areas of General Inquiry

- A. Legal Authority for FBI Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities
- B. Organization and Operation of the FBI Intelligence Division
  - 1. FBI Internal Security Intelligence Operations
  - 2. The FBI and the U. S. Intelligence Community
  - 3. FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Operations
  - 4. Inspection Division Investigations
  - 5. FBI Intelligence Activities and State or Local Law Enforcement Agencies

III. Case Studies

General Questions

- A. Electronic Surveillance
  - 1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance
  - 2. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and "Leaks"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2006 BY SP2A
MDR-16

62-116395-329

ENCLOSURE

Page

    3. Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King
    4. Electronic Surveillance and the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964
  B. Surreptitious Entry
  C. Mail Covers and Mail Openings
  D. Other Specific Techniques
  E. COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities
  F. Clandestine Informant Activities
  G. "Notional" Organizations
  H. Joint FBI-Police Operations
    1. White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi
    2. Black Panther Party, Chicago
  I. The "Huston Plan"
  J. Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI
IV. Department of Justice
  A. The Attorney General
  B. The Internal Security Section (formerly Division)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(INCLUDING DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)

I. Issues

The Committee's inquiry into the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is examining fundamental issues which bear directly on the adequacy of current legislation and administrative organization and procedure. The Committee seeks to determine whether FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities achieve legitimate objectives in conformity with the rule of law. Among the basic issues to be addressed are the following:

A. What is the legal authority for FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities? Should the FBI's authority be clarified or revised or incorporated in a comprehensive statutory charter?

B. What limitations are placed on FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities by the Constitution and laws of the United States? Should these limitations be clarified or revised?

C. What have been the purposes and aims of FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities? Should these objectives be modified?

D. How have the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the FBI been organized and coordinated with other agencies of government? Should these procedures and practices be revised?

E. What have been the procedures for and techniques of intelligence gathering and dissemination and counterintelligence operations used by the FBI? Under what conditions and through what procedures should these methods and techniques be used in the future?

F. What have been and should be the mechanisms for internal and external policy-making, control, and supervision of FBI intelligence and counter-intelligence activities?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2010 BY SP2ALM/BF
MDR-16

62-116395-329

As a means of examining the above issues in the context of actual FBI intelligence operations, the Committee intends to study certain specific topics, some of which are general in nature, and others of which involve specific cases, programs or techniques. Part II, below, contains descriptions of the general areas into which the Committee intends to inquire. Part III contains descriptions of the specific cases mentioned above. The descriptions specifically indicate whether the investigation may concentrate on specific allegations of possible abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. In addition to the topics described below, additional areas of inquiry may develop during the course of the Committee's work.

II. Areas of General Inquiry

A. Legal Authority for FBI Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities

The Committee is examining the legal basis for FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities. There may be serious question as to the adequacy of the present legislative framework for the FBI's functions in these fields. Current statutes authorize the FBI to perform investigative and law enforcement functions, but they do not specifically authorize intelligence or counterintelligence activities. Therefore, the Committee seeks to determine whether the FBI's authority should be clarified, revised, or incorporated in a comprehensive statutory charter.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein

B. Organization and Operation of the FBI Intelligence Division

The Committee is investigating the structure and operating practices of the FBI Intelligence Division. Proposals have been made that the national security intelligence and counterintelligence functions of the FBI should be lodged in a separate agency or otherwise separated from the FBI's criminal investigative activities. Further recommendations have been advanced for improved coordination between the FBI and other intelligence agencies, for strengthened supervision of FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities by the Attorney General or an independent board, and for clearer standards and procedures for FBI activities in this area. Therefore, the Committee desires complete information on the operating practices and procedures of the FBI Intelligence Division and of the field office activities supervised by the Intelligence Division.

The Committee's inquiry focuses on the following specific areas:

1. FBI Internal Security Intelligence Operations

   The Committee seeks to determine the nature and purpose of FBI intelligence operations directed at foreign intelligence activities and subversive or extremist activities within the United States. It has been alleged that the scope of FBI intelligence investigations is too broad and has extended to legitimate political activities. Consequently, the Committee must examine how the FBI's responsibilities have been defined.

   Responsible staff: Senior staff
   Task Force leader
   Mark Gitenstein

2. The FBI and the U. S. Intelligence Community

   The Committee seeks to determine what have been the policies and procedures for coordination between the FBI and other agencies in the U. S. intelligence community. There have been occasions in the past where friction between the FBI and other agencies has produced serious dissatisfaction within the U. S. intelligence community. The purpose of this inquiry is to evaluate the adequacy of past and present coordinating mechanisms.

   Responsible staff: Senior staff
   Task Force leader
   Mark Gitenstein

3. FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Operations

The Committee seeks to determine the nature of FBI counterintelligence operations directed at foreign intelligence activities within the United States or at any other hostile foreign-related activities within the United States. Since FBI operations to "counter" these activities go beyond intelligence collection, the Committee must consider whether such practices require statutory authorization. The impact of counterintelligence operations on United States foreign relations will also be considered.

Responsible staff:	Senior staff Task Force leader Loch Johnson Barbara Banoff

4. Inspection Division Investigations

The Committee is examining the relationship of the FBI Inspection Division to FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities. This includes both regular Inspection Division reviews of Intelligence Division and field office functions and specific investigations of allegations of improper conduct in connection with FBI intelligence activities.

Responsible staff:	Senior staff Task Force leader Mark Gitenstein

5. FBI Intelligence Activities and State or Local Law Enforcement Agencies

The Committee seeks to determine the nature of the relationships between FBI intelligence activities and state and local law enforcement agencies. This subject involves the delicate balance between the necessary centralization of certain law enforcement activities and the Constitutionally-mandated decentralization of general law enforcement responsibility. It is necessary for the Committee to evaluate the centralizing influence of the FBI, as well as the FBI's role as a check on local law enforcement abuses.

Responsible staff:
Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein
Walter Ricks

III. Case Studies

General Questions

The descriptions which follow of the specific cases the Committee intends to study are intended to serve the dual purpose of notifying the FBI of the issues the Committee will explore in connection with each case and eliciting from the FBI all information and material in its possession relating to the questions the Committee wishes to explore in each case. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition of certain questions which will be basic to the Committee's investigations of each case, certain fundamental questions are set forth below. As to each case described, the Committee intends to explore these fundamental questions, and expects that the FBI will, as to each case, provide all information and material it has relating to these basic questions even though they are not repeated in the discussion of each particular area.

1. What is or has been the legal authority for the activity?
2. What have been the purposes of the activity?
3. What techniques have been employed in the activity?
4. What kinds of information have been gathered in the activity?
5. How have specific uses of the activity been initiated and approved?
6. How have the targets for the activity been selected?
7. What have been the criteria for target selection?
8. How has the intelligence which is collected been used?
9. To whom has the intelligence collected been disseminated?
10. What has been the basis for any dissemination with respect to each recipient?
11. How has the activity been coordinated with other intelligence agencies?

12. What have been the effects of this coordination?

13. To what extent has each of the foregoing been compatible with the legal authority for and the purposes of the activity?

14. By what means has the activity been monitored, controlled and administered?

15. What are the potential abuses to which the activity may lead?

16. To what abuses has the activity led?

17. What steps have been taken to investigate such abuses?

18. What steps have been taken to avoid such abuses?

19. What have been the costs and utility of the activity?

In some instances, the specific questions set forth below may appear to repeat some of the general questions. The purpose in such cases is simply to clarify the application of the general question to the specific case. Except where inapplicable by their terms, all general questions relate to each specific case.

A. Electronic Surveillance

The Committee is examining all forms of electronic interception of communications including wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, consensual electronic surveillance interception of video and data communications, local monitoring devices, and all other forms of electronic or technical monitoring. The Committee's general questions apply to each of the techniques listed above, as well as to the matters set forth in the following specific cases.

1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance

The Committee seeks to determine whether the Attorney General should have the authority to authorize electronic surveillance for certain purposes without a prior judicial warrant. This power has been exercised by succeeding Attorneys General since 1940, upon the explicit directive of the President. The Supreme Court has ruled that this power does not extend to purely domestic matters, but the remaining scope of the Attorney General's authority remains undefined by the Supreme Court.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. What is the scope and basis of the claim of Executive authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance?

b. What have been the procedures for consideration and approval of requests for warrantless electronic surveillance authorized by the Attorney General?

c. What are the specific disadvantages of the judicial warrant requirement for those electronic surveillances which have been authorized by the Attorney General?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY [illegible] ALN/RF
MDR16

62-116395-327
ENCLOSURE

d. Does the Fourth Amendment permit the issuance of judicial warrants for electronic surveillance on grounds other than ordinary probable cause where national security intelligence purposes are advanced to justify the surveillance?

e. To what extent are the specific procedures of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 inappropriate for electronic surveillance conducted for national security intelligence purposes?

Documents

The Committee requests the following additional documents bearing on the questions stated above:

a. All written justifications for the specific authorizations by the Attorney General for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present.

b. All documents reflecting the denial by the Attorney General of specific requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present.

c. Committee staff access to information contained in the impounded documents, depositions, and other materials in all pending civil suits which involve warrantless electronic surveillance and in which the Committee has received the consent of the plaintiffs for such access.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mike Epstein

2. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and "Leaks"

The Committee is examining several instances of the use of warrantless electronic surveillance and other investigative techniques in connection with "leaks" of classified information. These cases may involve specific allegations of abuse or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. These instances include:

a. The investigation of alleged "leaks" by or to 17 Executive officials and newsmen between May 1969 and February 1971.

b. The investigation of alleged "leaks" from a military staff member assigned to the National Security Council in 1971-72.

c. The reported investigation of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969.

d. The reported investigation of the activities of Mrs. Anna Chennault and Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew in 1968.

e. Any other instances of warrantless electronic surveillance in connection with the investigation of "leaks" to the press.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. Through what procedures and by whom were each of these electronic surveillances authorized and approved, continued, and terminated?

b. As to each person to whom information was disseminated, please state:

   (1) The nature of the information.

   (2) The basis for the dissemination.

(3) The date of each dissemination.

(4) The use which was in fact made of the information by the recipient.

c. What evaluations were made of the original grounds for the surveillance as it progressed?

d. What were the results of the evaluations?

e. Who made them?

f. What are the reasons for use of electronic surveillance without judicial warrant to investigate "leaks" of classified information to the press?

g. How does each of the above instances relate to these reasons?

h. To what extent would requirement of a warrant interfere with the ability to detect such leaks?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein

3. Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King

This investigation examines the authorization for, conduct and termination of, and deliberations regarding the surveillance of Dr. King. This case may involve specific allegations of abuses and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. Through what procedures and by whom were wiretaps and electronic bugs of Dr. King initiated, approved, continued, and terminated?

b. What were the locations, extent, and duration of the electonic surveillances of Dr. King?

c. What were the grounds of national security, if any, for the introduction of the electronic surveillances of Dr. King?

d. What was the relationship between the information collected and each of the purposes of the surveillance?

e. What evaluations were made of the original grounds for the surveillance as it progressed?

f. What were the results of those evaluations?

g. Who made them?

h. What periodic evaluations were made of the relationship between the information being collected and the original objectives of the surveillance?

i. What were the results of the evaluations?

j. Who made them?

k. To whom were any results of the surveillance disseminated?

l. As to each person to whom information was disseminated, please state

(1) The nature of the information.

(2) The basis for the dissemination.

(3) The date of each dissemination.

(4) The use which was in fact made of the information.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force Leader
Mike Epstein

4: Surveillance at the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964

The Committee is examining the use of surveillance and other intelligence operations in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on or about the time of the Democratic National Convention in 1964. This case may involve specific allegations of abuses and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. Did the FBI conduct electronic surveillance and other intelligence operations at this time and place?

b. Who were the targets?

c. Through what procedures and by whom were the decisions made to engage in electronic surveillance and intelligence operations at this time and place?

d. What were the nature, extent, and duration of the electronic surveillance and other intelligence operations at this time and place?

e. What was the relationship between each target selected and the purpose of the surveillance?

f. Was the FBI requested to conduct such surveillance by any person or organization outside the FBI?

g. If so, by whom, when, and for what stated reason?

h. To whom were the results of the surveillance disseminated?

i. As to each person whom information was disseminated, please state

(1) The nature of the information.

(2) The basis for the dissemination.

(3) The date of each dissemination.

(4) The use which was in fact made of the information.

Responsible staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Mike Epstein

B. Surreptitious Entry

The purpose of this inquiry is to determine the extent to which the FBI has used surreptitious entry as an intelligence technique, either through its own operations or through operations by other agencies and individuals. This case may involve allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What are the scope and basis of the claim of Executive authority to conduct warrantless surreptitious entry as asserted by the Department of Justice in United States v. Ehrlichman?

2. What surreptitious entries have been carried out by the FBI or by another government agency with the knowledge of the FBI from January 1, 1960, to the present? Please list by date, place, and target.

3. As to any instance in which the FBI has refused to comply with another agency's request for surreptitious entry, what was

   a. The basis for the refusal?

   b. The reason given for the request?

4. What procedures were employed to authorize any surreptitious entry identified under 2, and who authorized each such entry?

5. To the extent applicable by their terms, each of the above questions and the General Questions will be explored specifically with reference to any entry or proposed entry at an embassy in May 1972.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Mike Epstein
Paul Wallach

C. Mail Covers and Mail Openings

The Committee is examining the conduct of mail covers and mail openings by or on behalf of the FBI and any instances of mail openings or intercepts which may have been conducted by or on behalf of the FBI. This inquiry may involve allegations of abuse or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. The specific purposes of all mail covers conducted in connection with FBI intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. This includes all documents pertaining to FBI decisions to request Postal Service mail covers and lists of all subjects upon whom mail covers have been placed as a result of FBI requests since January 1, 1960.

2. The procedures and practices for the dissemination of information from mail covers requested by the FBI. This includes a list of all entities to whom mail cover information has been disseminated since January 1, 1960.

3. Whether or not FBI personnel may have conducted mail covers in violation of existing Postal Service regulations. For any mail covers which may have been conducted by FBI personnel or for the FBI by persons other than Postal Service employees, from January 1, 1960, to the present: identify the physical location where the mail cover was conducted, the names of all persons who participated in and authorized the mail cover, and a brief explanation of the purpose of the mail cover and why it was initiated.

4. Whether or not the FBI has opened mail or caused mail to be opened, either with or without the permission of the Postal Service. For all incidents of mail opening which may have been conducted by FBI employees or by other persons in cooperation with the FBI, from January 1, 1960, until the present: identify the physical location where the mail was opened or intercepted, the names of the individuals who participated in the opening or intercept, and the purpose of the opening or intercept.

Documents

The Committee requests the following additional documents bearing on the questions stated above:

1. All documents which discuss, refer to, or relate to the origins, authorizations, conduct, and termination of and procedures for the mail covers, intercepts, and openings identified in 3 and 4 above.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Paul Wallach

D. Other Specific Techniques

As to the following techniques, the Committee's inquiry will initially be confined to the General Questions. As the inquiry proceeds, areas of potential abuse and thus of specific inquiry beyond the General Questions may develop:

1. Incommunicado detention and interrogation.
2. Photographic and television surveillance.
3. Polygraphs.
4. The obtaining of bank, credit, school, and other personal records and information, including the obtaining of information under false pretext.

E. COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities

The Committee is investigating the circumstances surrounding the origins of, authorization for, and implementation of the FBI program known as COINTELPRO and any similar programs. This inquiry may involve allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. The scope of this investigation covers:

1. COINTELPRO -- Communist Party USA;
2. COINTELPRO -- Socialist Workers Party;
3. COINTELPRO -- White Hate Groups;
4. COINTELPRO -- Black Extremists;
5. COINTELPRO -- New Left;
6. COINTELPRO -- Special Operations (except as targeted against hostile foreign intelligence services);
7. COINTELPRO -- Puerto Rican Independence Groups;
8. COINTELPRO -- Operation Hoodwink
9. Any other activities of the FBI which have or have had the purpose and effect of disrupting domestic groups or discrediting U.S. citizens, whether or not carried out under a COINTELPRO program.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Under what circumstances, through what procedures, and by whom were these programs initiated, authorized, and terminated?
2. Under what circumstances and through what procedures did the FBI discover and report to the Attorney General the existence of items 7 and 8 identified above and similar disruptive activities not included in the original review of COINTELPRO activities conducted by the Department of Justice in 1974?

3. What were the purposes of each program?

4. In each case, by what means was it intended the purpose would be accomplished?

5. What internal FBI procedures were adopted for the consideration and approval of specific disruptive activities and for determining the results of such activities?

6. As to each operation listed above, and any others of a fundamentally similar kind, identify by type the sources of the information used against individuals and groups for disruptive purposes.

7. As to each instance in which such information was obtained through electronic surveillance

   (a) What or who was the target of the surveillance?

   (b) Was the surveillance legal?

   (c) Was the surveillance conducted pursuant to warrant?

   (d) What were the dates of the surveillance?

   (e) What were the precise means of surveillance?

   (f) Who authorized the surveillance (both within and without the FBI)?

   (g) What was the purpose of the surveillance?

8. As to each case listed above and all fundamentally similar cases, what was the legality and propriety of the distruptive activities? Should any of the activities referred to in the above sentence be forbidden by statute, considered for future use, or otherwise subject to statutory or administrative regulation?

9. In what activities has the FBI engaged since April 28, 1971, the purpose or effect of which has been to disrupt domestic groups or discredit U.S. citizens or which bear any other similarity to the purposes or effects of COINTELPRO activities?

10. What restrictions, directives, or other measures have been adopted by the FBI and the Justice Department to limit or regulate the use of such disruptive techniques?

The Committee will investigate all COINTELPRO and disruptive activities identified above. On the basis of a review of the summaries of COINTELPRO cases prepared for the so-called Petersen Committee, as well as other sources of information, the Committee will develop further requests for information and documents.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Les Seidel
Mike Epstein
Walter Ricks

F. Clandestine Informant Activities

The Committee is examining all aspects of the FBI's use of informants, sources, and undercover personnel and the techniques employed by such persons. Although informants are the single most productive source of intelligence information, the difficulties of controlling their activities may increase the possibility of improper conduct. The use of informants to infiltrate organizations also may pose dangers to the right of associational privacy. Consequently, proposals have been made for the imposition of a judicial warrant requirement or other safeguards for the use of informants. The Committee seeks to evaluate such proposals as well as the contributions of informants to the accomplishment of legitimate objectives.

In addition, the Committee is examining informant activities with respect to several particular situations and cases. This investigation may involve specific allegations of abuse or controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. The Committee's inquiry covers the general circumstances surrounding the following incidents or cases:

a. Wounded Knee;

b. Kent State;

c. New York v. Stroble (Attica);

d. United States v. Buckalew (Gainesville);

e. United States v. Briggs (Camden);

f. New York v. Dillon (Hobart College);

g. United States v. Marshall (Seattle).

Additional cases may also be examined.

In addition to the above cases, the Committee is examining the role of FBI informants in providing information to the FBI concerning members of the following organizations:

a. Ku Klux Klan;

b. Students for a Democratic Society;

c. Weathermen;

d. Black Panther Party;

e. Communist Party USA;

f. W.E.B. DuBois Clubs.

Additional studies of informant activities with respect to members of other organizations may be formulated.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. With respect to both categories of cases listed above, what allegations, whether unfounded or not, of improper, illegal, unethical, or provocative conduct by FBI informants have been made in connection with these situations or groups?

2. What measures has the FBI taken to investigate such allegations of misconduct and to prevent such alleged misconduct from taking place in the future?

3. What instructions has the FBI given to its informants with respect to possible improper, illegal, unethical, or provocative conduct?

4. What has been the largest number of informants, sources, and undercover personnel in use at any one time during each year from 1960 until the present in connection with security, intelligence, and counterintelligence matters, cases, and programs?

5. What has been the annual total amount of funds (including reimbursement for expenses) paid to informants and sources for each year from 1960 until the present?

6. What limits, if any, have been placed on the type of information which informants have been intrusted to report back to the FBI?

7. What have been the annual percentage of potential informants who became paid informants in connection with security, intelligence, and counterintelligence matters, cases, and programs from 1960 until the present?

Documents

Please provide a summary of ten cases (for each of the following categories) where the FBI's use of informants, sources, or undercover personnel resulted in:

1. the conviction of an espionage agent of a foreign government.

2. the prevention of the theft of national security information.

3. the prevention of sabotage.

4. the prevention of an act of violence.

5. the prevention of the carrying out of a conspiracy to overthrow the government.

6. any other successful preventive actions in furtherance of the FBI's national security responsibilities.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mike Epstein
Jack Smith
Walter Ricks
Pat Shea

G. "Notional" Organizations

The Committee is examining the FBI's alleged creation of the support for "notional" organizations for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. Although it may rely upon informants and other clandestine operatives, this alleged practice is sufficiently novel to require separate attention.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What groups, organizations, movements, or other associations has the FBI caused directly or indirectly to be formed or created for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes? Please provide a complete list from January 1, 1960, to the present.

2. What groups, organizations, movements, or other associations has the FBI supported financially or materially? Please provide a complete list from January 1, 1960, to the present.

3. In which cases has the FBI supported or created such organizations in coordination or cooperation with other agencies?

4. How have the presence of such "notional" organizations affected the public's perception of the movements of which they form a part?

5. How have any FBI programs for the creation and support of such groups been coordinated with any similar programs undertaken by the CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mike Epstein

H. Joint FBI-Police Operations

The purpose of this inquiry is to examine certain allegations that joint FBI-police operations resulted in misconduct or abuse. These cases are complex and involve a variety of techniques. Nevertheless, they may indicate some of the most serious problems which may arise in attempting to deal with potentially violent situations.

1. The White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi

The Committee is inquiring into the relationships between the FBI and other law enforcement agencies and private organizations in Mississippi in connection with the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine what effect, if any, FBI activities had on the actions of other law enforcement agencies and private individuals with respect to the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi. This investigation may involve allegations of abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. Was this organization a target of FBI COINTELPRO operations?

b. If so, how and by whom was it selected as a target?

c. What were the purposes of any disruptive operations directed at it?

d. To what extent were the purposes achieved?

e. What disruptive techniques, if any, were employed?

f. Over what period of time did the disruptive activities occur?

g. What evaluations were made of their effects?

h. By whom were they made?

i. What were the results of the evaluations?

j. Were FBI informants used to infiltrate the organization?

k. If so, what kinds of information did the informants gather?

l. What activities did the informants engage in other than information gathering?

m. Identify by date and names the persons involved in all contacts the FBI had with other law enforcement agencies and private groups and individuals with respect to alleged Klan bombings of Jewish synagogues and the homes of Jewish leaders in Meridian, Mississippi, during May - August 1968.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Jack Smith
Les Seidel

2. The Black Panther Party, Chicago

The Committee is inquiring into the relationships between the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in the Chicago area in connection with the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine what effect, if any, FBI activities had on the actions of other law enforcement and intelligence agencies with respect to the Black Panther Party in the Chicago area. This investigation may involve allegations of abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. Was the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party a target of FBI COINTELPRO operations?

b. If so, how and by whom was it selected as a target?

c. What were the purposes of any disruptive operations directed at it?

d. To what extent were the purposes achieved?

e. What disruptive techniques, if any, were employed?

f. Over what period of time did the disruptive activities occur?

g. What evaluations were made of their effects?

h. By whom were they made?

i. If FBI informants were used to infiltrate the organization, what kinds of information did the informants gather?

j. What techniques did the informants employ to gather the information?

k. Were the techniques used by the informants all approved and monitored by the FBI? If not, which were not so approved?

l. What activities did the informants engage in other than information gathering?

m. What other methods and sources did the FBI use to gather intelligence on the organization?

n. If electronic surveillance was used, how did the use of such surveillance relate to each of the general questions?

o. To what extent was information on persons and groups not members of or affiliated with the Black Panther Party gathered, stored, or disseminated by the FBI as a result of its investigations of the organization?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Walter Ricks
Chris Pyle

I. The "Huston Plan"

The Committee is examining the FBI's role in the disposition of the report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) in 1970. This report as submitted to the President included certain options which were specifically identified as "illegal". It purported to represent the joint recommendations of all members of the U. S. intelligence community, but FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover disagreed in a series of footnotes. The serious consideration given to such allegedly illegal proposals gives this case the utmost significance for the Committee's understanding of the risks of uncontrolled intelligence activity. This case may involve specific allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What contacts occurred between Tom Charles Huston and personnel of the FBI and the Department of Justice during 1969 and 1970? Identify by date and names of persons involved.

2. What was the purpose of each such contact?

3. With respect to any assistance provided to the Interdepartmental Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) by personnel of the FBI:

   a. Who were the FBI participants?

   b. What kind of assistance was provided?

   c. What was the role of the FBI in preparing the various drafts of the special report of the Committee?

4. What were the specific arguments advanced for the inclusion of the allegedly illegal options in the special report submitted for the President's consideration? Were other allegedly illegal options considered and rejected?

5. Were any measures taken by the FBI to implement specific elements of the Huston Plan? This includes both the allegedly "illegal" aspects and other provisions such as the expanded recruitment of 18-21 year old informants.

6. What are the present views of the FBI and the Department of Justice as to the legality and propriety of the various options included in the special report?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Barbara Banoff
Loch Johnson

J. Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI

The Committee is investigating allegations that the intelligence and investigative resources of the FBI have been misused by various Presidents, Attorneys General, Members of Congress, and FBI executives themselves. This subject may involve specific allegations of abuse and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Have persons outside the FBI sought the FBI's assistance for partisan political purposes or personal advantage? Please identify each instance by the name of the person seeking to so use the FBI, the date, and the nature of the assistance sought.

2. In each such case, what has been the response of the FBI?

3. Have persons inside or outside the FBI sought to employ the resources of the FBI for purposes outside the FBI's authority? Please identify each instance by the name of the person seeking to so use the FBI, the date, and the purpose for which the person sought to use the FBI.

4. In each such case, what has been the response of the FBI?

5. What measures has the FBI employed to

    a. Respond to critics.

    b. Affect the reputation or credibility of or otherwise discredit critics.

6. What were the nature, purpose, duration, and results of Project INLET involving preparation of an intelligence letter for the President and other Executive officials?

7. With respect to any so-called "secret files" maintained within the FBI, including the "official and confidential" and "personal and confidential" files maintained by the executive assistant to the FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on his behalf until the time of his death, the Committee seeks to establish the contents of such files, the circumstances surrounding the transfer of a portion of such files within the Bureau at the time of Director Hoover's death, the transfer of a portion of such files to Mr. Hoover's residence, the destruction of any such files, the transfer of any such files from Mr. Hoover's residence, the use of information within such files, and their relationship to the official investigative files of the FBI. The Committee desires all information bearing on these matters, including the results of any inquiries conducted within the FBI and the Department of Justice.

8. What measures have been taken to ensure that the intelligence and investigative resources of the FBI are not misused for political purposes or personal advantage.

9. What additional measures should be taken?

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Mark Gitenstein

IV. Department of Justice

The Committee is examining activities of divisions of the Justice Department other than the FBI which perform internal security and intelligence functions. The purpose of these inquiries is to determine whether these functions have been carried out in conformity with the rule of law.

A. The Attorney General

The Committee is studying the functions of the Attorney General with respect to the supervision of and policy-making for internal security and intelligence activities. The Committee seeks to determine whether his duties are properly defined and his office properly organized to perform these functions effectively.

Questions

The Committee requests that the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. To what extent has the Attorney General been involved in the consideration or approval of the policies and activities of U. S. foreign and military intelligence agencies?

2. Has the Justice Department made any agreements with the CIA or any other U. S. intelligence agency with regard to the investigation or prosecution of agency personnel?

3. Under what circumstances and for what purposes has the Office of Legal Counsel provided legal advice to the Attorney General on matters pertaining to foreign and domestic intelligence activities?

4. To what extent has the Attorney General authorized cooperation, including the exchange of information and the conduct of joint operations, between the Drug Enforcement Administration or its predecessors and the CIA or other

intelligence agencies with respect to narcotics intelligence?

5. What standards and procedures has the Attorney General adopted for:

   a. The collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of narcotics intelligence.

   b. The collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of organized crime intelligence.

   c. The use of intelligence information by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

   d. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grants for the support of state or local police intelligence activities and intelligence data systems.

6. To what extent have communications between the White House and the FBI or other agencies under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General bypassed the Attorney General? To what extent should such communications be channeled through the Attorney General?

7. What have been the policies and procedures of the Justice Department for evaluating the budget requests of the FBI for intelligence and counterintelligence activities?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein
Barbara Banoff

B. The Internal Security Section (formerly Division)

The Committee is examining the activities of the Internal Security Section of the Justice Department and its predecessor, the Internal Security Division. These entities have supervised the Department's internal security law enforcement activities, coordinated certain interdepartmental internal security policies, and engaged in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence.

Questions

The Committee requests that the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Under what circumstances, if any, has the Justice Department seriously considered prosecutions under the Smith Act and laws pertaining to seditious conspiracy, rebellion, or insurrection, or "subversive activities", since January 1, 1960?

2. To what extent has FBI intelligence activity provided valuable evidence for use in the prosecution of specific federal crimes?

3. What have been the practices and procedures for coordination of policy through the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security?

4. What have been the practices and procedures for the interdepartmental and interagency evaluation of domestic intelligence and domestic collection of foreign intelligence through the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and its predecessors?

5. With respect to the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit and the Analysis and Evaluation Section of the Internal Security Division,

    a. What have been the practices and procedures of the Unit and Section for the gathering of intelligence?

b. What type of information has been stored in readily retrievable form by the Unit and Section?

c. To whom and for what reasons has intelligence information been disseminated by the Unit and Section?

d. What were the reasons for the submission of IDIU computer printouts to the CIA, as reportedly occurred in 1969?

e. To what extent did the Unit and Section make specific requests to other agencies within and outside the Justice Department for intelligence information?

6. With respect to the use of grand juries by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division,

a. Have any allegations of misuse of the grand jury process in cases handled by Special Litigation Section attorneys come to the attention of the Department? If so, briefly describe each such allegation and what, if any, action was taken by the Department in response to such allegation.

b. To what extent, if any, did the use of grand juries in cases handled by the Special Litigation Section attorneys differ from the use of grand juries in cases handled by other sections of the Justice Department?

c. To what extent, if any, was information obtained through the use of grand juries included in the intelligence files of the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit or the Analysis and Evaluation Section?

7. What have been the practices and procedures of the Internal Security Division and the Departmental Security Office for advising the Attorney General and other executive agencies with regard to the Federal Employee Security Program?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Barbara Banoff

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 6/26/75

1 - Mr. F. S. Putman
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

On 6/26/75 James J. Angleton, former Chief, Counterintelligence Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, telephonically furnished the following information to SA L. F. Schwartz. (U) (u)

Angleton recently testified under oath before three Senators and Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). He appeared without counsel. During his testimony, Angleton was asked numerous questions concerning his knowledge of Israeli capabilities to conduct intelligence collection in the United States. Among the questions asked Angleton were questions bearing on Israeli efforts to gather nuclear information in the United States. Angleton indicated that the SSC apparently is aware of Angleton's past close relationship with the Israelis, and Angleton feels that the questions directed to him by the SSC may be related to information provided to the Committee by correspondent Tad Szulc who, according to Angleton, is writing an article concerning Angleton's relationship with the Israelis for Penthouse Magazine. Angleton understands that Szulc has either testified or has been interviewed by the SSC. (U) (u)

Angleton stated that he avoided any direct answers on the above questions by stating that any knowledge he might have would be secondhand and fragmentary. He advised the SSC that such questions might more properly be directed to the FBI. (U) (u) When asked who in the Bureau might be knowledgeable in this

Oct 13 2000 SP2 ALM/BJP
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/BJP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
NDR-16

62-116395-328

REC-84

62-116395

LFS:lhb/hb
(7)

3 JUL 10 1975

Classified by SP4 alw/alm
Declassify on: OADR 10/31/89
C.A. # 88-1826

SP 7 clc/alm C.A. #88-1826 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
7/27/94 CIA INFO. IS UNCLASSIFIED PER CIA REVIEW of 3/17/94

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

FNVE

84 JUL 1 1 1975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET

area, Angleton replied that he did not know but that he believed the current senior Bureau official concerned with operational matters to be Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams. (S) (u)

In addition, Angleton advised that certain questions he was asked dealt with alleged Soviet attempts to infiltrate the CIA and other agencies. Again, Angleton avoided a direct answer and indicated that the FBI would be the appropriate agency to direct such questions to. Finally, Angleton commented that in the event the Bureau thought it desirable he would be happy to personally brief the Director or other appropriate Bureau official concerning his testimony. He commented that he has not been asked to, nor has he offered to, brief William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, concerning his testimony. (S) (u)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. We are checking for any available information in files concerning [Israeli intelligence collection capabilities in the United States.] Results will be summarized in separate memorandum. (S)

2. It is not believed appropriate to request Angleton to brief the Director or other Bureau official concerning his testimony, particularly since Angleton has not seen fit to brief his former superiors at CIA. A request by the Bureau for a briefing by Angleton might be misconstrued if it were to come to the attention of Colby or other CIA officials. (S)(u)

~~SECRET~~

wRW

JBA
PLM

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. P. W. Cook

July 3, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE~~ TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning a contact made by the Staff of captioned Committee with Mr. Harry Eugene Schafer and his spouse, Mrs. Jill D. Schafer. It is noted that the Schafers, until March, 1975, served as confidential informants of this Bureau. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 134-16380 (Harry Eugene Schafer)
1 - 134-19699 (Jill D. Schafer)

PWC:dew
(13)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-2000 BY SP2ALM/RP
MDR-16

REC-107

62-116395-327

3 JUL 9 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

134-16380 -
134-19699

1 - ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

8 AUG 1 6 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

July 3, 1975

1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. P. W. Cook

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: CONTACT OF MR. HARRY EUGENE SCHAFER
AND HIS SPOUSE, MRS. JILL D. SCHAFER,
WITH STAFF MEMBERS OF THE SSC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-2000 BY 5122ALM/bjg
MDE-16

Mr. Harry Eugene Schafer and his spouse, Mrs. Jill D. Schafer, served as confidential informants of the FBI until March, 1975. Immediately prior to that date they were identified as sources of the FBI by Joseph Alfred Burton, a former confidential informant of the FBI. Since his discontinuance as an FBI source in July, 1974, Burton has been publicly attacking the FBI for alleged improprieties and illegal activities. Burton's charges are distorted and in some instances false.

On May 21, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Schafer made available to our New Orleans Office a copy of a letter addressed to them dated May 14, 1975, signed by Michael T. Epstein, Counsel, of the SSC. In this letter Mr. Epstein requested the Schafers telephone him collect to discuss some matters relating to the current SSC inquiry.

Subsequently, Mr. and Mrs. Schafer voluntarily contacted the New Orleans Office of the FBI to advise that at the invitation of Mr. Epstein they had traveled to Washington, D. C., on June 7, 1975, to converse with representatives of the SSC. Mr. and Mrs. Schafer indicated Mr. Epstein had offered to reimburse them for the expenses of this travel. The Schafers advised that upon their arrival in Washington, D. C., at the appointed hour, they went to Mr. Epstein's office. Mr. Epstein introduced himself and two colleagues, a male named Marshal Elliott, described as a representative of Senator Schweiker, and Mary De Oreo, a female researcher.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

1 - 134-16380 (Harry Eugene Schafer)
1 - 134-19699 (Jill D. Schafer)
PWC:dew/rsm (12)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL

HEH

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-327

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

According to the Schafers, Mr. Epstein began the interview with the Schafers by stating the purpose of the Senate Committee and why the Schafers were asked to Washington, D. C. Mr. Epstein stated that the Committee was trying to develop information on what the U. S. intelligence agencies have been doing, what changes in these agencies are needed and "where mistakes might have happened."

The Schafers advised they requested Mr. Epstein to ask them specific questions. He asked them what was the entire period of time of the Schafers' relationship with the FBI and if they were still associated with the Bureau. Mr. Schafer told Mr. Epstein that he was not going to admit any association with the FBI at this point and the reply seemed to greatly upset Mr. Epstein. He asked the Schafers why they had come to Washington, D. C. The Schafers replied they wanted to establish some groundwork for any relationship with the Senate Committee. Mr. Epstein attempted to have the Schafers relate their activities in behalf of the FBI. Mr. Schafer advised they refused to comply due to Mr. Epstein's manner and presentation. The Schafers stated they received the definite impression that Mr. Epstein and his colleagues expected to hear an afternoon of interesting stories and anecdotes.

Mrs. Schafer told Mr. Epstein that they had done nothing wrong, illegal, immoral or unethical in their "movement" activities and they were proud of their contributions to the nation's internal security. The Schafers related they enjoyed a happy relationship with the FBI and they knew of nothing questionable or unprofessional regarding the Bureau's handling of their information. The Schafers said they made it clear that they would be happy to tell the SSC these things; however, since they were not reassured by Mr. Epstein, and were in fact put off by his manner and his colleagues' brusque reactions, they would not furnish anything further to Mr. Epstein. The Schafers stated that short of appearing before the Senate Committee, they wanted to be left alone.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: CONTACT OF MR. AND MRS. SCHAFER WITH STAFF MEMBERS OF SSC

According to the Schafers, Mr. Epstein and his colleagues gave the clear impression that they were disappointed and annoyed with the Schafers' reluctance to tell them anything. Mr. Epstein asked if the Schafers wanted to talk to any of the Senators and the Schafers stated they would be willing to speak to Senator Goldwater; however, Mr. Epstein made no specific arrangements other than to check with Charlie Lombard, Goldwater's representative. Mr. Epstein did not say if the Schafers would be subpoenaed; nor were any firm arrangements made about reimbursing them for their expenses. According to the Schafers, the meeting broke up rather abruptly and Mr. Epstein's colleagues left without saying good-by.

The Schafers stated they made an effort to be friendly, cooperative and amenable to Mr. Epstein and his colleagues, and they made a good faith gesture in appearing before Mr. Epstein in Washington, D. C.

NOTE:

The Schafers, as paid informants, furnished information from October, 1969, until March, 1975, to the Bureau. Information in this LHM was contained in New Orleans teletype to the Director, dated June 11, 1975. Several personal statements made by the Schafers, such as "bearded hippy" in reference to one of Epstein's colleagues, were not included in the LHM as this type of information is not fully germane and our reporting of it might be inferred as our being prejudicial.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
7/3/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

Memorandum furnished to the Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reports results of interview by SSC Staff Members of Harry E. Schafer and his spouse, Jill D. Schafer, formerly confidential informants of the FBI.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

See (8)

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interview failed to provide SSC any significant information due to an unfriendly atmosphere created by the participants resulting in an early termination of the interview.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-2000 BY SP2ALM/RP
MDR-16

WOC/8.
5- file

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395

SFP:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7-2-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities requested a staff interview with former Special Agent David E. Todd about COINTELPRO and the investigation at San Francisco of the Black Panther Party.

At the direction of Bureau teletype 6-9-75, San Francisco on 6-11-75, advised Todd of above and that he was released from the applicable employee secrecy agreement for the purpose of the Staff interview.

By letter dated June 11, 1975, Mr. Todd said the interview "may involve information disseminated to other Government agencies under security classification and may touch on foreign policy as well."

Mr. Todd asked:

1. For written confirmation of the release given him orally as well as a release from the provisions of any applicable executive orders;

2. If there is "any limitation on the scope of the material" he may release; and

3. Whether he will be permitted to "refresh my recollection by reviewing official files prior to or during the interview."

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.
1 - Personal File Special Agent David E. Todd - Enc.
1 - Mr. Miller - Enc.

REC-107

62-116395-326

3 JUL 9 1975

5/8

JDM: PVD:eek
(10)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJ
MDR-16

4 J 1 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

We have prepared an airtel to San Francisco with an enclosed letter for Mr. Todd in response to his request. We are having the San Francisco Office hand deliver the letter so that any questions he may have can be answered.

We have not regarded requests for interviews as "demands" within the meaning of 28 CFR 16.22; therefore, no release from the Department is necessary.

Regarding his request for access to Bureau files, we have not had former employees make this request previously. Our position should be that they not have access but rather rely on their recollection. If they cannot answer a specific question, the Committee can be referred to the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached Airtel with enclosed letter to Mr. Todd be approved and sent.

JBA

wRW

JBA
Rm

DAVID E TODD
20 COZZOLINO DR
MILLBRAE CA 94030

Airmail

CA#75-6203

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/30/83 BY SP-2TAP/RK/dc

Mr. Clarence M. Kelley,
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

~~34 JUL 21 1975~~

20 JUN 17 75

REC- 107 62-116395-325

3 JUL 9 1975

JUN 2 1975

RECEIVED
FOIA SECTION

RECEIVED
JUN 18 5 18 PM 1975
LEGAL COUNSEL

20 Cozzolino Drive
Millbrae, California 94030
June 11, 1975

Mr. Clarence M. Kelley
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Senstudy '75

Dear Mr. Kelley:

On this date Supervisor Berryman of the San Francisco Office read to me a teletype to the effect the Bureau had approved a secrecy release for me to respond to questions from Senate investigator Lester B. Seidel in connection with a Senate Select Committee on Internal Security investigation of the CoIntelPro as it related to the Black Panther Party. A copy of a letter from me to Mr. Seidel has been furnished to the Bureau previously.

At the time I was designated supervisor of the squad handling internal security investigations of the Black Panther Party (BPP), the BPP was international in scope; Eldridge Cleaver and others had been granted asylum in Algeria; the BPP had support and/or branches in France, Germany, Scandinavia and China. Aspects of the counter intelligence program approved by the Bureau of which I am aware were directed against some BPP foreign operations. Thus, interrogation by the Senate investigator may involve information disseminated to other government agencies under security classification and may touch on foreign policy as well.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-1-[illegible] BY SP[illegible]

Therefore, prior to furnishing information obtained in an official capacity to Mr. Seidel, who according to the Bureau's teletype will be in San Francisco in about two weeks, I would like written confirmation of the release which was furnished me orally, preferably an official document covering any secrecy agreement made with the Bureau as well as releasing me from the provisions of any applicable executive orders which preclude disclosure of official information without approval of the Attorney General or an authorized Departmental officer. I would also appreciate being advised if there is any limitation on the scope of the material which I may release.

Since the Bureau's teletype also approved a secrecy release for current SAC Charles Bates, this presupposes he will be authorized to furnish Mr. Seidel with the contents of files if Mr. Seidel so requests. Therefore, I would also appreciate advice as to whether I will be permitted to refresh my recollection by reviewing official files prior to or during the interview with Mr. Seidel.

Sincerely yours,

David E. Todd

David E. Todd
Retired Special Agent

cc: SAC San Francisco

84 JUL 21 1975

THREE

July 2, 1975

airtel

CA#75-6223
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/30/83 BY SP-J TAP/RDS

To: SAC, San Francisco (62-6887)

From: Director, FBI (62-116395)

Subject: SENSTUDY 75

ReButel June 9, 1975.

Enclosed is a letter from the Director to former Special Agent David E. Todd. You, an ASAC, or Senior Supervisor please hand deliver enclosed letter to Mr. Todd immediately.

You are reminded of a memorandum to all employees, Re: "INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES," in which the Director advised this Bureau has pledged its cooperation with the Congress.

Enclosure

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-Personal File Special Agent David E. Todd
1-Mr. Miller

62-116395-324

REC-107 ~~116-116395-324~~

PVD:lgp
(12)

1 - ENCLOSURE

MAILED 6
JUL 3 1975
FBI

3 JUL 9 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
irector Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

July 2, 1975

1 - Personnel File Special Agent
David E. Todd
1 - Mr. Miller

Mr. David E. Todd
20 Cozzolino Drive
Millbrae, California 94030

Dear Mr. Todd:

Thank you for your letter of June 11, 1975.

You are released from the FBI Employment Agreement for the purpose of a Staff interview by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities concerning COINTELPRO and the investigation at San Francisco, California, of the Black Panther Party.

I am not aware of any other release you may require.

Pursuant to your request of June 11, 1975, a Special Agent will be available during the interview to assist you in making a determination whether or not a response should be made to a particular question. This Agent is not to be considered private counsel and he will not be present during the interview.

FBI files will not be made available for the interview.

CA#75-6203

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/30/83 BY SP-3TAP/RBG

Sincerely yours,

REC- 107

ENCLOSURE

62-[illegible]-324

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

3 JUL 9 1975

JDM:PVD:eek
(13)

JBN
PLM

NOTE: Former SA Todd signed a secrecy agreement with the Bureau on 12-3-62.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 931-546

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TUL

DATE: 6/27/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC/LFS

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 6/27/75 James J. Angleton, former Chief, Counter Intelligence Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), telephonically advised SA L. F. Schwartz that he has been in contact with Herbert Itkin, former Bureau Criminal Informant who also had a relationship with CIA. Angleton advised that Itkin is being interviewed today at a local hotel by a Mr. Shea from the Senate Select Committee.

Itkin was successfully operated as a Top Echelon Criminal Informant from April, 1963, until February, 1968, when he was discontinued. He has testified in a number of Bureau cases and his past relationship with CIA and the Bureau has been publicized. We have not been in contact with Itkin for several years.

Angleton advised that he expects that Itkin will contact him some time after completion of his interview and if Angleton learns any information of interest to the Bureau he will advise us.

Angleton also commented that he is being interviewed himself today by Senate Select Committee representatives regarding his knowledge of the "Huston Report."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2ALM/bjr
MDR-16

ACTION:

REC-107 62-116395-323

For information.

3 JUL 9 1975

LFS:adn
(7)
62-116395

84 JUL 11 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - M[illegible]J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

JUNE 27, 1975

TO SACS ATLANTA
BIRMINGHAM
ALBANY
JACKSONVILLE
KNOXVILLE
LOS ANGELES
TAMPA
CHICAGO

PERSONAL ATTENTION
(Attn: T. J. Brownfield)

1 - Mr. W. M. Mooney
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF CONCERNING BUREAU'S FORMER INVESTIGATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF ABOUT THE KING INVESTIGATION. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF

2 - ENCLOSURE

SFP:lhb
(11)

62-116395-322

REC-107

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

3 JUL 9 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 27 1975
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/PJ

MDR-16

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

84 JUL 15 1975

GPO 971-546

SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE IS NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ATLANTA: INCUMBENTS - DONALD P. BURGESS, RICHARD E. FUGATT, EDMUND F. HAGGERTY, O. RICHARD HAMILTON, CHARLES T. HAYNES, WILBUR W. SEITZER, ROBERT W. THOMSON. FORMER - MARION E. CHEEK, 1613 GAIL AVENUE, ALBANY, GEORGIA 31705; CHARLES T. HARDING, 2243 PINECLIFF DRIVE, NORTHEAST, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30345.

BIRMINGHAM: LAWRENCE T. GURLEY, 1340 WESTMINISTER PLACE, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35235.

ALBANY: HENRY G. ROWSE, JR., 39 NORTH MAIN STREET, ENOSBURG FALLS, VERMONT 05450.

JACKSONVILLE: WILLIAM LEE BOLYARD - INCUMBENT.

KNOXVILLE: W. JOHN BENTON - INCUMBENT.

LOS ANGELES: JAMES M. KELLOGG - INCUMBENT.

TAMPA: JAMES E. MCMAHON, 3110 COCOS ROAD, TAMPA, FLORIDA 33618.

CHICAGO: JOHN BASSETT - INCUMBENT.

NOTE:

Legal Counsel Division has obtained an advanced copy of a letter dated 6/24/75 from John T. Elliff of the SSC Staff to K. William O'Connor of the Deputy AG's Office (copy attached) which makes reference to prior SSC requests concerning the King investigation and asks for the present offices of assignment or last known addresses of 19 individuals. The list had 21 names, two of which were duplicates. Several

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4

NOTE CONTINUED:

of the names were misspelled but we have been able to fairly well establish that the individuals they are interested in are those listed above. Included in the list were the following supervisors presently assigned at FBIHQ: William D. Campbell - Laboratory, Joseph H. O'Rourke - Training Division and Timothy Dorch - INTD. The caution taken herein in alerting former employees, as well as incumbents, is same we have taken by previous teletypes to selected SACs. After dispatch instant teletype, copies will be filed in personnel files of all named herein. The referenced 5/2/75 teletype was to all offices furnishing background regarding Senstudy 75. We are separately handling necessary response to the SSC.

OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

June 26, 1975

TO: Paul Daly

FROM: Bill O'Connor

Please obtain the requested addresses and return to me in a form to be provided to the SSC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/RAF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-322

FBI

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED
JUN 26 1975

June 24, 1975

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJP
MDR16

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Pursuant to our telephone conversation of this date, I am making the following request which relates to matters originally covered in Appendix D, items 5, 6, 9, 13, and 20.

Please provide the present offices of assignment or last known addresses of the following agents or former agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

Donald Burgess
Robert T. Thompson
Richard Hamilton
Charles Haynes
John Benton
James Kellogg
James McCann
Henry Rouse
Charles Harding
Charles Haynes
Richard Hamilton
Timothy Gorch
Richard Fuggett
Larry Gurley
John Bassett
Marion Cheek
Ed Hagerty
William Sitesis
Joseph O'Rorick
William Bolliard
William D. Campbell

Jan –
Send To Paul Daly for Action Today 6/26. Tickle 7/1. B.

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JUN 25 1975
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

Note to Paul Daly
Pls obtain the requested addresses & net to me in a form to be provided to SSC. 1/x. B

RECEIVED
JUN 26 1975
KWOC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

62-116395-322 file
62-116395
S. B

ENCLOSURE

All of these individuals are believed to possess information relevant to the Martin Luther King matter. With the exception of Mr. Gurley and Mr. Campbell, all of these persons are believed to have served at either the Atlanta or Albany, Georgia, office of the FBI. We understand that Mr. Gurley and Mr. Campbell were at one time assigned to headquarters.

It would be most helpful if this information could be provided telephonically to Mr. Michael T. Epstein of our staff.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/25/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

ORIGINAL ONLY

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

PURPOSE:

To advise that representatives of Intelligence Division this date reviewed 693-page CIA document containing information relating to joint ventures involving CIA and other members of intelligence community in sensitive matters, and a specific request has been made for CIA to furnish this Bureau with copies of all material contained therein believed to have a bearing on FBI activities.

DETAILS:

By memorandum 6/24/75 you were advised that arrangements had been effected whereby a CIA representative would on 6/25/75 bring to FBIHQ a copy of the 693-page document containing a series of memoranda and reports prepared by CIA citing instances wherein CIA may have engaged in activities outside the perimeter of its charter. As you have been advised, members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) have had prior access to this document and it contains numerous references to FBI-CIA joint ventures, some of which are of an extremely sensitive nature. CIA Director William Colby authorized a review of this document and agreed to this Bureau obtaining a copy of material contained therein believed pertinent to this Bureau's operations.

REC-102 62-116395-321

On 6/25/75, Mrs. Harriet Mowitt, Executive Secretary of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group, appeared at Bureau Headquarters with the 693-page document divided into three packages. These

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/BG
MDR-16

62-116395

3 JUL 7 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TJM:lhb lhb
(1)

CONTINUED - OVER

5

84 JUL 8 1975

packages were reviewed by Section Chief William O. Cregar and Special Agents Leon F. Schwartz and Thomas J. McNiff in Room 4123 JEH.

Material contained therein runs the entire gambit from CIA cooperation, and in some instances financing, of Bureau sensitive operations in foreign intelligence field, to CIA involvement in domestic affairs including cooperation with police departments and other Federal agencies. In all, it was determined that approximately 174 pages of the document contain information which in some respect has a bearing on this Bureau's operations.

Pertinent page numbers were identified to Mrs. Mowitt and she is taking this Bureau's request for these pages back to CIA Headquarters for the purpose of obtaining authorization to furnish this Bureau with copies of the pages in which this Bureau is interested. Mrs. Mowitt advised that she would insure our request in this respect received expeditious attention and she will furnish us with the results at the earliest time.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. Above submitted for information. You will be kept advised of developments.

TJM
LFS

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: June 20, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75 (62-116395)

Attached is a FD 302 reporting a conversation SA Paul V. Daly had with Mr. Paul Wallach, staff member of United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The gist of the conversation is that Mr. Wallach informed SA Daly that he had a list of national security mail covers which cover the last five years and that he would use this list for committee business including for interview purposes if the Bureau did not promptly comply with the Committee's request for a list of mail covers.

The contents of the attached FD 302, were orally furnished on 6-18-75 to Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Michael Shaheen of the Department. Mr. Shaheen and Mr. O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, contacted F. A. O. Schwartz, Chief Counsel to the Senate Select Committee, to protest Mr. Wallach's actions. Mr. Wallach denied, in a conversation with Mr. O'Connor, that he had stated he had such a list to SA Daly. Subsequent to this conversation with Mr. O'Connor, and on the same day according to Mr. Shaheen, Wallach called Shaheen and told Shaheen that he wanted to talk to him off the record, at which point Mr. Wallach stated that he had access to a list of mail covers through a source of his, but did not have possession of same. He also stated that he may have suggested to SA Daly that he had such a list.

Mr. Shaheen stated that it was obvious that Wallach could not be trusted and remarked that the Department had been keeping book on him. Shaheen informed SA Daly that Wallach

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

PVD:eek
(7)

62-116395-320

REC-102

15 JUL 3 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/PP

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ENCLOSURE

84 8 1975.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

had contacted Mr. Cox, Chief Counsel for the United States Postal Service, at which time he informed Mr. Cox that the White House had authorized the release of all national security mail covers, and requested Cox furnish same to him. According to Shaheen, Cox then contacted the White House to determine if Wallach's story was in fact true, at which time James Wilderotter, Assistant Counsel to the President, advised that Wallach's name was unfamiliar to him, and that he had not been given authority to obtain national security mail covers. Mr. Shaheen stated he, at the direction of Mr. O'Connor, was furnishing the Bureau in writing, a report of his conversations with Wallach and also stated that O'Connor stated he would no longer have any dealings with Wallach because of the obvious unethical conduct and lack of honesty on Wallach's part.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

JLF

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY 5P2ALM/jlf
MDR-16

Enclosure

116395

FD-302 (REV. 11-27-70)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 6-18-75

Mr. Paul Wallach, staff member of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, telephonically contacted me on 6-18-75 between 2:30 and 3 o'clock P. M., and inquired as to the status of a request by the Committee concerning mail cover information. He asked if I could furnish him a time when he might expect our response to be delivered to him. He pointed out that he had had previous discussions with me and Mr. Shaheen of the Department concerning this matter, and Mr. Shaheen had indicated to him that he could expect the response to have been given to him by this time. Mr. Wallach was informed that a time certain for delivery of a response concerning this request could not be given, and it was explained to him that a vast amount of material was being reviewed pursuant to request of the Senate Select Committee and other committees of Congress and that because of the amount of work involved in all these requests it was not possible to make a judgment as to the date of the response.

Mr. Wallach indicated he felt he had been misled by Mr. Shaheen into believing that he would have a response to his request and that he was going to recontact Mr. Shaheen. He made a general inquiry as to whether one Agent might be gathering all the information and as to whether he might be allowed to come to FBI Headquarters and review what has been gathered to this point. He was informed that all disclosures have to receive proper Bureau approval and that it would not be possible for him to review such information in the absence of such approval. He asked if the Bureau could separate the response by making available immediately portions of the mail cover lists such as the identities of people who were the targets of mail covers in the domestic field. He again was informed that this was not possible in the absence of proper approval. Mr. Wallach stated that he wanted me to know that he was in possession of a list of Bureau mail covers for the past five years which he had been furnished by a source whom he did not identify. He was asked (1) if this list concerned the mail covers in the national security areas and, (2) was it a national list. Mr. Wallach stated it was a national list in the national security areas. He stated he was not sure of its accuracy. He indicated that he would have no reservations about using the list to conduct the Senate Select Committee business and stated that interviews may be conducted based on the list.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/BF
MDR-16

Interviewed on 6-18-75 at Washington, D. C. File #

by Paul V. Daly Date dictated 6-18-75

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

He was advised that the list would contain sensitive information which would seriously impair ongoing Bureau investigations. He replied that the names were not classified, and since they were not classified he would have no problem in using the list. It was explained to Mr. Wallach that despite the fact it was not classified the list would be extremely sensitive since it would impair many ongoing investigations and in many instances the very fact that we are interested in an individual indicates that we are in possession of sensitive information concerning that individual. Mr. Wallach pointed out that if this were the case, acknowledging that he had been informed previously that one of the reasons for the necessity for closely reviewing the material to be made available was because of this problem, then the Bureau should come forward with its own list and point out to him which of the names are sensitive and which are not. Mr. Wallach stated that only one or two other people had knowledge of the fact he possessed such a list.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/26/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum 6/6/75 related contact with Legal Counsel Division by former SA Richard H. Davis who had been contacted by Michael Epstein, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee (SSC), who desired to interview Davis in Atlanta, Georgia, concerning the former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr., Stanley David Levison and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Davis requested a Bureau representative be made available for consultation purposes during the interview and that Davis would contact FBIHQ as soon as a date and place of interview had been determined. Approval has already been granted by the Bureau for the release of Davis from his employment agreement for purpose of the interview and you (Mr. Wannall) designated S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project to be the Bureau representative at the interview.

Phillips took a telephone call this morning from former SA Alan G. Sentinella (has already been interviewed and testified before the SSC) who advised that he had been contacted earlier this morning by Richard Davis. Davis told Sentinella that Epstein had called him 6/25/75 and made an appointment to interview Davis in Atlanta (exact site unknown) 2:00 p.m., Tuesday, 7/8/75. Davis had first tried to reach Charles Haynes, a supervisor in the Atlanta Office, on 6/25/75 and, being unable to do so, decided to pass the information to Sentinella as he knew that Sentinella had had several contacts with FBIHQ in relation to Sentinella's own testimony and Davis requested Sentinella to pass the information to FBIHQ. Davis gave his

On 7/1/75 Epstein adv. that int. postponed indefinitely. B

62-116395

62-116395-319

REC-102

3 JUL 8 1975

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former SA Richard H. Davis)

SFP:lhb lhb
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/BF
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

5

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUL 9 1975

telephone numbers at Atlanta (Code 404) as 294-2786 (office) and 633-1079 (residence). Davis is scheduled to be on vacation the week preceding the interview.

ACTION:

On the basis of the prior FBI release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of the interview, Intelligence Division will contact Davis in advance through the Atlanta Office and arrange for Phillips to consult with Davis immediately prior to the interview and be available for consultation purposes at the time of the interview. This is in accordance with the procedure we have been following in connection with interviews of former Bureau personnel.

JAM

wRW

The Attorney General

June 12, 1975

Director, FBI

1-Mr. J. B. Adams
1-Mr. H. N. Bassett
2-Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1-Mr. P. V. Daly

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by Staff Members of captioned Committee of Miss Helen W. Gandy, former Executive Assistant to the Director of the FBI. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - 67- (Personnel File of Helen W. Gandy)

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

HM:jvl
(12)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY

MDR-16

3 - ENCLOSURE

REC- 104

62-116395-318

3 JUL 7 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUL 9 1975

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Bassett

62-116395

June 12, 1975

2-Mr. Mintz
(1-Mr. Hotis)
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Daly

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY,
FORMER EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO
THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI, BY SSC
STAFF MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2001 BY
MDR-16

The following information concerning the interview of Miss Helen W. Gandy by members of the Staff of the SSC in Washington, D. C., on May 15, 1975, was voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Miss Gandy and by Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director of the FBI, who was present during the interview at the request of Miss Gandy.

Miss Gandy was interviewed by Staff Members Mark Gitenstein and Michael Epstein from approximately 10:30 a. m. to 1:00 p. m., and from 2:00 p. m. to 3:00 p. m. Staff Member Martha Talley was also present during the morning session of the interview. Miss Gandy was not placed under oath, and she was not advised of her rights or that she could be represented by personal counsel.

The questioning of Miss Gandy was directed primarily toward obtaining information on procedures and personnel in the office of former Director Hoover, on the floor plan of Mr. Hoover's office suite, on the "Official and Confidential" (OC) files maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, and on the destruction of Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence by Miss Gandy after Mr. Hoover's death.

Miss Gandy said she was asked about the setup of Mr. Hoover's office suite and that the questions showed a special interest in the rear exit of the suite. She explained that this exit was

1 - 67- (Personnel File of Helen W. Gandy)

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

HM:jvl
(12)

62-116395-318

ENCLOSURE

SEE NOTE PAGE TEN

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

used by Mr. Hoover since it was most convenient to his private office. Mr. Mohr stated that Mr. Gitenstein had attempted to draw a chart of Mr. Hoover's office. Since that chart was a poor one, Mr. Gitenstein asked Mr. Mohr to draw a rough chart of the office, which Mr. Mohr did. Mr. Mohr recalls that he inadvertently omitted the supply room from the chart; which room, he said, would have been of little or no significance to the questioners since it contained only supplies and no files. Mr. Mohr said concerning the back door to Mr. Hoover's office, that interviewers were informed that persons visiting Mr. Hoover were not brought through this back door, which was for Mr. Hoover's use.

Miss Gandy was asked by Staff Members about the use of the conference room, who attended the conferences, and the purpose of the conferences. She said that Mr. Mohr explained that the Director at these conferences discussed with FBI officials matters regarding FBI administration and policy. She was also asked about the contents of bookcases in the conference room which contained criminal code volumes, ring binders of interesting cases, and miscellaneous books.

Miss Gandy was asked how many file cabinets were in her office. She answered that she could not be positive but she believed there were approximately ten or twelve cabinets of five drawers each. These cabinets were secured with special locks and the key was kept in a special locked key cabinet.

Miss Gandy was asked for the names of other employees in Mr. Hoover's office and she provided the names of Miss Edna Holmes, Mrs. Erma Metcalf, Miss Ruth McCord, Miss Nancy Ann Mooney and Mr. Ronald E. Thompson.

Miss Gandy was asked if the Office Manager, Miss Holmes, had files in her office and she answered,"no." She was asked if the Office Manager's secretary, Miss McCord, had files in her office and she answered that Miss McCord did have those files necessary to her supervision of office personnel and maintenance. She also explained the function of the office receptionist.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY

Miss Gandy was asked whether files were kept in the Telephone Room and answered that the only files kept there were background material necessary to the functioning of that office. She was asked if a record was kept of telephone calls and visitors to the Director. She replied that a daily log was maintained, and that these logs were permanently filed in the main Bureau files.

Miss Gandy was asked if files were kept in the office of the mail clerk, Miss Mooney. She answered "yes," and described these files as mainly photograph files and scrapbooks.

Concerning the mail in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Mohr said Mr. Gitenstein raised a question about "Expedite Processing" of mail, to which Miss Gandy replied that the personal and confidential mail for Mr. Hoover was handled by Miss Mooney and that she, Miss Gandy, was not aware of just how this mail was handled. Mr. Mohr said he explained to the questioners that this mail was received in the Routing Unit of the Records and Communications Division and was taken unopened to Miss Mooney, who opened it. The clerical employee who brought the mail then logged it and stamped "Expedite Processing" on the left-hand edge. Then, the clerical employee would take the log back to the Routing Unit and when the mail was subsequently returned to the Routing Unit for regular filing purposes, the item would be crossed off the log. Mr. Mohr said Mr. Gitenstein wanted to know if the "Expedite Processing" logs were maintained permanently and Mr. Mohr answered that to his knowledge the logs were not kept after the items on a particular log had been accounted for.

Mr. Mohr said that Miss Gandy was asked about procedures regarding Mr. Hoover's commitments and she explained that each morning the employees in the Telephone Room prepared a "commitment card" of Mr. Hoover's commitments for the day and this card was placed on Mr. Hoover's desk the first thing in the morning for his information. Miss Gandy told the questioners that she received a copy of the commitment card and that these cards were not retained permanently. Mr. Mohr said that it was explained to the interviewers that the Bureau had an instruction that items of a temporary nature were to be destroyed after they were 90 days old and Miss Gandy indicated to the interviewers that commitment cards were in this category. Mr. Mohr said Miss Gandy was queried at length as to just how Telephone Room employees got their information to make up the commitment card and she explained that all employees in Mr. Hoover's office made certain the Telephone Room employees were promptly advised of all Mr. Hoover's commitments as they were made.

Further, concerning the Telephone Room, Mr. Mohr said the interviewers were informed that calls for Mr. Hoover were received in the Bureau switchboard and were then referred to the Telephone Room in Mr. Hoover's office. The employees in the Telephone Room connected Mr. Hoover with the calls. Mr. Mohr said the interviewers asked whether the Telephone Room "screened" Mr. Hoover's calls and that they were informed that the Telephone Room did not "screen" them except for "nut" calls.

Miss Gandy said she informed interviewers, in response to questions, that she did receive calls from persons wishing to speak with Mr. Hoover and if he was in his office, the calls would be transferred to his Telephone Room. She said Mr. Gitenstein made a remark about a special telephone connection between Mr. Hoover and former Attorney General Robert Kennedy and also remarked that Mr. Hoover and former Attorney General John Mitchell also had a special telephone connection. Miss Gandy said she corrected Mr. Gitenstein immediately by informing him that no special telephone connection existed with any Attorney General except Attorney General Kennedy.

Concerning the OC files maintained in Mr. Hoover's office suite, Miss Gandy said she informed the interviewers that these files were kept in a locked file cabinet and occupied about one and one half or two file drawers. In answer to questions from the interviewers, Miss Gandy said she informed them that on the day of Mr. Hoover's death she spoke with Mr. Clyde Tolson, who was then Acting Director of the FBI, and with Mr. Mohr and asked to whom she should deliver the OC files and other Bureau material contained in Mr. Hoover's office.

Mr. Tolson instructed that the OC files and all other Bureau material such as interesting cases, monographs and manuals be delivered to Mr. Mark Felt who then was Assistant Director-Deputy Associate Director of the FBI. Miss Gandy said she was exhaustively questioned by Mr. Epstein as to whether she called Mr. Tolson or he called her and concerning Mr. Tolson's location at the time. Miss Gandy said she told Mr. Epstein that at this late date she had no idea who called whom but Mr. Epstein was assured that she and Mr. Tolson communicated. She was also asked when Mr. Tolson arrived at Mr. Hoover's house on the morning of Mr. Hoover's death. She answered that Mr. Tolson arrived there soon after Mr. Hoover's body was discovered. Miss Gandy said she asked the interviewers if they desired more details of that morning and was told that they did not.

Miss Gandy said she told the interviewers that Mr. Tolson's instructions were carried out. The OC files and the index cards pertaining to them and the other Bureau material mentioned above were placed in cartons and delivered to Mr. Felt. She was asked who delivered the cartons to Mr. Felt's office and answered that she believed that the delivery was handled by messengers or maintenance personnel, but indicated she was not certain about this.

Miss Gandy said she told the interviewers that as soon as Mr. L. Patrick Gray III was named to head the FBI, Mr. Felt brought him to the Director's office to afford him an idea of the office setup. After Mr. Gray indicated a very special interest in the files in her office, the contents of these files were explained to him and he was invited to view the contents. Mr. Gray did glance through a drawer and obviously was satisfied that they contained personal correspondence only and was also satisfied that the Bureau material had been delivered to Mr. Felt.

Miss Gandy said one of the interviewers remarked that there appeared to be more OC files than had been indicated and that a larger number had been given to Attorney General Levi. She responded that she would not know whether other files had been added to the group after they had been delivered to Mr. Felt. Mr. Gitenstein, she said, attempted to show her a pamphlet apparently containing testimony of the Attorney General which described certain of the files in question. Mr. Gitenstein asked her about specific cases in the OC files and she told him that after three years she would not presume to try to remember specifics. Mr. Gitenstein asked if there was a file containing reports from the Washington Field Office. She told him that she certainly would not remember such a file, if one existed.

Miss Gandy said there was much questioning about the index cards which pertained to the OC files. She told the interviewers that they were filed in one index file, that cards of a different color were used and that this index file was locked.

Miss Gandy said she told the interviewers that strictly personal correspondence of Mr. Hoover had been contained in the file cabinets in her office and that from time to time during the past fifty years, files which were no longer current were eliminated. Concerning the destruction of Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence, she told interviewers that on the day of Mr. Hoover's death, she advised Mr. Tolson of Mr. Hoover's expressed instruction that his personal correspondence be destroyed, that Mr. Hoover had begun a review of these personal files sometime prior to his death and that some of them had been already destroyed.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY

Miss Gandy said she told the interviewers that up until the time she left the Bureau, she continued to tear up the contents of Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence files and deposited the contents of the files in the "confidential trash" waste baskets. Mr. Mohr said Mr. Epstein wanted to know if a log was maintained of items placed in the confidential trash baskets for destruction. Mr. Mohr informed Mr. Epstein that it would be ridiculous to think that such a log could be maintained and Mr. Mohr advised him exactly how confidential trash is destroyed in the Bureau. Mr. Mohr said he informed Mr. Epstein of the Bureau files that were scattered over the streets of Southwest Washington as a result of the Department of Justice engaging in destruction of some of its files. Mr. Mohr said this reference permitted an immediate termination of any questions regarding the destruction of confidential trash.

Miss Gandy said she told interviewers she asked Mr. Gray if, in order to vacate the office as soon as possible for his convenience, she could have his approval to send to Mr. Hoover's house the personal correspondence files which could not be disposed of before the date of her retirement, so that she could finish the task there. Mr. Gray did not hesitate to give her this permission. Mr. Felt, who was present when she spoke with Mr. Gray in her office, suggested that a locked room, on the fifth floor, with a key only she would have, could be made available so the files could be disposed of without moving. Miss Gandy said that would not be necessary and Mr. Gray agreed. At this point Mr. Gitenstein asked Miss Gandy if she thought she might not be the only one with a key. Miss Gandy asked Mr. Gitenstein what he would have thought and she said Mr. Gitenstein smiled and said he would have thought that.

Miss Gandy said that at a point in the interview when the questioning appeared to be getting pretty far afield, she said to the interviewers that if they were trying to learn whether the OC files contained anything that would be used for political purposes, the answer was no and that she had never found the need to lie about anything.

Mr. Mohr said that Miss Gandy, when she was describing to the interviewers exactly how Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence files were destroyed, said she reviewed each item that she handled to make sure that it was not related to Bureau official business. Mr. Mohr said Miss Gandy had previously indicated that Mrs. Erma Metcalf had assisted her in destroying these files, but Miss Gandy did not mention that Mrs. Metcalf made the same type of review and Miss Gandy was not questioned regarding whether Mrs. Metcalf made such a review as she went through the files and helped destroy them.

Mr. Mohr said that during the interview a rather heated conversation occurred over some of the questions which seemed to be repetitious and irrelevant. Mr. Mohr said he told Mr. Gitenstein he felt it was high time the questioners quit "beating around the bush" and come to the point by asking Miss Gandy if she ever destroyed any official and confidential files. Mr. Gitenstein replied that they had a discrepancy concerning the OC files in that a reliable source had reported that Mr. Mark Felt had five two-drawer cabinets marked "O and C Files" in his office. Miss Gandy on the other hand told Mr. Gitenstein in response to a question that she had turned over to Mr. Felt after Mr. Hoover's death, as she recollected, one and one half drawers and possibly two drawers of OC files. Mr. Mohr said he explained to Mr. Gitenstein that Miss Gandy would have no way of knowing what files Mr. Felt had in his office and if there was a discrepancy, the person to resolve it was Mr. Felt, who Mr. Gitenstein had said had been interviewed by him and had been cooperative.

Mr. Mohr said he had previously explained to Mr. Gitenstein, in response to questions at the time Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Staff Members, that at the time Mr. William C. Sullivan had furnished the data of 17 White House telephone tapes to Mr. Mardian in the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, Mr. Hoover had instructed that any Assistant Director or Bureau official who had files in his office that he considered confidential and relating to the Bureau's work would immediately transfer such files to Mr. Felt and prepare a memorandum stating exactly what was transferred to Mr. Felt. Mr. Mohr said he told Mr. Gitenstein he, Mr. Mohr, had no idea how many files Mr. Felt collected as a result of Mr. Hoover's instruction. Mr. Mohr said it was interesting to note that he was not asked at any time whether he had turned over any files to Mr. Felt in connection with Mr. Hoover's instructions.

Mr. Mohr stated that Miss Gandy was asked during her interview whether there were any files of Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence in Mr. Hoover's former home at the present time and Miss Gandy replied,"no."

Mr. Mohr said Mr. Epstein questioned Miss Gandy at length concerning her title as "Executive Assistant." Mr. Epstein wanted to know when she acquired this title and she said she could not recall. Mr. Epstein asked whether anyone else at the FBI had occupied this position and Miss Gandy explained that she was the only employee with the title of Executive Assistant who had served under Mr. Hoover during his tenure in office. Mr. Epstein seemed to pay a great deal of attention to the title Executive Assistant and Mr. Mohr attempted to explain to him that the title was a Civil Service Commission (CSC) title and that Miss Gandy's position was set up under the Classification Act administered by the CSC. Mr. Mohr said he was not sure what was behind Mr. Epstein's lengthy questioning about this title, but Mr. Mohr got the impression that Mr. Epstein may have been trying to find out if Miss Gandy acted for Mr. Hoover on her own initiative. Mr. Mohr said this was just a guess on his part.

Miss Gandy said that at one point during the interview, the questions concerned Mr. Hoover's being advised of Bureau matters. She said the interviewers were told by her and by Mr. Mohr that Mr. Hoover was never out of touch with the Bureau, day or night, whether he was in town or out of town.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY

NOTE:

The original and one copy of this LHM is being furnished to the Attorney General. The copy is to be forwarded by the Attorney General to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information in this LHM was taken from notes supplied by Mr. John P. Mohr and Miss Helen Gandy. These notes are attached to the file copy of this LHM.

~~J.~~ J. B. ADAMS
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

1a = drew a chart of Mr. H's office - identified people and things in large rm.

1. Expedite processing = how handled?

2. Executive Assistant = ?

3. O.C. Files were maintained in big Conf Rm in "black" folders. didn't mention supply rm. = oversight.

4. Destruction of Per Con files = Miss G. said she reviewed each item to make sure none related to Bu. Bus.

5. Miss Gandy explained a log was kept of all visitors seen by Mr. H. = also log was kept of all phone calls taken by Mr. H.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/PP [illegible]

6. Asked re. Mr. H's Commandments = who Tel. Rm prepared + were they retained = no.

7. All calls to Mr. H. came thru the Director's phone rm.

8. Re. O.C. File = reliable source told them Felt had 5 - 2 drawer cabinets marked O C files - discrepancy? why not ask Felt. Also re. Files we had to [illegible] Felt

J. B. ADAMS
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9. Are there any files - pers & corres. in Hoover's former home now = Miss Gandy - no.

10. Re. Confidential trash = Epstein wants to know if log was kept - since new.

11. Re back door = who used = any files in hallway - no.

Mr. Mohr.

I didn't mention the questions re expedite processing nor the close questioning re the Ex-Assistant title. You explained those items.

Hope I remembered enough.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJF
MDR-16

May 15, 1975

Present at questioning - Mark Gitenstein
Mike Epstein
Martha Talley (morning session only)
John P. Mohr
Helen W. Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/sfe
MDR-16

The first questions concerned the set-up of the Director's office suite. Special interest was indicated in the rear exit of the suite and it was explained that this exit was used by the Director as it was most convenient to his private office. Mr. Mohr also mentioned the kitchen and lavatory, as the questioners appeared to be completely unfamiliar with the arrangement of the suite.

Next, the conference room was described and in answer to questions the use of the conference room was explained - also, information was given re the contents of the bookcases in this room, ie, miscellaneous books; the Criminal Code volumns; the ring binders of Interesting Cases.

Numerous questions were asked:

How often did the Director call conferences of the officials of the Bureau -
what were the purposes of these conferences -
just who attended them -
were they called by the Director - and was this at set and regular intervals.

Mr. Mohr explained that the Director from time to time, as he reviewed matters of policy and like matters that came to his attention, made notes which he discussed with the officials, giving them his ideas on these matters and in turn listening to their views. These sessions considered ~~xxxx~~ all matters re Bureau administration and policy.

Three; The physical set-up of the office of the Executive Assistant:

I was asked re the number of file cases in my office - I answered that I could not, at this date, be positive, but I believe there were approximately ten or twelve five-drawer cabinets -

What were the contents of these cabinets and where were the so-called o.c. files - were the o.c. files contained in combination locked cabinets -

I answered that all of the cabinets in my office were secured with special locks and key, and that the key was kept in a special locked key-cabinet in this office.

Questions-did I receive calls for the Director from his friends and others, and did I transfer them to his desk; did I make memoranda of such calls; did I keep a diary; (Mr. Gitenstein made a remark re a special telephone connection between the Director and "Bobby", apparently thought better of it, and remarked that Mr. Mitchell had such a connection)

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-319

He was immediately corrected by me to the effect that no such connection existed with Attorneys General other than Attorney General Kennedy.

I answered that I did receive calls from persons wishing to speak with the Director; that, if he were in his office, such calls would be transferred to the Director's Office telephone room to be connected with the Director if he should be in his office and could take the call. (Here Mr. Mohr explained in detail the system of handling telephone calls in the Director's office and the functions of the FBI telephone switchboard.)

It was explained that the file cabinets in my office contained strictly personal correspondence of the Director; that from time to time during the past fifty years files which were no longer current were eliminated.

Re the so-called o.c. files - it was explained that these files were located in one of the locked cabinets; that there were, possibly one and a half or two file drawers of these. In answer to questioning it was explained that on the day of Mr. Hoover's death I spoke with both Mr. Tolson, who at that time was Acting Director, and Mr. Mohr, and asked for instructions as to whom I should deliver the official-confidential files and other Bureau material contained in the Director's offices. I also advised Mr. Tolson of Mr. Hoover's expressed instructions that his personal correspondence be destroyed, and that he, Mr. Hoover, had begun a review of these personal files sometime previous to his death, and some already had been destroyed. Mr. Tolson instructed that the official-confidential files and all other Bureau material, ie, Interesting Cases; monographs, Manuals, be delivered to Mr. Mark Felt. (Here, I was asked where the Bureau material was kept and answered that bookcases in my office were used for this purpose.

I was exhaustively questioned by Mr. Epstein as to whether I called Mr. Tolson (and where he was located at the time) or whether Mr. Tolson called me. I told him that at this late date I had no idea as to who called whom, but that he was assured that Mr. Tolson and I communicated. I also was asked when Mr. Tolson arrived at Mr. Hoover's house on the morning in question and/he was told Mr. Tolson arrived after Mr. Hoover's body was discovered. (I asked if more details of that morning were desired and was told no.)

I explained that instructions were immediately carried out; the o.c. files, with the*index cards pertaining to them, together with the above mentioned Bureau material, was placed in cartons and delivered to Mr. Felt. I was asked who carried these cartons to Mr. Felt's office and said I could not at this date answer this but I believe they would have been carried by either messengers or maintenance personnel.

*There was quite much questioning here as to how and where the index cards were filed. It was explained that they were filed in the one index file, cards of a different color being used, and that this file also was locked.

In connection with the above authorizations it was explained that as soon as Mr. Gray was named as the new Director Mr. Felt brought him to the Director's office to afford him an idea of the office set-up; that Mr. Gray indicated a very special interest in the files in my office; that their contents were explained to him and that he was invited to view the contents. He did glance thru a drawer and obviously was satisfied that they contained personal correspondence only, and was also satisfied that the Bureau material had been delivered to Mr. Felt. One of the questioners remarked that there appeared to be more o.c. files than had been indicated; that a larger number had been given to Attorney General Levi...I remarked that I would not know whether other files had been added to the group after they had been delivered to Mr. Felt. Mr. Gitenstein then attempted to show me a pamphlet indicating what appeared to be testimony of the Attorney General describing certain of the files in question and asked questions re specific cases which were contained in the o.c. files. I told him I would not presume, after three years, to try to remember specifics. He asked if there were a file containing reports from the Washington Field Office. I told him certainly I would not remmember such a file, if one existed.

To questions regarding the destruction of personal correspondence files I explained that up until the time I left the Bureau I continued to tear up and deposit the contents of these files in the "confidential trash" waste baskets; (Mr. Mohr here explained this method of disposal.) that I had asked Mr. Gray if, in order to vacate the office as soon as possible for his convenience, I could have his approval to send to Mr. Hoover's house files which could not be disposed of before my date of retirement and finish the task there. He did not hesitate to give me this permission. (Mr. Felt, who was present when I spoke with Mr. Gray (in my office) suggested that a locked room on the fifth floor, with a key only I would have, could be made available so the files would be disposed of without moving. I said that would not be necessary and Mr. Gray agreed. At this point Mr. Gitenstein asked me if I thought I might not be the only one with a key. I asked him what he would have thought and he smiled and said he would have thought that.

Four: Questions were asked, in further connection with the set-up of the office and personnel.

The office of the Office Manager (Miss Holmes). Did she have file cases in her office. The answer was "no".

The office of the secretary to the Office Manager (Miss McCord) Were there files in her office and if so what did they contain. The answer was "yes" and the contents were material necessary for use by the Office Manager in connection with her supervision of the office personnel, ~~andxmaintainingxthe~~ and maintainance.

The reception room. The function of the receptionist was explained.

The telephone room. Here, again, close questioning re files kept in this office. Assurance was given that the only files kept here were background material necessary to the functioning of the office. Questions were asked if records were made of telephone calls and visitors to the Director. Information was given that a daily log was maintained, and it was described. Question was asked re where and how long the logs were maintained. Answer was that they were permanently filed in the main Bureau files. Mail clerk's (Miss Mooney) office. Were there files here? Answer was yes, mainly photograph files and also the scrap books.

The names of Miss Holmes - Mrs. Metcalf - Miss McCord - Ron Thompson and Miss Mooney were requested and given.

At one point during the sessions in being questioned re the Director's being advised of Bureau matters the questioners were told by both Mr. Mohr and me that Mr. Hoover never was out of touch with the Bureau, day or night, whether in town or out of town.

Also, I said at a point when the questioning appeared to be getting pretty far afield, if what they were trying to learn was whether there was contained in the o.c. files anything that would be used for political purpose, the answer was NO - that I had never found the need to lie about anything.

5/23/75

RE: MISS GANDY'S QUESTIONING BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING FUNCTIONS

Miss Gandy and I appeared before the staff of the subcommittee for questioning on May 15, 1975, our appointment being set for 10:30 a.m. The group consisting of Messrs. Gitenstein, Epstein and M. S. Talley immediately proceeded to the former Carroll Arms Apartment building which is now used as an office building by the U.S. Senate. We were taken to the sixth floor where we entered an empty office which contained telephone equipment, some chairs, and a desk.

Mr. Gitenstein had apparently drawn up a list of questions he wished to discuss with Miss Gandy and he referred to this list throughout the questioning period.

There is attached a rough draft memorandum consisting of four pages and dated May 15, 1975, which was prepared by Miss Gandy concerning her recollection of what transpired during the interview. The interview, incidentally, lasted until 1 p.m. when a one-hour break was taken for lunch. The session reconvened at 2 p.m. and was terminated at 3 p.m.

I am setting forth hereafter in numbered paragraphs items which I recollect transpired during the interview which should be helpful in embellishing Miss Gandy's memorandum.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-1-2001 BY SP2 ACM/Bup
MDR-16

(1) During the early part of the questioning, Mr. Gitenstein attempted to draw a chart of Mr. Hoover's office in the Department of Justice building. He said he had previously visited Mr. Kelley's suite in the Justice Building. His effort at charting the office was poor at best and he requested my assistance. A rough chart was drawn showing Mr. Hoover's personal office on one end and Miss Mooney's office on the other end. In making up the chart I inadvertently left out the supply room which, of course, would have been of little or no significance to the questioners since this room contained supplies only and no files.

62-116395-318

ENCLOSURE

(2) Sometime during the interview, Mr. Gitenstein raised a question about "Expedite Processing" of mail and how it was handled in Mr. Hoover's office. Miss Gandy pointed out that the handling of personal and confidential mail for Mr. Hoover was handled by Miss Mooney and she, Miss Gandy, was not aware of just how this mail was handled. I explained that all personal and confidential mail received in the Routing Unit of the Records and Communications Division was taken unopened to Miss Mooney in Mr. Hoover's office where she opened this mail and the clerical employee who brought the mail down then logged it in and stamped the mail "Expedite Processing" on the left-hand edge. Thereafter the clerical employee would take the log back to the Routing Unit and when the mail was subsequently returned to the Routing Unit for regular filing purposes the item would be crossed off the log. Mr. Gitenstein wanted to know if the "Expedite Processing" logs were maintained permanently and he was informed that to my knowledge they were not kept after accounting for the particular items of mail contained on the particular log.

(3) Mr. Epstein questioned Miss Gandy at length concerning her title as "Executive Assistant." He wanted to know when she acquired this title and she said she could not recall. He wanted to know whether anyone else at the FBI had occupied this position and Miss Gandy explained that she was the only employee with the title of Executive Assistant who had served under Mr. Hoover during his tenure in office. Mr. Epstein seemed to pay a great deal of attention to the title Executive Assistant and I endeavored to explain to him that the title was a Civil Service Commission title and that Miss Gandy's position was set up under the Classification Act administered by the Civil Service Commission. Although I am not sure what was behind Mr. Epstein's lengthy questioning about this matter, I got the impression he might be trying to find out if Miss Gandy acted for Mr. Hoover on her own initiative. This is just a guess on my part and I am not sure what was behind his questioning.

(4) During Miss Gandy's description of the various offices, she did mention specifically the fact that the interesting case files were maintained on the shelves in the big conference room in black folders. They asked what the interesting case files consisted of and I explained this to their satisfaction; namely, that they were writeups of closed cases which might be of interest for various purposes.

(5) I should mention that Miss Gandy in describing exactly how Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence files were destroyed said she reviewed each item that she handled to make sure that it was not related to Bureau official business. She had previously indicated that Mrs. Erma Metcalf had assisted her in destroying these files but she did not mention that Mrs. Metcalf endulged in the same type of review and Miss Gandy was not questioned whether Mrs. Metcalf had made such a review as she went through the files and helped destroy them.

(6) Both Mr. Gitenstein and Mr. Epstein queried Miss Gandy at length about the log kept in the Telephone Room of all calls taken by Mr. Hoover. They also queried her at length concerning a log that was kept in the Telephone Room of all visitors to FBI Headquarters who were seen by Mr. Hoover. Miss Gandy explained that these logs, to her knowledge, were currently retained in the regular Bureau file room.

(7) Miss Gandy was asked regarding Mr. Hoover's commitments and she explained that each morning the employees in the Telephone Room prepared a commitment card of Mr. Hoover's commitments for the day and this card was placed on Mr. Hoover's desk the first thing in the morning for his information. Miss Gandy reported that she received a copy of this commitment card. She was asked whether these commitment cards were retained permanently and she replied in the negative. Somewhere along the line it was explained to the interviewers that the Bureau had an instruction that all items of a temporary nature, such as ticklers and the like were to be destroyed after they were 90 days old. Miss Gandy indicated these commitment cards would have come under this category for destruction. Miss Gandy was queried at length as to just how the Telephone Room employees got their information to make up the commitment card and she explained that all employees in Mr. Hoover's office made certain the Telephone Room employees were promptly advised of all of Mr. Hoover's commitments as they were made.

(8) In explaining the telephone set-up in the Department of Justice building as far as it related to the FBI, the Staff members were informed that calls for Mr. Hoover were received in the Bureau's switchboard and were then referred to the Telephone Room in Mr. Hoover's office and the employees in the Telephone Room handled the problem of connecting Mr. Hoover with the caller. They wanted to know whether employees in the Telephone Room screened Mr. Hoover's telephone calls and they were informed Telephone Room employees did not screen them except for "nut" calls.

(9) During a rather heated conversation in the afternoon about some of the questioning being done which seemed to be repetitious and

irrelevant, Mr. Gitenstein was told by me that I felt it was high time the questioners quit "beating around the bush" and came to the point by asking Miss Gandy if she had ever destroyed any official and confidential files. Mr. Gitenstein replied they had a discrepancy concerning the O and C files in that a reliable source had reported that Mr. Mark Felt had five two-drawer cabinets marked "O and C Files" in his office. Miss Gandy on the other hand told Mr. Gitenstein in response to a question that she had turned over to Mr. Felt after Mr. Hoover's death, as she recollected, one and one-half drawers and possibly two drawers of O and C files. I explained to Mr. Gitenstein that Miss Gandy would have no way of knowing what files Mr. Felt had in his office and if there was a discrepancy the person to resolve the discrepancy was Mr. Felt who Mr. Gitenstein had told me previously had been interviewed by him and had been cooperative. I had previously explained to Mr. Gitenstein in response to questions he asked me when I appeared before the Staff that at the time Mr. William C. Sullivan had furnished the data of the 17 White House telephone taps to Mr. Mardian in the Internal Security Division of the Department that Mr. Hoover had instructed that any Assistant Director or Bureau official who had any files in his office he considered to be confidential and relating to the Bureau's work were to be immediately transferred to Mr. Felt and a memorandum prepared concerning exactly what was transferred to Mr. Felt. I told Mr. Gitenstein I had no idea how many files Mr. Felt collected as a result of Mr. Hoover's instructions. It is interesting to note that I was not asked at any time whether I had turned over any files to Mr. Felt in connection with Mr. Hoover's instructions.

(10) Miss Gandy was asked whether there were any files of Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence in Mr. Hoover's former home at the present time. Miss Gandy replied no.

(11) At some point during the interview a reference was made to the confidential trash baskets maintained in the Bureau, to wit, the trash baskets with the painted rim on top. Mr. Epstein wanted to know if a log was maintained of items placed in the confidential trash baskets for destruction. I informed him it would be ridiculous to think that such a log could be maintained and he was advised exactly how confidential trash is destroyed in the Bureau. He was also informed of the Bureau files that were scattered over the streets of Southwest Washington as a result of the Department of Justice engaging in destruction of some of their files. This reference permitted an immediate termination of any questions along the lines of the destruction of confidential trash.

(12) Miss Gandy refers to the fact that questions were raised concerning Mr. Hoover's back door entrance. The questions concerning this back door were to determine just who used this back door entrance and its purpose. In addition to explaining it was immediately adjacent to the elevators at 9th and Pennsylvania Avenue which Mr. Hoover used to enter and exit the building, they were also ✓ advised that this was Mr. Hoover's private and personal entrance and that persons wishing to see Mr. Hoover were not brought through this back door.

The foregoing is submitted for information purposes and as an auxiliary record of Miss Gandy's appearance before the Staff of the Senate Select Committee on May 15, 1975, accompanied by me, John P. Mohr.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/12/74

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

Memorandum containing results of interview provided to Attorney General and to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Miss Helen W. Gandy, former Executive Assistant to the Director of the FBI.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

(NOT APPLICABLE)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Management
Operating Procedures

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]
MDR-16

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Miss Gandy was questioned by Staff Members of SSC concerning the organizational and operational procedures followed in former Director Hoover's office, as well as maintenance of and disposition of the files of the former Director marked "Official and Confidential."

WOC
EWF

5-AM

TREAT AS YELLOW

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 LFS

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

271-10029

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: 6 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE on Intelligence activities

C

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor advised me that the Senate Select Committee would like to obtain access to Appendices A through E of the original Petersen Committee report on COINTELPRO. He advised that the Deputy Attorney General had requested him to determine by the morning of 6/10/75 whether the FBI would object to disclosing the Appendices to the Committee. Subsequently, Mr. O'Connor sent me a copy of a notehe addressed to the Deputy Attorney General dated 6/9/75, and its enclosure (a copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated 6/9/75), both of which pertain to the Senate Select Committee request to have access to Appendices A through E of the Petersen report. The letter also requests access to Appendices K and L for inspection by designated Committee staff at the Department of Justice. (Copies of these two are attached).

Previously, the Intelligence Division has been requested to review Appendices A through E which are summaries of the several CONINTELPRO programs. This memorandum should be referred to the Intelligence Division to indicate the need to expedite that review and to furnish appropriate recommendations to the Director concerning any objections the FBI should have to disclosure of the Appendices requested. In view of the urgency of the information furnished by Mr. O'Connor it is suggested that this memorandum serve as the authority for the disclosing of the requested Appendices in the absence of any strong objections by the Intelligence Division.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2ACM/RJ

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116009-7X

62-116395

NOT RECORDED

6 JUN 20 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

167 JUL 2 1975

3

Legal Counsel Division be authorized to advise Mr. O'Connor on the morning of 6/10/75, that the FBI will defer to the judgment of the Deputy Attorney General in regard to disclosure of Appendices A through E of the Petersen report and of limited access to Appendices K and L by designated staff representatives.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

3 Enclosure

SEE ADDENDUM: INTD - PAGE 2

62-116009

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 6/10/75 ABF:glw

Intelligence Division strongly feels Exhibits A through E should not be made available. These constitute work papers prepared on an expedite basis by Special Agents operating under the understanding their effort was of a rough draft nature which would be utilized by a committee of the Justice Department and FBI for an in-house investigation. The Agents preparing the documents never conceived that their effort would be subject to review outside of the Department and particularly outside the Executive Branch.

By letter dated 4/21/75 to the Attorney General it was pointed out these exhibits related to the internal deliberations of the Department and FBI representatives, some of the material in these summaries is classified and relates to sensitive operations and they should not be revealed. Also, Deputy Attorney General Lawrence Silberman in testimony before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee (Edwards Committee) on 11/20/74 indicated as regards these documents, "If we had thought it was appropriate to release the full discussion we would have done so at the time. There are a lot of internal working documents which go into the making of a final report."

Further, if these documents are released to the SSC, or if the Committee is allowed access to them, we would not then be in a position to deny access to them by the Edwards Committee or the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Nedzi). Should they be released and come within the public domain, we could then be in a position of violating individual rights of privacy and compromising sensitive investigative techniques and Bureau sources. We feel we should first go through these work papers and excise such items to avoid any such complication.

INTD recommends Legal Counsel advise Mr. O'Connor we strongly object to the release of the above Exhibits to the SSC. However, we recognize our objection may be overruled by the Attorney General; and if so, we would request we have an opportunity to make the excisions noted above prior to the Department turning the Exhibits over to the SSC.

Done: 6/11/75. O'Connor suggested excised material be prepared on expedite basis. I so advised Dave Ryan 6/11/75

June 9, 1975

TO: Harold R. Tyler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General

FROM: Bill O'Connor

This letter follows up the dialogue described in my memo of June 5; Mr. Mintz advised me on June 9, that the Bureau would respond promptly with its views. I am supplying Mr. Mintz a copy of this letter for his file.

cc: ✓ Mr. Mintz

[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2010 BY SP2HLM/PMP
MDR-16

Enclosure

62-116395-

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRM[illegible]
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAI[illegible]

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAK[illegible] JR., TENN.
BARRY GOL[illegible]ER, ARIZ.
CHARLES [illegible]ATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. [illegible]EIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 9, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Thank you for your letters of May 17 and May 23, 1975, informing the Select Committee of five additional COINTELPRO-type operations disclosed by the continuing FBI review of its counterintelligence files. The Committee appreciates your candor in disclosing the sensitive aspects of these programs. Pursuant to its rules, the Committee will handle this information with the necessary security.

I have been informed that a member of the Committee staff has inspected and taken notes on the 39-page report of the Petersen committee on COINTELPRO. I believe that our security arrangements are more than sufficient to safeguard the confidentiality of its contents. The Committee members themselves as well as the staff would be convenienced by its availability in our secure facilities.

I believe that it is vitally important for the Committee to be provided with Appendices A through E of that report. These documents will also be handled according to our stringent security arrangements. In addition, Appendices K and L should be made available for inspection by designated Committee staff at the Department of Justice. I understand that these appendices are not "raw files" of the FBI.

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2010 BY SP2ALM/PP
MDR-16

62-116395-

Enclosure

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Page Two June 9, 1975

These requests do not preclude the Committee from further pursuing its original request for COINTELPRO materials.

Finally, I cannot emphasize too much the importance to the Select Committee's work of fully understanding COINTELPRO matters. In this regard, I wish to thank you again for calling the new materials, which we will follow up in due course, to our attention.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

JUN 5 1975

TO: Harold R. Tyler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO/Petersen Report

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SP2ALM/PLP
MDR-16

On June 4, 1975, Mr. Elliff of SSC reviewed the 39-page Petersen Report. Afterwards, he had a conference with me from 4:15 to 4:45. The conference resulted in a modification of the previous request. I told him I would be back in touch with him at an appropriate time. He also indicated a probable future course of action by the Committee.

The modification is as follows:

As to Appendices A-E (the summaries prepared by the FBI of certain COINTELPRO operations) Committee staff access is requested. Mr. Elliff advised that he understood that the FBI raw files question was most sensitive, and that he would propose to have staff of the Committee review these Exhibits, and, if the information in these Exhibits was not sufficient for their purposes, to then request an expanded summary of any particular topic summarized, without reaching the issue of access to the Bureau's "raw files".

As to F-J-Staff Assessments - he feels these are not of pressing present importance.

As to K-L (summary reports on espionage matters), he would like personal access; he does not view this as important as A-E above.

As to M & N (Criminal Division legal memoranda), these are not of immediate interest.

memo Wannall
to Cleveland
DR'ed 6/10/75

cc: Maroney
✓Daly

62-116395-

Enclosure

62-116009
5-

As to O-FBI public statement - no interest.

As to P (the overall FBI recommendation), he would like personal access.

I discussed as an alternative, access to the initiating documents in the COINTELPRO matters; and that I would attempt to obtain those as an alternative solution to his inquiry. He said that he might be interested in those documents, but they were far less important to him than access to A-E. He reiterated his sensitivity to the question of raw files, and indicated a strong inclination to avoid the raw files question, proceeding by the proposed expanded summaries route if necessary, with expanded summaries to be prepared only in the event of specific questions being raised after staff access to A-E.

He then went on to state that he perceived a significance in the recommendation and proposals of the Petersen Report; and that he felt FBI and DOJ policies might be perceived as at loggerheads, although this was muted in the prose. He said that he felt sure that, at an appropriate time, the Committee would wish to explore, by AG testimony at SSC, the actions of the DOJ on the recommendation reflected in the report. I said that I understood his interest in that process.

My recommendation is that, in view of the retrenchment regarding "raw files", A-E be made available, under the conditions outlined above; I am furnishing a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Daly for dissemination to appropriate Executives of the Bureau, and to Mr. Maroney of the Criminal Division.

I believe a prompt decision as to A-E would be most helpful.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

June 19, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)
BUREAU FILE 62-116464

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
BUREAU FILE 62-116395 — 316

REC-104

Enclosed herewith for your approval and transmittal to the HSC and the SSC are separate memoranda each enclosing a memorandum entitled "Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities," which was prepared at the oral request of Representative Lucien N. Nedzi and which has been coordinated with the intelligence community.

Copies of the memoranda and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 8

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

2 - ENCLOSURE

LFS:dmt/lhb lhb
(12)

UNRECORDED COPY AND ENCL FILED IN 62-116464
6/25/75 Returned to Nedzi [illegible]
(HSC)

ALL INFORMATION [illegible] HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY [illegible]
NWR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

W. O. Cregar - 4 [illegible]

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116464

June 19, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a copy of a memorandum entitled "Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities," which has been prepared pursuant to the oral request of Representative Lucien N. Nedzi. The procedures outlined in the enclosed memorandum are already being followed with regard to the Senate Select Committee, which has been furnished a copy separately.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:dmt/lhb lhb
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJF
MDR-16

WVC WOC LFS

NOTE:

Representative Nedzi orally requested preparation of a Memorandum of Understanding setting forth investigative and clearance procedures which we have been following with the SSC and which Mr. Nedzi indicated would be agreeable to his Committee. The Memorandum of Understanding was prepared and was coordinated with CIA and appropriate representatives of the Intelligence Community Staff who recommended certain changes which were set forth in memorandum from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, 6/3/75. The latter memorandum recommended that the revised Memorandum of Understanding be forwarded to the

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

62-116395-384

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE CONTINUED:

Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Mr. Nedzi. In accord with the recommendation in memorandum from G. R. Steel to Mr. W. V. Cleveland 6/10/75, a copy is also being furnished to the Attorney General for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

A[illegible]essee: House Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/19/75

Caption of Document: House Select Committee on Intelligence Actvts Procedures for Determining Eligibility on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Jr. Date: 6/25/75 4:15 P

Received by:

Title: Staff Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION C[illegible]
HEREIN IS UNCLAS[illegible]
DATE 10-6-2000 BY SP/ALM/BYP
MDR-16

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and, where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/PAF
MDR-16

62-116395-316

ENCLOSURE

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☒ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum with an attached Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Chairman, HSC, orally requested MOU regarding investigation and clearance procedures

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Agreements, other
Organization and Staffing

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

MOU entitled "Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities," furnished to HSC and SSC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/RP
MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-8

62-116395
62-116464

SFP:lhb
(6)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS - 7-2-75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: 6-10-75

FROM : G. R. Steel

SUBJECT: SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 6-3-75, concerning the above committees. Attached for approval was a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of captioned Committees. It was pointed out that in accordance with opinion expressed by John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding will not be furnished to Senator Church. The revised draft is to be furnished the Attorney General for his approval.

It is felt that we are confronted with a complex legal problem here and it would appear that if the Senate Select Committee is a party to the Memorandum of Understanding, it is entitled to a copy of such communication to prevent any misunderstanding in the future and to protect the FBI which has drawn up this Memorandum of Understanding.

Inserted in the revised draft are references to Executive Order (EO) 11652 and Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 1/14. Both are limited in their stated application to the Executive Branch and here their application is being extended to the Legislative Branch, which apparently has no established clearance procedure nor suitability for employment program. Of particular interest is that part of the "Personnel Security Approval Criteria" under DCID 1/14 which reads: "The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discretion and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-6-00 BY SPAAN/BP

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-104

62-116395-316

3 JUL 7 1975

62-116395

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. ~~Schwartz~~
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - Mr. Egan

RHE:mem
(9)

Records cc 62-116464

CONTINUED OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re: Senate and House Select Committees
on Intelligence Activities

Referenced memorandum pointed out that Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church. How would the Senate Select Committee know it is following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding if it does not have a copy? Does it have a copy of DCID 1/14 which has been, and possibly still is, classified?

The FBI has now received a request for a total of 122 investigations from the Senate Select Committee. This is many more than anticipated with all expenses absorbed by the FBI in connection with a function of the Legislative Branch. In addition, 16 requests have been received to date from the House Select Committee, Also the FBI has been asked by the Senate Select Committee to conduct additional investigation concerning Patricia Ann Monaco, already employed by the Committee, who admits living with Neal Stevens up to 4-75, and frequenting a lounge known as a hangout for prostitutes. Neal Stevens has said he engaged "in all forms of sexual activities" with Monaco. There is also the definite possibility that we will have to process many of these cases under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974.

To date notification has been received from the Director of Central Intelligence (CIA) that a total of 49 employees of the Senate Select Committee have been certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 (Security Requirements for Government Employment) for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret. Of this number, 17 staff members have been briefed on compartmented information and an additional 5 staff members designated to receive compartmented information. From the above it is not clear that, as stated by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, that the Senate Select Committee "had completed the Committee Staff."

It is noted that CIA refers to EO 10450 but the Memorandum of Understanding, as approved by CIA, does not refer to EO 10450.

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re: Senate and House Select Committees
on Intelligence Activities

RECOMMENDATION: That the recommendation in referenced memorandum of 6-3-75, with regard to not furnishing a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church be reconsidered.

WVC

PLM

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 23 1975

Senstudy '75

TO: John A. Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Access to Bureau Files Re Halperin Case

Pursuant to my conversation with S/A McNiff, it is requested that the Bureau files in this matter be made available under controlled circumstances to Mr. Shaheen for his review in order to facilitate the Department's resolution of pending requests from the Senate Select Committee.

This memorandum has been discussed with Mr. McNiff, and he anticipates that it will be sent to you.

65-75085

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-104

62-116395-315

3 JUL 7 1975

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-5-2000 BY SP[illegible]

62-116395

Let to AG
TJM:hk 6/26/75

Records
cc: 65-75085

5-TJM

84 JUL 17 1975

~~JUL 17 1975~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 26, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

65-75085

Reference is made to memorandum from K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, to Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated June 23, 1975, captioned "Access to Bureau Files Re Halperin Case."

Pursuant to request contained in referenced communication, Bureau files relating to the Halperin case are available for review under controlled circumstances at FBI Headquarters by Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice.

It would be appreciated if Mr. Shaheen would telephonically contact Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff of this Bureau, Government Interdepartmental Code 175, Extension 4636, for the purpose of finalizing the date and time at which the requested review will be made.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-314

1 - 65-75085

REC-104

JUL 7 1975

TJM:lhb lhb
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JUL 9 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/10/82 BY 7858-SR/cle/pwle
Cmp# 57,082

GPO 954-546

NOTE:

Memoranda 6/17/75 and 6/23/75, W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall captioned "Senstudy 75" advised that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) has made several requests of the Bureau for information and documents relating to the so-called "Kissinger 17." This material is being made available to the Department with the caveats that the Government has not publicly admitted to 15 of the coverages involved and that some material contained in the file has been impounded by court order due to the Halperin (one of 17) civil suit. The decision as to whether or not the material prepared in response to the SSC's request is to be turned over to the Committee was left to the Department. As mentioned in above memoranda, Mr. O'Connor advised that he believed it necessary for a representative of his office to personally review the file in question before a knowledgeable determination could be made as to what material should be turned over to the SSC. In anticipation of the Department's request, Legal Counsel Division inquired of the Department's Criminal ~~Civil~~ Division as to whether the court order of impoundment would prevent such a review. On 6/20/75, it was ascertained that USDC Judge John Lewis Smith, who issued the impoundment order, gave court clearance to make the "Kissinger 17" file available to the Department for review as indicated above.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : J. B. Adams

DATE: April 23, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated April 18, 1975, we advised the Attorney General that one document (memorandum dated May 20, 1954, captioned "Microphone Surveillance") requested by captioned Committee originated with the Department and the determination as to whether or not it should be released to the Committee should be made by the Department. It was also pointed out to the Department this particular document, while it is classified, had been printed publicly by the United States Government Printing Office.

On April 22, 1975, Jack Fuller, Assistant to the Attorney General, telephonically advised the Department was declassifying the document and requested the Bureau declassify its copy.

Document declassified 4/28/75 by T.E. Burns per instruction. 4/28/75 KB

ACTION:

Intelligence Division declassify Departmental Memorandum captioned, "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954.

62-116395

1-Mr. W. R. Wannall
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1-Mr. J. A. Mintz
1-Mr. P. V. Daly

PVD:lgp
(6)

REC-100

JCF 62-116395-313

10 JUN 10 1975

JBA
PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-5-2000 BY SP2ALM

MDR-16

84 JUL 8 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General June 4, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number one a. of Part I, "Policies and Procedures," Appendix B of referenced letter requested Committee Staff access to all indices and control files pertaining to SAC Memoranda and SAC Letters for 1960 to the present.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum advising the Committee that the above-requested material is presently available for examination at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395 3 ENCLOSURE

EX-108

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-63 62-116395-312

12 JUN 27 1975

TEB:cmc
(9)

P.V. Daly
Room 5095B

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JUL 15 1975

JUL 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-5-2000 BY SP2ALM/pf
MDR-16

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - T. E. Burns

62-116395

June 4, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Pursuant to your request for access to all indices and control files pertaining to SAC Memoranda and Letters, for 1960 to the present, we currently have such material available for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-05-2001 BY SP2ALM/AJP
MDR-16

TEB:cmc
(8)

NOTE:

The material available consists of Xeroxes of index cards covering all SAC Letters and Memos for the period in question. The cards contain the SAC Letter or Memorandum number, date, subject matter covered, and the location where copies of the SAC Letter or Memorandum have been filed. The file numbers have not been excised in order to avoid unnecessary extensive effort since there is no apparent reason why the SSC representative could not view such file numbers. The Xeroxed indices cards commence with SAC Letter 60-1 dated January 5, 1960, and conclude with SAC Memorandum number 22-75, dated May 20, 1975.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/4/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt. Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities:Re:Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Dept. of Justice; Policies and Procedures

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 9 June 75 10 55 AM

Received by: Sherry Towell

Title: Ass't Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-5-2000 BY SP2ALM/RLF
MDR-16

62-116395-312

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/4/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix B, Part 1, Item 1a.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was advised that internal documents advising field offices of clarification and/or revisions in operating procedures are available for review by appropriate SSC personnel at FBI Headquarters.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-5-2000 BY SPAUMLP
MDR-14

TREAT AS YELLOW

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 LFS

5-[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-312

ENCLOSURE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Hearings:

We are scheduled to testify 6-18-75, before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Judiciary on Terrorism. Testimony for this hearing has been prepared by the Intelligence Division.

We anticipate having to testify before the Post Office, Civil Service Subcommittee on Postal Fees, Mail and Label Management. The necessary materials for the testimony have been gathered and as soon as a request has been received, the testimony will be prepared in final form. The testimony will concern mail covers.

The following Committees have indicated that they will request Bureau testimony in the near future:

The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Tunney's Committee); Topic: S. 1427 - S. 1428 (Criminal Justice legislation); Briefing book has been prepared concerning this legislation.

House Judiciary Committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights; Topic: H. R. 61 and H. R. 62 (House version of S. 1427 and S. 1428 (Criminal Justice legislation)).

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities; Topic: Bureau legal authority to conduct domestic and counterintelligence activities. Tentative testimony is scheduled for late June or early July. We will be furnished additional details by the Committee as to the various topics to be covered during this testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Pur

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters

The Attorney General

June 17, 1975

Director, FBI

SUGGESTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

July 1975

Attached for your approval and forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, is a response to a request received from Mr. Wilderotter for suggestions for administrative and legislative action relative to the United States intelligence programs.

Mr. Wilderotter's request was forwarded to the FBI in a May 30, 1975, communication from the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) Ad Hoc Coordinating Group, a copy of which is also being enclosed for your information.

Your concurrence in our response is requested.

Enclosures (3)

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-5-2000 BY
MDR-16

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosures - 2)
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

AFW:kjg/jmn jmn
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

EX 103

REC-7 62-116395-311

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

180

56 JUL 08 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

By memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 6/3/75 captioned "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," Legal Counsel Division transmitted an "Eyes Only" communication, dated 5/30/75, from the Executive Secretary of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group. In its communication, the USIB Group requested that recipients furnish Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, with suggestions for administrative or legislative action relative to United States intelligence programs.

In response to USIB's request on behalf of Mr. Wilderotter, INTD Supervisors have been canvassed for suggestions and results obtained incorporated in communication being attached for Attorney General's approval. Since USIB's communication was marked "Eyes Only," we have not specifically referenced this document in our response to Mr. Wilderotter. We are, however, providing copies of the USIB letter and our response for the Attorney General's records and for the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. The latter action would appear appropriate, since the Department of Justice was included among the recipients of the USIB letter, although Inspector John B. Hotis of the Legal Counsel Division was erroneously designated as the Departmental addressee by USIB.

~~REC 102~~ index all names

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2274
30 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

0
(Senstudy 1975

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

Jack E Thomas
for John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-29-2000 BY SP2ALM/BG
MDR-16

Attachment

REC-102

62-116395-308

~~ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE ______ BY ______~~

3 JUL 2 1975

Records
Please file in
62-116395

5-8

84 JUL 3 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

30 JUN 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
Bader, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara	*	B 6/26	12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky.	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Brown, Maxine ✓	*	B 6/26	8-8-28	Ida.	568-40-3123	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	

62-116395-308

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-24-2000 BY SP2ALM/LP
MDR-16

15

30 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
Chesnick, Barbara			4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17(Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Dawson, Thomas	*	B 6/26	9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeMarco, James ✓	*	B 6/26	3-12-43	W. Va.	286-36-9097	
Dennin, Joseph Francis ✓	*	B 6/23	6-9-43	NY	567-62-5353	
DeOreo, Mary	*	B 6/26	6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
DiGenova, Joseph E. ✓	*	B 6/26	2-22-45	Del.	222-28-5430	
Dick, James ✓	*	B 6/26	7-25-47	Mass.	029-36-6745	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel			8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor	*	B 6/26	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
E[illegible]no, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	

16

30 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Ford, Harold ✓	*	B 6/26	3-23-21	Cal.	550-16-4630	
[redacted]enstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
Greissing, Edward			11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF Badge
Iverson, Portia			10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	
Jefferson, Arthur M. ✓	*	B 6/26	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
Karalekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge
Kirchheimer, Joseph ✓			6-3-17	Ill.	359-03-7843	

30 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Koppal, Diane	*	B 6/26	6-24-48	NC	219-48-0018	
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mascioli, Cynthia	*	B 6/26	1-4-51	NY	112-44-7636	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mayo, Betty	*	B 6/26	2-13-22	Ohio	277-14-4062	
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	

6

30 JUN 1975

	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social	
Name	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)			Security No.	
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
Murphy, Michael	*		10-13-54	Tex.	231-86-8829	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan	*	B 6/26	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.	*	B 6/26	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Pyle, Christopher	*	B 6/26	11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Rhea, Gordon	*	B 6/26	3-10-45	Va.	412-74-7901	
Ricks, Walter	*	B 6/26	12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester	*	B 6/26	7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	

16

30 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.	*	B 6/26	3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha	*	B 6/26	9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Tschirgi, James	*	B 6/26	2-23-25	Wyo.	520-16-7290	
Wallach, Paul	*	B 6/26	5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

30 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 016 NK PLAIN

7:09PM 6/25/75 NITEL RXG

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM SAC, NEWARK (66-3971)

SENSTUDY, 75

RE NKTELETYPE 6/5/75 CAPTIONED AS ABOVE AND TELCALL, BUREAU SUPERVISOR SEYMOUR PHILLIPS TO ASAC JOHN J. SCHWARTZ, 6/25/75 IN RESPECT TO FBIHQ'S INQUIRY FOR A MEMORANDUM FROM FORMER SA LEO T. CLARK TO SAC OR ASAC, NEWARK, DURING JULY AND AUGUST, 1964, WHICH ALLEGEDLY WAS CONTAINED IN NK FILE 62-109276.

NEWARK DETERMINED THAT FILE NO. 62-109276 IS THE BUREAU FILE NUMBER PERTAINING TO PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT. FURTHER EFFORT TO LOCATE FORMER SA CLARK'S MEMORANDUM IN NEWARK FILE 157-1602 PERTAINING TO RACIAL DEMONSTRATIONS, DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, N. J., 8/24-27/64; (RM); WERE NEGATIVE.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-5-8-2000 BY SP2ALM/PJ

MDR-16

~~PLS~~ HOLD

REC- 102

62-116395-307

3 JUL 2 1975

Pursuant to conference of Mike Epstein SSC,
Paul Daly, Leonardo, by Daly there no
memos of Clark in 62-109276 (Bufile not
NK file as claimed) nor in 157-1602

Place in Records
62-116395

84 JUL 3 1975

FBI

#C307

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMA[illegible]
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIR[illegible]

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKE[illegible]., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWAT[illegible]RIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MA[illegible]IAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

JUN 26 10 54 AM '75
DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAIL ROOM

June 23, 1975

See memo Legal Counsel to Adams - Senstudy 75 dated 6/27/75 PVD/rcb

RECEIVED
JUL 2 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General: Senstudy 75

The Select Committee proposes to interview the following employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice with respect to the case of Douglas Durham, an informant employed by the Bureau prior to March 1975:

Joseph L. Hearsley
F.B.I. Des Moines, Iowa

John McFee
F.B.I. Omaha, Nebraska

Larry L. Astoki
F.B.I. Des Moines, Iowa

David Hedgecock REC-102
F.B.I. Des Moines, Iowa

Robert Taubert
F.B.I. St. Paul, Minnesota

Ray Williams
F.B.I. St. Paul, Minnesota

Douglas Hofer
F.B.I. St. Paul, Minnesota

R. D. Hurd
U. S. Attorney

62-116395-306

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
3 JUL 2 1975

FED. BU. [illegible]
JUSTICE
JUL 28 1975
R.A.P.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FED. BU. OF INV.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-00 BY [illegible]
MDR-16

RECEIVED
JUN 27 1975
KWOC

5-8

file 62-116395

84 JUL 8 1975

The Committee has authorized the staff to conduct an investigation of matters pertaining to the above-named informant. Preparations will be made to interview the above-named employees in St. Paul and Des Moines. Liaison officials at the Bureau and the Department of Justice will be contacted shortly by Patrick Shea of the Select Committee staff with regard to the details of these interviews.

This investigation may involve specific allegations of abuse or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. It is not anticipated that these interviews will be monitored by the Bureau or the Department of Justice, as they will relate to alleged abuses falling within the mandate of the Committee pursuant to Senate Resolution 21.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

cc: William O'Connor
Paul Daley

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 6/23/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

REC-102

This is to record assignments of FBI representatives to coordinate with Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) Task Force (TF) leaders on ICS TFs for which FBI does not have primary responsibility.

My memorandum to you 6/17/75 reported upon a 6/13/75 meeting chaired by Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, to discuss the functions of TFs in connection with investigation of the intelligence community by the Senate Select Committee (SSC). An enclosure to that memorandum listed the various TFs and indicated those regarding which the FBI was expected to be involved with. We were asked to designate a specific individual who would coordinate with the TF leader of TFs which were not assigned to FBI representatives. The following designations are proposed:

Subject	Principal Agency	TF Leader	FBI Representatives
Electronic surveillance and warrantless wiretap	Justice	George Calhoun IDS 187-4401	J. W. Dalseg
Use of proprietary organizations	CIA	Erich Isenstead Green 3140	W. A. Branigan
Mail cover and intercept	Justice	Phil White IDS 187-4674	J. P. Lee

REC-102 62-116395-305

5 JUL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/BP ON 10-18-2000 MDR-16

62-116395

JPT:bkb
(12)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-18-2000 BY SP2ALM/BP
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

Classified by 6875
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

FIVES

84 JUL 3 1975

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

Subject	Principal Agency	TF Leader	FBI Representatives
Watch list	DoD	Benson Buffham ~~(NSA) 688-7222~~	R. L. Shackelford
Domestic surveillance	Justice	John Martin IDS 187-4555	J. G. Deegan

To date, "Notices" from the SSC specifically defining the areas to be covered under above topics, have not been received. They are to be sent to the TF leaders who will then contact our representatives as needed. Attached for the information of each of the above designees are single copies of aforementioned 6/17/75 memorandum, explaining the TFs, and ICS memorandum 6/10/75 showing TF assignments as of that date.

ACTION:

With your approval, the ICS Steering Group will be informed that the aforementioned FBI personnel have been designated to assist in the listed TFs.

JPT

NAMES AND BUREAU PHONE NUMBERS FURNISHED TO MAJ. PERRY MILES, IC STAFF, 6/30/75. LFS

OK

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall
June 23, 1975
1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - T. E. Burns
1 - D. Ryan

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from Senate Select Committee, dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which is responsive to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of the memorandum is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/pf
MDR-16

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ENCLOSURE

DR:pld pld
(10)

hand carried 6-23-75
PVD/[illegible]

REC- 102

62-116395-304

3 JUL 2 1975

PLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall
1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - T. E. Burns

62-116395

June 23, 1975
1 - D. Ryan

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

COINTELPRO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/
MDR-16

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated May 14, 1975, and the appendices thereto, which contained requests for information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Item 20, Part II, Appendix C, requested a list of any Cointelpro-type activities, as defined in the prepared statement of Attorney General Saxbe before the House Judiciary Committee on November 20, 1974, which were engaged in by the FBI subsequent to April 28, 1971, be provided.

In response to this request, it is noted all Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros) were discontinued by FBI Headquarters airtel to Albany, with copies to all field offices, dated April 28, 1971. Specifically, this communication listed seven Cointelpros. In addition to the seven mentioned in the April 28, 1971, airtel, subsequent reviews at FBI Headquarters disclosed five additional Cointelpros. In this context, it should be noted several of the 12 Cointelpro operations related to FBI activities in the foreign counterintelligence field.

FBI Headquarters airtel April 28, 1971, discontinuing the Cointelpros noted as follows, "In exceptional instances where it is considered counterintelligence action is warranted, recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption to which it pertains. These recommendations will be considered on an individual basis."

1 - The Attorney General

DR:pld
(9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

See NOTE page 2.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-304

GPO 954-546

Documents Pertaining to the "Huston Plan,"
Cointelpro, and Other Practices and Programs

A review of all of our files which have been referred to as Cointelpro files revealed no Cointelpro-type activity since April 28, 1971.

In foreign counterintelligence operations the objectives are detection, penetration and, finally, neutralization of intelligence operations directed against the United States by foreign intelligence services or other hostile elements. Various neutralizing techniques are employed against such services and elements, their officers and their agents in the United States. Among these are double agent operations, disruption, disinformation, penetrations, recruitments, persona non grata action, visa denial and, in rare instances when conditions allow, prosecution. Thus, it can be seen that so-called "Cointelpro-type" techniques are, and always have been, an integral part of our foreign counterintelligence efforts, whether they were practiced in individual cases or under the aegis of a formalized program. This is a critical distinction to be made between our foreign counterintelligence operations and operations conducted in the domestic security field.

In an effort to comply fully with the request to provide a list of any Cointelpro- type activities engaged in subsequent to April 28, 1971, in addition to the review of Cointelpro files noted above, personnel of the Intelligence Division were contacted during the week of June 2-6, 1975, to determine if any had knowledge of any such actions. Excepting foreign counterintelligence operations, the results of this inquiry were negative.

NOTE:

See letter to the Attorney General, dated 6/23/75, captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," prepared by DR:pld.

It is noted in one instance one individual alluded to the TARPRO disinformation-type operation which has been directed against the Soviet intelligence service as being of a Cointelpro character. It is not believed this latter technique constitutes the type of information sought by the Committee.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6-23-75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee Re: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS; COINTELPRO

Originating Office: Appendix C, Part II, Item 20 FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 6/25/75 1 15 PM

Received by: [illegible] B. MacDonald (Clerk)

Title: ______________________

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-28-2000 BY SP2ALM
MDR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/23/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix C, Part II, Item #20, requested information as to COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program) activities.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Counterintelligence
Intelligence activities, foreign

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Memorandum discussed the various COINTELPROS, their discontinuance and how counterintelligence activities in the foreign field are sometimes carried out in individual cases rather than through a formalized program.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJF
MDR-16

WDC
5/8

62-116395

SFP:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - [illegible] J. A. Mintz
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General June 23, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum responding to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

TEB:jmn
(9)

REC-102 62-116395-303

ENCLOSURE

3 JUL 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJB
MDR-16

6/25/75 Delivered to [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

5 - TJM

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. Mintz
(1 Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

62-116395

June 23, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number 3., Part I, Appendix B of referenced communication requested all general policy memoranda and other materials not already provided the Committee pertaining to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, and activities for the period 1960 to the present.

The above request has already been satisfied by our previous response to other requests contained in the referenced letter and its appendices. We are making specific reference to those responses which furnished the Committee access to the Manual of Rules and Regulations, the Manual of Instructions, the SAC Letters and Memoranda covering the period from 1960 to the present, and pertinent policy memoranda and other representative communications culled from the 100-00 file.

n/5

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TEB:jmn jmn
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/BMP
MDR-16

WRW

WOC

TVM

62-116395-303

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 56

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE:

The SSC had originally requested access to all double zero files, however, this request was modified by them during a conference with our representatives 5/30/75, wherein agreement was reached to provide SSC only pertinent memoranda and other representative communications from the 100-00 file.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6-23-75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee Re:
FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Originating Office: Appendix B, Part I., Item 3 FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 6/25/75 1:55 pm

Received by: Haldeen B. MacDonald Clerk

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SPRALM/BY

MDR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/23/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix B, Part I, Item #3, requested general policy communications in the security field

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Policies and procedures
Intelligence collection
Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Response memorandum noted that the request had already been satisfied by previous responses to other requests in the same 5/14/75 SSC letter and appendices.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/RY
MDR-16

uoc
5-18

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395

SFP:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

June 20, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested ~~certain~~ information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and a copy of each of the documents described in such memorandum.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 18

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

6/25/75 [illegible] to Nelson MacDonald [illegible]
[illegible] to [illegible] 6/23/75

TEB:dmt
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE ______ BY ______

REC- 102

62-116395-302

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/BP
MDR16

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intelligence ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___

5-

3 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

-4063 [illegible]

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

62-116395

June 20, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

OTHER SPECIFIC FBI PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

Reference is made to SSC letter to The Attorney General dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Pursuant to your request in Appendix C, Part III, Item 29, for all memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins, implementation, and termination of Project INLET, involving preparation of an Intelligence Letter for the President, enclosed are copies of the following documents:

1) W. C. Sullivan memorandum to C. D. DeLoach captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President," dated November 7, 1969, with enclosed letters to the President and The Attorney General.

2) W. C. Sullivan memorandum to C. D. DeLoach captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President," dated November 20, 1969, with enclosed letter to all field offices, captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President Code Name 'Inlet' Research-Satellite Matter," dated November 26, 1969.

3) R. D. Cotter memorandum to W. C. Sullivan captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President," dated April 23, 1970.

4) Letter from the Acting Director to all field offices captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President Code Name 'Inlet' Research Matter," dated December 26, 1972.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/PRL

ADR-16

TEB:dmt dmt
(9)

NB

PLM WRW

TJM

12-116395-302

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

5) T. J. Smith memorandum to E. S. Miller captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President Code Name 'Inlet' Research Matter," dated February 2, 1973.

Enclosures - 8

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

See W. O. Cregar memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall 6/18/75 captioned "SENSTUDY." The above material which we are furnishing to the Committee was supplied by SA Thomas J. Deakin, Central Research Unit, IS - 3 Section, INTD, who located the documents and provided sanitized Xerox copies, deleting administrative material.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Semate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/20/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Documents Pertaining to the "Huston Plan," Cointelpro, and other practices and programs; Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs. Appendix C, Part III, Item 29

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 6/25/75 1:15 PM

Received by: Nalleen B. MacDonald (Clerk)

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/bvp
MDR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/20/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum enclosing a number of FBI communications

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix C, Part III, Item #29, requested FBI communications regarding Project INLET (Intelligence Letter for the President).

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence Collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Material furnished SSC covered the origins, implementation and termination of Project.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SPRAM/BJP
MDR-16

wof
58

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395

SFP:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
DATE: 4/23/70

FROM : R. D. Cotter

SUBJECT: FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT

This memorandum recommends that we extend our dissemination of the FBI Intelligence Letter (Inlet) to include Vice President Agnew.

Inlet is outgrowth of Director's personal suggestion for a channel of high-level intelligence directly to the President. It has provided medium for furnishing President sensitive and top-level data in which he would have direct interest and has been disseminated only to President and Attorney General. Since first Inlet issued 11/7/69, we have prepared 36 issues which have summarized 120 individual items of significance on a wide range of topics, including racial violence, New Left intrigue, Soviet and communist bloc espionage, and important foreign intelligence data. Material is presented in a one-page format tailored to the President's convenience.

Vice President Agnew in recent conversations with the Director has indicated a keen interest in the information the Bureau has been furnishing him in recent months regarding domestic and foreign subversion. It is obvious the Vice President is relying on the Bureau as a key source of information. In view of Mr. Agnew's vital interest in these matters and the high position he occupies, it is believed we should at this time include him in dissemination to Inlet.

ACTION:

If the Director approves, the Vice President will be included in future dissemination of this material.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/BMP
MDR-16

SAC, Albany 12/26/72

For the Acting Director, FBI (65-73268)
W. Mark Felt
Acting Associate Director

FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER
FOR THE PRESIDENT
CODE NAME "INLET"
RESEARCH MATTER

ReBulet 11/26/69.

Referenced letter instructed all field offices to furnish the Bureau high-level intelligence data in the security field which was to be furnished to the President and the Attorney General on a continuing basis. All such communications were to be flagged with the code name "Inlet" in the caption.

Since the inception of this program an evolution in policies and practices has occurred and, currently, the information specified in referenced letter is furnished by each field office in form suitable for teletype dissemination to The White House and the Attorney General as well as other interested agencies of the Government. Accordingly, the "Inlet" program has, for all practical purposes, been rendered obsolete and the Bureau is now formally rescinding instructions set forth in referenced letter.

The termination of the "Inlet" program does not relieve the responsibility of all offices to be alert for the intelligence data specified in referenced letter and to submit this information in a timely manner by teletype and in a form suitable for dissemination.

2 - All Field Offices

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY ALM/BMP
MDR-16

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. E. S. Miller DATE: 2/2/73

OM : T. J. Smith

BJECT: FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER FOR
THE PRESIDENT, CODE NAME "INLET"
RESEARCH MATTER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJB
MDR-16

The FBI Intelligence Letter for the President was instituted in November, 1969, pursuant to then FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's instructions to keep the President fully informed of significant intelligence developments within the purview of the Bureau's security responsibilities. Dissemination was restricted to the President, the Attorney General, and later, the Vice President.

By letter dated November 26, 1969, all FBI field offices were advised to flag information obtained in our investigations important enough for the President's interest with the code word "INLET." This was to include:

1) Information of national or international significance which is security related.

2) Important current or pending developments in major security cases.

3) Current information which is representative of or calls attention to a significant developing intelligence trend.

4) Material which has a bearing on national security, particularly that from sensitive and/or penetrative coverage of foreign establishments, which could affect American relations with foreign countries, or assist in formulating United States policy.

5 FEB 16 1973

5) "Inside" information concerning demonstrations, disorders, or other civil disruptions which is of more than local significance.

6) Items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities which may be of special interest to the President or the Attorney General.

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: FBI Intelligence Letter for the President Code Name "INLET"

The FBI had, through several Administrations, furnished various Presidents and Attorneys General important intelligence matters on an individual basis. The Intelligence Letter served to consolidate this information into one document. By August, 1970, changes in our communications capability, including the ability to afford immediate teletype dissemination of intelligence data to The White House and the development of other reporting procedures such as the Summary of Extremist Activities, made the Intelligence Letter no longer necessary. Items submitted for this Letter by the field were disseminated in these other ways. In December, 1972, the use of the code word "INLET" was discontinued and field offices so advised. The field was also advised, however, they had the responsibility to be alert for this type intelligence data.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-104

UNITED STATES GOV RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 11/20/69

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER
FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is to recommend that attached letter be approved for sending to all field offices to advise them of the initiation of captioned intelligence letter and to furnish them instructions for the submission of material suitable for use in this letter. Transmission of captioned letter to the President on a continuing basis has been approved in accordance with the Director's instructions to keep the President fully informed of significant intelligence developments within the purview of the Bureau's security responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter be approved for field-wide dissemination. If approved, this memorandum should be returned to the Research-Satellite Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, for further processing of enclosure.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-28-2000 BY Sprain/pf
MDR-16

5

SAC, Albany　　　　　　　　　　　　November 26, 1969

Director, FBI

FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER
FOR THE PRESIDENT
CODE NAME ("INLET")
RESEARCH-SATELLITE MATTER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-24-2000 BY
MDR-16

Captioned letter has been initiated at the Bureau to furnish high-level intelligence data in the security field to the President and the Attorney General on a continuing basis. This letter will not be a vehicle for routine dissemination; rather it will be comprised of information obtained in connection with our investigations which has the qualities of importance and timeliness necessary to secure the President's interest and to provide him with meaningful intelligence for his guidance. Mere rumors or nebulous information will have no place in this letter.

It will be the responsibility of each field office to furnish the Bureau on a continuing basis intelligence items suitable for this letter. Each office must, in the course of its normal business and submissions of information to the Bureau, be alert to flag specific items for this purpose. For your guidance the following are suggested types of information (not all-inclusive) that would be appropriate for this intelligence letter:

(1) Information of national or international significance which is security related.

(2) Important current or pending developments in major security cases.

(3) Current information which is representative of or calls attention to a significant developing intelligence trend.

(4) Material which has a bearing on national security, particularly that from sensitive and/or penetrative coverage of foreign establishments, which could affect American relations with foreign countries, or assist in formulating United States policy.

2 - All other Offices

6

Letter to Albany
FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER
FOR THE PRESIDENT
CODE NAME "INLET"
RESEARCH-SATELLITE MATTER

(5) "Inside" information concerning demonstrations, disorders or other civil disruptions which is of more than local significance.

(6) Items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities which may be of special interest to the President or the Attorney General.

All information submitted to the Bureau by your office in investigations concerning old-line subversive organizations, new left groups, racial matters, hate groups, and espionage and counterintelligence matters should be carefully reviewed daily for any items deemed pertinent to this intelligence letter. Communications containing such items should be submitted by the most expeditious means warranted and should be flagged with the code name "Inlet" after the title and character. In those instances where an airtel or letter is used, an additional copy should be furnished the Bureau.

These instructions are to be implemented immediately. It is absolutely essential that a steady flow of quality intelligence data be received from all field offices to make this letter a success. Your submissions will be closely followed at the Bureau to insure this matter is receiving proper emphasis and attention.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach DATE: November 7, 1969

ROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

BJECT: FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to the Director's instructions to keep the President fully informed of significant intelligence developments within the purview of the Bureau's security responsibilities, we will prepare and transmit to him, on a continuing basis, an intelligence letter of the type enclosed. To preserve the impact and selectivity of this letter, dissemination is suggested for only the President and the Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letters to the President and the Attorney General be approved enclosing the proposed current intelligence letter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/BF
MDR-16

1

November 7, 1969

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

There is enclosed for your information a document containing items of current intelligence interest. This paper has been prepared to highlight certain timely developments in our security and intelligence investigations. Material of this type will be furnished to you in this manner on a continuing basis.

A copy of this document is being sent to the Attorney General. Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this letter becomes unclassified.

Sincerely yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJG
MDR-16

The Attorney General November 7, 1969

Director, FBI

FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER
FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is enclosed for your information a document containing items of current intelligence interest. This paper has been prepared to highlight certain timely developments in our security and intelligence investigations. Material of this type will be furnished to you in this manner on a continuing basis.

This document has also been made available to the President. Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this letter becomes unclassified.

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-28-2000 BY 5P2ALM/BJG
MDR-16

9

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

June 19, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning the testimony of retired FBI Special Agent Robert R. Nichols before an Executive Session of captioned Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-414885 (Personnel File Robert R. Nichols)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:mjg
(15)

for info. only per J. Aldhizer's instructions
5 copies sent to OPR - Dept of Justice
11/22/76 - JCB

ENCLOSURE

REC- 102

62-116395-301

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP5RJS/

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUL 3 1975

PLM

5-8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

June 19, 1975

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8/24/92 BY SP8BTO/khe

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA) ROBERT R. NICHOLS BEFORE SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION

Set out below are the facts known to the FBI concerning sworn testimony given to the SSC by Mr. Robert R. Nichols who served as an SA of the FBI from January 6, 1947, until his retirement May 12, 1972. This information is as voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Nichols.

CIRCUMSTANCES PRELUDE TO TESTIMONY

On May 28, 1975, Nichols telephonically advised the FBI that SSC Staff Member Lester B. Seidel had requested, and Nichols agreed, to travel to Washington, D. C., from Atlanta, Georgia, to be interviewed in the Committee's offices. Seidel indicated the interview would concern Martin Luther King, Jr., Stanley David Levison, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether it would be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an Executive Session of the Committee. He was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the FBI make available a representative so that Nichols might consult with him during the interview, if necessary. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted as the FBI furnishing counsel but that the representative would merely assist Nichols in determining whether a specific question should be answered or whether a response could properly be declined because it falls within one or more privileged areas. He was told these areas covered information

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF
DATE 10-27-92

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - 67-414885 (Personnel File Robert R. Nichols)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)
Original and one copy to Attorney General
SFP:mjg
(14)

~~CLASS. & EXT. BY SP-16SK/rg~~ 10/31/80
~~REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2~~
~~DATE OF REVIEW 6-1-95~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEE NOTE PAGE TWELVE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

301

which might compromise a source; information which might divulge a sensitive investigative technique or method; information which might divulge what had been furnished the FBI by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources; and information which might adversely affect an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Nichols that if he so desired, he could obtain private counsel. He was invited to obtain additional personal briefing on the early morning of May 30, 1975, before his appearance before the SSC, from the Legal Counsel Division and the Intelligence Division of the FBI.

Early on the morning of May 30, 1975, Nichols was briefed by the FBI, including advice to him that his employment agreement with the FBI was being waived for the purposes of the interview by the SSC to the extent that it pertained to King, Levison and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the organization which had been headed up by King. Nichols was reminded of the areas of privilege and, at his request, was accompanied to the SSC offices by SA Seymor F. Phillips of the FBI.

At the SSC offices, Nichols and Phillips met Mr. John Bayly of the office of the Minority Counsel of the Committee who indicated that the interview would be under oath. Staff Member Seidel then appeared and inquiry was made of him by Phillips as to whether the interview would be under oath, it being noted that it was only then, after appearing at the SSC offices, that Nichols and Phillips became aware of the oath aspects of the interview. When Seidel said that Nichols would be interviewed in an Executive Session, Phillips asked that he be permitted to confer with FBI Headquarters as it would require clearance from the

Attorney General (AG) before Nichols would be able to testify. Such AG clearance was immediately obtained telephonically through FBI Headquarters and Phillips advised Nichols, Seidel and Mr. John Smith, of the office of Senator Walter D. Huddleston of the Committee that clearance for the interview had been obtained from the AG provided the interview was within the scope of the aforementioned areas. Phillips further indicated that if Nichols believed the interview was outside the scope, he could invoke 16.22, Code of Federal Regulations. Arrangements were made for the Executive Session to take place in the nearby old Carroll Arms Hotel while Phillips remained at the SSC offices in the event he was needed for consultation purposes.

The Executive Session took place in Room 607 of the old Carroll Arms Hotel and lasted approximately for the period from 10:40 a.m., to 1:15 p.m. Present in addition to Seidel, Bayly and Smith, were a male reporter and Senator Huddleston who administered the oath to Nichols, remained about twenty minutes and who asked only a few questions. At the outset of this session, Seidel furnished Nichols the Rules of Procedure of the SSC, including Senate Resolution 21. Nichols was permitted to look at the Rules of Procedure and after a brief review, he told Seidel he was satisfied as to the SSC authority and that they could proceed with the questioning. Nichols was advised of his rights, including that to counsel.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT R. NICHOLS

The following reports the questions and answers as furnished by Nichols, but not necessarily in chronological order.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U. S. Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Testimony of Retired FBI
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session

Nichols was questioned about the communist background of Levison. He replied that he could not discuss this matter because it would jeopardize an FBI source. Nichols indicated that he did not know the identity of the source. Seidel, who did most of the questioning throughout the session, then asked Nichols a series of questions attempting to determine whether the source was a technical one, a foreign one, a "Soviet" one, also naming several other types. Nichols' answer in each case was that he did not know. At one point, Seidel claimed that Nichols had said it was a foreign source. Nichols then stated he did not recall having so stated and that if he had so stated, it was wrong as he did not know the source. Seidel then asked how Nichols knew that the information he had would disclose the source if he was unaware of the source's identity. Nichols responded that inasmuch as he knew in advance the interview would include the subject of Levison, he had asked Phillips of the FBI what he could discuss about Levison. Nichols then related that Phillips had asked Nichols what he knew or recalled about Levison's background and that when he gave Phillips certain information, Phillips told him that that information would possibly identify the source and, therefore, would be privileged. (The Nichols-Phillips exchange referred to here took place during the early morning of that same day, May 30, 1975).

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U. S. Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Testimony of Retired FBI
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Seidel questioned Nichols concerning alleged harassment of King by the FBI and mentioned such specific allegations as the following: Sending of a tape recording to Mrs. King; anonymous telephone calls to attempt to cancel press meetings by King; false fire alarms; and furnishing of information about King to the clergy and the news media, including an Atlanta editor, Ralph McGill. In each instance during this phase of the questioning, which Nichols described as rather extensive by Seidel, Nichols answered that he did not participate in any such actions and was unaware that any such things were being done. He also told Seidel that he knew of no COINTELPRO (counterintelligence) activity on the part of the FBI against King.

Nichols was asked if he had contacts at Atlanta, Georgia, Police Department (PD) in the King investigation which Nichols acknowledged he had been assigned to in 1964. Nichols answered that he had confided in one detective in the security detail of the PD and on the urging of Seidel, Nichols furnished the detective's identity as Sergeant Bobby Moore.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U. S. Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Testimony of Retired FBI
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session

Nichols was questioned as to what type of investigation concerning King was conducted besides the use of a technical surveillance. Nichols replied that he had attempted to initiate action to infiltrate the SCLC with live informants but that every one of his suggestions along this line was turned down by FBI Headquarters. Nichols furnished the reason for these rejections as being that the FBI did not want to interfere with civil rights organizations but indicated that the Bureau had never told him this in the rejections and that it was his own rationale. Nichols indicated that from time to time spot physical surveillances would take place in Atlanta to verify contacts between King and individuals known or suspected of being communists. During this phase of the interview, Seidel mentioned the name of Harry Wachtel and Nichols acknowledged he was one of King's contacts. In response to a question as to whether or not trash or mail covers were used against King, Nichols responded that they were not.

Inquiry was made as to why so much reliance was placed by the FBI on technical coverage of King and so little was done in the way of physical surveillances. Seidel pointed out that a technical surveillance of an individual was a greater infringement of his privacy than was a physical surveillance. Nichols responded that the Bureau did what it felt was necessary to get the information it needed. Seidel then asked Nichols how he would personally feel about a technical surveillance on him, Nichols. Nichols' response was that he would rather have his phone tapped than to always be followed around.

Nichols was questioned concerning the authority for the technical surveillance of King and how Nichols would learn of such authority. Nichols explained that he would be

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

called into the office of the Special Agent in Charge and told that advice from the Bureau had been received that the technical surveillance was authorized. When inquiry was made concerning the mechanics of installing the surveillance, Nichols answered that he had nothing to do with this phase. On questioning, Nichols discussed the monitoring plant he had set up with a cover company and Nichols gave the general location of the plant. Nichols indicated that he did not know who actually made the installation and was asked if an Al Miller was the sound man in the office. Nichols acknowledged that he was and when asked if Nichols had monitored the surveillance, Nichols indicated he had on a spot basis.

Nichols was questioned and furnished information of a biographical and personal nature. It included such things as the period of time he was assigned in Atlanta, the period of time assigned security work, the King case and criminal work, as well as when and why he had been transferred from Atlanta to Oklahoma City. Seidel brought up the matter of Nichols' testimony in Houston, Texas, in connection with an FBI case concerning the heavyweight boxer Cassius Clay. On questioning, Nichols acknowledged he had been transferred to Oklahoma City because of what the Bureau considered his deficiencies in his testimony in that case. Seidel inquired as to what actually Nichols had done wrong and Nichols replied that he had received a letter of censure but had thrown it away and cannot now recall the specific deficiencies for which he was censured. He only recalled that his testimony was considered not up to Bureau standards. Seidel then asked, "What are the Bureau standards? Didn't you tell the truth?" Nichols responded that there was no question as to the truthfulness of his testimony, that he had told the truth.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U. S. Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Testimony of Retired FBI
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session

Nichols was questioned about his contacts with another retired FBI Agent, Alan Sentinella, to whom the King case was assigned after it had been handled by Nichols. Nichols was asked if he had discussed his forthcoming testimony with Sentinella who resides in Atlanta. Nichols acknowledged that he had had a discussion with Sentinella but that they had both purposely avoided any discussion of the substance of Nichols' testimony-to-be and the testimony which Sentinella had already given the SSC. They discussed only procedural aspects as Nichols wanted to have some idea in advance as to what might be expected in any trip to Washington to testify. It was Nichols' impression that Seidel thought that Nichols was holding out some information on this matter.

On at least three occasions Seidel inquired of Nichols as to whether he had discussed his forthcoming testimony with Charles Harding of Atlanta, a retired FBI Agent who had also been acquainted with the King case in 1964. On each occasion, Nichols denied that he had had any discussion with Harding on this matter.

Nichols was questioned as to whether the technical surveillance on King was justified and his response was that it was justified. When asked why, Nichols stated that there was considerable evidence of communist influences on King inasmuch as King was receiving much advice in his work from Levison and other communists. Seidel asked if they included Jack O'Dell and Harry Wachtel and Nichols acknowledged that it did. When Nichols was asked as to whether or not he had developed any information as to the communist background of Levison, O'Dell or Wachtel, Nichols responded that he had not and that the information was developed by others.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

At one point, when Seidel asked about alleged harassment by the FBI, Nichols told him of FBI investigations of church burnings in South Georgia and that the Bureau recognized outstanding work by its Agents in this field and that some of the Agents, including Nichols, had received meritorious awards. Nichols indicated that he had been commended for his work generally in civil rights investigations.

When asked about what the FBI was doing in the King case besides use of wiretaps, Nichols advised that he had attended a conference at FBI Headquarters to explore avenues of investigation that might be pursued in the King case. The objective was to discuss ways of better determining the extent of the communist influences on King. Nichols furnished the names of the following FBI personnel as attending the conference: Agents Henry Rouse and Nichols from Atlanta; and from FBI Headquarters, Assistant Director William C. Sullivan, and Agents Larry Gurley and Fred Baumgardner. (Nichols advised that also attending the conference was a Bureau official, Joseph Sizoo, but that he did not furnish this name during his testimony as he did not then recall his presence at the conference). Nichols told the SSC that he could not remember what decisions were made at the conference.

Nichols was questioned concerning a dispute between King and former FBI Director Hoover which had been aired by the news media. Nichols was asked if the dispute was the reason for technical coverage of King and Nichols answered that he was convinced that that was not the reason for the technical coverage; that such coverage was otherwise fully justified. Nichols pointed out that the investigation of King was initiated before the dispute although it was his recollection that the technical coverage started after the dispute.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U. S. Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Testimony of Retired FBI
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session

Attempt was made by Seidel to question Nichols concerning FBI investigation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee but Nichols refused to discuss the matter on the basis it was outside the parameters of the testimony.

Nichols was questioned concerning an alleged visit of William C. Sullivan to Atlanta to see the newspaper editor, Ralph McGill. This discussion was initiated in the context of the allegation that the FBI furnished information about King to the news media. Nichols responded that he did not remember Sullivan ever coming to Atlanta.

Nichols was asked if he knew about the writing of a monograph about King by an FBI Agent named Charles Brennan. Nichols responded that he did not know of this.

Nichols advised that he was offered the opportunity to make a statement at the beginning of his testimony but declined to do so. He was given the same offer at the close of his testimony and he made a statement to the following effect. Nichols believed that the Bureau had always conducted the King investigation with the objective of determining the extent of communist influences on King and on the SCLC and that the only way to make a determination as to the full extent required technical coverage. Nichols pointed out that the Bureau never interfered in the legitimate civil rights activities of individuals or organizations or harassed such people and that it was Nichols' belief that FBI personnel were doing what they were being paid for when they conducted legitimate investigations revolving around communism and communist influences in civil rights activities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U. S. Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Testimony of Retired FBI
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session

Also at the conclusion of the testimony, Nichols was told that a draft of the testimony would be made available for him to review for editing purposes. The SSC would telephone Nichols who was returning to Atlanta to advise him the draft would be available and Nichols would have five days to review same. Nichols was told that the draft could not be mailed to him but that someone might bring it to Atlanta; otherwise, Nichols would have to return to Washington, D. C., if he wanted to review it. Expenses for such a second trip were not mentioned.

On June 2, 1975, Nichols telephoned FBI Headquarters from Birmingham, Alabama, where he was temporarily residing and advised he recalled the following additional details of what was covered in his testimony.

Seidel asked Nichols if information received through technical coverage included information relating to

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Senator Huddleston asked Nichols how it would be possible to follow the Bureau instruction precisely and Nichols responded that it would be very difficult to comply and in some instances, it would not be possible. Seidel then commented, "Why - because of the nature of the beast?" (wiretap).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U. S. Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Testimony of Retired FBI
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session

John Smith of Senator Huddleston's office asked the difference between a bug and a wiretap and Nichols responded that a bug was a microphone implanted on the premises whereas a wiretap was an interception of a telephone line. Smith then asked if there was a bug on King or the SCLC in Atlanta and Nichols responded "not to my knowledge." Seidel asked about any other places in Atlanta where there may have been bugs on King and Nichols advised he had no knowledge of any. Seidel asked if Nichols was familiar with a Willard Hotel (Washington, D. C.) incident involving King and Nichols responded that he was not.

NOTE:

Original and one copy to the Attorney General copy for forwarding to the White House. Debriefing of Nichols, including telephonic contact from him 6/2/75, by S. F. Phillips.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTENDEES

USIB AD HOC COORDINATING GROUP
ON CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

Wednesday, 4 June 1975, at 1000 hours
DCI Conference Room (7D64)

JFK(1)(A)

[Dr. John M. Clarke]
AD/DCI/IC

Mr. J. J. Hitchcock
State

[Mr. David Lowman] STAT
NSA

Mr. J. Foster Collins
Treasury

Mr. Leon F. Schwartz
FBI

Mr. Robert Upchurch
ERDA

RADM Donald P. Harvey, USN
[Mr. John Brock
Captain William Quisenberry] STAT
DIA

Captain L. C. Martinez
Navy

Lt. Col. Harold Coyle
Rep. for Deputy Under
Secretary of the Air Force

[Mr. Walter Elder] STAT JFK(1)(A)
CIA

Mrs. Harriett D. Mowitt
Exec Sec to the Ad Hoc Group
ICS

Mr. Donald E. Moore
Chairman, USIB Security
Committee

Mr. Merrill T. Kelly
Army

Colonel Jerry D. Alderson, Jr.
Air Force

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/RW

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

4. In addition to the "category II" items, there are a number of additional subjects largely geographic in nature for which the DCI feels CIA should assume responsibility for preparing comprehensive papers. In view of the apparent adversary relationship between the Senate Select Committee Staff and the agencies under investigation, it may be that preparation of papers dealing comprehensively with specific subjects will deflect some of this cross-agency probing and result in a positive solution to problems before they arise.

5. The Chairman reminded the group of the responsibility which exists to keep Mr. Cotter of the Post Office Department informed on matters resulting from the Congressional investigations which will clearly impact on his agency's affairs. At present, the cross-agency character of the interviews now under way indicate a possible communication gap in adequately coordinating on postal matters.

6. The Chairman explained the DCI's action taken in late May to separate the responsibility for CIA's response to the Congressional Select Committees from those responsibilities of the IC Staff. [Both Dr. Clarke and Mr. Elder emphasized the very close relationship which exists in the two efforts. Mr. Elder will represent CIA at all USIB Ad Hoc sessions henceforth.]

JFK(1)(A)
JFK(1)(A)

7. The Chairman questioned [Mr. Elder, the CIA representative] whether or not the Senate Select Committee had yet furnished the Agency with a list of subjects with which they plan to deal in depth. [Mr. Elder reported they have not yet done so, but it is apparent that three items are of priority interest at the moment: assassinations, the Phoenix program, and covert action; that it appears clear the Committee is currently pursuing the question of authorities, approvals, and support from other agencies.]

JFK(1)(A)
JFK(1)(A)

8. The 27 May request addressed to the DCI covering materials under the jurisdiction of a number of Community agencies was provided to the members of the Ad Hoc Group. [Dr. Clarke indicated he was seeking policy guidance on selected items in the request which dealt with Community product such as NIE etc.] He noted the 27 May request indicated identical letters were being forwarded to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Copies have been sent to all USIB Ad Hoc members, the NSC and the White House.

JFK(1)(A)

9. Copies of a memorandum which set forth the action items resulting from the Policy Steering Group session of last week were provided to the Ad Hoc members for their information.

10. Mr. Elder reported that the House Committee has indicated to CIA its intent to concentrate on specific issues, but as of now are not adequately organized to be specific in their requests. The one extant request forwarded to the CIA was posing some problems because of the lack of cleared personnel, approved storage facilities, and determinations on the ultimate disposition of records. The Chairman noted that concurrent with this meeting, a meeting of Community legal representatives was taking place with the purpose of commenting on the House Select Committee's proposed security regulations which have not yet been adopted.

JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(A)

11. [CIA reported its success with the provision of a reading room for SSC Staff at CIA headquarters.] State reported there were no comparable facilities anticipated there. Defense has provided badges to Staff members and reading facilities are available. The same accessability of materials is true at NSA and FBI.

12. The last subject on the agenda was the implementation of the Community Central Index. In the material provided to the group was a letter reaffirming the purposes of the Central Index and a list of 40 key words to be used in identifying material furnished the Index. A printout of the Index content was provided to the group as a review document only. The final format of such periodic reports has not yet been refined. Group members are encouraged to comment if they detect any problems with items in the printout. Forms for inputting information to the Central Index were also provided to the Group. This is a service of common concern which will assure the uniformity of information received and should serve to lighten the workload of the individual agencies. The telephone number of Mrs. Young of the Central Index was provided for agencies' convenience in accessing the Index information.

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

JFK (1) (3)

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff 6

DCI/IC-75-0116
6 June 1975

Senstudy-'75

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1. The following list includes subjects to be covered by the Agencies concerned:

Assassinations	White House	Mr. Wilderotter IDS 145-7094
Drug Abuse	CIA	Not yet designated
Political Abuses (1964)	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609
Domestic Surveillance	Justice	John Martin IDS 187-4555
Electronic Surveillance and Warrantless Wiretap	Justice	George Calhoun IDS 187-4401
Use of Notional Organizations	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609
Use of Proprietary Organizations	CIA	Not yet designated
Mail Cover and Intercept	Justice	Phil White IDS 187-4674
Watch List	DoD	Benson Buffham, NSA 688-7222
Army Surveillance	DoD	Dr. David Cooke 695-4436

File 62-116395

STATUTE

62-116395-

S-WOB

NOT RECORDED

17 JUN 18 1975

84 JUN 13 1975

The individuals named on this list are those designated by the Agencies as having prime responsibility for preparing the paper. The papers should be delivered in two copies directly to the Associate Counsel to the President, Mr. James Wilderotter, Room 182, Old Executive Office Building, by the Agencies. In the course of the next week, a meeting will be called for Mr. Wilderotter to meet with the individuals designated on this list. Each Agency will also be responsible for naming a person to work with each Task Force leader where it is appropriate to the subject matter. In the interim, Task Force leaders should deal directly with the following people with respect to individual Agency responsibilities:

DCI/Intelligence Community	John Clarke IDS 143-5477
CIA	E. Henry Knoche IDS 143-4086
Defense	Tom Latimer IDS 11-54221
State	William Hyland IDS 101-20342
Treasury	William Morell IDS 184-2536
Justice	William O'Connor IDS 187-5211
FBI	William Cregar IDS 175-4636

JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(B)

2. The CIA has been coordinating internally the DCI's letter to the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and this letter should be available for Community review and consideration soon. Distribution of this letter will be made sometime prior to a meeting of the General Counsels chaired by Mr. Wilderotter to go over details of the letter and coordinate on the final language. This arrangement is consistent with agreements reached in our meeting on 3 June 1975.

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

JFK(1)(A)

cc: Mr. Buchen

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. J. B. Adams~~
1 - ~~Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~(1 - Mr. Hotis)~~

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW 6/6

DATE: 6/6/75

1 - ~~Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. H. W. Dare
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

This records the results of contact with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning release to Senate Select Committee (SSC) of two documents pertaining to Appendix C, Paragraph 24 of the SSC request to the Department of 5/14/75, which requested "all memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of 'notional' Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States."

No information has been developed indicating this Bureau conferred with CIA regarding the establishment or creation of a Bureau-sponsored "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization. Although the FBI did, in fact, direct several such organizations, no information has been developed indicating the FBI consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.

JFK(1)(B)

In one instance, CIA advised in 2/70 it had established a notional organization with post office box addresses in Boston, Massachusetts and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This notional organization, to be known as the Union for the Revolution, had the objective of developing penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. It was CIA's intention to circulate propaganda from the post office boxes in anticipation of interesting Arab groups. Thereafter, it was CIA's plan to use its personnel under "suitable" cover to contact the Arab groups. (See memorandum dated 2/13/70, captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-2, copy attached.)

REC 101 62-116395-210

By letterhead memorandum dated 3/23/70, the FBI indicated information had been received indicating the Union for the Revolution had been in contact with a domestic Marxist-Leninist organization requesting literature. This memorandum set forth an analysis of a "Statement of the Union for the Revolution" indicating the document lacked credibility as a revolutionary document. (LHM dated 3/23/70, captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-4, copy attached.)

62-116395

5 JUN 11 1975

LFS:mjg
(8)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 11 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

JFK (1) (CA)

On 6/6/75, Mr. Walter Elder, CIA, advised that CIA had no objection to the LHM dated 3/23/70, being furnished to the SSC. With regard to the memorandum from Mr. Papich to Mr. Brennan dated 2/13/70, Mr. Elder requested that the name of the CIA representative who furnished the information in the memorandum be deleted from line one of the memorandum prior to its being furnished to the SSC. Provided this is done, CIA has no objection to this memorandum being furnished to the SSC. He suggested that when the name is deleted, it be replaced with the phrase "A CIA officer."

ACTION:

To record CIA's clearance of the above-described documents.

SECRET

Appendix C, III, 24

Please provide: all memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts, or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States.

No information has been developed indicating this Bureau conferred with CIA regarding the establishment or creation of a Bureau-sponsored "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization. Although the FBI did, in fact, direct several such organizations, no information has been developed indicating the FBI consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.

In one instance, CIA advised in 2/70 it had established a notional organization with post office box addresses in Boston, Massachusetts, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This notional organization, to be known as the Union for the Revolution, had the objective of developing penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. It was CIA's intention to circulate propaganda from the post office boxes in anticipation of interesting Arab groups. Thereafter, it was CIA's plan to use its personnel under "suitable" cover to contact the Arab groups. (See memorandum dated 2/13/70 captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-2, copy attached.) JFK(B)

By letterhead memorandum dated 3/23/70, the FBI indicated information had been received indicating the Union for the Revolution had been in contact with a domestic Marxist-Leninist organization requesting literature. This memorandum set forth an analysis of a "Statement of the Union for the Revolution" indicating the document lacked credibility as a revolutionary document. (LHM dated 3/23/70 captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-4, copy attached.)

As the Union for the Revolution was strictly a creation of CIA, it is recommended before any information be disseminated outside the FBI relating to this organization, clearance be obtained through CIA. JFK(B)

Prepared by SA David
Ryan, IS-3, 5/28/75

SECRET

Classified by 4375
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-216

reason and for the reason that the Director desired to be cooperative with the Committee, we would request a meeting with Senator Church and Senator Tower to arrive at an understanding as to procedures. I told Mr. O'Connor that I would consider such a letter and he said he would discuss the matter with the Deputy Attorney General and with James Wilderotter at the White House.

At approximately 9:05 a.m. on May 23, 1975, Mr. O'Connor called me and said that he had discussed the matter with Mr. Wilderotter and the Deputy Attorney General. He said that both had agreed that it was inopportune at this time to seek special guidelines for interviews of FBI personnel and former personnel with the Committee. He said that a meeting has been scheduled for Tuesday, May 27, 1975, at noon in a final effort to resolve an understanding with Committee representatives. He said at the present time it is proposed that the meeting be attended by Wilderotter and Roderick Hills, representing the White House; Hoffman, representing the Defense Department; [Warner, representing CIA] and O'Connor representing the Justice Department. Committee representatives would be Schwarz, Chief Counsel, and John Elliff. He said that at this time it was his thought that the Deputy Attorney General and I should not attend the meeting. He gave as his reasoning the thought that "should something go wrong" the Deputy Attorney General could disassociate himself from any agreement arrived at, and that I would similarly be in a position of saying that we have not been a party to the agreement.

JFK(1)(A)

I reminded Mr. O'Connor that meetings have been held frequently in the past and that tentative understandings made at such meetings have disappeared shortly after the meeting was concluded. I told him that was significant to us because we now understand that two more former employees of the FBI have been contacted and may be interviewed in the near future. I told him that former SA Sam Papich and former Agent Nichols have been contacted. I told him that the extent to which we should release these two former employees from their obligation of secrecy could not be intelligently evaluated unless we knew the subject matter of the interviews and that we plan to contact the Committee to inquire as to the subject matter. I pointed out to him that such pending interviews make it imperative for the FBI to consider action in addition to meetings that may be planned to discuss guidelines.

CONTINUED _ OVER

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 5/7/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Schwartz

FROM : H.C. Flemister, Jr.

Senstudy-75

SUBJECT: MORTON HALPERIN
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST

JFK (LCA)

This memorandum sets forth results of Liaison contact with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning Halperin's request to be provided with a copy of a 1948 memorandum of understanding between the FBI and the CIA. Halperin has made this request of both CIA and the Bureau.

On 4/30/75 Mr. James Garrison, CIA, advised that after considerable research in CIA files, the following documents (copies attached) were located which pertain to Halperin's request. Copies have also been located in Bufiles:

(1) Memorandum for the Record dated 9/22/48 entitled "Cooperation and Liaison Between Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Policy Coordination, CIA," which was prepared by CIA and originally classified Top Secret. This document has recently been downgraded by CIA to a classification of Secret.

(2) Letter dated 9/22/48 from Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, to Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant to the Director, FBI, which forwarded as an enclosure the 9/22/48 memorandum described above. This item was also originally classified Top Secret but has been downgraded by CIA to Secret.

62-116395-

JUN 25 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 63-16062-45

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

(3) Letter dated 10/2/48 from J. Edgar Hoover to Wisner which acknowledges that the arrangement set forth in the memorandum of 9/22/48 is satisfactory to the Bureau. This item was not classified in accordance with current classification standards but bears the marking "Personal and Confidential."

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures - 3
LFS:tdp (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

Records
cc in 62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

84 JUL 1 1975

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

DRAFT

22 September 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Cooperation and Liaison Between Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Policy Coordination, CIA

1. This memorandum records an understanding which has been arrived at in conversations between Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Mr. Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director, and Chief of the Office of Policy Coordination, of CIA. The conversations in question were duly authorized by the Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and by the Director and Deputy Director of CIA and were arranged by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on behalf of the White House. The purpose of the understanding is to provide a basis for cooperation and liaison between the FBI and the Office of Policy Coordination, CIA, and the following points summarize the essential elements of the understanding:

a. In view of the distinctive character of the activities of the Office of Policy Coordination, it is considered advisable that separate and direct liaison be established between that office and the FBI. For this purpose the FBI will provide a special liaison officer who will be nominated by the FBI within the near future. (This arrangement has been specifically approved by the Deputy Director, CIA, in the absence of the Director.)

b. It is understood that in the discharge of the duties and obligations laid upon the Office of Policy Coorination by the National Security Council, it is necessary for this Office to have dealings with individuals and groups of foreign nationalities within and without the United States and to sponsor the movement from time to time of such individuals and representatives of such groups between the United States and foreign countries. The Office of Policy Coordination recognizes the primary responsibility of the FBI in the field of United States domestic security, and the FBI acknowledges that it is essential for the Office of Policy Coordination to have direct dealings with the individuals and groups aforementioned.

c. In order that the interests of both parties to this understanding shall be served, it is understood that the Office of Policy Coordination keep the FBI generally informed concerning the extent and character of its dealings with

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
Destroy only with consent of the Historical Staff

owngraded to SECRET per
aul J. Burns 019210
Paul J Burns

JFK(1)(A)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

22 September 1948

Mr. D. Milton Ladd
Assistant to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Ladd:

Confirming our telephone conversation of today, I am enclosing a draft of a proposed memorandum which I have prepared for the purpose of recording the understanding which has been arrived at between us in regard to the cooperation and liaison between my office and the Bureau. I have endeavored in this draft to set out the essential features of our conversation of yesterday afternoon and I should appreciate your indicating to me any modifications or changes which you may deem necessary or advisable to reflect your recollection and understanding of our conversation. Upon my receipt of your suggested changes, if any, and following any further discussion between us which may be indicated as desirable, I shall prepare this memorandum in final form and furnish to you the original and a copy thereof, with the request that you initial and return to me the copy.

In accordance with the terms of our understanding, I should like to submit to you herewith the names of certain of the individuals and groups with whom it is proposed that my office will have dealings in connection with our authorized activities. From time to time in the future I shall furnish you with additional names. The following are the names:

I - Individuals:

George M. Dimitrov, Exiled Secretary General of Bulgarian Agrarian Party

Stefan Osusky, prominent Czech Refugee leader

Ferenc Nagy, head of Hungarian Small Holders Party

Dr. Vladko Macek, representative of Croatian Peasant Party

Stanislas Mikolajczyk, former Polish Vice Premier

Andre Cretzianu, former Rumanian Cabinet Minister

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
Destroy only with consent

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

Downgraded to SECRET per
Paul J. Burns, 019210

SECRET

foreign individuals and groups within the United States. More specifically the Office of Policy Coordination will, in so far as possible, inform the FBI sufficiently in advance of its proposed dealings with such individuals and groups to enable the FBI to advise the Office of Policy Coordination of any security risks which may be involved in dealing with such individuals and groups and in order to provide the FBI with adequate opportunity to indicate individuals which it is employing for its own purposes in connection with the penetration of foreign groups.

d. There shall be an exchange of information between the FBI and the Office of Policy Coordination concerning the significance, activities, and reliability of such individuals and groups of foreign nationalities within the United States as may be of interest to the Office of Policy Coordination.

F. G. W.

D. M. L.

EYES ALONE

JFK(1)(A)

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

30 MAY 1975

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0597

Sen study -75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Department of Defense
Mr. William G. Hyland, Department of State
Mr. E. H. Knoche, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. William O. Cregar, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. William N. Morell, Jr., Department of Treasury
Mr. James G. Poor, Energy Research & Development Administration
Mr. William Nichols, Office of Management and Budget
Mr. John B. Hotis, Department of Justice

SUBJECT : Future Legislation Relative to U.S. Intelligence

Following up on the discussion at yesterday's meeting of the Policy Steering Group, addressees are encouraged to provide to the White House specific suggestions for administrative or legislative action relative to U.S. intelligence programs. Such proposals should be realistic and doable in the near term. Please provide two copies of all suggestions to James Wilderotter, Room 182, Old Executive Office Building by 10 June 1975.

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY

REC-100 62-116395-166

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating ~~Group~~

17 JUN 4 1975

file in 62-116395 5.8

84 JUN 4 1975

EYES ALONE

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

151 THRU 163

164 THRU 188

190 THRU 208

210 THRU 219

220, 221

2ND NR 221 THRU 230

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88296 Date: 2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/2/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/

At 2:30 p.m. on June 2, 1975, a conference was held with the Deputy Attorney General attended by K. William O'Connor, Kevin Maroney, Philip White, and Robert McDermott of the Department. Bureau representatives were Mr. Callahan, Mr. Adams, Mr. Wannall and me.

Mr. O'Connor discussed the request by the Senate Select Committee for access to the 39 page report by former Assistant Attorney General Petersen concerning COINTELPRO. Though objections were presented by the Bureau representatives that the report should not be furnished to the Committee, and its enclosures, particularly the legal memoranda should not be made available, the Deputy Attorney General decided and instructed that the 39 page report should be made available to John Elliff on Tuesday, June 3, 1975, for his review, at which time he would be permitted to take notes, but he would not be furnished a copy of the document. The Deputy further instructed that should Mr. Elliff request the attachments to the report, Mr. O'Connor should offer as an alternative the memoranda which initiated each of the COINTELPROs.

EX-105 REC-20 62-116395-280

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Upon our return to the Bureau, Mr. Adams requested that the Intelligence Division undertake an analysis of each of the summaries which were attached to the Petersen report in order to make a damage assessment based on factors that would affect current Bureau operations should they be revealed to the Committee. He also requested that ~~this information~~ be compiled and available to brief the Deputy Attorney General as to the difficulties that would be involved upon disclosure.

JUN 10 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. David Ryan
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

62-116009

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Intelligence Division analyze the summaries for purposes of a damage assessment.

2. That the Intelligence Division be prepared to furnish a briefing to the Deputy Attorney General as to the damage assessment.

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/28/75

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO: Director, FBI (62-116395)
(Attention: INTD - W. O. Cregar)

FROM: SAC, Atlanta (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

Re Bureau airtel to Atlanta 5/23/75.

Material enclosed with referenced airtel was hand-delivered to former SA, ALAN G. SENTINELLA, 5/27/75, and same was returned by SENTINELLA to Atlanta Division same day.

Enclosed is the material furnished by SENTINELLA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

detached & filed w/ yellow of LHM 5/22/75

5-8

62-116395-229

REC-100

17 JUN 16 1975

2-Bureau (Enc.)
1-Atlanta
WKD:rrl
(3)

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

JUN 17 1975

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident ____
Inspection ____
Int. Il. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 5 1975

TELETYPE

NR 011 NK CODE

4:00PM 6/5/75 IMMEDIATE RXG

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

ATT: W. O. GREGAR, INTD

FROM NEWARK (62-3971)

SENSTUDY 75

RE TELCON BUREAU SUPERVISOR ROBERT SHEA AND ASAC HERBERT D. CLOUGH, JR., JUNE 5, 1975.

THOROUGH REVIEW OF FILES CAPTIONED "DISRUPTION OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION; INFORMATION CONCERNING"; "SPECIAL SQUAD AT DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION , ATLANTIC CITY, N.J., AUGUST 22-28, 1964"; "DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, AUGUST 24-28, 1964" AND JUNE FILES DOES NOT REVEAL ANY MEMORANDA, LETTERS OR OTHER TYPE COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED BY FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, LEO T. CLARK.

END

MWW FBI WASH DC CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC-100

62-116395-228

[illegible] JUN 16 1975

CC - Gregar

84 JUN 17 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 3, 1975

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.
   Stanley David Levison

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired SA, FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: Bureau file 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/12/75

5. INTERVIEWER: Mr. Lester B. Seidel, SSC Staff Member

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT:

Witness was questioned and furnished information concerning the former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley David Levison.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

62-116395

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC-100

62-116395-227

17 JUN 16 1975

84 JUN 17 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2190

10 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

Harriet Merritt for
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

ALL [illegible] CONTAINED
HEREIN [illegible]
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RU

Attachment

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-226

NOT RECORDED

17 JUN 16 1975

file 62-116395

FIVE

84 JUN 1 9 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

10 JUN 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
Bader, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara			12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
Chesnick, Barbara			4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	

HEREIN
DATE 1-14-01 BY SP2ALM/lew

62-116395-29

ENCLOSURE

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17 (Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Dawson, Thomas			9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeOreo, Mary			6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel			8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor			3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
Ernő, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
Greissing, Edward			11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF Badge
Iverson, Portia			10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
Karalekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan			11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.			6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Pyle, Christopher			11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Ricks, Walter			12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	

10 JUN 1975

	Compartmented Clearance					
Name	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Seidel, Lester			7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.			3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha			9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Wallach, Paul			5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

10 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

1 - D. W. Moore
(Attn: J.M. Murphy)
1 - J. A. Mintz
(Attn: Legal Analysis Section)
1 - W. R. Wannall

May 9, 1975

Se. Study - '75

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - R. W. Held

Honorable Charles E. Wiggins
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Wiggins:

Reference is made to your letter dated April 9, 1975, enclosing a resolution adopted by the State Bar of California condemning the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for placing an informant on the staff of a legal service agency to communicate information learned in that capacity to the FBI and our response dated April 28, 1975.

Contact with the State Bar of California has enabled us to identify the situation to which they were referring.

MAILED 6
MAY 14 1975
FBI

Between April, 1968, and November, 1968, one Rudolph Leamer Muse was operated as an informant by our New Orleans, Louisiana, Division. Muse furnished information regarding black extremist activities and he was paid for services rendered. Muse was unemployed when initially volunteering his assistance to the FBI and subsequently, on May 10, 1968, began working as an investigator for the New Orleans Legal Assistance Corps (NOLAC), an organization funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Information in the files of our New Orleans Division indicates during June, 1968, Muse advised it had become necessary to tell his supervisor at NOLAC of his relationship with the FBI. His supervisor became aware of Muse's association with black nationalist groups and attempted to discharge him. To avoid discharge, Muse told his supervisor he was cooperating with the FBI. Subsequently Muse's supervisor from NOLAC contacted the New Orleans Division and advised he wanted to assure the FBI that the relationship between

4

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

REC 62-116395

ST 104

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 16 1975

19 MAY 16 1975

cah
RWH:cah (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

MAIL ROOM ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

FLM

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JUN 17 1975

Muse and the FBI would be maintained by him and would go no further. Muse's supervisor said he was cognizant of the importance of Muse's cooperation with the FBI remaining confidential.

The New Orleans Division of the FBI never conducted any investigation regarding NOLAC and Muse never furnished information concerning its activities.

I hope this information will clarify the issue for you. If I may be of further assistance in this matter, please contact me.

A copy of this letter is being provided to the State Bar of California.

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

1 - State Bar of California
601 McAllister Street
San Francisco, California 94102

Honorable Charles E. Wiggins

NOTE:

The resolution of the State Bar of California (SBC) referred to above did not identify the specific incident in which they were interested so Congressman Wiggins' letter was acknowledged and we indicated additional details would follow. On 4/25/75 San Francisco advised the basis for the SBC resolution was articles contained in the 2/7/75 issues of the San Francisco Examiner and Oakland Tribune. In these articles Muse was not mentioned by name but the details corresponded with his case. On 4/28/75 Supervisor Ernest Wall, New Orleans, advised Muse was identified by name in articles concerning this incident in the 2/2/75 issue of the New Orleans Times Picayune and the 2/25/75 issue of the New Orleans States Item. Since Muse revealed his relationship with the FBI and has been publicly identified by name and appears to be no privacy issue or need to protect the confidentiality of our files, Congressman Wiggins should be advised of the complete details in this matter. As the SBC urged issues such as this be considered by the select committees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, a copy of this communication is being furnished for the information of the Legal Analysis Section and Project Senstudy 75 in Division 5.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-8-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth in summary form the requests we have received from various Committees in Congress and the status of our replies.

I. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

We have substantially complied with the request of this Committee contained in their letter of 3-19-75. The remaining aspects of this request involve a decision by the State Department concerning the release of exhibits contained in a study on FBI jurisdiction, a decision by the Department relating to COINTELPRO and our recommendation that one particular document not be furnished the Committee.

We are in receipt of a request by memorandum dated 4-30-75 from the SSC. This request generally relates to Sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Manual of Instructions, and the various divisions having responsibilities and interest in the Sections requested, are in the process of preparing the necessary responses.

We received a request by letter dated 4-28-75 from the Committee concerning allegations of our possible involvement in the removal of documents from the residence of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover. Our response has been prepared and it is anticipated it will be furnished the Department in the near future.

62-116395-

66-2725-171

ORIGINAL FILED IN

II. Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee

NOT RECORDED
170 JUN 3 1975

MAY 23 1975

We have complied with those aspects of the request contained in this Committee's letter of 4-10-75, pertaining to photographic surveillance and indexing procedures. We anticipate our response to their requests relating to our authority to collect, retain and disseminate information will be furnished in the immediate future.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

PVD:dkg (6)
102

CONTINUED - OVER

We also received a request from this Committee by letter dated 4-22-75, relating to our procedures of handling Freedom of Information Act requests and an inquiry by letter dated 4-25-75 regarding our alleged involvement in the removal of documents from the residence of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover. We have prepared responses to both requests. The response concerning the Freedom of Information Act has been furnished the Department for approval and furnishing to the Committee; the response relating to removal of documents has been prepared and is in the process of being approved by the Bureau.

III. Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate Judiciary Committee

We received a request by letter dated 4-28-75 for information relating to terrorist incidents. We have prepared and furnished a response to this request.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

PVD JBH/PVD PCM

ATTENDEES

USIB AD HOC COORDINATING GROUP ON CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

Wednesday, 4 June 1975, at 1000 hours
DCI Conference Room (7D64)

Dr. John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

Mr. J. J. Hitchcock
State

Mr. David Lowman
NSA

Mr. J. Foster Collins
Treasury

Mr. Leon F. Schwartz
FBI

Mr. Robert Upchurch
ERDA

RADM Donald P. Harvey, USN
Mr. John Brock
Captain William Quisenberry
DIA

Captain L. C. Martinez
Navy

Lt. Col. Harold Coyle
Rep. for Deputy Under
Secretary of the Air Force

Mr. Walter Elder
CIA

Mrs. Harriett D. Mowitt
Exec Sec to the Ad Hoc Group
ICS

Mr. Donald E. Moore
Chairman, USIB Security
Committee

Mr. Merrill T. Kelly
Army

Colonel Jerry D. Alderson, Jr.
Air Force

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/RW

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

DCI/IC-75-0608
6 June 1975

Senstudy - 75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals ~~of the USIB~~ Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Ninth Meeting, 4 June 1975

1. A meeting of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group was held on 4 June 1975 at 10:00 a.m. A list of attendees is attached.

2. The meeting was opened by Dr. Clarke who described the current activities of the Senate Select Committee in accelerating their official interviews with knowledgeable officials across the Community and the criticality of firming up agreements on how these interviews are to be handled. This has not been forthcoming despite White House interest. House Select Committee procedure is not yet clear.

3. The second item raised by the Chairman was the list of category II "abuses" which had been developed at the direction of the Policy Steering Group. The set developed was the result of discussions with Mr. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee, who plans to present a complete list of "category II" items to the Committee on Friday, 6 June. At that point, it is expected "notices" would go out to the Community agencies advising them so that agreed interview procedures will apply. It is also anticipated that the presence of private as well as Agency counsel will be addressed. The Policy Steering Group has accepted the principle of dealing with these identified "category II" subjects by assigning responsibility for gathering of comprehensive and paper preparation to specific individuals within the Community agencies. Dr. Clarke is the focal point for gathering the names of individuals who will assume these responsibilities. To date, individuals had been named for all subjects except those to be handled by CIA.

62-116395 -
NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 16 1975

file-62-116395

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

84 JUN 17 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

4. In addition to the "category II" items, there are a number of additional subjects largely geographic in nature for which the DCI feels CIA should assume responsibility for preparing comprehensive papers. In view of the apparent adversary relationship between the Senate Select Committee Staff and the agencies under investigation, it may be that preparation of papers dealing comprehensively with specific subjects will deflect some of this cross-agency probing and result in a positive solution to problems before they arise.

5. The Chairman reminded the group of the responsibility which exists to keep Mr. Cotter of the Post Office Department informed on matters resulting from the Congressional investigations which will clearly impact on his agency's affairs. At present, the cross-agency character of the interviews now under way indicate a possible communication gap in adequately coordinating on postal matters.

6. The Chairman explained the DCI's action taken in late May to separate the responsibility for CIA's response to the Congressional Select Committees from those responsibilities of the IC Staff. Both Dr. Clarke and Mr. Elder emphasized the very close relationship which exists in the two efforts. Mr. Elder will represent CIA at all USIB Ad Hoc sessions henceforth.

7. The Chairman questioned Mr. Elder, the CIA representative, whether or not the Senate Select Committee had yet furnished the Agency with a list of subjects with which they plan to deal in depth. Mr. Elder reported they have not yet done so, but it is apparent that three items are of priority interest at the moment: assassinations, the Phoenix program, and covert action; that it appears clear the Committee is currently pursuing the question of authorities, approvals, and support from other agencies.

8. The 27 May request addressed to the DCI covering materials under the jurisdiction of a number of Community agencies was provided to the members of the Ad Hoc Group. Dr. Clarke indicated he was seeking policy guidance on selected items in the request which dealt with Community product such as NIE etc. He noted the 27 May request indicated identical letters were being forwarded to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Copies have been sent to all USIB Ad Hoc members, the NSC and the White House.

9. Copies of a memorandum which set forth the action items resulting from the Policy Steering Group session of last week were provided to the Ad Hoc members for their information.

10. Mr. Elder reported that the House Committee has indicated to CIA its intent to concentrate on specific issues, but as of now are not adequately organized to be specific in their requests. The one extant request forwarded to the CIA was posing some problems because of the lack of cleared personnel, approved storage facilities, and determinations on the ultimate disposition of records. The Chairman noted that concurrent with this meeting, a meeting of Community legal representatives was taking place with the purpose of commenting on the House Select Committee's proposed security regulations which have not yet been adopted.

11. CIA reported its success with the provision of a reading room for SSC Staff at CIA headquarters. State reported there were no comparable facilities anticipated there. Defense has provided badges to Staff members and reading facilities are available. The same accessability of materials is true at NSA and FBI.

12. The last subject on the agenda was the implementation of the Community Central Index. In the material provided to the group was a letter reaffirming the purposes of the Central Index and a list of 40 key words to be used in identifying material furnished the Index. A printout of the Index content was provided to the group as a review document only. The final format of such periodic reports has not yet been refined. Group members are encouraged to comment if they detect any problems with items in the printout. Forms for inputting information to the Central Index were also provided to the Group. This is a service of common concern which will assure the uniformity of information received and should serve to lighten the workload of the individual agencies. The telephone number of Mrs. Young of the Central Index was provided for agencies' convenience in accessing the Index information.

Harriett D. Mowitt /km
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff 6

DCI/IC-75-0116
6 June 1975

Senstudy-75

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

1. The following list includes subjects to be covered by the Agencies concerned:

Assassinations	White House	Mr. Wilderotter IDS 145-7094
Drug Abuse	CIA	Not yet designated
Political Abuses (1964)	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609
Domestic Surveillance	Justice	John Martin IDS 187-4555
Electronic Surveillance and Warrantless Wiretap	Justice	George Calhoun IDS 187-4401
Use of Notional Organizations	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609
Use of Proprietary Organizations	CIA	Not yet designated
Mail Cover and Intercept	Justice	Phil White IDS 187-4674
Watch List	DoD	Benson Buffham, NSA 688-7222
Army Surveillance	DoD	Dr. David Cooke 695-4436

File 62-116395

62-116395—

S-W06

NOT RECORDED

17 JUN 13 1975

84 JUN 13 1975

The individuals named on this list are those designated by the Agencies as having prime responsibility for preparing the paper. The papers should be delivered in two copies directly to the Associate Counsel to the President, Mr. James Wilderotter, Room 182, Old Executive Office Building, by the Agencies. In the course of the next week, a meeting will be called for Mr. Wilderotter to meet with the individuals designated on this list. Each Agency will also be responsible for naming a person to work with each Task Force leader where it is appropriate to the subject matter. In the interim, Task Force leaders should deal directly with the following people with respect to individual Agency responsibilities:

DCI/Intelligence Community	John Clarke IDS 143-5477
CIA	E. Henry Knoche IDS 143-4086
Defense	Tom Latimer IDS 11-54221
State	William Hyland IDS 101-20342
Treasury	William Morell IDS 184-2536
Justice	William O'Connor IDS 187-5211
FBI	William Cregar IDS 175-4636

2. The CIA has been coordinating internally the DCI's letter to the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and this letter should be available for Community review and consideration soon. Distribution of this letter will be made sometime prior to a meeting of the General Counsels chaired by Mr. Wilderotter to go over details of the letter and coordinate on the final language. This arrangement is consistent with agreements reached in our meeting on 3 June 1975.

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Distribution:
1 - Mr. Wilderotter
1 - Mr. Latimer
1 - Mr. Hyland
1 - Mr. Morell
1 - Mr. O'Connor
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - Mrs. Mowitt/Executive Secretary of Steering Group (IDS 143-4055)

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY PLAZA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/14/01 BY

Special Agent Seymor Phillips
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

6

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw eKW
(13)

For info only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR - Dept. of Justice. - 11/02/76 - JKB

Delivered 5/23/75 to KWO'(mnc)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP16SKJRG

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

REC-100

62-116395-225

17 JUN 16 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

84 JUN 17 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

62-116395

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S.F.Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP1GSK/fg

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is the verbatim text of a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella who served as an SA of the FBI from July 12, 1948, until his retirement March 22, 1971. He is presently employed as Director of Safety, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia.

"Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

"Interview by Lester B. Siedel, (sic), representative of Senate Select Committee of Alan G. Sentinella. Interview commenced 12:24pm, terminated 2:20pm. Siedel at the outset identified self via credential as representative of aforementioned Committee.

"Mr. Siedel introduced by writer to Mr. Seymor Phillips of the FBI. The writer explained to Siedel that following his telephone conversation, 5/9/75, during which he stated he was interested in discussing matters related to the King and Levison cases it was felt that such discussion might involve issues currently sensitive to the Bureau. Accordingly the Atlanta Office was contacted and subsequently the writer was contacted by Robert Olmert of the Bureau. Mr. Olmert advised that if it was desired the Bureau would make available a representative not for the purpose of participating in the interview but to be available for advice. The

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw ekw
(13)

SEE NOTE PAGE TEN

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOS.

62-116395-225

GPO 954-546

writer stated he was interested in obtaining such assistance. Accordingly during the morning of 5/12/75 Mr. Seymor Phillips contacted the writer.

"This is dictated immediately following interview by Siedel. No effort is herein made to follow the chronology of questions presented by Siedel. During the interview no notes or recording were made by writer. Will use "Q" for question and "A" for answer. Questions (Q) were asked by Siedel and answers (A) were given by writer.

"A: Was it correct that matters concerning the King investigation were discussed openly over coffee by members of the Atlanta field office?

"A: Matters relating to the King investigation were discussed by individuals concerned therewith. I have no recollection during the period I was connected with the investigation that it was discussed by everybody like the previous night's ballgame might have been.

"Q: Shortly after King received the Nobel Prize did a Bureau official William Sullivan come to Atlanta?

"A: It is my recollection King received the Nobel Prize sometime before the case was assigned to me. I do not remember if Bureau official William Sullivan visited Atlanta.

"Q: Did Sullivan have any contact with Ralph McGill concerning King?

"A: I do not know.

"Q: Were taps (telephone) and bugs (microphone) used by Atlanta in connection with King?

"A: A tap (telephone) was utilized re King at his SCLC office and his residence.

"Q: When were the bugs (microphone) utilized?

"A: There were none.

"Q: What was the purpose of the investigation of King?

"A: To determine whether King and/or SCLC were influenced by persons or groups having communist tendencies.

"Q: Did you feel the investigation was worthwhile?

"A: I don't recall that I ever asked myself that question. It was an assignment made by my employer and my responsibility to handle it.

"Q: How did other agents feel about the illegal use of these taps?

"A: The taps were not illegal. They were obtained through the authority of the Attorney General.

"Q: Did any agents express the opinion that these investigations were improper?

"A: I do not recall specifically although Mr. Murtaugh (sic) may well have so stated.

"Q: What electronic surveillance was used concerning Levison?

"A: I do not know. Levison resided in New York City.

"Q: Was Levison covered by the tap on King?

"A: Only to the extent that he was in contact with King. There was no tap on Levison per se in Atlanta.

"Q: Was there any physical surveillance of King?

"A: I do not recall any physical surveillance of King as such. There was surveillance conducted of individuals in contact with King and consequently King would obviously have been physically surveilled. But such surveillance was not on King directly.

"Q. Did you participate in these surveillances?

"A: Yes on several occasions.

"Q: How many occasions?

"A: I cannot recall.

"Q: How long were you in Atlanta?

"A: August 1960 - March 1971.

"Q: What other offices did you serve in and when?

"A: Baltimore, September 1948 - January 1949; Buffalo, January 1949 - August 1960; Atlanta, August 1960 - March 1971.

"Q: Where were you born?

"A: London, England.

"Q: How long did you live there?

"A: 9 years.

"Q: Where did you live first when in this country?

"A: In New Jersey approximately one year. I spent most of my growing up time in Iowa.

"Q: You entered the Bureau July 1948 and left in March 1971?

"A: That is correct.

"Q: When was the King and SCLC case assigned to you?

"A: I believe it was the early part or spring of 1965.

"Q: How long had the investigation been going on before you got the case?

"A: I really am not sure - possibly a year; it might have been longer.

"A: How long did the investigation continue?

"A: I cannot actually recall.

"Q: Was it still going on when you left the Bureau?

"A: Yes, regarding the SCLC.

"Q: How long after King's death did the tap remain?

"A: I cannot be sure. It seems as though it was discontinued a short time after, however I believe it continued for a longer period of time on the SCLC.

"Q: Did you have any contact with news media or clergy regarding King, SCLC, or Levison?

"A: No.

"Q: What relationship was there with the Atlanta Police Department and what electronic surveillance did it have of King, SCLC, or Levison?

"A: Throughtout my entire period as agent in Atlanta I never had any information as to what electronic surveillance may have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison there was no discussion to my knowledge of these matters with the Atlanta Police Department. Generally speaking the rapport with the police department was good.

"Q: Did you monitor the taps on King, SCLC?

"A: No.

"Q: What squad were you assigned to in the Atlanta Office?

"A: Security. More correctly it was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad.

"Q: Who else was assigned to this squad? Was there a man named Harding?

"A: Yes.

"Q: What was his first name?

"A: Charles.

"A: Who else was assigned?

"A: Your friend Murtaugh, a Richard Davis.

"At this point the writer stated he preferred not to name additional personnel simply because he did not wish to feel that they might subsequently be interviewed as a result. The writer stated he was confident that Siedel or his agency had already been furnished all of these names by Mr. Murtaugh. He was informed that in the writer's opinion the Bureau was fully able and capable of furnishing this information. Siedel opined it would be a waste of government money to subpoena the writer to Washington in order to obtain these names.

"Q: Did you develop any evidence relating to Levison's CP connections?

"A: No.

"Q: Did you read reports from New York regarding Levison?

"A: Yes.

"Q: Did these reports set forth information from taps and bugs?

"A: The reports did not state source of information.

"Q: Did you know the information came from taps (or bugs)?

"A: I did not know directly but presumed that it did.

"Q: What type of work was the Security Squad in Atlanta concerned with?

"A: That squad primarily handled matters in the security category, racial matters, and also civil rights matters.

"Q: What kind of matters constituted racial matters besides SCLC?

"A: The investigation of SCLC was not a racial matter. It was concerned with possible communist influence of the organization. The Ku Klux Klan was a racial matter because it involved pressures between white and black persons.

"Q: What organizations or individuals were investigated in the security category?

"A: I have had no contact with Bureau matters for over four years. At this time I have no knowledge what effect my answer to your question might have upon the current status of any matter of concern to the Bureau.

"Siedel essentially repeated his question and endeavored to explain that he had no desire to affect the Bureau's investigative status.

"The writer advised his answer to the question remained as above. At this point Siedel suggested the writer might wish to consult Mr. Phillips which was done.

"Writer consulted privately with Phillips. After which Phillips entered the writer's office and told Siedel that if he was seeking the Bureau's policy relative to security, racial and civil rights investigations, same was in the Bureau's manuals available to the Committee. At this point Siedel said he was not after policy but names of specific persons and organizations the writer would now recall were under investigation.

"The writer restated former answer to this question and explained to Siedel that he did not consider himself so

naive to suppose that any of the information given to Siedel would not at some future time appear in print. To which Siedel stated he would not be personally responsible therefore. Siedel was informed the writer was not necessarily stating he would be personally responsible therefore. Siedel pointed out that he could not require a different answer to this question at the present time but went on to explain the writer could be subpoenaed for this purpose for open or closed testimony.

"Q: During the course of these investigations did you ever alter or fabricate any document previously prepared?

"A: No.

"Q: Do you know of such having been done in the Atlanta Office?

"A: No.

"Q: Do you know of a tape recording pertaining to King which was sent to Mrs. King?

"A: Not during that period. It seems I might have heard such an allegation but there has been so much material news media wise the past year or two, I actually cannot be sure whether I read of such an allegation or might have heard it said. In any case so far as I am concerned it was hearsay.

"Q: What was your participation in COINTELPRO investigations and what did they cover while you were in the Atlanta Office?

"A: I left the Bureau over four years ago and have absolutely no knowledge of what might be the present status of any investigation by the Bureau past or present. I feel very strongly that any answer I might give could conceivably adversely affect the Bureau's investigative position. For this reason I decline to discuss this matter.

Siedel stated the Bureau had recently stated it had discontinued COINTELPRO. The writer advised he was not aware of this; that his answer above remained the same.

"Q: Do you know of any effort by the Bureau to influence a political campaign?

"A: No."

In addition to the foregoing verbatim statement, Sentinella also voluntarily furnished to the FBI several observations, the following of which may be of interest:

"1. Siedel obviously was attempting to verify allegations made by other individuals.

"2. All of his questions appeared to have been previously prepared in writing.

"3. At one point he commented he was conducting this interview for a colleague (not named).

"4. Siedel did not appear satisfied with the results of the interview. It is presumed he considers the writer's cooperation to be minimal.

"5. As Siedel prepared to depart he was informed that during 23 years as an agent the writer suffered some adverse administrative action; that these ultimately proved to be experiences from which the writer profited. He was told the writer had "no axe to grind" regarding the Bureau and no intent or desire to accomplish any questionable literary fame."

The individual who interviewed Sentinella was SSC Staff Member Lester B. Seidel, not Siedel, as indicated in Sentinella's statement.

The King referred to in Sentinella's statement is the late Martin Luther King, Jr., subject of prior investigation by the FBI. The Levison referred to is Stanley David Levison, also subject of prior FBI investigation. The SCLC referred to is the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, an organization which was headed by King. The Murtaugh referred to is Arthur Leo Murtagh who was an SA of the FBI from April 16, 1951, until his retirement on September 25, 1971.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)

NOTE:

Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentinella's verbatim statement and from a separate statement containing his observations, both of which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The procedure of furnishing the AG an extra copy for forwarding to Wilderotter has been established through liaison by P. V. Daly of the Legal Counsel's Office with the AG's Office.

Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

Interview by Lester B. Siedel, (sic), representative of Senate Select Committee of Alan G. Sentinella. Interview commenced 12:24pm, terminated 2:20pm. Siedel at the outset identified self via credential as representative of aforementioned Committee.

Mr. Siedel introduced by writer to Mr. Seymor Phillips of the FBI. The writer explained to Siedel that following his telephone conversation, 5/9/75, during which he stated he was interested in discussing matters related to the King and Levison cases it was felt that such discussion might involve issues currently sensitive to the Bureau. Accordingly the Atlanta Office was contacted and subsequently the writer was contacted by Robert Olmert of the Bureau. Mr. Olmert advised that if it was desired the Bureau would make available a representative not for the purpose of participating in the interview but to be available for advice. The writer stated he was interested in obtaining such assistance. Accordingly during the morning of 5/12/75 Mr. Seymor Phillips contacted the writer.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/4/84 BY SP2ALM/lew

This is dictated immediately following interview by Siedel. No effort is herein made to follow the chronology of questions presented by Siedel. During the interview no notes or recording were made by writer. Will use "Q" for question and "A" for answer. Questions (Q) were asked by Siedel and answers (A) were given by writer.

init for HF w/ 24/M 5/22/75
SFP/ekw

A: Was it correct that matters concerning the King investigation were discussed openly over coffee by members of the Atlanta field office?

A: Matters relating to the King investigation were discussed by individuals concerned therewith. I have no recollection during the period I was connected with the investigation that it was discussed by everybody like the previous night's ballgame might have been.

62-116395-225

Q: Shortly after King received the Nobel Prize did a Bureau official William Sullivan come to Atlanta?

A: It is my recollection King received the Nobel Prize sometime before the case was assigned to me. I do not remember if Bureau official William Sullivan visited Atlanta.

Q: Did Sullivan have any contact with Ralph McGill concerning King?

A: I do not know.

Q: Were taps (telephone) and bugs (microphone) used by Atlanta in connection with King?

A: A tap (telephone) was utilized re King at his SCLC office and his residence.

Q: When were the bugs (microphone) utilized?

A: There were none.

Q: What was the purpose of the investigation of King?

A: To determine whether King and/or SCLC were influenced by persons or groups having communist tendencies.

Q: Did you feel the investigation was worthwhile?

A: I don't recall that I ever asked myself that question. It was an assignment made by my employer and my responsibility to handle it.

Q: How did other agents feel about the illegal use of these taps?

A: The taps were not illegal. They were obtained through the authority of the Attorney General.

Q: Did any agents express the opinion that these investigations were improper?

A: I do not recall specifically although Mr. Murtaugh may well have so stated.

Q: What electronic surveillance was used concerning Levison?

A: I do not know. Levison resided in New York City.

Q: Was Levison covered by the tap on King?

A: Only to the extent that he was in contact with King. There was no tap on Levison per se in Atlanta.

Q: Was there any physical surveillance of King?

A: I do not recall any physical surveillance of King as such. There was surveillance conducted of individuals in contact with King and consequently King would obviously have been physically surveilled. But such surveillance was not on King directly.

Q: Did you participate in these surveillances?

A: Yes on several occasions.

Q: How many occasions?

A: I cannot recall.

Q: How long were you in Atlanta?

A: August 1960 - March 1971.

Q: What other offices did you serve in and when?

A: Baltimore, September 1948 - January 1949; Buffalo, January 1949 - August 1960; Atlanta, August 1960 - March 1971.

Q: Where were you born?

A: London, England.

Q: How long did you live there?

A: 9 years.

Q: Where did you live first when in this country?

A: In New Jersey approximately one year. I spent most of my growing up time in Iowa.

Q: You entered the Bureau July 1948 and left in March 1971?

A: That is correct.

Q: When was the King and SCLC case assigned to you?

A: I believe it was the early part or spring of 1965.

Q: How long had the investigation been going on before you got the case?

A: I really am not sure - possibly a year; it might have been longer.

A: How long did the investigation continue?

A: I cannot actually recall.

Q: Was it still going on when you left the Bureau?

A: Yes, regarding the SCLC.

Q: How long after King's death did the tap remain?

A: I cannot be sure. It seems as though it was discontinued a short time after, however I believe it continued for a longer period of time on the SCLC.

Q: Did you have any contact with news media or clergy regarding King, SCLC, or Levison?

A: No.

Q: What relationship was there with the Atlanta Police Department and what electronic surveillance did it have of King, SCLC, or Levison?

A: Throughtout my entire period as agent in Atlanta I never had any information as to what electronic surveillance may have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison there was no discussion to my knowledge of these matters with the Atlanta Police Department. Generally speaking the rapport with the police department was good.

Q: Did you monitor the taps on King, SCLC?

A: No.

Q: What squad were you assigned to in the Atlanta Office?

A: Security. More correctly it was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad.

Q: Who else was assigned to this squad? Was there a man named Harding?

A: Yes.

Q: What was his first name?

A: Charles.

A: Who else was assigned?

A: Your friend Murtaugh, a Richard Davis.

At this point the writer stated he preferred not to name additional personnel simply because he did not wish to feel that they might subsequently be interviewed as a result. The writer stated he was confident that Siedel or his agency had already been furnished all of these names by Mr. Murtaugh. He was informed that in the writer's opinion the Bureau was fully able and capable of furnishing this information. Siedel opined it would be a waste of government money to subpoena the writer to Washington in order to obtain these names.

Q: Did you develop any evidence relating to Levison's CP connections?

A: No.

Q: Did you read reports from New York regarding Levison?

A: Yes.

Q: Did these reports set forth information from taps and bugs?

A: The reports did not state source of information.

Q: Did you know the information came from taps (or bugs)?

A: I did not know directly but presumed that it did.

Q: What type of work was the Security Squad in Atlanta concerned with?

A: That squad primarily handled matters in the security category, racial matters, and also civil rights matters.

Q: What kind of matters constituted racial matters besides SCLC?

A: The investigation of SCLC was not a racial matter. It was concerned with possible communist influence of the organization. The Ku Klux Klan was a racial matter because it involved pressures between white and black persons.

Q: What organizations or individuals were investigated in the security category?

A: I have had no contact with Bureau matters for over four years. At this time I have no knowledge what effect my answer to your question might have upon the current status of any matter of concern to the Bureau.

Siedel essentially repeated his question and endeavored to explain that he had no desire to affect the Bureau's investigative status.

The writer advised his answer to the question remained as above. At this point Siedel suggested the writer might wish to consult Mr. Phillips which was done.

Writer consulted privately with Phillips. After which Phillips entered the writer's office and told Siedel that if he was seeking the Bureau's policy relative to security, racial and civil rights investigations, same was in the Bureau's manuals available to the Committee. At this point Siedel said he was not after policy but names of specific persons and organizations the writer would now recall were under investigation.

The writer restated former answer to this question and explained to Siedel that he did not consider himself so naive to suppose that any of the information given to Siedel would not at some future time appear in print. To which Siedel stated he would not be personally responsible therefore. Siedel was informed the writer was not necessarily stating he would be personally responsible therefore. Siedel pointed out that he could not require a different answer to this question at the present time but went on to explain the writer

could be subpoenaed for this purpose for open or closed testimony.

Q: During the course of these investigations did you ever alter or fabricate any document previously prepared?

A: No.

Q: Do you know of such having been done in the Atlanta Office?

A: No.

Q: Do you know of a tape recording pertaining to King which was sent to Mrs. King?

A: Not during that period. It seems I might have heard such an allegation but there has been so much material news media wise the past year or two, I actually cannot be sure whether I read of such an allegation or might have heard it said. In any case so far as I am concerned it was hearsay.

Q: What was your participation in COINTELPRO investigations and what did they cover while you were in the Atlanta Office?

A: I left the Bureau over four years ago and have absolutely no knowledge of what might be the present status of any investigation by the Bureau past or present. I feel very strongly that any answer I might give could conceivably adversely effect the Bureau's investigative position. For this reason I decline to discuss this matter.

Siedel stated the Bureau had recently stated it had discontinued COINTELPRO. The writer advised he was not aware of this; that his answer above remained the same.

Q: Do you know of any effort by the Bureau to influence a political campaign?

A: No.

Atlanta, Georgia
May 12, 1975

WRITER'S OBSERVATIONS

1. Siedel obviously was attempting to verify allegations made by other individuals.

2. All of his questions appeared to have been previously prepared in writing.

3. At one point he commented he was conducting this interview for a colleague (not named).

4. Siedel did not appear satisfied with the results of the interview. It is presumed he considers the writer's cooperation to be minimal.

5. As Siedel prepared to depart he was informed that during 23 years as an agent the writer suffered some adverse administrative action; that these ultimately proved to be experiences from which the writer profited. He was told the writer had "no axe to grind" regarding the Bureau and no intent or desire to accomplish any questionable literary fame."

6. Upon departing Siedel inquired as to the proximity of the Equitable Building (office building) and the First National Bank of Atlanta (also office building). Any significance to these locations was not apparent to the writer. When informed that banking hours terminated at 4:00pm Siedel made no comment.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 22 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR004 AP PLAIN

6:03PM NITEL 5-22-75 FXH

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ALBUQUERQUE (66-1029)

SENSTUDY 1975.

REMYTELCALL, MAY 22, 1975.

ON MAY 21, 1975, SAM PAPICH, DIRECTOR, NEW MEXICO GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME (FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, FBI), ADVISED HE IS TO APPEAR BEFORE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., ON THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1975.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

EX-108

REC-25 62-116395-224

5 JUN 10 1975

Records
cc 67-176751 (Papich)

RKL XEROX
JUN 16 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

JUN 03 1975

On this envelope ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/rlw

62-11635-223

ENCLOSURE

FD-291 (Rev. 11-1-73)

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure or production of national security information, other classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is in a better position than I to make that determination;

(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-29-01 BY

____
(Signature)

____
(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

________________, 19 ____, by _______________________________.
(Signature)

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1970
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F.P.M. CHAPTER 295
61-107

OMB APPROVAL NO. 50-R0118

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

(Position to which appointed)	*(Date of appointment)*

JUSTICE	FBI	WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Department or agency)	*(Bureau or division)*	*(Place of employment)*

I, ______________________________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing this appointment.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

____
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn (or affirmed) before me this ______ day of ______________ A.D. 19____,

at	WASHINGTON,	D. C.
	(City)	*(State)*

[SEAL]

____
(Signature of officer)

Commission expires______________________
(If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown)

____
(Title)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U.S.C. 2903. The words "So help me God" in the oath and the word "swear" wherever it appears above should be stricken out when the appointee elects to affirm rather than swear to the affidavits; only these words may be stricken and only when the appointee elects to affirm the affidavits.*

GPO : 1970 O - 408-925

3-26 (Rev. 3-20-64)

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

(Place) ______________________

(Date) ______________________

Dear Sir:

Having received an appointment for a position as Special Agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, I hereby **agree and affirm** that I shall be governed by the following **conditions:**

1. I am required to proceed at my own expense to Washington, D. C., where I shall take the oath of office and enter on duty.

2. That my appointment is a probationary one.

3. That I shall remain on duty for a minimum period of three years, contingent upon a satisfactory work record.

4. That my retention in the Federal Bureau of Investigation is dependent upon the performance of satisfactory services, and if my services are deemed unsatisfactory it is understood that my employment may be discontinued at any time and that I shall not receive transportation to my home, or to any other point, at Government expense.

5. I may be sent to any part of the continental or territorial United States that the exigencies of the Bureau's work may require; that my headquarters may be fixed in some jurisdiction other than that in which I have heretofore resided; that my headquarters may be changed as the work of the Bureau may require and that no transfer will be made from one station to another for personal reasons.

6. That the **confidential character** of the relations of the employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the public is fully understood by me, and that the **strictly confidential character** of **any and all information secured by me,** in connection directly or indirectly with my work as a Special Agent, or the work of other employees of which I may become cognizant, is fully understood by me, and that **neither during my tenure of service** with the Federal Bureau of Investigation **nor at any other time shall I violate this confidence,** and **I agree and affirm** that I shall **not divulge** any information of any kind or character whatsoever that may become known to me, to persons **not officially entitled** thereto at any time.

I understand all of the foregoing and the conditions specified herein are agreeable to me **without reservation of any kind. I agree and affirm** that I shall abide by the foregoing conditions, and I am fully cognizant that the provisions mentioned above are to be complied with by me and they are a **part of my appointment.**

Very truly yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

FD-375 (Rev. 8-28-72)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Date:

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20535

TRAINING AGREEMENT

In consideration for the following specialized training which will result in considerable time and expense to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), I, ____________________________________, agree to remain in the service of the FBI (or Department of Justice, as to final item below) for the time specified, contingent upon my maintaining a satisfactory work record.

☐ So that I may receive training in **classifying, searching, and filing of fingerprints,** I agree to remain in the service of the FBI performing fingerprint duties for at least one year from this date. I understand that I may be assigned, consistent with the demands of the service, to work at night.

☐ So that I may receive training in ☐ **stenographic** ☐ **typing skills,** I agree to remain in the FBI for a minimum of one year after completion of training. In addition, I agree to accept any assignment in any division at FBIHQ or Washington Field Office consistent with such needs for my services.

☐ So that I may receive training in ☐ **automatic data processing equipment** ☐ **cryptanalytics,** I agree to remain in the FBI one year after completion of formal training.

☐ So that I may receive training in a **foreign language,** I agree to remain in the FBI for three years after I successfully complete this training.

☐ So that I may receive **advanced training in maintenance and repair of FM radio equipment,** I agree to remain in the service of the FBI for at least one year following completion of the training.

☐ So that I may receive training under the Government Employees Training Act to be given me at ________________________________, I agree to remain in the Department of Justice for a minimum of ____________________________ after completion of training. If I voluntarily leave the Department before expiration of that period, I will pay the Government the amount of the additional expenses paid by it for the above-mentioned training.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-29-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

____
Signature

Application for Employment
FD-140 (Rev. 10-16-73)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date

NOTICE: Application must be typewritten or clearly printed in black ink. All questions must be answered, if applicable. If not, indicate NA (not applicable). Applications which are not complete and legible will not be considered. If space provided is not sufficient for complete answers, or you wish to furnish additional information, attach sheets of the same size as this application, and number answers to correspond with questions.

Check Position Applied For:

☐ Special Agent
☐ Special Agent (Accountant)
☐ Radio Maintenance Technician *
☐ Laboratory Aid or Technician
☐ Translator
☐ Nurse
☐ Clerk-Stenographer
☐ Clerk-Typist
☐ Clerk (See Item 4, page 2 on Fingerprint Clerk position)
☐ Other ____________

* Applicants for this position must complete "Questionnaire for Radio Maintenance Technician Position."

1. PERSONAL HISTORY

a. Name in full (Last, first, middle)

b. Social Security Number

c. List all other names you have used including nicknames; if female, furnish maiden name. If you have ever used any surnames other than your true name, during what period and under what circumstances were these names used? If you have ever legally changed your name, give date, place, and court.

d. Birth date (Month, day, year)

Place of birth

e. Are you a U. S. citizen? ☐ Yes ☐ No Naturalized? ☐ Yes ☐ No Derivative? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Naturalization # ____________ ____________ Place Date Court

Explain derivative citizenship ____________

2. MARITAL STATUS

☐ Single ☐ Married ____________ Date ____________ Place of Marriage No. of Children ____________

☐ Widowed ☐ Divorced ☐ Separated ____________ Date ____________ Place of Divorce or Legal Separation ____________ Court (See Section 13k)

3. RESIDENCES

a. Present Residence Address: (Apartment, street, city, state, zip code)

Telephone Numbers:

Residence ____________

Business ____________

b. Complete address to which you wish mail or telegram sent (include zip code and telephone number if different from above)

c. List chronologically ALL of your residences in the past 10 years (include addresses while attending school if away from home and all military addresses including any off military base).

Dates						Apt. #	Street Address	City	State
From			To						
Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo	Day	Yr.				

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is an equal opportunity employer.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RE

4. AVAILABILITY OF APPLICANT

a. Have you previously submitted an application for employment with the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
☐ No ☐ Yes Date ______ Place ______

b. Are you willing to proceed to Washington, D. C., or other duty station, at your own expense? ☐ Yes ☐ No

c. Will you accept a lesser position if no vacancy exists or you fail to qualify for the position sought? ☐ Yes ☐ No

d. Are you interested in appointment as Fingerprint Clerk GS 3 at Washington, D. C.?
☐ Yes ☐ No You must understand that regardless of preference, appointment may be as Fingerprint Clerk GS 3 or Clerk GS 2 since assignments must be based on qualifications of appointees and vacancies.

e. If appointed to a clerical position, I am willing to serve a minimum period of one year. ☐ Yes ☐ No

f. If appointed as a Special Agent or Radio Maintenance Technician, are you willing and prepared to accept assignment or transfer to any part of the United States or Puerto Rico for either temporary or permanent duration? ☐ Yes ☐ No

g. If appointed as a Special Agent, I agree to serve a minimum period of three years and completely understand that I must be available for assignment wherever my services are needed. ☐ Yes ☐ No

h. Earliest date available for employment.

i. How much notice of reporting date do you need?

5. EDUCATION

a.

Name of School	Location	Dates From Mo.	Dates From Day	Dates From Yr.	Dates To Mo.	Dates To Day	Dates To Yr.	Course Pursued	Degrees or Diplomas
High Schools									
Colleges									
Graduate School									
Miscellaneous									

b. Were you ever dismissed from a school, or was any disciplinary action including scholastic probation ever taken against you during your scholastic career?

☐ No ☐ Yes ______ School ______ Date ______ Type of Action

c. **List awards, honors, citations, positions held in school organizations, athletic endeavors, and any other special recognition you received while attending school.**

d. **List any special abilities, interests, sports or hobbies with degree of proficiency.**

e. Indicate your proficiency in each phase of each **foreign language** listed as "slight," "good," "fluent."

Name of Language	Speak	Understand	Read	Write

f. **Are you a member of the bar?**
☐ No ☐ Yes Date(s) ______ State(s) ______

g. **Are you a certified public accountant?**
☐ No ☐ Yes Date(s) ______ State(s) ______

h. **Are you a licensed automobile operator?**
☐ No ☐ Yes State(s) ______

Driver's License # ______

6. EMPLOYMENT

List chronologically all employments, including summer and part-time employments while attending school. All time must be accounted for. **If unemployed for a period, indicate, setting forth dates of unemployment.**

Name and Address of Employer	Dates From Mo.	Dates From Day	Dates From Yr.	Dates To Mo.	Dates To Day	Dates To Yr.	Salary	Position and Kind of Work	Name of Supervisor	Reason for Leaving
a. Name										
Address										
City & State										

6. EMPLOYMENT

List chronologically all employments, including summer and part-time employments while attending school. All time must be accounted for. **If unemployed for a period, indicate, setting forth dates of unemployment.**

Name and Address of Employer	Dates						Salary	Position and Kind of Work	Name of Supervisor	Reason for Leaving
	From			To						
	Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Yr.				
b. Name										
Address										
City & State										
c. Name										
Address										
City & State										
d. Name										
Address										
City & State										
e. Name										
Address										
City & State										
f. Name										
Address										
City & State										

g. Have you ever been dismissed or asked to resign from any employment or position you have held? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Employer's Name ______ Date ______ Reason ______

h. Are you now or have you ever been employed by an agency of the Federal Government? (Include part-time employment.) ☐ No ☐ Yes

From ______ To ______ Agency ______ Location ______

i. Do you have any sources of income other than your salary or that of your spouse? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Specify each with amount ______

7. MILITARY RECORD

a. Are you registered for Selective Service? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Selective Service # ______ Lottery #______ Local Board # ______ City ______ State ______

b. What is your current classification?

Have you received any notice indicating you may be called into the Armed Forces in the near future? ☐ No ☐ Yes

If so, give approximate date.

c. If ever classified 1-Y (registrant qualified for military service only in time of war or national emergency) or 4-F (registrant not qualified for any military service), furnish reasons.

d. Have you ever served on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Highest rank attained ______ Date commissioned, if applicable ______

e. Branch of military service

f. Serial number

g. Dates of active duty (month, day & year)

From To

h. Type of Discharge

Basis for Discharge

i. Member of Reserve? ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ Ready ☐ Standby

Service Branch ______

j. Was any type of disciplinary action taken against you in the service? ☐ No ☐ Yes Nature of:	k. National Guard ☐ Present ☐ Former ☐ None If you attend drills, meetings, or camps, give name of unit and location. Summer camp attendance: From ______ To ______ Where ______

l. Do you claim veterans preference? ☐ No ☐ Yes Basis: ☐ Active duty between 12-7-41 and 7-1-55 ☐ Active duty subsequent to 1-31-55 in excess of 180 consecutive days ☐ Service-connected disability ☐ Wife ☐ Widow ☐ Mother

8. REFERENCES

Give three references (not relatives, former or present employers, fellow employees or school teachers) who are responsible adults of reputable standing in their communities, such as property owners, business or professional men or women including your physician, if you have one, who have known you well for at least five years, preferably those who have known you during the past five years. If retired, give former occupation.

Complete name		Addresses: Residence ______
No. yrs. acq.	Occupation	Business ______
Complete name		Addresses: Residence ______
No. yrs. acq.	Occupation	Business ______
Complete name		Addresses: Residence ______
No. yrs. acq.	Occupation	Business ______

Give three social acquaintances in your own age group including both sexes.

Complete name		Addresses: Residence ______
No. yrs. acq.	School or Occupation	School or Business ______
Complete name		Addresses: Residence ______
No. yrs. acq.	School or Occupation	School or Business ______
Complete name		Addresses: Residence: ______
No. yrs. acq.	School or Occupation	School or Business ______

9. FOREIGN TRAVEL - (MILITARY SERVICE, RESIDENCE, VISIT)

a. Have you ever visited or resided in any foreign country (including travel in the Armed Forces of the U. S.)? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Passport # ______ Date issued ______ Place issued ______

Countries Visited	Dates						Reason for Travel
	From			To			
	Mo.	Day	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Yr.	

b. Have you ever served in the Armed Forces of a foreign country? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(Specify countries; dates)

c. Do you or any members of your immediate family, including in-laws, have any relatives now residing outside the United States (except those in the Armed Forces of the United States or those employed by the United States Government living abroad)? ☐ No ☐ Yes. If so, list below and furnish degree of association and contact you and members of your immediate family have with these relatives.

Name	Relation	Age	City	Country	Citizen of what Country

10. CREDIT RECORD

a. Has your credit record ever been considered unsatisfactory, or have you ever been refused credit? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If "yes," give dates, places, names of creditors and circumstances.)

b. Are you indebted to anyone? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(List any debt over $100. Also list any debt, regardless of the amount, where payment is past due.)

Creditor	Address	Amount	Loan or Acct. #

11. COURT RECORD

a. Have you ever been arrested or charged with any violation including traffic, but not parking tickets? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(List all such matters even if not formally charged, or no court appearance, or found not guilty, or matter settled by payment of fine or forfeiture of collateral.)

Date	Place and Department	Charge	Final disposition	Details

b. Has any member of your family or close relative (including in-laws) ever been arrested for other than traffic violations? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Name	Relation	Date	Place	Charge	Final Disposition

c. Have you ever been a plaintiff or defendant in a court action including divorce actions? ☐ No ☐ Yes (Give date, place, court, names of parties involved, nature of action, and final disposition.)

12. ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP

a. Are you now, or have you ever been a member of any club, society or organization? ☐ No ☐ Yes. If yes, list below, do not abbreviate.

Name	City and State	Former	Present (List position held and extent of activity)

b. Are you now, or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., or any communist or fascist organization? ☐ No ☐ Yes

c. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If answer to any of these is "Yes," explain fully.)

13. RELATIVES

All applicants must give complete information concerning their relatives. If you have been married more than once, give the requested information concerning each former husband or wife. Furnish similar information, including date and place of action, for any members of your immediate family who have been divorced. Even though a relative is deceased, give all the information requested, and indicate last residence and year of death. Include stepbrothers and sisters, half brothers and sisters. If you or your spouse have stepparents, legal guardians or others who have reared you instead of your parents, the requested information should be furnished concerning them, as well as your real parents. If you are engaged to be married or contemplating marriage in the near future, complete information must be included under sections c, h, i and j regarding your future husband or wife and future in-laws, and clearly show that such relationship is a future one.

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
a. Father Address Birth date Place of birth		
b. Mother (Include maiden name) Address Birth date Place of birth		
c. Wife or Husband (If wife, include maiden name) Address Birth date Place of birth		
d. Children Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address		Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
e. Brothers			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
Name			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
Name			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
f. Sisters			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
Name			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
Name			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
g. Wives (including maiden names) and Husbands of Brothers & Sisters			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		
Name			
Address			
Birth date	Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials); Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
g. Wives and Husbands of Brothers & Sisters (Continued) Address Birth date | Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date | Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date | Place of birth		
h. Father-in-law Address Birth date | Place of birth		
i. Mother-in-law (Include maiden name) Address Birth date | Place of birth		
j. Brothers & Sisters of your Husband or Wife Address Birth date | Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date | Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date | Place of birth		

13. RELATIVES (Continued)

Complete Name, including Middle Name (no initials) ; Complete Address	Occupation & Name & Address of Firm where Employed	Naturalization or Alien Registration Number, Date and Place of Naturalization, if applicable
j. Brothers & Sisters of your Husband or Wife (Continued) Address Birth date Place of birth		
k. Other relatives with whom you have resided for an extended period of time (indicate relation, including name and present location of ex-spouses) Address Birth date Place of birth		
Name Address Birth date Place of birth		

14. RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY THE GOVERNMENT

List the complete names of any of your close relatives (including in-laws) who are employed in the Federal Government.

Complete Name	Relation	Agency by which Employed	Location

15. FRIENDS OR ACQUAINTANCES EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Complete Name	Location	Length of Acquaintance

16. RELATIVES FORMERLY EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Complete Name under which Employed	Current Address	Relationship

ALL APPLICANTS

Attach an unmounted full face photograph of yourself, not larger than 2¾ x 2½ inches. Print your name plainly on the back of the photograph. The photograph must have been taken not more than 3 months prior to the date of this application.

17. PHYSICAL DATA

a. Height without shoes

Weight without clothes

b. Do you now have or have you ever had any of the following: nervous, mental, or emotional disorder of any sort; tuberculosis; epilepsy, fainting spells or severe headaches; diabetes; ulcers; rheumatic fever or heart disease; or asthma? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If "yes" identify, describe, and give dates)

c. Do you now have or have you ever had any chronic or serious illnesses; or have you ever had any serious operations or injuries? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If "yes" describe and give dates)

d. Have you ever been hospitalized? ☐ No ☐ Yes

Dates			Hospital	Location	Reason
Mo.	Day	Yr.			

e. Describe any past or present physical handicap, defect, or disability not previously covered, but including extent of defective vision, if any, with and without glasses (Snellen) and deficiencies in color vision and hearing.

f. How many days have you lost from work or school due to illness during the past five years?

Nature of illness(es)

g. Have you ever received, is there pending, have you applied for, or do you intend to apply for pension or compensation for existing disability? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If "yes," specify what kind, granted by whom, and what amount, when, why. If applicable, include Veterans' Administration claim number.)

h. Special Agent Applicants Only: Do you have any physical defects such as, but not limited to, a bone, joint, or other deformity or loss of finger, which would preclude unrestricted, regular participation in all phases of the FBI's firearms training, physical training and defensive tactics? ☐ No ☐ Yes
(If "yes" describe)

I understand that all appointments are probationary for a period of one year during which I must demonstrate my fitness for continued employment by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I also understand that, in many parts of the Bureau, it has been necessary to establish regular night and midnight shifts in view of which I must be available for such assignments as the needs might require. I further understand that any appointment tendered me will be contingent upon the results of a complete character and fitness investigation, and I am aware that wilfully withholding information or making false statements on this application will be the basis for dismissal from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and constitutes a violation of Section 1001, Title 18, U. S. Code. I agree to these conditions and I hereby certify that all statements made by me on this application are true and complete, to the best of my knowledge.

Signature of Applicant as Usually Written (Do not use nickname)

GPO: 1974 - 538-864

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/4/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt. Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities; Re:Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance;Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs; Policies and Procedures

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V. Daly Date: 6/9/75

Received by: Mark Gitenstein

Title: Prof. staff member

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh

The Attorney General

June 4, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and enclosures which constitute a partial response covering a number of the requests set forth in referenced letter and its appendices. A copy of this memorandum and of the enclosures thereto are submitted for your records.

Enclosures - 12

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-100 62-116395-323

SFP:FMK:rbs/fmk
(10)

17 JUN 13 1975

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

84 JUN 16 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - M[illegible].A. Mintz
(1 [illegible] Mr. J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

June 4, 1975

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

OTHER SPECIFIC FBI PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, and appendices thereto, which requested certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendices C and D contain requests for the current office of assignment or last known address for a number of FBI employees. Set out below under appropriate headings relating to the specific request headings and numbers is the desired information, as well as information concerning the tenure of FBI service of all the employees involved.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/jlw

Appendix C - Item 30

a.) Leo Badgley App, Jr.
Entered on duty (EOD) as Special Agent (SA), June 17, 1957
Assigned Portland Field Office (FO) since December 1, 1959

b.) Edgar O. Ingalls, Jr. (Ingles on your request)
EOD as SA, March 21, 1966
Assigned Portland FO since August 7, 1970

Appendix D - Item 11

a.) Robert L. Tagg
EOD as SA, November 8, 1950
Assigned Omaha FO since January 19, 1973

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-283

SFP:FMK:rbs/fmk
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 5

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

b.) John E. Meade
EOD as SA, January 29, 1951
Assigned Philadelphia FO since January 17, 1966

c.) Bill D. Williams (Billie on your request)
EOD as SA, February 4, 1952
Assigned Special Agent in Charge, Kansas City FO
since December 17, 1974

d.) John J. Creamer, Jr.
EOD as SA, September 13, 1954
Assigned Assistant Special Agent in Charge,
Little Rock FO since May 1, 1975

e.) John J. Connolly
EOD as SA, July 7, 1947
Assigned Newark FO since March 30, 1963

f.) Marjorie Ann Mierzejewski (Miermejewski on your request)
EOD June 26, 1961
Assigned Newark FO since June 26, 1961

g.) Mary Ann Elizabeth Massa (Mass_ on your request)
EOD June 27, 1955
Assigned Newark FO since June 27, 1955

Appendix D - Item 12

a.) Harold P. Leinbaugh (Linebaugh on your request)
EOD as SA, October 20, 1947
Retired February 16, 1973, from FBI Headquarters
Last known address 1160 Wimbledon Drive,
McLean, Virginia 22101

b.) Elmer Lee Todd
EOD as SA, December 11, 1950
Assigned Washington Field Office since January 31, 1955

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Appendix D - Item 13

Rita Agnes Ambrosio
EOD July 19, 1939
Retired December 28, 1973
Last known address 1604 John Street, Fort Lee, New Jersey 07024

Thomas Jack Biamonte
EOD as SA, July 6, 1953
Assigned Rome 9/28/62

Olga Ciosa
EOD September 20, 1943
Resigned November 29, 1965
Last known address 10409 South Indiana Avenue, Chicago,
Illinois 60628

Theodore Andrew Korontjis
EOD as SA, June 30, 1952
Assigned FBI Headquarters since March 15, 1975

Joseph C. Michela
EOD as SA, July 2, 1951
Assigned Rome 5/26/63 to 9/1/65 and 12/14/70 to present

Mildred E. Nick
EOD July 8, 1940
Retired June 28, 1974
Last known address 11030 113th Drive, Youngtown, Arizona 85363

Helen C. Spear
EOD April 23, 1951
Assigned Rome 5/6/62 to 1/12/67 and 4/23/71 to present

Appendix D - Item 10

a.) Robert G. Kunkel
EOD as SA, July 11, 1949
Assigned Special Agent in Charge, Alexandria FO,
since March 22, 1974

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

b.) Courtland J. Jones
EOD as SA, October 6, 1941
Retired September 30, 1974
Last known address 6607 North 29th Street,
Arlington, Virginia 22213

c.) Ernest H. Belter
EOD as SA, July 19, 1943
Retired January 29, 1973
Last known address 616 Ednor Road, Silver Spring,
Maryland 20904

d.) James J. Gaffney
EOD as SA, March 5, 1951
Assigned Washington Field Office since January 29, 1962

Appendix D - Item 19

a.) Joseph A. Sizoo
EOD as SA, November 1, 1938
Retired May 19, 1972
Last known address 84A Pine Crescent, Whispering Pines,
North Carolina 28389

b.) Michael Joseph Rozamus
EOD as SA, November 3, 1947
Retired June 12, 1970
Last known address 6509 Gulf Drive, Holmes Beach,
Florida 33510

c.) Sterling B. Donohoe (Donohue on your request)
EOD as SA, January 6, 1941; Retired 6/29/73
Last known address 2813 Spiral Lane, Bowie, Maryland 20715

d.) Bernard A. Wells, Jr.
EOD as SA, June 6, 1949
Retired July 30, 1971
Last known address 5311 Montgomery Street,
Springfield, Virginia 22151

c.) Robert H. Haynes
EOD as SA, October 16, 1950
Retired March 28, 1975
Last known address 205 Northmoor Drive,
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901

Appendix D - Item 20

Alden F. Miller (Alan on your request)
EOD as SA, March 31, 1947
Assigned Atlanta FO since June 21, 1951

Appendix B, Item I-8 requested a sample of the confidentiality statement which FBI personnel are required to sign along with any other employment agreements currently in use. Attached are copies of the following documents responsive to this request:

1.) FD-291 Employment Agreement

2.) Standard Form 61 Appointment Affidavits

3.) 3-26 Form letter from FBI Special Agent appointee to FBI

4.) FD-375 Training Agreement

5.) FD-140 Application for Employment

Enclosures - 5
1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Samples of the five forms currently in use furnished by Administrative Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: June 2, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY

On the morning of May 30, 1975, Mr. Robert Nichols (SA-Retired), and SA John Dennis Miller, Legal Analysis Office, met in Miller's office, prior to Nichol's appointment for interview by members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee.

Miller gave Nichols a copy of the Committee's rules at approximately 8:35 a.m. after Nichols stated he had not been given a copy by anyone else. He advised Nichols that nothing Miller was about to say was intended to or should be interpreted as an order or suggestion to be uncooperative with the Senate Select Committee or its staff.

Miller then advised Nichols he had the right to be represented by an attorney; if he is unable to retain an attorney, he should so advise the Committee staff and ask them to assist him in securing counsel; and the FBI could not provide the services of an attorney. Nichols said he understood.

REC-100 62-116395-222

Miller then escorted Nichols to the JEH Building where he met SAs Paul V. Daly and Seymor F. Phillips.

13
5 JUN ~~10~~ 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

For information

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Personnel File 67-414885
(Former SA Robert Nichols)

LEGAL COUNSEL

JDM:eek
(8)

JBH

84 JUN 13 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-23-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

On the evening of 5-20-75 Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Conner telephonically advised SA Paul V. Daly of the Legal Counsel Division that the Department had reached a decision concerning the scope of testimony to be allowed in the Senate Select Committee interview of former SA Alan G. Sentinella. We previously had informed the Department that Mr. Sentinella was to testify pursuant to a subpoena before this Committee and that Department of Justice Order 501-73 requires we obtain Departmental approval before testimony may be given. We also informed the Department that Lester B. Seidel, staff member of the Senate Select Committee, had advised SA Daly that the scope of the intended interview of Sentinella would include knowledge Sentinella may have concerning the investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Mr. Seidel also indicated that they would interview Sentinella concerning his activities between the years 1960 to 1971.

Mr. O'Conner advised SA Daly that the decision of Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler; Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, and Associate Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott was that Sentinella was released insofar as the Department was concerned to only discuss three areas, those areas being the FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and SCLC. He was to advise the Committee that he was not permitted to go outside of these three areas because of instructions from the Department of Justice which instructions were issued pursuant to Department of Justice Order 501-73.

On 5-21-75 former SA Sentinella was advised of the Departmental restrictions on the information he could furnish the Committee by SA Daly, and he was accompanied by SA Daly to the Senate Select Committee office located in G308 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Sentinella's interview was scheduled for 9:30 a.m. Mr. Seidel met Mr. Sentinella and at 9:31 a.m. furnished Mr. Sentinella a copy of the Rules of Procedure for

REC-100

62-116395

62-116395-22

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Personnel File of Former Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella (67-432832)
1 - Mr. Daly

17 JUN 13 1975

84 JUN 13 1975

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. At the same time, former SA Sentinella was furnished forms which Seidel requested he fill out at that time. Seidel also made reference to Sentinella's Fifth Amendment rights but did not specify or spell out his rights.

It was brought to Mr. Seidel's attention by SA Daly that the Rules adopted by the Senate Select Committee called for a witness to be given copies of the Rules 24 hours prior to his appearance before the Committee and that these Rules are important for a potential witness to have knowledge of prior to his being interviewed since they contain a list of rights and privileges which a witness is entitled to. It was also brought to Mr. Seidel's attention that despite the fact that the interview was to be initiated at 10 a.m. (initially the interview was scheduled for 9:30 a.m., however, upon arrival former SA Sentinella was advised it would not be held until 10 a.m.) with Mr. Sentinella being required to fill out forms, he would have very little opportunity to review and digest the Rules of the Committee.

Mr. Seidel was also advised of the restrictions placed on the area which former SA Sentinella could respond to by the Department of Justice. Mr. Seidel specifically requested that he be allowed to ask questions concerning "COINTELPRO." He was advised that this was not within the scope of the Department's release for Sentinella unless such information may have been related to the investigations of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, or SCLC.

SA Daly also explained to John Elliff, Task Force Head for the Committee on Domestic Intelligence Matters, the circumstances surrounding the failure to provide a copy of the Rules 24 hours prior to interview and of the lack of specificity of Mr. Seidel as to areas in which Mr. Sentinella would be interviewed. Mr. Elliff apologized for the oversight of the Committee in complying with its Rules and assured SA Daly this would not happen again. In addition, he was advised that the Rules of the Committee provide that witnesses would have a reasonable opportunity to inspect and correct their testimony, however, the Rules provide that a witness must inspect his testimony in the office of the Committee. It was pointed out to Mr. Elliff that such procedures were unreasonable in that in Mr. Sentinella's instance, he would have to travel from Atlanta to Washington, D. C., to review the transcript of his testimony at his own expense. Mr. Elliff indicated that he believed other arrangements concerning this particular aspect of the Rules could and would be worked out.

Mr. Sentinella at the conclusion of his testimony advised SA Daly, who was not present at the testimony, that the Committee adhered to the restrictions placed on his testimony by the Attorney General with one possible exception. They asked Mr. Sentinella if while he was working in Atlanta his squad investigated the "Klan" and "SNCC" (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee). Sentinella advised he did not raise an objection to this question because he felt the deviation from the Departmental restrictions was very slight, and our investigations of these matters were well known.

On the afternoon of 5-21-75 K. William O'Conner inquired of SA Daly how the interview went and he was generally advised of the facts surrounding the interview, including the fact that former SA Sentinella was not furnished a copy of the Rules until immediately preceding the interview. Mr. O'Conner inquired as to whether the Senator (Senator Robert Morgan [D-N.C.]) remained during the taking of testimony from Mr. Sentinella, and he was advised that according to Sentinella, Senator Morgan departed approximately five minutes after placing Mr. Sentinella under oath.

Mr. O'Conner expressed his displeasure at the way the Committee operated and indicated he was going to discuss this matter with Deputy Attorney General Tyler.

Subsequently, on 5-21-75 O'Conner indicated he had been in contact with James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President, and Deputy Attorney General Tyler, and they want the Bureau to prepare a letter protesting the Committee's handling of the interview of Sentinella and of the fact that they violated Rules which were adopted by that Committee, specifically the Rules requiring Mr. Sentinella be furnished a copy of the Committee Rules 24 hours prior to giving testimony to the Committee, failure to be specific concerning the areas to be covered by Sentinella's testimony, the general manner in which the rights of Sentinella were explained to him, and the fact that Senator Morgan departed from the Committee session after giving the oath. O'Conner explained in this regard Deputy Attorney General Tyler feels that this is in contravention of the Rules of the Committee, and he questions whether an executive session of the Committee being held to hear such testimony can continue in the absence of a Senate Committee Member. He requested this letter be directed to Senator Church. He was advised that such a letter could only be prepared after approval had been obtained from proper Bureau authorities, and it was also pointed out to Mr. O'Conner that we had orally protested this matter to Mr. Elliff of the Committee and Mr. Seidel , and he was apprised of Elliff's statement that such mistakes would not be repeated in the future. It was pointed out to Mr. O'Conner

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

that the Bureau had furnished former SA Sentinella a detailed briefing of his rights and a briefing as to what was contained in the Rules of the Committee prior to his interview. Mr. O'Conner again requested that we prepare a letter protesting this matter.

It is not felt that a letter concerning this particular matter should be directed to Senator Church in view of Mr. Elliff's statement that this incident will not be repeated in the future. It is felt that our oral protest to the Committee is sufficient at this point, especially inasmuch as they accepted the limitations placed on the testimony of former SA Sentinella by the Department. It would appear we could expect to achieve very little by sending such a letter at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we orally advise Mr. O'Conner the Bureau does not feel a letter should be directed to the Committee, By FBI concerning this particular incident.

PVD JBH/PVD

Done. 5/22/75 and 5/23/75. See my memo 5/23/75.

We should not object if Dept. prepares a letter.

Per

6/3/75

OGC 75-20

Rec'd from Ad Hoc Comm 6/10/75 [illegible]

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

MAY 30 1975

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Senstudy-75

Dear Senator Church:

It is my understanding that the continuing efforts of staff members of the Executive and Legislative Branches to prepare standard guidelines for witness interview procedures are continuing this week. While that process continues, the Department of Justice is, of course, continuing to cooperate in an ad hoc and responsive manner. In order to ensure our attention to these cooperative efforts, I have designated K. William O'Connor as Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination and as such he will be the principle liaison officer of DOJ in this effort. I understand that your Chief Counsel and members of his staff are now dealing with Mr. O'Connor in the execution of their responsibilities.

In the meantime, in an effort to expedite the cooperative provision of appropriate information to SSC, it would be most helpful if the Committee Staff would ensure that the Department of Justice is advised, in advance of Committee Staff contact with FBI employees and former employees, of the name of the witness and the scope of the prospective interview. This would facilitate the interview process, since it would make it possible to ensure that appropriate instructions are issued to the witness under 28 CFR 16.22, and would permit early decision upon the release of any applicable secrecy agreements.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

cc: ✓John Warner

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 13 1975

file in
62-116395

[illegible]

84 JUN 13 1975

In the same vein, I should like to invite your attention to some procedural matters surrounding recent witness presentation before the Committee. It appears, from reports which I have received, that two former FBI agents who recently appeared, did not receive copies of the Committee's Rules of Procedures until immediately before appearance before the Committee; and that the scope of their proposed testimony was defined with somewhat less than optimum precision for pre-clearance. Some procedural problems are almost inevitable, especially in the early stages of hearings. I know that you share my interest in assuring that full procedural due process is unequivocally provided to all witnesses who testify before the Committee or are interviewed by Committee Staff. In calling this matter to your attention I seek your support in restricting such problems to a minimum and prospectively avoiding others of like kind.

Sincerely,

Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY [illegible]

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee has advised that if the Bureau's response to a Committee request concerning the Democratic Convention in Atlantic City in 1964 is sufficiently informative it may not be necessary to interview Bureau personnel concerning this matter and to recommend that an expeditious effort be made to furnish a summary concerning the Atlantic City investigation be made available along with certain documents concerning this matter.

By way of background, we have received a request dated 5-14-75 pertaining to many items, among which was information concerning the Bureau's activities in Atlantic City in 1964 at the Democratic National Convention. At a meeting on 5-30-75 it was pointed out to the Committee that certain aspects of their May 14, 1975, request were particularly burdensome, would in some instances invade privacy and for other reasons was most difficult. During this meeting which was attended by Mark Gitenstein, staff member of the Committee; John Elliff, Task Force Director; representatives of the Bureau; and K. William O'Conner, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, the Committee representatives indicated that subject to the Senate Committee's approval they would accept some sort of summary with regard to their request in Appendix D, Item 8 of the May 14, 1975, request. This item pertains to the Bureau's activities in Atlantic City.

We have had former Agents interviewed concerning this matter, a request has been made to interview two Bureau secretaries, and the Committee has indicated they intend to interview as many as five additional Bureau Agents concerning this matter. In conversation with K. William O'Conner, he mentioned that the Committee had specifically informed him that if the Bureau's response was informative enough concerning

62-116395

REC. [illegible]

62-116395-880

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Daly

5 JUN 10 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 1 1975

RVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

the Atlantic City matter, they would not interview the two Bureau secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski. (The request concerning the interview of these Bureau employees, who are Newark Office employees, is the subject of a separate memorandum captioned and dated same.) He requested SA Paul V. Daly to contact Mark Gitenstein in an effort to determine what type of response the Committee expected concerning the Atlantic City incident.

On 6-4-75, SA Daly contacted Mr. Gitenstein and Mr. Gitenstein advised that the Committee knew of the existence of certain memoranda and in particular a memorandum from former Assistant to the Director C. D. DeLoach reporting a conversation with the President requesting Bureau coverage at the Convention. Gitenstein stated that with regard to the Atlantic City incident, if a summary was prepared concerning this incident which would in general show the types of people whose conversations were monitored, the type of information collected, and the type of information disseminated along with furnishing the Committee certain important documents that it would not be necessary to interview Bureau personnel. He indicated among the documents they would expect to be furnished would be the DeLoach memorandum along with other "benign" documents which would not involve a privacy consideration or other considerations which might preclude their being made available to the Committee. Gitenstein indicated that it is the Committee's feeling that information of a political nature such as the credentials argument at the Convention was collected and furnished to the White House and that the collection and dissemination of this information is not apparently in concert with the ostensive purpose of electronic surveillance. He felt that the summary need not and should not identify individuals monitored but rather describe them such as a senator or some other descriptive phrase to describe the individual whose conversation might have been monitored. He said as to the verification of the information contained in the summary with the information in the files, that subject will be addressed by the Committee at a later time.

Gitenstein again mentioned that if such information was furnished by the Bureau, their need to interview employees would be muted as what they are attempting to learn through interview of Agents involved would have already been furnished by the Bureau. He volunteered that the Committee is relatively well informed concerning this particular matter. It is obvious from the specific mention of the DeLoach memorandum along with other observations and statements he made that this could well be true.

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

It is realized that the White House has requested that a paper be prepared which would include the Atlantic City incident; however, K. William O'Connor indicated that he had conversed with Mr. James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President, and that Wilderotter had advised that document requests pertaining to Atlantic City or any other topic which will be addressed in a paper should be responded to and response should not be delayed.

It would appear to be advantageous to the Bureau to attempt to comply with the summary request along with furnishing certain documents concerning Atlantic City on an expeditious basis as opposed to the Committee continuing to conduct interviews of current and former Bureau personnel. If this type of arrangement can be worked out in this particular incident which the Committee characterizes as an abuse, it might lend itself to a similar arrangement in other areas.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division expeditiously prepare a summary in line with the above concerning the Atlantic City incident along with furnishing the important documents concerning this incident.

pvD JBH/pvD

This is being done
WRW

NR 007 SF CODE

5:13 PM NITEL 5/14/75 MCC

TO DIRECTOR (62-113395)

FROM SAN FRANCISCO

ATTN LEGAL COUNSEL

SENSTUDY 75

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 14 1975
TELETYPE

REC 112

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED MAY 2, 1975, ABOVE CAPTION.

ON MAY 14, 1975, LESTER B. SEIDEL, INVESTIGATOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, WASHINGTON, D.C., TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE AND REQUESTED THE IDENTITY OF THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE OF THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE IN 1970. HE WAS ADVISED THAT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE CHARLES W. BATES SERVED IN THAT CAPACITY FROM JANUARY, 1970, THROUGH APRIL, 1970; THAT FORMER SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE HARRY J. MORGAN (NOW RETIRED) SERVED FROM APRIL, 1970, THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1970; AND THAT ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT E. GEBHARDT SERVED AS SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE FROM SEPTEMBER, 1970, THROUGH NOVEMBER, 1972.

REC 112

62-116395-219

SEIDEL DID NOT INDICATE THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF HIS INQUIRY OTHER THAT IT WAS CONNECTED WITH THE COMMITTEE WITH WHICH HE IS AFFILIATED.

ABOVE BEING FURNISHED FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU.

END

SFO CMC

HOLD

cc Div 11

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY

1 - M[illegible] J. B. Adams
1 - I[illegible] T. J. Jenkins
1 - E[illegible]ch Assistant Director

CODE TELETYPE NITEL Hot [illegible]

REC. 112

TO ALL SACS 219 MAY ~~19~~ 20, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395) PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY - 75.

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR, IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE. UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL INFORMATION FURNISHED.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 20 1975
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

SFP:cmc
(19)

LAF 10:45 JBA

NOTE:

Referenced teletype alerted field to work of the Senate and House Select Committees and Bureau's handling of its requests. Also, it pointed out FBI has pledged full cooperation with Committees. San Francisco teletype 5/14/75 advised that on that day Lester B. Seidel, Investigator, Senate Select Committee, telephonically sought and was furnished identities of SACs in San Francisco in 1970. Seidel did not indicate specific nature of his inquiries. Considering the publicity being afforded the work of the Committee, it is not inconceivable some unauthorized persons may attempt to obtain information from the FBI particularly at field level, under guise of one of the Committees. It is therefore believed this teletype to all SACs is desirable as a cautionary measure.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

S.F. PHILLIPS - [illegible]

84 JUN 11 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

June 5, 1975

LEGAL DIVISION

Attached teletype advises former Agent Richard H. Davis, Atlanta Office, had been contacted by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member (FNU) Epstein in an attempt by Epstein to arrange an interview concerning Bureau investigation of Martin Luther King. On the night of 6-4-75, Michael Epstein, Staff Member SSC advised SA Paul V. Daly that he had contacted former Agent Davis to arrange interview concerning Bureau investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and Southern Leadership Christian Conference (SLCC). Epstein stated Davis refused to submit to interview since he was bound by an employment secrecy agreement and needed necessary clearance from Bureau. He told Epstein that he would not contact Bureau for such clearance. Epstein requested Bureau release Davis from the agreement for purposes of this interview which will be a staff interview in Atlanta.

Legal Division recommends Davis be released from security agreement for purposes of this interview and to answer questions concerning the King, Levison, and SLCC investigations. If approved, we will separately advise Davis through Atlanta Office of this decision, and give him pertinent briefing.

1 - Intelligence Division
1 - Administrative Division
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. Daly

WRW/JCD

Jam/gg

PVD JBF/PVD

PVD:eek
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 04 1975
ms

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 025 AT CODED

8:08 PM NITEL JUNE 4, 1975 JWS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTN: INTD W. D. CREGAR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RLC

SENSTUDY '75.

1150p

ON 6/4/75, FORMER AGENT RICHARD H. DAVIS, 1147 WILD CREEK TRAIL, N. E., ATLANTA, GA., ADVISED HE WAS CONTACTED THIS DATE BY (FNU) EPSTEIN WHOM HE BELIEVED WAS CALLING FROM WASHINGTON, D. C. DAVIS STATED HE FEELS EPSTEIN IS A MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE SINCE INQUIRY CONCERNED DAVIS' KNOWLEDGE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING CASE. EPSTEIN STATED HE WISHED TO INTERVIEW DAVIS EITHER IN ATLANTA OR WASHINGTON, D. C.; HOWEVER, DAVIS SAID THAT NO DEFIN~~A~~ITE ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE DURING CONVERSATION OTHER THAN HE WOULD CONTACT EPSTEIN AS TO APPROPRIATE DATE FOR INTERVIEW IN ATLANTA.

REC-112

62-116395-218

DAVIS WAS INFORMED HE COULD CONTACT THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL COLLECT FOR ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER. DAVIS STATED HE WOULD DO SO.

7 JUN 16 1975

END

HOLD

84 JUN 11 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

FIVE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-30-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of an executive meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community on 5-28-75. The meeting was chaired by William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence. Also present were: Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President, James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, Section Chief William O. Cregar, Inspector John B. Hotis, and senior officials of the State Department, National Security Agency, Office of Management and Budget, Defense Department, and the Treasury Department.

Hotis

The following matters of interest were discussed at the meeting:

House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Mr. Colby said he met earlier this week with Chairman Nedzi of the House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, John L. Boos, Chief Counsel, and A. Searle Field, Committee Staff Director. He said they seemed interested in the relationship which had developed between the Senate Committee and CIA and asked where he thought the Senate inquiry was going. They also discussed procedures regarding access to documents and witnesses and requested they be furnished some basic materials concerning the CIA's authority to conduct intelligence investigations. They also requested that the Committee be provided with all the materials requested by the Senate Select Committee. Colby pointed out that the House Resolution (H-Res. 138) which established the Select Committee prohibits the disclosure of information outside the Committee without Committee approval. There is some question, however, whether this Resolution can supersede Rule 11 of the Rules of the House of Representatives

EC 112

~~62-116395~~ - 317

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Hotis
JBH:dkg (7)

5 JUN 11 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 11 1975

which provides that members of the House shall have access to all Committee records. He said Congressman Robert N. Giaimo (D-Conn.) has indicated that he will not accept any limitations on access. Colby said he will appear in an open session before the Committee sometime in the next few weeks to discuss, in general terms, the agency's position on collection of intelligence information.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Mr. Wilderotter said that F. A. O. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, has agreed to identify in advance specific allegations of abuse that will be reviewed by the Committee. Wilderotter said he will then appoint a task force or some other coordinating mechanism within the executive branch to examine each of these areas in depth. The purpose will be to develop an executive department brief on each subject which can be used to respond to Committee requests. He felt that this might enable the Administration to gain the initiative on these issues and perhaps limit the Committee's inquiries to the boundaries set forth in the Senate Resolution. He asked that the agencies make an effort to identify abuse subjects so that the White House can pull together all the information available on each topic. He said it is already clear that the Committee will examine such subjects as assassinations and the CIA's role in the internal affairs of Chile and the Dominican Republic.

Mr. E. H. Knoche, Assistant to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, reported that Mr. Colby has made three appearances before the Senate Select Committee and on each occasion discussed assassination matters. Mr. Colby will meet with the Committee three times next week, and it is expected that he will be asked about the Phoenix program and the covert activities of the CIA including political, counterintelligence, and clandestine intelligence collection. The Committee will trace the agency's operations back to the 1947 directive in an effort to determine how they relate to policy objectives of the Government.

Mr. William G. Hyland, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, said the Committee has requested position papers on the Department's activities in Laos and Chile and to explain of the Department's approach to covert action and whether it was a supplement or instrument of policy. Mr. Hyland raised the question of whether the agencies had any moral obligation to advise former employees that documents were now being

CONTINUED - OVER

made available to Congress. He felt that they should be given an opportunity to review these files prior to interview in order to refresh their memories. Mr. Wilderotter agreed and said that each agency should adopt a similar policy.

Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI, asked whether anyone knew what John Elliff hoped to accomplish as Director of the Task Force on Domestic Intelligence. We pointed out that his earlier writings would indicate that he intends to draft an intelligence charter for the FBI, and perhaps the entire intelligence community. Elliff has made a comprehensive study over the past several years of the Bureau's internal security intelligence functions, including sources of the FBI's authority and the legal restrictions of its operations. This was the subject of a paper he submitted at the Princeton Conference in 1971, and he has since called for the establishment of legal standards for the Bureau's collection, retention, and dissemination of intelligence information.

Mr. Buchen then requested that the FBI draft a proposed intelligence charter for the Bureau. He felt that it would be helpful for the Administration to have a proposal available which it might use to counter any recommendations made by the Committee. At the end of the meeting Mr. Wilderotter asked that a second paper be prepared reviewing all of Mr. Elliff's articles on the subject of domestic intelligence with the view toward identifying those issues which seem to be of major importance.

With regard to Mr. Buchen's request, we feel that it would be inappropriate for the Bureau to draft an intelligence charter for the executive branch. It is the responsibility of the White House and other consumers of intelligence to define their needs and propose appropriate operating authority. We also question the utility of reviewing Professor Elliff's writings on the domestic intelligence functions. We feel a better course of action at this point is simply to ask Mr. Elliff to define the goals and objectives of his task force. He has always been very candid and forthright and we have no reason to think that he would be reluctant to discuss the matter with us. In addition, it is likely his views on the intelligence function differ from those expressed in his earlier articles, and it is best to get his current thinking on the problem. If this approach proves unsuccessful, we can then resort to a review of his written materials.

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Legal Counsel Division advise Mr. Wilderotter that we feel it is inappropriate for the Bureau to draft an intelligence charter ~~o~~fr the FBI and recommend that the White House draft a statement of its intelligence needs.

(2) That Legal Counsel Division contact Mr. Elliff and attempt to determine what his goals and objectives are as Director of the Task Force on Domestic Intelligence.

PVD JBH/PVD

PLM

wRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. J. B. Adams~~
1 - ~~Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~(1 - Mr. Hotis)~~

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/6

DATE: 6/6/75

1 - ~~Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. H. W. Dare
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This records the results of contact with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning release to Senate Select Committee (SSC) of two documents pertaining to Appendix C, Paragraph 24 of the SSC request to the Department of 5/14/75, which requested "all memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of 'notional' Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States."

No information has been developed indicating this Bureau conferred with CIA regarding the establishment or creation of a Bureau-sponsored "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization. Although the FBI did, in fact, direct several such organizations, no information has been developed indicating the FBI consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.

In one instance, CIA advised in 2/70 it had established a notional organization with post office box addresses in Boston, Massachusetts and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This notional organization, to be known as the Union for the Revolution, had the objective of developing penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. It was CIA's intention to circulate propaganda from the post office boxes in anticipation of interesting Arab groups. Thereafter, it was CIA's plan to use its personnel under "suitable" cover to contact the Arab groups. (See memorandum dated 2/13/70, captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-2, copy attached.)

62-116395-216

REC 107

By letterhead memorandum dated 3/23/70, the FBI indicated information had been received indicating the Union for the Revolution had been in contact with a domestic Marxist-Leninist organization requesting literature. This memorandum set forth an analysis of a "Statement of the Union for the Revolution" indicating the document lacked credibility as a revolutionary document. (LHM dated 3/23/70, captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-4, copy attached.)

62-116395

ENCLOSURE

5 JUN 11 1975

LFS:mjg
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

5-606

84 JUN 11 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

On 6/6/75, Mr. Walter Elder, CIA, advised that CIA had no objection to the LHM dated 3/23/70, being furnished to the SSC. With regard to the memorandum from Mr. Papich to Mr. Brennan dated 2/13/70, Mr. Elder requested that the name of the CIA representative who furnished the information in the memorandum be deleted from line one of the memorandum prior to its being furnished to the SSC. Provided this is done, CIA has no objection to this memorandum being furnished to the SSC. He suggested that when the name is deleted, it be replaced with the phrase "A CIA officer."

ACTION:

To record CIA's clearance of the above-described documents.

SECRET

Appendix C, III, 24

Please provide: all memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts, or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States.

No information has been developed indicating this Bureau conferred with CIA regarding the establishment or creation of a Bureau-sponsored "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization. Although the FBI did, in fact, direct several such organizations, no information has been developed indicating the FBI consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.

In one instance, CIA advised in 2/70 it had established a notional organization with post office box addresses in Boston, Massachusetts, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This notional organization, to be known as the Union for the Revolution, had the objective of developing penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. It was CIA's intention to circulate propaganda from the post office boxes in anticipation of interesting Arab groups. Thereafter, it was CIA's plan to use its personnel under "suitable" cover to contact the Arab groups. (See memorandum dated 2/13/70 captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-2, copy attached.)

By letterhead memorandum dated 3/23/70, the FBI indicated information had been received indicating the Union for the Revolution had been in contact with a domestic Marxist-Leninist organization requesting literature. This memorandum set forth an analysis of a "Statement of the Union for the Revolution" indicating the document lacked credibility as a revolutionary document. (LHM dated 3/23/70 captioned "Union for the Revolution," 100-456409-4, copy attached.)

As the Union for the Revolution was strictly a creation of CIA, it is recommended before any information be disseminated outside the FBI relating to this organization, clearance be obtained through CIA.

Prepared by SA David
Ryan, IS-3, 5/28/75

SECRET

Classified by 4375
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-216

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___
Hotis JBA

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams   DATE: 6/4/75

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

At 4:55 p.m. on June 4, 1975, Daniel M. Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he has not as yet been contacted by the Senate Select Committee staff for interview but it was his intention to call Mark Gitenstein to discuss further his interview by the Committee. Mr. Armstrong inquired as to whether the Bureau has any objections to his discussing the two subject areas previously described by Mr. Gitenstein. Those areas were Armstrong's knowledge of the Bureau's Intelligence Division activities as a result of his employment in the FBI, and his knowledge of the possibility of the Bureau getting an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters.

I advised Mr. Armstrong that to the extent that the interview would concern those two subjects, the Bureau would have no objection and he could consider his secrecy agreement waived, but only to that extent. Mr. Armstrong inquired as to whether there were any particular problems with information he furnished to me on May 28, 1975. I told him that the waiver of the agreement was conditioned on the one limitation that he would not furnish information that would identify informants, compromise current investigations, or on-going programs, or reveal other sensitive matters which should be reserved for the information of members of the Committee or the Chairman of the Committee.

I told Mr. Armstrong that the Bureau would have available during his interview, though not present at the interview, a representative who would provide him with counsel as to any problems concerning subjects he may be reluctant to discuss with the Committee representative. I explained that the FBI representative was not intended to inhibit any

REC 117

62-116395-215

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

5 JUN 11 1975

JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 11 1975

interview he might have, but was there for the purpose of expediting the interview by resolving questions concerning information he was authorized to furnish.

Mr. Armstrong said he fully understood and that he would advise me in the event an interview was scheduled.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Cochran

DATE: 5/19/75

FROM : W. E. Harward

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEYS - SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Rememos Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams dated 4/9/75 and 4/25/75, concerning above-captioned matter, copies attached.

Liaison with Capitol Hill by the Office of Legal Counsel resulted in an arrangement whereby Laboratory representatives could meet with those members of the Capitol Police Force handling security surveys for the U. S. Congress. Laboratory personnel met with members of the Capitol Police Force on 5/6/75 and 5/8/75 at their headquarters, 331 First Street, NE, Washington, D. C. At the meeting on 5/6/75 an examination of their survey equipment revealed that it was adequate, however it did not meet the level of sophistication or quality available at the present state of the art. Further discussion revealed that the training received by members of the police force handling their responsibility was limited.

On 5/8/75 Laboratory Supervisors Wilbur G. Stevens and Joseph B. Parsons met with Chief James M. Powell and some of his staff members which included Deputy Chief Garner, Captain Brannon, Head of the Investigative Unit, and Lieutenant Bell, Head of the Bomb Disposal Unit. The discussion at this meeting centered around steps which could be taken to update their present security survey equipment as well as additional measures which could be put into practice to enhance their technical expertise in this area. Laboratory personnel furnished them with the names of manufacturers of additional survey equipment as well as suggestions as to the establishment of an in-house training program.

Enclosures (2)

1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz (Attn: Mr. Bowers, Room 4509 JB)
1 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. Cregar, Room 4123 JEH)
1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Harward
1 - Mr. Stevens

WGS:bms
(8)

ST-107
REC-59
62-116395-214

CONTINUED - OVER

5 MAY 30 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1 ms

57 JUN 12 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum W. E. Harward to Mr. Cochran
RE: SECURITY SURVEYS - SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT

At the conclusion of this conference, Chief Powell expressed his sincere appreciation to the Bureau for the excellent help and guidance extended to him and his staff in this matter of mutual interest, and expressed the hope that he could call on us again in the event he or his staff needed to tap our resevoir of knowledge. The Chief was assured that we would be available if needed in this capacity.

It appears that the Capitol Police Force has been forced into the untenable position of handling this responsibility for the Congress, and as a result are attempting to establish some degree of self-reliance and outward credibility being completely inexperienced in this area of technical expertise. Because of this, it is felt that the Bureau should move cautiously in any continuing liaison with the Capitol Police concerning security survey matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that any continuing liaison with the Capitol Hill Police Force be handled by mature and experienced Special Agent Supervisors, who are completely familiar with security survey matters.

WRW/TWL

TK

PLM

Mr. J. B. Adams 4-8-75

Legal Counsel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

During various contacts with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, and Congressman Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), Chairman of the House Select Committee, the question has come up regarding the need for a check of the private offices of individual Committee Members to ensure the absence of any electronic listening devices. The Committee personnel have been told that we consider this absolutely essential and they agreed.

In exploring this matter, it was determined that the Capitol Police Department recently has established a special unit to handle all types of security problems within the Capitol Hill complex, including checks for electronic listening devices. Personnel of this unit have received extensive training, some from CIA. The operations of the unit are controlled through the Sergeants at Arms of the House and Senate.

This matter has been discussed with Robert Hough, Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Hough advised that the special unit already has conducted complete security surveys of the new office space of the Senate Select Committee and certainly will perform any other checks of this type needed by the Committee or its individual Members. He said, in fact, that since they now have this capability they would oppose any outside agency coming on to the Hill to perform this function. Hough said he already has been in contact with Miller regarding the necessary security checks and stated he will let us know when the offices of the Senate Select Committee/Members have been checked. He said their rules require specific requests from the individual Members in writing.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. [illegible]
1 - Mr. [illegible]

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Dowers

62-116395-214

[illegible] (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

This matter was discussed with Congressman Nedzi on 4-9-75, and he stated he would promptly contact Mr. Harding to work out the necessary arrangements for security checks needed by his Committee and its Members. Harding has promised to let us know when the checks of the House Select Committee Members have been completed.

All contacts concerning this matter have been handled by Inspector Bowers who will continue to follow this situation with Senate Sergeant at Arms, William H. Wannall, or his Deputy; House Sergeant at Arms Harding; Mr. Miller of the Senate Select Committee; and Congressman Nedzi.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WOC:ekw 4/14/75

On 4/11/75 the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community was apprised of the discussions with Mr. Robert Hough, the Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and with Mr. Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Although the Executive Committee would have preferred the FBI to conduct audio sweeps, they interposed no objection to the sweeps being handled by the Capitol Police Department. Mr. Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, requested, however, that both Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding be requested to periodically advise the FBI as to the sweeps of Committee space for electronic listening devices. Specifically, Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding should be asked to furnish the FBI the following: How frequently they will conduct a counteraudio sweep, what offices will be swept, will the results of such sweeps be furnished the FBI, and will the FBI be immediately notified should the Capitol Police locate an electronic listening device?

Mr. J. B. Adams 4-25-75

RAYNEY

Legal Counsel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RL

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams memorandum of 4-9-75 to which the Intelligence Division placed an addendum dated 4-14-75 showing that Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, had requested that the Sergeants at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives keep the Bureau advised regarding checks made for electronic listening devices in the offices of captioned Select Committees.

This was discussed on 4-23-75 by Inspector Bowers with Senate Sergeant at Arms William Wannall and his Deputy, Robert Hough. They were amenable to notifying us concerning the checks they make of Senate Select Committee space and the offices of the Members of this Committee. Hough was designated by Wannall to handle this matter. Hough advised that the special Capitol Police unit had made a check of Room S148 in the Capitol on that date (4-23-75) prior to a meeting of the Senate Select Committee in that room and found nothing. Hough stated they have received no requests whatever to make any checks of the offices of individual Committee Members. He said he had discussed this matter with William Miller, Staff Director of the Select Committee, and Miller indicated it would be taken up with the Committee but he has heard nothing further from him.

On 4-24-75 Bowers discussed this matter with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives. Harding stated he has had no requests for any checks of the Members' offices or

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

DWB:ejs (9)

62-116395-214

CONTINUED - OVER

space of the House Select Committee since the Committee really has not begun to function as yet. He said he has discussed this matter with Committee Chairman Lucien Nedzi, and he certainly will give us complete accounting of checks they make of this Committee's space and the space of the individual Members of the Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

4-528

62-116395-213

CHANGED TO

62-116464-4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/Rw

JUN 12 1975

Hmk./cz

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/23/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES OR FORMER EMPLOYEES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Hotis

At the Executives Conference on May 22, 1975, I presented for discussion the question of the procedures to be followed when former employees or current employees of the Bureau are contacted for interview by staff representatives of the Senate Select Committee, or are called for testimony pursuant to a subpoena issued by the Committee. I explained the background including the numerous attempts to arrive at a working arrangement with the Committee in terms of stated guidelines and that all such efforts in the past had proven unworkable.

I pointed out that when presented with the proposal that an agency representative be present during interviews, the Committee met and voted unanimously to reject that proposal. The issue of whether the agency representative would be present during the interview therefore is a stumbling block to the development of a reasonable procedure to be followed by the Committee and by our present and former employees. I requested the authority of the Executives Conference and approval of the Director to waive the requirement that a Bureau representative be present during interviews and following a vote such approval was given.

I then requested authority to undertake the development of a working understanding with the Committee in behalf of the Bureau by which we would be given notice of the identities of persons to be interviewed prior to interview or testimony, that we would be advised of the subject matter of the

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
JAM:mfd

REC-100 62-116395-282

CONTINUED - OVER

17 JUN 10 1975

84 JUN 11 1975

interview or testimony, and afforded an opportunity to discuss with the witness those areas of the proposed interview or testimony which would require no special arrangements and those areas which would require the information possessed by the witness to be furnished to members of the Committee or to the Chairman exclusively.

We also wanted an opportunity prior to interview to furnish the witnesses information concerning their Constitutional rights, their rights pursuant to the Committee's rules, and to advise them concerning the extent to which they were released from obligations of secrecy made to the FBI, and to the procedures necessary to obtain authority of the Department to respond to a subpoena.

Following discussion and vote this matter also was approved.

Pursuant to such authority, I met with K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, from approximately 4:00 p.m. to 5:20 p.m. on May 22, 1975, accompanied by Inspector John B. Hotis. I explained to Mr. O'Connor that the Director was desirous of having the Committee understand that the FBI wanted to be cooperative to the extent that it was possible and consistent with the need to protect the identities of informants, sensitive sources of information and methods, on-going investigations and other current operations and personal privacy. Because of this view of the Director and the Bureau, we desired to make known to the Committee the fact that we would not insist on the presence of a Bureau representative during actual interviews or testimony of present or former employees, but we would want an understanding with the Committee and the Committee staff that the Bureau would be given prior notice of the identities of proposed witnesses, the subject matter of the proposed interview or testimony, and an opportunity prior to interview or testimony for the Bureau to consult with the employee in order to release him from his obligations of secrecy to the extent possible for purposes of the interview or testimony.

I restated our position that we were not endeavoring to deter testimony rather we were attempting to facilitate testimony under reasonable conditions and we felt that these matters should be discussed with the Committee. I told Mr. O'Connor that we were aware of the numerous discussions, proposals and conferences that have been held in an effort to establish specific formal guidelines with the Committee, but that all such efforts in behalf of the White House staff and the intelligence community at

CONTINUED - OVER

large have not been successful. I told him that therefore we felt it would be appropriate for the FBI to express our view to the Committee because interviews of FBI personnel and former employees have been conducted and are scheduled in the near future.

Mr. O'Connor said that he understood the Director's view that he desired to cooperate with the Committee and he felt that such cooperation could be negotiated if we were to offer the Committee as trading material COINTELPRO files. I told Mr. O'Connor that we were not going to negotiate an understanding concerning witness interview procedures on the basis of trading any of our files. He then suggested that we negotiate the May 14, 1975, letter which was addressed to the Attorney General by Senator Church and use that negotiation as a basis for trading with the Committee to develop workable guidelines. I again told Mr. O'Connor that I considered the question of procedural arrangements for witness interviews to be a very broad question and one that went far beyond the requests in the May 14, 1975, letter. I told him that I felt confident that the May 14, 1975, letter would be followed by perhaps an even longer letter with more requests and that such matters should be negotiated individually.

Mr. O'Connor then said that it was his strong view that a letter should be addressed to the Committee complaining of the treatment of FBI witnesses, particularly regarding violations of the Committee's own rules in that it appeared that during recent interviews the Committee had not furnished witness a copy of the rules in sufficient time and the treatment by staff representatives (& the Committee staff) of witnesses had been improper.

I told Mr. O'Connor that I thought that our efforts to develop a working relationship with the Committee could be seriously impaired at this time should a protest letter be sent to Senator Church because a formal communication of that nature would require some reaction on the part of the Committee and I could see no benefit to our present efforts to establish procedures by which we could reasonably cooperate with the Committee.

Mr. O'Connor then suggested that a letter might be addressed to Senator Church which described our concern that in the absence of reasonable procedures witnesses' rights might be impaired and that for that

CONTINUED - OVER

reason and for the reason that the Director desired to be cooperative with the Committee, we would request a meeting with Senator Church and Senator Tower to arrive at an understanding as to procedures. I told Mr. O'Connor that I would consider such a letter and he said he would discuss the matter with the Deputy Attorney General and with James Wilderotter at the White House.

At approximately 9:05 a.m. on May 23, 1975, Mr. O'Connor called me and said that he had discussed the matter with Mr. Wilderotter and the Deputy Attorney General. He said that both had agreed that it was inopportune at this time to seek special guidelines for interviews of FBI personnel and former personnel with the Committee. He said that a meeting has been scheduled for Tuesday, May 27, 1975, at noon in a final effort to resolve an understanding with Committee representatives. He said at the present time it is proposed that the meeting be attended by Wilderotter and Roderick Hills, representing the White House; Hoffman, representing the Defense Department; Warner, representing CIA; and O'Connor representing the Justice Department. Committee representatives would be Schwarz, Chief Counsel, and John Elliff. He said that at this time it was his thought that the Deputy Attorney General and I should not attend the meeting. He gave as his reasoning the thought that "should something go wrong" the Deputy Attorney General could disassociate himself from any agreement arrived at, and that I would similarly be in a position of saying that we have not been a party to the agreement.

I reminded Mr. O'Connor that meetings have been held frequently in the past and that tentative understandings made at such meetings have disappeared shortly after the meeting was concluded. I told him that was significant to us because we now understand that two more former employees of the FBI have been contacted and may be interviewed in the near future. I told him that former SA Sam Papich and former Agent Nichols have been contacted. I told him that the extent to which we should release these two former employees from their obligation of secrecy could not be intelligently evaluated unless we knew the subject matter of the interviews and that we plan to contact the Committee to inquire as to the subject matter. I pointed out to him that such pending interviews make it imperative for the FBI to consider action in addition to meetings that may be planned to discuss guidelines.

CONTINUED _ OVER

Mr. O'Connor asked that we not contact the Committee directly at this time, but that we allow him to call John Elliff and Schwarz to request that he be advised of the identity of all proposed FBI witnesses and of the subject matter of the proposed interviews, and that such interviews or testimony not go forward pending developments of an agreement on guidelines. O'Connor promised that he would make the contact promptly and advise me today of the results. I agreed to withhold our contact pending receipt of the information from him.

Mr. O'Connor then insisted that a letter be prepared for the Attorney General to send to Senator Church pointing out the failure of the Committee to afford complete protection of the rights of witnesses. I declined to undertake that responsibility and I told him the reason was that a formal document addressed to the Chairman of the Committee would tend to impair our efforts to negotiate with the Committee and certainly would be untimely in view of the conference he described as being scheduled for next Tuesday at noon.

Mr. O'Connor then said he would hate to have to tell the Deputy Attorney General that the FBI declined to prepare such a draft. I told him that not only would I not mind him telling the Deputy Attorney General, but I wished he would tell the Deputy Attorney General and explain my reason for not sending such a formal letter addressed to Senator Church at this time. Mr. O'Connor said that "well everyone else agrees to the letter," and I told him the FBI does not agree.

Mr. O'Connor said that if he was going to have to draft the letter for the Attorney General's signature, he would do it, but that he would need the information concerning the interviews of former SA Devlin and former SA Sentinella. I told Mr. O'Connor that the information concerning Sentinella was en route to him already and that we would endeavor to furnish him as promptly as possible any additional information available to us concerning these interviews.

At 11:13 a.m. on May 23, 1975, Mr. O'Connor called me and said that he had just concluded a conversation with John Elliff during which Elliff agreed that in regard to the scheduled interview of former SA Sam Papich on May 29, 1975, at 9:00 a.m., he would furnish us the substance of the

CONTINUED - OVER

questions to be asked Mr. Papich. He said that Elliff was agreeable to an informal arrangement under which the FBI would not require the presence of a Bureau representative at such interviews, but would expect to receive the identity of persons to be interviewed plus a statement as to the subject matter of the interview. Elliff then proceeded to identify as those persons scheduled for interview as William Turner, who will be interviewed today or this weekend by Mike Epstein at San Francisco, and "Chick" Brennan, who was interviewed yesterday, May 22, 1975, by Mark Gitenstein and who may be interviewed again today.

As to the interview of Sam Papich, Elliff said that the interview would concern:

1. A liaison agreement between the FBI and CIA;

2. The abolition of Papich's liaison responsibilities in 1970;

3. Dissatisfaction by the FBI with the Huston Plan;

4. The views in the White House regarding the intelligence community and the FBI with reference to a conversation Elliff had with Mr. Wannall and Mr. Cregar on May 22, 1975;

5. A detailed follow-up on the discussions with Mr. Wannall;.

6. A copy of the Huston Plan and certain minutes taken of meetings at which the Huston Plan was discussed. These minutes allegedly were made by William Cregar;

7. The matter raised with Paul Daly on May 22, 1975. (Mr. Daly recalled that Mr. Elliff discussed an incident concerning the CIA and the FBI which occurred at Denver, Colorado.)

Mr. O'Connor said that an interview proposed with former SA Nichols has been postponed indefinitely according to Elliff because of Nichols' unavailability.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee

Mr. O'Connor noted that even though formal current rules have not been agreed upon with the Committee, it appears that Elliff's cooperation in furnishing the above information indicates a willingness to abide by the terms and conditions that I had requested Mr. O'Connor to seek in behalf of the FBI.

In this developing cooperation with Elliff, it is my opinion that we should not participate in the conference at noon on Tuesday, May 27, 1975, at which time the broad proposals by Wilderotter will be discussed. It is to the interest of the FBI to develop a cooperative attitude on the part of Elliff and his staff and that is being accomplished.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-2-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, advised that he desired the Bureau to continue practice of furnishing communications setting forth the contents of interviews of former and current employees where such information is available. He also requested that the Bureau continue to furnish an extra copy for James Wilderotter, assistant to the Counsel to the President.

HOT

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD

JBH/PVD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-19-00 BY [illegible]

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(7)

REC-100 62-116395-211

17 JUN 10 1975

84 JUN 11 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

At 10:37 a.m. on May 28, 1975, former FBI employee Daniel M. (Mac) Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he has received information that the Senate Select Committee may contact him for purpose of interview. He requested my advice as to what his response should be. I told Mr. Armstrong that he should be aware of any secrecy agreements he may have signed while an employee of the FBI and he should be aware of the Attorney General Order 501-73. I told him the Director was interested in being as candid as possible with the Committee and that we would be willing to release him from his agreement to the extent it would be possible to do so consistent with the needs of on-going investigations and the sensitivity of the particular information. involved. I told him that should he receive a request for interview or subpoena, it would be appropriate for him to inquire as to the general areas of discussion proposed for the interview and to request the Director to release him from the secrecy agreement concerning those areas.

Mr. Armstrong said that if he was contacted, he would respond according to the advice furnished him.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/rw

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

PLM

REC-100 62-116395-210

17 JUN 10 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(7)

84 JUN 11 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 05 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 10 PH PLAIN

610 PM 6-5-75 NITEL MCA

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: PHILADELPHIA (62-0-23222)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL, MAY 28, 1975.

SA JOHN B. MEADE ADVISED TELEPHONICALLY MAY 29, 1975 RE CONTENTS OF RENITEL.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RU

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

REC-100

62-116395-208

(Meade)

cc 67

84 JUN 11 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 0 5 1975

TELETYPE

NR011 CE PLAIN

8:33PM NITEL JUNE 5, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM CHARLOTTE (62-4093)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUNITEL MAY 29, 1975.

MR. JOSEPH A. SIZOO, 84 A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PINES, NC, CONTACTED MAY 29, 1975 PER INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REBUNITEL.

END

~~MEB FBIHQ CLR AND TKS~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SPOALM/RW

Joseph A. Sizoo

REC-100

62-116395-707

JUN 10 1975

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

cc 671

84 JUN 11 1975.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 29 1975 HQ

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 003 PD CODE

1:45 P M URGENT MAY 29, 1975 LJQ

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: PORTLAND (66-0)

ATTENTION: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

SENSTUDY 75.

RE FBIHQ NITEL TO ALEXANDRIA AND OTHER OFFICES, INCLUDING PORTLAND, MAY 28, 1975.

FBIHQ NITEL NAMED SA LEO B. APP, JR., AND SA EDGAR O. INGALLS, BOTH CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO PORTLAND DIVISION, AND NOTED THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC), EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN.

FOR INFORMATION OF FBIHQ, STRONG POSSIBILITY SUBJECT MATTER PERTAINS TO MATTER ENUMERATED IN DETAIL IN PORTLAND TELETYPES TO FBIHQ JANUARY 18, 1973, FEBRUARY 1, 1973, FEBRUARY 5, 1973, PORTLAND AIRTEL TO FBIHQ, JANUARY 19, 1973, IN MATTER ENTITLED "HUNTLY COLLINS, INFORMATION CONCERNING, RESEARCH MATTER," AND FBIHQ TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED FEBRUARY 2, 1973, ENTITLED "FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT, CODE NAME 'INLET', RESEARCH MATTER."

END.

COPY RETAINED
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

REC-100

62-116395-206

JUN 10 1975

67-423754 (App)
67-623437 (Ingalls)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/eu

CC

84 JUN 11 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 05 1975

TYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR004 TP CODE

1:40PM URGENT JUNE 5, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM TAMPA (105-0-1121)

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

RE BUREAU NITEL MAY 28, 1975.

ON JUNE 4, 1975, MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6500 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BEACH, FLORIDA, WAS CONTACTED. MR. ROZAMUS HAD NOT BEEN AVAILABLE FOR CONTACT UNTIL THIS DATE BECAUSE OF TRAVEL. MR. ROZAMUS ADVISED THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BUT HE WAS ALERTED THAT HE MAY BE APPROACHED BY A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF. MR. ROZAMUS WAS ADVISED OF THE CONTENTS OF REBUNITEL CONCERNING THE FACT THAT HE MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT DURING INTERVIEW IN THE EVENT QUESTIONS ARE ASKED RELATING TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS. MR. ROZAMUS WAS ALSO ADVISED THAT AS A PRELUDE TO THE INTERVIEW HE MAY CONTACT THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL. HE WAS ADVISED THAT THE BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE WAS NOT INTENDED

END PAGE ONE

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

67-424444 Rozamus

REC-100

62-116395-805

JUN 10 1975

84 JUN 11 1975

TO IMPEDE THE WORK OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE BUT WAS DONE AS A COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. MR. ROZAMUS ADVISED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THIS AND FULLY APPRECIATED THE BUREAU'S EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD. MR. ROZAMUS FURTHER ADVISED THAT HE WOULD NOTIFY THE TAMPA OFFICE IN THE EVENT THAT HE IS CONTACTED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE.

END

RECD THREE

DCW FBIHQ CL CLR

cc. Putman

Airtel

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)
6/2/75

To: Legat, Rome

From: Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. Kolombatovic
PERSONAL ATTENTION
(Route through for review)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SENSTUDY 75

Enclosed is a copy of Bureau teletype 5/28/75 to selected SACs and one copy each of Bureau teletypes 5/2 and 20/75 to all SACs, latter two teletypes for background information concerning captioned matter.

You will note that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) is interested in the whereabouts of some current employees of your office, including yourself. For your additional information, an SSC Staff Member recently inquired of a former Bureau official concerning communications sent to Legat, Rome, in 1964 concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and concerning the name of the Legat at Rome in 1964. (It was the erroneous recollection of the former Bureau official that Armand Cammarota was the Legat in Rome in 1964).

Handle all inquiries from the SSC in accordance with the enclosed instructions.

REC-100 62-116395-204

Enclosures - 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/JEW

JUN 3 1975

SFP:ekw EKW
(10)

MAILED 20
JUN 2 1975
FBI

NOTE: Enclosed 5/2/75 tel to all offices gave general background as to Senstudy 75 and alerted field that former and incumbent employees might be contacted for interview by SSC Staff. Enclosed 5/20/75 tel alerted all SACs to possible inquiries made of field offices and action to take if contacted. SSC letter 5/14/75 enclosed a request for names and current office assignments or last known addresses of all FBI employees assigned Rome, 1964. Three employees then assigned there are still in Rome and their names are included in the copy of the 5/28/75 teletype being sent Rome. That teletype included instructions for selected offices to alert additional 1964 Rome employees who are now assigned elsewhere or no longer with FBI.

WOC
PLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 12 1975

GPO 954-546

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 05 1975

Dw

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 005 NK CODE

12:00PM IMMEDIATE JUNE 5, 1975 JCG

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM NEWARK (66-3971)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL MAY 28, 1975. Sen 178

FORMER AND PRESENT EMPLOYEES LISTED IN RE BUTEL HAVE BEEN CONTACTED AND ALERTED TO POSSIBILITY OF INTERVIEWS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS SET OUT IN BUTEL MADE KNOWN TO THESE EMPLOYEES, NONE OF WHOM HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF AS YET.

BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED SHOULD THEY CONTACT THIS OFFICE RE SUCH SSC CONTACT.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/rw

PLS HOLD HAVE ONE MORE Y FOR YOU

REC-100

62-116375-203

3 JUN 9 1975

5

79 JUN 10 1975

C.C. Putman

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

At 11:44 a.m. on June 5, 1975, Daniel M. Armstrong, III, telephonically advised me that he is scheduled to be interviewed at 10:00 a.m. on June 6, 1975, in Room 308 of the New Senate Office Building by Mark Gitenstein. He requested a Bureau representative to be available forc consultation during the interview. I told Mr. Armstrong that I would make appropriate arrangements and that the individual who would be available would contact him to make necessary arrangements prior to the interview.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an appropriate representative to contact Mr. Armstrong (telephone number 632-6990) and to accompany him to the above-described interview.

L. Frank Schwartz will handle. WOG

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1- Mr. Mintz

REC-100

62-116395-202

3 JUN 9 1975

JAM:mfd
(7)

79 JUN 10 1975

1 - M[illegible] J. J. McDermott
(A[illegible]: H. R. Hauer)
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. M. Mooney
(Attn: J. E. Reilly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

May 22, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. H. W. Dare, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(w153)

Reference is made to memorandum from Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum dated May 22, 1975, "RE: FILING SYSTEM," one copy of a document captioned "FBI Indexing Procedures" which concerns the FBI's filing system and one copy each of 13 Tables of Contents for FBI forms.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (30)

62-116395

HWD/SFP:cmc
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY [illegible]

delivered 5/28

delivered 5/29 to Committee by [illegible] WRW

3 - ENCLOSURE

62-116395-201

3 JUN 9 1975

ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM

PLM

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

79 JUN 10 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott
(Attn: H. R. Hauer)
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. M. Mooney
(Attn: J. E. Reilly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

May 22, 1975

1 - Mr. H. W. Dare, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: FILING SYSTEM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and the appendices thereto, which contained requests for documents and other information from the FBI.

In connection with Part four, concerning the FBI's filing system and printed forms utilized by this Bureau, enclosed are copies of the following:

1. Undated nine-page memorandum captioned "FBI Indexing Procedures."

2. One copy each of 13 Tables of Contents concerning forms utilized by this Bureau.

Concerning the FBI's filing system and the Committee's requests for a so-called "Clerk's Manual;" and for a list of FBI classifications used in its filing system, it will be noted that the nine-page memorandum contains the list of classifications. With respect to the so-called "Clerk's Manual," the Files and Communications Division of the FBI maintains detailed instructions which are followed by its employees in classifying mail for indexing. It is not known whether such instructions are what is referred to by the Committee as the "Clerk's Manual." These instructions consist of nine volumes of material. Because of their bulkiness and because it is not clear whether this material would serve the Committee's purpose, it is not being furnished at this time. However, it will be available for review at FBI Headquarters by the Committee Staff.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PLM

HWD/SFP:cmc
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-201

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

FILING SYSTEM

The following will explain the Tables of Contents concerning FBI forms which are being furnished in lieu of the actual forms at this time. This procedure is being followed because the forms number nearly 2,000 and many will probably be of no interest to the Committee. If the Committee will review these Tables of Contents and advise which forms it desires to see, appropriate steps will then be taken to make them available to the Committee Staff. The Tables of Contents headed "FBI Form Book" lists all FBI FD (Field Division) forms which are in use throughout the field. The remaining Tables of Contents list those forms applicable to the work of specific FBI Divisions at Headquarters. For example, forms with the prefix "1" are used in Division One (Identification); those with prefix "2" are used in Division Two (Training); etc. There are no forms peculiar to Divisions 11 (Legal Counsel) and 13 (Office of Planning and Evaluation). Those forms with prefix "0" (omnibus) are for use by two or more Divisions at Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Clearance for making these Tables of Contents available was obtained from the Training Division for the FD forms and from each Division for its applicable forms. The Files and Communications Division has cleared the paper "FBI Indexing Procedures."

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/22/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Filing System

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard [illegible] Date: 5/29/75 @ 2P

Received by: [illegible]

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/18/01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-201

ENCLOSURE

4-528

62-116395-200

CHANGED TO

62-116464-5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

JUN 12 1975

Hmk/cz

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 5/12/75

FROM : H.C. Flemister, Jr.

SUBJECT: CLEARANCE OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE (IIC) FOR RELEASE TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

The following is to record the clearance of certain documents prepared by the IIC and, in some instances, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) for release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC).

The SSC has been furnished a paper prepared by the Intelligence Division which was a position paper on the FBI's jurisdiction in internal security matters, intelligence and counterintelligence investigations. This paper was dated 2/13/75 and set forth information taken from certain documents or parts of documents by the IIC and, in some instances, the ICIS. All of these documents have been cleared for passage to the SSC by the following members of the IIC, as well as Mr. William Wark, Executive Secretary of the ICIS:

> Mr. Rowland Morrow, Director, Defense Investigative Programs Office; Mr. Merrill Kelly, Deputy Director of Operations, ACSI, U. S. Army; Colonel Leo Olsen, OSI, U. S. Air Force; Mr. Jack Donnelly, Naval Investigative Service.

Mr. Wark advised he did not feel it necessary to clear documents through the Attorney General since they pertain to IIC matters which were merely concurred in by ICIS.

Copies of the documents involved are attached and are as follows:

Enclosures

CONTINUED - OVER

JRW:tdp (7)
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Fulton (Lacey)
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Wagoner

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
191 JUN 4 1975

5 MAY 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

85 JUN 10 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: CLEARANCE OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE (IIC) FOR RELEASE TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

(1) Excerpt from report on the status of the Internal Security Program of the U. S. as of 6/30/58 dated 8/27/58, prepared by the IIC and the ICIS.

(2) Department of Justice memorandum dated 3/5/64 to Former Director Hoover setting forth new charter for the IIC under Attorney General supervision.

(3) Excerpt from report on the Internal Security Program dated 3/5/54, prepared by the IIC and the ICIS.

(4) Letter from Former Director Hoover, Chairman, IIC, to the Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, The White House, dated 7/25/61 and its enclosure of 7/25/61, prepared by the IIC.

(5) Memorandum from NSC Representative on Internal Security J. Patrick Coyne to Former Director Hoover dated 11/6/50 and letter to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC, dated 11/8/50 from Former Director Hoover, Chairman, IIC, and its enclosure.

ACTION:

None. For information.

WOC

JBA

1 - Mr. ~~J. B. Adams~~
1 - Mr. . A. Mintz (J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. [illegible] R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

TO SAC EL PASO (62-1957) JUNE 3, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (105-78256)

THOMAS RIHA; MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING.

REEPAIRTEL, MAY 8, 1970.

IMMEDIATELY CONTACT DR. JOSEPH SMILEY TO DETERMINE IF CONTENTS OF AIRTEL CAN BE FURNISHED CONFIDENTIALLY TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IF SMILEY HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT RELEASE OF INTERVIEW TO THIS COMMITTEE ASCERTAIN UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS, IF ANY, HE WOULD AGREE TO SUCH RELEASE. SUTEL ATTENTION W. O. CREGAR.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 3 1975
155pm

TELETYPE

RLM:jmn jmn
(7)

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 5 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-78256

43

NOTE:

The Senate Select Committee has expressed an urgent interest in the details of any FBI investigation concerning the disappearance of Thomas Riha, former Professor at University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, in March, 1969. The Bureau conducted no investigation regarding the disappearance. There was considerable publicity with reference to a statement made by Dr. Smiley, then President of the university, that he had been informed by a Government official that Riha "was alive and well" Smiley was interviewed by the El Paso Office. Smiley furnished information in the strictest of confidence, not to be disseminated to any outside agency, regarding his contacts with a CIA representative in Boulder after the Riha disappearance. It was the CIA official who told him that Riha was alive and well. Without the Smiley interview our response to the Senate Select Committee has an obvious gap. If the Committee calls any witnesses in the Riha matter Dr. Smiley would be one of the most logical persons to call. The passage of time and other factors may have brought about a change in the mind of Dr. Smiley regarding the necessity to keep the information furnished by him in a confidential relationship with the Bureau and it is believed he should be given the opportunity to either reinforce his request for confidentiality or release the Bureau from the restriction he imposed.

RLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

JUN 5 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

RECORDS
CC-62-116395
(SENSTUDY 75)

GPO 954-546

1 - [illegible]r. [illegible]. B. Adams
1 - [illegible] J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General May 22, 1975

Director, FBI

REC- 102

Encl.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning the interview by Senator Walter F. Mondale of the Senate Select Committee as well as members of its staff of retired FBI Special Agent John P. Devlin. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - 67-220521 (Personnel File for SA John P. Devlin)

WOC:cmc
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

NOTE:

The furnishing of the LHM to the Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to Wilderotter is the same procedure we have followed in the past regarding the interviews of former FBI employees by the SSC Staff.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ENCLOSURE

REC-102

62-116395-

JUN 6 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 6 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr J. B. Adams
1 - Mr J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395 May 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
BY SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE AND
STAFF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-2001 BY SP2ALM/RW

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by retired SA John P. Devlin following his voluntary appearance before Senator Mondale and Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on May 19, 1975. Devlin's appearance followed an interview of him by Senate Select Committee Staff Member Michael T. Epstein on April 25, 1975. A memorandum reporting the results of the April 25, 1975, interview was forwarded to the Attorney General as an enclosure to my letter to the Attorney General dated May 8, 1975, entitled "United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities."

On May 19, 1975, Devlin was interviewed by Senator Mondale; SSC Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.; Assistant Minority Counsel Charles Kirbow; and Epstein. The interview was conducted in a building across the street from the Dirksen Building in Washington, D. C., and lasted from approximately 2:00 p.m. to 3:20 p.m. Devlin was not subpoenaed to appear but appeared voluntarily. He was placed under oath by Senator Mondale.

At the outset of the interview Devlin was advised of his rights; that he could be represented by counsel and that if he had none, but desired counsel, the Committee Staff would attempt to provide one for him. At the conclusion of the interview he was thanked but given no indication as to whether he would be called to testify before the SSC.

1 - 67-220521 (Personnel File for SA John P. Devlin)

WOC:cmc cmc
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-199

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Re: Interview of Retired Special Agent (SA)
by Senator Walter F. Mondale and
Staff Members of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC)

Following being advised of his rights, Devlin was asked who sent him to Atlantic City and why he was sent. He advised he received his instructions from Special Agent in Charge Ralph Bachman through Devlin's supervisor, SA Vincent Murphy. It is to be noted here that upon being interviewed by Epstein on April 25, 1975, Devlin had indicated he had received his instructions through his supervisor, SA William Gagnon. Devlin corrected this mistake during the interview of May 19, 1975. As to why he was sent, Devlin advised that as a sound man of the Newark Office he was sent to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to install a technical surveillance on Martin Luther King, Jr., who occupied a room at the Claridge Hotel in that city. Devlin was asked whether the monitoring plant for the electronic surveillance was located in the same hotel. Upon being advised it was the interviewers' desire to know whether the location of the plant at the Claridge Hotel was also designed to serve as a physical lookout on King's room, Devlin advised he was not aware that the FBI employed a physical lookout on King's hotel room. Devlin was also asked whether he installed a microphone in the room of King. He advised that he had not because it was not technically feasible. Also of concern to those interviewing Devlin on May 19, was whether he had personal knowledge as to whether the Attorney General had approved the electronic surveillance on King's telephone. Devlin replied he had no personal knowledge but assumed such authority had been obtained by his supervisor. Devlin was also asked if he could recall any conversations over King's phone which were monitored. Devlin replied that the only recollection he had involved conversations between King and his wife wherein they discussed her plans to travel to Atlantic City. Additionally, he did recall conversations involving the noted entertainer, Mehalia Jackson, who was appearing at that time in Atlantic City. Devlin could not recall the substance of the conversation with Jackson. He was also asked whether he retained or possessed any

Re: Interview of Retired Special Agent (SA)
by Senator Walter F. Mondale and
Staff Members of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC)

notes regarding the activity that occurred in Atlantic City during the Democratic Party Nominating Convention during the summer of 1964. Devlin advised that he did not retain any notes but subsequent to the original contact of him by Epstein, Devlin called SA John Connelly of the FBI Office in Newark in an effort to review any available material that might refresh his recollection. Connelly advised Devlin that all materials and notes retained by the Newark Office were forwarded to FBI Headquarters. This information was conveyed to the interviewers on the occasion of the May 19, 1975, interview.

Devlin also was asked if he ever questioned the technical coverage of King inasmuch as it appeared to be for political rather than security reasons. Devlin replied that he had no reason to question the technical coverage of King. He also was asked if he personally met with Mr. Cartha DeLoach of the FBI while both were in Atlantic City. Devlin advised he could not recall whether he actually met DeLoach, pointing out that SA Billie D. Williams was assigned the liaison responsibility with DeLoach.

Devlin was asked whether he had contacted the FBI following his original interview by Epstein on April 25, 1975. Devlin advised he had reported the interview by Epstein to the FBI Office in Newark, New Jersey. He further advised that subsequent to this, he received a call from Newark Assistant Special Agent in Charge Herbert Clough who informed him that should he be contacted in the future, and should he feel he needed to consult with FBI officials, he could call the Legal Counsel Division, FBI Headquarters, in Washington, D. C., collect, for such consultation. Senator Mondale desired to know who Devlin saw upon his arrival in Washington, D. C., on the morning of May 19, 1975, and specifically what instructions he received from the FBI. Devlin advised Senator Mondale that

Re: Interview of Retired Special Agent (SA)
by Senator Walter F. Mondale and
Staff Members of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC)

upon arrival in Washington, D. C., he reported to Inspector John Hotis of the Legal Counsel Division and Paul V. Daly of the FBI at which time he was advised of what obligations he had to the Attorney General as a former employee of the FBI to protect information obtained by virtue of his former employment in the FBI. Subsequent to Devlin's meeting with Mr. Hotis and Mr. Daly, he spent the remainder of the morning with SA William O. Cregar. Mondale desired to know specifically what Devlin and Cregar discussed. Devlin advised that other than discussing mutual friendships in the FBI, Cregar advised of what Cregar's role would be in accompanying him to the interview and specifically that Devlin could feel free to ask for the opportunity to consult with Cregar during the interview if the line of inquiry could possibly reveal the identity of sources, sensitive methods or investigative techniques, information derived from third agencies, or information which could adversely affect sensitive ongoing investigations.

NOTE:

Original and one copy to the Attorney General (AG) for forwarding the copy of the memorandum to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. The information contained herein was orally furnished to SA W. O. Cregar by former SA Devlin following his interview of May 19, 1975.

~~1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall~~

June 4, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired Special Agent of FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: Bureau file 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/19/75

5. INTERVIEWERS: Senator Walter F. Mondale of the SSC; SSC Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.; SSC Assistant Minority Counsel Charles Kirbow; and SSC Staff Member Michael T. Epstein.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT: Witness was interviewed under oath, although he did not appear under subpoena, as a follow-up to an earlier interview of him by an SSC Staff Member. His testimony concerned his participation in the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395

SFP:ekw ERW
(6)

Delivered 6/5/75

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC- 102

62-116395-198

17 JUN 6 1975

84 JUN 6 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975

Intelligence Community Staff

Senstudy - '75

Mr. William O. Cregar
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4123
J. Edgar Hoover Building

Dear Bill:

Attached is a letter to the Chairman of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, signed by the DCI on 29 May 1975. It deals with the custody for and access to certain particularly sensitive material. This is an effective arrangement for the protection of special matters.

62-116395
5-HS

Sincerely,

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Enclosure:
As Stated

REC- 102

62-116395-197

17 JUN 6 1975

84 JUN 6 1975

Executive Registry
75-6430/1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OLC 75-1163

29 MAY 1975

Honorable John O. Pastore, Chairman
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my letter to you on 20 May 1975 I requested your assistance in making the Joint Committee's secure storage facilities available for the retention of certain sensitive material to which access is needed by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Those arrangements have been made with Mr. George Murphy and with the Select Committee. I want to thank you for making the facilities available and for permitting Mr. Murphy to be the custodian of the material.

A further need has now arisen for the same kind of arrangement for the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Again I would be very grateful to you and Mr. Murphy if a similar arrangement could be made for the members of the House Committee and members of the Committee staff designated for access to such material by mutual agreement of Chairman Nedzi and myself.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - ER
1 - Mr. Clarke
1 - Select Committee
1 - OLC Chrono
1 - JCAE File

62-116395-197
ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: May 23, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975

Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Intelligence Task Force Director of captioned Committee advised that they were in receipt of a letter from the U. S. Postal Service informing the Committee an inquiry concerning the identity of all mail covers placed by the FBI since 1960, should be directed to the FBI.

Elliff inquired as to whether a letter from the Committee concerning this particular request should be directed to the Bureau or Attorney General. He was instructed the request should be directed to the Attorney General. Elliff said that he would direct such a letter to the Attorney General making a request concerning mail covers in the near future.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Intelligence, Special Investigative and General Investigative Divisions should gather necessary material so that the appropriate response might be prepared.

PVD JBH/PVD

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Cleveland
1-Mr. Gebhardt
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly

PLM

REC-102

62-116395-196

PVD:lgp
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RU

17 JUN 6 1975

84 JUN 6 1975

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. J.C. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 21, 1975

1 - Mr. P. T. Blake

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Two of the documents requested were the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) dated June, 1970, and the original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. With respect to the original report on COINTELPRO activities, pursuant to the conversation between Mr. John C. Keeney, Department of Justice, and Special Agent James C. Farrington, FBI Headquarters, on March 27, 1975, it was agreed the Department would await receipt of the Bureau's opinion prior to formulating its response to Senator Church's request for the 39-page Petersen report on COINTELPRO.

The 39-page COINTELPRO report, as well as all but one of Exhibits A through P attached thereto, contains matters relating to the internal deliberations of Department and FBI representatives who constituted the study Committee headed by former Assistant Attorney General Petersen. It is, therefore, suggested that if it is decided the report should be made available to Senator Church, it be done with the provision it not be made public.

EX 104 REC-59 62-116395-195 MAY 1 1975

Concerning the exhibits referred to in the text of the report: Exhibits A through L are summaries and memoranda prepared by the FBI or by Department attorneys based on their review of FBI material, and some of these are classified "Secret"; Exhibits M and N are legal memoranda prepared by Department attorneys in connection with the study Committee inquiry; Exhibit P is a work paper prepared by the FBI setting

ENCLOSURE

EWL:glw/jvl
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

84 JUN 11 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Delivered to Jack Fuller, Atty Gen's Office, 5:30 pm 4/22/75 JBH

GPO 954-546

forth overall recommendations relating to counterintelligence activity. All of these exhibits are in the nature of deliberative, internal work papers wherein opinions were freely expressed because they were not prepared with the idea in mind of publication, and it would appear they would be exempt from disclosure even if the report itself is furnished to Senator Church.

It is, therefore, recommended that, due to the above considerations, those exhibits prepared by the FBI not be furnished to Senator Church if you do decide to give him the report. It is felt the Department should determine if those exhibits prepared solely by the Department, such as Exhibits M and N, should be furnished to the Senator, but it is our recommendation that they not be for the same reasons as stated above.

Exhibit O is a press release dated December 7, 1973, which, of course, is already public source in nature.

You will recall that then Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman, in testimony before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary as to why this 39-page report should not be furnished to that Committee stated, "...if we had thought it was appropriate to release the full discussion we would have done so at the time. There are a lot of internal working documents in the Justice Department which go to the making of a final report. This is the Attorney General's report."

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which sets forth the status of their request for the two documents. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures - 2

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. J.C. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. T. Blake

April 21, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

One of the requests, under V., A., was the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) dated June, 1970. This is the so-called "Huston Report" and was prepared for the White House. Under the circumstances, this request has been referred to the White House.

Under V., B., a request was made for the original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Since that report is the property of the Department of Justice, the request has been referred to that Department.

1 - The Attorney General

EWL:glw/jvl jvl
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/CW

WRW/TJL

JBA
TJM

6/3/75 P.V. Daly advised LHM not delivered to SSC, as Dept is preparing its own reply. SSC was orally advised of contents of LHM by Daly. TJM

[illegible] 6/11/75

Delivered to Jack Fuller, Atty Gen's off, 5:30 pm, 4/22/75 JBH

EWL

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-195

PERS. REC. UNIT

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General May 23, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P.V. Daly

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by Staff Members of captioned Committee of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director of the FBI. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/19/01 BY [illegible]

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

WOC:ekw ekw
(10)

REC-180 62-116395-194

17 JUN 5 1975

2 ENCLOSURES

[illegible] to Wilderotter
5/27/75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 5 1975

V. S. F. [illegible] - 4005 JEH (LOST)

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr.J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

62-116395

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. P. V. Daly
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE
DIRECTOR JOHN P. MOHR BY SSC STAFF
MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-81 BY SP2ALM/Pw

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Mohr following his interview by representatives of the Staff of the SSC in Washington, D. C., on May 9, 1975.

Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Lester B. Seidel, and Thomas Dawson from approximately 10:20 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. He was not placed under oath and he was not advised of his rights or that he could be represented by personal counsel.

At the outset of the interview, it was apparent that its purpose was to assist the SSC Staff Members in trying to understand how the flow of mail proceeded in the FBI under Mr. Hoover's directorship. For example, Mr. Mohr was shown FBI documents relating to the Socialist Workers Party as well as COINTELPRO documents which were obtained by Mr. Carl Stern under the Freedom of Information Act. No substantive questions were directed to Mr. Mohr regarding these documents but were shown to him in order that Mr. Mohr might identify who the final authority was in approving such documents.

In addition to the above, the Staff Members asked Mr. Mohr to explain the difference between an SAC Letter and a letter to all SACs. They also asked Mr. Mohr if the Bureau maintained a separate file on all SAC Letters.

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

WOC:ekw ekw
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

194

Mr. Mohr was also questioned about the procedures he followed in securing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's office after Mr. Hoover's death. Mr. Mohr told the Staff Members that the article which appeared in "The Washington Star" by columnist Jeremiah O'Leary was an accurate recording of what took place following Mr. Hoover's death. The Staff Members requested Mr. Mohr review in considerable detail exactly what he did to secure Mr. Hoover's office following his death.

The question of former Associate Director Clyde Tolson's will was also raised by Staff Members. Mr. Mohr advised the interviewers that Hillory Tolson, brother of Clyde Tolson, had not decided at that time whether he was going to contest the will.

Mr. Mohr was also asked about the whereabouts of Miss Helen Gandy, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Hoover. He advised that he did know her whereabouts and telephone number but promised he would not reveal them to anyone. Mr. Mohr was asked whether Miss Gandy would agree to being interviewed by Staff Members of the SSC. He advised that he would attempt to persuade Miss Gandy to agree to being interviewed on the condition he be allowed to be present during the entire interview. The Staff Members interposed no objection to that arrangement and Mr. Mohr indicated that he would advise Mr. Gitenstein of Miss Gandy's desires under the conditions stipulated above.

On May 12, 1975, Mr. Mohr telephonically advised that he recalled some additional topics covered during the interview of May 9, 1975, which he desired to furnish to the FBI. Specifically, Mr. Mohr recalled that he was asked if he knew who prepared the "surreptitious letters" the Bureau had mailed in the Socialist Workers Party case. Mr. Mohr advised the Staff Members that he did not know but presumed these letters were prepared in the Document Section of the FBI Laboratory.

Mr. Mohr also recalled that during his interview of May 9, 1975, he had advised Miss Gandy had turned over to Mr. Mark Felt of the FBI the official and confidential files of Mr. Hoover which amounted to one-half a file drawer. Subsequently, Mr. Mohr learned from Miss Gandy that the official and confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt amounted to one and one-half file drawers. This information was subsequently furnished to Mr. Gitenstein by Mr. Mohr. On that occasion, Mr. Gitenstein asked Mr. Mohr whether an itemized list of the official and confidential files was made and if so where the list was. Mohr told Gitenstein that he was sure a list was made and that in all probability the list accompanied the official and confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt by Miss Gandy.

In addition to the above, Mr. Mohr on May 12, 1975, recalled that Gitenstein asked about a requirement of all Bureau employees to turn over any confidential files in their possession ordered by Mr. Hoover following the revelation that former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had turned over certain confidential files to former Assistant Attorney General Mardian. Mr. Mohr advised Gitenstein that Mr. Hoover had in fact levied such a requirement on Bureau officials and that all confidential files were to be turned over to Mr. Felt along with a memorandum explaining the nature of these files. Gitenstein asked Mohr where these memoranda would be filed. Mohr responded by saying he presumed they were confidential memoranda and would have gone with the confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt by Bureau officials maintaining such files.

NOTE: The original and one copy of this LHM is being furnished to the Attorney General. The copy is to be forwarded by the Attorney General to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. The information herein was taken from two memoranda, Cregar to Wannall, dated 5/9 and 12/75 entitled "Senstudy 75."

~~1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
~~1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
June 2, 1975 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1. SUBJECT: FBI mail flow procedures and other miscellaneous matters.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Retired Special Agent, FBI

3. FILE REFERENCE NO.: 62-116395

4. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 5/9/75

5. INTERVIEWERS: SSC Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Lester B. Seidel, and Thomas Dawson.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

7. SUMMARY OF CONTENT: The witness was questioned and furnished information concerning procedures relating to the flow of mail at FBI Headquarters and other miscellaneous matters such as the difference between an SAC Letter and a letter to all SACs.

8. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395
SFP:ekw ekw
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN [illegible] DATE 1-19-01 SP2ALM/RW

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

REC-100

62-116395-193

JUN 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 971-546

84 JUN 5 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-29-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, K. William O'Connor requested on 5-28-75, that he be given the opportunity to review summaries of the five recently uncovered COINTELPRO programs. O'Connor stated that in view of captioned Committee's request concerning COINTELPRO and his position of being in charge of Bureau and Departmental responses to Committee requests, he felt that it would be advantageous for him to be generally aware of the contents of the five newly uncovered programs. Mr. O'Connor stated he had previously reviewed the other COINTELPRO programs. [while in Civil Rights Division]

RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. O'Connor be allowed to review the five recently uncovered COINTELPRO programs.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE [illegible] BY [illegible]

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Ryan
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

REC-100

62-116395-192

JUN 5 1975

FIVE

84 JUN 5 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/22/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Reference is made to my memorandum dated 5/19/75 advising of the receipt of a letter from the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to the Attorney General dated 5/14/75, appending requests for additional documents and other information.

Specific attention is invited to Appendix A, item number 5, which requests:

"All Memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use the following techniques to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities (see letter from the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General dated April 23, 1975):

a. All forms of electronic surveillance, including consensual electronic surveillance;

b. All forms of mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail;

c. Surreptitious entry;

d. All forms of physical surveillance, including agent infiltration, observation, photography, and remote viewing and sensing devices;

e. Informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems;

f. Obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information;

g. Incommunicado interrogation;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REC-100 62-116395-191

62-116395

17 JUN 5 1975

EWL:cmc
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 5 1975

h. Maintenance of files and records;

i. Dissemination of information from files and records;

j. So-called "COINTELPRO" techniques and methods, including all forms of organizational 'disruption.'"

Appendix B, item number 4, requests:

"For each of the techniques described in Item 5 of Appendix A above, all memoranda and other materials relating to:

a. The original decision to utilize the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

b. The policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities."

It would appear appropriate that response to Appendix A, item number 5, be prepared by the Legal Counsel Division. It is also apparent that response to Appendix B, item number 4, should be closely coordinated although responsibility for research in this area would appear to fall more logically within the Intelligence Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Legal Counsel Division assume responsibility for preparing response contained in Appendix A, Item number 5.

CONTINUED - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS - CONTINUED

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY - 75
62-116395

RECOMMENDATIONS - CONTINUED:

2. Intelligence Division will assume responsibility for preparing response to item number 4, Appendix B, with input from the Legal Counsel Division.

EWL

wrw

Jma

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 3, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) and its enclosures described below.

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Some of the enclosures to the LHM classified "Top Secret."

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: The LHM refers to a prior LHM furnished to the SSC enclosing a copy of "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75 and noted that certain exhibits were extracted prior to dissemination due to Third Agency Rule considerations. LHM advised that those considerations had been resolved and that the exhibits were being furnished with the LHM.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75. Response pertains to Part I of the SSC original letter of request dated 3/19/75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SRBALM/RW

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/20/75

REC-10 62-116395-190

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: Third Agency Rule clearances obtained.

17 JUN 5 1975

62-116395

SFP:ekw (4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
gal Coun. ____
lephone Rm. __
ector Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
(A[illegible]n: J. W. Hines)
2 - Le[illegible]al Counsel Division
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

The Attorney General

May 29, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE~~
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices A thru D requesting certain documents and other information.

Under item 26 of Appendix C, a request is made for "All reports prepared by the Office of Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice pursuant to the request in September 1974 of the Attorney General and/or Deputy Attorney General pertaining to the so-called 'Wounded Knee' case and any other so-called 'political trial' or other prosecutions brought by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division."

Under item 27 of Appendix C request is made of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for "All memoranda or other materials prepared by the FBI relating to the reports described in Item 26."

The Department is requested to advise this Bureau if reports which are requested in Appendix C under item 26 with respect to the "'Wounded Knee' case" were furnished to the FBI. If such reports were furnished please advise under what captions and dates these reports were submitted and identify by captions and dates all FBI communications on which your reports were based. If these reports were not furnished this Bureau please provide copies to us when you identify the FBI communications as requested herein.

REC-100 62-116395-188

You are also requested to provide to this Bureau copies of those reports, including sufficient information identifying FBI communications on which they were based, which will be furnished the Senate Select Committee per its request for "any other so-called 'political trial' or other prosecutions brought by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division."

62-116395

17 JUN 5 1975

KAM:cmc
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1975 JUN 5 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

KAM

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

Inasmuch as this Bureau's response to item 27 of Appendix C enclosed with referenced letter depends on your response to item 26, you are requested to furnish the desired information as soon as possible in order that we may comply with the Senate Select Committee request. Since all reports requested under item 26 were prepared by the Department this Bureau will take no action to provide copies of these reports to the Committee.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

Until such time as we determine what information will be furnished the Senate Select Committee by the Department under item 26 mentioned above we believe our response on item 27 to the Senate Select Committee should be delayed. This will enable us to provide material requested by the Senate Select Committee which will correspond to information being provided by the Department.

Trial material relating to Wounded-Knee case was handled by the General Investigative Division and this part of the request is being coordinated with SA J. C. Gordon who supervised the Wounded-Knee case. Upon receipt of requested information from the Department, General Investigative Division will be notified so an appropriate response may be compiled regarding Wounded-Knee matter. Intelligence Division will conduct necessary reviews for information pertaining to other prosecutions by "Special Litigation Section" of the Department.

DCI/IC 75-2008

29 MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Certification of Clearances for Classified Information and Compartmented Information of Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee

Senstudy '75

1. Arrangements have been made so that the Compartmented Information Branch (CIB) of CIA will maintain, as a matter of common concern, an up-to-date listing of all staff members of the Senate Select Committee who have been certified by the Committee for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET and also those who have been certified and briefed for compartmented information.

2. CIB will attempt to keep this listing in a current status and telephone inquiries can be made by calling 351-5507 (IDS 143-5507) during the hours 0800 to 1730 Monday through Friday. Periodically, a current listing of the individuals certified will be disseminated to members of the USIB Ad Hoc Group.

3. It is contemplated this same procedure will be followed for the House Select Committee when certification of clearances are received from this Committee and you will be advised when such procedure is instituted.

62-116395

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

NOT RECORDED
12 JUL 25 1975

Records Pls. file
62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. Adams

DATE: 5/21/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

At approximately 9:00 a.m. on May 21, 1975, retired Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella appeared in my office prior to his appointment to receive a subpoena and to testify at 9:30 a.m. on 5/21/75 at Washington, D.C., before the Senate Select Committee. I told Mr. Sentinella that it would not be possible for me to furnish him personal counsel prior to or during his testimony, however I felt it was appropriate for me to furnish him certain information. I told Mr. Sentinella that he was entitled to be represented by a personal counsel of his own choice at any time and that if he chose to secure the services of a private attorney he was at liberty to do so.

I also told Mr. Sentinella that under the rules of the Senate Select Committee (Rule 6.4), a witness may be accompanied by counsel during testimony and a witness who is unable to obtain counsel may inform the Committee of that fact and the Committee is obliged to endeavor to obtain voluntary counsel for the witness. I told him that the rules further provide that the failure to obtain counsel would not excuse him from appearing and testifying.

I asked Mr. Sentinella whether he had been given any advice by the Committee concerning his right to counsel and whether he had received a copy of the Committee's rules as required by regulations in the rules (Rule 6.1). Mr. Sentinella said that he had not been so advised and he had not been given a copy of the rules by any representative of the Committee.

I told Mr. Sentinella that as to matters other than the presence of personal counsel, no understanding had been reached with the Committee.

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

REC-102

62-116395-181

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

16 MAY 27 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 5 1975

I further explained to him that the Attorney General Order relating to responses to subpoenas would apply to him and that we had been advised that the Department had approved a waiver of the Attorney General Order limitation permitting his testimony, but only as to matters concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, including related matters. I told Mr. Sentinella that should the questioning involve other areas and he was in doubt as to his authorization to respond, he could request an opportunity to consult with the Department to secure approval for his testimony consistent with the terms of the Attorney General Order. I also reminded Mr. Sentinella that a representative of the FBI would be available during his testimony for such consultation as he felt might be necessary. I told him that SA Paul Daly would be available for that purpose.

I told Mr. Sentinella that our concern is not that matters of historical fact might be revealed, but that testimony which might be required of him could impair the Bureau's current efforts to discharge its responsibilities. I explained that in specific terms what this meant was that information that would identify sensitive sources, techniques or methods, or that would identify confidential informants, or would expose current investigative operations should be reserved for members of the Committee or perhaps the Chairman of the Committee depending upon the sensitivity of the particular information. I advised him that in the event such matters are involved in the questioning he could request consultation and that arrangements could be made for the answers to be supplied under appropriately limited conditions. I told Mr. Sentinella that as to other areas of possible testimony, the Bureau would impose no request that he decline to answer questions.

Mr. Sentinella advised me that he understood the matters I had explained to him and that he did not at this time feel the need of personal counsel because he said that he did not regard the appearance as one in the nature of a grand jury appearance. I told Mr. Sentinella that he should be aware that his testimony would be given under oath and in the event he made a statement that was self-incriminatory, it could be used against him. I reminded him I was not advising him in order to deter him from furnishing testimony, but only telling him of the protections he has under the

CONTINUED - OVER

Constitution against self-incrimination. He said he would keep that matter in mind.

Mr. Sentinella said that he would like to volunteer the results of his interview at the conclusion of the interview and he also would like to have an opportunity to review a transcript of the testimony for accuracy.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 16 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 019 SF PLAIN

7:09PM NITEL MAY 16, 1975 KEK

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395) (ATTN: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL)

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SENSTUDY, 1975

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL OFFICES MAY 2, 1975.

ON MAY 16, 1975, FORMER SAN FRANCISCO SUPERVISOR DAVID E. TODD CALLED AND ADVISED HE HAD RECEIVED CALL FROM LESTER SEIDEL, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, WANTING TO INTERVIEW TODD RE DOMESTIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, SPECIFICALLY, BLACK PANTHER PARTY. TODD SAID HE WANTED TO BE COOPERATIVE BUT WAS APPREHENSIVE REGARDING DIVULGING INFORMATION AS A RESULT OF HIS FBI EMPLOYMENT. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO IMMEDIATELY CALL COLLECT THE OFFICE OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL AT FBIHQ. HE SAID HE WOULD DO THIS.

TODD ALSO ADVISED THAT SEIDEL HAD TOLD HIM THE COMMITTEE ALSO WANTED TO INTERVIEW FORMER SAN FRANCISCO SUPERVISOR ALBERT P. CLARK.

END

EX 104

REC 67

62-116395-186

17 MAY 28 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/RW

CC

102

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 29 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 005 AX CODE

3:20 AM U R G E N T MAY 29, 1975 DKL

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-217) (RUC) 1 PAGE

SENSTUDY 75.

RECORDS UNIT

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA, MAY 28, 1975. Sw 178

ON MAY 29, 1975, FORMER EMPLOYEES COURTLAND J. JONES AND BERNARD A. WELLS WERE CONTACTED BY ASAC MICHAEL A. MORROW, IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, AND FURNISHED INFORMATION SET OUT IN REFERENCED TELETYPE.

END

HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/R

REC-100

62-116395-185

Records
cc 67-155313 (Jones)
67-436022 (Wells)

PERS. REC. UNIT

5-P

84 JUN 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 BA CODED

7:49 PM NITEL 5/30/75 JAN

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: BALTIMORE (66-3127)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL MAY 28, 1975. Ser 178

THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS WERE CONTACTED ON THE INDICATED DATES BY THE ASAC AND INSTRUCTIONS INRETEL FOLLOWED.

NONE OF THEM HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF TO DATE, AND EACH STATED THEY WOULD CONTACT THE FBI SHOULD THEY BE CONTACTED IN THE FUTURE.

MAY 29, 1975 - ROBERT H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND.

MAY 30, 1975 - ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDNOR ROAD, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND.

MAY 30, 1975 - STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAL LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND.

END

REC-100 62-116395-184

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/lcw

Records:
CC-67-140656 (Belter)
67-438869 (Haynes)
67-177725 (Donahoe)

5-(1).8

84 JUN 5 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 036 CG CODE

727PM NITEL 5/30/75 EMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM CHICAGO

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL MAY 28, 1975.

PURSUANT TO BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, MISS OLGA CIESA WAS CONTACTED BY SAC, CHICAGO, ON MAY 30, 1975 REGARDING CAPTIONED MATTER. SHE STATED SHE STILL RESIDES 10409 SOUTH INDIANA AVENUE, CHICAGO, AND IS STILL EMPLOYED AS AN EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AT THE FIRM OF ERNST AND ERNST, ATTORNEYS, IN CHICAGO.

MISS CIESA WAS ADVISED THAT THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAD MADE INQUIRY AS TO HER LAST KNOWN ADDRESS, INDICATING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MAY DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HER. SHE WAS FURTHER ADVISED THAT IN THE EVENT SHE IS INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME ANY QUESTIONS WERE ASKED RELATIVE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS; ETC., SHE COULD REQUEST THE ASSISTANCE OF AN AGENT TO BE PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW.

5-28

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

(019a Ciesa)

REC-100

62-116395-183

JUN 4 1975

cc 671

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 5 1975

PAGE TWO

SHE WAS FURTHER ADVISED THAT IF AFTER THE INTERVIEW THERE WERE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PRESENTED A QUESTION IN HER MIND SHE COULD CONTACT THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION IN WASHINGTON, D.C., COLLECT, FOR ANY ASSISTANCE THAT DIVISION COULD AFFORD HER.

MISS CIFSA WAS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WOULD DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HER AND ADVISED THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY SHE WOULD ASK FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF AN AGENT PRIOR TO ANSWERING ANY QUESTIONS THEY MAY PROPOSE TO HER. SHE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT SHE MIGHT INADVERTENTLY DISCLOSE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND AS A RESULT WOULD FEEL MUCH MORE SECURE WERE AN AGENT PRESENT TO ADVISE HER.

IN THE EVENT CONTACT IS MADE THE BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED.

END

HOLD

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

NR033 OM CODE

5:33PM NITEL 5/30/75 SKH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: OMAHA (62-3439) (P)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL, MAY 28, 1975.

SA ROBERT L. TAGG, WHO IS CURRENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY AND CURRENTLY ASSIGNED AS SENIOR RESIDENT AGENT, LINCOLN, NEBRASKA, RESIDENT AGENCY, ADVISED OF CONTENTS IN RE TELETYPE. SHOULD SA TAGG BE CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, THE BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED IEDIA.

END.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

REC-100

62-116395-182

17 JUN 4 1975

Records (Tagg)

cc 67-

PERS. REC. UNIT

5-

84 JUN 5 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 30 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Cregar

NR07 PX CODE

817PM MAY 30, 1975 URGENT WRC

TO: DIRECTOR

MINNEAPOLIS (PERSONAL ATTENTION)

FROM: PHOENIX (62-2033) 3P

SENSTUDY 75

Ser 178

REBUNITEL DATED MAY 28, 1975 AND PHOENIX TELCALL TO MINNEAPOLIS MAY 30, 1975.

FOR INFORMATION OF MINNEAPOLIS FOLLOWING IS BEING SET FORTH:

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

REC-100 62-116395-181

17 JUN 4 1975

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE

END PAGE ONE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY [illegible]

Records (Mildred) RISK

5-

cc 67-

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 5 1975

SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKNOWN. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

END PAGE TWO

PHOENIX: MILDRED E. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE,
YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA

INVESTIGATION AT YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA HAS DISCLOSED THAT MILDRED E. RISK IS NOW RESIDING WITH HER SISTER, MRS. W.A. HILLS, TEN MILE LAKE, HACKENSACK, MINNESOTA, RR 2, TELEPHONE NUMBER 218-547-3048, AND WILL BE THERE UNTIL FALL OF THIS YEAR WHEN SHE WILL RETURN TO ARIZONA.

MINNEAPOLIS HANDLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS.

END

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 29 1975
Dan
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 002 AT CODE

9:53 PM NITEL MAY 29,1975 WCG

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

Sew/178

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA AND OTHER OFFICES, MAY 28, 1975.

SA ALDEN F. MILLER, ATLANTA DIVISION, ALERTED TO POSSIBILITY OF CONTACT BY SSC. SA MILLER HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED TO DATE. IN THE EVENT CONTACT, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION WILL BE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THROUGH THE SAC.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Records
cc 67-415968 (Alden Miller)

REC-100

62-116395-180

PERS. REC. UNIT

17 JUN 4 1975

84 JUN 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1975

TELETYPE

REC-100

NR009 AT CODE

8:58 PM NITEL MAY 30,1975 WCG

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTENTION: INTD - W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

DURING A MEETING WITH REGINALD MURPHY, EDITOR, THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, MAY 29,1975, MURPHY IN GENERAL CONVERSATION ADVISED SAC, ATLANTA, THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, D. C., SEEKING AN INTERVIEW WITH HIM. MURPHY SAID HE HAD AGREED TO A MEETING WITH A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, NAME NOT STATED, AND DID SO SOMETIME APPARENTLY WITHIN THE LAST WEEK. MURPHY INDICATED THE INTERVIEW CONCERNED MARTIN LUTHER KING. MURPHY VOLUNTEERED HE WAS UNABLE TO ANSWER MANY OF THE QUESTIONS ASKED SINCE HE WAS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE EVENTS AND THAT SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS HE WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT ARE NOW DECEASED. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO FORMER EDITOR, RALPH MC GILL, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, NOW DECEASED, AND INDICATED THAT THE INQUIRY CONCERNED INFORMATION IT WAS FELT COULD BE PROVIDED BY MC GILL. MURPHY WAS NEVER SPECIFIC IN HIS CONVERSATION AND NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS

END PAGE ONE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-106670-

Records
cc 100-106670 (King)

REC-100

62-116395-179

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JOM/ML
6072

17 JUN 4 1975

84 JUN 4 1975

PAGE TWO (AT 62-2854)

SINCE IT WAS OBVIOUS HE DID NOT WISH TO EXPAND ON THE COMMENTS MADE BY HIM.

MURPHY INDICATED ALSO THAT THE PERSON OR PERSONS INTERVIEWING HIM FELT HE, MURPHY, SHOULD HAVE SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND HE IS NOT SURE HE WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THEM THAT HE DID NOT. FROM THE COMMENTS MADE BY MURPHY, IT WAS THE IMPRESSION OF THE SAC THAT MURPHY WAS PRESSED FOR DETAILS WHICH HE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE.

END

FBIHQ FLC CLR TKS

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

5/28/75

TO SACS ALEXANDRIA NEWARK
ATLANTA OMAHA
BALTIMORE PHILADELPHIA
CHARLOTTE PORTLAND
CHICAGO PHOENIX
KANSAS CITY TAMPA
LITTLE ROCK WFO

1 - Mr. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr.J.B.Hotis)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

REBuTEL MAY 2, 1975. See 93

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

REC-100

62-116395-178

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE

1 - ROME (BY MAIL)

17 JUN 4 1975

SFP:ekw EKW
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 29 1975
215 PM SLP
TELETYPE

84 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKNOWN. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALEXANDRIA: COURTLAND J. JONES, 6607 N. 29TH STREET, ARLINGTON, VA.; ROBERT G. KUNKEL, SAC; BERNARD A. WELLS, 5311 MONTGOMERY STREET, SPRINGFIELD, VA.

ATLANTA: ALDEN F. MILLER

BALTIMORE: ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDNOR ROAD, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND; STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAL LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND; ROBERT H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND

CHARLOTTE: JOSEPH A. SIZOO, 84A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PINES, NORTH CAROLINA

CHICAGO: OLGA CIESA, 10409 S. INDIANA AVENUE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

KANSAS CITY: BILL D. WILLIAMS, SAC

LITTLE ROCK: JOHN J. CREAMER, JR., ASAC

NEWARK: JOHN J. CONNOLLY; RITA AGNES AMBROSIO, 1604 JOHN STREET, FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY; RALPH W. BACHMAN, 610 NORWOOD DRIVE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY; KARL L. BROUSE,

5 BURRINGTON GORGE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY.

OMAHA: ROBERT L. TAGG

PHILADELPHIA: JOHN B. MEADE

PORTLAND: LEO B. APP, JR.; EDGAR O. INGALLS

PHOENIX: MILDRED E. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE, YOUNGTOWN, ARIZONA

TAMPA: MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6509 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BEACH, FLORIDA

WFO: JAMES J. GAFFNEY; ELMER L. TODD

ROME: THOMAS J. BIAMONTE; JOSEPH C. MICHELA; HELEN C. SPEAR
COPY TO ROME, WITH ITS EMPLOYEES NAMED, BY MAIL.

NOTE: May 14, 1975, SSC letter and appendices requested current whereabouts individuals named herein. Also included herein names of Bachman and Brouse who were SAC and ASAC respectively in Newark Office pertinent period inasmuch as one request from SSC was for memoranda from former SA Leo T. Clark to Newark SAC and ASAC. SSC request named several additional former employees who were previously alerted by tel to selected officers 5/2/75. Another 5/2/75 tel, to all offices, referenced herein, gave field general background re Senstudy 75. By separate airtel to Rome we are forwarding copy of instant tel as well as copies of prior pertinent tels. The caution taken herein in alerting former employees as well as incumbents is same we took previously by 5/2/75 tel to selected SACs. After dispatch instant tel, copies will be filed in personnel files of all named herein. One of the 1964 Rome employees was Theodore A. Korontjis, currently assigned INTD, who will be appropriately informed orally concerning this matter.

Korontjis informed
5/29/75 B

2 - [illegible] J. A. Mintz
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General May 20, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/rc

Reference is made to memorandum and appendices thereto, from the Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, requesting documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number three of referenced communication requests that a Senate Select Committee Staff Representative be authorized to examine certain portions of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, (MRR), at the FBI Offices. The material requested, MRR Part I, Section nine; Part II, Sections one thru nine, has been segregated and is available for examination at FBI Headquarters.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum advising the Senate Select Committee that the above requested material is presently available for examination at FBI Headquarters.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your record.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

TEB:cmc
(8)

Delivered to O'Connor Dep't 5/20 ... 5/21 ...
Delivered to C Berg of Committee By RTT 5/22/75

REC-10

62-116395-177

17 JUN 4 1975

2 ENCLOSURES

oc. Dir. ___
. AD Adm. ___
AD Inv. ___
Dir.:
n. ___
p. Syst. ___
; Affairs ___
es & Com. ___
Inv. ___
tion ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

[redacted]

2 - [redacted]. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

62-116395 May 20, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Reference is made to memorandum, with attached appendices, dated April 30, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Pursuant to your request to review the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations Part I, Section nine; and Part II, Sections one thru nine, we currently have such material available for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:cmc
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RC

NOTE:

The MRR sections described above have been reviewed by the appropriate FBIHQ Divisions and approved for examination in their entirety by Committee Staff Members with the following exceptions: MRR, Section 3, page 15 (j).(1) The phrase "Baltimore Source 4" has been deleted; Section 4, page 6, 20. The phrase "i.e., selective service records in other than selective service cases, Baltimore Confidential Source 4 information, etc." has been deleted. Excisions will be explained to Committee reviewers at the time of review by indicating the excisions related to sensitive confidential sources and have been made in order to protect sources' identity. These sources will not be further identified to Committee members nor will the term "Baltimore Source 4" be utilized.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NOTE CONTINUED:

The MRR sections to be made available are described by number and heading as follows:

Part I

Section 9 - Disciplinary Matters

Part II

Section 1 - Authority--Training--Submission of Information

Section 2 - Supervision--Availability-Resident Agencies

Section 3 - Administration of Offices

Section 4 - Communications

Section 5 - Dissemination of Information

Section 6 - Publications, Press, and Public Contacts

Section 7 - Payments--Property

Section 8 - Miscellaneous Regulations

Section 9 - Classification--Character--Copies--Abbreviations.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/20/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Manual of Rules and Regulations

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor, Jr. Date: 5/22/75 @ 1:20 PM

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-177

ENCLOSURE

May 30, 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions Not Previously Furnished.

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: LHM refers to a request of the SSC for review privileges of certain designated Sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions. The LHM advises that all but one of the requested Sections is being made available for review at FBI Headquarters and that the excluded Section will be made available for review after clearance by other interested agencies as it involves third agency considerations.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. Reply refers to Part 2 of the request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/19/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

Third agency considerations involved in one of the Manual Sections requested by the SSC.

SFP:ekw EKW
(4)
62-116395

REC-100

62-116395 176

Delivered 6/17/75

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/lew

17 JUN 4 1975

WB

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

May 30, 1975 2-Mr.S.F.Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: LHM refers to a request of the SSC for review privileges of certain designated Sections of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations. The LHM advises that the desired Sections are being made available for review at FBI Headquarters.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. Reply pertains to Part 3 of the SSC request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/20/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395.

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)

Delivered 6-5-75 HFS

Assoc. Dir. 62-116395
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. **NOTE:** Original via liaison to Central Community Index in
Asst. Dir.: connection with Senstudy 75.
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

62-116395-175

REC-100

17 JUN 4 1975

1103 8

84 JUN 4 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

The Attorney General

May 19, 1975

1 - Mr. D. R. Dickson

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from the Senate Select Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a partial response to the request set forth in referenced memorandum. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

A copy of the memorandum for the Committee is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

DRD:lfj
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

5/21 [illegible] 5/21 [illegible] 5/22

REC-100

62-116395-174

ENCL BEHIND FILE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - [illegible]egal Counsel Division
[illegible] - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - [illegible]r. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. D. R. Dickson

62-116395

May 19, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Part 2 of the request concerned Sections of the Manual of Instructions Not Previously Produced. Pursuant to your request, Sections 4, 8R, 19, 23, 27, 28, 29, 75, 78, 90, 103, 134, 136, 144, and 146 are now available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstion, or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

Section 102, which you requested, is not available for review at this time because this Section involves third agency considerations. When this Section has been cleared by the other interested agencies for review, you will be immediately advised.

1 - The Attorney General

HEREIN
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/jw

DRD:cmc
(9)

NOTE:

Section 4 coordinated with SA James E. Reilly, Division 2; Section 8R, with SA Charles D. Neudorfer, Division 12; Sections 19 and 90 with SA J. D. Domzalski, Division 9; Sections 27, 28, 29, 78, 134, and 144 with SA J. William Hines, Division 6; Sections 23, 75, 136, and 146 with SA D. R. Dickson, Division 5; Sections 102 and 103 with SA. R. L. Moore, Division 5. Section 102 being coordinated by SA L. F. Schwartz with other interested Government agencies.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-794

DRD

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Sections of the Manual of
Instructions Not Previously Furnished

NOTE CONTINUED:

Listed below are the above-mentioned Sections and their subjects.

Section	Subject
4	Surveillances and Raids
8R	Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division
19	Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Agencies
23	Bomb Threats Explosives and Incendiary Devices
27	Civil Rights
28	Civil Rights Act of 1964
29	Conspiracy
75	Neutrality Matters
78	Passports and Visas
90	Selective Service Act
102	Coordination with Other Government Agencies
103	Foreign Police Cooperation
134	Assaulting the President of the United States and Threats to the President of the United States
136	Antiriot Laws
144	Police Killings
146	Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/Rr

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/19/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committe to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Re: Sections of the MOI not previously Furnished

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 5/22/75 @ 1:20 PM

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-174

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins - Enc
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams - Enc
1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott - Enc
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore - Enc
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

May 13, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis - Enc
1 - Mr. P. V. Daly - Enc
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall - Enc
(Attn: W. O. Cregar)

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

163

Reference is made to the letter from the captioned Committee dated April 28, 1975, addressed to the Honorable Edward H. Levi, Attorney General, requesting information concerning the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum in response to the aforementioned request. A copy is enclosed for your records.

For your information, we did furnish empty boxes for the use of former Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, John P. Mohr, at the residence of the late Director, J. Edgar Hoover, subsequent to the death of Mr. Tolson. This material was brought to the residence by a clerical employee who merely deposited the material and left the residence. While we have no direct knowledge as to what material was removed from the residence, Mr. Mohr was contacted to determine the source and accuracy of the story contained in "Periscope" section of the April 28, 1975, issue of Newsweek, at which time he advised us that "furnishings" at the home had been removed by members of the family and the housekeeper. We have not contacted former employees concerning this request. Our contact with Mr. Mohr was prior to the date of this request.

Enclosures (2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

PVD:eek
(11)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

62-116395-173

REC-100

17 JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Letter from Director, FBI to Attorney General
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES

NOTE: By memorandum dated May 2, 1975, from Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams, each Assistant Director was requested to advise whether they or personnel in their divisions had any knowledge relating to the allegation that the FBI directed or participated in the removal of documents from the late Director's residence. The Alexandria and Washington field offices were separately requested to respond to this allegation. The responses were negative. External Affairs, by memo from D. W. Moore to Mr. Jenkins dated May 5, 1975, captioned Clyde A. Tolson, former Associate Director; advised that a clerk brought packaging material to the residence at the request of former Assistant to the Director, John P..Mohr. This memo indicated that the clerk deposited the material and left. He did not participate in the packing, etc., of documents.

May 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REQUEST PERTAINING TO DOCUMENTS REMOVED FROM RESIDENCE OF FORMER DIRECTOR J. EDGAR HOOVER

Reference is made to letter dated April 28, 1975, to the Attorney General from Chairman of captioned Committee which contained a request for certain information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has not removed, nor caused to be removed, documents from the residence of former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover, subsequent to the death of Mr. Clyde A. Tolson, former Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It is our understanding, however, that former Assistant to the Director, John P. Mohr, may have some knowledge as to what material may have been removed from the residence after Mr. Tolson's death.

1-Mr. T. J. Jenkins (Detached)
1-Mr. J. B. Adams (Detached)
1-Mr. J. J. McDermott (Detached)
1-Mr. D. W. Moore (Detached)
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall (Detached)
(W. O. Cregar)
1- Mr. J. A. Mintz (Detached)
1-Mr. J. B. Hotis (Detached)
1-Mr. P. V. Daly (Detached)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM

PVD:lgp
(11)

62-116395-173

ENCLOSURE

3-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☐ LHM ☒ Memo ☐ Report dated 5-9-75

Caption of Document: Request Pertaining to Documents Removed from Residence of Former Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 5/21/75 @ 3:10 P

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-173

ENCLOSURE

June 3, 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) enclosing a copy of a memorandum dated November 1, 1974, from the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, Glen E. Pommerening to the Director of the FBI, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program, Executive Order 10450."

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

The LHM refers to a request of the SSC for certain documents. The LHM serves as a cover communication for the aforementioned 11/1/74 memorandum which contains certain supplemental instructions the Department of Justice furnished the FBI with regard to Executive Order 11785 amending Executive Order 10450. The instructions concerned the FBI's conduct of intelligence-type investigations.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75 The response pertains to Part I of the SSC letter of request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/16/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

62-116395
SFP:ekw (4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

REC-100

62-116395-172

17 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 2, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

In response to a request from the SSC for certain documents and other information from the FBI concerning its policies and procedures, the LHM advised that the FBI was deferring action on one document to the U. S. Department of Justice inasmuch as that document originated with that Department. The document involved was a memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated 5/20/54.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75. Pertains to Part IV of request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

REC-100 62-116395-571

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/18/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

12 JUN 4 1975

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

Delivered 6/4/75

62-116395
SFP:ekw (4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
rector Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RL

84 JUN 4 1975

GPO 954-546

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. J. C. Farrington

The Attorney General

May 6, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which responds to a specific request by the Committee for a position paper dated July 31, 1972, concerning the "Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

You will note that the position taken by the FBI is that the requested position paper of July 31, 1972, is an internal deliberative document which is the direct basis for a formal statement on FBI authority to conduct internal security investigations embodied in a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973. On this basis we are stating in our response to the Committee that we feel it inappropriate that the July 31, 1972, paper be made available. We believe that this position is completely sound and a proper precedent to set with respect to the ambit of the Committee's mandate. We also feel that it is consistent with the position which has been expressed by you.

Note this memo appr. for del. to SSC - has been superceded by another memo to SSC.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

EWL:jvl
(7) jvl

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12501 BY

Delivered to Dept 5/8/75

Not delivered [illegible] 5/[illegible]/75

PLM

EWL

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-170

JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. J. C. Farrington
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

May 6, 1975

62-116395

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

ALL INF[illegible] CONTAINED
HEREIN [illegible]FIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/ICW

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Under I., Legal Authorities, a general request was made for memoranda discussing the legal authority of the FBI to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence activities. Material responsive to this request was delivered to the Committee during April, 1975. Included in this material was a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973, captioned "Scope of FBI Jurisdiction and Authority in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." This memorandum contained a lengthy and comprehensive discussion concerning the authority of the FBI to conduct investigations in the general internal security area.

Not deliv. to SSC

Since the receipt of the above-mentioned material the Committee has indicated a specific interest in a position paper dated July 31, 1972, discussing the "Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." This paper has been located and subjected to intensive review. It has been found that the July 31, 1972, position paper contains the internal deliberations which form the direct basis for the memorandum to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973. In view of these circumstances and particularly because the July 31, 1972, paper is considered to be an internal deliberative document, it is not considered appropriate that it should be made available to the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

PLM WRW EWL WOC

EWL:jvl
(7)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-170

GPO 954-546

June 2, 1975

2 - Mr.S.F.Phillips

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Filing System

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) with enclosures described below

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: SSC requested information concerning the FBI's filing system and copies of printed forms used by the FBI. The LHM served as a cover communication to furnish to the SSC an undated nine-page memorandum entitled "FBI Indexing Procedures." The SSC was also advised that there was available nine volumes of material containing detailed instructions followed by FBI employees in classifying mail for indexing; and that the nine volumes would be available for review at FBI Headquarters by the SSC Staff. Also furnished the SSC was one copy each of 13 Tables of Contents concerning forms used by the FBI. The various types of forms in use were explained in the LHM and the SSC was invited to choose those forms it desired to see, after which steps would be taken to make them available to the SSC Staff.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 4/30/75. The response is to Part IV of the SSC request.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 5/22/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. __
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

SFP:ekw (4)

62-116395

REC-100

62-116395-169

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

17 JUN 4 1975

84 JUN 4 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz
(1 [illegible]r. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

May 16, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITY

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of the captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration to Clarence M. Kelley, Director FBI, dated November 1, 1974, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program Executive Order 10450."

The instructions contained in the enclosure were the subject of conversation between W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director, and Mr. John Elliff of the Committee, May 5, 1975, at Quantico, Virginia, and are being furnished to the Committee in order to provide further information with respect to your March 19, 1975, request.

62-116395

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

TEB:cmc
(8)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

62-116395-168

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General May 16, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated March 19, 1975, the Senate Select Committee requested certain information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Part I of the Committee's letter pertained to legal authority for investigations.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and a copy of a letter from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration to the Director November 1, 1974, captioned "Federal Employee Security Program Executive Order 10450."

The instructions contained in the enclosed November 1, 1974, communication concern legal authority for investigations and were the subject of discussion between Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall and John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee during a conference at Quantico, Virginia, May 5, 1975. The instructions are being furnished to the Committee in an effort to provide more information with respect to the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, referred to above.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosure is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

3 - ENCL.

TEB:cmc
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

O'Connor
Approved 5/20
Returned

NOTE:

REC-104

PLM
62-116395-168

The enclosed Departmental letter contains certain supplemental instructions furnished FBIHQ with regard to Executive Order 11785 amending Executive Order 10450. We

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

17 JUN 4 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 4 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

are proposing the document be furnished to the Committee as a supplement to material previously furnished the Committee in line with their 3/19/75 request. John Elliff of the Committee evidenced interest in receiving such instructions during a recent conversation with Assistant Director Wannall. We are providing the instructions as a further delineation of our authority in this area.

AL FORM NO. 10
1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: NOV 1[illegible] 1974

FROM: Glen E. Pommerening
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

SUBJECT: Federal Employee Security Program
Executive Order 10450

XIII

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SPOALM/RW

This is in response to your memoranda, entitled as above, dated May 8, 1974 and August 19, 1974, directed to the Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division, and referring to problems which have arisen as a result of the promulgation of Executive Order 11785 which amends Executive Order 10450. In view of the involvement of my staff in these matters, I will undertake to answer your questions with the concurrence of the Criminal Division.

As you know this matter has been under continuing review both in the Task Force, chaired by a representative of this office, of working level representatives of various agencies in the security field and is now under study to a lesser degree in Project #10 of the "Domestic Council on Privacy".

You ask that the Department; (a) provide specific instructions to the Bureau to conduct intelligence-type investigations to identify and determine the activities of organizations now described in the amended Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450; (b) furnish guidelines to be used by the Bureau in initiating investigations of individuals under the captioned matter pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and specifically, criteria to be utilized in determining whether available information is a sufficient basis for investigation.

Under the amendment to Section 8(a)(5) of Executive Order 10450, we now have only two types of organizations; (1) those which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the constitution or laws of the United States or

any State, (2) or which seek to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof, by unlawful means: (Emphasis added).

Of course, the key words which are underlined indicate that the investigation should be initially based on a possible violation of a federal (such as the Smith Act) or state statute prohibiting unlawful advocacy or the commission of any unlawful act of force or violence. However, in order for the Bureau to detect organizations with a potential of the above nature, it is important that the investigation proceed on the basis of information indicating that the organization may be of the nature mentioned. It is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated, but only that a reasonable evaluation of the available information suggests that the activities of the organization may fall within the proscription of the Order. The most recent example of the type of organization, that you have advised is becoming more prevalent, is the small but dedicated to violence, Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). Organizations of this nature would clearly fall within the Order and should be investigated as soon as information is available indicating their potentiality for violence and of course, if possible, prior to the fulfillment of their purposes.

It is true that Executive Order 11785 eliminated the prior communist, totalitarian, fascist, and subversive characterizations and definitions, but there was no intention of restricting the investigations of such organizations if their programs call for acts of force or violence or the unlawful advocacy of the commission of acts of force or violence in furtherance of these programs.

It is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order but once the investigation reaches a stage that offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the investigation suggests a determination that the organization is engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it should continue.

It follows in answer to your second question that individuals who are active either as members of or as affiliates of

zations described above should be investigated when
mation is received indicating their involvement. The
yardstick indicated above for organizations in deter-
ing whether the investigation should continue, should apply
ncerning individuals and when a determination can reasonably
e made that the individuals activities, either within the
organization or as an individual, do not appear to be in violation of any law, then the investigation should cease.

otherwise ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

8911-8

62-116395-168

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 5/16/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Re: Legal Authority-Federal Employee Security Program, Executive Order 10450

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor, Jr. Date: 5/21/75 @ 3 1/2

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-168
ENCLOSURE

4-528

62-116395-167

CHANGED TO

62-116464-6X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

NOV 17 1976

Cons./MMD.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-23-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
DALLAS, TEXAS
11-22-63

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 5-22-75 CIA requested from the FBI copies of photographs of three "bums" who were taken into custody by Dallas authorities on 11-22-63 in the vicinity of the Texas School Book Depository. It has been alleged that the three persons shown in the photographs were E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis, individuals involved in the Watergate incident, and Thomas Arthur Vallee, who was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, several days before the Kennedy assassination based on a threat against the President. Don Donahue, Special Assistant to Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), made available on 9-12-74 to Inspector Bowers a set of the photographs depicting these "bums" which had been furnished to Donahue by one Michael Canfield, and the FBI Laboratory made copies from these prints, the original being returned to Donahue. Donahue requested that his identity be concealed as the source of these photographs. Canfield was supposed to furnish a set of these photographs to Washington Field Office but it has been determined he never did so.

At Mr. Adams' instructions, Bowers contacted Donahue on 5-22-75 and advised him of the CIA request for a set of these photographs. Donahue was told that if he has no objections we intend to furnish CIA a set of the pictures with the statement that the originals were obtained from an individual who requested his identity be concealed. Donahue stated that was quite satisfactory to him, adding that if it becomes necessary he would agree to his identity being disclosed as the source of these pictures.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-109060-7193

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 2 1975

80 MAY 30 1975

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Bowers

DWB:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)
DATE 8/5/94

LEGAL COUNSEL

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: ASSASSINATION OF JOHN FITZGERALD
KENNEDY
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Appropriate personnel of the General Investigative, Intelligence, and Laboratory Divisions were telephonically advised of the contact with Donahue late on 5-22-75 and the Intelligence Division arranged that date to provide a set of the photographs to CIA.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Given to F. Jansely to hand carry to CIA 5/22/75

Hoc Staff
75-817

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

21 May 1975

Senat. Cy. '75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : IC Staff Verification of Clearances

Attached is an updated list of the security clearances provided to the Senate Select Committee Staff members. You will note there has been a significant increase since our last listing.

Updated information will be provided to you as this information changes.

Harriett Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: a/s

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-05-01 BY SP2ALM/lcc

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
3 JUL 24 1975

ENCLOSURE

Records - please
file 62-116395

5-8

84 JUL 29 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

21 MAY 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE DESIGNATED	BRIEFED	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	IL	550-44-7971	
Bader, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF-Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara			12-20-45	CAL	561-68-9123	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	CONN	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I	*		7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Brissett, Belva			6-23-41	OK	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*		2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	CAL	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	CAL	567-56-8854	
Chesnik, Barbara			4/18/46	WI	390-46-2235	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17	9-6-43	FL	042-36-9155	TF-Badge
Dawson, Thomas			9-9-52	MINN	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	ILL	351-34-4329	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/30/01 BY

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

21 MAY 1975

	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL	
NAME	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED			SECURITY NO	
DeOreo, Mary			6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258	
Dillon, Molly			4-16-51	VA	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel			8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*		6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor			3-10-37	MASS	026-28-6318	
Erno, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*		3-7-46	ALA	420-60-8767	
Greissing, Edward			11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	MD	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF-Badge
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478	
Karalekas, Anne			11-6-46	MA	023-36-4329	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	IND	559-54-1348	

21 MAY 1975

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED				
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	GA	252-12-5112	TF - Badge
LaVoy, Diane			11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. VA.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF - Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF - Badge
Mecham, Martha Evans	*		2-11-40	CAL	528-48-6848	
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*		10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	
Moore, Janet	*		4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	ILL	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan			11-14-47	CAL	558-74-8394	

21 MAY 1975

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
	DESIGNATED	BRIEFED				
Peterson, John F.			6-15-41	CAL	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan			10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Pyle, Christopher			11-24-39	Mass	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N.DAK	501-14-4534	
Ricks, Walter			12-27-46	GA	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth [1]	*		10-31-44	CONN	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A.O., III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester			7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	VA	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.			3-3-39	KY	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	MD	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha			9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	IND	313-12-1857	

21 MAY 1975

NAME	COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCE DESIGNATED	BRIEFED	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	MD	219-14-5186	
Towell, Mary			4-25-44	TENN	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory			1-21-47	COLO.	524-62-2459	
Truehart, William			12-18-18	VA	225-20-6411	
Wallach, Paul			5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF - Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann[1]	*		4-21-51	MASS	017-40-7170	
Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

---

[1] documentation is being forwarded

Calendar No. 174

94th CONGRESS
1st Session

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

10.

MAY 21, 1975

Mr. CHURCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. CANNON, without amendment

(Sen study - 75)

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

V

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
6 JUL 28 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Pls file 5-8
62-116395

8 4 JUL 30 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

35

USIB-D-27.10/2
17 May 1975

Senstudy 75

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT : Reporting of Interviews with ~~Congressional~~ Investigating Committees or their Staffs

REFERENCE : My Memorandum to Addressees, 10 April 1975, Subject: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence (USIB-D-27.10/1)

Original Filed In 62-80750-5071

1. Reference memorandum reported establishment by the Intelligence Community Staff of a registry for documentation relating to the Congressional investigations, and furnished you with a format for abstracts to be provided to the registry on each formal input to a Select Committee. In addition to having in the registry the abstracts or, as appropriate, the actual papers submitted as documentation to a Select Committee, it is important that we establish a method for reporting on interviews. Accordingly, I am enclosing a proposed format for abstracts to be used for reporting on interviews by Congressional Committee members or staff with your personnel which involve information on Community activities or which, in your judgment, raise the possibility of follow-on queries elsewhere concerning the functioning or activities of the Community.

2. There is no intent to intrude upon matters which are properly each agency's organizational responsibility nor to infringe upon employees' individual rights or security. The interview abstract format does not provide for identification of the person being interviewed. The "File Reference No." entry is for your convenience to indicate where any supporting documentation is located within your own filing system.

~~REC-5~~

1 ENCLOSURE

~~JUN 3 1975~~

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED

AUG 19 1975

AUG 19 1975

3. It is essential that the Intelligence Community be aware of all aspects of the Congressional investigations which involve Community matters, or which may relate to Select Congressional Committee activities being conducted elsewhere in the Community. The availability in the registry of document and interview abstracts should help provide this internal visibility.

W. E. Colby
Chairman

Attachment: as stated

Attachment
USIB-D-27.10/2
17 May 1975

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO DCI/IC SELECT COMMITTEES COÖRDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE
(HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Subject:
2. Witness' Organization:
3. File Reference No.:
4. Date of Interview:
5. Interviewer(s):
6. Classification of Information:
7. Summary of Content: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed, and any conclusions or recommendation)
8. Relation to Intelligence Community Problems: (Identify)

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall
DATE: 5/7/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Schwartz

FROM : H.C. Flemister, Jr.

Sinstudy-75

SUBJECT: MORTON HALPERIN
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ✓
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum sets forth results of Liaison contact with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning Halperin's request to be provided with a copy of a 1948 memorandum of understanding between the FBI and the CIA. Halperin has made this request of both CIA and the Bureau.

On 4/30/75 Mr. James Garrison, CIA, advised that after considerable research in CIA files, the following documents (copies attached) were located which pertain to Halperin's request. Copies have also been located in Bufiles:

(1) Memorandum for the Record dated 9/22/48 entitled "Cooperation and Liaison Between Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Policy Coordination, CIA," which was prepared by CIA and originally classified Top Secret. This document has recently been downgraded by CIA to a classification of Secret.

(2) Letter dated 9/22/48 from Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, to Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant to the Director, FBI, which forwarded as an enclosure the 9/22/48 memorandum described above. This item was also originally classified Top Secret but has been downgraded by CIA to Secret.

(3) Letter dated 10/2/48 from J. Edgar Hoover to Wisner which acknowledges that the arrangement set forth in the memorandum of 9/22/48 is satisfactory to the Bureau. This item was not classified in accordance with current classification standards but bears the marking "Personal and Confidential."

63-16062-45

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395 - JUN 25 1975

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures - 3
LFS:tdp (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

Records
cc in 62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/lew

84 JUL 1 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: MORTON HALPERIN
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST

Mr. Garrison advised that CIA considers items 1 and 2 to be CIA documents and item 3 to be an FBI document containing CIA information. CIA proposes to furnish Halperin declassified copies of items 1 and 2 which have been sanitized in accordance with the brackets on the attached copies. CIA has no objection to the Bureau's furnishing Halperin a copy of item 3 if it is declassified and the CIA information indicated by brackets in the attached copy is excised. Mr. Garrison noted that CIA no longer considers the 9/22/48 memorandum to be operative since CIA's Office of Policy Coordination no longer exists.

Mr. Garrison advised further that with regard to a Senate Select Committee (SSC) request forcopies of all agreements between the FBI and the CIA, CIA does not plan to provide the SSC with copies of items 1 and 2 but plans to allow appropriately cleared SSC staff representatives to examine the unsanitized Secret versions of items 1 and 2 at CIA Headquarters. He further advised that CIA would have no objection if the Bureau allows SSC staff representatives to examine item 3 in Bureau space provided it is classified Secret in accordance with CIA's classification of its information. Mr. Garrison requested that if the Bureau decides to provide the SSC with a copy of item 3 for its retention, the document be declassified and sanitized in accordance with the attached copy.

The Intelligence Division has no objection to the FOIA request of Halperin being handled in accordance with the above. Recommendation for handling of the SSC request will be made by separate memorandum.

ACTION:

This memorandum and its attachments should be forwarded to the FOIA Unit of the Files and Communications Division for appropriate handling.

WOC WRW

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

D R A F T

22 September 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Cooperation and Liaison Between Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Policy Coordination, CIA

1. This memorandum records an understanding which has been arrived at in conversations between Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Mr. Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director, and Chief of the Office of Policy Coordination, of CIA. The conversations in question were duly authorized by the Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and by the Director and Deputy Director of CIA and were arranged by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on behalf of the White House. The purpose of the understanding is to provide a basis for cooperation and liaison between the FBI and the Office of Policy Coordination, CIA, and the following points summarize the essential elements of the understanding:

a. In view of the distinctive character of the activities of the Office of Policy Coordination, it is considered advisable that separate and direct liaison be established between that office and the FBI. For this purpose the FBI will provide a special liaison officer who will be nominated by the FBI within the near future. (This arrangement has been specifically approved by the Deputy Director, CIA, in the absence of the Director.)

b. It is understood that in the discharge of the duties and obligations laid upon the Office of Policy Coorination by the National Security Council, it is necessary for this Office to have dealings with individuals and groups of foreign nationalities within and without the United States and to sponsor the movement from time to time of such individuals and representatives of such groups between the United States and foreign countries. The Office of Policy Coordination recognizes the primary responsibility of the FBI in the field of United States domestic security, and the FBI acknowledges that it is essential for the Office of Policy Coordination to have direct dealings with the individuals and groups aforementioned.

c. In order that the interests of both parties to this understanding shall be served, it is understood that the Office of Policy Coordination keep the FBI generally informed concerning the extent and character of its dealings with

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
Destroy only with consent of the Historical Staff

owngraded to SECRET per
aul J. Burns 019210

Paul J. Burns

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES

II - Groups and Organizations:

International Peasant Union which is made up of representatives of Polish Agrarian Party; Bulgarian Agrarian Party; Croatian Peasant Party; Hungarian Small Holders Party; Rumanian National Peasant Party; Serbian Agrarian Union and a number of recognized Czechoslovak political leaders.

In view of the highly classified character of our activities, I am sure that you will appreciate the importance of maintaining the maximum security precautions.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

Enclosure - 1

[redacted] SECRET

C
O
P
Y

22 September 1948

Mr. D. Milton Ladd
Assistant to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Ladd:

Confirming our telephone conversation of today, I am enclosing a draft of a proposed memorandum which I have prepared for the purpose of recording the understanding which has been arrived at between us in regard to the cooperation and liaison between my office and the Bureau. I have endeavored in this draft to set out the essential features of our conversation of yesterday afternoon and I should appreciate your indicating to me any modifications or changes which you may deem necessary or advisable to reflect your recollection and understanding of our conversation. Upon my receipt of your suggested changes, if any, and following any further discussion between us which may be indicated as desirable, I shall prepare this memorandum in final form and furnish to you the original and a copy thereof, with the request that you initial and return to me the copy.

In accordance with the terms of our understanding, I should like to submit to you herewith the names of certain of the individuals and groups with whom it is proposed that my office will have dealings in connection with our authorized activities. From time to time in the future I shall furnish you with additional names. The following are the names:

I - Individuals:

George M. Dimitrov, Exiled Secretary General of Bulgarian Agrarian Party

Stefan Osusky, prominent Czech Refugee leader

Ferenc Nagy, head of Hungarian Small Holders Party

Dr. Vladko Macek, representative of Croatian Peasant Party

Stanislas Mikolajczyk, former Polish Vice Premier

Andre Cretzianu, former Rumanian Cabinet Minister

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
Destroy only with consent

ENCLOSURE 62-116395

Downgraded to SECRET per
Paul J. Burns, 019210

[redacted] SECRET

foreign individuals and groups within the United States. More specifically the Office of Policy Coordination will, in so far as possible, inform the FBI sufficiently in advance of its proposed dealings with such individuals and groups to enable the FBI to advise the Office of Policy Coordination of any security risks which may be involved in dealing with such individuals and groups and in order to provide the FBI with adequate opportunity to indicate individuals which it is employing for its own purposes in connection with the penetration of foreign groups.

d. There shall be an exchange of information between the FBI and the Office of Policy Coordination concerning the significance, activities, and reliability of such individuals and groups of foreign nationalities within the United States as may be of interest to the Office of Policy Coordination.

F. G. W.

D. M. L.

EYES ALONE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

30 MAY 1975

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0597

Sen study -75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Department of Defense
Mr. William G. Hyland, Department of State
Mr. E. H. Knoche, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. William O. Cregar, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. William N. Morell, Jr., Department of Treasury
Mr. James G. Poor, Energy Research & Development Administration
Mr. William Nichols, Office of Management and Budget
Mr. John B. Hotis, Department of Justice

SUBJECT : Future Legislation Relative to U.S. Intelligence

Following up on the discussion at yesterday's meeting of the Policy Steering Group, addressees are encouraged to provide to the White House specific suggestions for administrative or legislative action relative to U.S. intelligence programs. Such proposals should be realistic and doable in the near term. Please provide two copies of all suggestions to James Wilderotter, Room 182, Old Executive Office Building by 10 June 1975.

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY SP

REC-100 62-116395-166

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

17 JUN 4 1975

file in 62-116395 5.8

84 JUN 4 1975

EYES ALONE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-19-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

K. William O'Conner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, who has recently been designated by the Attorney General to coordinate all responses by the Department to the Senate Select Committee(SSC), advised on the afternoon of 5-19-75 that he had met with Chief Counsel to the SSC F. A. O. Schwarz and John Elliff, who is the head of the task force of the Senate Select Committee on the FBI. O'Conner stated he informed Schwarz and Elliff that he would not make available Bureau secretaries Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski, who are scheduled for interview on Tuesday, 5-20-75, absent an agreement by the Committee that an FBI representative would be allowed to be present during the interview. O'Conner indicated that the Department's stand in this matter regarding the insistence that FBI representatives be present during the interview was backed by the White House, the Attorney General, and the Deputy Attorney General.

By way of background, it should be noted that Mr. O'Conner and Associate Deputy Attorney General McDermott were contacted on 5-14-75, and advised of the requested interview of the two aforementioned employees at which time O'Conner and McDermott did not advise of any way in which the employees could be prevented from consenting to interview. While they were upset at the prospect of service personnel, such as stenographers being interviewed by the Committee, they indicated at that time they could not see any legal leverage which could be used to preclude such interviews. With this decision in mind arrangements were made to make these employees available for interview.

ST-104 REC 12 62-116395-1165

Schwarz told O'Conner he would have to check with the SSC prior to agreeing to allow FBI representatives to be present. O'Conner stated Schwarz was quite upset at the Department's stance in this matter, but indicated he would give O'Conner an answer this evening. O'Conner indicated to Schwarz that the two Bureau employees would be available for interview on the 20th should the Committee agree to the presence of FBI representatives during the interview.

MAY 27 1975

1 - Mr. Adams	1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall	1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz	1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE ADDENDUM - PAGE 2

O'Conner requested that the Bureau continue with his plan to have both employees available should the interview take place on the 20th.

ACTION:

You will be kept expeditiously advised of all developments concerning this matter.

JAM
R70

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION 5-19-75 PVD:dkg

At 4:15 p.m. Mr. O'Conner advised that he had just been contacted by F. A. O. Schwarz, and Schwarz stated the Committee's position concerning the presence of FBI representatives during the interview of the two secretaries is unchanged. O'Conner related that he told Schwarz that Departmental position is also unchanged in that there will be no interview unless the Committee relents on this position. O'Conner indicated he would keep the Bureau advised and requested that we continue with our plans to have the secretaries available for interview as Schwarz indicated he would again contact O'Conner regarding this issue.

JAM
R70

Airtel

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
5/23/75
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

To: SAC, Atlanta

From: Director, FBI (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

Enclosed for immediate hand delivery to former SA Alan G. Sentinella is an original and one copy of a statement he voluntarily dictated to a Bureau secretary 5/21/75 and which was transcribed subsequent to Sentinella's departure from Washington, D. C.

For your information, Sentinella has indicated a desire to review this statement and make any necessary corrections, after which he will furnish you a copy for forwarding to the Bureau which should be by cover airtel immediately after Sentinella makes it available. Direct airtel to Attention, INTD - W. O. Cregar.

Enclosure
SFP:ekw
(6)

NOTE: The statement involved concerns Sentinella's testimony before an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee 5/21/75, contents of which testimony Sentinella indicated to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project he (Sentinella) desired to make available to the Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-05-01 BY [illegible]

EX 104

REC-7 62-116395-164

MAILED 8
MAY 23 1975
FBI

5 MAY 27 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/23/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Reference is made to my memorandum dated 5/19/75 which attached a copy of a letter to the Attorney General dated 5/14/75, from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, United States Senate Select Committee (SSC) with appendices A thru D. The memorandum noted the ambiguous nature of some of the SSC requests and that Mr. K. William O'Conner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, who is the Department of Justice coordinator for SSC matters, is presently negotiating the 5/14/75 requests with the SSC Staff.

Even though the negotiations are still under way, we believe that ultimately we will be required to provide substantial responses to the 5/14/75 requests. To this end we have begun to gather together the necessary data from our files in anticipation of the substantial responses we will be required to prepare. The various requests set forth in the May 14, letter have been analyzed and specific assignments made to prepare responses. The primary assignments have been made to representatives of several Sections of the INTD. It is anticipated that in some circumstances it will be necessary for these INTD representatives to convey requests for information and material to other Divisions. When such action is necessary contact will be effected through the designated representatives of the other Headquarters Divisions. A list of such other Divisional representatives is maintained by the SENSTUDY Staff on the basis of designations made to assist in previous SSC requests, and is set forth below.

DIVISION	REPRESENTATIVE	EXTENSION
1-Identification	James T. Stewart	4219
2-Training	James E. Reilly	3472
3-Administrative	Fred Woodworth	4132

REC-100 62-116395-163

JUN 3 1975

62-116395
EWL/SFP:cmc
(17)

CONTINUED - OVER

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

PERS REC UNIT

84 JUN 3 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY - 75
62-116395

4-Files and Communications	Homer R. Hauer	4870
6-General Investigative	J. William Hines	4276
7-Laboratory	John P. Wilgus	~~3721~~ 3463
8-External Affairs	David L. Divan	2535
9-Special Investigative	John E. McHale	2525
10-Inspection	Fred Griffith	2830
11-Legal	Paul V. Daly	2542
12-Computer Systems	Charles D. Neudorfer	3635

The listed individuals are considered to be the permanent representatives to the SENSTUDY project and will be the primary points of contact within the respective Divisions. It is requested that any Division desiring to change the above designations promptly advise SENSTUDY project on extension 4636.

ACTION:

None except where necessary to redesignate Division representatives.

WRW

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/22/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1063 JEH

On 5/21/75, Andy Smith, Supervisor in our Birmingham Office, called Deputy Assistant Director Herington and advised that former SA Robert R. Nichols (EOD: 1/6/47; retired: 5/12/72) had been contacted by the Senate Select Committee for interview. Smith connected Nichols through to Herington, at which time Nichols advised that about ten days ago Lester Seidel of the Senate Select Committee had contacted him. At that time, Nichols was going to Oklahoma City, and has just recently returned home to Birmingham. Nichols stated that at one time he was the case agent in the Atlanta Office on the Martin Luther King investigation, and it was presumed this was the subject matter of the proposed interview.

Nichols was advised that the decision as to whether he would consent to interview was entirely his to make. He was reminded that he had signed a secrecy agreement, and was reminded of the provisions of AG Order 501-73 requiring prior authority from the appropriate Departmental official prior to a current or former employee furnishing information he acquired during the course of his employment. He was also advised that he had a right to be represented by a personal attorney if he desired and that he had all the constitutional rights available to him, the same as any citizen. He was further told that if he desired to have an FBI representative available, but not present during the interview, he could so request, noting that the purpose of the FBI representative would be to counsel him concerning sensitive areas which might be explored.

62-116395-162

REC-107

JUN 3 1975

It was emphasized to Nichols that the FBI would not and could not recommend the course of action he should take ~~and that the~~ decision with regard to this interview was entirely his to make.

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Herington

JH:mtm

Records
cc-67-414885 (Nichols)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-20-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

PERS. REC. UNIT

FIVE

JUN 3 1975

Mr. David E. Todd
20 Cozzolino Drive
Millbrae, CA 94030

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, CA 956
PM
19 MAY
1975

Christmas 10c US

CONQUER MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20535

Attention:
Office of the Legal Counsel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-8-01 BY

5-19-75

Attention:

Jack Harrington
Office of the Legal Counsel

Remytelcall 5/16/75

David E. Todd

Senstudy - 75

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

file
62-116395

REC-1 62-116395-161

17 MAY 21 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

LEGAL COUNSEL

Recds
cc 67-177553 (David Todd)

84 JUN 3 1975

May 19, 1975
20 Cozzolino Drive
Millbrae, CA 94030

Mr. Lester B. Seidel
Investigator
Select Committee to Study
 Government Operations with
 Respect to Intelligence Activities
Room 2308
Building 302 - Dirkson Building
Washington, DC 20510

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALC/lw

Dear Mr. Seidel:

Reference is made to your telephone call to me on May 16, 1975, in which you advised that the Committee was gathering facts concerning the FBI's various CoIntelPros and in particular, you were looking into the CoIntelPro having to do with the Black Panthers. You inquired if I recalled a letter, which had been made public, dated May 11, 1970, from the Director, FBI, to the SAC, San Francisco, which suggested disruptive techniques against the Black Panthers and which mentioned spurious police or FBI reports. I advised you I had no first hand recollection of having seen such a document at that time, but that I had read a recent news item describing such a document.

You also indicated an interest in the theoretical question as to whether intelligence functions should be divorced from enforcement functions in order to avoid the dilemma of disclosure versus dismissal, and you suggested that my views on this might be helpful in educating the Committee.

For your information, I entered on duty as a Special Agent on January 5, 1942, and retired from the Bureau on December 3, 1971. During the two years immediately preceding my retirement I served as supervisor of a squad of agents which investigated, among other matters, violations and alleged violations of law by the Black Panthers. The only information I have concerning the Black Panthers was learned as a direct result of my official duties. I have made no independent study of them, nor do I have any personal files or written material, either official or otherwise, relating to them.

Since speaking with you, I have reviewed Executive Order #501-73 (28 C.F.R.§§ 16.21, 16.22 and 16.23) which specifies that no employee or former employee of the Department of Justice shall produce any material contained in the files of the Department

161

nor shall he disclose any information acquired in the performance of his official duties without prior approval of the Attorney General or appropriate Departmental official.

From this, I must conclude that I am prohibited from furnishing you or the Committee any information along the lines requested by you unless appropriate authority to do so has first been given by an authorized representative of the Department of Justice.

Very truly yours,

David E. Todd

DAVID E. TODD

cc: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20535

SAC
Federal Bureau of Investigation
450 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/20/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/

I received by hand delivery from the Department at 3:06 p.m. on March 20, 1975, the attached copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated March 19, 1975, with its enclosed list of requests being made by the Committee.

Farrington
Hotis
Bowers

Senator Church requests that the documents involved be supplied to the committee at the earliest opportunity. A review of the requests revealed that the Intelligence Division would have the principal interest in all except request III, A and C, which would be of interest to the Administrative Division. The last item appearing under V, B should be available only through the Criminal Division of the Department or the Attorney General's office.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Intelligence Division and the Administrative Division review the attached request for FBI materials to determine whether we may make a full response to the requests.

EX 104 REC 44 62-116395-160

7 APR 22 1975

2. That the required materials be prepared for submission to the Committee and any difficulties be made known at the earliest possible date.

62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Enc.
1 - Mr. Farrington - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.

OK

LEGAL COUNSEL

JAM:mfd
(7)

84 JUN 3 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

HILIP A. HART, MICH. | HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
ALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. | BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
ALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. | CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
OBERT MORGAN, N.C. | RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
ARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 19, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on February 26, 1975, to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21. I believe we are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible.

Toward that end we are seeking initial documentation from various agencies whose activities fall within the mandate given us by the Senate. Enclosed with this letter is a copy of an initial request for documents relating to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has been previously discussed with staff representatives of the Bureau. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

We expect to make similar initial requests for documents to other parts of your Department that fall under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

I trust that our respective staffs will continue to work together in the spirit of mutual cooperation which we both recognize is necessary to ensure a thorough and expeditious investigation.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RE

MAR 19 1975

62-116395-160

ENCLOSURE

FIRST REQUEST FOR FBI DOCUMENTS

I. Legal Authorities

All memoranda discussing the legal authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials asserted as sources of such authority. 5

II. Jurisdictional Agreements

All delimitations agreements, jurisdictional agreements, agreements for coordination, and memoranda or understanding, between the FBI and any other Federal departments or agencies, insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5

III. Organization

A. A detailed current organizational chart reflecting all divisions, sections, branches, and units of the FBI, and the subject matters assigned to each by generic and numerical designation. 3

B. A list of names, titles, and offices of assignment of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBI Headquarters, down to and including unit chiefs, together with the number of personnel below the level of unit chief categorized by unit or other office of assignment. 5

C. At the field level, the titles and the number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations, and activities. 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ACM/RL

62-116395-160

ENCLOSURE

IV. Policies and Procedures

A. The table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions, and those portions of the Manual of Instructions which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5 ✓

B. The table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, and those portions of the Manual of Rules and Regulations which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities. 5 ✓

V. Studies and Reports

A. The Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), dated June, 1970. 5

B. The original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Dept.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-15-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Department has named Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Connor of the Civil Rights Division to be responsible for their responses to Congressional Committee requests.

At the request of Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott, SA Paul V. Daly and Inspector John B. Hotis attended a meeting with Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William O'Connor, Assistant to the Attorney General Jack Fuller, and Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General Robert McDermott. McDermott announced at the meeting that O'Connor was taking control of the Departmental responses to the Congressional Committees. He noted that the Department has been having some problems keeping track of and inconsistencies in its responses to the various Congressional Committees. Mr. O'Connor was generally briefed as to the status of our responses to Congressional requests and to the Rockefeller Commission. He requested, however, that he be briefed in a more detailed manner in the immediate future.

ACTION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

EX 104
REC 44 62-116395-159

MAY 23 1975

PVD:dkg (8)

84 JUN 3 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 8, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting between representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff and Bureau officials at Quantico, Virginia, on the evening of 5/5/75.

On 5/5/75 Mr. John Elliff, who heads the task force of the SSC looking into the FBI, met with officials of the Bureau at Quantico. Elliff was accompanied by Mark Gitenstein and Mary DeOreo. FBI officials present were Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Inspectors Thomas W. Leavitt, Hunter E. Helgeson, and John B. Hotis as well as Section Chief William O. Cregar.

At the outset of the meeting, Mr. Elliff provided the Bureau representatives with a memorandum the subject of which was entitled "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated 2/13/75, copy of which is attached. Elliff's memorandum contained a series of questions along with the rationale for these questions which provided the basis for the Quantico meeting. We are not considering these questions a formal request from the Select Committee. Mr. Elliff and the Staff of the Select Committee are aware that formal responses that the Bureau might be expected to provide the Committee can only be predicated on written requests to the Attorney General (AG) from Senator Frank Church or the Committee's Chief Counsel.

It is noted that under paragraph one of Elliff's memorandum he notes the Committee has not been supplied the following documents.

REC 44 62-116395-158

EX 104

(1) A position paper dated 7/31/72.

MAY 23 1975

(2) Appendices I, J, K, M, and P to the Intelligence Division "Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75.

62-116395

Enclosure / ENCLOSURE

WOC:ekw
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-06-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 3 1975

By memorandum dated 5/6/75, we advised the AG that the requested position paper of 7/31/72 is an internal deliberative document which we feel is inappropriate to furnish the Select Committee. This position is consistent with the position previously expressed by the AG. During the meeting with Elliff he was orally advised of the Bureau's position regarding making the 7/31/72 position paper available to the Select Committee.

The Appendices which have not yet been made available to the Select Committee are being cleared with other agencies under the Third Agency rule requirement and will be made available to the Select Committee once all clearances have been obtained. Elliff was orally apprised of this.

During the course of the meeting, Mr. Elliff stated that he felt the FBI's concerted investigative effort in the early 1960s against the Klan and later our investigative effort arising out of the ghetto riots were justified given the situation at that time. However, he felt the Committee would probably like to do an in-depth case study of both investigations. He asked if the FBI could provide the Committee with copies of all memoranda and documents reflecting the decision making process leading up to the initiation of the major investigative effort against the Klan as well as investigations during and following the ghetto riots. Elliff was advised that we certainly would consider responding following receiptoof a formal written request from Senator Church through the AG. Elliff advised he would prepare such a written request.

The Intelligence Division has already instituted the necessary research in anticipation of this request and will submit recommendations following a completion of this research.

In anticipation of Select Committee hearings which are expected to begin in about one month, Mr. Elliff and Gitenstein expect to start interviews of current Bureau employees in Bureau space during the week of 5/19/75. Mr. Gitenstein will concentrate on the work of the Internal Security Branch of the Intelligence Division and Mr. Elliff on the Counterintelligence Branch. We expect that Mr. Elliff will begin his interviews by meeting with Assistant Director Wannall, Inspector Leavitt and the Section Chiefs of the Counterintelligence Branch.

It is noted that we previously furnished to the Select Committee with the AG's approval one copy each of Sections 87 and 122 of the Manual of Instructions. Section 87 is concerned with investigations of subversive organizations and individuals. Section 122 addresses extremist matters and civil unrest. In his discussion of these two Sections it was readily apparent Mr. Gitenstein had conducted a thorough review. In this regard, he noted a difference in the investigative procedure outlined in these two Sections of the Manual. Mr. Gitenstein was advised that the Intelligence Division had just completed a Manual revision combining these two Sections into one and had submitted it to the Director for his approval. Mr. Gitenstein commented this was an excellent idea to combine these two Sections into one and expressed the hope that the revised Section could be made available to the Committee for its review in anticipation of the forthcoming Committee hearings.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Elliff asked whether the FBI would be willing to meet with the Staff to discuss such sensitive issues as surreptitious entry, the opening of mail, and incommunicado interviews. Elliff was advised that the Bureau was aware of certain allegations that have appeared in the press and felt that any interviews in sensitive areas should be restricted to the Senators on the Committee. Elliff interposed no objection to this suggestion.

The thrust of the meeting gave Bureau officials present the impression that the task force was primarily concerned with identifying what areas of the Bureau's investigative responsibilities needed to be better defined through new legislation. In fact, Elliff solicited the observations of those present as to what the Bureau's needs were in the way of new legislation to permit the Bureau to carry out its internal security responsibilities effectively. He recognized certain limitations involving records of educational institutions, banking institutions, telephone companies and credit establishments currently restrict the Bureau and suggest that some legislation with Congressional oversight should be written to assist the FBI in carrying out its mission.

ACTION:

(1) We will proceed to meet with Mr. Elliff and Mr. Gitenstein in accordance with their request. It is anticipated that an Intelligence Division official will be present at all such interviews of current Bureau personnel.

(2) That the review of the combined Sections of 87 and 122 by other Divisions of the Bureau be expedited in order that we may be able to provide the Senate Select Committee with this revision on an expedite basis.

OK

PLM

May 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM

From: John Elliff

Subject: "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction" dated February 13, 1975

1. The following documents directly related to this Position Paper have not been supplied to the Select Committee:

(1) The previous Position Paper, dated July 31, 1972.

(2) Appendices I, J, K, M, and P.

2. Parts I and II discuss the Presidential directives which may serve as the basis for FBI national security intelligence activities. Part IV lists statutes and Executive Orders affecting FBI jurisdiction. There is no mention in Parts I and II of the first Executive Order cited in Part IV. This is Executive Order #11605, dated July 2, 1971, amending Executive Orcer #10450, of April 27, 1953, relating to security requirements for Government employment.

These Executive Orders have been further amended by a more recent Executive Order of June 4, 1974. This latest order abolished the so-called "Attorney General's List" and revised the criteria for determining the suitability and loyalty of Government employees.

The following questions arise:

(1) In what way, if any, do the Executive Orders relating to employment security provide a legal basis for FBI intelligence activities?

(2) In what way, if any, did the Executive Order of June 4, 1974, affect the legal basis for FBI intelligence activities?

3. The analysis in Parts I and II discusses the legal basis for FBI national security intelligence investigations. There is no specific discussion of other intelligence activities. These other activities are variously described in the attached documents and quoted memoranda. The terms used include "counterespionage" (Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939),

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-158

ENCLOSURE

"to neutralize Communist front and Communist-dominated organizations of the United States" (IIC and ICIS Report to NSC, March 5, 1954), "program designed to intensify any confusion and dissatisfaction among its /Communist Party's/ members" and "counterintelligence operations" (NSC Briefing, November 6, 1958), "action proposals to protect the internal security of the United States" (National Security Action Memorandum 161, June 9, 1962). The term "counterespionage" reappears in several other documents.

These terms seem to refer to activities which have since been labeled COINTELPRO operations. In this regard, it should be noted that Attorney General Saxbe's report of November 18, 1974 on FBI COINTELPRO Activities stated, at p. 20:

> "(2) Espionage or Soviet-Satellite Intelligence
>
> This program, although officially designated a COINTELPRO program, emphasized intelligence gathering and counterintelligence efforts already being pursued in connection with the Bureau's ongoing foreign intelligence responsibilities. It did not curtail any activity or in any way change the scope of counterintelligence efforts already in effect and continuing today. It was primarily intended to inspire initiative and to encourage ingenuity in the Bureau's continuing counterintelligence efforts against hostile foreign intelligence services.
>
> In the interest of the national security, no statistics or examples of the types of actions implemented under this program may appropriately be disclosed."

This passage seems to say that the FBI continues to perform other activities going beyond investigation and directed at hostile foreign intelligence services.

The following questions arise:

(1) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for FBI national security intelligence activities beyond investigations?

(2) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for the COINTELPRO activities which have been discontinued as a matter of policy since 1971?

(3) In what way, if any, do the Presidential directives discussed in Parts I and II provide a legal basis for the FBI's continuing counterintelligence efforts against hostile foreign intelligence services?

4. Appendix S includes excerpts from the appropriations testimony of former Director Hoover. The testimony in 1939 and 1941 makes reference to President Roosevelt's Proclamation of National Emergency, September 8, 1939. The following exchange took place at the hearing on February 19, 1941:

> Mr. Ludlow. At the close of the present emergency, when peace comes, it would mean that much of this emergency work necessarily will be discontinued.
> Mr. Hoover. That is correct.
> Mr. Taber. Is your set-up for the national-defense work separate from the other work?
> Mr. Hoover. It is.
> Mr. Taber. Is it operated as a separate division?
> Mr. Hoover. Yes. In the field our field officials are under instructions to utilize approximately 50 percent of the personnel on national defense work and the other 50 percent on the regular work.
> Mr. Taber. But if some rush comes up, you might have to vary that?
> Mr. Hoover. That is correct.
> Mr. Taber. According to the situation.
> Mr. Hoover. According to the emergency that might arise. If the national emergency should terminate, the structure dealing with national defense can immediately be discontinued or very materially curtailed according to the wishes of Congress.

When President Roosevelt issued the Proclamation of National Emergency on September 8, 1939, he accompanied it with Executive Order No. 8247 directing the Attorney General to "increase the personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, in such number, not exceeding 150, as he shall find necessary for the proper performance of the additional duties imposed upon the Department of Justice in connection with the national emergency." At a press conference the same day,

President Roosevelt specifically discussed this Executive Order and the nature of the "additional duties imposed upon the Department of Justice."

> "And the fourth /Executive Order/ relates to what you might say is a combination of neutrality and national defense. It provides for an addition to the personnel of certain investigating agencies of the Government to protect this country against--I suppose the easiest way of putting it is--some of the episodes, some of the things that happened over here in 1914 and 1915 and 1916 and the beginning of 1917, before we got into the war. There was sabotage; there was a great deal of propaganda by both belligerents, and a good many definite plans laid in this country by foreign governments to try to sway American public opinion. We do not have to specify. The older men who are here can remember some of the episodes of that time. It is to guard against that, and against the spread by any foreign nation of propaganda in this country which would tend to be subversive--I believe that is the word--of our form of Government." (1939 Roosevelt Papers 485-486)

The following questions arise:

(1) To what extent, if any, were the Presidential directives of June 26, 1939 and September 6, 1939, based on the emergency powers of the President?

(2) To what extent, if any, was the establishment of the FBI's Intelligence Division in September, 1939, based on the President's Proclamation of National Emergency and Executive Order No. 8247?

(3) To what extent, if any, does Congress have the Constitutional authority to discontinue or curtail the FBI's national security intelligence activities based on the President's emergency powers or on other Constitutional powers of the Executive Branch?

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. __
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/16/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At approximately 3:20 PM, former SA David E. Todd (EOD as SA 1/5/42; retirement 12/9/71) called long distance from San Francisco and spoke to Deputy Assistant Director Herington. He said that he had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, Senate Select Committee, who said that he would be on the west coast in the near future and desired to interview Todd concerning FBI policies with regard to investigation of racial matters and our counterintelligence programs against the Black Panthers and other groups. Todd pointed out that he was a former supervisor of the San Francisco Office desk responsible for Black Panther cases. Todd asked what position he should take. He was advised that his decision as to whether or not to be interviewed was entirely his and that the Bureau could not make any suggestion in this regard. It was pointed out that if he decided to be interviewed, we had made arrangements with the Senate Select Committee which would permit a Bureau representative to be available for consultation with regard to matters that might seem sensitive, but that the Bureau representative would not be present during or participate in the actual interview. He was advised further that he had the same rights as any other citizen, namely, the right to personal counsel and any other rights guaranteed him under the Constitution. Pursuant to his request, he was also advised of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 which appears in Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, beginning at Section 16.21, which would require appropriate Departmental approval prior to any current or former employee revealing, pursuant to a subpoena or other demand, any information acquired during the course of the employee's official duties. He was also reminded that all Bureau employees had signed a secrecy agreement.

62-116395-157

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Herington

REC 67

20 MAY 22 1975

ST-101

JH:mtm
(6)

ALL [illegible] ED
HERE[illegible]
DATE 6-26-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 3 1975

Memo to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY 75

Todd indicated that while he desired to respond as legally required to an official committee inquiry, he would advise Mr. Seidel that he considered himself bound by the Attorney General Order and did not feel that he could reveal official information without approval by the appropriate Department official. Todd was clearly advised that this decision had to be his own and that the FBI could not and would not make any recommendation to him as to the course of action he should take.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: 5-8-75

FROM : G. R. Steel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

Reference is made to my ~~letter~~ memo dated 4-3-75 captioned as above (cc attached). Sec 63

This is to advise that as of 5-7-75 we have received and ordered to the field a total of 96 requests from the SSC for investigations of its staff members. An additional case was received on 5-8-75 which is being ordered to the field immediately. As a result of referenced memo, Inspector Bowers contacted the SSC which was in accord with a more realistic deadline on remaining investigations, except "a few" specials which would still be handled on an expedite basis, such as afforded Presidential appointments. Of all cases received to date only six have been designated as nonexpedite.

It is noted recent articles in the media have contained criticism of Congressman Lucien Nedzi for delay in staffing the HSC and proceeding with its inquiry. On 3-3-75 Inspector Bowers discussed with the Congressman the mechanics for FBI investigations of the HSC staff. In the intervening period no cases were received except one recent case from the HSC which has been ordered to the field. This concerns Carl Hendrickson Simms, Security Director, HSC, and formerly connected with the House impeachment inquiry. Simms has been in contact with our Project Senstudy 75 group. It is not known when additional investigations will be received from the HSC.

62-116464

ST-117

ACTION:

For information.

REC-75

62-116395-156

MAY 21 1975

MAY 20 1975

ENCLOSURE
Enc.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12601 BY SP2ALM/RCJ

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - Mr. Auerswald

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

GRS:dc
-6-

54JUN4 1975

MAY 20 1975

LEGAL COUN.

SSC folder

Mr. Cleveland **4-3-75**

G. R. Steel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

By agreement, the FBI is currently conducting full field investigations regarding SSC staff personnel. These have extremely short (2 week) deadlines which are identical to those afforded Presidential appointments and are, therefore, given preferential treatment in opening, assigning, and following field progress. The Special Inquiry Unit of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry Section, which has about twice its normal case load, is handling these requests. Senator Church, Chairman, SSC, originally estimated that between 35 and 40 staff members would be submitted for investigation. As of today, 4-3-75, we have received requests for 85 such investigations from the SSC and the end does not appear to be in sight. They are received in bunches as many as 6 at a time, which is not the even flow expected and presents an additional burden.

In addition it is expected that similar requests will be forthcoming in the near future from the HSC since we have a similar agreement with it. Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the HSC, has estimated "probably no more than about 25 staff members will be hired." It remains to be seen if this estimate also falls short of actual receipts.

Since there is no charge for these full field investigations they will have to be considered in the budget. It is noted the current charge for a full field investigation, where applicable, is $2028.

ACTION: For information. Since it appears the nucleus of the Committee has been formed, it is suggested Senator Church be contacted and queried regarding a more realistic (30 day) deadline on the remaining investigations concerning future staff members and their replacements.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
GRS ① - Mr. Steel

GRS:dc
-6-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-26-01 BY SP2ALM/JR

62-116395-156

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/2/75

FROM : Mr. H. E. Helgeson

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At about 1 p.m., 5/2/75, ASAC Herbert D. Clough, Newark Division, called to furnish the following information:

The Newark Office had just been contacted by former Bureau Supervisor Dan Brennan, retired, who resides at Sea Girt, New Jersey. Brennan advised that he had been contacted earlier today by Mike Epstein of the Senate Select Committee who desired to talk to Brennan today and an appointment was set up. Epstein was to arrive at Newark around noon and then drive to Sea Girt, about an hour's travel. Based on information furnished at the recent conference in New York, Newark had dispatched an Agent to be present during this interview as requested by Dan Brennan.

D

After completing my conversation with Clough, I discussed this matter with John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, and it was concluded the Agent from Newark who would be present during the interview should call Office of Legal Counsel, speak to Hotis, and obtain general guidelines for his participation in this interview.

ASAC Clough was recontacted and so instructed. I also asked Clough to get in touch with me later in the day to let me know what transpired.

REC-19 62-116395-155

ST-101

16 MAY 29 1975

ACTION:

For information.

62-116395

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

HEH:mah

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12601 BY SP2ALM/RW

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 3 (5) 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams   DATE: May 12, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel   Senstudy 75   Hotis

SUBJECT: ISSUE PAPER ON INTELLIGENCE FILES AND PRIVACY

The Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community identified ten issues likely to grow out of the Select Committee's deliberations. The Executive Committee asked the FBI to prepare a paper on one of these topics, Intelligence Files and Privacy. Specifically, the request was for a brief paper which raises the issues observed by the intelligence agencies when intelligence files and privacy are viewed together without suggesting or recommending how the questions should be resolved.

J. D. Miller drafted an outline which was discussed on April 16, 1975, with representatives of the CIA and Departments of Defense and Treasury. On April 21, this outline was presented by Mr. Hotis to the Executive Committee which received it without comment. Mr. Miller then prepared a rough draft which was discussed at a meeting on April 22, with the representatives of the CIA and Department of Treasury.

Mr. Miller's final draft is attached. It discusses both intelligence files and the concept of privacy in general terms before focusing on the issues which present themselves when an effort is made to establish the proper relationship between the two.

Enclosure   REC-37   62-116395-154

THH

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Cleveland
1-Mr. Miller

ST 114

MAY 20 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RL

JDM:lgp
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 29 1975
360

Memo from Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams
ISSUE PAPER ON INTELLIGENCE FILES AND PRIVACY

RECOMMENDATION:

The issue paper entitled Intelligence Files and Privacy be submitted by Mr. Hotis to the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

[illegible] JBA [illegible]
WRW/TOL

JBA/PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Each Assistant Director-Encs.
1 - Mr. Cregar-Encs.
1 - Mr. Hotis-Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz-Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly-Encs.

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-2-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
REQUEST OF 4-28-75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

REQUEST OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, U. S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES DATED 4-25-75

On 5-2-75, Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, furnished SA Paul V. Daly two requests from Congressional Committees pertaining to an allegation that documents were removed from former Director J. Edgar Hoover's residence in Washington, D. C., following the death of Mr. Clyde Tolson. Attached are copies of each of the captioned requests.

Each Assistant Director is to canvass his Division and furnish on an expedite basis any information they may develop considering this allegation. Responses should be directed to the Legal Analysis Office, Legal Counsel Division, so that the response may be prepared for the appropriate Congressional Committees and forwarded through the Attorney General's office.

REC 8 62-116395-153

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116395-

Also attached for approval is an airtel to the Washington Field Office requesting that an appropriate inquiry be made among Field Office personnel so that these allegations may be responded to.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

MAY 20 1975

(1) That Assistant Directors make ~~appropriate inquiry of~~ personnel concerning the allegations contained in the aforementioned letters and forward results of inquiry to the Legal Analysis Office, Legal Counsel Division, so that responses may be prepared to the Committees' request.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

4 ENCLOSURE

MAY 27 1975

Enclosures
PVD:dkg (19)

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 30 1975

(2) The attached airtel to the Washington Field Office be approved and sent making inquiry of that Office concerning allegations contained in the aforementioned letters.

pvd JBH|pvd

not sent - handled by phone JJD

JJD

PLM

5/6 -
SAC Kunkel - Alex
SAC Stames - WFO
Advise no personnel
those offices went to
Mr Hoover's home after
Mr Tolson's death and
none involved in transferring
records or any material in
connection w/ this inquiry -
JJD

5/7/75
Tom Feeney Div 3
advised his
Division negative

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRM[illegible]
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAI[illegible]

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 28, 1975

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
APR 30 1975

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Last week's issue of Newsweek, on page 15, states:

> Hoover's Secrets
>
> Following the death last week of Clyde Tolson, J. Edgar Hoover's close friend and No. 2 man at the FBI, two FBI agents reportedly removed some documents from the late director's house in Washington, where Tolson had been living. Officially, the FBI denies taking any such action, and a friend of Tolson's says the only Hoover documents Tolson had were old canceled checks and tax returns. But Newsweek had reported earlier that some of Hoover's private dossiers, including information "very, very damaging" to persons in the Nixon White House, were left in Tolson's custody, and a source told Newsweek this week that the materials were carted away in a truck.

Assuming that the files in question may be part of the so-called "Official and Confidential" files, your testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on February 27, 1975, is instructive. You said that the number of files which you reviewed contained matters relating to "Presidential directives regarding the role of the FBI in the security field" and to the matters related to "domestic

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

MAY 27 1975

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-153

violence", "intelligence activities by hostile nations", "domestic extremist activities", and use of the FBI to gather political intelligence.

Furthermore, at the same time, Director Kelley suggested that materials from the "Official and Confidential" files were taken to Director Hoover's home. He stated:

> Immediately after his death /Mr. Hoover's/ some of his employees, including his personal secretary, went through his files and completed the destruction of the remainder of the files that were purely personal. These were destroyed by shredding. Some I understand were taken out to his home and placed in his home, they being historical I presume to some extent. There is no indication that they were other than personal files.

Please determine for the Select Committee whether any documents were removed from Mr. Tolson's or Mr. Hoover's residence by FBI agents or former FBI agents after Mr. Tolson's death. If agents of the FBI did go to Mr. Hoover's or Mr. Tolson's residence to remove files, please provide the Select Committee with a complete description of the documents taken into custody by the FBI. Were any such documents copies or originals of documents relating to the business of the FBI? If so, please describe the subject matter of each such document. Also indicate the individual within the FBI who has custody over these files. Furthermore, I respectfully request on behalf of the Select Committee that such files not be destroyed or removed from the FBI's custody until further notice.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

PETER W. RODINO, JR. (N.J.), CHAIRMAN

JACK BROOKS, TEX.
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, WIS.
DON EDWARDS, CALIF.
WILLIAM L. HUNGATE, MO.
JOHN CONYERS, JR., MICH.
JOSHUA EILBERG, PA.
WALTER FLOWERS, ALA.
JAMES R. MANN, S.C.
PAUL S. SARBANES, MD.
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, OHIO
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, CALIF.
ROBERT F. DRINAN, MASS.
BARBARA JORDAN, TEX.
RAY THORNTON, ARK.
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, N.Y.
EDWARD MEZVINSKY, IOWA
HERMAN BADILLO, N.Y.
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, KY.
EDWARD W. PATTISON, N.Y.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, N.J.
MARTIN A. RUSSO, ILL.

EDWARD HUTCHINSON, MICH.
ROBERT MC CLORY, ILL.
TOM RAILSBACK, ILL.
CHARLES E. WIGGINS, CALIF.
HAMILTON FISH, JR., N.Y.
M. CALDWELL BUTLER, VA.
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, CALIF.
JOHN M. ASHBROOK, OHIO
HENRY J. HYDE, ILL.
THOMAS N. KINDNESS, OHIO

Congress of the United States
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Telephone: 202-225-3951

GENERAL COUNSEL:
EARL C. DUDLEY, JR.

STAFF DIRECTOR:
GARNER J. CLINE

COUNSEL:
HERBERT FUCHS
WILLIAM P. SHATTUCK
ALAN A. PARKER
JAMES F. FALCO
MAURICE A. BARBOZA
ARTHUR P. ENDRES, JR.
THOMAS W. HUTCHISON
DANIEL L. COHEN
FRANKLIN G. POLK
THOMAS E. MOONEY
MICHAEL W. BLOMMER
ALEXANDER B. COOK
CONSTANTINE J. GEKAS
ALAN F. COFFEY, JR.
KENNETH N. KLEE

RECEIVED
MAY 2 1975
O.L.A.

April 25, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

In the most recent issue, April 28, 1975, of Newsweek's "Periscope" section, it is alleged that following the death of Clyde Tolson, J. Edgar Hoover's close friend and top assistant, FBI agents removed documents from the late FBI Director's house, in which Mr. Tolson had been living. The article further alleges that the documents removed were of the nature of private dossiers.

During the hearing of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, on February 27, 1975, it was asserted that papers delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death were of a purely historical or personal nature. In keeping with the Subcommittee's oversight jurisdiction of the FBI, I respectfully request that the Department of Justice make an independent investigation of the allegations made by the Newsweek writer and report back to the Subcommittee within a reasonable time. This investigation should cover these points:

1. Were any documents or other material removed from the home of the late FBI Director by agents of the FBI, or others under the direction of the FBI or the Department of Justice, after the death of Clyde Tolson?

2. If it is determined that documents or other material were removed, on whose authority was such action initiated?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP3ALM/RL

MAY 21 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-153

3. What was the nature of the material removed?

4. For what purpose were the materials removed?

5. Was it the same material delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death?

6. If it is true that the materials delivered to the home of J. Edgar Hoover after his death were of an historical or personal nature, and that all or some of these same materials were removed after the death of Clyde Tolson, what legal rationale can be used to give the FBI any interest in, or authority to remove, such documents to their own possession?

Your prompt consideration of this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Don Edwards

Don Edwards
Chairman
Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights

DE:ss

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

WASHINGTON, D.C.
APR 28
10 AM
1975

Don Edwards

ALWAYS USE ZIP CODE
M.C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
~~MAY 1962~~ EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. JENKINS

DATE: 5/5/75

FROM : D.W. MOORE, JR.

SUBJECT: CLYDE A. TOLSON
FORMER ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

The April 28, 1975, issue of "Newsweek" magazine on page 15 under its "Periscope" section, referred to Mr. Tolson's death and claimed that 2 Agents reportedly removed documents from Hoover's residence where Tolson had been living. The article, captioned "Hoover's Secrets," carried the FBI's denial of such action and also stated that a friend of Tolson's said the only Hoover documents Tolson had were old cancelled checks and tax returns. However, the article added that "Newsweek" had reported earlier that some of Hoover's private dossiers, including information "very, very damaging" to persons in the Nixon White House, were left in Tolson's custody. "Newsweek" further claimed that a source advised that the materials were carted away in a truck.

Mr. Kelley has asked of Messrs. Callahan, Jenkins, Adams and Moore, "Do you have any idea where such a story got started? Ky."

My memorandum to you of 4/17/75 captioned as above (copy attached) pointed out that Tony Marro, "Newsweek" reporter, contacted my office that date advising he had heard from a source to the effect that 2 Agents were sent to Tolson's residence the day of his death with a truck and carted away some files which were subsequently brought to the home of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director. Upon checking with Mr. Mohr, Marro was advised there was absolutely no truth to the story. It should be noted that Mr. Mohr also advised at that time that most of the furnishings at Mr. Tolson's home have been removed over the past several months and that there were some associates of the family and Annie, the housekeeper who had stopped by the house on the day of the death with some empty boxes to help remove additional furnishings.

Enc.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Heim
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt

(CONTINUED)

JMM:jo
(7)

MAY 21 1975

62-116395-153

ENCLOSURE

Moore to Jenkins Memo (cont'd.)
Re: CLYDE A. TOLSON

Based upon a request from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Callahan, a Bureau clerk did go to the residence of Mr. Tolson on the day of his death whereupon he delivered some 24 boxes and 6 rolls of tape. The clerk merely delivered the boxes and tape and then left the residence. We have no idea what was placed in the boxes nor how this story started in the first place.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

MR. JENKINS 4/17/75

D.W. MOORE, JR.

CLYDE A. TOLSON
FORMER FBI ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Tony Marro, "Newsweek" magazine, Washington, D.C., called this morning advising that he had heard from a source who has been reliable in the past, to the effect that two Agents were sent to the home of Clyde Tolson Monday evening, 4/14/75, the day of his death, with a truck and carted away some files which were subsequently brought to the home of Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director.

Upon checking with Mr. Mohr, Mr. Marro was advised that there was absolutely no truth to his story. It should be noted that Mr. Mohr advised that most of the furnishings at Mr. Tolson's home have been removed over the past several months and that there were some associates of the family and Annie, the housekeeper, who had stopped by the house sometime Monday with some empty boxes to help remove additional furnishings. As you know, Mr. Mohr is the Administrator of Mr. Tolson's estate and stated that there was simply no truth to the allegation that any Agents had gone to the home in a truck to transfer any files to his residence, as alleged.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Heim
1 - Mr. Malmfeldt

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

JMM:jo
(7)

MAY 27 1975

62-116395-153

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-5-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

By memorandum dated 4-30-75, directed to the Deputy Attorney General and the Director of the FBI, signed by Chief Counsel of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., the SSC had made additional requests of the FBI. Their requests are divided into four separate areas which are as follows: (1) Request for prior changes in the Manual of Instructions, to those sections of the Manual of Instructions which they have already had access to. (2) Request to review certain sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished the Committee. A review of this list discloses generally these sections do not pertain to foreign or domestic intelligence investigations and some do not appear to be within the ambit of Senate Resolution 21 which charters the authority of the SSC. Regarding the sections of the Manual of Instructions, the request stated they would be satisfied with reviewing them at FBI Headquarters. (3) Request certain sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations be made available for review by SSC representatives at FBI Headquarters. As in request #2, some of the sections do not appear to be within the scope of Senate Resolution 21. Among the sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations requested are such sections as those concerning disciplinary matters and administration of offices. (4) A general request concerning the Bureau's filing procedures including information concerning our indexing system, list of classifications used in FBI filing system, and a set of forms used by the Bureau. (Attached is a copy of the memorandum.)

ST 112 REC 8 62-116395-152

It was pointed out regarding this request to senior staff member of the SSC, Mark Gitenstein, that some aspects of this request appear to be outside of the scope of the Committee's auth~~ority as set~~ forth in Senate Resolution 21. Gitenstein explained that while this may

MAY 19 1975

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Bassett - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Enc.
1 - Mr. Decker - Enc.
1 - Mr. Gebhardt - Enc.
1 - Mr. McDermott - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mooney - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - ~~Enc.~~
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

PVD:dkg (15)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 30 1975

ENCLOSURE

be technically accurate the Committee felt it was necessary for them to come to a general understanding as to Bureau operations and that this would assist them in their review of FBI operations in the domestic and foreign intelligence areas. Gitenstein also indicated it was the Committee's feeling that Senate Resolution 21 was intended to be construed liberally and that in general it required that the SSC be furnished by the various intelligence agencies that information which would be necessary for them to carry out its mandate. It was also explained to Gitenstein that concerning their requests involving prior changes in various sections of the Manual of Instructions that they had not placed a cutoff date as to how far back the Bureau had to go to comply with this request. Gitenstein indicated that we could use 1-1-60 as the cutoff date.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Recipients review requests pertaining to their Divisions and furnish in memorandum form their response to the Legal Counsel Division.

(2) The Legal Counsel Division will, upon receipt of responses from the interested Divisions, prepare the necessary communication to the Senate Select Committee to be approved by the Attorney General and furnished to the Committee.

PLM

OK

(FAOS--4/30/75)

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL TYLER AND DIRECTOR KELLY

April 30, 1975

This memorandum concerns paragraph IV of the attachment to Senator Church's letter of March 19 to the Attorney General. On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, I would like to request the following:

1. Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instructions. Certain sections of the Manual currently in effect have been produced to us. We had intended by the request to ask for the relevant superseded sections (note the absence of the word "current" in Section IV as compared to Section IIIA) and we did indicate previously to the liaison staff that we were interested in superseded sections. But without regard to that, it is clear from documents such as the Director's letter of August 7, 1973 to the Attorney General that certain superseded sections will be highly relevant in analyzing the question of legal authority, as well as in understanding particular events in earlier years. We would appreciate their being sent to us promptly or if that causes mechanical problems, being able to promptly review them at the FBI in order to select particular portions for copying. At a minimum we would be interested in superseded Manual provisions for the sections set out in Appendix A.

Xerox furnished to K. Wm O'Connor Deputy Asst. to A.G. by SA DALY 5-20-75

Copy to Harriet Mowitt, Ad Hoc Comm. by LFS 5-15-75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY

62-116395-152

ENCLOSURE

2. Sections of the Manual of Instructions Not Previously Produced. Based upon the previous production to us of the table of contents to the Manual of Instructions, we have identified certain additional sections of the Manual which we would like to examine. Rather than having these made available to us in the first instance in our offices, we suggest that they be made available to Mark Gitenstein, and other designated members of the staff, for initial examination at the FBI offices. A listing of those sections is annexed as Appendix B.

3. Manual of Rules and Regulations. Again, based upon the procedure whereby we were first furnished with the table of contents of the Manual of Rules, we have identified those sections which we want to examine initially. To expedite matters, these sections, identified in Appendix C, could be examined by Mr. Gitenstein, or other designated staff members, at the FBI offices.

4. Filing System. It would also be most helpful if you could provide the Committee with any other written materials on administration of any of the filing or information systems, manual or automated, which are used in the course of intelligence or internal security activities. This does not fit within our prior request but should serve to make future requests more focused.

I have in mind specifically any memoranda prepared by the Bureau on its indexing system and the so-called Clerk's Manual,

if such a document exists. Please also provide the Committee with a list of the classifications used in the FBI's filing system as well as a complete set of printed forms used by the Bureau (*e.g.*, FD-165, etc.).

* * * *

We believe that all the foregoing material will help expedite and focus the inquiry. I assume that Mr. Hotis will contact me promptly to arrange for our review of this material.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.,
Chief Counsel,
Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence
Activities

Appendix A

Section	Subject
36	Espionage
84	Registration Act
86	Sabotage
87	Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals
88	Sedition
95	Treason
97	Voorhis Act
105	Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency
107	Internal Security Informants and Confidential Sources; and Foreign Counterintelligence Assets
122	Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest
130	Extremist Informants and Sources

Appendix B

Section	Subject
4	Surveillances and Raids
8R	Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division
19	Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Agencies
23	Bomb Threats Explosives and Incendiary Devices
27	Civil Rights
28	Civil Rights Act of 1964
29	Conspiracy
75	Neutrality Matters
78	Passports and Visas
90	Selective Service Act
102	Coordination with Other Government Agencies
103	Foreign Police Cooperation
134	Assaulting the President of the United States and Threats to the President of the United States
136	Antiriot Laws
144	Police Killings
146	Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States

Appendix C

Part I

Section 9 - Disciplinary Matters

Part II

Section 1 - Authority--Training--Submission of Information

Section 2 - Supervision--Availability-Resident Agencies

Section 3 - Administration of Offices

Section 4 - Communications

Section 5 - Dissemination of Information

Section 6 - Publications, Press, and Public Contacts

Section 7 - Payments--Property

Section 8 - Miscellaneous Regulations

Section 9 - Classification--Character--Copies--Abbreviations

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 4/30/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY '75

Removed By 7 9 MAY 28 1975

File Number 62-116395-

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GO NMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4-30-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

Proposed Legislation

Senstudy '75

Bowers

SUBJECT: H. R. 214; LEGISLATION TO REQUIRE COURT ORDERS FOR THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS BY ELECTRONIC AND OTHER DEVICES, FOR ENTERING RESIDENCES, FOR OPENING MAIL, AND FOR INSPECTION OF CERTAIN RECORDS

Reference Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams memorandum, 4-28-75, reporting that the Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management, House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, is going to open hearings concerning captioned bill on 5-6-75, and that the Department of Justice will be requested to provide testimony.

Mike Cavanagh, Assistant on the Subcommittee staff, called Inspector Bowers on 4-29-75 stating the Subcommittee Chairman, Charles Wilson (D-Calif.), had instructed him to request a copy of the Hoover report to the President in June, 1970, on behalf of the Committee on Interagency Intelligence since this report contained information regarding mail openings and possibly mail covers. Cavanagh was advised that we have received prior requests from Congressional committees for this document and all such requests are being referred to the White House. He was told to contact James Wilderotter in the office of the Counsel to the President at the White House. Wilderotter is the individual to whom we have previously referred a similar request for this document from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUL 21 1975

66-22[illegible]-2356

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Charles Whitley, Administrative Assistant to Congressman David Henderson (D-N.C.), Chairman of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on 4-30-75 told Bowers that the Postal Facilities Subcommittee had scheduled the hearings regarding this legislation hurriedly after it was determined that the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, Committee on Government Operations, chaired by

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Bowers

REC-15 66-2[illegible] 2360

ST 104

5 JUN 10 1975

DWB:kjs (10)

CONTINUED - over

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

84 JUL 23 1975

Congresswoman Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.), had indicated an interest in holding hearings on this matter. Whitley stated hopefully Abzug's Subcommittee can be precluded from conducting any hearings in this area by virtue of the assertion of authority by the Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

James Wentzel, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, has been alerted to the effect that an invitation will be received by the Department for testimony on this legislation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the General and Special Investigative Divisions and the Intelligence Division promptly begin compiling appropriate information for submission to the Legal Counsel Division which can be submitted to the Department for its use in testifying or can be used as the basis for FBI testimony should the Department request an FBI representative to appear at these hearings.

RFB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TJL

DATE: 4/29/75

1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum records the receipt of two documents furnished to the Bureau as a member of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. These documents were furnished by Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, who is chairman of the Ad Hoc Group.

Attached herewith is a current list of those staff members of the Senate Select Committee who have received security clearances. The Bureau will continue to receive up-dated lists as additional staff members are afforded a security clearance.

Also attached is a copy of the request levied on the Department of State by the Senate Select Committee. A copy of this request was furnished to the Bureau for its information by Mr. Clarke.

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Enclosures

WRW/TJL

WOC:lmh lmh
(8)

REC-100 62-116395-151

21 MAY 15 1975

ENCLOSURE

2

84 MAY 27 1975

24 April 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET

	NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
B *	Aaron, David 15/4	8-21-38	IL	550-44-7971	
B *	Bader, William 17/4	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF - Badge
	Baron, Frederick	12-2-47	CONN	494-54-5241	
*	Benz, Charity I.	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
	Brooks, Nancy	2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773	
B *	Carter, Barry 24/4	12-14-42	CAL	567-56-8854	
	Chesnik, Barbara	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
B *	Davis, Lynn 17/4	9-6-43	FL	042-36-9155	TF - Badge
	Dawson, Thomas	9-9-52	MINN	471-60-1688	
	De Oreo, Mary	6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258	
	Dillon, Molly	4-16-51	VA	150-38-4588	
	Dwyer, Daniel	8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792	
	Epstein, Michael Taylor	3-10-37	MASS	026-28-6318	
B *	Fenn, Peter 24/4	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123	
	Gitenstein, Mark Henry	3-7-46	ALA	420-60-8767	
	Greissing, Edward	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
*	Hatry, Audrey Helen	6-10-23	MD	216-14-8691	
*	Inderfurth, Mark	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	
	Johnson, Dorothy	6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413	

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-151

Staff Members of Senate Select Committee cleared, page 2

		NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
		Johnson, Loch	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478	
	*	Kieves, Lawrence	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
3	*	Kirbow, Charles 24/4	10-2-22	GA	252-12-5112	TF - Badge
3	*	Lombard, Charles 24/4	6-2-30	FR	578-44-9471	
		Liebengood, Howard	12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707	
		MacDonald, Naldeen	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
B	*	Madigan, Michael James 15/4	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF - Badge
B	*	Marshall, Benjamin 17/4	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
B	*	Maxwell, Elliot Everett 15/4	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF - Badge
	*	Mecham, Martha Evans	2-11-40	CAL	528-48-6848	
B	*	Miller, William G. 15/4	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
B	*	O'Flaherty, James Daniel 15/4	11-4-42	ILL	239-62-8495	Badge
		Orloff, Jan	11-14-47	CAL	558-74-8394	
		Peterson, John F.	6-15-41	CAL	565-56-7707	
		Pitts, Susan	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
B	*	Romberg, Alan 22/4	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
B	*	Schwarz, Frederick A.O., III 15/4	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
B	*	Shea, Patrick 15/4	2-28-48	UT	528-64-1965	
		Smith, Stephanie	3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476	
B	*	Snider, Lewis Brittle 24/4	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
		Towell, Mary	4-25-44	TN	566-64-7628	
B	*	Wides, Burton Victor 17/4	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF - Badge

* Staff Members who are designated to receive COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION.
B Staff Members briefed on COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION.

4/23/75

Request to the Secretary of State for Documents and Other Material Regarding the Department of State and Intelligence Activities of the United States Government

1. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance or similar material setting forth the relationship of the Department of State to, and its role in, the Intelligence Community and the National Security Council structure, including but not limited to the United States Intelligence Board, the Forty Committee, Washington Special Action Group, Senior Review Group, the Verification Panel, and the Intelligence Committee. Specific descriptive and documentary material covering the nature and extent of the Department's relationship with the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other investigating and intelligence entities should be included, such as the Interagency Evaluation Committee.

2. Organization charts showing which officials represent the Department of State on the various Intelligence Community and NSC committees, and on all other bodies, including subcommittees, whose functions include intelligence activities. Such charts should give the names and titles of officials representing the Department of State in those committees (or their predecessor organizations) going as far back as 1947 or any earlier date which the Department believes relevant. The charts should also include, for the same time frame, the names, titles, and a brief job description of those officials of the Department who provided staff support to the Department's representatives on Intelligence Community and NSC committees or to the committees directly.

3. All regulations, guidance, inter-agency memoranda, delimitations agreements, including other agreements and similar material governing the support which the Department of State provides to or receives from other agencies within the Government, having an intelligence or security or investigative function. This would include, but not be limited to, such matters as administrative support and "cover" provided to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (and its predecessors), communications support, and financial services.

4. Description, including organization chart, of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). This should include, in particular, detailed discussion of the operations of the Directorate for Coordination (INR/DDC) and any predecessor offices, whether in INR, the Under Secretary's office, or elsewhere in the Department. Names of personnel throughout the Directorate for Coordination or its

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-25-01 BY SP2ALM/RW

62-116395-151
ENCLOSURE

predecessors should be listed covering the entire period since that function was developed.

5. Description of the organization and functions of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, and of the Office of Security within the Bureau of Administration, insofar as they relate to liaison or cooperation with any intelligence or domestic investigatory body.

6. All instructions, memoranda or similar documents authorizing the establishment of and detailing the mandate of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (and its Working Group). Also all reports on terrorism by the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (and its Working Group), such as the report by the Secretary of State to the President referred to in the President's Memorandum of September 25, 1972, establishing the Committee.

7. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance, or similar material which sets forth the Department of State's role in establishing or reviewing requirements or proposals for intelligence activity, including intelligence collection, recruitment of agents, political action programs, paramilitary programs, and counterintelligence activities. In addition, a descriptive account of the Department of State's role in establishing or reviewing requirements or proposals for intelligence activity, differentiating the Department's role in intelligence collection, recruitment of agents, political action programs, paramilitary programs, and counterintelligence activities. This should include differentiation between activities within these categories where differences exist.

8. All directives, regulations, memoranda, guidance, or similar material which sets forth the role and functions of the Department of State in the collection, assessment, production, and dissemination of national intelligence. In addition, a descriptive account of the current role and functions of the Department of State in this regard.

9. All instructions, guidance or similar material defining the authority of U.S. Ambassadors and other Chiefs of Mission to know about and control activities of any U.S. intelligence or investigative agent or entity in the country to which the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is accredited. This should include any limitations upon Ambassadorial control or cognizance of and discussion of any other coordination, monitoring, or other relationships between U.S. missions and the activities of any U.S. intelligence or investigative agent or entity.

10. Any other historical, descriptive or documentary material, studies or reports which the Department believes would be of assistance to the Select Committee in understanding the Department's role in intelligence activities, evaluation and monitoring of those activities, or other matters relevant to the Committee's mandate.

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

Elliff was also interested in knowing whether our legal attaches were operational in the counterintelligence field. He was advised they were not. Elliff also asked whether CIA made available to the FBI their latest technical developments. He was advised that we believed they did.

Finally, Elliff desired to know whether the FBI had received any documents [from another Government agency (CIA)] wherein [the Bureau was requested to surreptitiously enter the Chilean Embassy in Washington, D. C.] (S) He was advised that this would have to be researched and that we would be in touch with him on this particular subject. JFK(1)(B)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) We have already begun to examine the material asked for regarding the FBI's legal authority and implication of sensitive investigative techniques. Once examined and analyzed, we will submit recommendations as to how we should proceed taking into consideration the observations and suggestions of Elliff.

(2) We are pulling together the documents regarding [the Chilean Embassy episode] (S) and with approval will suggest Elliff submit his specific request in writing through the AG.

Elliff advised by SA Daley 6/16/75 wob

K

SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10271-10303
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-116395-281

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: CREGAR
TO: WANNALL
TITLE:

DATE: 06/20/1975
PAGES: 5
SUBJECT: CC

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 11/06/1998
UPDATE DATE:
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECRET

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/20/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

ORIGINAL ONLY

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. ~~EXCEPT BRACKETS~~
Info is classified for FBI
~~K 4-30-98~~ MAG 9.18.98

4-29-98
5668 SLD/KSB
c) d
1.6
(JFK) Cregar TJM

PURPOSE:

To advise that Senate Select Committee (SSC) has been given access to a CIA "Secret" document prepared in May, 1973, containing information concerning questionable activities in which CIA has engaged, a number of which activities involve the FBI and which are the subject matter of current SSC inquiries of this Bureau.

DETAILS:

On 6/20/75, through prior arrangement, Major Perry Miles, USMC, Intelligence Community Staff, upon instruction from John Clarke, Associate Deputy to Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, appeared at Headquarters for the purpose of briefing Intelligence Division personnel concerning possible problems which may have arisen in connection with captioned matter. Present at the briefing, in addition to yourself and me, were the following personnel familiar with CIA and Senstudy matters: Special Agents Leon F. Schwartz, John P. Thomas, Seymor F. Phillips, Fred J. Cassidy,*and Thomas J. McNiff.

Major Miles brought with him a 693-page document, classified "Secret," containing information concerning questionable activities in which CIA had engaged, which document was prepared in May, 1973, by CIA under the direction of then CIA Director James R. Schlesinger. This document consisted of numerous memoranda relating to a wide variety of operations in which CIA had engaged. Sometime after its compilation, date unknown, the document was turned over to the Justice Department for review to determine possible criminal

REC-100 62-116395-281

62-116395

SECRET

TJM:lhb

Classified by ~~7225~~ TJM
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

17 JUN 27 1975

5 TJM

84 JUN 27 1975

*Elmer W. Larson, Jr.

ramifications, and the Department still has a copy in its possession.* Major Miles advised that the White House is in possession of a copy of this document and it was his impression that Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, is aware of its existence. He also advised that members of the SSC, with the knowledge of CIA Director Colby, have had access to this document if not a copy of same in their possession. Major Miles, upon instruction of John Clarke, is visiting the various members of the intelligence community mentioned by CIA in the document for the purpose of briefing them concerning its existence and those portions which may pertain to those agencies. He indicated that he had the previous day briefed General Allen, Director of National Security Agency (NSA), and Mr. Benson Buffham, Deputy Director. From the document which Major Miles kept in his possession at all times, he cited numerous pages which made reference to the FBI. The following items of which are deemed pertinent for mention at this time and worthy of research are:

Page 23 - Information concerning incarceration by CIA of Soviet defector for an extended period in early 1960. In mid-1960, this defector was turned over to, and cooperated with, the FBI. It is believed this reference refers to Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko.

Pages 70 and 77 - Information concerning use of CIA funds [S] in the amount of $2,700,000 to acquire real estate and technical equipment in late 1971 for use of the FBI in Washington, D. C. (S) This undoubtedly refers to the KORSAJ Program with which the Director is familiar. (S)

Page 111 - Information concerning arrangements for purchase of audio equipment from a legitimate electronics firm through a CIA proprietary company, ostensively for the purpose of circumventing Federal statutes against such

CONTINUED - OVER

* according to Major Miles.

purchases. In October, 1971, as a result of Bureau inquiry at the above electronics firm, the Bureau was referred to the Department of Justice, which indicated it was aware of the operation and requested no additional investigation.

Pages 140-142 - A series of five code words describing CIA's clandestine operations, mostly electronic in nature, which were apparently being conducted in coordination with the FBI. One of the code words cited was the ~~above mentioned~~ [ORKID Program] (S) Other code words mentioned were [MOHAWK, UNION, ROSE] (S) and [WU GRAVEL,] (S) significance of which is unknown at this time.

Pages 221-222 - Makes mention of seven electronic penetration operations wherein the CIA supported the FBI by supplying electronic equipment. It is believed some of these operations refer to this Bureau's penetration of the [Chilean Embassy and our coverage of People's Republic of China establishments] (S) in this country.

Page 234 - Information concerning CIA refusal of FBI request to process photographic imagery of a suspect in a bank robbery case.

Page 329 - Information concerning [Project SALVAGE] (S) where, in 1967 at the request of a high Bureau official, [the Office (S)] of Security of CIA paid rent on and maintained custodianship of a plant in [New York City directed against the United Nations.] (S) In December, 1967, the assets of this operation allegedly were turned over to the FBI.

Page 334 - Information concerning [1971-73 electronic penetration of Chilean Embassy] (S) initiated by the FBI at the request of the CIA, which matter is the subject of a current inquiry of this Bureau from SSC.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall SECRET
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

Page 361 - Information contained in CIA report relating to a May, 1972, breakin in the Chilean Embassy, ~~which~~ report (S) stated that no investigation was being conducted by the FBI in view of lack of jurisdiction.

Pages 457-458 - Information concerning CIA counterintelligence operation including forcible entry and removal of documents in 1962 against an unnamed foreign establishment in the United States. Top United States officials, including President Kennedy, were briefed concerning this operation. Then Attorney General Robert Kennedy after being briefed stated the operation was not to be called to the attention of the FBI unless FBI first initiated inquiry. It is to be noted former Bureau Liaison officer Sam Papich was queried concerning this matter in recent interview by SSC representatives.

Page 459 - Information concerning controversy between former CIA Director McCone and Bureau official Mr. Belmont regarding Bureau's opposition to CIA recommendation that there be an extensive broadening of counterintelligence activities against diplomatic establishments in this country.

OBSERVATIONS:

Contact this date with Department officials elicited that four Department attorneys, including K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of Deputy Attorney General, have reviewed the above 693-page document and have been furnished additional sanitized documents of interest from a prosecutive standpoint.

From the above, it is obvious that this Bureau, in order to be in a position to knowledgeably and accurately reply to SSC inquiries and to fully identify operations listed above, should first obtain a copy of the above 693-page

CONTINUED - OVER

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr DATE: February 13, 1970

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: UNION FOR REVOLUTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[redacted], CIA, furnished the following to the Liaison Agent on 2/10/70. (S)

CIA has established a U.S. based notional organization representing itself as being communist oriented and having the following mailing addresses: P.O. Box 444, Boston, Massachusetts, 02102 and P.O. Box 8272, General Post Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19101. The organization's activity in the U.S. will be restricted to production of propaganda in the form of pamphlets, etc., which material will be mailed to various Left Wing groups in foreign countries. The primary objective of this operation is to develop penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. The organization is completely notional in character in that there will be no offices in the U.S. (only p.o. boxes) and even the officials will bear fictitious names. CIA hopes that once the propaganda begins circulating, Arab groups will become interested and will endeavor to establish contact with "officials" of the organization. If this develops, CIA will then proceed to use its own personnel under "suitable" cover to make the contact. From then on CIA will maneuver to penetrate the target group. (S)

X (S)

In response to the Liaison Agent's request, CIA will furnish us samples of propaganda. The Agent also asked that we be given copies of communications sent to the mailing addresses by any organizations or individuals. We should have such data so that we can take the necessary investigative action in the event any persons or organizations in the U.S. take an interest in the captioned group. We, of course, will also be interested in international ramifications which could have a bearing on the activities of Left Wing activity in this country. The Agent also asked for the names of the officials which will be related to the Union for Revolution. (S)

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/lbf
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
11-15-2000
MDR-16

At this stage there does not appear to be any conditions or developments which would have an adverse bearing on our operations or jurisdiction providing that CIA keeps us adequately informed. CIA asks that it be apprised of any information coming to our attention concerning the organization. CIA further requests that its interest not be revealed outside of the Bureau and that this information be handled on a need-to-know basis. (S)

SJP:wmk
(6)

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

62-116395-284

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

ACTION:

[The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Nationalities Intelligence Section. Liaison will follow in order to obtain samples of the propaganda referred to above and will again reiterate that we be furnished copies of communications transmitted to the mailing addresses.] (S)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr   DATE: February 13, 1970

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: UNION FOR REVOLUTION   JFK(1)(B)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Norman Garrett, CIA, furnished the following to the Liaison Agent on 2/10/70. (S)

JFK(1)(B)

CIA has established a U.S. based notional organization representing itself as being communist oriented and having the following mailing addresses: P.O. Box 444, Boston, Massachusetts, 02102 and P.O. Box 8272, General Post Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19101. The organization's activity in the U.S. will be restricted to production of propaganda in the form of pamphlets, etc., which material will be mailed to various Left Wing groups in foreign countries. The primary objective of this operation is to develop penetrations and/or sources in revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. The organization is completely notional in character in that there will be no offices in the U.S. (only p.o. boxes) and even the officials will bear fictitious names. CIA hopes that once the propaganda begins circulating, Arab groups will become interested and will endeavor to establish contact with "officials" of the organization. If this develops, CIA will then proceed to use its own personnel under "suitable" cover to make the contact. From then on CIA will maneuver to penetrate the target group. (S)

In response to the Liaison Agent's request, CIA will furnish us samples of propaganda. The Agent also asked that we be given copies of communications sent to the mailing addresses by any organizations or individuals. We should have such data so that we can take the necessary investigative action in the event any persons or organizations in the U.S. take an interest in the captioned group. We, of course, will also be interested in international ramifications which could have a bearing on the activities of Left Wing activity in this country. The Agent also asked for the names of the officials which will be related to the Union for Revolution. (S)

At this stage there does not appear to be any conditions or developments which would have an adverse bearing on our operations or jurisdiction providing that CIA keeps us adequately informed. CIA asks that it be apprised of any information coming to our attention concerning the organization. CIA further requests that its interest not be revealed outside of the Bureau and that this information be handled on a need-to-know basis. (S)

11-15-2000
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/BMP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
MDR-16

SJP:wmk
(6)

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

ACTION:

[The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Nationalities Intelligence Section. Liaison will follow in order to obtain samples of the propaganda referred to above and will again reiterate that we be furnished copies of communications transmitted to the mailing addresses.] (S)

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

387 THRU 391

393 THRU 396

397

1ST NR 397, 398

399

1ST NR 399, 400.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

DATE: 7/15/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

#MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

By letter 7/7/75 to the Honorable Frank Church, we noted that the Senate Select Committee had in its possession certain materials, which were compiled by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, for the preparation of its report to the President, which materials most probably contained information regarding FBI operations of the utmost sensitivity. In order to avoid any inadvertent compromise of such information, we requested an opportunity to meet with Senators Church and Tower at the earliest convenience to discuss areas of this Bureau's activities which might warrant special consideration. Senator Church agreed that the above matter would be discussed with Director Kelley at the latter's appearance before the Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee meeting scheduled for 7/16/75.

REC-88 62-116395-400

For your additional information, this Bureau had earlier ascertained that the Senate Select Committee has had access to a 693-page document prepared by CIA listing instances wherein CIA believed its operations may have exceeded its mandate. A review of this document by Bureau personnel indicated that some of these operations involve matters involving this Bureau of an extremely sensitive nature. In response to a request of CIA for copies of pertinent material contained in the above 693-page document, CIA on this date furnished copies of the material requested.

3 JUL 22 1975

In anticipation of the Director's appearance before SSC on 7/16/75, the above material furnished by CIA consisting of approximately 174 pages was reviewed. This material is found to contain numerous references, in sanitized form, to

62-116395

TJM:lhb lhb
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUL 21 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

various technical support CIA has provided this Bureau in the area of electronic coverage of embassies in the United States. No other information was found in this material which would tend to jeopardize sensitive Bureau sources, ongoing investigations or information we have received from foreign intelligence sources.

ACTION:

Above submitted for information. A separate memorandum is being prepared detailing information contained in the material received from CIA and requesting of interested Divisions and Sections at Headquarters their assessment of any possible damage and recommendation for action to be taken therewith.

TJM

WRW

PLM

Senator Church aware of our concern + also indicated would make avail to us [illegible] any ref to FBI in Rockefeller Comm. material furnished committee.

7/14/75

2cc

JUL 16 1975

Mr. John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Hot, [illegible]
Dick

Dear Mr. Elliff:

Your letter of July 16, responding to mine of July 15, was, as you may recall, hand-delivered to me by Mr. Dick at 12:45 today. I understand that your interpretive amplification is generally shared by Mr. Schwarz.

We are studying the suggestions you have made; in the meantime, of course, we are prepared to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the July 15, letter.

Sincerely,

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

cc: Deputy Attorney General
Doug Marvin
✓John Mintz

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUL 30 1975

SenStudy [illegible]

FILE
[illegible]

62-116395

84 JUL 30 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. Cochran
(Attn: Mr. W. D. Campbell)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

July 14, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
WILLIAM D. CAMPBELL BY SSC
STAFF MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2.20.87 BY SP4JPM/LH
607

Set out below is information concerning an interview of FBI SA William D. Campbell by SSC Staff Members. Campbell is currently assigned to FBI Headquarters. The details of the interview are as furnished by Campbell.

On advance notice from Mr. Michael Epstein, SSC Staff Member, Campbell was advised that he was to be interviewed at 11:00 a.m., June 27, 1975, in the SSC offices. Campbell was informed by the Legal Counsel Division of the FBI that he was being released from any applicable employment agreement for purposes of the SSC interview concerning the former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr., Stanley David Levison and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. It was explained to Campbell that he had a right to counsel; however, the FBI was unable to provide private counsel. Campbell was also told that there were certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions. These areas concerned information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and information which had originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Campbell was informed that if a question arose during the interview in one of these areas, he had the privilege, before replying, of consulting with an

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67- (Personnel File SA William D. Campbell)

SFP:lhb lhb
(11)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

62-116395-399

SEE NOTE PAGE 6

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

Campbell advised he was on a squad in the security area, that his Supervisor was E. H. Belter and that the Security Coordinating Supervisor was L. W. R. Oberndorf, now deceased.

Epstein then asked that they get to the point and inquired of Campbell as to when he had heard about the King case. Campbell responded that sometime early in 1964 he heard of the case and recalled it was shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy, and King had been named Man of the Year ("Time" Magazine), that Campbell became knowledgeable under the following circumstances. Campbell was summoned to the office of the SAC either by a fellow SA, Bill Bergeron, or by Supervisor Belter, specific individual not recalled. Present in the office was the SAC at the time, Marlin Johnson, the then FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan, Bergeron and probably several others, names not recalled. The following was related by Campbell in response to Epstein's questions concerning what took place at the conference.

After some opening remarks by the SAC, Sullivan advised that he did not want any of the information they were to discuss to leave the room. Sullivan said that he had information indicating that King was associating with communists and that it was possible that King's movement was being infiltrated. As a result, Sullivan said he wanted a technical installation on King in an effort to verify this information.

At some later date, Campbell was assigned to monitor the technical installation on King in which a radio transmitter was used. He could not recall whether the equipment was signed out to him but he did take the equipment home and on a Sunday afternoon he took a bus to Union Station.

He walked around for a short time and then went by cab to the Willard Hotel and checked in under an assumed name (name not recalled). These actions were taken by him as a security precaution. He did not recall who made his reservation at the hotel. The first night King did not enter the room which Campbell was monitoring. Campbell could not recall the names of the individuals who occupied the room he was monitoring but did recall that they were associated with the King party. The next day, Campbell and a fellow SA, John Borys, moved to a different room. He could not recall how the arrangements for the move were made.

Campbell and Borys monitored King for about two days, stayed one extra day at the hotel and then checked out. Either Campbell or Borys remained in the room at all times. One of them would take the logs and tapes out of the hotel each day and turn them over to someone from WFO, details not recalled. At no time did Campbell ever enter any room in the hotel that was occupied by King or any member of King's party. The tape recorder they utilized was manually operated and they attempted to run it at all times when someone was in the room being monitored. Campbell knew of no physical or photographic surveillance on King during that time. Campbell also advised that he could not recall any instructions concerning listening only to certain types of conversations.

Epstein inquired as to whether Campbell kept a card at WFO showing his location. He responded that it was the normal practice to place a card in the usual repository when one was away from the office. In this particular case, if Campbell did leave a card, he would have probably placed a notation on it such as "Special - See Supervisor Belter for contact."

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SA BY SSC

In response to direct questioning, Campbell advised that he had never seen any paper (memoranda, etc.) dealing with this case other than the logs previously mentioned.

Epstein inquired as to whether Campbell had ever seen the tapes again after he had departed the hotel. Campbell advised that sometime later, possibly one or two months, he was asked to review the tapes and logs in an effort to obtain additional information. He did this at the FBI Laboratory and was assisted by SA John Matter, retired, in the technical enhancement techniques, such as filtering. Campbell was not directed to concentrate on any one part of the tapes but reviewed all of them. He did not type any of the information overheard and if any such typing was done, it was probably done in the Intelligence Division. Campbell has not seen the tapes since that time.

On Epstein's inquiry, Campbell advised he first heard about the planned interview of him from SA Paul V. Daly of the FBI's Legal Counsel Division and did not discuss the King case with Bergeron, Matter or Borys after that contact. Campbell did not know whether or not the tapes are still in existence.

Miss DeOreo inquired as to whether it was the normal practice to erase tapes. Campbell answered that in this type of an investigation he was sure only new tapes were used. He explained he was certain that tapes were new when he found them still wrapped in cellophane and they had the appearance of new tapes. She also inquired as to how he secured the key for the second room in the hotel and whether he had to re-register. He answered that he did not recall but felt certain he did not re-register and that some other SA from WFO probably obtained the key for him. During the monitoring, no persons other than Campbell and Borys entered the monitoring room. Additional responses to questions from Epstein were as follows. Campbell utilized only one radio receiver and listened to only one radio microphone. He could not recall if there were any others in use. He and Borys took turns listening to the transmitter. Campbell did not remove the transmitter when he left the hotel as he never entered any of the rooms assigned to the King party. Campbell did not know any details concerning Mr. Sullivan's remarks about King's association with communists. Campbell did not attend all the meetings at WFO concerning the King installation. It was his best recollection that the monitoring was done in rooms one floor above the rooms occupied by the King party.

At the end of the interview, Epstein indicated he had one final question which was, as best Campbell could remember, "Is there anything else about this case that you know that has not come out because I did not ask the right question or did not ask a question in the right way?" Campbell replied that he felt that Epstein had done a good job in asking the questions.

NOTE:

Assistant Director Mintz briefed Campbell prior to his interview. Campbell was accompanied to the SSC offices by Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project but Phillips was not called upon for any consultation.

Epstein then stated lets get to the point. When did you hear about the King case. I responded that sometime early in 1964 - recalled since it was shortly after President Kennedy was shot and King was named man of the year - I was summons to the SAC's office either by my associate Bill Bergeron or my supervisor Mr. Belter not specifically recalled. The SAC, Marlin Johnson, Assistant Director William Sullivan, Bergeron and probably several others not recalled were in attendance. The following is a narrative of information I furnished in response to Epstein's questions.

The SAC made several remarks and Assistant Director Sullivan then stated that he did not want any information discussed to leave the room. Sullivan stated he had information that indicated King was associating with communists and it was possible his movement was being infiltrated. Sullivan said he wanted a technical installation on King in an effort to verify this information.

At some later date I was assigned to monitor the installation which was a radio transmitter. I could not recall if the equipment was signed out to me or not but I took the equipment home and on a Sunday afternoon I caught a bus to Union Station, I walked around for a short time and then by cab went to the hotel and checked in under an assumed name (name not remembered). I did not recall who made my reservations. The first night King did not enter the room we were monitoring. (I did not recall the names of individuals who occupied room but they were associated with King party.) The next day we (John Borys of WFO and myself) moved to a different room. I could not recall how the arrangements for the move was made. We then monitored King for about two days, stayed one extra day at the hotel, and checked out. Either Borys or myself stayed in the room at all time. One would take the logs and tapes out of the hotel each day and turn them over to someone from WFO (details not recalled). At no time did I ever enter any room in the hotel that was occupied by King or any member of his party. The tape recorder was manually operated and we attempted to run it any time someone was in the room. I know of no physical or photographic surveillance on King during this time. I had no instructions that I can recall concerning only listening to certain types of conversation.

Epstein asked if I kept a card at the office showing my location. I responded that it was the normal practice to place a card in file when one was away from the office. In this case, if I placed a card in file I probably would place a notation like "Special - See Supervisor Belter for contact."

I had never seen any paper, memos, etc. (other than logs) dealing with this case.

Epstein asked if I ever saw the tapes again after departing the hotel. I stated that sometime after (possibly one or two months) I was asked to review the tapes and logs in an effort to obtain additional information. I did this at the FBI Laboratory and was assisted by SA John Matter, retired, in the technical enhancement techniques such as filtering. I was not directed to concentrate on any one part of the tapes but reviewed all of the tapes. I did not type any of the information and if it was typed it was probably typed in the Intelligence Division. I have not seen the tapes since that time.

I first heard about my interview from Mr. Daly of the Legal Division and did not discuss this case with Mr. Bergeron, Mr. Matter or Mr. Borys after that contact. I do not know if the tapes are still in existance.

DeOreo ~~Dorio~~ asked if it was the normal practice to erase tapes. I stated that in this type investigation I was sure only new tapes were used. I was certain the tapes were new if they were still wrapped in cellophane and they had the appearance of new tapes. She also asked how I got the key for the second room at the hotel and did I have to re-register. I stated, I did not recall but felt sure I did not re-register and some agent from WFO probably got the key to me. No other person entered the rooms except Borys and myself where the monitoring was taking place.

Other responses to questions from Epstein were: We only had one radio receiver and only listened to one radio microphone, I could not recall if there were others. Borys and myself took turns listening to the transmitter. I did not remove the transmitter when I left the hotel as I never entered any of the rooms assigned to the King party.

One final question from Epstein. Is there anything else about this case that you know that has not come out because I did not ask the right question or asked a question in the right way. I advised I felt he had done a good job in asking the questions.

Additional answers to questions. I did not know any details concerning Mr. Sullivan's remarks about King's association with communists. I did not attend all of the meetings at WFO concerning the King installation. My best recollection was that the monitoring was in rooms one floor above the rooms occupied by King.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of incumbent FBI Special Agent William D. Campbell

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Intelligence collection
Intelligence activities, domestic
Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King Jr.; Stanley David Levison and Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organization of FBI Washington Field Office

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5' woc

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

273-10005

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

July 18, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2.20.81 BY SP4JAM/LLC
6070

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by Staff Members of captioned Committee of former FBI Assistant Director Ivan Conrad. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: K. William O'Connor
    Special Counsel for
    Intelligence Coordination

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-35912 (Personnel file Former AD Ivan Conrad)

SFP:lhb/hb
(11)

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

3 - ENCLOSURE

REC-88 62-116395-398

3 JUL 22 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUL 22 1975

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

July 18, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (AD)
IVAN CONRAD BY SSC STAFF
MEMBERS

INFORMATION CONTAINED
[illegible]

2.20 8 SP4JM/kk
6076

Set out below is information concerning an interview of former FBI AD Ivan Conrad by SSC Staff Members. Mr. Conrad served in the FBI from June 8, 1934, until his retirement July 12, 1973, at which time he held the position of AD in charge of the FBI's Laboratory.

On advance notice from Mr. Michael Epstein, SSC Staff Member, Conrad was advised that he was to be interviewed at 10:00 a.m., July 9, 1975, in the SSC offices. Conrad was informed by the Legal Counsel Division of the FBI that he was being released from any applicable employment agreement for purposes of the SSC interview concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. It was explained to Conrad that he had the right to counsel; however, FBI was unable to provide private counsel. Conrad was also told that there were certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions. These areas concerned information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and information which had originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Conrad was informed that if a question arose during the interview in one of these areas, he had the privilege, before

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-35912 (Personnel File Former AD Ivan Conrad)

SFP:lhb (10) lhb

62-116395-398

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

SEE NOTE PAGE 6

GPO 951-546

replying, of consulting with an FBI representative who would accompany him to the interview. The representative would not be present during the actual interview but would merely be available nearby in the event consultation was desired.

The details of the interview, as voluntarily furnished by Conrad, are as follows.

Conrad was interviewed in SSC quarters for the approximate period 10:10 a.m. to 10:45 a.m., July 9, 1975, by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo. No mention of Conrad's rights was made. The following details are not necessarily in chronological order.

Conrad was questioned concerning his career in the FBI and the positions which he held. He replied that he entered the FBI in 1934 and was assigned to the Laboratory where he spent his entire FBI career. During the 1940's, he was placed in charge of the Radio Engineering Section (RE). In 1955, he became the Number One Man, the equivalent of being the Deputy AD in the Laboratory. In 1961, he was elevated to the position of AD, which he held until his retirement in mid-1973.

Conrad was queried as to whether the Laboratory was broken down into various sections at the time he was AD. He responded that there were four sections in the Laboratory: Document, Physics and Chemistry, RE, and Cryptanalysis-Translation. He was asked as to whether the sections were further broken down into units and was asked for any such specific breakdown in the RE. His answer was that while there were unit breakdowns, he did not recall the specific breakdown within the RE. He was asked as to the basis for unit breakdowns and advised it was based upon sensitivity and expertise of the work; both factors entered into consideration with the greater weight placed upon the expertise factor.

Conrad was told that the SSC was focusing on an allegation that some tapes were made of a conversation of Martin Luther King, Jr., and that these tapes were mailed outside of the FBI. Conrad was also told that the SSC had been advised that Conrad had been requested to make copies of such tapes for the indicated purpose of mailing outside the FBI. Conrad was then asked what he knew about this matter. His answer was that he did not know or recall anything that would fit the description above. Conrad asked Epstein if the latter could indicate a time frame which might assist Conrad in his recall. Epstein said they were referring to the early 1960's, after which Conrad responded that that was a long time ago and Conrad was just unable to recall anything on the allegation. Conrad was asked if he recalled making copies of a tape dealing with King without knowing it was for the purpose of the tapes being mailed. His response was "No."

Conrad was asked if he had known that the FBI had technical coverage of King. His response was, "Not specifically." He was then asked what he meant by "specifically" and this point was pressed by the interrogators. Conrad responded that he recalled that FBI Director Hoover had announced publicly that the FBI had in effect a number of wire taps, thus indicating that a number of FBI subjects who were under investigation were thus covered through such means. However, Conrad did not know or recall that King was actually one of the subjects of such coverage.

Conrad was asked whether he recalled, aside from the King case, whether any recordings were sent to the Laboratory for processing or copying when they related to civil rights matters. His response was "No."

Conrad was asked who was in charge of the RE and responded by asking for time frame. He was told the reference was to the early 1960's and Conrad responded that, because of the turnover of personnel, he could not respond to any specific times. He was then asked who was in charge at the time Conrad retired in 1973 and he gave the name of Wayne Bradley (retired). He was asked how long Bradley was the Section Chief of RE and Conrad answered that he could not remember.

Conrad was asked whether it was common to make copies of tapes derived from technical coverage. He responded that it was done on occasion and explained that tapes would sometimes be sent to the Laboratory in order to obtain more coherent copies through a process known as filtering. In such instances, filtered copies were produced in the Laboratory. When asked where this was done, Conrad said it was done in the RE. He was asked whether all tapes derived from technical coverage were sent to the Laboratory and his response was "No." He was asked if all technical coverage tapes were maintained by the Laboratory and his response was "No." When asked under what conditions they would be sent to the Laboratory, Conrad advised that they would be sent to the Laboratory when it was necessary to have them filtered. In response to inquiry as to what the mechanics were of getting the tapes to the Laboratory, Conrad said there was no single procedure. They might be sent by a field office directly to the Laboratory with a request for assistance in making the tapes more readable; or, the assistance of this nature might originate with an FBI Headquarters official.

Conrad was asked for the detailed mechanics of the routing requests for filtering and he responded that he did not see how this bore on the King matter. He was then asked whether a record was always made of requests for filtering, and he responded that, if the request was from the field, there would normally be a cover communication which would be the permanent record. However, if the request was from a Headquarters official, there might not always be a written record. He was asked how the material would get to a specific person in the Laboratory and he responded by saying that it might be routed directly by the sender or routed to the Laboratory generally, and then from the central routing point in the Laboratory it would be sent to either RE or the specific person who would handle the matter. Conrad was asked how a router would know where to send such an item and he responded that there would be information in the cover communication which would assist in this routing.

Conrad was asked whether it was necessary to account by inventory for all tapes used in making copies of tapes. He answered that it was not so necessary because the volume was so small. He was asked if he knew whether any record or memorandum was made of such a request in connection with the King case and responded that he did not know; that he had no recollection. He was asked if it was possible that such a written record might exist and if so, would it not be in FBI files? He answered that he did not think he could contribute to this question as almost anything is possible. He added, however, that he had no knowledge or recollection of such a record or any knowledge of its existence in FBI files.

He was then asked if he had ever heard of mailings of tapes involving King. He replied that he had seen something in a newspaper within the past year or two indicating such an allegation. His recollection was that the news account was of a copy of a tape being mailed to Mrs. King, and that Mrs. King had denied receiving same.

Conrad was asked what would be done in the Laboratory if someone was asked to make an examination and the examiner thought it was improper or had other questions about the matter. Specifically, Conrad was asked if there was anyone that the examiner could go to in such an event. Conrad responded that there, of course, was a recourse for the examiner. He could take the matter up with his Section Chief, or with his AD, or, if he chose to, he could address the matter to Director Hoover. Conrad was asked whether he had been consulted by a Laboratory employee as to the propriety of making copies of King tapes. He responded that he absolutely was not so consulted.

Conrad was then asked whether a John Matter was an employee of the Laboratory when Conrad was there. Response was "Yes." Conrad was asked what Matter's expertise was and he responded that it was basically telephone security. When asked whether that included wire tapping, that is, whether Matter was qualified to perform wire tapping, the answer was "Yes." A similar answer was given to the question as to whether Matter was qualified to listen to tape recordings and attempt to filter them.

NOTE:

Briefing of Conrad, prior to interview, was conducted by AD Mintz, Legal Counsel Division, and S. F. Phillips of INTD, who accompanied Conrad to the SSC offices. It was not necessary for Conrad to consult with Phillips at any time during the interview. Debriefing of Conrad as reported herein was by Phillips.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former FBI Assistant Director Ivan Conrad,

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RC

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Intelligence activities, domestic
Organization and staffing
Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King Jr.
Organization of FBI Laboratory

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX.
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

S/ woc 18

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

273-10004

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(P. V. Daly)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/16/75

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. L. A. Crescioli

FROM : V. V. Kolombatovic

SUBJECT: JOHN D. TARPEY
ASSISTANT CHIEF INSPECTOR,
OFFICE OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE, APPEARANCE
BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
(SSC) 6/10/75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

9600

This memorandum is to advise of testimony by Postal Inspector John D. Tarpey on 6/10/75 before the SSC.

On 6/13/75, Inspector John D. Tarpey confidentially furnished Liaison Officer L. A. Crescioli the following information:

Tarpey testified before the SSC on 6/10/75 for a period of approximately two hours. At the outset of his testimony, Tarpey read a prepared statement in which he informed the Committee that although he wished to cooperate fully he was producing, upon advice of the U. S. Department of Justice, only six internal U. S. Postal Service documents which predate Tarpey's investigative files and which concerned U. S. mail openings in New York City. The six documents turned over to the Committee do not contain any information relating to the FBI; instead, they pertain to mail openings by CIA in New York City. The SSC accepted Tarpey's statement and did not press him for any additional documents. However, a SSC staff representative, (FNU) Wallach, inquired of Tarpey as to whether or not he knew of mail openings in Los Angeles by FBI Agents Ron Mascar (phonetic) and (FNU, but possibly William) Miller.* Tarpey replied that he was not knowledgeable on this matter and never heard of the above two Agents. (Tarpey requested that the above information concerning the two Los Angeles Agents be carefully handled by the FBI since he fears that Wallach may have posed this as a test question for Tarpey).

Liaison Agent Crescioli also contacted Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, U. S. Postal Service (USPS), on 6/13/75 and confidentially learned the following information:

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
191 JUL 25 1975

[illegible]
CONTINUED - OVER

57 JUL

Memorandum V. V. Kolombatovic to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: John D. Tarpey
Assistant Chief Inspector,
Office of Criminal Investigations,
U. S. Postal Service, Appearance
Before Senate Select Committee
(SSC) 6/10/75

Representatives of the SSC have recently requested the Inspection Service of the USPS to make available for interview the Inspector in Charge of the Boston Post Office. According to Jackson, the Inspector in Charge of Boston has been there for many years and is most knowledgeable about past and present activities in that office. In the opinion of Jackson, the representatives of the SSC will soon travel to Miami, Florida, to inquire into the activities of the Postal Service in that area.

The above matter has been coordinated with SA P. V. Daly of the Legal Counsel Division.

ACTION:

For the information of the Director.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

July 17, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT
(SA) JOHN R. BORYS BY SSC
STAFF MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2·20·01 BY SPKAmill
6076

Set out below is information concerning an interview of FBI SA John R. Borys by SSC Staff Members. Borys is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office (WFO) of the FBI.

On advance notice from Mr. Michael Epstein, SSC Staff Member, Borys was advised that he was to be interviewed at 9:00 a.m., July 7, 1975, in the SSC offices. Borys was informed by the Legal Counsel Division of the FBI that he was being released from any applicable employment agreement for purposes of the SSC interview concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. It was explained to Borys that he had a right to counsel; however, the FBI was unable to provide private counsel. Borys was also told that there were certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions. These areas concerned information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and information which had originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Borys was informed that if a question arose during the interview in one of these areas, he had the privilege, before replying, of consulting with an FBI representative who would accompany him to the interview. This representative would not be present during the actual interview but would merely be available nearby in the event consultation was desired.

62-116395-397

NOT REC

SEE NOTE PAGE 9

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-492952 (Personnel File SA John R. Borys)

cof

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE TO AG

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SFP:ms (11)

JBA
Pen WOC

GPO 954-546

A: I am a recruiter for the FBI.

Q: At WFO?

A: Yes.

Q: How long have you been so engaged?

A: About 3½ years.

Q: Were you on Mr. Belter's squad at the time you monitored Dr. King?

A: Yes.

Q: Where did that occur?

A: At the Willard Hotel.

Q: Have you done other monitoring before?

A: Yes.

Q: Is this the only monitoring work you have done outside of the Washington Field Office?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you recall when this occurred?

A: I seem to think it was shortly before President Kennedy's assassination in 1963.

(There followed at this point and at later times during the interview questions in an attempt to jog my memory as to the exact date of the monitoring. I appealed to my recollection that Robert Kennedy's tenure as Attorney General was from 1961 to 1964, and I had to admit the monitoring of Dr. King might have occurred sometime after President Kennedy's death. I pointed out that I had nothing with which to refresh my memory and only the incident of President Kennedy's untimely death tended to fix the date of our activities as taking place close to the time of that death.)

Q: Have you ever worked on cases related to demonstrations?

(It was explained that this question was asked in order to help me try to fix the date of our monitoring by relating it to demonstrations and the date of their occurrence.)

A: I have never worked matters relating to demonstrations. Furthermore, I had had no special interest in the activities of Dr. King or the S.C.L.C. (Southern Christian Leadership Conference). Since I have little or no recollection of demonstrations in which Dr. King might have been involved, this method of trying to jog my memory would seem to be of little help.

Q: Was the weather at the time of the monitoring cold or warm?

A: I seem to recall that the weather was warm, but I am not sure.

Q: Were you told of the purpose of monitoring Dr. King?

A: I am not sure. So much of this is now a gray area to me. I do seem to recall asking for the reason and being advised that this was an internal security matter and that there was some indication that Dr. King was being influenced by persons who leaned toward the left.

Q: Were you told that such people might be with Dr. King?

A: I do not recall. I simply have the recollection that our purpose was to determine whether he was being so influenced. I hasten to admit, however, that I am very hazy on this and it may very well be that I learned of these indications through conversations even after the occurrence of our monitoring. I cannot be more specific in this regard.

Q: Who was with you at the time of the monitoring?

A: Bill Campbell.

Q: Was anyone else involved?

A: I believe I did meet Bill Bergeron in the lobby of the hotel. No one else to my recollection.

Q: Did you sign out from the office to go to the hotel?

A: This would be the customary procedure, but whether it was done in this instance I do not recall.

Q: Did you handle any equipment, i.e., take any to the hotel?

A: No. My recollection is that the equipment was already set up in the room we occupied.

Q: Did you register in the hotel?

A:	I recall the registration desk, therefore, perhaps I did, but I am not sure.
Q:	Did you use old or new tapes?
A:	I do not recall.
Q:	What time of day was it?
A:	I seem to recall that it was at night. I feel a good guess might be between 8:00 p.m. and midnight, or thereabouts.
Q:	Did you monitor for only one night?
A:	That is my recollection.
Q:	Did you and Bill Campbell relieve each other?
A:	I do not recall this. It seems we both monitored at the same time.
Q:	Was Dr. King in the room being monitored?
A:	I associated voices I heard in the room to be that of Dr. King.
Q:	Were there other people in the room being monitored?
A:	I again associated voices heard with Mr. Abernathy, another male from Baltimore whose name I do not recall, and I believe the voices of two women.
Q:	Was there any visual monitoring?
A:	Not to my knowledge.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SA BY SSC

Q: Was this the only monitoring being done at this time?

A: Yes, as far as I know.

Q: Did you make a log while monitoring?

A: One could only take down very sketchy notes.

Q: Did you thereafter go over the tapes and make up logs?

A: Yes.

Q: Where was this done?

A: In an interview room of WFO or some room set up for that purpose.

Q: Regarding the time this monitoring took place, did you leave the hotel for your home when finished?

A: Normal procedure would have been to return to the office. I believe I returned to the office.

Q: Would it not be unusual for you to be returning to the office, say at 1:00 a.m.?

A: No. I have done this on several occasions.

(Purpose here it seems was to jog my memory as to the exact time of monitoring.)

Q: Were you involved in any of the reports or paper work connected with this matter?

A: No.

Q: Did you know to whom the case was assigned?

A: No.

Q: When you monitored in other matters, was it not customary to know the Agent to whom a case was assigned? If so, would you not then relate a conversation overheard to that Agent?

A: In the normal course of events, this would be true, and the Agent to whom the matter was assigned would be so advised if the overheard conversation was urgent in nature. In the matter of Dr. King, however, I did not know the Agent to whom the case was assigned.

Q: When you completed this monitoring, to whom did you give your logs?

A: I do not recall; normal procedure would have been to give them to my immediate supervisor, Mr. Belter.

Q: Getting back to the hotel, did you and Mr. Campbell leave together?

A: I do not recall. In all probability, we did.

Q: Did you carry the tapes and notes back to the office?

A: I do not recall. Either Mr. Campbell or I did, or we both may have. If I did carry them, I normally would have turned them over to the custody of Mr. Belter.

Q: You had no responsibility in regard to the equipment, i.e., setting up, dismantling it, or returning it?

A:	That is correct. My function in this matter was very limited and I recollect I was simply to go, monitor, and return.
Q:	Who gave you this assignment?
A:	I believe it was Mr. Belter.
Q:	When he gave it to you, was it done while you were alone or was someone else present?
A:	I do not recall. I feel it occurred in Mr. Belter's office which did not offer a good deal of privacy. If anyone else was present, however, it was probably Mr. Campbell.
Q:	Did you know the location of Dr. King's hotel room in regard to your location at the hotel?
A:	I do not recall, I do not think so.

The interview ended with some questions in an attempt to refresh my memory as to the actual date of the monitoring. In substance, this is covered above.

NOTE:

Supervisor Paul V. Daly handled Legal Counsel Division briefing of Borys prior to interview, and Borys was accompanied to the SSC offices by Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. Phillips was not called upon for consultation at any point during the interview.

Q: You were assigned to Mr. BELTER's squad?

A: I have been assigned to several security squads at WFO and have been moved back and forth from Mr. BELTER's squad to other squads on several occasions.

Q: Was this in the nature of formal transfers or just temporary moves without written transfers?

A: To the best of my recollection, paper was cut at WFO each time I moved from one squad to another.

Q: What is the nature of your work now?

A: I am a recruiter for the FBI.

Q: At WFO?

A: Yes.

Q: How long have you been so engaged?

A: About 3½ years.

III. THE MONITORING OF DR. KING

Questioning then related to our monitoring of Dr. KING substantially as follows:

Q: Were you on Mr. BELTER's squad at the time you monitored Dr. KING?

A: Yes.

Q: Where did that occur?

A: At the willard Hotel.

Q: Have you done other monitoring before?

A: Yes.

Q: Is this the only monitoring work you have done outside of the Washington Field Office?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you recall when this occurred?

A: I seem to think it was shortly before President KENNEDY's assassination in 1963.

(There followed at this point and at later times during the interview questions in an attempt to jog my memory as to the exact date of the monitoring. I appealed to my recollection that ROBERT KENNEDY's tenure as Attorney General was from 1961 to 1964, and I had to admit the monitoring of Dr. KING might have occurred sometime after President KENNEDY's death. I pointed out that I had nothing with which to refresh my memory and only the incident of President KENNEDY's untimely death tended to fix the date of our activities as taking place close to the time of that death.)

Q: Have you ever worked on cases related to demonstrations?

(It was explained that this question was asked in order to help me try to fix the date of our monitoring by relating it to demonstrations and the date of their occurrence.)

A: I have never worked matters relating to demonstrations. Furthermore, I had had no special interest in the activities of Dr. KING or the S.C.L.C. Since I have little or no recollection of demonstrations in which Dr. KING might have been involved, this method of trying to jog my memory would seem to be of little help.

Q: Was the weather at the time of the monitoring cold or warm?

A: I seem to recall that the weather was warm, but I am not sure.

Q: Were you told of the purpose of monitoring Dr. KING?

A: I am not sure. So much of this is now a gray area to me. I do seem to recall asking for the reason and being advised that this was an internal security matter and that there was ~~I had~~ some indication that Dr. KING was being influenced by persons who leaned toward the left.

Q: Were you told that such people might be with Dr. KING?

A: I do not recall. I simply have the recollection that our purpose was to determine whether he was being so influenced. I hasten to admit, however, that I am very hazy on this and it may very well be that ~~he~~ I learned of these indications through conversations even after the occurrence of our monitoring. I can not be more specific in this regard.

Q: Who was with you at the time of the monitoring?

A: BILL CAMPBELL.

Q: Was anyone else involved?

A: I believe I did meet BILL BERGERON (phonetic) in the lobby of the hotel. No one else to my recollection.

Q: DID ~~Would~~ you sign out from the office to go to the hotel?

A: This would be the customary procedure, but whether it was done in this instance I do not recall.

Q: Did you handle any equipment, i.e., take any to the hotel?

A: No. My recollection is that the equipment was already set up in the room we occupied.

Q: Did you register in the hotel?

A: I recall the registration desk, therefore, perhaps I did, but I am not sure.

Q: Did you use old or new tapes?

A: I do not recall.

Q: What time of day was it?

A: I seem to recall that it was at night. I feel a good guess might be between 8:00 p.m. and midnight, or thereabouts.

Q: Did you monitor for only one night?

A: That is my recollection.

Q: Did you and BILL CAMPBELL relieve each other?

A: I do not recall this. It seems we both monitored at the same time.

Q: Was Dr. KING in the room being monitored?

A: I associated voices I heard in the room to be that of Dr. KINGs.

Q: were there other people in the room being monitored?

A: I again associated voices heard with Mr. ABERNATHY, another male from Baltimore whose name I do not recall, and I believe the voices of two women.

Q: Was there any visual monitoring?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Was this the only monitoring being done at this time?

A: Yes, as far as I know.

Q: Did you make a log while monitoring?

A: One could only take down very sketchy notes.

Q: Did you thereafter go over the tapes and make up logs?

A: Yes.

Q: Where was this done?

A: In an interview room of WFO or some room set up for that purpose.

Q: Regarding the time this monitoring took place, did you leave the hotel for your home when finished?

A: Normal procedure would have been to return to the office. I believe I returned to the office.

Q: Would it not be unusual for you to be returning to the office, say at 1:00 a.m.?

A: No. I have done this on several occasions.

A: (Purpose here it seems was to jog my memory as to the exact time of monitoring.)

Q: Were you involved in any of the reports or paper work connected with this matter?

A: No.

Q: Did you know to whom the case was assigned?

A: No.

Q: When you monitored in other matters, was it not customary to know the agent to whom a case was assigned? If so, would you not then relate a conversation overheard to that agent?

A: In the normal course of events, this would be true, and the agent to whom the matter was assigned would be so advised if the overheard conversation was urgent in nature. In the matter of Dr. KING, however, I did not know the agent to whom the case was assigned.

Q: When you completed this monitoring, to whom did you give your logs?

A: I do not recall; normal procedure would have been to give them to my immediate supervisor, Mr. BELTER.

Q: Getting back to the hotel, did you and Mr. CAMPBELL leave together?

A: I do not recall. In all probability, we did.

Q: Did you carry the tapes and notes back to the office?

A: I do not recall. Either Mr. CAMPBELL or I did, or we both may have. If I did carry them, I normally would have turned them over to the custody of Mr. BELTER.

Q: You had no responsibility in regard to the equipment, i.e., setting up, dismantling it, or returning it?

A: That is correct. My function in ~~that~~ this matter was very limited and I recollect I was simply to go, monitor, and return.

Q: Who gave you this assignment?

A: I believe it was Mr. BELTER.

Q: When he gave it to you, was it done while you were alone or was someone else present?

A: I do not recall. I feel it occurred in Mr. BELTER's office which did not offer a good deal of privacy. If anyone else was present, however, it was probably Mr. CAMPBELL.

Q: Did you know the location of Dr. KING's hotel room in regard to your location at the hotel?

A: I do not recall, I do not think so.

(c) The interview ended with some questions in an attempt to refresh my memory as to the actual date of the monitoring. In substance, this is covered in my fifth answer under item three above.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of incumbent FBI Special Agent John R. Borys.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 0-3-00 BY

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Intelligence activities, domestic
Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King Jr.

62-116395

FMK:fmk

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

5/ woc 8

TREAT AS YELLOW

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

273-11063

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
~~Attn~~ (1) Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Bassett - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.

The Attorney General

July 14, 1975

1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to the Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI. With regard to material requested in Appendices A, III, Items 21, 22, and 23, we have available for SSC Staff review, excised summaries of the contents of the "official and confidential files."

This is in accordance with the agreement made by Bureau officials and Deputy Attorney General Tyler, on June 23, 1975. The excisions were made to protect personal privacy. Enclosed is a letterhead memorandum for your approval and forwarding to the Committee advising them that the aforementioned documents are available for review. A copy is also enclosed for your reference.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

REC-88 62-116395-396

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

3 JUL 22 1975

Delivered to O'Connor 7/14/75 by PVD

2 - ENCLOSURE

Note: By memorandum dated 6-23-75, captioned "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities Request for Access to Official and Confidential Files of Former Director Hoover." Approval was received for the preparation of summaries to be reviewed by SSC representatives. On 7-10-75, Michael Shaheen, Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, stated that it is acceptable with the Department that these excised summaries be reviewed in Bureau space.

PVD:eek
(10)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JBH/PVD JBH/PLM PLM PVD

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

54 JUL 22 1975

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. Wannall
Attn: Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

62-116395

July 14, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: REQUESTS PERTAINING TO "OFFICIAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL FILES"

Reference is made to your memorandum from captioned Committee dated May 14, 1975, and the appendices thereto, which contained a request relating to the "official and confidential files." In response to material requested in Appendices C, Part III, Items 21, 22, and 23, of the aforementioned letter, we have available for review by representatives of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, summaries of the contents of the "official and confidential files."

Arrangements for the review of these documents may be made in accordance with existing procedures. These documents are located in the Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

PVD:eek
(10)

JBH/PVD PVD

PLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

62-116395-396

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7-14-75

U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Requests Pertaining
Caption of Document: To "Official and Confidential Files."
Appendices C, Part III, Items 21, 22, and 23

Originating Office: FBI 205
Delivered by: SA Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 15 Jul '75
Received by: Sherry Towell
Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

FOR REVIEW

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/14/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and excised enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix C, Part III, Items 21, 22 and 23

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Operating Procedures

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

At the request of SSC, summaries of the contents of the "official and confidential files" are being made available at FBIHQ for review by SSC members.

62-116395

FMK;FMK
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WO

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE, 1945 OC
TECHNICAL SUMMARIES

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 3 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/14/45

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Tickler Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Summary of telephone conversation of [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] is advising [redacted] that [redacted] is "gunning" for [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/Plu

[redacted] 62-116395-396

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

TECHNICAL SUMMARIES, SENT TO WHITE HOUSE
VOLs. I - VII

Cabinet 3 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/8/45

Last Communication Dated 5/16/48

Approximate Pages 6,250

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Seven volumes of summaries, recording telephone conversations of [redacted] and [redacted], a prominent D. C. lawyer, at request of the President of the United States.

2

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
FBI TELEVISION SERIES AGREEMENT

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 3 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/11/64

Last Communication Dated 2/6/73

Approximate Pages 15

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memoranda and letters relating to the FBI series.

[illegible]te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 2/7/62

Last Communication Dated 2/12/62

Approximate Pages 4

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

2 serials from [redacted];[redacted] and 4 others arrested by LA police on vice charges 12/61. Interviewed by FBI and volunteered while acting as madam for [redacted]; during Democratic National Convention alleged secretary to [redacted], one [redacted], was sent prostitutes by her. Also heard prostitutes were sent to hotel parties attended by [redacted]. [redacted] at White House was advised of above 2/12/62. He appreciated receiving allegations.

4

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 1

Folder ______ File X (check one) (62-47774)

First Communication Dated 3/13/37

Last Communication Dated 10/18/67

Approximate Pages 45

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

File contains information on a variety of matters dealing with [redacted] including constituent matters, expressions of condolence, threats against [redacted] and a summary memo of information in Bureau files. Unsubstantiated information in file that [redacted] was having affair with a woman and also allegation described as "unfounded" that [redacted] was a homosexual.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
CRIMDEL - CRS

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 1

Folder ______ File 1 Section (check one)

First Communication Dated 4/7/60

Last Communication Dated 4/27/60

Approximate Pages 123

Derogatory Information: Yes X No _____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Tickler Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

17 serials; [redacted]
Los Angeles CRIMDEL Program

1 serial ([redacted]); L. A. advised CI learned from "confidential" magazine editor 2 mulatto prostitutes at party with [redacted] and [redacted] -- [redacted] campaign manager worried about his sex activities.

6

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 1

Folder ____ File X (check one)

First Communication Dated 11/16/40

Last Communication Dated 3/15/45

Approximate Pages 628

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Tickler Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

IS and ESP - G investigation on [redacted] with whom [redacted] [redacted] had a romance in Washington, D. C., and Charleston, South Carolina; from January, 1942 - June, 1942 per file. Investigation closed 1945 as no subversive activities were determined.

[redacted]

No dissemination was made of [redacted] "romance" information.

7

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 1

Folder ____ File X (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/4/37

Last Communication Dated 5/4/71

Approximate Pages 54

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Tickler Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains BUAP - SA investigation re [redacted] and follow-up correspondence from interested parties asking why he was not appointed.

8

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 8/4/62

Last Communication Dated 11/22/63

Approximate Pages 6

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Technical coverage on [redacted] disclosed conversation wherein [redacted] claimed [redacted] having affair with girl in El Paso.

Information furnished to R. Kennedy by us.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 1

Folder ____ File X (check one) (77-54743)

First Communication Dated 12/1/52

Last Communication Dated 7/12/57

Approximate Pages 45

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains results of our Special Inquiry investigation based on [redacted] appointment to be [redacted] plus two later communications of a general nature regarding [redacted]

10

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 1

Folder ____ File X (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/15/56

Last Communication Dated 6/5/68

Approximate Pages 75

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative and prominent persons

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

[redacted] opened on [redacted] upon his consideration for Presidential Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. Probably maintained in Director's Office because [redacted]

//

D[illegible]e: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 8/4/62

Last Communication Dated 8/20/62

Approximate Pages 7

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

4 serials from above investigation. In coverage of [redacted] Miami Division learned [redacted] claimed [redacted] is carrying on an affair with unnamed girl from El Paso, Texas (circa 8/1962). [redacted] [redacted] was advised of allegation. He denied and appreciated receiving data stating gossip mongers talk about people in public life.

[redacted]

[illegible]te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 1

Folder ____ File X (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/12/53

Last Communication Dated 7/22/74

Approximate Pages 700

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative and prominent person

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Five volume file containing requests by [redacted] and FBI responses. A general file dealing with threats against [redacted] as well as allegations of sexual misconduct as well as underworld connections. Some of the allegations of sexual promiscuity were sent to Attorney General.

File contains data subsequent to [redacted] [redacted] concerning threats to his [redacted] and travel of his [redacted], e.g., requests from [redacted] to alert foreign intelligence organizations of [redacted] travel to Greece 7/74.

/13

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 1

Folder ______ File X (check one)

First Communication Dated 9/7/43

Last Communication Dated 11/18/69

Approximate Pages 120

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative and prominent person

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

File opened when [redacted] became Special Service Contact (National Defense Matters) in [redacted] Contains record of his appointments to Presidential Commissions and correspondence with Director Hoover. [redacted] and Mr. Hoover were on a first name basis. Derogatory information concerns his [redacted] and is found in internal FBI summary memoranda, none of it ever disseminated. File discloses allegations of threats to life of [redacted] and son [redacted] children relayed to [redacted] (8/58) [redacted]

14

te: [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
BOMB SUMMARY

Cabinet 4 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1972

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 27

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

A comprehensive report (booklet) of incidents involving explosives and incendiary devices.

15

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 2

Folder ____ File X (check one) (94-40154)

First Communication Dated 11/4/70

Last Communication Dated 10/3/74

Approximate Pages 14

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

This file consists mainly of information pertaining to [redacted] former [redacted]

The last few serials in the file pertain to his son, [redacted]. This write-up contains information pertinent to the [redacted] only.

Contains summary memorandum of information in Bureau files, threat matter and constituent matter.

16

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 4/3/52

Last Communication Dated 10/31/64

Approximate Pages 60

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent person

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder with material inside marked "OC - [redacted]" includes summary memorandum of information Bufiles and copies of correspondence from and to [redacted] Includes information that [redacted] alleged to be homosexual.

~~TOP~~ SECRET MATERIAL CONTAINED

MV

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 2

Folder ____ File X (check one)

First Communication Dated 11/25/52

Last Communication Dated 5/28/68

Approximate Pages 12 serials (62 pages)

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative, Prominent Persons

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Files opened based on information furnished by Senator [redacted] Allegations that [redacted], President, [redacted] was a homosexual and Communists were using this to blackmail [redacted] to place other Communists on the University [redacted] staff. During interviews information received which linked then [redacted] with [redacted] as a homosexual.

18

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 2

Folder ______ File X (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/2/52

Last Communication Dated 4/12/60

Approximate Pages 7

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains personal background data relative to [redacted], one time [redacted]; memo regarding his alleged homosexual tendencie [redacted] association with [redacted] who also was reported to be a homosexual and news clippings relative to the murder of [redacted]

19

ce: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Cabinet 4 Drawer 2

Folder ______ File X (check one)

First Communication Dated 8/9/50

Last Communication Dated 4/24/59

Approximate Pages 450 (5 vol.)

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative, Congressional, Prominent Persons, Information from other Agency

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Consists of reports prefaced by the [redacted] as compiled through informant reports, Agency checks and interviews. [redacted], a self-admitted homosexual, alleged to an informant of the military that former [redacted], [redacted] a [redacted] and other prominent persons had engaged in homosexual activities. He later retracted this statement. There are no indications the Bureau investigated allegations made by [redacted] relative to the prominent persons.

20

te: [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

SPECIAL INQUIRY, STATE DEPT.

Cabinet 4 Drawer 2

Folder ______ File X (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/18/52

Last Communication Dated 9/11/57

Approximate Pages 59

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Tickler Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Primarily contains reports from field offices reflecting investigation conducted on captioned person based on [redacted] application for employment with Voice of America. Request made by State Department and report furnished to that agency.

21

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 4/10/56

Last Communication Dated 2/13/64

Approximate Pages 150

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional - Presidential

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

This is a collection of serials from various Bureau files pertinent to [redacted]. Includes information regarding [redacted] case among numerous others.

22

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
MATERIAL FROM [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/24/56

Last Communication Dated 8/13/56

Approximate Pages 200

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Tickling Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains information concerning an individual who conducted surveillance of FBI Agents in the Miami Division and administrative memo, etc., dealing with personnel matters within the FBI.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 4 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 10/18/62

Last Communication Dated 6/25/69

Approximate Pages 500 - 600

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative, Prominent Persons, Administrative, Information

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Consists of various documents relating to the activities of [redacted] and three tapes (not reviewed).

Documents contain information relating to electronic surveillance of [redacted] under Attorney General [redacted], Communist influence on [redacted], and [redacted] immoral and drunken behavior, and three copies of report entitled Elaboration and Documentation of Document [redacted]

24

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FBI AND SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 2/3/65

Last Communication Dated 6/6/66

Approximate Pages 25

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Copies of memoranda and letters to and from Secret Service, Department of Justice and FBI, re Presidential protection agreement. Confidential

25

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/27/57

Last Communication Dated 4/23/59

Approximate Pages 72

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent person - Information from CIA

Tickers Only X Originals Only X Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Copies of memoranda between [redacted] and CIA and memoranda recording [redacted] conversations with [redacted] at the White House and Attorney Generals [redacted] regarding [redacted] self-admission to CIA that he was a homosexual and had been compromised in Moscow in February, 1957, by Soviet police. TOP SECRET

26

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 9/18/52

Last Communication Dated 9/26/52

Approximate Pages 5

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Letter to Hoover 9/18/52 from [redacted] advising of remarks made to [redacted] by [redacted] regarding call to [redacted] from [redacted] asking if Hoover and [redacted] go to the races plus [redacted] comments as to why he did not believe Attorney General [redacted] to be an honest man.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/14/70

Last Communication Dated 1/26/71

Approximate Pages 22

Derogatory Information: Yes X No _____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional

Ticklers Only _____ Originals Only _____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains information concerning [redacted] association with prostitutes.

28

ate: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATIONS

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/6/33

Last Communication Dated -----

Approximate Pages 6

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Personnel

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Two anonymous letters chiding Hoover re internal staffing of FBI.

[illegible]te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

ATTORNEY GENERAL
(SUBMISSION OF MEMORANDA BY FBI)

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/12/25

Last Communication Dated 7/3/56

Approximate Pages 31

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Copy of 1925 letter of [redacted] informing all Department of Justice officials and employees that overall FBI operations is responsibility of Attorney General. Subsequent memoranda from various FBI officials regarding changes of policy regarding FBI reporting to varius Attorney Generals, Deputy Attorney Generals or Assistant Attorney Generals.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/17/67

Last Communication Dated 1/19/67

Approximate Pages 12

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Tticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

[redacted] request to determine whether five individuals were close to former [redacted] President wanted no record made of request. Mention is also made of FBI refusal of Department of Justice request to use recording device in the [redacted] case.

Five letterhead memoranda re background on:

(1) [redacted]- Narcotics Bureau
(2) [redacted]- Treasury Department
(3) [redacted], Narcotics Bureau
(4) [redacted], Former AAG
(5) [redacted], Narcotics Bureau

31

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 11/3/42

Last Communication Dated ------

Approximate Pages 3

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Record of expenses for entertainment in Washington, D. C., of [redacted] [redacted] of Cuba.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/27/44

Last Communication Dated 7/5/44

Approximate Pages 3

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Report of interview by New York Office Agents with [redacted] who reported he had heard a rumor to the effect [redacted] was "queer."

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 11/20/53

Last Communication Dated -----

Approximate Pages 27

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only _____ Both _____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Photostat copy of diagrams depicting distribution of investigative information by the FBI to the White House, Attorney General and employing agencies on 27 persons named by [redacted] on 11/7/45 who were still employed by the U. S. Government as of that date.

34

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initials [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 10/8/41

Last Communication Dated 12/2/41

Approximate Pages 4

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only X Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memorandum regarding [redacted] decision regarding supervision of FBI by an Assistant Attorney General and [redacted] support of [redacted] during a press conference.

35

[illegible]te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

"BLACK BAG" JOBS

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/19/66

Last Communication Dated 1/6/67

Approximate Pages 4

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal FBI memorandum setting forth procedures followed in granting field offices authority for "black bag" jobs. Hoover notes "No more such techniques must be used." CONFIDENTIAL

D[illegible]e: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/28/62

Last Communication Dated 12/13/66

Approximate Pages 1,000 (4 inches thick)

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only _____ Originals Only _____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

2 volumes of FBI internal memoranda, memoranda to the Attorney General, memoranda recording conversations with the White House, press clippings, Department of Justice legal briefs and memoranda regarding the question of authority for use of a microphone in connection with the antiracketeering investigation of [redacted] Primarily Xerox copies of original material filed in the general files although a few original internal memoranda are contained in the folders.

57

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 4/16/53

Last Communication Dated 9/23/59

Approximate Pages 37

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Summary of investigation of [redacted] requested by State Department in connection with his appointment as [redacted] Investigation revealed [redacted] was closely associated with self-admitted or known homosexuals who were either personal friends or co-workers. This data furnished to State Department, [redacted] at the White House, and Attorney General.

38

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

BOMBING AT U. S. CAPITOL

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder x File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/1/71

Last Communication Dated 3/29/71

Approximate Pages 25

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

FBI internal memoranda and letters to the House of Representatives, the Senate, [redacted] at the White House, and the Attorney General re FBI's recommendations for improved security measures at the Capitol.

[illegible]te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 9/18/41

Last Communication Dated 9/19/41

Approximate Pages 30

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Originals and copies of affidavits by Hoover and late Assistant Director [redacted] that no telephone wire taps or microphone surveillances were used during investigation of [redacted]

40

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

BUREAU RECORDING INSTRUMENTS

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 2/25/41

Last Communication Dated ------

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memorandum reporting to Hoover that 5 telephone recording instruments were in possession of FBI.

//

ate: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 4/2/51

Last Communication Dated ------

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Letter to Hoover from [redacted] declining invitation to join the FBI as the Budget Officer.

4/2

ate: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/24/63

Last Communication Dated =------

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Hoover internal memorandum reporting [redacted] informed Hoover of his concern that [redacted] had put several probing questions to him on very important matters.

43

Date: [illegible]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [illegible]

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/10/38

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Personnel

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memorandum reporting the identity of a confidential source who provided information on conditions in the Charlotte Division.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 8/1/40

Last Communication Dated -----

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative-Investigative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Hoover memorandum recording his conversation with the White House informing of receipt of information regarding [redacted] desire to meet with [redacted]

45

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

CIVIL RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/10/47

Last Communication Dated 3/24/47

Approximate Pages 100

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative - Policy

Tickler Only _____ Originals Only X Both _____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Booklet summary regarding Civil Rights and Domestic Violence for use by Hoover in addressing the President's Committee on Civil Rights which sets forth FBI policy and position; and correspondence from Hoover to the Committee concerning his views on spelling out the rights of individuals rather than leaving it up to judicial interpretation.

[illegible]te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

CO SUMMARIES
(LISTING OF DELIVERIES TO WHITE HOUSE)

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated Undated (circa April, 1947)

Last Communication Dated 5/21/48

Approximate Pages 19

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Listing of dates and times summaries on [redacted] were delivered to [redacted] White House, for the period 5/29/45 to 5/21/48, at which time summaries discontinued.

ate: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
COMMUNIST PARTY

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 9/30/40

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative and Information

Tickler Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

A report from an informant in New York City on a meeting of Communist Party leaders including [redacted] and [redacted] They desired Communist Party members not vote for [redacted] since, if elected President his attitude toward Communist Party unknown. Would be better if [redacted] reelected since it will then be possible to keep John Edgar Hoover's hands tied.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY COVERAGE

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/28/58

Last Communication Dated ------

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Hoover memorandum recording his conversation with the Attorney General concerning a Communist Party meeting. TOP SECRET

ML

49

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USSR.

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 9/24/59

Last Communication Dated ------

Approximate Pages 13

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information from other agency

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memorandum from State Department enclosing excerpts from conversations between [redacted] and Chairman Kruschev of USSR. CONFIDENTIAL

ate: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/9/46

Last Communication Dated 9/20/65

Approximate Pages 70

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investiative - Administrative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memoranda regarding Special Agents engaged in undercover assignments in Washington, D. C., to develop information re Bribery and Fraud Against the Government. Also internal memoranda reporting FBI officials' contacts with White House Staff employees 1946-1950.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/14/71

Last Communication Dated ------

Approximate Pages 6

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memorandum setting forth background data on [redacted]

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/14/49

Last Communication Dated -------

Approximate Pages 4

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative - Investigative

Tickler Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memorandum reporting results of FBI officials' contact with a White House Aide wherein FBI's position with regard to the [redacted] case was made known.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 11/4/42

Last Communication Dated -------

Approximate Pages 4

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Tickler Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memorandum attached a copy of "Peace Agreement" [redacted] was promoting on behalf of the [redacted]

54

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 4/17/70

Last Communication Dated 4/24/70

Approximate Pages 15

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memoranda between FBI and Department of Justice re reimbursement by Justice for funds expended for Departmental Applicant investigations.

55

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/13/51

Last Communication Dated 12/30/52

Approximate Pages 6

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Agreement between [redacted] and Hoover regarding motion picture rights to Hoover's article "[redacted]" Amended 12/30/52 by Hoover declining to accept payment for rights.

56

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 4/27/48

Last Communication Dated 1/6/53

Approximate Pages 13

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

1948 request by [redacted] for Hoover's views on the Communist Party, USA, and request of [redacted] in 1952 for information regarding [redacted]

57

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/3/41

Last Communication Dated (only one communication)

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains memo to Director from [redacted] which includes information that [redacted] had admitted to the State Department that he had accepted $2,000.00 from a "Jewish immigrant in Cuba" to get the alien into the U. S.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 10/21/40

Last Communication Dated 12/16/53

Approximate Pages 60

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains memoranda prepared primarily in 1940 and 1941 dealing with the [redacted] Committee. Generally reflects difficulties in FBI dealing with the Committee. Contains list of 2,500 names of alleged Bundists in U. S.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]
DIRECTIVES

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/26/39

Last Communication Dated 6/9/62

Approximate Pages 61

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Original and copies of various Presidential Directives and inter-agency agreements regarding the role of the FBI in the security field and SIS operations. TOP SECRET

MC

60

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)   Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6   Drawer 1

Folder X   File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 2/26/53

Last Communication Dated 3/5/53

Approximate Pages 5

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Tickler Only ____   Originals Only X   Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memorandum reporting on fine cooperation of [redacted] Department of Justice and letter of appreciation to [redacted] from Hoover.

61

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 11/18/41

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memorandum reporting information from a source that a New York City news reporter has been assigned to expose incompetency of [redacted] organization.

62

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/1/52

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 4

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Hoover internal memorandum recording conversation with [redacted] that [redacted] and [redacted] regarding role of FBI in forthcoming [redacted]

63

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

EXPANSION OF FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 9/21/71

Last Communication Dated 9/28/71

Approximate Pages 50

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Copies of internal memoranda and letters to and from the White House regarding expansion of FBI Legal Attache posts abroad.

64

ate: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

FBI APPROPRIATION DIFFICULTIES

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/13/36

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 6

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Tickles Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memorandum reporting on FBI official's contact with Acting Chairman of Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee of the House regarding FBI's budget for Fiscal Year 1937.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]
FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
TECHNICAL DEVICES AND TECHNIQUES

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/5/55

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 100

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Briefing material prepared for Hoover regarding captioned subject matter. TOP SECRET

ML

66

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

THE FBI STORY

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 10/8/45

Last Communication Dated 6/26/56

Approximate Pages 32

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Tickler Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memoranda concerning Chapter 29 of "The FBI Story" wherein Hoover took exception to portions of that chapter dealing with his conversations with State Department officials concerning [redacted] and memoranda of Hoover's conversations with the Attorney General and Secretary of State which supports Hoover's recollection of events.

67

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(REVIEW OF INFORMATION FROM)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 2/5/53

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Tickers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Copy of memorandum to "Members of Subcommittee" from [redacted] General Counsel setting forth procedures to be followed in requesting information from FBI files.

ate: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 11/24/47

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Personnel

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memorandum reporting poor attitude of Mr. [redacted]

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial:

FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN THE BLACK EXTREMIST MOVEMENT

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 2/28/69

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 26

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Summary internal memorandum and a document for dissemination to other agencies regarding information developed indicating foreign influence in the Black Extremist Movement.

70

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/20/67

Last Communication Dated 7/24/67

Approximate Pages 6

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Person

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Informal memorandum from Washington Field regarding allegation received through confidential informant that [redacted] was a homosexual. This allegation was furnished to [redacted] by [redacted]. Mr. Hoover ruled against [redacted] and [redacted] in their recommendation to bring to attention of the Attorney General.

71.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/30/40

Last Communication Dated ------

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative and Policy

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only x Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Director's copy of "Strictly Confidential" letter to [redacted] which enclosed memoranda to look over and if desirable to present to our contact to take up with the Boss (not further identified). One memorandum apparently concerned FBI taking over Border Patrol.

72

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/3/40

Last Communication Dated -------

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative and Information

Tickler Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memorandum dated 12/3/40 from [redacted] to the Director re influence of [redacted] in manipulating changes in Secretaries of War.

73

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 10/29/42

Last Communication Dated 11/24/43

Approximate Pages 100

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Envelope containing correspondence and personal papers of [redacted] and photos of letters from Hoover and [redacted] to [redacted]

74

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/30/43

Last Communication Dated 6/30/43 (same)

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Informative memorandum to [redacted] from [redacted], 6/30/43, re gossip information [redacted] had repeated to the effect Mr. Hoover was a homosexual.

75

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/12/71

Last Communication Dated 7/14/71

Approximate Pages 6

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Copy of memorandum July 14, 1971, with attached prior memorandum regarding [redacted] criticism of FBI and Mr. Hoover.

76

ate: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

GERMANY OC

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/4/40

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Information from a confidential source in close touch with German officials in an occupied territory, relating to German propaganda with regard to captured territories.

77

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/11/41

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 7

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, [✓ prominent persons], [✓ administrative], information, policy, [✓ personnel], information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): ____

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memorandum from [redacted] to [redacted] reporting conversation with [redacted] concerning the Department of Justice trying to play down the FBI. [redacted] stated [redacted] was sold on the FBI and furnished a copy of a press release dated 12/10/41 wherein he said [redacted] was commendatory to the FBI. [redacted] said he had received criticism (in the Department) for playing up the FBI.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted] [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 9/15/49

Last Communication Dated _____

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Miscellaneous

Tickler Only X Originals Only _____ Both _____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Routing slip with attached letter containing a business card from a racing tout [redacted] directed to SAC [redacted]

D[illegible]e: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/19/40

Last Communication Dated 6/16/48

Approximate Pages 50

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): ____

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Blind memorandum dated 3/19/40 re [redacted] prospective candidate [redacted] contains information from a confidential source that [redacted] was in trouble with the Income Tax authorities and this could result in his downfall as far as his chances of becoming a candidate.

Memoranda to JEH from various officials regarding information received from [redacted] from 5/29/41 - 5/8/48. Folder also contains technical summaries from 1/19 - 22/46 relative to conversation with others concerning the Honorable [redacted] to the effect [redacted] placement of numerous individuals in high Governmental positions and were obtaining control of the White House.

80

[illegible]e: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/25/63

Last Communication Dated 1/26/63

Approximate Pages 5

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains letter 1/25/63 from [redacted], to Hoover advising that prior to being robbed on 1/25/63 [redacted] had picked up a Negro female at a low-class night spot and tried to take her to a tourist home. [redacted] and female followed by two Negro males who assaulted him.

Contains newspaper clippings about robbery.

81

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/31/34

Last Communication Dated 10/26/65

Approximate Pages 8

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Personnel

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Handwritten letters from [redacted] to Hoover and Assistant Director [redacted] regarding internal matters.

82

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/2/71

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Personnel

Tickler Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memorandum March 2, 1971, re [redacted] who was seen by Mr. Hoover and [redacted] in elevator wearing large wig. By routing slip [redacted] recommended transfer to Identification Building. Mr. Hoover wrote "Yes" -- notation on memo to effect [redacted] advised to report there first thing "tomorrow morning," 3/4/--

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted] SUMMARIES

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/22/45

Last Communication Dated 9/6/46

Approximate Pages 500

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No. X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Tickles Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Technical coverage summaries on [redacted]

84

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

HOOVER, J. EDGAR (DIRECTORSHIP)

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 8/28/41

Last Communication Dated 1/22/58

Approximate Pages 10

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative, information

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal FBI memoranda regarding desires and efforts of various people to have Mr. Hoover replaced as Director, FBI.

85

e: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
HOOVER, JOHN EDGAR

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/15/66

Last Communication Dated 6/10/71

Approximate Pages 40

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative and Personnel

Tickers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Annual "Confidential Statement of Employment and Financial Interests" of Director, furnished Deputy Attorney General annually. Contains original cover memo and copies of statements.

84

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)   Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6   Drawer 1

Folder x   File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/10/40

Last Communication Dated 7/25/45

Approximate Pages 600

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent persons, investigative

Ticklers Only X   Originals Only ____   Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Consists of correspondence between Mr. Hoover and Bureau with [redacted] from 1940 - 43 and 2 manila envelopes containing results of physical and technical surveillance of [redacted] conducted on and off during 1944 and 1945. Results of coverage furnished [redacted] -- apparently conducted at his request. Notation on envelopes duplicates destroyed per Director's instructions.

87

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 10/29/42

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent persons and Information

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

2-page memorandum, with copies, of discussion with [redacted] by Mr. Hoover concerning improper activities of [redacted]. Discussion held at request of [redacted]

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/18/41

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy, Information

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

[redacted] memo to the Director re issuance of a story about [redacted] well worked out plan of having one single investigative agency responsible for Nation defense problems.

89

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/25/71

Last Communication Dated 4/12/71

Approximate Pages ____

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): ____

Tickler Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memoranda setting forth FBI technical and microphone coverage on black extremist and New Left subjects and organizations for background in connection with Hoover's meeting with [redacted] of [redacted] and [redacted] Memorandum from Hoover reporting results of meeting wherein [redacted] desired to discuss broadening operations particularly of the very confidential type. Hoover reports he was not enthusiastic about such extensions by the FBI in view of hazards involved. [redacted] was to make an in-depth review of what he and [redacted] wanted and thereafter would call for another meeting.

90

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/24/41

Last Communication Dated 4/4/41

Approximate Pages 18

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memoranda to and from Attorney General regarding proposed rules for inter-Departmental use of FBI.

91

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 11/29/63

Last Communication Dated 3/8/66

Approximate Pages 177

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Presidential

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains communications dealing with liaison with [redacted] on a number of matters.

92

[illegible]e: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 4/30/47

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Personnel

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal memorandum reporting an FBI official's conversation with [redacted] re retirement.

9

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/16/66

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memo [redacted] to [redacted] 12/16/66 re [redacted] wiretapping expert with [redacted], setting forth results of information obtained from [redacted]

74

I[illegible]e: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/2/49

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative, information

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Director memo to [redacted] recording his conversation with [redacted], held at request of Congressman [redacted] [redacted] desired to assure Director reports being circulated regarding his personal conduct were without foundation. FBI had investigated alleged irregularities of purchase of surplos Government property by [redacted] Had learned [redacted] and associates had stayed in St. Moritz Hotel, New York City, telephone calls to women of questionable character were made from room, visited nightclubs with women. It was suggested to [redacted] by Hoover he [redacted] discuss with his superior, [redacted]

95

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/29/60

Last Communication Dated 7/2/63

Approximate Pages 50

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional - Presidential

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Majority of information in this folder deals with alleged personal misconduct of [redacted]; i.e., affairs with women.

96

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/6/68

Last Communication Dated one communication only

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Consists of airtel from Los Angeles transmitting photos of [redacted]

97

D[illegible]e [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

KANSAS CITY ELECTION FRAUD CASE

Cabinet 6 Drawer 1

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/5/47

Last Communication Dated 6/10/48

Approximate Pages 600

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative and information

Tickers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Internal Study of Affair of U. S. Senate Judiciary Committee hearings re Investigation Concerning Failure of Attorney General and Department of Justice to act with respect to alleged irregularities in Missouri Primary Election. Includes testimony of Mr. Hoover and Bureau officials before Committee included (Photostat copy).

78

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
KHRUSHCHEV VISIT AND SOVIET
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/15/59 (Original - copy only)

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 12

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memo deals with briefing of President by Mr. Hoover and AG re Soviet Intelligence Activities in U. S. Briefing to prepare President for U. S. visit by Khrushchev.

Memo is accompanied by three looseleaf folders giving examples of intelligence activities in U. S. by Soviets and physical surveillance photographs.

99

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/10/65

Last Communication Dated 6/10/69

Approximate Pages 3

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Deals with possible telephone surveillance of [redacted] Bureau reluctant to install. AG not concerned about repercussions. Surveillance approved 10/10/63.

100

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/17/70

Last Communication Dated 3/23/71

Approximate Pages 300 (including enclosures)

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Tickles Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Correspondence between [redacted] and Mr. Hoover. [redacted] letters enclosed varied material including newspaper clippings, etc. Purpose of [redacted] letters was to enlist Mr. Hoover's assistance in preventing her removal as [redacted]

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/26/44

Last Communication Dated 2/9/66

Approximate Pages 7

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains letterhead memorandum (12/26/44) and memo (2/9/66). Memo sets forth Bureau's position re the defection and possible redefection of [redacted]

102

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/31/43 (memos) 2 - 3/43 (photostats)

Last Communication Dated 2/2/54 (memos)

Approximate Pages 200 including photostats

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X (Memos) Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Five "in-house" memos dealing with [redacted] relationship with [redacted]. Memos disclose the original source to be U. S. Army. Information orally related to Bureau by various army personnel. Information highly derogatory!!

Photostats deal with "in-house" Army memos concerning [redacted] relationship. Also photostats of correspondence from [redacted] to [redacted]

103

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/7/51

Last Communication Dated 1/9/52

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No. X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Person

Ticklers Only _____ Originals Only X Both _____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Two letterhead memoranda describing [redacted] as having caused Bureau trouble a
result of book written by [redacted].

104

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/18/53

Last Communication Dated 7/14/53

Approximate Pages 8

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains memo 3/18/53 from Hoover regarding phone call from [redacted] Conversation dealt with appointment of [redacted] to unspecified position. Conversation included discussion regarding possibility [redacted] was a homosexual.

Contains 7/14/53 memo from Hoover concerning visit from [redacted] secretary who discussed possibility of obtaining FBI Agent to be Chief of Staff of [redacted] Committee.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/9/71

Last Communication Dated 6/1/71

Approximate Pages 22

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains memo 3/9/71 (16 pages) summarizing information in Bureau files concerning [redacted]. Includes information regarding [redacted] fathering illegitimate child born [redacted]

Has memo 3/10/71 from [redacted] recommending no further action be taken concerning this information.

Has memo 6/1/71 from Hoover to "Personal Files" regarding conversation with Attorney General which included information that Hoover told Attorney General he had heard CBS was furnishing funds to [redacted]

106.

e: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted]

Aides Initial [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 11/15/41 (original only)

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 3

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

One memo deals with information re Designation of [redacted] as AAG. [redacted] is thought to be hostile toward Director and Bureau. [redacted] advises Bureau that he does not consider [redacted] to be hostile toward Mr. Hoover and Bureau.

107

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 10/20/41

Last Communication Dated 10/27/41

Approximate Pages 7

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Tickler Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Letterhead memorandum attaches five-page memo dealing with a continuous whispering campaign against Mr. Hoover. Memo identifies at least 23 people who are reportedly involved in a smear campaign against Mr. Hoover. Some identified are Congressmen.

[redacted] is person to whom source furnished memo.

108

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/30/39

Last Communication Dated 1/31/39

Approximate Pages 5

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Two memos dealing with address and employment of [redacted] No reason noted why information desired.

109

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/27/63

Last Communication Dated 4/2/63

Approximate Pages 5

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Letter to Mr. Hoover from SAC Las Vegas advises [redacted] dances in chorus at Desert Inn. Letter to SAC Las Vegas describes [redacted] as apparently subject of IS-R case. [redacted] possible Soviet agent.

110

Date: [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
STRIKE FORCE, NEW YORK CITY

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/21/69

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 7

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy

Tickers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memo attaches proposed draft of Memorandum of Understanding, Strike Force, New York City. Memo to Mr. Hoover from AAG.

///

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/31/43

Last Communication Dated 10/20/43

Approximate Pages 11

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Tickers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Letters to Mr. Hoover from [redacted] and [redacted] (all of which were answered). One letter deals with race conditions in several cities. Other letters mention attempt to meet Mr. Hoover when writer next in Washington, D.C.

112

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/20/51

Last Communication Dated 6/23/51

Approximate Pages 9

Derogatory Information: Yes X No _____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only _____ Originals Only X Both _____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memos relate derogatory remarks about Mr. Hoover made by [redacted] to a Bureau employee.

113

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/59

Last Communication Dated 7/66

Approximate Pages 150

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative, Policy

Tickklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Correspondence consists of memos to AG from Mr. Hoover; in-house memos and blind memos all of which deals with microphone surveillance policy and identifies (blind memos) subjects surveilled. Subjects are IS, Racial, Anti-Racketeering.

114

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/18/69

Last Communication Dated 6/4/71

Approximate Pages 75

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Person - Administrative

Ticklers Only _____ Originals Only _____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memoranda dealing with the protection of the Attorney General, his wife, office and residence. Memoranda dealing with possible leaks of information from Department of Justice. Memoranda dealing with appointment of [redacted] to [redacted]

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)   Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6   Drawer 2

Folder X   File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/24/44

Last Communication Dated 1/24/44

Approximate Pages 8

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): ______

Ticklers Only ______   Originals Only X   Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Signed statement by [redacted] Denying allegation he had sexual relations with relative of [redacted].

(2) Memos re [redacted] threat to sue [redacted]

Both memos are [redacted] to [redacted]

116

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

TECHNICAL SUMMARIES

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 8/13/45

Last Communication Dated 10/16/46

Approximate Pages 700

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Hundreds of pages of apparent technical surveillance information re [redacted].
Difficult to determine circumstances or to make sense out of summaries.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ________ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/4/39

Last Communication Dated 1/26/49

Approximate Pages 7

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Ticklers Only ________ Originals Only X Both ________

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Comments, both good and bad, concerning [redacted]

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/13/69

Last Communication Dated 7/3/69

Approximate Pages 47

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

[redacted], associate of [redacted] advised [redacted] that a source told him [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted] at the White House were homosexuals. [redacted] took sworn statements from them denying the charges.

117

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1920

Last Communication Dated 1925

Approximate Pages 75

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Correspondence from [redacted] and newspaper clippings dealing with [redacted] as an impostor.

120

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/5/41

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memorandum [redacted] to Mr. Hoover concerning conversation [redacted] with [redacted] re Secret Poll being taken to justify motion in Senate to investigate FBI. [redacted] asserted in the negative.

121

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

ORGANIZED CRIME .

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/13/66

Last Communication Dated 10/26/66

Approximate Pages 15

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Copy of Criminal Intelligence Digest. Memorandum to Attorney General re OC.

122.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DECEMBER 7, 1941

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/12/41

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memorandum [redacted] to Mr. Hoover re apparent unpreparedness of U.S.N.

123

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 11/29/45

Last Communication Dated 6/5/53

Approximate Pages 5

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Two letters [redacted] to person in Rome, Italy. One letter [redacted] to Mr. Hoover enclosing one of above letters.

124

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

PENTAGON PAPERS

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/19/71

Last Communication Dated 7/21/71

Approximate Pages 12

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Tickler Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Bureau letter plus enclosures to [redacted] requesting permission to interview USDS employee. [redacted] acknowledged.

/125

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/23/42

Last Communication Dated One communication only

Approximate Pages 8

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information from other agency

Tickles Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains information furnished by the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives indicating that credit was placed at Brooks Brothers in New York City by a person, possibly a contractor, for [redacted] to purchase haberdashery.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

[redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/3/43

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 6

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Letter to [redacted] enclosing summaries on five individuals.

127

[illegible]e: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

POLICE KILLINGS

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/28/71

Last Communication Dated 6/4/71

Approximate Pages 17

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Tickler Only _____ Originals Only X Both _____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Series of memoranda from Director setting forth his discussions with President, Attorney General, White House Aides and others concerning FBI investigation of police killings plus plans for meeting with Chiefs of Police relative to that subject.

/28

D[illegible]e: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial [redacted]
POSSIBLE TESTIMONY, U. S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADM. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/21/65

Last Communication Dated 1/10/67

Approximate Pages 150

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Possible testimony by J. E. Hoover re "FBI use of electronic listening devices" before U. S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.

129

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/19/54 (only one communication)

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memorandum from Hoover advising Attorney General had stated in conference that resolution for introduction in Congress was being considered which would give President full authority to initiate military action in Indo China. Hoover notes that this would impose heavy responsibility upon FBI.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON CRIME

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/5/69 (only communication)

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 25

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memorandum 3/5/69 [redacted] to [redacted] with draft of Presidential message on crime. Memorandum summarizes material in draft with observations and recommendation that memorandum be forwarded to Deputy Attorney General with our observation.

151

D[illegible]e: [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
PRESS MEDIA CAMPAIGN
AGAINST DIRECTOR

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 2/4/70

Last Communication Dated 6/11/70

Approximate Pages 19

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Tickler Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains airtels and memoranda dealing with information received indicating that [redacted] reporter for the [redacted] was planning to write some articles critical of Mr. Hoover including information that Hoover was a homosexual.

132

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/26/66

Last Communication Dated 7/1/66

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains memorandum from [redacted] indicating that [redacted], [redacted] [redacted] would probably seek meeting with Director Hoover soon to discuss a Senate Resolution being pushed by Senators [redacted] and [redacted] to set up a CIA "watchdog" committee.

Contains memorandum from Hoover setting forth results of meeting with [redacted]

133

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/28/49 (only communication)

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 6

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Letter from [redacted] to Director outlining proposed plans for [redacted] to visit Honolulu and includes information that [redacted] will urge visit as it will give [redacted] chance to develop close personal relationships with the President and enhance [redacted] chances of later being named [redacted]

134

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
RIOTS - SUMMER 1964

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 9/8/64

Last Communication Dated 11/20/64

Approximate Pages 630

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Compilation of data concerning riots in summer of 1964.

135

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 8/24/36

Last Communication Dated 5/29/42

Approximate Pages 27

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No x (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy

Ticklers Only _____ Originals Only _____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains memoranda recording Mr. Hoover's contacts with [redacted] and Attorney General between 8/24/36 - 5/29/42. Contacts relate to authority of FBI to investigate subversive activities, and execution of German saboteurs.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/29/65

Last Communication Dated 2/16/66

Approximate Pages 10

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains memoranda dealing with arrangements for employment and financing for [redacted], an informant, [redacted] in Alabama, 1965.

137

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated Undated material

Last Communication Dated _____

Approximate Pages 24

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Miscellaneous

Tickler Only _____ Originals Only X Both _____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains large envelope with writing "[redacted], Personal and Confidential." Inside are two copies of a printed pamphlet captioned "The Metlakahtla Case - Illegality of The Seizures of the Property of William Duncan and of The Metlakahtla Christian Mission."

Cannot determine basis for having this folder or significance of contents.

155

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File, _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 2/26/47 (only communication)

Last Communication Dated _____

Approximate Pages 3

Derogatory Information: Yes X No _____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Ticklers Only _____ Originals Only X Both _____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memo 2/26/47 summarizing information in Bureau files re [redacted] including association with hoodlums.

ate: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

SIS CHARTS

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/26/42

Last Communication Dated _____

Approximate Pages 4

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only _____ Originals Only X Both _____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Memo to Director from [redacted] dealing with 2 charts showing coverage by the Special Intelligence Section of FBI (1942).

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 10/2/41

Last Communication Dated 10/3/41

Approximate Pages 8

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains memo to Hoover from [redacted] re observations of [redacted], Assistant Attorney General re Special Defense Unit (1941).

141

ate: 2/17/75

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
SPECIALIZED MAIL COVERAGE

Aides Initial: JCM

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/2/71

Last Communication Dated 7/7/71

Approximate Pages 5

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains two memorandums (1971) re highly sensitive information concerning two types of security coverage on the Soviets.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/26/60

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 1 (routing slip)

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains routing slip to [redacted] stating that Mr. Hoover instructs these (refering to files [redacted] and OC folder to [redacted] 12/12/60) be filed in his Official Confidential files.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File (check one)

First Communication Dated 11/3/41

Last Communication Dated 1/12/44

Approximate Pages 5

Derogatory Information: Yes No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Tickers Only Originals Only X Both

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains four memoranda [redacted] to Hoover dealing with various Government appointments pending ~~(1944 - 1941)~~. (1941-1944)

144

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/9/52

Last Communication Dated 6/1/67

Approximate Pages 9

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains memorandum (1952) setting forth precedure which Bureau follows with reference to the installation of technical surveillance. Folder also contains memoranda (Secret) Attorney General to Hoover and Hoover to Attorney General dealing with [redacted] request for technical surveillance.

145

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) TITLE VIII GUIDELINES

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/7/70

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 8

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains memorandum to Director from Assistant Attorney General [redacted] setting up guidelines re Organized Crime and Control Act of 1970, particularly Title VIII - Syndicated Gambling

146

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File (check one)

First Communication Dated 9/28/38

Last Communication Dated

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes X No (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Personnel

Ticklers Only Originals Only X Both

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains one memorandum to Mr. Hoover (unsigned) re attitude , etc., of Agents assigned to New York Office.

Date: [illegible]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S
CONFERENCE - 1950

Aides Initial:

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File _____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/17/51

Last Communication Dated _____

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes _____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only _____ Originals Only X Both _____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains memorandum (1951) re forthcoming U. S. Attorney's conference and requested presence of Mr. Hoover.

148

ate: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)
U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES -
BRIEF FOR USE OF DIRECTOR IN APPEARANCE
BEFORE PRESIDENTIAL BOARD TO REVIEW PERIODICALLY

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/20/56

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 23

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder is TOP SECRET. Brief for use by Director before Presidential Board (1956) to review U. S. Foreign Intelligence Activities.

ML

149

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/5/48

Last Communication Dated 12/16/52

Approximate Pages 4

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional

Tickers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder contains following:

1. [redacted] to Hoover (1952) memorandum re meeting [redacted] in New York City.

2. Memorandum to Hoover (1948) re FBI denial it has file on "[redacted] Woman" to [redacted]

3. Memorandum to Hoover from [redacted] (1948) re photo of [redacted] and his girl friend. This refers to efforts by newspaper to obtain photo of [redacted] and [redacted] (paramour) at Union Station. Note - this memorandum refers to [redacted] as Agent of British Intelligence who was sent to U. S. for specific purpose of contacting [redacted] and obtaining information from him.

150.

ate: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/13/45

Last Communication Dated 2/15/47

Approximate Pages 4

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder captioned "[redacted]

Folder contains 2 letters to [redacted] from Mr. Hoover.

151

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/24/34

Last Communication Dated 6/5/41

Approximate Pages 211

Derogatory Information: Yes ___ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Ticklers Only ___ Originals Only X Both ___

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder captioned [redacted]

Folder contains photostats of letters from [redacted] to unidentified people and cover memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. Hoover.

152

Date: [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/20/42

Last Communication Dated 6/27/42

Approximate Pages 85

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains results of investigation conducted based on allegations that [redacted] was frequenting a house where homosexuals engaged in espionage activity visited.' Investigation disclosed person thought to be [redacted] was someone else.

153

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

WAR PLANS

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/26/50 1-communication

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages - 7

Derogatory Information: Yes ______ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Administrative

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ______ Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder captioned "War Plans"
7-page memorandum (1950) re possibility of war with Soviet Union. SECRET
Memo is to [redacted] " no signature.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 9/6/41

Last Communication Dated 9/6/44

Approximate Pages 24

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Personnel

Tickers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder captioned "Washington Field Division."
Folder contains 24 pages of miscellaneous items dealing with personnel problems in the Washington Field Office.

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISION
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 6/5/58

Last Communication Dated 10/29/65

Approximate Pages 67

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Congressional - Information

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Contains almost entirely letters to Hoover from SACs in Washington Field Office containing general immoral or criminal activities on the part of diplomats, Government employees, politicians, sport figures, socially prominent persons, Senators and Congressmen.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted] - [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 1/23/41

Last Communication Dated 9/14/43

Approximate Pages 160

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder captioned [redacted]
Folder contains report and memoranda of investigation re immoral activities of [redacted]. Allegation was that [redacted] was a homosexual.

157

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/29/39

Last Communication Dated 3/9/44

Approximate Pages 15

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Information (furnished White House)

Ticklers Only X Originals Only ____ Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder captioned "White House Correspondence"
Folder contains various memoranda and letter to White House reporting items of interest. This includes:

1. Memorandum enclosing public source information concerning unnamed Senator (1941)
2. Memorandum concerning [redacted], U. S. Army
3. Letter to White House re briefcase of [redacted] (it had been lost)
4. Note to Mr. Hoover and Attorney General re internment of German Seaman in U. S. (1939)

155

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

WHITE HOUSE EMPLOYEES

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 4/17/57

Last Communication Dated 5/10/57

Approximate Pages 14

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder captioned "White House Employees." Folder contains memoranda and report re investigation by FBI re 2 employees at White House who are homosexuals. This investigation referred to the FBI by White House in view of possibility of breach of security concerning these individuals.

te: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

WHITE HOUSE SECURITY SURVEY (1945)

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/31/45

Last Communication Dated 8/13/45

Approximate Pages 400

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Investigative

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only ______ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder captioned "White House Security Survey (1945)." Entire folder deals with Bureau investigation into "leaks" to the press concerning telegrams from [redacted] to the White House dealing with [redacted] - Stalin conversations in Moscow in 1945. [redacted] was one person to whom "leaks" were reportedly furnished. Some items "TOP SECRET."

ML

160

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print)

Aides Initial: [redacted]

[redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 7/2/40 1-communication

Last Communication Dated ____

Approximate Pages 1

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy

Tickling Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder captioned [redacted]
One serial in folder deals with Bureau's refusal to conduct investigation of [redacted] as the FBI would be accused of conducting a political investigation.

161

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) [redacted]

Aides Initial: [redacted]

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ______ (check one)

First Communication Dated 3/2/42 (only communication)

Last Communication Dated ______

Approximate Pages 2

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ______ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Prominent Persons

Ticklers Only ______ Originals Only X Both ______

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Folder captioned "[redacted]," contains memo of Mr. Hoover re [redacted] duty status with the U. S. Navy. Report that [redacted] receives $5,000.00 per week for his weekly broadcast and he is receiving this money while on duty status with U. S. Navy. Hoover recommends that [redacted] see President in order to get his duty status cleared up. Hoover obviously feels [redacted] services valuable to country and wanted this problem resolved.

162

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

"WIRETAPPING, PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY"

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ' (check one)

First Communication Dated 5/21/40

Last Communication Dated 11/10/50

Approximate Pages 3

Derogatory Information: Yes ____ No X (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy

Tickers Only ____ Originals Only X Both ____

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Three memos (2 - 1940, 1 - 1950) dealing with delegation of authority to approve wiretaps. (Both by AG and President). This folder captioned "Wiretapping, Presidential Authority."

16-3

Date: [redacted]

Caption on Folder or File: (Print) Aides Initial: [redacted]

"WIRETAPPING, USE OF IN FBI"

Cabinet 6 Drawer 2

Folder X File ____ (check one)

First Communication Dated 12/22/37

Last Communication Dated 3/26/55

Approximate Pages 250

Derogatory Information: Yes X No ____ (check one)

Describe Category; i.e. investigative, congressional, prominent persons, administrative, information, policy, personnel, information from other agency, (use miscellaneous category as little as possible): Policy (Brief on wiretapping)

Ticklers Only ____ Originals Only ____ Both X

Describe General Content of File or Folder: (use separate page if necessary)

Entire folder (250 pages) deals with preparation by J. E. Hoover for his appearance (1955) before the House Committee of the Judiciary. This includes actual statement by Hoover before House Committee of the Judiciary re wiretapping and legislation re this matter. Folder captioned "Wiretapping, Use of in FBI."

164

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 7/15/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2 ALM/RW

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 JUL 22 1975

File Number 62-116395-395

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

4-528

62-116395-394

CHANGED TO

134-19380-137

F460

SEP 8, 1975

Cons/ Inmd

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

1-Mr. Wannall - Enclosure
1-Mr. Cregar - Enclosure
1-Mr. Mintz - Enclosure
1-Mr. Hotis - Enclosure
1-Mr. Daly - Enclosure

The Attorney General July 10, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached in response to the oral request of K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, on June 25, 1975, is one copy of an FD 302, dated June 18, 1975, setting forth a conversation Special Agent Paul V. Daly, of this Bureau, had with Paul Wallach, Staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

Inasmuch as Mr. O'Connor indicated that James Wilderotter, assistant Counsel to the President, also desired a copy, we are enclosing a copy for your forwarding to him.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1-The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)

NOTE: SA Daly on 6-25-75, was furnished a copy of draft memorandum prepared by Michael Shaheen, Jr., Deputy Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, reporting his conversation with Paul Wallach on June 18, 1975, (copy attached). The background information concerning this matter is set forth in Legal Counsel memorandum to J. B. Adams, dated 6-20-75, captioned "SENSTUDY 75". The information contained in attached FD 302 was orally furnished Mr. Shaheen on 6-18-75 by SA Daly.

PVD:lgp
(10)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Letter to Attorney General
Enclosure (2) [illegible] Paul Daly
June 18, 1975

62-116395-393

REC-88

3-ENCLOSURE

3 JUL 22 1975

84 JUL 22 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 6-18-75

Mr. Paul Wallach, staff member of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, telephonically contacted me on 6-18-75 between 2:30 and 3 o'clock P. M., and inquired as to the status of a request by the Committee concerning mail cover information. He asked if I could furnish him a time when he might expect our response to be delivered to him. He pointed out that he had had previous discussions with me and Mr. Shaheen of the Department concerning this matter, and Mr. Shaheen had indicated to him that he could expect the response to have been given to him by this time. Mr. Wallach was informed that a time certain for delivery of a response concerning this request could not be given, and it was explained to him that a vast amount of material was being reviewed pursuant to request of the Senate Select Committee and other committees of Congress and that because of the amount of work involved in all these requests it was not possible to make a judgment as to the date of the response.

Mr. Wallach indicated he felt he had been misled by Mr. Shaheen into believing that he would have a response to his request and that he was going to recontact Mr. Shaheen. He made a general inquiry as to whether one Agent might be gathering all the information and as to whether he might be allowed to come to FBI Headquarters and review what has been gathered to this point. He was informed that all disclosures have to receive proper Bureau approval and that it would not be possible for him to review such information in the absence of such approval. He asked if the Bureau could separate the response by making available immediately portions of the mail cover lists such as the identities of people who were the targets of mail covers in the domestic field. He again was informed that this was not possible in the absence of proper approval. Mr. Wallach stated that he wanted me to know that he was in possession of a list of Bureau mail covers for the past five years which he had been furnished by a source whom he did not identify. He was asked (1) if this list concerned the mail covers in the national security areas and, (2) was it a national list. Mr. Wallach stated it was a national list in the national security areas. He stated he was not sure of its accuracy. He indicated that he would have no reservations about using the list to conduct the Senate Select Committee business and stated that interviews may be conducted based on the list.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-2-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

Interviewed on 6-18-75 at Washington, D. C. File #

by Paul V. Daly Date dictated 6-18-75

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-393

He was advised that the list would contain sensitive information which would seriously impair ongoing Bureau investigations. He replied that the names were not classified, and since they were not classified he would have no problem in using the list. It was explained to Mr. Wallach that despite the fact it was not classified the list would be extremely sensitive since it would impair many ongoing investigations and in many instances the very fact that we are interested in an individual indicates that we are in possession of sensitive information concerning that individual. Mr. Wallach pointed out that if this were the case, acknowledging that he had been informed previously that one of the reasons for the necessity for closely reviewing the material to be made available was because of this problem, then the Bureau should come forward with its own list and point out to him which of the names are sensitive and which are not. Mr. Wallach stated that only one or two other people had knowledge of the fact he possessed such a list.

DRAFT

TO:

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Deputy Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

SUBJECT: Telecon with Paul Wallach of the Senate Select Committee - June 18, 1975 - 4:20 p.m.

Paul Wallach called O'Connor, but I took the call. Wallach stated that his call to O'Connor was to express his personal concern over O'Connor's questioning his (Wallach's) professional ethics in an earlier telephone conversation with John Elliff of SSC staff. Wallach expressed the hope that Schwarz's conversation with O'Connor in which Schwarz categorically disclaimed that Wallach had made certain specific representations to Paul Daly of the FBI earlier, would put to rest all of O'Connor's concerns vis-à-vis Wallach. (O'Connor's concerns were aroused by my report to him of a Wallach call at about 3:00 p.m. to Daly in which Daly stated that Wallach claimed that he (Wallach) "had the NSC mail covers going back five years" and had received same with names listed from a source that Wallach refused to disclose. Daly further reported that Wallach stated that unless the Bureau was not immediately forthcoming with the SSC's request for the NSC mail covers, he (Wallach) would use the ones in his possession.) I told Wallach that I would convey his expression of concern to O'Connor and that I thought that we should let this conversation serve as the

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-393

DRAFT

concluding chapter of an unfortunate series of telephonic exch Further, I requested that in the future, and for the good of a parties concerned, he should direct all his requests and inquir to me.

Leaving that subject, Wallach said he wished "to say som and that "it was to be off the record, of course"; he proceede state that, indeed, he does know someone with access to the NSC covers and that that individual had offered him the list just t days ago, but that for "obviously ethical reasons" he (Wallach) refused the offer. Further, Wallach volunteered that "maybe I suggest that I had them (the NSC covers)" in his conversation Daly.

DRAFT

The Attorney General July 10, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached in response to the oral request of K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, on June 25, 1975, is one copy of an FD 302, dated June 18, 1975, setting forth a conversation Special Agent Paul V. Daly, of this Bureau, had with Paul Wallach, Staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

Inasmuch as Mr. O'Connor indicated that James Wilderotter, assistant Counsel to the President, also desired a copy, we are enclosing a copy for your forwarding to him.

Enclosure

62-116395

original in Sensitivity

1-The Deputy Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

DUPLICATE YELLOW

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVEST[illegible]TION

Date of transcription 6-18-75

Mr. Paul Wallach, staff member of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, telephonically contacted me on 6-18-75 between 2:30 and 3 o'clock P. M., and inquired as to the status of a request by the Committee concerning mail cover information. He asked if I could furnish him a time when he might expect our response to be delivered to him. He pointed out that he had had previous discussions with me and Mr. Shaheen of the Department concerning this matter, and Mr. Shaheen had indicated to him that he could expect the response to have been given to him by this time. Mr. Wallach was informed that a time certain for delivery of a response concerning this request could not be given, and it was explained to him that a vast amount of material was being reviewed pursuant to request of the Senate Select Committee and other committees of Congress and that because of the amount of work involved in all these requests it was not possible to make a judgment as to the date of the response.

Mr. Wallach indicated he felt he had been misled by Mr. Shaheen into believing that he would have a response to his request and that he was going to recontact Mr. Shaheen. He made a general inquiry as to whether one Agent might be gathering all the information and as to whether he might be allowed to come to FBI Headquarters and review what has been gathered to this point. He was informed that all disclosures have to receive proper Bureau approval and that it would not be possible for him to review such information in the absence of such approval. He asked if the Bureau could separate the response by making available immediately portions of the mail cover lists such as the identities of people who were the targets of mail covers in the domestic field. He again was informed that this was not possible in the absence of proper approval. Mr. Wallach stated that he wanted me to know that he was in possession of a list of Bureau mail covers for the past five years which he had been furnished by a source whom he did not identify. He was asked (1) if this list concerned the mail covers in the national security areas and, (2) was it a national list. Mr. Wallach stated it was a national list in the national security areas. He stated he was not sure of its accuracy. He indicated that he would have no reservations about using the list to conduct the Senate Select Committee business and stated that interviews may be conducted based on the list.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

Interviewed on 6-18-75 at Washington, D. C. File #

by Paul V. Daly Date dictated 6-18-75

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

He was advised that the list would contain sensitive information which would seriously impair ongoing Bureau investigations. He replied that the names were not classified, and since they were not classified he would have no problem in using the list. It was explained to Mr. Wallach that despite the fact it was not classified the list would be extremely sensitive since it would impair many ongoing investigations and in many instances the very fact that we are interested in an individual indicates that we are in possession of sensitive information concerning that individual. Mr. Wallach pointed out that if this were the case, acknowledging that he had been informed previously that one of the reasons for the necessity for closely reviewing the material to be made available was because of this problem, then the Bureau should come forward with its own list and point out to him which of the names are sensitive and which are not. Mr. Wallach stated that only one or two other people had knowledge of the fact he possessed such a list.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JUL 19 1975
[illegible]

NR 03 SD CODED

12:32 AM JULY 19 Q1975 NITEL GDF

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAN DIEGO (66-1714)

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL JULY 17, 1975.

FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT S. BAKER, 4268 HORTENSIA, SAN DIEGO, CONTACTED JULY 18, 1975 IN LINE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REBUTEL.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

5-8

REC-88

(Robert S. Baker)

62-116395-391

3 JUL 22 1975

Records
cc-67-

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUL 22 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 18 1975
TELETYPE

NR 005 SF CODE

:27 PM NITEL 7/18/75 CJC

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL, JULY 17, 1975.

FORMER SA WILLIAM COHENDET ADVISED OF CONTENTS OF RETEL THIS DATE. FORMER SA ALBERT P. CLARK IN TRAVEL STATUS ON VACATION UNTIL MONDAY, JULY 21, AT WHICH TIME HE WILL ALSO BE ADVISED.

END

HOLD PLS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

5.8

(W. COHENDET)

REC-38 62-116395-390

3 JUL 22 1975

cc-67

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

PERS. REC. ~~UNIT~~

84 JUL 22 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 15 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓ WRW
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR002 AQ PLAIN

12:13MPM URGENT 7/15/75 PD

TO: DIRECTOR (~~66~~ 62-116395)

FROM: ALBUQUERQUE (66-1029)

ATTENTION: WILLIAM O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY -75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

REMYTELCAL, JULY 15, 1975.

ON JULY 15, 1975, SAM PAPICH, DIRECTOR, NEW MEXICO GOVERNORS COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME (FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, FBI), ADVISED HE HAD BEEN TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED ON THIS DATE BY DAVE MARTIN, ASSOCIATED PRESS, WASHINGTON, D. C., WHO WAS INQUIRING CONCERNING PAPICH'S KNOWLEDGE OF EVENTS WHICH LED TO STATEMENTS MADE BY DIRECTOR KELLEY ON ~~LY~~ JULY 14, 1975. SPECIFICALLY, MARTIN WANTED PAPICH TO IDENTIFY THOSE AGENTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN BURGLARIES OF FOREIGN EMBASSIES AND ALSO WANTED THE IDENTITIES OF THE EMBASSIES.

PAPICH STATED HE TOLD MARTIN ABSOLUTELY NOTHING AND MARTIN THEN ASKED IF PAPICH WAS ACQUAINTED WITH FORMER ASSISTANDIRECTOR AL BELMONT, INDICATING POSSIBLY HE,

END PAGE ONE

COPY RETAINED
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Rec-67 N.Mex (Sam Papich) 62-116395-389

REC-

3 JUL 22 1975

cc-67

PERS. REC. UNIT

8 4 JUL 22 1975

MARTIN, COULD GET THE INFORMATION HE DESIRED FROM BELMONT.

PAPICH ADVISED HE WAS ACQUAINTED WITH MR. BELMONT BUT SUGGESTED

MARTIN CONTACT MR. BELMONT'S DOCTOR FIRST IN VIEW OF

MR. BELMONT'S CURRENT BAD HEALTH.

END

DCW

FBIHQ CLR

5-143a (Rev. 3-21-73)

Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 7/15/75

Attached contains information from former SA Sam Papich regarding contact of him by Associated Press reporter regarding embassy burglaries. Papich said he gave no information to the reporter. He also suggested former Assistant to the Director Al Belmont not be contacted without prior contact with Mr. Belmont's doctor.

For information only.

JPT/fmk
JPT

WOP
MBG
WRW
PLM
BA
PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RC

62-116395-389

DOJ/FBI

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 11 1975
TELETYPE

NR007 TP CODE

5:22PM NITEL JULY 11, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM TAMPA (105-5390)

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

REBUNITEL JULY 10, 1975.

JOHN M. MATTER, 8505 DOMINICAN COURT, FT. MYERS, FLA., TELEPHONE 813-936-1691, WAS CONTACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCED BUNITEL.

MATTER, A RETIRED AGENT FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO FBI LAB, INDICATED HE WOULD TELPHONICALLY CONTACT THE BUREAU, SPEAK WITH ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR CALLAHAN, AND THEREAFTER WITH OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE CONTACT BY REPRESENTATIVE OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

MATTER WILL KEEP BUREAU ADVISED THROUGH SAC, TAMPA OF ANY CONTACTS IN CAPTIONED MATTER.

END

LSG FBIHQ CLR FOR TWO AND TKS

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

REC-88

62-116395-388

67-607 (Matter)

Records

cc-67

3 JUL 22 1975

5-Phillips (Cert)

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUL 22 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/2/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-3-00 BY SP2ALM/RW

This memorandum records the results of a meeting in the Deputy Attorney General's office on the morning of 7/2/75.

Mr. Paul V. Daly, Legal Counsel Division, and Section Chief William O. Cregar of the Intelligence Division met in the office of the Deputy Attorney General on the morning of 7/2/75. Also present at the meeting were the Deputy Attorney General and Messrs. K. William O'Connor, Kevin Maroney, Michael Shaheen and Robert McDermott, all of the Department of Justice. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss three specific matters the first being the draft letter dated 6/25/75 to the Attorney General from Senators Church and Tower (see memorandum Wannall to Adams captioned as above dated 6/30/75). The second matter discussed was the Task Force concept. The third item was a review by FBI regarding the Rockefeller Commission files (these files constitute 12 legal file draws of documents as well as approximately 40,000 pages of testimony).

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-116395-387

LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DATED 6/25/75

REC-84

~~62-116395-333~~

A review of this letter was set out in the memorandum Wannall to Adams dated 6/30/75. The Deputy Attorney General found considerable difficulty in understanding paragraph 2 of the 6/25/75 letter pointing out that neither the Department of Justice nor the FBI had entered into any agreement. In view of the ambiguities the Deputy Attorney General found in the letter as well as the lack of any specific agreement entered into with the Senate Select Committee (SSC) by the Department and/or the FBI,

62-116395

3 JUL 10 1975

WOC:lhb lhb
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

~~84 JUL 17 1975~~

JUL 22 1975

the Deputy Attorney General instructed that the Department prepare a letter over the Attorney General's signature asking for clarification of the 6/25/75 letter as well as raising the question of any agreement entered into by the Department or the FBI.

TASK FORCE CONCEPT

The Task Force concept is designed to identify various abuses which the SSC desires to investigate in-depth. A member of the intelligence community would be identified to the Executive Branch as a Task Force leader. The purpose would be to permit that Task Force leader to be completely knowledgeable on all available information throughout the intelligence community for a particular abuse. In other words, the White House could look to the Task Force leader as the one person in the intelligence community who would be privy to all information regarding a particular abuse. The Deputy Attorney General had no problem with this concept but did insist that the Task Force leaders should not negotiate directly with their counterparts on the SSC on behalf of the intelligence community for any particular abuse (the White House has insisted on this). The Deputy Attorney General instructed Mr. O'Connor to make this quite clear to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, and if Wilderotter insisted on unilateral negotiations between Task Force leaders and the SSC, Wilderotter should be referred to the Deputy Attorney General in order to resolve this issue.

THE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION FILES

As you know, the President has ordered that copies of the Rockefeller Commission files including testimony be turned over to the SSC. There has been no third agency coordination on the part of CIA regarding what information was turned over to the Rockefeller Commission. As a result

CONTINUED - OVER

of the above, we are not aware what sensitive information involving the FBI has been furnished to the Rockefeller Commission by CIA.

The Criminal Division of the Department has received copies of the entire Rockefeller Commission file plus testimony. The Deputy Attorney General has ruled that these files and testimony cannot be turned over to the FBI in toto until such time as the Criminal Division has ruled on any possible criminal culpability on the part of the FBI. To faciliate the review of the Rockefeller Commission files, the Criminal Division will separate out any information it feels involves any FBI criminal culpability. That portion separated out will be the subject of discussion between the Deputy Attorney General and the Director. The remaining portion of the Rockefeller files will then be turned over to the FBI for review to determine if any of the information contained therein could possibly jeopardize sensitive ongoing investigations or adversely affect the security and welfare of FBI sources mentioned therein.

The Legal Counsel Division is preparing a letter alerting the SSC to the possibility that sensitive information may be contained in the Rockefeller files and requesting that Senators Church and Tower consider a briefing by FBI officials regarding those sensitive areas of concern to the FBI which may be embodied in the Rockefeller Commission files.

ACTION:

For information.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

101 THRU 150.

104 THRU 105

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO :MR. W. R. WANNALL WRW

DATE: April 24, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM :MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum reports the receipt of a legal memorandum prepared by Mr. Edmund Cohen, Office of the General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, entitled "Authority of Congress to Release Classified Data." Copies of this legal memorandum have been furnished to Mr. Anthonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, and Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Memorandum Cregar to W. R. Wannall dated 4/14/75 discussed an article contained in the 4/10/75 edition of "The Washington Post" wherein Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, stated he reserved the right to make public any documents the Committee received. This memorandum also noted that Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, advised that The White House was preparing a letter to Senator Church recognizing that Congress can, at its discretion, declassify material it receives, but strongly urging that such declassification action not be taken unilaterally by the Senate Select Committee without approval of the agency originating the information.

As an aid to the preparation of such a letter, the Office of CIA's General Counsel has prepared a paper entitled "Authority of Congress to Release Classified Data." Copy attached. It was made available to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Committee for information and any comments recipients desired to make.

ACTION: For information.

REC-100 62-116395-150

Enclosure

62-116395

WOC:ekw (6)

1 - [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/JG
#MO216

14 MAY 15 1975

The CIA memo does not solve the problem, therefore it requires no further analysis.

84 MAY 27 1975

DIRECTOR O[illegible]ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Ad Hoc Staff
75-350

17 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

This is being furnished you at Dr. Clarke's request.

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/dfb

62-116395-150

ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Antonin S[illegible]lia, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

Attached is a hurriedly done legal memorandum entitled "Authority of Congress to Release Classified Data." I would welcome your comments on this so that a finished document could be made available to the various agencies concerned.

John

John S. Warner
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency

12 April 1975
(DATE)

NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
G 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: James A. Wilderotter, Esq.
Associate Counsel to the
President

Attached is a hurriedly done legal memorandum entitled "Authority of Congress to Release Classified Data." I would welcome your comments on this so that a finished document could be made available to the various agencies concerned.

John

John S. Warner
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency

12 April 1975
(DATE)

NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

#mdr16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

11 March 1975

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-19-01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Authority of Congress to Release Classified Data

1. I have found no express authority for Congress to publicly release information classified by the executive branch pursuant to an Executive order issued by the President. Moreover, on a number of occasions Congress has mandated that matters pertaining to national defense or foreign policy be kept secret.

--Congress has made it a crime for one lawfully having possession, access or control of documents relating to national defense or information relating to the national defense which the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation to communicate, deliver, or transmit same to any person not entitled to receive it. 18 U.S.C.A. 793(d).

--Congress has made it a crime to disclose to an unauthorized person or publish any classified information obtained by the processes of communications intelligence. 18 U.S.C.A. 798(a).

--Congress has made it a crime to photograph or sketch vital military or naval installations or equipment requiring protection against general dissemination of information. 18 U.S.C.A. 795. It is also a crime to publish or disseminate photographs, maps, or drawings of such defense installations without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer or higher authority. 18 U.S.C.A. 797.

--Congress, in order to prevent public disclosure of certain activities, has given various officials the power to keep confidential certain funds expended for national security or foreign relations purposes. Such authority is given, for example, to the President (22 U.S.C.A. 2364), to the Secretary of State (31 U.S.C.A. 107), and to the Director of Central Intelligence (50 U.S.C.A. 403j).

--Congress has provided that meetings of the Senate Committee on the Budget may be closed to the public if it is determined by a record vote of a majority of the members that the matter to be discussed

> ...will disclose matters necessary to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the confidential conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. 2 U.S.C.A. 190a-3.

--Congress, after requiring that the Secretary of State transmit forthwith to the Congress the text of any international agreement, other than a treaty, to which the United States is a party, goes on to provide that

> ...any such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President. 1 U.S.C.A. 112b.

--Finally, Congress, in enacting the Freedom of Information Act, expressly exempted from disclosure matters which are

> ...specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. 5 U.S.C.A. 552(b)(1).

2. Despite this apparent lack of authority to release classified data and the existence of the above-mentioned statutes, Congress is constitutionally immunized, at least in part, against any consequences flowing from release and disclosure of classified information. Article I, § 6 of the Constitution states in respect to Senators and Representatives that:

> ...for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

3. A long line of Supreme Court cases, beginning with Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1991), has held that the privilege or immunity relating to speech or debate should be given a broad and liberal construction. In Kilbourn the court stated:

> It would be a narrow view of the Constitutional provision to limit it to words spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting.... In short, to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it. (At p. 204.)

4. The court, moreover, has resisted arguments that an unworthy purpose should destroy the privilege. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 the court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810), stating:

> ...that it was not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has remained unquestioned. (At p. 377.)

The distance to which the court was willing to go to uphold this principle was seen in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). In that case a former Congressman was convicted for conspiracy to defraud the U.S., in part on evidence that, in pursuance of a conspiracy designed to give assistance to certain savings and loan associations which had been indicted on mail fraud charges, he was paid to give a speech on the floor of the House. The Supreme Court granted a new trial holding that a prosecution which draws in question the legislative acts of the defendant member of Congress or his motives for performing them "necessarily contravenes the Speech or Debate Clause." (At p. 185.)

5. The court addressed the issue of classified information in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), a case which arose when Senator Gravel, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works Committee, convened a night meeting of the Subcommittee and there read extensively from a copy of the Pentagon Papers which bore a Defense security classification of Top Secret - Sensitive. He then placed the entire 47 volumes of the study in the public record. Senator Gravel claimed that Article I, section 6 protected him from criminal or civil liability and from

questioning elsewhere than in the Senate, with respect to the events occurring at the Subcommittee hearing at which the Pentagon Papers were introduced into the public record. The court stated: "...[T]/o us this claim is incontrovertible." (At p. 615.)

6. The court further noted that:

> The Speech or Debate Clause was designated to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch. It thus protects Members against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process. We have no doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to answer--either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution--for the events that occurred at the subcommittee meeting. (At p. 616.)

7. From the above, together with the positive phrasing of Article 1, § 6 of the Constitution, it would appear that any Member may make any statement he desires on the floor of the Congress or in one of its committees. Such statement shall be absolutely privileged, notwithstanding that it was based on information secured from classified Central Intelligence Agency material either furnished the Member in confidence or containing any restrictive notice as to use or dissemination. This privilege would operate if the Member were to read the information verbatim into the record on the floor or into the record of hearings before a congressional committee. It would still be privileged when it appeared, verbatim, in the Congressional Record or in the published hearings of a congressional committee. The only sanction, apart from the individual conscience and sense of responsibility of the Member, would have to come from Congress itself, which has the power to discipline any Representative or Senator who improperly disclosed classified information.

8. One additional wrinkle might be noted. Although Congressmen would be immune from liability for introducing classified information into a committee report and immune from liability for ordering it printed and disseminated to the public at large, the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents may not be immune from suit for printing and disseminating such reports to the public. The court examined this question in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306(1973), a case in which petitioners claimed that a report issued by the House Committee on the District of Columbia, containing

documents relating to disciplinary problems of certain specifically named students, violated statutory, constitutional and common-law rights to privacy. The Supreme Court refused to determine whether dissemination to the public would serve the important legislative function of informing the public concerning matters pending before Congress for the purpose of holding Members of Congress liable. However, it remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, in part to undertake just such a review in order to determine whether the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents, who were without blanket immunity, could be held liable.

9. The discussion thus far has dealt only with congressional immunity for releasing classified information in Congress. No such immunity exists in the case of disclosures made by congressmen outside of Congress. Thus, in Long v. Ansel, 69 F.2d 386 (Ct. App., D.C. 1934), affd. 293 U.S. 76 (1934), and in McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (US Dist. Ct., D.C. 1960) it was held that if a Senator or Representative is alleged to have committed libel by republishing and disseminating remarks made in the Congress, such republication and dissemination is not within the Speech or Debate privilege even if such privilege would have been applicable to the original publication of the remarks. Again, in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), and in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) the court noted that the Speech or Debate Clause does not protect "a private republication of documents introduced and made public at a committee hearing, although the hearing was unquestionably part of the legislative process."

10. From the above it is apparent that a Member is not privileged to circulate CIA documents to his constituents, to the press, or by reading to a meeting or on radio or television. Such action could well make the member liable for prosecution under the espionage laws, but in any event would expose him to the same liability for these actions as any other citizen. As a practical matter, however, the prosecution of a Member for unauthorized disclosure of classified CIA material, or disciplinary action by Congress itself, is very unlikely.

EDMUND COHEN
Office of General Counsel

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: May 2, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

The April 29, 1975, Congressional Record - Senate, pages S 7054 through and including S 7056, sets forth rules and procedures for the captioned Committee. The rules cover such topics as the convening of meetings, meeting procedures, news media coverage, investigations, subpoenas, procedures related to the taking of testimony, procedures for handling classified or sensitive material, preparation for committee meetings, staff, and reporting of measures or recommendations.

The key sections of these rules are subpoenas, investigations, and procedures related to taking of testimony.

Concerning the issue of subpoenas, subpoenas may be issued by the Chairman or any other member designated by him with the consultation of the Vice Chairman.

Procedures relating to the taking of testimony provide that testimony shall be given under oath or affirmation. It also provides that a witness may be accompanied by counsel. Witnesses may also request that there be no news media coverage of their testimony. Witnesses will also be given the opportunity of furnishing a statement prior to, and/or at the conclusion of his or her testimony. With regard to inspection and correction of testimony, witnesses will be allowed a reasonable opportunity to inspect their testimony, and corrections are permissible, but must be made in writing within five days of the availability of the transcript containing their testimony. Names of witnesses cannot be made public prior to their testimony unless authorized by the Chairman.

Contempt procedures as set forth, require that after notice to all members of the Committee, and the affected person has had the opportunity to state in writing or in person why he

REC-100
62-116395-149

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Cregar
PVD:eek
(8)

ENCLOSURE

6 MAY 20 1975

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 MAY 27 1975

or she should not be held in contempt, a vote would be taken by the Committe with a majority being necessary for the referral of a contempt citation to the full Senate.

The rules concerning sensitive material limit access to such material to employees on a need-to-know basis and to only those staff members with appropriate security clearances.

Reporting procedures for the Committee provide that where the Committee is unable to reach a unanimous decision, separate views and reports may be printed by any member or members of the Committee.

A complete Xerox copy of the rules as they appear in the Record is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

Action. For Information.

JBA

PLM

imperceptible, while 2.5 can be felt near the point of origin and 3 can be felt over a fair-sized area. Slight damage can be caused at 4.5, a level of 5 is considered damaging, 7 is major, and 8 is a "great earthquake."

The issue, most geologists and seismic experts agree, is not whether another blockbuster quake will occur, but when. It could happen any time.

Should that earthquake occur "tomorrow," these experts believe, the following realities await Californians:

Tens of thousands of buildings built in the first half of the century, clearly hazardous under severe earthquake conditions, in use in San Francisco and Los Angeles, could topple, endangering thousands of lives (an estimated 250,000 in Los Angeles alone).

Other thousands of buildings, built on or near faults face destruction from ground shaking and land fill.

High-rise buildings, built to more modern standards, may not topple, but face serious hazards of fire, disabled elevators and inadequate stairwell safety.

Earthquake disaster urgency plans are in the nascent stages throughout the state, hampered by apathy among public officials, lack of funds and infrequent exercises.

The public is ill-prepared to cope with earthquakes or their aftermaths. There is virtually no publicity about what to do during or after a major quake. Earthquake drills are rarely, if ever, held in communities or in public buildings (schools are an exception).

A recent federally sponsored study gives these estimates of death and injury should a temblor of more than 7 or 8 on the Richter scale occur in or near San Francisco or Los Angeles:

San Francisco—as many as 10,000 persons dead and 40,000 injured. (Should a major dam break, the death toll could rise to 60,000.) Another 56,000 could be left homeless (not including dam evacuees).

Los Angeles—as many as 20,000 deaths and up to 600,000 injured. Additional deaths possible due to major dam failure—up to 14,000. Homeless (not including dam evacuees), up to 180,000.

At the very best, Californians are fatalistic about earthquakes, accepting that they will come, and hoping they will be out of the affected area when it happens.

"You don't know when it is going to be or how it's going to be," said one West Los Angeles resident. "I should put money into making my house earthquake-proof when I could be in some skyscraper swaying when it happens? Who cares?"

In San Francisco, a college professor recently asked 125 residents in a random sampling what they would do if an earthquake comes. Sixty per cent said, in effect, "Start praying. What else is there to do?"

What can be done? In fact, quite a lot—and some of it is being accomplished in the areas of building code upgrading, land-use planning, emergency preparedness, earthquake prediction, and public education. But the effort of a few aggressive legislators, state and local officials, and private citizens is frustrated by the low level of priority generally assigned to earthquake protection.

The "kill ratio" of past California earthquakes is extremely low compared to, say, traffic accidents. About 900 persons have died as the results of quakes since the turn of the century compared to an average annual highway toll of 4,800. Thus there are those who argue against expenditures of time and effort on something as mercurial and unpredictable as an earthquake.

California's new governor, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., is said to be one of those. According to a recent news story, Brown suggested that money being allocated for safe buildings might be used to improve the quality of education, to rehabilitate housing for the poor, or to create construction jobs.

After the San Frenando quake, there was a flurry of studies, hearings, plans and legislation.

In Los Angeles, the building code requirements were toughened. Explained Bob Williams, general manager of Los Angeles' Department of Building and Safety: "We doubled the loading strength requirements and required standards twice as strong in reinforced concrete and reinforced masonry."

Los Angeles' building code is in some respect tougher than the Uniform Building Code to which most jurisdictions in the state adhere. One official, Long Beach building director Edward M. O'Connor, a leading proponent of better preparedness, contends that the Uniform Building Code falls short.

"It does not fulfill the purpose of the code: to preserve life, limb, property and the public welfare in the event of an earthquake," he said.

Changes in the uniform code come slowly. They are modeled after recommendations by the California Structural Engineers Association, composed of professional engineers who help design buildings.

The recommendations usually represent a balance of conservative and liberal strains within the association, and, according to some observers, are strongly influenced by economic considerations.

The drafters of the uniform code are still wrestling with one of the central lessons of the San Fernando earthquake—the fact that major buildings are being constructed with little knowledge or consideration of soil and geological conditions and how they might respond to ground shocks.

Geologists and seismic experts admit they know very little about what causes earthquakes or precisely how buildings are affected by local or even distant shocks. Now, for the first time, California is placing instruments that measure motion in key buildings around the state. But they must await another earthquake to produce usable data.

In the meantime, seismic considerations are working their way slowly—some say too slowly—into building requirements.

New laws ban construction directly over active faults, require satisfactory geologic studies before new hospitals are built, require that a "seismic safety element" be included in local planning, and require the correction of unsafe dam conditions.

This legislation added up to the most progressive package of earthquake measures in 40 years, but it was not accomplished without resistance. The restriction on building on or near faults, for example, inspired a storm of protest from real estate developers and individual lot owners that eventually forced a modification softening the restriction.

A hospital law passed in 1972 requires that detailed geological and soil reports for proposed hospital construction be reviewed by state geologists.

James Flosson, director of the state Department of Mines and Geology, promptly ran into problems.

"The reports the first few months were a disgrace to the profession," Flosson said. "We insisted that they be redone, and done again until they were right. I've had my head bloodied many times as a result. I've been threatened, told my career would be ruined—a few geologists tried to get me fired. But we stood by our guns and now the quality of the reports is excellent."

Another area of controversy is highrise safety. Berkeley architect Karl V. Steinbrugge believes the modern steelframe construction will withstand intense shocks. But Henry J. Degunkolb, a San Francisco structural engineer and frequent critic of safety standards, said:

"I would not find it unreasonable to expect . . . there will be 15 to 30 total collapses with another 50 to 100 severely damaged" in San Francisco.

While there is disagreement about highrise collapse, there is a broad consensus that most existing high rises are vulnerable to extensive internal damage from unbolted equipment and, most significantly, from fire.

The dangers are serious enough to have prompted major changes recently in fire regulations for all future buildings.

All future high rises (above 75 feet) will be built with automatic governors that bring elevators instantly to ground level, and, most importantly, with sprinkler systems at every level.

All but a minuscule number of the nearly 2,000 high rises presently in Los Angeles and San Francisco lack sprinkler systems.

Requirements that they be installed were written into a state law last year, but efforts to draft regulations ran into fierce opposition from builders, the Chambers of Commerce and other businessmen.

The battle is still being fought.

San Francisco's disaster plan is advanced over those of other municipalities, but it suffers from lack of a central communications network, insufficient coordination among departments and inadequate practical exercises, according to a city planning department study.

"All it is is a paper organization," said Alfred Goldberg, head of the city's building department.

Goldberg's concerns are echoed by James Halgwood, state emergency services officer in charge of helping to create state-level disaster plan for Southern California.

Commented Halgwood: "I don't think most elected and appointed officials understand they have a real responsibility to have their jurisdictions prepared. They are only doing a barebones job."

RULES ,OF PROCEDURE FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, in accordance with the provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, I submit now for publication in the RECORD the rules of procedure for the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. These rules were adopted by the members of the Select Committee on April 9, 1975. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the rules were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE, ADOPTED APRIL 9, 1975

These Rules are issued pursuant to the 1st Section of Senate Resolution 21, 94th Congress, 1st Session, agreed to January 27, 1975, and printed in full in the appendix hereto.

RULE 1. CONVENING OF MEETINGS

1.1 The Committee may schedule a regular day and hour for the Committee to meet.

1.2 The Chairman shall have authority, upon proper notice, to call such additional meetings of the Committee as he may deem necessary and may delegate such authority to any other member of the Committee.

1.3 A special meeting of the Committee may be called at any time upon the written request of six or more members of the Committee filed with the Clerk of the Committee.

1.4 In the case of any meeting of the Committee, other than a regularly scheduled meeting, the Clerk of the Committee

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/JTS

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-149

shall notify every member of the Committee of the time and place of the meeting and shall give reasonable notice which, except in extraordinary circumstances, shall be at least 24 hours in advance of any meeting held in Washington, D.C. and at least 48 hours in the case of any meeting held outside Washington, D.C.

1.5 If a majority of the members of the Committee have made a request in writing to the Chairman to call a meeting of the Committee and the Chairman fails to call such a meeting within seven calendar days thereafter, including the day on which the written notice is submitted, such majority may call a meeting by filing a written notice with the Clerk of the Committee who shall promptly notify each member of the Committee in writing of the date and time of the meeting.

RULE 2. MEETING PROCEDURES

2.1 Meetings of the Committee shall be open to the public except when otherwise directed by the Chairman or majority vote of members present.

2.2 It shall be the duty of the staff director to keep or cause to be kept a record of all Committee proceedings.

2.3 The Chairman of the Committee, or if the Chairman is not present the Vice Chairman, shall preside over all meetings of the Committee. In the absence of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman at any meeting majority member is present the ranking minority member present, shall preside.

2.4 Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, decisions of the Committee shall be by majority vote of the members present and voting. A quorum for the transaction of Committee business, including the conduct of Executive sessions, shall consist of six Committee members except, that for the purpose of hearing witnesses, taking sworn testimony, and receiving evidence under oath, a quorum may consist of one Senator.

2.5 A vote by any member of the Committee with respect to any measure or matter being considered by the Committee may be cast by proxy if the proxy authorization (1) is in writing to the Chairman or Vice Chairman; (2) designates the member of the Committee who is to exercise the proxy; and (3) is limited to a specific measure or matter and any amendments pertaining thereto. Proxies shall not be considered for the establishment of a quorum.

RULE 3. BROADCASTING, TELEVISION, AND PHOTOGRAPHY

Any Committee meeting which is open to the public may, subject to Rule 6.7, be covered, in whole or in part, by television, radio, still photography or other media coverage, if the Chairman authorizes such coverage. When coverage by any such media is authorized it must be conducted in an orderly and unobtrusive manner, and the Chairman may for good cause terminate such media coverage in whole or in part, or take such other action as the circumstances may warrant.

RULE 4. INVESTIGATIONS

No investigation shall be initiated by the Committee unless a majority of the members of the Committee has specifically authorized such investigation, but any member of the Committee shall be entitled to pursue any inquiry individually unless specifically prohibited by a majority vote of the members of the Committee. Authorized investigations or inquiries may be conducted by members of the Committee and/or by designated staff members.

RULE 5. SUBPOENAS

Subpoenas for attendance of witnesses or the production of memoranda, documents, records, or any other material may be issued by the Chairman, or any other member designated by him after consultation with the Vice Chairman, and may be served by any person designated by the Chairman or member. Each subpoena shall contain a copy of Senate Resolution 21, 94th Congress, 1st Session.

RULE 6. PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE TAKING OF TESTIMONY

6.1 *Notice.*—Witnesses required to appear before the Committee shall be given reasonable notice and all witnesses shall be furnished a copy of these Rules.

6.2 *Oath or Affirmation.*—Testimony of witnesses shall be given under oath or affirmation which may be administered by any member of the Committee.

6.3 *Interrogation.*—Committee interrogation shall be conducted by members of the Committee and such staff personnel as is authorized by the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, or the presiding member.

6.4 *Counsel for the Witness.*—(a) Any witness may be accompanied by counsel. A witness who is unable to obtain counsel may inform the Committee of such fact, and if consistent with the notice given under Section 6.1 hereof, at least 24 hours prior to his appearance before the Committee, the Committee shall then endeavor to obtain voluntary counsel for the witness, but failure to obtain such counsel will not excuse the witness from appearing and testifying.

(b) Counsel shall conduct themselves in an ethical and professional manner. Failure to do so shall, upon a finding to that effect by a majority of the members present, subject such counsel to disciplinary action which may include warning, censure, removal, or a recommendation of contempt proceedings.

(c) There shall be no direct or cross examination by counsel. However, counsel may submit in writing any questions he wishes propounded to his client or to any other witness and may, at the conclusion of his client's testimony suggest the presentation of other evidence or the calling of other witnesses. The Committee may use such questions and dispose of such suggestions as it may see fit.

6.5 *Statements by Witnesses.*—A witness may make a statement, which shall be brief and relevant, at the beginning and conclusion of his testimony. Such statements shall not exceed a reasonable period of time as determined by the Chairman, or other presiding member. Any witness desiring to make a prepared or written statement for the record of the proceedings shall file a copy with the Clerk of the Committee, and in so far as practicable and consistent with the notice given, shall do so at least 72 hours in adbance of his appearance before the Committee.

6.6 *Objections and Rulings.*—Any objection raised by a witness or counsel shall be ruled upon by the Chairman or other presiding member, and such ruling srhall be the ruling of the Committee unless a majority of the Committee present overrules the ruling. In the case of tie votes the rule of the chair will prevail.

6.7 *Lights and Broadcasting.*—(a) A witness may request, on grounds of distraction, harassment, or physical discomfort, that during his testimony, television, motion picture, and other cameras and lights shall not be directed at him, such requests to be ruled on in accordance with Rule 2.4.

(b) No witness subpoenaed by the Committee shall be required against his will to be photographed at any hearing or to give evidence or testimony while the broadcasting of that hearing, by radio or television, is being conducted. At the request of any witness who does not wish to be subjected to radio, television, or still photography coverage, all lenses shall be covered and all microphones used for coverage turned off. So far as is practicable, a witness desiring to make such a request shall so inform the Chief Counsel of the Committee at least 24 hours prior to the time that witness is scheduled to testify.

Inspection and Correction.—All witnesses testifying before the Committee shall be given a reasonable opportunity to inspect, in the office of the Committee, the transcript of their testimony to determine whether such testimony wes correctly transcribed. The witness may be accompanied by counsel. Any corrections the witness desires to make in the transcript shall be submited in writing to the Committee within five days of the availability of the transcript. Corrections shall be limited to grammar and minor editing, and may not be made to change the substance of the testimony. Any questions arising with respect to such corrections shall be decided by the Chairman. Upon request, those parts of testimony given by a witness in Executive session which are subsequently quoted or made part of a record shall be made available to that witness at his expense.

6.9 *Persons Affected by Testimony.*—A person who believes that testimony or other evidence presented at a public hearing, or any comment made by a Committee member or Committee counsel, may tend to affect adversely his reputation, may request to appear personally before the Committee to testify on his own behalf, or may file a sworn statement of facts relevant to the testimony, evidence, or comment, or may submit to the Chairman proposed questions in writing for the cross-examination of other witnesses. The Committee shall take such action as it deems appropriate.

6.10 *Contempt Procedures.*—No recommendations that a person be cited for contempt of Congress shall be forwarded to the Senate unless and until the Committee has, upon notice to all its members, met and considered the alleged contempt, afforded the person an opportunity to state in writing or in person why he should not be held in contempt, and agreed, by majority vote of the Committee to forward such recommendation to the Senate.

6.11 *Release of Name of Witness.*—Unless authorized by the Chairman, the name of any witness scheduled to be heard by the Committee shall not be released prior to his appearance before the Committee.

RULE 7. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING CLASSIFIED OR SENSITIVE MATERIAL

7.1 Committee staff offices on the first floor of the Dirksen Office Building shall operate under strict security precautions. At least one security guard shall be on duty at all times by the entrance to control entry. All persons before entering the offices shall identify themselves. At least one additional security guard shall be posted at night for surveillance of the secure area where sensitive documents are kept.

7.2 Sensitive or classified documents and material shall be segregated in a secure storage area. They may be examined only at secure reading facilities. Copying, duplicating, or removal from the Committee staff offices of such documents and other materials is prohibited except as is necessary for use in, or preparation for, interviews or Committee meetings, including the taking of testimony, and in conformity with Section 9.2 hereof.

7.3 Each member of the Committee shall at all times have access to all papers and other material received from any source. The Staff Director shall be responsible for the maintenance, under appropriate security procedures, of a registry which will number and identify all papers and other materials in the possession of the Committee, and such registry shall be available to any member of the Committee.

7.4 Access to classified information supplied to the Committee shall be limited to the Staff Director, the Chief Counsel and the Council to the Minority, and those staff members with appropriate security clearances and a need-to-know.

7.5 No testimony taken including the names of witnesses testifying or material presented at an Executive Session, or classified papers, and other materials received by the staff or its consultants while in the employ of the Committee shall be made public, in whole or in part or by way of summary, or disclosed to any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the entire Committee, or after the termination of the Committee, in such manner as may be determined by the Senate.

7.6 Before the Committee is called upon to make any deposition with respect to the testimony, papers, or other materials presented to it, the Committee members shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine all pertinent testimony, papers and other materials that have been obtained by the Committee staff. No member shall release any such testimony, papers, or other materials, or any information contained in such testimony, papers, or other materials, to the public or any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the entire Committee, or after the termination of the Committee, in such manner as may be determined by the Senate.

RULE 8. PREPARATION FOR COMMITTEE MEETINGS

8.1 Under direction of the Chairman, the Staff Director, Chief Counsel, Counsel to the Minority, or other designated staff members shall brief members of the Committee at a time sufficiently prior to any Committee meeting in order to assist the Committee members in preparation for such meeting and to determine any matter which the Committee member might wish considered during the meeting. Such briefing shall include a list of all pertinent papers and other materials that have been obtained by the Committee that bear on matters to be considered at the meeting.

8.2 The Staff Director, the Chief Counsel, and the Counsel to the Minority shall recommend to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman the testimony, papers, and other materials to be presented to the Committee at any meeting. The determination whether such testimony, papers, and other materials shall be presented in open or Executive session shall be made pursuant to the rules of the Senate.

RULE 9. STAFF

9.1 The appointment of all staff members and consultants shall be confirmed by a majority vote of the Committee. After confirmation, the Chairman shall certify staff appointments to the Financial Clerk of the Senate in writing.

9.2 Except as otherwise provided by the Committee, the duties of staff and consultants shall be performed, and staff personnel affairs and day-to-day operations, including security and control of classified documents and material, shall be administered under the direct supervision and control of the Staff Director and the Chief Counsel. The Counsel for the Minority shall be kept fully informed regarding all matters and shall have access to all material in the files of the Committee.

9.3 The staff of the Committee shall not discuss either the substance or procedure of the work of the Committee with anyone other than a member of the Committee or other Committee personnel. Upon termination of employment by the Committee, each member of the staff, or consultant, shall surrender all classified and other material relating to the work of the Committee which came into his possession while in the employ of the Committee.

9.4 The employment of any member of the staff or consultant who fails to conform to any of these Rules shall be immediately terminated.

RULE 10. SERVICES, INFORMATION, FACILITIES, AND PERSONNEL OF THE GOVERNMENT; CONSULTANTS

The Chairman shall have the authority to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and agencies of the government, and to procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants or organizations thereof to make studies or assist or advise the Committee with respect to any matter under investigation.

RULE 11. REPORTING OF MEASURES OR RECOMMENDATIONS

11.1 No measure or recommendations shall be reported from the Committee unless a majority of the Committee is actually present and a majority of those present concur.

11.2 In any case in which the Committee is unable to reach a unanimous decision, separate views or reports may be presented and printed by any member or members of the Committee.

11.3 A member of the Committee who gives notice of his intention to file supplemental, minority, or additional views at the time of final Committee approval of a measure or matter, shall be entitled to not less than three calendar days in which to file such views, in writing, with the Clerk of the Committee. Such views shall then be included in the Committee report and printed in the same volume, as a part thereof, and their inclusion shall be noted on the cover of the report.

RULE 12. CHANGES IN RULES

These Rules may be modified, amended, or repealed by the Committee, provided that a notice in writing of the proposed change has been given to each member at least 48 hours prior to the meeting at which action thereon is to be taken.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF POSITION ON VOTES

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, on April 23, 1975, I submitted for the RECORD a summary of my position on the votes for H.R. 2166, the tax reduction bill and H.R. 4296, the farm bill. For the permanent RECORD, I would like to correct an error made in this summary. The correct notation for votes No. 92 and 93 should be as follows:

Vote No. 92: Modified Hart unnumbered amendment—nay.

Vote No. 93: Motion to table motion to reconsider the vote by which the modified Hart unnumbered amendment was agreed to—nay.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LATIN AMERICA

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I wish to call to the attention of my colleagues an editorial which appeared in the Washington Post on April 26 entitled, "The Importance of Latin America." Frankly, it is a sorry thing we have to be reminded.

For too long, we have neglected what President Kennedy recognized as our "sister republics"—and when we have dealt with them, it has too often been on the basis of paternalism rather than equality. Yet the good neighbor policy and the alliance for progress remind us that our relations have been—and again can be—warm and constructive. They should occupy a central place in our foreign policy, and they should be conducted with the mutual respect they deserve.

Unfortunately, we have been distracted in recent years by hotter spots, such as Indochina and the Middle East, not to mention our traditional absorption in superpower politics. To be sure it is some measure of our indifference that we have withheld trade preferences across-the-board, despite the fact th countries like Venezuela and Ecuador d not participate in the Arab oil emba which provoked our action.

Beset by massive social and econom problems, South America continues ferment. We should not wait to be confronted with revolution and crisis. Rather, we should anticipate and encour progress and peaceful change. We mi begin by supporting a new and fa Panama Canal Treaty, by seriously re-evaluating the present policy of sanctions on Cuba, and by forswearing interference in internal affairs, which has h such serious repercussions in Chile an Honduras.

Clearly, the mere visit of Secretary Kissinger cannot substitute for the substantive reassessment and improvement of our attitudes and policies. Latin America is coming of age; so should America. Perhaps for our bicentennial we should establish a new corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, that Latin America be protected not only from European excesses but from our own as well.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the excellent Post editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE IMPORTANCE OF LATIN AMERICA

It is regrettable but not disastrous that the Indochina crisis should have forced Secretary of State Kissinger to postpone yet again his long-scheduled trip to Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. The trip would surely have enhanced the secretary's understanding of a region of far more critical and enduring importance to the United States than Indochina. And it would have given his hosts the opportunity to get what Latins perennially feel is a commodity in short supply—the high level attention of the U.S. government. Yet the visit of an American Secretary of State, even one who is a celebrity, is not something that would turn the heads of thoughtful Latins. They will wish to see what else of a serious nature in Latin-U.S. relations is going on.

The chief political task of American policy in the hemisphere is, plainly, to move beyond the arrogance and paranoia that l American officials to think it was not only appropriate but necessary to "destabilize" the elected governments of Chile in 1970-73. Since some of the same key officials, including Dr. Kissinger, are still in posts of responsibility, this is no small task. Optimists might hope that the newly heightened public and congressional vigilance over the CIA and the agency's own announced reforms, a enough to forestall another "Chile." Pessimists will remain skeptical, at least until the test of the next Chile is met.

Meanwhile, the developing emphasis of U.S. policy on treating Latin countries individually, rather than as look-alike members of a hemispheric collective, is a healthy s This new emphasis fits the reality that Latins are different. It fits the current Latin inclination to take a step away from the old notion of a hemispheric "community." And if deepened, it should free American policymakers from the insidious idea that what happens in one corner of Latin America will also happen in other corners. It is precisely this idea that led Washington to fear that Cuba and Chile, in their respective times, would contaminate the rest of the region.

Ad Hoc Staff
75-569

8 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

15

Senstudy 75

The following is a listing of 12 additional Senate Select Committee Staff members and official stenographers (*) who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified by Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, by letter dated May 6, 1975, as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Name	Date & Place of Birth		Soc. Sec. No.
*C. Harold Brown	6/6/38	Ohio	278-34-3428
*Wayne Birdsell	5/2/06	D.C.	578-03-1841
Anne Karalekas	11/6/46	Mass.	023-36-4329
*Mary Lynch	3/16/26	W. Va.	250-38-1344
Robert Kelley	10/29/40	Ind.	559-54-1348
Paul Wallach	5/24/47	N. Y.	149-36-2999
Lester Seidel	7/17/44	D.C.	216-38-5204
*Frank Shelburn	5/30/13	Va.	338-24-6934
*Robert Thomas	12/16/25	Md.	219-14-5186
Gregory Treverton	1/21/47	Colo.	524-62-2459
William Truehart	12/18/18	Va.	225-20-6411
*Fred Ward	11/20/40	D.C.	225-50-9983

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
18 MAY 13 1975

#MOE16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTB

Jack E Thomas
for John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

5-Ew8

File 62-116395

84 MAY 14 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr.J.B.Hotis)

DATE: May 14, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/ATC

My memorandum to you 5/13/75 furnished highlights of information relating to an interview by a Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member of retired SA Alan G. Sentinella, as obtained by Supervisor Seymor Fred Phillips of the Bureau's Senstudy 75 Special Project.

At 11:20 a.m. 5/14/75 Sentinella telephonically contacted Phillips from Atlanta, Georgia, and advised that he had been telephonically contacted earlier on the morning of 5/14/75 by SSC Staff Member Lester B. Seidel who had interviewed him 5/12/75. Seidel told Sentinella that he is being subpoenaed to give sworn testimony before an Executive Session of the SSC 9:30 a.m. Wednesday, 5/21/75. The testimony is to be given in Room G-308, New Senate Office Building. In response to specific questions from Sentinella, Seidel advised Sentinella that he will be reimbursed expenses, that his presence will probably be needed for only one day, and that the purpose is to essentially go over the material covered when Seidel interviewed Sentinella 5/12/75. Seidel asked Sentinella who had taken over the case concerning Levison (Stanley David Levison, former consultant to Martin Luther King, Jr., who was under Bureau investigation because of his communist background) in Atlanta when Sentinella left. Sentinella furnished Seidel the name of SA Richard Hamilton.

REC-100 62-116395-148

Sentinella asked Phillips for assistance of the nature he received when he was interviewed; that is, someone from the Bureau to render guidance relative to any sensitive areas that might be touched upon. He furnished the following as his telephone numbers in Atlanta, all area code 404.

MAY 27 1975

Office:	658-2167 658-2168 658-2170 658-2119
Residence:	475-5327 475-7816

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395
1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)

SFP:ekw EKW

84 MAY 28 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

In accordance with established procedure, Sentinella was advised that he would be contacted by someone from the Office of the Legal Counsel who will make arrangements for a Bureau representative to be available for consultation should Sentinella's testimony involve sensitive areas of inquiry. Sentinella indicated his intention of arriving in Washington, D. C., late in the afternoon or in the evening of the day preceding his testimony.

ACTION:

Refer to Legal Counsel so that someone from that Office may get in touch with Sentinella in accordance with the foregoing.

wrw

PLM

Mr Sentinella
adv 4:30 PM 5/19/75
that Bu representative would
be avail. for consultation
prior to his interview.
R70

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/16/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR-16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TAS

This informative memorandum is to report briefing of Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Members on informant matters by INTD personnel.

At the request of the SSC Staff, a briefing session was held in my office from 8:50 a.m., to 10:50 a.m., 5/16/75. Representing the SSC were Staff Members Mark Gitenstein and Thomas Dawson. In addition to myself, present from the INTD were Deputy Assistant Director H. E. Helgeson, S. F. Phillips of SENSTUDY - 75 Staff, and Unit Chiefs E. P. Grigalus (IS-2 Section), and H. A. Newman, Jr. (IS-1 Section). Also present was Supervisor J. D. Miller of the Legal Counsel's Office.

SSC Staff Members had previously reviewed Sections 107 (Part I - Security Informants) and 130 (Extremist Informants) of the Manual of Instructions and the purpose of the briefing was to go over these Sections and answer the visitors' questions and clarify doubtful areas. Such matters as the following were covered: Terminology regarding confidential sources, potential security informants and security informants; means for approving informants; payments to informants both on SAC approval and FBIHQ approval; converting of potential informants to informants; establishing reliability; assignment of symbol numbers; distinction between permanent and temporary symbol numbers; use of FD-401 for semiannual reports on informants; use of FD-405 for monthly and quarterly reports on informants. Also covered were: Use of informants in COINTELPRO; entrapment and agent provocateur aspects; movement of informants between field office territories; channelizing memoranda; handling of informants after determined to be unreliable; and inspectors' role relating to informants at field level.

REC-100 62-116395-141

Mr. Gitenstein, who was the senior member of the SSC team present, indicated satisfaction with the ~~results of the~~ briefing and that all their inquiries had been answered. He made

16 MAY 27 1975

62-116395

CONTINUED - OVER

SFP:cmc
(9)

5-8

84 MAY 27 1975

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY - 75
62-116395

a very cogent observation concerning the FBI's handling of informants. The SSC Task Force he is on is studying informant matters in various intelligence community agencies including the FBI. He stated that they had found the FBI as so much far superior to other agencies that they considered the FBI as the standard for all law enforcement. He cited specifically the finding that the Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as very weak in informant aspects.

It is believed that the visitors found the briefing most productive, as they themselves stated that briefings such as this one will be very helpful to the SSC in its work; and promote friendly and businesslike relations between the SSC and the Bureau.

ACTION:

None. For information.

PLM

JAM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATE[illegible]OVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
~~Files & Com.~~ ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO :Mr. McDermott

DATE: 5/9/75

FROM :J. C. Farrington

Select Committee of the Senate

SUBJECT:SENATOR GARY HART (D-COLORADO)
REQUEST FOR FBI DATA ON HIM UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)

Hart

We received this afternoon, 5/9/75, from Mrs. Susan M. Hauser of the Deputy Attorney General's Office, the following data: 1) informal note from Doug Marvin to the Deputy Attorney General re: Senator Hart's meeting with the Attorney General 5/6/75; 2) letter to Senator Hart by the Attorney General dated 5/7/75 advising that Hart's oral request for access to his FBI file will be treated as coming under the FOIA; and 3) a memorandum from for files dated 5/6/75 that appears to have been dictated by the Attorney General in which he sets forth pertinent information concerning his meeting with Senator Hart. The Attorney General points out that he will treat Hart's oral request as coming under the FOIA although he did not know whether the Senator should in fact make this request in writing (actually, the Code of Federal Regulations, of course, points out that FOIA requests must be in writing).

According to the Attorney General's memorandum, Senator Hart indicated that he was not trying to make a particular point and did not want to go to court, but rather felt it would be helpful to members of the Senate Select Committee, who wanted to do it, to see what an FBI file was like, and he felt that by seeing his own file it would raise less problems than trying to see someone else's file.

In view of the Attorney General's letter to Senator Hart of 5/7/75 advising him that his oral request will be processed under the FOIA, the FOIA Section will immediately institute the processing of this request. However, unless advised to the contrary, it is intended that Senator Hart's request will be put in chronological order and will receive no special treatment. It should also be noted that Senator Hart is under the mistaken belief that as a Senator, and particularly as a member of the Senate Select Committee, he could receive an FBI file on a third

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #mde16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/AJG

77-23050-17

62-116395-
Ack Legal Counsel
to [illegible]
MAY 16 1975

MAY 30 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

1 - Mr. McDermott - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
Atten: Mr. Cregar
1 - FOIA Section - Enc.

JCF:law (7)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

party and be allowed to look at it. This, of course, is not correct and we would advise Senator Hart the same as any other requester making a similar request that we would need authorization from the third party involved prior to releasing any data we may have to the Senator.

Senator Hart is a new Senator serving his first term. He was the campaign manager of Senator McGovern's 1972 Presidential campaign.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

I feel he requests info. as a member of the Committee rather than under FOI. Suggest he be contacted, informed of prevailing conditions & then [illegible] [illegible] course is indicated through [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :MR. W. R. WANNALL

FROM :MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr. P. V. Daly)

DATE: May 13, 1975

1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/EFS #MD8016

This informative memorandum to record highlights of information relating to an interview by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member of retired SA Alan G. Sentinella, as obtained by Supervisor Seymor Fred Phillips of the Bureau's Senstudy 75 Special Project.

Pursuant to Bureau instructions, Phillips went to Atlanta, Georgia, to fulfill the request of Sentinella for the presence of a Bureau Agent at the time Sentinella was to be interviewed on 5/12/75 by SSC Staff Member Lester B. Seidel. Sentinella is presently Safety Director, Georgia State University, Atlanta. He has been retired from the FBI for about four years and in the period around 1964-66 he did work on the investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., and for a time, the King case as well as that of King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, was assigned to him. Sentinella had been told in advance by Seidel that he was to be interviewed concerning King and Levison (Stanley David Levison, former consultant to King who was under Bureau investigation because of his communist background).

Phillips was in Sentinella's private office at 12:24 p.m. when Seidel arrived. Sentinella explained to Seidel that after Sentinella had agreed in a telephone conversation with Seidel 5/9/75 to being interviewed, he (Sentinella) contacted the Atlanta FBI Office because Sentinella was concerned with the sensitivity of the information he knew about King and Levison and wanted to protect the confidentiality of his information and the Bureau's interests, especially as pertaining to current investigations, sources, etc. Sentinella explained to Seidel that the FBI offered to have an Agent present, not to monitor the interview, but for consultation purposes should the interview reach into sensitive areas. Sentinella thus accounted to Seidel for Phillips' presence. At this point, Phillips reiterated the reasons given by Sentinella for the presence of an FBI Agent and Seidel was told that Phillips' presence was definitely

62-116395-146

REC-108

16 MAY 27 1975

62-116395
SFP:ekw (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)

84 MAY 27 1975

not intended to have any chilling effect on Seidel's interview and that Phillips was there only upon Sentinella's request and for the purposes indicated. Phillips then retired to an adjoining room.

Sentinella consulted with Phillips on only one occasion. At about 1:45 p.m. he came to Phillips' adjoining office and said that Seidel's current questioning was concerning the make-up of the squad Sentinella was assigned to around 1965. This squad handled security, racial, and civil rights matters and Seidel was apparently seeking information as to the parameters of these types of investigations and what they entailed. At this point Phillips joined Seidel and Sentinella and offered the following in possible assistance to Seidel. Phillips explained that the various Sections of the Bureau Manuals dealing with these types of investigations had been made available to the SSC and insofar as the security Sections were concerned, there was presently being processed at the Bureau superseded Sections dating back to 1960 to be made available to the SSC. At this point Seidel stated he was not so much interested in what the Manuals said but actually wanted Sentinella, to the best of his recollection, to furnish names of individuals and organizations under investigation in Atlanta during the pertinent period. Sentinella refused to name any, stating that he had no idea as to what might be under current investigation or how his furnishing of information now might affect current Bureau's interests. Sentinella also told Seidel that he, Sentinella, was not so naive as to believe that his information might not appear in the press. Seidel immediately said that he would furnish no information to the press. Sentinella then said that he was not intimating that Seidel would be responsible, but that the information might still be publicized and that once Sentinella gave the information it fell completely out of his control. Seidel indicated that Sentinella might be required through subpoena to testify before the SSC and be asked the same question. Sentinella responded that his answer before the Committee would be the same. Phillips indicated to Sentinella that if he desired to consult with Phillips concerning the names of any investigations Sentinella recalled, Phillips would assist him by indicating, if he knew, whether they were of current FBI interest. Sentinella desired no such help and insisted to Seidel that he did not desire to name the subjects of prior investigations. This interlude in the formal interview lasted about 10 minutes after which Phillips returned to the adjoining room.

At 2:20 p.m. the interview ended and Phillips was taken by Sentinella back into the latter's office where Seidel said he was leaving and wanted to say good-bye. Phillips alluded to the interview having been completed to which Seidel responded, and these are to the best of Phillips' recollection, Seidel's exact words, "Yes, you're not letting him give us the good information." Immediately upon hearing this statement from Seidel, Phillips interjected a strong protest by stating to Seidel that neither Phillips nor the FBI was keeping Sentinella from giving any information; that the FBI has not injected itself in Sentinella's decision to give or not give information. Seidel responded with a statement to the effect that the result is the same -- Sentinella is not giving the good information. Phillips again responded by telling Seidel that irrespective of the latter's opinion, Phillips wanted the record crystal clear that Sentinella has not been counseled by Phillips or anyone else in the FBI as to what he should or should not tell Seidel. Sentinella interrupted to express his loyalty to the Bureau as well as his respect for the confidentiality of his relationship with the Bureau and its work. He told Seidel that he did not intend to be a talkative, discontented former FBI employee as apparently [illegible] are some of the sources being consulted by the SSC. Sentinella pointed out that he himself had been the subject of disciplinary action by the Bureau but that it had made him a better Agent and that it in no way would influence his loyalty and responsibility to the Bureau. Seidel then left.

After Seidel's departure, Sentinella stated it was his personal desire to dictate a lengthy question and answer type statement of the entire interview while it was fresh in his mind as he had not taken any notes. He said he preferred to handle this with his own secretary whom he trusts implicitly and has pledged to maintain this information confidential. Sentinella advised that he would have the typing of the statement completed the following day and would immediately make a copy available to Atlanta SAC DeBruler for transmittal to Bureau Headquarters. At Sentinella's invitation, Phillips sat in on the dictation of practically the entire statement as a means for Sentinella briefing Phillips on the details of the interview. Instant memorandum is not intended to summarize these details which will be forthcoming with Sentinella's statement to be mailed to the Bureau. However, one significant question asked of Sentinella should be noted. During a discussion of electronic surveillances in the King investigation, Seidel asked how other Agents felt about "illegal use of taps." Sentinella's response was that the taps were not illegal and were put on only after approval by the Attorney General.

OBSERVATIONS:

It is Phillips' view that Sentinella represents a high caliber former Agent who is completely loyal to the Bureau and will apparently go to any extreme to maintain the confidentiality of the work he did. He certainly could be described as a reluctant witness if he is ever called to testify. He expressed personal concern that he might be called but hoped that his uncooperativeness in some areas to Seidel's questions might discourage his being called.

Two incidents related above are very suggestive of a lack of objectivity on the part of Seidel. The first concerns his comment to Phillips about the FBI not letting Sentinella give him "good information." To begin with, this was an unjustified allegation and Seidel was set straight immediately after his remark. Secondly, the mere fact that Seidel is referring to "good" information suggests itself that certain information fits their desires and others does not. There appears to be a lack of regard for merely securing the facts, regardless of what those facts might indicate. The second indicator of lack of objectivity was Seidel's inquiry about "illegal use of taps." This question fits the classic question of, "When did you stop beating your wife?" If the Committee is going to be asking questions like this one, its objectivity is certainly subject to challenge.

As ex- or current employees volunteer to us results of interviews conducted of them by the SSC, we will carefully study them for, among other things, additional evidence of the nature discussed above. If there is a continuation of this line of questioning or other unjustified comments to Bureau representatives, we will consider taking up with the Attorney General the matter of possible protest to the SSC.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

RECOMMENDATION:

This memorandum is for the immediate information of Bureau officials. When the detailed statement of Sentinella is received, we will prepare an LHM for the Attorney General with a copy for possible forwarding to Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. This is the procedure we have been following when former Agents have volunteered to us the results of interviews of them by the SSC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: April 23, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/

WRW

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
~~FORMER~~ SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

By memorandum captioned as above submitted earlier today, I advised you of a telephone call received 4/22/75 from former Special Agent Whitson. He had called to advise that he had been requested to appear for interview by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee.

At 2:50 p.m. today (4/23/75) Mr. Whitson called at my office and said that he had just been interviewed by Mr. Epstein and was desirous of reporting the results.

Epstein first asked Whitson when he entered the Bureau, when he first arrived for assignment at Headquarters, to what Headquarters Division he had been assigned, and when he retired. Epstein then said that he knew that Whitson had at one time mailed a package to Mrs. Martin Luther King from Tampa, Florida, and asked Whitson to relate the details concerning this matter. Whitson thereupon told him that in the late Summer of 1964 former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had telephoned Whitson at his home one Saturday and told him that former Director Hoover wanted Whitson to deliver a package to Miami, Florida, by plane and on arrival at the Miami Airport to telephone Sullivan for further instructions. Whitson did as directed and upon calling Sullivan was instructed to address the package to Mr. Martin Luther King. Accordingly, Whitson had the package weighed, put stamps on it, and addressed it to Martin Luther King (not Mrs. Martin Luther King as Epstein had indicated). The following day, Sunday, Whitson flew back to Washington. The next day, Monday, he informed Sullivan that his instructions had been carried out and Sullivan commented "Someday I will tell you about that."

REC-100 62-116395-145

Epstein asked him who had paid for the stamps to mail the package and Whitson said that he had probably done so utilizing per diem money. Epstein asked whether he had put a return address on the package and Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had gone to the Miami Office, whether any Agent had met him at the -

WRW:lml (6)

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Personnel File of SA Lish Whitson (Out of Service)

16 MAY 27 1975

CONTINUED ~~OVER~~

84 MAY 27 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Miami Airport, or whether Whitson had discussed this with anyone. Whitson advised Epstein that he had not gone to the Miami Office, that no Agent had met him, and that he had discussed the matter only with Sullivan. At this point, Whitson asked Epstein how he got the story. Epstein merely laughed and did not reply to the question.

The foregoing represents the information furnished to Epstein by Whitson. Whitson made the following additional comments and observations.

When Sullivan told Whitson he wanted him to fly the package to Miami, he stated that only he, Sullivan, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Tolson, and Mr. Belmont knew of this situation. Sullivan never did explain to Whitson anything more regarding this incident. Sullivan did during Whitson's anniversary celebration in 1968 in Sullivan's office refer to Whitson as "a real pro who knows how to carry out an assignment," and further commented that someday he would tell Lish about the assignment to which he had referred in his remarks.

Whitson said that when he arrived at the North Terminal of National Airport, following Sullivan's telephonic instructions, a young man who was unknown to Whitson but who addressed him as "Mr. Whitson" turned a package over to him which was wrapped in brown paper and sealed with sealing tape. It is Whitson's recollection the package measured approximately 8 inches by 8 inches by 1 inch.

It is Whitson's recollection that at the time the foregoing occurred, Martin Luther King was either just about to go abroad to receive the Nobel Peace Prize or probably had already gone abroad. It was Whitson's further recollection that sometime shortly after the mailing of the package Sullivan commented to Whitson that the package had not yet been received by Martin Luther King. Because of this remark, Whitson is of the belief that the package was mailed to Martin Luther King at the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and not to Mr. King at the latter's home. Further, it was Whitson's recollection that it was not long after he had mailed the package that Martin Luther King had a personal meeting with former Director Hoover in Mr. Hoover's office.

Whitson stated that during the interview Epstein asked Whitson if he had ever written a memorandum regarding this matter, to which Whitson replied in the negative. He was also asked by Epstein if he had ever seen a memorandum on this and Whitson again replied in the negative. Whitson observed that in his opinion the information which was in the possession of Epstein prior to his interview with

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Whitson must have originated with W. C. Sullivan. Whitson noted that Mr. Hoover and Mr. Tolson are both deceased and that he has heard nothing indicating Mr. Belmont has been contacted by members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee. One other factor that causes him to feel that Sullivan was the source of the information was a question Epstein raised as to whether Whitson had put a return address on the package when he addressed it to Martin Luther King. Whitson said he recalls that when he was in Miami and received the telephonic instructions from Sullivan, Sullivan told him that he should put a return address on the package and Whitson pointed out that if he did so and the name of the addressee became smeared the package would end up at someone's return address rather than in the dead letter office. Sullivan concurred that no return address should be used. Thus, Sullivan would probably have reason to have commented regarding the use or nonuse of a return address.

Whitson stated that in the event he is called again to be interviewed by anyone connected with the Senate Select Committee, he intended to notify the Bureau beforehand and would appreciate it if the Bureau would consider having someone present during the interview, if this could be arranged, since he recognizes an obligation not to reveal FBI information contrary to regulations issued by the Attorney General. Appreciation was expressed to Mr. Whitson for his volunteering the foregoing information.

This is the first instance which has come to our attention indicating staff members of the Senate Select Committee are proceeding with interviews of former Agents. I have discussed this matter with Mr. Mintz and he and I feel it would be appropriate to furnish an abstract of the interview of Whitson by Epstein to the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of the Intelligence Community in order that interested agencies will be aware of the procedures presently being followed by the Select Committee and of the Committee's interest in matters other than jurisdictional bases. All Committee requests to us have thus far been confined to the latter.

ACTION:

If approved, an abstract will be provided for the records of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group.

We are preparing LHM for AG and WH (considering) if Dept. concurs?

Suggest the abstract be paraphrased to avoid disclosure of the identity of the addressee of the envelope.

Per

CODE **TELETYPE** **URGENT**

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2-- Mr. E. W. Walsh
(1 - Movement)
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

May 16, 1975

TO SAC NEWARK

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975. Sew 93

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]
#MOR16

SECRETARIES MARY ANN MASSA AND M. ANN MIERZEJEWSKI OF YOUR OFFICE HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO APPEAR FOR INTERVIEWS UNDER OATH BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AT 2 P.M., TUESDAY, MAY 20, REPEAT 20, 1975. YOU ARE TO ADVISE BOTH I AM WAIVING THEIR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF PERMITTING THEIR DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION RELATING TO DUTIES PERFORMED BY THEM JULY - SEPTEMBER, 1964, IN CONNECTION WITH FBI WORK AT DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY.

EMPLOYEES ARE TO REPORT TO J. B. HOTIS OR P. V. DALY OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE, ROOM 4513, JUSTICE BUILDING, BETWEEN 11 A.M. AND NOON MAY 20, FOR CONSULTATION PRIOR TO 2 P.M. APPEARANCES. THEY MAY PLAN TO RETURN TO NEWARK SAME DAY. FBI REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION DURING INTERVIEWS BUT WILL NOT BE PRESENT DURING INTERVIEWS.

REC-100 62-116395-144

16 MAY 23 1975

1 - 67-538691 (Personnel file Mary Ann Massa)
1 - 67-581180 (Personnel file M. Ann Mierzejewski)

SFP:PVD:eek
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 16 1975
1110
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 MAY 27 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO 954-546

ISSUE GTR'S FOR TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL VOUCHERS FOR EXPENSES.

DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS MATTER TO LEGAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE.

NOTE:

Referenced teletype advised all offices of procedures to follow if present or former employees contacted by SSC for interview. These two secretaries were on a Special Squad at Atlantic City, New Jersey, in connection with the Convention in 1964. The SSC Staff known to have already interviewed two former Agents assigned to that squad. Instructions herein pursuant to Mr. Mintz's direction. F. A. O. Schwartz, Chief Counsel to the Senate Select Committee advised that the Committee would reimburse the employees' expenses incurred for transportation, etc., relating to their testimony for the Commission. This matter has been coordinated with L. Clyde Groover, of the Administrative Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5/9/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At approximately 2:35 PM, Mr. Allen G. Sentinella telephonically advised that he retired from the Atlanta Office in 1971, and is currently employed at Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia. Sentinella said he had just been contacted by an individual who identified himself as Lester Seidel of the Senate Select Committee. Seidel desires to interview Sentinella on Monday, May 12th, concerning the Martin Luther King and Levinson cases.

Sentinella stated that while assigned to the Atlanta Office he handled the dissemination of information received from informants during our investigation concerning the communist infiltration of the SCLC. Sentinella said he recalled very little concerning this investigation and gave his assurances that he would not divulge any confidential information.

Sentinella asked whether or not he should retain private counsel and he was informed if he felt it necessary, he should do so. He was further informed that his interview was entirely voluntarily and he had no obligation to submit to interview. Mr. Sentinella gave his office telephone number as Area Code 404-658-2167, 2168 or 2170 and his home phone number as Area Code 404-475-5327.

62-116395-143

REC-100

RECOMMENDATION: For information.

16 MAY 27 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Creager
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis

RFO:mtm
(6)

SA Seymour Phillips Div 5 to be available in atlanta Tuesday for any interviews for consultation re necessary matters

JBA
Per

S-WOB

[illegible]

70
5-9-75

84 MAY 27 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 [illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Each Assistant Director

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/19/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

Attached is a copy of a letter to the Attorney General dated 5/14/75, from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) with appendices A thru D.

Appendix A, entitled "Documents Pertaining to the Committee's Prior Requests," consists of 10 requests most of which have been already responded to or, in the instances of requests numbers 4, 7, 8 and 9, are the responsibility of the Department of Justice. Item 6 has been previously referred to the White House. Appendices B, C, and D, contain numerous "new" requests which are extremely broad in their definition, often ambiguous in meaning and contain many instances where they seem to be parallel to and overlap previous requests.

On 5/16/75, a conference was held in the Intelligence Division between representatives of the INTD SENSTUDY Staff and Departmental representatives Messrs. Robert McDermott and K. William O'Connor. Mr. McDermott is on the staff of the Deputy Attorney General and has been active in coordinating SSC matters. He is being replaced in this capacity on 5/19/75 by Mr. O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Division. Mr. O'Connor advised that the Deputy Attorney General, Judge Tyler and White House representative James Wilderotter were both greatly concerned about the requests contained in the May, 14, letter. They felt that the requests were much too broad and placed much too great a burden on the Department and the FBI to be forthcoming. Mr. O'Connor felt that the requests clearly indicated an intention of the SSC to gain access to FBI "raw files" while not actually stipulating this point. In this regard you will note that Page 3 of the May, 14, letter defines the SSC request for "memoranda and other materials" as meaning 'all documents relating to the subject matter requested and are to include (but are not limited

REC-108 62-116395-142

18 MAY 27 1975

62-116395

EWL:cmc
(17)

CONTINUED - OVER

5-8

84 MAY 27 1975

to) reports, letters, correspondence, airtels, LHMs, inserts, executive conference memoranda, 302s, Assistant Director memos, notes, routing slips, etc." This letter, also on Page 3, recognizes that the request is substantial but urges the executive agencies to apply sufficient manpower and attention to enable prompt responses. Prompt response is defined by the Committee as having most of the material available within 10 days and all of it shortly thereafter. Mr. O'Connor advised that he was aware that the imposition of such a condition upon the responses created an impossible task. He advised that on Monday, 5/19/75, he would contact SSC Chief Counsel F. A. O. Schwarz calling attention to this time factor and also the often broad and ambiguous manner of many of the requests appended to the May, 14, letter. Mr. O'Connor hopes to negotiate these requests as well as the conditions attached to the responses by the SSC to the end that the requests are more narrowly defined and that the deadline imposed by the Committee be relaxed to a more realistic time frame.

Pending receipt of results of Mr. O'Connor's intercession with SSC we are proceeding with an analysis of the SSC's requests and attempting to separate components for specific assignments to appropriate divisions within FBIHQ so that our responses may be forthcoming in as coordinated and timely a fashion as possible.

ACTION:

None. For information purposes.

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, A[illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MATH[illegible]R., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible].

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

#MOR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
MAY 15 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The purpose of this letter is to review with you the status of the Select Committee's outstanding requests to your Department and to set out several new areas in which the Committee is requesting either staff access to documents or copies of documents for its own files.

In the matter of the outstanding requests the chronology is as follows:

You will recall that I wrote to you on March 19, setting out five areas pertaining to the FBI in which the Committee was initially interested. Although we have had partial compliance with the request, that process is not yet complete.

In addition, on April 21, Mr. Schwarz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, met with the Deputy Attorney General about the March 19 letter and about the establishment of liaison between your Department and the Committee.

On April 23, Mr. Schwarz wrote to the Deputy Attorney General a letter reflecting that meeting, clarifying the March 19 request on the matter of intelligence techniques, and making a further request pertaining to the Internal Security Division.

Mr. Schwarz also wrote the Deputy Attorney General and the FBI Director a memorandum on April 30 requesting that Committee staff members be permitted access to certain documents falling within the scope of the March 19 request.

On April 28, I wrote to you concerning the so-called "Official and Confidential" files of the FBI.

ENCLOS

62-116395-142

The Committee has not yet received a formal response to those letters. Appendix A sets out those documents which have not yet been supplied to the Committee pursuant to the March 19 letter and follow-up correspondence.

On the second matter, that is, the request for copies of additional documents (and for staff access to others), the Committee's interest falls into roughly three areas pertaining to the activities of the FBI and the Department of Justice:

First, the Committee has been made aware of additional documents that are analogous to the background requests made in the First Document Request. These documents are set out as Appendix B.

Second, the Committee is concerned about several programs or studies pertaining to specific intelligence or counterintelligence activities of the FBI. S. Res. 21 specifically requires the Committee to investigate "the conduct of domestic counterintelligence operations against United States citizens" by the FBI. Therefore, the Committee must conduct an exhaustive investigation of the so-called "COINTELPRO" programs as well as miscellaneous other incidents which have come to our attention. S. Res. 21 also specifically requires the Committee to investigate all aspects of the so-called "Huston Plan". Further requests pertaining to these matters are set out as Appendix C.

Third, we are interested in allegations pertaining to electronic surveillance generally, electronic surveillance of the so-called "17 government officials and journalists" in 1969-71 by the FBI, electronic surveillance and other intelligence activities directed at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and electronic surveillance and other intelligence activities at the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in the summer of 1964. Requests pertaining to these subjects are set out as Appendix D.

In setting out certain specific documents in the Appendices, the Committee does not change its position that the original request of March 19 was general in scope and designed to encourage the Justice Department and the FBI to provide us with documents pertaining to the legal authority and the policy and procedures of the FBI which have not yet been brought to the attention of the Committee and were therefore not specifically mentioned in any of its requests. Furthermore, the Committee intends its requests to be generously construed so that descriptive words used herein are meant in a general usage sense and not necessarily in the technical sense used by the Justice Department or the FBI. Thus, words such as [illegible] other materials" refer to all documents relating to [illegible] matter requested and are to include (but are not limited to, [illegible] letters, correspondence, airtels, LHMs, inserts, executive conference memoranda, 302s, "Assistant Director memos", notes, routing slips, etc.

Where the response to a particular request would involve the production of derogatory personal information about an individual, please provide the document with such information deleted and consult the Chief Counsel regarding procedures for access to the deleted information which will protect individual privacy to the degree consistent with the Committee's need to exercise its mandate.

We recognize, of course, that this is a substantial request. But the mandate given to the Committee by the Senate is itself very broad. We are seeking to perform our duties under that mandate expeditiously. For us to do so, it is necessary for the Executive Agencies to apply sufficient manpower and attention to our requests to enable prompt responses. We hope that you will have a schedule for response promptly, have most of the material available within 10 days, and all of it shortly thereafter.

The Committee also asks to be advised at once whether the specific documents presently outstanding from the March 19 request (see Appendix A, items 1, 2, 6 and 7) will be provided.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

Appendix A

DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE COMMITTEE'S PRIOR REQUESTS

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/12TG

Please provide:

1. FBI Intelligence Division memorandum dated July 31, 1972, prepared by T. J. Smith discussing the legal authority for FBI intelligence activities.

2. The following attachments to the February 1975 FBI Intelligence Division position paper on legal authority:

   a. Memorandum by former FBI Director Hoover, dated April 28, 1965, relative to conversation with the President concerning effect of anti-Vietnam demonstrations upon the conduct of United States foreign and defense policy and letter to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, dated April 28, 1965, enclosing FBI memorandum titled "Communist Activities Relative to United States Policy of Vietnam" dated April 28, 1965.

   b. Letter to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, dated July 25, 1961, enclosing memorandum concerning United States internal security programs under the control of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee, memorandum prepared in response to White House request.

   c. Excerpt from report on the Status of the Internal Security Program of the United States as of June 30, 1958, dated August 27, 1958, prepared jointly by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

   d. Excerpt from report on the Internal Security Program, dated March 5, 1954, prepared by Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

ENCL

62-116395-142

e. Memorandum from J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, dated November 6, 1950, concerning necessary intelligence measures relative to violence by Puerto Rican nationalists.

3. All other FBI documents relating to paragraph I of the Committee's March 19 request. (Note: It is the responsibility of the Bureau to produce all responsive material whether or not the Committee has identified a specific document.)

4. All documents in the possession of the Justice Department (as opposed to the FBI) relating to paragraph I of the Committee's March 19 request. (Note: It was made clear on April 21 and 23 that the request applied to the Department itself, but no material has been received to date.)

5. All memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use the following techniques to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence activities (see letter from the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General dated April 23, 1975):

a. All forms of electronic surveillance, including consensual electronic surveillance;

b. All forms of mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail;

c. Surreptitious entry;

d. All forms of physical surveillance, including agent infiltration, observation, photography, and remote viewing and sensing devices;

e. Informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems;

f. Obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information;

g. Incommunicado interrogation;

h. Maintenance of files and records;

i. Dissemination of information from files and records;

j. So-called "COINTELPRO" techniques and methods, including all forms of organizational "disruption".

6. The Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), dated June 1970.

7. The original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen.

8. Committee staff access to all memoranda and other materials pertaining to the policies and procedures of the Internal Security Division (now Internal Security Section) and the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, including, but not limited to, the following materials discussed in the letter from the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General dated April 23, 1975:

a. "The files of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee ('IEC'), including former Assistant Attorney General Mardian's IEC files, which we understand were made available to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. We would also like to see any IEC or ICIS files of Justice (now Judge) Morrell Sharpe, Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Doherty, Mr. Bernard Wells, and Assistant Attorney General William Olson.

b. "The small box of classified document receipts which we understand is in the IEC file cabinet.

c. "Any intelligence estimates prepared by the IEC, particularly E 28.

d. "Any requests for Interdivision Information Unit ('IDIU') computer printouts made by the Special Litigation Section, the IEC, or the Analysis and Evaluation Section.

e. "An organization chart of the Internal Security Division before its 1970 reorganization, after its 1970 reorganization, and after its 1973 merger with the Criminal Division.

f. "A copy of the analysis of grand juries convened and prosecutions commenced by the Special Litigation Section which we understand was furnished to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights on May 8, 1974."

9. Response to the letter from the Chairman to the Attorney General dated April 28, 1975, regarding the so-called "Official and Confidential" files.

10. Further response to the memorandum from the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General and the FBI Director dated April 30, 1975, regarding Committee staff access to materials on FBI policies and procedures.

Appendix B

FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

#mor 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-07 BY SP-2 ALM/LRG

I. Policies and Procedures

Please provide:

1. Committee staff access to all indices and control files pertaining to:
    a. All SAC memoranda and SAC letters for 1960 to the present.
    b. All programs operated by the Intelligence Division for 1960 to the present.
2. Committee staff access to all so-called "O" files or other general policy files with respect to each file classification routinely used by the Intelligence Division for the period 1960 to the present.
3. All general policy memoranda and other materials not already provided the Committee pertaining to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, and activities for the period 1960 to the present.
4. For each of the techniques described in Item 5 of Appendix A above, all memoranda and other materials relating to:
    a. The original decision to utilize the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.
    b. The policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

62-116395-142

5. Committee staff access to annual inspection reports and related surveys for the past ten years with respect to the following FBI field offices: New York City; Chicago; San Francisco; Los Angeles; San Diego; Sacramento; Springfield, Illinois; Buffalo; Atlanta; and Columbia, South Carolina.

6. The annual inspection reports and related surveys for the past ten years pertaining to the FBI Intelligence Division.

7. Guidelines used by the FBI Inspection Division for inspecting field offices and for inspecting divisions of the FBI.

8. A sample of the confidentiality statement which FBI personnel are required to sign along with any other employment agreements currently in use.

II. Organization, Structure, and Jurisdiction

Please provide:

9. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins, contents, and implementation of National Security Action Memorandum 161, June 9, 1962.

9

10. The June 1964 memorandum from Attorney General Robert Kennedy to President Johnson recommending new FBI procedures for gathering intelligence about the Ku Klux Klan and related activities.

11. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins, contents, and implementation of the memorandum described in Item 10 above.

12. All memoranda prepared by former Special Agent James Gale relating to the FBI internal assignment of jurisdiction or responsibility with respect to matters involving the Ku Klux Klan in 1964.

13. All memoranda and other materials reflecting meetings and contacts between the President and the Director of the FBI during 1971 on the subject of "legal attaches".

14. All memoranda and other materials reflecting meetings and contacts during 1971 between officials of the FBI and officials of the Department of State on the subject of "legal attaches".

15. All memoranda and other materials relating to the elimination of the FBI Crime Records Division in late 1972 or early 1973.

III. Indices

Please provide:

16. Committee staff access to the following indices for the period 1960 to the present:

    a. "Agitator" index;

    b. "Rabble Rouser" index;

    c. "Key Activist" list;

    d. List of "Action Groups";

    e. "Security" index;

    f. "Administrative" index;

    g. All similar indices, lists, or computer printouts.

17. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origin, implementation, operation, or termination of any of the indices set out in Item 16 above.

Appendix C

DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON PLAN", COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

#MORI6
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-01 BY 5P-2 ALM/TTG

I. Huston Plan and Related Developments

Please provide:

1. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966 of the investigative techniques referred to in President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973 (Presidential Docs. 693-94).

2. A letter dated June 20, 1969, from Tom Charles Huston, staff assistant to the President, to the Director of the FBI concerning resources being targeted toward the monitoring of foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States, effectiveness of such resources, gaps in intelligence, and steps which should be taken to provide maximum coverage.

3. The response by the FBI to the letter set out in Item 2 and all other FBI memoranda and other materials pertaining to the correspondence.

4. The interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances, dated April 1, 1969, and all memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins and implementation of that Plan.

5. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to a request from Tom Charles Huston for an FBI investigation of the involvement of the New Mobilization Committee in violent demonstrations in November 1969.

6. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to FBI policies, practices, and procedures for liaison with the CIA from 1960 to May 1970.

7. All memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials relate to:

62-116395-142

a. Efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and

b. Inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then-President of the University of Colorado.

8. All memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

9. All memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations or communications, during 1970, between agents of the FBI and the FBI Director on the subject of liaison or contact between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency, including, but not limited to, all memoranda and other materials written by former Special Agent Sam Papich.

10. All memoranda or other materials relating to the elimination of the Liaison Section of the FBI Intelligence Division in 1970 and relating to the re-establishment of the Liaison Section in late 1972 or early 1973.

11. All memoranda and other materials prepared or compiled by FBI personnel assigned to the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) working group from June 5, 1970, to June 25, 1970.

12. Letter from FBI Director Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell dated July 27, 1970, regarding the "Huston Plan".

13. All memoranda or other materials pertaining to meetings or conversations between FBI Director Hoover and Attorney General Mitchell from July 23, 1970, through July 28, 1970, concerning the "Huston Plan".

14. All memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.

15. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the decision by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen to terminate the Intelligence Evaluation Committee on June 11, 1973. (Further documents regarding the Intelligence Evaluation Committee were requested in the letter of the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General dated April 23, 1975. See Appendix A, Item 8.)

II. COINTELPRO

Please provide:

16. Summaries of COINTELPRO case files prepared by the FBI for the Committee chaired by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen (see prepared statement of Attorney General William Saxbe before the House Judiciary Committee on November 20, 1974).

17. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origin and implementation of all COINTELPRO programs, including, but not limited to, the seven programs set out in the airtel from the FBI Director to SAC, Albany, dated April 28, 1971, entitled "Counterintelligence Programs (COINTELPROS), Internal Security - Racial Matters".

18. Committee staff access to a list of all FBI headquarters supervisory personnel involved in the origination, implementation, and termination of each COINTELPRO program.

19. All memoranda or other materials reflecting approval or knowledge of any COINTELPRO program by any government official outside the FBI including, but not limited to, any Attorney General, Member of Congress, or President.

20. A list of any COINTELPRO type activities as defined in the prepared statement of Attorney General Saxbe before the House Judiciary Committee on November 20, 1974, which were engaged in by the FBI subsequent to April 28, 1971.

III. Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs

21. An itemized description of the contents of each file folder in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files of the FBI (see testimony of Attorney General Levi before the House Judiciary Committee, February 27, 1975).

22. All memoranda and other materials contained in the "Official and Confidential" files pertaining to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities including, but not limited to, the following documents mentioned by the Attorney General:

    a. "Policy Matters" -- "Presidential directives regarding the role of the FBI in the security field; conversations between Mr. Hoover and a President-elect regarding the role of the FBI in his forthcoming Administration; letters to and from the White House regarding expansion of FBI legal attache posts abroad".

    b. "Administrative Matters" -- "Memoranda regarding an Attorney General's decision with respect to supervision of the FBI by an Assistant Attorney General; a memorandum concerning the briefing of the President by Mr. Hoover and the Attorney General with respect to certain intelligence activities by hostile nations within the United States".

    c. "Reference Material" -- "A compilation of data concerning the 1964 riots".

d. "Protection of sources or sensitive information" -- "Materials on FBI counterintelligence activities; technical devices and techniques; the telephone surveillance involving sensitive coverage in the national security area".

23. All memoranda, files, or other materials, including inspection reports or related surveys, which pertain to the following statement by Attorney General Levi in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, February 27, 1975:

". . . In order to consider what measures may be appropriate, we have endeavored to characterize the types of abuse to which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past.

a. "Use of the resources of the FBI to gather political intelligence. Our review disclosed a few documented instances in which the Bureau at times during the course of an election campaign was requested to provide -- and did indeed provide -- information which could be used as political intelligence information. In one instance, this involved a check of FBI files on the staff of a campaign opponent.

b. "Improper use of the FBI in connection with the political process. In a few instances recorded in Bureau files, an incumbent President caused the FBI to gather intelligence relating to a political convention under circumstances that although cast in legitimate law enforcement terms could -- and some would say should -- have been suspected of being politically motivated.

c. "Use of the FBI to report on certain activities of critics of an Administration's policies. The FBI files document a few instances in which an incumbent President caused the Bureau to report on certain activities of Members of Congress who were opposed to and critical of his policies.

d. "Use of information in the FBI files to respond to or discredit critics. Again, the Bureau files document a very small number of instances in which derogatory information legitimately obtained by the Bureau was disseminated to other members of the Executive Branch to enable them to discredit their critics.

e. "Use of the FBI in connection with other legitimate law enforcement activities. There was one documented instance where the FBI was used to conduct an inquiry for what might be described as political purposes, relating to an investigation properly conducted by other Executive Branch officials."

24. All memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts, or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States.

25. All memoranda and other materials reflecting activities of any agents, employees, or informants of the FBI in connection with:

a. The establishment, creation, or financing of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States.

b. The establishment, creation, or financing of:

(1) The Red Star Cadre, or Red Star Swap Shop;

(2) The Red Collective.

26. All reports prepared by the Office of Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice pursuant to the request in September 1974 of the Attorney General and/or Deputy Attorney General pertaining to the so-called "Wounded Knee" case and any other so-called "political trial" or other prosecutions brought by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division.

27. All memoranda or other materials prepared by the FBI relating to the reports described in Item 26.

28. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins and conduct of the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

29. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins, implementation, and termination of Project INLET, involving preparation of an Intelligence Letter for the President.

30. The current office assignment or last known address of the following persons who in 1970 were employed at the Portland, Oregon, office of the FBI:

    a. Leo B. App

    b. Edgar O. Ingles, Jr.

APPENDIX D

REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

#mDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Please provide the Committee:

1. "Manual for the Conduct of Electronic Surveillance".

2. All memoranda and other materials relating to the maintenance and operation of the so-called "ELSUR" electronic surveillance index.

3. Committee staff access to a list of all warrantless electronic surveillances, identified by subject and target, which were instituted or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request of the FBI, from January 1, 1960, until the present.

4. A list of all electronic surveillances, identified by subject and target, of the so-called "Kissinger 17".

5. A list of all electronic surveillances, identified by subject and target, which were instituted or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request of, the FBI, and which intercepted and/or monitored any conversations of Martin Luther King, Jr., at any time between January 1, 1960, and April 5, 1968.

6. With respect to each surveillance listed in response to numbers 4 and 5, please provide:

(a) the address of the premises surveilled, and the number of the telephone surveilled;

(b) a generic description of the surveillance technique employed;

(c) all memoranda and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization and re-authorization by the President, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, White House officials, or National Security Council officials;

(d) a list of all memoranda and other materials reflecting dissemination outside the FBI of information from each surveillance, stating author, address(s), and dates, together with the purpose of such dissemination.

7. All memoranda and other materials which:

(a) relate to intelligence activities at or in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in August 1964;

62-116395-142

(b) relate to electronic surveillances of telephones and/or premises at 2414 Atlantic Avenue and/or the Clairidge Hotel in Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August 1964.

8. Committee staff access to all memoranda and other materials reflecting the identities of persons monitored, the contents of conversations monitored, and/or any information obtained from conversations monitored on the surveillances described in 7.

9. Copies of all memoranda and other materials relating to the preparation, dissemination, and/or withdrawal of all monographs concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., not to include the monographs themselves.

10. All records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTR's), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D.C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D.C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D.C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

11. The current office of assignment or last known adress of the following persons who, in 1964, were employed at the Newark, New Jersey, office of the FBI:

(a) Robert L. Tagg

(b) John B. Meade

(c) Billie D. Williams

(d) John J. Creamer, Jr.

(e) John J. Connolly

(f) Marjorie Ann Miermejewski

(g) Mary Ann Mass

12. The last known address of the following former Special Agents of the FBI:

(a) Harold Linebaugh, who in 1964 was employed at FBI headquarters;

(b) Elmer Todd, who in 1964 was employed at the Washington Field Office.

13. The names and current office assignments or last known addresses of all FBI employees assigned to the U. S. Embassy in Rome, Italy, in 1964.

14. SAC letter 64-11 captioned "Protection of the President"; and February 28, 1964, communication from FBI headquarters to FBI field offices supplementing and/or relating to the same subject.

15. All July and August memoranda from former Special Agent Leo T. Clark to the Assistant Special Agent in Charge or the Special Agent in Charge of the Newark, New Jersey office of the FBI, captioned "Protection of the President - White House Inquiry".

16. All memoranda and other materials containing the results of any administrative or other inquiry undertaken by the FBI as a result of and/or relating to the allegations contained in the January 26, 1975, issue of The Washington Post concerning activities of the FBI in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in August 1964.

17. All memoranda and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization and re-authorization by the Attorney General and/or the Director of the FBI for electronic surveillance of Joseph Kraft.

18. The current office assignment or last known address of the following persons who, in 1969-70, were employed at the Washington, D.C., office of the FBI:

(a) Robert Kunkel

(b) Courtland Jones

(c) Ernest Belter

(d) James Gaffney

19. The current office assignment or last known address of the following persons who, in 1969-70, were employed at FBI headquarters:

(a) Joseph A. Sizoo

(b) Michael Joseph Rozamus

(c) Sterling Donahue

(d) Bernard A. Wells

(e) Robert Haynes

20. The current office assignment or last known address of Al or Alan Miller who, in 1964, was employed at the Atlanta, Georgia office of the FBI.

21. With respect to each occasion on which the Director of the FBI testified before the House Appropriations Committee from 1965 until the present, please provide the number of warrantless electronic surveillances in operation:

(a) on the date of such testimony;

(b) thirty days prior to such testimony; and

(c) thirty days subsequent to such testimony.

5-113a (Rev. 3-21-73)

Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date May 13, 1975

Attached is a teletype from the Newark Office advising that former SA John Patrick Devlin has been requested to appear before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., 5/19/75 to be interviewed "for the record."

By memorandum dated 5/8/75 we advised the Attorney General that Devlin had been interviewed by Staff Members, SSC, and furnished him an LHM covering the thrust of this interview.

Responsive to Devlin's request, we are telephonically advising him through the Newark Office to contact the Bureau's Legal Counsel regarding arrangements for a representative from the Bureau to accompany him on the 5/19/75 appearance before the SSC.

1 - Mr. Mintz

JHA

Cleveland advised to have Devlin call Mintz on Thurs. 4-15-75 WOC

WOB

NPC/mm

JBA/pm

WOC:ekw

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTB

DOJ/FBI

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 21 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR002 AX CODED

10:10PM NITEL 5/21/75 VAN

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-217) (RUC) 1 PAGE

SENSTUDY 75

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO BUREAU, MAY 3, 1975. Ser 78

FORMER BUREAU AGENT HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1160 WIMBLEDON DRIVE, MC CLEAN, VIRGINIA, CONTACTED ON MAY 20, 1975, IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS. LEINBAUGH STATED HIS FEELING AT PRESENT IS THAT HE WILL REFUSE TO BE INTERVIEWED BY STAFF MEMBER OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE BUT IN EVENT HE CONSENTS TO INTERVIEW AND SENSITIVE MATTERS ARISE, HE WILL REQUEST PRESENCE OF BUREAU AGENT OR CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL AT FBIHQ.

END

HOLD FOR ONE

MAH FBIHQ ACK FR ONE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG #mde 16

cc 67-42632 (Leinbaugh)

REC-100

62-116395-141

13 MAY 27 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 12 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
#MDR16

NR 006 NK PLAIN

5:37PM NITEL MAY 12, 1975 JCG

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM NEWARK (66-3971)

SENSTUDY 75

RE NKTEL CALL TO BUREAU TODAY.

FORMER SA JOHN PATRICK DEVLIN CONTACTED THE NEWARK OFFICE MAY 12, 1975, AND ADVISED HE WAS REQUESED TO APPEAR BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE AT 2:00 P.M., IN WASHINGTON, D.C., ON MONDAY, MAY 19, TO BE INTERVIEWED FOR THE RECORD. AS THE BUREAU IS AWARE, DEVLIN HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES CONDUCTED DURING 1964 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL NOMINATING CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, N.J.

DEVLIN ADVISED THAT HE WOULD LIKE SOMEONE FROM THE BUREAU TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO THE INTERVIEW BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE STAFF. BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE NEWARK, FOR TRANSMITTAL TO DEVLIN, INFORMATION CONCERNING WHOM HE SHOULD CONTACT AT BUREAU CONCERNING THIS REQUEST.

END

~~PLS ACK FOR (5)~~

5-Bright

REC-100 62-116395-140

16 MAY 27 1975

cc 67-770521 (Devlin)

84 MAY 27 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 5/21/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

On 5/15/75, Senate Select Committee Staff Members Mark Gitenstein and Thomas Dawson reviewed Manual of Instructions Sections 107, Part I, relating to security informants and Section 130 relating to extremist informants. The review took place from 3:50 p.m. to 5:40 p.m. in the conference room at INTD. SA Elmer W. Larson of SENSTUDY - 75 project was present during the review. Gitenstein and Dawson asked several questions concerning administrative and technical clarifications but raised no substantive questions concerning the sections under review.

9

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

62-116395

EWL:cmc
(3)

EWL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
#MOR16

REC-100 62-116395-139

16 MAY 23 1975

5-WTB

84 MAY 23 1975

1 - [illegible] Adams
1 - M[illegible] Cleveland
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall
May 16, 1975

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Crescioli

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/22/01 BY SP-2ALM/KG

Mr. William J. Cotter
Chief Postal Inspector
U. S. Postal Service
Washington, D. C.

Sen Study - 75

original of letter delivered to USPS by liaison 5/20/75 LAC

Dear Bill:

I have been advised that a representative of the Senate Select Committee has recently made a request of your Service to furnish the identities of all FBI mail covers placed since 1960.

In view of the fact that such information directly relates to the investigative responsibilities of this Bureau, it is requested that you advise the Senate Select Committee that such a request should be made to the FBI through the Office of the Attorney General.

Your cooperation in this matter is sincerely appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

62-
MAY 27 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-2-33-33

LAC:tdp (10) tdp
NOTE:

See memorandum Flemister to Wannall dated 5/15/75, captioned "Mail Covers," prepared by LAC:tdp.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Rec'd
cc 62-116395

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 MAY 27 1975

84 MAY 27 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 5/15/75

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : H.C. Flemister, Jr.

SUBJECT: MAIL COVERS

S

This is to advise of recent request by Senate Select Committee (SSC) that U. S. Postal Service (USPS) furnish to the SSC the identities of all mail covers placed by the FBI since 1960.

On 5/14/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, Office of Security Investigations, USPS, advised Liaison Officer L.A. Crescioli that Mr. Paul Wallach, staff member of the SSC, has requested USPS to furnish the identities of all FBI mail covers placed with the USPS since 1960. According to Jackson, Chief Postal Inspector William J. Cotter has informed Wallach that the FBI is the custodian of such detailed information and that the SSC should therefore make this request directly to the Bureau. Mr. Jackson requested that the FBI consider directing a communication to Chief Cotter, pointing out that the Bureau does interpose an objection to the USPS complying with above request and that the SSC should proceed directly to the FBI in this regard.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #mo216
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/22/01 BY SP2 ADM/tb

OBSERVATIONS:

The request for the identities of all FBI mail covers since 1960 in effect provides the SSC with the identities of the subjects of FBI investigations, which includes some extremely sensitive cases. The intelligence community in attempting to work out guidelines with the SSC as to sensitive areas of inquiry have indicated that specific targets of ongoing intelligence operations should be subject to negotiation between the SSC staff and the appropriate agency. The Intelligence Division believes that we should take a strong stand in this instance and attempt to negotiate an accommodation which would allow the SSC to carry out its mission but yet not compromise ongoing FBI sensitive investigations.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-235-33-

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
16 MAY 27 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LAC:tdp (9)

46 MAY 27 1975

Enclosure - Sent 5-20-75

Records
cc: 62-116395

5

84 MAY 27 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: MAIL COVERS

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter to Chief Postal Inspector Cotter be sent via Liaison, advising him of the proprietary interest of FBI concerning specifics of its requests to USPS for mail covers and that under the third agency requirement the SSC should make its request for such data to the FBI through the Office of the Attorney General.

LAC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/15/75

55

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: REQUEST OF HARRY H. WACHTEL ON BEHALF OF ESTATE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., CONGRESSMAN ANDREW YOUNG, AND DELEGATE WALTER E. FAUNTROY

Sen Study - 75

Bowers
~~Hotis~~ JBA

My memorandum of March 19, 1975, reported discussions with the attorney for the estate of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who also represents Mrs. Coretta King and her children. It was clearly indicated that Mrs. King and her children were concerned about invasion of personal privacy that might occur should there be disclosure of inquiries concerning the FBI investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. At the conclusion of our conference with the King representatives, Assistant Attorney General Scalia asked me whether I would be willing to agree to have Mr. Wachtel notified in the event a congressional committee requested access to such material in Bureau files. I told him that I saw no difficulty in the Department advising Mr. Wachtel in the event such a request is made by a committee of the Congress. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities has initiated inquiries concerning the Bureau's investigation of Dr. King and though they have not as yet requested material from our files which may contain tapes of electronic surveillance of Dr. King, it is likely that their inquiry will reach the stage where such demands will be made.

Therefore, in response to the requests made by Mr. Wachtel representing Mrs. King and in response to inquiry by Assistant Attorney General Scalia, it is my view that we should advise the Department of the nature of the inquiry currently being made by the Senate Select Committee and to suggest that they may wish to notify the representatives of the King estate and Mrs. King for whatever action they may deem appropriate.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-87 BY Sp...

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-106670

6076

Enc. — Sent 5-20-75
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mrs. Metcalf
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (8)

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
18 MAY 27 1975

46 MAY 27 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

Records - ~~place~~
cc in 62-116395.

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 27 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached memorandum to the Attorney General advising him of the concern of the King family and of the request that they be advised of congressional inquiries be approved and sent.

The Attorney General

May 16, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mrs. Metcalf
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz

Director, FBI

REQUEST OF HARRY H. WACHTEL ON BEHALF OF ESTATE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., CONGRESSMAN ANDREW YOUNG, AND DELEGATE ~~WALTER E.~~ FAUNTROY

Sen Study - '75

At a conference on March 10, 1975, Harry H. Wachtel, attorney representing the estate of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Mrs. Coretta King, and her children, accompanied by Congressman Andrew Young and District of Columbia Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy, advised representatives of the Attorney General and the FBI of their great concern for the privacy of Mrs. King and her children. They were concerned that inquiries into an investigation conducted by the FBI of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., could reveal information of a derogatory nature concerning Dr. King. They indicated an interest in undertaking appropriate measures to limit the possibility of public disclosure of derogatory information that may be produced as a result of inquiries such as those that might be made by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities and requested that they would be advised should such inquiries be made by a committee of Congress.

Subsequent to that meeting, the FBI has learned that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities is conducting interviews in an effort to develop information concerning an FBI investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In view of this fact, this matter is being brought to your attention in order that you may determine what action you feel is appropriate in response to the requests made by Mr. Wachtel on behalf of Mrs. King, her children, and the estate of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., which requests were joined in by Congressman Andrew Young

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

JAM:mfd
(12)

Delivered to Wm O'Connor
5/21/75 wrw

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 MAY 30 1975

✓ S. Phillips
RM 4063 JEH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JRM/ch
6076

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-106670-3

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

5 4 MAY 30 1975

and Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy. The FBI would have no objection should you decide to advise Mr. Wachtel that the current inquiry by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities concerns the FBI investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

NOTE: Based on memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, 5/15/75, captioned as above, JAM:mfd.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL wrw

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

DATE: May 12, 1975

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

This memorandum reports the telephonic contact between former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr and Mr. Jenkins at which time Mr. Mohr furnished additional information regarding his meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff on the morning of 5/9/75.

In reconstructing his interview on the morning of 5/9/75 by Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Thomas Dawson and Lester B. Seidel, Mr. Mohr recalled them asking if he knew who prepared the "surreptitious letters" the Bureau sent in the Socialist Workers Party case. Mr. Mohr advised the Staff Members that he did not know but he presumed somebody in the Document Section of the Laboratory probably prepared these letters.

62-116395-138

REC-106

As reported in my memorandum of 5/9/75, members of the Staff Committee are hoping that Mr. Mohr will be able to arrange an interview of Miss Gandy by members of the SSC providing Mr. Mohr is present. In this regard, Mr. Mohr desired some guidance as to what he could tell Miss Gandy if Staff Members asked her for the names of individuals appearing in the official and confidential files of Mr. Hoover. Mr. Mohr was telephonically advised on the afternoon of 5/12/75 by Cregar that the Bureau could not give him any advice as to what he could tell Miss Gandy recognizing that whatever he told Miss Gandy was strictly between the two of them and not of concern or interest to the FBI. It was further pointed out to Mr. Mohr that neither he nor Miss Gandy should feel under any obligation to report to the Bureau what Miss Gandy decided in this regard as well as what she might tell the Staff of the SSC during her forthcoming interview by them on 5/15/75.

16 MAY 23 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/dt/76

On the occasion of Cregar's call to Mr. Mohr on the afternoon of 5/12/75 Mohr recalled that he had told Staff Members of the SSC Miss Gandy had turned over to Mr. Felt the official and confidential files amounting to one-half a file drawer. Mr. Mohr in speaking with Miss Gandy subsequent to his interview on 5/9/75 learned the official and confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt

62-116395

WOC:ekw (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 27 1975

by Miss Gandy amounted to one and one-half file drawers. Mohr subsequently advised Mr. Gitenstein of this correction. Additionally, Gitenstein desired to know whether an itemized list of the official and confidential files was made and if so, where the list was. Mohr told Gitenstein that he was sure a list was made (subsequently confirmed by Miss Gandy) and that the list accompanied the official and confidential files.

In addition to the above, Mohr advised that Gitenstein asked about a requirement of all Bureau employees to turn over any confidential files in their possession ordered by Mr. Hoover following the revelation that former Assistant to the Director Sullivan had turned over certain confidential files to former Attorney General Mardian. Mohr advised Gitenstein that Mr. Hoover had in fact levied such a requirement on Bureau employees and that all confidential files were to be turned over to Mr. Felt along with a memorandum explaining the nature of these files. Gitenstein asked Mr. Mohr where these memoranda would be filed. Mohr responded by saying he presumed they were confidential memoranda and would have gone with the confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt by any Bureau employee maintaining such files.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WRW/TJL

By call to San Francisco, D. [illegible]. Adams was telephonically requested to inform Mr. Callahan & Dir. Kelley of Miss Gandy's future interview by Select Committee staff, 5/13/75.
MD

NPC/MD

JBA/Pcm

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 9, 1975

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting between former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr and representatives of the Staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the morning of 5/9/75.

Memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 5/5/75 recommended that a Bureau representative be available for consultation by Mr. Mohr during the time Mr. Mohr is being interviewed by Staff Members of the SSC 5/9/75. REC-100 62-116395-137

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2 ALM/LBC #MDR-16

Prior to Mr. Mohr's interview by the Staff of the SSC, Section Chief William O. Cregar met with him. Mr. Mohr was advised that should representatives of the Staff pose any questions to him which could lead to the identification of sensitive sources, sensitive methods of FBI operations or material derived from other U. S. agencies or foreign governments, he could decline to answer such questions until he had an opportunity to consult with a Bureau representative. Mr. Mohr understood the purpose of Mr. Cregar's presence and assured him that should the inquiry by Staff Members of the SSC get into these areas of inquiry, he would certainly consult with Cregar prior to responding.

16 MAY 23 1975

Following our arrival at the New Senate Office Building, Mr. Mohr and Cregar were met by Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Thomas Dawson, and Lester B. Seidel. As we proceeded to the office where the interview was to be conducted, Mr. Gitenstein referred to a previous conference he had with Assistant Director Wannall at Quantico on 5/5/75 at which Mr. Cregar was present. Gitenstein observed that this meeting had proved very, very beneficial and that he believed that future personal contacts between members of the Senate Select Committee Staff and the FBI could prove useful and allow the SSC Staff to better understand how the FBI was administered at Headquarters.

62-116395
WOC:ekw
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 23 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

The interview of Mr. Mohr began at approximately 10:20 and was concluded at 12:30 p.m. 5/9/75. Mr. Cregar, who was available in an adjacent room, was not called and following the interview, Mr. Mohr assured Mr. Cregar that no sensitive areas were addressed by the Staff Members. Mr. Mohr did indicate that the Staff Members were in possession of FBI documents dealing with the Socialist Workers Party as well as documents obtained by Mr. Carl Stern under the Freedom of Information Act (these are our COINTELPRO documents which we were obliged to provide Stern under the FOI). No substantive questions were directed to Mr. Mohr regarding these documents but apparently were used to permit Mr. Mohr to identify who might be the final authority in approving these documents. As an example, Mr. Mohr noted that in reviewing a sample of these documents, he voiced the opinion Document A probably would have been approved by an Assistant Director whereas Document B might have received the approval of the Director. Mr. Mohr was unable to identify precisely what documents he was shown.

It was quite apparent from the interview that the Staff of the SSC was trying to understand how the flow of mail proceeded in the FBI under Mr. Hoover's directorship. A classic example of the Staff Members' confusion was their inability to distinguish between an SAC letter from a letter to all SACs. Mr. Mohr attempted to clarify this confusion on behalf of the Staff Members. With regard to SAC letters, the Staff Members asked if there was a file on all SAC letters. Mr. Mohr advised he was not quite sure whether there was a single file containing all SAC letters.

Members of the Staff also asked Mr. Mohr about his securing of Mr. Hoover's office after Mr. Hoover's death. Mr. Mohr told the Committee that the articles which appeared in "The Washington Star" by columnist Jeremiah O'Leary was an accurate recording of his securing of Mr. Hoover's office. Nevertheless the Staff Members desired that Mr. Mohr go over in considerable detail exactly how he did secure Mr. Hoover's office following his death.

The question of Mr. Tolson's will did arise. Mr. Mohr advised that Hillory Tolson had not decided whether he was going to contest the will. According to Mr. Mohr, he recently had lunch with Hillory Tolson at Mr. Tolson's request at which time Hillory Tolson suggested he was not going to contest the will. However, Mr. Mohr had not seen any documentary evidence of Hillory's decision in this regard.

Finally, the Staff Members asked if Mr. Mohr knew the whereabouts of Miss Gandy or at least her telephone number. He told themhhe did know her whereabouts and telephone number but promised her he would not reveal them. Mr. Mohr was asked whether Miss Gandy would be available for interview. Mr. Mohr advised the Committee that he would attempt to persuade her to be interviewed providing he, Mr. Mohr, was allowed to be present during the entire interview. The Staff Members interposed no objection to that arrangement and Mr. Mohr indicated to Mr. Gitenstein that he would advise him of Miss Gandy's desires regarding an interview under the conditions stipulated above.

Prior to the onset of the interview with Mr. Mohr, Cregar asked Gitenstein whether a decision would be forthcoming from the SSC regarding the interviews of former employees of the intelligence community by Staff Members of the SSC. Gitenstein stated the the Committee had no problem with the FBI and that if The White House would not interfere he felt satisfactory arrangements between the FBI and the Select Committee could be worked out regarding future interviews of former FBI employees. The thrust of Mr. Gitenstein's comment as well as his general demeanor during the meeting suggested the Staff felt they could work closely with the FBI to the satisfaction of both parties.

ACTION: For information and record purposes.

WRW|TWL

JBA/PWN MBC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/14/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

O House Select Committee on Intelligence

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

Sew 135

Reference Mr. Heim memorandum to Mr. Moore dated 4/10/75, enclosing edited version of paper entitled "Dissertation on Procedures for Opening, Closing and Maintaining Domestic Security Cases in Pending Status."

INTD has no objection to the edited version.

ACTION:

Legal Counsel Division review edited version for legal considerations.

ALL:vb
(6)

WRW/NG

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTB
#MO816

EX-101
REC-20 62-116395-136

3 MAY 13 1975

FIVE

LEGAL COUNSEL

54MAY27 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOV[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. ~~Moore~~

DATE: 4/10/75

FROM : Mr. Heim

LJH

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

House Select Committee on Intelligence

Sew134 Reference W. R. Wannall to Adams memorandum dated 4/1/75, and captioned as above which submitted a proposed statement for congressional testimony concerning the opening, closing, and maintenance of domestic security cases in pending status. This Division was to review the statement from a stylistic standpoint.

The statement has been reviewed along these lines and edited.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached edited version of the aforementioned statement be forwarded to Intelligence Division for review and approval and then submitted to Legal Counsel Division for its review and approval.

JBA

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Mintz - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enclosure

REC-20 62-116395-135
EX-101

ltw
TDH/JAH:ltw (6)

3 MAY 13 1975

2 - ENCLOSURE

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/tfs

LEGAL COUNSEL

[illegible] Wannall [illegible] 4/14/75, ALL [illegible]

54 MAY 27 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MOR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP2 ALM/dts

DISSERTATION ON PROCEDURES FOR OPENING, CLOSING AND MAINTAINING DOMESTIC SECURITY CASES IN PENDING STATUS

FBI authority to investigate domestic security cases is derived from numerous criminal statutes and Presidential Directives and Executive Orders concerning internal security and employee loyalty matters. Procedurally, the Bureau opens, continues, and closes such cases on the basis of these legal considerations.

Upon receipt of a fact situation from any of a myriad of sources, an Agent must necessarily make a judgment as to whether this situation appears to fall within the scope of FBI jurisdiction.

More specifically, domestic security investigations are initiated when allegations clearly indicate a person, either as an individual or as a member of a group, acts to unlawfully alter the Government in violation of the Smith Act, the Rebellion or Insurrection Statute, the Seditious Conspiracy Statute, or other related enactments. Special emphasis is placed on those engaged in violent furtherance of such illegal acts. A full investigation continues so long as these indications of illegal activity exist.

When allegations do not clearly indicate that activities on the part of an individual fall within this jurisdictional area, self-imposed regulations require that a "preliminary investigation" be conducted. This inquiry consists of obtaining information from established sources (such as records maintained by police departments, local governments, and private agencies); informants; public source information; and FBI records. These investigations are limited to 90 days during which an honest effort is made to distinguish as soon as possible between legitimate political activity and illegal acts. If more than 90 days are required to resolve this question, authority to exceed this period must be obtained from FBI Headquarters. In seeking this extension, a full statement must be made of the allegation, the jurisdictional authority involved, and facts that appear to justify the continuance.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

WRW/KEW

VJH

TDH/JAH:djm (8)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1335

GPO 954-546

When an allegation is received that a group may fall within existing jurisdictional criteria, FBI Headquarters is immediately notified and a "preliminary investigation" along the lines already indicated is undertaken. Again, approval from FBI Headquarters must be obtained to continue this "preliminary investigation" beyond 90 days to resolve whether jurisdictional standards are met. If met, a full investigation is conducted upon approval by FBI Headquarters.

Internal security investigations are also conducted on the basis of specific instructions from the Attorney General (pursuant to Presidential Directives) to the Director of the FBI. Until the instruction is complied with, these matters remain pending.

Every effort is made to maintain proper administrative control over domestic security investigations and to insure full compliance with the law. In this regard, Bureau rules require Agents to limit investigations to relevant matters. Supervisory personnel in the Field and at FBI Headquarters review the progress and relevancy of these investigations, and reports are forwarded to the Department of Justice. Agents also receive legal instruction on a continuing basis in order that they may be fully able to recognize relevance and safeguard individual rights.

These Bureau procedures have been devised in an honest effort to carry out with maximum effectiveness and propriety our vital domestic security responsibilities. Over the years, the FBI has handled these responsibilities and protected the domestic security of our Nation with great dedication and, I believe, with great distinction. We will continue to vigorously carry out these duties with all due regard for individual rights and liberties. I believe the procedures I have outlined are in full accord with this purpose.

April 14, 1975

DISSERTATION ON PROCEDURES FOR OPENING, CLOSING AND MAINTAINING DOMESTIC SECURITY CASES IN PENDING STATUS

FBI authority to investigate domestic security cases is derived from numerous criminal statutes and Presidential Directives and Executive Orders concerning internal security and employee loyalty matters. Procedurally, the Bureau opens, continues, and closes such cases on the basis of these legal considerations.

Upon receipt of a fact situation from any of a myriad of sources, an Agent must necessarily make a judgment as to whether this situation appears to fall within the scope of FBI jurisdiction.

More specifically, domestic security investigations are initiated when allegations clearly indicate a person, either as an individual or as a member of a group, acts to unlawfully alter the Government in violation of the Smith Act, the Rebellion or Insurrection Statute, the Seditious Conspiracy Statute, or other related enactments. Special emphasis is placed on those engaged in violent furtherance of such illegal acts. A full investigation continues so long as these indications of illegal activity exist.

When allegations do not clearly indicate that activities on the part of an individual fall within this jurisdictional area, self-imposed regulations require that a "preliminary investigation" be conducted. This inquiry consists of obtaining information from established sources (such as records maintained by police departments, local governments, and private agencies); informants; public source information; and FBI records. These investigations are limited to 90 days during which an honest effort is made to distinguish as soon as possible between legitimate political activity and illegal acts. If more than 90 days are required to resolve this question, authority to exceed this period must be obtained from FBI Headquarters. In seeking this extension, a full statement must be made of the allegation, the jurisdictional authority involved, and facts that appear to justify the continuance.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/TG #MORI6

When an allegation is received that a group may fall within existing jurisdictional criteria, FBI Headquarters is immediately notified and a "preliminary investigation" along the lines already indicated is undertaken. Again, approval from FBI Headquarters must be obtained to continue this "preliminary investigation" beyond 90 days to resolve whether jurisdictional standards are met. If met, a full investigation is conducted upon approval by FBI Headquarters.

Internal security investigations are also conducted on the basis of specific instructions from the Attorney General (pursuant to Presidential Directives) to the Director of the FBI. Until the instruction is complied with, these matters remain pending.

Every effort is made to maintain proper administrative control over domestic security investigations and to insure full compliance with the law. In this regard, Bureau rules require Agents to limit investigations to relevant matters. Supervisory personnel in the Field and at FBI Headquarters review the progress and relevancy of these investigations, and reports are forwarded to the Department of Justice. Agents also receive legal instruction on a continuing basis in order that they may be fully able to recognize relevance and safeguard individual rights.

These Bureau procedures have been devised in an honest effort to carry out with maximum effectiveness and propriety our vital domestic security responsibilities. Over the years, the FBI has handled these responsibilities and protected the domestic security of our Nation with great dedication and, I believe, with great distinction. We will continue to vigorously carry out these duties with all due regard for individual rights and liberties. I believe the procedures I have outlined are in full accord with this purpose.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STA[illegible]S GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4/1/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/WRW

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

House Select Committee on Intelligence

The purpose of this memorandum is to enclose a paper concerning the opening, closing, and maintenance of domestic security cases in pending status requested as set forth in memorandum to Mr. Callahan from Mr. Adams of the same caption, dated 3/7/75. 62-116435-55

Referenced memorandum instructed that the paper was to be non-technical and in a form easily understood for purposes of argument. Legal Counsel Division and writers in the External Affairs Division are to be contacted to coordinate legal aspects and preparation of final paper, respectively.

ACTION:

Legal Counsel Division review attachment for legal considerations.

External Affairs Division review for preparation of final paper.

Enclosure

ALL:vb
(9)

TJJ

- 1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
- 1 - Mr. D. W. Moore, Jr.
- 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

RVS

#MOE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/TG

WRW

See Mintz to [illegible] memo 4/10/75
TA

REC-20 62-116395-134

3 MAY 13 1975

Memo Wannall to Mintz; 4/11/75, ALL:vb.

54 JUN

DISSERTATION ON PROCEDURES FOR OPENING, CLOSING AND MAINTAINING DOMESTIC SECURITY CASES IN PENDING STATUS

The FBI opens, continues pending investigation, and closes domestic security cases based on legal considerations. The Bureau is charged with the investigation of violation of numerous criminal statutes, as well as duties imposed by Presidential Directives and Executive Orders concerning internal security and employee loyalty matters.

The procedure for handling such investigation is dictated by the facts and circumstances of each case. Upon receipt of a fact situation from any of a myriad of sources, the Agent must necessarily make a judgment to determine whether these facts reasonably indicate an activity falling within the scope of the FBI's jurisdiction.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/dTS

Domestic security investigations are initiated regarding individuals when allegations establish that he, individually or as an active group member, acts to unlawfully alter the Government in violation of the Smith Act, the Rebellion or Insurrection Statute, the Seditious Conspiracy Statute, or other related enactments. Special emphasis is placed on those practicing action or violence in furtherance of their goal. If the allegation shows facts clearly within the scope of these statutes, a full investigation is conducted and continues so long as facts exist to indicate a reasonable possibility that these ends could be achieved.

In some instances, allegations regarding the individual do not clearly fall within the scope of authority. Self-imposed restraining regulations require that such inquiry be limited to a "preliminary investigation" consisting of contacts for informational purposes only with established sources, such as police bureaus, records departments of local governments, and private record sources; informants; public source information; and Bureau records. These investigations are limited to 90 days. An earnest effort is made to distinguish as soon as possible between mere unorthodox political views or dissent on the one hand and revolutionary and/or criminal activity on the other. If to exceed 90 days, a report is made to FBI Headquarters specifically stating the allegation, the jurisdictional authority and such facts as would justify continuance of the investigation. A concurrence of Headquarters is necessary for continuance.

When an allegation is received that a group may fall within the jurisdictional criteria, Headquarters is immediately notified and investigation is limited to the "preliminary investigation" as described above. Any investi-

wRW

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

ALL:vb

PLM

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-134

GPO 954-546

gation beyond that is made only upon approval by Headquarters. If such continuance is approved, investigation continues to resolve whether jurisdictional standards are met. If met, and Headquarters' approval obtained, a full investigation is conducted.

Apart from these situations, specific instructions from the Attorney General, pursuant to Presidential Directives, to the Director of the FBI concerning matters of internal security are the basis for investigations. Until the instruction is complied with, these matters remain pending.

Bureau rules require an Agent to limit investigations to relevant matters. Field office and Headquarters supervisors review the progress and relevancy of investigations and reports are forwarded to the Department of Justice. The FBI is ever aware of and controlled by court decisions interpreting the law. Agents receive continuing legal instruction in order to recognize relevance and the rights of persons under the law.

These regulatory procedures are the means by which the FBI implements the responsibilities imposed by the statutes, Presidential Directives, and orders of the Attorney General. An examination of the domestic security problems confronting this Nation would reveal that, as early as 1936, concern arose over "Fifth Column" activities of Communists and Fascists and continued through WW II. This concern has evolved to other threats, through the years, such as the foreign-dominated Communist influence in America during the Cold War, the Ku Klux Klan's interference with the rights of others, the turbulent anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, the urban ghetto riots, and the rise of the racially-oriented organizations preaching revolution and their more violent splinter groups practicing open guerrilla warfare. The FBI, charged by statute and supplemented by Directives to investigate such matters in order to fulfill the duty, promulgated the investigative procedure for a dual purpose. The FBI recognizes not only the duty to investigate, to preserve the Constitution, but the fact the Constitution delineates zones of privacy and individual liberties. These regulatory procedures speak reasonably to both.

NOTE:

See memorandum Mr. W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated 4/1/75, captioned "Congressional Testimony," prepared by ALL:vb.

DISSERTATION ON PROCEDURES FOR OPENING, CLOSING AND MAINTAINING DOMESTIC SECURITY CASES IN PENDING STATUS

The FBI opens, continues pending investigation, and closes domestic security cases based on legal considerations. The Bureau is charged with the investigation of violation of numerous criminal statutes, as well as duties imposed by Presidential Directives and Executive Orders concerning internal security and employee loyalty matters.

The procedure for handling such investigation is dictated by the facts and circumstances of each case. Upon receipt of a fact situation from any of a myriad of sources, the Agent must necessarily make a judgment to determine whether these facts reasonably indicate an activity falling within the scope of the FBI's jurisdiction.

Domestic security investigations are initiated regarding individuals when allegations establish that he, individually or as an active group member, acts to unlawfully alter the Government in violation of the Smith Act, the Rebellion or Insurrection Statute, the Seditious Conspiracy Statute, or other related enactments. Special emphasis is placed on those practicing action or violence in furtherance of their goal. If the allegation shows facts clearly within the scope of these statutes, a full investigation is conducted and continues so long as facts exist to indicate a reasonable possibility that these ends could be achieved.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/JS

In some instances, allegations regarding the individual do not clearly fall within the scope of authority. Self-imposed restraining regulations require that such inquiry be limited to a "preliminary investigation" consisting of contacts for informational purposes only with established sources, such as police bureaus, records departments of local governments, and private record sources; informants; public source information; and Bureau records. These investigations are limited to 90 days. An earnest effort is made to distinguish as soon as possible between mere unorthodox political views or dissent on the one hand and revolutionary and/or criminal activity on the other. If to exceed 90 days, a report is made to FBI Headquarters specifically stating the allegation, the jurisdictional authority and such facts as would justify continuance of the investigation. A concurrence of Headquarters is necessary for continuance.

When an allegation is received that a group may fall within the jurisdictional criteria, Headquarters is immediately notified and investigation is limited to the "preliminary investigation" as described above. Any investi-

gation beyond that is made only upon approval by Headquarters. If such continuance is approved, investigation continues to resolve whether jurisdictional standards are met. If met, and Headquarters' approval obtained, a full investigation is conducted.

Apart from these situations, specific instructions from the Attorney General, pursuant to Presidential Directives, to the Director of the FBI concerning matters of internal security are the basis for investigations. Until the instruction is complied with, these matters remain pending.

Bureau rules require an Agent to limit investigations to relevant matters. Field office and Headquarters supervisors review the progress and relevancy of investigations and reports are forwarded to the Department of Justice. The FBI is ever aware of and controlled by court decisions interpreting the law. Agents receive continuing legal instruction in order to recognize relevance and the rights of persons under the law.

These regulatory procedures are the means by which the FBI implements the responsibilities imposed by the statutes, Presidential Directives, and orders of the Attorney General. An examination of the domestic security problems confronting this Nation would reveal that, as early as 1936, concern arose over "Fifth Column" activities of Communists and Fascists and continued through WW II. This concern has evolved to other threats, through the years, such as the foreign-dominated Communist influence in America during the Cold War, the Ku Klux Klan's interference with the rights of others, the turbulent anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, the urban ghetto riots, and the rise of the racially-oriented organizations preaching revolution and their more violent splinter groups practicing open guerrilla warfare. The FBI, charged by statute and supplemented by Directives to investigate such matters in order to fulfill the duty, promulgated the investigative procedure for a dual purpose. The FBI recognizes not only the duty to investigate, to preserve the Constitution, but the fact the Constitution delineates zones of privacy and individual liberties. These regulatory procedures speak reasonably to both.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
(Enclosures - 2)

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : MR. J. B. ADAMS

DATE: May 7, 1975

FROM : LEGAL COUNSEL

1 - Each Assistant Director

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. P. V. Daly
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Re my memorandum to you 5/5/75 enclosing a request from the Senate Select Committee (SSC) for additional information. Attached to the copies of instant memorandum for Messrs. Jenkins, Ash, Moore, and White are copies of the referenced memorandum and its enclosure.

The following is to delineate individual responsibilities and assignments for securing the information requested by the SSC. Because the request covers areas of operations affecting all Divisions of the Bureau except Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE), it will be necessary that the very closest coordination and maximum of cooperation be effected in order to implement the SSC request.

In handling this request which deals primarily with the furnishing to the SSC of various Sections of the Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations, as well as information concerning our filing system, and particularly copies of all Bureau forms, we should bear in mind that there are available three options for consideration. One, is to give the requested information or documents. Two, is to not furnish the documents but merely permit their review at FBIHQ. A third option available is to set forth justifying data to support a denial of furnishing the information or documents. Of course, in furnishing any documents, we should bear in mind the option of excising sensitive information.

REC-40 62-116395-133

In delineating the specific responsibilities for the various Divisions, we are designating the Division having primary interest as the one to prepare the necessary material and are

EX-110

62-116395

PVD/SFP:ekw
(20)

3 MAY 19 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

56 MAY 22 1975

MAY 20 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2

#MOR 16

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

66-1855-

indicating in most instances what other Divisions would have an input to furnish the primary Division. Even if auxiliary Divisions are not designated for input purposes, if the primary Division desires the views of another Division, it should obtain same prior to preparing the material.

Because of the involved coordination necessary, it is requested that each Division except OPE designate a representative to appear at a conference at 10:00 A.M. Friday, 5/9/75, in the Intelligence Division Conference Room, Room 4017, JEH Building, where the details for preparation of the necessary material will be discussed.

The following are the assignments corresponding with the 4/30/75 SSC memorandum and its appendices which deal with four main requests.

(1) The portion dealing with Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instructions will be handled by the Training Division which will gather all of the necessary information from Bureau files after which Intelligence Division will review and make a final determination as to the necessary response to the SSC.

(2) Concerning Sections of the Manual of Instructions Not Previously Produced and the corresponding Appendix B, the following assignments are made.

Section	Subject	Assignment
4	Surveillances and Raids	(Training Division with input to be supplied by the three investigative Divisions. Note should be taken that this Section was previously made available to GAO in connection with its audit of Bureau operations.)
8R	Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division	(Computer Systems Division)

CONTINUED - OVER

Section	Subject	Assignment
19	Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Agencies	(Special Investigative Division) (SID)
23	Bomb Threats, Explosives and Incendiary Devices	(Intelligence Division) (INTD)
27	Civil Rights	(General Investigative Division) (GID)
28	Civil Rights Act of 1964	(GID)
29	Conspiracy	(GID with input from INTD and SID)
75	Neutrality Matters	(INTD)
78	Passports and Visas	(GID)
90	Selective Service Act	(SID)
102	Coordination with Other Government Agencies	(INTD with input from GID and SID).
103	Foreign Police Cooperation	(INTD)
134	Assaulting the President of the United States and Threats to the President of the United States	(GID)
136	Antiriot Laws	(INTD)
144	Police Killings	(GID)
146	Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States	(INTD with input from GID)

CONTINUED - OVER

(3) Concerning the Manual of Rules and Regulations and Appendix C, the following assignments are made. For Part I, Section 9 - Disciplinary Matters (Administrative Division). For Part II, Section 1 - Authority - Training - Submission of Information (Training Division); Section 2 - Supervision - Availability - Resident Agencies (Administrative Division); Section 3 - Administration of Offices (Files and Communications Division with input from Administrative Division. Computer Systems Division will supply the input for 3F); Section 4 - Communications (Files and Communications Division with input from the following Divisions: Administrative, INTD, GID, SID, Legal Counsel, and Computer Systems Division); Section 5 - Dissemination of Information (GID with input from INTD and SID); Section 6 - Publications, Press, and Public Contacts (External Affairs Division); Section 7 - Payments - Property (Administrative Division with input from Computer Systems Division); Section 8 - Miscellaneous Regulations (SID with all other Divisions except OPE furnishing appropriate input); Section 9 - Classification - Character - Copies - Abbreviations (Training Division with all other Divisions except OPE furnishing appropriate input).

(4) Concerning Filing System, Files and Communications Division will handle with necessary input from Training Division concerning the request pertaining to all Bureau Forms.

This matter must be given priority, expedite attention by all Divisions bearing in mind that on the one hand, it is absolutely imperative that the review and study be of high quality, and that on the other hand, there be no delay which could result in criticism of the Bureau for not responding promptly to the SSC.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Assignments to be handled as indicated above.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

(2) Representatives of all Divisions except OPE attend coordinating conference 10:00 A.M. 5/9/75, Room 4017, JEH Building.

JBH/pwj

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOV[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____
~~Hotis~~ JBH

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/6/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

From 10:30 a.m. until 2:45 p.m. on May 6, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis and I met with Frederick Schwarz, General Counsel to the Senate Select Committee, Committee staffers Burt Wides, Pat Shea and Mike Madigan, and CIA representatives Marvin Smith and Walter Lloyd.

I arranged to attend this conference in an effort to resolve with the Committee staff the procedures that would be followed during interviews of current and former FBI employees by staff representatives. Interviews have been conducted in the recent past by representatives of the Committee, and in the absence of any general understanding as to the procedures we have been advising those persons coming to our attention as prospective witnesses that they may request the presence of a Bureau representative during the interview. Committee staff members have objected to the presence of Bureau representatives and have insisted that the interviews proceed in the absence of any agency representative.

EX-110 REC-35 62-116375-132

At the outset of the meeting today, it became clear that Schwarz, speaking for the members of the Senate Select Committee and for the staff, was opposed to the presence of agency representatives during interviews concerning matters which they described as "abuses." Schwarz explained that the Committee has a responsibility to look into allegations of misconduct or abuse in addition to a broader study of the jurisdiction and operations of the intelligence community. He said that while there would be a willingness on their part to have agency representatives present during interviews concerning general inquiries regarding jurisdiction, they felt that it would be improper and would interfere with the integrity of their investigation if third parties were present during interviews concerning misconduct.

MAY 13 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(5)

70 MAY 23 1975

LEGAL COUN.

PERS. REC. UNIT

CONTINUED - OVER

Schwarz offered as an alternative that the agencies would be advised of the identity of persons to be interviewed and that prior to the interview the agency would contact the witness to explain the authority, the security arrangements made by the Committee for the protection of information, to authorize the witness to answer questions where the witness was bound by a secrecy agreement, and to caution the witness concerning matters of a sensitive nature which should be deferred for discussion with members of the Committee or with the Chairman of the Committee.

I pointed out to Schwarz that unless the FBI was given notice as to the specific subject matter of the interview to be conducted, we would find it most difficult to intelligently assess the sensitivity of the information that might be furnished by the witness. The CIA representatives expressed great alarm that an interview could disclose information without some prior assessment of the potential damage to intelligence collection techniques and sources.

As to these points, Schwarz stated that he would discuss with the members of the Committee a revision of their initial proposal that would include notice to the agency of the identity of a person to be interviewed plus a generic description of the subject matter of the interview followed by a contact by the agency with the prospective witness to assess the sensitivity of the information and to advise the witness of areas of inquiry that must be deferred for special handling by designated members of the Committee or of the Committee staff. Following that contact the Committee representative would proceed to conduct the interview with the understanding that the agency representative would be near-by and immediately available for consultation should the witness have concern as to the degree of sensitivity of information he was being asked to furnish. At the conclusion of the interview, the Committee would make available to the agency a summary of the notes taken during the interview but a transcription of the interview would not be made available either to the agency or to the witness interviewed.

Schwarz stipulated that there may be occasions when the Committee would reserve its right to interview an individual, whether a current employee or a former employee, in secret in order to protect the interview or to insure the completeness and accuracy of his information. I asked Burt Wides whether they had any basis for that concern and he indicated that they did have such a basis, but declined to specify the details.

CONTINUED - OVER

Inspector Hotis asked whether the on-going interviews would be delayed pending resolution of the differences concerning procedures. Schwarz replied that the interviews will proceed due to time factors. I then requested Schwarz to expedite his discussion with the members of the Committee, to state their proposals in writing in order that we could review them in specific detail, and to let me know as soon as their proposal as approved by the Committee was available for discussion. He agreed to do so and said that probably this could be accomplished by Thursday, May 8, 1975.

OPINION

It was my impression in dealing with Schwarz that he is making an honest effort to conduct the Committee inquiry reasonably and that he is concerned about the public acceptance of the Committee's final product. His concerns about the integrity of the investigation are similar to those that I would express about an FBI investigation. His insistence that interviews of individuals concerning possible misconduct be done alone with the witness appear to me to be reasonable to insure the integrity of their investigation. The compromise we discussed (they would identify the witnesses to us prior to interview and tell us the proposed subject matter of the interview and allow us to consult with the witness prior to interview) seems to be a practical solution to our mutual problem. This solution is not as acceptable to CIA due to their greater need for protection of their covert operations, sources and methods. The Committee has available to it the subpoena power, the authority to conduct public hearings, and a good deal of support by public opinion. Therefore, I conclude that the Committee is likely to discover the full details of events concerning which they inquire whether the FBI cooperates or appears to be reluctant. As to those areas of legitimate concern because of their sensitivity in terms of production of informants or sources and methods of gathering national security intelligence, the Bureau can properly expect an opportunity to provide protection for the information.

If the procedures suggested above are operated in good faith on both sides, the Bureau would be given notice as to the subject matter to be discussed prior to the interview and research could disclose the areas of sensitivity and appropriate action taken to caution the witness against disclosure of such information.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That until procedures are established with the Committee the Bureau continue its present practice of advising prospective witnesses upon their request that they have a right to consult with a Bureau representative during interview.

2. That further discussions of this matter with the Committee await the receipt of their proposed guidelines in writing after approval by members of the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Hotis

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE Activities

#M0R16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTC

This morning the Director asked me to inquire into the status of our understanding with the Senate Select Committee as to whether FBI representatives would or would not be present at interviews of former Bureau employees or current Bureau employees. The Director was concerned that the presence of a Bureau representative could be criticized as an attempt to interfere with the Committee's inquiries. I assured the Director that the purpose of such representatives being present was to assist the interviewer and the witness in determining areas of inquiry of particular sensitivity or that might concern a current Bureau operation. The Director agreed that such was an appropriate reason for the presence of a Bureau representative and asked me to consider preparing a letter addressed to Senator Church stating our desire to make available a Bureau representative and the reasons for the presence of such a Bureau representative.

As a result of a conference with representatives of CIA, Roderick Hills of the White House Counsel staff, and others, it was determined that Walter Lloyd of the CIA Legal Staff would continue negotiations with the Committee in behalf of the entire intelligence community to develop procedures concerning the interview of witnesses and the presence of agency representatives at such interviews. Mr. Lloyd was scheduled to meet with Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee, on Tuesday, May 6, 1975, to discuss such arrangements.

EX-101 REC-3 62-116395-131

I scheduled ~~an~~ appointment with the Deputy Attorney General and met with him at 5:00 p.m. on May 5, 1975, accompanied by Inspector John B. Hotis. I told the Deputy of our concern that the interviews by the Senate Committee are continuing even though no understanding has been reached by the Committee and the intelligence community. I told the Deputy that the Director would like to have some

3 MAY 13 1975

LEGAL COUN.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 21 1975

formal understanding with Senator Church as to the Bureau's position in regard to such interviews. I reminded the Deputy that our sole concern was to make a representative available to assist in the interviews in the event they touched upon sensitive areas and by no means was our interest to be understood to be an effort to interfere with the Senate Committee's inquiries.

The Deputy said he fully understood our position and agreed. He asked me whether I would be willing to agree to hold off on formal notification to Senator Church until the negotiations to be conducted by Mr. Lloydc could be concluded. I told the Deputy I would agree to that on the condition that I and also Inspector Hotis would participate in the discussions by Lloyd with the Committee representatives. The Deputy Attorney General said that he fully concurred in my condition and if there developed any difficulty in making such arrangements, he would assist in seeing that it was accomplished.

Inspector Hotis advised that Schwarz, the Committee counsel, has arranged a meeting on Wednesday morning, May 7, 1975, with Assistant Attorney General Scalia of the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department. We will also be represented at that meeting.

The Deputy Attorney General told me that he had been advised by Schwarz that a former Bureau Agent, Leo Clark, had objected to the fact that a Bureau representative had contacted him and had indicated a willingness to be present during Clark's interview by the Committee. I again assured the Deputy that our sole purpose in contacting Clark was to be available in the event a Bureau representative was needed to discuss matters of a sensitive nature or matters concerning current Bureau operations. The Deputy said he understood and Clark's complaint was likely the result of a misunderstanding.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

May 14, 1975

O

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) with enclosures described below.

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

In response to a request from the SSC for certain documents and other information, an LHM was submitted as a cover communication to furnish the SSC copies of the following documents.

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/16/72 captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."

2. An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/18/72 captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III dated 5/19/72.

4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated 8/7/73 recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP2 ALM/LT/G #moe16

REC-100 62-116395 - 130

ENCL

3 MAY 16 1975

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____ 62-116395
Ident. ____
Inspection ____ SFP:ekw (4)
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ekw

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 MAY 20 1975

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/22/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-83

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Hotis 5/13R

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/7/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/TB

At 5:05 p.m. on May 6, 1975, I went to the White House to meet with Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; Roderick Hills, Associate Counsel; James Wilderotter, Assistant Counsel; Assistant Attorney General Scalia, Office of Legal Counsel in the Department; John Clark, Associate to the Director of CIA; Walter Lloyd and Marvin Smith of CIA. The meeting was called by Mr. Buchen to discuss the developments that day with regard to the proposal that agency representatives would be present during interviews conducted by investigators of the Senate Select Committee staff.

At a meeting held earlier that day, the General Counsel of the Senate Select Committee had indicated that the Committee disapproved of the presence of agency representatives at interviews concerning alleged "abuses." I explained to Mr. Buchen the alternative proposal offered by F.A.O. Schwarz to the effect that agencies would be furnished the identities of proposed witnesses, the subject matter of the proposed interviews, and permitted an opportunity to review the subject matter and consult with the witness to advise him of sensitive areas that would require special treatment. John Clark agreed that in regard to interviews concerning abuses, it would seem to be necessary for the Committee to proceed with the interview without an agency representative present. After general discussion of the proposal by Schwarz, the meeting concluded with instructions by Mr. Buchen to Wilderotter to draft a statement that might be incorporated into a letter to be addressed to the Committee explaining the Administration's position.

The elements of the proposal would be that as a general rule, agency representatives would be present during interviews concerning matters that were not categorized as abuses and in those exceptional cases

REC-100 62-116395-429

15 MAY 13 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

PERS. REC. UNIT

LEGAL COUNSEL FILE

84 MAY 20 1975

where abuses would be the subject of interviews, the agencies would be given prior notice of the identities of the witnesses and of the subject matter of the interview, plus an opportunity to consult with the witness prior to the interview. Mr. Buchen also asked that the Committee be requested to provide a letter in each instance identifying the alleged abuse as the subject of the interview and indicating Committee approval of that inquiry. The objective of such a requirement would be to clearly identify those interviews characterized as "abuses" interviews which would require the absence of an agency representative during the actual interview.

I was also asked to contact Schwarz to insure that he would not present to the Committee his counterproposal during the regular committee meeting on Wednesday, May 7, 1975. The purpose of such a request was to avoid the Committee adopting a final proposal regarding interviews prior to the Executive having an opportunity to express its position.

On the morning of May 7, 1975, we spoke with Schwarz, requested him to refrain from offering his counterproposals to the Committee for approval, and in response to his request explained to him that the reason was that the proposals were under discussion and it was necessary for all agencies in the intelligence community to be involved in the determination whether the alternative procedures would be acceptable. Mr. Schwarz agreed to refrain from offering his counterproposals to the Committee today.

At approximately 10:25 a.m. on May 7th, I called Wilderotter and asked what the progress of his preparation of the proposed letter was. He told me that there would be no letter addressed to the Committee because the White House did not desire to escalate this matter and go over the head of the Committee counsel. I told him that I was extremely concerned at the inaction which has resulted thus far in the FBI being in an indefensible position in regard to interviews of former employees. I explained to him that the Committee has not advised us of the interviews that have been conducted and we have learned of them only by calls from the witnesses. I told him that the interviews are still continuing because at the meeting on May 6, 1975, we expressly requested the Committee counsel to discontinue the interviews temporarily until guidelines could be established and the Committee counsel expressly refused to do so.

I told Wilderotter that this morning I received a call from John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director, who has broad knowledge

CONTINUED - OVER

of FBI matters, in which Mohr told me that he has been called to be interviewed at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, May 9, 1975, at Room G-308 in the New Senate Office Building. Mark Gittenstein was identified as the interviewer. I told Wilderotter this concerned me because we have no basis on which to advise Mr. Mohr as to the appropriate guidelines that may be followed during the course of such an interview and in the absence of knowledge of the subject matter of the interview we have no way of counseling him as to sensitive areas that should be deferred for discussion with members of the Committee or with the Chairman of the Committee.

Wilderotter said he understood my concern but he saw no way in which the matter could be resolved in time for guidelines to be established for the Mohr interview. He told me he would work on the preparation of a position paper to be used by the White House and the intelligence community to establish a policy that could be discussed with the Committee.

Inspector Hotis and I then at approximately 11:10 a.m. went to a conference already in session in the office of Assistant Attorney General Scalia attended by representatives of the CIA, Department of Defense, NSA, Department of State and the Department of the Treasury. The other agencies were advised of the results of the meeting with the Senate Select Committee staff on May 6, 1975, and a general discussion ensued as to the willingness of the agencies to agree to interviews in the absence of agency representatives. The representatives of the State Department, Mr. Hitchcock and Mr. Jennings, indicated that State was adamant that interviews would not be conducted in the absence of representatives.

I spoke privately with Assistant Attorney General Scalia and advised him of my conversation with Wilderotter and of the fact that John Mohr had been called for interview on Friday, May 9, 1975. I told him of my great concern that Mohr's interview would be sensitive because of his broad knowledge of the Bureau and told him that it was essential that appropriate guidelines be developed concerning such interviews as soon as possible. Scalia told me that he had just finished speaking with Wilderotter and he shared my concern. He then called Wilderotter and subsequently advised me that Wilderotter said that he, Wilderotter, would immediately contact Schwarz to request a postponement of the interview of John Mohr pending the establishment of guidelines. In the event he would be unsuccessful, Roderick Hills and Philip Buchen would discuss the matter with Senator Church and Senator Tower.

CONTINUED - OVER

There was a general consensus of opinion at the meeting with the other agencies of agreeing that they would await the development of the position paper by Wilderotter. Walter Lloyd advised that another meeting with Schwarz and the Committee staff would be scheduled for Thursday, May 8, 1975.

Upon my return to my office, Wilderotter called me to report that he had been unsuccessful in having the Mohr interview postponed and further that Schwarz had advised him that he now feels that it would be inappropriate for agency representatives to be present at any interviews whether they concerned abuse or whether they concerned general matters, and further that he felt that it would be inappropriate for the agency to be advised of the subject matter prior to the interview.

At that point, Mark Gittenstein joined the conversation with Schwarz & Wilderotter and advised Wilderotter that he intended to interview Mohr concerning "procedures and how paper moved in the Hoover days," and this would constitute 90% of the interview. The remaining 10% of the interview would concern Hoover's "O. C. Files." Further Gittenstein mentioned that he was aware that John Mohr is the Executor of Mr. Tolson's estate and he may inquire concerning that matter.

Wilderotter said that there would be no further contact with the Committee concerning the Mohr interview and that we should assume the Mohr interview will proceed as scheduled. He said that he would suggest the Bureau contact Gittenstein to discuss any further details regarding the subject matter of the interview of Mohr and that we consider discussing with Mohr prior to the interview matters that he should not discuss with Gittenstein. He also suggested that we debrief Mr. Mohr at the completion of the interview.

I reminded Mr. Wilderotter that there are no guidelines by which the White House or the intelligence community or the Senate Committee have agreed that the FBI should make such arrangements with the witness. I told him that I thought that the FBI would be used as a test case both by the Committee and by the intelligence community if we undertook to negotiate such matters directly with Gittenstein. I told him that I thought that such direct negotiations would undermine the effectiveness of current

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

negotiations to establish broad guidelines with the concurrence of the Committee that could be used to effectively limit the scope and manner of interviews currently being conducted by staff investigators. I also told him that I thought it would put the Bureau in a most difficult posture because the intelligence community could well feel that the FBI had brought about the loss of the opportunity to have some effective control over Committee access to sensitive information by negotiating our own agreement with Gittenstein. I told him that certainly the Committee would use us as an example to other intelligence agencies and use our experience to their detriment in establishing limitations on the interviews.

Mr. Wilderotter said that he understood my position and he would continue to work on the policy paper. He asked to be advised of the time the meeting is to be held with Schwarz on May 8, 1975, and I indicated I would so advise him on learning of it myself from Walter Lloyd of CIA who is making the arrangements. I also suggested that it would be appropriate for Roderick Hills, Associate Counsel to the President, to be present at the meeting with Schwarz in order to have a greater chance of resolving these issues promptly. Wilderotter said that he agreed and would attempt to make arrangements for Mr. Hills to be present at the meeting.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Bureau provide a representative to be available for consultation by Mr. Mohr as he may request on Friday, May 9, 1975, at 10:00 a.m., in Room G-308, New Senate Office Building.

✓ Bill Cregar adv. to contact Mr. Mohr + be avail. [illegible] 5/9

2. That until appropriate guidelines are established by agreement between the Committee, the White House, and the intelligence community, the Bureau not undertake to counsel or debrief Mr. Mohr or any other witnesses concerning the subject matter of interview, pursuant to agreement with individual staff interviewers.

CONTINUED - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONT'D):

3. That Inspector Hotis and I, if I am available, attend the meeting with Schwarz on Thursday, May 8, 1975.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/22/01 BY SP2ALM/ets

Airtel

- Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
4/18/75

62-116395-

To: SAC, Buffalo (157-1681)

From: Director, FBI ~~(157-27812)~~

PERSONAL ATTENTION

KARL EDWARD HAND, JR.
EXTREMIST MATTER - NATIONAL GUARD PARTY
(BUDED: 4/23/75)

1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
(Mr. J. G. Kelly)
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. R. F. Olmert)
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W. D. Fallin
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

ReBUairtel dated 4/11/75.

A review of the copy of subject's letter to Senator Frank Church dated 4/8/75 and allegations contained therein concerning Agent personnel of your office requires prompt submission of affidavits in refutation of those allegations where facts so warrant.

Accordingly, and in view of the extreme likelihood of early inquiry concerning these allegations from Senator Church or other recipients of subject's letter, appropriate affidavits should be drawn and submitted by airtel to FBIHQ by the close of business 4/23/75.

In the event one or more of subject's allegations cannot be refuted, you should make specific comment concerning same in your airtel enclosing these affidavits.

An extra copy of this communication is furnished Buffalo for inclusion in its file concerning the National Guard Party.

Records
cc 62-116395

1 - Pittsburgh

1 - 157-33528 (National Guard Party)

MAY 16 1975

PEN:fb
(15)

MAILED 4
APR 17 1975

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Original Filed In 157-27812-12

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

54 MAY 21 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Airtel to SAC, Buffalo
RE: KARL EDWARD HAND, JR.
157-27812

NOTE:

Subject is a former leader of the white hate National Socialist White Peoples Party in Buffalo, New York. He presently heads an organization known as the National Guard Party (NGP), a neo-Nazi white hate organization which by its objectives would deny certain minority groups of their civil rights. Referenced airtel enclosed copies of a letter written by subject to Senator Frank Church (Democrat - Idaho) of the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities in which he makes complaint concerning the Bureau's investigation of his organization, himself, and with regard to the arrest of his coleader, William Edward Garrett, in connection with a Federal firearms violation. Subject's letter, copies of which were also directed to Senator John Tower (Republican - Texas) and to the Buffalo "Courier Express," a daily newspaper published in Buffalo, charges the FBI in Buffalo tapped his telephone as well as the telephones of NGP members and supporters; threatened to "frame" subject; threatened to "get" subject; attempted to bribe his personal friends; used "scare" tactics against friends, relatives, employees and businessmen who do the NGP organization's printing; threatened to shoot subject's dogs during arrest of William Edward Garrett; and lied to NGP supporters and businessmen by indicating the NGP group was planning to blow up certain buildings. Subject's letter alleges these activities are in direct violation of the NGP organization's constitutional rights and requests Senator Church conduct investigation concerning same. Appropriate instructions being directed to the Buffalo Division which, in referenced airtel, indicated Special Agents involved in the controversial arrest of Garrett have submitted memoranda categorically denying allegations concerning the arrest. Bureau files contain no information to substantiate allegations of subject.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

Airtel to SAC, Buffalo
RE: KARL EDWARD HAND, JR.
157-27812

NOTE CONTINUED:

This has been coordinated with SA R. F. Olmert of the Legal Counsel Division. Bureau deadline being imposed in view of the nature of the allegations made and current investigation into FBI operational activities by Senator Church's committee.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 4/11/75

Transmit the following in _______________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED MAIL (Priority)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/22/01 BY SP2ALM/ITG

#MOR16

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (157-27812)

FROM: SAC, BUFFALO (157-1681) (P)

KARL EDWARD HAND, JR., aka
EM - NGP
(OO: BUFFALO)

SENSTUDY 75

JGD/WA

Remylet, 1/23/75, captioned as above; report of SA ROBERT N. SHAW, 10/25/74, at Buffalo, and Buffalo airtel to Bureau, 10/31/74, both captioned "WILLIAM EDWARD GARRETT; EM - NSWPP; UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS, OO: PITTSBURGH."

Enclosed for the Bureau are two (2) typewritten copies and for Pittsburgh one (1) copy by Bureau secretary of letter received by the Buffalo Division on 4/10/75, addressed to The Honorable FRANK D. CHURCH, U. S. Senate, Washington, D.C., dated 4/8/75, which is self-explanatory. Buffalo unable to xerox because of poor quality of carbon copy received. Bureau's attention is drawn to the letter's distribution. For the information of the Bureau, Buffalo "Courier Express" is a daily newspaper published at Buffalo, New York. The letter is allegedly signed by KARL HAND, JR. Authenticity of HAND's letter writing activities confirmed in conversations with BU 1471-E, who alerted Buffalo Office prior to receipt of enclosed letter.

For the information of the Bureau, incident referred to as section "F." in the enclosed letter refers to

cc airtel & enclosure retained 4077 JEH

~~2~~ - Bureau (Encls. 2) (AMRM)
1 - Pittsburgh (157-1640) (Enc. 1) (AMRM)
2 - Buffalo

RFU:cas
(5)

62-116395-1

NOT RECORDED

APR 14 1975

MAY 16 1975

cc 62-116395

ENCLOSURE

airtel BU 4/11/75
1-PC

Original Filed In 157-27812-12

Approved: _______________ Sent ______M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

the arrest of WILLIAM EDWARD GARRETT (Bureau file 157-22471; Buffalo file 157-1388) by Bureau Agents at Buffalo, New York on 10/23/74 at the residence of KARL HAND, 2213 South Bailey Avenue, Buffalo, New York. GARRETT was arrested based on an authorized complaint and warrant at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, charging GARRETT with violation of Title 18, Appendix, Section 1202(a)(1), USC, "Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon". It should be noted that KARL HAND was not present at this arrest and GARRETT was alone in the house.

In that arrest Buffalo advised the Bureau in referenced airtel, dated 10/31/74, of the items observed by Bureau Agents at time of arrest, which were as follows:

The front windows and door of 2213 South Bailey Avenue are completely covered with chicken wire. There were two large German Shepherd dogs on the premises. Upon entering the residence a five-gallon can was observed behind the stove with approximately six axe handles. In the upstairs bedroom there was a fully-loaded Stevens Model 77B 20-gauge shotgun, serial number unknown. In the downstairs bedroom there were several boxes of .22 ammunition and numerous loose 20-gauge shotgun shells.

It is noted that memoranda have been prepared by the SAs who participated in this arrest of GARRETT on 10/23/74, including SA ROBERT N. SHAW, wherein all categorically deny that any attempt was made to incite GARRETT into doing anything against his best interests. In addition, all SAs categorically deny any threat having been made to shoot dogs found on the premises. It is pointed out that GARRETT was alone in the house at the time of arrest and that at no time was KARL HAND present.

It is also pointed out for the information of the Bureau that on 11/7/74, U. S. Magistrate EDMUND F. MAXWELL, Buffalo, New York, released GARRETT and dismissed charge of violation of Title 18, Appendix, Section 1202(a)(1), USC. However, on 11/8/74, the FGJ, Western District of Pennsylvania (WDPA) at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, entered a true bill charging GARRETT with violation of Title 18, Appendix, Section 1202(a)(1), USC and Title 18, Section 922(a)(6) and Section 924(a), USC (State Firearms Control Assistance Act). Bond recommended by AUSA, Pittsburgh was $35,000 cash or surety.

GARRETT was again arrested by a team of Agents led by SA ROBERT N. SHAW on 11/8/74, based on aforementioned indictment in WDPA, for Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon and for violation of the State Firearms Control Assistance Act. At this time KARL HAND was present but the aforementioned arrest was effected on the sidewalk in front of 2213 South Bailey Avenue, Buffalo, New York, without incident. There were no dogs present at this time.

No further action being taken by this Office in regards to the letter of KARL HAND.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 4/14/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/NG

#MDR16

This memorandum reports the results of an Executive Committee Meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community on 4/11/75.

The Executive Committee, hereinafter referred to as EXCOM, was chaired by Mr. W. E. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Present at the meeting were Mr. Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President; Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President; Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, as well as senior officials of State Department, National Security Agency (NSA), Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council. Mr. Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, was scheduled to represent the Department of Justice; however, due to a scheduling foul up Scalia never made the meeting.

The following matters of interest were discussed at this meeting:

SENATOR CHURCH'S STATEMENT

"The Washington Post" edition of 4/10/75 contained the results of an interview with Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). According to this article, Church stated the Committee reserves the right to make public eventually any documents it receives and is accepting nothing with "strings attached." Mr. Roderick Hills advised the EXCOM that he and Mr. Wilderotter had a meeting with SSC Staff Director, William Miller subsequent to the Church statement. Both Hills and Wilderotter came away from this meeting believing the newspaper report was an overstatement of Church's intent. Considerable discussion followed Mr. Hills' comments. Mr. Colby noted that by letter dated 3/11/75 to Senator Church he confirmed a previous conversation with Senator Church wherein the Senator

Enclosures

REC-100

62-116395-128

15 MAY 13 1975

WOC:lmh lmh
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

6 - ENCLOSURE

MAY 9 1975

84 MAY 20 1975

S-WAG

recognized that certain aspects of intelligence activities must receive special consideration and treatment (a copy of Colby's letter is attached). By letter dated 3/12/75, Senator Church confirmed the receipt of Colby's letter and again stated that in the event the SSC inquiry touches on such sensitive areas, Senator Church and Colby should discuss jointly what procedures should be followed (copy of Senator Church's letter is attached).

Following the meeting Mr. Wilderotter advised me that the White House will prepare a letter to Senator Church recognizing that Congress can, at its discretion, declassify material it receives but strongly urging that such declassification action not be taken unilaterally by the Senate Select Committee without the approval of the agency originating the information. Wilderotter stated that the White House expected to speak for the Executive Branch with a strong voice and that individual agencies should take no action regarding the Church statement until the White House has had the opportunity to clear the air with Senator Church.

SECRECY AGREEMENT AND EMPLOYEE NOTICE

Attached is a copy of a CIA employee bulletin dated 3/12/75. This bulletin relieves CIA employees from the secrecy agreement should they be interviewed or should they have to testify before the SSC. At the EXCOM meeting Mr. Wilderotter suggested all agencies of the intelligence community employing a secrecy agreement prepare such an employee notice as well as a letter to Senator Church advising him that the individual agency was relieving their employees from the secrecy agreement. Mr. Colby charged the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) with preparing a draft of such a bulletin and letter for the guidance of member agencies and departments.

It is the opinion of Assistant Director Mintz concurred IN by the Intelligence Division that a general letter to all employees from the Director releasing them from their obligation under the FBI employment agreement concerning secrecy for purposes of possible interviews by representatives of the Senate

CONTINUED - OVER

Select Committee would be unwise. It cannot be predicted what level of FBI employee will be contacted for interview or whether any employee contacted would have sufficient factual knowledge in order to provide a full responsive reply to Committee questions. Moreover, an employee without a full understanding of the material being inquired about may not be aware of the sensitive nature of the answers that might be given.

As written, the employment agreement provides that the burden is on the employee to determine prior to disclosure whether information may be disclosed and that the Director of the FBI is in a better position than the employee to make such a determination. Therefore, it is the opinion of Mr. Mintz and the Intelligence Division that if no general letter of release is issued to all employees, any member contacted for interview may rely upon the provisions of the employment agreement as guidelines for his or her appropriate response. Specifically, such an employee would be obligated to bring to the attention of the Bureau any such request for an interview and in addition, he or she would be obligated to describe the general nature of the inquiry. At such time as request for interviews are made we will be in a better position to determine whether the employee is the appropriate person and to evaluate the sensitivity of the material in question.

REVIEW OF WHITE HOUSE DOCUMENTS BY SENATORS CHURCH AND TOWER:

Mr. Hills advised that both Senators Church and Tower have tentatively agreed to review sensitive White House documents the SSC is interested in in White House space. They have tentatively accepted the fact that should they believe such documents are necessary for retention in SSC files, they will accept a paraphrase of the original document. This arrangement has not been completely agreed to by Senators Church and Tower but Mr. Hills is hopeful such an arrangement can be worked out.

BRIEFING OF THE SSC BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

Mr. Colby advised that during the week of 4/13/75 he and Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, will brief the Senate

CONTINUED - OVER

Select Committee staff on how the Director of Cental Intelligence manages the intelligence community. Later in the month, Colby is hopeful that those senators making up the Committee will also visit CIA Headquarters for a similar briefing.

KEY ISSUES

My memorandum of 4/7/75 reporting the results of the last EXCOM meeting identified eleven key issues which the White House was particularly interested in (copy of the key issues attached). As reported in the 4/7/75 memorandum the FBI has been designated to prepare the paper entitled "Intelligence Files and Privacy." Mr. J. Dennis Miller, Legal Counsel Division, will prepare this paper. He will work with Mr. John Brock, Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as Mr. Bob McBrien of Treasury. The White House is very interested in the preparation of these key issue papers and has asked that the person responsible for preparing each paper have ready a comprehensive outline as to how the paper will be constructed on the occasion of the next EXCOM meeting scheduled for Friday 4/18/75.

THIRD AGENCY RULE

Attached herewith is a paper entitled "Third Agency Rule" prepared by CIA's General Counsel. It is designed to acquaint the intelligence community with a background of the third agency rule and to insure that all members of the community adhere to the third agency rule when responding to requests from the Select Committees of the Congress. It is to be noted Mr. Wilderotter expressed the hope that all agencies in the intelligence community will respond to a third agency request within a 48 hour deadline. Both the military and CIA felt such a short deadline was impossible but all indicated they would try to provide responses within 48 hours when clearance to pass information to the Select Committees of Congress under the third agency rule is requested.

CONTINUED - OVER

INTERAGENCY REGISTRY

Attached is a memorandum from Mr. Colby to all USIB principals dated 4/10/75 describing the establishment of a registry to insure that the community is kept informed as to materials which will formally be provided to the Select Committee by all elements of the intelligence community. The Colby memorandum notes that in order to make the registry useful it is essential that it include the following:

File copies of documents or other materials which each intelligence community element provides to a Select Committee wherein the originating agency considers the material to involve aspects of community activities. (The Bureau would have very few items of this nature other than agreements or understandings the Bureau might have with other elements of the intelligence community.)

The second requirement of the registry is that an abstract of each response to a Select Committee be provided to the registry for its retention. The Bureau has already established a procedure for providing such abstracts to the registry.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. In light of the Church statement in "The Washington Post" and the subsequent conversations the White House has or contemplates having with Senators Church and Tower, it is recommended that we continue to disseminate all responses to the SSC except in those sensitive matters that require close administrative control. In those instances it is recommended that we advise the Staff Director that such information responsive to their request is available at Bureau Headquarters and may be reviewed by himself or a senior staff member of the SSC.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

2. That Liaison Officer Frank Schwartz, the Bureau's representative on the Security Committee of USIB, present the Bureau's position regarding the issuance of an employee bulletin.

OK

5/1/75
D.E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee
advised that Security Committee
has not been charged with drafting
employee bulletin and he doesn't
expect that it will be.

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE

[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/[redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 MAR 1975

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #m4216
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM [illegible]

The Honorable Frank Church
Chairman
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter will confirm and reduce to writing some of the matters agreed upon at our recent meeting.

At the outset, I should like to express my deep personal appreciation for the candor and helpfulness of you and Senator Tower in that meeting and for your sensitivity to the respective responsibilities under our Constitutional framework of the Select Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency in the area of your review. For my part, I should like to renew again, for myself and the CIA, my promise of cooperation with respect to the important work of the Select Committee. In my judgment, a spirit of good faith and cooperative effort is not only necessary to enable your Committee to discharge its responsibilities fully and expeditiously, but is indeed in the best interests of the intelligence community as well. I am convinced that a responsible and thorough review of U.S. intelligence activities will serve to vindicate the CIA and enhance the public's understanding of the important contribution that the intelligence efforts of this nation can make toward the goal of preserving and strengthening our democracy.

I am particularly appreciative of your recognition that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence activities must receive special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee in the course of your work. As we discussed, such matters as the identities of our sensitive sources, the material provided to us by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain of our employees who could be targets of kidnapping or assassination, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with U.S. intelligence, and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems, should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from the risk of exposure. We should also work together to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals. Where these kinds of considerations are present, I anticipate that appropriate understandings can be arrived at to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time to satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of our activities.

As I stated to you, employees of the Central Intelligence Agency will be available to the Select Committee for staff interviews and for testimony. As we have discussed, this might require, in some circumstances, special arrangements to protect the identity of particular employees whose physical safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure. I anticipate that suitable safeguards can be established to avoid such dangers. I assume the Committee will make its own arrangements with respect to ex-employees as to whom I no longer have the authority to direct their cooperation. However, I am available for whatever assistance I can provide in this regard.

As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are required to sign a secrecy agreement when they enter on duty. This is a condition of employment, and it requires that they keep forever secret all classified information gained during the course of their employment. The secrecy agreement further requires that they may not disclose classified information, either orally or by publication, without prior authorization from the Director of Central Intelligence. Under the secrecy agreement, an employee's obligations with respect to the protection of classified information continue after his employment with the CIA has been terminated.

It is my desire that the secrecy agreements signed by our employees shall not impair the necessary work of the Select Committee. To accomplish this, and in recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Select Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated staff members will constitute an authorized provision of information within the meaning of the secrecy agreements. This letter may be used to indicate such authorization for any Agency employee or ex-employee to furnish information to the Select Committee or appropriate staff members on matters which would otherwise be covered by their secrecy agreement, but which are not among the particularly sensitive matters such as mentioned above. With respect to those particularly sensitive matters, different procedures are obviously necessary. Accordingly, where any matter included in these sensitive categories would be involved in responding to the Committee, the employee should express his concern and, if possible, propose a way of responding to the Committee without exposing such sensitive details. If the Committee believes that a disclosure of those aspects is nevertheless necessary, the matter will be discussed between the Committee and the Agency. I am prepared to consult with the Committee at any time to avoid difficulties in this area and quickly determine together the appropriate course of action to be taken.

With the good faith evident in our discussions on these matters, I believe that these arrangements will enable me to discharge my responsibilities to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, while at the same time to provide the Select Committee with all the information it needs to accomplish its task.

As we have agreed, it is in the national interest as well as that of the Select Committee and the U.S. intelligence community to ensure that your review proceed as smoothly and as expeditiously as possible. Toward that end, I have instructed all CIA personnel to respond in a spirit of cooperation.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby
Director

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

10 April 1975

#M0216
FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/JT6

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence

1. The Intelligence Community Staff, with John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy/IC, as my representative in these matters, will keep the Board and other appropriate officials advised as to progress of the investigations conducted by the Senate and House Select Committees investigating intelligence activities. In particular, it will ensure that we are kept informed as to materials which are formally being provided to the Select Committees by all elements of the Community. The USIB Ad Hoc Group will assist on this matter and provide the mechanism for regular and constant communications.

2. In response to this assignment, the Intelligence Community Staff is establishing a registry for documentation relating to the investigations. This registry will be a source of reference of all responses, testimony, et cetera, provided by USIB agencies and available to your designated representatives.

3. In order to make the registry useful to the Board, it is essential that it include:

a. File copies of documents or other materials which each Intelligence Community element provides to one of the Select Committees where the originating agency considers the materials to involve aspects of Community activities, and/or which may result in follow-on queries concerning the functioning of the Community. The availability of this documentation will be of particular importance if it is expected there will be subsequent inquiries relating to the materials provided and involving elements of the Community other than the originating element.

b. An abstract of each formal input to a Select Committee - unless the Intelligence Community registry is provided with an actual copy of the material itself. A proposed format for such abstracts is attached.

W. E. Colby

Attachment:
As stated

#mDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

No. 442 12 March 1975

Senate Select Committee To Review U.S. Intelligence Activities

Senate Resolution 21 established a Select Committee of the Senate to review U.S. intelligence activities. The Resolution calls for a comprehensive review of the total U.S. intelligence effort and is not restricted to the recent charges and allegations against CIA alone. Consequently, it is likely to be far-ranging in its impact.

It is in all of our interests to see that the Select Committee receives full understanding of our activities and their contribution to the country as expeditiously as possible. I have every confidence that the inquiry will be responsible, and constructive, and will produce new understanding of, and improvements in, the American intelligence system.

It is with this conviction that I have pledged my personal cooperation and that of the CIA. I have advised Senators Church and Tower, the Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman, that employees of the CIA will be available to the Select Committee for Staff interviews and for testimony. We are working with the Committee Staff to design procedures to facilitate their work in examining topics of concern.

Attached to this bulletin is a letter which I have sent to Senator Church. To facilitate the necessary work of the Committee and in recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated Staff members will constitute authorized provision of information within the meaning of the Secrecy Agreements signed by each CIA employee, subject to the special procedures and limitations set forth in the letter regarding particularly sensitive matters. Senator Church has agreed that reference to sensitive data in any Committee report will be subject to consultation between the Committee and the Agency.

The cooperative spirit of our relationship with the Committee and its Staff must at the same time take account of the rights of Agency employees. The Committee Staff has agreed to advise employees of their Constitutional rights at the beginning of any interview or other appearance.

When a current Agency employee is selected to be interviewed by the Select Committee Staff, the Staff Director or Chief Counsel will normally notify Mr. John M. Clarke, who is my principal liaison with the Committee and its Staff. Mr. Clarke, in turn, will notify the employee. The purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the work of the Committee. It is intended to allow time for the employee to gain general legal guidance if he wants it, and to obtain security guidance from an appropriate senior officer.

My own belief is that after a careful review of all U.S. intelligence activities, the Committee will address needed legislative changes and will reaffirm their confidence in the importance and contribution of U.S. intelligence programs.

WEColby

W. E. Colby
Director

Attachment: a/s

DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES

#mDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

Issues Identified

1.	Economic Intelligence and National Security -- new discussion.	TREASURY + CIA
2.	Covert Action and the Law.	CIA ✓OSD.
3.	The Intelligence Budget -- open, block or closed -- notional procedures for handling past, present and future.	OMB
4.	Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for Intelligence.	CIA and OSD
5.	GAO and the Audit Authorities of U.S. Intelligence Agencies.	CIA and OSD
6.	Confidential Funds Authorities, Contingency Reserves, Legal Base, History and Use.	CIA and OSD
7.	Cover for Foreign Intelligence Actions, Legal and Administrative Issues.	FBI - Mintz (legal [illegible]) CIA and State
8.	Intelligence Files and Privacy.	FBI and OSD John Brooke, OSD Bob O'Brien - TREA
9.	The "fact of" question -- international, legal and political considerations.	State
10.	"Sources and Methods" Legislation.	OMB and Justic
11.	An additional issue (identified by Mr. Hills) address -- adequacy or inadequacy of present classification procedures. - 701 problems - [illegible]	Legal Office, Justice, was assigned the initial responsibility of drafting a paper with inputs from th Agencies.
12	Executive Branch oversight of - NSC Intelligence Community.	

Names are to be forwarded ASAP.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

Executive Registry
75-1266

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Ad Hoc Staff
75-103

March 12, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG
#MORI 6

Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Colby:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, I want to thank your for your letter of March 11, and the copy of the Employee Bulletin you have issued to all CIA employees. As we jointly recognize, in order for the Committee to carry out a thorough inquiry, in accordance with the mandate contained in S. Res. 21, the Agency's full cooperation will be necessary. Your recognition that our mandate authorizes all, past and present, agency employees to cooperate fully, and without impediment due to secrecy agreements, will serve to facilitate our expeditious collection of material relative to that mandate.

I particularly appreciate your statement recognizing our security precautions. As you know, your staff was very helpful to the Committee's staff in designing those precautions.

The Staff Director and the Chief Counsel will, under the direction of the Committee, notify Mr. John Clarke of the members of the Committee who have been designated to carry out studies, inquiries and investigations required to meet the tasks specified in S. Res. 21.

It is the Committee's understanding that the members of the Committee and designated staff will have access to any and all information which the Committee determines is necessary for its inquiry. We recognize, however, that the Committee inquiry may touch on sensitive areas, such as the identity of CIA personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations whose disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the event that the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive areas, which matters ✓ we have already discussed in our meeting of February 27, we should discuss jointly, and as you suggest quickly, what procedures might be followed should the Committee decide it requires more information in these specific areas.

Mr. William Colby
Page Two
March 12, 1975

I welcome these first steps in close cooperation and hope that it forecasts an expeditious and thorough inquiry that will result in the strengthening of our nation's intelligence activities under the law.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/dk
#MDR16

10 April 1975

The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency." The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities."

2. Historically, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence." This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information." This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

> A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the third agency rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community, then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI. Recipients may not disseminate the estimate outside the Intelligence Community without the approval of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured;

(d) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence;

(e) If a State/DOD joint cable is disseminated to CIA, CIA may not send the information to the FBI until CIA has received the concurrence of both State and DOD.

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

5/2/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/TTE
#MORI6

TO SACS ALEXANDRIA
BALTIMORE
NEW HAVEN
NEWARK
OMAHA

PERSONAL ATTENTION

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES. THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS ALREADY INTERVIEWED SOME FORMER EMPLOYEES. NEWARK TELETYPE APRIL 30 LAST "ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY; 1964 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NOMINATING CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY," REPORTED ADVICE FROM FORMER SPECIAL AGENT JOHN P. DEVLIN THAT HE HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED BY MICHAEL T. EPSTEIN, SSC STAFF MEMBER, CONCERNING DEVLIN'S PART

On 5/12/75 Mr. N. P. Callahan telephe.
adv. [illegible] no [illegible] as in Pers'l.
Per Mr. [illegible] Office

REC-89 62-116395-127

1 - Personnel File of Each Former SA

MAY 8 1975

SFP:elw (14)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAY 16 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 02 1975
TELETYPE

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

GPO 951-546

IN FBI'S ACTIVITIES AT DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, AUGUST 22-28, 1964.

SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL SQUAD AT ATLANTIC CITY, AUGUST, 1964. EACH OF THESE FORMER AGENTS IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT THEY MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF. THEY ARE NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO BE ADVISED OF THE AREA WHICH MAY BE COVERED IN ANY INTERVIEW OF THEM BY THE SSC. THEY SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS, THEY CAN REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER AGENTS TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN THE EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER AGENT NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

NEWARK SHOULD INCLUDE RECONTACT WITH DEVLIN FOR PURPOSE INDICATED ABOVE AND ALSO FURNISH BUREAU ANY INFORMATION DEVLIN MAY HAVE FURNISHED YOUR OFFICE IN ADDITION TO THAT IN YOUR TELETYPE.

TELETYPE TO SACs, ALEXANDRIA ET AL
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

ALEXANDRIA: HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1643 NORTH VAN DORN, ALEXANDRIA. WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 8338 WAGON WHEEL ROAD, ALEXANDRIA

BALTIMORE: DONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASE

NEW HAVEN: HOBSON H. ADCOCK, 65 GLENBROOK ROAD, STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT.

NEWARK: LEO THOMAS CLARK, 1421 ATLANTIC AVENUE, ATLANTIC CITY. JOHN PATRICK DEVLIN, 39 BENNINGTON ROAD, LIVINGSTON, NEW JERSEY. HOWARD J. WILSON, 30 CAMPBELL ROAD, SHORT HILLS, NEW JERSEY.

OMAHA: JOHN J. QUINN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, JOHNSTON, IOWA

NOTE: Addresses are most recent available in personnel files of these former Agents. The Newark teletype mentioned was sent up with an informative note advising that we had checked with Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, and he interposed no objection to our contacting former Agents who participated in the special squad we had at Atlantic City in 8/64 and advising them they might be approached for interview by the SSC. Assistant Director Mintz concurred in the Intelligence Division recommendation that we, on approval, contact the former Agents as indicated in this outgoing teletype. Deputy Associate Director J. B. Adams advised of his agreement with this recommendation and for instructions to go forward to the field.

Howard J. Wilson, one of the former Agents designated to be contacted, resigned for family reasons after being censured, suspended, placed on probation, and transferred for unsatisfactory work performance detected during an inspection of the Newark Office. However, there is no evidence in his personnel file suggesting Wilson is hostile to the Bureau and the INTD believes he should be included among those former Agents to be contacted.

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 5/8/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

[redacted] #MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS FORM
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Subject JUNE MAIL U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Removed By 7 9 MAY 1 9 1975

File Number 62-116395-126

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ✓
Comp. Syst. ✓
Ext. Affairs ✓
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 4-9-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/YJ/TG

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

During various contacts with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, and Congressman Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), Chairman of the House Select Committee, the question has come up regarding the need for a check of the private offices of individual Committee Members to assure the absence of any electronic listening devices. The Committee personnel have been told that we consider this absolutely essential and they agreed.

In exploring this matter, it was determined that the Capitol Police Department recently has established a special unit to handle all types of security problems within the Capitol Hill complex, including checks for electronic listening devices. Personnel of this unit have received extensive training, some from CIA. The operations of the unit are controlled through the Sergeants at Arms of the House and Senate.

Subsequent discussion with Chief James Powell, Capitol Police Dept. reveals this is not true. 4-17-75.

This matter has been discussed with Robert Hough, Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, and with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Hough advised that the special unit already has conducted complete security surveys of the new office space of the Senate Select Committee and certainly will perform any other checks of this type needed by the Committee or its individual Members. He said, in fact, that since they now have this capability they would oppose any outside agency coming on to the Hill to perform this function. Hough said he already has been in contact with Miller regarding the necessary security checks and stated he will let us know when the offices of the Senate Select Committee Members have been checked. He said their rules require specific requests from the individual Members in writing.

11 MAY 6 1975

62-116395-125

REC-100

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

DWB:kjs (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

MAY 14 1975

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

4-23-75

84 MAY 15 1975

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

This matter was discussed with Congressman Nedzi on 4-9-75, and he stated he would promptly contact Mr. Harding to work out the necessary arrangements for security checks needed by his Committee and its Members. Harding has promised to let us know when the checks of the House Select Committee Members have been completed.

All contacts concerning this matter have been handled by Inspector Bowers who will continue to follow this situation with Senate Sergeant at Arms, William Wannall, or his Deputy; House Sergeant at Arms Harding; Mr. Miller of the Senate Select Committee; and Congressman Nedzi.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WOC:ekw 4/14/75

On 4/11/75 the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community was apprised of the discussions with Mr. Robert Hough, the Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and with Mr. Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Although the Executive Committee would have preferred the FBI to conduct audio sweeps, they interposed no objection to the sweeps being handled by the Capitol Police Department. Mr. Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, requested, however, that both Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding be requested to periodically advise the FBI as to the sweeps of Committee space for electronic listening devices. Specifically, Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding should be asked to furnish the FBI the following: How frequently they will conduct a counteraudio sweep; what offices will be swept, will the results of such sweeps be furnished the FBI, and will the FBI be immediately notified should the Capitol Police locate an electronic listening device?

5-113a (Rev. 3-21-73)

LL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/JHS
#mdr16

Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 5/5/75

Attached teletype reports results of contacts by Newark Office with three former Bureau Agents to alert them they might be contacted by staff of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC). Former SA Leo Clark (e.o.d. 1/11/43; retired 2/1/65; Sr. RA, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 1944 to retirement) was belligerent concerning our contact of him. He had previously testified before Watergate Committee regarding 1964 Democratic Convention in Atlantic City and gave same information to SSC Staff Members 4/17/75. (Clark was one of Agents on FBI special squad at Atlantic City during convention).

ACTION:

Copy of this teletype being placed in personnel file of former SA Clark for due consideration should interview of him be entertained in the future.

WRW

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - General Investigative Division
1 - Inspection Division

PLM

SFP:lfj

DOJ/FBI

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 3/27/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS FORM
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTS

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY -75

Removed By 7 9 MAY 1 9 1975

File Number 62-116395-124

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 02 1975

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/KTC

#MDR16

NR014 NK CODED

9:42PM URGENT 5/2/75 DJP

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM NEWARK

SENSTUDY 75

10-J. A. Pooley

3-Welch

Sev 93

RE: BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALEXANDRIA, MAY 2, 1975.

FORMER SA, LEO THOMAS CLARK CONTACTED MAY, 2, 1975, BY SAC PAUL J. MOHR AND HE WAS TOLD HE MIGHT BE INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC (SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE) STAFF MEMBERS AND THAT IF QUESTIONS WERE ASKED WHICH RELATED TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS HE COULD REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. CLARK VOLUNTEERED HE WAS SUBPOENAED BEFORE WATERGATE COMMITTEE AND TESTIFIED. ALL THIS MATTER WAS REPORTED IN PRESS. HE ALSO VOLUNTEERED THAT ON APRIL 17, 1975, HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBERS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. ON SAME MATERIAL REGARDING 1964 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NOMINATION CONVENTION. STAFF MEMBERS WERE MICHAEL EPSTEIN, MONK GITERSTEIN, LOCK JOHNSON. HE SAID THEY HAD ALL OF HIS PREVIOUS TESTIMONY AND WENT OVER SAME MATERIAL. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION CLARK BECAME BELIGERANT STATING HE ONLY TOLD THE TRUTH REGARDING HIS ACTIVITIES IN THE BUREAU AND ADVISED THE BUREAU TO DO THE SAME. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT ASSISTANCE AN AGENT COULD RENDER TO HIM AND WHO INSTRUCTED THAT HE BE CONTACTED AND FOR WHAT REASON. CLARK WAS ADVISED WE MERELY INTENDED TO ASSIST HIM AND HE COULD ACCEPT IT OR NOT.

MARK

REC-100

62-116395-123

5 MAY 7 1975

Clark

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

COPY FILED IN

FORMER SA, HOWARD J. WILSON, SHORT HILLS, N.J., ALERTED BY

Records

cc 62-116406

PERS. REC. UNIT

cc 67-359446 (Clark)
67-534504 (Wilson)
67-220521 (DSV/in)

84 MAY 15 1975

ASAC WILLIAM BAILEY PER RETEL AND WAS APPRECIATIVE AND STATED HE HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED BUT WOULD ADVISE THE NEWARK OFFICE IF CONTACTED IN THE FUTURE.

FORMER SA, JOHN PATRICK DEVLIN, LIVINGSTON, N.J., CONTACTED BY ASAC WILLIAM BAILEY AND ALERTED PER RETEL AND STATED HE HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OTHER THAN SET FORTH IN NEWARK TELETYPE APRIL 30 LAST.

END

HOLD FOR FOUR

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

May 2, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2.20.81 BY SP4JAM/lr 6024

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Mr. Lish Whitson, retired Special Agent, FBI

3. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

4. SUMMARY OF CONTENT:

Mr. Whitson was questioned and furnished information concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. DATE OF INTERVIEW AND BEFORE WHOM:

Interview conducted by Mr. Michael Epstein, Staff Member, SSC, in person 4/23/75; supplemented by information Epstein obtained from Whitson telephonically 4/24/75.

6. ORGANIZATION REFERENCE NO: FBI file 62-116395

REC-100 62-116395-

7. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

10 MAY 13 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-106670

62-116395

Assoc. Dir. 1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
Dep. AD Adm. 1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Retired SA Lish Whitson)
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. SFP:ekw
Comp. Syst. (10)
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv. **NOTE:** Original via liaison to Central Community Index in
Ident. connection with Senstudy 75. Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to
Inspection
Intell. J. B. Adams 4/23/75 "Senstudy 75; Former Supervisor Lish Whitson,
Laboratory Assigned Intelligence Division," recommended, and it was approved,
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv. that an Abstract would be provided for the records of the Central
Training Community Index concerning the interview of Whitson by the SSC.
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 MAY 15 1975

1 - Mr. McNiff
May 5, 1975 2-Mr.S.F.Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2.20.81 BY SP4

6076

MATERIAL FOR JOINT COMMITTEE
ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: FBI's Investigation of Extremist Organizations and Individuals

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letter from FBI to Mr. Laurence N. Woodworth, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, dated 4/10/75.

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: The Joint Committee requested the names of FBI employees who made the decision to provide the Special Service Staff (Activist Organization Committee) of the Internal Revenue Service with FBI reports relating to the FBI's investigation of extremist organizations and individuals. The FBI response was that the matter had been thoroughly researched and it was established that the decision in the above matter was personally made by the late J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of the FBI.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. 3/28/75

REC-100 62-116395-121

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

Delivered to [illegible] 5/7/75

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/10/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: 62-17909-1104

16 MAY 13 1975

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: This matter is of joint interest to the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

62-116395
SFP:ekw (5) ekw

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75. See memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. W. R. Wannall 4/9/75 "Internal Revenue Service Investigations of New Left and Extremist Organizations and Individuals," TJM/dgr.

84 MAY 15 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

woc

GPO 954-546

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 05 1975

TELETYPE

REC-100

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS DECLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TS

#MDR16

NR004 NK CODED

3:55PM URGENT 5/5/75 DJP

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM NEWARK

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTELCALL OF SUPERVISOR SEYMOUR PHILLIPS TO SAC, NEWARK, MAY 5, 1975.

FORMER SA JOHN PATRICK DEVLIN WAS RECONTACTED BY ASAC, NEWARK, AND FURNISHED FOLLOWING INFO ON MAY 5, 1975:

HE WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF MEMBER MICHAEL T. EPSTEIN TELEPHONICALLY AT WORK (HERITAGE BANK - IRON, MORRISTOWN, N.J.) A DAY OR TWO PRIOR TO HIS INTERVIEW ON APRIL 25, 1975. MR. EPSTEIN DID NOT INDICATE IN ADVANCE AREA OF INQUIRY CONTEMPLATED AND WHEN ASKED BY FORMER SA DEVLIN HOW HE, EPSTEIN, HAD OBTAINED HIS, DEVLIN'S, PHONE NUMBER AT WORK, EPSTEIN INDICATED, "YOU KNOW, WE'VE GOT WAYS." IN ADDITION, EPSTEIN TOLD HIM THAT THE SSC HAD BEEN GIVEN A BROAD SCOPE OF INQUIRY AND WERE MANDATED TO LOOK INTO THE ACTIVITIES OF VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AGENCIES. EPSTEIN DID NOT MENTION THAT HE HAD ANY TYPE OF CLEARANCE BUT WAS VERY POSITIVE IN HIS POSITION THAT THE SSC HAD BEEN MANDATED BY CONGRESS TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES. EPSTEIN EXHIBITED

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

REC-100 62-116395-120

18 MAY 13 1975

2cc
62-116395

cc 67-221591 (Devlin)

84 MAY 15 1975

AN IDENTIFICATION CARD CONTAINING HIS PHOTOGRAPH TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND HE DID NOT PLACE DEVLIN UNDER OATH. EPSTEIN DID NOT INDICATE WHERE HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION REGARDING DEVLIN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE 1964 ATLANTIC CITY CONVENTION AND WHEN ASKED BY DEVLIN, HE INDICATED ONLY THAT, "WE'VE GOT WAYS".

DEVLIN INDICATED THAT EPSTEIN'S INQUIRY WAS CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE ELSUR COVERAGE AFFORDED KING. EPSTEIN'S INTEREST APPEARED TO ALSO CENTER AROUND WHO TOLD DEVLIN TO GO TO ATLANTIC CITY AND THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE FBI'S ACTIVITIES AT ATLANTIC CITY. EPSTEIN SEEMED TO BE DRIVING AT THE POLITICAL OVERTONES CONNECTED WITH THE ATLANTIC CITY COVERAGE AND HE ASKED QUESTIONS PARTICULARLY INVOLVING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE FBI'S INVESTIGATION AND WHETHER OR NOT FORMER VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY AND THE LATE ROBERT KENNEDY WERE MONITORED AS BEING IN CONTACT WITH KING.

FORMER SA DEVLIN INDICTAED HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY ADVISE NEWARK SHOULD HE BE RECONTACTED REGARDING THIS MATTER.

END

MEB FBIHQ CLR

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 5/2/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS FORM
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY -75

79 MAY 19 1975

Removed By

File Number 62-116395-119

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall DATE: 5/1/75

FROM : W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 KLM 1/16

On 4/30/75 Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman of the Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, furnished the attached list of Senate Select Committee staff members who have been certified by the Chairman of the Select Committee to the Central Intelligence Agency as having been cleared for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret based upon a background investigation conducted by the FBI within the last five years. Certain of these individuals have also been certified by the Select Committee for access to compartmented classified information in accordance with the requirements of Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/14.

Copies of the list of staff members are being attached to the tickler copies of this memorandum for retention by personnel who may be in contact with the Select Committee staff.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

REC-100

62-116395-118

Enclosure

LFS:tdp (8)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Schwartz

18 MAY 13 1975

JBA
PLM

Phillips
(CHAST)

ENCLOSURE

5-CWOCB

84 MAY 13 1975

SECRET

Name	DPOB	SSN	Compartmented Clearances
Aaron, David	8/21/38 Ill.	550-44-7971	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Bader, William	9/8/31 N.J.	545-30-3377	SI, TK, BYC 4/17/75
Baron, Frederick	12/2/47 Conn.	494-54-5241	(S)
Benz, Charity I.	7/23/46 N.Y.	053-38-7410	
Brooks, Nancy	2/14/40 Ky.	313-38-6773	(S)
Carter, Barry	12/14/42 Cal.	567-56-8854	SI, TK, BYC 4/24/75
Chesnik, Barbara	4/18/46 WI	390-46-2235	
Davis, Lynn	9/6/43 FL	042-36-9155	SI, TK, BYC 4/17/75
Dawson, Thomas	9/9/52 Minn.	471-60-1688	
De Oreo, Mary	6/13/47 Ohio	287-42-6258	
Dillon, Molly	4/16/51 Va.	150-38-4588	
Dwyer, Daniel	8/24/52 Ma.	023-44-8792	
Epstein, Michael T.	3/10/37 Mass.	026-28-6318	(S)
Fenn, Peter	12/12/47 Ma.	213-50-1128	SI, TK, BYC 4/24/75
Gitenstein, Mark	3/7/46 Ala.	420-60-8767	
Greissing, Edward	11/27/50 Germany	296-50-4113	
Hatry, Audrey	6/10/23 Md.	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Karl	9/29/46 N.C.	245-74-5617	
Johnson, Dorothy	6/8/25 OR	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	2/21/42 N.Z.	566-62-0478	
Kieves, Lawrence	1/4/48 N.Y.	068-38-6464	(S)
Kirbow, Charles	10/2/22 Ga.	252-12-5112	SI, TK, BYC 4/24/75
Lombard, Charles	6/2/30 FR	578-44-9471	SI, TK, BYC 4/24/75
Liebengood, Howard	12/29/42 IN	307-44-9707	
McDonald, Naldeen	10/19/51 Brazil	225-78-8708	(S)
Madigan, Michael J.	4/18/43 D.C.	042-34-3797	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Marshall, Benjamin	5/4/19 NE	485-28-4503	SI, TK. BYC 4/17/75
Maxwell, Eliot E.	7/24/46 N.Y.	133-34-4225	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Mecham, Martha E.	2/11/40 Ca.	528-48-6848	
Miller, William G.	8/15/31 N.Y.	109-26-4349	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
O'Flaherty, Jas. D.	11/4/42 Ill.	239-62-8495	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Orloff, Jan	11/14/47 Ca.	558-74-8394	(S)
Peterson, John F.	6/15/41 Ca.	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan	10/24/53 Canada	020-40-7638	(S)
Romberg, Alan	12/1/38 N.Y.	107-30-8583	SI, TK, BYC 4/22/75
Schwarz, F.A.O.	4/20/35 N.Y.	084-30-2047	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Shea, Patrick	2/28/48 Utah	528-64-1965	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Smith, Stephanie	3/23/54 OH	282-58-6476	
Snider, Lewis B.	1/12/45 N.C.	246-72-0956	SI, TK, BYC (S) 4/24/75
Towell, Mary	4/25/44 TN	566-64-7628	
Wides, Burton V.	6/14/41 N.J.	139-30-1936	SI, TK, BYC 4/17/75
			(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1-19-01 #moe16
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

62-116395-118

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-4 BY SP4JOm/ln

May 6, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
2-Mr.S.F.Phillips

6076

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Mr. John P. Devlin, retired Special Agent, FBI

3. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

4. SUMMARY OF CONTENT:

Mr. Devlin was questioned and furnished information concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. DATE OF INTERVIEW AND BEFORE WHOM:

Interview conducted by Mr. Michael Epstein, Staff Member, SSC, 4/25/75.

REC-100 62-116395-117

16 MAY 13 1975

6. ORGANIZATION REFERENCE NO: FBI file 62-116395.

7. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

100-106670-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Delivered to SSC 5/9/75

62-116395
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-220521 (Personnel File Former SA John P. Devlin)

SFP:ekw (9)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75. The furnishing of this Abstract is pursuant to procedure previously established in connection with a similar interview by Epstein of former Agent Lish Whitson.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

VPW
HEH

WOC
PLM

JAM
R70

84 MAY 13 1975

GPO 954-546

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4 Jarrold

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
May 6, 1975
1-Mr.W.R.Wannall
1-Mr.W.O.Cregar
2-Mr.S.F.Phillips

6076

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Mr. Daniel J. Brennan, Jr., retired Special Agent, FBI.

3. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

4. SUMMARY OF CONTENT:

Mr. Brennan was questioned concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., specifically during 1964. However, he was unable to furnish any of the requested information concerning the King investigation as he could not recall any information of the nature desired.

5. DATE OF INTERVIEW AND BEFORE WHOM:

Interview conducted by Mr. Michael Epstein, Staff Member, SSC, 5/2/75.

6. ORGANIZATION REFERENCE NO: FBI file 62-116395.

7. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-428628 (Personnel File Former SA Daniel J. Brennan, Jr.)
SFP:ekw (9) EKW

REC-100

62. 116395 - 116

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75. The furnishing of this ~~Abstract is~~ pursuant to procedure previously established in connection with a similar interview by Epstein of former Agent Lish Whitson.

18 MAY 13 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-106670-

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO :MR. J. B. ADAMS

DATE: April 25, 1975

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM :MR. W. R. WANNALL

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/dfs

Reference is made to my memorandum to you 4/24/75 reporting interview by Michael Epstein, Staff Member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, of retired SA Lish Whitson concerning a trip to Miami, Florida, by Whitson in 1964. The trip was for the purpose of mailing a package to the late Martin Luther King, Jr., and indicated we were checking our records for information regarding the expense voucher and Government Transportation Request (GTR) issued by Whitson and would report our findings.

Jay Deane Cox, Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division, supplied the following information as to the records available concerning Whitson's travel and what the procedures generally are for maintenance of travel and voucher records. The Voucher Unit maintains a Travel Authority Card (TAC) for all investigative and any other FBI employees who have ever had GTRs issued to them. The TACs are retained indefinitely as there is no provision for their destruction. For every voucher processed, there is recorded the voucher period, amount of voucher, date processed and record of any GTRs issued.

62-116395-115

REC-100

The TAC for Whitson reveals entries to show that on 12/9/64 a voucher was processed for payment to Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. With that voucher was a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air coach travel, Washington, D.C., to Miami and return. Attached to instant ~~memorandum is~~ a Xerox of the memorandum copy of the GTR, which copy is being retained in the Voucher Unit. Because of the illegibility resulting from Xeroxing,

MAY 16 1975

Enclosure

CONTINUED -- OVER

62-116395
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)
SFP:ekw
(9)

ENCLOSURE

5 4 MAY 13 1975

Phillips

the entries to the GTR have been reconstructed to make them readable on this Xerox. The memorandum copy, which is being retained in the Voucher Unit, is readable. The markings on the reverse side of the Xerox have no bearing on the date of travel but are merely entries relative to the payment to National Airlines. It might be noted that the issue date of this GTR, 11/21/64, has been determined to be a Saturday, which is the day of the week Whitson recalled making the trip to Miami.

According to Cox, the Bureau does not maintain copies of the actual vouchers and there is only a bare possibility that a voucher over 10 years old, such as the one involved in this matter, would be maintained anywhere in the Government, such as at the Federal Records Center.

ACTION:

None. For information.

NP

Void after
19

BILL TO **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CASHIER'S CODE	BILL NUMBER	TRANSP AMOUNT	ACCOMMOD. AMOUNT

CARRIER'S CODE	BILL NUMBER	TRANSP AMOUNT	ACCOMMOD. AMOUNT

A3,925,594

The National Airlines Company is requested
to furnish coach (FIRST, COACH, MIXED, CHARTER, ETC.) class air (RAIL, AIR OR BUS, ETC.) transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC
to Miami, Florida + return (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") (SHOW CARRIERS AND JUNCTION POINTS AND WHERE MIXED CLASS SERVICE IS TO BE FURNISHED SPECIFY)
SUCH BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE POINTS
for use of Lish Whitson and ____ others with ____ (LOWER BERTH, P.C. SEAT, ETC.) accommodations
from ____ to ____ (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") with authorization
to transport not over ____ lbs. of excess baggage from ____

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE OR TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson
TITLE Special Agent

PLACE OF ISSUE Washington DC Nov 21, '6

I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson
TITLE Special Agent

FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)
0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT.	TOTAL
107.40		107.40

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

The United States of America
Transportation Request

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-115

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/TAG
#MO26

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
May 1, 1955, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.
2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.
3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: April 24, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall

#FMOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/ITG

SUBJECT: (6)
SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1/45

Memorandum captioned as above 4/23/75 reported on interview of Mr. Whitson by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee. The interview related to Whitson's trip to Miami in 1964 at the instructions of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan to mail a package to Martin Luther King.

Whitson telephoned my office twice this morning. At 10:35 a.m. he advised that Epstein had asked him by telephone how Whitson had made the trip to Miami, meaning how it was paid for. Whitson told him he had issued a Government Transportation Request (GTR). Epstein asked whether there was any prior written authorization for Whitson to make this trip and Whitson told him there was none. Epstein asked what kind of record would have been made covering the trip. Whitson explained that the only record that he knew of would be the expense voucher he submitted covering the expenses involved and possibly the copy of the GTR which he had issued. He explained to Epstein the voucher would merely show the GTR had been issued for a round-trip to Miami and how much per diem had been claimed in connection with the trip.

In advising of the foregoing, Whitson stated it was his recollection he had made the Miami trip either in the late Summer or early Fall of 1964 and that Martin Luther King was "away" at the time.

In my absence from the office, Whitson called again at 11:05 a.m. to say that Mr. Epstein asked him as to whether he had registered at the Airport Hotel in Miami and, if so, whether it was under his own name. Whitson told Epstein that he had registered under his own name at this hotel.

REC-100

62-116395-114

MAY 6 1975

ACTION:

We are checking our records for information regarding the expense voucher and GTR issued by Whitson in connection with this trip and results will be reported.

WRW:lml (6)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Personnel File of SA Lish Whitson (Out of Service)

Phil

84 MAY 13 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4-25-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sen/125

Reference Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams memorandum of 4-9-75 to which the Intelligence Division placed an addendum dated 4-14-75 showing that Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, had requested that the Sergeants at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives keep the Bureau advised regarding checks made for electronic listening devices in the offices of captioned Select Committees.

This was discussed on 4-23-75 by Inspector Bowers with Senate Sergeant at Arms William Wannall and his Deputy, Robert Hough. They were amenable to notifying us concerning the checks they make of Senate Select Committee space and the offices of the Members of this Committee. Hough was designated by Wannall to handle this matter. Hough advised that the special Capitol Police unit had made a check of Room S146 in the Capitol on that date (4-23-75) prior to a meeting of the Senate Select Committee in that room and found nothing. Hough stated they have received no requests whatever to make any checks of the offices of individual Committee Members. He said he had discussed this matter with William Miller, Staff Director of the Select Committee, and Miller indicated it would be taken up with the Committee but he has heard nothing further from him.

62-116464-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTK

#MDR16

REC-100 62-116395-113

On 4-24-75 Bowers discussed this matter with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives. Harding stated he has had no requests for any checks of the Members' offices or

21 MAY 6 1975

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

MAY 30 1975

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

DWB:kjs (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 13 1975

space of the House Select Committee since the Committee really has not begun to function as yet. He said he has discussed this matter with Committee Chairman Lucien Nedzi, and he certainly will give us complete accounting of checks they make of this Committee's space and the space of the individual Members of the Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

WRW

plm

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep. AD Adm.
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
  - Admin.
  - Comp. Syst.
  - Ext. Affairs
  - Files & Com.
  - Gen. Inv.
  - Ident.
  - Inspection
  - Intell.
  - Laboratory
  - Plan. & Eval.
  - Spec. Inv.
  - Training
  - Legal Coun.
  - Telephone Rm.
  - Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-12-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

Hotis

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY
DESTRUCTION OF BUREAU FILES
AND RECORDS

Re my memorandum to you dated 2-14-75.

As indicated in referenced memorandum, the Bureau's program concerning destruction of files and records has been suspended until we can determine whether it involves any documents that might be of interest to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

We contacted William G. Miller, Staff Director for the Committee, and he asked that we withhold further destruction of files until the Committee Counsel, who had not been appointed at that time, had an opportunity to review the matter. Mr. F. A. O. Schwarz 3d, a New York attorney, was recently named the Committee's Chief Counsel. It is recommended that representatives of the Files and Communications Division and the Legal Counsel Division meet with Mr. Schwarz and Mr. Miller at the earliest opportunity to resolve this matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/tfs

#MDE16

RECOMMENDATION:

That representatives of the Files and Communications Division and the Legal Counsel Division meet with the Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to determine whether the Bureau's destruction program can be reinstituted.

REC-56 62-116395-112

21 MAY 2 1975

OK

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Jenkins
- 1 - Mr. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. Ash
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Farrington
- 1 - Mr. Hotis

JBH:bk (10)

MAY 8 1975

56 MAY 13 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-24-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY '75

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/TTB

SAC Thomas Kitchens of the Louisville Office telephonically advised on 4-23-75 that former Section Chief Fred Baumgardner had been contacted by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee, and Epstein had sought to arrange an interview of Baumgardner. SAC Kitchens advised Baumgardner requested that a Bureau representative be present during his interview. SAC Kitchens further advised that Baumgardner will telephonically contact SA Paul V. Daly on 4-24-75.

On 4-24-75 at 2:30 p.m., former Section Chief Baumgardner telephonically related that he had been requested to come to Washington for the purpose of being interviewed by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee. Baumgardner advised Epstein that he would make himself available for interview but at his office at 970 South 4th Street, Louisville, Kentucky, telephone number 584-5183. Mr. Baumgardner expressed concern regarding the interview pointing out that he was Section Chief in the Intelligence Division for some 18 years and during the time was continually dealing with very sensitive matters which he felt were not the proper subject matter of discussion with people outside the FBI. Additionally, he pointed out he has been out of the Bureau for some eight years and since he is not aware of current Bureau operations he, therefore, requested the Bureau have a representative present during the interview and that the Bureau representative so designated be thoroughly familiar with Intelligence Division operations so that he might be made aware of those areas which are sensitive and might compromise current Bureau investigations. He suggested that the Bureau representative should arrive sometime the day before the proposed interview which is 4-29-75 so that he may have a preliminary discussion with the Bureau representative concerning those areas in which he has knowledge of and may be sensitive.

REC-56 62-116395- EX-110 MAY 1 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That a representative of the Intelligence Division be made available to be present during the interview of former Section Chief Baumgardner to assist Mr. Baumgardner in insuring that he does not divulge or compromise sensitive material.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (8)

LEGAL COUNSEL

MAY 14 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. ___
Inspection __
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ___
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: May 1, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4

JRM/LM
6076

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Previous memoranda have reported former Supervisor Whitson's contact with the Bureau to report concerning an interview of him conducted by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities on 4/23/75. The interview related to Martin Luther King, Jr.

On 4/30/75 Whitson telephoned my office to report that he had been trying to establish in his mind the specific date when he made a plane trip from Washington National Airport to Miami, Florida. He had previously said he thought it was in the late Summer of 1964. During a subsequent call he fixed the time as the late Summer or early Fall of 1964. During his contact, 4/30/75, Whitson stated that to the best of his recollection, this plane trip took place in October, 1964. The Bureau's appreciation for his call was expressed to Whitson.

Memorandum 4/25/75 in captioned matter has reported the location of information from the files of the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, showing that Whitson traveled by plane to Miami utilizing a GTR issued 11/21/64. It has been determined this date was on a Saturday, it being noted Whitson previously stated he made the trip to Miami on Saturday and the return trip the next day, a Sunday.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-106670

REC-106 62-116395-110

ACTION:

None. For information and record purposes.

MAY 7 1975

File 62-116395

WRW:lml (6)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Personnel File of SA Lish Whitson (Out of Service)

PCM

JBA/PCM

cc-100-106670 (King)

Ad Hoc Staff
75-464

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

30 APR 1975

File

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Staff

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

0 Senstudy - '75

On 25 April 1975, we provided you a listing of the security clearances to date for members of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Attached is a listing of eight additional Staff personnel certified by Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director, as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

for Jack E Thomas
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

JHH

Attachment: as stated

REC- 106 62-116395-109

16 MAY 7 1975

ENCLOSURE

#m0216
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/776

8 0 MAY 7 1975

30 April 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOC. SEC. NO.
Belva Brissett	6-23-41	Oklahoma	440-44-6374
Margaret Carpenter	8-27-44	California	555-62-6129
Joan Erno	8-30-46	D. C.	215-46-2988
Arthur Harrigan	3-16-44	New York	141-34-1031
Diane LaVoy	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119
James Rowe	6-6-51	D.C.	579-62-6719
Elizabeth Smith	6-21-49	New York	076-42-0199
Martha Talley	9-7-50	No. Carolina	245-88-1368

#MOU16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/JTS

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-107

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

DATE: 4/22/75

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of an Executive Committee meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community on 4/21/75.

The Executive Committee, hereinafter referred to as the EXCOM, was chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for the Intelligence Community, in the absence of Mr. William Colby (DCI), who had been called to the Hill to testify on the current situation in Vietnam. Present at the meeting were Mr. Philip Buchen and Mr. Roderick Hills, Counsels to the President; Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President; Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, as well as senior officials of the State Department, National Security Agency (NSA), Office of Management and Budget, and the Treasury Department. Mr. Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, was scheduled to represent the Department of Justice but failed to appear.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ICT/6
#MDE/6

The following matters of interest were discussed at the meeting:

KEY ISSUES

The purpose of the key issue papers is to completely familiarize the White House with all facets of certain key issues which could arise from Senate Select Committee (SSC) deliberations. It is hoped these key issue papers will permit the President's Counsel to be a more articulate advocate of the intelligence community should any of these issues by raised.

REC-106 62-116395-108

Enclosures

16 MAY 7 1975

62-116395

WOC:lmh | mh
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

86 MAY 27 1975

Memorandum Cregar to Wannall dated 4/14/75 reported that Mr. J. Dennis Miller of the Legal Counsel Division was preparing the key issue paper entitled "Intelligence Files and Privacy." A copy of the outline for this paper was presented to the EXCOM with the commitment that a draft of the paper would be ready for review in the next two to three weeks.

Another key issue paper is one being prepared by Mr. Warren D. Magnusson of CIA entitled "G. A. O. and the Audit Authorities of U. S. Intelligence Agencies." Mr. Wilderotter suggested Mr. Magnusson consult with the FBI inasmuch as the Bureau was currently being audited by GAO. Mr. Robert Finzel of the Intelligence Division maintains liaison with GAO representatives auditing the Intelligence Division. Mr. Finzel's name will be furnished Mr. Magnusson for consultation purposes in line with the suggestion from Mr. Wilderotter.

WHITE HOUSE RESPONSES TO SSC REQUESTS

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from James A. Wilderotter to Mr. John Clarke dated 4/16/75. The memorandum advises that the White House provided copies of the Colby report (including annexes), as well as a list of documents to the Senate Select Committee on 4/14/75. The Colby report is the document prepared for the President following the Seymour Hersch articles which appeared in "The New York Times" alleging CIA was engaged in massive domestic surveillances.

GUIDELINES FOR PARAPHRASING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PROVIDED TO THE SELECT COMMITTEES

Memorandum Cregar to Wannall dated 4/7/75 attached a copy of sanitization guidelines for documents provided to Congressional Select Committees. Attached to this memorandum are new guidelines entitled "Guidelines for Paraphrasing Certain Documents Provided to the Select Committees." In essence the attachment is almost identical to the sanitization guidelines. The reason for the change is the White House prefers the word "paraphrase" rather than "sanitization." Thus, guidelines under the paraphrasing description were promulgated.

CONTINUED - OVER

LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter Senator Kennedy has directed to the Attorney General. Copies of this letter were furnished to the EXCOM by Mr. Wilderotter. In furnishing a copy of this letter, Mr. Wilderotter noted that the Department of Justice would handle the response to Senator Kennedy after consultation with individual agencies as well as the White House. Wilderotter was furnishing a copy to members of the EXCOM for coordination purposes. He further advised that the Department of Justice's response would be made a matter of record with the Interagency Registry.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WOC/

TWL/FSP

wRW

JBR/PLM

Ad Hoc Staff
75-331

SECRET ATTACHMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. JOHN M. CLARKE
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

FROM: JAMES A. WILDEROTTER

On Monday, April 14, the White House provided copies of the "Colby Report" (including the annexes) and the attached list of documents to the Senate Select Committee as classified documents. NSCIDs 4, 5, and 6 -- as well as the obsolete and superseded NSCIDs corresponding to them -- were not provided to the Committee.

#M0216

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

SECRET ATTACHMENT

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-108

#mor16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/176

SECRET

LIST OF DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITES

1. National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) -- These directives prescribe the organization and division of responsibility of the various elements of the intelligence community; provide procedures for the collection and production of overt intelligence; establish a communications system for the rapid reporting of critical intelligence information; and establish the National Photographic Interpretation Center.

2. Obsolete and Superseded NSCIDs -- These documents predate the existing directives (in item #1 above) but provide essentially the same guidance under the bureaucratic structure established by previous administrations.

3. Letter from President Nixon to Director Helms -- This letter, issued following a major review and restructuring of the intelligence community, set forth the Director's responsibilities and established goals to channel his further effort. 11/5/71

4. NSAM 57 - Paramilitary Operations -- This memorandum defines paramilitary operations; states US policy for rendering assistance to such operations overtly or covertly and establishes a procedure for the planning and approval of paramilitary operations. 6/28/71

5. NSAM 124 - Establishment of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) -- This 1962 memorandum set forth procedures for ensuring the use of all available government resources in preventing and resisting subversive-insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries.

6. NSAM 196 - Establishment of an Executive Committee of the National Security Council -- This 1962 memorandum established a committee to serve as a crisis management group during the Cuban missile crisis.

7. NSC 5511 -- Establishment of a Net Evaluation Subcommittee -- This 1955 directive established a subcomittee of the NSC for the purpose of providing estimates of the capability of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the US in time of general war.

8. NSAM 5815 - Comparative Evaluation Group -- This 1958 directive established an inter-agency body to prepare comparative evaluations of the US and Soviet weapons systems.

9. NSAM 303 - This 1964 document changed the name of the Special Group (5412) to the "303 Committee". (The predecessor body documentation is at Tab B).

10. NSAM 327.--This 1965 memorandum disestablishes the net evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC.

11. NSDM 40 - Covert Operations.-- This directive provides authority and sets forth procedures and responsibility for the planning, approval and conduct of covert operations. It also brings a number of Defense reconnaissance activities under the cognizance of the 40 Committee.

12. NSDM 224-- This 1973 directive established a Net Assessment Standing Committee to carry out intelligence assessments as directed by the NSC.

13. NSDM 239 - National Net Assessment Process -- This directive transferred responsibility for management of the subject program from the NSC to the Department of Defense.

14. NSDM 253 -- This 1974 memorandum updated the membership of the NSC Intelligence Committee.

15. The balance of documents included herein consist of unclassified reports, diagrams and press releases concerning the organization and functioning of the NSC and the Intelligence Community.

THE D[illegible]ECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

21 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Guidelines for Paraphrasing Certain Documents Provided to the Select Committees

1. Attached is a guidance paper, subject as above, prepared by the USIB Security Committee, and approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. In the interest of commonality in our approach to the matter of paraphrasing sensitive documents, it is requested that each of you arrange for the use of these guidelines in the handling of responses from your organizations to requests from the Select Committees.

John M. Clarke

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-19-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-108

GUIDELINES FOR PARAPHRASING SENSITIVE INFORMATION IN CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has recently discussed with Senator Church the need for special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee of certain sensitive aspects of intelligence activities and the Senator has expressed his recognition of this need. It is anticipated that appropriate arrangements can be made so as to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time satisfying the Select Committees' need for a full understanding of the intelligence community's activities. Included in such matters are the identities of sensitive sources, the material provided to the United States by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain employees whose safety could be jeopardized if revealed, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with US intelligence and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems. Such material should be protected not only from exposure but indeed the risk of exposure. Further, recognition should be given to the need to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals.

2. Proper procedures should enable intelligence community members to prevent risk of disclosure of sensitive sources and methods and at the same time present to the Select Committees the necessary details to allow for their proper understanding of community activities.

3. The procedures described herein are not to be used as downgrading or declassification guides. All concerned should be mindful that application of these procedures will not declassify, downgrade or remove from compartmentation controls any documents or information provided the Select Committees, unless individual advice to that effect is provided as well.

4. What May Be Paraphrased

While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which may be levied by the Committees for documenting material and not

#NDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2ALM/ET6

possible to determine specifically what material should be excised from these documents, the following illustrations are offered in certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet the test mentioned above.

5. Collection of Intelligence

(a) The Committees will probably address the matter of how intelligence is collected. Documents supporting responses may be paraphrased by removal of identities of sensitive agents and informants, covert personnel, and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be substituted, i.e., a foreign journalist, a political official in the opposition party. No paraphrasing should be used in connection with names of individuals whose employment or former employment by, or association with a department or agency, does not remain secret or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements remain secret.

(b) Some information may be required with respect to technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived by use of these codenames or nicknames in classified documents. Details of the technical systems which would reveal critical operational capabilities and contractual and funding arrangements which would identify individuals whose participation was obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in the Community's paraphrasing procedures. While documentary samples of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of testimony, special consideration should be given with regard to raw products which reveal critical operational capabilities.

6. Intelligence Estimates

Finished intelligence reports and estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not normally require paraphrasing. However, departments and agencies should review such publications to ensure deletion of sensitive source identities and details of collection systems.

7. Administration

Information concerning the administration of intelligence agencies may be required. This may include staffing charts with occupants identified. Identities of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning in a cover assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future be considered for a covert assignment.

8. General

The following categories of information or specific examples may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should be given by the department or agency concerned to the necessity of deletion or paraphrasing of this type of information, prior to providing the document.

(a) Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.

(b) Details which would reveal sensitive methods and techniques (1) employed in human source collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.

(c) The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment, attempted recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targeted foreign organizations.

(d) Names of particular employees whose physical safety or future careers might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.

(e) Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.

(f) Assumed identities, locations or other information permitting identification of defectors or refugees who might be targeted for retaliation.

(g) Identifying information on intelligence services of friendly and neutral countries and collaboration of those services with US intelligence agencies.

(h) Identification of technical foreign intelligence operations of high vulnerability or extremely high political sensitivity.

(i) Details of arrangements with US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of intelligence operations.

(j) Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that collaborate in a special manner such as providing cover for foreign intelligence operations.

(k) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).

(l) Proprietary, trade secret or patent information.

9. Techniques of Paraphrasing

Paraphrasing of intelligence material may include the physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing from written communication with or without regard for the residual content. Use of a substitute terms is an example of paraphrasing which permits intelligent continuity of the material without revealing the true identity. Paraphrasing does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material.

The integrity of official records must be maintained. The following paraphrasing techniques apply only to copies of records.

(a) Names may be obliterated, masked or replaced with substitute terms, the residual material xeroxed and the copy submitted to Committees.

(b) The material can be retyped or reprinted with substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal the sensitive material.

(c) Entire pages can be removed from some documents and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing department or agency.

(d) Within a category of inquiry, it may be desirable to extract a complete document from requested material when the request is broad and all-inclusive within its field. The existence of such a document should be made known to the Committees but retained by the agency or department for review under escort of a representative of the department or agency.

10. Management of Documents

The original record and a copy of the paraphrased version provided should be readily available in all cases. Materials developed within an agency or department in response to requests should be reviewed at an appropriate level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. In the case of documents or materials of a community nature, the release should be done in coordination with the departments or agencies and/or the Program Manager concerned an any paraphrasing should be agreed upon during coordination.

This proposed use of paraphrasing as a special arrangement to protect selected issues contained in material provided to Select Committees by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies. It is essential to the proposal that departments and agencies attempt to employ the same criteria for paraphrasing and coordinate as required. This paper can serve only as general guidelines.

JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS., CHAIRMAN

JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, ARK.
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C.
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS.
BIRCH BAYH, IND.
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, N. DAK.
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA.
JOHN V. TUNNEY, CALIF.

ROMAN L. HRUSKA, NEBR.
HIRAM L. FONG, HAWAII
HUGH SCOTT, PA.
STROM THURMOND, S.C.
MARLOW W. COOK, KY.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.

PETER M. STOCKETT, JR.
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

SUBCOMMITTEE:
ARD M. KENNEDY, MASS., CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
BIRCH BAYH, IND.
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, N. DAK.
JOHN V. TUNNEY, CALIF.

STROM THURMOND, S.C.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.

NATHAN LEVENTHAL, CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(PURSUANT TO SEC. 3, S. RES. 55, 93D CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

#C31

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

April 10, 1975

RECEIVED
APR 14 1975
CRIMINAL DIVISION

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

A newspaper report in today's Washington Post has raised serious questions as to how many federal agencies engage in electronic surveillance and the extent of such surveillance.

At a hearing on May 23, 1974, before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Attorney General Saxbe testified on this subject. I asked him: "Can you tell us about any other organizations or government departments that are involved in any wiretapping at all today?" The Attorney General replied: "We do not believe that there is anyone else and the penalties are rather severe." (p. 495) I am enclosing a copy of the hearings for your convenience.

The recent reports raise questions concerning the completeness and clarity of Attorney General Saxbe's earlier testimony. President Johnson's executive memorandum of June 30, 1965, requires that federal agencies engage in wiretapping only with the prior approval of the Attorney General. In order to fully answer the questions that have been raised, I request that you provide the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure with the following information by April 16:

177-072

1. A list of all federal departments, agencies, bureaus, divisions, and other units that conduct, have conducted, or have authority to conduct electronic surveillance of any type (including wiretaps, bugs, and other uses of any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication).

CRIMINAL GEN. CR

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-108

2. For each agency listed under #1 above, the specific statutory or other authority for the agency's conduct of electronic surveillance.

3. For each agency listed under #1 above, all guidelines, procedures, rules and regulations relating to the conduct of electronic surveillance.

4. For each agency listed under #1 above, a specification of whether the agency's conduct, or authority to conduct, electronic surveillance includes:

a. Electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to a court warrant obtained under the provisions of sections 2516 and 2518 of title 18, United States Code;

b. Electronic surveillance conducted without a court order obtained under the provisions of sections 2516 and 2518 of title 18, United States Code;

c. Electronic surveillance conducted within the United States;

d. Electronic surveillance conducted in foreign countries.

5. For each agency listed under #1 above, the number of electronic surveillances in place on April 1, 1975, and the number of electronic surveillances in place at any time during the calendar years 1970 through 1974 (with a description of the method used in computing these figures).

I am sure you appreciate the need for the questions raised by Attorney General Saxbe's testimony to be answered as quickly and definitively as possible. These questions demonstrate once again the need for close cooperation between the Department of Justice and the Congress.

Many of the questions posed in this letter were originally raised in my letter of October 10, 1973, to Attorney General Richardson. The Subcommittee requested additional information on April 16, 1974, and at the hearing on May 23, 1974. Attorney General Saxbe indicated a willingness at the hearing to provide this information in the near future, but none of this information has been provided. I am enclosing copies of the October 10, 1973, and April 16, 1974 correspondence for your convenience, and would appreciate your letting me know by when the information requested in these letters and at the hearing will be made available.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Edward M. Kennedy

Edward M. Kennedy
Chairman
Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure

We look forward to hearing from you and to making the necessary arrangements for your appearance.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.
EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Surveillance.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
Washington, D.C., April 16, 1974.

Hon. JOHN DAVITT,
Chief, Internal Security Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. DAVITT: I appreciate your meeting with me to discuss the nature of the requests by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure for materials relating to warrantless electronic surveillances. The purpose of this letter, as you requested, is to memorialize the Subcommittee's specific requests.

The materials requested are listed in the attached memorandum. Of course, these requests are not intended to be exclusive or exhaustive, and are in addition to any other requests that may be made by the Subcommittee.

I appreciate your cooperation in seeking to ensure that these requests be met promptly. If all the materials requested are not readily available, I would appreciate the Department's providing the materials in increments as they are assembled.

I will look forward to working with you on these and related matters. With best regards.

Sincerely,

KENNETH M. KAUFMAN,
Assistant Counsel.

MATERIALS ON WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE REQUESTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

1. For a representative group of electronic surveillances, please provide the materials listed under either "A" or "B" below. By "representative" is meant a group that is representative with respect to (a) the statutory categories of Section 2511(3), Title 18, United States Code, used by the Attorney General in authorizing the surveillances; (b) the types of targets of the surveillances; (c) the type of surveillance, e.g., telephone, microphone or other; and (d) the date of authorization of the surveillances, both before and after the Supreme Court decision in *United States v. United States District Court*, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

A. Copies of documents containing: (1) requests for authorization of electronic surveillances from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General; (2) authorizations signed by the Attorney General; (3) requests for reauthorization of existing electronic surveillances from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General; (4) reauthorizations signed by the Attorney General; and (5) communications between the FBI or the Department of Justice and a telephone company regarding the installation, maintenance, or discontinuance of electronic surveillances. These documents would be for actual, as opposed to hypothetical, surveillances, but not *necessarily* surveillances which are currently active. Names and other data which identify targets of the surveillances could be excised. The documents would be given to the Subcommittee staff on a confidential basis, and appropriate measures would be taken to ensure that they remain confidential. They could be shown to appropriate staff of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Surveillance under the same condition of confidentiality.

B. Copies of the same materials referred to in "A" above except that the documents would represent hypothetical, rather than actual, electronic surveillances. The materials would, however, accurately reflect documents for actual surveillances. The materials would be supplied to Subcommittee staff on a nonconfidential basis, since they would represent hypothetical and not real surveillances. In addition, the Subcommittee staff would be shown copies of some documents for actual surveillances (from which names and identifying data could be removed) in order to compare them with the hypotheticals.

2. Copies of actual or hypothetical documents reflecting each step in the process of review within the FBI of a request to initiate a warrantless electronic surveillance. At the meeting of February 27th, Director Kelley referred to at least a ten-step process within the FBI for reviewing a request for a wiretap. Director Kelley indicated that there are communications to and from the agent in the field, the agent's supervisor, the Assistant Agent in Charge, the Agent in Charge, the supervisor in the appropriate division of the FBI, the Unit Chief, the Section Chief, the Branch Chief, the Assistant Director, the Assistant to the Director, and the Director. To the extent that there may be differences in the review procedure for "bugs" as opposed to wiretaps, please provide documents reflecting these differences.

3. Copies of any FBI or Department of Justice rules, regulations, documents procedures, manuals or portions of manuals relating in any way to the initiation, installation, conduct, maintenance, supervision, approval, authorization, reauthorization, financing, or discontinuance of warrantless wiretaps or other electronic surveillances.

4. Copies of any documents, rules, regulations, procedures, manuals or portions of manuals relating to record-keeping procedures and indexes in the FBI or the Department of Justice with respect to warrantless electronic surveillances.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
Washington, D.C., April 17, 1974.

Hon. WILLIAM B. SAXBE,
Office of the Attorney General,
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I am writing with reference to my letter to the Attorney General of October 10, 1973, seeking certain information about warrantless electronic surveillance. A copy of this letter is enclosed for your convenience. The information requested would expand and update information supplied to the Subcommittee over the past several years. After six months, none of the information has yet been provided.

In your letter of February 5th, you indicated that every effort was being made to obtain the information I requested as expeditiously as possible. At a meeting with Subcommittee staff last month following our meeting of February 27th, however, the Department stated that it would be willing to provide only an update of the information provided in 1971 and 1972, and to furnish this information only to me personally on a confidential basis. This proposal would not meet the Subcommittee's requirements. The Subcommittee requires all the information requested, not just an update of that supplied two years ago. The information provided on a nonclassified basis in previous years should be provided on the same basis at this time. To the extent that any information is supplied on a confidential basis, Subcommittee members and staff must have access to it.

I am sure you realize that the Subcommittee's need for this information is pressing. As you are aware, we have been conducting hearings on warrantless electronic surveillance with the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Surveillance. In order to effectively exercise our oversight and legislative responsibilities in this area, we need the base of information requested in the letter.

I am writing to request that the bulk of the information requested be provided to the Subcommittee no later than April 29 in order to enable the Subcommittee to analyze the data prior to our next series of hearings beginning May 7th. Please contact Kenneth Kaufman, Assistant Counsel, if you have any questions regarding this request.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation in this matter. With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.

JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS., CHAIRMAN
CCLELLAN, ARK. ROMAN L. HRUSKA, NEBR.
VIN, JR., N.C. HIRAM L. FONG, HAWAII
HART, MICH. HUGH SCOTT, PA.
M. KENNEDY, MASS. STROM THURMOND, S.C.
YH, IND. MARLOW W. COOK, KY.
N. BURDICK, N. DAK. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
BYRD, W. VA. EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.
UNNEY, CALIF.

JOHN H. HOLLOMAN III
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS., CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. STROM THURMOND, S.C.
BIRCH BAYH, IND. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, N. DAK. EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.
JOHN V. TUNNEY, CALIF.

JAMES F. FLUG, CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(PURSUANT TO SEC 3, S. RES. 55, 93D CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

3

#MOR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

October 10, 1973

The Honorable Elliot L. Richardson
Office of the Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As you know, the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure has played an active role in the area of electronic surveillance over the past several years, including its role in the development and processing of the legislation which eventually became Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and its hearings on warrantless wiretapping last year.

On February 5, 1971, I wrote Attorney General John Mitchell seeking certain information about electronic surveillance installations without court orders. The Department was good enough to provide me with most of the information I sought. The information extended by the Department was extremely useful in enlightening both the Committee and the public about the extent and signficance of such surveillance.

The information sought and supplied dealt only with the period June 19, 1968 through calendar year 1970. Since then, of course, the United States Supreme Court has held that domestic security surveillance without a court order is unconstitutional, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Shortly after the Supreme Court decision, our Subcommittee held hearings on warrantless wiretapping, during which a detailed inquiry was made into the Justice Department's practices and procedures in implementing the decision. At the hearings, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Maroney testified that in response to the Supreme Court ruling, a certain number of installations "in cases involving domestic security," to use the description in Mr. Kleindienst's statement of June 19, 1972, were terminated. In a letter dated August 2, 1972, Mr. Maroney indicated the numbers of surveillances in place on

June 29, 1972 in each of the five statutory categories contained in Section 2511(3) of Title 18, United States Code. Also, on May 14, 1973, Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation William D. Ruckleshaus disclosed information concerning some 17 wiretaps that had been placed on the telephones of newsmen and government officials.

In order to keep this Subcommittee and the public fully informed about this extremely significant aspect of your practices and procedures, would you kindly provide the following information as soon as possible, sending us immediately those items of information which are readily available, and the remainder when obtained. As I indicated in my February 5, 1971 letter, I recognize that some of the statistics will be based on documents which are classified, but, as earlier, the requests have been framed so as to admit of answers which should be able to be unclassified. As previously indicated, if you nevertheless see a need to classify any particular answer, please provide it separately, and it will be handled on a classified basis.

As used in the following questions, the term "electronic surveillance" includes interceptions of both wire and oral communications. The questions refer only to warrantless electronic surveillances.

A. For each of the periods calendar year 1971, calendar year 1972, and January 1, 1973 to September 30, 1973, please provide:

1. The number of electronic surveillance installations placed in operation or continuing in operation at any time during the period, in terms of the number of "premises of organizations or individuals without regard to the number of instruments which may be involved in effectuating the surveillances," to use the description in Mr. Maroney's letter of August 2, 1972. I assume that this is the same method of computation used by Mr. Mardian in his letter of March 1, 1971; if it is not, please indicate the method of computation used by him and provide comparable figures for the time periods specified.

2. Of these, please provide:

a. The number of electronic surveillance installations newly placed in operation during the period;

b. The number of electronic surveillance installations continuing in operation at any time during the period but placed in operation during a prior period.

3. The number of each type of installation, i.e., telephone surveillances, microphone surveillances, combination surveillances, or other.

4. The number of surveillances installed during each period which continued for each of the following time categories: under one week, one week to one month, one month to six months, over six months.

5. The numbers of electronic surveillances in which:

a. One electronic surveillance device was installed;
b. Two electronic surveillance devices were installed;
c. Three to five electronic surveillance devices were installed;
d. Six to ten electronic surveillance devices were installed;
e. More than ten electronic surveillance devices were installed.

6. The total maximum number of surveillances in operation at any one time during each period, as referred to in Mr. Mardian's letter of March 1, 1971.

7. The number of electronic surveillances installed, conducted, maintained or monitored by any person or organization, or by any unit or employee of any state or local government, that were directed, supervised, made at the request of, made with the knowledge of, or connected in any way with any agency or other unit of the United States government.

8. The number of wiretaps or other electronic surveillances conducted in a foreign country in which the object or target of the surveillance was a United States citizen and which were directed, conducted, supervised, made at the request of, made with the knowledge of, or connected in any way with any agency or other unit of the United States government.

B. For each of the periods calendar year 1971, January 1, 1972 to June 19, 1972, June 20, 1972 to December 31, 1972, and January 1, 1973 to September 30, 1973, please provide:

9. a. The number of electronic surveillances that were installed in cases involving domestic security, as defined in United States v. United States District Court and as referred to in Mr. Kleindienst's statement of June 19, 1972.

b. The number of electronic surveillances that were installed with respect to activities of a foreign power or foreign agents as described in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 322.

c. The number of electronic surveillances that were installed on domestic organizations and individuals with a "significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies," as delineated in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 309 n.8, and discussed in the testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maroney before this Subcommittee. The above 3 categories are intended to be mutually exclusive.

10. a. The particular United States government departments, agencies, bureaus, divisions and other United States government entities that engaged in electronic surveillance of domestic organizations and individuals, as described in Question 9a above.

b. The particular United States government departments, agencies, bureaus, divisions and other United States government entities that engaged in electronic surveillance within the continental United States on a foreign power or foreign agents as described in Question 9b above.

c. The particular United States government departments, agencies, bureaus, divisions and other United States government entities that engaged in electronic surveillance of domestic organizations and individuals with significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies, as described in Question 9c above.

With respect to each such department, agency, bureau, division, or other government entity, please provide the numbers of electronic surveillances installed or in operation during each time period.

11. a. Please indicate whether the figures provided in Mr. Mardian's letter of March 1, 1971 included the wiretaps of 17 newsmen and government officials disclosed by Acting FBI Director Ruckleshaus on May 14, 1973.

b. For each period, please indicate the total number of other electronic surveillances conducted, directed, supervised, made at the request of, made with the knowledge of, or connected in any way with the FBI or the Department of Justice that were not included in the figures provided in Mr. Mardian's letter of March 1, 1971.

C. 12. On June 5, 1973, the White House released figures on the number of national security wiretaps installed since 1945, reported at page H 4343 of the Congressional Record. These figures seem inconsistent with those supplied to me by the Department on March 1, 1971. In addition, the figures are unclear in certain key respects. I would therefore appreciate your supplying the following information with respect to the figures released by the White House:

a. Do the years indicated refer to fiscal or to calendar years?

b. Do the totals include interceptions other than by telephone wiretaps--e.g., microphone surveillances, etc.?

c. Do the figures refer to the sum of all interceptions in operation during the year, or only to those in operation as of a certain date--e.g., December 31st?

d. Do the figures refer to the number of premises at which interceptions were made, the number of persons who were the primary targets of such interceptions, the number of listening devices installed, or some other number?

e. For each of the years involved, do the figures refer to wiretapping by all governmental agencies or only by the Federal Bureau of Investigation? If the reference is to agencies other than the F.B.I., please indicate which agencies. How many of the interceptions referred to related to organized crime investigations?

f. If the answers to the above questions do not explain the inconsistencies between the figures released by the White House and those supplied to me, please indicate any other explanation that may account for the differences.

13. a. Please provide the number, names, and the present status of all criminal prosecutions in which electronic surveillance was used in any way in cases involving domestic security, as described in Question 9a above.

b. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maroney testified before this Subcommittee that in "practically all cases" in which a criminal defendant was overheard without a warrant, the government disclosed the surveillance to the trial court. Please indicate the number, names, and the present status of any cases in which an electronic surveillance of a criminal defendant was made but in which such a disclosure was not made to the trial court. Please also specify the nature of any standards and procedures adopted by the Department to ascertain and review such cases.

14. With respect to all electronic surveillances newly installed between January 1, 1973, and September 30, 1973, please indicate the number of surveillances authorized under each of the five statutory categories contained in Section 2511(3) of Title 18, United States Code. Please also provide the same information with respect to all electronic surveillances in place on September 30, 1973, regardless of when they were installed.

15. a. Please set forth the standards and procedures that the Department has adopted with respect to assuring compliance with the Supreme Court decision in United States v. United States District Court. Please also indicate the nature and timing of any changes in the Department's practices and procedures in this respect.

b. Please indicate the nature of any standards or procedures adopted by any other department, agency, bureau, division, or any other entity of the United States government to assure compliance with the Supreme Court decision.

I realize that I am requesting a substantial amount of information, but as you can well understand, this is a matter of great current public significance. It is not only important that the Congress be kept fully informed, but also that the public be reassured that the Attorney General has full knowledge and control over the mechanisms of our government that directly affect the constitutional rights of our citizens. Accordingly, I am transmitting this letter in the spirit of cooperation between the Department and the Congress stressed by Deputy Attorney General Ruckleshaus at his confirmation hearings before the Judiciary Committee.

I very much appreciated the promptness of the Department's response to my initial inquiry two years ago. I assume that much of the information requested in this letter is readily available. Insofar as some of the information may not be immediately available, a prompt response with respect to such information as is readily available would be appreciated, with the remaining information provided at a later date.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Edward M. Kennedy
Chairman
Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

30 April 1975

Ad Hoc Coif
75-466

NOTE FOR: Mr. William Cregar
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Senstudy - '75

This correspondence has been sent to Senator Church.

John
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachments:
Two letters dated 29 Apr 75
from Mr. Colby to Sen. Church

REC- 106 62-116395-107

13 MAY 7 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/STG

File
62-116395
5.8

3 ENCLOSURE

INFORMATION

84 MAY 7 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

29 APR 1975

The Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

I have your request of 24 April for additional material, and we are working to make it available to your staff as soon as possible. I believe we will be able to meet your ten-day time requirement with the exception of the materials outlined in paragraphs 4 and 8. While the Agency's responses to paragraph 3 should satisfy part of your request in paragraph 4, a full response will require a file search and review, which cannot be accomplished in ten days. We do not have separated the responses to Director Schlesinger's letter of 9 May 1973 as between "senior operating officials" and "all employees or ex-employees" responses. We can of course provide you what we have as a start.

The answers to most of the nine parts of paragraph 8 will involve a careful file search and a careful review for sensitive sources and methods information. We will do our best, but a full answer to paragraph 8 will require more than ten days.

We have for other parts of your request summarized material which we will provide so that your staff can discuss with us the best way of proceeding against the more voluminous backup data. For example, in one instance the backup to the summary involves as many as 20,000 index cards. In another, the basic data involves a roomful of miniaturized data. We need to be certain as to the precise concern of the Committee in these matters in order to respond with the least disruption to the work of the Agency and to help the staff to understand whether they have asked the right question.

The materials requested in paragraphs 5 and 10(a) are in the Watergate reports. I would hope your staffs could acquire this data from the published versions of those reports.

#MOR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-107

As the inquiry progresses from a documentation phase to interview phases, it will become even more important to adhere to the general agreement we have with your staff to have preliminary consultations and discussions prior to a formal request by the Committee. In this way we can promote a better understanding of the work involved and establish reasonable time frames as well.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bill

W. E. Colby

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

29 APR 1975

The Honorable Frank Church
Chairman
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

I believe it would be useful if I placed on the record the situation with respect to your 12 March request. I regret that you considered it necessary to issue public criticism of CIA's efforts to meet your needs. As of this writing, the major portion of that request for CIA-originated material has been met and, I believe, in a responsive manner.

At our meeting of 22 April, we agreed that if your investigators could review materials at the CIA Headquarters, it would expedite the inquiry and lessen the amount of material which otherwise would have to be paraphrased, a process which takes a substantial amount of time. Special office space and access badges have been provided for this purpose. I agreed that, should specific documents or parts thereof be requested to be sent to the Senate Select Committee offices, the Agency would prepare these as expeditiously as possible without sacrifice to the security considerations consistent with our earlier understanding of the need to protect sources and methods from undue risk of exposure. I also gave you my assurance that we would assist in the clearance of multi-agency papers involving CIA, some of which are on your earlier request.

A speed-up in the Agency's paraphrasing process is being undertaken, although as you can appreciate, this involves senior personnel with heavy demands for substantive work, and

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-13-01 BY SP2 ALM 1776

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-107

the volume of the material you have requested is considerable. At our meeting, I showed you a list of the materials that have already been provided, and Mr. Miller has been kept advised about the status of other materials.

In discussing some of the concerns of people in the Intelligence Community about the procedures addressed above, you agreed to raise with the Committee the question of ultimate disposition of materials provided. I understand that this is in train. In this connection, I was very much appreciative of your reassurance that you and the Committee members will consult with me prior to the release of any classified materials in public statements or unclassified reports of the Committee. Such consultation is consistent with the spirit of the inquiry.

I believe our staffs are working well together. There have been the usual inherent problems that one can expect in an investigation of this scope. Because the Select Committee staff personnel engaged in the inquiry are relatively new to the field of intelligence and to the seriousness of the inquiry, expectations are ambitious. But there is something to be said for both sides of the equation. For example, we await the convenience of your investigators on selective follow-up matters on which they had requested further data. Meanwhile, we have urged and are providing the staff with detailed briefings by way of introduction to the Agency's history and functions. I am personally convinced that direct discussions about our work and about specific instances of interest to the staff investigators will be far more direct and productive to them (saving us much useless work) than engaging in debates about massive document transfer requests.

To that end, I am very anxious to renew and by this letter I would repeat my request to you that the Committee move personally and directly into the inquiry at an early date. I am delighted that you and the Committee are coming to visit our headquarters for a discussion of the Intelligence Community and the Agency and for an exchange on the precise interests which particular Committee members have concerning the inquiry. We need to understand the specific objectives the Committee seeks and relate these to the priorities of the materials you will need. I believe we can be helpful if we know these. Again, I am convinced that the constructive long-term contributions that we both envisage from the Select Committee's work will derive in a far more concrete fashion by focusing on specific and major questions about intelligence rather than consuming an inordinate amount of time reviewing the details of all of our past history. In that way our main energies and our judgment can be addressed to what kind of intelligence we want in our free society of the future, rather than what we may have had in the past.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bill

W. E. Colby

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry
75-2019

Ad Hoc Staff
75-416

April 24, 1975

#MOR 16
[illegible]
1-19-01 SP-2 ALM/TTG

Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Director Colby:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, I enclose a specification, furnished to John Clarke yesterday, which calls for certain material referred to in your December 24, 1974 report to the President and provides further detail concerning certain CIA material heretofore requested. Obviously it is not intended to limit what we have already requested.

It is the Committee's expectation that all this material should be produced in ten days.

I was heartened by the spirit of cooperation demonstrated in your personal reassurances in our meeting on April 22, 1975, and I understand that substantial material was made available to us today at the CIA. However, the fact remains that too much material called for in our document request remains outstanding and the system apparently being employed to clear material for us builds in excessive delays. A necessary prerequisite to our inquiry proceeding expeditiously--as it should to restore public confidence in our intelligence agencies and develop a new national consensus on the proper functions of intelligence activity--is to eliminate these delays.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

Enclosure

62-116395-107

[redacted]

SECRET

MATERIAL TO BE SUPPLIED TO
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BY THE CIA

Specification of CIA Material Relating To Director Colby's December 22, 1974 Report and Director Colby's January 15, 1975 Senate Testimony

The Committee's original request to the CIA should have been interpreted to cover all of the following in that the Committee requested all material underlying Director Colby's January 15, 1975 testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee. In any event, Director Colby's report of December 24, 1974, makes clear that all the following material is central to the Committee's mandate. The CIA is requested forthwith to supply the following, as well as the material which they have already collected in response to the Committee's March 12 request.

1. All of the instructions on "Questionable Activities" which were issued by Director Colby in 1973, or thereafter, except for the "selected group of attachments" which were included in the Colby Report and thus already furnished to the Committee.

2. All files relating to the following "questionable activities" which were mentioned in the attachments to the Colby Report:

(a) Project MHBOUND II (and any other project relating to "Penetration of Another Government Agency").

(b) "Reporting on Dissident Groups".

(c) Projects Mockingbird, Celotex I and Celotex II (and

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/ST6

#MDR16

any other projects relating to "surveillance, telephone tap, surreptitious entry or other action" taken on behalf of the Agency against U.S. citizens in the United States).

(d) Project Merrimac (or any other project relating to the "penetration" of domestic groups).

(e) Postal Service: (the files relating to "penetration of the mail", mail opening or mail cover).

3. All reports made by CIA's "senior operating officials" in response to Director Schlesinger's letter of May 9, 1973, asking for reports on activities which "might be construed to be outside the (CIA's) legislative charter".

4. All employee or ex-employee responses to the same letter as well as responses to the "standing order" referenced in the letter and calling for such material in the future.

5. All files relating to CIA's participation in the "so-called Huston Plan" (referenced on page 2 of Director Colby's Report).

6. Annex A of the Colby Report (re "Coverage of Subversive Student").

(a) Any memoranda by Richard Ober on the establishment of:

(1) Systems for coordination of activities

(2) Dissemination of material

(3) Regular reporting on activities

(b) The interim report suggested by paragraph 3 of Mr. Karamessines' memo.

7. Annex C.

(a) Any materials prepared for the review by the Director, noted in paragraph 1, of Agency efforts to monitor international activities of "radicals and black militants".

(b) An index of all projects developed by the Special Operations Group or by Agency Divisions in support of this program.

(c) A list of all agencies which had data links with the Special Operations Group as described in paragraph 5 of the memo.

8. Annex D. (Special Operations Group--Possible Foreign Links with American Dissidents)

(a) A list of all "organizations of interest" to the Special Operations Group, including but not limited to those mentioned in the memo from Mr. Ober.

(b) A list of all topic headings or subjects used for filing by the Special Operations Group.

(c) A list of all individuals or groups either "special targets" of the Special Operations Group or of "special concern" to the Special Operations Group, and a list of all program targets, all operational projects and all individual Agent projects.

(d) The materials which constitutes or underlies the "standing requirements" for information from the Special Operations Group by the FBI, Secret Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(e) Any documents consisting of or relating to FBI comments on the "adequacy and relevancy" of Special Operations Group information.

(f) Any reports "over the signature of the Director of CIA" based on Special Operations Group information disseminated to either the White House, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the FBI.

(g) Any reports, special studies, or estimates requested and prepared by the Special Operations Group for the President, his Counsel, or the Attorney General and for the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.

(h) A description of the audio program of the Special Operations Group.

(i) The "formal Table of Organization" of the Special Operations Group.

9. Annex E

The complete "Allegations and Answers" series.

10. Annex F

(a) The reports from the CIA on Agency activities "with respect to Mr. Howard Hunt and other parties" which were made available to "the appropriate law enforcement bodies".

(b) Any "information" assembled by the Inspector General or made by him in regard to "CIA activity in connection with Watergate and associated matters".

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/29/01 BY SP2-ALM/ #MOE16

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Organization of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with an enclosure, FBI Functional Organization Chart

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Letterhead memorandum serves as a cover communication to the FBI Organization Chart which was prepared 1/14/75; and advises of certain changes in personnel since 1/14/75. Chart identifies all FBI officials from Director down through all Assistant Directors and their respective areas of responsibilities; identifies all Sections in all Divisions with indication of type of matters handled in Section; and includes a list of all 59 FBI field offices.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI REC-106 62-116395-106 Encl

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/9/75 16 MAY 7 1975

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-69

11. NONE.

SFP:ekw (4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips
April 30, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 [illegible]

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) TO INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with enclosures described below

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

(a) Untitled memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, 9/14/67, dealing with FBI authority for investigations relating to riot situations.

(b) Two untitled memoranda dated 8/24 and 25/36 from FBI Director Hoover recording instructions received from President Franklin D. Roosevelt concerning FBI authority for investigations of subversive activities, particularly relating to communism and fascism.

(c) Untitled memorandum from FBI Director Hoover to Assistant to the Director E. A. Tamm, 9/10/36, concerning FBI authority for investigations of subversive activities, particularly communism and fascism, and the FBI function for the coordination of such investigations with Army and Navy Intelligence and State Department.

62-116395-105

REC-106

MAY 7 1975

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

SFP:ekw CKW
(4)

Original delivered To SSC, 5/1/75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 MAY 7 1975

(d) Presidential directives dated 9/6/39 and 1/8/43 (President Roosevelt); 7/24/50 (President Truman); and 12/15/53 (President Eisenhower). The first of the Roosevelt directives designated the FBI as coordinator of all law enforcement in the U. S. regarding espionage, sabotage and neutrality matters; the second Roosevelt directive reiterated the first. The Truman directive was a reiteration of the prior Roosevelt directives. The Eisenhower directive expanded upon the previous directives to include Atomic Energy Act violations.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/4/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-47

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

Some of the documents discuss role of the FBI as the coordinating agency in connection with the activities of other intelligence community agencies: Army and Navy Intelligence, and State. Also, in the Presidential directive of 12/15/53, there is stated the FBI responsibility for investigating all violations of the Atomic Energy Act.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

May 1, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) ~~to~~ INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) with enclosure described below, including exhibits to enclosure, some of which are classified "Confidential."

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

REC-106 62-116395-104

Under cover of an LHM, there was forwarded to the SSC an FBI "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated 2/13/75. The purpose of the paper is to set forth an analysis of the investigative authority granted by Presidential Directives, the National Security Council, and orders of the Attorney General, as well as to list statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation. The LHM noted that certain exhibits to the paper were extracted because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements and that approvals were being sought for clearances to subsequently furnish the excluded exhibits.

MAY 7 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/ORR
#mDR16

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

Delivered 5/5/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/10/75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ____
Inspection ___
Intell. ____
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ____
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)

62-116395

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

84 MAY 7 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-545

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-78

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

This study encompasses Agreements and Presidential Directives as well as Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Interagency Committee on Internal Security documents issued as supportive evidence in delineating the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 05 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Mr. Phillips 4063

NR001 NH CODE

11:29AM URGENT MAY 5,1975 VEM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: NEW HAVEN

SENSTUDY 75

REUTEL MAY 2,1975.

FORMER SA HOBSON H. ADCOCK WAS CONTACTED THIS DATE BY THE SAC. ADCOCK WAS FURNISHED INFORMATION AS SPECIFIED IN RETEL. ADCOCK ADVISED THAT HE HAD NOT AS YET BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF CAPTIONED GROUP.

END

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

5,8

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/9/01 BY SP2ALM/JTS #MOR16

File 62-116395

REC-106 62-116395-103

16 MAY 7 1975

Records cc 67-447115 (Adcock)

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

84 MAY 8 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

May 1, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) to INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Jurisdictional Agreements

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with enclosures described below.

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified except for one enclosure dated 2/7/66 classified "Secret."

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Enclosures are copies of various documents constituting jurisdictional agreements between the FBI and other Federal agencies or guidelines prepared by the Attorney General with reference to investigative responsibilities between the FBI and other Federal agencies in the security field generally. The specific documents are as follows:

(a) Delimitations of Investigative Duties of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force, dated 2/23/49, with certain supplemental agreements.

REC-106 62-116395-108

(b) Agreement between the FBI and CIA dated 2/7/66; classified "Secret."

(c) Agreement between the FBI and Secret Service effective 7/30/73.

Delivered 5/5/75

SFP:ekw
(4)
62-116395

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

(d) Investigative guidelines with reference to Title 11, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation of Explosives, prepared by the Attorney General, submitted by letter to the FBI 1/11/73.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/8/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY. FBI file 62-116395-65

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

These agreements and guidelines have direct bearing on the scope of responsibility of other intelligence community members and are in the nature of controls for both the FBI and other community members where common interests and responsibilities are present.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

May 1, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ACM/SFG
#m0re16

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Organization of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

LHM refers to a request for the titles and number of FBI field Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total Agent manhours devoted to such matters. LHM advises that a current survey of all FBI field offices had been made to obtain the desired data but that since the information is considered highly sensitive, it was not being furnished directly to the SSC, but being maintained in the Intelligence Division at FBIHQ available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff upon request.

REC-106 62-116395-101

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/21/75

16 MAY 7 1975

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395~~-82~~

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Teleph[illegible] Rm. ____
Dire[illegible] ____

62-116395
SFP:ekw (4) ekw

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

101 THRU 150.

104 THRU 105

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88296 Date: 2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO :MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 24, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM :MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

HOT

This memorandum reports the receipt of a legal memorandum prepared by Mr. Edmund Cohen, Office of the General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, entitled "Authority of Congress to Release Classified Data." Copies of this legal memorandum have been furnished to Mr. Anthonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, and Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Memorandum Cregar to W. R. Wannall dated 4/14/75 discussed an article contained in the 4/10/75 edition of "The Washington Post" wherein Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, stated he reserved the right to make public any documents the Committee received. This memorandum also noted that Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, advised that The White House was preparing a letter to Senator Church recognizing that Congress can, at its discretion, declassify material it receives, but strongly urging that such declassification action not be taken unilaterally by the Senate Select Committee without approval of the agency originating the information.

As an aid to the preparation of such a letter, the Office of CIA's General Counsel has prepared a paper entitled "Authority of Congress to Release Classified Data." Copy attached. It was made available to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Committee for information and any comments recipients desired to make.

ACTION: For information.

REC-100

62-116395-150

Enclosure

62-116395

WOC:ekw (6)

1 - [redacted]

#M0216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/

14 MAY 15 1975

The CIA memo does not solve the problem, therefore it requires no further analysis.

84 MAY 27 1975

DIRECTOR OF [illegible]ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Ad Hoc Staff
75-350

17 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB
Ad Hoc Coordinating
Group

This is being furnished you at Dr. Clarke's request.

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/dfb

62-116395-150

ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Antonin S[illegible]lia, Esq.
Assistant [illegible]ttorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

Attached is a hurriedly done legal memorandum entitled "Authority of Congress to Release Classified Data." I would welcome your comments on this so that a finished document could be made available to the various agencies concerned.

John

John S. Warner
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency

12 April 1975
(DATE)

NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)
G 54

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2ALM/ATG

MEMORANDUM FOR: James A, Wilderotter, Esq.
Associate Counsel to the
President

Attached is a hurriedly done legal memorandum entitled "Authority of Congress to Release Classified Data." I would welcome your comments on this so that a finished document could be made available to the various agencies concerned.

John

John S. Warner
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency

12 April 1975
(DATE)

NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)
54

11 March 1975

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-19-01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Authority of Congress to Release Classified Data

1. I have found no express authority for Congress to publicly release information classified by the executive branch pursuant to an Executive order issued by the President. Moreover, on a number of occasions Congress has mandated that matters pertaining to national defense or foreign policy be kept secret.

--Congress has made it a crime for one lawfully having possession, access or control of documents relating to national defense or information relating to the national defense which the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation to communicate, deliver, or transmit same to any person not entitled to receive it. 18 U.S.C.A. 793(d).

--Congress has made it a crime to disclose to an unauthorized person or publish any classified information obtained by the processes of communications intelligence. 18 U.S.C.A. 798(a).

--Congress has made it a crime to photograph or sketch vital military or naval installations or equipment requiring protection against general dissemination of information. 18 U.S.C.A. 795. It is also a crime to publish or disseminate photographs, maps, or drawings of such defense installations without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer or higher authority. 18 U.S.C.A. 797.

--Congress, in order to prevent public disclosure of certain activities, has given various officials the power to keep confidential certain funds expended for national security or foreign relations purposes. Such authority is given, for example, to the President (22 U.S.C.A. 2364), to the Secretary of State (31 U.S.C.A. 107), and to the Director of Central Intelligence (50 U.S.C.A. 403j).

--Congress has provided that meetings of the Senate Committee on the Budget may be closed to the public if it is determined by a record vote of a majority of the members that the matter to be discussed

> ...will disclose matters necessary to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the confidential conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. 2 U.S.C.A. 190a-3.

--Congress, after requiring that the Secretary of State transmit forthwith to the Congress the text of any international agreement, other than a treaty, to which the United States is a party, goes on to provide that

> ...any such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President. 1 U.S.C.A. 112b.

--Finally, Congress, in enacting the Freedom of Information Act, expressly exempted from disclosure matters which are

> ...specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. 5 U.S.C.A. 552(b)(1).

2. Despite this apparent lack of authority to release classified data and the existence of the above-mentioned statutes, Congress is constitutionally immunized, at least in part, against any consequences flowing from release and disclosure of classified information. Article I, § 6 of the Constitution states in respect to Senators and Representatives that:

> ...for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

3. A long line of Supreme Court cases, beginning with Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1991), has held that the privilege or immunity relating to speech or debate should be given a broad and liberal construction. In Kilbourn the court stated:

> It would be a narrow view of the Constitutional provision to limit it to words spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting.... In short, to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it. (At p. 204.)

4. The court, moreover, has resisted arguments that an unworthy purpose should destroy the privilege. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 the court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810), stating:

> ...that it was not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has remained unquestioned. (At p. 377.)

The distance to which the court was willing to go to uphold this principle was seen in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). In that case a former Congressman was convicted for conspiracy to defraud the U.S., in part on evidence that, in pursuance of a conspiracy designed to give assistance to certain savings and loan associations which had been indicted on mail fraud charges, he was paid to give a speech on the floor of the House. The Supreme Court granted a new trial holding that a prosecution which draws in question the legislative acts of the defendant member of Congress or his motives for performing them "necessarily contravenes the Speech or Debate Clause." (At p. 185.)

5. The court addressed the issue of classified information in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), a case which arose when Senator Gravel, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works Committee, convened a night meeting of the Subcommittee and there read extensively from a copy of the Pentagon Papers which bore a Defense security classification of Top Secret - Sensitive. He then placed the entire 47 volumes of the study in the public record. Senator Gravel claimed that Article I, section 6 protected him from criminal or civil liability and from

questioning elsewhere than in the Senate, with respect to the events occurring at the Subcommittee hearing at which the Pentagon Papers were introduced into the public record. The court stated: "…/T/o us this claim is incontrovertible." (At p. 615.)

6. The court further noted that:

> The Speech or Debate Clause was designated to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch. It thus protects Members against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process. We have no doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to answer--either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution--for the events that occurred at the subcommittee meeting. (At p. 616.)

7. From the above, together with the positive phrasing of Article 1, § 6 of the Constitution, it would appear that any Member may make any statement he desires on the floor of the Congress or in one of its committees. Such statement shall be absolutely privileged, notwithstanding that it was based on information secured from classified Central Intelligence Agency material either furnished the Member in confidence or containing any restrictive notice as to use or dissemination. This privilege would operate if the Member were to read the information verbatim into the record on the floor or into the record of hearings before a congressional committee. It would still be privileged when it appeared, verbatim, in the Congressional Record or in the published hearings of a congressional committee. The only sanction, apart from the individual conscience and sense of responsibility of the Member, would have to come from Congress itself, which has the power to discipline any Representative or Senator who improperly disclosed classified information.

8. One additional wrinkle might be noted. Although Congressmen would be immune from liability for introducing classified information into a committee report and immune from liability for ordering it printed and disseminated to the public at large, the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents may not be immune from suit for printing and disseminating such reports to the public. The court examined this question in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306(1973), a case in which petitioners claimed that a report issued by the House Committee on the District of Columbia, containing

documents relating to disciplinary problems of certain specifically named students, violated statutory, constitutional and common-law rights to privacy. The Supreme Court refused to determine whether dissemination to the public would serve the important legislative function of informing the public concerning matters pending before Congress for the purpose of holding Members of Congress liable. However, it remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, in part to undertake just such a review in order to determine whether the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents, who were without blanket immunity, could be held liable.

9. The discussion thus far has dealt only with congressional immunity for releasing classified information in Congress. No such immunity exists in the case of disclosures made by congressmen outside of Congress. Thus, in Long v. Ansel, 69 F.2d 386 (Ct. App., D.C. 1934), affd. 293 U.S. 76 (1934), and in McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (US Dist. Ct., D.C. 1960) it was held that if a Senator or Representative is alleged to have committed libel by republishing and disseminating remarks made in the Congress, such republication and dissemination is not within the Speech or Debate privilege even if such privilege would have been applicable to the original publication of the remarks. Again, in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), and in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) the court noted that the Speech or Debate Clause does not protect "a private republication of documents introduced and made public at a committee hearing, although the hearing was unquestionably part of the legislative process."

10. From the above it is apparent that a Member is not privileged to circulate CIA documents to his constituents, to the press, or by reading to a meeting or on radio or television. Such action could well make the member liable for prosecution under the espionage laws, but in any event would expose him to the same liability for these actions as any other citizen. As a practical matter, however, the prosecution of a Member for unauthorized disclosure of classified CIA material, or disciplinary action by Congress itself, is very unlikely.

EDMUND COHEN
Office of General Counsel

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: May 2, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

The April 29, 1975, Congressional Record - Senate, pages S 7054 through and including S 7056, sets forth rules and procedures for the captioned Committee. The rules cover such topics as the convening of meetings, meeting procedures, news media coverage, investigations, subpoenas, procedures related to the taking of testimony, procedures for handling classified or sensitive material, preparation for committee meetings, staff, and reporting of measures or recommendations.

The key sections of these rules are subpoenas, investigations, and procedures related to taking of testimony.

Concerning the issue of subpoenas, subpoenas may be issued by the Chairman or any other member designated by him with the consultation of the Vice Chairman.

Procedures relating to the taking of testimony provide that testimony shall be given under oath or affirmation. It also provides that a witness may be accompanied by counsel. Witnesses may also request that there be no news media coverage of their testimony. Witnesses will also be given the opportunity of furnishing a statement prior to, and/or at the conclusion of his or her testimony. With regard to inspection and correction of testimony, witnesses will be allowed a reasonable opportunity to inspect their testimony, and corrections are permissible, but must be made in writing within five days of the availability of the transcript containing their testimony. Names of witnesses cannot be made public prior to their testimony unless authorized by the Chairman.

Contempt procedures as set forth, require that after notice to all members of the Committee, and the affected person has had the opportunity to state in writing or in person why he

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Cregar
PVD:eek
(8)

REC-100 62-116395-149

ENCLOSURE

6 MAY 20 1975

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 MAY 27 1975

or she should not be held in contempt, a vote would be taken by the Committe with a majority being necessary for the referral of a contempt citation to the full Senate.

The rules concerning sensitive material limit access to such material to employees on a need-to-know basis and to only those staff members with appropriate security clearances.

Reporting procedures for the Committee provide that where the Committee is unable to reach a unanimous decision, separate views and reports may be printed by any member or members of the Committee.

A complete Xerox copy of the rules as they appear in the Record is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

Action. For Information.

JBA

PLM

K

imperceptible, while 2.5 can be felt near the point of origin and 3 can be felt over a fair-sized area. Slight damage can be caused at 4.5, a level of 5 is considered damaging, 7 is major, and 8 is a "great earthquake."

The issue, most geologists and seismic experts agree, is not whether another blockbuster quake will occur, but when. It could happen any time.

Should that earthquake occur "tomorrow," these experts believe, the following realities await Californians:

Tens of thousands of buildings built in the first half of the century, clearly hazardous under severe earthquake conditions, in use in San Francisco and Los Angeles, could topple, endangering thousands of lives (an estimated 250,000 in Los Angeles alone).

Other thousands of buildings, built on or near faults face destruction from ground shaking and land fill.

High-rise buildings, built to more modern standards, may not topple, but face serious hazards of fire, disabled elevators and inadequate stairwell safety.

Earthquake disaster urgency plans are in the nascent stages throughout the state, hampered by apathy among public officials, lack of funds and infrequent exercises.

The public is ill-prepared to cope with earthquakes or their aftermaths. There is virtually no publicity about what to do during or after a major quake. Earthquake drills are rarely, if ever, held in communities or in public buildings (schools are an exception).

A recent federally sponsored study gives these estimates of death and injury should a temblor of more than 7 or 8 on the Richter scale occur in or near San Francisco or Los Angeles:

San Francisco—as many as 10,000 persons dead and 40,000 injured. (Should a major dam break, the death toll could rise to 60,000.) Another 56,000 could be left homeless (not including dam evacuees).

Los Angeles—as many as 20,000 deaths and up to 600,000 injured. Additional deaths possible due to major dam failure—up to 14,000. Homeless (not including dam evacuees), up to 180,000.

At the very best, Californians are fatalistic about earthquakes, accepting that they will come, and hoping they will be out of the affected area when it happens.

"You don't know when it is going to be or how it's going to be," said one West Los Angeles resident. "I should put money into making my house earthquake-proof when I could be in some skyscraper swaying when it happens? Who cares?"

In San Francisco, a college professor recently asked 125 residents in a random sampling what they would do if an earthquake comes. Sixty per cent said, in effect, "Start praying. What else is there to do?"

What can be done? In fact, quite a lot—and some of it is being accomplished in the areas of building code upgrading, land-use planning, emergency preparedness, earthquake prediction, and public education. But the effort of a few aggressive legislators, state and local officials, and private citizens is frustrated by the low level of priority generally assigned to earthquake protection.

The "kill ratio" of past California earthquakes is extremely low compared to, say, traffic accidents. About 900 persons have died as the results of quakes since the turn of the century compared to an average annual highway toll of 4,800. Thus there are those who argue against expenditures of time and effort on something as mercurial and unpredictable as an earthquake.

California's new governor, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., is said to be one of those. According to a recent news story, Brown suggested that money being allocated for safe buildings might be used to improve the quality of education, to rehabilitate housing for the poor, or to create construction jobs.

After the San Frenando quake, there was a flurry of studies, hearings, plans and legislation.

In Los Angeles, the building code requirements were toughened. Explained Bob Williams, general manager of Los Angeles' Department of Building and Safety: "We doubled the loading strength requirements and required standards twice as strong in reinforced concrete and reinforced masonry."

Los Angeles' building code is in some respect tougher than the Uniform Building Code to which most jurisdictions in the state adhere. One official, Long Beach building director Edward M. O'Connor, a leading proponent of better preparedness, contends that the Uniform Building Code falls short.

"It does not fulfill the purpose of the code: to preserve life, limb, property and the public welfare in the event of an earthquake," he said.

Changes in the uniform code come slowly. They are modeled after recommendations by the California Structural Engineers Association, composed of professional engineers who help design buildings.

The recommendations usually represent a balance of conservative and liberal strains within the association, and, according to some observers, are strongly influenced by economic considerations.

The drafters of the uniform code are still wrestling with one of the central lessons of the San Fernando earthquake—the fact that major buildings are being constructed with little knowledge or consideration of soil and geological conditions and how they might respond to ground shocks.

Geologists and seismic experts admit they know very little about what causes earthquakes or precisely how buildings are affected by local or even distant shocks. Now, for the first time, California is placing instruments that measure motion in key buildings around the state. But they must await another earthquake to produce usable data.

In the meantime, seismic considerations are working their way slowly—some say too slowly—into building requirements.

New laws ban construction directly over active faults, require satisfactory geologic studies before new hospitals are built, require that a "seismic safety element" be included in local planning, and require the correction of unsafe dam conditions.

This legislation added up to the most progressive package of earthquake measures in 40 years, but it was not accomplished without resistance. The restriction on building on or near faults, for example, inspired a storm of protest from real estate developers and individual lot owners that eventually forced a modification softening the restriction.

A hospital law passed in 1972 requires that detailed geological and soil reports for proposed hospital construction be reviewed by state geologists.

James Flosson, director of the state Department of Mines and Geology, promptly ran into problems.

"The reports the first few months were a disgrace to the profession," Flosson said. "We insisted that they be redone, and done again until they were right. I've had my head bloodied many times as a result. I've been threatened, told my career would be ruined—a few geologists tried to get me fired. But we stood by our guns and now the quality of the reports is excellent."

Another area of controversy is highrise safety. Berkeley architect Karl V. Steinbrugge believes the modern steelframe construction will withstand intense shocks. But Henry J. Degunkolb, a San Francisco structural engineer and frequent critic of safety standards, said:

"I would not find it unreasonable to expect . . . there will be 15 to 30 total collapses with another 50 to 100 severely damaged" in San Francisco.

While there is disagreement about highrise collapse, there is a broad consensus that most existing high rises are vulnerable to extensive internal damage from unbolted equipment and, most significantly, from fire.

The dangers are serious enough to have prompted major changes recently in fire regulations for all future buildings.

All future high rises (above 75 feet) will be built with automatic governors that bring elevators instantly to ground level, and, most importantly, with sprinkler systems at every level.

All but a minuscule number of the nearly 2,000 high rises presently in Los Angeles and San Francisco lack sprinkler systems.

Requirements that they be installed were written into a state law last year, but efforts to draft regulations ran into fierce opposition from builders, the Chambers of Commerce and other businessmen.

The battle is still being fought.

San Francisco's disaster plan is advanced over those of other municipalities, but it suffers from lack of a central communications network, insufficient coordination among departments and inadequate practical exercises, according to a city planning department study.

"All it is is a paper organization," said Alfred Goldberg, head of the city's building department.

Goldberg's concerns are echoed by James Halgwood, state emergency services officer in charge of helping to create state-level disaster plan for Southern California.

Commented Halgwood: "I don't think most elected and appointed officials understand they have a real responsibility to have their jurisdictions prepared. They are only doing a barebones job."

RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, in accordance with the provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, I submit now for publication in the RECORD the rules of procedure for the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. These rules were adopted by the members of the Select Committee on April 9, 1975. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the rules were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE, ADOPTED APRIL 9, 1975

These Rules are issued pursuant to the 1st Section of Senate Resolution 21, 94th Congress, 1st Session, agreed to January 27, 1975, and printed in full in the appendix hereto.

RULE 1. CONVENING OF MEETINGS

1.1 The Committee may schedule a regular day and hour for the Committee to meet.

1.2 The Chairman shall have authority, upon proper notice, to call such additional meetings of the Committee as he may deem necessary and may delegate such authority to any other member of the Committee.

1.3 A special meeting of the Committee may be called at any time upon the written request of six or more members of the Committee filed with the Clerk of the Committee.

1.4 In the case of any meeting of the Committee, other than a regularly scheduled meeting, the Clerk of the Committee

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED HMOL16
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/JTS

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-149

shall notify every member of the Committee of the time and place of the meeting and shall give reasonable notice which, except in extraordinary circumstances, shall be at least 24 hours in advance of any meeting held in Washington, D.C. and at least 48 hours in the case of any meeting held outside Washington, D.C.

1.5 If a majority of the members of the Committee have made a request in writing to the Chairman to call a meeting of the Committee and the Chairman fails to call such a meeting within seven calendar days thereafter, including the day on which the written notice is submitted, such majority may call a meeting by filing a written notice with the Clerk of the Committee who shall promptly notify each member of the Committee in writing of the date and time of the meeting.

RULE 2. MEETING PROCEDURES

2.1 Meetings of the Committee shall be open to the public except when otherwise directed by the Chairman or majority vote of members present.

2.2 It shall be the duty of the staff director to keep or cause to be kept a record of all Committee proceedings.

2.3 The Chairman of the Committee, or if the Chairman is not present the Vice Chairman, shall preside over all meetings of the Committee. In the absence of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman at any meeting majority member is present the ranking minority member present, shall preside.

2.4 Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, decisions of the Committee shall be by majority vote of the members present and voting. A quorum for the transaction of Committee business, including the conduct of Executive sessions, shall consist of six Committee members except, that for the purpose of hearing witnesses, taking sworn testimony, and receiving evidence under oath, a quorum may consist of one Senator.

2.5 A vote by any member of the Committee with respect to any measure or matter being considered by the Committee may be cast by proxy if the proxy authorization (1) is in writing to the Chairman or Vice Chairman; (2) designates the member of the Committee who is to exercise the proxy; and (3) is limited to a specific measure or matter and any amendments pertaining thereto. Proxies shall not be considered for the establishment of a quorum.

RULE 3. BROADCASTING, TELEVISION, AND PHOTOGRAPHY

Any Committee meeting which is open to the public may, subject to Rule 6.7, be covered, in whole or in part, by television, radio, still photography or other media coverage, if the Chairman authorizes such coverage. When coverage by any such media is authorized it must be conducted in an orderly and unobtrusive manner, and the Chairman may for good cause terminate such media coverage in whole or in part, or take such other action as the circumstances may warrant.

RULE 4. INVESTIGATIONS

No investigation shall be initiated by the Committee unless a majority of the members of the Committee has specifically authorized such investigation, but any member of the Committee shall be entitled to pursue any inquiry individually unless specifically prohibited by a majority vote of the members of the Committee. Authorized investigations or inquiries may be conducted by members of the Committee and/or by designated staff members.

RULE 5. SUBPOENAS

Subpoenas for attendance of witnesses or the production of memoranda, documents, records, or any other material may be issued by the Chairman, or any other member designated by him after consultation with the Vice Chairman, and may be served by any person designated by the Chairman or member. Each subpoena shall contain a copy of Senate Resolution 21, 94th Congress, 1st Session.

RULE 6. PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE TAKING OF TESTIMONY

6.1 *Notice.*—Witnesses required to appear before the Committee shall be given reasonable notice and all witnesses shall be furnished a copy of these Rules.

6.2 *Oath or Affirmation.*—Testimony of witnesses shall be given under oath or affirmation which may be administered by any member of the Committee.

6.3 *Interrogation.*—Committee interrogation shall be conducted by members of the Committee and such staff personnel as is authorized by the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, or the presiding member.

6.4 *Counsel for the Witness.*—(a) Any witness may be accompanied by counsel. A witness who is unable to obtain counsel may inform the Committee of such fact, and if consistent with the notice given under Section 6.1 hereof, at least 24 hours prior to his appearance before the Committee, the Committee shall then endeavor to obtain voluntary counsel for the witness, but failure to obtain such counsel will not excuse the witness from appearing and testifying.

(b) Counsel shall conduct themselves in an ethical and professional manner. Failure to do so shall, upon a finding to that effect by a majority of the members present, subject such counsel to disciplinary action which may include warning, censure, removal, or a recommendation of contempt proceedings.

(c) There shall be no direct or cross examination by counsel. However, counsel may submit in writing any questions he wishes propounded to his client or to any other witness and may, at the conclusion of his client's testimony suggest the presentation of other evidence or the calling of other witnesses. The Committee may use such questions and dispose of such suggestions as it may see fit.

6.5 *Statements by Witnesses.*—A witness may make a statement, which shall be brief and relevant, at the beginning and conclusion of his testimony. Such statements shall not exceed a reasonable period of time as determined by the Chairman, or other presiding member. Any witness desiring to make a prepared or written statement for the record of the proceedings shall file a copy with the Clerk of the Committee, and in so far as practicable and consistent with the notice given, shall do so at least 72 hours in adbance of his appearance before the Committee.

6.6 *Objections and Rulings.*—Any objection raised by a witness or counsel shall be ruled upon by the Chairman or other presiding member, and such ruling srhall be the ruling of the Committee unless a majority of the Committee present overrules the ruling. In the case of tie votes the rule of the chair will prevail.

6.7 *Lights and Broadcasting.*—(a) A witness may request, on grounds of distraction, harassment, or physical discomfort, that during his testimony, television, motion picture, and other cameras and lights shall not be directed at him, such requests to be ruled on in accordance with Rule 2.4.

(b) No witness subpoenaed by the Committee shall be required against his will to be photographed at any hearing or to give evidence or testimony while the broadcasting of that hearing, by radio or television, is being conducted. At the request of any witness who does not wish to be subjected to radio, television, or still photography coverage, all lenses shall be covered and all microphones used for coverage turned off. So far as is practicable, a witness desiring to make such a request shall so inform the Chief Counsel of the Committee at least 24 hours prior to the time that witness is scheduled to testify.

Inspection and Correction.—All witnesses testifying before the Committee shall be given a reasonable opportunity to inspect, in the office of the Committee, the transcript of their testimony to determine whether such testimony wes correctly transcribed. The witness may be accompanied by counsel. Any corrections the witness desires to make in the transcript shall be submited in writing to the Committee within five days of the availability of the transcript. Corrections shall be limited to grammar and minor editing, and may not be made to change the substance of the testimony. Any questions arising with respect to such corrections shall be decided by the Chairman. Upon request, those parts of testimony given by a witness in Executive session which are subsequently quoted or made part of a record shall be made available to that witness at his expense.

6.9 *Persons Affected by Testimony.*—A person who believes that testimony or other evidence presented at a public hearing, or any comment made by a Committee member or Committee counsel, may tend to affect adversely his reputation, may request to appear personally before the Committee to testify on his own behalf, or may file a sworn statement of facts relevant to the testimony, evidence, or comment, or may submit to the Chairman proposed questions in writing for the cross-examination of other witnesses. The Committee shall take such action as it deems appropriate.

6.10 *Contempt Procedures.*—No recommendations that a person be cited for contempt of Congress shall be forwarded to the Senate unless and until the Committee has, upon notice to all its members, met and considered the alleged contempt, afforded the person an opportunity to state in writing or in person why he should not be held in contempt, and agreed, by majority vote of the Committee to forward such recommendation to the Senate.

6.11 *Release of Name of Witness.*—Unless authorized by the Chairman, the name of any witness scheduled to be heard by the Committee shall not be released prior to his appearance before the Committee.

RULE 7. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING CLASSIFIED OR SENSITIVE MATERIAL

7.1 Committee staff offices on the first floor of the Dirksen Office Building shall operate under strict security precautions. At least one security guard shall be on duty at all times by the entrance to control entry. All persons before entering the offices shall identify themselves. At least one additional security guard shall be posted at night for surveillance of the secure area where sensitive documents are kept.

7.2 Sensitive or classified documents and material shall be segregated in a secure storage area. They may be examined only at secure reading facilities. Copying, duplicating, or removal from the Committee staff offices of such documents and other materials is prohibited except as is necessary for use in, or preparation for, interviews or Committee meetings, including the taking of testimony, and in conformity with Section 9.2 hereof.

7.3 Each member of the Committee shall at all times have access to all papers and other material received from any source. The Staff Director shall be responsible for the maintenance, under appropriate security procedures, of a registry which will number and identify all papers and other materials in the possession of the Committee, and such registry shall be available to any member of the Committee.

7.4 Access to classified information supplied to the Committee shall be limited to the Staff Director, the Chief Counsel and the Council to the Minority, and those staff members with appropriate security clearances and a need-to-know.

7.5 No testimony taken including the names of witnesses testifying or material presented at an Executive Session, or classified papers, and other materials received by the staff or its consultants while in the employ of the Committee shall be made public, in whole or in part or by way of summary, or disclosed to any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the entire Committee, or after the termination of the Committee, in such manner as may be determined by the Senate.

7.6 Before the Committee is called upon to make any disposition with respect to the testimony, papers, or other materials presented to it, the Committee members shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine all pertinent testimony, papers and other materials that have been obtained by the Committee staff. No member shall release any such testimony, papers, or other materials, or any information contained in such testimony, papers, or other materials, to the public or any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the entire Committee, or after the termination of the Committee, in such manner as may be determined by the Senate.

RULE 8. PREPARATION FOR COMMITTEE MEETINGS

8.1 Under direction of the Chairman, the Staff Director, Chief Counsel, Counsel to the Minority, or other designated staff members shall brief members of the Committee at a time sufficiently prior to any Committee meeting in order to assist the Committee members in preparation for such meeting and to determine any matter which the Committee member might wish considered during the meeting. Such briefing shall include a list of all pertinent papers and other materials that have been obtained by the Committee that bear on matters to be considered at the meeting.

8.2 The Staff Director, the Chief Counsel, and the Counsel to the Minority shall recommend to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman the testimony, papers, and other materials to be presented to the Committee at any meeting. The determination whether such testimony, papers, and other materials shall be presented in open or Executive session shall be made pursuant to the rules of the Senate.

RULE 9. STAFF

9.1 The appointment of all staff members and consultants shall be confirmed by a majority vote of the Committee. After confirmation, the Chairman shall certify staff appointments to the Financial Clerk of the Senate in writing.

9.2 Except as otherwise provided by the Committee, the duties of staff and consultants shall be performed, and staff personnel affairs and day-to-day operations, including security and control of classified documents and material, shall be administered under the direct supervision and control of the Staff Director and the Chief Counsel. The Counsel for the Minority shall be kept fully informed regarding all matters and shall have access to all material in the files of the Committee.

9.3 The staff of the Committee shall not discuss either the substance or procedure of the work of the Committee with anyone other than a member of the Committee or other Committee personnel. Upon termination of employment by the Committee, each member of the staff, or consultant, shall surrender all classified and other material relating to the work of the Committee which came into his possession while in the employ of the Committee.

9.4 The employment of any member of the staff or consultant who fails to conform to any of these Rules shall be immediately terminated.

RULE 10. SERVICES, INFORMATION, FACILITIES, AND PERSONNEL OF THE GOVERNMENT; CONSULTANTS

The Chairman shall have the authority to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and agencies of the government, and to procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants or organizations thereof to make studies or assist or advise the Committee with respect to any matter under investigation.

RULE 11. REPORTING OF MEASURES OR RECOMMENDATIONS

11.1 No measure or recommendations shall be reported from the Committee unless a majority of the Committee is actually present and a majority of those present concur.

11.2 In any case in which the Committee is unable to reach a unanimous decision, separate views or reports may be presented and printed by any member or members of the Committee.

11.3 A member of the Committee who gives notice of his intention to file supplemental, minority, or additional views at the time of final Committee approval of a measure or matter, shall be entitled to not less than three calendar days in which to file such views, in writing, with the Clerk of the Committee. Such views shall then be included in the Committee report and printed in the same volume, as a part thereof, and their inclusion shall be noted on the cover of the report.

RULE 12. CHANGES IN RULES

These Rules may be modified, amended, or repealed by the Committee, provided that a notice in writing of the proposed change has been given to each member at least 48 hours prior to the meeting at which action thereon is to be taken.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF POSITION ON VOTES

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, on April 23, 1975, I submitted for the RECORD a summary of my position on the votes for H.R. 2166, the tax reduction bill and H.R. 4296, the farm bill. For the permanent RECORD, I would like to correct an error made in this summary. The correct notation for votes No. 92 and 93 should be as follows:

Vote No. 92: Modified Hart unnumbered amendment—nay.

Vote No. 93: Motion to table motion to reconsider the vote by which the modified Hart unnumbered amendment was agreed to—nay.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LATIN AMERICA

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I wish to call to the attention of my colleagues an editorial which appeared in the Washington Post on April 26 entitled, "The Importance of Latin America." Frankly, it is a sorry thing we have to be reminded.

For too long, we have neglected what President Kennedy recognized as our "sister republics"—and when we have dealt with them, it has too often been on the basis of paternalism rather than equality. Yet the good neighbor policy and the alliance for progress remind us that our relations have been—and again can be—warm and constructive. They should occupy a central place in our foreign policy, and they should be conducted with the mutual respect they deserve.

Unfortunately, we have been distracted in recent years by hotter spots, such as Indochina and the Middle East, not to mention our traditional absorption in superpower politics. To be sure, it is some measure of our indifference that we have withheld trade preferences across-the-board, despite the fact that countries like Venezuela and Ecuador did not participate in the Arab oil embargo which provoked our action.

Beset by massive social and economic problems, South America continues in ferment. We should not wait to be confronted with revolution and crisis. Rather, we should anticipate and encourage progress and peaceful change. We might begin by supporting a new and fair Panama Canal Treaty, by seriously re-evaluating the present policy of sanctions on Cuba, and by forswearing interference in internal affairs, which has had such serious repercussions in Chile and Honduras.

Clearly, the mere visit of Secretary Kissinger cannot substitute for the substantive reassessment and improvement of our attitudes and policies. Latin America is coming of age; so should America. Perhaps for our bicentennial we should establish a new corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, that Latin America be protected not only from European excesses but from our own as well.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the excellent Post editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE IMPORTANCE OF LATIN AMERICA

It is regrettable but not disastrous that the Indochina crisis should have forced Secretary of State Kissinger to postpone yet again his long-scheduled trip to Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. The trip would surely have enhanced the secretary's understanding of a region of far more critical and enduring importance to the United States than Indochina. And it would have given his hosts the opportunity to get what Latins perennially feel is a commodity in short supply—the high level attention of the U.S. government. Yet the visit of an American Secretary of State, even one who is a celebrity, is not something that would turn the heads of thoughtful Latins. They will wish to see what else of a serious nature in Latin-U.S. relations is going on.

The chief political task of American policy in the hemisphere is, plainly, to move beyond the arrogance and paranoia that led American officials to think it was not only appropriate but necessary to "destabilize" the elected governments of Chile in 1970-73. Since some of the same key officials, including Dr. Kissinger, are still in posts of responsibility, this is no small task. Optimists might hope that the newly heightened public and congressional vigilance over the CIA and the agency's own announced reforms, are enough to forestall another "Chile." Pessimists will remain skeptical, at least until the test of the next Chile is met.

Meanwhile, the developing emphasis of U.S. policy on treating Latin countries individually, rather than as look-alike members of a hemispheric collective, is a healthy step. This new emphasis fits the reality that Latins are different. It fits the current Latin inclination to take a step away from the old notion of a hemispheric "community." And if deepened, it should free American policy-makers from the insidious idea that what happens in one corner of Latin America will also happen in other corners. It is precisely this idea that led Washington to fear that Cuba and Chile, in their respective times, would contaminate the rest of the region.

Ad Hoc Staff
75-569

8 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

Senstudy 75

15

The following is a listing of 12 additional Senate Select Committee Staff members and official stenographers (*) who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified by Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, by letter dated May 6, 1975, as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Name	Date & Place of Birth		Soc. Sec. No.
*C. Harold Brown	6/6/38	Ohio	278-34-3428
*Wayne Birdsell	5/2/06	D.C.	578-03-1841
Anne Karalekas	11/6/46	Mass.	023-36-4329
*Mary Lynch	3/16/26	W. Va.	250-38-1344
Robert Kelley	10/29/40	Ind.	559-54-1348
Paul Wallach	5/24/47	N. Y.	149-36-2999
Lester Seidel	7/17/44	D.C.	216-38-5204
*Frank Shelburn	5/30/13	Va.	338-24-6934
*Robert Thomas	12/16/25	Md.	219-14-5186
Gregory Treverton	1/21/47	Colo.	524-62-2459
William Truehart	12/18/18	Va.	225-20-6411
*Fred Ward	11/20/40	D.C.	225-50-9983

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
18 MAY 13 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TTB #MDE16

Jack E Thomas
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

5-Ewb

File 62-116395

84 MAY 14 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr.J.B.Hotis)

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 14, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

My memorandum to you 5/13/75 furnished highlights of information relating to an interview by a Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member of retired SA Alan G. Sentinella, as obtained by Supervisor Seymor Fred Phillips of the Bureau's Senstudy 75 Special Project.

At 11:20 a.m. 5/14/75 Sentinella telephonically contacted Phillips from Atlanta, Georgia, and advised that he had been telephonically contacted earlier on the morning of 5/14/75 by SSC Staff Member Lester B. Seidel who had interviewed him 5/12/75. Seidel told Sentinella that he is being subpoenaed to give sworn testimony before an Executive Session of the SSC 9:30 a.m. Wednesday, 5/21/75. The testimony is to be given in Room G-308, New Senate Office Building. In response to specific questions from Sentinella, Seidel advised Sentinella that he will be reimbursed expenses, that his presence will probably be needed for only one day, and that the purpose is to essentially go over the material covered when Seidel interviewed Sentinella 5/12/75. Seidel asked Sentinella who had taken over the case concerning Levison (Stanley David Levison, former consultant to Martin Luther King, Jr., who was under Bureau investigation because of his communist background) in Atlanta when Sentinella left. Sentinella furnished Seidel the name of SA Richard Hamilton.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/BS

REC-100 62-116395-148

Sentinella asked Phillips for assistance of the nature he received when he was interviewed; that is, someone from the Bureau to render guidance relative to any sensitive areas that might be touched upon. He furnished the following as his telephone numbers in Atlanta, all area code 404.

Office:	658-2167 658-2168 658-2170 658-2119
Residence:	475-5327 475-7816

MAY 27 1975
F B I

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395
1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)

SFP:ekw

84 MAY 28 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

In accordance with established procedure, Sentinella was advised that he would be contacted by someone from the Office of the Legal Counsel who will make arrangements for a Bureau representative to be available for consultation should Sentinella's testimony involve sensitive areas of inquiry. Sentinella indicated his intention of arriving in Washington, D. C., late in the afternoon or in the evening of the day preceding his testimony.

ACTION:

Refer to Legal Counsel so that someone from that Office may get in touch with Sentinella in accordance with the foregoing.

wRW

PLM

Mr Sentinella
adv 4:30 PM 5/19/75
that Bu representative would
be avail. for consultation
prior to his interview.
RTO

- 2 -

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/16/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TAG #MDR-16

This informative memorandum is to report briefing of Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Members on informant matters by INTD personnel.

At the request of the SSC Staff, a briefing session was held in my office from 8:50 a.m., to 10:50 a.m., 5/16/75. Representing the SSC were Staff Members Mark Gitenstein and Thomas Dawson. In addition to myself, present from the INTD were Deputy Assistant Director H. E. Helgeson, S. F. Phillips of SENSTUDY - 75 Staff, and Unit Chiefs E. P. Grigalus (IS-2 Section), and H. A. Newman, Jr. (IS-1 Section). Also present was Supervisor J. D. Miller of the Legal Counsel's Office.

SSC Staff Members had previously reviewed Sections 107 (Part I - Security Informants) and 130 (Extremist Informants) of the Manual of Instructions and the purpose of the briefing was to go over these Sections and answer the visitors' questions and clarify doubtful areas. Such matters as the following were covered: Terminology regarding confidential sources, potential security informants and security informants; means for approving informants; payments to informants both on SAC approval and FBIHQ approval; converting of potential informants to informants; establishing reliability; assignment of symbol numbers; distinction between permanent and temporary symbol numbers; use of FD-401 for semiannual reports on informants; use of FD-405 for monthly and quarterly reports on informants. Also covered were: Use of informants in COINTELPRO; entrapment and agent provocateur aspects; movement of informants between field office territories; channelizing memoranda; handling of informants after determined to be unreliable; and inspectors' role relating to informants at field level.

REC-100 62-116395-141

Mr. Gitenstein, who was the senior member of the SSC team present, indicated satisfaction with the results of the briefing and that all their inquiries had been answered. He made

16 MAY 27 1975

62-116395

CONTINUED - OVER

SFP:cmc
(9)

5-8

84 MAY 27 1975

a very cogent observation concerning the FBI's handling of informants. The SSC Task Force he is on is studying informant matters in various intelligence community agencies including the FBI. He stated that they had found the FBI as so much far superior to other agencies that they considered the FBI as the standard for all law enforcement. He cited specifically the finding that the Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as very weak in informant aspects.

It is believed that the visitors found the briefing most productive, as they themselves stated that briefings such as this one will be very helpful to the SSC in its work; and promote friendly and businesslike relations between the SSC and the Bureau.

ACTION:

None. For information.

PLM

wRW

JAM
R70

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATE[illegible]OVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
~~Files & Com.~~
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO :Mr. McDermott

DATE: 5/9/75

FROM :J. C. Farrington

Select Committee of the Senate

SUBJECT:SENATOR GARY HART (D-COLORADO)
REQUEST FOR FBI DATA ON HIM UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)

Hart

We received this afternoon, 5/9/75, from Mrs. Susan M. Hauser of the Deputy Attorney General's Office, the following data: 1) informal note from Doug Marvin to the Deputy Attorney General re: Senator Hart's meeting with the Attorney General 5/6/75; 2) letter to Senator Hart by the Attorney General dated 5/7/75 advising that Hart's oral request for access to his FBI file will be treated as coming under the FOIA; and 3) a memorandum from for files dated 5/6/75 that appears to have been dictated by the Attorney General in which he sets forth pertinent information concerning his meeting with Senator Hart. The Attorney General points out that he will treat Hart's oral request as coming under the FOIA although he did not know whether the Senator should in fact make this request in writing (actually, the Code of Federal Regulations, of course, points out that FOIA requests must be in writing).

According to the Attorney General's memorandum, Senator Hart indicated that he was not trying to make a particular point and did not want to go to court, but rather felt it would be helpful to members of the Senate Select Committee, who wanted to do it, to see what an FBI file was like, and he felt that by seeing his own file it would raise less problems than trying to see someone else's file.

In view of the Attorney General's letter to Senator Hart of 5/7/75 advising him that his oral request will be processed under the FOIA, the FOIA Section will immediately institute the processing of this request. However, unless advised to the contrary, it is intended that Senator Hart's request will be put in chronological order and will receive no special treatment. It should also be noted that Senator Hart is under the mistaken belief that as a Senator, and particularly as a member of the Senate Select Committee, he could receive an FBI file on a third

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #NOE16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/dr16

77-23050-17

62-116395-

Ack Legal Counsel to [illegible]

[illegible] 16 1975

[illegible] 30 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

1 - Mr. McDermott - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
    Atten: Mr. Cregar
1 - FOIA Section - Enc.

JCF:law (7)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

party and be allowed to look at it. This, of course, is not correct and we would advise Senator Hart the same as any other requester making a similar request that we would need authorization from the third party involved prior to releasing any data we may have to the Senator.

Senator Hart is a new Senator serving his first term. He was the campaign manager of Senator McGovern's 1972 Presidential campaign.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

I feel he requests info. as a member of the Committee rather than under FOI. Suggest he be contacted, informed of [illegible] waiting conditions & then [illegible] [illegible] course is indicated through [illegible]

[illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1-Mr.P.V.Daly)

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 13, 1975

1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/MDR16

This informative memorandum to record highlights of information relating to an interview by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member of retired SA Alan G. Sentinella, as obtained by Supervisor Seymor Fred Phillips of the Bureau's Senstudy 75 Special Project.

Pursuant to Bureau instructions, Phillips went to Atlanta, Georgia, to fulfill the request of Sentinella for the presence of a Bureau Agent at the time Sentinella was to be interviewed on 5/12/75 by SSC Staff Member Lester B. Seidel. Sentinella is presently Safety Director, Georgia State University, Atlanta. He has been retired from the FBI for about four years and in the period around 1964-66 he did work on the investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., and for a time, the King case as well as that of King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, was assigned to him. Sentinella had been told in advance by Seidel that he was to be interviewed concerning King and Levison (Stanley David Levison, former consultant to King who was under Bureau investigation because of his communist background).

Phillips was in Sentinella's private office at 12:24 p.m. when Seidel arrived. Sentinella explained to Seidel that after Sentinella had agreed in a telephone conversation with Seidel 5/9/75 to being interviewed, he (Sentinella) contacted the Atlanta FBI Office because Sentinella was concerned with the sensitivity of the information he knew about King and Levison and wanted to protect the confidentiality of his information and the Bureau's interests, especially as pertaining to current investigations, sources, etc. Sentinella explained to Seidel that the FBI offered to have an Agent present, not to monitor the interview, but for consultation purposes should the interview reach into sensitive areas. Sentinella thus accounted to Seidel for Phillips' presence. At this point, Phillips reiterated the reasons given by Sentinella for the presence of an FBI Agent and Seidel was told that Phillips' presence was definitely

62-116395-146

REC-108

16 MAY 27 1975

62-116395
SFP:ekw (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)

84 MAY 27 1975

not intended to have any chilling effect on Seidel's interview and that Phillips was there only upon Sentinella's request and for the purposes indicated. Phillips then retired to an adjoining room.

Sentinella consulted with Phillips on only one occasion. At about 1:45 p.m. he came to Phillips' adjoining office and said that Seidel's current questioning was concerning the make-up of the squad Sentinella was assigned to around 1965. This squad handled security, racial, and civil rights matters and Seidel was apparently seeking information as to the parameters of these types of investigations and what they entailed. At this point Phillips joined Seidel and Sentinella and offered the following in possible assistance to Seidel. Phillips explained that the various Sections of the Bureau Manuals dealing with these types of investigations had been made available to the SSC and insofar as the security Sections were concerned, there was presently being processed at the Bureau superseded Sections dating back to 1960 to be made available to the SSC. At this point Seidel stated he was not so much interested in what the Manuals said but actually wanted Sentinella, to the best of his recollection, to furnish names of individuals and organizations under investigation in Atlanta during the pertinent period. Sentinella refused to name any, stating that he had no idea as to what might be under current investigation or how his furnishing of information now might affect current Bureau's interests. Sentinella also told Seidel that he, Sentinella, was not so naive as to believe that his information might not appear in the press. Seidel immediately said that he would furnish no information to the press. Sentinella then said that he was not intimating that Seidel would be responsible, but that the information might still be publicized and that once Sentinella gave the information it fell completely out of his control. Seidel indicated that Sentinella might be required through subpoena to testify before the SSC and be asked the same question. Sentinella responded that his answer before the Committee would be the same. Phillips indicated to Sentinella that if he desired to consult with Phillips concerning the names of any investigations Sentinella recalled, Phillips would assist him by indicating, if he knew, whether they were of current FBI interest. Sentinella desired no such help and insisted to Seidel that he did not desire to name the subjects of prior investigations. This interlude in the formal interview lasted about 10 minutes after which Phillips returned to the adjoining room.

At 2:20 p.m. the interview ended and Phillips was taken by Sentinella back into the latter's office where Seidel said he was leaving and wanted to say good-bye. Phillips alluded to the interview having been completed to which Seidel responded, and these are to the best of Phillips' recollection, Seidel's exact words, "Yes, you're not letting him give us the good information." Immediately upon hearing this statement from Seidel, Phillips interjected a strong protest by stating to Seidel that neither Phillips nor the FBI was keeping Sentinella from giving any information; that the FBI has not injected itself in Sentinella's decision to give or not give information. Seidel responded with a statement to the effect that the result is the same -- Sentinella is not giving the good information. Phillips again responded by telling Seidel that irrespective of the latter's opinion, Phillips wanted the record crystal clear that Sentinella has not been counseled by Phillips or anyone else in the FBI as to what he should or should not tell Seidel. Sentinella interrupted to express his loyalty to the Bureau as well as his respect for the confidentiality of his relationship with the Bureau and its work. He told Seidel that he did not intend to be a talkative, discontented former FBI employee as apparently [illegible] are some of the sources being consulted by the SSC. Sentinella pointed out that he himself had been the subject of disciplinary action by the Bureau but that it had made him a better Agent and that it in no way would influence his loyalty and responsibility to the Bureau. Seidel then left.

After Seidel's departure, Sentinella stated it was his personal desire to dictate a lengthy question and answer type statement of the entire interview while it was fresh in his mind as he had not taken any notes. He said he preferred to handle this with his own secretary whom he trusts implicitly and has pledged to maintain this information confidential. Sentinella advised that he would have the typing of the statement completed the following day and would immediately make a copy available to Atlanta SAC DeBruler for transmittal to Bureau Headquarters. At Sentinella's invitation, Phillips sat in on the dictation of practically the entire statement as a means for Sentinella briefing Phillips on the details of the interview. Instant memorandum is not intended to summarize these details which will be forthcoming with Sentinella's statement to be mailed to the Bureau. However, one significant question asked of Sentinella should be noted. During a discussion of electronic surveillances in the King investigation, Seidel asked how other Agents felt about "illegal use of taps." Sentinella's response was that the taps were not illegal and were put on only after approval by the Attorney General.

OBSERVATIONS:

It is Phillips' view that Sentinella represents a high caliber former Agent who is completely loyal to the Bureau and will apparently go to any extreme to maintain the confidentiality of the work he did. He certainly could be described as a reluctant witness if he is ever called to testify. He expressed personal concern that he might be called but hoped that his uncooperativeness in some areas to Seidel's questions might discourage his being called.

Two incidents related above are very suggestive of a lack of objectivity on the part of Seidel. The first concerns his comment to Phillips about the FBI not letting Sentinella give him "good information." To begin with, this was an unjustified allegation and Seidel was set straight immediately after his remark. Secondly, the mere fact that Seidel is referring to "good" information suggests itself that certain information fits their desires and others does not. There appears to be a lack of regard for merely securing the facts, regardless of what those facts might indicate. The second indicator of lack of objectivity was Seidel's inquiry about "illegal use of taps." This question fits the classic question of, "When did you stop beating your wife?" If the Committee is going to be asking questions like this one, its objectivity is certainly subject to challenge.

As ex- or current employees volunteer to us results of interviews conducted of them by the SSC, we will carefully study them for, among other things, additional evidence of the nature discussed above. If there is a continuation of this line of questioning or other unjustified comments to Bureau representatives, we will consider taking up with the Attorney General the matter of possible protest to the SSC.

RECOMMENDATION:

This memorandum is for the immediate information of Bureau officials. When the detailed statement of Sentinella is received, we will prepare an LHM for the Attorney General with a copy for possible forwarding to Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. This is the procedure we have been following when former Agents have volunteered to us the results of interviews of them by the SSC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: April 23, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall wrw

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/TTE

WRW

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
~~FORMER~~ SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

By memorandum captioned as above submitted earlier today, I advised you of a telephone call received 4/22/75 from former Special Agent Whitson. He had called to advise that he had been requested to appear for interview by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee.

At 2:50 p.m. today (4/23/75) Mr. Whitson called at my office and said that he had just been interviewed by Mr. Epstein and was desirous of reporting the results.

Epstein first asked Whitson when he entered the Bureau, when he first arrived for assignment at Headquarters, to what Headquarters Division he had been assigned, and when he retired. Epstein then said that he knew that Whitson had at one time mailed a package to Mrs. Martin Luther King from Tampa, Florida, and asked Whitson to relate the details concerning this matter. Whitson thereupon told him that in the late Summer of 1964 former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had telephoned Whitson at his home one Saturday and told him that former Director Hoover wanted Whitson to deliver a package to Miami, Florida, by plane and on arrival at the Miami Airport to telephone Sullivan for further instructions. Whitson did as directed and upon calling Sullivan was instructed to address the package to Mr. Martin Luther King. Accordingly, Whitson had the package weighed, put stamps on it, and addressed it to Martin Luther King (not Mrs. Martin Luther King as Epstein had indicated). The following day, Sunday, Whitson flew back to Washington. The next day, Monday, he informed Sullivan that his instructions had been carried out and Sullivan commented "Someday I will tell you about that."

REC-100 62-116395-145

Epstein asked him who had paid for the stamps to mail the package and Whitson said that he had probably done so utilizing per diem money. Epstein asked whether he had put a return address on the package and Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had gone to the Miami Office, whether any Agent had met him at the -

Abstracted 5/1/75 for CCI SFP/eks

4/28/75 SFP/eks

WRW:lml (6)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Personnel File of SA Lish Whitson (Out of Service)

16 MAY 27 1975

CONTINUED ~~OVER~~

file 62-116395

84 MAY 27 1975

Miami Airport, or whether Whitson had discussed this with anyone. Whitson advised Epstein that he had not gone to the Miami Office, that no Agent had met him, and that he had discussed the matter only with Sullivan. At this point, Whitson asked Epstein how he got the story. Epstein merely laughed and did not reply to the question.

The foregoing represents the information furnished to Epstein by Whitson. Whitson made the following additional comments and observations.

When Sullivan told Whitson he wanted him to fly the package to Miami, he stated that only he, Sullivan, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Tolson, and Mr. Belmont knew of this situation. Sullivan never did explain to Whitson anything more regarding this incident. Sullivan did during Whitson's anniversary celebration in 1968 in Sullivan's office refer to Whitson as "a real pro who knows how to carry out an assignment," and further commented that someday he would tell Lish about the assignment to which he had referred in his remarks.

Whitson said that when he arrived at the North Terminal of National Airport, following Sullivan's telephonic instructions, a young man who was unknown to Whitson but who addressed him as "Mr. Whitson" turned a package over to him which was wrapped in brown paper and sealed with sealing tape. It is Whitson's recollection the package measured approximately 8 inches by 8 inches by 1 inch.

It is Whitson's recollection that at the time the foregoing occurred, Martin Luther King was either just about to go abroad to receive the Nobel Peace Prize or probably had already gone abroad. It was Whitson's further recollection that sometime shortly after the mailing of the package Sullivan commented to Whitson that the package had not yet been received by Martin Luther King. Because of this remark, Whitson is of the belief that the package was mailed to Martin Luther King at the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and not to Mr. King at the latter's home. Further, it was Whitson's recollection that it was not long after he had mailed the package that Martin Luther King had a personal meeting with former Director Hoover in Mr. Hoover's office.

Whitson stated that during the interview Epstein asked Whitson if he had ever written a memorandum regarding this matter, to which Whitson replied in the negative. He was also asked by Epstein if he had ever seen a memorandum on this and Whitson again replied in the negative. Whitson observed that in his opinion the information which was in the possession of Epstein prior to his interview with

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Whitson must have originated with W. C. Sullivan. Whitson noted that Mr. Hoover and Mr. Tolson are both deceased and that he has heard nothing indicating Mr. Belmont has been contacted by members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee. One other factor that causes him to feel that Sullivan was the source of the information was a question Epstein raised as to whether Whitson had put a return address on the package when he addressed it to Martin Luther King. Whitson said he recalls that when he was in Miami and received the telephonic instructions from Sullivan, Sullivan told him that he should put a return address on the package and Whitson pointed out that if he did so and the name of the addressee became smeared the package would end up at someone's return address rather than in the dead letter office. Sullivan concurred that no return address should be used. Thus, Sullivan would probably have reason to have commented regarding the use or nonuse of a return address.

Whitson stated that in the event he is called again to be interviewed by anyone connected with the Senate Select Committee, he intended to notify the Bureau beforehand and would appreciate it if the Bureau would consider having someone present during the interview, if this could be arranged, since he recognizes an obligation not to reveal FBI information contrary to regulations issued by the Attorney General. Appreciation was expressed to Mr. Whitson for his volunteering the foregoing information.

This is the first instance which has come to our attention indicating staff members of the Senate Select Committee are proceeding with interviews of former Agents. I have discussed this matter with Mr. Mintz and he and I feel it would be appropriate to furnish an abstract of the interview of Whitson by Epstein to the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of the Intelligence Community in order that interested agencies will be aware of the procedures presently being followed by the Select Committee and of the Committee's interest in matters other than jurisdictional bases. All Committee requests to us have thus far been confined to the latter.

ACTION:

If approved, an abstract will be provided for the records of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group.

We are preparing
LHM For AG and
WH ([illegible]) IF
DEPT. CONCURS?

WRW

Suggest the abstract be paraphrased to avoid disclosure of the identity of the addressee of the envelope.

CODE TELETYPE

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
URGENT
2-- Mr. E. W. Walsh
(1 - Movement)
May 16, 1975
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

TO SAC NEWARK

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975. Sew 93

SECRETARIES MARY ANN MASSA AND M. ANN MIERZEJEWSKI OF YOUR OFFICE HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO APPEAR FOR INTERVIEWS UNDER OATH BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AT 2 P.M., TUESDAY, MAY 20, REPEAT 20, 1975. YOU ARE TO ADVISE BOTH I AM WAIVING THEIR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF PERMITTING THEIR DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION RELATING TO DUTIES PERFORMED BY THEM JULY - SEPTEMBER, 1964, IN CONNECTION WITH FBI WORK AT DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY.

EMPLOYEES ARE TO REPORT TO J. B. HOTIS OR P. V. DALY OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE, ROOM 4513, JUSTICE BUILDING, BETWEEN 11 A.M. AND NOON MAY 20, FOR CONSULTATION PRIOR TO 2 P.M. APPEARANCES. THEY MAY PLAN TO RETURN TO NEWARK SAME DAY. FBI REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION DURING INTERVIEWS BUT WILL NOT BE PRESENT DURING INTERVIEWS.

REC-100 62-116395-144

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/TJS
MORI 16

1 - 67-538691 (Personnel file Mary Ann Massa)
1 - 67-581180 (Personnel file M. Ann Mierzejewski)

16 MAY 23 1975

SFP:PVD:eek
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 16 1975
1110P
TELETYPE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

84 MAY 27 1975

ISSUE GTR'S FOR TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL VOUCHERS FOR EXPENSES.

DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS MATTER TO LEGAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE.

NOTE:

Referenced teletype advised all offices of procedures to follow if present or former employees contacted by SSC for interview. These two secretaries were on a Special Squad at Atlantic City, New Jersey, in connection with the Convention in 1964. The SSC Staff known to have already interviewed two former Agents assigned to that squad. Instructions herein pursuant to Mr. Mintz's direction. F. A. O. Schwartz, Chief Counsel to the Senate Select Committee advised that the Committee would reimburse the employees' expenses incurred for transportation, etc., relating to their testimony for the Commission. This matter has been coordinated with L. Clyde Groover, of the Administrative Division.

FVD/
Teal

[illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection ✓
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/9/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At approximately 2:35 PM, Mr. Allen G. Sentinella telephonically advised that he retired from the Atlanta Office in 1971, and is currently employed at Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia. Sentinella said he had just been contacted by an individual who identified himself as Lester Seidel of the Senate Select Committee. Seidel desires to interview Sentinella on Monday, May 12th, concerning the Martin Luther King and Levinson cases.

Sentinella stated that while assigned to the Atlanta Office he handled the dissemination of information received from informants during our investigation concerning the communist infiltration of the SCLC. Sentinella said he recalled very little concerning this investigation and gave his assurances that he would not divulge any confidential information.

Sentinella asked whether or not he should retain private counsel and he was informed if he felt it necessary, he should do so. He was further informed that his interview was entirely voluntarily and he had no obligation to submit to interview. Mr. Sentinella gave his office telephone number as Area Code 404-658-2167, 2168 or 2170 and his home phone number as Area Code 404-475-5327.

62-116395-143

REC-100

RECOMMENDATION: For information.

16 MAY 27 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Creager
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis

RFO:mtm
(6)

SA Seymour Phillips Div 5 to be available in atlanta for any interviews re consultation re necessary matters

[illegible]

JBA
Per

5-9-75

S-WOB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2ALM/ALS

84 MAY 27 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Each Assistant Director

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/19/75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/TFG

Attached is a copy of a letter to the Attorney General dated 5/14/75, from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) with appendices A thru D.

Appendix A, entitled "Documents Pertaining to the Committee's Prior Requests," consists of 10 requests most of which have been already responded to or, in the instances of requests numbers 4, 7, 8 and 9, are the responsibility of the Department of Justice. Item 6 has been previously referred to the White House. Appendices B, C, and D, contain numerous "new" requests which are extremely broad in their definition, often ambiguous in meaning and contain many instances where they seem to be parallel to and overlap previous requests.

On 5/16/75, a conference was held in the Intelligence Division between representatives of the INTD SENSTUDY Staff and Departmental representatives Messrs. Robert McDermott and K. William O'Connor. Mr. McDermott is on the staff of the Deputy Attorney General and has been active in coordinating SSC matters. He is being replaced in this capacity on 5/19/75 by Mr. O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Division. Mr. O'Connor advised that the Deputy Attorney General, Judge Tyler and White House representative James Wilderotter were both greatly concerned about the requests contained in the May, 14, letter. They felt that the requests were much too broad and placed much too great a burden on the Department and the FBI to be forthcoming. Mr. O'Connor felt that the requests clearly indicated an intention of the SSC to gain access to FBI "raw files" while not actually stipulating this point. In this regard you will note that Page 3 of the May, 14, letter defines the SSC request for "memoranda and other materials" as meaning 'all documents relating to the subject matter requested and are to include (but are not limited

REC 106 62-116395-142

18 MAY 27 1975

62-116395

EWL:cmc
(17)

CONTINUED - OVER

5-8

84 MAY 27 1975

to) reports, letters, correspondence, airtels, LHMs, inserts, executive conference memoranda, 302s, Assistant Director memos, notes, routing slips, etc." This letter, also on Page 3, recognizes that the request is substantial but urges the executive agencies to apply sufficient manpower and attention to enable prompt responses. Prompt response is defined by the Committee as having most of the material available within 10 days and all of it shortly thereafter. Mr. O'Connor advised that he was aware that the imposition of such a condition upon the responses created an impossible task. He advised that on Monday, 5/19/75, he would contact SSC Chief Counsel F. A. O. Schwarz calling attention to this time factor and also the often broad and ambiguous manner of many of the requests appended to the May, 14, letter. Mr. O'Connor hopes to negotiate these requests as well as the conditions attached to the responses by the SSC to the end that the requests are more narrowly defined and that the deadline imposed by the Committee be relaxed to a more realistic time frame.

Pending receipt of results of Mr. O'Connor's intercession with SSC we are proceeding with an analysis of the SSC's requests and attempting to separate components for specific assignments to appropriate divisions within FBIHQ so that our responses may be forthcoming in as coordinated and timely a fashion as possible.

ACTION:

None. For information purposes.

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, A
CHARLES MC C. MATH R., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

#MOR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
MAY 15 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The purpose of this letter is to review with you the status of the Select Committee's outstanding requests to your Department and to set out several new areas in which the Committee is requesting either staff access to documents or copies of documents for its own files.

In the matter of the outstanding requests the chronology is as follows:

You will recall that I wrote to you on March 19, setting out five areas pertaining to the FBI in which the Committee was initially interested. Although we have had partial compliance with the request, that process is not yet complete.

In addition, on April 21, Mr. Schwarz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, met with the Deputy Attorney General about the March 19 letter and about the establishment of liaison between your Department and the Committee.

On April 23, Mr. Schwarz wrote to the Deputy Attorney General a letter reflecting that meeting, clarifying the March 19 request on the matter of intelligence techniques, and making a further request pertaining to the Internal Security Division.

Mr. Schwarz also wrote the Deputy Attorney General and the FBI Director a memorandum on April 30 requesting that Committee staff members be permitted access to certain documents falling within the scope of the March 19 request.

On April 28, I wrote to you concerning the so-called "Official and Confidential" files of the FBI.

ENCLOS

62-116395-142

The Committee has not yet received a formal response to those letters. Appendix A sets out those documents which have not yet been supplied to the Committee pursuant to the March 19 letter and follow-up correspondence.

On the second matter, that is, the request for copies of additional documents (and for staff access to others), the Committee's interest falls into roughly three areas pertaining to the activities of the FBI and the Department of Justice:

> First, the Committee has been made aware of additional documents that are analogous to the background requests made in the First Document Request. These documents are set out as Appendix B.
>
> Second, the Committee is concerned about several programs or studies pertaining to specific intelligence or counterintelligence activities of the FBI. S. Res. 21 specifically requires the Committee to investigate "the conduct of domestic counterintelligence operations against United States citizens" by the FBI. Therefore, the Committee must conduct an exhaustive investigation of the so-called "COINTELPRO" programs as well as miscellaneous other incidents which have come to our attention. S. Res. 21 also specifically requires the Committee to investigate all aspects of the so-called "Huston Plan". Further requests pertaining to these matters are set out as Appendix C.
>
> Third, we are interested in allegations pertaining to electronic surveillance generally, electronic surveillance of the so-called "17 government officials and journalists" in 1969-71 by the FBI, electronic surveillance and other intelligence activities directed at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and electronic surveillance and other intelligence activities at the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in the summer of 1964. Requests pertaining to these subjects are set out as Appendix D.

In setting out certain specific documents in the Appendices, the Committee does not change its position that the original request of March 19 was general in scope and designed to encourage the Justice Department and the FBI to provide us with documents pertaining to the legal authority and the policy and procedures of the FBI which have not yet been brought to the attention of the Committee and were therefore not specifically mentioned in any of its requests. Furthermore, the Committee intends its requests to be generously construed so that descriptive words used herein are meant in a general usage sense and not necessarily in the technical sense used by the Justice Department or the FBI. Thus, words such as [illegible] other materials" refer to all documents relating to [illegible] matter requested and are to include (but are not limited to), [illegible] letters, correspondence, airtels, LHMs, inserts, executive conference memoranda, 302s, "Assistant Director memos", notes, routing slips, etc.

Where the response to a particular request would involve the production of derogatory personal information about an individual, please provide the document with such information deleted and consult the Chief Counsel regarding procedures for access to the deleted information which will protect individual privacy to the degree consistent with the Committee's need to exercise its mandate.

We recognize, of course, that this is a substantial request. But the mandate given to the Committee by the Senate is itself very broad. We are seeking to perform our duties under that mandate expeditiously. For us to do so, it is necessary for the Executive Agencies to apply sufficient manpower and attention to our requests to enable prompt responses. We hope that you will have a schedule for response promptly, have most of the material available within 10 days, and all of it shortly thereafter.

The Committee also asks to be advised at once whether the specific documents presently outstanding from the March 19 request (see Appendix A, items 1, 2, 6 and 7) will be provided.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

Appendix A

DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE COMMITTEE'S PRIOR REQUESTS

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2 ALM/12TG

Please provide:

1. FBI Intelligence Division memorandum dated July 31, 1972, prepared by T. J. Smith discussing the legal authority for FBI intelligence activities.

2. The following attachments to the February 1975 FBI Intelligence Division position paper on legal authority:

   a. Memorandum by former FBI Director Hoover, dated April 28, 1965, relative to conversation with the President concerning effect of anti-Vietnam demonstrations upon the conduct of United States foreign and defense policy and letter to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, dated April 28, 1965, enclosing FBI memorandum titled "Communist Activities Relative to United States Policy of Vietnam" dated April 28, 1965.

   b. Letter to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, dated July 25, 1961, enclosing memorandum concerning United States internal security programs under the control of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee, memorandum prepared in response to White House request.

   c. Excerpt from report on the Status of the Internal Security Program of the United States as of June 30, 1958, dated August 27, 1958, prepared jointly by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

   d. Excerpt from report on the Internal Security Program, dated March 5, 1954, prepared by Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

ENCLO

62-116395-142

e. Memorandum from J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, dated November 6, 1950, concerning necessary intelligence measures relative to violence by Puerto Rican nationalists.

3. All other FBI documents relating to paragraph I of the Committee's March 19 request. (Note: It is the responsibility of the Bureau to produce all responsive material whether or not the Committee has identified a specific document.)

4. All documents in the possession of the Justice Department (as opposed to the FBI) relating to paragraph I of the Committee's March 19 request. (Note: It was made clear on April 21 and 23 that the request applied to the Department itself, but no material has been received to date.)

5. All memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use the following techniques to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence activities (see letter from the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General dated April 23, 1975):

a. All forms of electronic surveillance, including consensual electronic surveillance;

b. All forms of mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail;

c. Surreptitious entry;

d. All forms of physical surveillance, including agent infiltration, observation, photography, and remote viewing and sensing devices;

e. Informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems;

f. Obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information;

g. Incommunicado interrogation;

h. Maintenance of files and records;

i. Dissemination of information from files and records;

j. So-called "COINTELPRO" techniques and methods, including all forms of organizational "disruption".

6. The Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), dated June 1970.

7. The original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen.

8. Committee staff access to all memoranda and other materials pertaining to the policies and procedures of the Internal Security Division (now Internal Security Section) and the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, including, but not limited to, the following materials discussed in the letter from the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General dated April 23, 1975:

a. "The files of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee ('IEC'), including former Assistant Attorney General Mardian's IEC files, which we understand were made available to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. We would also like to see any IEC or ICIS files of Justice (now Judge) Morrell Sharpe, Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Doherty, Mr. Bernard Wells, and Assistant Attorney General William Olson.

b. "The small box of classified document receipts which we understand is in the IEC file cabinet.

c. "Any intelligence estimates prepared by the IEC, particularly E 28.

d. "Any requests for Interdivision Information Unit ('IDIU') computer printouts made by the Special Litigation Section, the IEC, or the Analysis and Evaluation Section.

e. "An organization chart of the Internal Security Division before its 1970 reorganization, after its 1970 reorganization, and after its 1973 merger with the Criminal Division.

f. "A copy of the analysis of grand juries convened and prosecutions commenced by the Special Litigation Section which we understand was furnished to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights on May 8, 1974."

9. Response to the letter from the Chairman to the Attorney General dated April 28, 1975, regarding the so-called "Official and Confidential" files.

10. Further response to the memorandum from the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General and the FBI Director dated April 30, 1975, regarding Committee staff access to materials on FBI policies and procedures.

Appendix B

FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

#mor 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-07 BY SP2 ALM/TG

I. Policies and Procedures

Please provide:

1. Committee staff access to all indices and control files pertaining to:
    - a. All SAC memoranda and SAC letters for 1960 to the present.
    - b. All programs operated by the Intelligence Division for 1960 to the present.
2. Committee staff access to all so-called "O" files or other general policy files with respect to each file classification routinely used by the Intelligence Division for the period 1960 to the present.
3. All general policy memoranda and other materials not already provided the Committee pertaining to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, and activities for the period 1960 to the present.
4. For each of the techniques described in Item 5 of Appendix A above, all memoranda and other materials relating to:
    - a. The original decision to utilize the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.
    - b. The policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

ENCL

62-116395-142

5. Committee staff access to annual inspection reports and related surveys for the past ten years with respect to the following FBI field offices: New York City; Chicago; San Francisco; Los Angeles; San Diego; Sacramento; Springfield, Illinois; Buffalo; Atlanta; and Columbia, South Carolina.

6. The annual inspection reports and related surveys for the past ten years pertaining to the FBI Intelligence Division.

7. Guidelines used by the FBI Inspection Division for inspecting field offices and for inspecting divisions of the FBI.

8. A sample of the confidentiality statement which FBI personnel are required to sign along with any other employment agreements currently in use.

II. Organization, Structure, and Jurisdiction

Please provide:

9. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins, contents, and implementation of National Security Action Memorandum 161, June 9, 1962.

q

10. The June 1964 memorandum from Attorney General Robert Kennedy to President Johnson recommending new FBI procedures for gathering intelligence about the Ku Klux Klan and related activities.

11. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins, contents, and implementation of the memorandum described in Item 10 above.

12. All memoranda prepared by former Special Agent James Gale relating to the FBI internal assignment of jurisdiction or responsibility with respect to matters involving the Ku Klux Klan in 1964.

13. All memoranda and other materials reflecting meetings and contacts between the President and the Director of the FBI during 1971 on the subject of "legal attaches".

14. All memoranda and other materials reflecting meetings and contacts during 1971 between officials of the FBI and officials of the Department of State on the subject of "legal attaches".

15. All memoranda and other materials relating to the elimination of the FBI Crime Records Division in late 1972 or early 1973.

III. Indices

Please provide:

16. Committee staff access to the following indices for the period 1960 to the present:

    a. "Agitator" index;

    b. "Rabble Rouser" index;

    c. "Key Activist" list;

    d. List of "Action Groups";

    e. "Security" index;

    f. "Administrative" index;

    g. All similar indices, lists, or computer printouts.

17. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origin, implementation, operation, or termination of any of the indices set out in Item 16 above.

Appendix C

DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON PLAN", COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

#MORI6
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/TG

I. Huston Plan and Related Developments

Please provide:

1. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966 of the investigative techniques referred to in President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973 (Presidential Docs. 693-94).

2. A letter dated June 20, 1969, from Tom Charles Huston, staff assistant to the President, to the Director of the FBI concerning resources being targeted toward the monitoring of foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States, effectiveness of such resources, gaps in intelligence, and steps which should be taken to provide maximum coverage.

3. The response by the FBI to the letter set out in Item 2 and all other FBI memoranda and other materials pertaining to the correspondence.

4. The interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances, dated April 1, 1969, and all memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins and implementation of that Plan.

5. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to a request from Tom Charles Huston for an FBI investigation of the involvement of the New Mobilization Committee in violent demonstrations in November 1969.

6. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to FBI policies, practices, and procedures for liaison with the CIA from 1960 to May 1970.

7. All memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials relate to:

62-116395-142

a. Efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and

b. Inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then-President of the University of Colorado.

8. All memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

9. All memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations or communications, during 1970, between agents of the FBI and the FBI Director on the subject of liaison or contact between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency, including, but not limited to, all memoranda and other materials written by former Special Agent Sam Papich.

10. All memoranda or other materials relating to the elimination of the Liaison Section of the FBI Intelligence Division in 1970 and relating to the re-establishment of the Liaison Section in late 1972 or early 1973.

11. All memoranda and other materials prepared or compiled by FBI personnel assigned to the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) working group from June 5, 1970, to June 25, 1970.

12. Letter from FBI Director Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell dated July 27, 1970, regarding the "Huston Plan".

13. All memoranda or other materials pertaining to meetings or conversations between FBI Director Hoover and Attorney General Mitchell from July 23, 1970, through July 28, 1970, concerning the "Huston Plan".

14. All memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.

15. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the decision by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen to terminate the Intelligence Evaluation Committee on June 11, 1973. (Further documents regarding the Intelligence Evaluation Committee were requested in the letter of the Chief Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General dated April 23, 1975. See Appendix A, Item 8.)

II. COINTELPRO

Please provide:

16. Summaries of COINTELPRO case files prepared by the FBI for the Committee chaired by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen (see prepared statement of Attorney General William Saxbe before the House Judiciary Committee on November 20, 1974).

17. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origin and implementation of all COINTELPRO programs, including, but not limited to, the seven programs set out in the airtel from the FBI Director to SAC, Albany, dated April 28, 1971, entitled "Counterintelligence Programs (COINTELPROS), Internal Security - Racial Matters".

18. Committee staff access to a list of all FBI headquarters supervisory personnel involved in the origination, implementation, and termination of each COINTELPRO program.

19. All memoranda or other materials reflecting approval or knowledge of any COINTELPRO program by any government official outside the FBI including, but not limited to, any Attorney General, Member of Congress, or President.

20. A list of any COINTELPRO type activities as defined in the prepared statement of Attorney General Saxbe before the House Judiciary Committee on November 20, 1974, which were engaged in by the FBI subsequent to April 28, 1971.

III. Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs

21. An itemized description of the contents of each file folder in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files of the FBI (see testimony of Attorney General Levi before the House Judiciary Committee, February 27, 1975).

22. All memoranda and other materials contained in the "Official and Confidential" files pertaining to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities including, but not limited to, the following documents mentioned by the Attorney General:

    a. "Policy Matters" -- "Presidential directives regarding the role of the FBI in the security field; conversations between Mr. Hoover and a President-elect regarding the role of the FBI in his forthcoming Administration; letters to and from the White House regarding expansion of FBI legal attache posts abroad".

    b. "Administrative Matters" -- "Memoranda regarding an Attorney General's decision with respect to supervision of the FBI by an Assistant Attorney General; a memorandum concerning the briefing of the President by Mr. Hoover and the Attorney General with respect to certain intelligence activities by hostile nations within the United States".

    c. "Reference Material" -- "A compilation of data concerning the 1964 riots".

d. "Protection of sources or sensitive information" -- "Materials on FBI counterintelligence activities; technical devices and techniques; the telephone surveillance involving sensitive coverage in the national security area".

23. All memoranda, files, or other materials, including inspection reports or related surveys, which pertain to the following statement by Attorney General Levi in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, February 27, 1975:

". . . In order to consider what measures may be appropriate, we have endeavored to characterize the types of abuse to which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past.

a. "Use of the resources of the FBI to gather political intelligence. Our review disclosed a few documented instances in which the Bureau at times during the course of an election campaign was requested to provide -- and did indeed provide -- information which could be used as political intelligence information. In one instance, this involved a check of FBI files on the staff of a campaign opponent.

b. "Improper use of the FBI in connection with the political process. In a few instances recorded in Bureau files, an incumbent President caused the FBI to gather intelligence relating to a political convention under circumstances that although cast in legitimate law enforcement terms could -- and some would say should -- have been suspected of being politically motivated.

c. "Use of the FBI to report on certain activities of critics of an Administration's policies. The FBI files document a few instances in which an incumbent President caused the Bureau to report on certain activities of Members of Congress who were opposed to and critical of his policies.

d. "Use of information in the FBI files to respond to or discredit critics. Again, the Bureau files document a very small number of instances in which derogatory information legitimately obtained by the Bureau was disseminated to other members of the Executive Branch to enable them to discredit their critics.

e. "Use of the FBI in connection with other legitimate law enforcement activities. There was one documented instance where the FBI was used to conduct an inquiry for what might be described as political purposes, relating to an investigation properly conducted by other Executive Branch officials."

24. All memoranda and other materials reflecting conversations, contacts, or communications between the FBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or creation of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States.

25. All memoranda and other materials reflecting activities of any agents, employees, or informants of the FBI in connection with:

a. The establishment, creation, or financing of "notional" Marxist-Leninist organizations within the United States.

b. The establishment, creation, or financing of:

(1) The Red Star Cadre, or Red Star Swap Shop;

(2) The Red Collective.

26. All reports prepared by the Office of Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice pursuant to the request in September 1974 of the Attorney General and/or Deputy Attorney General pertaining to the so-called "Wounded Knee" case and any other so-called "political trial" or other prosecutions brought by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division.

27. All memoranda or other materials prepared by the FBI relating to the reports described in Item 26.

28. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins and conduct of the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

29. All memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins, implementation, and termination of Project INLET, involving preparation of an Intelligence Letter for the President.

30. The current office assignment or last known address of the following persons who in 1970 were employed at the Portland, Oregon, office of the FBI:

    a. Leo B. App

    b. Edgar O. Ingles, Jr.

APPENDIX D

REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

#mDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Please provide the Committee:

1. "Manual for the Conduct of Electronic Surveillance".

2. All memoranda and other materials relating to the maintenance and operation of the so-called "ELSUR" electronic surveillance index.

3. Committee staff access to a list of all warrantless electronic surveillances, identified by subject and target, which were instituted or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request of the FBI, from January 1, 1960, until the present.

4. A list of all electronic surveillances, identified by subject and target, of the so-called "Kissinger 17".

5. A list of all electronic surveillances, identified by subject and target, which were instituted or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request of, the FBI, and which intercepted and/or monitored any conversations of Martin Luther King, Jr., at any time between January 1, 1960, and April 5, 1968.

6. With respect to each surveillance listed in response to numbers 4 and 5, please provide:

(a) the address of the premises surveilled, and the number of the telephone surveilled;

(b) a generic description of the surveillance technique employed;

(c) all memoranda and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization and re-authorization by the President, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, White House officials, or National Security Council officials;

(d) a list of all memoranda and other materials reflecting dissemination outside the FBI of information from each surveillance, stating author, address(s), and dates, together with the purpose of such dissemination.

7. All memoranda and other materials which:

(a) relate to intelligence activities at or in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in August 1964;

62-116395-142

(b) relate to electronic surveillances of telephones and/or premises at 2414 Atlantic Avenue and/or the Clairidge Hotel in Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August 1964.

8. Committee staff access to all memoranda and other materials reflecting the identities of persons monitored, the contents of conversations monitored, and/or any information obtained [illegible] conversations monitored on the surveillances described [illegible]

9. Copies of all memoranda and other materials relating to the preparation, dissemination, and/or withdrawal of all monographs concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., not to include the monographs themselves.

10. All records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTR's), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D.C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D.C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D.C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

11. The current office of assignment or last known adress of the following persons who, in 1964, were employed at the Newark, New Jersey, office of the FBI:

(a) Robert L. Tagg

(b) John B. Meade

(c) Billie D. Williams

(d) John J. Creamer, Jr.

(e) John J. Connolly

(f) Marjorie Ann Miermejewski

(g) Mary Ann Mass

12. The last known address of the following former Special Agents of the FBI:

(a) Harold Linebaugh, who in 1964 was employed at FBI headquarters;

(b) Elmer Todd, who in 1964 was employed at the Washington Field Office.

13. The names and current office assignments or last known addresses of all FBI employees assigned to the U. S. Embassy in Rome, Italy, in 1964.

14. SAC letter 64-11 captioned "Protection of the President"; and February 28, 1964, communication from FBI headquarters to FBI field offices supplementing and/or relating to the same subject.

15. All July and August memoranda from former Special Agent Leo T. Clark to the Assistant Special Agent in Charge or the Special Agent in Charge of the Newark, New Jersey office of the FBI, captioned "Protection of the President - White House Inquiry".

16. All memoranda and other materials containing the results of any administrative or other inquiry undertaken by the FBI as a result of and/or relating to the allegations contained in the January 26, 1975, issue of The Washington Post concerning activities of the FBI in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in August 1964.

17. All memoranda and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization and re-authorization by the Attorney General and/or the Director of the FBI for electronic surveillance of Joseph Kraft.

18. The current office assignment or last known address of the following persons who, in 1969-70, were employed at the Washington, D.C., office of the FBI:

(a) Robert Kunkel

(b) Courtland Jones

(c) Ernest Belter

(d) James Gaffney

19. The current office assignment or last known address of the following persons who, in 1969-70, were employed at FBI headquarters:

(a) Joseph A. Sizoo

(b) Michael Joseph Rozamus

(c) Sterling Donahue

(d) Bernard A. Wells

(e) Robert Haynes

20. The current office assignment or last known address of Al or Alan Miller who, in 1964, was employed at the Atlanta, Georgia office of the FBI.

21. With respect to each occasion on which the Director of the FBI testified before the House Appropriations Committee from 1965 until the present, please provide the number of warrantless electronic surveillances in operation:

(a) on the date of such testimony;

(b) thirty days prior to such testimony; and

(c) thirty days subsequent to such testimony.

Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date May 13, 1975

Attached is a teletype from the Newark Office advising that former SA John Patrick Devlin has been requested to appear before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., 5/19/75 to be interviewed "for the record."

By memorandum dated 5/8/75 we advised the Attorney General that Devlin had been interviewed by Staff Members, SSC, and furnished him an LHM covering the thrust of this interview.

Responsive to Devlin's request, we are telephonically advising him through the Newark Office to contact the Bureau's Legal Counsel regarding arrangements for a representative from the Bureau to accompany him on the 5/19/75 appearance before the SSC.

1 - Mr. Mintz

Counsel advised to have Devlin call Mintz on Thurs. 4-15-75
WOC

WOB

NPC/MN

JBA/PM

WOC:ekw

#mDe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

DOJ/FBI

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 21 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR002 AX CODED

10:10PM NITEL 5/21/75 VAN

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-217) (RUC) 1 PAGE

SENSTUDY 75

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO BUREAU, MAY 3, 1975.

FORMER BUREAU AGENT HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1160 WIMBLEDON DRIVE, MC CLEAN, VIRGINIA, CONTACTED ON MAY 20, 1975, IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS. LEINBAUGH STATED HIS FEELING AT PRESENT IS THAT HE WILL REFUSE TO BE INTERVIEWED BY STAFF MEMBER OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE BUT IN EVENT HE CONSENTS TO INTERVIEW AND SENSITIVE MATTERS ARISE, HE WILL REQUEST PRESENCE OF BUREAU AGENT OR CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL AT FBIHQ.

END

HOLD FOR ONE

MAH FBIHQ ACK FR ONE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

#MDE 16

cc 67-42632 (Leinbaugh)

REC-100

62-116395-141

13 MAY 27 1975

84 MAY 29 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 12 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG #MDR16

NR 006 NK PLAIN

5:37PM NITEL MAY 12, 1975 JCG

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM NEWARK (66-3971)

SENSTUDY 75

RE NKTEL CALL TO BUREAU TODAY.

FORMER SA JOHN PATRICK DEVLIN CONTACTED THE NEWARK OFFICE MAY 12, 1975, AND ADVISED HE WAS REQUESED TO APPEAR BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE AT 2:00 P.M., IN WASHINGTON, D.C., ON MONDAY, MAY 19, TO BE INTERVIEWED FOR THE RECORD. AS THE BUREAU IS AWARE, DEVLIN HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES CONDUCTED DURING 1964 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL NOMINATING CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, N.J.

DEVLIN ADVISED THAT HE WOULD LIKE SOMEONE FROM THE BUREAU TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO THE INTERVIEW BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE STAFF. BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE NEWARK, FOR TRANSMITTAL TO DEVLIN, INFORMATION CONCERNING WHOM HE SHOULD CONTACT AT BUREAU CONCERNING THIS REQUEST.

END

~~PLS ACK FOR (5)~~

8

5-Bishop

D

REC-100 62-116395-140

16 MAY 27 1975

cc 67-770521 (Devlin)

84 MAY 27 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 5/21/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

On 5/15/75, Senate Select Committee Staff Members Mark Gitenstein and Thomas Dawson reviewed Manual of Instructions Sections 107, Part I, relating to security informants and Section 130 relating to extremist informants. The review took place from 3:50 p.m. to 5:40 p.m. in the conference room at INTD. SA Elmer W. Larson of SENSTUDY - 75 project was present during the review. Gitenstein and Dawson asked several questions concerning administrative and technical clarifications but raised no substantive questions concerning the sections under review.

9

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

62-116395

EWL:cmc
(3)

EWL

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

REC-100 62-116395-139

16 MAY 23 1975

5-WOB

84 MAY 23 1975

1 - [illegible] Adams
1 - [illegible] Cleveland
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall
May 16, 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/22/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TFG

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Crescioli

Mr. William J. Cotter
Chief Postal Inspector
U. S. Postal Service
Washington, D. C.

Sen Study - 75

original of letter delivered to USPS by liaison 5/20/75 LAC

Dear Bill:

I have been advised that a representative of the Senate Select Committee has recently made a request of your Service to furnish the identities of all FBI mail covers placed since 1960.

In view of the fact that such information directly relates to the investigative responsibilities of this Bureau, it is requested that you advise the Senate Select Committee that such a request should be made to the FBI through the Office of the Attorney General.

Your cooperation in this matter is sincerely appreciated.

Sincerely yours, 62-

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

MAY 27 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-2-35-33

LAC:tdp (10) tdp
NOTE:

See memorandum Flemister to Wannall dated 5/15/75, captioned "Mail Covers," prepared by LAC:tdp.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Rec'd LC 62-116395

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 MAY 27 1975

84 MAY 27 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 5/15/75

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Flemister
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : H.C. Flemister, Jr.

SUBJECT: MAIL COVERS

S

This is to advise of recent request by Senate Select Committee (SSC) that U. S. Postal Service (USPS) furnish to the SSC the identities of all mail covers placed by the FBI since 1960.

On 5/14/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, Office of Security Investigations, USPS, advised Liaison Officer L.A. Crescioli that Mr. Paul Wallach, staff member of the SSC, has requested USPS to furnish the identities of all FBI mail covers placed with the USPS since 1960. According to Jackson, Chief Postal Inspector William J. Cotter has informed Wallach that the FBI is the custodian of such detailed information and that the SSC should therefore make this request directly to the Bureau. Mr. Jackson requested that the FBI consider directing a communication to Chief Cotter, pointing out that the Bureau does interpose an objection to the USPS complying with above request and that the SSC should proceed directly to the FBI in this regard.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MO216
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/22/01 BY SP2 ALM/tat

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-2353-3

OBSERVATIONS:

The request for the identities of all FBI mail covers since 1960 in effect provides the SSC with the identities of the subjects of FBI investigations, which includes some extremely sensitive cases. The intelligence community in attempting to work out guidelines with the SSC as to sensitive areas of inquiry have indicated that specific targets of ongoing intelligence operations should be subject to negotiation between the SSC staff and the appropriate agency. The Intelligence Division believes that we should take a strong stand in this instance and attempt to negotiate an accommodation which would allow the SSC to carry out its mission but yet not compromise ongoing FBI sensitive investigations.

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
16 MAY 27 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LAC:tdp (9)

46 MAY 27 1975

Enclosure - Sent 5-20-75

Records
cc: 62-116395

5

84 MAY 27 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: MAIL COVERS

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter to Chief Postal Inspector Cotter be sent via Liaison, advising him of the proprietary interest of FBI concerning specifics of its requests to USPS for mail covers and that under the third agency requirement the SSC should make its request for such data to the FBI through the Office of the Attorney General.

TLN

LAC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5/15/75

55

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: REQUEST OF HARRY H. WACHTEL ON BEHALF OF ESTATE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., CONGRESSMAN ANDREW YOUNG, AND DELEGATE WALTER E. FAUNTROY

Sen Study - 75

~~Hotis~~ JBA

My memorandum of March 19, 1975, reported discussions with the attorney for the estate of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who also represents Mrs. Coretta King and her children. It was clearly indicated that Mrs. King and her children were concerned about invasion of personal privacy that might occur should there be disclosure of inquiries concerning the FBI investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. At the conclusion of our conference with the King representatives, Assistant Attorney General Scalia asked me whether I would be willing to agree to have Mr. Wachtel notified in the event a congressional committee requested access to such material in Bureau files. I told him that I saw no difficulty in the Department advising Mr. Wachtel in the event such a request is made by a committee of the Congress. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities has initiated inquiries concerning the Bureau's investigation of Dr. King and though they have not as yet requested material from our files which may contain tapes of electronic surveillance of Dr. King, it is likely that their inquiry will reach the stage where such demands will be made.

Therefore, in response to the requests made by Mr. Wachtel representing Mrs. King and in response to inquiry by Assistant Attorney General Scalia, it is my view that we should advise the Department of the nature of the inquiry currently being made by the Senate Select Committee and to suggest that they may wish to notify the representatives of the King estate and Mrs. King for whatever action they may deem appropriate.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-87 BY Spjsm/ck

100-106670-

ORIGINAL FILED IN

6076

Enc. — Sent 5-20-75

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
18 MAY 27 1975
46 MAY 27 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mrs. Metcalf
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (8)

Records - Please cc in 62-116395.

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 27 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached memorandum to the Attorney General advising him of the concern of the King family and of the request that they be advised of congressional inquiries be approved and sent.

The Attorney General

May 16, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mrs. Metcalf
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz

Director, FBI

REQUEST OF HARRY H. WACHTEL ON BEHALF OF ESTATE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., CONGRESSMAN ANDREW YOUNG, AND DELEGATE ~~WALTER E.~~ FAUNTROY

Sen Study - '75

At a conference on March 19, 1975, Harry H. Wachtel, attorney representing the estate of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Mrs. Coretta King, and her children, accompanied by Congressman Andrew Young and District of Columbia Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy, advised representatives of the Attorney General and the FBI of their great concern for the privacy of Mrs. King and her children. They were concerned that inquiries into an investigation conducted by the FBI of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., could reveal information of a derogatory nature concerning Dr. King. They indicated an interest in undertaking appropriate measures to limit the possibility of public disclosure of derogatory information that may be produced as a result of inquiries such as those that might be made by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities and requested that they would be advised should such inquiries be made by a committee of Congress.

Subsequent to that meeting, the FBI has learned that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities is conducting interviews in an effort to develop information concerning an FBI investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In view of this fact, this matter is being brought to your attention in order that you may determine what action you feel is appropriate in response to the requests made by Mr. Wachtel on behalf of Mrs. King, her children, and the estate of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., which requests were joined in by Congressman Andrew Young

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JRM/ch 6076

100-106670-3[illegible]

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

JAM:mfd
(12)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Delivered to Wm O'Connor 5/21/75 WRW

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 MAY 30 1975

✓ S.R. [illegible] RM 4063 JEH

64 MAY 30 1975

and Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy. The FBI would have no objection should you decide to advise Mr. Wachtel that the current inquiry by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities concerns the FBI investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

NOTE: Based on memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, 5/15/75, captioned as above, JAM:mfd.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. 220
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL wrw

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

DATE: May 12, 1975

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the telephonic contact between former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr and Mr. Jenkins at which time Mr. Mohr furnished additional information regarding his meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff on the morning of 5/9/75.

In reconstructing his interview on the morning of 5/9/75 by Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Thomas Dawson and Lester B. Seidel, Mr. Mohr recalled them asking if he knew who prepared the "surreptitious letters" the Bureau sent in the Socialist Workers Party case. Mr. Mohr advised the Staff Members that he did not know but he presumed somebody in the Document Section of the Laboratory probably prepared these letters.

62-116395-138
REC-106

As reported in my memorandum of 5/9/75, members of the Staff Committee are hoping that Mr. Mohr will be able to arrange an interview of Miss Gandy by members of the SSC providing Mr. Mohr is present. In this regard, Mr. Mohr desired some guidance as to what he could tell Miss Gandy if Staff Members asked her for the names of individuals appearing in the official and confidential files of Mr. Hoover. Mr. Mohr was telephonically advised on the afternoon of 5/12/75 by Cregar that the Bureau could not give him any advice as to what he could tell Miss Gandy recognizing that whatever he told Miss Gandy was strictly between the two of them and not of concern or interest to the FBI. It was further pointed out to Mr. Mohr that neither he nor Miss Gandy should feel under any obligation to report to the Bureau what Miss Gandy decided in this regard as well as what she might tell the Staff of the SSC during her forthcoming interview by them on 5/15/75.

16 MAY 23 1975

On the occasion of Cregar's call to Mr. Mohr on the afternoon of 5/12/75 Mohr recalled that he had told Staff Members of the SSC Miss Gandy had turned over to Mr. Felt the official and confidential files amounting to one-half a file drawer. Mr. Mohr in speaking with Miss Gandy subsequent to his interview on 5/9/75 learned the official and confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP2 ALM/176

62-116395 ekw
WOC:ekw (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

5 WOG

84 MAY 27 1975

by Miss Gandy amounted to one and one-half file drawers. Mohr subsequently advised Mr. Gitenstein of this correction. Additionally, Gitenstein desired to know whether an itemized list of the official and confidential files was made and if so, where the list was. Mohr told Gitenstein that he was sure a list was made (subsequently confirmed by Miss Gandy) and that the list accompanied the official and confidential files.

In addition to the above, Mohr advised that Gitenstein asked about a requirement of all Bureau employees to turn over any confidential files in their possession ordered by Mr. Hoover following the revelation that former Assistant to the Director Sullivan had turned over certain confidential files to former Attorney General Mardian. Mohr advised Gitenstein that Mr. Hoover had in fact levied such a requirement on Bureau employees and that all confidential files were to be turned over to Mr. Felt along with a memorandum explaining the nature of these files. Gitenstein asked Mr. Mohr where these memoranda would be filed. Mohr responded by saying he presumed they were confidential memoranda and would have gone with the confidential files turned over to Mr. Felt by any Bureau employee maintaining such files.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WRW/JWL

By call to San Francisco, D. Rosen [illegible]. Adams and telephonically requested to inform Mr. Callahan & Dir. Kelley of Miss Gandy's future interview by Select Committee staff. 5/13/75.

NPC/MD

JBA/PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 9, 1975

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting between former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr and representatives of the Staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the morning of 5/9/75.

Memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 5/5/75 recommended that a Bureau representative be available for consultation by Mr. Mohr during the time Mr. Mohr is being interviewed by Staff Members of the SSC 5/9/75. REC-100 62-116395-137

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR-16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2ALM/LRS

Prior to Mr. Mohr's interview by the Staff of the SSC, Section Chief William O. Cregar met with him. Mr. Mohr was advised that should representatives of the Staff pose any questions to him which could lead to the identification of sensitive sources, sensitive methods of FBI operations or material derived from other U. S. agencies or foreign governments, he could decline to answer such questions until he had an opportunity to consult with a Bureau representative. Mr. Mohr understood the purpose of Mr. Cregar's presence and assured him that should the inquiry by Staff Members of the SSC get into these areas of inquiry, he would certainly consult with Cregar prior to responding.

16 MAY 23 1975

Following our arrival at the New Senate Office Building, Mr. Mohr and Cregar were met by Staff Members Mark Gitenstein, Thomas Dawson, and Lester B. Seidel. As we proceeded to the office where the interview was to be conducted, Mr. Gitenstein referred to a previous conference he had with Assistant Director Wannall at Quantico on 5/5/75 at which Mr. Cregar was present. Gitenstein observed that this meeting had proved very, very beneficial and that he believed that future personal contacts between members of the Senate Select Committee Staff and the FBI could prove useful and allow the SSC Staff to better understand how the FBI was administered at Headquarters.

62-116395
WOC:ekw
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 23 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

The interview of Mr. Mohr began at approximately 10:20 and was concluded at 12:30 p.m. 5/9/75. Mr. Cregar, who was available in an adjacent room, was not called and following the interview, Mr. Mohr assured Mr. Cregar that no sensitive areas were addressed by the Staff Members. Mr. Mohr did indicate that the Staff Members were in possession of FBI documents dealing with the Socialist Workers Party as well as documents obtained by Mr. Carl Stern under the Freedom of Information Act (these are our COINTELPRO documents which we were obliged to provide Stern under the FOI). No substantive questions were directed to Mr. Mohr regarding these documents but apparently were used to permit Mr. Mohr to identify who might be the final authority in approving these documents. As an example, Mr. Mohr noted that in reviewing a sample of these documents, he voiced the opinion Document A probably would have been approved by an Assistant Director whereas Document B might have received the approval of the Director. Mr. Mohr was unable to identify precisely what documents he was shown.

It was quite apparent from the interview that the Staff of the SSC was trying to understand how the flow of mail proceeded in the FBI under Mr. Hoover's directorship. A classic example of the Staff Members' confusion was their inability to distinguish between an SAC letter from a letter to all SACs. Mr. Mohr attempted to clarify this confusion on behalf of the Staff Members. With regard to SAC letters, the Staff Members asked if there was a file on all SAC letters. Mr. Mohr advised he was not quite sure whether there was a single file containing all SAC letters.

Members of the Staff also asked Mr. Mohr about his securing of Mr. Hoover's office after Mr. Hoover's death. Mr. Mohr told the Committee that the articles which appeared in "The Washington Star" by columnist Jeremiah O'Leary was an accurate recording of his securing of Mr. Hoover's office. Nevertheless the Staff Members desired that Mr. Mohr go over in considerable detail exactly how he did secure Mr. Hoover's office following his death.

The question of Mr. Tolson's will did arise. Mr. Mohr advised that Hillory Tolson had not decided whether he was going to contest the will. According to Mr. Mohr, he recently had lunch with Hillory Tolson at Mr. Tolson's request at which time Hillory Tolson suggested he was not going to contest the will. However, Mr. Mohr had not seen any documentary evidence of Hillory's decision in this regard.

Finally, the Staff Members asked if Mr. Mohr knew the whereabouts of Miss Gandy or at least her telephone number. He told themhhe did know herewhereabouts and telephone number but promised her he would not reveal them. Mr. Mohr was asked whether Miss Gandy would be available for interview. Mr. Mohr advised the Committee that he would attempt to persuade her to be interviewed providing he, Mr. Mohr, was allowed to be present during the entire interview. The Staff Members interposed no objection to that arrangement and Mr. Mohr indicated to Mr. Gitenstein that he would advise him of Miss Gandy's desires regarding an interview under the conditions stipulated above.

Prior to the onset of the interview with Mr. Mohr, Cregar asked Gitenstein whether a decision would be forthcoming from the SSC regarding the interviews of former employees of the intelligence community by Staff Members of the SSC. Gitenstein stated the the Committee had no problem with the FBI and that if The White House would not interfere he felt satisfactory arrangements between the FBI and the Select Committee could be worked out regarding future interviews of former FBI employees. The thrust of Mr. Gitenstein's comment as well as his general demeanor during the meeting suggested the Staff felt they could work closely with the FBI to the satisfaction of both parties.

ACTION: For information and record purposes.

WRW|TWL

JBA/LWN MBC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/14/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

House Select Committee on Intelligence

Sew 135

Reference Mr. Heim memorandum to Mr. Moore dated 4/10/75, enclosing edited version of paper entitled "Dissertation on Procedures for Opening, Closing and Maintaining Domestic Security Cases in Pending Status."

INTD has no objection to the edited version.

ACTION:

Legal Counsel Division review edited version for legal considerations.

ALL:vb
(6)

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

EX-101
REC-20 62-116395-136

3 MAY 13 1975

FIVE

LEGAL COUNSEL

54 MAY 27 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD-Adm.	✓
Dep. AD-Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	✓
Intell.	✓
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. Moore

DATE: 4/10/75

FROM : Mr. Heim
LJH

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

House Select Committee on Intelligence

Sew134 Reference W. R. Wannall to Adams memorandum dated 4/1/75, and captioned as above which submitted a proposed statement for congressional testimony concerning the opening, closing, and maintenance of domestic security cases in pending status. This Division was to review the statement from a stylistic standpoint.

The statement has been reviewed along these lines and edited.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached edited version of the aforementioned statement be forwarded to Intelligence Division for review and approval and then submitted to Legal Counsel Division for its review and approval.

JBA

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Mintz - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enclosure

Memo Wannall to [illegible] 4/14/75, ALL [illegible]

REC-20 62 - 116395 - 135
EX-101

ltw
TDH/JAH:ltw (6)

3 MAY 13 1975

2 - ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/FJG

#MDR16

LEGAL COUNSEL

54 MAY 27 1975

DISSERTATION ON PROCEDURES FOR OPENING, CLOSING AND MAINTAINING DOMESTIC SECURITY CASES IN PENDING STATUS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/MLT #MDR16

FBI authority to investigate domestic security cases is derived from numerous criminal statutes and Presidential Directives and Executive Orders concerning internal security and employee loyalty matters. Procedurally, the Bureau opens, continues, and closes such cases on the basis of these legal considerations.

Upon receipt of a fact situation from any of a myriad of sources, an Agent must necessarily make a judgment as to whether this situation appears to fall within the scope of FBI jurisdiction.

More specifically, domestic security investigations are initiated when allegations clearly indicate a person, either as an individual or as a member of a group, acts to unlawfully alter the Government in violation of the Smith Act, the Rebellion or Insurrection Statute, the Seditious Conspiracy Statute, or other related enactments. Special emphasis is placed on those engaged in violent furtherance of such illegal acts. A full investigation continues so long as these indications of illegal activity exist.

When allegations do not clearly indicate that activities on the part of an individual fall within this jurisdictional area, self-imposed regulations require that a "preliminary investigation" be conducted. This inquiry consists of obtaining information from established sources (such as records maintained by police departments, local governments, and private agencies); informants; public source information; and FBI records. These investigations are limited to 90 days during which an honest effort is made to distinguish as soon as possible between legitimate political activity and illegal acts. If more than 90 days are required to resolve this question, authority to exceed this period must be obtained from FBI Headquarters. In seeking this extension, a full statement must be made of the allegation, the jurisdictional authority involved, and facts that appear to justify the continuance.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW/KEB

TDH/JAH:djm (8)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-135

When an allegation is received that a group may fall within existing jurisdictional criteria, FBI Headquarters is immediately notified and a "preliminary investigation" along the lines already indicated is undertaken. Again, approval from FBI Headquarters must be obtained to continue this "preliminary investigation" beyond 90 days to resolve whether jurisdictional standards are met. If met, a full investigation is conducted upon approval by FBI Headquarters.

Internal security investigations are also conducted on the basis of specific instructions from the Attorney General (pursuant to Presidential Directives) to the Director of the FBI. Until the instruction is complied with, these matters remain pending.

Every effort is made to maintain proper administrative control over domestic security investigations and to insure full compliance with the law. In this regard, Bureau rules require Agents to limit investigations to relevant matters. Supervisory personnel in the Field and at FBI Headquarters review the progress and relevancy of these investigations, and reports are forwarded to the Department of Justice. Agents also receive legal instruction on a continuing basis in order that they may be fully able to recognize relevance and safeguard individual rights.

These Bureau procedures have been devised in an honest effort to carry out with maximum effectiveness and propriety our vital domestic security responsibilities. Over the years, the FBI has handled these responsibilities and protected the domestic security of our Nation with great dedication and, I believe, with great distinction. We will continue to vigorously carry out these duties with all due regard for individual rights and liberties. I believe the procedures I have outlined are in full accord with this purpose.

April 14, 1975

DISSERTATION ON PROCEDURES FOR OPENING, CLOSING AND MAINTAINING DOMESTIC SECURITY CASES IN PENDING STATUS

FBI authority to investigate domestic security cases is derived from numerous criminal statutes and Presidential Directives and Executive Orders concerning internal security and employee loyalty matters. Procedurally, the Bureau opens, continues, and closes such cases on the basis of these legal considerations.

Upon receipt of a fact situation from any of a myriad of sources, an Agent must necessarily make a judgment as to whether this situation appears to fall within the scope of FBI jurisdiction.

More specifically, domestic security investigations are initiated when allegations clearly indicate a person, either as an individual or as a member of a group, acts to unlawfully alter the Government in violation of the Smith Act, the Rebellion or Insurrection Statute, the Seditious Conspiracy Statute, or other related enactments. Special emphasis is placed on those engaged in violent furtherance of such illegal acts. A full investigation continues so long as these indications of illegal activity exist.

When allegations do not clearly indicate that activities on the part of an individual fall within this jurisdictional area, self-imposed regulations require that a "preliminary investigation" be conducted. This inquiry consists of obtaining information from established sources (such as records maintained by police departments, local governments, and private agencies); informants; public source information; and FBI records. These investigations are limited to 90 days during which an honest effort is made to distinguish as soon as possible between legitimate political activity and illegal acts. If more than 90 days are required to resolve this question, authority to exceed this period must be obtained from FBI Headquarters. In seeking this extension, a full statement must be made of the allegation, the jurisdictional authority involved, and facts that appear to justify the continuance.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MOR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/TG

When an allegation is received that a group may fall within existing jurisdictional criteria, FBI Headquarters is immediately notified and a "preliminary investigation" along the lines already indicated is undertaken. Again, approval from FBI Headquarters must be obtained to continue this "preliminary investigation" beyond 90 days to resolve whether jurisdictional standards are met. If met, a full investigation is conducted upon approval by FBI Headquarters.

Internal security investigations are also conducted on the basis of specific instructions from the Attorney General (pursuant to Presidential Directives) to the Director of the FBI. Until the instruction is complied with, these matters remain pending.

Every effort is made to maintain proper administrative control over domestic security investigations and to insure full compliance with the law. In this regard, Bureau rules require Agents to limit investigations to relevant matters. Supervisory personnel in the Field and at FBI Headquarters review the progress and relevancy of these investigations, and reports are forwarded to the Department of Justice. Agents also receive legal instruction on a continuing basis in order that they may be fully able to recognize relevance and safeguard individual rights.

These Bureau procedures have been devised in an honest effort to carry out with maximum effectiveness and propriety our vital domestic security responsibilities. Over the years, the FBI has handled these responsibilities and protected the domestic security of our Nation with great dedication and, I believe, with great distinction. We will continue to vigorously carry out these duties with all due regard for individual rights and liberties. I believe the procedures I have outlined are in full accord with this purpose.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STA[illegible]S GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4/1/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

House Select Committee on Intell.

The purpose of this memorandum is to enclose a paper concerning the opening, closing, and maintenance of domestic security cases in pending status requested as set forth in memorandum to Mr. Callahan from Mr. Adams of the same caption, dated 3/7/75. 62-116435-55

Referenced memorandum instructed that the paper was to be non-technical and in a form easily understood for purposes of argument. Legal Counsel Division and writers in the External Affairs Division are to be contacted to coordinate legal aspects and preparation of final paper, respectively.

ACTION:

Legal Counsel Division review attachment for legal considerations.

External Affairs Division review for preparation of final paper.

Enclosure

ALL:vb
(9)

TJJ

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore, Jr.
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

RVS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG #MOE16

See Memo to [illegible] 4/10/75

REC-20 62-116395-134

3 MAY 13 1975

Memo Wannall to Mintz; 4/14/75, ALL:[illegible]

54 JUN

DISSERTATION ON PROCEDURES FOR OPENING, CLOSING AND MAINTAINING DOMESTIC SECURITY CASES IN PENDING STATUS

The FBI opens, continues pending investigation, and closes domestic security cases based on legal considerations. The Bureau is charged with the investigation of violation of numerous criminal statutes, as well as duties imposed by Presidential Directives and Executive Orders concerning internal security and employee loyalty matters.

The procedure for handling such investigation is dictated by the facts and circumstances of each case. Upon receipt of a fact situation from any of a myriad of sources, the Agent must necessarily make a judgment to determine whether these facts reasonably indicate an activity falling within the scope of the FBI's jurisdiction.

Domestic security investigations are initiated regarding individuals when allegations establish that he, individually or as an active group member, acts to unlawfully alter the Government in violation of the Smith Act, the Rebellion or Insurrection Statute, the Seditious Conspiracy Statute, or other related enactments. Special emphasis is placed on those practicing action or violence in furtherance of their goal. If the allegation shows facts clearly within the scope of these statutes, a full investigation is conducted and continues so long as facts exist to indicate a reasonable possibility that these ends could be achieved.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/dt6
#NW16

In some instances, allegations regarding the individual do not clearly fall within the scope of authority. Self-imposed restraining regulations require that such inquiry be limited to a "preliminary investigation" consisting of contacts for informational purposes only with established sources, such as police bureaus, records departments of local governments, and private record sources; informants; public source information; and Bureau records. These investigations are limited to 90 days. An earnest effort is made to distinguish as soon as possible between mere unorthodox political views or dissent on the one hand and revolutionary and/or criminal activity on the other. If to exceed 90 days, a report is made to FBI Headquarters specifically stating the allegation, the jurisdictional authority and such facts as would justify continuance of the investigation. A concurrence of Headquarters is necessary for continuance.

When an allegation is received that a group may fall within the jurisdictional criteria, Headquarters is immediately notified and investigation is limited to the "preliminary investigation" as described above. Any investi- WRW

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

ALL:vb

PLM

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-134

GPO 954-546

gation beyond that is made only upon approval by Headquarters. If such continuance is approved, investigation continues to resolve whether jurisdictional standards are met. If met, and Headquarters' approval obtained, a full investigation is conducted.

Apart from these situations, specific instructions from the Attorney General, pursuant to Presidential Directives, to the Director of the FBI concerning matters of internal security are the basis for investigations. Until the instruction is complied with, these matters remain pending.

Bureau rules require an Agent to limit investigations to relevant matters. Field office and Headquarters supervisors review the progress and relevancy of investigations and reports are forwarded to the Department of Justice. The FBI is ever aware of and controlled by court decisions interpreting the law. Agents receive continuing legal instruction in order to recognize relevance and the rights of persons under the law.

These regulatory procedures are the means by which the FBI implements the responsibilities imposed by the statutes, Presidential Directives, and orders of the Attorney General. An examination of the domestic security problems confronting this Nation would reveal that, as early as 1936, concern arose over "Fifth Column" activities of Communists and Fascists and continued through WW II. This concern has evolved to other threats, through the years, such as the foreign-dominated Communist influence in America during the Cold War, the Ku Klux Klan's interference with the rights of others, the turbulent anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, the urban ghetto riots, and the rise of the racially-oriented organizations preaching revolution and their more violent splinter groups practicing open guerrilla warfare. The FBI, charged by statute and supplemented by Directives to investigate such matters in order to fulfill the duty, promulgated the investigative procedure for a dual purpose. The FBI recognizes not only the duty to investigate, to preserve the Constitution, but the fact the Constitution delineates zones of privacy and individual liberties. These regulatory procedures speak reasonably to both.

NOTE:

See memorandum Mr. W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated 4/1/75, captioned "Congressional Testimony," prepared by ALL:vb.

DISSERTATION ON PROCEDURES FOR OPENING, CLOSING AND MAINTAINING DOMESTIC SECURITY CASES IN PENDING STATUS

The FBI opens, continues pending investigation, and closes domestic security cases based on legal considerations. The Bureau is charged with the investigation of violation of numerous criminal statutes, as well as duties imposed by Presidential Directives and Executive Orders concerning internal security and employee loyalty matters.

The procedure for handling such investigation is dictated by the facts and circumstances of each case. Upon receipt of a fact situation from any of a myriad of sources, the Agent must necessarily make a judgment to determine whether these facts reasonably indicate an activity falling within the scope of the FBI's jurisdiction.

Domestic security investigations are initiated regarding individuals when allegations establish that he, individually or as an active group member, acts to unlawfully alter the Government in violation of the Smith Act, the Rebellion or Insurrection Statute, the Seditious Conspiracy Statute, or other related enactments. Special emphasis is placed on those practicing action or violence in furtherance of their goal. If the allegation shows facts clearly within the scope of these statutes, a full investigation is conducted and continues so long as facts exist to indicate a reasonable possibility that these ends could be achieved.

In some instances, allegations regarding the individual do not clearly fall within the scope of authority. Self-imposed restraining regulations require that such inquiry be limited to a "preliminary investigation" consisting of contacts for informational purposes only with established sources, such as police bureaus, records departments of local governments, and private record sources; informants; public source information; and Bureau records. These investigations are limited to 90 days. An earnest effort is made to distinguish as soon as possible between mere unorthodox political views or dissent on the one hand and revolutionary and/or criminal activity on the other. If to exceed 90 days, a report is made to FBI Headquarters specifically stating the allegation, the jurisdictional authority and such facts as would justify continuance of the investigation. A concurrence of Headquarters is necessary for continuance.

When an allegation is received that a group may fall within the jurisdictional criteria, Headquarters is immediately notified and investigation is limited to the "preliminary investigation" as described above. Any investi-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/lr/BS

gation beyond that is made only upon approval by Headquarters. If such continuance is approved, investigation continues to resolve whether jurisdictional standards are met. If met, and Headquarters' approval obtained, a full investigation is conducted.

Apart from these situations, specific instructions from the Attorney General, pursuant to Presidential Directives, to the Director of the FBI concerning matters of internal security are the basis for investigations. Until the instruction is complied with, these matters remain pending.

Bureau rules require an Agent to limit investigations to relevant matters. Field office and Headquarters supervisors review the progress and relevancy of investigations and reports are forwarded to the Department of Justice. The FBI is ever aware of and controlled by court decisions interpreting the law. Agents receive continuing legal instruction in order to recognize relevance and the rights of persons under the law.

These regulatory procedures are the means by which the FBI implements the responsibilities imposed by the statutes, Presidential Directives, and orders of the Attorney General. An examination of the domestic security problems confronting this Nation would reveal that, as early as 1936, concern arose over "Fifth Column" activities of Communists and Fascists and continued through WW II. This concern has evolved to other threats, through the years, such as the foreign-dominated Communist influence in America during the Cold War, the Ku Klux Klan's interference with the rights of others, the turbulent anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, the urban ghetto riots, and the rise of the racially-oriented organizations preaching revolution and their more violent splinter groups practicing open guerrilla warfare. The FBI, charged by statute and supplemented by Directives to investigate such matters in order to fulfill the duty, promulgated the investigative procedure for a dual purpose. The FBI recognizes not only the duty to investigate, to preserve the Constitution, but the fact the Constitution delineates zones of privacy and individual liberties. These regulatory procedures speak reasonably to both.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
(Enclosures - 2)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. J. B. ADAMS

DATE: May 7, 1975

FROM : LEGAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Each Assistant Director

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. P. V. Daly
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Re my memorandum to you 5/5/75 enclosing a request from the Senate Select Committee (SSC) for additional information. Attached to the copies of instant memorandum for Messrs. Jenkins, Ash, Moore, and White are copies of the referenced memorandum and its enclosure.

The following is to delineate individual responsibilities and assignments for securing the information requested by the SSC. Because the request covers areas of operations affecting all Divisions of the Bureau except Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE), it will be necessary that the very closest coordination and maximum of cooperation be effected in order to implement the SSC request.

In handling this request which deals primarily with the furnishing to the SSC of various Sections of the Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations, as well as information concerning our filing system, and particularly copies of all Bureau forms, we should bear in mind that there are available three options for consideration. One, is to give the requested information or documents. Two, is to not furnish the documents but merely permit their review at FBIHQ. A third option available is to set forth justifying data to support a denial of furnishing the information or documents. Of course, in furnishing any documents, we should bear in mind the option of excising sensitive information.

REC-40 62-116395-133

In delineating the specific responsibilities for the various Divisions, we are designating the Division having primary interest as the one to prepare the necessary material and are

EX-116

62-116395

3 MAY ~~18~~ 19 1975

PVD/SFP:ekw
(20)

CONTINUED - OVER

56 MAY 22 1975

MAY 20 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-1855-A

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/LP/46 #MOR 16

indicating in most instances what other Divisions would have an input to furnish the primary Division. Even if auxiliary Divisions are not designated for input purposes, if the primary Division desires the views of another Division, it should obtain same prior to preparing the material.

Because of the involved coordination necessary, it is requested that each Division except OPE designate a representative to appear at a conference at 10:00 A.M. Friday, 5/9/75, in the Intelligence Division Conference Room, Room 4017, JEH Building, where the details for preparation of the necessary material will be discussed.

The following are the assignments corresponding with the 4/30/75 SSC memorandum and its appendices which deal with four main requests.

(1) The portion dealing with Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instructions will be handled by the Training Division which will gather all of the necessary information from Bureau files after which Intelligence Division will review and make a final determination as to the necessary response to the SSC.

(2) Concerning Sections of the Manual of Instructions Not Previously Produced and the corresponding Appendix B, the following assignments are made.

Section	Subject	Assignment
4	Surveillances and Raids	(Training Division with input to be supplied by the three investigative Divisions. Note should be taken that this Section was previously made available to GAO in connection with its audit of Bureau operations.)
8R	Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division	(Computer Systems Division)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

Section	Subject	Assignment
19	Applicant and Employee Investigations Conducted for Other Agencies	(Special Investigative Division) (SID)
23	Bomb Threats, Explosives and Incendiary Devices	(Intelligence Division) (INTD)
27	Civil Rights	(General Investigative Division) (GID)
28	Civil Rights Act of 1964	(GID)
29	Conspiracy	(GID with input from INTD and SID)
75	Neutrality Matters	(INTD)
78	Passports and Visas	(GID)
90	Selective Service Act	(SID)
102	Coordination with Other Government Agencies	(INTD with input from GID and SID).
103	Foreign Police Cooperation	(INTD)
134	Assaulting the President of the United States and Threats to the President of the United States	(GID)
136	Antiriot Laws	(INTD)
144	Police Killings	(GID)
146	Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States	(INTD with input from GID)

CONTINUED - OVER

(3) Concerning the Manual of Rules and Regulations and Appendix C, the following assignments are made. For Part I, Section 9 - Disciplinary Matters (Administrative Division). For Part II, Section 1 - Authority - Training - Submission of Information (Training Division); Section 2 - Supervision - Availability - Resident Agencies (Administrative Division); Section 3 - Administration of Offices (Files and Communications Division with input from Administrative Division. Computer Systems Division will supply the input for 3F); Section 4 - Communications (Files and Communications Division with input from the following Divisions: Administrative, INTD, GID, SID, Legal Counsel, and Computer Systems Division); Section 5 - Dissemination of Information (GID with input from INTD and SID); Section 6 - Publications, Press, and Public Contacts (External Affairs Division); Section 7 - Payments - Property (Administrative Division with input from Computer Systems Division); Section 8 - Miscellaneous Regulations (SID with all other Divisions except OPE furnishing appropriate input); Section 9 - Classification - Character - Copies - Abbreviations (Training Division with all other Divisions except OPE furnishing appropriate input).

(4) Concerning Filing System, Files and Communications Division will handle with necessary input from Training Division concerning the request pertaining to all Bureau Forms.

This matter must be given priority, expedite attention by all Divisions bearing in mind that on the one hand, it is absolutely imperative that the review and study be of high quality, and that on the other hand, there be no delay which could result in criticism of the Bureau for not responding promptly to the SSC.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Assignments to be handled as indicated above.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

(2) Representatives of all Divisions except OPE attend coordinating conference 10:00 A.M. 5/9/75, Room 4017, JEH Building.

JBH/pvd

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

~~Hotis~~

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/6/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/STG

From 10:30 a.m. until 2:45 p.m. on May 6, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis and I met with Frederick Schwarz, General Counsel to the Senate Select Committee, Committee staffers Burt Wides, Pat Shea and Mike Madigan, and CIA representatives Marvin Smith and Walter Lloyd.

I arranged to attend this conference in an effort to resolve with the Committee staff the procedures that would be followed during interviews of current and former FBI employees by staff representatives. Interviews have been conducted in the recent past by representatives of the Committee, and in the absence of any general understanding as to the procedures we have been advising those persons coming to our attention as prospective witnesses that they may request the presence of a Bureau representative during the interview. Committee staff members have objected to the presence of Bureau representatives and have insisted that the interviews proceed in the absence of any agency representative.

EX-110 REC-35 62-116375-132

At the outset of the meeting today, it became clear that Schwarz, speaking for the members of the Senate Select Committee and for the staff, was opposed to the presence of agency representatives during interviews concerning matters which they described as "abuses." Schwarz explained that the Committee has a responsibility to look into allegations of misconduct or abuse in addition to a broader study of the jurisdiction and operations of the intelligence community. He said that while there would be a willingness on their part to have agency representatives present during interviews concerning general inquiries regarding jurisdiction, they felt that it would be improper and would interfere with the integrity of their investigation if third parties were present during interviews concerning misconduct.

MAY 13 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz

LEGAL COUN.

PLS. REC. UNIT

JAM:mfd

70 MAY 23 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Schwarz offered as an alternative that the agencies would be advised of the identity of persons to be interviewed and that prior to the interview the agency would contact the witness to explain the authority, the security arrangements made by the Committee for the protection of information, to authorize the witness to answer questions where the witness was bound by a secrecy agreement, and to caution the witness concerning matters of a sensitive nature which should be deferred for discussion with members of the Committee or with the Chairman of the Committee.

I pointed out to Schwarz that unless the FBI was given notice as to the specific subject matter of the interview to be conducted, we would find it most difficult to intelligently assess the sensitivity of the information that might be furnished by the witness. The CIA representatives expressed great alarm that an interview could disclose information without some prior assessment of the potential damage to intelligence collection techniques and sources.

As to these points, Schwarz stated that he would discuss with the members of the Committee a revision of their initial proposal that would include notice to the agency of the identity of a person to be interviewed plus a generic description of the subject matter of the interview followed by a contact by the agency with the prospective witness to assess the sensitivity of the information and to advise the witness of areas of inquiry that must be deferred for special handling by designated members of the Committee or of the Committee staff. Following that contact the Committee representative would proceed to conduct the interview with the understanding that the agency representative would be near-by and immediately available for consultation should the witness have concern as to the degree of sensitivity of information he was being asked to furnish. At the conclusion of the interview, the Committee would make available to the agency a summary of the notes taken during the interview but a transcription of the interview would not be made available either to the agency or to the witness interviewed.

Schwarz stipulated that there may be occasions when the Committee would reserve its right to interview an individual, whether a current employee or a former employee, in secret in order to protect the interview or to insure the completeness and accuracy of his information. I asked Burt Wides whether they had any basis for that concern and he indicated that they did have such a basis, but declined to specify the details.

CONTINUED - OVER

Inspector Hotis asked whether the on-going interviews would be delayed pending resolution of the differences concerning procedures. Schwarz replied that the interviews will proceed due to time factors. I then requested Schwarz to expedite his discussion with the members of the Committee, to state their proposals in writing in order that we could review them in specific detail, and to let me know as soon as their proposal as approved by the Committee was available for discussion. He agreed to do so and said that probably this could be accomplished by Thursday, May 8, 1975.

OPINION

It was my impression in dealing with Schwarz that he is making an honest effort to conduct the Committee inquiry reasonably and that he is concerned about the public acceptance of the Committee's final product. His concerns about the integrity of the investigation are similar to those that I would express about an FBI investigation. His insistence that interviews of individuals concerning possible misconduct be done alone with the witness appear to me to be reasonable to insure the integrity of their investigation. The compromise we discussed (they would identify the witnesses to us prior to interview and tell us the proposed subject matter of the interview and allow us to consult with the witness prior to interview) seems to be a practical solution to our mutual problem. This solution is not as acceptable to CIA due to their greater need for protection of their covert operations, sources and methods. The Committee has available to it the subpoena power, the authority to conduct public hearings, and a good deal of support by public opinion. Therefore, I conclude that the Committee is likely to discover the full details of events concerning which they inquire whether the FBI cooperates or appears to be reluctant. As to those areas of legitimate concern because of their sensitivity in terms of production of informants or sources and methods of gathering national security intelligence, the Bureau can properly expect an opportunity to provide protection for the information.

If the procedures suggested above are operated in good faith on both sides, the Bureau would be given notice as to the subject matter to be discussed prior to the interview and research could disclose the areas of sensitivity and appropriate action taken to caution the witness against disclosure of such information.

CONTINUED - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That until procedures are established with the Committee the Bureau continue its present practice of advising prospective witnesses upon their request that they have a right to consult with a Bureau representative during interview.

2. That further discussions of this matter with the Committee await the receipt of their proposed guidelines in writing after approval by members of the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___
HOTIS

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE Activities

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/JTC

This morning the Director asked me to inquire into the status of our understanding with the Senate Select Committee as to whether FBI representatives would or would not be present at interviews of former Bureau employees or current Bureau employees. The Director was concerned that the presence of a Bureau representative could be criticized as an attempt to interfere with the Committee's inquiries. I assured the Director that the purpose of such representatives being present was to assist the interviewer and the witness in determining areas of inquiry of particular sensitivity or that might concern a current Bureau operation. The Director agreed that such was an appropriate reason for the presence of a Bureau representative and asked me to consider preparing a letter addressed to Senator Church stating our desire to make available a Bureau representative and the reasons for the presence of such a Bureau representative.

As a result of a conference with representatives of CIA, Roderick Hills of the White House Counsel staff, and others, it was determined that Walter Lloyd of the CIA Legal Staff would continue negotiations with the Committee in behalf of the entire intelligence community to develop procedures concerning the interview of witnesses and the presence of agency representatives at such interviews. Mr. Lloyd was scheduled to meet with Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee, on Tuesday, May 6, 1975, to discuss such arrangements.

EX-101 REC-3 62-116395-131

I scheduled an appointment with the Deputy Attorney General and met with him at 5:00 p.m. on May 5, 1975, accompanied by Inspector John B. Hotis. I told the Deputy of our concern that the interviews by the Senate Committee are continuing even though no understanding has been reached by the Committee and the intelligence community. I told the Deputy that the Director would like to have some

3 MAY 13 1975

LEGAL COUN

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 21 1975

formal understanding with Senator Church as to the Bureau's position in regard to such interviews. I reminded the Deputy that our sole concern was to make a representative available to assist in the interviews in the event they touched upon sensitive areas and by no means was our interest to be understood to be an effort to interfere with the Senate Committee's inquiries.

The Deputy said he fully understood our position and agreed. He asked me whether I would be willing to agree to hold off on formal notification to Senator Church until the negotiations to be conducted by Mr. Lloydc could be concluded. I told the Deputy I would agree to that on the condition that I and also Inspector Hotis would participate in the discussions by Lloyd with the Committee representatives. The Deputy Attorney General said that he fully concurred in my condition and if there developed any difficulty in making such arrangements, he would assist in seeing that it was accomplished.

Inspector Hotis advised that Schwarz, the Committee counsel, has arranged a meeting on Wednesday morning, May 7, 1975, with Assistant Attorney General Scalia of the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department. We will also be represented at that meeting.

The Deputy Attorney General told me that he had been advised by Schwarz that a former Bureau Agent, Leo Clark, had objected to the fact that a Bureau representative had contacted him and had indicated a willingness to be present during Clark's interview by the Committee. I again assured the Deputy that our sole purpose in contacting Clark was to be available in the event a Bureau representative was needed to discuss matters of a sensitive nature or matters concerning current Bureau operations. The Deputy said he understood and Clark's complaint was likely the result of a misunderstanding.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

May 14, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) with enclosures described below.

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

In response to a request from the SSC for certain documents and other information, an LHM was submitted as a cover communication to furnish the SSC copies of the following documents.

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/16/72 captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."

2. An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/18/72 captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III dated 5/19/72.

4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated 8/7/73 recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/9/01 BY SP2ALM/LRG #M0216

REC-100 62-116395-130

Encl

3 MAY 16 1975

~~SEE NOTE~~ PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

62-116395

SFP:ekw (4)

ekw

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAY 20 1975

GPO 954-546

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/22/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-83

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/7/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/TR

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

At 5:05 p.m. on May 6, 1975, I went to the White House to meet with Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; Roderick Hills, Associate Counsel;James Wilderotter, Assistant Counsel; Assistant Attorney General Scalia, Office of Legal Counsel in the Department; John Clark, Associate to the Director of CIA; Walter Lloyd and Marvin Smith of CIA. The meeting was called by Mr. Buchen to discuss the developments that day with regard to the proposal that agency representatives would be present during interviews conducted by investigators of the Senate Select Committee staff.

At a meeting held earlier that day, the General Counsel of the Senate Select Committee had indicated that the Committee disapproved of the presence of agency representatives at interviews concerning alleged "abuses." I explained to Mr. Buchen the alternative proposal offered by F.A.O. Schwarz to the effect that agencies would be furnished the identities of proposed witnesses, the subject matter of the proposed interviews, and permitted an opportunity to review the subject matter and consult with the witness to advise him of sensitive areas that would require special treatment. John Clark agreed that in regard to interviews concerning abuses, it would seem to be necessary for the Committee to proceed with the interview without an agency representative present. After general discussion of the proposal by Schwarz, the meeting concluded with instructions by Mr. Buchen to Wilderotter to draft a statement that might be incorporated into a letter to be addressed to the Committee explaining the Administration's position.

The elements of the proposal would be that as a general rule, agency representatives would be present during interviews concerning matters that were not categorized as abuses and in those exceptional cases

REC-100 62-116395-129

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (5)

15 MAY 13 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 MAY 20 1975

where abuses would be the subject of interviews, the agencies would be given prior notice of the identities of the witnesses and of the subject matter of the interview, plus an opportunity to consult with the witness prior to the interview. Mr. Buchen also asked that the Committee be requested to provide a letter in each instance identifying the alleged abuse as the subject of the interview and indicating Committee approval of that inquiry. The objective of such a requirement would be to clearly identify those interviews characterized as "abuses" interviews which would require the absence of an agency representative during the actual interview.

I was also asked to contact Schwarz to insure that he would not present to the Committee his counterproposal during the regular committee meeting on Wednesday, May 7, 1975. The purpose of such a request was to avoid the Committee adopting a final proposal regarding interviews prior to the Executive having an opportunity to express its position.

On the morning of May 7, 1975, we spoke with Schwarz, requested him to refrain from offering his counterproposals to the Committee for approval, and in response to his request explained to him that the reason was that the proposals were under discussion and it was necessary for all agencies in the intelligence community to be involved in the determination whether the alternative procedures would be acceptable. Mr. Schwarz agreed to refrain from offering his counterproposals to the Committee today.

At approximately 10:25 a.m. on May 7th, I called Wilderotter and asked what the progress of his preparation of the proposed letter was. He told me that there would be no letter addressed to the Committee because the White House did not desire to escalate this matter and go over the head of the Committee counsel. I told him that I was extremely concerned at the inaction which has resulted thus far in the FBI being in an indefensible position in regard to interviews of former employees. I explained to him that the Committee has not advised us of the interviews that have been conducted and we have learned of them only by calls from the witnesses. I told him that the interviews are still continuing because at the meeting on May 6, 1975, we expressly requested the Committee counsel to discontinue the interviews temporarily until guidelines could be established and the Committee counsel expressly refused to do so.

I told Wilderotter that this morning I received a call from John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director, who has broad knowledge of FBI matters, in which Mohr told me that he has been called to be interviewed at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, May 9, 1975, at Room G-308 in the New Senate Office Building. Mark Gittenstein was identified as the interviewer. I told Wilderotter this concerned me because we have no basis on which to advise Mr. Mohr as to the appropriate guidelines that may be followed during the course of such an interview and in the absence of knowledge of the subject matter of the interview we have no way of counseling him as to sensitive areas that should be deferred for discussion with members of the Committee or with the Chairman of the Committee.

Wilderotter said he understood my concern but he saw no way in which the matter could be resolved in time for guidelines to be established for the Mohr interview. He told me he would work on the preparation of a position paper to be used by the White House and the intelligence community to establish a policy that could be discussed with the Committee.

Inspector Hotis and I then at approximately 11:10 a.m. went to a conference already in session in the office of Assistant Attorney General Scalia attended by representatives of the CIA, Department of Defense, NSA, Department of State and the Department of the Treasury. The other agencies were advised of the results of the meeting with the Senate Select Committee staff on May 6, 1975, and a general discussion ensued as to the willingness of the agencies to agree to interviews in the absence of agency representatives. The representatives of the State Department, Mr. Hitchcock and Mr. Jennings, indicated that State was adamant that interviews would not be conducted in the absence of representatives.

I spoke privately with Assistant Attorney General Scalia and advised him of my conversation with Wilderotter and of the fact that John Mohr had been called for interview on Friday, May 9, 1975. I told him of my great concern that Mohr's interview would be sensitive because of his broad knowledge of the Bureau and told him that it was essential that appropriate guidelines be developed concerning such interviews as soon as possible. Scalia told me that he had just finished speaking with Wilderotter and he shared my concern. He then called Wilderotter and subsequently advised me that Wilderotter said that he, Wilderotter, would immediately contact Schwarz to request a postponement of the interview of John Mohr pending the establishment of guidelines. In the event he would be unsuccessful, Roderick Hills and Philip Buchen would discuss the matter with Senator Church and Senator Tower.

CONTINUED - OVER

There was a general consensus of opinion at the meeting with the other agencies of agreeing that they would await the development of the position paper by Wilderotter. Walter Lloyd advised that another meeting with Schwarz and the Committee staff would be scheduled for Thursday, May 8, 1975.

Upon my return to my office, Wilderotter called me to report that he had been unsuccessful in having the Mohr interview postponed and further that Schwarz had advised him that he now feels that it would be inappropriate for agency representatives to be present at any interviews whether they concerned abuse or whether they concerned general matters, and further that he felt that it would be inappropriate for the agency to be advised of the subject matter prior to the interview.

At that point, Mark Gittenstein joined the conversation with Schwarz & Wilderotter and advised Wilderotter that he intended to interview Mohr concerning "procedures and how paper moved in the Hoover days," and this would constitute 90% of the interview. The remaining 10% of the interview would concern Hoover's "O. C. Files." Further Gittenstein mentioned that he was aware that John Mohr is the Executor of Mr. Tolson's estate and he may inquire concerning that matter.

Wilderotter said that there would be no further contact with the Committee concerning the Mohr interview and that we should assume the Mohr interview will proceed as scheduled. He said that he would suggest the Bureau contact Gittenstein to discuss any further details regarding the subject matter of the interview of Mohr and that we consider discussing with Mohr prior to the interview matters that he should not discuss with Gittenstein. He also suggested that we debrief Mr. Mohr at the completion of the interview.

I reminded Mr. Wilderotter that there are no guidelines by which the White House or the intelligence community or the Senate Committee have agreed that the FBI should make such arrangements with the witness. I told him that I thought that the FBI would be used as a test case both by the Committee and by the intelligence community if we undertook to negotiate such matters directly with Gittenstein. I told him that I thought that such direct negotiations would undermine the effectiveness of current

CONTINUED - OVER

negotiations to establish broad guidelines with the concurrence of the Committee that could be used to effectively limit the scope and manner of interviews currently being conducted by staff investigators. I also told him that I thought it would put the Bureau in a most difficult posture because the intelligence community could well feel that the FBI had brought about the loss of the opportunity to have some effective control over Committee access to sensitive information by negotiating our own agreement with Gittenstein. I told him that certainly the Committee would use us as an example to other intelligence agencies and use our experience to their detriment in establishing limitations on the interviews.

Mr. Wilderotter said that he understood my position and he would continue to work on the policy paper. He asked to be advised of the time the meeting is to be held with Schwarz on May 8, 1975, and I indicated I would so advise him on learning of it myself from Walter Lloyd of CIA who is making the arrangements. I also suggested that it would be appropriate for Roderick Hills, Associate Counsel to the President, to be present at the meeting with Schwarz in order to have a greater chance of resolving these issues promptly. Wilderotter said that he agreed and would attempt to make arrangements for Mr. Hills to be present at the meeting.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Bureau provide a representative to be available for consultation by Mr. Mohr as he may request on Friday, May 9, 1975, at 10:00 a.m., in Room G-308, New Senate Office Building.

✓ Bill Cregar will contact Mr. Mohr + be avail. [illegible] 5/8

2. That until appropriate guidelines are established by agreement between the Committee, the White House, and the intelligence community, the Bureau not undertake to counsel or debrief Mr. Mohr or any other witnesses concerning the subject matter of interview, pursuant to agreement with individual staff interviewers.

CONTINUED - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONT'D):

3. That Inspector Hotis and I, if I am available, attend the meeting with Schwarz on Thursday, May 8, 1975.

OK

Airtel

62-116395-

- Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
4/18/75

To: SAC, Buffalo (157-1681)

From: Director, FBI ~~(157-27812)~~

PERSONAL ATTENTION

KARL EDWARD HAND, JR.
EXTREMIST MATTER - NATIONAL GUARD PARTY
(BUDED: 4/23/75)

1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
(Mr. J. G. Kelly)
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. R. F. Olmert)
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W. D. Fallin
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

ReBUairtel dated 4/11/75.

A review of the copy of subject's letter to Senator Frank Church dated 4/8/75 and allegations contained therein concerning Agent personnel of your office requires prompt submission of affidavits in refutation of those allegations where facts so warrant.

Accordingly, and in view of the extreme likelihood of early inquiry concerning these allegations from Senator Church or other recipients of subject's letter, appropriate affidavits should be drawn and submitted by airtel to FBIHQ by the close of business 4/23/75.

In the event one or more of subject's allegations cannot be refuted, you should make specific comment concerning same in your airtel enclosing these affidavits.

An extra copy of this communication is furnished Buffalo for inclusion in its file concerning the National Guard Party.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/22/01 BY SP-2ALM/eds

#mo446

Original Filed In 157-27812-12

Records
cc 62-116395

1 - Pittsburgh

1 - 157-33528 (National Guard Party)

MAY 16 1975

PEN:fb
(15)

MAILED 4
APR 17 1975
FBI

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

JGD

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAY 21 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Airtel to SAC, Buffalo
RE: KARL EDWARD HAND, JR.
157-27812

NOTE:

Subject is a former leader of the white hate National Socialist White Peoples Party in Buffalo, New York. He presently heads an organization known as the National Guard Party (NGP), a neo-Nazi white hate organization which by its objectives would deny certain minority groups of their civil rights. Referenced airtel enclosed copies of a letter written by subject to Senator Frank Church (Democrat - Idaho) of the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities in which he makes complaint concerning the Bureau's investigation of his organization, himself, and with regard to the arrest of his coleader, William Edward Garrett, in connection with a Federal firearms violation. Subject's letter, copies of which were also directed to Senator John Tower (Republican - Texas) and to the Buffalo "Courier Express," a daily newspaper published in Buffalo, charges the FBI in Buffalo tapped his telephone as well as the telephones of NGP members and supporters; threatened to "frame" subject; threatened to "get" subject; attempted to bribe his personal friends; used "scare" tactics against friends, relatives, employees and businessmen who do the NGP organization's printing; threatened to shoot subject's dogs during arrest of William Edward Garrett; and lied to NGP supporters and businessmen by indicating the NGP group was planning to blow up certain buildings. Subject's letter alleges these activities are in direct violation of the NGP organization's constitutional rights and requests Senator Church conduct investigation concerning same. Appropriate instructions being directed to the Buffalo Division which, in referenced airtel, indicated Special Agents involved in the controversial arrest of Garrett have submitted memoranda categorically denying allegations concerning the arrest. Bureau files contain no information to substantiate allegations of subject.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

NOTE CONTINUED:

This has been coordinated with SA R. F. Olmert of the Legal Counsel Division. Bureau deadline being imposed in view of the nature of the allegations made and current investigation into FBI operational activities by Senator Church's committee.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 4/11/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/22/01 BY SP2ALM 1876

#MOR16

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (157-27812)

FROM: SAC, BUFFALO (157-1681) (P)

KARL EDWARD HAND, JR., aka
EM - NGP
(OO: BUFFALO)

SENSTUDY 75

J60/WDA

Remylet, 1/23/75, captioned as above; report of SA ROBERT N. SHAW, 10/25/74, at Buffalo, and Buffalo airtel to Bureau, 10/31/74, both captioned "WILLIAM EDWARD GARRETT; EM - NSWPP; UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS, OO: PITTSBURGH."

Enclosed for the Bureau are two (2) typewritten copies and for Pittsburgh one (1) copy by Bureau secretary of letter received by the Buffalo Division on 4/10/75, addressed to The Honorable FRANK D. CHURCH, U. S. Senate, Washington, D.C., dated 4/8/75, which is self-explanatory. Buffalo unable to xerox because of poor quality of carbon copy received. Bureau's attention is drawn to the letter's distribution. For the information of the Bureau, Buffalo "Courier Express" is a daily newspaper published at Buffalo, New York. The letter is allegedly signed by KARL HAND, JR. Authenticity of HAND's letter writing activities confirmed in conversations with BU 1471-E, who alerted Buffalo Office prior to receipt of enclosed letter.

ENCLOSURE

For the information of the Bureau, incident referred to as section "F." in the enclosed letter refers to

1cc airtel & enclosure retained 4077 JEH

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2) (AMRM)
1 - Pittsburgh (157-1640) (Enc. 1) (AMRM)
2 - Buffalo

RFU:cas
(5)

62-116395-1

APR 14 1975

NOT RECORDED

MAY 16 1975

cc 62-116395

Original Filed In 157-27812-12

airtel Bu 4/17/75
1-PC

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge   Sent __________ M   Per __________ the arrest of WILLIAM EDWARD GARRETT (Bureau file 157-22471; Buffalo file 157-1388) by Bureau Agents at Buffalo, New York on 10/23/74 at the residence of KARL HAND, 2213 South Bailey Avenue, Buffalo, New York. GARRETT was arrested based on an authorized complaint and warrant at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, charging GARRETT with violation of Title 18, Appendix, Section 1202(a)(1), USC, "Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon". It should be noted that KARL HAND was not present at this arrest and GARRETT was alone in the house.

In that arrest Buffalo advised the Bureau in referenced airtel, dated 10/31/74, of the items observed by Bureau Agents at time of arrest, which were as follows:

The front windows and door of 2213 South Bailey Avenue are completely covered with chicken wire. There were two large German Shepherd dogs on the premises. Upon entering the residence a five-gallon can was observed behind the stove with approximately six axe handles. In the upstairs bedroom there was a fully-loaded Stevens Model 77B 20-gauge shotgun, serial number unknown. In the downstairs bedroom there were several boxes of .22 ammunition and numerous loose 20-gauge shotgun shells.

It is noted that memoranda have been prepared by the SAs who participated in this arrest of GARRETT on 10/23/74, including SA ROBERT N. SHAW, wherein all categorically deny that any attempt was made to incite GARRETT into doing anything against his best interests. In addition, all SAs categorically deny any threat having been made to shoot dogs found on the premises. It is pointed out that GARRETT was alone in the house at the time of arrest and that at no time was KARL HAND present.

It is also pointed out for the information of the Bureau that on 11/7/74, U. S. Magistrate EDMUND F. MAXWELL, Buffalo, New York, released GARRETT and dismissed charge of violation of Title 18, Appendix, Section 1202(a)(1), USC. However, on 11/8/74, the FGJ, Western District of Pennsylvania (WDPA) at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, entered a true bill charging GARRETT with violation of Title 18, Appendix, Section 1202(a)(1), USC and Title 18, Section 922(a)(6) and Section 924(a), USC (State Firearms Control Assistance Act). Bond recommended by AUSA, Pittsburgh was $35,000 cash or surety.

GARRETT was again arrested by a team of Agents led by SA ROBERT N. SHAW on 11/8/74, based on aforementioned indictment in WDPA, for Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon and for violation of the State Firearms Control Assistance Act. At this time KARL HAND was present but the aforementioned arrest was effected on the sidewalk in front of 2213 South Bailey Avenue, Buffalo, New York, without incident. There were no dogs present at this time.

No further action being taken by this Office in regards to the letter of KARL HAND.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 4/14/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/MAG

FM DR16

This memorandum reports the results of an Executive Committee Meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community on 4/11/75.

The Executive Committee, hereinafter referred to as EXCOM, was chaired by Mr. W. E. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Present at the meeting were Mr. Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President; Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President; Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, as well as senior officials of State Department, National Security Agency (NSA), Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council. Mr. Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, was scheduled to represent the Department of Justice; however, due to a scheduling foul up Scalia never made the meeting.

The following matters of interest were discussed at this meeting:

SENATOR CHURCH'S STATEMENT

"The Washington Post" edition of 4/10/75 contained the results of an interview with Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). According to this article, Church stated the Committee reserves the right to make public eventually any documents it receives and is accepting nothing with "strings attached." Mr. Roderick Hills advised the EXCOM that he and Mr. Wilderotter had a meeting with SSC Staff Director, William Miller subsequent to the Church statement. Both Hills and Wilderotter came away from this meeting believing the newspaper report was an overstatement of Church's intent. Considerable discussion followed Mr. Hills' comments. Mr. Colby noted that by letter dated 3/11/75 to Senator Church he confirmed a previous conversation with Senator Church wherein the Senator

Enclosures

WOC:lmh lmh
(7)

REC-100

62-116395-128

15 MAY 13 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

6 - ENCLOSURE

MAY 21 1975

84 MAY 20 1975

recognized that certain aspects of intelligence activities must receive special consideration and treatment (a copy of Colby's letter is attached). By letter dated 3/12/75, Senator Church confirmed the receipt of Colby's letter and again stated that in the event the SSC inquiry touches on such sensitive areas, Senator Church and Colby should discuss jointly what procedures should be followed (copy of Senator Church's letter is attached).

Following the meeting Mr. Wilderotter advised me that the White House will prepare a letter to Senator Church recognizing that Congress can, at its discretion, declassify material it receives but strongly urging that such declassification action not be taken unilaterally by the Senate Select Committee without the approval of the agency originating the information. Wilderotter stated that the White House expected to speak for the Executive Branch with a strong voice and that individual agencies should take no action regarding the Church statement until the White House has had the opportunity to clear the air with Senator Church.

SECRECY AGREEMENT AND EMPLOYEE NOTICE

Attached is a copy of a CIA employee bulletin dated 3/12/75. This bulletin relieves CIA employees from the secrecy agreement should they be interviewed or should they have to testify before the SSC. At the EXCOM meeting Mr. Wilderotter suggested all agencies of the intelligence community employing a secrecy agreement prepare such an employee notice as well as a letter to Senator Church advising him that the individual agency was relieving their employees from the secrecy agreement. Mr. Colby charged the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) with preparing a draft of such a bulletin and letter for the guidance of member agencies and departments.

It is the opinion of Assistant Director Mintz concurred IN by the Intelligence Division that a general letter to all employees from the Director releasing them from their obligation under the FBI employment agreement concerning secrecy for purposes of possible interviews by representatives of the Senate

CONTINUED - OVER

Select Committee would be unwise. It cannot be predicted what level of FBI employee will be contacted for interview or whether any employee contacted would have sufficient factual knowledge in order to provide a full responsive reply to Committee questions. Moreover, an employee without a full understanding of the material being inquired about may not be aware of the sensitive nature of the answers that might be given.

As written, the employment agreement provides that the burden is on the employee to determine prior to disclosure whether information may be disclosed and that the Director of the FBI is in a better position than the employee to make such a determination. Therefore, it is the opinion of Mr. Mintz and the Intelligence Division that if no general letter of release is issued to all employees, any member contacted for interview may rely upon the provisions of the employment agreement as guidelines for his or her appropriate response. Specifically, such an employee would be obligated to bring to the attention of the Bureau any such request for an interview and in addition, he or she would be obligated to describe the general nature of the inquiry. At such time as request for interviews are made we will be in a better position to determine whether the employee is the appropriate person and to evaluate the sensitivity of the material in question.

REVIEW OF WHITE HOUSE DOCUMENTS BY SENATORS CHURCH AND TOWER:

Mr. Hills advised that both Senators Church and Tower have tentatively agreed to review sensitive White House documents the SSC is interested in in White House space. They have tentatively accepted the fact that should they believe such documents are necessary for retention in SSC files, they will accept a paraphrase of the original document. This arrangement has not been completely agreed to by Senators Church and Tower but Mr. Hills is hopeful such an arrangement can be worked out.

BRIEFING OF THE SSC BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

Mr. Colby advised that during the week of 4/13/75 he and Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, will brief the Senate

CONTINUED - OVER

Select Committee staff on how the Director of Cental Intelligence manages the intelligence community. Later in the month, Colby is hopeful that those senators making up the Committee will also visit CIA Headquarters for a similar briefing.

KEY ISSUES

My memorandum of 4/7/75 reporting the results of the last EXCOM meeting identified eleven key issues which the White House was particularly interested in (copy of the key issues attached). As reported in the 4/7/75 memorandum the FBI has been designated to prepare the paper entitled "Intelligence Files and Privacy." Mr. J. Dennis Miller, Legal Counsel Division, will prepare this paper. He will work with Mr. John Brock, Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as Mr. Bob McBrien of Treasury. The White House is very interested in the preparation of these key issue papers and has asked that the person responsible for preparing each paper have ready a comprehensive outline as to how the paper will be constructed on the occasion of the next EXCOM meeting scheduled for Friday 4/18/75.

THIRD AGENCY RULE

Attached herewith is a paper entitled "Third Agency Rule" prepared by CIA's General Counsel. It is designed to acquaint the intelligence community with a background of the third agency rule and to insure that all members of the community adhere to the third agency rule when responding to requests from the Select Committees of the Congress. It is to be noted Mr. Wilderotter expressed the hope that all agencies in the intelligence community will respond to a third agency request within a 48 hour deadline. Both the military and CIA felt such a short deadline was impossible but all indicated they would try to provide responses within 48 hours when clearance to pass information to the Select Committees of Congress under the third agency rule is requested.

CONTINUED - OVER

INTERAGENCY REGISTRY

Attached is a memorandum from Mr. Colby to all USIB principals dated 4/10/75 describing the establishment of a registry to insure that the community is kept informed as to materials which will formally be provided to the Select Committee by all elements of the intelligence community. The Colby memorandum notes that in order to make the registry useful it is essential that it include the following:

File copies of documents or other materials which each intelligence community element provides to a Select Committee wherein the originating agency considers the material to involve aspects of community activities. (The Bureau would have very few items of this nature other than agreements or understandings the Bureau might have with other elements of the intelligence community.)

The second requirement of the registry is that an abstract of each response to a Select Committee be provided to the registry for its retention. The Bureau has already established a procedure for providing such abstracts to the registry.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. In light of the Church statement in "The Washington Post" and the subsequent conversations the White House has or contemplates having with Senators Church and Tower, it is recommended that we continue to disseminate all responses to the SSC except in those sensitive matters that require close administrative control. In those instances it is recommended that we advise the Staff Director that such information responsive to their request is available at Bureau Headquarters and may be reviewed by himself or a senior staff member of the SSC.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

2. That Liaison Officer Frank Schwartz, the Bureau's representative on the Security Committee of USIB, present the Bureau's position regarding the issuance of an employee bulletin.

OK

5/1/75
D.E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee
advised that Security Committee
has not been charged with drafting
employee bulletin and he does not
expect that it will be.

#MORI6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM [illegible]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 MAR 1975

FBI #mdr16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM

The Honorable Frank Church
Chairman
Select Committee to Study Governmental
  Operations with Respect to Intelligence
  Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter will confirm and reduce to writing some of the matters agreed upon at our recent meeting.

At the outset, I should like to express my deep personal appreciation for the candor and helpfulness of you and Senator Tower in that meeting and for your sensitivity to the respective responsibilities under our Constitutional framework of the Select Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency in the area of your review. For my part, I should like to renew again, for myself and the CIA, my promise of cooperation with respect to the important work of the Select Committee. In my judgment, a spirit of good faith and cooperative effort is not only necessary to enable your Committee to discharge its responsibilities fully and expeditiously, but is indeed in the best interests of the intelligence community as well. I am convinced that a responsible and thorough review of U.S. intelligence activities will serve to vindicate the CIA and enhance the public's understanding of the important contribution that the intelligence efforts of this nation can make toward the goal of preserving and strengthening our democracy.

I am particularly appreciative of your recognition that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence activities must receive special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee in the course of your work. As we discussed, such matters as the identities of our sensitive sources, the material provided to us by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain of our employees who could be targets of kidnapping or assassination, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with U.S. intelligence, and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems, should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from the risk of exposure. We should also work together to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals. Where these kinds of considerations are present, I anticipate that appropriate understandings can be arrived at to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time to satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of our activities.

As I stated to you, employees of the Central Intelligence Agency will be available to the Select Committee for staff interviews and for testimony. As we have discussed, this might require, in some circumstances, special arrangements to protect the identity of particular employees whose physical safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure. I anticipate that suitable safeguards can be established to avoid such dangers. I assume the Committee will make its own arrangements with respect to ex-employees as to whom I no longer have the authority to direct their cooperation. However, I am available for whatever assistance I can provide in this regard.

As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are required to sign a secrecy agreement when they enter on duty. This is a condition of employment, and it requires that they keep forever secret all classified information gained during the course of their employment. The secrecy agreement further requires that they may not disclose classified information, either orally or by publication, without prior authorization from the Director of Central Intelligence. Under the secrecy agreement, an employee's obligations with respect to the protection of classified information continue after his employment with the CIA has been terminated.

It is my desire that the secrecy agreements signed by our employees shall not impair the necessary work of the Select Committee. To accomplish this, and in recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Select Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated staff members will constitute an authorized provision of information within the meaning of the secrecy agreements. This letter may be used to indicate such authorization for any Agency employee or ex-employee to furnish information to the Select Committee or appropriate staff members on matters which would otherwise be covered by their secrecy agreement, but which are not among the particularly sensitive matters such as mentioned above. With respect to those particularly sensitive matters, different procedures are obviously necessary. Accordingly, where any matter included in these sensitive categories would be involved in responding to the Committee, the employee should express his concern and, if possible, propose a way of responding to the Committee without exposing such sensitive details. If the Committee believes that a disclosure of those aspects is nevertheless necessary, the matter will be discussed between the Committee and the Agency. I am prepared to consult with the Committee at any time to avoid difficulties in this area and quickly determine together the appropriate course of action to be taken.

With the good faith evident in our discussions on these matters, I believe that these arrangements will enable me to discharge my responsibilities to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, while at the same time to provide the Select Committee with all the information it needs to accomplish its task.

As we have agreed, it is in the national interest as well as that of the Select Committee and the U.S. intelligence community to ensure that your review proceed as smoothly and as expeditiously as possible. Toward that end, I have instructed all CIA personnel to respond in a spirit of cooperation.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby
Director

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

10 April 1975

#m0216
FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/JJ/6

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence

1. The Intelligence Community Staff, with John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy/IC, as my representative in these matters, will keep the Board and other appropriate officials advised as to progress of the investigations conducted by the Senate and House Select Committees investigating intelligence activities. In particular, it will ensure that we are kept informed as to materials which are formally being provided to the Select Committees by all elements of the Community. The USIB Ad Hoc Group will assist on this matter and provide the mechanism for regular and constant communications.

2. In response to this assignment, the Intelligence Community Staff is establishing a registry for documentation relating to the investigations. This registry will be a source of reference of all responses, testimony, et cetera, provided by USIB agencies and available to your designated representatives.

3. In order to make the registry useful to the Board, it is essential that it include:

a. File copies of documents or other materials which each Intelligence Community element provides to one of the Select Committees where the originating agency considers the materials to involve aspects of Community activities, and/or which may result in follow-on queries concerning the functioning of the Community. The availability of this documentation will be of particular importance if it is expected there will be subsequent inquiries relating to the materials provided and involving elements of the Community other than the originating element.

b. An abstract of each formal input to a Select Committee - unless the Intelligence Community registry is provided with an actual copy of the material itself. A proposed format for such abstracts is attached.

W. E. Colby

Attachment:
As stated

#MDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

No. 442

12 March 1975

Senate Select Committee To Review U.S. Intelligence Activities

Senate Resolution 21 established a Select Committee of the Senate to review U.S. intelligence activities. The Resolution calls for a comprehensive review of the total U.S. intelligence effort and is not restricted to the recent charges and allegations against CIA alone. Consequently, it is likely to be far-ranging in its impact.

It is in all of our interests to see that the Select Committee receives full understanding of our activities and their contribution to the country as expeditiously as possible. I have every confidence that the inquiry will be responsible, and constructive, and will produce new understanding of, and improvements in, the American intelligence system.

It is with this conviction that I have pledged my personal cooperation and that of the CIA. I have advised Senators Church and Tower, the Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman, that employees of the CIA will be available to the Select Committee for Staff interviews and for testimony. We are working with the Committee Staff to design procedures to facilitate their work in examining topics of concern.

Attached to this bulletin is a letter which I have sent to Senator Church. To facilitate the necessary work of the Committee and in recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated Staff members will constitute authorized provision of information within the meaning of the Secrecy Agreements signed by each CIA employee, subject to the special procedures and limitations set forth in the letter regarding particularly sensitive matters. Senator Church has agreed that reference to sensitive data in any Committee report will be subject to consultation between the Committee and the Agency.

The cooperative spirit of our relationship with the Committee and its Staff must at the same time take account of the rights of Agency employees. The Committee Staff has agreed to advise employees of their Constitutional rights at the beginning of any interview or other appearance.

When a current Agency employee is selected to be interviewed by the Select Committee Staff, the Staff Director or Chief Counsel will normally notify Mr. John M. Clarke, who is my principal liaison with the Committee and its Staff. Mr. Clarke, in turn, will notify the employee. The purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the work of the Committee. It is intended to allow time for the employee to gain general legal guidance if he wants it, and to obtain security guidance from an appropriate senior officer.

My own belief is that after a careful review of all U.S. intelligence activities, the Committee will address needed legislative changes and will reaffirm their confidence in the importance and contribution of U.S. intelligence programs.

W. E. Colby
Director

Attachment: a/s

DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES

#mdr16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Issues Identified

1.	Economic Intelligence and National Security -- new discussion.	TREASURY + CIA
2.	Covert Action and the Law.	CIA ✓OSD.
3.	The Intelligence Budget -- open, block or closed -- notional procedures for handling past, present and future.	OMB
4.	Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for Intelligence.	CIA and OSD
5.	GAO and the Audit Authorities of U.S. Intelligence Agencies.	CIA and OSD
6.	Confidential Funds Authorities, Contingency Reserves, Legal Base, History and Use.	CIA and OSD FBI - Mintz (legal [illegible])
7.	Cover for Foreign Intelligence Actions, Legal and Administrative Issues.	CIA and State
8.	Intelligence Files and Privacy.	FBI and OSD John Brock, OSD Bob O'Brien - TREA
9.	The "fact of" question -- international, legal and political considerations.	State
10.	"Sources and Methods" Legislation.	OMB and Justic
11.	An additional issue (identified by Mr. Hills) address -- adequacy or inadequacy of present classification procedures. - 701 problems - [illegible]	Legal Office, Justice, was assigned the initial responsibility of drafting a paper with inputs from th Agencies.
12	Executive Branch oversight of - NSC Intelligence Community.	

Names are to be forwarded ASAP.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

Executive Registry
75-1266

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Ad Hoc Staff
75-103

March 12, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/TG
#MOE16

Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Colby:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, I want to thank your for your letter of March 11, and the copy of the Employee Bulletin you have issued to all CIA employees. As we jointly recognize, in order for the Committee to carry out a thorough inquiry, in accordance with the mandate contained in S. Res. 21, the Agency's full cooperation will be necessary. Your recognition that our mandate authorizes all, past and present, agency employees to cooperate fully, and without impediment due to secrecy agreements, will serve to facilitate our expeditious collection of material relative to that mandate.

I particularly appreciate your statement recognizing our security precautions. As you know, your staff was very helpful to the Committee's staff in designing those precautions.

The Staff Director and the Chief Counsel will, under the direction of the Committee, notify Mr. John Clarke of the members of the Committee who have been designated to carry out studies, inquiries and investigations required to meet the tasks specified in S. Res. 21.

It is the Committee's understanding that the members of the Committee and designated staff will have access to any and all information which the Committee determines is necessary for its inquiry. We recognize, however, that the Committee inquiry may touch on sensitive areas, such as the identity of CIA personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations whose disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the event that the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive areas, which matters ✓ we have already discussed in our meeting of February 27, we should discuss jointly, and as you suggest quickly, what procedures might be followed should the Committee decide it requires more information in these specific areas.

I welcome these first steps in close cooperation and hope that it forecasts an expeditious and thorough inquiry that will result in the strengthening of our nation's intelligence activities under the law.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

10 April 1975

The Third Agency Rule

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-02 BY SP2 ALM/dts

#MDR16

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency." The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities."

2. Historically, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence." This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information." This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

> A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the third agency rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community, then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI. Recipients may not disseminate the estimate outside the Intelligence Community without the approval of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured;

(d) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence;

(e) If a State/DOD joint cable is disseminated to CIA, CIA may not send the information to the FBI until CIA has received the concurrence of both State and DOD.

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/TTE

5/2/75

TO SACS ALEXANDRIA
BALTIMORE
NEW HAVEN
NEWARK
OMAHA

PERSONAL ATTENTION

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES. THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS ALREADY INTERVIEWED SOME FORMER EMPLOYEES. NEWARK TELETYPE APRIL 30 LAST "ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY; 1964 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NOMINATING CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY," REPORTED ADVICE FROM FORMER SPECIAL AGENT JOHN P. DEVLIN THAT HE HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED BY MICHAEL T. EPSTEIN, SSC STAFF MEMBER, CONCERNING DEVLIN'S PART

On 5/2/75 Mr. N. P. Callahan [illegible] teletype [illegible] as [illegible] Gen'l Counsel

REC-89 62-116395-12

1 - Personnel File of Each Former SA

MAY 8 1975

SFP:elw (14)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 0 2 1975
TELETYPE

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

MAY 16 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

GPO 951-546

IN FBI'S ACTIVITIES AT DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, AUGUST 22-28, 1964.

SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL SQUAD AT ATLANTIC CITY, AUGUST, 1964. EACH OF THESE FORMER AGENTS IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT THEY MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF. THEY ARE NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO BE ADVISED OF THE AREA WHICH MAY BE COVERED IN ANY INTERVIEW OF THEM BY THE SSC. THEY SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS, THEY CAN REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER AGENTS TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN THE EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER AGENT NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

NEWARK SHOULD INCLUDE RECONTACT WITH DEVLIN FOR PURPOSE INDICATED ABOVE AND ALSO FURNISH BUREAU ANY INFORMATION DEVLIN MAY HAVE FURNISHED YOUR OFFICE IN ADDITION TO THAT IN YOUR TELETYPE.

ALEXANDRIA: HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1643 NORTH VAN DORN, ALEXANDRIA. WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 8338 WAGON WHEEL ROAD, ALEXANDRIA

BALTIMORE: DONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASE

NEW HAVEN: HOBSON H. ADCOCK, 65 GLENBROOK ROAD, STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT.

NEWARK: LEO THOMAS CLARK, 1421 ATLANTIC AVENUE, ATLANTIC CITY. JOHN PATRICK DEVLIN, 39 BENNINGTON ROAD, LIVINGSTON, NEW JERSEY. HOWARD J. WILSON, 30 CAMPBELL ROAD, SHORT HILLS, NEW JERSEY.

OMAHA: JOHN J. QUINN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, JOHNSTON, IOWA

NOTE: Addresses are most recent available in personnel files of these former Agents. The Newark teletype mentioned was sent up with an informative note advising that we had checked with Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, and he interposed no objection to our contacting former Agents who participated in the special squad we had at Atlantic City in 8/64 and advising them they might be approached for interview by the SSC. Assistant Director Mintz concurred in the Intelligence Division recommendation that we, on approval, contact the former Agents as indicated in this outgoing teletype. Deputy Associate Director J. B. Adams advised of his agreement with this recommendation and for instructions to go forward to the field.

Howard J. Wilson, one of the former Agents designated to be contacted, resigned for family reasons after being censured, suspended, placed on probation, and transferred for unsatisfactory work performance detected during an inspection of the Newark Office. However, there is no evidence in his personnel file suggesting Wilson is hostile to the Bureau and the INTD believes he should be included among those former Agents to be contacted.

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 5/8/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

[redacted]
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS FORM
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

Subject JUNE MAIL U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Removed By 7 9 MAY 1 9 1975

File Number 62-116395-126

Permanent Serial Charge Out

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ✓
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-9-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/YTG

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

During various contacts with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, and Congressman Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), Chairman of the House Select Committee, the question has come up regarding the need for a check of the private offices of individual Committee Members to assure the absence of any electronic listening devices. The Committee personnel have been told that we consider this absolutely essential and they agreed.

In exploring this matter, it was determined that the Capitol Police Department recently has established a special unit to handle all types of security problems within the Capitol Hill complex, including checks for electronic listening devices. Personnel of this unit have received extensive training, some from CIA. The operations of the unit are controlled through the Sergeants at Arms of the House and Senate.

Subsequent discussion with Chief James Powell, Capitol Police Dept. reveals this is not true. 4-17-75

This matter has been discussed with Robert Hough, Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, and with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Hough advised that the special unit already has conducted complete security surveys of the new office space of the Senate Select Committee and certainly will perform any other checks of this type needed by the Committee or its individual Members. He said, in fact, that since they now have this capability they would oppose any outside agency coming on to the Hill to perform this function. Hough said he already has been in contact with Miller regarding the necessary security checks and stated he will let us know when the offices of the Senate Select Committee Members have been checked. He said their rules require specific requests from the individual Members in writing.

62-116395-125

REC-100

MAY 6 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

DWB:kjs (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

MAY 14 1975

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

84 MAY 15 1975

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

This matter was discussed with Congressman Nedzi on 4-9-75, and he stated he would promptly contact Mr. Harding to work out the necessary arrangements for security checks needed by his Committee and its Members. Harding has promised to let us know when the checks of the House Select Committee Members have been completed.

All contacts concerning this matter have been handled by Inspector Bowers who will continue to follow this situation with Senate Sergeant at Arms, William Wannall, or his Deputy; House Sergeant at Arms Harding; Mr. Miller of the Senate Select Committee; and Congressman Nedzi.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WOC:ekw 4/14/75

On 4/11/75 the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community was apprised of the discussions with Mr. Robert Hough, the Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and with Mr. Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House. Although the Executive Committee would have preferred the FBI to conduct audio sweeps, they interposed no objection to the sweeps being handled by the Capitol Police Department. Mr. Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, requested, however, that both Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding be requested to periodically advise the FBI as to the sweeps of Committee space for electronic listening devices. Specifically, Mr. Hough and Mr. Harding should be asked to furnish the FBI the following: How frequently they will conduct a counteraudio sweep; what offices will be swept, will the results of such sweeps be furnished the FBI, and will the FBI be immediately notified should the Capitol Police locate an electronic listening device?

5-113a (Rev. 3-21-73)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/9/01 BY SP2ALM/176 #moe16

Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 5/5/75

Attached teletype reports results of contacts by Newark Office with three former Bureau Agents to alert them they might be contacted by staff of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC). Former SA Leo Clark (e.o.d. 1/11/43; retired 2/1/65; Sr. RA, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 1944 to retirement) was belligerent concerning our contact of him. He had previously testified before Watergate Committee regarding 1964 Democratic Convention in Atlantic City and gave same information to SSC Staff Members 4/17/75. (Clark was one of Agents on FBI special squad at Atlantic City during convention).

ACTION:

Copy of this teletype being placed in personnel file of former SA Clark for due consideration should interview of him be entertained in the future.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - General Investigative Division
1 - Inspection Division

PLM

SFP:lfj

DOJ/FBI

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 3/27/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS FORM
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ZTS

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY -75

Removed By 7 9 MAY 1 9 1975

File Number 62-116395-124

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 02 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR014 NK CODED

9:42PM URGENT 5/2/75 DJP

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM NEWARK

SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/TIG

10 - J. A. Dailey
3 - Walsh
EW

Sev 93

RE: BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALEXANDRIA, MAY 2, 1975.

FORMER SA, LEO THOMAS CLARK CONTACTED MAY, 2, 1975, BY SAC PAUL J. MOHR AND HE WAS TOLD HE MIGHT BE INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC (SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE) STAFF MEMBERS AND THAT IF QUESTIONS WERE ASKED WHICH RELATED TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS HE COULD REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. CLARK VOLUNTEERED HE WAS SUBPOENAED BEFORE WATERGATE COMMITTEE AND TESTIFIED. ALL THIS MATTER WAS REPORTED IN PRESS. HE A~~S~~LSO VOLUNTEERED THAT ON APRIL 17, 1975, HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBERS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. ON SAME MATERIAL REGARDING 1964 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NOMINATION CONVENTION. STAFF MEMBERS WERE MICHAEL EPSTEIN, MONK GITERSTEIN, LOCK JOHNSON. HE SAID THEY HAD ALL OF HIS PREVIOUS TESTIMONY AND WENT OVER SAME MATERIAL. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION CLARK BECAME BELIGERANT STATING HE ONLY TOLD THE TRUTH REGARDING HIS ACTIVITIES IN THE BUREAU AND ADVISED THE BUREAU TO DO THE SAME. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT ASSISTANCE AN AGENT COULD RENDER TO HIM AND WHO INSTRUCTED THAT HE BE CONTACTED AND FOR WHAT REASON. CLARK WAS ADVISED WE MERELY INTENDED TO ASSIST HIM AND HE COULD ACCEPT IT OR NOT.

MARK

Clegg (Cast)

REC-100

62-116395-123

MAY 7 1975

FORMER SA, HOWARD J. WILSON, SHORT HILLS, N.J., ALERTED BY

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

PERS. REC. UNIT

Records

cc 62-116406

cc 67-359446 (Clark)
67-534504 (Wilson)
67-220521 (DeV/in)

84 MAY 15 1975

ASAC WILLIAM BAILEY PER RETEL AND WAS APPRECIATIVE AND STATED HE HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED BUT WOULD ADVISE THE NEWARK OFFICE IF CONTACTED IN THE FUTURE.

FORMER SA, JOHN PATRICK DEVLIN, LIVINGSTON, N.J., CONTACTED BY ASAC WILLIAM BAILEY AND ALERTED PER RETEL AND STATED HE HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OTHER THAN SET FORTH IN NEWARK TELETYPE APRIL 30 LAST.

END

HOLD FOR FOUR

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2.20.81 BY SP4JAM/LA 6024

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

May 2, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillip

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Mr. Lish Whitson, retired Special Agent, FBI

3. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

4. SUMMARY OF CONTENT:

Mr. Whitson was questioned and furnished information concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. DATE OF INTERVIEW AND BEFORE WHOM:

Interview conducted by Mr. Michael Epstein, Staff Member, SSC, in person 4/23/75; supplemented by information Epstein obtained from Whitson telephonically 4/24/75.

6. ORGANIZATION REFERENCE NO: FBI file 62-116395

REC-100 62-116395-

7. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

10 MAY 13 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-106670

5/17/75

62-116395

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Retired SA Lish Whitson)

SFP:ekw ekw
(10)

PLM

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75. Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to J. B. Adams 4/23/75 "Senstudy 75; Former Supervisor Lish Whitson, Assigned Intelligence Division," recommended, and it was approved, that an Abstract would be provided for the records of the Central Community Index concerning the interview of Whitson by the SSC.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAY 15 1975

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. McNiff

May 5, 1975 2-Mr.S.F.Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4 JAM/UL

6076

MATERIAL FOR JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION

1. **TITLE/SUBJECT:** FBI's Investigation of Extremist Organizations and Individuals

2. **ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:** FBI

3. **NATURE OF MATERIAL:** Letter from FBI to Mr. Laurence N. Woodworth, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, dated 4/10/75.

4. **DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

5. **NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP:** NA

6. **SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:** The Joint Committee requested the names of FBI employees who made the decision to provide the Special Service Staff (Activist Organization Committee) of the Internal Revenue Service with FBI reports relating to the FBI's investigation of extremist organizations and individuals. The FBI response was that the matter had been thoroughly researched and it was established that the decision in the above matter was personally made by the late J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of the FBI.

7. **REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST:** Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. 3/28/75

REC-100 62-116395-121

8. **RELEASING AUTHORITY:** FBI

Delivered [illegible]

9. **DATE OF SUBMISSION:** 4/10/75

10. **LOCATION OF FILE COPY:** 62-17909-1104

16 MAY 13 1975

11. **RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:** This matter is of joint interest to the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

62-116395
SFP:ekw (5) ekw

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75. See memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. W. R. Wannall 4/9/75 "Internal Revenue Service Investigations of New Left and Extremist Organizations and Individuals," TJM/dgr.

WOC

84 MAY 15 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 05 1975

TELETYPE

REC-100

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2ALM/

NR004 NK CODED

3:55PM URGENT 5/5/75 DJP

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM NEWARK

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTELCALL OF SUPERVISOR SEYMOUR PHILLIPS TO SAC, NEWARK, MAY 5, 1975.

FORMER SA JOHN PATRICK DEVLIN WAS RECONTACTED BY ASAC, NEWARK, AND FURNISHED FOLLOWING INFO ON MAY 5, 1975:

HE WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF MEMBER MICHAEL T. EPSTEIN TELEPHONICALLY AT WORK (HERITAGE BANK - IRON, MORRISTOWN, N.J.) A DAY OR TWO PRIOR TO HIS INTERVIEW ON APRIL 25, 1975. MR. EPSTEIN DID NOT INDICATE IN ADVANCE AREA OF INQUIRY CONTEMPLATED AND WHEN ASKED BY FORMER SA DEVLIN HOW HE, EPSTEIN, HAD OBTAINED HIS, DEVLIN'S, PHONE NUMBER AT WORK, EPSTEIN INDICATED, "YOU KNOW, WE'VE GOT WAYS." IN ADDITION, EPSTEIN TOLD HIM THAT THE SSC HAD BEEN GIVEN A BROAD SCOPE OF INQUIRY AND WERE MANDATED TO LOOK INTO THE ACTIVITIES OF VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AGENCIES. EPSTEIN DID NOT MENTION THAT HE HAD ANY TYPE OF CLEARANCE BUT WAS VERY POSITIVE IN HIS POSITION THAT THE SSC HAD BEEN MANDATED BY CONGRESS TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES. EPSTEIN EXHIBITED

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORD UNIT

REC-100 62-116395-120

MAY 13 1975

2cc 62-116395

cc 67-221501 (Devlin)

84 MAY 15 1975

AN IDENTIFICATION CARD CONTAINING HIS PHOTOGRAPH TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND HE DID NOT PLACE DEVLIN UNDER OATH. EPSTEIN DID NOT INDICATE WHERE HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION REGARDING DEVLIN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE 1964 ATLANTIC CITY CONVENTION AND WHEN ASKED BY DEVLIN, HE INDICATED ONLY THAT, "WE'VE GOT WAYS".

DEVLIN INDICATED THAT EPSTEIN'S INQUIRY WAS CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE ELSUR COVERAGE AFFORDED KING. EPSTEIN'S INTEREST APPEARED TO ALSO CENTER AROUND WHO TOLD DEVLIN TO GO TO ATLANTIC CITY AND THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE FBI'S ACTIVITIES AT ATLANTIC CITY. EPSTEIN SEEMED TO BE DRIVING AT THE POLITICAL OVERTONES CONNECTED WITH THE ATLANTIC CITY COVERAGE AND HE ASKED QUESTIONS PARTICULARLY INVOLVING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE FBI'S INVESTIGATION AND WHETHER OR NOT FORMER VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY AND THE LATE ROBERT KENNEDY WERE MONITORED AS BEING IN CONTACT WITH KING.

FORMER SA DEVLIN INDICTAED HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY ADVISE NEWARK SHOULD HE BE RECONTACTED REGARDING THIS MATTER.

END

MEB FBIHQ CLR

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 5/2/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS FORM
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/TG

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY -75

7 9 MAY 1 9 1975

Removed By

File Number 62-116395-119

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 5/1/75

FROM : W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/116

On 4/30/75 Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman of the Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, furnished the attached list of Senate Select Committee staff members who have been certified by the Chairman of the Select Committee to the Central Intelligence Agency as having been cleared for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret based upon a background investigation conducted by the FBI within the last five years. Certain of these individuals have also been certified by the Select Committee for access to compartmented classified information in accordance with the requirements of Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/14.

Copies of the list of staff members are being attached to the tickler copies of this memorandum for retention by personnel who may be in contact with the Select Committee staff.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

REC-100

62-116395-118

Enclosure

LFS:tdp (8)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Schwartz

16 MAY 13 1975

JBH
PLM

Phillips
(CHAST)

ENCLOSURE

5-CWOCB

84 MAY 13 1975

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Name	DPOB	SSN	Compartmented Clearances
Aaron, David	8/21/38 Ill.	550-44-7971	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Bader, William	9/8/31 N.J.	545-30-3377	SI, TK, BYC 4/17/75
Baron, Frederick	12/2/47 Conn.	494-54-5241	(S)
Benz, Charity I.	7/23/46 N.Y.	053-38-7410	
Brooks, Nancy	2/14/40 Ky.	313-38-6773	(S)
Carter, Barry	12/14/42 Cal.	567-56-8854	SI, TK, BYC 4/24/75
Chesnik, Barbara	4/18/46 WI	390-46-2235	
Davis, Lynn	9/6/43 FL	042-36-9155	SI, TK, BYC 4/17/75
Dawson, Thomas	9/9/52 Minn.	471-60-1688	
De Oreo, Mary	6/13/47 Ohio	287-42-6258	
Dillon, Molly	4/16/51 Va.	150-38-4588	
Dwyer, Daniel	8/24/52 Ma.	023-44-8792	
Epstein, Michael T.	3/10/37 Mass.	026-28-6318	(S)
Fenn, Peter	12/12/47 Ma.	213-50-1128	SI, TK, BYC 4/24/75
Gitenstein, Mark	3/7/46 Ala.	420-60-8767	
Greissing, Edward	11/27/50 Germany	296-50-4113	
Hatry, Audrey	6/10/23 Md.	216-14-8691	
Inderfurth, Karl	9/29/46 N.C.	245-74-5617	
Johnson, Dorothy	6/8/25 OR	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	2/21/42 N.Z.	566-62-0478	
Kieves, Lawrence	1/4/48 N.Y.	068-38-6464	(S)
Kirbow, Charles	10/2/22 Ga.	252-12-5112	SI, TK, BYC 4/24/75
Lombard, Charles	6/2/30 FR	578-44-9471	SI, TK, BYC 4/24/75
Liebengood, Howard	12/29/42 IN	307-44-9707	
McDonald, Naldeen	10/19/51 Brazil	225-78-8708	(S)
Madigan, Michael J.	4/18/43 D.C.	042-34-3797	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Marshall, Benjamin	5/4/19 NE	485-28-4503	SI, TK. BYC 4/17/75
Maxwell, Eliot E.	7/24/46 N.Y.	133-34-4225	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Mecham, Martha E.	2/11/40 Ca.	528-48-6848	
Miller, William G.	8/15/31 N.Y.	109-26-4349	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
O'Flaherty, Jas. D.	11/4/42 Ill.	239-62-8495	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Orloff, Jan	11/14/47 Ca.	558-74-8394	(S)
Peterson, John F.	6/15/41 Ca.	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan	10/24/53 Canada	020-40-7638	(S)
Romberg, Alan	12/1/38 N.Y.	107-30-8583	SI, TK, BYC 4/22/75
Schwarz, F.A.O.	4/20/35 N.Y.	084-30-2047	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Shea, Patrick	2/28/48 Utah	528-64-1965	SI, TK, BYC 4/15/75
Smith, Stephanie	3/23/54 OH	282-58-6476	(S)
Snider, Lewis B.	1/12/45 N.C.	246-72-0956	SI, TK, BYC 4/24/75
Towell, Mary	4/25/44 TN	566-64-7628	
Wides, Burton V.	6/14/41 N.J.	139-30-1936	SI, TK, BYC 4/17/75

(S)

1-19-01 #moe16
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JHG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

62-116395-118

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-04 BY SP4JAM/lc

6076

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

May 6, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
2-Mr.S.F.Phillips

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. **SUBJECT:** Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. **WITNESS' ORGANIZATION:** Mr. John P. Devlin, retired Special Agent, FBI

3. **CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION:** Unclassified

4. **SUMMARY OF CONTENT:**

Mr. Devlin was questioned and furnished information concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. **DATE OF INTERVIEW AND BEFORE WHOM:**

Interview conducted by Mr. Michael Epstein, Staff Member, SSC, 4/25/75.

REC-100 62-116395-117

16 MAY 13 1975

6. **ORGANIZATION REFERENCE NO:** FBI file 62-116395.

7. **RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:** None.

62-116395
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-220521 (Personnel File Former SA John P. Devlin)

SFP:ekw (9)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75. The furnishing of this Abstract is pursuant to procedure previously established in connection with a similar interview by Epstein of former Agent Lish Whitson.

100-106670-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Delivered to RC 5/9/75

WRW
HEH

WOC

PLM

JAM
R70

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 MAY 13 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4 J[illegible]

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1-Mr.W.R.Wannall
1-Mr.W.O.Cregar
2-Mr.S.F.Phillips

May 6, 1975

6076

ORAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. WITNESS' ORGANIZATION: Mr. Daniel J. Brennan, Jr., retired Special Agent, FBI.

3. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: Unclassified

4. SUMMARY OF CONTENT:

Mr. Brennan was questioned concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., specifically during 1964. However, he was unable to furnish any of the requested information concerning the King investigation as he could not recall any information of the nature desired.

5. DATE OF INTERVIEW AND BEFORE WHOM:

Interview conducted by Mr. Michael Epstein, Staff Member, SSC, 5/2/75.

6. ORGANIZATION REFERENCE NO: FBI file 62-116395.

7. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

62-116395

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-428628 (Personnel File Former SA Daniel J. Brennan, Jr.)
SFP:ekw (9) EKW

REC-100

62-116395-11

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75. The furnishing of this ~~Abstract is~~ pursuant to procedure previously established in connection with a similar interview by Epstein of former Agent Lish Whitson.

18 MAY 13 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

100-106670

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. J. B. ADAMS

DATE: April 25, 1975

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM : MR. W. R. WANNALL

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Sw 114

Reference is made to my memorandum to you 4/24/75 reporting interview by Michael Epstein, Staff Member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, of retired SA Lish Whitson concerning a trip to Miami, Florida, by Whitson in 1964. The trip was for the purpose of mailing a package to the late Martin Luther King, Jr., and indicated we were checking our records for information regarding the expense voucher and Government Transportation Requests (GTR) issued by Whitson and would report our findings.

Jay Deane Cox, Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division, supplied the following information as to the records available concerning Whitson's travel and what the procedures generally are for maintenance of travel and voucher records. The Voucher Unit maintains a Travel Authority Card (TAC) for all investigative and any other FBI employees who have ever had GTRs issued to them. The TACs are retained indefinitely as there is no provision for their destruction. For every voucher processed, there is recorded the voucher period, amount of voucher, date processed and record of any GTRs issued.

62-116395-115

REC-100

The TAC for Whitson reveals entries to show that on 12/9/64 a voucher was processed for payment to Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. With that voucher was a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air coach travel, Washington, D.C., to Miami and return. Attached to instant ~~memorandum is~~ is a Xerox of the memorandum copy of the GTR, which copy is being retained in the Voucher Unit. Because of the illegibility resulting from Xeroxing,

MAY 16 1975

Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)
SFP:ekw
(9)

ENCLOSURE

Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/ALG

#MDR16

84 MAY 13 1975

the entries to the GTR have been reconstructed to make them readable on this Xerox. The memorandum copy, which is being retained in the Voucher Unit, is readable. The markings on the reverse side of the Xerox have no bearing on the date of travel but are merely entries relative to the payment to National Airlines. It might be noted that the issue date of this GTR, 11/21/64, has been determined to be a Saturday, which is the day of the week Whitson recalled making the trip to Miami.

According to Cox, the Bureau does not maintain copies of the actual vouchers and there is only a bare possibility that a voucher over 10 years old, such as the one involved in this matter, would be maintained anywhere in the Government, such as at the Federal Records Center.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Void after
19

BILL TO **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CASHIER'S CODE	BILL NUMBER	TRANSP AMOUNT	ACCOMMOD. AMOUNT
CARRIER'S CODE	BILL NUMBER	TRANSP AMOUNT	ACCOMMOD. AMOUNT

A3,925,594

The National Airlines Company is requested
to furnish coach (FIRST COACH, MIXED, CHARTER, ETC.) class air (RAIL, AIR OR BUS, ETC.) transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC
to Miami, Florida + return (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") (SHOW CARRIERS AND JUNCTION POINTS AND WHERE MIXED CLASS SERVICE IS TO BE FURNISHED SPECIFY)
SUCH BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE POINTS
for use of Lish Whitson and ______ others with ______ (LOWER BERTH, P.C. SEAT, ETC.) accommodations
from ______ to ______ (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") with authorization
to transport not over ______ lbs. of excess baggage from ______

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE OR TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson
TITLE Special Agent

PLACE OF ISSUE Washington DC Nov 21, '6
I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.
ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson
TITLE Special Agent
FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)

0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT.	TOTAL
107.40		107.40

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

The United States of America
Transportation Request

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-115

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/CG
#M026

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
May 1, 1955, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.
2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.
3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: April 24, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall

#Mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/ITB

SUBJECT: 6
SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Memorandum captioned as above 4/23/75 reported on interview of Mr. Whitson by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee. The interview related to Whitson's trip to Miami in 1964 at the instructions of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan to mail a package to Martin Luther King.

Whitson telephoned my office twice this morning. At 10:35 a.m. he advised that Epstein had asked him by telephone how Whitson had made the trip to Miami, meaning how it was paid for. Whitson told him he had issued a Government Transportation Request (GTR). Epstein asked whether there was any prior written authorization for Whitson to make this trip and Whitson told him there was none. Epstein asked what kind of record would have been made covering the trip. Whitson explained that the only record that he knew of would be the expense voucher he submitted covering the expenses involved and possibly the copy of the GTR which he had issued. He explained to Epstein the voucher would merely show the GTR had been issued for a round-trip to Miami and how much per diem had been claimed in connection with the trip.

In advising of the foregoing, Whitson stated it was his recollection he had made the Miami trip either in the late Summer or early Fall of 1964 and that Martin Luther King was "away" at the time.

In my absence from the office, Whitson called again at 11:05 a.m. to say that Mr. Epstein asked him as to whether he had registered at the Airport Hotel in Miami and, if so, whether it was under his own name. Whitson told Epstein that he had registered under his own name at this hotel.

REC-100

62-116395-114

MAY 6 1975

ACTION:
We are checking our records for information regarding the expense voucher and GTR issued by Whitson in connection with this trip and results will be reported.

WRW:lml (6)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Personnel File of SA Lish Whitson (Out of Service)

Phillips

wrw

84 MAY 13 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams   DATE: 4-25-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams memorandum of 4-9-75 to which the Intelligence Division placed an addendum dated 4-14-75 showing that Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President, had requested that the Sergeants at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives keep the Bureau advised regarding checks made for electronic listening devices in the offices of captioned Select Committees.

This was discussed on 4-23-75 by Inspector Bowers with Senate Sergeant at Arms William Wannall and his Deputy, Robert Hough. They were amenable to notifying us concerning the checks they make of Senate Select Committee space and the offices of the Members of this Committee. Hough was designated by Wannall to handle this matter. Hough advised that the special Capitol Police unit had made a check of Room S146 in the Capitol on that date (4-23-75) prior to a meeting of the Senate Select Committee in that room and found nothing. Hough stated they have received no requests whatever to make any checks of the offices of individual Committee Members. He said he had discussed this matter with William Miller, Staff Director of the Select Committee, and Miller indicated it would be taken up with the Committee but he has heard nothing further from him.

REC-100 62-116395-113

On 4-24-75 Bowers discussed this matter with Kenneth Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives. Harding stated he has had no requests for any checks of the Members' offices or

21 MAY 6 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

DWB:kjs (9)

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

MAY 30 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116464

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/JTS
#MDR16

8 4 MAY 1 7 1975

space of the House Select Committee since the Committee really has not begun to function as yet. He said he has discussed this matter with Committee Chairman Lucien Nedzi, and he certainly will give us complete accounting of checks they make of this Committee's space and the space of the individual Members of the Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-12-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

Hotis

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY
DESTRUCTION OF BUREAU FILES
AND RECORDS

Re my memorandum to you dated 2-14-75.

As indicated in referenced memorandum, the Bureau's program concerning destruction of files and records has been suspended until we can determine whether it involves any documents that might be of interest to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

We contacted William G. Miller, Staff Director for the Committee, and he asked that we withhold further destruction of files until the Committee Counsel, who had not been appointed at that time, had an opportunity to review the matter. Mr. F. A. O. Schwarz 3d, a New York attorney, was recently named the Committee's Chief Counsel. It is recommended that representatives of the Files and Communications Division and the Legal Counsel Division meet with Mr. Schwarz and Mr. Miller at the earliest opportunity to resolve this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

That representatives of the Files and Communications Division and the Legal Counsel Division meet with the Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to determine whether the Bureau's destruction program can be reinstituted.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/TAS
#MDE16

REC-56 62-116395-112

21 MAY 2 1975

OK

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Jenkins
- 1 - Mr. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. Ash
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Farrington
- 1 - Mr. Hotis

MAY 8 1975

JBH:[illegible] (10)

56 MAY 13 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 4-24-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY '75

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/JTB

SAC Thomas Kitchens of the Louisville Office telephonically advised on 4-23-75 that former Section Chief Fred Baumgardner had been contacted by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee, and Epstein had sought to arrange an interview of Baumgardner. SAC Kitchens advised Baumgardner requested that a Bureau representative be present during his interview. SAC Kitchens further advised that Baumgardner will telephonically contact SA Paul V. Daly on 4-24-75.

On 4-24-75 at 2:30 p.m., former Section Chief Baumgardner telephonically related that he had been requested to come to Washington for the purpose of being interviewed by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee. Baumgardner advised Epstein that he would make himself available for interview but at his office at 970 South 4th Street, Louisville, Kentucky, telephone number 584-5183. Mr. Baumgardner expressed concern regarding the interview pointing out that he was Section Chief in the Intelligence Division for some 18 years and during the time was continually dealing with very sensitive matters which he felt were not the proper subject matter of discussion with people outside the FBI. Additionally, he pointed out he has been out of the Bureau for some eight years and since he is not aware of current Bureau operations he, therefore, requested the Bureau have a representative present during the interview and that the Bureau representative so designated be thoroughly familiar with Intelligence Division operations so that he might be made aware of those areas which are sensitive and might compromise current Bureau investigations. He suggested that the Bureau representative should arrive sometime the day before the proposed interview which is 4-29-75 so that he may have a preliminary discussion with the Bureau representative concerning those areas in which he has knowledge of and may be sensitive.

REC-56 62-116395-
EX-110
MAY 1 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That a representative of the Intelligence Division be made available to be present during the interview of former Section Chief Baumgardner to assist Mr. Baumgardner in insuring that he does not divulge or compromise sensitive material.

LEGAL COUNSEL

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
PVD:dkg (8)

MAY 14 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: May 1, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2.20.81 BY SP4

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

6076

Previous memoranda have reported former Supervisor Whitson's contact with the Bureau to report concerning an interview of him conducted by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities on 4/23/75. The interview related to Martin Luther King, Jr.

On 4/30/75 Whitson telephoned my office to report that he had been trying to establish in his mind the specific date when he made a plane trip from Washington National Airport to Miami, Florida. He had previously said he thought it was in the late Summer of 1964. During a subsequent call he fixed the time as the late Summer or early Fall of 1964. During his contact, 4/30/75, Whitson stated that to the best of his recollection, this plane trip took place in October, 1964. The Bureau's appreciation for his call was expressed to Whitson.

Memorandum 4/25/75 in captioned matter has reported the location of information from the files of the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, showing that Whitson traveled by plane to Miami utilizing a GTR issued 11/21/64. It has been determined this date was on a Saturday, it being noted Whitson previously stated he made the trip to Miami on Saturday and the return trip the next day, a Sunday.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-106670

REC-106 62-116395-110

ACTION:

None. For information and record purposes.

MAY 7 1975

WRW:lml (6)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Personnel File of SA Lish Whitson (Out of Service)

pcm

JBA/pcm

cc-100-106670 (King)

Ad Hoc Staff
75-464

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

30 APR 1975

File

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Staff

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

Senstudy - '75

On 25 April 1975, we provided you a listing of the security clearances to date for members of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Attached is a listing of eight additional Staff personnel certified by Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director, as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

for Jack E Thomas
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

REC-106 62-116395-109

JHH

16 MAY 7 1975

ENCLOSURE

#m0216

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

FIVE

89 MAY 7 1975

30 April 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOC. SEC. NO.
Belva Brissett	6-23-41	Oklahoma	440-44-6374
Margaret Carpenter	8-27-44	California	555-62-6129
Joan Erno	8-30-46	D. C.	215-46-2988
Arthur Harrigan	3-16-44	New York	141-34-1031
Diane LaVoy	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119
James Rowe	6-6-51	D.C.	579-62-6719
Elizabeth Smith	6-21-49	New York	076-42-0199
Martha Talley	9-7-50	No. Carolina	245-88-1368

#MON16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTS

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-107

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 4/22/75

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Hotis

This memorandum reports the results of an Executive Committee meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community on 4/21/75.

The Executive Committee, hereinafter referred to as the EXCOM, was chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for the Intelligence Community, in the absence of Mr. William Colby (DCI), who had been called to the Hill to testify on the current situation in Vietnam. Present at the meeting were Mr. Philip Buchen and Mr. Roderick Hills, Counsels to the President; Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President; Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, as well as senior officials of the State Department, National Security Agency (NSA), Office of Management and Budget, and the Treasury Department. Mr. Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, was scheduled to represent the Department of Justice but failed to appear.

The following matters of interest were discussed at the meeting:

KEY ISSUES

The purpose of the key issue papers is to completely familiarize the White House with all facets of certain key issues which could arise from Senate Select Committee (SSC) deliberations. It is hoped these key issue papers will permit the President's Counsel to be a more articulate advocate of the intelligence community should any of these issues by raised.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/RS/G
#MDR16

REC-106 62-116395-108

16 MAY 7 1975

Enclosures

62-116395

WOC:lmh | mh
(7)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

5-C

84 MAY 27 1975

Memorandum Cregar to Wannall dated 4/14/75 reported that Mr. J. Dennis Miller of the Legal Counsel Division was preparing the key issue paper entitled "Intelligence Files and Privacy." A copy of the outline for this paper was presented to the EXCOM with the commitment that a draft of the paper would be ready for review in the next two to three weeks.

Another key issue paper is one being prepared by Mr. Warren D. Magnusson of CIA entitled "G. A. O. and the Audit Authorities of U. S. Intelligence Agencies." Mr. Wilderotter suggested Mr. Magnusson consult with the FBI inasmuch as the Bureau was currently being audited by GAO. Mr. Robert Finzel of the Intelligence Division maintains liaison with GAO representatives auditing the Intelligence Division. Mr. Finzel's name will be furnished Mr. Magnusson for consultation purposes in line with the suggestion from Mr. Wilderotter.

WHITE HOUSE RESPONSES TO SSC REQUESTS

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from James A. Wilderotter to Mr. John Clarke dated 4/16/75. The memorandum advises that the White House provided copies of the Colby report (including annexes), as well as a list of documents to the Senate Select Committee on 4/14/75. The Colby report is the document prepared for the President following the Seymour Hersch articles which appeared in "The New York Times" alleging CIA was engaged in massive domestic surveillances.

GUIDELINES FOR PARAPHRASING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PROVIDED TO THE SELECT COMMITTEES

Memorandum Cregar to Wannall dated 4/7/75 attached a copy of sanitization guidelines for documents provided to Congressional Select Committees. Attached to this memorandum are new guidelines entitled "Guidelines for Paraphrasing Certain Documents Provided to the Select Committees." In essence the attachment is almost identical to the sanitization guidelines. The reason for the change is the White House prefers the word "paraphrase" rather than "sanitization." Thus, guidelines under the paraphrasing description were promulgated.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter Senator Kennedy has directed to the Attorney General. Copies of this letter were furnished to the EXCOM by Mr. Wilderotter. In furnishing a copy of this letter, Mr. Wilderotter noted that the Department of Justice would handle the response to Senator Kennedy after consultation with individual agencies as well as the White House. Wilderotter was furnishing a copy to members of the EXCOM for coordination purposes. He further advised that the Department of Justice's response would be made a matter of record with the Interagency Registry.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WOC

TWL/FSP

WRW

JBK/PLM

Ad Hoc Staff
75-331

SECRET ATTACHMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. JOHN M. CLARKE
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

FROM: JAMES A. WILDEROTTER JW

On Monday, April 14, the White House provided copies of the "Colby Report" (including the annexes) and the attached list of documents to the Senate Select Committee as classified documents. NSCIDs 4, 5, and 6 -- as well as the obsolete and superseded NSCIDs corresponding to them -- were not provided to the Committee.

#MOL16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

SECRET ATTACHMENT

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-108

#mor16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2ALM/176

SECRET

LIST OF DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITES

1. National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) -- These directives prescribe the organization and division of responsibility of the various elements of the intelligence community; provide procedures for the collection and production of overt intelligence; establish a communications system for the rapid reporting of critical intelligence information; and establish the National Photographic Interpretation Center.

2. Obsolete and Superseded NSCIDs -- These documents predate the existing directives (in item #1 above) but provide essentially the same guidance under the bureaucratic structure established by previous administrations.

3. Letter from President Nixon to Director Helms -- This letter, issued following a major review and restructuring of the intelligence community, set forth the Director's responsibilities and established goals to channel his further effort. 11/5/71

4. NSAM 57 - Paramilitary Operations -- This memorandum defines paramilitary operations; states US policy for rendering assistance to such operations overtly or covertly and establishes a procedure for the planning and approval of paramilitary operations. 6/28/71

5. NSAM 124 - Establishment of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) -- This 1962 memorandum set forth procedures for ensuring the use of all available government resources in preventing and resisting subversive-insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries.

6. NSAM 196 - Establishment of an Executive Committee of the National Security Council -- This 1962 memorandum established a committee to serve as a crisis management group during the Cuban missile crisis.

7. NSC 5511 -- Establishment of a Net Evaluation Subcommittee -- This 1955 directive established a subcomittee of the NSC for the purpose of providing estimates of the capability of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the US in time of general war.

8. NSAM 5815 - Comparative Evaluation Group -- This 1958 directive established an inter-agency body to prepare comparative evaluations of the US and Soviet weapons systems.

9. NSAM 303 - This 1964 document changed the name of the Special Group (5412) to the "303 Committee". (The predecessor body documentation is at Tab B).

10. NSAM 327.--This 1965 memorandum disestablishes the net evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC.

11. NSDM 40 - Covert Operations.-- This directive provides authority and sets forth procedures and responsibility for the planning, approval and conduct of covert operations. It also brings a number of Defense reconnaissance activities under the cognizance of the 40 Committee.

12. NSDM 224-- This 1973 directive established a Net Assessment Standing Committee to carry out intelligence assessments as directed by the NSC.

13. NSDM 239 - National Net Assessment Process -- This directive transferred responsibility for management of the subject program from the NSC to the Department of Defense.

14. NSDM 253 -- This 1974 memorandum updated the membership of the NSC Intelligence Committee.

15. The balance of documents included herein consist of unclassified reports, diagrams and press releases concerning the organization and functioning of the NSC and the Intelligence Community.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

21 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Guidelines for Paraphrasing Certain Documents Provided to the Select Committees

1. Attached is a guidance paper, subject as above, prepared by the USIB Security Committee, and approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. In the interest of commonality in our approach to the matter of paraphrasing sensitive documents, it is requested that each of you arrange for the use of these guidelines in the handling of responses from your organizations to requests from the Select Committees.

John M. Clarke

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-108

GUIDELINES FOR PARAPHRASING SENSITIVE INFORMATION IN CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has recently discussed with Senator Church the need for special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee of certain sensitive aspects of intelligence activities and the Senator has expressed his recognition of this need. It is anticipated that appropriate arrangements can be made so as to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time satisfying the Select Committees' need for a full understanding of the intelligence community's activities. Included in such matters are the identities of sensitive sources, the material provided to the United States by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain employees whose safety could be jeopardized if revealed, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with US intelligence and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems. Such material should be protected not only from exposure but indeed the risk of exposure. Further, recognition should be given to the need to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals.

2. Proper procedures should enable intelligence community members to prevent risk of disclosure of sensitive sources and methods and at the same time present to the Select Committees the necessary details to allow for their proper understanding of community activities.

3. The procedures described herein are not to be used as downgrading or declassification guides. All concerned should be mindful that application of these procedures will not declassify, downgrade or remove from compartmentation controls any documents or information provided the Select Committees, unless individual advice to that effect is provided as well.

4. What May Be Paraphrased

While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which may be levied by the Committees for documenting material and not

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2ALM/LT/S

possible to determine specifically what material should be excised from these documents, the following illustrations are offered in certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet the test mentioned above.

5. Collection of Intelligence

(a) The Committees will probably address the matter of how intelligence is collected. Documents supporting responses may be paraphrased by removal of identities of sensitive agents and informants, covert personnel, and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be substituted, i.e., a foreign journalist, a political official in the opposition party. No paraphrasing should be used in connection with names of individuals whose employment or former employment by, or association with a department or agency, does not remain secret or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements remain secret.

(b) Some information may be required with respect to technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived by use of these codenames or nicknames in classified documents. Details of the technical systems which would reveal critical operational capabilities and contractual and funding arrangements which would identify individuals whose participation was obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in the Community's paraphrasing procedures. While documentary samples of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of testimony, special consideration should be given with regard to raw products which reveal critical operational capabilities.

6. Intelligence Estimates

Finished intelligence reports and estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not normally require paraphrasing. However, departments and agencies should review such publications to ensure deletion of sensitive source identities and details of collection systems.

7. Administration

Information concerning the administration of intelligence agencies may be required. This may include staffing charts with occupants identified. Identities of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning in a cover assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future be considered for a covert assignment.

8. General

The following categories of information or specific examples may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should be given by the department or agency concerned to the necessity of deletion or paraphrasing of this type of information, prior to providing the document.

(a) Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.

(b) Details which would reveal sensitive methods and techniques (1) employed in human source collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.

(c) The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment, attempted recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targeted foreign organizations.

(d) Names of particular employees whose physical safety or future careers might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.

(e) Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.

(f) Assumed identities, locations or other information permitting identification of defectors or refugees who might be targeted for retaliation.

(g) Identifying information on intelligence services of friendly and neutral countries and collaboration of those services with US intelligence agencies.

(h) Identification of technical foreign intelligence operations of high vulnerability or extremely high political sensitivity.

(i) Details of arrangements with US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of intelligence operations.

(j) Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that collaborate in a special manner such as providing cover for foreign intelligence operations.

(k) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).

(l) Proprietary, trade secret or patent information.

9. Techniques of Paraphrasing

Paraphrasing of intelligence material may include the physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing from written communication with or without regard for the residual content. Use of a substitute terms is an example of paraphrasing which permits intelligent continuity of the material without revealing the true identity. Paraphrasing does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material.

The integrity of official records must be maintained. The following paraphrasing techniques apply only to copies of records.

(a) Names may be obliterated, masked or replaced with substitute terms, the residual material xeroxed and the copy submitted to Committees.

(b) The material can be retyped or reprinted with substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal the sensitive material.

(c) Entire pages can be removed from some documents and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing department or agency.

(d) Within a category of inquiry, it may be desirable to extract a complete document from requested material when the request is broad and all-inclusive within its field. The existence of such a document should be made known to the Committees but retained by the agency or department for review under escort of a representative of the department or agency.

10. Management of Documents

The original record and a copy of the paraphrased version provided should be readily available in all cases. Materials developed within an agency or department in response to requests should be reviewed at an appropriate level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. In the case of documents or materials of a community nature, the release should be done in coordination with the departments or agencies and/or the Program Manager concerned an any paraphrasing should be agreed upon during coordination.

This proposed use of paraphrasing as a special arrangement to protect selected issues contained in material provided to Select Committees by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies. It is essential to the proposal that departments and agencies attempt to employ the same criteria for paraphrasing and coordinate as required. This paper can serve only as general guidelines.

#C31

JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS., CHAIRMAN
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, ARK.
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C.
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS.
BIRCH BAYH, IND.
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, N. DAK.
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA.
JOHN V. TUNNEY, CALIF.
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, NEBR.
HIRAM L. FONG, HAWAII
HUGH SCOTT, PA.
STROM THURMOND, S.C.
MARLOW W. COOK, KY.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.

PETER M. STOCKETT, JR.
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

SUBCOMMITTEE:
[illegible]ARD M. KENNEDY, MASS., CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
BIRCH BAYH, IND.
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, N. DAK.
JOHN V. TUNNEY, CALIF.
STROM THURMOND, S.C.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.

NATHAN LEVENTHAL, CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(PURSUANT TO SEC. 3, S. RES. 55, 93D CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

#mDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

April 10, 1975

RECEIVED
APR 14 1975
CRIMINAL DIVISION

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

A newspaper report in today's Washington Post has raised serious questions as to how many federal agencies engage in electronic surveillance and the extent of such surveillance.

At a hearing on May 23, 1974, before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Attorney General Saxbe testified on this subject. I asked him: "Can you tell us about any other organizations or government departments that are involved in any wiretapping at all today?" The Attorney General replied: "We do not believe that there is anyone else and the penalties are rather severe." (p. 495) I am enclosing a copy of the hearings for your convenience.

The recent reports raise questions concerning the completeness and clarity of Attorney General Saxbe's earlier testimony. President Johnson's executive memorandum of June 30, 1965, requires that federal agencies engage in wiretapping only with the prior approval of the Attorney General. In order to fully answer the questions that have been raised, I request that you provide the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure with the following information by April 16:

177-012

1. A list of all federal departments, agencies, bureaus, divisions, and other units that conduct, have conducted, or have authority to conduct electronic surveillance of any type (including wiretaps, bugs, and other uses of any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication).

CRIMINAL [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-108

2. For each agency listed under #1 above, the specific statutory or other authority for the agency's conduct of electronic surveillance.

3. For each agency listed under #1 above, all guidelines, procedures, rules and regulations relating to the conduct of electronic surveillance.

4. For each agency listed under #1 above, a specification of whether the agency's conduct, or authority to conduct, electronic surveillance includes:

a. Electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to a court warrant obtained under the provisions of sections 2516 and 2518 of title 18, United States Code;

b. Electronic surveillance conducted without a court order obtained under the provisions of sections 2516 and 2518 of title 18, United States Code;

c. Electronic surveillance conducted within the United States;

d. Electronic surveillance conducted in foreign countries.

5. For each agency listed under #1 above, the number of electronic surveillances in place on April 1, 1975, and the number of electronic surveillances in place at any time during the calendar years 1970 through 1974 (with a description of the method used in computing these figures).

I am sure you appreciate the need for the questions raised by Attorney General Saxbe's testimony to be answered as quickly and definitively as possible. These questions demonstrate once again the need for close cooperation between the Department of Justice and the Congress.

Many of the questions posed in this letter were originally raised in my letter of October 10, 1973, to Attorney General Richardson. The Subcommittee requested additional information on April 16, 1974, and at the hearing on May 23, 1974. Attorney General Saxbe indicated a willingness at the hearing to provide this information in the near future, but none of this information has been provided. I am enclosing copies of the October 10, 1973, and April 16, 1974 correspondence for your convenience, and would appreciate your letting me know by when the information requested in these letters and at the hearing will be made available.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Edward M. Kennedy

Edward M. Kennedy
Chairman
Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure

We look forward to hearing from you and to making the necessary arrangements for your appearance.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY.
Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.
EDMUND S. MUSKIE.
Chairman, Subcommittee on Surveillance.

U.S. SENATE.
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
Washington, D.C., April 16, 1974.

Hon. JOHN DAVITT,
Chief, Internal Security Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. DAVITT: I appreciate your meeting with me to discuss the nature of the requests by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure for materials relating to warrantless electronic surveillances. The purpose of this letter, as you requested, is to memorialize the Subcommittee's specific requests.

The materials requested are listed in the attached memorandum. Of course, these requests are not intended to be exclusive or exhaustive, and are in addition to any other requests that may be made by the Subcommittee.

I appreciate your cooperation in seeking to ensure that these requests be met promptly. If all the materials requested are not readily available, I would appreciate the Department's providing the materials in increments as they are assembled.

I will look forward to working with you on these and related matters. With best regards.

Sincerely,

KENNETH M. KAUFMAN,
Assistant Counsel.

MATERIALS ON WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE REQUESTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

1. For a representative group of electronic surveillances, please provide the materials listed under either "A" or "B" below. By "representative" is meant a group that is representative with respect to (a) the statutory categories of Section 2511(3), Title 18, United States Code, used by the Attorney General in authorizing the surveillances; (b) the types of targets of the surveillances; (c) the type of surveillance, e.g., telephone, microphone or other; and (d) the date of authorization of the surveillances, both before and after the Supreme Court decision in *United States v. United States District Court*, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

A. Copies of documents containing: (1) requests for authorization of electronic surveillances from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General; (2) authorizations signed by the Attorney General; (3) requests for reauthorization of existing electronic surveillances from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General; (4) reauthorizations signed by the Attorney General; and (5) communications between the FBI or the Department of Justice and a telephone company regarding the installation, maintenance, or discontinuance of electronic surveillances. These documents would be for actual, as opposed to hypothetical, surveillances, but not necessarily surveillances which are currently active. Names and other data which identify targets of the surveillances could be excised. The documents would be given to the Subcommittee staff on a confidential basis, and appropriate measures would be taken to ensure that they remain confidential. They could be shown to appropriate staff of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Surveillance under the same condition of confidentiality.

B. Copies of the same materials referred to in "A" above except that the documents would represent hypothetical, rather than actual, electronic surveillances. The materials would, however, accurately reflect documents for actual surveillances. The materials would be supplied to Subcommittee staff on a nonconfidential basis, since they would represent hypothetical and not real surveillances. In addition, the Subcommittee staff would be shown copies of some documents for actual surveillances (from which names and identifying data could be removed) in order to compare them with the hypotheticals.

2. Copies of actual or hypothetical documents reflecting each step in the process of review within the FBI of a request to initiate a warrantless electronic surveillance. At the meeting of February 27th, Director Kelley referred to at least a ten-step process within the FBI for reviewing a request for a wiretap. Director Kelley indicated that there are communications to and from the agent in the field, the agent's supervisor, the Assistant Agent in Charge, the Agent in Charge, the supervisor in the appropriate division of the FBI, the Unit Chief, the Section Chief, the Branch Chief, the Assistant Director, the Assistant to the Director, and the Director. To the extent that there may be differences in the review procedure for "bugs" as opposed to wiretaps, please provide documents reflecting these differences.

3. Copies of any FBI or Department of Justice rules, regulations, documents procedures, manuals or portions of manuals relating in any way to the initiation, installation, conduct, maintenance, supervision, approval, authorization, reauthorization, financing, or discontinuance of warrantless wiretaps or other electronic surveillances.

4. Copies of any documents, rules, regulations, procedures, manuals or portions of manuals relating to record-keeping procedures and indexes in the FBI or the Department of Justice with respect to warrantless electronic surveillances.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
Washington, D.C., April 17, 1974.

Hon. WILLIAM B. SAXBE,
Office of the Attorney General,
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I am writing with reference to my letter to the Attorney General of October 10, 1973, seeking certain information about warrantless electronic surveillance. A copy of this letter is enclosed for your convenience. The information requested would expand and update information supplied to the Subcommittee over the past several years. After six months, none of the information has yet been provided.

In your letter of February 5th, you indicated that every effort was being made to obtain the information I requested as expeditiously as possible. At a meeting with Subcommittee staff last month following our meeting of February 27th, however, the Department stated that it would be willing to provide only an update of the information provided in 1971 and 1972, and to furnish this information only to me personally on a confidential basis. This proposal would not meet the Subcommittee's requirements. The Subcommittee requires all the information requested, not just an update of that supplied two years ago. The information provided on a nonclassified basis in previous years should be provided on the same basis at this time. To the extent that any information is supplied on a confidential basis, Subcommittee members and staff must have access to it.

I am sure you realize that the Subcommittee's need for this information is pressing. As you are aware, we have been conducting hearings on warrantless electronic surveillance with the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Surveillance. In order to effectively exercise our oversight and legislative responsibilities in this area, we need the base of information requested in the letter.

I am writing to request that the bulk of the information requested be provided to the Subcommittee no later than April 29 in order to enable the Subcommittee to analyze the data prior to our next series of hearings beginning May 7th. Please contact Kenneth Kaufman, Assistant Counsel, if you have any questions regarding this request.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation in this matter. With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.

JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS., CHAIRMAN
CCLELLAN, ARK. ROMAN L. HRUSKA, NEBR.
VIN, JR., N.C. HIRAM L. FONG, HAWAII
HART, MICH. HUGH SCOTT, PA.
M. KENNEDY, MASS. STROM THURMOND, S.C.
YH, IND. MARLOW W. COOK, KY.
N. BURDICK, N. DAK. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
BYRD, W. VA. EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.
UNNEY, CALIF.

JOHN H. HOLLOMAN III
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS., CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. STROM THURMOND, S.C.
BIRCH BAYH, IND. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, N. DAK. EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.
JOHN V. TUNNEY, CALIF.

JAMES F. FLUG, CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(PURSUANT TO SEC. 3, S. RES. 55, 93D CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

3

#mOR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/STG

October 10, 1973

The Honorable Elliot L. Richardson
Office of the Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As you know, the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure has played an active role in the area of electronic surveillance over the past several years, including its role in the development and processing of the legislation which eventually became Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and its hearings on warrantless wiretapping last year.

On February 5, 1971, I wrote Attorney General John Mitchell seeking certain information about electronic surveillance installations without court orders. The Department was good enough to provide me with most of the information I sought. The information extended by the Department was extremely useful in enlightening both the Committee and the public about the extent and signficance of such surveillance.

The information sought and supplied dealt only with the period June 19, 1968 through calendar year 1970. Since then, of course, the United States Supreme Court has held that domestic security surveillance without a court order is unconstitutional, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Shortly after the Supreme Court decision, our Subcommittee held hearings on warrantless wiretapping, during which a detailed inquiry was made into the Justice Department's practices and procedures in implementing the decision. At the hearings, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Maroney testified that in response to the Supreme Court ruling, a certain number of installations "in cases involving domestic security," to use the description in Mr. Kleindienst's statement of June 19, 1972, were terminated. In a letter dated August 2, 1972, Mr. Maroney indicated the numbers of surveillances in place on

June 29, 1972 in each of the five statutory categories contained in Section 2511(3) of Title 18, United States Code. Also, on May 14, 1973, Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation William D. Ruckleshaus disclosed information concerning some 17 wiretaps that had been placed on the telephones of newsmen and government officials.

In order to keep this Subcommittee and the public fully informed about this extremely significant aspect of your practices and procedures, would you kindly provide the following information as soon as possible, sending us immediately those items of information which are readily available, and the remainder when obtained. As I indicated in my February 5, 1971 letter, I recognize that some of the statistics will be based on documents which are classified, but, as earlier, the requests have been framed so as to admit of answers which should be able to be unclassified. As previously indicated, if you nevertheless see a need to classify any particular answer, please provide it separately, and it will be handled on a classified basis.

As used in the following questions, the term "electronic surveillance" includes interceptions of both wire and oral communications. The questions refer only to warrantless electronic surveillances.

A. For each of the periods calendar year 1971, calendar year 1972, and January 1, 1973 to September 30, 1973, please provide:

1. The number of electronic surveillance installations placed in operation or continuing in operation at any time during the period, in terms of the number of "premises of organizations or individuals without regard to the number of instruments which may be involved in effectuating the surveillances," to use the description in Mr. Maroney's letter of August 2, 1972. I assume that this is the same method of computation used by Mr. Mardian in his letter of March 1, 1971; if it is not, please indicate the method of computation used by him and provide comparable figures for the time periods specified.

2. Of these, please provide:

a. The number of electronic surveillance installations newly placed in operation during the period;

b. The number of electronic surveillance installations continuing in operation at any time during the period but placed in operation during a prior period.

3. The number of each type of installation, i.e., telephone surveillances, microphone surveillances, combination surveillances, or other.

4. The number of surveillances installed during each period which continued for each of the following time categories: under one week, one week to one month, one month to six months, over six months.

5. The numbers of electronic surveillances in which:

a. One electronic surveillance device was installed;
b. Two electronic surveillance devices were installed;
c. Three to five electronic surveillance devices were installed;
d. Six to ten electronic surveillance devices were installed;
e. More than ten electronic surveillance devices were installed.

6. The total maximum number of surveillances in operation at any one time during each period, as referred to in Mr. Mardian's letter of March 1, 1971.

7. The number of electronic surveillances installed, conducted, maintained or monitored by any person or organization, or by any unit or employee of any state or local government, that were directed, supervised, made at the request of, made with the knowledge of, or connected in any way with any agency or other unit of the United States government.

8. The number of wiretaps or other electronic surveillances conducted in a foreign country in which the object or target of the surveillance was a United States citizen and which were directed, conducted, supervised, made at the request of, made with the knowledge of, or connected in any way with any agency or other unit of the United States government.

B. For each of the periods calendar year 1971, January 1, 1972 to June 19, 1972, June 20, 1972 to December 31, 1972, and January 1, 1973 to September 30, 1973, please provide:

9. a. The number of electronic surveillances that were installed in cases involving domestic security, as defined in *United States v. United States District Court* and as referred to in Mr. Kleindienst's statement of June 19, 1972.

b. The number of electronic surveillances that were installed with respect to activities of a foreign power or foreign agents as described in *United States v. United States District Court*, 407 U.S. at 322.

c. The number of electronic surveillances that were installed on domestic organizations and individuals with a "significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or

agencies," as delineated in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 309 n.8, and discussed in the testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maroney before this Subcommittee.
The above 3 categories are intended to be mutually exclusive.

10. a. The particular United States government departments, agencies, bureaus, divisions and other United States government entities that engaged in electronic surveillance of domestic organizations and individuals, as described in Question 9a above.

b. The particular United States government departments, agencies, bureaus, divisions and other United States government entities that engaged in electronic surveillance within the continental United States on a foreign power or foreign agents as described in Question 9b above.

c. The particular United States government departments, agencies, bureaus, divisions and other United States government entities that engaged in electronic surveillance of domestic organizations and individuals with significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies, as described in Question 9c above.

With respect to each such department, agency, bureau, division, or other government entity, please provide the numbers of electronic surveillances installed or in operation during each time period.

11. a. Please indicate whether the figures provided in Mr. Mardian's letter of March 1, 1971 included the wiretaps of 17 newsmen and government officials disclosed by Acting FBI Director Ruckleshaus on May 14, 1973.

b. For each period, please indicate the total number of other electronic surveillances conducted, directed, supervised, made at the request of, made with the knowledge of, or connected in any way with the FBI or the Department of Justice that were not included in the figures provided in Mr. Mardian's letter of March 1, 1971.

C. 12. On June 5, 1973, the White House released figures on the number of national security wiretaps installed since 1945, reported at page H 4343 of the Congressional Record. These figures seem inconsistent with those supplied to me by the Department on March 1, 1971. In addition, the figures are unclear in certain key respects. I would therefore appreciate your supplying the following information with respect to the figures released by the White House:

a. Do the years indicated refer to fiscal or to calendar years?

b. Do the totals include interceptions other than by telephone wiretaps--e.g., microphone surveillances, etc.?

c. Do the figures refer to the sum of all interceptions in operation during the year, or only to those in operation as of a certain date--e.g., December 31st?

d. Do the figures refer to the number of premises at which interceptions were made, the number of persons who were the primary targets of such interceptions, the number of listening devices installed, or some other number?

e. For each of the years involved, do the figures refer to wiretapping by all governmental agencies or only by the Federal Bureau of Investigation? If the reference is to agencies other than the F.B.I., please indicate which agencies. How many of the interceptions referred to related to organized crime investigations?

f. If the answers to the above questions do not explain the inconsistencies between the figures released by the White House and those supplied to me, please indicate any other explanation that may account for the differences.

13. a. Please provide the number, names, and the present status of all criminal prosecutions in which electronic surveillance was used in any way in cases involving domestic security, as described in Question 9a above.

b. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maroney testified before this Subcommittee that in "practically all cases" in which a criminal defendant was overheard without a warrant, the government disclosed the surveillance to the trial court. Please indicate the number, names, and the present status of any cases in which an electronic surveillance of a criminal defendant was made but in which such a disclosure was not made to the trial court. Please also specify the nature of any standards and procedures adopted by the Department to ascertain and review such cases.

14. With respect to all electronic surveillances newly installed between January 1, 1973, and September 30, 1973, please indicate the number of surveillances authorized under each of the five statutory categories contained in Section 2511(3) of Title 18, United States Code. Please also provide the same information with respect to all electronic surveillances in place on September 30, 1973, regardless of when they were installed.

15. a. Please set forth the standards and procedures that the Department has adopted with respect to assuring compliance with the Supreme Court decision in United States v. United States District Court. Please also indicate the nature and timing of any changes in the Department's practices and procedures in this respect.

b. Please indicate the nature of any standards or procedures adopted by any other department, agency, bureau, division, or any other entity of the United States government to assure compliance with the Supreme Court decision.

I realize that I am requesting a substantial amount of information, but as you can well understand, this is a matter of great current public significance. It is not only important that the Congress be kept fully informed, but also that the public be reassured that the Attorney General has full knowledge and control over the mechanisms of our government that directly affect the constitutional rights of our citizens. Accordingly, I am transmitting this letter in the spirit of cooperation between the Department and the Congress stressed by Deputy Attorney General Ruckleshaus at his confirmation hearings before the Judiciary Committee.

I very much appreciated the promptness of the Department's response to my initial inquiry two years ago. I assume that much of the information requested in this letter is readily available. Insofar as some of the information may not be immediately available, a prompt response with respect to such information as is readily available would be appreciated, with the remaining information provided at a later date.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Ted Kennedy

Edward M. Kennedy
Chairman
Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

Ad Hoc Staff
75-466

30 April 1975

NOTE FOR: Mr. William Cregar
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Senstudy-'75

This correspondence has been sent to Senator Church.

John
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachments:
Two letters dated 29 Apr 75
from Mr. Colby to Sen. Church

REC-106 62-116395-107

16 MAY 7 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/STS

File
62-116395
5.8

3 ENCLOSURE

INFORMATION

84 MAY 7 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

29 APR 1975

The Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

I have your request of 24 April for additional material, and we are working to make it available to your staff as soon as possible. I believe we will be able to meet your ten-day time requirement with the exception of the materials outlined in paragraphs 4 and 8. While the Agency's responses to paragraph 3 should satisfy part of your request in paragraph 4, a full response will require a file search and review, which cannot be accomplished in ten days. We do not have separated the responses to Director Schlesinger's letter of 9 May 1973 as between "senior operating officials" and "all employees or ex-employees" responses. We can of course provide you what we have as a start.

The answers to most of the nine parts of paragraph 8 will involve a careful file search and a careful review for sensitive sources and methods information. We will do our best, but a full answer to paragraph 8 will require more than ten days.

We have for other parts of your request summarized material which we will provide so that your staff can discuss with us the best way of proceeding against the more voluminous backup data. For example, in one instance the backup to the summary involves as many as 20,000 index cards. In another, the basic data involves a roomful of miniaturized data. We need to be certain as to the precise concern of the Committee in these matters in order to respond with the least disruption to the work of the Agency and to help the staff to understand whether they have asked the right question.

The materials requested in paragraphs 5 and 10(a) are in the Watergate reports. I would hope your staffs could acquire this data from the published versions of those reports.

#MOR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-107

As the inquiry progresses from a documentation phase to interview phases, it will become even more important to adhere to the general agreement we have with your staff to have preliminary consultations and discussions prior to a formal request by the Committee. In this way we can promote a better understanding of the work involved and establish reasonable time frames as well.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bill

W. E. Colby

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

29 APR 1975

The Honorable Frank Church
Chairman
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

I believe it would be useful if I placed on the record the situation with respect to your 12 March request. I regret that you considered it necessary to issue public criticism of CIA's efforts to meet your needs. As of this writing, the major portion of that request for CIA-originated material has been met and, I believe, in a responsive manner.

At our meeting of 22 April, we agreed that if your investigators could review materials at the CIA Headquarters, it would expedite the inquiry and lessen the amount of material which otherwise would have to be paraphrased, a process which takes a substantial amount of time. Special office space and access badges have been provided for this purpose. I agreed that, should specific documents or parts thereof be requested to be sent to the Senate Select Committee offices, the Agency would prepare these as expeditiously as possible without sacrifice to the security considerations consistent with our earlier understanding of the need to protect sources and methods from undue risk of exposure. I also gave you my assurance that we would assist in the clearance of multi-agency papers involving CIA, some of which are on your earlier request.

A speed-up in the Agency's paraphrasing process is being undertaken, although as you can appreciate, this involves senior personnel with heavy demands for substantive work, and

#mDL16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-13-01 BY SP2 ALM 1776

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-107

the volume of the material you have requested is considerable. At our meeting, I showed you a list of the materials that have already been provided, and Mr. Miller has been kept advised about the status of other materials.

In discussing some of the concerns of people in the Intelligence Community about the procedures addressed above, you agreed to raise with the Committee the question of ultimate disposition of materials provided. I understand that this is in train. In this connection, I was very much appreciative of your reassurance that you and the Committee members will consult with me prior to the release of any classified materials in public statements or unclassified reports of the Committee. Such consultation is consistent with the spirit of the inquiry.

I believe our staffs are working well together. There have been the usual inherent problems that one can expect in an investigation of this scope. Because the Select Committee staff personnel engaged in the inquiry are relatively new to the field of intelligence and to the seriousness of the inquiry, expectations are ambitious. But there is something to be said for both sides of the equation. For example, we await the convenience of your investigators on selective follow-up matters on which they had requested further data. Meanwhile, we have urged and are providing the staff with detailed briefings by way of introduction to the Agency's history and functions. I am personally convinced that direct discussions about our work and about specific instances of interest to the staff investigators will be far more direct and productive to them (saving us much useless work) than engaging in debates about massive document transfer requests.

To that end, I am very anxious to renew and by this letter I would repeat my request to you that the Committee move personally and directly into the inquiry at an early date. I am delighted that you and the Committee are coming to visit our headquarters for a discussion of the Intelligence Community and the Agency and for an exchange on the precise interests which particular Committee members have concerning the inquiry. We need to understand the specific objectives the Committee seeks and relate these to the priorities of the materials you will need. I believe we can be helpful if we know these. Again, I am convinced that the constructive long-term contributions that we both envisage from the Select Committee's work will derive in a far more concrete fashion by focusing on specific and major questions about intelligence rather than consuming an inordinate amount of time reviewing the details of all of our past history. In that way our main energies and our judgment can be addressed to what kind of intelligence we want in our free society of the future, rather than what we may have had in the past.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bill

W. E. Colby

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry
75-2019

Ad Hoc Staff
75-416

April 24, 1975

#MOR16
[illegible]
1-19-01 SP2 ALM/TG

Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Director Colby:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, I enclose a specification, furnished to John Clarke yesterday, which calls for certain material referred to in your December 24, 1974 report to the President and provides further detail concerning certain CIA material heretofore requested. Obviously it is not intended to limit what we have already requested.

It is the Committee's expectation that all this material should be produced in ten days.

I was heartened by the spirit of cooperation demonstrated in your personal reassurances in our meeting on April 22, 1975, and I understand that substantial material was made available to us today at the CIA. However, the fact remains that too much material called for in our document request remains outstanding and the system apparently being employed to clear material for us builds in excessive delays. A necessary prerequisite to our inquiry proceeding expeditiously--as it should to restore public confidence in our intelligence agencies and develop a new national consensus on the proper functions of intelligence activity--is to eliminate these delays.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

Enclosure

62-116395-107.

([redacted])

SECRET

MATERIAL TO BE SUPPLIED TO
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BY THE CIA

Specification of CIA Material Relating To Director Colby's December 22, 1974 Report and Director Colby's January 15, 1975 Senate Testimony

The Committee's original request to the CIA should have been interpreted to cover all of the following in that the Committee requested all material underlying Director Colby's January 15, 1975 testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee. In any event, Director Colby's report of December 24, 1974, makes clear that all the following material is central to the Committee's mandate. The CIA is requested forthwith to supply the following,as well as the material which they have already collected in response to the Committee's March 12 request.

1. All of the instructions on "Questionable Activities" which were issued by Director Colby in 1973, or thereafter, except for the "selected group of attachments" which were included in the Colby Report and thus already furnished to the Committee.

2. All files relating to the following "questionable activities" which were mentioned in the attachments to the Colby Report:

(a) Project MHBOUND II (and any other project relating to "Penetration of Another Government Agency").

(b) "Reporting on Dissident Groups".

(c) Projects Mockingbird, Celotex I and Celotex II (and

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/376
#mDB16

any other projects relating to "surveillance, telephone tap, surreptitious entry or other action" taken on behalf of the Agency against U.S. citizens in the United States).

(d) Project Merrimac (or any other project relating to the "penetration" of domestic groups).

(e) Postal Service: (the files relating to "penetration of the mail", mail opening or mail cover).

3. All reports made by CIA's "senior operating officials" in response to Director Schlesinger's letter of May 9, 1973, asking for reports on activities which "might be construed to be outside the (CIA's) legislative charter".

4. All employee or ex-employee responses to the same letter as well as responses to the "standing order" referenced in the letter and calling for such material in the future.

5. All files relating to CIA's participation in the "so-called Huston Plan" (referenced on page 2 of Director Colby's Report).

6. Annex A of the Colby Report (re "Coverage of Subversive Student").

(a) Any memoranda by Richard Ober on the establishment of:

(1) Systems for coordination of activities

(2) Dissemination of material

(3) Regular reporting on activities

(b) The interim report suggested by paragraph 3 of Mr. Karamessines' memo.

7. Annex C.

(a) Any materials prepared for the review by the Director, noted in paragraph 1, of Agency efforts to monitor international activities of "radicals and black militants".

(b) An index of all projects developed by the Special Operations Group or by Agency Divisions in support of this program.

(c) A list of all agencies which had data links with the Special Operations Group as described in paragraph 5 of the memo.

8. Annex D. (Special Operations Group--Possible Foreign Links with American Dissidents)

(a) A list of all "organizations of interest" to the Special Operations Group, including but not limited to those mentioned in the memo from Mr. Ober.

(b) A list of all topic headings or subjects used for filing by the Special Operations Group.

(c) A list of all individuals or groups either "special targets" of the Special Operations Group or of "special concern" to the Special Operations Group, and a list of all program targets, all operational projects and all individual Agent projects.

(d) The materials which constitutes or underlies the "standing requirements" for information from the Special Operations Group by the FBI, Secret Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(e) Any documents consisting of or relating to FBI comments on the "adequacy and relevancy" of Special Operations Group information.

(f) Any reports "over the signature of the Director of CIA" based on Special Operations Group information disseminated to either the White House, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the FBI.

(g) Any reports, special studies, or estimates requested and prepared by the Special Operations Group for the President, his Counsel, or the Attorney General and for the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.

(h) A description of the audio program of the Special Operations Group.

(i) The "formal Table of Organization" of the Special Operations Group.

9. Annex E

The complete "Allegations and Answers" series.

10. Annex F

(a) The reports from the CIA on Agency activities "with respect to Mr. Howard Hunt and other parties" which were made available to "the appropriate law enforcement bodies".

(b) Any "information" assembled by the Inspector General or made by him in regard to "CIA activity in connection with Watergate and associated matters".

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#M0216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/29/01 BY SP2-ALM/SRJ

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Organization of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with an enclosure, FBI Functional Organization Chart

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Letterhead memorandum serves as a cover communication to the FBI Organization Chart which was prepared 1/14/75; and advises of certain changes in personnel since 1/14/75. Chart identifies all FBI officials from Director down through all Assistant Directors and their respective areas of responsibilities; identifies all Sections in all Divisions with indication of type of matters handled in Section; and includes a list of all 59 FBI field offices.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI REC-106 62-116395-106

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/9/75 18 MAY 7 1975

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-69

11. NONE.

SFP:ekw (4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips
April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #moe16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2[illegible]

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with enclosures described below

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

(a) Untitled memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, 9/14/67, dealing with FBI authority for investigations relating to riot situations.

(b) Two untitled memoranda dated 8/24 and 25/36 from FBI Director Hoover recording instructions received from President Franklin D. Roosevelt concerning FBI authority for investigations of subversive activities, particularly relating to communism and fascism.

(c) Untitled memorandum from FBI Director Hoover to Assistant to the Director E. A. Tamm, 9/10/36, concerning FBI authority for investigations of subversive activities, particularly communism and fascism, and the FBI function for the coordination of such investigations with Army and Navy Intelligence and State Department.

62-116395-105

REC- 106

MAY 7 1975

SFP:ekw CKW
(4)

original [illegible] to OCI, 5/1/75

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

8 4 MAY 7 1975

GPO 954-546

(d) Presidential directives dated 9/6/39 and 1/8/43 (President Roosevelt); 7/24/50 (President Truman); and 12/15/53 (President Eisenhower). The first of the Roosevelt directives designated the FBI as coordinator of all law enforcement in the U. S. regarding espionage, sabotage and neutrality matters; the second Roosevelt directive reiterated the first. The Truman directive was a reiteration of the prior Roosevelt directives. The Eisenhower directive expanded upon the previous directives to include Atomic Energy Act violations.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/4/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-47

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

Some of the documents discuss role of the FBI as the coordinating agency in connection with the activities of other intelligence community agencies: Army and Navy Intelligence, and State. Also, in the Presidential directive of 12/15/53, there is stated the FBI responsibility for investigating all violations of the Atomic Energy Act.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

May 1, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) ~~to~~ INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Legal Authorities of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM) with enclosure described below, including exhibits to enclosure, some of which are classified "Confidential."

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

REC-106 62-116395-104

Under cover of an LHM, there was forwarded to the SSC an FBI "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated 2/13/75. The purpose of the paper is to set forth an analysis of the investigative authority granted by Presidential Directives, the National Security Council, and orders of the Attorney General, as well as to list statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation. The LHM noted that certain exhibits to the paper were extracted because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements and that approvals were being sought for clearances to subsequently furnish the excluded exhibits.

MAY 7 1975

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/10/75

Delivered 5/5/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/dfs

#MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____ SFP:ekw CKW
Ident. ____ (4)
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____ 62-116395
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

54 MAY 7 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-78

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

This study encompasses Agreements and Presidential Directives as well as Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Interagency Committee on Internal Security documents issued as supportive evidence in delineating the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 0 5 1975

TELETYPE

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
- Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
  - Admin.
  - Comp. Syst.
  - Ext. Affairs
  - Files & Com.
  - Gen. Inv.
  - Ident.
  - Inspection
  - Intell.
  - Laboratory
  - Plan. & Eval.
  - Spec. Inv.
  - Training
  - Legal Coun.
  - Telephone Rm.
  - Director Sec'y

✓ Mr. Phillips
4063

NR001 NH CODE

11:29AM URGENT MAY 5,1975 VEM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: NEW HAVEN

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2,1975.

FORMER SA HOBSON H. ADCOCK WAS CONTACTED THIS DATE BY THE SAC. ADCOCK WAS FURNISHED INFORMATION AS SPECIFIED IN RETEL. ADCOCK ADVISED THAT HE HAD NOT AS YET BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF CAPTIONED GROUP.

END

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/9/01 BY SP7ALM/JTS #MOR16

5.8

File 62-116395

REC- 106 62-116395-103

16 MAY 7 1975

Records cc 67-447115 (Adcock)

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

84 MAY 8 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

May 1, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) to INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTC

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Jurisdictional Agreements

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with enclosures described below.

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified except for one enclosure dated 2/7/66 classified "Secret."

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Enclosures are copies of various documents constituting jurisdictional agreements between the FBI and other Federal agencies or guidelines prepared by the Attorney General with reference to investigative responsibilities between the FBI and other Federal agencies in the security field generally. The specific documents are as follows:

(a) Delimitations of Investigative Duties of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force, dated 2/23/49, with certain supplemental agreements.

REC-106 62-116395-108

(b) Agreement between the FBI and CIA dated 2/7/66, classified "Secret."

(c) Agreement between the FBI and Secret Service effective 7/30/73.

Delivered 5/5/75

SFP:ekw
(4)
62-116395

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

(d) Investigative guidelines with reference to Title 11, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation of Explosives, prepared by the Attorney General, submitted by letter to the FBI 1/11/73.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/8/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY. FBI file 62-116395-65

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

These agreements and guidelines have direct bearing on the scope of responsibility of other intelligence community members and are in the nature of controls for both the FBI and other community members where common interests and responsibilities are present.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

May 1, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ACM/DTG

#more16

(6)

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
(6) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Organization of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

LHM refers to a request for the titles and number of FBI field Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total Agent manhours devoted to such matters. LHM advises that a current survey of all FBI field offices had been made to obtain the desired data but that since the information is considered highly sensitive, it was not being furnished directly to the SSC, but being maintained in the Intelligence Division at FBIHQ available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff upon request.

REC-106 62-116395-101

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/21/75

16 MAY 7 1975

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395~~-82~~

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Teleph. Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

62-116395
SFP:ekw (4) CKW

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

231 THRU 235

236 THRU 1ST NR 237

1ST NR 238, 239

241, 242

244, 245

247

249, 1ST NR 249

252 THRU 254

255 THRU 260

262 THRU 265

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

Alan G. Sentinella

May 21, 1975

The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood

Sent to H G 6/9/75
1-D.I.G. - SENSTUDY
Att: K. William O'Connor
Senate Intelligence Coordination
[illegible] ELH:mf
Senstudy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-265

to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were

assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

A. None.

Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted

to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

See attached pages ITEM II

Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison.

A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior ~~to that time which~~ thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

Q. Why would Harding know this information?

A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

A. Yes.

Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

A. Richard Hamilton.

Q. When did he assume these cases?

A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

A. It did not develop any such information.

Q. How did you know of what~~ever~~ their CP affiliation may have been?

A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

A. I did not have the cases at that time.

Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How?

A. From information in the appropriate file.

Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances,

airtels, letters, memoranda?

A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

Q. What was the gist of such communications?

A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

A. No.

Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign.

A. I have no such recollection.

Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned. ← SEE ITEM I. of attached pages

Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

Q. Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

Q. Kitchen floor?

A. Yes.

Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none..

Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau, with reference to the period of time when the policy ~~had~~ changed it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation. See ITEM III of attached pages.

Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights ~~complications~~ Complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

A. ~~Yes.~~ I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

See ITEM IV of attached pages

Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

Q. What about prior to 1965?

A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having KLAN ~~King~~ connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

A. Yes, I did not have any such contact.

Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters ~~or~~ were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category.

I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

A. No.

Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

Q. Who were some of those?

A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

A. Henry Rouse.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

Q. Recently testimony was given be one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

A. It is not my recollection that they did.

Q. What about a Klan organization?

A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceiably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

A. I do not know.

THIS WOULD READ BETTER IF MOVED TO PAGE 19

It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued.

Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted

such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes. He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time No longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened, Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

→ FROM P 18

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 9, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

Senstudy-75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIV...

Reference is made to my letter dated May 22, 1975, forwarding a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning testimony subsequently given by Mr. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

for info. only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR - Dept of Justice, 11/22/76 - JCB

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP165K/JG

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

3

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw - KW
(14)

P.U. [illegible]
Room 4509 JB
JB PCM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-102

62-116395-265

Hand carried to AG 6-10-75

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1-Mr.W.O.Cregar
1-Mr.S.F.Phillips

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4JRM/JG ON 2-20-81
6076

62-116395

June 9, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BEFORE
SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION

Reference is made to the memorandum of this Bureau dated May 22, 1975, reporting a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella, a retired SA of the FBI. That statement concerned the interview of Sentinella by an SSC Staff Member on May 12, 1975.

Pursuant to a subpoena, Mr. Sentinella testified before an Executive Session of the SSC on May 21, 1975, after which he voluntarily furnished the FBI a statement concerning his testimony. Set out below is the verbatim text of that statement.

CLASS. ~~& EXT.~~ BY SD165K/jg 10/31/80
REASON-FCIM II, ~~1-2.4.2~~ 3
DATE OF REVIEW 6-9-95

"Alan G. Sentinella"

"May 21, 1975

"The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw (13)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
aboratory ___
an. & Eval. ___
. Inv. ___
ing ___
Coun. ___
one Rm. ___
r Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JBA
62-116395-265

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

"The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

"Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

"Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it now was the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

"A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

"A. None.

"Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

"A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

"Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

"A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

"Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

"A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

"Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison?

"A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

"Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

"A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

"Q. Why would Harding know this information?

"A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

"Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

"A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

"Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

"A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

"Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

"A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

"Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

"A. I did not.

"Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

"A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

"Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

"A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

"Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

"A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

"Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

"A. Richard Hamilton.

"Q. When did he assume these cases?

"A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

"Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

"A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

"Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

"A. Yes, he was.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

"A. It did not develop any such information.

"Q. How did you know of what their CP affiliation may have been?

"A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

"Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

"A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

"Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

"A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

"Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

"A. I did not have the cases at that time.

"Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How?

"A. From information in the appropriate file.

"Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances, airtels, letters, memoranda?

"A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

"Q. What was the gist of such communications?

"A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

"Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

"A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

"Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

"A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

"Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

"A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

"Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign?

"A. I have no such recollection.

"Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

"A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned.

"Q. What about Julian Bond's campaign? Any effort to influence that?

"A. No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

"Q. What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

"A. None to my knowledge beyond such coverage as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

"Q. In same manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature. My answer was that my only concern had been with former Governor Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the Pickrick restaurant.

"Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

"A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

"Q. William Sullivan, whowas formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

"A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

"Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

"A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

"Q. Was King given a nickname in the Atlanta Office?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was it?

"A. "Zorro."

"Q. How did that come about?

"A. I believe that began with Mr. Nichols and just passed on down.

"Q. Why was that name selected?

"A. I do not know precisely.

"Q. Don't you have any idea?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for it?

"A. As I remember, "Zorro" was either a television or movie character who carried a sword and therefore could be referred to as a swordsman.

"Q. What connection had this with King?

"A. The Reverend King participated in a number of extra-marital relations and therefore it seemed fitting that in the vernacular the reference swordsman applied to him.

"Q. What extra-marital activities were there?

"A. There were several women involved.

"Q. How do you know this?

"A. It was indicated on occasions by conversations.

"Q. How?

"A. By reference to a previous escapade with an individual or to one pending.

"Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

"A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

"Q. Kitchen floor?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

"A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

"Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

"A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

"Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

"A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy changed, it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

"Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

"Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

"A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

"Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

"Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

"A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation.

"I cannot be certain - I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

"Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

"A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

"Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

"A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

"Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

"Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

"A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

"Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

"A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

"Q. What about prior to 1965?

"A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having Klan connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

"Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

"A. Yes. I did not have any such contact.

"Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

"A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category. I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

"Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

"A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

"Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

"A. No.

"Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

"A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

"Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

"A. A number of different gentlemen, some of them were periodically transferred.

"Q. Who were some of those?

"A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

"Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

"A. Henry Rouse.

"Q. Where is he now?

"A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

"Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

"Q. Recently testimony was given by one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

"A. It is not my recollection that they did.

"Q. What about a Klan organization?

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

"I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceivably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

"Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

"A. I do not know.

"Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

"Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

"The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened. Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

"The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

"It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued."

On June 4, 1975, Sentinella advised the FBI of the following additional information concerning this matter.

Sentinella received a telephone call that day from Seidel who advised him that the transcript of Sentinella's testimony was near completion and that Sentinella would receive a letter advising him it was ready for Sentinella's review, but only in SSC space.

Seidel sought from Sentinella and was furnished names of some FBI personnel who had monitored technical surveillance on King during the pertinent period. Seidel sought information concerning who supervised the King investigation at FBI Headquarters, to which Sentinella replied that he did not know any specifics. Seidel referred back to information from Sentinella both during the original interview and during Sentinella's testimony and Seidel asked why Sentinella had discussed the matter with former FBI Agent Harding. It was Sentinella's reply that he sought Harding's help in order to rectify what he thought was a wrong answer given to Seidel during the initial interview.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentintella's verbatim statement which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The additional information Sentinella furnished 6/4/75 was telephoned by him to Phillips. On that occasion Sentinella also advised that Seidel had inquired of him that day as to whether he had discussed with Phillips the King case after arriving in Washington, D.C., and prior to testifying. Sentinella stated that he had not.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/13/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Documents Pertaining to the Huston Plan, Cointelpro and other Practices and Programs

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/74, Appendix C, Part I, Item 7, 8.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
"S"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

LIAISON

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

With CIA concurrence, SSC was furnished with copies of documents maintained by the Bureau relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, with the resultant temporary discontinuance of formal liaison between the FBI and the CIA.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

UOC
Flwg

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 - TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000

MDR-16

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/13/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS
HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMEN

Originating Office: FBI 37

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec. Sec.

Appendix C
Part I, #7

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/DMC
mDR-16

(Additional questions)

ITEM I.

Q: What about JULIAN BOND's Campaign? Any effort to influence that?

A: No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia Legislature by 1964 or 1965.

Q: What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

A: None to my knowledge beyond such coverage ~~of SNCC of which organization he~~ as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

Q: [In some manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature]. My answer was ~~that~~ they only concern then with former Governor

62-116395-265

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmc

mdr-16

ENCLOSURE

Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the PICKRICK restaurant].

ITEM II

Re page 5, first Q. and A. set forth.

It seems this is where Seidel asked a question concerning other source (other than electronic) material re Levison. However, he went on talking and never actually posed a question as such; accordingly it was not answered].

OR

the above may have been related to the last Q. appearing at bottom of page 7.

ITEM III.

I cannot be certain — I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

ITEM IV.

Re page 14 and the answer you inquired about.

I'm sure my answer was as it now appears on page 14, i.e. corrected.

I did not say there was no connection. I'm sure I only introduced the negative when he asked if I would deny there was such connection.

I believe "Yes" may have come in here in answering a question raised by your steno.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 7, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. Item number 8, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed copies of 13 FBI communications.

In connection with your request for memoranda pertaining to inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, a search of the files of the FBI at Washington, D. C., and Denver, Colorado, does not indicate that any such inspections or administrative inquiries took place.

RLM:mam
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO & THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____ RLM
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-264

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

With reference to the information furnished by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley contained in the communication from the Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, to the Director of the FBI, dated May 8, 1970, your specific attention is directed to the restrictions placed by Dr. Smiley on the information furnished by him. On June 4, 1975, Dr. Smiley was recontacted, at which time he advised that under no circumstances would he testify in public to the information which he originally furnished to the FBI on a confidential basis. He further advised that under no circumstances would he reveal the identity of his contact in the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in the May 8, 1970, communication. He agreed to the release of the information in the May 8, 1970, communication to the SSC on a strictly confidential basis, for its use only and not for any further dissemination. Dr. Smiley stated he has no information other than that in the May 8, 1970, communication.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Concurrence to pass the 2/26/70 letter, with Secret enclosures, from Richard Helms, then Director of CIA, to J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of FBI, was obtained by Liaison Officer Leon F. Schwartz from Walter Elder, CIA on 6/10/75. The response to requests set forth in Appendix C, Part I, Item numbers 7 and 8 is being made in the same communication to avoid unnecessary duplication since the severing of liaison with CIA grew out of the RIHA matter.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

A. W. Gray memorandum to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/70, states "our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958." This information only appears on the cover page of the report of SA Daniel J. Griffin, dated, 8/31/60 at Boston. The information was furnished by Riha during interview on 8/11/60 and has never been given to us by CIA.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (28)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RLM:mam
(9)

RLM

at which Tolson advsd 7/11/75

Delivered To Martha Meeks [illegible]

REC- 102

62-116395-264

17 JUN 25 1975

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~
RLM

Dir.
AD Adm.
AD Inv.
Syst.
Affairs
& Com.

JUN 2 5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☒ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting testimony given by former FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the SSC.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence activities, domestic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Testimony covered former FBI investigation of:

1) Martin Luther King, Jr.
2) Stanley David Levison
3) Southern Christian Leadership Conference

5-8

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

62-116395

6-24-75 LFS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62- -16

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

XC 3/Ak ~~XC~~ B. Prong

XC ①/FC

Patch III

Assembly

264

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVE[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : DIRECTOR, F.B.I. February 12, 1970

ROM : SAC, DENVER

UBJECT: THOMAS RIHA

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was called by MIKE TODOROVICH, who is in charge of the CIA office here in Denver. TODOROVICH stated he has instructions from his Washington Office to contact Denver District Attorney JAMES MC KEVITT and tell MC KEVITT that CIA Agent JOHN D. FRITZ who is stationed in Boulder, Colorado, had told Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, former President of the University of Colorado, that FRITZ had been told that THOMAS RIHA's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that RIHA was, in fact, all right. TODOROVICH then told me that FRITZ got this information from an FBI Agent in Boulder.

I told TODOROVICH to give me the name of the FBI Agent and he stated he would not do so. He then stated the FBI Agent told him, TODOROVICH the same thing. I again requested the name of the Agent. He again declined to give it to me. I very emphatically told TODOROVICH that until he gave me the name of the Agent who supposedly gave him and FRITZ this information, that I would not believe that either he or FRITZ had been given any information such as this by any Agent of this Bureau and this was based on the fact that no Agent would have any reason whatsoever to make such a statement since we had not conducted any investigation in this matter nor did we have any information concerning RIHA and, therefore, we would not be in a position to make such a statement as to whether or not RIHA was all right.

I then also pointed out to Mr. TODOROVICH that if he gave the information to Mr. MC KEVITT and advised Mr. MC KEVITT the information had come from an FBI Agent and if Mr. MC KEVITT contacted me I would certainly advise him that the information did not come from anyone in the FBI for the same reasons as set forth above.

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum that they have not made such statements as were attributed to them by TODOROVICH. Not only that, neither of the two has ever had any contact personally or otherwise with JOHN D. FRITZ, the CIA representative in Boulder.

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of CIA's actions in connection with this matter.

1. Protests CIA re Todorovich's actions
2. Commends SAC re his handling of Todorovich.

H

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and when it may have happened.

While avoiding specifics about their theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest Wednesday in knowing more about the housewife's recollection that she telephoned Riha and carried on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon that Monday, the day when he first failed to show up for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph Smiley, Denver police chief George Seaton or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officials to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it "is entirely out of our jurisdiction."

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70
Edition: Home
Author: Alan Cunningham
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM

Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder housewife is certain she talked to Thomas ha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first led to show up for his history classes at the Univer- y of Colorado.

What is even more remarka- than this, in the opinion of ose who have been trying to down the exact date of ha's disappearance, is the man's insistence that Riha s cheerful, relaxed and inter- ted in chatting about a local litical issue.

The woman, who asks that she t be identified by name, has ld the News she was in the ocess of telephoning a list of ulder citizens last March, eking support for a proposed ection on whether the city ould take over its public utili- es.

While she had been involved the issue for several weeks, e is sure it was on Monday, arch 17, that she attempted to ach a dozen people whose mes began with the letters P" and "R." Among the three four whom she was able to each that day, she insists, was homas Riha. She says he an- vered the telephone at his ome at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, leasant and quite interested in e municipal issue, according the Boulder housewife. In ct, she explained, his name as on the list because he had arlier sent in a reader survey ballot" from a Boulder news- aper which related to the issue.

As a result, Riha struck her as more informed on it than most others she had talked to in her telephone inquiries, and she believes the conversation lasted about 10 minutes, making it the longest in which she took part that day.

The date, if the Boulder house- vife is correct, is significant, ince Riha reportedly missed a linner party to which he was in- vited the previous night, and ould not be reached on Satur- lay, March 15, by a friend who ried to telephone him repeat- dly.

Many people interested in the case have speculated that Riha left Boulder, was kidnaped or died as early as that Friday or [illegible]

professor who was rumored to have seen Riha on Sunday, the 16th, vigorously dismissed this rumor as untrue when asked about it Tuesday.

But the Boulder housewife who made the series of telephone calls is equally adamant about the date when she talked to Riha. She says she didn't know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist. Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alvie and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported no reply yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70
Edition: Home
Author:
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

Following is typewritten clarification of the handwritten comment of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

"I don't. I still want name of our agt which Todorovich gave to Dr. Smiley. H"

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan S

DATE: 2-18-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 2/10/70, SAC Werner, Denver, demanded that Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver, identify Bureau Agent who allegedly told a CIA officer that the subject's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that subject, in fact, was alright. Todorovich refused to do so. The Director instructed that we protest to CIA regarding Todorovich's actions.

On 2-17-70, Liaison Agent Papich vigorously protested Todorovich's actions to CIA, charging the Agency with impeding our inquiry. He pointed out that Todorovich's stubborn refusal to divulge the identity of the Bureau Agent involved was unacceptable because we had no information to support the statement attributed to our Agent. As a result of Papich's protest, a CIA official telephoned Todorovich and demanded that he divulge the identity of the Agent. Todorovich refused and stated that he considered this a matter of personal honor and that unless there was reason to believe Bureau operations were being adversely effected, he would not make the identification. CIA officials subsequently advised the Liaison Agent that they had reviewed the entire case and learned that District Attorney McKevitt publicly stated on 2-14-70 that the statement attributed to Dr. Smiley (which allegedly came to him via Todorovich from our Agent) was based on an "honest mistake" and that McKevitt felt this cleared the air and no further clarification was needed.

ACTION: I don't. I still want name of Agent which [illegible]

None. For information.

H.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 2-20-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to memorandum dated 2-18-70 from D. J. Brennan to Sullivan. The Director stated that he wants the name of the FBI Agent who had furnished certain information to Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver. The Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, on 2-20-70, repeating the background of this matter and reiterated the protest made earlier by the Bureau and asked that CIA obtain the identity of the FBI Agent.

Helms advised that he considered this a most serious development and fully recognizes the gravity of the situation since it has such a significant bearing on relations between the two agencies and the highly important work of both organizations. He stated that he does not have the identity of the FBI Agent and so far Todorovich has refused to disclose same. Helms advised that he is requesting Todorovich to proceed to Washington, D. C., immediately at which time he will be interviewed in detail by Helms. In the meantime, the CIA Director is requesting his subordinates to prepare for him a complete report covering all information in possession of CIA regarding the subject. He stated that he will communicate with the Bureau immediately after talking to Todorovich. He stated that it was absolutely necessary that he make certain that he has all the relevant facts so that he can accurately respond to the Director and take the proper and necessary administrative action within his own organization.

ACTION:

For information.

I shall await word.
H

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 25, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On February 24, 1970, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Richard Helms had instructed him to transmit the following message to the Director.

Pursuant to instructions from Helms, Mike Todorovich, CIA representative in Denver, arrived in Washington, D. C., on February 24, 1970, and Helms initiated his interview. Helms expects to complete the interview including an examination of various CIA records within two days, upon the completion of which he will be transmitting a personal letter to the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "Werner acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. Papich has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. Michael Todorovich. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to Dr. Joseph Smiley, then President of Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, now President of a university in El Paso, Texas, and to the District Attorney of Denver, Mr. James McKevitt. In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. Todorovich to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. Todorovich and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. Todorovich was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. Todorovich maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. Todorovich explained that the Riha/Galya Tannenbaum cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

The purpose of Mr. Todorovich's conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on Dr. Joseph Smiley. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. Todorovich affirms that before going to District Attorney McKevitt he called upon the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Scott Werner, and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. Werner to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Mr. Todorovich states that Mr. Werner refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. Werner engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. Todorovich. Subsequently, Mr. Todorovich conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding Dr. Smiley and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

Werner acted properly. H

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. Todorovich. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to Dr. Smiley and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. Todorovich, I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. Todorovich.

~~SECRET~~

I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent [illegible] or [illegible] the [illegible] of the information.

While the following is not pertinent to your request, my review of this case suggests the advisability of a re-examination of Riha's disappearance and past activities and, necessarily, the Tannenbaum case. Briefly, since 1958 we have communicated to your Bureau significant information which relates to Riha's involvement with Czech and Soviet intelligence services, when he was behind the Iron Curtain. I attach for your information and convenience copies of pertinent reports regarding this aspect of the case.

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Helms forgets it was a two way street. H

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Attachments - a/s

This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with C.I.A. to be terminated & any contacts with CIA in future to be by letter only. H

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. The January 1970 receipt of information from your Bureau that Mrs. Ruth Ann COOK, Thomas RIHA's mother, had mentioned rumors of her son's work for CIA in letters to the SAC, Denver, caused us to verify the fact RIHA has never been employed or used operationally by this Agency.

2. In 1958 and 1959 you were provided information that RIHA, when transitting Prague en route to Moscow, was contacted by Czech Intelligence and asked to remain in the CSR. Later in 1958 Czech Intelligence introduced RIHA to the KGB in Moscow and our source reported RIHA accepted certain privileges from the KGB while asserting he would not become a spy for the Soviets. Details reported by our source about RIHA's KGB contacts did not emerge during a 1960 FBI interview of RIHA.

3. This indication that RIHA may not have been truthful in 1960, when added to our current knowledge about KGB interest in recruiting American exchange students and RIHA's 1968 trip to the USSR, suggests the circumstances of RIHA's disappearance might be re-evaluated. This Agency is reopening its file on this case in view of the information disclosed in the attachments.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

COPY

27 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. The following report concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect the repatriation of Subject, a naturalized American East-West Exchange student, to his country of origin was recently submitted by a source of this office.

2. Source first became acquainted with Subject during the past year at The Russian Research Center, Harvard University. On 10 September 1958 he ran into Subject by chance at the SAS office in Vienna as the two boarded a SAS flight to Copenhagen via Duesseldorf. During the trip Subject disclosed the following to source which has been supplemented from information from our files.

3. RIHA, who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 17 April 1929, is one of the twenty American students selected for the East-West Exchange Program and will be studying in the USSR for the 1958-59 academic year. Files in this Agency indicate that RIHA arrived in the U. S. on 15 July 1947 and became a citizen in 1952.

4. Our source informed ~~us that RIHA~~ had gone to Prague, June of this year, to see his father and other relatives. His father and mother are divorced and according to information in our files, his mother is listed as Mrs. Ruth A. COOK. address: 2023 Etna Street, Berkeley 4, California.

5. RIHA told our source that when he arrived in Prague he was put into a Government hotel for three days before he was allowed to stay with his relatives and friends. During this time, and perhaps later, RIHA was accompanied through the city by a guide whom he described as a "Government Official" name unknown, who attempted to effect Subject's repatriation to Czechoslovakia. RIHA told our source that this man has set up an appointment (date and address unknown) to meet him in Moscow to talk further.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. Subject told our source that this "Government Official" did not mention Czech Intelligence or Security Forces as such and that he (RIHA) is not too worried concerning this contact. RIHA apparently feels that it is the price he must pay in order to study in the Soviet Union and once he gets deeply into his studies in Moscow he feels that he can plead that he is too busy with his academic work to have contact with any officials. Our source also stated that RIHA is in some kind of correspondence with the Czech official. We have no description or name for the Czech official.

7. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office, and that our source be fully protected in the event that contact is made with RIHA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/751,690

cc: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~

COPY

21 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CS CI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958 concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect Subject's repatriation while the latter was in Prague in June of 1958 visiting relatives en route to study in Moscow during 1958-59 as an East-West Exchange Student. The following report describes further action taken by the KGB in Moscow to cultivate Subject, and was recently submitted by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. Sometime in December 1958, Subject again met the Czech Official who had tried to have Subject repatriate to the CSR in Prague last summer. According to our source, it was apparently an accidental meeting at a Moscow railroad station as the Czech was returning to Prague. The Czech was delighted to see Subject, and introduced him to a Soviet official. This Soviet identified himself only by a first name and a telephone number, both unknown to our source. The Soviet described his work as being in the American Section of the MVD.

3. This Soviet Official has been cultivating Subject (trying to see him as often as possible, sometimes twice a week) since their introduction in December, by offering such blandishments as trips in a chauffered private limousine into forbidden areas outside Moscow, tickets to any entertainment, access to material from previously inaccessible archives, the use of private country villas and all the "beautiful, interesting and intelligent girls" he might want. Subject has further been promised the opportunity of returning to the Soviet Union for as long as he wants at any future date. He would have to pay only his way over there; his expenses and return trip to the US would be paid by the Soviets.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

4. Subject has taken advantage of this offer to take several trips for sightseeing into forbidden areas around Moscow in a private car with the Soviet Official, and has also taken up a few offers for entertainment. Subject visited one of these villas, but refused the girls on the ground that he wants a woman to like him for himself, and not because she has been told to do so. The Soviet answered that "some of them will really learn to like you for yourself, as well as work for us," but Subject still declined to get involved. However, Subject has recently been taken up by a Soviet girl who had previously tried to seduce another American student and subsequently blurted out that she was put onto the latter American by the MVD, which she has also told Subject. Subject is reported to be responding warmly to her approaches although he has flatly told her he doesn't trust her nor any Russian completely. He claims he enjoys her company but will not have a serious affair with her, and suspects she may be tied up with the other women offered him by the Soviet Official.

5. In his relationship with the Soviet Official, Subject is reportedly aware that he is playing a risky game, and is only utilizing the situation for the comfort and convenience it brings him. He has told the Soviet frankly that he cannot be won over ideologically. Subject says he feels that the Soviets' interest in him is to cultivate him as a scholar of possible future importance to insure that he will always be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Subject has reportedly told several other American students of his relationship with the Soviet Official in order to cover himself "in case anything happened".

6. This Soviet Official has evinced an interest to Subject in many of the American Exchange students, with the explanation that some would undoubtedly be back in Moscow within two years as Diplomats and that since this is his area of responsibility, he wants to know as much as possible about them. The Soviet indicated that he was quite aware of the pattern of the American Exchange students' trips to the US Embassy and what they do in the university buildings, but is not so sure of their activities around the city. To demonstrate to Subject his knowledge about the American students, the Soviet Official mentioned an affair going on within the American group of which Subject had been unaware. The Soviet's information turned out to be true.

7. Subject was described by a reliable source, who knows him from group social gatherings at Harvard, as mature and socially vivacious with a warm personality. Subject is a clever and humorous conversationalist who likes to be surrounded by people, make new acquaintances, and develop friendships. Subject's patriotic motivation was not known to our source, but the latter felt that Subject was completely "Americanized" in manners and interests. Our source would guess that Subject has courage.

8. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you either before or after his return to the United States.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed:
JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/754,303

COPY

~~SECRET~~

2 June 1959

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CSCI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958, and our CSCI 3/754,303 of 14 April 1959 in which are reported the attempt by Czech Intelligence to induce Subject, a Czech-born naturalized American, to repatriate to Czechoslovakia, and the further cultivation of Subject by the KGB in Moscow where Subject is an Exchange Student during 1958-59. The following report describes further action by the KGB to recruit Subject, and his adamant refusal of any such offer. This latest information was recently received from RIHA by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. During April 1959, the Soviet Official ~~who said he~~ was from the American Section of the MVD (sic) and who had been cultivating Subject, allegedly asked the latter to make complete and regular reports on Michael Martin LUTHER, one of the other American Exchange Students at Moscow University. Subject was asked to spend as much time as possible with LUTHER, and to report where he goes, what he does and with whom he associates. If Subject were to do this reporting, the Soviet Official said he would make available certain material from Archives which Subject has been unable to get permission to use although research in this material is vital to his having a successful year academically in Moscow.

3. Subject alleges he flatly refused this "deal", saying that if he ever got mixed up in such a dirty business, it would be for his own side and not for the Communists. The Soviet Official then told Subject he should engage in such observation and reporting to the Soviets to lose some "naivete" about how the United States is exploiting the Cultural Exchange Program for intelligence purposes. To back up this assertion, the Soviet Official told Subject about a "spy nest where spies deposit things for one another" which he said had recently been uncovered near a university entrance frequented by still another American student, Walter CLEMENS, who, the Soviet implied, was not engaged in academic work only while studying at Moscow University.

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Subject reportedly again adamantly refused to cooperate with the Soviet Official.

4. In paragraph 4 of CSCI 3/754,303, reference was made to a Soviet girl who had become interested in Subject, and whom Subject viewed with suspicion although continuing to see her for her companionship. Her name is Lida (Y)EGOROVA. Subject has now reportedly been alienated by ~~her undependable~~ personality and has pretty well broken up with her. This girl may have left, or soon be leaving, for Prague to join her husband.

5. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[illegible]

James Angleton

CSCI 3/754,373

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to letter from Richard Helms, Director, CIA, dated February 26, 1970.

Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised Helms on February 27, 1970, that (1) the Bureau is discontinuing all contact with the CIA office in Denver and (2) that direct Liaison with CIA at headquarters is being terminated. Helms was further told that henceforth our communication with CIA will be by letter only.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing that all contact with the local CIA office be discontinued.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CODE 3/2/70

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC DENVER

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL CIA OFFICE.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5-5-70

FROM : D. E. Moore DEM/wcw 6-4-70

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 4:35 p.m., today I telephonically contacted ASAC Morley, Denver, and advised him that an article concerning the Riha case had appeared in the Sunday News (New York) 4-3-70. This article was a general rehashing of the Riha case.

I told him that the Bureau desired that SAC Werner contact the District Attorney to determine the developments of his investigation in this case and also determine what conclusions had been reached. Morley said this would be done.

Morley was asked if Denver had information concerning a professor who had gone to El Paso, Texas, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and he advised this probably referred to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President at Colorado University who was there when Riha disappeared. He said that Smiley is now President of the University of Texas, at El Paso, Texas. He said Denver had no information that Dr. Smiley has any current information concerning this matter.

SAC Werner called at 5:30 p.m., today to advise that he had been unable to get in touch with the District Attorney but also was following up on this and would contact the District Attorney today and get in a teletype tonight.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

NR002 DN PLAIN

5:15 PM URGENT 5-5-70 DCM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

REBUTELCAL TODAY.

PURSUANT TO REQUEST IN REBUTELCAL, THIS IS TO ADVISE THE PROFESSOR WHO ALLEGEDLY WENT TO EL PASO OR NEW ORLEANS CONCERNING THOMAS RIHA HAD AND HIS DFISAPPEARANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY DR. JOSEPH SMILEY , FORMER PRESIDENT, COLORADO UNIVERSITY, BOULDER, COLO., WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS IN EL PASO, TEXAS.

DR. SMILEY WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY CIA AND ADVISED BY CIA THAT RIHA WAS ALIVE AND WELL.

AS BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED, CIA ATTEMPTED TO ATTRIBUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE WAS NO FEDERAL VIOLATION OVER WHICH THE BUREAU HAD INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST, NO FBI INVESTIGATION WAS

REC-35

END PAGE ONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

CONDUCTED.

DENVER FILES CONTAIN NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA OTHER THAT THAT PREVIOULSY SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU.

DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES MC KEVITT, GENERALLY KNOWN AS MIKE MC KEVITT, ADVISED TODAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA IS AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ALL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MC KEVITT STATES THAT HE FEELS GALYA TANNENBAUM, FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RIHA, MAY HAVE KILLED HIM IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MC KEVITT'S INVESTIGATION INDICATES THERE WAS A VERY BAD FEELING BETWEEN RIHA AND TANNENBAUM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DISAPPEARANCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT TANNENBAUM WAS FORGING CHECKS ON RIHA'S ACCOUNT.

FULL BACKGROUND CONCERNING TANNENBAUM PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED BUREAU UNDER CAPTION "GALYA TANNENBAUM, AKA, IMPERSONATION," BUFILE UNKNOWN, DENVER FILE FOUR SEVEN DASH THREE ONE NINE ZERO.

MC KEVITT SAID INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT TANNENBAUM

WAS PROBABLY A NYMPHOMANIAC AND THAT SHE AND RIHA HAD HAD CONSTANT SEXUAL AFFAIRS AND THAT SHE HELD THIS AS A CLUB OVER HIS HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORGERY OF THESE CHECKS.

IN ANY EVENT MC KEVITT STATES IT IS HIS OPINION THAT RIHA IS DEAD SINCE HIS INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALS RIHA WAS VERY ATTACHED TO HIS FRIENDS AND MC KEVITT FEELS THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS FRIENDS IF HE WERE ALIVE. MC KEVITT ALSO ADVISES THAT INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE INDICATES RIHA WAS VERY ABNORMAL IN HIS SEXUAL DESIRES AND PURSUITS AND THAT THIS WAS HIS GREAT WEAKNESS; THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WOMEN ALONE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THESE INVOLVEMENTS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS DEATH.

IN VIEW OF THE DETAILS AND FACTS SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY INTERVIEW WITH DR. JOSEPH SMILEY IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU.

END

WJM FBI WA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 6, 1970

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Pursuant to Director's request Denver District Attorney James "Mike" McKevitt interviewed 5/5/70 as to investigation of Riha, Czechoslovak-born, naturalized, former professor of Russian history at Colorado University, who departed Denver area 3/69 without notifying friends, associates or estranged wife. His disappearance has been glamorized and spiced up in newspaper articles by references to Galya Tannenbaum, his paramour. McKevitt stated investigation at standstill, all leads being exhausted. He feels Tannenbaum may have killed subject since bad feeling developed between them prior to his disappearance due to her forging checks on his account. Further, Tannenbaum probably a nymphomaniac who had constant sexual affairs with Riha and used this as a club over his head to prevent disclosure of forgeries. In McKevitt's opinion Riha is dead since he was close to his friends and if alive would contact them. Investigation indicates Riha abnormal in his sexual desires and could not leave women alone. Possibility exists one of these involvements may have resulted in his death.

Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President, Colorado University, where subject employed, is now President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas. Smiley after subject's disappearance stated subject was alive and well. When challenged by McKevitt to disclose basis for statement he refused and appealed to CIA, his source, for help. Bureau vigorously refuted CIA's claim that Bureau Agent was original source for statement. As result McKevitt publicly announced statement was not true and resulted from "honest mistake." No indication Smiley has any facts to contribute concerning subject's current whereabouts or basis for his disappearance. Since Bureau has conducted no investigation into Riha's disappearance, interview of Smiley could result in impression Bureau entering case. However, if Director so desires, El Paso will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley. Bureau files show subject attended Moscow University 9/58-9/59. Our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958. In 1958-59 CIA advised Czech intelligence attempted to persuade Riha to repatriate and later introduced Riha to Soviet intelligence which attempted his recruitment. After subject's return to US in 1959 no information was developed as to continued interest in him by Soviet intelligence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: THOMAS RIHA
105-78256

ACTION:

If the Director so desires, El Paso will be furnished background information regarding Riha and will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley.

Yes.
H.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
DATE: 5/7/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Rememo A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 5/6/70, by which the Director instructed we interview Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas.

At 1:40 p.m., 5/7/70, I telephoned ASAC Jay Cochran, Jr., El Paso, and furnished him background of this matter. I instructed him to have Dr. Smiley contacted immediately, to make it clear that the FBI was not investigating the Riha matter and to inquire of Smiley if he has any new information regarding Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

ASAC Cochran was told to send the results of this interview of Dr. Smiley immediately by teletype to the Bureau. He was also told that in the event Dr. Smiley is out of town or otherwise unavailable for interview, a teletype should be sent immediately to the Bureau advising as to when the interview would be conducted.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 5/8/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference memorandum A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/6/70, same caption, by which the Director instructed that Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, be interviewed as to any knowledge he possessed concerning Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

Dr. Smiley was interviewed 5/7/70 and was most cooperative. Smiley stated since leaving the University of Colorado in 6/69 his knowledge of developments in this case has been derived from articles he has read in "The Denver Post." He speculated Riha may have been involved in intelligence work and based this comment on Riha's being a "loner" and having married a Czech girl. He said he had no evidence to support this speculation. He said that he was aware that one Mrs. Tannenbaum, a woman indicted in Colorado for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of Riha. He concluded that he had no further information concerning either Riha's disappearance or his whereabouts.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/8/70

nsmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, EL PASO

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIJA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
SINO-SATELLITE SECTION

ReButel call to EP, 5/7/70;
EP tel call to Bureau, 5/7/70.

In accordance with the request of the Director, SA FRANCIS J. PRASEK interviewed Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, President of UTEP. Dr. SMILEY was advised that the FBI has no jurisdiction in this matter, nor is it conducting any active investigation regarding RIJA, and that we were simply desirous of being advised of any new information he may have received regarding RIJA's disappearance and/or present whereabouts.

Dr. SMILEY, who was most gracious and pleasant, stated that he left the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, in 6/69, and has since that time followed the investigation of RIJA and his disappearance which is being conducted by the newspaper "The Denver Post".

SMILEY, in 4/69, approximately three weeks after the disappearance of RIJA, contacted RIJA's attorney for the purpose of determining whether the attorney had any information regarding RIJA, since it was necessary for SMILEY to know whether RIJA was alive and whether he intended to return to the University for the fall semester of 1969 to resume teaching in the History Department. SMILEY, who cannot now recall the name of the attorney, was furnished an address for RIJA in Montreal, Canada, and a letter was directed to this address by the History Department seeking information regarding RIJA and his intentions.

② Bureau (RAM)
1-El Paso

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After leaving Boulder, SMILEY was advised by Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, that a letter was received by the University purportedly written by RIJA in which he stated that he would not be returning to the University. BRIGGS advised SMILEY that in his opinion, the letter was a forgery, since the signature did not compare with that of RIJA.

After the disappearance, SMILEY began receiving a great many inquiries from the news media and he was pressed for a statement regarding his knowledge of RIJA and whether or not he was alive.

THE FOLLOWING WAS FURNISHED BY DR. SMILEY IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE FBI AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION TO ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY SINCE HE WAS BREAKING A CONFIDENCE WITH AN ASSOCIATE IN THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Being hounded by the press for a statement, he contacted a source in the CIA Office at Denver since he, SMILEY, was formerly a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, thinking that perhaps that agency could assist him off the record with any information it might possess. SMILEY was aware that the CIA had interviewed RIJA following a trip by RIJA to the Soviet Union. The CIA source subsequently told Dr. SMILEY to merely advise the press that he had information to the effect that RIJA was "alive and well". This information was subsequently released by Dr. SMILEY to the student press at the University of Colorado, and it appeared in print.

When the Office of the District Attorney in Denver instituted investigation into the disappearance of RIJA, SMILEY was contacted by the DA's Office regarding the source of his statement. Dr. SMILEY again contacted the Denver CIA Office source and was advised that he was to state nothing and that he would be recontacted.

Some days later, the CIA source recontacted him and told him that he would be receiving an inquiry from the Office of the DA in the form of a statement, and that he should agree with the statement even though it "was not quite the truth". SMILEY did not question

these instructions, since he felt that CIA knew what should be done in this type of case. He received a telephone call from the DA's Office and a statement was read to him to the effect that the information which he had received and made public to the effect that RIJA was alive and well was in error. SMILEY told the caller that he agreed with the statement and nothing further came of this.

Dr. SMILEY does not know what part, if any, the CIA has in this case, but since he, SMILEY, is himself a former intelligence agent he did not feel that he had the right to question something which might be of vital importance to his country.

DR. SMILEY REQUESTED THAT NO HINT OR INFERENCE BE GIVEN TO THE CIA WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT HE HAS REVEALED TO THE FBI HIS CONTACTS REGARDING THIS MATTER WITH THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CIA.

He stated that though he has no evidence to substantiate his belief, he cannot get it out of his mind that RIJA may have been a double agent for the Soviets or the Czechoslovaks. He is aware that one Mrs. TANNENBAUM, a woman indicted for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsonic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of RIJA. He never knew RIJA to be associated with any such woman, but stated that he was not acquainted with the personal life of RIJA who was somewhat of a "loner".

RIJA, when he joined the staff of the University of Colorado, was single but in 8/68, an individual came to visit RIJA ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a marriage between RIJA and the man's sister. The intended bride was a Czechoslovakian girl who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and this "brother-in-law" was entertained by a member and colleague of RIJA in the History Department. This individual indicated to SMILEY that although the "brother-in-law" supposedly did not speak any English, and had RIJA translate every statement into Czech, it was apparent from the gestures and expressions of the "brother-in-law" that he understood more than he let on. Three weeks after the visit of this man, the woman who became Mrs. RIJA came to Boulder, Colorado, where she and RIJA were married. The marriage resulted in divorce a short time later and the girl reportedly returned to the East Coast from whence she came.

Dr. SMILEY indicated that he has no further information regarding this matter, but that Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, should be in possession of the letter purportedly written from Canada by RIJA, and may be in a position to assist in answering any question the Bureau might have regarding RIJA's association with the University of Colorado, since BRIGGS would have possession of these records. He stated BRIGGS is a trusted confidant of his and Dr. SMILEY's name should be used as an introduction should the Bureau desire any information of BRIGGS.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, which forwarded a memorandum of the same date for your approval and forwarding to the SSC in partial response to its request of April 30, 1975.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of an additional memorandum which completes the response to the Committee's request.

A copy of the memorandum for the SSC is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
LFS:mjg
(9)

Sect 102 behexed
HSC Sen 94. (8/24/75 ky)
11/16/76.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

REC-102

62-116395-263

8

VFS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AIM/mf
MDR-16

JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 25 1975

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, provided a partial response to this request and advised that it would be necessary to clear Section 102 of the Manual of Instructions with other interested agencies.

Section 102 has now been cleared with the other interested agencies and is available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstein or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:mjg mjs
(8)

NOTE:

Third agency considerations have been resolved by coordination with other appropriate agencies. Section 102 pertains to relations with other agencies.

LFS

8

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-11[illegible]-263

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Sections of the Manual of Instructions not Previously Furnished
Section 102 of MOI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6-13-75

Received by: John T. Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC J. T. Elliff
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part 2.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In response to above-cited SSC request, the SSC was advised that designated Sections, with one exception, of FBI Manual of Instructions were available for review at FBI Headquarters. By communication 6/11/75, SSC was advised excluded Section, which involved third agency considerations, is now available for review at FBI Headquarters.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC
EWS
5-TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE on Intelligence Activities TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a staff member of captioned Committee of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, former Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb lhb
(12)

✓ P. V. [illegible] 4509 JB

Hand carried by Paul V. Daly 6-12-75 PVD/

edm 1

REC-102

62-116395-262

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000
MOR-16

PcM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG, III, BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Armstrong, who was formerly Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. Mr. Armstrong furnished the information following his interview by SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein. The interview took place in Washington, D. C., on June 6, 1975, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. Mr. Armstrong was not put under oath and was not advised of his rights including his right to personal counsel.

Mr. Armstrong advised that the interview covered the following areas:

1. The general activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division, particularly Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning research conducted in the Intelligence Division concerning the possibility of obtaining an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters;

2. The alleged existence of files in former Director Hoover's office;

3. Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning the increase in the number of FBI representatives assigned abroad as Legal Attaches.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2002 BY SPArm/lmf

MOR-16

WRW/[illegible]

62-116395-262

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE BY SSC

With regard to the effort made to obtain an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters, Mr. Armstrong advised the SSC representative that in May, 1972, one of the principal questions raised by Mr. Gray was concerning the jurisdictional authority of the FBI to conduct intelligence or security investigations. He commented that in May, 1972, a conference was held at Quantico, Virginia, involving a number of Bureau executives and that during this conference the question of jurisdictional authority was discussed. Following the conference, a special team was set up to discuss this subject, including Mr. Armstrong and former Special Agent Thomas Smith of the Intelligence Division. According to Mr. Armstrong, it was felt that it would be appropriate to develop a new set of guidelines and not to rely on prior statutes and Presidential orders. Armstrong recalled that after several meetings of this group, Thomas Smith prepared a document consisting of 43 pages which was completed approximately six weeks after the group was created. Armstrong recalled that the document was received in the Acting Director's office and was discussed at one of the regular afternoon staff conferences. At that time it was agreed that the document was good but that the timing was not thought to be appropriate. The thought was expressed that it would be held in abeyance until after the coming elections. It was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the matter might have been discussed between Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Gray, and it was decided not to push the matter until after the elections. Mr. Armstrong recalled advising Mr. Smith of the location of the document and the fact that it was being held in abeyance until after the elections.

The matter of the above document did not come up again until shortly before the confirmation hearings concerning Mr. Gray. At that time it was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the Bureau should not push for the Executive Order until after a

permanent Director of the Bureau had been confirmed. Mr. Armstrong advised that to the best of his knowledge the document was not given to the Department of Justice while Mr. Gray and his staff were in the Bureau.

Concerning files that were allegedly maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Armstrong stated that shortly after Mr. Gray's arrival in the Bureau he made a statement to the effect that there were no secret files maintained by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Armstrong commented that he doubted the wisdom of making such a broad statement.

Shortly after Mr. Gray's statement was made, information came to Mr. Armstrong's attention which caused him to prepare a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating the possibility of the existence of files in Mr. Hoover's office. Armstrong could not recall Mr. Gray's response to his memorandum but he believed that the original of the memorandum was returned to him and that he placed the original and the carbon in his desk along with other memoranda that he had prepared for Mr. Gray.

Mr. Armstrong stated that it was his theory that the files in Mr. Hoover's office were in two categories; the first being files containing information possibly detrimental to prominent persons in the Government and the other category being tidbits of information received in personal correspondence from various Special Agents in Charge concerning persons of possible interest to Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Armstrong advised further that at one of his daily conferences, Mr. Gray mentioned that he had talked to former Acting Associate Director Mark Felt concerning files which may have been maintained in Mr. Hoover's office and which he said were then in a safe in the custody of Mr. Felt.

Mr. Armstrong could not recall whether Mr. Gray and Mr. Felt were to go through the safe together or whether Mr. Felt was to do it alone and advise Mr. Gray of his findings.

With regard to the present location of such files, Mr. Armstrong had no specific knowledge but speculated that if they existed they might have been destroyed before Mr. Gray arrived in the office, they might have been retained in Mr. Felt's safe or they might have been removed to the custody of Mr. Clyde Tolson or Miss Helen Gandy at Mr. Hoover's house.

Mr. Armstrong advised that on April 27, 1973, prior to his departure from the Bureau, he destroyed all of the memoranda he had retained in his desk and he is certain that among them was his memorandum concerning files in Mr. Hoover's office.

With regard to the increase in the number of Legal Attaches, Armstrong advised that he recalled that shortly before Mr. Gray came to the Bureau there had been an expansion in the number of Legal Attaches. He understood that traditionally the role of the Legal Attache had been to function as a liaison representative to foreign police agencies but that with the expansion in the number of Legal Attaches they were given additional responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, exactly to what extent he did not recall. He recalled that the expansion was at the initiation of the White House and may have been because the White House was not satisfied with the intelligence collected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Armstrong stated that he saw a potential for friction with CIA and speculated that this might have been a factor in the breach of liaison between the FBI and CIA. He recalled writing a memorandum for Mr. Gray expressing doubts as to whether the training of Special Agents of the FBI equipped them for the collection of foreign intelligence and some subsequent discussion that

perhaps the Legal Attaches should be brought home for such training, but that this idea was concluded to be impractical or unnecessary.

1 - The Attorney General

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

To the Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting interview of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, formerly Special Assistant to FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, by SSC Staff Member.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Authorities for FBI's security investigations

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interview included following topics: general activities of FBI's Intelligence Division, including FBI's authorities in security investigations; files maintained in former FBI Director Hoover's office, and increase in number of FBI representatives abroad as Legal Attaches.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

WDC

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-

SFP:1hb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 CFS

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

276-10483

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.

June 12, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter, and appendices thereto, from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are an original of a memorandum and enclosures which are responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 6

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-260

RDS:lek|ek
(10)

REC- 102

17 JUN 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

3

WRW

PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

62-116395

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to the SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, Item 10, the SSC requested all records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D. C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D. C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August, 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

In respect to 10a, on 12/9/64 a travel voucher was processed for payment to former Special Agent Lish Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. Accompanying the voucher was

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RDS:lek
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 by Whitson to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air travel from Washington, D. C., to Miami and return. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Whitson in connection with the aforementioned travel.

In respect to 10b, former Special Agents DeLoach, Adcock, Manning (correct name Donald Hanning), Linebaugh (correct name Harold Leinbaugh), and Special Agent Todd submitted travel vouchers for August, 1964. However, no GTRs were issued by them.

In regard to 10c, William C. Sullivan was the issuing officer of a GTR made out to Southern Railroad for travel from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta and return in the amount of $74.55. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Sullivan in connection with the aforementioned travel. Sullivan submitted a voucher for 11/28-30/64 in the amount of $37.10.

No other records are available concerning the travel and expenses of the individuals mentioned in 10a, 10b and 10c.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The data regarding the GTRs and the travel of the individuals mentioned in the memorandum was obtained from the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. In connection with 10a, 10b, and 10c, all expense vouchers of the individuals mentioned in these items have been destroyed under the Five-Year Retention Document Schedule Rule.

Void after 19

BILL TO **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A3,925,564

The United States of America Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

The National Airlines Company is requested to furnish coach (FIRST, COACH, ETC.) class air (RAIL, AIR, ETC.) transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC to Miami, Florida + return (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") (SHOW CARRIERS AND JUNCTION POINTS AND WHERE MIXED CLASS SERVICE IS TO BE FURNISHED SPECIFY SUCH BETWEEN ... POINTS)

for use of Lish Whitson and ____ others with ____ (LOWER BERTH, P.C. SEAT, ETC.) accommodations from ____ to ____ (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") with authorization to transport not over ____ lbs. of excess baggage from ____

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE OR TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

PLACE OF ISSUE Washington DC Nov 21, 6[illegible]

I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)

0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT	TOTAL
107.40		107.40

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf

MAR-16

62-116395-260

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
May 1, 1935, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.
2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.
3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10482

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S., Nov. [illegible] General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

PASSED
149/a
VO
DEC 16 1964

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.

Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.

3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATED 12/14/2000 BY SP2 evm/mf

MDR-16

62-116395-260

BILL TO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A 3,991,398

The United States of America
Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

The Southern Railroad ... Company is requested to furnish first class rail transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC to Atlanta, Ga. and return via Southern R.R.

for use of William C. Sullivan and ... others with ... accommodations

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

Place of issue: Washington DC 11-25-64

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

0500
21-60

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

		TOTAL
48.95	25.60	74.55

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/12/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard F. Taylor Jr. Date: 16 Jun 75 2PM

Received by: Sherry Powell

Title: Asst Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF

MOR-16

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/12/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 10.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

SURVEILLANCE

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was furnished with information and documents relating to travel on the part of Bureau personnel in connection with SSC inquiry into this Bureau's use of electronic surveillances.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
EWS
5- TJM

TREAT AS YELLOW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAT
MDR-16

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General with a letterhead memorandum attached enclosing a copy of a memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups." It appears that we are proposing to give the copy of the Gale memorandum to the Senate Select Committee in response to their request by letter dated May 14, 1975, for a memorandum prepared by Gale relative to the subject matter of the 1964 memorandum.

My reading of the memorandum revealed that it is a purely deliberative document which quotes personal views of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Gale. I am concerned that the release of such a memorandum containing not only the personal views of Bureau officials, but also identifying them by name could have an impact on individuals in the future who may be asked to furnish their opinions concerning policy matters in the FBI. As indicated by the Attorney General in his speech in New York, it is essential that the Executive Branch have a degree of privacy concerning policy discussions and expressions of personal views by officials in order for the Executive to function properly.

I do recognize that we may not be able to resist giving the Committee access to material documents that bear on particular issues under investigation, however, I do recommend that when we are required to produce deliberative documents, the names and other identifying data relating to individuals furnishing views be deleted.

Enc. REC- 102 62-116395-259

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DATE 10/14/2000 BY SP2ALM/MJC
MDR-16

JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

[redacted]

84 JUN 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the names of individuals described in the body of the memorandum of July 30, 1964, and other identifying data be deleted prior to furnishing the copy to the Committee.

2. In regard to future responses to requests for documents of a deliberative nature that our policy be that names and identifying data will be deleted prior to disclosure of the documents.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Former Special Agent Richard H. Davis of the Atlanta Office telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 6-4-75 at which time he explained that he had been contacted by Michael Epstein of captioned Committee at which time Epstein requested that Davis make himself available for interview in either Atlanta, Georgia, or travel to Washington, D. C. Davis informed Epstein that he would have to obtain Bureau approval prior to submitting to interview inasmuch as he had to obtain a release from his employment secrecy agreement.

Mr. Davis informed SA Daly that he was reluctant to agree to being interviewed by captioned Committee concerning his activities as an Agent. It was pointed out to Mr. Davis that the decision as to whether to agree to interview was his, but he was advised that captioned Committee has subpoena power and might attempt to force him to furnish information through the use of a subpoena. He was informed that the Bureau was cooperating with captioned Committee and their inquiry into FBI operations.

It was explained to Mr. Davis that if he desired to allow himself to be interviewed, the Bureau would make available an employee at his request to be available but not present during interview. He was also advised that this Agent would not represent him as private counsel. Mr. Davis was advised that the Bureau's concern was not of matters of historical fact but rather testimony might be required which could impair the Bureau's efforts to discharge its responsibilities. It was also explained that the Bureau representative would assist him in making determination whether his response to a particular question would identify confidential informants, impair on-going investigations, divulge information derived from other Government agencies or foreign sources or expose sensitive investigative techniques and, therefore, a response should not be given.

62-116395

REC-102

62-116395-258

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Personnel file, Richard H. Davis
1 - Mr. ~~W. O. Cregar~~
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

JUN 25 1975

PVD:dkg (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Davis indicated that he desired a Bureau representative be made available during his interview and would request the interview take place in Atlanta, Georgia. Additionally, he stated Epstein had indicated that the topic of discussion in the interview would be the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Mr. Davis stated he would recontact FBI Headquarters as soon as a date and place of interview had been determined. He indicated he would set the date for interview so that the Bureau would have ample opportunity to have an Agent available. We have separately requested Bureau approval for the release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

granted per 5x8 note on 6/4/75 tel.

ACTION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an Agent for the interview of Mr. Davis when and if a date and place are agreed upon.

PVD JBH/pvg

WRW

JBA/PLM

Wannall has designated SA Phillips per R/S 6/9/75

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Associate Director

__________, 1975

___ Director
___ Mr. Callahan
___ Mr. Jenkins
___ Mr. Adams
___ Mr. Feeney

___ Mr. Ash
___ Mr. Bassett
___ Mr. Cleveland
___ Mr. Cochran
___ Mr. Decker
___ Mr. Gallagher
___ Mr. Gebhardt
___ Mr. McDermott
___ Mr. Mintz
___ Mr. Mooney
___ Mr. Moore
___ Mr. Walsh
___ Mr. Wannall

___ Mr. Mack
___ Mr. O'Connell

___ Miss Tietgen
___ Mrs. Mutter
___ Miss Downing
___ Miss Southers
___ Mrs. Haines

___ M __________

Room __________

___ Mrs. Metcalf
___ Telephone Room

___ Corres. Review
___ Mail Room
___ Teletype
___ Personnel Records
___ Mechanical Section

___ For Appropriate Action
___ For Your Approval
___ Initial and Return
___ Please Call Me
___ For Information
___ Per Conversation

Sensitivity '75

Do we have any amplification of This instruction? or, do we know of any submission responsive to This which illustrate interpretation

K

Item #6 (tabbed) re

"items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities"

Should create Congressional furor.

Paul L. Mack
Room 7004, Ext. 5606

REC-102

62-116395-257

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/
MDR-16

84 JUN 26 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 6/18/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____ WRW
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Reference is made to Bureau letter to The Attorney General 6/20/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)," forwarding letterhead memorandum for approval and forwarding to SSC.

The Director asked if we have any amplification of this instruction (to submit items with unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities for dissemination to the President under the INLET Program) or do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation?

There has been no amplification of this instruction, nor any submission under INLET of an item on prominent personalities that would show the interpretation of this point.

With respect to the observation that this matter should cause a congressional furor, it is noted that INLET has already been afforded considerable publicity, beginning in February, 1973, after an office memorandum on the subject reached the news media. This publicity is why the Senate Committee asked for documents on INLET. The White House and Senator Bob Packwood inquired about the Program. A detailed defense of INLET appeared in the Congressional Record.

By way of background, the INLET instruction that has received the most publicity--items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities--was recalled by the author of the INLET Program initiating letter as having been specifically dictated by then Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan.

TEB:lek
(8)

REC- 102

62-116395-256

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/CMC
MDR-16

17 JUN 24 1975

5-Ext

84 JUN 25 1975

While we cannot say exactly what former Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan had in mind when he added the instruction about items with an unusual twist, we can speculate with a hypothetical example.

If we learned that a trusted assistant to an important government official--an official who had taken a "hard line" with respect to dealings with the Soviet Union, for example--was under development by Soviet intelligence, this would be an unusual twist to an item of intelligence interest to the President involving a prominent person.

In such a hypothetical case, we would, of course, advise the government official involved, and The Attorney General and the President. We would have done this under INLET and we would still disseminate this type of data. INLET was only a vehicle for special dissemination.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

1.0

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

John Elliff of captioned Committee's task force on Domestic Intelligence Activities advised on 6-9-75, that the Committee is planning to have a Bureau representative testify concerning the FBI's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic and counterintelligence areas in late June or early July. Mr. Elliff stated that this testimony would be before the Senators and will be a general exploration of jurisdictional authority. Mr. Elliff also volunteered that he had told K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination of the Department, that the Committee wanted to be furnished a copy of the T. J. Smith Memorandum dated 7-31-72 concerning FBI's investigative jurisdiction in domestic and counterintelligence matters. Elliff stated that at this point, a summary of such documents would not be an acceptable substitute. Elliff desired such a document be made available to the Committee prior to the aforementioned testimony. With regards to testimony, Elliff indicated that it would not necessarily have to be the Director giving a testimony.

Elliff stated as he finalizes his plans concerning the testimony concerning FBI investigative jurisdiction, he would recontact SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and give more details concerning this matter.

62-116395

REC-59 62-116395-255

ST-101

5 JUN 12 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
  Attn: Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Kelly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP [illegible]
MDR-14

84 [illegible] 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

Legal Counsel to Adams, Memo
Re: SENSTUDY 75

With regards to the request concerning the Smith document, we should await K. William O'Connor's request prior to taking any action concerning this matter, and with regards to testimony, we should await further details prior to engaging in the preparation of that testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. RW ✓ HEM
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 19 1975
TELETYPE

~~REC-102~~

Mr Cregar
4123 JCH

NR 026 LA PLAIN

10:14PM NITEL 6-18-75 RLD

TO DIRECTOR (62-1~~16464)~~

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-1700-4124)

ATTN: INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

SENSTUDY 1975.

RE BUTEL TO LOS ANGELES, JUNE 17, 1975.

THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY INSTANCE THAT WAS ALLUDED TO IN CAPTIONED AIRTEL AND THERE ISNO RECORD OF ANY AGENTS BY THE NAME OF RON MASCAR OR WILLIAM MILLER ASSIGNED TO THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION SINCE 1956 TO PRESENT.

END

HOLD

REC-102 62-116395-254

12 JUN 24 1975

FIVE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

84 JUN 24 1975

Black Panther Party



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

MARCH 1971

"WE ARE FROM 25 TO 30 MILLION STRONG, AND WE ARE ARMED. AND WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OUR SITUATION. AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO CHANGE IT. AND WE ARE UNAFRAID."



WARNING TO AMERICA

[illegible]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Table of Contents

I. FOUNDING 1
II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES 3
III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY 6
  Invasion of California State Legislature 6
  Police Officer Meets Panthers – and Death 6
  "Free Huey" Campaign 6
  Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver 7
  International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver 7
  Rise of the Black Panther Party 8
IV. LEADERSHIP 9
  National Committee to Combat Fascism 10
  International Section 10
V. FUNDS 12
VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS 13
VII. TACTICS 15
  Target: Police 15
  Attacks on Others 15
  Weapons Caches 16
  "Revolutionary Suicide" 16
  Panther "Justice" 18
VIII. PROPAGANDA 20
  Editorials 21
  Inflammatory Articles 24
  Provocative Slogans 29
  "Revolutionary Art" 30
  International News 35

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE FBI AS A BRIEF STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND, TACTICS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE ORGANIZATION'S OWN PUBLICATIONS WERE THE SOURCE FOR MOST OF THE MATERIAL REPRODUCED.

LET US HOLD HIGH THE BANNER OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNALISM
AND THE INVINCIBLE THOUGHTS OF

HUEY P. NEWTON

MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE.

I. FOUNDING

The Black Panther Party, with headquarters in Oakland, California, was founded in 1966 by two Oakland Negroes – Huey Percy Newton and Bobby George Seale – both at that time at Merritt College in Oakland. The name and symbol of the new party were taken from the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, an Alabama political party known informally in 1965 as the Black Panther Party.



HUEY PERCY NEWTON

From the writings of communists, revolutionaries, and black militants, Newton and Seale allegedly selected ideas around which they could build a revolutionary frame that suited the needs of their party. Influential writings included those of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader; Frantz Fanon , West Indian psychiatrist who advocated violence for Algerian nationalists; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one-time lieutenant of Cuba's Fidel Castro and a principal architect of 20th century guerrilla warfare; Malcolm X, American black nationalist who advocated violence to obtain Negro "freedom"; and W. E. B. DuBois, Negro educator who became a member of the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93.



BOBBY GEORGE SEALE

The organization was at first called the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense; however, the "Self-Defense" was removed in 1968 in an effort to project a more politically oriented image to prospective sympathizers and supporters.

As head of the new Black Panther Party, Newton assumed the title Minister of Defense, and Seale was named Chairman. When questioned about the membership of their organization, Newton and Seale gave the since oft-repeated reply: "Those who know don't say. Those who say don't know." The militancy of the group, however, had an immediate appeal to the discontented, restless youth of Oakland's ghettos.


HUEY NEWTON
BOBBY SEALE

Black Panther Party Chairman, Bobby Seale, and Minister of Defense, Huey Newton, selling Red Chinese magazine and "quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung."

3-2-67 San Francisco, Calif.

II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES

The Black Panther Party "Platform and Program" is repeated in each issue of the official Party publication, The Black Panther.

October 1966

Black Panther Party Platform and Program

What We Want What We Believe

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. **That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.** Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. **But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.**

III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Proclaiming a legal right to bear arms, the Panthers by early 1967 had begun to appear in public wearing black leather jackets and black berets, openly carrying shotguns, rifles, or pistols, and shouldering bandoliers of ammunition.

Calling the police "pigs," the Panthers began a buildup in Negro areas of the idea that police departments, especially that in Oakland, were dedicated to the brutalization and harassment of minority groups, and, acting as an appendage of white government authority, were working toward the eventual annihilation (genocide) of the Negro race.

Invasion of California State Legislature

The first incident that brought national attention to this group occurred on May 2, 1967, as the California Legislature was in session in Sacramento. Approximately 40 members of the Black Panther Party, carrying loaded rifles, pistols, and shotguns, and some wearing bandoliers of ammunition about their waists or draped over their shoulders, burst into the Chamber. They were protesting a bill being introduced on that date outlawing the carrying of loaded weapons in public and were proclaiming their right to bear arms and criticize the police. Before they were arrested, they passed out mimeographed leaflets calling on all Negroes to end the "terrorist" oppression of colored races by white America and referring to the preparation of concentration camps in the United States as a beginning of genocide.

Police Officer Meets Panthers--and Death

The Panthers became more militant with the passing of time. At 5:00 a.m., October 28, 1967, two Oakland, California, patrol officers, John F. Frey and Herbert C. Heanes, made a routine traffic violation car stop. While the officers were awaiting the results of the car registration check by radio, the driver, Huey Newton, got out of the car. Suddenly, shooting broke out. Officer Frey was killed; Officer Heanes was wounded critically; and Newton received a stomach wound. He stopped a passing automobile and had the driver take him to a hospital where he was taken into custody and hospitalized. After a state trial, which began July 15, 1968, Newton was sentenced on September 27, 1968, to serve from 2 to 15 years on a charge of voluntary manslaughter.*

"Free Huey" Campaign

Two days after Patrolman Frey's death, the Huey Newton Defense Fund was established at a meeting of a section of the Negro community of Oakland.

The cry of "Free Huey" became a clarion call. The imprisoned Newton was built up in the public eye as "black and bold in defense of his people." Each

bringing its own axe to grind, such organizations as the anarchist New Left group named Students for a Democratic Society; the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Communist Chinese-oriented Progressive Labor Party; the Communist Party, USA, and its youth affiliate, the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America; and militant campus groups, black and white, began to gather in support of the Panthers, who were willing not only to defy the establishment, but to destroy it.

**It was ruled later that the presiding judge in this trial erred in instructions to the jury. Newton was released August 5, 1970, and scheduled for retrial.*

LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver

Early in 1967, the Panthers were joined by a recent parolee from the California prison system, author of a best-selling autobiography, *Soul On Ice,* staff writer for the magazine *Ramparts,* and admitted Marxist – Leroy Eldridge Cleaver.

In *Soul On Ice,* Cleaver wrote: "I sought out his (Marx's) books...It was like taking medicine for me to find that, indeed, American Capitalism deserved all the hatred and contempt that I felt for it in my heart...."

After Newton was jailed, although he remained the undisputed leader, it soon became apparent that Cleaver, designated Minister of Information, was projecting a major leadership image. The Party began to further widen its publicity, nationally and internationally, and enlarge its radical support and revolutionary intent.

As an example of this spreading influence of the Panther Party, the 1968 National Election ticket of the Peace and Freedom Party, a coalition of radical groups, included Cleaver as candidate for the Presidential nomination; Newton as candidate for the 7th Congressional District of Alameda County, California; Kathleen Cleaver, 18th Assembly District, California State Legislature; Bobby Seale, 17th Assembly District, California State Legislature. Cleaver received a national total of almost 200,000 votes. Only a small percentage of the California electorate cast their votes for Newton, Seale, and Kathleen Cleaver.

On the evening of April 6, 1968, Cleaver and several Panthers became involved in a shoot-out with Oakland police officers. The incident resulted in the death of a Panther, the wounding of two police officers, and the wounding and arrest of Cleaver. Cleaver's parole was revoked immediately and he was returned to prison. After much publicity, he was later released on bail by a Superior Court Judge who ruled that the jeopardy of his parole status stemmed "from his undue eloquence in pursuing political goals...offensive to many of his contemporaries." This decision was overruled by the District Court of Appeals and upheld by the California Court of Appeals. Cleaver was ordered to return to prison by November 27, 1968. Electing to become a Federal fugitive, he disappeared in late November, 1968, going first to Havana, Cuba, and later to Algiers, where he has established residence.

International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver

Soon after Cleaver's arrest in the spring of 1968, approximately 150 prominent individuals sponsored the establishment of an International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. The committee intended to dispatch a team to Europe to gain

international support and arrange for a European edition of Cleaver's book, *Soul On Ice*.

Rise of the Black Panther Party

In May, 1968, the hard-core membership of the Black Panther Party was estimated at only 125, and Panther activity was confined largely to the San Francisco-Oakland, California, area. However, because of the dramatic shoot-outs, the "Free Huey" Campaign, the funds established for the defense of both Newton and Cleaver, the widespread publicity, and the support given readily by white radical groups and individual sympathizers, the Black Panther Party began to grow rapidly, not only in membership but in militancy and influence. Chapters began to appear in major cities throughout the country. By the end of 1968, the membership had reached nearly 2,000, with additional thousands of sympathizers and supporters.



PAGE [illegible] THE BLACK PANTHER SEPTEMBER [illegible]

1968: BALLOT OR THE BULLET

KATHLEEN CLEAVER,
COMMUNICATION SECT.,
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

18th ASSEMBLY DISTRICT
S.F. PEACE & FREEDOM PARTY

SHOOT YOUR SHOT

IV. LEADERSHIP

Organizationally, the Black Panther Party is set up to be under a Central Committee composed of the following positions:

- Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander, held by Huey Newton
- Chairman, held by Bobby George Seale
- Minister of Information, formerly held by Leroy Eldridge Cleaver
- Chief of Staff, held by David Hilliard
- Minister of Education, held by Raymond (Masai) Hewitt
- Communications Secretary, formerly held by Cleaver's wife, Kathleen
- Minister of Culture, held by Emory Douglas
- Field Marshal, formerly held by Donald Lee Cox

The position of Assistant Chief of Staff, not included among the Central Committee, is occupied by Roosevelt (June) Hilliard.

Under the Central Committee, the chain of command extends to leaders and officers of local chapters.

DAVID HILLIARD

RAYMOND (MASAI) HEWITT

KATHLEEN CLEAVER

EMORY DOUGLAS

DONALD LEE COX

National Committee to Combat Fascism

Set up to coexist with Black Panther Party branches in various cities in the United States are chapters of another organization called National Committee to Combat Fascism. In actuality, there is little difference between the two. This group, a Panther Party front, was set up as the result of a revolutionary conference, called National Conference for a United Front Against Fascism, held in Oakland, California, in July, 1969. The conference, sponsored by the Black Panther Party and assisted by the anarchist Students for a Democratic Society and the Communist Party, USA, was called to form a coalition of black and white radicals, described as "oppressed people."

The National Committee to Combat Fascism is considered by Party leaders to be the "political organizing bureau" of the Black Panther Party. Its specific task allegedly is to raise the political level of the people and educate them against the system.

International Section

On September 13, 1970, the International Section of the Black Panther Party officially opened in Algiers. Joining Cleaver on the staff were his wife, Kathleen, and Field Marshal Donald Lee Cox, a fugitive from justice. Cox faces charges of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, based on a warrant issued on April 20, 1970, at Baltimore, Maryland. He also failed to appear on May 14, 1970, in San Francisco, to answer Federal firearms charges.

This section, in its entirety, was expelled from the Black Panther Party by Huey Newton on February 27, 1971. The expulsion resulted from tensions and differences between Party hierarchy which led to disruptive factionalism.

D.C. greeting African brothers



Chinese 2nd Ambassador (R), Press Attaché (M) and Cultural Attaché (L) talking with Eldridge

Opening attended by cross section of Liberation Movements

Scenes from opening of International Section, The Black Panther, October 31, 1970

V. FUNDS

The money by which the Black Panther Party operates comes from a number of sources. There are substantial private contributions; fees for public appearances, such as campus speeches, radio, and television appearances; payments for magazine articles; collections for trials and bail funds in this country and abroad; subscriptions and individual sales of the Party's official organ, *The Black Panther;* fund-raising activities sponsored by sympathizers and supporters; sales of recordings of interviews and speeches; and financial aid from radicals and extremists.

According to the press, there is reason to believe that the Panthers, to obtain additional funds, are engaging in criminal activities, such as burglaries and robberies.

VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS

Panther Party leaders insist their primary aim is to serve the "people," meaning ghetto blacks. To establish good intent, Party officials have set up a series of community services aimed at recruiting members and sympathizers and building Party influence in ghetto areas. These programs, described by the Panthers as "socialistic" programs, are supposed to be carried out by all Party branches and include: "liberation schools" to give "our people a knowledge of self"; free health clinics, with money, medical supplies and professional services donated by laymen and professionals in the community; free clothing programs, with clothing donated by the community; Community Information Centers, to "answer the basic needs of the people"; and a monthly free shuttle bus service for families of blacks in prison. Few of these programs actually are carried out, and those that have been attempted have been mostly unsuccessful.

The program that has received the most publicity is the "breakfast program," devised as a further means of indoctrinating Negro youth in Panther teachings of racism and rebellion. As expressed in *The Black Panther,* June 14, 1969, "The youth we are feeding will surely feed the revolution." Breakfasts are held for ghetto children either at churches, housing projects, Panther Community Information Centers, or other space that can be obtained free of charge. Panthers usually ask local businessmen to donate food or money to this program, boycotting stores that refuse to participate. At these functions, children have been known to sing such chants as: "I am a revolutionary. I am a revolutionary. There's going to be some barbecue if Huey's not set free. Power to the people."

In 1969, Panther "Coloring Books" were printed and given out at these breakfasts. The books contained 22 pages of drawings teaching the children to distrust, hate, and kill police officers.



I am a Revolutionary
PEOPLE'S FREE SHOES PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE CLOTHING PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE FOOD PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE BUSING PROGRAM
EMORY

SURVIVAL PENDING REVOLUTION

HUEY TOLD ME THAT THE PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING REVOLUTION. BUT WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE REVOLUTION, HUEY SAYS, "WE THE PEOPLE ARE THREATENED WITH GENOCIDE, BECAUSE RACISM AND FASCISM ARE RAMPANT, NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD." HE SAYS, "WE INTEND TO CHANGE ALL THAT. BUT IN ORDER TO CHANGE IT, THERE MUST BE TOTAL TRANSFORMATION. BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THAT TOTAL TRANSFORMATION, WE MUST EXIST. IN ORDER TO EXIST, WE MUST SURVIVE; SO THEREFORE WE NEED A SURVIVAL KIT." SO THAT WE CAN GROW UP HEALTHY WITH A MIND THAT CAN BE FUNCTIONAL AND CREATIVE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
YOUR COMRADE IN ARMS

VII. TACTICS

The Black Panther Party is a violent revolutionary group whose members provoke confrontations with law enforcement officers and whose leaders incite racial hatred and preach urban guerrilla warfare.

Target: Police

Panthers claim that black communities are occupied by the police in the same way and for the same purpose that foreign troops occupy conquered territory and that these forces, operating under "establishment" orders, are engaged in gradual annihilation of the black race. Blacks, according to the Panthers, must, through urban guerrilla warfare, use guns to liberate themselves from the ever-present repressive enemy. Children in Panther "schools" do their exercises to the rhythm of: "There is a pig upon the hill – if you don't kill him the Panthers will."

Numerous claims have been made that the Black Panther Party is an innocent victim of police persecution and genocide. This charge is rendered absurd by fact. During 1970, 6 police officers were killed and 22 wounded through acts of violence traced to the Panthers. One officer, in 1969, was killed by a Panther with a shotgun blast at point-blank range as the officer lay wounded and helpless on the ground.

Out of 20 members named by the Panther Party as "killed in cold blood" by the police, four were killed by members of a rival black extremist group on the west coast; one died of barbiturate intoxication; one was shot and killed by a store owner during a robbery attempt; one was killed by his wife over a love affair he was having with a female Black Panther; and another was allegedly tortured and killed by Panther Party members. Of the remaining twelve, two were found dead on the street, the victims of unknown assailants, and ten were involved in shoot-outs with police officers.

Attacks on Others

Panther attacks have not been limited to the police. While claiming their intent to protect the black community, Panthers have assaulted and threatened citizens who have tried to assist the police.

Neighborhood stores have been forced to "contribute" food supplies and money under fear of Panther violence. Many other persons have also been victimized, as shown by the fact that in 1969 alone 348 Panther members were arrested for serious crimes, including murder, armed robbery, rape, bank robbery, and burglary.

On April 21, 1969, 21 members of the Black Panther Party were charged in New York in a 30-count indictment with conspiring to bomb public places and murder policemen and with possessing dangerous weapons.

Weapons Caches

Stockpiles of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, thousands of rounds of ammunition, Molotov cocktails, gunpowder, and accumulations of bayonets, swords, and machetes have been confiscated from Panther offices.

"Revolutionary Suicide"

On August 7, 1970, Superior Court Judge Harold Haley, the Deputy District Attorney, and three other persons were tied together with piano wire and dragged from a San Rafael, California, courtroom and taken as hostages by three armed Negro convicts, one of whom was standing trial for stabbing a San Quentin prison guard. The escapees were assisted by the defendant's 17-year-old brother who supplied them with weapons for the escapade. Judge Haley, who had a sawed-off shotgun taped to his neck, and the other hostages were forced into a waiting van. When the authorities tried to stop the kidnappers, the judge was brutally murdered; the Deputy District Attorney was injured seriously; and another hostage was slightly wounded. Three Negroes were slain and one was wounded.

Immediately thereafter, Huey Newton declared the killing of Judge Haley as being of "historical" importance to the Black Panther Party. This declaration was based on the Panther belief that all black prisoners, regardless of their crimes, are political prisoners and should be released.



OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT CRUISER INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6, 1968, GUNBATTLE WITH MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

CONFISCATED PANTHER WEAPONS

The perpetrators of the courtroom incident were lauded by the Panthers as setting another "revolutionary example for black people." In commenting further, *The Black Panther* of August 15, 1970, stated:

> *"The example that these brothers have set will be followed by many and many will rise to choose revolutionary suicide rather than reactionary suicide. Black people will unleash in great numbers the Black kamakazi..."*

In his eulogy at services for the slain Negroes, Newton said: "Our comrades have taught us all a revolutionary lesson. They have intensified the struggle and placed it on a higher level."

Panther "Justice"

Recalcitrant members of the Black Panther Party are sometimes victims of Panther "justice." As one example, Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was brought to trial in New Haven, Connecticut, for the torture-murder of Panther Alex Rackley. Rackley, a Panther suspected of being an informant, was scalded, murdered, and dumped in a swamp.

For a variety of reasons, many members have been purged from the Party. These incidents are usually written up in *The Black Panther* in special articles accompanied by photographs.


WASH ROOM
OLYMPICS
if you're not part of the solution... you're part of the problem.

PANTHER HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JUNE 4, 1969

EXPELLED

So let this be heard throughout the black community, of Atlantic City, New Jersey. That Leonard Weeks is no longer a servant of the people. That he is no longer the breakfast coordinator for this community center, or for that matter no center ran by the Black Panther Party. He has become slip-shod in his duties as a servant to the people, many times he has been warned by his comrades, about his work, and about his duty to the people's children. He deserted the children of the black community, there were days he would not attend the breakfast program, because he said that he was tired or that he overslept. Well we cannot adhear to this because as revolutionaries we must prepare ourselves to be a match for a hundred. We must prepare to run ourselves to death if need be, so that the people shall be served, and to see to it that they truly have a right to the best. And we have no time for slip-shod niggers. We must hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must confirm to the people's interest, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected, that is what being responsible to the people means.

WEEKS, EXPELLED

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Black Panther Party N.C.C.F.
Community Center
Atlantic City,

FOOLS RUSH IN

Harold Wright, number one fool in Pittsburgh, rushed out of here and into Baltimore.

HAROLD WRIGHT, FOOL

The National Committee to Combat Fascism has no time for crazy dumb fools who run around pimping off the people's just struggle for freedom and self-determination This modern day mad man can't seem to find himself or anything else for that matter. He started out, helping to put this office together and after a long train of was put out. Harold didn't like this and started to hang around our office trying to give the community the impression that he was still a member of the revolutionary ranks of Babylon.

After a few days of the breakfast program, his wife Michelle decided that she loved Harold more than the people and went with him.

We say goodbye to the Wright family and other love birds (like the Johnson's) who can't deal for the people.

So let this be heard, Harold and Michelle Wright are not members of the National Committe to Combat Fascism nor will these fools ever be.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
National
Committee to Combat Fascism
574 Brushton Ave.
Pittsburgh, Penn.
(412) 242-4728

The Black Panther,
June 20, 1970, p. 8.

VIII. PROPAGANDA

Although posters, pamphlets, recordings, and a singing group called "The Lumpen" are among propaganda vehicles used by the Black Panther Party, the main channel to the public is through their official organ, *The Black Panther*. Funds permitting, it is published weekly in Oakland, California. It includes editorials by Party leaders and spokesmen; provocative slogans; inflammatory articles; revolutionary art," comprising cartoons; and an international news section.

Excerpts from Article carrying
Typed Signature of Eldridge Cleaver.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1970 PAGE 4

TO MY BLACK BROTHERS IN VIET NAM

I'm writing this on January 4, 1970. We are starting out a new year. On August 31, I'll be 35 years old. I'm married, and I have one child with another one on the way. I am in love with my wife and I would like to enjoy a happy life raising a family. But I am not free to live the type of life that I would like. Pigs--the racist fascist rulers of the United States--won't let me....

We appeal to you Brothers to come to the aid of your people. Either quit the army, now, or start destroying it from the inside. Anything else is a compromise and a form of treason against your own people. Stop killing the Vietnamese people. You need to start killing the racist pigs who are over there with you giving you orders. Kill General Abrahms and his staff, all his officers. Sabotage supplies and equipment, or turn them over to the Vietnamese people. Talk to the other Brothers and wake them up. You should start now weeding out the traitors amongst you. It is better to do it now than to allow them to return home to help the pigs wipe us out. Especially the Uncle Tom officers should be dealt with now, because the pigs will use them as effective tools against our people. When you can no longer take care of business inside the army, then turn yourself over to the Vietnamese people and tell them you want to join the Black Panther Party to fight for the freedom and liberation of your own people. If you do cross over, you don't have to worry about the Vietnamese people abusing you. They will be glad to see you drop out of the army because what they want most in life is to stop the fighting in their land. You have a duty to humanity as well as to your own people not to be used as murderous tools by racist pigs to oppress the people.



"IF YOU WANT PEACE YOU GOT TO FIGHT FOR IT"

There's too many American flags out here, and our Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, says that the American flag and the American eagle are the true symbols of fascism. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE. Black power to Black people, Brown power to Brown people, Red power to Red people, and Yellow power to Ho Chi Minh, and Comrade Kim Il Sung the courageous leader of the 40,000,000 Korean people....

We say down with the American fascist society. Later for Richard Millhouse Nixon, the Later for all the pigs of the power structure. Later for all the people out here that don't want to hear me curse because that's all that I know how to do. That's all that I'm going to do. I'm not going to ever stop cursing, not only are we going to curse, we're going to put into practice some of the that we talk about. Because Richard Nixon is an evil man. This is the that unleashed the counter-insurgent teams upon the BPP. This is the man that's responsible for all the attacks on the Black Panther Party nationally. This is the man that sends his vicious murderous dogs out into the Black community and invade upon our Black Panther Party Breakfast Programs. Destroy food that we have for hungry kids and expect us to accept like that idlv. that man. ***We will kill Richard Nixon. We will kill any that stands in the way of our freedom.*** *We ain't here for no goddamned peace, because we know that we can't have no peace because this country was built on war. And if you want peace you got to fight for it.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

Photograph accompanying Article indicated these are the Words of Chief of Staff, David Hilliard.
THE BLACK PANTHER, November 22, 1969, p. 10.

Editorials

Through editorials, readers are advised of Party positions on national and international issues and are presented with the opinions of the hierarchy on inter-Party matters.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1971 PAGE 2

STATEMENT BY HUEY P. NEWTON, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE, ON THE OCCASION OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY- MARCH 5, 1971

Power to the People, Brothers and Sisters,

First of all I would like to thank all of you for my very presence here, because if it weren't for the Power of the People, I wouldn't be here tonight. I'm not here because of the Black Panther Party; I'm not here because of any group, I'm not here because of a group of kamakazis. I'm here because of the Power of the People.

We must remember that Revolution is a process. It's not a conclusion; because once we conclude, then we become counter-revolutionary. And that means even with the gun in our hands, because fascism also has a gun. And I would like to say tonight that the Black Panther Party stands against all forms of fascism, including sexual fascism. That we are against all kinds of chauvinism, including racial chauvinism; we're against sexual chauvinism, national chauvinism. We're intercommunalists. Before I went to prison, most of you know, you are aware, that I never made any speeches, you see, because I'm not a very eloquent man. I'm better known by the actions. And the Party was built upon the actions. And the action itself is a process. And we're not ever fixated. We haven't accepted any dogma. And we will not.

And I would like to say this, that from now on the Party itself will be better known by its contributions to the People, for the simple reason that some people around us seem to want to be known through the Media. But the Party can only judge itself through establishing certain survival programs, pending Revolution. Because remember, you make the Revolution. We can't free political prisoners, only the people can free political prisoners. And a people who are not free cannot free their prisoners, cannot free the prisoners that fascism makes. So I would like to say that we must work very hard in order to lift the consciousness of the people. We must free our Chairman Bobby Seale, Angela Davis, Ruchell Magee, the Soledad Brothers, the seven and the three, and all other political prisoners. Randy. We have to free all of them.

But we must remember that we must exhaust every possible tactic. And we must let it be known that never broadcast military tactics for military reasons. It's perfectly correct to broadcast military tactics for political reasons. That's what Uncle Ho said, and I agree with him. So we would like for the people to know that there are many things that we will not discuss in public. But what you can do is watch the fruits of our work. And we would like to say that our Party became an intercommunal Party upon its actions. And I think that's very good. So I'm asking you in order to free all political prisoners, free the people, free the woman and also the man, that we have to get together in unity by substituting verbal expressions for action. The final test of the pie is the action. We'll stand on the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party from 1966 when it was formed will stand on its record, will stand on the action. We won't claim to be ultra-leftists; we won't claim to be infantile leftists. What we'll do is act in accordance with the particular set of conditions and the particular problem that we have at a time. So please judge us upon our actions and we will develop like that. We will not develop with lip service coming from anyone. And sometimes I'm very thankful that I don't talk too well, because that's only one way of communication. We say that a picture is worth a thousand words, but action is supreme.

But what kind of action you take will depend upon the particular set of conditions. And I say all of this, because you know the Party and the world today is under turmoil. And this is very good. We always have welcomed all forms of contradictions. Because without the contradiction there is no transformation. So from the contradiction that has developed now in the world and in the Party, we hope to have a qualitative leap. If this leap eliminates some of us, then, of course, we'll weep for that. But we must not stop the Revolution. I will not stop the Revolution. You should not stop it. And, for all that it's worth, we know that words will never stop it. Words will not start the Revolution either. Only action. 'Sixty-six kicked off the armed manifestation of Revolution in this country, because it focused upon the need for the People not only to defend themselves, but also to develop a consciousness necessary to perform and to act to be able to fight in a protracted war. And that is why it is necessary for us to develop the correct ideology, which is a system of thinking. And we must not rely upon and conclude with the philosophy, which isn't necessarily a conclusion.

So we're ideologically revolutionists. We're in a constant state of change. And we fight with all people who want to change, because we know change will offer our hope. So after all of this, we must pay more attention to what is happening. The news media has attempted to discredit the Party by saying that it's over, because they don't see anyone. I think our programs are better than the Party. The communities are involved in forty-four cities. We must support these; we must expand them. Because I read an article, recently, a few months ago, where Che had some problems in Bolivia, because the peasants were so unconscious until he could not rally them even with the "focos". They did not understand why the military, the regular military was dropping. So what did he do. He attempted to form certain programs that he called survival programs. He attempted to form a free health program in order to get the peasants inside, to help them, and also to provide things for his focos. He also took to form a free breakfast program, a free shoe factory, and a sporting good store (for obvious reasons). So programs are good. Because an act that might be revolutionary might be counter-revolutionary, if the correct preparations are not made.

So to be a serious revolutionist, we must know that we are involved in a process, and not a set of principles or conclusions that are of face-value revolutionary. I do not know one thing that is revolutionary in itself. And all things might be revolutionary in context. In other words, capitalism was revolutionary when it kicked out feudalism. And now we have a situation where the capitalists have become the imperialists, and the people of the world, of the communities of the world will have to kick them out. So in order to free Angela, Bobby, Ruchell Magee and all other political prisoners, we must kick the fascists out. And we cannot do it with lip service.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

BOBBY SEALE: "I AM THE CHAIRMAN OF ONLY ONE PARTY."

March, 1971

This is Brother Bobby Seale, from the New Haven Courthouse, back in jail, back here. And I just wanted to say to the people, the masses of people, to all the brothers and sisters, Women's Liberation Movement, Black brothers and sisters, Chicano brothers, the Puerto Rican brothers, the young revolutionary White youth in America, and especially, all the Black brothers and sisters in the Black community, that I've seen a lot of things happening; and I've took time to analyse what's happening. And I see presently that there're some divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions going on. Now the Party accepts constructive criticism. Constructive criticism! But the divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions and jive tactics of Eldridge Cleaver is doing nothing but aiding the pig power structure. Aiding the pig power structure in their attempt to put in gas chambers and jails over 130 political prisoners, who are presently, like myself and Ericka, caught up in these jails, and are being railroaded to the gas chamber, where we're fighting for our lives in these trials. And this is the only thing that Eldridge's actions are doing. This is the only thing that I can see that is going on. And my analysis shows this.

There is no split in the Black Panther Party, at all. But the main thing that we want to get across, I want to get across, to the people is that the Party is based on Survival Programs to serve the people, and these survival programs - from Breakfast for Children to the recent programs that I'm designing right here in jail, in my time that I'm not in court, which is a decent housing fit for shelter of human beings program - these are survival programs - and this program and all other programs that all other revolutionary organizations have are survival programs, that must sustain the people so the people can wage a revolutionary struggle.

And Eldridge Cleaver, who's denouncing these types of programs and carrying on with all those other divisionary jive tactics, is negating the real meaning of a People's revolutionary struggle. That's why the Black Panther Party belongs to the people, because the survival programs come forth, and we set up the survival programs to sustain the people's revolutionary struggle. Even the Vietnamese people, if one would check it out, have their survival programs; they have their cooperative, functional survival programs throughout their land, amongst their people. The people just don't have guns alone fighting their battle. The people over there have actual everyday, functional, constructive survival programs. In their countries, in their lands, and in their everyday operations in fighting the capitalist pigs who occupy their country, they have survival programs. And those survival programs sustain the revolutionary struggle there. Of course, our survival programs will be directly related to here in America. But I, myself, send solidarity and support to all the socialistic, revolutionary peoples of the world, and the socialistic countries and lands - and the different war zones, where the people, the masses in those lands, are fighting against the capitalistic, imperialistic ruling class circles.

And Eldridge Cleaver - who negates the very survival programs that the Party is trying to set forth, that the Central Committee is trying to set forth, and all the real dedicated, hard-working brothers in the Party are trying to set forth to educate the people and serve the people, these survival programs (that) sustain the people's

to the gas chambers. He's aiding the power structure and causing us to be in the prisons, because the political prisoners are the ones who really initiate and work hard to maintain the survival programs for the revolution, the people's revolutionary struggle.

Only the masses of the people can really free political prisoners. And the people must see the value and the validity of the survival programs. And getting on down to it, so the people can understand where it's at, so that the people, even the supporters that we have all over Europe, all the solidarity committees that are in Europe, that're in Sweden, that are in Denmark, and other countries over there, who support the freedom of political prisoners in this country, who support the survival programs of the poor oppressed people in this country, and the revolutionary movement (who are initiating these programs), I am trying myself to get people to understand, that we are beautifully behind them and we are glad and send greetings to them and praise the people who are in the solidarity committees in other countries, and in fact here in America, here in Ameri-KKK-a. I think that the people really have to understand who and what the Black Panther Party is, so that these reactionary, counter-revolutionary, divisionary tactics will not be misunderstood. The Party is not falling apart. It's just that Eldridge Cleaver has personally defected his own self from the Party. He defected from the Party.

And I, Bobby Seale, am the Chairman of only one Party. And that Party is the Party that Brother Huey P. Newton is the Minister of Defense of and one of the supreme, top servants of the people; that Brother David Hilliard is the Chief of Staff of; that Brother June Hilliard is the Assistant Chief of Staff of; that Bobby Hutton was a member of, before the pigs murdered him. I am the Chairman of only one Party, that Brother Fred Hampton, who loved the survival programs for the people, was Deputy Chairman of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, who Brothers Jonathan Jackson and George Jackson are members of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party, with Huey, David, and the rest of the brothers and sisters on the Central Committee, where the Central Headquarters happens to be located on Peralta Street in Oakland, (California). So All Power to the People. Right On. And we're going to stick together. We ain't coming up with no jive. We have to free Brothers Ruchell Magee, George Jackson; we have to free Sister Angela Davis; we have to free these brothers and sisters. I am the Chairman of only one Party, the Party that Brother Huey is the Minister of Defense, with David Hilliard, June Hilliard, etc. And we're going to free political prisoners; and, we're going to keep these survival programs going; and, we're going to wage a People's revolutionary struggle, and not no jive, individualistic, defecting actions, by some individual who wants to play power games. I am the Chairman of the Party of which the San Quentin Cadre is apart and parcel of the same Party. The San Quentin Cadre of the Black Panther Party.

So all I have to say to the people is that you know where it's at. We're going to stick in solidarity. There're a bunch of jive renegades and jack-a-napes around. But later for that. Just later for that. Let that ride, cause we got survival to get on with, and a People's revolution to mobilize. And we got political prisoners to free all over this land.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
RIGHT ON!

Inflammatory Articles

Many of the articles in *The Black Panther* are written by local Party members and concern regional incidents and issues. They are aimed at provoking national black sympathy and joint retaliation for magnified grievances against the authorities.



RACIST-MAD PIGS SIC K9 POLICE DOG ON BROTHER

On Friday night, March 27, 1970, 14 yr. old Brother John (Little Hot-Rod) Hargrove became the victim of a brutal attack inflicted by a K9 Police dog. This brother along with two other bloods were playfully chasing each other along the sidewalk in the area of Sixth and Snyder Streets. When the brothers approached the corner, one brother ran past brushing against a lady standing at the corner. When this happened the lady immediately grabbed the brother. The two other bloods kept running. Soon after the pig grabbed the brother, a light colored station wagon appeared. In the station wagon were two plain clothes pigs. These pigs immediately proceeded to hand-cuff the blood, beat him in the face, and unleash a vicious police dog that ripped the flesh off the brother'sbody. As the brother tried to escape the blows of the pig beating him in the face, the K9 proceeded to bite him all over his body. While the brother was being beaten by the pig, and attacked by the dog, the other pigs who came along proceeded to chase the other two bloods. The pigs fired a shot barely missing the fore-head of one of the brothers.

Little Hot-Rod, handcuffed, face badly beaten and suffering from dog bites all over his body, was taken to the local police station where he was booked on suspicion of pick-pocketing. He did not receive any medical attention until several hours later at the Philadelphia General Hospital; there they gave him one tetnus shot and put a bandage on each leg. The pig who created the vicious attack was later identified as one of Rizzo's faggot law and order boys of the GRANNY PATROL. The Granny Patrol is a special segment of piggery which employs pigs to dress up as women so that they can arrest suspected pick-pockets.

The party conducted an interview with the bloods who were fortunate enough to get away, we also spoke withthe brother's parents, and were able to visit the brother, at the Youth Study Center. We also spoke with the people in the community who witnessed the horrid incident!

Following are excerpts from the tapes which describe the incident. We cannot use names here of the bloods because it has been passed down that the pigs are trying to round up the other brothers.

The racist pigs approached the brothers by shouting "Get them niggers, get them niggers" They chased the bloods with butcher knives, and what appeared to be an ax. One brother was hit with a pipe in the stomach.

People in the community responded to the arrest and attack angrily. When several people in the community demanded that the pigs call off the dog, they were met with racist remarks from the pigs.

The attack was so vicious, the dog ate the underwear on the brothers body. In addition to bites on the brothers hands, legs and waist the dog also bit the brother in the back and rectum. The brother suffered from severe beatings by the pigs, in the face.

When Little Hot-Rod was visited on Sunday at the Youth Study Center, his body was not healing properly. He related that the nurse only appliesmercurochrome on the bites. He is suffering from soreness. He is sleeping on hard cots in the over-crowded center. The bites on his body are swollen and inflamed. The brother's first remarks to his family were, "Tell my probation officer to get me out of here, this place is like Byberry" .

Just less than two weeks ago, the brother was beaten in a cell Division. This pig beat him so bad that Methodist Hospital complained to the Police Department. His eyes were badly damaged. The pig's name who inflicted that beating was Juvenile Aid Officer, Charles Kora. Hot-Rod identified Kora as his assailant and since then, he has been harrassed in his neighborhood by every pig who comes through.

At 14, John Hargrove is a marked victim of Frank Rizzo's fascists, like so many other Blackyouths in this city. Pigs are on the loose to inflict more physical harm to our people. It is high time that we escalate our war on the pigs and drive them out of our communities.

Seize The Time people of Philadelphia, Rizzo and all of his racist paper tigers can be rightously blown away.

Rosemari Mealy
Philadelphia Branch
Black Panther Party

THE BLACK PANTHER, APRIL 18, 1970, P. 9.

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY BOMBED, HEROES SUCCESSFULLY ESCAPE



Newburyport, Mass. is a small residental New England town basically composed of people from the White working class. Until last Saturday, September 19, Newburyport's only claim to fame was that it is one of the many small towns surrounding Boston which are strongholds for groups like the Minutemen and other right-wing fascist reactionaries. Last Saturday, however, at 6:00 a.m. in the morning a National Guard Armory was bombed, hundreds of rounds of aminunition ripped off, military personnel records taken and to top it off, they left the scene in a one ton army pick-up truck. They (the bombers) attempted to open the vault holding the weapons of the pig army, M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols and .30 caliber sniper carbines, but were not able to do so. The act was accomplished in one fast motion, and the heroes escaped capture and one week later, "law enforcement officials" are still scratching their heads in wonderment.

And although the weapons, themselves, tools of our liberation were not liberated from the oppressor, the success of this action cannot be denied.

As has been the case in liberation movements all over the world, the guns and arms made by and for the oppressor eventually ends up in the hands of the oppressed. More important, the unknown people who accomplished this act, obtained hundreds of rounds of desperately needed ammunition. Again, past experiences has shown that while the guns themselves can be obtained in ample supply, the ammunition, the bullets, that actually inflicts death upon our enemy, becomes very scarce. One of the necessities of our struggle is our ability to liberate, stockpile, and then accurately use the ammunition of our oppressor upon our oppressor.

As for the military personnel records, they can obviously be put to good use. Our oppressors must be harassed and intimidated day and night. They must not sleep, nor rest, these are the devils who plot the genocide of Black people. The National Guard Armory in the small town of Newburyport, like other small time towns surrounding the Black colony in Boston is designed to be used against us in the fascist genocidal plot devised by the treacherous minds of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell clique. It is to be carried out by those men whose names and addresses are now in the hands of the people. Unknown members of the fascist majority now appear before the people's tribunal and will be judged according to their actions.

This action is just one of many blows which will be dealt out to the oppressor. If this action was intended to help and serve the people, we welcome their help to our just liberation struggle against the Babylonian Empire.

ARM YOURSELF

*Michael·Fultz
Boston Chapter
Black Panther Party*

SISTER MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY RENT-A-PIG

FIVE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE RAILROADED BY TUCSON GRAND JURY

STORM TROOPERS INVADE COMMUNITY

THREE PIGS BEAT FIFTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK YOUTH

ENTIRE FAMILY BEATEN AND JAILED

Another regular feature in *The Black Panther* is a weekly article giving detailed instructions for the handling of firearms, or setting forth deportment for urban guerrilla warfare.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 9, 1970 PAGE 16

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS HOW TO COMBAT C.M.I.

Part 5

The principal of Juche (Self-Reliance) clarified by Eldridge Cleaver, the Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, is "Use what you got to get what you need." To answer the question of how do you combat the pigs' *C.M.I. (communication, mobility* and information), we must first determine what we have going for ourselves. Checking out the practice of self-defense groups, we see that we have the power to determine what is to happen, when it is to happen and how it is supposed *to go down. What, When* and How (W.W.H.)- the element of surprise. The pigs have C.M.I. and self-defense groups have W. W. H.

To consider a self-defense operation successful is not to just *plan and execute but to plan, execute* AND escape. There have been too many instances where members of self-defense groups have planned and executed righteous blows against this racist system only to be captured, wounded or *killed. These are the consequences* for revolutionary activity, however we must keep casualties within an acceptable minimun. The *slogan must be Maximum Damage* to the Enemy, Minimun Damage to Us. Practice has shown that when planning W.W.H. if it is done with knowledge and an understanding of C.M.I. casualties will be kept within an acceptable mini*mum. Too often, much attention* is given to a plan up to the point of execution without giving the same attention to evasion and escape, that phase of the operation that determines success. This is a subjective approach, a onesided *approach. W.W.H. is only* one side of the coin, C.M.I. is the other side. Because self-defense groups use W.W.H., the pigs' C.M.I. does not go into operation until a self-defense group commits itself by actually executing some type of *self-defense activity.*

All of us should be aware that once C.M.I. is activated pigs start showing on the set from 30 seconds to 1 minute maximum in every *major city in Babylon, therefore* the success or failure of a defense operation is dependent upon the attention given to C.M.I. and the planning of evasion and escape. As I see it, learning to deal with the pigs' C.M.I. is the number one *military problem* facing revolutionary forces in Babylon today. It is time for all who have something to teach, by example, to step forward. And remember, to die honorably, one does not need company.

USE WHAT YOU GOT TO GET WHAT YOU NEED

D.C.

TRYIN TO BE BLACK PANTHER
TAPE ON BLACK PANTHERS
TAPE ON "POLITICAL EDUCATION CLASSES"
TAPE ON DAVID HILLIARD SPEECH
EVIDENCE TO INDICT BLACK PEOPLE
PHONE

COMMUNICATION

MOBILITY

INFORMATION

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

Part 6 ON REVOLVERS

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been in previous issues of the Black Community News Service. This article is on revolvers, it gives a basic run down on the use of revolvers. Check out all of the photographs and notes to help you understand better the functioning of a revolver.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS:

1. Check to see if gun is loaded. You do this on a revolver by swinging out the cylinder. Pull back on the cylinder latch and gently push *out on the cylinder. (see unloading* a revolver photo #2)

2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless practicing trigger squeeze or firing.

3. Point your gun away from where someone may be shot-Point at the ceiling or to the floor, but wherever you point, make sure no one is in the way and can be harmed.

4. Never leave the hammer cocked on a revolver. (Explanation later on cocking a revolver.)

KINDS OF REVOLVERS:

.38 Snubnose - This gun has only a 2" barrel and shoots 38's. It is very easy to conceal.

.38 Special - Has a 4" barrel and shoots 38's.

.357 Magnum - This is the type of handgun the pig carries. The ammo for this is .357 magnum. Metal piercing bullets will pierce an engine block. This is the best type of revolver to have.

.41 and .44 Magnums - Have more knock down power than a .357 Magnum. The Highway Patrol carries these to shoot through car doors, but a .357 will go through a car door also and .357 ammunition is more plentiful.

PARTS OF A REVOLVER: PHOTO # 1

REVOLVER TERMS

UNLOADING:

Holding gun in left hand (pointed in safe direction) release cylinder latch with right hand. (#3). Push out cylinder with the fingers of left hand (#2). Now that you *have swung out the cylinder* and the bullets are visible you gently push down on the extractor and let bullets drop out into your right hand (#4).

LOADING:

To load, simply follow the same steps in unlatching the cylinder. Then drop bullets into the chambers of your cylinder. Gently push cylinder closed, and you are ready to fire. DO NOT SLAM CYLINDER CLOSED, this causes *extra wear on your gun.*

COCKING A REVOLVER:

Put the tip of your thumb on the hammer holding revolver steady in the palm of your hand. Do not put your finger in the trigger. Pull straight back steadily on your hammer spur until your hammer locks back. You gun is ready to *fire, do not put your finger in* the trigger until you are ready to fire. After cocking hammer, place your thumb directly on the frame beside the hammer, resting the tip of your thumb on the cylinder latch. (Photo #4) *Your forefinger should be placed* on the other side of the gun straight out just above the trigger guard until ready to fire. Everytime you cock the hammer before firing, this is called single action firing.

PHOTO # 2

UNCOCKING A REVOLVER (LOADED):

Keep your finger off the trigger! With gun already cocked, place your thumb on the hammer firmly. Now with the gun firmly in your hand, pointed in a safe direction, *and* thumb firmly on the hammer (still cocked) squeeze the trigger slowly until you can feel the hammer releasing. IMMEDIATE-

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

LOADING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 3

COCKING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 4

URBAN GUERILLAS

America's complexity will be her downfall, for complex power, communications and transportation networks are unprotected. These systems are the life lines of the industrial and military might of U.S.A. fascism. The source of America's strength is its vulnerable Achilles heel-therefore urban guerrillas, utilizing and relying on information divulged by sympathetic workers, can halt or severely cripple every industry in the nation, and bring fascism crashing to its knees. The dams, power stations, substations and power lines are vulnerable. Highly sophisticated communications networks are used by our enemies for carrying out routine business, and are an extremely important factor, in the fascist reaction to guerilla strikes. The neutralization of the fascist communications lie within the capabilities of urban guerillas.

The disruption of this system would hamper and cripple not only the fascist military but would also effect all industrial outputs. The fascist ruling clique realizes the vunerability of their transportation networks, yet all fascist military forces and industry utilize the railways, the state and interstate highway systems and the airports. Urban guerillas can cut and constantly harass these important links.

Urban guerilla teams highly motivated have already begun to put their theory into practice. Lists are being compiled and are constantly updated on fascist and all enemies of our people, because the location and identification of the enemy is an extremely vital task of urban guerillas. This basic intelligence is necessary for planning retaliatory strikes against our enemies. Where their killer groups, for the most, will be unable to locate guerillas, urban guerillas will, in every attack hit the fascist squarely on the chin. Urban guerillas, being one with the people, must attack like skilled brain surgeons--cutting out the diseased tissue while perserving the good. Their dual purpose is that of destroying all fascist forces and their lackeys, while protecting and serving our people. The fascist ruling clique fears this. They know the Party is preparing to fight until the last of our enemies bites the dust. The Party has dared to take the vanguard role in the struggle and will surely defeat U.S A. fascism no matter what the odds, no matter how great the sacrifice. The Party is aware that the fascists will never lay down their arms of their own accord. And also aware of the direction that U.S.A. fascism is taking in order to survive as long as possible.

In Brazil, the guerilla forces found through social practice that they could best achieve the goal of liberating their people from the strong-hold imposed by the fascist Brazilian oligarchy by waging urban guerilla warfare. Brazil's development as an industrial fascist nation and the economic and social backwardness of the indigenous peasants made the revolutionary forces adapt the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare. The urban guerrillas moved to mobilize the workers, and implement urban guerrilla warfare within the context of their historical experiences with the working class and the fascist ruling class oligarchy. The revolutionary forces have implemented this type of struggle which invariably catches the fascists with their pants down. The type of warfare which turns the asphalt concrete and steel of cities into jungles; into cemeteries for the fascist highly mechanized units and turns his weapons of mass slaughter into paper tigers; into urban jungles where the revolutionary forces can plunge the blade into the hilt in the vunerable life lines of even fascist U S.A In this country as well as in Brazil the fascists tremble with dread at the thought of nationwide attacks by urban guerrilla forces.

In the Pentagon and select centers scattered throughout the U S A., gigantic multimillion dollar computers are manned by hoards of the military. Technicians wrestle with fascism's nightmare-the problem of dealing with urban guerrillas. These machines can only reach an hypothesis drawn from information fed into them. In order for the fascists to test the solutions offered by the computer. they must first circumvent

27

the frail facade of the constitution and the bill of rights. The fascists realize that if these two pieces of paper were implemented they would be in their graves tonight because the constitution and the bill of rights contain the moral impetus necessary to bring this foul evil economic and social system to its doom.

U S.A. fascists have compiled and are still evaluating information received from South American satellite states who are being beset by courageous urban guerrillas waging relentless struggle with amazing(to fascists)and stunning success. Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, has said that we still have a little time left because the U.S.A fascist ruling clique hasn't programmed all of the people to accept the genocide of the Party and our people yet. For at least a year now, there have appeared in every major newspaper, seemingly innocent space fillers. Articles from UPI-API dealing with the deployment of fascist death squads against the revolutionary forces in South America.

These fillers had the sinister purpose of preparing America for the advent of death squads now in operation in every major urban center. These articles were to prepare the people to accept the first overt actions of the Chicago foul fascist gestapo killer unit. Their predawn kill all--destroy all mission was launched as a pilot, an experimental operation with a two fold objective. One was to put counter-revolutionary theory into practice in America --to bring into the streets the fascist ruling clique's solution to the Party--to test and evaluate the techniques of counter-insurgency urban warfare. The second important objective was to evaluate the response of the people to above ground counter-insurgency killer groups--to see if the people were conditioned to accept the outright fascist terror tactics directed officially by the fascist ruling clique.

REVOLUTIONARY HANDIWORK OF THE URBAN GUERILLA

Our Party has been and is still the main target of a national dehumanizing campaign. The fascist controlled news media has consistently maligned, viciously attacked and branded our Party as a racist band of blood-thirsty murderers out for their own personal gain. The fascist news media seeks to justify the fascist's program of destroying our people's first line of defense, the Party, and all other organizations which refuse to be either bought off with blood money or intimidated by the repressive fascist forces. The fascist attempts to isolate our Party from the people has been a dismal failure. The liquidation of Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark had top priority on the fascist's pig list. However, neither the people nor our Party were cowed or intimidated by the bestial slaying of these two revlutionaries. The fascist ruling clique made a grave error in under estimating the will of the people and our Party. People from all walks of life and every progressive organization saw through the fascist attempts to isolate and destroy their Party. The people mobilized and rallied mass support for the Party and soundly condemned the actions of Chicago's fascist killer groups.

Make trouble, fail, make trouble, fail again until their doom. This is the logic of fascists the world over. In Chicago, they refused to acknowledge the bankruptcy of their counter-insurgency campaign. In December, in Los Angeles, Southern California Chapter of our Party, came under attack by fascist killer groups. Although outnumbered and using inferior weapons, our Party repelled and held at bay the fascist shock troops and sounded the end of Chicago type operations in a fuselage of bullets. We learned valuable lessons paid for with the blood of our revolutionary comrades. The fascist ruling clique has seen the support, that their homicidal raids have generated for the Party. They now know that if conditions are favorable, they will receive tit for tat and then some. They now know that Black and all progressive people will not sit idly by and pacify the action of above ground killer groups Fascists have tried to rally the support of the American people to their avowed aims and failed.

Now begins the phase of underground, clandestine operation of fascist directed killer groups. This is all part of the nature of the fascist ruling clique. The fascists will no doubt expand the techniques of their South American lackeys who operate unrestricted, unswayed by either democratic institutions or public opinion. As the tempo of the struggle increases so will the fascist acts of reactionary terror and violence increase. The primary target of forming clandestine kill groups will be both our people and our Party. If we are to survive as a people, this next phase of attacks, and pave the way to victory, it is imperative that our people be armed with the ideology of the Party. For only then will our people be able to cope with, both, ideological and physical attacks initiated by the insane fascist ruling clique. Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, said that our Party must be a living shield that stands between our people and the fascist pigs and that our paper should serve to educate our people so that they will survive.

As the attacks against the Party escalate, so must the awareness of our people be channelled toward acceptance and even more, active participation in urban guerrilla warfare. Phase two of the fascist plans will surely and soundly be defeated. The fascists will awake to find themselves bogged down on that last front. They will be swallowed up in the morass of a people's war. Their graves will be dug by revolutionary urban guerrilla forces amidst the asphalt, concrete and steel of the cities.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEFEAT U S.A FASCISM ON EVERY FRONT

WE'LL ALL BE TOGETHER ON THE DAY OF VICTORY

Randy Williams,
Political Prisoner

Provocative Slogans

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE TIME SEIZES YOU!

AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE IS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL

BLOOD TO THE HORSES BROW AND WOE TO THOSE WHO CAN-NOT SWIM!

DARE TO STRUGGLE...DARE TO WIN!

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS



FOR EVERY PORK CHOP THERE IS A FRYING PAN!

''Revolutionary Art''

The most prominent artist on *The Black Panther* staff is Minister of Culture Emory Douglas. Although he prepares a large number of cartoons, other Panther artists are also represented. These cartoons characterize the Government and local law enforcement as ''pigs'' and call for the overthrow of the Government and the killing of Government officials, as well as police officers.



The Black Panther; May 9, 1970; page 18

THE REVOLUTIONARY ARTIST

When the Black revolutionary artist starts a still life painting, he doesn't see a beautiful vase, or a dish of tasty fruit, against a soft velvet backdrop...he sees only a tattered curtain, rusty cans, a broken dish--empty.

As he seeks out a beautiful landscape to paint, he sees not fertile fields with dancing flowers, and lovely maidens bathing in the sun, but decaying houses, and streets covered with debris, and a Black woman in ragged clothes with tear-stained cheeks.

The Black revolutionary *artist* knows only oppression, and that his art must relate to his surroundings, and his people, and most of all, his art cannot be abstract and unrelated to his revolutionary people. So he seeks, and finds what our Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton calls "the spirit of the people." As he moves on that, he shows what *Revolutionary Artist* and Minister of Culture, Emory Douglas shows--"the oppressor *hanging by his heels.*"

The revolutionary artist gives his art to his oppressed people.

So with his gun and his brush he shows the spirit of the people moving to crush the oppressor, and this is the essence of revolutionary art. His art then becomes part of the people's revolution.

He knows that only because of the urine covered walls and trash-littered alleys the people's desire for freedom will be replaced with the *BLOOD OF THE OPPRESSOR.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Malik Barafu
N.C.G.F.,
Washington, D.C.

TO ALL REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS

I would like to take this time to express on behalf of the Black Panther Party our warmest thanks to all revolutionary artists who have given their talents and thoughts to the people through revolutionary art. We would like to say that every artist's work that has appeared in the Black Panther Newspaper this past year has been a great contribution of visual interpretation of the ideology of the Black Panther Party and of the oppressed people of the world.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS
Emory Douglas
Minister of Culture
Black Panther Party


1971 YEAR OF THE YOUTH
YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION
DEATH
TO THE
FASCIST
PIGS
EMORY

EVERY DOOR THAT THE FASCISTS ATTEMPT TO KICK DOWN WILL PUT THEM DEEPER INTO THE PIT OF DEATH



SHOOT TO KILL


DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIG
PIG

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 3, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 17, 1970, P. 16



THE BLACK PANTHER
MARCH 20, 1971, P. 4


Only the power of the people can free political prisoners
PIG

We will not hesitate to kill
or die for our freedom.


TIER 3
"O" WING
RALPH

THE BLACK PANTHER
FEBRUARY 6, 1971, P. 5

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 2, 1970 PAGE 13


OINK OINK OINK
OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK
OINK
OINK
U.S. GOVT.
EMORY
OINK

International News

Panthers profess to believe that American Negroes comprise isolated "colonies" in the heart of the "mother" country, and are part of the Third World, defined as the nonwhite, undeveloped, and underdeveloped countries of the world. The 10-Point Program of the Black Panther Party includes, as a major political objective, a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony to determine the national destiny of American Negroes.

To internationalize their Party and enlarge their importance, Panther leaders have sought acceptance, support, and funds from sources abroad. They have made numerous trips to foreign countries, including Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Palestine, Germany, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Chinese Mainland.

Both at home and abroad, Panther leaders loudly proclaim anti-American sentiments and align themselves politically with the aims and tactics of enemy lands. The international contacts most important to the Panthers are made with revolutionary groups and communist countries, especially those that more closely follow Maoist thinking. The international news section of *The Black Panther* reflects attempts by the Black Panther Party to attract such attention, support, and aid.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1970 PAGE 8

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG
PREMIER OF THE CABINET
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA

June 25th marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S. imperialist aggressive invasion of the DPRK in 1950.

The Black Panther Party takes this occasion to salute the DPRK and the wise and brave leader of the 40 million Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung.

We recognize and respect the long history of resistance and victory that Comrade Kim Il Sung and the 40 million Korean people have contributed to the world wide struggle against imperialism and fascism; the shining examples of socialist construction while under severe conditions of U.S. provocation and aggression, the many brilliant ideological contributions you have made to the socialist camp and in particular the concept of "Juche".

Because of our historical experience in America; because we are faced with no alternatives but genocide or liberation we understand the criminal nature and gangster logic of the U.S. ruling class. Black people are increasingly the victims of overt military aggression and U.S. plots to subvert our struggle for national salvation. Under these conditions we have an increasing awareness that the expulsion of the U.S. imperialist burglars from Korean soil and the reunification of Korea will be a victory for the Korean people and a victory for oppressed people the world over.

We see clearly that the reunification of Korea is not seperate from the salvation of Black and other oppressed people in fascist America. As gang boss Nixon and his mob of criminals intensify their attempts to loot Asia they are intensifying their murderous repression of Black people in America. These attacks will be met with revolutionary solidarity manifested in action, both around the world and in the gangsters lair, and with one-beat-a-hundred fighters in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America; the U.S.A. will surely be brought to the peoples JUSTICE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
U.S.A.

INTERCOMMUNAL NEWS

MEMORANDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE ESCALATION OF THE U.S. WAR OF AGGRESSION IN LAOS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAO PROBLEM

PART II

Application Of The Nixon Doctrine And Escalation Of The War Of Aggression In Laos By The Nixon Administration

UNDER PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC OPINION , NIXON ON MARCH 6, 1970 HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE LOGISTIC AND AIR SUPPORT AND "OTHER ACTIVITIES' OF THE U.S. IN LAOS. He also admitted an increase in the U.S. military activities in Laos. But he tried to argue that those activities were "limited" and of a purely "defensive" character aimed at protecting American lives in South Viet Nam.

But public opinion in the United States and in the world immediately pointed out that that was the first time the highest executive in the United States made an open acknowledgement of the violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos by the U.S. On March 7, Senator Albert Gore declared that Nixon in fact had conceded that "we (the U.S.) have violated the Geneva Agreements". Public opinion has condemned Nixon's allegations as "queer" and "selfcontradictory" (the Japanese paper "Asahi Shimbun" March 9. "Nixon's allegations were misleading. They mentioned only some facts and not everything and showed no sign of any change of policy." (Senators Scranton and Fulbright, March 6 and 9, 1970).

Obivously, Nixon cannot dupe public opinion which bases its judgement not merely on the words but also on the deeds of the Nixon administration during the recent past.

After Nixon came to power, the so-called "Nixon doctrine on Asia" saw the light which consists in providing more U.S. advisers, weapons and firepower to the Asians, while the latter contribute more mercenaries for the U.S. The formula of this doctrine is "native soldiers plus U.S. advisers and maximum logistic and air support" This is in fact a more elaborate and more refined form of U.S. neo-colonialism's wicked policy of making Asians fight Asians, and natives fight natives.


The Resistance government formed in 1950 against the French Colonialists.

The active application of that doctrine in Laos finds a concrete expression in the steps of escalation taken by the Nixon administration in its aggressive war in Laos during the past 18 months, escalation in the logistic supply, in the supply of U.S. military personnel and in the use of U.S. combat troops in the "special war".

Under the Nixon administration, the amount of U.S. aid to Laos and military personnel introduced into this country have increased at almost the same rate. Compared with the 140 million dollars in 1967, U.S. aid in 1969 rose to 250 million dollars of which only the economic and technical aid accounting for less than 60 million was announced, while the rest was almost exclusively used for military purposes. Thus, military aid - about 190 million dollars a year, - is more than treble the economic aid and makes up 80 per cent of the total aid. This figure is approximately the same as estimated by Senator A.J. Allender in a censured report on the scale of American involvement in the war in Laos (AF, Jan. 22 1970). It is necessary to note that what is described as "economic and technical" has also been used for secret activities of a military character. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna, Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, disclosed that the U.S. aid program also covers the CIA activities in Laos. At present, according to a statement of Senator M. Mansfield on September 21, 1969, U.S. aid in Laos had exceeded 300 million dollars a year and continued to increase.

Obviously, the Nixon administration is squandering in Laos more and more money of the American people, while serious social problems in the United States are yet unsettled, because enormous sums are being spent for unjust wars in Laos and in Indochina as a whole.

On March 6, 1970, Nixon said there were 643 advisers and military personnel out of the 1,040 Americans operating in Laos and denied the presence of any U.S. combat troops in Laos. That is not true. Compared with the 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos under the Johnson administration, the figure rose to 12,000 U.S. military personnel, with or without military uniform in the first period of the Nixon administration. Of them, there were at least 2,000 air force advisers, or 800 more than in 1967. The number of U.S. advisers assigned to the "special forces" training centres and regular units of the puppet army increased from 150 to 1,000 (according to a British source, the figure might be 2,000). The U.S. "special forces" operating in southern Laos are estimated at about 1,200 men. Thus there is one U.S. military adviser for every six Laos puppet soldiers (compared to the 70,000 men of the Vientiane army). In addition according to a statement of Senator R. Ottinger on April 24, 1970, at least half of the 48,000 U.S. air force personnel in Thailand (i.e. 24,000) are now directly participating in air activities in Laos. All told, the number of U.S. military men now taking part in military activities in Laos on the ground and in the air has run into tens of thousands at least equal to half of the total effectives of the Laos puppet army.

The running of the U.S. colossal war machine in Laos remains an affair of the U.S. embassy, Nixon's ambassador to Vietiane remains a military proconsul. The paper "France Soir", on March 3, 1970 said everything in Laos is controlled from the building of the U.S. embassy which houses the brain of the war machine. The number of army and air force military attaches of the U.S. embassy exceeds 200, an unusual figure for a foreign diplomatic mission in a country like Laos. The USAID agency in Laos is also operating within the framework of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vientiane and is working for the CIA. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna acknowledged that Laos is the only place where such things happened [illegible] did not approve it.

Of late some 1,200 U.S. "green berets" were introduced into Laos, whose commanders [illegible] (Thailand), U.S. [illegible] Vietnam on February 27, 1970 [illegible] number of U.S. "green berets" in Laos had exceeded that of U.S. military advisers in South Viet Nam in the past. In late 1969 and early 1970, U.S. combat troops took part in ground attacks on the Plain of Jars area, Meng Khouang province. The U.S. magazine "Newsweek" of April 6, 1970 affirmed that the CIA office in [illegible] Viet Nam [illegible] was [illegible] d. Har[illegible]

With [illegible], there have been more [illegible] participating in the fighting [illegible] On March 6, 1970, Senator Mansfield [illegible] Americans are fighting [illegible] "The fact that [illegible] wear uniform does [illegible] this one bit. The fact [illegible] combat troops [illegible] uniform have been [illegible]

continued on next page

New textile factory at Sam-Neua

ON CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG'S DECLARATION OF 20 MAY, 1970

In this declaration, Chairman Mao Tse Tung has set forth a brilliant and timely analysis of the qualitatively new situation that exists in the world as a result of the treacherous new acts of aggression launched by the fascist, imperialist Nixon-

Chinese peoples.

This declaration pulls together into clear focus the revolutionary struggles and the liberation struggles of the people of the whole world, including the revolutionary struggle of the American people themselves.

Speaking specifically for the Black Panther Party, but reflecting the sentiments of millions of oppressed people inside the United States, it has become crystal clear to us that rampant imperialist aggression on the international scale and vicious fascist repression on the domestic scale are the two faces of the criminal government of the United States and the calculated policy of the American ruling circles. For 400 years now, Black people inside the United States have been the long-suffering victims of fascist violence and repression. But under the Nixon-Pentagon clique, this reactionary violence and repression has been escalated to new heights of barbaric cruelty. At the same time, in order to put down the already gigantic and still growing mass movement among White Americans against the wreckless and sanguinary policies and imperialist adventures of the U.S. government, the cowardly Nixon-Pentagon clique has unleashed a bloodbath against the American people as a whole, creating for itself new enemies who have joined hands with those who were already determined to carry out a struggle to the bitter end against an economic, political, and social system that is dominated by the madmen in the Pentagon and that is responsible for the misery and bloodshed all over the world today.

Chairman Mao Tse Tung captures the truth of the situation when he points out the unprecedented isolation of the Nixon-Pentagon clique. Never before have these criminals been so exposed and isolated as they are today. And never before has it been so clear that this criminality can only be ended by the people rising up to seize their own destiny from the handfull of willful exploiters and murderers that now have the power in their hands.

Coupling a revolutionary call to arms with revolutionary optimism in the assurance of victory, Chairman Mao Tse Tung, the great leader of the Chinese Revolution, hero and teacher of the revolutionary people of the world, has performed an invaluable service to all mankind by stepping forward at this time to renew the people's indictment of the common enemy of us all--U.S. Fascism and Imperialist Aggression. These courageous words of Chairman Mao Tse Tung will give new heart to the peoples in their lonely and difficult struggles to throw off the shackles and chains of oppression now being held in place by U.S. Fascism and Imperialism.

Lastly, we wish to point out that only the enemies of the people and those who shirk their revolutionary duties and who are afraid of their own shadows will find fault with Chairman Mao Tse Tung's declaration. For our part, we welcome it, because we have learned, by shedding our blood, that only through relentless struggle, by resorting to arms inside the very house of U.S. Fascism and Imperialism itself, can we gain our freedom and liberation. This is what our experience has taught us and this is the faith that will sustain us as we push forward our struggle..

LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG!
LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLES' WAR!
DEATH TO THE U.S. FASCISM AND IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
Eldridge Cleaver,
Minister of Information
Black Panther Party, U.S.A.

The Black Panther, June 20, 1970, page 16

THE TERROR, BRUTALITY AND MURDER OF MY BROTHERS AND SISTERS IS THE SUFFERING OF BLACK PEOPLE. THEREFORE, NOT TO LET SUCH EVENTS CONTINUE I MUST MERCILESSLY DO AWAY WITH THE LOW-NATURED BEAST THAT BITES THE HAND THAT FEEDS IT.



WE HAVE NO HANG UPS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

3 - Mr. J. A. [illegible]tz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
(1 - P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/13/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

4063

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

This is to advise of a meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on 6/12/75 in my office in accordance with the request set out in Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum dated 6/4/75.

IS-1 Section Chief J. G. Deegan, Number One Man William H. Atkinson, Unit Chiefs Homer A. Newman, Jr., David Ryan, Garnett T. Tunstall, and Special Agent Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division met with Jack Smith and Lester B. Seidel of the SSC staff.

At the outset Mr. Seidel indicated that SSC would do case studies on various organizations against which the COINTELPRO was directed. Black Panther Party (BPP) had been chosen for the start because many BPP members had been involved in and convicted of criminal activity. He distributed copies of a document (a copy of which is attached) outlining the purpose of the meeting and setting out requests that will be made of the Bureau through appropriate channels in connection with this case study. Included in this document, along with requests for various Bureau documents regarding COINTELPRO as it pertains to the BPP, were requests for a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted, a list of all media persons contacted and a list of all FBI personnel connected with this program and their present locations.

5 -

The investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, as relates to the BPP, were described generally to Messrs. Seidel and Smith highlighting the origin of this violence-prone organization and the series of violent confrontations in which it participated in the late 1960s. Mr. Seidel stated that he was specifically interested in ascertaining the extent of COINTELPRO and how it related to the investigation of the BPP in San Francisco - Oakland and Los Angeles. COINTELPRO was stressed only as a procedure which could have been followed in the course of our investigation. No specific

62-116395-253

REC- 102

Enclosures - 2

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/14/2000 BY SP2 ALM/

JUN 24 1975

62-116395

MOR-16

GTT:eks (10)

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

CONTINUED - OVER

JUN 24 1975

instances of institution of counterintelligence activities were discussed, and it was indicated that these activities were minor as far as the overall BPP investigation was concerned.

In connection with COINTELPRO, the Bureau letter to SAC, San Francisco dated 5/11/70 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations" was discussed. Basically, this letter suggests San Francisco consider a proposal that through the use of documents subtly incorporating false information, attempt to give the BPP the impression that the documents were stolen by a disgruntled police employee who is sympathetic to the Panthers. This document was presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security in 1974 and was included in their publication of hearings conducted by that Committee. Messrs. Seidel and Smith wanted to know if the activities outlined in this letter had been implemented by the San Francisco or Los Angeles Offices. He was advised that this letter was not implemented as it had requested comments and recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and that Office had recommended against the proposals contained therein.

Mr. Seidel asked the identity of the SAC who recommended against this proposal and was advised that the SAC there, at that time, would not necessarily have had personal knowledge of the matter. He then asked identity of supervisor who recommended against proposal and was advised this information was available in the field office. Concerning COINTELPRO in general, he inquired as to specific techniques used against the BPP and whether forgery and wiretaps had been a part of the program. He was advised that we were unable to furnish that information without extensive file review.

Mr. Seidel attempted to discuss Special Operations but he was advised that the matter was not within the purview of the current meeting.

Mr. Seidel explained that they would be traveling to San Francisco and intended to interrogate personnel in that Office as well as unspecified outsiders who may have been involved in COINTELPRO. Mr. Seidel stated that he had asked for the meeting with Bureau personnel to obtain background data to aid them in these

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

interrogations. Both Messrs. Seidel and Smith expressed appreciation for the assistance given them at this meeting and both additionally expressed their feeling that the Bureau had done a good and proper job in its investigation.

During the course of this meeting a monograph on the BPP prepared by the Bureau in March of 1971 was used for background data. Mr. Seidel expressed a desire to have a copy of this document. This document, which is prepared from public source data, was compiled for public distribution and, if you approve, a copy will be furnished to Mr. Seidel.

ACTION:

For your information and if you approve, one copy of attached document entitled "Black Panther Party"* will be sent to Mr. Seidel.

HEH/JGD

GTT

Get written request signed by Chairman of Committee

PLM

Naturally

*Per G.T. Tunstall, this document is not classified, made up of public source data, + until it became outdated, was furnished to the public.
Delivered to Sherry Towell of SSC 6/20/75 for delivery to Seidel

6/19/75

Black Panther Party: San Francisco-Oakland (Los Angeles)
Late 1960's through early 1970's

The Committee is examining the extent to which this COINTELPRO program relates to criminal investigation; the results obtained; the relationships between the FBI and local authorities (police and other governmental agencies); media and community leaders; the methods of targeting; techniques used to achieve program goals; legal authority; and authorization procedures and accountability.

To pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents in this initial stage:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the responses thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (e.g., field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO, with explanation of the dispositions thereof;
6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 ALM/TMR
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-253

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and their media affiliation;
8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;
9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to the whereabouts, and relation to the FBI should be indicated:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee requested to be given a briefing concerning counterintelligence programs as applied to our investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco.

Lester Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee who is assigned the area of COINTELPROS, advised that the Committee is preparing what he termed case studies on COINTELPROS in four separate areas. He defined these areas as the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Seidel previously had requested the Bureau arrange interviews of various Bureau personnel whom he considered familiar with the San Francisco Black Panther Party investigation, and at that time stated he intended to interview these individuals in two or three weeks. Mr. Seidel requested that prior to conducting interviews concerning this particular area, he desired to be briefed during the week of June 8 concerning the Bureau's general overall investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, along with the use of counterintelligence proposals against that organization. In this regard he desired that someone knowledgeable in this aspect be made available to brief him concerning this matter.

6/13/75

62-116395

REC- 102

62-116395-252

5-TUNSTALL

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2005 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

12 JUN 24 1975

PVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 27 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Seidel also stated that he was submitting a written request to the Bureau for certain Bureau documents pertaining to the COINTELPRO operations in the San Francisco Office and specifically mentioned requesting the quarterly status letters from that office on COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) The Intelligence Division advise if a briefing can be arranged and the date and time of such a briefing.

2) Legal Counsel Division will advise Mr. Seidel of the Bureau's decision in this regard.

PVD JBH|PVD

WRW|TWM

We should carefully consider fact that
Hampton case is subject of pending litigation
and coordinate with Dept. [illegible]
[illegible] specific [illegible] provided.

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0620
18 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Request for Documents by SSC

Attached is a request for documents received by CIA from the Senate Select Committee Staff on 10 June 1975. It is provided to you for information.

John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 23 1975

5

7 ENCLOSURE

file 62-116395

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPA AM/JMF
MDR-16

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

JUN 23 1975

~~SECRET~~

R223

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

DCI/IC 75-2202

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1975

Mr. Walter Elder
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Elder:

Further to our conversation regarding formal requests for documents and records, I attach a list of supplemental document requests.

What I would propose is that you and I discuss this list to insure that we have properly identified the requested documents.

In addition to the attached list I would like to review studies in the historical series: (1)"Maritime Operations in Indonesian Operations -- 1957-1958;" "Overthrow of a Government, November 1952-1953;" and any studies prepared that trace the CIA's activities in relation to the overthrow of the government of Guatamala in 1954.

Sincerely,

William B. Bader

Attachment

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 PVM/LML
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE
62-116395

R223

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

To: Bill Bader

From: Elliot Maxwell

Date: June 9, 1975

Subj: Supplemental Document Requests

1. The General Counsel's memo on February 3, 1975 on proprietaries mentioned in the briefing paper prepared for the Rockefeller Commission.

2. The Inspector General's Survey of Propeietaries from 1967.

3. Inspector General's Survey of Domestic Operations Division done prior to May 26, 1966.

4. The opinion on covert action authority of the CIA prepared by the Justice Department under Attorney General Katzenbach.

5. List of those individuals who worked with John Richards.

6. List of the component surveys from 1960 to 1970. (Approximately 50 studies)

7. The subject heading list, the keyword list, and the name list, used for filing in the Office of General Counsel.

8. The Bureau of the Budget Confidential Report on Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government, dated September 20, 1945. (HS/HC-71, Item 1).

9. The Report by William H. Jackson, on the Coordination of Intelligence Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British intelligence system. This is a report for the OSS dated August, 1945. (HS/HC-801, Item 9.)

10. A list of titles of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates from January 1, 1970 to the present.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPA sim/JMC
MOR-16

62-116395—

ENCLOSURE

11. The Office of the General Counsel memo on the subject "Text and Explanation, Public Law 110," dated October 10, 1952.

12. The Interim Report to the National Security Council by Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, dated May 13, 1948 and entitled "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."

13. The paper by the Office of General Counsel on the Origins of the CIA, which is mentioned in the memo of the General Counsel of September 1973.

14. The two pages of General Vandenberg's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee outlining the clandestine collection function of the CIA, which were never published, a copy of which is now in the possession of Walter Pforzheimer.

15. An explanation of all the two-letter prefixes to the project names. (diographic)

16. The paper prepared by the Office of the Controller entitled "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities of CIA and Predecessor Organizations, 20 September 1945 through Janaury 1952." This is identified as HS/HC-36, Item 2.

17. The history of the development of NSCID-5 by Mrs. Margaret Ehrmantraut.

18. Study on Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of Covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 through 1966.*

19. Draft bill written by Lawrence Houston in the Fall of 1946, entitled "A Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency," cited in the archives as HS/HC-805, Item

20. Detailed Budget Submissions and house notes prior to 1967.

21. (a) The transcript of the Senate Hearings on the CIA Act of 1949, cited Paragraph 7 OGC 73-2169, Memo for the Record, 20 November 1973, Subject: Payment to Richard Patrick Lippert;

    (b) Any documents relating to the inquiry by the Secretary of Defense in 1947 mentioned in Paragraph 8 of above memo.

22. Annex to the 1963 Inspector General's Report on Technical Services Division on Experiments with Drugs.

---

* Already on our priority list: for transmittal to Select Committee offic

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Each Assistant Director

TO ALL SACS

~~JUNE 11~~, 3 per SLP 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116464)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

HOUSTUDY 75.

REBUTELS MAY 2,20, 1975, "SENSTUDY 75."

BUFILE 62-116464 AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MATTERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FROM SENSTUDY 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

SFP:mjg
(19)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 1 4 1975
TELETYPE

320 A ESF

NOTE:

Referenced teletypes advised field of our pledge of full cooperation with Senate Committee and issued instructions concerning handling contacts with Senate Committee Staff as well as handling of matters relating to interviews with present and former Bureau employees. Inasmuch as we have opened a separate file under Houstudy 75, it is believed this teletype would assist in prompting better management of correspondence between Bureau and field.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-9

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

WRW/B

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAF
MDR-16 WRW/TAL

PCM

66 - 116395 -

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 23 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

84 JUN 23 1975

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Schwartz)

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Senstudy-75

Dear Mr. Halperin:

Reference is made to my letter to you dated April 8th, regarding your request for the "Delimination Agreement of 1948."

Coordination of this matter with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has disclosed three documents which are pertinent to your request. It is my understanding that two of the three documents have been released to you by that agency, and I am enclosing with this letter, the third document. You will find this letter dated October 2, 1948, from former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Frank G. Wisner, then the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, contains certain deletions. The material deleted refers to the same material excised in one of the two documents furnished to you by CIA, and concerning which CIA asserted exemption provisions found in Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). These provisions relate to matters that warrant classification and those which are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. It is considered appropriate for the same exemption provisions to be cited by this Bureau in connection with the deleted portion.

You have thirty days from receipt of this letter to appeal to the Attorney General from any denial contained herein. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Attorney General (Attention: Freedom of Information Appeals Unit), Washington, D. C. 20530.

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

62-116395-

ORIGINAL FILED IN

MAILED 6
MAY 23 1975
FBI

THB:dm (7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPAAM/DMT
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

Mr. Morton H. Halperin

The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Following the Attorney General's decision, judicial review is available in the district of your residence or principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia, where the records are situated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Delivered to CIA 5/27/75
VAS

Enclosure

1 - Freedom of Information Act Coordinator - Enclosure
    Central Intelligence Agency
    Attention: Mr. Charles Saviage
    Washington, D. C.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attn: Susan M. Hauser

NOTE: See copy of H. C. Flemister memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 5/7/75, captioned "Morton Halperin, FOIA Request," copy of which is attached. The material CIA requested to be excised has been deleted as described in this letter, and the Bureau file copy of the letter is not classified. Contact with CIA FOIA Section discloses the deletion of the material in the CIA letter dated 9/22/48 accomplishes the declassification of those documents. This has been coordinated with Intelligence Division. The original Bureau document is found in 65-48066-9.

~~SECRET~~

1 - [illegible] W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

JPL:jdp
(4)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 PM/MAF
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 1

MDR-16

REC-75 62-116395-249

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 18 1975
5:18 pm
TELETYPE

~~SECRET~~

JUN 20 1975

84 JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [GUS SURVEY.] (S) NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S* RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall
6/4/75

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)
INTERNAL SECURITY, MISCELLANEOUS

Senstudy -75

This is to receive approval for submission of copies of documents requested by the U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. By letter dated 5/14/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the above Committee, requested the Attorney General furnish documents including "all memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the IEC." (Appendix C, I, 14).

Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, advised Supervisor Garnett T. Tunstall on 5/29/75 that the Department has made available to Senator Church's Committee all data contained in Departmental files on the IEC. Included in this material are work papers and final estimates prepared by IEC as well as communications between IEC and the Bureau. The only information remaining in Bureau files not already made available to the Committee consists of in-office memoranda. These memoranda fall into three general categories:
1. Those dealing with the origin and staffing of IEC,
2. Memoranda setting out requests from IEC for information from the Bureau and requests for approval to send such data to IEC and
3. Memoranda transmitting estimates and work papers of IEC which was the result of information furnished by the Bureau and other participating agencies.

These memoranda, without exception, show that the Bureau's participation in IEC was at the instruction of the Attorney General, its activities were legal and that the Bureau's contribution was substantial. It should be noted that the memorandum M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop dated 11/25/70 captioned

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)
Enclosures
62-113887
GTT:eks (4)

62-116395 -
NOT RECORDED
48 JUN 25 1975

CONTINUED OVER

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-113887-2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 bm/lmf
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC)

"Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Meeting with the Director, 11/25/70," has been excised to delete information not germane to IEC. Copy of original memorandum not excised attached.

ACTION:

If approved, copies of the above-described memoranda, which are attached, will be transmitted to the Department by LHM for referral to the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ___
Intell. ____
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps. Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(7)

WRW/TJM

memo Mr Cregar [illegible]
6/17/75 TJM

62-116395-247

REC-102

17 JUN 23 1975

5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2020 BY SP2 ALM/JMC
MOR-16

84 JUN 23 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 18, 1975

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - A. B. Fulton
1 - D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached herewith in 14 bound volumes are excised copies of Exhibits A through E of the Department report of FBI Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activities, prepared by the committee chaired by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen.

These exhibits are individual write-ups prepared by the FBI of each proposed action in the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate, Black Extremist, and New Left Cointelpros.

In my letter to you dated April 21, 1975, I recommended against release of these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee as they are internal work papers which were prepared as a part of the deliberative process for an in-house Department investigation. I strongly object to the release of these exhibits. In the event you deem it necessary to release these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee, I request the enclosed copies, which have been excised in an attempt to avoid intrusions upon individuals' right of privacy and compromise of sensitive investigative techniques and sources, be made available.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

Enclosures (14)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009

DR:pld
(11)

Director signed original which was hand carried with enclosures to O'Connor 5 15/P 6/17 by SA Daly. Jam

REC-104 62-116395-245

17 JUN 23 1975

See NOTE page 2.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/tml
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 23 1975

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

NOTE:

On 6/11/75 Legal Counsel advised Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of our objection and our desire that excisions be made if we are overruled. Mr. O'Connor suggested the excised material be prepared on an expedite basis. It appears the Department will make available these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee but we feel we should be on record as relates to FBI recommendations and objections.

This letter and exhibits A through E, which will be made available to Legal Counsel, should be delivered to Mr. O'Connor at the Department by Legal Counsel Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF MRS. DOROTHY SKILLMAN
6/4/75
SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

On 6/4/75, Mrs. Dorothy Skillman, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Clyde Tolson, was interviewed by Mr. Mark H. Gittenstein and Miss Mary Deoreo of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Mrs. Skillman was escorted to the interview by former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr who remained outside the interview room during the interview. Prior to the interview, Mrs. Skillman was met by SA L. F. Schwartz at which time she advised that she had been advised by Mr. John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, that the interview was to be concerning Mr. Hoover's Official and Confidential (OC) files and that if questions came up during the interview on other matters which might impinge on sensitive sources and methods, current Bureau investigations, etc., she was free to request an interruption of the interview to consult with Mr. Schwartz.

The interview of Mrs. Skillman commenced at 2:30 p.m., and it was terminated at approximately 4:30 p.m. On only one occasion toward the end of the interview, Mrs. Skillman asked to consult with Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz. She advised that the interviewers had asked her concerning her knowledge of what might have been in certain cartons which were reportedly stored in the recreation room area of the late Director's residence. Mrs. Skillman stated that she thought these cartons contained many of the gifts and mementos that had been collected by Mr. Hoover over a period of years. After consulting with Mr. Mohr, she realized that she knew this only from comments that had been made to her by Mr. Mohr and had no firsthand knowledge of the contents of the cartons. On Mr. Mohr's advice, she advised the interviewers that she had no firsthand knowledge of what was in the cartons but that she knew that Mr. Mohr was aware of what was in them because he was present when the appraisers of Mr. Tolson's estate inventoried the entire house including these cartons. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Gittenstein commented to Mr. Mohr that he might have further questions to ask him concerning the contents of the cartons but would probably handle that by a telephone call to Mr. Mohr.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/1/99 BY SP 2 AM/MF

REC-102

62-116395-284

(8)

MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

1975

84 JUN 23 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

COPY ... PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Interview of Mrs. Dorothy Skillman
6/4/75
Senstudy 75

After the completion of the interview, Mrs. Skillman advised Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz that the interviewers had asked her a great number of questions concerning her knowledge of the OC files which she said was very limited, the layout of Mr. Hoover's house and the work that Mrs. Skillman and Miss Gandy had done at the residence subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death. She stated that the interviewers were quite courteous and in no way antagonistic. Mr. Mohr requested Mrs. Skillman to type up an informal memorandum concerning the interview and he indicated that when this was done, he would provide a copy to the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information.

WRW

PLM

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/13/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 JUN 24 1975

File Number 62-116395-242

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/2006 BY SP2 ALM/JMF
MDR-16

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 9 1975

TO: Kevin Maroney ~~General~~
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor Bill
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: IRS - SSC Request Senstudy-75

Attached is a copy of the SSC document request served upon IRS which I received on June 3, 1975. Since some of the items may relate to DOJ/FBI functions, I thought you should be aware of the scope of the request, as a matter of information.

The Topical Task Forces may need to be alert to this request as a matter of prospective coordination.

cc: Deputy Attorney General

5 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

REC- 102 62-116395-241

17 JUN 19 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395

84 JUN 19 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975 DCI/IC 75-2033

Mr. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Attached is a copy of a Senate Select Committee request to the Treasury Department dated 14 May 1975. Mr. Collins of Treasury has requested you be provided a copy of this request, but no other distribution will be made. It will, of course, become an entry in the Community Central Index.

Yours very truly,

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

Attachment: As stated

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-241

DCI/IC 75-2009

Department
of the Treasury
Office of Special
Assistant to Secretar
for National Security

to. Mr. John Clarke, Associate
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community, C

room. ______ date. 5/29/75

Forwarded is a copy of the Senate Select Committee's first request to the Internal Revenue Service for documents and explanations. As I stated yesterday at the Ad Hoc Committee meeting there have been some discussions with the Committee staff since this letter was received and the staff has indicated that they plan to revise the questions considerably. In these circumstances you may wish to hold distribution of this document to other members of the Ad Hoc Committee until we receive the revised document. The one exception to this might be the Justice Department since some of the questions will involve matters of interest to them.

Foster

J. Foster Collins
room 4328
964-~~2423~~ 2631

62-116395-341

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, [illegible]IZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

COMMISSIONER
MAY 16 1975
INTERNAL REVENUE

Hon. Donald C. Alexander
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
Internal Revenue Building
1111 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20224

Dear Commissioner Alexander:

The Committee appreciates your letter pledging the full cooperation and assistance of the Internal Revenue Service in the work of the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. We also appreciate your forwarding the draft resolution which would authorize the Committee to review any "tax-related information" which may fall within the purview of its responsibilities. Such a resolution is being put forward.

In an effort to expedite the Committee's inquiry into the intelligence functions of the Internal Revenue Service, the Committee asks your cooperation and assistance in furnishing the material and information sought in the enclosed "First Request for Documents from the Internal Revenue Service" and "First Interrogatories to the Internal Revenue Service". It is the Committee's desire that most of the material and information requested be provided by May 30 and the remainder very shortly thereafter. We also request that you provide the answers and documents as they are compiled rather than holding those which are initially compiled until May 30.

In the near future, the Committee's Chief Counsel will be in touch with your General Counsel to work out the mechanics of delivering the requested documents and interrogatory answers and to arrange for close liaison between the Committee's staff and the Internal Revenue Service personnel with whom the staff will wish to meet.

While we recognize that the enclosed requests are substantial, they reflect the broad mandate given to the Committee by the Senate. We believe that it is in the national interest that we perform our

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-541

work under that mandate both expeditiously and thoroughly. Of course, for us to proceed expeditiously, it is necessary to obtain prompt cooperation from the Executive agencies involved. We are hopeful that with your continued cooperation the end result of our joint efforts will meet the Committee's responsibilities to the Congress and to the American people.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

FIRST REQUEST TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR DOCUMENTS

The Committee wishes to identify all intelligence collection analysis and dissemination functions performed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to review the legal authority for such activities, the manner in which they are ordered and controlled, the coordination of such activities with other federal agencies, the exchange of intelligence information with other federal agencies and any other cooperation with such agencies relative to intelligence activity. In pursuit of this inquiry the Committee requests, that the IRS provide the Committee with the documents and information identified below.

The request is divided into two major parts. The first part seeks documents which relate generally to any intelligence functions which the IRS performs. The second part seeks documents relating to specific intelligence functions of the IRS of which the Committee is aware. Therefore, many of the documents encompassed by the second part of the request will also be encompassed by the first part of the request.

Wherever used herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

Documents	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, compute memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language and any other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
Intelligence	Information about persons or entiti other than purely financial information.
Relating to	Relating in whole or in part to.
Federal agencies	All such agencies, including the White House.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

I. GENERAL REQUEST

With respect to each intelligence gathering or intelligence dissemination function of the IRS either now being performed or which has been performed within the last fifteen years, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart of the organizational unit performing the function indicating the total number of employees in each unit, the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, the chain of command to the organizational unit performing the function.

2. All rules, guidelines, regulations, manuals or other documents defining the function or providing guidance or control to those performing it.

3. All statutes, executive orders, departmental regulations, agency regulations, and any other documents or materials which constitute legal authority for the function.

4. The annual budget of the organizational unit performing the function for the last five years or, in the case of a unit which has ceased to exist, for the last five years of its existence.

5. All documents relating to any agreement or understanding with any other federal agency or the executive or any state or local government or agency regarding the function or the dissemination of any intelligence produced by the function.

6. All documents constituting or relating to reports or investigations of the function performed by the IRS or any other entity, and all documents relating to the establishment of the function.

7. All documents relating to electronic surveillance by IRS or other federal agencies.

II. SPECIFIC REQUESTS

A. Organization and Functions of Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions

With respect to the Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions of the IRS, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart indicating the total number of employees in each category or position, defining the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, and delineating the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Chief of each division.

2. A breakdown of the personnel in each of the two named divisions assigned to each district office, indicating the titles and functions associated with each position in each office.

3. Copies of all rules, guidelines and regulations defining the duties, functions, and responsibilities of each of the two divisions.

B. Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following specific categories of documents:

1. All documents relating to or constituting the recommendations of the study group convened in 1969 by William A. Kolar to study the feasibility of Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System, including all backup documents for such recommendations, and any documents reflecting dissenting views.

2. All documents passing from, to, or between William Kolar and the Commissioners of Revenue or their assistants relating to the plans for and progress made toward the implementation of IGRS.

3. All documents containing evaluations of the various methods of implementation of IGRS.

4. All documents constituting regulations, employee instructions and operating manuals regarding the IGRS, including guidelines, rules or regulations regarding the receipt and storage of information from other federal agencies.

5. All documents passing between the Chief of the Intelligence Division and the District Manager relating to the implementation of IGRS in each District.

6. All documents and guidelines relating to the implementation of IGRS in individual districts or in districts as a whole.

7. A breakdown by district of the IGRS files maintained in each district office, indicating the following:

(a) the number of such files on which some form of action constituting enforcement of the tax laws other than the maintenance of the file has actually been undertaken;

(b) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file is planned;

(c) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file has not been taken and is not planned.

?

8. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which no files are maintained.

9. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which files are maintained.

10. Any regulations or documents relating to criteria for determining the duration of a file in IGRS.

11. Any documents relating to rules or guidelines for analysis and dissemination of information held in IGRS.

12. Any documents relating to actual instances of dissemination to any person or organization, including other federal agencies, of information contained in IGRS.

13. Any documents relating to or constituting requests by anyone, including other federal agencies, for information contained in IGRS.

14. All documents which have been gathered or produced by the group formed in December 1974 to study the operation of IGRS, and all documents relating to or explaining the establishment of the study group.

C. Internal Revenue Strike Force Participation

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following information and documents relating to the participation by IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces:

All documents constituting or relating to agreements with other agencies regarding participation by the IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces, including any documents relating to the desirability of participating on such strike forces.

D. Special Service Staff

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following documents relating to Special Service Staff (SSS):

1. any document which established the SSS;

2. a detailed organizational chart of the SSS indicating the number of employees in each unit of the SSS and the duties and responsibilities of the employees of each unit, as well as the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the head of SSS;

3. a document or documents indicating the names of all employees of SSS during its existence, and indicating the position occupied by each such employee;

4. all documents relating to the policies, operations and procedures of the SSS relating to the collection, analysis, storage and dissemination of information;

5. all documents relating to the transfer of any SSS files to IGRS.

E. Audit Division

In addition to any documents relating to the Audit Division which may be encompassed by Part I, please furnish:

1. the rules, regulations and guidelines, including employee manuals, for selection of taxpayers for audit and the legal authority for such rules, regulations and guidelines;

2. the rules, regulations and guidelines relating to the storage, use and dissemination of information gathered through audits;

3. all documents relating to any of the following occurring since 1950

(a) Politically motivated requests for an audit of any person or entity

(b) Requests by any person or state or federal agency whose official duties do not normally require the use of financial information on individual taxpayers for an audit of any person or entity

4. All documents constituting rules or guidelines for removal of taxpayers' names from the list of those to be audited.

F. General Requests For Information

To the extent they have not already been furnished in response to previous sections of this document request, please furnish:

1. All documents constituting requests to the IRS for information regarding any person or entity by anyone, including federal agencies, whose normal official functions do not require use of such information.

2. All documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to the requests referred to in 1. above.

3. All documents constituting or relating to requests by anyone, including other federal agencies:

(a) for electronic surveillance by IRS, or

(b) for information or investigation which led to electronic surveillance by IRS

and all documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to any such requests.

FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Please provide full, explanatory answers to the questions set forth below. As used in these questions, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

"Documents"	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, computer memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language, and all other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
"Relating to"	Relating in whole or in part to.
"Federal agency"	All federal agencies and the Executive Branch.

1. Regarding the February 7, 1975, official press release of the Internal Revenue Service and the answer of Commissioner Alexander to the first question posed by Senator Joseph Montoya in his letter of January 29, 1975, please answer the following:

   a. At whose direction did William A. Kolar convene a study group to study the feasibility of a formal, uniform Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System (IGRS)?

   b. Who were the participants in the meeting of the study group?

   c. Please explain the relationship between each participant and the IRS.

   d. Please describe in detail the various alternative systems of implementation of IGRS tested in the

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

various districts, indicating which method was tested in which district, and list the dates each alternative system was tested in each district.

e. Please describe the procedure followed by District Directors in implementing IGRS in each district.

f. In how many district offices has IGRS been implemented?

2. How was intelligence data compiled, maintained, and stored by the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service prior to the inception of IGRS?

3. Did officials, representatives, or members of other federal government agencies participate in the establishment of IGRS or in any discussions regarding its establishment? If so, list each such agency and its representatives and explain the manner and extent of its involvement.

4. Did IGRS compile, maintain, and store information received from other federal agencies? If so, was that information compiled, maintained, and stored for the benefit and use of the Internal Revenue Service, the other federal agency, or both?

5. Is information received from other agencies of the federal government edited to delete non-tax-related material prior to its being entered in IGRS? If so, please explain the editing procedure and furnish all documents relating to such procedure.

6. Upon how many individuals and groups did IGRS maintain files as of November 1974?

7. Please identify all individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

8. Please state the total number of individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

9. Were all IGRS files maintained on a computerized or mechanized basis as of November 1974? How were the files indexed? In connection with the answer to this question, please identify all cross-referencing systems whereby categories of information could be retrieved from IGRS other than through identification of the name of an individual or group.

10. How many names were indexed in IGRS on which there were no files?

11. Please fully describe the procedure followed by the Intelligence Division of the IRS in establishing and entering a file on an individual, group, or organization in IGRS, stating whether:

    a. each file or name contained in IGRS is the result of an investigation by the Intelligence Division of IRS;

    b. the files or names stored and maintained by IGRS are periodically investigated by the Intelligence Division of IRS.

12. Upon how many IGRS files has some form of action constituting enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or the Justice Department?

13. How many names and files appear in IGRS upon which no action constituting the enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, has been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or Justice Department?

14. What criteria has been established by the Internal Revenue Service governing the duration of a file or name in IGRS?

15. What procedures are followed by the Internal Revenue Service in disseminating files, names, and other information contained in IGRS to other agencies of the federal government?

16. To what other agencies of the federal government has information contained in IGRS been distributed? Have there been any instances in which information contained in IGRS has been disseminated to other federal agencies without following the procedures described in Item 15 above?

a. If so, specify each such instance, listing the name of the individual, group, or organization whose file was disseminated and the agency at whose request the file was disseminated.

17. Has the Internal Revenue Service received requests for the dissemination of information contained in IGRS which (a) were politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please furnish the Committee with the following:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

18. Were any members of the IGRS study group convened by William Kolar in 1969 participants in the formation or operation of the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify them and describe in detail their relationship with both the Special Services Staff and IGRS.

a. Was IGRS, either in its formative or operative stages, used to maintain and store information collected by the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify the nature of the information so stored and the nature of the information not so stored.

b. Was it a policy of the Internal Revenue Service that documents and files maintained by the Special Services Staff not be stored in IGRS or its generic predecessors? If so, please furnish the Committee with evidence of such policy.

c. What was the relationship between the formal creation of IGRS on May 4, 1973, and the decision of the IRS to review and purge Special Services Staff files on or about June 28, 1973?

d. Have any Special Service Staff files ever been transferred to IGRS? If so, please specify the name of the individual, group, or organization upon which the file was maintained and the date it was transferred to IGRS.

19. With regard to the recent suspension of IGRS activities on January 22, 1975, pending an internal review of its operations, please answer the following:

a. To what specific duties have personnel assigned to IGRS been reassigned pending the present Internal Revenue Service review of IGRS? Please furnish the names of the personnel reassigned and the offices and units to which they have been reassigned.

b. Please furnish the name of the IRS official who is charged with the primary responsibility for conducting the study of IGRS.

c. In what manner are IRS intelligence files being compiled and maintained pending completion of the study?

20. What is the relationship between the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service and Organized Crime Strike Forces?

21. On how many strike forces do IRS agents participate? Please identify the strike forces.

22. How many agents participate on each such strike force?

23. Has the involvement of IRS intelligence personnel on such strike forces been confined to investigation of tax-related matters? If not, please indicate the manner and extent of IRS involvement in non-tax-related actions of the strike forces. In this regard, provide the Committee with detailed summaries of IRS participation on strike forces which did not involve or were unrelated to enforcement of tax-related matters.

24. What intelligence gathering, compiling, and storage systems has the Internal Revenue Service maintained in addition to IGRS?

25. In December 1974 the Internal Revenue Service suspended the operation of IGRS pending an internal review of the system. Was this review prompted by concern that non-tax-related materials were being gathered, compiled, and stored in IGRS? If so, please furnish the Committee with all files, names, and other information contained in IGRS files which is non-tax related.

26. Has the Internal Security Division of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other division of the Internal Revenue Service, ever investigated any aspects of the intelligence gathering, compilation, storage, and dissemination procedures of the Internal Revenue Service? If so, please identify and describe all such investigations and describe any subsequent action taken by the Internal Revenue Service as a result of the investigation.

27. Has the IRS received requests for the dissemination of information which were either (a) politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please state:

    a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual, or the nature of the information sought;

    b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

    c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

28. Has the IRS ever engaged in mail cover or other mail surveillance activities, including the recording of dispatch and receipt of mail (other than to or from the IRS) and the opening of mail (other than to the IRS)? If so, please state:

    a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

    b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

29. Please set forth the rules, regulations, and procedures which govern removal of taxpayers' names from the list of returns to be audited.

30. Has the IRS ever engaged in wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, or any other type of electronic surveillance? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

31. If the answer to #30 is yes, as to each instance of such activity, state:

a. The dates during which the activity occurred;

b. The type of device used;

c. Whether judicial approval was obtained in advance and, if so, from which court;

d. The subject of the activity;

e. Why the activity occurred;

f. The use or disposition which was made of the information collected;

g. The names and current addresses of the individuals who (a) performed or (b) supervised the activity and whether they are IRS employees.

32. Has the IRS ever been directed, requested, or advised by any other federal agency to use electronic listening devices? If so, please state as to each such direction, request, or advice:

a. The date;

b. The federal agency making it;

c. The proposed subject;

d. The action IRS took;

e. If surveillance resulted, please identify the incident among those listed in answer to number 31;

f. The date and nature of all documents relating to the direction, request, or advice.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Adams DATE: 6-13-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

W.O.

Prior memoranda have been submitted reporting that the Capitol Police Department would handle security checks of the space assigned to captioned Committees as well as the offices of the individual members.

Arrangements were made through the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives to advise us of the Committee Members who have their private offices checked and the dates on which these checks were made.

On June 13, 1975, Captain Eugene Brannon of the Capitol Police Force advised Inspector Bowers that three members of the Senate Committee and two members of the House Committee have had their private offices checked to date. These are:

Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) who had his office in room 245 Russell Senate Office Building and his Capitol office, room S-201 checked on 5-14-75.

Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) whose office in 6325 Dirkson Senate Office Building was checked on 5-22-75.

Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Penna.) whose office in 347 Russell Senate Office Building was checked on 6-5-75.

62-116464-

REC- 102

62-116395-239

17 JUN 19 1975

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Bowers

DWB:lgp
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

File 62-116395
62-116464

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MC

84 JUN 19 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SEANTE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Congressman Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.) whose office in 2265 Rayburn Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Congressman Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.) whose office in 1113 Longworth House Office Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Captian Brannon said they have no pending requests from other members of these Committees to make any checks of their offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
6/9/75
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - All Sections Chiefs
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

HOUSTUDY 75

By memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett captioned "Senstudy 75" dated 2/6/75, you were advised that "Senstudy 75" is the code word for the control file (62-116395) containing all communications relating to the Senate Select Committee's (SSC) investigation and study of Governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

In mid-February, 1975, the House of Representatives created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities which will have virtually the same jurisdiction and responsibilities as the above SSC. To date, practically all our work has been related to the SSC and only very recently has the House Select Committee (HSC) made any efforts to commence staffing.

As it appears, we can expect in the near future requests from the HSC similar to that already received from the SSC and in order to facilitate the administrative handling and retrieval, where necessary, of HSC requests and this Bureau's response to same, the code word "Houstudy 75" is being assigned to the control file (62-116464) containing all communications pertaining to the HSC and related matters.

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-

62-116464

(1)- 62-116395

TJM:mjc
(20)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 19 1975

84 JUN 19 1975.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Bureau has been requested to again make available Newark office secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski for interview by captioned Committee and that the Department and White House had instructed that they not be made available until such time as the Committee decides to allow Bureau representatives to be present during interview.

By way of background, you will recall that these employees were released from the Employment Agreement and were made available for interview on May 20, 1975, by captioned Committee. However, the Department in objection stated that they were desirous that a Bureau representative be present during the interview. The topic of the interview was to have been their duties and responsibilities during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Ultimately, neither the Department nor the White House could reach agreement concerning the interviews and the employees did not submit to interview.

On June 3, 1975, Michael Epstein, staff member of captioned Committee again requested these employees be made available for interview on June 5, 1975, at 10:00 a.m. The scope of the interview would be the responsibilities and duties performed during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

REC-100

62-116395-237

62-116395

17 JUN 18 1975

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-67-538691 (Personnel File Mary Ann Massa)
1-67-581180 (Personnel File M. Ann Mierzewski)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/tmf

PVD:lgp
(9)

MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Epstein classified the interview as an "abuse" type and agreed to allow agents to be available but not present during interview.

On June 3, 1975, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, was advised of the request and of the fact that an agent could not be present during interview. He stated that the Department's position was that unless the Committee consented to allow Bureau personnel to be present, the interview would not go forth, and that he would advise Epstein and F. A. O. Schwarz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, of this decision.

Mr. O'Connor telephonically recontacted Special Agent Daly and advised that he discussed the matter with assistant to the Counsel ~~to~~ of the President, James A. Wilderotter. Wilderotter told O'Connor it was the White House position that these girls should not be made available for interview unless the Committee allows Bureau personnel to be present. Wilderotter stated these two employees had been cited as examples wherein the White House felt interviews should not be conducted without representatives of the particular agency or Bureau being present as they are service personnel. According to Wilderotter, Schwarz agreed to this position.

O'Connor telephonically contacted Special Agent Daly on June 4, 1975, at which time he advised that he had discussed the interview with Schwarz, Epstein, and staff member Mark Gitenstein, and they would hold in abeyance the request to interview the employees pending a review of documents the Bureau is making available concerning 1964 Atlantic City Convention as stated in the Committee's request of ~~June~~ May 14, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD JBH/PVD WRW/TWL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. [illegible]dams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : V.V. Kolombatovic

SUBJECT: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

This memorandum is to advise of the scheduled appearance, under oath, of former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague before the full Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., on 6/12/75.

On 6/4/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, U. S. Postal Service, advised Liaison Agent L.A. Crescioli that he was contacted this date by Mr. Montague who informed Jackson that he, Montague, was scheduled to appear before the full SSC on Thursday, 6/12/75. According to Jackson, Mr. Montague appeared to be very concerned about his appearance before this Committee. In fact, Montague requested that Jackson alert FBI Director Kelley to the fact that Montague will appear before this Committee. Montague did not indicate any specifics to Jackson as to why he was so concerned over his scheduled testimony before the Committee.

In the way of background, Montague was the Chief Postal Inspector from 1961 to the Spring of 1969, on which latter date Mr. William J. Cotter assumed the position of Chief Postal Inspector. Prior to 1961 Montague was the Inspector-in-Charge of the New York Division of the Postal Service. In the opinion of Mr. Jackson, Montague is a man of the highest integrity and most certainly is not involved in any wrongdoing. Jackson confidentially advised the Liaison Agent that it is his belief that Montague is so concerned about his appearance before the Committee because he may have to reveal certain agreements that prevailed in the past between the Bureau and the Postal Service concerning mail covers that have not been made public to date.

94-58540-55

ORIGINAL FILED IN

LAC:tdp ([illegible])

CONTINUED - OVER

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MOR-16

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Jackson added that he personally has no knowledge of what agreements or understandings between the Bureau and the Postal Service that may be divulged by Montague. He emphasized that Montague did not divulge such data to him.

In conclusion, Jackson stated that Montague is in a retired status and has just returned from an extended vacation in the Mediterranean area. Montague did inform Jackson that the Committee has authorized Montague to be accompanied before the Committee by personal counsel; however, Montague has decided that he will testify alone and without personal counsel.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

- Assoc. Dir. ____
- Dep. AD Adm. ____
- Dep. AD Inv. ____
- Asst. Dir.:
  - Admin. ____
  - Comp. Syst. ____
  - Ext. Affairs ____
  - Files & Com. ____
  - Gen. Inv. ____
  - Ident. ____
  - Inspection ____
  - Intell. ____
  - Laboratory ____
  - Plan. & Eval. ____
  - Spec. Inv. ____
  - Training ____
  - Legal Coun. ____
  - Telephone Rm. ____
  - Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 6/3/75

Transmit the following in ________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

REC-102

[illegible]-116395-236X

14 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/Tmf
MDR-16

Approved: ________________ Sent __________ M Per __________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

450 Golden Gate Avenue
Box 36015
San Francisco, California 94102

June 3, 1975

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums,

Mr. Don Jones, the Senior Resident Agent of the FBI Resident Agency in Berkeley, California, has referred to me your letter of May 28, 1975 asking certain information concerning the FBI's operation in Berkeley, California.

Your letter has been referred to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for appropriate action.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Bates
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF

MDR-16

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives

RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1417 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2661

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2490 CHANNING WAY, ROOM 202
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704
(415) 548-7767

201 13TH STREET, ROOM 105
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94604
(415) 763-0370

DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

May 28, 1975

Mr. Don Jones, Senior Resident Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P. O. Box 1033
Berkeley, California 94704

Dear Mr. Jones:

As you are aware, I have been concerned for some time about the nature of the Bureau's involvement in local law enforcement affairs. This concern has been heightened by my appointment to the House Select Committee to Investigate the U. S. Intelligence Community. In this light, I am requesting answers to the following questions concerning FBI activity in Berkeley:

1. What is the size of the contingent of agents in the Berkeley field office?
2. What are the functional responsibilities in the field office, and what are the percentages of agents involved in each, i.e., political, drug abuse, criminal, etc.?
3. What are the titles of the agents, and how do these relate to their involvement in category two?
4. What is the ethnic and sexual breakdown of the staff and agents in the Berkeley field office?
5. What are the interactions and working relationships between the field office, the Berkeley Police Department, the University of California Police Department, private security agencies and informers? How many informers are utilized by the field office?
6. Recent disclosures have raised serious questions regarding the Bureau's involvement in political surveillance activities of organizations and individuals over the past several years. What actions has the local field office taken to correct the abuses of these actions, and what political surveillance is being undertaken?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395-2318

7. I have read with interest of the Special Weapons and Tactics course given under Bureau auspices at the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Facility in Alameda County. I would appreciate your forwarding to me a description of the activities undertaken in this course, and the relationship of UCPD and BPD to the course. In addition, I would appreciate being provided any relevant information on SWAT that you have available.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

RVD/djc

6/3/75

AIRTEL   AIR MAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 BVM/LMF
MDR-16

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Miller

REC-102 62-116395-236X

July 14, 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums:

This is in response to your letter dated May 28, 1975, sent to the Senior Resident Agent of the Berkeley, California, FBI Resident Agency.

To clarify your inquiries, it should be noted the Resident Agency at Berkeley, California, operates under the general supervision of the FBI's San Francisco Office.

There are currently nineteen Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley Resident Agency. All are white males. The function of a resident agency is to handle all FBI matters within its specific geographical territory. This includes criminal, security and applicant investigations. The FBI does not have primary jurisdiction regarding drug matters and does not conduct "political" investigations.

MAILED 7
JUL 15 1975
FBI

As a matter of policy, the FBI advises other governmental law enforcement agencies of matters coming to our attention which are within the investigative jurisdiction of those agencies. In some cases there is concurrent jurisdiction and a joint investigation may be conducted; however, local law enforcement agencies do not have access to FBI files. Representatives of private security agencies may be contacted from time to time in the course of discharging our official responsibilities just as any other citizens may be contacted. The FBI also utilizes the services of informants to develop information concerning matters within this Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; however, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss more specifically the number of such informants or the manner in which they are utilized.

JDM:lgp
(7)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF

MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 AUG 11 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

As I have already indicated, the FBI does not conduct "political" investigations, nor do we conduct "political surveillances." We do, of course, have a responsibility for conducting domestic intelligence investigations authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential Directives and instructions of the Attorney General. These matters relate to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, and other activities involving the internal security of the United States. The policies relating to such investigations are not made on an ad hoc basis by individual Agents or individual offices, but conform with broad policy applicable to all offices.

The FBI offers a variety of courses of instruction for law enforcement personnel throughout the United States, including such subjects as anti-sniper and survival training and special weapons and tactics, commonly known as "SWAT". The basic purpose of this training is to provide well prepared teams capable of resolving highly dangerous situations with a minimum of risk to innocent bystanders, the law enforcement personnel involved and the subjects of the investigation.

Enclosed is a newsclipping describing some of the training of our own personnel in this field. The article appeared on June 1, 1975, in the "Washington Star News."

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosure

NOTE: The information concerning the Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley, California, Resident Agency was furnished by ASAC Druken, San Francisco.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: June 3, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

SUBJECT: ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. A. Mintz 4/11/75 recommended that a draft of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of the captioned Committees be coordinated with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other appropriate members of the intelligence community.

On 6/2/75 the draft Memorandum of Understanding was discussed by SA L. F. Schwartz with Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, who advised that the draft had been reviewed by CIA and by the Security Committee on behalf of the intelligence community. They requested that the draft be revised in order to recognize the need for certain Staff Members to be cleared for access to compartmented information (a procedure already being followed by the Church Committee) and the desire of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that it be made clear that the DCI will only offer his advice upon the request of the Committee Chairman and that in all cases the final determination as to clearance is the responsibility of the Committee Chairman.

Attached is a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the changes proposed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore which changes are underscored. Both Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church.

REC-100

62-116395
Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-236

LES:ekw
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 Am/lmk

JUN 18 1975

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

84 JUN 18 1975

MOR-16

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ACTIVITIES
62-116395

RECOMMENDATION:

If the attached revised draft is acceptable to the Bureau, it will be provided to the Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Congressman Nedzi. In accordance with opinion expressed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, a copy will not be furnished to Senator Church.

VFS

PLM WVC

LET TO A.G.
ENCL. LHM FOR HSC
6/12/75 HFS: dmt

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information, in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI willffurnish a summary memorandum containing therresults of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2006 BY SP2
MOR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-256

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters, Jr.

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 3/12/75, and my memorandum, 3/25/75, both captioned as above.

By referenced memorandum dated 3/12/75, Legal Counsel recommended that the Intelligence Division (INTD) discuss with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other members of the intelligence community procedures for clearing staff members of captioned committees for access to classified information when questions as to the individual's trustworthiness have arisen in the course of the FBI's background investigation. Following such discussions, Legal Counsel recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding concerning these matters be prepared by the INTD which might be used by both Senate and House Committees.

By memorandum 3/25/75, the INTD submitted for approval a draft of a proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for staff members of captioned committees. Special Investigative Division disagreed with several features of our draft memorandum and has prepared a revised memorandum, which is attached for approval.

The INTD has coordinated this matter with the Special Investigative Division and interposes no objection to the text of the revised memorandum; however, it is suggested that consideration be given to adding the words "by the FBI" at the end of paragraph five on page one. Paragraph five, thus modified, would read: "Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI."

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116395

Enclosure

AFW:dsh dsh
(7)

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-235

JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM SEE PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMF
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Mintz
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Discussions of this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community have been held in abeyance pending approval within the FBI as to the text of the proposed memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, that attached revised memorandum be coordinated by the INTD with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community prior to review by the Attorney General and transmittal to Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi by Legal Counsel Division.

Addendum

WVC

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division concurs with the general thrust of the memorandum of understanding, however, it is suggested the following wording be added where indicated:

Page 1, paragraph 3, insert after the word applicant, or employee. On line 2, change "applicant's" to read "person's".

Page 1, paragraph 4, after the word determined insert by the respective Chairman,.

Page 2, paragraph 1, after the word necessary insert by the Committee,.

Per

jma

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information. ①

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing ~~the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee~~ Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, OR EMPLOYEE, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the ~~applicant's~~ PERSON'S suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined BY THE RESPECTIVE CHAIRMAN to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI. ②

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2ALM/UMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-235

The DCI will furnish his observations as to eligibility for access to classified information to the appropriate Committee Chairman for his consideration. The Committee Chairman will render the final determination after consultation, where it is deemed necessary, BY THE COMMITTEE, with the interested agencies.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	✓
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. Adams memorandum to Mr. Callahan dated 3/7/75, captioned as above, copy attached, reported our conversation with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi.

As indicated in Mr. Adams' memorandum, Congressman Nedzi asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI, and the House Committee concerning investigative and clearance procedures for members of the Committee's staff. It appeared appropriate to us to coordinate a memorandum of understanding to be drafted for the House Committee with that to be drafted for the Senate Committee. Therefore, following our return from the meeting with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi, I called Bill Miller and advised him of the request made by Congressman Nedzi for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding. I asked him whether it would be possible for us to coordinate the language of that memorandum with the understanding that it will be drafted for use by the CIA, other members of the intelligence community, and the Church Committee. Mr. Miller said that the proposal to coordinate the memorandum was completely acceptable to him and he requested that the draft memorandum being prepared for Congressman Nedzi be furnished him for review and possible adoption as the memorandum to be used by the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division discuss this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community and prepare a draft memorandum of understanding that may be used by both House and Senate committees.

Bufile 62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

JUN 18 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 alm/lmb

MDR-16

JUN 18 1975

memo Wannall to Mintz 4/11/75 AFW:dsh

84 JUN 19 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116464

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 3/7/75 Mr. Mintz and I called on Senator Church and his staff director, Bill Miller, to further discuss the procedures for investigating and clearing staff employees of the Committee, particularly where information might be developed raising a question as to the propriety of a clearance. It had previously been approved that the FBI would conduct the background investigations, furnishing the results to Senator Church, and after his determination that the individuals met the required criteria for access to classified information he would notify CIA of his determination and intent to employ the individual involved, at which time CIA would grant the necessary clearance based on the certification by Senator Church.

In discussions between CIA and FBI representatives, we raised the question as to whether CIA would review the results of the investigation prior to granting clearances and CIA representatives indicated they did not intend to and were reluctant to inquire of Senator Church as to whether they could be furnished the results of any investigations involving derogatory information.

In discussing this matter with Senator Church, I inquired whether he had any objection to our bringing to the attention of CIA any questionable cases in order that CIA representatives, who have the responsibility of granting the actual clearances, would be in a position to advise and counsel with Senator Church on those individual cases. He had absolutely no objection to this and, in fact, felt there should be an open communication between FBI, CIA and his Committee to insure that no one was appointed and cleared who did not measure up in every respect from a security standpoint.

I discussed with him the particular case of Stanley Rawson Sloan, the results of which I had brought for delivery to Senator Church. Sloan was

Wannall to [illegible] memo, [illegible] 4/1/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/16/2000 BY [illegible]

REC-100

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

SEE

17 JUN 18 1975

JBA:ams
(5)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

MDR-16

CONTINUED—OVER

formerly employed by CIA and resigned in December, 1974, after his clearance for sensitive compartmented information had been lifted as a result of his marrying an alien. This marriage would not preclude him from clearance for access to lesser degrees of sensitive material but only for the more sophisticated clearances. Mr. Miller advised that Sloan had not been appointed and was not going to be appointed because of other reasons unrelated to a security clearance.

Senator Church indicated that he felt it would be wise to prepare a memorandum outlining our security clearance procedures and his staff would be glad to prepare such a document.

Following the meeting with Senator Church, Mr. Mintz and I dropped by to see Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the House Committee, and delivered to him Mr. Kelley's letter congratulating him and offering him our complete cooperation. Chairman Nedzi stated that he was very appreciative of this offer and would consider Mr. Kelley's request to confer with him as an open invitation and as soon as things had shaken down he would be in touch with us.

We discussed with him the investigative and clearance procedures we were following with the Senate Committee and Chairman Nedzi agreed the same procedures should be followed with his Committee, including our making available to CIA any derogatory information which might be pertinent to a clearance determination. At first, he suggested that we send the results of our investigations to CIA before coming to the Committee but then concluded that it would be more appropriate for them to come to him first since some of the applicants under consideration would probably not be appointed. He specifically asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI and himself.

I asked Mr. Nedzi whether he felt the formulation of his Committee would serve to trim down the number of requests for information being received from various House committees and it was his opinion that it would help in some instances; however, in others committee chairmen would pursue their own inquiries. He personally did not feel he had the clout nor the desire to try to preempt this area entirely for his Committee. He also stated he felt that CIA's problems had in the main been fully exposed and would soon be

CONTINUED - OVER

of less concern, whereas the concern over domestic security policies of the FBI would undoubtedly be greater in the future. He expressed his appreciation for our cooperation and indicated he was striving for a responsible approach to the inquiry.

Following the meeting with Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Mintz and I agreed that it would be best for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding concerning the investigative and clearance procedures for both Committees in order to try to insure uniformity, and Mr. Mintz will get in touch with Bill Miller to seek his concurrence in that regard. Our efforts will be coordinated with CIA and the proposed memorandum as drawn up will be submitted for the Director's approval.

ACTION:

Information only.

CONTINUED - OVER

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. CHURCH

MAY 21, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration
JUNE 5, 1975
Reported without amendment
JUNE 6, 1975
Considered and agreed to

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LHF
MDR-16

REC-100
62-116395-233
NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 18 1975

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21, 1975

Mr. CHURCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. CANNON, without amendment

JUNE 6, 1975

Considered and agreed to

Senate 4-'75

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

V

62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams　　DATE: 5-28-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated 5-22-75 you were advised that former SA Robert Nichols had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee, at which time Seidel attempted to arrange an interview of Nichols. Nichols was advised by Deputy Assistant Director Jack E. Herington of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 pertaining to Departmental approval prior to furnishing information from Bureau files. He was also reminded that he had signed an employee agreement with the Bureau agreeing to maintain confidentiality of the information contained in Bureau files. He was advised if he requested, the Bureau would make available a representative to accompany him should he be interviewed by the Committee.

Former SA Nichols telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 5-28-75 and advised he had been recontacted by Mr. Seidel. Seidel requested and Nichols agreed to travel to Washington, D. C., on the morning of 5-30-75 for an interview at the Committee's offices. Nichols stated that Seidel indicated the scope of the interview would be concerning Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether this was to be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an executive session of the Committee. He stated he was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the Bureau make available a representative so that Nichols may consult with him during the interview if need be.

62-116395-232

EX-105　REC-20　JUN 6 1975

Mr. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted by Nichols as being his private counsel but that the Agent would assist Nichols in making determination whether a specific question should be responded to or whether a response could properly be declined because an answer might compromise a source,

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Personnel File 67-414885 (Former SA Robert Nichols)
1 - Mr. Hotis

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

sensitive investigative technique, divulge information furnished the Bureau by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources or adversely affecting an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Mr. Nichols that if he so desires, he could, of course, obtain the services of private counsel. He indicated it was his intention to arrive in Washington Thursday night, 5-29-75. He was requested to appear in the Office of Legal Analysis, Room 4513, at approximately 8:15 a.m. on the morning of 5-30-75 so that arrangements might be made to brief him by the Office of Legal Analysis and subsequently by the Intelligence Division. Nichols stated he would do so.

The Office of Legal Analysis is attempting to obtain from Committee representatives further information as to the circumstances and exact time of interview of Nichols.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Intelligence Division representative be made available to accompany Nichols to his interview with captioned Committee.

2) That Nichols be released from his employment agreement to respond to questions concerning our investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters.

PVD JBH/PVD

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Hotis

On May 27, 1975, James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, requested me and representatives of other agencies interested in the arrangements concerning interviews of witnesses by the Senate Select Committee to confer with him and Roderick Hills at 2:30 p.m. that date at the White House. Mr. K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Inspector John B. Hotis and I represented the Department and the FBI. Roderick Hills and James A. Wilderotter represented the President's counsel; Bob Andrews represented the Defense Department; John Warner, General Counsel, CIA; Roy Banner, General Counsel of NSA, and Mr. Hyland from State Department as well as John Clark, Deputy to the Director of CIA, attended.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the latest version of proposed procedures to be followed by the Committee staff investigators during interviews of former and current employees. Roderick Hills presented a document (copy attached) which he described as a counteroffer by Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee. He called for general discussion of the document after indicating that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Schwarz at lunch on May 27th and felt that it was a workable document. I pointed out to Mr. Hills that the document provides that there would be notice to the agencies of the identity of witnesses at reasonable time prior to interviews or taking of sworn testimony except where "the committee or its appropriate delegee" determines that prior notice should not be given. I told him that I was concerned that that provision would be used by the Committee staff to permit individual staff investigators to make that determination and I was confident they would do so.

EX-105 REC-20 62-116395-231

ENCLOSURE

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (7)

7 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ADM/DMC
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Mr. Hills was reluctant to seek a modification of the language indicating that he had an understanding with Mr. Schwarz that the authority would be limited to the senior counsel and to members of the Committee. I told Mr. Hills I would request that the language be modified in writing so that the authority would be conferred on specific representatives of the Committee to avoid having staff authority which I thought would be abused. Mr. Hills finally agreed that the language would be modified so that the authority would be available only to both Committee senior counsel and/or a combination of senior counsel and a Committee member. Further, the language would be modified to require that the determination that an agency would not be given prior notice of a pending witness interview would be recorded in writing for the Committee's records.

I asked Mr. Wilderotter and Mr. Hills whether this agreement was to be made between the staff and the agencies or whether it in fact would be accepted by the Committee. After some discussion, we were advised by Mr. Hills and Mr. Wilderotter that the document would be submitted to the full Committee for their approval and incorporated into the Committee's records.

I pointed out that I believed it was necessary for the understanding to be made between the Committee and the Executive in order for there to be some basis for restraining Committee staff investigators who may not be inclined to follow the rules.

Other proposed changes discussed would require the Committee representative to furnish to a witness a copy of the Committee's rules which includes advice concerning the right to counsel and a copy of the proposed guidelines for witness interviews.

I recommended that the guidelines be expanded to address the problem of existing secrecy agreements with former and present employees and the procedural problem involved in Attorney General Order 501-73 which requires prior Departmental approval in order for a witness to respond to a subpoena. As a result, Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28, 1975, that he would recommend the addition of a sentence in the opening paragraph that would indicate the guidelines would not be understood to impair the constitutional rights of individual witnesses, agency agreements with employees or former employees, existing Departmental orders or the Committee's own rules.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

Other minor changes were considered and an effort will be made to correct the language so that the agencies will be obliged to make reasonable efforts to comply with all Committee requests instead of being required to furnish "all information" absolutely.

Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28th that the comments described above will be discussed with Frederick Schwarz in an effort to finally resolve this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Source: Hills 5/27

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

It is hoped that these voluntary guidelines will permit the Select Committee investigation to proceed without undue delay, but it is also recognized that these guidelines do not cover all points or anticipate all problems and that, therefore, either the Select Committee or some agency under investigation may have reason not to follow these suggested guidelines.

Also, it is recognized that this outline is without prejudice to the respective legal positions of the agencies and the Select Committee as to the production of specific information by way of documents or testimony. Not to impair Const. rights of ind witness, agency rules or agreements, comm rules.

A. Classification of Interviews/Preliminary Testimony

The parties to this investigation by the Select Committee recognize that interviews/preliminary testimony to be conducted by the Committee staff will generally be of two separate and distinct natures.

(1) Those primarily seeking information concerning (A) the overall structure and functions of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; (B) the substantive work being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; and (C) the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2000 BY SP2 ALM/VMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-231

des 7 197. [illegible] comm

(2) Those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

An agency representative will be present, as a general rule, at interviews/preliminary testimony in the first category for the purpose of assisting the Committee's investigation and facilitating the protection of information important to the national interest which is pertinent to the investigation. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews/preliminary testimony in the second category. The parties recognize, however, that for special reasons exceptions can be made in either case: i.e., when good reason exists, endorsed by the Select Committee, agency representatives may not be present for interviews/preliminary testimony falling under the first category, and for good and sufficient reason the agency may [seek to] have a representative present in the second category subject to the approval, of course, of the Select Committee.

B. Procedures to be Employed in Category (2).

When the Select Committee has identified a specific subject as a potential abuse or impropriety and has so notified the agency involved of its designation, that agency will, subject to the second sentence hereof, make [every effort] to provide the Select Committee

with all information and materials that it has on the subject. There will be a mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate.

In abuse or impropriety interviews/preliminary testimony, the following procedures will prevail.

(1) Witnesses will be identified to the agency a reasonable time prior to interviews or taking sworn testimony. This general rule includes current employees, former employees or others who have or have had a relationship with the agency.

Exceptions

~~Written record~~ of [illegible]

A. Where the Committee or its appropriate delegee ~~by written delegation~~ stet believes that prior identification of a witness could adversely affect the witness' willingness to be interviewed or to be forthcoming, or could otherwise hinder the investigation, such prior notice ~~by written authorization~~ will not be given, but in such cases the agency shall be given a general indication of the points or areas to be covered to the extent that is feasible without undercutting the reason for not providing prior notice in the first instance. Delegees shall consist of both Comm. senior counsel or a comb of senior counsel and committee member.

B. In certain cases, the Committee might notify the agency, if the agency agrees not to contact the witness before his appearance. The agency could identify for the Committee special security matters concerning prospective witnesses and provide information on how to locate a witness.

(2) When the Committee contacts a witness, it will explain the security and other arrangements between the Committee and the agency, as well as serve the witness a copy of these ground rules and a copy of the Committee rules. If the witness wishes to consult with the agency prior to his appearance, the Committee will not discourage or seek to interfere with that desire in any way and will help the witness contact the agency representative.

(3) Whenever they are not present at interviews or the taking of sworn statements, agency representatives will be available for consultations regarding the handling of special security matters.

(4) Whether or not an agency has notice of an interview or sworn statement, the Committee will inform the agency of the general substantive points covered as soon as possible thereafter, unless disclosure of the substance of a particular interview would make discernible the identity of a confidential source. In such cases, the Committee shall, to the extent feasible without undercutting that decision, notify the agency in general terms of the points or areas covered, and the fact that it has interviewed a witness on such matters.

(5) Whenever an agency receives prior notice of a particular interview or taking of a sworn statement, it will also be notified

of the general subject areas and periods of employment in which the Committee is primarily interested. The agency will then check the subject's personnel history file and advise the Committee of any exceptionally sensitive aspects of the subject's employment or activity which require special handling.

(6) If because of concern about security of sensitive information, a witness feels unable to give a responsive answer to a particular question, the witness shall so indicate to the interviewer. The questioner and witness may then consult with the agency representative with respect to an appropriate response which will facilitate the provision of pertinent information and its protection. These matters should be worked out forthwith and ordinarily before the close of the interview/testimony session.

(7) The Committee is responsible for providing special handling of interview notes and other working notes in a manner which will protect sensitive material. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee will consult with the agencies concerned regarding the appropriate disposition of any such notes which have not been destroyed following the preparation of finished Committee documents. The agencies will indicate which of these notes it feels are too sensitive to be stored under the Archives

arrangement being established for the general disposition of the Committee's working papers and non-public reports.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

231 THRU 235

236 THRU 1ST NR 237

1ST NR 238, 239

241, 242

244, 245

247

249, 1ST NR 249

252 THRU 254

255 THRU 260

262 THRU 265

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

Alan G. Sentinella

May 21, 1975

The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood

Sent 6 H 6 6/9/75
1-DIC - SENSTUDY
Att: K. William O'Connor
Spec. Intllgnc Coordination
[illegible] ELHmf

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-265

to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were

assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

A. None.

Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted

to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

See attached pages ITEM II

Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison.

A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior ~~to that time which~~ thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

Q. Why would Harding know this information?

A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

A. Yes.

Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

A. Richard Hamilton.

Q. When did he assume these cases?

A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

A. It did not develop any such information.

Q. How did you know of what~~ever~~ their CP affiliation may have been?

A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

A. I did not have the cases at that time.

Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How?

A. From information in the appropriate file.

Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances,

airtels, letters, memoranda?

A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

Q. What was the ~~j~~gist of such communications?

A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

A. No.

Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign.

A. I have no such recollection.

Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned. ← SEE ITEM I. of attached pages

Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

Q. Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

Q. Kitchen floor?

A. Yes.

Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none..

Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy ~~had~~ changed it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation. See ITEM III of attached pages.

Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights Complaints ~~complications~~ in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

See ITEM IV of attached pages

A. ~~Yes.~~ I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

Q. What about prior to 1965?

A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having KLAN ~~King~~ connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

A. Yes, I did not have any such contact.

Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters ~~or~~ were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category.

I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

A. No.

Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

Q. Who were some of those?

A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

A. Henry Rouse.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

Q. Recently testimony was given be one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

A. It is not my recollection that they did.

Q. What about a Klan organization?

A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceiably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

A. I do not know.

THIS WOULD READ BETTER IF MOVED TO PAGE 19

It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued.

Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted

such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

The writer apologized for asking the question and

assured Mr. Siedel he was not asking him to make any changes.

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time No longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened, it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

→ FROM P 18

Had such been furnished at an earlier date

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 9, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

Sen Study - 75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to my letter dated May 22, 1975, forwarding a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning testimony subsequently given by Mr. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

for info. only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR - Dept of Justice. 11/22/76 JCB

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP165K/JG9

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw KW
(14)

Rm 4509 JB

REC- 102

HAND carried TO AG 6-10-75

62-116395-265

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1-Mr.W.O.Cregar
1-Mr.S.F.Phillips

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4JAM/LL
ON 2-20-81
6076

62-116395

June 9, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BEFORE
SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION

Reference is made to the memorandum of this Bureau dated May 22, 1975, reporting a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella, a retired SA of the FBI. That statement concerned the interview of Sentinella by an SSC Staff Member on May 12, 1975.

Pursuant to a subpoena, Mr. Sentinella testified before an Executive Session of the SSC on May 21, 1975, after which he voluntarily furnished the FBI a statement concerning his testimony. Set out below is the verbatim text of that statement.

CLASS. & ~~EXT.~~ BY SD165K/JG 10/31/80
REASON-FCIM II, ~~1-2.4.2~~ 3
DATE OF REVIEW ~~6-9-95~~

"Alan G. Sentinella"

"May 21, 1975"

"The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw (13)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JBA

62-116395-265

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

"Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

'The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

"Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

'Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

CONFIDENTIAL

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

"A. None.

"Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

"A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

"Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

"A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

"Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

"A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

"Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison?

"A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

"Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

DENTIAL

"A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

"Q. Why would Harding know this information?

"A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

"Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

"A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

"Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

"A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

"Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

"A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

"Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

"A. I did not.

DENTIAL

"Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

"A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

"Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

"A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

"Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

"A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

"Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

"A. Richard Hamilton.

"Q. When did he assume these cases?

"A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

"Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

"A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

"Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

"A. Yes, he was.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

"A. It did not develop any such information.

"Q. How did you know of what their CP affiliation may have been?

"A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

"Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

"A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

"Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

"A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

"Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

"A. I did not have the cases at that time.

"Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How?

"A. From information in the appropriate file.

"Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances, airtels, letters, memoranda?

"A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

"Q. What was the gist of such communications?

"A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

"Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

"A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

"Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

"A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

"Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

"A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

"Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign?

"A. I have no such recollection.

"Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

"A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned.

"Q. What about Julian Bond's campaign? Any effort to influence that?

"A. No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

"Q. What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

"A. None to my knowledge beyond such coverage as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

"Q. In same manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature. My answer was that my only concern had been with former Governor Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the Pickrick restaurant.

"Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

"A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

"Q. William Sullivan, whowas formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

"A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

"Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

"Q. Was King given a nickname in the Atlanta Office?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was it?

"A. "Zorro."

"Q. How did that come about?

"A. I believe that began with Mr. Nichols and just passed on down.

"Q. Why was that name selected?

"A. I do not know precisely.

"Q. Don't you have any idea?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for it?

"A. As I remember, "Zorro" was either a television or movie character who carried a sword and therefore could be referred to as a swordsman.

"Q. What connection had this with King?

"A. The Reverend King participated in a number of extra-marital relations and therefore it seemed fitting that in the vernacular the reference swordsman applied to him.

"Q. What extra-marital activities were there?

"A. There were several women involved.

CONFIDENTIAL

"Q. How do you know this?

"A. It was indicated on occasions by conversations.

"Q. How?

"A. By reference to a previous escapade with an individual or to one pending.

"Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

"A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

"Q. Kitchen floor?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

"A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

"Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

"A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

"Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

"A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy changed, it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

"Q. Prior to 1963 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

"Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

"A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

"Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

"Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

"A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation.

"I cannot be certain - I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

"Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

"A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

"Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

"A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

"Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

"Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

"A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

"Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

"A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

CONFIDENTIAL

"Q. What about prior to 1965?

"A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having Klan connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

"Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

"A. Yes. I did not have any such contact.

"Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

"A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category. I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

"Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

"A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

"Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

"A. No.

"Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

"A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

"Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

"A. A number of different gentlemen, some of them were periodically transferred.

"Q. Who were some of those?

"A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

"Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

"A. Henry Rouse.

"Q. Where is he now?

"A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

"Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

"Q. Recently testimony was given by one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

"A. It is not my recollection that they did.

"Q. What about a Klan organization?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

"I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceivably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

"Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

"A. I do not know.

"Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

"Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

"The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened. Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

"The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

"It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued."

On June 4, 1975, Sentinella advised the FBI of the following additional information concerning this matter.

Sentinella received a telephone call that day from Seidel who advised him that the transcript of Sentinella's testimony was near completion and that Sentinella would receive a letter advising him it was ready for Sentinella's review, but only in SSC space.

Seidel sought from Sentinella and was furnished names of some FBI personnel who had monitored technical surveillance on King during the pertinent period. Seidel sought information concerning who supervised the King investigation at FBI Headquarters, to which Sentinella replied that he did not know any specifics. Seidel referred back to information from Sentinella both during the original interview and during Sentinella's testimony and Seidel asked why Sentinella had discussed the matter with former FBI Agent Harding. It was Sentinella's reply that he sought Harding's help in order to rectify what he thought was a wrong answer given to Seidel during the initial interview.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentintella's verbatim statement which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The additional information Sentinella furnished 6/4/75 was telephoned by him to Phillips. On that occasion Sentinella also advised that Seidel had inquired of him that day as to whether he had discussed with Phillips the King case after arriving in Washington, D.C., and prior to testifying. Sentinella stated that he had not.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/13/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Documents Pertaining to the Huston Plan, Cointelpro and other Practices and Programs

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/74, Appendix C, Part I, Item 7, 8.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"S"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

LIAISON

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

With CIA concurrence, SSC was furnished with copies of documents maintained by the Bureau relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, with the resultant temporary discontinuance of formal liaison between the FBI and the CIA.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
Flug

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 - TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 [illegible]

MOR-16

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/13/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS
HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMEN

Originating Office: FBI 37

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec. Sec.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

Appendix C
Part I, #7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/TMF
MDR-16

(Additional questions)

ITEM I.

Q: What about JULIAN BOND's Campaign? Any effort to influence that?

A: No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

Q: What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

A: None to my knowledge beyond such coverage ~~of SNCC of which organization he~~ as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

Q: [In some manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature]. My answer was ~~that~~ my only concern ~~that~~ then with former Governor

62-116395-265

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the PICKRICK restaurant].

✓ITEM II Re page 5, first Q. and A. set forth.

It seems this is where Seidel asked a question concerning other source (other than electronic) material re Levison. However, he went on talking and never actually posed a question as such; accordingly it was not answered.

OR

the above may have been related to the last Q. appearing at bottom of page 7.

ITEM III.

I cannot be certain — I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

ITEM IV.

Re page 14 and the answer you inquired about.

I'm sure my answer was as it now appears on page 14, i.e. corrected.

I did not say *there* *was* *no* connection. I'm sure I only introduced the negative when he asked if I would *deny* there was such connection.

I believe "Yes" may have come in here in answering a question raised by your steno.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 7, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. Item number 8, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed copies of 13 FBI communications.

In connection with your request for memoranda pertaining to inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, a search of the files of the FBI at Washington, D. C., and Denver, Colorado, does not indicate that any such inspections or administrative inquiries took place.

RLM:mam
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO & THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-264

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory RLM
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

With reference to the information furnished by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley contained in the communication from the Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, to the Director of the FBI, dated May 8, 1970, your specific attention is directed to the restrictions placed by Dr. Smiley on the information furnished by him. On June 4, 1975, Dr. Smiley was recontacted, at which time he advised that under no circumstances would he testify in public to the information which he originally furnished to the FBI on a confidential basis. He further advised that under no circumstances would he reveal the identity of his contact in the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in the May 8, 1970, communication. He agreed to the release of the information in the May 8, 1970, communication to the SSC on a strictly confidential basis, for its use only and not for any further dissemination. Dr. Smiley stated he has no information other than that in the May 8, 1970, communication.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Concurrence to pass the 2/26/70 letter, with Secret enclosures, from Richard Helms, then Director of CIA, to J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of FBI, was obtained by Liaison Officer Leon F. Schwartz from Walter Elder, CIA on 6/10/75. The response to requests set forth in Appendix C, Part I, Item numbers 7 and 8 is being made in the same communication to avoid unnecessary duplication since the severing of liaison with CIA grew out of the RIHA matter.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

A. W. Gray memorandum to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/70, states "our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958." This information only appears on the cover page of the report of SA Daniel J. Griffin, dated, 8/31/60 at Boston. The information was furnished by Riha during interview on 8/11/60 and has never been given to us by CIA.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (28)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RLM:mam
(9)

RLM

13

REC- 102

62-116395 - 264

17 JUN 25 1975

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

RLM

Delivered To Mr. [illegible] Meeting [illegible]

6/11/75

Dir. ___
AD Adm. ___
AD Inv. ___
Syst. ___
Affairs ___
& Com. ___

JUN 2 5 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW	X	TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

	SSC
	HSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting testimony given by former FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the SSC.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence activities, domestic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Testimony covered former FBI investigation of:

1) Martin Luther King, Jr.
2) Stanley David Levison
3) Southern Christian Leadership Conference

5-8

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

62-116395

6-24-75 LFS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 ALM/ML

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~XC~~ 3/Ar ~~XC~~ R. Prong

~~XC/FC~~

XC①/FC

Patch III

Assembly

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVE[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : DIRECTOR, F.B.I.

February 12, 1970

ROM : SAC, DENVER

UBJECT: THOMAS RIHA

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was called by MIKE TODOROVICH, who is in charge of the CIA office here in Denver. TODOROVICH stated he has instructions from his Washington Office to contact Denver District Attorney JAMES MC KEVITT and tell MC KEVITT that CIA Agent JOHN D. FRITZ who is stationed in Boulder, Colorado, had told Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, former President of the University of Colorado, that FRITZ had been told that THOMAS RIHA's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that RIHA was, in fact, all right. TODOROVICH then told me that FRITZ got this information from an FBI Agent in Boulder.

I told TODOROVICH to give me the name of the FBI Agent and he stated he would not do so. He then stated the FBI Agent told him, TODOROVICH the same thing. I again requested the name of the Agent. He again declined to give it to me. I very emphatically told TODOROVICH that until he gave me the name of the Agent who supposedly gave him and FRITZ this information, that I would not believe that either he or FRITZ had been given any information such as this by any Agent of this Bureau and this was based on the fact that no Agent would have any reason whatsoever to make such a statement since we had not conducted any investigation in this matter nor did we have any information concerning RIHA and, therefore, we would not be in a position to make such a statement as to whether or not RIHA was all right.

I then also pointed out to Mr. TODOROVICH that if he gave the information to Mr. MC KEVITT and advised Mr. MC KEVITT the information had come from an FBI Agent and if Mr. MC KEVITT contacted me I would certainly advise him that the information did not come from anyone in the FBI for the same reasons as set forth above.

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum that they have not made such statements as were attributed to them by TODOROVICH. Not only that, neither of the two has ever had any contact personally or otherwise with JOHN D. FRITZ, the CIA representative in Boulder.

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of CIA's actions in connection with this matter.

1. Protests to CIA re Todorovich's actions
2. Commends SAC re his handling of Todorovich.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and when it may have happened.

While avoiding specifics about their theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest Wednesday in knowing more about the housewife's recollection that she telephoned Riha and carried on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon that Monday, the day when he first failed to show up for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph Smiley, Denver police chief George Seaton or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officials to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it "is entirely out of our jurisdiction."

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70
Edition: Home
Author: Alan Cunningham
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM

Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder housewife is certain she talked to Thomas ha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first led to show up for his history classes at the Univer- y of Colorado.

What is even more remarka- than this, in the opinion of ose who have been trying to down the exact date of ba's disappearance, is the man's insistence that Riha s cheerful, relaxed and inter- ted in chatting about a local litical issue.

The woman, who asks that she t be identified by name, has ld the News she was in the ocess of telephoning a list of ulder citizens last March, eking support for a proposed ection on whether the city ould take over its public utili- es.

While she had been involved the issue for several weeks, e is sure it was on Monday, arch 17, that she attempted to ach a dozen people whose mes began with the letters P" and "R." Among the three four whom she was able to ach that day, she insists, was homas Riha. She says he answered the telephone at his ome at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, leasant and quite interested in e municipal issue, according the Boulder housewife. In ct, she explained, his name as on the list because he had arlier sent in a reader survey ballot" from a Boulder newspaper which related to the issue.

As a result, Riha struck her as more informed on it than most others she had talked to in her telephone inquiries, and she believes the conversation lasted about 10 minutes, making it the longest in which she took part that day.

The date, if the Boulder housewife is correct, is significant, ince Riha reportedly missed a inner party to which he was invited the previous night, and ould not be reached on Saturday, March 15, by a friend who ried to telephone him repeatedly.

Many people interested in the case have speculated that Riha eft Boulder, was kidnaped or died as early as that Friday or Saturday. And the wife of a CU professor who was rumored to have seen Riha on Sunday, the 16th, vigorously dismissed this rumor as untrue when asked about it Tuesday.

But the Boulder housewife who made the series of telephone calls is equally adamant about the date when she talked to Riha. She says she didn't know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist. Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alvie and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported no reply yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70
Edition: Home
Author:
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

Following is typewritten clarification of the handwritten comment of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

"I don't. I still want name of our agt which Todorovich gave to Dr. Smiley. H"

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan S/ DATE: 2-18-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 2/10/70, SAC Werner, Denver, demanded that Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver, identify Bureau Agent who allegedly told a CIA officer that the subject's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that subject, in fact, was alright. Todorovich refused to do so. The Director instructed that we protest to CIA regarding Todorovich's actions.

On 2-17-70, Liaison Agent Papich vigorously protested Todorovich's actions to CIA, charging the Agency with impeding our inquiry. He pointed out that Todorovich's stubborn refusal to divulge the identity of the Bureau Agent involved was unacceptable because we had no information to support the statement attributed to our Agent. As a result of Papich's protest, a CIA official telephoned Todorovich and demanded that he divulge the identity of the Agent. Todorovich refused and stated that he considered this a matter of personal honor and that unless there was reason to believe Bureau operations were being adversely effected, he would not make the identification. CIA officials subsequently advised the Liaison Agent that they had reviewed the entire case and learned that District Attorney McKevitt publicly stated on 2-14-70 that the statement attributed to Dr. Smiley (which allegedly came to him via Todorovich from our Agent) was based on an "honest mistake" and that McKevitt felt this cleared the air and no further clarification was needed.

ACTION:

None. For information.

I don't. I still want answer as to which [illegible] H.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 2-20-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to memorandum dated 2-18-70 from D. J. Brennan to Sullivan. The Director stated that he wants the name of the FBI Agent who had furnished certain information to Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver. The Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, on 2-20-70, repeating the background of this matter and reiterated the protest made earlier by the Bureau and asked that CIA obtain the identity of the FBI Agent.

Helms advised that he considered this a most serious development and fully recognizes the gravity of the situation since it has such a significant bearing on relations between the two agencies and the highly important work of both organizations. He stated that he does not have the identity of the FBI Agent and so far Todorovich has refused to disclose same. Helms advised that he is requesting Todorovich to proceed to Washington, D. C., immediately at which time he will be interviewed in detail by Helms. In the meantime, the CIA Director is requesting his subordinates to prepare for him a complete report covering all information in possession of CIA regarding the subject. He stated that he will communicate with the Bureau immediately after talking to Todorovich. He stated that it was absolutely necessary that he make certain that he has all the relevant facts so that he can accurately respond to the Director and take the proper and necessary administrative action within his own organization.

I shall await results.
H

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 25, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On February 24, 1970, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Richard Helms had instructed him to transmit the following message to the Director.

Pursuant to instructions from Helms, Mike Todorovich, CIA representative in Denver, arrived in Washington, D. C., on February 24, 1970, and Helms initiated his interview. Helms expects to complete the interview including an examination of various CIA records within two days, upon the completion of which he will be transmitting a personal letter to the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "Werner acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. Papich has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. Michael Todorovich. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to Dr. Joseph Smiley, then President of Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, now President of a university in El Paso, Texas, and to the District Attorney of Denver, Mr. James McKevitt. In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. Todorovich to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. Todorovich and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. Todorovich was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. Todorovich maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. Todorovich explained that the Riha/Galya Tannenbaum cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

The purpose of Mr. Todorovich's conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on Dr. Joseph Smiley. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. Todorovich affirms that before going to District Attorney McKevitt he called upon the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Scott Werner, and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. Werner to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Werner acted properly. H

Mr. Todorovich states that Mr. Werner refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. Werner engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. Todorovich. Subsequently, Mr. Todorovich conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding Dr. Smiley and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. Todorovich. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to Dr. Smiley and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. Todorovich, I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. Todorovich.

~~SECRET~~

I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent [illegible] or [illegible] the [illegible] of the information.

~~SECRET~~

While the following is not pertinent to your request, my review of this case suggests the advisability of a re-examination of Riha's disappearance and past activities and, necessarily, the Tannenbaum case. Briefly, since 1958 we have communicated to your Bureau significant information which relates to Riha's involvement with Czech and Soviet intelligence services, when he was behind the Iron Curtain. I attach for your information and convenience copies of pertinent reports regarding this aspect of the case.

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Helms forgets it is a two way street. H

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contacts with CIA in [illegible] similarly [illegible] and. H

Attachments - a/s

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. The January 1970 receipt of information from your Bureau that Mrs. Ruth Ann COOK, Thomas RIHA's mother, had mentioned rumors of her son's work for CIA in letters to the SAC, Denver, caused us to verify the fact RIHA has never been employed or used operationally by this Agency.

2. In 1958 and 1959 you were provided information that RIHA, when transitting Prague en route to Moscow, was contacted by Czech Intelligence and asked to remain in the CSR. Later in 1958 Czech Intelligence introduced RIHA to the KGB in Moscow and our source reported RIHA accepted certain privileges from the KGB while asserting he would not become a spy for the Soviets. Details reported by our source about RIHA's KGB contacts did not emerge during a 1960 FBI interview of RIHA.

3. This indication that RIHA may not have been truthful in 1960, when added to our current knowledge about KGB interest in recruiting American exchange students and RIHA's 1968 trip to the USSR, suggests the circumstances of RIHA's disappearance might be re-evaluated. This Agency is reopening its file on this case in view of the information disclosed in the attachments.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COPY

27 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. The following report concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect the repatriation of Subject, a naturalized American East-West Exchange student, to his country of origin was recently submitted by a source of this office.

2. Source first became acquainted with Subject during the past year at The Russian Research Center, Harvard University. On 10 September 1958 he ran into Subject by chance at the SAS office in Vienna as the two boarded a SAS flight to Copenhagen via Duesseldorf. During the trip Subject disclosed the following to source which has been supplemented from information from our files.

3. RIHA, who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 17 April 1929, is one of the twenty American students selected for the East-West Exchange Program and will be studying in the USSR for the 1958-59 academic year. Files in this Agency indicate that RIHA arrived in the U. S. on 15 July 1947 and became a citizen in 1952.

4. Our source informed us ~~that~~ RIHA had gone to Prague, June of this year, to see his father and other relatives. His father and mother are divorced and according to information in our files, his mother is listed as Mrs. Ruth A. COOK. address: 2023 Etna Street, Berkeley 4, California.

5. RIHA told our source that when he arrived in Prague he was put into a Government hotel for three days before he was allowed to stay with his relatives and friends. During this time, and perhaps later, RIHA was accompanied through the city by a guide whom he described as a "Government Official" name unknown, who attempted to effect Subject's repatriation to Czechoslovakia. RIHA told our source that this man has set up an appointment (date and address unknown) to meet him in Moscow to talk further.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

6. Subject told our source that this "Government Official" did not mention Czech Intelligence or Security Forces as such and that he (RIHA) is not too worried concerning this contact. RIHA apparently feels that it is the price he must pay in order to study in the Soviet Union and once he gets deeply into his studies in Moscow he feels that he can plead that he is too busy with his academic work to have contact with any officials. Our source also stated that RIHA is in some kind of correspondence with the Czech official. We have no description or name for the Czech official.

7. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office, and that our source be fully protected in the event that contact is made with RIHA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/751,690

cc: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~

COPY

21 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CS CI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958 concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect Subject's repatriation while the latter was in Prague in June of 1958 visiting relatives en route to study in Moscow during 1958-59 as an East-West Exchange Student. The following report describes further action taken by the KGB in Moscow to cultivate Subject, and was recently submitted by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. Sometime in December 1958, Subject again met the Czech Official who had tried to have Subject repatriate to the CSR in Prague last summer. According to our source, it was apparently an accidental meeting at a Moscow railroad station as the Czech was returning to Prague. The Czech was delighted to see Subject, and introduced him to a Soviet official. This Soviet identified himself only by a first name and a telephone number, both unknown to our source. The Soviet described his work as being in the American Section of the MVD.

3. This Soviet Official has been cultivating Subject (trying to see him as often as possible, sometimes twice a week) since their introduction in December, by offering such blandishments as trips in a chauffered private limousine into forbidden areas outside Moscow, tickets to any entertainment, access to material from previously inaccessible archives, the use of private country villas and all the "beautiful, interesting and intelligent girls" he might want. Subject has further been promised the opportunity of returning to the Soviet Union for as long as he wants at any future date. He would have to pay only his way over there; his expenses and return trip to the US would be paid by the Soviets.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

4. Subject has taken advantage of this offer to take several trips for sightseeing into forbidden areas around Moscow in a private car with the Soviet Official, and has also taken up a few offers for entertainment. Subject visited one of these villas, but refused the girls on the ground that he wants a woman to like him for himself, and not because she has been told to do so. The Soviet answered that "some of them will really learn to like you for yourself, as well as work for us," but Subject still declined to get involved. However, Subject has recently been taken up by a Soviet girl who had previously tried to seduce another American student and subsequently blurted out that she was put onto the latter American by the MVD, which she has also told Subject. Subject is reported to be responding warmly to her approaches although he has flatly told her he doesn't trust her nor any Russian completely. He claims he enjoys her company but will not have a serious affair with her, and suspects she may be tied up with the other women offered him by the Soviet Official.

5. In his relationship with the Soviet Official, Subject is reportedly aware that he is playing a risky game, and is only utilizing the situation for the comfort and convenience it brings him. He has told the Soviet frankly that he cannot be wom over ideologically. Subject says he feels that the Soviets' interest in him is to cultivate him as a scholar of possible future importance to insure that he will always be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Subject has reportedly told several other American students of his relationship with the Soviet Official in order to cover himself "in case anything happened".

6. This Soviet Official has evinced an interest to Subject in many of the American Exchange students, with the explanation that some would undoubtedly be back in Moscow within two years as Diplomats and that since this is his area of responsibility, he wants to know as much as possible about them. The Soviet indicated that he was quite aware of the pattern of the American Exchange students' trips to the US Embassy and what they do in the university buildings, but is not so sure of their activities around the city. To demonstrate to Subject his knowledge about the American students, the Soviet Official mentioned an affair going on within the American group of which Subject had been unaware. The Soviet's information turned out to be true.

7. Subject was described by a reliable source, who knows him from group social gatherings at Harvard, as mature and socially vivacious with a warm personality. Subject is a clever and humorous conversationalist who likes to be surrounded by people, make new acquaintances, and develop friendships. Subject's patriotic motivation was not known to our source, but the latter felt that Subject was completely "Americanized" in manners and interests. Our source would guess that Subject has courage.

8. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you either before or after his return to the United States.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed:
JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/754,303

COPY

~~SECRET~~

2 June 1959

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CSCI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958, and our CSCI 3/754,303 of 14 April 1959 in which are reported the attempt by Czech Intelligence to induce Subject, a Czech-born naturalized American, to repatriate to Czechoslovakia, and the further cultivation of Subject by the KGB in Moscow where Subject is an Exchange Student during 1958-59. The following report describes further action by the KGB to recruit Subject, and his adamant refusal of any such offer. This latest information was recently received from RIHA by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. During April 1959, the Soviet Official who said he was from the American Section of the MVD (sic) and who had been cultivating Subject, allegedly asked the latter to make complete and regular reports on Michael Martin LUTHER, one of the other American Exchange Students at Moscow University. Subject was asked to spend as much time as possible with LUTHER, and to report where he goes, what he does and with whom he associates. If Subject were to do this reporting, the Soviet Official said he would make available certain material from Archives which Subject has been unable to get permission to use although research in this material is vital to his having a successful year academically in Moscow.

3. Subject alleges he flatly refused this "deal", saying that if he ever got mixed up in such a dirty business, it would be for his own side and not for the Communists. The Soviet Official then told Subject he should engage in such observation and reporting to the Soviets to lose some "naivete" about how the United States is exploiting the Cultural Exchange Program for intelligence purposes. To back up this assertion, the Soviet Official told Subject about a "spy nest where spies deposit things for one another" which he said had recently been uncovered near a university entrance frequented by still another American student, Walter CLEMENS, who, the Soviet implied, was not engaged in academic work only while studying at Moscow University.

~~SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Subject reportedly again adamantly refused to cooperate with the Soviet Official.

4. In paragraph 4 of CSCI 3/754,303, reference was made to a Soviet girl who had become interested in Subject, and whom Subject viewed with suspicion although continuing to see her for her companionship. Her name is Lida (Y)EGOROVA. Subject has now reportedly been alienated by her undependable personality and has pretty well broken up with her. This girl may have left, or soon be leaving, for Prague to join her husband.

5. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[illegible]

James Angleton

CSCI 3/754,373

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to letter from Richard Helms, Director, CIA, dated February 26, 1970.

Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised Helms on February 27, 1970, that (1) the Bureau is discontinuing all contact with the CIA office in Denver and (2) that direct Liaison with CIA at headquarters is being terminated. Helms was further told that henceforth our communication with CIA will be by letter only.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing that all contact with the local CIA office be discontinued.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CODE 3/2/70

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC DENVER

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL CIA OFFICE.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5-5-70

FROM : D. E. Moore DEM/wcu 6-4-70

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 4:35 p.m., today I telephonically contacted ASAC Morley, Denver, and advised him that an article concerning the Riha case had appeared in the Sunday News (New York) 4-3-70. This article was a general rehashing of the Riha case.

I told him that the Bureau desired that SAC Werner contact the District Attorney to determine the developments of his investigation in this case and also determine what conclusions had been reached. Morley said this would be done.

Morley was asked if Denver had information concerning a professor who had gone to El Paso, Texas, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and he advised this probably referred to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President at Colorado University who was there when Riha disappeared. He said that Smiley is now President of the University of Texas, at El Paso, Texas. He said Denver had no information that Dr. Smiley has any current information concerning this matter.

SAC Werner called at 5:30 p.m., today to advise that he had been unable to get in touch with the District Attorney but also was following up on this and would contact the District Attorney today and get in a teletype tonight.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

[illegible]

NR002 DN PLAIN

5:15 PM URGENT 5-5-70 DCM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

REBUTELCAL TODAY.

PURSUANT TO REQUEST IN REBUTELCAL, THIS IS TO ADVISE THE PROFESSOR WHO ALLEGEDLY WENT TO EL PASO OR NEW ORLEANS CONCERNING THOMAS RIHA HAD AND HIS DFISAPPEARANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY DR. JOSEPH SMILEY , FORMER PRESIDENT, COLORADO UNIVERSITY, BOULDER, COLO., WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS IN EL PASO, TEXAS.

DR. SMILEY WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY CIA AND ADVISED BY CIA THAT RIHA WAS ALIVE AND WELL.

AS BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED, CIA ATTEMPTED TO ATTRIBUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE WAS NO FEDERAL VIOLATION OVER WHICH THE BUREAU HAD INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST, NO FBI INVESTIGATION WAS

REC-35

END PAGE ONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

PAGE TWO

CONDUCTED.

DENVER FILES CONTAIN NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA OTHER THAT THAT PREVIOULSY SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU.

DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES MC KEVITT, GENERALLY KNOWN AS MIKE MC KEVITT, ADVISED TODAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA IS AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ALL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MC KEVITT STATES THAT HE FEELS GALYA TANNENBAUM, FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RIHA, MAY HAVE KILLED HIM IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MC KEVITT'S INVESTIGATION INDICATES THERE WAS A VERY BAD FEELING BETWEEN RIHA AND TANNENBAUM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DISAPPEARANCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT TANNENBAUM WAS FORGING CHECKS ON RIHA'S ACCOUNT.

FULL BACKGROUND CONCERNING TANNENBAUM PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED BUREAU UNDER CAPTION "GALYA TANNENBAUM, AKA, IMPERSONATION," BUFILE UNKNOWN, DENVER FILE FOUR SEVEN DASH THREE ONE NINE ZERO.

MC KEVITT SAID INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT TANNENBAUM

END PAGE TWO

WAS PROBABLY A NYMPHOMANIAC AND THAT SHE AND RIHA HAD HAD CONSTANT SEXUAL AFFAIRS AND THAT SHE HELD THIS AS A CLUB OVER HIS HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORGERY OF THESE CHECKS.

IN ANY EVENT MC KEVITT STATES IT IS HIS OPINION THAT RIHA IS DEAD SINCE HIS INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALS RIHA WAS VERY ATTACHED TO HIS FRIENDS AND MC KEVITT FEELS THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS FRIENDS IF HE WERE ALIVE. MC KEVITT ALSO ADVISES THAT INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE INDICATES RIHA WAS VERY ABNORMAL IN HIS SEXUAL DESIRES AND PURSUITS AND THAT THIS WAS HIS GREAT WEAKNESS; THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WOMEN ALONE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THESE INVOLVEMENTS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS DEATH.

IN VIEW OF THE DETAILS AND FACTS SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY INTERVIEW WITH DR. JOSEPH SMILEY IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU.

END

WJM FBI WA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: May 6, 1970

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Pursuant to Director's request Denver District Attorney James "Mike" McKevitt interviewed 5/5/70 as to investigation of Riha, Czechoslovak-born, naturalized, former professor of Russian history at Colorado University, who departed Denver area 3/69 without notifying friends, associates or estranged wife. His disappearance has been glamorized and spiced up in newspaper articles by references to Galya Tannenbaum, his paramour. McKevitt stated investigation at standstill, all leads being exhausted. He feels Tannenbaum may have killed subject since bad feeling developed between them prior to his disappearance due to her forging checks on his account. Further, Tannenbaum probably a nymphomaniac who had constant sexual affairs with Riha and used this as a club over his head to prevent disclosure of forgeries. In McKevitt's opinion Riha is dead since he was close to his friends and if alive would contact them. Investigation indicates Riha abnormal in his sexual desires and could not leave women alone. Possibility exists one of these involvements may have resulted in his death.

Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President, Colorado University, where subject employed, is now President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas. Smiley after subject's disappearance stated subject was alive and well. When challenged by McKevitt to disclose basis for statement he refused and appealed to CIA, his source, for help. Bureau vigorously refuted CIA's claim that Bureau Agent was original source for statement. As result McKevitt publicly announced statement was not true and resulted from "honest mistake." No indication Smiley has any facts to contribute concerning subject's current whereabouts or basis for his disappearance. Since Bureau has conducted no investigation into Riha's disappearance, interview of Smiley could result in impression Bureau entering case. However, if Director so desires, El Paso will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley. Bureau files show subject attended Moscow University 9/58-9/59. Our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958. In 1958-59 CIA advised Czech intelligence attempted to persuade Riha to repatriate and later introduced Riha to Soviet intelligence which attempted his recruitment. After subject's return to US in 1959 no information was developed as to continued interest in him by Soviet intelligence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: THOMAS RIHA
105-78256

ACTION:

If the Director so desires, El Paso will be furnished background information regarding Riha and will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley.

Yes.
H.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/7/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Rememo A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 5/6/70, by which the Director instructed we interview Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas.

At 1:40 p.m., 5/7/70, I telephoned ASAC Jay Cochran, Jr., El Paso, and furnished him background of this matter. I instructed him to have Dr. Smiley contacted immediately, to make it clear that the FBI was not investigating the Riha matter and to inquire of Smiley if he has any new information regarding Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

ASAC Cochran was told to send the results of this interview of Dr. Smiley immediately by teletype to the Bureau. He was also told that in the event Dr. Smiley is out of town or otherwise unavailable for interview, a teletype should be sent immediately to the Bureau advising as to when the interview would be conducted.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
DATE: 5/8/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference memorandum A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/6/70, same caption, by which the Director instructed that Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, be interviewed as to any knowledge he possessed concerning Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

Dr. Smiley was interviewed 5/7/70 and was most cooperative. Smiley stated since leaving the University of Colorado in 6/69 his knowledge of developments in this case has been derived from articles he has read in "The Denver Post." He speculated Riha may have been involved in intelligence work and based this comment on Riha's being a "loner" and having married a Czech girl. He said he had no evidence to support this speculation. He said that he was aware that one Mrs. Tannenbaum, a woman indicted in Colorado for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of Riha. He concluded that he had no further information concerning either Riha's disappearance or his whereabouts.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

FBI

Date: 5/8/70

nsmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, EL PASO

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIJA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
SINO-SATELLITE SECTION

ReButel call to EP, 5/7/70;
EP tel call to Bureau, 5/7/70.

In accordance with the request of the Director, SA FRANCIS J. PRASEK interviewed Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, President of UTEP. Dr. SMILEY was advised that the FBI has no jurisdiction in this matter, nor is it conducting any active investigation regarding RIJA, and that we were simply desirous of being advised of any new information he may have received regarding RIJA's disappearance and/or present whereabouts.

Dr. SMILEY, who was most gracious and pleasant, stated that he left the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, in 6/69, and has since that time followed the investigation of RIJA and his disappearance which is being conducted by the newspaper "The Denver Post".

SMILEY, in 4/69, approximately three weeks after the disappearance of RIJA, contacted RIJA's attorney for the purpose of determining whether the attorney had any information regarding RIJA, since it was necessary for SMILEY to know whether RIJA was alive and whether he intended to return to the University for the fall semester of 1969 to resume teaching in the History Department. SMILEY, who cannot now recall the name of the attorney, was furnished an address for RIJA in Montreal, Canada, and a letter was directed to this address by the History Department seeking information regarding RIJA and his intentions.

②-Bureau (RAM)
1-El Paso

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After leaving Boulder, SMILEY was advised by Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, that a letter was received by the University purportedly written by RIJA in which he stated that he would not be returning to the University. BRIGGS advised SMILEY that in his opinion, the letter was a forgery, since the signature did not compare with that of RIJA.

After the disappearance, SMILEY began receiving a great many inquiries from the news media and he was pressed for a statement regarding his knowledge of RIJA and whether or not he was alive.

THE FOLLOWING WAS FURNISHED BY DR. SMILEY IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE FBI AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION TO ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY SINCE HE WAS BREAKING A CONFIDENCE WITH AN ASSOCIATE IN THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Being hounded by the press for a statement, he contacted a source in the CIA Office at Denver since he, SMILEY, was formerly a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, thinking that perhaps that agency could assist him off the record with any information it might possess. SMILEY was aware that the CIA had interviewed RIJA following a trip by RIJA to the Soviet Union. The CIA source subsequently told Dr. SMILEY to merely advise the press that he had information to the effect that RIJA was "alive and well". This information was subsequently released by Dr. SMILEY to the student press at the University of Colorado, and it appeared in print.

When the Office of the District Attorney in Denver instituted investigation into the disappearance of RIJA, SMILEY was contacted by the DA's Office regarding the source of his statement. Dr. SMILEY again contacted the Denver CIA Office source and was advised that he was to state nothing and that he would be recontacted.

Some days later, the CIA source recontacted him and told him that he would be receiving an inquiry from the Office of the DA in the form of a statement, and that he should agree with the statement even though it "was not quite the truth". SMILEY did not question

these instructions, since he felt that CIA knew what should be done in this type of case. He received a telephone call from the DA's Office and a statement was read to him to the effect that the information which he had received and made public to the effect that RIJA was alive and well was in error. SMILEY told the caller that he agreed with the statement and nothing further came of this.

Dr. SMILEY does not know what part, if any, the CIA has in this case, but since he, SMILEY, is himself a former intelligence agent he did not feel that he had the right to question something which might be of vital importance to his country.

DR. SMILEY REQUESTED THAT NO HINT OR INFERENCE BE GIVEN TO THE CIA WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT HE HAS REVEALED TO THE FBI HIS CONTACTS REGARDING THIS MATTER WITH THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CIA.

He stated that though he has no evidence to substantiate his belief, he cannot get it out of his mind that RIJA may have been a double agent for the Soviets or the Czechoslovaks. He is aware that one Mrs. TANNENBAUM, a woman indicted for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of RIJA. He never knew RIJA to be associated with any such woman, but stated that he was not acquainted with the personal life of RIJA who was somewhat of a "loner".

RIJA, when he joined the staff of the University of Colorado, was single but in 8/68, an individual came to visit RIJA ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a marriage between RIJA and the man's sister. The intended bride was a Czechoslovakian girl who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and this "brother-in-law" was entertained by a member and colleague of RIJA in the History Department. This individual indicated to SMILEY that although the "brother-in-law" supposedly did not speak any English, and had RIJA translate every statement into Czech, it was apparent from the gestures and expressions of the "brother-in-law" that he understood more than he let on. Three weeks after the visit of this man, the woman who became Mrs. RIJA came to Boulder, Colorado, where she and RIJA were married. The marriage resulted in divorce a short time later and the girl reportedly returned to the East Coast from whence she came.

Dr. SMILEY indicated that he has no further information regarding this matter, but that Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, should be in possession of the letter purportedly written from Canada by RIJA, and may be in a position to assist in answering any question the Bureau might have regarding RIJA's association with the University of Colorado, since BRIGGS would have possession of these records. He stated BRIGGS is a trusted confidant of his and Dr. SMILEY's name should be used as an introduction should the Bureau desire any information of BRIGGS.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, which forwarded a memorandum of the same date for your approval and forwarding to the SSC in partial response to its request of April 30, 1975.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of an additional memorandum which completes the response to the Committee's request.

A copy of the memorandum for the SSC is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
LFS:mjg
(9)

Sect 102 released
HSC Sen 94. (8/24/75 ky)
11/16/76.

REC-102

62-116395-263

23 JUN 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AIM/lmf
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 25 1975

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, provided a partial response to this request and advised that it would be necessary to clear Section 102 of the Manual of Instructions with other interested agencies.

Section 102 has now been cleared with the other interested agencies and is available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstein or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:mjg mjs
(8)

NOTE:

Third agency considerations have been resolved by coordination with other appropriate agencies. Section 102 pertains to relations with other agencies.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

LFS

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-11[illegible]-263

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Sections of the Manual of Instructions not Previously Furnished
Section 102 of MOI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6-13-75

Received by: John T. Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC J. T. Elliff
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part 2.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In response to above-cited SSC request, the SSC was advised that designated Sections, with one exception, of FBI Manual of Instructions were available for review at FBI Headquarters. By communication 6/11/75, SSC was advised excluded Section, which involved third agency considerations, is now available for review at FBI Headquarters.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC
EWS
5-TAM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ~~TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY~~ on Intelligence Activities

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a staff member of captioned Committee of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, former Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb lhb
(12)

✓ P. V. [illegible]
[illegible] 509 JB

Hand delivered
by Paul V. Daly
6-12-75 PVD/

edm

REC- 102

62-116395-262

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000

MOR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

PCM

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG, III, BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Armstrong, who was formerly Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. Mr. Armstrong furnished the information following his interview by SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein. The interview took place in Washington, D. C., on June 6, 1975, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. Mr. Armstrong was not put under oath and was not advised of his rights including his right to personal counsel.

Mr. Armstrong advised that the interview covered the following areas:

1. The general activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division, particularly Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning research conducted in the Intelligence Division concerning the possibility of obtaining an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters;

2. The alleged existence of files in former Director Hoover's office;

3. Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning the increase in the number of FBI representatives assigned abroad as Legal Attaches.

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb
(11)

WRW/TL

MOR-16

62-116395-262

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2001 BY SP2ARM/lmf

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

With regard to the effort made to obtain an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters, Mr. Armstrong advised the SSC representative that in May, 1972, one of the principal questions raised by Mr. Gray was concerning the jurisdictional authority of the FBI to conduct intelligence or security investigations. He commented that in May, 1972, a conference was held at Quantico, Virginia, involving a number of Bureau executives and that during this conference the question of jurisdictional authority was discussed. Following the conference, a special team was set up to discuss this subject, including Mr. Armstrong and former Special Agent Thomas Smith of the Intelligence Division. According to Mr. Armstrong, it was felt that it would be appropriate to develop a new set of guidelines and not to rely on prior statutes and Presidential orders. Armstrong recalled that after several meetings of this group, Thomas Smith prepared a document consisting of 43 pages which was completed approximately six weeks after the group was created. Armstrong recalled that the document was received in the Acting Director's office and was discussed at one of the regular afternoon staff conferences. At that time it was agreed that the document was good but that the timing was not thought to be appropriate. The thought was expressed that it would be held in abeyance until after the coming elections. It was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the matter might have been discussed between Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Gray, and it was decided not to push the matter until after the elections. Mr. Armstrong recalled advising Mr. Smith of the location of the document and the fact that it was being held in abeyance until after the elections.

The matter of the above document did not come up again until shortly before the confirmation hearings concerning Mr. Gray. At that time it was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the Bureau should not push for the Executive Order until after a

permanent Director of the Bureau had been confirmed. Mr. Armstrong advised that to the best of his knowledge the document was not given to the Department of Justice while Mr. Gray and his staff were in the Bureau.

Concerning files that were allegedly maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Armstrong stated that shortly after Mr. Gray's arrival in the Bureau he made a statement to the effect that there were no secret files maintained by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Armstrong commented that he doubted the wisdom of making such a broad statement.

Shortly after Mr. Gray's statement was made, information came to Mr. Armstrong's attention which caused him to prepare a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating the possibility of the existence of files in Mr. Hoover's office. Armstrong could not recall Mr. Gray's response to his memorandum but he believed that the original of the memorandum was returned to him and that he placed the original and the carbon in his desk along with other memoranda that he had prepared for Mr. Gray.

Mr. Armstrong stated that it was his theory that the files in Mr. Hoover's office were in two categories; the first being files containing information possibly detrimental to prominent persons in the Government and the other category being tidbits of information received in personal correspondence from various Special Agents in Charge concerning persons of possible interest to Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Armstrong advised further that at one of his daily conferences, Mr. Gray mentioned that he had talked to former Acting Associate Director Mark Felt concerning files which may have been maintained in Mr. Hoover's office and which he said were then in a safe in the custody of Mr. Felt.

Mr. Armstrong could not recall whether Mr. Gray and Mr. Felt were to go through the safe together or whether Mr. Felt was to do it alone and advise Mr. Gray of his findings.

With regard to the present location of such files, Mr. Armstrong had no specific knowledge but speculated that if they existed they might have been destroyed before Mr. Gray arrived in the office, they might have been retained in Mr. Felt's safe or they might have been removed to the custody of Mr. Clyde Tolson or Miss Helen Gandy at Mr. Hoover's house.

Mr. Armstrong advised that on April 27, 1973, prior to his departure from the Bureau, he destroyed all of the memoranda he had retained in his desk and he is certain that among them was his memorandum concerning files in Mr. Hoover's office.

With regard to the increase in the number of Legal Attaches, Armstrong advised that he recalled that shortly before Mr. Gray came to the Bureau there had been an expansion in the number of Legal Attaches. He understood that traditionally the role of the Legal Attache had been to function as a liaison representative to foreign police agencies but that with the expansion in the number of Legal Attaches they were given additional responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, exactly to what extent he did not recall. He recalled that the expansion was at the initiation of the White House and may have been because the White House was not satisfied with the intelligence collected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Armstrong stated that he saw a potential for friction with CIA and speculated that this might have been a factor in the breach of liaison between the FBI and CIA. He recalled writing a memorandum for Mr. Gray expressing doubts as to whether the training of Special Agents of the FBI equipped them for the collection of foreign intelligence and some subsequent discussion that

perhaps the Legal Attaches should be brought home for such training, but that this idea was concluded to be impractical or unnecessary.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

To the Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting interview of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, formerly Special Assistant to FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, by SSC Staff Member.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Authorities for FBI's security investigations

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interview included following topics: general activities of FBI's Intelligence Division, including FBI's authorities in security investigations; files maintained in former FBI Director Hoover's office, and increase in number of FBI representatives abroad as Legal Attaches.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/lml
MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

WDC

5-8

SFP:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 CFS

3791 (6-75)

276-10483

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.

The Attorney General

June 12, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter, and appendices thereto, from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are an original of a memorandum and enclosures which are responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 6

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-260

RDS:lek|ek
(10)

REC- 102

17 JUN 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

3

WRW

PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

JUN 25 1975 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to the SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, Item 10, the SSC requested all records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D. C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D. C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August, 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

In respect to 10a, on 12/9/64 a travel voucher was processed for payment to former Special Agent Lish Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. Accompanying the voucher was

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RDS:lek lek
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 by Whitson to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air travel from Washington, D. C., to Miami and return. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Whitson in connection with the aforementioned travel.

In respect to 10b, former Special Agents DeLoach, Adcock, Manning (correct name Donald Hanning), Linebaugh (correct name Harold Leinbaugh), and Special Agent Todd submitted travel vouchers for August, 1964. However, no GTRs were issued by them.

In regard to 10c, William C. Sullivan was the issuing officer of a GTR made out to Southern Railroad for travel from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta and return in the amount of $74.55. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Sullivan in connection with the aforementioned travel. Sullivan submitted a voucher for 11/28-30/64 in the amount of $37.10.

No other records are available concerning the travel and expenses of the individuals mentioned in 10a, 10b and 10c.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The data regarding the GTRs and the travel of the individuals mentioned in the memorandum was obtained from the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. In connection with 10a, 10b, and 10c, all expense vouchers of the individuals mentioned in these items have been destroyed under the Five-Year Retention Document Schedule Rule.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/JMF

MDR-16

62-116395-260

ENCLOSURE

The United States of America
Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

A3,925,554

Void after ________ 19

BILL TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

The National Airlines Company is requested

to furnish coach class air transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC

to Miami, Florida + Return

for use of Lish Whitson ________ and ________ others with ________ accommodations

from ________ to ________ with authorization

to transport not over ________ lbs. of excess baggage from ________

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE OR TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

PLACE OF ISSUE Washington DC Nov 21, [illegible]

I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)

0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT	TOTAL
107.40		107.40

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a

Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
May 1, 1935, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.
2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.
3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10482

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
Nov. 1945, General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

PASSED
VO 149/a
DEC 16 1964

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.

2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.

3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10182

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/14/2000 BY SP2 avm/lmf

MDR-16

62-116395-260

BILL TO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A 3,991,399

The United States of America
Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

The Seaboard Railroad Company is requested to furnish first class rail transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC to Atlanta Ga & return via Southern RR

for use of William C. Sullivan and ... others with ... accommodations

from ... to ...

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

Place of issue: Washington DC 11-25-64

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

48.95	25.60	74.55
		TOTAL

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

0500
21-60

-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/12/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard F. Taylor Jr. Date: 16 Jun 75 2 PM

Received by: Sherry Powell

Title: Asst Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM

mor-16

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/12/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 10.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

SURVEILLANCE

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

SSC was furnished with information and documents relating to travel on the part of Bureau personnel in connection with SSC inquiry into this Bureau's use of electronic surveillances.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAT
MDR-16

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General with a letterhead memorandum attached enclosing a copy of a memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups." It appears that we are proposing to give the copy of the Gale memorandum to the Senate Select Committee in response to their request by letter dated May 14, 1975, for a memorandum prepared by Gale relative to the subject matter of the 1964 memorandum.

My reading of the memorandum revealed that it is a purely deliberative document which quotes personal views of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Gale. I am concerned that the release of such a memorandum containing not only the personal views of Bureau officials, but also identifying them by name could have an impact on individuals in the future who may be asked to furnish their opinions concerning policy matters in the FBI. As indicated by the Attorney General in his speech in New York, it is essential that the Executive Branch have a degree of privacy concerning policy discussions and expressions of personal views by officials in order for the Executive to function properly.

I do recognize that we may not be able to resist giving the Committee access to material documents that bear on particular issues under investigation, however, I do recommend that when we are required to produce deliberative documents, the names and other identifying data relating to individuals furnishing views be deleted.

Enc.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

REC-102 62-116395-259

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DATE 10/14/2000 BY SP2 ALM/mfc
MDR-16

JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

[redacted]

84 JUN 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the names of individuals described in the body of the memorandum of July 30, 1964, and other identifying data be deleted prior to furnishing the copy to the Committee.

2. In regard to future responses to requests for documents of a deliberative nature that our policy be that names and identifying data will be deleted prior to disclosure of the documents.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Former Special Agent Richard H. Davis of the Atlanta Office telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 6-4-75 at which time he explained that he had been contacted by Michael Epstein of captioned Committee at which time Epstein requested that Davis make himself available for interview in either Atlanta, Georgia, or travel to Washington, D. C. Davis informed Epstein that he would have to obtain Bureau approval prior to submitting to interview inasmuch as he had to obtain a release from his employment secrecy agreement.

Mr. Davis informed SA Daly that he was reluctant to agree to being interviewed by captioned Committee concerning his activities as an Agent. It was pointed out to Mr. Davis that the decision as to whether to agree to interview was his, but he was advised that captioned Committee has subpoena power and might attempt to force him to furnish information through the use of a subpoena. He was informed that the Bureau was cooperating with captioned Committee and their inquiry into FBI operations.

It was explained to Mr. Davis that if he desired to allow himself to be interviewed, the Bureau would make available an employee at his request to be available but not present during interview. He was also advised that this Agent would not represent him as private counsel. Mr. Davis was advised that the Bureau's concern was not of matters of historical fact but rather testimony might be required which could impair the Bureau's efforts to discharge its responsibilities. It was also explained that the Bureau representative would assist him in making determination whether his response to a particular question would identify confidential informants, impair ongoing investigations, divulge information derived from other Government agencies or foreign sources or expose sensitive investigative techniques and, therefore, a response should not be given.

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

REC-102

62-116395-258

5-Phillips

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Personnel file, Richard H. Davis
1 - Mr. ~~W. O. Cregar~~
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

JUN 25 1975

PVD:dkg (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 [illegible] 5 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Adams Memorandum
Re: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Davis indicated that he desired a Bureau representative be made available during his interview and would request the interview take place in Atlanta, Georgia. Additionally, he stated Epstein had indicated that the topic of discussion in the interview would be the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Mr. Davis stated he would recontact FBI Headquarters as soon as a date and place of interview had been determined. He indicated he would set the date for interview so that the Bureau would have ample opportunity to have an Agent available. We have separately requested Bureau approval for the release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

granted per 5x8 note on 6/4/75 tel.

ACTION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an Agent for the interview of Mr. Davis when and if a date and place are agreed upon.

PVD JBH/pvs

WRW

JBA/PLM

Wannall has designated SA Phillips per R/S 6/9/75

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Associate Director

__________, 1975

Senstudy '75

___ Director
___ ~~Mr. Callahan~~
___ Mr. Jenkins
___ Mr. Adams
___ Mr. Feeney
___ Mr. Ash
___ Mr. Bassett
___ Mr. Cleveland
___ Mr. Cochran
___ Mr. Decker
___ Mr. Gallagher
___ Mr. Gebhardt
___ Mr. McDermott
___ Mr. Mintz
___ Mr. Mooney
___ Mr. Moore
___ Mr. Walsh
___ Mr. Wannall

___ Mr. Mack
___ Mr. O'Connell

___ Miss Tietgen
___ Mrs. Mutter
___ Miss Downing
___ Miss Southers
___ Mrs. Haines

___ M __________

Room __________

___ Mrs. Metcalf
___ Telephone Room

___ Corres. Review
___ Mail Room
___ Teletype
___ Personnel Records
___ Mechanical Section

___ For Appropriate Action
___ For Your Approval
___ Initial and Return
___ Please Call Me
___ For Information
___ Per Conversation

Do we have any amplification of this instruction? Or, do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation
K

Item #6 (tabbed) re "items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities" Should create Congressional furor.

Paul L. Mack M
Room 7004, Ext. 5606

REC-102

62-116395-257

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 AUM/
MOR-16

84 JUN 26 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/18/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Reference is made to Bureau letter to The Attorney General 6/20/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)," forwarding letterhead memorandum for approval and forwarding to SSC.

The Director asked if we have any amplification of this instruction (to submit items with unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities for dissemination to the President under the INLET Program) or do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation?

There has been no amplification of this instruction, nor any submission under INLET of an item on prominent personalities that would show the interpretation of this point.

With respect to the observation that this matter should cause a congressional furor, it is noted that INLET has already been afforded considerable publicity, beginning in February, 1973, after an office memorandum on the subject reached the news media. This publicity is why the Senate Committee asked for documents on INLET. The White House and Senator Bob Packwood inquired about the Program. A detailed defense of INLET appeared in the Congressional Record.

By way of background, the INLET instruction that has received the most publicity--items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities--was recalled by the author of the INLET Program initiating letter as having been specifically dictated by then Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan.

TEB:lek
(8)

REC-102

62-116395-256

CONTINUED - OVER

5-Ext

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/CNF
MDR-16

17 JUN 24 1975

84 JUN 25 1975

While we cannot say exactly what former Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan had in mind when he added the instruction about items with an unusual twist, we can speculate with a hypothetical example.

If we learned that a trusted assistant to an important government official--an official who had taken a "hard line" with respect to dealings with the Soviet Union, for example--was under development by Soviet intelligence, this would be an unusual twist to an item of intelligence interest to the President involving a prominent person.

In such a hypothetical case, we would, of course, advise the government official involved, and The Attorney General and the President. We would have done this under INLET and we would still disseminate this type of data. INLET was only a vehicle for special dissemination.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

1.0

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

John Elliff of captioned Committee's task force on Domestic Intelligence Activities advised on 6-9-75, that the Committee is planning to have a Bureau representative testify concerning the FBI's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic and counterintelligence areas in late June or early July. Mr. Elliff stated that this testimony would be before the Senators and will be a general exploration of jurisdictional authority. Mr. Elliff also volunteered that he had told K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination of the Department, that the Committee wanted to be furnished a copy of the T. J. Smith Memorandum dated 7-31-72 concerning FBI's investigative jurisdiction in domestic and counterintelligence matters. Elliff stated that at this point, a summary of such documents would not be an acceptable substitute. Elliff desired such a document be made available to the Committee prior to the aforementioned testimony. With regards to testimony, Elliff indicated that it would not necessarily have to be the Director giving a testimony.

Elliff stated as he finalizes his plans concerning the testimony concerning FBI investigative jurisdiction, he would recontact SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and give more details concerning this matter.

62-116395

REC-59 62-116395-255

ST-101

5 JUN 12 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
    Attn: Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Kelly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC

MAR-14

84 JUN 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Adams, Memo
Re: SENSTUDY 75

With regards to the request concerning the Smith document, we should await K. William O'Connor's request prior to taking any action concerning this matter, and with regards to testimony, we should await further details prior to engaging in the preparation of that testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. W.R.W. ✓ HEM.
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 19 1975
TELETYPE

~~REC-102~~

NR 026 LA PLAIN

10:14PM NITEL 6-18-75 RLD

TO DIRECTOR (62-1~~16464)~~

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-1700-4124)

ATTN: INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

SENSTUDY 1975.

Mr Cregar
4123 JEH

RE BUTEL TO LOS ANGELES, JUNE 17, 1975.

THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY INSTANCE THAT WAS ALLUDED TO IN CAPTIONED AIRTEL AND THERE ISNO RECORD OF ANY AGENTS BY THE NAME OF RON MASCAR OR WILLIAM MILLER ASSIGNED TO THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION SINCE 1956 TO PRESENT.

END

HOLD

REC-102

62-116395-254

12 JUN 24 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MF
MDR-16

FIVE

84 JUN 24 1975

Black Panther Party



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

MARCH 1971

"WE ARE FROM 25 TO 30 MILLION STRONG, AND WE ARE ARMED. AND WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OUR SITUATION. AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO CHANGE IT. AND WE ARE UNAFRAID."



WARNING TO AMERICA

[illegible]

Table of Contents

I. FOUNDING 1
II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES 3
III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY 6
    Invasion of California State Legislature 6
    Police Officer Meets Panthers – and Death 6
    "Free Huey" Campaign 6
    Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver 7
    International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver 7
    Rise of the Black Panther Party 8
IV. LEADERSHIP 9
    National Committee to Combat Fascism 10
    International Section 10
V. FUNDS 12
VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS 13
VII. TACTICS 15
    Target: Police 15
    Attacks on Others 15
    Weapons Caches 16
    "Revolutionary Suicide" 16
    Panther "Justice" 18
VIII. PROPAGANDA 20
    Editorials 21
    Inflammatory Articles 24
    Provocative Slogans 29
    "Revolutionary Art" 30
    International News 35

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE FBI AS A BRIEF STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND, TACTICS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE ORGANIZATION'S OWN PUBLICATIONS WERE THE SOURCE FOR MOST OF THE MATERIAL REPRODUCED.


LET US HOLD HIGH THE BANNER OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNALISM
AND THE INVINCIBLE THOUGHTS OF
HUEY P. NEWTON
MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE.

I. FOUNDING

The Black Panther Party, with headquarters in Oakland, California, was founded in 1966 by two Oakland Negroes – Huey Percy Newton and Bobby George Seale – both at that time at Merritt College in Oakland. The name and symbol of the new party were taken from the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, an Alabama political party known informally in 1965 as the Black Panther Party.

From the writings of communists, revolutionaries, and black militants, Newton and Seale allegedly selected ideas around which they could build a revolutionary frame that suited the needs of their party. Influential writings included those of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader; Frantz Fanon , West Indian psychiatrist who advocated violence for Algerian nationalists; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one-time lieutenant of Cuba's Fidel Castro and a principal architect of 20th century guerrilla warfare; Malcolm X, American black nationalist who advocated violence to obtain Negro "freedom"; and W. E. B. DuBois, Negro educator who became a member of the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93.



HUEY PERCY NEWTON

The organization was at first called the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense; however, the "Self-Defense" was removed in 1968 in an effort to project a more politically oriented image to prospective sympathizers and supporters.



BOBBY GEORGE SEALE

As head of the new Black Panther Party, Newton assumed the title Minister of Defense, and Seale was named Chairman. When questioned about the membership of their organization, Newton and Seale gave the since oft-repeated reply: "Those who know don't say. Those who say don't know." The militancy of the group, however, had an immediate appeal to the discontented, restless youth of Oakland's ghettos.


HUEY NEWTON
BOBBY SEALE

Black Panther Party Chairman, Bobby Seale, and Minister of Defense, Huey Newton, selling Red Chinese magazine and "quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung."

3-2-67 San Francisco, Calif.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES

The Black Panther Party "Platform and Program" is repeated in each issue of the official Party publication, The Black Panther.

October 1966
Black Panther Party Platform and Program

What We Want What We Believe

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. **That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.** Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. **But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.**

III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Proclaiming a legal right to bear arms, the Panthers by early 1967 had begun to appear in public wearing black leather jackets and black berets, openly carrying shotguns, rifles, or pistols, and shouldering bandoliers of ammunition.

Calling the police "pigs," the Panthers began a buildup in Negro areas of the idea that police departments, especially that in Oakland, were dedicated to the brutalization and harassment of minority groups, and, acting as an appendage of white government authority, were working toward the eventual annihilation (genocide) of the Negro race.

Invasion of California State Legislature

The first incident that brought national attention to this group occurred on May 2, 1967, as the California Legislature was in session in Sacramento. Approximately 40 members of the Black Panther Party, carrying loaded rifles, pistols, and shotguns, and some wearing bandoliers of ammunition about their waists or draped over their shoulders, burst into the Chamber. They were protesting a bill being introduced on that date outlawing the carrying of loaded weapons in public and were proclaiming their right to bear arms and criticize the police. Before they were arrested, they passed out mimeographed leaflets calling on all Negroes to end the "terrorist" oppression of colored races by white America and referring to the preparation of concentration camps in the United States as a beginning of genocide.

Police Officer Meets Panthers--and Death

The Panthers became more militant with the passing of time. At 5:00 a.m., October 28, 1967, two Oakland, California, patrol officers, John F. Frey and Herbert C. Heanes, made a routine traffic violation car stop. While the officers were awaiting the results of the car registration check by radio, the driver, Huey Newton, got out of the car. Suddenly, shooting broke out. Officer Frey was killed; Officer Heanes was wounded critically; and Newton received a stomach wound. He stopped a passing automobile and had the driver take him to a hospital where he was taken into custody and hospitalized. After a state trial, which began July 15, 1968, Newton was sentenced on September 27, 1968, to serve from 2 to 15 years on a charge of voluntary manslaughter.*

"Free Huey" Campaign

Two days after Patrolman Frey's death, the Huey Newton Defense Fund was established at a meeting of a section of the Negro community of Oakland.

The cry of "Free Huey" became a clarion call. The imprisoned Newton was built up in the public eye as "black and bold in defense of his people." Each

---

**It was ruled later that the presiding judge in this trial erred in instructions to the jury. Newton was released August 5, 1970, and scheduled for retrial.*

bringing its own axe to grind, such organizations as the anarchist New Left group named Students for a Democratic Society; the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Communist Chinese-oriented Progressive Labor Party; the Communist Party, USA, and its youth affiliate, the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America; and militant campus groups, black and white, began to gather in support of the Panthers, who were willing not only to defy the establishment, but to destroy it.

LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver

Early in 1967, the Panthers were joined by a recent parolee from the California prison system, author of a best-selling autobiography, *Soul On Ice*, staff writer for the magazine *Ramparts*, and admitted Marxist – Leroy Eldridge Cleaver.

In *Soul On Ice*, Cleaver wrote: "I sought out his (Marx's) books...It was like taking medicine for me to find that, indeed, American Capitalism deserved all the hatred and contempt that I felt for it in my heart...."

After Newton was jailed, although he remained the undisputed leader, it soon became apparent that Cleaver, designated Minister of Information, was projecting a major leadership image. The Party began to further widen its publicity, nationally and internationally, and enlarge its radical support and revolutionary intent.

As an example of this spreading influence of the Panther Party, the 1968 National Election ticket of the Peace and Freedom Party, a coalition of radical groups, included Cleaver as candidate for the Presidential nomination; Newton as candidate for the 7th Congressional District of Alameda County, California; Kathleen Cleaver, 18th Assembly District, California State Legislature; Bobby Seale, 17th Assembly District, California State Legislature. Cleaver received a national total of almost 200,000 votes. Only a small percentage of the California electorate cast their votes for Newton, Seale, and Kathleen Cleaver.

On the evening of April 6, 1968, Cleaver and several Panthers became involved in a shoot-out with Oakland police officers. The incident resulted in the death of a Panther, the wounding of two police officers, and the wounding and arrest of Cleaver. Cleaver's parole was revoked immediately and he was returned to prison. After much publicity, he was later released on bail by a Superior Court Judge who ruled that the jeopardy of his parole status stemmed "from his undue eloquence in pursuing political goals...offensive to many of his contemporaries." This decision was overruled by the District Court of Appeals and upheld by the California Court of Appeals. Cleaver was ordered to return to prison by November 27, 1968. Electing to become a Federal fugitive, he disappeared in late November, 1968, going first to Havana, Cuba, and later to Algiers, where he has established residence.

International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver

Soon after Cleaver's arrest in the spring of 1968, approximately 150 prominent individuals sponsored the establishment of an International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. The committee intended to dispatch a team to Europe to gain

international support and arrange for a European edition of Cleaver's book, *Soul On Ice*.

Rise of the Black Panther Party

In May, 1968, the hard-core membership of the Black Panther Party was estimated at only 125, and Panther activity was confined largely to the San Francisco-Oakland, California, area. However, because of the dramatic shoot-outs, the "Free Huey" Campaign, the funds established for the defense of both Newton and Cleaver, the widespread publicity, and the support given readily by white radical groups and individual sympathizers, the Black Panther Party began to grow rapidly, not only in membership but in militancy and influence. Chapters began to appear in major cities throughout the country. By the end of 1968, the membership had reached nearly 2,000, with additional thousands of sympathizers and supporters.



PAGE [illegible] THE BLACK PANTHER SEPTEMBER [illegible], [illegible]

1968: BALLOT OR THE BULLET

KATHLEEN CLEAVER,
COMMUNICATION SECT.,
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

18th ASSEMBLY DISTRICT
S.F. PEACE & FREEDOM PARTY

SHOOT YOUR SHOT

IV. LEADERSHIP

Organizationally, the Black Panther Party is set up to be under a Central Committee composed of the following positions:

- Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander, held by Huey Newton
- Chairman, held by Bobby George Seale
- Minister of Information, formerly held by Leroy Eldridge Cleaver
- Chief of Staff, held by David Hilliard
- Minister of Education, held by Raymond (Masai) Hewitt
- Communications Secretary, formerly held by Cleaver's wife, Kathleen
- Minister of Culture, held by Emory Douglas
- Field Marshal, formerly held by Donald Lee Cox

The position of Assistant Chief of Staff, not included among the Central Committee, is occupied by Roosevelt (June) Hilliard.

Under the Central Committee, the chain of command extends to leaders and officers of local chapters.

DAVID HILLIARD

RAYMOND (MASAI) HEWITT

KATHLEEN CLEAVER

EMORY DOUGLAS

DONALD LEE COX

National Committee to Combat Fascism

Set up to coexist with Black Panther Party branches in various cities in the United States are chapters of another organization called National Committee to Combat Fascism. In actuality, there is little difference between the two. This group, a Panther Party front, was set up as the result of a revolutionary conference, called National Conference for a United Front Against Fascism, held in Oakland, California, in July, 1969. The conference, sponsored by the Black Panther Party and assisted by the anarchist Students for a Democratic Society and the Communist Party, USA, was called to form a coalition of black and white radicals, described as "oppressed people."

The National Committee to Combat Fascism is considered by Party leaders to be the "political organizing bureau" of the Black Panther Party. Its specific task allegedly is to raise the political level of the people and educate them against the system.

International Section

On September 13, 1970, the International Section of the Black Panther Party officially opened in Algiers. Joining Cleaver on the staff were his wife, Kathleen, and Field Marshal Donald Lee Cox, a fugitive from justice. Cox faces charges of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, based on a warrant issued on April 20, 1970, at Baltimore, Maryland. He also failed to appear on May 14, 1970, in San Francisco, to answer Federal firearms charges.

This section, in its entirety, was expelled from the Black Panther Party by Huey Newton on February 27, 1971. The expulsion resulted from tensions and differences between Party hierarchy which led to disruptive factionalism.

D.C. greeting African brothers



Chinese 2nd Ambassador (R), Press Attaché (M) and Cultural Attaché (L) talking with Eldridge

Opening attended by cross section of Liberation Movements

Scenes from opening of International Section, The Black Panther, October 31, 1970

V. FUNDS

The money by which the Black Panther Party operates comes from a number of sources. There are substantial private contributions; fees for public appearances, such as campus speeches, radio, and television appearances; payments for magazine articles; collections for trials and bail funds in this country and abroad; subscriptions and individual sales of the Party's official organ, *The Black Panther;* fund-raising activities sponsored by sympathizers and supporters; sales of recordings of interviews and speeches; and financial aid from radicals and extremists.

According to the press, there is reason to believe that the Panthers, to obtain additional funds, are engaging in criminal activities, such as burglaries and robberies.

VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS

Panther Party leaders insist their primary aim is to serve the "people," meaning ghetto blacks. To establish good intent, Party officials have set up a series of community services aimed at recruiting members and sympathizers and building Party influence in ghetto areas. These programs, described by the Panthers as "socialistic" programs, are supposed to be carried out by all Party branches and include: "liberation schools" to give "our people a knowledge of self"; free health clinics, with money, medical supplies and professional services donated by laymen and professionals in the community; free clothing programs, with clothing donated by the community; Community Information Centers, to "answer the basic needs of the people"; and a monthly free shuttle bus service for families of blacks in prison. Few of these programs actually are carried out, and those that have been attempted have been mostly unsuccessful.

The program that has received the most publicity is the "breakfast program," devised as a further means of indoctrinating Negro youth in Panther teachings of racism and rebellion. As expressed in *The Black Panther*, June 14, 1969, "The youth we are feeding will surely feed the revolution." Breakfasts are held for ghetto children either at churches, housing projects, Panther Community Information Centers, or other space that can be obtained free of charge. Panthers usually ask local businessmen to donate food or money to this program, boycotting stores that refuse to participate. At these functions, children have been known to sing such chants as: "I am a revolutionary. I am a revolutionary. There's going to be some barbecue if Huey's not set free. Power to the people."

In 1969, Panther "Coloring Books" were printed and given out at these breakfasts. The books contained 22 pages of drawings teaching the children to distrust, hate, and kill police officers.


I am a Revolutionary
PEOPLE'S FREE SHOES PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE CLOTHING PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE FOOD PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE BUSING PROGRAM
EMORY

SURVIVAL PENDING REVOLUTION

HUEY TOLD ME THAT THE PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING REVOLUTION. BUT WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE REVOLUTION, HUEY SAYS, "WE THE PEOPLE ARE THREATENED WITH GENOCIDE, BECAUSE RACISM AND FASCISM ARE RAMPANT, NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD." HE SAYS, "WE INTEND TO CHANGE ALL THAT. BUT IN ORDER TO CHANGE IT, THERE MUST BE TOTAL TRANSFORMATION. BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THAT TOTAL TRANSFORMATION, WE MUST EXIST. IN ORDER TO EXIST, WE MUST SURVIVE; SO THEREFORE WE NEED A SURVIVAL KIT." SO THAT WE CAN GROW UP HEALTHY WITH A MIND THAT CAN BE FUNCTIONAL AND CREATIVE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
YOUR COMRADE IN ARMS

VII. TACTICS

The Black Panther Party is a violent revolutionary group whose members provoke confrontations with law enforcement officers and whose leaders incite racial hatred and preach urban guerrilla warfare.

Target: Police

Panthers claim that black communities are occupied by the police in the same way and for the same purpose that foreign troops occupy conquered territory and that these forces, operating under "establishment" orders, are engaged in gradual annihilation of the black race. Blacks, according to the Panthers, must, through urban guerrilla warfare, use guns to liberate themselves from the ever-present repressive enemy. Children in Panther "schools" do their exercises to the rhythm of: "There is a pig upon the hill – if you don't kill him the Panthers will."

Numerous claims have been made that the Black Panther Party is an innocent victim of police persecution and genocide. This charge is rendered absurd by fact. During 1970, 6 police officers were killed and 22 wounded through acts of violence traced to the Panthers. One officer, in 1969, was killed by a Panther with a shotgun blast at point-blank range as the officer lay wounded and helpless on the ground.

Out of 20 members named by the Panther Party as "killed in cold blood" by the police, four were killed by members of a rival black extremist group on the west coast; one died of barbiturate intoxication; one was shot and killed by a store owner during a robbery attempt; one was killed by his wife over a love affair he was having with a female Black Panther; and another was allegedly tortured and killed by Panther Party members. Of the remaining twelve, two were found dead on the street, the victims of unknown assailants, and ten were involved in shoot-outs with police officers.

Attacks on Others

Panther attacks have not been limited to the police. While claiming their intent to protect the black community, Panthers have assaulted and threatened citizens who have tried to assist the police.

Neighborhood stores have been forced to "contribute" food supplies and money under fear of Panther violence. Many other persons have also been victimized, as shown by the fact that in 1969 alone 348 Panther members were arrested for serious crimes, including murder, armed robbery, rape, bank robbery, and burglary.

On April 21, 1969, 21 members of the Black Panther Party were charged in New York in a 30-count indictment with conspiring to bomb public places and murder policemen and with possessing dangerous weapons.

Weapons Caches

Stockpiles of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, thousands of rounds of ammunition, Molotov cocktails, gunpowder, and accumulations of bayonets, swords, and machetes have been confiscated from Panther offices.

''Revolutionary Suicide''

On August 7, 1970, Superior Court Judge Harold Haley, the Deputy District Attorney, and three other persons were tied together with piano wire and dragged from a San Rafael, California, courtroom and taken as hostages by three armed Negro convicts, one of whom was standing trial for stabbing a San Quentin prison guard. The escapees were assisted by the defendant's 17-year-old brother who supplied them with weapons for the escapade. Judge Haley, who had a sawed-off shotgun taped to his neck, and the other hostages were forced into a waiting van. When the authorities tried to stop the kidnappers, the judge was brutally murdered; the Deputy District Attorney was injured seriously; and another hostage was slightly wounded. Three Negroes were slain and one was wounded.

Immediately thereafter, Huey Newton declared the killing of Judge Haley as being of ''historical'' importance to the Black Panther Party. This declaration was based on the Panther belief that all black prisoners, regardless of their crimes, are political prisoners and should be released.



OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT CRUISER INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6, 1968, GUNBATTLE WITH MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

CONFISCATED PANTHER WEAPONS

The perpetrators of the courtroom incident were lauded by the Panthers as setting another "revolutionary example for black people." In commenting further, *The Black Panther* of August 15, 1970, stated:

> *"The example that these brothers have set will be followed by many and many will rise to choose revolutionary suicide rather than reactionary suicide. Black people will unleash in great numbers the Black kamakazi..."*

In his eulogy at services for the slain Negroes, Newton said: "Our comrades have taught us all a revolutionary lesson. They have intensified the struggle and placed it on a higher level."

Panther "Justice"

Recalcitrant members of the Black Panther Party are sometimes victims of Panther "justice." As one example, Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was brought to trial in New Haven, Connecticut, for the torture-murder of Panther Alex Rackley. Rackley, a Panther suspected of being an informant, was scalded, murdered, and dumped in a swamp.

For a variety of reasons, many members have been purged from the Party. These incidents are usually written up in *The Black Panther* in special articles accompanied by photographs.




WASH ROOM
OLYMPICS

if you're not part of the solution... you're part of the problem.

PANTHER HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JUNE 4, 1969

EXPELLED

So let this be heard throughout the black community, of Atlantic City, New Jersey. That Leonard Weeks is no longer a servant of the people. That he is no longer the breakfast coordinator for this community center, or for that matter no center ran by the Black Panther Party. He has become slip-shod in his duties as a servant to the people, many times he has been warned by his comrades, about his work, and about his duty to the people's children. He deserted the children of the black community, there were days he would not attend the breakfast program, because he said that he was tired or that he overslept. Well we cannot adhear to this because as revolutionaries we must prepare ourselves to be a match for a hundred. We must prepare to run ourselves to death if need be, so that the people shall be served, and to see to it that they truly have a right to the best. And we have no time for slip-shod niggers. We must hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must confirm to the people's interest, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected, that is what being responsible to the people means.

WEEKS, EXPELLED

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Black Panther Party N.C.C.F.
Community Center
Atlantic City,

FOOLS RUSH IN

Harold Wright, number one fool in Pittsburgh, rushed out of here and into Baltimore.

HAROLD WRIGHT, FOOL

The National Committee to Combat Fascism has no time for crazy dumb fools who run around pimping off the people's just struggle for freedom and self-determination This modern day mad man can't seem to find himself or anything else for that matter. He started out, helping to put this office together and after a long train of was put out. Harold didn't like this and started to hang around our office trying to give the community the impression that he was still a member of the revolutionary ranks of Babylon.

After a few days of the breakfast program, his wife Michelle decided that she loved Harold more than the people and went with him.

We say goodbye to the Wright family and other love birds (like the Johnson's) who can't deal for the people.

So let this be heard, Harold and Michelle Wright are not members of the National Committe to Combat Fascism nor will these fools ever be.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
National
Committee to Combat Fascism
574 Brushton Ave.
Pittsburgh, Penn.
(412) 242-4728

The Black Panther,
June 20, 1970, p. 8.

VIII. PROPAGANDA

Although posters, pamphlets, recordings, and a singing group called "The Lumpen" are among propaganda vehicles used by the Black Panther Party, the main channel to the public is through their official organ, *The Black Panther*. Funds permitting, it is published weekly in Oakland, California. It includes editorials by Party leaders and spokesmen; provocative slogans; inflammatory articles; revolutionary art," comprising cartoons; and an international news section.

Excerpts from Article carrying
Typed Signature of Eldridge Cleaver.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1970 PAGE 4

TO MY BLACK BROTHERS IN VIET NAM

I'm writing this on January 4, 1970. We are starting out a new year. On August 31, I'll be 35 years old. I'm married, and I have one child with another one on the way. I am in love with my wife and I would like to enjoy a happy life raising a family. But I am not free to live the type of life that I would like. Pigs--the racist fascist rulers of the United States--won't let me....

We appeal to you Brothers to come to the aid of your people. Either quit the army, now, or start destroying it from the inside. Anything else is a compromise and a form of treason against your own people. Stop killing the Vietnamese people. You need to start killing the racist pigs who are over there with you giving you orders. Kill General Abrahms and his staff, all his officers. Sabotage supplies and equipment, or turn them over to the Vietnamese people. Talk to the other Brothers and wake them up. You should start now weeding out the traitors amongst you. It is better to do it now than to allow them to return home to help the pigs wipe us out. Especially the Uncle Tom officers should be dealt with now, because the pigs will use them as effective tools against our people. When you can no longer take care of business inside the army, then turn yourself over to the Vietnamese people and tell them you want to join the Black Panther Party to fight for the freedom and liberation of your own people. If you do cross over, you don't have to worry about the Vietnamese people abusing you. They will be glad to see you drop out of the army because what they want most in life is to stop the fighting in their land. You have a duty to humanity as well as to your own people not to be used as murderous tools by racist pigs to oppress the people.



"IF YOU WANT PEACE YOU GOT TO FIGHT FOR IT"

There's too many American flags out here, and our Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, says that the American flag and the American eagle are the true symbols of fascism. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE. Black power to Black people, Brown power to Brown people, Red power to Red people, and Yellow power to Ho Chi Minh, and Comrade Kim Il Sung the courageous leader of the 40,000,000 Korean people....

We say down with the American fascist society. Later for Richard Millhouse Nixon, the Later for all the pigs of the power structure. Later for all the people out here that don't want to hear me curse because that's all that I know how to do. That's all that I'm going to do. I'm not going to ever stop cursing, not only are we going to curse, we're going to put into practice some of the that we talk about. Because Richard Nixon is an evil man. This is the that unleashed the counter-insurgent teams upon the BPP. This is the man that's responsible for all the attacks on the Black Panther Party nationally. This is the man that sends his vicious murderous dogs out into the Black community and invade upon our Black Panther Party Breakfast Programs. Destroy food that we have for hungry kids and expect us to accept like that idly. that man. ***We will kill Richard Nixon. We will kill any that stands in the way of our freedom.*** *We ain't here for no goddamned peace, because we know that we can't have no peace because this country was built on war. And if you want peace you got to fight for it.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

Photograph accompanying Article indicated these are the Words of Chief of Staff, David Hilliard.
THE BLACK PANTHER, November 22, 1969, p. 10.

Editorials

Through editorials, readers are advised of Party positions on national and international issues and are presented with the opinions of the hierarchy on inter-Party matters.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1971 PAGE 2

STATEMENT BY HUEY P. NEWTON, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE, ON THE OCCASION OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY- MARCH 5, 1971

Power to the People, Brothers and Sisters,

First of all I would like to thank all of you for my very presence here, because if it weren't for the Power of the People, I wouldn't be here tonight. I'm not here because of the Black Panther Party; I'm not here because of any group, I'm not here because of a group of kamakazis. I'm here because of the Power of the People.

We must remember that Revolution is a process. It's not a conclusion; because once we conclude, then we become counter-revolutionary. And that means even with the gun in our hands, because fascism also has a gun. And I would like to say tonight that the Black Panther Party stands against all forms of fascism, including sexual fascism. That we are against all kinds of chauvinism, including racial chauvinism; we're against sexual chauvinism, national chauvinism. We're intercommunalists. Before I went to prison, most of you know, you are aware, that I never made any speeches, you see, because I'm not a very eloquent man. I'm better known by the actions. And the Party was built upon the actions. And the action itself is a process. And we're not ever fixated. We haven't accepted any dogma. And we will not.

And I would like to say this, that from now on the Party itself will be better known by its contributions to the People, for the simple reason that some people around us seem to want to be known through the Media. But the Party can only judge itself through establishing certain survival programs, pending Revolution. Because remember, you make the Revolution. We can't free political prisoners, only the people can free political prisoners. And a people who are not free cannot free their prisoners, cannot free the prisoners that fascism makes. So I would like to say that we must work very hard in order to lift the consciousness of the people. We must free our Chairman Bobby Seale, Angela Davis, Ruchell Magee, the Soledad Brothers, the seven and the three, and all other political prisoners. Randy. We have to free all of them.

But we must remember that we must exhaust every possible tactic. And we must let it be known that never broadcast military tactics for military reasons. It's perfectly correct to broadcast military tactics for political reasons. That's what Uncle Ho said, and I agree with him. So we would like for the people to know that there are many things that we will not discuss in public. But what you can do is watch the fruits of our work. And we would like to say that our Party became an intercommunal Party upon its actions. And I think that's very good. So I'm asking you in order to free all political prisoners, free the people, free the woman and also the man, that we have to get together in unity by substituting verbal expressions for action. The final test of the pie is the action. We'll stand on the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party from 1966 when it was formed will stand on its record, will stand on the action. We won't claim to be ultra-leftists; we won't claim to be infantile leftists. What we'll do is act in accordance with the particular set of conditions and the particular problem that we have at a time. So please judge us upon our actions and we will develop like that. We will not develop with lip service coming from anyone. And sometimes I'm very thankful that I don't talk too well, because that's only one way of communication. We say that a picture is worth a thousand words, but action is supreme.

But what kind of action you take will depend upon the particular set of conditions. And I say all of this, because you know the Party and the world today is under turmoil. And this is very good. We always have welcomed all forms of contradictions. Because without the contradiction there is no transformation. So from the contradiction that has developed now in the world and in the Party, we hope to have a qualitative leap. If this leap eliminates some of us, then, of course, we'll weep for that. But we must not stop the Revolution. I will not stop the Revolution. You should not stop it. And, for all that it's worth, we know that words will never stop it. Words will not start the Revolution either. Only action. 'Sixty-six kicked off the armed manifestation of Revolution in this country, because it focused upon the need for the People not only to defend themselves, but also to develop a consciousness necessary to perform and to act to be able to fight in a protracted war. And that is why it is necessary for us to develop the correct ideology, which is a system of thinking. And we must not rely upon and conclude with the philosophy, which isn't necessarily a conclusion.

So we're ideologically revolutionists. We're in a constant state of change. And we fight with all people who want to change, because we know change will offer our hope. So after all of this, we must pay more attention to what is happening. The news media has attempted to discredit the Party by saying that it's over, because they don't see anyone. I think our programs are better than the Party. The communities are involved in forty-four cities. We must support these; we must expand them. Because I read an article, recently, a few months ago, where Che had some problems in Bolivia, because the peasants were so unconscious until he could not rally them even with the "focos". They did not understand why the military, the regular military was dropping. So what did he do. He attempted to form certain programs that he called survival programs. He attempted to form a free health program in order to get the peasants inside, to help them, and also to provide things for his focos. He also took to form a free breakfast program, a free shoe factory, and a sporting good store (for obvious reasons). So programs are good. Because an act that might be revolutionary might be counter-revolutionary, if the correct preparations are not made.

So to be a serious revolutionist, we must know that we are involved in a process, and not a set of principles or conclusions that are of face-value revolutionary. I do not know one thing that is revolutionary in itself. And all things might be revolutionary in context. In other words, capitalism was revolutionary when it kicked out feudalism. And now we have a situation where the capitalists have become the imperialists, and the people of the world, of the communities of the world will have to kick them out. So in order to free Angela, Bobby, Ruchell Magee and all other political prisoners, we must kick the fascists out. And we cannot do it with lip service.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

BOBBY SEALE: "I AM THE CHAIRMAN OF ONLY ONE PARTY."

March, 1971

This is Brother Bobby Seale, from the New Haven Courthouse, back in jail, back here. And I just wanted to say to the people, the masses of people, to all the brothers and sisters, Women's Liberation Movement, Black brothers and sisters, Chicano brothers, the Puerto Rican brothers, the young revolutionary White youth in America, and especially, all the Black brothers and sisters in the Black community, that I've seen a lot of things happening; and I've took time to analyse what's happening. And I see presently that there're some divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions going on. Now the Party accepts constructive criticism. Constructive criticism! But the divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions and jive tactics of Eldridge Cleaver is doing nothing but aiding the pig power structure. Aiding the pig power structure in their attempt to put in gas chambers and jails over 130 political prisoners, who are presently, like myself and Ericka, caught up in these jails, and are being railroaded to the gas chamber, where we're fighting for our lives in these trials. And this is the only thing that Eldridge's actions are doing. This is the only thing that I can see that is going on. And my analysis shows this.

There is no split in the Black Panther Party, at all. But the main thing that we want to get across, I want to get across, to the people is that the Party is based on Survival Programs to serve the people, and these survival programs - from Breakfast for Children to the recent programs that I'm designing right here in jail, in my time that I'm not in court, which is a decent housing fit for shelter of human beings program - these are survival programs - and this program and all other programs that all other revolutionary organizations have are survival programs, that must sustain the people so the people can wage a revolutionary struggle.

And Eldridge Cleaver, who's denouncing these types of programs and carrying on with all those other divisionary jive tactics, is negating the real meaning of a People's revolutionary struggle. That's why the Black Panther Party belongs to the people, because the survival programs come forth, and we set up the survival programs to sustain the people's revolutionary struggle. Even the Vietnamese people, if one would check it out, have their survival programs; they have their cooperative, functional survival programs throughout their land, amongst their people. The people just don't have guns alone fighting their battle. The people over there have actual everyday, functional, constructive survival programs. In their countries, in their lands, and in their everyday operations in fighting the capitalist pigs who occupy their country, they have survival programs. And those survival programs sustain the revolutionary struggle there. Of course, our survival programs will be directly related to here in America. But I, myself, send solidarity and support to all the socialistic, revolutionary peoples of the world, and the socialistic countries and lands - and the different war zones, where the people, the masses in those lands, are fighting against the capitalistic, imperialistic ruling class circles.

And Eldridge Cleaver - who negates the very survival programs that the Party is trying to set forth, that the Central Committee is trying to set forth, and all the real dedicated, hard-working brothers in the Party are trying to set forth to educate the people and serve the people, these survival programs (that) sustain the people's

to the gas chambers. He's aiding the power structure and causing us to be in the prisons, because the political prisoners are the ones who really initiate and work hard to maintain the survival programs for the revolution, the people's revolutionary struggle.

Only the masses of the people can really free political prisoners. And the people must see the value and the validity of the survival programs. And getting on down to it, so the people can understand where it's at, so that the people, even the supporters that we have all over Europe, all the solidarity committees that are in Europe, that're in Sweden, that are in Denmark, and other countries over there, who support the freedom of political prisoners in this country, who support the survival programs of the poor oppressed people in this country, and the revolutionary movement (who are initiating these programs), I am trying myself to get people to understand, that we are beautifully behind them and we are glad and send greetings to them and praise the people who are in the solidarity committees in other countries, and in fact here in America, here in AmeriKKK-a. I think that the people really have to understand who and what the Black Panther Party is, so that these reactionary, counter-revolutionary, divisionary tactics will not be misunderstood. The Party is not falling apart. It's just that Eldridge Cleaver has personally defected his own self from the Party. He defected from the Party.

And I, Bobby Seale, am the Chairman of only one Party. And that Party is the Party that Brother Huey P. Newton is the Minister of Defense of and one of the supreme, top servants of the people; that Brother David Hilliard is the Chief of Staff of; that Brother June Hilliard is the Assistant Chief of Staff of; that Bobby Hutton was a member of, before the pigs murdered him. I am the Chairman of only one Party, that Brother Fred Hampton, who loved the survival programs for the people, was Deputy Chairman of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, who Brothers Jonathan Jackson and George Jackson are members of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party, with Huey, David, and the rest of the brothers and sisters on the Central Committee, where the Central Headquarters happens to be located on Peralta Street in Oakland, (California). So All Power to the People. Right On. And we're going to stick together. We ain't coming up with no jive. We have to free Brothers Ruchell Magee, George Jackson; we have to free Sister Angela Davis; we have to free these brothers and sisters. I am the Chairman of only one Party, the Party that Brother Huey is the Minister of Defense, with David Hilliard, June Hilliard, etc. And we're going to free political prisoners; and, we're going to keep these survival programs going; and, we're going to wage a People's revolutionary struggle, and not no jive, individualistic, defecting actions, by some individual who wants to play power games. I am the Chairman of the Party of which the San Quentin Cadre is apart and parcel of the same Party. The San Quentin Cadre of the Black Panther Party.

So all I have to say to the people is that you know where it's at. We're going to stick in solidarity. There're a bunch of jive renegades and jack-a-napes around. But later for that. Just later for that. Let that ride, cause we got survival to get on with, and a People's revolution to mobilize. And we got political prisoners to free all over this land.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
RIGHT ON!

Inflammatory Articles

Many of the articles in *The Black Panther* are written by local Party members and concern regional incidents and issues. They are aimed at provoking national black sympathy and joint retaliation for magnified grievances against the authorities.



RACIST-MAD PIGS SIC K9 POLICE DOG ON BROTHER

On Friday night, March 27, 1970, 14 yr. old Brother John (Little Hot-Rod) Hargrove became the victim of a brutal attack inflicted by a K9 Police dog. This brother along with two other bloods were playfully chasing each other along the sidewalk in the area of Sixth and Snyder Streets. When the brothers approached the corner, one brother ran past brushing against a lady standing at the corner. When this happened the lady immediately grabbed the brother. The two other bloods kept running. Soon after the pig grabbed the brother, a light colored station wagon appeared. In the station wagon were two plain clothes pigs. These pigs immediately proceeded to hand-cuff the blood, beat him in the face, and unleash a vicious police dog that ripped the flesh off the brother's body. As the brother tried to escape the blows of the pig beating him in the face, the K9 proceeded to bite him all over his body. While the brother was being beaten by the pig, and attacked by the dog, the other pigs who came along proceeded to chase the other two bloods. The pigs fired a shot barely missing the fore-head of one of the brothers.

Little Hot-Rod, handcuffed, face badly beaten and suffering from dog bites all over his body, was taken to the local police station where he was booked on suspicion of pick-pocketing. He did not receive any medical attention until several hours later at the Philadelphia General Hospital; there they gave him one tetnus shot and put a bandage on each leg. The pig who created the vicious attack was later identified as one of Rizzo's faggot law and order boys of the GRANNY PATROL. The Granny Patrol is a special segment of piggery which employs pigs to dress up as women so that they can arrest suspected pick-pockets.

The party conducted an interview with the bloods who were fortunate enough to get away, we also spoke with the brother's parents, and were able to visit the brother, at the Youth Study Center. We also spoke with the people in the community who witnessed the horrid incident!

Following are excerpts from the tapes which describe the incident. We cannot use names here of the bloods because it has been passed down that the pigs are trying to round up the other brothers.

The racist pigs approached the brothers by shouting "Get them niggers, get them niggers" They chased the bloods with butcher knives, and what appeared to be an ax. One brother was hit with a pipe in the stomach.

People in the community responded to the arrest and attack angrily. When several people in the community demanded that the pigs call off the dog, they were met with racist remarks from the pigs.

The attack was so vicious, the dog ate the underwear on the brothers body. In addition to bites on the brothers hands, legs and waist the dog also bit the brother in the back and rectum. The brother suffered from severe beatings by the pigs, in the face.

When Little Hot-Rod was visited on Sunday at the Youth Study Center, his body was not healing properly. He related that the nurse only applies mercurochrome on the bites. He is suffering from soreness. He is sleeping on hard cots in the over-crowded center. The bites on his body are swollen and inflamed. The brother's first remarks to his family were, "Tell my probation officer to get me out of here, this place is like Byberry" .

Just less than two weeks ago, the brother was beaten in a cell Division. This pig beat him so bad that Methodist Hospital complained to the Police Department. His eyes were badly damaged. The pig's name who inflicted that beating was Juvenile Aid Officer, Charles Kora. Hot-Rod identified Kora as his assailant and since then, he has been harrassed in his neighborhood by every pig who comes through.

At 14, John Hargrove is a marked victim of Frank Rizzo's fascists, like so many other Black youths in this city. Pigs are on the loose to inflict more physical harm to our people. It is high time that we escalate our war on the pigs and drive them out of our communities.

Seize The Time people of Philadelphia, Rizzo and all of his racist paper tigers can be rightously blown away.

Rosemari Mealy
Philadelphia Branch
Black Panther Party

THE BLACK PANTHER, APRIL 18, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1970 PAGE 9

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY BOMBED, HEROES SUCCESSFULLY ESCAPE



Newburyport, Mass. is a small residental New England town basically composed of people from the White working class. Until last Saturday, September 19, Newburyport's only claim to fame was that it is one of the many small towns surrounding Boston which are strongholds for groups like the Minutemen and other right-wing fascist reactionaries. Last Saturday, however, at 6:00 a.m. in the morning a National Guard Armory was bombed, hundreds of rounds of ammunition ripped off, military personnel records taken and to top it off, they left the scene in a one ton army pick-up truck. They (the bombers) attempted to open the vault holding the weapons of the pig army, M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols and .30 caliber sniper carbines, but were not able to do so. The act was accomplished in one fast motion, and the heroes escaped capture and one week later, "law enforcement officials" are still scratching their heads in wonderment.

And although the weapons, themselves, tools of our liberation were not liberated from the oppressor, the success of this action cannot be denied.

As has been the case in liberation movements all over the world, the guns and arms made by and for the oppressor eventually ends up in the hands of the oppressed. More important, the unknown people who accomplished this act, obtained hundreds of rounds of desperately needed ammunition. Again, past experiences has shown that while the guns themselves can be obtained in ample supply, the ammunition, the bullets, that actually inflicts death upon our enemy, becomes very scarce. One of the necessities of our struggle is our ability to liberate, stockpile, and then accurately use the ammunition of our oppressor upon our oppressor.

As for the military personnel records, they can obviously be put to good use. Our oppressors must be harassed and intimidated day and night. They must not sleep, nor rest, these are the devils who plot the genocide of Black people. The National Guard Armory in the small town of Newburyport, like other small time towns surrounding the Black colony in Boston is designed to be used against us in the fascist genocidal plot devised by the treacherous minds of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell clique. It is to be carried out by those men whose names and addresses are now in the hands of the people. Unknown members of the fascist majority now appear before the people's tribunal and will be judged according to their actions.

This action is just one of many blows which will be dealt out to the oppressor. If this action was intended to help and serve the people, we welcome their help to our just liberation struggle against the Babylonian Empire.

ARM YOURSELF

Michael·Fultz
Boston Chapter
Black Panther Party



SISTER MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY RENT-A-PIG

FIVE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE RAILROADED BY TUCSON GRAND JURY

STORM TROOPERS INVADE COMMUNITY

THREE PIGS BEAT FIFTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK YOUTH

ENTIRE FAMILY BEATEN AND JAILED

Another regular feature in *The Black Panther* is a weekly article giving detailed instructions for the handling of firearms, or setting forth deportment for urban guerrilla warfare.

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 9, 1970 PAGE 16

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS HOW TO COMBAT C.M.I.

Part 5

The *principal of Juche (Self-Reliance)* clarified by Eldridge Cleaver, the Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, is "Use what you got to get what you need." To answer the question of how do you combat the pigs' *C.M.I. (communication, mobility* and information), we must first determine what we have going for ourselves. Checking out the practice of self-defense groups, we see that we have the power to determine what is to happen, when it is to happen and how it is supposed to go down. *What, When* and How (W.W.H.)- the element of surprise. The pigs have C.M.I. and self-defense groups have W. W. H.

To consider a self-defense operation successful is not to just *plan and execute but to plan, execute* AND escape. There have been too many instances where members of self-defense groups have planned and executed righteous blows against this racist system only to be captured, wounded or *killed. These are the consequences* for revolutionary activity, however we must keep casualties within an acceptable minimum. The *slogan must be Maximum Damage* to the Enemy, Minimun Damage to Us. Practice has shown that when planning W.W.H. if it is done with knowledge and an understanding of C.M.I. casualties will be kept within an acceptable minimum. *Too often, much attention* is given to a plan up to the point of execution without giving the same attention to evasion and escape, that phase of the operation that determines success. This is a subjective approach, a onesided *approach. W.W.H. is only one side* of the coin, C.M.I. is the other side. Because self-defense groups use W.W.H., the pigs' C.M.I. does not go into operation until a self-defense group commits itself by actually executing some type of *self-defense activity.*


TRYIN TO BE BLACK PANTHER

COMMUNICATION



MOBILITY


THE ON BLACK PANTHERS
THE ON "RADICAL" EDUCATION CLASSES
THE ON SAN HUNTING SPECIAL
EVIDENCE TO INDICT BLACK PEOPLE
PHONE

INFORMATION

All of us should be aware that once C.M.I. is activated pigs start showing on the set from 30 seconds to 1 minute maximum in every *major city in Babylon, therefore* the success or failure of a defense operation is dependent upon the attention given to C.M.I. and the planning of evasion and escape. As I see it, learning to deal with the pigs' C.M.I. is the number one *military problem* facing revolutionary forces in Babylon today. It is time for all who have something to teach, by example, to step forward. And remember, to die honorably, one does not need company.

USE WHAT YOU GOT TO GET WHAT YOU NEED
D.C.

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

Part 6 ON REVOLVERS

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been in previous issues of the Black Community News Service. This article is on revolvers, it gives a basic run down on the use of revolvers. Check out all of the photographs and notes to help you understand better the functioning of a revolver.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS:

1. Check to see if gun is loaded. You do this on a revolver by swinging out the cylinder. Pull back on the cylinder latch and gently push *out on the cylinder. (see unloading* a revolver photo #2)

2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless practicing trigger squeeze or firing.

3. Point your gun away from where someone may be shot-Point at the ceiling or to the floor, but wherever you point, make sure no one is in the way and can be harmed.

4. Never leave the hammer cocked on a revolver. (Explanation later on cocking a revolver.)

KINDS OF REVOLVERS:

.38 Snubnose - This gun has only a 2" barrel and shoots 38's. It is very easy to conceal.

.38 Special - Has a 4" barrel and shoots 38's.

.357 Magnum - This is the type of handgun the pig carries. The ammo for this is .357 magnum. Metal piercing bullets will pierce an engine block. This is the best type of revolver to have.

.41 and .44 Magnums - Have more knock down power than a .357 Magnum. The Highway Patrol carries these to shoot through car doors, but a .357 will go through a car door also and .357 ammunition is more plentiful.

PARTS OF A REVOLVER: PHOTO # 1

REVOLVER TERMS



UNLOADING:

Holding gun in left hand (pointed in safe direction) release cylinder latch with right hand. (#3). Push out cylinder with the fingers of left hand (#2). Now that you *have swung out the cylinder* and the bullets are visible you gently push down on the extractor and let bullets drop out into your right hand (#4).

LOADING:

To load, simply follow the same steps in unlatching the cylinder. Then drop bullets into the chambers of your cylinder. Gently push cylinder closed, and you are ready to fire. DO NOT SLAM CYLINDER CLOSED, this causes *extra wear on your gun.*

COCKING A REVOLVER:

Put the tip of your thumb on the hammer holding revolver steady in the palm of your hand. Do not put your finger in the trigger. Pull straight back steadily on your hammer spur until your hammer locks back. You gun is ready to *fire, do not put your finger in* the trigger until you are ready to fire. After cocking hammer, place your thumb directly on the frame beside the hammer, resting the tip of your thumb on the cylinder latch. (Photo #4) *Your forefinger should be placed* on the other side of the gun straight out just above the trigger guard until ready to fire. Everytime you cock the hammer before firing, this is called single action firing.



PHOTO # 2

UNCOCKING A REVOLVER (LOADED):

Keep your finger off the trigger! With gun already cocked, place your thumb on the hammer firmly. Now with the gun firmly in your hand, pointed in a safe direction, *and* thumb *firmly* on the hammer (still cocked) squeeze the trigger slowly until you can feel the hammer releasing. IMMEDIATE-

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

LOADING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 3



COCKING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 4



URBAN GUERILLAS

America's complexity will be her downfall, for complex power, communications and transportation networks are unprotected. These systems are the life lines of the industrial and military might of U.S.A. fascism. The source of America's strength is its vulnerable Achilles heel-therefore urban guerrillas, utilizing and relying on information divulged by sympathetic workers, can halt or severely cripple every industry in the nation, and bring fascism crashing to its knees. The dams, power stations, substations and power lines are vulnerable. Highly sophisticated communications networks are used by our enemies for carrying out routine business, and are an extremely important factor, in the fascist reaction to guerilla strikes. The neutralization of the fascist communications lie within the capabilities of urban guerillas.

The disruption of this system would hamper and cripple not only the fascist military but would also effect all industrial outputs. The fascist ruling clique realizes the vunerability of their transportation networks, yet all fascist military forces and industry utilize the railways, the state and interstate highway systems and the airports. Urban guerillas can cut and constantly harass these important links.

Urban guerilla teams highly motivated have already begun to put their theory into practice. Lists are being compiled and are constantly updated on fascist and all enemies of our people, because the location and identification of the enemy is an extremely vital task of urban guerillas. This basic intelligence is necessary for planning retaliatory strikes against our enemies. Where their killer groups, for the most, will be unable to locate guerillas, urban guerillas will, in every attack hit the fascist squarely on the chin. Urban guerillas, being one with the people, must attack like skilled brain surgeons--cutting out the diseased tissue while perserving the good. Their dual purpose is that of destroying all fascist forces and their lackeys, while protecting and serving our people. The fascist ruling clique fears this. They know the Party is preparing to fight until the last of our enemies bites the dust. The Party has dared to take the vanguard role in the struggle and will surely defeat U.S A. fascism no matter what the odds, no matter how great the sacrifice. The Party is aware that the fascists will never lay down their arms of their own accord. And also aware of the direction that U.S.A. fascism is taking in order to survive as long as possible.

In Brazil, the guerilla forces found through social practice that they could best achieve the goal of liberating their people from the strong-hold imposed by the fascist Brazilian oligarchy by waging urban guerilla warfare. Brazil's development as an industrial fascist nation and the economic and social backwardness of the indigenous peasants made the revolutionary forces adapt the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare. The urban guerrillas moved to mobilize the workers, and implement urban guerrilla warfare within the context of their historical experiences with the working class and the fascist ruling class oligarchy. The revolutionary forces have implemented this type of struggle which invariably catches the fascists with their pants down. The type of warfare which turns the asphalt concrete and steel of cities into jungles; into cemeteries for the fascist highly mechanized units and turns his weapons of mass slaughter into paper tigers; into urban jungles where the revolutionary forces can plunge the blade into the hilt in the vunerable life lines of even fascist U S.A In this country as well as in Brazil the fascists tremble with dread at the thought of nationwide attacks by urban guerrilla forces.

In the Pentagon and select centers scattered throughout the U S A., gigantic multimillion dollar computers are manned by hoards of the military. Technicians wrestle with fascism's nightmare-the problem of dealing with urban guerrillas. These machines can only reach an hypothesis drawn from information fed into them. In order for the fascists to test the solutions offered by the computer. they must first circumvent

the frail facade of the constitution and the bill of rights. The fascists realize that if these two pieces of paper were implemented they would be in their graves tonight because the constitution and the bill of rights contain the moral impetus necessary to bring this foul evil economic and social system to its doom.

U S.A. fascists have compiled and are still evaluating information received from South American satellite states who are being beset by courageous urban guerrillas waging relentless struggle with amazing(to fascists)and stunning success. Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, has said that we still have a little time left because the U.S.A fascist ruling clique hasn't programmed all of the people to accept the genocide of the Party and our people yet. For at least a year now, there have appeared in every major newspaper, seemingly innocent space fillers. Articles from UPI-API dealing with the deployment of fascist death squads against the revolutionary forces in South America.

These fillers had the sinister purpose of preparing America for the advent of death squads now in operation in every major urban center. These articles were to prepare the people to accept the first overt actions of the Chicago foul fascist gestapo killer unit. Their predawn kill all--destroy all mission was launched as a pilot, an experimental operation with a two fold objective. One was to put counter-revolutionary theory into practice in America --to bring into the streets the fascist ruling clique's solution to the Party--to test and evaluate the techniques of counter-insurgency urban warfare. The second important objective was to evaluate the response of the people to above ground counter-insurgency killer groups--to see if the people were conditioned to accept the outright fascist terror tactics directed officially by the fascist ruling clique.

REVOLUTIONARY HANDIWORK OF THE URBAN GUERILLA

Our Party has been and is still the main target of a national dehumanizing campaign. The fascist controlled news media has consistently maligned, viciously attacked and branded our Party as a racist band of blood-thirsty murderers out for their own personal gain. The fascist news media seeks to justify the fascist's program of destroying our people's first line of defense, the Party, and all other organizations which refuse to be either bought off with blood money or intimidated by the repressive fascist forces. The fascist attempts to isolate our Party from the people has been a dismal failure. The liquidation of Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark had top priority on the fascist's pig list. However, neither the people nor our Party were cowed or intimidated by the bestial slaying of these two revlutionaries. The fascist ruling clique made a grave error in under estimating the will of the people and our Party. People from all walks of life and every progressive organization saw through the fascist attempts to isolate and destroy their Party. The people mobilized and rallied mass support for the Party and soundly condemned the actions of Chicago's fascist killer groups.

Make trouble, fail, make trouble, fail again until their doom. This is the logic of fascists the world over. In Chicago, they refused to acknowledge the bankruptcy of their counter-insurgency campaign. In December, in Los Angeles, Southern California, Chapter of our Party, came under attack by fascist killer groups. Although outnumbered and using inferior weapons, our Party repelled and held at bay the fascist shock troops and sounded the end of Chicago type operations in a fuselage of bullets. We learned valuable lessons paid for with the blood of our revolutionary comrades. The fascist ruling clique has seen the support, that their homicidal raids have generated for the Party. They now know that if conditions are favorable, they will receive tit for tat and then some. They now know that Black and all progressive people will not sit idly by and pacify the action of above ground killer groups Fascists have tried to rally the support of the American people to their avowed aims and failed.

Now begins the phase of underground, clandestine operation of fascist directed killer groups. This is all part of the nature of the fascist ruling clique. The fascists will no doubt expand the techniques of their South American lackeys who operate unrestricted, unswayed by either democratic institutions or public opinion. As the tempo of the struggle increases so will the fascist acts of reactionary terror and violence increase. The primary target of forming clandestine kill groups will be both our people and our Party. If we are to survive as a people, this next phase of attacks, and pave the way to victory, it is imperative that our people be armed with the ideology of the Party. For only then will our people be able to cope with, both, ideological and physical attacks initiated by the insane fascist ruling clique. Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, said that our Party must be a living shield that stands between our people and the fascist pigs and that our paper should serve to educate our people so that they will survive.

As the attacks against the Party escalate, so must the awareness of our people be channelled toward acceptance and even more, active participation in urban guerrilla warfare. Phase two of the fascist plans will surely and soundly be defeated. The fascists will awake to find themselves bogged down on that last front. They will be swallowed up in the morass of a people's war. Their graves will be dug by revolutionary urban guerrilla forces amidst the asphalt, concrete and steel of the cities.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEFEAT U S.A FASCISM ON EVERY FRONT

WE'LL ALL BE TOGETHER ON THE DAY OF VICTORY

Randy Williams,
Political Prisoner

Provocative Slogans

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE TIME SEIZES YOU!

AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE IS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL

BLOOD TO THE HORSES BROW AND WOE TO THOSE WHO CANNOT SWIM!

DARE TO STRUGGLE...DARE TO WIN!

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS



FOR EVERY PORK CHOP THERE IS A FRYING PAN!

"Revolutionary Art"

The most prominent artist on *The Black Panther* staff is Minister of Culture Emory Douglas. Although he prepares a large number of cartoons, other Panther artists are also represented. These cartoons characterize the Government and local law enforcement as "pigs" and call for the overthrow of the Government and the killing of Government officials, as well as police officers.

The Black Panther; May 9, 1970; page 18



THE REVOLUTIONARY ARTIST

When the Black revolutionary artist starts a still life painting, he doesn't see a beautiful vase, or a dish of tasty fruit, against a soft velvet backdrop...he sees only a tattered curtain, rusty cans, a broken dish--empty.

As he seeks out a beautiful landscape to paint, he sees not fertile fields with dancing flowers, and lovely maidens bathing in the sun, but decaying houses, and streets covered with debris, and a Black woman in ragged clothes with tear-stained cheeks.

The Black revolutionary artist knows only oppression, and that his art must relate to his surroundings, and his people, and most of all, his art cannot be abstract and unrelated to his revolutionary people. So he seeks, and finds what our Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton calls "the spirit of the people." As he moves on that, he shows what Revolutionary Artist and Minister of Culture, Emory Douglas shows--"the oppressor *hanging by his heels."*

The revolutionary artist gives his art to his oppressed people. So with his gun and his brush he shows the spirit of the people moving to crush the oppressor, and this is the essence of revolutionary art. His art then becomes part of the people's revolution.

He knows that only because of the urine covered walls and trash-littered alleys the people's desire for freedom will be replaced with the *BLOOD OF THE OPPRESSOR.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Malik Barafu
N.C.C.F.,
Washington, D.C.

TO ALL REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS

I would like to take this time to express on behalf of the Black Panther Party our warmest thanks to all revolutionary artists who have given their talents and thoughts to the people through revolutionary art. We would like to say that every artist's work that has appeared in the Black Panther Newspaper this past year has been a great contribution of visual interpretation of the ideology of the Black Panther Party and of the oppressed people of the world.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS
Emory Douglas
Minister of Culture
Black Panther Party


1971 YEAR OF THE YOUTH
YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION
DEATH
TO THE
FASCIST
PIGS
EMORY

EVERY DOOR THAT THE FASCISTS ATTEMPT TO KICK DOWN WILL PUT THEM DEEPER INTO THE PIT OF DEATH



SHOOT TO KILL


DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIG
PIG

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 3, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 17, 1970, P. 16



THE BLACK PANTHER
MARCH 20, 1971, P. 4


PIG
Only the power of the people can free political prisoners

We will not hesitate to kill or die for our freedom.


TIER 3
"O" WING
RALPH

THE BLACK PANTHER
FEBRUARY 6, 1971, P. 5

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 2, 1970 PAGE 13


OINK OINK OINK
OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
U.S. GOVT.
EMORY
OINK

International News

Panthers profess to believe that American Negroes comprise isolated "colonies" in the heart of the "mother" country, and are part of the Third World, defined as the nonwhite, undeveloped, and underdeveloped countries of the world. The 10-Point Program of the Black Panther Party includes, as a major political objective, a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony to determine the national destiny of American Negroes.

To internationalize their Party and enlarge their importance, Panther leaders have sought acceptance, support, and funds from sources abroad. They have made numerous trips to foreign countries, including Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Palestine, Germany, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Chinese Mainland.

Both at home and abroad, Panther leaders loudly proclaim anti-American sentiments and align themselves politically with the aims and tactics of enemy lands. The international contacts most important to the Panthers are made with revolutionary groups and communist countries, especially those that more closely follow Maoist thinking. The international news section of *The Black Panther* reflects attempts by the Black Panther Party to attract such attention, support, and aid.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1970 PAGE 8

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG
PREMIER OF THE CABINET
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA

June 25th marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S. imperialist aggressive invasion of the DPRK in 1950.

The Black Panther Party takes this occasion to salute the DPRK and the wise and brave leader of the 40 million Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung.

We recognize and respect the long history of resistance and victory that Comrade Kim Il Sung and the 40 million Korean people have contributed to the world wide struggle against imperialism and fascism; the shining examples of socialist construction while under severe conditions of U.S. provocation and aggression, the many brilliant ideological contributions you have made to the socialist camp and in particular the concept of "Juche".

Because of our historical experience in America; because we are faced with no alternatives but genocide or liberation we understand the criminal nature and gangster logic of the U.S. ruling class. Black people are increasingly the victims of overt military aggression and U.S. plots to subvert our struggle for national salvation. Under these conditions we have an increasing awareness that the expulsion of the U.S. imperialist burglars from Korean soil and the reunification of Korea will be a victory for the Korean people and a victory for oppressed people the world over.

We see clearly that the reunification of Korea is not seperate from the salvation of Black and other oppressed people in fascist America. As gang boss Nixon and his mob of criminals intensify their attempts to loot Asia they are intensifying their murderous repression of Black people in America. These attacks will be met with revolutionary solidarity manifested in action, both around the world and in the gangsters lair, and with one-beat-a-hundred fighters in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America; the U.S.A. will surely be brought to the peoples JUSTICE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
U.S.A.

INTERCOMMUNAL NEWS

MEMORANDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE ESCALATION OF THE U.S. WAR OF AGGRESSION IN LAOS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAO PROBLEM

PART II

Application Of The Nixon Doctrine And Escalation Of The War Of Aggression In Laos By The Nixon Administration



The Resistance government formed in 1950 against the French Colonialists.

UNDER PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC OPINION, NIXON ON MARCH 6, 1970 HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE LOGISTIC AND AIR SUPPORT AND "OTHER ACTIVITIES" OF THE U.S. IN LAOS. He also admitted an increase in the U.S. military activities in Laos. But he tried to argue that those activities were "limited" and of a purely "defensive" character aimed at protecting American lives in South Viet Nam.

But public opinion in the United States and in the world immediately pointed out that that was the first time the highest executive in the United States made an open acknowledgement of the violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos by the U.S. On March 7, Senator Albert Gore declared that Nixon in fact had conceded that "we (the U.S.) have violated the Geneva Agreements". Public opinion has condemned Nixon's allegations as "queer" and "selfcontradictory" (the Japanese paper "Asahi Shimbun" March 9. "Nixon's allegations were misleading. They mentioned only some facts and not everything and showed no sign of any change of policy." (Senators Scranton and Fulbright, March 6 and 9, 1970).

Obivously, Nixon cannot dupe public opinion which bases its judgement not merely on the words but also on the deeds of the Nixon administration during the recent past.

After Nixon came to power, the so-called "Nixon doctrine on Asia" saw the light which consists in providing more U.S. advisers, weapons and firepower to the Asians, while the latter contribute more mercenaries for the U.S. The formula of this doctrine is "native soldiers plus U.S. advisers and maximum logistic and air support". This is in fact a more elaborate and more refined form of U.S. neo-colonialism's wicked policy of making Asians fight Asians, and natives fight natives.

The active application of that doctrine in Laos finds a concrete expression in the steps of escalation taken by the Nixon administration in its aggressive war in Laos during the past 18 months, escalation in the logistic supply, in the supply of U.S. military personnel and in the use of U.S. combat troops in the "special war".

Under the Nixon administration, the amount of U.S. aid to Laos and military personnel introduced into this country have increased at almost the same rate. Compared with the 140 million dollars in 1967, U.S. aid in 1969 rose to 250 million dollars of which only the economic and technical aid accounting for less than 60 million was announced, while the rest was almost exclusively used for military purposes. Thus, military aid – about 190 million dollars a year, – is more than treble the economic aid and makes up [illegible] per cent of the total aid. This figure is approximately the same as estimated by Senator A.J. Allender in a censured report on the scale of American involvement in the war in Laos (AFP, Jan. 22 1970). It is necessary to note that what is described as "economic and technical" has also been used for secret activities of a military character. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna, Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, disclosed that the U.S. aid program also covers the CIA activities in Laos. At present, according to a statement of Senator M. Mansfield on September 21, 1969, U.S. aid in Laos had exceeded [illegible] million dollars a year and continued to increase.

Obviously, the Nixon administration is squandering in Laos more and more money of the American people, while serious social problems in the United States are yet unsettled, because enormous sums are being spent for unjust wars in Laos and in Indochina as a whole.

On March 6, 1970, Nixon said there were 643 advisers and military personnel out of the 1,040 Americans operating in Laos and denied the presence of any U.S. combat troops in Laos. That is not true. Compared with the 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos under the Johnson administration, the figure rose to 12,000 U.S. military personnel, with or without military uniform in the first period of the Nixon administration. Of them, there were at least 2,000 air force advisers, or 800 more than in 1967. The number of U.S. advisers assigned to the "special forces" training centres and regular units of the puppet army increased from 150 to 1,000 (according to a British source, the figure might be 2,000). The U.S. "special forces" operating in southern Laos are estimated at about 1,200 men. Thus there is one U.S. military adviser for every six Laos puppet soldiers (compared to the 70,000 men of the Vientiane army). In addition according to a statement of Senator R. Ottinger on April 24, 1970, at least half of the 45,000 U.S. air force personnel in Thailand (i.e. 24,000) are now directly participating in air activities in Laos. All told, the number of U.S. military men now taking part in military activities in Laos on the ground and in the air has run into tens of thousands at least equal to half of the total effectives of the Laos puppet army.

The running of the U.S. colossal war machine in Laos remains an affair of the U.S. embassy, Nixon's ambassador to Vietiane remains a military proconsul. The paper "France Soir", on March 3, 1970 said everything in Laos is controlled from the building of the U.S. embassy which houses the brain of the war machine. The number of army and air force military attaches of the U.S. embassy exceeds 200, an unusual figure for a foreign diplomatic mission in a country like Laos. The USAID agency in Laos is also operating within the framework of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vientiane and is working for the CIA. [illegible] 1970, J.A. Hanna acknowledged that Laos is the only place where such things happened [illegible] did not approve it.

Of late some 1,500 U.S. "green berets" were introduced into Laos, whose commanders [illegible] (Thailand), U.S. [illegible] on February 27, 1970 [illegible] number of U.S. "green berets" in Laos had exceeded that of U.S. military advisers in South Viet Nam in the past. [illegible] 1969 and early 1970, U.S. [illegible] troops took part in ground attacks on the Plain of Jars area, [illegible] province. The U.S. magazine "Newsweek" of April 6, 1970 affirmed that the CIA office in [illegible] G.I.'s [illegible] Viet Nam [illegible] weekly [illegible] d. Har[illegible].

With [illegible] there have been more [illegible] participating in the fighting [illegible]. On March 6, 1970, senator Mansfield [illegible] Americans are fighting [illegible]. "The fact that some of them [illegible] wear uniform does not [illegible] this one bit. The fact is that [illegible] Americans combat troops [illegible] uniform have been fighting in Laos."

continued on next page

New textile factory at Sam-Neua



ON CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG'S DECLARATION OF 20 MAY, 1970

In this declaration, Chairman Mao Tse Tung has set forth a brilliant and timely analysis of the qualitatively new situation that exists in the world as a result of the treacherous new acts of aggression launched by the fascist, imperialist Nixon-Chinesepeoples.

This declaration pulls together into clear focus the revolutionary struggles and the liberation struggles ofthe people of the whole world, including the revolutionary struggle oftheAmerican people themselves.

Speaking specifically for the Black Panther Party, but reflecting the sentiments of millions of oppressed people inside the United States, it has become crystal clear to us that rampant imperialist aggression onthe international scale and vicious fascist repression on the domestic scale are the two faces of the criminal government of the United States and the calculated policy of the American ruling circles. For 400 years now, Black people inside the United States have been the long-suffering victims of fascist violence and repression. But under the Nixon-Pentagon clique, this reactionary violence and repression has been escalated to newheights of barbaric cruelty. At the sametime, in order to put down the already gigantic and still growing mass movement among White Americans against the wreckless and sanguinary policies and imperialist adventures of the U.S. government, the cowardly Nixon-Pentagon clique has unleashed a bloodbath against the Americanpeople as a whole, creating for itself new enemies who have joined hands with those who were already determined to carry out a struggle to the bitter end against an economic, political, and social system that is dominated by the madmen in the Pentagon and that is responsible for the misery and bloodshed all over the world today.

Chairman Mao Tse Tung captures the truth of the situation when he points out the unprecedented isolation of the Nixon-Pentagon clique. Never before have these criminals been so exposed and isolated as they are today. And never before has it been so clear that this criminality can only be ended by the people rising up to seize their own destiny from the handfull of willful exploiters and murderers that now have the power in their hands.

Coupling a revolutionary call to arms with revolutionary optimism in the assurance of victory, Chairman Mao Tse Tung, the great leader of the Chinese Revolution, hero and teacher of the revolutionary people of the world, has performed an invaluable service to all mankind by stepping forward at this time to renew the people's indictment of the common enemy of us all--U.S. Fascism and Imperialist Aggression. These courageous words of Chairman Mao Tse Tung will give new heart to the peoples in their lonely anddifficult struggles to throw off the shackles and chains of oppression now being held in place by U.S. Fascism and Imperialism.

Lastly, we wish to point out that only the enemies of the people and those who shirk their revolutionary duties and who are afraid of their own shadows will findfault with Chairman Mao Tse Tung's declaration. For our part, we welcome it, because we have learned, by shedding our blood, that only through relentless struggle, by resorting to arms inside the very house of U.S. Fascism and Imperialism itself, can we gain our freedom and liberation. This is what our experience has taught us and this is the faith that will sustain us as we push forward our struggle..

LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAOTSETUNG!
LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLES' WAR!
DEATH TO THE U.S. FASCISM AND IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!
ALL POWER TO THEPEOPLE!
Eldridge Cleaver,
Minister of Information
Black Panther Party, U.S.A.

The Black Panther, June 20, 1970, page 16

THE TERROR, BRUTALITY AND MURDER OF MY BROTHERS AND SISTERS IS THE SUFFERING OF BLACK PEOPLE. THEREFORE, NOT TO LET SUCH EVENTS CONTINUE I MUST MERCILESSLY DO AWAY WITH THE LOW-NATURED BEAST THAT BITES THE HAND THAT FEEDS IT.



WE HAVE NO HANG UPS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

3 - Mr. J. A. [illegible]tz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
(1 - P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/13/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

4063

This is to advise of a meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on 6/12/75 in my office in accordance with the request set out in Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum dated 6/4/75.

IS-1 Section Chief J. G. Deegan, Number One Man William H. Atkinson, Unit Chiefs Homer A. Newman, Jr., David Ryan, Garnett T. Tunstall, and Special Agent Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division met with Jack Smith and Lester B. Seidel of the SSC staff.

At the outset Mr. Seidel indicated that SSC would do case studies on various organizations against which the COINTELPRO was directed. Black Panther Party (BPP) had been chosen for the start because many BPP members had been involved in and convicted of criminal activity. He distributed copies of a document (a copy of which is attached) outlining the purpose of the meeting and setting out requests that will be made of the Bureau through appropriate channels in connection with this case study. Included in this document, along with requests for various Bureau documents regarding COINTELPRO as it pertains to the BPP, were requests for a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted, a list of all media persons contacted and a list of all FBI personnel connected with this program and their present locations.

5 -

The investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, as relates to the BPP, were described generally to Messrs. Seidel and Smith highlighting the origin of this violence-prone organization and the series of violent confrontations in which it participated in the late 1960s. Mr. Seidel stated that he was specifically interested in ascertaining the extent of COINTELPRO and how it related to the investigation of the BPP in San Francisco - Oakland and Los Angeles. COINTELPRO was stressed only as a procedure which could have been followed in the course of our investigation. ~~No specific~~

62-116395-253

REC-102

Enclosures - 2

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MJW

JUN 24 1975

62-116395

GTT:eks (10)

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

instances of institution of counterintelligence activities were discussed, and it was indicated that these activities were minor as far as the overall BPP investigation was concerned.

In connection with COINTELPRO, the Bureau letter to SAC, San Francisco dated 5/11/70 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations" was discussed. Basically, this letter suggests San Francisco consider a proposal that through the use of documents subtly incorporating false information, attempt to give the BPP the impression that the documents were stolen by a disgruntled police employee who is sympathetic to the Panthers. This document was presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security in 1974 and was included in their publication of hearings conducted by that Committee. Messrs. Seidel and Smith wanted to know if the activities outlined in this letter had been implemented by the San Francisco or Los Angeles Offices. He was advised that this letter was not implemented as it had requested comments and recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and that Office had recommended against the proposals contained therein.

Mr. Seidel asked the identity of the SAC who recommended against this proposal and was advised that the SAC there, at that time, would not necessarily have had personal knowledge of the matter. He then asked identity of supervisor who recommended against proposal and was advised this information was available in the field office. Concerning COINTELPRO in general, he inquired as to specific techniques used against the BPP and whether forgery and wiretaps had been a part of the program. He was advised that we were unable to furnish that information without extensive file review.

Mr. Seidel attempted to discuss Special Operations but he was advised that the matter was not within the purview of the current meeting.

Mr. Seidel explained that they would be traveling to San Francisco and intended to interrogate personnel in that Office as well as unspecified outsiders who may have been involved in COINTELPRO. Mr. Seidel stated that he had asked for the meeting with Bureau personnel to obtain background data to aid them in these

interrogations. Both Messrs. Seidel and Smith expressed appreciation for the assistance given them at this meeting and both additionally expressed their feeling that the Bureau had done a good and proper job in its investigation.

During the course of this meeting a monograph on the BPP prepared by the Bureau in March of 1971 was used for background data. Mr. Seidel expressed a desire to have a copy of this document. This document, which is prepared from public source data, was compiled for public distribution and, if you approve, a copy will be furnished to Mr. Seidel.

ACTION:

For your information and if you approve, one copy of attached document entitled "Black Panther Party"* will be sent to Mr. Seidel.

HEH/JGD

GTT

Get written request signed by Chairman of Committee
WRW

PLM

Not necessary

*Per G.T. Tunstall, this document is not classified, made up of public source data, + until it became outdated, was furnished to the public. 6/19/75

Delivered to Sherry Towell of SSC 6/20/75 for delivery to Seidel

Black Panther Party: San Francisco-Oakland (Los Angeles)
Late 1960's through early 1970's

The Committee is examining the extent to which this COINTELPRO program relates to criminal investigation; the results obtained; the relationships between the FBI and local authorities (police and other governmental agencies); media and community leaders; the methods of targeting; techniques used to achieve program goals; legal authority; and authorization procedures and accountability.

To pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents in this initial stage:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the responses thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (e.g., field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO, with explanation of the dispositions thereof;
6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 ALM/TMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-253

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and their media affiliation;
8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;
9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to the whereabouts, and relation to the FBI should be indicated:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee requested to be given a briefing concerning counterintelligence programs as applied to our investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco.

Lester Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee who is assigned the area of COINTELPROS, advised that the Committee is preparing what he termed case studies on COINTELPROS in four separate areas. He defined these areas as the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Seidel previously had requested the Bureau arrange interviews of various Bureau personnel whom he considered familiar with the San Francisco Black Panther Party investigation, and at that time stated he intended to interview these individuals in two or three weeks. Mr. Seidel requested that prior to conducting interviews concerning this particular area, he desired to be briefed during the week of June 8 concerning the Bureau's general overall investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, along with the use of counterintelligence proposals against that organization. In this regard he desired that someone knowledgeable in this aspect be made available to brief him concerning this matter.

[illegible] 6/13/75 [illegible]

62-116395

REC- 102

62-116395-252

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]/lmf
MDR-16

5- [illegible]STALL

12 JUN 24 1975

PVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 [illegible] 27 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Seidel also stated that he was submitting a written request to the Bureau for certain Bureau documents pertaining to the COINTELPRO operations in the San Francisco Office and specifically mentioned requesting the quarterly status letters from that office on COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) The Intelligence Division advise if a briefing can be arranged and the date and time of such a briefing.

2) Legal Counsel Division will advise Mr. Seidel of the Bureau's decision in this regard.

PVD JBH|PVD

WRW|TM

PCM

We should carefully consider fact that Hampton case is subject of pending litigation and coordinate with Dept. instead of [illegible] to [illegible] specific [illegible] provided.

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0620
18 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Request for Documents by SSC

Attached is a request for documents received by CIA from the Senate Select Committee Staff on 10 June 1975. It is provided to you for information.

John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 23 1975

5

3 ELSUR

file 62-116395

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 alm/jm/f
MDR-16

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

64 JUN 2 3 1975

~~SECRET~~

R223

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.	HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.	BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.	CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.	RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.	

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

DCI/IC 75-2202

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1975

Mr. Walter Elder
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Elder:

Further to our conversation regarding formal requests for documents and records, I attach a list of supplemental document requests.

What I would propose is that you and I discuss this list to insure that we have properly identified the requested documents.

In addition to the attached list I would like to review studies in the historical series: (1)"Maritime Operations in Indonesian Operations -- 1957-1958;" "Overthrow of a Government, November 1952-1953;" and any studies prepared that trace the CIA's activities in relation to the overthrow of the government of Guatamala in 1954.

Sincerely,

William B. Bader

Attachment

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2001 BY SP2 ALM/JML
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-

R223

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

To: Bill Bader

From: Elliot Maxwell

Date: June 9, 1975

Subj: Supplemental Document Requests

1. The General Counsel's memo on February 3, 1975 on proprietaries mentioned in the briefing paper prepared for the Rockefeller Commission.

2. The Inspector General's Survey of Propeietaries from 1967.

3. Inspector General's Survey of Domestic Operations Division done prior to May 26, 1966.

4. The opinion on covert action authority of the CIA prepared by the Justice Department under Attorney General Katzenbach.

5. List of those individuals who worked with John Richards.

6. List of the component surveys from 1960 to 1970. (Approximately 50 studies)

7. The subject heading list, the keyword list, and the name list, used for filing in the Office of General Counsel.

8. The Bureau of the Budget Confidential Report on Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government, dated September 20, 1945. (HS/HC-71, Item 1).

9. The Report by William H. Jackson, on the Coordination of Intelligence Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British intelligence system. This is a report for the OSS dated August, 1945. (HS/HC-801, Item 9.)

10. A list of titles of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates from January 1, 1970 to the present.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 SPSAIM/MC

62-116395-
ENCLOSURE

MOR-16

11. The Office of the General Counsel memo on the subject "Text and Explanation, Public Law 110," dated October 10, 1952.

12. The Interim Report to the National Security Council by Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, dated May 13, 1948 and entitled "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."

13. The paper by the Office of General Counsel on the Origins of the CIA, which is mentioned in the memo of the General Counsel of September 1973.

14. The two pages of General Vandenberg's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee outlining the clandestine collection function of the CIA, which were never published, a copy of which is now in the possession of Walter Pforzheimer.

15. An explanation of all the two-letter prefixes to the project names. (diographic)

16. The paper prepared by the Office of the Controller entitled "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities of CIA and Predecessor Organizations, 20 September 1945 through Janaury 1952." This is identified as HS/HC-36, Item 2.

17. The history of the development of NSCID-5 by Mrs. Margaret Ehrmantraut.

18. Study on Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of Covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 through 1966.*

19. Draft bill written by Lawrence Houston in the Fall of 1946, entitled "A Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency," cited in the archives as HS/HC-805, Item

20. Detailed Budget Submissions and house notes prior to 1967.

21. (a) The transcript of the Senate Hearings on the CIA Act of 1949, cited Paragraph 7 OGC 73-2169, Memo for the Record, 20 November 1973, Subject: Payment to Richard Patrick Lippert;

    (b) Any documents relating to the inquiry by the Secretary of Defense in 1947 mentioned in Paragraph 8 of above memo.

22. Annex to the 1963 Inspector General's Report on Technical Services Division on Experiments with Drugs.

* Already on our priority list: for transmittal to Select Committee offic

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Each Assistant Director

TO ALL SACS 3 per SLP JUNE 11, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116464)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

HOUSTUDY 75.

REBUTELS MAY 2,20, 1975, "SENSTUDY 75."

BUFILE 62-116464 AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MATTERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FROM SENSTUDY 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

SFP:mjg
(19)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 1 4 1975
TELETYPE

320 A ESF

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-9

NOTE:

Referenced teletypes advised field of our pledge of full cooperation with Senate Committee and issued instructions concerning handling contacts with Senate Committee Staff as well as handling of matters relating to interviews with present and former Bureau employees. Inasmuch as we have opened a separate file under Houstudy 75, it is believed this teletype would assist in prompting better management of correspondence between Bureau and field.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

WRW/B

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAF
MDR-16 WRW/TH

PCM

66-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 23 1975

84 JUN 23 1975

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Schwartz)

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Senstudy-75

Dear Mr. Halperin:

Reference is made to my letter to you dated April 8th, regarding your request for the "Delimination Agreement of 1948."

Coordination of this matter with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has disclosed three documents which are pertinent to your request. It is my understanding that two of the three documents have been released to you by that agency, and I am enclosing with this letter, the third document. You will find this letter dated October 2, 1948, from former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Frank G. Wisner, then the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, contains certain deletions. The material deleted refers to the same material excised in one of the two documents furnished to you by CIA, and concerning which CIA asserted exemption provisions found in Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). These provisions relate to matters that warrant classification and those which are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. It is considered appropriate for the same exemption provisions to be cited by this Bureau in connection with the deleted portion.

You have thirty days from receipt of this letter to appeal to the Attorney General from any denial contained herein. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Attorney General (Attention Freedom of Information Appeals Unit), Washington, D. C. 20530.

62-116395

THB:dm (7)

MAILED 6
MAY 23 1975
FBI

ORIGINAL FILED IN

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPAALM/DMF
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Following the Attorney General's decision, judicial review is available in the district of your residence or principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia, where the records are situated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Delivered to CIA 5/27/75

Enclosure

1 - Freedom of Information Act Coordinator - Enclosure
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Mr. Charles Saviage
Washington, D. C.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M. Hauser

NOTE: See copy of H. C. Flemister memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 5/7/75, captioned "Morton Halperin, FOIA Request," copy of which is attached. The material CIA requested to be excised has been deleted as described in this letter, and the Bureau file copy of the letter is not classified. Contact with CIA FOIA Section discloses the deletion of the material in the CIA letter dated 9/22/48 accomplishes the declassification of those documents. This has been coordinated with Intelligence Division. The original Bureau document is found in 65-48066-9.

~~SECRET~~

1 - [illegible] W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

JPL:jdp
(4)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JMF
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 X 1

MDR-16

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 18 1975
TELETYPE

5:18pm

REC-75 62-116395-249

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~SECRET~~

JUN 20 1975

84 JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SECRET

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [GUS SURVEY.] (S) NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S* RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall
6/4/75

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)
INTERNAL SECURITY, MISCELLANEOUS

Senstudy -75

This is to receive approval for submission of copies of documents requested by the U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. By letter dated 5/14/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the above Committee, requested the Attorney General furnish documents including "all memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the IEC." (Appendix C, I, 14).

Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, advised Supervisor Garnett T. Tunstall on 5/29/75 that the Department has made available to Senator Church's Committee all data contained in Departmental files on the IEC. Included in this material are work papers and final estimates prepared by IEC as well as communications between IEC and the Bureau. The only information remaining in Bureau files not already made available to the Committee consists of in-office memoranda. These memoranda fall into three general categories:
1. Those dealing with the origin and staffing of IEC,
2. Memoranda setting out requests from IEC for information from the Bureau and requests for approval to send such data to IEC and
3. Memoranda transmitting estimates and work papers of IEC which was the result of information furnished by the Bureau and other participating agencies.

These memoranda, without exception, show that the Bureau's participation in IEC was at the instruction of the Attorney General, its activities were legal and that the Bureau's contribution was substantial. It should be noted that the memorandum M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop dated 11/25/70 captioned

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)
Enclosures
62-113887
GTT:eks (4)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-113887-2

62-116395 -
NOT RECORDED
JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 bm/lmf
MDR-16

CONTINUED OVER

84 JUN 25 1975

"Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Meeting with the Director, 11/25/70," has been excised to delete information not germane to IEC. Copy of original memorandum not excised attached.

ACTION:

If approved, copies of the above-described memoranda, which are attached, will be transmitted to the Department by LHM for referral to the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps. Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(7)

WRW/TWL

PLM

62-116395-247

REC-102

17 JUN 23 1975

5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MOR-16

84 JUN 23 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 18, 1975

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - A. B. Fulton
1 - D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached herewith in 14 bound volumes are excised copies of Exhibits A through E of the Department report of FBI Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activities, prepared by the committee chaired by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen.

These exhibits are individual write-ups prepared by the FBI of each proposed action in the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate, Black Extremist, and New Left Cointelpros.

In my letter to you dated April 21, 1975, I recommended against release of these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee as they are internal work papers which were prepared as a part of the deliberative process for an in-house Department investigation. I strongly object to the release of these exhibits. In the event you deem it necessary to release these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee, I request the enclosed copies, which have been excised in an attempt to avoid intrusions upon individuals' right of privacy and compromise of sensitive investigative techniques and sources, be made available.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

Enclosures (14)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-104 62-116395-245

1 - 62-116009

DR:pld
(11)

Director signed original which was hand carried with enclosures to O'Connor 5 15/P 6/17 by SA Daly. Jam

17 JUN 23 1975

See NOTE page 2.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2001 BY SPG AWM/tml
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 23 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

NOTE:

On 6/11/75 Legal Counsel advised Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of our objection and our desire that excisions be made if we are overruled. Mr. O'Connor suggested the excised material be prepared on an expedite basis. It appears the Department will make available these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee but we feel we should be on record as relates to FBI recommendations and objections.

This letter and exhibits A through E, which will be made available to Legal Counsel, should be delivered to Mr. O'Connor at the Department by Legal Counsel Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF MRS. DOROTHY SKILLMAN
6/4/75
SENSTUDY 75

On 6/4/75, Mrs. Dorothy Skillman, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Clyde Tolson, was interviewed by Mr. Mark H. Gittenstein and Miss Mary Deoreo of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Mrs. Skillman was escorted to the interview by former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr who remained outside the interview room during the interview. Prior to the interview, Mrs. Skillman was met by SA L. F. Schwartz at which time she advised that she had been advised by Mr. John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, that the interview was to be concerning Mr. Hoover's Official and Confidential (OC) files and that if questions came up during the interview on other matters which might impinge on sensitive sources and methods, current Bureau investigations, etc., she was free to request an interruption of the interview to consult with Mr. Schwartz.

The interview of Mrs. Skillman commenced at 2:30 p.m., and it was terminated at approximately 4:30 p.m. On only one occasion toward the end of the interview, Mrs. Skillman asked to consult with Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz. She advised that the interviewers had asked her concerning her knowledge of what might have been in certain cartons which were reportedly stored in the recreation room area of the late Director's residence. Mrs. Skillman stated that she thought these cartons contained many of the gifts and mementos that had been collected by Mr. Hoover over a period of years. After consulting with Mr. Mohr, she realized that she knew this only from comments that had been made to her by Mr. Mohr and had no firsthand knowledge of the contents of the cartons. On Mr. Mohr's advice, she advised the interviewers that she had no firsthand knowledge of what was in the cartons but that she knew that Mr. Mohr was aware of what was in them because he was present when the appraisers of Mr. Tolson's estate inventoried the entire house including these cartons. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Gittenstein commented to Mr. Mohr that he might have further questions to ask him concerning the contents of the cartons but would probably handle that by a telephone call to Mr. Mohr.

COPY
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/1/99 BY SP2 AM/MF
(8)

MDR-16

REC-102

62-116395-244

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 23 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Interview of Mrs. Dorothy Skillman
6/4/75
Senstudy 75

After the completion of the interview, Mrs. Skillman advised Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz that the interviewers had asked her a great number of questions concerning her knowledge of the OC files which she said was very limited, the layout of Mr. Hoover's house and the work that Mrs. Skillman and Miss Gandy had done at the residence subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death. She stated that the interviewers were quite courteous and in no way antagonistic. Mr. Mohr requested Mrs. Skillman to type up an informal memorandum concerning the interview and he indicated that when this was done, he would provide a copy to the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information.

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/13/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 JUN 24 1975

File Number 62-116395-242

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/2006 BY SP2 ALM/MMF
MDR-16

Permanent Serial Charge Out

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 9 1975

General

TO: Kevin Maroney
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Bill

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: IRS - SSC Request (Senstudy-75)

Attached is a copy of the SSC document request served upon IRS which I received on June 3, 1975. Since some of the items may relate to DOJ/FBI functions, I thought you should be aware of the scope of the request, as a matter of information.

The Topical Task Forces may need to be alert to this request as a matter of prospective coordination.

cc: Deputy Attorney General

5 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

REC- 102

62-116395-241

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

17 JUN 19 1975

62-116395

84 JUN 19 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975 DCI/IC 75-2033

Mr. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Attached is a copy of a Senate Select Committee request to the Treasury Department dated 14 May 1975. Mr. Collins of Treasury has requested you be provided a copy of this request, but no other distribution will be made. It will, of course, become an entry in the Community Central Index.

Yours very truly,

Harriett D. Mowitt

Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

Attachment: As stated

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-241

DCI/IC 75-2009

Department
of the Treasury
Office of Special
Assistant to Secretar
for National Security

to. Mr. John Clarke, Associate
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community, CIA
room. ______ date. 5/29/75

Forwarded is a copy of the Senate Select Committee's first request to the Internal Revenue Service for documents and explanations. As I stated yesterday at the Ad Hoc Committee meeting there have been some discussions with the Committee staff since this letter was received and the staff has indicated that they plan to revise the questions considerably. In these circumstances you may wish to hold distribution of this document to other members of the Ad Hoc Committee until we receive the revised document. The one exception to this might be the Justice Department since some of the questions will involve matters of interest to them.

Foster
J. Foster Collins
room 4328
964-~~242xx~~ 2631

62-116395-341

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

COMMISSIONER
MAY 16 1975
INTERNAL REVENUE

Hon. Donald C. Alexander
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
Internal Revenue Building
1111 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20224

Dear Commissioner Alexander:

The Committee appreciates your letter pledging the full cooperation and assistance of the Internal Revenue Service in the work of the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. We also appreciate your forwarding the draft resolution which would authorize the Committee to review any "tax-related information" which may fall within the purview of its responsibilities. Such a resolution is being put forward.

In an effort to expedite the Committee's inquiry into the intelligence functions of the Internal Revenue Service, the Committee asks your cooperation and assistance in furnishing the material and information sought in the enclosed "First Request for Documents from the Internal Revenue Service" and "First Interrogatories to the Internal Revenue Service". It is the Committee's desire that most of the material and information requested be provided by May 30 and the remainder very shortly thereafter. We also request that you provide the answers and documents as they are compiled rather than holding those which are initially compiled until May 30.

In the near future, the Committee's Chief Counsel will be in touch with your General Counsel to work out the mechanics of delivering the requested documents and interrogatory answers and to arrange for close liaison between the Committee's staff and the Internal Revenue Service personnel with whom the staff will wish to meet.

While we recognize that the enclosed requests are substantial, they reflect the broad mandate given to the Committee by the Senate. We believe that it is in the national interest that we perform our

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

work under that mandate both expeditiously and thoroughly. Of course, for us to proceed expeditiously, it is necessary to obtain prompt cooperation from the Executive agencies involved. We are hopeful that with your continued cooperation the end result of our joint efforts will meet the Committee's responsibilities to the Congress and to the American people.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

FIRST REQUEST TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR DOCUMENTS

The Committee wishes to identify all intelligence collection analysis and dissemination functions performed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to review the legal authority for such activities, the manner in which they are ordered and controlled, the coordination of such activities with other federal agencies, the exchange of intelligence information with other federal agencies and any other cooperation with such agencies relative to intelligence activity. In pursuit of this inquiry the Committee requests, that the IRS provide the Committee with the documents and information identified below.

The request is divided into two major parts. The first part seeks documents which relate generally to any intelligence functions which the IRS performs. The second part seeks documents relating to specific intelligence functions of the IRS of which the Committee is aware. Therefore, many of the documents encompassed by the second part of the request will also be encompassed by the first part of the request.

Wherever used herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

Documents	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, compute memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language and any other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
Intelligence	Information about persons or entitie other than purely financial information.
Relating to	Relating in whole or in part to.
Federal agencies	All such agencies, including the White House.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

I. GENERAL REQUEST

With respect to each intelligence gathering or intelligence dissemination function of the IRS either now being performed or which has been performed within the last fifteen years, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart of the organizational unit performing the function indicating the total number of employees in each unit, the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, the chain of command to the organizational unit performing the function.

2. All rules, guidelines, regulations, manuals or other documents defining the function or providing guidance or control to those performing it.

3. All statutes, executive orders, departmental regulations, agency regulations, and any other documents or materials which constitute legal authority for the function.

4. The annual budget of the organizational unit performing the function for the last five years or, in the case of a unit which has ceased to exist, for the last five years of its existence.

5. All documents relating to any agreement or understanding with any other federal agency or the executive or any state or local government or agency regarding the function or the dissemination of any intelligence produced by the function.

6. All documents constituting or relating to reports or investigations of the function performed by the IRS or any other entity, and all documents relating to the establishment of the function.

7. All documents relating to electronic surveillance by IRS or other federal agencies.

II. SPECIFIC REQUESTS

A. Organization and Functions of Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions

With respect to the Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions of the IRS, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart indicating the total number of employees in each category or position, defining the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, and delineating the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Chief of each division.

2. A breakdown of the personnel in each of the two named divisions assigned to each district office, indicating the titles and functions associated with each position in each office.

3. Copies of all rules, guidelines and regulations defining the duties, functions, and responsibilities of each of the two divisions.

B. Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following specific categories of documents:

1. All documents relating to or constituting the recommendations of the study group convened in 1969 by William A. Kolar to study the feasibility of Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System, including all backup documents for such recommendations, and any documents reflecting dissenting views.

2. All documents passing from, to, or between William Kolar and the Commissioners of Revenue or their assistants relating to the plans for and progress made toward the implementation of IGRS.

3. All documents containing evaluations of the various methods of implementation of IGRS.

4. All documents constituting regulations, employee instructions and operating manuals regarding the IGRS, including guidelines, rules or regulations regarding the receipt and storage of information from other federal agencies.

5. All documents passing between the Chief of the Intelligence Division and the District Manager relating to the implementation of IGRS in each District.

6. All documents and guidelines relating to the implementation of IGRS in individual districts or in districts as a whole.

7. A breakdown by district of the IGRS files maintained in each district office, indicating the following:

(a) the number of such files on which some form of action constituting enforcement of the tax laws other than the maintenance of the file has actually been undertaken;

(b) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file is planned;

(c) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file has not been taken and is not planned.

8. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which no files are maintained.

9. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which files are maintained.

10. Any regulations or documents relating to criteria for determining the duration of a file in IGRS.

11. Any documents relating to rules or guidelines for analysis and dissemination of information held in IGRS.

12. Any documents relating to actual instances of dissemination to any person or organization, including other federal agencies, of information contained in IGRS.

13. Any documents relating to or constituting requests by anyone, including other federal agencies, for information contained in IGRS.

14. All documents which have been gathered or produced by the group formed in December 1974 to study the operation of IGRS, and all documents relating to or explaining the establishment of the study group.

C. Internal Revenue Strike Force Participation

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following information and documents relating to the participation by IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces:

All documents constituting or relating to agreements with other agencies regarding participation by the IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces, including any documents relating to the desirability of participating on such strike forces.

D. Special Service Staff

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following documents relating to Special Service Staff (SSS):

1. any document which established the SSS;

2. a detailed organizational chart of the SSS indicating the number of employees in each unit of the SSS and the duties and responsibilities of the employees of each unit, as well as the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the head of SSS;

3. a document or documents indicating the names of all employees of SSS during its existence, and indicating the position occupied by each such employee;

4. all documents relating to the policies, operations and procedures of the SSS relating to the collection, analysis, storage and dissemination of information;

5. all documents relating to the transfer of any SSS files to IGRS.

E. Audit Division

In addition to any documents relating to the Audit Division which may be encompassed by Part I, please furnish:

1. the rules, regulations and guidelines, including employee manuals, for selection of taxpayers for audit and the legal authority for such rules, regulations and guidelines;

2. the rules, regulations and guidelines relating to the storage, use and dissemination of information gathered through audits;

3. all documents relating to any of the following occurring since 1950

(a) Politically motivated requests for an audit of any person or entity

(b) Requests by any person or state or federal agency whose official duties do not normally require the use of financial information on individual taxpayers for an audit of any person or entity

4. All documents constituting rules or guidelines for removal of taxpayers' names from the list of those to be audited.

F. General Requests For Information

To the extent they have not already been furnished in response to previous sections of this document request, please furnish:

1. All documents constituting requests to the IRS for information regarding any person or entity by anyone, including federal agencies, whose normal official functions do not require use of such information.

2. All documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to the requests referred to in 1. above.

3. All documents constituting or relating to requests by anyone, including other federal agencies:

(a) for electronic surveillance by IRS, or

(b) for information or investigation which led to electronic surveillance by IRS

and all documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to any such requests.

FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Please provide full, explanatory answers to the questions set forth below. As used in these questions, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

"Documents"	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, computer memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language, and all other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
"Relating to"	Relating in whole or in part to.
"Federal agency"	All federal agencies and the Executive Branch.

1. Regarding the February 7, 1975, official press release of the Internal Revenue Service and the answer of Commissioner Alexander to the first question posed by Senator Joseph Montoya in his letter of January 29, 1975, please answer the following:

   a. At whose direction did William A. Kolar convene a study group to study the feasibility of a formal, uniform Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System (IGRS)?

   b. Who were the participants in the meeting of the study group?

   c. Please explain the relationship between each participant and the IRS.

   d. Please describe in detail the various alternative systems of implementation of IGRS tested in the

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

various districts, indicating which method was tested in which district, and list the dates each alternative system was tested in each district.

e. Please describe the procedure followed by District Directors in implementing IGRS in each district.

f. In how many district offices has IGRS been implemented?

2. How was intelligence data compiled, maintained, and stored by the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service prior to the inception of IGRS?

3. Did officials, representatives, or members of other federal government agencies participate in the establishment of IGRS or in any discussions regarding its establishment? If so, list each such agency and its representatives and explain the manner and extent of its involvement.

4. Did IGRS compile, maintain, and store information received from other federal agencies? If so, was that information compiled, maintained, and stored for the benefit and use of the Internal Revenue Service, the other federal agency, or both?

5. Is information received from other agencies of the federal government edited to delete non-tax-related material prior to its being entered in IGRS? If so, please explain the editing procedure and furnish all documents relating to such procedure.

6. Upon how many individuals and groups did IGRS maintain files as of November 1974?

7. Please identify all individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

8. Please state the total number of individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

9. Were all IGRS files maintained on a computerized or mechanized basis as of November 1974? How were the files indexed? In connection with the answer to this question, please identify all cross-referencing systems whereby categories of information could be retrieved from IGRS other than through identification of the name of an individual or group.

10. How many names were indexed in IGRS on which there were no files?

11. Please fully describe the procedure followed by the Intelligence Division of the IRS in establishing and entering a file on an individual, group, or organization in IGRS, stating whether:

    a. each file or name contained in IGRS is the result of an investigation by the Intelligence Division of IRS;

    b. the files or names stored and maintained by IGRS are periodically investigated by the Intelligence Division of IRS.

12. Upon how many IGRS files has some form of action constituting enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or the Justice Department?

13. How many names and files appear in IGRS upon which no action constituting the enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, has been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or Justice Department?

14. What criteria has been established by the Internal Revenue Service governing the duration of a file or name in IGRS?

15. What procedures are followed by the Internal Revenue Service in disseminating files, names, and other information contained in IGRS to other agencies of the federal government?

16. To what other agencies of the federal government has information contained in IGRS been distributed? Have there been any instances in which information contained in IGRS has been disseminated to other federal agencies without following the procedures described in Item 15 above?

a. If so, specify each such instance, listing the name of the individual, group, or organization whose file was disseminated and the agency at whose request the file was disseminated.

17. Has the Internal Revenue Service received requests for the dissemination of information contained in IGRS which (a) were politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please furnish the Committee with the following:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

18. Were any members of the IGRS study group convened by William Kolar in 1969 participants in the formation or operation of the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify them and describe in detail their relationship with both the Special Services Staff and IGRS.

a. Was IGRS, either in its formative or operative stages, used to maintain and store information collected by the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify the nature of the information so stored and the nature of the information not so stored.

b. Was it a policy of the Internal Revenue Service that documents and files maintained by the Special Services Staff not be stored in IGRS or its generic predecessors? If so, please furnish the Committee with evidence of such policy.

c. What was the relationship between the formal creation of IGRS on May 4, 1973, and the decision of the IRS to review and purge Special Services Staff files on or about June 28, 1973?

d. Have any Special Service Staff files ever been transferred to IGRS? If so, please specify the name of the individual, group, or organization upon which the file was maintained and the date it was transferred to IGRS.

19. With regard to the recent suspension of IGRS activities on January 22, 1975, pending an internal review of its operations, please answer the following:

a. To what specific duties have personnel assigned to IGRS been reassigned pending the present Internal Revenue Service review of IGRS? Please furnish the names of the personnel reassigned and the offices and units to which they have been reassigned.

b. Please furnish the name of the IRS official who is charged with the primary responsibility for conducting the study of IGRS.

c. In what manner are IRS intelligence files being compiled and maintained pending completion of the study?

20. What is the relationship between the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service and Organized Crime Strike Forces?

21. On how many strike forces do IRS agents participate? Please identify the strike forces.

22. How many agents participate on each such strike force?

23. Has the involvement of IRS intelligence personnel on such strike forces been confined to investigation of tax-related matters? If not, please indicate the manner and extent of IRS involvement in non-tax-related actions of the strike forces. In this regard, provide the Committee with detailed summaries of IRS participation on strike forces which did not involve or were unrelated to enforcement of tax-related matters.

24. What intelligence gathering, compiling, and storage systems has the Internal Revenue Service maintained in addition to IGRS?

25. In December 1974 the Internal Revenue Service suspended the operation of IGRS pending an internal review of the system. Was this review prompted by concern that non-tax-related materials were being gathered, compiled, and stored in IGRS? If so, please furnish the Committee with all files, names, and other information contained in IGRS files which is non-tax related.

26. Has the Internal Security Division of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other division of the Internal Revenue Service, ever investigated any aspects of the intelligence gathering, compilation, storage, and dissemination procedures of the Internal Revenue Service? If so, please identify and describe all such investigations and describe any subsequent action taken by the Internal Revenue Service as a result of the investigation.

27. Has the IRS received requests for the dissemination of information which were either (a) politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please state:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual, or the nature of the information sought;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

28. Has the IRS ever engaged in mail cover or other mail surveillance activities, including the recording of dispatch and receipt of mail (other than to or from the IRS) and the opening of mail (other than to the IRS)? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

29. Please set forth the rules, regulations, and procedures which govern removal of taxpayers' names from the list of returns to be audited.

30. Has the IRS ever engaged in wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, or any other type of electronic surveillance? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

31. If the answer to #30 is yes, as to each instance of such activity, state:

a. The dates during which the activity occurred;

b. The type of device used;

c. Whether judicial approval was obtained in advance and, if so, from which court;

d. The subject of the activity;

e. Why the activity occurred;

f. The use or disposition which was made of the information collected;

g. The names and current addresses of the individuals who (a) performed or (b) supervised the activity and whether they are IRS employees.

32. Has the IRS ever been directed, requested, or advised by any other federal agency to use electronic listening devices? If so, please state as to each such direction, request, or advice:

a. The date;

b. The federal agency making it;

c. The proposed subject;

d. The action IRS took;

e. If surveillance resulted, please identify the incident among those listed in answer to number 31;

f. The date and nature of all documents relating to the direction, request, or advice.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-13-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

W.O. [illegible]

Prior memoranda have been submitted reporting that the Capitol Police Department would handle security checks of the space assigned to captioned Committees as well as the offices of the individual members.

Arrangements were made through the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives to advise us of the Committee Members who have their private offices checked and the dates on which these checks were made.

On June 13, 1975, Captain Eugene Brannon of the Capitol Police Force advised Inspector Bowers that three members of the Senate Committee and two members of the House Committee have had their private offices checked to date. These are:

Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) who had his office in room 245 Russell Senate Office Building and his Capitol office, room S-201 checked on 5-14-75.

Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) whose office in 6325 Dirkson Senate Office Building was checked on 5-22-75.

Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Penna.) whose office in 347 Russell Senate Office Building was checked on 6-5-75.

62-116464-

REC-102

62-116395-239

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Bowers

CONTINUED - OVER

17 JUN 19 1975

DWB:lgp
(7)

File 62-116395
62-116464

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP3 RM/JMC
MDR-16

84 JU 9 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SEANTE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Congressman Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.) whose office in 2265 Rayburn Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Congressman Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.) whose office in 1113 Longworth House Office Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Captian Brannon said they have no pending requests from other members of these Committees to make any checks of their offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
6/9/75
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - All Sections Chiefs
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

HOUSTUDY 75

By memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett captioned "Senstudy 75" dated 2/6/75, you were advised that "Senstudy 75" is the code word for the control file (62-116395) containing all communications relating to the Senate Select Committee's (SSC) investigation and study of Governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

In mid-February, 1975, the House of Representatives created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities which will have virtually the same jurisdiction and responsibilities as the above SSC. To date, practically all our work has been related to the SSC and only very recently has the House Select Committee (HSC) made any efforts to commence staffing.

As it appears, we can expect in the near future requests from the HSC similar to that already received from the SSC and in order to facilitate the administrative handling and retrieval, where necessary, of HSC requests and this Bureau's response to same, the code word "Houstudy 75" is being assigned to the control file (62-116464) containing all communications pertaining to the HSC and related matters.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

62-116464

(1)- 62-116395

TJM:mjc
(20)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 19 1975

84 JUN 19 1975.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Bureau has been requested to again make available Newark office secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski for interview by captioned Committee and that the Department and White House had instructed that they not be made available until such time as the Committee decides to allow Bureau representatives to be present during interview.

By way of background, you will recall that these employees were released from the Employment Agreement and were made available for interview on May 20, 1975, by captioned Committee. However, the Department in objection stated that they were desirous that a Bureau representative be present during the interview. The topic of the interview was to have been their duties and responsibilities during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Ultimately, neither the Department nor the White House could reach agreement concerning the interviews and the employees did not submit to interview.

On June 3, 1975, Michael Epstein, staff member of captioned Committee again requested these employees be made available for interview on June 5, 1975, at 10:00 a.m. The scope of the interview would be the responsibilities and duties performed during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

REC-100

62-116395-237

62-116395

17 JUN 18 1975

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-67-538691 (Personnel File Mary Ann Massa)
1-67-581180 (Personnel File M. Ann Mierzewski)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/2000 BY

PVD:lgp
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

MDR-16

84 J 8 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Epstein classified the interview as an "abuse" type and agreed to allow agents to be available but not present during interview.

On June 3, 1975, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, was advised of the request and of the fact that an agent could not be present during interview. He stated that the Department's position was that unless the Committee consented to allow Bureau personnel to be present, the interview would not go forth, and that he would advise Epstein and F. A. O. Schwarz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, of this decision.

Mr. O'Connor telephonically recontacted Special Agent Daly and advised that he discussed the matter with assistant to the Counsel of the President, James A. Wilderotter. Wilderotter told O'Connor it was the White House position that these girls should not be made available for interview unless the Committee allows Bureau personnel to be present. Wilderotter stated these two employees had been cited as examples wherein the White House felt interviews should not be conducted without representatives of the particular agency or Bureau being present as they are service personnel. According to Wilderotter, Schwarz agreed to this position.

O'Connor telephonically contacted Special Agent Daly on June 4, 1975, at which time he advised that he had discussed the interview with Schwarz, Epstein, and staff member Mark Gitenstein, and they would hold in abeyance the request to interview the employees pending a review of documents the Bureau is making available concerning 1964 Atlantic City Convention as stated in the Committee's request of ~~June~~ May 14, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD JBH/PVD WRW/TWL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : V.V. Kolombatovic

SUBJECT: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

This memorandum is to advise of the scheduled appearance, under oath, of former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague before the full Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., on 6/12/75.

On 6/4/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, U. S. Postal Service, advised Liaison Agent L.A. Crescioli that he was contacted this date by Mr. Montague who informed Jackson that he, Montague, was scheduled to appear before the full SSC on Thursday, 6/12/75. According to Jackson, Mr. Montague appeared to be very concerned about his appearance before this Committee. In fact, Montague requested that Jackson alert FBI Director Kelley to the fact that Montague will appear before this Committee. Montague did not indicate any specifics to Jackson as to why he was so concerned over his scheduled testimony before the Committee.

In the way of background, Montague was the Chief Postal Inspector from 1961 to the Spring of 1969, on which latter date Mr. William J. Cotter assumed the position of Chief Postal Inspector. Prior to 1961 Montague was the Inspector-in-Charge of the New York Division of the Postal Service. In the opinion of Mr. Jackson, Montague is a man of the highest integrity and most certainly is not involved in any wrongdoing. Jackson confidentially advised the Liaison Agent that it is his belief that Montague is so concerned about his appearance before the Committee because he may have to reveal certain agreements that prevailed in the past between the Bureau and the Postal Service concerning mail covers that have not been made public to date.

94-585-40-55

ORIGINAL FILED IN

LAC:tdp (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/ML
MOR-16

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Jackson added that he personally has no knowledge of what agreements or understandings between the Bureau and the Postal Service that may be divulged by Montague. He emphasized that Montague did not divulge such data to him.

In conclusion, Jackson stated that Montague is in a retired status and has just returned from an extended vacation in the Mediterranean area. Montague did inform Jackson that the Committee has authorized Montague to be accompanied before the Committee by personal counsel; however, Montague has decided that he will testify alone and without personal counsel.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 6/3/75

Transmit the following in ____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

REC-102

2-116395-236X

14 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2AM/lmf
MDR-16

Approved: ____ Sent ____ M Per ____
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

450 Golden Gate Avenue
Box 36015
San Francisco, California 94102

June 3, 1975

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums,

Mr. Don Jones, the Senior Resident Agent of the FBI Resident Agency in Berkeley, California, has referred to me your letter of May 28, 1975 asking certain information concerning the FBI's operation in Berkeley, California.

Your letter has been referred to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for appropriate action.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Bates
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF

MDR-16

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives

RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1417 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2661

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2490 CHANNING WAY, ROOM 202
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704
(415) 548-7767

201 13TH STREET, ROOM 105
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94604
(415) 763-0370

DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

May 28, 1975

Mr. Don Jones, Senior Resident Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P. O. Box 1033
Berkeley, California 94704

Dear Mr. Jones:

As you are aware, I have been concerned for some time about the nature of the Bureau's involvement in local law enforcement affairs. This concern has been heightened by my appointment to the House Select Committee to Investigate the U. S. Intelligence Community. In this light, I am requesting answers to the following questions concerning FBI activity in Berkeley:

1. What is the size of the contingent of agents in the Berkeley field office?
2. What are the functional responsibilities in the field office, and what are the percentages of agents involved in each, i.e., political, drug abuse, criminal, etc.?
3. What are the titles of the agents, and how do these relate to their involvement in category two?
4. What is the ethnic and sexual breakdown of the staff and agents in the Berkeley field office?
5. What are the interactions and working relationships between the field office, the Berkeley Police Department, the University of California Police Department, private security agencies and informers? How many informers are utilized by the field office?
6. Recent disclosures have raised serious questions regarding the Bureau's involvement in political surveillance activities of organizations and individuals over the past several years. What actions has the local field office taken to correct the abuses of these actions, and what political surveillance is being undertaken?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2 avm/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395-2318

7. I have read with interest of the Special Weapons and Tactics course given under Bureau auspices at the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Facility in Alameda County. I would appreciate your forwarding to me a description of the activities undertaken in this course, and the relationship of UCPD and BPD to the course. In addition, I would appreciate being provided any relevant information on SWAT that you have available.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

RVD/djc

6/3/75

AIRTEL AIR MAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2pvm/lmf

MDR-16

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Miller

REC- 102 62-116-[illegible]-236X

July 14, 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums:

This is in response to your letter dated May 28, 1975, sent to the Senior Resident Agent of the Berkeley, California, FBI Resident Agency.

To clarify your inquiries, it should be noted the Resident Agency at Berkeley, California, operates under the general supervision of the FBI's San Francisco Office.

There are currently nineteen Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley Resident Agency. All are white males. The function of a resident agency is to handle all FBI matters within its specific geographical territory. This includes criminal, security and applicant investigations. The FBI does not have primary jurisdiction regarding drug matters and does not conduct "political" investigations.

MAILED 7
JUL 15 1975
FBI

As a matter of policy, the FBI advises other governmental law enforcement agencies of matters coming to our attention which are within the investigative jurisdiction of those agencies. In some cases there is concurrent jurisdiction and a joint investigation may be conducted; however, local law enforcement agencies do not have access to FBI files. Representatives of private security agencies may be contacted from time to time in the course of discharging our official responsibilities just as any other citizens may be contacted. The FBI also utilizes the services of informants to develop information concerning matters within this Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; however, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss more specifically the number of such informants or the manner in which they are utilized.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JDM:lgp
(7)

WRW TJM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 Alm/lmf
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

84 AUG 1 1 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

As I have already indicated, the FBI does not conduct "political" investigations, nor do we conduct "political surveillances." We do, of course, have a responsibility for conducting domestic intelligence investigations authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential Directives and instructions of the Attorney General. These matters relate to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, and other activities involving the internal security of the United States. The policies relating to such investigations are not made on an ad hoc basis by individual Agents or individual offices, but conform with broad policy applicable to all offices.

The FBI offers a variety of courses of instruction for law enforcement personnel throughout the United States, including such subjects as anti-sniper and survival training and special weapons and tactics, commonly known as "SWAT". The basic purpose of this training is to provide well prepared teams capable of resolving highly dangerous situations with a minimum of risk to innocent bystanders, the law enforcement personnel involved and the subjects of the investigation.

Enclosed is a newsclipping describing some of the training of our own personnel in this field. The article appeared on June 1, 1975, in the "Washington Star News."

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosure

NOTE: The information concerning the Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley, California, Resident Agency was furnished by ASAC Druken, San Francisco.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: June 3, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

SUBJECT: ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. A. Mintz 4/11/75 recommended that a draft of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of the captioned Committees be coordinated with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other appropriate members of the intelligence community.

On 6/2/75 the draft Memorandum of Understanding was discussed by SA L. F. Schwartz with Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, who advised that the draft had been reviewed by CIA and by the Security Committee on behalf of the intelligence community. They requested that the draft be revised in order to recognize the need for certain Staff Members to be cleared for access to compartmented information (a procedure already being followed by the Church Committee) and the desire of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that it be made clear that the DCI will only offer his advice upon the request of the Committee Chairman and that in all cases the final determination as to clearance is the responsibility of the Committee Chairman.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Attached is a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the changes proposed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore which changes are underscored. Both Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church.

REC-100

62-116395
Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-236

LES:ekw
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 AM/lmk
MOR-16

JUN 18 1975

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ACTIVITIES
62-116395

RECOMMENDATION:

If the attached revised draft is acceptable to the Bureau, it will be provided to the Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Congressman Nedzi. In accordance with opinion expressed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, a copy will not be furnished to Senator Church.

WS

WVC

PLM

QRS

LET TO A.G.
ENCL. LHM FOR HSC
6/12/75 HFS: dmt

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information, in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI willffurnish a summary memorandum containing therresults of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2016 BY SP2
MOR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-256

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters, Jr.

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 3/12/75, and my memorandum, 3/25/75, both captioned as above.

By referenced memorandum dated 3/12/75, Legal Counsel recommended that the Intelligence Division (INTD) discuss with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other members of the intelligence community procedures for clearing staff members of captioned committees for access to classified information when questions as to the individual's trustworthiness have arisen in the course of the FBI's background investigation. Following such discussions, Legal Counsel recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding concerning these matters be prepared by the INTD which might be used by both Senate and House Committees.

By memorandum 3/25/75, the INTD submitted for approval a draft of a proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for staff members of captioned committees. Special Investigative Division disagreed with several features of our draft memorandum and has prepared a revised memorandum, which is attached for approval.

The INTD has coordinated this matter with the Special Investigative Division and interposes no objection to the text of the revised memorandum; however, it is suggested that consideration be given to adding the words "by the FBI" at the end of paragraph five on page one. Paragraph five, thus modified, would read: "Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI."

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116395

Enclosure

AFW:dsh dsh
(7)

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-235

8 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION ADDENDUM SEE PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMF
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Mintz
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Discussions of this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community have been held in abeyance pending approval within the FBI as to the text of the proposed memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, that attached revised memorandum be coordinated by the INTD with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community prior to review by the Attorney General and transmittal to Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi by Legal Counsel Division.

Addendum

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division concurs with the general thrust of the memorandum of understanding, however, it is suggested the following wording be added where indicated:

Page 1, paragraph 3, insert after the word applicant, or employee. On line 2, change "applicant's" to read "person's".

Page 1, paragraph 4, after the word determined insert by the respective Chairman,.

Page 2, paragraph 1, after the word necessary insert by the Committee,.

Per

Jma

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information. ①

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant (OR EMPLOYEE), the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the ~~applicant's~~ PERSON'S suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined BY THE RESPECTIVE CHAIRMAN to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI. ②

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 alm/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395-235

ENCLOSURE

The DCI will furnish his observations as to eligibility for access to classified information to the appropriate Committee Chairman for his consideration. The Committee Chairman will render the final determination after consultation, where it is deemed necessary, BY THE COMMITTEE, with the interested agencies.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. Adams memorandum to Mr. Callahan dated 3/7/75, captioned as above, copy attached, reported our conversation with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi.

As indicated in Mr. Adams' memorandum, Congressman Nedzi asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI, and the House Committee concerning investigative and clearance procedures for members of the Committee's staff. It appeared appropriate to us to coordinate a memorandum of understanding to be drafted for the House Committee with that to be drafted for the Senate Committee. Therefore, following our return from the meeting with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi, I called Bill Miller and advised him of the request made by Congressman Nedzi for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding. I asked him whether it would be possible for us to coordinate the language of that memorandum with the understanding that it will be drafted for use by the CIA, other members of the intelligence community, and the Church Committee. Mr. Miller said that the proposal to coordinate the memorandum was completely acceptable to him and he requested that the draft memorandum being prepared for Congressman Nedzi be furnished him for review and possible adoption as the memorandum to be used by the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division discuss this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community and prepare a draft memorandum of understanding that may be used by both House and Senate committees.

Bufile 62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

JUN 18 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

MDR-16

JUN 18 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-116464-

4/9/75 [illegible] to Mintz memo

memo Wannall to Mintz 4/11/75 AFW:dsh

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 3/7/75 Mr. Mintz and I called on Senator Church and his staff director, Bill Miller, to further discuss the procedures for investigating and clearing staff employees of the Committee, particularly where information might be developed raising a question as to the propriety of a clearance. It had previously been approved that the FBI would conduct the background investigations, furnishing the results to Senator Church, and after his determination that the individuals met the required criteria for access to classified information he would notify CIA of his determination and intent to employ the individual involved, at which time CIA would grant the necessary clearance based on the certification by Senator Church.

In discussions between CIA and FBI representatives, we raised the question as to whether CIA would review the results of the investigation prior to granting clearances and CIA representatives indicated they did not intend to and were reluctant to inquire of Senator Church as to whether they could be furnished the results of any investigations involving derogatory information.

In discussing this matter with Senator Church, I inquired whether he had any objection to our bringing to the attention of CIA any questionable cases in order that CIA representatives, who have the responsibility of granting the actual clearances, would be in a position to advise and counsel with Senator Church on those individual cases. He had absolutely no objection to this and, in fact, felt there should be an open communication between FBI, CIA and his Committee to insure that no one was appointed and cleared who did not measure up in every respect from a security standpoint.

I discussed with him the particular case of Stanley Rawson Sloan, the results of which I had brought for delivery to Senator Church. Sloan was

Wannall to [illegible], [illegible] 4/1/75.

REC-100

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MML

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

SEE

17 JUN 18 1975

JBA:ams
(5)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

MOE-1C

CONTINUED - OVER

formerly employed by CIA and resigned in December, 1974, after his clearance for sensitive compartmented information had been lifted as a result of his marrying an alien. This marriage would not preclude him from clearance for access to lesser degrees of sensitive material but only for the more sophisticated clearances. Mr. Miller advised that Sloan had not been appointed and was not going to be appointed because of other reasons unrelated to a security clearance.

Senator Church indicated that he felt it would be wise to prepare a memorandum outlining our security clearance procedures and his staff would be glad to prepare such a document.

Following the meeting with Senator Church, Mr. Mintz and I dropped by to see Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the House Committee, and delivered to him Mr. Kelley's letter congratulating him and offering him our complete cooperation. Chairman Nedzi stated that he was very appreciative of this offer and would consider Mr. Kelley's request to confer with him as an open invitation and as soon as things had shaken down he would be in touch with us.

We discussed with him the investigative and clearance procedures we were following with the Senate Committee and Chairman Nedzi agreed the same procedures should be followed with his Committee, including our making available to CIA any derogatory information which might be pertinent to a clearance determination. At first, he suggested that we send the results of our investigations to CIA before coming to the Committee but then concluded that it would be more appropriate for them to come to him first since some of the applicants under consideration would probably not be appointed. He specifically asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI and himself.

I asked Mr. Nedzi whether he felt the formulation of his Committee would serve to trim down the number of requests for information being received from various House committees and it was his opinion that it would help in some instances; however, in others committee chairmen would pursue their own inquiries. He personally did not feel he had the clout nor the desire to try to preempt this area entirely for his Committee. He also stated he felt that CIA's problems had in the main been fully exposed and would soon be

CONTINUED - OVER

of less concern, whereas the concern over domestic security policies of the FBI would undoubtedly be greater in the future. He expressed his appreciation for our cooperation and indicated he was striving for a responsible approach to the inquiry.

Following the meeting with Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Mintz and I agreed that it would be best for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding concerning the investigative and clearance procedures for both Committees in order to try to insure uniformity, and Mr. Mintz will get in touch with Bill Miller to seek his concurrence in that regard. Our efforts will be coordinated with CIA and the proposed memorandum as drawn up will be submitted for the Director's approval.

ACTION:

Information only.

CONTINUED - OVER

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. CHURCH

MAY 21, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration
JUNE 5, 1975
Reported without amendment
JUNE 6, 1975
Considered and agreed to

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2006 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

REC-100 62-116395-233

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 18 1975

94th CONGRESS
1st Session

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

May 21, 1975

Mr. Church submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

June 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. Cannon, without amendment

Senstudy 6-75

June 6, 1975

Considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

V

62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-28-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated 5-22-75 you were advised that former SA Robert Nichols had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee, at which time Seidel attempted to arrange an interview of Nichols. Nichols was advised by Deputy Assistant Director Jack E. Herington of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 pertaining to Departmental approval prior to furnishing information from Bureau files. He was also reminded that he had signed an employee agreement with the Bureau agreeing to maintain confidentiality of the information contained in Bureau files. He was advised if he requested, the Bureau would make available a representative to accompany him should he be interviewed by the Committee.

Former SA Nichols telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 5-28-75 and advised he had been recontacted by Mr. Seidel. Seidel requested and Nichols agreed to travel to Washington, D. C., on the morning of 5-30-75 for an interview at the Committee's offices. Nichols stated that Seidel indicated the scope of the interview would be concerning Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether this was to be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an executive session of the Committee. He stated he was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the Bureau make available a representative so that Nichols may consult with him during the interview if need be.

62-116395-232

EX-105 REC-20 JUN 6 1975

Mr. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted by Nichols as being his private counsel but that the Agent would assist Nichols in making determination whether a specific question should be responded to or whether a response could properly be declined because an answer might compromise a source,

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMC
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Personnel File 67-414885
(Former SA Robert Nichols)
1 - Mr. Hotis

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

sensitive investigative technique, divulge information furnished the Bureau by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources or adversely affecting an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Mr. Nichols that if he so desires, he could, of course, obtain the services of private counsel. He indicated it was his intention to arrive in Washington Thursday night, 5-29-75. He was requested to appear in the Office of Legal Analysis, Room 4513, at approximately 8:15 a.m. on the morning of 5-30-75 so that arrangements might be made to brief him by the Office of Legal Analysis and subsequently by the Intelligence Division. Nichols stated he would do so.

The Office of Legal Analysis is attempting to obtain from Committee representatives further information as to the circumstances and exact time of interview of Nichols.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Intelligence Division representative be made available to accompany Nichols to his interview with captioned Committee.

2) That Nichols be released from his employment agreement to respond to questions concerning our investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters.

PUD JBH/PUD

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Hotis

On May 27, 1975, James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, requested me and representatives of other agencies interested in the arrangements concerning interviews of witnesses by the Senate Select Committee to confer with him and Roderick Hills at 2:30 p.m. that date at the White House. Mr. K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Inspector John B. Hotis and I represented the Department and the FBI. Roderick Hills and James A. Wilderotter represented the President's counsel; Bob Andrews represented the Defense Department; John Warner, General Counsel, CIA; Roy Banner, General Counsel of NSA, and Mr. Hyland from State Department as well as John Clark, Deputy to the Director of CIA, attended.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the latest version of proposed procedures to be followed by the Committee staff investigators during interviews of former and current employees. Roderick Hills presented a document (copy attached) which he described as a counteroffer by Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee. He called for general discussion of the document after indicating that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Schwarz at lunch on May 27th and felt that it was a workable document. I pointed out to Mr. Hills that the document provides that there would be notice to the agencies of the identity of witnesses at reasonable time prior to interviews or taking of sworn testimony except where "the committee or its appropriate delegee" determines that prior notice should not be given. I told him that I was concerned that that provision would be used by the Committee staff to permit individual staff investigators to make that determination and I was confident they would do so.

EX-105

REC-20 62-116395-231

ENCLOSURE

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (7)

7 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ADM/MC
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

8 4 JUN 18 1975

Mr. Hills was reluctant to seek a modification of the language indicating that he had an understanding with Mr. Schwarz that the authority would be limited to the senior counsel and to members of the Committee. I told Mr. Hills I would request that the language be modified in writing so that the authority would be conferred on specific representatives of the Committee to avoid having staff authority which I thought would be abused. Mr. Hills finally agreed that the language would be modified so that the authority would be available only to both Committee senior counsel and/or a combination of senior counsel and a Committee member. Further, the language would be modified to require that the determination that an agency would not be given prior notice of a pending witness interview would be recorded in writing for the Committee's records.

I asked Mr. Wilderotter and Mr. Hills whether this agreement was to be made between the staff and the agencies or whether it in fact would be accepted by the Committee. After some discussion, we were advised by Mr. Hills and Mr. Wilderotter that the document would be submitted to the full Committee for their approval and incorporated into the Committee's records.

I pointed out that I believed it was necessary for the understanding to be made between the Committee and the Executive in order for there to be some basis for restraining Committee staff investigators who may not be inclined to follow the rules.

Other proposed changes discussed would require the Committee representative to furnish to a witness a copy of the Committee's rules which includes advice concerning the right to counsel and a copy of the proposed guidelines for witness interviews.

I recommended that the guidelines be expanded to address the problem of existing secrecy agreements with former and present employees and the procedural problem involved in Attorney General Order 501-73 which requires prior Departmental approval in order for a witness to respond to a subpoena. As a result, Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28, 1975, that he would recommend the addition of a sentence in the opening paragraph that would indicate the guidelines would not be understood to impair the constitutional rights of individual witnesses, agency agreements with employees or former employees, existing Departmental orders or the Committee's own rules.

CONTINUED - OVER

Other minor changes were considered and an effort will be made to correct the language so that the agencies will be obliged to make reasonable efforts to comply with all Committee requests instead of being required to furnish "all information" absolutely.

Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28th that the comments described above will be discussed with Frederick Schwarz in an effort to finally resolve this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Source: Hills 5/27

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

It is hoped that these voluntary guidelines will permit the Select Committee investigation to proceed without undue delay, but it is also recognized that these guidelines do not cover all points or anticipate all problems and that, therefore, either the Select Committee or some agency under investigation may have reason not to follow these suggested guidelines.

Also, it is recognized that this outline is without prejudice to the respective legal positions of the agencies and the Select Committee as to the production of specific information by way of documents or testimony. Not to impair Const. rights of ind. witness, agency rules or agreements, comm rule.

A. Classification of Interviews/Preliminary Testimony

The parties to this investigation by the Select Committee recognize that interviews/preliminary testimony to be conducted by the Committee staff will generally be of two separate and distinct natures.

(1) Those primarily seeking information concerning (A) the overall structure and functions of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; (B) the substantive work being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; and (C) the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-231

des 1 '97. [illegible] comm

(2) Those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

An agency representative will be present, as a general rule, at interviews/preliminary testimony in the first category for the purpose of assisting the Committee's investigation and facilitating the protection of information important to the national interest which is pertinent to the investigation. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews/preliminary testimony in the second category. The parties recognize, however, that for special reasons exceptions can be made in either case: i.e., when good reason exists, endorsed by the Select Committee, agency representatives may not be present for interviews/preliminary testimony falling under the first category, and for good and sufficient reason the agency may [seek to] have a representative present in the second category subject to the approval, of course, of the Select Committee.

B. Procedures to be Employed in Category (2).

When the Select Committee has identified a specific subject as a potential abuse or impropriety and has so notified the agency involved of its designation, that agency will, subject to the second sentence hereof, make [every effort] to provide the Select Committee

with all information and materials that it has on the subject. There will be a mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate.

In abuse or impropriety interviews/preliminary testimony, the following procedures will prevail.

(1) Witnesses will be identified to the agency a reasonable time prior to interviews or taking sworn testimony. This general rule includes current employees, former employees or others who have or have had a relationship with the agency.

Exceptions

~~Written record~~ conf [illegible]

A. Where the Committee or its appropriate delegee ~~by written [illegible]~~ stet believes that prior identification of a witness could adversely affect the witness' willingness to be interviewed or to be forthcoming, or could otherwise hinder the investigation, such prior notice ~~by written authorization~~ will not be given, but in such cases the agency shall be given a general indication of the points or areas to be covered to the extent that is feasible without undercutting the reason for not providing prior notice in the first instance. Delegees shall consist of both Comm. senior counsel or a comb of senior counsel and committee member.

B. In certain cases, the Committee might notify the agency, if the agency agrees not to contact the witness before his appearance. The agency could identify for the Committee special security matters concerning prospective witnesses and provide information on how to locate a witness.

(2) When the Committee contacts a witness, it will explain the security and other arrangements between the Committee and the agency, as well as serve the witness a copy of these ground rules and a copy of the Committee rules. If the witness wishes to consult with the agency prior to his appearance, the Committee will not discourage or seek to interfere with that desire in any way and will help the witness contact the agency representative.

(3) Whenever they are not present at interviews or the taking of sworn statements, agency representatives will be available for consultations regarding the handling of special security matters.

(4) Whether or not an agency has notice of an interview or sworn statement, the Committee will inform the agency of the general substantive points covered as soon as possible thereafter, unless disclosure of the substance of a particular interview would make discernible the identity of a confidential source. In such cases, the Committee shall, to the extent feasible without undercutting that decision, notify the agency in general terms of the points or areas covered, and the fact that it has interviewed a witness on such matters.

(5) Whenever an agency receives prior notice of a particular interview or taking of a sworn statement, it will also be notified

of the general subject areas and periods of employment in which the Committee is primarily interested. The agency will then check the subject's personnel history file and advise the Committee of any exceptionally sensitive aspects of the subject's employment or activity which require special handling.

(6) If because of concern about security of sensitive information, a witness feels unable to give a responsive answer to a particular question, the witness shall so indicate to the interviewer. The questioner and witness may then consult with the agency representative with respect to an appropriate response which will facilitate the provision of pertinent information and its protection. These matters should be worked out forthwith and ordinarilv before the close of the interview/testimony session.

(7) The Committee is responsible for providing special handling of interview notes and other working notes in a manner which will protect sensitive material. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee will consult with the agencies concerned regarding the appropriate disposition of any such notes which have not been destroyed following the preparation of finished Committee documents. The agencies will indicate which of these notes it feels are too sensitive to be stored under the Archives

arrangement being established for the general disposition of the Committee's working papers and non-public reports.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

231 THRU 235

236 THRU 1ST NR 237

1ST NR 238, 239

241, 242

244, 245

247

249, 1ST NR 249

252 THRU 254

255 THRU 260

262 THRU 265

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

Alan G. Sentinella

May 21, 1975

The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood

Sent 6 H 6, 6/9/75
1 - Dir - SENSTUDY
Att: K. William O'Connor
Spec. Coun. Intelligence Coordination
[illegible]-2
ELH:mj
Senstudy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-265

to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were

assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

A. None.

Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted

to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

See attached pages ITEM II

Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison.

A. I do not recall that I was ever, apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior ~~to that time which~~ thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

Q. Why would Harding know this information?

A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes.?

A. Yes.

Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony.?

A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

A. Richard Hamilton.

Q. When did he assume these cases?

A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

A. It did not develop any such information.

Q. How did you know of what~~ever~~ their CP affiliation may have been?

A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

A. I did not have the cases at that time.

Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How?

A. From information in the appropriate file.

Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances,

airtels, letters, memoranda?

A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

Q. What was the gist of such communications?

A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

A. No.

Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign.

A. I have no such recollection.

Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned. ← SEE ITEM I. of attached pages

Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

Q. Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

Q. Kitchen floor?

A. Yes.

Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy ~~had~~ changed, it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation. See ITEM III of attached pages.

Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights ~~complications~~ Complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

See ~~[illegible]~~ ITEM IV of attached pages

A. ~~Yes.~~ I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

Q. What about prior to 1965?

A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having KLAN ~~King~~ connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

A. Yes, I did not have any such contact.

Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were ~~or~~ that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category.

I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

A. No.

Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

Q. Who were some of those?

A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

A. Henry Rouse.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

Q. Recently testimony was given be one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

A. It is not my recollection that they did.

Q. What about a Klan organization?

A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceivably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

A. I do not know.

THIS WOULD READ BETTER IF MOVED TO PAGE 19

It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued.

Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted

such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Sidell he was not asking him to make any changes. He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time No longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened, it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

→ FROM P 18

Had such been furnished at an earlier date

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 9, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

Senstudy-75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIV... OPERATIONS WITH

Reference is made to my letter dated May 22, 1975, forwarding a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning testimony subsequently given by Mr. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

for info. only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR - Dept of Justice, 11/22/76 - JCB

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP165K/JG

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw
(14)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-102

62-116395-265

HAND carried to AG 6-10-75

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

62-116395

June 9, 1975

1-Mr.W.O.Cregar
1-Mr.S.F.Phillips

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4JAM/LG
ON 2-20-81
6076

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BEFORE
SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION

Reference is made to the memorandum of this Bureau dated May 22, 1975, reporting a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella, a retired SA of the FBI. That statement concerned the interview of Sentinella by an SSC Staff Member on May 12, 1975.

Pursuant to a subpoena, Mr. Sentinella testified before an Executive Session of the SSC on May 21, 1975, after which he voluntarily furnished the FBI a statement concerning his testimony. Set out below is the verbatim text of that statement.

~~CLASS. & EXT. BY SD16SK/gg 10/31/80~~
~~REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 3~~
~~DATE OF REVIEW 6-9-95~~

"Alan G. Sentinella"

"May 21, 1975

"The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw
(13)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
aboratory ___
an. & Eval. ___
. Inv. ___
ing ___
Coun. ___
one Rm. ___
r Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JBA

62-116395-263

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

"The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

"Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

"Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

"A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

"A. None.

"Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

"A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

"Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

"A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

"Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

"A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

"Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison?

"A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

"Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

~~DENTIAL~~

"A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

"Q. Why would Harding know this information?

"A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

"Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

"A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

"Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

"A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

"Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

"A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

"Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

"A. I did not.

~~DENTIAL~~

"Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

"A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

"Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

"A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

"Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

"A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

"Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

"A. Richard Hamilton.

"Q. When did he assume these cases?

"A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

"Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

"A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

"Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

"A. Yes, he was.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

"A. It did not develop any such information.

"Q. How did you know of what their CP affiliation may have been?

"A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

"Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

"A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

"Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

"A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

"Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

"A. I did not have the cases at that time.

"Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How?

"A. From information in the appropriate file.

"Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances, airtels, letters, memoranda?

"A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

"Q. What was the gist of such communications?

"A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

"Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

"A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

"Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

"A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

"Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

"A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

"Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign?

"A. I have no such recollection.

"Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

"A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned.

"Q. What about Julian Bond's campaign? Any effort to influence that?

"A. No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

"Q. What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

"A. None to my knowledge beyond such coverage as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

"Q. In same manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature. My answer was that my only concern had been with former Governor Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the Pickrick restaurant.

"Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

"A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

"Q. William Sullivan, whowas formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

"A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

"Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

"A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

"Q. Was King given a nickname in the Atlanta Office?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was it?

"A. "Zorro."

"Q. How did that come about?

"A. I believe that began with Mr. Nichols and just passed on down.

"Q. Why was that name selected?

"A. I do not know precisely.

"Q. Don't you have any idea?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for it?

"A. As I remember, "Zorro" was either a television or movie character who carried a sword and therefore could be referred to as a swordsman.

"Q. What connection had this with King?

"A. The Reverend King participated in a number of extra-marital relations and therefore it seemed fitting that in the vernacular the reference swordsman applied to him.

"Q. What extra-marital activities were there?

"A. There were several women involved.

"Q. How do you know this?

"A. It was indicated on occasions by conversations.

"Q. How?

"A. By reference to a previous escapade with an individual or to one pending.

"Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

"A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

"Q. Kitchen floor?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

"A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

"Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

"A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

"Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

"A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy changed, it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

"Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

"Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

"A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

"Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

"Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

"A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation.

"I cannot be certain - I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

"Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

"A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

"A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

"Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

"Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

"A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

"Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

"A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

"Q. What about prior to 1965?

"A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having Klan connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

"Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

"A. Yes. I did not have any such contact.

"Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

"A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category. I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

"Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

"A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

"Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

"A. No.

"Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

"A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

"Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

"A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

"Q. Who were some of those?

"A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

"Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

"A. Henry Rouse.

"Q. Where is he now?

"A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

"Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

"Q. Recently testimony was given by one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

"A. It is not my recollection that they did.

"Q. What about a Klan organization?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

"I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceivably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

"Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

"A. I do not know.

"Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

"Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

"The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes.

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened. Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

"The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

"It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued."

On June 4, 1975, Sentinella advised the FBI of the following additional information concerning this matter.

Sentinella received a telephone call that day from Seidel who advised him that the transcript of Sentinella's testimony was near completion and that Sentinella would receive a letter advising him it was ready for Sentinella's review, but only in SSC space.

Seidel sought from Sentinella and was furnished names of some FBI personnel who had monitored technical surveillance on King during the pertinent period. Seidel sought information concerning who supervised the King investigation at FBI Headquarters, to which Sentinella replied that he did not know any specifics. Seidel referred back to information from Sentinella both during the original interview and during Sentinella's testimony and Seidel asked why Sentinella had discussed the matter with former FBI Agent Harding. It was Sentinella's reply that he sought Harding's help in order to rectify what he thought was a wrong answer given to Seidel during the initial interview.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentintella's verbatim statement which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The additional information Sentinella furnished 6/4/75 was telephoned by him to Phillips. On that occasion Sentinella also advised that Seidel had inquired of him that day as to whether he had discussed with Phillips the King case after arriving in Washington, D.C., and prior to testifying. Sentinella stated that he had not.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/13/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Documents Pertaining to the Huston Plan, Cointelpro and other Practices and Programs

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/74, Appendix C, Part I, Item 7, 8.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"S"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

LIAISON

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

With CIA concurrence, SSC was furnished with copies of documents maintained by the Bureau relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, with the resultant temporary discontinuance of formal liaison between the FBI and the CIA.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

LWC
Ewg

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 - TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF

3791 (6-75)

MOR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/13/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS
HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMEN

Originating Office: FBI 37

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec. Sec.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

Appendix C
Part I, #7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 Alm/dmf
mor-16

(Additional questions)

ITEM I.

Q: What about JULIAN BOND's Campaign? Any effort to influence that?

A: No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

Q: What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

A: None to my knowledge beyond such coverage ~~of SNCC of which organization he~~ as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

Q: [In some manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature]. My answer was ~~that~~ - my: only concern ~~that~~ then with former Governor

62-116395-2165

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/16/2000 BY SP2BAM/lmc
mdr-16

ENCLOSURE

Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the PICKRICK restaurant].

✓ITEM II
Re page 5, first Q. and A. set forth.

It seems this is where Lidell asked a question concerning other source (other than electronic) material re Levison. However, he went on talking and never actually posed a question as such; accordingly it was not answered.

OR

the above may have been related to the last Q. appearing at bottom of page 7.

ITEM III.

I cannot be certain — I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

ITEM IV.

Re page 14 and the answer you inquired about.

I'm sure my answer was as it now appears on page 14, i.e. corrected.

I did not say *there was no* connection. I'm sure I only introduced the negative when he asked if I would *deny* there was such connection.

I believe "Yes" may have come in here in answering a question raised by your steno.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 7, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. Item number 8, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed copies of 13 FBI communications.

In connection with your request for memoranda pertaining to inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, a search of the files of the FBI at Washington, D. C., and Denver, Colorado, does not indicate that any such inspections or administrative inquiries took place.

RLM:mam
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO & THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-264

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory RLM
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

With reference to the information furnished by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley contained in the communication from the Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, to the Director of the FBI, dated May 8, 1970, your specific attention is directed to the restrictions placed by Dr. Smiley on the information furnished by him. On June 4, 1975, Dr. Smiley was recontacted, at which time he advised that under no circumstances would he testify in public to the information which he originally furnished to the FBI on a confidential basis. He further advised that under no circumstances would he reveal the identity of his contact in the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in the May 8, 1970, communication. He agreed to the release of the information in the May 8, 1970, communication to the SSC on a strictly confidential basis, for its use only and not for any further dissemination. Dr. Smiley stated he has no information other than that in the May 8, 1970, communication.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Concurrence to pass the 2/26/70 letter, with Secret enclosures, from Richard Helms, then Director of CIA, to J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of FBI, was obtained by Liaison Officer Leon F. Schwartz from Walter Elder, CIA on 6/10/75. The response to requests set forth in Appendix C, Part I, Item numbers 7 and 8 is being made in the same communication to avoid unnecessary duplication since the severing of liaison with CIA grew out of the RIHA matter.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

A. W. Gray memorandum to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/70, states "our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958." This information only appears on the cover page of the report of SA Daniel J. Griffin, dated, 8/31/60 at Boston. The information was furnished by Riha during interview on 8/11/60 and has never been given to us by CIA.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (28)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RLM:mam
(9)

RLM

Delivered To Mr. [illegible] Meeltham [illegible]

[illegible] 7/11/75

REC- 102

62-116395-264

17 JUN 25 1975

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~ RLM

Dir.
AD Adm.
AD Inv.
yst.
Affairs
& Com.

JUN 2 ? 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: **FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*) ☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☒ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER	2. DATE PROVIDED 6/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting testimony given by former FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the SSC.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*) **NA**	6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*) **U**

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence activities, domestic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Testimony covered former FBI investigation of:

1) Martin Luther King, Jr.
2) Stanley David Levison
3) Southern Christian Leadership Conference

5-18

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:1hb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 LFS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP[illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~XC~~ 3/Ar ~~XC~~ R. Prong

XC (1)/FC

Patch III

Assembly

264

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVE[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : DIRECTOR, F.B.I. February 12, 1970

ROM : SAC, DENVER

UBJECT: THOMAS RIHA

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was called by MIKE TODOROVICH, who is in charge of the CIA office here in Denver. TODOROVICH stated he has instructions from his Washington Office to contact Denver District Attorney JAMES MC KEVITT and tell MC KEVITT that CIA Agent JOHN D. FRITZ who is stationed in Boulder, Colorado, had told Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, former President of the University of Colorado, that FRITZ had been told that THOMAS RIHA's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that RIHA was, in fact, all right. TODOROVICH then told me that FRITZ got this information from an FBI Agent in Boulder.

I told TODOROVICH to give me the name of the FBI Agent and he stated he would not do so. He then stated the FBI Agent told him, TODOROVICH the same thing. I again requested the name of the Agent. He again declined to give it to me. I very emphatically told TODOROVICH that until he gave me the name of the Agent who supposedly gave him and FRITZ this information, that I would not believe that either he or FRITZ had been given any information such as this by any Agent of this Bureau and this was based on the fact that no Agent would have any reason whatsoever to make such a statement since we had not conducted any investigation in this matter nor did we have any information concerning RIHA and, therefore, we would not be in a position to make such a statement as to whether or not RIHA was all right.

I then also pointed out to Mr. TODOROVICH that if he gave the information to Mr. MC KEVITT and advised Mr. MC KEVITT the information had come from an FBI Agent and if Mr. MC KEVITT contacted me I would certainly advise him that the information did not come from anyone in the FBI for the same reasons as set forth above.

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum that they have not made such statements as were attributed to them by TODOROVICH. Not only that, neither of the two has ever had any contact personally or otherwise with JOHN D. FRITZ, the CIA representative in Boulder.

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of CIA's actions in connection with this matter.

1. Protests CIA re Todorovich's actions
2. Commends SAC re his handling of Todorovich.
H

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and when it may have happened.

While avoiding specifics about their theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest Wednesday in knowing more about the housewife's recollection that she telephoned Riha and carried on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon that Monday, the day when he first failed to show up for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph Smiley, Denver police chief George Seaton or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officials to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it "is entirely out of our jurisdiction."

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70
Edition: Home
Author: Alan Cunningham
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM

Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder housewife is certain she talked to Thomas ha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first led to show up for his history classes at the Univer- y of Colorado.

What is even more remarka- than this, in the opinion of se who have been trying to down the exact date of ba's disappearance, is the man's insistence that Riha s cheerful, relaxed and inter- ted in chatting about a local litical issue.

The woman, who asks that she t be identified by name, has ld the News she was in the ocess of telephoning a list of ulder citizens last March, eking support for a proposed ection on whether the city ould take over its public utili- es.

While she had been involved the issue for several weeks, e is sure it was on Monday, arch 17, that she attempted to ach a dozen people whose mes began with the letters P" and "R." Among the three four whom she was able to ach that day, she insists, was homas Riha. She says he an- vered the telephone at his me at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, leasant and quite interested in e municipal issue, according the Boulder housewife. In ct, she explained, his name as on the list because he had arlier sent in a reader survey ballot" from a Boulder news- aper which related to the issue.

As a result, Riha struck her as more informed on it than most others she had talked to in her telephone inquiries, and she believes the conversation lasted about 10 minutes, making it the longest in which she took part that day.

The date, if the Boulder house- ife is correct, is significant, ince Riha reportedly missed a inner party to which he was in- ited the previous night, and ould not be reached on Satur- lay, March 15, by a friend who ried to telephone him repeat- dly.

Many people interested in the case have speculated that Riha eft Boulder, was kidnaped or died as early as that Friday or Sat[illegible]

professor who was rumored to have seen Riha on Sunday, the 16th, vigorously dismissed this rumor as untrue when asked about it Tuesday.

But the Boulder housewife who made the series of telephone calls is equally adamant about the date when she talked to Riha. She says she didn't know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist. Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alvie and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported no reply yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70
Edition: Home
Author:
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

Following is typewritten clarification of the handwritten comment of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

"I don't. I still want name of our agt which Todorovich gave to Dr. Smiley. H"

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan S/

DATE: 2-18-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 2/10/70, SAC Werner, Denver, demanded that Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver, identify Bureau Agent who allegedly told a CIA officer that the subject's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that subject, in fact, was alright. Todorovich refused to do so. The Director instructed that we protest to CIA regarding Todorovich's actions.

On 2-17-70, Liaison Agent Papich vigorously protested Todorovich's actions to CIA, charging the Agency with impeding our inquiry. He pointed out that Todorovich's stubborn refusal to divulge the identity of the Bureau Agent involved was unacceptable because we had no information to support the statement attributed to our Agent. As a result of Papich's protest, a CIA official telephoned Todorovich and demanded that he divulge the identity of the Agent. Todorovich refused and stated that he considered this a matter of personal honor and that unless there was reason to believe Bureau operations were being adversely effected, he would not make the identification. CIA officials subsequently advised the Liaison Agent that they had reviewed the entire case and learned that District Attorney McKevitt publicly stated on 2-14-70 that the statement attributed to Dr. Smiley (which allegedly came to him via Todorovich from our Agent) was based on an "honest mistake" and that McKevitt felt this cleared the air and no further clarification was needed.

ACTION:

None. For information.

I dont. I still want name of [illegible] Agent [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] H.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 2-20-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to memorandum dated 2-18-70 from D. J. Brennan to Sullivan. The Director stated that he wants the name of the FBI Agent who had furnished certain information to Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver. The Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, on 2-20-70, repeating the background of this matter and reiterated the protest made earlier by the Bureau and asked that CIA obtain the identity of the FBI Agent.

Helms advised that he considered this a most serious development and fully recognizes the gravity of the situation since it has such a significant bearing on relations between the two agencies and the highly important work of both organizations. He stated that he does not have the identity of the FBI Agent and so far Todorovich has refused to disclose same. Helms advised that he is requesting Todorovich to proceed to Washington, D. C., immediately at which time he will be interviewed in detail by Helms. In the meantime, the CIA Director is requesting his subordinates to prepare for him a complete report covering all information in possession of CIA regarding the subject. He stated that he will communicate with the Bureau immediately after talking to Todorovich. He stated that it was absolutely necessary that he make certain that he has all the relevant facts so that he can accurately respond to the Director and take the proper and necessary administrative action within his own organization.

I shall await word.
H

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 25, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On February 24, 1970, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Richard Helms had instructed him to transmit the following message to the Director.

Pursuant to instructions from Helms, Mike Todorovich, CIA representative in Denver, arrived in Washington, D. C., on February 24, 1970, and Helms initiated his interview. Helms expects to complete the interview including an examination of various CIA records within two days, upon the completion of which he will be transmitting a personal letter to the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "Werner acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. Papich has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. Michael Todorovich. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to Dr. Joseph Smiley, then President of Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, now President of a university in El Paso, Texas, and to the District Attorney of Denver, Mr. James McKevitt. In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. Todorovich to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. Todorovich and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. Todorovich was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. Todorovich maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. Todorovich explained that the Riha/Galya Tannenbaum cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

The purpose of Mr. Todorovich's conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on Dr. Joseph Smiley. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. Todorovich affirms that before going to District Attorney McKevitt he called upon the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Scott Werner, and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. Werner to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Werner acted properly. H

Mr. Todorovich states that Mr. Werner refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. Werner engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. Todorovich. Subsequently, Mr. Todorovich conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding Dr. Smiley and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. Todorovich. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to Dr. Smiley and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. Todorovich, I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. Todorovich.

~~SECRET~~

I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent [illegible] [illegible] information.

While the following is not pertinent to your request, my review of this case suggests the advisability of a re-examination of Riha's disappearance and past activities and, necessarily, the Tannenbaum case. Briefly, since 1958 we have communicated to your Bureau significant information which relates to Riha's involvement with Czech and Soviet intelligence services, when he was behind the Iron Curtain. I attach for your information and convenience copies of pertinent reports regarding this aspect of the case.

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Helms forgets that it was a two way street. H

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Attachments - a/s

This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contacts with CIA in field offices is to be by letter only. H

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. The January 1970 receipt of information from your Bureau that Mrs. Ruth Ann COOK, Thomas RIHA's mother, had mentioned rumors of her son's work for CIA in letters to the SAC, Denver, caused us to verify the fact RIHA has never been employed or used operationally by this Agency.

2. In 1958 and 1959 you were provided information that RIHA, when transitting Prague en route to Moscow, was contacted by Czech Intelligence and asked to remain in the CSR. Later in 1958 Czech Intelligence introduced RIHA to the KGB in Moscow and our source reported RIHA accepted certain privileges from the KGB while asserting he would not become a spy for the Soviets. Details reported by our source about RIHA's KGB contacts did not emerge during a 1960 FBI interview of RIHA.

3. This indication that RIHA may not have been truthful in 1960, when added to our current knowledge about KGB interest in recruiting American exchange students and RIHA's 1968 trip to the USSR, suggests the circumstances of RIHA's disappearance might be re-evaluated. This Agency is reopening its file on this case in view of the information disclosed in the attachments.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COPY

27 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. The following report concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect the repatriation of Subject, a naturalized American East-West Exchange student, to his country of origin was recently submitted by a source of this office.

2. Source first became acquainted with Subject during the past year at The Russian Research Center, Harvard University. On 10 September 1958 he ran into Subject by chance at the SAS office in Vienna as the two boarded a SAS flight to Copenhagen via Duesseldorf. During the trip Subject disclosed the following to source which has been supplemented from information from our files.

3. RIHA, who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 17 April 1929, is one of the twenty American students selected for the East-West Exchange Program and will be studying in the USSR for the 1958-59 academic year. Files in this Agency indicate that RIHA arrived in the U. S. on 15 July 1947 and became a citizen in 1952.

4. Our source informed us ~~that RIHA~~ had gone to Prague, June of this year, to see his father and other relatives. His father and mother are divorced and according to information in our files, his mother is listed as Mrs. Ruth A. COOK. address: 2023 Etna Street, Berkeley 4, California.

5. RIHA told our source that when he arrived in Prague he was put into a Government hotel for three days before he was allowed to stay with his relatives and friends. During this time, and perhaps later, RIHA was accompanied through the city by a guide whom he described as a "Government Official" name unknown, who attempted to effect Subject's repatriation to Czechoslovakia. RIHA told our source that this man has set up an appointment (date and address unknown) to meet him in Moscow to talk further.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. Subject told our source that this "Government Official" did not mention Czech Intelligence or Security Forces as such and that he (RIHA) is not too worried concerning this contact. RIHA apparently feels that it is the price he must pay in order to study in the Soviet Union and once he gets deeply into his studies in Moscow he feels that he can plead that he is too busy with his academic work to have contact with any officials. Our source also stated that RIHA is in some kind of correspondence with the Czech official. We have no description or name for the Czech official.

7. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office, and that our source be fully protected in the event that contact is made with RIHA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

(Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/751,690

cc: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

COPY

21 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CS CI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958 concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect Subject's repatriation while the latter was in Prague in June of 1958 visiting relatives en route to study in Moscow during 1958-59 as an East-West Exchange Student. The following report describes further action taken by the KGB in Moscow to cultivate Subject, and was recently submitted by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. Sometime in December 1958, Subject again met the Czech Official who had tried to have Subject repatriate to the CSR in Prague last summer. According to our source, it was apparently an accidental meeting at a Moscow railroad station as the Czech was returning to Prague. The Czech was delighted to see Subject, and introduced him to a Soviet official. This Soviet identified himself only by a first name and a telephone number, both unknown to our source. The Soviet described his work as being in the American Section of the MVD.

3. This Soviet Official has been cultivating Subject (trying to see him as often as possible, sometimes twice a week) since their introduction in December, by offering such blandishments as trips in a chauffered private limousine into forbidden areas outside Moscow, tickets to any entertainment, access to material from previously inaccessible archives, the use of private country villas and all the "beautiful, interesting and intelligent girls" he might want. Subject has further been promised the opportunity of returning to the Soviet Union for as long as he wants at any future date. He would have to pay only his way over there; his expenses and return trip to the US would be paid by the Soviets.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

4. Subject has taken advantage of this offer to take several trips for sightseeing into forbidden areas around Moscow in a private car with the Soviet Official, and has also taken up a few offers for entertainment. Subject visited one of these villas, but refused the girls on the ground that he wants a woman to like him for himself, and not because she has been told to do so. The Soviet answered that "some of them will really learn to like you for yourself, as well as work for us," but Subject still declined to get involved. However, Subject has recently been taken up by a Soviet girl who had previously tried to seduce another American student and subsequently blurted out that she was put onto the latter American by the MVD, which she has also told Subject. Subject is reported to be responding warmly to her approaches although he has flatly told her he doesn't trust her nor any Russian completely. He claims he enjoys her company but will not have a serious affair with her, and suspects she may be tied up with the other women offered him by the Soviet Official.

5. In his relationship with the Soviet Official, Subject is reportedly aware that he is playing a risky game, and is only utilizing the situation for the comfort and convenience it brings him. He has told the Soviet frankly that he cannot be wom over ideologically. Subject says he feels that the Soviets' interest in him is to cultivate him as a scholar of possible future importance to insure that he will always be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Subject has reportedly told several other American students of his relationship with the Soviet Official in order to cover himself "in case anything happened".

6. This Soviet Official has evinced an interest to Subject in many of the American Exchange students, with the explanation that some would undoubtedly be back in Moscow within two years as Diplomats and that since this is his area of responsibility, he wants to know as much as possible about them. The Soviet indicated that he was quite aware of the pattern of the American Exchange students' trips to the US Embassy and what they do in the university buildings, but is not so sure of their activities around the city. To demonstrate to Subject his knowledge about the American students, the Soviet Official mentioned an affair going on within the American group of which Subject had been unaware. The Soviet's information turned out to be true.

7. Subject was described by a reliable source, who knows him from group social gatherings at Harvard, as mature and socially vivacious with a warm personality. Subject is a clever and humorous conversationalist who likes to be surrounded by people, make new acquaintances, and develop friendships. Subject's patriotic motivation was not known to our source, but the latter felt that Subject was completely "Americanized" in manners and interests. Our source would guess that Subject has courage.

8. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you either before or after his return to the United States.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/754,303

COPY ~~SECRET~~

2 June 1959

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CSCI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958, and our CSCI 3/754,303 of 14 April 1959 in which are reported the attempt by Czech Intelligence to induce Subject, a Czech-born naturalized American, to repatriate to Czechoslovakia, and the further cultivation of Subject by the KGB in Moscow where Subject is an Exchange Student during 1958-59. The following report describes further action by the KGB to recruit Subject, and his adamant refusal of any such offer. This latest information was recently received from RIHA by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. During April 1959, the Soviet Official ~~who said he~~ was from the American Section of the MVD (sic) and who had been cultivating Subject, allegedly asked the latter to make complete and regular reports on Michael Martin LUTHER, one of the other American Exchange Students at Moscow University. Subject was asked to spend as much time as possible with LUTHER, and to report where he goes, what he does and with whom he associates. If Subject were to do this reporting, the Soviet Official said he would make available certain material from Archives which Subject has been unable to get permission to use although research in this material is vital to his having a successful year academically in Moscow.

3. Subject alleges he flatly refused this "deal", saying that if he ever got mixed up in such a dirty business, it would be for his own side and not for the Communists. The Soviet Official then told Subject he should engage in such observation and reporting to the Soviets to lose some "naivete" about how the United States is exploiting the Cultural Exchange Program for intelligence purposes. To back up this assertion, the Soviet Official told Subject about a "spy nest where spies deposit things for one another" which he said had recently been uncovered near a university entrance frequented by still another American student, Walter CLEMENS, who, the Soviet implied, was not engaged in academic work only while studying at Moscow University.

~~SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Subject reportedly again adamantly refused to cooperate with the Soviet Official.

4. In paragraph 4 of CSCI 3/754,303, reference was made to a Soviet girl who had become interested in Subject, and whom Subject viewed with suspicion although continuing to see her for her companionship. Her name is Lida (Y)EGOROVA. Subject has now reportedly been alienated by her undependable personality and has pretty well broken up with her. This girl may have left, or soon be leaving, for Prague to join her husband.

5. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[illegible]

James Angleton

CSCI 3/754,373

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to letter from Richard Helms, Director, CIA, dated February 26, 1970.

Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised Helms on February 27, 1970, that (1) the Bureau is discontinuing all contact with the CIA office in Denver and (2) that direct Liaison with CIA at headquarters is being terminated. Helms was further told that henceforth our communication with CIA will be by letter only.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing that all contact with the local CIA office be discontinued.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CODE 3/2/70

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC DENVER

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL CIA OFFICE.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5-5-70

FROM : D. E. Moore DEM/wcw 6-4-70

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 4:35 p.m., today I telephonically contacted ASAC Morley, Denver, and advised him that an article concerning the Riha case had appeared in the Sunday News (New York) 4-3-70. This article was a general rehashing of the Riha case.

I told him that the Bureau desired that SAC Werner contact the District Attorney to determine the developments of his investigation in this case and also determine what conclusions had been reached. Morley said this would be done.

Morley was asked if Denver had information concerning a professor who had gone to El Paso, Texas, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and he advised this probably referred to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President at Colorado University who was there when Riha disappeared. He said that Smiley is now President of the University of Texas, at El Paso, Texas. He said Denver had no information that Dr. Smiley has any current information concerning this matter.

SAC Werner called at 5:30 p.m., today to advise that he had been unable to get in touch with the District Attorney but also was following up on this and would contact the District Attorney today and get in a teletype tonight.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

[illegible]

NR002 DN PLAIN

5:15 PM URGENT 5-5-70 DCM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

REBUTELCAL TODAY.

PURSUANT TO REQUEST IN REBUTELCAL, THIS IS TO ADVISE THE PROFESSOR WHO ALLEGEDLY WENT TO EL PASO OR NEW ORLEANS CONCERNING THOMAS RIHA HAD AND HIS DFISAPPEARANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY DR. JOSEPH SMILEY , FORMER PRESIDENT, COLORADO UNIVERSITY, BOULDER, COLO., WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS IN EL PASO, TEXAS.

DR. SMILEY WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY CIA AND ADVISED BY CIA THAT RIHA WAS ALIVE AND WELL.

AS BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED, CIA ATTEMPTED TO ATTRIBUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE WAS NO FEDERAL VIOLATION OVER WHICH THE BUREAU HAD INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST, NO FBI INVESTIGATION WAS

REC-35

END PAGE ONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

PAGE TWO

CONDUCTED.

DENVER FILES CONTAIN NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA OTHER THAT THAT PREVIOULSY SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU.

DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES MC KEVITT, GENERALLY KNOWN AS MIKE MC KEVITT, ADVISED TODAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA IS AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ALL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MC KEVITT STATES THAT HE FEELS GALYA TANNENBAUM, FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RIHA, MAY HAVE KILLED HIM IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MC KEVITT'S INVESTIGATION INDICATES THERE WAS A VERY BAD FEELING BETWEEN RIHA AND TANNENBAUM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DISAPPEARANCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT TANNENBAUM WAS FORGING CHECKS ON RIHA'S ACCOUNT.

FULL BACKGROUND CONCERNING TANNENBAUM PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED BUREAU UNDER CAPTION "GALYA TANNENBAUM, AKA, IMPERSONATION," BUFILE UNKNOWN, DENVER FILE FOUR SEVEN DASH THREE ONE NINE ZERO.

MC KEVITT SAID INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT TANNENBAUM

END PAGE TWO

WAS PROBABLY A NYMPHOMANIAC AND THAT SHE AND RIHA HAD HAD CONSTANT SEXUAL AFFAIRS AND THAT SHE HELD THIS AS A CLUB OVER HIS HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORGERY OF THESE CHECKS.

IN ANY EVENT MC KEVITT STATES IT IS HIS OPINION THAT RIHA IS DEAD SINCE HIS INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALS RIHA WAS VERY ATTACHED TO HIS FRIENDS AND MC KEVITT FEELS THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS FRIENDS IF HE WERE ALIVE. MC KEVITT ALSO ADVISES THAT INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE INDICATES RIHA WAS VERY ABNORMAL IN HIS SEXUAL DESIRES AND PURSUITS AND THAT THIS WAS HIS GREAT WEAKNESS; THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WOMEN ALONE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THESE INVOLVEMENTS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS DEATH.

IN VIEW OF THE DETAILS AND FACTS SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY INTERVIEW WITH DR. JOSEPH SMILEY IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU.

END

WJM FBI WA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 6, 1970

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Pursuant to Director's request Denver District Attorney James "Mike" McKevitt interviewed 5/5/70 as to investigation of Riha, Czechoslovak-born, naturalized, former professor of Russian history at Colorado University, who departed Denver area 3/69 without notifying friends, associates or estranged wife. His disappearance has been glamorized and spiced up in newspaper articles by references to Galya Tannenbaum, his paramour. McKevitt stated investigation at standstill, all leads being exhausted. He feels Tannenbaum may have killed subject since bad feeling developed between them prior to his disappearance due to her forging checks on his account. Further, Tannenbaum probably a nymphomaniac who had constant sexual affairs with Riha and used this as a club over his head to prevent disclosure of forgeries. In McKevitt's opinion Riha is dead since he was close to his friends and if alive would contact them. Investigation indicates Riha abnormal in his sexual desires and could not leave women alone. Possibility exists one of these involvements may have resulted in his death.

Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President, Colorado University, where subject employed, is now President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas. Smiley after subject's disappearance stated subject was alive and well. When challenged by McKevitt to disclose basis for statement he refused and appealed to CIA, his source, for help. Bureau vigorously refuted CIA's claim that Bureau Agent was original source for statement. As result McKevitt publicly announced statement was not true and resulted from "honest mistake." No indication Smiley has any facts to contribute concerning subject's current whereabouts or basis for his disappearance. Since Bureau has conducted no investigation into Riha's disappearance, interview of Smiley could result in impression Bureau entering case. However, if Director so desires, El Paso will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley. Bureau files show subject attended Moscow University 9/58-9/59. Our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958. In 1958-59 CIA advised Czech intelligence attempted to persuade Riha to repatriate and later introduced Riha to Soviet intelligence which attempted his recruitment. After subject's return to US in 1959 no information was developed as to continued interest in him by Soviet intelligence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: THOMAS RIHA
105-78256

ACTION:

If the Director so desires, El Paso will be furnished background information regarding Riha and will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley.

Yes.
H.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/7/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Rememo A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 5/6/70, by which the Director instructed we interview Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas.

At 1:40 p.m., 5/7/70, I telephoned ASAC Jay Cochran, Jr., El Paso, and furnished him background of this matter. I instructed him to have Dr. Smiley contacted immediately, to make it clear that the FBI was not investigating the Riha matter and to inquire of Smiley if he has any new information regarding Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

ASAC Cochran was told to send the results of this interview of Dr. Smiley immediately by teletype to the Bureau. He was also told that in the event Dr. Smiley is out of town or otherwise unavailable for interview, a teletype should be sent immediately to the Bureau advising as to when the interview would be conducted.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 5/8/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference memorandum A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/6/70, same caption, by which the Director instructed that Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, be interviewed as to any knowledge he possessed concerning Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

Dr. Smiley was interviewed 5/7/70 and was most cooperative. Smiley stated since leaving the University of Colorado in 6/69 his knowledge of developments in this case has been derived from articles he has read in "The Denver Post." He speculated Riha may have been involved in intelligence work and based this comment on Riha's being a "loner" and having married a Czech girl. He said he had no evidence to support this speculation. He said that he was aware that one Mrs. Tannenbaum, a woman indicted in Colorado for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of Riha. He concluded that he had no further information concerning either Riha's disappearance or his whereabouts.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/8/70

nsmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, EL PASO

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIJA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
SINO-SATELLITE SECTION

ReButel call to EP, 5/7/70;
EP tel call to Bureau, 5/7/70.

In accordance with the request of the Director, SA FRANCIS J. PRASEK interviewed Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, President of UTEP. Dr. SMILEY was advised that the FBI has no jurisdiction in this matter, nor is it conducting any active investigation regarding RIJA, and that we were simply desirous of being advised of any new information he may have received regarding RIJA's disappearance and/or present whereabouts.

Dr. SMILEY, who was most gracious and pleasant, stated that he left the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, in 6/69, and has since that time followed the investigation of RIJA and his disappearance which is being conducted by the newspaper "The Denver Post".

SMILEY, in 4/69, approximately three weeks after the disappearance of RIJA, contacted RIJA's attorney for the purpose of determining whether the attorney had any information regarding RIJA, since it was necessary for SMILEY to know whether RIJA was alive and whether he intended to return to the University for the fall semester of 1969 to resume teaching in the History Department. SMILEY, who cannot now recall the name of the attorney, was furnished an address for RIJA in Montreal, Canada, and a letter was directed to this address by the History Department seeking information regarding RIJA and his intentions.

②-Bureau (RAM)
1-El Paso

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After leaving Boulder, SMILEY was advised by Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, that a letter was received by the University purportedly written by RIJA in which he stated that he would not be returning to the University. BRIGGS advised SMILEY that in his opinion, the letter was a forgery, since the signature did not compare with that of RIJA.

After the disappearance, SMILEY began receiving a great many inquiries from the news media and he was pressed for a statement regarding his knowledge of RIJA and whether or not he was alive.

THE FOLLOWING WAS FURNISHED BY DR. SMILEY IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE FBI AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION TO ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY SINCE HE WAS BREAKING A CONFIDENCE WITH AN ASSOCIATE IN THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Being hounded by the press for a statement, he contacted a source in the CIA Office at Denver since he, SMILEY, was formerly a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, thinking that perhaps that agency could assist him off the record with any information it might possess. SMILEY was aware that the CIA had interviewed RIJA following a trip by RIJA to the Soviet Union. The CIA source subsequently told Dr. SMILEY to merely advise the press that he had information to the effect that RIJA was "alive and well". This information was subsequently released by Dr. SMILEY to the student press at the University of Colorado, and it appeared in print.

When the Office of the District Attorney in Denver instituted investigation into the disappearance of RIJA, SMILEY was contacted by the DA's Office regarding the source of his statement. Dr. SMILEY again contacted the Denver CIA Office source and was advised that he was to state nothing and that he would be recontacted.

Some days later, the CIA source recontacted him and told him that he would be receiving an inquiry from the Office of the DA in the form of a statement, and that he should agree with the statement even though it "was not quite the truth". SMILEY did not question

these instructions, since he felt that CIA knew what should be done in this type of case. He received a telephone call from the DA's Office and a statement was read to him to the effect that the information which he had received and made public to the effect that RIJA was alive and well was in error. SMILEY told the caller that he agreed with the statement and nothing further came of this.

Dr. SMILEY does not know what part, if any, the CIA has in this case, but since he, SMILEY, is himself a former intelligence agent he did not feel that he had the right to question something which might be of vital importance to his country.

DR. SMILEY REQUESTED THAT NO HINT OR INFERENCE BE GIVEN TO THE CIA WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT HE HAS REVEALED TO THE FBI HIS CONTACTS REGARDING THIS MATTER WITH THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CIA.

He stated that though he has no evidence to substantiate his belief, he cannot get it out of his mind that RIJA may have been a double agent for the Soviets or the Czechoslovaks. He is aware that one Mrs. TANNENBAUM, a woman indicted for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of RIJA. He never knew RIJA to be associated with any such woman, but stated that he was not acquainted with the personal life of RIJA who was somewhat of a "loner".

RIJA, when he joined the staff of the University of Colorado, was single but in 8/68, an individual came to visit RIJA ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a marriage between RIJA and the man's sister. The intended bride was a Czechoslovakian girl who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and this "brother-in-law" was entertained by a member and colleague of RIJA in the History Department. This individual indicated to SMILEY that although the "brother-in-law" supposedly did not speak any English, and had RIJA translate every statement into Czech, it was apparent from the gestures and expressions of the "brother-in-law" that he understood more than he let on. Three weeks after the visit of this man, the woman who became Mrs. RIJA came to Boulder, Colorado, where she and RIJA were married. The marriage resulted in divorce a short time later and the girl reportedly returned to the East Coast from whence she came.

Dr. SMILEY indicated that he has no further information regarding this matter, but that Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, should be in possession of the letter purportedly written from Canada by RIJA, and may be in a position to assist in answering any question the Bureau might have regarding RIJA's association with the University of Colorado, since BRIGGS would have possession of these records. He stated BRIGGS is a trusted confidant of his and Dr. SMILEY's name should be used as an introduction should the Bureau desire any information of BRIGGS.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, which forwarded a memorandum of the same date for your approval and forwarding to the SSC in partial response to its request of April 30, 1975.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of an additional memorandum which completes the response to the Committee's request.

A copy of the memorandum for the SSC is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

LFS:mjg
(9)

Sect 102 Referral
HSC Ser 94. (8/24/75 Ky)
4/16/76.

REC-102

62-116395-263

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AIM/mf
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 JUN 25 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, provided a partial response to this request and advised that it would be necessary to clear Section 102 of the Manual of Instructions with other interested agencies.

Section 102 has now been cleared with the other interested agencies and is available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstein or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:mjg mjs
(8)

NOTE:

Third agency considerations have been resolved by coordination with other appropriate agencies. Section 102 pertains to relations with other agencies.

LFS

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-11 [illegible] -263

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Sections of the Manual of Instructions not Previously Furnished
Section 102 of MOI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6-13-75

Received by: John T Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N : SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC J. T. Elliff
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part 2.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In response to above-cited SSC request, the SSC was advised that designated Sections, with one exception, of FBI Manual of Instructions were available for review at FBI Headquarters. By communication 6/11/75, SSC was advised excluded Section, which involved third agency considerations, is now available for review at FBI Headquarters.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC
EWS
5-TAM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY

on Intelligence Activities

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a staff member of captioned Committee of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, former Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb lhb
(12)

P. V. [illegible] 4509 JB

Hand carried
by Paul V. Daly
6-12-75 PVD/

edm

REC- 102

62-116395-262

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000

MOR-16

JUN 25 1975

PCM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG, III, BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Armstrong, who was formerly Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. Mr. Armstrong furnished the information following his interview by SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein. The interview took place in Washington, D. C., on June 6, 1975, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. Mr. Armstrong was not put under oath and was not advised of his rights including his right to personal counsel.

Mr. Armstrong advised that the interview covered the following areas:

1. The general activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division, particularly Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning research conducted in the Intelligence Division concerning the possibility of obtaining an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters;

2. The alleged existence of files in former Director Hoover's office;

3. Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning the increase in the number of FBI representatives assigned abroad as Legal Attaches.

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf

MOR-16

WRW/pl

62-116395-262

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

With regard to the effort made to obtain an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters, Mr. Armstrong advised the SSC representative that in May, 1972, one of the principal questions raised by Mr. Gray was concerning the jurisdictional authority of the FBI to conduct intelligence or security investigations. He commented that in May, 1972, a conference was held at Quantico, Virginia, involving a number of Bureau executives and that during this conference the question of jurisdictional authority was discussed. Following the conference, a special team was set up to discuss this subject, including Mr. Armstrong and former Special Agent Thomas Smith of the Intelligence Division. According to Mr. Armstrong, it was felt that it would be appropriate to develop a new set of guidelines and not to rely on prior statutes and Presidential orders. Armstrong recalled that after several meetings of this group, Thomas Smith prepared a document consisting of 43 pages which was completed approximately six weeks after the group was created. Armstrong recalled that the document was received in the Acting Director's office and was discussed at one of the regular afternoon staff conferences. At that time it was agreed that the document was good but that the timing was not thought to be appropriate. The thought was expressed that it would be held in abeyance until after the coming elections. It was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the matter might have been discussed between Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Gray, and it was decided not to push the matter until after the elections. Mr. Armstrong recalled advising Mr. Smith of the location of the document and the fact that it was being held in abeyance until after the elections.

The matter of the above document did not come up again until shortly before the confirmation hearings concerning Mr. Gray. At that time it was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the Bureau should not push for the Executive Order until after a

permanent Director of the Bureau had been confirmed. Mr. Armstrong advised that to the best of his knowledge the document was not given to the Department of Justice while Mr. Gray and his staff were in the Bureau.

Concerning files that were allegedly maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Armstrong stated that shortly after Mr. Gray's arrival in the Bureau he made a statement to the effect that there were no secret files maintained by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Armstrong commented that he doubted the wisdom of making such a broad statement.

Shortly after Mr. Gray's statement was made, information came to Mr. Armstrong's attention which caused him to prepare a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating the possibility of the existence of files in Mr. Hoover's office. Armstrong could not recall Mr. Gray's response to his memorandum but he believed that the original of the memorandum was returned to him and that he placed the original and the carbon in his desk along with other memoranda that he had prepared for Mr. Gray.

Mr. Armstrong stated that it was his theory that the files in Mr. Hoover's office were in two categories; the first being files containing information possibly detrimental to prominent persons in the Government and the other category being tidbits of information received in personal correspondence from various Special Agents in Charge concerning persons of possible interest to Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Armstrong advised further that at one of his daily conferences, Mr. Gray mentioned that he had talked to former Acting Associate Director Mark Felt concerning files which may have been maintained in Mr. Hoover's office and which he said were then in a safe in the custody of Mr. Felt.

Mr. Armstrong could not recall whether Mr. Gray and Mr. Felt were to go through the safe together or whether Mr. Felt was to do it alone and advise Mr. Gray of his findings.

With regard to the present location of such files, Mr. Armstrong had no specific knowledge but speculated that if they existed they might have been destroyed before Mr. Gray arrived in the office, they might have been retained in Mr. Felt's safe or they might have been removed to the custody of Mr. Clyde Tolson or Miss Helen Gandy at Mr. Hoover's house.

Mr. Armstrong advised that on April 27, 1973, prior to his departure from the Bureau, he destroyed all of the memoranda he had retained in his desk and he is certain that among them was his memorandum concerning files in Mr. Hoover's office.

With regard to the increase in the number of Legal Attaches, Armstrong advised that he recalled that shortly before Mr. Gray came to the Bureau there had been an expansion in the number of Legal Attaches. He understood that traditionally the role of the Legal Attache had been to function as a liaison representative to foreign police agencies but that with the expansion in the number of Legal Attaches they were given additional responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, exactly to what extent he did not recall. He recalled that the expansion was at the initiation of the White House and may have been because the White House was not satisfied with the intelligence collected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Armstrong stated that he saw a potential for friction with CIA and speculated that this might have been a factor in the breach of liaison between the FBI and CIA. He recalled writing a memorandum for Mr. Gray expressing doubts as to whether the training of Special Agents of the FBI equipped them for the collection of foreign intelligence and some subsequent discussion that

perhaps the Legal Attaches should be brought home for such training, but that this idea was concluded to be impractical or unnecessary.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING	X	INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

	SSC
	HSC

To the Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum reporting interview of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, formerly Special Assistant to FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, by SSC Staff Member.

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Authorities for FBI's security investigations

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Interview included following topics: general activities of FBI's Intelligence Division, including FBI's authorities in security investigations; files maintained in former FBI Director Hoover's office, and increase in number of FBI representatives abroad as Legal Attaches.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

WDC

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-8

SFP:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 CFS

3791 (6-75)

276-10483

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter, and appendices thereto, from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are an original of a memorandum and enclosures which are responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 6

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-260

RDS:lek|ek
(10)

REC- 102

17 JUN 25 1975

3

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PLM

WRW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to the SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, Item 10, the SSC requested all records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D. C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D. C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August, 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

In respect to 10a, on 12/9/64 a travel voucher was processed for payment to former Special Agent Lish Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. Accompanying the voucher was

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RDS:lek lek
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 by Whitson to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air travel from Washington, D. C., to Miami and return. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Whitson in connection with the aforementioned travel.

In respect to 10b, former Special Agents DeLoach, Adcock, Manning (correct name Donald Hanning), Linebaugh (correct name Harold Leinbaugh), and Special Agent Todd submitted travel vouchers for August, 1964. However, no GTRs were issued by them.

In regard to 10c, William C. Sullivan was the issuing officer of a GTR made out to Southern Railroad for travel from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta and return in the amount of $74.55. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Sullivan in connection with the aforementioned travel. Sullivan submitted a voucher for 11/28-30/64 in the amount of $37.10.

No other records are available concerning the travel and expenses of the individuals mentioned in 10a, 10b and 10c.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The data regarding the GTRs and the travel of the individuals mentioned in the memorandum was obtained from the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. In connection with 10a, 10b, and 10c, all expense vouchers of the individuals mentioned in these items have been destroyed under the Five-Year Retention Document Schedule Rule.

The United States of America
Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

Void after ____ 19__

BILL TO **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A3,925,504

The National Airlines Company is requested to furnish coach class air transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC to Miami, Florida + Return
(SHOW CARRIERS AND JUNCTION POINTS AND WHERE MIXED CLASS SERVICE IS TO BE FURNISHED SPECIFY)

for use of Lish Whitson ______ and ______ others with ______ accommodations
(LOWER BERTH, P.C. SEAT, ETC.)

from ______ to ______ with authorization
(IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN")

to transport not over ______ lbs. of excess baggage from ______

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE ON TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

PLACE OF ISSUE Washington DC Nov 21, '6

I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)

0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

107.40		107.40
TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT	TOTAL

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMF

MOR-16

62-116395-260

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
May 1, 1935, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.
2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.
3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10482

276-16112

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S., Nov. [illegible] General Regulations No. 123.

PASSED
149/a
VO
DEC 16 1964

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.

2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.

3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/14/00 BY SP2 avm/lmf

MDR-16

62-116395-260

The United States of America
Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

BILL TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A 3,991,399

To Southern Railroad Company is requested to furnish first class rail transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC to Atlanta Ga & return via Southern RR

for use of William C. Sullivan and ___ others with ___ accommodations

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

Place of issue: Washington DC 11-25-64

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

0500

21-60

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

42.95	25.60	74.55
		TOTAL

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/12/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard F. Taylor Jr. Date: 16 Jun 75 2PM

Received by: Sherry Powell

Title: Asst Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMC

MOR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/12/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 10.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

SURVEILLANCE

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was furnished with information and documents relating to travel on the part of Bureau personnel in connection with SSC inquiry into this Bureau's use of electronic surveillances.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
EWS
5- TJM

TREAT AS YELLOW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAT
MDR-16

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General with a letterhead memorandum attached enclosing a copy of a memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups." It appears that we are proposing to give the copy of the Gale memorandum to the Senate Select Committee in response to their request by letter dated May 14, 1975, for a memorandum prepared by Gale relative to the subject matter of the 1964 memorandum.

My reading of the memorandum revealed that it is a purely deliberative document which quotes personal views of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Gale. I am concerned that the release of such a memorandum containing not only the personal views of Bureau officials, but also identifying them by name could have an impact on individuals in the future who may be asked to furnish their opinions concerning policy matters in the FBI. As indicated by the Attorney General in his speech in New York, it is essential that the Executive Branch have a degree of privacy concerning policy discussions and expressions of personal views by officials in order for the Executive to function properly.

I do recognize that we may not be able to resist giving the Committee access to material documents that bear on particular issues under investigation, however, I do recommend that when we are required to produce deliberative documents, the names and other identifying data relating to individuals furnishing views be deleted.

Enc.

REC- 102 62-116395-259

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DATE 10/14/2000 BY SP2 ALM/mjc
MDR-16

JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

[redacted]

84 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the names of individuals described in the body of the memorandum of July 30, 1964, and other identifying data be deleted prior to furnishing the copy to the Committee.

2. In regard to future responses to requests for documents of a deliberative nature that our policy be that names and identifying data will be deleted prior to disclosure of the documents.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Former Special Agent Richard H. Davis of the Atlanta Office telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 6-4-75 at which time he explained that he had been contacted by Michael Epstein of captioned Committee at which time Epstein requested that Davis make himself available for interview in either Atlanta, Georgia, or travel to Washington, D. C. Davis informed Epstein that he would have to obtain Bureau approval prior to submitting to interview inasmuch as he had to obtain a release from his employment secrecy agreement.

Mr. Davis informed SA Daly that he was reluctant to agree to being interviewed by captioned Committee concerning his activities as an Agent. It was pointed out to Mr. Davis that the decision as to whether to agree to interview was his, but he was advised that captioned Committee has subpoena power and might attempt to force him to furnish information through the use of a subpoena. He was informed that the Bureau was cooperating with captioned Committee and their inquiry into FBI operations.

It was explained to Mr. Davis that if he desired to allow himself to be interviewed, the Bureau would make available an employee at his request to be available but not present during interview. He was also advised that this Agent would not represent him as private counsel. Mr. Davis was advised that the Bureau's concern was not of matters of historical fact but rather testimony might be required which could impair the Bureau's efforts to discharge its responsibilities. It was also explained that the Bureau representative would assist him in making determination whether his response to a particular question would identify confidential informants, impair ongoing investigations, divulge information derived from other Government agencies or foreign sources or expose sensitive investigative techniques and, therefore, a response should not be given.

REC-102

62-116395-258

62-116395
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Personnel file, Richard H. Davis
1 - Mr. ~~W. O. Cregar~~
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

JUN 25 1975

5-Phillips

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Davis indicated that he desired a Bureau representative be made available during his interview and would request the interview take place in Atlanta, Georgia. Additionally, he stated Epstein had indicated that the topic of discussion in the interview would be the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Mr. Davis stated he would recontact FBI Headquarters as soon as a date and place of interview had been determined. He indicated he would set the date for interview so that the Bureau would have ample opportunity to have an Agent available. We have separately requested Bureau approval for the release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

granted per 5x8 note on 6/4/75 tel.

ACTION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an Agent for the interview of Mr. Davis when and if a date and place are agreed upon.

PVD JBH/pvg

WRW

JBA/PLM

Wannall has designated SA Phillips per R/S 6/9/75

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Associate Director

____________, 1975

✓ Director
~~Mr. Callahan~~
___ Mr. Jenkins
✓ Mr. Adams
✓ Mr. Feeney
___ Mr. Ash
___ Mr. Bassett
___ Mr. Cleveland
___ Mr. Cochran
___ Mr. Decker
___ Mr. Gallagher
___ Mr. Gebhardt
___ Mr. McDermott
___ Mr. Mintz
___ Mr. Mooney
___ Mr. Moore
___ Mr. Walsh
___ Mr. Wannall

___ Mr. Mack
___ Mr. O'Connell

___ Miss Tietgen
___ Mrs. Mutter
___ Miss Downing
___ Miss Southers
___ Mrs. Haines

___ M ____________

Room ____________

___ Mrs. Metcalf
___ Telephone Room

___ Corres. Review
___ Mail Room
___ Teletype
___ Personnel Records
___ Mechanical Section

___ For Appropriate Action
___ For Your Approval
___ Initial and Return
___ Please Call Me
___ For Information
___ Per Conversation

Sent July 1 '75

Do we have any amplification of this instruction? Or, do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation K

Item #6 (tabbed) re

"items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities"

Should create Congressional furor.

Paul L. Mack
Room 7004, Ext. 5606

EC-102

62-116395-257

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/EG
MDR-16

84 JUN 26 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/18/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Reference is made to Bureau letter to The Attorney General 6/20/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)," forwarding letterhead memorandum for approval and forwarding to SSC.

The Director asked if we have any amplification of this instruction (to submit items with unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities for dissemination to the President under the INLET Program) or do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation?

There has been no amplification of this instruction, nor any submission under INLET of an item on prominent personalities that would show the interpretation of this point.

With respect to the observation that this matter should cause a congressional furor, it is noted that INLET has already been afforded considerable publicity, beginning in February, 1973, after an office memorandum on the subject reached the news media. This publicity is why the Senate Committee asked for documents on INLET. The White House and Senator Bob Packwood inquired about the Program. A detailed defense of INLET appeared in the Congressional Record.

By way of background, the INLET instruction that has received the most publicity--items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities--was recalled by the author of the INLET Program initiating letter as having been specifically dictated by then Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan.

TEB:lek
(8)

REC- 102

62-116395-256

CONTINUED - OVER

5-EW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 ALM/CRF
MDR-16

17 JUN 24 1975

84 JUN 25 1975

While we cannot say exactly what former Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan had in mind when he added the instruction about items with an unusual twist, we can speculate with a hypothetical example.

If we learned that a trusted assistant to an important government official--an official who had taken a "hard line" with respect to dealings with the Soviet Union, for example--was under development by Soviet intelligence, this would be an unusual twist to an item of intelligence interest to the President involving a prominent person.

In such a hypothetical case, we would, of course, advise the government official involved, and The Attorney General and the President. We would have done this under INLET and we would still disseminate this type of data. INLET was only a vehicle for special dissemination.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

John Elliff of captioned Committee's task force on Domestic Intelligence Activities advised on 6-9-75, that the Committee is planning to have a Bureau representative testify concerning the FBI's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic and counterintelligence areas in late June or early July. Mr. Elliff stated that this testimony would be before the Senators and will be a general exploration of jurisdictional authority. Mr. Elliff also volunteered that he had told K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination of the Department, that the Committee wanted to be furnished a copy of the T. J. Smith Memorandum dated 7-31-72 concerning FBI's investigative jurisdiction in domestic and counterintelligence matters. Elliff stated that at this point, a summary of such documents would not be an acceptable substitute. Elliff desired such a document be made available to the Committee prior to the aforementioned testimony. With regards to testimony, Elliff indicated that it would not necessarily have to be the Director giving a testimony.

Elliff stated as he finalizes his plans concerning the testimony concerning FBI investigative jurisdiction, he would recontact SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and give more details concerning this matter.

62-116395

REC-59 62-116395-255

ST-101

5 JUN 12 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
  Attn: Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Kelly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAF

MDR-14

84 JUN 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

With regards to the request concerning the Smith document, we should await K. William O'Connor's request prior to taking any action concerning this matter, and with regards to testimony, we should await further details prior to engaging in the preparation of that testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. W.R.W. ✓ HEM.
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 19 1975
TELETYPE

REC-102

NR 026 LA PLAIN

10:14PM NITEL 6-18-75 RLD

TO DIRECTOR (62-1~~16464)~~

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-1700-4124)

ATTN: INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

Mr Cregar
4123 RH

SENSTUDY 1975.

RE BUTEL TO LOS ANGELES, JUNE 17, 1975.

THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY INSTANCE THAT WAS ALLUDED TO IN CAPTIONED AIRTEL AND THERE ISNO RECORD OF ANY AGENTS BY THE NAME OF RON MASCAR OR WILLIAM MILLER ASSIGNED TO THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION SINCE 1956 TO PRESENT.

END

HOLD

REC-102

62-116395-254

12 JUN 24 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SPd ALM/LMF
MDR-16

FIVE

84 JUN 24 1975

Black Panther Party



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

MARCH 1971

"WE ARE FROM 25 TO 30 MILLION STRONG, AND WE ARE ARMED. AND WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OUR SITUATION. AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO CHANGE IT. AND WE ARE UNAFRAID."



WARNING TO AMERICA

[illegible]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Table of Contents

I. FOUNDING 1
II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES 3
III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY 6
  Invasion of California State Legislature 6
  Police Officer Meets Panthers – and Death 6
  "Free Huey" Campaign 6
  Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver 7
  International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver 7
  Rise of the Black Panther Party 8
IV. LEADERSHIP 9
  National Committee to Combat Fascism 10
  International Section 10
V. FUNDS 12
VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS 13
VII. TACTICS 15
  Target: Police 15
  Attacks on Others 15
  Weapons Caches 16
  "Revolutionary Suicide" 16
  Panther "Justice" 18
VIII. PROPAGANDA 20
  Editorials 21
  Inflammatory Articles 24
  Provocative Slogans 29
  "Revolutionary Art" 30
  International News 35

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE FBI AS A BRIEF STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND, TACTICS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE ORGANIZATION'S OWN PUBLICATIONS WERE THE SOURCE FOR MOST OF THE MATERIAL REPRODUCED.



LET US HOLD HIGH THE BANNER OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNALISM
AND THE INVINCIBLE THOUGHTS OF

HUEY P. NEWTON

MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE.

I. FOUNDING



HUEY PERCY NEWTON



BOBBY GEORGE SEALE

The Black Panther Party, with headquarters in Oakland, California, was founded in 1966 by two Oakland Negroes – Huey Percy Newton and Bobby George Seale – both at that time at Merritt College in Oakland. The name and symbol of the new party were taken from the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, an Alabama political party known informally in 1965 as the Black Panther Party.

From the writings of communists, revolutionaries, and black militants, Newton and Seale allegedly selected ideas around which they could build a revolutionary frame that suited the needs of their party. Influential writings included those of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader; Frantz Fanon , West Indian psychiatrist who advocated violence for Algerian nationalists; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one-time lieutenant of Cuba's Fidel Castro and a principal architect of 20th century guerrilla warfare; Malcolm X, American black nationalist who advocated violence to obtain Negro "freedom"; and W. E. B. DuBois, Negro educator who became a member of the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93.

The organization was at first called the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense; however, the "Self-Defense" was removed in 1968 in an effort to project a more politically oriented image to prospective sympathizers and supporters.

As head of the new Black Panther Party, Newton assumed the title Minister of Defense, and Seale was named Chairman. When questioned about the membership of their organization, Newton and Seale gave the since oft-repeated reply: "Those who know don't say. Those who say don't know." The militancy of the group, however, had an immediate appeal to the discontented, restless youth of Oakland's ghettos.


HUEY NEWTON
BOBBY SEALE

Black Panther Party Chairman, Bobby Seale, and Minister of Defense, Huey Newton, selling Red Chinese magazine and "quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung."

3-2-67 San Francisco, Calif.

II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES

The Black Panther Party "Platform and Program" is repeated in each issue of the official Party publication, The Black Panther.

October 1966

Black Panther Party Platform and Program

What We Want What We Believe

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. **That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.** Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. **But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.**



III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Proclaiming a legal right to bear arms, the Panthers by early 1967 had begun to appear in public wearing black leather jackets and black berets, openly carrying shotguns, rifles, or pistols, and shouldering bandoliers of ammunition.

Calling the police "pigs," the Panthers began a buildup in Negro areas of the idea that police departments, especially that in Oakland, were dedicated to the brutalization and harassment of minority groups, and, acting as an appendage of white government authority, were working toward the eventual annihilation (genocide) of the Negro race.

Invasion of California State Legislature

The first incident that brought national attention to this group occurred on May 2, 1967, as the California Legislature was in session in Sacramento. Approximately 40 members of the Black Panther Party, carrying loaded rifles, pistols, and shotguns, and some wearing bandoliers of ammunition about their waists or draped over their shoulders, burst into the Chamber. They were protesting a bill being introduced on that date outlawing the carrying of loaded weapons in public and were proclaiming their right to bear arms and criticize the police. Before they were arrested, they passed out mimeographed leaflets calling on all Negroes to end the "terrorist" oppression of colored races by white America and referring to the preparation of concentration camps in the United States as a beginning of genocide.

Police Officer Meets Panthers--and Death

The Panthers became more militant with the passing of time. At 5:00 a.m., October 28, 1967, two Oakland, California, patrol officers, John F. Frey and Herbert C. Heanes, made a routine traffic violation car stop. While the officers were awaiting the results of the car registration check by radio, the driver, Huey Newton, got out of the car. Suddenly, shooting broke out. Officer Frey was killed; Officer Heanes was wounded critically; and Newton received a stomach wound. He stopped a passing automobile and had the driver take him to a hospital where he was taken into custody and hospitalized. After a state trial, which began July 15, 1968, Newton was sentenced on September 27, 1968, to serve from 2 to 15 years on a charge of voluntary manslaughter.*

"Free Huey" Campaign

Two days after Patrolman Frey's death, the Huey Newton Defense Fund was established at a meeting of a section of the Negro community of Oakland.

The cry of "Free Huey" became a clarion call. The imprisoned Newton was built up in the public eye as "black and bold in defense of his people." Each

---

**It was ruled later that the presiding judge in this trial erred in instructions to the jury. Newton was released August 5, 1970, and scheduled for retrial.*



LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

bringing its own axe to grind, such organizations as the anarchist New Left group named Students for a Democratic Society; the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Communist Chinese-oriented Progressive Labor Party; the Communist Party, USA, and its youth affiliate, the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America; and militant campus groups, black and white, began to gather in support of the Panthers, who were willing not only to defy the establishment, but to destroy it.

Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver

Early in 1967, the Panthers were joined by a recent parolee from the California prison system, author of a best-selling autobiography, *Soul On Ice,* staff writer for the magazine *Ramparts,* and admitted Marxist – Leroy Eldridge Cleaver.

In *Soul On Ice,* Cleaver wrote: "I sought out his (Marx's) books...It was like taking medicine for me to find that, indeed, American Capitalism deserved all the hatred and contempt that I felt for it in my heart...."

After Newton was jailed, although he remained the undisputed leader, it soon became apparent that Cleaver, designated Minister of Information, was projecting a major leadership image. The Party began to further widen its publicity, nationally and internationally, and enlarge its radical support and revolutionary intent.

As an example of this spreading influence of the Panther Party, the 1968 National Election ticket of the Peace and Freedom Party, a coalition of radical groups, included Cleaver as candidate for the Presidential nomination; Newton as candidate for the 7th Congressional District of Alameda County, California; Kathleen Cleaver, 18th Assembly District, California State Legislature; Bobby Seale, 17th Assembly District, California State Legislature. Cleaver received a national total of almost 200,000 votes. Only a small percentage of the California electorate cast their votes for Newton, Seale, and Kathleen Cleaver.

On the evening of April 6, 1968, Cleaver and several Panthers became involved in a shoot-out with Oakland police officers. The incident resulted in the death of a Panther, the wounding of two police officers, and the wounding and arrest of Cleaver. Cleaver's parole was revoked immediately and he was returned to prison. After much publicity, he was later released on bail by a Superior Court Judge who ruled that the jeopardy of his parole status stemmed "from his undue eloquence in pursuing political goals...offensive to many of his contemporaries." This decision was overruled by the District Court of Appeals and upheld by the California Court of Appeals. Cleaver was ordered to return to prison by November 27, 1968. Electing to become a Federal fugitive, he disappeared in late November, 1968, going first to Havana, Cuba, and later to Algiers, where he has established residence.

International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver

Soon after Cleaver's arrest in the spring of 1968, approximately 150 prominent individuals sponsored the establishment of an International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. The committee intended to dispatch a team to Europe to gain

international support and arrange for a European edition of Cleaver's book, *Soul On Ice*.

Rise of the Black Panther Party

In May, 1968, the hard-core membership of the Black Panther Party was estimated at only 125, and Panther activity was confined largely to the San Francisco-Oakland, California, area. However, because of the dramatic shoot-outs, the "Free Huey" Campaign, the funds established for the defense of both Newton and Cleaver, the widespread publicity, and the support given readily by white radical groups and individual sympathizers, the Black Panther Party began to grow rapidly, not only in membership but in militancy and influence. Chapters began to appear in major cities throughout the country. By the end of 1968, the membership had reached nearly 2,000, with additional thousands of sympathizers and supporters.



PAGE [illegible] THE BLACK PANTHER SEPTEMBER [illegible], [illegible]

1968: BALLOT OR THE BULLET

KATHLEEN CLEAVER,
COMMUNICATION SECT.,
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

18th ASSEMBLY DISTRICT
S.F. PEACE & FREEDOM PARTY

SHOOT YOUR SHOT

IV. LEADERSHIP

Organizationally, the Black Panther Party is set up to be under a Central Committee composed of the following positions:

- Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander, held by Huey Newton
- Chairman, held by Bobby George Seale
- Minister of Information, formerly held by Leroy Eldridge Cleaver
- Chief of Staff, held by David Hilliard
- Minister of Education, held by Raymond (Masai) Hewitt
- Communications Secretary, formerly held by Cleaver's wife, Kathleen
- Minister of Culture, held by Emory Douglas
- Field Marshal, formerly held by Donald Lee Cox

The position of Assistant Chief of Staff, not included among the Central Committee, is occupied by Roosevelt (June) Hilliard.

Under the Central Committee, the chain of command extends to leaders and officers of local chapters.

DAVID HILLIARD

RAYMOND (MASAI) HEWITT

KATHLEEN CLEAVER

EMORY DOUGLAS

DONALD LEE COX

National Committee to Combat Fascism

Set up to coexist with Black Panther Party branches in various cities in the United States are chapters of another organization called National Committee to Combat Fascism. In actuality, there is little difference between the two. This group, a Panther Party front, was set up as the result of a revolutionary conference, called National Conference for a United Front Against Fascism, held in Oakland, California, in July, 1969. The conference, sponsored by the Black Panther Party and assisted by the anarchist Students for a Democratic Society and the Communist Party, USA, was called to form a coalition of black and white radicals, described as "oppressed people."

The National Committee to Combat Fascism is considered by Party leaders to be the "political organizing bureau" of the Black Panther Party. Its specific task allegedly is to raise the political level of the people and educate them against the system.

International Section

On September 13, 1970, the International Section of the Black Panther Party officially opened in Algiers. Joining Cleaver on the staff were his wife, Kathleen, and Field Marshal Donald Lee Cox, a fugitive from justice. Cox faces charges of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, based on a warrant issued on April 20, 1970, at Baltimore, Maryland. He also failed to appear on May 14, 1970, in San Francisco, to answer Federal firearms charges.

This section, in its entirety, was expelled from the Black Panther Party by Huey Newton on February 27, 1971. The expulsion resulted from tensions and differences between Party hierarchy which led to disruptive factionalism.

D. C. greeting African brothers



Chinese 2nd Ambassador (R), Press Attaché (M) and Cultural Attaché (L) talking with Eldridge

Opening attended by cross section of Liberation Movements

Scenes from opening of International Section, The Black Panther, October 31, 1970

V. FUNDS

The money by which the Black Panther Party operates comes from a number of sources. There are substantial private contributions; fees for public appearances, such as campus speeches, radio, and television appearances; payments for magazine articles; collections for trials and bail funds in this country and abroad; subscriptions and individual sales of the Party's official organ, *The Black Panther;* fund-raising activities sponsored by sympathizers and supporters; sales of recordings of interviews and speeches; and financial aid from radicals and extremists.

According to the press, there is reason to believe that the Panthers, to obtain additional funds, are engaging in criminal activities, such as burglaries and robberies.

VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS

Panther Party leaders insist their primary aim is to serve the "people," meaning ghetto blacks. To establish good intent, Party officials have set up a series of community services aimed at recruiting members and sympathizers and building Party influence in ghetto areas. These programs, described by the Panthers as "socialistic" programs, are supposed to be carried out by all Party branches and include: "liberation schools" to give "our people a knowledge of self"; free health clinics, with money, medical supplies and professional services donated by laymen and professionals in the community; free clothing programs, with clothing donated by the community; Community Information Centers, to "answer the basic needs of the people"; and a monthly free shuttle bus service for families of blacks in prison. Few of these programs actually are carried out, and those that have been attempted have been mostly unsuccessful.

The program that has received the most publicity is the "breakfast program," devised as a further means of indoctrinating Negro youth in Panther teachings of racism and rebellion. As expressed in *The Black Panther,* June 14, 1969, "The youth we are feeding will surely feed the revolution." Breakfasts are held for ghetto children either at churches, housing projects, Panther Community Information Centers, or other space that can be obtained free of charge. Panthers usually ask local businessmen to donate food or money to this program, boycotting stores that refuse to participate. At these functions, children have been known to sing such chants as: "I am a revolutionary. I am a revolutionary. There's going to be some barbecue if Huey's not set free. Power to the people."

In 1969, Panther "Coloring Books" were printed and given out at these breakfasts. The books contained 22 pages of drawings teaching the children to distrust, hate, and kill police officers.


I am a Revolutionary
PEOPLE'S FREE SHOES PROGRAM
PEOPLES FREE CLOTHING PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE FOOD PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE BUSING PROGRAM
EMORY

SURVIVAL PENDING REVOLUTION

HUEY TOLD ME THAT THE PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING REVOLUTION. BUT WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE REVOLUTION, HUEY SAYS, "WE THE PEOPLE ARE THREATENED WITH GENOCIDE, BECAUSE RACISM AND FASCISM ARE RAMPANT, NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD." HE SAYS, "WE INTEND TO CHANGE ALL THAT. BUT IN ORDER TO CHANGE IT, THERE MUST BE TOTAL TRANSFORMATION. BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THAT TOTAL TRANSFORMATION, WE MUST EXIST. IN ORDER TO EXIST, WE MUST SURVIVE; SO THEREFORE WE NEED A SURVIVAL KIT." SO THAT WE CAN GROW UP HEALTHY WITH A MIND THAT CAN BE FUNCTIONAL AND CREATIVE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
YOUR COMRADE IN ARMS

VII. TACTICS

The Black Panther Party is a violent revolutionary group whose members provoke confrontations with law enforcement officers and whose leaders incite racial hatred and preach urban guerrilla warfare.

Target: Police

Panthers claim that black communities are occupied by the police in the same way and for the same purpose that foreign troops occupy conquered territory and that these forces, operating under "establishment" orders, are engaged in gradual annihilation of the black race. Blacks, according to the Panthers, must, through urban guerrilla warfare, use guns to liberate themselves from the ever-present repressive enemy. Children in Panther "schools" do their exercises to the rhythm of: "There is a pig upon the hill – if you don't kill him the Panthers will."

Numerous claims have been made that the Black Panther Party is an innocent victim of police persecution and genocide. This charge is rendered absurd by fact. During 1970, 6 police officers were killed and 22 wounded through acts of violence traced to the Panthers. One officer, in 1969, was killed by a Panther with a shotgun blast at point-blank range as the officer lay wounded and helpless on the ground.

Out of 20 members named by the Panther Party as "killed in cold blood" by the police, four were killed by members of a rival black extremist group on the west coast; one died of barbiturate intoxication; one was shot and killed by a store owner during a robbery attempt; one was killed by his wife over a love affair he was having with a female Black Panther; and another was allegedly tortured and killed by Panther Party members. Of the remaining twelve, two were found dead on the street, the victims of unknown assailants, and ten were involved in shoot-outs with police officers.

Attacks on Others

Panther attacks have not been limited to the police. While claiming their intent to protect the black community, Panthers have assaulted and threatened citizens who have tried to assist the police.

Neighborhood stores have been forced to "contribute" food supplies and money under fear of Panther violence. Many other persons have also been victimized, as shown by the fact that in 1969 alone 348 Panther members were arrested for serious crimes, including murder, armed robbery, rape, bank robbery, and burglary.

On April 21, 1969, 21 members of the Black Panther Party were charged in New York in a 30-count indictment with conspiring to bomb public places and murder policemen and with possessing dangerous weapons.

Weapons Caches

Stockpiles of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, thousands of rounds of ammunition, Molotov cocktails, gunpowder, and accumulations of bayonets, swords, and machetes have been confiscated from Panther offices.

"Revolutionary Suicide"

On August 7, 1970, Superior Court Judge Harold Haley, the Deputy District Attorney, and three other persons were tied together with piano wire and dragged from a San Rafael, California, courtroom and taken as hostages by three armed Negro convicts, one of whom was standing trial for stabbing a San Quentin prison guard. The escapees were assisted by the defendant's 17-year-old brother who supplied them with weapons for the escapade. Judge Haley, who had a sawed-off shotgun taped to his neck, and the other hostages were forced into a waiting van. When the authorities tried to stop the kidnappers, the judge was brutally murdered; the Deputy District Attorney was injured seriously; and another hostage was slightly wounded. Three Negroes were slain and one was wounded.

Immediately thereafter, Huey Newton declared the killing of Judge Haley as being of "historical" importance to the Black Panther Party. This declaration was based on the Panther belief that all black prisoners, regardless of their crimes, are political prisoners and should be released.



OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT CRUISER INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6, 1968, GUNBATTLE WITH MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

CONFISCATED PANTHER WEAPONS

The perpetrators of the courtroom incident were lauded by the Panthers as setting another "revolutionary example for black people." In commenting further, *The Black Panther* of August 15, 1970, stated:

> *"The example that these brothers have set will be followed by many and many will rise to choose revolutionary suicide rather than reactionary suicide. Black people will unleash in great numbers the Black kamakazi..."*

In his eulogy at services for the slain Negroes, Newton said: "Our comrades have taught us all a revolutionary lesson. They have intensified the struggle and placed it on a higher level."

Panther "Justice"

Recalcitrant members of the Black Panther Party are sometimes victims of Panther "justice." As one example, Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was brought to trial in New Haven, Connecticut, for the torture-murder of Panther Alex Rackley. Rackley, a Panther suspected of being an informant, was scalded, murdered, and dumped in a swamp.

For a variety of reasons, many members have been purged from the Party. These incidents are usually written up in *The Black Panther* in special articles accompanied by photographs.

WASH ROOM
OLYMPICS
PARTY MEMBER W
PIECE OF TH
if you're not part of the solution... you're part of the problem.

PANTHER HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JUNE 4, 1969

EXPELLED

WEEKS, EXPELLED

So let this be heard throughout the black community, of Atlantic City, New Jersey. That Leonard Weeks is no longer a servant of the people. That he is no longer the breakfast coordinator for this community center, or for that matter no center ran by the Black Panther Party. He has become slip-shod in his duties as a servant to the people, many times he has been warned by his comrades, about his work, and about his duty to the people's children. He deserted the children of the black community, there were days he would not attend the breakfast program, because he said that he was tired or that he overslept. Well we cannot adhear to this because as revolutionaries we must prepare ourselves to be a match for a hundred. We must prepare to run ourselves to death if need be, so that the people shall be served, and to see to it that they truly have a right to the best. And we have no time for slip-shod niggers. We must hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must confirm to the people's interest, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected, that is what being responsible to the people means.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Black Panther Party N.C.C.F.
Community Center
Atlantic City,

FOOLS RUSH IN

Harold Wright, number one fool in Pittsburgh, rushed out of here and into Baltimore.

HAROLD WRIGHT, FOOL

The National Committee to Combat Fascism has no time for crazy dumb fools who run around pimping off the people's just struggle for freedom and self-determination This modern day mad man can't seem to find himself or anything else for that matter. He started out, helping to put this office together and after a long train of was put out. Harold didn't like this and started to hang around our office trying to give the community the impression that he was still a member of the revolutionary ranks of Babylon.

After a few days of the breakfast program, his wife Michelle decided that she loved Harold more than the people and went with him.

We say goodbye to the Wright family and other love birds (like the Johnson's) who can't deal for the people.

So let this be heard, Harold and Michelle Wright are not members of the National Committe to Combat Fascism nor will these fools ever be.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
National
Committee to Combat Fascism
574 Brushton Ave.
Pittsburgh, Penn.
(412) 242-4728

The Black Panther,
June 20, 1970, p. 8.

VIII. PROPAGANDA

Although posters, pamphlets, recordings, and a singing group called "The Lumpen" are among propaganda vehicles used by the Black Panther Party, the main channel to the public is through their official organ, *The Black Panther*. Funds permitting, it is published weekly in Oakland, California. It includes editorials by Party leaders and spokesmen; provocative slogans; inflammatory articles; "revolutionary art," comprising cartoons; and an international news section.

Excerpts from Article carrying
Typed Signature of Eldridge Cleaver.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1970 PAGE 4

TO MY BLACK BROTHERS IN VIET NAM

I'm writing this on January 4, 1970. We are starting out a new year. On August 31, I'll be 35 years old. I'm married, and I have one child with another one on the way. I am in love with my wife and I would like to enjoy a happy life raising a family. But I am not free to live the type of life that I would like. Pigs--the racist fascist rulers of the United States--won't let me....

We appeal to you Brothers to come to the aid of your people. Either quit the army, now, or start destroying it from the inside. Anything else is a compromise and a form of treason against your own people. Stop killing the Vietnamese people. You need to start killing the racist pigs who are over there with you giving you orders. Kill General Abrahms and his staff, all his officers. Sabotage supplies and equipment, or turn them over to the Vietnamese people. Talk to the other Brothers and wake them up. You should start now weeding out the traitors amongst you. It is better to do it now than to allow them to return home to help the pigs wipe us out. Especially the Uncle Tom officers should be dealt with now, because the pigs will use them as effective tools against our people. When you can no longer take care of business inside the army, then turn yourself over to the Vietnamese people and tell them you want to join the Black Panther Party to fight for the freedom and liberation of your own people. If you do cross over, you don't have to worry about the Vietnamese people abusing you. They will be glad to see you drop out of the army because what they want most in life is to stop the fighting in their land. You have a duty to humanity as well as to your own people not to be used as murderous tools by racist pigs to oppress the people.



"IF YOU WANT PEACE YOU GOT TO FIGHT FOR IT"

There's too many American flags out here, and our Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, says that the American flag and the American eagle are the true symbols of fascism. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE. Black power to Black people, Brown power to Brown people, Red power to Red people, and Yellow power to Ho Chi Minh, and Comrade Kim Il Sung the courageous leader of the 40,000,000 Korean people....

*We say down with the American fascist society. Later for Richard Millhouse Nixon, the Later for all the pigs of the power structure. Later for all the people out here that don't want to hear me curse because that's all that I know how to do. That's all that I'm going to do. I'm not going to ever stop cursing, not only are we going to curse, we're going to put into practice some of the that we talk about. Because Richard Nixon is an evil man. This is the that unleashed the counter-insurgent teams upon the BPP. This is the man that's responsible for all the attacks on the Black Panther Party nationally. This is the man that sends his vicious murderous dogs out into the Black community and invade upon our Black Panther Party Breakfast Programs. Destroy food that we have for hungry kids and expect us to accept like that idly. that man. **We will kill Richard Nixon. We will kill any that stands in the way of our freedom.** We ain't here for no goddamned peace, because we know that we can't have no peace because this country was built on war. And if you want peace you got to fight for it.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

Photograph accompanying Article indicated these are the Words of Chief of Staff, David Hilliard.
THE BLACK PANTHER, November 22, 1969, p. 10.

Editorials

Through editorials, readers are advised of Party positions on national and international issues and are presented with the opinions of the hierarchy on inter-Party matters.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1971 PAGE 2

STATEMENT BY HUEY P. NEWTON, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE, ON THE OCCASION OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY- MARCH 5, 1971

Power to the People, Brothers and Sisters,

First of all I would like to thank all of you for my very presence here, because if it weren't for the Power of the People, I wouldn't be here tonight. I'm not here because of the Black Panther Party; I'm not here because of any group, I'm not here because of a group of kamakazis. I'm here because of the Power of the People.

We must remember that Revolution is a process. It's not a conclusion; because once we conclude, then we become counter-revolutionary. And that means even with the gun in our hands, because fascism also has a gun. And I would like to say tonight that the Black Panther Party stands against all forms of fascism, including sexual fascism. That we are against all kinds of chauvinism, including racial chauvinism; we're against sexual chauvinism, national chauvinism. We're intercommunalists. Before I went to prison, most of you know, you are aware, that I never made any speeches, you see, because I'm not a very eloquent man. I'm better known by the actions. And the Party was built upon the actions. And the action itself is a process. And we're not ever fixated. We haven't accepted any dogma. And we will not.

And I would like to say this, that from now on the Party itself will be better known by its contributions to the People, for the simple reason that some people around us seem to want to be known through the Media. But the Party can only judge itself through establishing certain survival programs, pending Revolution. Because remember, you make the Revolution. We can't free political prisoners, only the people can free political prisoners. And a people who are not free cannot free their prisoners, cannot free the prisoners that fascism makes. So I would like to say that we must work very hard in order to lift the consciousness of the people. We must free our Chairman Bobby Seale, Angela Davis, Ruchell Magee, the Soledad Brothers, the seven and the three, and all other political prisoners. Randy. We have to free all of them.

But we must remember that we must exhaust every possible tactic. And we must let it be known that never broadcast military tactics for military reasons. It's perfectly correct to broadcast military tactics for political reasons. That's what Uncle Ho said, and I agree with him. So we would like for the people to know that there are many things that we will not discuss in public. But what you can do is watch the fruits of our work. And we would like to say that our Party became an intercommunal Party upon its actions. And I think that's very good. So I'm asking you in order to free all political prisoners, free the people, free the woman and also the man, that we have to get together in unity by substituting verbal expressions for action. The final test of the pie is the action. We'll stand on the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party from 1966 when it was formed will stand on its record, will stand on the action. We won't claim to be ultra-leftists; we won't claim to be infantile leftists. What we'll do is act in accordance with the particular set of conditions and the particular problem that we have at a time. So please judge us upon our actions and we will develop like that. We will not develop with lip service coming from anyone. And sometimes I'm very thankful that I don't talk too well, because that's only one way of communication. We say that a picture is worth a thousand words, but action is supreme.

But what kind of action you take will depend upon the particular set of conditions. And I say all of this, because you know the Party and the world today is under turmoil. And this is very good. We always have welcomed all forms of contradictions. Because without the contradiction there is no transformation. So from the contradiction that has developed now in the world and in the Party, we hope to have a qualitative leap. If this leap eliminates some of us, then, of course, we'll weep for that. But we must not stop the Revolution. I will not stop the Revolution. You should not stop it. And, for all that it's worth, we know that words will never stop it. Words will not start the Revolution either. Only action. 'Sixty-six kicked off the armed manifestation of Revolution in this country, because it focused upon the need for the People not only to defend themselves, but also to develop a consciousness necessary to perform and to act to be able to fight in a protracted war. And that is why it is necessary for us to develop the correct ideology, which is a system of thinking. And we must not rely upon and conclude with the philosophy, which isn't necessarily a conclusion.

So we're ideologically revolutionists. We're in a constant state of change. And we fight with all people who want to change, because we know change will offer our hope. So after all of this, we must pay more attention to what is happening. The news media has attempted to discredit the Party by saying that it's over, because they don't see anyone. I think our programs are better than the Party. The communities are involved in forty-four cities. We must support these; we must expand them. Because I read an article, recently, a few months ago, where Che had some problems in Bolivia, because the peasants were so unconscious until he could not rally them even with the "focos". They did not understand why the military, the regular military was dropping. So what did he do. He attempted to form certain programs that he called survival programs. He attempted to form a free health program in order to get the peasants inside, to help them, and also to provide things for his focos. He also took to form a free breakfast program, a free shoe factory, and a sporting good store (for obvious reasons). So programs are good. Because an act that might be revolutionary might be counter-revolutionary, if the correct preparations are not made.

So to be a serious revolutionist, we must know that we are involved in a process, and not a set of principles or conclusions that are of face-value revolutionary. I do not know one thing that is revolutionary in itself. And all things might be revolutionary in context. In other words, capitalism was revolutionary when it kicked out feudalism. And now we have a situation where the capitalists have become the imperialists, and the people of the world, of the communities of the world will have to kick them out. So in order to free Angela, Bobby, Ruchell Magee and all other political prisoners, we must kick the fascists out. And we cannot do it with lip service.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

BOBBY SEALE: "I AM THE CHAIRMAN OF ONLY ONE PARTY."

March, 1971

This is Brother Bobby Seale, from the New Haven Courthouse, back in jail, back here. And I just wanted to say to the people, the masses of people, to all the brothers and sisters, Women's Liberation Movement, Black brothers and sisters, Chicano brothers, the Puerto Rican brothers, the young revolutionary White youth in America, and especially, all the Black brothers and sisters in the Black community, that I've seen a lot of things happening; and I've took time to analyse what's happening. And I see presently that there're some divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions going on. Now the Party accepts constructive criticism. Constructive criticism! But the divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions and jive tactics of Eldridge Cleaver is doing nothing but aiding the pig power structure. Aiding the pig power structure in their attempt to put in gas chambers and jails over 130 political prisoners, who are presently, like myself and Ericka, caught up in these jails, and are being railroaded to the gas chamber, where we're fighting for our lives in these trials. And this is the only thing that Eldridge's actions are doing. This is the only thing that I can see that is going on. And my analysis shows this.

There is no split in the Black Panther Party, at all. But the main thing that we want to get across, I want to get across, to the people is that the Party is based on Survival Programs to serve the people, and these survival programs - from Breakfast for Children to the recent programs that I'm designing right here in jail, in my time that I'm not in court, which is a decent housing fit for shelter of human beings program - these are survival programs - and this program and all other programs that all other revolutionary organizations have are survival programs, that must sustain the people so the people can wage a revolutionary struggle.

And Eldridge Cleaver, who's denouncing these types of programs and carrying on with all those other divisionary jive tactics, is negating the real meaning of a People's revolutionary struggle. That's why the Black Panther Party belongs to the people, because the survival programs come forth, and we set up the survival programs to sustain the people's revolutionary struggle. Even the Vietnamese people, if one would check it out, have their survival programs; they have their cooperative, functional survival programs throughout their land, amongst their people. The people just don't have guns alone fighting their battle. The people over there have actual everyday, functional, constructive survival programs. In their countries, in their lands, and in their everyday operations in fighting the capitalist pigs who occupy their country, they have survival programs. And those survival programs sustain the revolutionary struggle there. Of course, our survival programs will be directly related to here in America. But I, myself, send solidarity and support to all the socialistic, revolutionary peoples of the world, and the socialistic countries and lands - and the different war zones, where the people, the masses in those lands, are fighting against the capitalistic, imperialistic ruling class circles.

And Eldridge Cleaver - who negates the very survival programs that the Party is trying to set forth, that the Central Committee is trying to set forth, and all the real dedicated, hard-working brothers in the Party are trying to set forth to educate the people and serve the people, these survival programs (that) sustain the people's

to the gas chambers. He's aiding the power structure and causing us to be in the prisons, because the political prisoners are the ones who really initiate and work hard to maintain the survival programs for the revolution, the people's revolutionary struggle.

Only the masses of the people can really free political prisoners. And the people must see the value and the validity of the survival programs. And getting on down to it, so the people can understand where it's at, so that the people, even the supporters that we have all over Europe, all the solidarity committees that are in Europe, that're in Sweden, that are in Denmark, and other countries over there, who support the freedom of political prisoners in this country, who support the survival programs of the poor oppressed people in this country, and the revolutionary movement (who are initiating these programs), I am trying myself to get people to understand, that we are beautifully behind them and we are glad and send greetings to them and praise the people who are in the solidarity committees in other countries, and in fact here in America, here in Ameri-KKK-a. I think that the people really have to understand who and what the Black Panther Party is, so that these reactionary, counter-revolutionary , divisionary tactics will not be misunderstood. The Party is not falling apart. It's just that Eldridge Cleaver has personally defected his own self from the Party. He defected from the Party.

And I, Bobby Seale, am the Chairman of only one Party. And that Party is the Party that Brother Huey P. Newton is the Minister of Defense of and one of the supreme, top servants of the people; that Brother David Hilliard is the Chief of Staff of; that Brother June Hilliard is the Assistant Chief of Staff of; that Bobby Hutton was a member of, before the pigs murdered him. I am the Chairman of only one Party, that Brother Fred Hampton, who loved the survival programs for the people, was Deputy Chairman of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, who Brothers Jonathan Jackson and George Jackson are members of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party, with Huey, David, and the rest of the brothers and sisters on the Central Committee, where the Central Headquarters happens to be located on Peralta Street in Oakland, (California). So All Power to the People. Right On. And we're going to stick together. We ain't coming up with no jive. We have to free Brothers Ruchell Magee, George Jackson; we have to free Sister Angela Davis; we have to free these brothers and sisters. I am the Chairman of only one Party, the Party that Brother Huey is the Minister of Defense, with David Hilliard, June Hilliard, etc. And we're going to free political prisoners; and, we're going to keep these survival programs going; and, we're going to wage a People's revolutionary struggle, and not no jive, individualistic, defecting actions, by some individual who wants to play power games. I am the Chairman of the Party of which the San Quentin Cadre is apart and parcel of the same Party. The San Quentin Cadre of the Black Panther Party.

So all I have to say to the people is that you know where it's at. We're going to stick in solidarity. There're a bunch of jive renegades and jack-a-napes around. But later for that. Just later for that. Let that ride, cause we got survival to get on with, and a People's revolution to mobilize. And we got political prisoners to free all over this land.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
RIGHT ON!

Inflammatory Articles

Many of the articles in *The Black Panther* are written by local Party members and concern regional incidents and issues. They are aimed at provoking national black sympathy and joint retaliation for magnified grievances against the authorities.



RACIST-MAD PIGS SIC K9 POLICE DOG ON BROTHER

On Friday night, March 27, 1970, 14 yr. old Brother John (Little Hot-Rod) Hargrove became the victim of a brutal attack inflicted by a K9 Police dog. This brother along with two other bloods were playfully chasing each other along the sidewalk in the area of Sixth and Snyder Streets. When the brothers approached the corner, one brother ran past brushing against a lady standing at the corner. When this happened the lady immediately grabbed the brother. The two other bloods kept running. Soon after the pig grabbed the brother, a light colored station wagon appeared. In the station wagon were two plain clothes pigs. These pigs immediately proceeded to hand-cuff the blood, beat him in the face, and unleash a vicious police dog that ripped the flesh off the brother'sbody. As the brother tried to escape the blows of the pig beating him in the face, the K9 proceeded to bite him all over his body. While the brother was being beaten by the pig, and attacked by the dog, the other pigs who came along proceeded to chase the other two bloods. The pigs fired a shot barely missing the fore-head of one of the brothers.

Little Hot-Rod, handcuffed, face badly beaten and suffering from dog bites all over his body, was taken to the local police station where he was booked on suspicion of pick-pocketing. He did not receive any medical attention until several hours later at the Philadelphia General Hospital; there they gave him one tetnus shot and put a bandage on each leg. The pig who created the vicious attack was later identified as one of Rizzo's faggot law and order boys of the GRANNY PATROL. The Granny Patrol is a special segment of piggery which employs pigs to dress up as women so that they can arrest suspected pick-pockets.

The party conducted an interview with the bloods who were fortunate enough to get away, we also spoke withthe brother's parents, and were able to visit the brother, at the Youth Study Center. We also spoke with the people in the community who witnessed the horrid incident!

Following are excerpts from the tapes which describe the incident. We cannot use names here of the bloods because it has been passed down that the pigs are trying to round up the other brothers.

The racist pigs approached the brothers by shouting "Get them niggers, get them niggers" They chased the bloods with butcher knives, and what appeared to be an ax. One brother was hit with a pipe in the stomach.

People in the community responded to the arrest and attack angrily. When several people in the community demanded that the pigs call off the dog, they were met with racist remarks from the pigs.

The attack was so vicious, the dog ate the underwear on the brothers body. In addition to bites on the brothers hands, legs and waist the dog also bit the brother in the back and rectum. The brother suffered from severe beatings by the pigs, in the face.

When Little Hot-Rod was visited on Sunday at the Youth Study Center, his body was not healing properly. He related that the nurse only appliesmercurochrome on the bites. He is suffering from soreness. He is sleeping on hard cots in the over-crowded center. The bites on his body are swollen and inflamed. The brother's first remarks to his family were, "Tell my probation officer to get me out of here, this place is like Byberry' .

Just less than two weeks ago, the brother was beaten in a cell Division. This pig beat him so bad that Methodist Hospital complained to the Police Department. His eyes were badly damaged. The pig's name who inflicted that beating was Juvenile Aid Officer, Charles Kora. Hot-Rod identified Kora as his assailant and since then, he has been harrassed in his neighborhood by every pig who comes through.

At 14, John Hargrove is a marked victim of Frank Rizzo's fascists, like so many other Blackyouths in this city. Pigs are on the loose to inflict more physical harm to our people. It is high time that we escalate our war on the pigs and drive them out of our communities.

Seize The Time people of Philadelphia, Rizzo and all of his racist paper tigers can be rightously blown away.

Rosemari Mealy
Philadelphia Branch
Black Panther Party

THE BLACK PANTHER, APRIL 18, 1970, P. 9.

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY BOMBED, HEROES SUCCESSFULLY ESCAPE



Newburyport, Mass. is a small residental New England town basically composed of people from the White working class. Until last Saturday, September 19, Newburyport's only claim to fame was that it is one of the many small towns surrounding Boston which are strongholds for groups like the Minutemen and other right-wing fascist reactionaries. Last Saturday, however, at 6:00 a.m. in the morning a National Guard Armory was bombed, hundreds of rounds of ammunition ripped off, military personnel records taken and to top it off, they left the scene in a one ton army pick-up truck. They (the bombers) attempted to open the vault holding the weapons of the pig army, M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols and .30 caliber sniper carbines, but were not able to do so. The act was accomplished in one fast motion, and the heroes escaped capture and one week later, "law enforcement officials" are still scratching their heads in wonderment.

And although the weapons, themselves, tools of our liberation were not liberated from the oppressor, the success of this action cannot be denied.

As has been the case in liberation movements all over the world, the guns and arms made by and for the oppressor eventually ends up in the hands of the oppressed. More important, the unknown people who accomplished this act, obtained hundreds of rounds of desperately needed ammunition. Again, past experiences has shown that while the guns themselves can be obtained in ample supply, the ammunition, the bullets, that actually inflicts death upon our enemy, becomes very scarce. One of the necessities of our struggle is our ability to liberate, stockpile, and then accurately use the ammunition of our oppressor upon our oppressor.

As for the military personnel records, they can obviously be put to good use. Our oppressors must be harassed and intimidated day and night. They must not sleep, nor rest, these are the devils who plot the genocide of Black people. The National Guard Armory in the small town of Newburyport, like other small time towns surrounding the Black colony in Boston is designed to be used against us in the fascist genocidal plot devised by the treacherous minds of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell clique. It is to be carried out by those men whose names and addresses are now in the hands of the people. Unknown members of the fascist majority now appear before the people's tribunal and will be judged according to their actions.

This action is just one of many blows which will be dealt out to the oppressor. If this action was intended to help and serve the people, we welcome their help to our just liberation struggle against the Babylonian Empire.

ARM YOURSELF

Michael Fultz
Boston Chapter
Black Panther Party

SISTER MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY RENT-A-PIG

FIVE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE RAILROADED BY TUCSON GRAND JURY

STORM TROOPERS INVADE COMMUNITY

THREE PIGS BEAT FIFTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK YOUTH

ENTIRE FAMILY BEATEN AND JAILED

Another regular feature in *The Black Panther* is a weekly article giving detailed instructions for the handling of firearms, or setting forth deportment for urban guerrilla warfare.

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS HOW TO COMBAT C.M.I.

Part 5

The principal of Juche (Self-Reliance) clarified by Eldridge Cleaver, the Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, is "Use what you got to get what you need." To answer the question of how do you combat the pigs' *C.M.I. (communication, mobility and information)*, we must first determine what we have going for ourselves. Checking out the practice of self-defense groups, we see that we have the power to determine what is to happen, when it is to happen and how it is supposed to go down. *What, When* and How (W.W.H.)- the element of surprise. The pigs have C.M.I. and self-defense groups have W.W.H.

To consider a self-defense operation successful is not to just *plan and execute but to plan, execute* AND escape. There have been too many instances where members of self-defense groups have planned and executed righteous blows against this racist system only to be captured, wounded or *killed. These are the consequences* for revolutionary activity, however we must keep casualties within an acceptable minimun. The *slogan must be Maximum Damage* to the Enemy, Minimun Damage to Us. Practice has shown that when planning W.W.H. if it is done with knowledge and an understanding of C.M.I. casualties will be kept within an acceptable minimum. *Too often, much attention* is given to a plan up to the point of execution without giving the same attention to evasion and escape, that phase of the operation that determines success. This is a subjective approach, a onesided *approach. W.W.H. is only one side* of the coin, C.M.I. is the other side. Because self-defense groups use W.W.H., the pigs' C.M.I. does not go into operation until a self-defense group commits itself by actually executing some type of *self-defense activity.*



COMMUNICATION



MOBILITY



INFORMATION

All of us should be aware that once C.M.I. is activated pigs start showing on the set from 30 seconds to 1 minute maximum in every *major city in Babylon, therefore* the success or failure of a defense operation is dependent upon the attention given to C.M.I. and the planning of evasion and escape. As I see it, learning to deal with the pigs' C.M.I. is the number one military problem facing revolutionary forces in Babylon today. It is time for all who have something to teach, by example, to step forward. And remember, to die honorably, one does not need company.

USE WHAT YOU GOT TO GET WHAT YOU NEED

D.C.

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

Part 6 ON REVOLVERS

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been in previous issues of the Black Community News Service. This article is on revolvers, it gives a basic run down on the use of revolvers. Check out all of the photographs and notes to help you understand better the functioning of a revolver.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS:

1. Check to see if gun is loaded. You do this on a revolver by swinging out the cylinder. Pull back on the cylinder latch and gently push *out on the cylinder. (see unloading* a revolver photo #2)

2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless practicing trigger squeeze or firing.

3. Point your gun away from where someone may be shot-Point at the ceiling or to the floor, but wherever you point, make sure no one is in the way and can be harmed.

4. Never leave the hammer cocked on a revolver. (Explanation later on cocking a revolver.)

KINDS OF REVOLVERS:

.38 Snubnose - This gun has only a 2" barrel and shoots 38's. It is very easy to conceal.

.38 Special - Has a 4" barrel and shoots 38's.

.357 Magnum - This is the type of handgun the pig carries. The ammo for this is .357 magnum. Metal piercing bullets will pierce an engine block. This is the best type of revolver to have.

.41 and .44 Magnums - Have more knock down power than a .357 Magnum. The Highway Patrol carries these to shoot through car doors, but a .357 will go through a car door also and .357 ammunition is more plentiful.

PARTS OF A REVOLVER: PHOTO # 1

REVOLVER TERMS



UNLOADING:

Holding gun in left hand (pointed in safe direction) release cylinder latch with right hand. (#3). Push out cylinder with the fingers of left hand (#2). Now that you *have swung out the cylinder* and the bullets are visible you gently push down on the extractor and let bullets drop out into your right hand (#4).

LOADING:

To load, simply follow the same steps in unlatching the cylinder. Then drop bullets into the chambers of your cylinder. Gently push cylinder closed, and you are ready to fire. DO NOT SLAM CYLINDER CLOSED, this causes *extra wear on your gun.*

COCKING A REVOLVER:

Put the tip of your thumb on the hammer holding revolver steady in the palm of your hand. Do not put your finger in the trigger. Pull straight back steadily on your hammer spur until your hammer locks back. You gun is ready to *fire, do not put your finger in* the trigger until you are ready to fire. After cocking hammer, place your thumb directly on the frame beside the hammer, resting the tip of your thumb on the cylinder latch. (Photo #4) *Your forefinger should be placed* on the other side of the gun straight out just above the trigger guard until ready to fire. Everytime you cock the hammer before firing, this is called single action firing.



PHOTO # 2

UNCOCKING A REVOLVER (LOADED):

Keep your finger off the trigger) With gun already cocked, place your thumb on the hammer firmly. Now with the gun firmly in your hand, pointed in a safe direction, *and* thumb firmly on the hammer (still cocked) squeeze the trigger slowly until you can feel the hammer releasing. IMMEDIATE-

ALL POWER
TO
THE PEOPLE!



LOADING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 3



COCKING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 4

URBAN GUERILLAS

America's complexity will be her downfall, for complex power, communications and transportation networks are unprotected. These systems are the life lines of the industrial and military might of U.S.A. fascism. The source of America's strength is its vulnerable Achilles heel-therefore urban guerrillas, utilizing and relying on information divulged by sympathetic workers, can halt or severely cripple every industry in the nation, and bring fascism crashing to its knees. The dams, power stations, substations and power lines are vulnerable. Highly sophisticated communications networks are used by our enemies for carrying out routine business, and are an extremely important factor, in the fascist reaction to guerilla strikes. The neutralization of the fascist communications lie within the capabilities of urban guerillas.

The disruption of this system would hamper and cripple not only the fascist military but would also effect all industrial outputs. The fascist ruling clique realizes the vunerability of their transportation networks, yet all fascist military forces and industry utilize the railways, the state and interstate highway systems and the airports. Urban guerillas can cut and constantly harass these important links.

Urban guerilla teams highly motivated have already begun to put their theory into practice. Lists are being compiled and are constantly updated on fascist and all enemies of our people, because the location and identification of the enemy is an extremely vital task of urban guerillas. This basic intelligence is necessary for planning retaliatory strikes against our enemies. Where their killer groups, for the most, will be unable to locate guerillas, urban guerillas will, in every attack hit the fascist squarely on the chin. Urban guerillas, being one with the people, must attack like skilled brain surgeons--cutting out the diseased tissue while perserving the good. Their dual purpose is that of destroying all fascist forces and their lackeys, while protecting and serving our people. The fascist ruling clique fears this. They know the Party is preparing to fight until the last of our enemies bites the dust. The Party has dared to take the vanguard role in the struggle and will surely defeat U.S A. fascism no matter what the odds, no matter how great the sacrifice. The Party is aware that the fascists will never lay down their arms of their own accord. And also aware of the direction that U.S.A. fascism is taking in order to survive as long as possible.

In Brazil, the guerilla forces found through social practice that they could best achieve the goal of liberating their people from the strong-hold imposed by the fascist Brazilian oligarchy by waging urban guerilla warfare. Brazil's development as an industrial fascist nation and the economic and social backwardness of the indigenous peasants made the revolutionary forces adapt the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare. The urban guerrillas moved to mobilize the workers, and implement urban guerrilla warfare within the context of their historical experiences with the working class and the fascist ruling class oligarchy. The revolutionary forces have implemented this type of struggle which invariably catches the fascists with their pants down. The type of warfare which turns the asphalt concrete and steel of cities into jungles; into cemeteries for the fascist highly mechanized units and turns his weapons of mass slaughter into paper tigers; into urban jungles where the revolutionary forces can plunge the blade into the hilt in the vunerable life lines of even fascist U S.A In this country as well as in Brazil the fascists tremble with dread at the thought of nationwide attacks by urban guerrilla forces.

In the Pentagon and select centers scattered throughout the U S A., gigantic multimillion dollar computers are manned by hoards of the military. Technicians wrestle with fascism's nightmare-the problem of dealing with urban guerrillas. These machines can only reach an hypothesis drawn from information fed into them. In order for the fascists to test the solutions offered by the computer. they must first circumvent

the frail facade of the constitution and the bill of rights. The fascists realize that if these two pieces of paper were implemented they would be in their graves tonight because the constitution and the bill of rights contain the moral impetus necessary to bring this foul evil economic and social system to its doom.

U S.A. fascists have compiled and are still evaluating information received from South American satellite states who are being beset by courageous urban guerrillas waging relentless struggle with amazing(to fascists)and stunning success. Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, has said that we still have a little time left because the U.S.A fascist ruling clique hasn't programmed all of the people to accept the genocide of the Party and our people yet. For at least a year now, there have appeared in every major newspaper, seemingly innocent space fillers. Articles from UPI-API dealing with the deployment of fascist death squads against the revolutionary forces in South America.

These fillers had the sinister purpose of preparing America for the advent of death squads now in operation in every major urban center. These articles were to prepare the people to accept the first overt actions of the Chicago foul fascist gestapo killer unit. Their predawn kill all--destroy all mission was launched as a pilot, an experimental operation with a two fold objective. One was to put counter-revolutionary theory into practice in America --to bring into the streets the fascist ruling clique's solution to the Party--to test and evaluate the techniques of counter-insurgency urban warfare. The second important objective was to evaluate the response of the people to above ground counter-insurgency killer groups--to see if the people were conditioned to accept the outright fascist terror tactics directed officially by the fascist ruling clique.

Our Party has been and is still the main target of a national dehumanizing campaign. The fascist controlled news media has consistently maligned, viciously attacked and branded our Party as a racist band of blood-thirsty murderers out for their own personal gain. The fascist news media seeks to justify the fascist's program of destroying our people's first line of defense, the Party, and all other organizations which refuse to be either bought off with blood money or intimidated by the repressive fascist forces. The fascist attempts to isolate our Party from the people has been a dismal failure. The liquidation of Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark had top priority on the fascist's pig list. However, neither the people nor our Party were cowed or intimidated by the bestial slaying of these two revlutionaries. The fascist ruling clique made a grave error in underestimating the will of the people and our Party. People from all walks of life and every progressive organization saw through the fascist attempts to isolate and destroy their Party. The people mobilized and rallied mass support for the Party and soundly condemned the actions of Chicago's fascist killer groups.

Make trouble, fail, make trouble, fail again until their doom. This is the logic of fascists the world over. In Chicago, they refused to acknowledge the bankruptcy of their counter-insurgency campaign. In December, in Los Angeles, Southern California, Chapter of our Party, came under attack by fascist killer groups. Although outnumbered and using inferior weapons, our Party repelled and held at bay the fascist shock troops and sounded the end of Chicago type operations in a fuselage of bullets. We learned valuable lessons paid for with the blood of our revolutionary comrades. The fascist ruling clique has seen the support, that their homicidal raids have generated for the Party. They now know that if conditions are favorable, they will receive tit for tat and then some. They now know that Black and all progressive people will not sit idly by and pacify the action of above ground killer groups Fascists have tried to rally the support of the American people to their avowed aims and failed.

Now begins the phase of underground, clandestine operation of fascist directed killer groups. This is all part of the nature of the fascist ruling clique. The fascists will no doubt expand the techniques of their South American lackeys who operate unrestricted, unswayed by either democratic institutions or public opinion. As the tempo of the struggle increases so will the fascist acts of reactionary terror and violence increase. The primary target of forming clandestine kill groups will be both our people and our Party. If we are to survive as a people, this next phase of attacks, and pave the way to victory, it is imperative that our people be armed with the ideology of the Party. For only then will our people be able to cope with, both, ideological and physical attacks initiated by the insane fascist ruling clique. Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, said that our Party must be a living shield that stands between our people and the fascist pigs and that our paper should serve to educate our people so that they will survive.

As the attacks against the Party escalate, so must the awareness of our people be channelled toward acceptance and even more, active participation in urban guerrilla warfare. Phase two of the fascist plans will surely and soundly be defeated. The fascists will awake to find themselves bogged down on that last front. They will be swallowed up in the morass of a people's war. Their graves will be dug by revolutionary urban guerrilla forces amidst the asphalt, concrete and steel of the cities.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEFEAT U S.A FASCISM ON EVERY FRONT

WE'LL ALL BE TOGETHER ON THE DAY OF VICTORY

Randy Williams,
Political Prisoner

REVOLUTIONARY HANDIWORK OF THE URBAN GUERILLA

Provocative Slogans

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE TIME SEIZES YOU!

AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE IS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL

BLOOD TO THE HORSES BROW AND WOE TO THOSE WHO CAN-NOT SWIM!

DARE TO STRUGGLE...DARE TO WIN!

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS



FOR EVERY PORK CHOP THERE IS A FRYING PAN!

"Revolutionary Art"

The most prominent artist on *The Black Panther* staff is Minister of Culture Emory Douglas. Although he prepares a large number of cartoons, other Panther artists are also represented. These cartoons characterize the Government and local law enforcement as "pigs" and call for the overthrow of the Government and the killing of Government officials, as well as police officers.



THE REVOLUTIONARY ARTIST

When the Black revolutionary artist starts a still life painting, he doesn't see a beautiful vase, or a dish of tasty fruit, against a soft velvet backdrop...he sees only a tattered curtain, rusty cans, a broken dish--empty.

As he seeks out a beautiful landscape to paint, he sees not fertile fields with dancing flowers, and lovely maidens bathing in the sun, but decaying houses, and streets covered with debris, and a Black woman in ragged clothes with tear-stained cheeks.

The Black revolutionary artist knows only oppression, and that his art must relate to his surroundings, and his people, and most of all, his art cannot be abstract and unrelated to his revolutionary people. So he seeks, and finds what our Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton calls "the spirit of the people." As he moves on that, he shows what *Revolutionary Artist* and Minister of Culture, Emory Douglas shows--"the oppressor *hanging by his heels.*"

The revolutionary artist gives his art to his oppressed people.

So with his gun and his brush he shows the spirit of the people moving to crush the oppressor, and this is the essence of revolutionary art. His art then becomes part of the people's revolution.

He knows that only because of the urine covered walls and trash-littered alleys the people's desire for freedom will be replaced with the *BLOOD OF THE OPPRESSOR.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Malik Barafu
N.C.G.F.,
Washington, D.C.

The Black Panther; May 9, 1970; page 18

TO ALL REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS

I would like to take this time to express on behalf of the Black Panther Party our warmest thanks to all revolutionary artists who have given their talents and thoughts to the people through revolutionary art. We would like to say that every artist's work that has appeared in the Black Panther Newspaper this past year has been a great contribution of visual interpretation of the ideology of the Black Panther Party and of the oppressed people of the world.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS
Emory Douglas
Minister of Culture
Black Panther Party


1971 YEAR OF THE YOUTH
YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION
DEATH
TO THE
FASCIST
PIGS
EMORY

EVERY DOOR THAT THE FASCISTS ATTEMPT TO KICK DOWN WILL PUT THEM DEEPER INTO THE PIT OF DEATH



SHOOT TO KILL


DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIG
PIG

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 3, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 17, 1970, P. 16



THE BLACK PANTHER
MARCH 20, 1971, P. 4


Only the power of the people can free political prisoners
PIG

We will not hesitate to kill
or die for our freedom.


TIER 3
"O" WING
RALPH

THE BLACK PANTHER
FEBRUARY 6, 1971, P. 5

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 2, 1970 PAGE 13


OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
U.S. GOVT.
EMORY
OINK

International News

Panthers profess to believe that American Negroes comprise isolated "colonies" in the heart of the "mother" country, and are part of the Third World, defined as the nonwhite, undeveloped, and underdeveloped countries of the world. The 10-Point Program of the Black Panther Party includes, as a major political objective, a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony to determine the national destiny of American Negroes.

To internationalize their Party and enlarge their importance, Panther leaders have sought acceptance, support, and funds from sources abroad. They have made numerous trips to foreign countries, including Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Palestine, Germany, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Chinese Mainland.

Both at home and abroad, Panther leaders loudly proclaim anti-American sentiments and align themselves politically with the aims and tactics of enemy lands. The international contacts most important to the Panthers are made with revolutionary groups and communist countries, especially those that more closely follow Maoist thinking. The international news section of *The Black Panther* reflects attempts by the Black Panther Party to attract such attention, support, and aid.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1970 PAGE 8

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG
PREMIER OF THE CABINET
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA

June 25th marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S. imperialist aggressive invasion of the DPRK in 1950.

The Black Panther Party takes this occasion to salute the DPRK and the wise and brave leader of the 40 million Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung.

We recognize and respect the long history of resistance and victory that Comrade Kim Il Sung and the 40 million Korean people have contributed to the world wide struggle against imperialism and fascism; the shining examples of socialist construction while under severe conditions of U.S. provocation and aggression, the many brilliant ideological contributions you have made to the socialist camp and in particular the concept of "Juche".

Because of our historical experience in America; because we are faced with no alternatives but genocide or liberation we understand the criminal nature and gangster logic of the U.S. ruling class. Black people are increasingly the victims of overt military aggression and U.S. plots to subvert our struggle for national salvation. Under these conditions we have an increasing awareness that the expulsion of the U.S. imperialist burglars from Korean soil and the reunification of Korea will be a victory for the Korean people and a victory for oppressed people the world over.

We see clearly that the reunification of Korea is not seperate from the salvation of Black and other oppressed people in fascist America. As gang boss Nixon and his mob of criminals intensify their attempts to loot Asia they are intensifying their murderous repression of Black people in America. These attacks will be met with revolutionary solidarity manifested in action, both around the world and in the gangsters lair, and with one-beat-a-hundred fighters in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America; the U.S.A. will surely be brought to the peoples JUSTICE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
U.S.A.

INTERCOMMUNAL NEWS

MEMORANDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE ESCALATION OF THE U.S. WAR OF AGGRESSION IN LAOS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAO PROBLEM

PART II

Application Of The Nixon Doctrine And Escalation Of The War Of Aggression In Laos By The Nixon Administration

UNDER PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC OPINION, NIXON ON MARCH 6, 1970 HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE LOGISTIC AND AIR SUPPORT AND "OTHER ACTIVITIES" OF THE U.S. IN LAOS. He also admitted an increase in the U.S. military activities in Laos. But he tried to argue that those activities were "limited" and of a purely "defensive" character aimed at protecting American lives in South Viet Nam.

But public opinion in the United States and in the world immediately pointed out that that was the first time the highest executive in the United States made an open acknowledgement of the violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos by the U.S. On March 7, Senator Albert Gore declared that Nixon in fact had conceded that "we (the U.S.) have violated the Geneva Agreements". Public opinion has condemned Nixon's allegations as "queer" and "selfcontradictory" (the Japanese paper "Asahi Shimbun" March 9. "Nixon's allegations were misleading. They mentioned only some facts and not everything and showed no sign of any change of policy." (Senators Scranton and Fulbright, March 6 and 9, 1970).

Obivously, Nixon cannot dupe public opinion which bases its judgement not merely on the words but also on the deeds of the Nixon administration during the recent past.

After Nixon came to power, the so-called "Nixon doctrine on Asia" saw the light which consists in providing more U.S. advisers, weapons and firepower to the Asians, while the latter contribute more mercenaries for the U.S. The formula of this doctrine is "native soldiers plus U.S. advisers and maximum logistic and air support". This is in fact a more elaborate and more refined form of U.S. neo-colonialism's wicked policy of making Asians fight Asians, and natives fight natives.



The Resistance government formed in 1950 against the French Colonialists.

The active application of that doctrine in Laos finds a concrete expression in the steps of escalation taken by the Nixon administration in its aggressive war in Laos during the past 18 months, escalation in the logistic supply, in the supply of U.S. military personnel and in the use of U.S. combat troops in the "special war".

Under the Nixon administration, the amount of U.S. aid to Laos and military personnel introduced into this country have increased at almost the same rate. Compared with the 140 million dollars in 1967, U.S. aid in 1969 rose to 250 million dollars of which only the economic and technical aid accounting for less than 60 million was announced, while the rest was almost exclusively used for military purposes. Thus, military aid – about 190 million dollars a year, – is more than treble the economic aid and makes up 80 per cent of the total aid. This figure is approximately the same as estimated by Senator A.J. Allender in a censured report on the scale of American involvement in the war in Laos (AF, Jan. 22 1970). It is necessary to note that what is described as "economic and technical" has also been used for secret activities of a military character. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna, Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, disclosed that the U.S. aid program also covers the CIA activities in Laos. At present, according to a statement of Senator M. Mansfield on September 21, 1969, U.S. aid in Laos had exceeded 300 million dollars a year and continued to increase.

Obviously, the Nixon administration is squandering in Laos more and more money of the American people, while serious social problems in the United States are yet unsettled, because enormous sums are being spent for unjust wars in Laos and in Indochina as a whole.

On March 6, 1970, Nixon said there were 643 advisers and military personnel out of the 1,040 Americans operating in Laos and denied the presence of any U.S. combat troops in Laos. That is not true. Compared with the 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos under the Johnson administration, the figure rose to 12,000 U.S. military personnel, with or without military uniform in the first period of the Nixon administration. Of them, there were at least 2,000 air force advisers, or 800 more than in 1967. The number of U.S. advisers assigned to the "special forces" training centres and regular units of the puppet army increased from 150 to 1,000 (according to a British source, the figure might be 2,000). The U.S. "special forces" operating in southern Laos are estimated at about 1,200 men. Thus there is one U.S. military adviser for every six Laos puppet soldiers (compared to the 70,000 men of the Vientiane army). In addition according to a statement of Senator R. Ottinger on April 24, 1970, at least half of the 45,000 U.S. air force personnel in Thailand (i.e. 24,000) are now directly participating in air activities in Laos. All told, the number of U.S. military men now taking part in military activities in Laos on the ground and in the air has run into tens of thousands at least equal to half of the total effectives of the Laos puppet army.

The running of the U.S. colossal war machine in Laos remains an affair of the U.S. embassy, Nixon's ambassador to Vietiane remains a military proconsul. The paper "France Soir", on March 3, 1970 said everything in Laos is controlled from the building of the U.S. embassy which houses the brain of the war machine. The number of army and air force military attaches of the U.S. embassy exceeds 200, an unusual figure for a foreign diplomatic mission in a country like Laos. The USAID agency in Laos is also operating within the framework of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vientiane and is working for the CIA. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna acknowledged that Laos is the only place where such things happened [illegible] did not approve it.

Of late some 1,200 U.S. "green berets" were introduced into Laos, whose commander [illegible] (Thailand), U.S. [illegible] Vet [illegible] on February 27, 1970 [illegible] number of U.S. "green berets" in Laos had exceeded that of U.S. military advisers in South Viet Nam in the past. In late 1969 and early 1970, U.S. combat troops took part in ground attacks on the Plain of Jars area, Meng Khouang province. The U.S. magazine "Newsweek" of April 6, 1970 affirmed that the CIA office in [illegible] G.I.'s who [illegible] Viet Nam [illegible] Laos with a weekly [illegible] d. Har [illegible].

With [illegible], there have been more [illegible] participating in the fighting [illegible]. On March 6, 1970, U.S. Senator Mansfield [illegible] stated that Americans are fighting [illegible]. "The fact that some of them do not wear uniform does not [illegible] this one bit. The fact that [illegible] American combat troops [illegible] uniform have been fighting in Laos [illegible]"

continued on next page

New textile factory at Sam-Neua

ON CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG'S DECLARATION OF 20 MAY, 1970

In this declaration, Chairman Mao Tse Tung has set forth a brilliant and timely analysis of the qualitatively new situation that exists in the world as a result of the treacherous new acts of aggression launched by the fascist, imperialist Nixon-

Chinesepeoples.

This declaration pulls together into clear focus the revolutionary struggles and the liberation struggles of the people of the whole world, including the revolutionary struggle of the American people themselves.

Speaking specifically for the Black Panther Party, but reflecting the sentiments of millions of oppressed people inside the United States, it has become crystal clear to us that rampant imperialist aggression on the international scale and vicious fascist repression on the domestic scale are the two faces of the criminal government of the United States and the calculated policy of the American ruling circles. For 400 years now, Black people inside the United States have been the long-suffering victims of fascist violence and repression. But under the Nixon-Pentagon clique, this reactionary violence and repression has been escalated to new heights of barbaric cruelty. At the same time, in order to put down the already gigantic and still growing mass movement among White Americans against the wreckless and sanguinary policies and imperialist adventures of the U.S. government, the cowardly Nixon-Pentagon clique has unleashed a bloodbath against the American people as a whole, creating for itself new enemies who have joined hands with those who were already determined to carry out a struggle to the bitter end against an economic, political, and social system that is dominated by the madmen in the Pentagon and that is responsible for the misery and bloodshed all over the world today.

Chairman Mao Tse Tung captures the truth of the situation when he points out the unprecedented isolation of the Nixon-Pentagon clique. Never before have these criminals been so exposed and isolated as they are today. And never before has it been so clear that this criminality can only be ended by the people rising up to seize their own destiny from the handfull of willful exploiters and murderers that now have the power in their hands.

Coupling a revolutionary call to arms with revolutionary optimism in the assurance of victory, Chairman Mao Tse Tung, the great leader of the Chinese Revolution, hero and teacher of the revolutionary people of the world, has performed an invaluable service to all mankind by stepping forward at this time to renew the people's indictment of the common enemy of us all--U.S. Fascism and Imperialist Aggression. These courageous words of Chairman Mao Tse Tung will give new heart to the peoples in their lonely anddifficult struggles to throw off the shackles and chains of oppression now being held in place by U.S. Fascism and Imperialism.

Lastly, we wish to point out that only the enemies of the people and those who shirk their revolutionary duties and who are afraid of their own shadows will find fault with Chairman Mao Tse Tung's declaration. For our part, we welcome it, because we have learned, by shedding our blood, that only through relentless struggle, by resorting to arms inside the very house of U.S. Fascism and Imperialism itself, can we gain our freedom and liberation. This is what our experience has taught us and this is the faith that will sustain us as we push forward our struggle..

LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG!
LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLES' WAR!
DEATH TO THE U.S. FASCISM AND IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
Eldridge Cleaver,
Minister of Information
Black Panther Party, U.S.A.

The Black Panther, June 20, 1970, page 16

THE TERROR, BRUTALITY AND MURDER OF MY BROTHERS AND SISTERS IS THE SUFFERING OF BLACK PEOPLE. THEREFORE, NOT TO LET SUCH EVENTS CONTINUE I MUST MERCILESSLY DO AWAY WITH THE LOW - NATURED BEAST THAT BITES THE HAND THAT FEEDS IT.



WE HAVE NO HANG UPS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

3 - Mr. J. A. [redacted]tz
(1 - J. B. otis)
(1 - P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/13/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

4063

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This is to advise of a meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on 6/12/75 in my office in accordance with the request set out in Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum dated 6/4/75.

IS-1 Section Chief J. G. Deegan, Number One Man William H. Atkinson, Unit Chiefs Homer A. Newman, Jr., David Ryan, Garnett T. Tunstall, and Special Agent Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division met with Jack Smith and Lester B. Seidel of the SSC staff.

At the outset Mr. Seidel indicated that SSC would do case studies on various organizations against which the COINTELPRO was directed. Black Panther Party (BPP) had been chosen for the start because many BPP members had been involved in and convicted of criminal activity. He distributed copies of a document (a copy of which is attached) outlining the purpose of the meeting and setting out requests that will be made of the Bureau through appropriate channels in connection with this case study. Included in this document, along with requests for various Bureau documents regarding COINTELPRO as it pertains to the BPP, were requests for a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted, a list of all media persons contacted and a list of all FBI personnel connected with this program and their present locations.

The investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, as relates to the BPP, were described generally to Messrs. Seidel and Smith highlighting the origin of this violence-prone organization and the series of violent confrontations in which it participated in the late 1960s. Mr. Seidel stated that he was specifically interested in ascertaining the extent of COINTELPRO and how it related to the investigation of the BPP in San Francisco - Oakland and Los Angeles. COINTELPRO was stressed only as a procedure which could have been followed in the course of our investigation. ~~No specific~~

62-116395-353

REC-102

Enclosures - 2

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

GTT:eks (10)

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM

JUN 24 1975

MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

instances of institution of counterintelligence activities were discussed, and it was indicated that these activities were minor as far as the overall BPP investigation was concerned.

In connection with COINTELPRO, the Bureau letter to SAC, San Francisco dated 5/11/70 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations" was discussed. Basically, this letter suggests San Francisco consider a proposal that through the use of documents subtly incorporating false information, attempt to give the BPP the impression that the documents were stolen by a disgruntled police employee who is sympathetic to the Panthers. This document was presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security in 1974 and was included in their publication of hearings conducted by that Committee. Messrs. Seidel and Smith wanted to know if the activities outlined in this letter had been implemented by the San Francisco or Los Angeles Offices. He was advised that this letter was not implemented as it had requested comments and recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and that Office had recommended against the proposals contained therein.

Mr. Seidel asked the identity of the SAC who recommended against this proposal and was advised that the SAC there, at that time, would not necessarily have had personal knowledge of the matter. He then asked identity of supervisor who recommended against proposal and was advised this information was available in the field office. Concerning COINTELPRO in general, he inquired as to specific techniques used against the BPP and whether forgery and wiretaps had been a part of the program. He was advised that we were unable to furnish that information without extensive file review.

Mr. Seidel attempted to discuss Special Operations but he was advised that the matter was not within the purview of the current meeting.

Mr. Seidel explained that they would be traveling to San Francisco and intended to interrogate personnel in that Office as well as unspecified outsiders who may have been involved in COINTELPRO. Mr. Seidel stated that he had asked for the meeting with Bureau personnel to obtain background data to aid them in these

interrogations. Both Messrs. Seidel and Smith expressed appreciation for the assistance given them at this meeting and both additionally expressed their feeling that the Bureau had done a good and proper job in its investigation.

During the course of this meeting a monograph on the BPP prepared by the Bureau in March of 1971 was used for background data. Mr. Seidel expressed a desire to have a copy of this document. This document, which is prepared from public source data, was compiled for public distribution and, if you approve, a copy will be furnished to Mr. Seidel.

ACTION:

For your information and if you approve, one copy of attached document entitled "Black Panther Party"* will be sent to Mr. Seidel.

HEH/JGD

GTT

Get written request signed by Chairman of Committee
WRW

PLM

Not initially [illegible]

*Per G.T. Tunstall, this document is not classified, made up of public source data, + until it became outdated, was furnished to the public. 6/19/75

Delivered to Sherry Towell of SSC 6/20/75 for delivery to Seidel

Black Panther Party: San Francisco-Oakland (Los Angeles)
Late 1960's through early 1970's

The Committee is examining the extent to which this COINTELPRO program relates to criminal investigation; the results obtained; the relationships between the FBI and local authorities (police and other governmental agencies); media and community leaders; the methods of targeting; techniques used to achieve program goals; legal authority; and authorization procedures and accountability.

To pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents in this initial stage:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the responses thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (e.g., field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO, with explanation of the dispositions thereof;
6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 alm/tmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-253

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and their media affiliation;
8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;
9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to the whereabouts, and relation to the FBI should be indicated:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee requested to be given a briefing concerning counterintelligence programs as applied to our investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco.

Lester Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee who is assigned the area of COINTELPROS, advised that the Committee is preparing what he termed case studies on COINTELPROS in four separate areas. He defined these areas as the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Seidel previously had requested the Bureau arrange interviews of various Bureau personnel whom he considered familiar with the San Francisco Black Panther Party investigation, and at that time stated he intended to interview these individuals in two or three weeks. Mr. Seidel requested that prior to conducting interviews concerning this particular area, he desired to be briefed during the week of June 8 concerning the Bureau's general overall investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, along with the use of counterintelligence proposals against that organization. In this regard he desired that someone knowledgeable in this aspect be made available to brief him concerning this matter.

6/13/75

62-116395

REC- 102

62-116395-252

5-TALL

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2001 BY SP2 DLM/LMC
MDR-16

12 JUN 24 1975

PVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 [illegible] 27 1975 *Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan*

Mr. Seidel also stated that he was submitting a written request to the Bureau for certain Bureau documents pertaining to the COINTELPRO operations in the San Francisco Office and specifically mentioned requesting the quarterly status letters from that office on COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) The Intelligence Division advise if a briefing can be arranged and the date and time of such a briefing.

2) Legal Counsel Division will advise Mr. Seidel of the Bureau's decision in this regard.

PVD JBH/PVD

WRW/TJM

We should carefully consider fact that Hampton case is subject of pending litigation and coordinate with Dept. in advance of any [illegible] to committee or specific information provided.

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0620
18 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Request for Documents by SSC

Attached is a request for documents received by CIA from the Senate Select Committee Staff on 10 June 1975. It is provided to you for information.

John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 23 1975

5

file 62-116395

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPa am/jmf
MDR-16

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY § 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

JUN 23 1975

~~SECRET~~

R223

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.	HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.	BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.	CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.	RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.	

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

DCI/IC 75-2202

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1975

Mr. Walter Elder
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Elder:

Further to our conversation regarding formal requests for documents and records, I attach a list of supplemental document requests.

What I would propose is that you and I discuss this list to insure that we have properly identified the requested documents.

In addition to the attached list I would like to review studies in the historical series: (1)"Maritime Operations in Indonesian Operations -- 1957-1958;" "Overthrow of a Government, November 1952-1953;" and any studies prepared that trace the CIA's activities in relation to the overthrow of the government of Guatamala in 1954.

Sincerely,

William B. Bader

Attachment

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JML
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-

R223

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

To: Bill Bader

From: Elliot Maxwell

Date: June 9, 1975

Subj: Supplemental Document Requests

1. The General Counsel's memo on February 3, 1975 on proprietaries mentioned in the briefing paper prepared for the Rockefeller Commission.

2. The Inspector General's Survey of Propeietaries from 1967.

3. Inspector General's Survey of Domestic Operations Division done prior to May 26, 1966.

4. The opinion on covert action authority of the CIA prepared by the Justice Department under Attorney General Katzenbach.

5. List of those individuals who worked with John Richards.

6. List of the component surveys from 1960 to 1970. (Approximately 50 studies)

7. The subject heading list, the keyword list, and the name list, used for filing in the Office of General Counsel.

8. The Bureau of the Budget Confidential Report on Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government, dated September 20, 1945. (HS/HC-71, Item 1).

9. The Report by William H. Jackson, on the Coordination of Intelligence Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British intelligence system. This is a report for the OSS dated August, 1945. (HS/HC-801, Item 9.)

10. A list of titles of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates from January 1, 1970 to the present.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 SPbalm/jmc

MOR-16

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

11. The Office of the General Counsel memo on the subject "Text and Explanation, Public Law 110," dated October 10, 1952.

12. The Interim Report to the National Security Council by Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, dated May 13, 1948 and entitled "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."

13. The paper by the Office of General Counsel on the Origins of the CIA, which is mentioned in the memo of the General Counsel of September 1973.

14. The two pages of General Vandenberg's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee outlining the clandestine collection function of the CIA, which were never published, a copy of which is now in the possession of Walter Pforzheimer.

15. An explanation of all the two-letter prefixes to the project names. (diographic)

16. The paper prepared by the Office of the Controller entitled "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities of CIA and Predecessor Organizations, 20 September 1945 through Janaury 1952." This is identified as HS/HC-36, Item 2.

17. The history of the development of NSCID-5 by Mrs. Margaret Ehrmantraut.

18. Study on Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of Covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 through 1966.*

19. Draft bill written by Lawrence Houston in the Fall of 1946, entitled "A Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency," cited in the archives as HS/HC-805, Item

20. Detailed Budget Submissions and house notes prior to 1967.

21. (a) The transcript of the Senate Hearings on the CIA Act of 1949, cited Paragraph 7 OGC 73-2169, Memo for the Record, 20 November 1973, Subject: Payment to Richard Patrick Lippert;

    (b) Any documents relating to the inquiry by the Secretary of Defense in 1947 mentioned in Paragraph 8 of above memo.

22. Annex to the 1963 Inspector General's Report on Technical Services Division on Experiments with Drugs.

* Already on our priority list: for transmittal to Select Committee offic

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

CODE **TELETYPE** **NITEL**

1 - Each Assistant Director

3 per SLP

TO ALL SACS JUNE 11, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116464)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

HOUSTUDY 75.

REBUTELS MAY 2,20, 1975, "SENSTUDY 75."

BUFILE 62-116464 AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MATTERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FROM SENSTUDY 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

SFP:mjg
(19)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 1 1975
4
TELETYPE
320 PM ESF

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-9

NOTE:

Referenced teletypes advised field of our pledge of full cooperation with Senate Committee and issued instructions concerning handling contacts with Senate Committee Staff as well as handling of matters relating to interviews with present and former Bureau employees. Inasmuch as we have opened a separate file under Houstudy 75, it is believed this teletype would assist in prompting better management of correspondence between Bureau and field.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAF
MDR-16 WRW/TAL

WRW/B

PCM

66-116395

NOT RECORDED
JUN 23 1975
46 JUN 23 1975

84 JUN 23 1975

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Schwartz)

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Senstudy-75

Dear Mr. Halperin:

Reference is made to my letter to you dated April 8th, regarding your request for the "Delimination Agreement of 1948."

Coordination of this matter with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has disclosed three documents which are pertinent to your request. It is my understanding that two of the three documents have been released to you by that agency, and I am enclosing with this letter, the third document. You will find this letter dated October 2, 1948, from former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Frank G. Wisner, then the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, contains certain deletions. The material deleted refers to the same material excised in one of the two documents furnished to you by CIA, and concerning which CIA asserted exemption provisions found in Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). These provisions relate to matters that warrant classification and those which are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. It is considered appropriate for the same exemption provisions to be cited by this Bureau in connection with the deleted portion.

You have thirty days from receipt of this letter to appeal to the Attorney General from any denial contained herein. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Attorney General (Attention Freedom of Information Appeals Unit), Washington, D. C. 20530.

THB:dm (7)

MAILED 6
MAY 23 1975
FBI

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116395 -

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPAAUM/DMF
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Following the Attorney General's decision, judicial review is available in the district of your residence or principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia, where the records are situated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Delivered to CIA 5/27/75

Enclosure

1 - Freedom of Information Act Coordinator - Enclosure
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Mr. Charles Saviage
Washington, D. C.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M. Hauser

NOTE: See copy of H. C. Flemister memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 5/7/75, captioned "Morton Halperin, FOIA Request," copy of which is attached. The material CIA requested to be excised has been deleted as described in this letter, and the Bureau file copy of the letter is not classified. Contact with CIA FOIA Section discloses the deletion of the material in the CIA letter dated 9/22/48 accomplishes the declassification of those documents. This has been coordinated with Intelligence Division. The original Bureau document is found in 65-48066-9.

~~SECRET~~

1 - [illegible] W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

JPL:jdp
(4)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/MJF
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 [illegible]
1 MDR-16

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 18 1975
5:18 pm
TELETYPE

REC-75 62-116395-249

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~SECRET~~

JUN 20 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 JUN 25 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

PAGE TWO ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [GUS SURVEY.] (S) NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S* RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

6/4/75

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)
INTERNAL SECURITY, MISCELLANEOUS

Senstudy-75

This is to receive approval for submission of copies of documents requested by the U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. By letter dated 5/14/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the above Committee, requested the Attorney General furnish documents including "all memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the IEC." (Appendix C, I, 14).

Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, advised Supervisor Garnett T. Tunstall on 5/29/75 that the Department has made available to Senator Church's Committee all data contained in Departmental files on the IEC. Included in this material are work papers and final estimates prepared by IEC as well as communications between IEC and the Bureau. The only information remaining in Bureau files not already made available to the Committee consists of in-office memoranda. These memoranda fall into three general categories:
1. Those dealing with the origin and staffing of IEC,
2. Memoranda setting out requests from IEC for information from the Bureau and requests for approval to send such data to IEC and
3. Memoranda transmitting estimates and work papers of IEC which was the result of information furnished by the Bureau and other participating agencies.

These memoranda, without exception, show that the Bureau's participation in IEC was at the instruction of the Attorney General, its activities were legal and that the Bureau's contribution was substantial. It should be noted that the memorandum M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop dated 11/25/70 captioned

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-113887-2

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)
Enclosures
62-113887
GTT:eks (4)

62-116395 -
NOT RECORDED
13 JUN 25 1975

CONTINUED OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 kmm/vmf
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975

"Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Meeting with the Director, 11/25/70," has been excised to delete information not germane to IEC. Copy of original memorandum not excised attached.

ACTION:

If approved, copies of the above-described memoranda, which are attached, will be transmitted to the Department by LHM for referral to the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps. Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(7)

WRW/TJM

memo to Mr Cregar [illegible]
6/17/75 TJM

62-116395-247

5

REC-102

17 JUN 23 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 RUM/JMC
MOR-16

84 23 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 18, 1975

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - A. B. Fulton
1 - D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached herewith in 14 bound volumes are excised copies of Exhibits A through E of the Department report of FBI Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activities, prepared by the committee chaired by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen.

These exhibits are individual write-ups prepared by the FBI of each proposed action in the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate, Black Extremist, and New Left Cointelpros.

In my letter to you dated April 21, 1975, I recommended against release of these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee as they are internal work papers which were prepared as a part of the deliberative process for an in-house Department investigation. I strongly object to the release of these exhibits. In the event you deem it necessary to release these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee, I request the enclosed copies, which have been excised in an attempt to avoid intrusions upon individuals' right of privacy and compromise of sensitive investigative techniques and sources, be made available.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

Enclosures (14)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009

DR:pld
(11)

Director signed original which was hand carried with enclosures to O'Connor 5 15/P 6/17 by SA Daly. Jam

REC-104 62-116395-245

17 JUN 23 1975

See NOTE page 2.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/TAL
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 23 1975

GPO 954-546

NOTE:

On 6/11/75 Legal Counsel advised Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of our objection and our desire that excisions be made if we are overruled. Mr. O'Connor suggested the excised material be prepared on an expedite basis. It appears the Department will make available these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee but we feel we should be on record as relates to FBI recommendations and objections.

This letter and exhibits A through E, which will be made available to Legal Counsel, should be delivered to Mr. O'Connor at the Department by Legal Counsel Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF MRS. DOROTHY SKILLMAN
6/4/75
SENSTUDY 75

On 6/4/75, Mrs. Dorothy Skillman, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Clyde Tolson, was interviewed by Mr. Mark H. Gittenstein and Miss Mary Deoreo of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Mrs. Skillman was escorted to the interview by former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr who remained outside the interview room during the interview. Prior to the interview, Mrs. Skillman was met by SA L. F. Schwartz at which time she advised that she had been advised by Mr. John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, that the interview was to be concerning Mr. Hoover's Official and Confidential (OC) files and that if questions came up during the interview on other matters which might impinge on sensitive sources and methods, current Bureau investigations, etc., she was free to request an interruption of the interview to consult with Mr. Schwartz.

The interview of Mrs. Skillman commenced at 2:30 p.m., and it was terminated at approximately 4:30 p.m. On only one occasion toward the end of the interview, Mrs. Skillman asked to consult with Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz. She advised that the interviewers had asked her concerning her knowledge of what might have been in certain cartons which were reportedly stored in the recreation room area of the late Director's residence. Mrs. Skillman stated that she thought these cartons contained many of the gifts and mementos that had been collected by Mr. Hoover over a period of years. After consulting with Mr. Mohr, she realized that she knew this only from comments that had been made to her by Mr. Mohr and had no firsthand knowledge of the contents of the cartons. On Mr. Mohr's advice, she advised the interviewers that she had no firsthand knowledge of what was in the cartons but that she knew that Mr. Mohr was aware of what was in them because he was present when the appraisers of Mr. Tolson's estate inventoried the entire house including these cartons. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Gittenstein commented to Mr. Mohr that he might have further questions to ask him concerning the contents of the cartons but would probably handle that by a telephone call to Mr. Mohr.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/9/90 BY

REC-102

62-116395-244

(8)

MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

JUN 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

COPY ... PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

84 JUN 23 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Interview of Mrs. Dorothy Skillman
6/4/75
Senstudy 75

After the completion of the interview, Mrs. Skillman advised Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz that the interviewers had asked her a great number of questions concerning her knowledge of the OC files which she said was very limited, the layout of Mr. Hoover's house and the work that Mrs. Skillman and Miss Gandy had done at the residence subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death. She stated that the interviewers were quite courteous and in no way antagonistic. Mr. Mohr requested Mrs. Skillman to type up an informal memorandum concerning the interview and he indicated that when this was done, he would provide a copy to the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information.

WRW

PLM

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

/

Date of Mail 6/13/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 JUN 24 1975

File Number 62-116395-242

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 9 1975

TO: Kevin Maroney ~~General~~
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor Bill
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: IRS - SSC Request Senstudy-75

Attached is a copy of the SSC document request served upon IRS which I received on June 3, 1975. Since some of the items may relate to DOJ/FBI functions, I thought you should be aware of the scope of the request, as a matter of information.

The Topical Task Forces may need to be alert to this request as a matter of prospective coordination.

cc: Deputy Attorney General

5 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

REC- 102 62-116395-241

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 Alm/lmf
MDR-16

17 JUN 19 1975

62-116395

84 JUN 19 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975 DCI/IC 75-2033

Mr. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Attached is a copy of a Senate Select Committee request to the Treasury Department dated 14 May 1975. Mr. Collins of Treasury has requested you be provided a copy of this request, but no other distribution will be made. It will, of course, become an entry in the Community Central Index.

Yours very truly,

Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

Attachment: As stated

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-241

DCI/IC 75-2009

Department of the Treasury
Office of Special Assistant to Secretar
for National Security

to: Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, CIA

room. ______ date. 5/29/75

Forwarded is a copy of the Senate Select Committee's first request to the Internal Revenue Service for documents and explanations. As I stated yesterday at the Ad Hoc Committee meeting there have been some discussions with the Committee staff since this letter was received and the staff has indicated that they plan to revise the questions considerably. In these circumstances you may wish to hold distribution of this document to other members of the Ad Hoc Committee until we receive the revised document. The one exception to this might be the Justice Department since some of the questions will involve matters of interest to them.

Foster

J. Foster Collins
room 4328
964-~~xxxx~~ 2631

62-116395-341

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

COMMISSIONER
MAY 16 1975
INTERNAL REVENUE

Hon. Donald C. Alexander
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
Internal Revenue Building
1111 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20224

Dear Commissioner Alexander:

The Committee appreciates your letter pledging the full cooperation and assistance of the Internal Revenue Service in the work of the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. We also appreciate your forwarding the draft resolution which would authorize the Committee to review any "tax-related information" which may fall within the purview of its responsibilities. Such a resolution is being put forward.

In an effort to expedite the Committee's inquiry into the intelligence functions of the Internal Revenue Service, the Committee asks your cooperation and assistance in furnishing the material and information sought in the enclosed "First Request for Documents from the Internal Revenue Service" and "First Interrogatories to the Internal Revenue Service". It is the Committee's desire that most of the material and information requested be provided by May 30 and the remainder very shortly thereafter. We also request that you provide the answers and documents as they are compiled rather than holding those which are initially compiled until May 30.

In the near future, the Committee's Chief Counsel will be in touch with your General Counsel to work out the mechanics of delivering the requested documents and interrogatory answers and to arrange for close liaison between the Committee's staff and the Internal Revenue Service personnel with whom the staff will wish to meet.

While we recognize that the enclosed requests are substantial, they reflect the broad mandate given to the Committee by the Senate. We believe that it is in the national interest that we perform our

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

work under that mandate both expeditiously and thoroughly. Of course, for us to proceed expeditiously, it is necessary to obtain prompt cooperation from the Executive agencies involved. We are hopeful that with your continued cooperation the end result of our joint efforts will meet the Committee's responsibilities to the Congress and to the American people.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

FIRST REQUEST TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR DOCUMENTS

The Committee wishes to identify all intelligence collection analysis and dissemination functions performed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to review the legal authority for such activities, the manner in which they are ordered and controlled, the coordination of such activities with other federal agencies, the exchange of intelligence information with other federal agencies and any other cooperation with such agencies relative to intelligence activity. In pursuit of this inquiry the Committee requests, that the IRS provide the Committee with the documents and information identified below.

The request is divided into two major parts. The first part seeks documents which relate generally to any intelligence functions which the IRS performs. The second part seeks documents relating to specific intelligence functions of the IRS of which the Committee is aware. Therefore, many of the documents encompassed by the second part of the request will also be encompassed by the first part of the request.

Wherever used herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

Documents	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, compute memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language and any other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
Intelligence	Information about persons or entiti other than purely financial information.
Relating to	Relating in whole or in part to.
Federal agencies	All such agencies, including the White House.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

I. GENERAL REQUEST

With respect to each intelligence gathering or intelligence dissemination function of the IRS either now being performed or which has been performed within the last fifteen years, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart of the organizational unit performing the function indicating the total number of employees in each unit, the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, the chain of command to the organizational unit performing the function.

2. All rules, guidelines, regulations, manuals or other documents defining the function or providing guidance or control to those performing it.

3. All statutes, executive orders, departmental regulations, agency regulations, and any other documents or materials which constitute legal authority for the function.

4. The annual budget of the organizational unit performing the function for the last five years or, in the case of a unit which has ceased to exist, for the last five years of its existence.

5. All documents relating to any agreement or understanding with any other federal agency or the executive or any state or local government or agency regarding the function or the dissemination of any intelligence produced by the function.

6. All documents constituting or relating to reports or investigations of the function performed by the IRS or any other entity, and all documents relating to the establishment of the function.

7. All documents relating to electronic surveillance by IRS or other federal agencies.

II. SPECIFIC REQUESTS

A. Organization and Functions of Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions

With respect to the Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions of the IRS, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart indicating the total number of employees in each category or position, defining the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, and delineating the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Chief of each division.

2. A breakdown of the personnel in each of the two named divisions assigned to each district office, indicating the titles and functions associated with each position in each office.

3. Copies of all rules, guidelines and regulations defining the duties, functions, and responsibilities of each of the two divisions.

B. Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following specific categories of documents:

1. All documents relating to or constituting the recommendations of the study group convened in 1969 by William A. Kolar to study the feasibility of Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System, including all backup documents for such recommendations, and any documents reflecting dissenting views.

2. All documents passing from, to, or between William Kolar and the Commissioners of Revenue or their assistants relating to the plans for and progress made toward the implementation of IGRS.

3. All documents containing evaluations of the various methods of implementation of IGRS.

4. All documents constituting regulations, employee instructions and operating manuals regarding the IGRS, including guidelines, rules or regulations regarding the receipt and storage of information from other federal agencies.

5. All documents passing between the Chief of the Intelligence Division and the District Manager relating to the implementation of IGRS in each District.

6. All documents and guidelines relating to the implementation of IGRS in individual districts or in districts as a whole.

7. A breakdown by district of the IGRS files maintained in each district office, indicating the following:

(a) the number of such files on which some form of action constituting enforcement of the tax laws other than the maintenance of the file has actually been undertaken;

(b) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file is planned;

(c) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file has not been taken and is not planned.

? 8. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which no files are maintained.

9. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which files are maintained.

10. Any regulations or documents relating to criteria for determining the duration of a file in IGRS.

11. Any documents relating to rules or guidelines for analysis and dissemination of information held in IGRS.

12. Any documents relating to actual instances of dissemination to any person or organization, including other federal agencies, of information contained in IGRS.

13. Any documents relating to or constituting requests by anyone, including other federal agencies, for information contained in IGRS.

14. All documents which have been gathered or produced by the group formed in December 1974 to study the operation of IGRS, and all documents relating to or explaining the establishment of the study group.

C. Internal Revenue Strike Force Participation

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following information and documents relating to the participation by IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces:

All documents constituting or relating to agreements with other agencies regarding participation by the IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces, including any documents relating to the desirability of participating on such strike forces.

D. Special Service Staff

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following documents relating to Special Service Staff (SSS):

1. any document which established the SSS;

2. a detailed organizational chart of the SSS indicating the number of employees in each unit of the SSS and the duties and responsibilities of the employees of each unit, as well as the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the head of SSS;

3. a document or documents indicating the names of all employees of SSS during its existence, and indicating the position occupied by each such employee;

4. all documents relating to the policies, operations and procedures of the SSS relating to the collection, analysis, storage and dissemination of information;

5. all documents relating to the transfer of any SSS files to IGRS.

E. Audit Division

In addition to any documents relating to the Audit Division which may be encompassed by Part I, please furnish:

1. the rules, regulations and guidelines, including employee manuals, for selection of taxpayers for audit and the legal authority for such rules, regulations and guidelines;

2. the rules, regulations and guidelines relating to the storage, use and dissemination of information gathered through audits;

3. all documents relating to any of the following occurring since 1950

(a) Politically motivated requests for an audit of any person or entity

(b) Requests by any person or state or federal agency whose official duties do not normally require the use of financial information on individual taxpayers for an audit of any person or entity

4. All documents constituting rules or guidelines for removal of taxpayers' names from the list of those to be audited.

F. General Requests For Information

To the extent they have not already been furnished in response to previous sections of this document request, please furnish:

1. All documents constituting requests to the IRS for information regarding any person or entity by anyone, including federal agencies, whose normal official functions do not require use of such information.

2. All documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to the requests referred to in 1. above.

3. All documents constituting or relating to requests by anyone, including other federal agencies:

(a) for electronic surveillance by IRS, or

(b) for information or investigation which led to electronic surveillance by IRS

and all documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to any such requests.

FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Please provide full, explanatory answers to the questions set forth below. As used in these questions, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

"Documents"	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, computer memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language, and all other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
"Relating to"	Relating in whole or in part to.
"Federal agency"	All federal agencies and the Executive Branch.

1. Regarding the February 7, 1975, official press release of the Internal Revenue Service and the answer of Commissioner Alexander to the first question posed by Senator Joseph Montoya in his letter of January 29, 1975, please answer the following:

   a. At whose direction did William A. Kolar convene a study group to study the feasibility of a formal, uniform Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System (IGRS)?

   b. Who were the participants in the meeting of the study group?

   c. Please explain the relationship between each participant and the IRS.

   d. Please describe in detail the various alternative systems of implementation of IGRS tested in the

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

various districts, indicating which method was tested in which district, and list the dates each alternative system was tested in each district.

e. Please describe the procedure followed by District Directors in implementing IGRS in each district.

f. In how many district offices has IGRS been implemented?

2. How was intelligence data compiled, maintained, and stored by the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service prior to the inception of IGRS?

3. Did officials, representatives, or members of other federal government agencies participate in the establishment of IGRS or in any discussions regarding its establishment? If so, list each such agency and its representatives and explain the manner and extent of its involvement.

4. Did IGRS compile, maintain, and store information received from other federal agencies? If so, was that information compiled, maintained, and stored for the benefit and use of the Internal Revenue Service, the other federal agency, or both?

5. Is information received from other agencies of the federal government edited to delete non-tax-related material prior to its being entered in IGRS? If so, please explain the editing procedure and furnish all documents relating to such procedure.

6. Upon how many individuals and groups did IGRS maintain files as of November 1974?

7. Please identify all individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

8. Please state the total number of individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

9. Were all IGRS files maintained on a computerized or mechanized basis as of November 1974? How were the files indexed? In connection with the answer to this question, please identify all cross-referencing systems whereby categories of information could be retrieved from IGRS other than through identification of the name of an individual or group.

10. How many names were indexed in IGRS on which there were no files?

11. Please fully describe the procedure followed by the Intelligence Division of the IRS in establishing and entering a file on an individual, group, or organization in IGRS, stating whether:

    a. each file or name contained in IGRS is the result of an investigation by the Intelligence Division of IRS;

    b. the files or names stored and maintained by IGRS are periodically investigated by the Intelligence Division of IRS.

12. Upon how many IGRS files has some form of action constituting enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or the Justice Department?

13. How many names and files appear in IGRS upon which no action constituting the enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, has been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or Justice Department?

14. What criteria has been established by the Internal Revenue Service governing the duration of a file or name in IGRS?

15. What procedures are followed by the Internal Revenue Service in disseminating files, names, and other information contained in IGRS to other agencies of the federal government?

16. To what other agencies of the federal government has information contained in IGRS been distributed? Have there been any instances in which information contained in IGRS has been disseminated to other federal agencies without following the procedures described in Item 15 above?

a. If so, specify each such instance, listing the name of the individual, group, or organization whose file was disseminated and the agency at whose request the file was disseminated.

17. Has the Internal Revenue Service received requests for the dissemination of information contained in IGRS which (a) were politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please furnish the Committee with the following:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

18. Were any members of the IGRS study group convened by William Kolar in 1969 participants in the formation or operation of the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify them and describe in detail their relationship with both the Special Services Staff and IGRS.

a. Was IGRS, either in its formative or operative stages, used to maintain and store information collected by the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify the nature of the information so stored and the nature of the information not so stored.

b. Was it a policy of the Internal Revenue Service that documents and files maintained by the Special Services Staff not be stored in IGRS or its generic predecessors? If so, please furnish the Committee with evidence of such policy.

c. What was the relationship between the formal creation of IGRS on May 4, 1973, and the decision of the IRS to review and purge Special Services Staff files on or about June 28, 1973?

d. Have any Special Service Staff files ever been transferred to IGRS? If so, please specify the name of the individual, group, or organization upon which the file was maintained and the date it was transferred to IGRS.

19. With regard to the recent suspension of IGRS activities on January 22, 1975, pending an internal review of its operations, please answer the following:

a. To what specific duties have personnel assigned to IGRS been reassigned pending the present Internal Revenue Service review of IGRS? Please furnish the names of the personnel reassigned and the offices and units to which they have been reassigned.

b. Please furnish the name of the IRS official who is charged with the primary responsibility for conducting the study of IGRS.

c. In what manner are IRS intelligence files being compiled and maintained pending completion of the study?

20. What is the relationship between the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service and Organized Crime Strike Forces?

21. On how many strike forces do IRS agents participate? Please identify the strike forces.

22. How many agents participate on each such strike force?

23. Has the involvement of IRS intelligence personnel on such strike forces been confined to investigation of tax-related matters? If not, please indicate the manner and extent of IRS involvement in non-tax-related actions of the strike forces. In this regard, provide the Committee with detailed summaries of IRS participation on strike forces which did not involve or were unrelated to enforcement of tax-related matters.

24. What intelligence gathering, compiling, and storage systems has the Internal Revenue Service maintained in addition to IGRS?

25. In December 1974 the Internal Revenue Service suspended the operation of IGRS pending an internal review of the system. Was this review prompted by concern that non-tax-related materials were being gathered, compiled, and stored in IGRS? If so, please furnish the Committee with all files, names, and other information contained in IGRS files which is non-tax related.

26. Has the Internal Security Division of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other division of the Internal Revenue Service, ever investigated any aspects of the intelligence gathering, compilation, storage, and dissemination procedures of the Internal Revenue Service? If so, please identify and describe all such investigations and describe any subsequent action taken by the Internal Revenue Service as a result of the investigation.

27. Has the IRS received requests for the dissemination of information which were either (a) politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please state:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual, or the nature of the information sought;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

28. Has the IRS ever engaged in mail cover or other mail surveillance activities, including the recording of dispatch and receipt of mail (other than to or from the IRS) and the opening of mail (other than to the IRS)? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

29. Please set forth the rules, regulations, and procedures which govern removal of taxpayers' names from the list of returns to be audited.

30. Has the IRS ever engaged in wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, or any other type of electronic surveillance? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

31. If the answer to #30 is yes, as to each instance of such activity, state:

a. The dates during which the activity occurred;

b. The type of device used;

c. Whether judicial approval was obtained in advance and, if so, from which court;

d. The subject of the activity;

e. Why the activity occurred;

f. The use or disposition which was made of the information collected;

g. The names and current addresses of the individuals who (a) performed or (b) supervised the activity and whether they are IRS employees.

32. Has the IRS ever been directed, requested, or advised by any other federal agency to use electronic listening devices? If so, please state as to each such direction, request, or advice:

a. The date;

b. The federal agency making it;

c. The proposed subject;

d. The action IRS took;

e. If surveillance resulted, please identify the incident among those listed in answer to number 31;

f. The date and nature of all documents relating to the direction, request, or advice.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Adams
DATE: 6-13-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

W.O. [illegible]

Prior memoranda have been submitted reporting that the Capitol Police Department would handle security checks of the space assigned to captioned Committees as well as the offices of the individual members.

Arrangements were made through the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives to advise us of the Committee Members who have their private offices checked and the dates on which these checks were made.

On June 13, 1975, Captain Eugene Brannon of the Capitol Police Force advised Inspector Bowers that three members of the Senate Committee and two members of the House Committee have had their private offices checked to date. These are:

Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) who had his office in room 245 Russell Senate Office Building and his Capitol office, room S-201 checked on 5-14-75.

Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) whose office in 6325 Dirkson Senate Office Building was checked on 5-22-75.

Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Penna.) whose office in 347 Russell Senate Office Building was checked on 6-5-75.

62-116464-

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Bowers

REC- 102

62-116395-239

17 JUN 19 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

DWB:lgp
(7)

File 62-116395
62-116464

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

84 JUN 19 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SEANTE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Congressman Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.) whose office in 2265 Rayburn Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Congressman Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.) whose office in 1113 Longworth House Office Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Captian Brannon said they have no pending requests from other members of these Committees to make any checks of their offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
6/9/75
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - All Sections Chiefs
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

HOUSTUDY 75

By memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett ~~captioned "Senstudy 75"~~ dated 2/6/75, you were advised that "Senstudy 75" is the code word for the control file (62-116395) containing all communications relating to the Senate Select Committee's (SSC) investigation and study of Governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

In mid-February, 1975, the House of Representatives created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities which will have virtually the same jurisdiction and responsibilities as the above SSC. To date, practically all our work has been related to the SSC and only very recently has the House Select Committee (HSC) made any efforts to commence staffing.

As it appears, we can expect in the near future requests from the HSC similar to that already received from the SSC and in order to facilitate the administrative handling and retrieval, where necessary, of HSC requests and this Bureau's response to same, the code word "Houstudy 75" is being assigned to the control file (62-116464) containing all communications pertaining to the HSC and related matters.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

62-116464

① - 62-116305

TJM:mjc
(26)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 19 1975

84 JUN 19 1975.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Adams DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Bureau has been requested to again make available Newark office secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski for interview by captioned Committee and that the Department and White House had instructed that they not be made available until such time as the Committee decides to allow Bureau representatives to be present during interview.

By way of background, you will recall that these employees were released from the Employment Agreement and were made available for interview on May 20, 1975, by captioned Committee. However, the Department in objection stated that they were desirous that a Bureau representative be present during the interview. The topic of the interview was to have been their duties and responsibilities during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Ultimately, neither the Department nor the White House could reach agreement concerning the interviews and the employees did not submit to interview.

On June 3, 1975, Michael Epstein, staff member of captioned Committee again requested these employees be made available for interview on June 5, 1975, at 10:00 a.m. The scope of the interview would be the responsibilities and duties performed during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

REC-100

62-116395-237

62-116395

17 JUN 18 1975

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-67-538691 (Personnel File Mary Ann Massa)
1-67-581180 (Personnel File M. Ann Mierzewski)

11-9

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

PVD:lgp
(9)

MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo from Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Epstein classified the interview as an "abuse" type and agreed to allow agents to be available but not present during interview.

On June 3, 1975, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, was advised of the request and of the fact that an agent could not be present during interview. He stated that the Department's position was that unless the Committee consented to allow Bureau personnel to be present, the interview would not go forth, and that he would advise Epstein and F. A. O. Schwarz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, of this decision.

Mr. O'Connor telephonically recontacted Special Agent Daly and advised that he discussed the matter with assistant to the Counsel of the President, James A. Wilderotter. Wilderotter told O'Connor it was the White House position that these girls should not be made available for interview unless the Committee allows Bureau personnel to be present. Wilderotter stated these two employees had been cited as examples wherein the White House felt interviews should not be conducted without representatives of the particular agency or Bureau being present as they are service personnel. According to Wilderotter, Schwarz agreed to this position.

O'Connor telephonically contacted Special Agent Daly on June 4, 1975, at which time he advised that he had discussed the interview with Schwarz, Epstein, and staff member Mark Gitenstein, and they would hold in abeyance the request to interview the employees pending a review of documents the Bureau is making available concerning 1964 Atlantic City Convention as stated in the Committee's request of ~~June~~ May 14, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD JBH/PVD WRW/TVL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : V.V. Kolombatovic

SUBJECT: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum is to advise of the scheduled appearance, under oath, of former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague before the full Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., on 6/12/75.

On 6/4/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, U. S. Postal Service, advised Liaison Agent L.A. Crescioli that he was contacted this date by Mr. Montague who informed Jackson that he, Montague, was scheduled to appear before the full SSC on Thursday, 6/12/75. According to Jackson, Mr. Montague appeared to be very concerned about his appearance before this Committee. In fact, Montague requested that Jackson alert FBI Director Kelley to the fact that Montague will appear before this Committee. Montague did not indicate any specifics to Jackson as to why he was so concerned over his scheduled testimony before the Committee.

In the way of background, Montague was the Chief Postal Inspector from 1961 to the Spring of 1969, on which latter date Mr. William J. Cotter assumed the position of Chief Postal Inspector. Prior to 1961 Montague was the Inspector-in-Charge of the New York Division of the Postal Service. In the opinion of Mr. Jackson, Montague is a man of the highest integrity and most certainly is not involved in any wrongdoing. Jackson confidentially advised the Liaison Agent that it is his belief that Montague is so concerned about his appearance before the Committee because he may have to reveal certain agreements that prevailed in the past between the Bureau and the Postal Service concerning mail covers that have not been made public to date.

LAC:tdp (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 17 1975

94-58540-55

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF

MOR-16

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Jackson added that he personally has no knowledge of what agreements or understandings between the Bureau and the Postal Service that may be divulged by Montague. He emphasized that Montague did not divulge such data to him.

In conclusion, Jackson stated that Montague is in a retired status and has just returned from an extended vacation in the Mediterranean area. Montague did inform Jackson that the Committee has authorized Montague to be accompanied before the Committee by personal counsel; however, Montague has decided that he will testify alone and without personal counsel.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 6/3/75

Transmit the following in ________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

REC- 102

- 116395 - 236X

14 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/BMF
MDR-16

Approved: ________ Sent ________ M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

450 Golden Gate Avenue
Box 36015
San Francisco, California 94102

June 3, 1975

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums,

Mr. Don Jones, the Senior Resident Agent of the FBI Resident Agency in Berkeley, California, has referred to me your letter of May 28, 1975 asking certain information concerning the FBI's operation in Berkeley, California.

Your letter has been referred to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for appropriate action.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Bates
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY sp2avm/lmf

MDR-16

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives

RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1417 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2661

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2490 CHANNING WAY, ROOM 202
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704
(415) 548-7767

201 13TH STREET, ROOM 105
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94604
(415) 763-0370

DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

May 28, 1975

Mr. Don Jones, Senior Resident Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P. O. Box 1033
Berkeley, California 94704

Dear Mr. Jones:

As you are aware, I have been concerned for some time about the nature of the Bureau's involvement in local law enforcement affairs. This concern has been heightened by my appointment to the House Select Committee to Investigate the U. S. Intelligence Community. In this light, I am requesting answers to the following questions concerning FBI activity in Berkeley:

1. What is the size of the contingent of agents in the Berkeley field office?
2. What are the functional responsibilities in the field office, and what are the percentages of agents involved in each, i.e., political, drug abuse, criminal, etc.?
3. What are the titles of the agents, and how do these relate to their involvement in category two?
4. What is the ethnic and sexual breakdown of the staff and agents in the Berkeley field office?
5. What are the interactions and working relationships between the field office, the Berkeley Police Department, the University of California Police Department, private security agencies and informers? How many informers are utilized by the field office?
6. Recent disclosures have raised serious questions regarding the Bureau's involvement in political surveillance activities of organizations and individuals over the past several years. What actions has the local field office taken to correct the abuses of these actions, and what political surveillance is being undertaken?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 0/19/2000 BY sp2 avm/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395-231X

7. I have read with interest of the Special Weapons and Tactics course given under Bureau auspices at the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Facility in Alameda County. I would appreciate your forwarding to me a description of the activities undertaken in this course, and the relationship of UCPD and BPD to the course. In addition, I would appreciate being provided any relevant information on SWAT that you have available.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Ronald V. Dellums

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

RVD/djc

6/3/75

AIRTEL AIR MAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 pvm/lmf
MDR-16

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Miller

REC- 102 62-116-395-236X

July 14, 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums:

This is in response to your letter dated May 28, 1975, sent to the Senior Resident Agent of the Berkeley, California, FBI Resident Agency.

To clarify your inquiries, it should be noted the Resident Agency at Berkeley, California, operates under the general supervision of the FBI's San Francisco Office.

There are currently nineteen Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley Resident Agency. All are white males. The function of a resident agency is to handle all FBI matters within its specific geographical territory. This includes criminal, security and applicant investigations. The FBI does not have primary jurisdiction regarding drug matters and does not conduct "political" investigations.

MAILED 7
JUL 15 1975
FBI

As a matter of policy, the FBI advises other governmental law enforcement agencies of matters coming to our attention which are within the investigative jurisdiction of those agencies. In some cases there is concurrent jurisdiction and a joint investigation may be conducted; however, local law enforcement agencies do not have access to FBI files. Representatives of private security agencies may be contacted from time to time in the course of discharging our official responsibilities just as any other citizens may be contacted. The FBI also utilizes the services of informants to develop information concerning matters within this Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; however, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss more specifically the number of such informants or the manner in which they are utilized.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JDM:lgp
(7)

WRW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 AUG 1 1 1975

GPO 954-546

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

As I have already indicated, the FBI does not conduct "political" investigations, nor do we conduct "political surveillances." We do, of course, have a responsibility for conducting domestic intelligence investigations authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential Directives and instructions of the Attorney General. These matters relate to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, and other activities involving the internal security of the United States. The policies relating to such investigations are not made on an ad hoc basis by individual Agents or individual offices, but conform with broad policy applicable to all offices.

The FBI offers a variety of courses of instruction for law enforcement personnel throughout the United States, including such subjects as anti-sniper and survival training and special weapons and tactics, commonly known as "SWAT". The basic purpose of this training is to provide well prepared teams capable of resolving highly dangerous situations with a minimum of risk to innocent bystanders, the law enforcement personnel involved and the subjects of the investigation.

Enclosed is a newsclipping describing some of the training of our own personnel in this field. The article appeared on June 1, 1975, in the "Washington Star News."

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosure

NOTE: The information concerning the Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley, California, Resident Agency was furnished by ASAC Druken, San Francisco.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

DATE: June 3, 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

SUBJECT: ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. A. Mintz 4/11/75 recommended that a draft of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of the captioned Committees be coordinated with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other appropriate members of the intelligence community.

On 6/2/75 the draft Memorandum of Understanding was discussed by SA L. F. Schwartz with Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, who advised that the draft had been reviewed by CIA and by the Security Committee on behalf of the intelligence community. They requested that the draft be revised in order to recognize the need for certain Staff Members to be cleared for access to compartmented information (a procedure already being followed by the Church Committee) and the desire of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that it be made clear that the DCI will only offer his advice upon the request of the Committee Chairman and that in all cases the final determination as to clearance is the responsibility of the Committee Chairman.

Attached is a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the changes proposed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore which changes are underscored. Both Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-100

62-116395
Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-236

LES:ekw
(8)

JUN 18 1975

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/16/2000 BY SP2 am/lmc

MOR-16

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ACTIVITIES
62-116395

RECOMMENDATION:

If the attached revised draft is acceptable to the Bureau, it will be provided to the Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Congressman Nedzi. In accordance with opinion expressed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, a copy will not be furnished to Senator Church.

HFS

PLM WVC

LET TO A.G.
ENCL. LHM FOR HSC
6/12/75 HFS: dmt

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information, in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI willffurnish a summary memorandum containing therresults of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2026 BY SP2 [illegible]
MOR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-256

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters, Jr.

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 3/12/75, and my memorandum, 3/25/75, both captioned as above.

By referenced memorandum dated 3/12/75, Legal Counsel recommended that the Intelligence Division (INTD) discuss with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other members of the intelligence community procedures for clearing staff members of captioned committees for access to classified information when questions as to the individual's trustworthiness have arisen in the course of the FBI's background investigation. Following such discussions, Legal Counsel recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding concerning these matters be prepared by the INTD which might be used by both Senate and House Committees.

By memorandum 3/25/75, the INTD submitted for approval a draft of a proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for staff members of captioned committees. Special Investigative Division disagreed with several features of our draft memorandum and has prepared a revised memorandum, which is attached for approval.

The INTD has coordinated this matter with the Special Investigative Division and interposes no objection to the text of the revised memorandum; however, it is suggested that consideration be given to adding the words "by the FBI" at the end of paragraph five on page one. Paragraph five, thus modified, would read: "Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI."

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-116395

Enclosure

AFW:dsh dsh
(7)

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395-235

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM SEE PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMF
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Mintz
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Discussions of this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community have been held in abeyance pending approval within the FBI as to the text of the proposed memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, that attached revised memorandum be coordinated by the INTD with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community prior to review by the Attorney General and transmittal to Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi by Legal Counsel Division.

Addendum

WVC

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division concurs with the general thrust of the memorandum of understanding, however, it is suggested the following wording be added where indicated:

Page 1, paragraph 3, insert after the word applicant, or employee. On line 2, change "applicant's" to read "person's".

Page 1, paragraph 4, after the word determined insert by the respective Chairman,.

Page 2, paragraph 1, after the word necessary insert by the Committee,.

Per

jma

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information. ①

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing ~~the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee~~ Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, OR EMPLOYEE, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the PERSON'S ~~applicant's~~ suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined BY THE RESPECTIVE CHAIRMAN to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI. ②

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395-235

ENCLOSURE

The DCI will furnish his observations as to eligibility for access to classified information to the appropriate Committee Chairman for his consideration. The Committee Chairman will render the final determination after consultation, where it is deemed necessary, by the committee, with the interested agencies.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. Adams memorandum to Mr. Callahan dated 3/7/75, captioned as above, copy attached, reported our conversation with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi.

As indicated in Mr. Adams' memorandum, Congressman Nedzi asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI, and the House Committee concerning investigative and clearance procedures for members of the Committee's staff. It appeared appropriate to us to coordinate a memorandum of understanding to be drafted for the House Committee with that to be drafted for the Senate Committee. Therefore, following our return from the meeting with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi, I called Bill Miller and advised him of the request made by Congressman Nedzi for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding. I asked him whether it would be possible for us to coordinate the language of that memorandum with the understanding that it will be drafted for use by the CIA, other members of the intelligence community, and the Church Committee. Mr. Miller said that the proposal to coordinate the memorandum was completely acceptable to him and he requested that the draft memorandum being prepared for Congressman Nedzi be furnished him for review and possible adoption as the memorandum to be used by the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division discuss this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community and prepare a draft memorandum of understanding that may be used by both House and Senate committees.

Bufile 62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMB

JUN 18 1975

MDR-16

17 JUN 18 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116395-

Wannall to Mintz memo 4/9/75 [illegible]

memo Wannall to Mintz 4/11/75 AFW:dsh

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN   DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 3/7/75 Mr. Mintz and I called on Senator Church and his staff director, Bill Miller, to further discuss the procedures for investigating and clearing staff employees of the Committee, particularly where information might be developed raising a question as to the propriety of a clearance. It had previously been approved that the FBI would conduct the background investigations, furnishing the results to Senator Church, and after his determination that the individuals met the required criteria for access to classified information he would notify CIA of his determination and intent to employ the individual involved, at which time CIA would grant the necessary clearance based on the certification by Senator Church.

In discussions between CIA and FBI representatives, we raised the question as to whether CIA would review the results of the investigation prior to granting clearances and CIA representatives indicated they did not intend to and were reluctant to inquire of Senator Church as to whether they could be furnished the results of any investigations involving derogatory information.

In discussing this matter with Senator Church, I inquired whether he had any objection to our bringing to the attention of CIA any questionable cases in order that CIA representatives, who have the responsibility of granting the actual clearances, would be in a position to advise and counsel with Senator Church on those individual cases. He had absolutely no objection to this and, in fact, felt there should be an open communication between FBI, CIA and his Committee to insure that no one was appointed and cleared who did not measure up in every respect from a security standpoint.

I discussed with him the particular case of Stanley Rawson Sloan, the results of which I had brought for delivery to Senator Church. Sloan was

Wannall to [illegible] 4/1/75

REC-100

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MNT

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

SEE

17 JUN 18 1975

JBA:ams
(5)
1 - Mr. Cleveland MOE-16 1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

CONTINUED — OVER

formerly employed by CIA and resigned in December, 1974, after his clearance for sensitive compartmented information had been lifted as a result of his marrying an alien. This marriage would not preclude him from clearance for access to lesser degrees of sensitive material but only for the more sophisticated clearances. Mr. Miller advised that Sloan had not been appointed and was not going to be appointed because of other reasons unrelated to a security clearance.

Senator Church indicated that he felt it would be wise to prepare a memorandum outlining our security clearance procedures and his staff would be glad to prepare such a document.

Following the meeting with Senator Church, Mr. Mintz and I dropped by to see Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the House Committee, and delivered to him Mr. Kelley's letter congratulating him and offering him our complete cooperation. Chairman Nedzi stated that he was very appreciative of this offer and would consider Mr. Kelley's request to confer with him as an open invitation and as soon as things had shaken down he would be in touch with us.

We discussed with him the investigative and clearance procedures we were following with the Senate Committee and Chairman Nedzi agreed the same procedures should be followed with his Committee, including our making available to CIA any derogatory information which might be pertinent to a clearance determination. At first, he suggested that we send the results of our investigations to CIA before coming to the Committee but then concluded that it would be more appropriate for them to come to him first since some of the applicants under consideration would probably not be appointed. He specifically asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI and himself.

I asked Mr. Nedzi whether he felt the formulation of his Committee would serve to trim down the number of requests for information being received from various House committees and it was his opinion that it would help in some instances; however, in others committee chairmen would pursue their own inquiries. He personally did not feel he had the clout nor the desire to try to preempt this area entirely for his Committee. He also stated he felt that CIA's problems had in the main been fully exposed and would soon be

CONTINUED - OVER

of less concern, whereas the concern over domestic security policies of the FBI would undoubtedly be greater in the future. He expressed his appreciation for our cooperation and indicated he was striving for a responsible approach to the inquiry.

Following the meeting with Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Mintz and I agreed that it would be best for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding concerning the investigative and clearance procedures for both Committees in order to try to insure uniformity, and Mr. Mintz will get in touch with Bill Miller to seek his concurrence in that regard. Our efforts will be coordinated with CIA and the proposed memorandum as drawn up will be submitted for the Director's approval.

ACTION:

Information only.

CONTINUED - OVER

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. CHURCH

MAY 21, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration
JUNE 5, 1975
Reported without amendment
JUNE 6, 1975
Considered and agreed to

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2006 BY SP2 alm/lmf
MDR-16

REC-100

62-116395-233

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 18 1975

94th CONGRESS
1st Session

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

May 21, 1975

Mr. Church submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

June 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. Cannon, without amendment

June 6, 1975

Considered and agreed to

Senate 4-'75

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

V

file
62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-28-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated 5-22-75 you were advised that former SA Robert Nichols had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee, at which time Seidel attempted to arrange an interview of Nichols. Nichols was advised by Deputy Assistant Director Jack E. Herington of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 pertaining to Departmental approval prior to furnishing information from Bureau files. He was also reminded that he had signed an employee agreement with the Bureau agreeing to maintain confidentiality of the information contained in Bureau files. He was advised if he requested, the Bureau would make available a representative to accompany him should he be interviewed by the Committee.

Former SA Nichols telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 5-28-75 and advised he had been recontacted by Mr. Seidel. Seidel requested and Nichols agreed to travel to Washington, D. C., on the morning of 5-30-75 for an interview at the Committee's offices. Nichols stated that Seidel indicated the scope of the interview would be concerning Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether this was to be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an executive session of the Committee. He stated he was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the Bureau make available a representative so that Nichols may consult with him during the interview if need be.

62-116395-232

EX-105 REC-20 7 JUN 6 1975

Mr. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted by Nichols as being his private counsel but that the Agent would assist Nichols in making determination whether a specific question should be responded to or whether a response could properly be declined because an answer might compromise a source,

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Personnel File 67-414885
(Former SA Robert Nichols)
1 - Mr. Hotis

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

sensitive investigative technique, divulge information furnished the Bureau by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources or adversely affecting an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Mr. Nichols that if he so desires, he could, of course, obtain the services of private counsel. He indicated it was his intention to arrive in Washington Thursday night, 5-29-75. He was requested to appear in the Office of Legal Analysis, Room 4513, at approximately 8:15 a.m. on the morning of 5-30-75 so that arrangements might be made to brief him by the Office of Legal Analysis and subsequently by the Intelligence Division. Nichols stated he would do so.

The Office of Legal Analysis is attempting to obtain from Committee representatives further information as to the circumstances and exact time of interview of Nichols.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Intelligence Division representative be made available to accompany Nichols to his interview with captioned Committee.

2) That Nichols be released from his employment agreement to respond to questions concerning our investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters.

PVD JBH/PVD

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Hotis

On May 27, 1975, James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, requested me and representatives of other agencies interested in the arrangements concerning interviews of witnesses by the Senate Select Committee to confer with him and Roderick Hills at 2:30 p.m. that date at the White House. Mr. K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Inspector John B. Hotis and I represented the Department and the FBI. Roderick Hills and James A. Wilderotter represented the President's counsel; Bob Andrews represented the Defense Department; John Warner, General Counsel, CIA; Roy Banner, General Counsel of NSA, and Mr. Hyland from State Department as well as John Clark, Deputy to the Director of CIA, attended.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the latest version of proposed procedures to be followed by the Committee staff investigators during interviews of former and current employees. Roderick Hills presented a document (copy attached) which he described as a counteroffer by Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee. He called for general discussion of the document after indicating that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Schwarz at lunch on May 27th and felt that it was a workable document. I pointed out to Mr. Hills that the document provides that there would be notice to the agencies of the identity of witnesses at reasonable time prior to interviews or taking of sworn testimony except where "the committee or its appropriate delegee" determines that prior notice should not be given. I told him that I was concerned that that provision would be used by the Committee staff to permit individual staff investigators to make that determination and I was confident they would do so.

EX-105

REC-20 62-116395-231

ENCLOSURE

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (7)

7 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MLF
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Mr. Hills was reluctant to seek a modification of the language indicating that he had an understanding with Mr. Schwarz that the authority would be limited to the senior counsel and to members of the Committee. I told Mr. Hills I would request that the language be modified in writing so that the authority would be conferred on specific representatives of the Committee to avoid having staff authority which I thought would be abused. Mr. Hills finally agreed that the language would be modified so that the authority would be available only to both Committee senior counsel and/or a combination of senior counsel and a Committee member. Further, the language would be modified to require that the determination that an agency would not be given prior notice of a pending witness interview would be recorded in writing for the Committee's records.

I asked Mr. Wilderotter and Mr. Hills whether this agreement was to be made between the staff and the agencies or whether it in fact would be accepted by the Committee. After some discussion, we were advised by Mr. Hills and Mr. Wilderotter that the document would be submitted to the full Committee for their approval and incorporated into the Committee's records.

I pointed out that I believed it was necessary for the understanding to be made between the Committee and the Executive in order for there to be some basis for restraining Committee staff investigators who may not be inclined to follow the rules.

Other proposed changes discussed would require the Committee representative to furnish to a witness a copy of the Committee's rules which includes advice concerning the right to counsel and a copy of the proposed guidelines for witness interviews.

I recommended that the guidelines be expanded to address the problem of existing secrecy agreements with former and present employees and the procedural problem involved in Attorney General Order 501-73 which requires prior Departmental approval in order for a witness to respond to a subpoena. As a result, Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28, 1975, that he would recommend the addition of a sentence in the opening paragraph that would indicate the guidelines would not be understood to impair the constitutional rights of individual witnesses, agency agreements with employees or former employees, existing Departmental orders or the Committee's own rules.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

Other minor changes were considered and an effort will be made to correct the language so that the agencies will be obliged to make reasonable efforts to comply with all Committee requests instead of being required to furnish "all information" absolutely.

Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28th that the comments described above will be discussed with Frederick Schwarz in an effort to finally resolve this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Source: Hills 5/27

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

It is hoped that these voluntary guidelines will permit the Select Committee investigation to proceed without undue delay, but it is also recognized that these guidelines do not cover all points or anticipate all problems and that, therefore, either the Select Committee or some agency under investigation may have reason not to follow these suggested guidelines.

Also, it is recognized that this outline is without prejudice to the respective legal positions of the agencies and the Select Committee as to the production of specific information by way of documents or testimony. Not to impair Const. rights of ind. witness, agency rules or agreements, comm. rules.

A. Classification of Interviews/Preliminary Testimony

The parties to this investigation by the Select Committee recognize that interviews/preliminary testimony to be conducted by the Committee staff will generally be of two separate and distinct natures.

(1) Those primarily seeking information concerning (A) the overall structure and functions of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; (B) the substantive work being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; and (C) the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2000 BY SP2 NM/VMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-231

des 1 /97. [illegible] comm

(2) Those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

An agency representative will be present, as a general rule, at interviews/preliminary testimony in the first category for the purpose of assisting the Committee's investigation and facilitating the protection of information important to the national interest which is pertinent to the investigation. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews/preliminary testimony in the second category. The parties recognize, however, that for special reasons exceptions can be made in either case: i.e., when good reason exists, endorsed by the Select Committee, agency representatives may not be present for interviews/preliminary testimony falling under the first category, and for good and sufficient reason the agency may [seek to] have a representative present in the second category subject to the approval, of course, of the Select Committee.

B. Procedures to be Employed in Category (2).

When the Select Committee has identified a specific subject as a potential abuse or impropriety and has so notified the agency involved of its designation, that agency will, subject to the second sentence hereof, make [every effort] to provide the Select Committee

with all information and materials that it has on the subject. There will be a mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate.

In abuse or impropriety interviews/preliminary testimony, the following procedures will prevail.

(1) Witnesses will be identified to the agency a reasonable time prior to interviews or taking sworn testimony. This general rule includes current employees, former employees or others who have or have had a relationship with the agency.

Exceptions

Written record
[illegible]

A. Where the Committee or its appropriate delegee ~~by written doc~~ stet believes that prior identification of a witness could adversely affect the witness' willingness to be interviewed or to be forthcoming, or could otherwise hinder the investigation, such prior notice ~~by written authorization~~ will not be given, but in such cases the agency shall be given a general indication of the points or areas to be covered to the extent that is feasible without undercutting the reason for not providing prior notice in the first instance. Delegees shall consist of both Comm. senior counsel or a comb of senior counsel and committee member.

B. In certain cases, the Committee might notify the agency, if the agency agrees not to contact the witness before his appearance. The agency could identify for the Committee special security matters concerning prospective witnesses and provide information on how to locate a witness.

(2) When the Committee contacts a witness, it will explain the security and other arrangements between the Committee and the agency, as well as serve the witness a copy of these ground rules and a copy of the Committee rules. If the witness wishes to consult with the agency prior to his appearance, the Committee will not discourage or seek to interfere with that desire in any way and will help the witness contact the agency representative.

(3) Whenever they are not present at interviews or the taking of sworn statements, agency representatives will be available for consultations regarding the handling of special security matters.

(4) Whether or not an agency has notice of an interview or sworn statement, the Committee will inform the agency of the general substantive points covered as soon as possible thereafter, unless disclosure of the substance of a particular interview would make discernible the identity of a confidential source. In such cases, the Committee shall, to the extent feasible without undercutting that decision, notify the agency in general terms of the points or areas covered, and the fact that it has interviewed a witness on such matters.

(5) Whenever an agency receives prior notice of a particular interview or taking of a sworn statement, it will also be notified

of the general subject areas and periods of employment in which the Committee is primarily interested. The agency will then check the subject's personnel history file and advise the Committee of any exceptionally sensitive aspects of the subject's employment or activity which require special handling.

(6) If because of concern about security of sensitive information, a witness feels unable to give a responsive answer to a particular question, the witness shall so indicate to the interviewer. The questioner and witness may then consult with the agency representative with respect to an appropriate response which will facilitate the provision of pertinent information and its protection. These matters should be worked out forthwith and ordinarilv before the close of the interview/testimony session.

(7) The Committee is responsible for providing special handling of interview notes and other working notes in a manner which will protect sensitive material. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee will consult with the agencies concerned regarding the appropriate disposition of any such notes which have not been destroyed following the preparation of finished Committee documents. The agencies will indicate which of these notes it feels are too sensitive to be stored under the Archives

arrangement being established for the general disposition of the Committee's working papers and non-public reports.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

231 THRU 235

236 THRU 1ST NR 237

1ST NR 238, 239

241, 242

244, 245

247

249, 1ST NR 249

252 THRU 254

255 THRU 260

262 THRU 265

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

Alan G. Sentinella

May 21, 1975

The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood

Sent to AG 6/9/75
1 - DIC - SENSTUDY
Att: K. William O'Connor
Spec. Intelligence Coordination
Liaison-2
ELHmf
Senstudy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-265

to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were

assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

A. None.

Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted

to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

See attached pages ITEM II

Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison.

A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto ~~to that time which~~ it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

Q. Why would Harding know this information?

A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes.?

A. Yes.

Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony.?

A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

A. Richard Hamilton.

Q. When did he assume these cases?

A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

A. It did not develop any such information.

Q. How did you know of what~~ever~~ their CP affiliation may have been?

A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

A. I did not have the cases at that time.

Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How?

A. From information in the appropriate file.

Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances,

airtels, letters, memoranda?

A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

Q. What was the ~~j~~gist of such communications?

A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

A. No.

Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign.

A. I have no such recollection.

Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned. ← SEE ITEM I. of attached pages

Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

Q. Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[redacted]

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

Q. Kitchen floor?

A. Yes.

Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau, With reference to the period of time when the policy ~~had~~ changed it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation. See ITEM III of attached pages.

Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights ~~complications~~ Complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

See ITEM IV of attached pages

A. ~~Yes.~~ I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

Q. What about prior to 1965?

A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having KLAN ~~King~~ connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

A. Yes, I did not have any such contact.

Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters ~~or~~ were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category.

I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

A. No.

Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

Q. Who were some of those?

A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

A. Henry Rouse.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

Q. Recently testimony was given be one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

A. It is not my recollection that they did.

Q. What about a Klan organization?

A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceiably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

A. I do not know.

THIS WOULD READ BETTER IF MOVED TO PAGE 19

It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued.

Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted

such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Sidell he was not asking him to make any changes. He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened. Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

→ FROM P 18

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 9, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

Senstudy-75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS WITH

Reference is made to my letter dated May 22, 1975, forwarding a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning testimony subsequently given by Mr. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

for info. only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions,
5 copies of this interview sent to OPR-Dept of Justice,
11/22/76-JCB

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP165K/JG9

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw
(14)

Adm. —

Rm 4509 JB

REC-102

62-116395-265

Hand carried to AG 6-10-75

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

62-116395

June 9, 1975 1-Mr.W.O.Cregar
1-Mr.S.F.Phillips

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4JAM/lls ON 2-20-81 6074

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BEFORE
SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION

Reference is made to the memorandum of this Bureau dated May 22, 1975, reporting a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella, a retired SA of the FBI. That statement concerned the interview of Sentinella by an SSC Staff Member on May 12, 1975.

Pursuant to a subpoena, Mr. Sentinella testified before an Executive Session of the SSC on May 21, 1975, after which he voluntarily furnished the FBI a statement concerning his testimony. Set out below is the verbatim text of that statement.

CLASS. & ~~EXT.~~ BY SP1GSK/jg 10/31/80
REASON-FCIM II, ~~1-2.4.2~~ 3
DATE OF REVIEW ~~6-9-95~~

"Alan G. Sentinella"

"May 21, 1975

"The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
aboratory ___
an. & Eval. ___
. Inv. ___
ing ___
Coun. ___
one Rm. ___
r Sec'y ___

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw (13)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JBA 62-116395-265

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

'The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

"Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

'Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

"A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

"A. None.

"Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

"A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

"Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

"A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

"Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

"A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

"Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison?

"A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

"Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

~~IDENTIAL~~

~~DENTIAL~~

"A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

"Q. Why would Harding know this information?

"A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

"Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

"A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

"Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

"A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

"Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

"A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

"Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

"A. I did not.

~~DENTIAL~~

"Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

"A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

"Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

"A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

"Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

"A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

"Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

"A. Richard Hamilton.

"Q. When did he assume these cases?

"A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

"Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

"A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

"Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

"A. Yes, he was.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

"A. It did not develop any such information.

"Q. How did you know of what their CP affiliation may have been?

"A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

"Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

"A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

"Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

"A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

"Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

"A. I did not have the cases at that time.

"Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How?

"A. From information in the appropriate file.

"Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances, airtels, letters, memoranda?

"A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

"Q. What was the gist of such communications?

"A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

"Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

"A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

"Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

"A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

"Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

"A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

"Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign?

"A. I have no such recollection.

"Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

"A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned.

"Q. What about Julian Bond's campaign? Any effort to influence that?

"A. No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

"Q. What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

"A. None to my knowledge beyond such coverage as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

"Q. In same manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature. My answer was that my only concern had been with former Governor Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the Pickrick restaurant.

"Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

"A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

"Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

"A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

"Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

"A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

"Q. Was King given a nickname in the Atlanta Office?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was it?

"A. "Zorro."

"Q. How did that come about?

"A. I believe that began with Mr. Nichols and just passed on down.

"Q. Why was that name selected?

"A. I do not know precisely.

"Q. Don't you have any idea?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for it?

"A. As I remember, "Zorro" was either a television or movie character who carried a sword and therefore could be referred to as a swordsman.

"Q. What connection had this with King?

"A. The Reverend King participated in a number of extra-marital relations and therefore it seemed fitting that in the vernacular the reference swordsman applied to him.

"Q. What extra-marital activities were there?

"A. There were several women involved.

"Q. How do you know this?

"A. It was indicated on occasions by conversations.

"Q. How?

"A. By reference to a previous escapade with an individual or to one pending.

"Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

"A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

"Q. Kitchen floor?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

"A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

"Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

"A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

"Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

"A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy changed, it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

"Q. Prior to 1963 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

"Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

"A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

"Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

"Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

"A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation.

"I cannot be certain - I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

"Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

"A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

"Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

"A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

"Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

"Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

"A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

"Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

"A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

CONFIDENTIAL

"Q. What about prior to 1965?

"A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having Klan connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

"Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

"A. Yes. I did not have any such contact.

"Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

"A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category. I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

"Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

"A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

"Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

"A. No.

"Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

"A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

"Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

"A. A number of different gentlemen, some of them were periodically transferred.

"Q. Who were some of those?

"A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

"Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

"A. Henry Rouse.

"Q. Where is he now?

"A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

"Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

"Q. Recently testimony was given by one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

"A. It is not my recollection that they did.

"Q. What about a Klan organization?

"A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

"I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceivably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

"Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

"A. I do not know.

"Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

"Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

"The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes.

CONFIDENTIAL

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened. Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

"The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

"It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued."

On June 4, 1975, Sentinella advised the FBI of the following additional information concerning this matter.

Sentinella received a telephone call that day from Seidel who advised him that the transcript of Sentinella's testimony was near completion and that Sentinella would receive a letter advising him it was ready for Sentinella's review, but only in SSC space.

Seidel sought from Sentinella and was furnished names of some FBI personnel who had monitored technical surveillance on King during the pertinent period. Seidel sought information concerning who supervised the King investigation at FBI Headquarters, to which Sentinella replied that he did not know any specifics. Seidel referred back to information from Sentinella both during the original interview and during Sentinella's testimony and Seidel asked why Sentinella had discussed the matter with former FBI Agent Harding. It was Sentinella's reply that he sought Harding's help in order to rectify what he thought was a wrong answer given to Seidel during the initial interview.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentintella's verbatim statement which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The additional information Sentinella furnished 6/4/75 was telephoned by him to Phillips. On that occasion Sentinella also advised that Seidel had inquired of him that day as to whether he had discussed with Phillips the King case after arriving in Washington, D.C., and prior to testifying. Sentinella stated that he had not.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/13/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Documents Pertaining to the Huston Plan, Cointelpro and other Practices and Programs

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/74, Appendix C, Part I, Item 7, 8.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"S"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

LIAISON

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

With CIA concurrence, SSC was furnished with copies of documents maintained by the Bureau relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, with the resultant temporary discontinuance of formal liaison between the FBI and the CIA.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
Flwg

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 - TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

MOR-16

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/13/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS
HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMEN

Originating Office: FBI 37

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec. Sec.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

Appendix C
Part I, #7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/DMF
MOR-16

(Additional questions)

ITEM I.

Q: What about JULIAN BOND's Campaign? Any effort to influence that?

A: No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

Q: What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

A: None to my knowledge beyond such coverage ~~of SNCC of which organization he~~ as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

Q: [In some manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature]. My answer was ~~that~~ my only concern that then elected former Governor

62-116395-265

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmc
mdr-16

ENCLOSURE

Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the PICKRICK restaurant].

ITEM II Re page 5, first Q. and A. set forth.

It seems this is where Liedel asked a question concerning other source (other than electronic) material re Levison. However, he went on talking and never actually posed a question as such; accordingly it was not answered).

OR

the above may have been related to the last Q. appearing at bottom of page 7.

ITEM III.

I cannot be certain — I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

ITEM IV.

Re page 14 and the answer you inquired about.

I'm sure my answer was as it now appears on page 14, i.e. corrected.

I did not say *there was no* connection. I'm sure I only introduced the negative when he asked if I would *deny* there was such connection.

I believe "Yes" may have come in here in answering a question raised by your steno.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 7, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. Item number 8, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed copies of 13 FBI communications.

In connection with your request for memoranda pertaining to inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, a search of the files of the FBI at Washington, D. C., and Denver, Colorado, does not indicate that any such inspections or administrative inquiries took place.

RLM:mam
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO & THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-264

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory RLM
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

With reference to the information furnished by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley contained in the communication from the Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, to the Director of the FBI, dated May 8, 1970, your specific attention is directed to the restrictions placed by Dr. Smiley on the information furnished by him. On June 4, 1975, Dr. Smiley was recontacted, at which time he advised that under no circumstances would he testify in public to the information which he originally furnished to the FBI on a confidential basis. He further advised that under no circumstances would he reveal the identity of his contact in the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in the May 8, 1970, communication. He agreed to the release of the information in the May 8, 1970, communication to the SSC on a strictly confidential basis, for its use only and not for any further dissemination. Dr. Smiley stated he has no information other than that in the May 8, 1970, communication.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Concurrence to pass the 2/26/70 letter, with Secret enclosures, from Richard Helms, then Director of CIA, to J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of FBI, was obtained by Liaison Officer Leon F. Schwartz from Walter Elder, CIA on 6/10/75. The response to requests set forth in Appendix C, Part I, Item numbers 7 and 8 is being made in the same communication to avoid unnecessary duplication since the severing of liaison with CIA grew out of the RIHA matter.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

A. W. Gray memorandum to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/70, states "our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958." This information only appears on the cover page of the report of SA Daniel J. Griffin, dated, 8/31/60 at Boston. The information was furnished by Riha during interview on 8/11/60 and has never been given to us by CIA.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (28)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RLM:mam
(9)

RLM

[illegible] 7/11/75

Delivered To Mr. [illegible] Meeting [illegible]

REC- 102

62-116395-264

17 JUN 25 1975

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

RLM

Dir.
AD Adm.
AD Inv.

JUN 2 5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☒ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting testimony given by former FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the SSC.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence activities, domestic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Testimony covered former FBI investigation of:

1) Martin Luther King, Jr.
2) Stanley David Levison
3) Southern Christian Leadership Conference

5-18

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

62-116395

6-24-75 LFS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

[redacted] ~~XC~~ 3/4 A4 ~~XC~~ R. Prong [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] XC ① /FC

Patch III

Assembly

264

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVE[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : DIRECTOR, F.B.I. February 12, 1970

ROM : SAC, DENVER

UBJECT: THOMAS RIHA

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was called by MIKE TODOROVICH, who is in charge of the CIA office here in Denver. TODOROVICH stated he has instructions from his Washington Office to contact Denver District Attorney JAMES MC KEVITT and tell MC KEVITT that CIA Agent JOHN D. FRITZ who is stationed in Boulder, Colorado, had told Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, former President of the University of Colorado, that FRITZ had been told that THOMAS RIHA's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that RIHA was, in fact, all right. TODOROVICH then told me that FRITZ got this information from an FBI Agent in Boulder.

I told TODOROVICH to give me the name of the FBI Agent and he stated he would not do so. He then stated the FBI Agent told him, TODOROVICH the same thing. I again requested the name of the Agent. He again declined to give it to me. I very emphatically told TODOROVICH that until he gave me the name of the Agent who supposedly gave him and FRITZ this information, that I would not believe that either he or FRITZ had been given any information such as this by any Agent of this Bureau and this was based on the fact that no Agent would have any reason whatsoever to make such a statement since we had not conducted any investigation in this matter nor did we have any information concerning RIHA and, therefore, we would not be in a position to make such a statement as to whether or not RIHA was all right.

I then also pointed out to Mr. TODOROVICH that if he gave the information to Mr. MC KEVITT and advised Mr. MC KEVITT the information had come from an FBI Agent and if Mr. MC KEVITT contacted me I would certainly advise him that the information did not come from anyone in the FBI for the same reasons as set forth above.

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum that they have not made such statements as were attributed to them by TODOROVICH. Not only that, neither of the two has ever had any contact personally or otherwise with JOHN D. FRITZ, the CIA representative in Boulder.

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of CIA's actions in connection with this matter.

1. Protests CIA re Todorovich's actions
2. Commends SAC re his handling of Todorovich.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and when it may have happened.

While avoiding specifics about their theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest Wednesday in knowing more about the housewife's recollection that she telephoned Riha and carried on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon that Monday, the day when he first failed to show up for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph Smiley, Denver police chief George Seaton or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officials to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it "is entirely out of our jurisdiction."

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70
Edition: Home
Author: Alan Cunningham
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM

Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder housewife is certain she talked to Thomas ha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first led to show up for his history classes at the Univer-y of Colorado.

What is even more remarka-e than this, in the opinion of ose who have been trying to down the exact date of ba's disappearance, is the man's insistence that Riha s cheerful, relaxed and inter-ted in chatting about a local litical issue.

The woman, who asks that she t be identified by name, has ld the News she was in the ocess of telephoning a list of ulder citizens last March, eking support for a proposed ection on whether the city ould take over its public utili-es.

While she had been involved the issue for several weeks, e is sure it was on Monday, arch 17, that she attempted to ach a dozen people whose mes began with the letters P" and "R." Among the three four whom she was able to ach that day, she insists, was homas Riha. She says he an-vered the telephone at his ome at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, leasant and quite interested in e municipal issue, according the Boulder housewife. In ct, she explained, his name as on the list because he had arlier sent in a reader survey ballot" from a Boulder news-aper which related to the issue.

As a result, Riha struck her as more informed on it than most others she had talked to in her telephone inquiries, and she believes the conversation lasted about 10 minutes, making it the longest in which she took part that day.

The date, if the Boulder house-vife is correct, is significant, ince Riha reportedly missed a linner party to which he was in-vited the previous night, and ould not be reached on Satur-lay, March 15, by a friend who ried to telephone him repeat-dly.

Many people interested in the case have speculated that Riha left Boulder, was kidnaped or died as early as that Friday or Saturday. And the wife of a CU professor who was rumored to have seen Riha on Sunday, the 16th, vigorously dismissed this rumor as untrue when asked about it Tuesday.

But the Boulder housewife who made the series of telephone calls is equally adamant about the date when she talked to Riha. She says she didn't know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist. Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alvie and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported no reply yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70
Edition: Home
Author:
Editor: Jack Foster
Title: THOMAS RIHA

Following is typewritten clarification of the handwritten comment of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

"I don't. I still want name of our agt which Todorovich gave to Dr. Smiley. H"

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/

DATE: 2-18-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

C

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 2/10/70, SAC Werner, Denver, demanded that Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver, identify Bureau Agent who allegedly told a CIA officer that the subject's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that subject, in fact, was alright. Todorovich refused to do so. The Director instructed that we protest to CIA regarding Todorovich's actions.

On 2-17-70, Liaison Agent Papich vigorously protested Todorovich's actions to CIA, charging the Agency with impeding our inquiry. He pointed out that Todorovich's stubborn refusal to divulge the identity of the Bureau Agent involved was unacceptable because we had no information to support the statement attributed to our Agent. As a result of Papich's protest, a CIA official telephoned Todorovich and demanded that he divulge the identity of the Agent. Todorovich refused and stated that he considered this a matter of personal honor and that unless there was reason to believe Bureau operations were being adversely effected, he would not make the identification. CIA officials subsequently advised the Liaison Agent that they had reviewed the entire case and learned that District Attorney McKevitt publicly stated on 2-14-70 that the statement attributed to Dr. Smiley (which allegedly came to him via Todorovich from our Agent) was based on an "honest mistake" and that McKevitt felt this cleared the air and no further clarification was needed.

ACTION: I don't. I still want [illegible]

None. For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 2-20-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to memorandum dated 2-18-70 from D. J. Brennan to Sullivan. The Director stated that he wants the name of the FBI Agent who had furnished certain information to Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver. The Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, on 2-20-70, repeating the background of this matter and reiterated the protest made earlier by the Bureau and asked that CIA obtain the identity of the FBI Agent.

Helms advised that he considered this a most serious development and fully recognizes the gravity of the situation since it has such a significant bearing on relations between the two agencies and the highly important work of both organizations. He stated that he does not have the identity of the FBI Agent and so far Todorovich has refused to disclose same. Helms advised that he is requesting Todorovich to proceed to Washington, D. C., immediately at which time he will be interviewed in detail by Helms. In the meantime, the CIA Director is requesting his subordinates to prepare for him a complete report covering all information in possession of CIA regarding the subject. He stated that he will communicate with the Bureau immediately after talking to Todorovich. He stated that it was absolutely necessary that he make certain that he has all the relevant facts so that he can accurately respond to the Director and take the proper and necessary administrative action within his own organization.

ACTION:

I shall await results.
H

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 25, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On February 24, 1970, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Richard Helms had instructed him to transmit the following message to the Director.

Pursuant to instructions from Helms, Mike Todorovich, CIA representative in Denver, arrived in Washington, D. C., on February 24, 1970, and Helms initiated his interview. Helms expects to complete the interview including an examination of various CIA records within two days, upon the completion of which he will be transmitting a personal letter to the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "Werner acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. Papich has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. Michael Todorovich. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to Dr. Joseph Smiley, then President of Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, now President of a university in El Paso, Texas, and to the District Attorney of Denver, Mr. James McKevitt. In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. Todorovich to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. Todorovich and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. Todorovich was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. Todorovich maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. Todorovich explained that the Riha/Galya Tannenbaum cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

The purpose of Mr. Todorovich's conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on Dr. Joseph Smiley. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. Todorovich affirms that before going to District Attorney McKevitt he called upon the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Scott Werner, and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. Werner to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Werner acted properly. H

Mr. Todorovich states that Mr. Werner refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. Werner engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. Todorovich. Subsequently, Mr. Todorovich conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding Dr. Smiley and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. Todorovich. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to Dr. Smiley and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. Todorovich, I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. Todorovich.

~~SECRET~~

I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent [illegible]

While the following is not pertinent to your request, my review of this case suggests the advisability of a re-examination of Riha's disappearance and past activities and, necessarily, the Tannenbaum case. Briefly, since 1958 we have communicated to your Bureau significant information which relates to Riha's involvement with Czech and Soviet intelligence services, when he was behind the Iron Curtain. I attach for your information and convenience copies of pertinent reports regarding this aspect of the case.

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Helms forgets it was a two way street. H

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Attachments - a/s

This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in future is to be by letter only.
H

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. The January 1970 receipt of information from your Bureau that Mrs. Ruth Ann COOK, Thomas RIHA's mother, had mentioned rumors of her son's work for CIA in letters to the SAC, Denver, caused us to verify the fact RIHA has never been employed or used operationally by this Agency.

2. In 1958 and 1959 you were provided information that RIHA, when transitting Prague en route to Moscow, was contacted by Czech Intelligence and asked to remain in the CSR. Later in 1958 Czech Intelligence introduced RIHA to the KGB in Moscow and our source reported RIHA accepted certain privileges from the KGB while asserting he would not become a spy for the Soviets. Details reported by our source about RIHA's KGB contacts did not emerge during a 1960 FBI interview of RIHA.

3. This indication that RIHA may not have been truthful in 1960, when added to our current knowledge about KGB interest in recruiting American exchange students and RIHA's 1968 trip to the USSR, suggests the circumstances of RIHA's disappearance might be re-evaluated. This Agency is reopening its file on this case in view of the information disclosed in the attachments.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COPY

27 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. The following report concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect the repatriation of Subject, a naturalized American East-West Exchange student, to his country of origin was recently submitted by a source of this office.

2. Source first became acquainted with Subject during the past year at The Russian Research Center, Harvard University. On 10 September 1958 he ran into Subject by chance at the SAS office in Vienna as the two boarded a SAS flight to Copenhagen via Duesseldorf. During the trip Subject disclosed the following to source which has been supplemented from information from our files.

3. RIHA, who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 17 April 1929, is one of the twenty American students selected for the East-West Exchange Program and will be studying in the USSR for the 1958-59 academic year. Files in this Agency indicate that RIHA arrived in the U. S. on 15 July 1947 and became a citizen in 1952.

4. Our source informed ~~us that RIHA~~ had gone to Prague, June of this year, to see his father and other relatives. His father and mother are divorced and according to information in our files, his mother is listed as Mrs. Ruth A. COOK. address: 2023 Etna Street, Berkeley 4, California.

5. RIHA told our source that when he arrived in Prague he was put into a Government hotel for three days before he was allowed to stay with his relatives and friends. During this time, and perhaps later, RIHA was accompanied through the city by a guide whom he described as a "Government Official" name unknown, who attempted to effect Subject's repatriation to Czechoslovakia. RIHA told our source that this man has set up an appointment (date and address unknown) to meet him in Moscow to talk further.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. Subject told our source that this "Government Official" did not mention Czech Intelligence or Security Forces as such and that he (RIHA) is not too worried concerning this contact. RIHA apparently feels that it is the price he must pay in order to study in the Soviet Union and once he gets deeply into his studies in Moscow he feels that he can plead that he is too busy with his academic work to have contact with any officials. Our source also stated that RIHA is in some kind of correspondence with the Czech official. We have no description or name for the Czech official.

7. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office, and that our source be fully protected in the event that contact is made with RIHA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/751,690

cc: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~

COPY

21 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CS CI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958 concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect Subject's repatriation while the latter was in Prague in June of 1958 visiting relatives en route to study in Moscow during 1958-59 as an East-West Exchange Student. The following report describes further action taken by the KGB in Moscow to cultivate Subject, and was recently submitted by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. Sometime in December 1958, Subject again met the Czech Official who had tried to have Subject repatriate to the CSR in Prague last summer. According to our source, it was apparently an accidental meeting at a Moscow railroad station as the Czech was returning to Prague. The Czech was delighted to see Subject, and introduced him to a Soviet official. This Soviet identified himself only by a first name and a telephone number, both unknown to our source. The Soviet described his work as being in the American Section of the MVD.

3. This Soviet Official has been cultivating Subject (trying to see him as often as possible, sometimes twice a week) since their introduction in December, by offering such blandishments as trips in a chauffered private limousine into forbidden areas outside Moscow, tickets to any entertainment, access to material from previously inaccessible archives, the use of private country villas and all the "beautiful, interesting and intelligent girls" he might want. Subject has further been promised the opportunity of returning to the Soviet Union for as long as he wants at any future date. He would have to pay only his way over there; his expenses and return trip to the US would be paid by the Soviets.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

4. Subject has taken advantage of this offer to take several trips for sightseeing into forbidden areas around Moscow in a private car with the Soviet Official, and has also taken up a few offers for entertainment. Subject visited one of these villas, but refused the girls on the ground that he wants a woman to like him for himself, and not because she has been told to do so. The Soviet answered that "some of them will really learn to like you for yourself, as well as work for us," but Subject still declined to get involved. However, Subject has recently been taken up by a Soviet girl who had previously tried to seduce another American student and subsequently blurted out that she was put onto the latter American by the MVD, which she has also told Subject. Subject is reported to be responding warmly to her approaches although he has flatly told her he doesn't trust her nor any Russian completely. He claims he enjoys her company but will not have a serious affair with her, and suspects she may be tied up with the other women offered him by the Soviet Official.

5. In his relationship with the Soviet Official, Subject is reportedly aware that he is playing a risky game, and is only utilizing the situation for the comfort and convenience it brings him. He has told the Soviet frankly that he cannot be wom over ideologically. Subject says he feels that the Soviets' interest in him is to cultivate him as a scholar of possible future importance to insure that he will always be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Subject has reportedly told several other American students of his relationship with the Soviet Official in order to cover himself "in case anything happened".

6. This Soviet Official has evinced an interest to Subject in many of the American Exchange students, with the explanation that some would undoubtedly be back in Moscow within two years as Diplomats and that since this is his area of responsibility, he wants to know as much as possible about them. The Soviet indicated that he was quite aware of the pattern of the American Exchange students' trips to the US Embassy and what they do in the university buildings, but is not so sure of their activities around the city. To demonstrate to Subject his knowledge about the American students, the Soviet Official mentioned an affair going on within the American group of which Subject had been unaware. The Soviet's information turned out to be true.

7. Subject was described by a reliable source, who knows him from group social gatherings at Harvard, as mature and socially vivacious with a warm personality. Subject is a clever and humorous conversationalist who likes to be surrounded by people, make new acquaintances, and develop friendships. Subject's patriotic motivation was not known to our source, but the latter felt that Subject was completely "Americanized" in manners and interests. Our source would guess that Subject has courage.

8. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you either before or after his return to the United States.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed:
JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/754,303

COPY ~~SECRET~~

2 June 1959

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CSCI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958, and our CSCI 3/754,303 of 14 April 1959 in which are reported the attempt by Czech Intelligence to induce Subject, a Czech-born naturalized American, to repatriate to Czechoslovakia, and the further cultivation of Subject by the KGB in Moscow where Subject is an Exchange Student during 1958-59. The following report describes further action by the KGB to recruit Subject, and his adamant refusal of any such offer. This latest information was recently received from RIHA by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. During April 1959, the Soviet Official ~~who said he~~ was from the American Section of the MVD (sic) and who had been cultivating Subject, allegedly asked the latter to make complete and regular reports on Michael Martin LUTHER, one of the other American Exchange Students at Moscow University. Subject was asked to spend as much time as possible with LUTHER, and to report where he goes, what he does and with whom he associates. If Subject were to do this reporting, the Soviet Official said he would make available certain material from Archives which Subject has been unable to get permission to use although research in this material is vital to his having a successful year academically in Moscow.

3. Subject alleges he flatly refused this "deal", saying that if he ever got mixed up in such a dirty business, it would be for his own side and not for the Communists. The Soviet Official then told Subject he should engage in such observation and reporting to the Soviets to lose some "naivete" about how the United States is exploiting the Cultural Exchange Program for intelligence purposes. To back up this assertion, the Soviet Official told Subject about a "spy nest where spies deposit things for one another" which he said had recently been uncovered near a university entrance frequented by still another American student, Walter CLEMENS, who, the Soviet implied, was not engaged in academic work only while studying at Moscow University.

~~SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Subject reportedly again adamantly refused to cooperate with the Soviet Official.

4. In paragraph 4 of CSCI 3/754,303, reference was made to a Soviet girl who had become interested in Subject, and whom Subject viewed with suspicion although continuing to see her for her companionship. Her name is Lida (Y)EGOROVA. Subject has now reportedly been alienated by ~~her~~ undependable personality and has pretty well broken up with her. This girl may have left, or soon be leaving, for Prague to join her husband.

5. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[illegible]

James Angleton

CSCI 3/754,373

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to letter from Richard Helms, Director, CIA, dated February 26, 1970.

Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised Helms on February 27, 1970, that (1) the Bureau is discontinuing all contact with the CIA office in Denver and (2) that direct Liaison with CIA at headquarters is being terminated. Helms was further told that henceforth our communication with CIA will be by letter only.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing that all contact with the local CIA office be discontinued.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CODE 3/2/70

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC DENVER

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL CIA OFFICE.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5-5-70

FROM : D. E. Moore DEM/wrw 6-4-70

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 4:35 p.m., today I telephonically contacted ASAC Morley, Denver, and advised him that an article concerning the Riha case had appeared in the Sunday News (New York) 4-3-70. This article was a general rehashing of the Riha case.

I told him that the Bureau desired that SAC Werner contact the District Attorney to determine the developments of his investigation in this case and also determine what conclusions had been reached. Morley said this would be done.

Morley was asked if Denver had information concerning a professor who had gone to El Paso, Texas, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and he advised this probably referred to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President at Colorado University who was there when Riha disappeared. He said that Smiley is now President of the University of Texas, at El Paso, Texas. He said Denver had no information that Dr. Smiley has any current information concerning this matter.

SAC Werner called at 5:30 p.m., today to advise that he had been unable to get in touch with the District Attorney but also was following up on this and would contact the District Attorney today and get in a teletype tonight.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

[illegible]

NR002 DN PLAIN

5:15 PM URGENT 5-5-70 DCM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

REBUTELCAL TODAY.

PURSUANT TO REQUEST IN REBUTELCAL, THIS IS TO ADVISE THE PROFESSOR WHO ALLEGEDLY WENT TO EL PASO OR NEW ORLEANS CONCERNING THOMAS RIHA HAD AND HIS DFISAPPEARANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY DR. JOSEPH SMILEY , FORMER PRESIDENT, COLORADO UNIVERSITY, BOULDER, COLO., WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS IN EL PASO, TEXAS.

DR. SMILEY WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY CIA AND ADVISED BY CIA THAT RIHA WAS ALIVE AND WELL.

AS BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED, CIA ATTEMPTED TO ATTRIBUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE WAS NO FEDERAL VIOLATION OVER WHICH THE BUREAU HAD INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST, NO FBI INVESTIGATION WAS

REC-35

END PAGE ONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

PAGE TWO

CONDUCTED.

DENVER FILES CONTAIN NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA OTHER THAT THAT PREVIOULSY SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU.

DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES MC KEVITT, GENERALLY KNOWN AS MIKE MC KEVITT, ADVISED TODAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA IS AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ALL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MC KEVITT STATES THAT HE FEELS GALYA TANNENBAUM, FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RIHA, MAY HAVE KILLED HIM IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MC KEVITT'S INVESTIGATION INDICATES THERE WAS A VERY BAD FEELING BETWEEN RIHA AND TANNENBAUM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DISAPPEARANCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT TANNENBAUM WAS FORGING CHECKS ON RIHA'S ACCOUNT.

FULL BACKGROUND CONCERNING TANNENBAUM PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED BUREAU UNDER CAPTION "GALYA TANNENBAUM, AKA, IMPERSONATION," BUFILE UNKNOWN, DENVER FILE FOUR SEVEN DASH THREE ONE NINE ZERO.

MC KEVITT SAID INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT TANNENBAUM

END PAGE TWO

WAS PROBABLY A NYMPHOMANIAC AND THAT SHE AND RIHA HAD HAD CONSTANT SEXUAL AFFAIRS AND THAT SHE HELD THIS AS A CLUB OVER HIS HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORGERY OF THESE CHECKS.

IN ANY EVENT MC KEVITT STATES IT IS HIS OPINION THAT RIHA IS DEAD SINCE HIS INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALS RIHA WAS VERY ATTACHED TO HIS FRIENDS AND MC KEVITT FEELS THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS FRIENDS IF HE WERE ALIVE. MC KEVITT ALSO ADVISES THAT INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE INDICATES RIHA WAS VERY ABNORMAL IN HIS SEXUAL DESIRES AND PURSUITS AND THAT THIS WAS HIS GREAT WEAKNESS; THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WOMEN ALONE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THESE INVOLVEMENTS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS DEATH.

IN VIEW OF THE DETAILS AND FACTS SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY INTERVIEW WITH DR. JOSEPH SMILEY IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU.

END

WJM FBI WA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 6, 1970

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Pursuant to Director's request Denver District Attorney James "Mike" McKevitt interviewed 5/5/70 as to investigation of Riha, Czechoslovak-born, naturalized, former professor of Russian history at Colorado University, who departed Denver area 3/69 without notifying friends, associates or estranged wife. His disappearance has been glamorized and spiced up in newspaper articles by references to Galya Tannenbaum, his paramour. McKevitt stated investigation at standstill, all leads being exhausted. He feels Tannenbaum may have killed subject since bad feeling developed between them prior to his disappearance due to her forging checks on his account. Further, Tannenbaum probably a nymphomaniac who had constant sexual affairs with Riha and used this as a club over his head to prevent disclosure of forgeries. In McKevitt's opinion Riha is dead since he was close to his friends and if alive would contact them. Investigation indicates Riha abnormal in his sexual desires and could not leave women alone. Possibility exists one of these involvements may have resulted in his death.

Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President, Colorado University, where subject employed, is now President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas. Smiley after subject's disappearance stated subject was alive and well. When challenged by McKevitt to disclose basis for statement he refused and appealed to CIA, his source, for help. Bureau vigorously refuted CIA's claim that Bureau Agent was original source for statement. As result McKevitt publicly announced statement was not true and resulted from "honest mistake." No indication Smiley has any facts to contribute concerning subject's current whereabouts or basis for his disappearance. Since Bureau has conducted no investigation into Riha's disappearance, interview of Smiley could result in impression Bureau entering case. However, if Director so desires, El Paso will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley. Bureau files show subject attended Moscow University 9/58-9/59. Our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958. In 1958-59 CIA advised Czech intelligence attempted to persuade Riha to repatriate and later introduced Riha to Soviet intelligence which attempted his recruitment. After subject's return to US in 1959 no information was developed as to continued interest in him by Soviet intelligence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: THOMAS RIHA
105-78256

ACTION:

If the Director so desires, El Paso will be furnished background information regarding Riha and will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley.

Yes.
H.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/7/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Rememo A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 5/6/70, by which the Director instructed we interview Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas.

At 1:40 p.m., 5/7/70, I telephoned ASAC Jay Cochran, Jr., El Paso, and furnished him background of this matter. I instructed him to have Dr. Smiley contacted immediately, to make it clear that the FBI was not investigating the Riha matter and to inquire of Smiley if he has any new information regarding Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

ASAC Cochran was told to send the results of this interview of Dr. Smiley immediately by teletype to the Bureau. He was also told that in the event Dr. Smiley is out of town or otherwise unavailable for interview, a teletype should be sent immediately to the Bureau advising as to when the interview would be conducted.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 5/8/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference memorandum A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/6/70, same caption, by which the Director instructed that Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, be interviewed as to any knowledge he possessed concerning Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

Dr. Smiley was interviewed 5/7/70 and was most cooperative. Smiley stated since leaving the University of Colorado in 6/69 his knowledge of developments in this case has been derived from articles he has read in "The Denver Post." He speculated Riha may have been involved in intelligence work and based this comment on Riha's being a "loner" and having married a Czech girl. He said he had no evidence to support this speculation. He said that he was aware that one Mrs. Tannenbaum, a woman indicted in Colorado for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of Riha. He concluded that he had no further information concerning either Riha's disappearance or his whereabouts.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/8/70

nsmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, EL PASO

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIJA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
SINO-SATELLITE SECTION

ReButel call to EP, 5/7/70;
EP tel call to Bureau, 5/7/70.

In accordance with the request of the Director, SA FRANCIS J. PRASEK interviewed Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, President of UTEP. Dr. SMILEY was advised that the FBI has no jurisdiction in this matter, nor is it conducting any active investigation regarding RIJA, and that we were simply desirous of being advised of any new information he may have received regarding RIJA's disappearance and/or present whereabouts.

Dr. SMILEY, who was most gracious and pleasant, stated that he left the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, in 6/69, and has since that time followed the investigation of RIJA and his disappearance which is being conducted by the newspaper "The Denver Post".

SMILEY, in 4/69, approximately three weeks after the disappearance of RIJA, contacted RIJA's attorney for the purpose of determining whether the attorney had any information regarding RIJA, since it was necessary for SMILEY to know whether RIJA was alive and whether he intended to return to the University for the fall semester of 1969 to resume teaching in the History Department. SMILEY, who cannot now recall the name of the attorney, was furnished an address for RIJA in Montreal, Canada, and a letter was directed to this address by the History Department seeking information regarding RIJA and his intentions.

② Bureau (RAM)
1-El Paso

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After leaving Boulder, SMILEY was advised by Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, that a letter was received by the University purportedly written by RIJA in which he stated that he would not be returning to the University. BRIGGS advised SMILEY that in his opinion, the letter was a forgery, since the signature did not compare with that of RIJA.

After the disappearance, SMILEY began receiving a great many inquiries from the news media and he was pressed for a statement regarding his knowledge of RIJA and whether or not he was alive.

THE FOLLOWING WAS FURNISHED BY DR. SMILEY IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE FBI AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION TO ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY SINCE HE WAS BREAKING A CONFIDENCE WITH AN ASSOCIATE IN THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Being hounded by the press for a statement, he contacted a source in the CIA Office at Denver since he, SMILEY, was formerly a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, thinking that perhaps that agency could assist him off the record with any information it might possess. SMILEY was aware that the CIA had interviewed RIJA following a trip by RIJA to the Soviet Union. The CIA source subsequently told Dr. SMILEY to merely advise the press that he had information to the effect that RIJA was "alive and well". This information was subsequently released by Dr. SMILEY to the student press at the University of Colorado, and it appeared in print.

When the Office of the District Attorney in Denver instituted investigation into the disappearance of RIJA, SMILEY was contacted by the DA's Office regarding the source of his statement. Dr. SMILEY again contacted the Denver CIA Office source and was advised that he was to state nothing and that he would be recontacted.

Some days later, the CIA source recontacted him and told him that he would be receiving an inquiry from the Office of the DA in the form of a statement, and that he should agree with the statement even though it "was not quite the truth". SMILEY did not question

these instructions, since he felt that CIA knew what should be done in this type of case. He received a telephone call from the DA's Office and a statement was read to him to the effect that the information which he had received and made public to the effect that RIJA was alive and well was in error. SMILEY told the caller that he agreed with the statement and nothing further came of this.

Dr. SMILEY does not know what part, if any, the CIA has in this case, but since he, SMILEY, is himself a former intelligence agent he did not feel that he had the right to question something which might be of vital importance to his country.

DR. SMILEY REQUESTED THAT NO HINT OR INFERENCE BE GIVEN TO THE CIA WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT HE HAS REVEALED TO THE FBI HIS CONTACTS REGARDING THIS MATTER WITH THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CIA.

He stated that though he has no evidence to substantiate his belief, he cannot get it out of his mind that RIJA may have been a double agent for the Soviets or the Czechoslovaks. He is aware that one Mrs. TANNENBAUM, a woman indicted for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of RIJA. He never knew RIJA to be associated with any such woman, but stated that he was not acquainted with the personal life of RIJA who was somewhat of a "loner".

RIJA, when he joined the staff of the University of Colorado, was single but in 8/68, an individual came to visit RIJA ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a marriage between RIJA and the man's sister. The intended bride was a Czechoslovakian girl who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and this "brother-in-law" was entertained by a member and colleague of RIJA in the History Department. This individual indicated to SMILEY that although the "brother-in-law" supposedly did not speak any English, and had RIJA translate every statement into Czech, it was apparent from the gestures and expressions of the "brother-in-law" that he understood more than he let on. Three weeks after the visit of this man, the woman who became Mrs. RIJA came to Boulder, Colorado, where she and RIJA were married. The marriage resulted in divorce a short time later and the girl reportedly returned to the East Coast from whence she came.

Dr. SMILEY indicated that he has no further information regarding this matter, but that Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, should be in possession of the letter purportedly written from Canada by RIJA, and may be in a position to assist in answering any question the Bureau might have regarding RIJA's association with the University of Colorado, since BRIGGS would have possession of these records. He stated BRIGGS is a trusted confidant of his and Dr. SMILEY's name should be used as an introduction should the Bureau desire any information of BRIGGS.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, which forwarded a memorandum of the same date for your approval and forwarding to the SSC in partial response to its request of April 30, 1975.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of an additional memorandum which completes the response to the Committee's request.

A copy of the memorandum for the SSC is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

LFS:mjg
(9)

Sect 102 behind.
HSC Sen 94. (8/24/75 [illegible])
11/16/76.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

REC-102

62-116395-263

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2AIM/lmf
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 JUN 25 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, provided a partial response to this request and advised that it would be necessary to clear Section 102 of the Manual of Instructions with other interested agencies.

Section 102 has now been cleared with the other interested agencies and is available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstein or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:mjg mjs
(8)

NOTE:

Third agency considerations have been resolved by coordination with other appropriate agencies. Section 102 pertains to relations with other agencies.

LFS

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-11[illegible]-263

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Sections of the Manual of Instructions not Previously Furnished
Section 102 of MOI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6-13-75

Received by: John T. Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC	J. T. Elliff
	HSC	

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part 2.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In response to above-cited SSC request, the SSC was advised that designated Sections, with one exception, of FBI Manual of Instructions were available for review at FBI Headquarters. By communication 6/11/75, SSC was advised excluded Section, which involved third agency considerations, is now available for review at FBI Headquarters.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ~~TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY~~ on Intelligence Activities

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a staff member of captioned Committee of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, former Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb lhb
(12)

P. V. [illegible] 509 JB

Hand carried by Paul V. Daly 6-12-75 PVD

62-116395-262

REC-102

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000

MOR-16

PCM

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG, III, BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Armstrong, who was formerly Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. Mr. Armstrong furnished the information following his interview by SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein. The interview took place in Washington, D. C., on June 6, 1975, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. Mr. Armstrong was not put under oath and was not advised of his rights including his right to personal counsel.

Mr. Armstrong advised that the interview covered the following areas:

1. The general activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division, particularly Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning research conducted in the Intelligence Division concerning the possibility of obtaining an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters;

2. The alleged existence of files in former Director Hoover's office;

3. Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning the increase in the number of FBI representatives assigned abroad as Legal Attaches.

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf

MOR-16

62-116395-262

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

With regard to the effort made to obtain an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters, Mr. Armstrong advised the SSC representative that in May, 1972, one of the principal questions raised by Mr. Gray was concerning the jurisdictional authority of the FBI to conduct intelligence or security investigations. He commented that in May, 1972, a conference was held at Quantico, Virginia, involving a number of Bureau executives and that during this conference the question of jurisdictional authority was discussed. Following the conference, a special team was set up to discuss this subject, including Mr. Armstrong and former Special Agent Thomas Smith of the Intelligence Division. According to Mr. Armstrong, it was felt that it would be appropriate to develop a new set of guidelines and not to rely on prior statutes and Presidential orders. Armstrong recalled that after several meetings of this group, Thomas Smith prepared a document consisting of 43 pages which was completed approximately six weeks after the group was created. Armstrong recalled that the document was received in the Acting Director's office and was discussed at one of the regular afternoon staff conferences. At that time it was agreed that the document was good but that the timing was not thought to be appropriate. The thought was expressed that it would be held in abeyance until after the coming elections. It was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the matter might have been discussed between Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Gray, and it was decided not to push the matter until after the elections. Mr. Armstrong recalled advising Mr. Smith of the location of the document and the fact that it was being held in abeyance until after the elections.

The matter of the above document did not come up again until shortly before the confirmation hearings concerning Mr. Gray. At that time it was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the Bureau should not push for the Executive Order until after a

permanent Director of the Bureau had been confirmed. Mr. Armstrong advised that to the best of his knowledge the document was not given to the Department of Justice while Mr. Gray and his staff were in the Bureau.

Concerning files that were allegedly maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Armstrong stated that shortly after Mr. Gray's arrival in the Bureau he made a statement to the effect that there were no secret files maintained by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Armstrong commented that he doubted the wisdom of making such a broad statement.

Shortly after Mr. Gray's statement was made, information came to Mr. Armstrong's attention which caused him to prepare a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating the possibility of the existence of files in Mr. Hoover's office. Armstrong could not recall Mr. Gray's response to his memorandum but he believed that the original of the memorandum was returned to him and that he placed the original and the carbon in his desk along with other memoranda that he had prepared for Mr. Gray.

Mr. Armstrong stated that it was his theory that the files in Mr. Hoover's office were in two categories; the first being files containing information possibly detrimental to prominent persons in the Government and the other category being tidbits of information received in personal correspondence from various Special Agents in Charge concerning persons of possible interest to Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Armstrong advised further that at one of his daily conferences, Mr. Gray mentioned that he had talked to former Acting Associate Director Mark Felt concerning files which may have been maintained in Mr. Hoover's office and which he said were then in a safe in the custody of Mr. Felt.

Mr. Armstrong could not recall whether Mr. Gray and Mr. Felt were to go through the safe together or whether Mr. Felt was to do it alone and advise Mr. Gray of his findings.

With regard to the present location of such files, Mr. Armstrong had no specific knowledge but speculated that if they existed they might have been destroyed before Mr. Gray arrived in the office, they might have been retained in Mr. Felt's safe or they might have been removed to the custody of Mr. Clyde Tolson or Miss Helen Gandy at Mr. Hoover's house.

Mr. Armstrong advised that on April 27, 1973, prior to his departure from the Bureau, he destroyed all of the memoranda he had retained in his desk and he is certain that among them was his memorandum concerning files in Mr. Hoover's office.

With regard to the increase in the number of Legal Attaches, Armstrong advised that he recalled that shortly before Mr. Gray came to the Bureau there had been an expansion in the number of Legal Attaches. He understood that traditionally the role of the Legal Attache had been to function as a liaison representative to foreign police agencies but that with the expansion in the number of Legal Attaches they were given additional responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, exactly to what extent he did not recall. He recalled that the expansion was at the initiation of the White House and may have been because the White House was not satisfied with the intelligence collected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Armstrong stated that he saw a potential for friction with CIA and speculated that this might have been a factor in the breach of liaison between the FBI and CIA. He recalled writing a memorandum for Mr. Gray expressing doubts as to whether the training of Special Agents of the FBI equipped them for the collection of foreign intelligence and some subsequent discussion that

perhaps the Legal Attaches should be brought home for such training, but that this idea was concluded to be impractical or unnecessary.

1 - The Attorney General

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

To the Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting interview of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, formerly Special Assistant to FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, by SSC Staff Member.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Authorities for FBI's security investigations

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interview included following topics: general activities of FBI's Intelligence Division, including FBI's authorities in security investigations; files maintained in former FBI Director Hoover's office, and increase in number of FBI representatives abroad as Legal Attaches.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

WDC

SFP:1hb (4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 CFS

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

276-10483

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

The Attorney General

June 12, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter, and appendices thereto, from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are an original of a memorandum and enclosures which are responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 6

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-260

RDS:lek|ek
(10)

REC- 102

17 JUN 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

3 CA

WRW

PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/ihf
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to the SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, Item 10, the SSC requested all records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D. C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D. C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August, 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

In respect to 10a, on 12/9/64 a travel voucher was processed for payment to former Special Agent Lish Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. Accompanying the voucher was

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SPBRM/LMF
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RDS:lek lek
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 by Whitson to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air travel from Washington, D. C., to Miami and return. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Whitson in connection with the aforementioned travel.

In respect to 10b, former Special Agents DeLoach, Adcock, Manning (correct name Donald Hanning), Linebaugh (correct name Harold Leinbaugh), and Special Agent Todd submitted travel vouchers for August, 1964. However, no GTRs were issued by them.

In regard to 10c, William C. Sullivan was the issuing officer of a GTR made out to Southern Railroad for travel from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta and return in the amount of $74.55. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Sullivan in connection with the aforementioned travel. Sullivan submitted a voucher for 11/28-30/64 in the amount of $37.10.

No other records are available concerning the travel and expenses of the individuals mentioned in 10a, 10b and 10c.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The data regarding the GTRs and the travel of the individuals mentioned in the memorandum was obtained from the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. In connection with 10a, 10b, and 10c, all expense vouchers of the individuals mentioned in these items have been destroyed under the Five-Year Retention Document Schedule Rule.

Void after ___ 19

BILL TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A3,925,504

The National Airlines Company is requested

to furnish coach class air transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC

to Miami, Florida + return

(IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") (SHOW CARRIERS AND JUNCTION POINTS AND WHERE MIXED CLASS SERVICE IS TO BE FURNISHED SPECIFY)

for use of Lish Whitson and ___ others with ___ accommodations (LOWER BERTH, P.C. SEAT, ETC.)

from ___ to ___ with authorization (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN")

to transport not over ___ lbs. of excess baggage from ___

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE OR TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

PLACE OF ISSUE Washington DC Nov 21, '6

I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)

0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT	TOTAL
107.40		107.40

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

The United States of America
Transportation Request

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf

MOR-16

62-116395-260

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a

Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S., May 1, 1935, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.
2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.
3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10482

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a

Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S., [illegible] General Regulations No. 123

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

PASSED

149/a

vo

DEC 16 1964

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.

2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.

3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-16112

BILL TO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A 3,991,399

The United States of America
Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

To Southern Railroad ... Company is requested to furnish first class rail transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC to Atlanta Ga. & return via Southern RR

for use of William C. Sullivan and others with accommodations

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

Place of issue Washington DC 11-25-64

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

0500
21-60

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

42.95	31.60	74.55
[illegible]	[illegible]	TOTAL

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 RVM/mf

MDR-16

62-116395-260

-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

ddressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/12/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard L. Taylor Jr. Date: 16 Jun 75 2PM

eceived by: Sherry Powell

Title: Asst Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/KMF

MOR-16

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/12/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 10.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

SURVEILLANCE

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was furnished with information and documents relating to travel on the part of Bureau personnel in connection with SSC inquiry into this Bureau's use of electronic surveillances.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
EWS
5-TJM

TREAT AS YELLOW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAT
MDR-16

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General with a letterhead memorandum attached enclosing a copy of a memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups." It appears that we are proposing to give the copy of the Gale memorandum to the Senate Select Committee in response to their request by letter dated May 14, 1975, for a memorandum prepared by Gale relative to the subject matter of the 1964 memorandum.

My reading of the memorandum revealed that it is a purely deliberative document which quotes personal views of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Gale. I am concerned that the release of such a memorandum containing not only the personal views of Bureau officials, but also identifying them by name could have an impact on individuals in the future who may be asked to furnish their opinions concerning policy matters in the FBI. As indicated by the Attorney General in his speech in New York, it is essential that the Executive Branch have a degree of privacy concerning policy discussions and expressions of personal views by officials in order for the Executive to function properly.

I do recognize that we may not be able to resist giving the Committee access to material documents that bear on particular issues under investigation, however, I do recommend that when we are required to produce deliberative documents, the names and other identifying data relating to individuals furnishing views be deleted.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

REC- 102 62-116395-259

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/mfc
MDR-16

JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

[redacted]

84 25 1975

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the names of individuals described in the body of the memorandum of July 30, 1964, and other identifying data be deleted prior to furnishing the copy to the Committee.

2. In regard to future responses to requests for documents of a deliberative nature that our policy be that names and identifying data will be deleted prior to disclosure of the documents.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Former Special Agent Richard H. Davis of the Atlanta Office telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 6-4-75 at which time he explained that he had been contacted by Michael Epstein of captioned Committee at which time Epstein requested that Davis make himself available for interview in either Atlanta, Georgia, or travel to Washington, D. C. Davis informed Epstein that he would have to obtain Bureau approval prior to submitting to interview inasmuch as he had to obtain a release from his employment secrecy agreement.

Mr. Davis informed SA Daly that he was reluctant to agree to being interviewed by captioned Committee concerning his activities as an Agent. It was pointed out to Mr. Davis that the decision as to whether to agree to interview was his, but he was advised that captioned Committee has subpoena power and might attempt to force him to furnish information through the use of a subpoena. He was informed that the Bureau was cooperating with captioned Committee and their inquiry into FBI operations.

It was explained to Mr. Davis that if he desired to allow himself to be interviewed, the Bureau would make available an employee at his request to be available but not present during interview. He was also advised that this Agent would not represent him as private counsel. Mr. Davis was advised that the Bureau's concern was not of matters of historical fact but rather testimony might be required which could impair the Bureau's efforts to discharge its responsibilities. It was also explained that the Bureau representative would assist him in making determination whether his response to a particular question would identify confidential informants, impair ongoing investigations, divulge information derived from other Government agencies or foreign sources or expose sensitive investigative techniques and, therefore, a response should not be given.

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

REC-102

62-116395-258

Phillips

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Personnel file, Richard H. Davis
1 - Mr. ~~W. O. Cregar~~
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

JUN 25 1975

PVD:dkg (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 5 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Davis indicated that he desired a Bureau representative be made available during his interview and would request the interview take place in Atlanta, Georgia. Additionally, he stated Epstein had indicated that the topic of discussion in the interview would be the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Mr. Davis stated he would recontact FBI Headquarters as soon as a date and place of interview had been determined. He indicated he would set the date for interview so that the Bureau would have ample opportunity to have an Agent available. We have separately requested Bureau approval for the release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

granted per 5x8 note on 6/4/75 tel.

ACTION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an Agent for the interview of Mr. Davis when and if a date and place are agreed upon.

PVD JBH/pvs

WRW

JBA
PLM

Wannall has designated SA Phillips per R/S 6/9/75

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Associate Director

_______________, 1975

___ Director
___ ~~Mr. Callahan~~
___ Mr. Jenkins
___ Mr. Adams
___ Mr. Feeney
___ Mr. Ash
___ Mr. Bassett
___ Mr. Cleveland
___ Mr. Cochran
___ Mr. Decker
___ Mr. Gallagher
___ Mr. Gebhardt
___ Mr. McDermott
___ Mr. Mintz
___ Mr. Mooney
___ Mr. Moore
___ Mr. Walsh
___ Mr. Wannall

___ Mr. Mack
___ Mr. O'Connell

___ Miss Tietgen
___ Mrs. Mutter
___ Miss Downing
___ Miss Southers
___ Mrs. Haines

___ M _______________

Room __________

___ Mrs. Metcalf
___ Telephone Room

___ Corres. Review
___ Mail Room
___ Teletype
___ Personnel Records
___ Mechanical Section

___ For Appropriate Action
___ For Your Approval
___ Initial and Return
___ Please Call Me
___ For Information
___ Per Conversation

Sensitivity '75

Do we have any
amplification of
This instruction.
Or, do we know
of any submission
responsive to this
which illustrate
interpretation
K

Item #6 (tabbed) re

"items with an unusual twist or
concerning prominent personalities"
Should create Congressional furor.

Paul L. Mack
Room 7004, Ext. 5606

C-102

62-116395-257

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/
MDR-16

84 JUN 26 1975.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/18/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Reference is made to Bureau letter to The Attorney General 6/20/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)," forwarding letterhead memorandum for approval and forwarding to SSC.

The Director asked if we have any amplification of this instruction (to submit items with unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities for dissemination to the President under the INLET Program) or do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation?

There has been no amplification of this instruction, nor any submission under INLET of an item on prominent personalities that would show the interpretation of this point.

With respect to the observation that this matter should cause a congressional furor, it is noted that INLET has already been afforded considerable publicity, beginning in February, 1973, after an office memorandum on the subject reached the news media. This publicity is why the Senate Committee asked for documents on INLET. The White House and Senator Bob Packwood inquired about the Program. A detailed defense of INLET appeared in the Congressional Record.

By way of background, the INLET instruction that has received the most publicity--items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities--was recalled by the author of the INLET Program initiating letter as having been specifically dictated by then Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan.

TEB:lek
(8)

REC- 102

62-116395-256

CONTINUED - OVER

5-Encl

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/CMF
MDR-16

17 JUN 24 1975

84 JUN 25 1975

While we cannot say exactly what former Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan had in mind when he added the instruction about items with an unusual twist, we can speculate with a hypothetical example.

If we learned that a trusted assistant to an important government official--an official who had taken a "hard line" with respect to dealings with the Soviet Union, for example--was under development by Soviet intelligence, this would be an unusual twist to an item of intelligence interest to the President involving a prominent person.

In such a hypothetical case, we would, of course, advise the government official involved, and The Attorney General and the President. We would have done this under INLET and we would still disseminate this type of data. INLET was only a vehicle for special dissemination.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

1.0

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

John Elliff of captioned Committee's task force on Domestic Intelligence Activities advised on 6-9-75, that the Committee is planning to have a Bureau representative testify concerning the FBI's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic and counterintelligence areas in late June or early July. Mr. Elliff stated that this testimony would be before the Senators and will be a general exploration of jurisdictional authority. Mr. Elliff also volunteered that he had told K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination of the Department, that the Committee wanted to be furnished a copy of the T. J. Smith Memorandum dated 7-31-72 concerning FBI's investigative jurisdiction in domestic and counterintelligence matters. Elliff stated that at this point, a summary of such documents would not be an acceptable substitute. Elliff desired such a document be made available to the Committee prior to the aforementioned testimony. With regards to testimony, Elliff indicated that it would not necessarily have to be the Director giving a testimony.

Elliff stated as he finalizes his plans concerning the testimony concerning FBI investigative jurisdiction, he would recontact SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and give more details concerning this matter.

62-116395

REC-59 62-116395-255

ST-101

5 JUN 12 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
Attn: Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Kelly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAF
MDR-14

84 [illegible] 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

Legal Counsel to Adams, Memo
Re: SENSTUDY 75

With regards to the request concerning the Smith document, we should await K. William O'Connor's request prior to taking any action concerning this matter, and with regards to testimony, we should await further details prior to engaging in the preparation of that testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 19 1975

TELETYPE

REC-102

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. W.R.W. ✓ HEM
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Mr. Cregar
4123 JEH

NR 026 LA PLAIN

10:14PM NITEL 6-18-75 RLD

TO DIRECTOR (62-1~~16464)~~

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-1700-4124)

ATTN: INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

SENSTUDY 1975.

RE BUTEL TO LOS ANGELES, JUNE 17, 1975.

THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY INSTANCE THAT WAS ALLUDED TO IN CAPTIONED AIRTEL AND THERE ISNO RECORD OF ANY AGENTS BY THE NAME OF RON MASCAR OR WILLIAM MILLER ASSIGNED TO THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION SINCE 1956 TO PRESENT.

END

HOLD

REC-102 62-116395-254

12 JUN 24 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMF

MDR-16

FIVE

84 JUN 24 1975

Black Panther Party



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

MARCH 1971

"WE ARE FROM 25 TO 30 MILLION STRONG, AND WE ARE ARMED. AND WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OUR SITUATION. AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO CHANGE IT. AND WE ARE UNAFRAID."



WARNING TO AMERICA

[illegible]

Table of Contents

I. FOUNDING 1
II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES 3
III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY 6
    Invasion of California State Legislature 6
    Police Officer Meets Panthers – and Death 6
    "Free Huey" Campaign 6
    Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver 7
    International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver 7
    Rise of the Black Panther Party 8
IV. LEADERSHIP 9
    National Committee to Combat Fascism 10
    International Section 10
V. FUNDS 12
VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS 13
VII. TACTICS 15
    Target: Police 15
    Attacks on Others 15
    Weapons Caches 16
    "Revolutionary Suicide" 16
    Panther "Justice" 18
VIII. PROPAGANDA 20
    Editorials 21
    Inflammatory Articles 24
    Provocative Slogans 29
    "Revolutionary Art" 30
    International News 35

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE FBI AS A BRIEF STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND, TACTICS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE ORGANIZATION'S OWN PUBLICATIONS WERE THE SOURCE FOR MOST OF THE MATERIAL REPRODUCED.


LET US HOLD HIGH THE BANNER OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNALISM
AND THE INVINCIBLE THOUGHTS OF
HUEY P. NEWTON
MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE.

I. FOUNDING

The Black Panther Party, with headquarters in Oakland, California, was founded in 1966 by two Oakland Negroes – Huey Percy Newton and Bobby George Seale – both at that time at Merritt College in Oakland. The name and symbol of the new party were taken from the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, an Alabama political party known informally in 1965 as the Black Panther Party.



HUEY PERCY NEWTON

From the writings of communists, revolutionaries, and black militants, Newton and Seale allegedly selected ideas around which they could build a revolutionary frame that suited the needs of their party. Influential writings included those of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader; Frantz Fanon , West Indian psychiatrist who advocated violence for Algerian nationalists; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one-time lieutenant of Cuba's Fidel Castro and a principal architect of 20th century guerrilla warfare; Malcolm X, American black nationalist who advocated violence to obtain Negro "freedom"; and W. E. B. DuBois, Negro educator who became a member of the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93.

The organization was at first called the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense; however, the "Self-Defense" was removed in 1968 in an effort to project a more politically oriented image to prospective sympathizers and supporters.



BOBBY GEORGE SEALE

As head of the new Black Panther Party, Newton assumed the title Minister of Defense, and Seale was named Chairman. When questioned about the membership of their organization, Newton and Seale gave the since oft-repeated reply: "Those who know don't say. Those who say don't know." The militancy of the group, however, had an immediate appeal to the discontented, restless youth of Oakland's ghettos.


HUEY NEWTON
BOBBY SEALE

Black Panther Party Chairman, Bobby Seale, and Minister of Defense, Huey Newton, selling Red Chinese magazine and "quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung."

3-2-67 San Francisco, Calif.

II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES

The Black Panther Party "Platform and Program" is repeated in each issue of the official Party publication, The Black Panther.

October 1966
Black Panther Party Platform and Program

What We Want What We Believe

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. **That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.** Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. **But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.**



BLACK PANTHER PARTY

III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Proclaiming a legal right to bear arms, the Panthers by early 1967 had begun to appear in public wearing black leather jackets and black berets, openly carrying shotguns, rifles, or pistols, and shouldering bandoliers of ammunition.

Calling the police "pigs," the Panthers began a buildup in Negro areas of the idea that police departments, especially that in Oakland, were dedicated to the brutalization and harassment of minority groups, and, acting as an appendage of white government authority, were working toward the eventual annihilation (genocide) of the Negro race.

Invasion of California State Legislature

The first incident that brought national attention to this group occurred on May 2, 1967, as the California Legislature was in session in Sacramento. Approximately 40 members of the Black Panther Party, carrying loaded rifles, pistols, and shotguns, and some wearing bandoliers of ammunition about their waists or draped over their shoulders, burst into the Chamber. They were protesting a bill being introduced on that date outlawing the carrying of loaded weapons in public and were proclaiming their right to bear arms and criticize the police. Before they were arrested, they passed out mimeographed leaflets calling on all Negroes to end the "terrorist" oppression of colored races by white America and referring to the preparation of concentration camps in the United States as a beginning of genocide.

Police Officer Meets Panthers--and Death

The Panthers became more militant with the passing of time. At 5:00 a.m., October 28, 1967, two Oakland, California, patrol officers, John F. Frey and Herbert C. Heanes, made a routine traffic violation car stop. While the officers were awaiting the results of the car registration check by radio, the driver, Huey Newton, got out of the car. Suddenly, shooting broke out. Officer Frey was killed; Officer Heanes was wounded critically; and Newton received a stomach wound. He stopped a passing automobile and had the driver take him to a hospital where he was taken into custody and hospitalized. After a state trial, which began July 15, 1968, Newton was sentenced on September 27, 1968, to serve from 2 to 15 years on a charge of voluntary manslaughter.*

"Free Huey" Campaign

Two days after Patrolman Frey's death, the Huey Newton Defense Fund was established at a meeting of a section of the Negro community of Oakland.

The cry of "Free Huey" became a clarion call. The imprisoned Newton was built up in the public eye as "black and bold in defense of his people." Each

---

**It was ruled later that the presiding judge in this trial erred in instructions to the jury. Newton was released August 5, 1970, and scheduled for retrial.*

LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

bringing its own axe to grind, such organizations as the anarchist New Left group named Students for a Democratic Society; the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Communist Chinese-oriented Progressive Labor Party; the Communist Party, USA, and its youth affiliate, the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America; and militant campus groups, black and white, began to gather in support of the Panthers, who were willing not only to defy the establishment, but to destroy it.

Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver

Early in 1967, the Panthers were joined by a recent parolee from the California prison system, author of a best-selling autobiography, *Soul On Ice,* staff writer for the magazine *Ramparts,* and admitted Marxist – Leroy Eldridge Cleaver.

In *Soul On Ice,* Cleaver wrote: "I sought out his (Marx's) books...It was like taking medicine for me to find that, indeed, American Capitalism deserved all the hatred and contempt that I felt for it in my heart...."

After Newton was jailed, although he remained the undisputed leader, it soon became apparent that Cleaver, designated Minister of Information, was projecting a major leadership image. The Party began to further widen its publicity, nationally and internationally, and enlarge its radical support and revolutionary intent.

As an example of this spreading influence of the Panther Party, the 1968 National Election ticket of the Peace and Freedom Party, a coalition of radical groups, included Cleaver as candidate for the Presidential nomination; Newton as candidate for the 7th Congressional District of Alameda County, California; Kathleen Cleaver, 18th Assembly District, California State Legislature; Bobby Seale, 17th Assembly District, California State Legislature. Cleaver received a national total of almost 200,000 votes. Only a small percentage of the California electorate cast their votes for Newton, Seale, and Kathleen Cleaver.

On the evening of April 6, 1968, Cleaver and several Panthers became involved in a shoot-out with Oakland police officers. The incident resulted in the death of a Panther, the wounding of two police officers, and the wounding and arrest of Cleaver. Cleaver's parole was revoked immediately and he was returned to prison. After much publicity, he was later released on bail by a Superior Court Judge who ruled that the jeopardy of his parole status stemmed "from his undue eloquence in pursuing political goals...offensive to many of his contemporaries." This decision was overruled by the District Court of Appeals and upheld by the California Court of Appeals. Cleaver was ordered to return to prison by November 27, 1968. Electing to become a Federal fugitive, he disappeared in late November, 1968, going first to Havana, Cuba, and later to Algiers, where he has established residence.

International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver

Soon after Cleaver's arrest in the spring of 1968, approximately 150 prominent individuals sponsored the establishment of an International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. The committee intended to dispatch a team to Europe to gain

international support and arrange for a European edition of Cleaver's book, *Soul On Ice.*

Rise of the Black Panther Party

In May, 1968, the hard-core membership of the Black Panther Party was estimated at only 125, and Panther activity was confined largely to the San Francisco-Oakland, California, area. However, because of the dramatic shoot-outs, the "Free Huey" Campaign, the funds established for the defense of both Newton and Cleaver, the widespread publicity, and the support given readily by white radical groups and individual sympathizers, the Black Panther Party began to grow rapidly, not only in membership but in militancy and influence. Chapters began to appear in major cities throughout the country. By the end of 1968, the membership had reached nearly 2,000, with additional thousands of sympathizers and supporters.



PAGE [illegible] THE BLACK PANTHER SEPTEMBER [illegible], [illegible]

1968: BALLOT OR THE BULLET

KATHLEEN CLEAVER,
COMMUNICATION SECT.,
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

18th ASSEMBLY DISTRICT
S.F. PEACE & FREEDOM PARTY

SHOOT YOUR SHOT

IV. LEADERSHIP

Organizationally, the Black Panther Party is set up to be under a Central Committee composed of the following positions:

- Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander, held by Huey Newton
- Chairman, held by Bobby George Seale
- Minister of Information, formerly held by Leroy Eldridge Cleaver
- Chief of Staff, held by David Hilliard
- Minister of Education, held by Raymond (Masai) Hewitt
- Communications Secretary, formerly held by Cleaver's wife, Kathleen
- Minister of Culture, held by Emory Douglas
- Field Marshal, formerly held by Donald Lee Cox

The position of Assistant Chief of Staff, not included among the Central Committee, is occupied by Roosevelt (June) Hilliard.

Under the Central Committee, the chain of command extends to leaders and officers of local chapters.

DAVID HILLIARD

RAYMOND (MASAI) HEWITT

KATHLEEN CLEAVER

EMORY DOUGLAS

DONALD LEE COX

National Committee to Combat Fascism

Set up to coexist with Black Panther Party branches in various cities in the United States are chapters of another organization called National Committee to Combat Fascism. In actuality, there is little difference between the two. This group, a Panther Party front, was set up as the result of a revolutionary conference, called National Conference for a United Front Against Fascism, held in Oakland, California, in July, 1969. The conference, sponsored by the Black Panther Party and assisted by the anarchist Students for a Democratic Society and the Communist Party, USA, was called to form a coalition of black and white radicals, described as "oppressed people."

The National Committee to Combat Fascism is considered by Party leaders to be the "political organizing bureau" of the Black Panther Party. Its specific task allegedly is to raise the political level of the people and educate them against the system.

International Section

On September 13, 1970, the International Section of the Black Panther Party officially opened in Algiers. Joining Cleaver on the staff were his wife, Kathleen, and Field Marshal Donald Lee Cox, a fugitive from justice. Cox faces charges of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, based on a warrant issued on April 20, 1970, at Baltimore, Maryland. He also failed to appear on May 14, 1970, in San Francisco, to answer Federal firearms charges.

This section, in its entirety, was expelled from the Black Panther Party by Huey Newton on February 27, 1971. The expulsion resulted from tensions and differences between Party hierarchy which led to disruptive factionalism.

D.C. greeting African brothers



Chinese 2nd Ambassador (R), Press Attaché (M) and Cultural Attaché (L) talking with Eldridge

Opening attended by cross section of Liberation Movements

Scenes from opening of International Section, The Black Panther, October 31, 1970

V. FUNDS

The money by which the Black Panther Party operates comes from a number of sources. There are substantial private contributions; fees for public appearances, such as campus speeches, radio, and television appearances; payments for magazine articles; collections for trials and bail funds in this country and abroad; subscriptions and individual sales of the Party's official organ, *The Black Panther;* fund-raising activities sponsored by sympathizers and supporters; sales of recordings of interviews and speeches; and financial aid from radicals and extremists.

According to the press, there is reason to believe that the Panthers, to obtain additional funds, are engaging in criminal activities, such as burglaries and robberies.

VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS

Panther Party leaders insist their primary aim is to serve the "people," meaning ghetto blacks. To establish good intent, Party officials have set up a series of community services aimed at recruiting members and sympathizers and building Party influence in ghetto areas. These programs, described by the Panthers as "socialistic" programs, are supposed to be carried out by all Party branches and include: "liberation schools" to give "our people a knowledge of self"; free health clinics, with money, medical supplies and professional services donated by laymen and professionals in the community; free clothing programs, with clothing donated by the community; Community Information Centers, to "answer the basic needs of the people"; and a monthly free shuttle bus service for families of blacks in prison. Few of these programs actually are carried out, and those that have been attempted have been mostly unsuccessful.

The program that has received the most publicity is the "breakfast program," devised as a further means of indoctrinating Negro youth in Panther teachings of racism and rebellion. As expressed in *The Black Panther*, June 14, 1969, "The youth we are feeding will surely feed the revolution." Breakfasts are held for ghetto children either at churches, housing projects, Panther Community Information Centers, or other space that can be obtained free of charge. Panthers usually ask local businessmen to donate food or money to this program, boycotting stores that refuse to participate. At these functions, children have been known to sing such chants as: "I am a revolutionary. I am a revolutionary. There's going to be some barbecue if Huey's not set free. Power to the people."

In 1969, Panther "Coloring Books" were printed and given out at these breakfasts. The books contained 22 pages of drawings teaching the children to distrust, hate, and kill police officers.


I am a Revolutionary
PEOPLE'S FREE SHOES PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE CLOTHING PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE FOOD PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE BUSING PROGRAM
EMORY

SURVIVAL PENDING REVOLUTION

HUEY TOLD ME THAT THE PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING REVOLUTION. BUT WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE REVOLUTION, HUEY SAYS, "WE THE PEOPLE ARE THREATENED WITH GENOCIDE, BECAUSE RACISM AND FASCISM ARE RAMPANT, NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD." HE SAYS, "WE INTEND TO CHANGE ALL THAT. BUT IN ORDER TO CHANGE IT, THERE MUST BE TOTAL TRANSFORMATION. BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THAT TOTAL TRANSFORMATION, WE MUST EXIST. IN ORDER TO EXIST, WE MUST SURVIVE; SO THEREFORE WE NEED A SURVIVAL KIT." SO THAT WE CAN GROW UP HEALTHY WITH A MIND THAT CAN BE FUNCTIONAL AND CREATIVE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
YOUR COMRADE IN ARMS

VII. TACTICS

The Black Panther Party is a violent revolutionary group whose members provoke confrontations with law enforcement officers and whose leaders incite racial hatred and preach urban guerrilla warfare.

Target: Police

Panthers claim that black communities are occupied by the police in the same way and for the same purpose that foreign troops occupy conquered territory and that these forces, operating under "establishment" orders, are engaged in gradual annihilation of the black race. Blacks, according to the Panthers, must, through urban guerrilla warfare, use guns to liberate themselves from the ever-present repressive enemy. Children in Panther "schools" do their exercises to the rhythm of: "There is a pig upon the hill – if you don't kill him the Panthers will."

Numerous claims have been made that the Black Panther Party is an innocent victim of police persecution and genocide. This charge is rendered absurd by fact. During 1970, 6 police officers were killed and 22 wounded through acts of violence traced to the Panthers. One officer, in 1969, was killed by a Panther with a shotgun blast at point-blank range as the officer lay wounded and helpless on the ground.

Out of 20 members named by the Panther Party as "killed in cold blood" by the police, four were killed by members of a rival black extremist group on the west coast; one died of barbiturate intoxication; one was shot and killed by a store owner during a robbery attempt; one was killed by his wife over a love affair he was having with a female Black Panther; and another was allegedly tortured and killed by Panther Party members. Of the remaining twelve, two were found dead on the street, the victims of unknown assailants, and ten were involved in shoot-outs with police officers.

Attacks on Others

Panther attacks have not been limited to the police. While claiming their intent to protect the black community, Panthers have assaulted and threatened citizens who have tried to assist the police.

Neighborhood stores have been forced to "contribute" food supplies and money under fear of Panther violence. Many other persons have also been victimized, as shown by the fact that in 1969 alone 348 Panther members were arrested for serious crimes, including murder, armed robbery, rape, bank robbery, and burglary.

On April 21, 1969, 21 members of the Black Panther Party were charged in New York in a 30-count indictment with conspiring to bomb public places and murder policemen and with possessing dangerous weapons.

Weapons Caches

Stockpiles of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, thousands of rounds of ammunition, Molotov cocktails, gunpowder, and accumulations of bayonets, swords, and machetes have been confiscated from Panther offices.

''Revolutionary Suicide''

On August 7, 1970, Superior Court Judge Harold Haley, the Deputy District Attorney, and three other persons were tied together with piano wire and dragged from a San Rafael, California, courtroom and taken as hostages by three armed Negro convicts, one of whom was standing trial for stabbing a San Quentin prison guard. The escapees were assisted by the defendant's 17-year-old brother who supplied them with weapons for the escapade. Judge Haley, who had a sawed-off shotgun taped to his neck, and the other hostages were forced into a waiting van. When the authorities tried to stop the kidnappers, the judge was brutally murdered; the Deputy District Attorney was injured seriously; and another hostage was slightly wounded. Three Negroes were slain and one was wounded.

Immediately thereafter, Huey Newton declared the killing of Judge Haley as being of ''historical'' importance to the Black Panther Party. This declaration was based on the Panther belief that all black prisoners, regardless of their crimes, are political prisoners and should be released.



OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT CRUISER INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6, 1968, GUNBATTLE WITH MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

CONFISCATED PANTHER WEAPONS

The perpetrators of the courtroom incident were lauded by the Panthers as setting another "revolutionary example for black people." In commenting further, *The Black Panther* of August 15, 1970, stated:

> *"The example that these brothers have set will be followed by many and many will rise to choose revolutionary suicide rather than reactionary suicide. Black people will unleash in great numbers the Black kamakazi..."*

In his eulogy at services for the slain Negroes, Newton said: "Our comrades have taught us all a revolutionary lesson. They have intensified the struggle and placed it on a higher level."

Panther "Justice"

Recalcitrant members of the Black Panther Party are sometimes victims of Panther "justice." As one example, Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was brought to trial in New Haven, Connecticut, for the torture-murder of Panther Alex Rackley. Rackley, a Panther suspected of being an informant, was scalded, murdered, and dumped in a swamp.

For a variety of reasons, many members have been purged from the Party. These incidents are usually written up in *The Black Panther* in special articles accompanied by photographs.

WASH ROOM
OLYMPICS
if you're not part of the solution... you're part of the problem.

PANTHER HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JUNE 4, 1969

EXPELLED

So let this be heard throughout the black community, of Atlantic City, New Jersey. That Leonard Weeks is no longer a servant of the people. That he is no longer the breakfast coordinator for this community center, or for that matter no center ran by the Black Panther Party. He has become slip-shod in his duties as a servant to the people, many times he has been warned by his comrades, about his work, and about his duty to the people's children. He deserted the children of the black community, there were days he would not attend the breakfast program, because he said that he was tired or that he overslept. Well we cannot adhear to this because as revolutionaries we must prepare ourselves to be a match for a hundred. We must prepare to run ourselves to death if need be, so that the people shall be served, and to see to it that they truly have a right to the best. And we have no time for slip-shod niggers. We must hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must confirm to the people's interest, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected, that is what being responsible to the people means.

WEEKS, EXPELLED

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Black Panther Party N.C.C.F.
Community Center
Atlantic City,

FOOLS RUSH IN

Harold Wright, number one fool in Pittsburgh, rushed out of here and into Baltimore.

HAROLD WRIGHT, FOOL

The National Committee to Combat Fascism has no time for crazy dumb fools who run around pimping off the people's just struggle for freedom and self-determination This modern day mad man can't seem to find himself or anything else for that matter. He started out, helping to put this office together and after a long train of was put out. Harold didn't like this and started to hang around our office trying to give the community the impression that he was still a member of the revolutionary ranks of Babylon.

After a few days of the breakfast program, his wife Michelle decided that she loved Harold more than the people and went with him.

We say goodbye to the Wright family and other love birds (like the Johnson's) who can't deal for the people.

So let this be heard, Harold and Michelle Wright are not members of the National Committe to Combat Fascism nor will these fools ever be.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

National
Committee to Combat Fascism
574 Brushton Ave.
Pittsburgh, Penn.
(412) 242-4728

The Black Panther,
June 20, 1970, p. 8.

VIII. PROPAGANDA

Although posters, pamphlets, recordings, and a singing group called "The Lumpen" are among propaganda vehicles used by the Black Panther Party, the main channel to the public is through their official organ, *The Black Panther*. Funds permitting, it is published weekly in Oakland, California. It includes editorials by Party leaders and spokesmen; provocative slogans; inflammatory articles; revolutionary art," comprising cartoons; and an international news section.

Excerpts from Article carrying
Typed Signature of Eldridge Cleaver.

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1970 PAGE 4

TO MY BLACK BROTHERS IN VIET NAM

I'm writing this on January 4, 1970. We are starting out a new year. On August 31, I'll be 35 years old. I'm married, and I have one child with another one on the way. I am in love with my wife and I would like to enjoy a happy life raising a family. But I am not free to live the type of life that I would like. Pigs--the racist fascist rulers of the United States--won't let me....

We appeal to you Brothers to come to the aid of your people. Either quit the army, now, or start destroying it from the inside. Anything else is a compromise and a form of treason against your own people. Stop killing the Vietnamese people. You need to start killing the racist pigs who are over there with you giving you orders. Kill General Abrahms and his staff, all his officers. Sabotage supplies and equipment, or turn them over to the Vietnamese people. Talk to the other Brothers and wake them up. You should start now weeding out the traitors amongst you. It is better to do it now than to allow them to return home to help the pigs wipe us out. Especially the Uncle Tom officers should be dealt with now, because the pigs will use them as effective tools against our people. When you can no longer take care of business inside the army, then turn yourself over to the Vietnamese people and tell them you want to join the Black Panther Party to fight for the freedom and liberation of your own people. If you do cross over, you don't have to worry about the Vietnamese people abusing you. They will be glad to see you drop out of the army because what they want most in life is to stop the fighting in their land. You have a duty to humanity as well as to your own people not to be used as murderous tools by racist pigs to oppress the people.

"IF YOU WANT PEACE YOU GOT TO FIGHT FOR IT"

There's too many American flags out here, and our Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, says that the American flag and the American eagle are the true symbols of fascism. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE. Black power to Black people, Brown power to Brown people, Red power to Red people, and Yellow power to Ho Chi Minh, and Comrade Kim Il Sung the courageous leader of the 40,000,000 Korean people....

We say down with the American fascist society. Later for Richard Millhouse Nixon, the
Later for all the pigs of the power structure. Later for all the people out here that don't want to hear me curse because that's all that I know how to do. That's all that I'm going to do. I'm not going to ever stop cursing, not only are we going to curse, we're going to put into practice some of the that we talk about. Because Richard Nixon is an evil man. This is the that unleashed the counter-insurgent teams upon the BPP. This is the man that's responsible for all the attacks on the Black Panther Party nationally. This is the man that sends his vicious murderous dogs out into the Black community and invade upon our Black Panther Party Breakfast Programs. Destroy food that we have for hungry kids and expect us to accept like that idly. that man. ***We will kill Richard Nixon. We will kill any that stands in the way of our freedom.*** *We ain't here for no goddamned peace, because we know that we can't have no peace because this country was built on war. And if you want peace you got to fight for it.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

Photograph accompanying Article indicated these are the Words of Chief of Staff, David Hilliard.
THE BLACK PANTHER, November 22, 1969, p. 10.

Editorials

Through editorials, readers are advised of Party positions on national and international issues and are presented with the opinions of the hierarchy on inter-Party matters.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1971 PAGE 2

STATEMENT BY HUEY P. NEWTON, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE, ON THE OCCASION OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY- MARCH 5, 1971

Power to the People, Brothers and Sisters,

First of all I would like to thank all of you for my very presence here, because if it weren't for the Power of the People, I wouldn't be here tonight. I'm not here because of the Black Panther Party; I'm not here because of any group, I'm not here because of a group of kamakazis. I'm here because of the Power of the People.

We must remember that Revolution is a process. It's not a conclusion; because once we conclude, then we become counter-revolutionary. And that means even with the gun in our hands, because fascism also has a gun. And I would like to say tonight that the Black Panther Party stands against all forms of fascism, including sexual fascism. That we are against all kinds of chauvinism, including racial chauvinism; we're against sexual chauvinism, national chauvinism. We're intercommunalists. Before I went to prison, most of you know, you are aware, that I never made any speeches, you see, because I'm not a very eloquent man. I'm better known by the actions. And the Party was built upon the actions. And the action itself is a process. And we're not ever fixated. We haven't accepted any dogma. And we will not.

And I would like to say this, that from now on the Party itself will be better known by its contributions to the People, for the simple reason that some people around us seem to want to be known through the Media. But the Party can only judge itself through establishing certain survival programs, pending Revolution. Because remember, you make the Revolution. We can't free political prisoners, only the people can free political prisoners. And a people who are not free cannot free their prisoners, cannot free the prisoners that fascism makes. So I would like to say that we must work very hard in order to lift the consciousness of the people. We must free our Chairman Bobby Seale, Angela Davis, Ruchell Magee, the Soledad Brothers, the seven and the three, and all other political prisoners. Randy. We have to free all of them.

But we must remember that we must exhaust every possible tactic. And we must let it be known that never broadcast military tactics for military reasons. It's perfectly correct to broadcast military tactics for political reasons. That's what Uncle Ho said, and I agree with him. So we would like for the people to know that there are many things that we will not discuss in public. But what you can do is watch the fruits of our work. And we would like to say that our Party became an intercommunal Party upon its actions. And I think that's very good. So I'm asking you in order to free all political prisoners, free the people, free the woman and also the man, that we have to get together in unity by substituting verbal expressions for action. The final test of the pie is the action. We'll stand on the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party from 1966 when it was formed will stand on its record, will stand on the action. We won't claim to be ultra-leftists; we won't claim to be infantile leftists. What we'll do is act in accordance with the particular set of conditions and the particular problem that we have at a time. So please judge us upon our actions and we will develop like that. We will not develop with lip service coming from anyone. And sometimes I'm very thankful that I don't talk too well, because that's only one way of communication. We say that a picture is worth a thousand words, but action is supreme.

But what kind of action you take will depend upon the particular set of conditions. And I say all of this, because you know the Party and the world today is under turmoil. And this is very good. We always have welcomed all forms of contradictions. Because without the contradiction there is no transformation. So from the contradiction that has developed now in the world and in the Party, we hope to have a qualitative leap. If this leap eliminates some of us, then, of course, we'll weep for that. But we must not stop the Revolution. I will not stop the Revolution. You should not stop it. And, for all that it's worth, we know that words will never stop it. Words will not start the Revolution either. Only action. 'Sixty-six kicked off the armed manifestation of Revolution in this country, because it focused upon the need for the People not only to defend themselves, but also to develop a consciousness necessary to perform and to act to be able to fight in a protracted war. And that is why it is necessary for us to develop the correct ideology, which is a system of thinking. And we must not rely upon and conclude with the philosophy, which isn't necessarily a conclusion.

So we're ideologically revolutionists. We're in a constant state of change. And we fight with all people who want to change, because we know change will offer our hope. So after all of this, we must pay more attention to what is happening. The news media has attempted to discredit the Party by saying that it's over, because they don't see anyone. I think our programs are better than the Party. The communities are involved in forty-four cities. We must support these; we must expand them. Because I read an article, recently, a few months ago, where Che had some problems in Bolivia, because the peasants were so unconscious until he could not rally them even with the "focos". They did not understand why the military, the regular military was dropping. So what did he do. He attempted to form certain programs that he called survival programs. He attempted to form a free health program in order to get the peasants inside, to help them, and also to provide things for his focos. He also took to form a free breakfast program, a free shoe factory, and a sporting good store (for obvious reasons). So programs are good. Because an act that might be revolutionary might be counter-revolutionary, if the correct preparations are not made.

So to be a serious revolutionist, we must know that we are involved in a process, and not a set of principles or conclusions that are of face-value revolutionary. I do not know one thing that is revolutionary in itself. And all things might be revolutionary in context. In other words, capitalism was revolutionary when it kicked out feudalism. And now we have a situation where the capitalists have become the imperialists, and the people of the world, of the communities of the world will have to kick them out. So in order to free Angela, Bobby, Ruchell Magee and all other political prisoners, we must kick the fascists out. And we cannot do it with lip service.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

BOBBY SEALE: "I AM THE CHAIRMAN OF ONLY ONE PARTY."

March, 1971

This is Brother Bobby Seale, from the New Haven Courthouse, back in jail, back here. And I just wanted to say to the people, the masses of people, to all the brothers and sisters, Women's Liberation Movement, Black brothers and sisters, Chicano brothers, the Puerto Rican brothers, the young revolutionary White youth in America, and especially, all the Black brothers and sisters in the Black community, that I've seen a lot of things happening; and I've took time to analyse what's happening. And I see presently that there're some divisionary , counter-revolutionary actions going on. Now the Party accepts constructive criticism. Constructive criticism! But the divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions and jive tactics of Eldridge Cleaver is doing nothing but aiding the pig power structure. Aiding the pig power structure in their attempt to put in gas chambers and jails over 130 political prisoners, who are presently, like myself and Ericka, caught up in these jails, and are being railroaded to the gas chamber, where we're fighting for our lives in these trials. And this is the only thing that Eldridge's actions are doing. This is the only thing that I can see that is going on. And my analysis shows this.

There is no split in the Black Panther Party, at all. But the main thing that we want to get across, I want to get across, to the people is that the Party is based on Survival Programs to serve the people, and these survival programs - from Breakfast for Children to the recent programs that I'm designing right here in jail, in my time that I'm not in court, which is a decent housing fit for shelter of human beings program - these are survival programs - and this program and all other programs that all other revolutionary organizations have are survival programs, that must sustain the people so the people can wage a revolutionary struggle.

And Eldridge Cleaver, who's denouncing these types of programs and carrying on with all those other divisionary jive tactics, is negating the real meaning of a People's revolutionary struggle. That's why the Black Panther Party belongs to the people, because the survival programs come forth, and we set up the survival programs to sustain the people's revolutionary struggle. Even the Vietnamese people, if one would check it out, have their survival programs; they have their cooperative, functional survival programs throughout their land, amongst their people. The people just don't have guns alone fighting their battle. The people over there have actual everyday, functional, constructive survival programs. In their countries, in their lands, and in their everyday operations in fighting the capitalist pigs who occupy their country, they have survival programs. And those survival programs sustain the revolutionary struggle there. Of course, our survival programs will be directly related to here in America. But I, myself, send solidarity and support to all the socialistic, revolutionary peoples of the world, and the socialistic countries and lands - and the different war zones, where the people, the masses in those lands, are fighting against the capitalistic, imperialistic ruling class circles.

And Eldridge Cleaver - who negates the very survival programs that the Party is trying to set forth, that the Central Committee is trying to set forth, and all the real dedicated, hard-working brothers in the Party are trying to set forth to educate the people and serve the people, these survival programs (that) sustain the people's

to the gas chambers. He's aiding the power structure and causing us to be in the prisons, because the political prisoners are the ones who really initiate and work hard to maintain the survival programs for the revolution, the people's revolutionary struggle.

Only the masses of the people can really free political prisoners. And the people must see the value and the validity of the survival programs. And getting on down to it, so the people can understand where it's at, so that the people, even the supporters that we have all over Europe, all the solidarity committees that are in Europe, that're in Sweden, that are in Denmark, and other countries over there, who support the freedom of political prisoners in this country, who support the survival programs of the poor oppressed people in this country, and the revolutionary movement (who are initiating these programs), I am trying myself to get people to understand, that we are beautifully behind them and we are glad and send greetings to them and praise the people who are in the solidarity committees in other countries, and in fact here in America, here in Ameri-KKK-a. I think that the people really have to understand who and what the Black Panther Party is, so that these reactionary, counter-revolutionary, divisionary tactics will not be misunderstood. The Party is not falling apart. It's just that Eldridge Cleaver has personally defected his own self from the Party. He defected from the Party.

And I, Bobby Seale, am the Chairman of only one Party. And that Party is the Party that Brother Huey P. Newton is the Minister of Defense of and one of the supreme, top servants of the people; that Brother David Hilliard is the Chief of Staff of; that Brother June Hilliard is the Assistant Chief of Staff of; that Bobby Hutton was a member of, before the pigs murdered him. I am the Chairman of only one Party, that Brother Fred Hampton, who loved the survival programs for the people, was Deputy Chairman of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, who Brothers Jonathan Jackson and George Jackson are members of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party, with Huey, David, and the rest of the brothers and sisters on the Central Committee, where the Central Headquarters happens to be located on Peralta Street in Oakland, (California). So All Power to the People. Right On. And we're going to stick together. We ain't coming up with no jive. We have to free Brothers Ruchell Magee, George Jackson; we have to free Sister Angela Davis; we have to free these brothers and sisters. I am the Chairman of only one Party, the Party that Brother Huey is the Minister of Defense, with David Hilliard, June Hilliard, etc. And we're going to free political prisoners; and, we're going to keep these survival programs going; and, we're going to wage a People's revolutionary struggle, and not no jive, individualistic, defecting actions, by some individual who wants to play power games. I am the Chairman of the Party of which the San Quentin Cadre is apart and parcel of the same Party. The San Quentin Cadre of the Black Panther Party.

So all I have to say to the people is that you know where it's at. We're going to stick in solidarity. There're a bunch of jive renegades and jack-a-napes around. But later for that. Just later for that. Let that ride, cause we got survival to get on with, and a People's revolution to mobilize. And we got political prisoners to free all over this land.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
RIGHT ON!

Inflammatory Articles

Many of the articles in *The Black Panther* are written by local Party members and concern regional incidents and issues. They are aimed at provoking national black sympathy and joint retaliation for magnified grievances against the authorities.



RACIST-MAD PIGS SIC K9 POLICE DOG ON BROTHER

On Friday night, March 27, 1970, 14 yr. old Brother John (Little Hot-Rod) Hargrove became the victim of a brutal attack inflicted by a K9 Police dog. This brother along with two other bloods were playfully chasing each other along the sidewalk in the area of Sixth and Snyder Streets. When the brothers approached the corner, one brother ran past brushing against a lady standing at the corner. When this happened the lady immediately grabbed the brother. The two other bloods kept running. Soon after the pig grabbed the brother, a light colored station wagon appeared. In the station wagon were two plain clothes pigs. These pigs immediately proceeded to hand-cuff the blood, beat him in the face, and unleash a vicious police dog that ripped the flesh off the brother's body. As the brother tried to escape the blows of the pig beating him in the face, the K9 proceeded to bite him all over his body. While the brother was being beaten by the pig, and attacked by the dog, the other pigs who came along proceeded to chase the other two bloods. The pigs fired a shot barely missing the fore-head of one of the brothers.

Little Hot-Rod, handcuffed, face badly beaten and suffering from dog bites all over his body, was taken to the local police station where he was booked on suspicion of pick-pocketing. He did not receive any medical attention until several hours later at the Philadelphia General Hospital; there they gave him one tetnus shot and put a bandage on each leg. The pig who created the vicious attack was later identified as one of Rizzo's faggot law and order boys of the GRANNY PATROL. The Granny Patrol is a special segment of piggery which employs pigs to dress up as women so that they can arrest suspected pick-pockets.

The party conducted an interview with the bloods who were fortunate enough to get away, we also spoke with the brother's parents, and were able to visit the brother, at the Youth Study Center. We also spoke with the people in the community who witnessed the horrid incident!

Following are excerpts from the tapes which describe the incident. We cannot use names here of the bloods because it has been passed down that the pigs are trying to round up the other brothers.

The racist pigs approached the brothers by shouting "Get them niggers, get them niggers" They chased the bloods with butcher knives, and what appeared to be an ax. One brother was hit with a pipe in the stomach.

People in the community responded to the arrest and attack angrily. When several people in the community demanded that the pigs call off the dog, they were met with racist remarks from the pigs.

The attack was so vicious, the dog ate the underwear on the brothers body. In addition to bites on the brothers hands, legs and waist the dog also bit the brother in the back and rectum. The brother suffered from severe beatings by the pigs, in the face.

When Little Hot-Rod was visited on Sunday at the Youth Study Center, his body was not healing properly. He related that the nurse only applies mercurochrome on the bites. He is suffering from soreness. He is sleeping on hard cots in the over-crowded center. The bites on his body are swollen and inflamed. The brother's first remarks to his family were, "Tell my probation officer to get me out of here, this place is like Byberry" .

Just less than two weeks ago, the brother was beaten in a cell Division. This pig beat him so bad that Methodist Hospital complained to the Police Department. His eyes were badly damaged. The pig's name who inflicted that beating was Juvenile Aid Officer, Charles Kora. Hot-Rod identified Kora as his assailant and since then, he has been harrassed in his neighborhood by every pig who comes through.

At 14, John Hargrove is a marked victim of Frank Rizzo's fascists, like so many other Black youths in this city. Pigs are on the loose to inflict more physical harm to our people. It is high time that we escalate our war on the pigs and drive them out of our communities.

Seize The Time people of Philadelphia, Rizzo and all of his racist paper tigers can be rightously blown away.

Rosemari Mealy
Philadelphia Branch
Black Panther Party

THE BLACK PANTHER, APRIL 18, 1970, P. 9.

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY BOMBED, HEROES SUCCESSFULLY ESCAPE



Newburyport, Mass. is a small residental New England town basically composed of people from the White working class. Until last Saturday, September 19, Newburyport's only claim to fame was that it is one of the many small towns surrounding Boston which are strongholds for groups like the Minutemen and other right-wing fascist reactionaries. Last Saturday, however, at 6:00 a.m. in the morning a National Guard Armory was bombed, hundreds of rounds of ammunition ripped off, military personnel records taken and to top it off, they left the scene in a one ton army pick-up truck. They (the bombers) attempted to open the vault holding the weapons of the pig army, M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols and .30 caliber sniper carbines, but were not able to do so. The act was accomplished in one fast motion, and the heroes escaped capture and one week later, "law enforcement officials" are still scratching their heads in wonderment.

And although the weapons, themselves, tools of our liberation were not liberated from the oppressor, the success of this action cannot be denied.

As has been the case in liberation movements all over the world, the guns and arms made by and for the oppressor eventually ends up in the hands of the oppressed. More important, the unknown people who accomplished this act, obtained hundreds of rounds of desperately needed ammunition. Again, past experiences has shown that while the guns themselves can be obtained in ample supply, the ammunition, the bullets, that actually inflicts death upon our enemy, becomes very scarce. One of the necessities of our struggle is our ability to liberate, stockpile, and then accurately use the ammunition of our oppressor upon our oppressor.

As for the military personnel records, they can obviously be put to good use. Our oppressors must be harassed and intimidated day and night. They must not sleep, nor rest, these are the devils who plot the genocide of Black people. The National Guard Armory in the small town of Newburyport, like other small time towns surrounding the Black colony in Boston is designed to be used against us in the fascist genocidal plot devised by the treacherous minds of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell clique. It is to be carried out by those men whose names and addresses are now in the hands of the people. Unknown members of the fascist majority now appear before the people's tribunal and will be judged according to their actions.

This action is just one of many blows which will be dealt out to the oppressor. If this action was intended to help and serve the people, we welcome their help to our just liberation struggle against the Babylonian Empire.

ARM YOURSELF

Michael·Fultz
Boston Chapter
Black Panther Party

SISTER MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY RENT-A-PIG

FIVE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE RAILROADED BY TUCSON GRAND JURY

STORM TROOPERS INVADE COMMUNITY

THREE PIGS BEAT FIFTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK YOUTH

ENTIRE FAMILY BEATEN AND JAILED

Another regular feature in *The Black Panther* is a weekly article giving detailed instructions for the handling of firearms, or setting forth deportment for urban guerrilla warfare.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 9, 1970 PAGE 16

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS HOW TO COMBAT C.M.I.

Part 5

The principal of Juche (Self-Reliance) clarified by Eldridge Cleaver, the Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, is "Use what you got to get what you need." To answer the question of how do you combat the pigs' *C.M.I. (communication, mobility* and information), we must first determine what we have going for ourselves. Checking out the practice of self-defense groups, we see that we have the power to determine what is to happen, when it is to happen and how it is supposed *to go down. What, When* and How (W.W.H.)- the element of surprise. The pigs have C.M.I. and self-defense groups have W. W. H.

To consider a self-defense operation successful is not to just *plan and execute but to plan,* execute AND escape. There have been too many instances where members of self-defense groups have planned and executed righteous blows against this racist system only to be captured, wounded or *killed. These are the consequences* for revolutionary activity, however we must keep casualties within an acceptable minimum. The *slogan must be Maximum Damage* to the Enemy, Minimun Damage to Us. Practice has shown that when planning W.W.H. if it is done with knowledge and an understanding of C.M.I. casualties will be kept within an acceptable minimum. *Too often, much attention* is given to a plan up to the point of execution without giving the same attention to evasion and escape, that phase of the operation that determines success. This is a subjective approach, a onesided *approach. W.W.H. is only* one side of the coin, C.M.I. is the other side. Because self-defense groups use W.W.H., the pigs' C.M.I. does not go into operation until a self-defense group commits itself by actually executing some type of *self-defense activity.*

COMMUNICATION

MOBILITY

INFORMATION

All of us should be aware that once C.M.I. is activated pigs start showing on the set from 30 seconds to 1 minute maximum in every *major city in Babylon, therefore* the success or failure of a defense operation is dependent upon the attention given to C.M.I. and the planning of evasion and escape. As I see it, learning to deal with the pigs' C.M.I. is the number one *military problem* facing revolutionary forces in Babylon today. It is time for all who have something to teach, by example, to step forward. And remember, to die honorably, one does not need company.

USE WHAT YOU GOT TO GET WHAT YOU NEED

D.C.

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

Part 6 ON REVOLVERS

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been in previous issues of the Black Community News Service. This article is on revolvers, it gives a basic run down on the use of revolvers. Check out all of the photographs and notes to help you understand better the functioning of a revolver.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS:

1. Check to see if gun is loaded. You do this on a revolver by swinging out the cylinder. Pull back on the cylinder latch and gently push *out on the cylinder. (see unloading* a revolver photo #2)

2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless practicing trigger squeeze or firing.

3. Point your gun away from where someone may be shot-Point at the ceiling or to the floor, but wherever you point, make sure no one is in the way and can be harmed.

4. Never leave the hammer cocked on a revolver. (Explanation later on cocking a revolver.)

KINDS OF REVOLVERS:

.38 Snubnose - This gun has only a 2" barrel and shoots 38's. It is very easy to conceal.

.38 Special - Has a 4" barrel and shoots 38's.

.357 Magnum - This is the type of handgun the pig carries. The ammo for this is .357 magnum. Metal piercing bullets will pierce an engine block. This is the best type of revolver to have.

.41 and .44 Magnums - Have more knock down power than a .357 Magnum. The Highway Patrol carries these to shoot through car doors, but a .357 will go through a car door also and .357 ammunition is more plentiful.

PARTS OF A REVOLVER: PHOTO # 1

REVOLVER TERMS

UNLOADING:

Holding gun in left hand (pointed in safe direction) release cylinder latch with right hand. (#3). Push out cylinder with the fingers of left hand (#2). Now that you *have swung out the cylinder* and the bullets are visible you gently push down on the extractor and let bullets drop out into your right hand (#4).

LOADING:

To load, simply follow the same steps in unlatching the cylinder. Then drop bullets into the chambers of your cylinder. Gently push cylinder closed, and you are ready to fire. DO NOT SLAM CYLINDER CLOSED, this causes *extra wear on your gun.*

COCKING A REVOLVER:

Put the tip of your thumb on the hammer holding revolver steady in the palm of your hand. Do not put your finger in the trigger. Pull straight back steadily on your hammer spur until your hammer locks back. You gun is ready to *fire, do not put your finger in* the trigger until you are ready to fire. After cocking hammer, place your thumb directly on the frame beside the hammer, resting the tip of your thumb on the cylinder latch. (Photo #4)
Your forefinger should be placed on the other side of the gun straight out just above the trigger guard until ready to fire. Everytime you cock the hammer before firing, this is called single action firing.

PHOTO # 2

UNCOCKING A REVOLVER (LOADED):

Keep your finger off the trigger! With gun already cocked, place your thumb on the hammer firmly. Now with the gun firmly in your hand, pointed in a safe direction, *and* thumb firmly on the hammer (still cocked) squeeze the trigger slowly until you can feel the hammer releasing. IMMEDIATE-

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

LOADING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 3

COCKING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 4

URBAN GUERILLAS

America's complexity will be her downfall, for complex power, communications and transportation networks are unprotected. These systems are the life lines of the industrial and military might of U.S.A. fascism. The source of America's strength is its vulnerable Achilles heel-therefore urban guerrillas, utilizing and relying on information divulged by sympathetic workers, can halt or severely cripple every industry in the nation, and bring fascism crashing to its knees. The dams, power stations, substations and power lines are vulnerable. Highly sophisticated communications networks are used by our enemies for carrying out routine business, and are an extremely important factor, in the fascist reaction to guerilla strikes. The neutralization of the fascist communications lie within the capabilities of urban guerillas.

The disruption of this system would hamper and cripple not only the fascist military but would also effect all industrial outputs. The fascist ruling clique realizes the vunerability of their transportation networks, yet all fascist military forces and industry utilize the railways, the state and interstate highway systems and the airports. Urban guerillas can cut and constantly harass these important links.

Urban guerilla teams highly motivated have already begun to put their theory into practice. Lists are being compiled and are constantly updated on fascist and all enemies of our people, because the location and identification of the enemy is an extremely vital task of urban guerillas. This basic intelligence is necessary for planning retaliatory strikes against our enemies. Where their killer groups, for the most, will be unable to locate guerillas, urban guerillas will, in every attack hit the fascist squarely on the chin. Urban guerillas, being one with the people, must attack like skilled brain surgeons--cutting out the diseased tissue while perserving the good. Their dual purpose is that of destroying all fascist forces and their lackeys, while protecting and serving our people. The fascist ruling clique fears this. They know the Party is preparing to fight until the last of our enemies bites the dust. The Party has dared to take the vanguard role in the struggle and will surely defeat U.S A. fascism no matter what the odds, no matter how great the sacrifice. The Party is aware that the fascists will never lay down their arms of their own accord. And also aware of the direction that U.S.A. fascism is taking in order to survive as long as possible.

In Brazil, the guerilla forces found through social practice that they could best achieve the goal of liberating their people from the strong-hold imposed by the fascist Brazilian oligarchy by waging urban guerilla warfare. Brazil's development as an industrial fascist nation and the economic and social backwardness of the indigenous peasants made the revolutionary forces adapt the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare. The urban guerrillas moved to mobilize the workers, and implement urban guerrilla warfare within the context of their historical experiences with the working class and the fascist ruling class oligarchy. The revolutionary forces have implemented this type of struggle which invariably catches the fascists with their pants down. The type of warfare which turns the asphalt concrete and steel of cities into jungles; into cemeteries for the fascist highly mechanized units and turns his weapons of mass slaughter into paper tigers; into urban jungles where the revolutionary forces can plunge the blade into the hilt in the vunerable life lines of even fascist U S.A In this country as well as in Brazil the fascists tremble with dread at the thought of nationwide attacks by urban guerrilla forces.

In the Pentagon and select centers scattered throughout the U S A., gigantic multimillion dollar computers are manned by hoards of the military. Technicians wrestle with fascism's nightmare-the problem of dealing with urban guerrillas. These machines can only reach an hypothesis drawn from information fed into them. In order for the fascists to test the solutions offered by the computer. they must first circumvent

the frail facade of the constitution and the bill of rights. The fascists realize that if these two pieces of paper were implemented they would be in their graves tonight because the constitution and the bill of rights contain the moral impetus necessary to bring this foul evil economic and social system to its doom.

U S.A. fascists have compiled and are still evaluating information received from South American satellite states who are being beset by courageous urban guerrillas waging relentless struggle with amazing(to fascists)and stunning success. Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, has said that we still have a little time left because the U.S.A fascist ruling clique hasn't programmed all of the people to accept the genocide of the Party and our people yet. For at least a year now, there have appeared in every major newspaper, seemingly innocent space fillers. Articles from UPI-API dealing with the deployment of fascist death squads against the revolutionary forces in South America.

These fillers had the sinister purpose of preparing America for the advent of death squads now in operation in every major urban center. These articles were to prepare the people to accept the first overt actions of the Chicago foul fascist gestapo killer unit. Their predawn kill all--destroy all mission was launched as a pilot, an experimental operation with a two fold objective. One was to put counter-revolutionary theory into practice in America --to bring into the streets the fascist ruling clique's solution to the Party--to test and evaluate the techniques of counter-insurgency urban warfare. The second important objective was to evaluate the response of the people to above ground counter-insurgency killer groups--to see if the people were conditioned to accept the outright fascist terror tactics directed officially by the fascist ruling clique.

Our Party has been and is still the main target of a national dehumanizing campaign. The fascist controlled news media has consistently maligned, viciously attacked and branded our Party as a racist band of blood-thirsty murderers out for their own personal gain. The fascist news media seeks to justify the fascist's program of destroying our people's first line of defense, the Party, and all other organizations which refuse to be either bought off with blood money or intimidated by the repressive fascist forces. The fascist attempts to isolate our Party from the people has been a dismal failure. The liquidation of Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark had top priority on the fascist's pig list. However, neither the people nor our Party were cowed or intimidated by the bestial slaying of these two revlutionaries. The fascist ruling clique made a grave error in underestimating the will of the people and our Party. People from all walks of life and every progressive organization saw through the fascist attempts to isolate and destroy their Party. The people mobilized and rallied mass support for the Party and soundly condemned the actions of Chicago's fascist killer groups.

REVOLUTIONARY HANDIWORK OF THE URBAN GUERILLA

Make trouble, fail, make trouble, fail again until their doom. This is the logic of fascists the world over. In Chicago, they refused to acknowledge the bankruptcy of their counter-insurgency campaign. In December, in Los Angeles, Southern California, Chapter of our Party, came under attack by fascist killer groups. Although outnumbered and using inferior weapons, our Party repelled and held at bay the fascist shock troops and sounded the end of Chicago type operations in a fuselage of bullets. We learned valuable lessons paid for with the blood of our revolutionary comrades. The fascist ruling clique has seen the support, that their homicidal raids have generated for the Party. They now know that if conditions are favorable, they will receive tit for tat and then some. They now know that Black and all progressive people will not sit idly by and pacify the action of above ground killer groups Fascists have tried to rally the support of the American people to their avowed aims and failed.

Now begins the phase of underground, clandestine operation of fascist directed killer groups. This is all part of the nature of the fascist ruling clique. The fascists will no doubt expand the techniques of their South American lackeys who operate unrestricted, unswayed by either democratic institutions or public opinion. As the tempo of the struggle increases so will the fascist acts of reactionary terror and violence increase. The primary target of forming clandestine kill groups will be both our people and our Party. If we are to survive as a people, this next phase of attacks, and pave the way to victory, it is imperative that our people be armed with the ideology of the Party. For only then will our people be able to cope with, both, ideological and physical attacks initiated by the insane fascist ruling clique. Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, said that our Party must be a living shield that stands between our people and the fascist pigs and that our paper should serve to educate our people so that they will survive.

As the attacks against the Party escalate, so must the awareness of our people be channelled toward acceptance and even more, active participation in urban guerrilla warfare. Phase two of the fascist plans will surely and soundly be defeated. The fascists will awake to find themselves bogged down on that last front. They will be swallowed up in the morass of a people's war. Their graves will be dug by revolutionary urban guerrilla forces amidst the asphalt, concrete and steel of the cities.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEFEAT U S.A FASCISM ON EVERY FRONT

WE'LL ALL BE TOGETHER ON THE DAY OF VICTORY

Randy Williams,
Political Prisoner

Provocative Slogans

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE TIME SEIZES YOU!

AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE IS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL

BLOOD TO THE HORSES BROW AND WOE TO THOSE WHO CANNOT SWIM!

DARE TO STRUGGLE...DARE TO WIN!

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS



FOR EVERY PORK CHOP THERE IS A FRYING PAN!

"Revolutionary Art"

The most prominent artist on *The Black Panther* staff is Minister of Culture Emory Douglas. Although he prepares a large number of cartoons, other Panther artists are also represented. These cartoons characterize the Government and local law enforcement as "pigs" and call for the overthrow of the Government and the killing of Government officials, as well as police officers.



THE REVOLUTIONARY ARTIST

When the Black revolutionary artist starts a still life painting, he doesn't see a beautiful vase, or a dish of tasty fruit, against a soft velvet backdrop...he sees only a tattered curtain, rusty cans, a broken dish--empty.

As he seeks out a beautiful landscape to paint, he sees not fertile fields with dancing flowers, and lovely maidens bathing in the sun, but decaying houses, and streets covered with debris, and a Black woman in ragged clothes with tear-stained cheeks.

The Black revolutionary artist knows only oppression, and that his art must relate to his surroundings, and his people, and most of all, his art cannot be abstract and unrelated to his revolutionary people. So he seeks, and finds what our Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton calls "the spirit of the people." As he moves on that, he shows what Revolutionary Artist and Minister of Culture, Emory Douglas shows--"the oppressor *hanging by his heels.*"

The revolutionary artist gives his art to his oppressed people. So with his gun and his brush he shows the spirit of the people moving to crush the oppressor, and this is the essence of revolutionary art. His art then becomes part of the people's revolution.

He knows that only because of the urine covered walls and trash-littered alleys the people's desire for freedom will be replaced with *the BLOOD OF THE OPPRESSOR.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Malik Barafu
N.C.C.F.,
Washington, D.C.

The Black Panther; May 9, 1970; page 18

TO ALL REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS

I would like to take this time to express on behalf of the Black Panther Party our warmest thanks to all revolutionary artists who have given their talents and thoughts to the people through revolutionary art. We would like to say that every artist's work that has appeared in the Black Panther Newspaper this past year has been a great contribution of visual interpretation of the ideology of the Black Panther Party and of the oppressed people of the world.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS
Emory Douglas
Minister of Culture
Black Panther Party


1971 YEAR OF THE YOUTH
YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION
DEATH
TO THE
FASCIST
PIGS
EMORY

EVERY DOOR THAT THE FASCISTS ATTEMPT TO KICK DOWN WILL PUT THEM DEEPER INTO THE PIT OF DEATH



SHOOT TO KILL

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIG



THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 3, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 17, 1970, P. 16




Only the power of the people can free political prisoners
PIG

THE BLACK PANTHER
MARCH 20, 1971, P. 4

We will not hesitate to kill
or die for our freedom.


TIER 3
"O" WING
RALPH

THE BLACK PANTHER
FEBRUARY 6, 1971, P. 5

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 2, 1970 PAGE 13


OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
U.S. GOVT.
EMORY

International News

Panthers profess to believe that American Negroes comprise isolated "colonies" in the heart of the "mother" country, and are part of the Third World, defined as the nonwhite, undeveloped, and underdeveloped countries of the world. The 10-Point Program of the Black Panther Party includes, as a major political objective, a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony to determine the national destiny of American Negroes.

To internationalize their Party and enlarge their importance, Panther leaders have sought acceptance, support, and funds from sources abroad. They have made numerous trips to foreign countries, including Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Palestine, Germany, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Chinese Mainland.

Both at home and abroad, Panther leaders loudly proclaim anti-American sentiments and align themselves politically with the aims and tactics of enemy lands. The international contacts most important to the Panthers are made with revolutionary groups and communist countries, especially those that more closely follow Maoist thinking. The international news section of *The Black Panther* reflects attempts by the Black Panther Party to attract such attention, support, and aid.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1970 PAGE 8

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG
PREMIER OF THE CABINET
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA

June 25th marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S. imperialist aggressive invasion of the DPRK in 1950.

The Black Panther Party takes this occasion to salute the DPRK and the wise and brave leader of the 40 million Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung.

We recognize and respect the long history of resistance and victory that Comrade Kim Il Sung and the 40 million Korean people have contributed to the world wide struggle against imperialism and fascism; the shining examples of socialist construction while under severe conditions of U.S. provocation and aggression, the many brilliant ideological contributions you have made to the socialist camp and in particular the concept of "Juche".

Because of our historical experience in America; because we are faced with no alternatives but genocide or liberation we understand the criminal nature and gangster logic of the U.S. ruling class. Black people are increasingly the victims of overt military aggression and U.S. plots to subvert our struggle for national salvation. Under these conditions we have an increasing awareness that the expulsion of the U.S. imperialist burglars from Korean soil and the reunification of Korea will be a victory for the Korean people and a victory for oppressed people the world over.

We see clearly that the reunification of Korea is not seperate from the salvation of Black and other oppressed people in fascist America. As gang boss Nixon and his mob of criminals intensify their attempts to loot Asia they are intensifying their murderous repression of Black people in America. These attacks will be met with revolutionary solidarity manifested in action, both around the world and in the gangsters lair, and with one-beat-a-hundred fighters in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America; the U.S.A. will surely be brought to the peoples JUSTICE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
U.S.A.

INTERCOMMUNAL NEWS

MEMORANDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE ESCALATION OF THE U.S. WAR OF AGGRESSION IN LAOS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAO PROBLEM

PART II

Application Of The Nixon Doctrine And Escalation Of The War Of Aggression In Laos By The Nixon Administration

UNDER PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC OPINION, NIXON ON MARCH 6, 1970 HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE LOGISTIC AND AIR SUPPORT AND "OTHER ACTIVITIES" OF THE U.S. IN LAOS. He also admitted an increase in the U.S. military activities in Laos. But he tried to argue that those activities were "limited" and of a purely "defensive" character aimed at protecting American lives in South Viet Nam.

But public opinion in the United States and in the world immediately pointed out that that was the first time the highest executive in the United States made an open acknowledgement of the violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos by the U.S. On March 7, Senator Albert Gore declared that Nixon in fact had conceded that "we (the U.S.) have violated the Geneva Agreements". Public opinion has condemned Nixon's allegations as "queer" and "selfcontradictory" (the Japanese paper "Asahi Shimbun" March 9. "Nixon's allegations were misleading. They mentioned only some facts and not everything and showed no sign of any change of policy." (Senators Scranton and Fulbright, March 6 and 9, 1970).



The Resistance government formed in 1950 against the French Colonialists.

Obivously, Nixon cannot dupe public opinion which bases its judgement not merely on the words but also on the deeds of the Nixon administration during the recent past.

After Nixon came to power, the so-called "Nixon doctrine on Asia" saw the light which consists in providing more U.S. advisers, weapons and firepower to the Asians, while the latter contribute more mercenaries for the U.S. The formula of this doctrine is "native soldiers plus U.S. advisers and maximum logistic and air support" This is in fact a more elaborate and more refined form of U.S. neo-colonialism's wicked policy of making Asians fight Asians, and natives fight natives.

The active application of that doctrine in Laos finds a concrete expression in the steps of escalation taken by the Nixon administration in its aggressive war in Laos during the past 18 months, escalation in the logistic supply, in the supply of U.S. military personnel and in the use of U.S. combat troops in the "special war".

Under the Nixon administration, the amount of U.S. aid to Laos and military personnel introduced into this country have increased at almost the same rate. Compared with the 140 million dollars in 1967, U.S. aid in 1969 rose to 250 million dollars of which only the economic and technical aid accounting for less than 60 million was announced, while the rest was almost exclusively used for military purposes. Thus, military aid - about 190 million dollars a year, - is more than treble the economic aid and makes up 80 per cent of the total aid. This figure is approximately the same as estimated by Senator A.J. Allender in a censured report on the scale of American involvement in the war in Laos (AF, Jan. 22 1970). It is necessary to note that what is described as "economic and technical" has also been used for secret activities of a military character. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna, Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, disclosed that the U.S. aid program also covers the CIA activities in Laos. At present, according to a statement of Senator M. Mansfield on September 21, 1969, U.S. aid in Laos had exceeded 300 million dollars a year and continued to increase.

Obviously, the Nixon administration is squandering in Laos more and more money of the American people, while serious social problems in the United States are yet unsettled, because enormous sums are being spent for unjust wars in Laos and in Indochina as a whole.

On March 6, 1970, Nixon said there were 643 advisers and military personnel out of the 1,040 Americans operating in Laos and denied the presence of any U.S. combat troops in Laos. That is not true. Compared with the 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos under the Johnson administration, the figure rose to 12,000 U.S. military personnel, with or without military uniform in the first period of the Nixon administration. Of them, there were at least 2,000 air force advisers, or 800 more than in 1967. The number of U.S. advisers assigned to the "special forces" training centres and regular units of the puppet army increased from 150 to 1,000 (according to a British source, the figure might be 2,000). The U.S. "special forces" operating in southern Laos are estimated at about 1,200 men. Thus there is one U.S. military adviser for every six Laos puppet soldiers (compared to the 70,000 men of the Vientiane army). In addition according to a statement of Senator R. Ottinger on April 24, 1970, at least half of the 48,000 U.S. air force personnel in Thailand (i.e. 24,000) are now directly participating in air activities in Laos. All told, the number of U.S. military men now taking part in military activities in Laos on the ground and in the air has run into tens of thousands at least equal to half of the total effectives of the Laos puppet army.

The running of the U.S. colossal war machine in Laos remains an affair of the U.S. embassy, Nixon's ambassador to Vietiane remains a military proconsul. The paper "France Soir", on March 3, 1970 said everything in Laos is controlled from the building of the U.S. embassy which houses the brain of the war machine. The number of army and air force military attaches of the U.S. embassy exceeds 200, an unusual figure for a foreign diplomatic mission in a country like Laos. The USAID agency in Laos is also operating within the framework of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vientiane and is working for the CIA. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna acknowledged that Laos is the only place where such things [illegible] did not approve it.

Of late some 1,300 U.S. "green berets" were introduced into Laos, whose command [illegible] (Thailand), U.S. [illegible] Vietnam on February 27, 1970 [illegible] number of U.S. "green berets" in Laos had exceeded that of U.S. military advisers in South Viet Nam in the past. [illegible] 1969 and early 1970, U.S. combat troops took part in ground attacks on the Plain of Jars area, Meng Khouang province. The U.S. magazine "Newsweek" on April 6, 1970 affirmed that the CIA office in [illegible] Viet Nam [illegible] d. Har[illegible].

With [illegible], there [illegible] been more [illegible] participating in the fighting [illegible]. On March 6, 1970, Senator Mansfield [illegible] Americans are fighting [illegible] "The fact that [illegible] wear uniforms does not [illegible] this one bit. The fact is that American combat troops [illegible] form have been fighting in Laos"

continued on next page



New textile factory at Sam-Neua

ON CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG'S DECLARATION OF 20 MAY, 1970

In this declaration, Chairman Mao Tse Tung has set forth a brilliant and timely analysis of the qualitatively new situation that exists in the world as a result of the treacherous new acts of aggression launched by the fascist, imperialist Nixon-

Chinesepeoples.

This declaration pulls together into clear focus the revolutionary struggles and the liberation struggles of the people of the whole world, including the revolutionary struggle of the American people themselves.

Speaking specifically for the Black Panther Party, but reflecting the sentiments of millions of oppressed people inside the United States, it has become crystal clear to us that rampant imperialist aggression on the international scale and vicious fascist repression on the domestic scale are the two faces of the criminal government of the United States and the calculated policy of the American ruling circles. For 400 years now, Black people inside the United States have been the long-suffering victims of fascist violence and repression. But under the Nixon-Pentagon clique, this reactionary violence and repression has been escalated to new heights of barbaric cruelty. At the same time, in order to put down the already gigantic and still growing mass movement among White Americans against the wreckless and sanguinary policies and imperialist adventures of the U.S. government, the cowardly Nixon-Pentagon clique has unleashed a bloodbath against the American people as a whole, creating for itself new enemies who have joined hands with those who were already determined to carry out a struggle to the bitter end against an economic, political, and social system that is dominated by the madmen in the Pentagon and that is responsible for the misery and bloodshed all over the world today.

Chairman Mao Tse Tung captures the truth of the situation when he points out the unprecedented isolation of the Nixon-Pentagon clique. Never before have these criminals been so exposed and isolated as they are today. And never before has it been so clear that this criminality can only be ended by the people rising up to seize their own destiny from the handfull of willful exploiters and murderers that now have the power in their hands.

Coupling a revolutionary call to arms with revolutionary optimism in the assurance of victory, Chairman Mao Tse Tung, the great leader of the Chinese Revolution, hero and teacher of the revolutionary people of the world, has performed an invaluable service to all mankind by stepping forward at this time to renew the people's indictment of the common enemy of us all--U.S. Fascism and Imperialist Aggression. These courageous words of Chairman Mao Tse Tung will give new heart to the peoples in their lonely and difficult struggles to throw off the shackles and chains of oppression now being held in place by U.S. Fascism and Imperialism.

Lastly, we wish to point out that only the enemies of the people and those who shirk their revolutionary duties and who are afraid of their own shadows will find fault with Chairman Mao Tse Tung's declaration. For our part, we welcome it, because we have learned, by shedding our blood, that only through relentless struggle, by resorting to arms inside the very house of U.S. Fascism and Imperialism itself, can we gain our freedom and liberation. This is what our experience has taught us and this is the faith that will sustain us as we push forward our struggle..

LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG!
LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLES' WAR!
DEATH TO THE U.S. FASCISM AND IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
Eldridge Cleaver,
Minister of Information
Black Panther Party, U.S.A.

The Black Panther, June 20, 1970, page 16

THE TERROR, BRUTALITY AND MURDER OF MY BROTHERS AND SISTERS IS THE SUFFERING OF BLACK PEOPLE. THEREFORE, NOT TO LET SUCH EVENTS CONTINUE I MUST MERCILESSLY DO AWAY WITH THE LOW - NATURED BEAST THAT BITES THE HAND THAT FEEDS IT.



WE HAVE NO HANG UPS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

3 - Mr. J. A. [redacted]tz
(1 - J. B. [redacted]otis)
(1 - P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/13/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

4063

This is to advise of a meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on 6/12/75 in my office in accordance with the request set out in Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum dated 6/4/75.

IS-1 Section Chief J. G. Deegan, Number One Man William H. Atkinson, Unit Chiefs Homer A. Newman, Jr., David Ryan, Garnett T. Tunstall, and Special Agent Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division met with Jack Smith and Lester B. Seidel of the SSC staff.

At the outset Mr. Seidel indicated that SSC would do case studies on various organizations against which the COINTELPRO was directed. Black Panther Party (BPP) had been chosen for the start because many BPP members had been involved in and convicted of criminal activity. He distributed copies of a document (a copy of which is attached) outlining the purpose of the meeting and setting out requests that will be made of the Bureau through appropriate channels in connection with this case study. Included in this document, along with requests for various Bureau documents regarding COINTELPRO as it pertains to the BPP, were requests for a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted, a list of all media persons contacted and a list of all FBI personnel connected with this program and their present locations.

5-

The investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, as relates to the BPP, were described generally to Messrs. Seidel and Smith highlighting the origin of this violence-prone organization and the series of violent confrontations in which it participated in the late 1960s. Mr. Seidel stated that he was specifically interested in ascertaining the extent of COINTELPRO and how it related to the investigation of the BPP in San Francisco - Oakland and Los Angeles. COINTELPRO was stressed only as a procedure which could have been followed in the course of our investigation. No specific

62-116395-253

REC-102

Enclosures - 2 ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/

JUN 24 1975

62-116395

MOR-16

GTT:eks (10) "ENCLOSURE ATTACHED" CONTINUED - OVER

JUN 24 1975

instances of institution of counterintelligence activities were discussed, and it was indicated that these activities were minor as far as the overall BPP investigation was concerned.

In connection with COINTELPRO, the Bureau letter to SAC, San Francisco dated 5/11/70 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations" was discussed. Basically, this letter suggests San Francisco consider a proposal that through the use of documents subtly incorporating false information, attempt to give the BPP the impression that the documents were stolen by a disgruntled police employee who is sympathetic to the Panthers. This document was presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security in 1974 and was included in their publication of hearings conducted by that Committee. Messrs. Seidel and Smith wanted to know if the activities outlined in this letter had been implemented by the San Francisco or Los Angeles Offices. He was advised that this letter was not implemented as it had requested comments and recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and that Office had recommended against the proposals contained therein.

Mr. Seidel asked the identity of the SAC who recommended against this proposal and was advised that the SAC there, at that time, would not necessarily have had personal knowledge of the matter. He then asked identity of supervisor who recommended against proposal and was advised this information was available in the field office. Concerning COINTELPRO in general, he inquired as to specific techniques used against the BPP and whether forgery and wiretaps had been a part of the program. He was advised that we were unable to furnish that information without extensive file review.

Mr. Seidel attempted to discuss Special Operations but he was advised that the matter was not within the purview of the current meeting.

Mr. Seidel explained that they would be traveling to San Francisco and intended to interrogate personnel in that Office as well as unspecified outsiders who may have been involved in COINTELPRO. Mr. Seidel stated that he had asked for the meeting with Bureau personnel to obtain background data to aid them in these

interrogations. Both Messrs. Seidel and Smith expressed appreciation for the assistance given them at this meeting and both additionally expressed their feeling that the Bureau had done a good and proper job in its investigation.

During the course of this meeting a monograph on the BPP prepared by the Bureau in March of 1971 was used for background data. Mr. Seidel expressed a desire to have a copy of this document. This document, which is prepared from public source data, was compiled for public distribution and, if you approve, a copy will be furnished to Mr. Seidel.

ACTION:

For your information and if you approve, one copy of attached document entitled "Black Panther Party"* will be sent to Mr. Seidel.

HEH/JGD

GTT

Get written request. signed by Chairman of Committee WRW

PLM

Naturally

*Per G.T. Tunstall, this document is not classified, made up of public source data, + until it became outdated, was furnished to the public. 6/19/75

Delivered to Sherry Towell of SSC 6/20/75 for delivery to Seidel

Black Panther Party: San Francisco-Oakland (Los Angeles)
Late 1960's through early 1970's

The Committee is examining the extent to which this COINTELPRO program relates to criminal investigation; the results obtained; the relationships between the FBI and local authorities (police and other governmental agencies); media and community leaders; the methods of targeting; techniques used to achieve program goals; legal authority; and authorization procedures and accountability.

To pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents in this initial stage:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the responses thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (e.g., field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO, with explanation of the dispositions thereof;
6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 alm/tmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-253

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and their media affiliation;
8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;
9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to the whereabouts, and relation to the FBI should be indicated:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee requested to be given a briefing concerning counterintelligence programs as applied to our investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco.

Lester Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee who is assigned the area of COINTELPROS, advised that the Committee is preparing what he termed case studies on COINTELPROS in four separate areas. He defined these areas as the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Seidel previously had requested the Bureau arrange interviews of various Bureau personnel whom he considered familiar with the San Francisco Black Panther Party investigation, and at that time stated he intended to interview these individuals in two or three weeks. Mr. Seidel requested that prior to conducting interviews concerning this particular area, he desired to be briefed during the week of June 8 concerning the Bureau's general overall investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, along with the use of counterintelligence proposals against that organization. In this regard he desired that someone knowledgeable in this aspect be made available to brief him concerning this matter.

6/13/75 [illegible]

62-116395

REC- 102

62-116395-252

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmc
MDR-16

5- TUNSTALL

12 JUN 24 1975

PVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 [illegible] 27 1975 *Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan*

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Seidel also stated that he was submitting a written request to the Bureau for certain Bureau documents pertaining to the COINTELPRO operations in the San Francisco Office and specifically mentioned requesting the quarterly status letters from that office on COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) The Intelligence Division advise if a briefing can be arranged and the date and time of such a briefing.

2) Legal Counsel Division will advise Mr. Seidel of the Bureau's decision in this regard.

PVD JBH/PVD

WRW/TJM

We should carefully consider fact that Hampton case is subject of pending litigation and coordinate with Dept. ahead of any [illegible] specific [illegible] provided.

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0620
18 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Request for Documents by SSC

Attached is a request for documents received by CIA from the Senate Select Committee Staff on 10 June 1975. It is provided to you for information.

John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 23 1975

5

7 [illegible]

file 62-116395

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 am/jmf
MDR-16

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

84 JUN 23 1975

~~SECRET~~

R223

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

DCI/IC 75-2202

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1975

Mr. Walter Elder
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Elder:

Further to our conversation regarding formal requests for documents and records, I attach a list of supplemental document requests.

What I would propose is that you and I discuss this list to insure that we have properly identified the requested documents.

In addition to the attached list I would like to review studies in the historical series: (1)"Maritime Operations in Indonesian Operations -- 1957-1958;" "Overthrow of a Government, November 1952-1953;" and any studies prepared that trace the CIA's activities in relation to the overthrow of the government of Guatamala in 1954.

Sincerely,

William B. Bader

Attachment

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE
62-116395

R223

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

To: Bill Bader

From: Elliot Maxwell

Date: June 9, 1975

Subj: Supplemental Document Requests

1. The General Counsel's memo on February 3, 1975 on proprietaries mentioned in the briefing paper prepared for the Rockefeller Commission.

2. The Inspector General's Survey of Propeietaries from 1967.

3. Inspector General's Survey of Domestic Operations Division done prior to May 26, 1966.

4. The opinion on covert action authority of the CIA prepared by the Justice Department under Attorney General Katzenbach.

5. List of those individuals who worked with John Richards.

6. List of the component surveys from 1960 to 1970. (Approximately 50 studies)

7. The subject heading list, the keyword list, and the name list, used for filing in the Office of General Counsel.

8. The Bureau of the Budget Confidential Report on Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government, dated September 20, 1945. (HS/HC-71, Item 1).

9. The Report by William H. Jackson, on the Coordination of Intelligence Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British intelligence system. This is a report for the OSS dated August, 1945. (HS/HC-801, Item 9.)

10. A list of titles of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates from January 1, 1970 to the present.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 SPbalm/jmc
mor-16

62-116395-
ENCLOSURE

11. The Office of the General Counsel memo on the subject "Text and Explanation, Public Law 110," dated October 10, 1952.

12. The Interim Report to the National Security Council by Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, dated May 13, 1948 and entitled "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."

13. The paper by the Office of General Counsel on the Origins of the CIA, which is mentioned in the memo of the General Counsel of September 1973.

14. The two pages of General Vandenberg's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee outlining the clandestine collection function of the CIA, which were never published, a copy of which is now in the possession of Walter Pforzheimer.

15. An explanation of all the two-letter prefixes to the project names. (diographic)

16. The paper prepared by the Office of the Controller entitled "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities of CIA and Predecessor Organizations, 20 September 1945 through Janaury 1952." This is identified as HS/HC-36, Item 2.

17. The history of the development of NSCID-5 by Mrs. Margaret Ehrmantraut.

18. Study on Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of Covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 through 1966.*

19. Draft bill written by Lawrence Houston in the Fall of 1946, entitled "A Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency," cited in the archives as HS/HC-805, Item

20. Detailed Budget Submissions and house notes prior to 1967.

21. (a) The transcript of the Senate Hearings on the CIA Act of 1949, cited Paragraph 7 OGC 73-2169, Memo for the Record, 20 November 1973, Subject: Payment to Richard Patrick Lippert;

    (b) Any documents relating to the inquiry by the Secretary of Defense in 1947 mentioned in Paragraph 8 of above memo.

22. Annex to the 1963 Inspector General's Report on Technical Services Division on Experiments with Drugs.

* Already on our priority list: for transmittal to Select Committee offic

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Each Assistant Director

TO ALL SACS JUNE 11, 1975 3 per SLP

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116464)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

HOUSTUDY 75.

REBUTELS MAY 2,20, 1975, "SENSTUDY 75."

BUFILE 62-116464 AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MATTERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FROM SENSTUDY 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

SFP:mjg
(19)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 1 1975
TELETYPE

NOTE:

Referenced teletypes advised field of our pledge of full cooperation with Senate Committee and issued instructions concerning handling contacts with Senate Committee Staff as well as handling of matters relating to interviews with present and former Bureau employees. Inasmuch as we have opened a separate file under Houstudy 75, it is believed this teletype would assist in prompting better management of correspondence between Bureau and field.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-9

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAF
MDR-16

WRW/TAL

WRW/B

REC

66-116395

NOT RECORDED
JUN 23 1975
46 JUN 23 1975

84 JUN 23 1975

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Schwartz)

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Senstudy - 75

Dear Mr. Halperin:

Reference is made to my letter to you dated April 8th, regarding your request for the "Delimination Agreement of 1948."

Coordination of this matter with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has disclosed three documents which are pertinent to your request. It is my understanding that two of the three documents have been released to you by that agency, and I am enclosing with this letter, the third document. You will find this letter dated October 2, 1948, from former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Frank G. Wisner, then the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, contains certain deletions. The material deleted refers to the same material excised in one of the two documents furnished to you by CIA, and concerning which CIA asserted exemption provisions found in Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). These provisions relate to matters that warrant classification and those which are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. It is considered appropriate for the same exemption provisions to be cited by this Bureau in connection with the deleted portion.

You have thirty days from receipt of this letter to appeal to the Attorney General from any denial contained herein. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Attorney General (Attention Freedom of Information Appeals Unit), Washington, D. C. 20530.

MAILED 6
MAY 23 1975
FBI

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116395

THB:dm (7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPAAIM/DMT
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Mr. Morton H. Halperin

The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Following the Attorney General's decision, judicial review is available in the district of your residence or principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia, where the records are situated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Delivered to CIA 5/27/75
VAS

Enclosure

1 - Freedom of Information Act Coordinator - Enclosure
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Mr. Charles Saviage
Washington, D. C.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M. Hauser

NOTE: See copy of H. C. Flemister memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 5/7/75, captioned "Morton Halperin, FOIA Request," copy of which is attached. The material CIA requested to be excised has been deleted as described in this letter, and the Bureau file copy of the letter is not classified. Contact with CIA FOIA Section discloses the deletion of the material in the CIA letter dated 9/22/48 accomplishes the declassification of those documents. This has been coordinated with Intelligence Division. The original Bureau document is found in 65-48066-9.

~~SECRET~~

1 - [illegible] W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~T O P S E C R E T~~

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

JPL:jdp
(4)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 AIM/MAF
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

MDR-16

REC-75 62-116395-249

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 18 1975
5:18 pm
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

WRW
WOB

~~SECRET~~

JUN 20 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JUN 25 1975

PAGE TWO ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [GUS SURVEY.] (S) NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S* RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall
6/4/75

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)
INTERNAL SECURITY, MISCELLANEOUS

Senstudy -75

This is to receive approval for submission of copies of documents requested by the U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. By letter dated 5/14/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the above Committee, requested the Attorney General furnish documents including "all memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the IEC." (Appendix C, I, 14).

Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, advised Supervisor Garnett T. Tunstall on 5/29/75 that the Department has made available to Senator Church's Committee all data contained in Departmental files on the IEC. Included in this material are work papers and final estimates prepared by IEC as well as communications between IEC and the Bureau. The only information remaining in Bureau files not already made available to the Committee consists of in-office memoranda. These memoranda fall into three general categories:
1. Those dealing with the origin and staffing of IEC,
2. Memoranda setting out requests from IEC for information from the Bureau and requests for approval to send such data to IEC and
3. Memoranda transmitting estimates and work papers of IEC which was the result of information furnished by the Bureau and other participating agencies.

These memoranda, without exception, show that the Bureau's participation in IEC was at the instruction of the Attorney General, its activities were legal and that the Bureau's contribution was substantial. It should be noted that the memorandum M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop dated 11/25/70 captioned

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)
Enclosures
62-113887
GTT:eks (4)

62-116395 -
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 25 1975

CONTINUED OVER

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-113887-2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 kum/kmf
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975

"Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Meeting with the Director, 11/25/70," has been excised to delete information not germane to IEC. Copy of original memorandum not excised attached.

ACTION:

If approved, copies of the above-described memoranda, which are attached, will be transmitted to the Department by LHM for referral to the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps. Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(7)

WRW/TWL

memo to Mr Cregar @ the [illegible]
6/17/75 [illegible]

62-116395-247

5

REC-102

17 JUN 23 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2020 BY SP2 RLM/MC
MOR-16

84 JUL 23 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 18, 1975

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - A. B. Fulton
1 - D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached herewith in 14 bound volumes are excised copies of Exhibits A through E of the Department report of FBI Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activities, prepared by the committee chaired by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen.

These exhibits are individual write-ups prepared by the FBI of each proposed action in the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate, Black Extremist, and New Left Cointelpros.

In my letter to you dated April 21, 1975, I recommended against release of these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee as they are internal work papers which were prepared as a part of the deliberative process for an in-house Department investigation. I strongly object to the release of these exhibits. In the event you deem it necessary to release these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee, I request the enclosed copies, which have been excised in an attempt to avoid intrusions upon individuals' right of privacy and compromise of sensitive investigative techniques and sources, be made available.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

Enclosures (14)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009

REC-104 62-116395-245

DR:pld
(11)

Director signed original which was hand carried with enclosures to O'Connor $5\frac{15}{P}$ 6/17 by SA Daly. Jam

17 JUN 23 1975

See NOTE page 2.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SPA AW/[illegible]
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 23 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

NOTE:

On 6/11/75 Legal Counsel advised Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of our objection and our desire that excisions be made if we are overruled. Mr. O'Connor suggested the excised material be prepared on an expedite basis. It appears the Department will make available these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee but we feel we should be on record as relates to FBI recommendations and objections.

This letter and exhibits A through E, which will be made available to Legal Counsel, should be delivered to Mr. O'Connor at the Department by Legal Counsel Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF MRS. DOROTHY SKILLMAN
6/4/75
SENSTUDY 75

On 6/4/75, Mrs. Dorothy Skillman, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Clyde Tolson, was interviewed by Mr. Mark H. Gittenstein and Miss Mary Deoreo of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Mrs. Skillman was escorted to the interview by former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr who remained outside the interview room during the interview. Prior to the interview, Mrs. Skillman was met by SA L. F. Schwartz at which time she advised that she had been advised by Mr. John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, that the interview was to be concerning Mr. Hoover's Official and Confidential (OC) files and that if questions came up during the interview on other matters which might impinge on sensitive sources and methods, current Bureau investigations, etc., she was free to request an interruption of the interview to consult with Mr. Schwartz.

The interview of Mrs. Skillman commenced at 2:30 p.m., and it was terminated at approximately 4:30 p.m. On only one occasion toward the end of the interview, Mrs. Skillman asked to consult with Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz. She advised that the interviewers had asked her concerning her knowledge of what might have been in certain cartons which were reportedly stored in the recreation room area of the late Director's residence. Mrs. Skillman stated that she thought these cartons contained many of the gifts and mementos that had been collected by Mr. Hoover over a period of years. After consulting with Mr. Mohr, she realized that she knew this only from comments that had been made to her by Mr. Mohr and had no firsthand knowledge of the contents of the cartons. On Mr. Mohr's advice, she advised the interviewers that she had no firsthand knowledge of what was in the cartons but that she knew that Mr. Mohr was aware of what was in them because he was present when the appraisers of Mr. Tolson's estate inventoried the entire house including these cartons. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Gittenstein commented to Mr. Mohr that he might have further questions to ask him concerning the contents of the cartons but would probably handle that by a telephone call to Mr. Mohr.

62-116395-244

REC-102

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/MF

(8)

MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

1975

COPY ... PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 23 1975

After the completion of the interview, Mrs. Skillman advised Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz that the interviewers had asked her a great number of questions concerning her knowledge of the OC files which she said was very limited, the layout of Mr. Hoover's house and the work that Mrs. Skillman and Miss Gandy had done at the residence subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death. She stated that the interviewers were quite courteous and in no way antagonistic. Mr. Mohr requested Mrs. Skillman to type up an informal memorandum concerning the interview and he indicated that when this was done, he would provide a copy to the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information.

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/13/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 JUN 24 1975

File Number 62-116395-242

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 9 1975

TO: Kevin Maroney
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Bill

SUBJECT: IRS - SSC Request (Senstudy-75)

Attached is a copy of the SSC document request served upon IRS which I received on June 3, 1975. Since some of the items may relate to DOJ/FBI functions, I thought you should be aware of the scope of the request, as a matter of information.

The Topical Task Forces may need to be alert to this request as a matter of prospective coordination.

cc: Deputy Attorney General

5 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

REC- 102

62-116395-241

17 JUN 19 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395

84 JUN 19 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975 DCI/IC 75-2033

Mr. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Attached is a copy of a Senate Select Committee request to the Treasury Department dated 14 May 1975. Mr. Collins of Treasury has requested you be provided a copy of this request, but no other distribution will be made. It will, of course, become an entry in the Community Central Index.

Yours very truly,

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

Attachment: As stated

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

DCI/IC 75-2009

Department
of the Treasury
Office of Special
Assistant to Secretar
for National Security

to: Mr. John Clarke, Associate
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community, CIA

room: ______ date: 5/29/75

Forwarded is a copy of the Senate Select Committee's first request to the Internal Revenue Service for documents and explanations. As I stated yesterday at the Ad Hoc Committee meeting there have been some discussions with the Committee staff since this letter was received and the staff has indicated that they plan to revise the questions considerably. In these circumstances you may wish to hold distribution of this document to other members of the Ad Hoc Committee until we receive the revised document. The one exception to this might be the Justice Department since some of the questions will involve matters of interest to them.

Foster

J. Foster Collins
room 4328
964-~~242~~ 2631

62-116395-341

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

COMMISSIONER
MAY 16 1975
INTERNAL REVENUE

Hon. Donald C. Alexander
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
Internal Revenue Building
1111 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20224

Dear Commissioner Alexander:

The Committee appreciates your letter pledging the full cooperation and assistance of the Internal Revenue Service in the work of the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. We also appreciate your forwarding the draft resolution which would authorize the Committee to review any "tax-related information" which may fall within the purview of its responsibilities. Such a resolution is being put forward.

In an effort to expedite the Committee's inquiry into the intelligence functions of the Internal Revenue Service, the Committee asks your cooperation and assistance in furnishing the material and information sought in the enclosed "First Request for Documents from the Internal Revenue Service" and "First Interrogatories to the Internal Revenue Service". It is the Committee's desire that most of the material and information requested be provided by May 30 and the remainder very shortly thereafter. We also request that you provide the answers and documents as they are compiled rather than holding those which are initially compiled until May 30.

In the near future, the Committee's Chief Counsel will be in touch with your General Counsel to work out the mechanics of delivering the requested documents and interrogatory answers and to arrange for close liaison between the Committee's staff and the Internal Revenue Service personnel with whom the staff will wish to meet.

While we recognize that the enclosed requests are substantial, they reflect the broad mandate given to the Committee by the Senate. We believe that it is in the national interest that we perform our

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-541

work under that mandate both expeditiously and thoroughly. Of course, for us to proceed expeditiously, it is necessary to obtain prompt cooperation from the Executive agencies involved. We are hopeful that with your continued cooperation the end result of our joint efforts will meet the Committee's responsibilities to the Congress and to the American people.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

FIRST REQUEST TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR DOCUMENTS

The Committee wishes to identify all intelligence collection analysis and dissemination functions performed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to review the legal authority for such activities, the manner in which they are ordered and controlled, the coordination of such activities with other federal agencies, the exchange of intelligence information with other federal agencies and any other cooperation with such agencies relative to intelligence activity. In pursuit of this inquiry the Committee requests that the IRS provide the Committee with the documents and information identified below.

The request is divided into two major parts. The first part seeks documents which relate generally to any intelligence functions which the IRS performs. The second part seeks documents relating to specific intelligence functions of the IRS of which the Committee is aware. Therefore, many of the documents encompassed by the second part of the request will also be encompassed by the first part of the request.

Wherever used herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

Documents	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, compute memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language and any other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
Intelligence	Information about persons or entiti other than purely financial information.
Relating to	Relating in whole or in part to.
Federal agencies	All such agencies, including the White House.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

I. GENERAL REQUEST

With respect to each intelligence gathering or intelligence dissemination function of the IRS either now being performed or which has been performed within the last fifteen years, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart of the organizational unit performing the function indicating the total number of employees in each unit, the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, the chain of command to the organizational unit performing the function.

2. All rules, guidelines, regulations, manuals or other documents defining the function or providing guidance or control to those performing it.

3. All statutes, executive orders, departmental regulations, agency regulations, and any other documents or materials which constitute legal authority for the function.

4. The annual budget of the organizational unit performing the function for the last five years or, in the case of a unit which has ceased to exist, for the last five years of its existence.

5. All documents relating to any agreement or understanding with any other federal agency or the executive or any state or local government or agency regarding the function or the dissemination of any intelligence produced by the function.

6. All documents constituting or relating to reports or investigations of the function performed by the IRS or any other entity, and all documents relating to the establishment of the function.

7. All documents relating to electronic surveillance by IRS or other federal agencies.

II. SPECIFIC REQUESTS

A. Organization and Functions of Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions

With respect to the Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions of the IRS, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart indicating the total number of employees in each category or position, defining the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, and delineating the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Chief of each division.

2. A breakdown of the personnel in each of the two named divisions assigned to each district office, indicating the titles and functions associated with each position in each office.

3. Copies of all rules, guidelines and regulations defining the duties, functions, and responsibilities of each of the two divisions.

B. Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following specific categories of documents:

1. All documents relating to or constituting the recommendations of the study group convened in 1969 by William A. Kolar to study the feasibility of Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System, including all backup documents for such recommendations, and any documents reflecting dissenting views.

2. All documents passing from, to, or between William Kolar and the Commissioners of Revenue or their assistants relating to the plans for and progress made toward the implementation of IGRS.

3. All documents containing evaluations of the various methods of implementation of IGRS.

4. All documents constituting regulations, employee instructions and operating manuals regarding the IGRS, including guidelines, rules or regulations regarding the receipt and storage of information from other federal agencies.

5. All documents passing between the Chief of the Intelligence Division and the District Manager relating to the implementation of IGRS in each District.

6. All documents and guidelines relating to the implementation of IGRS in individual districts or in districts as a whole.

7. A breakdown by district of the IGRS files maintained in each district office, indicating the following:

(a) the number of such files on which some form of action constituting enforcement of the tax laws other than the maintenance of the file has actually been undertaken;

(b) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file is planned;

(c) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file has not been taken and is not planned.

? 8. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which no files are maintained.

9. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which files are maintained.

10. Any regulations or documents relating to criteria for determining the duration of a file in IGRS.

11. Any documents relating to rules or guidelines for analysis and dissemination of information held in IGRS.

12. Any documents relating to actual instances of dissemination to any person or organization, including other federal agencies, of information contained in IGRS.

13. Any documents relating to or constituting requests by anyone, including other federal agencies, for information contained in IGRS.

14. All documents which have been gathered or produced by the group formed in December 1974 to study the operation of IGRS, and all documents relating to or explaining the establishment of the study group.

C. Internal Revenue Strike Force Participation

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following information and documents relating to the participation by IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces:

All documents constituting or relating to agreements with other agencies regarding participation by the IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces, including any documents relating to the desirability of participating on such strike forces.

D. Special Service Staff

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following documents relating to Special Service Staff (SSS):

1. any document which established the SSS;

2. a detailed organizational chart of the SSS indicating the number of employees in each unit of the SSS and the duties and responsibilities of the employees of each unit, as well as the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the head of SSS;

3. a document or documents indicating the names of all employees of SSS during its existence, and indicating the position occupied by each such employee;

4. all documents relating to the policies, operations and procedures of the SSS relating to the collection, analysis, storage and dissemination of information;

5. all documents relating to the transfer of any SSS files to IGRS.

E. Audit Division

In addition to any documents relating to the Audit Division which may be encompassed by Part I, please furnish:

1. the rules, regulations and guidelines, including employee manuals, for selection of taxpayers for audit and the legal authority for such rules, regulations and guidelines;

2. the rules, regulations and guidelines relating to the storage, use and dissemination of information gathered through audits;

3. all documents relating to any of the following occurring since 1950

(a) Politically motivated requests for an audit of any person or entity

(b) Requests by any person or state or federal agency whose official duties do not normally require the use of financial information on individual taxpayers for an audit of any person or entity

4. All documents constituting rules or guidelines for removal of taxpayers' names from the list of those to be audited.

F. General Requests For Information

To the extent they have not already been furnished in response to previous sections of this document request, please furnish:

1. All documents constituting requests to the IRS for information regarding any person or entity by anyone, including federal agencies, whose normal official functions do not require use of such information.

2. All documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to the requests referred to in 1. above.

3. All documents constituting or relating to requests by anyone, including other federal agencies:

(a) for electronic surveillance by IRS, or

(b) for information or investigation which led to electronic surveillance by IRS

and all documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to any such requests.

FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Please provide full, explanatory answers to the questions set forth below. As used in these questions, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

"Documents"	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, computer memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language, and all other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
"Relating to"	Relating in whole or in part to.
"Federal agency"	All federal agencies and the Executive Branch.

1. Regarding the February 7, 1975, official press release of the Internal Revenue Service and the answer of Commissioner Alexander to the first question posed by Senator Joseph Montoya in his letter of January 29, 1975, please answer the following:

   a. At whose direction did William A. Kolar convene a study group to study the feasibility of a formal, uniform Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System (IGRS)?

   b. Who were the participants in the meeting of the study group?

   c. Please explain the relationship between each participant and the IRS.

   d. Please describe in detail the various alternative systems of implementation of IGRS tested in the

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

various districts, indicating which method was tested in which district, and list the dates each alternative system was tested in each district.

e. Please describe the procedure followed by District Directors in implementing IGRS in each district.

f. In how many district offices has IGRS been implemented?

2. How was intelligence data compiled, maintained, and stored by the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service prior to the inception of IGRS?

3. Did officials, representatives, or members of other federal government agencies participate in the establishment of IGRS or in any discussions regarding its establishment? If so, list each such agency and its representatives and explain the manner and extent of its involvement.

4. Did IGRS compile, maintain, and store information received from other federal agencies? If so, was that information compiled, maintained, and stored for the benefit and use of the Internal Revenue Service, the other federal agency, or both?

5. Is information received from other agencies of the federal government edited to delete non-tax-related material prior to its being entered in IGRS? If so, please explain the editing procedure and furnish all documents relating to such procedure.

6. Upon how many individuals and groups did IGRS maintain files as of November 1974?

7. Please identify all individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

8. Please state the total number of individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

9. Were all IGRS files maintained on a computerized or mechanized basis as of November 1974? How were the files indexed? In connection with the answer to this question, please identify all cross-referencing systems whereby categories of information could be retrieved from IGRS other than through identification of the name of an individual or group.

10. How many names were indexed in IGRS on which there were no files?

11. Please fully describe the procedure followed by the Intelligence Division of the IRS in establishing and entering a file on an individual, group, or organization in IGRS, stating whether:

    a. each file or name contained in IGRS is the result of an investigation by the Intelligence Division of IRS;

    b. the files or names stored and maintained by IGRS are periodically investigated by the Intelligence Division of IRS.

12. Upon how many IGRS files has some form of action constituting enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or the Justice Department?

13. How many names and files appear in IGRS upon which no action constituting the enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, has been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or Justice Department?

14. What criteria has been established by the Internal Revenue Service governing the duration of a file or name in IGRS?

15. What procedures are followed by the Internal Revenue Service in disseminating files, names, and other information contained in IGRS to other agencies of the federal government?

16. To what other agencies of the federal government has information contained in IGRS been distributed? Have there been any instances in which information contained in IGRS has been disseminated to other federal agencies without following the procedures described in Item 15 above?

a. If so, specify each such instance, listing the name of the individual, group, or organization whose file was disseminated and the agency at whose request the file was disseminated.

17. Has the Internal Revenue Service received requests for the dissemination of information contained in IGRS which (a) were politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please furnish the Committee with the following:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

18. Were any members of the IGRS study group convened by William Kolar in 1969 participants in the formation or operation of the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify them and describe in detail their relationship with both the Special Services Staff and IGRS.

a. Was IGRS, either in its formative or operative stages, used to maintain and store information collected by the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify the nature of the information so stored and the nature of the information not so stored.

b. Was it a policy of the Internal Revenue Service that documents and files maintained by the Special Services Staff not be stored in IGRS or its generic predecessors? If so, please furnish the Committee with evidence of such policy.

c. What was the relationship between the formal creation of IGRS on May 4, 1973, and the decision of the IRS to review and purge Special Services Staff files on or about June 28, 1973?

d. Have any Special Service Staff files ever been transferred to IGRS? If so, please specify the name of the individual, group, or organization upon which the file was maintained and the date it was transferred to IGRS.

19. With regard to the recent suspension of IGRS activities on January 22, 1975, pending an internal review of its operations, please answer the following:

a. To what specific duties have personnel assigned to IGRS been reassigned pending the present Internal Revenue Service review of IGRS? Please furnish the names of the personnel reassigned and the offices and units to which they have been reassigned.

b. Please furnish the name of the IRS official who is charged with the primary responsibility for conducting the study of IGRS.

c. In what manner are IRS intelligence files being compiled and maintained pending completion of the study?

20. What is the relationship between the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service and Organized Crime Strike Forces?

21. On how many strike forces do IRS agents participate? Please identify the strike forces.

22. How many agents participate on each such strike force?

23. Has the involvement of IRS intelligence personnel on such strike forces been confined to investigation of tax-related matters? If not, please indicate the manner and extent of IRS involvement in non-tax-related actions of the strike forces. In this regard, provide the Committee with detailed summaries of IRS participation on strike forces which did not involve or were unrelated to enforcement of tax-related matters.

24. What intelligence gathering, compiling, and storage systems has the Internal Revenue Service maintained in addition to IGRS?

25. In December 1974 the Internal Revenue Service suspended the operation of IGRS pending an internal review of the system. Was this review prompted by concern that non-tax-related materials were being gathered, compiled, and stored in IGRS? If so, please furnish the Committee with all files, names, and other information contained in IGRS files which is non-tax related.

26. Has the Internal Security Division of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other division of the Internal Revenue Service, ever investigated any aspects of the intelligence gathering, compilation, storage, and dissemination procedures of the Internal Revenue Service? If so, please identify and describe all such investigations and describe any subsequent action taken by the Internal Revenue Service as a result of the investigation.

27. Has the IRS received requests for the dissemination of information which were either (a) politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please state:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual, or the nature of the information sought;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

28. Has the IRS ever engaged in mail cover or other mail surveillance activities, including the recording of dispatch and receipt of mail (other than to or from the IRS) and the opening of mail (other than to the IRS)? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

29. Please set forth the rules, regulations, and procedures which govern removal of taxpayers' names from the list of returns to be audited.

30. Has the IRS ever engaged in wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, or any other type of electronic surveillance? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

31. If the answer to #30 is yes, as to each instance of such activity, state:

a. The dates during which the activity occurred;

b. The type of device used;

c. Whether judicial approval was obtained in advance and, if so, from which court;

d. The subject of the activity;

e. Why the activity occurred;

f. The use or disposition which was made of the information collected;

g. The names and current addresses of the individuals who (a) performed or (b) supervised the activity and whether they are IRS employees.

32. Has the IRS ever been directed, requested, or advised by any other federal agency to use electronic listening devices? If so, please state as to each such direction, request, or advice:

a. The date;

b. The federal agency making it;

c. The proposed subject;

d. The action IRS took;

e. If surveillance resulted, please identify the incident among those listed in answer to number 31;

f. The date and nature of all documents relating to the direction, request, or advice.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Adams DATE: 6-13-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

W.O.

Prior memoranda have been submitted reporting that the Capitol Police Department would handle security checks of the space assigned to captioned Committees as well as the offices of the individual members.

Arrangements were made through the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives to advise us of the Committee Members who have their private offices checked and the dates on which these checks were made.

On June 13, 1975, Captain Eugene Brannon of the Capitol Police Force advised Inspector Bowers that three members of the Senate Committee and two members of the House Committee have had their private offices checked to date. These are:

Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) who had his office in room 245 Russell Senate Office Building and his Capitol office, room S-201 checked on 5-14-75.

Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) whose office in 6325 Dirkson Senate Office Building was checked on 5-22-75.

Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Penna.) whose office in 347 Russell Senate Office Building was checked on 6-5-75.

62-116464-

REC- 102

62-116395-239

17 JUN 19 1975

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Bowers

DWB:lgp
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

File 62-116395
62-116464

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMK
MDR-16

84 JUN 9 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SEANTE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Congressman Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.) whose office in 2265 Rayburn Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Congressman Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.) whose office in 1113 Longworth House Office Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Captian Brannon said they have no pending requests from other members of these Committees to make any checks of their offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
6/9/75
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - All Sections Chiefs
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

HOUSTUDY 75

By memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett captioned "Senstudy 75" dated 2/6/75, you were advised that "Senstudy 75" is the code word for the control file (62-116395) containing all communications relating to the Senate Select Committee's (SSC) investigation and study of Governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

In mid-February, 1975, the House of Representatives created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities which will have virtually the same jurisdiction and responsibilities as the above SSC. To date, practically all our work has been related to the SSC and only very recently has the House Select Committee (HSC) made any efforts to commence staffing.

As it appears, we can expect in the near future requests from the HSC similar to that already received from the SSC and in order to facilitate the administrative handling and retrieval, where necessary, of HSC requests and this Bureau's response to same, the code word "Houstudy 75" is being assigned to the control file (62-116464) containing all communications pertaining to the HSC and related matters.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

62-116464

① - 62-116395

TJM:mjc
(20)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 19 1975

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Bureau has been requested to again make available Newark office secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski for interview by captioned Committee and that the Department and White House had instructed that they not be made available until such time as the Committee decides to allow Bureau representatives to be present during interview.

By way of background, you will recall that these employees were released from the Employment Agreement and were made available for interview on May 20, 1975, by captioned Committee. However, the Department in objection stated that they were desirous that a Bureau representative be present during the interview. The topic of the interview was to have been their duties and responsibilities during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Ultimately, neither the Department nor the White House could reach agreement concerning the interviews and the employees did not submit to interview.

On June 3, 1975, Michael Epstein, staff member of captioned Committee again requested these employees be made available for interview on June 5, 1975, at 10:00 a.m. The scope of the interview would be the responsibilities and duties performed during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

REC-100

62-116395-237

62-116395

17 JUN 18 1975

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-67-538691 (Personnel File Mary Ann Massa)
1-67-581180 (Personnel File M. Ann Mierzewski)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lms
MOR-16

PVD:lgp
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo from Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Epstein classified the interview as an "abuse" type and agreed to allow agents to be available but not present during interview.

On June 3, 1975, K. William O'Conner, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, was advised of the request and of the fact that an agent could not be present during interview. He stated that the Department's position was that unless the Committee consented to allow Bureau personnel to be present, the interview would not go forth, and that he would advise Epstein and F. A. O. Schwarz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, of this decision.

Mr. O'Conner telephonically recontacted Special Agent Daly and advised that he discussed the matter with assistant to the Counsel to the President, James A. Wilderotter. Wilderotter told O'Conner it was the White House position that these girls should not be made available for interview unless the Committee allows Bureau personnel to be present. Wilderotter stated these two employees had been cited as examples wherein the White House felt interviews should not be conducted without representatives of the particular agency or Bureau being present as they are service personnel. According to Wilderotter, Schwarz agreed to this position.

O'Conner telephonically contacted Special Agent Daly on June 4, 1975, at which time he advised that he had discussed the interview with Schwarz, Epstein, and staff member Mark Gitenstein, and they would hold in abeyance the request to interview the employees pending a review of documents the Bureau is making available concerning 1964 Atlantic City Convention as stated in the Committee's request of ~~June~~ May 14, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD JBH/PVD WRW/TVL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : V.V. Kolombatovic

SUBJECT: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

This memorandum is to advise of the scheduled appearance, under oath, of former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague before the full Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., on 6/12/75.

On 6/4/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, U. S. Postal Service, advised Liaison Agent L.A. Crescioli that he was contacted this date by Mr. Montague who informed Jackson that he, Montague, was scheduled to appear before the full SSC on Thursday, 6/12/75. According to Jackson, Mr. Montague appeared to be very concerned about his appearance before this Committee. In fact, Montague requested that Jackson alert FBI Director Kelley to the fact that Montague will appear before this Committee. Montague did not indicate any specifics to Jackson as to why he was so concerned over his scheduled testimony before the Committee.

In the way of background, Montague was the Chief Postal Inspector from 1961 to the Spring of 1969, on which latter date Mr. William J. Cotter assumed the position of Chief Postal Inspector. Prior to 1961 Montague was the Inspector-in-Charge of the New York Division of the Postal Service. In the opinion of Mr. Jackson, Montague is a man of the highest integrity and most certainly is not involved in any wrongdoing. Jackson confidentially advised the Liaison Agent that it is his belief that Montague is so concerned about his appearance before the Committee because he may have to reveal certain agreements that prevailed in the past between the Bureau and the Postal Service concerning mail covers that have not been made public to date.

LAC:tdp ([illegible])

CONTINUED - OVER

94-55340-55

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MOR-16

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Jackson added that he personally has no knowledge of what agreements or understandings between the Bureau and the Postal Service that may be divulged by Montague. He emphasized that Montague did not divulge such data to him.

In conclusion, Jackson stated that Montague is in a retired status and has just returned from an extended vacation in the Mediterranean area. Montague did inform Jackson that the Committee has authorized Montague to be accompanied before the Committee by personal counsel; however, Montague has decided that he will testify alone and without personal counsel.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

WRW/tah

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 6/3/75

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

REC- 102

-116395 - 236X

14 ~~JUN 6~~ 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/lmf
MDR-16

Approved: ____________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ____________ M Per ____________

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

450 Golden Gate Avenue
Box 36015
San Francisco, California 94102

June 3, 1975

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums,

Mr. Don Jones, the Senior Resident Agent of the FBI Resident Agency in Berkeley, California, has referred to me your letter of May 28, 1975 asking certain information concerning the FBI's operation in Berkeley, California.

Your letter has been referred to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for appropriate action.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Bates
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives

RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1417 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2661

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2490 CHANNING WAY, ROOM 202
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704
(415) 548-7767

201 13TH STREET, ROOM 105
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94604
(415) 763-0370

DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

May 28, 1975

Mr. Don Jones, Senior Resident Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P. O. Box 1033
Berkeley, California 94704

Dear Mr. Jones:

As you are aware, I have been concerned for some time about the nature of the Bureau's involvement in local law enforcement affairs. This concern has been heightened by my appointment to the House Select Committee to Investigate the U. S. Intelligence Community. In this light, I am requesting answers to the following questions concerning FBI activity in Berkeley:

1. What is the size of the contingent of agents in the Berkeley field office?
2. What are the functional responsibilities in the field office, and what are the percentages of agents involved in each, i.e., political, drug abuse, criminal, etc.?
3. What are the titles of the agents, and how do these relate to their involvement in category two?
4. What is the ethnic and sexual breakdown of the staff and agents in the Berkeley field office?
5. What are the interactions and working relationships between the field office, the Berkeley Police Department, the University of California Police Department, private security agencies and informers? How many informers are utilized by the field office?
6. Recent disclosures have raised serious questions regarding the Bureau's involvement in political surveillance activities of organizations and individuals over the past several years. What actions has the local field office taken to correct the abuses of these actions, and what political surveillance is being undertaken?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2 avm/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395-2318

7. I have read with interest of the Special Weapons and Tactics course given under Bureau auspices at the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Facility in Alameda County. I would appreciate your forwarding to me a description of the activities undertaken in this course, and the relationship of UCPD and BPD to the course. In addition, I would appreciate being provided any relevant information on SWAT that you have available.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Ronald V Dellums

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

RVD/djc

6/3/75

AIRTEL AIR MAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2bm/lmf
MDR-16

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Miller

REC-102 62-116-395-236X

July 14, 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums:

This is in response to your letter dated May 28, 1975, sent to the Senior Resident Agent of the Berkeley, California, FBI Resident Agency.

To clarify your inquiries, it should be noted the Resident Agency at Berkeley, California, operates under the general supervision of the FBI's San Francisco Office.

There are currently nineteen Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley Resident Agency. All are white males. The function of a resident agency is to handle all FBI matters within its specific geographical territory. This includes criminal, security and applicant investigations. The FBI does not have primary jurisdiction regarding drug matters and does not conduct "political" investigations.

MAILED 7
JUL 15 1975
FBI

As a matter of policy, the FBI advises other governmental law enforcement agencies of matters coming to our attention which are within the investigative jurisdiction of those agencies. In some cases there is concurrent jurisdiction and a joint investigation may be conducted; however, local law enforcement agencies do not have access to FBI files. Representatives of private security agencies may be contacted from time to time in the course of discharging our official responsibilities just as any other citizens may be contacted. The FBI also utilizes the services of informants to develop information concerning matters within this Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; however, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss more specifically the number of such informants or the manner in which they are utilized.

JDM:lgp
(7)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

WRW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF

MDR-16

8 4 AUG 11 1975

GPO 971-546

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

As I have already indicated, the FBI does not conduct "political" investigations, nor do we conduct "political surveillances." We do, of course, have a responsibility for conducting domestic intelligence investigations authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential Directives and instructions of the Attorney General. These matters relate to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, and other activities involving the internal security of the United States. The policies relating to such investigations are not made on an ad hoc basis by individual Agents or individual offices, but conform with broad policy applicable to all offices.

The FBI offers a variety of courses of instruction for law enforcement personnel throughout the United States, including such subjects as anti-sniper and survival training and special weapons and tactics, commonly known as "SWAT". The basic purpose of this training is to provide well prepared teams capable of resolving highly dangerous situations with a minimum of risk to innocent bystanders, the law enforcement personnel involved and the subjects of the investigation.

Enclosed is a newsclipping describing some of the training of our own personnel in this field. The article appeared on June 1, 1975, in the "Washington Star News."

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosure

NOTE: The information concerning the Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley, California, Resident Agency was furnished by ASAC Druken, San Francisco.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: June 3, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

SUBJECT: ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON~~
~~INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. A. Mintz 4/11/75 recommended that a draft of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of the captioned Committees be coordinated with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other appropriate members of the intelligence community.

On 6/2/75 the draft Memorandum of Understanding was discussed by SA L. F. Schwartz with Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, who advised that the draft had been reviewed by CIA and by the Security Committee on behalf of the intelligence community. They requested that the draft be revised in order to recognize the need for certain Staff Members to be cleared for access to compartmented information (a procedure already being followed by the Church Committee) and the desire of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that it be made clear that the DCI will only offer his advice upon the request of the Committee Chairman and that in all cases the final determination as to clearance is the responsibility of the Committee Chairman.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Attached is a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the changes proposed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore which changes are underscored. Both Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church.

REC-100

62-116395
Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-236

LES:ekw
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 AM/LMF

JUN 18 1975

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

MOR-16

RECOMMENDATION:

If the attached revised draft is acceptable to the Bureau, it will be provided to the Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Congressman Nedzi. In accordance with opinion expressed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, a copy will not be furnished to Senator Church.

WVC

PLM

LET TO A.G.
ENCL. LHM FOR HSC
6/12/75 HFS: dmt

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information, in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI willffurnish a summary memorandum containing therresults of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2006 BY SP2
MOR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-256

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters, Jr.

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 3/12/75, and my memorandum, 3/25/75, both captioned as above.

By referenced memorandum dated 3/12/75, Legal Counsel recommended that the Intelligence Division (INTD) discuss with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other members of the intelligence community procedures for clearing staff members of captioned committees for access to classified information when questions as to the individual's trustworthiness have arisen in the course of the FBI's background investigation. Following such discussions, Legal Counsel recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding concerning these matters be prepared by the INTD which might be used by both Senate and House Committees.

By memorandum 3/25/75, the INTD submitted for approval a draft of a proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for staff members of captioned committees. Special Investigative Division disagreed with several features of our draft memorandum and has prepared a revised memorandum, which is attached for approval.

The INTD has coordinated this matter with the Special Investigative Division and interposes no objection to the text of the revised memorandum; however, it is suggested that consideration be given to adding the words "by the FBI" at the end of paragraph five on page one. Paragraph five, thus modified, would read: "Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI."

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116

Enclosure

AFW:dsh
(7)

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-235

18 JUN 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM SEE PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPA AW/JMF
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Mintz
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Discussions of this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community have been held in abeyance pending approval within the FBI as to the text of the proposed memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, that attached revised memorandum be coordinated by the INTD with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community prior to review by the Attorney General and transmittal to Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi by Legal Counsel Division.

Addendum

WVC

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division concurs with the general thrust of the memorandum of understanding, however, it is suggested the following wording be added where indicated:

Page 1, paragraph 3, insert after the word applicant, or employee. On line 2, change "applicant's" to read "person's".

Page 1, paragraph 4, after the word determined insert by the respective Chairman,.

Page 2, paragraph 1, after the word necessary insert by the Committee,.

Per

Jma

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information. ①

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing ~~the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee~~ Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the ~~applicant's~~ PERSON'S suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined BY THE RESPECTIVE CHAIRMAN to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI. ②

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2alm/lmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-235

The DCI will furnish his observations as to eligibility for access to classified information to the appropriate Committee Chairman for his consideration. The Committee Chairman will render the final determination after consultation, where it is deemed necessary, by the committee, with the interested agencies.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. Adams memorandum to Mr. Callahan dated 3/7/75, captioned as above, copy attached, reported our conversation with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi.

As indicated in Mr. Adams' memorandum, Congressman Nedzi asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI, and the House Committee concerning investigative and clearance procedures for members of the Committee's staff. It appeared appropriate to us to coordinate a memorandum of understanding to be drafted for the House Committee with that to be drafted for the Senate Committee. Therefore, following our return from the meeting with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi, I called Bill Miller and advised him of the request made by Congressman Nedzi for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding. I asked him whether it would be possible for us to coordinate the language of that memorandum with the understanding that it will be drafted for use by the CIA, other members of the intelligence community, and the Church Committee. Mr. Miller said that the proposal to coordinate the memorandum was completely acceptable to him and he requested that the draft memorandum being prepared for Congressman Nedzi be furnished him for review and possible adoption as the memorandum to be used by the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division discuss this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community and prepare a draft memorandum of understanding that may be used by both House and Senate committees.

Bufile 62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

JUN 18 1975

17 JUN 18 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY

MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training ✓
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 3/7/75 Mr. Mintz and I called on Senator Church and his staff director, Bill Miller, to further discuss the procedures for investigating and clearing staff employees of the Committee, particularly where information might be developed raising a question as to the propriety of a clearance. It had previously been approved that the FBI would conduct the background investigations, furnishing the results to Senator Church, and after his determination that the individuals met the required criteria for access to classified information he would notify CIA of his determination and intent to employ the individual involved, at which time CIA would grant the necessary clearance based on the certification by Senator Church.

In discussions between CIA and FBI representatives, we raised the question as to whether CIA would review the results of the investigation prior to granting clearances and CIA representatives indicated they did not intend to and were reluctant to inquire of Senator Church as to whether they could be furnished the results of any investigations involving derogatory information.

In discussing this matter with Senator Church, I inquired whether he had any objection to our bringing to the attention of CIA any questionable cases in order that CIA representatives, who have the responsibility of granting the actual clearances, would be in a position to advise and counsel with Senator Church on those individual cases. He had absolutely no objection to this and, in fact, felt there should be an open communication between FBI, CIA and his Committee to insure that no one was appointed and cleared who did not measure up in every respect from a security standpoint.

I discussed with him the particular case of Stanley Rawson Sloan, the results of which I had brought for delivery to Senator Church. Sloan was

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MJT

REC-100

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

SEE

17 JUN 18 1975

JBA:ams
(5)
1 - Mr. Cleveland 1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

MOE-16

CONTINUED - OVER

Wannall to Neely, memo, [illegible] 4/1/75.

formerly employed by CIA and resigned in December, 1974, after his clearance for sensitive compartmented information had been lifted as a result of his marrying an alien. This marriage would not preclude him from clearance for access to lesser degrees of sensitive material but only for the more sophisticated clearances. Mr. Miller advised that Sloan had not been appointed and was not going to be appointed because of other reasons unrelated to a security clearance.

Senator Church indicated that he felt it would be wise to prepare a memorandum outlining our security clearance procedures and his staff would be glad to prepare such a document.

Following the meeting with Senator Church, Mr. Mintz and I dropped by to see Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the House Committee, and delivered to him Mr. Kelley's letter congratulating him and offering him our complete cooperation. Chairman Nedzi stated that he was very appreciative of this offer and would consider Mr. Kelley's request to confer with him as an open invitation and as soon as things had shaken down he would be in touch with us.

We discussed with him the investigative and clearance procedures we were following with the Senate Committee and Chairman Nedzi agreed the same procedures should be followed with his Committee, including our making available to CIA any derogatory information which might be pertinent to a clearance determination. At first, he suggested that we send the results of our investigations to CIA before coming to the Committee but then concluded that it would be more appropriate for them to come to him first since some of the applicants under consideration would probably not be appointed. He specifically asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI and himself.

I asked Mr. Nedzi whether he felt the formulation of his Committee would serve to trim down the number of requests for information being received from various House committees and it was his opinion that it would help in some instances; however, in others committee chairmen would pursue their own inquiries. He personally did not feel he had the clout nor the desire to try to preempt this area entirely for his Committee. He also stated he felt that CIA's problems had in the main been fully exposed and would soon be

CONTINUED - OVER

of less concern, whereas the concern over domestic security policies of the FBI would undoubtedly be greater in the future. He expressed his appreciation for our cooperation and indicated he was striving for a responsible approach to the inquiry.

Following the meeting with Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Mintz and I agreed that it would be best for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding concerning the investigative and clearance procedures for both Committees in order to try to insure uniformity, and Mr. Mintz will get in touch with Bill Miller to seek his concurrence in that regard. Our efforts will be coordinated with CIA and the proposed memorandum as drawn up will be submitted for the Director's approval.

ACTION:

Information only.

CONTINUED - OVER

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. CHURCH

MAY 21, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration
JUNE 5, 1975
Reported without amendment
JUNE 6, 1975
Considered and agreed to

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2006 BY SP2ALM/LWF
MDR-16

REC-100

62-116395-233

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 18 1975

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21, 1975

Mr. CHURCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. CANNON, without amendment

Senate 6-'75

JUNE 6, 1975

Considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

V

62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-28-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated 5-22-75 you were advised that former SA Robert Nichols had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee, at which time Seidel attempted to arrange an interview of Nichols. Nichols was advised by Deputy Assistant Director Jack E. Herington of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 pertaining to Departmental approval prior to furnishing information from Bureau files. He was also reminded that he had signed an employee agreement with the Bureau agreeing to maintain confidentiality of the information contained in Bureau files. He was advised if he requested, the Bureau would make available a representative to accompany him should he be interviewed by the Committee.

Former SA Nichols telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 5-28-75 and advised he had been recontacted by Mr. Seidel. Seidel requested and Nichols agreed to travel to Washington, D. C., on the morning of 5-30-75 for an interview at the Committee's offices. Nichols stated that Seidel indicated the scope of the interview would be concerning Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether this was to be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an executive session of the Committee. He stated he was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the Bureau make available a representative so that Nichols may consult with him during the interview if need be.

62-116395-232

EX-105 REC-20 JUN 6 1975

Mr. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted by Nichols as being his private counsel but that the Agent would assist Nichols in making determination whether a specific question should be responded to or whether a response could properly be declined because an answer might compromise a source,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2Am/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Personnel File 67-414885 (Former SA Robert Nichols)
1 - Mr. Hotis

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

sensitive investigative technique, divulge information furnished the Bureau by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources or adversely affecting an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Mr. Nichols that if he so desires, he could, of course, obtain the services of private counsel. He indicated it was his intention to arrive in Washington Thursday night, 5-29-75. He was requested to appear in the Office of Legal Analysis, Room 4513, at approximately 8:15 a.m. on the morning of 5-30-75 so that arrangements might be made to brief him by the Office of Legal Analysis and subsequently by the Intelligence Division. Nichols stated he would do so.

The Office of Legal Analysis is attempting to obtain from Committee representatives further information as to the circumstances and exact time of interview of Nichols.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Intelligence Division representative be made available to accompany Nichols to his interview with captioned Committee.

2) That Nichols be released from his employment agreement to respond to questions concerning our investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters.

PVD JBH/PVD

Pvn

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Hotis

On May 27, 1975, James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, requested me and representatives of other agencies interested in the arrangements concerning interviews of witnesses by the Senate Select Committee to confer with him and Roderick Hills at 2:30 p.m. that date at the White House. Mr. K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Inspector John B. Hotis and I represented the Department and the FBI. Roderick Hills and James A. Wilderotter represented the President's counsel; Bob Andrews represented the Defense Department; John Warner, General Counsel, CIA; Roy Banner, General Counsel of NSA, and Mr. Hyland from State Department as well as John Clark, Deputy to the Director of CIA, attended.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the latest version of proposed procedures to be followed by the Committee staff investigators during interviews of former and current employees. Roderick Hills presented a document (copy attached) which he described as a counteroffer by Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee. He called for general discussion of the document after indicating that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Schwarz at lunch on May 27th and felt that it was a workable document. I pointed out to Mr. Hills that the document provides that there would be notice to the agencies of the identity of witnesses at reasonable time prior to interviews or taking of sworn testimony except where "the committee or its appropriate delegee" determines that prior notice should not be given. I told him that I was concerned that that provision would be used by the Committee staff to permit individual staff investigators to make that determination and I was confident they would do so.

EX-105

REC-20 62-116395-231

ENCLOSURE

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (7)

7 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ADM/MAF
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Mr. Hills was reluctant to seek a modification of the language indicating that he had an understanding with Mr. Schwarz that the authority would be limited to the senior counsel and to members of the Committee. I told Mr. Hills I would request that the language be modified in writing so that the authority would be conferred on specific representatives of the Committee to avoid having staff authority which I thought would be abused. Mr. Hills finally agreed that the language would be modified so that the authority would be available only to both Committee senior counsel and/or a combination of senior counsel and a Committee member. Further, the language would be modified to require that the determination that an agency would not be given prior notice of a pending witness interview would be recorded in writing for the Committee's records.

I asked Mr. Wilderotter and Mr. Hills whether this agreement was to be made between the staff and the agencies or whether it in fact would be accepted by the Committee. After some discussion, we were advised by Mr. Hills and Mr. Wilderotter that the document would be submitted to the full Committee for their approval and incorporated into the Committee's records.

I pointed out that I believed it was necessary for the understanding to be made between the Committee and the Executive in order for there to be some basis for restraining Committee staff investigators who may not be inclined to follow the rules.

Other proposed changes discussed would require the Committee representative to furnish to a witness a copy of the Committee's rules which includes advice concerning the right to counsel and a copy of the proposed guidelines for witness interviews.

I recommended that the guidelines be expanded to address the problem of existing secrecy agreements with former and present employees and the procedural problem involved in Attorney General Order 501-73 which requires prior Departmental approval in order for a witness to respond to a subpoena. As a result, Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28, 1975, that he would recommend the addition of a sentence in the opening paragraph that would indicate the guidelines would not be understood to impair the constitutional rights of individual witnesses, agency agreements with employees or former employees, existing Departmental orders or the Committee's own rules.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

Other minor changes were considered and an effort will be made to correct the language so that the agencies will be obliged to make reasonable efforts to comply with all Committee requests instead of being required to furnish "all information" absolutely.

Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28th that the comments described above will be discussed with Frederick Schwarz in an effort to finally resolve this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Source: Hills 5/27

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

It is hoped that these voluntary guidelines will permit the Select Committee investigation to proceed without undue delay, but it is also recognized that these guidelines do not cover all points or anticipate all problems and that, therefore, either the Select Committee or some agency under investigation may have reason not to follow these suggested guidelines.

Also, it is recognized that this outline is without prejudice to the respective legal positions of the agencies and the Select Committee as to the production of specific information by way of documents or testimony. Not to impair Const. rights of ind witness, agency rules or agreements, comm rule.

A. Classification of Interviews/Preliminary Testimony

The parties to this investigation by the Select Committee recognize that interviews/preliminary testimony to be conducted by the Committee staff will generally be of two separate and distinct natures.

(1) Those primarily seeking information concerning (A) the overall structure and functions of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; (B) the substantive work being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; and (C) the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2000 BY SP2 ALM/VMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-231

des 1 '97. [illegible] comm

(2) Those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

An agency representative will be present, as a general rule, at interviews/preliminary testimony in the first category for the purpose of assisting the Committee's investigation and facilitating the protection of information important to the national interest which is pertinent to the investigation. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews/preliminary testimony in the second category. The parties recognize, however, that for special reasons exceptions can be made in either case: i.e., when good reason exists, endorsed by the Select Committee, agency representatives may not be present for interviews/preliminary testimony falling under the first category, and for good and sufficient reason the agency may [seek to] have a representative present in the second category subject to the approval, of course, of the Select Committee.

B. Procedures to be Employed in Category (2).

When the Select Committee has identified a specific subject as a potential abuse or impropriety and has so notified the agency involved of its designation, that agency will, subject to the second sentence hereof, make [every effort] to provide the Select Committee

with all information and materials that it has on the subject. There will be a mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate.

In abuse or impropriety interviews/preliminary testimony, the following procedures will prevail.

(1) Witnesses will be identified to the agency a reasonable time prior to interviews or taking sworn testimony. This general rule includes current employees, former employees or others who have or have had a relationship with the agency.

Exceptions

~~Written record~~ of dec'n

A. Where the Committee or its appropriate delegee ~~by written determination~~ stet believes that prior identification of a witness could adversely affect the witness' willingness to be interviewed or to be forthcoming, or could otherwise hinder the investigation, such prior notice ~~by written authorization~~ will not be given, but in such cases the agency shall be given a general indication of the points or areas to be covered to the extent that is feasible without undercutting the reason for not providing prior notice in the first instance. Delegees shall consist of both Comm. senior counsel or a comb of senior counsel and committee member.

B. In certain cases, the Committee might notify the agency, if the agency agrees not to contact the witness before his appearance. The agency could identify for the Committee special security matters concerning prospective witnesses and provide information on how to locate a witness.

(2) When the Committee contacts a witness, it will explain the security and other arrangements between the Committee and the agency, as well as serve the witness a copy of these ground rules and a copy of the Committee rules. If the witness wishes to consult with the agency prior to his appearance, the Committee will not discourage or seek to interfere with that desire in any way and will help the witness contact the agency representative.

(3) Whenever they are not present at interviews or the taking of sworn statements, agency representatives will be available for consultations regarding the handling of special security matters.

(4) Whether or not an agency has notice of an interview or sworn statement, the Committee will inform the agency of the general substantive points covered as soon as possible thereafter, unless disclosure of the substance of a particular interview would make discernible the identity of a confidential source. In such cases, the Committee shall, to the extent feasible without undercutting that decision, notify the agency in general terms of the points or areas covered, and the fact that it has interviewed a witness on such matters.

(5) Whenever an agency receives prior notice of a particular interview or taking of a sworn statement, it will also be notified

of the general subject areas and periods of employment in which the Committee is primarily interested. The agency will then check the subject's personnel history file and advise the Committee of any exceptionally sensitive aspects of the subject's employment or activity which require special handling.

(6) If because of concern about security of sensitive information, a witness feels unable to give a responsive answer to a particular question, the witness shall so indicate to the interviewer. The questioner and witness may then consult with the agency representative with respect to an appropriate response which will facilitate the provision of pertinent information and its protection. These matters should be worked out forthwith and ordinarily before the close of the interview/testimony session.

(7) The Committee is responsible for providing special handling of interview notes and other working notes in a manner which will protect sensitive material. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee will consult with the agencies concerned regarding the appropriate disposition of any such notes which have not been destroyed following the preparation of finished Committee documents. The agencies will indicate which of these notes it feels are too sensitive to be stored under the Archives

arrangement being established for the general disposition of the Committee's working papers and non-public reports.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

231 THRU 235

236 THRU 1ST NR 237

1ST NR 238, 239

241, 242

244, 245

247

249, 1ST NR 249

252 THRU 254

255 THRU 260

262 THRU 265

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

Alan G. Sentinella

May 21, 1975

The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood

[illegible] 6/9/75 [illegible] Senstudy [illegible] Intelligence Coordination

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/VMF
MPR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-265

to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were

assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

A. None.

Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted

to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

See attached pages ITEM II

Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison.

A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior ~~to that time which~~ thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

Q. Why would Harding know this information?

A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

A. Yes.

Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

A. Richard Hamilton.

Q. When did he assume these cases?

A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

A. It did not develop any such information.

Q. How did you know of what~~ever~~ their CP affiliation may have been?

A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

A. I did not have the cases at that time.

Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How?

A. From information in the appropriate file.

Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances,

airtels, letters, memoranda?

A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

Q. What was the gist of such communications?

A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

A. No.

Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign.

A. I have no such recollection.

Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned. ← SEE ITEM I. of attached pages

Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

Q. Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

Q. Kitchen floor?

A. Yes.

Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy ~~had~~ changed it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation. See ITEM III of attached pages.

Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights Complaints ~~complications~~ in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

See ~~the~~ ITEM IV of attached pages

A. ~~Yes.~~ I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

Q. What about prior to 1965?

A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having KLAN ~~King~~ connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

A. Yes, I did not have any such contact.

Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were ~~or~~ that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category.

I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

A. No.

Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

Q. Who were some of those?

A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

A. Henry Rouse.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

Q. Recently testimony was given be one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

A. It is not my recollection that they did.

Q. What about a Klan organization?

A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceiably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

A. I do not know.

THIS WOULD READ BETTER IF MOVED TO PAGE 19

It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued.

Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted

such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Sidell he was not asking him to make any changes. He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened, Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

→ FROM P 18

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 9, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

Senstudy - 75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS WITH

Reference is made to my letter dated May 22, 1975, forwarding a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning testimony subsequently given by Mr. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

for info. only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR - Dept of Justice, 11/22/76 - JCB

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP165K/JG

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw KW
(14)

P.U. [illegible]
Rm 4509
JB

REC-102

Hand carried to AG 6-10-75

62-116395-265

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

62-116395

June 9, 1975

1-Mr.W.O.Cregar
1-Mr.S.F.Phillips

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4JAM/LL
ON 2-20-81 6076

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BEFORE
SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION

Reference is made to the memorandum of this Bureau dated May 22, 1975, reporting a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella, a retired SA of the FBI. That statement concerned the interview of Sentinella by an SSC Staff Member on May 12, 1975.

Pursuant to a subpoena, Mr. Sentinella testified before an Executive Session of the SSC on May 21, 1975, after which he voluntarily furnished the FBI a statement concerning his testimony. Set out below is the verbatim text of that statement.

CLASS. ~~& EXT.~~ BY SD165K/jg 10/31/80
REASON-FCIM II, ~~1-2.4.2~~ 3
DATE OF REVIEW 6-9-95

"Alan G. Sentinella"

"May 21, 1975"

"The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw (13)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JBA

62-116395-265

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

"The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

"Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

"Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

"A. None.

"Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

"A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

"Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

"A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

"Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

"A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

"Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison?

"A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

"Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

~~IDENTIAL~~

DENTIAL

"A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

"Q. Why would Harding know this information?

"A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

"Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

"A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

"Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

"A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

"Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

"A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

"Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

"A. I did not.

DENTIAL

"Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

"A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

"Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

"A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

"Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

"A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

"Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

"A. Richard Hamilton.

"Q. When did he assume these cases?

"A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

"Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

"A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

"Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

"A. Yes, he was.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

"A. It did not develop any such information.

"Q. How did you know of what their CP affiliation may have been?

"A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

"Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

"A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

"Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

"A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

"Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

"A. I did not have the cases at that time.

"Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How?

"A. From information in the appropriate file.

"Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances, airtels, letters, memoranda?

"A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

"Q. What was the gist of such communications?

"A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

"Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

"A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

"Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

"A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

"Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

"A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

"Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign?

"A. I have no such recollection.

"Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

"A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned.

"Q. What about Julian Bond's campaign? Any effort to influence that?

"A. No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

"Q. What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

"A. None to my knowledge beyond such coverage as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

"Q. In same manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature. My answer was that my only concern had been with former Governor Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the Pickrick restaurant.

"Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

"A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

"Q. William Sullivan, whowas formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

"A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

"Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

"A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

"Q. Was King given a nickname in the Atlanta Office?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was it?

"A. "Zorro"

"Q. How did that come about?

"A. I believe that began with Mr. Nichols and just passed on down.

"Q. Why was that name selected?

"A. I do not know precisely.

"Q. Don't you have any idea?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for it?

"A. As I remember, "Zorro" was either a television or movie character who carried a sword and therefore could be referred to as a swordsman.

"Q. What connection had this with King?

"A. The Reverend King participated in a number of extra-marital relations and therefore it seemed fitting that in the vernacular the reference swordsman applied to him.

"Q. What extra-marital activities were there?

"A. There were several women involved.

"Q. How do you know this?

"A. It was indicated on occasions by conversations.

"Q. How?

"A. By reference to a previous escapade with an individual or to one pending.

"Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

"A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

"Q. Kitchen floor?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

"A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

"Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

"A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

"Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

"A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy changed, it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

"Q. Prior to 1963 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

"Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

"A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

"Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

"Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

"A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation.

"I cannot be certain - I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

"Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

"A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

"Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

"A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

"Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

"Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

"A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

"Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

"A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"Q. What about prior to 1965?

"A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having Klan connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

"Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

"A. Yes. I did not have any such contact.

"Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

"A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category. I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

"Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

"A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

"Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

"A. No.

"Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

"A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

"Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

"A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

"Q. Who were some of those?

"A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

"Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

"A. Henry Rouse.

"Q. Where is he now?

"A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

"Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

"Q. Recently testimony was given by one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

"A. It is not my recollection that they did.

"Q. What about a Klan organization?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

"I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceivably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

"Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

"A. I do not know.

"Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

"Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

"The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened. Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

"The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

"It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued."

On June 4, 1975, Sentinella advised the FBI of the following additional information concerning this matter.

Sentinella received a telephone call that day from Seidel who advised him that the transcript of Sentinella's testimony was near completion and that Sentinella would receive a letter advising him it was ready for Sentinella's review, but only in SSC space.

Seidel sought from Sentinella and was furnished names of some FBI personnel who had monitored technical surveillance on King during the pertinent period. Seidel sought information concerning who supervised the King investigation at FBI Headquarters, to which Sentinella replied that he did not know any specifics. Seidel referred back to information from Sentinella both during the original interview and during Sentinella's testimony and Seidel asked why Sentinella had discussed the matter with former FBI Agent Harding. It was Sentinella's reply that he sought Harding's help in order to rectify what he thought was a wrong answer given to Seidel during the initial interview.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentintella's verbatim statement which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The additional information Sentinella furnished 6/4/75 was telephoned by him to Phillips. On that occasion Sentinella also advised that Seidel had inquired of him that day as to whether he had discussed with Phillips the King case after arriving in Washington, D.C., and prior to testifying. Sentinella stated that he had not.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/13/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Documents Pertaining to the Huston Plan, Cointelpro and other Practices and Programs

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/74, Appendix C, Part I, Item 7, 8.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"S"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

LIAISON

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

With CIA concurrence, SSC was furnished with copies of documents maintained by the Bureau relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, with the resultant temporary discontinuance of formal liaison between the FBI and the CIA.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 - TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/19/2000 [illegible]

MDR-16

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/13/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS
HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMEN

Originating Office: FBI 37

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec. Sec.

Appendix C
Part I, #7

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/DMF
MDR-16

[redacted]

(Additional questions)

ITEM I.

Q: What about JULIAN BOND'S Campaign? Any effort to influence that? //

A: No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

Q: What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

A: None to my knowledge beyond such coverage ~~of SNCC of which organization he~~ as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

Q: [In some manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature]. My answer was ~~that~~ they were only concerned then with former Governor

62-116395-2165

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/16/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmc
mdr-16

ENCLOSURE

Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the PICKRICK restaurant].

✓ITEM II

Re page 5, first Q. and A. set forth.

It seems this is where Seidel asked a question concerning other source (other than electronic) material re Levison. However, he went on talking and never actually posed a question as such; accordingly it was not answered].

OR

the above may have been related to the last Q. appearing at bottom of page 7.

(3)

ITEM III.

I cannot be certain — I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

ITEM IV.

Re page 14 and the answer you inquired about.

I'm sure my answer was as it now appears on page 14, i.e. corrected.

I did not say there was no connection. I'm sure I only introduced the negative when he asked if I would deny there was such connection.

I believe "Yes" may have come in here in answering a question raised by your steno.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 7, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. Item number 8, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed copies of 13 FBI communications.

In connection with your request for memoranda pertaining to inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, a search of the files of the FBI at Washington, D. C., and Denver, Colorado, does not indicate that any such inspections or administrative inquiries took place.

RLM:mam
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO & THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-264

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory RLM
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

With reference to the information furnished by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley contained in the communication from the Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, to the Director of the FBI, dated May 8, 1970, your specific attention is directed to the restrictions placed by Dr. Smiley on the information furnished by him. On June 4, 1975, Dr. Smiley was recontacted, at which time he advised that under no circumstances would he testify in public to the information which he originally furnished to the FBI on a confidential basis. He further advised that under no circumstances would he reveal the identity of his contact in the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in the May 8, 1970, communication. He agreed to the release of the information in the May 8, 1970, communication to the SSC on a strictly confidential basis, for its use only and not for any further dissemination. Dr. Smiley stated he has no information other than that in the May 8, 1970, communication.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Concurrence to pass the 2/26/70 letter, with Secret enclosures, from Richard Helms, then Director of CIA, to J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of FBI, was obtained by Liaison Officer Leon F. Schwartz from Walter Elder, CIA on 6/10/75. The response to requests set forth in Appendix C, Part I, Item numbers 7 and 8 is being made in the same communication to avoid unnecessary duplication since the severing of liaison with CIA grew out of the RIHA matter.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

A. W. Gray memorandum to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/70, states "our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958." This information only appears on the cover page of the report of SA Daniel J. Griffin, dated, 8/31/60 at Boston. The information was furnished by Riha during interview on 8/11/60 and has never been given to us by CIA.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (28)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RLM:mam
(9)

RLM

Delivered To [illegible]

REC- 102

62-116395 - 264

17 JUN 25 1975

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

RLM

Dir.
AD Adm.
AD Inv.
Syst.
Affairs
& Com.

JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☒ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting testimony given by former FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the SSC.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence activities, domestic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Testimony covered former FBI investigation of:

1) Martin Luther King, Jr.
2) Stanley David Levison
3) Southern Christian Leadership Conference

5-18

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

62-116395

6-24-75 LFS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

3791 (6-73)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

-16

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~XC~~ 3/4 Az

~~XC~~

B. Prong

XC ①/FC

Patch III

Assembly

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVE[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : DIRECTOR, F.B.I.

DATE: February 12, 1970

ROM : SAC, DENVER

UBJECT: THOMAS RIHA

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was called by MIKE TODOROVICH, who is in charge of the CIA office here in Denver. TODOROVICH stated he has instructions from his Washington Office to contact Denver District Attorney JAMES MC KEVITT and tell MC KEVITT that CIA Agent JOHN D. FRITZ who is stationed in Boulder, Colorado, had told Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, former President of the University of Colorado, that FRITZ had been told that THOMAS RIHA's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that RIHA was, in fact, all right. TODOROVICH then told me that FRITZ got this information from an FBI Agent in Boulder.

I told TODOROVICH to give me the name of the FBI Agent and he stated he would not do so. He then stated the FBI Agent told him, TODOROVICH the same thing. I again requested the name of the Agent. He again declined to give it to me. I very emphatically told TODOROVICH that until he gave me the name of the Agent who supposedly gave him and FRITZ this information, that I would not believe that either he or FRITZ had been given any information such as this by any Agent of this Bureau and this was based on the fact that no Agent would have any reason whatsoever to make such a statement since we had not conducted any investigation in this matter nor did we have any information concerning RIHA and, therefore, we would not be in a position to make such a statement as to whether or not RIHA was all right.

I then also pointed out to Mr. TODOROVICH that if he gave the information to Mr. MC KEVITT and advised Mr. MC KEVITT the information had come from an FBI Agent and if Mr. MC KEVITT contacted me I would certainly advise him that the information did not come from anyone in the FBI for the same reasons as set forth above.

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum that they have not made such statements as were attributed to them by TODOROVICH. Not only that, neither of the two has ever had any contact personally or otherwise with JOHN D. FRITZ, the CIA representative in Boulder.

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of CIA's actions in connection with this matter.

1. Protests CIA re Todorovich's actions
2. Commends SAC re his handling of Todorovich.
H

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and when it may have happened.

While avoiding specifics about their theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest Wednesday in knowing more about the housewife's recollection that she telephoned Riha and carried on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon that Monday, the day when he first failed to show up for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph Smiley, Denver police chief George Seaton or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officials to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it "is entirely out of our jurisdiction."

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70
Edition: Home
Author: Alan Cunningham
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM

Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder housewife is certain she talked to Thomas ha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first led to show up for his history classes at the Univer- y of Colorado.

Vhat is even more remarka- than this, in the opinion of se who have been trying to down the exact date of ba's disappearance, is the man's insistence that Riha s cheerful, relaxed and inter- ted in chatting about a local litical issue.

The woman, who asks that she t be identified by name, has ld the News she was in the ocess of telephoning a list of ulder citizens last March, eking support for a proposed ection on whether the city ould take over its public utili- es.

While she had been involved the issue for several weeks, e is sure it was on Monday, arch 17, that she attempted to ach a dozen people whose mes began with the letters P" and "R." Among the three four whom she was able to ach that day, she insists, was homas Riha. She says he an- vered the telephone at his ome at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, leasant and quite interested in e municipal issue, according the Boulder housewife. In ct, she explained, his name as on the list because he had arlier sent in a reader survey ballot" from a Boulder news- aper which related to the issue.

As a result, Riha struck her as more informed on it than most others she had talked to in her telephone inquiries, and she believes the conversation lasted about 10 minutes, making it the longest in which she took part that day.

The date, if the Boulder housewife is correct, is significant, ince Riha reportedly missed a inner party to which he was in- ited the previous night, and ould not be reached on Satur- lay, March 15, by a friend who ried to telephone him repeat- dly.

Many people interested in the ase have speculated that Riha eft Boulder, was kidnaped or lied as early as that Friday or

professor who was rumored to have seen Riha on Sunday, the 16th, vigorously dismissed this rumor as untrue when asked about it Tuesday.

But the Boulder housewife who made the series of telephone calls is equally adamant about the date when she talked to Riha. She says she didn't know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist. Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alvie and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported no reply yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70
Edition: Home
Author:
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

Following is typewritten clarification of the handwritten comment of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

"I don't. I still want name of our agt which Todorovich gave to Dr. Smiley. H"

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan S

DATE: 2-18-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

C

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 2/10/70, SAC Werner, Denver, demanded that Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver, identify Bureau Agent who allegedly told a CIA officer that the subject's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that subject, in fact, was alright. Todorovich refused to do so. The Director instructed that we protest to CIA regarding Todorovich's actions.

On 2-17-70, Liaison Agent Papich vigorously protested Todorovich's actions to CIA, charging the Agency with impeding our inquiry. He pointed out that Todorovich's stubborn refusal to divulge the identity of the Bureau Agent involved was unacceptable because we had no information to support the statement attributed to our Agent. As a result of Papich's protest, a CIA official telephoned Todorovich and demanded that he divulge the identity of the Agent. Todorovich refused and stated that he considered this a matter of personal honor and that unless there was reason to believe Bureau operations were being adversely effected, he would not make the identification. CIA officials subsequently advised the Liaison Agent that they had reviewed the entire case and learned that District Attorney McKevitt publicly stated on 2-14-70 that the statement attributed to Dr. Smiley (which allegedly came to him via Todorovich from our Agent) was based on an "honest mistake" and that McKevitt felt this cleared the air and no further clarification was needed.

ACTION:

None. For information.

I dont. I still want name of our Agent which Todorovich [illegible] [illegible] H.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 2-20-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to memorandum dated 2-18-70 from D. J. Brennan to Sullivan. The Director stated that he wants the name of the FBI Agent who had furnished certain information to Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver. The Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, on 2-20-70, repeating the background of this matter and reiterated the protest made earlier by the Bureau and asked that CIA obtain the identity of the FBI Agent.

Helms advised that he considered this a most serious development and fully recognizes the gravity of the situation since it has such a significant bearing on relations between the two agencies and the highly important work of both organizations. He stated that he does not have the identity of the FBI Agent and so far Todorovich has refused to disclose same. Helms advised that he is requesting Todorovich to proceed to Washington, D. C., immediately at which time he will be interviewed in detail by Helms. In the meantime, the CIA Director is requesting his subordinates to prepare for him a complete report covering all information in possession of CIA regarding the subject. He stated that he will communicate with the Bureau immediately after talking to Todorovich. He stated that it was absolutely necessary that he make certain that he has all the relevant facts so that he can accurately respond to the Director and take the proper and necessary administrative action within his own organization.

I shall await events.
H

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 25, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On February 24, 1970, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Richard Helms had instructed him to transmit the following message to the Director.

Pursuant to instructions from Helms, Mike Todorovich, CIA representative in Denver, arrived in Washington, D. C., on February 24, 1970, and Helms initiated his interview. Helms expects to complete the interview including an examination of various CIA records within two days, upon the completion of which he will be transmitting a personal letter to the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "Werner acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. Papich has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. Michael Todorovich. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to Dr. Joseph Smiley, then President of Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, now President of a university in El Paso, Texas, and to the District Attorney of Denver, Mr. James McKevitt. In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. Todorovich to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. Todorovich and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. Todorovich was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. Todorovich maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. Todorovich explained that the Riha/Galya Tannenbaum cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

The purpose of Mr. Todorovich's conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on Dr. Joseph Smiley. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. Todorovich affirms that before going to District Attorney McKevitt he called upon the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Scott Werner, and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. Werner to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Werner acted properly. H

Mr. Todorovich states that Mr. Werner refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. Werner engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. Todorovich. Subsequently, Mr. Todorovich conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding Dr. Smiley and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. Todorovich. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to Dr. Smiley and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. Todorovich, I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. Todorovich.

~~SECRET~~

I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent in any way [illegible]
[illegible]

While the following is not pertinent to your request, my review of this case suggests the advisability of a re-examination of Riha's disappearance and past activities and, necessarily, the Tannenbaum case. Briefly, since 1958 we have communicated to your Bureau significant information which relates to Riha's involvement with Czech and Soviet intelligence services, when he was behind the Iron Curtain. I attach for your information and convenience copies of pertinent reports regarding this aspect of the case.

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Helms forgets this is a two way street. H

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contacts with CIA in future to be by letter only. H

Attachments - a/s

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. The January 1970 receipt of information from your Bureau that Mrs. Ruth Ann COOK, Thomas RIHA's mother, had mentioned rumors of her son's work for CIA in letters to the SAC, Denver, caused us to verify the fact RIHA has never been employed or used operationally by this Agency.

2. In 1958 and 1959 you were provided information that RIHA, when transitting Prague en route to Moscow, was contacted by Czech Intelligence and asked to remain in the CSR. Later in 1958 Czech Intelligence introduced RIHA to the KGB in Moscow and our source reported RIHA accepted certain privileges from the KGB while asserting he would not become a spy for the Soviets. Details reported by our source about RIHA's KGB contacts did not emerge during a 1960 FBI interview of RIHA.

3. This indication that RIHA may not have been truthful in 1960, when added to our current knowledge about KGB interest in recruiting American exchange students and RIHA's 1968 trip to the USSR, suggests the circumstances of RIHA's disappearance might be re-evaluated. This Agency is reopening its file on this case in view of the information disclosed in the attachments.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COPY

27 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. The following report concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect the repatriation of Subject, a naturalized American East-West Exchange student, to his country of origin was recently submitted by a source of this office.

2. Source first became acquainted with Subject during the past year at The Russian Research Center, Harvard University. On 10 September 1958 he ran into Subject by chance at the SAS office in Vienna as the two boarded a SAS flight to Copenhagen via Duesseldorf. During the trip Subject disclosed the following to source which has been supplemented from information from our files.

3. RIHA, who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 17 April 1929, is one of the twenty American students selected for the East-West Exchange Program and will be studying in the USSR for the 1958-59 academic year. Files in this Agency indicate that RIHA arrived in the U. S. on 15 July 1947 and became a citizen in 1952.

4. Our source informed ~~us that RIHA~~ had gone to Prague, June of this year, to see his father and other relatives. His father and mother are divorced and according to information in our files, his mother is listed as Mrs. Ruth A. COOK. address: 2023 Etna Street, Berkeley 4, California.

5. RIHA told our source that when he arrived in Prague he was put into a Government hotel for three days before he was allowed to stay with his relatives and friends. During this time, and perhaps later, RIHA was accompanied through the city by a guide whom he described as a "Government Official" name unknown, who attempted to effect Subject's repatriation to Czechoslovakia. RIHA told our source that this man has set up an appointment (date and address unknown) to meet him in Moscow to talk further.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. Subject told our source that this "Government Official" did not mention Czech Intelligence or Security Forces as such and that he (RIHA) is not too worried concerning this contact. RIHA apparently feels that it is the price he must pay in order to study in the Soviet Union and once he gets deeply into his studies in Moscow he feels that he can plead that he is too busy with his academic work to have contact with any officials. Our source also stated that RIHA is in some kind of correspondence with the Czech official. We have no description or name for the Czech official.

7. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office, and that our source be fully protected in the event that contact is made with RIHA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/751,690

cc: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

COPY

21 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CS CI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958 concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect Subject's repatriation while the latter was in Prague in June of 1958 visiting relatives en route to study in Moscow during 1958-59 as an East-West Exchange Student. The following report describes further action taken by the KGB in Moscow to cultivate Subject, and was recently submitted by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. Sometime in December 1958, Subject again met the Czech Official who had tried to have Subject repatriate to the CSR in Prague last summer. According to our source, it was apparently an accidental meeting at a Moscow railroad station as the Czech was returning to Prague. The Czech was delighted to see Subject, and introduced him to a Soviet official. This Soviet identified himself only by a first name and a telephone number, both unknown to our source. The Soviet described his work as being in the American Section of the MVD.

3. This Soviet Official has been cultivating Subject (trying to see him as often as possible, sometimes twice a week) since their introduction in December, by offering such blandishments as trips in a chauffered private limousine into forbidden areas outside Moscow, tickets to any entertainment, access to material from previously inaccessible archives, the use of private country villas and all the "beautiful, interesting and intelligent girls" he might want. Subject has further been promised the opportunity of returning to the Soviet Union for as long as he wants at any future date. He would have to pay only his way over there; his expenses and return trip to the US would be paid by the Soviets.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

4. Subject has taken advantage of this offer to take several trips for sightseeing into forbidden areas around Moscow in a private car with the Soviet Official, and has also taken up a few offers for entertainment. Subject visited one of these villas, but refused the girls on the ground that he wants a woman to like him for himself, and not because she has been told to do so. The Soviet answered that "some of them will really learn to like you for yourself, as well as work for us," but Subject still declined to get involved. However, Subject has recently been taken up by a Soviet girl who had previously tried to seduce another American student and subsequently blurted out that she was put onto the latter American by the MVD, which she has also told Subject. Subject is reported to be responding warmly to her approaches although he has flatly told her he doesn't trust her nor any Russian completely. He claims he enjoys her company but will not have a serious affair with her, and suspects she may be tied up with the other women offered him by the Soviet Official.

5. In his relationship with the Soviet Official, Subject is reportedly aware that he is playing a risky game, and is only utilizing the situation for the comfort and convenience it brings him. He has told the Soviet frankly that he cannot be wom over ideologically. Subject says he feels that the Soviets' interest in him is to cultivate him as a scholar of possible future importance to insure that he will always be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Subject has reportedly told several other American students of his relationship with the Soviet Official in order to cover himself "in case anything happened".

6. This Soviet Official has evinced an interest to Subject in many of the American Exchange students, with the explanation that some would undoubtedly be back in Moscow within two years as Diplomats and that since this is his area of responsibility, he wants to know as much as possible about them. The Soviet indicated that he was quite aware of the pattern of the American Exchange students' trips to the US Embassy and what they do in the university buildings, but is not so sure of their activities around the city. To demonstrate to Subject his knowledge about the American students, the Soviet Official mentioned an affair going on within the American group of which Subject had been unaware. The Soviet's information turned out to be true.

SECRET

7. Subject was described by a reliable source, who knows him from group social gatherings at Harvard, as mature and socially vivacious with a warm personality. Subject is a clever and humorous conversationalist who likes to be surrounded by people, make new acquaintances, and develop friendships. Subject's patriotic motivation was not known to our source, but the latter felt that Subject was completely "Americanized" in manners and interests. Our source would guess that Subject has courage.

8. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you either before or after his return to the United States.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

[illegible]
JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/754,303

SECRET

COPY ~~SECRET~~

2 June 1959

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CSCI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958, and our CSCI 3/754,303 of 14 April 1959 in which are reported the attempt by Czech Intelligence to induce Subject, a Czech-born naturalized American, to repatriate to Czechoslovakia, and the further cultivation of Subject by the KGB in Moscow where Subject is an Exchange Student during 1958-59. The following report describes further action by the KGB to recruit Subject, and his adamant refusal of any such offer. This latest information was recently received from RIHA by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. During April 1959, the Soviet Official ~~who said he~~ was from the American Section of the MVD (sic) and who had been cultivating Subject, allegedly asked the latter to make complete and regular reports on Michael Martin LUTHER, one of the other American Exchange Students at Moscow University. Subject was asked to spend as much time as possible with LUTHER, and to report where he goes, what he does and with whom he associates. If Subject were to do this reporting, the Soviet Official said he would make available certain material from Archives which Subject has been unable to get permission to use although research in this material is vital to his having a successful year academically in Moscow.

3. Subject alleges he flatly refused this "deal", saying that if he ever got mixed up in such a dirty business, it would be for his own side and not for the Communists. The Soviet Official then told Subject he should engage in such observation and reporting to the Soviets to lose some "naivete" about how the United States is exploiting the Cultural Exchange Program for intelligence purposes. To back up this assertion, the Soviet Official told Subject about a "spy nest where spies deposit things for one another" which he said had recently been uncovered near a university entrance frequented by still another American student, Walter CLEMENS, who, the Soviet implied, was not engaged in academic work only while studying at Moscow University.

~~SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Subject reportedly again adamantly refused to cooperate with the Soviet Official.

4. In paragraph 4 of CSCI 3/754,303, reference was made to a Soviet girl who had become interested in Subject, and whom Subject viewed with suspicion although continuing to see her for her companionship. Her name is Lida (Y)EGOROVA. Subject has now reportedly been alienated by her undependable personality and has pretty well broken up with her. This girl may have left, or soon be leaving, for Prague to join her husband.

5. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[illegible]

James Angleton

CSCI 3/754,373

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
14

DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to letter from Richard Helms, Director, CIA, dated February 26, 1970.

Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised Helms on February 27, 1970, that (1) the Bureau is discontinuing all contact with the CIA office in Denver and (2) that direct Liaison with CIA at headquarters is being terminated. Helms was further told that henceforth our communication with CIA will be by letter only.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing that all contact with the local CIA office be discontinued.

G14
10

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CODE 3/2/70

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC DENVER

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL CIA OFFICE.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5-5-70

FROM : D. E. Moore DEM/wcw 6-4-70

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 4:35 p.m., today I telephonically contacted ASAC Morley, Denver, and advised him that an article concerning the Riha case had appeared in the Sunday News (New York) 4-3-70. This article was a general rehashing of the Riha case.

I told him that the Bureau desired that SAC Werner contact the District Attorney to determine the developments of his investigation in this case and also determine what conclusions had been reached. Morley said this would be done.

Morley was asked if Denver had information concerning a professor who had gone to El Paso, Texas, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and he advised this probably referred to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President at Colorado University who was there when Riha disappeared. He said that Smiley is now President of the University of Texas, at El Paso, Texas. He said Denver had no information that Dr. Smiley has any current information concerning this matter.

SAC Werner called at 5:30 p.m., today to advise that he had been unable to get in touch with the District Attorney but also was following up on this and would contact the District Attorney today and get in a teletype tonight.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

NR002 DN PLAIN

5:15 PM URGENT 5-5-70 DCM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

REBUTELCAL TODAY.

PURSUANT TO REQUEST IN REBUTELCAL, THIS IS TO ADVISE THE PROFESSOR WHO ALLEGEDLY WENT TO EL PASO OR NEW ORLEANS CONCERNING THOMAS RIHA HAD AND HIS DFISAPPEARANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY DR. JOSEPH SMILEY , FORMER PRESIDENT, COLORADO UNIVERSITY, BOULDER, COLO., WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS IN EL PASO, TEXAS.

DR. SMILEY WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY CIA AND ADVISED BY CIA THAT RIHA WAS ALIVE AND WELL.

AS BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED, CIA ATTEMPTED TO ATTRIBUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE WAS NO FEDERAL VIOLATION OVER WHICH THE BUREAU HAD INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST, NO FBI INVESTIGATION WAS

REC-35

END PAGE ONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

CONDUCTED.

DENVER FILES CONTAIN NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA OTHER THAT THAT PREVIOULSY SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU.

DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES MC KEVITT, GENERALLY KNOWN AS MIKE MC KEVITT, ADVISED TODAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA IS AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ALL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MC KEVITT STATES THAT HE FEELS GALYA TANNENBAUM, FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RIHA, MAY HAVE KILLED HIM IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MC KEVITT'S INVESTIGATION INDICATES THERE WAS A VERY BAD FEELING BETWEEN RIHA AND TANNENBAUM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DISAPPEARANCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT TANNENBAUM WAS FORGING CHECKS ON RIHA'S ACCOUNT.

FULL BACKGROUND CONCERNING TANNENBAUM PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED BUREAU UNDER CAPTION "GALYA TANNENBAUM, AKA, IMPERSONATION," BUFILE UNKNOWN, DENVER FILE FOUR SEVEN DASH THREE ONE NINE ZERO.

MC KEVITT SAID INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT TANNENBAUM

END PAGE TWO

WAS PROBABLY A NYMPHOMANIAC AND THAT SHE AND RIHA HAD HAD CONSTANT SEXUAL AFFAIRS AND THAT SHE HELD THIS AS A CLUB OVER HIS HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORGERY OF THESE CHECKS.

IN ANY EVENT MC KEVITT STATES IT IS HIS OPINION THAT RIHA IS DEAD SINCE HIS INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALS RIHA WAS VERY ATTACHED TO HIS FRIENDS AND MC KEVITT FEELS THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS FRIENDS IF HE WERE ALIVE. MC KEVITT ALSO ADVISES THAT INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE INDICATES RIHA WAS VERY ABNORMAL IN HIS SEXUAL DESIRES AND PURSUITS AND THAT THIS WAS HIS GREAT WEAKNESS; THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WOMEN ALONE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THESE INVOLVEMENTS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS DEATH.

IN VIEW OF THE DETAILS AND FACTS SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY INTERVIEW WITH DR. JOSEPH SMILEY IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU.

END

WJM FBI WA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: May 6, 1970

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Pursuant to Director's request Denver District Attorney James "Mike" McKevitt interviewed 5/5/70 as to investigation of Riha, Czechoslovak-born, naturalized, former professor of Russian history at Colorado University, who departed Denver area 3/69 without notifying friends, associates or estranged wife. His disappearance has been glamorized and spiced up in newspaper articles by references to Galya Tannenbaum, his paramour. McKevitt stated investigation at standstill, all leads being exhausted. He feels Tannenbaum may have killed subject since bad feeling developed between them prior to his disappearance due to her forging checks on his account. Further, Tannenbaum probably a nymphomaniac who had constant sexual affairs with Riha and used this as a club over his head to prevent disclosure of forgeries. In McKevitt's opinion Riha is dead since he was close to his friends and if alive would contact them. Investigation indicates Riha abnormal in his sexual desires and could not leave women alone. Possibility exists one of these involvements may have resulted in his death.

Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President, Colorado University, where subject employed, is now President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas. Smiley after subject's disappearance stated subject was alive and well. When challenged by McKevitt to disclose basis for statement he refused and appealed to CIA, his source, for help. Bureau vigorously refuted CIA's claim that Bureau Agent was original source for statement. As result McKevitt publicly announced statement was not true and resulted from "honest mistake." No indication Smiley has any facts to contribute concerning subject's current whereabouts or basis for his disappearance. Since Bureau has conducted no investigation into Riha's disappearance, interview of Smiley could result in impression Bureau entering case. However, if Director so desires, El Paso will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley. Bureau files show subject attended Moscow University 9/58-9/59. Our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958. In 1958-59 CIA advised Czech intelligence attempted to persuade Riha to repatriate and later introduced Riha to Soviet intelligence which attempted his recruitment. After subject's return to US in 1959 no information was developed as to continued interest in him by Soviet intelligence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: THOMAS RIHA
105-78256

ACTION:

If the Director so desires, El Paso will be furnished background information regarding Riha and will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley.

Yes.

H.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/7/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Rememo A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 5/6/70, by which the Director instructed we interview Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas.

At 1:40 p.m., 5/7/70, I telephoned ASAC Jay Cochran, Jr., El Paso, and furnished him background of this matter. I instructed him to have Dr. Smiley contacted immediately, to make it clear that the FBI was not investigating the Riha matter and to inquire of Smiley if he has any new information regarding Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

ASAC Cochran was told to send the results of this interview of Dr. Smiley immediately by teletype to the Bureau. He was also told that in the event Dr. Smiley is out of town or otherwise unavailable for interview, a teletype should be sent immediately to the Bureau advising as to when the interview would be conducted.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 5/8/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference memorandum A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/6/70, same caption, by which the Director instructed that Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, be interviewed as to any knowledge he possessed concerning Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

Dr. Smiley was interviewed 5/7/70 and was most cooperative. Smiley stated since leaving the University of Colorado in 6/69 his knowledge of developments in this case has been derived from articles he has read in "The Denver Post." He speculated Riha may have been involved in intelligence work and based this comment on Riha's being a "loner" and having married a Czech girl. He said he had no evidence to support this speculation. He said that he was aware that one Mrs. Tannenbaum, a woman indicted in Colorado for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of Riha. He concluded that he had no further information concerning either Riha's disappearance or his whereabouts.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

3L (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/8/70

nsmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, EL PASO

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIJA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
SINO-SATELLITE SECTION

ReButel call to EP, 5/7/70;
EP tel call to Bureau, 5/7/70.

In accordance with the request of the Director, SA FRANCIS J. PRASEK interviewed Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, President of UTEP. Dr. SMILEY was advised that the FBI has no jurisdiction in this matter, nor is it conducting any active investigation regarding RIJA, and that we were simply desirous of being advised of any new information he may have received regarding RIJA's disappearance and/or present whereabouts.

Dr. SMILEY, who was most gracious and pleasant, stated that he left the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, in 6/69, and has since that time followed the investigation of RIJA and his disappearance which is being conducted by the newspaper "The Denver Post".

SMILEY, in 4/69, approximately three weeks after the disappearance of RIJA, contacted RIJA's attorney for the purpose of determining whether the attorney had any information regarding RIJA, since it was necessary for SMILEY to know whether RIJA was alive and whether he intended to return to the University for the fall semester of 1969 to resume teaching in the History Department. SMILEY, who cannot now recall the name of the attorney, was furnished an address for RIJA in Montreal, Canada, and a letter was directed to this address by the History Department seeking information regarding RIJA and his intentions.

②-Bureau (RAM)
1-El Paso

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After leaving Boulder, SMILEY was advised by Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, that a letter was received by the University purportedly written by RIJA in which he stated that he would not be returning to the University. BRIGGS advised SMILEY that in his opinion, the letter was a forgery, since the signature did not compare with that of RIJA.

After the disappearance, SMILEY began receiving a great many inquiries from the news media and he was pressed for a statement regarding his knowledge of RIJA and whether or not he was alive.

THE FOLLOWING WAS FURNISHED BY DR. SMILEY IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE FBI AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION TO ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY SINCE HE WAS BREAKING A CONFIDENCE WITH AN ASSOCIATE IN THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Being hounded by the press for a statement, he contacted a source in the CIA Office at Denver since he, SMILEY, was formerly a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, thinking that perhaps that agency could assist him off the record with any information it might possess. SMILEY was aware that the CIA had interviewed RIJA following a trip by RIJA to the Soviet Union. The CIA source subsequently told Dr. SMILEY to merely advise the press that he had information to the effect that RIJA was "alive and well". This information was subsequently released by Dr. SMILEY to the student press at the University of Colorado, and it appeared in print.

When the Office of the District Attorney in Denver instituted investigation into the disappearance of RIJA, SMILEY was contacted by the DA's Office regarding the source of his statement. Dr. SMILEY again contacted the Denver CIA Office source and was advised that he was to state nothing and that he would be recontacted.

Some days later, the CIA source recontacted him and told him that he would be receiving an inquiry from the Office of the DA in the form of a statement, and that he should agree with the statement even though it "was not quite the truth". SMILEY did not question

these instructions, since he felt that CIA knew what should be done in this type of case. He received a telephone call from the DA's Office and a statement was read to him to the effect that the information which he had received and made public to the effect that RIJA was alive and well was in error. SMILEY told the caller that he agreed with the statement and nothing further came of this.

Dr. SMILEY does not know what part, if any, the CIA has in this case, but since he, SMILEY, is himself a former intelligence agent he did not feel that he had the right to question something which might be of vital importance to his country.

DR. SMILEY REQUESTED THAT NO HINT OR INFERENCE BE GIVEN TO THE CIA WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT HE HAS REVEALED TO THE FBI HIS CONTACTS REGARDING THIS MATTER WITH THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CIA.

He stated that though he has no evidence to substantiate his belief, he cannot get it out of his mind that RIJA may have been a double agent for the Soviets or the Czechoslovaks. He is aware that one Mrs. TANNENBAUM, a woman indicted for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsonic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of RIJA. He never knew RIJA to be associated with any such woman, but stated that he was not acquainted with the personal life of RIJA who was somewhat of a "loner".

RIJA, when he joined the staff of the University of Colorado, was single but in 8/68, an individual came to visit RIJA ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a marriage between RIJA and the man's sister. The intended bride was a Czechoslovakian girl who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and this "brother-in-law" was entertained by a member and colleague of RIJA in the History Department. This individual indicated to SMILEY that although the "brother-in-law" supposedly did not speak any English, and had RIJA translate every statement into Czech, it was apparent from the gestures and expressions of the "brother-in-law" that he understood more than he let on. Three weeks after the visit of this man, the woman who became Mrs. RIJA came to Boulder, Colorado, where she and RIJA were married. The marriage resulted in divorce a short time later and the girl reportedly returned to the East Coast from whence she came.

Dr. SMILEY indicated that he has no further information regarding this matter, but that Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, should be in possession of the letter purportedly written from Canada by RIJA, and may be in a position to assist in answering any question the Bureau might have regarding RIJA's association with the University of Colorado, since BRIGGS would have possession of these records. He stated BRIGGS is a trusted confidant of his and Dr. SMILEY's name should be used as an introduction should the Bureau desire any information of BRIGGS.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, which forwarded a memorandum of the same date for your approval and forwarding to the SSC in partial response to its request of April 30, 1975.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of an additional memorandum which completes the response to the Committee's request.

A copy of the memorandum for the SSC is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

LFS:mjg
(9)

Sect 102 Referred
HSC Ser 94. (8/24/75 ky)
11/16/76.

REC-102

62-116395-263

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 JUN 25 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, provided a partial response to this request and advised that it would be necessary to clear Section 102 of the Manual of Instructions with other interested agencies.

Section 102 has now been cleared with the other interested agencies and is available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstein or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:mjg mjs
(8)

NOTE:

Third agency considerations have been resolved by coordination with other appropriate agencies. Section 102 pertains to relations with other agencies.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

LFS

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-11[illegible]-263

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Sections of the Manual of Instructions not Previously Furnished
Section 102 of MOI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6-13-75

Received by: John T Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC J. T. Elliff
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part 2.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In response to above-cited SSC request, the SSC was advised that designated Sections, with one exception, of FBI Manual of Instructions were available for review at FBI Headquarters. By communication 6/11/75, SSC was advised excluded Section, which involved third agency considerations, is now available for review at FBI Headquarters.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC
EWS
5-7 AM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY on Intelligence Activities

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a staff member of captioned Committee of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, former Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb lhb
(12)

P. V. [illegible] 4509 JB

Hand carried by Paul V. Daly 6-12-75 PVD/ljp

edm

REC-102

62-116395-262

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000
MOR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG, III, BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Armstrong, who was formerly Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. Mr. Armstrong furnished the information following his interview by SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein. The interview took place in Washington, D. C., on June 6, 1975, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. Mr. Armstrong was not put under oath and was not advised of his rights including his right to personal counsel.

Mr. Armstrong advised that the interview covered the following areas:

1. The general activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division, particularly Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning research conducted in the Intelligence Division concerning the possibility of obtaining an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters;

2. The alleged existence of files in former Director Hoover's office;

3. Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning the increase in the number of FBI representatives assigned abroad as Legal Attaches.

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SPaRm/lmf

MOR-16

62-116395-262

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. 1
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE BY SSC

With regard to the effort made to obtain an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters, Mr. Armstrong advised the SSC representative that in May, 1972, one of the principal questions raised by Mr. Gray was concerning the jurisdictional authority of the FBI to conduct intelligence or security investigations. He commented that in May, 1972, a conference was held at Quantico, Virginia, involving a number of Bureau executives and that during this conference the question of jurisdictional authority was discussed. Following the conference, a special team was set up to discuss this subject, including Mr. Armstrong and former Special Agent Thomas Smith of the Intelligence Division. According to Mr. Armstrong, it was felt that it would be appropriate to develop a new set of guidelines and not to rely on prior statutes and Presidential orders. Armstrong recalled that after several meetings of this group, Thomas Smith prepared a document consisting of 43 pages which was completed approximately six weeks after the group was created. Armstrong recalled that the document was received in the Acting Director's office and was discussed at one of the regular afternoon staff conferences. At that time it was agreed that the document was good but that the timing was not thought to be appropriate. The thought was expressed that it would be held in abeyance until after the coming elections. It was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the matter might have been discussed between Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Gray, and it was decided not to push the matter until after the elections. Mr. Armstrong recalled advising Mr. Smith of the location of the document and the fact that it was being held in abeyance until after the elections.

The matter of the above document did not come up again until shortly before the confirmation hearings concerning Mr. Gray. At that time it was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the Bureau should not push for the Executive Order until after a

permanent Director of the Bureau had been confirmed. Mr. Armstrong advised that to the best of his knowledge the document was not given to the Department of Justice while Mr. Gray and his staff were in the Bureau.

Concerning files that were allegedly maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Armstrong stated that shortly after Mr. Gray's arrival in the Bureau he made a statement to the effect that there were no secret files maintained by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Armstrong commented that he doubted the wisdom of making such a broad statement.

Shortly after Mr. Gray's statement was made, information came to Mr. Armstrong's attention which caused him to prepare a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating the possibility of the existence of files in Mr. Hoover's office. Armstrong could not recall Mr. Gray's response to his memorandum but he believed that the original of the memorandum was returned to him and that he placed the original and the carbon in his desk along with other memoranda that he had prepared for Mr. Gray.

Mr. Armstrong stated that it was his theory that the files in Mr. Hoover's office were in two categories; the first being files containing information possibly detrimental to prominent persons in the Government and the other category being tidbits of information received in personal correspondence from various Special Agents in Charge concerning persons of possible interest to Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Armstrong advised further that at one of his daily conferences, Mr. Gray mentioned that he had talked to former Acting Associate Director Mark Felt concerning files which may have been maintained in Mr. Hoover's office and which he said were then in a safe in the custody of Mr. Felt.

Mr. Armstrong could not recall whether Mr. Gray and Mr. Felt were to go through the safe together or whether Mr. Felt was to do it alone and advise Mr. Gray of his findings.

With regard to the present location of such files, Mr. Armstrong had no specific knowledge but speculated that if they existed they might have been destroyed before Mr. Gray arrived in the office, they might have been retained in Mr. Felt's safe or they might have been removed to the custody of Mr. Clyde Tolson or Miss Helen Gandy at Mr. Hoover's house.

Mr. Armstrong advised that on April 27, 1973, prior to his departure from the Bureau, he destroyed all of the memoranda he had retained in his desk and he is certain that among them was his memorandum concerning files in Mr. Hoover's office.

With regard to the increase in the number of Legal Attaches, Armstrong advised that he recalled that shortly before Mr. Gray came to the Bureau there had been an expansion in the number of Legal Attaches. He understood that traditionally the role of the Legal Attache had been to function as a liaison representative to foreign police agencies but that with the expansion in the number of Legal Attaches they were given additional responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, exactly to what extent he did not recall. He recalled that the expansion was at the initiation of the White House and may have been because the White House was not satisfied with the intelligence collected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Armstrong stated that he saw a potential for friction with CIA and speculated that this might have been a factor in the breach of liaison between the FBI and CIA. He recalled writing a memorandum for Mr. Gray expressing doubts as to whether the training of Special Agents of the FBI equipped them for the collection of foreign intelligence and some subsequent discussion that

perhaps the Legal Attaches should be brought home for such training, but that this idea was concluded to be impractical or unnecessary.

1 - The Attorney General

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☒	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

To the Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting interview of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, formerly Special Assistant to FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, by SSC Staff Member.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Authorities for FBI's security investigations

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interview included following topics: general activities of FBI's Intelligence Division, including FBI's authorities in security investigations; files maintained in former FBI Director Hoover's office, and increase in number of FBI representatives abroad as Legal Attaches.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

wdc

SFP:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 CFS

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

276-10483

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter, and appendices thereto, from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are an original of a memorandum and enclosures which are responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 6

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-260

RDS:lek|ek
(10)

REC-102

17 JUN 25 1975

3 CA

WRW

PLM

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/dmf
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to the SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, Item 10, the SSC requested all records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D. C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D. C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August, 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

In respect to 10a, on 12/9/64 a travel voucher was processed for payment to former Special Agent Lish Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. Accompanying the voucher was

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SPRum/lmf
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RDS:lek lek
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 by Whitson to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air travel from Washington, D. C., to Miami and return. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Whitson in connection with the aforementioned travel.

In respect to 10b, former Special Agents DeLoach, Adcock, Manning (correct name Donald Manning), Linebaugh (correct name Harold Leinbaugh), and Special Agent Todd submitted travel vouchers for August, 1964. However, no GTRs were issued by them.

In regard to 10c, William C. Sullivan was the issuing officer of a GTR made out to Southern Railroad for travel from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta and return in the amount of $74.55. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Sullivan in connection with the aforementioned travel. Sullivan submitted a voucher for 11/28-30/64 in the amount of $37.10.

No other records are available concerning the travel and expenses of the individuals mentioned in 10a, 10b and 10c.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The data regarding the GTRs and the travel of the individuals mentioned in the memorandum was obtained from the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. In connection with 10a, 10b, and 10c, all expense vouchers of the individuals mentioned in these items have been destroyed under the Five-Year Retention Document Schedule Rule.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP[illegible]

MDR-16

62-116395-260

ENCLOSURE

The United States of America
Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

A3,925,564

Void after 19

BILL TO **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D.C.

The National Airlines Company is requested

to furnish coach class air transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC

to Miami, Florida + return

for use of Lish Whitson and others with accommodations

from to with authorization

to transport not over lbs. of excess baggage from

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE ON TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

PLACE OF ISSUE Washington DC Nov 21, 6[illegible]

I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)

0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT	TOTAL
107.40		107.40

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a

Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
May 1, 1955, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.
2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.
3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10482

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a

Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S., [illegible] General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

PASSED
VO
149/0
DEC 16 1964

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.

2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.

3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10112

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/1/2000 BY SP2 evm/lmf

MDR-16

62-116395-260

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

BILL TO

A 3,991,399

To Southern Railroad ... Company is requested
to furnish first class rail transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC
to Atlanta Ga. with via Southern #13

for use of William C. Sullivan and others with accommodations

Place of issue: Washington DC 11-25-64

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director F.B.I.

0500

21-60

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

48.95	25.60	74.55
		TOTAL

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

The United States of America
Transportation Request

-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/12/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard F. Taylor Jr. Date: 16 Jun 75 2PM

Received by: Sherry Powell

Title: Asst Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf

mor-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/12/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 10.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

SURVEILLANCE

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was furnished with information and documents relating to travel on the part of Bureau personnel in connection with SSC inquiry into this Bureau's use of electronic surveillances.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
EWS
5- TJM

TREAT AS YELLOW
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAT
MDR-16

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General with a letterhead memorandum attached enclosing a copy of a memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups." It appears that we are proposing to give the copy of the Gale memorandum to the Senate Select Committee in response to their request by letter dated May 14, 1975, for a memorandum prepared by Gale relative to the subject matter of the 1964 memorandum.

My reading of the memorandum revealed that it is a purely deliberative document which quotes personal views of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Gale. I am concerned that the release of such a memorandum containing not only the personal views of Bureau officials, but also identifying them by name could have an impact on individuals in the future who may be asked to furnish their opinions concerning policy matters in the FBI. As indicated by the Attorney General in his speech in New York, it is essential that the Executive Branch have a degree of privacy concerning policy discussions and expressions of personal views by officials in order for the Executive to function properly.

I do recognize that we may not be able to resist giving the Committee access to material documents that bear on particular issues under investigation, however, I do recommend that when we are required to produce deliberative documents, the names and other identifying data relating to individuals furnishing views be deleted.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

REC- 102

62-116395-259

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DATE 10/14/2000 BY SP2 alm/mjc
MDR-16

JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

[redacted]

84 [illegible] 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the names of individuals described in the body of the memorandum of July 30, 1964, and other identifying data be deleted prior to furnishing the copy to the Committee.

2. In regard to future responses to requests for documents of a deliberative nature that our policy be that names and identifying data will be deleted prior to disclosure of the documents.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Former Special Agent Richard H. Davis of the Atlanta Office telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 6-4-75 at which time he explained that he had been contacted by Michael Epstein of captioned Committee at which time Epstein requested that Davis make himself available for interview in either Atlanta, Georgia, or travel to Washington, D. C. Davis informed Epstein that he would have to obtain Bureau approval prior to submitting to interview inasmuch as he had to obtain a release from his employment secrecy agreement.

Mr. Davis informed SA Daly that he was reluctant to agree to being interviewed by captioned Committee concerning his activities as an Agent. It was pointed out to Mr. Davis that the decision as to whether to agree to interview was his, but he was advised that captioned Committee has subpoena power and might attempt to force him to furnish information through the use of a subpoena. He was informed that the Bureau was cooperating with captioned Committee and their inquiry into FBI operations.

It was explained to Mr. Davis that if he desired to allow himself to be interviewed, the Bureau would make available an employee at his request to be available but not present during interview. He was also advised that this Agent would not represent him as private counsel. Mr. Davis was advised that the Bureau's concern was not of matters of historical fact but rather testimony might be required which could impair the Bureau's efforts to discharge its responsibilities. It was also explained that the Bureau representative would assist him in making determination whether his response to a particular question would identify confidential informants, impair ongoing investigations, divulge information derived from other Government agencies or foreign sources or expose sensitive investigative techniques and, therefore, a response should not be given.

REC-102

62-116395-258

Phillips

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Personnel file, Richard H. Davis
1 - Mr. ~~W. O. Cregar~~
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

JUN 25 1975

PVD:dkg (8)

84 JUN 25 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Davis indicated that he desired a Bureau representative be made available during his interview and would request the interview take place in Atlanta, Georgia. Additionally, he stated Epstein had indicated that the topic of discussion in the interview would be the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Mr. Davis stated he would recontact FBI Headquarters as soon as a date and place of interview had been determined. He indicated he would set the date for interview so that the Bureau would have ample opportunity to have an Agent available. We have separately requested Bureau approval for the release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

granted per 5x8 note on 6/4/75 tel.

ACTION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an Agent for the interview of Mr. Davis when and if a date and place are agreed upon.

pvd JBH/pvd

JBA/PLM

Wannall had designated SA Phillips per R/S 6/9/75

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Associate Director

____________, 1975

- Director
- ~~Mr. Callahan~~
- Mr. Jenkins
- Mr. Adams
- Mr. Feeney
- Mr. Ash
- Mr. Bassett
- Mr. Cleveland
- Mr. Cochran
- Mr. Decker
- Mr. Gallagher
- Mr. Gebhardt
- Mr. McDermott
- Mr. Mintz
- Mr. Mooney
- Mr. Moore
- Mr. Walsh
- Mr. Wannall
- Mr. Mack
- Mr. O'Connell
- Miss Tietgen
- Mrs. Mutter
- Miss Downing
- Miss Southers
- Mrs. Haines
- M ____________

Room ____________

- Mrs. Metcalf
- Telephone Room
- Corres. Review
- Mail Room
- Teletype
- Personnel Records
- Mechanical Section
- For Appropriate Action
- For Your Approval
- Initial and Return
- Please Call Me
- For Information
- Per Conversation

Sent July 1 '75

Do we have any amplification of This instruction. Or, do we know of any submission responsive to This which illustrate interpretation

K

Item #6 (tabbed) re

"items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities"

Should create Congressional furor.

Paul L. Mack
Room 7004, Ext. 5606

C-102

62-116395-257

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/
MDR-16

84 JUN 26 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/18/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Reference is made to Bureau letter to The Attorney General 6/20/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)," forwarding letterhead memorandum for approval and forwarding to SSC.

The Director asked if we have any amplification of this instruction (to submit items with unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities for dissemination to the President under the INLET Program) or do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation?

There has been no amplification of this instruction, nor any submission under INLET of an item on prominent personalities that would show the interpretation of this point.

With respect to the observation that this matter should cause a congressional furor, it is noted that INLET has already been afforded considerable publicity, beginning in February, 1973, after an office memorandum on the subject reached the news media. This publicity is why the Senate Committee asked for documents on INLET. The White House and Senator Bob Packwood inquired about the Program. A detailed defense of INLET appeared in the Congressional Record.

By way of background, the INLET instruction that has received the most publicity--items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities--was recalled by the author of the INLET Program initiating letter as having been specifically dictated by then Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan.

TEB:lek
(8)

REC- 102

62-116395-256

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY 5Q2ALM/CNF
MDR-16

17 JUN 24 1975

5-EWF

84 JUN 25 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY

While we cannot say exactly what former Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan had in mind when he added the instruction about items with an unusual twist, we can speculate with a hypothetical example.

If we learned that a trusted assistant to an important government official--an official who had taken a "hard line" with respect to dealings with the Soviet Union, for example--was under development by Soviet intelligence, this would be an unusual twist to an item of intelligence interest to the President involving a prominent person.

In such a hypothetical case, we would, of course, advise the government official involved, and The Attorney General and the President. We would have done this under INLET and we would still disseminate this type of data. INLET was only a vehicle for special dissemination.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

1.0

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

John Elliff of captioned Committee's task force on Domestic Intelligence Activities advised on 6-9-75, that the Committee is planning to have a Bureau representative testify concerning the FBI's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic and counterintelligence areas in late June or early July. Mr. Elliff stated that this testimony would be before the Senators and will be a general exploration of jurisdictional authority. Mr. Elliff also volunteered that he had told K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination of the Department, that the Committee wanted to be furnished a copy of the T. J. Smith Memorandum dated 7-31-72 concerning FBI's investigative jurisdiction in domestic and counterintelligence matters. Elliff stated that at this point, a summary of such documents would not be an acceptable substitute. Elliff desired such a document be made available to the Committee prior to the aforementioned testimony. With regards to testimony, Elliff indicated that it would not necessarily have to be the Director giving a testimony.

Elliff stated as he finalizes his plans concerning the testimony concerning FBI investigative jurisdiction, he would recontact SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and give more details concerning this matter.

62-116395

REC-59 62-116395-255

ST-101

5 JUN 12 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
  Attn: Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Kelly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]
MDR-14

84 [illegible] 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

With regards to the request concerning the Smith document, we should await K. William O'Connor's request prior to taking any action concerning this matter, and with regards to testimony, we should await further details prior to engaging in the preparation of that testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Int W.RW ✓ HEM
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Mr. Cregar
4123 JEH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 19 1975

TELETYPE

REC-102

NR 026 LA PLAIN

10:14PM NITEL 6-18-75 RLD

TO DIRECTOR (62-1~~16464)~~

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-1700-4124)

ATTN: INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

SENSTUDY 1975.

RE BUTEL TO LOS ANGELES, JUNE 17, 1975.

THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY INSTANCE THAT WAS ALLUDED TO IN CAPTIONED AIRTEL AND THERE ISNO RECORD OF ANY AGENTS BY THE NAME OF RON MASCAR OR WILLIAM MILLER ASSIGNED TO THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION SINCE 1956 TO PRESENT.

END

HOLD

REC-102

62-116395-254

12 JUN 24 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

FIVE

84 JUN 24 1975

Black Panther Party



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

MARCH 1971

"WE ARE FROM 25 TO 30 MILLION STRONG, AND WE ARE ARMED. AND WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OUR SITUATION. AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO CHANGE IT. AND WE ARE UNAFRAID."



WARNING TO AMERICA

[illegible]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Table of Contents

I. FOUNDING 1
II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES 3
III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY 6
  Invasion of California State Legislature 6
  Police Officer Meets Panthers – and Death 6
  "Free Huey" Campaign 6
  Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver 7
  International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver 7
  Rise of the Black Panther Party 8
IV. LEADERSHIP 9
  National Committee to Combat Fascism 10
  International Section 10
V. FUNDS 12
VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS 13
VII. TACTICS 15
  Target: Police 15
  Attacks on Others 15
  Weapons Caches 16
  "Revolutionary Suicide" 16
  Panther "Justice" 18
VIII. PROPAGANDA 20
  Editorials 21
  Inflammatory Articles 24
  Provocative Slogans 29
  "Revolutionary Art" 30
  International News 35

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE FBI AS A BRIEF STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND, TACTICS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE ORGANIZATION'S OWN PUBLICATIONS WERE THE SOURCE FOR MOST OF THE MATERIAL REPRODUCED.



LET US HOLD HIGH THE BANNER OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNALISM
AND THE INVINCIBLE THOUGHTS OF

HUEY P. NEWTON

MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE.

I. FOUNDING

The Black Panther Party, with headquarters in Oakland, California, was founded in 1966 by two Oakland Negroes – Huey Percy Newton and Bobby George Seale – both at that time at Merritt College in Oakland. The name and symbol of the new party were taken from the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, an Alabama political party known informally in 1965 as the Black Panther Party.



HUEY PERCY NEWTON

From the writings of communists, revolutionaries, and black militants, Newton and Seale allegedly selected ideas around which they could build a revolutionary frame that suited the needs of their party. Influential writings included those of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader; Frantz Fanon , West Indian psychiatrist who advocated violence for Algerian nationalists; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one-time lieutenant of Cuba's Fidel Castro and a principal architect of 20th century guerrilla warfare; Malcolm X, American black nationalist who advocated violence to obtain Negro "freedom"; and W. E. B. DuBois, Negro educator who became a member of the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93.



BOBBY GEORGE SEALE

The organization was at first called the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense; however, the "Self-Defense" was removed in 1968 in an effort to project a more politically oriented image to prospective sympathizers and supporters.

As head of the new Black Panther Party, Newton assumed the title Minister of Defense, and Seale was named Chairman. When questioned about the membership of their organization, Newton and Seale gave the since oft-repeated reply: "Those who know don't say. Those who say don't know." The militancy of the group, however, had an immediate appeal to the discontented, restless youth of Oakland's ghettos.


HUEY NEWTON
BOBBY SEALE

Black Panther Party Chairman, Bobby Seale, and Minister of Defense, Huey Newton, selling Red Chinese magazine and "quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung."

3-2-67 San Francisco, Calif.

II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES

The Black Panther Party "Platform and Program" is repeated in each issue of the official Party publication, The Black Panther.

October 1966

Black Panther Party Platform and Program

What We Want What We Believe

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. **That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.** Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. **But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.**

III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Proclaiming a legal right to bear arms, the Panthers by early 1967 had begun to appear in public wearing black leather jackets and black berets, openly carrying shotguns, rifles, or pistols, and shouldering bandoliers of ammunition.

Calling the police "pigs," the Panthers began a buildup in Negro areas of the idea that police departments, especially that in Oakland, were dedicated to the brutalization and harassment of minority groups, and, acting as an appendage of white government authority, were working toward the eventual annihilation (genocide) of the Negro race.

Invasion of California State Legislature

The first incident that brought national attention to this group occurred on May 2, 1967, as the California Legislature was in session in Sacramento. Approximately 40 members of the Black Panther Party, carrying loaded rifles, pistols, and shotguns, and some wearing bandoliers of ammunition about their waists or draped over their shoulders, burst into the Chamber. They were protesting a bill being introduced on that date outlawing the carrying of loaded weapons in public and were proclaiming their right to bear arms and criticize the police. Before they were arrested, they passed out mimeographed leaflets calling on all Negroes to end the "terrorist" oppression of colored races by white America and referring to the preparation of concentration camps in the United States as a beginning of genocide.

Police Officer Meets Panthers--and Death

The Panthers became more militant with the passing of time. At 5:00 a.m., October 28, 1967, two Oakland, California, patrol officers, John F. Frey and Herbert C. Heanes, made a routine traffic violation car stop. While the officers were awaiting the results of the car registration check by radio, the driver, Huey Newton, got out of the car. Suddenly, shooting broke out. Officer Frey was killed; Officer Heanes was wounded critically; and Newton received a stomach wound. He stopped a passing automobile and had the driver take him to a hospital where he was taken into custody and hospitalized. After a state trial, which began July 15, 1968, Newton was sentenced on September 27, 1968, to serve from 2 to 15 years on a charge of voluntary manslaughter.*

"Free Huey" Campaign

Two days after Patrolman Frey's death, the Huey Newton Defense Fund was established at a meeting of a section of the Negro community of Oakland.

The cry of "Free Huey" became a clarion call. The imprisoned Newton was built up in the public eye as "black and bold in defense of his people." Each

---

**It was ruled later that the presiding judge in this trial erred in instructions to the jury. Newton was released August 5, 1970, and scheduled for retrial.*

bringing its own axe to grind, such organizations as the anarchist New Left group named Students for a Democratic Society; the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Communist Chinese-oriented Progressive Labor Party; the Communist Party, USA, and its youth affiliate, the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America; and militant campus groups, black and white, began to gather in support of the Panthers, who were willing not only to defy the establishment, but to destroy it.

LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver

Early in 1967, the Panthers were joined by a recent parolee from the California prison system, author of a best-selling autobiography, *Soul On Ice,* staff writer for the magazine *Ramparts,* and admitted Marxist – Leroy Eldridge Cleaver.

In *Soul On Ice,* Cleaver wrote: "I sought out his (Marx's) books...It was like taking medicine for me to find that, indeed, American Capitalism deserved all the hatred and contempt that I felt for it in my heart...."

After Newton was jailed, although he remained the undisputed leader, it soon became apparent that Cleaver, designated Minister of Information, was projecting a major leadership image. The Party began to further widen its publicity, nationally and internationally, and enlarge its radical support and revolutionary intent.

As an example of this spreading influence of the Panther Party, the 1968 National Election ticket of the Peace and Freedom Party, a coalition of radical groups, included Cleaver as candidate for the Presidential nomination; Newton as candidate for the 7th Congressional District of Alameda County, California; Kathleen Cleaver, 18th Assembly District, California State Legislature; Bobby Seale, 17th Assembly District, California State Legislature. Cleaver received a national total of almost 200,000 votes. Only a small percentage of the California electorate cast their votes for Newton, Seale, and Kathleen Cleaver.

On the evening of April 6, 1968, Cleaver and several Panthers became involved in a shoot-out with Oakland police officers. The incident resulted in the death of a Panther, the wounding of two police officers, and the wounding and arrest of Cleaver. Cleaver's parole was revoked immediately and he was returned to prison. After much publicity, he was later released on bail by a Superior Court Judge who ruled that the jeopardy of his parole status stemmed "from his undue eloquence in pursuing political goals...offensive to many of his contemporaries." This decision was overruled by the District Court of Appeals and upheld by the California Court of Appeals. Cleaver was ordered to return to prison by November 27, 1968. Electing to become a Federal fugitive, he disappeared in late November, 1968, going first to Havana, Cuba, and later to Algiers, where he has established residence.

International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver

Soon after Cleaver's arrest in the spring of 1968, approximately 150 prominent individuals sponsored the establishment of an International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. The committee intended to dispatch a team to Europe to gain

international support and arrange for a European edition of Cleaver's book, *Soul On Ice*.

Rise of the Black Panther Party

In May, 1968, the hard-core membership of the Black Panther Party was estimated at only 125, and Panther activity was confined largely to the San Francisco-Oakland, California, area. However, because of the dramatic shoot-outs, the "Free Huey" Campaign, the funds established for the defense of both Newton and Cleaver, the widespread publicity, and the support given readily by white radical groups and individual sympathizers, the Black Panther Party began to grow rapidly, not only in membership but in militancy and influence. Chapters began to appear in major cities throughout the country. By the end of 1968, the membership had reached nearly 2,000, with additional thousands of sympathizers and supporters.



PAGE [illegible] THE BLACK PANTHER SEPTEMBER [illegible], 1968

1968: BALLOT OR THE BULLET

KATHLEEN CLEAVER,
COMMUNICATION SECT.,
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

18th ASSEMBLY DISTRICT
S.F. PEACE & FREEDOM PARTY

SHOOT YOUR SHOT

IV. LEADERSHIP

Organizationally, the Black Panther Party is set up to be under a Central Committee composed of the following positions:

- Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander, held by Huey Newton
- Chairman, held by Bobby George Seale
- Minister of Information, formerly held by Leroy Eldridge Cleaver
- Chief of Staff, held by David Hilliard
- Minister of Education, held by Raymond (Masai) Hewitt
- Communications Secretary, formerly held by Cleaver's wife, Kathleen
- Minister of Culture, held by Emory Douglas
- Field Marshal, formerly held by Donald Lee Cox

The position of Assistant Chief of Staff, not included among the Central Committee, is occupied by Roosevelt (June) Hilliard.

Under the Central Committee, the chain of command extends to leaders and officers of local chapters.

DAVID HILLIARD

RAYMOND (MASAI) HEWITT

KATHLEEN CLEAVER

EMORY DOUGLAS

DONALD LEE COX

National Committee to Combat Fascism

Set up to coexist with Black Panther Party branches in various cities in the United States are chapters of another organization called National Committee to Combat Fascism. In actuality, there is little difference between the two. This group, a Panther Party front, was set up as the result of a revolutionary conference, called National Conference for a United Front Against Fascism, held in Oakland, California, in July, 1969. The conference, sponsored by the Black Panther Party and assisted by the anarchist Students for a Democratic Society and the Communist Party, USA, was called to form a coalition of black and white radicals, described as "oppressed people."

The National Committee to Combat Fascism is considered by Party leaders to be the "political organizing bureau" of the Black Panther Party. Its specific task allegedly is to raise the political level of the people and educate them against the system.

International Section

On September 13, 1970, the International Section of the Black Panther Party officially opened in Algiers. Joining Cleaver on the staff were his wife, Kathleen, and Field Marshal Donald Lee Cox, a fugitive from justice. Cox faces charges of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, based on a warrant issued on April 20, 1970, at Baltimore, Maryland. He also failed to appear on May 14, 1970, in San Francisco, to answer Federal firearms charges.

This section, in its entirety, was expelled from the Black Panther Party by Huey Newton on February 27, 1971. The expulsion resulted from tensions and differences between Party hierarchy which led to disruptive factionalism.

D.C. greeting African brothers



Chinese 2nd Ambassador (R), Press Attaché (M) and Cultural Attaché (L) talking with Eldridge

Opening attended by cross section of Liberation Movements

Scenes from opening of International Section, The Black Panther, October 31, 1970

V. FUNDS

The money by which the Black Panther Party operates comes from a number of sources. There are substantial private contributions; fees for public appearances, such as campus speeches, radio, and television appearances; payments for magazine articles; collections for trials and bail funds in this country and abroad; subscriptions and individual sales of the Party's official organ, *The Black Panther;* fund-raising activities sponsored by sympathizers and supporters; sales of recordings of interviews and speeches; and financial aid from radicals and extremists.

According to the press, there is reason to believe that the Panthers, to obtain additional funds, are engaging in criminal activities, such as burglaries and robberies.

VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS

Panther Party leaders insist their primary aim is to serve the "people," meaning ghetto blacks. To establish good intent, Party officials have set up a series of community services aimed at recruiting members and sympathizers and building Party influence in ghetto areas. These programs, described by the Panthers as "socialistic" programs, are supposed to be carried out by all Party branches and include: "liberation schools" to give "our people a knowledge of self"; free health clinics, with money, medical supplies and professional services donated by laymen and professionals in the community; free clothing programs, with clothing donated by the community; Community Information Centers, to "answer the basic needs of the people"; and a monthly free shuttle bus service for families of blacks in prison. Few of these programs actually are carried out, and those that have been attempted have been mostly unsuccessful.

The program that has received the most publicity is the "breakfast program," devised as a further means of indoctrinating Negro youth in Panther teachings of racism and rebellion. As expressed in *The Black Panther,* June 14, 1969, "The youth we are feeding will surely feed the revolution." Breakfasts are held for ghetto children either at churches, housing projects, Panther Community Information Centers, or other space that can be obtained free of charge. Panthers usually ask local businessmen to donate food or money to this program, boycotting stores that refuse to participate. At these functions, children have been known to sing such chants as: "I am a revolutionary. I am a revolutionary. There's going to be some barbecue if Huey's not set free. Power to the people."

In 1969, Panther "Coloring Books" were printed and given out at these breakfasts. The books contained 22 pages of drawings teaching the children to distrust, hate, and kill police officers.


I am a Revolutionary
PEOPLE'S FREE SHOES PROGRAM
PEOPLES FREE CLOTHING PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE FOOD PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE BUSING PROGRAM
Emory

SURVIVAL PENDING REVOLUTION

HUEY TOLD ME THAT THE PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING REVOLUTION. BUT WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE REVOLUTION, HUEY SAYS, "WE THE PEOPLE ARE THREATENED WITH GENOCIDE, BECAUSE RACISM AND FASCISM ARE RAMPANT, NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD." HE SAYS, "WE INTEND TO CHANGE ALL THAT. BUT IN ORDER TO CHANGE IT, THERE MUST BE TOTAL TRANSFORMATION. BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THAT TOTAL TRANSFORMATION, WE MUST EXIST. IN ORDER TO EXIST, WE MUST SURVIVE; SO THEREFORE WE NEED A SURVIVAL KIT." SO THAT WE CAN GROW UP HEALTHY WITH A MIND THAT CAN BE FUNCTIONAL AND CREATIVE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
YOUR COMRADE IN ARMS

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

VII. TACTICS

The Black Panther Party is a violent revolutionary group whose members provoke confrontations with law enforcement officers and whose leaders incite racial hatred and preach urban guerrilla warfare.

Target: Police

Panthers claim that black communities are occupied by the police in the same way and for the same purpose that foreign troops occupy conquered territory and that these forces, operating under "establishment" orders, are engaged in gradual annihilation of the black race. Blacks, according to the Panthers, must, through urban guerrilla warfare, use guns to liberate themselves from the ever-present repressive enemy. Children in Panther "schools" do their exercises to the rhythm of: "There is a pig upon the hill – if you don't kill him the Panthers will."

Numerous claims have been made that the Black Panther Party is an innocent victim of police persecution and genocide. This charge is rendered absurd by fact. During 1970, 6 police officers were killed and 22 wounded through acts of violence traced to the Panthers. One officer, in 1969, was killed by a Panther with a shotgun blast at point-blank range as the officer lay wounded and helpless on the ground.

Out of 20 members named by the Panther Party as "killed in cold blood" by the police, four were killed by members of a rival black extremist group on the west coast; one died of barbiturate intoxication; one was shot and killed by a store owner during a robbery attempt; one was killed by his wife over a love affair he was having with a female Black Panther; and another was allegedly tortured and killed by Panther Party members. Of the remaining twelve, two were found dead on the street, the victims of unknown assailants, and ten were involved in shoot-outs with police officers.

Attacks on Others

Panther attacks have not been limited to the police. While claiming their intent to protect the black community, Panthers have assaulted and threatened citizens who have tried to assist the police.

Neighborhood stores have been forced to "contribute" food supplies and money under fear of Panther violence. Many other persons have also been victimized, as shown by the fact that in 1969 alone 348 Panther members were arrested for serious crimes, including murder, armed robbery, rape, bank robbery, and burglary.

On April 21, 1969, 21 members of the Black Panther Party were charged in New York in a 30-count indictment with conspiring to bomb public places and murder policemen and with possessing dangerous weapons.

Weapons Caches

Stockpiles of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, thousands of rounds of ammunition, Molotov cocktails, gunpowder, and accumulations of bayonets, swords, and machetes have been confiscated from Panther offices.

''Revolutionary Suicide''

On August 7, 1970, Superior Court Judge Harold Haley, the Deputy District Attorney, and three other persons were tied together with piano wire and dragged from a San Rafael, California, courtroom and taken as hostages by three armed Negro convicts, one of whom was standing trial for stabbing a San Quentin prison guard. The escapees were assisted by the defendant's 17-year-old brother who supplied them with weapons for the escapade. Judge Haley, who had a sawed-off shotgun taped to his neck, and the other hostages were forced into a waiting van. When the authorities tried to stop the kidnappers, the judge was brutally murdered; the Deputy District Attorney was injured seriously; and another hostage was slightly wounded. Three Negroes were slain and one was wounded.

Immediately thereafter, Huey Newton declared the killing of Judge Haley as being of ''historical'' importance to the Black Panther Party. This declaration was based on the Panther belief that all black prisoners, regardless of their crimes, are political prisoners and should be released.



OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT CRUISER INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6, 1968, GUNBATTLE WITH MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

CONFISCATED PANTHER WEAPONS

The perpetrators of the courtroom incident were lauded by the Panthers as setting another "revolutionary example for black people." In commenting further, *The Black Panther* of August 15, 1970, stated:

> *"The example that these brothers have set will be followed by many and many will rise to choose revolutionary suicide rather than reactionary suicide. Black people will unleash in great numbers the Black kamakazi..."*

In his eulogy at services for the slain Negroes, Newton said: "Our comrades have taught us all a revolutionary lesson. They have intensified the struggle and placed it on a higher level."

Panther "Justice"

Recalcitrant members of the Black Panther Party are sometimes victims of Panther "justice." As one example, Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was brought to trial in New Haven, Connecticut, for the torture-murder of Panther Alex Rackley. Rackley, a Panther suspected of being an informant, was scalded, murdered, and dumped in a swamp.

For a variety of reasons, many members have been purged from the Party. These incidents are usually written up in *The Black Panther* in special articles accompanied by photographs.


WASH ROOM
OLYMPICS
if you're not part of the solution... you're part of the problem.

PANTHER HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JUNE 4, 1969

EXPELLED

WEEKS, EXPELLED

So let this be heard throughout the black community, of Atlantic City, New Jersey. That Leonard Weeks is no longer a servant of the people. That he is no longer the breakfast coordinator for this community center, or for that matter no center ran by the Black Panther Party. He has become slip-shod in his duties as a servant to the people, many times he has been warned by his comrades, about his work, and about his duty to the people's children. He deserted the children of the black community, there were days he would not attend the breakfast program, because he said that he was tired or that he overslept. Well we cannot adhear to this because as revolutionaries we must prepare ourselves to be a match for a hundred. We must prepare to run ourselves to death if need be, so that the people shall be served, and to see to it that they truly have a right to the best. And we have no time for slip-shod niggers. We must hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must confirm to the people's interest, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected, that is what being responsible to the people means.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Black Panther Party N.C.C.F.
Community Center
Atlantic City,

FOOLS RUSH IN

Harold Wright, number one fool in Pittsburgh, rushed out of here and into Baltimore.

HAROLD WRIGHT, FOOL

The National Committee to Combat Fascism has no time for crazy dumb fools who run around pimping off the people's just struggle for freedom and self-determination This modern day mad man can't seem to find himself or anything else for that matter. He started out, helping to put this office together and after a long train of was put out. Harold didn't like this and started to hang around our office trying to give the community the impression that he was still a member of the revolutionary ranks of Babylon.

After a few days of the breakfast program, his wife Michelle decided that she loved Harold more than the people and went with him.

We say goodbye to the Wright family and other love birds (like the Johnson's) who can't deal for the people.

So let this be heard, Harold and Michelle Wright are not members of the National Committe to Combat Fascism nor will these fools ever be.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
National
Committee to Combat Fascism
574 Brushton Ave.
Pittsburgh, Penn.
(412) 242-4728

The Black Panther,
June 20, 1970, p. 8.

VIII. PROPAGANDA

Although posters, pamphlets, recordings, and a singing group called "The Lumpen" are among propaganda vehicles used by the Black Panther Party, the main channel to the public is through their official organ, *The Black Panther*. Funds permitting, it is published weekly in Oakland, California. It includes editorials by Party leaders and spokesmen; provocative slogans; inflammatory articles; revolutionary art," comprising cartoons; and an international news section.

Excerpts from Article carrying
Typed Signature of Eldridge Cleaver.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1970 PAGE 4

TO MY BLACK BROTHERS IN VIET NAM

I'm writing this on January 4, 1970. We are starting out a new year. On August 31, I'll be 35 years old. I'm married, and I have one child with another one on the way. I am in love with my wife and I would like to enjoy a happy life raising a family. But I am not free to live the type of life that I would like. Pigs--the racist fascist rulers of the United States--won't let me....

We appeal to you Brothers to come to the aid of your people. Either quit the army, now, or start destroying it from the inside. Anything else is a compromise and a form of treason against your own people. Stop killing the Vietnamese people. You need to start killing the racist pigs who are over there with you giving you orders. Kill General Abrahms and his staff, all his officers. Sabotage supplies and equipment, or turn them over to the Vietnamese people. Talk to the other Brothers and wake them up. You should start now weeding out the traitors amongst you. It is better to do it now than to allow them to return home to help the pigs wipe us out. Especially the Uncle Tom officers should be dealt with now, because the pigs will use them as effective tools against our people. When you can no longer take care of business inside the army, then turn yourself over to the Vietnamese people and tell them you want to join the Black Panther Party to fight for the freedom and liberation of your own people. If you do cross over, you don't have to worry about the Vietnamese people abusing you. They will be glad to see you drop out of the army because what they want most in life is to stop the fighting in their land. You have a duty to humanity as well as to your own people not to be used as murderous tools by racist pigs to oppress the people.



"IF YOU WANT PEACE YOU GOT TO FIGHT FOR IT"

There's too many American flags out here, and our Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, says that the American flag and the American eagle are the true symbols of fascism. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE. Black power to Black people, Brown power to Brown people, Red power to Red people, and Yellow power to Ho Chi Minh, and Comrade Kim Il Sung the courageous leader of the 40,000,000 Korean people....

We say down with the American fascist society. Later for Richard Millhouse Nixon, the Later for all the pigs of the power structure. Later for all the people out here that don't want to hear me curse because that's all that I know how to do. That's all that I'm going to do. I'm not going to ever stop cursing, not only are we going to curse, we're going to put into practice some of the that we talk about. Because Richard Nixon is an evil man. This is the that unleashed the counter-insurgent teams upon the BPP. This is the man that's responsible for all the attacks on the Black Panther Party nationally. This is the man that sends his vicious murderous dogs out into the Black community and invade upon our Black Panther Party Breakfast Programs. Destroy food that we have for hungry kids and expect us to accept like that idly. that man. ***We will kill Richard Nixon. We will kill any that stands in the way of our freedom.*** *We ain't here for no goddamned peace, because we know that we can't have no peace because this country was built on war. And if you want peace you got to fight for it.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

Photograph accompanying Article indicated these are the Words of Chief of Staff, David Hilliard.
THE BLACK PANTHER, November 22, 1969, p. 10.

Editorials

Through editorials, readers are advised of Party positions on national and international issues and are presented with the opinions of the hierarchy on inter-Party matters.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1971 PAGE 2

STATEMENT BY HUEY P. NEWTON, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE, ON THE OCCASION OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY-

MARCH 5, 1971

Power to the People, Brothers and Sisters,

First of all I would like to thank all of you for my very presence here, because if it weren't for the Power of the People, I wouldn't be here tonight. I'm not here because of the Black Panther Party; I'm not here because of any group, I'm not here because of a group of kamakazis. I'm here because of the Power of the People.

We must remember that Revolution is a process. It's not a conclusion; because once we conclude, then we become counter-revolutionary. And that means even with the gun in our hands, because fascism also has a gun. And I would like to say tonight that the Black Panther Party stands against all forms of fascism, including sexual fascism. That we are against all kinds of chauvinism, including racial chauvinism; we're against sexual chauvinism, national chauvinism. We're intercommunalists. Before I went to prison, most of you know, you are aware, that I never made any speeches, you see, because I'm not a very eloquent man. I'm better known by the actions. And the Party was built upon the actions. And the action itself is a process. And we're not ever fixated. We haven't accepted any dogma. And we will not.

And I would like to say this, that from now on the Party itself will be better known by its contributions to the People, for the simple reason that some people around us seem to want to be known through the Media. But the Party can only judge itself through establishing certain survival programs, pending Revolution. Because remember, you make the Revolution. We can't free political prisoners, only the people can free political prisoners. And a people who are not free cannot free their prisoners, cannot free the prisoners that fascism makes. So I would like to say that we must work very hard in order to lift the consciousness of the people. We must free our Chairman Bobby Seale, Angela Davis, Ruchell Magee, the Soledad Brothers, the seven and the three, and all other political prisoners. Randy. We have to free all of them.

But we must remember that we must exhaust every possible tactic. And we must let it be known that never broadcast military tactics for military reasons. It's perfectly correct to broadcast military tactics for political reasons. That's what Uncle Ho said, and I agree with him. So we would like for the people to know that there are many things that we will not discuss in public. But what you can do is watch the fruits of our work. And we would like to say that our Party became an intercommunal Party upon its actions. And I think that's very good. So I'm asking you in order to free all political prisoners, free the people, free the woman and also the man, that we have to get together in unity by substituting verbal expressions for action. The final test of the pie is the action. We'll stand on the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party from 1966 when it was formed will stand on its record, will stand on the action. We won't claim to be ultra-leftists; we won't claim to be infantile leftists. What we'll do is act in accordance with the particular set of conditions and the particular problem that we have at a time. So please judge us upon our actions and we will develop like that. We will not develop with lip service coming from anyone. And sometimes I'm very thankful that I don't talk too well, because that's only one way of communication. We say that a picture is worth a thousand words, but action is supreme.

But what kind of action you take will depend upon the particular set of conditions. And I say all of this, because you know the Party and the world today is under turmoil. And this is very good. We always have welcomed all forms of contradictions. Because without the contradiction there is no transformation. So from the contradiction that has developed now in the world and in the Party, we hope to have a qualitative leap. If this leap eliminates some of us, then, of course, we'll weep for that. But we must not stop the Revolution. I will not stop the Revolution. You should not stop it. And, for all that it's worth, we know that words will never stop it. Words will not start the Revolution either. Only action. 'Sixty-six kicked off the armed manifestation of Revolution in this country, because it focused upon the need for the People not only to defend themselves, but also to develop a consciousness necessary to perform and to act to be able to fight in a protracted war. And that is why it is necessary for us to develop the correct ideology, which is a system of thinking. And we must not rely upon and conclude with the philosophy, which isn't necessarily a conclusion.

So we're ideologically revolutionists. We're in a constant state of change. And we fight with all people who want to change, because we know change will offer our hope. So after all of this, we must pay more attention to what is happening. The news media has attempted to discredit the Party by saying that it's over, because they don't see anyone. I think our programs are better than the Party. The communities are involved in forty-four cities. We must support these; we must expand them. Because I read an article, recently, a few months ago, where Che had some problems in Bolivia, because the peasants were so unconscious until he could not rally them even with the "focos". They did not understand why the military, the regular military was dropping. So what did he do. He attempted to form certain programs that he called survival programs. He attempted to form a free health program in order to get the peasants inside, to help them, and also to provide things for his focos. He also took to form a free breakfast program, a free shoe factory, and a sporting good store (for obvious reasons). So programs are good. Because an act that might be revolutionary might be counter-revolutionary, if the correct preparations are not made.

So to be a serious revolutionist, we must know that we are involved in a process, and not a set of principles or conclusions that are of face-value revolutionary. I do not know one thing that is revolutionary in itself. And all things might be revolutionary in context. In other words, capitalism was revolutionary when it kicked out feudalism. And now we have a situation where the capitalists have become the imperialists, and the people of the world, of the communities of the world will have to kick them out. So in order to free Angela, Bobby, Ruchell Magee and all other political prisoners, we must kick the fascists out. And we cannot do it with lip service.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, APRIL 3, 1971 PAGE 2

BOBBY SEALE: "I AM THE CHAIRMAN OF ONLY ONE PARTY."

March, 1971

This is Brother Bobby Seale, from the New Haven Courthouse, back in jail, back here. And I just wanted to say to the people, the masses of people, to all the brothers and sisters, Women's Liberation Movement, Black brothers and sisters, Chicano brothers, the Puerto Rican brothers, the young revolutionary White youth in America, and especially, all the Black brothers and sisters in the Black community, that I've seen a lot of things happening; and I've took time to analyse what's happening. And I see presently that there're some divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions going on. Now the Party accepts constructive criticism. Constructive criticism! But the divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions and jive tactics of Eldridge Cleaver is doing nothing but aiding the pig power structure. Aiding the pig power structure in their attempt to put in gas chambers and jails over 130 political prisoners, who are presently, like myself and Ericka, caught up in these jails, and are being railroaded to the gas chamber, where we're fighting for our lives in these trials. And this is the only thing that Eldridge's actions are doing. This is the only thing that I can see that is going on. And my analysis shows this.

There is no split in the Black Panther Party, at all. But the main thing that we want to get across, I want to get across, to the people is that the Party is based on Survival Programs to serve the people, and these survival programs - from Breakfast for Children to the recent programs that I'm designing right here in jail, in my time that I'm not in court, which is a decent housing fit for shelter of human beings program - these are survival programs - and this program and all other programs that all other revolutionary organizations have are survival programs, that must sustain the people so the people can wage a revolutionary struggle.

And Eldridge Cleaver, who's denouncing these types of programs and carrying on with all those other divisionary jive tactics, is negating the real meaning of a People's revolutionary struggle. That's why the Black Panther Party belongs to the people, because the survival programs come forth, and we set up the survival programs to sustain the people's revolutionary struggle. Even the Vietnamese people, if one would check it out, have their survival programs; they have their cooperative, functional survival programs throughout their land, amongst their people. The people just don't have guns alone fighting their battle. The people over there have actual everyday, functional, constructive survival programs. In their countries, in their lands, and in their everyday operations in fighting the capitalist pigs who occupy their country, they have survival programs. And those survival programs sustain the revolutionary struggle there. Of course, our survival programs will be directly related to here in America. But I, myself, send solidarity and support to all the socialistic, revolutionary peoples of the world, and the socialistic countries and lands - and the different war zones, where the people, the masses in those lands, are fighting against the capitalistic, imperialistic ruling class circles.

And Eldridge Cleaver - who negates the very survival programs that the Party is trying to set forth, that the Central Committee is trying to set forth, and all the real dedicated, hard-working brothers in the Party are trying to set forth to educate the people and serve the people, these survival programs (that) sustain the people's

to the gas chambers. He's aiding the power structure and causing us to be in the prisons, because the political prisoners are the ones who really initiate and work hard to maintain the survival programs for the revolution, the people's revolutionary struggle.

Only the masses of the people can really free political prisoners. And the people must see the value and the validity of the survival programs. And getting on down to it, so the people can understand where it's at, so that the people, even the supporters that we have all over Europe, all the solidarity committees that are in Europe, that're in Sweden, that are in Denmark, and other countries over there, who support the freedom of political prisoners in this country, who support the survival programs of the poor oppressed people in this country, and the revolutionary movement (who are initiating these programs), I am trying myself to get people to understand, that we are beautifully behind them and we are glad and send greetings to them and praise the people who are in the solidarity committees in other countries, and in fact here in America, here in Ameri-KKK-a. I think that the people really have to understand who and what the Black Panther Party is, so that these reactionary, counter-revolutionary, divisionary tactics will not be misunderstood. The Party is not falling apart. It's just that Eldridge Cleaver has personally defected his own self from the Party. He defected from the Party.

And I, Bobby Seale, am the Chairman of only one Party. And that Party is the Party that Brother Huey P. Newton is the Minister of Defense of and one of the supreme, top servants of the people; that Brother David Hilliard is the Chief of Staff of; that Brother June Hilliard is the Assistant Chief of Staff of; that Bobby Hutton was a member of, before the pigs murdered him. I am the Chairman of only one Party, that Brother Fred Hampton, who loved the survival programs for the people, was Deputy Chairman of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, who Brothers Jonathan Jackson and George Jackson are members of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party, with Huey, David, and the rest of the brothers and sisters on the Central Committee, where the Central Headquarters happens to be located on Peralta Street in Oakland, (California). So All Power to the People. Right On. And we're going to stick together. We ain't coming up with no jive. We have to free Brothers Ruchell Magee, George Jackson; we have to free Sister Angela Davis; we have to free these brothers and sisters. I am the Chairman of only one Party, the Party that Brother Huey is the Minister of Defense, with David Hilliard, June Hilliard, etc. And we're going to free political prisoners; and, we're going to keep these survival programs going; and, we're going to wage a People's revolutionary struggle, and not no jive, individualistic, defecting actions, by some individual who wants to play power games. I am the Chairman of the Party of which the San Quentin Cadre is apart and parcel of the same Party. The San Quentin Cadre of the Black Panther Party.

So all I have to say to the people is that you know where it's at. We're going to stick in solidarity. There're a bunch of jive renegades and jack-a-napes around. But later for that. Just later for that. Let that ride, cause we got survival to get on with, and a People's revolution to mobilize. And we got political prisoners to free all over this land.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
RIGHT ON!

Inflammatory Articles

Many of the articles in *The Black Panther* are written by local Party members and concern regional incidents and issues. They are aimed at provoking national black sympathy and joint retaliation for magnified grievances against the authorities.



RACIST-MAD PIGS SIC K9 POLICE DOG ON BROTHER

On Friday night, March 27, 1970, 14 yr. old Brother John (Little Hot-Rod) Hargrove became the victim of a brutal attack inflicted by a K9 Police dog. This brother along with two other bloods were playfully chasing each other along the sidewalk in the area of Sixth and Snyder Streets. When the brothers approached the corner, one brother ran past brushing against a lady standing at the corner. When this happened the lady immediately grabbed the brother. The two other bloods kept running. Soon after the pig grabbed the brother, a light colored station wagon appeared. In the station wagon were two plain clothes pigs. These pigs immediately proceeded to hand-cuff the blood, beat him in the face, and unleash a vicious police dog that ripped the flesh off the brother'sbody. As the brother tried to escape the blows of the pig beating him in the face, the K9 proceeded to bite him all over his body. While the brother was being beaten by the pig, and attacked by the dog, the other pigs who came along proceeded to chase the other two bloods. The pigs fired a shot barely missing the fore-head of one of the brothers.

Little Hot-Rod, handcuffed, face badly beaten and suffering from dog bites all over his body, was taken to the local police station where he was booked on suspicion of pick-pocketing. He did not receive any medical attention until several hours later at the Philadelphia General Hospital; there they gave him one tetnus shot and put a bandage on each leg. The pig who created the vicious attack was later identified as one of Rizzo's faggot law and order boys of the GRANNY PATROL. The Granny Patrol is a special segment of piggery which employs pigs to dress up as women so that they can arrest suspected pick-pockets.

The party conducted an interview with the bloods who were fortunate enough to get away, we also spoke withthe brother's parents, and were able to visit the brother. at the Youth Study Center. We also spoke with the people in the community who witnessed the horrid incident!

Following are excerpts from the tapes which describe the incident. We cannot use names here of the bloods because it has been passed down that the pigs are trying to round up the other brothers.

The racist pigs approached the brothers by shouting "Get them niggers, get them niggers" They chased the bloods with butcher knives, and what appeared to be an ax. One brother was hit with a pipe in the stomach.

People in the community responded to the arrest and attack angrily. When several people in the community demanded that the pigs call off the dog, they were met with racist remarks from the pigs.

The attack was so vicious, the dog ate the underwear on the brothers body. In addition to bites on the brothers hands, legs and waist the dog also bit the brother in the back and rectum. The brother suffered from severe beatings by the pigs, in the face.

When Little Hot-Rod was visited on Sunday at the Youth Study Center, his body was not healing properly. He related that the nurse only appliesmercurochrome on the bites. He is suffering from soreness. He is sleeping on hard cots in the over-crowded center. The bites on his body are swollen and inflamed. The brother's first remarks to his family were, "Tell my probation officer to get me out of here, this place is like Byberry" .

Just less than two weeks ago, the brother was beaten in a cell Division. This pig beat him so bad that Methodist Hospital complained to the Police Department. His eyes were badly damaged. The pig's name who inflicted that beating was Juvenile Aid Officer, Charles Kora. Hot-Rod identified Kora as his assailant and since then, he has been harrassed in his neighborhood by every pig who comes through.

At 14, John Hargrove is a marked victim of Frank Rizzo's fascists, like so many other Blackyouths in this city. Pigs are on the loose to inflict more physical harm to our people. It is high time that we escalate our war on the pigs and drive them out of our communities.

Seize The Time people of Philadelphia, Rizzo and all of his racist paper tigers can be rightously blown away.

Rosemari Mealy
Philadelphia Branch
Black Panther Party

THE BLACK PANTHER, APRIL 18, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1970 PAGE 9

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY BOMBED, HEROES SUCCESSFULLY ESCAPE



Newburyport, Mass. is a small residental New England town basically composed of people from the White working class. Until last Saturday, September 19, Newburyport's only claim to fame was that it is one of the many small towns surrounding Boston which are strongholds for groups like the Minutemen and other right-wing fascist reactionaries. Last Saturday, however, at 6:00 a.m. in the morning a National Guard Armory was bombed, hundreds of rounds of amimunition ripped off, military personnel records taken and to top it off, they left the scene in a one ton army pick-up truck. They (the bombers) attempted to open the vault holding the weapons of the pig army, M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols and .30 caliber sniper carbines, but were not able to do so. The act was accomplished in one fast motion, and the heroes escaped capture and one week later, "law enforcement officials" are still scratching their heads in wonderment.

And although the weapons, themselves, tools of our liberation were not liberated from the oppressor, the success of this action cannot be denied.

As has been the case in liberation movements all over the world, the guns and arms made by and for the oppressor eventually ends up in the hands of the oppressed. More important, the unknown people who accomplished this act, obtained hundreds of rounds of desperately needed ammunition. Again, past experiences has shown that while the guns themselves can be obtained in ample supply, the ammunition, the bullets, that actually inflicts death upon our enemy, becomes very scarce. One of the necessities of our struggle is our ability to liberate, stockpile, and then accurately use the ammunition of our oppressor upon our oppressor.

As for the military personnel records, they can obviously be put to good use. Our oppressors must be harassed and intimidated day and night. They must not sleep, nor rest, these are the devils who plot the genocide of Black people. The National Guard Armory in the small town of Newburyport, like other small time towns surrounding the Black colony in Boston is designed to be used against us in the fascist genocidal plot devised by the treacherous minds of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell clique. It is to be carried out by those men whose names and addresses are now in the hands of the people. Unknown members of the fascist majority now appear before the people's tribunal and will be judged according to their actions.

This action is just one of many blows which will be dealt out to the oppressor. If this action was intended to help and serve the people, we welcome their help to our just liberation struggle against the Babylonian Empire.

ARM YOURSELF

Michael·Fultz
Boston Chapter
Black Panther Party

SISTER MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY RENT-A-PIG

FIVE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE RAILROADED BY TUCSON GRAND JURY

STORM TROOPERS INVADE COMMUNITY

THREE PIGS BEAT FIFTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK YOUTH

ENTIRE FAMILY BEATEN AND JAILED

Another regular feature in *The Black Panther* is a weekly article giving detailed instructions for the handling of firearms, or setting forth deportment for urban guerrilla warfare.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 9, 1970 PAGE 16

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS HOW TO COMBAT C.M.I.

Part 5

The principal of Juche (Self-Reliance) clarified by Eldridge Cleaver, the Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, is "Use what you got to get what you need." To answer the question of how do you combat the pigs' *C.M.I. (communication, mobility* and information), we must first determine what we have going for ourselves. Checking out the practice of self-defense groups, we see that we have the power to determine what is to happen, when it is to happen and how it is supposed *to go down. What, When* and How (W.W.H.)- the element of surprise. The pigs have C.M.I. and self-defense groups have W. W. H.

To consider a self-defense operation successful is not to just *plan and execute but to plan, execute* AND escape. There have been too many instances where members of self-defense groups have planned and executed righteous blows against this racist system only to be captured, wounded or killed. *These are the consequences* for revolutionary activity, however we must keep casualties within an acceptable minimun. The *slogan must be Maximum Damage* to the Enemy, Minimun Damage to Us. Practice has shown that when planning W.W.H. if it is done with knowledge and an understanding of C.M.I. casualties will be kept within an acceptable minimum. *Too often, much attention* is given to a plan up to the point of execution without giving the same attention to evasion and escape, that phase of the operation that determines success. This is a subjective approach, a onesided *approach. W.W.H. is only one side* of the coin, C.M.I. is the other side. Because self-defense groups use W.W.H., the pigs' C.M.I. does not go into operation until a self-defense group commits itself by actually executing some type of *self-defense activity.*

COMMUNICATION

MOBILITY

INFORMATION

All of us should be aware that once C.M.I. is activated pigs start showing on the set from 30 seconds to 1 minute maximum in every *major city in Babylon, therefore* the success or failure of a defense operation is dependent upon the attention given to C.M.I. and the planning of evasion and escape. As I see it, learning to deal with the pigs' C.M.I. is the number one *military* problem facing revolutionary forces in Babylon today. It is time for all who have something to teach, by example, to step forward. And remember, to die honorably, one does not need company.

USE WHAT YOU GOT TO GET WHAT YOU NEED
D.C.

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

Part 6 ON REVOLVERS

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been in previous issues of the Black Community News Service. This article is on revolvers, it gives a basic run down on the use of revolvers. Check out all of the photographs and notes to help you understand better the functioning of a revolver.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS:

1. Check to see if gun is loaded. You do this on a revolver by swinging out the cylinder. Pull back on the cylinder latch and gently push *out on the cylinder. (see unloading* a revolver photo #2)

2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless practicing trigger squeeze or firing.

3. Point your gun away from where someone may be shot-Point at the ceiling or to the floor, but wherever you point, make sure no one is in the way and can be harmed.

4. Never leave the hammer cocked on a revolver. (Explanation later on cocking a revolver.)

KINDS OF REVOLVERS:

.38 Snubnose - This gun has only a 2" barrel and shoots 38's. It is very easy to conceal.

.38 Special - Has a 4" barrel and shoots 38's.

.357 Magnum - This is the type of handgun the pig carries. The ammo for this is .357 magnum. Metal piercing bullets will pierce an engine block. This is the best type of revolver to have.

.41 and .44 Magnums - Have more knock down power than a .357 Magnum. The Highway Patrol carries these to shoot through car doors, but a .357 will go through a car door also and .357 ammunition is more plentiful.

PARTS OF A REVOLVER: PHOTO # 1

REVOLVER TERMS

UNLOADING:

Holding gun in left hand (pointed in safe direction) release cylinder latch with right hand. (#3). Push out cylinder with the fingers of left hand (#2). Now that you *have swung out the cylinder* and the bullets are visible you gently push down on the extractor and let bullets drop out into your right hand (#4).

LOADING:

To load, simply follow the same steps in unlatching the cylinder. Then drop bullets into the chambers of your cylinder. Gently push cylinder closed, and you are ready to fire. DO NOT SLAM CYLINDER CLOSED, this causes *extra wear on your gun.*

COCKING A REVOLVER:

Put the tip of your thumb on the hammer holding revolver steady in the palm of your hand. Do not put your finger in the trigger. Pull straight back steadily on your hammer spur until your hammer locks back. You gun is ready to *fire, do not put your finger in* the trigger until you are ready to fire. After cocking hammer, place your thumb directly on the frame beside the hammer, resting the tip of your thumb on the cylinder latch. (Photo #4)
Your forefinger should be placed on the other side of the gun straight out just above the trigger guard until ready to fire. Everytime you cock the hammer before firing, this is called single action firing.

PHOTO # 2

UNCOCKING A REVOLVER (LOADED):

Keep your finger off the trigger! With gun already cocked, place your thumb on the hammer firmly. Now with the gun firmly in your hand, pointed in a safe direction, *and* thumb firmly on the hammer (still cocked) squeeze the trigger slowly until you can feel the hammer releasing. IMMEDIATE-

ALL POWER
TO
THE PEOPLE!

LOADING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 3

COCKING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 4

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 6, 1970 PAGE 5

URBAN GUERILLAS

America's complexity will be her downfall, for complex power, communications and transportation networks are unprotected. These systems are the life lines of the industrial and military might of U.S.A. fascism. The source of America's strength is its vulnerable Achilles heel-therefore urban guerrillas, utilizing and relying on information divulged by sympathetic workers, can halt or severely cripple every industry in the nation, and bring fascism crashing to its knees. The dams, power stations, substations and power lines are vulnerable. Highly sophisticated communications networks are used by our enemies for carrying out routine business, and are an extremely important factor, in the fascist reaction to guerilla strikes. The neutralization of the fascist communications lie within the capabilities of urban guerillas.

The disruption of this system would hamper and cripple not only the fascist military but would also effect all industrial outputs. The fascist ruling clique realizes the vunerability of their transportation networks, yet all fascist military forces and industry utilize the railways, the state and interstate highway systems and the airports. Urban guerillas can cut and constantly harass these important links.

Urban guerilla teams highly motivated have already begun to put their theory into practice. Lists are being compiled and are constantly updated on fascist and all enemies of our people, because the location and identification of the enemy is an extremely vital task of urban guerillas. This basic intelligence is necessary for planning retaliatory strikes against our enemies. Where their killer groups, for the most, will be unable to locate guerillas, urban guerillas will, in every attack hit the fascist squarely on the chin. Urban guerillas, being one with the people, must attack like skilled brain surgeons--cutting out the diseased tissue while perserving the good. Their dual purpose is that of destroying all fascist forces and their lackeys, while protecting and serving our people. The fascist ruling clique fears this. They know the Party is preparing to fight until the last of our enemies bites the dust. The Party has dared to take the vanguard role in the struggle and will surely defeat U.S A. fascism no matter what the odds, no matter how great the sacrifice. The Party is aware that the fascists will never lay down their arms of their own accord. And also aware of the direction that U.S.A. fascism is taking in order to survive as long as possible.

In Brazil, the guerilla forces found through social practice that they could best achieve the goal of liberating their people from the strong-hold imposed by the fascist Brazilian oligarchy by waging urban guerilla warfare. Brazil's development as an industrial fascist nation and the economic and social backwardness of the indigenous peasants made the revolutionary forces adapt the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare. The urban guerrillas moved to mobilize the workers, and implement urban guerrilla warfare within the context of their historical experiences with the working class and the fascist ruling class oligarchy. The revolutionary forces have implemented this type of struggle which invariably catches the fascists with their pants down. The type of warfare which turns the asphalt concrete and steel of cities into jungles; into cemeteries for the fascist highly mechanized units and turns his weapons of mass slaughter into paper tigers; into urban jungles where the revolutionary forces can plunge the blade into the hilt in the vunerable life lines of even fascist U S.A In this country as well as in Brazil the fascists tremble with dread at the thought of nationwide attacks by urban guerrilla forces.

In the Pentagon and select centers scattered throughout the U S A., gigantic multimillion dollar computers are manned by hoards of the military. Technicians wrestle with fascism's nightmare-the problem of dealing with urban guerrillas. These machines can only reach an hypothesis drawn from information fed into them. In order for the fascists to test the solutions offered by the computer. they must first circumvent

the frail facade of the constitution and the bill of rights. The fascists realize that if these two pieces of paper were implemented they would be in their graves tonight because the constitution and the bill of rights contain the moral impetus necessary to bring this foul evil economic and social system to its doom.

U S.A. fascists have compiled and are still evaluating information received from South American satellite states who are being beset by courageous urban guerrillas waging relentless struggle with amazing(to fascists)and stunning success. Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, has said that we still have a little time left because the U.S.A fascist ruling clique hasn't programmed all of the people to accept the genocide of the Party and our people yet. For at least a year now, there have appeared in every major newspaper, seemingly innocent space fillers. Articles from UPI-API dealing with the deployment of fascist death squads against the revolutionary forces in South America.

These fillers had the sinister purpose of preparing America for the advent of death squads now in operation in every major urban center. These articles were to prepare the people to accept the first overt actions of the Chicago foul fascist gestapo killer unit. Their predawn kill all--destroy all mission was launched as a pilot, an experimental operation with a two fold objective. One was to put counter-revolutionary theory into practice in America --to bring into the streets the fascist ruling clique's solution to the Party--to test and evaluate the techniques of counter-insurgency urban warfare. The second important objective was to evaluate the response of the people to above ground counter-insurgency killer groups--to see if the people were conditioned to accept the outright fascist terror tactics directed officially by the fascist ruling clique.

Our Party has been and is still the main target of a national dehumanizing campaign. The fascist controlled news media has consistently maligned, viciously attacked and branded our Party as a racist band of blood-thirsty murderers out for their own personal gain. The fascist news media seeks to justify the fascist's program of destroying our people's first line of defense, the Party, and all other organizations which refuse to be either bought off with blood money or intimidated by the repressive fascist forces. The fascist attempts to isolate our Party from the people has been a dismal failure. The liquidation of Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark had top priority on the fascist's pig list. However, neither the people nor our Party were cowed or intimidated by the bestial slaying of these two revlutionaries. The fascist ruling clique made a grave error in underestimating the will of the people and our Party. People from all walks of life and every progressive organization saw through the fascist attempts to isolate and destroy their Party. The people mobilized and rallied mass support for the Party and soundly condemned the actions of Chicago's fascist killer groups.

Make trouble, fail, make trouble, fail again until their doom. This is the logic of fascists the world over. In Chicago, they refused to acknowledge the bankruptcy of their counter-insurgency campaign. In December, in Los Angeles, Southern California, Chapter of our Party, came under attack by fascist killer groups. Although outnumbered and using inferior weapons, our Party repelled and held at bay the fascist shock troops and sounded the end of Chicago type operations in a fuselage of bullets. We learned valuable lessons paid for with the blood of our revolutionary comrades. The fascist ruling clique has seen the support, that their homicidal raids have generated for the Party. They now know that if conditions are favorable, they will receive tit for tat and then some. They now know that Black and all progressive people will not sit idly by and pacify the action of above ground killer groups Fascists have tried to rally the support of the American people to their avowed aims and failed.

Now begins the phase of underground, clandestine operation of fascist directed killer groups. This is all part of the nature of the fascist ruling clique. The fascists will no doubt expand the techniques of their South American lackeys who operate unrestricted, unswayed by either democratic institutions or public opinion. As the tempo of the struggle increases so will the fascist acts of reactionary terror and violence increase. The primary target of forming clandestine kill groups will be both our people and our Party. If we are to survive as a people, this next phase of attacks, and pave the way to victory, it is imperative that our people be armed with the ideology of the Party. For only then will our people be able to cope with, both, ideological and physical attacks initiated by the insane fascist ruling clique. Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, said that our Party must be a living shield that stands between our people and the fascist pigs and that our paper should serve to educate our people so that they will survive.

As the attacks against the Party escalate, so must the awareness of our people be channelled toward acceptance and even more, active participation in urban guerrilla warfare. Phase two of the fascist plans will surely and soundly be defeated. The fascists will awake to find themselves bogged down on that last front. They will be swallowed up in the morass of a people's war. Their graves will be dug by revolutionary urban guerrilla forces amidst the asphalt, concrete and steel of the cities.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEFEAT U S.A FASCISM ON EVERY FRONT

WE'LL ALL BE TOGETHER ON THE DAY OF VICTORY

Randy Williams,
Political Prisoner

REVOLUTIONARY HANDIWORK OF THE URBAN GUERILLA

Provocative Slogans

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE TIME SEIZES YOU!

AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE IS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL

BLOOD TO THE HORSES BROW AND WOE TO THOSE WHO CANNOT SWIM!

DARE TO STRUGGLE...DARE TO WIN!

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS



FOR EVERY PORK CHOP THERE IS A FRYING PAN!

"Revolutionary Art"

The most prominent artist on *The Black Panther* staff is Minister of Culture Emory Douglas. Although he prepares a large number of cartoons, other Panther artists are also represented. These cartoons characterize the Government and local law enforcement as "pigs" and call for the overthrow of the Government and the killing of Government officials, as well as police officers.



THE REVOLUTIONARY ARTIST

When the Black revolutionary artist starts a still life painting, he doesn't see a beautiful vase, or a dish of tasty fruit, against a soft velvet backdrop...he sees only a tattered curtain, rusty cans, a broken dish--empty.

As he seeks out a beautiful landscape to paint, he sees not fertile fields with dancing flowers, and lovely maidens bathing in the sun, but decaying houses, and streets covered with debris, and a Black woman in ragged clothes with tear-stained cheeks.

The Black revolutionary artist knows only oppression, and that his art must relate to his surroundings, and his people, and most of all, his art cannot be abstract and unrelated to his revolutionary people. So he seeks, and finds what our Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton calls "the spirit of the people." As he moves on that, he shows what *Revolutionary Artist* and Minister of Culture, Emory Douglas shows--"the oppressor *hanging by his heels.*"

The revolutionary artist gives his art to his oppressed people.

So with his gun and his brush he shows the spirit of the people moving to crush the oppressor, and this is the essence of revolutionary art. His art then becomes part of the people's revolution.

He knows that only because of the urine covered walls and trash-littered alleys the people's desire for freedom will be replaced with *the BLOOD OF THE OPPRESSOR.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Malik Barafu
N.C.C.F.,
Washington, D.C.

The Black Panther; May 9, 1970; page 18

TO ALL REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS

I would like to take this time to express on behalf of the Black Panther Party our warmest thanks to all revolutionary artists who have given their talents and thoughts to the people through revolutionary art. We would like to say that every artist's work that has appeared in the Black Panther Newspaper this past year has been a great contribution of visual interpretation of the ideology of the Black Panther Party and of the oppressed people of the world.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS
Emory Douglas
Minister of Culture
Black Panther Party


1971 YEAR OF THE YOUTH
YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION
DEATH
TO THE
FASCIST
PIGS
EMORY

EVERY DOOR THAT THE FASCISTS ATTEMPT TO KICK DOWN WILL PUT THEM DEEPER INTO THE PIT OF DEATH



SHOOT TO KILL


DEATH TO THE
FASCIST PIG
PIG

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 3, 1970, P. 9.



THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 17, 1970, P. 16


PIG
Only the power of the people can free political prisoners

THE BLACK PANTHER
MARCH 20, 1971, P. 4

THE BLACK PANTHER
FEBRUARY 6, 1971, P. 5

We will not hesitate to kill
or die for our freedom.


TIER 3
"O" WING
RALPH

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 2, 1970 PAGE 13


OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK
OINK OINK OINK
OINK
OINK
U.S. GOVT.
EMORY
OINK

International News

Panthers profess to believe that American Negroes comprise isolated "colonies" in the heart of the "mother" country, and are part of the Third World, defined as the nonwhite, undeveloped, and underdeveloped countries of the world. The 10-Point Program of the Black Panther Party includes, as a major political objective, a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony to determine the national destiny of American Negroes.

To internationalize their Party and enlarge their importance, Panther leaders have sought acceptance, support, and funds from sources abroad. They have made numerous trips to foreign countries, including Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Palestine, Germany, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Chinese Mainland.

Both at home and abroad, Panther leaders loudly proclaim anti-American sentiments and align themselves politically with the aims and tactics of enemy lands. The international contacts most important to the Panthers are made with revolutionary groups and communist countries, especially those that more closely follow Maoist thinking. The international news section of *The Black Panther* reflects attempts by the Black Panther Party to attract such attention, support, and aid.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1970 PAGE 8

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG
PREMIER OF THE CABINET
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA

June 25th marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S. imperialist aggressive invasion of the DPRK in 1950.

The Black Panther Party takes this occasion to salute the DPRK and the wise and brave leader of the 40 million Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung.

We recognize and respect the long history of resistance and victory that Comrade Kim Il Sung and the 40 million Korean people have contributed to the world wide struggle against imperialism and fascism; the shining examples of socialist construction while under severe conditions of U.S. provocation and aggression, the many brilliant ideological contributions you have made to the socialist camp and in particular the concept of "Juche".

Because of our historical experience in America; because we are faced with no alternatives but genocide or liberation we understand the criminal nature and gangster logic of the U.S. ruling class. Black people are increasingly the victims of overt military aggression and U.S. plots to subvert our struggle for national salvation. Under these conditions we have an increasing awareness that the expulsion of the U.S. imperialist burglars from Korean soil and the reunification of Korea will be a victory for the Korean people and a victory for oppressed people the world over.

We see clearly that the reunification of Korea is not seperate from the salvation of Black and other oppressed people in fascist America. As gang boss Nixon and his mob of criminals intensify their attempts to loot Asia they are intensifying their murderous repression of Black people in America. These attacks will be met with revolutionary solidarity manifested in action, both around the world and in the gangsters lair, and with one-beat-a-hundred fighters in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America; the U.S.A. will surely be brought to the peoples JUSTICE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
U.S.A.

INTERCOMMUNAL NEWS

MEMORANDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE ESCALATION OF THE U.S. WAR OF AGGRESSION IN LAOS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAO PROBLEM

PART II

Application Of The Nixon Doctrine And Escalation Of The War Of Aggression In Laos By The Nixon Administration

UNDER PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC OPINION , NIXON ON MARCH 6, 1970 HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE LOGISTIC AND AIR SUPPORT AND "OTHER ACTIVITIES" OF THE U.S. IN LAOS. He also admitted an increase in the U.S. military activities in Laos. But he tried to argue that those activities were "limited" and of a purely "defensive" character aimed at protecting American lives in South Viet Nam.

But public opinion in the United States and in the world immediately pointed out that that was the first time the highest executive in the United States made an open acknowledgement of the violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos by the U.S. On March 7, Senator Albert Gore declared that Nixon in fact had conceded that "we (the U.S.) have violated the Geneva Agreements". Public opinion has condemned Nixon's allegations as "queer" and "selfcontradictory" (the Japanese paper "Asahi Shimbun" March 9. "Nixon's allegations were misleading. They mentioned only some facts and not everything and showed no sign of any change of policy." (Senators Scranton and Fulbright, March 6 and 9, 1970).

Obivously, Nixon cannot dupe public opinion which bases its judgement not merely on the words but also on the deeds of the Nixon administration during the recent past.

After Nixon came to power, the so-called "Nixon doctrine on Asia" saw the light which consists in providing more U.S. advisers, weapons and firepower to the Asians, while the latter contribute more mercenaries for the U.S. The formula of this doctrine is "native soldiers plus U.S. advisers and maximum logistic and air support" This is in fact a more elaborate and more refined form of U.S. neo-colonialism's wicked policy of making Asians fight Asians, and natives fight natives.

The active application of that doctrine in Laos finds a concrete expression in the steps of escalation taken by the Nixon administration in its aggressive war in Lao. during the past 18 months, escalation in the logistic supply, in the supply of U.S. military personnel and in the use of U.S. combat troops in the "special war".


The Resistance government formed in 1950 against the French Colonialists.

Under the Nixon administration, the amount of U.S. aid to Laos and military personnel introduced into this country have increased at almost the same rate. Compared with the 140 million dollars in 1967, U.S. aid in 1969 rose to 250 million dollars of which only the economic and technical aid accounting for less than 60 million was announced, while the rest was almost exclusively used for military purposes. Thus, military aid - about 190 million dollars a year, - is more than treble the economic aid and makes up [illegible] per cent of the total aid. This figure is approximately the same as estimated by Senator A.J. Allender in a censured report on the scale of American involvement in the war in Laos (AF, Jan. 22 1970). It is necessary to note that what is described as "economic and technical" has also been used for secret activities of a military character. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna, Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, disclosed that the U.S. aid program also covers the CIA activities in Laos. At present, according to a statement of Senator M. Mansfield on September 21, 1969, U.S. aid in Laos had exceeded 300 million dollars a year and continued to increase.

Obviously, the Nixon administration is squandering in Laos more and more money of the American people, while serious social problems in the United States are yet unsettled, because enormous sums are being spent for unjust wars in Laos and in Indochina as a whole.

On March 6, 1970, Nixon said there were 643 advisers and military personnel out of the 1,040 Americans operating in Laos and denied the presence of any U.S. combat troops in Laos. That is not true. Compared with the 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos under the Johnson administration, the figure rose to 12,000 U.S. military personnel, with or without military uniform in the first period of the Nixon administration. Of them, there were at least 2,000 air force advisers, or 800 more than in 1967. The number of U.S. advisers assigned to the "special forces" training centres and regular units of the puppet army increased from 150 to 1,000 (according to a British source, the figure might be 2,000). The U.S. "special forces" operating in southern Laos are estimated at about 1,200 men. Thus there is one U.S. military adviser for every six Laos puppet soldiers (compared to the 70,000 men of the Vientiane army). In addition according to a statement of Senator R. Ottinger on April 24, 1970, at least half of the 45,000 U.S. air force personnel in Thailand (i.e. 24,000) are now directly participating in air activities in Laos. All told, the number of U.S. military men now taking part in military activities in Laos on the ground and in the air has run into tens of thousands at least equal to half of the total effectives of the Laos puppet army.

The running of the U.S. colossal war machine in Laos remains an affair of the U.S. embassy, Nixon's ambassador to Vietiane remains a military proconsul. The paper "France Soir", on March 3, 1970 said everything in Laos is controlled from the building of the U.S. embassy which houses the brain of the war machine. The number of army and air force military attaches of the U.S. embassy exceeds 200, an unusual figure for a foreign diplomatic mission in a country like Laos. The USAID agency in Laos is also operating within the framework of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vientiane and is working for the CIA. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna acknowledged that Laos is the only place where such things [illegible] and he did not approve it.

Of late some 1,500 U.S. "green berets" were introduced into Laos, whose commanders [illegible] (Thailand), U.S. Senator [illegible] Vietnam on February 27, 1970 said the number of U.S. "green berets" in Laos had exceeded that of U.S. military advisers in South Viet Nam in the past. [illegible] 1969 and early 1970, U.S. combat troops took part in ground attacks on the Plain of Jars area, Meng Khouang province. The U.S. magazine "Newsweek" of April 6, 1970 affirmed that the CIA office in [illegible] Viet Nam [illegible] Laos [illegible] d. Har [illegible].

With [illegible], there have been more [illegible] participating in the fighting [illegible]. On March 6, 1970, Senator [illegible] Americans are fighting [illegible] "The fact that [illegible] wear uniforms does [illegible] this one bit. The fact [illegible] combat [illegible] uniform have been fighting in Laos."

continued on next page


New textile factory at Sam-Neua

ON CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG'S DECLARATION OF 20 MAY, 1970

In this declaration, Chairman Mao Tse Tung has set forth a brilliant and timely analysis of the qualitatively new situation that exists in the world as a result of the treacherous new acts of aggression launched by the fascist, imperialist Nixon-

Chinese peoples.

This declaration pulls together into clear focus the revolutionary struggles and the liberation struggles of the people of the whole world, including the revolutionary struggle of the American people themselves.

Speaking specifically for the Black Panther Party, but reflecting the sentiments of millions of oppressed people inside the United States, it has become crystal clear to us that rampant imperialist aggression on the international scale and vicious fascist repression on the domestic scale are the two faces of the criminal government of the United States and the calculated policy of the American ruling circles. For 400 years now, Black people inside the United States have been the long-suffering victims of fascist violence and repression. But under the Nixon-Pentagon clique, this reactionary violence and repression has been escalated to new heights of barbaric cruelty. At the same time, in order to put down the already gigantic and still growing mass movement among White Americans against the wreckless and sanguinary policies and imperialist adventures of the U.S. government, the cowardly Nixon-Pentagon clique has unleashed a bloodbath against the American people as a whole, creating for itself new enemies who have joined hands with those who were already determined to carry out a struggle to the bitter end against an economic, political, and social system that is dominated by the madmen in the Pentagon and that is responsible for the misery and bloodshed all over the world today.

Chairman Mao Tse Tung captures the truth of the situation when he points out the unprecedented isolation of the Nixon-Pentagon clique. Never before have these criminals been so exposed and isolated as they are today. And never before has it been so clear that this criminality can only be ended by the people rising up to seize their own destiny from the handfull of willful exploiters and murderers that now have the power in their hands.

Coupling a revolutionary call to arms with revolutionary optimism in the assurance of victory, Chairman Mao Tse Tung, the great leader of the Chinese Revolution, hero and teacher of the revolutionary people of the world, has performed an invaluable service to all mankind by stepping forward at this time to renew the people's indictment of the common enemy of us all--U.S. Fascism and Imperialist Aggression. These courageous words of Chairman Mao Tse Tung will give new heart to the peoples in their lonely and difficult struggles to throw off the shackles and chains of oppression now being held in place by U.S. Fascism and Imperialism.

Lastly, we wish to point out that only the enemies of the people and those who shirk their revolutionary duties and who are afraid of their own shadows will find fault with Chairman Mao Tse Tung's declaration. For our part, we welcome it, because we have learned, by shedding our blood, that only through relentless struggle, by resorting to arms inside the very house of U.S. Fascism and Imperialism itself, can we gain our freedom and liberation. This is what our experience has taught us and this is the faith that will sustain us as we push forward our struggle..

LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG!
LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLES' WAR!
DEATH TO THE U.S. FASCISM AND IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
Eldridge Cleaver,
Minister of Information
Black Panther Party, U.S.A.

The Black Panther, June 20, 1970, page 16

THE TERROR, BRUTALITY AND MURDER OF MY BROTHERS AND SISTERS IS THE SUFFERING OF BLACK PEOPLE. THEREFORE, NOT TO LET SUCH EVENTS CONTINUE I MUST MERCILESSLY DO AWAY WITH THE LOW - NATURED BEAST THAT BITES THE HAND THAT FEEDS IT.



WE HAVE NO HANG UPS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

3 - Mr. J. A. [illegible]tz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
(1 - P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/13/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

4063

This is to advise of a meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on 6/12/75 in my office in accordance with the request set out in Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum dated 6/4/75.

IS-1 Section Chief J. G. Deegan, Number One Man William H. Atkinson, Unit Chiefs Homer A. Newman, Jr., David Ryan, Garnett T. Tunstall, and Special Agent Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division met with Jack Smith and Lester B. Seidel of the SSC staff.

At the outset Mr. Seidel indicated that SSC would do case studies on various organizations against which the COINTELPRO was directed. Black Panther Party (BPP) had been chosen for the start because many BPP members had been involved in and convicted of criminal activity. He distributed copies of a document (a copy of which is attached) outlining the purpose of the meeting and setting out requests that will be made of the Bureau through appropriate channels in connection with this case study. Included in this document, along with requests for various Bureau documents regarding COINTELPRO as it pertains to the BPP, were requests for a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted, a list of all media persons contacted and a list of all FBI personnel connected with this program and their present locations.

The investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, as relates to the BPP, were described generally to Messrs. Seidel and Smith highlighting the origin of this violence-prone organization and the series of violent confrontations in which it participated in the late 1960s. Mr. Seidel stated that he was specifically interested in ascertaining the extent of COINTELPRO and how it related to the investigation of the BPP in San Francisco - Oakland and Los Angeles. COINTELPRO was stressed only as a procedure which could have been followed in the course of our investigation. ~~No specific~~

62-116395-353

REC-102

Enclosures - 2 ENCLOSURE
62-116395
GTT:eks (10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/

JUN 24 1975

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

instances of institution of counterintelligence activities were discussed, and it was indicated that these activities were minor as far as the overall BPP investigation was concerned.

In connection with COINTELPRO, the Bureau letter to SAC, San Francisco dated 5/11/70 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations" was discussed. Basically, this letter suggests San Francisco consider a proposal that through the use of documents subtly incorporating false information, attempt to give the BPP the impression that the documents were stolen by a disgruntled police employee who is sympathetic to the Panthers. This document was presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security in 1974 and was included in their publication of hearings conducted by that Committee. Messrs. Seidel and Smith wanted to know if the activities outlined in this letter had been implemented by the San Francisco or Los Angeles Offices. He was advised that this letter was not implemented as it had requested comments and recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and that Office had recommended against the proposals contained therein.

Mr. Seidel asked the identity of the SAC who recommended against this proposal and was advised that the SAC there, at that time, would not necessarily have had personal knowledge of the matter. He then asked identity of supervisor who recommended against proposal and was advised this information was available in the field office. Concerning COINTELPRO in general, he inquired as to specific techniques used against the BPP and whether forgery and wiretaps had been a part of the program. He was advised that we were unable to furnish that information without extensive file review.

Mr. Seidel attempted to discuss Special Operations but he was advised that the matter was not within the purview of the current meeting.

Mr. Seidel explained that they would be traveling to San Francisco and intended to interrogate personnel in that Office as well as unspecified outsiders who may have been involved in COINTELPRO. Mr. Seidel stated that he had asked for the meeting with Bureau personnel to obtain background data to aid them in these

interrogations. Both Messrs. Seidel and Smith expressed appreciation for the assistance given them at this meeting and both additionally expressed their feeling that the Bureau had done a good and proper job in its investigation.

During the course of this meeting a monograph on the BPP prepared by the Bureau in March of 1971 was used for background data. Mr. Seidel expressed a desire to have a copy of this document. This document, which is prepared from public source data, was compiled for public distribution and, if you approve, a copy will be furnished to Mr. Seidel.

ACTION:

For your information and if you approve, one copy of attached document entitled "Black Panther Party"* will be sent to Mr. Seidel.

HEH/JGD

GTT

Get written request signed by Chairman of Committee (wrd)

PLM

Not [illegible]

*Per G.T. Tunstall, this document is not classified, made up of public source data, + until it became outdated, was furnished to the public. 6/19/75

Delivered to Sherry Towell of SSC 6/20/75 for delivery to Seidel

Black Panther Party: San Francisco-Oakland (Los Angeles)
Late 1960's through early 1970's

The Committee is examining the extent to which this COINTELPRO program relates to criminal investigation; the results obtained; the relationships between the FBI and local authorities (police and other governmental agencies); media and community leaders; the methods of targeting; techniques used to achieve program goals; legal authority; and authorization procedures and accountability.

To pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents in this initial stage:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the responses thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (e.g., field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO, with explanation of the dispositions thereof;
6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MR
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-253

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and their media affiliation;
8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;
9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to the whereabouts, and relation to the FBI should be indicated:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee requested to be given a briefing concerning counterintelligence programs as applied to our investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco.

Lester Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee who is assigned the area of COINTELPROS, advised that the Committee is preparing what he termed case studies on COINTELPROS in four separate areas. He defined these areas as the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Seidel previously had requested the Bureau arrange interviews of various Bureau personnel whom he considered familiar with the San Francisco Black Panther Party investigation, and at that time stated he intended to interview these individuals in two or three weeks. Mr. Seidel requested that prior to conducting interviews concerning this particular area, he desired to be briefed during the week of June 8 concerning the Bureau's general overall investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, along with the use of counterintelligence proposals against that organization. In this regard he desired that someone knowledgeable in this aspect be made available to brief him concerning this matter.

62-116395

REC- 102

62-116395-252

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 DLM/LMC
MDR-16

5-~~TU~~ STALL

12 JUN 24 1975

PVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 [illegible] 27 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Seidel also stated that he was submitting a written request to the Bureau for certain Bureau documents pertaining to the COINTELPRO operations in the San Francisco Office and specifically mentioned requesting the quarterly status letters from that office on COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) The Intelligence Division advise if a briefing can be arranged and the date and time of such a briefing.

2) Legal Counsel Division will advise Mr. Seidel of the Bureau's decision in this regard.

PVD JBH|PVD

WRW/TM

We should carefully consider fact that Hampton case is subject of pending litigation and coordinate with Dept. ahead of any [illegible] to committee [illegible] specific [illegible] provided.

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0620
18 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Request for Documents by SSC

Attached is a request for documents received by CIA from the Senate Select Committee Staff on 10 June 1975. It is provided to you for information.

John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 23 1975

5

file 62-116395

7 ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 alm/jmf
MDR-16

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY § 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

JUN 23 1975

~~SECRET~~

R223

DCI/IC 75-2202

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1975

Mr. Walter Elder
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Elder:

Further to our conversation regarding formal requests for documents and records, I attach a list of supplemental document requests.

What I would propose is that you and I discuss this list to insure that we have properly identified the requested documents.

In addition to the attached list I would like to review studies in the historical series: (1)"Maritime Operations in Indonesian Operations -- 1957-1958;" "Overthrow of a Government, November 1952-1953;" and any studies prepared that trace the CIA's activities in relation to the overthrow of the government of Guatamala in 1954.

Sincerely,

William B. Bader

Attachment

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2001 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE
62-116395

R223

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

To: Bill Bader

From: Elliot Maxwell

Date: June 9, 1975

Subj: Supplemental Document Requests

1. The General Counsel's memo on February 3, 1975 on proprietaries mentioned in the briefing paper prepared for the Rockefeller Commission.

2. The Inspector General's Survey of Propeietaries from 1967.

3. Inspector General's Survey of Domestic Operations Division done prior to May 26, 1966.

4. The opinion on covert action authority of the CIA prepared by the Justice Department under Attorney General Katzenbach.

5. List of those individuals who worked with John Richards.

6. List of the component surveys from 1960 to 1970. (Approximately 50 studies)

7. The subject heading list, the keyword list, and the name list, used for filing in the Office of General Counsel.

8. The Bureau of the Budget Confidential Report on Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government, dated September 20, 1945. (HS/HC-71, Item 1).

9. The Report by William H. Jackson, on the Coordination of Intelligence Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British intelligence system. This is a report for the OSS dated August, 1945. (HS/HC-801, Item 9.)

10. A list of titles of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates from January 1, 1970 to the present.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 SPSALM/JMC

MOR-16

62-116395 —

ENCLOSURE

11. The Office of the General Counsel memo on the subject "Text and Explanation, Public Law 110," dated October 10, 1952.

12. The Interim Report to the National Security Council by Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, dated May 13, 1948 and entitled "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."

13. The paper by the Office of General Counsel on the Origins of the CIA, which is mentioned in the memo of the General Counsel of September 1973.

14. The two pages of General Vandenberg's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee outlining the clandestine collection function of the CIA, which were never published, a copy of which is now in the possession of Walter Pforzheimer.

15. An explanation of all the two-letter prefixes to the project names. (diographic)

16. The paper prepared by the Office of the Controller entitled "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities of CIA and Predecessor Organizations, 20 September 1945 through Janaury 1952." This is identified as HS/HC-36, Item 2.

17. The history of the development of NSCID-5 by Mrs. Margaret Ehrmantraut.

18. Study on Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of Covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 through 1966.*

19. Draft bill written by Lawrence Houston in the Fall of 1946, entitled "A Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency," cited in the archives as HS/HC-805, Item

20. Detailed Budget Submissions and house notes prior to 1967.

21. (a) The transcript of the Senate Hearings on the CIA Act of 1949, cited Paragraph 7 OGC 73-2169, Memo for the Record, 20 November 1973, Subject: Payment to Richard Patrick Lippert;

    (b) Any documents relating to the inquiry by the Secretary of Defense in 1947 mentioned in Paragraph 8 of above memo.

22. Annex to the 1963 Inspector General's Report on Technical Services Division on Experiments with Drugs.

---

* Already on our priority list: for transmittal to Select Committee offic

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

CODE **TELETYPE** **NITEL**

1 - Each Assistant Director

TO ALL SACS JUNE 11, 1975

3 per SLP

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116464)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

HOUSTUDY 75.

REBUTELS MAY 2,20, 1975, "SENSTUDY 75."

BUFILE 62-116464 AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MATTERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FROM SENSTUDY 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

SFP:mjg
(19)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 1 1975
TELETYPE

NOTE:

Referenced teletypes advised field of our pledge of full cooperation with Senate Committee and issued instructions concerning handling contacts with Senate Committee Staff as well as handling of matters relating to interviews with present and former Bureau employees. Inasmuch as we have opened a separate file under Houstudy 75, it is believed this teletype would assist in prompting better management of correspondence between Bureau and field.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-9

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

WRW/B

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16 WRW/TAL

PCM

66-116395

NOT RECORDED
JUN 23 1975
46 JUN 23 1975

84 JUN 23 1975

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Schwartz)

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Senstudy - 75

Dear Mr. Halperin:

Reference is made to my letter to you dated April 8th, regarding your request for the "Delimination Agreement of 1948."

Coordination of this matter with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has disclosed three documents which are pertinent to your request. It is my understanding that two of the three documents have been released to you by that agency, and I am enclosing with this letter, the third document. You will find this letter dated October 2, 1948, from former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Frank G. Wisner, then the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, contains certain deletions. The material deleted refers to the same material excised in one of the two documents furnished to you by CIA, and concerning which CIA asserted exemption provisions found in Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). These provisions relate to matters that warrant classification and those which are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. It is considered appropriate for the same exemption provisions to be cited by this Bureau in connection with the deleted portion.

You have thirty days from receipt of this letter to appeal to the Attorney General from any denial contained herein. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Attorney General (Attention Freedom of Information Appeals Unit), Washington, D. C. 20530.

MAILED 6
MAY 23 1975
FBI

62-116395-46

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

THB:dm (7)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPAAIM/DMF
MDR-16

GPO 951-546

Mr. Morton H. Halperin

The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Following the Attorney General's decision, judicial review is available in the district of your residence or principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia, where the records are situated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Delivered to CIA 5/27/75

Enclosure

1 - Freedom of Information Act Coordinator - Enclosure
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Mr. Charles Saviage
Washington, D. C.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M. Hauser

NOTE: See copy of H. C. Flemister memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 5/7/75, captioned "Morton Halperin, FOIA Request," copy of which is attached. The material CIA requested to be excised has been deleted as described in this letter, and the Bureau file copy of the letter is not classified. Contact with CIA FOIA Section discloses the deletion of the material in the CIA letter dated 9/22/48 accomplishes the declassification of those documents. This has been coordinated with Intelligence Division. The original Bureau document is found in 65-48066-9.

~~SECRET~~

1 - [illegible] W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~T O P S E C R E T~~

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

JPL:jdp
(4)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 AIM/MAF
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 X 1
MDR-16

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 18 1975
5:18 pm
TELETYPE

REC-75 62-116395-249

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

WRW
WOB

~~SECRET~~

JUN 20 1975

84 JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☒

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [GUS SURVEY.] (S) NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP

~~SECRET~~

AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S* RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall
6/4/75

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)
INTERNAL SECURITY, MISCELLANEOUS

Senstudy -75

This is to receive approval for submission of copies of documents requested by the U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. By letter dated 5/14/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the above Committee, requested the Attorney General furnish documents including "all memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the IEC." (Appendix C, I, 14).

Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, advised Supervisor Garnett T. Tunstall on 5/29/75 that the Department has made available to Senator Church's Committee all data contained in Departmental files on the IEC. Included in this material are work papers and final estimates prepared by IEC as well as communications between IEC and the Bureau. The only information remaining in Bureau files not already made available to the Committee consists of in-office memoranda. These memoranda fall into three general categories:
1. Those dealing with the origin and staffing of IEC,
2. Memoranda setting out requests from IEC for information from the Bureau and requests for approval to send such data to IEC and
3. Memoranda transmitting estimates and work papers of IEC which was the result of information furnished by the Bureau and other participating agencies.

These memoranda, without exception, show that the Bureau's participation in IEC was at the instruction of the Attorney General, its activities were legal and that the Bureau's contribution was substantial. It should be noted that the memorandum M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop dated 11/25/70 captioned

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)
Enclosures
62-113887
GTT:eks (4)

62-116395 -
NOT RECORDED
48 JUN 25 1975

CONTINUED OVER

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-113887-2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 bm/umf
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC)

"Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Meeting with the Director, 11/25/70," has been excised to delete information not germane to IEC. Copy of original memorandum not excised attached.

ACTION:

If approved, copies of the above-described memoranda, which are attached, will be transmitted to the Department by LHM for referral to the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps. Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(7)

memo Mr Cregar to Mr Wannall
6/17/75

62-116395-247

REC-102

17 JUN 23 1975

5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2020 BY SP2 RUM/LMC
MOR-16

84 [illegible] 23 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 18, 1975

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - A. B. Fulton
1 - D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached herewith in 14 bound volumes are excised copies of Exhibits A through E of the Department report of FBI Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activities, prepared by the committee chaired by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen.

These exhibits are individual write-ups prepared by the FBI of each proposed action in the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate, Black Extremist, and New Left Cointelpros.

In my letter to you dated April 21, 1975, I recommended against release of these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee as they are internal work papers which were prepared as a part of the deliberative process for an in-house Department investigation. I strongly object to the release of these exhibits. In the event you deem it necessary to release these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee, I request the enclosed copies, which have been excised in an attempt to avoid intrusions upon individuals' right of privacy and compromise of sensitive investigative techniques and sources, be made available.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

Enclosures (14)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009

REC-104 62-116395-245

DR:pld
(11)

Director signed original which was hand carried with enclosures to O'Connor 5 15 P 6/17 by SA Daly. Jam

17 JUN 23 1975

See NOTE page 2.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/9/2000 BY SP2 ALM/Tml
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 23 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

NOTE:

On 6/11/75 Legal Counsel advised Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of our objection and our desire that excisions be made if we are overruled. Mr. O'Connor suggested the excised material be prepared on an expedite basis. It appears the Department will make available these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee but we feel we should be on record as relates to FBI recommendations and objections.

This letter and exhibits A through E, which will be made available to Legal Counsel, should be delivered to Mr. O'Connor at the Department by Legal Counsel Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF MRS. DOROTHY SKILLMAN
6/4/75
SENSTUDY 75

On 6/4/75, Mrs. Dorothy Skillman, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Clyde Tolson, was interviewed by Mr. Mark H. Gittenstein and Miss Mary Deoreo of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Mrs. Skillman was escorted to the interview by former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr who remained outside the interview room during the interview. Prior to the interview, Mrs. Skillman was met by SA L. F. Schwartz at which time she advised that she had been advised by Mr. John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, that the interview was to be concerning Mr. Hoover's Official and Confidential (OC) files and that if questions came up during the interview on other matters which might impinge on sensitive sources and methods, current Bureau investigations, etc., she was free to request an interruption of the interview to consult with Mr. Schwartz.

The interview of Mrs. Skillman commenced at 2:30 p.m., and it was terminated at approximately 4:30 p.m. On only one occasion toward the end of the interview, Mrs. Skillman asked to consult with Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz. She advised that the interviewers had asked her concerning her knowledge of what might have been in certain cartons which were reportedly stored in the recreation room area of the late Director's residence. Mrs. Skillman stated that she thought these cartons contained many of the gifts and mementos that had been collected by Mr. Hoover over a period of years. After consulting with Mr. Mohr, she realized that she knew this only from comments that had been made to her by Mr. Mohr and had no firsthand knowledge of the contents of the cartons. On Mr. Mohr's advice, she advised the interviewers that she had no firsthand knowledge of what was in the cartons but that she knew that Mr. Mohr was aware of what was in them because he was present when the appraisers of Mr. Tolson's estate inventoried the entire house including these cartons. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Gittenstein commented to Mr. Mohr that he might have further questions to ask him concerning the contents of the cartons but would probably handle that by a telephone call to Mr. Mohr.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM/MJF

REC-102

62-116395-244

(8)

MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER 1975

COPY TO PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 23 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Interview of Mrs. Dorothy Skillman
6/4/75
Senstudy 75

After the completion of the interview, Mrs. Skillman advised Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz that the interviewers had asked her a great number of questions concerning her knowledge of the OC files which she said was very limited, the layout of Mr. Hoover's house and the work that Mrs. Skillman and Miss Gandy had done at the residence subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death. She stated that the interviewers were quite courteous and in no way antagonistic. Mr. Mohr requested Mrs. Skillman to type up an informal memorandum concerning the interview and he indicated that when this was done, he would provide a copy to the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information.

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/13/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 JUN 24 1975

File Number 62-116395-242

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/2006 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

Permanent Serial Charge Out

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 9 1975

TO: Kevin Maroney
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

General

John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Bill

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: IRS - SSC Request Senstudy-75

Attached is a copy of the SSC document request served upon IRS which I received on June 3, 1975. Since some of the items may relate to DOJ/FBI functions, I thought you should be aware of the scope of the request, as a matter of information.

The Topical Task Forces may need to be alert to this request as a matter of prospective coordination.

cc: Deputy Attorney General

5 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

REC- 102

62-116395-241

17 JUN 19 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SP2 [illegible]
MDR-16

62-116395

84 JUN 19 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975 DCI/IC 75-2033

Mr. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Attached is a copy of a Senate Select Committee request to the Treasury Department dated 14 May 1975. Mr. Collins of Treasury has requested you be provided a copy of this request, but no other distribution will be made. It will, of course, become an entry in the Community Central Index.

Yours very truly,

Harriett D. Mowat

Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

Attachment: As stated

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-241

DCI/IC 75-2009

Department
of the Treasury
Office of Special
Assistant to Secretar
for National Security

to. Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, CIA

room. ______ date. 5/29/75

Forwarded is a copy of the Senate Select Committee's first request to the Internal Revenue Service for documents and explanations. As I stated yesterday at the Ad Hoc Committee meeting there have been some discussions with the Committee staff since this letter was received and the staff has indicated that they plan to revise the questions considerably. In these circumstances you may wish to hold distribution of this document to other members of the Ad Hoc Committee until we receive the revised document. The one exception to this might be the Justice Department since some of the questions will involve matters of interest to them.

Foster

J. Foster Collins
room 4328
964-~~242~~ 2631

62-116395-341

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMA

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

COMMISSIONER
MAY 15 1975
INTERNAL REVENUE

Hon. Donald C. Alexander
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
Internal Revenue Building
1111 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20224

Dear Commissioner Alexander:

The Committee appreciates your letter pledging the full cooperation and assistance of the Internal Revenue Service in the work of the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. We also appreciate your forwarding the draft resolution which would authorize the Committee to review any "tax-related information" which may fall within the purview of its responsibilities. Such a resolution is being put forward.

In an effort to expedite the Committee's inquiry into the intelligence functions of the Internal Revenue Service, the Committee asks your cooperation and assistance in furnishing the material and information sought in the enclosed "First Request for Documents from the Internal Revenue Service" and "First Interrogatories to the Internal Revenue Service". It is the Committee's desire that most of the material and information requested be provided by May 30 and the remainder very shortly thereafter. We also request that you provide the answers and documents as they are compiled rather than holding those which are initially compiled until May 30.

In the near future, the Committee's Chief Counsel will be in touch with your General Counsel to work out the mechanics of delivering the requested documents and interrogatory answers and to arrange for close liaison between the Committee's staff and the Internal Revenue Service personnel with whom the staff will wish to meet.

While we recognize that the enclosed requests are substantial, they reflect the broad mandate given to the Committee by the Senate. We believe that it is in the national interest that we perform our

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

work under that mandate both expeditiously and thoroughly. Of course, for us to proceed expeditiously, it is necessary to obtain prompt cooperation from the Executive agencies involved. We are hopeful that with your continued cooperation the end result of our joint efforts will meet the Committee's responsibilities to the Congress and to the American people.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

FIRST REQUEST TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR DOCUMENTS

The Committee wishes to identify all intelligence collection analysis and dissemination functions performed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to review the legal authority for such activities, the manner in which they are ordered and controlled, the coordination of such activities with other federal agencies, the exchange of intelligence information with other federal agencies and any other cooperation with such agencies relative to intelligence activity. In pursuit of this inquiry the Committee requests that the IRS provide the Committee with the documents and information identified below.

The request is divided into two major parts. The first part seeks documents which relate generally to any intelligence functions which the IRS performs. The second part seeks documents relating to specific intelligence functions of the IRS of which the Committee is aware. Therefore, many of the documents encompassed by the second part of the request will also be encompassed by the first part of the request.

Wherever used herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

Documents	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, compute memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language and any other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
Intelligence	Information about persons or entiti other than purely financial information.
Relating to	Relating in whole or in part to.
Federal agencies	All such agencies, including the White House.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

I. GENERAL REQUEST

With respect to each intelligence gathering or intelligence dissemination function of the IRS either now being performed or which has been performed within the last fifteen years, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart of the organizational unit performing the function indicating the total number of employees in each unit, the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, the chain of command to the organizational unit performing the function.

2. All rules, guidelines, regulations, manuals or other documents defining the function or providing guidance or control to those performing it.

3. All statutes, executive orders, departmental regulations, agency regulations, and any other documents or materials which constitute legal authority for the function.

4. The annual budget of the organizational unit performing the function for the last five years or, in the case of a unit which has ceased to exist, for the last five years of its existence.

5. All documents relating to any agreement or understanding with any other federal agency or the executive or any state or local government or agency regarding the function or the dissemination of any intelligence produced by the function.

6. All documents constituting or relating to reports or investigations of the function performed by the IRS or any other entity, and all documents relating to the establishment of the function.

7. All documents relating to electronic surveillance by IRS or other federal agencies.

II. SPECIFIC REQUESTS

A. Organization and Functions of Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions

With respect to the Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions of the IRS, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart indicating the total number of employees in each category or position, defining the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, and delineating the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Chief of each division.

2. A breakdown of the personnel in each of the two named divisions assigned to each district office, indicating the titles and functions associated with each position in each office.

3. Copies of all rules, guidelines and regulations defining the duties, functions, and responsibilities of each of the two divisions.

B. Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following specific categories of documents:

1. All documents relating to or constituting the recommendations of the study group convened in 1969 by William A. Kolar to study the feasibility of Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System, including all backup documents for such recommendations, and any documents reflecting dissenting views.

2. All documents passing from, to, or between William Kolar and the Commissioners of Revenue or their assistants relating to the plans for and progress made toward the implementation of IGRS.

3. All documents containing evaluations of the various methods of implementation of IGRS.

4. All documents constituting regulations, employee instructions and operating manuals regarding the IGRS, including guidelines, rules or regulations regarding the receipt and storage of information from other federal agencies.

5. All documents passing between the Chief of the Intelligence Division and the District Manager relating to the implementation of IGRS in each District.

6. All documents and guidelines relating to the implementation of IGRS in individual districts or in districts as a whole.

7. A breakdown by district of the IGRS files maintained in each district office, indicating the following:

(a) the number of such files on which some form of action constituting enforcement of the tax laws other than the maintenance of the file has actually been undertaken;

(b) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file is planned;

(c) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file has not been taken and is not planned.

? 8. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which no files are maintained.

9. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which files are maintained.

10. Any regulations or documents relating to criteria for determining the duration of a file in IGRS.

11. Any documents relating to rules or guidelines for analysis and dissemination of information held in IGRS.

12. Any documents relating to actual instances of dissemination to any person or organization, including other federal agencies, of information contained in IGRS.

13. Any documents relating to or constituting requests by anyone, including other federal agencies, for information contained in IGRS.

14. All documents which have been gathered or produced by the group formed in December 1974 to study the operation of IGRS, and all documents relating to or explaining the establishment of the study group.

C. Internal Revenue Strike Force Participation

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following information and documents relating to the participation by IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces:

All documents constituting or relating to agreements with other agencies regarding participation by the IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces, including any documents relating to the desirability of participating on such strike forces.

D. Special Service Staff

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following documents relating to Special Service Staff (SSS):

1. any document which established the SSS;

2. a detailed organizational chart of the SSS indicating the number of employees in each unit of the SSS and the duties and responsibilities of the employees of each unit, as well as the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the head of SSS;

3. a document or documents indicating the names of all employees of SSS during its existence, and indicating the position occupied by each such employee;

4. all documents relating to the policies, operations and procedures of the SSS relating to the collection, analysis, storage and dissemination of information;

5. all documents relating to the transfer of any SSS files to IGRS.

E. Audit Division

In addition to any documents relating to the Audit Division which may be encompassed by Part I, please furnish:

1. the rules, regulations and guidelines, including employee manuals, for selection of taxpayers for audit and the legal authority for such rules, regulations and guidelines;

2. the rules, regulations and guidelines relating to the storage, use and dissemination of information gathered through audits;

3. all documents relating to any of the following occurring since 1950

(a) Politically motivated requests for an audit of any person or entity

(b) Requests by any person or state or federal agency whose official duties do not normally require the use of financial information on individual taxpayers for an audit of any person or entity

4. All documents constituting rules or guidelines for removal of taxpayers' names from the list of those to be audited.

F. General Requests For Information

To the extent they have not already been furnished in response to previous sections of this document request, please furnish:

1. All documents constituting requests to the IRS for information regarding any person or entity by anyone, including federal agencies, whose normal official functions do not require use of such information.

2. All documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to the requests referred to in 1. above.

3. All documents constituting or relating to requests by anyone, including other federal agencies:

(a) for electronic surveillance by IRS, or

(b) for information or investigation which led to electronic surveillance by IRS

and all documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to any such requests.

FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Please provide full, explanatory answers to the questions set forth below. As used in these questions, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

"Documents"	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, computer memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language, and all other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
"Relating to"	Relating in whole or in part to.
"Federal agency"	All federal agencies and the Executive Branch.

1. Regarding the February 7, 1975, official press release of the Internal Revenue Service and the answer of Commissioner Alexander to the first question posed by Senator Joseph Montoya in his letter of January 29, 1975, please answer the following:

   a. At whose direction did William A. Kolar convene a study group to study the feasibility of a formal, uniform Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System (IGRS)?

   b. Who were the participants in the meeting of the study group?

   c. Please explain the relationship between each participant and the IRS.

   d. Please describe in detail the various alternative systems of implementation of IGRS tested in the

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

various districts, indicating which method was tested in which district, and list the dates each alternative system was tested in each district.

e. Please describe the procedure followed by District Directors in implementing IGRS in each district.

f. In how many district offices has IGRS been implemented?

2. How was intelligence data compiled, maintained, and stored by the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service prior to the inception of IGRS?

3. Did officials, representatives, or members of other federal government agencies participate in the establishment of IGRS or in any discussions regarding its establishment? If so, list each such agency and its representatives and explain the manner and extent of its involvement.

4. Did IGRS compile, maintain, and store information received from other federal agencies? If so, was that information compiled, maintained, and stored for the benefit and use of the Internal Revenue Service, the other federal agency, or both?

5. Is information received from other agencies of the federal government edited to delete non-tax-related material prior to its being entered in IGRS? If so, please explain the editing procedure and furnish all documents relating to such procedure.

6. Upon how many individuals and groups did IGRS maintain files as of November 1974?

7. Please identify all individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

8. Please state the total number of individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

9. Were all IGRS files maintained on a computerized or mechanized basis as of November 1974? How were the files indexed? In connection with the answer to this question, please identify all cross-referencing systems whereby categories of information could be retrieved from IGRS other than through identification of the name of an individual or group.

10. How many names were indexed in IGRS on which there were no files?

11. Please fully describe the procedure followed by the Intelligence Division of the IRS in establishing and entering a file on an individual, group, or organization in IGRS, stating whether:

    a. each file or name contained in IGRS is the result of an investigation by the Intelligence Division of IRS;

    b. the files or names stored and maintained by IGRS are periodically investigated by the Intelligence Division of IRS.

12. Upon how many IGRS files has some form of action constituting enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or the Justice Department?

13. How many names and files appear in IGRS upon which no action constituting the enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, has been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or Justice Department?

14. What criteria has been established by the Internal Revenue Service governing the duration of a file or name in IGRS?

15. What procedures are followed by the Internal Revenue Service in disseminating files, names, and other information contained in IGRS to other agencies of the federal government?

16. To what other agencies of the federal government has information contained in IGRS been distributed? Have there been any instances in which information contained in IGRS has been disseminated to other federal agencies without following the procedures described in Item 15 above?

a. If so, specify each such instance, listing the name of the individual, group, or organization whose file was disseminated and the agency at whose request the file was disseminated.

17. Has the Internal Revenue Service received requests for the dissemination of information contained in IGRS which (a) were politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please furnish the Committee with the following:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

18. Were any members of the IGRS study group convened by William Kolar in 1969 participants in the formation or operation of the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify them and describe in detail their relationship with both the Special Services Staff and IGRS.

a. Was IGRS, either in its formative or operative stages, used to maintain and store information collected by the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify the nature of the information so stored and the nature of the information not so stored.

b. Was it a policy of the Internal Revenue Service that documents and files maintained by the Special Services Staff not be stored in IGRS or its generic predecessors? If so, please furnish the Committee with evidence of such policy.

c. What was the relationship between the formal creation of IGRS on May 4, 1973, and the decision of the IRS to review and purge Special Services Staff files on or about June 28, 1973?

d. Have any Special Service Staff files ever been transferred to IGRS? If so, please specify the name of the individual, group, or organization upon which the file was maintained and the date it was transferred to IGRS.

19. With regard to the recent suspension of IGRS activities on January 22, 1975, pending an internal review of its operations, please answer the following:

a. To what specific duties have personnel assigned to IGRS been reassigned pending the present Internal Revenue Service review of IGRS? Please furnish the names of the personnel reassigned and the offices and units to which they have been reassigned.

b. Please furnish the name of the IRS official who is charged with the primary responsibility for conducting the study of IGRS.

c. In what manner are IRS intelligence files being compiled and maintained pending completion of the study?

20. What is the relationship between the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service and Organized Crime Strike Forces?

21. On how many strike forces do IRS agents participate? Please identify the strike forces.

22. How many agents participate on each such strike force?

23. Has the involvement of IRS intelligence personnel on such strike forces been confined to investigation of tax-related matters? If not, please indicate the manner and extent of IRS involvement in non-tax-related actions of the strike forces. In this regard, provide the Committee with detailed summaries of IRS participation on strike forces which did not involve or were unrelated to enforcement of tax-related matters.

24. What intelligence gathering, compiling, and storage systems has the Internal Revenue Service maintained in addition to IGRS?

25. In December 1974 the Internal Revenue Service suspended the operation of IGRS pending an internal review of the system. Was this review prompted by concern that non-tax-related materials were being gathered, compiled, and stored in IGRS? If so, please furnish the Committee with all files, names, and other information contained in IGRS files which is non-tax related.

26. Has the Internal Security Division of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other division of the Internal Revenue Service, ever investigated any aspects of the intelligence gathering, compilation, storage, and dissemination procedures of the Internal Revenue Service? If so, please identify and describe all such investigations and describe any subsequent action taken by the Internal Revenue Service as a result of the investigation.

27. Has the IRS received requests for the dissemination of information which were either (a) politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please state:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual, or the nature of the information sought;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

28. Has the IRS ever engaged in mail cover or other mail surveillance activities, including the recording of dispatch and receipt of mail (other than to or from the IRS) and the opening of mail (other than to the IRS)? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

29. Please set forth the rules, regulations, and procedures which govern removal of taxpayers' names from the list of returns to be audited.

30. Has the IRS ever engaged in wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, or any other type of electronic surveillance? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

31. If the answer to #30 is yes, as to each instance of such activity, state:

a. The dates during which the activity occurred;

b. The type of device used;

c. Whether judicial approval was obtained in advance and, if so, from which court;

d. The subject of the activity;

e. Why the activity occurred;

f. The use or disposition which was made of the information collected;

g. The names and current addresses of the individuals who (a) performed or (b) supervised the activity and whether they are IRS employees.

32. Has the IRS ever been directed, requested, or advised by any other federal agency to use electronic listening devices? If so, please state as to each such direction, request, or advice:

a. The date;

b. The federal agency making it;

c. The proposed subject;

d. The action IRS took;

e. If surveillance resulted, please identify the incident among those listed in answer to number 31;

f. The date and nature of all documents relating to the direction, request, or advice.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. ____
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-13-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

W.O.

Prior memoranda have been submitted reporting that the Capitol Police Department would handle security checks of the space assigned to captioned Committees as well as the offices of the individual members.

Arrangements were made through the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives to advise us of the Committee Members who have their private offices checked and the dates on which these checks were made.

On June 13, 1975, Captain Eugene Brannon of the Capitol Police Force advised Inspector Bowers that three members of the Senate Committee and two members of the House Committee have had their private offices checked to date. These are:

Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) who had his office in room 245 Russell Senate Office Building and his Capitol office, room S-201 checked on 5-14-75.

Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) whose office in 6325 Dirkson Senate Office Building was checked on 5-22-75.

Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Penna.) whose office in 347 Russell Senate Office Building was checked on 6-5-75.

62-116464

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Bowers

REC-102

62-116395-239

17 JUN 19 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

DWB:lgp
(7)

File 62-116395
62-116464

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC

84 JUN 9 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SEANTE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Congressman Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.) whose office in 2265 Rayburn Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Congressman Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.) whose office in 1113 Longworth House Office Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Captian Brannon said they have no pending requests from other members of these Committees to make any checks of their offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

HOUSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
6/9/75
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - All Sections Chiefs
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

By memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett captioned "Senstudy 75" dated 2/6/75, you were advised that "Senstudy 75" is the code word for the control file (62-116395) containing all communications relating to the Senate Select Committee's (SSC) investigation and study of Governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

In mid-February, 1975, the House of Representatives created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities which will have virtually the same jurisdiction and responsibilities as the above SSC. To date, practically all our work has been related to the SSC and only very recently has the House Select Committee (HSC) made any efforts to commence staffing.

As it appears, we can expect in the near future requests from the HSC similar to that already received from the SSC and in order to facilitate the administrative handling and retrieval, where necessary, of HSC requests and this Bureau's response to same, the code word "Houstudy 75" is being assigned to the control file (62-116464) containing all communications pertaining to the HSC and related matters.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

62-116464

① - 62-116395

TJM:mjc
(28)

62-116395

NOT RECORDED

46 JUN 19 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Bureau has been requested to again make available Newark office secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski for interview by captioned Committee and that the Department and White House had instructed that they not be made available until such time as the Committee decides to allow Bureau representatives to be present during interview.

By way of background, you will recall that these employees were released from the Employment Agreement and were made available for interview on May 20, 1975, by captioned Committee. However, the Department in objection stated that they were desirous that a Bureau representative be present during the interview. The topic of the interview was to have been their duties and responsibilities during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Ultimately, neither the Department nor the White House could reach agreement concerning the interviews and the employees did not submit to interview.

On June 3, 1975, Michael Epstein, staff member of captioned Committee again requested these employees be made available for interview on June 5, 1975, at 10:00 a.m. The scope of the interview would be the responsibilities and duties performed during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

REC-100

62-116395-237

62-116395

17 JUN 18 1975

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-67-538691 (Personnel File Mary Ann Massa)
1-67-581180 (Personnel File M. Ann Mierzewski)

11-9

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMS
MOR-16

PVD:lgp
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Epstein classified the interview as an "abuse" type and agreed to allow agents to be available but not present during interview.

On June 3, 1975, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, was advised of the request and of the fact that an agent could not be present during interview. He stated that the Department's position was that unless the Committee consented to allow Bureau personnel to be present, the interview would not go forth, and that he would advise Epstein and F. A. O. Schwartz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, of this decision.

Mr. O'Connor telephonically recontacted Special Agent Daly and advised that he discussed the matter with assistant to the Counsel to the President, James A. Wilderotter. Wilderotter told O'Connor it was the White House position that these girls should not be made available for interview unless the Committee allows Bureau personnel to be present. Wilderotter stated these two employees had been cited as examples wherein the White House felt interviews should not be conducted without representatives of the particular agency or Bureau being present as they are service personnel. According to Wilderotter, Schwartz agreed to this position.

O'Connor telephonically contacted Special Agent Daly on June 4, 1975, at which time he advised that he had discussed the interview with Schwartz, Epstein, and staff member Mark Gitenstein, and they would hold in abeyance the request to interview the employees pending a review of documents the Bureau is making available concerning 1964 Atlantic City Convention as stated in the Committee's request of ~~June~~ May 14, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD JBH/PVD

WRW/TVL

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. [illegible]dams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : V.V. Kolombatovic

SUBJECT: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum is to advise of the scheduled appearance, under oath, of former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague before the full Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., on 6/12/75.

On 6/4/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, U. S. Postal Service, advised Liaison Agent L.A. Crescioli that he was contacted this date by Mr. Montague who informed Jackson that he, Montague, was scheduled to appear before the full SSC on Thursday, 6/12/75. According to Jackson, Mr. Montague appeared to be very concerned about his appearance before this Committee. In fact, Montague requested that Jackson alert FBI Director Kelley to the fact that Montague will appear before this Committee. Montague did not indicate any specifics to Jackson as to why he was so concerned over his scheduled testimony before the Committee.

In the way of background, Montague was the Chief Postal Inspector from 1961 to the Spring of 1969, on which latter date Mr. William J. Cotter assumed the position of Chief Postal Inspector. Prior to 1961 Montague was the Inspector-in-Charge of the New York Division of the Postal Service. In the opinion of Mr. Jackson, Montague is a man of the highest integrity and most certainly is not involved in any wrongdoing. Jackson confidentially advised the Liaison Agent that it is his belief that Montague is so concerned about his appearance before the Committee because he may have to reveal certain agreements that prevailed in the past between the Bureau and the Postal Service concerning mail covers that have not been made public to date.

LAC:tdp (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

94-55-40-35

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 0/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MOR-16

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Jackson added that he personally has no knowledge of what agreements or understandings between the Bureau and the Postal Service that may be divulged by Montague. He emphasized that Montague did not divulge such data to him.

In conclusion, Jackson stated that Montague is in a retired status and has just returned from an extended vacation in the Mediterranean area. Montague did inform Jackson that the Committee has authorized Montague to be accompanied before the Committee by personal counsel; however, Montague has decided that he will testify alone and without personal counsel.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

WRW

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

- Assoc. Dir. ____
- Dep. AD Adm. ____
- Dep. AD Inv. ____
- Asst. Dir.:
  - Admin. ____
  - Comp. Syst. ____
  - Ext. Affairs ____
  - Files & Com. ____
  - Gen. Inv. ____
  - Ident. ____
  - Inspection ____
  - Intell. ____
  - Laboratory ____
  - Plan. & Eval. ____
  - Spec. Inv. ____
  - Training ____
  - Legal Coun. ____
  - Telephone Rm. ____
  - Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 6/3/75

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

REC-102

-116395-236X

14 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/bmf
MDR-16

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

450 Golden Gate Avenue
Box 36015
San Francisco, California 94102

June 3, 1975

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums,

Mr. Don Jones, the Senior Resident Agent of the FBI Resident Agency in Berkeley, California, has referred to me your letter of May 28, 1975 asking certain information concerning the FBI's operation in Berkeley, California.

Your letter has been referred to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for appropriate action.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Bates
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 BVM/LMF

MDR-16

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives

RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1417 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2661

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2490 CHANNING WAY, ROOM 202
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704
(415) 548-7767

201 13TH STREET, ROOM 105
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94604
(415) 763-0370

DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

May 28, 1975

Mr. Don Jones, Senior Resident Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P. O. Box 1033
Berkeley, California 94704

Dear Mr. Jones:

As you are aware, I have been concerned for some time about the nature of the Bureau's involvement in local law enforcement affairs. This concern has been heightened by my appointment to the House Select Committee to Investigate the U. S. Intelligence Community. In this light, I am requesting answers to the following questions concerning FBI activity in Berkeley:

1. What is the size of the contingent of agents in the Berkeley field office?

2. What are the functional responsibilities in the field office, and what are the percentages of agents involved in each, i.e., political, drug abuse, criminal, etc.?

3. What are the titles of the agents, and how do these relate to their involvement in category two?

4. What is the ethnic and sexual breakdown of the staff and agents in the Berkeley field office?

5. What are the interactions and working relationships between the field office, the Berkeley Police Department, the University of California Police Department, private security agencies and informers? How many informers are utilized by the field office?

6. Recent disclosures have raised serious questions regarding the Bureau's involvement in political surveillance activities of organizations and individuals over the past several years. What actions has the local field office taken to correct the abuses of these actions, and what political surveillance is being undertaken?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmt
MDR-16

62-116395-2318

7. I have read with interest of the Special Weapons and Tactics course given under Bureau auspices at the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Facility in Alameda County. I would appreciate your forwarding to me a description of the activities undertaken in this course, and the relationship of UCPD and BPD to the course. In addition, I would appreciate being provided any relevant information on SWAT that you have available.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Ronald V. Dellums

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

RVD/djc

6/3/75

AIRTEL AIR MAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 pvm/lmf
MDR-16

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Miller

REC-102 62-116395-236X

July 14, 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums:

This is in response to your letter dated May 28, 1975, sent to the Senior Resident Agent of the Berkeley, California, FBI Resident Agency.

To clarify your inquiries, it should be noted the Resident Agency at Berkeley, California, operates under the general supervision of the FBI's San Francisco Office.

There are currently nineteen Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley Resident Agency. All are white males. The function of a resident agency is to handle all FBI matters within its specific geographical territory. This includes criminal, security and applicant investigations. The FBI does not have primary jurisdiction regarding drug matters and does not conduct "political" investigations.

MAILED 7
JUL 15 1975
FBI

As a matter of policy, the FBI advises other governmental law enforcement agencies of matters coming to our attention which are within the investigative jurisdiction of those agencies. In some cases there is concurrent jurisdiction and a joint investigation may be conducted; however, local law enforcement agencies do not have access to FBI files. Representatives of private security agencies may be contacted from time to time in the course of discharging our official responsibilities just as any other citizens may be contacted. The FBI also utilizes the services of informants to develop information concerning matters within this Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; however, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss more specifically the number of such informants or the manner in which they are utilized.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JDM:lgp
(7)

WRW/TJM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMH
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 AUG 11 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

As I have already indicated, the FBI does not conduct "political" investigations, nor do we conduct "political surveillances." We do, of course, have a responsibility for conducting domestic intelligence investigations authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential Directives and instructions of the Attorney General. These matters relate to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, and other activities involving the internal security of the United States. The policies relating to such investigations are not made on an ad hoc basis by individual Agents or individual offices, but conform with broad policy applicable to all offices.

The FBI offers a variety of courses of instruction for law enforcement personnel throughout the United States, including such subjects as anti-sniper and survival training and special weapons and tactics, commonly known as "SWAT". The basic purpose of this training is to provide well prepared teams capable of resolving highly dangerous situations with a minimum of risk to innocent bystanders, the law enforcement personnel involved and the subjects of the investigation.

Enclosed is a newsclipping describing some of the training of our own personnel in this field. The article appeared on June 1, 1975, in the "Washington Star News."

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosure

NOTE: The information concerning the Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley, California, Resident Agency was furnished by ASAC Druken, San Francisco.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

TO :MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: June 3, 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

FROM :MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. A. Mintz 4/11/75 recommended that a draft of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of the captioned Committees be coordinated with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other appropriate members of the intelligence community.

On 6/2/75 the draft Memorandum of Understanding was discussed by SA L. F. Schwartz with Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, who advised that the draft had been reviewed by CIA and by the Security Committee on behalf of the intelligence community. They requested that the draft be revised in order to recognize the need for certain Staff Members to be cleared for access to compartmented information (a procedure already being followed by the Church Committee) and the desire of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that it be made clear that the DCI will only offer his advice upon the request of the Committee Chairman and that in all cases the final determination as to clearance is the responsibility of the Committee Chairman.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Attached is a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the changes proposed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore which changes are underscored. Both Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church.

REC-100

62-116395
Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-236

LES:ekw
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 am/lmk
MOR-16

JUN 18 1975

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ACTIVITIES
62-116395

RECOMMENDATION:

If the attached revised draft is acceptable to the Bureau, it will be provided to the Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Congressman Nedzi. In accordance with opinion expressed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, a copy will not be furnished to Senator Church.

VFS

PLM WVC

QRS

LET TO A.G.
ENCL. LHM FOR HSC
6/12/75 HFS: dmt

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information, in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI willffurnish a summary memorandum containing therresults of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2006 BY SP2 [illegible]
MOR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-256

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters, Jr.

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 3/12/75, and my memorandum, 3/25/75, both captioned as above.

By referenced memorandum dated 3/12/75, Legal Counsel recommended that the Intelligence Division (INTD) discuss with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other members of the intelligence community procedures for clearing staff members of captioned committees for access to classified information when questions as to the individual's trustworthiness have arisen in the course of the FBI's background investigation. Following such discussions, Legal Counsel recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding concerning these matters be prepared by the INTD which might be used by both Senate and House Committees.

By memorandum 3/25/75, the INTD submitted for approval a draft of a proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for staff members of captioned committees. Special Investigative Division disagreed with several features of our draft memorandum and has prepared a revised memorandum, which is attached for approval.

The INTD has coordinated this matter with the Special Investigative Division and interposes no objection to the text of the revised memorandum; however, it is suggested that consideration be given to adding the words "by the FBI" at the end of paragraph five on page one. Paragraph five, thus modified, would read: "Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI."

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-116395

Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

AFW:dsh
(7)

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-235

18 JUN 18 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM - SEE PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPd ALM/jmf
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Mintz
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Discussions of this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community have been held in abeyance pending approval within the FBI as to the text of the proposed memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, that attached revised memorandum be coordinated by the INTD with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community prior to review by the Attorney General and transmittal to Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi by Legal Counsel Division.

Addendum

WVC

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division concurs with the general thrust of the memorandum of understanding, however, it is suggested the following wording be added where indicated:

Page 1, paragraph 3, insert after the word applicant, or employee. On line 2, change "applicant's" to read "person's".

Page 1, paragraph 4, after the word determined insert by the respective Chairman,.

Page 2, paragraph 1, after the word necessary insert by the Committee,.

Per

Jma

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information. ①

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing ~~the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee~~ Chairman.

In the case of an applicant (or employee), the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the ~~applicant's~~ PERSON'S suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined BY THE RESPECTIVE CHAIRMAN to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI. ②

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395-235

ENCLOSURE

The DCI will furnish his observations as to eligibility for access to classified information to the appropriate Committee Chairman for his consideration. The Committee Chairman will render the final determination after consultation, where it is deemed necessary, BY THE COMMITTEE, with the interested agencies.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. Adams memorandum to Mr. Callahan dated 3/7/75, captioned as above, copy attached, reported our conversation with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi.

As indicated in Mr. Adams' memorandum, Congressman Nedzi asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI, and the House Committee concerning investigative and clearance procedures for members of the Committee's staff. It appeared appropriate to us to coordinate a memorandum of understanding to be drafted for the House Committee with that to be drafted for the Senate Committee. Therefore, following our return from the meeting with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi, I called Bill Miller and advised him of the request made by Congressman Nedzi for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding. I asked him whether it would be possible for us to coordinate the language of that memorandum with the understanding that it will be drafted for use by the CIA, other members of the intelligence community, and the Church Committee. Mr. Miller said that the proposal to coordinate the memorandum was completely acceptable to him and he requested that the draft memorandum being prepared for Congressman Nedzi be furnished him for review and possible adoption as the memorandum to be used by the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division discuss this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community and prepare a draft memorandum of understanding that may be used by both House and Senate committees.

Bufile 62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

Wannall to Mintz memo 4/9/75 prepared

memo Wannall to Mintz 4/11/75 AFW:dsh

62-116395-234

ENCLOSURE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY

JUN 18 1975

JUN 18 1975

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 3/7/75 Mr. Mintz and I called on Senator Church and his staff director, Bill Miller, to further discuss the procedures for investigating and clearing staff employees of the Committee, particularly where information might be developed raising a question as to the propriety of a clearance. It had previously been approved that the FBI would conduct the background investigations, furnishing the results to Senator Church, and after his determination that the individuals met the required criteria for access to classified information he would notify CIA of his determination and intent to employ the individual involved, at which time CIA would grant the necessary clearance based on the certification by Senator Church.

In discussions between CIA and FBI representatives, we raised the question as to whether CIA would review the results of the investigation prior to granting clearances and CIA representatives indicated they did not intend to and were reluctant to inquire of Senator Church as to whether they could be furnished the results of any investigations involving derogatory information.

In discussing this matter with Senator Church, I inquired whether he had any objection to our bringing to the attention of CIA any questionable cases in order that CIA representatives, who have the responsibility of granting the actual clearances, would be in a position to advise and counsel with Senator Church on those individual cases. He had absolutely no objection to this and, in fact, felt there should be an open communication between FBI, CIA and his Committee to insure that no one was appointed and cleared who did not measure up in every respect from a security standpoint.

I discussed with him the particular case of Stanley Rawson Sloan, the results of which I had brought for delivery to Senator Church. Sloan was

Wannall to [illegible] [illegible] 4/1/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMT

REC-100
ENCLOSURE
62-116395-234
SEE
17 JUN 18 1975

JBA:ams
(5)
1 - Mr. Cleveland 1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

CONTINUED—OVER

formerly employed by CIA and resigned in December, 1974, after his clearance for sensitive compartmented information had been lifted as a result of his marrying an alien. This marriage would not preclude him from clearance for access to lesser degrees of sensitive material but only for the more sophisticated clearances. Mr. Miller advised that Sloan had not been appointed and was not going to be appointed because of other reasons unrelated to a security clearance.

Senator Church indicated that he felt it would be wise to prepare a memorandum outlining our security clearance procedures and his staff would be glad to prepare such a document.

Following the meeting with Senator Church, Mr. Mintz and I dropped by to see Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the House Committee, and delivered to him Mr. Kelley's letter congratulating him and offering him our complete cooperation. Chairman Nedzi stated that he was very appreciative of this offer and would consider Mr. Kelley's request to confer with him as an open invitation and as soon as things had shaken down he would be in touch with us.

We discussed with him the investigative and clearance procedures we were following with the Senate Committee and Chairman Nedzi agreed the same procedures should be followed with his Committee, including our making available to CIA any derogatory information which might be pertinent to a clearance determination. At first, he suggested that we send the results of our investigations to CIA before coming to the Committee but then concluded that it would be more appropriate for them to come to him first since some of the applicants under consideration would probably not be appointed. He specifically asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI and himself.

I asked Mr. Nedzi whether he felt the formulation of his Committee would serve to trim down the number of requests for information being received from various House committees and it was his opinion that it would help in some instances; however, in others committee chairmen would pursue their own inquiries. He personally did not feel he had the clout nor the desire to try to preempt this area entirely for his Committee. He also stated he felt that CIA's problems had in the main been fully exposed and would soon be

CONTINUED - OVER

of less concern, whereas the concern over domestic security policies of the FBI would undoubtedly be greater in the future. He expressed his appreciation for our cooperation and indicated he was striving for a responsible approach to the inquiry.

Following the meeting with Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Mintz and I agreed that it would be best for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding concerning the investigative and clearance procedures for both Committees in order to try to insure uniformity, and Mr. Mintz will get in touch with Bill Miller to seek his concurrence in that regard. Our efforts will be coordinated with CIA and the proposed memorandum as drawn up will be submitted for the Director's approval.

ACTION:

Information only.

CONTINUED - OVER

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. CHURCH

MAY 21, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration
JUNE 5, 1975
Reported without amendment
JUNE 6, 1975
Considered and agreed to

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2006 BY SP2alm/lmf
MDR-16

REC-100

62-116395-233

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 18 1975

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21, 1975

Mr. CHURCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. CANNON, without amendment

Serialized 6-75

JUNE 6, 1975

Considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

V

62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-28-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated 5-22-75 you were advised that former SA Robert Nichols had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee, at which time Seidel attempted to arrange an interview of Nichols. Nichols was advised by Deputy Assistant Director Jack E. Herington of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 pertaining to Departmental approval prior to furnishing information from Bureau files. He was also reminded that he had signed an employee agreement with the Bureau agreeing to maintain confidentiality of the information contained in Bureau files. He was advised if he requested, the Bureau would make available a representative to accompany him should he be interviewed by the Committee.

Former SA Nichols telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 5-28-75 and advised he had been recontacted by Mr. Seidel. Seidel requested and Nichols agreed to travel to Washington, D. C., on the morning of 5-30-75 for an interview at the Committee's offices. Nichols stated that Seidel indicated the scope of the interview would be concerning Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether this was to be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an executive session of the Committee. He stated he was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the Bureau make available a representative so that Nichols may consult with him during the interview if need be.

62-116395-232

EX-105 REC-20 JUN 6 1975

Mr. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted by Nichols as being his private counsel but that the Agent would assist Nichols in making determination whether a specific question should be responded to or whether a response could properly be declined because an answer might compromise a source,

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 AM/LMC
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Personnel File 67-414885
(Former SA Robert Nichols)
1 - Mr. Hotis

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

sensitive investigative technique, divulge information furnished the Bureau by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources or adversely affecting an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Mr. Nichols that if he so desires, he could, of course, obtain the services of private counsel. He indicated it was his intention to arrive in Washington Thursday night, 5-29-75. He was requested to appear in the Office of Legal Analysis, Room 4513, at approximately 8:15 a.m. on the morning of 5-30-75 so that arrangements might be made to brief him by the Office of Legal Analysis and subsequently by the Intelligence Division. Nichols stated he would do so.

The Office of Legal Analysis is attempting to obtain from Committee representatives further information as to the circumstances and exact time of interview of Nichols.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Intelligence Division representative be made available to accompany Nichols to his interview with captioned Committee.

2) That Nichols be released from his employment agreement to respond to questions concerning our investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters.

pud JBH/pud

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Hotis

On May 27, 1975, James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, requested me and representatives of other agencies interested in the arrangements concerning interviews of witnesses by the Senate Select Committee to confer with him and Roderick Hills at 2:30 p.m. that date at the White House. Mr. K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Inspector John B. Hotis and I represented the Department and the FBI. Roderick Hills and James A. Wilderotter represented the President's counsel; Bob Andrews represented the Defense Department; John Warner, General Counsel, CIA; Roy Banner, General Counsel of NSA, and Mr. Hyland from State Department as well as John Clark, Deputy to the Director of CIA, attended.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the latest version of proposed procedures to be followed by the Committee staff investigators during interviews of former and current employees. Roderick Hills presented a document (copy attached) which he described as a counteroffer by Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee. He called for general discussion of the document after indicating that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Schwarz at lunch on May 27th and felt that it was a workable document. I pointed out to Mr. Hills that the document provides that there would be notice to the agencies of the identity of witnesses at reasonable time prior to interviews or taking of sworn testimony except where "the committee or its appropriate delegee" determines that prior notice should not be given. I told him that I was concerned that that provision would be used by the Committee staff to permit individual staff investigators to make that determination and I was confident they would do so.

EX-105

REC-20 62-116395-231

ENCLOSURE

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (7)

7 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ADM/MF
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Mr. Hills was reluctant to seek a modification of the language indicating that he had an understanding with Mr. Schwarz that the authority would be limited to the senior counsel and to members of the Committee. I told Mr. Hills I would request that the language be modified in writing so that the authority would be conferred on specific representatives of the Committee to avoid having staff authority which I thought would be abused. Mr. Hills finally agreed that the language would be modified so that the authority would be available only to both Committee senior counsel and/or a combination of senior counsel and a Committee member. Further, the language would be modified to require that the determination that an agency would not be given prior notice of a pending witness interview would be recorded in writing for the Committee's records.

I asked Mr. Wilderotter and Mr. Hills whether this agreement was to be made between the staff and the agencies or whether it in fact would be accepted by the Committee. After some discussion, we were advised by Mr. Hills and Mr. Wilderotter that the document would be submitted to the full Committee for their approval and incorporated into the Committee's records.

I pointed out that I believed it was necessary for the understanding to be made between the Committee and the Executive in order for there to be some basis for restraining Committee staff investigators who may not be inclined to follow the rules.

Other proposed changes discussed would require the Committee representative to furnish to a witness a copy of the Committee's rules which includes advice concerning the right to counsel and a copy of the proposed guidelines for witness interviews.

I recommended that the guidelines be expanded to address the problem of existing secrecy agreements with former and present employees and the procedural problem involved in Attorney General Order 501-73 which requires prior Departmental approval in order for a witness to respond to a subpoena. As a result, Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28, 1975, that he would recommend the addition of a sentence in the opening paragraph that would indicate the guidelines would not be understood to impair the constitutional rights of individual witnesses, agency agreements with employees or former employees, existing Departmental orders or the Committee's own rules.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

Other minor changes were considered and an effort will be made to correct the language so that the agencies will be obliged to make reasonable efforts to comply with all Committee requests instead of being required to furnish "all information" absolutely.

Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28th that the comments described above will be discussed with Frederick Schwarz in an effort to finally resolve this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Source: Hills 5/27

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

It is hoped that these voluntary guidelines will permit the Select Committee investigation to proceed without undue delay, but it is also recognized that these guidelines do not cover all points or anticipate all problems and that, therefore, either the Select Committee or some agency under investigation may have reason not to follow these suggested guidelines.

Also, it is recognized that this outline is without prejudice to the respective legal positions of the agencies and the Select Committee as to the production of specific information by way of documents or testimony. Not to impair Const. rights of ind. witness, agency rules or agreements, comm rules.

A. Classification of Interviews/Preliminary Testimony

The parties to this investigation by the Select Committee recognize that interviews/preliminary testimony to be conducted by the Committee staff will generally be of two separate and distinct natures.

(1) Those primarily seeking information concerning (A) the overall structure and functions of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; (B) the substantive work being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; and (C) the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2000 BY SP2 ALM/VMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-231

des 1 197. [illegible] comm

(2) Those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

An agency representative will be present, as a general rule, at interviews/preliminary testimony in the first category for the purpose of assisting the Committee's investigation and facilitating the protection of information important to the national interest which is pertinent to the investigation. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews/preliminary testimony in the second category. The parties recognize, however, that for special reasons exceptions can be made in either case: i.e., when good reason exists, endorsed by the Select Committee, agency representatives may not be present for interviews/preliminary testimony falling under the first category, and for good and sufficient reason the agency may [seek to] have a representative present in the second category subject to the approval, of course, of the Select Committee.

B. Procedures to be Employed in Category (2).

When the Select Committee has identified a specific subject as a potential abuse or impropriety and has so notified the agency involved of its designation, that agency will, subject to the second sentence hereof, make [every effort] to provide the Select Committee

with all information and materials that it has on the subject. There will be a mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate.

In abuse or impropriety interviews/preliminary testimony, the following procedures will prevail.

(1) Witnesses will be identified to the agency a reasonable time prior to interviews or taking sworn testimony. This general rule includes current employees, former employees or others who have or have had a relationship with the agency.

Exceptions

Written record of decision

A. Where the Committee or its appropriate delegee ~~by written determination~~ stet believes that prior identification of a witness could adversely affect the witness' willingness to be interviewed or to be forthcoming, or could otherwise hinder the investigation, such prior notice ~~by written authorization~~ will not be given, but in such cases the agency shall be given a general indication of the points or areas to be covered to the extent that is feasible without undercutting the reason for not providing prior notice in the first instance. Delegees shall consist of both Comm. senior counsel or a comb of senior counsel and committee member.

B. In certain cases, the Committee might notify the agency, if the agency agrees not to contact the witness before his appearance. The agency could identify for the Committee special security matters concerning prospective witnesses and provide information on how to locate a witness.

(2) When the Committee contacts a witness, it will explain the security and other arrangements between the Committee and the agency, as well as serve the witness a copy of these ground rules and a copy of the Committee rules. If the witness wishes to consult with the agency prior to his appearance, the Committee will not discourage or seek to interfere with that desire in any way and will help the witness contact the agency representative.

(3) Whenever they are not present at interviews or the taking of sworn statements, agency representatives will be available for consultations regarding the handling of special security matters.

(4) Whether or not an agency has notice of an interview or sworn statement, the Committee will inform the agency of the general substantive points covered as soon as possible thereafter, unless disclosure of the substance of a particular interview would make discernible the identity of a confidential source. In such cases, the Committee shall, to the extent feasible without undercutting that decision, notify the agency in general terms of the points or areas covered, and the fact that it has interviewed a witness on such matters.

(5) Whenever an agency receives prior notice of a particular interview or taking of a sworn statement, it will also be notified

of the general subject areas and periods of employment in which the Committee is primarily interested. The agency will then check the subject's personnel history file and advise the Committee of any exceptionally sensitive aspects of the subject's employment or activity which require special handling.

(6) If because of concern about security of sensitive information, a witness feels unable to give a responsive answer to a particular question, the witness shall so indicate to the interviewer. The questioner and witness may then consult with the agency representative with respect to an appropriate response which will facilitate the provision of pertinent information and its protection. These matters should be worked out forthwith and ordinarily before the close of the interview/testimony session.

(7) The Committee is responsible for providing special handling of interview notes and other working notes in a manner which will protect sensitive material. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee will consult with the agencies concerned regarding the appropriate disposition of any such notes which have not been destroyed following the preparation of finished Committee documents. The agencies will indicate which of these notes it feels are too sensitive to be stored under the Archives

arrangement being established for the general disposition of the Committee's working papers and non-public reports.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

231 THRU 235

236 THRU 1ST NR 237

1ST NR 238, 239

241, 242

244, 245

247

249, 1ST NR 249

252 THRU 254

255 THRU 260

262 THRU 265

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

Alan G. Sentinella

May 21, 1975

The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood

Sent to H 6/9/75
1 - ~~SENSTUDY~~
Att: K. William O'Connor
Sen. Intelligence Coordination
SENSTUDY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/VMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-265

to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were

assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

A. None.

Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted

to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

See attached pages ITEM II

Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison.

A. I do not recall that I was ever, apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior ~~to that time which~~ thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

Q. Why would Harding know this information?

A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes.?

A. Yes.

Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony.?

A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

A. Richard Hamilton.

Q. When did he assume these cases?

A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

A. It did not develop any such information.

Q. How did you know of whate~~ver~~ their CP affiliation may have been?

A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

A. I did not have the cases at that time.

Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How?

A. From information in the appropriate file.

Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances,

airtels, letters, memoranda?

A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

Q. What was the ~~j~~gist of such communications?

A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

A. No.

Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign.

A. I have no such recollection.

Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned. ← SEE ITEM I. of attached pages

Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

Q. Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

Q. Kitchen floor?

A. Yes.

Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau, With reference to the period of time when the policy ~~had~~ changed it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation. See ITEM III of attached pages.

Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights ~~complications~~ Complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

See ITEM IV of attached pages

A. ~~Yes.~~ I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

Q. What about prior to 1965?

A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having KLAN ~~King~~ connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

A. Yes, I did not have any such contact.

Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were ~~or~~ that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category.

I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

A. No.

Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

Q. Who were some of those?

A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

A. Henry Rouse.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

Q. Recently testimony was given be one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

A. It is not my recollection that they did.

Q. What about a Klan organization?

A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceiably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

A. I do not know.

THIS WOULD READ BETTER IF MOVED TO PAGE 19

It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued.

Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted

such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes. He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened, Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

→ FROM P 18

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 9, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

Senstudy - 75

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to my letter dated May 22, 1975, forwarding a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning testimony subsequently given by Mr. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

for info. only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR - Dept of Justice, 11/22/76 - JCB

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP165K/JG9

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Conno
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw
(14)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-102

Hand carried to AG 6-10-75

62-116395-265

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4JAM/lk
ON 2-20-81
6076

62-116395

June 9, 1975

1-Mr.W.O.Cregar
1-Mr.S.F.Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BEFORE
SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION

Reference is made to the memorandum of this Bureau dated May 22, 1975, reporting a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella, a retired SA of the FBI. That statement concerned the interview of Sentinella by an SSC Staff Member on May 12, 1975.

Pursuant to a subpoena, Mr. Sentinella testified before an Executive Session of the SSC on May 21, 1975, after which he voluntarily furnished the FBI a statement concerning his testimony. Set out below is the verbatim text of that statement.

CLASS. & ~~EXT.~~ BY SD16SK/RG 10/31/80
REASON-FCIM ~~II, 1-2.4.2~~ 3
DATE OF REVIEW ~~6-9-95~~

"Alan G. Sentinella"

"May 21, 1975

"The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
aboratory ___
gn. & Eval. ___
. Inv. ___
ing ___
Coun. ___
one Rm. ___
r Sec'y ___

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw ekw
(13)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JBA
62-116395-265

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

"The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

"Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

"Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

"A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

"A. None.

"Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

"A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

"Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

"A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

"Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

"A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

"Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison?

"A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

"Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

DENTIAL

"A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

"Q. Why would Harding know this information?

"A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

"Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

"A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

"Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

"A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

"Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

"A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

"Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

"A. I did not.

DENTIAL

"Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

"A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

"Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

"A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

"Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

"A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

"Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

"A. Richard Hamilton.

"Q. When did he assume these cases?

"A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

"Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

"A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

"Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

"A. Yes, he was.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

"A. It did not develop any such information.

"Q. How did you know of what their CP affiliation may have been?

"A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

"Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

"A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

"Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

"A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

"Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

"A. I did not have the cases at that time.

"Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How?

"A. From information in the appropriate file.

"Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances, airtels, letters, memoranda?

"A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

"Q. What was the gist of such communications?

"A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

"Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

"A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

"Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

"A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

"Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

"A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

"Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign?

"A. I have no such recollection.

"Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

"A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned.

"Q. What about Julian Bond's campaign? Any effort to influence that?

"A. No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

"Q. What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

"A. None to my knowledge beyond such coverage as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

"Q. In same manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature. My answer was that my only concern had been with former Governor Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the Pickrick restaurant.

"Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

"A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

"Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

"A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

"Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

"A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

"Q. Was King given a nickname in the Atlanta Office?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was it?

"A. "Zorro"

"Q. How did that come about?

"A. I believe that began with Mr. Nichols and just passed on down.

"Q. Why was that name selected?

"A. I do not know precisely.

"Q. Don't you have any idea?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for it?

"A. As I remember, "Zorro" was either a television or movie character who carried a sword and therefore could be referred to as a swordsman.

"Q. What connection had this with King?

"A. The Reverend King participated in a number of extra-marital relations and therefore it seemed fitting that in the vernacular the reference swordsman applied to him.

"Q. What extra-marital activities were there?

"A. There were several women involved.

"Q. How do you know this?

"A. It was indicated on occasions by conversations.

"Q. How?

"A. By reference to a previous escapade with an individual or to one pending.

"Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

"A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

"Q. Kitchen floor?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

"A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

"Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

"A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

"Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

"A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy changed, it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

"Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

"Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

"A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

"Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

"Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

"A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation.

"I cannot be certain - I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

"Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

"A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

"Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

"A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

"Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

"Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

"A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

"Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

"A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

CONFIDENTIAL

"Q. What about prior to 1965?

"A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having Klan connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

"Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

"A. Yes. I did not have any such contact.

"Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

"A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category. I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

"Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

"A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

"Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

"A. No.

"Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

"A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

"Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

"A. A number of different gentlemen, some of them were periodically transferred.

"Q. Who were some of those?

"A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

"Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

"A. Henry Rouse.

"Q. Where is he now?

"A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

"Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

"Q. Recently testimony was given by one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

"A. It is not my recollection that they did.

"Q. What about a Klan organization?

"A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

"I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceivably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

"Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

"A. I do not know.

"Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

"Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

"The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes.

CONFIDENTIAL

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened. Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

"The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

"It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued."

On June 4, 1975, Sentinella advised the FBI of the following additional information concerning this matter.

Sentinella received a telephone call that day from Seidel who advised him that the transcript of Sentinella's testimony was near completion and that Sentinella would receive a letter advising him it was ready for Sentinella's review, but only in SSC space.

Seidel sought from Sentinella and was furnished names of some FBI personnel who had monitored technical surveillance on King during the pertinent period. Seidel sought information concerning who supervised the King investigation at FBI Headquarters, to which Sentinella replied that he did not know any specifics. Seidel referred back to information from Sentinella both during the original interview and during Sentinella's testimony and Seidel asked why Sentinella had discussed the matter with former FBI Agent Harding. It was Sentinella's reply that he sought Harding's help in order to rectify what he thought was a wrong answer given to Seidel during the initial interview.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentintella's verbatim statement which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The additional information Sentinella furnished 6/4/75 was telephoned by him to Phillips. On that occasion Sentinella also advised that Seidel had inquired of him that day as to whether he had discussed with Phillips the King case after arriving in Washington, D.C., and prior to testifying. Sentinella stated that he had not.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/13/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Documents Pertaining to the Huston Plan, Cointelpro and other Practices and Programs

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/74, Appendix C, Part I, Item 7, 8.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"S"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

LIAISON

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

With CIA concurrence, SSC was furnished with copies of documents maintained by the Bureau relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, with the resultant temporary discontinuance of formal liaison between the FBI and the CIA.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

5 - TJM

TREAT AS YELLOW

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

MOR-16

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/13/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS
HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMEN

Originating Office: FBI 37

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec. Sec.

Appendix C
Part I, #7

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/DMF

MOR-16

(Additional questions)

ITEM I.

Q: What about JULIAN BOND's Campaign? Any effort to influence that?

A: No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

Q: What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

A: None to my knowledge beyond such coverage ~~of SNCC of which organization he~~ as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

Q: [In some manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature]. My answer was ~~that~~ – my only concern ~~that~~ then sitting former Governor

62-116395-2165

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmc
mDR-16

ENCLOSURE

Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the PICKRICK restaurant].

✓ITEM II

Re page 5, first Q. and A. set forth.

It seems this is where Seidel asked a question concerning other source (other than electronic) material re Levison. However, he went on talking and never actually posed a question as such; accordingly it was not answered.

OR

the above may have been related to the last Q. appearing at bottom of page 7.

ITEM III.

I cannot be certain — I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

ITEM IV.

Re page 14 and the answer you inquired about.

I'm sure my answer was as it now appears on page 14, i.e. corrected.

I did not say *there was no* connection. I'm sure I only introduced the negative when he asked if I would *deny* there was such connection.

I believe "Yes" may have come in here in answering a question raised by your steno.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 7, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. Item number 8, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed copies of 13 FBI communications.

In connection with your request for memoranda pertaining to inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, a search of the files of the FBI at Washington, D. C., and Denver, Colorado, does not indicate that any such inspections or administrative inquiries took place.

RLM:mam
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO & THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-264

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory RLM
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

With reference to the information furnished by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley contained in the communication from the Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, to the Director of the FBI, dated May 8, 1970, your specific attention is directed to the restrictions placed by Dr. Smiley on the information furnished by him. On June 4, 1975, Dr. Smiley was recontacted, at which time he advised that under no circumstances would he testify in public to the information which he originally furnished to the FBI on a confidential basis. He further advised that under no circumstances would he reveal the identity of his contact in the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in the May 8, 1970, communication. He agreed to the release of the information in the May 8, 1970, communication to the SSC on a strictly confidential basis, for its use only and not for any further dissemination. Dr. Smiley stated he has no information other than that in the May 8, 1970, communication.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Concurrence to pass the 2/26/70 letter, with Secret enclosures, from Richard Helms, then Director of CIA, to J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of FBI, was obtained by Liaison Officer Leon F. Schwartz from Walter Elder, CIA on 6/10/75. The response to requests set forth in Appendix C, Part I, Item numbers 7 and 8 is being made in the same communication to avoid unnecessary duplication since the severing of liaison with CIA grew out of the RIHA matter.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

A. W. Gray memorandum to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/70, states "our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958." This information only appears on the cover page of the report of SA Daniel J. Griffin, dated, 8/31/60 at Boston. The information was furnished by Riha during interview on 8/11/60 and has never been given to us by CIA.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (28)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RLM:mam
(9) mam

RLM

at which Tomas ad 7/11/75

Delivered To Marshall Meekstrum RPT
6/20 [illegible] for Wm. Miller

REC-102

62-116395-264

17 JUN 25 1975

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~
RLM

Dir.
AD Adm.
AD Inv.
Syst.
Affairs
& Com.

JUN 2 5 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☒ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting testimony given by former FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the SSC.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence activities, domestic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Testimony covered former FBI investigation of:

1) Martin Luther King, Jr.
2) Stanley David Levison
3) Southern Christian Leadership Conference

5-18

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

62-116395

6-24-75 LFS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMK

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~XC~~ 3/Aa ~~XC~~ R. Prong ~~XC/FC~~ XC ① /FC

Patch III

Assembly

264

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVE[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : DIRECTOR, F.B.I. February 12, 1970

ROM : SAC, DENVER

UBJECT: THOMAS RIHA

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was called by MIKE TODOROVICH, who is in charge of the CIA office here in Denver. TODOROVICH stated he has instructions from his Washington Office to contact Denver District Attorney JAMES MC KEVITT and tell MC KEVITT that CIA Agent JOHN D. FRITZ who is stationed in Boulder, Colorado, had told Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, former President of the University of Colorado, that FRITZ had been told that THOMAS RIHA's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that RIHA was, in fact, all right. TODOROVICH then told me that FRITZ got this information from an FBI Agent in Boulder.

I told TODOROVICH to give me the name of the FBI Agent and he stated he would not do so. He then stated the FBI Agent told him, TODOROVICH the same thing. I again requested the name of the Agent. He again declined to give it to me. I very emphatically told TODOROVICH that until he gave me the name of the Agent who supposedly gave him and FRITZ this information, that I would not believe that either he or FRITZ had been given any information such as this by any Agent of this Bureau and this was based on the fact that no Agent would have any reason whatsoever to make such a statement since we had not conducted any investigation in this matter nor did we have any information concerning RIHA and, therefore, we would not be in a position to make such a statement as to whether or not RIHA was all right.

I then also pointed out to Mr. TODOROVICH that if he gave the information to Mr. MC KEVITT and advised Mr. MC KEVITT the information had come from an FBI Agent and if Mr. MC KEVITT contacted me I would certainly advise him that the information did not come from anyone in the FBI for the same reasons as set forth above.

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum that they have not made such statements as were attributed to them by TODOROVICH. Not only that, neither of the two has ever had any contact personally or otherwise with JOHN D. FRITZ, the CIA representative in Boulder.

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of CIA's actions in connection with this matter.

1. Protests CIA re Todorovich's actions
2. Commends SAC re his handling of Todorovich.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and when it may have happened.

While avoiding specifics about their theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest Wednesday in knowing more about the housewife's recollection that she telephoned Riha and carried on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon that Monday, the day when he first failed to show up for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph Smiley, Denver police chief George Seaton or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officials to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it "is entirely out of our jurisdiction."

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70
Edition: Home
Author: Alan Cunningham
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder housewife is certain she talked to Thomas ha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first led to show up for his history classes at the Univery of Colorado.

What is even more remarkae than this, in the opinion of ose who have been trying to down the exact date of ba's disappearance, is the man's insistence that Riha is cheerful, relaxed and interted in chatting about a local litical issue.

The woman, who asks that she t be identified by name, has ld the News she was in the ocess of telephoning a list of ulder citizens last March, eking support for a proposed ection on whether the city ould take over its public utilies.

While she had been involved the issue for several weeks, e is sure it was on Monday, arch 17, that she attempted to each a dozen people whose mes began with the letters P" and "R." Among the three four whom she was able to each that day, she insists, was homas Riha. She says he anwered the telephone at his ome at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, leasant and quite interested in e municipal issue, according the Boulder housewife. In ct, she explained, his name as on the list because he had arlier sent in a reader survey ballot" from a Boulder newsaper which related to the issue.

As a result, Riha struck her as more informed on it than most others she had talked to in her telephone inquiries, and she believes the conversation lasted about 10 minutes, making it the longest in which she took part that day.

The date, if the Boulder housevife is correct, is significant, ince Riha reportedly missed a linner party to which he was invited the previous night, and ould not be reached on Saturlay, March 15, by a friend who ried to telephone him repeatdly.

Many people interested in the ase have speculated that Riha eft Boulder, was kidnaped or lied as early as that Friday or Saturday. And the wife of a CU professor who was rumored to have seen Riha on Sunday, the 16th, vigorously dismissed this rumor as untrue when asked about it Tuesday.

But the Boulder housewife who made the series of telephone calls is equally adamant about the date when she talked to Riha. She says she didn't know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist. Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alvie and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported no reply yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70
Edition: Home
Author:
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

Following is typewritten clarification of the handwritten comment of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

"I don't. I still want name of our agt which Todorovich gave to Dr. Smiley. H"

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan S

DATE: 2-18-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 2/10/70, SAC Werner, Denver, demanded that Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver, identify Bureau Agent who allegedly told a CIA officer that the subject's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that subject, in fact, was alright. Todorovich refused to do so. The Director instructed that we protest to CIA regarding Todorovich's actions.

On 2-17-70, Liaison Agent Papich vigorously protested Todorovich's actions to CIA, charging the Agency with impeding our inquiry. He pointed out that Todorovich's stubborn refusal to divulge the identity of the Bureau Agent involved was unacceptable because we had no information to support the statement attributed to our Agent. As a result of Papich's protest, a CIA official telephoned Todorovich and demanded that he divulge the identity of the Agent. Todorovich refused and stated that he considered this a matter of personal honor and that unless there was reason to believe Bureau operations were being adversely effected, he would not make the identification. CIA officials subsequently advised the Liaison Agent that they had reviewed the entire case and learned that District Attorney McKevitt publicly stated on 2-14-70 that the statement attributed to Dr. Smiley (which allegedly came to him via Todorovich from our Agent) was based on an "honest mistake" and that McKevitt felt this cleared the air and no further clarification was needed.

ACTION: I don't. I still want [illegible]

None. For information. [illegible]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
0-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 2-20-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to memorandum dated 2-18-70 from D. J. Brennan to Sullivan. The Director stated that he wants the name of the FBI Agent who had furnished certain information to Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver. The Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, on 2-20-70, repeating the background of this matter and reiterated the protest made earlier by the Bureau and asked that CIA obtain the identity of the FBI Agent.

Helms advised that he considered this a most serious development and fully recognizes the gravity of the situation since it has such a significant bearing on relations between the two agencies and the highly important work of both organizations. He stated that he does not have the identity of the FBI Agent and so far Todorovich has refused to disclose same. Helms advised that he is requesting Todorovich to proceed to Washington, D. C., immediately at which time he will be interviewed in detail by Helms. In the meantime, the CIA Director is requesting his subordinates to prepare for him a complete report covering all information in possession of CIA regarding the subject. He stated that he will communicate with the Bureau immediately after talking to Todorovich. He stated that it was absolutely necessary that he make certain that he has all the relevant facts so that he can accurately respond to the Director and take the proper and necessary administrative action within his own organization.

ACTION:

For information.

I shall await words.
H

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 25, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On February 24, 1970, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Richard Helms had instructed him to transmit the following message to the Director.

Pursuant to instructions from Helms, Mike Todorovich, CIA representative in Denver, arrived in Washington, D. C., on February 24, 1970, and Helms initiated his interview. Helms expects to complete the interview including an examination of various CIA records within two days, upon the completion of which he will be transmitting a personal letter to the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "Werner acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. Papich has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. Michael Todorovich. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to Dr. Joseph Smiley, then President of Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, now President of a university in El Paso, Texas, and to the District Attorney of Denver, Mr. James McKevitt. In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. Todorovich to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. Todorovich and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. Todorovich was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. Todorovich maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. Todorovich explained that the Riha/Galya Tannenbaum cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

The purpose of Mr. Todorovich's conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on Dr. Joseph Smiley. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. Todorovich affirms that before going to District Attorney McKevitt he called upon the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Scott Werner, and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. Werner to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Werner acted properly. H

Mr. Todorovich states that Mr. Werner refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. Werner engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. Todorovich. Subsequently, Mr. Todorovich conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding Dr. Smiley and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. Todorovich. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to Dr. Smiley and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. Todorovich, I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. Todorovich.

~~SECRET~~

I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] investigation.

While the following is not pertinent to your request, my review of this case suggests the advisability of a re-examination of Riha's disappearance and past activities and, necessarily, the Tannenbaum case. Briefly, since 1958 we have communicated to your Bureau significant information which relates to Riha's involvement with Czech and Soviet intelligence services, when he was behind the Iron Curtain. I attach for your information and convenience copies of pertinent reports regarding this aspect of the case.

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Helms forgets it is a two way street. H

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Attachments - a/s

This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with C.I.A. to be terminated & any contacts with CIA in field offices to be by letter only. H

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. The January 1970 receipt of information from your Bureau that Mrs. Ruth Ann COOK, Thomas RIHA's mother, had mentioned rumors of her son's work for CIA in letters to the SAC, Denver, caused us to verify the fact RIHA has never been employed or used operationally by this Agency.

2. In 1958 and 1959 you were provided information that RIHA, when transitting Prague en route to Moscow, was contacted by Czech Intelligence and asked to remain in the CSR. Later in 1958 Czech Intelligence introduced RIHA to the KGB in Moscow and our source reported RIHA accepted certain privileges from the KGB while asserting he would not become a spy for the Soviets. Details reported by our source about RIHA's KGB contacts did not emerge during a 1960 FBI interview of RIHA.

3. This indication that RIHA may not have been truthful in 1960, when added to our current knowledge about KGB interest in recruiting American exchange students and RIHA's 1968 trip to the USSR, suggests the circumstances of RIHA's disappearance might be re-evaluated. This Agency is reopening its file on this case in view of the information disclosed in the attachments.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COPY

27 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. The following report concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect the repatriation of Subject, a naturalized American East-West Exchange student, to his country of origin was recently submitted by a source of this office.

2. Source first became acquainted with Subject during the past year at The Russian Research Center, Harvard University. On 10 September 1958 he ran into Subject by chance at the SAS office in Vienna as the two boarded a SAS flight to Copenhagen via Duesseldorf. During the trip Subject disclosed the following to source which has been supplemented from information from our files.

3. RIHA, who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 17 April 1929, is one of the twenty American students selected for the East-West Exchange Program and will be studying in the USSR for the 1958-59 academic year. Files in this Agency indicate that RIHA arrived in the U. S. on 15 July 1947 and became a citizen in 1952.

4. Our source informed us ~~that RIHA~~ had gone to Prague, June of this year, to see his father and other relatives. His father and mother are divorced and according to information in our files, his mother is listed as Mrs. Ruth A. COOK. address: 2023 Etna Street, Berkeley 4, California.

5. RIHA told our source that when he arrived in Prague he was put into a Government hotel for three days before he was allowed to stay with his relatives and friends. During this time, and perhaps later, RIHA was accompanied through the city by a guide whom he described as a "Government Official" name unknown, who attempted to effect Subject's repatriation to Czechoslovakia. RIHA told our source that this man has set up an appointment (date and address unknown) to meet him in Moscow to talk further.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

6. Subject told our source that this "Government Official" did not mention Czech Intelligence or Security Forces as such and that he (RIHA) is not too worried concerning this contact. RIHA apparently feels that it is the price he must pay in order to study in the Soviet Union and once he gets deeply into his studies in Moscow he feels that he can plead that he is too busy with his academic work to have contact with any officials. Our source also stated that RIHA is in some kind of correspondence with the Czech official. We have no description or name for the Czech official.

7. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office, and that our source be fully protected in the event that contact is made with RIHA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

(Signed) James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/751,690

cc: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~

COPY

21 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CS CI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958 concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect Subject's repatriation while the latter was in Prague in June of 1958 visiting relatives en route to study in Moscow during 1958-59 as an East-West Exchange Student. The following report describes further action taken by the KGB in Moscow to cultivate Subject, and was recently submitted by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. Sometime in December 1958, Subject again met the Czech Official who had tried to have Subject repatriate to the CSR in Prague last summer. According to our source, it was apparently an accidental meeting at a Moscow railroad station as the Czech was returning to Prague. The Czech was delighted to see Subject, and introduced him to a Soviet official. This Soviet identified himself only by a first name and a telephone number, both unknown to our source. The Soviet described his work as being in the American Section of the MVD.

3. This Soviet Official has been cultivating Subject (trying to see him as often as possible, sometimes twice a week) since their introduction in December, by offering such blandishments as trips in a chauffered private limousine into forbidden areas outside Moscow, tickets to any entertainment, access to material from previously inaccessible archives, the use of private country villas and all the "beautiful, interesting and intelligent girls" he might want. Subject has further been promised the opportunity of returning to the Soviet Union for as long as he wants at any future date. He would have to pay only his way over there; his expenses and return trip to the US would be paid by the Soviets.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

4. Subject has taken advantage of this offer to take several trips for sightseeing into forbidden areas around Moscow in a private car with the Soviet Official, and has also taken up a few offers for entertainment. Subject visited one of these villas, but refused the girls on the ground that he wants a woman to like him for himself, and not because she has been told to do so. The Soviet answered that "some of them will really learn to like you for yourself, as well as work for us," but Subject still declined to get involved. However, Subject has recently been taken up by a Soviet girl who had previously tried to seduce another American student and subsequently blurted out that she was put onto the latter American by the MVD, which she has also told Subject. Subject is reported to be responding warmly to her approaches although he has flatly told her he doesn't trust her nor any Russian completely. He claims he enjoys her company but will not have a serious affair with her, and suspects she may be tied up with the other women offered him by the Soviet Official.

5. In his relationship with the Soviet Official, Subject is reportedly aware that he is playing a risky game, and is only utilizing the situation for the comfort and convenience it brings him. He has told the Soviet frankly that he cannot be wom over ideologically. Subject says he feels that the Soviets' interest in him is to cultivate him as a scholar of possible future importance to insure that he will always be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Subject has reportedly told several other American students of his relationship with the Soviet Official in order to cover himself "in case anything happened".

6. This Soviet Official has evinced an interest to Subject in many of the American Exchange students, with the explanation that some would undoubtedly be back in Moscow within two years as Diplomats and that since this is his area of responsibility, he wants to know as much as possible about them. The Soviet indicated that he was quite aware of the pattern of the American Exchange students' trips to the US Embassy and what they do in the university buildings, but is not so sure of their activities around the city. To demonstrate to Subject his knowledge about the American students, the Soviet Official mentioned an affair going on within the American group of which Subject had been unaware. The Soviet's information turned out to be true.

7. Subject was described by a reliable source, who knows him from group social gatherings at Harvard, as mature and socially vivacious with a warm personality. Subject is a clever and humorous conversationalist who likes to be surrounded by people, make new acquaintances, and develop friendships. Subject's patriotic motivation was not known to our source, but the latter felt that Subject was completely "Americanized" in manners and interests. Our source would guess that Subject has courage.

8. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you either before or after his return to the United States.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/754,303

COPY

~~SECRET~~

2 June 1959

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CSCI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958, and our CSCI 3/754,303 of 14 April 1959 in which are reported the attempt by Czech Intelligence to induce Subject, a Czech-born naturalized American, to repatriate to Czechoslovakia, and the further cultivation of Subject by the KGB in Moscow where Subject is an Exchange Student during 1958-59. The following report describes further action by the KGB to recruit Subject, and his adamant refusal of any such offer. This latest information was recently received from RIHA by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. During April 1959, the Soviet Official who said he was from the American Section of the MVD (sic) and who had been cultivating Subject, allegedly asked the latter to make complete and regular reports on Michael Martin LUTHER, one of the other American Exchange Students at Moscow University. Subject was asked to spend as much time as possible with LUTHER, and to report where he goes, what he does and with whom he associates. If Subject were to do this reporting, the Soviet Official said he would make available certain material from Archives which Subject has been unable to get permission to use although research in this material is vital to his having a successful year academically in Moscow.

3. Subject alleges he flatly refused this "deal", saying that if he ever got mixed up in such a dirty business, it would be for his own side and not for the Communists. The Soviet Official then told Subject he should engage in such observation and reporting to the Soviets to lose some "naivete" about how the United States is exploiting the Cultural Exchange Program for intelligence purposes. To back up this assertion, the Soviet Official told Subject about a "spy nest where spies deposit things for one another" which he said had recently been uncovered near a university entrance frequented by still another American student, Walter CLEMENS, who, the Soviet implied, was not engaged in academic work only while studying at Moscow University.

~~SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Subject reportedly again adamantly refused to cooperate with the Soviet Official.

4. In paragraph 4 of CSCI 3/754,303, reference was made to a Soviet girl who had become interested in Subject, and whom Subject viewed with suspicion although continuing to see her for her companionship. Her name is Lida (Y)EGOROVA. Subject has now reportedly been alienated by ~~her~~ undependable personality and has pretty well broken up with her. This girl may have left, or soon be leaving, for Prague to join her husband.

5. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[illegible]

James Angleton

CSCI 3/754,373

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to letter from Richard Helms, Director, CIA, dated February 26, 1970.

Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised Helms on February 27, 1970, that (1) the Bureau is discontinuing all contact with the CIA office in Denver and (2) that direct Liaison with CIA at headquarters is being terminated. Helms was further told that henceforth our communication with CIA will be by letter only.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing that all contact with the local CIA office be discontinued.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CODE 3/2/70

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC DENVER

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL CIA OFFICE.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5-5-70

FROM : D. E. Moore DEM/wcw 5-4-70

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 4:35 p.m., today I telephonically contacted ASAC Morley, Denver, and advised him that an article concerning the Riha case had appeared in the Sunday News (New York) 4-3-70. This article was a general rehashing of the Riha case.

I told him that the Bureau desired that SAC Werner contact the District Attorney to determine the developments of his investigation in this case and also determine what conclusions had been reached. Morley said this would be done.

Morley was asked if Denver had information concerning a professor who had gone to El Paso, Texas, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and he advised this probably referred to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President at Colorado University who was there when Riha disappeared. He said that Smiley is now President of the University of Texas, at El Paso, Texas. He said Denver had no information that Dr. Smiley has any current information concerning this matter.

SAC Werner called at 5:30 p.m., today to advise that he had been unable to get in touch with the District Attorney but also was following up on this and would contact the District Attorney today and get in a teletype tonight.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

NR002 DN PLAIN

5:15 PM URGENT 5-5-70 DCM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

REBUTELCAL TODAY.

PURSUANT TO REQUEST IN REBUTELCAL, THIS IS TO ADVISE THE PROFESSOR WHO ALLEGEDLY WENT TO EL PASO OR NEW ORLEANS CONCERNING THOMAS RIHA AND HAD HIS DFISAPPEARANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY DR. JOSEPH SMILEY , FORMER PRESIDENT, COLORADO UNIVERSITY, BOULDER, COLO., WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS IN EL PASO, TEXAS.

DR. SMILEY WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY CIA AND ADVISED BY CIA THAT RIHA WAS ALIVE AND WELL.

AS BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED, CIA ATTEMPTED TO ATTRIBUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE WAS NO FEDERAL VIOLATION OVER WHICH THE BUREAU HAD INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST, NO FBI INVESTIGATION WAS

REC-35

END PAGE ONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

CONDUCTED.

DENVER FILES CONTAIN NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA OTHER THAT THAT PREVIOULSY SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU.

DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES MC KEVITT, GENERALLY KNOWN AS MIKE MC KEVITT, ADVISED TODAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA IS AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ALL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MC KEVITT STATES THAT HE FEELS GALYA TANNENBAUM, FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RIHA, MAY HAVE KILLED HIM IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MC KEVITT'S INVESTIGATION INDICATES THERE WAS A VERY BAD FEELING BETWEEN RIHA AND TANNENBAUM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DISAPPEARANCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT TANNENBAUM WAS FORGING CHECKS ON RIHA'S ACCOUNT.

FULL BACKGROUND CONCERNING TANNENBAUM PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED BUREAU UNDER CAPTION "GALYA TANNENBAUM, AKA, IMPERSONATION," BUFILE UNKNOWN, DENVER FILE FOUR SEVEN DASH THREE ONE NINE ZERO.

MC KEVITT SAID INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT TANNENBAUM

WAS PROBABLY A NYMPHOMANIAC AND THAT SHE AND RIHA HAD HAD CONSTANT SEXUAL AFFAIRS AND THAT SHE HELD THIS AS A CLUB OVER HIS HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORGERY OF THESE CHECKS.

IN ANY EVENT MC KEVITT STATES IT IS HIS OPINION THAT RIHA IS DEAD SINCE HIS INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALS RIHA WAS VERY ATTACHED TO HIS FRIENDS AND MC KEVITT FEELS THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS FRIENDS IF HE WERE ALIVE. MC KEVITT ALSO ADVISES THAT INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE INDICATES RIHA WAS VERY ABNORMAL IN HIS SEXUAL DESIRES AND PURSUITS AND THAT THIS WAS HIS GREAT WEAKNESS; THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WOMEN ALONE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THESE INVOLVEMENTS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS DEATH.

IN VIEW OF THE DETAILS AND FACTS SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY INTERVIEW WITH DR. JOSEPH SMILEY IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU.

END

WJM FBI WA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: May 6, 1970

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Pursuant to Director's request Denver District Attorney James "Mike" McKevitt interviewed 5/5/70 as to investigation of Riha, Czechoslovak-born, naturalized, former professor of Russian history at Colorado University, who departed Denver area 3/69 without notifying friends, associates or estranged wife. His disappearance has been glamorized and spiced up in newspaper articles by references to Galya Tannenbaum, his paramour. McKevitt stated investigation at standstill, all leads being exhausted. He feels Tannenbaum may have killed subject since bad feeling developed between them prior to his disappearance due to her forging checks on his account. Further, Tannenbaum probably a nymphomaniac who had constant sexual affairs with Riha and used this as a club over his head to prevent disclosure of forgeries. In McKevitt's opinion Riha is dead since he was close to his friends and if alive would contact them. Investigation indicates Riha abnormal in his sexual desires and could not leave women alone. Possibility exists one of these involvements may have resulted in his death.

Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President, Colorado University, where subject employed, is now President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas. Smiley after subject's disappearance stated subject was alive and well. When challenged by McKevitt to disclose basis for statement he refused and appealed to CIA, his source, for help. Bureau vigorously refuted CIA's claim that Bureau Agent was original source for statement. As result McKevitt publicly announced statement was not true and resulted from "honest mistake." No indication Smiley has any facts to contribute concerning subject's current whereabouts or basis for his disappearance. Since Bureau has conducted no investigation into Riha's disappearance, interview of Smiley could result in impression Bureau entering case. However, if Director so desires, El Paso will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley. Bureau files show subject attended Moscow University 9/58-9/59. Our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958. In 1958-59 CIA advised Czech intelligence attempted to persuade Riha to repatriate and later introduced Riha to Soviet intelligence which attempted his recruitment. After subject's return to US in 1959 no information was developed as to continued interest in him by Soviet intelligence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: THOMAS RIHA
105-78256

ACTION:

If the Director so desires, El Paso will be furnished background information regarding Riha and will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley.

Yes.
H

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/7/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Rememo A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 5/6/70, by which the Director instructed we interview Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas.

At 1:40 p.m., 5/7/70, I telephoned ASAC Jay Cochran, Jr., El Paso, and furnished him background of this matter. I instructed him to have Dr. Smiley contacted immediately, to make it clear that the FBI was not investigating the Riha matter and to inquire of Smiley if he has any new information regarding Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

ASAC Cochran was told to send the results of this interview of Dr. Smiley immediately by teletype to the Bureau. He was also told that in the event Dr. Smiley is out of town or otherwise unavailable for interview, a teletype should be sent immediately to the Bureau advising as to when the interview would be conducted.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 5/8/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference memorandum A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/6/70, same caption, by which the Director instructed that Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, be interviewed as to any knowledge he possessed concerning Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

Dr. Smiley was interviewed 5/7/70 and was most cooperative. Smiley stated since leaving the University of Colorado in 6/69 his knowledge of developments in this case has been derived from articles he has read in "The Denver Post." He speculated Riha may have been involved in intelligence work and based this comment on Riha's being a "loner" and having married a Czech girl. He said he had no evidence to support this speculation. He said that he was aware that one Mrs. Tannenbaum, a woman indicted in Colorado for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of Riha. He concluded that he had no further information concerning either Riha's disappearance or his whereabouts.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/8/70

nsmit the following in ____________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL ____________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, EL PASO

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
SINO-SATELLITE SECTION

ReButel call to EP, 5/7/70;
EP tel call to Bureau, 5/7/70.

In accordance with the request of the Director, SA FRANCIS J. PRASEK interviewed Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, President of UTEP. Dr. SMILEY was advised that the FBI has no jurisdiction in this matter, nor is it conducting any active investigation regarding RIJA, and that we were simply desirous of being advised of any new information he may have received regarding RIJA's disappearance and/or present whereabouts.

Dr. SMILEY, who was most gracious and pleasant, stated that he left the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, in 6/69, and has since that time followed the investigation of RIJA and his disappearance which is being conducted by the newspaper "The Denver Post".

SMILEY, in 4/69, approximately three weeks after the disappearance of RIJA, contacted RIJA's attorney for the purpose of determining whether the attorney had any information regarding RIJA, since it was necessary for SMILEY to know whether RIJA was alive and whether he intended to return to the University for the fall semester of 1969 to resume teaching in the History Department. SMILEY, who cannot now recall the name of the attorney, was furnished an address for RIJA in Montreal, Canada, and a letter was directed to this address by the History Department seeking information regarding RIJA and his intentions.

② Bureau (RAM)
1-El Paso

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After leaving Boulder, SMILEY was advised by Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, that a letter was received by the University purportedly written by RIJA in which he stated that he would not be returning to the University. BRIGGS advised SMILEY that in his opinion, the letter was a forgery, since the signature did not compare with that of RIJA.

After the disappearance, SMILEY began receiving a great many inquiries from the news media and he was pressed for a statement regarding his knowledge of RIJA and whether or not he was alive.

THE FOLLOWING WAS FURNISHED BY DR. SMILEY IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE FBI AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION TO ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY SINCE HE WAS BREAKING A CONFIDENCE WITH AN ASSOCIATE IN THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Being hounded by the press for a statement, he contacted a source in the CIA Office at Denver since he, SMILEY, was formerly a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, thinking that perhaps that agency could assist him off the record with any information it might possess. SMILEY was aware that the CIA had interviewed RIJA following a trip by RIJA to the Soviet Union. The CIA source subsequently told Dr. SMILEY to merely advise the press that he had information to the effect that RIJA was "alive and well". This information was subsequently released by Dr. SMILEY to the student press at the University of Colorado, and it appeared in print.

When the Office of the District Attorney in Denver instituted investigation into the disappearance of RIJA, SMILEY was contacted by the DA's Office regarding the source of his statement. Dr. SMILEY again contacted the Denver CIA Office source and was advised that he was to state nothing and that he would be recontacted.

Some days later, the CIA source recontacted him and told him that he would be receiving an inquiry from the Office of the DA in the form of a statement, and that he should agree with the statement even though it "was not quite the truth". SMILEY did not question

these instructions, since he felt that CIA knew what should be done in this type of case. He received a telephone call from the DA's Office and a statement was read to him to the effect that the information which he had received and made public to the effect that RIJA was alive and well was in error. SMILEY told the caller that he agreed with the statement and nothing further came of this.

Dr. SMILEY does not know what part, if any, the CIA has in this case, but since he, SMILEY, is himself a former intelligence agent he did not feel that he had the right to question something which might be of vital importance to his country.

DR. SMILEY REQUESTED THAT NO HINT OR INFERENCE BE GIVEN TO THE CIA WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT HE HAS REVEALED TO THE FBI HIS CONTACTS REGARDING THIS MATTER WITH THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CIA.

He stated that though he has no evidence to substantiate his belief, he cannot get it out of his mind that RIJA may have been a double agent for the Soviets or the Czechoslovaks. He is aware that one Mrs. TANNENBAUM, a woman indicted for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of RIJA. He never knew RIJA to be associated with any such woman, but stated that he was not acquainted with the personal life of RIJA who was somewhat of a "loner".

RIJA, when he joined the staff of the University of Colorado, was single but in 8/68, an individual came to visit RIJA ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a marriage between RIJA and the man's sister. The intended bride was a Czechoslovakian girl who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and this "brother-in-law" was entertained by a member and colleague of RIJA in the History Department. This individual indicated to SMILEY that although the "brother-in-law" supposedly did not speak any English, and had RIJA translate every statement into Czech, it was apparent from the gestures and expressions of the "brother-in-law" that he understood more than he let on. Three weeks after the visit of this man, the woman who became Mrs. RIJA came to Boulder, Colorado, where she and RIJA were married. The marriage resulted in divorce a short time later and the girl reportedly returned to the East Coast from whence she came.

Dr. SMILEY indicated that he has no further information regarding this matter, but that Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, should be in possession of the letter purportedly written from Canada by RIJA, and may be in a position to assist in answering any question the Bureau might have regarding RIJA's association with the University of Colorado, since BRIGGS would have possession of these records. He stated BRIGGS is a trusted confidant of his and Dr. SMILEY's name should be used as an introduction should the Bureau desire any information of BRIGGS.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, which forwarded a memorandum of the same date for your approval and forwarding to the SSC in partial response to its request of April 30, 1975.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of an additional memorandum which completes the response to the Committee's request.

A copy of the memorandum for the SSC is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
LFS:mjg
(9)

Sect 102 [illegible]
HSC Ser 94. (8/24/75 [illegible])
11/16/76.

REC-102

62-116395-263

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 25 1975

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 11, 1975
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, provided a partial response to this request and advised that it would be necessary to clear Section 102 of the Manual of Instructions with other interested agencies.

Section 102 has now been cleared with the other interested agencies and is available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstein or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:mjg mjs
(8)

NOTE:

Third agency considerations have been resolved by coordination with other appropriate agencies. Section 102 pertains to relations with other agencies.

LFS

8

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-11 [illegible] -263

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Sections of the Manual of Instructions not Previously Furnished
Section 102 of MOI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6-13-75

Received by: John T. Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC **J. T. Elliff**
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part 2.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In response to above-cited SSC request, the SSC was advised that designated Sections, with one exception, of FBI Manual of Instructions were available for review at FBI Headquarters. By communication 6/11/75, SSC was advised excluded Section, which involved third agency considerations, is now available for review at FBI Headquarters.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC
Ews
5-TAM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ~~TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY~~ on Intelligence Activities

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a staff member of captioned Committee of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, former Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb lhb
(12)

P. V. [illegible] 509 JB

Hand carried by Paul V. Daly 6-12-75 PVD/

62-116395-262

REC-102

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000

MOR-16

PCM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG, III, BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Armstrong, who was formerly Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. Mr. Armstrong furnished the information following his interview by SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein. The interview took place in Washington, D. C., on June 6, 1975, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. Mr. Armstrong was not put under oath and was not advised of his rights including his right to personal counsel.

Mr. Armstrong advised that the interview covered the following areas:

1. The general activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division, particularly Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning research conducted in the Intelligence Division concerning the possibility of obtaining an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters;

2. The alleged existence of files in former Director Hoover's office;

3. Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning the increase in the number of FBI representatives assigned abroad as Legal Attaches.

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. 1
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2001 BY SP2ALM/lmf

MOR-16

WRW/TDL

62-116395-262

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

With regard to the effort made to obtain an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters, Mr. Armstrong advised the SSC representative that in May, 1972, one of the principal questions raised by Mr. Gray was concerning the jurisdictional authority of the FBI to conduct intelligence or security investigations. He commented that in May, 1972, a conference was held at Quantico, Virginia, involving a number of Bureau executives and that during this conference the question of jurisdictional authority was discussed. Following the conference, a special team was set up to discuss this subject, including Mr. Armstrong and former Special Agent Thomas Smith of the Intelligence Division. According to Mr. Armstrong, it was felt that it would be appropriate to develop a new set of guidelines and not to rely on prior statutes and Presidential orders. Armstrong recalled that after several meetings of this group, Thomas Smith prepared a document consisting of 43 pages which was completed approximately six weeks after the group was created. Armstrong recalled that the document was received in the Acting Director's office and was discussed at one of the regular afternoon staff conferences. At that time it was agreed that the document was good but that the timing was not thought to be appropriate. The thought was expressed that it would be held in abeyance until after the coming elections. It was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the matter might have been discussed between Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Gray, and it was decided not to push the matter until after the elections. Mr. Armstrong recalled advising Mr. Smith of the location of the document and the fact that it was being held in abeyance until after the elections.

The matter of the above document did not come up again until shortly before the confirmation hearings concerning Mr. Gray. At that time it was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the Bureau should not push for the Executive Order until after a

permanent Director of the Bureau had been confirmed. Mr. Armstrong advised that to the best of his knowledge the document was not given to the Department of Justice while Mr. Gray and his staff were in the Bureau.

Concerning files that were allegedly maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Armstrong stated that shortly after Mr. Gray's arrival in the Bureau he made a statement to the effect that there were no secret files maintained by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Armstrong commented that he doubted the wisdom of making such a broad statement.

Shortly after Mr. Gray's statement was made, information came to Mr. Armstrong's attention which caused him to prepare a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating the possibility of the existence of files in Mr. Hoover's office. Armstrong could not recall Mr. Gray's response to his memorandum but he believed that the original of the memorandum was returned to him and that he placed the original and the carbon in his desk along with other memoranda that he had prepared for Mr. Gray.

Mr. Armstrong stated that it was his theory that the files in Mr. Hoover's office were in two categories; the first being files containing information possibly detrimental to prominent persons in the Government and the other category being tidbits of information received in personal correspondence from various Special Agents in Charge concerning persons of possible interest to Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Armstrong advised further that at one of his daily conferences, Mr. Gray mentioned that he had talked to former Acting Associate Director Mark Felt concerning files which may have been maintained in Mr. Hoover's office and which he said were then in a safe in the custody of Mr. Felt.

Mr. Armstrong could not recall whether Mr. Gray and Mr. Felt were to go through the safe together or whether Mr. Felt was to do it alone and advise Mr. Gray of his findings.

With regard to the present location of such files, Mr. Armstrong had no specific knowledge but speculated that if they existed they might have been destroyed before Mr. Gray arrived in the office, they might have been retained in Mr. Felt's safe or they might have been removed to the custody of Mr. Clyde Tolson or Miss Helen Gandy at Mr. Hoover's house.

Mr. Armstrong advised that on April 27, 1973, prior to his departure from the Bureau, he destroyed all of the memoranda he had retained in his desk and he is certain that among them was his memorandum concerning files in Mr. Hoover's office.

With regard to the increase in the number of Legal Attaches, Armstrong advised that he recalled that shortly before Mr. Gray came to the Bureau there had been an expansion in the number of Legal Attaches. He understood that traditionally the role of the Legal Attache had been to function as a liaison representative to foreign police agencies but that with the expansion in the number of Legal Attaches they were given additional responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, exactly to what extent he did not recall. He recalled that the expansion was at the initiation of the White House and may have been because the White House was not satisfied with the intelligence collected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Armstrong stated that he saw a potential for friction with CIA and speculated that this might have been a factor in the breach of liaison between the FBI and CIA. He recalled writing a memorandum for Mr. Gray expressing doubts as to whether the training of Special Agents of the FBI equipped them for the collection of foreign intelligence and some subsequent discussion that

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE BY SSC

perhaps the Legal Attaches should be brought home for such training, but that this idea was concluded to be impractical or unnecessary.

1 - The Attorney General

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

To the Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum reporting interview of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, formerly Special Assistant to FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, by SSC Staff Member.

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Authorities for FBI's security investigations

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Interview included following topics: general activities of FBI's Intelligence Division, including FBI's authorities in security investigations; files maintained in former FBI Director Hoover's office, and increase in number of FBI representatives abroad as Legal Attaches.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

WDC

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-8

SFP:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 CFS

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

276-10483

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter, and appendices thereto, from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are an original of a memorandum and enclosures which are responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 6

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-260

RDS:lek|ek
(10)

REC-102

17 JUN 25 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

3

WRW

PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to the SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, Item 10, the SSC requested all records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D. C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D. C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August, 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

In respect to 10a, on 12/9/64 a travel voucher was processed for payment to former Special Agent Lish Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. Accompanying the voucher was

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RDS:lek lek
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 by Whitson to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air travel from Washington, D. C., to Miami and return. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Whitson in connection with the aforementioned travel.

In respect to 10b, former Special Agents DeLoach, Adcock, Manning (correct name Donald Hanning), Linebaugh (correct name Harold Leinbaugh), and Special Agent Todd submitted travel vouchers for August, 1964. However, no GTRs were issued by them.

In regard to 10c, William C. Sullivan was the issuing officer of a GTR made out to Southern Railroad for travel from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta and return in the amount of $74.55. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Sullivan in connection with the aforementioned travel. Sullivan submitted a voucher for 11/28-30/64 in the amount of $37.10.

No other records are available concerning the travel and expenses of the individuals mentioned in 10a, 10b and 10c.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The data regarding the GTRs and the travel of the individuals mentioned in the memorandum was obtained from the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. In connection with 10a, 10b, and 10c, all expense vouchers of the individuals mentioned in these items have been destroyed under the Five-Year Retention Document Schedule Rule.

Void after ______ 19

BILL TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A3,925,564

The *National Airlines* Company is requested to furnish *coach* class *air* transportation at lowest rate from *Washington DC* to *Miami, Florida & return*

(IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") (SHOW CARRIERS AND JUNCTION POINTS AND WHERE MIXED CLASS SERVICE IS TO BE FURNISHED SPECIFY)

for use of *Lish Whitson* ______ and ______ others with ______ accommodations (LOWER BERTH, P.C. SEAT, ETC.)

from ______ to ______ with authorization (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN")

to transport not over ______ lbs. of excess baggage from ______

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE OR TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE *Lish Whitson*

TITLE *Special Agent*

PLACE OF ISSUE *Washington DC Nov 21, 63*

I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE *Lish Whitson*

TITLE *Special Agent*

FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)

0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT	TOTAL
107.40		107.40

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

The United States of America Transportation Request

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf

MDR-16

62-116395-260

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a

Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S., May 1, 1935, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.
2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.
3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10482

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
May 1, 1953, General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required).

PASSED
FOD VO 149/a
DEC 16 1964

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.

Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.

3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 RVM/MAF

MDR-16

62-116395-260

The United States of America
Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

A 3,991,399

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

BILL TO

To Southern Railroad ... Company is requested
to furnish first class rail transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC
to Atlanta Ga. return via Southern #13
for use of William C. Sullivan and others with accommodations
from ____ to ____

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

Place of issue Washington DC 11-25-64

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

0500
21-60

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

48.95	25.60	74.55
		TOTAL

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

FD-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/12/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard F. Taylor Jr. Date: 16 Jun 75 2PM

Received by: Sherry Powell

Title: Asst Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/jmf

MOR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/12/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 10.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

SURVEILLANCE

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was furnished with information and documents relating to travel on the part of Bureau personnel in connection with SSC inquiry into this Bureau's use of electronic surveillances.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
EWS

5-TJM

TREAT AS YELLOW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAT
MDR-16

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General with a letterhead memorandum attached enclosing a copy of a memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups." It appears that we are proposing to give the copy of the Gale memorandum to the Senate Select Committee in response to their request by letter dated May 14, 1975, for a memorandum prepared by Gale relative to the subject matter of the 1964 memorandum.

My reading of the memorandum revealed that it is a purely deliberative document which quotes personal views of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Gale. I am concerned that the release of such a memorandum containing not only the personal views of Bureau officials, but also identifying them by name could have an impact on individuals in the future who may be asked to furnish their opinions concerning policy matters in the FBI. As indicated by the Attorney General in his speech in New York, it is essential that the Executive Branch have a degree of privacy concerning policy discussions and expressions of personal views by officials in order for the Executive to function properly.

I do recognize that we may not be able to resist giving the Committee access to material documents that bear on particular issues under investigation, however, I do recommend that when we are required to produce deliberative documents, the names and other identifying data relating to individuals furnishing views be deleted.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

REC- 102 62-116395-259

17 JUN 25 1975

JAM:mfd (7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DATE 10/14/2000 BY SP2 alm/mc
MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

[redacted]

84 JUN 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the names of individuals described in the body of the memorandum of July 30, 1964, and other identifying data be deleted prior to furnishing the copy to the Committee.

2. In regard to future responses to requests for documents of a deliberative nature that our policy be that names and identifying data will be deleted prior to disclosure of the documents.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

Former Special Agent Richard H. Davis of the Atlanta Office telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 6-4-75 at which time he explained that he had been contacted by Michael Epstein of captioned Committee at which time Epstein requested that Davis make himself available for interview in either Atlanta, Georgia, or travel to Washington, D. C. Davis informed Epstein that he would have to obtain Bureau approval prior to submitting to interview inasmuch as he had to obtain a release from his employment secrecy agreement.

Mr. Davis informed SA Daly that he was reluctant to agree to being interviewed by captioned Committee concerning his activities as an Agent. It was pointed out to Mr. Davis that the decision as to whether to agree to interview was his, but he was advised that captioned Committee has subpoena power and might attempt to force him to furnish information through the use of a subpoena. He was informed that the Bureau was cooperating with captioned Committee and their inquiry into FBI operations.

It was explained to Mr. Davis that if he desired to allow himself to be interviewed, the Bureau would make available an employee at his request to be available but not present during interview. He was also advised that this Agent would not represent him as private counsel. Mr. Davis was advised that the Bureau's concern was not of matters of historical fact but rather testimony might be required which could impair the Bureau's efforts to discharge its responsibilities. It was also explained that the Bureau representative would assist him in making determination whether his response to a particular question would identify confidential informants, impair on-going investigations, divulge information derived from other Government agencies or foreign sources or expose sensitive investigative techniques and, therefore, a response should not be given.

62-116395

REC-102

62-116395-258

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Personnel file, Richard H. Davis
1 - Mr. ~~W. O. Cregar~~
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (8)

JUN 25 1975

84 JUN 5 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Adams Memorandum
Re: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Davis indicated that he desired a Bureau representative be made available during his interview and would request the interview take place in Atlanta, Georgia. Additionally, he stated Epstein had indicated that the topic of discussion in the interview would be the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Mr. Davis stated he would recontact FBI Headquarters as soon as a date and place of interview had been determined. He indicated he would set the date for interview so that the Bureau would have ample opportunity to have an Agent available. We have separately requested Bureau approval for the release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

granted per 5x8 note on 6/4/75 tel.

ACTION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an Agent for the interview of Mr. Davis when and if a date and place are agreed upon.

PVD JBH/pvg

WRW

JBA/PLM

Wannall had designated SA Phillips per R|S 6/9/75

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Associate Director

___________, 1975

[✓ Director]
[✓ ~~Mr. Callahan~~]
[✓ Mr. Jenkins]
[✓ Mr. Adams]
[✓ Mr. Feeney]
___ Mr. Ash
___ Mr. Bassett
___ Mr. Cleveland
___ Mr. Cochran
___ Mr. Decker
___ Mr. Gallagher
___ Mr. Gebhardt
___ Mr. McDermott
___ Mr. Mintz
___ Mr. Mooney
___ Mr. Moore
___ Mr. Walsh
___ Mr. Wannall

___ Mr. Mack
___ Mr. O'Connell

___ Miss Tietgen
___ Mrs. Mutter
___ Miss Downing
___ Miss Southers
___ Mrs. Haines

___ M ___________

Room ___________

___ Mrs. Metcalf
___ Telephone Room

___ Corres. Review
___ Mail Room
___ Teletype
___ Personnel Records
___ Mechanical Section

___ For Appropriate Action
___ For Your Approval
___ Initial and Return
___ Please Call Me
___ For Information
___ Per Conversation

Senstudy '75

Do we have any amplification of This instruction, or, do we know of any submission responsive to This which illustrate interpretation
K

Item #6 (tabbed) re K
"items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities" Should create Congressional furor.

Paul L. Mack
Room 7004, Ext. 5606

C- 102

62-116395-257

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/TAG
MDR-16

84 JUN 26 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/18/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

Reference is made to Bureau letter to The Attorney General 6/20/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)," forwarding letterhead memorandum for approval and forwarding to SSC.

The Director asked if we have any amplification of this instruction (to submit items with unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities for dissemination to the President under the INLET Program) or do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation?

There has been no amplification of this instruction, nor any submission under INLET of an item on prominent personalities that would show the interpretation of this point.

With respect to the observation that this matter should cause a congressional furor, it is noted that INLET has already been afforded considerable publicity, beginning in February, 1973, after an office memorandum on the subject reached the news media. This publicity is why the Senate Committee asked for documents on INLET. The White House and Senator Bob Packwood inquired about the Program. A detailed defense of INLET appeared in the Congressional Record.

By way of background, the INLET instruction that has received the most publicity--items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities--was recalled by the author of the INLET Program initiating letter as having been specifically dictated by then Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan.

TEB:lek
(8)

REC- 102

62-116395-256

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY 5092 ALM/CRF
MDR-16

17 JUN 24 1975

84 JUN 25 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY

While we cannot say exactly what former Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan had in mind when he added the instruction about items with an unusual twist, we can speculate with a hypothetical example.

If we learned that a trusted assistant to an important government official--an official who had taken a "hard line" with respect to dealings with the Soviet Union, for example--was under development by Soviet intelligence, this would be an unusual twist to an item of intelligence interest to the President involving a prominent person.

In such a hypothetical case, we would, of course, advise the government official involved, and The Attorney General and the President. We would have done this under INLET and we would still disseminate this type of data. INLET was only a vehicle for special dissemination.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. Wannall ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

John Elliff of captioned Committee's task force on Domestic Intelligence Activities advised on 6-9-75, that the Committee is planning to have a Bureau representative testify concerning the FBI's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic and counterintelligence areas in late June or early July. Mr. Elliff stated that this testimony would be before the Senators and will be a general exploration of jurisdictional authority. Mr. Elliff also volunteered that he had told K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination of the Department, that the Committee wanted to be furnished a copy of the T. J. Smith Memorandum dated 7-31-72 concerning FBI's investigative jurisdiction in domestic and counterintelligence matters. Elliff stated that at this point, a summary of such documents would not be an acceptable substitute. Elliff desired such a document be made available to the Committee prior to the aforementioned testimony. With regards to testimony, Elliff indicated that it would not necessarily have to be the Director giving a testimony.

Elliff stated as he finalizes his plans concerning the testimony concerning FBI investigative jurisdiction, he would recontact SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and give more details concerning this matter.

62-116395

REC-59 62-116395-255

ST-101

5 JUN 12 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
    Attn: Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Kelly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP [illegible]
MDR-14

84 [illegible] 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

With regards to the request concerning the Smith document, we should await K. William O'Connor's request prior to taking any action concerning this matter, and with regards to testimony, we should await further details prior to engaging in the preparation of that testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. WRW ✓ HEM
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 19 1975
TELETYPE

REC-102

NR 026 LA PLAIN

10:14PM NITEL 6-18-75 RLD

TO DIRECTOR (62-116464)

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-1700-4124)

ATTN: INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

Mr. Cregar
4123 RH

SENSTUDY 1975.

RE BUTEL TO LOS ANGELES, JUNE 17, 1975.

THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY INSTANCE THAT WAS ALLUDED TO IN CAPTIONED AIRTEL AND THERE ISNO RECORD OF ANY AGENTS BY THE NAME OF RON MASCAR OR WILLIAM MILLER ASSIGNED TO THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION SINCE 1956 TO PRESENT.

END

HOLD

REC-102

62-116395-254

12 JUN 24 1975

Orig

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY [illegible]

MDR-16

FIVE

84 JUN 24 1975

Black Panther Party



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

MARCH 1971

"WE ARE FROM 25 TO 30 MILLION STRONG, AND WE ARE ARMED. AND WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OUR SITUATION. AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO CHANGE IT. AND WE ARE UNAFRAID."



WARNING TO AMERICA

Table of Contents

I. FOUNDING 1
II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES 3
III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY 6
    Invasion of California State Legislature 6
    Police Officer Meets Panthers – and Death 6
    "Free Huey" Campaign 6
    Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver 7
    International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver 7
    Rise of the Black Panther Party 8
IV. LEADERSHIP 9
    National Committee to Combat Fascism 10
    International Section 10
V. FUNDS 12
VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS 13
VII. TACTICS 15
    Target: Police 15
    Attacks on Others 15
    Weapons Caches 16
    "Revolutionary Suicide" 16
    Panther "Justice" 18
VIII. PROPAGANDA 20
    Editorials 21
    Inflammatory Articles 24
    Provocative Slogans 29
    "Revolutionary Art" 30
    International News 35

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE FBI AS A BRIEF STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND, TACTICS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE ORGANIZATION'S OWN PUBLICATIONS WERE THE SOURCE FOR MOST OF THE MATERIAL REPRODUCED.


LET US HOLD HIGH THE BANNER OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNALISM
AND THE INVINCIBLE THOUGHTS OF
HUEY P. NEWTON
MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE.

I. FOUNDING

The Black Panther Party, with headquarters in Oakland, California, was founded in 1966 by two Oakland Negroes – Huey Percy Newton and Bobby George Seale – both at that time at Merritt College in Oakland. The name and symbol of the new party were taken from the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, an Alabama political party known informally in 1965 as the Black Panther Party.

From the writings of communists, revolutionaries, and black militants, Newton and Seale allegedly selected ideas around which they could build a revolutionary frame that suited the needs of their party. Influential writings included those of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader; Frantz Fanon , West Indian psychiatrist who advocated violence for Algerian nationalists; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one-time lieutenant of Cuba's Fidel Castro and a principal architect of 20th century guerrilla warfare; Malcolm X, American black nationalist who advocated violence to obtain Negro "freedom"; and W. E. B. DuBois, Negro educator who became a member of the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93.



HUEY PERCY NEWTON

The organization was at first called the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense; however, the "Self-Defense" was removed in 1968 in an effort to project a more politically oriented image to prospective sympathizers and supporters.



BOBBY GEORGE SEALE

As head of the new Black Panther Party, Newton assumed the title Minister of Defense, and Seale was named Chairman. When questioned about the membership of their organization, Newton and Seale gave the since oft-repeated reply: "Those who know don't say. Those who say don't know." The militancy of the group, however, had an immediate appeal to the discontented, restless youth of Oakland's ghettos.


HUEY NEWTON
BOBBY SEALE

Black Panther Party Chairman, Bobby Seale, and Minister of Defense, Huey Newton, selling Red Chinese magazine and "quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung."

3-2-67 San Francisco, Calif.

II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES

The Black Panther Party "Platform and Program" is repeated in each issue of the official Party publication, The Black Panther.

October 1966

Black Panther Party Platform and Program

What We Want What We Believe

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. **That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.** Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. **But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.**



III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Proclaiming a legal right to bear arms, the Panthers by early 1967 had begun to appear in public wearing black leather jackets and black berets, openly carrying shotguns, rifles, or pistols, and shouldering bandoliers of ammunition.

Calling the police "pigs," the Panthers began a buildup in Negro areas of the idea that police departments, especially that in Oakland, were dedicated to the brutalization and harassment of minority groups, and, acting as an appendage of white government authority, were working toward the eventual annihilation (genocide) of the Negro race.

Invasion of California State Legislature

The first incident that brought national attention to this group occurred on May 2, 1967, as the California Legislature was in session in Sacramento. Approximately 40 members of the Black Panther Party, carrying loaded rifles, pistols, and shotguns, and some wearing bandoliers of ammunition about their waists or draped over their shoulders, burst into the Chamber. They were protesting a bill being introduced on that date outlawing the carrying of loaded weapons in public and were proclaiming their right to bear arms and criticize the police. Before they were arrested, they passed out mimeographed leaflets calling on all Negroes to end the "terrorist" oppression of colored races by white America and referring to the preparation of concentration camps in the United States as a beginning of genocide.

Police Officer Meets Panthers--and Death

The Panthers became more militant with the passing of time. At 5:00 a.m., October 28, 1967, two Oakland, California, patrol officers, John F. Frey and Herbert C. Heanes, made a routine traffic violation car stop. While the officers were awaiting the results of the car registration check by radio, the driver, Huey Newton, got out of the car. Suddenly, shooting broke out. Officer Frey was killed; Officer Heanes was wounded critically; and Newton received a stomach wound. He stopped a passing automobile and had the driver take him to a hospital where he was taken into custody and hospitalized. After a state trial, which began July 15, 1968, Newton was sentenced on September 27, 1968, to serve from 2 to 15 years on a charge of voluntary manslaughter.*

"Free Huey" Campaign

Two days after Patrolman Frey's death, the Huey Newton Defense Fund was established at a meeting of a section of the Negro community of Oakland.

The cry of "Free Huey" became a clarion call. The imprisoned Newton was built up in the public eye as "black and bold in defense of his people." Each

---

**It was ruled later that the presiding judge in this trial erred in instructions to the jury. Newton was released August 5, 1970, and scheduled for retrial.*

LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

bringing its own axe to grind, such organizations as the anarchist New Left group named Students for a Democratic Society; the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Communist Chinese-oriented Progressive Labor Party; the Communist Party, USA, and its youth affiliate, the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America; and militant campus groups, black and white, began to gather in support of the Panthers, who were willing not only to defy the establishment, but to destroy it.

Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver

Early in 1967, the Panthers were joined by a recent parolee from the California prison system, author of a best-selling autobiography, *Soul On Ice,* staff writer for the magazine *Ramparts,* and admitted Marxist – Leroy Eldridge Cleaver.

In *Soul On Ice,* Cleaver wrote: "I sought out his (Marx's) books...It was like taking medicine for me to find that, indeed, American Capitalism deserved all the hatred and contempt that I felt for it in my heart...."

After Newton was jailed, although he remained the undisputed leader, it soon became apparent that Cleaver, designated Minister of Information, was projecting a major leadership image. The Party began to further widen its publicity, nationally and internationally, and enlarge its radical support and revolutionary intent.

As an example of this spreading influence of the Panther Party, the 1968 National Election ticket of the Peace and Freedom Party, a coalition of radical groups, included Cleaver as candidate for the Presidential nomination; Newton as candidate for the 7th Congressional District of Alameda County, California; Kathleen Cleaver, 18th Assembly District, California State Legislature; Bobby Seale, 17th Assembly District, California State Legislature. Cleaver received a national total of almost 200,000 votes. Only a small percentage of the California electorate cast their votes for Newton, Seale, and Kathleen Cleaver.

On the evening of April 6, 1968, Cleaver and several Panthers became involved in a shoot-out with Oakland police officers. The incident resulted in the death of a Panther, the wounding of two police officers, and the wounding and arrest of Cleaver. Cleaver's parole was revoked immediately and he was returned to prison. After much publicity, he was later released on bail by a Superior Court Judge who ruled that the jeopardy of his parole status stemmed "from his undue eloquence in pursuing political goals...offensive to many of his contemporaries." This decision was overruled by the District Court of Appeals and upheld by the California Court of Appeals. Cleaver was ordered to return to prison by November 27, 1968. Electing to become a Federal fugitive, he disappeared in late November, 1968, going first to Havana, Cuba, and later to Algiers, where he has established residence.

International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver

Soon after Cleaver's arrest in the spring of 1968, approximately 150 prominent individuals sponsored the establishment of an International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. The committee intended to dispatch a team to Europe to gain

international support and arrange for a European edition of Cleaver's book, *Soul On Ice*.

Rise of the Black Panther Party

In May, 1968, the hard-core membership of the Black Panther Party was estimated at only 125, and Panther activity was confined largely to the San Francisco-Oakland, California, area. However, because of the dramatic shoot-outs, the "Free Huey" Campaign, the funds established for the defense of both Newton and Cleaver, the widespread publicity, and the support given readily by white radical groups and individual sympathizers, the Black Panther Party began to grow rapidly, not only in membership but in militancy and influence. Chapters began to appear in major cities throughout the country. By the end of 1968, the membership had reached nearly 2,000, with additional thousands of sympathizers and supporters.



PAGE [illegible] THE BLACK PANTHER SEPTEMBER [illegible], [illegible]

1968: BALLOT
OR THE BULLET

KATHLEEN CLEAVER,
COMMUNICATION SECT.,
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

18th ASSEMBLY DISTRICT
S.F. PEACE & FREEDOM PARTY

SHOOT YOUR SHOT

IV. LEADERSHIP

Organizationally, the Black Panther Party is set up to be under a Central Committee composed of the following positions:

- Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander, held by Huey Newton
- Chairman, held by Bobby George Seale
- Minister of Information, formerly held by Leroy Eldridge Cleaver
- Chief of Staff, held by David Hilliard
- Minister of Education, held by Raymond (Masai) Hewitt
- Communications Secretary, formerly held by Cleaver's wife, Kathleen
- Minister of Culture, held by Emory Douglas
- Field Marshal, formerly held by Donald Lee Cox

The position of Assistant Chief of Staff, not included among the Central Committee, is occupied by Roosevelt (June) Hilliard.

Under the Central Committee, the chain of command extends to leaders and officers of local chapters.

DAVID HILLIARD

RAYMOND (MASAI) HEWITT

KATHLEEN CLEAVER

EMORY DOUGLAS

DONALD LEE COX

National Committee to Combat Fascism

Set up to coexist with Black Panther Party branches in various cities in the United States are chapters of another organization called National Committee to Combat Fascism. In actuality, there is little difference between the two. This group, a Panther Party front, was set up as the result of a revolutionary conference, called National Conference for a United Front Against Fascism, held in Oakland, California, in July, 1969. The conference, sponsored by the Black Panther Party and assisted by the anarchist Students for a Democratic Society and the Communist Party, USA, was called to form a coalition of black and white radicals, described as "oppressed people."

The National Committee to Combat Fascism is considered by Party leaders to be the "political organizing bureau" of the Black Panther Party. Its specific task allegedly is to raise the political level of the people and educate them against the system.

International Section

On September 13, 1970, the International Section of the Black Panther Party officially opened in Algiers. Joining Cleaver on the staff were his wife, Kathleen, and Field Marshal Donald Lee Cox, a fugitive from justice. Cox faces charges of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, based on a warrant issued on April 20, 1970, at Baltimore, Maryland. He also failed to appear on May 14, 1970, in San Francisco, to answer Federal firearms charges.

This section, in its entirety, was expelled from the Black Panther Party by Huey Newton on February 27, 1971. The expulsion resulted from tensions and differences between Party hierarchy which led to disruptive factionalism.

INTERNATIO

D.C. greeting African brothers



Chinese 2nd Ambassador (R), Press Attaché (M) and Cultural Attaché (L) talking with Eldridge

Opening attended by cross section of Liberation Movements

Scenes from opening of International Section, The Black Panther, October 31, 1970

V. FUNDS

The money by which the Black Panther Party operates comes from a number of sources. There are substantial private contributions; fees for public appearances, such as campus speeches, radio, and television appearances; payments for magazine articles; collections for trials and bail funds in this country and abroad; subscriptions and individual sales of the Party's official organ, *The Black Panther;* fund-raising activities sponsored by sympathizers and supporters; sales of recordings of interviews and speeches; and financial aid from radicals and extremists.

According to the press, there is reason to believe that the Panthers, to obtain additional funds, are engaging in criminal activities, such as burglaries and robberies.

VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS

Panther Party leaders insist their primary aim is to serve the "people," meaning ghetto blacks. To establish good intent, Party officials have set up a series of community services aimed at recruiting members and sympathizers and building Party influence in ghetto areas. These programs, described by the Panthers as "socialistic" programs, are supposed to be carried out by all Party branches and include: "liberation schools" to give "our people a knowledge of self"; free health clinics, with money, medical supplies and professional services donated by laymen and professionals in the community; free clothing programs, with clothing donated by the community; Community Information Centers, to "answer the basic needs of the people"; and a monthly free shuttle bus service for families of blacks in prison. Few of these programs actually are carried out, and those that have been attempted have been mostly unsuccessful.

The program that has received the most publicity is the "breakfast program," devised as a further means of indoctrinating Negro youth in Panther teachings of racism and rebellion. As expressed in *The Black Panther,* June 14, 1969, "The youth we are feeding will surely feed the revolution." Breakfasts are held for ghetto children either at churches, housing projects, Panther Community Information Centers, or other space that can be obtained free of charge. Panthers usually ask local businessmen to donate food or money to this program, boycotting stores that refuse to participate. At these functions, children have been known to sing such chants as: "I am a revolutionary. I am a revolutionary. There's going to be some barbecue if Huey's not set free. Power to the people."

In 1969, Panther "Coloring Books" were printed and given out at these breakfasts. The books contained 22 pages of drawings teaching the children to distrust, hate, and kill police officers.


I am a Revolutionary
PEOPLE'S FREE SHOES PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE CLOTHING PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE FOOD PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE BUSING PROGRAM
EMORY

SURVIVAL PENDING REVOLUTION

HUEY TOLD ME THAT THE PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING REVOLUTION. BUT WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE REVOLUTION, HUEY SAYS, "WE THE PEOPLE ARE THREATENED WITH GENOCIDE, BECAUSE RACISM AND FASCISM ARE RAMPANT, NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD." HE SAYS, "WE INTEND TO CHANGE ALL THAT. BUT IN ORDER TO CHANGE IT, THERE MUST BE TOTAL TRANSFORMATION. BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THAT TOTAL TRANSFORMATION, WE MUST EXIST. IN ORDER TO EXIST, WE MUST SURVIVE; SO THEREFORE WE NEED A SURVIVAL KIT." SO THAT WE CAN GROW UP HEALTHY WITH A MIND THAT CAN BE FUNCTIONAL AND CREATIVE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
YOUR COMRADE IN ARMS

VII. TACTICS

The Black Panther Party is a violent revolutionary group whose members provoke confrontations with law enforcement officers and whose leaders incite racial hatred and preach urban guerrilla warfare.

Target: Police

Panthers claim that black communities are occupied by the police in the same way and for the same purpose that foreign troops occupy conquered territory and that these forces, operating under "establishment" orders, are engaged in gradual annihilation of the black race. Blacks, according to the Panthers, must, through urban guerrilla warfare, use guns to liberate themselves from the ever-present repressive enemy. Children in Panther "schools" do their exercises to the rhythm of: "There is a pig upon the hill – if you don't kill him the Panthers will."

Numerous claims have been made that the Black Panther Party is an innocent victim of police persecution and genocide. This charge is rendered absurd by fact. During 1970, 6 police officers were killed and 22 wounded through acts of violence traced to the Panthers. One officer, in 1969, was killed by a Panther with a shotgun blast at point-blank range as the officer lay wounded and helpless on the ground.

Out of 20 members named by the Panther Party as "killed in cold blood" by the police, four were killed by members of a rival black extremist group on the west coast; one died of barbiturate intoxication; one was shot and killed by a store owner during a robbery attempt; one was killed by his wife over a love affair he was having with a female Black Panther; and another was allegedly tortured and killed by Panther Party members. Of the remaining twelve, two were found dead on the street, the victims of unknown assailants, and ten were involved in shoot-outs with police officers.

Attacks on Others

Panther attacks have not been limited to the police. While claiming their intent to protect the black community, Panthers have assaulted and threatened citizens who have tried to assist the police.

Neighborhood stores have been forced to "contribute" food supplies and money under fear of Panther violence. Many other persons have also been victimized, as shown by the fact that in 1969 alone 348 Panther members were arrested for serious crimes, including murder, armed robbery, rape, bank robbery, and burglary.

On April 21, 1969, 21 members of the Black Panther Party were charged in New York in a 30-count indictment with conspiring to bomb public places and murder policemen and with possessing dangerous weapons.

Weapons Caches

Stockpiles of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, thousands of rounds of ammunition, Molotov cocktails, gunpowder, and accumulations of bayonets, swords, and machetes have been confiscated from Panther offices.

"Revolutionary Suicide"

On August 7, 1970, Superior Court Judge Harold Haley, the Deputy District Attorney, and three other persons were tied together with piano wire and dragged from a San Rafael, California, courtroom and taken as hostages by three armed Negro convicts, one of whom was standing trial for stabbing a San Quentin prison guard. The escapees were assisted by the defendant's 17-year-old brother who supplied them with weapons for the escapade. Judge Haley, who had a sawed-off shotgun taped to his neck, and the other hostages were forced into a waiting van. When the authorities tried to stop the kidnappers, the judge was brutally murdered; the Deputy District Attorney was injured seriously; and another hostage was slightly wounded. Three Negroes were slain and one was wounded.

Immediately thereafter, Huey Newton declared the killing of Judge Haley as being of "historical" importance to the Black Panther Party. This declaration was based on the Panther belief that all black prisoners, regardless of their crimes, are political prisoners and should be released.



OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT CRUISER INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6, 1968, GUNBATTLE WITH MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

CONFISCATED PANTHER WEAPONS

The perpetrators of the courtroom incident were lauded by the Panthers as setting another "revolutionary example for black people." In commenting further, *The Black Panther* of August 15, 1970, stated:

> *"The example that these brothers have set will be followed by many and many will rise to choose revolutionary suicide rather than reactionary suicide. Black people will unleash in great numbers the Black kamakazi..."*

In his eulogy at services for the slain Negroes, Newton said: "Our comrades have taught us all a revolutionary lesson. They have intensified the struggle and placed it on a higher level."

Panther "Justice"

Recalcitrant members of the Black Panther Party are sometimes victims of Panther "justice." As one example, Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was brought to trial in New Haven, Connecticut, for the torture-murder of Panther Alex Rackley. Rackley, a Panther suspected of being an informant, was scalded, murdered, and dumped in a swamp.

For a variety of reasons, many members have been purged from the Party. These incidents are usually written up in *The Black Panther* in special articles accompanied by photographs.

WASH ROOM
OLYMPICS
if you're not part of the solution... you're part of the problem.

PANTHER HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JUNE 4, 1969

EXPELLED

So let this be heard throughout the black community, of Atlantic City, New Jersey. That Leonard Weeks is no longer a servant of the people. That he is no longer the breakfast coordinator for this community center, or for that matter no center ran by the Black Panther Party. He has become slip-shod in his duties as a servant to the people, many times he has been warned by his comrades, about his work, and about his duty to the people's children. He deserted the children of the black community, there were days he would not attend the breakfast program, because he said that he was tired or that he overslept. Well we cannot adhear to this because as revolutionaries we must prepare ourselves to be a match for a hundred. We must prepare to run ourselves to death if need be, so that the people shall be served, and to see to it that they truly have a right to the best. And we have no time for slip-shod niggers. We must hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must confirm to the people's interest, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected, that is what being responsible to the people means.

WEEKS, EXPELLED

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Black Panther Party N.C.C.F.
Community Center
Atlantic City,

FOOLS RUSH IN

Harold Wright, number one fool in Pittsburgh, rushed out of here and into Baltimore.

HAROLD WRIGHT, FOOL

The National Committee to Combat Fascism has no time for crazy dumb fools who run around pimping off the people's just struggle for freedom and self-determination This modern day mad man can't seem to find himself or anything else for that matter. He started out, helping to put this office together and after a long train of was put out. Harold didn't like this and started to hang around our office trying to give the community the impression that he was still a member of the revolutionary ranks of Babylon.

After a few days of the breakfast program, his wife Michelle decided that she loved Harold more than the people and went with him.

We say goodbye to the Wright family and other love birds (like the Johnson's) who can't deal for the people.

So let this be heard, Harold and Michelle Wright are not members of the National Committe to Combat Fascism nor will these fools ever be.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

National
Committee to Combat Fascism
574 Brushton Ave.
Pittsburgh, Penn.
(412) 242-4728

The Black Panther,
June 20, 1970, p. 8.

VIII. PROPAGANDA

Although posters, pamphlets, recordings, and a singing group called "The Lumpen" are among propaganda vehicles used by the Black Panther Party, the main channel to the public is through their official organ, *The Black Panther*. Funds permitting, it is published weekly in Oakland, California. It includes editorials by Party leaders and spokesmen; provocative slogans; inflammatory articles; revolutionary art," comprising cartoons; and an international news section.

Excerpts from Article carrying
Typed Signature of Eldridge Cleaver.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1970 PAGE 4

TO MY BLACK BROTHERS IN VIET NAM

I'm writing this on January 4, 1970. We are starting out a new year. On August 31, I'll be 35 years old. I'm married, and I have one child with another one on the way. I am in love with my wife and I would like to enjoy a happy life raising a family. But I am not free to live the type of life that I would like. Pigs--the racist fascist rulers of the United States--won't let me....

We appeal to you Brothers to come to the aid of your people. Either quit the army, now, or start destroying it from the inside. Anything else is a compromise and a form of treason against your own people. Stop killing the Vietnamese people. You need to start killing the racist pigs who are over there with you giving you orders. Kill General Abrahms and his staff, all his officers. Sabotage supplies and equipment, or turn them over to the Vietnamese people. Talk to the other Brothers and wake them up. You should start now weeding out the traitors amongst you. It is better to do it now than to allow them to return home to help the pigs wipe us out. Especially the Uncle Tom officers should be dealt with now, because the pigs will use them as effective tools against our people. When you can no longer take care of business inside the army, then turn yourself over to the Vietnamese people and tell them you want to join the Black Panther Party to fight for the freedom and liberation of your own people. If you do cross over, you don't have to worry about the Vietnamese people abusing you. They will be glad to see you drop out of the army because what they want most in life is to stop the fighting in their land. You have a duty to humanity as well as to your own people not to be used as murderous tools by racist pigs to oppress the people.



"IF YOU WANT PEACE YOU GOT TO FIGHT FOR IT"

There's too many American flags out here, and our Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, says that the American flag and the American eagle are the true symbols of fascism. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE. Black power to Black people, Brown power to Brown people, Red power to Red people, and Yellow power to Ho Chi Minh, and Comrade Kim Il Sung the courageous leader of the 40,000,000 Korean people....

We say down with the American fascist society. Later for Richard Millhouse Nixon, the
Later for all the pigs of the power structure. Later for all the people out here that don't want to hear me curse because that's all that I know how to do. That's all that I'm going to do. I'm not going to ever stop cursing, not only are we going to curse, we're going to put into practice some of the that we talk about. Because Richard Nixon is an evil man. This is the that unleashed the counter-insurgent teams upon the BPP. This is the man that's responsible for all the attacks on the Black Panther Party nationally. This is the man that sends his vicious murderous dogs out into the Black community and invade upon our Black Panther Party Breakfast Programs. Destroy food that we have for hungry kids and expect us to accept like that idly. that man. ***We will kill Richard Nixon. We will kill any that stands in the way of our freedom.*** *We ain't here for no goddamned peace, because we know that we can't have no peace because this country was built on war. And if you want peace you got to fight for it.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

Photograph accompanying Article indicated these are the Words of Chief of Staff, David Hilliard.
THE BLACK PANTHER, November 22, 1969, p. 10.

Editorials

Through editorials, readers are advised of Party positions on national and international issues and are presented with the opinions of the hierarchy on inter-Party matters.

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1971 PAGE 2

STATEMENT BY HUEY P. NEWTON, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE, ON THE OCCASION OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY- MARCH 5, 1971

Power to the People, Brothers and Sisters,

First of all I would like to thank all of you for my very presence here, because if it weren't for the Power of the People, I wouldn't be here tonight. I'm not here because of the Black Panther Party; I'm not here because of any group, I'm not here because of a group of kamakazis. I'm here because of the Power of the People.

We must remember that Revolution is a process. It's not a conclusion; because once we conclude, then we become counter-revolutionary. And that means even with the gun in our hands, because fascism also has a gun. And I would like to say tonight that the Black Panther Party stands against all forms of fascism, including sexual fascism. That we are against all kinds of chauvinism, including racial chauvinism; we're against sexual chauvinism, national chauvinism. We're intercommunalists. Before I went to prison, most of you know, you are aware, that I never made any speeches, you see, because I'm not a very eloquent man. I'm better known by the actions. And the Party was built upon the actions. And the action itself is a process. And we're not ever fixated. We haven't accepted any dogma. And we will not.

And I would like to say this, that from now on the Party itself will be better known by its contributions to the People, for the simple reason that some people around us seem to want to be known through the Media. But the Party can only judge itself through establishing certain survival programs, pending Revolution. Because remember, you make the Revolution. We can't free political prisoners, only the people can free political prisoners. And a people who are not free cannot free their prisoners, cannot free the prisoners that fascism makes. So I would like to say that we must work very hard in order to lift the consciousness of the people. We must free our Chairman Bobby Seale, Angela Davis, Ruchell Magee, the Soledad Brothers, the seven and the three, and all other political prisoners. Randy. We have to free all of them.

But we must remember that we must exhaust every possible tactic. And we must let it be known that never broadcast military tactics for military reasons. It's perfectly correct to broadcast military tactics for political reasons. That's what Uncle Ho said, and I agree with him. So we would like for the people to know that there are many things that we will not discuss in public. But what you can do is watch the fruits of our work. And we would like to say that our Party became an intercommunal Party upon its actions. And I think that's very good. So I'm asking you in order to free all political prisoners, free the people, free the woman and also the man, that we have to get together in unity by substituting verbal expressions for action. The final test of the pie is the action. We'll stand on the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party from 1966 when it was formed will stand on its record, will stand on the action. We won't claim to be ultra-leftists; we won't claim to be infantile leftists. What we'll do is act in accordance with the particular set of conditions and the particular problem that we have at a time. So please judge us upon our actions and we will develop like that. We will not develop with lip service coming from anyone. And sometimes I'm very thankful that I don't talk too well, because that's only one way of communication. We say that a picture is worth a thousand words, but action is supreme.

But what kind of action you take will depend upon the particular set of conditions. And I say all of this, because you know the Party and the world today is under turmoil. And this is very good. We always have welcomed all forms of contradictions. Because without the contradiction there is no transformation. So from the contradiction that has developed now in the world and in the Party, we hope to have a qualitative leap. If this leap eliminates some of us, then, of course, we'll weep for that. But we must not stop the Revolution. I will not stop the Revolution. You should not stop it. And, for all that it's worth, we know that words will never stop it. Words will not start the Revolution either. Only action. 'Sixty-six kicked off the armed manifestation of Revolution in this country, because it focused upon the need for the People not only to defend themselves, but also to develop a consciousness necessary to perform and to act to be able to fight in a protracted war. And that is why it is necessary for us to develop the correct ideology, which is a system of thinking. And we must not rely upon and conclude with the philosophy, which isn't necessarily a conclusion.

So we're ideologically revolutionists. We're in a constant state of change. And we fight with all people who want to change, because we know change will offer our hope. So after all of this, we must pay more attention to what is happening. The news media has attempted to discredit the Party by saying that it's over, because they don't see anyone. I think our programs are better than the Party. The communities are involved in forty-four cities. We must support these; we must expand them. Because I read an article, recently, a few months ago, where Che had some problems in Bolivia, because the peasants were so unconscious until he could not rally them even with the "focos". They did not understand why the military, the regular military was dropping. So what did he do. He attempted to form certain programs that he called survival programs. He attempted to form a free health program in order to get the peasants inside, to help them, and also to provide things for his focos. He also took to form a free breakfast program, a free shoe factory, and a sporting good store (for obvious reasons). So programs are good. Because an act that might be revolutionary might be counter-revolutionary, if the correct preparations are not made.

So to be a serious revolutionist, we must know that we are involved in a process, and not a set of principles or conclusions that are of face-value revolutionary. I do not know one thing that is revolutionary in itself. And all things might be revolutionary in context. In other words, capitalism was revolutionary when it kicked out feudalism. And now we have a situation where the capitalists have become the imperialists, and the people of the world, of the communities of the world will have to kick them out. So in order to free Angela, Bobby, Ruchell Magee and all other political prisoners, we must kick the fascists out. And we cannot do it with lip service.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

BOBBY SEALE: "I AM THE CHAIRMAN OF ONLY ONE PARTY."

March, 1971

This is Brother Bobby Seale, from the New Haven Courthouse, back in jail, back here. And I just wanted to say to the people, the masses of people, to all the brothers and sisters, Women's Liberation Movement, Black brothers and sisters, Chicano brothers, the Puerto Rican brothers, the young revolutionary White youth in America, and especially, all the Black brothers and sisters in the Black community, that I've seen a lot of things happening; and I've took time to analyse what's happening. And I see presently that there're some divisionary , counter-revolutionary actions going on. Now the Party accepts constructive criticism. Constructive criticism! But the divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions and jive tactics of Eldridge Cleaver is doing nothing but aiding the pig power structure. Aiding the pig power structure in their attempt to put in gas chambers and jails over 130 political prisoners, who are presently, like myself and Ericka, caught up in these jails, and are being railroaded to the gas chamber, where we're fighting for our lives in these trials. And this is the only thing that Eldridge's actions are doing. This is the only thing that I can see that is going on. And my analysis shows this.

There is no split in the Black Panther Party, at all. But the main thing that we want to get across, I want to get across, to the people is that the Party is based on Survival Programs to serve the people, and these survival programs - from Breakfast for Children to the recent programs that I'm designing right here in jail, in my time that I'm not in court, which is a decent housing fit for shelter of human beings program - these are survival programs - and this program and all other programs that all other revolutionary organizations have are survival programs, that must sustain the people so the people can wage a revolutionary struggle.

And Eldridge Cleaver, who's denouncing these types of programs and carrying on with all those other divisionary jive tactics, is negating the real meaning of a People's revolutionary struggle. That's why the Black Panther Party belongs to the people, because the survival programs come forth, and we set up the survival programs to sustain the people's revolutionary struggle. Even the Vietnamese people, if one would check it out, have their survival programs; they have their cooperative, functional survival programs throughout their land, amongst their people. The people just don't have guns alone fighting their battle. The people over there have actual everyday, functional, constructive survival programs. In their countries, in their lands, and in their everyday operations in fighting the capitalist pigs who occupy their country, they have survival programs. And those survival programs sustain the revolutionary struggle there. Of course, our survival programs will be directly related to here in America. But I, myself, send solidarity and support to all the socialistic, revolutionary peoples of the world, and the socialistic countries and lands - and the different war zones, where the people, the masses in those lands, are fighting against the capitalistic, imperialistic ruling class circles.

And Eldridge Cleaver - who negates the very survival programs that the Party is trying to set forth, that the Central Committee is trying to set forth, and all the real dedicated, hard-working brothers in the Party are trying to set forth to educate the people and serve the people, these survival programs (that) sustain the people's

to the gas chambers. He's aiding the power structure and causing us to be in the prisons, because the political prisoners are the ones who really initiate and work hard to maintain the survival programs for the revolution, the people's revolutionary struggle.

Only the masses of the people can really free political prisoners. And the people must see the value and the validity of the survival programs. And getting on down to it, so the people can understand where it's at, so that the people, even the supporters that we have all over Europe, all the solidarity committees that are in Europe, that're in Sweden, that are in Denmark, and other countries over there, who support the freedom of political prisoners in this country, who support the survival programs of the poor oppressed people in this country, and the revolutionary movement (who are initiating these programs), I am trying myself to get people to understand, that we are beautifully behind them and we are glad and send greetings to them and praise the people who are in the solidarity committees in other countries, and in fact here in America, here in Ameri-KKK-a. I think that the people really have to understand who and what the Black Panther Party is, so that these reactionary, counter-revolutionary, divisionary tactics will not be misunderstood. The Party is not falling apart. It's just that Eldridge Cleaver has personally defected his own self from the Party. He defected from the Party.

And I, Bobby Seale, am the Chairman of only one Party. And that Party is the Party that Brother Huey P. Newton is the Minister of Defense of and one of the supreme, top servants of the people; that Brother David Hilliard is the Chief of Staff of; that Brother June Hilliard is the Assistant Chief of Staff of; that Bobby Hutton was a member of, before the pigs murdered him. I am the Chairman of only one Party, that Brother Fred Hampton, who loved the survival programs for the people, was Deputy Chairman of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, who Brothers Jonathan Jackson and George Jackson are members of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party, with Huey, David, and the rest of the brothers and sisters on the Central Committee, where the Central Headquarters happens to be located on Peralta Street in Oakland, (California). So All Power to the People. Right On. And we're going to stick together. We ain't coming up with no jive. We have to free Brothers Ruchell Magee, George Jackson; we have to free Sister Angela Davis; we have to free these brothers and sisters. I am the Chairman of only one Party, the Party that Brother Huey is the Minister of Defense, with David Hilliard, June Hilliard, etc. And we're going to free political prisoners; and, we're going to keep these survival programs going; and, we're going to wage a People's revolutionary struggle, and not no jive, individualistic, defecting actions, by some individual who wants to play power games. I am the Chairman of the Party of which the San Quentin Cadre is apart and parcel of the same Party. The San Quentin Cadre of the Black Panther Party.

So all I have to say to the people is that you know where it's at. We're going to stick in solidarity. There're a bunch of jive renegades and jack-a-napes around. But later for that. Just later for that. Let that ride, cause we got survival to get on with, and a People's revolution to mobilize. And we got political prisoners to free all over this land.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
RIGHT ON!

Inflammatory Articles

Many of the articles in *The Black Panther* are written by local Party members and concern regional incidents and issues. They are aimed at provoking national black sympathy and joint retaliation for magnified grievances against the authorities.



RACIST-MAD PIGS SIC K9 POLICE DOG ON BROTHER

On Friday night, March 27, 1970, 14 yr. old Brother John (Little Hot-Rod) Hargrove became the victim of a brutal attack inflicted by a K9 Police dog. This brother along with two other bloods were playfully chasing each other along the sidewalk in the area of Sixth and Snyder Streets. When the brothers approached the corner, one brother ran past brushing against a lady standing at the corner. When this happened the lady immediately grabbed the brother. The two other bloods kept running. Soon after the pig grabbed the brother, a light colored station wagon appeared. In the station wagon were two plain clothes pigs. These pigs immediately proceeded to hand-cuff the blood, beat him in the face, and unleash a vicious police dog that ripped the flesh off the brother's body. As the brother tried to escape the blows of the pig beating him in the face, the K9 proceeded to bite him all over his body. While the brother was being beaten by the pig, and attacked by the dog, the other pigs who came along proceeded to chase the other two bloods. The pigs fired a shot barely missing the fore-head of one of the brothers.

Little Hot-Rod, handcuffed, face badly beaten and suffering from dog bites all over his body, was taken to the local police station where he was booked on suspicion of pick-pocketing. He did not receive any medical attention until several hours later at the Philadelphia General Hospital; there they gave him one tetnus shot and put a bandage on each leg. The pig who created the vicious attack was later identified as one of Rizzo's faggot law and order boys of the GRANNY PATROL. The Granny Patrol is a special segment of piggery which employs pigs to dress up as women so that they can arrest suspected pick-pockets.

The party conducted an interview with the bloods who were fortunate enough to get away, we also spoke with the brother's parents, and were able to visit the brother, at the Youth Study Center. We also spoke with the people in the community who witnessed the horrid incident!

Following are excerpts from the tapes which describe the incident. We cannot use names here of the bloods because it has been passed down that the pigs are trying to round up the other brothers.

The racist pigs approached the brothers by shouting "Get them niggers, get them niggers" They chased the bloods with butcher knives, and what appeared to be an ax. One brother was hit with a pipe in the stomach.

People in the community responded to the arrest and attack angrily. When several people in the community demanded that the pigs call off the dog, they were met with racist remarks from the pigs.

The attack was so vicious, the dog ate the underwear on the brothers body. In addition to bites on the brothers hands, legs and waist the dog also bit the brother in the back and rectum. The brother suffered from severe beatings by the pigs, in the face.

When Little Hot-Rod was visited on Sunday at the Youth Study Center, his body was not healing properly. He related that the nurse only applies mercurochrome on the bites. He is suffering from soreness. He is sleeping on hard cots in the over-crowded center. The bites on his body are swollen and inflamed. The brother's first remarks to his family were, "Tell my probation officer to get me out of here, this place is like Byberry' .

Just less than two weeks ago, the brother was beaten in a cell Division. This pig beat him so bad that Methodist Hospital complained to the Police Department. His eyes were badly damaged. The pig's name who inflicted that beating was Juvenile Aid Officer, Charles Kora. Hot-Rod identified Kora as his assailant and since then, he has been harrassed in his neighborhood by every pig who comes through.

At 14, John Hargrove is a marked victim of Frank Rizzo's fascists, like so many other Black youths in this city. Pigs are on the loose to inflict more physical harm to our people. It is high time that we escalate our war on the pigs and drive them out of our communities.

Seize The Time people of Philadelphia, Rizzo and all of his racist paper tigers can be rightously blown away.

Rosemari Mealy
Philadelphia Branch
Black Panther Party

THE BLACK PANTHER, APRIL 18, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1970 PAGE 9

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY BOMBED, HEROES SUCCESSFULLY ESCAPE



Newburyport, Mass. is a small residental New England town basically composed of people from the White working class. Until last Saturday, September 19, Newburyport's only claim to fame was that it is one of the many small towns surrounding Boston which are strongholds for groups like the Minutemen and other right-wing fascist reactionaries. Last Saturday, however, at 6:00 a.m. in the morning a National Guard Armory was bombed, hundreds of rounds of ammunition ripped off, military personnel records taken and to top it off, they left the scene in a one ton army pick-up truck. They (the bombers) attempted to open the vault holding the weapons of the pig army, M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols and .30 caliber sniper carbines, but were not able to do so. The act was accomplished in one fast motion, and the heroes escaped capture and one week later, "law enforcement officials" are still scratching their heads in wonderment.

And although the weapons, themselves, tools of our liberation were not liberated from the oppressor, the success of this action cannot be denied.

As has been the case in liberation movements all over the world, the guns and arms made by and for the oppressor eventually ends up in the hands of the oppressed. More important, the unknown people who accomplished this act, obtained hundreds of rounds of desperately needed ammunition. Again, past experiences has shown that while the guns themselves can be obtained in ample supply, the ammunition, the bullets, that actually inflicts death upon our enemy, becomes very scarce. One of the necessities of our struggle is our ability to liberate, stockpile, and then accurately use the ammunition of our oppressor upon our oppressor.

As for the military personnel records, they can obviously be put to good use. Our oppressors must be harassed and intimidated day and night. They must not sleep, nor rest, these are the devils who plot the genocide of Black people. The National Guard Armory in the small town of Newburyport, like other small time towns surrounding the Black colony in Boston is designed to be used against us in the fascist genocidal plot devised by the treacherous minds of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell clique. It is to be carried out by those men whose names and addresses are now in the hands of the people. Unknown members of the fascist majority now appear before the people's tribunal and will be judged according to their actions.

This action is just one of many blows which will be dealt out to the oppressor. If this action was intended to help and serve the people, we welcome their help to our just liberation struggle against the Babylonian Empire.

ARM YOURSELF

Michael·Fultz
Boston Chapter
Black Panther Party

SISTER MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY RENT-A-PIG

FIVE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE RAILROADED BY TUCSON GRAND JURY

STORM TROOPERS INVADE COMMUNITY

THREE PIGS BEAT FIFTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK YOUTH

ENTIRE FAMILY BEATEN AND JAILED

Another regular feature in *The Black Panther* is a weekly article giving detailed instructions for the handling of firearms, or setting forth deportment for urban guerrilla warfare.


PHONE
BULLET
CARTRIDGE CASE
POWDER
PRIMER
.38 cal. Cartridge
FRONT SIGHT
BARREL
BREECH
REAR SIGHT
HAMMER
CYLINDER LATCH
HAND
MAIN SPRING
GRIP
FRAME
TRIGGER
TRIGGER GUARD
EXTRACTOR ROD
CYLINDER
BORE
MUZZLE
.38 CAL. REVOLVER
1
2
3
4

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 9, 1970 PAGE 16

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS HOW TO COMBAT C.M.I.

Part 5

The principal of Juche (Self-Reliance) clarified by Eldridge Cleaver, the Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, is "Use what you got to get what you need." To answer the question of how do you combat the pigs' *C.M.I. (communication, mobility* and information), we must first determine what we have going for ourselves. Checking out the practice of self-defense groups, we see that we have the power to determine what is to happen, when it is to happen and how it is supposed *to go down. What, When* and How (W.W.H.)- the element of surprise. The pigs have C.M.I. and self-defense groups have W. W. H.

To consider a self-defense operation successful is not to just *plan and execute but to plan, execute* AND escape. There have been too many instances where members of self-defense groups have planned and executed righteous blows against this racist system only to be captured, wounded or *killed. These are the consequences* for revolutionary activity, however we must keep casualties within an acceptable minimum. The *slogan must be Maximum Damage* to the Enemy, Minimun Damage to Us. Practice has shown that when planning W.W.H. if it is done with knowledge and an understanding of C.M.I. casualties will be kept within an acceptable minimum. *Too often, much attention* is given to a plan up to the point of execution without giving the same attention to evasion and escape, that phase of the operation that determines success. This is a subjective approach, a onesided *approach. W.W.H. is only* one side of the coin, C.M.I. is the other side. Because self-defense groups use W.W.H., the pigs' C.M.I. does not go into operation until a self-defense group commits itself by actually executing some type of *self-defense activity.*

COMMUNICATION

MOBILITY

INFORMATION

All of us should be aware that once C.M.I. is activated pigs start showing on the set from 30 seconds to 1 minute maximum in every *major city in Babylon, therefore* the success or failure of a defense operation is dependent upon the attention given to C.M.I. and the planning of evasion and escape. As I see it, learning to deal with the pigs' C.M.I. is the number one military problem facing revolutionary forces in Babylon today. It is time for all who have something to teach, by example, to step forward. And remember, to die honorably, one does not need company.

USE WHAT YOU GOT TO GET WHAT YOU NEED
D.C.

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

Part 6 ON REVOLVERS

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been in previous issues of the Black Community News Service. This article is on revolvers, it gives a basic run down on the use of revolvers. Check out all of the photographs and notes to help you understand better the functioning of a revolver.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS:

1. Check to see if gun is loaded. You do this on a revolver by swinging out the cylinder. Pull back on the cylinder latch and gently push *out on the cylinder. (see unloading* a revolver photo #2)

2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless practicing trigger squeeze or firing.

3. Point your gun away from where someone may be shot-Point at the ceiling or to the floor, but wherever you point, make sure no one is in the way and can be harmed.

4. Never leave the hammer cocked on a revolver. (Explanation later on cocking a revolver.)

KINDS OF REVOLVERS:

.38 Snubnose - This gun has only a 2" barrel and shoots 38's. It is very easy to conceal.

.38 Special - Has a 4" barrel and shoots 38's.

.357 Magnum - This is the type of handgun the pig carries. The ammo for this is .357 magnum. Metal piercing bullets will pierce an engine block. This is the best type of revolver to have.

.41 and .44 Magnums - Have more knock down power than a .357 Magnum. The Highway Patrol carries these to shoot through car doors, but a .357 will go through a car door also and .357 ammunition is more plentiful.

PARTS OF A REVOLVER: PHOTO # 1

REVOLVER TERMS

UNLOADING:

Holding gun in left hand (pointed in safe direction) release cylinder latch with right hand. (#3). Push out cylinder with the fingers of left hand (#2). Now that you *have swung out the cylinder* and the bullets are visible you gently push down on the extractor and let bullets drop out into your right hand (#4).

LOADING:

To load, simply follow the same steps in unlatching the cylinder. Then drop bullets into the chambers of your cylinder. Gently push cylinder closed, and you are ready to fire. DO NOT SLAM CYLINDER CLOSED, this causes *extra wear on your gun.*

COCKING A REVOLVER:

Put the tip of your thumb on the hammer holding revolver steady in the palm of your hand. Do not put your finger in the trigger. Pull straight back steadily on your hammer spur until your hammer locks back. You gun is ready to *fire, do not put your finger in* the trigger until you are ready to fire. After cocking hammer, place your thumb directly on the frame beside the hammer, resting the tip of your thumb on the cylinder latch. (Photo #4)
Your forefinger should be placed on the other side of the gun straight out just above the trigger guard until ready to fire. Everytime you cock the hammer before firing, this is called single action firing.

PHOTO # 2

UNCOCKING A REVOLVER (LOADED):

Keep your finger off the trigger! With gun already cocked, place your thumb on the hammer firmly. Now with the gun firmly in your hand, pointed in a safe direction, *and* thumb firmly on the hammer (still cocked) squeeze the trigger slowly until you can feel the hammer releasing. IMMEDIATE-

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

LOADING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 3

COCKING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 4



URBAN GUERILLAS

America's complexity will be her downfall, for complex power, communications and transportation networks are unprotected. These systems are the life lines of the industrial and military might of U.S.A. fascism. The source of America's strength is its vulnerable Achilles heel-therefore urban guerrillas, utilizing and relying on information divulged by sympathetic workers, can halt or severely cripple every industry in the nation, and bring fascism crashing to its knees. The dams, power stations, substations and power lines are vulnerable. Highly sophisticated communications networks are used by our enemies for carrying out routine business, and are an extremely important factor, in the fascist reaction to guerilla strikes. The neutralization of the fascist communications lie within the capabilities of urban guerillas.

The disruption of this system would hamper and cripple not only the fascist military but would also effect all industrial outputs. The fascist ruling clique realizes the vunerability of their transportation networks, yet all fascist military forces and industry utilize the railways, the state and interstate highway systems and the airports. Urban guerillas can cut and constantly harass these important links.

Urban guerilla teams highly motivated have already begun to put their theory into practice. Lists are being compiled and are constantly updated on fascist and all enemies of our people, because the location and identification of the enemy is an extremely vital task of urban guerillas. This basic intelligence is necessary for planning retaliatory strikes against our enemies. Where their killer groups, for the most, will be unable to locate guerillas, urban guerillas will, in every attack hit the fascist squarely on the chin. Urban guerillas, being one with the people, must attack like skilled brain surgeons--cutting out the diseased tissue while perserving the good. Their dual purpose is that of destroying all fascist forces and their lackeys, while protecting and serving our people. The fascist ruling clique fears this. They know the Party is preparing to fight until the last of our enemies bites the dust. The Party has dared to take the vanguard role in the struggle and will surely defeat U.S A. fascism no matter what the odds, no matter how great the sacrifice. The Party is aware that the fascists will never lay down their arms of their own accord. And also aware of the direction that U.S.A. fascism is taking in order to survive as long as possible.

In Brazil, the guerilla forces found through social practice that they could best achieve the goal of liberating their people from the strong-hold imposed by the fascist Brazilian oligarchy by waging urban guerilla warfare. Brazil's development as an industrial fascist nation and the economic and social backwardness of the indigenous peasants made the revolutionary forces adapt the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare. The urban guerrillas moved to mobilize the workers, and implement urban guerrilla warfare within the context of their historical experiences with the working class and the fascist ruling class oligarchy. The revolutionary forces have implemented this type of struggle which invariably catches the fascists with their pants down. The type of warfare which turns the asphalt concrete and steel of cities into jungles; into cemeteries for the fascist highly mechanized units and turns his weapons of mass slaughter into paper tigers; into urban jungles where the revolutionary forces can plunge the blade into the hilt in the vunerable life lines of even fascist U S.A In this country as well as in Brazil the fascists tremble with dread at the thought of nationwide attacks by urban guerrilla forces.

In the Pentagon and select centers scattered throughout the U S A., gigantic multimillion dollar computers are manned by hoards of the military. Technicians wrestle with fascism's nightmare-the problem of dealing with urban guerrillas. These machines can only reach an hypothesis drawn from information fed into them. In order for the fascists to test the solutions offered by the computer. they must first circumvent

the frail facade of the constitution and the bill of rights. The fascists realize that if these two pieces of paper were implemented they would be in their graves tonight because the constitution and the bill of rights contain the moral impetus necessary to bring this foul evil economic and social system to its doom.

U S.A. fascists have compiled and are still evaluating information received from South American satellite states who are being beset by courageous urban guerrillas waging relentless struggle with amazing(to fascists)and stunning success. Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, has said that we still have a little time left because the U.S.A fascist ruling clique hasn't programmed all of the people to accept the genocide of the Party and our people yet. For at least a year now, there have appeared in every major newspaper, seemingly innocent space fillers. Articles from UPI-API dealing with the deployment of fascist death squads against the revolutionary forces in South America.

These fillers had the sinister purpose of preparing America for the advent of death squads now in operation in every major urban center. These articles were to prepare the people to accept the first overt actions of the Chicago foul fascist gestapo killer unit. Their predawn kill all--destroy all mission was launched as a pilot, an experimental operation with a two fold objective. One was to put counter-revolutionary theory into practice in America --to bring into the streets the fascist ruling clique's solution to the Party--to test and evaluate the techniques of counter-insurgency urban warfare. The second important objective was to evaluate the response of the people to above ground counter-insurgency killer groups--to see if the people were conditioned to accept the outright fascist terror tactics directed officially by the fascist ruling clique.

Our Party has been and is still the main target of a national dehumanizing campaign. The fascist controlled news media has consistently maligned, viciously attacked and branded our Party as a racist band of blood-thirsty murderers out for their own personal gain. The fascist news media seeks to justify the fascist's program of destroying our people's first line of defense, the Party, and all other organizations which refuse to be either bought off with blood money or intimidated by the repressive fascist forces. The fascist attempts to isolate our Party from the people has been a dismal failure. The liquidation of Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark had top priority on the fascist's pig list. However, neither the people nor our Party were cowed or intimidated by the bestial slaying of these two revlutionaries. The fascist ruling clique made a grave error in underestimating the will of the people and our Party. People from all walks of life and every progressive organization saw through the fascist attempts to isolate and destroy their Party. The people mobilized and rallied mass support for the Party and soundly condemned the actions of Chicago's fascist killer groups.

Make trouble, fail, make trouble, fail again until their doom. This is the logic of fascists the world over. In Chicago, they refused to acknowledge the bankruptcy of their counter-insurgency campaign. In December, in Los Angeles, Southern California, Chapter of our Party, came under attack by fascist killer groups. Although outnumbered and using inferior weapons, our Party repelled and held at bay the fascist shock troops and sounded the end of Chicago type operations in a fuselage of bullets. We learned valuable lessons paid for with the blood of our revolutionary comrades. The fascist ruling clique has seen the support, that their homicidal raids have generated for the Party. They now know that if conditions are favorable, they will receive tit for tat and then some. They now know that Black and all progressive people will not sit idly by and pacify the action of above ground killer groups Fascists have tried to rally the support of the American people to their avowed aims and failed.

Now begins the phase of underground, clandestine operation of fascist directed killer groups. This is all part of the nature of the fascist ruling clique. The fascists will no doubt expand the techniques of their South American lackeys who operate unrestricted, unswayed by either democratic institutions or public opinion. As the tempo of the struggle increases so will the fascist acts of reactionary terror and violence increase. The primary target of forming clandestine kill groups will be both our people and our Party. If we are to survive as a people, this next phase of attacks, and pave the way to victory, it is imperative that our people be armed with the ideology of the Party. For only then will our people be able to cope with, both, ideological and physical attacks initiated by the insane fascist ruling clique. Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, said that our Party must be a living shield that stands between our people and the fascist pigs and that our paper should serve to educate our people so that they will survive.

As the attacks against the Party escalate, so must the awareness of our people be channelled toward acceptance and even more, active participation in urban guerrilla warfare. Phase two of the fascist plans will surely and soundly be defeated. The fascists will awake to find themselves bogged down on that last front. They will be swallowed up in the morass of a people's war. Their graves will be dug by revolutionary urban guerrilla forces amidst the asphalt, concrete and steel of the cities.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEFEAT U S.A FASCISM ON EVERY FRONT

WE'LL ALL BE TOGETHER ON THE DAY OF VICTORY

Randy Williams,
Political Prisoner

REVOLUTIONARY HANDIWORK OF THE URBAN GUERILLA

Provocative Slogans

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE TIME SEIZES YOU!

AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE IS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL

BLOOD TO THE HORSES BROW AND WOE TO THOSE WHO CAN-NOT SWIM!

DARE TO STRUGGLE...DARE TO WIN!

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS



FOR EVERY PORK CHOP THERE IS A FRYING PAN!

"Revolutionary Art"

The most prominent artist on *The Black Panther* staff is Minister of Culture Emory Douglas. Although he prepares a large number of cartoons, other Panther artists are also represented. These cartoons characterize the Government and local law enforcement as "pigs" and call for the overthrow of the Government and the killing of Government officials, as well as police officers.



THE REVOLUTIONARY ARTIST

When the Black revolutionary artist starts a still life painting, he doesn't see a beautiful vase, or a dish of tasty fruit, against a soft velvet backdrop...he sees only a tattered curtain, rusty cans, a broken dish--empty.

As he seeks out a beautiful landscape to paint, he sees not fertile fields with dancing flowers, and lovely maidens bathing in the sun, but decaying houses, and streets covered with debris, and a Black woman in ragged clothes with tear-stained cheeks.

The Black revolutionary artist knows only oppression, and that his art must relate to his surroundings, and his people, and most of all, his art cannot be abstract and unrelated to his revolutionary people. So he seeks, and finds what our Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton calls "the spirit of the people." As he moves on that, he shows what Revolutionary Artist and Minister of Culture, Emory Douglas shows--"the oppressor *hanging by his heels.*"

The revolutionary artist gives his art to his oppressed people. So with his gun and his brush he shows the spirit of the people moving to crush the oppressor, and this is the essence of revolutionary art. His art then becomes part of the people's revolution.

He knows that only because of the urine covered walls and trash-littered alleys the people's desire for freedom will be replaced with *the BLOOD OF THE OPPRESSOR.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Malik Barafu
N.C.G.F.,
Washington, D.C.

The Black Panther; May 9, 1970; page 18

TO ALL REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS

I would like to take this time to express on behalf of the Black Panther Party our warmest thanks to all revolutionary artists who have given their talents and thoughts to the people through revolutionary art. We would like to say that every artist's work that has appeared in the Black Panther Newspaper this past year has been a great contribution of visual interpretation of the ideology of the Black Panther Party and of the oppressed people of the world.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS
Emory Douglas
Minister of Culture
Black Panther Party


1971 YEAR OF THE YOUTH
YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION
DEATH
TO THE
FASCIST
PIGS
EMORY

EVERY DOOR THAT THE FASCISTS ATTEMPT TO KICK
DOWN WILL PUT THEM DEEPER INTO THE PIT OF DEATH



SHOOT TO KILL


DEATH TO THE
FASCIST PIG
PIG

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 3, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 17, 1970, P. 16



THE BLACK PANTHER
MARCH 20, 1971, P. 4


Only the
power
of the
people can
free
political
prisoners
PIG
Paul
G.Gary
'71 SND

We will not hesitate to kill
or die for our freedom.


TIER 3
"O" WING
RALPH

THE BLACK PANTHER
FEBRUARY 6, 1971, P. 5

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 2, 1970 PAGE 13


OINK OINK OINK
OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK
OINK
OINK
U.S. GOVT.
EMORY
OINK

International News

Panthers profess to believe that American Negroes comprise isolated "colonies" in the heart of the "mother" country, and are part of the Third World, defined as the nonwhite, undeveloped, and underdeveloped countries of the world. The 10-Point Program of the Black Panther Party includes, as a major political objective, a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony to determine the national destiny of American Negroes.

To internationalize their Party and enlarge their importance, Panther leaders have sought acceptance, support, and funds from sources abroad. They have made numerous trips to foreign countries, including Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Palestine, Germany, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Chinese Mainland.

Both at home and abroad, Panther leaders loudly proclaim anti-American sentiments and align themselves politically with the aims and tactics of enemy lands. The international contacts most important to the Panthers are made with revolutionary groups and communist countries, especially those that more closely follow Maoist thinking. The international news section of *The Black Panther* reflects attempts by the Black Panther Party to attract such attention, support, and aid.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1970 PAGE 8

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG
PREMIER OF THE CABINET
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA

June 25th marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S. imperialist aggressive invasion of the DPRK in 1950.

The Black Panther Party takes this occasion to salute the DPRK and the wise and brave leader of the 40 million Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung.

We recognize and respect the long history of resistance and victory that Comrade Kim Il Sung and the 40 million Korean people have contributed to the world wide struggle against imperialism and fascism; the shining examples of socialist construction while under severe conditions of U.S. provocation and aggression, the many brilliant ideological contributions you have made to the socialist camp and in particular the concept of "Juche".

Because of our historical experience in America; because we are faced with no alternatives but genocide or liberation we understand the criminal nature and gangster logic of the U.S. ruling class. Black people are increasingly the victims of overt military aggression and U.S. plots to subvert our struggle for national salvation. Under these conditions we have an increasing awareness that the expulsion of the U.S. imperialist burglars from Korean soil and the reunification of Korea will be a victory for the Korean people and a victory for oppressed people the world over.

We see clearly that the reunification of Korea is not seperate from the salvation of Black and other oppressed people in fascist America. As gang boss Nixon and his mob of criminals intensify their attempts to loot Asia they are intensifying their murderous repression of Black people in America. These attacks will be met with revolutionary solidarity manifested in action, both around the world and in the gangsters lair, and with one-beat-a-hundred fighters in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America; the U.S.A. will surely be brought to the peoples JUSTICE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
U.S.A.

INTERCOMMUNAL NEWS

MEMORANDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE ESCALATION OF THE U.S. WAR OF AGGRESSION IN LAOS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAO PROBLEM

PART II

Application Of The Nixon Doctrine And Escalation Of The War Of Aggression In Laos By The Nixon Administration

UNDER PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC OPINION, NIXON ON MARCH 6, 1970 HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE LOGISTIC AND AIR SUPPORT AND "OTHER ACTIVITIES" OF THE U.S. IN LAOS. He also admitted an increase in the U.S. military activities in Laos. But he tried to argue that those activities were "limited" and of a purely "defensive" character aimed at protecting American lives in South Viet Nam.

But public opinion in the United States and in the world immediately pointed out that that was the first time the highest executive in the United States made an open acknowledgement of the violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos by the U.S. On March 7, Senator Albert Gore declared that Nixon in fact had conceded that "we (the U.S.) have violated the Geneva Agreements". Public opinion has condemned Nixon's allegations as "queer" and "selfcontradictory" (the Japanese paper "Asahi Shimbun" March 9. "Nixon's allegations were misleading. They mentioned only some facts and not everything and showed no sign of any change of policy." (Senators Scranton and Fulbright, March 6 and 9, 1970).



The Resistance government formed in 1950 against the French Colonialists.

Obivously, Nixon cannot dupe public opinion which bases its judgement not merely on the words but also on the deeds of the Nixon administration during the recent past.

After Nixon came to power, the so-called "Nixon doctrine on Asia" saw the light which consists in providing more U.S. advisers, weapons and firepower to the Asians, while the latter contribute more mercenaries for the U.S. The formula of this doctrine is "native soldiers plus U.S. advisers and maximum logistic and air support". This is in fact a more elaborate and more refined form of U.S. neo-colonialism's wicked policy of making Asians fight Asians, and natives fight natives.

The active application of that doctrine in Laos finds a concrete expression in the steps of escalation taken by the Nixon administration in its aggressive war in Lao. during the past 18 months, escalation in the logistic supply, in the supply of U.S. military personnel and in the use of U.S. combat troops in the "special war".

Under the Nixon administration, the amount of U.S. aid to Laos and military personnel introduced into this country have increased at almost the same rate. Compared with the 140 million dollars in 1967, U.S. aid in 1969 rose to 250 million dollars of which only the economic and technical aid accounting for less than 60 million was announced, while the rest was almost exclusively used for military purposes. Thus, military aid - about 190 million dollars a year, - is more than treble the economic aid and makes up 80 per cent of the total aid. This figure is approximately the same as estimated by Senator A.J. Allender in a censured report on the scale of American involvement in the war in Laos (AF, Jan. 22 1970). It is necessary to note that what is described as "economic and technical" has also been used for secret activities of a military character. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna, Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, disclosed that the U.S. aid program also covers the CIA activities in Laos. At present, according to a statement of Senator M. Mansfield on September 21, 1969, U.S. aid in Laos had exceeded 200 million dollars a year and continued to increase.

Obviously, the Nixon administration is squandering in Laos more and more money of the American people, while serious social problems in the United States are yet unsettled, because enormous sums are being spent for unjust wars in Laos and in Indochina as a whole.

On March 6, 1970, Nixon said there were 643 advisers and military personnel out of the 1,040 Americans operating in Laos and denied the presence of any U.S. combat troops in Laos. That is not true. Compared with the 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos under the Johnson administration, the figure rose to 12,000 U.S. military personnel, with or without military uniform in the first period of the Nixon administration. Of them, there were at least 2,000 air force advisers, or 800 more than in 1967. The number of U.S. advisers assigned to the "special forces" training centres and regular units of the puppet army increased from 150 to 1,000 (according to a British source, the figure might be 2,000). The U.S. "special forces" operating in southern Laos are estimated at about 1,200 men. Thus there is one U.S. military adviser for every six Laos puppet soldiers (compared to the 70,000 men of the Vientiane army). In addition according to a statement of Senator R. Ottinger on April 24, 1970, at least half of the 45,000 U.S. air force personnel in Thailand (i.e. 24,000) are now directly participating in air activities in Laos. All told, the number of U.S. military men now taking part in military activities in Laos on the ground and in the air has run into tens of thousands at least equal to half of the total effectives of the Lars puppet army.

The running of the U.S. colossal war machine in Laos remains an affair of the U.S. embassy, Nixon's ambassador to Vietiane remains a military proconsul. The paper "France Soir", on March 3, 1970 said everything in Laos is controlled from the building of the U.S. embassy which houses the brain of the war machine. The number of army and air force military attaches of the U.S. embassy exceeds 200, an unusual figure for a foreign diplomatic mission in a country like Laos. The USAID agency in Laos is also operating within the framework of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vientiane and is working for the CIA. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna acknowledged that Laos is the only place where such things happened [illegible] did not approve it.

Of late some 1,200 U.S. "green berets" were introduced into Laos, whose commanders [illegible] (Thailand), U.S. senator [illegible] on February 27, 1970 said the number of U.S. "green berets" in Laos had exceeded that of U.S. military advisers in South Viet Nam in the past. [illegible] 1969 and early 1970, U.S. combat troops took part in ground attacks on the Plain of Jars area, Meng Khouang province. The U.S. magazine "Newsweek" of April 6, 1970 affirmed that the CIA office in [illegible] G.I.'s who [illegible] Viet Nam [illegible] Laos [illegible] a week [illegible].

With [illegible], there have been more [illegible] participating in the fighting [illegible]. On March 6, 1970, Senator Mansfield [illegible] that Americans are fighting [illegible] "The fact that some of them do not wear uniforms does not [illegible] this one bit. The fact is that American combat troops [illegible] uniform have been fighting in Laos."

continued on next page

New textile factory at Sam-Neua

ON CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG'S DECLARATION OF 20 MAY, 1970

In this declaration, Chairman Mao Tse Tung has set forth a brilliant and timely analysis of the qualitatively new situation that exists in the world as a result of the treacherous new acts of aggression launched by the fascist, imperialist Nixon-

Chinese peoples.

This declaration pulls together into clear focus the revolutionary struggles and the liberation struggles of the people of the whole world, including the revolutionary struggle of the American people themselves.

Speaking specifically for the Black Panther Party, but reflecting the sentiments of millions of oppressed people inside the United States, it has become crystal clear to us that rampant imperialist aggression on the international scale and vicious fascist repression on the domestic scale are the two faces of the criminal government of the United States and the calculated policy of the American ruling circles. For 400 years now, Black people inside the United States have been the long-suffering victims of fascist violence and repression. But under the Nixon-Pentagon clique, this reactionary violence and repression has been escalated to new heights of barbaric cruelty. At the same time, in order to put down the already gigantic and still growing mass movement among White Americans against the wreckless and sanguinary policies and imperialist adventures of the U.S. government, the cowardly Nixon-Pentagon clique has unleashed a bloodbath against the American people as a whole, creating for itself new enemies who have joined hands with those who were already determined to carry out a struggle to the bitter end against an economic, political, and social system that is dominated by the madmen in the Pentagon and that is responsible for the misery and bloodshed all over the world today.

Chairman Mao Tse Tung captures the truth of the situation when he points out the unprecedented isolation of the Nixon-Pentagon clique. Never before have these criminals been so exposed and isolated as they are today. And never before has it been so clear that this criminality can only be ended by the people rising up to seize their own destiny from the handfull of willful exploiters and murderers that now have the power in their hands.

Coupling a revolutionary call to arms with revolutionary optimism in the assurance of victory, Chairman Mao Tse Tung, the great leader of the Chinese Revolution, hero and teacher of the revolutionary people of the world, has performed an invaluable service to all mankind by stepping forward at this time to renew the people's indictment of the common enemy of us all--U.S. Fascism and Imperialist Aggression. These courageous words of Chairman Mao Tse Tung will give new heart to the peoples in their lonely and difficult struggles to throw off the shackles and chains of oppression now being held in place by U.S. Fascism and Imperialism.

Lastly, we wish to point out that only the enemies of the people and those who shirk their revolutionary duties and who are afraid of their own shadows will find fault with Chairman Mao Tse Tung's declaration. For our part, we welcome it, because we have learned, by shedding our blood, that only through relentless struggle, by resorting to arms inside the very house of U.S. Fascism and Imperialism itself, can we gain our freedom and liberation. This is what our experience has taught us and this is the faith that will sustain us as we push forward our struggle..

LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG!
LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLES' WAR!
DEATH TO THE U.S. FASCISM AND IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
Eldridge Cleaver,
Minister of Information
Black Panther Party, U.S.A.

The Black Panther, June 20, 1970, page 16

THE TERROR, BRUTALITY AND MURDER OF MY BROTHERS AND SISTERS IS THE SUFFERING OF BLACK PEOPLE. THEREFORE, NOT TO LET SUCH EVENTS CONTINUE I MUST MERCILESSLY DO AWAY WITH THE LOW-NATURED BEAST THAT BITES THE HAND THAT FEEDS IT.



WE HAVE NO HANG UPS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

3 - Mr. J. A. [illegible]tz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
(1 - P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/13/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

4063

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This is to advise of a meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on 6/12/75 in my office in accordance with the request set out in Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum dated 6/4/75.

IS-1 Section Chief J. G. Deegan, Number One Man William H. Atkinson, Unit Chiefs Homer A. Newman, Jr., David Ryan, Garnett T. Tunstall, and Special Agent Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division met with Jack Smith and Lester B. Seidel of the SSC staff.

At the outset Mr. Seidel indicated that SSC would do case studies on various organizations against which the COINTELPRO was directed. Black Panther Party (BPP) had been chosen for the start because many BPP members had been involved in and convicted of criminal activity. He distributed copies of a document (a copy of which is attached) outlining the purpose of the meeting and setting out requests that will be made of the Bureau through appropriate channels in connection with this case study. Included in this document, along with requests for various Bureau documents regarding COINTELPRO as it pertains to the BPP, were requests for a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted, a list of all media persons contacted and a list of all FBI personnel connected with this program and their present locations.

5 -

The investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, as relates to the BPP, were described generally to Messrs. Seidel and Smith highlighting the origin of this violence-prone organization and the series of violent confrontations in which it participated in the late 1960s. Mr. Seidel stated that he was specifically interested in ascertaining the extent of COINTELPRO and how it related to the investigation of the BPP in San Francisco - Oakland and Los Angeles. COINTELPRO was stressed only as a procedure which could have been followed in the course of our investigation. ~~No specific~~

REC- 102

62-116395-953

Enclosures - 2

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AWM/mf

JUN 24 1975

62-116395

MOR-16

GTT:eks (10)

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

CONTINUED - OVER

JUN 24 1975

instances of institution of counterintelligence activities were discussed, and it was indicated that these activities were minor as far as the overall BPP investigation was concerned.

In connection with COINTELPRO, the Bureau letter to SAC, San Francisco dated 5/11/70 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations" was discussed. Basically, this letter suggests San Francisco consider a proposal that through the use of documents subtly incorporating false information, attempt to give the BPP the impression that the documents were stolen by a disgruntled police employee who is sympathetic to the Panthers. This document was presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security in 1974 and was included in their publication of hearings conducted by that Committee. Messrs. Seidel and Smith wanted to know if the activities outlined in this letter had been implemented by the San Francisco or Los Angeles Offices. He was advised that this letter was not implemented as it had requested comments and recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and that Office had recommended against the proposals contained therein.

Mr. Seidel asked the identity of the SAC who recommended against this proposal and was advised that the SAC there, at that time, would not necessarily have had personal knowledge of the matter. He then asked identity of supervisor who recommended against proposal and was advised this information was available in the field office. Concerning COINTELPRO in general, he inquired as to specific techniques used against the BPP and whether forgery and wiretaps had been a part of the program. He was advised that we were unable to furnish that information without extensive file review.

Mr. Seidel attempted to discuss Special Operations but he was advised that the matter was not within the purview of the current meeting.

Mr. Seidel explained that they would be traveling to San Francisco and intended to interrogate personnel in that Office as well as unspecified outsiders who may have been involved in COINTELPRO. Mr. Seidel stated that he had asked for the meeting with Bureau personnel to obtain background data to aid them in these

interrogations. Both Messrs. Seidel and Smith expressed appreciation for the assistance given them at this meeting and both additionally expressed their feeling that the Bureau had done a good and proper job in its investigation.

During the course of this meeting a monograph on the BPP prepared by the Bureau in March of 1971 was used for background data. Mr. Seidel expressed a desire to have a copy of this document. This document, which is prepared from public source data, was compiled for public distribution and, if you approve, a copy will be furnished to Mr. Seidel.

ACTION:

For your information and if you approve, one copy of attached document entitled "Black Panther Party"* will be sent to Mr. Seidel.

HEH/JGD

GTT

Get written request signed by Chairman of Committee. WRW

PLM

Not initially

*Per G.T. Tunstall, this document is not classified, made up of public source data, + until it became outdated, was furnished to the public. 6/19/75

Delivered to Sherry Towell of SSC 6/20/75 for delivery to Seidel

Black Panther Party: San Francisco-Oakland (Los Angeles)
Late 1960's through early 1970's

The Committee is examining the extent to which this COINTELPRO program relates to criminal investigation; the results obtained; the relationships between the FBI and local authorities (police and other governmental agencies); media and community leaders; the methods of targeting; techniques used to achieve program goals; legal authority; and authorization procedures and accountability.

To pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents in this initial stage:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the responses thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (*e.g.*, field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO, with explanation of the dispositions thereof;
6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 ALM/TMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-253

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and their media affiliation;
8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;
9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to the whereabouts, and relation to the FBI should be indicated:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee requested to be given a briefing concerning counterintelligence programs as applied to our investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco.

Lester Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee who is assigned the area of COINTELPROS, advised that the Committee is preparing what he termed case studies on COINTELPROS in four separate areas. He defined these areas as the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Seidel previously had requested the Bureau arrange interviews of various Bureau personnel whom he considered familiar with the San Francisco Black Panther Party investigation, and at that time stated he intended to interview these individuals in two or three weeks. Mr. Seidel requested that prior to conducting interviews concerning this particular area, he desired to be briefed during the week of June 8 concerning the Bureau's general overall investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, along with the use of counterintelligence proposals against that organization. In this regard he desired that someone knowledgeable in this aspect be made available to brief him concerning this matter.

[illegible] 6/13/75 [illegible]

62-116395

REC- 102

62-116395-252

5-[illegible]STALL

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

12 JUN 24 1975

PVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 [illegible] 2 7 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Seidel also stated that he was submitting a written request to the Bureau for certain Bureau documents pertaining to the COINTELPRO operations in the San Francisco Office and specifically mentioned requesting the quarterly status letters from that office on COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) The Intelligence Division advise if a briefing can be arranged and the date and time of such a briefing.

2) Legal Counsel Division will advise Mr. Seidel of the Bureau's decision in this regard.

PVD JBH|PVD

WRW/TWL

We should carefully consider fact that Hampton case is subject of pending litigation and coordinate with Dept. instead of being [illegible] specific [illegible] provided.

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0620

18 JUN 1975

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Request for Documents by SSC

Attached is a request for documents received by CIA from the Senate Select Committee Staff on 10 June 1975. It is provided to you for information.

John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 23 1975

5

7 ENCLOSURE

file 62-116395

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 alm/jmf
MDR-16

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

JUN 23 1975

~~SECRET~~

R223

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

DCI/IC 75-2202

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1975

Mr. Walter Elder
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Elder:

Further to our conversation regarding formal requests for documents and records, I attach a list of supplemental document requests.

What I would propose is that you and I discuss this list to insure that we have properly identified the requested documents.

In addition to the attached list I would like to review studies in the historical series: (1)"Maritime Operations in Indonesian Operations -- 1957-1958;" "Overthrow of a Government, November 1952-1953;" and any studies prepared that trace the CIA's activities in relation to the overthrow of the government of Guatamala in 1954.

Sincerely,

William B. Bader

Attachment

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2001 BY SPA ALM/LMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE
62-116395

R223

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

To: Bill Bader

From: Elliot Maxwell

Date: June 9, 1975

Subj: Supplemental Document Requests

1. The General Counsel's memo on February 3, 1975 on proprietaries mentioned in the briefing paper prepared for the Rockefeller Commission.

2. The Inspector General's Survey of Propeietaries from 1967.

3. Inspector General's Survey of Domestic Operations Division done prior to May 26, 1966.

4. The opinion on covert action authority of the CIA prepared by the Justice Department under Attorney General Katzenbach.

5. List of those individuals who worked with John Richards.

6. List of the component surveys from 1960 to 1970. (Approximately 50 studies)

7. The subject heading list, the keyword list, and the name list, used for filing in the Office of General Counsel.

8. The Bureau of the Budget Confidential Report on Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government, dated September 20, 1945. (HS/HC-71, Item 1).

9. The Report by William H. Jackson, on the Coordination of Intelligence Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British intelligence system. This is a report for the OSS dated August, 1945. (HS/HC-801, Item 9.)

10. A list of titles of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates from January 1, 1970 to the present.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 SPbalm/lmc

MOR-16

62-116395-
ENCLOSURE

11. The Office of the General Counsel memo on the subject "Text and Explanation, Public Law 110," dated October 10, 1952.

12. The Interim Report to the National Security Council by Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, dated May 13, 1948 and entitled "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."

13. The paper by the Office of General Counsel on the Origins of the CIA, which is mentioned in the memo of the General Counsel of September 1973.

14. The two pages of General Vandenberg's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee outlining the clandestine collection function of the CIA, which were never published, a copy of which is now in the possession of Walter Pforzheimer.

15. An explanation of all the two-letter prefixes to the project names. (diographic)

16. The paper prepared by the Office of the Controller entitled "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities of CIA and Predecessor Organizations, 20 September 1945 through Janaury 1952." This is identified as HS/HC-36, Item 2.

17. The history of the development of NSCID-5 by Mrs. Margaret Ehrmantraut.

18. Study on Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of Covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 through 1966.*

19. Draft bill written by Lawrence Houston in the Fall of 1946, entitled "A Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency," cited in the archives as HS/HC-805, Item

20. Detailed Budget Submissions and house notes prior to 1967.

21. (a) The transcript of the Senate Hearings on the CIA Act of 1949, cited Paragraph 7 OGC 73-2169, Memo for the Record, 20 November 1973, Subject: Payment to Richard Patrick Lippert;

    (b) Any documents relating to the inquiry by the Secretary of Defense in 1947 mentioned in Paragraph 8 of above memo.

22. Annex to the 1963 Inspector General's Report on Technical Services Division on Experiments with Drugs.

---

* Already on our priority list: for transmittal to Select Committee offic

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Each Assistant Director

TO ALL SACS JUNE 11, 1975 3 per SLP

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116464)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

HOUSTUDY 75.

REBUTELS MAY 2,20, 1975, "SENSTUDY 75."

BUFILE 62-116464 AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MATTERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FROM SENSTUDY 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 1 1975
TELETYPE
320 A ESF

SFP:mjg
(19)

NOTE:

Referenced teletypes advised field of our pledge of full cooperation with Senate Committee and issued instructions concerning handling contacts with Senate Committee Staff as well as handling of matters relating to interviews with present and former Bureau employees. Inasmuch as we have opened a separate file under Houstudy 75, it is believed this teletype would assist in prompting better management of correspondence between Bureau and field.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-9

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAG
MDR-16 WRW/TAL

WRW/B

PCM

66-116395

NOT RECORDED
JUN 23 1975
46 JUN 23 1975

84 JUN 23 1975

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Schwartz)

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Dear Mr. Halperin:

Senstudy-75

Reference is made to my letter to you dated April 8th, regarding your request for the "Delimination Agreement of 1948."

Coordination of this matter with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has disclosed three documents which are pertinent to your request. It is my understanding that two of the three documents have been released to you by that agency, and I am enclosing with this letter, the third document. You will find this letter dated October 2, 1948, from former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Frank G. Wisner, then the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, contains certain deletions. The material deleted refers to the same material excised in one of the two documents furnished to you by CIA, and concerning which CIA asserted exemption provisions found in Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). These provisions relate to matters that warrant classification and those which are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. It is considered appropriate for the same exemption provisions to be cited by this Bureau in connection with the deleted portion.

You have thirty days from receipt of this letter to appeal to the Attorney General from any denial contained herein. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Attorney General (Attention: Freedom of Information Appeals Unit), Washington, D. C. 20530.

62-116395-

MAILED 6
MAY 23 1975
FBI

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116395-46

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

THB:dm (7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPAAIM/dmf
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Following the Attorney General's decision, judicial review is available in the district of your residence or principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia, where the records are situated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Delivered to CIA 5/27/75
VAS

Enclosure

1 - Freedom of Information Act Coordinator - Enclosure
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Mr. Charles Saviage
Washington, D. C.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M. Hauser

NOTE: See copy of H. C. Flemister memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 5/7/75, captioned "Morton Halperin, FOIA Request," copy of which is attached. The material CIA requested to be excised has been deleted as described in this letter, and the Bureau file copy of the letter is not classified. Contact with CIA FOIA Section discloses the deletion of the material in the CIA letter dated 9/22/48 accomplishes the declassification of those documents. This has been coordinated with Intelligence Division. The original Bureau document is found in 65-48066-9.

~~SECRET~~

1 - [redacted] W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

JPL:jdp jdp
(4)

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 PM/MF
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 X 1
MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REC-75 62-116395-249

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 18 1975
5:18 pm
TELETYPE

WRW
WOB

~~SECRET~~

JUN 20 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JUN 25 1975

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [GUS SURVEY.] (S) NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S* RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall
6/4/75

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)
INTERNAL SECURITY, MISCELLANEOUS

Senstudy-75

This is to receive approval for submission of copies of documents requested by the U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. By letter dated 5/14/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the above Committee, requested the Attorney General furnish documents including "all memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the IEC." (Appendix C, I, 14).

Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, advised Supervisor Garnett T. Tunstall on 5/29/75 that the Department has made available to Senator Church's Committee all data contained in Departmental files on the IEC. Included in this material are work papers and final estimates prepared by IEC as well as communications between IEC and the Bureau. The only information remaining in Bureau files not already made available to the Committee consists of in-office memoranda. These memoranda fall into three general categories:
1. Those dealing with the origin and staffing of IEC,
2. Memoranda setting out requests from IEC for information from the Bureau and requests for approval to send such data to IEC and
3. Memoranda transmitting estimates and work papers of IEC which was the result of information furnished by the Bureau and other participating agencies.

These memoranda, without exception, show that the Bureau's participation in IEC was at the instruction of the Attorney General, its activities were legal and that the Bureau's contribution was substantial. It should be noted that the memorandum M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop dated 11/25/70 captioned

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)
Enclosures
62-113887
GTT:eks (4)

62-116395 -
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 25 1975

CONTINUED OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 bm/lmf
MDR-16

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-113887-2

84 JUN 25 1975

"Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Meeting with the Director, 11/25/70," has been excised to delete information not germane to IEC. Copy of original memorandum not excised attached.

ACTION:

If approved, copies of the above-described memoranda, which are attached, will be transmitted to the Department by LHM for referral to the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps. Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(7)

WRW/TJM

memo to Mr Cregar [illegible]
6/17/75 TJM

62-116395-247

5

REC-102

17 JUN 23 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 RVM/LMC
MOR-16

84 JUN 23 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 18, 1975

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - A. B. Fulton
1 - D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached herewith in 14 bound volumes are excised copies of Exhibits A through E of the Department report of FBI Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activities, prepared by the committee chaired by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen.

These exhibits are individual write-ups prepared by the FBI of each proposed action in the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate, Black Extremist, and New Left Cointelpros.

In my letter to you dated April 21, 1975, I recommended against release of these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee as they are internal work papers which were prepared as a part of the deliberative process for an in-house Department investigation. I strongly object to the release of these exhibits. In the event you deem it necessary to release these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee, I request the enclosed copies, which have been excised in an attempt to avoid intrusions upon individuals' right of privacy and compromise of sensitive investigative techniques and sources, be made available.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

Enclosures (14)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-104 62-116395-245

1 - 62-116009

DR:pld
(11)

Director signed original
which was hand carried
with enclosures to
O'Connor 5 15/P 6/17
by SA Daly. Jam

17 JUN 23 1975

See NOTE page 2.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/4/2000 BY SPA Alm/Mel
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 23 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

NOTE:

On 6/11/75 Legal Counsel advised Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of our objection and our desire that excisions be made if we are overruled. Mr. O'Connor suggested the excised material be prepared on an expedite basis. It appears the Department will make available these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee but we feel we should be on record as relates to FBI recommendations and objections.

This letter and exhibits A through E, which will be made available to Legal Counsel, should be delivered to Mr. O'Connor at the Department by Legal Counsel Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ✓
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF MRS. DOROTHY SKILLMAN
6/4/75
SENSTUDY 75

On 6/4/75, Mrs. Dorothy Skillman, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Clyde Tolson, was interviewed by Mr. Mark H. Gittenstein and Miss Mary Deoreo of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Mrs. Skillman was escorted to the interview by former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr who remained outside the interview room during the interview. Prior to the interview, Mrs. Skillman was met by SA L. F. Schwartz at which time she advised that she had been advised by Mr. John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, that the interview was to be concerning Mr. Hoover's Official and Confidential (OC) files and that if questions came up during the interview on other matters which might impinge on sensitive sources and methods, current Bureau investigations, etc., she was free to request an interruption of the interview to consult with Mr. Schwartz.

The interview of Mrs. Skillman commenced at 2:30 p.m., and it was terminated at approximately 4:30 p.m. On only one occasion toward the end of the interview, Mrs. Skillman asked to consult with Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz. She advised that the interviewers had asked her concerning her knowledge of what might have been in certain cartons which were reportedly stored in the recreation room area of the late Director's residence. Mrs. Skillman stated that she thought these cartons contained many of the gifts and mementos that had been collected by Mr. Hoover over a period of years. After consulting with Mr. Mohr, she realized that she knew this only from comments that had been made to her by Mr. Mohr and had no firsthand knowledge of the contents of the cartons. On Mr. Mohr's advice, she advised the interviewers that she had no firsthand knowledge of what was in the cartons but that she knew that Mr. Mohr was aware of what was in them because he was present when the appraisers of Mr. Tolson's estate inventoried the entire house including these cartons. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Gittenstein commented to Mr. Mohr that he might have further questions to ask him concerning the contents of the cartons but would probably handle that by a telephone call to Mr. Mohr.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/9/99 BY SP2 AM/LMF

(8)

MDR-16

REC-102

62-116395-244

CONTINUED - OVER

JUN 23 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

84 JUN 23 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Interview of Mrs. Dorothy Skillman
6/4/75
Senstudy 75

After the completion of the interview, Mrs. Skillman advised Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz that the interviewers had asked her a great number of questions concerning her knowledge of the OC files which she said was very limited, the layout of Mr. Hoover's house and the work that Mrs. Skillman and Miss Gandy had done at the residence subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death. She stated that the interviewers were quite courteous and in no way antagonistic. Mr. Mohr requested Mrs. Skillman to type up an informal memorandum concerning the interview and he indicated that when this was done, he would provide a copy to the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information.

WRW

PLM

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/13/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 JUN 24 1975

File Number 62-116395-242

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/2006 BY SP2 alm/lmc
mdr-16

Permanent Serial Charge Out

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 9 1975

TO: Kevin Maroney
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Bill

General

SUBJECT: IRS - SSC Request

Senstudy-75

Attached is a copy of the SSC document request served upon IRS which I received on June 3, 1975. Since some of the items may relate to DOJ/FBI functions, I thought you should be aware of the scope of the request, as a matter of information.

The Topical Task Forces may need to be alert to this request as a matter of prospective coordination.

cc: Deputy Attorney General

5 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

REC- 102

62-116395-241

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

17 JUN 19 1975

62-116395

84 JUN 19 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975 DCI/IC 75-2033

Mr. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Attached is a copy of a Senate Select Committee request to the Treasury Department dated 14 May 1975. Mr. Collins of Treasury has requested you be provided a copy of this request, but no other distribution will be made. It will, of course, become an entry in the Community Central Index.

Yours very truly,

Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

Attachment: As stated

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-241

DCI/IC 75-2009

Department
of the Treasury
Office of Special
Assistant to Secretar
for National Security

to. Mr. John Clarke, Associate
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community, C

room. ______ date. 5/29/75

Forwarded is a copy of the Senate Select Committee's first request to the Internal Revenue Service for documents and explanations. As I stated yesterday at the Ad Hoc Committee meeting there have been some discussions with the Committee staff since this letter was received and the staff has indicated that they plan to revise the questions considerably. In these circumstances you may wish to hold distribution of this document to other members of the Ad Hoc Committee until we receive the revised document. The one exception to this might be the Justice Department since some of the questions will involve matters of interest to them.

Foster

J. Foster Collins
room 4328
964-~~242~~ 2631

62-116395-341

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

COMMISSIONER
MAY 16 1975
INTERNAL REVENUE

Hon. Donald C. Alexander
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
Internal Revenue Building
1111 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20224

Dear Commissioner Alexander:

The Committee appreciates your letter pledging the full cooperation and assistance of the Internal Revenue Service in the work of the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. We also appreciate your forwarding the draft resolution which would authorize the Committee to review any "tax-related information" which may fall within the purview of its responsibilities. Such a resolution is being put forward.

In an effort to expedite the Committee's inquiry into the intelligence functions of the Internal Revenue Service, the Committee asks your cooperation and assistance in furnishing the material and information sought in the enclosed "First Request for Documents from the Internal Revenue Service" and "First Interrogatories to the Internal Revenue Service". It is the Committee's desire that most of the material and information requested be provided by May 30 and the remainder very shortly thereafter. We also request that you provide the answers and documents as they are compiled rather than holding those which are initially compiled until May 30.

In the near future, the Committee's Chief Counsel will be in touch with your General Counsel to work out the mechanics of delivering the requested documents and interrogatory answers and to arrange for close liaison between the Committee's staff and the Internal Revenue Service personnel with whom the staff will wish to meet.

While we recognize that the enclosed requests are substantial, they reflect the broad mandate given to the Committee by the Senate. We believe that it is in the national interest that we perform our

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-541

work under that mandate both expeditiously and thoroughly. Of course, for us to proceed expeditiously, it is necessary to obtain prompt cooperation from the Executive agencies involved. We are hopeful that with your continued cooperation the end result of our joint efforts will meet the Committee's responsibilities to the Congress and to the American people.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

FIRST REQUEST TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR DOCUMENTS

The Committee wishes to identify all intelligence collection analysis and dissemination functions performed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to review the legal authority for such activities, the manner in which they are ordered and controlled, the coordination of such activities with other federal agencies, the exchange of intelligence information with other federal agencies and any other cooperation with such agencies relative to intelligence activity. In pursuit of this inquiry the Committee requests, that the IRS provide the Committee with the documents and information identified below.

The request is divided into two major parts. The first part seeks documents which relate generally to any intelligence functions which the IRS performs. The second part seeks documents relating to specific intelligence functions of the IRS of which the Committee is aware. Therefore, many of the documents encompassed by the second part of the request will also be encompassed by the first part of the request.

Wherever used herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

Documents	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, compute memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language and any other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
Intelligence	Information about persons or entiti other than purely financial information.
Relating to	Relating in whole or in part to.
Federal agencies	All such agencies, including the White House.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

I. GENERAL REQUEST

With respect to each intelligence gathering or intelligence dissemination function of the IRS either now being performed or which has been performed within the last fifteen years, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart of the organizational unit performing the function indicating the total number of employees in each unit, the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, the chain of command to the organizational unit performing the function.

2. All rules, guidelines, regulations, manuals or other documents defining the function or providing guidance or control to those performing it.

3. All statutes, executive orders, departmental regulations, agency regulations, and any other documents or materials which constitute legal authority for the function.

4. The annual budget of the organizational unit performing the function for the last five years or, in the case of a unit which has ceased to exist, for the last five years of its existence.

5. All documents relating to any agreement or understanding with any other federal agency or the executive or any state or local government or agency regarding the function or the dissemination of any intelligence produced by the function.

6. All documents constituting or relating to reports or investigations of the function performed by the IRS or any other entity, and all documents relating to the establishment of the function.

7. All documents relating to electronic surveillance by IRS or other federal agencies.

II. SPECIFIC REQUESTS

A. Organization and Functions of Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions

With respect to the Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions of the IRS, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart indicating the total number of employees in each category or position, defining the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, and delineating the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Chief of each division.

2. A breakdown of the personnel in each of the two named divisions assigned to each district office, indicating the titles and functions associated with each position in each office.

3. Copies of all rules, guidelines and regulations defining the duties, functions, and responsibilities of each of the two divisions.

B. Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following specific categories of documents:

1. All documents relating to or constituting the recommendations of the study group convened in 1969 by William A. Kolar to study the feasibility of Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System, including all backup documents for such recommendations, and any documents reflecting dissenting views.

2. All documents passing from, to, or between William Kolar and the Commissioners of Revenue or their assistants relating to the plans for and progress made toward the implementation of IGRS.

3. All documents containing evaluations of the various methods of implementation of IGRS.

4. All documents constituting regulations, employee instructions and operating manuals regarding the IGRS, including guidelines, rules or regulations regarding the receipt and storage of information from other federal agencies.

5. All documents passing between the Chief of the Intelligence Division and the District Manager relating to the implementation of IGRS in each District.

6. All documents and guidelines relating to the implementation of IGRS in individual districts or in districts as a whole.

7. A breakdown by district of the IGRS files maintained in each district office, indicating the following:

(a) the number of such files on which some form of action constituting enforcement of the tax laws other than the maintenance of the file has actually been undertaken;

(b) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file is planned;

(c) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file has not been taken and is not planned.

? 8. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which no files are maintained.

9. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which files are maintained.

10. Any regulations or documents relating to criteria for determining the duration of a file in IGRS.

11. Any documents relating to rules or guidelines for analysis and dissemination of information held in IGRS.

12. Any documents relating to actual instances of dissemination to any person or organization, including other federal agencies, of information contained in IGRS.

13. Any documents relating to or constituting requests by anyone, including other federal agencies, for information contained in IGRS.

14. All documents which have been gathered or produced by the group formed in December 1974 to study the operation of IGRS, and all documents relating to or explaining the establishment of the study group.

C. Internal Revenue Strike Force Participation

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following information and documents relating to the participation by IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces:

All documents constituting or relating to agreements with other agencies regarding participation by the IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces, including any documents relating to the desirability of participating on such strike forces.

D. Special Service Staff

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following documents relating to Special Service Staff (SSS):

1. any document which established the SSS;

2. a detailed organizational chart of the SSS indicating the number of employees in each unit of the SSS and the duties and responsibilities of the employees of each unit, as well as the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the head of SSS;

3. a document or documents indicating the names of all employees of SSS during its existence, and indicating the position occupied by each such employee;

4. all documents relating to the policies, operations and procedures of the SSS relating to the collection, analysis, storage and dissemination of information;

5. all documents relating to the transfer of any SSS files to IGRS.

E. Audit Division

In addition to any documents relating to the Audit Division which may be encompassed by Part I, please furnish:

1. the rules, regulations and guidelines, including employee manuals, for selection of taxpayers for audit and the legal authority for such rules, regulations and guidelines;

2. the rules, regulations and guidelines relating to the storage, use and dissemination of information gathered through audits;

3. all documents relating to any of the following occurring since 1950

(a) Politically motivated requests for an audit of any person or entity

(b) Requests by any person or state or federal agency whose official duties do not normally require the use of financial information on individual taxpayers for an audit of any person or entity

4. All documents constituting rules or guidelines for removal of taxpayers' names from the list of those to be audited.

F. General Requests For Information

To the extent they have not already been furnished in response to previous sections of this document request, please furnish:

1. All documents constituting requests to the IRS for information regarding any person or entity by anyone, including federal agencies, whose normal official functions do not require use of such information.

2. All documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to the requests referred to in 1. above.

3. All documents constituting or relating to requests by anyone, including other federal agencies:

(a) for electronic surveillance by IRS, or

(b) for information or investigation which led to electronic surveillance by IRS

and all documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to any such requests.

FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Please provide full, explanatory answers to the questions set forth below. As used in these questions, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

"Documents"	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, computer memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language, and all other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
"Relating to"	Relating in whole or in part to.
"Federal agency"	All federal agencies and the Executive Branch.

1. Regarding the February 7, 1975, official press release of the Internal Revenue Service and the answer of Commissioner Alexander to the first question posed by Senator Joseph Montoya in his letter of January 29, 1975, please answer the following:

   a. At whose direction did William A. Kolar convene a study group to study the feasibility of a formal, uniform Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System (IGRS)?

   b. Who were the participants in the meeting of the study group?

   c. Please explain the relationship between each participant and the IRS.

   d. Please describe in detail the various alternative systems of implementation of IGRS tested in the

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

various districts, indicating which method was tested in which district, and list the dates each alternative system was tested in each district.

e. Please describe the procedure followed by District Directors in implementing IGRS in each district.

f. In how many district offices has IGRS been implemented?

2. How was intelligence data compiled, maintained, and stored by the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service prior to the inception of IGRS?

3. Did officials, representatives, or members of other federal government agencies participate in the establishment of IGRS or in any discussions regarding its establishment? If so, list each such agency and its representatives and explain the manner and extent of its involvement.

4. Did IGRS compile, maintain, and store information received from other federal agencies? If so, was that information compiled, maintained, and stored for the benefit and use of the Internal Revenue Service, the other federal agency, or both?

5. Is information received from other agencies of the federal government edited to delete non-tax-related material prior to its being entered in IGRS? If so, please explain the editing procedure and furnish all documents relating to such procedure.

6. Upon how many individuals and groups did IGRS maintain files as of November 1974?

7. Please identify all individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

8. Please state the total number of individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

9. Were all IGRS files maintained on a computerized or mechanized basis as of November 1974? How were the files indexed? In connection with the answer to this question, please identify all cross-referencing systems whereby categories of information could be retrieved from IGRS other than through identification of the name of an individual or group.

10. How many names were indexed in IGRS on which there were no files?

11. Please fully describe the procedure followed by the Intelligence Division of the IRS in establishing and entering a file on an individual, group, or organization in IGRS, stating whether:

    a. each file or name contained in IGRS is the result of an investigation by the Intelligence Division of IRS;

    b. the files or names stored and maintained by IGRS are periodically investigated by the Intelligence Division of IRS.

12. Upon how many IGRS files has some form of action constituting enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or the Justice Department?

13. How many names and files appear in IGRS upon which no action constituting the enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, has been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or Justice Department?

14. What criteria has been established by the Internal Revenue Service governing the duration of a file or name in IGRS?

15. What procedures are followed by the Internal Revenue Service in disseminating files, names, and other information contained in IGRS to other agencies of the federal government?

16. To what other agencies of the federal government has information contained in IGRS been distributed? Have there been any instances in which information contained in IGRS has been disseminated to other federal agencies without following the procedures described in Item 15 above?

a. If so, specify each such instance, listing the name of the individual, group, or organization whose file was disseminated and the agency at whose request the file was disseminated.

17. Has the Internal Revenue Service received requests for the dissemination of information contained in IGRS which (a) were politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please furnish the Committee with the following:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

18. Were any members of the IGRS study group convened by William Kolar in 1969 participants in the formation or operation of the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify them and describe in detail their relationship with both the Special Services Staff and IGRS.

a. Was IGRS, either in its formative or operative stages, used to maintain and store information collected by the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify the nature of the information so stored and the nature of the information not so stored.

b. Was it a policy of the Internal Revenue Service that documents and files maintained by the Special Services Staff not be stored in IGRS or its generic predecessors? If so, please furnish the Committee with evidence of such policy.

c. What was the relationship between the formal creation of IGRS on May 4, 1973, and the decision of the IRS to review and purge Special Services Staff files on or about June 28, 1973?

d. Have any Special Service Staff files ever been transferred to IGRS? If so, please specify the name of the individual, group, or organization upon which the file was maintained and the date it was transferred to IGRS.

19. With regard to the recent suspension of IGRS activities on January 22, 1975, pending an internal review of its operations, please answer the following:

a. To what specific duties have personnel assigned to IGRS been reassigned pending the present Internal Revenue Service review of IGRS? Please furnish the names of the personnel reassigned and the offices and units to which they have been reassigned.

b. Please furnish the name of the IRS official who is charged with the primary responsibility for conducting the study of IGRS.

c. In what manner are IRS intelligence files being compiled and maintained pending completion of the study?

20. What is the relationship between the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service and Organized Crime Strike Forces?

21. On how many strike forces do IRS agents participate? Please identify the strike forces.

22. How many agents participate on each such strike force?

23. Has the involvement of IRS intelligence personnel on such strike forces been confined to investigation of tax-related matters? If not, please indicate the manner and extent of IRS involvement in non-tax-related actions of the strike forces. In this regard, provide the Committee with detailed summaries of IRS participation on strike forces which did not involve or were unrelated to enforcement of tax-related matters.

24. What intelligence gathering, compiling, and storage systems has the Internal Revenue Service maintained in addition to IGRS?

25. In December 1974 the Internal Revenue Service suspended the operation of IGRS pending an internal review of the system. Was this review prompted by concern that non-tax-related materials were being gathered, compiled, and stored in IGRS? If so, please furnish the Committee with all files, names, and other information contained in IGRS files which is non-tax related.

26. Has the Internal Security Division of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other division of the Internal Revenue Service, ever investigated any aspects of the intelligence gathering, compilation, storage, and dissemination procedures of the Internal Revenue Service? If so, please identify and describe all such investigations and describe any subsequent action taken by the Internal Revenue Service as a result of the investigation.

27. Has the IRS received requests for the dissemination of information which were either (a) politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please state:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual, or the nature of the information sought;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

28. Has the IRS ever engaged in mail cover or other mail surveillance activities, including the recording of dispatch and receipt of mail (other than to or from the IRS) and the opening of mail (other than to the IRS)? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

29. Please set forth the rules, regulations, and procedures which govern removal of taxpayers' names from the list of returns to be audited.

30. Has the IRS ever engaged in wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, or any other type of electronic surveillance? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

31. If the answer to #30 is yes, as to each instance of such activity, state:

a. The dates during which the activity occurred;

b. The type of device used;

c. Whether judicial approval was obtained in advance and, if so, from which court;

d. The subject of the activity;

e. Why the activity occurred;

f. The use or disposition which was made of the information collected;

g. The names and current addresses of the individuals who (a) performed or (b) supervised the activity and whether they are IRS employees.

32. Has the IRS ever been directed, requested, or advised by any other federal agency to use electronic listening devices? If so, please state as to each such direction, request, or advice:

a. The date;

b. The federal agency making it;

c. The proposed subject;

d. The action IRS took;

e. If surveillance resulted, please identify the incident among those listed in answer to number 31;

f. The date and nature of all documents relating to the direction, request, or advice.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Adams DATE: 6-13-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

W.O.

Prior memoranda have been submitted reporting that the Capitol Police Department would handle security checks of the space assigned to captioned Committees as well as the offices of the individual members.

Arrangements were made through the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives to advise us of the Committee Members who have their private offices checked and the dates on which these checks were made.

On June 13, 1975, Captain Eugene Brannon of the Capitol Police Force advised Inspector Bowers that three members of the Senate Committee and two members of the House Committee have had their private offices checked to date. These are:

Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) who had his office in room 245 Russell Senate Office Building and his Capitol office, room S-201 checked on 5-14-75.

Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) whose office in 6325 Dirkson Senate Office Building was checked on 5-22-75.

Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Penna.) whose office in 347 Russell Senate Office Building was checked on 6-5-75.

62-116464

REC-102

62-116395-239

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Bowers

17 JUN 19 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

DWB:lgp
(7)

File 62-116395
62-116464

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SEANTE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Congressman Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.) whose office in 2265 Rayburn Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Congressman Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.) whose office in 1113 Longworth House Office Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Captian Brannon said they have no pending requests from other members of these Committees to make any checks of their offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
6/9/75
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - All Sections Chiefs
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

HOUSTUDY 75

By memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett captioned "Senstudy 75" dated 2/6/75, you were advised that "Senstudy 75" is the code word for the control file (62-116395) containing all communications relating to the Senate Select Committee's (SSC) investigation and study of Governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

In mid-February, 1975, the House of Representatives created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities which will have virtually the same jurisdiction and responsibilities as the above SSC. To date, practically all our work has been related to the SSC and only very recently has the House Select Committee (HSC) made any efforts to commence staffing.

As it appears, we can expect in the near future requests from the HSC similar to that already received from the SSC and in order to facilitate the administrative handling and retrieval, where necessary, of HSC requests and this Bureau's response to same, the code word "Houstudy 75" is being assigned to the control file (62-116464) containing all communications pertaining to the HSC and related matters.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

62-116464

(1) - 62-116395

TJM:mjc
(20)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 19 1975

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Bureau has been requested to again make available Newark office secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski for interview by captioned Committee and that the Department and White House had instructed that they not be made available until such time as the Committee decides to allow Bureau representatives to be present during interview.

By way of background, you will recall that these employees were released from the Employment Agreement and were made available for interview on May 20, 1975, by captioned Committee. However, the Department in objection stated that they were desirous that a Bureau representative be present during the interview. The topic of the interview was to have been their duties and responsibilities during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Ultimately, neither the Department nor the White House could reach agreement concerning the interviews and the employees did not submit to interview.

On June 3, 1975, Michael Epstein, staff member of captioned Committee again requested these employees be made available for interview on June 5, 1975, at 10:00 a.m. The scope of the interview would be the responsibilities and duties performed during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

REC-100

62-116395-237

62-116395

17 JUN 18 1975

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-67-538691 (Personnel File Mary Ann Massa)
1-67-581180 (Personnel File M. Ann Mierzewski)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/2000 BY

MOR-16

PVD:lgp
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo from Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Epstein classified the interview as an "abuse" type and agreed to allow agents to be available but not present during interview.

On June 3, 1975, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, was advised of the request and of the fact that an agent could not be present during interview. He stated that the Department's position was that unless the Committee consented to allow Bureau personnel to be present, the interview would not go forth, and that he would advise Epstein and F. A. O. Schwarz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, of this decision.

Mr. O'Connor telephonically recontacted Special Agent Daly and advised that he discussed the matter with assistant to the Counsel of the President, James A. Wilderotter. Wilderotter told O'Connor it was the White House position that these girls should not be made available for interview unless the Committee allows Bureau personnel to be present. Wilderotter stated these two employees had been cited as examples wherein the White House felt interviews should not be conducted without representatives of the particular agency or Bureau being present as they are service personnel. According to Wilderotter, Schwarz agreed to this position.

O'Connor telephonically contacted Special Agent Daly on June 4, 1975, at which time he advised that he had discussed the interview with Schwarz, Epstein, and staff member Mark Gitenstein, and they would hold in abeyance the request to interview the employees pending a review of documents the Bureau is making available concerning 1964 Atlantic City Convention as stated in the Committee's request of ~~June~~ May 14, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD JBH/PVD

WRW/TWL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : V.V. Kolombatovic

SUBJECT: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum is to advise of the scheduled appearance, under oath, of former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague before the full Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., on 6/12/75.

On 6/4/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, U. S. Postal Service, advised Liaison Agent L.A. Crescioli that he was contacted this date by Mr. Montague who informed Jackson that he, Montague, was scheduled to appear before the full SSC on Thursday, 6/12/75. According to Jackson, Mr. Montague appeared to be very concerned about his appearance before this Committee. In fact, Montague requested that Jackson alert FBI Director Kelley to the fact that Montague will appear before this Committee. Montague did not indicate any specifics to Jackson as to why he was so concerned over his scheduled testimony before the Committee.

In the way of background, Montague was the Chief Postal Inspector from 1961 to the Spring of 1969, on which latter date Mr. William J. Cotter assumed the position of Chief Postal Inspector. Prior to 1961 Montague was the Inspector-in-Charge of the New York Division of the Postal Service. In the opinion of Mr. Jackson, Montague is a man of the highest integrity and most certainly is not involved in any wrongdoing. Jackson confidentially advised the Liaison Agent that it is his belief that Montague is so concerned about his appearance before the Committee because he may have to reveal certain agreements that prevailed in the past between the Bureau and the Postal Service concerning mail covers that have not been made public to date.

LAC:tdp ([illegible])

CONTINUED - OVER

94-585-40-53

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MOR-16

84 JUN 18 1975

Jackson added that he personally has no knowledge of what agreements or understandings between the Bureau and the Postal Service that may be divulged by Montague. He emphasized that Montague did not divulge such data to him.

In conclusion, Jackson stated that Montague is in a retired status and has just returned from an extended vacation in the Mediterranean area. Montague did inform Jackson that the Committee has authorized Montague to be accompanied before the Committee by personal counsel; however, Montague has decided that he will testify alone and without personal counsel.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

- Assoc. Dir. ____
- Dep. AD Adm. ____
- Dep. AD Inv. ____
- Asst. Dir.:
  - Admin. ____
  - Comp. Syst. ____
  - Ext. Affairs ____
  - Files & Com. ____
  - Gen. Inv. ____
  - Ident. ____
  - Inspection ____
  - Intell. ____
  - Laboratory ____
  - Plan. & Eval. ____
  - Spec. Inv. ____
  - Training ____
  - Legal Coun. ____
  - Telephone Rm. ____
  - Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 6/3/75

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

REC-102

- 116395 - 236X

14 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/lmf
MDR-16

Legal

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

450 Golden Gate Avenue
Box 36015
San Francisco, California 94102

June 3, 1975

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums,

Mr. Don Jones, the Senior Resident Agent of the FBI Resident Agency in Berkeley, California, has referred to me your letter of May 28, 1975 asking certain information concerning the FBI's operation in Berkeley, California.

Your letter has been referred to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for appropriate action.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Bates
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1417 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2661

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2490 CHANNING WAY, ROOM 202
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704
(415) 548-7767

201 13TH STREET, ROOM 105
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94604
(415) 763-0370

DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

May 28, 1975

Mr. Don Jones, Senior Resident Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P. O. Box 1033
Berkeley, California 94704

Dear Mr. Jones:

As you are aware, I have been concerned for some time about the nature of the Bureau's involvement in local law enforcement affairs. This concern has been heightened by my appointment to the House Select Committee to Investigate the U. S. Intelligence Community. In this light, I am requesting answers to the following questions concerning FBI activity in Berkeley:

1. What is the size of the contingent of agents in the Berkeley field office?
2. What are the functional responsibilities in the field office, and what are the percentages of agents involved in each, i.e., political, drug abuse, criminal, etc.?
3. What are the titles of the agents, and how do these relate to their involvement in category two?
4. What is the ethnic and sexual breakdown of the staff and agents in the Berkeley field office?
5. What are the interactions and working relationships between the field office, the Berkeley Police Department, the University of California Police Department, private security agencies and informers? How many informers are utilized by the field office?
6. Recent disclosures have raised serious questions regarding the Bureau's involvement in political surveillance activities of organizations and individuals over the past several years. What actions has the local field office taken to correct the abuses of these actions, and what political surveillance is being undertaken?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395-2318

7. I have read with interest of the Special Weapons and Tactics course given under Bureau auspices at the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Facility in Alameda County. I would appreciate your forwarding to me a description of the activities undertaken in this course, and the relationship of UCPD and BPD to the course. In addition, I would appreciate being provided any relevant information on SWAT that you have available.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

RVD/djc

6/3/75

AIRTEL AIR MAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 pvm/lmf
MDR-16

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Miller

REC-102 62-116395-236X

July 14, 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums:

This is in response to your letter dated May 28, 1975, sent to the Senior Resident Agent of the Berkeley, California, FBI Resident Agency.

To clarify your inquiries, it should be noted the Resident Agency at Berkeley, California, operates under the general supervision of the FBI's San Francisco Office.

There are currently nineteen Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley Resident Agency. All are white males. The function of a resident agency is to handle all FBI matters within its specific geographical territory. This includes criminal, security and applicant investigations. The FBI does not have primary jurisdiction regarding drug matters and does not conduct "political" investigations.

MAILED 7
JUL 15 1975
FBI

As a matter of policy, the FBI advises other governmental law enforcement agencies of matters coming to our attention which are within the investigative jurisdiction of those agencies. In some cases there is concurrent jurisdiction and a joint investigation may be conducted; however, local law enforcement agencies do not have access to FBI files. Representatives of private security agencies may be contacted from time to time in the course of discharging our official responsibilities just as any other citizens may be contacted. The FBI also utilizes the services of informants to develop information concerning matters within this Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; however, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss more specifically the number of such informants or the manner in which they are utilized.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JDM:lgp
(7)

WRW/TML

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

84 AUG 11 1975

As I have already indicated, the FBI does not conduct "political" investigations, nor do we conduct "political surveillances." We do, of course, have a responsibility for conducting domestic intelligence investigations authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential Directives and instructions of the Attorney General. These matters relate to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, and other activities involving the internal security of the United States. The policies relating to such investigations are not made on an ad hoc basis by individual Agents or individual offices, but conform with broad policy applicable to all offices.

The FBI offers a variety of courses of instruction for law enforcement personnel throughout the United States, including such subjects as anti-sniper and survival training and special weapons and tactics, commonly known as "SWAT". The basic purpose of this training is to provide well prepared teams capable of resolving highly dangerous situations with a minimum of risk to innocent bystanders, the law enforcement personnel involved and the subjects of the investigation.

Enclosed is a newsclipping describing some of the training of our own personnel in this field. The article appeared on June 1, 1975, in the "Washington Star News."

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosure

NOTE: The information concerning the Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley, California, Resident Agency was furnished by ASAC Druken, San Francisco.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: June 3, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

SUBJECT: ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. A. Mintz 4/11/75 recommended that a draft of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of the captioned Committees be coordinated with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other appropriate members of the intelligence community.

On 6/2/75 the draft Memorandum of Understanding was discussed by SA L. F. Schwartz with Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, who advised that the draft had been reviewed by CIA and by the Security Committee on behalf of the intelligence community. They requested that the draft be revised in order to recognize the need for certain Staff Members to be cleared for access to compartmented information (a procedure already being followed by the Church Committee) and the desire of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that it be made clear that the DCI will only offer his advice upon the request of the Committee Chairman and that in all cases the final determination as to clearance is the responsibility of the Committee Chairman.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Attached is a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the changes proposed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore which changes are underscored. Both Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church.

REC-100

62-116395
Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-236

LES:ekw
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 am/mk

JUN 18 1975

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

MDR-16

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ACTIVITIES
62-116395

RECOMMENDATION:

If the attached revised draft is acceptable to the Bureau, it will be provided to the Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Congressman Nedzi. In accordance with opinion expressed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, a copy will not be furnished to Senator Church.

WVC

PLM

LET TO A.G.
ENCL. LHM FOR HSC
6/12/75 HFS: dmt

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information, in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI willffurnish a summary memorandum containing therresults of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2026 BY SP2[illegible]/mf
MOR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-256

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters, Jr.

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 3/12/75, and my memorandum, 3/25/75, both captioned as above.

By referenced memorandum dated 3/12/75, Legal Counsel recommended that the Intelligence Division (INTD) discuss with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other members of the intelligence community procedures for clearing staff members of captioned committees for access to classified information when questions as to the individual's trustworthiness have arisen in the course of the FBI's background investigation. Following such discussions, Legal Counsel recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding concerning these matters be prepared by the INTD which might be used by both Senate and House Committees.

By memorandum 3/25/75, the INTD submitted for approval a draft of a proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for staff members of captioned committees. Special Investigative Division disagreed with several features of our draft memorandum and has prepared a revised memorandum, which is attached for approval.

The INTD has coordinated this matter with the Special Investigative Division and interposes no objection to the text of the revised memorandum; however, it is suggested that consideration be given to adding the words "by the FBI" at the end of paragraph five on page one. Paragraph five, thus modified, would read: "Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI."

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116

Enclosure

AFW:dsh
(7)

ENCLOSURE

REC-100
JUN 18 1975

62-116395-235

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM 197 SEE PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPd ALM/JMF
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Mintz
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Discussions of this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community have been held in abeyance pending approval within the FBI as to the text of the proposed memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, that attached revised memorandum be coordinated by the INTD with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community prior to review by the Attorney General and transmittal to Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi by Legal Counsel Division.

Addendum

WVC

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division concurs with the general thrust of the memorandum of understanding, however, it is suggested the following wording be added where indicated:

Page 1, paragraph 3, insert after the word applicant, or employee. On line 2, change "applicant's" to read "person's".

Page 1, paragraph 4, after the word determined insert by the respective Chairman,.

Page 2, paragraph 1, after the word necessary insert by the Committee,.

Per

JMA

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information. ①

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant (OR EMPLOYEE) the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the PERSON'S ~~applicant's~~ suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined BY THE RESPECTIVE CHAIRMAN to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI. ②

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395-235

ENCLOSURE

The DCI will furnish his observations as to eligibility for access to classified information to the appropriate Committee Chairman for his consideration. The Committee Chairman will render the final determination after consultation, where it is deemed necessary, BY THE COMMITTEE, with the interested agencies.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. Adams memorandum to Mr. Callahan dated 3/7/75, captioned as above, copy attached, reported our conversation with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi.

As indicated in Mr. Adams' memorandum, Congressman Nedzi asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI, and the House Committee concerning investigative and clearance procedures for members of the Committee's staff. It appeared appropriate to us to coordinate a memorandum of understanding to be drafted for the House Committee with that to be drafted for the Senate Committee. Therefore, following our return from the meeting with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi, I called Bill Miller and advised him of the request made by Congressman Nedzi for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding. I asked him whether it would be possible for us to coordinate the language of that memorandum with the understanding that it will be drafted for use by the CIA, other members of the intelligence community, and the Church Committee. Mr. Miller said that the proposal to coordinate the memorandum was completely acceptable to him and he requested that the draft memorandum being prepared for Congressman Nedzi be furnished him for review and possible adoption as the memorandum to be used by the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division discuss this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community and prepare a draft memorandum of understanding that may be used by both House and Senate committees.

Bufile 62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

62-116395-

JUN 18 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 alm/lmc

MOR-16

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Wannall to Mintz memo 4/9/75 received

memo Wannall to Mintz 4/11/75 AFW:dsh

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

On 3/7/75 Mr. Mintz and I called on Senator Church and his staff director, Bill Miller, to further discuss the procedures for investigating and clearing staff employees of the Committee, particularly where information might be developed raising a question as to the propriety of a clearance. It had previously been approved that the FBI would conduct the background investigations, furnishing the results to Senator Church, and after his determination that the individuals met the required criteria for access to classified information he would notify CIA of his determination and intent to employ the individual involved, at which time CIA would grant the necessary clearance based on the certification by Senator Church.

In discussions between CIA and FBI representatives, we raised the question as to whether CIA would review the results of the investigation prior to granting clearances and CIA representatives indicated they did not intend to and were reluctant to inquire of Senator Church as to whether they could be furnished the results of any investigations involving derogatory information.

In discussing this matter with Senator Church, I inquired whether he had any objection to our bringing to the attention of CIA any questionable cases in order that CIA representatives, who have the responsibility of granting the actual clearances, would be in a position to advise and counsel with Senator Church on those individual cases. He had absolutely no objection to this and, in fact, felt there should be an open communication between FBI, CIA and his Committee to insure that no one was appointed and cleared who did not measure up in every respect from a security standpoint.

I discussed with him the particular case of Stanley Rawson Sloan, the results of which I had brought for delivery to Senator Church. Sloan was

Wannall to Wait, [illegible] 4/1/75.

REC-100
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-234

SEE

17 JUN 18 1975

JBA:ams
(5)
1 - Mr. Cleveland 1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

CONTINUED - OVER

formerly employed by CIA and resigned in December, 1974, after his clearance for sensitive compartmented information had been lifted as a result of his marrying an alien. This marriage would not preclude him from clearance for access to lesser degrees of sensitive material but only for the more sophisticated clearances. Mr. Miller advised that Sloan had not been appointed and was not going to be appointed because of other reasons unrelated to a security clearance.

Senator Church indicated that he felt it would be wise to prepare a memorandum outlining our security clearance procedures and his staff would be glad to prepare such a document.

Following the meeting with Senator Church, Mr. Mintz and I dropped by to see Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the House Committee, and delivered to him Mr. Kelley's letter congratulating him and offering him our complete cooperation. Chairman Nedzi stated that he was very appreciative of this offer and would consider Mr. Kelley's request to confer with him as an open invitation and as soon as things had shaken down he would be in touch with us.

We discussed with him the investigative and clearance procedures we were following with the Senate Committee and Chairman Nedzi agreed the same procedures should be followed with his Committee, including our making available to CIA any derogatory information which might be pertinent to a clearance determination. At first, he suggested that we send the results of our investigations to CIA before coming to the Committee but then concluded that it would be more appropriate for them to come to him first since some of the applicants under consideration would probably not be appointed. He specifically asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI and himself.

I asked Mr. Nedzi whether he felt the formulation of his Committee would serve to trim down the number of requests for information being received from various House committees and it was his opinion that it would help in some instances; however, in others committee chairmen would pursue their own inquiries. He personally did not feel he had the clout nor the desire to try to preempt this area entirely for his Committee. He also stated he felt that CIA's problems had in the main been fully exposed and would soon be

CONTINUED - OVER

of less concern, whereas the concern over domestic security policies of the FBI would undoubtedly be greater in the future. He expressed his appreciation for our cooperation and indicated he was striving for a responsible approach to the inquiry.

Following the meeting with Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Mintz and I agreed that it would be best for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding concerning the investigative and clearance procedures for both Committees in order to try to insure uniformity, and Mr. Mintz will get in touch with Bill Miller to seek his concurrence in that regard. Our efforts will be coordinated with CIA and the proposed memorandum as drawn up will be submitted for the Director's approval.

ACTION:

Information only.

CONTINUED - OVER

94th CONGRESS
1st Session

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. Church

May 21, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration
June 5, 1975
Reported without amendment
June 6, 1975
Considered and agreed to

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2006 BY SP2alm/bmf
MDR-16

REC-100

62-116395-233

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 18 1975

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21, 1975

Mr. CHURCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. CANNON, without amendment

Senstudy 4-75

JUNE 6, 1975

Considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

V

Re
62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-28-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated 5-22-75 you were advised that former SA Robert Nichols had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee, at which time Seidel attempted to arrange an interview of Nichols. Nichols was advised by Deputy Assistant Director Jack E. Herington of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 pertaining to Departmental approval prior to furnishing information from Bureau files. He was also reminded that he had signed an employee agreement with the Bureau agreeing to maintain confidentiality of the information contained in Bureau files. He was advised if he requested, the Bureau would make available a representative to accompany him should he be interviewed by the Committee.

Former SA Nichols telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 5-28-75 and advised he had been recontacted by Mr. Seidel. Seidel requested and Nichols agreed to travel to Washington, D. C., on the morning of 5-30-75 for an interview at the Committee's offices. Nichols stated that Seidel indicated the scope of the interview would be concerning Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether this was to be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an executive session of the Committee. He stated he was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the Bureau make available a representative so that Nichols may consult with him during the interview if need be.

62-116395-232

EX-105 REC-20 JUN 6 1975

Mr. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted by Nichols as being his private counsel but that the Agent would assist Nichols in making determination whether a specific question should be responded to or whether a response could properly be declined because an answer might compromise a source,

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Personnel File 67-414885
(Former SA Robert Nichols)
1 - Mr. Hotis

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

sensitive investigative technique, divulge information furnished the Bureau by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources or adversely affecting an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Mr. Nichols that if he so desires, he could, of course, obtain the services of private counsel. He indicated it was his intention to arrive in Washington Thursday night, 5-29-75. He was requested to appear in the Office of Legal Analysis, Room 4513, at approximately 8:15 a.m. on the morning of 5-30-75 so that arrangements might be made to brief him by the Office of Legal Analysis and subsequently by the Intelligence Division. Nichols stated he would do so.

The Office of Legal Analysis is attempting to obtain from Committee representatives further information as to the circumstances and exact time of interview of Nichols.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Intelligence Division representative be made available to accompany Nichols to his interview with captioned Committee.

2) That Nichols be released from his employment agreement to respond to questions concerning our investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters.

PVD JBH/PVD

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Hotis

On May 27, 1975, James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, requested me and representatives of other agencies interested in the arrangements concerning interviews of witnesses by the Senate Select Committee to confer with him and Roderick Hills at 2:30 p.m. that date at the White House. Mr. K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Inspector John B. Hotis and I represented the Department and the FBI. Roderick Hills and James A. Wilderotter represented the President's counsel; Bob Andrews represented the Defense Department; John Warner, General Counsel, CIA; Roy Banner, General Counsel of NSA, and Mr. Hyland from State Department as well as John Clark, Deputy to the Director of CIA, attended.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the latest version of proposed procedures to be followed by the Committee staff investigators during interviews of former and current employees. Roderick Hills presented a document (copy attached) which he described as a counteroffer by Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee. He called for general discussion of the document after indicating that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Schwarz at lunch on May 27th and felt that it was a workable document. I pointed out to Mr. Hills that the document provides that there would be notice to the agencies of the identity of witnesses at reasonable time prior to interviews or taking of sworn testimony except where "the committee or its appropriate delegee" determines that prior notice should not be given. I told him that I was concerned that that provision would be used by the Committee staff to permit individual staff investigators to make that determination and I was confident they would do so.

EX-105

REC-20 62-116395-231

ENCLOSURE

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (7)

7 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ALM/DMF
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Mr. Hills was reluctant to seek a modification of the language indicating that he had an understanding with Mr. Schwarz that the authority would be limited to the senior counsel and to members of the Committee. I told Mr. Hills I would request that the language be modified in writing so that the authority would be conferred on specific representatives of the Committee to avoid having staff authority which I thought would be abused. Mr. Hills finally agreed that the language would be modified so that the authority would be available only to both Committee senior counsel and/or a combination of senior counsel and a Committee member. Further, the language would be modified to require that the determination that an agency would not be given prior notice of a pending witness interview would be recorded in writing for the Committee's records.

I asked Mr. Wilderotter and Mr. Hills whether this agreement was to be made between the staff and the agencies or whether it in fact would be accepted by the Committee. After some discussion, we were advised by Mr. Hills and Mr. Wilderotter that the document would be submitted to the full Committee for their approval and incorporated into the Committee's records.

I pointed out that I believed it was necessary for the understanding to be made between the Committee and the Executive in order for there to be some basis for restraining Committee staff investigators who may not be inclined to follow the rules.

Other proposed changes discussed would require the Committee representative to furnish to a witness a copy of the Committee's rules which includes advice concerning the right to counsel and a copy of the proposed guidelines for witness interviews.

I recommended that the guidelines be expanded to address the problem of existing secrecy agreements with former and present employees and the procedural problem involved in Attorney General Order 501-73 which requires prior Departmental approval in order for a witness to respond to a subpoena. As a result, Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28, 1975, that he would recommend the addition of a sentence in the opening paragraph that would indicate the guidelines would not be understood to impair the constitutional rights of individual witnesses, agency agreements with employees or former employees, existing Departmental orders or the Committee's own rules.

CONTINUED - OVER

Other minor changes were considered and an effort will be made to correct the language so that the agencies will be obliged to make reasonable efforts to comply with all Committee requests instead of being required to furnish "all information" absolutely.

Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28th that the comments described above will be discussed with Frederick Schwarz in an effort to finally resolve this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLn

Source: Hills 5/27

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

It is hoped that these voluntary guidelines will permit the Select Committee investigation to proceed without undue delay, but it is also recognized that these guidelines do not cover all points or anticipate all problems and that, therefore, either the Select Committee or some agency under investigation may have reason not to follow these suggested guidelines.

Also, it is recognized that this outline is without prejudice to the respective legal positions of the agencies and the Select Committee as to the production of specific information by way of documents or testimony. Not to impair Const. rights of ind. witness, agency rules or agreements, comm. rules.

A. Classification of Interviews/Preliminary Testimony

The parties to this investigation by the Select Committee recognize that interviews/preliminary testimony to be conducted by the Committee staff will generally be of two separate and distinct natures.

(1) Those primarily seeking information concerning (A) the overall structure and functions of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; (B) the substantive work being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; and (C) the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-231

des 1 '79. comm

(2) Those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

An agency representative will be present, as a general rule, at interviews/preliminary testimony in the first category for the purpose of assisting the Committee's investigation and facilitating the protection of information important to the national interest which is pertinent to the investigation. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews/preliminary testimony in the second category. The parties recognize, however, that for special reasons exceptions can be made in either case: i.e., when good reason exists, endorsed by the Select Committee, agency representatives may not be present for interviews/preliminary testimony falling under the first category, and for good and sufficient reason the agency may [seek to] have a representative present in the second category subject to the approval, of course, of the Select Committee.

B. Procedures to be Employed in Category (2).

When the Select Committee has identified a specific subject as a potential abuse or impropriety and has so notified the agency involved of its designation, that agency will, subject to the second sentence hereof, make [every effort] to provide the Select Committee

with all information and materials that it has on the subject. There will be a mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate.

In abuse or impropriety interviews/preliminary testimony, the following procedures will prevail.

(1) Witnesses will be identified to the agency a reasonable time prior to interviews or taking sworn testimony. This general rule includes current employees, former employees or others who have or have had a relationship with the agency.

Exceptions

Written record
of conv.

A. Where the Committee or its appropriate delegee ~~by written doc~~ stet believes that prior identification of a witness could adversely affect the witness' willingness to be interviewed or to be forthcoming, or could otherwise hinder the investigation, such prior notice ~~by written authorization~~ will not be given, but in such cases the agency shall be given a general indication of the points or areas to be covered to the extent that is feasible without undercutting the reason for not providing prior notice in the first instance. Delegees shall consist of both Comm. senior counsel or a comb of senior counsel and committee member.

B. In certain cases, the Committee might notify the agency, if the agency agrees not to contact the witness before his appearance. The agency could identify for the Committee special security matters concerning prospective witnesses and provide information on how to locate a witness.

(2) When the Committee contacts a witness, it will explain the security and other arrangements between the Committee and the agency, as well as serve the witness a copy of these ground rules and a copy of the Committee rules. If the witness wishes to consult with the agency prior to his appearance, the Committee will not discourage or seek to interfere with that desire in any way and will help the witness contact the agency representative.

(3) Whenever they are not present at interviews or the taking of sworn statements, agency representatives will be available for consultations regarding the handling of special security matters.

(4) Whether or not an agency has notice of an interview or sworn statement, the Committee will inform the agency of the general substantive points covered as soon as possible thereafter, unless disclosure of the substance of a particular interview would make discernible the identity of a confidential source. In such cases, the Committee shall, to the extent feasible without undercutting that decision, notify the agency in general terms of the points or areas covered, and the fact that it has interviewed a witness on such matters.

(5) Whenever an agency receives prior notice of a particular interview or taking of a sworn statement, it will also be notified

of the general subject areas and periods of employment in which the Committee is primarily interested. The agency will then check the subject's personnel history file and advise the Committee of any exceptionally sensitive aspects of the subject's employment or activity which require special handling.

(6) If because of concern about security of sensitive information, a witness feels unable to give a responsive answer to a particular question, the witness shall so indicate to the interviewer. The questioner and witness may then consult with the agency representative with respect to an appropriate response which will facilitate the provision of pertinent information and its protection. These matters should be worked out forthwith and ordinarily before the close of the interview/testimony session.

(7) The Committee is responsible for providing special handling of interview notes and other working notes in a manner which will protect sensitive material. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee will consult with the agencies concerned regarding the appropriate disposition of any such notes which have not been destroyed following the preparation of finished Committee documents. The agencies will indicate which of these notes it feels are too sensitive to be stored under the Archives

arrangement being established for the general disposition of the Committee's working papers and non-public reports.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

SSC FOREIGN TRAVEL

The CIA was informed by Senator Walter F. Mondale, a member of the SSC, that he intended to travel to Europe to inspect some of the CIA covert intelligence sites in Norway and other locations. The White House, and particularly Mr. Roderick Hills, was very concerned about this type of trip feeling that it could cause all sorts of problems with friendly foreign intelligence services and possibly result in a discontinuance of agreements between CIA and some of the friendly foreign intelligence services. Mr. Colby felt that such trips had been arranged for in the past involving congressmen and that some good came out of such trips. The Committee discussed the pros and cons of the contemplated trip by Mondale and possibly Senator Gary Hart, also a member of the SSC, and decided that the purpose and procedures for such trips would be discussed with Senator Church by Mr. Colby and a senior official of the Department of State.

JFK (1)(C) (S)

JFK (1)(C) (S)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The SSC has asked Colby for detailed briefings as to how National Intelligence Estimates are prepared by the United States Intelligence Board for the NSC. Colby contemplates giving a rather detailed briefing to the SSC on this procedure accompanied by several senior officials of the Intelligence Community Staff.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

to RWW

I recommend that we confirm this by letter to Senator Church. I have been unable to find any other documentation that it was accepted by the Committee.

agreed

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

TO : MR. BOARDMAN DATE: January 22, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.

Project Hunter - Policy
Hunter Project Policy
June
[illegible] 200 Policy

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

(S)

On January 10, 1958, Harry Stone of MI-5, Liaison Representative with the Bureau, confidentially advised that his Service had determined that Soviet illegal agents all over the world, when they want a meet with their principal, are under instructions to send a proper communication to "K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R." Mr. Stone stated (S) that the aforementioned information was being made available to the Bureau and the RCMP only.

On the basis of this information, we immediately instructed the Washington Field and New York Offices to institute confidential inquiries with appropriate Post Office officials to determine the feasibility of covering outgoing correspondence from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R., looking toward picking up a communication dispatched to the aforementioned address.

On January 21, 1958, SAC Powers of the New York Office called advising that his preliminary inquiries at first disclosed that such coverage could possibly be effected at LaGuardia Airfield. Powers stated that he subsequently received a call from the Chief Post Office Inspector who told him that he would not be able to make such arrangements and explained that something had happened in Washington on a similar matter and that Bureau Headquarters should take up the matter with Post Office Headquarters here in Washington. The Post Office Inspector said that it did not involve our agency and because of what was going on in Washington at the present time, he just couldn't do it on his own.

Almost simultaneous with this advice, Mr. James Angleton of CIA approached our Liaison Agent, Sam Papich on a personal basis. He indicated that if it were known within CIA that he was volunteering this information to the Bureau, he would lose his job. Mr. Angleton stated it had come to the attention of CIA, through the Post Office, that we were making inquiries concerning the coverage of mail to the U.S.S.R., and as a result CIA was expecting to receive an inquiry in Washington from the FBI. Mr. Angleton then admitted that this coverage was one of the biggest and most secret operations being conducted by CIA. He stated the coverage is actually made through the Post Office in New York

WAB:hmm
(5)

cc: 1 - Boardman
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan

105-93089-1

REC-94

SECRET

FEB 20 1958

273-10070

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

10/26/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/clj
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6
MDR-16

SECRET

and in view of the volume of material being sent from the U.S., their coverage is an extensive and expensive operation. He indicated that they had to set up an elaborate array of IBM machines to tally and tabulate the results. In addition a complicated indexing procedure was involved, as well as complex scientific examinations of the material. He said two or three hundred CIA employees are exclusively engaged on various facets of the coverage. Angleton also indicated that the cost of the operation was well over a million dollars a year. He further indicated that the coverage has been in existence in excess of a year and he stated that the sole purpose for the coverage was to identify persons behind the Iron Curtain who might have some ties in the U.S. and who could be approached in their countries as contacts and sources for CIA. Angleton indicated that CIA had successfully developed several sources through this means. He stressed the confidential nature of his information and stated that while other officials of CIA more directly concerned with the coverage were expecting a visit from the FBI, he was passing this along for our guidance.

It would appear that our inquiries of the Post Office officials in New York have flushed out a most secret operation of CIA. The question immediately arises as to whether CIA in effecting this coverage in New York has invaded our jurisdiction. In this regard, it is believed that they have a legitimate right in the objectives for which the coverage was set up, namely, the development of contacts and sources of information behind the Iron Curtain, and according to Angleton they have had some success in this regard. At the same time, there is an internal security objective here in which, because of our responsibilities, we have a definite interest, namely, the identification of illegal espionage agents who may be in the United States. While recognizing this interest, it is not believed that the Bureau should assume this coverage because of the inherent dangers in the sensitive nature of it, its complexity, size and expense. It is believed that we can capitalize on this coverage by pointing out to CIA our internal security objectives and holding them responsible to share their coverage with us. Of course, we are not interested in the identities of the numerous persons in this country legitimately corresponding abroad. The Post Office has indicated there are approximately four thousand items of correspondence to the (U.S.S.R.) each day. Angleton said they have not come up with a microdot or secret message communication as yet.

ACTION:

SECRET

1. On the basis of our inquiries conducted in New York, we are in a position and should, through Liaison, approach CIA, informing them that it has been indicated that their Agency has coverage of mail going to the (U.S.S.R.) We should get from them the details of their coverage and explain our interest in being furnished with the results of the coverage as it might effect internal security matters

2. It is believed that we can and should furnish CIA with the name and Moscow address furnished us by the British, telling CIA that we want to (S) be advised of any communications going to that address. We will not explain to them our interest in the particular address and, therefore, we will not be violating the confidence of the British. (S)

3. In view of the highly sensitive nature of this coverage, we will have to work out arrangements so that knowledge of it is strictly confined within the Bureau. We will handle this the same as [illegible] handle communications intelligence data.

OK

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 6, 1958

~~JUNE~~

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6
10/24/00

SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

Tolson	
Nichols	
Boardman	
Belmont	
Mohr	
Parsons	
Rosen	
Tamm	
Trotter	
Nease	
Tele. Room	
Holloman	
Gandy	

Reference my memo of 1-27-58 advising of the briefing given our Liaison Agent by CIA representatives on 1-24-58 as to the nature and extent of CIA coverage of mail going to and coming from (Russia). Our Liaison Agent determined that CIA began this coverage approximately a year and a half ago through confidential arrangements made with postal authorities. Initially, this coverage involved photographing of envelopes; these envelopes were not to be opened. The envelopes were microfilmed and the names and addresses appearing thereon were indexed with IBM equipment. Several months ago CIA began opening some of this mail, microfilming the contents and indexing pertinent data therein. Approximately 250,000 names have been indexed by CIA. Examination of certain of this mail for microdots and secret writing has been made to a limited extent because the volume of mail has been too numerous for the establishment of a practical system without delaying movement of the mail. CIA has advised that to date it has not discovered any microdots or secret writing or information revealing evidence of Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. CIA has also advised that this program has not reached its full potential, but that its system of opening mail is rapidly increasing. CIA has expressed a willingness to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we feel would be of interest to us.

An analysis has been made of CIA capabilities as revealed to the Liaison Agent and it is believed we should request that CIA furnish us information of the following types, both that which has been received in the past and that which they will obtain in the future:

1) All correspondence of a suspicious nature, such as that containing double talk, et cetera.

2) All correspondence indicating that the (Soviets) may be utilizing a hostage situation, i.e., correspondence indicating pressure being exerted on (Soviet) citizens who have close relatives in the U.S. or pressure being exerted on individuals in U.S.

3) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating weaknesses or dissatisfaction on the part of any Soviet presently in the United States so that the Bureau might give consideration to feasibility of approaching such individuals for defection or double agent purposes.

(105-93089-4)

4) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating Soviet control or direction of the Cp, USA.

APL:DEM:mn (9)

cc - Messrs. Boardman Belmont
Branigan Litrento
Baumgardner JDDonohue
Papich Turner

REC- 94

EX-135

10 FEB 20 1958

SECRET

55 FEB 27 1958

SECRET

Belmont to Boardman (2-6-58)
re: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.

With regard to the above coverage, it is believed desirable that Liaison make arrangements for us to review at CIA any material of this nature and we will then select that which appears to warrant investigation and then make appropriate checks. This procedure will eliminate having CIA sending us a bunch of worthless material with the possible expectation that we will be running out leads for them. It is believed this arrangement can be ~~worked~~ out with CIA in a proper fashion.

In addition to the above it is believed the following arrangements can be effected with CIA:

1) Place stops against names and addresses of individuals possibly presently engaged in Soviet espionage to determine if they are in correspondence with U.S.S.R. This would include a check of the back traffic on these individuals also. We would, of course, make these stops on a highly selective basis.

2) Request CIA to place stops against addresses in Soviet Russia believed by the Bureau to be mail drops or suspected mail drops. (It should be noted that we already have placed a stop with CIA against the name and address of K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R., which, according to information received from MI-5, is a drop utilized by Soviet illegal agents all over the world arranging emergency meetings.) (S)

We will, of course, continue to analyze this coverage by CIA to see that we obtain maximum benefits.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) That information received from this source be hereinafter designated as Bureau Informant 200. Records Section has advised that this informant symbol has not been previously used.

2) That this matter and any mail relating thereto be labeled "June" and then filed and maintained in the Sovme Unit, Room 1734 (the regular repository of "June" mail) to afford maximum security to this source.

3) That our Liaison Agent orally advise CIA of the type of data set forth above that would be of interest to us and make arrangements with CIA so that we can review this type of information in order to select that which we feel will warrant further investigation. Liaison should also perfect the arrangement with CIA so that on a continuing basis we can place appropriate stops with them.

SECRET

(1) CIA ADVISED RE TYPE OF DATA OF INTEREST TO US (2) ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO REVIEW INFO. (3) ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR STOPS

4) In view of the extreme sensitivity of this matter, a confirmatory memorandum will not be furnished to CIA

Rec 2/13/58

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY 502

6 February 1958

3-1
8-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: HUNTER Report #1

1. The intercept project that has been explained orally to Mr. Papich will be referred to as Project HUNTER in correspondence between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency.

2. This explanatory memorandum constitutes HUNTER Report #1. Future disseminations will be numbered consecutively.

3. In submitting possible traces on individuals of interest to you, reports will be submitted in the following form:

a. If the individual named in the intercept appears to be identical with the individual of interest to you, you will be furnished a reproduction of the exterior, and of the contents if the item has been opened.

b. If the individual named in the intercept is only possibly identical with the individual of interest to you, only machine run listing of the items will be submitted. In such cases a reproduction of the exterior and of the contents, if the item has been opened, will be available upon request.

4. In order to facilitate your reading of machine run entries, there follows an explanation of the various types of replies which you will receive in connection with requests. A hypothetical request for any addressee in the U. S. of mail from P. KROVAN whose location is believed to be in Moscow, might result in the following reply:

REC- 94

105-93089-3

EX-135

10 FEB 20 1958

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

Date	Name In	Ref	Loc	Name Out	Ref	Loc	Ban	Firms
A 57C05C3325	KROVAN, Paraskoviya	(*)	ABB	EVOSWA, Wasyl	( )	KM		

This reply has the following meaning:

"A" has no present meaning. All numbers are now preceeded by "A" only to allow for future additional classifications. None are presently contemplated.

"57C05"is the date of intercept, namely: "57" is the year. "C" indicates the month. The code key for months is set out as Enclosure 1. "05" is the day of the month. Thus, "57C05" is 5 March 1957.

The group "C3325" is our own internal filing number.

The "Name In" entry identifies the correspondent inside the USSR.

The asterisk in "Ref" column indicates that KROVAN sent the letter.

The entry in "Loc"(ation) column indicates the area or city inside the Soviet Union from which the letter was mailed. In this case it was mailed from the western section of Ukrainian SSR. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 2. This code key is to be used for all items prior to 1 January 1958, on which date a 4-place code was instituted in order to designate more precisely the localities within the USSR. A copy of this new code is enclosed as Enclosure 3.

The "Name Out" entry identifies the correspondent outside the USSR. In both the "Name In" and "Name Out" columns, the last or family name is listed first.

The absence of an asterisk in the "Ref" column after EVOSWA indicates that she is the recipient of the letter.

The entry in the second "Loc"(ation) column indicates the state of the U.S. (in this case, New Jersey) to which the letter was addressed. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 4. You will note that some 3-digit entries indicate large cities within a state, thus KO indicates New York State and KOA indicates New York City. For your convenience an alphabetical list of the states with their code indicator is set out in Enclosure 5.

The absence of an "X" in the "Ban" column means that the letter was not opened and that only the exterior is recorded in our files.

5. Since the hypothetical request was for mail from P. KROVAN, who is believed to be located in Moscow only the listing as set out above would be furnished, since it would not appear that Paraskoviya KROVAN, located in the western section of the Ukrainian SSR is identical. If in connection with future investigation or information otherwise available, you may believe that KROVAN may be identical with the individual of interest to you, you need reference only the HUNTER report number and request the exterior photographs of item No. A57C05C3325, which will be reproduced from the original film and made available to you.

6. If the hypothetical request is for any mail from the Soviet Union to Rose ESTERSON, who resides in Chicago, the reply might be as follows:

Date		Name In	Ref	Loc	Name Out	Ref	Loc	Ban	Firms
A57D23U	57D18	AVRUNINA, Vera	(*)	AAA	ESTERSON, Rose		KKB	X	

The difference in this listing from that previously illustrated is as follows:

"U" is our internal identifying designator. The first date is the date of the intercept. The second date is the date of the communication inside the letter. The "X" under the "Ban" column indicates the letter was opened. Again this indicator would indicate only a possible identification since KKB under "Loc" indicates California. In this instance upon request, identifying the HUNTER report number and referencing both A57D23U and 57D18 numbers, the outer envelopes and their contents will be reproduced and furnished to you.

7. Normal service of either of the above requests will be 24 hours. In an emergency we could service the request in a few minutes.

8. If your first request had been for KROVAN, or P. KROVAN, or Paraskoviya KROVAN located in the western section of the Ukrainian SSR you would have initially received the photograph of the envelope. Likewise, in the second instance, if your request had

been for ESTERSON, or R. ESTERSON, or Rose ESTERSON located in Chicago, or Illinois, you would initially have received photographed copies of the envelope and its contents.

9. In order to insure most efficient servicing of your request, it is suggested that you submit trace requests as follows: List the last name first with any known first and given names or initials, and address including state, city and street, if known. If an exact address is not known, a probable state or section will be helpful but is not required. The same would apply to the USSR. The above should be listed on duplicate 3 x 5 cards. If only a phonetic name is known, various combinations of spellings would be appreciated, together with any other data such as probable address or area. Where an address is known and there are individuals, other than the subject, at this address to whom the questioned communication might be addressed, their names should also be given. For record purposes and in order to facilitate our answers to your request, would you in turn number each card as HUNTER Request No. ________.

10. On each request will you also indicate whether the request is for a one-time check or whether the name should be put on the Watch List. If the latter, please indicate the duration of the Watch List, i.e. 30, 60, 90 days, or "until cancelled". If a Watch List is requested, you should also indicate the treatment desired when a possible hit is made, i.e. photograph outside only; photograph outside and contents; photograph outside, contents, and examine for S/W or microdots. Specifically indicate any Watch List item which should not be opened. In this connection you may also desire to give us a white list of correspondents of interest to you who are not Watch List subjects but whose mail should not be opened in the course of our normal openings for spot-checking for operational or intelligence information. In some instances you may desire to indicate that you are to be informed immediately when a hit is made and prior to the receipt of the letter by the addressee.

11. It is possible to make a special machine run of the names of all correspondents either addressor, addressee, or both, from any specific area in the USSR to the United States or to any specific state or city in the U.S., or vice versa. There are various other combinations that could be run, such as all letters mailed in Florida either on a specific date or for any given period. If the above-listed

or any other type of exploratory processing is desired, a presentation of the problem will enable us to tell you immediately what we can do, how long it will take, and the amount of work that is involved. While this type of service is possible, it does involve a great deal of work and should be requested in connection with very important cases only.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

J. Angleton
James Angleton JFK (1)(B)

Enclosures (5)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Litrento
1 - Schweppe

DATE: 4-21-58

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/21/02 BY [illegible]

Bureau Informant 200 is the symbol number designated for information furnished by CIA to the Bureau from its coverage of mail going to and from the USSR. This designation was approved in your memorandum to Mr. Boardman dated 2-6-58. That memo pointed out the willingness of CIA to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we felt would be of interest to us. That memo recommended that Liaison effect arrangements with CIA so that we could review information obtained from that coverage.

CIA is furnishing us with certain of the results of the coverage of Soviet mail under the caption "Project Hunter." Each report received is labeled with a report number, for example, Hunter Report # 19.

SF 100

The reports received are reviewed in the Sovme Unit. When the information fails to indicate which Section or Unit would have a logical interest in the report, the names involved will be searched for identifiable information. When we can locate no such information, a case will be opened if deemed warranted. The objectives of these investigations will be the identification of persons of pro-Soviet sympathies whose dealings with the Russians are of a security or intelligence interest, the identification of those individuals who might present logical "hostage" possibilities which could be exploited by the Soviets and the identification of any Soviet individual in the U.S. who has indicated weakness or dissatisfaction, a situation which the Bureau might exploit for defection or double agent purposes.

Investigations in the field would include a check of office indices and logical sources and informants in order to establish the subject's background, activities, sympathies and the strategic character of his employment. This could culminate in recommendations for interview to clarify certain points not established by investigation and to determine whether the present activities of the subject are inimical to the best interests of the U.S., provided available information does not dictate against such interview and provided the interview can be conducted without compromising Bureau Informant 200.

Information from Bureau Informant 200 would be forwarded to the field, personal attention SAC, utilizing the following or similar phraseology: "Information has been received from Bureau Informant 200

304

105-67845

HHS:cvg

(5)

58 MAY 8 1958

Branigan
All Supervisors
Espionage
[illegible]

REC- 11 105-93089-9

17

a most sensitive and reliable source, indicating that John Doe has been in direct contact with....." The contents of the Hunter Report should then be summarized as necessary and paraphrased. Following the reporting of information found in Bufiles on the subject, and instructions regarding the investigation to be conducted a paragraph as follows should also be added: "You are being cautioned that information obtained from Bureau Informant 200 is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau and should not be set forth in any investigative reports. Information from this informant should be utilized for lead purposes. only. You must avoid any statement concerning the scope of the coverage in effect in this instance and under no circumstances is the subject or any unauthorized person to become aware that we have knowledge of his contact with a person in Russia."

JFK

In those instances where an opened or closed case file on a person mentioned in a Hunter Report is located at the Bureau, the Hunter Report will be forwarded to the appropriate Section Chief or Supervisor for his information and any action he deems necessary. Said Supervisor might desire to advise the field in the manner described above or place a brief, paraphrased version of the Hunter Report into the subject's main file for information purposes.

JFK

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the extreme sensitivity of this source, the knowledge of the same is to be confined to a need-to-know basis. Therefore, within the Domestic Intelligence Division the Section Chiefs of the Nationalities and Intelligence Section, the Internal Security Section, and the Subversive Control Section will be advised of the above procedure for their personal information. All supervisors in the Espionage Section will also be informed of this procedure.

WMS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: March 10, 1961

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Parsons
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Belmont
Mr. D. E. Moore
Mr. Branigan
Mr. W. D. Stewart

SUBJECT: HUNTER P.
ESPIONAGE - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY

JFK (2)(B)

Hunter is CIA's sensitive project involving the review of mail going to the Soviet Union. CIA makes available to us results of their analysis relative to this project.

On 3-9-61 during a conference on Soviet illegal espionage activities between Special Agents Papich, Litrento, Duckett and ~~M~~ and Messrs. Angleton, Horton and Hunt of CIA, we were advised that CIA has now established a laboratory in New York in connection with this project which can examine correspondence for secret writing, micro dots and possibly codes. He said the laboratory is fully equipped and they would be glad to make its facilities available to us if at any time we desire an examination of this nature to be made in NYC and time was of the essence and would not permit the material to be brought to our Laboratory in Washington, D.C. We expressed our appreciation for the offer and said that in the event we desired to utilize their laboratory, we would contact them.

JFK (2)(B)

ACTION: For information.

DEM:td (7)

ERE 3/13

Another inroad!

SA S. J. Papich advised 4/19/61 that Hunter material will increase about 20% since NY Lab now established. WDA 4/21/61

JFK (2)(B)

EX-114

REC- 22

105-93589-25

7 MAR 23 1961

63 MAR 28 1961

0-14f (Rev. 10-16-70)

SECRET

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

March 10, 1972

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

BY CIA COURIER

ATTENTION: Deputy Director for Plans, [JAMES ANGLETON]

RE: [HUNTER PROJECT]

JFK

Dear Sir:

☐ 1. For your information, I am enclosing communications which may be of interest to you.

☐ 2. It will be appreciated if you will have the investigation conducted as requested in the enclosed memorandum and furnish the results.

☐ 3. No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter.

REC-50 [illegible]-46

☐ 4. You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection with this inquiry.

☐ 5. Please note change in caption of this case.

☐ 6. Status of case: ☐ Completed ☐ Incomplete

MAR 10 1972

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Enc.

[redacted]

Reference is made to your special notation on Hunter Report No. 27,226, Item 72A13AM. Attached is a list of types of traffic we would like to receive.

ENCLOSURE

97 MAR 1 1972

1

SECRET

[1 - M. E. Triplett]
[1 - W. O. Cregar]

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

March 10, 1972

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

We are in the process of reviewing the Watch List and will advise you of additions and deletions. The following types of traffic have been of assistance and continue to be of interest to us:

1. Current and former [Soviet] exchange students, visitors, researchers and scientists.

2. Current and former [Soviet] official visitors.

3. Current and former [Soviet] nonofficial visitors whose U.S. contacts are subversive, would be of interest to the [Soviets] because of their access to classified data or are in a position to be of assistance to the [Soviets.]

4. U.S. exchange students, researchers and persons who have been in the [USSR] with American exhibitions and delegations.

5. Current and former U.S. students and researchers in the [USSR] who do not come under official East-West Exchange Program. This does not include the short-term student tours but does include individuals who are in the [USSR] for some time. We would, of course, like to receive any traffic on individuals who are there for a short time if they have been sponsored by subversive organizations and subversive individuals or have received special invitations or special treatment from the [Soviets].

6. We have no interest in the hundreds of legitimate travelers who visit the [USSR] on regular tours or go to see relatives. We do have an interest in travel and contacts involving persons on the Watch List; known communists, New Left activists, extremists and other subversives; suspected and known espionage agents; individuals known to be of interest to the [Soviets] because of their specialized knowledge or work on classified matters; individuals who appear to have been compromised; and persons who meet with [Soviets] connected with organizations known to specialize in propaganda or in obtaining information regarding the U.S.

7. Communist Party and front organizations (such as [American Russian] Institute, National Council of [American-Soviet Friendship] and ["Ukrainian News"]), extremist and New Left organizations.

[105-93089
M.E.Triplett] [met^WOC]
(4)

(10 -9[illegible]-96)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[Original to CIA, Att'n James Angleton] by
CIA courier 3-10-72.

SECRET

8. Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committee and Women's Strike for Peace.

9. Communists, Trotskyites and members of other Marxist-Leninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalist and Liberation groups, Venceremos Brigade, Venceremos Organization, Weathermen, Progressive Labor Party, Worker's Student Alliance, Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union and other New Left groups. This would include persons sympathetic to the Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam and Red China. Far East

10. Cubans and pro-Castro individuals in the U.S.

11. Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies.

12. Contacts with the Soviet Red Cross, particularly those made or received by individuals.

13. Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad (contacts with emigres and emigre organizations in U.S.).

14. Traffic between U.S. nationals and aliens in the U.S. with individuals attending such institutions as the Central Komsomol School and Friendship University. This would include any aliens in the U.S. who have previously been in the USSR as students.

NOTE: Above sent in answer to special notation on Hunter Report 27,226, Item 72A13AM (105-67845-38542) reading as follows: "Your 30 October 1962 statement of HUNTER Project requirements does not cover contacts such as the one reflected in attached item. Please advise whether you wish to see traffic from U.S. nationals or aliens temporarily residing in the U.S. (e.g., foreign students) to relatives or friends studying at Friendship University or similar institutions. You may wish to take this opportunity to review, and possibly revise, your above-cited requirements statement." Subsequent to 10-30-62 memo, there have been several oral requests for other types (Items 1,2,3,12 and 14) and "Hunter" asked us if we desired information on New Left and Black Nationalist fields on 1-15-69 and we advised them that we did. They had made a similar inquiry regarding P.O. Boxes utilized by the Soviets by Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad. Hunter Report 27,226 was dated January 25, 1972, and transmittal letter was signed by James Angleton.

JFK

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

1-Mr. E. S. Miller
1-Mr. J. P. Lee
1-Miss M. E. Triplett

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: February 15, 1973

1-Mr. Branigan

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200] - POLICY

10/26/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/cj
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S. ✓
Mr. Purvis
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Ms. Herwig
Mr. Mintz
Mrs. Neenan

[Bureau Informant 200] is the symbol number designated for information furnished on a highly confidential basis by CIA and referred to by them as "PROJECT HUNTER."

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, Deputy Director of CIA, has an appointment to meet with Acting Director Gray on February 16, 1973. In this connection, at 5:50 p.m., on February 15, 1973, Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA, advised that the reason for General Walters' visit is to discuss PROJECT HUNTER. Specifically, General Walters will raise the question of the Bureau taking the PROJECT over. Angleton stated that Dr. Schlesinger, Director of CIA, had instructed Walters to meet with Mr. Gray prior to his, Schlesinger's, return from overseas planned for February 19, 1973.

Commencing in January, 1958, and continuing to the present time, the Central Intelligence Agency has furnished this Bureau with the product of its highly confidential review of mail going to and coming from the USSR. Arrangements for this review were obviously worked out between the Agency and Post Office officials and we are not privy to the details.

It is obvious that both incoming and outgoing mail is opened and photographed. At one time in March of 1961, we were advised that CIA had established a laboratory in New York where they could examine correspondence for secret writing, microdots, and possibly codes. At that time CIA offered to make these facilities available if we needed them. During the same approximate time, CIA advised that about 500,000 items per month passed to and from the [USSR] and about 200,000 of these items are screened. Approximately 1,200 items per month received "close scrutiny."

REC-49

22 FEB 27 1973

On February 15, 1973, Mr. James Angleton advised that at the present time, he has 9 of his people in Washington working on PROJECT HUNTER, and there are 2 additional personnel working in New York, for a total of 11. Presumably, all or most of these people have [Russian] language ability. Angleton further

File in [105-93089

EX-103

WAB:hke
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

advised that the U. S. Postal Service had raised a question as to CIA's necessity to continue PROJECT HUNTER in view of possible security problems within the Postal Service.

The Bureau has always handled PROJECT HUNTER material on a strict need-to-know basis. The material received is handled on one desk in the Domestic Intelligence Division where it is screened for items of possible investigative use and retention. Material of no interest is destroyed. HUNTER material can be only transmitted to our field divisions in paraphrased form and can only be used for investigative purposes. The material can never be incorporated in any communication which is intended for dissemination outside of the Bureau. HUNTER material that is retained is kept in a Special File Room in the Records Branch at the Identification Division Building. Periodically CIA has been furnished with general guidelines as to the material which would be of special interest to our needs. For example, we are currently interested in material concerning current and former Soviet exchange students, visitors, researchers, and scientists. (S) We are likewise interested in Americans who are in the USSR for an appreciable period of time. We are interested in American communists and other extremists who may be corresponding with persons in the USSR.

We have always considered the product from PROJECT HUNTER as valuable to our investigative interests. In this connection, it has provided us with the identities of Americans in contact with Soviet exchange students in the United States who offer some potential as informants regarding the Soviet students' activities. We know from highly confidential sources that a proportion of these students have already been recruited by one or the other of the major Soviet Intelligence Services. We know also that many of the exchange students will subsequently be posted to the United States in some official capacity. (S)

PROJECT HUNTER has identified numerous individuals from the United States and from other areas of the world in attendance at the Central Komsomol School and Friendship University. (S)

CIA has permitted us to furnish them the names of specific individuals in whom we have an investigative interest, and this has been valuable in covering their activities. The product from HUNTER has also been valuable in identifying Soviets who plan to and later visit the United States. (S)

SECRET

Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200]

The [Soviet Union] is currently building up the number of trade representatives who will be assigned in various areas of the United States where we normally would not have coverage. We anticipate that PROJECT HUNTER would be valuable in providing leads for any necessary coverage of these people. (S)

With the relaxation of tensions between the U. S. and the [USSR] the volume of correspondence has obviously increased. We do not currently know what that volume is. To the best of our knowledge, CIA has maintained this PROJECT smoothly and without hitch. It would be necessary to now examine what security problems the U. S. Postal Service is experiencing.

ACTION:

The above is submitted for possible use by the Acting Director for the visit of General Walters.

EM

G 11/2-16 9:10 P

[DDK/DmR3]

CONFIRMED WITH GEN.
WALTERS FOR 2:00 P.M
TUESDAY, 2-20-73

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY

SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200) - Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

C.D. Brennan
G.C. Griffith

JFK (c)(3)

On January 15, 1969 (Richard Ober) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's [Hunter project] for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. (Ober) admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The [Hunter project] for which we have given the designation of (Bureau Informant 200) essentially consists of [specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia.] If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the (Soviet Union) it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving (Bureau Informant 200) should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See (Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.))

File in 105-93089

REC 102

(105-93089 - 90)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - Liaison
1 - S. J. Papich

18 FEB 5 1969

SJP:clb
(6)

Stops not warranted on black extremists at this time
J E H 1/31/69

5 - Papich

58FEB 1 1969

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - W. A. Branigan
1 - A. P. Litrento

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: August 24, 1966

FROM : M. E. Triplett

1 - S. Papich
1 - M. E. Triplett

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200
JFK LAW 10(a)2
Hunter Project - Policy

ST

From 8-14-65 through 8-13-66, 3028 Hunter Reports transmitting 6077 items were received from Bureau Informant 200. This is a slight increase (almost 3%) in number of items over the previous year.

JFK 10(a)

Although items were received on a continuous basis, the number dropped during the period of August, 1965, through January, 1966. This is believed to be due to the reorganization, transfer of personnel and change in supervision over the Hunter Project at CIA which was taking place during this time.

JFK 10(a)

From February, 1966, to the present, there has been a marked increase in number of items received. The average for the past four months has been 627 per month, whereas the average for the same period last year was 421. There has been no significant change in the type of material except that more items are being received regarding subjects on whom the source has not furnished information previously, necessitating more research. The value of this material is shown by the fact that there was an increase of 53% in number of new cases opened on the basis of information furnished by the source.

Approximately 580 letters were written on information furnished by Bureau Informant 200 during the past year. This is an increase of approximately 9% over those written the previous year. More than 260 new cases were opened and 96 cases were reopened. The majority of new cases were opened on the basis of travel to the USSR and contacts of U.S. citizens, Latin Americans and Cubans in the U.S. with individuals in the USSR. Information was sent to the field to assist in pending investigations and for information. In some cases, data was extracted from several items, summarized and sent to the field in one communication under more than one caption to show relationships between various subjects.

An analysis of information received from the source during the past year is attached.

(105-93087-78)

EX-110 REC 5

ENCLOSURE

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

SEP 12 1966

Enclosure

Memo W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan 8/24/66
Appr'd

JFK(1)(B)

10-30-62

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

After an extensive review of 2500 Hunter Reports since our last memo captioned as above and dated 8/21/62, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project Hunter as it related to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense involved in the preparation of such material.

I Traffic Which Holds No Interest:

1. Soviet-bloc immigrants desiring to repatriate to USSR. These people are interviewed by INS and INS refers anything of interest to us.

2. Americans traveling to the USSR as such travel is permissible and several hundred people a year visit the USSR while on tour abroad as well as Soviets returning to visit relatives. We, of course, have an interest in such travel involving people on the CIA Watch List, known Communist Party members, and suspected intelligence agents.

3. U. S. professors in Academic Research corresponding with each other. It is not likely if U. S. professor is passing any data he would identify himself at the same time.

II Traffic of Specific Interest:

1. All data re Cuba. This serves to identify pro-Castro followers in the U. S.

2. All data re U. S. Cubans in contact with Cubans attending Friendship University in Moscow.

3. All material emanating from Puerto Rico of an Anti-U. S. nature and pro-Soviet.

4. Data re U. S. peace groups going to Russia and while in Russia.

5. Data indicating death of any U. S. Communist abroad.

6. Data re [redacted]

7. Any data on [redacted]

[illegible]

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

8. Any traffic from or to U. S. Students in Moscow or to U. S. persons who were former students in Moscow.

9. Any traffic between U. S. persons who are with a current exposition or a previous exposition in the USSR.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan WCS

DATE: 6/9/61

FROM : Mr. W. A. Branigan WAB

1 - W. C. Sullivan
1 - W. A. Branigan
1 - W. D. Stewart

SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200) - POLICY

JFK/CB1 Branigan

The purpose of this memo is to bring to your attention, as a matter of interest, the increase in the volume of Hunter Reports received from CIA, the additional administrative controls instituted to cope with increased volume, and lastly the desirable type of information (Bureau Informant 200) has been continually furnishing.

(Bureau Informant 200) is the symbol number designated for information furnished on a highly confidential basis by CIA and referred to by CIA as "Project Hunter" and the reports emanating from this project as Hunter Reports. This informant originated in 1/58 and furnished its first Hunter Report in 2/58. As of 6/6/61, we have received Hunter Report number 5005; many reports transmit as many as twelve items, and some reports transmitting up to twenty items. My memo to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated 12/5/60 revealed as of that date 3425 Hunter Reports had been received. You may be interested to learn that in the last seven months we have received 1680 Hunter Reports or almost 50% of the number received from 2/58 until 12/60. On 3/9/61 CIA advised representatives of this Bureau that it had recently established a laboratory in New York City in connection with this project. This laboratory is able to process Hunter material for secret writing, microdots and possibly codes. Our liaison representative advised the laboratory would probably increase the Hunter Report volume to us by 20%; however, from the above figures it appears this increase in volume is far greater than 20%.

A memo W. D. Stewart to W. A. Branigan 2/21/61 re captioned matter recommended and received approval for the utilization of a stamped notation on the front of the Hunter Report permitting the interested supervisor to destroy contents of a Hunter Report if found to be of no value after checking the appropriate block on the stamp indicating his reason for destroying same. Approval to destroy these Hunter Reports was received from CIA which can, if necessary, at a later date reproduce any Hunter Report. A memo from Mr. Belmont 3/3/61 to All Supervisors of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Internal Security and Subversive Control Sections instructed all recipients re use of above-mentioned stamp. In addition, above memo 2/21/61 received approval for a proceedure whereby Hunter Reports would be screened for destruction by substantative desk handling captioned matter prior to sending these reports to Records Section for handling to preclude any indexing or handling which would later be deemed unnecessary if report is destroyed.

(105-93089).

(WDS:slj slj

REC- 8

(105-[illegible]-27

25 JUN 14 1961

EX 101

A great deal of material furnished by the informant relates directly to contacts and activities of individuals who are of current interest to us such as top level communists as William Z. Foster and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and such espionage subjects as the Maurice Hyman Halperins, who were identified by Elizabeth Bentley, who stated Maurice Halperin was a source of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. The Halperins are now in Russia. Pertinent information relating to individuals of current interest is passed to the field for its intelligence interest. In addition, material is received which reveals the Soviet sympathies of some U.S. citizens and also indicates certain arrangements with the Soviets which may be considered against the best interests of the U.S. Government. The larger amount of data received tends to confirm information already known and it does not require in itself that the field be advised of same.

The informant furnished two specific Hunter Reports reflecting that two different individuals were sending post cards to USSR with another post card deliberately and carefully sealed to the first post card. In a case opened entitled "V. Podgoretsky, IS - R" (105-98499), the informant advised that both of the post cards forwarded by Podgoretsky contained a clandestine message on the inner side of the back post card. Investigations concerning James D. Cawthon, the former individual mentioned, and Podgoretsky are still in progress.

Typical data furnished by Bureau Informant 200 are set out below:

Information concerning travel plans abroad of several SM-C subjects; one namely, Martin Field (101-1019). Contacts in this country of Security Index (SI) subjects vacationing and studying abroad; namely, Mary Lou Patterson (100-136466). Data relating to a contact by Bernon Ferguson Mitchell with his mother in California. As you recall, Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin were employed at NSA a short time ago before they defected to Russia. Data that one D. C. Mac Donald, Jr. of Brighton, Massachusetts, requested publishers of the Soviet "Pravda" to forward to him old issues of that paper so he could distribute same to Americans in various cities here to improve their language skill and to acquaint them with the USSR. Data concerning numerous individuals who sent New Years greetings to Nikita Khrushchev and expressed their sympathies toward Soviet way of life; namely, Donald A. Sawtelle (105-15570), a New York SI subject. Data revealing a contact by John Peter Grothe (62-105833) with the Minister of Culture in Moscow requesting this individual to promise the Moiseyov dancers would perform in U.S. and also indicating to him he expected to visit USSR again in the near future. Grothe advised him that last year he worked for Senator Hubert Humphrey as a foreign relations advisor and did a lot of work in field of disarmament. He further indicated he was doing graduate work at Stanford but still served as a consultant to Senator Humphrey. Bufiles reveal one Victoria Ivanova Sandor (105-58070), a Russian-born alien and her husband John Sandor who is presently employed as an attorney in the Office of the Attorney General, State of Minnesota, are close friends of Orville Freeman, former Governor of Minnesota and present Secretary of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. The informant advised recently in regard to Victoria Sandor that she advised her mother in USSR she expected to move to Washington where her husband will work for Secretary of Agriculture, Freeman; that she and her husband will be friends of Freeman and President Kennedy; and that she hopes through these connections she will be able to obtain a necessary permit for her mother to come to the U.S. She indicated she will go to the President, to his wife, or to whomever it will be necessary to achieve this goal.

Information received from Bureau Informant 200 cannot be disseminated directly as it might tend to reveal this highly confidential source; however, the information is used to great advantage by the Bureau for its own intelligence at the Bureau and in the field. Investigations are opened on data furnished as above and if we can ascertain confirmation of same data from our sources in the field we can then appropriately disseminate pertinent information.

ACTION:

None, above data are furnished solely for your information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: 8/21/61

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

CLASSIFIED BY 5ℓ7 ~~[illegible]~~ 10/26/00
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

Reference is made to memorandum Stewart to Branigan 8/8/61 re same subject wherein it was requested a conference be arranged between Special Agents Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart and an interested CIA representative to explain to CIA specific type of "Project Hunter" material we desire. JFK CIA

On 8/17/61 Special Agents Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart, and CIA representatives, James Hunt, John Mertz and Thomas Chalmers conferred at CIA concerning the "Project Hunter." The observations set out on pages 2, 3, and 4 of the referenced memorandum were individually discussed with the CIA representatives. They appeared very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and were also pleased with the attention afforded it. Mr. Hunt, at the conclusion of the conference, requested we furnish a set of guides, similar to our afore-mentioned observations discussed, for his people. Attached is a blind memo for CIA setting forth material in which we have no interest and a specific interest.

JFK

In order to better understand the coverage of Bureau Informant 200, the writer specifically asked the following questions and received the following answers:

1. Is the informant covering all traffic or selected traffic?

Answer: Approximately 500,000 items pass to and from each month. Approximately 200,000 items are screened. The other 300,000 escape screening because they pass through at hours when no one is on duty. Of the 200,000 items screened, approximately 1,200 items receive "close" scrutiny.

2. What portion of the informant's coverage are we getting?

Answer: Of the 1,200 items closely scrutinized, we are receiving approximately 250 to 300 monthly.

ENCLOSURE

WDS:ct (4)
Enclosure
(105-93089)

REC-52

AUG 29 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SECRET

61 SEP 1 1961

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY
105-93089

3. Why are we getting specific type traffic, i.e., Exchange Students, Vladimir Kazakevich material (Kazakevich is a prolific letter writer now in USSR who was formerly a pro-Soviet economist living in the U.S.), and Intourist traffic (general data re arrangements for Americans traveling to Russia)? (S)

Answer: Exchange Student traffic ("Mother writes to son who is a Soviet-bloc exchange student in U.S. and sends family love" and vice versa. Letters are synopsized and are of no interest as such) has been sent because CIA is surveying a certain area of traffic. Mr. Hunt advised they derived no intelligence benefit from their survey and was interested to learn of our similar results. In regard to Kazakevich CIA develops a great deal of foreign intelligence data from material he transmits and receives. Mr. Hunt felt material would be of interest to us. He was advised we have derived nothing to date from this material as we are soley interested in the individuals involved and in order to protect this highly sensitive informant we do not route the informant's material around for general intelligence interest. Mr. Hunt was advised all of the informant's material is handled on a strictly need-to-know basis and the material retained is under strict control. Mr. Hunt was pleased in regard to our secure precautions as only a very few CIA people have any knowledge of "Project Hunter." In regard to Intourist traffic, Mr. Hunt advised we were furnished same because one of the individuals associated with an Intourist agency was suspected of being a Soviet intelligence contact. Mr. Hunt agreed with our observation that all Americans traveling abroad had to obtain a passport from State Department, such travel to the USSR being permissible, we could obtain any necessary data re an individual from State. (S)

In regard to item number three above, it was agreed we would not receive any more Hunter material re Exchange Students, Vladimir Kazakevich (who alone provided 300 items in 1960) and Intourist traffic. In addition "holiday greeting" type traffic will not be furnished. Specific exceptions to the above-mentioned traffic we will not receive are set out in our blind memorandum to CIA and were set out in the referenced memorandum on pages 2 and 3. (S)

SECRET

The matter of receipt of illegible material was also discussed and it was pointed out to Mr. Hunt no matter how important the contents may be if the name and address of the U.S. addressee or addressor is illegible the material is of no value. It was specifically requested more legible material be furnished and, if it was obvious reproduction would be poor, we would appreciate it if U.S. person's name and address could be printed or written out. Mr. Hunt advised they were aware of reproduction problem and stated Xerox equipment was to be installed in the near future. This, he believed, would help the problem.

In regard to the CIA Watch List, approximately 535 names now appear on this list which is supplemented each Monday morning. Mr. Hunt requested we specifically place on this list the individuals on whom we want coverage even though we are presently receiving items re these persons. If their names appear on the Watch List, we will possibly get closer coverage. Attached with the blind memorandum for CIA is a list of individuals presently on the Watch List which Mr. Hunt requested. Interested supervisors will be advised and additional names of Communist Party members now in Soviet-bloc countries will be furnished CIA via our Liaison Agent.

In regard to CIA's sampling of certain types of traffic and furnishing same to us, Mr. Hunt was requested to advise our Liaison Agent what it was doing and after a period of six months we would furnish the results of our observations which would dictate whether we would continue to receive this new type material.

Mr. Hunt desired that in regard to any correspondence with CIA wherein a reference is made to a Hunter Report or the Project Hunter in any way that the letter be sent via Liaison as only a few CIA people have any knowledge of "Project Hunter" and CIA does not want such letters in regular mail channels.

JFK
[illegible]

As pointed out in the referenced memorandum, the need for this conference was to insure the Bureau Informant 200 Program will continue to operate under maximum economy and efficiency to the mutual interests of CIA and the Bureau. It is believed as a result of the above conference that the Hunter material now received will be reduced approximately 50%.

SECRET

SECRET

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY.
105-93089

At the conclusion of the conference, Mr. Hunt and his aides who were obviously pleased with our observations requested a similar conference in approximately six months. SA Stewart will prepare an appropriate tickler in this regard and set same for 2/18/62, at which time a suitable memo will be prepared indicating observations which might be discussed and requesting permission to attend such a conference.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the three copies of the attached blind memorandum be furnished to CIA by our Liaison Agent as a guide to the Hunter traffic in which we have an interest.

(WDS) WAB

delivered to CIA 8/23/61 WDS

SECRET

SECRET

1 - Stewart

August 21, 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE...

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

10/26/00
CLASSIFIED BY SPZALINKLY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

JFK (S)(B1)

After an extensive review of 5600 Hunter Reports transmitting innumerable items, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project Hunter as it relates to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense of furnishing our Bureau this unwanted material.

I TRAFFIC WHICH HOLDS NO INTEREST:

1 - Intourist traffic (general data concerning arrangements for Americans traveling to Russia. Such travel is permissible and arrangements have been previously made through State Department for a passport. (S)

2 - Personal type letters, which have been translated into English, between the United States relatives, sweethearts, stamp collectors, and their Russian counterparts.

3 - Letters to and from Exchange Students, which again are synopsized in English and reveal that "Mother writes to son who is an Exchange Student in the United States and sends family's love," and vice versa. (S)

4 - No "holiday greeting" type traffic desired.

In regard to the above four categories, your Agency's laboratory processes all Hunter material for secret writing, microdots and possible codes and presently furnishes us its observations concerning anyone of these appearing in the traffic.

II EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABOVE FOUR CATEGORIES:

A. Any traffic in the above-mentioned nondesired categories wherein the translator feels there is some intelligence significance. Numerous letters have the translator's

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Malone ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Ingram ____

WDS:ct
(5)

SECRET

[illegible] - Bo[illegible] — 30

comments indicating your Agency's Watch List shows the person is a suspected intelligence agent or that the text of the letter indicates some type of code,, et cetera.

B. Any traffic wherein it is revealed United States addressee or addressor is a United States Government employee or is employed in a sensitive industry, i.e., missile field.

C. Any traffic wherein we have an obvious intelligence interest such as an open offer by an individual to assist Soviets, an indication an individual is going to Russia and wants to become a citizen or wherein any individual professes pro-Soviet or procommunist sympathies.

III. WE ARE SPECIFICALLY INTERESTED IN:

1 - All traffic relating to top communists traveling abroad which we have been getting regularly and from which we have been extracting a great deal of intelligence data such as Mary Lou Patterson, the Pittmans, William Z. Foster, Claude Lightfoot, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, et cetera.

2 - All traffic on specific individuals we place on the Watch List.

3 - All traffic on special individuals such as NSA defectors William Hamilton Martin and Bernon Ferguson Mitchell.

4 - All traffic of a clandestine type such as that in the V. Podgoretsky case.

IV

If possible, it would be appreciated if an effort could be made to furnish as legible a copy of Hunter material as possible. In particular, if it is evident paper from which copy is to be made is not type to give a good reproduction, it would be appreciated if a notation concerning name and address of United States recipient or sender could be made from original. Frequently, information of interest is received but United States person's name on reproduction is indistinguishable and information becomes of no value.

V LIST OF PERSON DESIRED ON THE WATCH LIST AS OF AUGUST 18, 1961

NAME	ADDRESS
BERLAND, MARK V.	Flat 15 Lasvinskaya St. 11 Perm 24, USSR
FOSTER, WILLIAM Z.	Apartment 6B, 1040 Nelson Avenue, Bronx, New York
HASKELL, ROY	12 Crown Street Brooklyn, New York
KAHN, ALBERT EUGENE	1302 Henno Way, Glen Ellen, California
KOVOLENKO, V. P.	General P. O., Kiev I, USSR
PECHTER, BERNARD DAVID	2161 Shattuck Avenue Berkeley, California
ROBERTS, HOLLAND DEWITTE	383 Hadonia, Palo Alto, California. During Week Days - 787 Castro Street, San Francisco, California
SUCHOBECK, ALEX (NMI)	1315 Lincoln Avenue, Pacific Grove, California

SECRET

Project Hunter

TRILUPAITIENE, ALDONA	131/14-1, Antakaenio Street Vilnius, Lithuania
TRILUPAITIS, LEONAS (also card on Leonas Algeda)	Apartment 1B, 104 Irvington Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/2/62

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Stewart

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

This is to advise you that on 10/31/62 representatives of this Bureau conferred with CIA representatives (James Hunt, John Mertz and Thomas Chalmers) at CIA concerning "Project Hunter." At this conference our observations concerning Hunter material furnished since our last conference on 2/13/62 were given CIA. In addition, we advised CIA specifically of certain Hunter items which were of no interest to us and of certain Hunter items which were of interest to us. These items were set forth in memorandum form and furnished to CIA; a copy of same is attached. JFK (1) (B)

CIA advised that its (Hunter-Don) coverage was being operated seven days a week until November 15. This concentrated coverage is for the purpose of determining if there is any illegal agent traffic. After November 15 all Hunter coverage can be expected to be reduced until after the Christmas mail rush has subsided. JFK (1) (B)

The CIA representatives were very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and with the attention afforded it by us. They are very cooperative in that they are willing to focus their attention on any particular phase of coverage we suggest for our own benefit. For CIA's interest we furnished them a copy of the attached memorandum of our analysis of typical information furnished by (Bureau Informant 200) of interest to us.

ACTION:

None. Above data furnished for your information.

WDS (WNB)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE [illegible] BY [illegible]

WDS:jes
(4)

(105-93089)

Enclosure

REC-35

(105-93089-54)

7 NOV 5 1962

ENCLOSURE

EX-118

65 NOV 9 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Sullivan~~
1 - ~~Branigan~~
1 - ~~Bland~~
1 - ~~Baumgardner~~
1 - ~~Donahoe~~
1 - ~~Stewart~~

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 8-25-61

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200-POLICY

On 8-17-61, a conference took place between Special Agents Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart and representatives of CIA in regard to Bureau Informant 200. As a result, CIA was recently furnished a guide as to Bureau Informant material we desire. This guide was prepared after discussion with several members of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Subversive Control, and Internal Security Sections. In addition, CIA was furnished a current list of names previously placed on the CIA Watch List by us. In this regard, the CIA representative advised that, although we are getting coverage on certain individuals, to insure we get complete coverage on each individual we desire it on, they should be specifically added to the Watch List. This Watch List is revised each Monday; therefore, any person not included on this list at present can be included by forwarding a routing slip anytime to W. D. Stewart, Room 644 RB, bearing the individual's name, his address in U.S., and indicating the period coverage is desired. A list will be compiled by Mr. Stewart weekly and furnished to CIA via liaison. The CIA representative further advised that very few people there have any knowledge of "Project Hunter" and that any communication referring to this project or a "Hunter Report" should be forwarded to CIA via liaison and appropriately flagged for our Liaison agent's attention to avoid the communication getting into CIA's regular mail channel.

JFK

The CIA representative further advised, if any security subject travels to the USSR and his name is added to the Watch List, CIA will promptly afford him coverage while he is abroad.

JFK

EX. 107

REC- 47 (105-93089 - 32)

RECOMMENDATION:

That the above information be discussed at the next conference held by the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Subversive Control, and the Internal Security Sections and that all agents in the above-mentioned sections be reminded to furnish Mr. Stewart a copy of any letter prepared from Bureau Informant 200 material to assist him in continually evaluating the program.

10 SEP 13

WDS:ekg
(7)

(105-93089)

WAB

Done at Section Chiefs Conf 9/1/61, names will
Resubmitted
Chief,

5

99

10/30/62

RE: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Typical data furnished by Bureau Informant 200:

Information indicating travel plans to the USSR of numerous Communist Party subjects; data indicating pro-Soviet sympathies of U. S. individuals; data indicating a U. S. person may be serving as a Soviet courier; data indicating the existence of particular Russian social and art clubs in the U. S.; data indicating a desire of U. S. students to study in USSR; data indicating pro-Castro sympathies of U. S. persons; data revealing present activity, feelings, and former associates of Bernon Ferguson Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin, recent National Security Agency (NSA) defectors; data revealing U. S. military personnel are in contact with official establishments and/or individuals in USSR; data revealing activities of the Maurice Hyman Halperins, now residing in Cuba, and of their son David Carlos Halperin, a medical student at the University of Chicago, and data indicating current whereabouts of Carl and Alice Jerome, Communist Party subjects; and data relating to the current whereabouts of James M. McMillin, Jr., a former U. S. soldier attached to U. S. Embassy, Moscow, Russia, who previously defected and married a Soviet.

Data of Special Interest:

During the present Cuban crisis, we have identified several pro-Castro sympathizers in U. S. through their contacts with Cubans at Friendship University, Moscow, and have been alerted to their activity. We have learned that Russian school authorities are greatly displeased with Huldah S. Clark, daughter of Negro Communist Party subject William Clark of Newark, because of her behavior. She too evidenced discontentment there. Her educational trip to USSR served as CP propaganda. We were alerted to Maurice Halperins intended return to U. S. We have been advised of Lillie Mae Teslich's intended visit to USSR. Her daughter in Moscow is suspected as being the propaganda-radio announcer "Moscow Molly." We are developing U. S. contacts of Helen Kagen-Pozner, UN employee discharged in 1950's for failure to answer questions re possible espionage involvement, through correspondence of her with relatives in Russia.

(105-93089-54)

such as Valeriy Tereshchenko. One of Tereshchenko's contacts is believed to be a target for contact by KGB and another is the son-in-law of the woman in whose apartment Viktor Kravchenko had been visiting. Kravchenko is a Soviet defector who recently committed suicide. The informant has advised of the activities and contacts of Vladislaw Krasnow, Soviet defector to Sweden in 1962. The Bureau was not aware previously that Krasnow was in the U.S.

Although much material regarding communists and the Communist Party (CP) is also received from other sources, the informant continues to furnish additional details and new information regarding changes of employment and residence, travel, contacts and activities. Data regarding attempts of the DuBois Clubs to expand nationally and internationally was furnished in items on Paula Garb, International Secretary, who went to the USSR to marry a Soviet if he can obtain a divorce. Items pertaining to Mary Lou Camacho (daughter of CP leader) told of the birth of her daughter, reconciliation with her Cuban husband, plans to go to Cuba to live and that one of her friends, a Security Index subject, was in Ghana when she was believed to be in the U.S.

Data is received regarding travel and contacts of Mary Rakoczy (widow of suspected espionage agent), who attended the Higher Party School of the Ukraine in Kiev, USSR. Information continues to be received regarding her son, Andrew Rakoczy, who was allegedly studying ballet but actually attended the above school for almost two years. This has included his contacts, change of employment and residence and racial, poverty and Progressive Labor Party activities in Chicago. One of his contacts now at this school has been identified as Teddie Kardash, son of Canadian communists. The source has also advised that Irene Rakoczy and three unidentified individuals plan to study dancing in Kiev this summer (possibly at the above-mentioned school which maintains a special section to combine lessons in dancing and indoctrination) and that Bernard Francis Taylor (son of CP official), who went to the USSR with a musical and dancinggroup, remained in Kiev to attend school. Don Zurilko, son of the alien wife of a U.S. citizen residing in State of Washington, is attending school in Kiev. He is believed to be from the U.S. or Canada.

Additional information is received regarding persons involved in the peace movements, anti-Vietnam demonstrations, women's organizations, "teach-ins" (one has been in contact with a GRU officer), racial matters, Progressive Labor Party, Students for a Democratic Society, DuBois Clubs, Students Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and other organizations. Items reveal names of U.S. contacts with members of such Soviet propaganda organizations as the Soviet Peace Committee, Soviet Women's Committee, Committee For Return to the Homeland and others.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 27, 1963

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW/RLC

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Stewart
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Harrell

SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200) - POLICY

For approximately one month beginning in February, 1963, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had coverage of mail destined to (Cuba) which was funneled through New York City from approximately one-half of the United States. The results of this highly confidential project were furnished us under the code ("Hunter-Vince") through special arrangements made with CIA. The project has been temporarily discontinued so CIA can analyze the results and decision will be made as to its reinstitution based on the results achieved.

JFK (8)

During the period the coverage was in effect, we received 94 items and opened 15 new cases based on the material. While no specific data was developed indicating clandestine messages were being transmitted, we know that one of the illegal (Cuban) agent networks has plans for mail drops in the New York City area, and this coverage could conceivably lead us to these drops in the future. We have previously furnished CIA summaries concerning positive results achieved through its coverage of (Soviet) mail for its assistance in evaluating whether that program should be continued. It is believed we should do so in this instance.

JFK (8)

ACTION:

If you approve, the attached memorandum containing a summary of the action taken by us as a result of the (Hunter-Vince) coverage will be furnished CIA by liaison for assistance of CIA in evaluating whether the program should be continued.

JFK (8)

Enclosure

105-93089

RAM:djw
(8)

EX-102

REC-52 105-93089-60

17 APR 3 1963

Multiples

Furnished to [illegible] Hunt) CIA - 3/29/63

ENCLOSURE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-

67 APR 4 - 1963 FILED

APR 4 1963

SECRET

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Data received regarding the following current and former double agents and sources has been utilized to evaluate their reliability: Luke Chia Liu Yuan; Pedro Celestino Jimenez Moreno; Gordon Philip Polley; Hugo Rodriguez-Ramirez; Julius (S) Shell; NH 445-S; Phyllis Oja; Samuel Jaffe; NY 2911-S; NY 3556-S; CG 6562-S; Mr. and Mrs. George R. Atkins; and Boris I. Oblesow. (S) The field has been advised of individuals in close contact with Soviets with the request to consider for development as sources.

Information regarding Soviet exchange students (eight are KGB agents) includes names of associates, activities, travel, types of material requested to obtain and individuals with whom they continue to maintain contact after they leave the U.S. Similar information is furnished regarding other Soviets in the U.S. as a result of the exchange program. Material is also furnished regarding U.S. citizens who travel to the USSR as part of the exchange.

Data regarding current and former U.S. exchange students shows Soviet and U.S. contacts before and after return, romantic involvements, sympathies and difficulties encountered in Russia. A former exchange student has been in contact with a suspected espionage agent regarding Ralph Matlaw (according to Nosenko, the KGB was to attempt recruitment of Matlaw). The source has revealed former exchange student Michael Cole's travel plans and continued contacts with Soviets (one is son of an espionage agent) and Henry Huttenbdch's attempts to obtain a divorce in order to marry a Soviet girl. Similar information is furnished regarding U.S. citizens who are, or have been, in Russia but are not under the exchange program. These include Sally Harris, Natasha Kent, Kathy Boudin and Alexander Nikolauk. Two of the four U.S. citizens who have applied for entrance to Soviet universities have stated that they desire to become Soviet citizens. Milagros Ruiz Aponte, Puerto Rican nationalist in the USSR, is using an alias in her correspondence. Another Puerto Rican went to Cuba before he left for the USSR.

Material has been received regarding three employees of USIA, two U.S. citizens employed by the UN, a Federal employee who intends to marry a Soviet girl, three individuals involved with Soviet women and two U.S. contacts of Galina Smirnova (an Intourist guide who has compromised Americans in the past).

Contacts of foreign exchange students and aliens in the U.S. from Canada, Peru, Cuba, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile, Haiti, Italy, France, Iraq and Africa with their friends in the USSR who are studying at Friendship University or other schools show that

11/1/62
CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SECRET

(105-93081-78)

SECRET

they may be communists. Two foreign students and an exile from Haiti have been acting as intermediaries. Several have applied for admittance to Friendship University and other schools in the USSR because of finances or ideology. A Nicaraguan Marxist in the U.S. is acting as an intermediary for an individual at Friendship University by forwarding mail to Bolivia. Data is furnished regarding foreign students who attended school in the USSR and are now in the U.S. One of these appears to have been compromised before he left Russia and another brought his Soviet wife to the U.S.

Items are received regarding Soviets who have entered the U.S. as wives of Americans: Victoria Sandor (now a Federal employee); Ala Anderson; Ludmila Olsen who has advised that she was approached by Soviet Intelligence when in the USSR in 1965; Irina Horwitz; Nataliya Konigsford; and Rosita Brayton wife of an Alaskan politician and newspaperman, who has become involved with a Russian-born U.S. Army Captain. The source advised of contacts, travel and study in the USSR of Mrs. Kemp Tolley, Soviet wife of former U.S. Naval Attache, who has admitted furnishing information regarding Americans to the Soviets in the 1940's.

Much material has been furnished regarding U.S. citizens' travel plans, including those of known subversives, their Soviet relatives and contacts and difficulties encountered by two tourists with Soviet authorities. Data has been received regarding Soviets and former U.S. citizens who have traveled, or intend to travel, to the U.S., their contacts, activities and relatives. Several had renounced their U.S. citizenship and had been engaged in questionable activities in the past. Mary Mackler, who recently returned to the U.S., has had numerous contacts with known subversives, at least two of whom were connected with espionage in the past. Material is received on U.S. defectors now in the USSR.

Additional information received includes: plans of seven individuals to repatriate to the USSR; U.S. contacts with current and former known and suspected Soviet agents now in the USSR (Vladimir Sossinskiy, Vladimir Pozner, Eugenia Olkhina, Leonids Rimjans, Vladimir Paramonov, Igor Melekh and others); activities and contacts of current and former known and suspected espionage agents now in the U.S. (Aaron Pressman, Josef Zarovich, Victor Perlo, Helen Pozner Wilga and others); the death of Georgi Lieb (suspected of working as black market currency operator for KGB) and continuation of his contacts by his wife; activities of Kirill Alexeev (suspect in Umbel case) family; Soviet contacts of Gerard Piel who has been in contact with a KGB officer; Soviet contacts and travel of D. G. Brennan who, according to Federa was to be approached by KGB; contacts of Olga Yourkevitch (widow of ship designer) with KGB agent, travel to USSR as a guest of organization to receive her husband's archives and her illness in the USSR; contact of Major Abdel Okeil of United Arab Republic who was attending the FBI National Academy with individual in the USSR; U.S. contacts of several defectors and Soviet repatriates,

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

51 THRU 100

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Organization of the [illegible]

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

LHM refers to request of the SSC for a list of names and titles of certain FBI Intelligence Division (INTD) personnel at FBIHQ and numbers only of certain other INTD personnel; and relates agreement reached between FBI officials and Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the SSC, that the original request be modified as follows. The FBI will prepare the necessary list and make it available for review at FBIHQ by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75.

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI REC-106 62-116395-100

16 MAY 7 1975

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/8/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-53

11. NONE.

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/TG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

SFP:ekw
(4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1975

GPO 646

3-113a (Rev. 3-21-73)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-19-88 BY SP-5 ci/ake

Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 4/25/75

You were previously advised that Douglas Durham, former MP 4115-E, who has furnished high-level information regarding activities of the American Indian Movement (AIM), after being confronted by AIM leaders, admitted being a confidential informant for the FBI. This information has been made public.

Attached teletype from Omaha advises that Assistant U. S. Attorney Keith E. Uhl, Office of Special Prosecutor, stated he received a telephone call 4/24/75 from Durham and that Durham told him he had been contacted by representatives of the Office of Senator Frank Church, Washington, D. C., requesting Durham's presence in Washington during the week of April 28, 1975, for purpose of attending staff meetings to determine his potential as a witness before committee investigating operations of the FBI. Durham indicated he intended to comply and would have no further contact with the FBI. We are following this matter closely and you will be kept advised.

1 - General Investigative Division
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - External Affairs Division
1 - William O. Cregar

WRW

WDN:lfj WDN

JGD/WHA

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 24 1975

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 12-19-88 BY SP5 clahi

NR005 OM PLAIN

4:39PM NITEL 4/24/75 RRH

TO: DIRECTOR (137-33264)

MINNEAPOLIS (157-1458)

SENSTUDY - 75

FROM: OMAHA (170-231) (P)

FORMER MP 4115-E. Comp-Inst.

ON APRIL 24, 1975, AUSA KEITH E. UHL, ADVISED HE RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM SUBJECT RELATING SUBJECT HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICE OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, WASHINGTON, D.C., REQUESTING HIS PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON DURING WEEK OF APRIL 28, 1975, FOR PURPOSE OF STAFF MEETINGS TO DETERMINE SUBJECT'S POTENTIAL AS WITNESS BEFORE CHURCH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING OPERATIONS OF THE FBI. SUBJECT INDICATED HE INTENDED TO COMPLY WITH REQUEST AND HAD DECIDED THAT IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, HE WOULD DECLINE AND NOT SOLICIT ANY FURTHER CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FBI.

END.

RSP FBIHQ

5 - Action

Original Filed In 137-33264-6

REC-18 137-33264

18 MAY 2 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~50 MAY 30 1975~~

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED

JUN 11 1975

JUN 11 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 22, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/JIG

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to record that on 4/18/75 Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, Executive Office Building, stated he had reviewed a final copy of the Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction including Exhibit L, pages 36 and 37. Mr. Wilderotter advised Bureau Supervisor Alonzo L. Lacey that The White House interposed no objection to the Jurisdiction paper being furnished to the Senate Select Committee.

With reference to the study entitled Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction, Mr. Wilderotter requested that he be furnished a copy and this was done. In addition, Wilderotter had previously on 4/4/75 reviewed the paper for approval of the use of items concerning Presidential or National Security Council interest.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

ALL:ekw
(5)

62-116395

REC- 106
WRW
62-116395-99

5-2

8 4 MAY 7 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/7/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SENSTUDY 75

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER ON AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS
~~Security~~ Jurisdiction

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize investigative efforts to authenticate Hoover memoranda dated 8/24-25/36.

Document Section, FBI Laboratory, determined the type appearing on Hoover memorandum dated 8/25/36 was prepared on a Remington typewriter with an elite type used since October, 1935. Hoover memorandum to Tamm dated 9/10/36, was prepared on an IBM typewriter with pica-style type used since 1930.

The letterhead used on both Hoover memoranda of 8/24-25/36 was authorized FBI stationery effective August 14, 1936.

On 3/10/75, Mr. Donald B. Schewe, Assistant Librarian, Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, advised that The White House Ushers Appointment Book contained entries showing that on Thursday, August 24, 1936, from 9:20 a.m. to 10:12 a.m., President Roosevelt met with Mr. Hoover in his residence at The White House prior to leaving for his office. Schewe pointed out that this meeting was significant since President Roosevelt met Mr. Hoover immediately after returning from an extended trip, a departure from his usual practice. There was no entry on 8/25/36, other than the President's departure for the Dakotas at 10:40 p.m.

On 4/2/75, review of Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress, reflected that a Desk Diary (container #68, folder #295, microfilm #38) of Secretary Hull contained an entry on 8/25/36 that the Secretary had luncheon with the President between 1:00 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.

~~REC-8~~

Detailed memorandum attached.

ACTION:

For information.

5 ENCLOSURE
~~Enclosure~~

ALL:vb

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
MAY 2 1975

~~50 APR 25 1975~~
MAY 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-7-00 BY 39063 ~~ELW~~/BCE/AMW

Original Filed In 62-

Mr. White February 27, 1975

J. H. Mortimer

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TAMM
FROM JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1936;
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DATED AUGUST 25, 1936.

On this date, SA Alonzo L. Lacey of the Intelligence Division delivered the above-captioned memoranda to the Laboratory with a request to determine the make of typewriter employed in the preparation of the memoranda and the date of introduction of the type styles employed. The purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether or not the type styles on the typewriters used to write the memoranda were in use on the dates appearing on the memoranda.

It was determined that the "Memorandum For Mr. Tamm from John Edgar Hoover dated September 10, 1936" was prepared on an IBM typewriter equipped with a pica style of type which has been in use since 1930. The typewriting comprising the "Confidential Memorandum by John Edgar Hoover dated August 25, 1936" was determined to have been prepared on a Remington typewriter equipped with an elite style of type that has been in use since October, 1935.

The memoranda were returned to SA Lacey.

RECOMMENDATION:

The result of this examination be forwarded to the Intelligence Division

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Lacey
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mortimer
1 - Mr. Oberg

WSO:mrg
(6)

ENCLOSURE

~~62-66121-1844~~

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

August 14,1936.

Mr. Nathan ......
Mr. Tolson ......
Mr. Baughman ......
Mr. Clegg ......
Mr. Coffey ......
Mr. Dawsey ......
Mr. Edwards ......
Mr. Egan ......
Mr. Foxworth ......
Mr. Glavin ......
Mr. Harbo ......
Mr. Joseph ......
Mr. Lester ......
Mr. Nichols ......
Mr. Quinn ......
Mr. Schilder ......
Mr. Tamm ......
Mr. Tracy ......
Miss Gandy ......

New letterheads.

st

AUG 20 1936

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

66-2412-33

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AUG 18 1936 P.M.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FILE

ENCLOSURE 62-66737-1842

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Tolson
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Egan
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Harbo
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Lester
Mr. Nichols
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

OK

62-116395-
ENCLOSURE
~~ENCLOSURE~~
~~62-66727/~~

[illegible] DESTROYED

Mar[illegible]13, 1975

RESEARCH CONDUCTED AT FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT LIBRARY, HYDE PARK, NY
ON 3/10-12/75

On 3/10/74, Mr. DONALD B. SCHEWE, Assistant Librarian in the Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, was advised of our interest in locating any communications bearing upon a conversation between former President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT and former Secretary of State CORDELL HULL in the latter part of August, 1936. Mr. SCHEWE was advised that this conversation was concerned with the security of the US and that Mr. J. EDGAR HOOVER of the FBI may have participated in this conversation. Mr. SCHEWE was also advised that Mr. ROOSEVELT allegedly reduced the subject matter of above conversation to a memorandum and that we were interested in locating this memorandum or some information bearing upon above conversation. Arrangements were made to meet with Mr. SCHEWE at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY, on 3/12/75. Mr. SCHEWE indicated that in the meantime he would conduct some research in this matter.

On 3/12/75, Mr. SCHEWE advised that he had conducted some research relative to our telephone call on 3/10/75, and inquired if we could be more specific with regard to the dates of the information desired. SCHEWE was advised that to the best of our knowledge the conversation we were interested in involving FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (FDR), HULL and Mr. HOOVER, occurred on approximately 8/24-26/36 and that the conversation concerned the internal security of the US.

Mr. SCHEWE, at this point, furnished a Xerox copy of a "buck slip" dated 8/24/36, (copy of which is attached) on White House stationery, classified "Confidential and addressed to the Secretary of State from FDR". Mr. SCHEWE stated that "buck slips" are nothing more than a cover memorandum utilized to transmit communications which are attached thereto. It is to be noted that this "buck slip" indicates that attached to it was a memorandum for the Secretary of State, unsigned, undated and recommending coordination of activities of all agents of the Government in foreign countries. SCHEWE advised

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

~~6[illegible]~~

that the synopsis of this memorandum which appears on the "buck slip" was the usual practice at that time to identify the documents attached to it. SCHEWE added that this was the only document he was able to locate which may have some bearing on the desired information. SCHEWE stated that the possibility exists that the referred to memorandum may be located among the collection of papers of CORDELL HULL which are now stored at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Mr. SCHEWE then exhibited to interviewing personnel the White House Ushers Appointment Book which was hand-written and kept on a daily basis. This appointment book contained the following pertinent information:

> Thursday, August 13, 1936, at 9:50 AM FDR departed the White House for a visit to the flood areas in NY, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
>
> Thursday, August 24, 1936, FDR returned to White House at 8:45 AM.
> 9:20 AM FDR met with Mr. HOOVER from 9:20 AM to 10:12 AM.
>
> (Note * - There is no entry in this book for Aug. 24, 1936, indicating that Mr. HULL was there. Mr. SCHEWE advised that it is interesting to note that FDR met Mr. HOOVER in his residence in the White House on 8/24/36, prior to leaving for his office in the White House. SCHEWE also pointed out that this meeting was significant since FDR met with Mr. HOOVER on 8/24/36, immediately after returning from an extended trip. This, according to SCHEWE was a departure from FDR's usual practice.

There was no record in the White House Usher's Appointment Book for 8/25/36, which would indicate that FDR met with either Mr. HULL or Mr. HOOVER on that date. This book indicates that FDR departed the White House on Tuesday, 8/25/75, at 10:40 PM for a trip to the draught areas, in upper Maine, South Dakota and North

Dakota, as well as a visit to Mt. Rushmore. FDR did not return to the White House until Sunday, Sept. 6, 1936, at 10:02 AM.

The White House Usher's Appointment Book further reflects that FDR, during the period July 10, 1936, to Aug. 10, 1936, was away from the White House campaigning. FDR returned to the White House on 8/10/36, and remained there until 8/13/36, when he again departed on a trip and returned on 8/24/36. FDR also departed from the White House on 8/25/36, and returned on 9/6/36.

Mr. SCHEWE also produced to interviewing personnel the appointment book of FDR's private secretary, GRACE TULLY for the pertinent period. This appointment book reflects all of FDR's office appointments. A review of this appointment book fails to reflect that FDR met or had an appointment with Mr. HOOVER in his office during the period 8/13/36 to 9/6/36. However, this appointment book does reflect that during this period FDR did have a meeting with CORDELL HULL on 8/25/36, at 1:00 PM.

Mr. SCHEWE further advised that he personally reviewed the following and was unable to locate any documents or references which could possibly shed some light on the matter of interest to us:

1.) Papers kept in FDR's safe.

2.) Papers kept by his secretary in a separate White House safe.

3.) Papers kept in FDR's official presidential file.

4.) Papers kept in FDR's alphabetical file maintained by his secretary.

5.) Individual agencies files.

6.) J. EDGAR HOOVER's file.

7.) Attorney General's file.

8.) Assistant Attorney General's file.

9.) National Security file.

10.) Internal Security file.

11.) FBI file.

In conclusion, Mr. SCHEWE stated that after reviewing all of the above data, he concluded that the pertinent document of interest to us is not at the FDR Library at Hyde Park, NY. SCHEWE added that if any such document is at the Library, it is misfiled and as there are approximately 21 million pages of manuscripts and documents at the Library, it would be impossible to locate same.

It is to be noted that on the enclosed "buck slip" there are four penciled notations, i.e. 285-C, X20, X285 and X67. SCHEWE stated that these notations are part of the FDR Library cross-reference system. SCHEWE added that he checked these references and could locate nothing further regarding the matter of interest to us. SCHEWE stated that these references pertained to the enclosed "buck slip".

285-6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

August 24, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE x 20

I find this in my file, dating back two months. As I understand it everybody is agreed on it. What is the next step?

x 255

F. D. R.

Memo. from State, unsigned and undated, recommending coordination of activities of all agents of the govt. in foreign countries: each agency as it is related to the others, and all in their relation to the State Department; makes 9 recommendations of coordination.

x 67

6/4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/RTG

#mac 1.6

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 003 AX CODE

11:43PM NITEL MAY 3, 1975 WMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-NEW) (P)

MAY 03 1975
TELETYPE

SENSTUDY 75

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/STG

RE BUTEL MAY 2, 1975. Sec93

FORMER BUREAU AGENT WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 6302 GOLF COURSE SQUARE, ALEXANDRIA, VA., CONTACTED MAY 2, 1975 AND STATED THAT IN EVENT HE IS CONTACTED BY STAFF OF SENATE OR HOUSE COMMITTEES, HE MAY REFUSE TO BE INTERVIEWED, BUT IF HE CONSENTS TO BE INTERVIEWED HE WILL REQUEST PRESENCE OF FBI AGENT, IF QUESTIONS ARE ASKED RELATIVE TO SENSATIVE TO BUREAU OPERATIONS.

INQUIRY AT RESIDENCE OF HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1160 WIMBLEDON DRIVE, MC LEAN, VA., ON MAY 2, 1975, REVEALS THAT HE IS PRESENTLY AT CLUB MEDITERRANEAN, HOTEL CARAVELLE, ST. ANNE, GUADALUPE, FRENCH WEST INDIES. HE IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO HIS RESIDENCE ON MAY 18, 1975.

REC-106 62-116395-98

BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE IF ALEXANDRIA SHOULD CONTACT LEINBAUGH UPON HIS RETURN.

18 MAY 7 1975

[illegible] RETAINED IN
[illegible] RECORDS UNIT

TJT FBI WASH DC CLR

SAC [illegible] AX, [illegible] to contact Leinbaugh on return from 5/18/75

Records
cc 67-585330 (George)
67-476321 (Leinbaugh)

84 MAY 8 1975

NR 002 BA PLAIN

1220PM URGENT MAY 3, 1975 BJD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: BALTIMORE (62-NEW)

SENSTUDY 75

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 03 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

RE BUREAU TEL, MAY 2, 1975.

DONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND, CONTACTED INSTANT DATE BY SAC, BALTIMORE. INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED TELETYPE FOLLOWED. HANNING ADVISED HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO DATE. ADVISED WOULD CONTACT SAC, BALTIMORE SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED IN THE FUTURE.

ENDDSS FBIHQ CCLR

REC-106

62-116395-97

16 MAY 7 1975

#M0016
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2ALM/116

5-8

file 62-116395

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

cc: 67-414504 (Hanning)

84 MAY 8 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 02 1975

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/tG

#MDR16

NR 09 OM PLAIN

7:00 PM CST URGENT MAY 2, 1975 SKH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: OMAHA (62-NEW) (P)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MAY 2, 1975.

FORMER SA JOHN J. QUINN WAS CONTACTED BY ME PERSONALLY AND ADVISED PER INSTRUCTIONS IN RETEL. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF ADVANCED NOTICE RE POSSIBLE INTERVIEW AND STATED THAT HE WOULD DESIRE AN AGENT BE PRESENT IF SUCH INTERVIEW OCCURS. STATED HE WOULD PERSONALLY CONTACT ME IF HE IS CONTACTED BY STAFF MEMBERS.

BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

END.

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CRLR

REC-106 62-116395-96

16 MAY 7 1975

cc 67-436724 (Quinn)

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

84 MAY 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/JT6
#MDR16

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with enclosures described below

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified except for one enclosure which is classified "Secret."

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Following excerpts from the FBI Manual of Instructions:

(a) Table of Contents.
(b) Preface. Guidelines for FBI Investigations.
(c) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret").
(d) Section 84. Registration Act.
(e) Section 86. Sabotage.
(f) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals.
(g) Section 88. Sedition.
(h) Section 95. Treason.
(i) Section 97. Voorhis Act.
(j) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

REC-106
62-116395-95
18 MAY 7 1975

Also, Table of Contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations.

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Material furnished includes policy, statutes, instructions and related matters covering FBI investigations in the security field generally. Limited, extremely sensitive material excluded but available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff at FBI Headquarters.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/7/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-75

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

No direct relation.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 12-17-73)

(Copies to [illegible]ces Checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Beirut
☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☒ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Singapore
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date 5/8/75

RE: **SENSTUDY 75**

PERSONAL ATTN.

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☒ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ______

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ______ dated ______.

Remarks:

Attached should be brought to the attention of Assistant Legat Armand Cammarota. For his information, the SSC has exhibited an interest in Bureau's communications to Rome in 1964 and is aware Cammarota was then Legat there. He thus may be contacted by SSC personnel.

Enc.
Bufile 62-116395
Urfile

#mol16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

File
5-8

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: 2/7/75.

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/116

Hotis

FARRINGTON

On 2/6/75 Mr. Kelley and I met with Senator Church and Bill Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee. Senator Church pointed out that he intended to run the Committee in a very responsible manner, had no intention of destroying or impairing the effectiveness of the intelligence community and, in fact, hoped that the efforts of the Committee would help to reestablish public confidence in the intelligence agencies.

Parameters have not been drawn but Senator Church feels that the Committee will confine its activities largely to inquiries into domestic activities. The inquiries will be designed to determine whether agencies have acted outside the law and the type of remedial legislation necessary to prevent such abuses in the future.

Study will be largely concerned with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency but will, of course, involve the FBI and other agencies involved in domestic intelligence.

The Committee hopes to have a nonpartisan staff of approximately 40 employees headed up by Mr. Miller and would appreciate having necessary background investigations expedited to permit an early clearance. Miller indicated he has already been in touch with Mr. Hotis and Mr. Bowers in this regard. It was explained that the contemplated procedure involved the FBI conducting the full-field investigation necessary with the results being furnished to the Chairman, after which he would, upon being personally satisfied as to their loyalty, furnish the results to CIA for final clearance. Senator Church appeared satisfied with this arrangement. He stated that he wanted to prevent leaks and be hopefully as successful as the Judiciary Committee was on the impeachment inquiry. Our experience in this regard was pointed out wherein the Judiciary Committee in connection with the 17 wiretaps had written us a letter indicating that if we made classified

ST-117

REC 68 62-116395-94

APR 30 1975

JBA:ams (8)

1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis

LEGAL COUNSEL

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 7 1975

information available they would afford it appropriate security restricted to members only, excluding staff, and would not make the information public. Subsequent to the hearings, the Committee published its report which contained our classified documents right along with the Top Secret classifications. Senator Church was not aware of this, appeared surprised by it, and stated surely the information must have been declassified. I advised him that not by us and it was our information.

Senator Church was asked whether in his opinion the formation of the Select Committee would have any effect on the proliferation of committees seeking to obtain testimony from the FBI and it was his opinion that this would have a favorable effect. He said he had been in touch with other members of the Senate who felt that it was a waste of time to have repetitious testimony on the same subject matter before a variety of committees and he had the feeling that the other committees would hold off until after the Senate Select Committee completed its hearings. He indicated that he could not vouch for what would happen in the House, however, he intended to speak to the House leadership in order to try to effect some coordinated approach there also, because he was well aware of the large number of committees seeking to provide oversight or obtain information from the intelligence agencies.

A question arose as to the extent of cooperation with the Committee and Senator Church was assured that the FBI would be completely responsive subject to certain limitations which would have to be delineated by the President in order to protect sensitive sources and information. Senator Church indicated that he was going to talk to the President in this regard in order to secure his complete cooperation, and it was Senator Church's feeling that the Committee should be entitled to answers to any questions they might ask without restriction other than, of course, the identities of informants. He felt the progress of the Committee would be severely impaired if it were necessary to go to Court over such questions to obtain enforcement of their right to have access to whatever information they need.

ACTION:

Information.

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

TO SACS ALL OFFICES

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. T.J.Jenkins 5/2/75
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

PERSONAL ATTENTION

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK TO INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/bts

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-16 62-116395-93

WOC:ekw
(18)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

5 MAY 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 0~~2~~3 1975
TELETYPE

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

58 MAY 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO 954-546

PROTECTED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL. YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

NOTE: Teletype prepared for all offices to alert SACs to the possibility former employees may contact their offices seeking guidance.

The Office of Legal Counsel in response to requests from former employees will utilize the briefing paper prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by Assistant Attorney General Antonino Scalia.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 1, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum for record purposes reports discussion 4/25/75 between Bureau's Liaison Agent, L. F. Schwartz, and Mr. Jack E. Thomas, Chief, Coordination Staff, Intelligence Community Staff, relating to Abstracts we are to prepare for the Central Community Index (CCI) in connection with Senstudy 75.

Attached are (1) memorandum 4/11/75 re CCI and its attachments, memorandum 4/10/75 and Abstract format; and (2) letter 4/21/75 from Thomas to Schwartz and its attachment, Abstract format. On 4/25/75 Schwartz and Thomas discussed applicability of instructions in attachments and arrived at the following understandings.

The FBI will provide Abstracts only, not documents, to have on record in the CCI a summary of what we have furnished to the Select Committees. Abstracts should be dated when typed without regard to delivery date of Abstract or date of communications to which they pertain. Under item number nine of format, enter date of communication involved, not date it is delivered to a Select Committee. We may use an abbreviated version for the Select Committees' names, such as "Senate Select Committee." We will title Abstracts as near as possible in a manner keyed to the language of the request from the Select Committee. Inasmuch as we will honor only written requests from the Select Committees, the "Requester" will always be shown as the name of the requesting Committee and not the name of any Committee personnel.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2

#MDR16

ACTION: None. For information and record purposes.

62-116395-92

62-116395

REC-88

16 MAY 6 1975

Enclosures

SFP:ekw
(6)

2 ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 6 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

11 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Reviews

Inspector General, CIA

SUBJECT : Central Community Index

1. The central indexing capability detailed in the attached memorandum has been implemented. Format for preparation of abstracts has been accepted and the Community Index is ready to receive material. The address of the Community Index is

Room 6E25
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia 20505.

2. The timeliness of reporting to the Central Index is critical and you are requested to make this information available to the appropriate organizational components within your agencies.

Sincerely,

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment

[illegible] deliver our abstracts

5/1/75

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG
#m0216

File 62-116395

5-8

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-92

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

10 April 1975

#moe16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ZTG

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence

1. The Intelligence Community Staff, with John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy/IC, as my representative in these matters, will keep the Board and other appropriate officials advised as to progress of the investigations conducted by the Senate and House Select Committees investigating intelligence activities. In particular, it will ensure that we are kept informed as to materials which are formally being provided to the Select Committees by all elements of the Community. The USIB Ad Hoc Group will assist on this matter and provide the mechanism for regular and constant communications.

2. In response to this assignment, the Intelligence Community Staff is establishing a registry for documentation relating to the investigations. This registry will be a source of reference of all responses, testimony, et cetera, provided by USIB agencies and available to your designated representatives.

3. In order to make the registry useful to the Board, it is essential that it include:

a. File copies of documents or other materials which each Intelligence Community element provides to one of the Select Committees where the originating agency considers the materials to involve aspects of Community activities, and/or which may result in follow-on queries concerning the functioning of the Community. The availability of this documentation will be of particular importance if it is expected there will be subsequent inquiries relating to the materials provided and involving elements of the Community other than the originating element.

b. An abstract of each formal input to a Select Committee - unless the Intelligence Community registry is provided with an actual copy of the material itself. A proposed format for such abstracts is attached.

W. E. Colby

Attachment:
As stated

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT:

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)

7. DATE OF REQUEST:

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY:

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY:

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify)

MOR 16
1-19-01 SP-2 ALM/JTG

Ad Hoc Staff
75-358

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

21 April 1975

Recd from [illegible] IC Staff [illegible] 4/21/75 WOB

Mr. L. Frank Schwartz
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4637
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, D. C.

#MORI6
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ZTG

Dear Frank:

Reference is your request for comments on the sample abstracts prepared in the FBI as a report on materials being provided to the Senate Select Committee.

As you know, we want to make the Community Registry as complete a record as possible of what is provided to the Committee, and for this reason hope that the actual copy of special reports and particularly important documents will be provided to the Registry. Where this is not done, an abstract or summary of each document or homogenous set of documents.

We have amended the abstract format slightly to include an entry for "Document Classification." A copy of the amended format is enclosed.

Your sample abstracts require a few alterations to make them more "indexable."

a. Item 1, "TITLE/SUBJECT" refers to the subject matter of the material which is being provided. The abstract on the FBI Manual of Instructions should have an entry here something like "Instructions covering FBI Investigations in the Security Field," rather than the title of the Senate Committee.

b. The date at the head of the page should be the date of preparation of the abstract. The date of submission to the Committee is listed at Item 9.

c. The entry "ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION" identified the organization with authority to release the document.

[illegible] W.O. [illegible] 10-1/1/75
SFP:eRW

File 62-116395

5

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-92

d. The "SUMMARY OF CONTENTS" section should be brief, but also should clearly indicate what is being provided to the Committee. I wonder, for instance, whether your sample on the letterhead memoranda was issued in widely separated time periods. The summary as written gives no indication as to the particular subject of any of the memoranda and the single sentence now used to describe all of them covers the waterfront.

e. If the request for information comes officially from the Committee, the Committee title should be entered under "REQUESTOR," but if the requestor is an individual member of the Staff, his name should be indicated.

f. The last entry in the format, "PROBLEM AREAS," has particular significance since it is important to know if there are Third Agency, or sources and methods, or other sensitivity problems involved, and this is the place to identify them. We are beginning to use the abstracts prepared in our office as an aid to obtaining release clearance when we are dealing with the document for which another agency must concur in the release. The "PROBLEM AREAS" section gives such other agency an idea as to whether we see any important reason why they should be concerned about release of the document. The entry in this final section of the format is expected to prove useful for this purpose.

5. One copy of the document or its abstract is all that is needed by the registry.

6. The mailing address of the registry is:

Community Index
Room 6E25
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia 20505

Jack E Thomas

Jack E. Thomas
Chief
Coordination Staff, ICS

Enclosure: as stated

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT:

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)

7. DATE OF REQUEST:

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY:

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY:

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify)

#m DR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TKG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 21, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On Thursday, 4/17/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President for Congressional Inquiries, was furnished the following four documents with a request that he advise whether copies of such documents could be made available to the Senate Select Committee: (1) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/16/72 captioned "FBI Jurisdiction, Criminal Intelligence Information"; (2) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/18/72 captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters"; (3) A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director L. Louis Patrick Gray III dated 5/19/72; (4) A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated 8/7/73 recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

On 4/18/75 Mr. Wilderotter advised Section Chief William O. Cregar that the above four documents were cleared for delivery to the Senate Select Committee.

ACTION: For information and record purposes.

WOC:ekw ekw

62-116395

REC-88

62-116395-91

16 MAY 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/ts/16

84 MAY 6 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General April 28, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Lish Whitson. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for your use in the event you desire to furnish it to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JPM/CA

6076

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)

SFP:ekw
(11)

REC-6

62-116395-90

EX-110

MAY 2 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NPC/mv

JBT/Pen

56 MAY 06 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JGmlw
6026

62-116395

April 28, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information available to the FBI concerning captioned matter.

SSC Interview of Retired FBI SA Lish Whitson

On the afternoon of April 23, 1975, Mr. Lish Whitson personally appeared at the office of an FBI official, stated that he had just been interviewed by Mr. Michael Epstein, Staff Member of the SSC, and was desirous of reporting the results of that interview which Whitson related as follows:

Epstein first asked Whitson when he entered the FBI, when he first arrived for assignment at FBI Headquarters, to which Headquarters Division he had been assigned, and when he retired. (FBI records reveal that Whitson joined the FBI as an SA November 20, 1933, and retired June 19, 1972. He was assigned at Headquarters December 16, 1941, attached to the Domestic Intelligence Division and served in that Division until his retirement. The current name for that Division is Intelligence Division). Epstein then told Whitson that he knew that Whitson had at one time mailed a package to Mrs. Martin Luther King from Tampa, Florida, and asked Whitson to relate the details concerning this matter. Whitson thereupon

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)

SFP:ekw (KW)
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NPC/

JBR/Pen

SEE NOTE PAGE FIVE

62-116395-90

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

told Epstein that in the late Summer of 1964, former FBI Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had telephoned Whitson at his home one Saturday and told him that late FBI Director Hoover wanted Whitson to deliver a package to Miami, Florida, by plane and on arrival at the Miami airport to telephone Sullivan for further instructions. Whitson did as directed and upon calling Sullivan, was instructed to address the package to Mr. Martin Luther King. Accordingly, Whitson had the package weighed, put postage stamps on it, and addressed it to Martin Luther King (not Mrs. Martin Luther King as Epstein had indicated). The following day, Sunday, Whitson flew back to Washington and on the next day, Monday, he informed Sullivan that his instructions had been carried out. Sullivan commented to Whitson "Someday I will tell you about that."

Epstein asked Whitson who had paid for the stamps to mail the package and Whitson said that he had probably done so utilizing per diem money. Epstein asked whether he had put a return address on the package and Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had gone to the Miami FBI Office, whether any Agent had met him at the Miami airport, and whether Whitson had discussed this matter with anyone. Whitson told Epstein that he had not gone to the Miami Office, that no Agent had met him, and that he had discussed the matter only with Sullivan. At this point, Whitson asked Epstein how he got the story. Epstein merely laughed and did not reply to the question.

Epstein also asked Whitson whether he had ever written a memorandum regarding this matter, to which Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had ever seen a memorandum on this matter and Whitson again replied in the negative.

On April 24, 1975, Whitson telephoned the FBI official referred to above on two occasions to report additional information which Epstein had secured from Whitson by telephone on April 24, 1975. This additional information was as follows:

Epstein asked how Whitson had made the trip to Miami; that is, how it was paid for. Whitson told him he had issued a Government Transportation Request (GTR). Epstein asked whether there was any prior written authorization for Whitson to make the trip and Whitson told him there was none. Epstein asked what kind of record would have been made covering the trip and Whitson explained that the only record he knew of would be the expense voucher he submitted covering the expenses involved and possibly the copy of the GTR which he had issued. Whitson explained to Epstein that the voucher would merely show that the GTR had been issued for a round-trip to and from Miami and how much per diem had been claimed in connection with the trip. Epstein inquired as to whether Whitson had registered at the Airport Hotel in Miami, and, if so, whether it was under his own name. Whitson told Epstein that he had registered under his name at this hotel.

Additional Information Furnished to FBI By Whitson

In addition to the foregoing, Whitson furnished to the FBI official the following information on April 23, 1975, which information he did not furnish to Epstein.

When Sullivan told Whitson he wanted him to fly the package to Miami, he stated that only he, Sullivan, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Tolson, (then FBI Associate Director) and Mr. Belmont (then FBI Assistant to the Director) knew of this situation. (At the time, 1964, Sullivan was an Assistant Director.) Sullivan never did explain to Whitson anything more regarding this incident.

Whitson said that when he arrived at the North Terminal at National Airport, following Sullivan's telephonic instructions, a young man who was unknown to Whitson but who addressed him as "Mr. Whitson," turned over to him a package which was wrapped in brown paper and sealed with sealing tape. It is Whitson's recollection the package measured approximately eight inches by eight inches by one inch.

It is Whitson's further recollection that at the time the foregoing occurred, King was either just about to go abroad to receive the Nobel Peace Prize or probably had already gone abroad. It was Whitson's recollection that sometime shortly after the mailing of the package, Sullivan commented to Whitson that the package had not yet been received by King. Because of this remark, Whitson is of the belief that the package was mailed to King at the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and not to King's residence. Further, it was Whitson's recollection that it was not long after he had mailed the package that King had a personal meeting with Mr. Hoover in the latter's office.

Whitson observed that in his opinion, the information which was in the possession of Epstein prior to interviewing Whitson must have originated with Sullivan. Whitson noted that Mr. Hoover and Mr. Tolson are both deceased and that he has heard nothing to indicate that Mr. Belmont has been contacted by members of the Staff of the SSC. One other factor that causes Whitson to feel that Sullivan was the source of the information was a question Epstein raised as to whether Whitson had put a return address on the package when he addressed it to King. Whitson said he recalls that when he was in Miami and received the telephonic instructions from Sullivan, Sullivan told him that he should put a return address on the package and Whitson then pointed out to Sullivan that if he did so, and the name of the addressee became smeared, the package would end up at someone's return address rather than in the

dead letter office. Sullivan concurred that no return address should be used. Thus, Sullivan would probably have reason to have commented regarding the use or nonuse of a return address.

On April 24, 1975, Whitson furnished by telephone to the aforementioned Bureau official the following additional information which he had not furnished to Epstein. Whitson stated it was now his recollection he had made the Miami trip either in the late Summer or early Fall of 1964 and that King was "away" at the time.

FBI Records Concerning Whitson's Travel

The following information is on record in the FBI concerning the travel of Whitson discussed above. On December 9, 1964, a Travel Voucher was processed for payment to Whitson the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period November 1-30, 1964. On record also is a memorandum copy of a Government Transportation Request issued November 21, 1964, to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air coach travel, Washington, D. C., to Miami, Florida, and return. November 21, 1964, has been determined to have been a Saturday. There is not available in the FBI any copy of the actual voucher submitted by Whitson.

NOTE: Original and one copy to the Attorney General (AG may forward the copy to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President). Information herein taken from two memoranda W.R. Wannall to J. B. Adams 4/23, 24/75, "Senstudy 75; Former Supervisor Lish Whitson, Assigned Intelligence Division." Voucher and GTR information from J. D. Cox, Voucher Unit, Computer Systems Division.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 18, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

#mac16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2ALM/ftG

6

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and specifically Part IV, Policies and Procedures.

Since the enclosed memorandum captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, originated with the Office of the Attorney General and is covered under this request, we are deferring to your judgment in this matter. The FBI interposes no objection to furnishing this document to the Committee, it being noted that the document appeared in toto in the United States Government Printing Office publication captioned "Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillances, 1974."

Also enclosed for your approval is the original of a memorandum to the Senate Select Committee apprising the Committee of our referral of this matter to you. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

4/25 Approved by A.G. ([illegible])
4/24 Delivered to B[illegible] office by K[illegible]

REC-100

62-116395-89

TEB:vb
(8)

16 MAY 2 1975

NOTE:

The request referred to above is one of several contained in the referenced communication. We are referring this matter to the Department as a matter of protocol in line with our policy of furnishing the Committee only documents originating with the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

PLM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

April 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of the captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

This is to advise that with respect to the memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, we are deferring action on this request to the United States Department of Justice inasmuch as this communication originated with that Department.

62 - 116395

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:vb
(8)

#MOE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW/TWL

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-89

GPO 954-546

S-89

#moc16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/JG

62-116395-89

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation DATE: May 20, 1954

XI

FROM : The Attorney General

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE 155-26

declassified 4/28/75 TEB/[illegible]

[redacted]

The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of microphone surveillance in connection with matters relating to the internal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal security matters equally as important as the duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigations. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of installing a microphone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all cases, including internal security matters. Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion that under such circumstances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.

Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones, suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow rather than reflect the present state of the law. It is realized that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone. The question of whether a trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the circumstances in each case in the light of the practical necessities of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.

H.B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. WALSH

DATE: 4/3/75 FMD016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

FROM : L. C. GROOVER
LCG/[illegible]

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Jew 160 Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church dated 3/19/75.

Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities, together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations and activities (page 3, item IIIC of relet).

The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached herewith, to the above request.

It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security, intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the data for both of the other categories as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-100

62-116395-88

That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

16 MAY 2 1975

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Jackson

JJC:jmb

SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE THREE

ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 21 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities

WOB

ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75

The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.

JWR/HHW

OVER

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg dly 4-14-75

Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:

OK to classify confidential
PVD

(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.

(2) Before making any determination as to whether we make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.

(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.

PVD

Tom Feeney acting for W.O. Cregar OK'd using Walsh as classification authority - 4/28/75 WOC

see memo Cregar to Wannall dated 4/1/75
woc f ekw

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 5412 BLM/ZKG Amoe16
ON 1-18-07

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

62-116395-88

ENCLOSURE

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-14-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 4-11-75 Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, was apprised of the fact we intended to affix a property stamp on certain nonclassified documents we were furnishing the Senate Select Committee (SSC). It was explained the stamp contained a caveat that the particular document may not be made available to unauthorized individuals without the Bureau's consent. He advised he felt this procedure was excellent.

On 4-14-75 Mr. Marvin requested that all future contacts with the Department concerning SENSTUDY be coordinated with Jack Fuller, extension 3892. Mr. Fuller is assigned to the Attorney General's office.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TTG

REC- 106

62-116395-87

APR 23 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (7)

84 APR 30 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. J. B. Adams~~
1 - ~~Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

DATE: April 14, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Mr. L. C. Groover to Mr. Walsh memorandum dated 3/4/75 entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities" forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review the titles and numbers of FBI field office Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities. This was in response to requirement IIIC of Senator Church's letter dated 3/19/75.

By addendum dated 4/4/75 the Intelligence Division recommended that the Legal Counsel Division discusses with the staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) our reluctance to provide these type figures to the SSC.

On 4/11/75 I discussed with Mr. John Clark, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the intelligence community, the request of Senator Church. Specifically, Mr. Clark was asked if Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had received such a request and how they responded. Mr. Clark advised that CIA had not received a specific request for the titles and numbers of CIA officers assigned to intelligence collection or counterintelligence matters. However, CIA had received a request to identify the names and numbers of CIA covert officers assigned overseas.

REC-106 62-116395-866

Mr. Clark advised that CIA intended to advise the Staff Director of the SSC that CIA was unwilling to provide such names and numbers to the SSC for retention in its files. However, CIA would be willing to allow a senior staff member or the Staff Director to review the names and numbers of CIA covert officers overseas at the CIA headquarters building.

APR 29 1975

WOC:ekw CKV
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL ADDENDUM PAGE 3

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/KG

84 APR 30 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

If approved, the Legal Counsel Division should advise the SCC that because of security considerations, the ~~[illegible]~~ titles and numbers of Special Agents of the FBI assigned to internal security and counterintelligence matters cannot be furnished to the SCC in documented form for the Committee files. However, the FBI would be willing to show the titles and figures to Mr. Miller or a senior staff member at FBIHQ in an effort to demonstrate a spirit of cooperation and credibility.

WRW/TJL

Addendum

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division interposes no objection to Intelligence Division's recommendation. If approved, Intelligence Division prepare necessary communication to notify the SSC.

JCF

JH

See memo to A.G.
with encl. for AD & SSC
4/22/75 EWL/EKW.
WJB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

DATE: 4/11/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
APRIL 11, 1975

MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM 1746

On 4/11/75, from 10:00 am until 12:20 pm, staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities were briefed by Assistant Director Wannall and members of his staff in the Conference Room at INTD. Briefed from the Committee were Mr. William Miller, Staff Director; Mr. Frederick A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel; and Messrs. Mark Gitenstein, Marvin Epstein, Patrick Shea, Britt Snider and Loch Johnson, all staff members.

The first hour of the briefing was occupied with the showing of the INTD slide presentation and commentary which provided highlights of the work of the INTD, both in the counterintelligence and internal security field. Following this presentation a question and answer period ensued for the rest of the briefing. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz posed most of the questions.

In the counterintelligence field the thrust of the questioning was directed toward the continuing growth of the hostile intelligence presence in the United States and its short-term and long-term effect on the FBI's operations. Mr. Wannall pointed out that the Director on previous occasions had indicated his intention to "beef up" the counterintelligence effort of the FBI by the addition of some 250 Special Agents, and that INTD had also effected certain programs designed to assign certain counterintelligence functions to non-Agent personnel, thereby freeing additional Special Agents to function as case officers. In response to a question as to whether the additional investigative effort necessary to counter the mounting hostile intelligence threat might not involve investigation of more and more American citizens, Mr. Wannall conceded

62-116395

REC-106 62-116395-83

APR 29 1975

EWL:jvl
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 APR 30 1975

that this was inevitable. He stressed, however, the investigative policies of the FBI which protected the constitutional rights and right of privacy of such individuals.

On the domestic internal security side the thrust of the questioning appeared to indicate an interest in the predication, duration and administrative controls of investigations of domestic organizations and individuals. Again, Mr. Wannall stressed the precautions inherent in FBI policy and instructions to the field in these matters, pointing out, in effect, that these investigations are founded on statutory authority and are closely supervised by experienced personnel at Headquarters level. The Committee staff appeared to accept these answers and no critical or hostile attitudes on their part were evident.

The briefing was terminated at 12:20 pm, due to commitments on the part of the staff. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz both expressed their appreciation for the briefing and indicated it had been most instructive. They indicated a desire to continue these discussions at some later date and Mr. Wannall assured them that he would be happy to continue the briefing at any future mutually agreeable time.

Perhaps most significant of all questions posed was the final question by Mr. Schwarz in which he inquired as to what advantages and disadvantages to the FBI could be anticipated as a result of the Committee fulfilling its mandate. Mr. Wannall replied that any statutory authority defining and affirming the FBI's role in the intelligence collection field would certainly be a positive achievement. He also stated that any result of the Committee's investigation which would tend to limit the investigative resources or the investigative effectiveness of the FBI would surely be an unfortunate negative factor.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: April 23, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
~~FORMER~~ SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

T. J. Cregar

At 3:17 p.m., 4/22/75 former Special Agent Lish Whitson who for many years was a supervisor in the Intelligence Division telephoned me to advise that he had received a request to appear for an interview by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee. The interview was scheduled for 4/23/75.

In response to a question by Mr. Whitson, he was advised that to the writer's knowledge this was the first former Bureau employee who had been requested to appear for an interview by any member of the staff of the Select Committee. Whitson stated that he was proceeding on the basis that he would respond to questions propounded to him but he had some reservation in his mind concerning answering questions which would involve material which he knew to be classified at the time he retired. He commented he had noted in the news media that staff members of the Committee were reportedly to be granted clearances through TOP SECRET - Q (Atomic Energy Matters).

Whitson was advised by the writer that while it was true staff members were being granted clearances, the Bureau was endeavoring to establish procedures through the Attorney General whereby highly sensitive and classified material could be revealed on a restricted basis in response to Committee inquiries; for example, in some instances we would request that only the Majority and Minority leaders on the Committee be furnished certain types of material and in other instances only the Senators themselves as opposed to all staff members.

REC-100 62-116395-84

Mr. Whitson said in view of this, it was his intention to be as responsive and candid during the interview by Mr. Epstein as he could be but if any questions arose in his mind with respect to revelation as to what he, Whitson, considered to be sensitive material, he anticipated he would express his concern to Mr. Epstein and advise him he felt it would be appropriate to check with the Bureau since he is aware of regulations by the Attorney General which preclude revealing FBI information without the Attorney General's specific

8 APR 29 1975

WRW:lml

(5)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall

#MOR 6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/

CONTINUED - OVER

5-6508

84 APR 29 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

prior approval. Whitson stated that if the writer had no objection, he would telephone again after his interview with Epstein in the event any matters came up which he felt would be of interest to the Bureau. He was assured that the writer had no objection whatsoever and would appreciate any observations which he cared to pass along.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

JBA
PLM

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 22, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TFG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated March 19, 1975, the Senate Select Committee requested information from the FBI. Part I of the Committee's letter pertained to the legal authority for investigations.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and four documents on the subject of legal authority for investigations.

A copy of this memorandum, with enclosures, is being provided for your records.

4/28/75 Approved by [illegible] ([illegible])
4/28/75 Delivered to Mike Epstein of Committee (SSC)

Enclosures - 10

AFW:vb (6)

REC-100

62-116395-83

NOTE:

The Senate Select Committee's 3/19/75, letter was transmitted with an attachment, prepared by the Committee's staff, which set forth examples of the type of information concerning domestic intelligence jurisdiction of interest to it. Among those items cited in the attachment to the Committee's 3/19/75, letter was a study on jurisdiction prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III by the Office of Legal Counsel, dated 5/18/72. Representatives of the Legal Counsel Division do not believe the 5/18/72 study is, in itself, appropriate to furnish in response to the question of the Senate Select Committee on legal authority. However, Legal Counsel Division believes that two internal FBI memoranda, prepared in connection with the drafting of the 5/18/72 study, would be pertinent to the Senate Select Committee's inquiry. Accordingly, these two documents, items one and two of attached memorandum for the Committee, are being furnished.

APR 29 1975

6 ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

JBA

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

APR 29 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."

2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.

4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

1 - The Attorney General

soc. Dir. ——
Dep. AD Adm. —
Dep. AD Inv. —
Asst Dir
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. —
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
tell. ——
boratory ——
. & Eval. —
Inv. ——
ing ——
oun ——
e Rm. —
Sec'y —

AFW:vb
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

mor16

Jot

JBA
PLM

62-116395-83
ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."

2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.

4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/

62-116395-83

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

O : Mr. Dalbey DATE: 5/16/72

ROM : J. A. Mintz JAM

UBJECT: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

#moe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/MG

You requested analysis of the legal authority for FBI criminal intelligence collection and its relationship to our statutory jurisdiction in criminal matters.

"The gathering of criminal intelligence information" describes activity not subject to precise definition. However, its general objective is well understood by those engaged in law enforcement. There exist individuals and groups whose daily occupations are directed toward profit without regard to the restraints of the law. Yet, by the very nature of their associations, little actual participation in criminal acts may be observed by the most astute law enforcement observer. Their existence and contribution to the sum of criminal behavior has been detected and to some degree measured by the collection of data concerning their personal life-styles, property holdings, associates, influence, and access to capital. Such information has been characterized as "criminal intelligence."

For years, the FBI has been aware of the need to identify these resources of the criminal element. Congress responded to this need through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The Congressional findings were that organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and by the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption. Legitimate business and labor unions are infiltrated and corrupted and our democratic processes are subverted. The problem was declared to be of of national concern both as to our economy and the domestic security.

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395-83 ✓

ENCLOSURE

The Act attempted to attack organized crime by making criminal the management of syndicated gambling and by prohibiting racketeering activity characteristic of organized crime including the use of illegal proceeds for investment in legitimate business enterprises.

The long-established suspicions of law enforcement officers were confirmed by the Congressional findings but statutory enactments did not eliminate the conduct described as evil therein. There remains the task of establishing the identities of those constituting the national menace and developing prosecutable evidence of their guilt. "Criminal intelligence" collection is one means by which this responsibility may be fulfilled. It may be the only practical means in view of the scarcity of witnesses willing to testify and of the high mortality potential of those who do appear. A classic example of such intimidation is reported in United States v. Addonizio, 451 F2d 49 (3rd Cir. 1972) where a prospective witness in a corruption case found an anonymous note on the seat of his car which read "This could have been a bomb. Keep your mouth shut."

Accepting the need for intelligence gathering as a practical necessity, the issue remains as to its propriety in the face of Constitutional protections. If the Supreme Court announces that individuals have a Constitutionally protected right of privacy that may be overcome only through established arrest, search, and subpoena procedures, the issue will be settled. But, thus far, the Court has only drawn upon the concept of Constitutional privacy to resolve cases involving special circumstances such as marital affairs (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)) and interception of communications (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))

More specific Constitutional limitations on the criminal intelligence function may be found in the First Amendment protections of speech and assembly; the Fourth Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

The theme consistently found in decisions having a bearing on th relationship between these rights and the collection of criminal intelligence is that, when in direct conflict, the collection efforts must yield. Such is

not to label criminal intelligence as necessarily the product of malpractice, but to recognize the paramount nature of the Constitutional interests being safeguarded. Other incidents of government regulatory authority have been required to yield as well when confronted with legitimate claims of Constitutional protection, e.g. the administrative search cases, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

Overt and obtrusive conduct susceptible of being characterized as harassment may well be enjoined as, for example, was the case of an obvious 24-hour-a-day physical surveillance of an individual, his home, relatives, friends, and associates (Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964) cert. den. 379 U.S. 1001. Similar results might be expected where an identified officer loiters in the subject's place of business (Bee See Books, Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (SD N.Y. 1968) or openly attends organizational meetings where his presence inhibits communication and the transaction of the business of the assembly (Local 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (ND Ind. 1948)). However, open photographic surveillance of public gatherings (Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (ED Va. 1971)) and secret monitoring of criminal activities through the use of undercover agents (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)) and informants (Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 295 (1966)) have met with judicial approval.

Obviously, criminal intelligence information gained by unreasonable search and seizure or through compelled self-incrimination is tainted and subject to judicial condemnation upon complaint of one having the requisite standing.

Perhaps, the decision coming nearest to discussing the legality of criminal intelligence collection was Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A2d 298 (1969), (reversed on the ground more complete record was needed to support the decision) 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970). New Jersey had responded to the threat of continuing civil disorders by collecting intelligence information on persons and events alleged to have some relationship to such activities. The trial court held the collection effort to be unconstitutional because it conflicted with the First Amendment.

However, the court order to destroy the intelligence files excepted instances "where such information will be used to charge persons with specifically defined criminal conduct." 256 A2d at 305. Thus, the decision may be interpreted as drawing a distinction between collection of intelligence information where political or social factors are involved and First Amendment freedoms therefore may be directly inhibited and collection of criminal intelligence information where the objective is the establishment of criminal conduct and the identities of the offenders. While the Fourth and Fifth Amendment may be enjoyed by the guilty and innocent alike, it is improbable that the First Amendment would be stretched so far as to protect freedom of speech and assembly when such speech and assembly constitute elements of a criminal offense. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey returned the case for further development of the record and observed ". . . the executive branch may gather whatever information it reasonably believes to be necessary to enable it to perform the police roles, detectional and preventive. A court should not interfere in the absence of proof of bad faith or arbitrariness." 265 A2d at 688.

A tentative conclusion may be stated, subject to further development of the case law. The gathering of criminal intelligence information for the purpose of developing evidence of specific offenses characteristic of organized crime is legally justified as well as practically necessary. Where there is diversion from the proper objective and such collection efforts are manipulated to cause harassment or where such activity conflicts with Constitutional rights, to that extent the criminal intelligence program must be reformed.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOV ENT

Memorandum

ɔ : Mr. Dalbey DATE: 5/18/72

ROM : J. B. Hotis

UBJECT: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

You requested an analysis of the Bureau's authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. The question of the jurisdictional basis for these investigations is being examined at length by the Domestic Intelligence Division and will not be discussed here.

It is fair to say that the domestic intelligence program is one of the more controversial areas of the Bureau's activities. For one thing, an intelligence investigation casts a broader net than inquiries that are directed toward the proof of a specific offense. A large amount of raw data is collected, much of which has no immediate bearing on potential offenses or offenders. But seemingly trivial information may later become important in the detection and prevention of violence or civil disorder. There are also fears that these investigations may eventually touch upon one's political beliefs, habits or associations; or that information collected for proper purposes may eventually be misused at the hands of Government. Each is a legitimate concern. The notion of Government prying into the personal lives of its citizens is repellent to all of us. And yet there is a strong sense that the Government must acquire necessary intelligence information if it is to meet its responsibilities in connection with the national security.

One of the major concerns about our domestic intelligence activities is that they are not supervised or monitored by any outside agency. The claim is made that the Executive Branch has been left wide discretion to define its own authority, and to choose the directions, methods, and focus of its investigations. For one thing, the law has never made clear what facts and circumstances must be present to authorize an intelligence investigation, nor how far such an investigation may lawfully proceed without being directed toward proof of a specific offense.

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

And unlike the practice in criminal cases, our electronic surveillances in security matters are not submitted for prior court approval. For another, the exclusionary rule which provides the usual method of judicial control over investigative procedures, is not often available in security cases. Since the goal is largely preventive, these cases seldom come before the courts. As a result, the public, the courts, and the Congress have very little information about how we operate in domestic intelligence matters and what we do with the information acquired.

In response to this situation, some members of the Congress have pressured for tighter controls over the Bureau, perhaps in the form of a watchdog committee to oversee our operations. Senator Ervin, who chairs the Senate Subsommittee on Constitutional Rights has expressed particular concern about the right of privacy and the authority of the Government to gather information. In an exchange of correspondence with the Department of Justice, the Senator has requested specific documentation of the Department's guidelines for the gathering and retention of domestic intelligence information. He has also suggested that legislation might be enacted, requiring a showing of probable cause before an investigation can be initiated by the Government. It is doubtful that any such measure would pass the Congress, but the proposal does show the mood of the times.

A parallel trend may be developing in the courts. In several recent cases, plaintiffs have made the claim that Government information gathering, which goes beyond the effort to apprehend criminal suspects, may have a "chilling effect" on the exercise of First Amendment rights. These challenges thus far have not been successful. Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970); Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Westmoreland, 323 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1971).

The courts have generally recognized that one of the principal functions of the Bureau is to gather information law violators, agitators of violence and possible subversives.. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1971) cert. granted, 404 U.S. 955 (1971); The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et. al., 70 Civ. 2646 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has observed that the identity of the agency gathering such information is determinative of the significance of any alleged chill to

to First Amendment rights. Thus, in Davis v. Ichord, 442 F2d 1207 (D. C. Cir. 1970) although appellants allegedly felt chilled by a Congressional Committee's investigation of them, the Court of Appeals found there was insufficient justiciability in their claims to create a viable case or controversy. This was because appellants had "failed to bring the fear of investigation by the present Committee home to themselves," their fears were wholly speculative; there were no criminal proceedings confronting them; nor was any action pending. Moreover, the Court in Davis found that the power of a Congressional Committee began and ended with the investigation; whenever a Committee of the Congress seeks punitive action, the Judiciary must become involved, and thus every investigation has a judicial check which operates to guarantee the protection of constitutional rights.

This latter aspect of the Davis decision was given perspective by the Court of Appeals in Tatum. In contrasting the potential impact on First Amendment rights occasioned by investigations conducted by the military with investigations conducted by a civilian investigative agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Court observed:

> The compilation of data by a civilian investigative agency is thus not the threat to civil liberties or the deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech that such action by the military is, because a civil investigative agency has no inherent power always being subject to the well-defined restrictions of law and the approval of the courts. * * *

There, the Court pointedly examined the "source of the chill" as it had in Davis, and in applying the "chilling effect doctrine", singled out the FBI as a source which does not generate a reasonable basis for inhibitions or apprehensions. In this connection the Court stated,

> Referring to our holding in Davis that the "source of the chill" is important in determining whether there is any inhibiting effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights, we think that there is a significant difference between investigative actions taken by a military agency in reference to civilians and similar investigative actions taken by a regular investigative agency of a civilian branch of the Government.
>
> One of the functions of a civilian investigative agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is to compile information on law violators, agitators of violence, and possible subversives. It has always been recognized that this is a delicate function, and it is exercised under the direction of the Attorney General. Investigation is performed by men a majority of whom are under the direction of lawyers in the Justice Department, and the information compiled is only usable and effective through court action. The FBI is powerless to imprison or to affect his liberty in any way except through the action of the courts.

As to the surveillance of public meetings through the use of informants, it has been held that such surveillance is not per se actionable. See Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971) (police surveillance of street demonstrations held not to offend First Amendment rights).

The Supreme Court in Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293 (1966), held that the use of secret informants is "not per se unconstitutional", and does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, nor the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court upheld, as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, admission at trial of evidence obtained by an undercover informant to whom a defendant spoke without knowledge that he was in the employ of the police. 385 U.S. at 300-303. See also Lewis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 206 (1966) and Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963).

Moreover, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), recently held that the use of secret informants does not violate any constitutionally justifiable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, even when an informant uses electronic equipment to transmit his conversations with defendants to other agents.

If the use of undercover government informants without a warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment and invade a defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, Hoffa v. U.S., supra, and such informants may write down their conversations with defendants and testify concerning them, or simultaneously record and transmit such conversations to others, who may testify against them, On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747 (1952); U.S. v. White, supra, then clearly mere visual "surveillance" of plaintiffs in plain view by informants at public meetings would not violate their constitutional rights.

It would seem that those who elect to present their views actively in the public arena deliberately expose themselves to the public. See Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Any recording of their activities by the defendants does not invade their privacy any more than does a newspaper, radio, or television story, and, indeed, much less since any information compiled is usable and effective only through court action. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

More difficult questions are presented where the investigation delves into the private affairs of the individuals or organizations. But even here, the courts have generally sustained our procedures so long as they comport with the restrictions of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et. al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et. al., 70 Civ. 2646 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. (examination of bank records) U.S. v. Gerhart, 275 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (examination of bank records); Minker v. U.S., 312 F2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962) (trash covers); Cohen v. U.S., 378 F2d 751 (9th Cir. 1967) (mail covers); U.S. v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detention and examination of packages in the mail); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (seizure of union records); Hoffa v. U.S., supra; U.S. v. White, supra; (use of informants).

In summary, it is premature to say that the First Amendment line of cases, dealing with the "chilling" concept offers any substantial impediment to our intelligence investigations. There is less reason for optimism, however, with regard to congressional intervention. We should be prepared, therefore, to meet arguments regarding the need for outside supervision. The sound answer, which should satisfy governmental needs and individual rights, is found in tight internal controls and carefully developed guidelines.

POSITION PAPER

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSION

May 19, 1972

OVERVIEW

This paper deals with the conduct by the FBI of intelligence-type investigations supervised by the Domestic Intelligence Division. Authority for these investigations is documented and outlined, including situations where there is no direct violation of law. Criteria and controls and dissemination policies implementing this authority are detailed.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ATG

62-116395-83
ENCLOSURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 1

AUTHORITY 10
  - Congressional Enactments 10
  - Presidential Directives 11
  - Policy Instructions of Attorney General 12
  - National Security Council Directives 13
  - Interagency Agreements 13

IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY 14
  - Administrative Index 15
  - Revolutionary Groups 17
  - Extremist Groups 19
  - Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals 19
  - Unaffiliated Individuals 21
  - Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations 21
  - Restrictions on Investigations 23
  - Information Storage and Retrieval 25
  - Dissemination 27

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2-ALM/STG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]
#MORI6

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

The FBI's intelligence function is well established and documented. Yet, our work in gathering intelligence has been the subject of continuing criticism from segments of the press with charges being made that the FBI is conducting without authority security investigations of persons who are not in violation of the law. It has also been charged that our intelligence collection is uncontrolled, capricious and dwells on personal idiosyncrasies without there being any security interest involved. Fragments of information, distorted and twisted to convey the false impression that the FBI is wantonly disregarding the privacy of citizens, have been published.

The FBI does not conduct security investigations of individuals without clear-cut authority and tight controls. Critics have taken fragments of intelligence which have come to their attention and built them up into what is represented as the end product of security investigations with political overtones. In these instances, the items upon which such importance was placed have been fragmentary intelligence from substantive

investigations and could not be viewed in their real significance, except as they fit into the overall perspective of the case. This is indicative of the danger of using piecemeal intelligence taken out of context; properly used, however, intelligence is a legitimate and necessary part of all security investigations.

Intelligence is information and the collection of it is inseparable from efficient investigative operations. In fact the two--investigation and intelligence--are mutually dependent.

In the security field, it is vital that the Federal Government detect factors which have a direct bearing on possible violations of law related to the overthrow or destruction of the Government. Intelligence developed to identify individuals who have a propensity for revolutionary or racial violence or have affiliations with subversive or revolutionary groups is essential in the enforcement of the laws designed to protect the integrity of the Government. Intelligence is also essential to the detection of attempts or conspiracies to move against the Government, actions which may themselves be crimes.

No constitutional provisions, statutory enactments or judicial rulings have attempted to deprive law enforcement of its intelligence function, although various attempts have

been made to define or limit the areas encompassed by intelligence and particularly the techniques of collection. It is also recognized that some intelligence gathering activities may have an incidental "chilling" effect on individual citizens. The spectre of the Government's investigatory presence may cause a reaction in citizens, inhibiting the exercise of their full constitutional rights. Therefore, a balance between the requirements of the Government and the constitutional rights of citizens must be maintained.

The intelligence function of investigation, must be both reasonable and practical. It varies in scope and intensity with the seriousness of the provision it seeks to enforce. It is neither reasonable nor practical to launch an aggressive intelligence collection effort concerning the activities of those who might potentially violate a local antilittering ordinance. Detection of a conspiracy to bomb the White House, on the other hand, certainly justifies a continuous and intensive intelligence effort to identify the participants and gain knowledge of any specific plans.

It is mandatory that a Government protect its integrity and this has been recognized by judicial authorities. Ordinary crimes victimize an individual or groups; crimes against the existence of the government victimize society. Carrying these crimes to their ultimate produces the ultimate crime against society--the destruction of that society.

It is clear that the aspirations of most revolutionary groups far exceed their capability to achieve their ultimate objectives. They are, however, quite capable of eroding the integrity of the democratic system by lesser acts and, if not discouraged or thwarted, might well accumulate the will and power for more decisive action. The dramatic success of the Castro revolution is a sufficient example. Consequently, continuing intelligence collection relating to all revolutionary individuals and organizations, commensurate with the immediate threat posed, is imperative to proper vigilance.

The FBI serves as a prime producer of intelligence for the Executive Branch. Over the years it has provided information concerning hostile actions directed against the U. S.

by foreign governments, their intelligence services and others acting in their behalf. On the domestic scene the FBI has penetrated conspiracies ranging from the communist underground to the hooded night riders of the Klan who terrorized our black citizens. But, in the 1960's explosive changes occurred in the internal security problems faced by the country. These changes were reflected in both the scope and nature of the FBI's response and in the intelligence requirements levied upon the FBI by the Executive Branch.

In the decade of the '60's, social change and upheaval added to the critical areas of the FBI's intelligence responsibilities the problems of revolutionary and extremist activities. ✓ America was stunned by violent student disruptions, bombings and riots. Spanning the decade were civil rights protests, reactions against them, and tragically, the burning and looting of Watts in 1965 and the conflagrations in Detroit, Newark and Washington, D. C. And, what had been the youthful idealism of the emerging new left in the 1962 Port Huron Statement was drowned out by the obscene Weatherman war cries

as they took their revolution to the streets of Chicago in 1969 during their "Days of Rage."

As the tide of crime and disruption swelled, it brought with it new and pressing problems on the domestic security scene. FBI domestic security investigations increased accordingly. There was also an immediate increase in FBI intelligence collection concerning the lawlessness and violent tactics of these emerging revolutionary elements.

Intelligence collection was essential in contending with these new domestic security problems. This fact was recognized by the reports of two Presidential Commissions. The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission, 1968) stressed that the absence of accurate information before and during disorders created special control problems. It emphasized that law enforcement organizations must develop the means to obtain adequate intelligence for planning purposes and that law enforcement should "gather, evaluate, analyze and disseminate information on potential as well as actual civil disorders."

Similarly, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) took special note of the need for intelligence in effective law enforcement. The Commission stated in its report, "It is an undoubted fact that on some campuses there are men and women who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and sometimes to maim and kill." The report concluded that the best, AND sometimes the only, means law enforcement has to thwart or prevent such plots is through "clandestine intelligence work."

Prevention is the very essence of the proper use of intelligence. To be forewarned is to be placed in a position to carry out countermeasures to meet a threat. During the mass actions and violent confrontations of the 1960's, FBI intelligence collection was crystallized in dissemination of information to other government agencies. This intelligence provided them with an essential working tool to contend with public disorders and activities of a revolutionary nature.

In a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, 9/14/67, Attorney General Clark stressed the importance of intelligence. The Attorney General asserted, "It is most important that

you use the maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon (riot activity)." Elaborating on this point, he said, "In these circumstances we must be certain that every attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon these problems; to take every step possible to determine whether the rioting is pre-planned or organized; and, if so, to determine the identity of the people and interests involved; and to deter this activity by prompt and vigorous legal action." The Attorney General's evaluation of the importance of intelligence in this instance applies with equal force to other areas of the FBI's security work.

In December, 1967, the Department of Justice, aware of the high priority of intelligence in dealing with civil disorders, created the Inter-Division Information Unit. This is a repository for "reports which relate to individual or organizational activities which may play a part in instigating or spreading civil disorders" and includes intelligence "relating to black power and black nationalist organizations,

officers and members thereof, racial incidents throughout the country, and any specific demonstrations which are being planned and are of such nature as to render them subject to the possibility of violence." Quick retrieval of this intelligence was emphasized through the use of computers.

Attorney General Mitchell wrote to the FBI Director on May 17, 1971, concerning the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, created to analyze and evaluate intelligence for the guidance of the White House and other departments of the Executive Branch. In this memorandum, the Attorney General stated, "Intensified activities on the part of militant groups here in Washington, D. C., and elsewhere in the country clearly point up the need not only for the gathering of the highest quality intelligence available but also for an expert analysis and evaluation of the intelligence product itself."

AUTHORITY

All FBI investigations and intelligence collection functions in the internal security field are based on authorizations in Congressional enactments, Presidential directives, policy instructions of the Attorney General, National Security Council directives and interagency agreements as set forth below.

Congressional Enactments

Attorney General direction of FBI - 28 U. S. Code, Section 533

Treason - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2381 (U. S. Constitution, Article III, Section 3)

Rebellion and insurrection - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2383

Seditious Conspiracy - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2384

Advocating violent overthrow of Government - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2385 (Smith Act)

Sedition - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 2387, 2388, 2391

Recruiting for armed hostilities against U. S. - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2389

Designation of Organizations as "communist-action" and of Individuals as members of such groups after hearings by Subversive Activities Control Board - 50 U. S. Code, Sections 781-798 as amended or repealed (Internal Security Act of 1950, Subchapter I, called Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 and amendments by Communist Control Act of 1954) See also Executive Order 11605 below

Espionage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 792 et seq.

Sabotage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2151 et seq.

Private Correspondence with Foreign Governments - 18 U. S. Code, Section 953 (Logan Act)

Registration of Foreign Agents - 22 U. S. Code, Sections 611-621

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 - 42 U. S. Code, Section 2122

Deportation for Subversive Activities - 8 U. S. Code, Section 1481 (Immigration and Nationality Act 1952)

Possession, threatened use, or use of explosives for illicit purposes - 18 U. S. Code, Section 844

Travel in or use of facility of interstate commerce to promote or incite riot, to commit violence in furtherance of riot or to abet others in inciting or participating in a riot. - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 231-233, 245, 2101-2102

Neutrality Matters - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 956, 958-962; 22 U. S. Code, Sections 1934, 401 (Munitions Control Act)

Intelligence exchange with CIA - 50 U. S. Code, Section 403 (National Security Act)

Presidential Directives

Directive of the President - 6/26/39 directing that investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters are handled by FBI.

Directive of the President - 9/6/39 requesting the Attorney General to instruct FBI to take charge of investigative matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.

Presidential Directive - 1/8/43
reiterated instructions of previous directive of 9/6/39 and requested law enforcement officers, patriotic organizations and individuals turn over to FBI all information regarding espionage, sabotage and violations of neutrality regulations.

Presidential Directive - 7/24/50
reiterated substance of 9/6/39 and 1/8/43 directives, noting they provided for FBI to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.

Directive of President 12/15/53
referred to previous Presidential Directives and added investigation by FBI of violations of Atomic Energy Act.

Executive Order 10450 4/27/53
established programs to insure that the employment and retention of any Government employee is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. Requires check of FBI Fingerprint Files and, in cases where derogatory information develops, FBI conducts a full-field investigation.

Executive Order 11605 7/2/71
calls for Subversive Activities Control Board, when petitioned by the Attorney General, to determine after hearings if any organization is totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or whether it has adopted a policy of advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their Constitutional or statutory rights. By inference, the FBI, as investigative arm of the Attorney General, would develop evidence for hearings required. Also, FBI, by inference, would develop evidence of membership in such organizations, which may be basis for denial of Government employment.

Policy Instructions of Attorney General

September 14, 1967: instructions of then Attorney General Ramsey Clark for FBI to investigate possibility of conspiracy to plan, promote, or aggravate riot activity.

February 18, 1969: instructions from the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, for FBI to obtain information concerning possibility that underlying subversive groups were giving illegal directions or guidance to numerous campus disorders.

(Other policy instructions from Attorney General and Department have been received, amplifying points set forth above; many of these concerned specific cases.)

National Security Council Directives

Directive on Internal Security, March 23, 1949, establishing Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC) responsible to coordinate investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. FBI represented on IIC.

United States Intelligence Board (USIB) established September 15, 1958, to maintain coordination between CIA and other intelligence agencies. FBI a member of USIB to provide domestic intelligence for correlation with foreign intelligence.

Interagency Agreements

Delimitations Agreement signed by IIC members March 23, 1949, to establish jurisdiction in investigations by members of espionage, counterespionage, subversion, and sabotage and to provide for exchange of information on above matters.

FBI-Secret Service Agreement signed November 26, 1971, to provide for transmittal of information from FBI to Secret Service regarding individuals and organizations who, because of their propensities, represent or may represent a danger to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY

The criteria and guidelines for FBI investigations are furnished to the field in a "Manual of Instructions," the "F. B. I. Handbook," and in Letters to all Special Agents in Charge. In addition, instructions and guidance are given to the field in Headquarters communications on specific cases. Compliance with criteria and guidelines is obtained by supervision in both the field and at Bureau Headquarters. In addition, regular inspections of field and Headquarters Divisions assure that Bureau policies concerning investigations are being followed.

In the security field, the basic responsibility of the FBI is to investigate revolutionary organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow or destruction of the United States Government. These include old-line Marxist groups, for example, the Communist Party, USA, and the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party; and such new revolutionary groups as the Students for a Democratic Society, the Black Panther Party and the Weatherman. In the investigation of subversive individuals a determination is made of the dangerousness of the individual and efforts are made to obtain evidence of violations of any applicable

Federal laws. To assist in cataloguing the level of dangerousness of those individuals and to retrieve quickly information concerning them, the Domestic Intelligence Division maintains a card file known as the Administrative Index.

Administrative Index

Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Emergency Detention Act) before it was repealed on September 25, 1971, provided for emergency detention of subversive individuals in the event of a national emergency. To implement that provision of the act, the FBI and the Department of Justice maintained the Security Index. This Index was, of course, discontinued with the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act. By memorandum of October 22, 1971, however, the Attorney General noted that the repeal of Title II "does not alter or limit the FBI's authority and responsibility to record, file and index information secured" in this field and concurred in the establishment of an administrative index to assist in "making readily retrievable and available the results of its (the FBI's) investigations into subversive activities."

15

To this end, such an index (called Adex) was instituted for making quickly retrievable information on four categories of individuals in order of dangerousness:

I) National leaders of revolutionary or extremist groups, members who have exhibited a propensity for violence, members with training in sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla warfare,. unaffiliated revolutionaries with a propensity for violence, and revolutionaries with access to key facilities.

II) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and extremist groups, active members of these groups, and unaffiliated revolutionaries or extremists with a propensity for violence against property rather than persons.

III) Rank-and-file members of revolutionary groups within the previous five years, leaders of fronts for revolutionary groups, and individuals with revolutionary ideologies likely in a national emergency to commit acts of espionage, sabotage, or terrorism.

IV) Persons likely to assist, financially or otherwise, revolutionary groups, or persons in a position to influence others to commit acts inimical to the national defense.

Investigation of an individual is conducted to determine whether or not he should, consistent with the criteria of these categories, be listed on the Adex. If, as

1b

the result of the investigation, it is determined he does not meet the criteria the case is closed. If, on the other hand, he does meet the criteria, he is listed in the Adex according to the determined degree of dangerousness. Category I cases continue under investigation for as long as the individual continues to warrant that Category listing. When an individual is listed in Categories II, III, and IV, however, the investigation is closed, subject to periodic reopening to verify his location, to determine his activities and to ascertain whether he still qualifies for inclusion in the Adex. Provision is made for upgrading, downgrading and purging an individual from the Adex as his activities and level of dangerousness fluctuate.

Revolutionary Groups

Investigations of individuals for a determination of whether or not they meet the criteria for Adex generally involve their degree of affiliation with revolutionary and extremist groups. The purpose of investigations of basic revolutionary and new-left type groups is to: (1) provide intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities;

(2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to prevent such conspiracies from being carried out; and (3) develop evidence necessary for the Attorney General to file petitions before the Subversive Activities Control Board in accordance with provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and Executive Order 11605.

The criteria, guidelines and restrictions on the investigations of revolutionary groups are outlined below:

> Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information indicating that organization advocates overthrow of Government or engages in activity to deny others their Constitutional or statutory rights.
>
> Investigation is conducted to establish aims and objectives, location and size, domination and control by hostile foreign power, identities of all leaders and members.

In regard to their front groups and organizations which they have infiltrated:

> Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information that organization is dominated, controlled or influenced to substantial degree by revolutionary organization.
>
> Investigation is conducted to determine degree of infiltration, aims and objectives, location and size and identities of all leaders.

Extremist Groups

The purpose of investigations of white hate and black extremist organizations is to: (1) provide intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities; and (2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to prevent such conspiracies from being carried out. Investigations of white hate groups are confined to those which have actually or allegedly committed or have conspired to commit acts of violence or have adopted a policy of advocating or inciting the use of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution. Investigations of black extremist organizations concern those groups which take extremist, anti-U. S. Government, anti-white positions and whose activities have involved them or may involve them in civil unrest and/or subversive activity.

Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals

Individuals referred to as subversives are generally affiliated with old-line basic revolutionary organizations; those termed revolutionaries are usually new left types; and those called extremists are fundamentally

involved in violent or revolutionary activities based on race. Procedures for the investigation of these types of individuals are similar and the criteria are outlined as follows:

Membership in a basic revolutionary organization

Espousing the LINE OF REVOlutionary movements

Special trainING GROUP, or leadership training, in a revolutionary group

Individuals having access to key facilities who have been members of a revolutionary group at any time

Persons with revolutionary, terrorist, anarchistic or extremist beliefs who are likely to seize upon a national emergency to endanger public safety

Individuals who have actually or allegedly committed, conspired to commit, or adopted policy to commit acts of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution

Extremists and revolutionaries who have demonstrated a propensity for violence, have involved or may involve themselves in civil unrest, or who advocate violent overthrow of the Government

Persons who influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense or who are likely to furnish financial or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements because of their sympathies, associations or ideologies

Unaffiliated Individuals

In the areas of revolutionary (new left) and extremist activities, some investigations are conducted of individuals who are not affiliated with organizations. Investigation of an individual is undertaken when information is received that the person:

Is a revolutionary and adheres to the Weatherman ideology of advocating a revolution now and uses terrorist tactics in furtherance of revolution

Is a revolutionary or extremist and demonstrates by acts or statements propensity for violence against property

Exhibits revolutionary or extremist ideology and is likely to seize opportunity in national emergency to commit espionage, sabotage, terrorism or otherwise interfere with Federal or local governments or defense efforts

Influences others to engage in acts inimical to national defense or likely to furnish financial or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements

Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations

The mission of the FBI in the foreign intelligence field is one of counterintelligence. The objectives and priorities of counterintelligence have been variously stated and evaluated. Generally, these objectives may be listed in declining priority as follows: (1) the detection and

identification of intelligence operations and agents; (2) the penetration of these operations for the purpose of control and the development of intelligence information; (3) neutralization of hostile intelligence operations through disruption and disinformation; and, (4) prosecution. Whatever the assigned priority, the overall objective is to deny access to information sought by whatever practical means are available.

Foreign intelligence investigations are grounded in the Espionage statute and related laws including the Registration and Atomic Energy Acts. Individual investigations are initiated usually on the basis of a known or suspected connection with a foreign intelligence service, foreign country or subversive organization with such connections. Since these investigations emanate from various sensitive sources and involve special considerations, extensive criteria and limitations are defined and enumerated in current instructions.

In general terms, the governing criteria are designed to preclude initiation and continuance of investigations which are not justified. The limitations are designed to control the scope of investigation in order to insure security of our interests through close supervisory scrutiny.

22

Restrictions on Investigations

FBI guidelines go beyond the rules for opening, investigating and closing cases; they also impose restrictions to make certain that we do not violate the constitutional rights of any individual and to preclude investigations from becoming "fishing expeditions." In the security field these are some of the restrictions WHICH are applied:

Security cases are evaluated continually to determine if we are fulfilling our responsibilities. Those cases not warranting further investigation are closed promptly.

There are no investigations of members of an organization which does not advocate use of force to bring about existing changes in the Government. Examples are the Socialist Party, the Independent Workers of the World and Independence Party of Puerto Rico.

Persons arrested during disruptive demonstrations are identified since circumstances of an arrest, in some cases, may indicate a propensity for violence. However, a mere arrest in connection with a demonstration is an insufficient basis in itself for security investigation. The arrest must be coupled with a demonstrated propensity for violence or with subversive or revolutionary activity on the part of the individual arrested.

When it is determined that a security subject is a member of the armed services, the investigation is discontinued immediately and the military advised.

Civil rights organizations are not investigated.

Ambassadors or heads of permanent missions to the United Nations are not investigated.

No surveillances are conducted at the White House, the Capitol, the Supreme Court, the House and Senate Office Buildings or the United Nations.

No telephone or microphone surveillances are operated without prior written approval of the Attorney General.

Bureau authority is REQUIRED for:

Investigations of officials and diplomatic representatives of foreign countries. (Department of State authority is also required.)

Investigation of communist infiltration of a political organization.

Developing sources connected with an institution of learning.

Interviews of subjects of active, current security investigations.

Investigations of faculty members. If approval is granted, only established sources functioning in an administrative capacity may be contacted on the campus. Other established sources and informants must be contacted away from the campus. Contacts with students, graduate students and faculty members must also have Bureau authority.

Interviews of labor leaders and persons in educational, mass media or publishing fields.

These examples demonstrate a consciousness of the need to impose limitations on investigations and the continuing imposition of them.

Information Storage and Retrieval

The storage and retrieval of information is a basic operational necessity of any investigative or intelligence-gathering agency. Procedures within the FBI for these functions provide for written records of information received from a variety of sources--confidential informants, confidential INVESTIGATIVE techniques, and open sources--and the storage of this information in different types of files. These include active investigative files on organizations and individuals and some general files. These "raw" files are maintained both at the Seat of Government and in the various field offices. Information in the files is thoroughly indexed so that data can be retrieved.

In the intelligence field, when an allegation within the jurisdiction of the FBI is received, a case on an individual or on an organization may be opened, depending on the quality of the allegation. Nonspecific information that is received on an individual or organization is placed in the pertinent file, if one exists, or is placed in a general file if the organization or individual is not the subject of a specific file.

These files are an integral part of the intelligence-gathering function. By the very nature of the FBI's assignment to coordinate internal security information, the maintenance of data over a period of time is required and it is necessary that a system for retrieving this information be used.

Because these files OFTEN contain derogatory information that may not SUBSTANTIATED [illegible]sed by further investigation (the derogatory information received may not be germane to a matter within the FBI's jurisdiction), the Attorneys General have long taken the position that these files should not be available for public scrutiny. Incalculable damage to individual reputations could result from the disclosure of single items of information without knowing the full background concerning the receipt of a particular item and the context within which it was recorded.

The late Justice Robert Jackson, in his capacity as Attorney General, wrote in 1941:

> Disclosure of information contained in the reports (FBI files) might also be the grossest kind of injustice to innocent individuals. Investigative reports include leads and suspicions, and sometimes even the statements of malicious or misinformed people. Even though later and more complete reports exonerate the individuals, the use of particular or selected reports might constitute the grossest injustice, and we all know a correction never catches up with an accusation.

Dissemination

The Bureau's general policy on dissemination is that information developed by or coming to the attention of the FBI is promptly referred to all agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government having a potential interest in it or responsibility for taking action concerning it, whenever that interest or responsibility is apparent or known. This policy is in accordance with numerous formal agreements entered into between the Bureau and other Government agencies. It is also in accordance with Presidential directives obligating the Bureau to act as clearing house for information affecting the internal security of the U. S.

Despite this general liberal policy of dissemination, we have recognized that with regard to highly sensitive information a determination must be made on an individual basis as to what information should be disseminated and how it should be transmitted. The degree of sensitivity and/or the security classification will determine level of dissemination to any interested agency and the method of transmittal. In certain instances, sensitive information may be furnished to a high-level official with a request that dissemination in his agency be restricted to his personnel on a need-to-know basis. Such information might be disseminated by secure teletype, courier, liaison, and where necessary, by secure telephone. Information furnished orally is confirmed in writing.

The Attorney General   August 7, 1973

Director, FBI

SCOPE OF FBI JURISDICTION
AND AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

mDF16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/LTG

During our meeting on July 26, 1973, you referred to a discussion you had with Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland during your confirmation hearings as to the statutory authority of the FBI and the Department of Justice in the field of domestic intelligence investigations. You then asked Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus to work with the FBI in weighing the pros and cons with regard to statutory authority in this area. I mentioned that research was being performed on this subject at the present time and that we would be in touch with Mr. Ruckelshaus with regard to this matter when we have completed the results of our consideration and findings within the FBI.

Actually, a study has been going on in the FBI for more than two years as to the scope of FBI jurisdiction and authority in domestic intelligence investigations. When Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III, was designated as Acting Director of the FBI, he instructed that a position paper be prepared concerning the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. A position paper was prepared which in essence stated that authority of the FBI in this field is based on legislative enactments, even though we may have publicly relied heavily on Presidential directives as the basis for such authority. Mr. Gray ordered an in-depth study made of the position and in August, 1972, a detailed report was furnished to him. The following is a summary of that report.

Over a period of several months there were a number of public statements questioning authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations, particularly where there is no clear-cut legislative authority apparent. One of the most searching inquiries was contained in a paper presented by Professor John T. Elliff at a two-day conference at Princeton University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public Justice.

62-116395-83

ENCLOSURE

A major thrust of Professor Elliff's paper concerned FBI authority derived from legislative enactments as opposed to that derived from Presidential directives, beginning with a directive issued by President Roosevelt in September, 1939. Professor Elliff is of the opinion that the 1939 directive, which was reiterated on three subsequent occasions, was magnified by the FBI from its original purpose to a definitive order to conduct intelligence-type investigations.

Senator Sam J. Ervin, as you know, had been probing into the nature and extent of FBI intelligence-type investigations. Senator Ervin had even announced that he intended to propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any person without that individual's consent, unless the Government has reason to believe that person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Other Congressmen indicated a similar interest in FBI investigative activities.

Our study revealed that the FBI had declared publicly over a long period of time that its responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field are authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential directives, and instructions of the Attorney General. The Presidential directives are obviously the 1) directive dated September 6, 1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953, and 2) Executive Order 10450 dated April 27, 1953 (and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order 11605 dated July 2, 1971).

In carefully analyzing the language of the first directive, dated September 6, 1939, and considering that the subsequent directives are all hinged on that one, we believe that there is a misconception as to the extent of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBI by these directives. It appears that while the 1939 directive fixed responsibility on the FBI to handle espionage, sabotage, and neutrality matters, it did not convey any authority or jurisdiction which the FBI did not already have from legislative enactments. It is difficult to read into this directive or in any of those which followed any authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations which would or could not be conducted under an umbrella of legislative enactments.

As a matter of historical fact, President Roosevelt in August, 1936, did request former Director J. Edgar Hoover to conduct investigations of subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism. This request, however, was a confidential oral request and there is doubt that any record of it was made outside the FBI. This request, or Presidential mandate, was based, incidentally, on the fact that the law provided that the FBI could conduct such investigations if the Secretary of State should so request.

The study revealed that while the 1939 et seq. directives did not grant any special intelligence-gathering authority to the FBI, we were responsible under these directives to collect all intelligence information furnished by local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies and patriotic citizens and to sift and coordinate all such information for indications of subversive activity covered by Federal statutes.

The study concluded that the FBI has the responsibility to conduct whatever investigations are necessary to determine if statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditious conspiracy, advocacy of overthrowing the Government, and other such crimes affecting the national security have been violated. In this connection we note that in a letter dated September 14, 1967, the Department of Justice advised that the FBI is continually alert to the problem of recurring riots and is submitting intelligence reports to the Department of Justice concerning such activity. This letter enumerated several Federal statutes and stated these could be applicable in using maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing on the question of schemes or conspiracies to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.

In other words, the Department was requesting all possible intelligence-type investigative activity based on the existence of certain statutes. We see this as being no different from our intelligence-type investigations relating to plans of groups or individuals to overthrow, destroy, interfere with or threaten the survival of effective operation of national, state, and local governments.

Based on this study, we believe that had there never been a single one of the Presidential directives in question the FBI would have conducted and will, through necessity, continue to conduct the same intelligence-type investigations as were conducted from 1939 to the present date. We also believe, however, that in order to counter the criticism and skepticism of such individuals as Professor Elliff and Senator Sam J. Ervin that an up-to-date Executive order should be issued clearly establishing a need for intelligence-type investigations and delineating a clear authority for the FBI to conduct such investigations based on guidelines established by the Attorney General and adhering to constitutional principles.

The study concluded with two basic recommendations. 1) That the Department of Justice be requested to sponsor comprehensive legislation spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of intelligence information relating to the national security and; 2) that the Department of Justice be requested to seek a comprehensive Executive order which would cover any possible gap between statutory authority and Executive necessity in protection of the national security.

At first glance these recommendations may appear to contradict our position that we already have statutory authority to conduct security-type investigations; that this being the case we do not need additional legislative enactments, nor do we need an Executive order. But being realistic we think that the basic statutes upon which we rely for our authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations need to be updated to fit 1973 needs. Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2383, 2384, and 2385 relate to the national security, but the legislative history of 2383 and 2384 indicates that they were designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth Century, and Section 2385 has been reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court. These statutes are unquestionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introduced as H.R. 6046 and S. 1400 in the 93rd Congress appear to contain language which should fill our statutory needs, except perhaps for those groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteed rights.

As to the need for an Executive order, we think that two issues are involved. We have statutory authority, but what we need is a definitive requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelligence data he requires in the pursuit of his responsibilities based on our statutory authority. In other words, there is a need, from our standpoint, for both authoritative and definitive guidelines. The statutes give us the authority. The Executive order would define our national security objectives.

Members of Congress, including such men as Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, have proposed legislation to spell out jurisdiction and authority of the FBI in this field. It would appear that the President would rather spell out his own requirements in an Executive order instead of having Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill his obligations and responsibilities as President.

The political climate of suspicion and distrust resulting from disclosures coming out of the Watergate hearings could present an obstacle to getting any such Executive order signed in the immediate future. However, the rationale is nevertheless valid and when scrutinized closely, the language in the Executive order we hereinafter propose establishes definitive guidelines which have heretofore been unclear. It is my belief that we should go forward with this.

We therefore propose and recommend that an Executive order along the following lines be submitted to the White House with a strong recommendation for approval. The language which follows is merely to illustrate the type of Executive order which we think would be appropriate and does not necessarily represent an ideal format or style which should be submitted to the White House.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Whereas the Constitution of the United States was established to insure, among other things, domestic tranquility; to provide for the common defense; and to promote the general welfare for the people of the United States; and

"Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally imposed responsibility of defending the Constitution and the existence of the Government thereunder; and

"Whereas there have been continuing unlawful acts of violence perpetrated against the Government of the United States or against citizens of the United States or against persons entitled to the protection of the United States thereby endangering the domestic tranquility, threatening the common defense, and jeopardizing the general welfare of the people of the United States; and

"Whereas the Congress has enacted laws prohibiting acts such as treason, sedition, sabotage, espionage, insurrection and rebellion, seditious conspiracy, civil disobedience, rioting, assassination, kidnaping, deprival of civil rights, and conspiracies to commit such acts; and

"Whereas the President of the United States as Chief Executive in the maintenance of the Government thereunder must have intelligence information for appropriate decisions in the discharge of his constitutionally imposed responsibilities;

"Now by authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States and in the interest of orderly operation of this Government and in furtherance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general welfare of the people of the United States it is ordered that;

"The Attorney General prepare and issue guidelines, conforming to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis intelligence information essential to the execution of laws pertaining to subversive activity and other such activity affecting the national security, domestic tranquility, and general welfare of the United States."

The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concept of urban guerrilla terrorism has been adopted by various extremist elements in the United States. Bombings of public buildings and national institutions;

killing of police officers who, by their uniform, are a symbol of the democratic establishment; hijacking of aircraft in furtherance of revolutionary movements; terrorist assaults on foreign diplomatic personnel and establishments; and open declaration of war on our form of government are only a few of the violent acts which have been perpetrated by domestic subversives who seek to destroy or seriously cripple our Government. Terrorist guerrilla attacks which were once confined to far away places and related to problems of no immediate concern of ours are now possible in this country. Foreign terrorist groups in collusion with domestic terrorists have laid plans for an airport massacre of the type which recently occurred in Israel. Other foreign terrorist elements have laid plans for terrorist attacks on American soil. Already one foreign official has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists.

It would be folly to adopt an investigative policy based on the concept of investigation only when there is reason to believe a crime involving the national security has been committed. The FBI must obviously anticipate the crimes described above. We believe that in order for the Government to be in position to defend itself against revolutionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it, the FBI must have sufficient investigative authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations not normally associated with enforcement of the statutes. In other words we think the President has the inherent Executive power to expand by further defining the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance information concerning the plans and aspirations of terrorists and revolutionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Government. However, we also believe that such expanded authority must be formally set forth in an Executive order and that this recommendation is responsive in the Attorney General's expressed interest in laying more formal guidelines to our work in areas where definition is not now clear.

We consider the issuance of a new Executive order delineating our jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility to gather and report intelligence information relating to the national security to be a very important and high priority matter. We believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney General under Title 28, Section 533, United States Code, to be equally important.

The Attorney General

For your information, our own investigative guidelines as contained in our Manual of Instructions relating to domestic subversive investigations have been completely rewritten to conform with the concept that our domestic intelligence-type investigations are based on Federal statutes. These guidelines provide that in each instance, the domestic intelligence investigation must be predicated on information indicating that the organization or individual is engaged in activity which could involve a violation of specific statutes relating to the national security. A copy of the new guidelines was previously provided to the Department of Justice in connection with the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy to obtain a copy of the FBI's Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions. The effective date of the new guidelines was August 1, 1973.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
2 - Legal Counsel Division

The Attorney General

April 22, 1975
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.

Director, FBI

#MDR16.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to one of the requests set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures (2)

4/24 Approved by A.G. (Jack Miller)
4/25 Delivered to Mike Epstein of SSC

62-116395

EWL:ekw
(8)

REC-100

62-116395- 82

NOTE: The Senate Select Committee has made a request for titles and number of FBI field office Agents in the internal security and counterintelligence field as well as the percentage of manpower assigned in these areas. The Administrative Division has compiled this information. However, it is not felt this data should be furnished formally in a written response to the Committee. This data can be classified "Confidential" under Executive Order 11652. Over and above this technical classification a great deal of sensitivity attaches to these figures since should they be made public or otherwise fall ~~into the~~

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

APR 29 1975

2-ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

hands of hostile foreign intelligence services, they would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat.

It is noted that a precedent exists for making the information available for review only at FBIHQ. By letterhead memorandum 4/8/75 we advised the Committee that we would not furnish them a requested list of names and titles of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBIHQ down to and including Unit Chiefs together with a number of personnel below that level but that this list would be made available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee staff at FBIHQ.

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)

April 21, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.)

RE: ORGANIZATION

Reference is made to letter dated March 10, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Under Item III entitled "Organization," paragraph C requested at the field level, the titles and number of FBI field office Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total Agent manhours devoted to such matters, operations, and activities.

You are advised that a current survey of all FBI field offices has been made to obtain the data requested. Since this information is considered to be highly sensitive, it is not being furnished directly to the Committee; however, the requested data is being maintained in the Intelligence Division at FBIHQ and is available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee staff upon request.

1 - The Attorney General
EWL:ekw
(8)

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/HG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. 62-116395
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JBN/PLM

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-22

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

MD216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JG

62-116395-82

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Response

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. WALSH

DATE: 4/3/75

FROM : L. C. GROOVER
LCG/WC

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church dated 3/19/75.

Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities, together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations and activities (page 3, item IIIC of relet).

The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached herewith, to the above request.

It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security, intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the data for both of the other categories as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Jackson

JJC:jmb

#MORE6

SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION ADDENDUM PAGE THREE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2-ALM/KAG

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities

WOB

ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75

The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.

JWR/HHW

OVER

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-14-75

Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:

(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.

(2) Before making any determination as to whether we make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.

(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/ETG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/TAG #MORI6

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 4-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In connection with our investigations of staff members for captioned Committee, we have developed derogatory information on two individuals which has been brought specifically to the attention of William Miller, Staff Director of the Committee. One of these involved Mrs. Diane Eloise LaVoy whose sister-in-law questioned her loyalty and declared she "does not love America." The sister-in-law said Mrs. LaVoy constantly criticized the U. S. Government and its policy and underlying weaknesses of our society. Another individual said she was highly critical of CIA activities. This information was pointed out to Miller on 3-25-75 when the results of the investigation were delivered to him, and he also was advised that the CIA would be furnished the same data in accordance with our agreement concerning these matters.

On 3-24-75 and 3-28-75 results of the investigation concerning Mrs. Betty Dale Ellison were delivered to Miller and he was advised that a prior supervisor with eight years of training and experience in psychiatric care stated he felt Mrs. Ellison needs psychological examination. He termed her a trouble maker and said he would have fired her if he had the authority. He described her definitely as a security risk due to her mental and emotional instability. It also was pointed out to Miller that other former supervisors described her as unstable when working under pressure and unable to get along with fellow employees. Miller was told that this information also would be furnished to CIA.

On 4-2-75 Miller advised Inspector Bowers he had considered the matter involving Mrs. LaVoy and had discussed it with the Committee Chairman, and they had decided to proceed with her as a staff member since they did not feel the derogatory remarks by her sister-in-law were sufficiently strong enough to disqualify her since the remainder of the investigation was favorable.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 161-1022

62-116395-81

REC-100

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

3 APR 22 1975

DWB:kjs (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 APR 29 1975

Miller also advised on 4-2-75 that their review of the Ellison investigation showed justifiable concern for her being cleared for the staff, and he asked for any guidance we might give him. It was pointed out that the only real solution to the situation seemed to be that she not be added to the staff. Miller said he would appreciate any comments from the CIA also in this regard. This request was conveyed to CIA by Section Chief William Cregar of the Intelligence Division who subsequently advised that Charles Kane, Director of Security, CIA, had reviewed the file on Ellison and agreed there was sufficient cause to question her suitability for assignment to the Select Committee staff. Kane stated CIA Director Colby concurred in this observation.

These views were conveyed to Miller on 4-9-75. Miller stated at that time that they had resolved the situation by assigning Mrs. Ellison to purely administrative tasks and that she would be fully isolated from any sensitive or classified information in connection with her responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/MG

On 3-19-75 Inspectors John B. Hotis, David W. Bowers, and Special Agent Paul V. Daly met with William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; and Michael T. Epstein of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) staff. During the meeting Mr. Schwarz requested a briefing be arranged for staff members of SSC concerning the operations of the Intelligence Division, that they be furnished copies of training documents pertaining to matters handled by the Intelligence Division, and that they be furnished a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field. He pointed out the aforementioned material would greatly assist in the SSC staff developing an understanding of the Intelligence Division operations and hopefully prevent misunderstandings or needless requests of the FBI.

Mr. Miller advised that Senators Frank Church and John Tower intended to contact the Director in the immediate future to discuss arrangements relating to the SSC's review of the FBI activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Intelligence Division review and where possible make available training documents relating to training concerning Intelligence Division matters and a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field, or recommend a counter offer,

(2) Legal Analysis Office in conjunction with the Intelligence Division arrange a briefing for Senate Select Committee staff members.

See memo – Cregar to Wannall 4/11/75 prepared [illegible]

REC 44 62-116395-80

17 APR 22 1975

5-Ends

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
PVD:kjs/dkg (8)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4/17/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JLG

At 11:00 a.m. on April 17, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis Special Agent Paul V. Daly and I met with Deputy Attorney General Tyler and Associate Deputy Attorney General James Hutchinson at the request of the Deputy Attorney General.

Deputy Attorney General Tyler advised that he had been requested by Burke Marshall and F.A.O. Schwarz, III, who are consultant and General Counsel, respectively, for the Senate Select Committee, to meet with him on Monday afternoon, April 21, 1975, to discuss matters relating to the Committee's activities. The Deputy Attorney General said that he has been personally acquainted with Mr. Marshall for a long time and also is acquainted with Mr. Schwarz. He considered the possibility of having a Bureau representative attend the meeting, but then decided it would be best if he would meet with Marshall and Schwarz privately to determine whether they desire to discuss details of the Committee's responsibilities and if it became necessary, he would request the Bureau to send a representative to the meeting.

REC 44 62-116395-79

EX-111

The Deputy Attorney General said that he would, of course, advise us orally or in writing of the results of his conference with Mr. Marshall and Mr. Schwarz.

APR 22 1975

The Deputy Attorney General inquired as to the procedure currently being employed in responding to the Committee's requests and Inspector Hotis explained the current procedures. I mentioned to the Deputy Attorney General the existence of the Ad Hoc Committee of Intelligence Agencies and suggested to him that he might desire to designate a representative to attend those meetings in order to be on notice as to the policies being developed by the White House and the intelligence community in responding to Committee requests. I explained to him that James Wilderotter, formerly Associate Deputy Attorney General, was the

62-116395
1 - Mr. Wannall 1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Cregar 1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (7)

54 APR 29 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Department's representative on the Committee, but he has now been reassigned to responsibilities at the White House. I told him that Assistant Attorney General Scalia had been scheduled to attend the last meeting of the Committee, although he was unable to attend. The Deputy Attorney General said that he would discuss with Mr. Scalia the possibility of having Mr. Scalia attend as the Department's representative.

I asked the Deputy Attorney General whether he was undertaking the principal responsibility in the Department for matters relating to the Senate Select Committee and other committees that may be inquiring into the FBI and he said that that was not clear as yet because the Attorney General has taken a personal interest in these matters and it appeared that the responsibilities are still fragmented within the Department. It was his opinion that the responsibilities should be centralized and he appeared to be willing to undertake that responsibility.

It was my impression that the Deputy Attorney General was interested in being of assistance to the FBI in these matters and expressed a willingness to cooperate by having the FBI participate as much as possible with the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Dir. was advised [illegible]
[illegible] meeting on 4/17.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

1 - Mr. [illegible] B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/14/75

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. H. Weimar

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: WILLIAM G. MILLER
IS - R

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Senstudy - '75

Mr. William G. Miller is the Staff Director for the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to intelligence activities. On 10/5/73, representatives of our Washington Field Office (WFO) interviewed Mr. Miller, with Bureau approval, [relative to contacts he had had with members of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.] (S) At that time, Mr. Miller was the Director of the Special Senate Committee to Terminate the National Emergency. On that occasion he was most cooperative, and upon being advised that the FBI's interest in (S) [Soviet Embassy personnel focused more on their personalities rather than Soviet policies] per se, Mr. Miller agreed to be interviewed whenever the FBI felt such was necessary.

WFO has recently conducted an interview with Mr. Albert Ashton Lakeland, Jr., Executive Assistant to Senator Jacob Javits of New York, [relative to his past contacts with Grigoriy A. Rapota, a former Third Secretary assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Rapota was a known officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB), Political Branch (PB), who was extremely active on Capitol Hill.] (S) In the course of the interview with Mr. Lakeland, he advised that among others Mr. William G. Miller was known to have had [numerous contacts with Soviet Embassy personnel,] although he was not able to state with certainty that Mr. Miller had been [in contact with Rapota.] (S)

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 APR 25 1975

21 APR 25 1975

WFO has now requested the Bureau through the Legal Analysis Office obtain concurrence of the chairman of the aforementioned committee for Agents of WFO to again interview Mr. Miller concerning his possible contact with

[105-213145] (S)

CONTINUED - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

VHW:dan
(7)

Classified by 5683
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Enc. — Sent 4-17-75

RECORDS

Place cc in 62-116395
(SENSTUDY - 75)

ORIGINAL FILED IN

105-213145-192 (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

MDR16 1-23-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

84 APR 25 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: William G. Miller
[105-213145](S)

Rapota and possibly other Soviets. WFO has noted that Mr. Miller is also known to have been in contact with Aleksandr A. Kokorev, a First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., and a known officer of the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). (S)

While Mr. Miller was most cooperative on the last occasion he was interviewed by the FBI, it is noted he did not provide any particularly significant information concerning [the Soviets with whom he had contact.](S) While it is not known at this time whether he could presently provide meaningful information, an interview with him at this time, when he is now the Staff Director of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, could well be untimely and indiscreet.

ACTION:

(1) In view of impending contacts which will be had by FBIHQ with Mr. Miller, the purpose of this memorandum is to draw attention to the fact that Mr. Miller has had [past contact with representatives of Soviet intelligence services and may be continuing to have same.](S)

KAW WRS/KAW WRW/FSP

(2) If you agree, there is attached a communication to WFO captioned, "Grigoriy A. Rapota; IS - R (SOVEMB-KGB)" which denys authority for an interview with Mr. Miller at this time and instructs that office to promptly advise FBIHQ of any additional contacts between Mr. Miller and representatives of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., which may come to its attention. (S)

KAW WRS/KAW WRW/FSP JBA PLM Jmm

SECRET

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 10, 1975

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/TG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, setting forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority granted by Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and Attorney General instructions, as well as a list of statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation. Certain exhibits are extracted due to the "Third Agency Rule," however, approval for release is now being sought and the exhibits will be forwarded as soon as possible. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

Also enclosed with the jurisdiction paper is an original memorandum for the Committee and one copy for your records.

Enclosures - 3

ALL:vb
(6)

Approved by AG 4/ , '75 [illegible] to SSC [illegible] 4/10/75

62-116395-178

REC- 106

APR 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/LJS #MDR16

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 10, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached is the FBI "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, which, though not specifically named, falls within the spirit of the documents requested in the letter of March 19, 1975.

The purpose of this paper is to set forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority granted by the Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and orders of the Attorney General, as well as to list statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation.

It is noted that certain exhibits are extracted. Extractions were made because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Approvals are being expeditiously sought and these exhibits will be made available as soon as approvals are obtained. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

We are attempting to identify Items 1, 2, 3, and 4, of the examples cited in the attachment to your March 19th letter. When identified, immediate consideration will be given to furnishing the Items to your Committee.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

ALL:vb
(6)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116[illegible]-78

GPO 934-546

8 per PVD 18

April 1~~6~~, 1975

This is to acknowledge receipt of classified material by letterhead memorandum dated April 10, 1975, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Ben Marshall
for Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence Activit

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/ITG

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-78

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. T. Jenkins

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 15, 1975

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

My memorandum to you 4/10/75, tickler copies as above, advised of the formal establishment of a task force called Project Senstudy 75 for the purpose of implementing responses to requests for information from Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities.

From time to time, requests will be made of various Divisions at FBIHQ for assistance in preparing responses. The Office of Legal Counsel has already contributed considerably in support of Senstudy 75 and is an integral part of the Project.

In order that we may keep an up-to-date record of the cost to the Bureau in handling this Project, each Assistant Director is requested to effect the necessary procedures to maintain such records and by the third of each month furnish by routing slip to W. O. Cregar, Room 4063, JEH Building, the following information: (1) Name of Division reporting; (2) Month for which reporting, which will be month just ended; (3) Man days devoted to Project assistance, broken down by (a) Agent and (b) clerical, including GS level for both Agent and clerical. An example submitted by 5/3/75 would be as follows: (1) GID; (2) Report for 4/75; (3)(a) one-half day @ GS-16; one day @ GS-15; three days @ GS-14; (3)(b) two days @ GS-7; two days @ GS-5.

This is effective commencing 4/1/75 and first routing slip report due 5/3/75 will be for the month of April, 1975.

If a Division has not participated during the preceding month, merely submit a routing slip to this effect.

The cooperation of all is urged so that the necessary cost data may be compiled each month. It is recognized that exact figures will not be feasible and that estimates will be most practical and will suffice.

ST-100 REC-43 62-116395-17

ACTION: For action as above by each Assistant Director.

62-116395
SFP:ekw (18)

15 APR 22 1975

WBW

ekw
82

51 APR 28 1975

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/dfs
#MDR16

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116464

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Each Assistant Director

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/10/75
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/LMG

This memorandum records the formal establishment of a task force entitled Project Senstudy 75.

The concept behind the establishment of this Project is to develop a capability of implementing requests received from Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible. We believe that by creating this facility we will be able to meet the requirements of these Select Committees with the exception of the research that will have to be done in the substantive Divisions.

While the Project will direct internal work and related liaison with the intelligence community and the White House staff, we envision the Legal Analysis Unit Office of Legal Counsel Division as continuing to be the primary point of direct contact with the Select Committees of the Congress. They will receive all requests and deliver all responses to these Committees. In addition, they will meet with the staffs of the Committees to insure the reasonableness of requests. If necessary, they will call upon the expertise of the substantive Division for determination as to whether a proposed request from the Committees can be responded to within a reasonable period of time and within the capabilities of the FBI's information retrieval system.

REC-100 62-116395-7

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

At the present time four Supervisors have been delegated to work exlusively on the Project. They are as follows:

12 APR 23 1975

The Project Manager will be Section Chief William O. Cregar, CI-2 Section, Intelligence Division. His duties will encompass the review of all incoming requests from the Select Committees in an effort to identify policy questions;

WOC:lmh lmh
(18)

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

8 4 APR 23 1975

ambiguities requiring recontact with Committee staffs; the assignment of research responsibilities to substantive Divisions; following such responsibilities to insure timely responses; as well as representing the FBI on the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. Assistant Director John A. Mintz is also a member of the Executive Committee. This latter responsibility will provide Cregar and Mintz with direct liaison not only with senior officials of the intelligence community but also with the President's counsel.

Mr. Elmer W. Larson, Unit Chief, Training Unit, IS-3 Section, Intelligence Division will act as Cregar's Number One Man; will administer the work of the Project; and act in the absence of Cregar.

Seymor F. Phillips, Unit Chief, Civil Disorders Reporting Unit, IS-1 Section, Intelligence Division will serve as the Review Coordinator for the Project. His responsibilities will be to review all research; coordinate all responses; be available to consult with substantive Divisions as to proper form of our responses; identify any conflicts in FBI positions where several Divisions are responding to a particular question; as well as to insure the quality, completeness and adequacy of responses to Select Committees requests. Additionally, Phillips will be responsible for the preparation of abstracts to be furnished to the Interagency Registry maintained at CIA Headquarters. This Registry established by the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Group at the suggestion of and with the concurrence of the White House will serve as the coordinating mechanism for the entire intelligence community.

Mr. Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Officer with CIA, CI-4 Section, Intelligence Division will function as the Liaison Officer with the intelligence community responsible for coordinating and clearing all information under the third agency rule where FBI responses are of interest to or are of a proprietary interest to other agencies of the intelligence community. Schwartz will serve as the Bureau's representative on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

CONTINUED - OVER

Because of the White House insistence that all requests and responses be completely coordinated and available for review by White House representatives, it is imperative that the Project have a self-sustained records facility to insure immediate access to requests received from and responses furnished to the Select Committees. In addition, in those instances where certain FBI documents furnished to the Select Committees must be sanitized (excised), it is imperative this records facility not only retain copies of the sanitized documents but also copies of the original text. For these reasons a senior clerical employee has been requested to function as a Records Manager for the Project.

In addition to the above, there will be stenographic and clerical personnel assigned to the Project to support the work of the Bureau Supervisors. We have not committed any more personnel to the Project than are absolutely necessary at the present time. Should the requests of the Select Committees require additional personnel, appropriate memoranda will be submitted with a complete justification for additional personnel assigned to the Project.

Although the physical space for the Project is limited, all personnel connected with Project Senstudy 75 will be located in Room 4063, J. Edgar Hoover Building. This space is physically located within the Intelligence Division.

As a matter of interest, Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has requested that should any member of the intelligence community get requests from other Committees of the Congress which impact on the intelligence community; could be of interest to the White House; or are of such sensitivity that coordination is required, copies of both the requests and an abstract of the responses should be made available to the Interagency Registry.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

PLM

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General April 9, 1975

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/1116

#MD116

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which responds to the Committee's request for the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and those portions of these Manuals which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures - 13

REC-106

62-116395-75

12 APR 23 1975

EWL:jvl
(7)

4/10/75 [illegible] to SSC [illegible]

ENCL BEHIND FILE

3-ENCLOSURE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

#mOK16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/TTG

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Under IV. A. (Policies and Procedures) the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and certain portions of this Manual were requested. In accordance with this request the following material is enclosed:

1) Table of contents; 2) Preface. Guidelines for FBI Investigations; 3) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret"); 4) Section 84. Registration Act; 5) Section 86. Sabotage; 6) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals; 7) Section 88. Sedition; 8) Section 95. Treason; 9) Section 97. Voorhis Act; 10) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

Not included as enclosures are Section 105, Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency (Foreign Intelligence), classified "Secret"; Section 107, Part I, Internal Security Informants and Confidential Sources; Section 107, Part II, Foreign Counterintelligence Assets; or Section 130, Extremist Informants and Sources. These Sections are deemed to contain extremely sensitive information and for that reason are not being transmitted; however, they are available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

Under IV. B. the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and pertinent portions of this Manual were requested. There is enclosed a copy of the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

EWL:jvl jvl
(7)

PLM

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

From a review of the table of contents of this Manual it can be seen that the material contained in this Manual pertains to administrative rather than investigative operations of the FBI, and for that reason it has not been possible to select portions of this Manual which pertain directly to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities responsive to the Committee's request. The various other requests contained in the Committee letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and further response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures - 11

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Table of contents for Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations, as well as the several Sections of the Manual of Instructions which are being transmitted to the Select Committee, have already been made available to the General Accounting Office in the past, with the exception of Section 36, Section 105, and Section 107, Part II. Sections 105, 107, Part I and Part II, and Section 130 are not being furnished to the Committee, but the Committee will be allowed to examine these Sections at FBIHQ. Section 36, dealing with espionage, although classified, does not contain sensitive material involving sources and we feel in the spirit of the requirement we should furnish this Section to the Committee.

As a matter of interest, all of the material with respect to the Manual of Instructions which has been made available to GAO is actually maintained in FBI space.

April 1~~6~~, 1975 8-per PVD/

This is to acknowledge receipt of classified material by letterhead memorandum dated April ~~10~~, 9 1975, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Ben Marshall
for Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence Activities.

#mDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2-ALM/HG

62-116395-75

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD-Adm. ___
Dep. AD-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___ WRW/EWG
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-8-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
APRIL 11, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/11G

As you were previously advised, William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, requested that we provide a briefing for certain staff members of the Committee on the functions of the Intelligence Division. He asked that the briefing cover both internal security and foreign counterintelligence operations and that it provide a broad overview of our investigative responsibilities.

The Intelligence Division is prepared to offer a two-hour briefing beginning at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, 4-11-75. It will include a slide show to be followed by a general discussion and an opportunity to afford questions and answers. After a luncheon break, the staff members will be given a brief tour of the Files and Communications Division.

Since the briefing will cover classified materials, no staff members will be invited unless they have appropriate security clearances. As a consequence Professor John Elliff, who has been tentatively named Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence, will not attend. It is hoped that we may provide him with a private meeting at some later date.

REC-106 62-116395-74

It is expected that those attending the briefing will include: Mr. Miller, F. A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel, Mark Gitenstein and Marvin Epstein, staff members. Since no Committee members will be present, we are not recommending that the staff meet with the Director.

12 APR 23 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That the above-named staff members of the Senate Select Committee be given a briefing by the Intelligence Division and the Files and Communications Division on 4-11-75.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis

PLM

JBH:dkg (10)

84 APR 23 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/MG
#N0216

"The Washington Post," Thursday, 4-10-75, edition on page A31 contains an article reporting an interview of Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Senator Church, according to this article, stated that the Committee is reserving the right to make public eventually any documents it gets and is accepting nothing with "strings attached."

Inasmuch as this Committee is also the Committee which the FBI is furnishing information to, it is believed a clarification of Senator Church's statement must be obtained and in the interim we should furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.

Section Chief William O. Cregar advised that he had contacted Dr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Committee concerning Senator Church's reported statement. Clarke stated that CIA Director William E. Colby was highly upset at Church's remark and that this statement would be a topic of a discussion of the Executive Committee meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review the morning of 4-11-75. We will be represented at that conference by Section Chief William O. Cregar and Assistant Director John A. Mintz. Clarke indicated the position that the CIA will apparently take regarding this problem is that the White House should obtain the clarification although CIA Director Colby initially was prepared to send a letter over his signature to Senator Church to obtain such clarification.

ENCLOSURE

EX-110 REC-40 62-116395-13

Inasmuch as the request by this Committee was forwarded through the Department, Senator Church's statement was brought to the attention of Douglas Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, who has been handling all FBI responses to Senate Select Committee requests. Marvin ~~indicated he~~ was concerned at Church's statement and stated it was the Attorney General's desire that he be advised of any Bureau response to the Committee concerning this matter.

23 APR 17 1975

Enc.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

2 APR 24 1975

PVD:dkg (9)

RECOMMENDATION
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

RECOMMENDATION:

No action be taken by the Bureau to obtain clarification of Senator Church's statement pending the results, 4-11-75, meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review, and that in the interim we furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.

pvD JBH/pvD

Senate CIA Committee Says White House Stalls on Data

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Committee on Intelligence Operations disclosed yesterday that the White House is still stalling on a month-old request for the directives involving covert activities by the Central Intelligence Agency and other arms of the Government.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), the committee chairman, told reporters after a closed, 2½-hour meeting that he had been authorized to write another letter to President Ford asking him to expedite the request.

The committee asked Mr. Ford on March 12 for all the executive orders and top-secret National Security Council directives concerning the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community, including the command structure at the White House.

The President was also asked to supply the committee with a copy of CIA Director William E. Colby's January report to Mr. Ford on allegations of illegal domestic spying by the agency.

But all the committee has gotten so far, Church said, has been what the White House evidently regards as the least sensitive documents on the list.

Church said he did not know "what the hang-up is" since White House aides have indicated they consider the committee's entire request as "perfectly proper."

Church did not spell out all of "the more sensitive data" that is still being withheld, but he said it includes both the Colby report and the top-secret White House and National Security Council directives dealing with covert operations, both foreign and domestic.

The Idaho senator said the committee is reserving the right to make public eventually any documents it gets and is accepting nothing with "strings attached." But he declined to speculate on whether this might be the reason for the administration's hesitance.

Church said all of the records were essential to the committee's mandate to investigate the CIA and the rest of the government's intelligence community. He said he still had no reason to think at this point that the White House would refuse to give them up, but he emphasized that he saw no reason for further delay.

Church said the committee also authorized its staff of about 35 lawyers and investigators to start gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses as the prelude to a projected round of public hearings this summer. The House has also ordered a similar inquiry but its committee, headed by Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), has yet to choose a staff director.

The Senate committee's chief counsel, Fritz Schwarz, said directors have now been named for all four of its task forces. They are William Bader, head of the foreign intelligence task force; John Elliff, head of the domestic intelligence task force; Alton H. Quanbeck, head of the Military intelligence task force, and David Aaron, head of the task force that will study the intelligence community's 'command and control structure."

Bader is a former Senate Foreign Relations Committee aide and has recently been working with the Ford Foundation. Elliff is a Brandeis University professor and expert in domestic law enforcement activities. Quanbeck has been director of the Brookings Institution's defense analysis project and Aaron has served on the National Security Council staff.

Schwarz said that each of the task forces will cut across the lines of various intelligence agencies and focus on general avenues of inquiry, such as the "legal authority and legal restraints" for intelligence work; the targets and techniques of intelligence-gathering, counterintelligence and covert operations, and the question of who orders and controls those activities.

#moe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

"The Washington Post"
April 10, 1975

62-116395-93
ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO :Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/7/75

FROM :W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the EXCOM), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/4/75.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were Mr. Roderick Hills, Assistant Counsel to the President; Associate Deputy AG Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke; as well as senior officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

The following items of interest were discussed:

Mr. Roderick Hills reported that he had a meeting with the Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to discuss having Legal Counsel present when members of a particular agency were being interviewed by SSC staff personnel. The essence of this meeting resulted in the SSC being receptive to such an arrangement but it would be incumbent upon each agency, department or bureau to negotiate the specific arrangements for such representation with the SSC. Hills also discussed the problem of the unknown employee or former employee who might request to be interviewed unbeknownst to the parent agency. It was suggested to the Counsel and Staff Director by Hills that such an employee be interviewed by only one staff member, that the staff member attempt to determine the scope of this individual's testimony and then discuss such testimony with the parent agency to insure the agency could provide advice as to the sensitivity of the unknown employee's testimony. No firm decisions were made but it would appear the Counsel and Staff Director will agree to allow Counsel to be present during the

REC-40 62-116395-172

APR 16 1975

ST-106

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

5 1 APR 21 1975

testimony of a secret employee and following such testimony the employee will be allowed to meet with staff members of the SSC in an Executive Session. It is anticipated more definitive information on the final decisions regarding this aspect will be forthcoming from the White House.

The question was raised by the Bureau representative as to whether the Ad Hoc Group and/or the interagency registry should be notified as to requests members of the Intelligence Community receive from other Congressional committees. Mr. Wilderotter advised that this would be a judgment question; however, if a request from a Congressional committee other than the Select Committees impacted on the Intelligence Community, involve sensitive issues or would be of interest to the White House, such requests should be provided to the interagency registry along with an abstract of the response.

Attached is a list of those members of the SSC staff who have been certified for access to compartmented information. Also attached is a paper identifying 10 issues likely to grow out of Select Committee deliberations. The pencil notation in the right-hand column identifies those agencies of the Intelligence Community responsible for preparing a paper which addresses these issues. It is noted that issue identified as number eight is entitled, "Intelligence Files and Privacy." Mr. Colby asked that the FBI prepare this paper. Assistant Director Mintz advised that the Bureau has a study underway on this very subject and agreed that the Bureau would prepare this study. The deadline for completion of the study is 4/25/75.

Also attached is a copy of the survey of the SSC facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, covering all aspects of physical and technical security. None of the participants of the EXCOM had any objection to the facility and we presume the SSC will abide by the procedures outlined in the attached survey report.

Attached also for information is a draft of an employee notice and agreement concerning treatment of confidential material being considered by the SSC. It is to be noted that to date neither the Committee nor its staff has signed any such Secrecy Agreement.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

AGREEMENT

I have read the foregoing employee notice concerning treatment of confidential material and have read the Resolution establishing the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, and the Committee Rules.

I understand that to qualify as an employee of the Select Committee, I am required to, and I hereby agree to, abide by those Rules. I further understand [illegible] and agree that the obligations hereby placed upon me continue after my employment with the Committee has terminated.

SIGNATURE

SWORN TO BEFORE NOTARY

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/LTG

those staff members with appropriate security clearances and a [redacted] need to know.

"7.5 Testimony taken in Executive session or papers and other materials received by the staff shall not be made public or disclosed to any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee, or upon termination of the Committee, as determined by a vote of the Senate.

"7.6 Before the Committee is called upon to make any disposition with respect to the testimony, papers, or other materials presented to it, the Committee members shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine all pertinent testimony, papers, and other materials that have been obtained by the inquiry staff. No member shall release any of that testimony or those papers or other materials to the public or any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote, a quorum being present at the time the vote is taken.

"9.3 The staff of the Committee shall not discuss either the substance or procedure of the work of the Committee with anyone other than a member of the Committee or other Committee personnel. Upon termination of employment by the Committee, each member of the staff, or consultant, shall surrender any classified material which came into his possession while in the employ of the Committee.

"9.4 The employment of any member of the staff who fails to conform to these Rules shall be immediately terminated."

In addition to the strict security precautions adopted by the Committee there are, as you no doubt know, sections of the United States Code and Executive Orders which relate to keeping certain material confidential--they are sections [TO BE INSERTED] which are annexed hereto.

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Committee Rules include provisions relating to the confidential treatment of material received by the Committee. These provisions are contained in Rules 6.11; 7 (and each of its subsections), 9.3 and 9.4 which provide the following:

"6.11 Release of Testimony and Other Matters. No testimony taken or material presented at an Executive session shall be made public, in whole or in part or by way or summary, unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee. Unless authorized by the Chairman the name of any witness scheduled to be heard by the Committee shall not be released prior to his testimony.

"RULE 7. Procedures for Handling Select Committee Classified or Sensitive Material

"7.1 Staff offices on the first floor of the Dirksen Office Building shall operate under strict security precautions. One guard shall be on duty at all times by the entrance to control entry. All persons before entering the offices shall identify themselves. An additional guard shall be posted at night for surveillance of the secure area where sensitive documents are kept.

"7.2 Sensitive documents and other materials shall be segregated in a secure storage area. They may be examined only at secure reading facilities. Copying or duplicating of such documents and other materials is prohibited except as is necessary for use in Committee meetings or to prepare for the taking of testimony or for interviews.

"7.3 Each member of the Committee shall at all times have access to all papers and things received from any source by subpoena or otherwise. The staff director shall be responsible for the maintenance, under appropriate security procedures, of a record of all papers and things in the possession of the Committee, which log shall be available to any member of the Committee.

"7.4 Access to classified information supplied to the Committee shall be limited by the staff director, the chief counsel and the counsel to the minority, and to

DRAFT 3/28/75

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Employee Notice and Agreement Concerning Treatment of Confidential Material

NOTICE

Concern about security and the maintenance of confidentiality of information provided the Senate Select Committee has been stressed since the outset by the Senate and the Committee.

Section 7 of the resolution which established the Committee requires the Committee to:

> "institute and carry out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to prevent the disclosure, outside the Select Committee of any information relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the Federal Government engaged in intelligence activities, obtained by the Select Committee during the course of its study and investigation, not authorized by the Select Committee to be disclosed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the Select Committee, of any information which would adversely affect the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign countries or the intelligence activities in foreign countries of any department or agency of the Federal Government."

DD/A 75-1549

1 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration 2 APR 1975

SUBJECT : Security Survey, Senate Select Committee Facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, Capitol Hill

1. Attached to this memorandum is a letter to Mr. William G. Miller for your signature.

2. A security survey of the Senate Select Committee facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, as requested by Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director of that Committee, was completed on 24 March 1975.

3. With the security procedures now in effect and those planned for implementation, the facility will provide adequate protection for the handling and storage of CIA documents of all levels of classification. Also attached for your information is a copy of the survey report.

Charles W. Kane
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

Att

cc: DD/A
Chairman, SECOM

Refer
CFA

OS 5 1284

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 063417

Regraded Unclassified when separated
from Classified Attachment(s)

SURVEY REPORT

Senate Select Committee Facility
Dirksen Bldg. 1st & C Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C.

1. In response to a request from Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director, Senate Select Committee, (tele. 224-1700) Messrs. Nicholas R. Zubon and Robert E. Burgener conducted a comprehensive security survey of the Senate Select Committee's Facility on 24 March 1975.

2. Mr. Marshall provided both a comprehensive tour of the facility and a detailed explanation of the operation.

3. The following are pertinent facts concerning the security procedures as related to the Senate Select Committee Facility:

A. Type of Facility

The Committee is in the auditorium (Room G 308) of the Dirksen Building at 1st and C Streets, N. E., Washington, D. C. Access to the auditorium is gained easiest by entering the building from the 1st and C Streets entrance. A 24-hour guard post is located just inside this entrance. The Select Committee facility is 40' east of the building guard post. It is nearly in direct line of sight, however, a foyer surrounded by a 6' high temporary partition precludes the auditorium entrance door from being visible. The entrance to the auditorium is protected by a 24-hour guard post.

The auditorium (Room G 308) is approximately 100' long x 45' wide. The floor, ceiling and walls are made of 6" to 8" solid masonry. The ceiling has a false ceiling approximately 18" deep in which the air handling equipment and sundry other service components are housed. All major air handling equipment is on the roof above the auditorium. Access to the roof which is strictly controlled by the Director of Security, is gained by a stairway in the southeast corner of the auditorium. The sidewalls each have a 2' x 3' register approximately 12' above the floor through which

air is passed from the auditorium to the air handling equipment on the roof. These registers are solidly bolted into the walls.

The front of the auditorium (south wall) is covered by a large movie screen. To the right and left of the movie screen are two rooms 6' wide and approximately 15' long used by the research section clerical personnel. These rooms have countertop openings approximately 3' above the floor for access from within the auditorium. Countertop openings exist along both sidewalls for approximately three quarters of the length of the wall. The sidewalls have intercorridors on the opposite side of the countertops which have been converted into unpartitioned office space. The only reproduction machine, a xerox model 3100, is located in the west corridor. The east corridor has been converted into a compartmented information storage room and a compartmented document reading room. The Security Director indicated that he may move his office to the head of the compartmented reading room to provide a larger measure of access control to this sensitive area.

The auditorium has six wooden exterior doors, 7' high and 3" thick. The entrance door into the auditorium (west and north wall) will have an electrical push-button lock installed. A similar door in the east end of the north wall will be barred and bracketed on the inside to prevent unauthorized entry. The west wall has 2 exterior doors leading into the Capitol Police offices. The east wall has two exterior doors with one leading to the roof while the second door exits into the Capitol Police Garage. All exterior doors will be alarmed. The doors now have Yale 197 1/4 locks with the keys controlled by Mr. Marshall. The fire safety factor concerning these locked doors was discussed with him.

The auditorium has a small second floor area at the north end. Access is gained by two stairways on the east and west side of the auditorium. The second floor space consists of a large projection room, currently filled with projection equipment, and five small private film viewing rooms.

The five small rooms will be converted into witness interview rooms. The windows in each of these rooms will be covered during the stay of the Select Committee in the auditorium.

B. Access Controls

Access to the Dirksen Building is gained by either the main entrance on 1st and C Streets, ground level, or the Basement Tunnel Entrance at the rear of the building. Both entrances have a 24-hour guard post where persons entering are checked for identification. Brief cases and packages are processed through x-ray machines. Vendors entering the main entrance are checked for ID, however, all boxes are not checked.

Entry into the auditorium is controlled by a guard at the door. His instructions are that all persons entering must show an ID card. Visitors are permitted only by appointment. They are logged in and escorted at all times while in the auditorium. From 1800 hours Friday through 0800 hours Saturday, and from 1300 hours Saturday to 0700 hours Monday everyone must sign the log in and out and show an ID. In the event an access problem arises at the guard post, regardless of the hour, Mr. Marshall is alerted.

C. Guards

The Dirksen Building and the auditorium are protected by members of the U. S. Capitol Police Department. The Building has two 24-hour/7day-a-week guard posts at the entrances while the Senate Select Committee has one 24-hour/7 day-a-week guard post at the entrance and an after-hours roving patrol inside the auditorium. All police officers are well trained, wear the Capitol Police uniform and carry Smith and Wesson 38 caliber revolvers. After-hour patrols check all doors, the entire auditorium for classified material that may not have been secured, and the second floor hourly during the night. The guards on duty at the time of the survey were alert and responsive to their duties. During off-duty hours, guard supervisors make at least two unscheduled visits to the guard posts during each shift. In addition the guard at the stationary post has four telephones, two of which have a pickup and automatic ring feature with Capitol Police Headquarters. There will be no rotation of police officers during the occupancy of the Committee. The same officers will be assigned to these posts.

D. Alarms

All exterior doors to the auditorium will have contact (microswitch) alarms. The Remington Rand safes, being obsolete, will be protected by a proximity alarm. The compartmented storage room and an adjacent reading area will be protected by a volumetric alarm. For fire protection a smoke detector/rate of rise alarm will be installed in the compartmented area. All alarms will enunciate at the guard desk at the entrance to the auditorium. The ADT Company will install and maintain the alarms.

E. Safes

The facility has 22 safes. Sixteen 4-drawer Remington Rand Safes located below the movie screen. Three class six Mosler 5-drawer, two class 1 Diebold 2-drawer, and one class 2 Diebold four-drawer are located in the compartmented storage room. With the exception of the Remington Rand safes, all other safes are in good working order.

The safe combination and repairs are under contract with the Safemaster Company. The safe combinations were recently changed by that company. All safe combinations are under the control of Mr. Marshall. However, an assist on day-to-day operations is provided by Mr. Pat Shea, Assistant Staff Director, who acts as backup for safeguarding the combinations to the safes in the compartmented storage room. Messrs. Larry Kieves, John Petersen and Ms. Jan Orloff are backup for the combinations to the sixteen Remington Rand Safes. Mr. Marshall was given two change keys in the event he decides to change the combination himself should staff personnel rotate.

F. Document Control

Incoming CIA documents will be delivered by Agency courier to the guard at the entrance door to the auditorium. The registry officer will receipt for them and take them to the Registry Section where all documents will be logged. Compartmented and Top Secret material will be taken to the Compartmented Storage Room and placed in a safe after it has been logged in Registry. Individuals, on an access list promulgated by Mr. Marshall draw the compartmented documents from the safes but must read them in the adjacent area dedicated for this purpose. Documents classified below TS/Codeword will

be stored in the Remington Rand safes. The documents in the Remington Rand safes can be drawn by anyone on the staff, but must be receipted for with the Registry Officer. The documents are to be read on the tables placed there for that purpose in the Research Section.

Further control of classified documents is directed through the assigning of a staff employee given responsibility for the reproduction of documents on the xerox machine. He will control the number of copies made on typewriters.

All classified material is secured in safes at the end of the working day.

H. Classified Waste

It is estimated that one 50-pound bag of classified waste will be generated each week while the Committee is in session. Once the bag is filled with classified waste, it will be placed in the locked trunk of Mr. Marshall's automobile and taken to the Federal Reserve Building incinerator where he will witness destruction by burning. In the event this incinerator is booked to capacity, he will take the classified waste and burn it at the D. C. incinerator. Should either incinerator become unavailable to the Committee, Mr. Marshall was assured that CIA would consider assisting him in the secure disposition of Committee classified waste.

I. Compartmented/TS Storage

A room dedicated as the codeword/TS storage room is in the northeast corner of the auditorium. Its five walls are solid masonry ranging from 6" to 8" thick. A 1/8" stainless steel door frame is bolted to the masonry walls. A prefabricated 9 gage wire cross-patch metal frame door is attached to the steel frame serving as access control to the dedicated room. The door will be secured by lock and key once classified material arrives for storage. This room will be alarmed.

J. Telephone

The Facility has six standard telephones in the auditorium. Five of the telephones will be equipped with conversation

masking devices. A central switch installed ahead of the telephone instruments will disconnect all telephones simultaneously, should the need arise. The telephone system is maintained by the local telephone company.

K. Security Briefings

All new members of the committee receive a thorough briefing from Mr. Marshall on security procedures and security responsibilities. Briefings are periodically reinforced when conditions warrant.

L. Security Duty Check Procedures

Custodians secure the safe cabinets assigned to them, i.e. Mr. Shea, codeword room, Messrs. Kieves, Petersen, and Ms. Orloff, Research area. Mr. Marshall double checks behind them. The custodian, Security Director and the roving guard patrol check the entire auditorium to ensure all classified material has been secured at the end of the day.

M. Counteraudio Inspection

Mr. Marshall has taken action on this requirement and continues to monitor this area to provide the Committee with as much security protection against the Audio threat as possible.

N. Shredder

The facility has one Destroyit Model 51 Shredder used only for shredding the most sensitive documents. Other documents are not shredded in this machine because of its limited shredding capability.

O. General Observations

The security procedures implemented within the Senate Select Committee facility are sufficient to provide a proper environment for the protection of classified materials. The survey officers were pleased with the security director's dedication to the objective of providing the best security possible for the Committee.


Capitol PARK Police GARAge
To GARAge
Locked
Locked
SCREEN
office Space
SAFES
To AIR COND AND FURNACE ROOM FOR AUDITORIUM
TABLE
Locked
TS And compartmented Reading Room
del VOLUMES
del VOLUMES
OFFICES
Xerox Reproduction AREA
Capitol PARK Police GARAGE
Capitol PARK Police offices
Locked
TS And compartmented storage
Bolted
office space unoccupied
Guard Reception AREA
6' high Temp partition
6' high Temp partition
NORTH
MAIN HALL IN FRONT of AUDITORIUM in DIRKSEN BLDG
To GUARD Post

SECOND FLOOR

North


INTERVIEW ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM
Projection ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/JK

NOTES FOR SESSION

In previous sessions we discussed the importance of highlighting issues likely to grow out of Commission or Committee deliberations. We observed that we should identify some of those on which a legal brief or annex would be helpful to Executive Branch initiatives. The idea was to select a few where a solid research paper with options, pros and cons, etc., could help us develop a firm grip on the questions in the issue and identify options. For example, the question of Executive privacy presents itself, and I gather is being worked on.

There are others we feel it would be useful for the group to address and assign responsibility for further work. For example:

	Suggested Action
1. Economic Intelligence and National Security--new discussion —	Treasury
2. Covert action and the law —	CIA
3. The Intelligence Budget--open, black, or closed--rational and procedures for handling past, present and future —	OMB
4. Joint Congressional oversight committee for Intelligence —	CIA.
5. GAO and the audit authorities of U.S. Intelligence Agencies —	IC Staff help from legal counsel
6. Confidential funds authorities, contingency reserves, legal base, history and uses —	CIA-DOD
7. Cover for Foreign Intelligence Actions legal and administrative issues —	CIA-State
8. Intelligence files and privacy —	FBI [illegible]
9. The "fact of" question--international, legal and political considerations —	State
10. "Sources and methods" legislation —	OMB & Justice

What human being responsible by next Friday
3 weeks at Executive Session

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 31, 1975

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
#MORI6

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

With respect to our letter to you of March 17, 1975 you will find attached the first list of members of the Committee staff designated to receive compartmented information.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller
Staff Director

Enclosure

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret and are designated to receive compartmented information. They also meet the requirements as set forth in DCID 1/14. WGM

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
William G. Miller	8-15-31	N.Y.	109-26-4349
Frederick A. O. Schwarz	4-20-35	N.Y.	084-30-2047
William Bader	9-8-31	N.J.	545-30-3377
Burton V. Wides	6-14-41	N.J.	139-30-1936
Elliot E. Maxwell	7-24-46	N.Y.	133-34-4225
Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495
Michael J. Madigan	4-18-43	D.C.	042-34-3797
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48	N.Y.	068-38-6464
Charity I. Benz	7-23-46	N.Y.	053-38-7410
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19	Neb.	485-28-4530
Maratha E. Mecham	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848
Audrey H. Hatry	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691

#MOR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]TG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1-2

ENVELOPE

EMPTY

Official DocLab Instruction(s) – Revised 10-Apr-2014

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 4/10/75

REC-40

FROM : W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JG

W.O. Cregar

On 4/8/75 Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman of the Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, forwarded the attached copy of a letter dated 3/28/75 from Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, enclosing a list of staff members who have been certified for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Copies of the list are attached to tickler copies of this memorandum for retention by personnel who may be in contact with the Select Committee staff.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Enclosures (2) ENCLOSURE

62-116395

LFS:tdp (8)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Schwartz

PLM

ST-106

REC-40 62-116395-

15 APR 16 1975

51 APR 21 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., T[illegible]N.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
LTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
ARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 23, 1975

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William Miller
Staff Director

1 62-116395-[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

ATTACHMENT

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
David Aaron	8-21-38	IL.	550-44-7971
Nancy Brooks	2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773
Barbara Chesnik	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235
Mary De Oreo	6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258
Daniel Dwyer	8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792
Peter Fenn	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123
Edward Greissing	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113
Mark Inderfurth	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617
Dorothy Johnson	6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413
Loch Johnson	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478
Howard Liebengood	12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707
Naldeen MacDonald	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503
William G. Miller	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349
Susan Pitts	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638
Alan Romberg	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583
Frederick A.O. Schwarz, III	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047
Patrick Shea	2-28-48	UT	528-64-1965
Stephanie Smith	3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476
Mary Towell	4-25-44	TN	566-64-7628

62-116395-71

ENCLOSURE

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1 - Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 14, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/TAG #MDR16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to the Senate Select Committee letter dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents from the FBI and my letter to you dated April 10, 1975, enclosing a memorandum and a copy of the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, less certain exhibits, for the Committee's use.

The purpose of this letter is to make available for your information a copy of the aforementioned paper with all exhibits intact. The Committee's copy of the paper has missing exhibits because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Authority to release these exhibits is being expeditiously sought so they may be made available to the Committee.

The exhibits extracted from the Committee's copy included Exhibit I, J, K, M, and P.

REC- 106 62-116395-70

Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has reviewed and approved all exhibits left in the paper and has requested to review the extracted exhibits after "Third Agency Rule" approval has been granted and before the exhibits are forwarded to the Committee. This will be done at the earliest possible time.

Enclosure

APR 21 1975

ALL:vb
(7)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
sst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Inv. ____
tion ____
ory ____
Eval. ____
m. ____

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Director, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/KG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (3)

DRD:mjg
(6)

NOTE: This is the most current FBI Functional Organization Chart. A new chart would not be available if prepared in response to the Senate Select Committee's request for approximately 7 to 10 days.

REC- 106 62-116395-69

PLD

5- WOC

6 APR 21 1975

PLM

ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

DRD

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 APR 24 1975

GPO 954-546

#MDR16

11/8/01 SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975 to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

In response to the Committee's request for a detailed current organizational chart attached hereto is a document entitled "FBI Functional Organization Chart."

This chart was prepared January 14, 1975, and since that time the following changes concerning the position of Assistant Director have been made. The Assistant Director of the Files and Communications Division is John J. McDermott. The Assistant Director of External Affairs is Donald W. Moore, Jr. The Assistant Director of the Training Division is William M. Mooney.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

DRD/PVD:mjg/kjs
(6)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-69

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED [redacted] ON THIS ENVELOPE
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ETG
#MDR

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-69

FBI FUNCTIONAL ORG

DIRECTO
CLARENCE M. K

ASSOCIATE DIR
NICHOLAS P. CA

FIELD OFFICES

ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
ALEXANDRIA
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
COLUMBIA
DALLAS
DENVER
DETROIT
EL PASO
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JACKSONVILLE
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LAS VEGAS
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
(ADMINISTRATION)
THOMAS J. JENKINS

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD H. ASH

RECORDING SECTION:

FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE
LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL MATTERS

POSTING SECTION:

FUGITIVE WANTED NOTICES
PROBATION AND PAROLE FLASHES

CARD INDEX SECTION:

CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND DECEASED NAME INDICES

TECHNICAL SECTION:

CLASSIFICATION AND SEARCHING
CRIMINAL FINGERPRINT FILE
CIVIL FINGERPRINT FILE (ALIEN, CIVIL SERVICE, MILITARY AND PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION)
WIRE ROOM SERVICES

ASSEMBLY SECTION:

FILING AND MAINTENANCE OF FINGERPRINT JACKETS
VERIFICATION OF IDENTIFICATIONS
MICROFILMING

FINGERPRINT CORRESPONDENCE SECTION:

UPDATING AND DISSEMINATION OF FINGERPRINT RECORDS
CERTIFIED RECORDS
MISSING PERSONS UNIT
MAIL ROOM

LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION:

DECEASED HAND AND FINGER EXAMINATIONS
DISASTER IDENTIFICATION SQUAD
FINGERPRINT PHOTO LAB
FINGERPRINT TESTIMONY
GENERAL APPEARANCE FILE ON CONFIDENCE MEN
LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATIONS
LATENT FINGERPRINT INSTRUCTION
NATIONAL UNIDENTIFIED LATENT FINGERPRINT FILE
SINGLE FINGERPRINT FILE
TECHNICAL FIELD ASSISTANCE

AUTOMATION AND RESEARCH SECTION:

AUTOMATED IDENTIFICATION DIVISION SYSTEM (AIDS)
CCH/CIRFO DESK
FINGERPRINT AUTOMATION RESEARCH

TRAINING DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOE DAVID JAMIESON

QUANTICO:

FBI ACADEMY – TRAINING CENTER
FIELD FIREARMS TRAINING
FIREARMS INSPECTION AND REPAIR
IN-SERVICE FIREARMS TRAINING
LAW ENFORCEMENT COMBAT ARTS RESEARCH PROGRAM (LECARP)
NATIONAL ACADEMY FIREARMS TRAINING
NEW AGENTS FIREARMS TRAINING
SPECIALIZED POLICE FIREARMS TRAINING
SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) TRAINING
RADIO STATIONS
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY
IN-SERVICE COURSES
DEFENSE PLANS FOR DIVISION
LEARNING RESOURCE CENTER
DEFENSIVE TACTICS COURSES
NEW AGENTS TRAINING
POLICE INSTRUCTOR COURSES
PHYSICAL TRAINING
SUPERVISORY AND MANAGEMENT TRAINING
EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT COURSES
ASSESSMENT CENTER – CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
TRAINING RESEARCH
POLICE INSTRUCTOR BULLETINS
LAW ENFORCEMENT SYMPOSIUMS
LAW ENFORCEMENT SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS
FACULTY DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH UNIT
INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
FIELD CLERICAL TRAINING ASSISTANCE
POLICE VISITORS
LIAISON – PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SOCIETIES
LIAISON – UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
LIAISON – NATIONAL ASSOCIATION STATE DIRECTORS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (NASDLET)
LIAISON – INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
LIAISON – INTERAGENCY POLICE GROUP

HEADQUARTERS:

BUREAU MANUALS
CHIEF CLERK MATTERS
CLERICAL RETRAINING COURSES
FIELD POLICE SCHOOLS
FORMS MANAGEMENT
LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES
SAC MEMORANDA
REPORTS MANAGEMENT
STENOGRAPHIC TRAINING
SUGGESTION PROGRAM
NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ADMISSIONS
INDOOR RANGE

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
EUGENE W. WALSH

BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION:

ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT
BUDGET AND FISCAL MATTERS
BUREAU ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS
PHYSICAL SECURITY MATTERS

EXHIBITS SECTION:

ARTIST'S-CONCEPTION DRAWINGS
GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF INVESTIGATIVE AND STATISTICAL DATA
PREPARATION OF CREDENTIALS AND SPECIAL FORMS
TRAINING AIDS (DIAGRAMS, ILLUSTRATIONS AND DISPLAYS)
TRIAL EXHIBITS (CHARTS AND MODELS)
J. EDGAR HOOVER FBI BUILDING

MECHANICAL SECTION:

AUTOMOTIVE POOL
EMPLOYEE PARKING
ENERGY CONSERVATION
PHOTOGRAPHY
PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION
SPACE MATTERS
SUPPLY AND STORAGE

PERSONNEL SECTION:

APPLICANT RECRUITING AND PLACEMENT
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
COMMENDATIONS AND AWARDS
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE
EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
HEALTH PROGRAMS
LEAVE
LIVING QUARTERS
PAY ADMINISTRATION
PERFORMANCE RATINGS
PERSONNEL MATTERS
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
POSITION CLASSIFICATION
RETIREMENT MATTERS
SAFETY PROGRAMS
VETERANS' COUNSELING
VOCATION AND AVOCATION RECORDS

PROCUREMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES SECTION:

PROCUREMENT (SUPPLIES-EQUIPMENT)
CONTRACTING
INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
TYPEWRITER REPAIR SHOP
MAINTENANCE

SPECIAL AGENT TRANSFERS AND MOVEMENT UNIT:

PERSONNEL LOCATION RECORDS
SPECIAL AGENT TRANSFERS
RESIDENT AGENCY MATTERS

FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
J. WALLACE LAPRADE

RECORDS SECTION:

AUTOMATION AND RESEARCH
CHIEF CLERK MATTERS
CLASSIFYING
CONSOLIDATION
CORRELATION
FILE REVIEW
FILING
GENERAL INDEX
MAIL ROOM
MESSENGERS
NAME SEARCHING
NUMBERING
PERSONNEL RECORDS
RECORDING
RECORDS MANAGEMENT
ROUTING
SERVICE
TRAINING

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION:

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS (INTRA-BUREAU)
TELEGRAPH, TELETYPE, AND MESSAGE ENCODING/DECODING SERVICES
TELEPHONE SERVICE

LABORATORY DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
BRIGGS J. WHITE

FRONT OFFICE:

FORENSIC SCIENCE TRAINING UNIT
PLANNING AND EVALUATION UNIT
TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE UNIT

CRYPTANALYSIS-GAMBLING-TRANSLATION SECTION:

CRYPTANALYSIS
GAMBLING EXAMINATIONS
POLYGRAPH
SECURITY OF FBI COMMUNICATIONS
TRANSLATIONS

DOCUMENT SECTION:

CHARRED PAPER EXAMINATIONS
HANDWRITING AND HANDPRINTING
INDENTED WRITING
INK AND PENCIL EXAMINATIONS
OBLITERATED WRITINGS
PAPER EXAMINATIONS
PHOTOGRAPHIC EXAMINATIONS
PORTRAIT PARLE EXAMINATIONS
PRINTING
RUBBER STAMP, CHECKWRITER, AND OTHER MECHANICAL DEVICES
SHOEPRINT EXAMINATIONS
TIRETREAD EXAMINATIONS
TYPEWRITING
MISCELLANEOUS

RADIO ENGINEERING SECTION:

CW RADIO NETWORK ENGINEERING
FM RADIO SYSTEMS
MAINTENANCE COORDINATION
MOBILE AND PORTABLE RADIO
RADIO FREQUENCY LIAISON COMMITTEES
EVIDENCE EXAMINATIONS

PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY SECTION:

BIOCHEMICAL
BIOLOGICAL
EXPLOSIVES
FIBERS AND HAIRS
GENERAL CHEMICAL
GLASS FRACTURES
GUNPOWDER TESTS
GUNS AND AMMUNITION
INSTRUMENTAL ANALYSIS
METALLURGICAL
MINERALOGICAL
NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS
NUMBER RESTORATION
PHARMACOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
TOOLMARKS
TOXICOLOGICAL
WOOD
X-RAY

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOHN J. McDERMOTT

PRESS SERVICES OFFICE

CORRESPONDENCE AND TOURS:

CORRESPONDENCE – CITIZEN INQUIRIES
CORRESPONDENCE REVIEW
MAILING LISTS
DISTRIBUTION OF REPRINTS
TOURS OF FBIHQ
SPEECH MATTERS

RESEARCH SECTION:

FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN
INVESTIGATOR
TOP TEN FUGITIVE PROGRAM
FUGITIVE PUBLICITY PROGRAMS
SPECIAL PROJECTS
LIBRARY
BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM
YOUTHFUL CRIMINALITY
RADIO-TV NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS
NEWS RELEASES

COMPUTER SYSTEMS DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ANDREW J. DECKER, JR.

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING SECTION:

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED OR ASSAULTED STATISTICS
NATIONAL BOMB DATA STATISTICS

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER SECTION:

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER/COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL HISTORIES SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
NCIC/CCH OPERATIONS
NCIC/CCH CRIMINAL HISTORY CONVERSION

DATA PROCESSING SECTION:

ACCOUNTING REPORTS
COMPUTER SYSTEMS:
  DATA PROCESSING
  TELEPROCESSING
  OPERATIONS RESEARCH
  SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
PAYROLL
RETIREMENT RECORDS
STATISTICAL TABULATIONS
VOUCHERS

FBI EXHIBITS SECTION

JANUARY 14, 1975

ANIZATION CHART

#MDK16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-91 BY SP2ALM)716



R
ELLEY

ECTOR
.LAHAN

FIELD OFFICES

MEMPHIS
MIAMI
MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
NORFOLK

OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH
PORTLAND
RICHMOND
SACRAMENTO
ST. LOUIS
SALT LAKE CITY

SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
TAMPA
WASHINGTON, D.C
TOTAL 59

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
(INVESTIGATION)
JAMES B. ADAMS

OFFICE OF PLANNING AND EVALUATION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD J. GALLAGHER

STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

OPERATIONS
PLANNING
POLICIES
PROGRAMS

INSPECTION DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
HAROLD N BASSETT

INSPECTIONS – FIELD AND HQs
SPECIAL PROJECTS
SURVEYS
INTERNAL AUDITS
SECURITY COORDINATOR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
W. RAYMOND WANNALL

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

CI-1 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY

CI-2 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY

CI-3 SECTION:

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT - VIOLATIONS
ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
FOREIGN ECONOMIC MATTERS
FOREIGN FUNDS
FOREIGN MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS
FOREIGN SOCIAL CONDITIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY
NEUTRALITY MATTERS
SECURITY MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY
BOMBING MATTERS
ANTI-RIOT
ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN GUESTS OF U. S.

CI-4 SECTION:

DOMESTIC AND MILITARY LIAISON
FOREIGN LIAISON MATTERS
FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH:

IS-1 SECTION:

EXTREMISTS AND
ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
EXTREMISTS
ACTIVITIES
CIVIL UNREST AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE
EXTREMIST INFORMANTS

IS-2 SECTION:

SEDITION
SABOTAGE
COMMUNIST
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS
OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS
SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (EXCEPT ESPIONAGE)

IS-3 SECTION:

CENTRAL RESEARCH
ANALYTICAL RESEARCH
TRAINING
SPECIAL RECORDS
DEFENSE PLANS

.LEGAL COUNSEL

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
LEGAL COUNSEL
JOHN A. MINTZ

LEGAL ANALYSIS
LEGAL INSTRUCTION
LEGAL LIAISON
LEGAL RESEARCH
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ROBERT E. GEBHARDT

CRIMINAL SECTION:

ASSAULTING OR KILLING A FEDERAL OFFICER
ASSAULTING FOREIGN PERSONNEL
CONGRESSIONAL ASSASSINATION STATUTE
ASSAULTING THE PRESIDENT (OR VICE-PRESIDENT) OF THE UNITED STATES
AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT
BANK ROBBERY
BILLS OF LADING ACT
CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT
CRIME ON INDIAN AND GOVERNMENT RESERVATIONS
CRIME ON THE HIGH SEAS
DESECRATION OF THE FLAG
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES
EXTORTION
FALSE ADVERTISING OR MISUSE OF NAMES TO INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY
FALSE ENTRIES IN RECORDS OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS
FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT
FEDERAL TRAIN WRECK STATUTE
FIREARMS ACT (A) NATIONAL (B) STATE FIREARMS CONTROL ASSISTANCE ACT (C) UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS
FRAUDULENT PRACTICES CONCERNING MILITARY AND NAVAL DOCUMENTS, AND SEALS AND SYMBOLS OF AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE, USE, POSSESSION OR SALE OF EMBLEMS AND INSIGNIA
ILLEGAL USE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS
ILLEGAL USE OF RAILROAD PASS
ILLEGAL WEARING OF UNIFORM
IMPERSONATION
INTERSTATE OBSCENE OR HARASSING TELEPHONE CALLS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISON-MADE GOODS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN CATTLE
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE OR AIRCRAFT
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS
IRREGULARITIES IN FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS
KIDNAPING
MAY ACT
POLICE KILLINGS
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - CRIMINAL
SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT
THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT, ROBBERY, AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT
WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT

CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION:

CIVIL RIGHTS
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
ELECTION LAWS
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY

NAME CHECK SECTION:

NAME CHECKS
SPECIAL MEMORANDA

ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD SECTION:

ACCOUNTING CONTROL
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRIES
ADMIRALTY MATTERS
ANTI-RACKETEERING
HOBBS ACT
LEA ACT
INTERFERENCE WITH GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
ANTITRUST
ASCERTAINING FINANCIAL ABILITY
BANK FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT
BONDSMEN AND SURETIES
BRIBERY
CENSUS MATTERS
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
CONTEMPT OF COURT
COPYRIGHT MATTERS
COURT OF CLAIMS
DEPENDENTS ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950
DESTRUCTION OF INTERSTATE PROPERTY
EIGHT-HOUR DAY LAW
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
FALSE CLAIMS – CIVIL
FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
FEDERAL LENDING AND INSURANCE AGENCIES
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STRIKEBREAKERS
JURY PANEL INVESTIGATIONS
KICKBACK RACKET ACT
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 (INVESTIGATIVE MATTER)
LANDS DIVISION MATTERS
MAIL FRAUD
MIGRATORY BIRD ACT
MISCELLANEOUS – CIVIL SUITS
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
OBSTRUCTION OF COURT ORDERS
OBSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
PASSPORT AND VISA MATTERS
PATENT MATTERS
PERJURY
RAILWAY LABOR ACT
RED CROSS ACT
RENEGOTIATION ACT – CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT – 1940
TARIFF ACT OF 1930
UNREPORTED INTERSTATE SHIPMENT OF CIGARETTES
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
WAGE AND HOUR LAW
WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM V. CLEVELAND

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE-- ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION:

ANTI-RACKETEERING (INTELLIGENCE)
EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS – OBSTRUCTION
INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF LOTTERY TICKETS
INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING INFORMATION
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF RACKETEERING
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF WAGERING PARAPHERNALIA
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
SPORTS BRIBERY
TOP-ECHELON CRIMINAL INFORMANTS

FUGITIVE SECTION:

BOND DEFAULT
CONDITIONAL RELEASE VIOLATORS
CRIMINAL INFORMANT MATTERS
DESERTERS AND DESERTER-HARBORING
ESCAPE AND RESCUE
ESCAPED FEDERAL PRISONERS
FUGITIVES
HARBORING
PAROLE VIOLATORS
PROBATION VIOLATORS
SELECTIVE SERVICE, INCLUDING FUGITIVE AND RE-EMPLOYMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID CUSTODY OR CONFINEMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID GIVING TESTIMONY
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION

EMPLOYEES SECURITY AND SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION:

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
APPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AND APPLICATIONS FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION OF SENTENCE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS)
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
PEACE CORPS
SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
U. S. COURTS APPLICANTS
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	✓
Intell.	✓
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	✓
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/7/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/2/75.

The study prepared for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) entitled, "Human Intelligence," has come to the attention of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The major contributors to this report were the FBI and CIA. It is an extremely sensitive document and for that reason any requests from any committees of the Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the White House. At the present time, the consensus of those persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release of information to the committees of Congress is that this report will not be provided Congressional committees at this time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/tgt/C
#MDefb

The SSC does recognize a requirement to comply with the Third Agency Rule which states in effect that classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department. CIA's General Counsel has produced a paper entitled "The Third Agency Rule," copy attached, which they have requested be reviewed by the Legal Counsels of all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. A copy of CIA's paper referred to above has been made available to Assistant Director Mintz who has indicated he will be in direct contact with Mr. Warner, CIA's General Counsel.

REC-106 62-116395-608

Attached is a copy of sanitization guidelines for documents provided Congressional Select Committees. The Group asked that these guidelines be reviewed and concurrence or

APR 21 1975

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

objections be furnished to the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) for consideration. A copy of these guidelines has been furnished to the Freedom of Information Unit of the Legal Counsel Division for review. Their comments will be furnished to the Bureau's representative, Mr. Frank Schwartz, on the USIB Committee in compliance with the mandate from the Ad Hoc Group.

Also attached is a copy of the abstract which all agencies of the Intelligence Community are being required to use in abstracting information that agency has provided one of the Select Committees. These abstracts will be retained in an interagency registry to be available for review by any members of the Intelligence Community as well as the White House. The purpose of this interagency registry is to have available in one location all information in abstract form that members of the Intelligence Community have provided the SSC.

Attached is a memorandum for Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Group, advising the names and titles of individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that these persons will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated with the House Select Committee.

Also attached is a letter from Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee, addressed to the President enclosing a list of documents which the SSC is requesting from the White House.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a~~n~~ homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/ALT/JG

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-68

contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community and then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(d) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/ETG

#MDR16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-68

> shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to interrelationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. agency receiving request
2. originating agency

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Sanitization Guidelines for Documents Provided Congressional Select Committees

1. Attached is a copy of a statement, "Guidelines for Sanitizing Certain Documents Provided Select Committees" prepared by the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, for consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. This step is a follow on to the understanding the DCI has with Senator Church that sanitization of selective documents will be undertaken before the documents are released to the Committee. Similar understandings have been discussed with House Staff as well.

2. It is important that, to the extent possible, all intelligence organizations follow generally the same sanitization guidelines. Accordingly, the USIB Ad Hoc Group should consider utilizing these or similar guidelines within their respective organizations.

3. If requested by the Chairman, the DCI will discuss orally with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate and House Select Committees the content of the sensitive USIB or CIA material excised from documents. Where appropriate, the DCI may discuss this sensitive material with the entire Select Committee. He considers it essential that the written record provided to the Committee staff not include such sensitive information for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

Attachment: As Stated

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY 55[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-68

DRAFT

28 MARCH '75

GUIDELINES FOR SANITIZING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has recently discussed with Senator Church the need for special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee of certain sensitive aspects of intelligence activities and the Senator has expressed his recognition of this need. Included in such matters are the identities of sensitive sources, the material provided to the United States by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain employees whose safety could be jeopardized if revealed, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with US intelligence and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems. Such material should be protected not only from exposure but indeed the risk of exposure. Further, recognition should be given to the need to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals.

#MOR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JG

2. One form of this special consideration may include use of sanitization procedures to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of the community's activities.

3. What May Be Sanitized

While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which may be levied by the Committees for documenti~~ng~~ry material and not possible to determine specifically what material should be excised from these documents, the following illustrations are offered in certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet the test mentioned above.

4. Collection of Intelligence

(a) The Committee will probably address the matter of how intelligence activities or methods have or may impinge upon individual rights. Documents supporting responses may be sanitized by removal of identities of sensitive agents and informants, covert personnel, and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be substituted, i.e., a foreign journalist, a political official in the opposition party. No sanitization should be used in connection with

names of individuals whose employment or former employment by, or association with a department or agency, does not remain secret or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements remain secret.

(b) Some information may be required with respect to technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived by release of these codenames or nicknames in documents. Details of the technical systems involved, contractual arrangements, funding and/or names of companies or consultants whose participation was obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in the community's sanitization procedure. While documentary samples of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of verbal testimony, no raw product should be provided the Committees

for retention. If absolutely required by the Committees, sanitization of such raw product should be conducted to mask the degree of technical capabilities.

5. Intelligence Estimates

Finished intelligence reports of departments and agencies and estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not normally require sanitization. However, departments and agencies should review such publications to ensure deletion of source identities.

6. Administration

Information concerning the internal administration arrangements of intelligence agencies may be requested. This may include staffing charts with occupants identified. ~~Sanitization of individual~~, Identities of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning in a cover assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future be considered for a covert assignment.

7. General

The following categories of information or specific examples may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should be given by the department or agency concerned to the necessity of

deletion or sanitization of this type of information, prior to providing the document.

(a) Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.

(b) Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) ~~employed overseas in human source~~ collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.

(c) The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targetted foreign organizations.

(d) The success or failure of recruitment attempts in any given targetted foreign organization.

(e) Names of particular employees whose physical safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.

(f) Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.

(g) Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries.

(h) Identifying collaborative operations between the United States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaborations or within a jointly targetted third country.

(i) Identifying collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved.

(j) Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.

(k) Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country.

(l) Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence operations.

(m) Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that collaborate in a special manner such as providing cover for foreign intelligence operations.

(n) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).

(o) Proprietary information relating to contractors or furnished in confidence.

8. What Should Not Be Sanitized

There are general categories of intelligence activities which have already been placed in the public domain by the mass news media or authors with background experience in intelligence departments or agencies of the community. Names, places, dates and events which have been so revealed should not be excised if contained in requested documents.

There is an increasing body of information which has been released under the Freedom of Information Act. No further sanitization of this material should be conducted unless it relates to an individual's rights to privacy.

9. Techniques of Sanitization

Sanitization of intelligence material is usually considered the act of physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing from written communication with or without regard for the residual

content. Use of a substitution device, either pseudonym or ident is an example of sanitization which permits intelligent continuity of the material without revealing the true identity. Sanitization does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material in this context.

The integrity of official records must be maintained. The following sanitization techniques apply only to copies of records.

(a) Physical Sanitization - Names may be cut out and the residual material xeroxed and submitted to Committees. Names may be masked with correction tape and then xeroxed. The xerox copy may be submitted to the Committees.

(b) Names may be deleted and replaced with "IDEN." The deleted material is provided on a separate IDEN list which contains names or descriptive phrases substituted for deletions.

(c) The material can be retyped or reprinted with substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal the sensitive material.

(d) Entire pages can be removed from some documents and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information

as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing department or agency. This technique may be employed when physical sanitization or excision of material results in unintelligible gibberish as residue.

(e) Within a category of inquiry, it may be desirable to extract a complete document from requested material when the request is broad and all inclusive within its field. The existence of such a document should be made known to the Committees but retained by the agency or department for review under escort of a representative of the department or agency.

10. Management of Sanitization

The original record and a copy of the sanitized version provided should be readily available in all cases. Materials developed within an agency or department in response to requests should be reviewed at an appropriate level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. In the case of documents or materials of a community nature, the release should be done in coordination with the departments or agencies and/or the Program Manager concerned and any sanitization should be agreed upon during coordination.

This proposed use of sanitization as a special arrangement to protect selected issues contained in material provided to Select Committees by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies. It is essential to the proposal that departments and agencies attempt to employ the same criteria for sanitization and coordinate as required. This paper can serve only as general guidelines on sanitization.

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT OF MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT:
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)
4. TITLE:
5. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (A brief narrative statement which describes content of the material provided, problems addressed, and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should be of sufficient length clearly to convey the basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)
6. REQUESTOR:
7. DATE OF REQUEST:
8. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
9. LOCATION OF FILE COPY/COPIES
10. DOES MATERIAL RELATE TO AN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEM? IF SO, IDENTIFY:

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP'2 ALM/TG

62-116395-68

IC-75-1951
28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Clarke

SUBJECT : SECURITY - House Select Committee - Cleared Personnel

1. The following information has been obtained from the Office of Legislative Counsel and addresses those individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee, who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that they will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated in the near future with the House Select Committee.

Mr. Frank M. Slatinshek
Chief Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

Mr. William H. Hogan, Jr.
Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

Mr. John L. Boos
Chairman Nedzi's Assistant for Intelligence Matters
Room 2343 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

2. The following secretaries are approved for receipt of classified material at the levels indicated:

Berniece Kalinowski (Slatinshek)
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

62-116395-68

Rita D. Argenta (Hogan)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI

Oneta L. Stockstill (Boos)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

3. Safe storage facilities are available in Mr. William Hogan's office which have been approved by CIA. Mr. Slatinshek and Mr. Boos keep classified material meant for Congressman Nedzi in this area.

Don
Donald E. Moore

Dist: RTaylor:mm/28Mar75
O-Adse
1 - IC Reg
1 - SECOM

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, [illegible]
CHARLES MCC. MATH[illegible]R., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible]A.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 12, 1975

MDE16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JHG

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on March 5 to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for the direct and forthright manner in which you addressed some of the initial questions that lay before the Select Committee, and your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

We are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible and the Committee is gratified at the full and complete cooperation that we have received from the Executive agencies up to this point. In every respect thus far, the agencies have been fully cooperative with the Committee and the staff and I believe this augers well for a constructive and expeditious conclusion to our inquiry.

At our meeting on March 5th with you, we discussed the general areas in which the Committee would need initial documentation. As we discussed, our first requirements are to determine the legal basis for the activities for the intelligence agencies of the United States Government. In this regard, it will be helpful to the Committee to receive from whomever you may designate, the documents, files, and other papers that might be required to fully determine the legal basis for the activities of United States intelligence agencies. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents on the attached list directly relevant to the inquiry authorized by S. Res. 21, be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church

62-116395-68

ATTACHMENT

1. The report furnished to the President by Director Colby in January 19

2. All Executive Orders, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) or Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and other White House* directives pertaining to the charter, structure or guidelines for any overt or covert foreign or domestic intelligence agencies or activities.

3. All Executive Orders, National Security Council memoranda and directives, and other White House instructions pertaining to the structure, functions or organization of intelligence policy organizations within the Office of the President, including the Forty Committee and the Washington Special Action Group (and their predecessor organizations, e.g., the Operations Coordinating Board, Special Group, 54/12 Group, 303 Committee, etc.).

4. Organization charts and staffing patterns (for the present and, to the extent reasonably convenient, back to 1947) for all intelligence-related organizations within the White House (NSC, Forty Committee, OEP, WSAG, etc.) including names of key officials and staff personnel.

#MDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2ALM/TAG

---

* "White House" as used in this listing is meant to include the President, the Office of the President, including the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JDB
NW46

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

By memorandum dated 3-20-75, you were advised of a request received from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Intelligence Division requested that an attempt be made to modify portions of the Committee's request.

Regarding Part I titled Legal Authorities, the Intelligence Division pointed out that this particular request was wide-ranging and required a considerable file review as it requested any memorandum discussing the legal authority of the FBI to "(1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials asserted as sources of such authority." With regard to Part III concerning the FBI's administrative organization, they requested the identities by name of personnel in the Intelligence Division, Unit Chief and above. This caused concern in the Intelligence Division that there would be a needless proliferation of a list of Bureau personnel working in this field which list, of course, would be of interest to foreign intelligence sources.

On 4-1-75 Inspector John B. Hotis and SA Paul V. Daly discussed these matters with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee; John T. Elliff, who has been nominated to head the task force for the Committee looking into FBI activities; F. A. O. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee; and staff member Michael Epstein. They agreed to modify the request in Part III to the extent that personnel in the Intelligence Division need not be identified by name below the level of Assistant Director in the organization chart to be furnished them pursuant to their request of 3-19-75. They asked as an alternative the Bureau prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of Unit Chief with names included which they would have access to review in Bureau space.

REC 17 62-116395-61

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Farrington - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

ENCLOSURE

APR 15 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:dkg (11)

APR 22 1975

With regard to Part I relating to legal authorities, they stated they were amenable to the Bureau furnishing them whatever documents they have retrieved up to this time which have been recovered pursuant to their request of 3-19-75 and that no additional detailed review need be conducted until they review the aforementioned documents. At the end of their review they will make any additional specific requests concerning this part of their request. They also asked that in our response we furnish them copies of documents listed on a three-page paper prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee, a copy of which is attached.

Staff Director Miller requested that the Bureau expedite their response to the Senate Select Committee's request as the first meeting of that Committee is scheduled for Wednesday, 4-9-75, and he felt strongly that they must have material that showed progress in their study of the FBI prior to that time. Mr. Miller requested that, if necessary, the request be responded to in a piecemeal basis and that the complete response does not necessarily have to be made at one time.

It is suggested that we make available to this Committee as soon as possible those documents which we have furnished the General Accounting Office (GAO) which also fall within the 3-19-75 request of the Senate Select Committee. In this regard staff members have advised they are in contact with GAO auditors concerning the FBI.

By way of observations it is obvious that the staff members of the Committee are well versed in Bureau policy and procedures. To this point they have been cooperative and we should insure that we give a timely response to their various requests.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Intelligence Division advise whether modification of the Senate Select Committee's request concerning legal authorities for investigations and the modification of the table of organization of the Intelligence Division are acceptable and, if so, expeditiously prepare the necessary response to the Senate Select Committee.

4/8/75

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

(2) That we furnish all information which has previously been furnished GAO and is within the ambit of the Senate Select Committee's request.

Material furnished to GAO reviewed. All information within ambit of SSC has been furnished to SSC 4/8/75
WOB

(3) That as our response to any one of the five particular areas of inquiry as set forth in the 3-19-75 letter is completed, we furnish it to the Senate Select Committee.

Done 4/8/75 WOB

(4) This material should be sent to the Deputy Attorney General by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should specifically identify the request, for review and subsequent transmittal to the Senate Select Committee.

JBA

PVD

RLM

WRW

AG Levi is presently reviewing material. Per conversation with John Hotis letters should be directed to Attorney General 4/8/75
WOB

OK

Examples of the types of materials requested under Part I:

1. Studies on Subversion and FBI Jurisdiction which were prepared for Director Gray. See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session) on the *Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation* (1973), pp. 7 and 14.

2. Paper prepared on jurisdiction which was discussed by Director Gray and others at a Quantico meeting on May 23 and 24, 1972. *Id.* at p. 151.

3. Memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an executive order concerning the authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence operations. See the Attorney General's reply to this memorandum which is published in the Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Surveillance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), on *Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance* (1974), pp. 31-32.

4. An Intelligence Division study which was furnished to the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, by Director Kelley. See Hearing before the Subcommittee on FBI Oversight of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session) on *S. 2106, Ten-Year Term for FBI Director* (1974), pp. 12-13.

5. Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Director Hoover, dated September 14, 1967. See Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), *Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, Part I* (1974), pp. 3404-3406.

6. The two FBI memoranda which record instructions from President Roosevelt to Director Hoover concerning FBI investigations of subversive activities, and which indicate meetings between President Roosevelt and Director Hoover on August 24 and 25, 1936. *Id.* at pp. 3392-3393.

7. Memorandum from Director Hoover to Associate Director Tamm, dated September 10, 1936. *Id.* at p. 3377.

8. Presidential directives dated September 6, 1939; January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953. Id. at pp. 3404 et seq.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-67

Examples of the types of materials requested under Part II:

1. See Delimitations Agreement in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (First Session), on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights (1971), Part II, pp. 1172-1179.

2. See Agreement of Coordination in the Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes. (1974), Part I, pp. 3369-3383.

For references to items requested in Part IV, see:

1. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), on the Nomination of Richard G. Kleindienst, of Arisona, to be Attorney General (1972), pp. 63-64.

2. Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes. (1974), pp. 3569-3570.

3. Hearings before the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session), on the Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973), pp. 150-151.

An excised copy of the Report requested under Part V, Item A, is published in the record of the Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), pursuant to H. Res 803 (Impeachment), Book VII, Part 1, pp. 384-431.

The original COINTELPRO Report which is requested in Part V, Item B, is referred to in the Hearings before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session), FBI Counterintelligence Programs (1974), p. 21.

Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, dated May 20, 1954, captioned "Microphone Surveillance." See [illegible]earings before the Subcom[illegible]ttee on Administrative Prac[illegible]ce and Procedure of the C[illegible]mittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), *Warrantless Wiretapping* (1972), p. 178.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/
#MDR16

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	✓
Legal Coun.	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

Sen. Study - 75

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that all responses for the production of records, etc., received from Congressional committees be forwarded by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General to the requesting committee, and also that in selected instances a property stamp or statement be affixed to certain documents limiting access.

With the proliferation of committees in Congress looking into FBI operations, it is essential that a standard procedure for the forwarding of documents to the requesting committees be established. Inasmuch as requests such as the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities have been forwarded to this Bureau through the Department, it would appear logical that responses to such inquiries and all other inquiries of Congressional committees, whether they be directed to the Department and/or the Bureau, be responded to through the Department. Such a procedure not only will make all our responses consistent but will also give the Department an opportunity to review and approve documents being made available to Congress.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

In connection with our preparation of responses to requests of Congressional committees, it is suggested that all responses should be by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should clearly describe the specific request which is being responded to in the letterhead memorandum.

REC-18 62-116395-66

In those instances where documents are of a nature that we are not desirous of unauthorized personnel, whether they be in Congress or otherwise, having access to, we should affix a property stamp. This property stamp should read as follows:

APR 11 1975

> "This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside of your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the contents may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI."

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

APR 18 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

PVD:kjs (21)

JUN 11 1975

RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all responses to Congressional inquiries concerning FBI operations be forwarded to the Congressional committees by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General. Upon approval, these letterhead memoranda will be hand-delivered to the Deputy Attorney General's office by Legal Counsel Division.

(2) That in instances where access to a particular document should be limited because of the contents of that document, a property stamp in line with the above be affixed thereto.

Div 5 is obtaining appropriate stamp. JCF 4/9

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/TAG

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached are copies of various documents which are jurisdictional agreements between the FBI and other Federal agencies or guidelines prepared by the Attorney General with reference to investigative responsibilities between the FBI and other Federal agencies insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

1. Delimitations of Investigative Duties of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force, dated February 23, 1949, with supplemental agreements 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Supplemental agreement number 2 is no longer in effect.

2. Agreement between the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency, dated February 7, 1966, classified "Secret."

3. Agreement between the FBI and the United States Secret Service, effective July 30, 1973.

RLM:mam
(6) mam

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

65

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-545

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General

April 8, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to the request entitled, "Jurisdictional Agreements." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of additional requests is continuing and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (2)

REC-106

RLM:mam
(6) mam

RLM

62-116395-65

7 APR 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

FMDR16

2 - ENCLOSURE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

APR 10 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

4. Investigative guidelines with reference to Title 11, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation of Explosives, prepared by the Attorney General of the United States, submitted by letter to the FBI on January 11, 1973.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures (4)

1 - The Attorney General

#MOL16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/176

62-116395-65

[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

February 23, 1949

VI

Subject: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Office of Naval Intelligence, the
Intelligence Division of the Army, and
the Office of Special Investigations,
Inspector General, U. S. Air Force.

The Agreement for Coordination of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office
of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence
Division of the Army, and the Office of
Special Investigations, Inspector General,
U. S. Air Force.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, and the Presidential Directive of October 30, 1947. In addition, cognizance has been taken of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the specific application of that Act is set forth in Section II hereof. All other provisions of this Agreement are apart from and have no relation to the stated requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. In view of the above, it is now agreed that responsibility for the investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage (hereinafter referred to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated hereinafter. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with the other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest. When the organization with primary operating responsibility is unable for any reason to produce material in that field desired by the subscribing agencies, such special arrangements as may be legal or desirable will be worked out through negotiation at the national level prior to activity by one agency in another agency's field. It is recognized by the subscribers hereto that the Headquarters Department of the Army has decentralized such functions to its major subordinate commanders. When the major subordinate commanders of the Department of the Army cannot effect satisfactory special arrangements, the matter will be referred to the Director of Intelligence of the Army for further negotiations at the national level. Close cooperation and coordination between the four subscribing organizations is a mutually recognized necessity.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/KG

II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigations of cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals of all classes in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the State of Hawaii**, and the State of Alaska* except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5.

2. All investigations of violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. There are no territorial or personnel limitations on this provision.

3. The coordination of the investigative activities of civilian agencies in the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the State of Alaska except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5, which provide information regarding subversive movements and activities in these categories.

4. Keeping the other subscribing organizations advised of important developments in these categories within its cognizance, particularly:

a. Activities of inactive reserves of the armed service, including the National Guard.

b. Developments affecting plants engaged in armed forces contracts.

c. Developments concerning the strength, composition, and intentions of civilian groups within its cognizance which are classed as subversive and whose activities are a potential danger to the security of the United States.

d. Developments affecting those vital facilities and vital utilities which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

e. Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

(For b, d, and e above no protective coverage is contemplated.)

---

*Editorial revision of this Agreement to reflect the statehood of Alaska was approved by the IIC on January 7, 1959.

**Revision to reflect the statehood of Hawaii was approved by the IIC on September 9, 1959.

III. ID, Army will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Army.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Army Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

6. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Army contracts.

IV. ONI will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired naval personnel of the Navy.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Navy Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and in the State of Alaska except as described in Section 5, below.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations and with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government on Kodiak and Afognak Islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula and Adak Island in the Aleutian Chain.*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Navy contracts.

V. The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Air Force.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Air Force Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The investigation of the same cases described above in that portion of Alaska described in Section 5, below, with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians, except as described hereinabove, (1) in that part of the Alaska Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay

---

*This paragraph added. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

northwest to the town of Old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to the Kvichak Bay; (2) in the islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula excluding Kodiak and Afognak Islands which are the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; (3) in the Aleutian Islands excluding Adak Island which is the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; and (4) in the Pribilof Islands.*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Air Force contracts.

VI. 1. Where Sections III, IV, and V involve general territorial coverage, responsibility for such coverage will pass from one element of the armed forces to another automatically when a change of command responsibility ensues. This provision is subject to modification by direct agreement between the interested elements of the armed forces.

2. While investigative jurisdiction over the civilian populace in former enemy territories occupied by the armed forces has been provided for in Sections III, IV, and V above, those provisions are subject to direct adjustment with the Department of State if and when that Department assumes governmental direction in such areas of occupation.

VII. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this Delimitations Agreement. Subject to the exceptions already provided for above, general amendments or modifications involving all of the four subscribing organizations shall be issued in the form of a revised Delimitations Agreement and not as separate instructions.

VIII. During periods of martial law, or periods of predominant armed forces interest not involving martial law, when agreed upon by the subscribing agencies, the provisions of Appendix A or B, hereto attached, will additionally apply.

IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to two or more of the subscribing agencies to the Delimitations Agreement which affect the basic jurisdiction thereof which are

---

*Original paragraph changed. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

now or hereafter mutually entered into by any of the subscribers thereto will be reduced to writing; will thereafter become supplements to the Delimitations Agreement, and distributed only to the extent agreed upon by the co-signers.

(Signed) S. Leroy Irwin
Director of Intelligence,
Department of the Army

(Signed) Thomas B. Inglis
Chief of Naval Intelligence

(Signed) J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

(Signed) Joseph F. Carroll
Director, Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force

APPROVED

APPENDIX A

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

I. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the armed forces commander will assume responsibilities for coverage in these categories. His authority to direct and control the subscribing agencies of the armed forces will be limited only by such instructions as he may receive from the Secretary of Defense. He will have authority to coordinate the intelligence activities of the subscribing agencies in his area of responsibility, within the limits of their available personnel and facilities, by the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibility, nor to issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

II. Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsibility of the armed forces commander will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. They will render such aid and assistance to the armed forces commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. They will furnish all pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to the armed forces commander by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. Each headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised by its agencies of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the armed forces commander.

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]16

APPENDIX B

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY INTERESTS, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

I. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theaters of operation. When an armed forces commander of such a potential theater is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the armed forces commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

1. Agents of the FBI; of ONI; ID, Army; and the OSI, IG, U.S. Air Force will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of Sections II, III, IV, and V.

2. In addition thereto, the armed forces commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other subscribing agencies will insure that the armed forces commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other agencies.

3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the other three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.

II. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When the commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that he is authorized to augment the coverage with such elements of the subscribing agencies as are under his jurisdiction. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies, the armed forces commander should obtain the necessary authority from the Secretary of Defense.

III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have placed the initiative in the hands of the armed forces commander, whenever any of the other services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/TAB

Supplemental Agreement No. I
to the Delimitations Agreement

Cooperation and Coordination Between
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Intelligence Division of the Army
The Office of Naval Intelligence and
The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, with a view to promoting the closest possible cooperation and coordination between the Field Services of these agencies agree that the following recommendations will be transmitted to their field installations:

(a) Special Agents in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Divisional Offices, Military Intelligence Officers of the pertinent Armies, District Officers of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, and Naval District Intelligence Officers will maintain close personal liaison between those offices and their representatives, including a meeting of representatives of the four agencies, preferably the officers in charge, at least twice per month, for the purpose of discussing pending and contemplated investigative activities, and any other subject necessary to insure that there is proper coordination of their investigative work.

(b) The close personal liaison to be maintained between representatives of the four agencies at all times should insure that there is not duplication of effort in any field, and that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is maintained. Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use of informers.

(c) A distinction should be recognized between the investigative interest of individual agencies and the coverage interest. It is believed that all four agencies should study, from time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in order to insure that all channels of interest and avenues of information are adequately covered by at least one of the participating agencies.

(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it should be transmitted to the other agency.

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/

(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain classes of information are of general interest to the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services in connection with background and knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations, even though the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.

(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature occur, the directors of the four intelligence agencies feel that with proper personal liaison, such differences can be satisfactorily adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various divisional organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. III to the Delimitations Agreement (As Amended June 8, 1950)

Investigative Jurisdiction on Vessels of Military Sea Transportation Service

1. The investigative jurisdiction of all activities under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage on vessels of the Military Sea Transportation Service is as follows:

a. Investigative jurisdiction on vessels purchased by the Navy will be the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

b. Vessels obtained by the Navy through a "bare boat charter" will be under the investigative jurisdiction of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

c. Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Transportation Service which are manned and supervised by their private owners are under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

2. When civilian personnel who are subjects of an investigation under a or b above reach a U.S. port or a port where the FBI has a field agency, or prior to reaching such port, if practicable, the Department of the Navy will promptly furnish the FBI all pertinent information concerning the investigation. If personnel who are subjects of an investigation as above remove themselves from the vessel upon arrival of the vessel in port and further surveillance is considered necessary, the Navy will continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local level that the FBI will make every effort to transfer responsibility upon arrival of the vessel at the port.

3. When the FBI opens an investigation under c above or when an FBI investigation in progress develops or is believed about to develop ramifications under a, b or c above, the FBI will promptly furnish all pertinent information to the Navy and will thereafter coordinate its actions with the Navy whenever and wherever deemed necessary to insure proper pursuit of the case.

#moe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/JT6

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/MG

Supplemental Agreement No. IV to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Private Contractors of the Armed Forces

It is agreed by the subscribers of the Delimitations Agreement (hereinafter referred to as subscribers) that with reference investigations of civilian employees, applicants for employment, directors and key personnel of privately owned plants and facilities, working or bidding on contracts important to the Army, Navy or Air Force (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces) procurement, the following will be followed insofar as practicable. Exceptions thereto will be adjusted by mutual agreement between the subscribers concerned.

a. The Armed Forces will conduct background investigations of such persons unless there is a particular reason for requesting that an investigation be conducted by the FBI or the FBI has a special interest in a particular case and has notified the Armed Forces of such interest.

b. The FBI will conduct complaint investigations of such personnel upon specific request in each case by one or more of the Armed Forces. If one of the Armed Forces has no further need for an investigation requested, but not completed, prompt notification will be made to the FBI.

c. Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces under a above will be terminated and all information passed to the FBI when credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature is uncovered. Upon receipt of such a case, the FBI will proceed as under b above if one of the Armed Forces so requests.

d. When one of the subscribers is aware that another is conducting an investigation on a person or firm identical or closely connected with a person or firm it contemplates investigating, no investigation will be undertaken without the consent of the subscriber which has an investigation in progress. The investigating agency will make available to the other interested agency copies of the reports of the investigation made.

e. Normally, identity of confidential informants will not be communicated from one subscriber to another; however, when such communication occurs, the receiving subscriber will employ the highest possible safeguards to insure that such informants are not compromised. No transmittal of information concerning confidential informants to a third subscriber or to another agency is authorized except by specific consent of the originator.

f. A subscriber who receives a report of investigation from another subscriber may freely transmit copies of such reports to a third subscriber except as provided in e above.

g. A report of complete investigation received by the Armed Forces from the FBI will not be reopened without the approval of the FBI except to obtain additional background information. In such case, the FBI will be furnished copies of all information obtained. Other information required by the Armed Forces will be requested of the FBI.

h. If one of the Armed Forces requests the FBI to conduct an investigation or to conduct additional investigation as provided under g above, and if for any reason the FBI declines or is unable to conduct such investigation or additional investigation, the Armed Force concerned may proceed with the investigation. The FBI will be furnished copies of the results thereof if the FBI so requests or if the Armed Force concerned considers the results to be of FBI interest.

i. Nothing above is to be construed as altering the basic Delimitations Agreement of 1949 or current agreements concerning subversive organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. V to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Reserve and Civilian Components of the Armed Services

It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force may conduct background investigations on members of the inactive reserve and National Guard who are anticipated being called back to active duty, or where an investigation is undertaken for the purpose of determining whether the individual should be disenrolled from his military status, or to determine whether the individual may be granted access to classified military information. The following procedures shall be pursued in each of the above circumstances:

(1) The Intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or Air Force before undertaking such background investigation will consult the FBI to determine: (a) if the FBI has an investigation in progress; if so, no investigation will be undertaken by the intelligence agencies except as may be mutually agreeable to the Armed Force concerned and the FBI; (b) if the FBI already has made an investigation; if so, the results will be made available to the other agencies; (c) if the FBI has information on the individual, even though it may not have conducted an investigation.

(2) If, after consulting the FBI, investigation is undertaken by the other agencies, it will be pursued no further than is necessary to make the determination required by the other agencies, and all information developed pertinent to the four categories will be furnished promptly to the FBI.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

MD616

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JRS

Supplemental Agreement No. VI to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation in Areas Not Specifically Assigned

It is agreed by the military subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the references therein in paragraphs III. 4., IV. 4., and V. 4. to "areas where the Army (Navy, Air Force) Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein" shall be interpreted as referring to areas where the Department of the Army (Navy, Air Force) is responsible for the administrative and logistic support of the Headquarters of Commands established by the Secretary of Defense.

(Approved by I.I.C. November 4, 1959)

#m Del6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 7, 1966

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JAC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
model 6 1-17-01

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (S)

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an (S)

SECRET

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (S)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. (S)

INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES
TITLE XI, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970
REGULATION OF EXPLOSIVES

1. General

Title XI of the captioned law amends Title 18, United States Code, by adding a new chapter 40 with section numbers 841 through 848 governing the importation, manufacture, distribution and storage of explosive materials and creating certain Federal offenses pertaining to the unlawful use of explosives. Administration of explosives regulation is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury as is investigative jurisdiction over the unlawful acts proscribed in section 842. Under authority contained in section 846 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) have concurrent investigative jurisdiction as to the remainder of chapter 40, i.e., the unlawful acts proscribed in subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of section 844. Although not specified in chapter 40, the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction to investigate all incidents involving explosive or incendiary devices sent through the mails or directed against U.S. Postal Service property.

Title XI greatly broadens Federal authority pertaining to explosives-connected offenses. At the same time, Congress has expressly disclaimed any intent to occupy the field to the exclusion of state law on the same subject matter. To effect both Congressional purposes and to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort it is essential that the limited Federal investigative resources be carefully allocated, particularly in cases in which both the ATF and the FBI have jurisdiction.

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Effect on prior jurisdiction - This agreement applies only to those incidents as to which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction prior to the enactment of the captioned law and to incidents previously subject to FBI investigation by reason of chapter 65, Title 18, United States Code (malicious mischief). Investigative procedures in other types of incidents (e.g., train wrecking, damaging aircraft and motor vehicles, racketeering) shall remain unchanged.

#MOM6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/ftb

(b) Primary jurisdiction - Subject to the provisions hereof, the FBI will exercise primary jurisdiction over all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities or at activities, such as transportation and tourist offices, operating under the aegis of a foreign government although not in a diplomatic status, over all alleged violations of subsections 844(d) through (i) which are perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals and all other violations of subsections 844(e) through (g) which are not directed at Treasury Department or Postal Service buildings or functions.

(c) Type of Investigation to be Conducted

(1) Offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which appear at the outset to have been perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals as defined in advance by the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice. If ATF or the Postal Inspection Service has properly initiated investigations and information is subsequently developed indicating apparent involvement of terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals, responsibility shall be relinquished to the FBI unless a determination is made by the Department of Justice that a transfer of responsibilities will unduly impair further investigative efforts.

(2) Alleged offenses against Colleges and Universities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of any alleged violation of section 844 which involves the use or attempted use of explosive (as distinguished from incendiary) materials against the facilities of a college or university. Investigation of alleged violations involving use or attempted use of incendiary materials will be limited initially to the development of background information as prescribed in paragraph 6 below.

(3) Alleged offenses directed against foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities as described in paragraph 2(b) above.

(4) All other alleged violations of subsection 844(f) -- offenses involving use of explosives against United States property or federally financed organizations, and (g) - offenses involving possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used, etc., by the United States - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all violations of subsection 844(g) over which it has primary jurisdiction hereunder, and those violations of 844(f) which are directed at federal property (e.g., a military facility) or a federal function (e.g., a Selective Service or ROTC facility). In other violations of 844(f) the FBI will develop and disseminate background information as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

3. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Violations ancillary to firearms laws violations or violation of section 842 - The Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) of the Department of the Treasury will exercise investigative jurisdiction over violations of section 844 which are ancillary to its primary jurisdiction over the Federal firearms laws or over section 842 of Title XI.

(b) Violations of subsection 844(d) - interstate transportation of explosives with unlawful intent and subsection 844(i) - offenses against property used in or affecting commerce - Subject to paragraph 2b, above, the ATF will exercise primary investigative jurisdiction over violations of subsection 844(d) and (i) and will conduct a full investigation thereof unless notified by the Criminal Division that pursuant to paragraph 2(c)(1), above, the Department of Justice has requested FBI investigation in a particular matter.

(c) Violations directed at Treasury Department property or functions - The ATF shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at Treasury Department property or functions and will conduct a full investigation of such violations.

4. Postal Inspection Service Jurisdiction

The Postal Inspection Service shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at U.S. Postal Service property or functions.

5. Special Considerations

(a) Bomb Threats, false information (section 844(e)) - The ATF and the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction over violations of section 844(e) against Treasury Department or Postal Service property or functions, respectively. The FBI shall have jurisdiction over all other violations of section 844(e). Upon receipt of information alleging or suggesting a violation of subsection 844(e), the investigative agency concerned will review available information to determine whether the identity of the offender is known or can be readily ascertained and, if not, whether the evidence suggests a pattern or plan of such offenses by a particular offender or against a particular victim. If such a pattern appears or if the offender is identified, all available information will be disseminated as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

(b) Use/carrying explosive in commission of a felony (section 844(h)) - Violations of 844(h) should be handled as an adjunct of the felony from which they arise and should be discussed with the appropriate United States Attorney or Division of the Department handling prosecution of the underlying felony offense. The agency having jurisdiction over the underlying felony will have investigative jurisdiction over the 844(h) violation (e.g., bank robbery is under FBI jurisdiction).

(c) Violations of 26 U.S.C. 5861 (destructive devices) - In incidents involving alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 844 (which may also involve a violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861), ATF shall not exercise its primary jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 5861 involving destructive devices, but the incident shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of these guidelines. This is in no way a relinquishment by ATF of its investigative jurisdiction under Title II of the Gun Control Act of 1968.

6. Development of Background Information

Some incidents such as those directed against Federal property or functions (paragraph 2(b) above) require immediate full federal investigation. Others require a more circumspect approach and will result in full Federal investigation only after consideration of factors pertinent to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, in those incidents which these guidelines do not prescribe immediate full investigation, the investigative agency having jurisdiction will develop background information which includes (a) facts bearing on motivation such as involvement of the suspected perpetrators in terrorist/revolutionary activities, organized crime, labor-management disputes, or racial-religious hate activities; (b) the applicability of state and local laws and likelihood of state or local investigative and prosecutive actions; and (c) any other available facts indicating whether or not the offense warrants Federal investigation and prosecution. Such background information will be submitted telephonically (202-739-2745) or by teletype (710-822-0008) to the General Crimes Section of the Criminal Division and to the appropriate United States Attorney. The Criminal Division will advise the investigative agency concerned whether the matter warrants submission to any other Division or Section of the Criminal Division, and when so warranted the Criminal Division will transmit the information to such other Division or Section.

7. Full Investigation

A full investigation will be initiated immediately in those instances wherein such investigation is specified herein. In other instances full investigation will be initiated only upon direction of the Department of Justice after consideration by the Division having cognizance over the matter of the background information developed under paragraph 6 above.

8. Reports

Copies of case reports prepared in matters investigated under these guidelines will be furnished directly to the Department of Justice and the appropriate United States Attorney. All investigative agencies

shall submit initial reports as soon as practicable to the Department of Justice and shall submit progress reports once each 30 days or as soon thereafter as possible. The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice will be informed as soon as possible in each instance wherein an investigative agency initiates an investigation under section 844. Such notification is of critical importance to the avoidance of duplication of investigative activities. Also each agency subscribing to these guidelines shall, upon instituting investigation regarding possible violations of section 844, immediately notify other subscribing agencies having a logical interest therein. Also, a sufficient level of follow-up liaison and dissemination shall be maintained to avoid duplication of investigative effort.

Additionally, each such agency will exchange information on a timely basis and in a manner which will not interfere with ongoing investigations relative to types, sources, movement, and storage of explosives which are the subject of its investigations. Information regarding significant developments in investigations being conducted under these guidelines and information of an intelligence nature developed incidental to investigations which is of logical interest to the Department of Justice shall be furnished promptly to the Criminal Division of that Department which will be responsible for any necessary further dissemination within that Department.

9. Review of Guidelines

These guidelines shall be reviewed on a continuing basis by the parties hereto to determine whether problems exist in their administration which should be alleviated or whether modification of any of the terms of the agreement are needed in the interests of better law enforcement.

10. Summary

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
842	Regulatory provision violations	ATF
844(d)	Interstate transportation (except by mail) of explosives with unlawful intent	ATF

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
844(e)	Bomb threats - false information - Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
844(f)	Offenses against property of the United States or federally financed organizations --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other (including colleges and universities)	FBI
844(g)	Possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used by the United States --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
844(h)	Use/carrying explosives in commission of a felony	Agency having jurisdiction over underlying felony

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
844(i)	Offenses against property used in or affecting commerce	ATF
All Sections	All offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals	FBI - Unless another agency has started investigation before receipt of information indicating terrorist/revolutionary involvement. In this event see paragraph 2c(1) above.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

["I. Purpose of Agreement

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) originates, and receives from other sources, large numbers of reports on individuals and organizations. One purpose of this agreement is to define that portion of the information on file with, or received or originated by, the FBI, which the United States Secret Service (USSS) desires to receive in connection with its protective responsibilities.

"The USSS has statutory authority to protect, or to engage in certain activities to protect, the President and certain other persons. (Certain other persons, as used in this agreement, refers to those persons protected by the Secret Service under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056.) The authority of the USSS to protect the President or certain other persons is construed to authorize it to investigate organizations or individuals and to interview individuals who might constitute a threat to the President or certain other persons. The FBI has statutory authority to investigate assault, killing or kidnaping and attempts or conspiracies to kill or kidnap the President and other designated individuals.

"The FBI will make available to the USSS information it may request or information which by its nature reveals a definite or possible threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

"A second purpose of this agreement is to insure the most effective protection for the President and certain other persons by establishing a clear division of responsibility between the FBI and the USSS. Such division will also avoid compromising investigations or sources and needless duplication of effort.

"II. General Responsibilities

"The USSS is charged by Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056, with the responsibility of protecting the person of the President of the United States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer in the order of succession to the office of President, and the Vice President-elect; protecting the person of a former President and his wife during his lifetime and the person of a widow of a former President until her death or remarriage, and minor children of a former President until they reach 16 years of age, unless such protection is declined; protecting persons who are determined from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Advisory Committee, as being major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who should receive such protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection); protecting the person of a visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad (unless such persons decline protection).

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

"The Executive Protective Service, under the control of the Director, USSS, is charged by Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202, with protection of the Executive Mansion and grounds in the District of Columbia; any building in which Presidential offices are located; foreign diplomatic missions located in the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia; and foreign diplomatic missions located in such other areas in the United States, its territories and possessions, as the President, on a case-by-case basis, may direct.

"The FBI is charged under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, with investigative jurisdiction over the assault, killing or kidnaping, and attempts or conspiracies to assault, kill or kidnap the President of the United States and other designated individuals.

"The FBI has responsibility for Federal investigations of all violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117 and 1201, relating to the 'Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests in the United States.'

"The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of a wide range of the criminal statutes of the United States including primary jurisdiction over matters affecting the internal security of the United States.

"III. Exchange of Information and Coordination of Responsibilities

"The USSS undertakes to identify individuals or groups who because of their propensities or characteristics, may be dangerous to the President of the United States and certain other persons. To assist the USSS in identifying such individuals and groups the FBI agrees to furnish to the USSS, information (other than public source information or information originating with other U. S. agencies) from its files or which may come to its attention which by its nature reveals a danger or possible danger to the President or certain other persons, or which can be construed as falling within the categories of information desired by the USSS as set forth in Section IV of this agreement.

"The FBI will inform the USSS of the identity of individuals or organizations who come to the attention of the FBI as knowingly and willfully advocating, abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States, or the Government of any state, territory, or possession, or political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government. The FBI will furnish the USSS with reports on such individuals or organizations as requested. During investigation by the FBI of such individuals or organizations, the FBI will be alert and promptly notify the USSS of any information indicating a possible plot against the person of the President and certain other persons.

"The USSS agrees that it will conduct no investigation of individuals or groups identified or suspected of being threats to the internal security of the United States without notifying the FBI. However, when time for

consultation is not available, and an indication of immediate danger exists, the USSS may take such action as is necessary with respect to carrying out its protective responsibilities. Any information obtained by the USSS during such action will be furnished to the FBI as expeditiously as possible.

"The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction.

"It will be the responsibility of the FBI to advise the USSS when investigation is being initiated under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751 and thereafter to furnish the USSS with copies of the FBI investigative reports as they are prepared. It will be the responsibility of the USSS to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention which reasonably indicates that a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, has been or is being committed.

"The USSS also agrees to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention indicating a violation of any other statutes over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction.

"The FBI, under its responsibility for investigation of violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117, 1201 and 1751 will take cognizance of the protective responsibilities of the Treasury Department under Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202 and Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 and thus does not limit or interfere with the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury in the discharge of his statutory protective responsibilities. This is not to be construed as vesting concurrent investigative jurisdiction with the Treasury Department with respect to investigations of individuals or organizations engaged in activities affecting the national security including terrorism, treason, sabotage, espionage, counter-espionage, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, seditious conspiracy, neutrality matters, Foreign Agents Registration Act, or any other Statute or Executive Order relating to national security. Any investigations of such groups or individuals for any reasons other than in connection with protective responsibilities must be closely coordinated with and have the concurrence of the FBI in order to minimize interference with national security responsibilities of the FBI.

"IV. Information to be Furnished to the United States Secret Service by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

"A. When an individual or group is referred by the FBI to the USSS, the following information will be furnished to the extent available:

"Individual - Identification data including name or names, addresses, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment, and marital status.

"Organization - Name or names, address or addresses, officers, size, purpose or goals of organization, source of financial support, background data and such other relevant information as may be available.

"Reason for Referral - Statement of the class or classes of information described in Section IV B under which the individual or organization belongs.

"Information in FBI Files - A summary, as appropriate, of pertinent portions of any FBI file on an individual or organization referred.

"FBI Identification Records - The USSS will make specific requests in each instance where a check of the FBI identification records is desired.

"B. Types of information to be referred:

"1. Information concerning attempts, threats, or conspiracies to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by the USSS or other U. S. or foreign officials in the U. S. or abroad.

"2. Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means, or attempts personally to contact such officials for that purpose.

"3. Information concerning threatening, irrational, or abusive written or oral statements about U. S. Government or foreign officials.

"4. Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U. S. demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic establishments.

"5. Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-making; concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or other implements of war; or other terrorist activity.

"6. Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a desire to defect from the United States and who demonstrate one or more of the following characteristics:

a. Irrational or suicidal behavior or other emotional instability.

b. Strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment.

c. A propensity toward violence.

"7. Information concerning persons who may be considered potentially dangerous to individuals protected by the USSS because of their background or activities, including evidence of emotional instability or participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the United States.

"V. Provision of Federal Bureau of Investigation Personnel to Protect the President and Other Protected Persons

"The USSS may, in accordance with Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 request FBI Agents be detailed to the USSS in order to augment the capacity of the USSS to perform its protective duties. Such requests should be addressed to the Director of the FBI.

"FBI Agents detailed to the USSS are under the direction and exclusive operational control of the Director of the USSS for the period of their assignment. The FBI Agents so detailed may perform an armed or other protective function.

"VI. Implementation of Agreement

"In order to effect the best possible security of the President and certain other persons and places whose protection is the responsibility of the USSS, the FBI and the USSS will construe the terms of this agreement liberally and will take such steps as are necessary to insure the proper exchange and coordination of information.

"The agreement shall be reviewed annually by representatives of the FBI and the USSS, or at such other times as the FBI or the USSS may request, to insure that the agreement is both practical and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Director of the FBI and the Director of the USSS.

"This agreement supersedes all prior agreements between the FBI and the USSS.

July 16, 1973
Date

BY /s/ Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

July 30, 1973
Date

BY /s/ James J. Rowley
Director
United States Secret Service"

#NDP16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/HG

April 9, 1975

REC- 106

62-116395-64

BY LIAISON

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Flemister
1-Mr. Rachner

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Davis:

In connection with a request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, it is requested that the following documents, which were originated or received by representatives of the National Security Council, be cleared for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee:

Memorandum dated November 6, 1950, from J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and Mr. Raymond P. Whearty, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

DELIVERED BY LIAISON
ON 4/[illegible]/75 LES

Letter dated November 8, 1950, from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council, which encloses a report captioned "Report by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to the National Security Council Regarding the Recent Outbreak of Violence by Puerto Rican Nationalists"

Letter dated July 25, 1961, from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference,

BCR:hc
(7)

BCR

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y

APR 1 9 1975

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council

to Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which encloses a memorandum concerning United States internal security programs under the control of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee

Inasmuch as the Senate Select Committee requested the above documents by close of business April 7, 1975, your prompt attention to this matter would be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

NOTE:

In view of the urgency of the Senate Select Committee request, the above documents were hand carried to the NSC Staff on 4/4/75, by Liaison Agent B. C. Rachner. This letter constitutes a formal request which as in the past has been requested by the National Security Council Staff.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/~~116~~

April 7, 1975

Sen Study - 75

Mr. Wannall:

The statement in the attached of the Third Agency rule is accurate and does not present legal problems.

As an observation paragraph number 7 of the document titled "Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committee," dated March 28, 1975, (attached) appears to be subject to various interpretations. This paragraph and in particular the second sentence of the paragraph appears to allow the agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is indirectly involved and the material is sensitive without first contacting the Third Agency. Any notification of the Third Agency in this instance of the furnishing of such information to the Committee would be after the fact. The term indirectly is not defined. Additionally, this paragraph allows the Agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is directly involved and the material is nonsensitive without checking with the Third Agency involved. It would appear the language in paragraph number 7 should be tightened up and the appropriate terms defined.

REC-106 62-116395-64

Legal Counsel Division

6 APR 15 1975

3 ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

4/9/75
ABOVE WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTN OF JOHN WARNER, GENERAL COUNSEL, CIA, WHO ADVISED THAT HE AGREED WITH BU'S OBSERVATION AND WOULD ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM IN NEW PAPER BEING PREPARED.
VPS

62-116395

5-VFS

PVD:dkg (4)

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

#mDR16

"ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAIN
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/ATG

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-64

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to interrelationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency receiving request
2. Originating agency

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency|Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency|relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/MG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-64

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

✗ 5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to interrelationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

✗ 7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency security interests
2. Originating agency

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a~~n~~ homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/26/01 BY SP2ALM/dts

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-64

[illegible]tractual obligations. The dete[illegible]nation of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community and then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(2) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ✓
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : G. R. Steel GRS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/ats

#MDR16

By agreement, the FBI is currently conducting full field investigations regarding SSC staff personnel. These have extremely short (2 week) deadlines which are identical to those afforded Presidential appointments and are, therefore, given preferential treatment in opening, assigning, and following field progress. The Special Inquiry Unit of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry Section, which has about twice its normal case load, is handling these requests. Senator Church, Chairman, SSC, originally estimated that between 35 and 40 staff members would be submitted for investigation. As of today, 4-3-75, we have received requests for 65 such investigations from the SSC and the end does not appear to be in sight. They are received in bunches as many as 6 at a time, which is not the even flow expected and presents an additional burden.

In addition it is expected that similar requests will be forthcoming in the near future from the HSC since we have a similar agreement with it. Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the HSC, has estimated "probably no more than about 25 staff members will be hired." It remains to be seen if this estimate also falls short of actual receipts.

Since there is no charge for these full field investigations they will have to be considered in the budget. It is noted the current charge for a full field investigation, where applicable, is $2028.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116[illegible]

EX 104 MCT REC 44 62-116395-63

ACTION: For information. Since it appears the nucleus of the Committee has been formed, it is suggested Senator Church be contacted and queried regarding a more realistic (30 day) deadline on the remaining investigations concerning future staff members and their replacements.

APR 14 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Walsh

1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Steel

Discussed with Wm. Miller 4-4-75. He agreed to 30-Day [illegible] on future [illegible] except a few which he will indicate still need in 2 weeks. GRS

LEGAL COUNSEL

GRS:dc
-6-

APR 17 1975

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

84 APR 18 1975

4-528

62-116395-62X
62X1 **CHANGED TO** 62-116464-2
3

JUN 12 1975

Hmk/cz

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18-01 BY SP2 ALM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/3/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Farrington

This memorandum recommends that the attached draft of a paper prepared by CIA entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment and that a member of the Division be named to represent the FBI in future meetings with legal representatives from other U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies and departments. The purpose of such a group is to develop recommendations for changes in existing laws or the proposal of new legislation which Mr. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence can offer to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

At a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community 2/27/75, a draft paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," was distributed to all members. This paper was drafted by Mr. Marvin Smith of CIA. It is considered a starting point for the Intelligence Community to identify areas in existing statutes that should be changed, as well as to recommend new legislation deemed necessary to clarify for the Congress and the American people the authorities, the limitations and missions of various member agencies or departments of the Intelligence Community.

In furnishing copies of this paper to members, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Mr. John Clarke, acknowledged the paper presents a starting point and in no way should be considered a final draft. He suggested that Legal Counsel representatives of each agency or department of USIB review the document and submit their comments directly to Mr. Marvin Smith, on Agency code 143, extension 4055. Following the receipt of such comments from the legal offices of member agencies and departments, it was proposed that a meeting would be called in an effort to begin drafting a paper representative of the Intelligence Community which would reflect recommended changes in existing statutes or proposals for new legislation.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]
#MDR16

Enclosure
62-116395

ENCLOSURE

REC-10 62-116395-62

APR 14 1975

SEE ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, PAGE 3

CONTINUED - OVER

WOC:dln/ebc
(5)

MAR 21 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

The Department of Justice is represented on the Ad Hoc Group by Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, and there will be Departmental participation in this matter.

ACTION:

(1) That the attached CIA paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment in concert with representatives of the Intelligence Division.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division designate a representative to participate in the drafting of a paper to be furnished by Mr. Colby to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Wannall dtd 3/3/75
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, 3/5/75, JH:msl

In view of the direct impact on operations of the Intelligence Division, we feel that representatives of that Division should participate in and coordinate these matters. Legal Counsel will review attached CIA paper and will furnish representative to assist the Intelligence Division regarding proposals and legislative language.

JCF

D R A F T

AMBIGUITIES AND THE LAW

CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI and, to some extent, several other Federal Agencies, collect information and produce intelligence, but of different kinds and for different purposes. This is recognized in practice but is not as clearly established in the law. Given some lack of clarity in the law and some uncertainty regarding limits placed on intelligence activities, misunderstanding and fear of abuse of power easily thrive~~s~~. In reality, however, in the implementation of mission and charters and in direction and control, there are not as many unresolved ambiguities as the uninformed may suppose.

The experience following the National Security Act of 1947 is such that it is now possible to eliminate some of the vagueness of the language of the Act. The certainty and public confidence that should result from clarifications in the law should far outweigh any disadvantages. A number of possible amendments or additions to current laws have already been mentioned, and proposed legislation has already been submitted for some. These ideas and others are suggested, below.

FmOR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 BLM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-162

1) Clarify CIA's mission and charter by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect:

--that included in the proper functions of the Agency are (a) collection of foreign intelligence information; (b) conduct of activities to carry out CIA's counter-intelligence responsibilities overseas; and (c) conduct of covert action operations overseas when authorized by the President;

--that CIA's responsibility to produce intelligence relates only to foreign intelligence;

--that it is a duty of the Agency to develop advanced technical equipment to improve the collection and processing of foreign intelligence information; and

--that the conduct of any counterintelligence operation or other activity overseas directed specifically at U.S. citizens (other than CIA employees) will be undertaken in coordination with the FBI or as requested by the FBI or by other USG agencies in coordination with the FBI.

2) Establish the authority for those agencies engaged in the collection and production of foreign intelligence to carry on certain specified activities within the United States, such as:

--protection of classified information and their own installations against penetration and compromise;

--investigation of employees, applicants, and those persons who could assist the U.S. foreign intelligence effort;

--investigation of employees and other individuals to be granted access to sensitive information;

✓ --collection of foreign intelligence information from foreign nationals and from cooperating U.S. citizens;

--establishment of mechanisms in support of foreign intelligence activities; and

--cooperation with the FBI in investigations relating to the unauthorized disclosure of foreign intelligence.

3) Remove uncertainty regarding responsibility for internal security matters by modifying appropriate laws to establish clearly:

--that the collection of counterintelligence information in the United States and the collection of information related to internal security are functions of the FBI;

--that the responsibility for the production of intelligence related to internal security rests with the FBI; and

--that with due regard to assessed reliability of the information and responsibilities for protecting sources and methods, those agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities will make available to the FBI and other Federal agencies, as appropriate, the security and counterintelligence information relating to foreign nationals in the United States and to U.S. citizens which is derived as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities.

4) Recognize international terrorism and international illegal drug activities as threats to U.S. national security and proper targets for U.S. foreign intelligence efforts, as well as for internal security operations.

5) Provide protection against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods by:

--providing for the protection of intelligence sources and methods on a statutory basis independent of Executive Order 11652;

--clarifying that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods related to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence;

--assigning to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the duty of protecting intelligence sources and methods related to internal security and to counterintelligence within the United States;

--imposing specific burdens, upon officers and employees of all branches of the government and others granted official access, not to disclose such information without authorization,

and providing criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures;

--establishing effective injunctive recourse, through the Attorney General, for protection of all intelligence sources and methods;

--providing for in camera judicial review of material revealing intelligence sources and methods when relevant and necessary to criminal and civil proceedings;

--delineating authorities and responsibilities for investigating suspected or discovered unauthorized disclosures by (a) U.S. citizens overseas and (b) all persons within the United States.

6) Delineate areas of interagency assistance that facilitate performance of authorized missions, promote economy of resources, and as a matter of policy are desirable, for example:

--cooperation in research and development of technical collection and information processing equipment, methods and techniques;

--loan or supply of equipment, methods and techniques;

--provision of training in special skills and techniques;

--passage of information derived as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities to those agencies responsible for the matters involved.

A few changes in the procedures for reviewing intelligence activities might add considerable understanding and confidence. Of paramount importance is a form of congressional oversight that permits the provision to Congress of the necessary information in a timely, efficient and controlled manner. It is recognized that a number of Committees in both the Senate and House must be informed of substantive intelligence, operational matters and fiscal details in varying degrees. Just as in the executive branch, the test of access should be

"need-to-know." To apply this test and to control and protect sensitive information provided to Congress, a focal point within Congress would be extremely helpful. Whether a joint committee or not, such a focal point would also be valuable in facilitating changes in laws affecting intelligence activities. Congress might find that a more uniform approach to budget presentation and review would provide better insight and understanding.

The foregoing suggestions are by no means definitive. They do, however, present areas that in the experience of the intelligence community deserve careful attention.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Legal Counsel Division

DATE: 4/7/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MATERIAL; AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE EXHIBITS IN "INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER ON JURISDICTION" DATED 2/13/75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that on 4/7/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Executive Office Building, Washington, personally reviewed and approved each of the following exhibits from the captioned paper for release to the Select Committee:

1) Exhibit A - Historical Highlights.

2) Exhibit B - Confidential Memoranda: John Edgar Hoover, 8/24/36; 8/25/36; and, 9/10/36.

3) Exhibit C - Presidential Directives: 6/26/39; 9/6/39; 1/8/43; 7/24/50; 12/15/53; and, 10/30/47.

4) Exhibit D - The Delimitations Agreement of 2/23/49, as amended.

5) Exhibit E - National Security Council Charters of the IIC and the ICIS.

6) Exhibit F - National Security Action Memorandum 161, 6/9/62.

7) Exhibit G - Department of Justice Memorandum dated 3/5/64, setting forth new Charter for the IIC under supervision of the Attorney General.

8) Exhibit H - Preamble and Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947.

9) Exhibit L - Excerpt from former FBI Director Hoover's briefing of the National Security Council on 11/6/58.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/MG #60216

REC-23 62-116395-61

EX-110

5 APR 10 1975

ALL:vb
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

10) Exhibit N - Background information concerning the emergency detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950.

11) Exhibit O - Memorandum by former FBI Director Hoover, dated 5/11/61, concerning Cuban individuals and groups.

12) Exhibit Q - Memorandum of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark dated 9/14/67, concerning urban riot activities.

13) Exhibit R - Departmental Memorandum dated 2/18/69, concerning instructions on campus disorders.

14) Exhibit S - Excerpts from testimony of former Director Hoover.

15) Section of paper on "Statutes."

It was explained to Mr. Wilderotter that the extracted exhibits were letters and reports to and from The White House and/or National Security Council with which there are "Third Agency Rule" problems. As soon as cleared, it was planned to forward these to the Committee. He requested to review these exhibits prior to forwarding.

ACTION:

Upon "Third Agency Rule" approval regarding other exhibits, have same reviewed by Mr. Wilderotter. INTD will insure exhibits are made available for Mr. Wilderotter's review.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott
(Attention: Mr. J.W. Awe
Room 5644, JEH)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/MDR16

Project Senstudy 75, established within the Intelligence Division, for the purpose of developing a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress. Bureau file 62-116395 has been opened for this Project.

Because of the unusual factors relating to this entire Project, such as the sensitive nature of much of the material involved, urgency for handling, necessity for having the file very readily available to the working staff at all times, and similar other reasons, it is essential that the file be maintained in the work area of the Project which, effective 4/14/75, will be in room 4063, JEH. The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to have Files and Communications Division take necessary steps to arrange for the maintenance of the file in the designated room rather than in the usual manner.

There has already been much publicity about the Select Committees and we anticipate much more. This involves many newspaper stories. It is, therefore, believed very desirable that a Sub A file to the main file be opened as the standardized repository for newspaper articles. As a first step, it will be necessary that a few articles already in the main file be extracted and placed in the new Sub A file in the usual chronological order.

Per agreement between Awe (Div. 4) & Phillips (Div 5) we will NOT open a Sub A for newsclips but keep them in T-folder w/ Project. 4/14/75

EX 104
REC-8 62-116395-60

The foregoing matters have been already discussed with Mr. J. W. Awe, Unit Chief, of the Files and Communications Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

6 APR 15 1975

This memorandum to be referred to the Files and Communications Division for appropriate action as above.

62-116395

SFP:jvl
(6)

WOC
WRW
Phillips

FIVE

~~APR 23 1975~~

Handled by Special File Room 4-25-75

66-17404

84 APR 25 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 4/9/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. C. Flemister
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

#NW216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2-ALM/JTG

This memorandum provides for the record the temporary reassignment of Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division.

Project Senstudy 75 has been established within the Intelligence Division, effective 4/4/75. Its purpose is to develop a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible.

Pursuant to the establishment of Project Senstudy 75, certain Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division have been relieved of substantive assignments. They are as follows:

Section Chief William O. Cregar, effective 4/4/75, has assumed the responsibilities of administering the Project.

Unit Chief Elmer W. Larson, effective the same date, will function as Cregar's Number One Man.

62-116395-59

REC-71

Liaison Supervisor Leon F. Schwartz has been relieved of his regular liaison duties and will function as the Liaison Officer in contact with the intelligence community for Project Senstudy 75.

APR 10 1975

Unit Chief Seymor F. Phillips, effective 4/8/75, was assigned to the Project and will function as the Review Coordinator.

1 - Personnel file of W. O. Cregar
1 - Personnel file of E. W. Larson
1 - Personnel file of L. F. Schwartz
1 - Personnel file of S. F. Phillips

WOC:lmh lmh
(12)

CONTINUED - OVER

54 APR 16 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

At this time the length of the temporary assignment is indefinite. Upon the termination of Project Senstudy 75, the Bureau Supervisors mentioned above will revert back to their substantive assignments and an appropriate memorandum for the record will be prepared.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

wRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-12-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

In attached W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum of 3-6-75, captioned as above, it is recommended that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we can anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

In this regard, it is suggested that all Divisions receiving requests for information in connection with testimony before this Committee respond in the same commendable and expeditious manner that they responded in connection with the preparation of the Director's Brief on his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights. The format of this information should generally be as follows:

1 - Heading in all caps, centered, brief description of contents;

2 - White, watermarked bond paper, 8 x 10 1/2";

3 - At least a 2" left margin. This is essential since material will be inserted into a folder;

4 - Double spaced;

5 - Do not number pages;

6 - Each Division will be responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the information furnished in final form. This will also include up-dating any information previously furnished;

7 - Use "Mag" card typewriter (courier ~~ball~~); identifying caption on the card folder should be adequate to readily identify it with the corresponding paper. In addition to the ~~caption, card~~ folder should also have the name of the originating Division.

8 - Furnish all "Mag" cards to the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, along with the write-up.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.
JCF:law ([illegible])

1 - Each Assistant Director - Enc.

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALR/[illegible]

EX 104

REC-23

62-116395-58

APR 10 1975

56 APR 18 1975

ENCLOSURE

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memo
Re: Senstudy 75

All mail should be routed through and coordinated with the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, and all contacts with the Senate and House committees will be handled by representatives of the Legal Analysis Office, Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division.

Each Division should advise the Legislative Matters Section the identity of individual who will be the contact and coordinator of that Division's responsibilities along with his phone extension.

The Intelligence Division will be responsible for representing the Bureau on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and the identity of such individual should be made known to the Legislative Matters Section. In addition, the Intelligence Division should accumulate the data identified in paragraphs 1 and 2, as they pertain to the FBI, in Mr. John M. Clarke's memorandum to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and submit this in the form suggested above.

The Administrative Division is requested to obtain the information set forth in paragraph 3 of Mr. Clarke's memorandum, also furnishing this data in narrative form as explained above.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TJL

DATE: 3/6/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Each Assistant Director

1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum recommends that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated 3/5/75, reported the results of a meeting between Senator Church and Mr. Colby wherein Senator Church advised he anticipated asking all agencies and departments of the Intelligence Community for (1) Organizational charts broken down to a branch level going back to 1947, (2) Copies of all budgets since 1947 and (3) Documents reflecting all cash flows since 1947.

Attached is a copy of a short letter from Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community to Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director, SSC. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Clarke to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. This memorandum sets out in more detail what information the SSC will be seeking from all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. It should be noted that on page two of Mr. Clarke's memorandum he notes a formal request from Senator Church to all agencies can be expected.

The Intelligence Division believes considerable time and effort will be required from several Divisions to pull this information together. It is believed we should begin now to assemble the data in anticipation of a request.

ENCLOSURE

EX 104 REC-23 62-116395-58

ACTION: If you agree, the Legal Counsel Division will coordinate this matter and assign responsibilities to appropriate Division for the collection and preparation of the material we anticipate the SSC will request from the FBI.

1 APR 10 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/

MOR 16

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(16) ebc

TJL

LEGAL Counsel TO
MR Adams Memo
3/12/75 JCF:LAW

5-

2 - ENCLOSURE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

4 March 1975

#M0216
CLASSIFICATION CHANGED [illegible] UNCLASSIFIED [illegible] SP-2ALM/JTG 1-18-01

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental
  Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear ~~Mr. Miller~~ Bill:

Pursuant to your request, I have advised all members of the Ad Hoc Group of the United States Intelligence Board and Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, of Senator Church's request to provide legal authority and organization charts of USIB entities from their inception. I also have alerted them to the Committee's desire for comprehensive historical data on personnel, budgets, and cash flow for the same periods. They will expect to hear more directly from Senator Church on these matters.

By early next week, we will begin providing you the CIA data in response to the Chairman's request. The first set of annexes developed under the auspices of the USIB Ad Hoc Group is ready and I am having five copies of each run off for your use. Please advise if more copies are desired.

Sincerely,

John

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
  for the Intelligence Community

Attachment:
  Memo to Ad Hoc Group

62-116395-58

ENCLOSURE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

4 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review

SUBJECT: Information Requested by Senate Select Committee Staff Director

1. Senator Church has asked the Director to provide to the Senate Select Committee copies of CIA legal authorities and organization charts to branch levels, 1947-1975. He also indicated he wants similar authorities and charts for all USIB entities from their inceptions. In the case of CIA this will be from 1947; NSA from 1952; DIA from 1961; etc.

2. The Committee is seeking a comprehensive historical base line for each U.S. intelligence organization--its structure and the people involved over time. Therefore, Senator Church has asked that the names of all incumbents who have held supervisory responsibilities over the period, down through the branch level, also be provided. The Staff Director has been made aware of the difficulties involved in tracing personnel assignments too far back but asks that every effort be made to meet the request. CIA is proceeding accordingly.

3. Senator Church has also asked for budget and cash flow data on all U.S. intelligence organizations from their inceptions. The CIA finds that the source and uses tables, employed in annual financial reports, provides the historical profile desired. Supplemental data on specific programs can follow if requested. Senator Church wants data which will show specific patterns of expenditures

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-58

as distinct from budgets and appropriations. A formal request from the Chairman to all agencies on this matter can be expected.

4. The Senate Select Committee will be ready to receive classified material this week. It is suggested that Ad Hoc Group members begin assembling the legal, organizational, personnel, and budgetary data for early submission. I have provided Mr. Miller, Staff Director, with a list of Ad Hoc Principals, phone numbers, titles, etc. He understands that the central point for DOD is Mr. Thomas K. Latimer and for Treasury, Mr. Edward C. Schmults, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement.

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

1-Mr. Callahan
1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Jenkins
1-Each Assistant Director
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Farrington
1-Mr. Fulton

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 3/21/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

By memorandum Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams dated 3/12/75, the Legal Counsel Division indicated that its Legislative Matters Section would coordinate and assign responsibilities within the Bureau for the collection and preparation of material for the Senate Select Committee.

This memorandum instructed Intelligence Division to accumulate data which was identified in a memorandum from Mr. John M. Clarke from the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of the Intelligence Committee. Clarke's memorandum was attached to W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall memorandum dated 3/6/75. The identified data to be collected outlined in Clarke's memorandum was proposed-type data that the Senate Select Committee has indicated an interest in.

In view of 3/19/75 letter subsequently received from Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, to the Attorney General outlining a request for specific FBI documents they are interested in receiving, the Intelligence Division has begun accumulating this specific data. In view of this request for specific data, the Intelligence Division will not accumulate the data outlined in the Clarke memorandum since it was only in the nature of proposed data and differs from the specific data to be collected which is extensive in nature.

ACTION:

For information.

EX 104
REC-23
2-116395-5
APR 10 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/MG
#m0016

ABF:enm
(19)

5-1006

70 APR 15 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Groover

DATE: 4/8/75

FROM : J. J. Clynick

JJC

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In order to respond to item III-C of Senator Church's letter dated 3/19/75, it was necessary to survey all field offices. This was done, the response summarized and forwarded to Legal Counsel Division by memo dated 4/3.

Attached hereto are the file copies of the teletypes from the field used to compile our response. It is believed these should be filed as one item as an EBF.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached be filed as an EBF.

Enclosure

Field Offices [illegible]

JJC:jmb

~~ENCLOSURE~~

REC-11 62-116375-56

ST-112

APR 10 1975

63 ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/12/01 BY SP2 ALM [illegible]

#MDR16

3-JJC

70 APR 16 1975

TMDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

62-116395-56

1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/TEG

Budget + Acctg
[illegible]

NR004 AL CODE

4:09 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 CHP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALBANY

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPE, THE FOLLOWING IS ALBANY DIVISION'S RESPONSE:

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED ON PART-TIME BASIS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

8 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 20 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 30 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 35 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 45 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 50 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 60 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 75 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED ON A PART-TIME BASIS TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS ON

3/

PAGE 2

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

6 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 5 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 4 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 30 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 35 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 45 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 60 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.

END.

2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
[illegible]
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR001 AQ CODE

10:55AM URGENT 3-36-75 PD

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: ALBUQUERQUE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

ALBUQUERQUE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 25 PER CENT OF HIS TIME IN THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THREE AGENTS WHO WORK THESE MATTERS ON A PART-TIME BASIS WITH 20 PER CENT, 40 PER CENT AND 40 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME DEVOTED TO THESE MATTERS.

ONE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THERE ARE 15 RESIDENT AGENTS EACH OF WHO WORK APPROXIMATELY FIVE PERSENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

END

JTG FBIHQ CLR

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/ZRG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

3

R-4028

Dcw

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR006 AX CODE

6:20PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VAN

TO: BUREAU (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTIONS)

FROM: ALEXANDRIA (80-131)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

ALEXANDRIA, HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS. APPROXIMATELY SIXTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS.

ALEXANDRIA AGENTS PERFORMING IS WORK AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

3 SPECIAL AGENTS	NINETY PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	SIXTY-FIVE PERCENT
4 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIFTEEN PERCENT
5 SPECIAL AGENTS	TEN PERCENT

ALEXANDRIA HAS THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO CI WORK AS FOLLOWS:

1 SPECIAL AGENT	TEN PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIVE PERCENT

END.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3/1R

4

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
Dw
TELETYPE

NR001 AN CODE

5:45 PM 3-25-75 NITEL MAB

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SAC, ANCHORAGE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

ANCHORAGE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED BY THE SAC, WHO SPENDS 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE FORMER AND 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE LATTER CATEGORY.

THERE ARE 3 AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THEY SPEND 40 PERCENT, 5 PERCENT, AND 2 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME, RESPECTIVELY, ON THIS CATEGORY. ONE OF THE 3 AGENTS SPENDS 10 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC HOLD

#MDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

5

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
[illegible]
Eval. ____
Coun. ____
Rm. ____
Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR008 AT CODED

5:44 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 LAP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF ATLANTA AGENT PERSONNEL PRESENTLY WORKING ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ALSO INCLUDING IN THIS AREA ALL OF CLASSIFICATIONS GENERALLY REGARDED AS SECURITY WORK AND EXTREMIST WORK, AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES:

	POSITION		PER CENT OF TIME
1	SAC	WORKING	5
1	ASAC	"	3
1	SUPERVISOR	"	75
1	SUPERVISOR	"	3
3	HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS	WORKING	100
4	" " "	"	90
2	" " "	"	80
1	" " "	"	50
1	" " "	"	40
2	" " "	"	20

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP 2 ALM/BJG
#MO216

3/27

Note: Supervisor Charlie Haynes, Atlanta, telephonically contacted 3pm, 3/27/75. He will send Nitel 3/27 breaking above out by IS & CI matters separately. DJ

PAGE TWO AT 100-0

POSITION		PER CENT OF TIME
3 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS	WORKING	10
3 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	10
4 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	6
1 " "	"	3
1 " "	"	2

THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE INCLUDED IN ARRIVING AT THE ABOVE COMPUTATION:

2, 3, 14, 61, 64, 65, 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 117, 134, 135, 157, 163, 170, 174, 176, AND 185.

E N D

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

5 Revised

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAR 27 1975
TELETYPE

NR007 AT CODE

9:46 PM NITEL MARCH 27, 1975 SSP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

R-6068

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE ATLANTA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, MARCH 26, 1975.

UNDER PER CENT OF TIME COLUMN, "IS" STANDS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND "CI" STANDS FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

POSITION		PER CENT OF TIME	
		IS	CI
1 SAC	WORKING	4	1
1 ASAC	"	2	1
1 SUPERVISOR	"	45	30
1 SUPERVISOR	"	3	0
1 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENT	"	100	0
1 " " "	"	85	15
1 " " "	"	80	20
1 " " "	"	90	0
1 " " "	"	0	90
1 " " "	"	85	5
1 " " "	"	75	15
1 " " "	"	60	20

#mpe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/TG

PAGE TWO AT 100-0

POSITION				PER CENT OF TIME IS	CI
1 HEADQUARTERS	CITY	AGENT	WORKING	80	20
1 "	"	"	"	20	40
1 "	"	"	"	0	40
1 "	"	"	"	5	15
1 "	"	"	"	20	0
1 "	"	"	"	10	0
1 "	"	"	"	5	5
1 "	"	"	"	5	5
1 RESIDENT	AGENT		"	10	~~1~~0
1 "	"		"	10	0
1 "	"		"	10	~~5~~0
1 "	"		"	3	3
1 "	"		"	6	~~1~~0
1 "	"		"	0	6
1 "	"		"	6	~~1~~0
1 "	"		"	3	~~2~~0
1 "	"		"	0	~~1~~2

IN CONSIDERING ABOVE COMPUTATIONS, THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION UNDER INTERNAL SECURITY HEADING: 3, 14, 61, 98, 100, 117, 134 (INFORMANTS) 157, 163, 170, 176, 185. THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE CONSIDERED UNDER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HEADING: 2, 64, 65, 97, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 134 (ASSETS).

END

HOLD FOR 5 MORE

MAR 17 9 53 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

6

Assoc. [illegible]
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
[illegible]
Admin. ___
Comp. [illegible] ___
Ext. A[illegible] ___
F[illegible] ___
G[illegible] ___
I[illegible] ___
I[illegible] ___
[illegible] ___
[illegible] ___
P[illegible] ___
S[illegible] ___
T[illegible] ___
Leg. [illegible] ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR 014 BA CODE

10:14PM NITEL 3/25/75 JAN

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

Budget/Acct
60-8 [illegible] H

FROM BALTIMORE 66-NEW

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BALTIMORE HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 33 AGENTS DEVOTED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS). TWENTY AGENTS DEVOTE 100 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME TO IS MATTERS. THIRTEEN AGENTS DEVOTE 75 PER CENT TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PER CENT TO IS MATTERS. THE SAC'S OVERALL SUPERVISION INCLUDES 20 PER CENT OVER IS AND CI MATTERS.

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/1A

MAR 23 10 45 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

7

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budget & Accounting Sect

✓Pm 6

NR 002 BH CODE

241 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DGS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: BIRMINGHAM (66-2204)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL, 3/24/74, REGARDING PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS.

BIRMINGHAM HAS NO AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE MATTERS. FOLLOWING REPRESENT PERCENTAGES OF AGENT TIME:

AGENT	IS PERCENTAGE	CI PERCENTAGE
A	95	0
B	50	40
C	80	0
D	40	10
E	60	0
F	35	15
G	5	10
H	0	25
I	30	30
J	25	0
K (SUPERVISOR)	40	20

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTB

FmDe16

3/D2

CEIVED
ETYPE UNIT
'75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

8

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR017 BS CODE

6:58 PM NITEL MARCH 25,1975 MCC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BOSTON (66-82)

ATTN/ BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ Budget [illegible]
6057

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

BOSTON HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND TWENTY-ONE AGENTS, ALL ASSIGNED FULL TIME, TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IN ADDITION, TWELVE RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

BOSTON HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND TEN AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIME. IN ADDITION, ELEVEN RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

BUREAU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE SAME RESIDENT AGENTS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, WHO ARE ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, ARE ALSO ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/jtb

3/20

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

9

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget & Acct.
60358 JI H

NR001 BU CODE

4:04 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 TRR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUFFALO KYYXXX(66-NEW)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BUFFALO DIVISION HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 28 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT NOT NECESSARILY ON A FULL TIME BASIS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THESE AREAS ON FULL TIME BASIS:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SAC	0	0
ASAC	0	0
SUPERVISORS	0	0
SPECIAL AGENTS	6	0

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/SS
#mdels

1-2

3/10

PAGE TWO BU 66-NEW

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, COMPUTATION OF ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY OTHER AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED THESE MATTERS WOULD REPRESENT EQUIVALENT OF FOLLOWING NUMBER OF FULL TIME PERSONNEL:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	71/2	5
GRAND TOTALS:		
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	13 1/2	5

END

MAR 27 4 08 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

10

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

QNR 006 BT PLAIN

9-13 QP PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 TDS

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUTTE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SECURITY MATTERS SUPERVISED BY ASAC FIVE PERCENT OF HIS TIME. ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT HANDLES FIFTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME AND ONE RA TEN PERCENT OF HIS TIME. NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORK BUTTE DIVISION.

END

V

FBIHQ FLC FR THREE TELS TKS AND CUL.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

7/00

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 11:14 PM '75

62-116395-56

11

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

Budget Acct. Unit
6038

NR 009 CE CODED

5:33 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBULET MARCH 24, 1975.

CHARLOTTE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY MATTERS, NO OTHER SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLE SECURITY. THERE ARE 3 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE ADDITIONAL HEADQUARTERS AGENT ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ONE RESIDENT AGENT IS ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, 4 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, AND 9 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED FROM 5 TO 15 PER CENT OF THEIR WORK IN SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.

NO SUPERVISORY OR AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM WHICH WAS DISCONTINUED PER BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS IN 1971.

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JMG

Note: Charlotte security supervisor telephonically contacted 2^{45} PM, 3/27/75 and the difference between counterintelligence program and C.I. matters explained to him. He will send corrected Nitel 3/27.
DLA

3/DW

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 5 37 PM '75

62-116395-56

Revised
11

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR005 CE CODE

5:26 PMNITEL MARCH 27, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975, AND CHARLOTTE TEL MARCH 25, 1975.

CHARLOTTE OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO BOTH SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT IS ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND A SECOND HEADQUARTERS AGENT DEVOTES 25 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TWO RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 25 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND TWO ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED BETWEEN 5 TO 10 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. OTHER RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WHEN NEED ARISES, HOWEVER, NO EXACT PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE SINCE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS GREATLY FLUCTUATE.

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

3/10

MAR 27 8 31 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

12

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
Dcw

NR026 CG CODE

610PM NITEL 3-25-75 RWR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHICAGO

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ 18-698

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975, TO ALL SAC'S.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF AGENT TIME IN THE CHICAGO DIVISION SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

SAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, 20 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PERCENT.

ASAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 20 PERCENT.

SUPERVISORS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, FOUR, FULL TIME; INTERNAL SECURITY, ONE, FULL TIME, ONE, 50 PERCENT. (THE OTHER FIFTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IS SPENT ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.)

AGENTS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 76, FULL TIME (INCLUDES 10 AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE);

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2-ALM/LTG

3/10

PAGE TWO

INTERNAL SECURITY, 28, FULL TIME.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, 10 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO EXTREMIST MATTERS.

THIS REPRESENTS A TOTLE OF 114 SA'S ASSIGNED SECURITY WORK EXCLUSIVE OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL.

END.

PLS ACK FOR TWELVE

~~NEED A RERUN OF UR NRTS HAVE AN OVERLINE~~

MAR 25 7 19 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

13

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

NR 004 CI CODE

748PM NITEL 3/25/75 KOD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CINCINNATI (105-7038)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Rm. [illegible] 8

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL TIME BEING EXPENDED IN CINCINNATI DIVISION OM INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (CIM):

SAC AND ASAC - NONE

	IS	CIM
ONE SUPERVISOR	65 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE SUPERVISOR	53 PERCENT	36 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	100 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	80 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	60 PERCENT	40 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	27 PERCENT	73 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	45 PERCENT	55 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	50 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	50 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	73 PERCENT	27 PERCENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG
#M0016

3/19

	IS	CIM
ONE AGENT	30 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	40 PERCENT	20 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	25 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
THREE AGENTS	10 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	10 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	5 PERCENT	5 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	2 PERCENT	8 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	5 PERCENT	0 PERCENT.

END

REC 4 DBS FBIHQ CLR

RELAYED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 23 PM '75

62-116395-56

14

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budget & Accounting

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 005 CV CODE

8:25PM NITEL 3/25/75 RJB

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: CLEVELAND (66-5641)

CONF~~IDE~~NTIAL

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

CLEVELAND HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS TWO, AGENTS 20. THE FOLLOWING NUMBER ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-INTELLIGNECE WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS ONE, AGENTS 16. THE THREE SUPERVISORS HANDLE SECURITY-TYPE MATTERS EXCLUSIVELY.

CLEVELAND HAS UTILIZED PERCENTAGES OF AGENT'S TIME SPENT IN THESE CATEGORIES WHERE APPLICABLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE RESIDENT AGENCIES.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 6020, XGDS CATEGORY 2, INDEFINITE.~~

END

HOLD FOR ONE

TJT FBI WASH D

#mDe16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG
ON 1-17-01

MAR 25 8 31 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

15

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

✓ Budget [illegible] Unit
JEH

NR005 CO CODE

7:00PMEDT NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WCA

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM COLUMBIA (105-NEW)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

COLUMBIA PRESENTLY HAS ZERO AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS COLUMBIA HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS AND SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED THE FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME:

AGENTS	1 - 75, 1 - 30, 3 - 20, 1 - 10, 3 - 5 OR LESS
SUPERVISORS	1 - 20

END.

DBS FBIHQ

CLR

#MDL16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

3/0.J

RECEIVED
ETYPE UNIT
8 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

16

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR008 DL CODE

5:44 PM NITEL 3/26/75 DRH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: DALLAS (105-NEW)

Budget Accounting
6028

ATTN: INTD SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN REPLY TO BUREAU REQUEST, THE DALLAS OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO WORK ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS), COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI), APPLICANT AND RELATED MATTERS. FIFTY-FOUR PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS. THERE ARE SIX HEADQUARTERS AGENTS HANDLING IS AND/OR CI MATTERS, THREE RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING THE MAJORITY OF THEIR TIME ON BOTH IS AND CI MATTERS AND EIGHT RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME IN THE IS AND CI FIELDS. DATA FOR SURVEY WAS OBTAINED FROM THE FEBRUARY, 1975, CASE LOAD. THE NUMBER OF DALLAS AGENTS WORKING IS, CI OR BOTH AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME SPENT IN THESE FIELDS IS SET OUT BELOW:

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3/10

SAS	3X	1X	1X	1X	1X	1X	1X	2	2
IS PERCENT	100		34	63	62	24	30	16	5
CI PERCENT		100	66	11	38	76	16		

SAS	1	1	1	1
IS PERCENT	13	6		2
CI PERCENT			8	

X RA AND HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS AND CI SQUAD.

END.

[illegible]

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 6 48 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

17

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Ge ____
Id ____
Ir ____
In ____
L ____
Pl el. ____
S ____
T ____
Leg ____
Tel m. ____
Direct Sec'y ____

NR007 DN PLAIN

535 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JSG

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

(ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: DENVER (66-DEAD)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL OFFICES, MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (CI):

SAC - 0

ASAC-0

SUPERVISOR - ONE FULL TIME, 3/4 OF TIME OF IS, 1/4 TO CI

AGENTS - 12 AND 1/2, 3/4 TIME TO IS, 1/4 TIME TO CI.

IN DENVER OFFICE, IS AND CI MATTERS ARE HANDLED BY FIELD SUPERVISOR ON FULL TIME BASIS. DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES ALSO HANDLED ON SQUAD BUT ONLY FRACTION OF SUPERVISOR'S AND SQUAD TIME IS USED ON THESE CASES. SAC AND ASAC ARE KEPT ABREAST OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND, OF COURSE, HAVE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY BUT HAVE NOT IS OR CI MATTERS ASSIGNED TO THEM. BESIDES SUPERVISOR, THERE ARE 8 SPECIAL AGENTS (SA) IN HEADQUARTERS CITY ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS AND CI MATTERS WITH ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THIS TIME GIVEN TO DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES. ALL BOMBING MATTERS

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/

PAGE TWO (DN 66-DEAD)

(174 CLASSIFICATION) ARE CONSIDERED A PART OF IS INVESTIGATIONS. TWO OF EIGHT SAS FULL TIME AND ONE SA HALF TIME HANDLE CI MATTERS, REMAINDER HANDLE IS.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES (RA) FOLLOWING SITUATION EXISTS:

ONE AGENT IN COLORADO SPRINGS SPENDS 50 0/0 AND ANOTHER AGENT SPENDS 25 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON IS AND CI MATTERS. IN BOULDER RA ONE FULL TIME AGENT AND ONE AGENT SPENDING 60 0/0 OF HIS TIME HANDLE IS AND CI MATTERS. IN FORT COLLINS RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 50 0/0 AND THE OTHER 40 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. IN CHEYENNE RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 25 0/0 OF HIS TIME ONE THESE MATTERS. IN THE OTHER RAS ONLY A MINOR FRACTION OF THE TIME OF EACH RA IS DEVOTED TO IS AND CI MATTERS. TOTAL TIME WOULD POSSIBLY EQUAL THAT OF ONE SA FULL TIME. IN ALL INSTANCES, ABOUT 3/4 OF TIME SPENT ON SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IS ON IS MATTERS WITH REMAINING 1/4 ON CI MATTERS.

END

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR FOUR

WA CLR

PAGE TWO (CI [illegible])

(IN CLASSIFICATION) ARE CONSIDERED A PART OF IS INVESTIGATIONS. TWO OF EIGHT RAS FULL TIME AND ONE SA HALF TIME HANDLE CI MATTERS. [illegible] HANDLE IS.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES (RAS) FOLLOWING SITUATION EXISTS:

ONE AGENT IN COLORADO SPRINGS SPENDS 1/3 AND ANOTHER AGENT SPENDS 2/3 OF THEIR TIME ON IS AND CI MATTERS. IN BOULDER RA ONE FULL TIME AGENT AND ONE AGENT SPENDING 60 0/0 OF HIS TIME HANDLE IS AND CI MATTERS. IN FORT COLLINS RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 3/4 AND THE OTHER AGENT 1/4 OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. IN [illegible] RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 50 0/0 OF HIS TIME ON THESE MATTERS. IN THE OTHER RAS ONLY A MINOR FRACTION OF THE TIME OF EACH SA IS DEVOTED TO IS AND CI MATTERS. TOTAL TIME WOULD POSSIBLY EQUAL THAT OF ONE SA FULL TIME. IN ALL INSTANCES, ABOUT 3/4 OF TIME SPENT ON SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IS ON IS MATTERS WITH REMAINING 1/4 ON CI MATTERS.

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 7 59 PM '75

END

[illegible] FOUR

[illegible]

62-116395-56

18

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
DCW

NR032 DE CODE

5:42 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WGM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DETROIT

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

DETROIT DIVISION CURRENTLY HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND FOURTEEN AGENTS ASSIGNED 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, ONE ASAC IS ASSIGNED FIVE PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT, THREE SAS FIFTEEN PERCENT, ONE SA TEN PERCENT, ONE SA FIVE PERCENT.

DETROIT DIVISION ALSO HAS ASSIGNED ONE SUPERVISOR AND ELEVEN SAS SPENDING 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN ADDITION, ONE ASAC FIVE PERCENT, THREE SAS 75 PERCENT, ONE SA 50 PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT AND ONE SA TEN PERCENT. ONE SAC HAS FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

HOLD PLS

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/STG

MAR 27 2 21 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. A.D.-Adm. ____
A.D.-Inv. ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

19

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 EP CODE

6:28 PM NITEL 3-25-75 MJT

TO: DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM: EL PASO (66-NEW) ///1P///

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC, EL PASO CURRENTLY SPENDS 3 PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY, 2 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ASAC HANDLES NO SECURITY MATTERS; SUPERVISOR NUMER THREE DESK DEVOTES 15 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 5 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

FOUR AGENTS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED SECURITY MATTERS, WITH ONE AGENT DEVOTING 60 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY, 0 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; SECOND AGENT SPENDS 10 PER CENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; THIRD AGENT 50 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; FOURTH AGENT, WHO IS RELIEF SUPERVISOR, DEVOTES 10 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 65 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JG

3/DR

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

20

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 001 HN CODE

5:08 PM HST NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JVS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HONOLULU (66-) 1P

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

Budget & Acct

JEH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

HONOLULU CURRENTLY HAS FOUR SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED PRIMARILY SECURITY MATTERS BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY AS FOLLOWS: 2 AGENTS 90 PER CENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND AND 10 PER CENT EACH OTHER MATTERS; 1 AGENT 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY; 1 AGENT 30 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 40 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 30 PER CENT OTHER MATTERS. 3 ADDITIONAL AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 15 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

ASAC, SUPERVISES SECURITY MATTER, SPENDS 35 PER CENT OF TIME ON SECURITY BROKEN DOWN AS: 25 PER CENT COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND 10 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

END.

HOLD

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP8ALM/ETG

3/DA

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAY 25 11 01 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 2 6 1975

TELETYPE

21

Assoc. Dir. —
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. —
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. —
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. —
Comp. Syst. —
Ext. Affairs —
Files & Com. —
Gen. Inv. —
Ident. —
Inspection —
Intell. —
Laboratory —
Plan. & Eval. —
Spec. Inv. —
Training —
Legal Coun. —
Telephone Rm. —
Director Sec'y —

Budget & Acct.
66- [illegible]

NR008 HO CODE

5:55 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 BNG

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HOUSTON

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SET FORTH BELOW ARE SAC, SUPERVISOR AND AGENTS CURRENTLY WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AGENTS	2.05	2.70
SUPERVISOR	.30	.40
SAC	.02	.04

END

HOLD

#MOE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP 2 ALM/ [illegible]

3/EX

MAR 25 6 PM '75
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

22

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

Budget & Accounting
Rm. [illegible]

NR005 IP CODE

5:39 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RXH

TO DIRECTOR

FROM INDIANAPOLIS

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL, FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED CONCERNING INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

SAC	NONE
ASAC	NONE
SUPERVISORS	.30 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND .40 INTERNAL SECURITY
SPECIAL AGENTS	6.25 ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 9.50 ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD FOR FIVE MORE

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2ALM/HG

[illegible]

MAR 25 6 53 PM '75
REC TELET

62-116395-56

23

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 CODE JN

4:07PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JWD

TO DIRECTOR, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM JACKSON (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC AND ASAC, JACKSON OFFICE, HAVE NO CASES ASSIGNED IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. TWO SUPERVISORS HAVE CASES ASSIGNED AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO FORTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIFTEEN PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THERE ARE FIFTY FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO THREE POINT SIX TENTHS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE POINT ONE TENTH AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG #m0216

3/20

62-116395-56

24

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 JK CODE

7:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 GLB

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Rm-6058

EH

FROM JACKSONVILLE (100-NEW) (RUC)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED NITEL FOR JACKSONVILLE DIVISION:

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FIFTY PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY AND TEN PERCENT INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, NONE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, ACCUMULATED TO REPRESENT FOUR AGENTS ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE AGENT ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2-ALM/JJ16

B/PR

TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 21 PM '75

62-116395-56

25

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DCW

NR 003 KC CODE

6:15 PM 3/25/75 NITEL JAW

TO: DIRECTOR

(ATTN:BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: KANSAS CITY (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

KANSAS CITY DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TIME SPENT IS 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 40 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

TWO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

KANSAS CITY HAS THIRTEEN ADDITIONAL AGENTS HANDLING BOTH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: FIVE AGENTS, 90 PERCENT, INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE AGENT, 90 PERCENT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: TWO AGENTS, 30 PERCENT ON EACH:; FOUR AGENTS, 10 PERCENT ON EACH, AND ONE AGENT 50 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD

#moe
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JHS

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 23 PM 75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

DCW

TELETYPE

2-6

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR004 KX CODE

8:10 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WEH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATN: BUDGET & ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SAC, KNOXVILLE (100-00)

VR-9028

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/ATG #MDe16

INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ASAC'S DESK IN THE KNOXVILLE DIVISION. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE ASAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON SUCH MATTERS, DIVIDED 15 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IN ADDITION, THERE ARE FIVE AGENTS WITHIN THE DIVISION WORKING PRIMARILY ON SECURITY MATTERS. TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND 80 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY WORK AND 5 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 75 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 20 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 60 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 35 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; AND ONE AGENT SPENDS 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 75 PERCENT ON

3/19

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

SECURITY ITEMS REQUIRING THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF THE SAC UTILIZE ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON EACH CATEGORY.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE AND CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 47 PM '75

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y ✓

Budget & Accnt.

27

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

NR 011 LV CODE

838 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 MLP

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM LAS VEGAS (100-00)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

LAS VEGAS SAC AND ASAC DO NOT SUPERVISE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. LAS VEGAS HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ①

LAS VEGAS HAS ONE FIELD SUPERVISOR WHO SUPERVISES INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AMONG MANY OTHER CATEGORIES. IT IS ESTIMATED THIS SUPERVISOR SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON MATTERS OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY NATURE.

LAS VEGAS HAS FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO ARE NORMALLY ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 95 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. ONE OTHER SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 30 PER CENT, AND THE OTHER TWO, APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC CLR

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/toTG

① Supervisor Don Smith contacted and advises Counterintelligence matters should be as follows: No supervisory time.

3/27/75
5^45 pm

2 agents involved, one about 3% of his time + one about 2%.

3/DA

62-116395-56

28

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Budget & Acct

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 004 LR PLAIN

3:09 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 GM

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LITTLE ROCK (66-1880)

ATTENTIONC BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING SET FORTH IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED TELETYPE:

TWO AGENTS IN LITTLE ROCK DIVISION ASSIGNED PART-TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH BREAKDOWN OF TIME SPENT AS FOLLOWS:

ONE AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 45 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. SECOND AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 65 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 8 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 2 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TAG

3/07

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 1 13PM 1975

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

29

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plans & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget & Acct.
60 Sch

NR 009 LA CODE

12:09 PM URGENT 3-26-75 SMA

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOS ANGELES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUTEL, MARCH 24 LAST.

LOS ANGELES DIVISION HAS CAREFULLY BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGES THOSE AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE WORK USING THOSE CLASSIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY SUPERVISOR GROOVER. DIVISION HAS A TOTAL OF 91 AGENTS PLUS ONE SAC, FOUR SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, ASSIGNED TO SUCH CLASSIFICATIONS. THIRTY FIVE OF THESE WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 56 WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

ADMINISTRATIVE

LOS ANGELES IS SUBMITTING FOR BUREAU'S CONSIDERATION, IF PERTINENT. THREE OF THE ABOVE 56 CLASSIFIED AS SECURITY AGENTS WORK FULL TIME ON BOMBING MATTERS WHICH ARE ALMOST ALL MATTERS WHEREIN WE HAVE NO JURISDICTION EXCEPT FOR DATA KEEPING FOR NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER. TWELVE OF THE 56 SECURITY AGENTS

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JJ/6

3/

3
12
7
1
23

ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN OUR FALSE IDENTITY PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM ORIGINATED WITH OUR WEATHFUG ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER, THE FRAUDULENT USE OF DECEASED INFANT IDENTITY PAPERS HAS EXPANDED TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT THE VAST MAJORITY INVOLVE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN SECURITY WORK. SEVEN OF THE 56 AGENTS ON SECURITY ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS WHICH ORIGINATE WITH SOME DEMONSTRATION OR ACT OF TERROR, ETC, BUT AT THE PRESENT THEY ARE CLEAR CUT CRIMINAL FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS. ONE OF THE 56 IS INVOLVED FULL TIME IN THE HANDLING OF FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION MATTERS WHICH IS TECHNICALLY AN APPLICANT-TYPE INVESTIGATION, BUT THE 163 CLASSIFICATION WAS INCLUDED IN THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS. SUMMARIZING THESE EXCEPTIONS WE HAVE A TOTAL OF 23 AGENTS WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO SECURITY WORK BUT ARE, IN FACT, NOT INVOLVED IN ANY INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, LEAVING ONLY 33 AGENTS DEVOTING THEIR FULL TIME EFFORTS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS PLUS, THE ABOVE MENTIONED 35 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENTS.

END

JTG FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 3 14 PM '75

62-116395-56

30

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
Dcw
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
[illegible] Com. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Pla[illegible] Eval. ____
Sp[illegible] ____
Tr[illegible] ____
Legal [illegible]un. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR013 LS CODE

9:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 HSH

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOUISVILLE

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, FOLLOWING DATA PERTAINS TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

SUPERVISOR (1) 40 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 85 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 30 IS, 40 CI; AGENT (1) 40 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 10 IS, 0 CI.

END.

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/1d[illegible]

3/DH

MAR 25 9 51 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

31

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 005 ME PLAIN

9:12 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JLC

TO DIRECTOR ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM MEMPHIS

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

✓Budget & Acct JEH

MEMPHIS OFFICE USES APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IN THE SECURITY FIELD, 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IN ADDITION, SIX AGENTS ARE UTILIZED, THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS IN THIS FIELD:

AGENT	TIME ON SECURITY CASES	TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY	TIME ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
A	100	100	0
B	75	50	25
C	50	50	0
D	50	25	25
E	25	25	0
F	25	0	25

#MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 Alm/jtb

IN ADDITION TO THE ONE-FOURTH SUPERVISOR TIME, THIS OFFICE USES THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-FOURTH AGENTS IN THE SECURITY

3/DD

PAGE TWO

FIELD; TWO AND ONE-HALF AGENTS ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE-FOURTHS OF ONE AGENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

PLS ACK FOR FOUR TES

ACK FOR 4 AND HOLD

TJT FBI WASH DC

MAR 25 10 14 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

32

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget + Accounting Section
Rm. 6625 JEM

NR002 MM CODE

925AM URGENT MARCH 27, 1975 JWB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MIAMI 1P

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING ARE MIAMI OFFICE STATISTICS SHOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS BY SPECIAL AGENT PERSONNEL:

SACS - 0; ASACS - 0.

SUPERVISORS - CI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 90 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. SI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT.

SPECIAL AGENTS- CI MATTERS: 15 ASSIGNED FULL TIME; TWO ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 40 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. IS MATTERS: TWO ASSIGNED FULL TIME; THREE ASSIGNED 75 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 60 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 30 PERCENT; FIVE ASSIGNED 10 PERCENT.

END.

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

#mde16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP2-ALM/JTS

3/DJ

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 9 29 AM '75

MAR 27 11 14 AM '75
REC'D
[illegible]

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

Budget + Account.

33

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR004 MI CODE

7:08PM NITEL 3 / 25 / 75 LSK

O: DIRECTOR

FROM: MILWAUKEE (66-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MILWAUKEE HAS 2 SECURITY SUPERVISORS, #5 AND #6, NEITHER OF WHOM IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY WORK. 23 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO THESE 2 SECURITY SQUADS, INCLUDING HEADQUARTERS AND RESIDENT AGENTS (RA'S). 4 OF LATTER squad ARE ENGAGED FULL TIME IN SECURITY WORK. 15 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS NOT ASSIGNED TO EITHER SECURITY SQUAD ALSO HANDLE SOME SECURITY WORK IN THEIR VARIOUS AREAS. PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN IS AS FOLLOWS:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COINTEL	OTHER
#5 SUPERVISOR	70	5	25
#6 SUPERVISOR	30	55	L5
#5 SQUAD 12 agents*	59	8	33
#6 SQUAD 11 agents*	44	44	L2
RA'S 15 agents *	2.5	4.5	93

END

ACJ FOR FOUR $$$

* Per phone call 4:55 pm, 3/27/75 with George Whople, supervisor of #6 squad in Milwaukee.

#MD016
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/4/16

3/DD

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 2
46 PM '75

62-116395-56

34

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 197
TELETYPE

216

NR001 MP CODED

7:13 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DSC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (100-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget & Acct.
[illegible]

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MINNEAPOLIS HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. A SECOND SUPERVISOR SPENDS 40 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY. THERE ARE FIVE AND ONE HALF AGENTS WORKING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 14 WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JG

H

O

L

3/JA

[illegible]

MAR 25 8 15 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

8

35

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR005 MOBILE PLAIN

11-12 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VFP

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM MOBILE (66-1145)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE MOBILE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDING FIFTY PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS TWENTYFIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCY MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THERE ARE NINE AGENTS WHO SPEND AN AVERAGE OF FORTY FIVE PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

END

TMA ACK FOR TWO FBIHQ CLR

#m0216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM [illegible]

MAR 27 7 17 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 007 NK CODE

6:06PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 JCG

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget/Acct
6088 JEH

FROM NEWARK

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL TO SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN RE NITEL NEWARK SUBMITS FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY PERSONNEL IN THE TWO SEPARATE CATEGORIES:

INTERNAL SECURITY:
1 ASAC - 15 PER CENT
1 SUPERVISOR - 50 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 100 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 70 PER CENT

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JG

B/UA

NK

PAGE TWO

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

1 ASAC - 35 PER CENT

1 SUPERVICSOR - 50 PER CENT

1 SUPERVISOR - 100 PER CENT

23 SA 'S - 100 PER CENT

6 SA'S - 50 PER CENT

3 SA'S - 10 PER CENT

END

MAR 26 6 04 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

37

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

NR002 NH CODE

1038PM NITEL MARCH 25,1975 LM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: NEW HAVEN (105-13579) (RUC) 1P

ATTN; BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24,1975.

ONE SUPERVISORY AGENT DEVOTES ONE-THIRD OF HIS TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND ONE THIRD TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

SEVENTEEN AGENTS ARE REGULARLY ASSIGNED EITHER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OR INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS IN ADDITION TO OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS. OF THESE 17 AGENTS THE EQUIVALENT OF FIVE AGENTS WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIMW AND FIVE AND ONE THIRD AGENTS WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

FBIHQ FLC FR TWO TELS CLR TKS

#m 0216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ATG

CEIVED
ETYPE UNIT
3 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

38

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR001 NO CODE

2:49PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DCB

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget & Acct.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE; PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE...

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CLR

#mde16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-12-01 BY SP2 ALM/TTG

Note: Security supervisor contacted 5^{20}P, 3/27/75 re counterintelligence matters. He will check & get the obvious error corrected, either through call back or corrected Nitel.

2/DA

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 3 47 PM '75

62-116395-56

38 Revised

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
[illegible] Com. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] Eval. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR015 NO CODE

7:15PM URGENT MARCH 27,1975 JMF

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Budget [illegible]
JFH

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24,1975; NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE MARCH 26,1975; BUTEL CALL MARCH 27,1975.

THE FOLLOWING ARE CORRECTIONS TO REFERENCED NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE. NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE, OF WHICH SEVEN ARE ALSO ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 25 PERCENT AND PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS 35 PERCENT. PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS 25 PERCENT, AND 35 PERCENT SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE.

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JBB

44

MAR 8 8 18 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

39

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 NY CODE

NITEL 3/25/75 SENT 9:25AM 3/26/75 GMD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

Budget & Accounting

6028 JEH

NEW YORK HAS ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (DIVISION III) AND ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS (DIVISION IV). THERE ARE NO ASACS IN NEW YORK OFFICE.

SAC, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION (III) SPENDS FULL-TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SAC, INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION (IV) SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 60 PERCENT IS SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

SIX SUPERVISORS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 14 SUPERVISORS HANDLE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

114 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 331 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END.

JTG FBIHQ CLR

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JT6

3/10A

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 9 30 AM '75

62-116395-56

40

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 002 NF PLAIN

444PM NITEL 3-26-75 SNB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM NORFOLK (66-981)

R-6028

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS INFORMATION REQUESTED IN RETEL:

POSITION	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ONE SUPERVISOR	50 PER CENT OF TIME	10 PER CENT OF TIME
THREE SAS	50 PER CENT OF TIME	20 PER CENT OF TIME
TWO SAS	75 PER CENT OF TIME	0
THREE SAS	50 PER CENT OF TIME	0

TOTAL AGENT PERSONNEL OF NORFOLK OFFICE ASSIGNED IS ONE SUPERVISOR AND EIGHT AGENTS FOR PERCENTAGES INDICATED ABOVE.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2ALM/ITG

3/10

MAR 26 4 48 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

41

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR008 OC PLAIN

9:30PM MARCH 25, 1975 NITEL DSM

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

DEW

R-17838

TO DIRECTOR

FROM OKLAHOMA CITY (105-2398)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THE SAC AND THE ASAC OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE ARE NOT ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE HAS NO SUPERVISOR OR SPECIAL AGENT ASIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND / OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN IN PERCENTAGES OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT'S TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

	NUMBER	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISOR	1	75	5
SA'S	31	615	65

OF THE THIRTY-ONE SPECIAL AGENT S, IT IS NOTED THAT 8 ARE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT OR MORE OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT ACCOUNT FOR 550 PERCENT OT THE 615 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY TIME AND 62 PERCENT OT THE 65 PERCENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TIME.

END PAGE 1

#MDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTS

3/10

PAGE 2

OC 105-2398

IN SUMMARY, THERE IS .75 AND .05 SUPERVISORY EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIEGENCE, RESPECTIVELY. THERE ARE 6.15 AND .65 AGENT EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, RESPECTIVELY.

END

ACK FOR 1 TJT FBI WASH DC CL

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 10:37 PM '75

62-116395-56

42

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget & Acct. Unit
JEH

NR 004 OM CODE

4:38 PM NITEL 3/25/75 BJP

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: OMAHA

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

OMAHA CURRENTLY HAS SEVEN AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, WITH TWO AGENTS SPENDING 60 PER CENT AND TWO AGENTS SPENDING 25 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON IS MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON IS MATTERS.

TWO AGENTS AND ONE SUPERVISOR SPEND APPROXIMATELY 10 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

MSE FBIHQ

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/EJB

3/iA

TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 5 43 PM '75

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

43

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 PH CODE

245 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DMS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PHILADELPHIA (66-NEW) (P)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ Budget & Acctg

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

PHILA. DIVISION UTILIZES FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) INCLUDING EXTREMISTS, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

		IS	CI
1	SAC	5	5
1	ASAC	50	
1	SUPERVISOR	100	
1	SUPERVISOR		100
13	SAS AT HEADQUARTERS	100	
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS	50	
9	SAS AT HEADQUARTERS		100
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS		75
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS		85

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/00 BY SP-2 [illegible]
#MOR16

PH 66-NEW PAGE TWO

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SAS IN RAS:

	IS	CI
1 SA	5	
1 SA	45	45
1 SA	2	2
1 SA	50	25
1 SA	30	10
1 SA	75	20
1 SA	5	70
1 SA	2	5
1 SA	70	30
1 SA		10
1 SA	5	10
1 SA	55	15
1 SA	5	1
1 SA	1	5
1 SA	35	50
1 SA	5	3

IN SUMMARY, 16 RAS AVERAGED 24 IS, AND 19 CI.

END

KAC FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 2 58 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

44

NR 003 PX PCODE

12:35 AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL JRL

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECT)

FROM PHOENIX (100-8529) (1P)

SENATE SELECT COMMITEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

PHOENIX DIVISION HAS FOLLOWING AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

A. INTERNAL SECURITY

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS -100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS - 75 PER CENT

THREE AGENTS - 50 PER CENT

B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. DOMESTIC - NONE

2. FOREIGN-

ONE SUPERVISOR - 30 PER CENT

ONE AGENT - 100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS- 25 PER CENT

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

MPM FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 3 30 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

45

NR 09 PG PLAIN

7:35 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RGM

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: PITTSBURGH (62-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Budget & Accounting
60

REBUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THERE ARE 110 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE PITTSBURGH OFFICE (75 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS, 35 RESIDENTS AGENTS (RAS)).

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) FULL TIME. ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) FULL TIME.

11 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED CI FULL TIME AND 7 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED IS FULL TIME.

RESIDENT AGENT ASSIGNMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

6 RAS 2 PERCENT CI	5 RAS 2 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 3 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 3 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 5 PERCENT CI	1 RA 4 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 6 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 5 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 7 PERCENT CI	1 RA 7 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 8 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 11 PERCENT IS
1 RA 25 PERCENT CI	1 RA 12 PERCENT IS

END PAGE ONE

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JFG

3/DA

1 RA 16 PERCENT IS

1 RA 24 PERCENT IS

1 RA 28 PERCENT IS

THE ABOVE PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES WERE ARRIVED AT BY COMPARING THE NUMBER OF CI AND IS CASES WITH THE TOTAL CASE LOAD OF EACH RA.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

PAGE TWO, PG 62-CEU

1. TA 16 PERCENT IS

1 RA 24 PERCENT IS

3 PA 26 PERCENT IS

THE ABOVE PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES WERE ARRIVED AT BY COMPARING THE NUMBER OF CI AND IS CASES WITH THE TOTAL CASE LOAD OF EACH [illegible].

END.

DRS FBIHQ CLR

TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 12 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

46

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

NR 007 PD CODE

8:57 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LLD

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PORTLAND

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

PORTLAND HAS TWO SUPERVISORY DESKS HANDLING SECURITY MATTERS. ONE DESK HANDLES ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) AND ACCOUNTING MATTERS. BOTH DESKS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND SOME CRIMINAL MATTERS. BECAUSE OF OFFICE SIZE, PERSONNEL OF BOTH DESKS NECESSARILY PARTICIAPTE IN BANK ROBBERY AND OTHER MAJOR CRIMINAL MATTERS.

ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS, SAC EXPENDS TIME IN DIRECTIONAL AND OVERSIGHT CAPACITY ON CI AND IS MATTERS.

ESTIMATED SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON SECURITY MATTERS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE:

SAC (ONE), 5 PERCENT CI, 5 PERCENT IS.

ASAC (ONE), NONE.

SUPERVISORS (TWO), 45 PERCENT CI, 85 PERCENT IS.

AGENTS AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON SECURITY MATTERS:

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2-ALM/[illegible]

3/DA

PAGE TWO

CI: 90 PERCENT - TWO
80 PERCENT - TWO
70 PERCENT - TWO

IS: 90 PERCENT - FOUR
80 PERCENT - SIX
50 PERCENT - TWO
40 PERCENT - TWO
20 PERCENT - ONE
10 PERCENT - FOUR.

LOWER PERCENTAGES ATTEMPT TO ACCOUNT FOR TIME SPENT BY RESIDENT AGENTS IN COVERING LEADS IN THESE FIELDS AND TO DISCOUNT TIME SPENT ON OTHER MATTERS BY HEADQUARTERS AGENTS.

END.

TJT FBI WASH DCC LR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 12 01 AM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

47

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-AD-Adm. ____
Dep.-AD-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget & Accounting
Room

NR004 RH PLAIN

3:50 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 EJM

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SEC.

FROM RICHMOND 1P

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS MAR 24, 1975.

RICHMOND HAS ONE AGENT ASSIGNED APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND NO AGENTS ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR DEVOTES LESS THAN 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO SUCH CASES.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/ESG

3/00

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 3 52 PM '75

MAR 25 5 00 PM '75
RECD
DIVISION

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

48

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/RTG

NR002 SC PLAIN

9:23 AM URGENT 3/27/75 VLS

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SACRAMENTO (66-511)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. ✓ Budget [illegible]

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN HEADQUARTERS, SACRAMENTO HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGEND FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. 7 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; 3 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS; 1 AGENT EXPENDS 75 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES, 1 AGENT WITH 90 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; 1 AGENT WITH 50 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. 7 RAS HANDLE VARIETY OF CLASSIFICATIONS AND ALSO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THESE 7 AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (20 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 5 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE).

END

FBIHQ CLR SMD

3/DA

MAR 27 12 28 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

PM '75
IVED
YPE UNIT

62-116395-56

49

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

ML

✓ Budget & Accounting Section
[illegible] JEH

NR001 SL PLAIN

8:30AM URGENT 3/27/75 TJO

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM ST. LOUIS (94-297) RUC

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

π MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JHB

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE ST. LOUIS DIVISION AS REQUESTED BY RE COMMUNICATION.

NEITHER THE SAC OR THE ASAC ARE ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONLY ONE SUPERVISOR IS ASSIGNED TO SUCH MATTERS, HE SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 55 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THE REMAINING AGENTS SPEND NO TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT SPEND THE LISTED PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY: THREE AGENTS, 50 PERCENT; THREE AGENTS, 25 PERCENT; ONE AGENT, 10 PERCENT; TWO AGENTS, 5 PERCENT, TWO AGENTS, 2 PERCENT.

3/07

ABOVE FIGURES REFLECT BOTH HEADQUARTERS CITY AND RESIDENT AGENTS IN THIS DIVISION.

END

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 9 34 AM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

50

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 aim/ATG

NR006 SU PLAIN

8:46 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

✓ Budget & Acctg

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI). ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS). TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.

END. M

3/27

TELETYPE

MAR 26 10 51 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

59 ?

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

NR006 SU PLAIN

846 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

✓ Budget & Accts
[illegible]

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI). ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS). TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.

END.

JTG FBIHQ CLR

#MO016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2ALM/T16

3/DN

MAR 26 10 57 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

51

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 5 1975
TELETYPE

LPP
Daw

NR005 SA CODE

6:55PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN ANTONIO

✓ R-6028

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN ANTONIO OFFICE. ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF THESE MATTERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF TIME ON SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME TO THESE MATTERS.

FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, THIS BEING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL.

E N D.......

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTS

3 DA

NR005 SA CODE

6:55PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LPP

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN ANTONIO

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION
OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN
ANTONIO OFFICE. ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF
THESE MATTERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 10 PER CENT OF TIME ON
SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME
ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS
AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME TO
THESE MATTERS.

FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THI
ING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL.

E N D........

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 17 PM '75

62-116395-56

52

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 02SD CODED

12:11AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL GDF

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAN DIEGO (66-NEW)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ✓ 6 JEH

REBUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SUPERVISORY AND AGENT TIME DEVOTED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE SAN DIEGO DIVISION:

SAC - SIX PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST MATTERS; TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ASAC - SIX PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST MATTERS; TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; 40 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 20 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

SEVEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

FOUR AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

END

*MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/DJ

THAT IS ALL

SSSSSSSS

MPM FBIHQ CLR

MAR 4 3 17 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

53

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

Budget & Accounting

NR 004 SF CODE

12:28 PM URGENT 3/26/75 MCC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN FRANCISCO

ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUNITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN EXCLUDES ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS MAN DAYS SPENT ON CRIMINAL MATTERS BY AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES.

SAN FRANCISCO HAS 70 AGENTS AND 5 SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY. IT HAS 73 AGENTS AND 3 SUPERVISORS FULL TIME AND ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR 25 PER CENT TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. ONE SAC AND ONE ASAC 25 PER CENT EACH ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

IEWTZ

JTG FBIHQ

#mDe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/DA

MAR 26 3 26 PM '75
UNIT

62-116395-56

54

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep. A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 SJ CODE

10:06 PM NITEL 3-25-75 JXC

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget & Accounting

FROM SAN JUAN

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT PERSONNEL IN THE SAN JUAN DIVISION ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR - FULL TIME; ONE SUPERVISOR - TWENTY PER CENT OF THE TIME; FOURTEEN SPECIAL AGENTS - FULL TIME; THREE SPECIAL AGENTS - FIFTY PER CENT OF THE TIME.

AT THIS TIME, THE SAN JUAN DIVISION HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN A PENDING STATUS; THEREFORE, NO AGENT PERSONNEL ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE GA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/HS
#MOR16

62-116395-56

55

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975

NR002 SV CODE

715 PM NITEL 3/25/75 PNR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAVANNAH

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

IN RESPONSE TO RENITEL, THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN IN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS BEING SET FORTH:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
1 SAC	0	0
1 ASAC	0	0
1 SUPERVISOR	40 PERCENT	10 PERCENT
1 AGENT	90 "	0
1 AGENT	50 "	10 PERCENT
1 AGENT	10 "	0
1 AGENT	0	30 PERCENT

ALL OTHER AGENTS' ACCUMULATIVE TOTAL OF TIME WOULD EQUAL 10 PERCENT FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND 0 FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FOR ONE AGENT.

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/tlb

3/24

MAR 13 7 24 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

56

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

Bud [illegible]
[illegible] EH

NR002 SE CODED

3:59 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 CSC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SEATTLE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR- FULLTIME; FIVE AGENTS - FULLTIME; THREE AGENTS - 85PERCENT OF THEIR TIME.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR: 80 PER CENT OF TIME; SEVEN AGENTS - FULLTIME.

END

HOLD FOR ONE MORE

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM [illegible]

3/P[illegible]

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 09 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

57

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-AD-Adm. ____
Dep.-AD-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
& Com. ____
Inv. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 013 SI CODE

10:22PM NITEL 3-26-75 DJK

TO DIRECTOR

(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM SPRINGFIELD (66)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE TIME SPENT BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

THIRTY-SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. ONE OF THE ABOVE SAS SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND ONE OTHER SA SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND APPROXIMATELY 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHILE ANOTHER SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SURITY MATTERS.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-12-01 BY SP2ALM/JFS

THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE ANY SQUADS OF AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE MATTERS AND THE ABOVE ESTIMATE HAS BEEN DETERMINED FROM THE UTILIZATION OF TIMES SPENT DURING A TWO-WEEK PERIOD ON MATTERS BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 11 33 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

58

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budg & Accnt.
602 [illegible]

NR010 TP CODE

6-10PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM TAMPA (105-0)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975, REQUESTING THAT EACH SAC SUTEL THE NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TAMPA HAS ONE SQUAD WHICH HANDLES INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS WELL AS OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS, SUCH AS APPLICANT, SELECTIVE SERVICE, DESERTERS, AND EXTREMISTS.

NONE OF THE AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 1 AGENT WHO IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THE PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AN ACCUMULATION OF THE TIME SPENT BY EACH AGENT WORKING SUCH MATTERS.

INTERNAL SECURITY - SUPERVISOR, 20 PERCENT; AGENTS, 3.5

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - SUPERVISOR, 15 PERCENT; AGENTS, 1.5.

END

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JB

3/06

59

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

NR004 WF CODED

2:57PM URGENT 3-26-75 KLS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO

✓ Budget & Accts
6048

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REGARDING BUREAU NITEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (WFO) HAS ONE ASAC DEVOTING 12 PERCENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND 78 PERCENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS, THE REMAINING 10 PERCENT BEING ADMINISTRATIVE, POLICE AND LIAISON DUTIES.

IN ADDITION, WFO HAS 162 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 6 SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO CI, AND 21 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 1 SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS MATTERS. ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR DEVOTES 75 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO IS MATTERS.

END.

JRM FBIHQ

CLR

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3/DA

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 3 02 PM '75

62-116395-56

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

ROUTE I[illegible] ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP~~ SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	✓
Dep. AD Inv.	✓
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	✓
Intell.	✓
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4/4/75

Downgraded to SECRET
60324 UC BAW/SAB/ML
1/12/2011

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; ~~RODERICK HILLS~~, ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

#MOR16 1-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

Memorandum captioned as above, 3/27/75, from Legal Counsel to you, noted that you and Wannall were to meet with Mr. Hills and Mr. Phillip Buchen, Counsel to the President, on 3/28/75. Your addendum to the memorandum pointed out the results of this meeting and the various matters discussed.

As a follow-up to this meeting, you, Legal Counsel Mintz and Wannall met on 4/4/75 with Mr. James Wilderotter, who is presently working under Mr. Buchen in coordinating intelligence community matters relating to the inquiries underway by the Senate Select Committee. Mr. Wilderotter was given a briefing similar to that which had been afforded to Buchen and Hills. In addition, the discussion covered matters of a sensitive nature relating to the ORCHID and similar programs, electronic surveillances, specialized handling of informants, and Bureau Source 4 (access to social security records). Many of these matters discussed covered topics with which Mr. Wilderotter had become familiar when he was assigned to the Department as an Assistant to former Deputy Attorney General Silberman. (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Wilderotter said it was the feeling at The White House that while raw FBI files should not be made available to the Committee, it might be necessary to permit the Committee to review a few such files in order that the integrity of the FBI could be established with the Committee. It was pointed out to him that we did not agree to this, that we could furnish summaries of material from the files. Wilderotter said he did not feel that

REC-11 62-116395-55

WRW:dsh
(5) dsh

CONTINUED - OVER

6 APR 11 1975

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Classified ~~by~~ 12 WRW
Exempt from GDS, ~~Categories~~ 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

5-WO

54 APR 16 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

furnishing reports and letterhead memoranda which had been prepared for dissemination would satisfy the Committee's needs. He was advised by both you and Mr. Mintz that it was our feeling that we should not furnish the raw material but summaries could be prepared for the Committee's purposes and if necessary, Bureau officials could be placed under oath and attest to the correctness of the summaries. Wilderotter said that this was a matter which he would afford further consideration.

As during the conference with Buchen and Hills, it was obvious as the result of our meeting with Wilderotter that The White House was most anxious that it not be caught by surprise by revelations of activities which in any way might be considered questionable. The White House is making every effort possible to become cognizant of any such situation prior to the Committee hearings.

Classified "T~~o~~p Secret" to protect highly sensitive investigative techniques and matters relating to foreign relations.

ACTION:

For information. Further contacts with Wilderotter or other White House Staff Members will be duly reported.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/4/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This will confirm that on 4/4/75 Mr. James Wilderotter of the White House orally approved the Bureau's dissemination to the Senate Select Committee the following two memoranda: confidential memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover dated 8/24/36, confidential memorandum from John Edgar Hoover dated 8/25/36, both dealing with conversations Mr. Hoover had with the President.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

WOC:aso (3)

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/AG
#MDR16

REC-5 62-116395-54

12 APR 8 1975

5-WOB

54APR 22 1975

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 8, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures - 2

EWL:jvl
(7)

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2ALM/TAG

REC-38

62-116395-53

NOC

EX-110

5 APR 10 1975

MAILED 7
APR 9 1975
FBI

2-ENCLOSURES

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

57 APR 16 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr.Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

One of the requests contained in referenced letter was for a list of names and titles of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBI Headquarters down to and including unit chiefs, together with a number of personnel below the level of unit chief categorized by unit. At a meeting on April 1, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis and Special Agent Paul V. Daly discussed this request with Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee. It was agreed that the request as stated would be modified and that the FBI would prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of unit chief, with names included, which would be made available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

This is to advise that the list has been prepared and is available for review under the above conditions.

1 - The Attorney General

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP 2ALM/TG

EWL:jvl
(7)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PVD

wrw

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-53

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JMC

#moe16

access only

check 7/28

#mdr16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

62-111375-53

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

#mori6 L-1701
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ETG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

IV

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Branch

Hunter E. Helgeson
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Internal Security Branch

4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor
F. Anthony Tansey

Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor
Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan	Section Chief
Eugene C. Peterson	Number 1 Man
Special Cases Unit	
James P. Lee	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
New York Unit	
Alfred E. Smith	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Washington Unit Chief	
Wilfred R. Schlarman	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	

One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar	Section Chief
James W. Redfield	Number 1 Man

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

[Chinese] (S) Unit	
Herbert J. Morgan	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Satellite Unit	
Howard H. Wallace	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Coordination Unit	
John P. Thomas	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr.	Section Chief
Sebastian S. Mignosa	Number 1 Man
Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit	
Richard J. Deily	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
[Middle East] (S) Unit	
Carl F. Freeman	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
[Far East] (S) Unit	
William W. Hamilton	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
[Cuban] (S) Unit	
Charles H. McCarthy	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Nationality Unit	
Vinicio Henry Nasca	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr.	Section Chief
H. C. Flemister, Jr.	Number 1 Man
Liaison Supervisors	
Six	

SECRET

Foreign Liaison Unit	
Robert A. Bermingham	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan	Section Chief
William H. Atkinson	Number 1 Man
Black Nationalist and White Hate - Central Unit	
William D. Neumann	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - East Unit	
Paul E. Nugent	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - West Unit	
Garnett T. Tunstall	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Black Nationalist - South, Klan and Informant Unit	
Homer A. Newman, Jr.	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Civil Disorders Reporting Unit	
Seymor F. Phillips	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford	Section Chief
Conrad W. Thompson	Number 1 Man

Trotskyist Unit	
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Communist Party Unit	
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Security Informant Unit	
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Extremist-West Unit	
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Extremist-East Unit	
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	

Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man
Training Unit	
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Central Research Unit	
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Special Records and Related Research Unit	
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Analytical Research Unit	
David Ryan	Unit Chief
Seven Special Agents	

SECRET

#mo16 1-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director Counterintelligence Branch	Hunter E. Helgeson Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director Internal Security Branch
4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor F. Anthony Tansey	Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan	Section Chief
Eugene C. Peterson	Number 1 Man
Special Cases Unit	
James P. Lee	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
New York Unit	
Alfred E. Smith	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Washington Unit Chief	
Wilfred R. Schlarman	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	

One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar	Section Chief
James W. Redfield	Number 1 Man

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Chinese (S) Unit	
Herbert J. Morgan	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Satellite Unit	
Howard H. Wallace	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Coordination Unit	
John P. Thomas	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr.	Section Chief
Sebastian S. Mignosa	Number 1 Man
Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit	
~~Richard J. Daily~~	~~Unit Chief~~
Four Special Agents	
Middle East (S) Unit	
Carl F. Freeman	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Far East (S) Unit	
William W. Hamilton	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Cuban (S) Unit	
Charles H. McCarthy	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Nationality Unit	
Vinicio Henry Nasca	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr.	Section Chief
H. C. Flemister, Jr.	Number 1 Man
Liaison Supervisors	
Six	

Foreign Liaison Unit	
Robert A. Bermingham	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan	Section Chief
William H. Atkinson	Number 1 Man
Black Nationalist and White Hate - Central Unit	
William D. Neumann	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - East Unit	
Paul E. Nugent	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - West Unit	
Garnett T. Tunstall	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Black Nationalist - South, Klan and Informant Unit	
Homer A. Newman, Jr.	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Civil Disorders Reporting Unit	
Seymor F. Phillips	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford	Section Chief
Conrad W. Thompson	Number 1 Man

Trotskyist Unit	
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Communist Party Unit	
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Security Informant Unit	
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Extremist-West Unit	
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Extremist-East Unit	
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	

Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man
Training Unit	
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Central Research Unit	
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Special Records and Related Research Unit	
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Analytical Research Unit	
David Ryan	Unit Chief
Seven Special Agents	

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MOR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ZK
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/BJE
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by 9~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MOR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/J16
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

#MOR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/23/01 BY SP-2 ALM

SUBJECT: JOHN T. ELLIFF
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICS
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

On 3-18-75 Professor John T. Elliff advised Inspector John B. Hotis that he had been contacted by William Miller, Staff Director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, and was asked to serve as Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence. This is one of four Task Forces being formed by the Select Committee and it will focus primarily on the activities of the FBI. The other Task Forces are on Foreign Intelligence, Military and Technological Intelligence, and Command and Control.

Elliff said he had not decided whether to accept the offer and believed that others were also being considered for the position. He said he was reluctant to do anything that would interfere with the excellent working arrangements he had developed with the Bureau. He feels that his initial obligation is to the Director, and the purpose of going to the Police Foundation was to get formal support for a project that would be of primary benefit to the Bureau and only secondarily to the Attorney General and Congress. He said he would be guided by our judgment in this matter and not want to break any commitments that he might have made with the Bureau.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116395-26

If he accepts the appointment Elliff said he would, of course, suspend work on his research project until he had terminated his employment with the Committee. He said he would also agree not to use any classified material that he acquired in his capacity as Task Force Director. Elliff has discussed this matter with John Heaphy, Assistant Director of the Police Foundation. Heaphy said the Foundation had no objections whatsoever for his accepting the position with the Senate Select Committee, and he would be free to resume his project after the Committee work was done.

REC-10 62-116395-52

NOT RECORDED
102 APR 10 1975

MAR 28 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Reed
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
JBH:dkg (7)

54 APR 14 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

It should be noted that the Select Committee considered offering the position to Larry Baskir, Counsel to the President's Clemency Board. Mr. Baskir formerly served as Chief Counsel to Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, and we had numerous contacts with him in that capacity. Our purpose was to reach some common agreement on privacy legislation that Senator Ervin planned to introduce in the 93rd Session of Congress. There were numerous meetings with Baskir on the same subject in the Deputy Attorney General's office. These efforts proved unsuccessful and after several months we discontinued the discussions. In our opinion, Mr. Baskir was unwilling to work out any reasonable compromise and seemed unsympathetic to the ~~legislation~~ legitimate concerns of law enforcement.

B.C.

It is clear that this is a matter for Professor Elliff to determine and the Bureau should not express an official opinion. Although we have not always agreed with his views on intelligence matters, we have had no occasion to question his objectivity or his integrity as a scholar. Mr. Miller knows that Professor Elliff enjoys our confidence and it is our understanding that he offered Elliff the position in order to avoid an adversary relationship between the Bureau and the Committee.

Professor Elliff said he would make no commitments to the Senate Committee until he hears from us.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Professor Elliff be advised that it would be inappropriate for us to express an opinion on whether he should accept the appointment offered by the Senate Select Committee.

JAF/JBH

Handled 3/25/75 JBH

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/31/75

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the afternoon of 3/25/75.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; the then Deputy AG Laurence Silberman, Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke, as well as officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

The following items of interest were discussed:

Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), and the Committee's Counsel, Mr. F.A.O. Schwarz, III, visited CIA Headquarters to discuss SSC business. Mr. Miller suggested that a tactic the SSC was considering is the identification of several key issues that the Committee could look into in-depth. For example, the SSC might propose to identify two or three covert actions engaged in by CIA and examine them in-depth rather than try to cover each and every covert action CIA might identify. Colby advised that this appeared to be an encouraging development and possibly each agency of the Intelligence Community might be asked to provide a series of key issues from which the Select Committee could select one or two for an in-depth study.

EX 104 REC-10 62-116395-51

The question of the SSC staff signing a Secrecy Agreement is still not settled. The Staff Director raised some constitutional questions regarding the Secrecy Agreement. Mr. Schwarz admitted, however, that some type of arrangement would have to be made to insure that the Intelligence Community had some protection against unauthorized disclosures by staff members of the SSC.

APR 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/MDR16

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

54 APR 14 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Both Miller and Schwarz accepted the Third Agency Rule and agreed to abide by it. For the record, the SSC's interpretation of the Third Agency Rule (which is consistent with the Intelligence Community) is as follows: Classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department.

The Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) will meet to develop some ground rules and standardization for sanitizing documents to be furnished to the Select Committees.

The question of Intelligence Community personnel being represented by counsel was discussed. The position of the White House on this issue has been fully reported in a memorandum from the Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, dated 3/27/75, entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Rodney Hills Associate Counsel to the President."

It was also agreed at the meeting of 3/25/75 that the President's Counsel would attempt to negotiate with the SSC to insure that all interviews of Intelligence Community personnel would be conducted on the premises of the bureau, agency or department employing the persons to be interviewed.

Attached also for the record are the following:

A letter dated 3/20/75 from Staff Director William G. Miller to Mr. John Clarke advising that Mr. Ben Marshall has been designated as the Security Officer of the SSC;

A letter dated 3/17/75 from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke listing employees of the SSC who have been cleared by the Committee for certification by CIA for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

A letter from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke dated 3/20/75 advising that Mr. Ben Marshall was cleared for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

A memorandum from the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee advising that arrangements had been perfected for the delivery of classified documents to the SSC and describing how such documents should be delivered.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WRW/TWL

PLM

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER[illegible].
CHARLES MCC. MA[illegible], JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible] PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Officer of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, has been designated Compartmentation Officer.

Sincerely,

William Green Miller

William G. Miller

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2ALM/ak

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMA
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAI
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKE[illegible]JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATE[illegible] ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 17, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/TAG

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter of March 13, outlining a procedure for clearance for the Select Committee staff. The procedure you have suggested has been adopted and attached to this letter is the Select Committee's first listing of staff who have been cleared by the Committee. This listing is the result of the investigation undertaken by the FBI and a consideration of the FBI reports on individuals by the Chairman. As further investigations by the FBI are received, we will send additional persons to be granted clearances.

As to access to compartmentalized information, those members of the staff who will be designated will be indicated to you in subsequent communications.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
Charity Benz	7-23-46	N.Y.	053-38-7410
Michael Taylor Epstein	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318
Mark Henry Gitenstein	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767
Audrey Helen Hatry	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48	N.Y.	068-38-6464
Michael James Madigan	4-18-43	D.C.	042-34-3797
Elliot Everett Maxwell	7-24-46	N.Y.	133-34-4225
Martha Evans Mecham	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848
James Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495
Jan Orloff	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394
John F. Peterson	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707
Lewis Brittle Snider	1-12-45	N.C.	246-72-0956
Burton Victor Wides	6-14-41	N.J.	139-30-1936

As the FBI completes its investigative work, other names will be sent to you.

Ad Hoc Staff

75-181

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. M[illegible]AS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHW[illegible], PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number has received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and is hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Benjamin Marshall, May 4, 1919, Walnut (now Verdigre)
Nebraska, soc sec no 485-28-4530

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller

#MOR16

[illegible] CONTAINED [illegible] UNCLASSIFIED [illegible] 1-17-01 [illegible] SP2ALM/ZTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

UN[illegible]D STATES INTELLIGENCE B[illegible]RD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-49
21 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of USIB on Congressional Review

SUBJECT : Security - Arrangements for Receipt of Classified Material by Senate Select Committee

1. On 19 March 1975 I telephonically inquired of Mr. Benjamin C. Marshall, Security Officer of the Senate Select Committee, whether he was in a position to begin receiving classified documents. He advised that arrangements had been perfected and that effective 20 March 1975 such documents could be delivered as follows:

> The courier should enter the 1st and C Street entrance of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, inquire of the guard as to the location of Room G308, go to the front door of G308, advise the guard there that material is being delivered and have him call Mr. Marshall or Charity Benz, both of whom are authorized to receive classified documents up to and including TOP SECRET*.

2. Mr. Marshall requested that prior to delivery he or someone in his office be telephonically advised (224-1700) of the impending delivery and the estimated time of arrival so that he or someone from his office can be available. He also stated that if delivery was desired to a specific staff member, Mr. Marshall would try and have such person available, but stated he was authorized to accept documents for members of the Committee and staff.

3. The Committee has not yet advised as to compartmented clearances but Mr. Marshall has been designated Compartmentation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2ALM/LT/TG

MORI6

---

*Mr. Patrick Shea is expected to be added as a person to receive documents but the certification for this access to classified material has not as yet been received by your office.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

Officer and has advised that the same delivery arrangements will be in effect for compartmented material. When necessary clearance arrangements have been perfected so that delivery of compartmented material can begin, you will be advised.

Donald E. Moore
Donald E. Moore
Chairman

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

51 THRU 100

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Organization of the [illegible]

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

LHM refers to request of the SSC for a list of names and titles of certain FBI Intelligence Division (INTD) personnel at FBIHQ and numbers only of certain other INTD personnel; and relates agreement reached between FBI officials and Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the SSC, that the original request be modified as follows. The FBI will prepare the necessary list and make it available for review at FBIHQ by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75.

62-116395-100

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI REC-106

16 MAY 7 1975

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/8/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-53

11. NONE.

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/TG

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

SFP:ekw
(4)

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO

3-113a (Rev. 3-21-73)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-19-88 BY SP-5 ci/ake

intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 4/25/75

You were previously advised that Douglas Durham, former MP 4115-E, who has furnished high-level information regarding activities of the American Indian Movement (AIM), after being confronted by AIM leaders, admitted being a confidential informant for the FBI. This information has been made public.

Attached teletype from Omaha advises that Assistant U. S. Attorney Keith E. Uhl, Office of Special Prosecutor, stated he received a telephone call 4/24/75 from Durham and that Durham told him he had been contacted by representatives of the Office of Senator Frank Church, Washington, D. C., requesting Durham's presence in Washington during the week of April 28, 1975, for purpose of attending staff meetings to determine his potential as a witness before committee investigating operations of the FBI. Durham indicated he intended to comply and would have no further contact with the FBI. We are following this matter closely and you will be kept advised.

1 - General Investigative Division
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - External Affairs Division
1 - William O. Cregar

WRW

WDN:lfj wdn

JGD/wdA

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 24 1975

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-19-88 BY SP5 cl/ahi

NR005 OM PLAIN

4:39PM NITEL 4/24/75 RRH

TO: DIRECTOR (137-33264)

MINNEAPOLIS (157-1458)

SENSTUDY-75

FROM: OMAHA (170-231) (P)

FORMER MP 4115-E. Conf.-Inst.

ON APRIL 24, 1975, AUSA KEITH E. UHL, ADVISED HE RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM SUBJECT RELATING SUBJECT HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICE OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, WASHINGTON, D.C., REQUESTING HIS PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON DURING WEEK OF APRIL 28, 1975, FOR PURPOSE OF STAFF MEETINGS TO DETERMINE SUBJECT'S POTENTIAL AS WITNESS BEFORE CHURCH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING OPERATIONS OF THE FBI. SUBJECT INDICATED HE INTENDED TO COMPLY WITH REQUEST AND HAD DECIDED THAT IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, HE WOULD DECLINE AND NOT SOLICIT ANY FURTHER CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FBI.

END.

RSP FBIHQ

5-Acting

Original Filed In 137-33264-6

REC-[illegible] 137-33264

18 MAY 2 1975

NOTE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~10 MAY 30 1975~~

62-116395-

SEX

NOT RECORDED

JUN 11 1975

JUN 11 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 22, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/JHG

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

The purpose of this memorandum is to record that on 4/18/75 Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, Executive Office Building, stated he had reviewed a final copy of the Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction including Exhibit L, pages 36 and 37. Mr. Wilderotter advised Bureau Supervisor Alonzo L. Lacey that The White House interposed no objection to the Jurisdiction paper being furnished to the Senate Select Committee.

With reference to the study entitled Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction, Mr. Wilderotter requested that he be furnished a copy and this was done. In addition, Wilderotter had previously on 4/4/75 reviewed the paper for approval of the use of items concerning Presidential or National Security Council interest.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

ALL:ekw
(5)

62-116395

REC- 106
62-116395-99

5-7

84 MAY 7 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/7/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SENSTUDY 75

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER ON AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

~~Security Jurisdiction~~

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize investigative efforts to authenticate Hoover memoranda dated 8/24-25/36.

Document Section, FBI Laboratory, determined the type appearing on Hoover memorandum dated 8/25/36 was prepared on a Remington typewriter with an elite type used since October, 1935. Hoover memorandum to Tamm dated 9/10/36, was prepared on an IBM typewriter with pica-style type used since 1930.

The letterhead used on both Hoover memoranda of 8/24-25/36 was authorized FBI stationery effective August 14, 1936.

On 3/10/75, Mr. Donald B. Schewe, Assistant Librarian, Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, advised that The White House Ushers Appointment Book contained entries showing that on Thursday, August 24, 1936, from 9:20 a.m. to 10:12 a.m., President Roosevelt met with Mr. Hoover in his residence at The White House prior to leaving for his office. Schewe pointed out that this meeting was significant since President Roosevelt met Mr. Hoover immediately after returning from an extended trip, a departure from his usual practice. There was no entry on 8/25/36, other than the President's departure for the Dakotas at 10:40 p.m.

On 4/2/75, review of Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress, reflected that a Desk Diary (container #68, folder #295, microfilm #38) of Secretary Hull contained an entry on 8/25/36 that the Secretary had luncheon with the President between 1:00 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.

~~REC-8~~ ~~62-116395-~~ 842

Detailed memorandum attached.

ACTION:

~~EX-110~~

For information.

5 ENCLOSURE
~~Enclosure~~

ALL:vb

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
MAY 2 1975

~~50 APR 25 1975~~
MAY 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-7-00 BY 3906 3 ~~ELW~~/BCE/AMW

Original Filed In 62-

Mr. White February 27, 1975

J. H. Mortimer

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TAMM
FROM JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1936;
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DATED AUGUST 25, 1936.

On this date, SA Alonzo L. Lacey of the Intelligence Division delivered the above-captioned memoranda to the Laboratory with a request to determine the make of typewriter employed in the preparation of the memoranda and the date of introduction of the type styles employed. The purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether or not the type styles on the typewriters used to write the memoranda were in use on the dates appearing on the memoranda.

It was determined that the "Memorandum For Mr. Tamm from John Edgar Hoover dated September 10, 1936" was prepared on an IBM typewriter equipped with a pica style of type which has been in use since 1930. The typewriting comprising the "Confidential Memorandum by John Edgar Hoover dated August 25, 1936" was determined to have been prepared on a Remington typewriter equipped with an elite style of type that has been in use since October, 1935.

The memoranda were returned to SA Lacey.

RECOMMENDATION:

The result of this examination be forwarded to the Intelligence Division

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Lacey
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mortimer
1 - Mr. Oberg

WSO:mrg
(6)

ENCLOSURE

~~62-66127-1842~~

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

August 14,1936.

[illegible] ....
Mr. Tolson........
Mr. Baughman ......
Mr. Clegg ....
Mr. Coffey ....
Mr. Dawsey ....
Mr. Edwards ....
Mr. Egan........
Mr. Foxworth ....
Mr. Glavin ....
Mr. Harbo ....
Mr. Joseph ....
Mr. Lester ....
Mr. Nichols. ....
Mr. Quinn........
Mr. Schilder........
Mr. Tamm ....
Mr. Tracy........
Miss Gandy........

New letterheads.

st

AUG 20 1936

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

66-342-33

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AUG 18 1936 P.M.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FILE

ENCLOSURE; 62-66727-1842

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Coffey
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Egan
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Nichols
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Schilder
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

OK

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

~~ENCLOSURE~~

~~62-66727~~

[illegible] DESTROYED

Mar 13, 1975

RESEARCH CONDUCTED AT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY, HYDE PARK, NY ON 3/10-12/75

On 3/10/74, Mr. DONALD B. SCHEWE, Assistant Librarian in the Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, was advised of our interest in locating any communications bearing upon a conversation between former President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT and former Secretary of State CORDELL HULL in the latter part of August, 1936. Mr. SCHEWE was advised that this conversation was concerned with the security of the US and that Mr. J. EDGAR HOOVER of the FBI may have participated in this conversation. Mr. SCHEWE was also advised that Mr. ROOSEVELT allegedly reduced the subject matter of above conversation to a memorandum and that we were interested in locating this memorandum or some information bearing upon above conversation. Arrangements were made to meet with Mr. SCHEWE at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY, on 3/12/75. Mr. SCHEWE indicated that in the meantime he would conduct some research in this matter.

On 3/12/75, Mr. SCHEWE advised that he had conducted some research relative to our telephone call on 3/10/75, and inquired if we could be more specific with regard to the dates of the information desired. SCHEWE was advised that to the best of our knowledge the conversation we were interested in involving FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (FDR),HULL and Mr. HOOVER, occurred on approximately 8/24-26/36 and that the conversation concerned the internal security of the US.

Mr. SCHEWE, at this point, furnished a Xerox copy of a "buck slip" dated 8/24/36, (copy of which is attached) on White House stationery, classified "Confidential and addressed to the Secretary of State from FDR". Mr. SCHEWE stated that "buck slips" are nothing more than a cover memorandum utilized to transmit communications which are attached thereto. It is to be noted that this "buck slip" indicates that attached to it was a memorandum for the Secretary of State, unsigned, undated and recommending coordination of activities of all agents of the Government in foreign countries. SCHEWE advised

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

~~[illegible]~~

that the synopsis of this memorandum which appears on the "buck slip" was the usual practice at that time to identify the documents attached to it. SCHEWE added that this was the only document he was able to locate which may have some bearing on the desired information. SCHEWE stated that the possibility exists that the referred to memorandum may be located among the collection of papers of CORDELL HULL which are now stored at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Mr. SCHEWE then exhibited to interviewing personnel the White House Ushers Appointment Book which was hand-written and kept on a daily basis. This appointment book contained the following pertinent information:

> Thursday, August 13, 1936, at 9:50 AM FDR departed the White House for a visit to the flood areas in NY, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
>
> Thursday, August 24, 1936, FDR returned to White House at 8:45 AM.
> 9:20 AM FDR met with Mr. HOOVER from 9:20 AM to 10:12 AM.
>
> (Note * - There is no entry in this book for Aug. 24, 1936, indicating that Mr. HULL was there. Mr. SCHEWE advised that it is interesting to note that FDR met Mr. HOOVER in his residence in the White House on 8/24/36, prior to leaving for his office in the White House. SCHEWE also pointed out that this meeting was significant since FDR met with Mr. HOOVER on 8/24/36, immediately after returning from an extended trip. This, according to SCHEWE was a departure from FDR's usual practice.

There was no record in the White House Usher's Appointment Book for 8/25/36, which would indicate that FDR met with either Mr. HULL or Mr. HOOVER on that date. This book indicates that FDR departed the White House on Tuesday, 8/25/75, at 10:40 PM for a trip to the draught areas, in upper Maine, South Dakota and North

Dakota, as well as a visit to Mt. Rushmore. FDR did not return to the White House until Sunday, Sept. 6, 1936, at 10:02 AM.

The White House Usher's Appointment Book further reflects that FDR, during the period July 10, 1936, to Aug. 10, 1936, was away from the White House campaigning. FDR returned to the White House on 8/10/36, and remained there until 8/13/36, when he again departed on a trip and returned on 8/24/36. FDR also departed from the White House on 8/25/36, and returned on 9/6/36.

Mr. SCHEWE also produced to interviewing personnel the appointment book of FDR's private secretary, GRACE TULLY for the pertinent period. This appointment book reflects all of FDR's office appointments. A review of this appointment book fails to reflect that FDR met or had an appointment with Mr. HOOVER in his office during the period 8/13/36 to 9/6/36. However, this appointment book does reflect that during this period FDR did have a meeting with CORDELL HULL on 8/25/36, at 1:00 PM.

Mr. SCHEWE further advised that he personally reviewed the following and was unable to locate any documents or references which could possibly shed some light on the matter of interest to us:

1.) Papers kept in FDR's safe.

2.) Papers kept by his secretary in a separate White House safe.

3.) Papers kept in FDR's official presidential file.

4.) Papers kept in FDR's alphabetical file maintained by his secretary.

5.) Individual agencies files.

6.) J. EDGAR HOOVER's file.

7.) Attorney General's file.

8.) Assistant Attorney General's file.

9.) National Security file.

10.) Internal Security file.

11.) FBI file.

In conclusion, Mr. SCHEWE stated that after reviewing all of the above data, he concluded that the pertinent document of interest to us is not at the FDR Library at Hyde Park, NY. SCHEWE added that if any such document is at the Library, it is misfiled and as there are approximately 21 million pages of manuscripts and documents at the Library, it would be impossible to locate same.

It is to be noted that on the enclosed "buck slip" there are four penciled notations, i.e. 285-C, X20, X285 and X67. SCHEWE stated that these notations are part of the FDR Library cross-reference system. SCHEWE added that he checked these references and could locate nothing further regarding the matter of interest to us. SCHEWE stated that these references pertained to the enclosed "buck slip".

285-6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

August 24, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE x 20

I find this in my file, dating back two months. As I understand it everybody is agreed on it. What is the next step?

x255

F. D. R.

x67 Memo. from State, unsigned and undated, recommending coordination of activities of all agents of the govt. in foreign countries: each agency as it is related to the others, and all in their relation to the State Department; makes 9 recommendations of coordination.

6/4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/ATG
#mac 16

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 003 AX CODE

11:43PM NITEL MAY 3, 1975 WMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-NEW) (P)

MAY 0 3 1975
TELETYPE

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/GTG
#MORI6

RE BUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

FORMER BUREAU AGENT WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 6302 GOLF COURSE SQUARE, ALEXANDRIA, VA., CONTACTED MAY 2, 1975 AND STATED THAT IN EVENT HE IS CONTACTED BY STAFF OF SENATE OR HOUSE COMMITTEES, HE MAY REFUSE TO BE INTERVIEWED, BUT IF HE CONSENTS TO BE INTERVIEWED HE WILL REQUEST PRESENCE OF FBI AGENT, IF QUESTIONS ARE ASKED RELATIVE TO SENSATIVE TO BUREAU OPERATIONS.

INQUIRY AT RESIDENCE OF HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1160 WIMBLEDON DRIVE, MC LEAN, VA., ON MAY 2, 1975, REVEALS THAT HE IS PRESENTLY AT CLUB MEDITERRANEAN, HOTEL CARAVELLE, ST. ANNE, GUADALUPE, FRENCH WEST INDIES. HE IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO HIS RESIDENCE ON MAY 18, 1975.

REC-106 62-116395-98

BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE IF ALEXANDRIA SHOULD CONTACT LEINBAUGH UPON HIS RETURN.

COPY RETAINED IN RECORDS UNIT

18 MAY 7 1975

TJT FBI WASH DC CLR

SAC [illegible] AX, [illegible] to contact Leinbaugh on return from 5/18/75

Records

cc 67-585330 (George)
67-476321 (Leinbaugh)

84 MAY 8 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 03 1975
TELETYPE

NR 002 BA PLAIN

1220PM URGENT MAY 3, 1975 BJD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: BALTIMORE (62-NEW)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU TEL, MAY 2, 1975.

DONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND, CONTACTED INSTANT DATE BY SAC, BALTIMORE. INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED TELETYPE FOLLOWED. HANNING ADVISED HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO DATE. ADVISED WOULD CONTACT SAC, BALTIMORE SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED IN THE FUTURE.

ENDDSS FBIHQ CCLR

REC- 106

62-116395-97

16 MAY 7 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALK/176
#MOE16

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

5-8

file 62-116395

cc: 62-41404 (Hanning)

84 MAY 8 1975

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 02 1975

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG
MDR16

NR 09 OM PLAIN

7:00 PM CST URGENT MAY 2, 1975 SKH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: OMAHA (62-NEW) (P)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MAY 2, 1975.

FORMER SA JOHN J. QUINN WAS CONTACTED BY ME PERSONALLY AND ADVISED PER INSTRUCTIONS IN RETEL. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF ADVANCED NOTICE RE POSSIBLE INTERVIEW AND STATED THAT HE WOULD DESIRE AN AGENT BE PRESENT IF SUCH INTERVIEW OCCURS. STATED HE WOULD PERSONALLY CONTACT ME IF HE IS CONTACTED BY STAFF MEMBERS.

BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

END.

REC- 106

62-116395-96

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CRLR

16 MAY 7 1975

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

cc 67-436724 (Quinn)

84 MAY [illegible] 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG #MDR16

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with enclosures described below

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified except for one enclosure which is classified "Secret."

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Following excerpts from the FBI Manual of Instructions:

(a) Table of Contents.
(b) Preface. Guidelines for FBI Investigations.
(c) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret").
(d) Section 84. Registration Act.
(e) Section 86. Sabotage.
(f) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals.
(g) Section 88. Sedition.
(h) Section 95. Treason.
(i) Section 97. Voorhis Act.
(j) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

REC-106 62-116395-95

cc 5/1/75

16 MAY 7 1975

Also, Table of Contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations.

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Material furnished includes policy, statutes, instructions and related matters covering FBI investigations in the security field generally. Limited, extremely sensitive material excluded but available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff at FBI Headquarters.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/7/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-75

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

No direct relation.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 12-17-73)

(Copies to [illegible]ces Checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Beirut
☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☒ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Singapore
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date 5/8/75

RE: **SENSTUDY 75**

PERSONAL ATTN.

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☒ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ____

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ____ dated ____.

Remarks:

Attached should be brought to the attention of Assistant Legat Armand Cammarota. For his information, the SSC has exhibited an interest in Bureau's communications to Rome in 1964 and is aware Cammarota was then Legat there. He thus may be contacted by SSC personnel.

#mol16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM [illegible]

File
5-8

Enc.
Bufile 62-116395
Urfile

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: 2/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2-ADM/MG

Hotis

FARRINGTON

On 2/6/75 Mr. Kelley and I met with Senator Church and Bill Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee. Senator Church pointed out that he intended to run the Committee in a very responsible manner, had no intention of destroying or impairing the effectiveness of the intelligence community and, in fact, hoped that the efforts of the Committee would help to reestablish public confidence in the intelligence agencies.

Parameters have not been drawn but Senator Church feels that the Committee will confine its activities largely to inquiries into domestic activities. The inquiries will be designed to determine whether agencies have acted outside the law and the type of remedial legislation necessary to prevent such abuses in the future.

Study will be largely concerned with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency but will, of course, involve the FBI and other agencies involved in domestic intelligence.

The Committee hopes to have a nonpartisan staff of approximately 40 employees headed up by Mr. Miller and would appreciate having necessary background investigations expedited to permit an early clearance. Miller indicated he has already been in touch with Mr. Hotis and Mr. Bowers in this regard. It was explained that the contemplated procedure involved the FBI conducting the full-field investigation necessary with the results being furnished to the Chairman, after which he would, upon being personally satisfied as to their loyalty, furnish the results to CIA for final clearance. Senator Church appeared satisfied with this arrangement. He stated that he wanted to prevent leaks and be hopefully as successful as the Judiciary Committee was on the impeachment inquiry. Our experience in this regard was pointed out wherein the Judiciary Committee in connection with the 17 wiretaps had written us a letter indicating that if we made classified

ST-117

REC 68 62-116395-94

APR 1975

JBA:ams (8)

1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis

LEGAL COUNSEL

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 7 1975

information available they would afford it appropriate security restricted to members only, excluding staff, and would not make the information public. Subsequent to the hearings, the Committee published its report which contained our classified documents right along with the Top Secret classifications. Senator Church was not aware of this, appeared surprised by it, and stated surely the information must have been declassified. I advised him that not by us and it was our information.

Senator Church was asked whether in his opinion the formation of the Select Committee would have any effect on the proliferation of committees seeking to obtain testimony from the FBI and it was his opinion that this would have a favorable effect. He said he had been in touch with other members of the Senate who felt that it was a waste of time to have repetitious testimony on the same subject matter before a variety of committees and he had the feeling that the other committees would hold off until after the Senate Select Committee completed its hearings. He indicated that he could not vouch for what would happen in the House, however, he intended to speak to the House leadership in order to try to effect some coordinated approach there also, because he was well aware of the large number of committees seeking to provide oversight or obtain information from the intelligence agencies.

A question arose as to the extent of cooperation with the Committee and Senator Church was assured that the FBI would be completely responsive subject to certain limitations which would have to be delineated by the President in order to protect sensitive sources and information. Senator Church indicated that he was going to talk to the President in this regard in order to secure his complete cooperation, and it was Senator Church's feeling that the Committee should be entitled to answers to any questions they might ask without restriction other than, of course, the identities of informants. He felt the progress of the Committee would be severely impaired if it were necessary to go to Court over such questions to obtain enforcement of their right to have access to whatever information they need.

ACTION:

Information.

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Mr. T.J.Jenkins 5/2/75
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

TO SACS ALL OFFICES

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

PERSONAL ATTENTION

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK TO INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/dt6
#MORE/6

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-16 62-116395-93

WOC:ekw ekw
(18)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

5 MAY 1975

JB/ PvM

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 03 1975
TELETYPE

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

58 MAY 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

PROTECTED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL. YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

NOTE: Teletype prepared for all offices to alert SACs to the possibility former employees may contact their offices seeking guidance.

The Office of Legal Counsel in response to requests from former employees will utilize the briefing paper prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by Assistant Attorney General Antonino Scalia.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.

TO :MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 1, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM :MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum for record purposes reports discussion 4/25/75 between Bureau's Liaison Agent, L. F. Schwartz, and Mr. Jack E. Thomas, Chief, Coordination Staff, Intelligence Community Staff, relating to Abstracts we are to prepare for the Central Community Index (CCI) in connection with Senstudy 75.

Attached are (1) memorandum 4/11/75 re CCI and its attachments, memorandum 4/10/75 and Abstract format; and (2) letter 4/21/75 from Thomas to Schwartz and its attachment, Abstract format. On 4/25/75 Schwartz and Thomas discussed applicability of instructions in attachments and arrived at the following understandings.

The FBI will provide Abstracts only, not documents, to have on record in the CCI a summary of what we have furnished to the Select Committees. Abstracts should be dated when typed without regard to delivery date of Abstract or date of communications to which they pertain. Under item number nine of format, enter date of communication involved, not date it is delivered to a Select Committee. We may use an abbreviated version for the Select Committees' names, such as "Senate Select Committee." We will title Abstracts as near as possible in a manner keyed to the language of the request from the Select Committee. Inasmuch as we will honor only written requests from the Select Committees, the "Requester" will always be shown as the name of the requesting Committee and not the name of any Committee personnel.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2

#MDR16

ACTION: None. For information and record purposes.

62-116395-92

62-116395

Enclosures

SFP:ekw
(6)

REC-88

16 MAY 6 1975

2 ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 6 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

11 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Reviews

Inspector General, CIA

SUBJECT : Central Community Index

[illegible]

Schumate deliver our abstracts
WOP

1. The central indexing capability detailed in the attached memorandum has been implemented. Format for preparation of abstracts has been accepted and the Community Index is ready to receive material. The address of the Community Index is

Room 6E25
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia 20505.

2. The timeliness of reporting to the Central Index is critical and you are requested to make this information available to the appropriate organizational components within your agencies.

Sincerely,

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

[illegible] 5/1/75

Attachment

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JAB
#m0216

file 62-116395

5-8

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-92

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

10 April 1975

#moe16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/776

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence

1. The Intelligence Community Staff, with John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy/IC, as my representative in these matters, will keep the Board and other appropriate officials advised as to progress of the investigations conducted by the Senate and House Select Committees investigating intelligence activities. In particular, it will ensure that we are kept informed as to materials which are formally being provided to the Select Committees by all elements of the Community. The USIB Ad Hoc Group will assist on this matter and provide the mechanism for regular and constant communications.

2. In response to this assignment, the Intelligence Community Staff is establishing a registry for documentation relating to the investigations. This registry will be a source of reference of all responses, testimony, et cetera, provided by USIB agencies and available to your designated representatives.

3. In order to make the registry useful to the Board, it is essential that it include:

a. File copies of documents or other materials which each Intelligence Community element provides to one of the Select Committees where the originating agency considers the materials to involve aspects of Community activities, and/or which may result in follow-on queries concerning the functioning of the Community. The availability of this documentation will be of particular importance if it is expected there will be subsequent inquiries relating to the materials provided and involving elements of the Community other than the originating element.

b. An abstract of each formal input to a Select Committee - unless the Intelligence Community registry is provided with an actual copy of the material itself. A proposed format for such abstracts is attached.

W. E. Colby

Attachment:
As stated

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT:

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)

7. DATE OF REQUEST:

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY:

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY:

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify)

MOR 16
SP-2 ALM/JTG
1-19-01

Ad Hoc Staff
75-358

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

21 April 1975

Recd from Jack Thomas Int Comm Staff 4/21/75 WOB

Mr. L. Frank Schwartz
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4637
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, D. C.

#MORI6
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ZTG

Dear Frank:

Reference is your request for comments on the sample abstracts prepared in the FBI as a report on materials being provided to the Senate Select Committee.

As you know, we want to make the Community Registry as complete a record as possible of what is provided to the Committee, and for this reason hope that the actual copy of special reports and particularly important documents will be provided to the Registry. Where this is not done, an abstract or summary of each document or homogenous set of documents.

We have amended the abstract format slightly to include an entry for "Document Classification." A copy of the amended format is enclosed.

Your sample abstracts require a few alterations to make them more "indexable."

a. Item 1, "TITLE/SUBJECT" refers to the subject matter of the material which is being provided. The abstract on the FBI Manual of Instructions should have an entry here something like "Instructions covering FBI Investigations in the Security Field," rather than the title of the Senate Committee.

b. The date at the head of the page should be the date of preparation of the abstract. The date of submission to the Committee is listed at Item 9.

c. The entry "ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION" identified the organization with authority to release the document.

[illegible] W.O. [illegible] 0-7/1/75
SFP&RW

File 62-116395

5

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-92

d. The "SUMMARY OF CONTENTS" section should be brief, but also should clearly indicate what is being provided to the Committee. I wonder, for instance, whether your sample on the letterhead memoranda was issued in widely separated time periods. The summary as written gives no indication as to the particular subject of any of the memoranda and the single sentence now used to describe all of them covers the waterfront.

e. If the request for information comes officially from the Committee, the Committee title should be entered under "REQUESTOR," but if the requestor is an individual member of the Staff, his name should be indicated.

f. The last entry in the format, "PROBLEM AREAS," has particular significance since it is important to know if there are Third Agency, or sources and methods, or other sensitivity problems involved, and this is the place to identify them. We are beginning to use the abstracts prepared in our office as an aid to obtaining release clearance when we are dealing with the document for which another agency must concur in the release. The "PROBLEM AREAS" section gives such other agency an idea as to whether we see any important reason why they should be concerned about release of the document. The entry in this final section of the format is expected to prove useful for this purpose.

5. One copy of the document or its abstract is all that is needed by the registry.

6. The mailing address of the registry is:

Community Index
Room 6E25
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia 20505

Jack E Thomas

Jack E. Thomas
Chief
Coordination Staff, ICS

Enclosure: as stated

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT:

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)

7. DATE OF REQUEST:

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY:

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY:

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify)

#m DR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/TG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 21, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On Thursday, 4/17/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President for Congressional Inquiries, was furnished the following four documents with a request that he advise whether copies of such documents could be made available to the Senate Select Committee: (1) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/16/72 captioned "FBI Jurisdiction, Criminal Intelligence Information"; (2) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/18/72 captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters"; (3) A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director L. Louis Patrick Gray III dated 5/19/72; (4) A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated 8/7/73 recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

On 4/18/75 Mr. Wilderotter advised Section Chief William O. Cregar that the above four documents were cleared for delivery to the Senate Select Committee.

ACTION: For information and record purposes.

WOC:ekw ekw

62-116395

REC-88

62-116395-91

16 MAY 6 1975

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

84 MAY 6 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General

April 28, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Lish Whitson. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for your use in the event you desire to furnish it to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JOM/CA

6076

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)

SFP:ekw
(11)

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

REC-6

62-116395-90

EX-110

MAY 2 1975

NPC/mo

JB+
Pcn

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

56 MAY 06 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JSmlw 6026

April 28, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information available to the FBI concerning captioned matter.

SSC Interview of Retired FBI SA Lish Whitson

On the afternoon of April 23, 1975, Mr. Lish Whitson personally appeared at the office of an FBI official, stated that he had just been interviewed by Mr. Michael Epstein, Staff Member of the SSC, and was desirous of reporting the results of that interview which Whitson related as follows:

Epstein first asked Whitson when he entered the FBI, when he first arrived for assignment at FBI Headquarters, to which Headquarters Division he had been assigned, and when he retired. (FBI records reveal that Whitson joined the FBI as an SA November 20, 1933, and retired June 19, 1972. He was assigned at Headquarters December 16, 1941, attached to the Domestic Intelligence Division and served in that Division until his retirement. The current name for that Division is Intelligence Division). Epstein then told Whitson that he knew that Whitson had at one time mailed a package to Mrs. Martin Luther King from Tampa, Florida, and asked Whitson to relate the details concerning this matter. Whitson thereupon

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)

SFP:ekw (Kw)
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NPC/

JBA/Pen

SEE NOTE PAGE FIVE

62-116395-90

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

told Epstein that in the late Summer of 1964, former FBI Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had telephoned Whitson at his home one Saturday and told him that late FBI Director Hoover wanted Whitson to deliver a package to Miami, Florida, by plane and on arrival at the Miami airport to telephone Sullivan for further instructions. Whitson did as directed and upon calling Sullivan, was instructed to address the package to Mr. Martin Luther King. Accordingly, Whitson had the package weighed, put postage stamps on it, and addressed it to Martin Luther King (not Mrs. Martin Luther King as Epstein had indicated). The following day, Sunday, Whitson flew back to Washington and on the next day, Monday, he informed Sullivan that his instructions had been carried out. Sullivan commented to Whitson "Someday I will tell you about that."

Epstein asked Whitson who had paid for the stamps to mail the package and Whitson said that he had probably done so utilizing per diem money. Epstein asked whether he had put a return address on the package and Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had gone to the Miami FBI Office, whether any Agent had met him at the Miami airport, and whether Whitson had discussed this matter with anyone. Whitson told Epstein that he had not gone to the Miami Office, that no Agent had met him, and that he had discussed the matter only with Sullivan. At this point, Whitson asked Epstein how he got the story. Epstein merely laughed and did not reply to the question.

Epstein also asked Whitson whether he had ever written a memorandum regarding this matter, to which Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had ever seen a memorandum on this matter and Whitson again replied in the negative.

On April 24, 1975, Whitson telephoned the FBI official referred to above on two occasions to report additional information which Epstein had secured from Whitson by telephone on April 24, 1975. This additional information was as follows:

Epstein asked how Whitson had made the trip to Miami; that is, how it was paid for. Whitson told him he had issued a Government Transportation Request (GTR). Epstein asked whether there was any prior written authorization for Whitson to make the trip and Whitson told him there was none. Epstein asked what kind of record would have been made covering the trip and Whitson explained that the only record he knew of would be the expense voucher he submitted covering the expenses involved and possibly the copy of the GTR which he had issued. Whitson explained to Epstein that the voucher would merely show that the GTR had been issued for a round-trip to and from Miami and how much per diem had been claimed in connection with the trip. Epstein inquired as to whether Whitson had registered at the Airport Hotel in Miami, and, if so, whether it was under his own name. Whitson told Epstein that he had registered under his name at this hotel.

Additional Information Furnished to FBI By Whitson

In addition to the foregoing, Whitson furnished to the FBI official the following information on April 23, 1975, which information he did not furnish to Epstein.

When Sullivan told Whitson he wanted him to fly the package to Miami, he stated that only he, Sullivan, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Tolson, (then FBI Associate Director) and Mr. Belmont (then FBI Assistant to the Director) knew of this situation. (At the time, 1964, Sullivan was an Assistant Director.) Sullivan never did explain to Whitson anything more regarding this incident.

Whitson said that when he arrived at the North Terminal at National Airport, following Sullivan's telephonic instructions, a young man who was unknown to Whitson but who addressed him as "Mr. Whitson," turned over to him a package which was wrapped in brown paper and sealed with sealing tape. It is Whitson's recollection the package measured approximately eight inches by eight inches by one inch.

It is Whitson's further recollection that at the time the foregoing occurred, King was either just about to go abroad to receive the Nobel Peace Prize or probably had already gone abroad. It was Whitson's recollection that sometime shortly after the mailing of the package, Sullivan commented to Whitson that the package had not yet been received by King. Because of this remark, Whitson is of the belief that the package was mailed to King at the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and not to King's residence. Further, it was Whitson's recollection that it was not long after he had mailed the package that King had a personal meeting with Mr. Hoover in the latter's office.

Whitson observed that in his opinion, the information which was in the possession of Epstein prior to interviewing Whitson must have originated with Sullivan. Whitson noted that Mr. Hoover and Mr. Tolson are both deceased and that he has heard nothing to indicate that Mr. Belmont has been contacted by members of the Staff of the SSC. One other factor that causes Whitson to feel that Sullivan was the source of the information was a question Epstein raised as to whether Whitson had put a return address on the package when he addressed it to King. Whitson said he recalls that when he was in Miami and received the telephonic instructions from Sullivan, Sullivan told him that he should put a return address on the package and Whitson then pointed out to Sullivan that if he did so, and the name of the addressee became smeared, the package would end up at someone's return address rather than in the

dead letter office. Sullivan concurred that no return address should be used. Thus, Sullivan would probably have reason to have commented regarding the use or nonuse of a return address.

On April 24, 1975, Whitson furnished by telephone to the aforementioned Bureau official the following additional information which he had not furnished to Epstein. Whitson stated it was now his recollection he had made the Miami trip either in the late Summer or early Fall of 1964 and that King was "away" at the time.

FBI Records Concerning Whitson's Travel

The following information is on record in the FBI concerning the travel of Whitson discussed above. On December 9, 1964, a Travel Voucher was processed for payment to Whitson the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period November 1-30, 1964. On record also is a memorandum copy of a Government Transportation Request issued November 21, 1964, to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air coach travel, Washington, D. C., to Miami, Florida, and return. November 21, 1964, has been determined to have been a Saturday. There is not available in the FBI any copy of the actual voucher submitted by Whitson.

NOTE: Original and one copy to the Attorney General (AG may forward the copy to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President). Information herein taken from two memoranda W.R. Wannall to J. B. Adams 4/23, 24/75, "Senstudy 75; Former Supervisor Lish Whitson, Assigned Intelligence Division." Voucher and GTR information from J. D. Cox, Voucher Unit, Computer Systems Division.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 18, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

6

#mor16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/ETG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and specifically Part IV, Policies and Procedures.

Since the enclosed memorandum captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, originated with the Office of the Attorney General and is covered under this request, we are deferring to your judgment in this matter. The FBI interposes no objection to furnishing this document to the Committee, it being noted that the document appeared in toto in the United States Government Printing Office publication captioned "Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillances, 1974."

Also enclosed for your approval is the original of a memorandum to the Senate Select Committee apprising the Committee of our referral of this matter to you. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

4/25 Approved by A.G [illegible]
4/24 Delivered to B[illegible] office by K[illegible]

REC-100

62-116395-849

TEB:vb
(8)

16 MAY 2 1975

NOTE:

The request referred to above is one of several contained in the referenced communication. We are referring this matter to the Department as a matter of protocol in line with our policy of furnishing the Committee only documents originating with the FBI.

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

PLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

April 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of the captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

This is to advise that with respect to the memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, we are deferring action on this request to the United States Department of Justice inasmuch as this communication originated with that Department.

62 - 116395

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:vb
(8)

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/TG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW/TWL

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-89

GPO 954-546

S-89

#mo16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/

62-116395-89

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation DATE: May 20, 1954.

XI

FROM The Attorney General

SUBJECT:MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE 155-26

declassified 4/28/75 TEB/asm

[redacted]

The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of microphone surveillance in connection with matters relating to the internal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal security matters equally as important as the duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigations. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of installing a microphone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all cases, including internal security matters. Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion that under such circumstances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.

Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones, suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow rather than reflect the present state of the law. It is realized that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone. The question of whether a trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the circumstances in each case in the light of the practical necessities of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.

H.B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : MR. WALSH

DATE: 4/3/75 PF mo e16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/

FROM : L. C. GROOVER
LCG/

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Jew 160 Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church dated 3/19/75.

Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities, together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations and activities (page 3, item IIIC of relet).

The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached herewith, to the above request.

It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security, intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the data for both of the other categories as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-100 62-116395-88

That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Jackson

JJC:jmb

16 MAY 2 1975

SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE THREE

ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 21 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities

WOB

ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75

The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.

JWR/HHW

WAB

LCB

FBP

WRW

OVER

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg dly 4-14-75

Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:

OK to classify Confidential
TJM

(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.

(2) Before making any determination as to whether we make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.

(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.

PVD

Tom Feeney acting for W.O.C. OK'd using Walsh as classification authority - 4/28/75 WOC

see memo Cregar to Wannall dated 4/1/75
woc / ekw

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Amoel6
DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible] BLM/ZTG
ON 1-18-07

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

62-116395-88

ENCLOSURE

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 4-14-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 4-11-75 Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, was apprised of the fact we intended to affix a property stamp on certain nonclassified documents we were furnishing the Senate Select Committee (SSC). It was explained the stamp contained a caveat that the particular document may not be made available to unauthorized individuals without the Bureau's consent. He advised he felt this procedure was excellent.

On 4-14-75 Mr. Marvin requested that all future contacts with the Department concerning SENSTUDY be coordinated with Jack Fuller, extension 3892. Mr. Fuller is assigned to the Attorney General's office.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TLE

REC- 106

62-116395-87

APR 23 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (7)

84 APR 30 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. J. B. Adams~~
1 - ~~Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 14, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. L. C. Groover to Mr. Walsh memorandum dated 3/4/75 entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities" forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review the titles and numbers of FBI field office Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities. This was in response to requirement IIIC of Senator Church's letter dated 3/19/75.

By addendum dated 4/4/75 the Intelligence Division recommended that the Legal Counsel Division discuss with the staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) our reluctance to provide these type figures to the SSC.

On 4/11/75 I discussed with Mr. John Clark, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the intelligence community, the request of Senator Church. Specifically, Mr. Clark was asked if Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had received such a request and how they responded. Mr. Clark advised that CIA had not received a specific request for the titles and numbers of CIA officers assigned to intelligence collection or counterintelligence matters. However, CIA had received a request to identify the names and numbers of CIA covert officers assigned overseas.

REC-106 62-116395-866

Mr. Clark advised that CIA intended to advise the Staff Director of the SSC that CIA was unwilling to provide such names and numbers to the SSC for retention in its files. However, CIA would be willing to allow a senior staff member or the Staff Director to review the names and numbers of CIA covert officers overseas at the CIA headquarters building.

APR 29 1975

WOC:ekw
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/MG

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL ADDENDUM
PAGE 3

84 APR 30 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

If approved, the Legal Counsel Division should advise the SCC that because of security considerations, the [illegible] titles and numbers of Special Agents of the FBI assigned to internal security and counterintelligence matters cannot be furnished to the SCC in documented form for the Committee files. However, the FBI would be willing to show the titles and figures to Mr. Miller or a senior staff member at FBIHQ in an effort to demonstrate a spirit of cooperation and credibility.

WRW/TJL

Addendum

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division interposes no objection to Intelligence Division's recommendation. If approved, Intelligence Division prepare necessary communication to notify the SSC.

JCF

JH

See memo to A.G.
with encl. for A D & SSC
4/22/75 EWL/EKW.
WJS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
APRIL 11, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM 1776
MORI 6

W. O. Cregar

On 4/11/75, from 10:00 am until 12:20 pm, staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities were briefed by Assistant Director Wannall and members of his staff in the Conference Room at INTD. Briefed from the Committee were Mr. William Miller, Staff Director; Mr. Frederick A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel; and Messrs. Mark Gitenstein, Marvin Epstein, Patrick Shea, Britt Snider and Loch Johnson, all staff members.

The first hour of the briefing was occupied with the showing of the INTD slide presentation and commentary which provided highlights of the work of the INTD, both in the counterintelligence and internal security field. Following this presentation a question and answer period ensued for the rest of the briefing. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz posed most of the questions.

In the counterintelligence field the thrust of the questioning was directed toward the continuing growth of the hostile intelligence presence in the United States and its short-term and long-term effect on the FBI's operations. Mr. Wannall pointed out that the Director on previous occasions had indicated his intention to "beef up" the counterintelligence effort of the FBI by the addition of some 250 Special Agents, and that INTD had also effected certain programs designed to assign certain counterintelligence functions to non-Agent personnel, thereby freeing additional Special Agents to function as case officers. In response to a question as to whether the additional investigative effort necessary to counter the mounting hostile intelligence threat might not involve investigation of more and more American citizens, Mr. Wannall conceded

62-116395

REC-106 62-116395-83

APR 29 1975

EWL:jvl
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 APR 30 1975

that this was inevitable. He stressed, however, the investigative policies of the FBI which protected the constitutional rights and right of privacy of such individuals.

On the domestic internal security side the thrust of the questioning appeared to indicate an interest in the predication, duration and administrative controls of investigations of domestic organizations and individuals. Again, Mr. Wannall stressed the precautions inherent in FBI policy and instructions to the field in these matters, pointing out, in effect, that these investigations are founded on statutory authority and are closely supervised by experienced personnel at Headquarters level. The Committee staff appeared to accept these answers and no critical or hostile attitudes on their part were evident.

The briefing was terminated at 12:20 pm, due to commitments on the part of the staff. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz both expressed their appreciation for the briefing and indicated it had been most instructive. They indicated a desire to continue these discussions at some later date and Mr. Wannall assured them that he would be happy to continue the briefing at any future mutually agreeable time.

Perhaps most significant of all questions posed was the final question by Mr. Schwarz in which he inquired as to what advantages and disadvantages to the FBI could be anticipated as a result of the Committee fulfilling its mandate. Mr. Wannall replied that any statutory authority defining and affirming the FBI's role in the intelligence collection field would certainly be a positive achievement. He also stated that any result of the Committee's investigation which would tend to limit the investigative resources or the investigative effectiveness of the FBI would surely be an unfortunate negative factor.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: April 23, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
~~FORMER SUPERVISOR~~ LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

At 3:17 p.m., 4/22/75 former Special Agent Lish Whitson who for many years was a supervisor in the Intelligence Division telephoned me to advise that he had received a request to appear for an interview by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee. The interview was scheduled for 4/23/75.

In response to a question by Mr. Whitson, he was advised that to the writer's knowledge this was the first former Bureau employee who had been requested to appear for an interview by any member of the staff of the Select Committee. Whitson stated that he was proceeding on the basis that he would respond to questions propounded to him but he had some reservation in his mind concerning answering questions which would involve material which he knew to be classified at the time he retired. He commented he had noted in the news media that staff members of the Committee were reportedly to be granted clearances through TOP SECRET - Q (Atomic Energy Matters).

Whitson was advised by the writer that while it was true staff members were being granted clearances, the Bureau was endeavoring to establish procedures through the Attorney General whereby highly sensitive and classified material could be revealed on a restricted basis in response to Committee inquiries; for example, in some instances we would request that only the Majority and Minority leaders on the Committee be furnished certain types of material and in other instances only the Senators themselves as opposed to all staff members.

REC-100 62-116395-84

Mr. Whitson said in view of this, it was his intention to be as responsive and candid during the interview by Mr. Epstein as he could be but if any questions arose in his mind with respect to revelation as to what he, Whitson, considered to be sensitive material, he anticipated he would express his concern to Mr. Epstein and advise him he felt it would be appropriate to check with the Bureau since he is aware of regulations by the Attorney General which preclude revealing FBI information without the Attorney General's specific

8 APR 29 1975

WRW:lml
(5)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall

CONTINUED - OVER

#MOR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/rs

5-1508

8 4 APR 2 9 1975

prior approval. Whitson stated that if the writer had no objection, he would telephone again after his interview with Epstein in the event any matters came up which he felt would be of interest to the Bureau. He was assured that the writer had no objection whatsoever and would appreciate any observations which he cared to pass along.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

JBA
PLM

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 22, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ITG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated March 19, 1975, the Senate Select Committee requested information from the FBI. Part I of the Committee's letter pertained to the legal authority for investigations.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and four documents on the subject of legal authority for investigations.

A copy of this memorandum, with enclosures, is being provided for your records.

4/28/75 Approved by [illegible] ([illegible])
4/28/75 Delivered to Mike Epstein of Committee (SSC)

Enclosures - 10

AFW:vb. (6)

REC-100

62-116395-83

NOTE:

The Senate Select Committee's 3/19/75, letter was transmitted with an attachment, prepared by the Committee's staff, which set forth examples of the type of information concerning domestic intelligence jurisdiction of interest to it. Among those items cited in the attachment to the Committee's 3/19/75, letter was a study on jurisdiction prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III by the Office of Legal Counsel, dated 5/18/72. Representatives of the Legal Counsel Division do not believe the 5/18/72 study is, in itself, appropriate to furnish in response to the question of the Senate Select Committee on legal authority. However, Legal Counsel Division believes that two internal FBI memoranda, prepared in connection with the drafting of the 5/18/72, study, would be pertinent to the Senate Select Committee's inquiry. Accordingly, these two documents, items one and two of attached memorandum for the Committee, are being furnished.

APR 29 1975

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."

2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.

4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

1 - The Attorney General

soc. Dir. —
Dep. AD Adm. —
Dep. AD Inv. —
Asst Dir.:
Admin. —
Comp. Syst. —
Ext. Affairs —
Files & Com. —
Gen. Inv. —
Ident. —
Inspection —
tell. —
boratory —
. & Eval. —
Inv. —
ing —
oun —
e Rm. —
Sec'y —

AFW:vb
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

MOR 16

JBA/PLM

62-116395-83
ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UN[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]USTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."

2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.

4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

62-116395-83

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVER[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : Mr. Dalbey

DATE: 5/16/72

ROM : J. A. Mintz

UBJECT: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

#MDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/MG

You requested analysis of the legal authority for FBI criminal intelligence collection and its relationship to our statutory jurisdiction in criminal matters.

"The gathering of criminal intelligence information" describes activity not subject to precise definition. However, its general objective is well understood by those engaged in law enforcement. There exist individuals and groups whose daily occupations are directed toward profit without regard to the restraints of the law. Yet, by the very nature of their associations, little actual participation in criminal acts may be observed by the most astute law enforcement observer. Their existence and contribution to the sum of criminal behavior has been detected and to some degree measured by the collection of data concerning their personal life-styles, property holdings, associates, influence, and access to capital. Such information has been characterized as "criminal intelligence."

For years, the FBI has been aware of the need to identify these resources of the criminal element. Congress responded to this need through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The Congressional findings were that organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and by the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption. Legitimate business and labor unions are infiltrated and corrupted and our democratic processes are subverted. The problem was declared to be of of national concern both as to our economy and the domestic security.

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116[illegible]-83

ENCLOSURE

The Act attempted to attack organized crime by making criminal the management of syndicated gambling and by prohibiting racketeering activity characteristic of organized crime including the use of illegal proceeds for investment in legitimate business enterprises.

The long-established suspicions of law enforcement officers were confirmed by the Congressional findings but statutory enactments did not eliminate the conduct described as evil therein. There remains the task of establishing the identities of those constituting the national menace and developing prosecutable evidence of their guilt. "Criminal intelligence" collection is one means by which this responsibility may be fulfilled. It may be the only practical means in view of the scarcity of witnesses willing to testify and of the high mortality potential of those who do appear. A classic example of such intimidation is reported in United States v. Addonizio, 451 F2d 49 (3rd Cir. 1972) where a prospective witness in a corruption case found an anonymous note on the seat of his car which read "This could have been a bomb. Keep your mouth shut."

Accepting the need for intelligence gathering as a practical necessity, the issue remains as to its propriety in the face of Constitutional protections. If the Supreme Court announces that individuals have a Constitutionally protected right of privacy that may be overcome only through established arrest, search, and subpoena procedures, the issue will be settled. But, thus far, the Court has only drawn upon the concept of Constitutional privacy to resolve cases involving special circumstances such as marital affairs (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)) and interception of communications (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))

More specific Constitutional limitations on the criminal intelligence function may be found in the First Amendment protections of speech and assembly; the Fourth Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

The theme consistently found in decisions having a bearing on th relationship between these rights and the collection of criminal intelligence is that, when in direct conflict, the collection efforts must yield. Such is

not to label criminal intelligence as necessarily the product of malpractice, but to recognize the paramount nature of the Constitutional interests being safeguarded. Other incidents of government regulatory authority have been required to yield as well when confronted with legitimate claims of Constitutional protection, e.g. the administrative search cases, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

Overt and obtrusive conduct susceptible of being characterized as harassment may well be enjoined as, for example, was the case of an obvious 24-hour-a-day physical surveillance of an individual, his home, relatives, friends, and associates (Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964) cert. den. 379 U.S. 1001. Similar results might be expected where an identified officer loiters in the subject's place of business (Bee See Books, Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (SD N.Y. 1968) or openly attends organizational meetings where his presence inhibits communication and the transaction of the business of the assembly (Local 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (ND Ind. 1948)). However, open photographic surveillance of public gatherings (Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (ED Va. 1971)) and secret monitoring of criminal activities through the use of undercover agents (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)) and informants (Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 295 (1966)) have met with judicial approval.

Obviously, criminal intelligence information gained by unreasonable search and seizure or through compelled self-incrimination is tainted and subject to judicial condemnation upon complaint of one having the requisite standing.

Perhaps, the decision coming nearest to discussing the legality of criminal intelligence collection was Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A2d 298 (1969), (reversed on the ground more complete record was needed to support the decision) 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970). New Jersey had responded to the threat of continuing civil disorders by collecting intelligence information on persons and events alleged to have some relationship to such activities. The trial court held the collection effort to be unconstitutional because it conflicted with the First Amendment.

However, the court order to destroy the intelligence files excepted instances "where such information will be used to charge persons with specifically defined criminal conduct." 256 A2d at 305. Thus, the decision may be interpreted as drawing a distinction between collection of intelligence information where political or social factors are involved and First Amendment freedoms therefore may be directly inhibited and collection of criminal intelligence information where the objective is the establishment of criminal conduct and the identities of the offenders. While the Fourth and Fifth Amendment may be enjoyed by the guilty and innocent alike, it is improbable that the First Amendment would be stretched so far as to protect freedom of speech and assembly when such speech and assembly constitute elements of a criminal offense. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey returned the case for further development of the record and observed ". . . the executive branch may gather whatever information it reasonably believes to be necessary to enable it to perform the police roles, detectional and preventive. A court should not interfere in the absence of proof of bad faith or arbitrariness." 265 A2d at 688.

A tentative conclusion may be stated, subject to further development of the case law. The gathering of criminal intelligence information for the purpose of developing evidence of specific offenses characteristic of organized crime is legally justified as well as practically necessary. Where there is diversion from the proper objective and such collection efforts are manipulated to cause harassment or where such activity conflicts with Constitutional rights, to that extent the criminal intelligence program must be reformed.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOV[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : Mr. Dalbey DATE: 5/18/72

ROM : J. B. Hotis

UBJECT: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/TAG

You requested an analysis of the Bureau's authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. The question of the jurisdictional basis for these investigations is being examined at length by the Domestic Intelligence Division and will not be discussed here.

It is fair to say that the domestic intelligence program is one of the more controversial areas of the Bureau's activities. For one thing, an intelligence investigation casts a broader net than inquiries that are directed toward the proof of a specific offense. A large amount of raw data is collected, much of which has no immediate bearing on potential offenses or offenders. But seemingly trivial information may later become important in the detection and prevention of violence or civil disorder. There are also fears that these investigations may eventually touch upon one's political beliefs, habits or associations; or that information collected for proper purposes may eventually be misused at the hands of Government. Each is a legitimate concern. The notion of Government prying into the personal lives of its citizens is repellent to all of us. And yet there is a strong sense that the Government must acquire necessary intelligence information if it is to meet its responsibilities in connection with the national security.

One of the major concerns about our domestic intelligence activities is that they are not supervised or monitored by any outside agency. The claim is made that the Executive Branch has been left wide discretion to define its own authority, and to choose the directions, methods, and focus of its investigations. For one thing, the law has never made clear what facts and circumstances must be present to authorize an intelligence investigation, nor how far such an investigation may lawfully proceed without being directed toward proof of a specific offense.

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

And unlike the practice in criminal cases, our electronic surveillances in security matters are not submitted for prior court approval. For another, the exclusionary rule which provides the usual method of judicial control over investigative procedures, is not often available in security cases. Since the goal is largely preventive, these cases seldom come before the courts. As a result, the public, the courts, and the Congress have very little information about how we operate in domestic intelligence matters and what we do with the information acquired.

In response to this situation, some members of the Congress have pressured for tighter controls over the Bureau, perhaps in the form of a watchdog committee to oversee our operations. Senator Ervin, who chairs the Senate Subsommittee on Constitutional Rights has expressed particular concern about the right of privacy and the authority of the Government to gather information. In an exchange of correspondence with the Department of Justice, the Senator has requested specific documentation of the Department's guidelines for the gathering and retention of domestic intelligence information. He has also suggested that legislation might be enacted, requiring a showing of probable cause before an investigation can be initiated by the Government. It is doubtful that any such measure would pass the Congress, but the proposal does show the mood of the times.

A parallel trend may be developing in the courts. In several recent cases, plaintiffs have made the claim that Government information gathering, which goes beyond the effort to apprehend criminal suspects, may have a "chilling effect" on the exercise of First Amendment rights. These challenges thus far have not been successful. Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970); Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Westmoreland, 323 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1971).

The courts have generally recognized that one of the principal functions of the Bureau is to gather information law violators, agitators of violence and possible subversives.. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1971) cert. granted, 404 U.S. 955 (1971); The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et. al., 70 Civ. 2646 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has observed that the identity of the agency gathering such information is determinative of the significance of any alleged chill to

to First Amendment rights. Thus, in Davis v. Ichord, 442 F2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1970) although appellants allegedly felt chilled by a Congressional Committee's investigation of them, the Court of Appeals found there was insufficient justiciability in their claims to create a viable case or controversy. This was because appellants had "failed to bring the fear of investigation by the present Committee home to themselves," their fears were wholly speculative; there were no criminal proceedings confronting them; nor was any action pending. Moreover, the Court in Davis found that the power of a Congressional Committee began and ended with the investigation; whenever a Committee of the Congress seeks punitive action, the Judiciary must become involved, and thus every investigation has a judicial check which operates to guarantee the protection of constitutional rights.

This latter aspect of the Davis decision was given perspective by the Court of Appeals in Tatum. In contrasting the potential impact on First Amendment rights occasioned by investigations conducted by the military with investigations conducted by a civilian investigative agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Court observed:

> The compilation of data by a civilian investigative agency is thus not the threat to civil liberties or the deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech that such action by the military is, because a civil investigative agency has no inherent power always being subject to the well-defined restrictions of law and the approval of the courts. * * *

There, the Court pointedly examined the "source of the chill" as it had in Davis, and in applying the "chilling effect doctrine", singled out the FBI as a source which does not generate a reasonable basis for inhibitions or apprehensions. In this connection the Court stated,

> Referring to our holding in Davis that the "source of the chill" is important in determining whether there is any inhibiting effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights, we think that there is a significant difference between investigative actions taken by a military agency in reference to civilians and similar investigative actions taken by a regular investigative agency of a civilian branch of the Government.
>
> One of the functions of a civilian investigative agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is to compile information on law violators, agitators of violence, and possible subversives. It has always been recognized that this is a delicate function, and it is exercised under the direction of the Attorney General. Investigation is performed by men a majority of whom are under the direction of lawyers in the Justice Department, and the information compiled is only usable and effective through court action. The FBI is powerless to imprison or to affect his liberty in any way except through the action of the courts.

As to the surveillance of public meetings through the use of informants, it has been held that such surveillance is not per se actionable. See Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971) (police surveillance of street demonstrations held not to offend First Amendment rights).

The Supreme Court in Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293 (1966), held that the use of secret informants is "not per se unconstitutional", and does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, nor the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court upheld, as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, admission at trial of evidence obtained by an undercover informant to whom a defendant spoke without knowledge that he was in the employ of the police. 385 U.S. at 300-303. See also Lewis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 206 (1966) and Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963).

Moreover, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), recently held that the use of secret informants does not violate any constitutionally justifiable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, even when an informant uses electronic equipment to transmit his conversations with defendants to other agents.

If the use of undercover government informants without a warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment and invade a defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, Hoffa v. U.S., supra, and such informants may write down their conversations with defendants and testify concerning them, or simultaneously record and transmit such conversations to others, who may testify against them, On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747 (1952); U.S. v. White, supra, then clearly mere visual "surveillance" of plaintiffs in plain view by informants at public meetings would not violate their constitutional rights.

It would seem that those who elect to present their views actively in the public arena deliberately expose themselves to the public. See Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Any recording of their activities by the defendants does not invade their privacy any more than does a newspaper, radio, or television story, and, indeed, much less since any information compiled is usable and effective only through court action. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

More difficult questions are presented where the investigation delves into the private affairs of the individuals or organizations. But even here, the courts have generally sustained our procedures so long as they comport with the restrictions of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et. al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et. al., 70 Civ. 2646 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. (examination of bank records) U.S. v. Gerhart, 275 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (examination of bank records); Minker v. U.S., 312 F2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962) (trash covers); Cohen v. U.S., 378 F2d 751 (9th Cir. 1967) (mail covers); U.S. v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detention and examination of packages in the mail); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (seizure of union records); Hoffa v. U.S., supra; U.S. v. White, supra; (use of informants).

In summary, it is premature to say that the First Amendment line of cases, dealing with the "chilling" concept offers any substantial impediment to our intelligence investigations. There is less reason for optimism, however, with regard to congressional intervention. We should be prepared, therefore, to meet arguments regarding the need for outside supervision. The sound answer, which should satisfy governmental needs and individual rights, is found in tight internal controls and carefully developed guidelines.

POSITION PAPER

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSION

May 13, 1972

OVERVIEW

This paper deals with the conduct by the FBI of intelligence-type investigations supervised by the Domestic Intelligence Division. Authority for these investigations is documented and outlined, including situations where there is no direct violation of law. Criteria and controls and dissemination policies implementing this authority are detailed.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ATG

62-116395-83
ENCLOSURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 1

AUTHORITY 10
  Congressional Enactments 10
  Presidential Directives 11
  Policy Instructions of Attorney General 12
  National Security Council Directives 13
  Interagency Agreements 13

IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY 14
  Administrative Index 15
  Revolutionary Groups 17
  Extremist Groups 19
  Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals 19
  Unaffiliated Individuals 21
  Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations 21
  Restrictions on Investigations 23
  Information Storage and Retrieval 25
  Dissemination 27

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2-ALM/STG

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/~~TH~~

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

The FBI's intelligence function is well established and documented. Yet, our work in gathering intelligence has been the subject of continuing criticism from segments of the press with charges being made that the FBI is conducting without authority security investigations of persons who are not in violation of the law. It has also been charged that our intelligence collection is uncontrolled, capricious and dwells on personal idiosyncrasies without there being any security interest involved. Fragments of information, distorted and twisted to convey the false impression that the FBI is wantonly disregarding the privacy of citizens, have been published.

The FBI does not conduct security investigations of individuals without clear-cut authority and tight controls. Critics have taken fragments of intelligence which have come to their attention and built them up into what is represented as the end product of security investigations with political overtones. In these instances, the items upon which such importance was placed have been fragmentary intelligence from substantive

investigations and could not be viewed in their real significance, except as they fit into the overall perspective of the case. This is indicative of the danger of using piecemeal intelligence taken out of context; properly used, however, intelligence is a legitimate and necessary part of all security investigations.

Intelligence is information and the collection of it is inseparable from efficient investigative operations. In fact the two--investigation and intelligence--are mutually dependent.

In the security field, it is vital that the Federal Government detect factors which have a direct bearing on possible violations of law related to the overthrow or destruction of the Government. Intelligence developed to identify individuals who have a propensity for revolutionary or racial violence or have affiliations with subversive or revolutionary groups is essential in the enforcement of the laws designed to protect the integrity of the Government. Intelligence is also essential to the detection of attempts or conspiracies to move against the Government, actions which may themselves be crimes.

No constitutional provisions, statutory enactments or judicial rulings have attempted to deprive law enforcement of its intelligence function, although various attempts have

been made to define or limit the areas encompassed by intelligence and particularly the techniques of collection. It is also recognized that some intelligence gathering activities may have an incidental "chilling" effect on individual citizens. The spectre of the Government's investigatory presence may cause a reaction in citizens, inhibiting the exercise of their full constitutional rights. Therefore, a balance between the requirements of the Government and the constitutional rights of citizens must be maintained.

The intelligence function of investigation, must be both reasonable and practical. It varies in scope and intensity with the seriousness of the provision it seeks to enforce. It is neither reasonable nor practical to launch an aggressive intelligence collection effort concerning the activities of those who might potentially violate a local antilittering ordinance. Detection of a conspiracy to bomb the White House, on the other hand, certainly justifies a continuous and intensive intelligence effort to identify the participants and gain knowledge of any specific plans.

It is mandatory that a Government protect its integrity and this has been recognized by judicial authorities. Ordinary crimes victimize an individual or groups; crimes against the existence of the government victimize society. Carrying these crimes to their ultimate produces the ultimate crime against society--the destruction of that society.

It is clear that the aspirations of most revolutionary groups far exceed their capability to achieve their ultimate objectives. They are, however, quite capable of eroding the integrity of the democratic system by lesser acts and, if not discouraged or thwarted, might well accumulate the will and power for more decisive action. The dramatic success of the Castro revolution is a sufficient example. Consequently, continuing intelligence collection relating to all revolutionary individuals and organizations, commensurate with the immediate threat posed, is imperative to proper vigilance.

The FBI serves as a prime producer of intelligence for the Executive Branch. Over the years it has provided information concerning hostile actions directed against the U. S.

by foreign governments, their intelligence services and others acting in their behalf. On the domestic scene the FBI has penetrated conspiracies ranging from the communist underground to the hooded night riders of the Klan who terrorized our black citizens. But, in the 1960's explosive changes occurred in the internal security problems faced by the country. These changes were reflected in both the scope and nature of the FBI's response and in the intelligence requirements levied upon the FBI by the Executive Branch.

In the decade of the '60's, social change and upheaval added to the critical areas of the FBI's intelligence responsibilities the problems of revolutionary and extremist ✓ activities. America was stunned by violent student disruptions, bombings and riots. Spanning the decade were civil rights protests, reactions against them, and tragically, the burning and looting of Watts in 1965 and the conflagrations in Detroit, Newark and Washington, D. C. And, what had been the youthful idealism of the emerging new left in the 1962 Port Huron Statement was drowned out by the obscene Weatherman war cries

as they took their revolution to the streets of Chicago in 1969 during their "Days of Rage."

As the tide of crime and disruption swelled, it brought with it new and pressing problems on the domestic security scene. FBI domestic security investigations increased accordingly. There was also an immediate increase in FBI intelligence collection concerning the lawlessness and violent tactics of these emerging revolutionary elements.

Intelligence collection was essential in contending with these new domestic security problems. This fact was recognized by the reports of two Presidential Commissions. The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission, 1968) stressed that the absence of accurate information before and during disorders created special control problems. It emphasized that law enforcement organizations must develop the means to obtain adequate intelligence for planning purposes and that law enforcement should "gather, evaluate, analyze and disseminate information on potential as well as actual civil disorders."

Similarly, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) took special note of the need for intelligence in effective law enforcement. The Commission stated in its report, "It is an undoubted fact that on some campuses there are men and women who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and sometimes to maim and kill." The report concluded that the best, AND sometimes the only, means law enforcement has to thwart or prevent such plots is through "clandestine intelligence work."

Prevention is the very essence of the proper use of intelligence. To be forewarned is to be placed in a position to carry out countermeasures to meet a threat. During the mass actions and violent confrontations of the 1960's, FBI intelligence collection was crystallized in dissemination of information to other government agencies. This intelligence provided them with an essential working tool to contend with public disorders and activities of a revolutionary nature.

In a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, 9/14/67, Attorney General Clark stressed the importance of intelligence. The Attorney General asserted, "It is most important that

you use the maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon (riot activity)." Elaborating on this point, he said, "In these circumstances we must be certain that every attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon these problems; to take every step possible to determine whether the rioting is pre-planned or organized; and, if so, to determine the identity of the people and interests involved; and to deter this activity by prompt and vigorous legal action." The Attorney General's evaluation of the importance of intelligence in this instance applies with equal force to other areas of the FBI's security work.

In December, 1967, the Department of Justice, aware of the high priority of intelligence in dealing with civil disorders, created the Inter-Division Information Unit. This is a repository for "reports which relate to individual or organizational activities which may play a part in instigating or spreading civil disorders" and includes intelligence "relating to black power and black nationalist organizations,

officers and members thereof, racial incidents throughout the country, and any specific demonstrations which are being planned and are of such nature as to render them subject to the possibility of violence." Quick retrieval of this intelligence was emphasized through the use of computers.

Attorney General Mitchell wrote to the FBI Director on May 17, 1971, concerning the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, created to analyze and evaluate intelligence for the guidance of the White House and other departments of the Executive Branch. In this memorandum, the Attorney General stated, "Intensified activities on the part of militant groups here in Washington, D. C., and elsewhere in the country clearly point up the need not only for the gathering of the highest quality intelligence available but also for an expert analysis and evaluation of the intelligence product itself."

AUTHORITY

All FBI investigations and intelligence collection functions in the internal security field are based on authorizations in Congressional enactments, Presidential directives, policy instructions of the Attorney General, National Security Council directives and interagency agreements as set forth below.

Congressional Enactments

Attorney General direction of FBI - 28 U. S. Code, Section 533

Treason - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2381 (U. S. Constitution, Article III, Section 3)

Rebellion and insurrection - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2383

Seditious Conspiracy - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2384

Advocating violent overthrow of Government - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2385 (Smith Act)

Sedition - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 2387, 2388, 2391

Recruiting for armed hostilities against U. S. - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2389

Designation of Organizations as "communist-action" and of Individuals as members of such groups after hearings by Subversive Activities Control Board - 50 U. S. Code, Sections 781-798 as amended or repealed (Internal Security Act of 1950, Subchapter I, called Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 and amendments by Communist Control Act of 1954) See also Executive Order 11605 below

Espionage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 792 et seq.

Sabotage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2151 et seq.

Private Correspondence with Foreign Governments - 18 U. S. Code, Section 953 (Logan Act)

Registration of Foreign Agents - 22 U. S. Code, Sections 611-621

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 - 42 U. S. Code, Section 2122

Deportation for Subversive Activities - 8 U. S. Code, Section 1481 (Immigration and Nationality Act 1952)

Possession, threatened use, or use of explosives for illicit purposes - 18 U. S. Code, Section 844

Travel in or use of facility of interstate commerce to promote or incite riot, to commit violence in furtherance of riot or to abet others in inciting or participating in a riot. - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 231-233, 245, 2101-2102

Neutrality Matters - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 956, 958-962; 22 U. S. Code, Sections 1934, 401 (Munitions Control Act)

Intelligence exchange with CIA - 50 U. S. Code, Section 403 (National Security Act)

Presidential Directives

Directive of the President - 6/26/39 directing that investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters are handled by FBI.

Directive of the President - 9/6/39 requesting the Attorney General to instruct FBI to take charge of investigative matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.

Presidential Directive - 1/8/43
reiterated instructions of previous directive of 9/6/39 and requested law enforcement officers, patriotic organizations and individuals turn over to FBI all information regarding espionage, sabotage and violations of neutrality regulations.

Presidential Directive - 7/24/50
reiterated substance of 9/6/39 and 1/8/43 directives, noting they provided for FBI to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.

Directive of President 12/15/53
referred to previous Presidential Directives and added investigation by FBI of violations of Atomic Energy Act.

Executive Order 10450 4/27/53
established programs to insure that the employment and retention of any Government employee is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. Requires check of FBI Fingerprint Files and, in cases where derogatory information develops, FBI conducts a full-field investigation.

Executive Order 11605 7/2/71
calls for Subversive Activities Control Board, when petitioned by the Attorney General, to determine after hearings if any organization is totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or whether it has adopted a policy of advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their Constitutional or statutory rights. By inference, the FBI, as investigative arm of the Attorney General, would develop evidence for hearings required. Also, FBI, by inference, would develop evidence of membership in such organizations, which may be basis for denial of Government employment.

Policy Instructions of Attorney General

September 14, 1967: instructions of then Attorney General Ramsey Clark for FBI to investigate possibility of conspiracy to plan, promote, or aggravate riot activity.

February 18, 1969: instructions from the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, for FBI to obtain information concerning possibility that underlying subversive groups were giving illegal directions or guidance to numerous campus disorders.

(Other policy instructions from Attorney General and Department have been received, amplifying points set forth above; many of these concerned specific cases.)

National Security Council Directives

Directive on Internal Security, March 23, 1949, establishing Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC) responsible to coordinate investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. FBI represented on IIC.

United States Intelligence Board (USIB) established September 15, 1958, to maintain coordination between CIA and other intelligence agencies. FBI a member of USIB to provide domestic intelligence for correlation with foreign intelligence.

Interagency Agreements

Delimitations Agreement signed by IIC members March 23, 1949, to establish jurisdiction in investigations by members of espionage, counterespionage, subversion, and sabotage and to provide for exchange of information on above matters.

FBI-Secret Service Agreement signed November 26, 1971, to provide for transmittal of information from FBI to Secret Service regarding individuals and organizations who, because of their propensities, represent or may represent a danger to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY

The criteria and guidelines for FBI investigations are furnished to the field in a "Manual of Instructions," the "F. B. I. Handbook," and in Letters to all Special Agents in Charge. In addition, instructions and guidance are given to the field in Headquarters communications on specific cases. Compliance with criteria and guidelines is obtained by supervision in both the field and at Bureau Headquarters. In addition, regular inspections of field and Headquarters Divisions assure that Bureau policies concerning investigations are being followed.

In the security field, the basic responsibility of the FBI is to investigate revolutionary organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow or destruction of the United States Government. These include old-line Marxist groups, for example, the Communist Party, USA, and the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party; and such new revolutionary groups as the Students for a Democratic Society, the Black Panther Party and the Weatherman. In the investigation of subversive individuals a determination is made of the dangerousness of the individual and efforts are made to obtain evidence of violations of any applicable

Federal laws. To assist in cataloguing the level of dangerousness of those individuals and to retrieve quickly information concerning them, the Domestic Intelligence Division maintains a card file known as the Administrative Index.

Administrative Index

Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Emergency Detention Act) before it was repealed on September 25, 1971, provided for emergency detention of subversive individuals in the event of a national emergency. To implement that provision of the act, the FBI and the Department of Justice maintained the Security Index. This Index was, of course, discontinued with the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act. By memorandum of October 22, 1971, however, the Attorney General noted that the repeal of Title II "does not alter or limit the FBI's authority and responsibility to record, file and index information secured" in this field and concurred in the establishment of an administrative index to assist in "making readily retrievable and available the results of its (the FBI's) investigations into subversive activities."

15

To this end, such an index (called Adex) was instituted for making quickly retrievable information on four categories of individuals in order of dangerousness:

I) National leaders of revolutionary or extremist groups, members who have exhibited a propensity for violence, members with training in sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla warfare, unaffiliated revolutionaries with a propensity for violence, and revolutionaries with access to key facilities.

II) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and extremist groups, active members of these groups, and unaffiliated revolutionaries or extremists with a propensity for violence against property rather than persons.

III) Rank-and-file members of revolutionary groups within the previous five years, leaders of fronts for revolutionary groups, and individuals with revolutionary ideologies likely in a national emergency to commit acts of espionage, sabotage, or terrorism.

IV) Persons likely to assist, financially or otherwise, revolutionary groups, or persons in a position to influence others to commit acts inimical to the national defense.

Investigation of an individual is conducted to determine whether or not he should, consistent with the criteria of these categories, be listed on the Adex. If, as

the result of the investigation, it is determined he does not meet the criteria the case is closed. If, on the other hand, he does meet the criteria, he is listed in the Adex according to the determined degree of dangerousness. Category I cases continue under investigation for as long as the individual continues to warrant that Category listing. When an individual is listed in Categories II, III, and IV, however, the investigation is closed, subject to periodic reopening to verify his location, to determine his activities and to ascertain whether he still qualifies for inclusion in the Adex. Provision is made for upgrading, downgrading and purging an individual from the Adex as his activities and level of dangerousness fluctuate.

Revolutionary Groups

Investigations of individuals for a determination of whether or not they meet the criteria for Adex generally involve their degree of affiliation with revolutionary and extremist groups. The purpose of investigations of basic revolutionary and new-left type groups is to: (1) provide intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities;

(2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to prevent such conspiracies from being carried out; and (3) develop evidence necessary for the Attorney General to file petitions before the Subversive Activities Control Board in accordance with provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and Executive Order 11605.

The criteria, guidelines and restrictions on the investigations of revolutionary groups are outlined below:

> Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information indicating that organization advocates overthrow of Government or engages in activity to deny others their Constitutional or statutory rights.
>
> Investigation is conducted to establish aims and objectives, location and size, domination and control by hostile foreign power, identities of all leaders and members.

In regard to their front groups and organizations which they have infiltrated:

> Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information that organization is dominated, controlled or influenced to substantial degree by revolutionary organization.
>
> Investigation is conducted to determine degree of infiltration, aims and objectives, location and size and identities of all leaders.

Extremist Groups

The purpose of investigations of white hate and black extremist organizations is to: (1) provide intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities; and (2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to prevent such conspiracies from being carried out. Investigations of white hate groups are confined to those which have actually or allegedly committed or have conspired to commit acts of violence or have adopted a policy of advocating or inciting the use of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution. Investigations of black extremist organizations concern those groups which take extremist, anti-U. S. Government, anti-white positions and whose activities have involved them or may involve them in civil unrest and/or subversive activity.

Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals

Individuals referred to as subversives are generally affiliated with old-line basic revolutionary organizations; those termed revolutionaries are usually new left types; and those called extremists are fundamentally

19

involved in violent or revolutionary activities based on race. Procedures for the investigation of these types of individuals are similar and the criteria are outlined as follows:

Membership in a basic revolutionary organization

Espousing the LINE OF REVOlutionary movements

Special training ABROAD, or leadership training, in a revolutionary group

Individuals having access to key facilities who have been members of a revolutionary group at any time

Persons with revolutionary, terrorist, anarchistic or extremist beliefs who are likely to seize upon a national emergency to endanger public safety

Individuals who have actually or allegedly committed, conspired to commit, or adopted policy to commit acts of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution

Extremists and revolutionaries who have demonstrated a propensity for violence, have involved or may involve themselves in civil unrest, or who advocate violent overthrow of the Government

Persons who influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense or who are likely to furnish financial or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements because of their sympathies, associations or ideologies

Unaffiliated Individuals

In the areas of revolutionary (new left) and extremist activities, some investigations are conducted of individuals who are not affiliated with organizations. Investigation of an individual is undertaken when information is received that the person:

Is a revolutionary and adheres to the Weatherman ideology of advocating a revolution now and uses terrorist tactics in furtherance of revolution

Is a revolutionary or extremist and demonstrates by acts or statements propensity for violence against property

Exhibits revolutionary or extremist ideology and is likely to seize opportunity in national emergency to commit espionage, sabotage, terrorism or otherwise interfere with Federal or local governments or defense efforts

Influences others to engage in acts inimical to national defense or likely to furnish financial or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements

Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations

The mission of the FBI in the foreign intelligence field is one of counterintelligence. The objectives and priorities of counterintelligence have been variously stated and evaluated. Generally, these objectives may be listed in declining priority as follows: (1) the detection and

identification of intelligence operations and agents; (2) the penetration of these operations for the purpose of control and the development of intelligence information; (3) neutralization of hostile intelligence operations through disruption and disinformation; and, (4) prosecution. Whatever the assigned priority, the overall objective is to deny access to information sought by whatever practical means are available.

Foreign intelligence investigations are grounded in the Espionage statute and related laws including the Registration and Atomic Energy Acts. Individual investigations are initiated usually on the basis of a known or suspected connection with a foreign intelligence service, foreign country or subversive organization with such connections. Since these investigations emanate from various sensitive sources and involve special considerations, extensive criteria and limitations are defined and enumerated in current instructions.

In general terms, the governing criteria are designed to preclude initiation and continuance of investigations which are not justified. The limitations are designed to control the scope of investigation in order to insure security of our interests through close supervisory scrutiny.

22

Restrictions on Investigations

FBI guidelines go beyond the rules for opening, investigating and closing cases; they also impose restrictions to make certain that we do not violate the constitutional rights of any individual and to preclude investigations from becoming "fishing expeditions." In the security field these are some of the restrictions WHICH are applied:

> Security cases are evaluated continually to determine if we are fulfilling our responsibilities. Those cases not warranting further investigation are closed promptly.
>
> There are no investigations of members of an organization which does not advocate use of force to bring about existing changes in the Government. Examples are the Socialist Party, the Independent Workers of the World and Independence Party of Puerto Rico.
>
> Persons arrested during disruptive demonstrations are identified since circumstances of an arrest, in some cases, may indicate a propensity for violence. However, a mere arrest in connection with a demonstration is an insufficient basis in itself for security investigation. The arrest must be coupled with a demonstrated propensity for violence or with subversive or revolutionary activity on the part of the individual arrested.
>
> When it is determined that a security subject is a member of the armed services, the investigation is discontinued immediately and the military advised.
>
> Civil rights organizations are not investigated.

Ambassadors or heads of permanent missions to the United Nations are not investigated.

No surveillances are conducted at the White House, the Capitol, the Supreme Court, the House and Senate Office Buildings or the United Nations.

No telephone or microphone surveillances are operated without prior written approval of the Attorney General.

Bureau authority is REQUIRED for:

Investigations of officials and diplomatic representatives of foreign countries. (Department of State authority is also required.)

Investigation of communist infiltration of a political organization.

Developing sources connected with an institution of learning.

Interviews of subjects of active, current security investigations.

Investigations of faculty members. If approval is granted, only established sources functioning in an administrative capacity may be contacted on the campus. Other established sources and informants must be contacted away from the campus. Contacts with students, graduate students and faculty members must also have Bureau authority.

Interviews of labor leaders and persons in educational, mass media or publishing fields.

These examples demonstrate a consciousness of the need to impose limitations on investigations and the continuing imposition of them.

Information Storage and Retrieval

The storage and retrieval of information is a basic operational necessity of any investigative or intelligence-gathering agency. Procedures within the FBI for these functions provide for written records of information received from a variety of sources--confidential informants, confidential INVESTIGATIVE techniques, and open sources--and the storage of this information in different types of files. These include active investigative files on organizations and individuals and some general files. These "raw" files are maintained both at the Seat of Government and in the various field offices. Information in the files is thoroughly indexed so that data can be retrieved.

In the intelligence field, when an allegation within the jurisdiction of the FBI is received, a case on an individual or on an organization may be opened, depending on the quality of the allegation. Nonspecific information that is received on an individual or organization is placed in the pertinent file, if one exists, or is placed in a general file if the organization or individual is not the subject of a specific file.

These files are an integral part of the intelligence-gathering function. By the very nature of the FBI's assignment to coordinate internal security information, the maintenance of data over a period of time is required and it is necessary that a system for retrieving this information be used.

Because these files often contain derogatory information that may not substantiated by further investigation (the derogatory information received may not be germane to a matter within the FBI's jurisdiction), the Attorneys General have long taken the position that these files should not be available for public scrutiny. Incalculable damage to individual reputations could result from the disclosure of single items of information without knowing the full background concerning the receipt of a particular item and the context within which it was recorded.

The late Justice Robert Jackson, in his capacity as Attorney General, wrote in 1941:

> Disclosure of information contained in the reports (FBI files) might also be the grossest kind of injustice to innocent individuals. Investigative reports include leads and suspicions, and sometimes even the statements of malicious or misinformed people. Even though later and more complete reports exonerate the individuals, the use of particular or selected reports might constitute the grossest injustice, and we all know a correction never catches up with an accusation.

Dissemination

The Bureau's general policy on dissemination is that information developed by or coming to the attention of the FBI is promptly referred to all agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government having a potential interest in it or responsibility for taking action concerning it, WHENEVER THAT interest or responsibility is apparent or known. This policy is in accordance with numerous formal agreements entered into between the Bureau and other Government agencies. It is also in accordance with Presidential directives obligating the Bureau to act as clearing house for information affecting the internal security of the U. S.

Despite this general liberal policy of dissemination, we have recognized that with regard to highly sensitive information a determination must be made on an individual basis as to what information should be disseminated and how it should be transmitted. The degree of sensitivity and/or the security classification will determine level of dissemination to any interested agency and the method of transmittal. In certain instances, sensitive information may be furnished to a high-level official with a request that dissemination in his agency be restricted to his personnel on a need-to-know basis. Such information might be disseminated by secure teletype, courier, liaison, and where necessary, by secure telephone. Information furnished orally is confirmed in writing.

The Attorney General August 7, 1973

Director, FBI

SCOPE OF FBI JURISDICTION
AND AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

mDF16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/LG

During our meeting on July 26, 1973, you referred to a discussion you had with Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland during your confirmation hearings as to the statutory authority of the FBI and the Department of Justice in the field of domestic intelligence investigations. You then asked Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus to work with the FBI in weighing the pros and cons with regard to statutory authority in this area. I mentioned that research was being performed on this subject at the present time and that we would be in touch with Mr. Ruckelshaus with regard to this matter when we have completed the results of our consideration and findings within the FBI.

Actually, a study has been going on in the FBI for more than two years as to the scope of FBI jurisdiction and authority in domestic intelligence investigations. When Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III, was designated as Acting Director of the FBI, he instructed that a position paper be prepared concerning the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. A position paper was prepared which in essence stated that authority of the FBI in this field is based on legislative enactments, even though we may have publicly relied heavily on Presidential directives as the basis for such authority. Mr. Gray ordered an in-depth study made of the position and in August, 1972, a detailed report was furnished to him. The following is a summary of that report.

Over a period of several months there were a number of public statements questioning authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations, particularly where there is no clear-cut legislative authority apparent. One of the most searching inquiries was contained in a paper presented by Professor John T. Elliff at a two-day conference at Princeton University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public Justice.

62-116395-83

ENCLOSURE

A major thrust of Professor Elliff's paper concerned FBI authority derived from legislative enactments as opposed to that derived from Presidential directives, beginning with a directive issued by President Roosevelt in September, 1939. Professor Elliff is of the opinion that the 1939 directive, which was reiterated on three subsequent occasions, was magnified by the FBI from its original purpose to a definitive order to conduct intelligence-type investigations.

Senator Sam J. Ervin, as you know, had been probing into the nature and extent of FBI intelligence-type investigations. Senator Ervin had even announced that he intended to propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any person without that individual's consent, unless the Government has reason to believe that person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Other Congressmen indicated a similar interest in FBI investigative activities.

Our study revealed that the FBI had declared publicly over a long period of time that its responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field are authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential directives, and instructions of the Attorney General. The Presidential directives are obviously the 1) directive dated September 6, 1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953, and 2) Executive Order 10450 dated April 27, 1953 (and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order 11605 dated July 2, 1971).

In carefully analyzing the language of the first directive, dated September 6, 1939, and considering that the subsequent directives are all hinged on that one, we believe that there is a misconception as to the extent of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBI by these directives. It appears that while the 1939 directive fixed responsibility on the FBI to handle espionage, sabotage, and neutrality matters, it did not convey any authority or jurisdiction which the FBI did not already have from legislative enactments. It is difficult to read into this directive or in any of those which followed any authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations which would or could not be conducted under an umbrella of legislative enactments.

As a matter of historical fact, President Roosevelt in August, 1936, did request former Director J. Edgar Hoover to conduct investigations of subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism. This request, however, was a confidential oral request and there is doubt that any record of it was made outside the FBI. This request, or Presidential mandate, was based, incidentally, on the fact that the law provided that the FBI could conduct such investigations if the Secretary of State should so request.

The study revealed that while the 1939 et seq. directives did not grant any special intelligence-gathering authority to the FBI, we were responsible under these directives to collect all intelligence information furnished by local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies and patriotic citizens and to sift and coordinate all such information for indications of subversive activity covered by Federal statutes.

The study concluded that the FBI has the responsibility to conduct whatever investigations are necessary to determine if statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditious conspiracy, advocacy of overthrowing the Government, and other such crimes affecting the national security have been violated. In this connection we note that in a letter dated September 14, 1967, the Department of Justice advised that the FBI is continually alert to the problem of recurring riots and is submitting intelligence reports to the Department of Justice concerning such activity. This letter enumerated several Federal statutes and stated these could be applicable in using maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing on the question of schemes or conspiracies to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.

In other words, the Department was requesting all possible intelligence-type investigative activity based on the existence of certain statutes. We see this as being no different from our intelligence-type investigations relating to plans of groups or individuals to overthrow, destroy, interfere with or threaten the survival of effective operation of national, state, and local governments.

Based on this study, we believe that had there never been a single one of the Presidential directives in question the FBI would have conducted and will, through necessity, continue to conduct the same intelligence-type investigations as were conducted from 1939 to the present date. We also believe, however, that in order to counter the criticism and skepticism of such individuals as Professor Elliff and Senator Sam J. Ervin that an up-to-date Executive order should be issued clearly establishing a need for intelligence-type investigations and delineating a clear authority for the FBI to conduct such investigations based on guidelines established by the Attorney General and adhering to constitutional principles.

The study concluded with two basic recommendations. 1) That the Department of Justice be requested to sponsor comprehensive legislation spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of intelligence information relating to the national security and; 2) that the Department of Justice be requested to seek a comprehensive Executive order which would cover any possible gap between statutory authority and Executive necessity in protection of the national security.

At first glance these recommendations may appear to contradict our position that we already have statutory authority to conduct security-type investigations; that this being the case we do not need additional legislative enactments, nor do we need an Executive order. But being realistic we think that the basic statutes upon which we rely for our authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations need to be updated to fit 1973 needs. Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2383, 2384, and 2385 relate to the national security, but the legislative history of 2383 and 2384 indicates that they were designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth Century, and Section 2385 has been reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court. These statutes are unquestionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introduced as H.R. 6046 and S. 1400 in the 93rd Congress appear to contain language which should fill our statutory needs, except perhaps for those groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteed rights.

As to the need for an Executive order, we think that two issues are involved. We have statutory authority, but what we need is a definitive requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelligence data he requires in the pursuit of his responsibilities based on our statutory authority. In other words, there is a need, from our standpoint, for both authoritative and definitive guidelines. The statutes give us the authority. The Executive order would define our national security objectives.

Members of Congress, including such men as Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, have proposed legislation to spell out jurisdiction and authority of the FBI in this field. It would appear that the President would rather spell out his own requirements in an Executive order instead of having Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill his obligations and responsibilities as President.

The political climate of suspicion and distrust resulting from disclosures coming out of the Watergate hearings could present an obstacle to getting any such Executive order signed in the immediate future. However, the rationale is nevertheless valid and when scrutinized closely, the language in the Executive order we hereinafter propose establishes definitive guidelines which have heretofore been unclear. It is my belief that we should go forward with this.

We therefore propose and recommend that an Executive order along the following lines be submitted to the White House with a strong recommendation for approval. The language which follows is merely to illustrate the type of Executive order which we think would be appropriate and does not necessarily represent an ideal format or style which should be submitted to the White House.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Whereas the Constitution of the United States was established to insure, among other things, domestic tranquility; to provide for the common defense; and to promote the general welfare for the people of the United States; and

"Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally imposed responsibility of defending the Constitution and the existence of the Government thereunder; and

"Whereas there have been continuing unlawful acts of violence perpetrated against the Government of the United States or against citizens of the United States or against persons entitled to the protection of the United States thereby endangering the domestic tranquility, threatening the common defense, and jeopardizing the general welfare of the people of the United States; and

"Whereas the Congress has enacted laws prohibiting acts such as treason, sedition, sabotage, espionage, insurrection and rebellion, seditious conspiracy, civil disobedience, rioting, assassination, kidnaping, deprival of civil rights, and conspiracies to commit such acts; and

"Whereas the President of the United States as Chief Executive in the maintenance of the Government thereunder must have intelligence information for appropriate decisions in the discharge of his constitutionally imposed responsibilities;

"Now by authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States and in the interest of orderly operation of this Government and in furtherance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general welfare of the people of the United States it is ordered that;

"The Attorney General prepare and issue guidelines, conforming to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis intelligence information essential to the execution of laws pertaining to subversive activity and other such activity affecting the national security, domestic tranquility, and general welfare of the United States."

The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concept of urban guerrilla terrorism has been adopted by various extremist elements in the United States. Bombings of public buildings and national institutions;

killing of police officers who, by their uniform, are a symbol of the democratic establishment; hijacking of aircraft in furtherance of revolutionary movements; terrorist assaults on foreign diplomatic personnel and establishments; and open declaration of war on our form of government are only a few of the violent acts which have been perpetrated by domestic subversives who seek to destroy or seriously cripple our Government. Terrorist guerrilla attacks which were once confined to far away places and related to problems of no immediate concern of ours are now possible in this country. Foreign terrorist groups in collusion with domestic terrorists have laid plans for an airport massacre of the type which recently occurred in Israel. Other foreign terrorist elements have laid plans for terrorist attacks on American soil. Already one foreign official has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists.

It would be folly to adopt an investigative policy based on the concept of investigation only when there is reason to believe a crime involving the national security has been committed. The FBI must obviously anticipate the crimes described above. We believe that in order for the Government to be in position to defend itself against revolutionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it, the FBI must have sufficient investigative authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations not normally associated with enforcement of the statutes. In other words we think the President has the inherent Executive power to expand by further defining the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance information concerning the plans and aspirations of terrorists and revolutionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Government. However, we also believe that such expanded authority must be formally set forth in an Executive order and that this recommendation is responsive in the Attorney General's expressed interest in laying more formal guidelines to our work in areas where definition is not now clear.

We consider the issuance of a new Executive order delineating our jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility to gather and report intelligence information relating to the national security to be a very important and high priority matter. We believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney General under Title 28, Section 533, United States Code, to be equally important.

The Attorney General

For your information, our own investigative guidelines as contained in our Manual of Instructions relating to domestic subversive investigations have been completely rewritten to conform with the concept that our domestic intelligence-type investigations are based on Federal statutes. These guidelines provide that in each instance, the domestic intelligence investigation must be predicated on information indicating that the organization or individual is engaged in activity which could involve a violation of specific statutes relating to the national security. A copy of the new guidelines was previously provided to the Department of Justice in connection with the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy to obtain a copy of the FBI's Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions. The effective date of the new guidelines was August 1, 1973.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
2 - Legal Counsel Division

The Attorney General

April 22, 1975
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.

Director, FBI

#MDR16.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to one of the requests set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures (2)

4/24 Approved by A.G. ([illegible])
4/25 Delivered to Mike Epstein of SSC

62-116395

EWL:ekw
(8)

REC-100

62-116395-82

NOTE: The Senate Select Committee has made a request for titles and number of FBI field office Agents in the internal security and counterintelligence field as well as the percentage of manpower assigned in these areas. The Administrative Division has compiled this information. However, it is not felt this data should be furnished formally in a written response to the Committee. This data can be classified "Confidential" under Executive Order 11652. Over and above this technical classification a great deal of sensitivity attaches to these figures since should they be made public or otherwise fall into the

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

APR 29 1975

2-ENCLOSURE

ssoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
st. Dir.:
dmin. ____
omp. Syst. ____
xt. Affairs ____
iles & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
dent. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
al Coun. ____
phone Rm. __
ector Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

hands of hostile foreign intelligence services, they would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat.

It is noted that a precedent exists for making the information available for review only at FBIHQ. By letterhead memorandum 4/8/75 we advised the Committee that we would not furnish them a requested list of names and titles of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBIHQ down to and including Unit Chiefs together with a number of personnel below that level but that this list would be made available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee staff at FBIHQ.

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)

April 21, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.)

RE: ORGANIZATION

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Under Item III entitled "Organization," paragraph C requested at the field level, the titles and number of FBI field office Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total Agent manhours devoted to such matters, operations, and activities.

You are advised that a current survey of all FBI field offices has been made to obtain the data requested. Since this information is considered to be highly sensitive, it is not being furnished directly to the Committee; however, the requested data is being maintained in the Intelligence Division at FBIHQ and is available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee staff upon request.

1 - The Attorney General
EWL:ek
(8)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/HG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. 62-116395
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JBN/plm

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-22

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[illegible] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

62-116395-82

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Response

EX

TO : MR. WALSH

DATE: 4/3/75

FROM : L. C. GROOVER
LCG/WC

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church dated 3/19/75.

Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities, together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations and activities (page 3, item IIIC of relet).

The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached herewith, to the above request.

It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security, intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the data for both of the other categories as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Jackson

JJC:jmb

#MORI6

SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION ADDENDUM PAGE THREE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/MAG

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities

wob

ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75

The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.

JWR/HHW

OVER

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-14-75

Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:

(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.

(2) Before making any determination as to whether we make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.

(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/TG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/TH6
#MDR16

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 4-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In connection with our investigations of staff members for captioned Committee, we have developed derogatory information on two individuals which has been brought specifically to the attention of William Miller, Staff Director of the Committee. One of these involved Mrs. Diane Eloise LaVoy whose sister-in-law questioned her loyalty and declared she "does not love America." The sister-in-law said Mrs. LaVoy constantly criticized the U. S. Government and its policy and underlying weaknesses of our society. Another individual said she was highly critical of CIA activities. This information was pointed out to Miller on 3-25-75 when the results of the investigation were delivered to him, and he also was advised that the CIA would be furnished the same data in accordance with our agreement concerning these matters.

On 3-24-75 and 3-28-75 results of the investigation concerning Mrs. Betty Dale Ellison were delivered to Miller and he was advised that a prior supervisor with eight years of training and experience in psychiatric care stated he felt Mrs. Ellison needs psychological examination. He termed her a trouble maker and said he would have fired her if he had the authority. He described her definitely as a security risk due to her mental and emotional instability. It also was pointed out to Miller that other former supervisors described her as unstable when working under pressure and unable to get along with fellow employees. Miller was told that this information also would be furnished to CIA.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 161-1022

On 4-2-75 Miller advised Inspector Bowers he had considered the matter involving Mrs. LaVoy and had discussed it with the Committee Chairman, and they had decided to proceed with her as a staff member since they did not feel the derogatory remarks by her sister-in-law were sufficiently strong enough to disqualify her since the remainder of the investigation was favorable.

62-116375-81

REC-100

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

3 APR 22 1975

DWB:kjs (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 APR 29 1975

Miller also advised on 4-2-75 that their review of the Ellison investigation showed justifiable concern for her being cleared for the staff, and he asked for any guidance we might give him. It was pointed out that the only real solution to the situation seemed to be that she not be added to the staff. Miller said he would appreciate any comments from the CIA also in this regard. This request was conveyed to CIA by Section Chief William Cregar of the Intelligence Division who subsequently advised that Charles Kane, Director of Security, CIA, had reviewed the file on Ellison and agreed there was sufficient cause to question her suitability for assignment to the Select Committee staff. Kane stated CIA Director Colby concurred in this observation.

These views were conveyed to Miller on 4-9-75. Miller stated at that time that they had resolved the situation by assigning Mrs. Ellison to purely administrative tasks and that she would be fully isolated from any sensitive or classified information in connection with her responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#mori6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/00 BY SP-2ALM/MG

On 3-19-75 Inspectors John B. Hotis, David W. Bowers, and Special Agent Paul V. Daly met with William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; and Michael T. Epstein of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) staff. During the meeting Mr. Schwarz requested a briefing be arranged for staff members of SSC concerning the operations of the Intelligence Division, that they be furnished copies of training documents pertaining to matters handled by the Intelligence Division, and that they be furnished a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field. He pointed out the aforementioned material would greatly assist in the SSC staff developing an understanding of the Intelligence Division operations and hopefully prevent misunderstandings or needless requests of the FBI.

Mr. Miller advised that Senators Frank Church and John Tower intended to contact the Director in the immediate future to discuss arrangements relating to the SSC's review of the FBI activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Intelligence Division review and where possible make available training documents relating to training concerning Intelligence Division matters and a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field, or recommend a counter offer.

(2) Legal Analysis Office in conjunction with the Intelligence Division arrange a briefing for Senate Select Committee staff members.

See memo Cregar to Wannall 4/11/75 prepared for [illegible]

REC 44 62-116395-8

17 APR 22 1975

5-End

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
PVD:kjs/dkg (8)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4/17/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ME

At 11:00 a.m. on April 17, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis Special Agent Paul V. Daly and I met with Deputy Attorney General Tyler and Associate Deputy Attorney General James Hutchinson at the request of the Deputy Attorney General.

Deputy Attorney General Tyler advised that he had been requested by Burke Marshall and F.A.O. Schwarz, III, who are consultant and General Counsel, respectively, for the Senate Select Committee, to meet with him on Monday afternoon, April 21, 1975, to discuss matters relating to the Committee's activities. The Deputy Attorney General said that he has been personally acquainted with Mr. Marshall for a long time and also is acquainted with Mr. Schwarz. He considered the possibility of having a Bureau representative attend the meeting, but then decided it would be best if he would meet with Marshall and Schwarz privately to determine whether they desire to discuss details of the Committee's responsibilities and if it became necessary, he would request the Bureau to send a representative to the meeting.

REC 44 62-116395-79

EX-111

The Deputy Attorney General said that he would, of course, advise us orally or in writing of the results of ~~his conference~~ with Mr. Marshall and Mr. Schwarz.

APR 22 1975

The Deputy Attorney General inquired as to the procedure currently being employed in responding to the Committee's requests and Inspector Hotis explained the current procedures. I mentioned to the Deputy Attorney General the existence of the Ad Hoc Committee of Intelligence Agencies and suggested to him that he might desire to designate a representative to attend those meetings in order to be on notice as to the policies being developed by the White House and the intelligence community in responding to Committee requests. I explained to him that James Wilderotter, formerly Associate Deputy Attorney General, was the

62-116395
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz

54 APR 29 1975
JAM:mfd (7)

LEGAL COUN.

CONTINUED - OVER

Department's representative on the Committee, but he has now been reassigned to responsibilities at the White House. I told him that Assistant Attorney General Scalia had been scheduled to attend the last meeting of the Committee, although he was unable to attend. The Deputy Attorney General said that he would discuss with Mr. Scalia the possibility of having Mr. Scalia attend as the Department's representative.

I asked the Deputy Attorney General whether he was undertaking the principal responsibility in the Department for matters relating to the Senate Select Committee and other committees that may be inquiring into the FBI and he said that that was not clear as yet because the Attorney General has taken a personal interest in these matters and it appeared that the responsibilities are still fragmented within the Department. It was his opinion that the responsibilities should be centralized and he appeared to be willing to undertake that responsibility.

It was my impression that the Deputy Attorney General was interested in being of assistance to the FBI in these matters and expressed a willingness to cooperate by having the FBI participate as much as possible with the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Dir. was advised of
and mtg on 4/17.
Jma

Pcn

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. [illegible] B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/14/75

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. H. Weimar

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: WILLIAM G. MILLER
IS - R

Senstudy - '75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Mr. William G. Miller is the Staff Director for the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to intelligence activities. On 10/5/73, representatives of our Washington Field Office (WFO) interviewed Mr. Miller, with Bureau approval, [relative to contacts he had had with members of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.] (S) At that time, Mr. Miller was the Director of the Special Senate Committee to Terminate the National Emergency. On that occasion he was most cooperative, and upon being advised that the FBI's interest in (S) [Soviet Embassy personnel focused more on their personalities rather than Soviet policies] per se, Mr. Miller agreed to be interviewed whenever the FBI felt such was necessary.

WFO has recently conducted an interview with Mr. Albert Ashton Lakeland, Jr., Executive Assistant to Senator Jacob Javits of New York, [relative to his past contacts with Grigoriy A. Rapota, a former Third Secretary assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Rapota was a known officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB), Political Branch (PB), who was extremely active on Capitol Hill.] (S) In the course of the interview with Mr. Lakeland, he advised that among others Mr. William G. Miller was known to have had [numerous contacts with Soviet Embassy personnel,] (S) although he was not able to state with certainty that Mr. Miller had been [in contact with Rapota.] (S)

62-116395

21 APR 25 1975

WFO has now requested [illegible]reau through the Legal Analysis Office obtain concurrence of the chairman of the aforementioned committee for Agents of WFO to again interview Mr. Miller concerning his possible contact with

NOT RECORDED
46 APR 25 1975

[105-213145] (S)

CONTINUED - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

VHW:dan
(7)

Classified by 5683
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

MDR16 1-23-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-213145-192

Enc. — Sent 4-17-75

RECORDS
Place cc in 62-116395
(SENSTUDY - '75)

84 APR 25 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: William G. Miller
[105-213145](S)

Rapota and possibly other Soviets. WFO has noted that Mr. Miller is also known to have been in contact with Aleksandr A. Kokorev, a First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., and a known officer of the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). (S)

While Mr. Miller was most cooperative on the last occasion he was interviewed by the FBI, it is noted he did not provide any particularly significant information concerning [the Soviets with whom he had contact.](S) While it is not known at this time whether he could presently provide meaningful information, an interview with him at this time, when he is now the Staff Director of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, could well be untimely and indiscreet.

ACTION:

(1) In view of impending contacts which will be had by FBIHQ with Mr. Miller, the purpose of this memorandum is to draw attention to the fact that Mr. Miller has had [past contact with representatives of Soviet intelligence services and may be continuing to have same.](S)

KAW WRS/KAW WRW/FSP

(2) If you agree, there is attached a communication to WFO captioned, "Grigoriy A. Rapota; IS - R (SOVEMB-KGB)" which denys authority for an interview with Mr. Miller at this time and instructs that office to promptly advise FBIHQ of any additional contacts between Mr. Miller and representatives of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., which may come to its attention. (S)

KAW WRS/KAW WRW/FSP

CONFIDENTIAL

PLM

SECRET

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 10, 1975

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/FTG
#MDEK

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, setting forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority granted by Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and Attorney General instructions, as well as a list of statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation. Certain exhibits are extracted due to the "Third Agency Rule," however, approval for release is now being sought and the exhibits will be forwarded as soon as possible. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

Also enclosed with the jurisdiction paper is an original memorandum for the Committee and one copy for your records.

Enclosures - 3

ALL:vb
(6)

Approved by AG 4/ , '75 [illegible] to SSC [illegible] 4/10/75 [illegible]

62-116395-178

REC- 106

APR 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG #MDE16

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 10, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached is the FBI "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, which, though not specifically named, falls within the spirit of the documents requested in the letter of March 19, 1975.

The purpose of this paper is to set forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority granted by the Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and orders of the Attorney General, as well as to list statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation.

It is noted that certain exhibits are extracted. Extractions were made because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Approvals are being expeditiously sought and these exhibits will be made available as soon as approvals are obtained. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

We are attempting to identify Items 1, 2, 3, and 4, of the examples cited in the attachment to your March 19th letter. When identified, immediate consideration will be given to furnishing the Items to your Committee.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

ALL:vb
(6)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-98

GPO 934-546

8 per PVD 18
April 1~~6~~, 1975

This is to acknowledge receipt of classified material by letterhead memorandum dated April 10, 1975, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Ben Marshall
for Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence Activit

#MOE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-78

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. T. Jenkins

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 15, 1975

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.: ____
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ts

My memorandum to you 4/10/75, tickler copies as above, advised of the formal establishment of a task force called Project Senstudy 75 for the purpose of implementing responses to requests for information from Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities.

From time to time, requests will be made of various Divisions at FBIHQ for assistance in preparing responses. The Office of Legal Counsel has already contributed considerably in support of Senstudy 75 and is an integral part of the Project.

In order that we may keep an up-to-date record of the cost to the Bureau in handling this Project, each Assistant Director is requested to effect the necessary procedures to maintain such records and by the third of each month furnish by routing slip to W. O. Cregar, Room 4063, JEH Building, the following information: (1) Name of Division reporting; (2) Month for which reporting, which will be month just ended; (3) Man days devoted to Project assistance, broken down by (a) Agent and (b) clerical, including GS level for both Agent and clerical. An example submitted by 5/3/75 would be as follows: (1) GID; (2) Report for 4/75; (3)(a) one-half day @ GS-16; one day @ GS-15; three days @ GS-14; (3)(b) two days @ GS-7; two days @ GS-5.

This is effective commencing 4/1/75 and first routing slip report due 5/3/75 will be for the month of April, 1975.

If a Division has not participated during the preceding month, merely submit a routing slip to this effect.

The cooperation of all is urged so that the necessary cost data may be compiled each month. It is recognized that exact figures will not be feasible and that estimates will be most practical and will suffice.

ACTION: For action as above by each Assistant Director.

ST-100 REC-43 62-116395-17

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-116395
SFP:ekw (18)

15 APR 22 1975

XEROX JUN 11 1975

51 APR 28 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Each Assistant Director

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/10/75

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

This memorandum records the formal establishment of a task force entitled Project Senstudy 75.

The concept behind the establishment of this Project is to develop a capability of implementing requests received from Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible. We believe that by creating this facility we will be able to meet the requirements of these Select Committees with the exception of the research that will have to be done in the substantive Divisions.

While the Project will direct internal work and related liaison with the intelligence community and the White House staff, we envision the Legal Analysis Unit Office of Legal Counsel Division as continuing to be the primary point of direct contact with the Select Committees of the Congress. They will receive all requests and deliver all responses to these Committees. In addition, they will meet with the staffs of the Committees to insure the reasonableness of requests. If necessary, they will call upon the expertise of the substantive Division for determination as to whether a proposed request from the Committees can be responded to within a reasonable period of time and within the capabilities of the FBI's information retrieval system.

REC-100 62-116395-76

At the present time four Supervisors have been delegated to work exlusively on the Project. They are as follows:

12 APR 23 1975

The Project Manager will be Section Chief William O. Cregar, CI-2 Section, Intelligence Division. His duties will encompass the review of all incoming requests from the Select Committees in an effort to identify policy questions;

WOC:lmh lmh
(18)

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

84 APR 23 1975

ambiguities requiring recontact with Committee staffs; the assignment of research responsibilities to substantive Divisions; following such responsibilities to insure timely responses; as well as representing the FBI on the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. Assistant Director John A. Mintz is also a member of the Executive Committee. This latter responsibility will provide Cregar and Mintz with direct liaison not only with senior officials of the intelligence community but also with the President's counsel.

Mr. Elmer W. Larson, Unit Chief, Training Unit, IS-3 Section, Intelligence Division will act as Cregar's Number One Man; will administer the work of the Project; and act in the absence of Cregar.

Seymor F. Phillips, Unit Chief, Civil Disorders Reporting Unit, IS-1 Section, Intelligence Division will serve as the Review Coordinator for the Project. His responsibilities will be to review all research; coordinate all responses; be available to consult with substantive Divisions as to proper form of our responses; identify any conflicts in FBI positions where several Divisions are responding to a particular question; as well as to insure the quality, completeness and adequacy of responses to Select Committees requests. Additionally, Phillips will be responsible for the preparation of abstracts to be furnished to the Interagency Registry maintained at CIA Headquarters. This Registry established by the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Group at the suggestion of and with the concurrence of the White House will serve as the coordinating mechanism for the entire intelligence community.

Mr. Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Officer with CIA, CI-4 Section, Intelligence Division will function as the Liaison Officer with the intelligence community responsible for coordinating and clearing all information under the third agency rule where FBI responses are of interest to or are of a proprietary interest to other agencies of the intelligence community. Schwartz will serve as the Bureau's representative on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

CONTINUED - OVER

Because of the White House insistence that all requests and responses be completely coordinated and available for review by White House representatives, it is imperative that the Project have a self-sustained records facility to insure immediate access to requests received from and responses furnished to the Select Committees. In addition, in those instances where certain FBI documents furnished to the Select Committees must be sanitized (excised), it is imperative this records facility not only retain copies of the sanitized documents but also copies of the original text. For these reasons a senior clerical employee has been requested to function as a Records Manager for the Project.

In addition to the above, there will be stenographic and clerical personnel assigned to the Project to support the work of the Bureau Supervisors. We have not committed any more personnel to the Project than are absolutely necessary at the present time. Should the requests of the Select Committees require additional personnel, appropriate memoranda will be submitted with a complete justification for additional personnel assigned to the Project.

Although the physical space for the Project is limited, all personnel connected with Project Senstudy 75 will be located in Room 4063, J. Edgar Hoover Building. This space is physically located within the Intelligence Division.

As a matter of interest, Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has requested that should any member of the intelligence community get requests from other Committees of the Congress which impact on the intelligence community; could be of interest to the White House; or are of such sensitivity that coordination is required, copies of both the requests and an abstract of the responses should be made available to the Interagency Registry.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

PLM

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General April 9, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JHG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which responds to the Committee's request for the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and those portions of these Manuals which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

REC-106

62-116395-75

Enclosures - 13

12 APR 23 1975

EWL:jvl
(7)

[illegible] 4/[illegible]75 [illegible] to SSC [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCL BEHIND FILE

3-ENCLOSURE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

#MOL16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Under IV. A. (Policies and Procedures) the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and certain portions of this Manual were requested. In accordance with this request the following material is enclosed:

1) Table of contents; 2) Preface. Guidelines for FBI Investigations; 3) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret"); 4) Section 84. Registration Act; 5) Section 86. Sabotage; 6) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals; 7) Section 88. Sedition; 8) Section 95. Treason; 9) Section 97. Voorhis Act; 10) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

Not included as enclosures are Section 105, Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency (Foreign Intelligence), classified "Secret"; Section 107, Part I, Internal Security Informants and Confidential Sources; Section 107, Part II, Foreign Counterintelligence Assets; or Section 130, Extremist Informants and Sources. These Sections are deemed to contain extremely sensitive information and for that reason are not being transmitted; however, they are available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

Under IV. B. the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and pertinent portions of this Manual were requested. There is enclosed a copy of the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

EWL:jvl jol
(7)

PLM

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395 - 75

GPO 954-546

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

From a review of the table of contents of this Manual it can be seen that the material contained in this Manual pertains to administrative rather than investigative operations of the FBI, and for that reason it has not been possible to select portions of this Manual which pertain directly to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities responsive to the Committee's request. The various other requests contained in the Committee letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and further response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures - 11

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Table of contents for Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations, as well as the several Sections of the Manual of Instructions which are being transmitted to the Select Committee, have already been made available to the General Accounting Office in the past, with the exception of Section 36, Section 105, and Section 107, Part II. Sections 105, 107, Part I and Part II, and Section 130 are not being furnished to the Committee, but the Committee will be allowed to examine these Sections at FBIHQ. Section 36, dealing with espionage, although classified, does not contain sensitive material involving sources and we feel in the spirit of the requirement we should furnish this Section to the Committee.

As a matter of interest, all of the material with respect to the Manual of Instructions which has been made available to GAO is actually maintained in FBI space.

April 1~~6~~, 1975 8-per PVD/8

This is to acknowledge receipt of classified material by letterhead memorandum dated April ~~10,~~ 9, 1975, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Ben Marshall
for Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence Activities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #moe16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/LMG

62-116395-75

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD-Adm. ____
Dep. AD-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-8-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/TG

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
APRIL 11, 1975

As you were previously advised, William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, requested that we provide a briefing for certain staff members of the Committee on the functions of the Intelligence Division. He asked that the briefing cover both internal security and foreign counterintelligence operations and that it provide a broad overview of our investigative responsibilities.

The Intelligence Division is prepared to offer a two-hour briefing beginning at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, 4-11-75. It will include a slide show to be followed by a general discussion and an opportunity to afford questions and answers. After a luncheon break, the staff members will be given a brief tour of the Files and Communications Division.

Since the briefing will cover classified materials, no staff members will be invited unless they have appropriate security clearances. As a consequence Professor John Elliff, who has been tentatively named Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence, will not attend. It is hoped that we may provide him with a private meeting at some later date.

REC-106 62-116395-74

It is expected that those attending the briefing will include: Mr. Miller, F. A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel, Mark Gitenstein and Marvin Epstein, staff members. Since no Committee members will be present, we are not recommending that the staff meet with the Director.

12 APR 23 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That the above-named staff members of the Senate Select Committee be given a briefing by the Intelligence Division and the Files and Communications Division on 4-11-75.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis

JBH:dkg (10)

84 APR 28 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 4-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/116
#mo216

"The Washington Post," Thursday, 4-10-75, edition on page A31 contains an article reporting an interview of Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Senator Church, according to this article, stated that the Committee is reserving the right to make public eventually any documents it gets and is accepting nothing with "strings attached."

Inasmuch as this Committee is also the Committee which the FBI is furnishing information to, it is believed a clarification of Senator Church's statement must be obtained and in the interim we should furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.

Section Chief William O. Cregar advised that he had contacted Dr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Committee concerning Senator Church's reported statement. Clarke stated that CIA Director William E. Colby was highly upset at Church's remark and that this statement would be a topic of a discussion of the Executive Committee meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review the morning of 4-11-75. We will be represented at that conference by Section Chief William O. Cregar and Assistant Director John A. Mintz. Clarke indicated the position that the CIA will apparently take regarding this problem is that the White House should obtain the clarification although CIA Director Colby initially was prepared to send a letter over his signature to Senator Church to obtain such clarification.

ENCLOSURE
EX-110
REC-46 62-116395-13

Inasmuch as the request by this Committee was forwarded through the Department, Senator Church's statement was brought to the attention of Douglas Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, who has been handling all FBI responses to Senate Select Committee requests. Marvin indicated he was concerned at Church's statement and stated it was the Attorney General's desire that he be advised of any Bureau response to the Committee concerning this matter.

18 APR 17 1975

Enc.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

11-96

PVD:dkg (9)

RECOMMENDATION
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

RECOMMENDATION:

No action be taken by the Bureau to obtain clarification of Senator Church's statement pending the results, 4-11-75, meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review, and that in the interim we furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.

PVD JBH/pvD

Senate CIA Committee Says White House Stalls on Data

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Committee on Intelligence Operations disclosed yesterday that the White House is still stalling on a month-old request for the directives involving covert activities by the Central Intelligence Agency and other arms of the Government.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), the committee chairman, told reporters after a closed, 2½-hour meeting that he had been authorized to write another letter to President Ford asking him to expedite the request.

The committee asked Mr. Ford on March 12 for all the executive orders and top-secret National Security Council directives concerning the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community, including the command structure at the White House.

The President was also asked to supply the committee with a copy of CIA Director William E. Colby's January report to Mr. Ford on allegations of illegal domestic spying by the agency.

But all the committee has gotten so far, Church said, has been what the White House evidently regards as the least sensitive documents on the list.

Church said he did not know "what the hang-up is" since White House aides have indicated they consider the committee's entire request as "perfectly proper."

Church did not spell out all of "the more sensitive data" that is still being withheld, but he said it includes both the Colby report and the top-secret White House and National Security Council directives dealing with covert operations, both foreign and domestic.

The Idaho senator said the committee is reserving the right to make public eventually any documents it gets and is accepting nothing with "strings attached." But he declined to speculate on whether this might be the reason for the administration's hesitance.

Church said all of the records were essential to the committee's mandate to investigate the CIA and the rest of the government's intelligence community. He said he still had no reason to think at this point that the White House would refuse to give them up, but he emphasized that he saw no reason for further delay.

Church said the committee also authorized its staff of about 35 lawyers and investigators to start gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses as the prelude to a projected round of public hearings this summer. The House has also ordered a similar inquiry but its committee, headed by Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), has yet to choose a staff director.

The Senate committee's chief counsel, Fritz Schwarz, said directors have now been named for all four of its task forces. They are William Bader, head of the foreign intelligence task force; John Elliff, head of the domestic intelligence task force; Alton H. Quanbeck, head of the Military intelligence task force, and David Aaron, head of the task force that will study the intelligence community's 'command and control structure."

Bader is a former Senate Foreign Relations Committee aide and has recently been working with the Ford Foundation. Elliff is a Brandeis University professor and expert in domestic law enforcement activities. Quanbeck has been director of the Brookings Institution's defense analysis project and Aaron has served on the National Security Council staff.

Schwarz said that each of the task forces will cut across the lines of various intelligence agencies and focus on general avenues of inquiry, such as the "legal authority and legal restraints" for intelligence work; the targets and techniques of intelligence-gathering, counterintelligence and covert operations, and the question of who orders and controls those activities.

#moe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTS

"The Washington Post"
April 10, 1975

62-116395-93
ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO :Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/7/75

FROM :W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ✓
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the EXCOM), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/4/75.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were Mr. Roderick Hills, Assistant Counsel to the President; Associate Deputy AG Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke; as well as senior officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

The following items of interest were discussed:

Mr. Roderick Hills reported that he had a meeting with the Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to discuss having Legal Counsel present when members of a particular agency were being interviewed by SSC staff personnel. The essence of this meeting resulted in the SSC being receptive to such an arrangement but it would be incumbent upon each agency, department or bureau to negotiate the specific arrangements for such representation with the SSC. Hills also discussed the problem of the unknown employee or former employee who might request to be interviewed unbeknownst to the parent agency. It was suggested to the Counsel and Staff Director by Hills that such an employee be interviewed by only one staff member, that the staff member attempt to determine the scope of this individual's testimony and then discuss such testimony with the parent agency to insure the agency could provide advice as to the sensitivity of the unknown employee's testimony. No firm decisions were made but it would appear the Counsel and Staff Director will agree to allow Counsel to be present during the

REC-40 62-116395

APR 16 1975

ST-106

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

5 1 APR 21 1975

testimony of a secret employee and following such testimony the employee will be allowed to meet with staff members of the SSC in an Executive Session. It is anticipated more definitive information on the final decisions regarding this aspect will be forthcoming from the White House.

The question was raised by the Bureau representative as to whether the Ad Hoc Group and/or the interagency registry should be notified as to requests members of the Intelligence Community receive from other Congressional committees. Mr. Wilderotter advised that this would be a judgment question; however, if a request from a Congressional committee other than the Select Committees impacted on the Intelligence Community, involve sensitive issues or would be of interest to the White House, such requests should be provided to the interagency registry along with an abstract of the response.

Attached is a list of those members of the SSC staff who have been certified for access to compartmented information. Also attached is a paper identifying 10 issues likely to grow out of Select Committee deliberations. The pencil notation in the right-hand column identifies those agencies of the Intelligence Community responsible for preparing a paper which addresses these issues. It is noted that issue identified as number eight is entitled, "Intelligence Files and Privacy." Mr. Colby asked that the FBI prepare this paper. Assistant Director Mintz advised that the Bureau has a study underway on this very subject and agreed that the Bureau would prepare this study. The deadline for completion of the study is 4/25/75.

Also attached is a copy of the survey of the SSC facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, covering all aspects of physical and technical security. None of the participants of the EXCOM had any objection to the facility and we presume the SSC will abide by the procedures outlined in the attached survey report.

Attached also for information is a draft of an employee notice and agreement concerning treatment of confidential material being considered by the SSC. It is to be noted that to date neither the Committee nor its staff has signed any such Secrecy Agreement.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

TM

PCM WRW

JMA

AGREEMENT

I have read the foregoing employee notice concerning treatment of confidential material and have read the Resolution establishing the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, and the Committee Rules.

I understand that to qualify as an employee of the Select Committee, I am required to, and I hereby agree to, abide by those Rules. I further understand and agree that the obligations hereby placed upon me continue after my employment with the Committee has terminated.

SIGNATURE

SWORN TO BEFORE NOTARY

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

those staff members with appropriate security clearances and a [redacted] need to know.

"7.5 Testimony taken in Executive session or papers and other materials received by the staff shall not be made public or disclosed to any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee, or upon termination of the Committee, as determined by a vote of the Senate.

"7.6 Before the Committee is called upon to make any disposition with respect to the testimony, papers, or other materials presented to it, the Committee members shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine all pertinent testimony, papers, and other materials that have been obtained by the inquiry staff. No member shall release any of that testimony or those papers or other materials to the public or any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote, a quorum being present at the time the vote is taken.

"9.3 The staff of the Committee shall not discuss either the substance or procedure of the work of the Committee with anyone other than a member of the Committee or other Committee personnel. Upon termination of employment by the Committee, each member of the staff, or consultant, shall surrender any classified material which came into his possession while in the employ of the Committee.

"9.4 The employment of any member of the staff who fails to conform to these Rules shall be immediately terminated."

In addition to the strict security precautions adopted by the Committee there are, as you no doubt know, sections of the United States Code and Executive Orders which relate to keeping certain material confidential--they are sections [TO BE INSERTED] which are annexed hereto.

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Committee Rules include provisions relating to the confidential treatment of material received by the Committee. These provisions are contained in Rules 6.11; 7 (and each of its subsections), 9.3 and 9.4 which provide the following:

> "6.11 Release of Testimony and Other Matters. No testimony taken or material presented at an Executive session shall be made public, in whole or in part or by way or summary, unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee. Unless authorized by the Chairman the name of any witness scheduled to be heard by the Committee shall not be released prior to his testimony.
>
> "RULE 7. Procedures for Handling Select Committee Classified or Sensitive Material
>
> "7.1 Staff offices on the first floor of the Dirksen Office Building shall operate under strict security precautions. One guard shall be on duty at all times by the entrance to control entry. All persons before entering the offices shall identify themselves. An additional guard shall be posted at night for surveillance of the secure area where sensitive documents are kept.
>
> "7.2 Sensitive documents and other materials shall be segregated in a secure storage area. They may be examined only at secure reading facilities. Copying or duplicating of such documents and other materials is prohibited except as is necessary for use in Committee meetings or to prepare for the taking of testimony or for interviews.
>
> "7.3 Each member of the Committee shall at all times have access to all papers and things received from any source by subpoena or otherwise. The staff director shall be responsible for the maintenance, under appropriate security procedures, of a record of all papers and things in the possession of the Committee, which log shall be available to any member of the Committee.
>
> "7.4 Access to classified information supplied to the Committee shall be limited by the staff director, the chief counsel and the counsel to the minority, and to

DRAFT 3/28/75

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Employee Notice and Agreement Concerning Treatment of Confidential Material

NOTICE

Concern about security and the maintenance of confidentiality of information provided the Senate Select Committee has been stressed since the outset by the Senate and the Committee.

Section 7 of the resolution which established the Committee requires the Committee to:

> "institute and carry out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to prevent the disclosure, outside the Select Committee of any information relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the Federal Government engaged in intelligence activities, obtained by the Select Committee during the course of its study and investigation, not authorized by the Select Committee to be disclosed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the Select Committee, of any information which would adversely affect the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign countries or the intelligence activities in foreign countries of any department or agency of the Federal Government."

DD/A 75-1549

1 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration 2 APR 1975

SUBJECT : Security Survey, Senate Select Committee Facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, Capitol Hill

1. Attached to this memorandum is a letter to Mr. William G. Miller for your signature.

2. A security survey of the Senate Select Committee facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, as requested by Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director of that Committee, was completed on 24 March 1975.

3. With the security procedures now in effect and those planned for implementation, the facility will provide adequate protection for the handling and storage of CIA documents of all levels of classification. Also attached for your information is a copy of the survey report.

Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

Att

cc: DD/A
Chairman, SECOM

Refer
CFA

OS 5 1284

Regraded Unclassified when separated
from Classified Attachment(s)

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 063417

SURVEY REPORT

Senate Select Committee Facility
Dirksen Bldg. 1st & C Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C.

1. In response to a request from Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director, Senate Select Committee, (tele. 224-1700) Messrs. Nicholas R. Zubon and Robert E. Burgener conducted a comprehensive security survey of the Senate Select Committee's Facility on 24 March 1975.

2. Mr. Marshall provided both a comprehensive tour of the facility and a detailed explanation of the operation.

3. The following are pertinent facts concerning the security procedures as related to the Senate Select Committee Facility:

A. Type of Facility

The Committee is in the auditorium (Room G 308) of the Dirksen Building at 1st and C Streets, N. E., Washington, D. C. Access to the auditorium is gained easiest by entering the building from the 1st and C Streets entrance. A 24-hour guard post is located just inside this entrance. The Select Committee facility is 40' east of the building guard post. It is nearly in direct line of sight, however, a foyer surrounded by a 6' high temporary partition precludes the auditorium entrance door from being visible. The entrance to the auditorium is protected by a 24-hour guard post.

The auditorium (Room G 308) is approximately 100' long x 45' wide. The floor, ceiling and walls are made of 6" to 8" solid masonry. The ceiling has a false ceiling approximately 18" deep in which the air handling equipment and sundry other service components are housed. All major air handling equipment is on the roof above the auditorium. Access to the roof which is strictly controlled by the Director of Security, is gained by a stairway in the southeast corner of the auditorium. The sidewalls each have a 2' x 3' register approximately 12' above the floor through which

air is passed from the auditorium to the air handling equipment on the roof. These registers are solidly bolted into the walls.

The front of the auditorium (south wall) is covered by a large movie screen. To the right and left of the movie screen are two rooms 6' wide and approximately 15' long used by the research section clerical personnel. These rooms have countertop openings approximately 3' above the floor for access from within the auditorium. Countertop openings exist along both sidewalls for approximately three quarters of the length of the wall. The sidewalls have intercorridors on the opposite side of the countertops which have been converted into unpartitioned office space. The only reproduction machine, a xerox model 3100, is located in the west corridor. The east corridor has been converted into a compartmented information storage room and a compartmented document reading room. The Security Director indicated that he may move his office to the head of the compartmented reading room to provide a larger measure of access control to this sensitive area.

The auditorium has six wooden exterior doors, 7' high and 3" thick. The entrance door into the auditorium (west and north wall) will have an electrical push-button lock installed. A similar door in the east end of the north wall will be barred and bracketed on the inside to prevent unauthorized entry. The west wall has 2 exterior doors leading into the Capitol Police offices. The east wall has two exterior doors with one leading to the roof while the second door exits into the Capitol Police Garage. All exterior doors will be alarmed. The doors now have Yale 197 1/4 locks with the keys controlled by Mr. Marshall. The fire safety factor concerning these locked doors was discussed with him.

The auditorium has a small second floor area at the north end. Access is gained by two stairways on the east and west side of the auditorium. The second floor space consists of a large projection room, currently filled with projection equipment, and five small private film viewing rooms.

The five small rooms will be converted into witness interview rooms. The windows in each of these rooms will be covered during the stay of the Select Committee in the auditorium.

B. Access Controls

Access to the Dirksen Building is gained by either the main entrance on 1st and C Streets, ground level, or the Basement Tunnel Entrance at the rear of the building. Both entrances have a 24-hour guard post where persons entering are checked for identification. Brief cases and packages are processed through x-ray machines. Vendors entering the main entrance are checked for ID, however, all boxes are not checked.

Entry into the auditorium is controlled by a guard at the door. His instructions are that all persons entering must show an ID card. Visitors are permitted only by appointment. They are logged in and escorted at all times while in the auditorium. From 1800 hours Friday through 0800 hours Saturday, and from 1300 hours Saturday to 0700 hours Monday everyone must sign the log in and out and show an ID. In the event an access problem arises at the guard post, regardless of the hour, Mr. Marshall is alerted.

C. Guards

The Dirksen Building and the auditorium are protected by members of the U. S. Capitol Police Department. The Building has two 24-hour/7day-a-week guard posts at the entrances while the Senate Select Committee has one 24-hour/7 day-a-week guard post at the entrance and an after-hours roving patrol inside the auditorium. All police officers are well trained, wear the Capitol Police uniform and carry Smith and Wesson 38 caliber revolvers. After-hour patrols check all doors, the entire auditorium for classified material that may not have been secured, and the second floor hourly during the night. The guards on duty at the time of the survey were alert and responsive to their duties. During off-duty hours, guard supervisors make at least two unscheduled visits to the guard posts during each shift. In addition the guard at the stationary post has four telephones, two of which have a pickup and automatic ring feature with Capitol Police Headquarters. There will be no rotation of police officers during the occupancy of the Committee. The same officers will be assigned to these posts.

D. Alarms

All exterior doors to the auditorium will have contact (microswitch) alarms. The Remington Rand safes, being obsolete, will be protected by a proximity alarm. The compartmented storage room and an adjacent reading area will be protected by a volumetric alarm. For fire protection a smoke detector/rate of rise alarm will be installed in the compartmented area. All alarms will enunciate at the guard desk at the entrance to the auditorium. The ADT Company will install and maintain the alarms.

E. Safes

The facility has 22 safes. Sixteen 4-drawer Remington Rand Safes located below the movie screen. Three class six Mosler 5-drawer, two class 1 Diebold 2-drawer, and one class 2 Diebold four-drawer are located in the compartmented storage room. With the exception of the Remington Rand safes, all other safes are in good working order.

The safe combination and repairs are under contract with the Safemaster Company. The safe combinations were recently changed by that company. All safe combinations are under the control of Mr. Marshall. However, an assist on day-to-day operations is provided by Mr. Pat Shea, Assistant Staff Director, who acts as backup for safeguarding the combinations to the safes in the compartmented storage room. Messrs. Larry Kieves, John Petersen and Ms. Jan Orloff are backup for the combinations to the sixteen Remington Rand Safes. Mr. Marshall was given two change keys in the event he decides to change the combination himself should staff personnel rotate.

F. Document Control

Incoming CIA documents will be delivered by Agency courier to the guard at the entrance door to the auditorium. The registry officer will receipt for them and take them to the Registry Section where all documents will be logged. Compartmented and Top Secret material will be taken to the Compartmented Storage Room and placed in a safe after it has been logged in Registry. Individuals, on an access list promulgated by Mr. Marshall draw the compartmented documents from the safes but must read them in the adjacent area dedicated for this purpose. Documents classified below TS/Codeword will

be stored in the Remington Rand safes. The documents in the Remington Rand safes can be drawn by anyone on the staff, but must be receipted for with the Registry Officer. The documents are to be read on the tables placed there for that purpose in the Research Section.

Further control of classified documents is directed through the assigning of a staff employee given responsibility for the reproduction of documents on the xerox machine. He will control the number of copies made on typewriters.

All classified material is secured in safes at the end of the working day.

H. Classified Waste

It is estimated that one 50-pound bag of classified waste will be generated each week while the Committee is in session. Once the bag is filled with classified waste, it will be placed in the locked trunk of Mr. Marshall's automobile and taken to the Federal Reserve Building incinerator where he will witness destruction by burning. In the event this incinerator is booked to capacity, he will take the classified waste and burn it at the D. C. incinerator. Should either incinerator become unavailable to the Committee, Mr. Marshall was assured that CIA would consider assisting him in the secure disposition of Committee classified waste.

I. Compartmented/TS Storage

A room dedicated as the codeword/TS storage room is in the northeast corner of the auditorium. Its five walls are solid masonry ranging from 6" to 8" thick. A 1/8" stainless steel door frame is bolted to the masonry walls. A prefabricated 9 gage wire cross-patch metal frame door is attached to the steel frame serving as access control to the dedicated room. The door will be secured by lock and key once classified material arrives for storage. This room will be alarmed.

J. Telephone

The Facility has six standard telephones in the auditorium. Five of the telephones will be equipped with conversation

masking devices. A central switch installed ahead of the telephone instruments will disconnect all telephones simultaneously, should the need arise. The telephone system is maintained by the local telephone company.

K. Security Briefings

All new members of the committee receive a thorough briefing from Mr. Marshall on security procedures and security responsibilities. Briefings are periodically reinforced when conditions warrant.

L. Security Duty Check Procedures

Custodians secure the safe cabinets assigned to them, i.e. Mr. Shea, codeword room, Messrs. Kieves, Petersen, and Ms. Orloff, Research area. Mr. Marshall double checks behind them. The custodian, Security Director and the roving guard patrol check the entire auditorium to ensure all classified material has been secured at the end of the day.

M. Counteraudio Inspection

Mr. Marshall has taken action on this requirement and continues to monitor this area to provide the Committee with as much security protection against the Audio threat as possible.

N. Shredder

The facility has one Destroyit Model 51 Shredder used only for shredding the most sensitive documents. Other documents are not shredded in this machine because of its limited shredding capability.

O. General Observations

The security procedures implemented within the Senate Select Committee facility are sufficient to provide a proper environment for the protection of classified materials. The survey officers were pleased with the security director's dedication to the objective of providing the best security possible for the Committee.


Capitol PARK Police Garage
To Garage
Locked
Locked
SCREEN
office Space
To AIR COND And Furnace Room For Auditorium
SAFES
TABLE
Locked
TS And compartmented Reading Room
Curtained
Curtained
OFFICES
Xerox
Reproduction Area
Capitol Park Police Offices
Capitol PARK police Garage
TS And compartmented storage
Locked
Bolted
office Space unoccupied
Guard Reception Area
6' high Temp partition
6' high Temp partition
NORTH
MAIN HALL IN FRONT of AUDITORIUM in DIRKSEN BLDG
To Guard Post

SECOND FLOOR


North
INTERVIEW ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM
Projection ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]

NOTES FOR SESSION

In previous sessions we discussed the importance of highlighting issues likely to grow out of Commission or Committee deliberations. We observed that we should identify some of those on which a legal brief or annex would be helpful to Executive Branch initiatives. The idea was to select a few where a solid research paper with options, pros and cons, etc., could help us develop a firm grip on the questions in the issue and identify options. For example, the question of Executive privacy presents itself, and I gather is being worked on.

There are others we feel it would be useful for the group to address and assign responsibility for further work. For example:

	Suggested Action
1. Economic Intelligence and National Security--new discussion —	Treasury
2. Covert action and the law —	CIA
3. The Intelligence Budget--open, black, or closed--rational and procedures for handling past, present and future —	OMB
4. Joint Congressional oversight committee for Intelligence —	CIA.
5. GAO and the audit authorities of U.S. Intelligence Agencies —	IC Staff help from legal counsel
6. Confidential funds authorities, contingency reserves, legal base, history and uses —	CIA-DOD
7. Cover for Foreign Intelligence Actions legal and administrative issues —	CIA-State
8. Intelligence files and privacy —	FBI [illegible]
9. The "fact of" question--international, legal and political considerations —	State
10. "Sources and methods" legislation —	OMB & Justice

What human being responsible by next Friday
3 weeks at Executive Session

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 31, 1975

#MORI6

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

With respect to our letter to you of March 17, 1975 you will find attached the first list of members of the Committee staff designated to receive compartmented information.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller
Staff Director

Enclosure

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret and are designated to receive compartmented information. They also meet the requirements as set forth in DCID 1/14 WGM

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
William G. Miller	8-15-31	N.Y.	109-26-4349
Frederick A. O. Schwarz	4-20-35	N.Y.	084-30-2047
William Bader	9-8-31	N.J.	545-30-3377
Burton V. Wides	6-14-41	N.J.	139-30-1936
Elliot E. Maxwell	7-24-46	N.Y.	133-34-4225
Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495
Michael J. Madigan	4-18-43	D.C.	042-34-3797
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48	N.Y.	068-38-6464
Charity I. Benz	7-23-46	N.Y.	053-38-7410
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19	Neb.	485-28-4530
Maratha E. Mecham	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848
Audrey H. Hatry	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691

#MOR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/TG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-172

ENVELOPE

EMPTY

Official DocLab Instruction(s) – Revised 10-Apr-2014

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 4/10/75

REC-40

FROM : W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JG

On 4/8/75 Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman of the Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, forwarded the attached copy of a letter dated 3/28/75 from Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, enclosing a list of staff members who have been certified for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Copies of the list are attached to tickler copies of this memorandum for retention by personnel who may be in contact with the Select Committee staff.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Enclosures (2) ENCLOSURE

62-116395

LFS:tdp (8)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Schwartz

PLM

ST-106

REC-40 62-116395-

15 APR 16 1975

51 APR 21 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., T[illegible]N.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
LTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
ARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 28, 1975

#mor16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William Miller
Staff Director

62-116395-[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

ATTACHMENT

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
David Aaron	8-21-38	IL.	550-44-7971
Nancy Brooks	2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773
Barbara Chesnik	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235
Mary De Oreo	6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258
Daniel Dwyer	8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792
Peter Fenn	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123
Edward Greissing	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113
Mark Inderfurth	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617
Dorothy Johnson	6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413
Loch Johnson	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478
Howard Liebengood	12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707
Naldeen MacDonald	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503
William G. Miller	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349
Susan Pitts	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638
Alan Romberg	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583
Frederick A.O. Schwarz, III	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047
Patrick Shea	2-28-48	UT	528-64-1965
Stephanie Smith	3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476
Mary Towell	4-25-44	TN	566-64-7628

62-116395-71

ENCLOSURE

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1 - Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 14, 1975

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/ #MDP16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to the Senate Select Committee letter dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents from the FBI and my letter to you dated April 10, 1975, enclosing a memorandum and a copy of the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, less certain exhibits, for the Committee's use.

The purpose of this letter is to make available for your information a copy of the aforementioned paper with all exhibits intact. The Committee's copy of the paper has missing exhibits because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Authority to release these exhibits is being expeditiously sought so they may be made available to the Committee.

The exhibits extracted from the Committee's copy included Exhibit I, J, K, M, and P.

REC- 106 62-116395-70

Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has reviewed and approved all exhibits left in the paper and has requested to review the extracted exhibits after "Third Agency Rule" approval has been granted and before the exhibits are forwarded to the Committee. This will be done at the earliest possible time.

APR 21 1975

Enclosure

ALL:vb
(7)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Inv. ___
___
tion ___
___
ory ___
Eval. ___
___
___
___
m. ___

~~TOP~~ SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Director, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/MG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (3)

DRD:mjg
(6)

NOTE: This is the most current FBI Functional Organization Chart. A new chart would not be available if prepared in response to the Senate Select Committee's request for approximately 7 to 10 days.

REC-106 62-116395-69

DRD

5- WOC

6 APR 21 1975

PLM

ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

DRD

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

#mDR16

1/18/01 SP-2 ALM/LTG

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975 to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

In response to the Committee's request for a detailed current organizational chart attached hereto is a document entitled "FBI Functional Organization Chart."

This chart was prepared January 14, 1975, and since that time the following changes concerning the position of Assistant Director have been made. The Assistant Director of the Files and Communications Division is John J. McDermott. The Assistant Director of External Affairs is Donald W. Moore Jr. The Assistant Director of the Training Division is William M. Mooney.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

DRD/PVD:mjg/kjs
(6)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-69

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #NDE ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-69

FBI FUNCTIONAL ORG

DIRECTO
CLARENCE M. K

ASSOCIATE DIR
NICHOLAS P. CA

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
(ADMINISTRATION)
THOMAS J. JENKINS

FIELD OFFICES

ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
ALEXANDRIA
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
COLUMBIA
DALLAS
DENVER
DETROIT
EL PASO
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JACKSONVILLE
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LAS VEGAS
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE

IDENTIFICATION · DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD H. ASH

RECORDING SECTION:

FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE
LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL MATTERS

POSTING SECTION:

FUGITIVE WANTED NOTICES
PROBATION AND PAROLE FLASHES

CARD INDEX SECTION:

CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND DECEASED NAME INDICES

TECHNICAL SECTION:

CLASSIFICATION AND SEARCHING
CRIMINAL FINGERPRINT FILE
CIVIL FINGERPRINT FILE (ALIEN, CIVIL SERVICE, MILITARY AND PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION)
WIRE ROOM SERVICES

ASSEMBLY SECTION:

FILING AND MAINTENANCE OF FINGERPRINT JACKETS
VERIFICATION OF IDENTIFICATIONS
MICROFILMING

FINGERPRINT CORRESPONDENCE SECTION:

UPDATING AND DISSEMINATION OF FINGERPRINT RECORDS
CERTIFIED RECORDS
MISSING PERSONS UNIT
MAIL ROOM

LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION:

DECEASED HAND AND FINGER EXAMINATIONS
DISASTER IDENTIFICATION SQUAD
FINGERPRINT PHOTO LAB
FINGERPRINT TESTIMONY
GENERAL APPEARANCE FILE ON CONFIDENCE MEN
LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATIONS
LATENT FINGERPRINT INSTRUCTION
NATIONAL UNIDENTIFIED LATENT FINGERPRINT FILE
SINGLE FINGERPRINT FILE
TECHNICAL FIELD ASSISTANCE

AUTOMATION AND RESEARCH SECTION:

AUTOMATED IDENTIFICATION DIVISION SYSTEM (AIDS)
CCH/CIRFO DESK
FINGERPRINT AUTOMATION RESEARCH

TRAINING DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOE DAVID JAMIESON

QUANTICO:

FBI ACADEMY – TRAINING CENTER
FIELD FIREARMS TRAINING
FIREARMS INSPECTION AND REPAIR
IN-SERVICE FIREARMS TRAINING
LAW ENFORCEMENT COMBAT ARTS RESEARCH PROGRAM (LECARP)
NATIONAL ACADEMY FIREARMS TRAINING
NEW AGENTS FIREARMS TRAINING
SPECIALIZED POLICE FIREARMS TRAINING
SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) TRAINING
RADIO STATIONS
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY
IN-SERVICE COURSES
DEFENSE PLANS FOR DIVISION
LEARNING RESOURCE CENTER
DEFENSIVE TACTICS COURSES
NEW AGENTS TRAINING
POLICE INSTRUCTOR COURSES
PHYSICAL TRAINING
SUPERVISORY AND MANAGEMENT TRAINING
EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT COURSES
ASSESSMENT CENTER – CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
TRAINING RESEARCH
POLICE INSTRUCTOR BULLETINS
LAW ENFORCEMENT SYMPOSIUMS
LAW ENFORCEMENT SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS
FACULTY DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH UNIT
INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
FIELD CLERICAL TRAINING ASSISTANCE
POLICE VISITORS
LIAISON – PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SOCIETIES
LIAISON – UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
LIAISON – NATIONAL ASSOCIATION STATE DIRECTORS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (NASDLET)
LIAISON – INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
LIAISON – INTERAGENCY POLICE GROUP

HEADQUARTERS:

BUREAU MANUALS
CHIEF CLERK MATTERS
CLERICAL RETRAINING COURSES
FIELD POLICE SCHOOLS
FORMS MANAGEMENT
LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES
SAC MEMORANDA
REPORTS MANAGEMENT
STENOGRAPHIC TRAINING
SUGGESTION PROGRAM
NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ADMISSIONS
INDOOR RANGE

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
EUGENE W. WALSH

BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION:

ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT
BUDGET AND FISCAL MATTERS
BUREAU ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS
PHYSICAL SECURITY MATTERS

EXHIBITS SECTION:

ARTIST'S-CONCEPTION DRAWINGS
GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF INVESTIGATIVE AND STATISTICAL DATA
PREPARATION OF CREDENTIALS AND SPECIAL FORMS
TRAINING AIDS (DIAGRAMS, ILLUSTRATIONS AND DISPLAYS)
TRIAL EXHIBITS (CHARTS AND MODELS)
J. EDGAR HOOVER FBI BUILDING

MECHANICAL SECTION:

AUTOMOTIVE POOL
EMPLOYEE PARKING
ENERGY CONSERVATION
PHOTOGRAPHY
PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION
SPACE MATTERS
SUPPLY AND STORAGE

PERSONNEL SECTION:

APPLICANT RECRUITING AND PLACEMENT
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
COMMENDATIONS AND AWARDS
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE
EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
HEALTH PROGRAMS
LEAVE
LIVING QUARTERS
PAY ADMINISTRATION
PERFORMANCE RATINGS
PERSONNEL MATTERS
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
POSITION CLASSIFICATION
RETIREMENT MATTERS
SAFETY PROGRAMS
VETERANS' COUNSELING
VOCATION AND AVOCATION RECORDS

PROCUREMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES SECTION:

PROCUREMENT (SUPPLIES-EQUIPMENT)
CONTRACTING
INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
TYPEWRITER REPAIR SHOP
MAINTENANCE

SPECIAL AGENT TRANSFERS AND MOVEMENT UNIT:

PERSONNEL LOCATION RECORDS
SPECIAL AGENT TRANSFERS
RESIDENT AGENCY MATTERS

FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
J. WALLACE LAPRADE

RECORDS SECTION:

AUTOMATION AND RESEARCH
CHIEF CLERK MATTERS
CLASSIFYING
CONSOLIDATION
CORRELATION
FILE REVIEW
FILING
GENERAL INDEX
MAIL ROOM
MESSENGERS
NAME SEARCHING
NUMBERING
PERSONNEL RECORDS
RECORDING
RECORDS MANAGEMENT
ROUTING
SERVICE
TRAINING

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION:

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS (INTRA-BUREAU)
TELEGRAPH, TELETYPE, AND MESSAGE ENCODING/DECODING SERVICES
TELEPHONE SERVICE

LABORATORY DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
BRIGGS J. WHITE

FRONT OFFICE:

FORENSIC SCIENCE TRAINING UNIT
PLANNING AND EVALUATION UNIT
TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE UNIT

CRYPTANALYSIS-GAMBLING-TRANSLATION SECTION:

CRYPTANALYSIS
GAMBLING EXAMINATIONS
POLYGRAPH
SECURITY OF FBI COMMUNICATIONS
TRANSLATIONS

DOCUMENT SECTION:

CHARRED PAPER EXAMINATIONS
HANDWRITING AND HANDPRINTING
INDENTED WRITING
INK AND PENCIL EXAMINATIONS
OBLITERATED WRITINGS
PAPER EXAMINATIONS
PHOTOGRAPHIC EXAMINATIONS
PORTRAIT PARLE EXAMINATIONS
PRINTING
RUBBER STAMP, CHECKWRITER, AND OTHER MECHANICAL DEVICES
SHOEPRINT EXAMINATIONS
TIRETREAD EXAMINATIONS
TYPEWRITING
MISCELLANEOUS

RADIO ENGINEERING SECTION:

CW RADIO NETWORK ENGINEERING
FM RADIO SYSTEMS
MAINTENANCE COORDINATION
MOBILE AND PORTABLE RADIO
RADIO FREQUENCY LIAISON COMMITTEES
EVIDENCE EXAMINATIONS

PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY SECTION:

BIOCHEMICAL
BIOLOGICAL
EXPLOSIVES
FIBERS AND HAIRS
GENERAL CHEMICAL
GLASS FRACTURES
GUNPOWDER TESTS
GUNS AND AMMUNITION
INSTRUMENTAL ANALYSIS
METALLURGICAL
MINERALOGICAL
NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS
NUMBER RESTORATION
PHARMACOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
TOOLMARKS
TOXICOLOGICAL
WOOD
X-RAY

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOHN J. McDERMOTT

PRESS SERVICES OFFICE

CORRESPONDENCE AND TOURS:

CORRESPONDENCE – CITIZEN INQUIRIES
CORRESPONDENCE REVIEW
MAILING LISTS
DISTRIBUTION OF REPRINTS
TOURS OF FBIHQ
SPEECH MATTERS

RESEARCH SECTION:

FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN
INVESTIGATOR
TOP TEN FUGITIVE PROGRAM
FUGITIVE PUBLICITY PROGRAMS
SPECIAL PROJECTS
LIBRARY
BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM
YOUTHFUL CRIMINALITY
RADIO-TV NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS
NEWS RELEASES

COMPUTER SYSTEMS DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ANDREW J. DECKER, JR.

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING SECTION:

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED OR ASSAULTED STATISTICS
NATIONAL BOMB DATA STATISTICS

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER SECTION:

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER/COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL HISTORIES SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
NCIC/CCH OPERATIONS
NCIC/CCH CRIMINAL HISTORY CONVERSION

DATA PROCESSING SECTION:

ACCOUNTING REPORTS
COMPUTER SYSTEMS:
  DATA PROCESSING
  TELEPROCESSING
  OPERATIONS RESEARCH
  SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
PAYROLL
RETIREMENT RECORDS
STATISTICAL TABULATIONS
VOUCHERS

JANUARY 14, 1975

ANIZATION CHART

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-91 BY SP2ALM/JT6
#MD46

FIELD OFFICES

MEMPHIS
MIAMI
MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
NORFOLK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH
PORTLAND
RICHMOND
SACRAMENTO
ST. LOUIS
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
TAMPA
WASHINGTON, D.C
TOTAL 59



R
ELLEY

ECTOR
.LAHAN

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
(INVESTIGATION)
JAMES B. ADAMS

OFFICE OF PLANNING AND EVALUATION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD J. GALLAGHER

STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

OPERATIONS
PLANNING
POLICIES
PROGRAMS

INSPECTION DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
HAROLD N BASSETT

INSPECTIONS – FIELD AND HQs
SPECIAL PROJECTS
SURVEYS
INTERNAL AUDITS
SECURITY COORDINATOR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
W. RAYMOND WANNALL

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

CI-1 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY

CI-2 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY

CI-3 SECTION:

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT - VIOLATIONS
ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
FOREIGN ECONOMIC MATTERS
FOREIGN FUNDS
FOREIGN MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS
FOREIGN SOCIAL CONDITIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY
NEUTRALITY MATTERS
SECURITY MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY
BOMBING MATTERS
ANTI-RIOT
ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN GUESTS OF U. S.

CI-4 SECTION:

DOMESTIC AND MILITARY LIAISON
FOREIGN LIAISON MATTERS
FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH:

IS-1 SECTION:

EXTREMISTS AND
ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
EXTREMISTS
ACTIVITIES
CIVIL UNREST AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE
EXTREMIST INFORMANTS

IS-2 SECTION:

SEDITION
SABOTAGE
COMMUNIST
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS
OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS
SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (EXCEPT ESPIONAGE)

IS-3 SECTION:

CENTRAL RESEARCH
ANALYTICAL RESEARCH
TRAINING
SPECIAL RECORDS
DEFENSE PLANS

.LEGAL COUNSEL

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
LEGAL COUNSEL
JOHN A. MINTZ

LEGAL ANALYSIS
LEGAL INSTRUCTION
LEGAL LIAISON
LEGAL RESEARCH
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ROBERT E. GEBHARDT

CRIMINAL SECTION:

ASSAULTING OR KILLING A FEDERAL OFFICER
ASSAULTING FOREIGN PERSONNEL
CONGRESSIONAL ASSASSINATION STATUTE
ASSAULTING THE PRESIDENT (OR VICE-PRESIDENT) OF THE UNITED STATES
AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT
BANK ROBBERY
BILLS OF LADING ACT
CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT
CRIME ON INDIAN AND GOVERNMENT RESERVATIONS
CRIME ON THE HIGH SEAS
DESECRATION OF THE FLAG
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES
EXTORTION
FALSE ADVERTISING OR MISUSE OF NAMES TO INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY
FALSE ENTRIES IN RECORDS OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS
FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT
FEDERAL TRAIN WRECK STATUTE
FIREARMS ACT (A) NATIONAL (B) STATE FIREARMS CONTROL ASSISTANCE ACT (C) UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS
FRAUDULENT PRACTICES CONCERNING MILITARY AND NAVAL DOCUMENTS, AND SEALS AND SYMBOLS OF AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE, USE, POSSESSION OR SALE OF EMBLEMS AND INSIGNIA
ILLEGAL USE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS
ILLEGAL USE OF RAILROAD PASS
ILLEGAL WEARING OF UNIFORM
IMPERSONATION
INTERSTATE OBSCENE OR HARASSING TELEPHONE CALLS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISON-MADE GOODS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN CATTLE
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE OR AIRCRAFT
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS
IRREGULARITIES IN FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS
KIDNAPING
MAY ACT
POLICE KILLINGS
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - CRIMINAL
SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT
THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT, ROBBERY, AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT
WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT

CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION:

CIVIL RIGHTS
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
ELECTION LAWS
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY

NAME CHECK SECTION:

NAME CHECKS
SPECIAL MEMORANDA

ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD SECTION:

ACCOUNTING CONTROL
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRIES
ADMIRALTY MATTERS
ANTI-RACKETEERING
HOBBS ACT
LEA ACT
INTERFERENCE WITH GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
ANTITRUST
ASCERTAINING FINANCIAL ABILITY
BANK FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT
BONDSMEN AND SURETIES
BRIBERY
CENSUS MATTERS
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
CONTEMPT OF COURT
COPYRIGHT MATTERS
COURT OF CLAIMS
DEPENDENTS ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950
DESTRUCTION OF INTERSTATE PROPERTY
EIGHT-HOUR DAY LAW
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
FALSE CLAIMS – CIVIL
FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
FEDERAL LENDING AND INSURANCE AGENCIES
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STRIKEBREAKERS
JURY PANEL INVESTIGATIONS
KICKBACK RACKET ACT
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 (INVESTIGATIVE MATTER)
LANDS DIVISION MATTERS
MAIL FRAUD
MIGRATORY BIRD ACT
MISCELLANEOUS – CIVIL SUITS
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
OBSTRUCTION OF COURT ORDERS
OBSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
PASSPORT AND VISA MATTERS
PATENT MATTERS
PERJURY
RAILWAY LABOR ACT
RED CROSS ACT
RENEGOTIATION ACT – CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT – 1940
TARIFF ACT OF 1930
UNREPORTED INTERSTATE SHIPMENT OF CIGARETTES
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
WAGE AND HOUR LAW
WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM V. CLEVELAND

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE-- ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION:

ANTI-RACKETEERING (INTELLIGENCE)
EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS – OBSTRUCTION
INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF LOTTERY TICKETS
INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING INFORMATION
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF RACKETEERING
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF WAGERING PARAPHERNALIA
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
SPORTS BRIBERY
TOP-ECHELON CRIMINAL INFORMANTS

FUGITIVE SECTION:

BOND DEFAULT
CONDITIONAL RELEASE VIOLATORS
CRIMINAL INFORMANT MATTERS
DESERTERS AND DESERTER-HARBORING
ESCAPE AND RESCUE
ESCAPED FEDERAL PRISONERS
FUGITIVES
HARBORING
PAROLE VIOLATORS
PROBATION VIOLATORS
SELECTIVE SERVICE, INCLUDING FUGITIVE AND RE-EMPLOYMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID CUSTODY OR CONFINEMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID GIVING TESTIMONY
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION

EMPLOYEES SECURITY AND SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION:

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
APPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AND APPLICATIONS FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION OF SENTENCE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS)
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
PEACE CORPS
SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
U. S. COURTS APPLICANTS
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/7/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/2/75.

The study prepared for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) entitled, "Human Intelligence," has come to the attention of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The major contributors to this report were the FBI and CIA. It is an extremely sensitive document and for that reason any requests from any committees of the Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the White House. At the present time, the consensus of those persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release of information to the committees of Congress is that this report will not be provided Congressional committees at this time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 [illegible]

The SSC does recognize a requirement to comply with the Third Agency Rule which states in effect that classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department. CIA's General Counsel has produced a paper entitled "The Third Agency Rule," copy attached, which they have requested be reviewed by the Legal Counsels of all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. A copy of CIA's paper referred to above has been made available to Assistant Director Mintz who has indicated he will be in direct contact with Mr. Warner, CIA's General Counsel.

REC-106 62-116395-68

APR 21 1975

Attached is a copy of sanitization guidelines for documents provided Congressional Select Committees. The Group asked that these guidelines be reviewed and concurrence or

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

objections be furnished to the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) for consideration. A copy of these guidelines has been furnished to the Freedom of Information Unit of the Legal Counsel Division for review. Their comments will be furnished to the Bureau's representative, Mr. Frank Schwartz, on the USIB Committee in compliance with the mandate from the Ad Hoc Group.

Also attached is a copy of the abstract which all agencies of the Intelligence Community are being required to use in abstracting information that agency has provided one of the Select Committees. These abstracts will be retained in an interagency registry to be available for review by any members of the Intelligence Community as well as the White House. The purpose of this interagency registry is to have available in one location all information in abstract form that members of the Intelligence Community have provided the SSC.

Attached is a memorandum for Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Group, advising the names and titles of individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that these persons will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated with the House Select Committee.

Also attached is a letter from Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee, addressed to the President enclosing a list of documents which the SSC is requesting from the White House.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a~~n~~ homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

> A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-68

contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community and then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(d) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/STG

#MDR16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-68

> shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to interrelationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. agency receiving request
2. originating agency

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Sanitization Guidelines for Documents Provided Congressional Select Committees

1. Attached is a copy of a statement, "Guidelines for Sanitizing Certain Documents Provided Select Committees" prepared by the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, for consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. This step is a follow on to the understanding the DCI has with Senator Church that sanitization of selective documents will be undertaken before the documents are released to the Committee. Similar understandings have been discussed with House Staff as well.

2. It is important that, to the extent possible, all intelligence organizations follow generally the same sanitization guidelines. Accordingly, the USIB Ad Hoc Group should consider utilizing these or similar guidelines within their respective organizations.

3. If requested by the Chairman, the DCI will discuss orally with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate and House Select Committees the content of the sensitive USIB or CIA material excised from documents. Where appropriate, the DCI may discuss this sensitive material with the entire Select Committee. He considers it essential that the written record provided to the Committee staff not include such sensitive information for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

Attachment: As Stated

#MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY 5535P-2 ALM/LRS

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-68

DRAFT
28 MARCH '75

GUIDELINES FOR SANITIZING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has recently discussed with Senator Church the need for special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee of certain sensitive aspects of intelligence activities and the Senator has expressed his recognition of this need. Included in such matters are the identities of sensitive sources, the material provided to the United States by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain employees whose safety could be jeopardized if revealed, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with US intelligence and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems. Such material should be protected not only from exposure but indeed the risk of exposure. Further, recognition should be given to the need to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals.

#MOR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JG

2. One form of this special consideration may include use of sanitization procedures to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of the community's activities.

3. What May Be Sanitized

While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which may be levied by the Committees for document~~ing~~ary material and not possible to determine specifically what material should be excised from these documents, the following illustrations are offered in certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet the test mentioned above.

4. Collection of Intelligence

(a) The Committee will probably address the matter of how intelligence activities or methods have or may impinge upon individual rights. Documents supporting responses may be sanitized by removal of identities of sensitive agents and informants, covert personnel, and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be substituted, i.e., a foreign journalist, a political official in the opposition party. No sanitization should be used in connection with

names of individuals whose employment or former employment by, or association with a department or agency, does not remain secret or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements remain secret.

(b) Some information may be required with respect to technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived by release of these codenames or nicknames in documents. Details of the technical systems involved, contractual arrangements, funding and/or names of companies or consultants whose participation was obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in the community's sanitization procedure. While documentary samples of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of verbal testimony, no raw product should be provided the Committees

for retention. If absolutely required by the Committees, sanitization of such raw product should be conducted to mask the degree of technical capabilities.

5. Intelligence Estimates

Finished intelligence reports of departments and agencies and estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not normally require sanitization. However, departments and agencies should review such publications to ensure deletion of source identities.

6. Administration

Information concerning the internal administration arrangements of intelligence agencies may be requested. This may include staffing charts with occupants identified. ~~Sanitization of individual~~, Identities of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning in a cover assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future be considered for a covert assignment.

7. General

The following categories of information or specific examples may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should be given by the department or agency concerned to the necessity of

deletion or sanitization of this type of information, prior to providing the document.

(a) Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.

(b) Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) ~~employed overseas in human source~~ collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.

(c) The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targetted foreign organizations.

(d) The success or failure of recruitment attempts in any given targetted foreign organization.

(e) Names of particular employees whose physical safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.

(f) Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.

(g) Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries.

(h) Identifying collaborative operations between the United States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaborations or within a jointly targetted third country.

(i) Identifying collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved.

(j) Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.

(k) Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country.

(l) Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence operations.

(m) Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that collaborate in a special manner such as providing cover for foreign intelligence operations.

(n) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).

(o) Proprietary information relating to contractors or furnished in confidence.

8. What Should Not Be Sanitized

There are general categories of intelligence activities which have already been placed in the public domain by the mass news media or authors with background experience in intelligence departments or agencies of the community. Names, places, dates and events which have been so revealed should not be excised if contained in requested documents.

There is an increasing body of information which has been released under the Freedom of Information Act. No further sanitization of this material should be conducted unless it relates to an individual's rights to privacy.

9. Techniques of Sanitization

Sanitization of intelligence material is usually considered the act of physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing from written communication with or without regard for the residual

content. Use of a substitution device, either pseudonym or ident is an example of sanitization which permits intelligent continuity of the material without revealing the true identity. Sanitization does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material in this context.

The integrity of official records must be maintained. The following sanitization techniques apply only to copies of records.

(a) Physical Sanitization - Names may be cut out and the residual material xeroxed and submitted to Committees. Names may be masked with correction tape and then xeroxed. The xerox copy may be submitted to the Committees.

(b) Names may be deleted and replaced with "IDEN." The deleted material is provided on a separate IDEN list which contains names or descriptive phrases substituted for deletions.

(c) The material can be retyped or reprinted with substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal the sensitive material.

(d) Entire pages can be removed from some documents and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information

as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing department or agency. This technique may be employed when physical sanitization or excision of material results in unintelligible gibberish as residue.

(e) Within a category of inquiry, it may be desirable to extract a complete document from requested material when the request is broad and all inclusive within its field. The existence of such a document should be made known to the Committees but retained by the agency or department for review under escort of a representative of the department or agency.

10. Management of Sanitization

The original record and a copy of the sanitized version provided should be readily available in all cases. Materials developed within an agency or department in response to requests should be reviewed at an appropriate level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. In the case of documents or materials of a community nature, the release should be done in coordination with the departments or agencies and/or the Program Manager concerned and any sanitization should be agreed upon during coordination.

This proposed use of sanitization as a special arrangement to protect selected issues contained in material provided to Select Committees by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies. It is essential to the proposal that departments and agencies attempt to employ the same criteria for sanitization and coordinate as required. This paper can serve only as general guidelines on sanitization.

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT OF MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT:

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)

4. TITLE:

5. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (A brief narrative statement which describes content of the material provided, problems addressed, and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should be of sufficient length clearly to convey the basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)

6. REQUESTOR:

7. DATE OF REQUEST:

8. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

9. LOCATION OF FILE COPY/COPIES

10. DOES MATERIAL RELATE TO AN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEM? IF SO, IDENTIFY:

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP'2 ALM/TG

62-116395-68

IC-75-1951
28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Clarke

SUBJECT : SECURITY - House Select Committee - Cleared Personnel

1. The following information has been obtained from the Office of Legislative Counsel and addresses those individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee, who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that they will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated in the near future with the House Select Committee.

Mr. Frank M. Slatinshek
Chief Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

Mr. William H. Hogan, Jr.
Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

Mr. John L. Boos
Chairman Nedzi's Assistant for Intelligence Matters
Room 2343 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

2. The following secretaries are approved for receipt of classified material at the levels indicated:

Berniece Kalinowski (Slatinshek)
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

62-116395-68

Rita D. Argenta (Hogan)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI

Oneta L. Stockstill (Boos)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

3. Safe storage facilities are available in Mr. William Hogan's office which have been approved by CIA. Mr. Slatinshek and Mr. Boos keep classified material meant for Congressman Nedzi in this area.

Don
Donald E. Moore

Dist: RTaylor:mm/28Mar75
O-Adse
1 - IC Reg
1 - SECOM

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, A[illegible]
CHARLES MCC. MATH[illegible]R., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible]A.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 12, 1975

MDE16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/JHG

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on March 5 to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for the direct and forthright manner in which you addressed some of the initial questions that lay before the Select Committee, and your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

We are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible and the Committee is gratified at the full and complete cooperation that we have received from the Executive agencies up to this point. In every respect thus far, the agencies have been fully cooperative with the Committee and the staff and I believe this augers well for a constructive and expeditious conclusion to our inquiry.

At our meeting on March 5th with you, we discussed the general areas in which the Committee would need initial documentation. As we discussed, our first requirements are to determine the legal basis for the activities for the intelligence agencies of the United States Government. In this regard, it will be helpful to the Committee to receive from whomever you may designate, the documents, files, and other papers that might be required to fully determine the legal basis for the activities of United States intelligence agencies. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents on the attached list directly relevant to the inquiry authorized by S. Res. 21, be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church

62-116395-68

ATTACHMENT

1. The report furnished to the President by Director Colby in January 19

2. All Executive Orders, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) or Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and other White House* directives pertaining to the charter, structure or guidelines for any overt or covert foreign or domestic intelligence agencies or activities.

3. All Executive Orders, National Security Council memoranda and directives, and other White House instructions pertaining to the structure, functions or organization of intelligence policy organizations within the Office of the President, including the Forty Committee and the Washington Special Action Group (and their predecessor organizations, e.g., the Operations Coordinating Board, Special Group, 54/12 Group, 303 Committee, etc.).

4. Organization charts and staffing patterns (for the present and, to the extent reasonably convenient, back to 1947) for all intelligence-related organizations within the White House (NSC, Forty Committee, OEP, WSAG, etc.) including names of key officials and staff personnel.

#mDe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/LRG

---

* "White House" as used in this listing is meant to include the President, the Office of the President, including the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG
#NW46

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Jew160

By memorandum dated 3-20-75, you were advised of a request received from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Intelligence Division requested that an attempt be made to modify portions of the Committee's request.

Regarding Part I titled Legal Authorities, the Intelligence Division pointed out that this particular request was wide-ranging and required a considerable file review as it requested any memorandum discussing the legal authority of the FBI to "(1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials asserted as sources of such authority." With regard to Part III concerning the FBI's administrative organization, they requested the identities by name of personnel in the Intelligence Division, Unit Chief and above. This caused concern in the Intelligence Division that there would be a needless proliferation of a list of Bureau personnel working in this field which list, of course, would be of interest to foreign intelligence sources.

On 4-1-75 Inspector John B. Hotis and SA Paul V. Daly discussed these matters with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee; John T. Elliff, who has been nominated to head the task force for the Committee looking into FBI activities; F. A. O. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee; and staff member Michael Epstein. They agreed to modify the request in Part III to the extent that personnel in the Intelligence Division need not be identified by name below the level of Assistant Director in the organization chart to be furnished them pursuant to their request of 3-19-75. They asked as an alternative the Bureau prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of Unit Chief with names included which they would have access to review in Bureau space.

REC 17 62-116395-61

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Farrington - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

ENCLOSURE

APR 15 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:dkg (11)

APR 22 1975

With regard to Part I relating to legal authorities, they stated they were amenable to the Bureau furnishing them whatever documents they have retrieved up to this time which have been recovered pursuant to their request of 3-19-75 and that no additional detailed review need be conducted until they review the aforementioned documents. At the end of their review they will make any additional specific requests concerning this part of their request. They also asked that in our response we furnish them copies of documents listed on a three-page paper prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee, a copy of which is attached.

Staff Director Miller requested that the Bureau expedite their response to the Senate Select Committee's request as the first meeting of that Committee is scheduled for Wednesday, 4-9-75, and he felt strongly that they must have material that showed progress in their study of the FBI prior to that time. Mr. Miller requested that, if necessary, the request be responded to in a piecemeal basis and that the complete response does not necessarily have to be made at one time.

It is suggested that we make available to this Committee as soon as possible those documents which we have furnished the General Accounting Office (GAO) which also fall within the 3-19-75 request of the Senate Select Committee. In this regard staff members have advised they are in contact with GAO auditors concerning the FBI.

By way of observations it is obvious that the staff members of the Committee are well versed in Bureau policy and procedures. To this point they have been cooperative and we should insure that we give a timely response to their various requests.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Intelligence Division advise whether modification of the Senate Select Committee's request concerning legal authorities for investigations and the modification of the table of organization of the Intelligence Division are acceptable and, if so, expeditiously prepare the necessary response to the Senate Select Committee.

4/8/75

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

(2) That we furnish all information which has previously been furnished GAO and is within the ambit of the Senate Select Committee's request.

Material furnished to GAO reviewed. All information within ambit of SSC has been furnished to SSC 4/8/75 WOB

(3) That as our response to any one of the five particular areas of inquiry as set forth in the 3-19-75 letter is completed, we furnish it to the Senate Select Committee.

Done 4/8/75 WOB

(4) This material should be sent to the Deputy Attorney General by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should specifically identify the request, for review and subsequent transmittal to the Senate Select Committee.

JBH

PLM

WRW

All General information reviewing material. Per conversation with John Hotis letters should be directed to Attorney General 4/8/75 WOB

OK

Examples of the types of materials requested under Part I:

1. Studies on Subversion and FBI Jurisdiction which were prepared for Director Gray. See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session) on the Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973), pp. 7 and 14.

2. Paper prepared on jurisdiction which was discussed by Director Gray and others at a Quantico meeting on May 23 and 24, 1972. Id. at p. 151.

3. Memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an executive order concerning the authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence operations. See the Attorney General's reply to this memorandum which is published in the Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Surveillance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), on Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance (1974), pp. 31-32.

4. An Intelligence Division study which was furnished to the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, by Director Kelley. See Hearing before the Subcommittee on FBI Oversight of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session) on S. 2106, Ten-Year Term for FBI Director (1974), pp. 12-13.

5. Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Director Hoover, dated September 14, 1967. See Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, Part I (1974), pp. 3404-3406.

6. The two FBI memoranda which record instructions from President Roosevelt to Director Hoover concerning FBI investigations of subversive activities, and which indicate meetings between President Roosevelt and Director Hoover on August 24 and 25, 1936. Id. at pp. 3392-3393.

7. Memorandum from Director Hoover to Associate Director Tamm, dated September 10, 1936. Id. at p. 3377.

8. Presidential directives dated September 6, 1939; January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953. Id. at pp. 3404 et seq.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TAG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-67

Examples of the types of materials requested under Part II:

1. See Delimitations Agreement in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (First Session), on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights (1971), Part II, pp. 1172-1179.

2. See Agreement of Coordination in the Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes. (1974), Part I, pp. 3369-3383.

For references to items requested in Part IV, see:

1. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), on the Nomination of Richard G. Kleindienst, of Arizona, to be Attorney General (1972), pp. 63-64.

2. Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes. (1974), pp. 3569-3570.

3. Hearings before the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session), on the Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973), pp. 150-151.

An excised copy of the Report requested under Part V, Item A, is published in the record of the Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), pursuant to H. Res 803 (Impeachment), Book VII, Part 1, pp. 384-431.

The original COINTELPRO Report which is requested in Part IV, Item B, is referred to in the Hearings before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session), FBI Counterintelligence Programs (1974), p. 21.

Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, dated May 20, 1954, captioned "Microphone Surveillance." See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), Warrantless Wiretapping (1972), p. 178.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/146
#MDR16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

Sen Study-75

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that all responses for the production of records, etc., received from Congressional committees be forwarded by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General to the requesting committee, and also that in selected instances a property stamp or statement be affixed to certain documents limiting access.

With the proliferation of committees in Congress looking into FBI operations, it is essential that a standard procedure for the forwarding of documents to the requesting committees be established. Inasmuch as requests such as the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities have been forwarded to this Bureau through the Department, it would appear logical that responses to such inquiries and all other inquiries of Congressional committees, whether they be directed to the Department and/or the Bureau, be responded to through the Department. Such a procedure not only will make all our responses consistent but will also give the Department an opportunity to review and approve documents being made available to Congress.

In connection with our preparation of responses to requests of Congressional committees, it is suggested that all responses should be by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should clearly describe the specific request which is being responded to in the letterhead memorandum.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116464 62-116395

REC-18 62-116395-66

In those instances where documents are of a nature that we are not desirous of unauthorized personnel, whether they be in Congress or otherwise, having access to, we should affix a property stamp. This property stamp should read as follows:

APR 11 1975

> "This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside of your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the contents may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI."

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

APR 18 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

PVD:kjs (21)

JUN 11 1975 RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all responses to Congressional inquiries concerning FBI operations be forwarded to the Congressional committees by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General. Upon approval, these letterhead memoranda will be hand-delivered to the Deputy Attorney General's office by Legal Counsel Division.

(2) That in instances where access to a particular document should be limited because of the contents of that document, a property stamp in line with the above be affixed thereto.

Div 5 is obtaining appropriate stamp. JCF 4/9

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP2 ALM/TLG

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached are copies of various documents which are jurisdictional agreements between the FBI and other Federal agencies or guidelines prepared by the Attorney General with reference to investigative responsibilities between the FBI and other Federal agencies insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

1. Delimitations of Investigative Duties of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force, dated February 23, 1949, with supplemental agreements 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Supplemental agreement number 2 is no longer in effect.

2. Agreement between the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency, dated February 7, 1966, classified "Secret."

3. Agreement between the FBI and the United States Secret Service, effective July 30, 1973.

RLM:mam
(6) mam

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

WRW

65

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-545

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General April 8, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to the request entitled, "Jurisdictional Agreements." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of additional requests is continuing and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (2)

REC-106

62-116[illegible]-65

RLM:mam
(6) mam

RLM

lcf

FF MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

7 APR 17 1975

2 - ENCLOSURE

B.M

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

APR 1 [illegible] 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

4. Investigative guidelines with reference to Title 11, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation of Explosives, prepared by the Attorney General of the United States, submitted by letter to the FBI on January 11, 1973.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures (4)

1 - The Attorney General

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/1/16

[illegible]

62-116395-65

[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

February 23, 1949

VI

Subject: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Office of Naval Intelligence, the
Intelligence Division of the Army, and
the Office of Special Investigations,
Inspector General, U. S. Air Force.

The Agreement for Coordination of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office
of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence
Division of the Army, and the Office of
Special Investigations, Inspector General,
U. S. Air Force.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, and the Presidential Directive of October 30, 1947. In addition, cognizance has been taken of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the specific application of that Act is set forth in Section II hereof. All other provisions of this Agreement are apart from and have no relation to the stated requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. In view of the above, it is now agreed that responsibility for the investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage (hereinafter referred to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated hereinafter. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with the other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest. When the organization with primary operating responsibility is unable for any reason to produce material in that field desired by the subscribing agencies, such special arrangements as may be legal or desirable will be worked out through negotiation at the national level prior to activity by one agency in another agency's field. It is recognized by the subscribers hereto that the Headquarters Department of the Army has decentralized such functions to its major subordinate commanders. When the major subordinate commanders of the Department of the Army cannot effect satisfactory special arrangements, the matter will be referred to the Director of Intelligence of the Army for further negotiations at the national level. Close cooperation and coordination between the four subscribing organizations is a mutually recognized necessity.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 [illegible]

II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigations of cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals of all classes in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the State of Hawaii**, and the State of Alaska* except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5.

2. All investigations of violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. There are no territorial or personnel limitations on this provision.

3. The coordination of the investigative activities of civilian agencies in the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the State of Alaska except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5, which provide information regarding subversive movements and activities in these categories.

4. Keeping the other subscribing organizations advised of important developments in these categories within its cognizance, particularly:

a. Activities of inactive reserves of the armed service, including the National Guard.

b. Developments affecting plants engaged in armed forces contracts.

c. Developments concerning the strength, composition, and intentions of civilian groups within its cognizance which are classed as subversive and whose activities are a potential danger to the security of the United States.

d. Developments affecting those vital facilities and vital utilities which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

e. Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

(For b, d, and e above no protective coverage is contemplated.)

*Editorial revision of this Agreement to reflect the statehood of Alaska was approved by the IIC on January 7, 1959.

**Revision to reflect the statehood of Hawaii was approved by the IIC on September 9, 1959.

III. ID, Army will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Army.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Army Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

6. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Army contracts.

IV. ONI will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired naval personnel of the Navy.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Navy Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and in the State of Alaska except as described in Section 5, below.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations and with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government on Kodiak and Afognak Islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula and Adak Island in the Aleutian Chain.*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Navy contracts.

V. The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Air Force.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Air Force Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The investigation of the same cases described above in that portion of Alaska described in Section 5, below, with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians, except as described hereinabove, (1) in that part of the Alaska Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay

---

*This paragraph added. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

northwest to the town of Old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to the Kvichak Bay; (2) in the islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula excluding Kodiak and Afognak Islands which are the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; (3) in the Aleutian Islands excluding Adak Island which is the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; and (4) in the Pribilof Islands.*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Air Force contracts.

VI. 1. Where Sections III, IV, and V involve general territorial coverage, responsibility for such coverage will pass from one element of the armed forces to another automatically when a change of command responsibility ensues. This provision is subject to modification by direct agreement between the interested elements of the armed forces.

2. While investigative jurisdiction over the civilian populace in former enemy territories occupied by the armed forces has been provided for in Sections III, IV, and V above, those provisions are subject to direct adjustment with the Department of State if and when that Department assumes governmental direction in such areas of occupation.

VII. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this Delimitations Agreement. Subject to the exceptions already provided for above, general amendments or modifications involving all of the four subscribing organizations shall be issued in the form of a revised Delimitations Agreement and not as separate instructions.

VIII. During periods of martial law, or periods of predominant armed forces interest not involving martial law, when agreed upon by the subscribing agencies, the provisions of Appendix A or B, hereto attached, will additionally apply.

IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to two or more of the subscribing agencies to the Delimitations Agreement which affect the basic jurisdiction thereof which are

---

*Original paragraph changed. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

now or hereafter mutually entered into by any of the subscribers thereto will be reduced to writing; will thereafter become supplements to the Delimitations Agreement, and distributed only to the extent agreed upon by the co-signers.

(Signed) S. Leroy Irwin
Director of Intelligence,
Department of the Army

(Signed) Thomas B. Inglis
Chief of Naval Intelligence

(Signed) J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

(Signed) Joseph F. Carroll
Director, Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force

APPROVED

APPENDIX A

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

I. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the armed forces commander will assume responsibilities for coverage in these categories. His authority to direct and control the subscribing agencies of the armed forces will be limited only by such instructions as he may receive from the Secretary of Defense. He will have authority to coordinate the intelligence activities of the subscribing agencies in his area of responsibility, within the limits of their available personnel and facilities, by the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibility, nor to issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

II. Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsibility of the armed forces commander will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. They will render such aid and assistance to the armed forces commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. They will furnish all pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to the armed forces commander by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. Each headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised by its agencies of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the armed forces commander.

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JMG

APPENDIX B

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY INTERESTS, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

I. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theaters of operation. When an armed forces commander of such a potential theater is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the armed forces commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

1. Agents of the FBI; of ONI; ID, Army; and the OSI, IG, U.S. Air Force will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of Sections II, III, IV, and V.

2. In addition thereto, the armed forces commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other subscribing agencies will insure that the armed forces commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other agencies.

3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the other three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.

II. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When the commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that he is authorized to augment the coverage with such elements of the subscribing agencies as are under his jurisdiction. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies, the armed forces commander should obtain the necessary authority from the Secretary of Defense.

III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have placed the initiative in the hands of the armed forces commander, whenever any of the other services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended.

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/TTB

Supplemental Agreement No. I
to the Delimitations Agreement

Cooperation and Coordination Between
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Intelligence Division of the Army
The Office of Naval Intelligence and
The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, with a view to promoting the closest possible cooperation and coordination between the Field Services of these agencies agree that the following recommendations will be transmitted to their field installations:

(a) Special Agents in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Divisional Offices, Military Intelligence Officers of the pertinent Armies, District Officers of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, and Naval District Intelligence Officers will maintain close personal liaison between those offices and their representatives, including a meeting of representatives of the four agencies, preferably the officers in charge, at least twice per month, for the purpose of discussing pending and contemplated investigative activities, and any other subject necessary to insure that there is proper coordination of their investigative work.

(b) The close personal liaison to be maintained between representatives of the four agencies at all times should insure that there is not duplication of effort in any field, and that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is maintained. Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use of informers.

(c) A distinction should be recognized between the investigative interest of individual agencies and the coverage interest. It is believed that all four agencies should study, from time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in order to insure that all channels of interest and avenues of information are adequately covered by at least one of the participating agencies.

(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it should be transmitted to the other agency.

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain classes of information are of general interest to the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services in connection with background and knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations, even though the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.

(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature occur, the directors of the four intelligence agencies feel that with proper personal liaison, such differences can be satisfactorily adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various divisional organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. III to the Delimitations Agreement (As Amended June 8, 1950)

Investigative Jurisdiction on Vessels of Military Sea Transportation Service

1. The investigative jurisdiction of all activities under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage on vessels of the Military Sea Transportation Service is as follows:

a. Investigative jurisdiction on vessels purchased by the Navy will be the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

b. Vessels obtained by the Navy through a "bare boat charter" will be under the investigative jurisdiction of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

c. Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Transportation Service which are manned and supervised by their private owners are under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

2. When civilian personnel who are subjects of an investigation under a or b above reach a U.S. port or a port where the FBI has a field agency, or prior to reaching such port, if practicable, the Department of the Navy will promptly furnish the FBI all pertinent information concerning the investigation. If personnel who are subjects of an investigation as above remove themselves from the vessel upon arrival of the vessel in port and further surveillance is considered necessary, the Navy will continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local level that the FBI will make every effort to transfer responsibility upon arrival of the vessel at the port.

3. When the FBI opens an investigation under c above or when an FBI investigation in progress develops or is believed about to develop ramifications under a, b or c above, the FBI will promptly furnish all pertinent information to the Navy and will thereafter coordinate its actions with the Navy whenever and wherever deemed necessary to insure proper pursuit of the case.

#moel6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/JJ6

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM

Supplemental Agreement No. IV to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Private Contractors of the Armed Forces

It is agreed by the subscribers of the Delimitations Agreement (hereinafter referred to as subscribers) that with reference investigations of civilian employees, applicants for employment, directors and key personnel of privately owned plants and facilities, working or bidding on contracts important to the Army, Navy or Air Force (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces) procurement, the following will be followed insofar as practicable. Exceptions thereto will be adjusted by mutual agreement between the subscribers concerned.

a. The Armed Forces will conduct background investigations of such persons unless there is a particular reason for requesting that an investigation be conducted by the FBI or the FBI has a special interest in a particular case and has notified the Armed Forces of such interest.

b. The FBI will conduct complaint investigations of such personnel upon specific request in each case by one or more of the Armed Forces. If one of the Armed Forces has no further need for an investigation requested, but not completed, prompt notification will be made to the FBI.

c. Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces under a above will be terminated and all information passed to the FBI when credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature is uncovered. Upon receipt of such a case, the FBI will proceed as under b above if one of the Armed Forces so requests.

d. When one of the subscribers is aware that another is conducting an investigation on a person or firm identical or closely connected with a person or firm it contemplates investigating, no investigation will be undertaken without the consent of the subscriber which has an investigation in progress. The investigating agency will make available to the other interested agency copies of the reports of the investigation made.

e. Normally, identity of confidential informants will not be communicated from one subscriber to another; however, when such communication occurs, the receiving subscriber will employ the highest possible safeguards to insure that such informants are not compromised. No transmittal of information concerning confidential informants to a third subscriber or to another agency is authorized except by specific consent of the originator.

f. A subscriber who receives a report of investigation from another subscriber may freely transmit copies of such reports to a third subscriber except as provided in e above.

g. A report of complete investigation received by the Armed Forces from the FBI will not be reopened without the approval of the FBI except to obtain additional background information. In such case, the FBI will be furnished copies of all information obtained. Other information required by the Armed Forces will be requested of the FBI.

h. If one of the Armed Forces requests the FBI to conduct an investigation or to conduct additional investigation as provided under g above, and if for any reason the FBI declines or is unable to conduct such investigation or additional investigation, the Armed Force concerned may proceed with the investigation. The FBI will be furnished copies of the results thereof if the FBI so requests or if the Armed Force concerned considers the results to be of FBI interest.

i. Nothing above is to be construed as altering the basic Delimitations Agreement of 1949 or current agreements concerning subversive organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. V to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Reserve and Civilian Components of the Armed Services

It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force may conduct background investigations on members of the inactive reserve and National Guard who are anticipated being called back to active duty, or where an investigation is undertaken for the purpose of determining whether the individual should be disenrolled from his military status, or to determine whether the individual may be granted access to classified military information. The following procedures shall be pursued in each of the above circumstances:

(1) The Intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or Air Force before undertaking such background investigation will consult the FBI to determine: (a) if the FBI has an investigation in progress; if so, no investigation will be undertaken by the intelligence agencies except as may be mutually agreeable to the Armed Force concerned and the FBI; (b) if the FBI already has made an investigation; if so, the results will be made available to the other agencies; (c) if the FBI has information on the individual, even though it may not have conducted an investigation.

(2) If, after consulting the FBI, investigation is undertaken by the other agencies, it will be pursued no further than is necessary to make the determination required by the other agencies, and all information developed pertinent to the four categories will be furnished promptly to the FBI.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

MD616

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JRB

Supplemental Agreement No. VI
to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation in Areas Not Specifically Assigned

It is agreed by the military subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the references therein in paragraphs III. 4., IV. 4., and V. 4. to "areas where the Army (Navy, Air Force) Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein" shall be interpreted as referring to areas where the Department of the Army (Navy, Air Force) is responsible for the administrative and logistic support of the Headquarters of Commands established by the Secretary of Defense.

(Approved by I.I.C. November 4, 1959)

#m Del6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 7, 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (S)

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an (S)

modl6 1-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/TAC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

SECRET

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (S)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. (S)

INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES
TITLE XI, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970
REGULATION OF EXPLOSIVES

1. General

Title XI of the captioned law amends Title 18, United States Code, by adding a new chapter 40 with section numbers 841 through 848 governing the importation, manufacture, distribution and storage of explosive materials and creating certain Federal offenses pertaining to the unlawful use of explosives. Administration of explosives regulation is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury as is investigative jurisdiction over the unlawful acts proscribed in section 842. Under authority contained in section 846 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) have concurrent investigative jurisdiction as to the remainder of chapter 40, i.e., the unlawful acts proscribed in subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of section 844. Although not specified in chapter 40, the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction to investigate all incidents involving explosive or incendiary devices sent through the mails or directed against U.S. Postal Service property.

Title XI greatly broadens Federal authority pertaining to explosives-connected offenses. At the same time, Congress has expressly disclaimed any intent to occupy the field to the exclusion of state law on the same subject matter. To effect both Congressional purposes and to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort it is essential that the limited Federal investigative resources be carefully allocated, particularly in cases in which both the ATF and the FBI have jurisdiction.

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Effect on prior jurisdiction - This agreement applies only to those incidents as to which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction prior to the enactment of the captioned law and to incidents previously subject to FBI investigation by reason of chapter 65, Title 18, United States Code (malicious mischief). Investigative procedures in other types of incidents (e.g., train wrecking, damaging aircraft and motor vehicles, racketeering) shall remain unchanged.

#MOM6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/1416

(b) Primary jurisdiction - Subject to the provisions hereof, the FBI will exercise primary jurisdiction over all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities or at activities, such as transportation and tourist offices, operating under the aegis of a foreign government although not in a diplomatic status, over all alleged violations of subsections 844(d) through (i) which are perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals and all other violations of subsections 844(e) through (g) which are not directed at Treasury Department or Postal Service buildings or functions.

(c) Type of Investigation to be Conducted

(1) Offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which appear at the outset to have been perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals as defined in advance by the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice. If ATF or the Postal Inspection Service has properly initiated investigations and information is subsequently developed indicating apparent involvement of terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals, responsibility shall be relinquished to the FBI unless a determination is made by the Department of Justice that a transfer of responsibilities will unduly impair further investigative efforts.

(2) Alleged offenses against Colleges and Universities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of any alleged violation of section 844 which involves the use or attempted use of explosive (as distinguished from incendiary) materials against the facilities of a college or university. Investigation of alleged violations involving use or attempted use of incendiary materials will be limited initially to the development of background information as prescribed in paragraph 6 below.

(3) Alleged offenses directed against foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities as described in paragraph 2(b) above.

(4) All other alleged violations of subsection 844(f) -- offenses involving use of explosives against United States property or federally financed organizations, and (g) - offenses involving possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used, etc., by the United States - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all violations of subsection 844(g) over which it has primary jurisdiction hereunder, and those violations of 844(f) which are directed at federal property (e.g., a military facility) or a federal function (e.g., a Selective Service or ROTC facility). In other violations of 844(f) the FBI will develop and disseminate background information as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

3. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Violations ancillary to firearms laws violations or violation of section 842 - The Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) of the Department of the Treasury will exercise investigative jurisdiction over violations of section 844 which are ancillary to its primary jurisdiction over the Federal firearms laws or over section 842 of Title XI.

(b) Violations of subsection 844(d) - interstate transportation of explosives with unlawful intent and subsection 844(i) - offenses against property used in or affecting commerce - Subject to paragraph 2b, above, the ATF will exercise primary investigative jurisdiction over violations of subsection 844(d) and (i) and will conduct a full investigation thereof unless notified by the Criminal Division that pursuant to paragraph 2(c)(1), above, the Department of Justice has requested FBI investigation in a particular matter.

(c) Violations directed at Treasury Department property or functions - The ATF shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at Treasury Department property or functions and will conduct a full investigation of such violations.

4. Postal Inspection Service Jurisdiction

The Postal Inspection Service shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at U.S. Postal Service property or functions.

5. Special Considerations

(a) Bomb Threats, false information (section 844(e)) - The ATF and the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction over violations of section 844(e) against Treasury Department or Postal Service property or functions, respectively. The FBI shall have jurisdiction over all other violations of section 844(e). Upon receipt of information alleging or suggesting a violation of subsection 844(e), the investigative agency concerned will review available information to determine whether the identity of the offender is known or can be readily ascertained and, if not, whether the evidence suggests a pattern or plan of such offenses by a particular offender or against a particular victim. If such a pattern appears or if the offender is identified, all available information will be disseminated as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

(b) Use/carrying explosive in commission of a felony (section 844(h)) - Violations of 844(h) should be handled as an adjunct of the felony from which they arise and should be discussed with the appropriate United States Attorney or Division of the Department handling prosecution of the underlying felony offense. The agency having jurisdiction over the underlying felony will have investigative jurisdiction over the 844(h) violation (e.g., bank robbery is under FBI jurisdiction).

(c) Violations of 26 U.S.C. 5861 (destructive devices) - In incidents involving alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 844 (which may also involve a violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861), ATF shall not exercise its primary jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 5861 involving destructive devices, but the incident shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of these guidelines. This is in no way a relinquishment by ATF of its investigative jurisdiction under Title II of the Gun Control Act of 1968.

6. Development of Background Information

Some incidents such as those directed against Federal property or functions (paragraph 2(b) above) require immediate full federal investigation. Others require a more circumspect approach and will result in full Federal investigation only after consideration of factors pertinent to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, in those incidents which these guidelines do not prescribe immediate full investigation, the investigative agency having jurisdiction will develop background information which includes (a) facts bearing on motivation such as involvement of the suspected perpetrators in terrorist/revolutionary activities, organized crime, labor-management disputes, or racial-religious hate activities; (b) the applicability of state and local laws and likelihood of state or local investigative and prosecutive actions; and (c) any other available facts indicating whether or not the offense warrants Federal investigation and prosecution. Such background information will be submitted telephonically (202-739-2745) or by teletype (710-822-0008) to the General Crimes Section of the Criminal Division and to the appropriate United States Attorney. The Criminal Division will advise the investigative agency concerned whether the matter warrants submission to any other Division or Section of the Criminal Division, and when so warranted the Criminal Division will transmit the information to such other Division or Section.

7. Full Investigation

A full investigation will be initiated immediately in those instances wherein such investigation is specified herein. In other instances full investigation will be initiated only upon direction of the Department of Justice after consideration by the Division having cognizance over the matter of the background information developed under paragraph 6 above.

8. Reports

Copies of case reports prepared in matters investigated under these guidelines will be furnished directly to the Department of Justice and the appropriate United States Attorney. All investigative agencies

shall submit initial reports as soon as practicable to the Department of Justice and shall submit progress reports once each 30 days or as soon thereafter as possible. The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice will be informed as soon as possible in each instance wherein an investigative agency initiates an investigation under section 844. Such notification is of critical importance to the avoidance of duplication of investigative activities. Also each agency subscribing to these guidelines shall, upon instituting investigation regarding possible violations of section 844, immediately notify other subscribing agencies having a logical interest therein. Also, a sufficient level of follow-up liaison and dissemination shall be maintained to avoid duplication of investigative effort.

Additionally, each such agency will exchange information on a timely basis and in a manner which will not interfere with ongoing investigations relative to types, sources, movement, and storage of explosives which are the subject of its investigations. Information regarding significant developments in investigations being conducted under these guidelines and information of an intelligence nature developed incidental to investigations which is of logical interest to the Department of Justice shall be furnished promptly to the Criminal Division of that Department which will be responsible for any necessary further dissemination within that Department.

9. Review of Guidelines

These guidelines shall be reviewed on a continuing basis by the parties hereto to determine whether problems exist in their administration which should be alleviated or whether modification of any of the terms of the agreement are needed in the interests of better law enforcement.

10. Summary

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
842	Regulatory provision violations	ATF
844(d)	Interstate transportation (except by mail) of explosives with unlawful intent	ATF

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
844(e)	Bomb threats - false information - Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
844(f)	Offenses against property of the United States or federally financed organizations --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other (including colleges and universities)	FBI
844(g)	Possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used by the United States --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
844(h)	Use/carrying explosives in commission of a felony	Agency having jurisdiction over underlying felony

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
844(i)	Offenses against property used in or affecting commerce	ATF
All Sections	All offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals	FBI - Unless another agency has started investigation before receipt of information indicating terrorist/revolutionary involvement. In this event see paragraph 2c(1) above.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

["I. Purpose of Agreement

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) originates, and receives from other sources, large numbers of reports on individuals and organizations. One purpose of this agreement is to define that portion of the information on file with, or received or originated by, the FBI, which the United States Secret Service (USSS) desires to receive in connection with its protective responsibilities.

"The USSS has statutory authority to protect, or to engage in certain activities to protect, the President and certain other persons. (Certain other persons, as used in this agreement, refers to those persons protected by the Secret Service under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056.) The authority of the USSS to protect the President or certain other persons is construed to authorize it to investigate organizations or individuals and to interview individuals who might constitute a threat to the President or certain other persons. The FBI has statutory authority to investigate assault, killing or kidnaping and attempts or conspiracies to kill or kidnap the President and other designated individuals.

"The FBI will make available to the USSS information it may request or information which by its nature reveals a definite or possible threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

"A second purpose of this agreement is to insure the most effective protection for the President and certain other persons by establishing a clear division of responsibility between the FBI and the USSS. Such division will also avoid compromising investigations or sources and needless duplication of effort.

"II. General Responsibilities

"The USSS is charged by Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056, with the responsibility of protecting the person of the President of the United States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer in the order of succession to the office of President, and the Vice President-elect; protecting the person of a former President and his wife during his lifetime and the person of a widow of a former President until her death or remarriage, and minor children of a former President until they reach 16 years of age, unless such protection is declined; protecting persons who are determined from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Advisory Committee, as being major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who should receive such protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection); protecting the person of a visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad (unless such persons decline protection).

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP 2 ALM/[illegible]

"The Executive Protective Service, under the control of the Director, USSS, is charged by Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202, with protection of the Executive Mansion and grounds in the District of Columbia; any building in which Presidential offices are located; foreign diplomatic missions located in the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia; and foreign diplomatic missions located in such other areas in the United States, its territories and possessions, as the President, on a case-by-case basis, may direct.

"The FBI is charged under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, with investigative jurisdiction over the assault, killing or kidnaping, and attempts or conspiracies to assault, kill or kidnap the President of the United States and other designated individuals.

"The FBI has responsibility for Federal investigations of all violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117 and 1201, relating to the 'Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests in the United States.'

"The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of a wide range of the criminal statutes of the United States including primary jurisdiction over matters affecting the internal security of the United States.

"III. Exchange of Information and Coordination of Responsibilities

"The USSS undertakes to identify individuals or groups who because of their propensities or characteristics, may be dangerous to the President of the United States and certain other persons. To assist the USSS in identifying such individuals and groups the FBI agrees to furnish to the USSS, information (other than public source information or information originating with other U. S. agencies) from its files or which may come to its attention which by its nature reveals a danger or possible danger to the President or certain other persons, or which can be construed as falling within the categories of information desired by the USSS as set forth in Section IV of this agreement.

"The FBI will inform the USSS of the identity of individuals or organizations who come to the attention of the FBI as knowingly and willfully advocating, abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States, or the Government of any state, territory, or possession, or political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government. The FBI will furnish the USSS with reports on such individuals or organizations as requested. During investigation by the FBI of such individuals or organizations, the FBI will be alert and promptly notify the USSS of any information indicating a possible plot against the person of the President and certain other persons.

"The USSS agrees that it will conduct no investigation of individuals or groups identified or suspected of being threats to the internal security of the United States without notifying the FBI. However, when time for

consultation is not available, and an indication of immediate danger exists, the USSS may take such action as is necessary with respect to carrying out its protective responsibilities. Any information obtained by the USSS during such action will be furnished to the FBI as expeditiously as possible.

"The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction.

"It will be the responsibility of the FBI to advise the USSS when investigation is being initiated under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751 and thereafter to furnish the USSS with copies of the FBI investigative reports as they are prepared. It will be the responsibility of the USSS to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention which reasonably indicates that a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, has been or is being committed.

"The USSS also agrees to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention indicating a violation of any other statutes over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction.

"The FBI, under its responsibility for investigation of violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117, 1201 and 1751 will take cognizance of the protective responsibilities of the Treasury Department under Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202 and Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 and thus does not limit or interfere with the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury in the discharge of his statutory protective responsibilities. This is not to be construed as vesting concurrent investigative jurisdiction with the Treasury Department with respect to investigations of individuals or organizations engaged in activities affecting the national security including terrorism, treason, sabotage, espionage, counter-espionage, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, seditious conspiracy, neutrality matters, Foreign Agents Registration Act, or any other Statute or Executive Order relating to national security. Any investigations of such groups or individuals for any reasons other than in connection with protective responsibilities must be closely coordinated with and have the concurrence of the FBI in order to minimize interference with national security responsibilities of the FBI.

"IV. Information to be Furnished to the United States Secret Service by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

"A. When an individual or group is referred by the FBI to the USSS, the following information will be furnished to the extent available:

"Individua[illegible] Identification data including [illegible]ame or names, addresses, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment, and marital status.

"Organization - Name or names, address or addresses, officers, size, purpose or goals of organization, source of financial support, background data and such other relevant information as may be available.

"Reason for Referral - Statement of the class or classes of information described in Section IV B under which the individual or organization belongs.

"Information in FBI Files - A summary, as appropriate, of pertinent portions of any FBI file on an individual or organization referred.

"FBI Identification Records - The USSS will make specific requests in each instance where a check of the FBI identification records is desired.

"B. Types of information to be referred:

"1. Information concerning attempts, threats, or conspiracies to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by the USSS or other U. S. or foreign officials in the U. S. or abroad.

"2. Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means, or attempts personally to contact such officials for that purpose.

"3. Information concerning threatening, irrational, or abusive written or oral statements about U. S. Government or foreign officials.

"4. Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U. S. demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic establishments.

"5. Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-making; concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or other implements of war; or other terrorist activity.

"6. Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a desire to defect from the United States and who demonstrate one or more of the following characteristics:

a. Irrational or suicidal behavior or other emotional instability.

b. Strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment.

c. A propensity toward violence.

"7. Information concerning persons who may be considered potentially dangerous to individuals protected by the USSS because of their background or activities, including evidence of emotional instability or participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the United States.

"V. Provision of Federal Bureau of Investigation Personnel to Protect the President and Other Protected Persons

"The USSS may, in accordance with Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 request FBI Agents be detailed to the USSS in order to augment the capacity of the USSS to perform its protective duties. Such requests should be addressed to the Director of the FBI.

"FBI Agents detailed to the USSS are under the direction and exclusive operational control of the Director of the USSS for the period of their assignment. The FBI Agents so detailed may perform an armed or other protective function.

"VI. Implementation of Agreement

"In order to effect the best possible security of the President and certain other persons and places whose protection is the responsibility of the USSS, the FBI and the USSS will construe the terms of this agreement liberally and will take such steps as are necessary to insure the proper exchange and coordination of information.

"The agreement shall be reviewed annually by representatives of the FBI and the USSS, or at such other times as the FBI or the USSS may request, to insure that the agreement is both practical and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Director of the FBI and the Director of the USSS.

"This agreement supersedes all prior agreements between the FBI and the USSS.

July 16, 1973
Date

BY /s/ Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

July 30, 1973
Date

BY /s/ James J. Rowley
Director
United States Secret Service"

#NDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

REC- 106

1.2-116395-64

April 9, 1975

BY LIAISON

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Flemister
1-Mr. Rachner

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Davis:

In connection with a request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, it is requested that the following documents, which were originated or received by representatives of the National Security Council, be cleared for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee:

Memorandum dated November 6, 1950, from J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and Mr. Raymond P. Whearty, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

DELIVERED BY LIAISON
ON 4/15/75 LES

Letter dated November 8, 1950, from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council, which encloses a report captioned "Report by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to the National Security Council Regarding the Recent Outbreak of Violence by Puerto Rican Nationalists"

Letter dated July 25, 1961, from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference,

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

BCR:hc
(7)

BCR

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

3:38 PM

8 APR 1 1975

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council

to Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which encloses a memorandum concerning United States internal security programs under the control of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee

Inasmuch as the Senate Select Committee requested the above documents by close of business April 7, 1975, your prompt attention to this matter would be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

NOTE:

In view of the urgency of the Senate Select Committee request, the above documents were hand carried to the NSC Staff on 4/4/75, by Liaison Agent B. C. Rachner. This letter constitutes a formal request which as in the past has been requested by the National Security Council Staff.

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JAG

April 7, 1975

Sen study - 75

Mr. Wannall:

The statement in the attached of ~~the~~ Third Agency rule is accurate and does not present legal problems.

As an observation paragraph number 7 of the document titled "Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committee," dated March 28, 1975, (attached) appears to be subject to various interpretations. This paragraph and in particular the second sentence of the paragraph appears to allow the agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is indirectly involved and the material is sensitive without first contacting the Third Agency. Any notification of the Third Agency in this instance of the furnishing of such information to the Committee would be after the fact. The term indirectly is not defined. Additionally, this paragraph allows the Agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is directly involved and the material is nonsensitive without checking with the Third Agency involved. It would appear the language in paragraph number 7 should be tightened up and the appropriate terms defined.

REC-106 62-116395-64

Legal Counsel Division

6 APR 15 1975

3 ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

4/9/75

ABOVE WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTN OF JOHN WARNER, GENERAL COUNSEL, CIA, WHO ADVISED THAT HE AGREED WITH BU'S OBSERVATION AND WOULD ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM IN NEW PAPER BEING PREPARED.

HFS

62-116395

5-HFS

PVD:dkg (4)

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

#MORI 6

"ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAIN
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

ENCLOSURE

62-116[illegible]-64

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to interrelationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency [illegible] request
2. Originating agencies

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

#moe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM KTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-64

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to inter-relationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency security review
2. Operational concerns

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a~~n~~ homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/26/01 BY SP2 ALM/lt/STS

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-64

contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community and then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(2) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ✓
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : G. R. Steel GRS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

By agreement, the FBI is currently conducting full field investigations regarding SSC staff personnel. These have extremely short (2 week) deadlines which are identical to those afforded Presidential appointments and are, therefore, given preferential treatment in opening, assigning, and following field progress. The Special Inquiry Unit of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry Section, which has about twice its normal case load, is handling these requests. Senator Church, Chairman, SSC, originally estimated that between 35 and 40 staff members would be submitted for investigation. As of today, 4-3-75, we have received requests for 65 such investigations from the SSC and the end does not appear to be in sight. They are received in bunches as many as 6 at a time, which is not the even flow expected and presents an additional burden.

In addition it is expected that similar requests will be forthcoming in the near future from the HSC since we have a similar agreement with it. Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the HSC, has estimated "probably no more than about 25 staff members will be hired." It remains to be seen if this estimate also falls short of actual receipts.

Since there is no charge for these full field investigations they will have to be considered in the budget. It is noted the current charge for a full field investigation, where applicable, is $2028.

EX 104   MCT   REG 44   62-116395-63

ACTION: For information. Since it appears the nucleus of the Committee has been formed, it is suggested Senator Church be contacted and queried regarding a more realistic (30 day) deadline on the remaining investigations concerning future staff members and their replacements.

APR 14 1975

[redacted]

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Walsh

1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Steel

GRS:dc
-6-

Discussed with Wm Miller 4-4-75. He agreed to 30-day deadline on future members except a few which he will indicate still need in 2 weeks. GRS

COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/ts

#MDR16

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116464

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

APR 17 1975

84 APR 18 1975

4-528

62-116395- 62X
62X1 **CHANGED TO** 62-116464 - 2
3

JUN 12 1975

Hmk/cz

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

5010-106

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/3/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum recommends that the attached draft of a paper prepared by CIA entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment and that a member of the Division be named to represent the FBI in future meetings with legal representatives from other U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies and departments. The purpose of such a group is to develop recommendations for changes in existing laws or the proposal of new legislation which Mr. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence can offer to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

At a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community 2/27/75, a draft paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," was distributed to all members. This paper was drafted by Mr. Marvin Smith of CIA. It is considered a starting point for the Intelligence Community to identify areas in existing statutes that should be changed, as well as to recommend new legislation deemed necessary to clarify for the Congress and the American people the authorities, the limitations and missions of various member agencies or departments of the Intelligence Community.

In furnishing copies of this paper to members, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Mr. John Clarke, acknowledged the paper presents a starting point and in no way should be considered a final draft. He suggested that Legal Counsel representatives of each agency or department of USIB review the document and submit their comments directly to Mr. Marvin Smith, on Agency code 143, extension 4055. Following the receipt of such comments from the legal offices of member agencies and departments, it was proposed that a meeting would be called in an effort to begin drafting a paper representative of the Intelligence Community which would reflect recommended changes in existing statutes or proposals for new legislation.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/dfg

REC-10 62-116395-62
APR 14 1975

Enclosure
62-116395

ENCLOSURE

SEE ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, PAGE 3

CONTINUED - OVER

WOC:dln/ebc
(5)

R 21 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

The Department of Justice is represented on the Ad Hoc Group by Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, and there will be Departmental participation in this matter.

ACTION:

(1) That the attached CIA paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment in concert with representatives of the Intelligence Division.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division designate a representative to participate in the drafting of a paper to be furnished by Mr. Colby to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

Tul

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Wannall dtd 3/3/75
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, 3/5/75, JH:msl

In view of the direct impact on operations of the Intelligence Division, we feel that representatives of that Division should participate in and coordinate these matters. Legal Counsel will review attached CIA paper and will furnish representative to assist the Intelligence Division regarding proposals and legislative language.

DRAFT

AMBIGUITIES AND THE LAW

CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI and, to some extent, several other Federal Agencies, collect information and produce intelligence, but of different kinds and for different purposes. This is recognized in practice but is not as clearly established in the law. Given some lack of clarity in the law and some uncertainty regarding limits placed on intelligence activities, misunderstanding and fear of abuse of power easily thrive~~s~~. In reality, however, in the implementation of mission and charters and in direction and control, there are not as many unresolved ambiguities as the uninformed may suppose.

The experience following the National Security Act of 1947 is such that it is now possible to eliminate some of the vagueness of the language of the Act. The certainty and public confidence that should result from clarifications in the law should far outweigh any disadvantages. A number of possible amendments or additions to current laws have already been mentioned, and proposed legislation has already been submitted for some. These ideas and others are suggested, below.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 BLM/TG
FM OR16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-162

1) Clarify CIA's mission and charter by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect:

--that included in the proper functions of the Agency are (a) collection of foreign intelligence information; (b) conduct of activities to carry out CIA's counter-intelligence responsibilities overseas; and (c) conduct of covert action operations overseas when authorized by the President;

--that CIA's responsibility to produce intelligence relates only to foreign intelligence;

--that it is a duty of the Agency to develop advanced technical equipment to improve the collection and processing of foreign intelligence information; and

--that the conduct of any counterintelligence operation or other activity overseas directed specifically at U.S. citizens (other than CIA employees) will be undertaken in coordination with the FBI or as requested by the FBI or by other USG agencies in coordination with the FBI.

2) Establish the authority for those agencies engaged in the collection and production of foreign intelligence to carry on certain specified activities within the United States, such as:

--protection of classified information and their own installations against penetration and compromise;

--investigation of employees, applicants, and those persons who could assist the U.S. foreign intelligence effort;

--investigation of employees and other individuals to be granted access to sensitive information;

✓ --collection of foreign intelligence information from foreign nationals and from cooperating U.S. citizens;

--establishment of mechanisms in support of foreign intelligence activities; and

--cooperation with the FBI in investigations relating to the unauthorized disclosure of foreign intelligence.

3) Remove uncertainty regarding responsibility for internal security matters by modifying appropriate laws to establish clearly:

--that the collection of counterintelligence information in the United States and the collection of information related to internal security are functions of the FBI;

--that the responsibility for the production of intelligence related to internal security rests with the FBI; and

--that with due regard to assessed reliability of the information and responsibilities for protecting sources and methods, those agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities will make available to the FBI and other Federal agencies, as appropriate, the security and counterintelligence information relating to foreign nationals in the United States and to U.S. citizens which is derived as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities.

4) Recognize international terrorism and international illegal drug activities as threats to U.S. national security and proper targets for U.S. foreign intelligence efforts, as well as for internal security operations.

5) Provide protection against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods by:

--providing for the protection of intelligence sources and methods on a statutory basis independent of Executive Order 11652;

--clarifying that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods related to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence;

--assigning to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the duty of protecting intelligence sources and methods related to internal security and to counterintelligence within the United States;

--imposing specific burdens, upon officers and employees of all branches of the government and others granted official access, not to disclose such information without authorization,

and providing criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures;

--establishing effective injunctive recourse, through the Attorney General, for protection of all intelligence sources and methods;

--providing for in camera judicial review of material revealing intelligence sources and methods when relevant and necessary to criminal and civil proceedings;

--delineating authorities and responsibilities for investigating suspected or discovered unauthorized disclosures by (a) U.S. citizens overseas and (b) all persons within the United States.

6) Delineate areas of interagency assistance that facilitate performance of authorized missions, promote economy of resources, and as a matter of policy are desirable, for example:

--cooperation in research and development of technical collection and information processing equipment, methods and techniques;

--loan or supply of equipment, methods and techniques;

--provision of training in special skills and techniques;

--passage of information derived as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities to those agencies responsible for the matters involved.

A few changes in the procedures for reviewing intelligence activities might add considerable understanding and confidence. Of paramount importance is a form of congressional oversight that permits the provision to Congress of the necessary information in a timely, efficient and controlled manner. It is recognized that a number of Committees in both the Senate and House must be informed of substantive intelligence, operational matters and fiscal details in varying degrees. Just as in the executive branch, the test of access should be

"need-to-know." To apply this test and to control and protect sensitive information provided to Congress, a focal point within Congress would be extremely helpful. Whether a joint committee or not, such a focal point would also be valuable in facilitating changes in laws affecting intelligence activities. Congress might find that a more uniform approach to budget presentation and review would provide better insight and understanding.

The foregoing suggestions are by no means definitive. They do, however, present areas that in the experience of the intelligence community deserve careful attention.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

TO : Legal Counsel Division

DATE: 4/7/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MATERIAL; AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE EXHIBITS IN "INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER ON JURISDICTION" DATED 2/13/75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that on 4/7/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Executive Office Building, Washington, personally reviewed and approved each of the following exhibits from the captioned paper for release to the Select Committee:

1) Exhibit A - Historical Highlights.

2) Exhibit B - Confidential Memoranda: John Edgar Hoover, 8/24/36; 8/25/36; and, 9/10/36.

3) Exhibit C - Presidential Directives: 6/26/39; 9/6/39; 1/8/43; 7/24/50; 12/15/53; and, 10/30/47.

4) Exhibit D - The Delimitations Agreement of 2/23/49, as amended.

5) Exhibit E - National Security Council Charters of the IIC and the ICIS.

6) Exhibit F - National Security Action Memorandum 161, 6/9/62.

7) Exhibit G - Department of Justice Memorandum dated 3/5/64, setting forth new Charter for the IIC under supervision of the Attorney General.

8) Exhibit H - Preamble and Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947.

9) Exhibit L - Excerpt from former FBI Director Hoover's briefing of the National Security Council on 11/6/58.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/ds
#60216

REC-23 62-116395-61

EX-110

5 APR 10 1975

ALL:vb
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

10) Exhibit N - Background information concerning the emergency detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950.

11) Exhibit O - Memorandum by former FBI Director Hoover, dated 5/11/61, concerning Cuban individuals and groups.

12) Exhibit Q - Memorandum of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark dated 9/14/67, concerning urban riot activities.

13) Exhibit R - Departmental Memorandum dated 2/18/69, concerning instructions on campus disorders.

14) Exhibit S - Excerpts from testimony of former Director Hoover.

15) Section of paper on "Statutes."

It was explained to Mr. Wilderotter that the extracted exhibits were letters and reports to and from The White House and/or National Security Council with which there are "Third Agency Rule" problems. As soon as cleared, it was planned to forward these to the Committee. He requested to review these exhibits prior to forwarding.

ACTION:

Upon "Third Agency Rule" approval regarding other exhibits, have same reviewed by Mr. Wilderotter. INTD will insure exhibits are made available for Mr. Wilderotter's review.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott
(Attention: Mr. J.W. Awe
Room 5644, JEH)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/
#MDR16

Project Senstudy 75, established within the Intelligence Division, for the purpose of developing a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress. Bureau file 62-116395 has been opened for this Project.

Because of the unusual factors relating to this entire Project, such as the sensitive nature of much of the material involved, urgency for handling, necessity for having the file very readily available to the working staff at all times, and similar other reasons, it is essential that the file be maintained in the work area of the Project which, effective 4/14/75, will be in room 4063, JEH. The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to have Files and Communications Division take necessary steps to arrange for the maintenance of the file in the designated room rather than in the usual manner.

There has already been much publicity about the Select Committees and we anticipate much more. This involves many newspaper stories. It is, therefore, believed very desirable that a Sub A file to the main file be opened as the standardized repository for newspaper articles. As a first step, it will be necessary that a few articles already in the main file be extracted and placed in the new Sub A file in the usual chronological order.

Per agreement between Awe (Div. 4) & Phillips (Div 5) we will NOT open a Sub A for newsclips but keep them in T-folder w/ Project.
4/14/75

EX104
REC-8 62-116395-60

The foregoing matters have been already discussed with Mr. J. W. Awe, Unit Chief, of the Files and Communications Division.

APR 15 1975

66-1740-

RECOMMENDATION:

This memorandum to be referred to the Files and Communications Division for appropriate action as above.

62-116395

SFP:jvl
(6)

WOC

WRW

Phillips

FIVE

~~APR 23 1975~~

Handled by
Special File Room
4-25-75

84 APR 25 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

FROM : W. O. Cregar

DATE: 4/9/75

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. C. Flemister
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

#moe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

This memorandum provides for the record the temporary reassignment of Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division.

Project Senstudy 75 has been established within the Intelligence Division, effective 4/4/75. Its purpose is to develop a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible.

Pursuant to the establishment of Project Senstudy 75, certain Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division have been relieved of substantive assignments. They are as follows:

Section Chief William O. Cregar, effective 4/4/75, has assumed the responsibilities of administering the Project.

Unit Chief Elmer W. Larson, effective the same date, will function as Cregar's Number One Man.

62-116395-59

REC-71

Liaison Supervisor Leon F. Schwartz has been relieved of his regular liaison duties and will function as the Liaison Officer in contact with the intelligence community for Project Senstudy 75.

APR 10 1975

Unit Chief Seymor F. Phillips, effective 4/8/75, was assigned to the Project and will function as the Review Coordinator.

1 - Personnel file of W. O. Cregar
1 - Personnel file of E. W. Larson
1 - Personnel file of L. F. Schwartz
1 - Personnel file of S. F. Phillips

5-6mb

WOC:lmh lmh
(12)

CONTINUED - OVER

54 APR 16 1975

At this time the length of the temporary assignment is indefinite. Upon the termination of Project Senstudy 75, the Bureau Supervisors mentioned above will revert back to their substantive assignments and an appropriate memorandum for the record will be prepared.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-12-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

In attached W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum of 3-6-75, captioned as above, it is recommended that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we can anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

In this regard, it is suggested that all Divisions receiving requests for information in connection with testimony before this Committee respond in the same commendable and expeditious manner that they responded in connection with the preparation of the Director's Brief on his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights. The format of this information should generally be as follows:

1 - Heading in all caps, centered, brief description of contents;

2 - White, watermarked bond paper, 8 x 10 1/2";

3 - At least a 2" left margin. This is essential since material will be inserted into a folder;

4 - Double spaced;

5 - Do not number pages;

6 - Each Division will be responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the information furnished in final form. This will also include up-dating any information previously furnished;

EX 104 REC-23 62-116395-58

7 - Use "Mag" card typewriter (courier ~~ball~~); identifying caption on the card folder should be adequate to readily identify it with the corresponding paper. In addition to the ~~caption, card~~ folder should also have the name of the originating Division.

APR 10 1975

8 - Furnish all "Mag" cards to the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, along with the write-up.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.
JCF:law (11)

1 - Each Assistant Director - Enc.

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALK/STS

56 APR 18 1975

ENCLOSURE

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memo
Re: Senstudy 75

All mail should be routed through and coordinated with the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, and all contacts with the Senate and House committees will be handled by representatives of the Legal Analysis Office, Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division.

Each Division should advise the Legislative Matters Section the identity of individual who will be the contact and coordinator of that Division's responsibilities along with his phone extension.

The Intelligence Division will be responsible for representing the Bureau on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and the identity of such individual should be made known to the Legislative Matters Section. In addition, the Intelligence Division should accumulate the data identified in paragraphs 1 and 2, as they pertain to the FBI, in Mr. John M. Clarke's memorandum to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and submit this in the form suggested above.

The Administrative Division is requested to obtain the information set forth in paragraph 3 of Mr. Clarke's memorandum, also furnishing this data in narrative form as explained above.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TJL

DATE: 3/6/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Each Assistant Director

1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum recommends that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated 3/5/75, reported the results of a meeting between Senator Church and Mr. Colby wherein Senator Church advised he anticipated asking all agencies and departments of the Intelligence Community for (1) Organizational charts broken down to a branch level going back to 1947, (2) Copies of all budgets since 1947 and (3) Documents reflecting all cash flows since 1947.

Attached is a copy of a short letter from Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community to Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director, SSC. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Clarke to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. This memorandum sets out in more detail what information the SSC will be seeking from all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. It should be noted that on page two of Mr. Clarke's memorandum he notes a formal request from Senator Church to all agencies can be expected.

The Intelligence Division believes considerable time and effort will be required from several Divisions to pull this information together. It is believed we should begin now to assemble the data in anticipation of a request.

ENCLOSURE

EX 104

REC-23 62-116395-58

ACTION: If you agree, the Legal Counsel Division will coordinate this matter and assign responsibilities to appropriate Division for the collection and preparation of the material we anticipate the SSC will request from the FBI.

1 APR 10 1975

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(16) ebc

TJL

LEGAL COUNSEL TO
MR ADAMS MEMO
3/12/75 JCF:LAW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/LMS

MOR 16

5-

WRW

2 — ENCLOSURE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

4 March 1975

#MOR16
[illegible] UNCLASSIFIED
1-18-01 SP-2 ALM/JTG

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear ~~Mr. Miller~~ Bill:

Pursuant to your request, I have advised all members of the Ad Hoc Group of the United States Intelligence Board and Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, of Senator Church's request to provide legal authority and organization charts of USIB entities from their inception. I also have alerted them to the Committee's desire for comprehensive historical data on personnel, budgets, and cash flow for the same periods. They will expect to hear more directly from Senator Church on these matters.

By early next week, we will begin providing you the CIA data in response to the Chairman's request. The first set of annexes developed under the auspices of the USIB Ad Hoc Group is ready and I am having five copies of each run off for your use. Please advise if more copies are desired.

Sincerely,

John

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment:
Memo to Ad Hoc Group

62-116395-58

ENCLOSURE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

4 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review

SUBJECT: Information Requested by Senate Select Committee Staff Director

1. Senator Church has asked the Director to provide to the Senate Select Committee copies of CIA legal authorities and organization charts to branch levels, 1947-1975. He also indicated he wants similar authorities and charts for all USIB entities from their inceptions. In the case of CIA this will be from 1947; NSA from 1952; DIA from 1961; etc.

2. The Committee is seeking a comprehensive historical base line for each U.S. intelligence organization--its structure and the people involved over time. Therefore, Senator Church has asked that the names of all incumbents who have held supervisory responsibilities over the period, down through the branch level, also be provided. The Staff Director has been made aware of the difficulties involved in tracing personnel assignments too far back but asks that every effort be made to meet the request. CIA is proceeding accordingly.

3. Senator Church has also asked for budget and cash flow data on all U.S. intelligence organizations from their inceptions. The CIA finds that the source and uses tables, employed in annual financial reports, provides the historical profile desired. Supplemental data on specific programs can follow if requested. Senator Church wants data which will show specific patterns of expenditures

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-58

as distinct from budgets and appropriations. A formal request from the Chairman to all agencies on this matter can be expected.

4. The Senate Select Committee will be ready to receive classified material this week. It is suggested that Ad Hoc Group members begin assembling the legal, organizational, personnel, and budgetary data for early submission. I have provided Mr. Miller, Staff Director, with a list of Ad Hoc Principals, phone numbers, titles, etc. He understands that the central point for DOD is Mr. Thomas K. Latimer and for Treasury, Mr. Edward C. Schmults, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement.

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

1-Mr. Callahan
1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Jenkins

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/21/75

1-Each Assistant Director
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Farrington
1-Mr. Fulton

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

By memorandum Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams dated 3/12/75, the Legal Counsel Division indicated that its Legislative Matters Section would coordinate and assign responsibilities within the Bureau for the collection and preparation of material for the Senate Select Committee.

This memorandum instructed Intelligence Division to accumulate data which was identified in a memorandum from Mr. John M. Clarke from the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of the Intelligence Committee. Clarke's memorandum was attached to W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall memorandum dated 3/6/75. The identified data to be collected outlined in Clarke's memorandum was proposed-type data that the Senate Select Committee has indicated an interest in.

In view of 3/19/75 letter subsequently received from Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, to the Attorney General outlining a request for specific FBI documents they are interested in receiving, the Intelligence Division has begun accumulating this specific data. In view of this request for specific data, the Intelligence Division will not accumulate the data outlined in the Clarke memorandum since it was only in the nature of proposed data and differs from the specific data to be collected which is extensive in nature.

ACTION:

For information.

EX 104

REC-23

62-116395-57

APR 10 1975

#m0816

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/MG

ABF:enm
(19)

5-1006

70 APR 15 1975

OPTIONAL FO[illegible]NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Groover

DATE: 4/8/75

FROM : J. J. Clynick

JJC

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In order to respond to item III-C of Senator Church's letter dated 3/19/75, it was necessary to survey all field offices. This was done, the response summarized and forwarded to Legal Counsel Division by memo dated 4/3.

Attached hereto are the file copies of the teletypes from the field used to compile our response. It is believed these should be filed as one item as an EBF.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached be filed as an EBF.

Enclosure
Field Offices [illegible]

JJC:jmb

~~ENC BEHIND FILE~~

ENCLOSURE

63

REC-11 62-116395-56

ST-112

APR 10 1975

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM

3 - JJC

70 APR 16 1975

MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

62-116395-56

1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/FFG

Budget & Acct.
[illegible]

NR004 AL CODE

4:09 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 CHP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALBANY

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPE, THE FOLLOWING IS ALBANY DIVISION'S RESPONSE:

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED ON PART-TIME BASIS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

8 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 20 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 30 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 35 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 45 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 50 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 60 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 75 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED ON A PART-TIME BASIS TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS ON

3/4

PAGE 2

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

6 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 5 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 4 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 30 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 35 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 45 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 60 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.

END.

2

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
[illegible]
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

NR001 AQ CODE

10:55AM URGENT 3-36-75 PD

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: ALBUQUERQUE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

ALBUQUERQUE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 25 PER CENT OF HIS TIME IN THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THREE AGENTS WHO WORK THESE MATTERS ON A PART-TIME BASIS WITH 20 PER CENT, 40 PER CENT AND 40 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME DEVOTED TO THESE MATTERS.

ONE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THERE ARE 15 RESIDENT AGENTS EACH OF WHO WORK APPROXIMATELY FIVE PERSENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

END

JTG FBIHQ CLR

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/TAB

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

3

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Dcw

R-4028

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR006 AX CODE

6:20PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VAN

TO: BUREAU (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTIONS)

FROM: ALEXANDRIA (80-131)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

ALEXANDRIA, HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS. APPROXIMATELY SIXTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS.

ALEXANDRIA AGENTS PERFORMING IS WORK AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

3 SPECIAL AGENTS	NINETY PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	SIXTY-FIVE PERCENT
4 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIFTEEN PERCENT
5 SPECIAL AGENTS	TEN PERCENT

ALEXANDRIA HAS THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO CI WORK AS FOLLOWS:

1 SPECIAL AGENT	TEN PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIVE PERCENT

END.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/06 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3/R

4

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR001 AN CODE

5:45 PM 3-25-75 NITEL MAB

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SAC, ANCHORAGE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

ANCHORAGE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED BY THE SAC, WHO SPENDS 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE FORMER AND 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE LATTER CATEGORY.

THERE ARE 3 AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THEY SPEND 40 PERCENT, 5 PERCENT, AND 2 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME, RESPECTIVELY, ON THIS CATEGORY. ONE OF THE 3 AGENTS SPENDS 10 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC HOLD

#MDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/1776

3/27

5

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
[illegible] Syst. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Eval. ____
Coun. ____
Rm. ____
Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

NR008 AT CODED

5:44 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 LAP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF ATLANTA AGENT PERSONNEL PRESENTLY WORKING ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ALSO INCLUDING IN THIS AREA ALL OF CLASSIFICATIONS GENERALLY REGARDED AS SECURITY WORK AND EXTREMIST WORK, AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES:

	POSITION		PER CENT OF TIME
1	SAC	WORKING	5
1	ASAC	"	3
1	SUPERVISOR	"	75
1	SUPERVISOR	"	3
3	HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS	WORKING	100
4	" " "	"	90
2	" " "	"	80
1	" " "	"	50
1	" " "	"	40
2	" " "	"	20

3/10

Note: Supervisor Charlie Haynes, Atlanta, telephonically contacted 3pm, 3/27/75. He will send Nitel 3/27 breaking above out by IS & CI matters separately. DG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP 2 ALM/DG
#M0616

PAGE TWO AT 100-0

POSITION		PER CENT OF TIME
3 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS	WORKING	10
3 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	10
4 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	6
1 " "	"	3
1 " "	"	2

THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE INCLUDED IN ARRIVING AT THE ABOVE COMPUTATION:

2, 3, 14, 61, 64, 65, 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 117, 134, 135, 157, 163, 170, 174, 176, AND 185.

END

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

5 Revised

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
I[illegible] ____
In[illegible] ____
L[illegible] ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Sp[illegible] ____
Tr[illegible] ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR007 AT CODE

9:46 PM NITEL MARCH 27, 1975 SSP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE ATLANTA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, MARCH 26, 1975.

UNDER PER CENT OF TIME COLUMN, "IS" STANDS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND "CI" STANDS FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

POSITION		PER CENT OF TIME	
		IS	CI
1 SAC	WORKING	4	1
1 ASAC	"	2	1
1 SUPERVISOR	"	45	30
1 SUPERVISOR	"	3	0
1 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENT	"	100	0
1 " " "	"	85	15
1 " " "	"	80	20
1 " " "	"	90	0
1 " " "	"	0	90
1 " " "	"	85	5
1 " " "	"	75	15
1 " " "	"	60	20

#mpe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/LTG

POSITION		PER CENT OF TIME	
		IS	CI
1 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENT	WORKING	80	20
1 " " "	"	20	40
1 " " "	"	0	40
1 " " "	"	5	15
1 " " "	"	20	0
1 " " "	"	10	0
1 " " "	"	5	5
1 " " "	"	5	5
1 RESIDENT AGENT	"	10	0
1 " "	"	10	0
1 " "	"	10	0
1 " "	"	3	3
1 " "	"	6	0
1 " "	"	0	6
1 " "	"	6	0
1 " "	"	3	0
1 " "	"	0	2

IN CONSIDERING ABOVE COMPUTATIONS, THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION UNDER INTERNAL SECURITY HEADING: 3, 14, 61, 98, 100, 117, 134 (INFORMANTS) 157, 163, 170, 176, 185. THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE CONSIDERED UNDER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HEADING: 2, 64, 65, 97, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 134 (ASSETS).

END

HOLD FOR 5 MORE

MAR 17 9 53 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

6

Dep-A.D.-Adm.
Admin.
G
I
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 014 BA CODE

10:14PM NITEL 3/25/75 JAN

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

Budget/Acct

FROM BALTIMORE 66-NEW

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BALTIMORE HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 33 AGENTS DEVOTED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS). TWENTY AGENTS DEVOTE 100 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME TO IS MATTERS. THIRTEEN AGENTS DEVOTE 75 PER CENT TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PER CENT TO IS MATTERS. THE SAC'S OVERALL SUPERVISION INCLUDES 20 PER CENT OVER IS AND CI MATTERS.

END

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

MAR 23 10 45 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

7

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 002 BH CODE

241 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DGS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: BIRMINGHAM (66-2204)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Budget & Accounting Sect
✓ Pm 62

REBUTEL, 3/24/74, REGARDING PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS.

BIRMINGHAM HAS NO AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE MATTERS. FOLLOWING REPRESENT PERCENTAGES OF AGENT TIME:

AGENT	IS PERCENTAGE	CI PERCENTAGE
A	95	0
B	50	40
C	80	0
D	40	10
E	60	0
F	35	15
G	5	10
H	0	25
I	30	30
J	25	0
K (SUPERVISOR)	40	20

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

FM 0216

3/DB

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

8

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR017 BS CODE

6:58 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 MCC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BOSTON (66-82)

ATTN/ BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

Budget [illegible] Unit
6057

BOSTON HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND TWENTY-ONE AGENTS, ALL ASSIGNED FULL TIME, TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IN ADDITION, TWELVE RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

BOSTON HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND TEN AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIME. IN ADDITION, ELEVEN RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

BUREAU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE SAME RESIDENT AGENTS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, WHO ARE ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, ARE ALSO ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/gmf

3/

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
PM 75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

9

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR001 BU CODE

4:04 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 TRR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUFFALO KYYXXX(66-NEW)

Budget & Acct.
6058 JH

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BUFFALO DIVISION HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 28 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT NOT NECESSARILY ON A FULL TIME BASIS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THESE AREAS ON FULL TIME BASIS:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SAC	0	0
ASAC	0	0
SUPERVISORS	0	0
SPECIAL AGENTS	6	0

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG
#MDELS

3/10

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, COMPUTATION OF ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY OTHER AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED THESE MATTERS WOULD REPRESENT EQUIVALENT OF FOLLOWING NUMBER OF FULL TIME PERSONNEL:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	71/2	5
GRAND TOTALS:		
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	13 1/2	5

END

MAR 20 4 08 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

10

QNR 006 BT PLAIN

9-13 QP PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 TDS

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUTTE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SECURITY MATTERS SUPERVISED BY ASAC FIVE PERCENT OF HIS TIME. ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT HANDLES FIFTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME AND ONE RA TEN PERCENT OF HIS TIME. NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORK BUTTE DIVISION.

END

V

FBIHQ FLC FR THREE TELS TKS AND CUL.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

7/00

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 11 14 PM '75

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

11

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

Budget [illegible]
6038

NR 009 CE CODED

5:33 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBULET MARCH 24, 1975.

CHARLOTTE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY MATTERS, NO OTHER SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLE SECURITY. THERE ARE 3 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE ADDITIONAL HEADQUARTERS AGENT ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ONE RESIDENT AGENT IS ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, 4 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, AND 9 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED FROM 5 TO 15 PER CENT OF THEIR WORK IN SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.

NO SUPERVISORY OR AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM WHICH WAS DISCONTINUED PER BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS IN 1971.

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Note: Charlotte security supervisor telephonically contacted 2:45 PM, 3/27/75 and the difference between counterintelligence program and C.I. matters explained to him. He will send corrected Nitel 3/27.
DLA

3/DW

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 5 37 PM '75

62-116395-56

Revised
11

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR005 CE CODE

5:26 PMNITEL MARCH 27, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975, AND CHARLOTTE TEL MARCH 25, 1975.

CHARLOTTE OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO BOTH SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT IS ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND A SECOND HEADQUARTERS AGENT DEVOTES 25 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TWO RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 25 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND TWO ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED BETWEEN 5 TO 10 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. OTHER RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WHEN NEED ARISES, HOWEVER, NO EXACT PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE SINCE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS GREATLY FLUCTUATE.

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

3/10

MAR 27 [illegible] 31 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

12

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
Dcw

NR026 CG CODE

610PM NITEL 3-25-75 RWR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHICAGO

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

R-6988

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975, TO ALL SAC'S.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF AGENT TIME IN THE CHICAGO DIVISION SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

SAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, 20 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PERCENT.

ASAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 20 PERCENT.

SUPERVISORS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, FOUR, FULL TIME; INTERNAL SECURITY, ONE, FULL TIME, ONE, 50 PERCENT. (THE OTHER FIFTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IS SPENT ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.)

AGENTS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 76, FULL TIME (INCLUDES 10 AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE);

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/LETG

3/10

PAGE TWO

INTERNAL SECURITY, 28, FULL TIME.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, 10 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO EXTREMIST MATTERS.

THIS REPRESENTS A TOTLE OF 114 SA'S ASSIGNED SECURITY WORK EXCLUSIVE OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL.

END.

PLS ACK FOR TWELVE

~~NEED A RERUN OF UR NRTS HAVE AN OVERLINE~~

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 19 PM '75

62-116395-56

13

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 004 CI CODE

748PM NITEL 3/25/75 KOD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CINCINNATI (105-7038)

Rm. [illegible]

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL TIME BEING EXPENDED IN CINCINNATI DIVISION OM INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (CIM):

SAC AND ASAC - NONE

	IS	CIM
ONE SUPERVISOR	65 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE SUPERVISOR	53 PERCENT	36 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	100 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	80 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	60 PERCENT	40 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	27 PERCENT	73 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	45 PERCENT	55 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	50 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	50 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	73 PERCENT	27 PERCENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/376
#Moe16

3/19

PAGE TWO CI 105-7038

	IS	CIM
ONE AGENT	30 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	40 PERCENT	20 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	25 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
THREE AGENTS	10 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	10 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	5 PERCENT	5 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	2 PERCENT	8 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	5 PERCENT	0 PERCENT.

END

REC 4 DBS FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 23 PM 1975

62-116395-56

14

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Secty ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 005 CV CODE

8:25PM NITEL 3/25/75 RJB

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: CLEVELAND (66-5641)

C O N F ~~I D~~ E N T I A L

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Budget & Accounting
Rm 6625 Tech

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

CLEVELAND HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS TWO, AGENTS 20. THE FOLLOWING NUMBER ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-INTELLIGNECE WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS ONE, AGENTS 16. THE THREE SUPERVISORS HANDLE SECURITY-TYPE MATTERS EXCLUSIVELY.

CLEVELAND HAS UTILIZED PERCENTAGES OF AGENT'S TIME SPENT IN THESE CATEGORIES WHERE APPLICABLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE RESIDENT AGENCIES.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 6020, XGDS CATEGORY 2, INDEFINITE.~~

END

HOLD FOR ONE

TJT FBI WASH D

#MDE16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM 1876
ON 1-17-01

3/[illegible]

MAR 25 8 31 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

15

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

NR005 CO CODE

7:00PMEDT NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WCA

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM COLUMBIA (105-NEW)

Budget & A. Unit

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

COLUMBIA PRESENTLY HAS ZERO AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS COLUMBIA HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS AND SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED THE FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME:

AGENTS	1 - 75, 1 - 30, 3 - 20, 1 - 10, 3 - 5 OR LESS
SUPERVISORS	1 - 20

END.

DBS FBIHQ

CLR

#MDL16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

3/0.J

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

16

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR008 DL CODE

5:44 PM NITEL 3/26/75 DRH

Budget & Accounting
6025 [illegible]

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: DALLAS (105-NEW)

ATTN: INTD SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN REPLY TO BUREAU REQUEST, THE DALLAS OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO WORK ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS), COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI), APPLICANT AND RELATED MATTERS. FIFTY-FOUR PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS. THERE ARE SIX HEADQUARTERS AGENTS HANDLING IS AND/OR CI MATTERS, THREE RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING THE MAJORITY OF THEIR TIME ON BOTH IS AND CI MATTERS AND EIGHT RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME IN THE IS AND CI FIELDS. DATA FOR SURVEY WAS OBTAINED FROM THE FEBRUARY, 1975, CASE LOAD. THE NUMBER OF DALLAS AGENTS WORKING IS, CI OR BOTH AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME SPENT IN THESE FIELDS IS SET OUT BELOW:

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/BJG

3/15

PAGE TWO DL 105-NEW

SAS	3X	1X	1X	1X	1X	1X	1X	2	2
IS PERCENT	100		34	63	62	24	30	16	5
CI PERCENT		100	66	11	38	76	16		

SAS	1	1	1	1
IS PERCENT	13	6		2
CI PERCENT			8	

X RA AND HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS AND CI SQUAD.

END.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

X LV AND HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS AND CI SQUADS.

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 6 48 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

17

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Ge ____
Id ____
Ir ____
In ____
L ____
Pl ____
S ____
T ____
Leg ____
Tel ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 007 DN PLAIN

535 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JSG

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

(ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: DENVER (66-DEAD)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL OFFICES, MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (CI):

SAC - 0

ASAC-0

SUPERVISOR - ONE FULL TIME, 3/4 OF TIME OF IS, 1/4 TO CI

AGENTS - 12 AND 1/2, 3/4 TIME TO IS, 1/4 TIME TO CI.

IN DENVER OFFICE, IS AND CI MATTERS ARE HANDLED BY FIELD SUPERVISOR ON FULL TIME BASIS. DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES ALSO HANDLED ON SQUAD BUT ONLY FRACTION OF SUPERVISOR'S AND SQUAD TIME IS USED ON THESE CASES. SAC AND ASAC ARE KEPT ABREAST OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND, OF COURSE, HAVE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY BUT HAVE NO IS OR CI MATTERS ASSIGNED TO THEM. BESIDES SUPERVISOR, THERE ARE 8 SPECIAL AGENTS (SA) IN HEADQUARTERS CITY ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS AND CI MATTERS WITH ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THIS TIME GIVEN TO DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES. ALL BOMBING MATTERS

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/4

(174 CLASSIFICATION) ARE CONSIDERED A PART OF IS INVESTIGATIONS. TWO OF EIGHT SAS FULL TIME AND ONE SA HALF TI~~0~~ME HANDLE CI MATTERS, REMAINDER HANDLE IS.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES (RA) FOLLOWING SITUATION EXISTS:

ONE AGENT IN COLORADO SPRINGS SPENDS 50 0/0 AND ANOTHER AGENT SPENDS 25 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON IS AND CI MATTERS. IN BOULDER RA ONE FULL TIME AGENT AND ONE AGENT SPENDING 60 0/0 OF HIS TIME HANDLE IS AND CI MATTERS. IN FORT COLLINS RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 50 0/0 AND THE OTHER 40 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. IN CHEYENNE RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 25 0/0 OF HIS TIME ONE THESE MATTERS. IN THE OTHER RAS ONLY A MINOR FRACTION OF THE TIME OF EACH RA IS DEVOTED TO IS AND CI MATTERS. TOTAL TIME WOULD POSSIBLY EQUAL THAT OF ONE SA FULL TIME. IN ALL INSTANCES, ABOUT 3/4 OF TIME SPENT ON SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IS ON IS MATTERS WITH REMAINING 1/4 ON CI MATTERS.

END

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR FOUR

WA CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 7 58 PM '75

62-116395-56

18

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
Dcw

NR032 DE CODE

5:42 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WGM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DETROIT

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

DETROIT DIVISION CURRENTLY HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND FOURTEEN AGENTS ASSIGNED 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, ONE ASAC IS ASSIGNED FIVE PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT, THREE SAS FIFTEEN PERCENT, ONE SA TEN PERCENT, ONE SA FIVE PERCENT.

DETROIT DIVISION ALSO HAS ASSIGNED ONE SUPERVISOR AND ELEVEN SAS SPENDING 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN ADDITION, ONE ASAC FIVE PERCENT, THREE SAS 75 PERCENT, ONE SA 50 PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT AND ONE SA TEN PERCENT. ONE SAC HAS FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

HOLD PLS

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

MAR 27 7 21 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep. A.D.-Inv. ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

19

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 EP CODE

6:28 PM NITEL 3-25-75 MJT

TO: DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM: EL PASO (66-NEW) ///1P///

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC, EL PASO CURRENTLY SPENDS 3 PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY, 2 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ASAC HANDLES NO SECURITY MATTERS; SUPERVISOR NUMER THREE DESK DEVOTES 15 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 5 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

FOUR AGENTS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED SECURITY MATTERS, WITH ONE AGENT DEVOTING 60 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY, 0 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; SECOND AGENT SPENDS 10 PER CENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; THIRD AGENT 50 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; FOURTH AGENT, WHO IS RELIEF SUPERVISOR, DEVOTES 10 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 65 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

#MDR16
[illegible] INFORMATION CONTAINED
[illegible] IS UNCLASSIFIED
[illegible] 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JJG

3/DR

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

20

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 001 HN CODE

5:08 PM HST NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JVS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HONOLULU (66-) 1P

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

Budget & Acct JEH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

HONOLULU CURRENTLY HAS FOUR SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED PRIMARILY SECURITY MATTERS BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY AS FOLLOWS: 2 AGENTS 90 PER CENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND AND 10 PER CENT EACH OTHER MATTERS; 1 AGENT 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY; 1 AGENT 30 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 40 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 30 PER CENT OTHER MATTERS. 3 ADDITIONAL AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 15 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

ASAC, SUPERVISES SECURITY MATTER, SPENDS 35 PER CENT OF TIME ON SECURITY BROKEN DOWN AS: 25 PER CENT COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND 10 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

END.

HOLD

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP8 ALM/JTG

3/DA

MAY 25 11 41 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

21

Assoc. Dir. __
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. __
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. __
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. __
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

Budget & Acct.

NR008 HO CODE

5:55 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 BNG

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HOUSTON

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SET FORTH BELOW ARE SAC, SUPERVISOR AND AGENTS CURRENTLY WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AGENTS	2.05	2.70
SUPERVISOR	.30	.40
SAC	.02	.04

#MOE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/lrs

END

HOLD

3/EX

MAR 25 6 PM '75
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

22

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budget & Accounting Room [illegible]

NR005 IP CODE

5:39 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RXH

TO DIRECTOR

FROM INDIANAPOLIS

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL, FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED CONCERNING INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

SAC	NONE
ASAC	NONE
SUPERVISORS	.30 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND .40 INTERNAL SECURITY
SPECIAL AGENTS	6.25 ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 9.50 ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD FOR FIVE MORE

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2ALM/HG

JUL 9 6 53 PM '75
REC TELET.

62-116395-56

23

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 CODE JN

4:07PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JWD

TO DIRECTOR, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM JACKSON (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC AND ASAC, JACKSON OFFICE, HAVE NO CASES ASSIGNED IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. TWO SUPERVISORS HAVE CASES ASSIGNED AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO FORTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIFTEEN PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THERE ARE FIFTY FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO THREE POINT SIX TENTHS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE POINT ONE TENTH AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#m0216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

3/20

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

24

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

Rm-6[illegible]8
EH

NR003 JK CODE

7:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 GLB

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM JACKSONVILLE (100-NEW) (RUC)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED NITEL FOR JACKSONVILLE DIVISION:

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FIFTY PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY AND TEN PERCENT INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, NONE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, ACCUMULATED TO REPRESENT FOUR AGENTS ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE AGENT ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2-ALM/JJF

3/PR

TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 21 PM '75

62-116395-56

25

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 003 KC CODE

6:15 PM 3/25/75 NITEL JAW

TO: DIRECTOR

(ATTN:BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: KANSAS CITY (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

KANSAS CITY DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TIME SPENT IS 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 40 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

TWO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

KANSAS CITY HAS THIRTEEN ADDITIONAL AGENTS HANDLING BOTH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: FIVE AGENTS, 90 PERCENT, INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE AGENT, 90 PERCENT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: TWO AGENTS, 30 PERCENT ON EACH:; FOUR AGENTS, 10 PERCENT ON EACH, AND ONE AGENT 50 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD

#mDe
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

MAR 23 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

DCW

TELETYPE

2-6

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR004 KX CODE

8:10 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WEH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATN: BUDGET & ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SAC, KNOXVILLE (100-00)

VR-9028

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2ALM/STG #MDR16

INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ASAC'S DESK IN THE KNOXVILLE DIVISION. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE ASAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON SUCH MATTERS, DIVIDED 15 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IN ADDITION, THERE ARE FIVE AGENTS WITHIN THE DIVISION WORKING PRIMARILY ON SECURITY MATTERS. TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND 80 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY WORK AND 5 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 75 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 20 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 60 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 35 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; AND ONE AGENT SPENDS 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 75 PERCENT ON

3/19

PAGE TWO KX 100-00

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

SECURITY ITEMS REQUIRING THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF THE SAC UTILIZE ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON EACH CATEGORY.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE AND CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 47 PM '75

62-116395-56

27

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budget & Accnt.

NR 011 LV CODE

838 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 MLP

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM LAS VEGAS (100-00)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

LAS VEGAS SAC AND ASAC DO NOT SUPERVISE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. LAS VEGAS HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ①

LAS VEGAS HAS ONE FIELD SUPERVISOR WHO SUPERVISES INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AMONG MANY OTHER CATEGORIES. IT IS ESTIMATED THIS SUPERVISOR SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON MATTERS OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY NATURE.

LAS VEGAS HAS FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO ARE NORMALLY ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 95 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. ONE OTHER SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 30 PER CENT, AND THE OTHER TWO, APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC CLR

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/gjg

① Supervisor Don Smith contacted and advises Counterintelligence matters should be as follows: No supervisory time.

2 agents involved, one about 3% of his time & one about 2%.

D.J.

3/27/75
5⁴⁵pm

3/DA

MAR 30 1975
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

28

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Budget Acct

NR 004 LR PLAIN

3:09 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 GM

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LITTLE ROCK (66-1880)

ATTENTIONC BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING SET FORTH IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED TELETYPE:

TWO AGENTS IN LITTLE ROCK DIVISION ASSIGNED PART-TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH BREAKDOWN OF TIME SPENT AS FOLLOWS:

ONE AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 45 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. SECOND AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 65 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 8 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 2 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

3/07

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 13PM 1975

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

29

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget & Acctg. Sect.

NR 009 LA CODE

12:09 PM URGENT 3-26-75 SMA

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOS ANGELES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUTEL, MARCH 24 LAST.

LOS ANGELES DIVISION HAS CAREFULLY BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGES THOSE AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE WORK USING THOSE CLASSIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY SUPERVISOR GROOVER. DIVISION HAS A TOTAL OF 91 AGENTS PLUS ONE SAC, FOUR SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, ASSIGNED TO SUCH CLASSIFICATIONS. THIRTY FIVE OF THESE WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 56 WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

ADMINISTRATIVE

LOS ANGELES IS SUBMITTING FOR BUREAU'S CONSIDERATION, IF PERTINENT. THREE OF THE ABOVE 56 CLASSIFIED AS SECURITY AGENTS WORK FULL TIME ON BOMBING MATTERS WHICH ARE ALMOST ALL MATTERS WHEREIN WE HAVE NO JURISDICTION EXCEPT FOR DATA KEEPING FOR NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER. TWELVE OF THE 56 SECURITY AGENTS

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TTG

3/

3
12
7
1
23

ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN OUR FALSE IDENTITY PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM ORIGINATED WITH OUR WEATHFUG ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER, THE FRAUDULENT USE OF DECEASED INFANT IDENTITY PAPERS HAS EXPANDED TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT THE VAST MAJORITY INVOLVE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN SECURITY WORK. SEVEN OF THE 56 AGENTS ON SECURITY ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS WHICH ORIGINATE WITH SOME DEMONSTRATION OR ACT OF TERROR, ETC, BUT AT THE PRESENT THEY ARE CLEAR CUT CRIMINAL FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS. ONE OF THE 56 IS INVOLVED FULL TIME IN THE HANDLING OF FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION MATTERS WHICH IS TECHNICALLY AN APPLICANT-TYPE INVESTIGATION, BUT THE 163 CLASSIFICATION WAS INCLUDED IN THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS. SUMMARIZING THESE EXCEPTIONS WE HAVE A TOTAL OF 23 AGENTS WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO SECURITY WORK BUT ARE, IN FACT, NOT INVOLVED IN ANY INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, LEAVING ONLY 33 AGENTS DEVOTING THEIR FULL TIME EFFORTS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS PLUS, THE ABOVE MENTIONED 35 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENTS.

END

JTG FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 3 14 PM '75

62-116395-56

30

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
[illegible] Com. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
[illegible] ____
Tr[illegible] ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
DCW
TELETYPE

NR013 LS CODE

9:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 HSH

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOUISVILLE

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ 62-116[illegible]

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, FOLLOWING DATA PERTAINS TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

SUPERVISOR (1) 40 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 85 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 30 IS, 40 CI; AGENT (1) 40 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 10 IS, 0 CI.

END.

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/1dj

3/DH

MAR 25 9 51 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

31

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 005 ME PLAIN

9:12 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JLC

TO DIRECTOR ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM MEMPHIS

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

✓Budget Acct JEH

MEMPHIS OFFICE USES APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IN THE SECURITY FIELD, 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IN ADDITION, SIX AGENTS ARE UTILIZED, THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS IN THIS FIELD:

AGENT	TIME ON SECURITY CASES	TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY	TIME ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
A	100	100	0
B	75	50	25
C	50	50	0
D	50	25	25
E	25	25	0
F	25	0	25

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

IN ADDITION TO THE ONE-FOURTH SUPERVISOR TIME, THIS OFFICE USES THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-FOURTH AGENTS IN THE SECURITY

3/DO

PAGE TWO

FIELD; TWO AND ONE-HALF AGENTS ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE-FOURTHS OF ONE AGENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

PLS ACK FOR FOUR TES

ACK FOR 4 AND HOLD

TJT FBI WASH DC

MAR 25 10 14 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

32

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget + Accounting Section
Rm. 6028 JEH

NR002 MM CODE

925AM URGENT MARCH 27, 1975 JWB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MIAMI 1P

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING ARE MIAMI OFFICE STATISTICS SHOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS BY SPECIAL AGENT PERSONNEL:

SACS - 0; ASACS - 0.

SUPERVISORS - CI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 90 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. SI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT.

SPECIAL AGENTS- CI MATTERS: 15 ASSIGNED FULL TIME; TWO ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 40 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. IS MATTERS: TWO ASSIGNED FULL TIME; THREE ASSIGNED 75 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 60 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 30 PERCENT; FIVE ASSIGNED 10 PERCENT.

END.

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
#mde16

3/D

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 9 29 AM '75

REC'D
[illegible] SECTION
MAR 27 11 14 AM '75

62-116395-56

33

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

Budget + Account.
6/25

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR004 MI CODE

7:08PM NITEL 3 / 25 / 75 LSK

O: DIRECTOR

FROM: MILWAUKEE (66-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MILWAUKEE HAS 2 SECURITY SUPERVISORS, #5 AND #6, NEITHER OF WHOM IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY WORK. 23 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO THESE 2 SECURITY SQUADS, INCLUDING HEADQUARTERS AND RESIDENT AGENTS (RA'S). 4 OF LATTER squad ARE ENGAGED FULL TIME IN SECURITY WORK. 15 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS NOT ASSIGNED TO EITHER SECURITY SQUAD ALSO HANDLE SOME SECURITY WORK IN THEIR VARIOUS AREAS. PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN IS AS FOLLOWS:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COINTEL	OTHER
#5 SUPERVISOR	70	5	25
#6 SUPERVISOR	30	55	L5
#5 SQUAD 12 agents*	59	8	33
#6 SQUAD 11 agents*	44	44	L2
RA'S 15 agents *	2.5	4.5	93

END

ACJ FOR FOUR $$$

* Per phone call 4 55 pm, 3/27/75 with George Whopple, supervisor of #6 squad in Milwaukee.

#MD016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/ATG

3/DJ

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 46 PM '75

62-116395-56

34

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975

NR001 MP CODED

7:13 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DSC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (100-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget Acct.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MINNEAPOLIS HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. A SECOND SUPERVISOR SPENDS 40 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY. THERE ARE FIVE AND ONE HALF AGENTS WORKING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 14 WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM

H

O

L

MAR 25 8 15 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975 8

TELETYPE

35

Assoc. Dir. ______
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ______
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ______
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ______
Comp. Syst. ______
Ext. Affairs ______
Files & Com. ______
Gen. Inv. ______
Ident. ______
Inspection ______
Intell. ______
Laboratory ______
Plan. & Eval. ______
Spec. Inv. ______
Training ______
Legal Coun. ______
Telephone Rm. ______
Director Sec'y ______

NR005 MOBILE PLAIN

11-12 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VFP

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM MOBILE (66-1145)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE MOBILE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDING FIFTY PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS TWENTYFIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCY MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THERE ARE NINE AGENTS WHO SPEND AN AVERAGE OF FORTY FIVE PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

END

TMA ACK FOR TWO FBIHQ CLR

#M0216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM 1776

MAR 27 2 17 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 007 NK CODE

6:06PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 JCG

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget/Acct
[illegible] JFH

FROM NEWARK

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL TO SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN RE NITEL NEWARK SUBMITS FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY PERSONNEL IN THE TWO SEPARATE CATEGORIES:

INTERNAL SECURITY:
1 ASAC - 15 PER CENT
1 SUPERVISOR - 50 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 100 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 70 PER CENT

#mdr16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 [illegible]

B/DA

NK

PAGE TWO

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

1 ASAC - 35 PER CENT

1 SUPERVICSOR - 50 PER CENT

1 SUPERVISOR - 100 PER CENT

23 SA 'S - 100 PER CENT

6 SA'S - 50 PER CENT

3 SA'S - 10 PER CENT

END

MAR 26 6 04 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

37

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
DoJ
TELETYPE

NR002 NH CODE

1038PM NITEL MARCH 25,1975 LM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: NEW HAVEN (105-13579) (RUC) 1P

ATTN; BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

R 4028

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24,1975.

ONE SUPERVISORY AGENT DEVOTES ONE-THIRD OF HIS TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND ONE THIRD TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

SEVENTEEN AGENTS ARE REGULARLY ASSIGNED EITHER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OR INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS IN ADDITION TO OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS. OF THESE 17 AGENTS THE EQUIVALENT OF FIVE AGENTS WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIMW AND FIVE AND ONE THIRD AGENTS WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

FBIHQ FLC FR TWO TELS CLR TKS

#m 0216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM / ATG

3/10

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
3 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

38

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR001 NO CODE

2:49PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DCB

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

Budget & Acct.

ATTENTION: BUGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE; PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE...

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CLR

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-12-01 BY SP2 ALM/TG

Note: Security supervisor contacted 5²⁰P, 3/27/75 re counterintelligence matters. He will check & get the obvious error corrected, either through call back or corrected Nitel. DA

2/DA

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 3 47 PM '75

62-116395-56

38 Revised

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR015 NO CODE

7:15PM URGENT MARCH 27,1975 JMF

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Budget & Acct
JFH

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24,1975; NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE MARCH 26,1975; BUTEL CALL MARCH 27,1975.

THE FOLLOWING ARE CORRECTIONS TO REFERENCED NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE. NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE, OF WHICH SEVEN ARE ALSO ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 25 PERCENT AND PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS 35 PERCENT. PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS 25 PERCENT, AND 35 PERCENT SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE.

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JT6

44

MAR 8 18 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

39

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 NY CODE

NITEL 3/25/75 SENT 9:25AM 3/26/75 GMD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget & Accounting

6028 JEH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

NEW YORK HAS ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (DIVISION III) AND ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS (DIVISION IV). THERE ARE NO ASACS IN NEW YORK OFFICE.

SAC, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION (III) SPENDS FULL-TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SAC, INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION (IV) SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 60 PERCENT IS SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

SIX SUPERVISORS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 14 SUPERVISORS HANDLE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

114 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 331 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END.

JTG FBIHQ CLR

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

3/10A

MAR 26 9 30 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

40

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975
DC
TELETYPE

NR 002 NF PLAIN

444PM NITEL 3-26-75 SNB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM NORFOLK (66-981)

R-6028

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS INFORMATION REQUESTED IN RETEL:

POSITION	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ONE SUPERVISOR	50 PER CENT OF TIME	10 PER CENT OF TIME
THREE SAS	50 PER CENT OF TIME	20 PER CENT OF TIME
TWO SAS	75 PER CENT OF TIME	0
THREE SAS	50 PER CENT OF TIME	0

TOTAL AGENT PERSONNEL OF NORFOLK OFFICE ASSIGNED IS ONE SUPERVISOR AND EIGHT AGENTS FOR PERCENTAGES INDICATED ABOVE.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/ltb

3/8

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 4 48 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

41

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR008 OC PLAIN

9:30PM MARCH 25, 1975 NITEL DSM

MAR 25 1975

Dew

TELETYPE

R-

TO DIRECTOR

FROM OKLAHOMA CITY (105-2398)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THE SAC AND THE ASAC OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE ARE NOT ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE HAS NO SUPERVISOR OR SPECIAL AGENT ASIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND / OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN IN PERCENTAGES OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT'S TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

	NUMBER	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISOR	1	75	5
SA'S	31	615	65

OF THE THIRTY-ONE SPECIAL AGENT S, IT IS NOTED THAT 8 ARE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT OR MORE OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT ACCOUNT FOR 550 PERCENT OT THE 615 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY TIME AND 62 PERCENT OT THE 65 PERCENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TIME.

END PAGE 1

#mDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JFK

3/10

OC 105-2398

IN SUMMARY, THERE IS .75 AND .05 SUPERVISORY EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIEGENCE, RESPECTIVELY. THERE ARE 6.15 AND .65 AGENT EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, RESPECTIVELY.

END

ACK FOR 1 TJT FBI WASH DC CL

MAR 25 10:37 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

42

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 004 OM CODE

4:38 PM NITEL 3/25/75 BJP

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: OMAHA

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ Budget + Acct. Unit
JEH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

OMAHA CURRENTLY HAS SEVEN AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, WITH TWO AGENTS SPENDING 60 PER CENT AND TWO AGENTS SPENDING 25 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON IS MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON IS MATTERS.

TWO AGENTS AND ONE SUPERVISOR SPEND APPROXIMATELY 10 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

MSE FBIHQ

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2[illegible]

3/

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 5 43 PM '75

62-116395-56

43

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

✓ Budget & Acctg

NR 002 PH CODE

245 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DMS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PHILADELPHIA (66-NEW) (P)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

PHILA. DIVISION UTILIZES FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) INCLUDING EXTREMISTS, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

		IS	CI
1	SAC	5	5
1	ASAC	50	
1	SUPERVISOR	100	
1	SUPERVISOR		100
13	SAS AT HEADQUARTERS	100	
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS	50	
9	SAS AT HEADQUARTERS		100
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS		75
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS		85

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/00 BY SP-2 ALM/MLG

#M0216

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SAS IN RAS:

	IS	CI
1 SA	5	
1 SA	45	45
1 SA	2	2
1 SA	50	25
1 SA	30	10
1 SA	75	20
1 SA	5	70
1 SA	2	5
1 SA	70	30
1 SA		10
1 SA	5	10
1 SA	55	15
1 SA	5	1
1 SA	1	5
1 SA	35	50
1 SA	5	3

IN SUMMARY, 16 RAS AVERAGED 24 IS, AND 19 CI.

END

KAC FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 2 58 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

44

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 003 PX PCODE

12:35 AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL JRL

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECT)

FROM PHOENIX (100-8529) (1P)

SENATE SELECT COMMITEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

PHOENIX DIVISION HAS FOLLOWING AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

A. INTERNAL SECURITY

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS -100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS - 75 PER CENT

THREE AGENTS - 50 PER CENT

B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. DOMESTIC - NONE

2. FOREIGN-

ONE SUPERVISOR - 30 PER CENT

ONE AGENT - 100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS- 25 PER CENT

END

MPM FBIHQ CLR

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ 16

3/[illegible]

MAR 26 3 30 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

45

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

NR 09 PG PLAIN

7:35 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RGM

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: PITTSBURGH (62-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Budget [illegible]
602

REBUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THERE ARE 110 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE PITTSBURGH OFFICE (75 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS, 35 RESIDENTS AGENTS (RAS)).

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) FULL TIME. ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) FULL TIME.

11 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED CI FULL TIME AND 7 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED IS FULL TIME.

RESIDENT AGENT ASSIGNMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

6 RAS 2 PERCENT CI	5 RAS 2 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 3 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 3 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 5 PERCENT CI	1 RA 4 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 6 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 5 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 7 PERCENT CI	1 RA 7 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 8 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 11 PERCENT IS
1 RA 25 PERCENT CI	1 RA 12 PERCENT IS

END PAGE ONE

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/TG

3/DA

1 RA 16 PERCENT IS

1 RA 24 PERCENT IS

1 RA 28 PERCENT IS

THE ABOVE PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES WERE ARRIVED AT BY COMPARING THE NUMBER OF CI AND IS CASES WITH THE TOTAL CASE LOAD OF EACH RA.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 12 PM '75

62-116395-56

46

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

NR 007 PD CODE

8:57 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LLD

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PORTLAND

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

PORTLAND HAS TWO SUPERVISORY DESKS HANDLING SECURITY MATTERS. ONE DESK HANDLES ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) AND ACCOUNTING MATTERS. BOTH DESKS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND SOME CRIMINAL MATTERS. BECAUSE OF OFFICE SIZE, PERSONNEL OF BOTH DESKS NECESSARILY PARTICIAPTE IN BANK ROBBERY AND OTHER MAJOR CRIMINAL MATTERS.

ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS, SAC EXPENDS TIME IN DIRECTIONAL AND OVERSIGHT CAPACITY ON CI AND IS MATTERS.

ESTIMATED SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON SECURITY MATTERS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE:

SAC (ONE), 5 PERCENT CI, 5 PERCENT IS.

ASAC (ONE), NONE.

SUPERVISORS (TWO), 45 PERCENT CI, 85 PERCENT IS.

AGENTS AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON SECURITY MATTERS:

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2-ALM/KSTG

3/DA

CI: 90 PERCENT - TWO

80 PERCENT - TWO

70 PERCENT - TWO

IS: 90 PERCENT - FOUR

80 PERCENT - SIX

50 PERCENT - TWO

40 PERCENT - TWO

20 PERCENT - ONE

10 PERCENT - FOUR.

LOWER PERCENTAGES ATTEMPT TO ACCOUNT FOR TIME SPENT BY RESIDENT AGENTS IN COVERING LEADS IN THESE FIELDS AND TO DISCOUNT TIME SPENT ON OTHER MATTERS BY HEADQUARTERS AGENTS.

END.

TJT FBI WASH DCC LR

MAR 27 12 01 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

47

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budget & Accounting
Room [illegible]

NR004 RH PLAIN

3:50 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 EJM

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SEC.

FROM RICHMOND 1P

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS MAR 24, 1975.

RICHMOND HAS ONE AGENT ASSIGNED APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND NO AGENTS ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR DEVOTES LESS THAN 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO SUCH CASES.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#MOR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/ETG

3/00

MAR 25 3 52 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

48

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAR 27 1975
TELETYPE

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/ATG

NR002 SC PLAIN

9:23 AM URGENT 3/27/75 VLS

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SACRAMENTO (66-511)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. ✓ Budget [illegible]

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN HEADQUARTERS, SACRAMENTO HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGEND FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. 7 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; 3 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS; 1 AGENT EXPENDS 75 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES, 1 AGENT WITH 90 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; 1 AGENT WITH 50 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. 7 RAS HANDLE VARIETY OF CLASSIFICATIONS AND ALSO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THESE 7 AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (20 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 5 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE).

END

FBIHQ CLR SMD

3/DA

MAR 27 12 28 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

PM '75
IVED
YPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

49

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 27 1975
TELETYPE

ML

✓ Budget & Accounting Section
Rm. [illegible] JEH

NR001 SL PLAIN

8:30AM URGENT 3/27/75 TJO

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM ST. LOUIS (94-297) RUC

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

π MDL16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/HB

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE ST. LOUIS DIVISION AS REQUESTED BY RE COMMUNICATION.

NEITHER THE SAC OR THE ASAC ARE ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONLY ONE SUPERVISOR IS ASSIGNED TO SUCH MATTERS, HE SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 55 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THE REMAINING AGENTS SPEND NO TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT SPEND THE LISTED PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY: THREE AGENTS, 50 PERCENT; THREE AGENTS, 25 PERCENT; ONE AGENT, 10 PERCENT; TWO AGENTS, 5 PERCENT, TWO AGENTS, 2 PERCENT.

3/27

PAGE TWO SL 94-297

ABOVE FIGURES REFLECT BOTH HEADQUARTERS CITY AND RESIDENT AGENTS IN THIS DIVISION.

END

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 9 34 AM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

50

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/ALG

NR006 SU PLAIN

8:46 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

✓ Budget & Acctg
Sec

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI). ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS). TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.

END. M

3/27

[illegible]

TELETYPE

[illegible]

MAR 26 10 51 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

50?

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR006 SU PLAIN

846 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

✓ Budget & Accts
[illegible]

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI). ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS). TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.

END.

JTG FBIHQ CLR

#mDe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]

3/DN

MAR 26 10 57 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

51

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
LPP
TELETYPE

NR005 SA CODE

6:55PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN ANTONIO

R-6028

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN ANTONIO OFFICE. ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF THESE MATTERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF TIME ON SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME TO THESE MATTERS.

FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, THIS BEING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL.

E N D.......

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTS
#MOR16

3/DA

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 17 PM '75

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

52

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

NR 02 SD CODED

12:11AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL GDF

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAN DIEGO (66-NEW)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ✓

REBUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SUPERVISORY AND AGENT TIME DEVOTED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE SAN DIEGO DIVISION:

SAC - SIX PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST MATTERS; TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ASAC - SIX PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST MATTERS; TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; 40 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 20 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

SEVEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

FOUR AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

END

*MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/DJ

THAT IS ALL

SSSSSSSS

MPM FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 4 3 17 AM '75

62-116395-56

53

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

NR 004 SF CODE

12:28 PM URGENT 3/26/75 MCC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN FRANCISCO

ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget & Accounting
6028

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUNITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN EXCLUDES ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS MAN DAYS SPENT ON CRIMINAL MATTERS BY AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES.

SAN FRANCISCO HAS 70 AGENTS AND 5 SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY. IT HAS 73 AGENTS AND 3 SUPERVISORS FULL TIME AND ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR 25 PER CENT TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. ONE SAC AND ONE ASAC 25 PER CENT EACH ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

IEWTZ

JTG FBIHQ

#MDe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/DA

MAR 26 3 26 PM '75
UNIT

62-116395-56

54

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 SJ CODE

10:06 PM NITEL 3-25-75 JXC

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM SAN JUAN

Budget + Accounting
60

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT PERSONNEL IN THE SAN JUAN DIVISION ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR - FULL TIME; ONE SUPERVISOR - TWENTY PER CENT OF THE TIME; FOURTEEN SPECIAL AGENTS - FULL TIME; THREE SPECIAL AGENTS - FIFTY PER CENT OF THE TIME.

AT THIS TIME, THE SAN JUAN DIVISION HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN A PENDING STATUS; THEREFORE, NO AGENT PERSONNEL ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE GA

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JFS

3/1A

MAR 25 9 PM '75
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

55

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975

NR002 SV CODE

715 PM NITEL 3/25/75 PNR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAVANNAH

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

IN RESPONSE TO RENITEL, THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN IN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS BEING SET FORTH:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
1 SAC	0	0
1 ASAC	0	0
1 SUPERVISOR	40 PERCENT	10 PERCENT
1 AGENT	90 "	0
1 AGENT	50 "	10 PERCENT
1 AGENT	10 "	0
1 AGENT	0	30 PERCENT

ALL OTHER AGENTS' ACCUMULATIVE TOTAL OF TIME WOULD EQUAL 10 PERCENT FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND 0 FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FOR ONE AGENT.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/LAG

MAR 13 7 24 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

56

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

NR002 SE CODED

3:59 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 CSC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SEATTLE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR- FULLTIME; FIVE AGENTS - FULLTIME; THREE AGENTS - 85PERCENT OF THEIR TIME.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR: 80 PER CENT OF TIME; SEVEN AGENTS - FULLTIME.

END

HOLD FOR ONE MORE

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/

3/P

MAR 25 7 09 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

57

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-AD-Adm. ____
Dep.-AD-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
[illegible] ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
[illegible] & Com. ____
[illegible] Inv. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible]ry ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 013 SI CODE

10:22PM NITEL 3-26-75 DJK

TO DIRECTOR

(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM SPRINGFIELD (66)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE TIME SPENT BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

THIRTY-SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. ONE OF THE ABOVE SAS SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND ONE OTHER SA SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND APPROXIMATELY 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHILE ANOTHER SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SURITY MATTERS.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-1201 BY SP2ALM/JES

SI 66-

PAGE TWO

THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE ANY SQUADS OF AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE MATTERS AND THE ABOVE ESTIMATE HAS BEEN DETERMINED FROM THE UTILIZATION OF TIMES SPENT DURING A TWO-WEEK PERIOD ON MATTERS BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION.

E N D

DBS FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 11 33 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

58

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budg & Accnt.
602 [illegible]

NR010 TP CODE

6-10PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM TAMPA (105-0)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975, REQUESTING THAT EACH SAC SUTEL THE NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TAMPA HAS ONE SQUAD WHICH HANDLES INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS WELL AS OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS, SUCH AS APPLICANT, SELECTIVE SERVICE, DESERTERS, AND EXTREMISTS.

NONE OF THE AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 1 AGENT WHO IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THE PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AN ACCUMULATION OF THE TIME SPENT BY EACH AGENT WORKING SUCH MATTERS.

INTERNAL SECURITY - SUPERVISOR, 20 PERCENT; AGENTS, 3.5

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - SUPERVISOR, 15 PERCENT; AGENTS, 1.5.

END

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/IRB

3/06

59

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget & Accts
6028

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR004 WF CODED

2:57PM URGENT 3-26-75 KLS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REGARDING BUREAU NITEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (WFO) HAS ONE ASAC DEVOTING 12 PERCENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND 78 PERCENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS, THE REMAINING 10 PERCENT BEING ADMINISTRATIVE, POLICE AND LIAISON DUTIES.

IN ADDITION, WFO HAS 162 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 6 SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO CI, AND 21 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 1 SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS MATTERS. ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR DEVOTES 75 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO IS MATTERS.

END.

JRM FBIHQ

CLR

#mor6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3DA

MAR 26 3 02 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

ROUTE I[illegible] ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP~~ SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	✓
Dep. AD Inv.	✓
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	✓
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	✓
Intell.	✓
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4/4/75

Downgraded to SECRET
60324 UC BAW/SAB/ML
1/12/2011

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; ~~RODERICK HILLS~~, ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

#M0116 1-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

Memorandum captioned as above, 3/27/75, from Legal Counsel to you, noted that you and Wannall were to meet with Mr. Hills and Mr. Phillip Buchen, Counsel to the President, on 3/28/75. Your addendum to the memorandum pointed out the results of this meeting and the various matters discussed.

As a follow-up to this meeting, you, Legal Counsel Mintz and Wannall met on 4/4/75 with Mr. James Wilderotter, who is presently working under Mr. Buchen in coordinating intelligence community matters relating to the inquiries underway by the Senate Select Committee. Mr. Wilderotter was given a briefing similar to that which had been afforded to Buchen and Hills. In addition, the discussion covered matters of a sensitive nature relating to the ORCHID and similar programs, electronic surveillances, specialized handling of informants, and Bureau Source 4 (access to social security records). Many of these matters discussed covered topics with which Mr. Wilderotter had become familiar when he was assigned to the Department as an Assistant to former Deputy Attorney General Silberman. (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Wilderotter said it was the feeling at The White House that while raw FBI files should not be made available to the Committee, it might be necessary to permit the Committee to review a few such files in order that the integrity of the FBI could be established with the Committee. It was pointed out to him that we did not agree to this, that we could furnish summaries of material from the files. Wilderotter said he did not feel that

REC-11 62-116395-55

WRW:dsh dsh
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

APR 11 1975

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Classified ~~by~~ 12 WRW
Exempt from GDS, ~~Categories~~ 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

5-WR

54 APR 16 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;
RODERICK HILLS, ASSOCIATE
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

furnishing reports and letterhead memoranda which had been prepared for dissemination would satisfy the Committee's needs. He was advised by both you and Mr. Mintz that it was our feeling that we should not furnish the raw material but summaries could be prepared for the Committee's purposes and if necessary, Bureau officials could be placed under oath and attest to the correctness of the summaries. Wilderotter said that this was a matter which he would afford further consideration.

As during the conference with Buchen and Hills, it was obvious as the result of our meeting with Wilderotter that The White House was most anxious that it not be caught by surprise by revelations of activities which in any way might be considered questionable. The White House is making every effort possible to become cognizant of any such situation prior to the Committee hearings.

Classified "T~~o~~p Secret" to protect highly sensitive investigative techniques and matters relating to foreign relations.

ACTION:

For information. Further contacts with Wilderotter or other White House Staff Members will be duly reported.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/4/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This will confirm that on 4/4/75 Mr. James Wilderotter of the White House orally approved the Bureau's dissemination to the Senate Select Committee the following two memoranda: confidential memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover dated 8/24/36, confidential memorandum from John Edgar Hoover dated 8/25/36, both dealing with conversations Mr. Hoover had with the President.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

WOC:aso (3)

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey

REC-5 62-116395-54

APR 8 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/HG

5-W06

54 APR 22 1975

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 8, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures - 2

EWL:jvl
(7)

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2ALM/lfg

REC-38
62-116395-53

EX-110
5 APR 10 1975

MAILED 7
APR 9 1975
FBI

2-ENCLOSURES

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

57 APR 16 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

One of the requests contained in referenced letter was for a list of names and titles of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBI Headquarters down to and including unit chiefs, together with a number of personnel below the level of unit chief categorized by unit. At a meeting on April 1, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis and Special Agent Paul V. Daly discussed this request with Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee. It was agreed that the request as stated would be modified and that the FBI would prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of unit chief, with names included, which would be made available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

This is to advise that the list has been prepared and is available for review under the above conditions.

1 - The Attorney General

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP 2ALM/TAG

EWL:jvl
(7)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-53

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-545

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JMC

#M0216

access only

check 7/28

#mpR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JG

62-111375-53

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

#mori6 L-1701
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 Alm/ZTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

IV

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director Counterintelligence Branch	Hunter E. Helgeson Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director Internal Security Branch
4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor F. Anthony Tansey	Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan	Section Chief
Eugene C. Peterson	Number 1 Man
Special Cases Unit	
James P. Lee	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
New York Unit	
Alfred E. Smith	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Washington Unit Chief	
Wilfred R. Schlarman	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	

One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar	Section Chief
James W. Redfield	Number 1 Man

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Chinese (S) Unit	
Herbert J. Morgan	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Satellite Unit	
Howard H. Wallace	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Coordination Unit	
John P. Thomas	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr.	Section Chief
Sebastian S. Mignosa	Number 1 Man
Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit	
Richard J. Deily	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Middle East (S) Unit	
Carl F. Freeman	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Far East (S) Unit	
William W. Hamilton	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Cuban (S) Unit	
Charles H. McCarthy	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Nationality Unit	
Vinicio Henry Nasca	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr.	Section Chief
H. C. Flemister, Jr.	Number 1 Man
Liaison Supervisors	
Six	

SECRET

Foreign Liaison Unit Robert A. Bermingham Two Special Agents	Unit Chief

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan	Section Chief
William H. Atkinson	Number 1 Man
Black Nationalist and White Hate - Central Unit William D. Neumann Two Special Agents	Unit Chief
Black Nationalist and White Hate - East Unit Paul E. Nugent Two Special Agents	Unit Chief
Black Nationalist and White Hate - West Unit Garnett T. Tunstall Three Special Agents	Unit Chief
Black Nationalist - South, Klan and Informant Unit Homer A. Newman, Jr. Two Special Agents	Unit Chief
Civil Disorders Reporting Unit Seymor F. Phillips Two Special Agents	Unit Chief

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford	Section Chief
Conrad W. Thompson	Number 1 Man

Trotskyist Unit	
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Communist Party Unit	
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Security Informant Unit	
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Extremist-West Unit	
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Extremist-East Unit	
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	

Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man
Training Unit	
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Central Research Unit	
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Special Records and Related Research Unit	
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Analytical Research Unit	
David Ryan	Unit Chief
Seven Special Agents	

#mori6 1-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JHG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Branch

Hunter E. Helgeson
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Internal Security Branch

4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor
F. Anthony Tansey

Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor
Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan	Section Chief
Eugene C. Peterson	Number 1 Man
Special Cases Unit	
James P. Lee	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
New York Unit	
Alfred E. Smith	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Washington Unit Chief	
Wilfred R. Schlarman	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	

One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar	Section Chief
James W. Redfield	Number 1 Man

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Chinese (S) Unit	
Herbert J. Morgan	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Satellite Unit	
Howard H. Wallace	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Coordination Unit	
John P. Thomas	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr.	Section Chief
Sebastian S. Mignosa	Number 1 Man
Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit	
~~Richard J. Daily~~	~~Unit Chief~~
Four Special Agents	
Middle East (S) Unit	
Carl F. Freeman	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Far East (S) Unit	
William W. Hamilton	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Cuban (S) Unit	
Charles H. McCarthy	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Nationality Unit	
Vinicio Henry Nasca	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr.	Section Chief
H. C. Flemister, Jr.	Number 1 Man
Liaison Supervisors	
Six	

Foreign Liaison Unit Robert A. Bermingham Two Special Agents	Unit Chief

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan	Section Chief
William H. Atkinson	Number 1 Man
Black Nationalist and White Hate - Central Unit William D. Neumann Two Special Agents	Unit Chief
Black Nationalist and White Hate - East Unit Paul E. Nugent Two Special Agents	Unit Chief
Black Nationalist and White Hate - West Unit Garnett T. Tunstall Three Special Agents	Unit Chief
Black Nationalist - South, Klan and Informant Unit Homer A. Newman, Jr. Two Special Agents	Unit Chief
Civil Disorders Reporting Unit Seymor F. Phillips Two Special Agents	Unit Chief

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford	Section Chief
Conrad W. Thompson	Number 1 Man

Trotskyist Unit	
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Communist Party Unit	
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Security Informant Unit	
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Extremist-West Unit	
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Extremist-East Unit	
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	

Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man
Training Unit	
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Central Research Unit	
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Special Records and Related Research Unit	
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Analytical Research Unit	
David Ryan	Unit Chief
Seven Special Agents	

(+)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MOR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

4/3/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/BJG
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by 9~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MORI6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JAG
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by 9~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED ST[illegible]ES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/23/01 BY SP-2 ALM

SUBJECT: JOHN T. ELLIFF
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICS
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

On 3-18-75 Professor John T. Elliff advised Inspector John B. Hotis that he had been contacted by William Miller, Staff Director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, and was asked to serve as Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence. This is one of four Task Forces being formed by the Select Committee and it will focus primarily on the activities of the FBI. The other Task Forces are on Foreign Intelligence, Military and Technological Intelligence, and Command and Control.

Elliff said he had not decided whether to accept the offer and believed that others were also being considered for the position. He said he was reluctant to do anything that would interfere with the excellent working arrangements he had developed with the Bureau. He feels that his initial obligation is to the Director, and the purpose of going to the Police Foundation was to get formal support for a project that would be of primary benefit to the Bureau and only secondarily to the Attorney General and Congress. He said he would be guided by our judgment in this matter and not want to break any commitments that he might have made with the Bureau.

If he accepts the appointment Elliff said he would, of course, suspend work on his research project until he had terminated his employment with the Committee. He said he would also agree not to use any classified material that he acquired in his capacity as Task Force Director. Elliff has discussed this matter with John Heaphy, Assistant Director of the Police Foundation. Heaphy said the Foundation had no objections whatsoever for his accepting the position with the Senate Select Committee, and he would be free to resume his project after the Committee work was done.

REC-10 62-116395-52

NOT RECORDED
102 APR 10 1975

MAR 28 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116395-

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Reed
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis

54 APR 14 1975

JBH:dkg (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: JOHN T. ELLIFF

It should be noted that the Select Committee considered offering the position to Larry Baskir, Counsel to the President's Clemency Board. Mr. Baskir formerly served as Chief Counsel to Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, and we had numerous contacts with him in that capacity. Our purpose was to reach some common agreement on privacy legislation that Senator Ervin planned to introduce in the 93rd Session of Congress. There were numerous meetings with Baskir on the same subject in the Deputy Attorney General's office. These efforts proved unsuccessful and after several months we discontinued the discussions. In our opinion, Mr. Baskir was unwilling to work out any reasonable compromise and seemed unsympathetic to the ~~legislation~~ legitimate concerns of law enforcement.

B.C.

It is clear that this is a matter for Professor Elliff to determine and the Bureau should not express an official opinion. Although we have not always agreed with his views on intelligence matters, we have had no occasion to question his objectivity or his integrity as a scholar. Mr. Miller knows that Professor Elliff enjoys our confidence and it is our understanding that he offered Elliff the position in order to avoid an adversary relationship between the Bureau and the Committee.

Professor Elliff said he would make no commitments to the Senate Committee until he hears from us.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Professor Elliff be advised that it would be inappropriate for us to express an opinion on whether he should accept the appointment offered by the Senate Select Committee.

JAF/JBH

Handled 3/25/75 JBH

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/31/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the afternoon of 3/25/75.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; the then Deputy AG Laurence Silberman, Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke, as well as officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

The following items of interest were discussed:

Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), and the Committee's Counsel, Mr. F.A.O. Schwarz, III, visited CIA Headquarters to discuss SSC business. Mr. Miller suggested that a tactic the SSC was considering is the identification of several key issues that the Committee could look into in-depth. For example, the SSC might propose to identify two or three covert actions engaged in by CIA and examine them in-depth rather than try to cover each and every covert action CIA might identify. Colby advised that this appeared to be an encouraging development and possibly each agency of the Intelligence Community might be asked to provide a series of key issues from which the Select Committee could select one or two for an in-depth study.

EX 104 REC-10 62-116395-51

The question of the SSC staff signing a Secrecy Agreement is still not settled. The Staff Director raised some constitutional questions regarding the Secrecy Agreement. Mr. Schwarz admitted, however, that some type of arrangement would have to be made to insure that the Intelligence Community had some protection against unauthorized disclosures by staff members of the SSC.

APR 8 1975

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JG

ENCLOSURE
54 APR 14 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Both Miller and Schwarz accepted the Third Agency Rule and agreed to abide by it. For the record, the SSC's interpretation of the Third Agency Rule (which is consistent with the Intelligence Community) is as follows: Classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department.

The Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) will meet to develop some ground rules and standardization for sanitizing documents to be furnished to the Select Committees.

The question of Intelligence Community personnel being represented by counsel was discussed. The position of the White House on this issue has been fully reported in a memorandum from the Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, dated 3/27/75, entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Rodney Hills Associate Counsel to the President."

It was also agreed at the meeting of 3/25/75 that the President's Counsel would attempt to negotiate with the SSC to insure that all interviews of Intelligence Community personnel would be conducted on the premises of the bureau, agency or department employing the persons to be interviewed.

Attached also for the record are the following:

A letter dated 3/20/75 from Staff Director William G. Miller to Mr. John Clarke advising that Mr. Ben Marshall has been designated as the Security Officer of the SSC;

A letter dated 3/17/75 from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke listing employees of the SSC who have been cleared by the Committee for certification by CIA for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

A letter from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke dated 3/20/75 advising that Mr. Ben Marshall was cleared for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

A memorandum from the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee advising that arrangements had been perfected for the delivery of classified documents to the SSC and describing how such documents should be delivered.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WRW/TWL

PLM

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATE[illegible].
CHARLES MCC. MA[illegible], JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible] PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Officer of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, has been designated Compartmentation Officer.

Sincerely,

William Green Miller

William G. Miller

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRM[illegible]
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAI[illegible]

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKE[illegible]R., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATE[illegible] ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 17, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter of March 13, outlining a procedure for clearance for the Select Committee staff. The procedure you have suggested has been adopted and attached to this letter is the Select Committee's first listing of staff who have been cleared by the Committee. This listing is the result of the investigation undertaken by the FBI and a consideration of the FBI reports on individuals by the Chairman. As further investigations by the FBI are received, we will send additional persons to be granted clearances.

As to access to compartmentalized information, those members of the staff who will be designated will be indicated to you in subsequent communications.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
Charity Benz	7-23-46	N.Y.	053-38-7410
Michael Taylor Epstein	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318
Mark Henry Gitenstein	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767
Audrey Helen Hatry	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48	N.Y.	068-38-6464
Michael James Madigan	4-18-43	D.C.	042-34-3797
Elliot Everett Maxwell	7-24-46	N.Y.	133-34-4225
Martha Evans Mecham	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848
James Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495
Jan Orloff	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394
John F. Peterson	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707
Lewis Brittle Snider	1-12-45	N.C.	246-72-0956
Burton Victor Wides	6-14-41	N.J.	139-30-1936

As the FBI completes its investigative work, other names will be sent to you.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, [illegible]RIZ.
CHARLES MCC. M[illegible]AS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHW[illegible], PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

Ad Hoc Staff
75-181

United State[illegible] Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number has received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and is hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Benjamin Marshall, May 4, 1919, Walnut (now Verdigre)
Nebraska, soc sec no 485-28-4530

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/TG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-49
21 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of USIB on Congressional Review

SUBJECT : Security - Arrangements for Receipt of Classified Material by Senate Select Committee

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2ALM/DTS

#MORI6

1. On 19 March 1975 I telephonically inquired of Mr. Benjamin C. Marshall, Security Officer of the Senate Select Committee, whether he was in a position to begin receiving classified documents. He advised that arrangements had been perfected and that effective 20 March 1975 such documents could be delivered as follows:

> The courier should enter the 1st and C Street entrance of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, inquire of the guard as to the location of Room G308, go to the front door of G308, advise the guard there that material is being delivered and have him call Mr. Marshall or Charity Benz, both of whom are authorized to receive classified documents up to and including TOP SECRET*.

2. Mr. Marshall requested that prior to delivery he or someone in his office be telephonically advised (224-1700) of the impending delivery and the estimated time of arrival so that he or someone from his office can be available. He also stated that if delivery was desired to a specific staff member, Mr. Marshall would try and have such person available, but stated he was authorized to accept documents for members of the Committee and staff.

3. The Committee has not yet advised as to compartmented clearances but Mr. Marshall has been designated Compartmentation

---

*Mr. Patrick Shea is expected to be added as a person to receive documents but the certification for this access to classified material has not as yet been received by your office.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

Officer and has advised that the same delivery arrangements will be in effect for compartmented material. When necessary clearance arrangements have been perfected so that delivery of compartmented material can begin, you will be advised.

Donald E. Moore
Donald E. Moore
Chairman

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10273-10104
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-116395-1640

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE
TITLE:

DATE: 02/16/1967
PAGES: 102
SUBJECT: CIA, NATIONAL STUDENT ASSOC, PICKETING, DEMONSTRATION

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 10/30/1998
UPDATE DATE: 02/14/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

Consultation

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(C)

JFK Act 6 (4)

COMMENTS: EBF, INC 2 ADMIN PAGE, 3 T/T, 34 MEMO, 5 LTR, 2 LHM, 6 NEWS ARTIC, 8 A/T

2/18/67

AIRTEL AIRMAIL

TO: SAC, JACKSONVILLE

FROM: SAC, JACKSON (166-NEW) (P)

WENDELL R. MELCUIST;
ANTHONY LENNON;
ITAR - GAMBLING
(OO: Jackson)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Informant

On 2/16/67, (PCI LOUISE SKELTON, Biloxi, Miss.) advised on 2/7/67 above subjects registered into the Travel Inn Motel, Biloxi. PCI stated that at time of registration above subjects furnished the following information on their motel registration card:

IRAN ~~WENDELL X MELQUIST~~

"WENDELL R. X MELQUEST MISS
~~260 Vernal Street~~
~~Eugene, Oregon~~

B. APPROX
1937-1942

"1965 Ford, Florida License 8W20164
Employed, U. S. Government"

"ANTHONY X LENNON
~~43-24 165th Street~~ MISS
Flushing, N. Y. DC

B. APPROX
1937-1942

"Self-employed"

PCI described MELQUEST as a white male, age 25-30, height, 5' 5", weight 150 to 160 pounds, dark hair, brown eyes, medium complexion, and subject LENNON as a white male, age 25-30, height 6', weight 175 pounds, light brown or sandy hair, fair or light complexion with freckles.

2 - Jacksonville
2 - New York
1 ② - Portland
2 - Jackson (166-NEW)
WDJ/bjk (8)
1 - Bureau 4-12-67

62-80750-4552

SEARCHED........INDEXED........
SERIALIZED........FILED........
FEB 23 1967
FBI - PORTLAND

ENCLOSURE

166-94-1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GO NMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 3/6/67

FROM : [LEGAT, HONG KONG] (X)(U) (80-2)

SUBJECT: (X) RELATIONS WITH [CIA] (S)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT.
EXCEPT BRACKETS
Jm 6-18-97

(S)

ReBulet 2/8/67.

[Assistant Chief of Station, CIA,] Hong Kong, has (S) advised that the situation in Macau has returned to a degree of normalcy in which covert inquiries can again be handled in that colony with no more difficulty than before. (X)

This is submitted for info of Bureau supervisors handling [Chinese] investigative matters. (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

9/29/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mt
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

~~9/25/95~~
~~Classified by 5668-SLD/mde~~
~~Declassify on: OADR (JFK)~~

~~P2 and Bracketed info Classified per Agency ltr. dated 11/26/97~~
~~9803 [illegible] #211,326 5/14/92~~

1 - Bureau
(1 - Foreign Liaison)
1 - [Hong Kong] (X)(U)
DAC/djw
(4)

REC 10 62-80750-45

EX-114

10 MAR 13 1967

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SECRET

6 MAR 21 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT.
EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS
JM 6-25-97
(SLD/KSR 8-3-97) JFK

TO : Mr. Rosen DATE: March 15, 1967

FROM : R. I. Shroder

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Thompson
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Trotter

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA
[CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)] ~~(S)~~ (U)
INTERNAL SECURITY - VENEZUELA
KIDNAPING

[C.I.A.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

This relates to information received from CIA indicating the possibility that the Communist Party of Venezuela may attempt to kidnap the child of [a CIA employee Thomas Keogh.] No investigation is being conducted by us and appropriate dissemination has previously been made. ~~(S)~~ (S)

At our suggestion, [through liaison with CIA, fingerprints and photographs have been obtained and were furnished to SA W. O. Cregar by Mrs. Jane Roman of CIA on 3/10/67. This material is being made part of this file for possible use in the event of a kidnaping. Photographs and fingerprints are of the following individuals: Joseph Edward Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, Jr.; Christina Margarita Keogh; Elizabeth Teresa Keogh; Francis Xavier Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, III, and Maria Rita Keogh.] (S)

Agency info classified
per CIA ltr 11/26/91.
9803-Rdd/gcl #211,326. 5/14/92

ACTION:

[MRS THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH JR] (S)

This matter has been coordinated with the Identification Division and it is recommended that this memo and attachment be sent directly to SA Carl Volker, Room 4125, IB, in order that the fingerprints may be promptly classified and filed.

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

REC 33

ST-114

62-80750-4563

FDT:emf
(7)

MAR 20 1967

Fingerprints of following detached and filed in Ident Div.

[MARIA RITA KEOGH
EDWARD JOSEPH KEOGH
CHRISTINA MARGARITA KEOGH
ELIZABETH TERESA KEOGH
FRANCIS XAVIER KEOGH
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH JR.
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH III] (S)

71 MAR 29 1967

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

9/25/95
Classified by SLD/KSR/SLD/jmd
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

SECRET

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

9/25/95
~~Classified by 5668-SLD/mle~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK)

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3/15/67

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Brannigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 6-18-97

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

SOURCE

In connection with developments in the case captioned "NK 2264-S, (IS-R," Bureau file 134-9824, the (S) Director noted "I note more and more we are telling CIA about our domestic operations and always to our detriment. I want this trend stopped. H." (A separate memorandum is being submitted concerning a new development in the aforementioned case).

On 3/15/67, the Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, and took the opportunity to review the status of relations between FBI and CIA. It was felt that this was an opportune time to do so in view of the Director's concern as expressed above.

Helms stated that he personally was pleased with relations between the two Agencies. He stated that sometimes he is irked or disturbed when people outside and inside of the Government ask the question "How are you getting along with the FBI?" He indicated that this question is frequently asked by members of Congress. Helms stated that he religiously has followed a practice of lucidly and firmly advising such people that relations are excellent. He stated that he personally believed that this was true.

The Liaison Agent commented that working relations are good, but there was an area which might not be getting proper attention. The Agent stated that there was reason to be concerned regarding effective coordination on those cases which are of interest to both FBI and CIA because there appeared to be developing an atmosphere where people in both Agencies felt that there was now wide-open liberty to conduct operations and activities of a joint nature. The Agent stated that he wished to emphasize that such an atmosphere cannot exist and that Mr. Hoover would never condone any trend in this direction. The Agent commented that work in this area had to be very efficiently coordinated and that we in the Bureau were closely scrutinizing each situation as it develops where both Agencies had an interest. The Agent suggested that Mr. Helms might desire to alert appropriate subordinates in the Agency on this point. 62-80750-4564

9/29/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668-SLD/mle
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

REC-51

CONTINUED - OVER

SJP:rab
(6)

59 MAR 24 1967

SECRET

5 MAR 20 1967

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/17/67

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT.
JM 6-18-97

SLD/KSR
6-30-97
(JFK)

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (~~65~~ 62-80750)

FROM: SAC, WFO (66-3896)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Source

On 3/15/67, (PSI EMIL R. SVEILIS, the late night desk editor, United Press International, Washington, D. C.) who has furnished reliable information in the past, said that he wished to advise this office that he overheard comments indicating that CIA had contributed at least one million dollars to the National Council of Churches. He also advised that he understood that the CIA maintains a "safe house at the Airle House, Warrenton, Virginia." He was questioned specifically about the source of the above information and indicated that he believed that he heard this information from individuals connected with the news media but he could not recall the exact identity of these individuals. He indicated that he got the impression that this information was common knowledge in the news field.

The Bureau may wish to advise CIA by appropriate channels concerning the information that the CIA had allegedly contributed money to the National Council of Churches and maintains a "safe house" at Warrenton, Virginia. This information was not put in LHM form because of its general character and because the PSI was unable to recall his source of this information or when the information came to his attention.

The PSI requested that his identity be protected.

3 - Bureau
2 - WFO
(1-134-7249 Sub A) (SVEILIS) Source

REC-35 62 80750 4565

PAT:mfd
(5)

LIAISON

CIA

MAR 17 1967

AIRTEL

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

INT. SEC.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. J. P. MOHR

DATE: 3/24/67

FROM : MR. I. W. CONRAD

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TOUR OF LABORATORY BY TECHNICAL PERSONNEL OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(U)

Mr. Lon Thomas, Document Examiner for [CIA], called this afternoon to inquire if a tour could be arranged through the FBI Laboratory for himself and two of his co-workers, Mr. Joseph Hall and [Stanley Schultz.] They have [C] no specific problems, but merely wish to visit our facilities briefly. Accordingly, tentative arrangements have been made for the requested tour at 1 p.m., March 29, 1967.

8-2-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/lksr
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

ACTION:

Unless advised to the contrary, the tour will be conducted as requested.

~~Bracketed info Classified per CIA ltr 11/26/91 Remainder is unclass. 9803-Rdd/gel #211,320 5/14/92.~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS
JM 6-25-97

1-Mr. Wick (Att: Tour Room)
1-Mr. W. C. Sullivan (Att: Mr. S. Papich)
1-Mr. Conrad
(4) IWC:dmg

(SLD/lksr 8-2-97 JFK)

9/25/95
~~Classified by 5668 SLD/mde~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REC 4 62-80750-4567

handled 3/29/67

18 MAR 31 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

SEVEN

59 APR 10 1967

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. DATE: 4/4/67

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) (C)
ALIEN INTERVIEW REQUESTS

Re memorandum Cotter to Sullivan dated 3/28/67, which instructed the Liaison Agent to advise appropriate [C] CIA representatives of the change in handling alien interview requests at the Bureau. (C)

On 3/31/67, the Liaison Agent advised Mr. Leo [C] Dunn of the change in handling alien interview requests [C] at FBI Headquarters. Dunn was advised that the overall [C] coordination for handling these requests would be handled by the Bureau's Name Check Section under the coordination of Special Agent J. W. Brown.

Inasmuch as CIA occasionally makes a telephonic request when expedite matters are involved, the Liaison Agent obtained the names of Eugene Young and Becky Vaughn as the persons who would call Special Agent Brown in the event an expedite matter is involved. CIA is well aware that the use of this telephonic request should be held to a minimum and used only at times when time is of the essence and the matter is of sufficient importance to deviate from the normal request procedures. (C)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classification Per
CIA ltr. 11/26/91.
9803-RDD/gcl #217,326
5/14/92

ACTION:

The above is directed to the Name Check Section for their information and attention.

1 - Mr. Scatterday (J.W. Brown)
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. Cregar

9/25/95
Classified by 5668 SLD/jwde
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

REC-47 62-80750-457

WOC:rab
(6)

3 APR 7 1967

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONFIDENTIAL

56APR 17 1967

NAME CHECK

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

The Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter of July 14, 1975, to K. William O'Connor, Esq., requested a response to Item #3.

Item #3 is set forth as follows:

"All memoranda and any other materials which relate to or reflect discussions about the Ku Klux Klan at the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958, and all memoranda and any other materials which relate to or reflect recommendations, proposals, and decisions made either prior to or following said conference."

A diligent, extensive, exhaustive search was conducted in an effort to obtain a copy of the minutes of the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958. However, this search disclosed no memorandum reflecting an Executive Conference being held on October 1, 1958. Executive Conference memoranda for the year 1958 were reviewed. This review did not disclose any memorandum which related to discussions about the Ku Klux Klan.

The Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter of July 14, 1975, to K. William O'Connor, Esq., requested a response to Item #3.

Item #3 is set forth as follows:

"All memoranda and any other materials which relate to or reflect discussions about the Ku Klux Klan at the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958, and all memoranda and any other materials which relate to or reflect recommendations, proposals, and decisions made either prior to or following said conference."

A diligent, extensive, exhaustive search was conducted in an effort to obtain a copy of the minutes of the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958. However, this search disclosed no memorandum reflecting an Executive Conference being held on October 1, 1958. Executive Conference memoranda for the year 1958 were reviewed. This review did not disclose any memorandum which related to discussions about the Ku Klux Klan.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/23/64

FROM : SAC, JACKSONVILLE

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(TWO-WAY RADIO UNITS)

ReBulet 9/15/64.

The Jacksonville Office has carefully noted the obvious intent of reBulet and agrees that there is a real strong possibility for taking some counter-intelligence action against the Klan through this medium.

[redacted] was re-contacted and he stated at the present time there is no additional information concerning the use of two-way radios nor has the local Klan in Jacksonville formulated any code. This would indicate that at the present time, while a number of local Klansmen have radios, there is no opportunity to introduce deceptive transmissions as the Klan has no "missions" on the planning board. The above informant has reported that it is anticipated additional Klansmen will purchase more two-way radio equipment which would be indicative of an expansion in plans of the Klan to use this method of communication. To date there has been no operation of the Klan where two-way radio communications have played an integral part.

This office through its informants, particularly [redacted] will remain alert and will promptly advise the Bureau whenever information is received indicating the Klan has a sizeable "mission" in the planning stages wherein radios will play an important part. Depending upon the purpose of the "mission" plans could be formulated for some deceptive attacks on the Klan itself.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/23/64

FROM : SAC, JACKSONVILLE

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(TWO-WAY RADIO UNITS)

ReBulet 9/15/64.

The Jacksonville Office has carefully noted the obvious intent of reBulet and agrees that there is a real strong possibility for taking some counter-intelligence action against the Klan through this medium.

~~JK 143-R~~ was re-contacted and he stated at the present time there is no additional information concerning the use of two-way radios nor has the local Klan in Jacksonville formulated any code. This would indicate that at the present time, while a number of local Klansmen have radios, there is no opportunity to introduce deceptive transmissions as the Klan has no "missions" on the planning board. The above informant has reported that it is anticipated additional Klansmen will purchase more two-way radio equipment which would be indicative of an expansion in plans of the Klan to use this method of communication. To date there has been no operation of the Klan where two-way radio communications have played an integral part.

This office through its informants, particularly ~~JK 143-R~~, will remain alert and will promptly advise the Bureau whenever information is received indicating the Klan has a sizeable "mission" in the planning stages wherein radios will play an important part. Depending upon the purpose of the "mission" plans could be formulated for some deceptive attacks on the Klan itself.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10-15-64

FROM : SAC, JACKSON

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM,
INTERNAL SECURITY,
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter to Atlanta dated 9-2-64.

To implement a counterintelligence program as outlined in referenced letter, this office has been and will continue to penetrate klan and hate organizations with continued informant coverage. This is the first step to learn the complete organizational structure, members, their activities, sympathizers and followers, action they plan, including actions of violence and distruction of property.

Once their activities, etc., are determined through informant coverage proper action can be taken to disrupt and neutralize their activities and efforts can be directed to frustrate their plans. In addition, those specifically responsible for unlawful actions are determined through informant coverage.

Informant coverage will be specifically concentrated on the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan since this is the largest and most important of the klan groups in Mississippi. Other pertinent organizations considered for counterintelligence action are:

Mississippi Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
United Klans of America, Inc.,
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
Americans for the Preservation of the White Race.

The pertinent individuals to first consider are the state officers of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. They are:

SAMUEL BOWERS, Laurel, Mississippi, Imperial Wizard
JULIUS HARPER, Crystal Springs, Mississippi, Grand Dragon
BILLY BUCKLES, Roxie, Mississippi, Grand Giant
A. C. HARRINGTON, Ruth, Mississippi, State Organizer
ERNEST GILBERT, Brookhaven, Mississippi, Chief of the Klans' Bureau of Investigation(KBI)
PAUL FOSTER, Natchez, Mississippi, State Chaplain
ACE WEATHERS, Hattiesburg, Mississippi, Contact Leader for the County and Secretary

Informant coverage will be supplemented by technical installations where practical. Specifically, it has been learned through an informant that a klan group holds meetings in a building especially built for this purpose in Copiah County. These meetings are held on a weekly basis. The building is in a rural area several miles from the nearest town and has access by only one road. During meetings guards are placed at strategic points outside the building to insure complete privacy. An appropriate survey is being made to determine the feasibility of a technical installation in this building. The Bureau will be advised by separate communication regarding this. Other logical points are being determined for this type of coverage.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTION

1. Liaison is established with the governor's office to bring pressure to bear on local officials, such as mayors, chiefs of police, sheriffs, etc., to solve recent bombings, church burnings, and other acts of violence.

EXAMPLE:

Jackson teletype to the Bureau dated 10-11-64 captioned UNSUBS; EXPLOSION ON LAWN OF RESIDENCE OF ~~MAYOR JOHN NOSSER, NATCHEZ, MISSISSIPPI~~, 9-25-64, stated that an Investigator of the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol(MHSP) advised he was instructed by ~~Governor PAUL B. JOHNSON~~ to inform ~~Adams County~~ Sheriff ~~ODELL ANDERS~~ that the ~~governor~~ was seriously considering sending the National Guard into ~~Adams~~ County to close down all gambling and liquor activity in the county. Sheriff ~~ANDERS~~ advised he is in the process of contacting all gambling and liquor establishments in Adams County to inform operators that if pertinent information regarding ~~Natchez~~ bombings are not in his possession by October 15 he will close all such establishments on October 16.

The Jackson Office will, in each instant that presents itself in other localities and counties, arrange for similar action and follow through on each.

2. Repeated contacts and constant interviews of known and suspected klan members are being conducted each Saturday. This has been done since July, 1964, and is being continued. This has a three fold purpose. It lets the klansmen know the FBI is interested and will be around. It also enables FBI to know ~~their~~ whereabouts on that day, become better acquainted with their habits and gain more background information regarding the person being interviewed. In several instances during such interviews it has been possible to convert certain klansmen into informants. During interviews of klansmen who are completely unco-operative and who want to know how we got their name and why they are being interviewed we can flip through the cards and pick out a name of another klansman who is completely unco-operative. This is a disruptive tactic which can breed suspicion among themselves.

3. Consideration is being given to invite the State Police to make raids at known klan meetings. The local sheriffs, of course, will not be invited to participate since they are most likely in on the klan meetings. MHSP Investigators at McComb have indicated they seemed interested in this sort of thing and it is believed this will have the backing of the governor since he has indicated such to them. This type of thing, of course, will be used at places where technical installations are not feasible or productive.

4. Will participate with the governor in press releases on the arrests of klansmen when appropriate. This has been done in the recent arrests in McComb, Mississippi, in connection with recent bombings in that area.

5. Information has been developed through an informant that a faction of the klan is interested in putting another man in office rather than the present person. More information is being obtained on this so as to exploit all possibilities and create dissention among the leaders, and by doing so the opportunity may present itself to have the informant put in a high office.

The above is some of the potential counterintelligence action contemplated by this office. It is being studied on a day to day basis. The Bureau will be furnished with complete details on all the above plans as the opportunities are made and present themselves, prior to any specific action being taken by this office.

ACTION GROUPS

Recent actions of violence in McComb, Mississippi, were for the most part believed to be carried out by an "action group". As a result of an intensive investigation and informant coverage, 11 men were arrested. One had a membership card in the Ku Klux Klan and another a card for membership in the "Americans for the Preservation of the White Race". Some acts of violence such as bombings are, according to [illegible], planned with great secrecy by small groups who [illegible] to determine which ones do the job. Often criminal characters, or others not officially under klan orders, pretend to represent the klan as a cover for acts of violence.

Recommendations for specific counterintelligence action will be submitted by separate communications and the status letter required will be submitted beginning 1-1-65.

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/12/64

FROM : SAC, CHARLOTTE

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet 9/2/64 to Atlanta and other offices. It is noted this letter lists as one of the target organizations, as No. 7 on page 2, the Independent Klavern, Fountain Inn, S. C. Since this organization is no longer active or in existence, it is suggested it be deleted from this list.

Since the major organization in Charlotte Division is the United Klans of America, Inc., of which Birmingham is origin, a copy of this letter is being designated to Birmingham for information.

The following represents the consensus of Charlotte Agents familiar with Klan activity:

1. Disruptive activity should not be undertaken at a particular Klavern, as a general rule, unless there is sufficient well established informant coverage to be able to tell the effect of the action when instituted. Such action would probably serve to "tighten up" the organization and make it more difficult to get an informant in thereafter.

2. It is considered doubtful that newspaper publicity, of only a generally unfavorable nature against the Klan organization, is effective in reducing new applicants or causing any large number of present members to drop out. The "Charlotte Observer," which has wide distribution throughout North and South Carolina, published in August and September, 1964, a series of articles, copies of which were sent the Bureau by Charlotte letter of 9/15/64. These articles ridiculed the United Klans

of America, Inc., in North Carolina, and published both photos and names of a number of members. So far as has been learned from informants, this had very little adverse effect upon the organization. It was alleged that two to five members were discharged from their jobs, or warned about continuing membership, but the identities of these alleged persons is not known. ~~North Carolina Grand Dragon JAMES R. JONES~~ has stated, both publicly and privately to informants, that this publicity was very valuable to the growth of the organization. One informant reported that the day after the articles published his name as a local leader, three persons contacted him and applied for membership, stating they had not previously known whom to contact.

It is considered that publicity of this type generally deters from joining only those persons who would not be interested in joining in the first place. It is believed that a large proportion of those persons who are potential members are seeking status and recognition, and publicity is no deterrent to them; it makes them feel important and members of an important group.

The major apparent effect of the series of newspaper articles referred to has been a tightening up of security, and refusal of leaders to allow newspaper photos of individual Klansmen to be taken at public rallies.

3. Disruptive activity, wherever possible, should be of a nature which does not expose the fact that the Bureau, or the "Federal Government", is behind the activity. It is believed that open action, to a large extent, can backfire and create resentment and sympathy. It must be remembered that Klan membership, in many sections, does not by any means carry the odium that alleged Communist membership or sympathy does in almost any section of society.

4. Along this same line, there is probably no point in trying disruptive activity, at least not at this stage, on a local Klan group which is small, inactive, and peaceful. Any such activity which is not completely discreet and concealed would likely have the effect of stirring it up.

5. By letter of 9/26/64, Charlotte furnished the Bureau a sample of a lapel pin which was adopted at the Imperial

Klonvocation of United Klans of America at Birmingham on 9/5-6/64. This is to be sold to members for $2 each and there is apparently considerable demand for it. Since it is not apparent to the unitiated that it has anything to do with "the Klan," it is expected that members will wear it openly as a secret recognition signal. If it does become widely adopted and worn, consideration should then be given to giving widespread publicity to the fact of what it represents. This should have the result of discouraging some persons who do not want their Klan membership publicly known.

6. It is considered that possibly the most effective way of discourgging membership, or causing existing members to withdraw, is to establish that someone in the organization is getting rich off it, or embezzling the proceeds. Charlotte is endeavoring to develop information along these lines, but nothing specific has yet been developed.

✓ 7. The following are suggested tactics that appear useful on a selected basis against individual Klansmen, particularly those whose employers might object to their Klan membership:

a. Anonymous letter or phone call to the employer telling of the Klan membership.

b. Enter on behalf of the member a subscription to the "Fiery Cross," United Klans of America publication, and have it mailed to his employment.

c. When a particular member is away from home at a Klavern meeting, have a female phone his home and indicate he was to meet her and is late. This might have the effect of making it difficult for him to get away from home at night thereafter. This should be limited to particular individuals who are considered potential ones to stir up trouble in a Klavern.

8. ~~ROBERT ECHOLS SCOGGINS~~, Aka., Charlotte ~~file 105-991,~~ ~~Bureau file 157-1530~~, is ~~South Carolina Grand Dragon of~~ United Klans of America. Charlotte reports by SA ~~JOHN ALDEN MUNN~~, 1/31/64 and 3/27/64, show that he is receiving over ~~$300~~ per month from the ~~Veterans Administration as a 100 per cent disabled veteran.~~ At the same time he operates a ~~plumbing business~~ and is active in United Klans of America, making public speeches, etc. Charlotte furnished extra copies of those reports to the Bureau, with the suggestion furnishing them to VA be considered.

It is suggested consideration be given to asking the VA to re-evaluate his disability rating, in view of his employment and activities. It is believed this should be done on a SOG level, to reduce the possibility of ~~SCOGGINS~~ learning that such a suggestion came from the FBI.

9. "Action Groups." No particular such groups, given to violence, are known within Klan organizations in Charlotte territory. As the Bureau is aware, United Klans of America has instituted what it calls "Security Guards," who wear military type uniforms and have military ranks. These function at public rallies for the purpose of keeping order, watching for "spies," etc. It is expected that if violence is undertaken, these will probably be the ones to do it, but no such undertakings have been learned.

Specific individual recommendations for counterintelligence action will be submitted by subsequent letters as developed.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/13/64

FROM : SAC, LITTLE ROCK

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO

ReBulet to Atlanta and Other Offices, 9/2/64.

Set out below are an analysis and recommendations under captioned program.

NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRP)

The Arkansas branch of NSRP has been inactive in the State of Arkansas for the past year with the exception of placing on the Arkansas ballot candidates for President and Vice President of the United States. It is not recommended that any action be taken against this group at this time.

ASSOCIATION OF ARKANSAS KLANS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (AAK)

The AAK in Arkansas is made up of three klaverns located at Little Rock, Texarkana, and Pine Bluff; and it has no affiliation with any national klan group. There are no "action" groups within any of these three klaverns. The three klaverns do not own or lease any property for meeting places. The four Little Rock members usually meet in the home of a member. The Texarkana Klavern has not held any klavern meetings as such in several months. The Pine Bluff Klavern meetings vary from residences to business places of klavern members.

State meetings are held at irregular intervals on an average of about once per month or less. There is no regular meeting place for the state meetings, which are held in various Arkansas towns including towns in which there are no klaverns. The state meetings are attended

by from one to five members of each of the three klaverns and are well covered by informants. The State ~~Grand Dragon BILL WILLIAMS~~ has continually cautioned members against violence and any type of illegal activities. None of the klaverns have engaged in violence.

1. LITTLE ROCK KLAVERN

Of the four members who attend weekly meetings [redacted] ~~JOE J. FARMER~~, who is considered the head of this small group, draws a pension from the Federal Government and, according to informants, is afraid to engage in any illegal activity or to let his name be used in connection with the klan for fear of losing his pension. The two informants maintain the full confidence of the other two members. In recent months the klavern ran a series of small ads in a Little Rock daily newspaper in an effort to renew interest and gain new members. The klavern received a number of responses, but no action whatsoever has been taken by the klavern to take in any new members. The klavern has no organized activity other than the weekly meetings described by informants as being "bull sessions" with the principal topic being politics.

No recommendation for counterintelligence is being made concerning the Little Rock Klavern.

2. TEXARKANA KLAVERN

This klavern has not held any klavern meetings as such in several months, and it appears that the principal reason for the lack of meetings was the interview of members and leaders concerning the assassination of President KENNEDY. Klavern representatives regularly attend state meetings, one reason being that ~~State Grand Dragon BILL WILLIAMS~~, who officiates at state meetings, is a member of the Texarkana Klavern. Of the five or six members who from time to time attend state meetings, two are informants. On 10/1/64 [redacted] advised that the Grand Dragon had stated that hereafter Texarkana Klavern members will meet with the Bivins - Kildare, Texas, Klavern of the AAK.

Grand Dragon WILLIAMS, according to informants, is active in politics in Bowie County, Texas, is a former member of the Board of Regents of Texarkana Junior College, Texarkana, Texas, and in recent months has been defeated for election to the Board of Regents of that college and defeated as a candidate for the City Council of Texarkana, Texas. He cannot afford to become involved in any illegal activities because of his activities in legitimate enterprises. He has continually cautioned Texarkana Klavern members as well as members of other klaverns attending state meetings against any violence and/or illegal activities.

No recommendation is being made for counterintelligence against the Texarkana Klavern except as it is effected by a recommendation set out hereafter under the Pine Bluff Klavern.

3. PINE BLUFF KLAVERN

The Pine Bluff Klavern has a membership of approximately twenty to twenty-five. It meets once a week in different business locations of its members, and average weekly attendance is twelve. Among the twelve, one or two informants meet with them and furnish full coverage of their activities.

The klavern's main activity has been to discourage integration by legal means and to get members elected to school board positions. The klavern collected the funds and donated the money for the campaign expense of two of its members who ran for a position on the Pine Bluff School Board and the Dollarway School Board. These two members made a miserable showing and were defeated.

The klavern was behind and organized the National Patriots League (NPL) to further its non-integration program publicly. The Exalted Cyclops, or president, of the Klavern is chairman of the NPL. The NPL actually is a front organization for the klavern. The main activity of the NPL was to organize a private country club, which is known as the Butram Country Club. The purpose of the

club was to build a swimming pool for white only. The construction of the pool itself was completed but not sufficiently to place it in use this season. Membership in Butram Country Club is $25. The majority of the members are not aware of the fact that the klavern was behind its organization. Membership in the Butram Country Club was easily obtained as the public pool for whites and public pool for Negroes were both closed during the summer of 1964 when Negroes attempted to integrate the white pool. This left no public pool open in Pine Bluff. J. E. BUTRAM, vice president of the klavern, donated the land for the Butram Country Club; as he owns land surrounding the club, he will benefit financially from the sale of this land for building lots. The NPL has also distributed a limited number of leaflets publicly discouraging peope from patronizing certain restaurants and businesses which had hired or served Negroes.

Members of the klavern were responsible for forming a John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff, and a klavern member is leader of this chapter. Approximately eight to ten people attend the monthly meetings of the John Birch Society Chapter; and of the men who attend, all are klavern members with the exception of one man. Members of the klavern completely control and dominate the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff. They, however, only conduct John Birch Society business. Likewise, the members of the klavern further the John Birch Society program through the klavern.

Members of the klavern are working individually in politics for the re-election of Governor ORVAL E. FAUBUS and for the election of BARRY GOLDWATER.

The klavern has not advocated any violence but on occasion has cautioned its members against violence. As an example, klavern members were cautioned to stay away from Ray's Truck Stop, a location which Negroes were attempting to integrate, in the spring of 1964 so that no violence would occur.

Members of the klavern recently distributed a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leaflet seeking new members and

stating requests for applications be directed to P. O. Box 1182, Pine Bluff. In this leaflet it was pointed out that the KKK was striving for a lawful settlement of the difficulties brought on by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAAC) and that it is opposed to violence. This leaflet further set forth that this was a chartered, legalized movement and it is no more illegal to be a member of it than to be a member of other organizations.

At various times in the past the klavern has attempted to organize "action" groups within the klavern, but on each occasion the project has died from lack of interest.

In line with Bureau policy of dissemination of information, the main activities regarding the Pine Bluff Klavern have been disseminated confidentially to Chief of Police NORMAN D. YOUNG, Pine Bluff, (NA) on a regular basis. Chief YOUNG has exerted every effort to keep down the possibility of violence. Through his confidential sources he is also well aware of the identities of the klavern members and their activities. He personally has warned particular klavern members against any violence and has stated they will be met with immediate arrest if any violence occurs. As an example, ~~Chief YOUNG~~ was advised through his own confidential source of the time and location of the klavern meeting on the night of October 5, 1964. ~~Chief YOUNG~~ sent a lieutenant of his department in uniform to check the location, record license numbers, and to be seen checking the meeting so that the klavern members would know that he was checking on them. This has had a strong influence on making the klavern follow a line of legal activity. It has also resulted in the more responsible leading citizens of the community being made aware of certain klavern members, causing these klavern members to be discredited in the eyes of the public. This was borne out in the recent school board election on 9/29/64 when two klavern members, one of whom is J. E. BUTRAM, were miserably defeated.

The klavern has during the past few months urged its members to solicit and obtain new members. The ineffectiveness of their program is shown by the

fact that only one new member was initiated, and this member is a non-organizational informant of the Little Rock Division. Likewise, as a result of the KKK leaflets distributed encouraging people to write for applications they have received only two letters; and neither of the writers have become a member. The leaflet has met with complete failure in its effort to build up its membership.

At this time the following are the only specific counterintelligence action being recommended:

1. An anonymous letter be mailed to the National Office of John Birch Society, Belmont, Massachusetts, pointing out that the KKK is in full control of the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff. In this letter specifically mention the name of one or two of the more leading klan members who are also leading the John Birch Society in Pine Bluff.

2. An anonymous letter be mailed to ~~CHARLES D.~~ CUTHBERTSON, ~~Exalted Cyclops~~ of the Pine Bluff Klavern, and a copy mailed to BILL WILLIAMS, State Grand Dragon, with the letters to be mailed to the Post Office Box in Pine Bluff and in Texarkana, Arkansas, of the AAK. The letter should be a complaining letter from a member who was active in the past and who recently found one of the KKK leaflets in his automobile which leaflet encouraged membership. The letter would let them know why he has not rejoined; it would point out that he dropped out because of such leadership as ~~J. E.~~ BUTRAM, who has used the klan for personal gain as BUTRAM had a residence on his property remodeled at klavern expense and then made the klavern stop holding meetings there; that BUTRAM has now donated land for the Butram Country Club so that he can sell his surrounding land for building lots at an exorbitant price. The letter should also set forth the fact he heard BUTRAM was discharged from the Army for mental deficiency (moron). This letter should be mailed from Little Rock.

Interviews of klan members and leaders in the past (for example, at the time of the assassination of President KENNEDY and on particular bombing matter cases)

have had deterring effect on the klan. For example, the Texarkana Klavern has not held a klavern meeting as such since that time. One Little Rock member has dropped out as a result of being interviewed; and, according to an informant, this member is a "changed man," meaning that he is not as radical as previously. In interviews with members of the Pine Bluff Klavern, agents have not met with any hostility and have been treated cordially and with respect. Individual members during these interviews have indicated they are opposed to violence and advocate proceeding in a legal manner. A number of the members have said that through political pressure and voting are the only ways any change can be made. However, they have stated they are still avid segregationists and do not condone race mixing in any manner.

When and if it appears that interest may be renewing in the AAK in Arkansas, consideration will be given to another interview program. It is noted that particular klan members are interviewed on a spasmodic basis in regard to leads from surrounding field offices on bombing matter cases, and this has had a tendency to deter any violent activity on the part of klavern members.

[illegible]
[illegible]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/13/64

FROM : SAC, LITTLE ROCK

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO

ReBulet to Atlanta and Other Offices, 9/2/64.

Set out below are an analysis and recommendations under captioned program.

NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRP)

The Arkansas branch of NSRP has been inactive in the State of Arkansas for the past year with the exception of placing on the Arkansas ballot candidates for President and Vice President of the United States. It is not recommended that any action be taken against this group at this time.

ASSOCIATION OF ARKANSAS KLANS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (AAK)

The AAK in Arkansas is made up of three klaverns located at Little Rock, Texarkana, and Pine Bluff; and it has no affiliation with any national klan group. There are no "action" groups within any of these three klaverns. The three klaverns do not own or lease any property for meeting places. The four Little Rock members usually meet in the home of a member. The Texarkana Klavern has not held any klavern meetings as such in several months. The Pine Bluff Klavern meetings vary from residences to business places of klavern members.

State meetings are held at irregular intervals on an average of about once per month or less. There is no regular meeting place for the state meetings, which are held in various Arkansas towns including towns in which there are no klaverns. The state meetings are attended

by from one to five members of each of the three klaverns and are well covered by informants. The ~~State Grand Dragon BILL WILLIAMS~~ has continually cautioned members against violence and any type of illegal activities. None of the klaverns have engaged in violence.

1. LITTLE ROCK KLAVERN

Of the four members who attend weekly meetings two are informants. ~~JOE J. FARMER~~, who is considered the head of this small group, draws a pension from the Federal Government and, according to informants, is afraid to engage in any illegal activity or to let his name be used in connection with the klan for fear of losing his pension. The two informants maintain the full confidence of the other two members. In recent months the klavern ran a series of small ads in a Little Rock daily newspaper in an effort to renew interest and gain new members. The klavern received a number of responses, but no action whatsoever has been taken by the klavern to take in any new members. The klavern has no organized activity other than the weekly meetings described by informants as being "bull sessions" with the principal topic being politics.

No recommendation for counterintelligence is being made concerning the Little Rock Klavern.

2. TEXARKANA KLAVERN

This klavern has not held any klavern meetings as such in several months, and it appears that the principal reason for the lack of meetings was the interview of members and leaders concerning the assassination of President KENNEDY. Klavern representatives regularly attend state meetings, one reason being that ~~State Grand Dragon BILL WILLIAMS~~, who officiates at state meetings, is a member of the Texarkana Klavern. Of the five or six members who from time to time attend state meetings, two are informants. On 10/1/64 ~~AR 577-R~~ advised that the Grand Dragon had stated that hereafter Texarkana Klavern members will meet with the Bivins - Kildare, Texas, Klavern of the AAK.

~~Grand Dragon~~ WILLIAMS, according to informants, is active in politics in Bowie County, Texas, is a former member of the Board of Regents of ~~Texarkana Junior College~~, ~~Texarkana, Texas~~, and in recent months has been [illegible] for election to the Board of Regents of that college and defeated as a candidate for the City Council of ~~Texarkana, Texas~~. He cannot afford to become involved in any illegal activities because of his activities in legitimate enterprises. He has continually cautioned Texarkana Klavern members as well as members of other klaverns attending state meetings against any violence and/or illegal activities.

No recommendation is being made for counterintelligence against the Texarkana Klavern except as it is effected by a recommendation set out hereafter under the Pine Bluff Klavern.

3. PINE BLUFF KLAVERN

The Pine Bluff Klavern has a membership of approximately twenty to twenty-five. It meets once a week in different business locations of its members, and average weekly attendance is twelve. Among the twelve, one or two informants meet with them and furnish full coverage of their activities.

The klavern's main activity has been to discourage integration by legal means and to get members elected to school board positions. The klavern collected the funds and donated the money for the campaign expense of two of its members who ran for a position on the Pine Bluff School Board and the Dollarway School Board. These two members made a miserable showing and were defeated.

The klavern was behind and organized the National Patriots League (NPL) to further its non-integration program publicly. The Exalted Cyclops, or president, of the Klavern is chairman of the NPL. The NPL actually is a front organization for the klavern. The main activity of the NPL was to organize a private country club, which is known as the Butram Country Club. The purpose of the

club was to build a swimming pool for white only. The construction of the pool itself was completed but not sufficiently to place it in use this season. Membership in Butram Country Club is $25. The majority of the members are not aware of the fact that the klavern was behind its organization. Membership in the Butram Country Club was easily obtained as the public pool for whites and public pool for Negroes were both closed during the summer of 1964 when Negroes attempted to integrate the white pool. This left no public pool open in Pine Bluff. ~~S. E. BUTRAM~~, vice president of the klavern, donated the land for the Butram Country Club; as he owns land surrounding the club, he will benefit financially from the sale of this land for building lots. The NPL has also distributed a limited number of leaflets publicly discouraging people from patronizing certain restaurants and businesses which had hired or served Negroes.

Members of the klavern were responsible for forming a John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff, and a klavern member is leader of this chapter. Approximately eight to ten people attend the monthly meetings of the John Birch Society Chapter; and of the men who attend, all are klavern members with the exception of one man. Members of the klavern completely control and dominate the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff. They, however, only conduct John Birch Society business. Likewise, the members of the klavern further the John Birch Society program through the klavern.

Members of the klavern are working individually in politics for the re-election of ~~Governor ORVAL E. FAUBUS~~ and for the election of ~~BARRY GOLDWATER~~.

The klavern has not advocated any violence but on occasion has cautioned its members against violence. As an example, klavern members were cautioned to stay away from Ray's Truck Stop, a location which Negroes were attempting to integrate, in the spring of 1964 so that no violence would occur.

Members of the klavern recently distributed a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leaflet seeking new members and

stating requests for applications be directed to P. O. Box 1182, Pine Bluff. In this leaflet it was pointed out that the KKK was striving for a lawful settlement of the difficulties brought on by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAAC) and that it is opposed to violence. This leaflet further set forth that this was a chartered, legalized movement and it is no more illegal to be a member of it than to be a member of other organizations.

At various times in the past the klavern has attempted to organize "action" groups within the klavern, but on each occasion the project has died from lack of interest.

In line with Bureau policy of dissemination of information, the main activities regarding the Pine Bluff Klavern have been disseminated confidentially to Chief of Police NORMAN D. YOUNG, Pine Bluff, (NA) on a regular basis. Chief YOUNG has exerted every effort to keep down the possibility of violence. Through his confidential sources he is also well aware of the identities of the klavern members and their activities. He personally has warned particular klavern members against any violence and has stated they will be met with immediate arrest if any violence occurs. As an example, Chief YOUNG was advised through his own confidential source of the time and location of the klavern meeting on the night of October 5, 1964. Chief YOUNG sent a lieutenant of his department in uniform to check the location, record license numbers, and to be seen checking the meeting so that the klavern members would know that he was checking on them. This has had a strong influence on making the klavern follow a line of legal activity. It has also resulted in the more responsible leading citizens of the community being made aware of certain klavern members, causing these klavern members to be discredited in the eyes of the public. This was borne out in the recent school board election on 9/29/64 when two klavern members, one of whom is J. F. BUTRAM, were miserably defeated.

The klavern has during the past few months urged its members to solicit and obtain new members. The ineffectiveness of their program is shown by the

fact that only one new member was initiated, and this member is a non-organizational informant of the Little Rock Division. Likewise, as a result of the KKK leaflets distributed encouraging people to write for applications they have received only two letters; and neither of the writers have become a member. The leaflet has met with complete failure in its effort to build up its membership.

At this time the following are the only specific counterintelligence action being recommended:

1. An anonymous letter be mailed to the National Office of John Birch Society, Belmont, Massachusetts, pointing out that the KKK is in full control of the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff. In this letter specifically mention the name of one or two of the more leading klan members who are also leading the John Birch Society in Pine Bluff.

2. An anonymous letter be mailed to ~~CHARLES D. CUTHBERTSON~~, ~~Exalted Cyclops~~ of the Pine Bluff Klavern, and a copy mailed to BILL WILLIAMS, ~~State Grand Dragon,~~ with the letters to be mailed to the Post Office Box in Pine Bluff and in Texarkana, Arkansas, of the AAK. The letter should be a complaining letter from a member who was active in the past and who recently found one of the KKK leaflets in his automobile which leaflet encouraged membership. The letter would let them know why he has not rejoined; it would point out that he dropped out because of such leadership as ~~J. E. BUTRAM~~, who has used the klan for personal gain as ~~BUTRAM~~ had a residence on his property remodeled at klavern expense and then made the klavern stop holding meetings there; that ~~BUTRAM~~ has now donated land for the Butram Country Club so that he can sell his surrounding land for building lots at an exorbitant price. The letter should also set forth the fact he heard ~~BUTRAM~~ was discharged from the Army for mental deficiency (moron). This letter should be mailed from Little Rock.

Interviews of klan members and leaders in the past (for example, at the time of the assassination of President KENNEDY and on particular bombing matter cases)

have had deterring effect on the klan. For example, the Texarkana Klavern has not held a klavern meeting as such since that time. One Little Rock member has dropped out as a result of being interviewed; and, according to an informant, this member is a "changed man," meaning that he is not as radical as previously. In interviews with members of the Pine Bluff Klavern, agents have not met with any hostility and have been treated cordially and with respect. Individual members during these interviews have indicated they are opposed to violence and advocate proceeding in a legal manner. A number of the members have said that through political pressure and voting are the only ways any change can be made. However, they have stated they are still avid segregationists and do not condone race mixing in any manner.

When and if it appears that interest may be renewing in the AAK in Arkansas, consideration will be given to another interview program. It is noted that particular klan members are interviewed on a spasmodic basis in regard to leads from surrounding field offices on bombing matter cases, and this has had a tendency to deter any violent activity on the part of klavern members.

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10/13/64

FROM : SAC, Birmingham

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bulet to Atlanta 9/2/64

The Klan-type and hate organizations operating in Birmingham territory and which are potential objects of a counterintelligence program are the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and the National States Rights Party.

Recently Mr. VINCENT TOWNSEND, Vice-President and Assistant ~~Publisher, Birmingham News, and SAC Contact,~~ advised SAC EVERETT J. INGRAM that he read a story in the Chicago Daily News concerning Klan activity in Mississippi and felt the story could not have been prepared without FBI cooperation. He was impressed with this and has indicated a strong interest in similar material for the ~~Birmingham~~ News. He promised to protect the Bureau;s interest in any such endeavor. He is a well known civic leader in Birmingham. A review of the files in the Birmingham Office is being made for suitable information in this connection.

Bureau instructed in referenced letter that specific mention be made of "Action Groups" in Klan organizations. At the present time the weekly meetings of Eastview Klavern No. 13, which has been the leading Klavern in United Klans of America, Inc., in this territory, have been poorly attended. The principal members of the "Action Group" in this Klavern are ~~HARRY WALKER~~, ~~CECIL HENSON~~, ~~EUGENE REEVES~~, and ~~RONNIE TIDWELL~~. Efforts are being made to secure information suitable for disruption purposes in connection with this group.

Investigation is being conducted concerning ~~ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON~~. The Atlanta Office has been requested to ascertain why ~~E. L. EDWARDS~~, now deceased, ousted ~~SHELTON~~ from his then position of ~~Grand Dragon~~ of the U. S. Klans. A copy of the article appearing in the "~~Birmingham News~~" for April ~~30~~, 1960, entitled "SHELTON ousted from Klan Post," has been obtained. The article did not disclose the exact nature of the charges against ~~SHELTON~~. Records of the ~~Alabama~~ Secretary of State reflect that ~~SHELTON~~ was dropped as the Klan's authorized agent and was replaced by ~~Rev. ALVIN HORN~~ of ~~Talladega~~, Alabama. ~~E. L. EDWARDS~~, ~~Imperial Wizard~~, U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, was quoted as saying "We had to have a grand dragon in Alabama and we didn't have one in ROBERT M. SHELTON." He told reporters that SHELTON was replaced as grand dragon and agent of the "Klan" in Alabama "for conduct unbecoming a Klansman and attempting to use the organization for selfish purposes." The article said EDWARDS did not elaborate on what is considered conduct unbecoming a Klansman.

Informants are being contacted for any information of a derogatory nature concerning ~~SHELTON~~. Discreet inquiries are being made in Tuscaloosa concerning his financial status. In view of recent information from the Bureau no request is being made for a mail cover on ~~Shelton~~ or the United Klans.

The information on ~~LOEL ROGERS~~ and ~~WILLIAM A. HOLT, JR.~~ will be afforded prompt attention.

As the Bureau is aware, some few months ago several individuals, who had been active officials and/or dedicated members of the National States Rights Party (NSRP), left the NSRP. They are trying to form and make a going party of the American States Rights Party (ASRP) with its headquarters in Birmingham.

Since the group pulled out of the NSRP, both the ASRP and NSRP leaders have been belittling, berating and making extremely derogatory remarks concerning each other. Both groups are using the same mailing list, (the NSRP's list), which the ASRP group obtained before pulling out of the NSRP, and they disseminate their derogatory remarks in the literature they distribute.

The Bureau has also been advised that ~~GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL~~, American Nazi Party (ANP) leader has recently filed a $550,000.00 libel suit in the U. S. District Court, ~~Birmingham, Alabama~~, against ~~Dr. EDWARD R. FIELDS~~, ~~Information~~ Director of the NSRP, and others connected with the NSRP.

Birmingham contemplates furnishing certain items, on a confidential basis to a few trusted, reliable newsmen (established SAC contacts), concerning the NSRP, the ASRP and the ANP for the purpose of possibly causing further disruption of any unified actions or working arrangements between these groups. Such newsmen may be used to contact the leaders of one group to inquire about or confirm something of a derogatory nature reportedly made by some leader of one of the other groups.

Birmingham also contemplates working closely with other law enforcement agencies to see that any activity of such groups are known, covered and where considered desirable, the group will be made cognizant that their activity is known.

Birmingham also is considering having some racial informants drop remarks to or for the benefit of the leaders of the NSRP, etc., that will tend to cause the leaders of one group to retaliate in like manner against the other groups.

If the Bureau has any material on disruptive tactics or results of efforts, which is not already in all field offices, Birmingham would be glad to receive it.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/14/64

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet, 9/2/64.

NY has case files on the following organizations which were listed in relet:

AMERICAN NAZI PARTY (ANP) (~~NY 157-13~~)
OO:RH

Available information reflects that there is currently no ANP activity in the NYC area and the organization appears to be defunct.

FIGHTING AMERICAN NATIONALISTS (FAN) (~~NY 157-195~~)
OO:BA

Available information reflects that FAN has ceased to exist as a separate organization and is merely a name used on occasion by the American Nazi Party.

NATIONAL RENAISSANCE PARTY (NRP) (~~NY 105-6112~~)
OO:NY

The NRP is now defunct in NYC and available information makes it appear unlikely that it will be reactivated.

NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRP)
OO:BA

The NSRP in NYC is operated by [redacted], [redacted], self-identified as the NY [redacted] of the NSRP. This is a one man organization in NYC with no membership other than [redacted] who utilizes [redacted], as his NSRP mailing address. Because of this there are no meetings of this organization in NYC.

WHITE YOUTH CORPS (WYC),
OO:CG

No information has been developed by NY indicating the WYC exists in NY.

Recommendations

In view of the above, NY has no specific recommendations at the present time. Logical persons handling above captioned and related matters are alert to captioned program, and in the event information is developed which would make some counterintelligence activity feasible, the Bureau will be advised.

NY will again review the above files so that a letter will reach the Bureau on or before 1/1/65.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/14/64

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet, 9/2/64.

NY has case files on the following organizations which were listed in relet:

AMERICAN NAZI PARTY (ANP) (~~NY 157-13~~)
OO:RH

Available information reflects that there is currently no ANP activity in the NYC area and the organization appears to be defunct.

FIGHTING AMERICAN NATIONALISTS (FAN) (~~NY 157-195~~)
OO:BA

Available information reflects that FAN has ceased to exist as a separate organization and is merely a name used on occasion by the American Nazi Party.

NATIONAL RENAISSANCE PARTY (NRP) (~~NY 105-6112~~)
OO:NY

The NRP is now defunct in NYC and available information makes it appear unlikely that it will be reactivated.

NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRP)
OO:BA

The NSRP in NYC is operated by [redacted], [redacted] self-identified as the NY [redacted] of the NSRP. This is a one man organization in NYC with no membership other than [redacted] who utilizes [redacted], as his NSRP mailing address. Because of this there are no meetings of this organization in NYC.

WHITE YOUTH CORPS (WYC),
OO:CG

No information has been developed by NY indicating the WYC exists in NY.

Recommendations

In view of the above, NY has no specific recommendations at the present time. Logical persons handling above captioned and related matters are alert to captioned program, and in the event information is developed which would make some counterintelligence activity feasible, the Bureau will be advised.

NY will again review the above files so that a letter will reach the Bureau on or before 1/1/65.

FBI

Date: 10/14/64

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plain text or code)

____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MEMPHIS

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Relet Bureau to Atlanta, copies Memphis, 9/2/64.

The Memphis Division has carefully reviewed the contents of relet, including the list of organizations designated for action pursuant to this program.

None of these organizations are currently active in the territory covered by the Memphis FBI Division.

Similarly, there are no so-called "action groups" known to exist or to have existed in this territory.

This office will continue to be alert for possibilities and methods of implementation of this program.

FBI

Date: 10/14/64

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plain text or code)

____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MEMPHIS

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Relet Bureau to Atlanta, copies Memphis, 9/2/64.

The Memphis Division has carefully reviewed the contents of relet, including the list of organizations designated for action pursuant to this program.

None of these organizations are currently active in the territory covered by the Memphis FBI Division.

Similarly, there are no so-called "action groups" known to exist or to have existed in this territory.

This office will continue to be alert for possibilities and methods of implementation of this program.

5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/14/64

FROM : SAC, MIAMI

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.

The following news media can be utilized in the Cointelpro upon confirmation of any action group forming in Miami and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (Dade and Broward Counties):

Newspapers

"Miami Herald"
A morning Miami, Florida, daily newspaper
~~GEORGE BEEBE, Managing Editor (SAC Contact)~~

"The Miami News"
An evening local Miami, Florida, newspaper
~~WILLIAM C. BAGGS, Editor (SAC Contact)~~

"The Ft. Lauderdale News"
A daily Broward County newspaper
~~MILTON KELLY, Editor~~

TV Stations

WCKT-TV, Channel 7, NBC
~~GENE STRUBEL, News Director~~

WLBW-TV, Channel 10, ABC
~~CHARLES H. TOPMILLER,~~ General Manager (SAC Contact)
~~CHARLES MATTHEWS, National Sales Director~~

Radio Stations

WGBS, ~~BOB MARTIN, News~~

WIOD, ~~JAMES LE GATE~~

At Sebring, Florida
(Highlands County)

United Florida Ku Klux Klan
Sebring Klavern

Through recent information furnished by [redacted] it is noted that the Sebring Klavern is apparently dying out. Attendance at the weekly meetings has been very poor with a maximum of 3 to 4 in attendance. On the last two scheduled meeting dates, the only ones present were the Exalted Cyclops, ~~CHARLES FRITZ~~ and [redacted]

In view of the above, the Sebring Klavern will probably become inactive in the very near future. It is felt that any counterintelligence move at the present time would possibly result in a renewed interest and regrouping by the members rather than the desired results.

Should the Sebring Klavern not disband in the near future, it is then felt that information could be confidentially furnished to Highlands County Sheriff BROWARD COKER, Sebring, as to time, date and location of the Ku Klux Klan meetings. Sheriff's Department patrol cars could patrol the area in an obvious fashion in order to disrupt the meetings and cause concern among those in attendance.

~~Sheriff~~ COKER has been very cooperative and has reflected a distaste for any Ku Klux Klan activity in his county. It is not felt that ~~Sheriff COKER~~ would in any way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

It is felt that counterintelligence contact with the Sebring press would be unwise.

Reported Attempts to Organize Klavern
of United Florida Ku Klux Klan in
Sebastian, Florida (Indian River County)

It is recommended that immediately upon confirmation of the attempted organization of a Ku Klux Klan Klavern in Indian River County, that counterintelligence steps be taken to discourage same.

The "Ft. Pierce News-Tribune," a daily newspaper with circulation including Indian River County, could be utilized. ~~Mr. CHARLES MILEY, Editor, is an SAC contact~~ of the Miami Division and has proven reliable and cooperative in past dealings. Through information furnished to ~~MILEY~~, the attempt at organizing the Ku Klux Klan in Sebastian, Florida, could be exposed to the community. Community leaders would then likely take steps to counteract the formation of this organization.

It is not felt that ~~Mr. MILEY~~ would in any way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

It is also recommended that ~~LEM BRUMLEY~~, ~~Chief Deputy~~, Indian River County Sheriff's Office be furnished information regarding the attempted Ku Klux Klan organization in Sebastian. ~~BRUMLEY~~ could arrange for patrol cars to cover the Ku Klux Klan meetings in an obvious fashion. This would likely discourage attendance and cause concern.

~~Chief Deputy BRUMLEY~~ is a National Academy graduate and has been completely cooperative with contacting Agents. It is not felt that BRUMLEY would in any way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

At West Palm Beach, Florida
(Palm Beach County)

Council For Statehood
West Palm Beach, Florida

The Council for Statehood has been found to be not an action group but rather a mailing facility for the writings of ~~MARY M. DAVISON~~. These writings are disseminated to local and national legislators and all are filed with the Library of Congress in Washington. The dissemination of writings by this group has now become practically negligible. The group is said to have political overtones as a republican group.

It is not recommended that any positive harassment activities be undertaken with regard to this group at this time, since such action, in all probability, would enhance the activities of this group rather than accomplish the desired effect.

United Free Men
West Palm Beach, Florida

This organization is now defunct.

* * *

At the present time there are no known "action groups" within the Miami Division.

SUGGESTIONS FOR COINTELPRO

(1) Many hate groups send literature, to individuals on their mailing lists, which has been distorted or is out of context, regarding individuals and organizations. The literature is intended to promote a hostile and unfavorable image of the organization and/or individual. Favorite targets in this regard are the United Nations and U. S. Supreme Court Justice EARL WARREN.

It is noted the United Nations has considerable literature setting forth favorable information regarding accomplishments and the desirability of having a United Nations. It would appear appropriate to offset the literature sent out by the hate groups, by sending out favorable information concerning the organization or individual under attack.

(2) Any hate organizations tend to disguise their true identity under the pretext of being a religious study group. Using such a disguise, they find it easy and inexpensive to obtain the facilities of an established church to hold special or organizational meetings.

By using an appropriate pretext, such as a free lance reporter for the local paper, or through a reliable news contact, the individual responsible for the facility could be contacted shortly prior to the planned meeting. At this time, the true identity of the hate organization could be exposed, resulting in considerable disruption, especially if the use of the facilities are canceled at the last moment.

In September, 1962, and December, 1963, ~~STONER~~ spent several weeks in Florida, including visits to Miami and Vero Beach, Florida, attempting to organize and promote the NSRP. To date the NSRP has failed to gain any "foot hold" within the Miami Division. It is not known if this article was responsible for ~~STONER's~~ failure, however, it does represent a type of counterintelligence.

5010-104

UNITED STATES (ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/14/64

FROM : SAC, MIAMI

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.

The following news media can be utilized in the Cointelpro upon confirmation of any action group forming in Miami and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (Dade and Broward Counties):

Newspapers

"Miami Herald"
A morning Miami, Florida, daily newspaper
~~GEORGE BEEBE, Managing Editor (SAC Contact)~~

"The Miami News"
An evening local Miami, Florida, newspaper
~~WILLIAM C. BAGGS, Editor (SAC Contact)~~

"The Ft. Lauderdale News"
A daily Broward County newspaper
MILTON ~~KELLY, Editor~~

TV Stations

WCKT-TV, Channel 7, NBC
~~GENE~~ STRUHL, News Director

WLBW-TV, Channel 10, ABC
CHARLES H. ~~TOPMILLER~~, General Manager (SAC Contact)
CHARLES ~~MATTHEWS, National~~ Sales Director

Radio Stations

WGBS, ~~BOB MARTIN, News~~

WIOD, ~~JAMES LE GATE~~

At Sebring, Florida
(Highlands County)

United Florida Ku Klux Klan
Sebring Klavern

Through recent information furnished by [redacted] it is noted that the Sebring Klavern is apparently dying out. Attendance at the weekly meetings has been very poor with a maximum of 3 to 4 in attendance. On the last two scheduled meeting dates, the only ones present were the Exalted ~~Cyclops, CHARLES FRITZ~~ and [redacted]

In view of the above, the Sebring Klavern will probably become inactive in the very near future. It is felt that any counterintelligence move at the present time would possibly result in a renewed interest and regrouping by the members rather than the desired results.

Should the Sebring Klavern not disband in the near future, it is then felt that information could be confidentially furnished to Highlands County Sheriff ~~BROWARD COKER~~, Sebring, as to time, date and location of the Ku Klux Klan meetings. Sheriff's Department patrol cars could patrol the area in an obvious fashion in order to disrupt the meetings and cause concern among those in attendance.

~~Sheriff~~ COKER has been very cooperative and has reflected a distaste for any Ku Klux Klan activity in his county. It is not felt that ~~Sheriff COKER~~ would in any way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

It is felt that counterintelligence contact with the Sebring press would be unwise.

Reported Attempts to Organize Klavern of United Florida Ku Klux Klan in Sebastian, Florida (Indian River County)

It is recommended that immediately upon confirmation of the attempted organization of a Ku Klux Klan Klavern in Indian River County, that counterintelligence steps be taken to discourage same.

The "Ft. Pierce News-Tribune," a daily newspaper with circulation including Indian River County, could be utilized. ~~Mr. CHARLES MILEY, Editor, is an SAC contact~~ of the Miami Division and has proven reliable and cooperative in past dealings. Through information furnished to ~~MILEY~~, the attempt at organizing the Ku Klux Klan in Sebastian, Florida, could be exposed to the community. Community leaders would then likely take steps to counteract the formation of this organization.

It is not felt that ~~Mr. MILEY~~ would in any way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

It is also recommended that ~~LEM BRUMLEY, Chief Deputy~~, Indian River County Sheriff's Office be furnished information regarding the attempted Ku Klux Klan organization in Sebastian. ~~BRUMLEY~~ could arrange for patrol cars to cover the Ku Klux Klan meetings in an obvious fashion. This would likely discourage attendance and cause concern.

~~Chief Deputy BRUMLEY~~ is a National Academy graduate and has been completely cooperative with contacting Agents. It is not felt that BRUMLEY would in any way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

At West Palm Beach, Florida
(Palm Beach County)

Council For Statehood
West Palm Beach, Florida

The Council for Statehood has been found to be not an action group but rather a mailing facility for the writings of ~~MARY M. DAVISON~~. These writings are disseminated to local and national legislators and all are filed with the Library of Congress in Washington. The dissemination of writings by this group has now become practically negligible. The group is said to have political overtones as a republican group.

It is not recommended that any positive harassment activities be undertaken with regard to this group at this time, since such action, in all probability, would enhance the activities of this group rather than accomplish the desired effect.

United Free Men
West Palm Beach, Florida

This organization is now defunct.

* * *

At the present time there are no known "action groups" within the Miami Division.

SUGGESTIONS FOR COINTELPRO

(1) Many hate groups send literature, to individuals on their mailing lists, which has been distorted or is out of context, regarding individuals and organizations. The literature is intended to promote a hostile and unfavorable image of the organization and/or individual. Favorite targets in this regard are the United Nations and U. S. Supreme Court Justice ~~EARL WARREN~~.

It is noted the United Nations has considerable literature setting forth favorable information regarding accomplishments and the desirability of having a United Nations. It would appear appropriate to offset the literature sent out by the hate groups, by sending out favorable information concerning the organization or individual under attack.

(2) Any hate organizations tend to disguise their true identity under the pretext of being a religious study group. Using such a disguise, they find it easy and inexpensive to obtain the facilities of an established church to hold special or organizational meetings.

By using an appropriate pretext, such as a free lance reporter for the local paper, or through a reliable news contact, the individual responsible for the facility could be contacted shortly prior to the planned meeting. At this time, the true identity of the hate organization could be exposed, resulting in considerable disruption, especially if the use of the facilities are canceled at the last moment.

[redacted] the Bureau is one copy of the "National Federation of Labor News," dated [redacted] prepared and distributed by [redacted], [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]. ~~It is noted that~~ [redacted] for many years until he was discontinued November, 1961, in view of continuing evidence of indiscretion and use of poor judgment. [redacted] [redacted] regarding the ~~National States~~ Rights Party (NSRP) and ~~J. B.~~ STONER. This article was prepared and distributed by [redacted] of his own volition, as a means of keeping the NSRP out of South Florida.

In September, 1962, and December, 1963, ~~STONER~~ spent several weeks in Florida, including visits to Miami and Vero Beach, Florida, attempting to organize and promote the NSRP. To date the NSRP has failed to gain any "foot hold" within the Miami Division. It is not known if this article was responsible for ~~STONER's~~ failure, however, it does represent a type of counterintelligence.

5010-104

UNITED STATES (ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/14/64

FROM : SAC, MIAMI

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.

The following news media can be utilized in the Cointelpro upon confirmation of any action group forming in Miami and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (Dade and Broward Counties):

Newspapers

"Miami Herald"
A morning Miami, Florida, daily newspaper
~~GEORGE BEEBE, Managing Editor (SAC Contact)~~

"The Miami News"
An evening local Miami, Florida, newspaper
~~WILLIAM C. BAGGS, Editor (SAC Contact)~~

"The Ft. Lauderdale News"
A daily Broward County newspaper
MILTON ~~KELLY, Editor~~

TV Stations

WCKT-TV, Channel 7, NBC
~~GENE~~ STRUHL, News Director

WLBW-TV, Channel 10, ABC
CHARLES H. TOPMILLER, General Manager (SAC Contact)
CHARLES ~~MATTHEWS,~~ National Sales Director

Radio Stations

WGBS, ~~BOB MARTIN, News~~

WIOD, ~~JAMES LE CATE~~

At Sebring, Florida
(Highlands County)

United Florida Ku Klux Klan
Sebring Klavern

Through recent information furnished by ~~MM 842-R~~, it is noted that the Sebring Klavern is apparently dying out. Attendance at the weekly meetings has been very poor with a maximum of 3 to 4 in attendance. On the last two scheduled meeting dates, the only ones present were the Exalted Cyclops, CHARLES FRITZ and MM 842-R.

In view of the above, the Sebring Klavern will probably become inactive in the very near future. It is felt that any counterintelligence move at the present time would possibly result in a renewed interest and regrouping by the members rather than the desired results.

Should the Sebring Klavern not disband in the near future, it is then felt that information could be confidentially furnished to Highlands County Sheriff BROWARD COKER, Sebring, as to time, date and location of the Ku Klux Klan meetings. Sheriff's Department patrol cars could patrol the area in an obvious fashion in order to disrupt the meetings and cause concern among those in attendance.

Sheriff COKER has been very cooperative and has reflected a distaste for any Ku Klux Klan activity in his county. It is not felt that ~~Sheriff COKER~~ would in any way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

It is felt that counterintelligence contact with the Sebring press would be unwise.

Reported Attempts to Organize Klavern of United Florida Ku Klux Klan in Sebastian, Florida (Indian River County)

It is recommended that immediately upon confirmation of the attempted organization of a Ku Klux Klan Klavern in Indian River County, that counterintelligence steps be taken to discourage same.

The "Ft. Pierce News-Tribune," a daily newspaper with circulation including Indian River County, could be utilized. ~~Mr. CHARLES MILEY, Editor, is an SAC~~ contact of the Miami Division and has proven reliable and cooperative in past dealings. Through information furnished to ~~MILEY~~, the attempt at organizing the Ku Klux Klan in Sebastian, Florida, could be exposed to the community. Community leaders would then likely take steps to counteract the formation of this organization.

It is not felt that ~~Mr. MILEY~~ would in any way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

It is also recommended that ~~LEM BRUMLEY, Chief Deputy~~, Indian River County Sheriff's Office be furnished information regarding the attempted Ku Klux Klan organization in Sebastian. ~~BRUMLEY~~ could arrange for patrol cars to cover the Ku Klux Klan meetings in an obvious fashion. This would likely discourage attendance and cause concern.

~~Chief Deputy BRUMLEY~~ is a National Academy graduate and has been completely cooperative with contacting Agents. It is not felt that BRUMLEY would in any way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

At West Palm Beach, Florida
(Palm Beach County)

Council For Statehood
West Palm Beach, Florida

The Council for Statehood has been found to be not an action group but rather a mailing facility for the writings of ~~MARY M. DAVISON~~. These writings are disseminated to local and national legislators and all are filed with the Library of Congress in Washington. The dissemination of writings by this group has now become practically negligible. The group is said to have political overtones as a republican group.

It is not recommended that any positive harassment activities be undertaken with regard to this group at this time, since such action, in all probability, would enhance the activities of this group rather than accomplish the desired effect.

United Free Men
West Palm Beach, Florida

This organization is now defunct.

* * *

At the present time there are no known "action groups" within the Miami Division.

SUGGESTIONS FOR COINTELPRO

(1) Many hate groups send literature, to individuals on their mailing lists, which has been distorted or is out of context, regarding individuals and organizations. The literature is intended to promote a hostile and unfavorable image of the organization and/or individual. Favorite targets in this regard are the United Nations and U. S. Supreme Court Justice ~~EARL WARREN~~.

It is noted the United Nations has considerable literature setting forth favorable information regarding accomplishments and the desirability of having a United Nations. It would appear appropriate to offset the literature sent out by the hate groups, by sending out favorable information concerning the organization or individual under attack.

(2) Any hate organizations tend to disguise their true identity under the pretext of being a religious study group. Using such a disguise, they find it easy and inexpensive to obtain the facilities of an established church to hold special or organizational meetings.

By using an appropriate pretext, such as a free lance reporter for the local paper, or through a reliable news contact, the individual responsible for the facility could be contacted shortly prior to the planned meeting. At this time, the true identity of the hate organization could be exposed, resulting in considerable disruption, especially if the use of the facilities are canceled at the last moment.

(3) Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of the "National Federation of Labor News," dated September, 1963, prepared and distributed by WILLIAM SOMERSETT, formerly MM 607-C (RAC), Bureau file 66-16458. It is noted that SOMERSETT was formerly a Bureau informant for many years until he was discontinued November, 1961, in view of continuing evidence of indiscretion and use of poor judgment. Page 3 of this paper sets forth an article by SOMERSETT regarding the National States Rights Party (NSRP) and J. B. STONER. This article was prepared and distributed by SOMERSETT of his own volition, as a means of keeping the NSRP out of South Florida.

In September, 1962, and December, 1963, STONER spent several weeks in Florida, including visits to Miami and Vero Beach, Florida, attempting to organize and promote the NSRP. To date the NSRP has failed to gain any "foot hold" within the Miami Division. It is not known if this article was responsible for STONER's failure, however, it does represent a type of counterintelligence.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/20/64

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO

Re Bureau letter to SAC, Atlanta 9/2/64.

Referenced communication advises the following hate organizations operating within the Chicago Division as included in this program:

American Nazi Party (Origin: Richmond)

White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago).

Regarding the White Youth Corps it is noted confidential informants of this division have advised that the White Youth Corps in Chicago did not, in fact, exist as a organization per se but was considered rather a "level of affiliation" within the structure of the American Nazi Party at Chicago, Illinois. All operations of this unit were subsequently combined with those of the American Nazi Party and were carried on under that name only. The White Youth Corps was determined to no longer exist in any way in Chicago and no information has developed to indicate the possible reorganization of this group.

On October 12, 1964, confidential informants CG 6535-R, ~~CG-6557-R~~ and CG 6650-R, all of whom have furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the White Youth Corps no longer exists in any capacity in Chicago. To sources' knowledge the White Youth Corps does not operate as an organization in any other locale known to them. These sources further advised that as of this date no information is available to indicate possible interest in reorganizing the White Youth Corps.

Symbol Numbers

In view of the above, Chicago do [illegible] further inquiry regarding the White Y[illegible] and in that the White Youth Corps is no longer in existence, it will not be considered in connection with this program.

Regarding Chicago's proposed plan to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the American Nazi Party in Chicago, Illinois, the following is submitted for the Bureau's consideration:

I. Proposal -- To Increase Financial Burden of the American Nazi Party

Brief Resume of Current Economic Problems

The principal weakness in the Chicago unit of the American Nazi Party exists in their lack of funds to operate. This fact alone has forestalled all the participation of the Chicago organization in public demonstrations and other activities in that sufficient monies are not available to provide necessary bonds and/or fines should members be arrested during the course of such activity.

Further, the Chicago American Nazi Party has recently purchased a building which they utilize as a headquarters. The building is old and in dire need of repair. Mortgage payments and maintenance alone absorb the bulk of all funds which the Chicago unit collects.

Proposed Plan of Approach

In that it is the desire of the local American Nazi Party to "hold onto" their headquarters building at all costs, it is apparent that the first line of approach to increase the organization's financial burden is to direct our efforts at the headquarters building itself.

Discreet inquiry and observation has shown the building has numerous building code violations, some of

which make the building mainly uninhabitable until such violations are rectified such as electrical wiring and plumbing. It is recognized that building code authorities will allow such deficiencies to exist for a reasonable period of time and during such time habitation on the premises is permitted. Violations such as those mentioned are known to be costly to eliminate and are of the type that cannot or should not be "do-it-yourself" projects since repairs made are subject to inspection by building authorities.

In that the American Nazi Party has in the past and still levels its attacks at persons of the Jewish faith, Chicago Jewish organizations are most desirable of accumulating information which can serve to initiate an attack by these organizations against the American Nazi Party. Prominent among such organizations are the Jewish War Veterans and the Anti-Defamation League B'nai B'rith.

The Chicago Division, either by direct approach to established sources in these organizations, or through use of suitable pretext, can make available to appropriate officials information establishing the fact that such building code violations do exist. There is no doubt that should such information become available to proper individuals within these organizations, great pressure will be brought to bear to insist that these building code violations are corrected and the possibility strongly exists that court action may follow and fines may be levied.

As an alternative, a direct approach can be made to established contacts within the city government to bring such building code violations to the attention of appropriate authorities.

Anticipated Results

A penetrating analysis of the present economic situation of the American Nazi Party strongly indicates

that by firmly increasing the financial burden of this group the following results are certain:

1. American Nazi Party public activity will be held to the barest minimum due to fear of possible arrest resulting in further economic hardship.
2. Funds will not be available to bring about necessary repairs on the headquarters building
3. Funds for the printing and distribution of literature locally for recruiting purposes would not be available
4. Morale of the organization in Chicago, which is now at low ebb would be further lessened thus creating feelings of dissatisfaction among the membership
5. As a direct result of items above the attractiveness of the American Nazi Party to possible recruits would be held at a minimum

II. Proposal -- Divide Loyalty of Membership Against Present Leaders

Brief Resume of Leadership Problems

At the present time the Chicago American Nazi Party has no established leaders. One of the members, ~~JOHN WALLACE~~, was appointed by ~~GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL~~, the group's ~~national~~ commander, however, ~~WALLACE~~ has failed to undertake the responsibilities of leadership and as a result certain dissatisfaction exists among members.

As a result of ~~WALLACE~~'s failure current activities of the organization are being directed by ~~CHRISTOPHER VIDNJEVICH~~, who is operating without authority of the national headquarters.

Because of the inactivity and the failure of the Chicago organization to demonstrate progress the so-called "hard core" of the membership have raised numerous questions in the recent past challenging the adequacy and capability of ~~WALLACE~~ and ~~VIDNJEVICH~~ to head their organization in Chicago.

Proposed Plan of Approach

It is anticipated that through established sources all of whom are current members of the American Nazi Party in Chicago, feelings of discontent can be initiated. Further, communications which would indicate a thorough and substantial knowledge of the Chicago organization could be directed at the ~~National Commander GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL~~ either anonymously or under the signature of a likely member who is known to be in disagreement with local leadership and practices.

Anticipated Results

By concentrating the efforts of this program in a firm but carefully concealed manner it is strongly believed that the following results will be obtained:

1. Loyalties of the membership will be divided and dissension will be created

2. The national headquarters of the American Nazi Party will have sufficient reason to question the adequacy and capabilities of local leadership

3. Through established sources programs proposed by those in leadership capacities can be sabotaged whereby the confidence of both the national headquarters and the local membership will be shattered

It is recognized that the Bureau considers it vital that the functions and membership of these organizations be brought into the "public spotlight". Chicago does not deem

such an approach appropriate at this time due to the small membership which at this time consists of three established informants of long standing. Activity to bring public pressure to bear at this particular time could jeopardize the position of the three informants who furnish valuable information to this Bureau concerning the membership and activities of the American Nazi Party at Chicago.

It is requested that the Bureau consider the above detailed approaches in connection with this program and authorize their institution in Chicago.

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/15/64

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO

Re Bureau letter to SAC, Atlanta 9/2/64.

Referenced communication advises the following hate organizations operating within the Chicago Division as included in this program:

American Nazi Party (Origin: Richmond)

White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago)

Regarding the White Youth Corps it is noted confidential informants of this division have advised that the White Youth Corps in Chicago did not, in fact, exist as a organization per se but was considered rather a "level of affiliation" within the structure of the American Nazi Party at Chicago, Illinois. All operations of this unit were subsequently combined with those of the American Nazi Party and were carried on under that name only. The White Youth Corps was determined to no longer exist in any way in Chicago and no information has developed to indicate the possible reorganization of this group.

On October 12, 1964, confidential informants [redacted] all of whom have furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the White Youth Corps no longer exists in any capacity in Chicago. To sources' knowledge the White Youth Corps does not operate as an organization in any other locale known to them. These sources further advised that as of this date no information is available to indicate possible interest in reorganizing the White Youth Corps.

In view of the above, Chicago contemplates no further inquiry regarding the White Youth Corps [illegible] and in that the White Youth Corps is no longer in existence, it will not be considered in connection with this program.

Regarding Chicago's proposed plan to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the American Nazi Party in Chicago, Illinois, the following is submitted for the Bureau's consideration:

I. Proposal -- To Increase Financial Burden of the American Nazi Party

Brief Resume of Current Economic Problems

The principal weakness in the Chicago unit of the American Nazi Party exists in their lack of funds to operate. This fact alone has forestalled all the participation of the Chicago organization in public demonstrations and other activities in that sufficient monies are not available to provide necessary bonds and/or fines should members be arrested during the course of such activity.

Further, the Chicago American Nazi Party has recently purchased a building which they utilize as a headquarters. The building is old and in dire need of repair. Mortgage payments and maintenance alone absorb the bulk of all funds which the Chicago unit collects.

Proposed Plan of Approach

In that it is the desire of the local American Nazi Party to "hold onto" their headquarters building at all costs, it is apparent that the first line of approach to increase the organization's financial burden is to direct our efforts at the headquarters building itself.

Discreet inquiry and observation has shown the building has numerous building code violations, some of

which make the building mainly uninhabitable until such violations are rectified such as electrical wiring and plumbing. It is recognized that building code authorities will allow such deficiencies to exist for a reasonable period of time and during such time habitation on the premises is permitted. Violations such as those mentioned are known to be costly to eliminate and are of the type that cannot or should not be "do-it-yourself" projects since repairs made are subject to inspection by building authorities.

In that the American Nazi Party has in the past and still levels its attacks at persons of the Jewish faith, Chicago Jewish organizations are most desirable of accumulating information which can serve to initiate an attack by these organizations against the American Nazi Party. Prominent among such organizations are the Jewish War Veterans and the Anti-Defamation League B'nai B'rith.

The Chicago Division, either by direct approach to established sources in these organizations, or through use of suitable pretext, can make available to appropriate officials information establishing the fact that such building code violations do exist. There is no doubt that should such information become available to proper individuals within these organizations, great pressure will be brought to bear to insist that these building code violations are corrected and the possibility strongly exists that court action may follow and fines may be levied.

As an alternative, a direct approach can be made to established contacts within the city government to bring such building code violations to the attention of appropriate authorities.

Anticipated Results

A penetrating analysis of the present economic situation of the American Nazi Party strongly indicates

that by firmly increasing the financial burden of this group the following results are certain:

1. American Nazi Party public activity will be held to the barest minimum due to fear of possible arrest resulting in further economic hardship.
2. Funds will not be available to bring about necessary repairs on the headquarters building
3. Funds for the printing and distribution of literature locally for recruiting purposes would not be available
4. Morale of the organization in Chicago, which is now at low ebb would be further lessened thus creating feelings of dissatisfaction among the membership
5. As a direct result of items above the attractivenes of the American Nazi Party to possible recruits would be held at a minimum

II. Proposal -- Divide Loyalty of Membership Against Present Leaders

Brief Resume of Leadership Problems

At the present time the Chicago American Nazi Party has no established leaders. One of the members, JOHN WALLACE, was appointed by GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL, the group's national commander; however, WALLACE has failed to undertake the responsibilities of leadership and as a result certain dissatisfaction exists among members.

As a result of WALLACE's failure current activities of the organization are being directed by CHRISTOPHER VIDNJEVICH, who is operating without authority of the national headquarters.

Because of the inactivity and the failure of the Chicago organization to demonstrate progress the so-called "hard core" of the membership have raised numerous questions in the recent past challenging the adequacy and capability of ~~WALLACE~~ and ~~VIDNJEVICH~~ to head their organization in Chicago.

Proposed Plan of Approach

It is anticipated that through established sources all of whom are current members of the American Nazi Party in Chicago, feelings of discontent can be initiated. Further, communications which would indicate a thorough and substantial knowledge of the Chicago organization could be directed at the ~~National Commander GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL~~ either anonymously or under the signature of a likely member who is known to be in disagreement with local leadership and practices.

Anticipated Results

By concentrating the efforts of this program in a firm but carefully concealed manner it is strongly believed that the following results will be obtained:

1. Loyalties of the membership will be divided and dissension will be created
2. The national headquarters of the American Nazi Party will have sufficient reason to question the adequacy and capabilities of local leadership
3. Through established sources programs proposed by those in leadership capacities can be sabotaged whereby the confidence of both the national headquarters and the local membership will be shattered

It is recognized that the Bureau considers it vital that the functions and membership of these organizations be brought into the "public spotlight". Chicago does not deem

such an approach appropriate at this time due to the small membership which at this time consists of three established informants of long standing. Activity to bring public pressure to bear at this particular time could jeopardize the position of the three informants who furnish valuable information to this Bureau concerning the membership and activities of the American Nazi Party at Chicago.

It is requested that the Bureau consider the above detailed approaches in connection with this program and authorize their institution in Chicago.

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/15/64

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO

Re Bureau letter to SAC, Atlanta 9/2/64.

Referenced communication advises the following hate organizations operating within the Chicago Division as included in this program:

American Nazi Party (Origin: Richmond)

White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago)

Regarding the White Youth Corps it is noted confidential informants of this division have advised that the White Youth Corps in Chicago did not, in fact, exist as a organization per se but was considered rather a "level of affiliation" within the structure of the American Nazi Party at Chicago, Illinois. All operations of this unit were subsequently combined with those of the American Nazi Party and were carried on under that name only. The White Youth Corps was determined to no longer exist in any way in Chicago and no information has developed to indicate the possible reorganization of this group.

On October 12, 1964, confidential informants [redacted] all of whom have furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the White Youth Corps no longer exists in any capacity in Chicago. To sources' knowledge the White Youth Corps does not operate as an organization in any other locale known to them. These sources further advised that as of this date no information is available to indicate possible interest in reorganizing the White Youth Corps.

In view of the above, Chicago contemplates no further inquiry regarding the White Youth Corps [illegible] and in that the White Youth Corps is no longer in existence, it will not be considered in connection with this program.

Regarding Chicago's proposed plan to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the American Nazi Party in Chicago, Illinois, the following is submitted for the Bureau's consideration:

I. Proposal -- To Increase Financial Burden of the American Nazi Party

Brief Resume of Current Economic Problems

The principal weakness in the Chicago unit of the American Nazi Party exists in their lack of funds to operate. This fact alone has forestalled all the participation of the Chicago organization in public demonstrations and other activities in that sufficient monies are not available to provide necessary bonds and/or fines should members be arrested during the course of such activity.

Further, the Chicago American Nazi Party has recently purchased a building which they utilize as a headquarters. The building is old and in dire need of repair. Mortgage payments and maintenance alone absorb the bulk of all funds which the Chicago unit collects.

Proposed Plan of Approach

In that it is the desire of the local American Nazi Party to "hold onto" their headquarters building at all costs, it is apparent that the first line of approach to increase the organization's financial burden is to direct our efforts at the headquarters building itself.

Discreet inquiry and observation has shown the building has numerous building code violations, some of

which make the building mainly uninhabitable until such violations are rectified such as electrical wiring and plumbing. It is recognized that building code authorities will allow such deficiencies to exist for a reasonable period of time and during such time habitation on the premises is permitted. Violations such as those mentioned are known to be costly to eliminate and are of the type that cannot or should not be "do-it-yourself" projects since repairs made are subject to inspection by building authorities.

In that the American Nazi Party has in the past and still levels its attacks at persons of the Jewish faith, Chicago Jewish organizations are most desirable of accumulating information which can serve to initiate an attack by these organizations against the American Nazi Party. Prominent among such organizations are the Jewish War Veterans and the Anti-Defamation League B'nai B'rith.

The Chicago Division, either by direct approach to established sources in these organizations, or through use of suitable pretext, can make available to appropriate officials information establishing the fact that such building code violations do exist. There is no doubt that should such information become available to proper individuals within these organizations, great pressure will be brought to bear to insist that these building code violations are corrected and the possibility strongly exists that court action may follow and fines may be levied.

As an alternative, a direct approach can be made to established contacts within the city government to bring such building code violations to the attention of appropriate authorities.

Anticipated Results

A penetrating analysis of the present economic situation of the American Nazi Party strongly indicates

that by firmly increasing the financial burden of this group the following results are certain:

1. American Nazi Party public activity will be held to the barest minimum due to fear of possible arrest resulting in further economic hardship.

2. Funds will not be available to bring about necessary repairs on the headquarters building

3. Funds for the printing and distribution of literature locally for recruiting purposes would not be available

4. Morale of the organization in Chicago, which is now at low ebb would be further lessened thus creating feelings of dissatisfaction among the membership

5. As a direct result of items above the attractivenes of the American Nazi Party to possible recruits would be held at a minimum

II. Proposal -- Divide Loyalty of Membership Against Present Leaders

Brief Resume of Leadership Problems

At the present time the Chicago American Nazi Party has no established leaders. One of these members, JOHN WALLACE, was appointed by GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL, the group's national commander; however, WALLACE has failed to undertake the responsibilities of leadership and as a result certain dissatisfaction exists among members.

As a result of WALLACE's failure current activities of the organization are being directed by CHRISTOPHER VIDNJEVICH, who is operating without authority of the national headquarters.

Because of the inactivity and the failure of the Chicago organization to demonstrate progress the so-called "hard core" of the membership have raised numerous questions in the recent past challenging the adequacy and capability of ~~WALLACE~~ and ~~VIDNJEVICH~~ to head their organization in Chicago.

Proposed Plan of Approach

It is anticipated that through established sources all of whom are current members of the American Nazi Party in Chicago, feelings of discontent can be initiated. Further, communications which would indicate a thorough and substantial knowledge of the Chicago organization could be directed at the ~~National Commander GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL~~ either anonymously or under the signature of a likely member who is known to be in disagreement with local leadership and practices.

Anticipated Results

By concentrating the efforts of this program in a firm but carefully concealed manner it is strongly believed that the following results will be obtained:

1. Loyalties of the membership will be divided and dissension will be created
2. The national headquarters of the American Nazi Party will have sufficient reason to question the adequacy and capabilities of local leadership
3. Through established sources programs proposed by those in leadership capacities can be sabotaged whereby the confidence of both the national headquarters and the local membership will be shattered

It is recognized that the Bureau considers it vital that the functions and membership of these organizations be brought into the "public spotlight". Chicago does not deem

such an approach appropriate at this time due to the small membership which at this time consists of three established informants of long standing. Activity to bring public pressure to bear at this particular time could jeopardize the position of the three informants who furnish valuable information to this Bureau concerning the membership and activities of the American Nazi Party at Chicago.

It is requested that the Bureau consider the above detailed approaches in connection with this program and authorize their institution in Chicago.

UNITED STATES GOV NMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/15/64

FROM : SAC, KNOXVILLE

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet to Atlanta 9/2/64.

In compliance with referenced letter, the Knoxville Office has opened an active control file captioned as above and has assigned this matter to an Agent who is experienced in the investigation of hate and racist-type organizations.

The Knoxville Office currently has under investigation two klan organizations. The Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. (DK, KKKK) has its national headquarters in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and presently has one chapter active in that area. Information reflects that the weekly meetings of the chapter of this organization are attended by approximately 25 members, although the actual membership is reported to be approximately 45 members. The other klan organization under investigation in this division is the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA, KKKK). The national headquarters of this organization is located within the Birmingham Division. The organization has active chapters within the Knoxville territory at Harriman, Maryville, Knoxville and Sevierville. The Maryville chapter has approximately 127 members and the other three chapters have less than 30 members.

Investigation and information obtained from informants disclose no information that there are any "Action groups" within either of the two klan organizations. Informants have been continually reminded to be alert for any members within the groups who might organize strong-arm groups to engage in any violent actions and they have reported no information of this nature.

In considering various disruptive actions which may be exercised against these groups, it should be borne in mind that neither the DK, KKKK nor the UKA, KKKK have been placed on the Attorney General's list under EO 10450. Although the Knoxville territory does not lie within the traditionally deep South, there is, of course, some sympathy for organizations such as the klans within the territory as evidenced by the increased growth and activity of these organizations in recent years. Within the Knoxville territory there have been no acts of violence within recent years which were attributable to the klan. Although there may not be any public sympathy for the klan in this area, there is certainly no antagonism toward the organization and many persons have a passive feeling toward its membership and activities. In some instances, politicians have solicited the support of the klan in local elections. Just recently, one of the informants of the Knoxville Office, who is a high official in the UKA, KKKK, reported that one of the candidates for U. S. Congress running from the Knoxville district had contacted him and solicited the support of klan members on his behalf.

Because of such factors as the above, it is not believed that the cooperation of individuals can be utilized for plans of disruptive action such as might be available if the targets were Communist front organizations or related groups. In this regard, although news media are very cooperative with the Bureau in this territory, it is not believed that in a program such as this was, it would be feasible, to utilize news media in any counterintelligence operation in this area.

This matter has been discussed with Agents handling investigations of the klan organizations in the Knoxville Division and the following plans have been suggested as feasible for operation against the DK, KKKK and UKA, KKKK in this territory:

It is suggested that anonymous telephone calls be made to employers of klan members inferring to the employer that his company or business must be following a racist policy in view of the fact that he has an employee (giving his identity) who is a member of the klan organization. These calls would be limited to those instances where the klan member is employed by some large company or leading business who would possibly be concerned about the picture they present to the public concerning racial matters.

In view of the previously expressed desires of the officials of the Knoxville Police Department to maintain racial harmony in Knoxville, it is believed that arrangements could be made with the Chief of Police to have one or more squad cars visible in the vicinity of the meeting hall of the Knoxville Klavern on the nights of their meetings. It is believed that if the members saw these squad cars parked in the vicinity on a continuing basis, it would cause them some apprehension and would act as a deterrent to their activities, as well as possible recruitment of new members.

The UKA, KKKK often holds public meetings on private property leased for that purpose. At these meetings, officials make speeches and invite spectators to make application for membership. Informants report that the actual purpose of such a meeting is to publicize the klan and secure new members. In a few instances, informants have reported that some members arriving at the meetings have intentionally covered their license plate with a confederate flag metal insignia or with a facsimile. On occasions, both the rear and front license plates have been obscured or usually only the front license obscured. It is believed through the cooperation of the Highway Patrol on a command level, that patrolmen might be assigned to the area where the meeting is held so that if the klan members leaving the meeting continue to have their license plate obscured, they may be arrested for violation of the state law prohibiting such.

In connection with the informant program of the Knoxville Office, certain persons are interviewed to ascertain their cooperation and their potentials as a possible informant. It is believed that in such cases where antagonism is shown to the Agents' contact, that a later anonymous call might be made to other members accusing the person contacted by the

FBI as being an informant. This would cause a disruptive influence among the rank and file and would arouse suspicion and distrust. This same plan could be pursued further and calls be made to members even though they had not actually been contacted by an Agent in connection with the informant program.

Additional ideas and tactics were discussed but were not considered feasible. Many of the ideas were discarded because it was believed that other actions proposed would greatly jeopardize our present informant coverage. As the Bureau is aware, this office has informant coverage in these organizations on a very high level and we have been able to secure detailed information on membership rolls and applications, as well as detailed information on personal activities of members, as well as detailed activity of the membership as a group. The Bureau has previously been advised that the program of interviewing klan members at the time of the assassination of President KENNEDY and later in connection with the bombings in Birmingham tended to jeopardize our informant coverage, due to their high-level positions and the fact that some of the klan members felt that the information in the possession of the FBI could only have been obtained from some high official source in the klan.

Agent personnel responsible for the klan investigations are continuing to give this program thought and attention, and as the investigations progress, expect that additional ideas will be submitted to the Bureau in connection with the status reports. The implementation of any of the above-listed plans, of course, will not be put into effect without Bureau approval and benefit of Bureau suggestions.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/15/64

FROM : SAC, KNOXVILLE

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet to Atlanta 9/2/64.

In compliance with referenced letter, the Knoxville Office has opened an active control file captioned as above and has assigned this matter to an Agent who is experienced in the investigation of hate and racist-type organizations.

The Knoxville Office currently has under investigation two klan organizations. The Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. (DK, KKKK) has its national headquarters in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and presently has one chapter active in that area. Information reflects that the weekly meetings of the chapter of this organization are attended by approximately 25 members, although the actual membership is reported to be approximately 45 members. The other klan organization under investigation in this division is the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA, KKKK). The national headquarters of this organization is located within the Birmingham Division. The organization has active chapters within the Knoxville territory at Harriman, Maryville, Knoxville and Sevierville. The Maryville chapter has approximately 127 members and the other three chapters have less than 30 members.

Investigation and information obtained from informants disclose no information that there are any "Action groups" within either of the two klan organizations. Informants have been continually reminded to be alert for any members within the groups who might organize strong-arm groups to engage in any violent actions and they have reported no information of this nature.

In considering various disruptive actions which may be exercised against these groups, it should be borne in mind that neither the DK, KKKK nor the UKA, KKKK have been placed on the Attorney General's list under EO 10450. Although the Knoxville territory does not lie within the traditional deep South, there is, of course, some sympathy for organizations such as the klans within the territory as evidenced by the increased growth and activity of these organizations in recent years. Within the Knoxville territory there have been no acts of violence within recent years which were attributable to the klan. Although there may not be any public sympathy for the klan in this area, there is certainly no antagonism toward the organization and many persons have a passive feeling toward its membership and activities. In some instances, politicians have solicited the support of the klan in local elections. Just recently, one of the informants of the Knoxville Office, who is a high official in the UKA, KKKK, reported that one of the candidates for U. S. Congress running from the Knoxville district had contacted him and solicited the support of klan members on his behalf.

Because of such factors as the above, it is not believed that the cooperation of individuals can be utilized for plans of disruptive action such as might be available if the targets were Communist front organizations or related groups. In this regard, although news media are very cooperative with the Bureau in this territory, it is not believed that in a program such as this ~~was~~, it would be feasible, to utilize news media in any counterintelligence operation in this area.

This matter has been discussed with Agents handling investigations of the klan organizations in the Knoxville Division and the following plans have been suggested as feasible for operation against the DK, KKKK and UKA, KKKK in this territory:

It is suggested that anonymous telephone calls be made to employers of klan members inferring to the employer that his company or business must be following a racist policy in view of the fact that he has an employee (giving his identity) who is a member of the klan organization. These calls would be limited to those instances where the klan member is employed by some large company or leading business who would possibly be concerned about the picture they present to the public concerning racial matters.

In view of the previously expressed desires of the officials of the Knoxville Police Department to maintain racial harmony in Knoxville, it is believed that arrangements could be made with the Chief of Police to have one or more squad cars visible in the vicinity of the meeting hall of the Knoxville Klavern on the nights of their meetings. It is believed that if the members saw these squad cars parked in the vicinity on a continuing basis, it would cause them some apprehension and would act as a deterrent to their activities, as well as possible recruitment of new members.

The UKA, KKKK often holds public meetings on private property leased for that purpose. At these meetings, officials make speeches and invite spectators to make application for membership. Informants report that the actual purpose of such a meeting is to publicize the klan and secure new members. In a few instances, informants have reported that some members arriving at the meetings have intentionally covered their license plate with a confederate flag metal insignia or with a facsimile. On occasions, both the rear and front license plates have been obscured or usually only the front license obscured. It is believed through the cooperation of the Highway Patrol on a command level, that patrolmen might be assigned to the area where the meeting is held so that if the klan members leaving the meeting continue to have their license plate obscured, they may be arrested for violation of the state law prohibiting such.

In connection with the informant program of the Knoxville Office, certain persons are interviewed to ascertain their cooperation and their potentials as a possible informant. It is believed that in such cases where antagonism is shown to the Agents' contact, that a later anonymous call might be made to other members accusing the person contacted by the

FBI as being an informant. This would cause a disruptive influence among the rank and file and would arouse suspicion and distrust. This same plan could be pursued further and calls be made to members even though they had not actually been contacted by an Agent in connection with the informant program.

Additional ideas and tactics were discussed but were not considered feasible. Many of the ideas were discarded because it was believed that other actions proposed would greatly jeopardize our present informant coverage. As the Bureau is aware, this office has informant coverage in these organizations on a very high level and we have been able to secure detailed information on membership rolls and applications, as well as detailed information on personal activities of members, as well as detailed activity of the membership as a group. The Bureau has previously been advised that the program of interviewing klan members at the time of the assassination of President KENNEDY and later in connection with the bombings in Birmingham tended to jeopardize our informant coverage, due to their high-level positions and the fact that some of the klan members felt that the information in the possession of the FBI could only have been obtained from some high official source in the klan.

Agent personnel responsible for the klan investigations are continuing to give this program thought and attention, and as the investigations progress, expect that additional ideas will be submitted to the Bureau in connection with the status reports. The implementation of any of the above-listed plans, of course, will not be put into effect without Bureau approval and benefit of Bureau suggestions.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/15/64

FROM : SAC, RICHMOND

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet to Atlanta, dated 9/2/64.

The following is an analysis of potential counterintelligence action against the American Nazi Party (ANP), the only hate or Klan organization currently active in the Richmond territory.

The ANP ~~is headed by GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL,~~ a white American citizen, who resides with his "Army" at 6150 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. Headquarters of ANP is located at 928 North Randolph St., Arlington, Va.

The ANP "Army" consists of about fifteen nondescript individuals from all parts of the country who have no place to go. They are between the ages of 18 to 40. ANP also has members throughout the country, totaling about 200.

~~GEORGE LINCOLN~~ ROCKWELL has many personal idiosyncrasies or weaknesses which make him vulnerable for attack. He cannot stand criticism; he is afraid for his own personal safety; he continually believes that he has been infiltrated by the Anti-Defamation League, the FBI and hate groups. He is suspicious of all members, believing they will be potential assassins of himself or spies within his group.

In view of these characteristics, it is suggested that consideration be given for a careful campaign of correspondence to be sent to ~~ROCKWELL~~ from unnamed individuals to warn him concerning a new member who plans to do bodily harm to him.

Further, in this connection, correspondence should be directed to ROCKWELL to plant the seed of suspicion concerning new members, identifying them as "spies" or the Anti-Defamation League or hate groups such as the National States Rights Party (NSRP).

It is noted that both buildings leased by the ANP from "sympathizers" are in poor condition and would be, most likely, in violation of local law. It is suggested that consideration be given to contacting officials of the Arlington County Board of Health and the Arlington County Fire Department for an official investigation of ANP premises.

Furthermore, in this regard it is believed that if reliable news sources were apprised of the investigation, there would be an expose of the true conditions of the ANP, resulting in public criticism of ROCKWELL. Also, the publicity would tend to frustrate efforts to recruit new and youthful adherents who hold any grandeur of ANP when apprised of the true picture.

ROCKWELL maintains a printing press at ANP Headquarters, 928 N. Randolph St., and without this printing press, ANP activities would be greatly impaired. This printing press is actually owned by a former member, CHRISTOPER AVERY BAILEY, who leased the printing press to ROCKWELL for $1.00 per year.

Information recently received indicates that BAILEY has expressed interest in getting back his printing press. It is suggested that consideration be given to approaching BAILEY, through a third party, to seek the return of the printing press and possibly entertainment of a law suit which seeks the return of the printing press. BAILEY is presently residing in the Washington, D. C. area.

It is noted animosity exists between ROCKWELL and EDWARD R. FIELDS, head of NSRP. Furthermore, it is noted that ROCKWELL recently brought suit against FIELDS for slander in a letter written to a third party. It is suggested that this relationship could be further antogonized by inflammatory correspondence, ostensibly sent to ROCKWELL by NSRP officials in Birmingham, Alabama. It is thought such correspondence might also result in disruptive action of NSRP.

It is recommended that consideration be given to the potential counterintelligence actions against ANP and if the Bureau approves, specific recommendations will be immediately submitted.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/15/64

FROM : SAC, RICHMOND

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet to Atlanta, dated 9/2/64.

The following is an analysis of potential counter-intelligence action against the American Nazi Party (ANP), the only hate or Klan organization currently active in the Richmond territory.

The ANP ~~is headed by GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL,~~ a white American citizen, who resides with his "Army" at 6150 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. Headquarters of ANP is located at 928 North Randolph St., Arlington, Va.

The ANP "Army" consists of about fifteen nondescript individuals from all parts of the country who have no place to go. They are between the ages of 18 to 40. ANP also has members throughout the country, totaling about 200.

~~GEORGE LINCOLN~~ ROCKWELL has many personal idiosyncrasies or weaknesses which make him vulnerable for attack. He cannot stand criticism; he is afraid for his own personal safety; he continually believes that he has been infiltrated by the Anti-Defamation League, the FBI and hate groups. He is suspicious of all members, believing they will be potential assassins of himself or spies within his group.

In view of these characteristics, it is suggested that consideration be given for a careful campaign of correspondence to be sent to ~~ROCKWELL~~ from unnamed individuals to warn him concerning a new member who plans to do bodily harm to him.

Further, in this connection, correspondence should be directed to ROCKWELL to plant the seed of suspicion concerning new members, identifying them as "spies" or the Anti-Defamation League or hate groups such as the National States Rights Party (NSRP).

It is noted that both buildings leased by the ANP from "sympathizers" are in poor condition and would be, most likely, in violation of local law. It is suggested that consideration be given to contacting officials of the Arlington County Board of Health and the Arlington County Fire Department for an official investigation of ANP premises.

Furthermore, in this regard it is believed that if reliable news sources were apprised of the investigation, there would be an expose of the true conditions of the ANP, resulting in public criticism of ROCKWELL. Also, the publicity would tend to frustrate efforts to recruit new and youthful adherents who hold any grandeur of ANP when apprised of the true picture.

ROCKWELL maintains a printing press at ANP Headquarters, 928 N. Randolph St., and without this printing press, ANP activities would be greatly impaired. This printing press is actually owned by a former member, CHRISTOPER AVERY BAILEY, who leased the printing press to ROCKWELL for $1.00 per year.

Information recently received indicates that BAILEY has expressed interest in getting back his printing press. It is suggested that consideration be given to approaching BAILEY, through a third party, to seek the return of the printing press and possibly entertainment of a law suit which seeks the return of the printing press. BAILEY is presently residing in the Washington, D. C. area.

It is noted animosity exists between ROCKWELL and EDWARD R. FIELDS, head of NSRP. Furthermore, it is noted that ROCKWELL recently brought suit against FIELDS for slander in a letter written to a third party. It is suggested that this relationship could be further antogonized by inflammatory correspondence, ostensibly sent to ROCKWELL by NSRP officials in Birmingham, Alabama. It is thought such correspondence might also result in disruptive action of NSRP.

It is recommended that consideration be given to the potential counterintelligence actions against ANP and if the Bureau approves, specific recommendations will be immediately submitted.

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: [illegible]

FROM : SAC, SAVANNAH

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet to Atlanta, 9/2/64.

The Savannah Office has the following klan organizations currently under active investigation.

1. Association of Georgia Klans

   This klan has only one klavern, Klavern #2A located in Savannah, Georgia. It has recently been attempting to organize a klavern in Brunswick, Georgia, but has not met with any success.

   ~~CHARLES H.~~ MADDOX, ~~the leader~~ of this group, is ineffective in that he talks a great deal about what they should do and what the officers and members should do, but does not take any specific action.

2. Association of South Carolina Klans, KKKK

   This klan now has only one active klavern within the Savannah Division and that is Klavern #335 in West Columbia, S. C. This klan has conducted several rallies in South Carolina for the purpose of building up their klavern and starting new klaverns, and may have a new klavern in Hemingway, S. C.

   The active leader of this klan group appears to be ~~ROBERT S. HODGES~~, a post office employee in Columbia, S. C., although he carries the title only of secretary. There have been recent indications that members of the Board of Association of South Carolina Klans feel ~~HODGES~~ is usurping their authority and making decisions without consulting them.

3. United Klans of America, Inc., KKKK

This klan group has the following active klaverns located within the Savannah Division:

a. Klavern #4, Olanta, S. C.

This klavern moved about a year ago from Effingham to Olanta in anticipation of attracting more members, but still attracts a maximum of 9 members to its meetings.

b. Klavern #41, Savannah, Georgia.

The attendants at the meetings of this klavern have fallen off to usually a maximum of 6. It did sponsor one rally in the summer of 1964 which was considered a failure.

c. Klavern #314, Swainsboro, Georgia.

This klavern is one of the most active, but meets only once a month. Many members also meet with Klavern #310, Waynesboro, Georgia, but neither klavern has engaged in any activity other than one street walk held in Waynesboro this past summer. The active membership has fallen off apparently due to lack of activity during the past year.

d. Klavern #310, Waynesboro, Georgia

This klavern has only 8 to 10 members in attendance at their monthly meetings and has lost membership during the past year.

e. Klavern #301, Washington, Georgia.

This klavern has reportedly been in a doubtful state for the past two years. The klavern was torn by dissension over financial matters about two years ago and has rarely had sufficient members in attendance since that time to hold a meeting.

2. Altamaha Men's Club #72, Baxley, Ga.

This klavern is the newest active klavern and has about 40 members, of which about 16 are active. They ousted one Exalted Cyclops who indicated he favored aggressive action, and several members have quit because of the views of this Exalted Cyclops. This is the only klavern in the Savannah Division believed to have an "action" group within the klavern.

At a meeting on 7/27/64, the Exalted Cyclops stated ~~CALVIN CRAIG, State Grand Dragon~~, had advised them to start a military unit. They plan to have this unit trained in a secret type of training. It was indicated that in the event the Communists and Negroes attempt to take over public facilities, that the klan would take over operation of the railroads.

At a meeting on 8/11/64, it was decided the military unit would be called the "Brothers of Patriots" and that they have a bank account as such. A fee is charged to join, and they are going to teach the members judo.

The most effective disruptive action taken against the klan so far was the interviewing of klan members in connection with the "Bapbomb" case.

It is believed the most effective counterintelligence program would be a program that would reveal to the members of this organization that their identities are known to the FBI. This would include a program of harassment by setting up "not too discreet" stake out of the meeting places or roads leading to meeting places to obtain license numbers, interview of the klan members, neighborhood investigations and inquiry at their places of employment concerning the members' activity in the klan.

It is further believed that efforts should be made during the course of these inquiries to obtain knowledge concerning the individual member's personal life which might furnish information that could be used in a campaign of anonymous telephone calls or notes to his family or employer.

During interviews of members, inferences or slight hints could be dropped indicating another specific member of the klavern as the source of information.

On 9/25/64, ~~Chief J. P. STROM (NA)~~, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SCLED), Columbia, S. C., advised his organization had arrested five persons from the vicinity of West Columbia, S. C., in connection with the burning of a cross on the grounds of the Governor's Mansion, Columbia, S. C.

These persons admitted they are members of a recently formed group of the United Klans of America, Inc., at West Columbia, S. C.

Chief STROM said he desires to call in several responsible newspapermen from throughout South Carolina, and ask them to publish articles in the leading South Carolina newspapers, pointing out to the public how membership in a klan organization may hurt an individual, his family or his children in later life. ~~Chief STROM~~ requested that the FBI assist him in gathering information concerning this matter such as how klan membership may affect the opportunity for the klan member or members of his family in obtaining employment with the U. S. Government.

In addition, some klan informants are in a position to take the side of dissident groups within the klaberns and help to create or increase dissension.

It is requested that the Bureau give consideration to helping Chief ~~J. P. STROM~~ of the SCLED in connection with his request for information as to how klan membership may prevent employment by klan members or members of their families by the Federal Government.

It is also suggested that the Atlanta Office ascertain applicable state laws that could be used in the State of Georgia in discouraging klan membership, particularly on the part of state or local employees or appointees.

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/ [illegible]

FROM : SAC, SAVANNAH

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet to Atlanta, 9/2/64.

The Savannah Office has the following klan organizations currently under active investigation.

1. Association of Georgia Klans

This klan has only one klavern, Klavern #2A located in Savannah, Georgia. It has recently been attempting to organize a klavern in Brunswick, Georgia, but has not met with any success.

~~CHARLES H.~~ MADDOX, ~~the leader~~ of this group, is ineffective in that he talks a great deal about what they should do and what the officers and members should do, but does not take any specific action.

2. Association of South Carolina Klans, KKKK

This klan now has only one active klavern within the Savannah Division and that is Klavern #335 in West Columbia, S. C. This klan has conducted several rallies in South Carolina for the purpose of building up their klavern and starting new klaverns, and may have a new klavern in Hemingway, S. C.

The active leader of this klan group appears to be ~~ROBERT E. HODGES~~, a ~~post office employee~~ in Columbia, S. C., although he carries the title only of ~~secretary~~. There have been recent indications that members of the Board of Association of South Carolina Klans feel ~~HODGES~~ is usurping their authority and making decisions without consulting them.

3. United Klans of America, Inc., KKKK

This klan group has the following active klaverns located within the Savannah Division:

a. Klavern #4, Olanta, S. C.

This klavern moved about a year ago from Effingham to Olanta in anticipation of attracting more members, but still attracts a maximum of 9 members to its meetings.

b. Klavern #41, Savannah, Georgia.

The attendants at the meetings of this klavern have fallen off to usually a maximum of 6. It did sponsor one rally in the summer of 1964 which was considered a failure.

c. Klavern #314, Swainsboro, Georgia.

This klavern is one of the most active, but meets only once a month. Many members also meet with Klavern #310, Waynesboro, Georgia, but neither klavern has engaged in any activity other than one street walk held in Waynesboro this past summer. The active membership has fallen off apparently due to lack of activity during the past year.

d. Klavern #310, Waynesboro, Georgia

This klavern has only 8 to 10 members in attendance at their monthly meetings and has lost membership during the past year.

e. Klavern #301, Washington, Georgia.

This klavern has reportedly been in a doubtful state for the past two years. The klavern was torn by dissension over financial matters about two years ago and has rarely had sufficient members in attendance since that time to hold a meeting.

f. Altamaha Men's Club #72, Baxley, Ga.

This klavern is the newest active klavern and has about 40 members, of which about 16 are active. They ousted one Exalted Cyclops who indicated he favored aggressive action, and several members have quit because of the views of this Exalted Cyclops. This is the only klavern in the Savannah Division believed to have an "action" group within the klavern.

At a meeting on 7/27/64, the Exalted Cyclops stated ~~CALVIN CRAIG, State Grand Dragon~~, had advised them to start a military unit. They plan to have this unit trained in a secret type of training. It was indicated that in the event the Communists and Negroes attempt to take over public facilities, that the klan would take over operation of the railroads.

At a meeting on 8/11/64, it was decided the military unit would be called the "Brothers of Patriots" and that they have a bank account as such. A fee is charged to join, and they are going to teach the members judo.

The most effective disruptive action taken against the klan so far was the interviewing of klan members in connection with the "Bapbomb" case.

It is believed the most effective counterintelligence program would be a program that would reveal to the members of this organization that their identities are known to the FBI. This would include a program of harassment by setting up "not too discreet" stake out of the meeting places or roads leading to meeting places to obtain license numbers, interview of the klan members, neighborhood investigations and inquiry at their places of employment concerning the members' activity in the klan.

It is further believed that efforts should be made during the course of these inquiries to obtain knowledge concerning the individual member's personal life which might furnish information that could be used in a campaign of anonymous telephone calls or notes to his family or employer.

During interviews of members, inferences or slight hints could be dropped indicating another specific member of the klavern as the source of information.

On 9/25/64, ~~Chief J. P. STROM (NA)~~, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SCLED), Columbia, S. C., advised his organization had arrested five persons from the vicinity of West Columbia, S. C., in connection with the burning of a cross on the grounds of the Governor's Mansion, Columbia, S. C.

These persons admitted they are members of a recently formed group of the United Klans of America, Inc., at West Columbia, S. C.

Chief STROM said he desires to call in several responsible newspapermen from throughout South Carolina, and ask them to publish articles in the leading South Carolina newspapers, pointing out to the public how membership in a klan organization may hurt an individual, his family or his children in later life. ~~Chief STROM~~ requested that the FBI assist him in gathering information concerning this matter such as how klan membership may affect the opportunity for the klan member or members of his family in obtaining employment with the U. S. Government.

In addition, some klan informants are in a position to take the side of dissident groups within the klaberns and help to create or increase dissension.

It is requested that the Bureau give consideration to helping Chief ~~J. P. STROM~~ of the SCLED in connection with his request for information as to how klan membership may prevent employment by klan members or members of their families by the Federal Government.

It is also suggested that the Atlanta Office ascertain applicable state laws that could be used in the State of Georgia in discouraging klan membership, particularly on the part of state or local employees or appointees.

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: October 15, 1964

ROM : SAC, BALTIMORE

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Reference Bureau letter to Atlanta dated September 2, 1964.

A review of Baltimore files reflects that there are presently no Klan organizations operating within the territory covered by the Baltimore Office. Baltimore files reflect that there are several alleged members of the American Nazi Party (ANP) living in the Baltimore area. However these individuals are associated with the ANP located in the territory covered by the Richmond Office and there are no ANP groups in the Baltimore territory. The Fighting American Nationalists (FAN) organization in the Baltimore area is defunct.

The National States Rights Party (NSRP) was to some extent active on the Eastern Shore of Maryland during the Spring and early Summer of 1964 but there has been no reported activity there in recent months. The only evidence of current activity by the NSRP in the Baltimore area are news stories which appeared in the September 28 and September 30, 1964, editions of the Baltimore Evening Sun, which reflected that two Baltimore County Councilmen received letters from ~~WILLIAM BRAILSFORD~~, organizer of the NSRP, threatening to "paper" their districts with derogatory pamphlets if they voted for a proposed civil rights bill in Baltimore County. Information was also received that a leaflet put out by the NSRP entitled "A Stab in the Back" was being distributed in the Towson, Maryland, area of Baltimore County.

In view of the current lack of activity by Klan and hate groups within the Baltimore Division territory, the Baltimore Office is not in a position at this time to make any specific recommendations for counterintelligence action.

The Baltimore Office will be alert for any opportunities for potential counterintelligence action against pertinent organizations or individuals active within the Baltimore Office territory.

Memorandum

: DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: October 15, 1964

ROM : SAC, BALTIMORE

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Reference Bureau letter to Atlanta dated September 2, 1964.

A review of Baltimore files reflects that there are presently no Klan organizations operating within the territory covered by the Baltimore Office. Baltimore files reflect that there are several alleged members of the American Nazi Party (ANP) living in the Baltimore area. However these individuals are associated with the ANP located in the territory covered by the Richmond Office and there are no ANP groups in the Baltimore territory. The Fighting American Nationalists (FAN) organization in the Baltimore area is defunct.

The National States Rights Party (NSRP) was to some extent active on the Eastern Shore of Maryland during the Spring and early Summer of 1964 but there has been no reported activity there in recent months. The only evidence of current activity by the NSRP in the Baltimore area are news stories which appeared in the September 28 and September 30, 1964, editions of the Baltimore Evening Sun, which reflected that two Baltimore County Councilmen received letters from ~~WILLIAM BRAILSFORD~~, organizer of the NSRP, threatening to "paper" their districts with derogatory pamphlets if they voted for a proposed civil rights bill in Baltimore County. Information was also received that a leaflet put out by the NSRP entitled "A Stab in the Back" was being distributed in the Towson, Maryland, area of Baltimore County.

In view of the current lack of activity by Klan and hate groups within the Baltimore Division territory, the Baltimore Office is not in a position at this time to make any specific recommendations for counterintelligence action.

The Baltimore Office will be alert for any opportunities for potential counterintelligence action against pertinent organizations or individuals active within the Baltimore Office territory.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/12, [illegible]

FROM : SAC, MOBILE

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.

Analysis of Potential CI Action Against Organizations and Personnel of United Klans of America, Inc., KKKK (UKA); Improved Order of the U.S. Klans, KKKK, Inc. (IOUSK); and the Alabama States Rights Party (ASRP)

Files on captioned organizations have been reviewed at the Mobile Office to discover any information of the kind which would prevent a potential for effective CI action. This review of files includes the files of the organizations themselves and of individuals known to be officers and members of the organization. It is the understanding of this office that this information would consist of situations involving potential friction between individual members or between rival organizations; or would consist of information reflecting immorality, particularly sexual immorality, on the part of one or more members, possibly involving the wife or wives of other members; or consisting generally of information of a highly unfavorable or embarrassing nature pertaining to a member or group of members which would be not known, and the exposure of which could produce suitable conflicts. A minimum of such information is contained in Mobile files pertaining to Klan and States Rights Party personnel. There have been conflicts between individuals within groups and between members of different groups, but these conflicts have already matured and have already produced the division and animosity of which the situations were capable. Unlike personnel of Communist organizations, Personnel of Klan organizations are not particularly prone to sexual immorality, and no information has been received indicating promiscuity on the part of a Klansman's wife or on the part of a Klansman, although informants who furnish information pertaining to these individuals are fairly well acquainted with many of them. Approximately two years ago, one Klansman did become jealous when a single Klan member (unmarried) flirted with his wife at a social function. However, the married member is no longer active, and there is not known to have been any further development of that situation.

Pertinent to this analysis is the following observation: Within the past 70 days, Montgomery, Ala., where activity of UKA and ASRP are centralized, has experienced desegregation of restaurants, hotels, motels, and public schools, pursuant to the 1964 Civil Rights Act and pursuant to orders of the United States District Court at Montgomery. Initially, particularly on 7/4 and 7/6/64, following the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, there was an attempt by Klansmen to gather and conspire for the purpose of interfering with the desegregation of movie theaters and restaurants in downtown Montgomery. However, Mobile informants furnished information well in advance of the actual proposed action, enabling Mobile to notify the Montgomery Police Department. The Police Department acted very promptly and effectively, disbursing Klansmen who had gathered in the danger area, and making it quite clear that no unlawful activity or interference with the enforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act would be tolerated. Both the fact that the information was leaked to authorities and the fact that the authorities took effective action were highly demoralizing to the Klan personnel (who are also the only significant personnel of the ASRP). The demoralization was so complete that when Montgomery public schools were desegregated, Klansmen did not even appear in the vicinities of the schools and took no action of any kind, either at the schools or in any other place, in any effort to interfere with the desegregation.

It is therefore fully evident that the purposes sought by the CI program, that is the demoralization and the rendering ineffective of such organizations, was accomplished by direct investigation and Police action. No implication is intended that the work of the Mobile Office has been finally done pertaining to these organizations, and, in fact, the current program of the Mobile Office is to intensify and make more extensive the informant coverage of pertinent organizations. These informants will be particularly alert for personal information of the kind which might be suitable for the institution of CI action in the future, and such information will be diligently sought by Agents conducting investigation concerning these organizations and individuals. Mobile will also continue to be alert for any opportunity to utilize the system which has been effective in the past, that of cooperating with local law enforcement to take the kind of action which discourages unlawful action on the part of the Klan groups.

Recommendation

The Mobile Office has no recommendation for any logical immediate CI action at this time.

Action Groups

Mobile racial informants have furnished the identities of most individuals within the UKA and ASRP who are considered the most likely to commit acts of violence or intimidation. Most of these persons have been under investigation for some time, and in many instances Summary Reports have been furnished to the Bureau pertaining to them. In each of the instances of bombings in the vicinity of Montgomery, Ala., including the bombings in Mississippi in recent weeks, Agents have interviewed neighbors and employers of these individuals and have made visual checks, particularly late at night, in efforts to ascertain whether or not the persons themselves were home or whether or not their automobiles were parked at their residences. In many cases, and probably in most cases, these Klan personnel become aware of these inquiries and on several situations it is known that they observed Agents checking their cars and observing their residences at night. These persons are therefore under the impression that Bureau Agents have them under virtually constant surveillance. They remarked to each other in the presence of informants on occasion that they feel that their telephones are tapped and they have also expressed the fear that their meeting places are subjected to microphone devices. It is believed that this fear on their part constitutes a very effective deterrent, and may very well be a principal reason for their failure to take any unlawfull measures in connection with the racial situation in this area within recent weeks. Through informants and through observations of license tags of automobiles parked at meeting places, Mobile Office is constantly learning of the identities of new persons who have some potential for violence. In all such cases, a case file is opened on that individual, his identity being established and his background being obtained. No particular effort is made to keep these investigations so discreet that the Klansman will not learn that the FBI is inquiring about him. This practice is deemed to be effective with respect to these individuals.

As set forth hereinbefore, Mobile will intensify its efforts to discover information which can be used in the CI program.

Pertaining to the possibility of exposure of Klan and Klan-type activities through reliable news media, it should be observed that it is the firm policy of news media in the Montgomery, Ala., area to completely ignore these Klan groups, and to give them no publicity at all. Within recent months, UKA has held several public rallies, advertising some with leaflet distribution and even one instance of a paid spot radio advertisement. They have invited the press to attend these rallies, hoping to secure publicity from them. Again, it is believed that the policy of the press to ignore these groups has had the most desirable effect, both in frustrating them in their search for publicity, and in avoiding advertising them which, if done, might rally more persons to the Klan cause and result in their increasing their membership. Because of these considerations, it is believed that at least in this area, the current press policy of ignoring the Klan is more effective than would be a policy of exposure of the evils of the organizations.

Attached hereto is the response to Item #2 in the Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter to Mr. K. William O'Connor, Esq. on July 14, 1975. Item #2 is set forth as follows:

"All memoranda and any other materials which contain or reflect studies of 'counterintelligence and disruption tactics' and the making of 'appropriate recommendation' as mentioned in approved Recommendation #3 on page 5 of the July 30, 1964 memorandum captioned 'Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups' from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson."

Attached hereto is the response to Item #2 in the Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter to Mr. K. William O'Connor, Esq. on July 14, 1975. Item #2 is set forth as follows:

"All memoranda and any other materials which contain or reflect studies of 'counterintelligence and disruption tactics' and the making of 'appropriate recommendation' as mentioned in approved Recommendation #3 on page 5 of the July 30, 1964 memorandum captioned 'Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups' from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson."

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
~~Callahan~~
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: July 30, 1964

FROM : J. H. GALE

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION OF KU KLUX KLAN AND OTHER HATE GROUPS

Mr. Sullivan has proposed that the development of informants in the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and other hate groups as well as the investigation and penetration of these organizations from an intelligence standpoint be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). He bases his recommendations on the premise that organizations like the KKK and supporting groups are essentially subversive in that they hold principles and recommend courses of action that are inimical to the Constitution as are the viewpoints of the Communist Party. He does not maintain that the actions of the hate groups constitute the same menace as the Communist Party inasmuch as they are not controlled by a foreign power. Counterintelligence Program – Disruption of Hate Groups –

He feels that the DID over the years has developed wide experience in the penetration of subversive organizations through informants, anonymous sources, sophisticated microphone and technical surveillances, interview programs of a highly specialized nature, etc., and that his division could put this experience to excellent use in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups.

Mr. Sullivan feels that the DID would be in a position to launch a disruptive counter-intelligence program against the Klan and other hate groups with the same effectiveness that they are now doing insofar as the Communist Party is concerned. He also proposes an immediate series of regional conferences to instruct pertinent field personnel and to devise imaginative, aggressive and highly specialized programs to carry out the responsibilities in question. He states the Communist Party is increasing its activities in the field of racial matters and civil rights, directing more and more of its fire against the KKK and similar organizations to confuse the issue. He feels that because of the stepped up activities of the Communist Party in this area it would help prevent marked confusion from developing in the areas of activities being handled by the General Investigative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions if the DID assumes these responsibilities.

The functions in question were formerly handled by the DID up until 1958 when they were transferred to the General Investigative Division. This matter was considered by the Executives Conference 10/1/58 and the transfer recommended.

1 - Mr. Rosen 1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Mohr
JHG;wmj (7) Enclosures

REC 30

EX-108

SEP 28 1964

SENT DIRECTOR
7-31-64

XEROX
16 SEP 28 1964

One of the prime factors in the decision to transfer these responsibilities from the DID in 1958 was the almost complete absence of Communist Party activity in the racial area although at that time the Communist Party sought to capitalize on such incidents after their occurrence.

Mr. Rosen was opposed to the transfer of the functions in question to the General Investigative Division in 1958 and his present position is consistent in that he maintains that the development of informants and the penetration of the Klan and other hate groups are primarily intelligence functions which should be handled by the DID as suggested by Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Rosen feels that the Bureau can best keep abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united in one division as suggested by Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Rosen points out that the development, supervision and administrative handling of racial and security informants are analogous.

Mr. Rosen feels that there is a tendency toward oversimplification in blaming all racial murders on Klansmen and hate groups. He points out that the murders of Medgar Evers, Postman Moore and even the assassination of President Kennedy were initially and generally attributed to Klan and hate group members whereas investigation showed that the individuals charged with the murders of Evers and Moore were without organization affiliation and the President was slain by an avowed Marxist who was active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Mr. Rosen and Mr. Sullivan both agree that the investigation of individual cases, i.e. bombings, murders, police brutality, etc., should be handled by the General Investigative Division. Mr. Rosen feels that whether subject or victims are Klan members, Communist Party members or completely without organizational affiliation has no more bearing on our supervision of the substantive civil rights violation than it would have if the violation involved were Theft from Interstate Shipment, Bank Robbery or White Slave Traffic Act.

Mr. Belmont disagrees with Messrs. Rosen and Sullivan and feels that while the proposed transfer of functions from the General Investigative to the Domestic Intelligence Division is theoretically appealing, it is not a practical answer to our problem. He states that at the time of the 1958 transfer of functions in question the basis was the close inter-relationship between the activities of the Klan and hate groups and the entire civil rights field of investigation. He feels this argument has even more strength today than in 1958, because, overwhelmingly, our interest in Klan and hate groups today is their relationship with integration and civil rights. Mr. Belmont believes the transfer of functions would create an undesirable division of authority and responsibility; that our best chance to break major civil rights cases such as bombings, murders, etc., is through information developed from the inside as a result of coverage established in the community where the crime occurred; i.e. informants and sources in the Klan, hate groups, subversive organizations, but also sources not connected with any group, who will report potential violence and individuals prone to violence. We are following the policy of aggressively seeking out persons addicted to violence even though they have not violated a Federal law as yet. He feels that the Division that is going to investigate these cases should forge the necessary tools to use for this purpose. Mr. Belmont does not feel that the transfer of this responsibility will be helpful to the Bureau from an investigative standpoint nor in meeting the heavy responsibilities we no have in this area.

VIEWS OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION:

Inspector feels there is certainly some merit and logic in Mr. Belmont's reasoning and it is felt instant issue is not one that is completely black or white.

Under the present setup there is coordination and daily exchange of information between Domestic Intelligence and General Investigative Divisions in that both Divisions insure that communications and other matters of information are brought to the attention of each other as they arise from matters for which each Division is primarily responsible. However, it seems the real issue today just as in 1958, is where does the weight of the interest lie in the racial question. In 1958 it clearly lay in the General Investigative Division because, according to information available to the Bureau at that time, in practically no instances had racial incidents been caused or inspired by Communist Party elements although the Party naturally sought to capitalize on incidents after they occurred. Also, in 1958, it was felt that consolidation would streamline certain operations.

Today it seems clear from information developed by Domestic Intelligence Division that the Communist Party now has evidenced a definite interest in the racial problem, is becoming deeply enmeshed therein, and appears to be exploiting it to an ever-increasing extent. Although prosecution for civil rights and other criminal violations is still an ultimate objective, there is definite need for an intelligence type penetration of these racial and hate groups so as to keep abreast of and ahead of their plans and activities. This seems more properly the function of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Analysis was made by Inspector relative to coverage of the Klan and other hate groups. The General Investigative Division has been putting a great deal of pressure on the field to increase informant coverage. They have recently instructed the field to conduct surveys relative to instituting technical coverage on certain key Klan figures, have interviewed at least once all known Klan members; all Klan leaders have been investigated from intelligence standpoint and recommendations have been made that intelligence type cases be opened on each Klan member. A weekly progress airtel is being obtained from field concerning informant development. However, undoubtedly additional coverage is needed particularly in the Klaverns that have been formed since the civil rights bill passed. There is no question about

None of these things had been done until after I complained about lack of proper coverage. H the fact that the DID has had broad experience in the penetration of subversive organizations and has achieved noteworthy results in infiltrating the Communist Party and Soviet intelligence operations. It is felt that unquestionably this experience and know-how could be put to good advantage in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups.

The Inspection Division feels that the advantages in having the direction of all informant and intelligence matters in the racial field in one division as outlined by Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Rosen outweigh the advantages of having the hate group informants and intelligence functions with the substantive civil rights cases. Under the proposed transfer of phases of the racial problem to Domestic Intelligence Division there will still be definite responsibility in both divisions, Mr. Rosen to retain responsibility for supervision of substantive civil rights violations and other criminal violations. This dual responsibility, however, should pose no problem because there are numerous examples of it successfully being handled in the Bureau today. In this regard it will be noted that the administrative handling of the entire criminal informant program is handled by the Special Investigative Division which includes the informants being utilized on General Investigative Division cases. It will also be noted that the Special Investigative Division handles the informant and intelligence aspects of organized crime. However, the General Investigative Division handles key substantive violations such as Bankruptcy, Extortion, Assaulting a Federal Officer, and Theft from Interstate Shipment violations committed by members of the organized criminal syndicate utilizing Criminal Intelligence informants. It is understood that there have been no insoluble problems in this regard and it is felt that there should be no insoluble problems in the coordination of racial intelligence and informant information between the General Investigative Division and the DID.

In any event there will certainly be no lessening of pressure and supervision on the field if these functions are transferred. The same Agents in the field will be working the cases and developing the informants. However, it is felt that the DID should be given a chance to demonstrate whether their broad knowledge of and experience in penetration techniques and infiltration tactics can possibly increase our penetration of these hate groups. It is felt that a study of counter-intelligence and disruption tactics against the Klan certainly merits further consideration. It is also felt that the proposed series of field conferences on this problem should be favorably considered.

Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the responsibility for development of informants and gathering of intelligence on the KKK and other hate groups be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the DID. (If approved, appropriate memorandum will be submitted by Inspection Division concerning realignment and distribution of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the DID.)

O.K.
H

2. That a series of regional field conferences be held by appropriate Bureau official to instruct personnel and attempt to develop further imaginative and aggressive highly specialized programs to carry out desired penetration. (If approved, to be coordinated by Mr. Belmont.)

O.K.
H.

3. That counter-intelligence and disruption tactics be given further study by DID and appropriate recommendations made.

O.K.
H

7/31

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GC RNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
~~Callahan~~
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: July 30, 1964

FROM : J. H. GALE

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION OF KU KLUX KLAN AND OTHER HATE GROUPS

Mr. Sullivan has proposed that the development of informants in the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and other hate groups as well as the investigation and penetration of these organizations from an intelligence standpoint be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). He bases his recommendations on the premise that organizations like the KKK and supporting groups are essentially subversive in that they hold principles and recommend courses of action that are inimical to the Constitution as are the viewpoints of the Communist Party. He does not maintain that the actions of the hate groups constitute the same menace as the Communist Party inasmuch as they are not controlled by a foreign power. Counterintelligence Program - Disruption of Hate Groups - Enc

He feels that the DID over the years has developed wide experience in the penetration of subversive organizations through informants, anonymous sources, sophisticated microphone and technical surveillances, interview programs of a highly specialized nature, etc., and that his division could put this experience to excellent use in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups.

Mr. Sullivan feels that the DID would be in a position to launch a disruptive counter-intelligence program against the Klan and other hate groups with the same effectiveness that they are now doing insofar as the Communist Party is concerned. He also proposes an immediate series of regional conferences to instruct pertinent field personnel and to devise imaginative, aggressive and highly specialized programs to carry out the responsibilities in question. He states the Communist Party is increasing its activities in the field of racial matters and civil rights, directing more and more of its fire against the KKK and similar organizations to confuse the issue. He feels that because of the stepped up activities of the Communist Party in this area it would help prevent marked confusion from developing in the areas of activities being handled by the General Investigative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions if the DID assumes these responsibilities.

The functions in question were formerly handled by the DID up until 1958 when they were transferred to the General Investigative Division. This matter was considered by the Executives Conference 10/1/58 and the transfer recommended.

1 - Mr. Rosen 1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Mohr
JHG:wmj (7) Enclosures

XEROX
16 SEP 28 1964

SENT DIRECTOR
7-31-64

REC 30
EX-108
SEP 28 1964

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

One of the prime factors in the decision to transfer these responsibilities from the DID in 1958 was the almost complete absence of Communist Party activity in the racial area although at that time the Communist Party sought to capitalize on such incidents after their occurrence.

Mr. Rosen was opposed to the transfer of the functions in question to the General Investigative Division in 1958 and his present position is consistent in that he maintains that the development of informants and the penetration of the Klan and other hate groups are primarily intelligence functions which should be handled by the DID as suggested by Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Rosen feels that the Bureau can best keep abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united in one division as suggested by Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Rosen points out that the development, supervision and administrative handling of racial and security informants are analogous.

Mr. Rosen feels that there is a tendency toward oversimplification in blaming all racial murders on Klansmen and hate groups. He points out that the murders of Medgar Evers, Postman Moore and even the assassination of President Kennedy were initially and generally attributed to Klan and hate group members whereas investigation showed that the individuals charged with the murders of Evers and Moore were without organization affiliation and the President was slain by an avowed Marxist who was active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Mr. Rosen and Mr. Sullivan both agree that the investigation of individual cases, i.e. bombings, murders, police brutality, etc., should be handled by the General Investigative Division. Mr. Rosen feels that whether subject or victims are Klan members, Communist Party members or completely without organizational affiliation has no more bearing on our supervision of the substantive civil rights violation than it would have if the violation involved were Theft from Interstate Shipment, Bank Robbery or White Slave Traffic Act.

Mr. Belmont disagrees with Messrs. Rosen and Sullivan and feels that while the proposed transfer of functions from the General Investigative to the Domestic Intelligence Division is theoretically appealing, it is not a practical answer to our problem.. He states that at the time of the 1958 transfer of functions in question the basis was the close inter-relationship between the activities of the Klan and hate groups and the entire civil rights field of investigation. He feels this argument has even more strength today than in 1958, because, overwhelmingly, our interest in Klan and hate groups today is their relationship with integration and civil rights. Mr. Belmont believes the transfer of functions would create an undesirable division of authority and responsibility; that our best chance to break major civil rights cases such as bombings, murders, etc., is through information developed from the inside as a result of coverage established in the community where the crime occurred; i.e. informants and sources in the Klan, hate groups, subversive organizations, but also sources not connected with any group, who will report potential violence and individuals prone to violence. We are following the policy of aggressively seeking out persons addicted to violence even though they have not violated a Federal law as yet. He feels that the Division that is going to investigate these cases should forge the necessary tools to use for this purpose. Mr. Belmont does not feel that the transfer of this responsibility will be helpful to the Bureau from an investigative standpoint nor in meeting the heavy responsibilities we now have in this area.

VIEWS OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION:

Inspector feels there is certainly some merit and logic in Mr. Belmont's reasoning and it is felt instant issue is not one that is completely black or white.

Under the present setup there is coordination and daily exchange of information between Domestic Intelligence and General Investigative Divisions in that both Divisions insure that communications and other matters of information are brought to the attention of each other as they arise from matters for which each Division is primarily responsible. However, it seems the real issue today just as in 1958, is where does the weight of the interest lie in the racial question. In 1958 it clearly lay in the General Investigative Division because, according to information available to the Bureau at that time, in practically no instances had racial incidents been caused or inspired by Communist Party elements although the Party naturally sought to capitalize on incidents after they occurred. Also, in 1958, it was felt that consolidation would streamline certain operations.

Today it seems clear from information developed by Domestic Intelligence Division that the Communist Party now has evidenced a definite interest in the racial problem, is becoming deeply enmeshed therein, and appears to be exploiting it to an ever-increasing extent. Although prosecution for civil rights and other criminal violations is still an ultimate objective, there is definite need for an intelligence type penetration of these racial and hate groups so as to keep abreast of and ahead of their plans and activities. This seems more properly the function of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Analysis was made by Inspector relative to coverage of the Klan and other hate groups. The General Investigative Division has been putting a great deal of pressure on the field to increase informant coverage. They have recently instructed the field to conduct surveys relative to instituting technical coverage on certain key Klan figures, have interviewed at least once all known Klan members; all Klan leaders have been investigated from intelligence standpoint and recommendations have been made that intelligence type cases be opened on each Klan member. A weekly progress airtel is being obtained from field concerning informant development. However, undoubtedly additional coverage is needed particularly in the Klaverns that have been formed since the civil rights bill passed. There is no question about

None of these things had been done until -
[illegible]ained [illegible] lack of [illegible] coverage. H.

the fact that the DID has had broad experience in the penetration of subversive organizations and has achieved noteworthy results in infiltrating the Communist Party and Soviet intelligence operations. It is felt that unquestionably this experience and know-how could be put to good advantage in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups.

The Inspection Division feels that the advantages in having the direction of all informant and intelligence matters in the racial field in one division as outlined by Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Rosen outweigh the advantages of having the hate group informants and intelligence functions with the substantive civil rights cases. Under the proposed transfer of phases of the racial problem to Domestic Intelligence Division there will still be definite responsibility in both divisions, Mr. Rosen to retain responsibility for supervision of substantive civil rights violations and other criminal violations. This dual responsibility, however, should pose no problem because there are numerous examples of it successfully being handled in the Bureau today. In this regard it will be noted that the administrative handling of the entire criminal informant program is handled by the Special Investigative Division which includes the informants being utilized on General Investigative Division cases. It will also be noted that the Special Investigative Division handles the informant and intelligence aspects of organized crime. However, the General Investigative Division handles key substantive violations such as Bankruptcy, Extortion, Assaulting a Federal Officer, and Theft from Interstate Shipment violations committed by members of the organized criminal syndicate utilizing Criminal Intelligence informants. It is understood that there have been no insoluble problems in this regard and it is felt that there should be no insoluble problems in the coordination of racial intelligence and informant information between the General Investigative Division and the DID.

In any event there will certainly be no lessening of pressure and supervision on the field if these functions are transferred. The same Agents in the field will be working the cases and developing the informants. However, it is felt that the DID should be given a chance to demonstrate whether their broad knowledge of and experience in penetration techniques and infiltration tactics can possibly increase our penetration of these hate groups. It is felt that a study of counter-intelligence and disruption tactics against the Klan certainly merits further consideration. It is also felt that the proposed series of field conferences on this problem should be favorably considered.

Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the responsibility for development of informants and gathering of intelligence on the KKK and other hate groups be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the DID. (If approved, appropriate memorandum will be submitted by Inspection Division concerning realignment and distribution of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the DID.)

O.K.
H

2. That a series of regional field conferences be held by appropriate Bureau official to instruct personnel and attempt to develop further imaginative and aggressive highly specialized programs to carry out desired penetration. (If approved, to be coordinated by Mr. Belmont.)

O.K.
H.

3. That counter-intelligence and disruption tactics be given further study by DID and appropriate recommendations made.

O.K.
H 1/31

SAC, Atlanta

September 2, 1964

Director, FBI (157-9-Main)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Mr. Trainor 1 - Mr. Ryan

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Disruption

Effective immediately, the Bureau is instituting a coordinated Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) directed against Klan-type and hate organizations. Offices receiving copies of this letter are instructed to immediately open an active control file, captioned as above, and to assign responsibility for this program to an experienced and imaginative Special Agent who is well versed in investigation of hate and racist-type organizations and their membership.

The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities of the various Klans and hate organizations, their leadership and adherents. The activities of these groups must be followed on a continuous basis so we may take advantage of all opportunities for counterintelligence and also inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant. The devious maneuvers and duplicity of these groups must be exposed to public scrutiny through the cooperation of reliable news media sources, both locally and at the Seat of Government. We must frustrate any effort of the groups to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents. In every instance, consideration should be given to disrupting the organized activity of these groups and no opportunity should be missed to capitalize upon organizational and personal conflicts of their leadership.

FBI READING ROOM
SEP 7 4 57 PM '64

2 - Baltimore
2 - Birmingham
2 - Charlotte
2 - Chicago
2 - Jacksonville
2 - Jackson
2 - Knoxville
2 - Little Rock
2 - Memphis
2 - Miami
2 - Mobile
2 - New Orleans
2 - New York
2 - Richmond
2 - Savannah
2 - Tampa

MAILED 6
SEP 3 - 1964
COMM-FBI

REC
157-9-1
18 SEP 4 1964

1 - 100-3-104-Main (CPUSA, Cointelpro)

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

NOTE: See memo Baumgardner to Sullivan, 8/27/64, same caption, DR:bgc.

DR:bgc (42)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Ryan-812RB

The following Klan organizations, currently under active investigation, should be considered for counterintelligence action:

1. Association of Arkansas Klans of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
2. Association of Georgia Klans.
3. Association of South Carolina Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
4. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Hinton, West Virginia.
5. Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
6. Improved Order of the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
7. Independent Klavern, Fountain Inn.
8. Independent Klan Unit, St. Augustine, Florida.
9. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Aka.
10. Mississippi Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
11. National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
12. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
13. Pioneer Club, Orlando, Florida.
14. United Florida Ku Klux Klan.
15. United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
16. U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
17. White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi.

The following hate organizations currently being afforded active investigation are included in this program.

1. Alabama States Rights Party (Origin: Mobile)
2. American Nazi Party (Origin: Richmond)

2W

Letter to Atlanta
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main

3. Council for Statehood, aka, Freemen
   (Origin: Miami)
4. Fighting American Nationalists
   (Origin: Baltimore)
5. National States Rights Party
   (Origin: Birmingham)
6. National Renaissance Party
   (Origin: New York)
7. United Freemen (Origin: Miami)
8. Viking Youth of America (Origin: Tampa)
9. White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago)

On or before 10/15/64, participating offices are instructed to submit to the Bureau a detailed analysis of potential counterintelligence action against pertinent organizations and individuals active within their respective territories and specific recommendations should be included for any logical immediate counterintelligence action. Recommendations submitted under this program must include all necessary facts to enable the Bureau to intelligently pass upon the feasibility of the proposed action. In instances where a reliable and cooperative news media representative or other source outside the Bureau is to be contacted or utilized in connection with a proposed counterintelligence operation, it will be incumbent upon the recommending office to furnish assurances the source will not reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

Offices participating in this program who have investigative responsibility for Klan organizations should specifically comment in the initial letter to the Bureau regarding "Action Groups." As these offices are aware, these groups have been described as the relatively few individuals in each organization who use strong-arm tactics and violent actions to achieve their ends. Often these groups act without the approval of the Klan organization

Rw

or membership. The Bureau considers it vital that we expose the identities and activities of such groups and where possible disrupt their efforts. These groups should be subjected to continuing counterintelligence action.

No counterintelligence action may be initiated by the field without specific Bureau authorization.

Commencing 1/1/65 and every 3 months thereafter, each participating office should submit to the Bureau a status letter covering the prior 3-month period, including comments under the following captions:

1. Potential Counterintelligence Action
2. Pending Counterintelligence Action
3. Tangible Results

If necessary, a 4th caption "Miscellaneous" may be utilized for additional comments.

Recommendations for counterintelligence action should not be included in 90-day status letters to the Bureau but following the initial analysis due 10/15/64, should be submitted individually by separate letter.

All Special Agent personnel responsible for the investigation of Klan-type and hate organizations and their membership should be alerted to our counterintelligence plans relating to these groups. Counterintelligence action directed at these groups is intended to complement and stimulate our accelerated intelligence investigations. Each investigative Agent has a responsibility to call to the attention of the counterintelligence coordinator suggestions and possibilities for implementing the program. You are cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded this sensitive operation.

The Bureau is pleased with past successes achieved by our counterintelligence efforts in other phases of our investigative responsibilities. To insure our success in this new endeavor, the Agent to whom the program is assigned in each office must have a detailed knowledge of the activities of the racist groups in the territory and that knowledge must be coupled with interest, initiative and imagination. The Agent must be alert for information which has a disruptive potential. The information will not come to him - - he must look for it. The most effective way of being assured of keeping on top of the situation is to maintain close contact with those Agents who handle the investigation of the racial and hate groups and their membership and also to periodically review relevant files.

If an enthusiastic approach is made to this new endeavor, there is no reason why the results achieved under this program will not equal or surpass our achievements in similar-type programs directed against subversives.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: August 27, 1964

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner FJB

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Mr. Trainor
1 - Mr. Ryan

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Memorandum from Mr. J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated 7/30/64 captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups" was approved by the Director authorizing the Domestic Intelligence Division to give consideration to the application of counterintelligence and disruptive tactics to hate groups and to thereafter make appropriate recommendations. It is our recommendation that we immediately initiate a hard-hitting, closely supervised, coordinated counterintelligence program to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and specified other hate groups.

This new counterintelligence effort will take advantage of our experience with a variety of sophisticated techniques successfully applied against the Communist Party, USA, and related organizations since 1956. Primarily, we intend to expose to public scrutiny the devious maneuvers and duplicity of the hate groups; to frustrate any efforts or plans they may have to consolidate their forces; to discourage their recruitment of new or youthful adherents; and to disrupt or eliminate their efforts to circumvent or violate the law. Our counterintelligence efforts against hate groups will be closely supervised and coordinated to complement our expanded intelligence investigations directed at these organizations.

We are furnishing general instructions to 17 field offices (14 Southern offices responsible for active investigation of 17 Klan groups and 6 hate organizations, and New York, Chicago and Baltimore, who have active investigative responsibilities for one hate organization each) relating to the administration and prompt enactment of this new counterintelligence program. Briefly, these instructions require the 17 participating offices to submit to the Bureau on or before 10/15/64 an analysis of possible counterintelligence operations, including any specific recommendations for action. Thereafter (commencing 1/1/65) the participating offices will submit a 90-day status letter setting

Enc. Sent 9-3-64
157-9-Main
1 - 100-3-104-Main (CPUSA, Cointelpro)

EX-105 REC 20 157-9-2

SEP 24 1964

DR:bgc (8)

SEP 30 1964 CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main

forth a summary of current, possible, and successfully achieved counterintelligence activity during the prior 3-month period. Each office will be instructed to open and maintain a pending investigation relating to this program and to assign a Special Agent on a part-time basis as the program coordinator responsible for following and initiating counterintelligence action.

* Portion in brackets classified Secret

As is the instance in our established counterintelligence program against the Communist Party, USA, [and in our current 90-day trial counterintelligence program directed against Soviet-Satellite intelligence,] all recommended counterintelligence action against Klan-type and hate organizations will be required to be approved at the Seat of Government.

This new counterintelligence program directed at Klan and hate organizations will be supervised at the Seat of Government by the Special Agent supervisor responsible for our similar programs directed against the Communist Party, USA, [and Soviet-Satellite intelligence.] His efforts will be closely coordinated with supervisory personnel responsible for the intelligence investigations of the Klans and hate organizations and their membership. An annual memorandum justifying continuance of the program will be submitted and the participating field offices will be periodically apprised of techniques which have been found to be most successful. At such time as the program is considered to be successfully under way, a status memorandum will be submitted which will include any additional recommendations relating to manpower or other administrative requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized to immediately initiate a coordinated counterintelligence program directed at exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing the 17 active Klan organizations and 9 active racial hate organizations.

* Portion in brackets classified Secret by #183 5/7/74 pm

over

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main

2. That the attached letter be forwarded to the 17 field offices slated to participate in this new counterintelligence program setting forth instructions for the administration and immediate enactment of the program.

OK

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad ✓
DeLoach ✓
Evans
Gale ✓
Rosen ✓
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: August 27, 1964

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner FJB

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Mr. Trainor
1 - Mr. Ryan

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Memorandum from Mr. J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated 7/30/64 captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups" was approved by the Director authorizing the Domestic Intelligence Division to give consideration to the application of counterintelligence and disruptive tactics to hate groups and to thereafter make appropriate recommendations. It is our recommendation that we immediately initiate a hard-hitting, closely supervised, coordinated counterintelligence program to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and specified other hate groups.

This new counterintelligence effort will take advantage of our experience with a variety of sophisticated techniques successfully applied against the Communist Party, USA, and related organizations since 1956. Primarily, we intend to expose to public scrutiny the devious maneuvers and duplicity of the hate groups; to frustrate any efforts or plans they may have to consolidate their forces; to discourage their recruitment of new or youthful adherents; and to disrupt or eliminate their efforts to circumvent or violate the law. Our counterintelligence efforts against hate groups will be closely supervised and coordinated to complement our expanded intelligence investigations directed at these organizations.

We are furnishing general instructions to 17 field offices (14 Southern offices responsible for active investigation of 17 Klan groups and 6 hate organizations, and New York, Chicago and Baltimore, who have active investigative responsibilities for one hate organization each) relating to the administration and prompt enactment of this new counterintelligence program. Briefly, these instructions require the 17 participating offices to submit to the Bureau on or before 10/15/64 an analysis of possible counterintelligence operations, including any specific recommendations for action. Thereafter (commencing 1/1/65) the participating offices will submit a 90-day status letter setting

Enc. Sent 9-3-64 EX-105 REC 20 157-9-2
157-9-Main
1 - 100-3-104-Main (CPUSA, Cointelpro) SEP 24 1964

DR:bgc (8) SEP 30 1964 CONTINUED - OVER

forth a summary of current, possible, and successfully achieved counterintelligence activity during the prior 3-month period. Each office will be instructed to open and maintain a pending investigation relating to this program and to assign a Special Agent on a part-time basis as the program coordinator responsible for following and initiating counterintelligence action.

* Portion in brackets classified Secret

As is the instance in our established counterintelligence program against the Communist Party, USA, [and in our current 90-day trial counterintelligence program directed against Soviet-Satellite intelligence,] all recommended counterintelligence action against Klan-type and hate organizations will be required to be approved at the Seat of Government.

This new counterintelligence program directed at Klan and hate organizations will be supervised at the Seat of Government by the Special Agent supervisor responsible for our similar programs directed against the Communist Party, USA, [and Soviet-Satellite intelligence.] His efforts will be closely coordinated with supervisory personnel responsible for the intelligence investigations of the Klans and hate organizations and their membership. An annual memorandum justifying continuance of the program will be submitted and the participating field offices will be periodically apprised of techniques which have been found to be most successful. At such time as the program is considered to be successfully under way, a status memorandum will be submitted which will include any additional recommendations relating to manpower or other administrative requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized to immediately initiate a coordinated counterintelligence program directed at exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing the 17 active Klan organizations and 9 active racial hate organizations.

* Portion in brackets classified Secret by 77183 5/7/74 pmt

over

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main

2. That the attached letter be forwarded to the 17 field offices slated to participate in this new counterintelligence program setting forth instructions for the administration and immediate enactment of the program.

O.K.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES G RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 9/9/64

FROM : SAC, TAMPA

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter dated 9/2/64 captioned as above.

On Page 3 Bureau listed the Viking Youth of America, Tampa origin, as one of the hate groups currently being afforded active investigation and included in captioned program.

Reference is now made to Tampa letter to the Bureau dated 5/6/64 which made reference in turn to Jacksonville letter dated 4/30/64 wherein ~~GEORGE FRANKLIN MARCHELOS~~ stated that the Viking Youth of America never became organized in the United States and that he never made an actual active attempt to recruit members in this organization. The Tampa file in this matter is closed. We have not been able to determine that any active chapters of this group are in existence or that any members were recruited for the group. It is therefore felt that there would be no point in our attempting any disruptive tactics in connection with this group.

The Bureau is requested to advise Tampa whether it would be satisfactory not to initiate any action on the Viking Youth of America and to substitute some other organization for this purpose.

UNITED STATES G RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 9/9/64

FROM : SAC, TAMPA

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter dated 9/2/64 captioned as above.

On Page 3 Bureau listed the Viking Youth of America, Tampa origin, as one of the hate groups currently being afforded active investigation and included in captioned program.

Reference is now made to Tampa letter to the Bureau dated 5/6/64 which made reference in turn to Jacksonville letter dated 4/30/64 wherein ~~GEORGE FRANKLIN MARCHELOS~~ stated that the Viking Youth of America never became organized in the United States and that he never made an actual active attempt to recruit members in this organization. The Tampa file in this matter is closed. We have not been able to determine that any active chapters of this group are in existence or that any members were recruited for the group. It is therefore felt that there would be no point in our attempting any disruptive tactics in connection with this group.

The Bureau is requested to advise Tampa whether it would be satisfactory not to initiate any action on the Viking Youth of America and to substitute some other organization for this purpose.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI DATE: 9/9/64

FROM : SAC, New Orleans

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet to Atlanta and interested offices 9/2/64.

1) Potential Counterintelligence Action

The majority of members of klan-type organizations in the New Orleans area are located in rural areas and in small communities. In order to effectively expose the identities and activities of individuals in these groups, individual cases are being opened on members and a background type of investigation is being instituted by the New Orleans Office on these individual members.

These individual investigations, of course, will become known through contact with various individuals in the developing of background. The mere knowledge that their identities are known to the FBI will have disruptive force on the individual's activities.

To highlight and further cause consternation, interviews of one or two specifically hand-picked members will be conducted by Agents in these areas, after which background investigations will be instituted immediately on other known members in the particular community.

The individuals to be interviewed will be members of "wrecking crews". The mere fact of these investigations will plant the seeds of mistrust among the members and leadership in the particular community.

Bureau authority is requested to immediately initiate the above counterintelligence activity.

2) Pending Counterintelligence Action

Surveys are being conducted at Monroe, West Monroe, Alexandria and Bogalusa, Louisiana, pursuant to Bureau authority by airtel dated 9/4/64.

3) Tangible Results

Tangible results of such potential and pending counterintelligence action will be furnished the Bureau afto: inauguration of the above.

4) Miscellaneous

A completed initial analysis will reach the Bureau on 10/15/64 concerning this matter.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI DATE: 9/9/64

FROM : SAC, New Orleans

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet to Atlanta and interested offices 9/2/64.

1) Potential Counterintelligence Action

The majority of members of klan-type organizations in the New Orleans area are located in rural areas and in small communities. In order to effectively expose the identities and activities of individuals in these groups, individual cases are being opened on members and a background type of investigation is being instituted by the New Orleans Office on these individual members.

These individual investigations, of course, will become known through contact with various individuals in the developing of background. The mere knowledge that their identities are known to the FBI will have disruptive force on the individual's activities.

To highlight and further cause consternation, interviews of one or two specifically hand-picked members will be conducted by Agents in these areas, after which background investigations will be instituted immediately on other known members in the particular community.

The individuals to be interviewed will be members of "wrecking crews". The mere fact of these investigations will plant the seeds of mistrust among the members and leadership in the particular community.

Bureau authority is requested to immediately initiate the above counterintelligence activity.

2) Pending Counterintelligence Action

Surveys are being conducted at Monroe, West Monroe, Alexandria and Bogalusa, Louisiana, pursuant to Bureau authority by airtel dated 9/4/64.

3) Tangible Results

Tangible results of such potential and pending counterintelligence action will be furnished the Bureau after inauguration of the above.

4) Miscellaneous

A completed initial analysis will reach the Bureau on 10/15/64 concerning this matter.

PTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106-03
AY 1962 EDITION
SA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GC RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main) DATE: 9/16/64

FROM : SAC, ATLANTA (157-826) (P)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN)

ReBulet 9/2/64.

In 1960, a comparatively small group of Klansmen pulled out of U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., and formed a new Klan group called Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.

The Imperial Wizard of this new group was ROBERT L. BING of Jonesboro, Georgia. In the Summer of 1961, following a meeting between BING and officials of United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (United Klans), the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., were merged into United Klans and BING was given the position of Imperial Klokard of United Klans held at Birmingham, Alabama, 9/5-6/64. At this meeting, BING was opposed for election as Imperial Klokard by [redacted] and J. D. JOHNWON, a Georgia State Klan Officer.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 3010-106-03
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GC RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main)

DATE: 9/16/64

FROM : SAC, ATLANTA (157-826) (P)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN)

ReBulet 9/2/64.

In 1960, a comparatively small group of Klansmen pulled out of U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., and formed a new Klan group called Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.

The Imperial Wizard of this new group was ROBERT L. BING of Jonesboro, Georgia. In the Summer of 1961, following a meeting between BING and officials of United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (United Klans), the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., were merged into United Klans and BING was given the position of Imperial Klokard of United Klans held at Birmingham, Alabama, 9/5-6/64. At this meeting, BING was opposed for election as Imperial Klokard by [redacted] and J. D. JOHNWON, a Georgia State Klan Officer.

OPTI(FORM NO. 10
MAY , EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-108-03

UNITED STATES G(:RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main)

DATE: 9/16/64

FROM : SAC, ATLANTA (157-826) (P)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN)

Symbol
Number

ReBulet 9/2/64.

In 1960, a comparatively small group of Klansmen pulled out of U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., and formed a new Klan group called Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.

The Imperial Wizard of this new group was ROBERT L. BING of Jonesboro, Georgia. In the Summer of 1961, following a meeting between BING and officials of United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (United Klans), the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., were merged into United Klans and BING was given the position of Imperial Klokard of United Klans held at Birmingham, Alabama, 9/5-6/64. At this meeting, BING was opposed for election as Imperial Klokard by AT 1705-R and J. D. JOHNWON, a Georgia State Klan Officer.

CALVIN CRAIG, Grand Dragon for Georgia of United Klans, through his support and influence to AT 1705-R, AT 1705-R was elected Imperial Klokard.

AT 1652-R, AT 1705-R, AT 1700-R, AT 1720-R, and AT 1761-R have all reported that BING is extremely bitter, particularly at CRAIG, over his defeat.

Recently, BING made a trip to Macon, Georgia, and contacted ROBERT LEE DAVIDSON, JR. He asked DAVIDSON to join with him in an effort to get CRAIG removed as Grand Dragon for Georgia. DAVIDSON did not commit himself but told BING he would think it over and notify him when he had reached a decision.

ROBERT LEE DAVIDSON, JR., is a racial informant of the Atlanta Office. He was formerly Imperial Wizard of first U. S. Klans, Nights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., and later of United K~~lans~~. He is presently not a member of any Klan group; however, he has considerable influence and contacts among many of the members of United Klans.

This situation appears to offer an opportunity to capitalize upon the personal conflict of two Klan leaders. We propose the following action:

Instruct Racial Informant ROBERT LEE DAVIDSON, JR., to agree to help BING oust CRAIG as Grand Dragon for Georgia and instruct DAVIDSON to actively work with BING to achieve CRAIG's ouster.

BING has considerable following, particularly in the rural area south of Atlanta. DAVIDSON has contacts in the Klan throughout Georgia. We believe that with DAVIDSON's assistance, BING could disrupt much of the United Klans' organization in Georgia.

The Bureau is requested to authorize the above action.

INformant
Name

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/23/64

FROM : SAC, JACKSONVILLE

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(TWO-WAY RADIO UNITS)

ReBulet 9/15/64.

The Jacksonville Office has carefully noted the obvious intent of reBulet and agrees that there is a real strong possibility for taking some counter-intelligence action against the Klan through this medium.

[redacted] was re-contacted and he stated at the present time there is no additional information concerning the use of two-way radios nor has the local Klan in Jacksonville formulated any code. This would indicate that at the present time, while a number of local Klansmen have radios, there is no opportunity to introduce deceptive transmissions as the Klan has no "missions" on the planning board. The above informant has reported that it is anticipated additional Klansmen will purchase more two-way radio equipment which would be indicative of an expansion in plans of the Klan to use this method of communication. To date there has been no operation of the Klan where two-way radio communications have played an integral part.

This office through its informants, particularly [redacted] will remain alert and will promptly advise the Bureau whenever information is received indicating the Klan has a sizeable "mission" in the planning stages wherein radios will play an important part. Depending upon the purpose of the "mission" plans could be formulated for some deceptive attacks on the Klan itself.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/12/64

FROM : SAC, MOBILE

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.

Analysis of Potential CI Action Against Organizations and Personnel of United Klans of America, Inc., KKKK (UKA); Improved Order of the U.S. Klans, KKKK, Inc. (IOUSK); and the Alabama States Rights Party (ASRP)

Files on captioned organizations have been reviewed at the Mobile Office to discover any information of the kind which would prevent a potential for effective CI action. This review of files includes the files of the organizations themselves and of individuals known to be officers and members of the organization. It is the understanding of this office that this information would consist of situations involving potential friction between individual members or between rival organizations; or would consist of information reflecting immorality, particularly sexual immorality, on the part of one or more members, possibly involving the wife or wives of other members; or consisting generally of information of a highly unfavorable or embarrassing nature pertaining to a member or group of members which would be not known, and the exposure of which could produce suitable conflicts. A minimum of such information is contained in Mobile files pertaining to Klan and States Rights Party personnel. There have been conflicts between individuals within groups and between members of different groups, but those conflicts have already matured and have already produced the division and animosity of which the situations were capable. Unlike personnel of Communist organizations, Personnel of Klan organizations are not particularly prone to marital immorality, and no information has been received indicating promiscuity on the part of a Klansman's wife or on the part of a Klansman, although informants who furnish information pertaining to these individuals are fairly well acquainted with many of them. Approximately two years ago, one Klansman did become jealous when a single Klan member (unmarried) flirted with his wife at a social function. However, the married member is no longer active, and there is not known to have been any further development of that situation.

Pertinent to this analysis is the following observation: Within the past 70 days, Montgomery, Ala., where activity of UKA and ASRP are centralized, has experienced desegregation of restaurants, hotels, motels, and public schools, pursuant to the 1964 Civil Rights Act and pursuant to orders of the United States District Court at Montgomery. Initially, particularly on 7/4 and 7/6/64, following the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, there was an attempt by Klansmen to gather and conspire for the purpose of interfering with the desegregation of movie theaters and restaurants in downtown Montgomery. However, Mobile informants furnished information well in advance of the actual proposed action, enabling Mobile to notify the Montgomery Police Department. The Police Department acted very promptly and effectively, disbursing Klansmen who had gathered in the danger area, and making it quite clear that no unlawful activity or interference with the enforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act would be tolerated. Both the fact that the information was leaked to authorities and the fact that the authorities took effective action were highly demoralizing to the Klan personnel (who are also the only significant personnel of the ASRP). The demoralization was so complete that when Montgomery public schools were desegregated, Klansmen did not even appear in the vicinities of the schools and took no action of any kind, either at the schools or in any other place, in any effort to interfere with the desegregation.

It is therefore fully evident that the purposes sought by the CI program, that is the demoralization and the rendering ineffective of such organizations, was accomplished by direct investigation and Police action. No implication is intended that the work of the Mobile Office has been finally done pertaining to these organizations, and, in fact, the current program of the Mobile Office is to intensify and make more extensive the informant coverage of pertinent organizations. These informants will be particularly alert for personal information of the kind which might be suitable for the institution of CI action in the future, and such information will be diligently sought by Agents conducting investigation concerning these organizations and individuals. Mobile will also continue to be alert for any opportunity to utilize the system which has been effective in the past, that of cooperating with local law enforcement to take the kind of action which discourages unlawful action on the part of the Klan groups.

Recommendation

The Mobile Office has no recommendation for any logical immediate CI action at this time.

Action Groups :

Mobile racial informants have furnished the identities of most individuals within the UKA and ASRP who are considered the most likely to commit acts of violence or intimidation. Most of these persons have been under investigation for some time, and in many instances Summary Reports have been furnished to the Bureau pertaining to them. In each of the instances of bombings in the vicinity of Montgomery, Ala., including the bombings in Mississippi in recent weeks, Agents have interviewed neighbors and employers of these individuals and have made visual checks, particularly late at night, in efforts to ascertain whether or not the persons themselves were home or whether or not their automobiles were parked at their residences. In many cases, and probably in most cases, these Klan personnel become aware of these inquiries and on several situations it is known that they observed Agents checking their cars and observing their residences at night. These persons are therefore under the impression that Bureau Agents have them under virtually constant surveillance. They remarked to each other in the presence of informants on occasion that they feel that their telephones are tapped and they have also expressed the fear that their meeting places are subjected to microphone devices. It is believed that this fear on their part constitutes a very effective deterrent, and may very well be a principal reason for their failure to take any unlawfull measures in connection with the racial division in this area within recent weeks. Through informants and through observations of license tags of automobiles parked at meeting places, Mobile Office is constantly learning of the identities of new persons who have some potential for violence. In all such cases, a case file is opened on that individual, his identity being established and his background being obtained. No particular effort is made to keep these investigations so discreet that the Klansman will not learn that the FBI is inquiring about him. This practice is deemed to be effective with respect to these individuals.

As set forth hereinbefore, Mobile will intensify its efforts to discover information which can be used in the CI program.

Pertaining to the possibility of exposure of Klan and Klan-type activities through reliable news media, it should be observed that it is the firm policy of news media in the Montgomery, Ala., area to completely ignore these Klan groups, and to give them no publicity at all. Within recent months, UKA has held several public rallies, advertising some with leaflet distribution and even one instance of a paid spot radio advertisement. They have invited the press to attend these rallies, hoping to secure publicity from them. Again, it is believed that the policy of the press to ignore these groups has had the most desirable effect, both in frustrating them in their search for publicity, and in avoiding advertising them which, if done, might rally more persons to the Klan cause and result in their increasing their membership. Because of these considerations, it is believed that at least in this area, the current press policy of ignoring the Klan is more effective than would be a policy of exposure of the evils of the organizations.

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/12/64

FROM : SAC, CHARLOTTE

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet 9/2/64 to Atlanta and other offices. It is noted this letter lists as one of the target organizations, as No. 7 on page 2, the Independent Klavern, Fountain Inn, S. C. Since this organization is no longer active or in existence, it is suggested it be deleted from this list.

Since the major organization in Charlotte Division is the United Klans of America, Inc., of which Birmingham is origin, a copy of this letter is being designated to Birmingham for information.

The following represents the consensus of Charlotte Agents familiar with Klan activity:

1. Disruptive activity should not be undertaken at a particular Klavern, as a general rule, unless there is sufficient well established informant coverage to be able to tell the effect of the action when instituted. Such action would probably serve to "tighten up" the organization and make it more difficult to get an informant in thereafter.

2. It is considered doubtful that newspaper publicity, of only a generally unfavorable nature against the Klan organization, is effective in reducing new applicants or causing any large number of present members to drop out. The "Charlotte Observer," which has wide distribution throughout North and South Carolina, published in August and September, 1964, a series of articles, copies of which were sent the Bureau by Charlotte letter of 9/15/64. These articles ridiculed the United Klans

of America, Inc., in North Carolina, and published both photos and names of a number of members. So far as has been learned from informants, this had very little adverse effect upon the organization. It was alleged that two to five members were discharged from their jobs, or warned about continuing membership, but the identities of these alleged persons is not known. ~~North Carolina~~ Grand ~~Dragon JAMES R. JONES~~ has stated, both publicly and privately to informants, that this publicity was very valuable to the growth of the organization. One informant reported that the day after the articles published his name as a local leader, three persons contacted him and applied for membership, stating they had not previously known whom to contact.

It is considered that publicity of this type generally deters from joining only those persons who would not be interested in joining in the first place. It is believed that a large proportion of those persons who are potential members are seeking status and recognition, and publicity is no deterrent to them; it makes them feel important and members of an important group.

The major apparent effect of the series of newspaper articles referred to has been a tightening up of security, and refusal of leaders to allow newspaper photos of individual Klansmen to be taken at public rallies.

3. Disruptive activity, wherever possible, should be of a nature which does not expose the fact that the Bureau, or the "Federal Government", is behind the activity. It is believed that open action, to a large extent, can backfire and create resentment and sympathy. It must be remembered that Klan membership, in many sections, does not by any means carry the odium that alleged Communist membership or sympathy does in almost any section of society.

4. Along this same line, there is probably no point in trying disruptive activity, at least not at this stage, on a local Klan group which is small, inactive, and peaceful. Any such activity which is not completely discreet and concealed would likely have the effect of stirring it up.

5. By letter of 9/26/64, Charlotte furnished the Bureau a sample of a lapel pin which was adopted at the Imperial

Klonvocation of United Klans of America at Birmingham on 9/5-6/64. This is to be sold to members for $2 each and there is apparently considerable demand for it. Since it is not apparent to the unitiated that it has anything to do with "the Klan," it is expected that members will wear it openly as a secret recognition signal. If it does become widely adopted and worn, consideration should then be given to giving widespread publicity to the fact of what it represents. This should have the result of discouraging some persons who do not want their Klan membership publicly known.

6. It is considered that possibly the most effective way of discourgging membership, or causing existing members to withdraw, is to establish that someone in the organization is getting rich off it, or embezzling the proceeds. Charlotte is endeavoring to develop information along these lines, but nothing specific has yet been developed.

✓ 7. The following are suggested tactics that appear useful on a selected basis against individual Klansmen, particularly those whose employers might object to their Klan membership:

a. Anonymous letter or phone call to the employer telling of the Klan membership.

b. Enter on behalf of the member a subscription to the "Fiery Cross," United Klans of America publication, and have it mailed to his employment.

c. When a particular member is away from home at a Klavern meeting, have a female phone his home and indicate he was to meet her and is late. This might have the effect of making it difficult for him to get away from home at night thereafter. This should be limited to particular individuals who are considered potential ones to stir up trouble in a Klavern.

8. ~~ROBERT ECHOLS SCOGGINS~~, Aka., Charlotte ~~file 105-991~~, ~~Bureau file 157-1530~~, is ~~South Carolina Grand Dragon of~~ United Klans of America. Charlotte reports by SA ~~JOHN ALDEN MUNN~~, 1/31/64 and 3/27/64, show that he is receiving over ~~$300~~ per month from the Veterans ~~Administration as a 100 per cent disabled veteran.~~ At the same time he operates a ~~plumbing business~~ and is active in United Klans of America, making public speeches, etc. Charlotte furnished extra copies of those reports to the Bureau, with the suggestion furnishing them to VA be considered.

It is suggested consideration be given to asking the VA to re-evaluate his disability rating, in view of his employment and activities. It is believed this should be done on a SOG level, to reduce the possibility of ~~SCOGGINS~~ learning that such a suggestion came from the FBI.

9. "Action Groups." No particular such groups, given to violence, are known within Klan organizations in Charlotte territory. As the Bureau is aware, United Klans of America has instituted what it calls "Security Guards," who wear military type uniforms and have military ranks. These function at public rallies for the purpose of keeping order, watching for "spies," etc. It is expected that if violence is undertaken, these will probably be the ones to do it, but no such undertakings have been learned.

Specific individual recommendations for counterintelligence action will be submitted by subsequent letters as developed.

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10/13/64

FROM : SAC, Birmingham

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bulet to Atlanta 9/2/64

The Klan-type and hate organizations operating in Birmingham territory and which are potential objects of a counterintelligence program are the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and the National States Rights Party.

Recently Mr. VINCENT TOWNSEND, Vice-President and Assistant Publisher, Birmingham News, and ~~SAC Contact~~, advised SAC EVERETT J. INGRAM that he read a story in the Chicago Daily News concerning Klan activity in Mississippi and felt the story could not have been prepared without FBI cooperation. He was impressed with this and has indicated a strong interest in similar material for the ~~Birmingham~~ News. He promised to protect the Bureau;s interest in any such endeavor. He is a well known civic leader in Birmingham. A review of the files in the Birmingham Office is being made for suitable information in this connection.

Bureau instructed in referenced letter that specific mention be made of "Action Groups" in Klan organizations. At the present time the weekly meetings of Eastview Klavern No. 13, which has been the leading Klavern in United Klans of America, Inc., in this territory, have been poorly attended. The principal members of the "Action Group" in this Klavern are HARRY WALKER, CECIL HENSON, EUGENE REEVES, and RONNIE TIDWELL. Efforts are being made to secure information suitable for disruption purposes in connection with this group.

Investigation is being conducted concerning ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON. The Atlanta Office has been requested to ascertain why E. L. EDWARDS, now deceased, ousted SHELTON from his then position of Grand Dragon of the U. S. Klans. A copy of the article appearing in the "Birmingham News" for April 30, 1960, entitled "SHELTON ousted from Klan Post," has been obtained. The article did not disclose the exact nature of the charges against SHELTON. Records of the Alabama Secretary of State reflect that SHELTON was dropped as the Klan's authorized agent and was replaced by Rev. ALVIN HORN of Talladega, Alabama. E. L. EDWARDS, Imperial Wizard, U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, was quoted as saying "We had to have a grand dragon in Alabama and we didn't have one in ROBERT M. SHELTON." He told reporters that SHELTON was replaced as grand dragon and agent of the "Klan" in Alabama "for conduct unbecoming a Klansman and attempting to use the organization for selfish purposes." The article said EDWARDS did not elaborate on what is considered conduct unbecoming a Klansman.

Informants are being contacted for any information of a derogatory nature concerning SHELTON. Discreet inquiries are being made in Tuscaloosa concerning his financial status. In view of recent information from the Bureau no request is being made for a mail cover on Shelton or the United Klans.

The information on LOEL ROGERS and WILLIAM A. HOLT, JR. will be afforded prompt attention.

As the Bureau is aware, some few months ago several individuals, who had been active officials and/or dedicated members of the National States Rights Party (NSRP), left the NSRP. They are trying to form and make a going party of the American States Rights Party (ASRP) with its headquarters in Birmingham.

Since the group pulled out of the NSRP, both the ASRP and NSRP leaders have been belittling, berating and making extremely derogatory remarks concerning each other. Both groups are using the same mailing list, (the NSRP's list), which the ASRP group obtained before pulling out of the NSRP, and they disseminate their derogatory remarks in the literature they distribute.

The Bureau has also been advised that GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL, American Nazi Party (ANP) leader has recently filed a $550,000.00 libel suit in the U. S. District Court, Birmingham, Alabama, against Dr. EDWARD R. FIELDS, Information Director of the NSRP, and others connected with the NSRP.

Birmingham contemplates furnishing certain items, on a confidential basis to a few trusted, reliable newsmen (established SAC contacts), concerning the NSRP, the ASRP and the ANP for the purpose of possibly causing further disruption of any unified actions or working arrangements between these groups. Such newsmen may be used to contact the leaders of one group to inquire about or confirm something of a derogatory nature reportedly made by some leader of one of the other groups.

Birmingham also contemplates working closely with other law enforcement agencies to see that any activity of such groups are known, covered and where considered desirable, the group will be made cognizant that their activity is known.

Birmingham also is considering having some racial informants drop remarks to or for the benefit of the leaders of the NSRP, etc., that will tend to cause the leaders of one group to retaliate in like manner against the other groups.

If the Bureau has any material on disruptive tactics or results of efforts, which is not already in all field offices, Birmingham would be glad to receive it.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/13/64

FROM : SAC, LITTLE ROCK

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO

ReBulet to Atlanta and Other Offices, 9/2/64.

Set out below are an anglysis and recommendations under captioned program.

NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRP)

The Arkansas branch of NSRP has been inactive in the State of Arkansas for the past year with the exception of placing on the Arkansas ballot candidates for President and Vice President of the United States. It is not recommended that any action be taken against this group at this time.

ASSOCIATION OF ARKANSAS KLANS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (AAK)

The AAK in Arkansas is made up of three klaverns located at Little Rock, Texarkana, and Pine Bluff; and it has no affiliation with any national klan group. There are no "action" groups within any of these three klaverns. The three klaverns do not own or lease any property for meeting places. The four Little Rock members usually meet in the home of a member. The Texarkana Klavern has not held any klavern meetings as such in several months. The Pine Bluff Klavern meetings vary from residences to business places of klavern members.

State meetings are held at irregular intervals on an average of about once per month or less. There is no regular meeting place for the state meetings, which are held in various Arkansas towns including towns in which there are no klaverns. The state meetings are attended

by from one to five members of each of the three klaverns and are well covered by informants. The ~~State Grand Dragon BILL WILLIAMS~~ has continually cautioned members against violence and any type of illegal activities. None of the klaverns have engaged in violence.

1. LITTLE ROCK KLAVERN

Of the four members who attend weekly meetings [redacted] ~~JOE J. FARMER~~, who is considered the head of this small group, draws a pension from the Federal Government and, according to informants, is afraid to engage in any illegal activity or to let his name be used in connection with the klan for fear of losing his pension. The two informants maintain the full confidence of the other two members. In recent months the klavern ran a series of small ads in a Little Rock daily newspaper in an effort to renew interest and gain new members. The klavern received a number of responses, but no action whatsoever has been taken by the klavern to take in any new members. The klavern has no organized activity other than the weekly meetings described by informants as being "bull sessions" with the principal topic being politics.

No recommendation for counterintelligence is being made concerning the Little Rock Klavern.

2. TEXARKANA KLAVERN

This klavern has not held any klavern meetings as such in several months, and it appears that the principal reason for the lack of meetings was the interview of members and leaders concerning the assassination of President KENNEDY. Klavern representatives regularly attend state meetings, one reason being that ~~State Grand Dragon BILL WILLIAMS~~, who officiates at state meetings, is a member of the Texarkana Klavern. Of the five or six members who from time to time attend state meetings, two are informants. On 10/1/64 [redacted] advised that the Grand Dragon had stated that hereafter Texarkana Klavern members will meet with the Bivins - Kildare, Texas, Klavern of the AAK.

~~Grand Dragon~~ WILLIAMS, according to informants, is active in politics in Bowie County, Texas, is a former member of the Board of Regents of Texarkana Junior College, Texarkana, ~~Texas~~, and in recent months has been selected for election to the Board of Regents of that college and defeated as a candidate for the City Council of Texarkana, Texas. He cannot afford to become involved in any illegal activities because of his activities in legitimate enterprises. He has continually cautioned Texarkana Klavern members as well as members of other klaverns attending state meetings against any violence and/or illegal activities.

No recommendation is being made for counterintelligence against the Texarkana Klavern except as it is effected by a recommendation set out hereafter under the Pine Bluff Klavern.

3. PINE BLUFF KLAVERN

The Pine Bluff Klavern has a membership of approximately twenty to twenty-five. It meets once a week in different business locations of its members, and average weekly attendance is twelve. Among the twelve, one or two informants meet with them and furnish full coverage of their activities.

The klavern's main activity has been to discourage integration by legal means and to get members elected to school board positions. The klavern collected the funds and donated the money for the campaign expense of two of its members who ran for a position on the Pine Bluff School Board and the Dollarway School Board. These two members made a miserable showing and were defeated.

The klavern was behind and organized the National Patriots League (NPL) to further its non-integration program publicly. The Exalted Cyclops, or president, of the Klavern is chairman of the NPL. The NPL actually is a front organization for the klavern. The main activity of the NPL was to organize a private country club, which is known as the Butram Country Club. The purpose of the

club was to build a swimming pool for white only. The construction of the pool itself was completed but not sufficiently to place it in use this season. Membership in Butram Country Club is $25. The majority of the members are not aware of the fact that the klavern was behind its organization. Membership in the Butram Country Club was easily obtained as the public pool for whites and public pool for Negroes were both closed during the summer of 1964 when Negroes attempted to integrate the white pool. This left no public pool open in Pine Bluff. ~~L. E. BUTRAM~~, vice president of the klavern, donated the land for the Butram Country Club; as he owns land surrounding the club, he will benefit financially from the sale of this land for building lots. The NPL has also distributed a limited number of leaflets publicly discouraging people from patronizing certain restaurants and businesses which had hired or served Negroes.

Members of the klavern were responsible for forming a John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff, and a klavern member is leader of this chapter. Approximately eight to ten people attend the monthly meetings of the John Birch Society Chapter; and of the men who attend, all are klavern members with the exception of one man. Members of the klavern completely control and dominate the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff. They, however, only conduct John Birch Society business. Likewise, the members of the klavern further the John Birch Society program through the klavern.

Members of the klavern are working individually in politics for the re-election of Governor ORVAL E. FAUBUS and for the election of BARRY GOLDWATER.

The klavern has not advocated any violence but on occasion has cautioned its members against violence. As an example, klavern members were cautioned to stay away from Ray's Truck Stop, a location which Negroes were attempting to integrate, in the spring of 1964 so that no violence would occur.

Members of the klavern recently distributed a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leaflet seeking new members and

stating requests for applications be directed to P. O. Box 1182, Pine Bluff. In this leaflet it was pointed out that the KKK was striving for a lawful settlement of the difficulties brought on by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAAC) and that it is opposed to violence. This leaflet further set forth that this was a chartered, legalized movement and it is no more illegal to be a member of it than to be a member of other organizations.

At various times in the past the klavern has attempted to organize "action" groups within the klavern, but on each occasion the project has died from lack of interest.

In line with Bureau policy of dissemination of information, the main activities regarding the Pine Bluff Klavern have been disseminated confidentially to Chief of Police NORMAN D. YOUNG, Pine Bluff, (NA) on a regular basis. Chief YOUNG has exerted every effort to keep down the possibility of violence. Through his confidential sources he is also well aware of the identities of the klavern members and their activities. He personally has warned particular klavern members against any violence and has stated they will be met with immediate arrest if any violence occurs. As an example, ~~Chief YOUNG~~ was advised through his own confidential source of the time and location of the klavern meeting on the night of October 5, 1964. ~~Chief YOUNG~~ sent a lieutenant of his department in uniform to check the location, record license numbers, and to be seen checking the meeting so that the klavern members would know that he was checking on them. This has had a strong influence on making the klavern follow a line of legal activity. It has also resulted in the more responsible leading citizens of the community being made aware of certain klavern members, causing these klavern members to be discredited in the eyes of the public. This was borne out in the recent school board election on 9/29/64 when two klavern members, one of whom is J. E. BUTRAM, were miserably defeated.

The klavern has during the past few months urged its members to solicit and obtain new members. The ineffectiveness of their program is shown by the

fact that only one new member was initiated, and this member is a non-organizational informant of the Little Rock Division. Likewise, as a result of the KKK leaflets distributed encouraging people to write for applications they have received only two letters; and neither of the writers have become a member. The leaflet has met with complete failure in its effort to build up its membership.

At this time the following are the only specific counterintelligence action being recommended:

1. An anonymous letter be mailed to the National Office of John Birch Society, Belmont, Massachusetts, pointing out that the KKK is in full control of the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff. In this letter specifically mention the name of one or two of the more leading klan members who are also leading the John Birch Society in Pine Bluff.

2. An anonymous letter be mailed to ~~CHARLES D.~~ CUTHBERTSON, ~~Exalted Cyclops~~ of the Pine Bluff Klavern, and a copy mailed to BILL WILLIAMS, State Grand Dragon, with the letters to be mailed to the Post Office Box in Pine Bluff and in Texarkana, Arkansas, of the AAK. The letter should be a complaining letter from a member who was active in the past and who recently found one of the KKK leaflets in his automobile which leaflet encouraged membership. The letter would let them know why he has not rejoined; it would point out that he dropped out because of such leadership as J. E. BUTRAM, who has used the klan for personal gain as BUTRAM had a residence on his property remodeled at klavern expense and then made the klavern stop holding meetings there; that BUTRAM has now donated land for the Butram Country Club so that he can sell his surrounding land for building lots at an exorbitant price. The letter should also set forth the fact he heard BUTRAM was discharged from the Army for mental deficiency (moron). This letter should be mailed from Little Rock.

Interviews of klan members and leaders in the past (for example, at the time of the assassination of President KENNEDY and on particular bombing matter cases)

have had deterring effect on the klan. For example, the Texarkana Klavern has not held a klavern meeting as such since that time. One Little Rock member has dropped out as a result of being interviewed; and, according to an informant, this member is a "changed man," meaning that he is not as radical as previously. In interviews with members of the Pine Bluff Klavern, agents have not met with any hostility and have been treated cordially and with respect. Individual members during these interviews have indicated they are opposed to violence and advocate proceeding in a legal manner. A number of the members have said that through political pressure and voting are the only ways any change can be made. However, they have stated they are still avid segregationists and do not condone race mixing in any manner.

When and if it appears that interest may be renewing in the AAK in Arkansas, consideration will be given to another interview program. It is noted that particular klan members are interviewed on a spasmodic basis in regard to leads from surrounding field offices on bombing matter cases, and this has had a tendency to deter any violent activity on the part of klavern members.

62-116395-551 | enc. 2 30 | EWL:lhb 8/8/75

The Attorney General U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTE
ON INTELL ACTVTS (SSC)

Re 7/28/75 superseding req for FBI materials rec'd that date from SSC. Enclsd is memo for forwarding to Committee which responds to req identified as Roman numerals set frth below. As indicated in memo, V. G. is being delivered by separate communicatn 8/8/75. Also enclsd for ur records is cc of memo prepared for Committee.

Attached hereto is the response to Item #1 in the Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter to Mr. K. William O'Connor, Esq. on July 14, 1975. Item #1 is set forth as follows:

"All memoranda and any other materials prepared in or by the General Investigative Division, the Domestic Intelligence Division, and the Inspection Division, which relate to, are referred to, or alluded to in, or portions of which are summarized or described in, the July 30, 1964, memorandum captioned 'Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups'' from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson. (See attachment to your letter of June 17, 1975.)"

July 24, 1964

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Thank you very much for your letter of July 17, 1964. I have been giving this racial problem constant thought. Parenthetically, I did what I could yesterday in New York to get that office moving faster and more effectively in this matter.

You asked for suggestions and this is what I now offer you for whatever little value it has.

(1) After writing you I recommended to the Inspection Division that a study be made relative to whether or not the Domestic Intelligence Division can better handle certain aspects of the Civil Rights-Racial problem. Mr. Gale is very much in favor of this inquiry and is moving promptly in this matter. I think the results of his inquiry will be most helpful in evaluating the situation.

(2) What I have in mind basically is this: You may want to, in light of his inquiry, consider transferring the responsibility for the development of informants in the Klu Klux Klan White Citizens Council and related "hate" organizations to the Division while leaving the responsibility for investigating bombings, killings, and so forth where it now is. My idea is: This Division can bring to bear all the techniques, skills, and procedures which it has used to successfully penetrate the Communist Party and espionage organizations to now penetrate these hate organizations causing us so much trouble. (In talking to Mr. Tolson this morning I mentioned this briefly to him.)

(3) If my idea is operationally sound, and if this is done, I would immediately hold some regional conferences in areas where the racial issue is acute and get under way in these offices, special and aggressive programs to carry out this high level quality informant development. You are completely

8 AUG [illegible]

REC

right when you say that informant development of the right kind is essentially the solution to our current problem. The number of informants per se as we both know, are of no significance. What we must have is the right kind of informants on the right level. The old saying "The proof of the pudding is in the eating" is relevant here because if we had this kind of informant penetration, we wouldn't have some of these unsolved cases now causing us so much concern. This is simply a hard, stubborn fact we cannot theorize away.

(4) Further, we should expand our informant penetration to cover some of these legitimate but extremist organizations which we have up to now ignored in this respect. They often are "supporting" forces for such as the K.K.K. etc. and we ought to be on the inside of them.

This then is my response to your letter for now. As I have said, the Inspection Division is making the inquiry to ascertain the operational facts and the feasibility of what I suggest.

Cordially,

Bill Sullivan
William C. Sullivan

Expedite
H

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: July 27, 1964

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: RACIAL MATTERS

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan

Certainly, the items mentioned by Mr. Sullivan*are such as to be handled by the Bureau on an intelligence basis. The racial field is a most fertile field for Communist Party and other subversive groups. There are indications of this such as in the cases of Martin Luther King and Michael Schwerner, one of the missing civil rights workers from Philadelphia, Mississippi, and other situations. Also there are reports of foreign funds being used to support the current actions of Malcolm X. The racial strife and disorder are of such major significance as to have international aspects and this is tailor-made for the disruptive tactics of subversive elements both right and left.

We cannot afford to divorce the national racial program from its possible international aspects. The devices and tactics presently in use in the security field should be utilized to the fullest in developing intelligence information regarding national as well as international developments in the racial strife. The tense racial potential in major cities is a fertile field for subversive activities both right and left.

We have seen from the killings in the South, for example, the killing of Medgar Evers, that such appear to be isolated incidents usually carried out by one man or a small unattached group occurring on the spur-of-the-moment, such as the killing of the Lieutenant Colonel near Colbert, Georgia, and the assaulting of a minister in the streets in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.

REC-9 -284

The investigation of the Klan and hate groups as well as the development of informants in such organizations must, out of necessity, be handled as a whole. The following of the informants cannot be isolated from the over-all investigation of the organizations just as the informants in the Communist Party cannot be isolated from the organizations they are connected with.

AUG 31 1964

CLM/nkr
(7)

*in letter to the Director dated 7/24/64

70 SEP 2 1964

Of course, any specific offenses such as, for example, the case of the three missing civil rights workers in Philadelphia, Mississippi, or cases involving brutality, bombings or any other violations these individual investigations should be handled by the appropriate substantive desks such as the Civil Rights Desk.

The over-all racial field is specifically an intelligence operation for the Bureau. It can best be organized when all facets are followed and directed by one Division. The communist potential for activities in this field would seem to be a major factor as evidenced by the doings of Martin Luther King and his associates. The Bureau can best keep abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united in one Division utilizing the tactics which Mr. Sullivan has suggested as being effective.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
~~Rosen~~
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: August 4, 1964

FROM : J. H. GALE

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL TRANSFERS TO EFFECT PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RACIAL INFORMANTS

By memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson 7/30/64 it was recommended, and now approved by the Director, that supervisory responsibility over Racial Matters and Racial Informants be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division. In accordance with this approval, proposed realignment and distribution of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division are being submitted.

Inasmuch as approximately 75% of the work of this Unit is now represented in the categories being transferred to Division 5, appropriate personnel transfers consistent therewith should be made:

Category	Caseload, June, 1964	Percent
Racial Matters	870	51.5%
Racial Informants	481	28.5
Bombing Matters	183	10.8
Federal Train Wreck Statute	80	4.7
Destruction of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles	74	4.5
Total	1,688	100.0%

REC-143

147000-2946X
38 — 38

The current supervisory responsibility among the seven Agent Supervisors in this Unit, including Supervisor in Charge Joseph C. Trainor, is as follows:

SA J. C. Trainor supervises classifications (other than racial informants and organizations) for Atlantic Seaboard offices north of Virginia.

18 SEP 24 1964

SA J. G. Deegan has responsibility for racial informants for all field divisions and supervises other classifications for the Virginia and Florida offices.

REMOVED BY SHD
3 Xerox 8-19-65 dpm

1 - Mr. Callahan
Mr. Rosen

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Belmont

SENT DIRECTOR
8-5-64

jmj (7)

18

SEE NEXT PAGE

67
PERS. REC. UNIT

37

SA F. H. Freund has responsibility for Klan organizations for all field divisions and supervises other classifications for 11 western and midwestern offices.

SA L. A. Giovanetti has alternate responsibility for Klan organizations for all field divisions and supervises other classifications for Atlanta, Little Rock, Savannah and 4 other midwestern offices.

SA C. A. Parkis has responsibility for other hate organizations (8 currently active) for all field divisions and supervises other classifications for Birmingham, Mobile, Cleveland and the 4 Texas offices.

SA F. P. Smith supervises classifications (other than racial informants and organizations) for New Orleans, Memphis, Knoxville and 7 western offices, and special cases.

SA H. E. Trent supervises classifications (other than racial informants and organizations) for Charlotte, Savannah, Baltimore, Washington Field office, Louisville and 2 midwestern offices.

Based on the distribution of work, Inspector's analysis reflects that it would take 5 of the 7 men assigned to the Organizations Unit to handle racial matters and racial informants under the approved change of responsibilities. There are 7 clerical employees assigned to the Organizations Unit of the Civil Rights Section and it is felt that 5 of these clerical employees who generally handle the work being transferred from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division be transferred along with the supervisors. Assistant Directors Rosen and Sullivan are in accord that the proposed personnel changes are equitable, consistent and correspond with the transfer of responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Supervisor in Charge Joseph C. Trainor and Agent Supervisors Deegan, Freund, Giovanetti and Parkis be transferred to Division 5 (Domestic Intelligence Division) concomitant to the transfer to that Division of supervisory responsibility over racial matters and racial informants (if approved to be handled by Mr. Mohr's Office).

Transfer letters on agents prep
8/11/64
ypc

wts prep
9-18-64
pjh

SEE NEXT PAGE

Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Personnel Transfers to Effect Proposed
Reassignment of Supervisory Responsibilities
in Racial Matters and Racial Informants

2. That the remaining Agent Supervisors, Smith and Trent, be retained in the Civil Rights Section to supervise bombing matters, Destruction of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles, Federal Train Wreck Statute, and special cases.

3. That the following clerical employees be transferred (presently assigned to the Organizations Unit) to the Domestic Intelligence Division (if approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division):

B.A.U. to handle
PAR

Mary A. Cammann - stenographer
Kathryn T. Chernitsky - stenographer
Sue E. Waller - stenographer
Carol Ann Hancock - clerk
Wilbur Lane Perkins - clerk

Employees transferred PAU 9-17-64

OK. "Reassigned"! Mr. Rosen's office should advise Mr. Sullivan's office and Personnel actions unit, administrative Div. - date employees are to be released for reassignment. (Discussed with Malley 8/11/64)

Rev. 8/11/64.

ADDENDUM: (WCS:jdd, 8-5-64)

The personnel changes as recommended are acceptable to this Division at this time. Contingent upon our thorough analysis of this situation and upon developments which will take place in the coming months, the personnel requirements may be either reduced or increased depending upon the volume of work and related ramifications.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont DATE: August 17, 1964

FROM : W. C. Sullivan
A. Rosen

1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen

SUBJECT: AGREEMENT REACHED IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES INVOLVING THE KU KLUX KLAN, OTHER HATE GROUPS, AND RACIAL MATTERS

Reference is made to the memoranda of Mr. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, and August 4, 1964.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the responsibilities of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the General Investigative Division following the reassignment of supervisory responsibilities involving the Ku Klux Klan, other hate groups, and racial matters. To clarify this matter, it is set forth in two parts. Part I will set forth the responsibilities of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Part II will define the responsibilities of the General Investigative Division.

REC-113

8 AUG 27 [illegible]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

PART I

I. The Domestic Intelligence Division will be responsible for the investigation of all Klan and hate-type organizations and their members on a selective basis.

Several inquiries are presently pending in the field regarding additional organizations to determine whether such organizations are, in fact, hate groups.

II. The Domestic Intelligence Division will assume the responsibility for the development of quality informants in all such organizations.

REC- 18 66-1855-5-1982

WCS&AR:hw

1 XEROX) 5 (
SEP 2 1964

67 SEP 17 1964

CONTINUED - OVER

9-9-2
1964

INT. SEC.

1-XEROX 808 R.B

III. The Domestic Intelligence Division will assume the responsibility for formulating and carrying out disruptive counterintelligence programs against such organizations.

IV. The Domestic Intelligence Division, in addition, is willing to go beyond the recommendations approved by the Director related to the above and will, with Bureau approval, develop highly placed, quality informants in certain legitimate organizations whose activities generally relate to racial matters, such as

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)

Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)

Student Nonviolence Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) - headed by Martin Luther King

White Citizens Council

(Each one, of course, will be handled on a carefully selected basis and the action approved individually by the Bureau.)

V. Similarly, the Domestic Intelligence Division is willing to go beyond what was originally approved and will, with Bureau authorization, proceed to establish informants and sources in Negro communities throughout the Nation for the purpose of developing intelligence information relating to the degree of racial tension; the possibility of violence erupting in the form of riots, etc.; and will disseminate this material to all interested persons inside and outside the Bureau.

The organizations and objectives as set forth in paragraphs IV and V above are being made the subject of a separate memorandum inasmuch as this involves a matter of policy and will have to be acted on separately subject to approval by the Director.

CONTINUED - OVER

VI. The Domestic Intelligence Division will follow and disseminate information concerning demonstrations, picketing activities, racial disturbances, riots and incidents relating to matters of a racial nature. Any violations of a local nature which occur during the above and are not Federal violations should be disseminated by the Domestic Intelligence Division.

(However, if during the course of any of theabove situations, a Federal violation is indicated, this should be immediately referred to the General Investigative Division. It will be the responsibility of the General Investigative Division to conduct any necessary investigation of the specific Federal violation which occurs. It will also have the responsibility of disseminating such information to persons entitled to receive same. Where special cases arise which are not Federal violations and an investigation is requested by the White House or Attorney General, determination will be made at that time based upon the pertinent factors involved as to which Division has the responsibility.)

PART II

I. The General Investigative Division will have the responsibility for the Bureau's supervision relative to the enforcement of all Civil Rights legislation. It will also have the responsibility for the supervision, accumulation of information, and dissemination of material relating to civil actions being undertaken to enforce compliance with the various elements of the Civil Rights laws.

II. The General Investigative Division will have the responsibility for investigating bombings, police brutality and all other Federal violations now assigned to the General Investigative Division.

III. The daily racial matters memorandum disseminated to the White House, the Attorney General, etc., which is coordinated by a representative of Mr. DeLoach's Office, will be prepared in Headquarters building. This requires the use of a stenographer who reports on duty at midnight each night in order to complete the memorandum by 8:00 a.m., in the morning. This duty should be alternated, a week at a time, between Division 5 and Division 6.

R W.C.S.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: 8/18/64

FROM : A. ROSEN

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL TRANSFERS TO EFFECT PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RACIAL INFORMANTS

Pursuant to Mr. Gale's memorandum of 8/4/64, to Mr. Tolson, in the above-captioned matter, the personnel on the attached list will be transferred from the Civil Rights Section, General Investigative Division, effective 9 a.m., 8/19/64, to the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Enclosure

R

AR:WW
(12)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Callahan - Att: Movement
1 - Mr. Callahan - Att: Voucher Statistical Section, Rm. 6221 IB
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. Sullivan

att

3 Xerox 8-19-65 djm

1 Xerox copy
[illegible]
9-21-64. mh

REC-143

67-149000-2960
38 Not Recorded 38

REMOVED BY SRD
139

XEROX
OCT 8 1964

NAME	TITLE	GRADE	SALARY
Joseph G. Deegan	Special Agent	GS-13	$~~13,265~~13,755
Frederick H. Freund, Jr.	Special Agent (A)	GS-14	~~15,415~~ 16,130
Louis A. Giovanetti	Special Agent	GS-14	~~14,515~~ 15,150
Charles A. Parkis, Jr.	Special Agent (A)	GS-14	~~14,515~~ 15,150
Joseph C. Trainor.	Special Agent	GS-14	~~15,415~~ 16,130
Mary A. Cammann	Clerk-Stenographer	GS-5	~~4690~~ 5000
Kathryn T. Chernitsky	Clerk-Stenographer	GS-~~4~~5	~~4215~~~~4480~~ 5000
Sue E. Waller	Clerk-Stenographer	GS-5	~~4690~~ 5000
Carol Ann Hancock	Clerk	GS-4	~~4775~~5080
Wilbur Lane Perkins	Clerk	GS-4	~~4915~~ 5230

Excised Copy

April 29, 1966

THE ROLE OF THE FBI IN CLANDESTINE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

CIA

10190-10113

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1

B. INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY 2

C. THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 8

- 1. Prior to World War II 8
- 2. During World War II (1941 - 1945) 8
- 3. National Intelligence Authority (NIA) 15
- 4. Responsibilities of CIA 20
  - a. The National Security Act of 1947 20
  - b. National Security Council Intelligence Directive 22
  - c. Director of Central Intelligence Directives 26
  - d. Dulles Committee, 1949 29
  - e. Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955 33
  - f. The Doolittle Committee, 1954 39
  - g. The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government 41
- 5. Responsibilities of the FBI 44
  - a. Laws and Directives 44
  - b. Requests From Other Agencies 45
  - c. FBI's Role in the United States Intelligence Board 46
  - d. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) 48
  - e. The Director's Stand Over the Years 50

D. THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U. S. 55

E. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES 59

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

F. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI.................. 64

  1. Manpower Being Devoted..................... 64
  2. Number of Microphone and Telephone Surveillances With Evaluation of Product... 65
  3. Live Sources With Evaluation............... 66
  4. Anagram Program............................ 67
  5. Double Agents and Informants............... 67
  6. Additional Potential....................... 68

G. AREAS OF CONFLICT, FBI - CIA.................. 69

H. CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA......... 74

I. EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES....................... 77

  1. Overt Collection Activities................ 77
  2. Clandestine Gathering Activities........... 79

J. GENERAL FINDINGS.............................. 82

K. RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION.................... 86

  Authorization.................................. 86
  Selection of Targets........................... 87
  Technical Surveillance of Targets.............. 90
  Technical Surveillance Controls................ 91
  Anagram Program................................ 91
  Live Sources................................... 91
  Training of Personnel.......................... 93
  Reporting Procedures........................... 94
  Language Capabilities.......................... 94
  Relations With Other Agencies.................. 95
  Administrative Reorganization.................. 97

L. ALTERNATIVES.................................. 99

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this study is to define a new role for the Bureau in the field of clandestine collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. This action is necessary and most timely because of our Government's vital need for increased foreign intelligence and because of CIA's expanding interests in the United States. There is a decided need for a new Bureau concept, the implementation of which could greatly increase our effectiveness and could deter CIA from becoming a threat to our operational interests.

The study encompasses a review of history as it relates to foreign intelligence collection in the U. S. Analysis is made of the need and the potential for such intelligence; the capabilities of the Bureau and CIA in this field; and the responsibilities of over-all (overt and covert) collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. We have submitted our general findings, and we recommend a plan of action for a new Bureau role.

This study was not designed to eliminate once and for all the many problems relating to collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. It would have been a Utopian objective to recommend a plan which would produce maximum intelligence collection, remove existing defects within the U. S. intelligence community, and establish complete harmony among interested agencies. We did not go that far. Careful and exhaustive analysis dictated that we endeavor to reach a reasonable goal consistent with prudent planning and sound operational implementation. We feel that the recommended plan meets such guidelines, that it is a decidedly major step forward for the Bureau, and it strongly conforms with the national security needs.

It should be noted that this document does not deal with our law enforcement or internal security functions, although it is fully recognized that internal security and clandestine collection of foreign intelligence are closely linked. Any plan on our part to produce foreign intelligence will affect our capabilities in the field of counterintelligence.

B. INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY

People who do not speak and understand a common language have difficulty in communicating their ideas. Even in a country such as ours where English is the common language, words take on different meanings in different geographical locales and in different social, political, and economic environments. Likewise, in professional fields, varying backgrounds and experiences have conveyed different meanings to terms in the professional vocabulary.

In the field of security, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations, certain professional terminology has developed ostensibly to assist in the exchange of ideas by persons in this field. However, as progress is made in a field or a special segment of the field, new horizons develop which require additional terminology or cause an evolution in existing terminology. This development or evolution in security and intelligence terminology, coupled with individualistic usage, brings further problems in meaning which we also face in the broader aspects of the English language. We have all noted that our dictionaries do not always provide a single meaning and we must be careful in daily conversation that we are not misunderstood when merely using a conversational vocabulary. We face a similar problem in the use of professional terminology in security and intelligence matters as this terminology takes on new meaning with additional experience and takes on varying meanings to different persons.

An additional factor to consider in understanding the meaning of terminology is the context in which a term is used. For example, the term "intelligence" may be vague and confusing without the knowledge of the context in which it is used. It can, as a generic term, pertain to the whole field of activities undertaken by a government in the collection of information, the protection of its institutions, and the conduct of nonattributable activities to facilitate the formation and implementation of government policy. Also, it can relate to the organization devoted to the collection and production of information necessary to the government. In addition, it may pertain to the whole body of theory and practice on the basis of which an intelligence organization operates. Finally, the word "intelligence" may be utilized to mean any part or all of the above.

The following definitions do not include all possible meanings that have been utilized but, instead, are designed to assist the reader in digesting this study.

BASIC INTELLIGENCE is that factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedia information of a fundamental and more or less permanent nature and which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available.

BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE is intelligence concerning individuals.

CLANDESTINE COLLECTION A coordinated complex of collection activities designed to accomplish an intelligence, counterintelligence, or other similar purpose, sponsored and conducted by a governmental department or agency, or jointly by two or more such entities, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE is military intelligence for use in combat situations. This is commonly referred to as tactical.

COUNTERESPIONAGE is identifying, penetrating, manipulating or repressing inimical espionage organizations.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE is defined as that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation, and its personnel, information, and installations against espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activity.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.

DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE concerns information and investigation of espionage, counterespionage, etc., which pertains to the internal security of the U.S. and, therefore, is in subject matter pertinent to the internal affairs of the U.S.

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the potentialities, utilization, and vulnerabilities of a nation's natural and human resources.

ESPIONAGE is defined as that intelligence activity which is directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine operations.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE pertains to foreign affairs and subject matters pertinent to foreign countries. The word "foreign" as used here denotes the target of the intelligence and is distinct from the geographic location of the source providing the information. For example, refugees, defectors, and immigrants from target countries (such as the Soviet Union) have the potential for supplying intelligence regarding their countries to United States authorities. Although physically located in the United States, they are potential foreign intelligence sources.

GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the meterology, hydrography, topography, and basic natural resources of an area.

INTELLIGENCE is the product derived from information collected for the formulation and execution of Government policy and for safeguarding the national welfare.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION is information collected for intelligence purposes that has not been evaluated by comparison with the existing body of knowledge on the subject reported on; the raw material of intelligence.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is integrated departmental intelligence which is required by departments and agencies of the Government for the execution of their missions, but which transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce.

INTERNAL SECURITY relates to the defense and protection within the United States and its territories and possessions of the people, the government, the institutions, and the installations of critical importance from all hostile or destructive action.

INVESTIGATION means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; investigation does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: See Combat Intelligence and Strategic Intelligence.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency.

OVERT COLLECTION is collection activities conducted in such a manner that they may be attributed to or acknowledged by the sponsoring government.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE concerns foreign and domestic policies of governments and the activities of political movements.

POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE may be described as a comprehensive product resulting from collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, and interpretation of all available information relating to national security and concerning other countries where such information is significant to our Government's development and execution of plans, policies, and courses of action. Such intelligence can be divided into various categories, such as basic, biographic, combat, current, departmental, economic, geographic, interdepartmental, military, national, political, scientific, sociological, strategic, tactical, and technical. Perhaps the most simple definition would be that positive intelligence is all the things you should know in advance of initiating a course of action.

There appears to be much confusion in professional circles regarding the use of the term "positive intelligence." Some professionals use the term "positive intelligence" synonymously with the term "foreign intelligence." In still another usage, "positive intelligence" and "intelligence" are used interchangeably. In another useage, which is closely related to the definition utilized in this study, "positive intelligence" is described as what is left of the entire field after "security intelligence" has been subtracted. This source continues that both "positive intelligence" and "security intelligence" can be against domestic targets, as well as against foreign targets. For example, the Department of State, in connection with its formulation of foreign policy, encounters a large number of organizations of Americans whose parents came from foreign countries. Many of these organizations--the Poles for example--have strong views on what United States policy should be toward Poland. The views of these organizations regarding our foreign policy is likely to be a matter of some importance to the Department of State in its policy formulation. The knowledge of what these organizations think and do can be a very significant phase of what might be called "domestic positive intelligence." In addition, the connections which these organizations may have with the foreign country such as Poland sometimes provide a source of "foreign positive intelligence."

SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE pertains to the progress of scientific research and development and usually this intelligence is within the framework of how it affects military or economic potential of a nation.

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE is basically the intelligence behind the police function to protect the nation and its members from those working to our national and individual detriment. For example, this would include intelligence regarding clandestine agents sent to the United States by a foreign power.

SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE pertains to the social, cultural, psychological, or ethnic structure and characteristics of a people.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE is the intelligence required for broad and usually long-range planning, especially with regard to military operations.

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE See Combat Intelligence.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE concerns devices, equipment, and special processes. This is related to Scientific Intelligence, but tends to be differentiated from it as practice differs from theory.

C. THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

1. Prior to World War II

A study of the history and progress of foreign intelligence collection in the United States reveals that prior to World War II such collection efforts were incidental and in direct proportion to the intensity of the coverage maintained in the counterintelligence field. Accordingly, the history of foreign intelligence collection in the United States prior to World War II is primarily a history of counterintelligence and internal security coverage, of which foreign intelligence was a by-product. Historical highlights of the developments in this field are as follows:

(a) In August, 1914, when German espionage agents Count Johann Von Bernstorff and Dr. Heinrich Albert of the German Embassy, Washington, D. C., arrived in the United States with $150,000,000 in German treasury notes to finance the first foreign espionage and sabotage apparatus to be organized in this country, United States Government intelligence work was handled for the most part by five small organizations (Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, Secret Service, Army, State and Navy), all operating on their own with small staffs and without coordination and sufficient delineation of responsibilities.

(b) On April 6, 1917, Congress declared war against Germany and President Woodrow Wilson gave the Bureau of Investigation the task of enforcing his proclamation governing the conduct of enemy aliens. The Bureau at the time had 300 Agents but shortly after the outbreak of the war the staff was increased to 400.

(c) As result of a rash of bombings believed executed by Bolsheviks, Attorney General Palmer appointed Francis P. Garvan of New York as Assistant Attorney General to deal with the problem. He created a General Intelligence Division under command of J. Edgar Hoover and Mr. Hoover was instructed to make a study of subversive activities in the United States to determine their scope and the potential for prosecution.

(d) On May 9, 1934, President Roosevelt called a White House conference attended by the Attorney General, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Labor, Director of FBI and Chief of United States Secret Service to deal with the problem of growth of fascist organizations in the United States. The conference agreed that there should be an investigation of these groups and their activities for intelligence purposes. Since the only Federal law believed applicable at the time was the Immigration Law, the President decided that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service would confer with the Chief of Secret Service and the Director of the FBI to work out details of the investigation.

Mr. Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI personnel to conduct an intensive and confidential investigation of the Nazi movement. This was the first general intelligence investigation made by the Government into fascist activities in this country.

(e) As a result of President Franklin Roosevelt's concern over activities of the communists and other subversive groups, a series of conferences was held in the latter part of August and early September, 1936, participated in by the President, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI. As a result of his concern over the international character of communism and fascism, the President stated the FBI should conduct necessary investigations and coordinate information upon these matters in the possession of the Military Intelligence Division, the Naval Intelligence Division and the State Department.

It is noteworthy that it was specified the investigation was to be for intelligence purposes only.

The Presidential Order was implemented by the Director in a letter to all Special Agents in Charge, September 5, 1936.

(f) As a result of opposition primarily by the State Department against accepting the FBI as the coordinating agency in the investigations of all subversive activities in the United States, President Roosevelt, on June 26, 1939, issued a confidential directive to Cabinet members which established an Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee composed of the FBI and the Intelligence Divisions of the War Department and the Navy. He named the FBI as the coordinating agency to receive all reports on subversive activities.

(g) President Roosevelt publicly designated the FBI to investigate matters relating to espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations by Presidential Directive dated September 6, 1939.

(h) On May 21, 1940, President Roosevelt in a memorandum to the then Attorney General, Robert H. Jackson, authorized and directed the Attorney General in such cases as he might approve to authorize the use of listening devices directed to the conversations or other communications of persons suspected of subversive activity against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies.

Pursuant to such authorization, commencing on June 1, 1940, technical surveillances were installed on diplomatic establishments throughout the United States of such countries as Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and France. These installations in addition to providing counterintelligence information of value produced a substantial quantity of foreign intelligence information.

(i) Although lines of responsibility were established for domestic intelligence work in connection with the September 6, 1939, Presidential Directive, there were no clearly defined areas of responsibility of overseas intelligence operations and as time passed the need for decisions in that field grew more evident.

As a result, the Special Intelligence Service (SIS) came into being. By Presidential Directive June 24, 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt set forth lines of responsibility in the operations of United States intelligence agencies in the foreign field. This Directive grew out of a series of meetings involving representatives of State Department, Army and Navy intelligence and the FBI wherein it was agreed that the SIS would act as a service agency, furnishing the State Department, the military, the FBI and other governmental agencies with information having to do with financial, economic, political and subversive activities detrimental to the security of the United States. The June 24th Directive placed the responsibility for nonmilitary intelligence coverage in the Western Hemisphere on the FBI. Less than thirty days thereafter the FBI had organized an SIS operation.

Through World War II and until approximately March 31, 1947, the FBI continued its SIS operations. The culmination of our activities in this field came about as a result of the January 22, 1946, Presidential Directive establishing the Central Intelligence Group and giving it the responsibility of collecting foreign intelligence abroad.

2. During World War II (1941 - 1945)

a. The FBI's Role

During World War II, as prior to the war, foreign intelligence collection in this country was geared to and principally a product of our intensive efforts in the counterintelligence field. It is also significant to note that a steady stream of foreign intelligence continued to be developed from our technical coverage of diplomatic establishments of enemy-bloc countries, as well as other sensitive countries such as Russia, Argentina, Portugal and Spain.

In line with the Presidential Directive of September 6, 1939, the FBI continued to be in charge of all investigative work in matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, counterespionage, subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws.

On January 8, 1943, the President issued another Directive in which he reiterated the previous Directive of September 6, 1939.

In ordering the FBI to take charge in the foregoing areas, President Roosevelt did not define the various types of intelligence involved but placed the entire intelligence and internal security responsibilities involved under the jurisdiction of the FBI. As a matter of fact, in carrying out these responsibilities we did produce foreign intelligence in substantial quantity especially through our technical coverage of foreign diplomatic establishments.

b. Office of Strategic Services

The position of Colonel William J. Donovan as Coordinator of Information (COI) was created by Presidential Directive dated July 11, 1941. On July 14, 1941, President Roosevelt sent a letter to the Attorney General stating the position was created, "in order to provide a central point in the Government for the analysis of information and data which bears upon national security. . . ." The President described Donovan's duties as "assist me and the various Departments and agencies of the Government in assembling and correlating information which may be useful in the formulation of basic plans for the defense of the nation."

In the letter President Roosevelt clearly limited Donovan's jurisdiction with the following statement: "I should like to emphasize that Colonel Donovan's work is not intended to supersede or duplicate or involve any direction of the activities of established agencies already obtaining and interpreting defense information."

The Presidential order dated September 11, 1941, established the position of COI with clear cut authority to collect and analyze information bearing on national security; correlate and make such information available to the President and other Government officials as the President may determine. COI was finally authorized to carry out, when requested by the President, supplementary activities as might facilitate the securing of information not then available to the Government.

Donovan, in a memorandum captioned "MEMORANDUM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION," expanded on the President's directive in general terms. Under his plan for procedure there was a Coordinator of Strategic Information responsible directly to the President. (Note this same organizational set up was later adopted by the Director of Central Intelligence.) Donovan noted, however, in his memorandum, "The proposed centralized unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy Intelligence, or any other Department of the Government." (62-64427, serials 23 and X3.)

Our file on the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) reveals that that organization continued its organizational, training, and operational activities in this country based on Donovan's premise that he was the central clearing point for anti-Axis espionage and counterespionage. An interesting insight into OSS operations in this country is provided in the nonfiction work "The Scarlet Thread" by former OSS agent Donald Downes. Downes noted that he was a former British intelligence agent serving for that organization in New York when he was recruited by OSS immediately after Pearl Harbor. He tells of his recruitment by Allan Dulles, his association with Donovan, and his work in the counterespionage field in New York City and Washington, D. C., with other OSS agents, including the current United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg. Downes detailed attempts by him and other OSS agents to steal diplomatic codes from "friendly" or "neutral" country embassies in Washington in the early 1940's and frequently referred to the fact that this was being done by OSS with knowledge that its jurisdiction in this country was based only on the theory that a foreign Embassy is not American soil and is technically outside the jurisdiction of the FBI, which had full jurisdiction for counterintelligence in the western hemisphere.

Our file on the OSS is replete with incidents indicating OSS recruitment and counterespionage activities in this country during the early 1940's.

By memorandum dated May 22, 1945, Stanley J. Tracey, advised of a conversation overheard between two high-ranking State Department officials. The conversation dealt with OSS attempts to take over Bureau SIS operations in Latin America with one of the State Department officials, Aura Warren, stating that officials of OSS felt that organization was better equipped to handle work than FBI personnel attached to various American Embassies in South America. In response to this attempt of OSS to take over our duties, the Director commented: "I would like to know where Warren gets this. According to Ladd our contacts in State Department have no knowledge of such OSS efforts. Also Tracey should point out it is State Department duty to initiate it as we would 'service it' and the State Department in fact started the SIS project. H" (62-64427-1059.)

An interesting evaluation of OSS operations is provided in a report prepared by Colonel Richard Park of the War Department as a result of a survey of OSS operations made as a special and confidential mission for the President in 1944 and 1945. Colonel Park commented: "Without going into details I was everywhere left with the same impression of utter incompetency on the part of OSS leadership....

"Everywhere that the subject of OSS came up, unsolicited remarks clearly brought out the very well known amateurish nature of the organization.

"The OSS has been restricted from active operations in South America by Presidential directive...."

Despite the absence of any jurisdiction in or responsibility for counterintelligence operations in the western hemisphere, an officer of OSS was reported to have attempted to obtain cover for an OSS agent in South America under guise of employment by an organization doing business in South America.

A closing paragraph of Colonel Park's report commented on observations made by an official of OSS as follows:

"This official of OSS added that it was the policy of his agency not to give any more information than necessary to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He pointed out that OSS instructors in their school in the United States had discussed the FBI in an unfavorable light and had painted the picture of OSS replacing the Federal Bureau of Investigation not only outside the United States but in the domestic field. The publicity campaign referred to was to be one of the means adopted to accomplish this purpose."

3. National Intelligence Authority (NIA)

On January 22, 1946, President Harry S. Truman addressed a Directive to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy stating, in part, "I hereby designate you, together with another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority. . ." The Directive provided that each of these three Secretaries would from time to time assign personnel and facilities from their respective departments "which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group" (CIG) under a Director of Central Intelligence. It was provided that the latter would be responsible to the NIA.

President Truman then stated that subject to the existing law the Director of Central Intelligence should (a) accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the results; (b) plan for the coordination of such activities of the intelligence agencies of the three departments involved as related to the national security; (c) perform such services of common concern as the NIA determined could be more effectively accomplished centrally; and (d) perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence as the President and the NIA might from time to time direct.

The Presidential Directive said that no police, law enforcement or internal security functions should be exercised under the Directive; that certain intelligence should be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence "for correlation, evaluation or dissemination"; and that "the existing intelligence agencies of your departments shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence." The ninth provision of the Directive stated, "Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives."

A series of communications between the Bureau and Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who was designated as Director of the Central Intelligence Group, then followed. On June 21, 1946, a memorandum analyzed a communication from Vandenberg which submitted a proposed memorandum to the NIA and a proposed Directive to be issued by NIA extending the powers and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Directive provided, in essence, the following additional functions and powers for the Director of Central Intelligence:

(1) Undertake such basic research and analysis of intelligence and counterintelligence as may in his opinion be required.

(2) Act as the executive agent of this authority (NIA) in coordinating and in supervising all Federal foreign intelligence activities.

(3) Perform the following services of common concern: (a) conduct all Federal espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence; (b) conduct all Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers for the collection of intelligence information.

In discussing this Directive which Vandenberg desired issued, the memorandum stated the Directive did not conform with the original plan proposed by the President or which was envisioned by the discussions occurring prior to the time the President issued his Directive. The original plan, insofar as the Bureau was advised, contemplated the setting up of solely a coordinating agency which was given the power to perform certain functions which it would be determined could more adequately and economically be performed centrally for the benefit of all Government agencies. The memorandum noted that "undoubtedly if this Directive is approved and the Central Intelligence Group is successful in setting up complete foreign coverage, the Bureau would undoubtedly be pushed into a 'second rate' position insofar as purely intelligence functions are concerned in the domestic field. . . It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign intelligence existing in that field. Also, it is impossible to separate entirely foreign intelligence and the domestic functions performed by the Bureau."*

In reply to the Directive proposed by General Vandenberg, a letter was sent to him June 25, 1946, which stated that the Directive was approved with certain changes suggested "for clarification purposes only." The Director suggested that to the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence acting

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* With respect to this last quoted statement, Mr. E. A. Tamm and Mr. C. A. Tolson noted an exception by placing an addendum on the memorandum. The Director's comments were set forth. This is more fully reported below under the heading, "Director's Comments."

as the executive agent of National Intelligence Authority in coordinating and supervising all foreign intelligence activities there should be added "performed outside the United States and its possessions relating to the national security in accordance with the overall policies and objectives established by this Authority." With respect to the proposal that the Director of Central Intelligence direct all espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence, it was proposed that the phrase "outside the United States and its possessions" also be inserted in this provision.

On July 29, 1946, General Vandenberg sent over a memorandum on the subject "Exploitation of American Business Concerns With Connections Abroad as Sources of Foreign Intelligence Information." He added a proposed Directive. The Director replied by letter August 6, 1946, "I should like to comment that there appears to have been an addition to the field encompassed by CIG Directive #11 calling for a survey of the exploitation of American business concerns. I note that in your report and in the proposed NIA Directive, you refer not only to American business concerns but to other private groups with connections abroad. This latter phrase, in my opinion, is extremely broad and could be taken to include all types of organizations, including Foreign Nationality Groups. In fact, I feel that the report and proposed Directive should confine themselves to the discussion of American business concerns and that no references at all should be made to 'private groups'. . . I feel that at a later date the question of exploitation of these private groups by CIG representatives might be worked out by discussing them individually with the FBI when their identities are determined." This matter remained unresolved.

On August 22, 1946, General Vandenberg submitted another proposed Directive concerning exploitation of American business concerns, nongovernmental groups, and individuals (in the United States) with connections abroad as sources of foreign intelligence information. A memorandum analyzing this on August 22, 1946, pointed out the new Directive was even more obnoxious than the one originally proposed. The Directive noted, in part, "CIG field representatives will establish and maintain liaison with the intelligence officers of local Army and Navy headquarters and Air Force headquarters, if present, through the medium of local interagency offices." The analyzing memorandum pointed out, "If this means the CIG is going to maintain field representatives in the United States or establish offices, it certainly is something new and a provision that we did not understand was intended in the President's Directive. . . Attached to the proposed Directive is a discussion which is more or less the same as was attached to the original proposed Directive. It, however, makes the following statement which the Bureau cannot subscribe to and it would seem must oppose, that is, 'Foreign Intelligence Information related to the national security, although it may be collected from sources whose headquarters are within the limits of the United States and its possessions, is definitely a part of the national intelligence mission, the coordination of which is specifically a function of the National Intelligence Authority under the provisions of the President's letter of 22 January 1946.'"

In pointing out the Bureau's objections, the analyzing memorandum of August 22, 1946, stated, "There is now involved in this Directive the fundamental question of just what rights the Central Intelligence Group has with reference to operations within the United States. Carrying to a logical conclusion the statements set forth above contained in the discussion, they could cover all foreign embassies in the United States, take charge of double agents we are operating or radio stations we are operating as double agent set-ups, etc., because essentially these operations engaged in by the Bureau do not directly involve enforcement of the laws but rather are concerned with obtaining information in the nature of foreign intelligence which, of course, is related to internal security as is all foreign intelligence. Essentially, the Bureau's domestic operations in intelligence involve the determining of the aims, intentions, and activities of foreign countries or their representatives."

The memorandum of analysis stated that our position would be the Bureau would not consent to any provisions except those related to American business concerns with connections abroad. On August 23, 1946, the Director sent a letter to General Vandenberg stating in part, "I must advise that the proposed Directive does not incorporate the changes suggested in my letter of August 6, 1946, and I, therefore, cannot approve it. This new directive also includes provisions and statements in which I cannot concur and, in fact, must oppose."

The strong stand of the Director obviously led to a conference between General Vandenberg and the Director which was reported in a memorandum of September 13, 1946, which the Director prepared. As stated in the Director's memorandum the conference concerned CIG's desire to gather contacts among "nongovernmental groups and individuals with connections abroad." The entire conference was on this subject matter and did not enter into collection of foreign intelligence from foreign embassies or from foreign officials or, in fact, from any other source. The Director wrote, "I told the General that I could well appreciate that there would be cases in which his organization would be desirous of making contacts in the United States for the purpose of obtaining information from abroad and that the Bureau was not interested in such contacts except in those situations wherein the individual or the group might be engaged in activities within the United States that were either under investigation by the Bureau or might possibly be the medium of obtaining information concerning the activities of a subversive character being carried on within the United States. I told the General that I would be perfectly agreeable to his suggestion, with the added provision that if CIG was desirous of contacting any individuals of the character that he had indicated, before doing so it would check with the FBI."

The foregoing has been set forth rather extensively since it shows the strong stand the Bureau took against CIG's operating in the United States. Actually, as will be reported hereinafter, Directives were adopted permitting CIG to collect positive intelligence in this country by contacting United States citizens, American businessmen, aliens (with prior FBI approval) through the foreign language press and in later years through contacts with United States governmental personnel.

4. Responsibilities of CIA

a. The National Security Act of 1947

This Act, which is reported in 50 USC 401 et seq., established the National Security Council (NSC) and under it the Central Intelligence Agency. It provided that when the Director of Central Intelligence was appointed the NIA should cease to exist.

There was much discussion concerning the powers and authorities to be vested in the Director of Central Intelligence. Many individuals, especially in Congress, expressed fears that CIA could develop into a gestapo if permitted to become operational in the United States. The following two excerpts, of interest in this connection, are from a Congressional publication related to hearings prior to passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The publication is entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 1st Session on H. R. 2319 (National Security Act of 1947)":

Page 127 - During testimony concerning authority for and scope of CIA, James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, stated:

> "The purposes of the Central Intelligence Authority are limited definitely to purposes outside of this country, except the collation of information gathered by other government agencies.
>
> "Regarding domestic operations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is working at all times in collaboration with General Vandenberg. He relies upon them for domestic activities."

Page 438 - Congressman Clarence J. Brown of Ohio in speaking about the National Security Act of 1947, which was under scrutiny before passage, stated:

> "I want to write a lot of other safeguards into the section that deals with the Central Intelligence Agency.

"I want to make certain that the activities and the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency were carefully confined to international matters, to military matters, and to matters of national security. We have enough people now running around butting into everybody else's business in this country without establishing another agency to do so.

"What we ought to do is to eliminate 90 percent of the present snoopers instead of adding to them.

"I do not think it would be the Central Intelligence Agency's right, authority, or responsibility to check on the ordinary domestic activities of the average American citizen, and yet they could have the power and authority to do it under this bill as written."

The National Security Act of 1947 was approved 7/26/47. It provided that for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, the Agency under the direction of the NSC was:

(1) To advise NSC in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security,

(2) To make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such activities,

(3) To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and provide for its appropriate dissemination within the Government: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security responsibilities,

(4) To perform such additional services of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally,

(5) To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting national security as the NSC may from time to time direct.

There is tacit acknowledgement in Section 403 (e) of the National Security Act of 1947 that the FBI gathers information affecting the national security. This section provides:

> (e) To the extent recommended by the NSC and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

b. National Security Council Intelligence Directives

To implement the authority granted to it under the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council has issued a series of "National Security Council Intelligence Directives," usually referred to as NSCID's and commonly called "Nonscids." The first of these was issued December 12, 1947, and provided for the establishing of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to maintain the relationship necessary for a fully effective integration of the national intelligence effort. By Directive dated September 15, 1958, the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) was formally created as successor to the Intelligence Advisory Committee and a counterpart known as the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board.

NSCID No. 1 provided that the Director of Central Intelligence should coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, such coordination to include both special and other forms of intelligence. The USIB under this Directive shall "advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence as he may require in the discharge of his statutory responsibilities." It is the Board which is empowered to establish policies, define intelligence objectives, make recommendations to appropriate U. S. officials, develop standards for protection of intelligence, and formulate policies with respect to arrangements with foreign governments. The Director of Central

Intelligence is designated as Chairman of this Board and in this capacity is distinguished from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. A more complete discussion with regard to the Bureau's role in this over-all setup is set forth hereinafter under the caption "FBI Relations With the United States Intelligence Board."

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, originally issued 12/12/47, defines the various types of intelligence in Section 4.

(a) National Intelligence is that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce* national intelligence with the support of the U. S. Intelligence Board.

(b) Departmental Intelligence is that intelligence which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission.

(c) Interdepartmental Intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence which is required by departments and agencies of the Government for the execution of their missions, but which transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce. The subcommittee structure of the U. S. Intelligence Board may be utilized for the production and dissemination of interdepartmental intelligence.

Director of Central Intelligence is then authorized to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence provided it is done consistent with statutes and Presidential policy, and provided further "that any disclosure of FBI intelligence information shall be cleared with that agency prior to dissemination."

This acknowledges that FBI information includes both national and interdepartmental intelligence.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*A footnote here states: "By 'produce' is meant 'to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security' as provided in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Section 102 (d) (3)."

NSCID No. 2 issued 1/13/48, relates to coordination of foreign intelligence collection activities "not covered by other NSC Directives."

The Director of Central Intelligence has responsibility for planning to assure there is no undesirable duplication and that coverage is adequate.

Responsibilities are then assigned as follows:

(1) The Department of State shall have primary responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection abroad (i.e., outside the U. S. and its possessions) of political, sociological, economic, scientific and technical information.

(2) The Department of Defense shall have primary responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection of military intelligence information. Owing to the importance of scientific and technical intelligence to the Department of Defense and the military services, this collection responsibility shall include scientific and technical, as well as economic, information directly pertinent to Department of Defense missions. (It seems significant that while State Department primary responsibility was limited by the phrase "the collection abroad," there was no such limitation on the Department of Defense in its responsibility.)

(3) The Central Intelligence Agency may collect abroad intelligence information in support of assigned functions or as a byproduct of assigned functions: Provided, that this collection involves no undesirable duplication of any of the specific assignments to State and Defense Departments, and Provided, that any such overt collection is coordinated with the Department of State or with the Senior U. S. Representative.

In Section 7 of NSCID No. 2 there is delegated to CIA responsibility for overt collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. as follows:

"The Central Intelligence Agency, as a service of common concern, shall be responsible for the selective exploitation within the United States of non-governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information, in accordance with policies, procedures and practices established as provided in paragraph 3a of NSCID No. 1, by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrences of the U. S. Intelligence Board."

Section 9 of the same Directive provides that CIA "shall conduct the exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes, as appropriate, as a service of common concern. When this function is carried out in the U. S., this also constitutes overt collection of foreign intelligence by that Agency in this country.

It may be worthy to note at this point that NSCID No.'s 1 and 2 were discussed, approved, and issued in their original forms prior to 7/7/49 when the FBI was designated a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

NSCID No. 3 on Coordination of Intelligence Production contains definitions of various types of intelligence (including those defined in NSCID No. 1) and then delineates primary responsibilities for "producing" intelligence among various agencies, stating with respect to CIA:

> "The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and / scientific and technical intelligence as a service of common concern. Further, the Central Intelligence Agency may produce such other intelligence as may be necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence."

Since, as noted hereinbefore, "collection" activities are defined in NSCID No. 2, it would seem to follow that the word "produce" as used in NSCID No. 3 has the same definition as set out in a footnote to NSCID No. 1, paragraph 4, i.e., "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security." Thus, NSCID No. 3 would not appear to extend CIA's jurisdiction to collect intelligence or be operational in any way.

The remaining NSCID's appear to have no bearing on the subject matter of foreign intelligence collection in the United States.

c. Director of Central Intelligence Directives

To implement the National Security Act of 1947 as amended and the various National Security Council Intelligence Directives issued pursuant thereto, the Director of Central Intelligence has issued numerous Directives (DCID's). The first of these having a direct bearing on jurisdictional matters is DCID No. 2/3, captioned "Domestic Exploitation of Nongovernmental Organizations and Individuals." NSCID No. 2, paragraph 7, states that CIA shall be responsible for the selective exploitation within the U. S. of such organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information. We, therefore, have avoided, and should avoid, any operations among nongovernmental organizations and individuals designed solely to produce foreign intelligence without CIA prior approval or nullification of these provisions.

DCID No. 2/3 provides for exploitation of nongovernmental U. S. citizens by CIA domestic field offices and states, "In cases where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has indicated an operational interest in a U. S. citizen, Central Intelligence Agency will coordinate with that agency prior to further contact."

This DCID also provides for exploitation by CIA domestic field offices of aliens, following a prior name check with FBI so our statutory obligations may be properly met without CIA interference.

It is of possible interest to note that in dealing with these two matters, DCID No. 2/3 refers to nongovernmental U. S. citizens but only to aliens (without the restrictive adjective). The NSCID on which it is based refers to nongrovernmental individuals without distinguishing between citizens and aliens. Thus, there appears to have been an intention to confine CIA's intelligence exploitation functions within the U. S. A review of our file on CIA (62-80750) indicates this might well have been a concession to the Bureau since we went on record opposing delegation of any intelligence collection functions within the U. S. to CIA in letters to Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (then Director of Central Intelligence Group) on June 25, 1946, (Serial 96), August 6, 1946, (Serial 138), and August 23, 1946, (Serial 222), which have been discussed more fully under the heading "National Intelligence Authority."

DCID No. 2/8 is captioned "Domestic Exploitation of U. S. Government Organizations and Officials." It begins in very general terms, "Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 1 and NSCID No. 2. . . ." It provides, "The Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate and have the primary responsibility for exploitation of the foreign intelligence potential of non-USIB organizations and officials to meet community needs as a service of common concern."

As set forth above, there seems to be no basis for such CIA jurisdiction in NSCID No. 1 and No. 2. Paragraph 7 of NSCID No. 2 specifically restricts CIA in this area of operations to nongovernmental organizations and individuals.

A review of our U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) file, 62-90718, shows following apropos this matter:

> The Draft Minutes of the 3/21/61 USIB meeting report that the Board approved the draft of a DCID on "Domestic Exploitation of U. S. Government Organizations and Officials," which would be issued as DCID No. 2/8, effective 3/21/61. Mr. Belmont was present at this USIB meeting as the FBI representative. (unnumbered serial between serials 1131 & 1132, USIB file)
>
> Tracing this subject matter back through the USIB file it was learned that it apparently was first considered at the meeting held 2/23/60 at which the Bureau was represented by Fred A. Frohbose. The minutes for that meeting reported the Board agreed in principle that a directive on Intelligence Exploitation of U. S. Governmental officials would be desirable. However, the matter was referred to the Committee on Domestic Exploitation for further study and the submission of a revised draft for Board consideration. (unnumbered serial between serials 1040 & 1041, USIB file)

From the foregoing it would appear that the Bureau concurred in the issuance of this particular Directive and thus to an extension of CIA's overt collection activities in the U. S. if this should, in fact, be interpreted as an extension.

DCID 4/1 provides for the establishment of the Interagency Defector Committee.

DCID's 4/2 and 4/3 relate to the Defector Program abroad and domestically, respectively. The latter one dwells on division of responsibilities between FBI and CIA in the handling of defectors within the continental limits of the United States. It provides that exploitation of such defectors shall be conducted:

1. To obtain internal security information or other data required by FBI in view of its statutory responsibilities in the internal security field.

2. To obtain foreign intelligence information required in the interests of national security by the member agencies of the USIB.

3. For such other purposes as are deemed to be in the interests of national security.

The very next sentence then gives the implication that exploitation of the defector for foreign intelligence purposes is the principal responsibility of CIA, for it reads, "Decision as to the relative importance of internal security exploitation by FBI and foreign intelligence exploitation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) shall be made jointly by representatives of CIA and FBI."

There then follows a listing of nine specific FBI responsibilities, one of which is to make available to CIA foreign intelligence information resulting from the initial exploitation of defectors. There is no subsequent specific delineation of CIA responsibility over foreign intelligence exploitation until there is a transfer of responsibility for handling a defector from FBI to CIA after FBI interests have been fully satisfied. There is a general assignment of such responsibility to CIA in the terms, "CIA shall be responsible for: a. Coordinating the activities of other departments and agencies concerned with defector matters, except those responsibilities assigned exclusively to FBI . . . ."

As a matter of practice, if it is determined there is little or no importance from an internal security standpoint in connection with a particular defection, we do not take over but in effect give clearance to CIA to proceed from a foreign intelligence standpoint.

DCID's in the 5/ series (numbers one through five) were issued principally to implement NSCID Number 5 which deals with U. S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities abroad. There appears to be no conflict with FBI jurisdiction in this series.

All other DCID's relate to Elint Critical Intelligence and other matters which appear to have no bearing on possible conflicts between CIA and FBI responsibilities.

d. Dulles Committee, 1949

The Dulles Committee was appointed February 3, 1948, by the National Security Council (NSC) to make a "comprehensive, impartial and objective survey of the organization, activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)." The Committee was instructed to report its findings and recommendations on the following matters:

(a) The adequacy and effectiveness of the organization structure of CIA.

(b) The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities.

(c) The relationship of these activities to those of other departments and agencies.

(d) The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel.

The Committee's scope was extended on March 17, 1948, to include the following provisions: "This survey will comprise primarily a thorough and comprehensive examination of the structure, administration, activities and inter-agency relationships of the CIA as outlined in the resolution of the National Security Council. It will also include an examination of such intelligence activities of other Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security, in order to make recommendations for their effective operation and overall coordination. . ."

This report, which is dated January 1, 1949, for the most part concerned itself with administrative matters affecting CIA and the necessity for reorganization within that Agency. It notes, however, that the National Security Act, as implemented by directives of the NSC, imposed upon CIA responsibility for carrying out three essential functions:

(1) The coordination of intelligence activities.

(2) The correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, which has been interpreted by directive as meaning the production* of national intelligence.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* See definition of "produce" in footnote to NSCID No. 1, Section 4b as "correlate and evaluate," the reverse of connotation given here.

(3) The performance centrally, subject to NSC direction, of certain intelligence and related functions of common concern to various departments of the Government.

The report noted that Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 established a framework for a sound intelligence system and no amendment to that Section of the Act was deemed necessary.

Although the coordination of intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies concerned with national security was a primary reason for establishing CIA, the report noted the National Security Act does not give CIA independent authority to coordinate intelligence activities, as final responsibility to establish policies was vested in the NSC.

The statutory limitations upon the authority of CIA to coordinate intelligence activities without the approval of the NSC were, according to the report, obviously designed to protect the autonomy and internal arrangements of the various departments and agencies performing intelligence functions. In spite of these calculated limitations on the authority of CIA, the report noted, it was clear the Agency was expected to provide the initiative and leadership in developing a coordinated intelligence system. In practice, the NSC has almost without exception approved the recommendations submitted to it by CIA for the coordination of intelligence activities.

The National Security Act does not define the "intelligence activities" which were to be coordinated by CIA under the direction of the NSC or specify the departments whose activities were covered. Presumably, according to the report, all intelligence activities relating to the national security were included, from collecting information in the first instance to the preparation and dissemination of finished intelligence reports and estimates. "The criterion," which the report noted was a very broad one, was "such intelligence activities. . . as relate to the national security and not the identity of the departments concerned or the nature or locale of the intelligence activity." Thus, the report noted, practically no limitations are set upon the scope of the intelligence activities with which the Central Intelligence Agency is to concern itself.

The report noted another broad field requiring coordination is that of foreign intelligence derived from domestic sources and the allied field of domestic counterintelligence. This includes the exploitation of intelligence from United States business firms, travellers, etc., exploitation of the intelligence possibilities of groups and individuals of foreign nationality in the United States, the relating of domestic counterintelligence to foreign intelligence and the coordination of domestic counterespionage with counterespionage abroad. Except for the exploitation of private sources of foreign intelligence in the United States which is centralized in the Office of Operations, CIA, responsibility for other activities is scattered among the State Department, the armed services, the FBI and CIA.

The FBI, which has primary security and law enforcement responsibilities, is concerned in fact with an important area of intelligence. This includes domestic counterespionage and countersabotage, control of communist and other subversive activities and surveillances of alien individuals and groups. All of these functions, according to the report, are closely related to the comparable activities abroad of the CIA.

The report noted the FBI was not part of the then existing machinery for coordination of intelligence through the Intelligence Advisory Committee and there was no continuing manner whereby domestic intelligence and counterintelligence were related to overall national intelligence in order to serve the general purpose set forth in the National Security Act, which was set forth as "of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security."

It was the opinion of the authors of the Dulles Report that CIA had the duty under the Act to concern itself with the problem of coordinating those phases of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence which relate to the national security and CIA should submit recommendations on this subject to the NSC. The report noted this was not inconsistent with the stipulation of the National Security Act that CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions."

The Dulles Commission recommended that the FBI should be made a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to improve coordination of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence insofar as these matters related to the national security.

While discussing the production of National Intelligence Estimates by CIA, the report noted, "There is no systematic way of tapping that domestic intelligence information, which should be chiefly in the hands of the FBI, having a bearing on broader intelligence issues and there is no regular and agreed arrangement for participation by the FBI and for the use of intelligence from domestic sources in a national estimate."

National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 7 provided that CIA shall be responsible for the exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United States of business concerns, other non-Governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information. The report concluded the amount of foreign intelligence which can be obtained through the exploitation of non-Governmental sources in the United States is considerable and its quality could be very high if appropriate arrangements were made and discrimination was employed. It was felt the vast number of organizations, institutions and individuals having foreign interests and knowledge represented a potential source of intelligence that in many ways was superior to any other, as it was felt that they were in a position to provide information obtained from their foreign contacts and from the findings on their own people abroad.

A further important source of information, the exploitation for intelligence purposes of foreign individuals and groups in the United States was also being developed. The report noted that these individuals and groups as well as political refugees and former foreign government officials were often engaged in political activity with significant international implications.

CIA and other intelligence agencies had not developed coordinated and effective policies and procedures for the exploitation of intelligence in this important field. The FBI, according to the report, had a major interest in foreign individuals and groups in the United States because of possible security implications. The report indicated the FBI possessed considerable information concerning many individuals and groups but this information had been obtained primarily with security rather than intelligence considerations in mind and was not normally given the kind of interpretation or dissemination that intelligence required if it was to be properly used. It was also noted the FBI was, in cases where it had a security interest, reluctant on security grounds to have intelligence exploitation by outside agencies. The general result of this situation, according to the report, was that an important source of intelligence was not being fully exploited.

The report noted that the question of the exploitation for intelligence purposes of foreign groups and individuals in the United States was a clear example where the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with the FBI being added as a member, should establish principles and rules for coordination.

In discussing the administrative handling of espionage and counterespionage matters within the CIA, the report noted the FBI was charged with all counterespionage responsibilities in the United States except those affecting personnel of the armed services. The Dulles Commission recommended the counterespionage activities of CIA should be increased in scope and emphasis and that closer liaison in this field should be established with the FBI.

The only effect the Dulles Report had on the FBI was its inclusion as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee by amendment to HSCID Number 1 dated July 7, 1949.

e. Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955

Task forces of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) conducted surveys of CIA operations from 1947 to 1949 (under F. Eberstadt) and from 1953 to 1955 (under General Mark Clark).

The Commission concerned itself principally with the efficiency with which CIA was fulfilling its statutory missions of coordination, correlation, evaluation, and dissemination of the intelligence product of other Government agencies and departments. The Commission examined agency activity in light of the CIA primary mission of advising NSC and performing services and duties related to intelligence and national security as the NSC directed.

(1a) Eberstadt Task Force Report

The results of the first examination of CIA by the Hoover Commission were more or less apologetic in tone, emphasizing the soundness of directives setting up NSC and its direction of the Agency. The report pointed out, however, that CIA and its parent, NSC, had had little time to actually implement the coordination necessary for leadership in the field. The Task Force clearly defined its understanding of the CIA mission as: ".....coordinate intelligence activities of Federal agencies concerned with national security."

The duties of CIA were listed as:

1. Advise National Security Council on national security intelligence activities of Federal departments and agencies.

2. Recommend necessary coordination of such activities to National Security Council.

3. Correlate, evaluate and disseminate national security intelligence.

4. Render intelligence services for other Federal departments and agencies." (62-88575-3 enclosure behind file.)

In discussing the duties of the CIA the Task Force noted, "Under the statute CIA is entrusted with the performance of such services of common concern as the National Security Council shall determine. At present these include, apart from Scientific Intelligence, which is discussed separately: (a) maintenance of central indexes of report, records, and documents having intelligence value; (b) examination of foreign documents from which intelligence material is extracted and disseminated; (c) maintenance of central map facilities; (d) monitoring of foreign broadcasts; and (e) collection of the information by clandestine means and counterespionage abroad."

In evaluating the operations and location of CIA counterespionage the Task Force commented as follows:

"The counterespionage activities of CIA abroad appear properly integrated with CIA's other clandestine operations. Although arguments have been made in favor of extending CIA's authority to include responsibility for counterespionage in this Country, such an extension of jurisdiction does not a present appear justified. For one thing, concentration of power over counterespionage activities at home in the hands of a Director of Central Intelligence responsible for espionage abroad might justifiably arouse public suspicion and opposition. Conceivably it could form the basis for a charge that a gestapo is in process of creating even though the power to arrest were specifically withheld. To transfer responsibility for domestic counterespionage from the FBI, which has an established organization and long tradition, to CIA, which is not equipped for the assignment, would probably create more problems than it would solve. It is doubtful whether the logical benefit of having one agency responsible for counterespionage throughout the world would justify the dislocation and confusion that such a transfer would inevitably occasion."

"CIA representatives have indicated that their present working liaison with FBI is satisfactory, but the Committee doubts that FBI-CIA relationships are completely adequate. The Director of FBI declined the Committee's invitation to appear before it to discuss the CIA with the committee or its representatives on the ground that he knew too little of its activities."

The groundwork for CIA acceptance was laid by the Committee recommendation and finding: "CIA is not now properly organized. Co-equal improvement in G-2, FBI, ONI, State Department, and other Government intelligence services is also essential. Spirit of teamwork must govern interagency intelligence relationships. CIA deserves and must have greater degree of acceptance and support from old-line intelligence services than it has had in the past."

A pitch was made for a single agency controlling internal security in the Committee's finding: "The committee believes that responsibility for internal security policies should be immediately focused in one agency. A more thorough study of the subject than any yet made must be prosecuted, and interagency frictions must be ended." It is noted that the committee commented elsewhere in its report:

"Detailed study of organization and activities of intelligence divisions of the Government, including CIA, is being made by a committee consisting of Messrs. Allen Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias Correa, assisted by a staff of four directed by Mr. Robert Blum of the Office of Secretary of Defense." With this statement it may be assumed the Task Force excused omissions it may have made with the observation that the Dulles group was conducting almost the same survey carried on in the Hoover Commission so far as CIA was involved.

(1b) Clark Task Force Report

The Task Force headed by General Mark Clark submitted a Top Secret report dated in May, 1955, setting forth results of the second Hoover Commission survey of the organization of CIA. The report pointed out the survey was of departments and agencies with entire or prime responsibility in the field of positive foreign intelligence as it pertains to national defense and security. It qualified this survey when speaking of the FBI, noting survey was limited to survey of Bureau only to the extent that it dealt in security intelligence.

Again the Hoover Commission through its Task Force pinned CIA jurisdiction down to the areas defined by statute, and emphasized the Agency was subordinate only to the National Security Council in its coordination, correlation, dissemination and collection of intelligence data. The Task Force noted that since CIA is charged with the over-all responsibility for coordinating the output of all intelligence forces, the Task Force was giving special attention to the work of that Agency.

In the Task Force Report a review of the FBI functions in the intelligence community was set forth. The committee noted that the FBI had only limited activities in the positive intelligence field but noted additionally that FBI functions in the current intelligence effort were of interest in order to fill out the intelligence picture.

The FBI was cited as one of the four members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), created by the NSC, approved by the President 3/23/49, to coordinate "the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related matters affecting internal security."

It was noted that the IIC charter did not disturb responsibilities of its member agencies but made mandatory action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete investigative coverage in compliance with the needs of the IIC, which had full responsibility for coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, et cetera, affecting internal security.

The Committee stated, "The Central Intelligence Agency is, by law, excluded from duplicating the internal security functions of the FBI. However, the CIA does develop within and without the U. S., sources for foreign (positive) intelligence, and incidental thereto may develop leads as to subversive activities within this country. In such cases CIA through liaison gives its information to the FBI."

A Task Force survey revealed, "Through the Central Intelligence Agency's domestic field offices, contacts are made on a highly selective basis with business concerns and other nongovernmental agencies, as well as with previously cleared individuals who travel abroad . . . Under the provisions of DCID 7/1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is required to establish in Washington a focal office for the purpose of interviewing nongovernment visitors. . . Any visitors to these offices demonstrating good intelligence potential are referred to the CIA for further exploitation."

The Task Force noted that as far back as 1939 President Roosevelt by executive order directed the FBI to coordinate and conduct domestic counterintelligence activities. In 1949, according to the Committee's survey, the IIC was formalized and by charter restricted to coordinating investigations in intelligence matters domestically.

In commenting on the role of the FBI the Committee further noted, "The Federal Bureau of Investigation, however, is the recognized center of the domestic aspect of internal security including counterintelligence within the United States and its possessions."

With regard to the use and surfacing of sources, the Committee noted that CIA was not bound to disclose its sources; however, it commented on the excellent liaison system of the FBI which had overcome this restriction so far as internal security within the U. S. is concerned. "Now, as a matter of practice the CIA usually refers domestic sources to the FBI, the only exception being where the source is to be used in foreign intelligence work by the CIA." In the area of defectors within this country, the Committee noted that the FBI will receive from CIA or by a direct interrogation of a CIA-controlled defector information which the defector may have concerning internal security. Persons who defect within this country, on the other hand, were found to be under the cognizance of the FBI. Then the reverse of the above situation comes into play and CIA has access to the defector for developing leads in the foreign intelligence field. The Committee commented, "It is the duty of the FBI to conduct investigations of all cases involving foreign nationals in the United States as set forth in the Delimitations Agreement."

A review of the Commission report lends one important fact to our study of this subject matter. This was pointed up by the membership of the various groups at the disposal of the National Security Council within the field of national intelligence. Ten subcommittees or working groups with membership from separate departments or interested agencies acted in advisory capacities to the IAC parent committee. In each of these subcommittees the chairman was a representative of the Director of CIA and the working groups were individually serviced by a secretariat furnished by CIA. From the top-heavy alignment of CIA personnel in IAC and its working groups it was obvious in which direction advisory opinions would be slanted when dissenting matters were presented by the IAC and CIA to the NSC.

f. The Doolittle Committee, 1954

In July, 1954, we received information from the White House that the President had appointed Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle to study in collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certain aspects of the national intelligence effort. By letter dated July 28, 1954, Sherman Adams, the Assistant to the President, requested that the Bureau brief General Doolittle's group concerning the relationship that existed between the Bureau and CIA. We subsequently learned that at approximately the same time a survey would be conducted by the Hoover Commission under the chairmanship of General Mark Clark. We learned from Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA, that the President strongly believed that General Clark should not permit the survey to get into CIA covert operations, particularly in the field of political and psychological warfare. The President had told Dulles that he was selecting General Doolittle to study CIA's covert operations.

General Doolittle's group was briefed on August 25, 1954, at which time the Bureau's position in the intelligence field was described and the manner in which the Bureau transacted business with CIA was explained. In addition, certain constructive criticism concerning problems and conflicts experienced in dealing with CIA was furnished General Doolittle's group. The following salient features of the criticism appear to bear on the current study:

We were critical of a policy of the Office of Operations, CIA, which precluded that Division from identifying any of its sources in the United States when such sources possessed information bearing on the internal security of the United States. The Office of Operations as of 1954 collected foreign intelligence information in the United States from aliens, businessmen, and others, and periodically would receive information of interest to the Bureau. Instances arose where the Bureau desired to interview the original source but was prevented from getting to the source by CIA policy. We were of the opinion that CIA's policy could be modified to allow us direct access to the source in the United States when such was necessary.

As of 1954, CIA had interest in various organizations such as Radio Free Europe and others and from time to time the Bureau would get involved in investigation of organizations only to learn they were being supported or guided by CIA. Our opinion was that if we had been appropriately notified of CIA's interest considerable investigative time and manpower could have been saved and in addition we would have been in a position to notify CIA when anything of interest came to our attention.

Concerning CIA investigations in the United States, we readily acknowledged CIA's right to investigate its own applicants or consultants. We did object to CIA's undertaking any investigation in this country when the facts indicated the case was clearly within Bureau jurisdiction and pointed out that the Bureau had recently become involved in investigating an individual suspected of espionage activity. We were in contact with CIA and had solicited its help concerning certain aspects in the case but it was a few weeks before we learned CIA had conducted a very close investigation of this same individual. We made the observations that close and open cooperation between the Bureau and CIA was vital to the proper handling of espionage cases.

The Bureau pointed out that as of 1954 it had received little or no significant information concerning espionage or sabotage agents coming to the United States. We excluded diplomatic personnel in this matter but clearly indicated that CIA should be in a position to give us some advance notification when spies were coming to this country.

Possibly this latter was the strongest criticism we had since we did not feel CIA with its resources and overseas contacts was performing one of its prime functions in the intelligence field; that is, identifying foreign illegals who are en route to the United States. During our briefing of General Doolittle's group, we described the Bureau's collection of intelligence information for the interested Government agencies as a major operation. Our discharge of our intelligence operation concerning the Communist Party and Soviet and Satellite diplomats was explained in detail to the satisfaction of all personnel attending the briefing.

General Doolittle asked for recommendations as to what could be done to improve CIA so the Bureau would get better service. It was suggested that corrective action be taken on the matters which had been criticized constructively; CIA should establish adequate coverage (although not specifically noted, this obviously regarded advance notice of foreign intelligence personnel coming to the United States); and finally CIA should transmit information developed in an expedite fashion.

Prior to submitting the report to the President, General Doolittle expressed a desire to see Mr. Hoover, whom he regarded as the outstanding intelligence authority in the world. The General visited the Director on October 5, 1954, during which visit CIA's operations were discussed and generally the points of the previous meeting were reiterated. General Doolittle felt the ideal solution would be to wipe out CIA entirely and start all over again, but since this was impractical his committee would point out certain weaknesses and make certain recommendations and suggestions to the President for the correction of these weaknesses.

We do not have the contents of General Doolittle's report and there is nothing to indicate an executive order was issued from it which in any way delineated the respective jurisdiction of the Bureau or of CIA.

g. The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government

Captioned report was prepared by the Study Group and issued 12/15/60. The Group was under the chairmanship of

Lyman B. Kirtkpatrick, Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), acting as a representative of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The other four members of the Study Group represented the Department of State, Secretary of Defense, Bureau of the Budget, and the National Security Council (NSC).

The stated targets of examination by the Group were organizational and management aspects within the intelligence effort relating to all aspects of foreign intelligence. In the confines of these objectives the Bureau was not considered for examination by the Group in view of the Bureau's lack of operational jurisdiction in matters outside of this country. Mr. Belmont, acting for the Bureau, gave a briefing before the Group on 7/29/60 regarding the Bureau's relations with other United States intelligence agencies. There was no mention made of the Bureau in the report except in one of its recommendations relative to reorganization of the membership of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which will be dealt with in more detail later.

The 141 page report submitted by the Group appeared to be apologetic in tone for any shortcomings of CIA. The reader obtains the definite impression the report was used as a sounding board for differences of opinion as to methods and administration for collection of foreign intelligence (overt and covert) abroad.

The main basis for conclusions and recommendations made by the Group rested in delineation of duties of DCI as coordinator of intelligence as opposed to DCI secondary responsibility as head of CIA. The Group recognized service jealousies apparently resulting from refusal to accept the fact that DCI could control and coordinate intelligence effort without affording preferential treatment to CIA which was his operational and administrative arm.

There is no reference in the report to a clear definition of CIA operational responsibilities or jurisdiction within continental United States.

The Group found that DCI through heads of missions abroad and designated DCI representatives in foreign countries had principal responsibility for control and coordination of foreign collection efforts. The CIA's operations abroad were recognized in almost all 43 of the Group's recommendations.

Recommendation number 17 emphasized that CIA should place emphasis on the establishment of unofficial cover throughout the world; recommendation number 20 was that CIA should increase intelligence support to unified and component commanders by direct dissemination from pertinent field stations.

The report noted that CIA's main requirements problem related to clandestine collection and concerned the great number of requirements served on the Agency. . .

The main tone of the report was that greater cooperation was required between the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Department of State, and CIA in carrying out foreign intelligence collection missions. The recommendations of the Group were all directed toward this end and had no bearing on internal espionage or counterespionage activities within the United States.

In commenting on the coordination duties of the DCI, the Group pointed out that USIB had been officially directed to "establish policies and develop programs for the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned; the DCI is authorized to make such surveys of departmental intelligence activities or the various departments and agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the NSC and coordinate the intelligence effort of the United States." The report interpreted these official directions to indicate that USIB should assume a greater proportion of the actual direction and control of the intelligence community of which the Bureau was noted to be a member.

To strengthen USIB position as a director, coordinator, and controller of intelligence effort, the Group recommended (recommendation number 30) that the USIB should be reduced to four members who should be the DCI (chairman) and representatives of Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission would be relegated to ad hoc representation on the Board.

It should be noted in considering the proposed change of USIB membership that the Bureau was a member of six of the twenty-six subcommittees which formed the committee make-up of the USIB.

Memorandum January 10, 1961, Mr. Belmont to Mr. Parsons outlined the proposed USIB membership change for the Director. It recommended that Bureau make no issue of the proposed recommendation. The Director underlined a passage of the memorandum which stated "In one sense of the word it could be argued the FBI would lose prestige by changing from a regular member to an ad hoc member." The Director approved the recommendation of the memorandum with the following notation: "O.K. but I am not enthusiastic about the change of our status. H." Our status, however, was not changed and the Bureau has continued to hold full membership on the Board.

In brief, the Joint Study Group Report noted that the majority of the recommendations of the Study Group had been favorably received by the intelligence community in that positive action had been taken to place most of them in effect. Many of the recommendations of the Group were felt to have been met by the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) which acted as a coordinator and overseer of the intelligence effort of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is no comment made in this report which would bear on our present survey of CIA jurisdiction or activities within the United States in conflict with our own jurisdictional and investigative interests. The only reference to the Bureau in this latter report was as previously mentioned in the comment relative to reorganization of the membership of the USIB.

5. Responsibilities of the FBI

a. Laws and Directives

No information has been developed with respect to any laws passed or directives issued specifically delegating to the FBI responsibilities for the positive acquisition of foreign intelligence in the United States. As has been set forth above under the caption, "The History of Foreign Intelligence Collection in the United States - Prior to World War II," President Roosevelt conducted certain conferences following which he issued instructions with regard to investigations of fascist and communist activities in the United States. Those investigations were to be for intelligence purposes. For the most part, they took on a counterintelligence aspect; however, during the course of them foreign intelligence information was developed either as an outgrowth of investigative activity or through the conducting of technical surveillances.

We found no record regarding the designation of the FBI as the agency responsible for collection of foreign intelligence information in the United States as of the time the Office of Coordinator of Information was created on 7/11/41. Neither did we find any record indicating such responsibility had been delegated to any other agency.

b. Requests From Other Agencies

From time to time the Bureau has received specific requests from other agencies based upon which we have undertaken the collection of foreign intelligence information in the United States in a clandestine fashion. Two instances of this nature were based on requests from the Department of State and from the White House.

(1) Department of State Request - Recognizing a gap in our intelligence coverage of friendly governments, on 10/21/55 we discussed with the then Deputy Undersecretary of State, Robert Murphy, the question of instituting limited discreet technical surveillances on official establishments of selected foreign nations, principally those located in world trouble areas. We pointed out that the FBI stood ready to institute such coverage as might be desired by the Department of State.

Mr. Murphy was quite receptive to this idea, stating that limited coverage sufficiently flexible to change with changing world conditions might be highly desirable. After further discussions it was agreed that a program, "progressive" in nature, would be instituted. By this, Mr. Murphy explained that he did not feel at that time that all desirable coverage should be instituted at a given date, but rather that coverage should be placed on one country at a time as moving events abroad might dictate. On this basis this type coverage was instituted based on a specific request from Mr. Murphy on 12/5/55 that we place technical surveillances on all Egyptian establishments in the United States. Since then, technical surveillances have been placed on numerous establishments of foreign countries for either extended or limited periods of time, depending upon developments on the international scene.

(2) White House Request - In May, 1965, President Johnson advised the Director he wanted the FBI to set up a group in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of taking charge of cleaning out communists in the Dominican Government and advising the Government of those who might try to infiltrate Government ranks. This was the basis for opening our Santo Domingo Office, which has continued operation since 5/21/65.

As a result of maintaining our Dominican Office and assisting in its mission, we have instituted various technical surveillances and developed numerous live sources in the United States from which we regularly acquire foreign intelligence information. Since the President has relied on the Bureau to keep him apprised of developments from an intelligence standpoint as well as developments with respect to communist influence, these sources are regularly contacted for information which fits within the terms of foreign intelligence data.

c. FBI's Role in the United States Intelligence Board

The predecessor to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). the IAC was established by National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) number 1 dated 12/12/47. By amendment to this Directive dated 7/7/49, the Bureau was designated a member of the IAC for the purpose of coordinating domestic intelligence with foreign intelligence. NSCID 1 has been revised several times. Subsequent to a revision dated 4/21/58, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board merged the IAC and the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board into one body known as the United States Intelligence Board. National Security Council Directive dated 9/15/58, approved by the President, formally created the United States Intelligence Board as successor to the IAC and the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board.

The USIB in its present form is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central

Intelligence is distinguished from the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in that the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board is considered the President's principal advisor on foreign intelligence. Membership on the United States Intelligence Board consists of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Director of CIA; the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of the National Security Agency; the Assistant General Manager for Administration, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Assistant Director of the FBI. The primary responsibility of the USIB is the coordination of intelligence activities. In this regard, USIB's major effort is concerned with the preparation and approval of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) for use by policy makers.

As a rule, the Bureau does not participate in the preparation of NIE's inasmuch as the subject matter is usually outside the jurisdiction of this Bureau. We have in the past participated in some selective NIE's such as certain estimates on Cuba, world communism, the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the United States and on the Dominican Republic.

As part of its staffing procedure, USIB has created numerous committees in some of which the Bureau maintains membership. The USIB committees on which the Bureau has representation are the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, the Signal Intelligence Committee, the Interagency Defector Committee, the Watch Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Security Committee, and the Committee on Documentation. As a general rule, attendance at Committee sessions is handled by the Liaison Section. Attendance at meetings is in the main restricted to the Interagency Defector Committee, the Watch Committee, the Security Committee, the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee and the Committee on Documentation. The Bureau has a primary interest in the business of these five committees. All decisions made by these committees, which are subsequently approved by the USIB, are the subject of individual memoranda submitted to the Director for his approval.

Over the years, consideration has been given to the Bureau's withdrawing its membership from USIB. On each occasion the Director has chosen to have the Bureau retain its membership on the Board. The last such occasion occurred in 1964 during the period when John McCone was Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board. At that time, the military services were removed from membership on the Board and replaced by the Defense Intelligence Agency. At the time, Mr. Belmont, then Assistant to the Director, orally discussed with the Director the possibility of the Bureau's withdrawing from the USIB. The Director's comments were that we would not request removal from membership on the Board but would withdraw our membership only if so requested by the Director of Central Intelligence in his role as Chairman of the USIB. The Bureau's withdrawal would, of course, require action on the part of the National Security Council.

d. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

This group was originally organized in January, 1956, as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activity. Its primary function at that time was to review periodically the Government's foreign intelligence efforts with specific emphasis on the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was established as a result of recommendations by the Hoover Commission. In the later years of the Eisenhower Administration the activity of the group fell off and it was re-organized in its present form with the advent of the Kennedy Administration.

Our relationship with this Board has historically been one of informal liaison in view of the fact that the primary function of the Board is concerned with foreign intelligence. There have been occasions where representatives of the Bureau briefed individual members and/or panels of the Board concerning our jurisdiction, techniques and accomplishments in the intelligence field. These briefings have been received with a receptive and sympathetic attitude. Our main concern in following the activities of this Board has been to assure that the Central Intelligence Agency does not encroach upon our jurisdiction and upon the functions of the various intelligence communities in which we hold membership.

The case involving Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap, a former employee of the National Security Agency who was a Soviet espionage agent, was thoroughly reviewed by the present PFIAB in view of the most serious ramifications it presented. This case concerned the penetration by the Soviets of the National Security Agency. The report which emanated from the PFIAB study included proposals which affect the responsibilities and activities of several agencies within the intelligence community. All of the twenty-one recommendations of the Board dealt with various aspects of achieving a strengthened counterintelligence capability to guard against penetration of our security establishments by hostile intelligence agencies. Nineteen of the recommendations of the Board were approved by the President and three of these related directly to Bureau activity. They are as follows:

> #18: "That steps be taken to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has adequate agent resources to effect the required domestic counterintelligence coverage of both bloc and nonbloc official installations and personnel who may be engaged in intelligence and related activities inimical to the national security."
>
> #19: "That the policies of the Department of State with respect to authorizing technical coverage (use of wiretapping and listening devices) by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of foreign official installations and personnel in this country be re-examined with a view to liberalization to the extent necessary to provide the counterintelligence coverage required in the interest of national security."
>
> #20: "That, in future, when consideration is given to exchanging detected Soviet-bloc intelligence agents for imprisoned American personnel in bloc countries, advance consultations be held with Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assure that adequate attention is given all intelligence aspects of such proposed exchanges in the interest of the national security, weighed against the political gains to be achieved."

e. The Director's Stand Over the Years

The Director's stand over the years with respect to jurisdiction concerning foreign intelligence matters within the United States is reflected in numerous comments he has made dating back to the days when the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was being formed.

In June, 1946, General Vandenberg, then head of CIG, sent a memorandum to the Director proposing that the National Intelligence Authority issue a directive extending the powers and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence, which position General Vandenberg occupied. The memorandum was analyzed on June 21, 1946, in a memorandum from C. H. Carson to D. M. Ladd in which it was pointed out that it was inevitable that CIG must enter into the domestic picture because of sources of foreign intelligence in that field. An addendum was placed on the memorandum by Mr. Edward A. Tamm and Mr. C. A. Tolson which was followed by comments by the Director which is most pertinent to the subject matter under discussion. The addendum read:

> "Mr. Tolson and Mr. Tamm do not concur with the conclusion expressed in this memorandum that 'It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign intelligence existing in that field.' They feel that a coordinated program for the exchange of information between the Central Intelligence Authority and the FBI, permitting a free and comprehensive exchange of information in matters of mutual interest, will enable the Bureau to work in the domestic field without interference from the Central Intelligence Authority in the same manner that the Bureau works, for example, with local police departments or other governmental agencies within defined jurisdictional lines. We believe that the attached letter to General Vandenberg is satisfactory."

The Director commented as follows:

> "I am not as optimistic as are Tolson & Tamm. I think it is inevitable that there will be a collision with CIG over our domestic jurisdiction

> or rather their expansion into it on intelligence matters. It ought not occur but this new memo of CIG shows how greedy it is. It is the Donovan plan almost in toto & is being slyly put over. It means we must zealously guard our domestic jurisdiction & not yield an inch & be ever alert to resist any encroachment."

On March 27, 1953, the Director testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations. In response to a question from Senator McCarran concerning liaison between FBI and CIA, the Director stated: "There is close liaison. CIA has exclusive jurisdiction abroad for intelligence. We have exclusive jurisdiction within the United States. We maintain continuous liaison with CIA Headquarters in Washington through a liaison representative of our Bureau in order to facilitate the transmission of material from them to us and from our service to them."

In October, 1958, CIA approached us requesting our concurrence in CIA's establishing physical and technical surveillance in the United States on the CIA had an operational interest in this individual. By memorandum it was recommended that the Bureau not become involved in this CIA operation and that CIA be informed that this would not establish a precedent for approval of future CIA activities in the United States. Responsive to continuing to present problems, the Director noted: "This is an understatement particularly if we are going to adopt a macaroni backbone attitude instead of standing up forthrightly for our rights and jurisdiction."

CIA, in April, 1959, advised us that one of its sources would be visiting the United States, and requested our concurrence in CIA's establishing coverage including technical surveillance. It was recommended we stay out of this matter and inform CIA that this was not to be construed as a precedent for approval of future CIA counterintelligence activity in the United States. The Director commented on the memorandum: "The trend has gone so far we have become nothing but a rubber stamp for CIA yet they won't even allow us to perform liaison functions abroad much less operational ones."

In January, 1960, CIA agreed to comply with conditions imposed by the Bureau with regard to developing positive intelligence information through contacts between U. S. residents and visitors from Iron Curtain countries. CIA agreed to contact us first before promoting such associations. In March, 1960, CIA inquired if it might obtain Bureau clearance at the field level for such contacts in the interest of expediency. Mr. Tolson noted: "More and more we are agreeing to CIA operations in the U. S. I am opposed to this relaxation. We can exercise better control here than through our field offices." The Director added: "I share Tolson's views." CIA was advised clearance was to be obtained through Bureau headquarters.

A source, furnished information alleging penetration of American intelligence. One Serge Karlow, a CIA officer, was developed as a suspect. On 2/9/62, we took over the investigation. On 2/26/62, Sheffield Edwards, then CIA Director of Security, admitted CIA had had technical coverage on Karlow from February, 1961 to 2/9/62. Edwards claimed his reluctance to tell us of this situation earlier because of obvious possible jeopardy to prosecution, plus embarrassment to his Agency should the Bureau raise an objection to CIA's maintaining such coverage. The Director noted: "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion but on specific instances all too many in number. Yet there exists wistful belief that 'the leopard has changed his spots'."

In April, 1962, we received information on a strictly confidential basis from Jay Sourwine of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to the effect that an unidentified CIA representative had talked to Senator Eastland concerning an alleged move to place CIA in charge of all intelligence-gathering operations for the Government -- to include Soviet espionage in the U. S. The Director noted: "I am not surprised at the above alleged effort. There is no doubt in many quarters a desire to eliminate the FBI in dealing with espionage and subversion for we are a thorn not only in the side of communists but also the ADA and Fabian Socialists. CIA which failed again and again to know what is actually going on abroad could be counted upon to blunder the same way in the USA."

In April, 1963, we received information indicating that CIA Director John McCone was considering expansion of CIA operations in the United States -- specifically intelligence coverage and the development of sources in this country. The Director made a note on the memorandum recording this: "McCone is trying to do another 'Donovan.' If he injects himself into the U. S., the FBI gets out. Too many cooks spoil the broth."

In December, 1963, the Director inquired as to the nature and extent of intelligence operations wherein CIA had established contact with a diplomat, operated him in the U. S. with our coordination, and continued to operate him upon his having departed this country. Four such cases were cited. On the memorandum, the Director noted: "I have little confidence in CIA abiding by agreements if it serves its purpose better not to do so."

In January, 1964, CIA advised us it had reorganized its activities in the U. S. The Domestic Operations Division, CIA, had established field offices in this country under appropriate cover. A memorandum was prepared describing the history of CIA operations in the U. S. and recommending action designed to protect our interests. A letter went to CIA with ground rules which the Bureau expected CIA to follow in all matters requiring coordination. The Director noted: "OK, but I hope you are not being taken in. I can't forget CIA withholding the French espionage activities in the U. S. nor the false story concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, only to mention two of their instances of double dealing."

The New York Office, by letter 2/14/64, set forth its observations concerning a briefing given that office on the matter of CIA operations in the U. S. The Director commented: "I think this domestic operations expansion of CIA is very dangerous and will inevitably 'muddy' the waters."

In May, 1964, the Bureau reconsidered its stand with respect to permitting CIA to approach sources at foreign establishments in the United States for intelligence purposes. The following policy was proposed and subsequently approved:

(1) Where there was no indication a source would be leaving the United States, we would deny CIA clearance for contact until we had fully explored the person's potential for our own purposes. If we decided we had no

interest and CIA contact would not jeopardize any FBI investigations, we would grant CIA approval to proceed with its contact with proviso we be kept informed of information developed of possible interest to us.

(2) Where it appeared source would be returning to a foreign country shortly we would normally grant CIA clearance for preliminary contact with proviso we be kept informed of results. We reserved the right to take direct access to the source as our needs required.

(3) Where there was an overlapping of interests and source expected to continue in United States for fairly extended period of time, in those instances where CIA had entree and no Bureau investigation would be jeopardized we would permit CIA to explore matter and make preliminary contact keeping us advised of progress and getting our specific clearance before a direct recruitment approach; however, where factors indicated it would be to best Bureau interests to operate source, we would undertake the recruitment and keep CIA advised of information of interest to that Agency.

When these matters were submitted for approval Mr. Tolson commented, "Looks okay, but we will have to watch this very closely." The Director concurred in Mr. Tolson's remark.

D. THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U. S.

In 1941, the U. S. allegedly had in its possession practically all of the foreign intelligence it needed regarding military and strategic targets in Japan. The information was scattered among various individuals who had personal knowledge or was located in libraries, various Government agencies, private business firms, institutions, et cetera. Tragically, the U. S. Government did not have any mechanism to collect, record and evaluate such information. Intelligence was badly needed in 1941, and we paid dearly in lives and financial resources to accomplish certain missions because the information was not readily available.

Today, the need for foreign intelligence is greater than ever. The stakes of foreign policy have never been higher. The U. S., being a dominating world power, has assumed vast responsibilities enmeshed in delicate political situations throughout the world. The ever-existing threat of an atomic war with communist countries demands a continuing acquirement of knowledge so thatpolicies and courses of action can be designed in the most effective manner possible. The information needed applies to numerous fields of activity, a major area being scientific research and development. In this connection, the revolutionary break-throughs in the scientific category are occurring with unusually high frequency, and if the U. S. is to remain in the forefront, it is absolutely necessary that we obtain an accurate evaluation of the enemy's capabilities and intentions. We have been fortunate to collect high quality positive intelligence through sophisticated collection methods, i.e high altitude photography and research in this area is proceeding at an accelerated pace. Nevertheless, electronic gadgets and machines will never produce all that is required. We still need supplementary coverage on a heavy scale, and the human being still continues to be a vital source of information. The individual talks and volunteers information. He talks and his statements are intercepted. All of this produces valuable increments of intelligence. The individual can still provide badly needed data either through his voluntary contribution or through his unwitting divulging of intelligence. The importance of the individual is further emphasized when we realize that as each sophisticated collection technique is introduced, science also introduces newly designed countertechniques of covering, protecting, and camouflaging important assets. In essence, technology eventually hits an inpenetrable or leveling-off depth.

Foreign intelligence is not geographically restricted. Information regarding Chinese Communists can be obtained anywhere in the world, and even if it is of a fragmentary nature, the data can be of significant value. The demand for information is heavy and is sought by every agency in the Government. Because of this, it has been necessary for the U. S. Government to map a program of collection on a priority basis. This has been done through the creation of a committee which is attached to the U. S. Intelligence Board. The committee maintains a list of priorities on a current basis. A recent list of guidelines for the collection of foreign intelligence pertaining to scientific affairs in Communist China included approximately 170 items, i.e.

In the U. S. proper, the sources of foreign intelligence are voluminous. Most of these sources overtly provide information through newspapers, scientific publications, libraries, tourists, visiting professors and students, journalists, and immigrants. The compilation, collation, analysis, and reporting of such information involves an extensive program and, needless to say, the U. S. today does not have the capability of tapping all available sources on a current basis.

For the purpose of this paper, we are thinking about the search for knowledge considered vital for national survival. One could suggest that clandestine collection of intelligence is overemphasized and that our Government could readily protect its interests through overt collection and the employment of our best analysts and evaluators. If we take this approach, we may as well discount the importance of the Bureau's activities in the counterintelligence field, which essentially are of a clandestine nature and which have produced time and again vital intelligence. We, therefore, must move on the assumption that the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence is very definitely a most necessary element of our over-all intelligence capabilities.

In addition to the overt sources, there exists a rich potential in the U. S. among the foreign diplomatic establishments including the U. N., the officials of foreign governments, and visitors such as students, professors, and scientists. A certain amount of information from such sources can be obtained in an overt fashion, but the high quality data is normally acquired through clandestine means. This can be done through technical monitoring, development of live sources, access to records, files, et cetera. There are approximately 10,000 foreign officials in the U. S. assigned to embassies, consulates, trade missions, U. N., and other international organizations. This excludes dependents. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, 38,544 foreign government officials visited the U. S.; about 1500 of these came from communist-bloc countries. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, approximately 50,000 foreign students came to the U. S.; 733 of these came from the communist bloc. During the same fiscal year, there were 2,075,967 visitors from all countries. Everyone of the foregoing is a potential source of foreign intelligence. As can be readily accepted, the U. S. Government does not have a capability of assessing each and every one of these sources for foreign intelligence. We can say at this point that the FBI and CIA are just scratching the surface. It is recognized that a program designed to assess or attempt to recruit each potential source would be out of the question. Such a massive undertaking would not be compatible with U. S. Government foreign policy. There is no question that there must be selectivity of a judicious and prudent nature.

Since the U. S. is such a major power, Washington, D. C. is the center of diplomatic activity involving practically all foreign nations. The location of the U. N. in New York City presents us with another area of intensified activity. Most countries send their most able diplomats to the U. S. so we are confronted with hundreds of highly talented people. The day-to-day activities in diplomatic establishments, conferences, meetings, negotiations, liaison between countries, all create a tremendous reservoir of foreign intelligence potential.

E. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding regarding CIA's capabilities to collect foreign intelligence in the United States, we should first clarify that one of the components of the Agency which has offices in the United States does not engage in this particular activity. The Office of Security, which is responsible for personnel and physical security, maintains several offices in the United States under authorized Treasury Department cover. Personnel of this office conduct investigations of applicants, firms or individuals who may be utilized by CIA on a contract basis to support intelligence operations overseas.

The overt collection of intelligence by CIA is handled by the Domestic Contact Service (DCS) (formerly called Contact Division). CIA estimates that DCS has a capability of tapping approximately 15 per cent of the total potential of intelligence in the U. S. This Division has 18 field offices and 16 resident agencies in the United States, and each office is openly identified as being connected with CIA. Personnel totaling approximately 140 carry CIA credentials. The Division regularly has a number of officers from the various military services who are assigned to this Division on a temporary basis. These military officers concentrate on the collection of that foreign intelligence which relates to the immediate United States military needs. The personnel of DCS interview aliens, tourists, officials of import-export firms, students, scientists, and the information collected covers a very broad spectrum in the positive intelligence category. DCS claims to have contact with about 7200 organizations, institutions, or businesses and has approximately 60,000 contacts or sources of information. The information is reported in the form of "Information Reports," which is disseminated throughout the intelligence community. During 1965, DCS disseminated 26,000 such reports. DCS does not have any responsibilities in the clandestine collection of intelligence, and in that sense it is very specifically not operational. DCS definitely cannot engage in any activity of an internal security nature, and within CIA it is clearly understood that DCS is not to be operational under any circumstances. DCS has been the subject of some controversy within CIA. There is one school of thought which maintains that DCS should be an appendage of the Deputy Director of Plans, who is responsible for all clandestine operations. The other school which has prevailed holds to the line that DCS should be separate and continue under the supervision of the Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI). This situation not only has caused headaches for CIA but also for the Bureau because of situations which arise where the "left hand does not know what the right hand is doing."

DCS is essentially carrying out CIA's responsibilities emanating from National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 2 which has its roots in a similar directive issued under the National Intelligence Authority in 1946. It has been in business for approximately twenty years. Per agreement, DCS cannot interview an alien without first clearing with the Bureau. This is done on a daily basis. With regard to American citizens, Bureau approval is not required unless the Bureau has indicated a prior interest in the individual; however, DCS nevertheless submits name checks on Americans, and if it so happens that the subject of such an inquiry is a Bureau source or involved in a Bureau investigation, we are in a position to move to protect our interests. It should be noted that although DCS is engaged primarily in positive intelligence collection, it is required to be on the alert for sources who possibly might be useful to CIA's clandestine operations. For example, if DCS encounters an alien who can be utilized in an overseas operation, the lead is passed on to the appropriate division. At the present time, DCS alerts the newly created Domestic Operations Division (explained below) regarding potential sources.

Our current controls with regard to DCS are functioning efficiently. We regularly examine the status of this relationship, and we periodically make adjustments in order to make certain there is no "freewheeling" and to take advantage of the information which DCS gains and which is of interest to the Bureau. For example, we are currently working out arrangements where our field offices can contact the local DCS offices concerning Chinese aliens who might be of interest to us either as subjects for investigation or as potential informants. This liaison at the field level was deemed desirable so that we could get information at the "horse's mouth" rather than wait for a reply from CIA headquarters, which is often prolonged and, when transmitted, is sometimes stripped of pieces of information. This occurs because of the involved and sometimes complicated maze of bureaucratic compartmentation within CIA.

In the latter part of 1963, CIA created its Domestic Operations Division (DOD), which was to be responsible for any clandestine development of sources in the United States. Prior to the establishment of this Division, CIA activity in this field was managed from each individual area division at Washington headquarters. The pressing need for more clandestine sources, coupled with the recognition of the vast potential in the United States, prompted CIA to create a new division which would be responsible for all of the area division interests. DOD has headquarters at Washington, D. C., and currently has field offices at New York City, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Washington, D. C., proper. Approximately 40 intelligence officers are assigned to the task of engaging in assessment and/or recruitment of positive intelligence sources, primarily in the diplomatic field. Some of the personnel are assigned to the handling of firms or organizations which may be supporting certain CIA operations abroad. DOD personnel in the field operate under authorized Department of Defense cover. The heads of these field offices are known to us, and we have established a satisfactory liaison area at the field level.

DOD is also responsible for the handling of CIA agents (informants) who have been recruited abroad and who come to the United States for assignments either on a temporary basis or for the duration of a normal diplomatic assignment.

The creation of DOD within CIA was and still is a somewhat controversial Agency subject. DCS saw DOD as an interfering element. The area desks were reluctant to have a new division to take over their agents. Some of the DOD personnel are very capable and seasoned intelligence officers. Many of them are considered of mediocre capability, and there is a frequent rumor that other CIA divisions send their misfits to DOD. From CIA's standpoint there appears to be a definite need for a much stronger team within DOD.

Theoretically, DOD is required to be on the alert for all potential sources who can be used by CIA in its intelligence operations, and the approach is basically one of a long-range nature. DOD is required to make use of all leads emanating from fellow employees who may have developed social contacts or associations with foreigners abroad or who might meet potential sources in the United States. Since CIA personnel operate under diplomatic cover when abroad, they do get the opportunity to move in diplomatic circles. Similarly, undercover agents of CIA traveling throughout the world also make contacts which offer potential exploitation if and when the target stops in the United States.

Since January, 1964, when DOD actually began moving, it has recruited approximately ten individuals in the diplomatic field. Most of these were in the noncommunist-bloc area. All of those recruited appear to have been in a fairly low-level category. All of them were career diplomats, and there was no evidence that the individuals were connected with any intelligence service.

In addition to the activities of DCS and DOD, there is a certain amount of CIA operational movements which do not fall under either of the foregoing divisions. One example is the CIA base in Miami which was set up for CIA's operations directed against the Cuban Government. This base is used for the training and dispatching of agents into Cuba and to some extent into other countries in the Caribbean, particularly the Dominican Republic. This base is directly responsible to the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, which could be called the Latin American Division.

CIA also becomes involved in political and psychological warfare type of programs directed against targets in foreign countries. The Agency broadly refers to this activity as "covert action." The programs are essentially designed to influence individuals, organizations or governments through various news media, and this will include the utilization of "agents of influence." This activity falls under the International Organizations Division (IOD) of CIA, which has no responsibility to collect information. IOD does use people in the United States to help implement the overseas programs. Quite often the Agency uses cutouts or covers for such an operation. Although IOD does not engage in intelligence collection, it is a CIA division which should be kept in mind, since its activities quite often will be tangent to matters of interest to the Bureau. For example, IOD becomes involved in the World Youth Festival, where its objective is to neutralize communist influence. We, of course, have had an interest in the Festival because of the participation of Americans, including members of the CPUSA. Theoretically, IOD is required to coordinate closely with other appropriate components of CIA. We do not believe that this coordination has been effective enough.

There is no doubt that there are individuals in CIA who aspire to broaden the Agency's operational activities in the United States. Such individuals would like to see an arrangement similar to one currently in force in England where MI-6 has a free hand to assess and recruit all foreigners, including diplomats, where there is no evidence that they are engaged in intelligence activity. If such evidence is obtained, MI-6 is required to coordinate with MI-5. There are people in CIA who would like to see similar machinery and in addition would want the freedom to conduct certain investigations and maybe even institute technical surveillances.

In summary, CIA so far has a very limited capability to recruit foreign diplomatic sources in the United States, but the Agency appears to have done fairly well with a relatively small staff; however, it can be anticipated that this capability will increase. CIA's effectiveness will probably be adversely affected for some time to come because of the Agency's well-known deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, loose administration, and lack of skilled and talented personnel.

F. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI

1. Manpower Being Devoted

It is most difficult to give any specific figures as to how much manpower the FBI is currently devoting strictly to foreign intelligence collection, separate and apart from the Bureau's internal security and counterintelligence functions. Much of the foreign intelligence developed by the Bureau is an outgrowth of our internal security investigations and cannot be neatly separated in terms of manpower or time.

A substantial amount of our foreign intelligence activity is concentrated in two offices where most of the diplomatic establishments in the United States are located; namely, New York and Washington Field. Both offices were requested to furnish estimates as to how much manpower is being allocated to foreign intelligence matters, including both live sources developed and technical coverage. In both cases, the estimates provided were highly tentative and both offices stress that manpower commitments in this area fluctuate widely from week to week depending on international politics and other unpredictable factors. For instance, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, both offices greatly increased their normal manpower commitment to the development of current foreign intelligence. The present Dominican crisis which involves production of foreign intelligence to a large extent represents another "abnormal" situation.

However, for what it is worth, WFO and New York have estimated that at the present time they are allocating approximately 35 Agents and 20 clerical employees to the full time task of foreign intelligence collection. Virtually all of the clerical time and about 40 per cent of the Agent time is related to technical coverage and the balance is aimed at the development of live sources.

In addition, of course, all of the other offices, including our Legal Attaches abroad, have devoted manpower to foreign intelligence collection in varying degrees. operations conducted in different field offices have involved the assignment of as many as 10 or 12 Agents for temporary periods. In connection with its responsibilities in the Cuban and Latin-American fields, the Miami and San Juan offices have devoted considerable manpower to the development of foreign intelligence in recent years. The Chicago Office in connection with its handling of our informant has devoted manpower to the development of foreign intelligence. These represent only a few examples.

On an overall basis and bearing in mind the difficulty in citing any precise figures, it is estimated that the Bureau probably averages approximately 50 to 75 Agents and 25 to 30 clerks assigned primarily to foreign intelligence work.

2. Number of Microphone and Telephone Surveillances with Evaluation of Product

At present, Bureau has only one microphone surveillance in foreign intelligence field and this is in connection with a special National Security Agency project directed against coded communications. Concerning technical surveillances, we are now operating about 70 foreign intelligence installations on various diplomatic establishments in this country. The majority of these are in Washington Field and New York with scattered installations in Chicago, Miami, Pittsburgh, San Francisco and San Juan. Under current Bureau policy, we are limited to 80 foreign intelligence technical surveillances and no microphone surveillances with the exception of one on the

In addition, during recent years, we have maintained approximately 50 so-called "telex" surveillances on the teletype facilities of various foreign establishments. This has been done at the specific request of the National Security Agency, in connection with its efforts to break foreign codes and to read foreign government communications.

We have had excellent results from these technical installations. Any compilation of items of value to the U.S. Intelligence Community and policy-making officials developed through this coverage would run many hundreds of pages. The results have ranged from information regarding plans and activities of key foreign countries in the diplomatic field to information regarding intelligence, political, economic and military developments in the countries concerned. In many instances, we have been able to forewarn the White House, the State Department and other interested agencies of impending developments and to furnish data giving an insight into the thinking and strategy of key foreign officials and governments. This coverage has proved specially valuable during crisis periods such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and during the tense negotiations involving the Panama Canal in 1964. On many occasions, top-ranking United States officials have commented on the effectiveness of this data. The particular importance of this information has been its timeliness to current events as well as the fact that it represents a penetration of foreign diplomatic circles which is only infrequently available through live sources.

In some instances, of course, this type coverage on a particular foreign establishment or official has not paid off. We have had cases where this technique has been unproductive for sustained periods of time on a particular country. This is to be expected and we have sought to overcome this by rotating our installations, correlating our technical operations with shifting international developments and putting coverage on those countries which appear to offer the most promise for worthwhile intelligence.

3. Live Sources With Evaluation

At present we are making active efforts to develop live informant coverage in the diplomatic establishments of 37 non-Soviet bloc countries. This list of so-called "target countries" varies from time to time but essentially we are seeking informant coverage in countries considered critical from an intelligence standpoint such as those leaning towards the Soviet bloc or countries in which the United States has paramount political or military interests or which are otherwise of primary concern. The current list includes virtually all Latin-American countries, a number of Middle East countries, and scattered countries throughout Africa and the Far East.

Our program was initiated in the early 1950s, and we are now using some 50 sources (This number fluctuates due to transfers, resignations, etc.). In each case, we clear with State Department prior to designating any country as a "target" and we also clear with State prior to conducting interviews with employees at the "target" establishment. In a number of instances, including most Latin-American countries, State has asked us to restrict our efforts to American citizens. This, of course, is a highly limiting factor.

Over the years this live informant coverage has on many occasions produced foreign intelligence of real value. Our sources have frequently provided data regarding proposed political, diplomatic or economic action by the countries concerned, on occasion in advance of other forewarning to U.S. intelligence. They have also been able to furnish a considerable amount of information regarding the whereabouts, background and general activities of individual foreign officials of security interest, thereby saving investigative time. These sources have been especially valuable in connection with the Program and other sophisticated attacks on foreign establishments, providing us with data regarding the physical security, location of code rooms, etc., of the various foreign establishments.

In addition to so-called "target" countries which are in the non-Soviet bloc area, the Bureau has developed a number of informants and defectors-in-place in Soviet-bloc establishments who have been able to furnish a substantial amount of foreign intelligence. In the Soviet-bloc field, we have also developed a number of sources in quasi-official establishments, such as trade missions, who have produced valuable foreign intelligence. In the Soviet-bloc field, of course, our live informant development has been aimed essentially at internal security and counterintelligence needs of the Bureau.

It is significant that we have been able to operate for many years in the development of live sources in foreign diplomatic establishments, both Soviet bloc and non-bloc, without encountering any serious incidents embarrassing to the FBI or the United States Government.

In assessing the product of such live sources in a number of instances in the non-Soviet field, State Department has requested that we restrict our efforts to American citizens. To a considerable degree, this has limited the effectiveness of our program in the non-Soviet field since U.S. employees of foreign establishments will normally not have access to top-grade data. Thus, especially in the non-Soviet bloc field we are not tapping the full potential which exists for high-level foreign intelligence. This can only be realized through the development of high quality sources.

4. *(This material, which is a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation, will be covered in a briefing to be arranged by the Counsel to the President)*

5. Double Agents and Informants

In a number of instances, Bureau double agents and informants, developed to assist us in connection with our internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, have been able to provide significant high-level information of foreign intelligence value.

For example, in the Soviet field, we have developed a number of top-level sources such as who have provided current intelligence regarding the organizational structure, personnel, and operations of the KGB and GRU, both in the Soviet Union and abroad; a description of various technical equipment used by Soviet intelligence; data regarding current relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China; and data regarding Soviet foreign policy, political and military developments, etc. Similar information of foreign intelligence value has been developed through FBI informants, double agents and defectors-in-place operating against

Polish, Yugoslav, Czechoslovakian and other communist-bloc countries. For instance, in the Cuban field on several occasions, FBI informants have been able to develop high-level or current intelligence regarding conditions in Cuba, and policies of the Castro regime through personal contacts with ranking Cuban officials both in the U.S. and abroad.

Through our coverage of the Communist Party, USA, and related organizations we have also frequently produced foreign intelligence, although to a lesser extent than in our operations in the foreign nationality field. One of our best sources of foreign intelligence in the domestic area is our so-called * wherein we have informants acting in a capacity between the Communist Party, USA, and foreign communist groups, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We have developed information through this operation regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute, social and political conditions in various countries, both in and outside the Soviet bloc, and tactics of the international communist movement.

6. Additional Potential

As indicated in the foregoing subsections, the Bureau is currently producing a considerable volume of foreign intelligence through covert means, much of it of a significant nature. Most of this data is an outgrowth of informants, technical coverage and investigative programs targeted primarily to fulfill our internal security and counterintelligence objectives and relatively speaking, we have committed only a small percentage of our assets exclusively in the direction of foreign intelligence.

It is believed that the Bureau possesses considerable potential for the development of foreign intelligence which could be realized with a fairly modest expenditure of manpower and costs if we were to make foreign intelligence collection a primary aim. For example, with existing equipment and facilities, we could expand our technical coverage of foreign establishments to include additional 30 to 40 foreign establishments provided we could assign about 25 additional personnel to this field. With the assignment of an additional 75 to 100 Agents, we could greatly intensify our foreign intelligence collection through live informants, primarily through the development and exploitation of additional sources at foreign diplomatic establishments. We could place more stress on foreign intelligence collection in our training programs and conferences to make more effective use of our already available ass We could, for example, add specialized classes on foreign intellig collection to our In-Service schedules or designate selected Burea personnel to attend training sessions operated by other U.S. agenc regarding this subject.

---

* *identifies a peculiarly sensitive foreign counterintelligence operation.*

G. AREAS OF CONFLICT, FBI - CIA

Any differences between FBI and CIA are first related to a basic problem existing in any country among the major powers, namely "How does a law enforcement agency coordinate its internal security functions with an intelligence organization which must operate as a clandestine service?" The very nature of the functions of the two organizations immediately introduces potential areas of conflict. One essentially operates overtly and the other covertly. This alone is enough to create an atmosphere fraught with controversies and confusion. Because each agency was molded differently and because responsibilities differ, there naturally will be conflicting approaches to national security objectives. For example, in the field of intelligence the Bureau is basically a counterintelligence body. CIA, to the contrary, has a much broader responsibility in intelligence, which includes collection of foreign intelligence, political and psychological warfare, interagency coordinating, evaluation, research, etc. Counterintelligence within CIA is actually a relatively small component of the agency. Personnel in the two organizations is recruited under different criteria and standards. Training is likewise at variance. In a final analysis, the experienced FBI Agent and the seasoned CIA intelligence officer are not of the same mold but certainly are tailored as two entirely and distinctly different instruments. We should bear in mind that little has been done to introduce truly substantive cross-fertilization of outlook, approach and operational philosophy between the two agencies. This could be advocated from a Utopian point of view, but it also could be argued that there are distinct advantages to maintaining sound compartmentation.

Separate from the above basic and fundamental situation, the differences between FBI and CIA also relate to other factors such as:

1) FBI was first on the scene and was well established long before CIA came to life. This led to a conception in the early years that CIA was an intruder.

2) The seed of CIA was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an organization whose personnel, activities and free-wheeling were the sources of numerous conflicts

with the Bureau during World War II. It was during these years that an atmosphere of mistrust and lack of confidence was created.

3) CIA was established as our first over-all, worldwide intelligence agency. The events and the maneuvering which led to this certainly did not bring with them a harmonious relationship.

4) Unfortunately, CIA grew big and grew fast, particularly because of an unsettled atomic world and developments such as the Korean War. The Agency did not jell effectively as an organization, and with this came numerous difficulties, many of which exist to this day.

5) Each organization has lacked adequate knowledge of the other's operational machinery, objectives, and "ways and means of doing things."

6) An element of rivalry actually developed over the years, and this, when not tempered with prudence and sound judgment, creates unhealthy situations.

7) A growing tendency on the part of CIA to expand its operational activities not originally contemplated in the formation of that agency.

It can be recognized that with this background it has not been an easy matter to establish a good working relationship with CIA without frequent conflicts, and sometimes agonizing negotiations. It could be suggested that the ideal situation would be to remove CIA from the U. S. with the understanding that we would assume responsibility for any and all activity in the intelligence field. As described in another section of this report, such a move would be highly infeasible for the Bureau.

It is to our credit that despite the problems of the past there have been some highly constructive developments in FBI-CIA relations, particularly as they affect activities in the U. S. Several years ago arrangements were made whereby CIA's Office of Security could conduct applicant investigations without infringing upon our jurisdiction. For several years we have been permitting CIA to interview aliens for foreign intelligence information under ground rules which have been very successful. Our liaison mechanism has been functioning effectively. We have frequent conferences. Bureau personnel lectures before CIA officers. Dissemination of information is excellent. The atmosphere for negotiating and discussing unusually complicated problems is very good. Personnel can work in the same area with a minimum of problems, as evidenced in the Dominican Republic. We attend USIB meetings and are actively engaged in the work of several committees attached to USIB. All of this is commendable progress and certainly beneficial to national security.

All of the foregoing was set forth in the way of background in order to better understand the current source of differences with CIA, namely the Agency's desire to assess and recruit foreign intelligence sources in the U.S. in the foreign diplomatic establishments, including United Nations, and to some extent among foreign visitors. CIA fully acknowledges our internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities. This is clear-cut and free of any debatable question; however, CIA feels that we have no legally-established responsibility in foreign intelligence collection and that somebody (in this case, CIA) should be fully exploiting the foreign intelligence potential in the United States, bearing in mind that there are approximately 10,000 foreign officials and employees in this country. CIA argues that a foreign diplomat can be recruited anywhere in the world but maintains that there is no better place than the United States for assessment, recruitment, training and orientation of an informant. CIA further maintains that if the Agency moves on a target, such as an Argentine diplomat who may be a career officer not connected with a foreign intelligence service, there should not be any conflict because the activity is in no way related to the internal security functions of the Bureau. CIA has also expressed the attitude that in the communist-bloc field CIA should be permitted to assess and recruit those individuals not connected with an intelligence or internal security service.

There are some people in CIA who are of the opinion that in the field of foreign intelligence the Bureau should be exerting more effort to actually assist CIA in spotting sources and, when needed, give CIA support in developing an individual through such means as surveillances, neighborhood investigations, etc. When CIA is permitted to recruit a source in the U. S., the Agency takes the position that if the source can be of help to the Bureau we should levy requirements on CIA and not ask for access to the source unless it clearly appears that only through access we can properly discharge our responsibilities. CIA takes a very strong view that once a source is developed it is basically unsound to introduce another agency into the relationship. The developing agency may have used techniques peculiar to its own organization and may have developed a relationship under varied circumstances, and when a new agency is introduced this relationship with the source could be unfavorably disturbed. CIA does not dispute the fact that informant and Agent turnovers sometimes are absolutely necessary.

CIA maintains that if the Bureau is given access to a CIA source we would be responsible for the counterintelligence aspects, but if the source produces foreign intelligence CIA should be responsible for handling this information, including the dissemination. CIA's position is that it is better qualified to evaluate the information and correlate it with the foreign intelligence being developed abroad. For example, if a Nigerian source of CIA, also available to the Bureau, furnishes information regarding the Nigerian Foreign Office, CIA claims that it can better handle the report and dissemination.

Discussions and agreements with CIA, including the actions stemming from meetings with the representatives of that agency in November 1965, have resulted in a greatly improved coordinating machinery. There still are areas of potential conflict which will necessitate improvement. They are:

1) DOD personnel receives leads or tips pertaining to possible access to Soviet-bloc diplomats. This CIA Division pursues these leads and is inclined to take the position that such individuals contacted by CIA are their "CIA-controlled sources." If we permitted this to go on over a period of time, CIA would have a vast network of sources not directly available to the Bureau. This is basically unsound, and there is no reason CIA shouldn't immediately give us the lead or tip for exploitation. We can recognize that, depending upon circumstances, it might be favorable to us and CIA for the Agency to handle a particular individual, and if so, it would be clearly

coordinated. This would be most important if the individual in any way was connected with or associated with an intelligence service.

2) DOD is anxious to have freedom to assess and recruit Bloc diplomats not known to be engaged in intelligence activity. On the surface, this does not appear to present a problem, but realistically speaking it is impossible for us to know that a Soviet diplomat, not known to be engaged in intelligence activity one day, appears on the scene the following week as an agent or coopted agent. To give CIA wide latitude in this field could create a truly undesirable mess. We believe that if CIA is permitted to move on such targets it should be done on a selective basis and with maximum coordination.

3) CIA's organizational and operational deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, poor internal coordination, unsatisfactory records, all introduce headaches which undoubtedly will continue to exist for many years.

4) There continues to be an element of mistrust and misunderstanding between the two organizations because of the historical reasons described above.

5) Continuing lack of one agency's appreciation for the other's objectives, responsibilities and operational philosophy.

6) The absence of a clearly defined Bureau policy and objectives in the field of foreign intelligence collection. CIA really does not know the nature and the extent of our interests, and consequently this lends to confusion and misunderstanding.

H. CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA

1. According to SAC Letter 59 dated 5/24/49, CIA and FBI had reached agreement whereby clearance would be requested of FBI before CIA conducted an interview with an alien in the U.S. This clearance would consist of a review of Bureau files concerning individual in question.

According to same SAC Letter, agreement had been reached by the FBI and CIA whereby CIA was allowed to contact American businessmen without obtaining clearance from FBI in order to obtain positive foreign intelligence information and arrange covers for CIA personnel abroad. This agreement was based strictly on collection of foreign intelligence and positively did not allow for the formulation of a network of confidential informants for CIA in the U.S.

Regarding FBI-CIA agreement that CIA would clear with us prior to interviewing aliens in U.S., following documentation has been located. By letter 2/19/48 Director of CIA Hillenkoetter wrote Director and referred to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7, 2/12/48. This Directive states in part that CIA will be responsible for exploitation on highly selective basis within U.S. of business concerns, other nongovernmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information. Hillenkoetter commented that CIA had been interviewing foreign businessmen, immigrants and refugees on small scale, always clearing matter first with FBI office in area concerned. He asked Director's views as to possible expansion of this activity.

By letter 2/26/48 Director replied to Hillenkoetter. In part, this letter pointed out FBI had no objection to CIA interviewing individuals enumerated above for foreign intelligence purposes; however, it was suggested that prior to interview such individual matters be cleared with FBI Headquarters.

2. Bureau letter to CIA 1/16/64 confirmed results of meetings between CIA and Bureau via liaison in discussing reorganization of CIA's Domestic Operations Division (DOD). Letter recognized CIA needs (recruitment of sources in U.S. who may be used abroad; recruitment of diplomats, including UN representatives, who might be useful to CIA in overseas operations or who might be transferred to Soviet-bloc countries; training of agents recruited; handling of agents developed abroad who come to U.S. for a visit or assignment; and approaches to foreign officials and visitors to assess their potential as sources when they leave the U.S.). Our letter to CIA set forth the following ground rules to be followed in connection with CIA's operations in order to avoid operational conflicts and embarrassment:

a. CIA would not conduct investigation of any foreign official in U.S. and if CIA felt such investigation warranted, FBI should be consulted.

b. No foreign official would be approached for recruitment by CIA without its conferring with FBI.

c. When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for visit or assignment, FBI will be advised and two agencies will confer regarding handling of agent in this country, it being recognized each case has its individual peculiarities.

d. Before approaching any foreign official or visitor for recruitment assessment, CIA will clear with FBI.

3. As result of conference with CIA in January, 1966, the above "ground rules" were modified and expanded and agreed upon by both agencies early this year (Confirmed by letter to Admiral Raborn 2/7/66). New ground rules in summary are as follows:

a. CIA will not initiate investigation of any foreign official in U.S. without concurrence of FBI. (Comment: This is essentially same as (a) in January, 1964, ground rules. Only difference is that wording of this modification implies more sympathetic FBI attitude towards any proposed CIA investigations.)

b. CIA will seek FBI concurrence before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist bloc visitor in U.S. FBI will concur if CIA action does not conflict with any FBI operations. (Comment: This is similar to (b) and (c) ground rules adopted in January, 1964, with two differences. First, it drops requirement that CIA clear with us before approaching a non-Soviet visitor although it must still do so with regard to non-Soviet officials. Secondly, it specifically commits the FBI to concur if proposed CIA action does not conflict with FBI operations.)

c. CIA will advise FBI prior to meetings between CIA assets and foreign officials or communist bloc visitors of interest to FBI. (Comment: This was not included in previous set of ground rules.)

d. Agents of CIA who come to U.S. will be identified to FBI by name or appropriate description depending on national security interest involved.

e. When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for a visit or assignment, FBI will be advised and two agencies will confer regarding handling of agent in U.S. It is recognized each case will have individual peculiarities and governing principle will be positive intelligence weighed against internal security factors. CIA may, however, continue its contractual relationship for purpose of handling training, procurement of positive foreign intelligence, (underlining added) fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent and preparation for next assignment abroad.

f. Where CIA will be handling its agent in U.S., CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide FBI all information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters. Where CIA servicing is inadequate for FBI internal security interests, FBI will have direct access to agent. (Comment: Rules (d), (e) and (f) represent greatly expanded and refined version of rule (c) of January, 1964, agreement. Old ground rules provided considerable latitude with regard to who would handle CIA source in the U.S. and this has led to some disagreements with CIA. The current ground rules clearly provide for CIA to retain contact with its agents not only for training, financing, etc., but also for "procurement of positive foreign intelligence." In addition, they make it clear that the FBI should not ask for direct access unless there is a specific internal security need.)

4. In addition to the above, there is one agreement we have reached with CIA which is of possible relevance; namely, our recent agreement relative to treatment of Soviet students in the U.S. By way of background, there are a number of Soviet exchange students currently attending various U.S. universities. Each student, of course, is not only a possible Soviet intelligence agent but also a potential source for the U.S. after he returns to his homeland. Accordingly, both FBI and CIA have an interest in these students.

Per memo dated 1/14/64 we advised CIA via liaison on 1/20/64 that the Bureau would adopt following procedure relative to Soviet students here. FBI will take responsibility for collecting material regarding each student on expedite basis, furnishing results to CIA as developed. At logical point FBI will confer with CIA to decide on case-by-case basis re possible recruitment. If Bureau recruits Soviet student, we will resolve whether we should turn him over to CIA before he leaves U.S. Under this procedure, CIA will not make any inquiries (through its sources in U.S.) unless it has some unusual source in a university not available to FBI who could furnish data on the student. In latter case, we would allow CIA to obtain data and advise us.

The foregoing represent all of the major agreements we have reached to date with CIA with respect to CIA operations here in foreign intelligence field.

I. EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

1. Overt Collection Activities

It is evident from the National Security Act of 1947 and the succeeding National Security Council Intelligence Directives as well as the directives of the Director of Central Intelligence that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is charged with major responsibilities in the overt collection of foreign intelligence in the United States. In pursuit of this, CIA exploits non-governmental organizations and individuals, foreign language publications and aliens. Although CIA claims to have contacts with about 7,200 organizations and businesses as well as about 60,000 sources of information as a result of its overt activities for this purpose, CIA estimates it is reaching only 15 per cent of the foreign intelligence information available in this country.

The question we must consider here is whether the FBI should take over the overt collection of foreign intelligence in the United States, thereby making CIA operational only in areas outside the limits of FBI's jurisdiction. In this connection, the following would have to be considered:

(a) Reporting:

The Bureau is a fact-finding agency which has traditionally gathered evidence and presented its findings without bias or conclusions. This would not change. Intelligence developed by the FBI would be evaluated by the users in the intelligence community. Our report writing format might have to be geared to the needs and established procedures of the United States intelligence community.

(b) Coordination With Other Government Agencies:

Foreign intelligence is a commodity produced for the benefit of many separate agencies of the United States Government. Because of this, if the Bureau were to have full responsibility for the overt collection of foreign intelligence in this country, we would have to greatly expand our liaison services, not only for dissemination purposes but to assure that we are kept fully informed regarding all matters dealing with intelligence priorities, Our role in preparation of National Intelligence Estimates would be more active as a result of our increased contribution under this program. It might be necessary to utilize the assistance of highly trained personnel of other agencies to assist us periodically on interviews dealing with complicated military or scientific matters.

(c) Manpower:

While no manpower requirements can be presently estimated should we assume full responsibility for overt foreign intelligence collection, CIA is currently using approximately employees throughout the United States to interview individuals in connection with its overt intelligence gathering activities, and is reaching what it estimates to be only 15 per cent of available foreign intelligence information. These CIA employees do not include personnel required at CIA Headquarters to correlate, evaluate and disseminate the data gathered in the field. We would want to more effectively exploit this intelligence potential.

To merely handle the necessary review of the vast number of foreign language publications would require many additional employees proficient in foreign languages and with backgrounds in scientific or technical fields.

(d) Selection and Training of Personnel:

To assume full responsibility for the overt collection of foreign intelligence in this country, would require that we vastly broaden our selection and training procedures. We would require applicants with degrees in the sciences, languages, history, government and economics. Our basic training and In-Service agenda would have to be geared to meet our new responsibilities. We would undoubtedly desire to utilize the services of outstanding lecturers from the agencies constituting our intelligence community, and in turn, we would wish to afford our personnel training at the War Colleges operated by the Department of Defense, and from time to time furnish them the opportunity of specialized training and briefings provided by the members of the U. S. Intelligence Board.

(e) Legislation:

CIA currently has the duty to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and to provide for appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government. This is set out in Title 50, USC, Section 403. The overt collection of foreign intelligence is not the subject of legislation but rather of National Security Council Intelligence Directives which would have to be revised in order to give the Bureau this authority now lodged with CIA.

(f) Organizational Changes:

To carry out a program committing the Bureau to the full responsibility for the overt collecting of foreign intelligence in this country would necessitate a substantial increase to the headquarters staffs of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Laboratory Divison, as well to the personnel assigned to the New York and Washington Field Offices where diplomatic establishments and international organizations are mainly located. In all probability the creation of a new division at the Seat of Government devoted entirely to overt collection responsibilities, would be required.

(g) Observations:

The many responsibilities that would be ours under a program making the Bureau accountable for the overt collection of all foreign intelligence in this country would (1) require an enormous increase in our own personnel, trained in many specialized fields, or (2) the delegation of varied intelligence functions to other governmental agencies and close supervision of such agencies to insure efficient execution of the tasks levied upon them. These overt collection responsibilities would undoubtedly be subject to the scrutiny of many sources, some of them hostile, and we would have to face the charges, unjust though they might be, that the Bureau had ceased to perform the duties for which it was originally created and had developed into a gigantic bureaucratic octopus.

2. Clandestine Gathering Activities

There are no statutory provisions for the clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence in the United States. We have in the past produced substantial foreign intelligence while carrying out our present responsibilities.

CIA established its Domestic Operations Division (DOD) in 1963 and began to clandestinely gather foreign intelligence in this country. It now has field offices with approximately intelligence officers assigned to these matters. It is anticipated that DOD's efforts will become more extensive.

CIA estimates there are approximately 10,000 employees and dependents assigned to the diplomatic establishments and international organizations represented in this country by approximately 120 foreign nations. It can readily be seen that we would have to establish priorities and well-defined objectives in order to cope effectively with the problem presented by the vast number of persons and establishments which could be considered for clandestine coverage.

Today there are approximately 40 nations in addition to the Soviet-bloc countries, whose establishments in this country we consider "target" countries for the purpose of developing live sources therein. In the absence of more precise criteria, our initial efforts in a program designed to expand our clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence, could be directed against these "target" nations.

(a) Objectives:

Under a program confined to the clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence in this country, and consistent with the intelligence needs of this Government, we would have as our objectives:

(1) Increasing substantially the number of live sources of high quality in diplomatic establishments, trade missions, consular offices or international organizations located within the United States;

(2) Expanding our present technical and microphone coverage in such establishments.

(This material, which is a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation, will be covered in a briefing to be arranged by the Counsel to the President.)

(b) Observations:

While a program limited to the clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence would require a substantial increase in manpower, both in the field and at the Bureau's headquarters, as well as an expansion o_ our personnel selection and training procedures, our liaison responsibilities and our filing and data processing facilities, however; in none of these phases would the increase be nearly as great as that which would be required should we assume full responsibility for the overt gathering of such foreign intelligence.

J. GENERAL FINDINGS

The study conducted by the Committee has produced the following significant findings:

(1) There definitely is a vast potential for collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. available through overt and clandestine channels. Even with the available capabilities of existing agencies, there is a large reservoir of untapped sources.

(2) CIA has been authorized by statute and implementing directives to collect foreign intelligence in the U. S. through overt methods and has been involved in such collection since the establishment of the Agency. This includes review of foreign language press and interviews with selected individuals such as American businessmen, aliens, and students. In addition, CIA has established an elaborate system of processing, storing, evaluating, and disseminating this information.

(3) Such overt collection by CIA does not present any threat or infringement on FBI jurisdiction or operations. The present Bureau controls for such CIA activity are satisfactory.

(4) We concluded that it would be highly undesirable for the Bureau to become responsible for overt collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. The necessary reorganization, expansion of facilities and manpower, and heavy task of information collection and processing could place a damaging burden on the Bureau.

(5) There has never been any statutory or similar provision for the clandestine development by CIA of foreign intelligence in the United States. There are instances where the FBI has received specific assignments which encompassed foreign intelligence collection in the United States (SIS operations covering entire Western Hemisphere in World War II; present operations concerning Dominican Republic). There is no statute or directive which assigns or confirms exclusive FBI jurisdiction in clandestine development

of foreign intelligence in the United States. As a result of our internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, we have produced a volume of foreign intelligence covertly. In addition, either at the specific request of other U. S. agencies or on our own initiative in response to national intelligence needs, we have produced such intelligence. We have done this on a selective basis and have not assumed full responsibility in this area. As indicative of this, certain agreements have been made with CIA permitting that Agency to assess and recruit after coordination with the FBI covert foreign intelligence sources in the United States (principally for use abroad). We have reserved the right to take over such sources if internal security factors are paramount. In the absence of such factors, CIA is permitted to utilize these sources for foreign intelligence purposes.

(6) We concluded that the expanded development of clandestine foreign intelligence sources is essential if national security interests are to be effectively served.

(7) Exploitation of foreign diplomatic targets fortifies our efforts in the internal security and counterintelligence fields. Information developed increases over-all knowledge and produces leads or ties to intelligence activity being carried out by foreign intelligence and security services.

(8) The U. S. intelligence community currently does not provide an organization or a mechanism which can effectively exploit the intelligence potential in the foreign diplomatic field. There have been expressions of concern and certain limited action taken by FBI and CIA, but there has not been a well-organized or united effort and most important of all, there has been a decided lack of leadership directed toward attacking the problem and at the same time inducing an atmosphere of harmonious application of all available resources.

(9) We concluded there is an excellent opportunity for the Bureau to assume leadership in this matter and in so doing, enhance national security and

the capabilities of the Bureau. The time has arrived for us to adopt and implement a new concept toward foreign intelligence collection. It would be unwise if the Bureau did not move into a leading role and instead applied policy and tactics conforming with a "holding action." This, in our opinion, is not consistent with the reputation of a progressive and forward looking organization.

(10) The Bureau does have talent and capability to assume a more active role in clandestine collection of foreign intelligence. We have the potential to handle clandestine collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. in a more effective manner than any other agency. This can be done in a constructive and prudent manner.

(11) It is recognized that a new approach by the Bureau will involve operational risks. If one is to progress, he must take risks. We feel that we have the capability to succeed with a minimum of losses or debits.

(12) We feel that if we do not adopt a new role characterized with an aggressive approach, a door is left open for other agencies such as CIA to progressively introduce programs designed to fill the vacuum. CIA currently does not have the capability to inject a rapid "take-over" of operational areas. We do feel that such would be accelerated not by CIA's strength, but by our weaknesses.

(13) CIA is progressively expanding its objectives and capabilities to conduct clandestine intelligence operations in the U. S. This presents a potential for areas of conflict between CIA and FBI.

(14) We definitely must define our role in the field of clandestine foreign intelligence collection so that policy and objectives are clear-cut. Not only our own personnel but other agencies including CIA should know exactly where we stand.

(15) CIA can be permitted to develop clandestine sources of foreign intelligence under the

established ground rules which do protect Bureau interests. A new approach being recommended would heavily deter CIA from extensive development of clandestine sources and would really leave the Agency in a minor or subordinate role.

K. RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION

A penetrative and objective study of the Bureau's position has led us to conclude that the Bureau should play a much more active and influential role in the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in the United States. We are recommending the implementation of a plan which will lead to a valuable contribution to our national security effort and concurrently will improve our internal security capabilities. This plan presents a concept of an FBI as an Agency primarily responsible for internal security, but supplementing its coverage with a substantially expanded capability in the clandestine collection of positive intelligence. We believe that we have the capability of developing this new look knowing that at the same time we can institute a badly needed leadership to eliminate a gap in the acquirement of high-quality intelligence in the United States. The main features of this plan are:

1) Establishment of a list of foreign diplomatic targets consistent with the needs of the Government.

2) Expansion of our technical surveillance capabilities with emphasis on misurs.

3) Expansion of live sources characterized with selectivity and high-quality value.

4) The FBI assuming a role of leadership in the clandestine exploitation of positive intelligence in the U. S., and in so doing making maximum use of the talent and capabilities of other appropriate U. S. Agencies.

Authorization

The plan would be implemented under proper executive authorization (Presidential) and furthermore would be coordinated with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). A letter from the President authorizing the Bureau to expand its capabilities in clandestine positive intelligence collection, consistent with the needs of the government, would suffice. In order to avoid any misunderstanding or confusion within the intelligence community, USIB would be apprised of the Presidential authorization. The letter from the President would not require any details regarding the nature and the scope of the action to be taken by the Bureau but could be expressed in general terms. This same authorization could be further defined by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

It is realized that it would be necessary to discuss this plan with the President so that he fully understood the purpose, scope and the controlling features. With his approval, the plan could also be discussed with the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Selection of Targets

Priority on targets can be established by application of the following criteria:

1) Review of requests or requirements levied on us by the President and U. S. Intelligence Agencies.

2) Review of priority listed by the USIB. (This is done on a regular basis.)

3) Our own analysis and evaluation of international political developments. This primarily will be done at SOG, but we should be so organized that the field would be free to submit recommendations.

As of March, 1966, the following could be set forth as a tentative list of priority targets in the United States:

1) USSR

a. Indications of significant changes in Soviet policies, particularly with respect to relations with the West and with Communist China.

b. Background information illuminating the decisions of the 23rd Party Congress, especially indications of policy disputes or political rivalries; repercussions in other Communist parties.

c. Developments in Soviet space programs in the wake of Luna 9.

2) Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia

a. Chinese Communist, Soviet and North Vietnamese capabilities, intentions, and actions with respect to Vietnam/Laos and to US activities in the area.

b. Indications of Soviet deployment of surface-to-surface missiles to North Vietnam.

c. Changes in the attitudes and policies of influential South Vietnamese, especially Buddhist leaders, toward the war effort or the US.

d. Indications of a major change in Viet Cong/PAVN and Pathet Lao military capabilities and tactics.

e. Information pertaining to the location, size, and types of Chinese troop units in Indochina.

f. Evidence of Viet Cong/PAVN/Chinese Communist use of Cambodia as a sanctuary, operating base, or source of supply; Cambodian Government attitudes toward such uses.

3) Communist China

a. Military, logistic, transportation, and economic information bearing on Communist China's capability to fight a war in Southeast Asia and indications of Chinese intentions respecting direct involvement in this area.

b. Movements of Chinese submarines out of their normal bases or operating areas, particularly toward the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin.

c. Increased air defense capability, particularly production and deployment of advanced fighter/interceptor aircraft.

d. Military activities in other border areas.

4) France

a. French foreign policy, especially concerning NATO, the USSR, the war in Vietnam/Laos and estrangement or competition with the US.

5) The Dominican Republic

a. The character, strength, influence and potential of the contending parties and factions; their capabilities and intentions to conduct coups or insurrectionist activities; their attitudes toward the June elections; capabilities of the Provisional Government to maintain control.

6) India-Pakistan

a. Developments in Indo-Pakistani relations and attitudes toward the US, the USSR and Communist China.

7) Latin America

a. Evidence of increased external Communist assistance to insurgency movements in Latin America in the wake of the January conferences in Havana.

8) Indonesia and Malaysia/Singapore

a. Political aims of the Indonesian military; Sukarno's health and political intentions and capabilities; moves to rebuild a Communist party.

b. Indonesian intentions to continue or reduce the conflict with Malaysia.

c. Changes in Soviet or Chinese policy toward Indonesia resulting from the current internal conflict.

9) Thailand and Burma

a. Communist subversive activity and external support; government capabilities to oppose subversion.

10) Africa

a. African and Communist support to Southern Rhodesian black nationalists; nationalist capabilities to act against the Smith regime; white opposition to the Smith regime; South African and Portuguese assistance to the Smith regime.

b. Effect of recent coups on the stability of other African states.

11) Yemen

a. Evidence of intentions and actions of the UAR and Saudi Arabia with respect to the Yemeni situation.

Technical Surveillance of Targets

Coverage in this field will be divided into the following categories:

1) Technical Surveillances
2) Microphone Surveillances
3) More sophisticated electronic monitoring, i.e. code machines.

At the present time we are handling a very limited number of installations. With existing capabilities, we could virtually double our present technical coverage. Once we have established reasonable priority listing, it is believed we should systematically expand our operations. In this connection, the following should be borne in mind:

1) Heavy emphasis should be placed on microphone surveillances.

2) Today we are placing greater stress on coverage of official establishments. The new program asks for an expansion of coverage on individuals and/or residences of individuals. Here again selectivity will be a dominating characteristic.

3) The program should be so flexible that we would be able to deactivate any installation for security reasons or for non-productivity and whenever possible employ techniques which would permit easy reactivation.

4) Except for current intelligence requiring immediate dissemination, the product should be handled as communications intelligence and dissemination would be subjected to well-established Comint controls of the National Security Agency (NSA) plus any additional restrictions the Bureau felt should be imposed.

5) The product would be transmitted to NSA by us for dissemination within the intelligence community. NSA would be responsible for handling any needed translation. We must recognize that the program will produce voluminous information and the responsibility for processing the data should be fixed with an agency which is organized and equipped to handle the job. It is believed that if the Bureau assumed this responsibility we would be burdened with a gigantic task of information processing to the point that this element would adversely affect other phases of the program.

6) If the information collected by us suggested a potential for the development of an operation, i.e. double agent, the Bureau could assume complete control of this operation including the dissemination of the information.

7) Our involvement in the "sophisticated" category should be increased by expanded research and development bearing in mind we should be utilizing the most productive equipment available. The importance of this field cannot be exaggerated in light of the rapid developments in the scientific world.

Technical Surveillance Controls

Under this plan we could furnish the President and the Attorney General a listing of technical surveillance targets and do so on a periodic basis. This could even include an annual evaluation of the program.

[redacted]

(This material, which is a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation, will be covered in a briefing to be arranged by the Counsel to the President)

Live Sources

The category of "live sources" when broadly interpreted includes every individual from the casual contact to the controlled informant who is delivering high quality information at an obvious risk. At the present time, our sources in diplomatic establishments are for the most part American citizens. This situation is largely due to an undesirable arrangement where we must first obtain clearance from the State Department before we proceed to recruit any employee or officials of a diplomatic establishment. This places State in the "driver's seat" and that Department, therefore, is practically controlling our efforts. We feel that such an arrangement is certainly not conducive to producing the best results. In our opinion this can be removed by the President's advising the Secretary of State that the FBI is being authorized to develop penetrations in foreign diplomatic establishments without obtaining clearances from State. It would be understood that the Bureau would proceed in a discreet and secure manner. Periodic contact with the Secretary of State or other top State officials to discuss general developments and any potential problems will provide a mechanism for healthy coordination with State. We recognize that a source can turn "sour" and, therefore, there is the danger of potential embarrassment. However, it should be noted that our record in this regard has been outstanding over the years.

Any efficient investigative agency needs sources of all categories and we are no exception. Therefore, we should continue our present program of general source development, and this would include contacts who can produce information on an occasional basis or who might be in a position to be of assistance in a particular investigation. In diplomatic establishments the reception clerk, chauffeur, the maid, can always be of assistance.

However, the primary emphasis of this new program would be directed toward high quality sources, such as:

1) Code clerks
2) Officials who have access to files, records, or communications
3) Officials or employees who are in a position to penetrate communist-bloc circles or establishments
4) Members of foreign intelligence and security services.

Our existing programs of seeking penetrations in communist-bloc installations naturally must continue but will require an increased effort toward production of information relating to personality data, and this should be done on a larger number of individual targets. We realize that Bloc personnel does live in a fairly insulated world, and elementary investigative techniques do not produce voluminous and highly significant data. It is therefore believed that our techniques should become more sophisticated through additional coverage on the residences of individuals

Such efforts naturally fall in line with our internal security responsibilities, but the coverage may also provide leads for development of sources in the positive intelligence field. Every Soviet is not a member of KGB or GRU, but he nevertheless could offer information of value, and he could be most useful on a long-range basis. Our program very definitely should have this philosophy in mind, and it is an element which must be impressed upon our personnel in our training programs. In this regard, we must recognize that at some point it may become necessary to turn over recruited sources to another agency such as CIA or one of the military services. Such turnover will, of course, depend on the circumstances. The guiding principle should be the preservation of the source under the best security.

In the non-communist bloc field we would concentrate on development of high-quality sources to meet the priority needs of the Government.

Training of Personnel

At the present time, our personnel are not properly oriented to effectively engage in a program as recommended. To accommodate to a new approach, it will be necessary to:

1) Include in our training classes lectures which will cover a more detailed picture of U. S. intelligence, its history, definition of terms, functions of intelligence agencies.

2) Include lectures regarding the foreign intelligence needs of the U. S. Government.

3) Use outstanding officials of other agencies to lecture on special intelligence matters. This would include the critical areas throughout the world.

4) Disseminate a bulletin to the field on a regular basis to emphasize foreign intelligence needs as they relate to our capabilities.

5) Institute a special In-Service class (once or twice per year) which will concentrate on foreign intelligence. This will be designed to develop the leaders or the specialists in the field.

6) Arrange for attendance of selected Bureau personnel to schools of other agencies such as State Department, CIA, and the military services.

7) Arrange for attendance of selected personnel at War Colleges.

8) Expand the training of Agents in the handling of technical surveillance installations.

Reporting Procedures

This program will not require any basic departure from our present reporting procedures. The Bureau should not become involved in evaluating, estimating, etc. We should endeavor to adhere to our traditional position of reporting the facts as collected. We may wish to give consideration to adding one feature to our regular reporting on individuals. This could be an annex for "Personality Data." The objective would be to maintain an up-to-date book on everything collected relating to the subject's character, habits, family life, interests, weaknesses, etc.

Language Capabilities

An expanded program for collection of foreign intelligence would require increased capability to handle foreign languages. As explained above, the material collected through technical surveillances should be handled as communications intelligence, and the major translating responsibility would, therefore, be placed on NSA.

We do, however, recognize that it is necessary to maintain a strong foreign language capability in the field wherever it may be useful to develop live sources. In offices such as New York City and Washington, D. C., we should expand the number of Agents who are fluent in French, Russian, Polish, Czech, German, Chinese, and Spanish. An office which is well equipped with a capability in the foregoing is generally able to handle most situations which arise.

Relations with Other Agencies

If this program is adopted, other intelligence agencies would be officially apprised of the Presidential authority granted to the FBI to collect foreign intelligence in the United States. Other agencies would be informed regarding the nature and the extent of the authority being delegated to the Bureau. It would be necessary to make clear that the Bureau was not assuming responsibility for the clandestine collection of all foreign intelligence in the United States, but we were taking a constructive step in an effort to increase the production of foreign intelligence through assets available to us. We would clearly point out that the FBI was not taking this approach as a solution to all of the problems relating to foreign intelligence collection in this country. We would emphasize that we would move against targets in line with established priorities and that we would do so on a selective basis. We would have it understood that operational activities would be properly coordinated wherever it was obviously necessary.

With regard to the handling of the product of technical surveillances, it would be necessary to effect a working agreement with NSA. To do this we might be obliged to discuss this at the USIB level so that NSA could obtain the required authority to support the hiring of additional personnel and purchase of equipment for the processing of our product. Our arrangement with NSA would include ground rules for processing, translation, and classification and dissemination.

Since any announcement that we were in the foreign intelligence field would prompt unusual interest and very likely queries, we should brief CIA regarding the objectives of our program. Our plan will not abrogate the existing ground rules which permit CIA to assess and recruit positive intelligence sources in this country under certain conditions. Since both Agencies will have foreign intelligence sources in the U.S., we undoubtedly will find it useful to work out an agreement whereby one Agency knows that the other has coverage in a particular area or establishment. We already receive the identities of CIA sources. It would not be necessary for us to identify our sources, but we could indicate to CIA that we had an asset in a particular area.

This would permit CIA to levy requirements on us. For example, if we recruited the Third Secretary of the French Embassy, CIA might wish to ask any number of questions dealing with the French political situation. If we felt that the request was reasonable, we could handle this through our source.

It will be noted that the program does not preclude CIA from development of foreign intelligence sources in the U. S. for fulfillment of CIA responsibilities. CIA will continue to operate under existing ground rules which are designed to protect Bureau interests.

We believe that if the program is implemented and jells we will be in a position to "spot" sources required by CIA and other agencies to discharge their responsibilities. This would apply to cases where the target was in the U. S. for a visit or if he had some specialized knowledge not related to our internal security responsibilities. These would be targets which other agencies could handle without interfering with our operations and without making us carry a load for another agency. This particular concept should include a Bureau attitude that any and every source handled by another agency in the U. S. potentially can be useful to us. We should have an outlook that all sources should be exploited to the fullest extent and under secure conditions. If another agency has a capability to open a door we should take advantage of the situation.

In those instances where CIA has a source in the United States, we should prod that agency to seek information of interest to the Bureau, and where obviously necessary we should arrange access to the CIA source. The important feature of this new concept is that we assume the role of projecting initiative, leadership and aggressiveness. Our position should be such that we push the other agencies to use their resources even to the point of healthy irritation.

We have looked at CIA as the "other agency" in this picture, but we should not neglect the potential of agencies such as ACSI, Air Force, ONI and State. All of them have entree to diplomatic circles. The day-to-day contacts which officials of these agencies have with personnel of foreign governments produce many "pieces" of personality data which, when added up over a period of time, can prove to be extremely useful. We should confer with these agencies regarding ways and means of recruiting sources either to be handled by us jointly or by one of the intelligence agencies. Here again, the Bureau can be the dominant and pushing source.

It is believed that if we moved along the lines described above, the Bureau, over a period of time, would have collected valuable information regarding numerous personalities and the inner workings of the many diplomatic establishments. The acquirement of data of this type creates operational strength. It places us in a position to exploit the development of new sources, bearing in mind that in planning our approaches we will be equipped with ammunition not gained through casual surveillances and observations. With the knowledge that we gain, we can plan high quality operations. It is interesting to note that during the past two years the information received from CIA's sources in the United States has been fairly voluminous and very definitely valuable. It is a good illustration of the Bureau's gaining useful data from another agency with a minimum of Bureau expense and effort, but still maintaining very effective control of our jurisdictional rights.

Undoubtedly related to the utilization of other agencies' resources is the considerably vast potential offered by friendly foreign security services. If the services of Great Britain, Germany, France, Holland, Italy, Australia and Canada provided us information collected in Washington, D. C. and New York resulting from contacts with communist-bloc officials, we would have another valuable source of information. We should bear in mind that we do spend hundreds and thousands of man-hours seeking such information through other difficult channels.

We should utilize the friendly liaison services along the lines described above.

Administrative Reorganization

The present administrative framework at the Seat of Government and in the field would not be adequate to implement the recommended program. Placing the additional load on our existing supervisory structure is, of course, out of the question. We definitely would require an increase in supervisory personnel in the Domestic Intelligence Division. In addition, there would be a need for more manpower in our Laboratory to handle expansion in the technical surveillance field. There would be a need for additional personnel to be assigned for the development of live sources in the field. It would be necessary to have field personnel assigned to technical surveillance installations on a continued basis and, of course, there would be a need for support related to such activities as preliminary security surveys.

It is outside the scope of this Committee's competency to outline any specific administrative reorganization and propose what personnel, equipment and facilities would be needed. We feel that this could be best handled only after the objectives of the program are approved. At that point, officials from the Seat of Government and the field could meet to map out the necessary reorganization. The extent of reorganization will hinge on our decision as to the pace we should set. We recommend that we proceed at a steady, even pace, making certain that we lay solid groundwork for all of our activity. We should refrain from becoming involved in a "crash" program unless national security interests obviously warrant such an approach.

In connection with any planning for reorganization, it would be unwise to proceed without first obtaining a reliable inventory of our current resources. Such an inventory would encompass the following: (1) The number of Agents currently assigned to strictly positive intelligence collection; (2) Our foreign language capabilities; (3) Our current sources and informants with an objective assessment of capabilities; (4) Number of supervisors at the Seat of Government currently handling positive intelligence matters.

In connection with any plans for reorganization, we should not neglect to give consideration to the problems which we will encounter as time goes on in the areas of information storage and retrieval. We, therefore, should realize that it would be unwise to exclude research or study regarding the computerizing of information.

L. ALTERNATIVES

In addition to the recommended plan set forth in preceeding sections, there are several alternative courses of action we might take:

1. We could take the position, and seek ways to implement it, that the entire field of foreign intelligence collection in the U. S., both overt and covert, should be handled by the FBI. Such an across-the-board approach would exclude CIA and other U. S. agencies from foreign intelligence collection in this country and would place exclusive responsibility and jurisdiction in this field on the FBI. As indicated in Section I, this would require a revamping of existing legislation and directives and would necessitate drastic changes in the Bureau's operations, including major increases in personnel and costs and a substantial expansion in our recruitment and training programs, and other reorganization. We do not feel this approach is warranted nor do we believe it would be a practical and sound one.

2. We could recommend that CIA continue to be responsible for overt collection of foreign intelligence in this country but that the FBI exclusively handle covert foreign intelligence collection. This has several obvious drawbacks. First, we would be assuming a wide range of heavy and fixed responsibilities which in many cases would be completely divorced from the Bureau's internal security and counterintelligence interests. Second, we would become to a large extent a service group for other U. S. agencies and departments (including CIA, State, the military and others) in the handling of a host of foreign intelligence requirements levied by other agencies. This would involve a considerable commitment of manpower, communication costs, etc. on the part of the Bureau. In addition, such an approach would necessitate significant changes in our recruitment and training procedures and would also place on our shoulders a definite accountability in connection with any failures in U. S. intelligence foreign collection. It is not believed that this approach is as sound or desirable as our recommended plan of action: namely, that we expand our foreign intelligence collection efforts but on a selective basis and without our assuming full responsibility.

3. We cou[illegible] endeavor to work out a [illegible]ision of responsibility and work in this area whereby the Bureau and CIA would each have certain primary areas of operation. For example, the FBI could make known its willingness to contribute more heavily in support of U. S. foreign intelligence collection efforts and propose this field be broken into two categories; namely, technical coverage (this would include and live informant development among foreign diplomats. We could propose that the FBI continue to operate exclusively in the first category (technical coverage) with CIA continuing to stay entirely out of this field.

In this regard, the Bureau is better equipped than CIA to handle technical surveillances and operations by reason of our long experience and expertise in this area.

With regard to the second category (live sources) we could propose that CIA conduct no operations involving countries where the Bureau's counterintelligence interests are paramount or significant. This would include the Sino-Soviet-bloc countries and could also include certain other countries, such as the Dominican Republic, where we have already developed strong capabilities or where there are unique factors.

With regard to other countries (non-Bloc), we could propose that CIA should assume primary responsibility for developing live diplomatic sources. However, this would be with the clear proviso that, in the event the FBI should develop significant internal security interests, we would have the prerogative of levying requirements on CIA sources, having direct access to CIA sources when needed, or as a final step, developing our own sources if CIA could not satisify our needs.

This alternative plan would not involve as much manpower or other expense to the Bureau as our recommended plan. However, it would involve our approval of CIA operations in the live informant field and would risk CIA infringing on FBI interests. It is our consensus that this approach not be adopted.

4. We could recommend that the FBI could withdraw entirely from the field of covert foreign intelligence collection allowing CIA to handle all aspects, including and both live and technical coverage. We are strongly opposed to such an approach on the grounds that it would drastically diminish the FBI's role in the intelligence community, would give CIA carte blanche to operate in the U. S., and in many instances would certainly result in CIAs compromising on internal security and counterintelligence operations.

5. Finally, we could take no action to change the current situation and, in effect, adopt a "status quo" approach. We are opposed to this. As indicated in this study, U. S. Government needs for foreign intelligence are growing on an almost daily basis and CIA has made definite efforts to move more actively into this field. If we were to adopt a "status quo" attitude, it is only a question of time until this matter comes to a head; for example, in the U. S. Intelligence Board or the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. If and when this occurs, the decision as to the FBI's role would, of course, be subject to the thinking and aims of people outside the FBI, possibly including individuals who are not sympathetic to our views. We would not be in a position to maintain control of developments.

10/90-10123

Copy identifying excised material

Retain copy

7/28/75
IV, B

April 29, 1966

THE ROLE OF THE FBI IN CLANDESTINE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

or

Papich Report

CIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE.............................. 1

B. INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY....................... 2

C. THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES............................. 8

- 1. Prior to World War II.......................... 8
- 2. During World War II (1941 - 1945).............. 8
- 3. National Intelligence Authority (NIA)...... 15
- 4. Responsibilities of CIA....................... 20
  - a. The National Security Act of 1947...... 20
  - b. National Security Council Intelligence Directive............................. 22
  - c. Director of Central Intelligence Directives............................ 26
  - d. Dulles Committee, 1949................. 29
  - e. Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955....... 33
  - f. The Doolittle Committee, 1954.......... 39
  - g. The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government................ 41
- 5. Responsibilities of the FBI................ 44
  - a. Laws and Directives.................... 44
  - b. Requests From Other Agencies........... 45
  - c. FBI's Role in the United States Intelligence Board..................... 46
  - d. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)................ 48
  - e. The Director's Stand Over the Years.... 50

D. THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U. S. 55

E. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES................................. 59

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

F. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI.................. 64

1. Manpower Being Devoted..................... 64
2. Number of Microphone and Telephone Surveillances With Evaluation of Product... 65
3. Live Sources With Evaluation................ 66
4. Anagram Program............................ 67
5. Double Agents and Informants............... 67
6. Additional Potential....................... 68

G. AREAS OF CONFLICT, FBI - CIA.................. 69

H. CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA......... 74

I. EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES.................................. 77

1. Overt Collection Activities................ 77
2. Clandestine Gathering Activities........... 79

J. GENERAL FINDINGS.............................. 82

K. RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION.................... 86

Authorization.................................. 86
Selection of Targets........................... 87
Technical Surveillance of Targets.............. 90
Technical Surveillance Controls................ 91
Anagram Program................................ 91
Live Sources................................... 91
Training of Personnel.......................... 93
Reporting Procedures........................... 94
Language Capabilities.......................... 94
Relations With Other Agencies.................. 95
Administrative Reorganization.................. 97

L. ALTERNATIVES.................................. 99

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this study is to define a new role for the Bureau in the field of clandestine collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. This action is necessary and most timely because of our Government's vital need for increased foreign intelligence and because of CIA's expanding interests in the United States. There is a decided need for a new Bureau concept, the implementation of which could greatly increase our effectiveness and could deter CIA from becoming a threat to our operational interests.

The study encompasses a review of history as it relates to foreign intelligence collection in the U. S. Analysis is made of the need and the potential for such intelligence; the capabilities of the Bureau and CIA in this field; and the responsibilities of over-all (overt and covert) collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. We have submitted our general findings, and we recommend a plan of action for a new Bureau role.

This study was not designed to eliminate once and for all the many problems relating to collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. It would have been a Utopian objective to recommend a plan which would produce maximum intelligence collection, remove existing defects within the U. S. intelligence community, and establish complete harmony among interested agencies. We did not go that far. Careful and exhaustive analysis dictated that we endeavor to reach a reasonable goal consistent with prudent planning and sound operational implementation. We feel that the recommended plan meets such guidelines, that it is a decidedly major step forward for the Bureau, and it strongly conforms with the national security needs.

It should be noted that this document does not deal with our law enforcement or internal security functions, although it is fully recognized that internal security and clandestine collection of foreign intelligence are closely linked. Any plan on our part to produce foreign intelligence will affect our capabilities in the field of counterintelligence.

B. INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY

People who do not speak and understand a common language have difficulty in communicating their ideas. Even in a country such as ours where English is the common language, words take on different meanings in different geographical locales and in different social, political, and economic environments. Likewise, in professional fields, varying backgrounds and experiences have conveyed different meanings to terms in the professional vocabulary.

In the field of security, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations, certain professional terminology has developed ostensibly to assist in the exchange of ideas by persons in this field. However, as progress is made in a field or a special segment of the field, new horizons develop which require additional terminology or cause an evolution in existing terminology. This development or evolution in security and intelligence terminology, coupled with individualistic usage, brings further problems in meaning which we also face in the broader aspects of the English language. We have all noted that our dictionaries do not always provide a single meaning and we must be careful in daily conversation that we are not misunderstood when merely using a conversational vocabulary. We face a similar problem in the use of professional terminology in security and intelligence matters as this terminology takes on new meaning with additional experience and takes on varying meanings to different persons.

An additional factor to consider in understanding the meaning of terminology is the context in which a term is used. For example, the term "intelligence" may be vague and confusing without the knowledge of the context in which it is used. It can, as a generic term, pertain to the whole field of activities undertaken by a government in the collection of information, the protection of its institutions, and the conduct of nonattributable activities to facilitate the formation and implementation of government policy. Also, it can relate to the organization devoted to the collection and production of information necessary to the government. In addition, it may pertain to the whole body of theory and practice on the basis of which an intelligence organization operates. Finally, the word "intelligence" may be utilized to mean any part or all of the above.

The following definitions do not include all possible meanings that have been utilized but, instead, are designed to assist the reader in digesting this study.

BASIC INTELLIGENCE is that factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedia information of a fundamental and more or less permanent nature and which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available.

BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE is intelligence concerning individuals.

CLANDESTINE COLLECTION A coordinated complex of collection activities designed to accomplish an intelligence, counterintelligence, or other similar purpose, sponsored and conducted by a governmental department or agency, or jointly by two or more such entities, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE is military intelligence for use in combat situations. This is commonly referred to as tactical.

COUNTERESPIONAGE is identifying, penetrating, manipulating or repressing inimical espionage organizations.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE is defined as that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation, and its personnel, information, and installations against espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activity.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.

DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE concerns information and investigation of espionage, counterespionage, etc., which pertains to the internal security of the U.S. and, therefore, is in subject matter pertinent to the internal affairs of the U.S.

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the potentialities, utilization, and vulnerabilities of a nation's natural and human resources.

ESPIONAGE is defined as that intelligence activity which is directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine operations.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE pertains to foreign affairs and subject matters pertinent to foreign countries. The word "foreign" as used here denotes the target of the intelligence and is distinct from the geographic location of the source providing the information. For example, refugees, defectors, and immigrants from target countries (such as the Soviet Union) have the potential for supplying intelligence regarding their countries to United States authorities. Although physically located in the United States, they are potential foreign intelligence sources.

GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the meterology, hydrography, topography, and basic natural resources of an area.

INTELLIGENCE is the product derived from information collected for the formulation and execution of Government policy and for safeguarding the national welfare.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION is information collected for intelligence purposes that has not been evaluated by comparison with the existing body of knowledge on the subject reported on; the raw material of intelligence.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is integrated departmental intelligence which is required by departments and agencies of the Government for the execution of their missions, but which transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce.

INTERNAL SECURITY relates to the defense and protection within the United States and its territories and possessions of the people, the government, the institutions, and the installations of critical importance from all hostile or destructive action.

INVESTIGATION means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; investigation does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: See Combat Intelligence and Strategic Intelligence.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency.

OVERT COLLECTION is collection activities conducted in such a manner that they may be attributed to or acknowledged by the sponsoring government.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE concerns foreign and domestic policies of governments and the activities of political movements.

POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE may be described as a comprehensive product resulting from collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, and interpretation of all available information relating to national security and concerning other countries where such information is significant to our Government's development and execution of plans, policies, and courses of action. Such intelligence can be divided into various categories, such as basic, biographic, combat, current, departmental, economic, geographic, interdepartmental, military, national, political, scientific, sociological, strategic, tactical, and technical. Perhaps the most simple definition would be that positive intelligence is all the things you should know in advance of initiating a course of action.

There appears to be much confusion in professional circles regarding the use of the term "positive intelligence." Some professionals use the term "positive intelligence" synonymously with the term "foreign intelligence." In still another usage, "positive intelligence" and "intelligence" are used interchangeably. In another useage, which is closely related to the definition utilized in this study, "positive intelligence" is described as what is left of the entire field after "security intelligence" has been subtracted. This source continues that both "positive intelligence" and "security intelligence" can be against domestic targets, as well as against foreign targets. For example, the Department of State, in connection with its formulation of foreign policy, encounters a large number of organizations of Americans whose parents came from foreign countries. Many of these organizations--the Poles for example--have strong views on what United States policy should be toward Poland. The views of these organizations regarding our foreign policy is likely to be a matter of some importance to the Department of State in its policy formulation. The knowledge of what these organizations think and do can be a very significant phase of what might be called "domestic positive intelligence." In addition, the connections which these organizations may have with the foreign country such as Poland sometimes provide a source of "foreign positive intelligence."

SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE pertains to the progress of scientific research and development and usually this intelligence is within the framework of how it affects military or economic potential of a nation.

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE is basically the intelligence behind the police function to protect the nation and its members from those working to our national and individual detriment. For example, this would include intelligence regarding clandestine agents sent to the United States by a foreign power.

SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE pertains to the social, cultural, psychological, or ethnic structure and characteristics of a people.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE is the intelligence required for broad and usually long-range planning, especially with regard to military operations.

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE See Combat Intelligence.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE concerns devices, equipment, and special processes. This is related to Scientific Intelligence, but tends to be differentiated from it as practice differs from theory.

C. THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

1. Prior to World War II

A study of the history and progress of foreign intelligence collection in the United States reveals that prior to World War II such collection efforts were incidental and in direct proportion to the intensity of the coverage maintained in the counterintelligence field. Accordingly, the history of foreign intelligence collection in the United States prior to World War II is primarily a history of counterintelligence and internal security coverage, of which foreign intelligence was a by-product. Historical highlights of the developments in this field are as follows:

(a) In August, 1914, when German espionage agents Count Johann Von Bernstorff and Dr. Heinrich Albert of the German Embassy, Washington, D. C., arrived in the United States with $150,000,000 in German treasury notes to finance the first foreign espionage and sabotage apparatus to be organized in this country, United States Government intelligence work was handled for the most part by five small organizations (Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, Secret Service, Army, State and Navy), all operating on their own with small staffs and without coordination and sufficient delineation of responsibilities.

(b) On April 6, 1917, Congress declared war against Germany and President Woodrow Wilson gave the Bureau of Investigation the task of enforcing his proclamation governing the conduct of enemy aliens. The Bureau at the time had 300 Agents but shortly after the outbreak of the war the staff was increased to 400.

(c) As result of a rash of bombings believed executed by Bolsheviks, Attorney General Palmer appointed Francis P. Garvan of New York as Assistant Attorney General to deal with the problem. He created a General Intelligence Division under command of J. Edgar Hoover and Mr. Hoover was instructed to make a study of subversive activities in the United States to determine their scope and the potential for prosecution.

(d) On May 9, 1934, President Roosevelt called a White House conference attended by the Attorney General, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Labor, Director of FBI and Chief of United States Secret Service to deal with the problem of growth of fascist organizations in the United States. The conference agreed that there should be an investigation of these groups and their activities for intelligence purposes. Since the only Federal law believed applicable at the time was the Immigration Law, the President decided that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service would confer with the Chief of Secret Service and the Director of the FBI to work out details of the investigation.

Mr. Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI personnel to conduct an intensive and confidential investigation of the Nazi movement. This was the first general intelligence investigation made by the Government into fascist activities in this country.

(e) As a result of President Franklin Roosevelt's concern over activities of the communists and other subversive groups, a series of conferences was held in the latter part of August and early September, 1936, participated in by the President, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI. As a result of his concern over the international character of communism and fascism, the President stated the FBI should conduct necessary investigations and coordinate information upon these matters in the possession of the Military Intelligence Division, the Naval Intelligence Division and the State Department.

It is noteworthy that it was specified the investigation was to be for intelligence purposes only.

The Presidential Order was implemented by the Director in a letter to all Special Agents in Charge, September 5, 1936.

(f) As a result of opposition primarily by the State Department against accepting the FBI as the coordinating agency in the investigations of all subversive activities in the United States, President Roosevelt, on June 26, 1939, issued a confidential directive to Cabinet members which established an Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee composed of the FBI and the Intelligence Divisions of the War Department and the Navy. He named the FBI as the coordinating agency to receive all reports on subversive activities.

(g) President Roosevelt publicly designated the FBI to investigate matters relating to espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations by Presidential Directive dated September 6, 1939.

(h) On May 21, 1940, President Roosevelt in a memorandum to the then Attorney General, Robert H. Jackson, authorized and directed the Attorney General in such cases as he might approve to authorize the use of listening devices directed to the conversations or other communications of persons suspected of subversive activity against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies.

Pursuant to such authorization, commencing on June 1, 1940, technical surveillances were installed on diplomatic establishments throughout the United States of such countries as Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and France. These installations in addition to providing counterintelligence information of value produced a substantial quantity of foreign intelligence information.

(i) Although lines of responsibility were established for domestic intelligence work in connection with the September 6, 1939, Presidential Directive, there were no clearly defined areas of responsibility of overseas intelligence operations and as time passed the need for decisions in that field grew more evident.

As a result, the Special Intelligence Service (SIS) came into being. By Presidential Directive June 24, 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt set forth lines of responsibility in the operations of United States intelligence agencies in the foreign field. This Directive grew out of a series of meetings involving representatives of State Department, Army and Navy intelligence and the FBI wherein it was agreed that the SIS would act as a service agency, furnishing the State Department, the military, the FBI and other governmental agencies with information having to do with financial, economic, political and subversive activities detrimental to the security of the United States. The June 24th Directive placed the responsibility for nonmilitary intelligence coverage in the Western Hemisphere on the FBI. Less than thirty days thereafter the FBI had organized an SIS operation.

Through World War II and until approximately March 31, 1947, the FBI continued its SIS operations. The culmination of our activities in this field came about as a result of the January 22, 1946, Presidential Directive establishing the Central Intelligence Group and giving it the responsibility of collecting foreign intelligence abroad.

2. During World War II (1941 - 1945)

a. The FBI's Role

During World War II, as prior to the war, foreign intelligence collection in this country was geared to and principally a product of our intensive efforts in the counterintelligence field. It is also significant to note that a steady stream of foreign intelligence continued to be developed from our technical coverage of diplomatic establishments of enemy-bloc countries, as well as other sensitive countries such as Russia, Argentina, Portugal and Spain.

In line with the Presidential Directive of September 6, 1939, the FBI continued to be in charge of all investigative work in matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, counterespionage, subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws.

On January 8, 1943, the President issued another Directive in which he reiterated the previous Directive of September 6, 1939.

In ordering the FBI to take charge in the foregoing areas, President Roosevelt did not define the various types of intelligence involved but placed the entire intelligence and internal security responsibilities involved under the jurisdiction of the FBI. As a matter of fact, in carrying out these responsibilities we did produce foreign intelligence in substantial quantity especially through our technical coverage of foreign diplomatic establishments.

b. Office of Strategic Services

The position of Colonel William J. Donovan as Coordinator of Information (COI) was created by Presidential Directive dated July 11, 1941. On July 14, 1941, President Roosevelt sent a letter to the Attorney General stating the position was created, "in order to provide a central point in the Government for the analysis of information and data which bears upon national security. . . ." The President described Donovan's duties as "assist me and the various Departments and agencies of the Government in assembling and correlating information which may be useful in the formulation of basic plans for the defense of the nation."

In the letter President Roosevelt clearly limited Donovan's jurisdiction with the following statement: "I should like to emphasize that Colonel Donovan's work is not intended to supersede or duplicate or involve any direction of the activities of established agencies already obtaining and interpreting defense information."

The Presidential order dated September 11, 1941, established the position of COI with clear cut authority to collect and analyze information bearing on national security; correlate and make such information available to the President and other Government officials as the President may determine. COI was finally authorized to carry out, when requested by the President, supplementary activities as might facilitate the securing of information not then available to the Government.

Donovan, in a memorandum captioned "MEMORANDUM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION," expanded on the President's directive in general terms. Under his plan for procedure there was a Coordinator of Strategic Information responsible directly to the President. (Note this same organizational set up was later adopted by the Director of Central Intelligence.) Donovan noted, however, in his memorandum, "The proposed centralized unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy Intelligence, or any other Department of the Government." (62-64427, serials 23 and X3.)

Our file on the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) reveals that that organization continued its organizational, training, and operational activities in this country based on Donovan's premise that he was the central clearing point for anti-Axis espionage and counterespionage. An interesting insight into OSS operations in this country is provided in the nonfiction work "The Scarlet Thread" by former OSS agent Donald Downes. Downes noted that he was a former British intelligence agent serving for that organization in New York when he was recruited by OSS immediately after Pearl Harbor. He tells of his recruitment by Allan Dulles, his association with Donovan, and his work in the counterespionage field in New York City and Washington, D. C., with other OSS agents, including the current United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg. Downes detailed attempts by him and other OSS agents to steal diplomatic codes from "friendly" or "neutral" country embassies in Washington in the early 1940's and frequently referred to the fact that this was being done by OSS with knowledge that its jurisdiction in this country was based only on the theory that a foreign Embassy is not American soil and is technically outside the jurisdiction of the FBI, which had full jurisdiction for counterintelligence in the western hemisphere.

Our file on the OSS is replete with incidents indicating OSS recruitment and counterespionage activities in this country during the early 1940's.

By memorandum dated May 22, 1945, Stanley J. Tracey, advised of a conversation overheard between two high-ranking State Department officials. The conversation dealt with OSS attempts to take over Bureau SIS operations in Latin America with one of the State Department officials, Aura Warren, stating that officials of OSS felt that organization was better equipped to handle work than FBI personnel attached to various American Embassies in South America. In response to this attempt of OSS to take over our duties, the Director commented: "I would like to know where Warren gets this. According to Ladd our contacts in State Department have no knowledge of such OSS efforts. Also Tracey should point out it is State Department duty to initiate it as we would 'service it' and the State Department in fact started the SIS project. H" (62-64427-1059.)

An interesting evaluation of OSS operations is provided in a report prepared by Colonel Richard Park of the War Department as a result of a survey of OSS operations made as a special and confidential mission for the President in 1944 and 1945. Colonel Park commented: "Without going into details I was everywhere left with the same impression of utter incompetency on the part of OSS leadership....

"Everywhere that the subject of OSS came up, unsolicited remarks clearly brought out the very well known amateurish nature of the organization.

"The OSS has been restricted from active operations in South America by Presidential directive...."

Despite the absence of any jurisdiction in or responsibility for counterintelligence operations in the western hemisphere, an officer of OSS was reported to have attempted to obtain cover for an OSS agent in South America under guise of employment by an organization doing business in South America.

A closing paragraph of Colonel Park's report commented on observations made by an official of OSS as follows:

> "This official of OSS added that it was the policy of his agency not to give any more information than necessary to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He pointed out that OSS instructors in their school in the United States had discussed the FBI in an unfavorable light and had painted the picture of OSS replacing the Federal Bureau of Investigation not only outside the United States but in the domestic field. The publicity campaign referred to was to be one of the means adopted to accomplish this purpose."

3. National Intelligence Authority (NIA)

On January 22, 1946, President Harry S. Truman addressed a Directive to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy stating, in part, "I hereby designate you, together with another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority. . ." The Directive provided that each of these three Secretaries would from time to time assign personnel and facilities from their respective departments "which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group" (CIG) under a Director of Central Intelligence. It was provided that the latter would be responsible to the NIA.

President Truman then stated that subject to the existing law the Director of Central Intelligence should (a) accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the results; (b) plan for the coordination of such activities of the intelligence agencies of the three departments involved as related to the national security; (c) perform such services of common concern as the NIA determined could be more effectively accomplished centrally; and (d) perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence as the President and the NIA might from time to time direct.

The Presidential Directive said that no police, law enforcement or internal security functions should be exercised under the Directive; that certain intelligence should be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence "for correlation, evaluation or dissemination"; and that "the existing intelligence agencies of your departments shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence." The ninth provision of the Directive stated, "Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives."

A series of communications between the Bureau and Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who was designated as Director of the Central Intelligence Group, then followed. On June 21, 1946, a memorandum analyzed a communication from Vandenberg which submitted a proposed memorandum to the NIA and a proposed Directive to be issued by NIA extending the powers and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Directive provided, in essence, the following additional functions and powers for the Director of Central Intelligence:

(1) Undertake such basic research and analysis of intelligence and counterintelligence as may in his opinion be required.

(2) Act as the executive agent of this authority (NIA) in coordinating and in supervising all Federal foreign intelligence activities.

(3) Perform the following services of common concern: (a) conduct all Federal espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence; (b) conduct all Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers for the collection of intelligence information.

In discussing this Directive which Vandenberg desired issued, the memorandum stated the Directive did not conform with the original plan proposed by the President or which was envisioned by the discussions occurring prior to the time the President issued his Directive. The original plan, insofar as the Bureau was advised, contemplated the setting up of solely a coordinating agency which was given the power to perform certain functions which it would be determined could more adequately and economically be performed centrally for the benefit of all Government agencies. The memorandum noted that "undoubtedly if this Directive is approved and the Central Intelligence Group is successful in setting up complete foreign coverage, the Bureau would undoubtedly be pushed into a 'second rate' position insofar as purely intelligence functions are concerned in the domestic field. . . It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign intelligence existing in that field. Also, it is impossible to separate entirely foreign intelligence and the domestic functions performed by the Bureau."*

In reply to the Directive proposed by General Vandenberg, a letter was sent to him June 25, 1946, which stated that the Directive was approved with certain changes suggested "for clarification purposes only." The Director suggested that to the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence acting

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* With respect to this last quoted statement, Mr. E. A. Tamm and Mr. C. A. Tolson noted an exception by placing an addendum on the memorandum. The Director's comments were set forth. This is more fully reported below under the heading, "Director's Comments."

as the executive agent of National Intelligence Authority in coordinating and supervising all foreign intelligence activities there should be added "performed outside the United States and its possessions relating to the national security in accordance with the overall policies and objectives established by this Authority." With respect to the proposal that the Director of Central Intelligence direct all espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence, it was proposed that the phrase "outside the United States and its possessions" also be inserted in this provision.

On July 29, 1946, General Vandenberg sent over a memorandum on the subject "Exploitation of American Business Concerns With Connections Abroad as Sources of Foreign Intelligence Information." He added a proposed Directive. The Director replied by letter August 6, 1946, "I should like to comment that there appears to have been an addition to the field encompassed by CIG Directive #11 calling for a survey of the exploitation of American business concerns. I note that in your report and in the proposed NIA Directive, you refer not only to American business concerns but to other private groups with connections abroad. This latter phrase, in my opinion, is extremely broad and could be taken to include all types of organizations, including Foreign Nationality Groups. In fact, I feel that the report and proposed Directive should confine themselves to the discussion of American business concerns and that no references at all should be made to 'private groups'. . . I feel that at a later date the question of exploitation of these private groups by CIG representatives might be worked out by discussing them individually with the FBI when their identities are determined." This matter remained unresolved.

On August 22, 1946, General Vandenberg submitted another proposed Directive concerning exploitation of American business concerns, nongovernmental groups, and individuals (in the United States) with connections abroad as sources of foreign intelligence information. A memorandum analyzing this on August 22, 1946, pointed out the new Directive was even more obnoxious than the one originally proposed. The Directive noted, in part, "CIG field representatives will establish and maintain liaison with the intelligence officers of local Army and Navy headquarters and Air Force headquarters, if present, through the medium of local interagency offices." The analyzing memorandum pointed out, "If this means the CIG is going to maintain field representatives in the United States or establish offices, it certainly is something new and a provision that we did not understand was intended in the President's Directive. . . Attached to the proposed Directive is a discussion which is more or less the same as was attached to the original proposed Directive. It, however, makes the following statement which the Bureau cannot subscribe to and it would seem must oppose, that is, 'Foreign Intelligence Information related to the national security, although it may be collected from sources whose headquarters are within the limits of the United States and its possessions, is definitely a part of the national intelligence mission, the coordination of which is specifically a function of the National Intelligence Authority under the provisions of the President's letter of 22 January 1946.'"

In pointing out the Bureau's objections, the analyzing memorandum of August 22, 1946, stated, "There is now involved in this Directive the fundamental question of just what rights the Central Intelligence Group has with reference to operations within the United States. Carrying to a logical conclusion the statements set forth above contained in the discussion, they could cover all foreign embassies in the United States, take charge of double agents we are operating or radio stations we are operating as double agent set-ups, etc., because essentially these operations engaged in by the Bureau do not directly involve enforcement of the laws but rather are concerned with obtaining information in the nature of foreign intelligence which, of course, is related to internal security as is all foreign intelligence. Essentially, the Bureau's domestic operations in intelligence involve the determining of the aims, intentions, and activities of foreign countries or their representatives."

The memorandum of analysis stated that our position would be the Bureau would not consent to any provisions except those related to American business concerns with connections abroad. On August 23, 1946, the Director sent a letter to General Vandenberg stating in part, "I must advise that the proposed Directive does not incorporate the changes suggested in my letter of August 6, 1946, and I, therefore, cannot approve it. This new directive also includes provisions and statements in which I cannot concur and, in fact, must oppose."

The strong stand of the Director obviously led to a conference between General Vandenberg and the Director which was reported in a memorandum of September 13, 1946, which the Director prepared. As stated in the Director's memorandum the conference concerned CIG's desire to gather contacts among "nongovernmental groups and individuals with connections abroad." The entire conference was on this subject matter and did not enter into collection of foreign intelligence from foreign embassies or from foreign officials or, in fact, from any other source. The Director wrote, "I told the General that I could well appreciate that there would be cases in which his organization would be desirous of making contacts in the United States for the purpose of obtaining information from abroad and that the Bureau was not interested in such contacts except in those situations wherein the individual or the group might be engaged in activities within the United States that were either under investigation by the Bureau or might possibly be the medium of obtaining information concerning the activities of a subversive character being carried on within the United States. I told the General that I would be perfectly agreeable to his suggestion, with the added provision that if CIG was desirous of contacting any individuals of the character that he had indicated, before doing so it would check with the FBI."

The foregoing has been set forth rather extensively since it shows the strong stand the Bureau took against CIG's operating in the United States. Actually, as will be reported hereinafter, Directives were adopted permitting CIG to collect positive intelligence in this country by contacting United States citizens, American businessmen, aliens (with prior FBI approval) through the foreign language press and in later years through contacts with United States governmental personnel.

4. Responsibilities of CIA

a. The National Security Act of 1947

This Act, which is reported in 50 USC 401 et seq., established the National Security Council (NSC) and under it the Central Intelligence Agency. It provided that when the Director of Central Intelligence was appointed the NIA should cease to exist.

There was much discussion concerning the powers and authorities to be vested in the Director of Central Intelligence. Many individuals, especially in Congress, expressed fears that CIA could develop into a gestapo if permitted to become operational in the United States. The following two excerpts, of interest in this connection, are from a Congressional publication related to hearings prior to passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The publication is entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 1st Session on H. R. 2319 (National Security Act of 1947)":

Page 127 - During testimony concerning authority for and scope of CIA, James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, stated:

> "The purposes of the Central Intelligence Authority are limited definitely to purposes outside of this country, except the collation of information gathered by other government agencies.
>
> "Regarding domestic operations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is working at all times in collaboration with General Vandenberg. He relies upon them for domestic activities."

Page 438 - Congressman Clarence J. Brown of Ohio in speaking about the National Security Act of 1947, which was under scrutiny before passage, stated:

> "I want to write a lot of other safeguards into the section that deals with the Central Intelligence Agency.

"I want to make certain that the activities and the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency were carefully confined to international matters, to military matters, and to matters of national security. We have enough people now running around butting into everybody else's business in this country without establishing another agency to do so.

"What we ought to do is to eliminate 90 percent of the present snoopers instead of adding to them.

"I do not think it would be the Central Intelligence Agency's right, authority, or responsibility to check on the ordinary domestic activities of the average American citizen, and yet they could have the power and authority to do it under this bill as written."

The National Security Act of 1947 was approved 7/26/47. It provided that for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, the Agency under the direction of the NSC was:

(1) To advise NSC in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security,

(2) To make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such activities,

(3) To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and provide for its appropriate dissemination within the Government: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security responsibilities,

(4) To perform such additional services of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally,

(5) To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting national security as the NSC may from time to time direct.

There is tacit acknowledgement in Section 403 (e) of the National Security Act of 1947 that the FBI gathers information affecting the national security. This section provides:

> (e) To the extent recommended by the NSC and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

b. National Security Council Intelligence Directives

To implement the authority granted to it under the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council has issued a series of "National Security Council Intelligence Directives," usually referred to as NSCID's and commonly called "Nonscids." The first of these was issued December 12, 1947, and provided for the establishing of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to maintain the relationship necessary for a fully effective integration of the national intelligence effort. By Directive dated September 15, 1958, the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) was formally created as successor to the Intelligence Advisory Committee and a counterpart known as the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board.

NSCID No. 1 provided that the Director of Central Intelligence should coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, such coordination to include both special and other forms of intelligence. The USIB under this Directive shall "advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence as he may require in the discharge of his statutory responsibilities." It is the Board which is empowered to establish policies, define intelligence objectives, make recommendations to appropriate U. S. officials, develop standards for protection of intelligence, and formulate policies with respect to arrangements with foreign governments. The Director of Central

Intelligence is designated as Chairman of this Board and in this capacity is distinguished from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. A more complete discussion with regard to the Bureau's role in this over-all setup is set forth hereinafter under the caption "FBI Relations With the United States Intelligence Board."

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, originally issued 12/12/47, defines the various types of intelligence in Section 4.

(a) National Intelligence is that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce* national intelligence with the support of the U. S. Intelligence Board.

(b) Departmental Intelligence is that intelligence which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission.

(c) Interdepartmental Intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence which is required by departments and agencies of the Government for the execution of their missions, but which transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce. The subcommittee structure of the U. S. Intelligence Board may be utilized for the production and dissemination of interdepartmental intelligence.

Director of Central Intelligence is then authorized to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence provided it is done consistent with statutes and Presidential policy, and provided further "that any disclosure of FBI intelligence information shall be cleared with that agency prior to dissemination."

This acknowledges that FBI information includes both national and interdepartmental intelligence.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*A footnote here states: "By 'produce' is meant 'to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security' as provided in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Section 102 (d) (3)."

NSCID No. 2 issued 1/13/48, relates to coordination of foreign intelligence collection activities "not covered by other NSC Directives."

The Director of Central Intelligence has responsibility for planning to assure there is no undesirable duplication and that coverage is adequate.

Responsibilities are then assigned as follows:

(1) The Department of State shall have primary responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection abroad (i.e., outside the U. S. and its possessions) of political, sociological, economic, scientific and technical information.

(2) The Department of Defense shall have primary responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection of military intelligence information. Owing to the importance of scientific and technical intelligence to the Department of Defense and the military services, this collection responsibility shall include scientific ~~and technical~~, as well as economic, information directly pertinent to Department of Defense missions. (It seems significant that while State Department primary responsibility was limited by the phrase "the collection abroad," there was no such limitation on the Department of Defense in its responsibility.)

(3) The Central Intelligence Agency may collect abroad intelligence information in support of assigned functions or as a byproduct of assigned functions: Provided, that this collection involves no undesirable duplication of any of the specific assignments to State and Defense Departments, and Provided, that any such overt collection is coordinated with the Department of State or with the Senior U. S. Representative.

In Section 7 of NSCID No. 2 there is delegated to CIA responsibility for overt collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. as follows:

"The Central Intelligence Agency, as a service of common concern, shall be responsible for the selective exploitation within the United States of non-governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign

> intelligence information, in accordance with policies, procedures and practices established as provided in paragraph 3a of NSCID No. 1, by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrences of the U. S. Intelligence Board."

Section 9 of the same Directive provides that CIA "shall conduct the exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes, as appropriate, as a service of common concern. When this function is carried out in the U. S., this also constitutes overt collection of foreign intelligence by that Agency in this country.

It may be worthy to note at this point that NSCID No.'s 1 and 2 were discussed, approved, and issued in their original forms prior to 7/7/49 when the FBI was designated a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

NSCID No. 3 on Coordination of Intelligence Production contains definitions of various types of intelligence (including those defined in NSCID No. 1) and then delineates primary responsibilities for "producing" intelligence among various agencies, stating with respect to CIA:

> "The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and scientific and technical intelligence as a service of common concern. Further, the Central Intelligence Agency may produce such other intelligence as may be necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence."

Since, as noted hereinbefore, "collection" activities are defined in NSCID No. 2, it would seem to follow that the word "produce" as used in NSCID No. 3 has the same definition as set out in a footnote to NSCID No. 1, paragraph 4, i.e., "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security." Thus, NSCID No. 3 would not appear to extend CIA's jurisdiction to collect intelligence or be operational in any way.

The remaining NSCID's appear to have no bearing on the subject matter of foreign intelligence collection in the United States.

c. Director of Central Intelligence Directives

To implement the National Security Act of 1947 as amended and the various National Security Council Intelligence Directives issued pursuant thereto, the Director of Central Intelligence has issued numerous Directives (DCID's). The first of these having a direct bearing on jurisdictional matters is DCID No. 2/3, captioned "Domestic Exploitation of Nongovernmental Organizations and Individuals." NSCID No. 2, paragraph 7, states that CIA shall be responsible for the selective exploitation within the U. S. of such organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information. We, therefore, have avoided, and should avoid, any operations among nongovernmental organizations and individuals designed solely to produce foreign intelligence without CIA prior approval or nullification of these provisions.

DCID No. 2/3 provides for exploitation of nongovernmental U. S. citizens by CIA domestic field offices and states, "In cases where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has indicated an operational interest in a U. S. citizen, Central Intelligence Agency will coordinate with that agency prior to further contact."

This DCID also provides for exploitation by CIA domestic field offices of aliens, following a prior name check with FBI so our statutory obligations may be properly met without CIA interference.

It is of possible interest to note that in dealing with these two matters, DCID No. 2/3 refers to nongovernmental U. S. citizens but only to aliens (without the restrictive adjective). The NSCID on which it is based refers to nongrovernmental individuals without distinguishing between citizens and aliens. Thus, there appears to have been an intention to confine CIA's intelligence exploitation functions within the U. S. A review of our file on CIA (62-80750) indicates this might well have been a concession to the Bureau since we went on record opposing delegation of any intelligence collection functions within the U. S. to CIA in letters to Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (then Director of Central Intelligence Group) on June 25, 1946, (Serial 96), August 6, 1946, (Serial 138), and August 23, 1946, (Serial 222), which have been discussed more fully under the heading "National Intelligence Authority."

DCID No. 2/8 is captioned "Domestic Exploitation of U. S. Government Organizations and Officials." It begins in very general terms, "Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 1 and NSCID No. 2. . . ." It provides, "The Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate and have the primary responsibility for exploitation of the foreign intelligence potential of non-USIB organizations and officials to meet community needs as a service of common concern."

As set forth above, there seems to be no basis for such CIA jurisdiction in NSCID No. 1 and No. 2. Paragraph 7 of NSCID No. 2 specifically restricts CIA in this area of operations to nongovernmental organizations and individuals.

A review of our U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) file, 62-90718, shows following apropos this matter:

> The Draft Minutes of the 3/21/61 USIB meeting report that the Board approved the draft of a DCID on "Domestic Exploitation of U. S. Government Organizations and Officials," which would be issued as DCID No. 2/8, effective 3/21/61. Mr. Belmont was present at this USIB meeting as the FBI representative. (unnumbered serial between serials 1131 & 1132, USIB file)
>
> Tracing this subject matter back through the USIB file it was learned that it apparently was first considered at the meeting held 2/23/60 at which the Bureau was represented by Fred A. Frohbose. The minutes for that meeting reported the Board agreed in principle that a directive on Intelligence Exploitation of U. S. Governmental officials would be desirable. However, the matter was referred to the Committee on Domestic Exploitation for further study and the submission of a revised draft for Board consideration. (unnumbered serial between serials 1040 & 1041, USIB file)

From the foregoing it would appear that the Bureau concurred in the issuance of this particular Directive and thus to an extension of CIA's overt collection activities in the U. S. if this should, in fact, be interpreted as an extension.

DCID 4/1 provides for the establishment of the Interagency Defector Committee.

DCID's 4/2 and 4/3 relate to the Defector Program abroad and domestically, respectively. The latter one dwells on division of responsibilities between FBI and CIA in the handling of defectors within the continental limits of the United States. It provides that exploitation of such defectors shall be conducted:

1. To obtain internal security information or other data required by FBI in view of its statutory responsibilities in the internal security field.

2. To obtain foreign intelligence information required in the interests of national security by the member agencies of the USIB.

3. For such other purposes as are deemed to be in the interests of national security.

The very next sentence then gives the implication that exploitation of the defector for foreign intelligence purposes is the principal responsibility of CIA, for it reads, "Decision as to the relative importance of internal security exploitation by FBI and foreign intelligence exploitation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) shall be made jointly by representatives of CIA and FBI."

There then follows a listing of nine specific FBI responsibilities, one of which is to make available to CIA foreign intelligence information resulting from the initial exploitation of defectors. There is no subsequent specific delineation of CIA responsibility over foreign intelligence exploitation until there is a transfer of responsibility for handling a defector from FBI to CIA after FBI interests have been fully satisfied. There is a general assignment of such responsibility to CIA in the terms, "CIA shall be responsible for: a. Coordinating the activities of other departments and agencies concerned with defector matters, except those responsibilities assigned exclusively to FBI . . . ."

As a matter of practice, if it is determined there is little or no importance from an internal security standpoint in connection with a particular defection, we do not take over but in effect give clearance to CIA to proceed from a foreign intelligence standpoint.

DCID's in the 5/ series (numbers one through five) were issued principally to implement NSCID Number 5 which deals with U. S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities abroad. There appears to be no conflict with FBI jurisdiction in this series.

All other DCID's relate to Elint Critical Intelligence and other matters which appear to have no bearing on possible conflicts between CIA and FBI responsibilities.

d. Dulles Committee, 1949

The Dulles Committee was appointed February 3, 1948, by the National Security Council (NSC) to make a "comprehensive, impartial and objective survey of the organization, activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)." The Committee was instructed to report its findings and recommendations on the following matters:

(a) The adequacy and effectiveness of the organization structure of CIA.

(b) The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities.

(c) The relationship of these activities to those of other departments and agencies.

(d) The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel.

The Committee's scope was extended on March 17, 1948, to include the following provisions: "This survey will comprise primarily a thorough and comprehensive examination of the structure, administration, activities and inter-agency relationships of the CIA as outlined in the resolution of the National Security Council. It will also include an examination of such intelligence activities of other Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security, in order to make recommendations for their effective operation and overall coordination. . ."

This report, which is dated January 1, 1949, for the most part concerned itself with administrative matters affecting CIA and the necessity for reorganization within that Agency. It notes, however, that the National Security Act, as implemented by directives of the NSC, imposed upon CIA responsibility for carrying out three essential functions:

(1) The coordination of intelligence activities.

(2) The correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, which has been interpreted by directive as meaning the production* of national intelligence.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* See definition of "produce" in footnote to NSCID No. 1, Section 4b as "correlate and evaluate," the reverse of connotation given here.

(3) The performance centrally, subject to NSC direction, of certain intelligence and related functions of common concern to various departments of the Government.

The report noted that Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 established a framework for a sound intelligence system and no amendment to that Section of the Act was deemed necessary.

Although the coordination of intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies concerned with national security was a primary reason for establishing CIA, the report noted the National Security Act does not give CIA independent authority to coordinate intelligence activities, as final responsibility to establish policies was vested in the NSC.

The statutory limitations upon the authority of CIA to coordinate intelligence activities without the approval of the NSC were, according to the report, obviously designed to protect the autonomy and internal arrangements of the various departments and agencies performing intelligence functions. In spite of these calculated limitations on the authority of CIA, the report noted, it was clear the Agency was expected to provide the initiative and leadership in developing a coordinated intelligence system. In practice, the NSC has almost without exception approved the recommendations submitted to it by CIA for the coordination of intelligence activities.

The National Security Act does not define the "intelligence activities" which were to be coordinated by CIA under the direction of the NSC or specify the departments whose activities were covered. Presumably, according to the report, all intelligence activities relating to the national security were included, from collecting information in the first instance to the preparation and dissemination of finished intelligence reports and estimates. "The criterion," which the report noted was a very broad one, was "such intelligence activities. . . as relate to the national security and not the identity of the departments concerned or the nature or locale of the intelligence activity." Thus, the report noted, practically no limitations are set upon the scope of the intelligence activities with which the Central Intelligence Agency is to concern itself.

The report noted another broad field requiring coordination is that of foreign intelligence derived from domestic sources and the allied field of domestic counterintelligence. This includes the exploitation of intelligence from United States business firms, travellers, etc., exploitation of the intelligence possibilities of groups and individuals of foreign nationality in the United States, the relating of domestic counterintelligence to foreign intelligence and the coordination of domestic counterespionage with counterespionage abroad. Except for the exploitation of private sources of foreign intelligence in the United States which is centralized in the Office of Operations, CIA, responsibility for other activities is scattered among the State Department, the armed services, the FBI and CIA.

The FBI, which has primary security and law enforcement responsibilities, is concerned in fact with an important area of intelligence. This includes domestic counterespionage and countersabotage, control of communist and other subversive activities and surveillances of alien individuals and groups. All of these functions, according to the report, are closely related to the comparable activities abroad of the CIA.

The report noted the FBI was not part of the then existing machinery for coordination of intelligence through the Intelligence Advisory Committee and there was no continuing manner whereby domestic intelligence and counterintelligence were related to overall national intelligence in order to serve the general purpose set forth in the National Security Act, which was set forth as "of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security."

It was the opinion of the authors of the Dulles Report that CIA had the duty under the Act to concern itself with the problem of coordinating those phases of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence which relate to the national security and CIA should submit recommendations on this subject to the NSC. The report noted this was not inconsistent with the stipulation of the National Security Act that CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions."

The Dulles Commission recommended that the FBI should be made a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to improve coordination of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence insofar as these matters related to the national security.

While discussing the production of National Intelligence Estimates by CIA, the report noted, "There is no systematic way of tapping that domestic intelligence information, which should be chiefly in the hands of the FBI, having a bearing on broader intelligence issues and there is no regular and agreed arrangement for participation by the FBI and for the use of intelligence from domestic sources in a national estimate."

National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 7 provided that CIA shall be responsible for the exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United States of business concerns, other non-Governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information. The report concluded the amount of foreign intelligence which can be obtained through the exploitation of non-Governmental sources in the United States is considerable and its quality could be very high if appropriate arrangements were made and discrimination was employed. It was felt the vast number of organizations, institutions and individuals having foreign interests and knowledge represented a potential source of intelligence that in many ways was superior to any other, as it was felt that they were in a position to provide information obtained from their foreign contacts and from the findings on their own people abroad.

A further important source of information, the exploitation for intelligence purposes of foreign individuals and groups in the United States was also being developed. The report noted that these individuals and groups as well as political refugees and former foreign government officials were often engaged in political activity with significant international implications.

CIA and other intelligence agencies had not developed coordinated and effective policies and procedures for the exploitation of intelligence in this important field. The FBI, according to the report, had a major interest in foreign individuals and groups in the United States because of possible security implications. The report indicated the FBI possessed considerable information concerning many individuals and groups but this information had been obtained primarily with security rather than intelligence considerations in mind and was not normally given the kind of interpretation or dissemination that intelligence required if it was to be properly used. It was also noted the FBI was, in cases where it had a security interest, reluctant on security grounds to have intelligence exploitation by outside agencies. The general result of this situation, according to the report, was that an important source of intelligence was not being fully exploited.

The report noted that the question of the exploitation for intelligence purposes of foreign groups and individuals in the United States was a clear example where the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with the FBI being added as a member, should establish principles and rules for coordination.

In discussing the administrative handling of espionage and counterespionage matters within the CIA, the report noted the FBI was charged with all counterespionage responsibilities in the United States except those affecting personnel of the armed services. The Dulles Commission recommended the counterespionage activities of CIA should be increased in scope and emphasis and that closer liaison in this field should be established with the FBI.

The only effect the Dulles Report had on the FBI was its inclusion as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee by amendment to HSCID Number 1 dated July 7, 1949.

e. Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955

Task forces of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) conducted surveys of CIA operations from 1947 to 1949 (under F. Eberstadt) and from 1953 to 1955 (under General Mark Clark).

The Commission concerned itself principally with the efficiency with which CIA was fulfilling its statutory missions of coordination, correlation, evaluation, and dissemination of the intelligence product of other Government agencies and departments. The Commission examined agency activity in light of the CIA primary mission of advising NSC and performing services and duties related to intelligence and national security as the NSC directed.

(1a) Eberstadt Task Force Report

The results of the first examination of CIA by the Hoover Commission were more or less apologetic in tone, emphasizing the soundness of directives setting up NSC and its direction of the Agency. The report pointed out, however, that CIA and its parent, NSC, had had little time to actually implement the coordination necessary for leadership in the field. The Task Force clearly defined its understanding of the CIA mission as: "......coordinate intelligence activities of Federal agencies concerned with national security."

The duties of CIA were listed as:

1. Advise National Security Council on national security intelligence activities of Federal departments and agencies.

2. Recommend necessary coordination of such activities to National Security Council.

3. Correlate, evaluate and disseminate national security intelligence.

4. Render intelligence services for other Federal departments and agencies." (62-88575-3 enclosure behind file.)

In discussing the duties of the CIA the Task Force noted, "Under the statute CIA is entrusted with the performance of such services of common concern as the National Security Council shall determine. At present these include, apart from Scientific Intelligence, which is discussed separately: (a) maintenance of central indexes of report, records, and documents having intelligence value; (b) examination of foreign documents from which intelligence material is extracted and disseminated; (c) maintenance of central map facilities; (d) monitoring of foreign broadcasts; and (e) collection of the information by clandestine means and counterespionage abroad."

In evaluating the operations and location of CIA counterespionage the Task Force commented as follows:

"The counterespionage activities of CIA abroad appear properly integrated with CIA's other clandestine operations. Although arguments have been made in favor of extending CIA's authority to include responsibility for counterespionage in this Country, such an extension of jurisdiction does not a present appear justified. For one thing, concentration of power over counterespionage activities at home in the hands of a Director of Central Intelligence responsible for espionage abroad might justifiably arouse public suspicion and opposition. Conceivably it could form the basis for a charge that a gestapo is in process of creating even though the power to arrest were specifically withheld. To transfer responsibility for domestic counterespionage from the FBI, which has an established organization and long tradition, to CIA, which is not equipped for the assignment, would probably create more problems than it would solve. It is doubtful whether the logical benefit of having one agency responsible for counterespionage throughout the world would justify the dislocation and confusion that such a transfer would inevitably occasion."

"CIA representatives have indicated that their present working liaison with FBI is satisfactory, but the Committee doubts that FBI-CIA relationships are completely adequate. The Director of FBI declined the Committee's invitation to appear before it to discuss the CIA with the committee or its representatives on the ground that he knew too little of its activities."

The groundwork for CIA acceptance was laid by the Committee recommendation and finding: "CIA is not now properly organized. Co-equal improvement in G-2, FBI, ONI, State Department, and other Government intelligence services is also essential. Spirit of teamwork must govern interagency intelligence relationships. CIA deserves and must have greater degree of acceptance and support from old-line intelligence services than it has had in the past."

A pitch was made for a single agency controlling internal security in the Committee's finding: "The committee believes that responsibility for internal security policies should be immediately focused in one agency. A more thorough study of the subject than any yet made must be prosecuted, and interagency frictions must be ended." It is noted that the committee commented elsewhere in its report:

"Detailed study of organization and activities of intelligence divisions of the Government, including CIA, is being made by a committee consisting of Messrs. Allen Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias Correa, assisted by a staff of four directed by Mr. Robert Blum of the Office of Secretary of Defense." With this statement it may be assumed the Task Force excused omissions it may have made with the observation that the Dulles group was conducting almost the same survey carried on in the Hoover Commission so far as CIA was involved.

(1b) Clark Task Force Report

The Task Force headed by General Mark Clark submitted a Top Secret report dated in May, 1955, setting forth results of the second Hoover Commission survey of the organization of CIA. The report pointed out the survey was of departments and agencies with entire or prime responsibility in the field of positive foreign intelligence as it pertains to national defense and security. It qualified this survey when speaking of the FBI, noting survey was limited to survey of Bureau only to the extent that it dealt in security intelligence.

Again the Hoover Commission through its Task Force pinned CIA jurisdiction down to the areas defined by statute, and emphasized the Agency was subordinate only to the National Security Council in its coordination, correlation, dissemination and collection of intelligence data. The Task Force noted that since CIA is charged with the over-all responsibility for coordinating the output of all intelligence forces, the Task Force was giving special attention to the work of that Agency.

In the Task Force Report a review of the FBI functions in the intelligence community was set forth. The committee noted that the FBI had only limited activities in the positive intelligence field but noted additionally that FBI functions in the current intelligence effort were of interest in order to fill out the intelligence picture.

The FBI was cited as one of the four members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), created by the NSC, approved by the President 3/23/49, to coordinate "the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related matters affecting internal security."

It was noted that the IIC charter did not disturb responsibilities of its member agencies but made mandatory action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete investigative coverage in compliance with the needs of the IIC, which had full responsibility for coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, et cetera, affecting internal security.

The Committee stated, "The Central Intelligence Agency is, by law, excluded from duplicating the internal security functions of the FBI. However, the CIA does develop within and without the U. S., sources for foreign (positive) intelligence, and incidental thereto may develop leads as to subversive activities within this country. In such cases CIA through liaison gives its information to the FBI."

A Task Force survey revealed, "Through the Central Intelligence Agency's domestic field offices, contacts are made on a highly selective basis with business concerns and other nongovernmental agencies, as well as with previously cleared individuals who travel abroad . . . Under the provisions of DCID 7/1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is required to establish in Washington a focal office for the purpose of interviewing nongovernment visitors. . . Any visitors to these offices demonstrating good intelligence potential are referred to the CIA for further exploitation."

The Task Force noted that as far back as 1939 President Roosevelt by executive order directed the FBI to coordinate and conduct domestic counterintelligence activities. In 1949, according to the Committee's survey, the IIC was formalized and by charter restricted to coordinating investigations in intelligence matters domestically.

In commenting on the role of the FBI the Committee further noted, "The Federal Bureau of Investigation, however, is the recognized center of the domestic aspect of internal security including counterintelligence within the United States and its possessions."

With regard to the use and surfacing of sources, the Committee noted that CIA was not bound to disclose its sources; however, it commented on the excellent liaison system of the FBI which had overcome this restriction so far as internal security within the U. S. is concerned. "Now, as a matter of practice the CIA usually refers domestic sources to the FBI, the only exception being where the source is to be used in foreign intelligence work by the CIA." In the area of defectors within this country, the Committee noted that the FBI will receive from CIA or by a direct interrogation of a CIA-controlled defector information which the defector may have concerning internal security. Persons who defect within this country, on the other hand, were found to be under the cognizance of the FBI. Then the reverse of the above situation comes into play and CIA has access to the defector for developing leads in the foreign intelligence field. The Committee commented, "It is the duty of the FBI to conduct investigations of all cases involving foreign nationals in the United States as set forth in the Delimitations Agreement."

A review of the Commission report lends one important fact to our study of this subject matter. This was pointed up by the membership of the various groups at the disposal of the National Security Council within the field of national intelligence. Ten subcommittees or working groups with membership from separate departments or interested agencies acted in advisory capacities to the IAC parent committee. In each of these subcommittees the chairman was a representative of the Director of CIA and the working groups were individually serviced by a secretariat furnished by CIA. From the top-heavy alignment of CIA personnel in IAC and its working groups it was obvious in which direction advisory opinions would be slanted when dissenting matters were presented by the IAC and CIA to the NSC.

f. The Doolittle Committee, 1954

In July, 1954, we received information from the White House that the President had appointed Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle to study in collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certain aspects of the national intelligence effort. By letter dated July 28, 1954, Sherman Adams, the Assistant to the President, requested that the Bureau brief General Doolittle's group concerning the relationship that existed between the Bureau and CIA. We subsequently learned that at approximately the same time a survey would be conducted by the Hoover Commission under the chairmanship of General Mark Clark. We learned from Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA, that the President strongly believed that General Clark should not permit the survey to get into CIA covert operations, particularly in the field of political and psychological warfare. The President had told Dulles that he was selecting General Doolittle to study CIA's covert operations.

General Doolittle's group was briefed on August 25, 1954, at which time the Bureau's position in the intelligence field was described and the manner in which the Bureau transacted business with CIA was explained. In addition, certain constructive criticism concerning problems and conflicts experienced in dealing with CIA was furnished General Doolittle's group. The following salient features of the criticism appear to bear on the current study:

We were critical of a policy of the Office of Operations, CIA, which precluded that Division from identifying any of its sources in the United States when such sources possessed information bearing on the internal security of the United States. The Office of Operations as of 1954 collected foreign intelligence information in the United States from aliens, businessmen, and others, and periodically would receive information of interest to the Bureau. Instances arose where the Bureau desired to interview the original source but was prevented from getting to the source by CIA policy. We were of the opinion that CIA's policy could be modified to allow us direct access to the source in the United States when such was necessary.

As of 1954, CIA had interest in various organizations such as Radio Free Europe and others and from time to time the Bureau would get involved in investigation of organizations only to learn they were being supported or guided by CIA. Our opinion was that if we had been appropriately notified of CIA's interest considerable investigative time and manpower could have been saved and in addition we would have been in a position to notify CIA when anything of interest came to our attention.

Concerning CIA investigations in the United States, we readily acknowledged CIA's right to investigate its own applicants or consultants. We did object to CIA's undertaking any investigation in this country when the facts indicated the case was clearly within Bureau jurisdiction and pointed out that the Bureau had recently become involved in investigating an individual suspected of espionage activity. We were in contact with CIA and had solicited its help concerning certain aspects in the case but it was a few weeks before we learned CIA had conducted a very close investigation of this same individual. We made the observations that close and open cooperation between the Bureau and CIA was vital to the proper handling of espionage cases.

The Bureau pointed out that as of 1954 it had received little or no significant information concerning espionage or sabotage agents coming to the United States. We excluded diplomatic personnel in this matter but clearly indicated that CIA should be in a position to give us some advance notification when spies were coming to this country.

Possibly this latter was the strongest criticism we had since we did not feel CIA with its resources and overseas contacts was performing one of its prime functions in the intelligence field; that is, identifying foreign illegals who are en route to the United States. During our briefing of General Doolittle's group, we described the Bureau's collection of intelligence information for the interested Government agencies as a major operation. Our discharge of our intelligence operation concerning the Communist Party and Soviet and Satellite diplomats was explained in detail to the satisfaction of all personnel attending the briefing.

General Doolittle asked for recommendations as to what could be done to improve CIA so the Bureau would get better service. It was suggested that corrective action be taken on the matters which had been criticized constructively; CIA should establish adequate coverage (although not specifically noted, this obviously regarded advance notice of foreign intelligence personnel coming to the United States); and finally CIA should transmit information developed in an expedite fashion.

Prior to submitting the report to the President, General Doolittle expressed a desire to see Mr. Hoover, whom he regarded as the outstanding intelligence authority in the world. The General visited the Director on October 5, 1954, during which visit CIA's operations were discussed and generally the points of the previous meeting were reiterated. General Doolittle felt the ideal solution would be to wipe out CIA entirely and start all over again, but since this was impractical his committee would point out certain weaknesses and make certain recommendations and suggestions to the President for the correction of these weaknesses.

We do not have the contents of General Doolittle's report and there is nothing to indicate an executive order was issued from it which in any way delineated the respective jurisdiction of the Bureau or of CIA.

g. The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government

Captioned report was prepared by the Study Group and issued 12/15/60. The Group was under the chairmanship of

Lyman B. Kirtkpatrick, Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), acting as a representative of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The other four members of the Study Group represented the Department of State, Secretary of Defense, Bureau of the Budget, and the National Security Council (NSC).

The stated targets of examination by the Group were organizational and management aspects within the intelligence effort relating to all aspects of foreign intelligence. In the confines of these objectives the Bureau was not considered for examination by the Group in view of the Bureau's lack of operational jurisdiction in matters outside of this country. Mr. Belmont, acting for the Bureau, gave a briefing before the Group on 7/29/60 regarding the Bureau's relations with other United States intelligence agencies. There was no mention made of the Bureau in the report except in one of its recommendations relative to reorganization of the membership of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which will be dealt with in more detail later.

The 141 page report submitted by the Group appeared to be apologetic in tone for any shortcomings of CIA. The reader obtains the definite impression the report was used as a sounding board for differences of opinion as to methods and administration for collection of foreign intelligence (overt and covert) abroad.

The main basis for conclusions and recommendations made by the Group rested in delineation of duties of DCI as coordinator of intelligence as opposed to DCI secondary responsibility as head of CIA. The Group recognized service jealousies apparently resulting from refusal to accept the fact that DCI could control and coordinate intelligence effort without affording preferential treatment to CIA which was his operational and administrative arm.

There is no reference in the report to a clear definition of CIA operational responsibilities or jurisdiction within continental United States.

The Group found that DCI through heads of missions abroad and designated DCI representatives in foreign countries had principal responsibility for control and coordination of foreign collection efforts. The CIA's operations abroad were recognized in almost all 43 of the Group's recommendations.

Recommendation number 17 emphasized that CIA should place emphasis on the establishment of unofficial cover throughout the world; recommendation number 20 was that CIA should increase intelligence support to unified and component commanders by direct dissemination from pertinent field stations.

The report noted that CIA's main requirements problem related to clandestine collection and concerned the great number of requirements served on the Agency. . .

The main tone of the report was that greater cooperation was required between the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Department of State, and CIA in carrying out foreign intelligence collection missions. The recommendations of the Group were all directed toward this end and had no bearing on internal espionage or counterespionage activities within the United States.

In commenting on the coordination duties of the DCI, the Group pointed out that USIB had been officially directed to "establish policies and develop programs for the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned; the DCI is authorized to make such surveys of departmental intelligence activities or the various departments and agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the NSC and coordinate the intelligence effort of the United States." The report interpreted these official directions to indicate that USIB should assume a greater proportion of the actual direction and control of the intelligence community of which the Bureau was noted to be a member.

To strengthen USIB position as a director, coordinator, and controller of intelligence effort, the Group recommended (recommendation number 30) that the USIB should be reduced to four members who should be the DCI (chairman) and representatives of Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission would be relegated to ad hoc representation on the Board.

It should be noted in considering the proposed change of USIB membership that the Bureau was a member of six of the twenty-six subcommittees which formed the committee make-up of the USIB.

Memorandum January 10, 1961, Mr. Belmont to Mr. Parsons outlined the proposed USIB membership change for the Director. It recommended that Bureau make no issue of the proposed recommendation. The Director underlined a passage of the memorandum which stated "In one sense of the word it could be argued the FBI would lose prestige by changing from a regular member to an ad hoc member." The Director approved the recommendation of the memorandum with the following notation: "O.K. but I am not enthusiastic about the change of our status. H." Our status, however, was not changed and the Bureau has continued to hold full membership on the Board.

In brief, the Joint Study Group Report noted that the majority of the recommendations of the Study Group had been favorably received by the intelligence community in that positive action had been taken to place most of them in effect. Many of the recommendations of the Group were felt to have been met by the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) which acted as a coordinator and overseer of the intelligence effort of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is no comment made in this report which would bear on our present survey of CIA jurisdiction or activities within the United States in conflict with our own jurisdictional and investigative interests. The only reference to the Bureau in this latter report was as previously mentioned in the comment relative to reorganization of the membership of the USIB.

5. Responsibilities of the FBI

a. Laws and Directives

No information has been developed with respect to any laws passed or directives issued specifically delegating to the FBI responsibilities for the positive acquisition of foreign intelligence in the United States. As has been set forth above under the caption, "The History of Foreign Intelligence Collection in the United States - Prior to World War II," President Roosevelt conducted certain conferences following which he issued instructions with regard to investigations of fascist and communist activities in the United States. Those investigations were to be for intelligence purposes. For the most part, they took on a counterintelligence aspect; however, during the course of them foreign intelligence information was developed either as an outgrowth of investigative activity or through the conducting of technical surveillances.

We found no record regarding the designation of the FBI as the agency responsible for collection of foreign intelligence information in the United States as of the time the Office of Coordinator of Information was created on 7/11/41. Neither did we find any record indicating such responsibility had been delegated to any other agency.

b. Requests From Other Agencies

From time to time the Bureau has received specific requests from other agencies based upon which we have undertaken the collection of foreign intelligence information in the United States in a clandestine fashion. Two instances of this nature were based on requests from the Department of State and from the White House.

(1) Department of State Request - Recognizing a gap in our intelligence coverage of friendly governments, on 10/21/55 we discussed with the then Deputy Undersecretary of State, Robert Murphy, the question of instituting limited discreet technical surveillances on official establishments of selected foreign nations, principally those located in world trouble areas. We pointed out that the FBI stood ready to institute such coverage as might be desired by the Department of State.

Mr. Murphy was quite receptive to this idea, stating that limited coverage sufficiently flexible to change with changing world conditions might be highly desirable. After further discussions it was agreed that a program, "progressive" in nature, would be instituted. By this, Mr. Murphy explained that he did not feel at that time that all desirable coverage should be instituted at a given date, but rather that coverage should be placed on one country at a time as moving events abroad might dictate. On this basis this type coverage was instituted based on a specific request from Mr. Murphy on 12/5/55 that we place technical surveillances on all Egyptian establishments in the United States. Since then, technical surveillances have been placed on numerous establishments of foreign countries for either extended or limited periods of time, depending upon developments on the international scene.

(2) White House Request - In May, 1965, President Johnson advised the Director he wanted the FBI to set up a group in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of taking charge of cleaning out communists in the Dominican Government and advising the Government of those who might try to infiltrate Government ranks. This was the basis for opening our Santo Domingo Office, which has continued operation since 5/21/65.

As a result of maintaining our Dominican Office and assisting in its mission, we have instituted various technical surveillances and developed numerous live sources in the United States from which we regularly acquire foreign intelligence information. Since the President has relied on the Bureau to keep him apprised of developments from an intelligence standpoint as well as developments with respect to communist influence, these sources are regularly contacted for information which fits within the terms of foreign intelligence data.

c. FBI's Role in the United States Intelligence Board

The predecessor to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). the IAC was established by National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) number 1 dated 12/12/47. By amendment to this Directive dated 7/7/49, the Bureau was designated a member of the IAC for the purpose of coordinating domestic intelligence with foreign intelligence. NSCID 1 has been revised several times. Subsequent to a revision dated 4/21/58, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board merged the IAC and the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board into one body known as the United States Intelligence Board. National Security Council Directive dated 9/15/58, approved by the President, formally created the United States Intelligence Board as successor to the IAC and the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board.

The USIB in its present form is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central

Intelligence is distinguished from the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in that the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board is considered the President's principal advisor on foreign intelligence. Membership on the United States Intelligence Board consists of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Director of CIA; the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of the National Security Agency; the Assistant General Manager for Administration, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Assistant Director of the FBI. The primary responsibility of the USIB is the coordination of intelligence activities. In this regard, USIB's major effort is concerned with the preparation and approval of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) for use by policy makers.

As a rule, the Bureau does not participate in the preparation of NIE's inasmuch as the subject matter is usually outside the jurisdiction of this Bureau. We have in the past participated in some selective NIE's such as certain estimates on Cuba, world communism, the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the United States and on the Dominican Republic.

As part of its staffing procedure, USIB has created numerous committees in some of which the Bureau maintains membership. The USIB committees on which the Bureau has representation are the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, the Signal Intelligence Committee, the Interagency Defector Committee, the Watch Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Security Committee, and the Committee on Documentation. As a general rule, attendance at Committee sessions is handled by the Liaison Section. Attendance at meetings is in the main restricted to the Interagency Defector Committee, the Watch Committee, the Security Committee, the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee and the Committee on Documentation. The Bureau has a primary interest in the business of these five committees. All decisions made by these committees, which are subsequently approved by the USIB, are the subject of individual memoranda submitted to the Director for his approval.

Over the years, consideration has been given to the Bureau's withdrawing its membership from USIB. On each occasion the Director has chosen to have the Bureau retain its membership on the Board. The last such occasion occurred in 1964 during the period when John McCone was Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board. At that time, the military services were removed from membership on the Board and replaced by the Defense Intelligence Agency. At the time, Mr. Belmont, then Assistant to the Director, orally discussed with the Director the possibility of the Bureau's withdrawing from the USIB. The Director's comments were that we would not request removal from membership on the Board but would withdraw our membership only if so requested by the Director of Central Intelligence in his role as Chairman of the USIB. The Bureau's withdrawal would, of course, require action on the part of the National Security Council.

d. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

This group was originally organized in January, 1956, as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activity. Its primary function at that time was to review periodically the Government's foreign intelligence efforts with specific emphasis on the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was established as a result of recommendations by the Hoover Commission. In the later years of the Eisenhower Administration the activity of the group fell off and it was re-organized in its present form with the advent of the Kennedy Administration.

Our relationship with this Board has historically been one of informal liaison in view of the fact that the primary function of the Board is concerned with foreign intelligence. There have been occasions where representatives of the Bureau briefed individual members and/or panels of the Board concerning our jurisdiction, techniques and accomplishments in the intelligence field. These briefings have been received with a receptive and sympathetic attitude. Our main concern in following the activities of this Board has been to assure that the Central Intelligence Agency does not encroach upon our jurisdiction and upon the functions of the various intelligence communities in which we hold membership

The case involving Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap, a former employee of the National Security Agency who was a Soviet espionage agent, was thoroughly reviewed by the present PFIAB in view of the most serious ramifications it presented. This case concerned the penetration by the Soviets of the National Security Agency. The report which emanated from the PFIAB study included proposals which affect the responsibilities and activities of several agencies within the intelligence community. All of the twenty-one recommendations of the Board dealt with various aspects of achieving a strengthened counterintelligence capability to guard against penetration of our security establishments by hostile intelligence agencies. Nineteen of the recommendations of the Board were approved by the President and three of these related directly to Bureau activity. They are as follows:

> #18: "That steps be taken to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has adequate agent resources to effect the required domestic counterintelligence coverage of both bloc and nonbloc official installations and personnel who may be engaged in intelligence and related activities inimical to the national security."
>
> #19: "That the policies of the Department of State with respect to authorizing technical coverage (use of wiretapping and listening devices) by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of foreign official installations and personnel in this country be re-examined with a view to liberalization to the extent necessary to provide the counterintelligence coverage required in the interest of national security."
>
> #20: "That, in future, when consideration is given to exchanging detected Soviet-bloc intelligence agents for imprisoned American personnel in bloc countries, advance consultations be held with Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assure that adequate attention is given all intelligence aspects of such proposed exchanges in the interest of the national security, weighed against the political gains to be achieved."

e. The Director's Stand Over the Years

The Director's stand over the years with respect to jurisdiction concerning foreign intelligence matters within the United States is reflected in numerous comments he has made dating back to the days when the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was being formed.

In June, 1946, General Vandenberg, then head of CIG, sent a memorandum to the Director proposing that the National Intelligence Authority issue a directive extending the powers and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence, which position General Vandenberg occupied. The memorandum was analyzed on June 21, 1946, in a memorandum from C. H. Carson to D. M. Ladd in which it was pointed out that it was inevitable that CIG must enter into the domestic picture because of sources of foreign intelligence in that field. An addendum was placed on the memorandum by Mr. Edward A. Tamm and Mr. C. A. Tolson which was followed by comments by the Director which is most pertinent to the subject matter under discussion. The addendum read:

> "Mr. Tolson and Mr. Tamm do not concur with the conclusion expressed in this memorandum that 'It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign intelligence existing in that field.' They feel that a coordinated program for the exchange of information between the Central Intelligence Authority and the FBI, permitting a free and comprehensive exchange of information in matters of mutual interest, will enable the Bureau to work in the domestic field without interference from the Central Intelligence Authority in the same manner that the Bureau works, for example, with local police departments or other governmental agencies within defined jurisdictional lines. We believe that the attached letter to General Vandenberg is satisfactory."

The Director commented as follows:

> "I am not as optimistic as are Tolson & Tamm. I think it is inevitable that there will be a collision with CIG over our domestic jurisdiction

> or rather their expansion into it on intelligence matters. It ought not occur but this new memo of CIG shows how greedy it is. It is the Donovan plan almost in toto & is being slyly put over. It means we must zealously guard our domestic jurisdiction & not yield an inch & be ever alert to resist any encroachment."

On March 27, 1953, the Director testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations. In response to a question from Senator McCarran concerning liaison between FBI and CIA, the Director stated: "There is close liaison. CIA has exclusive jurisdiction abroad for intelligence. We have exclusive jurisdiction within the United States. We maintain continuous liaison with CIA Headquarters in Washington through a liaison representative of our Bureau in order to facilitate the transmission of material from them to us and from our service to them."

In October, 1958, CIA approached us requesting our concurrence in CIA's establishing physical and technical surveillance in the United States on the [brother of the then current ruler of Yemen] CIA had an operational interest in this individual. By memorandum it was recommended that the Bureau not become involved in this CIA operation and that CIA be informed that this would not establish a precedent for approval of future CIA activities in the United States. Responsive to continuing to present problems, the Director noted: "This is an understatement particularly if we are going to adopt a macaroni backbone attitude instead of standing up forthrightly for our rights and jurisdiction."

CIA, in April, 1959, advised us that one of its [Egyptian] sources would be visiting the United States, and requested our concurrence in CIA's establishing coverage including technical surveillance. It was recommended we stay out of this matter and inform CIA that this was not to be construed as a precedent for approval of future CIA counterintelligence activity in the United States. The Director commented on the memorandum: "The trend has gone so far we have become nothing but a rubber stamp for CIA yet they won't even allow us to perform liaison functions abroad much less operational ones."

In January, 1960, CIA agreed to comply with conditions imposed by the Bureau with regard to developing positive intelligence information through contacts between U. S. residents and visitors from Iron Curtain countries. CIA agreed to contact us first before promoting such associations. In March, 1960, CIA inquired if it might obtain Bureau clearance at the field level for such contacts in the interest of expediency. Mr. Tolson noted: "More and more we are agreeing to CIA operations in the U. S. I am opposed to this relaxation. We can exercise better control here than through our field offices." The Director added: "I share Tolson's views." CIA was advised clearance was to be obtained through Bureau headquarters.

A source

[Anatoli Golitzyn, a Soviet, defected in Finland in December, 1961], and furnished information alleging penetration of American intelligence. One Serge Karlow, a CIA officer, was developed as a suspect. On 2/9/62, we took over the investigation. On 2/26/62, Sheffield Edwards, then CIA Director of Security, admitted CIA had had technical coverage on Karlow from February, 1961 to 2/9/62. Edwards claimed his reluctance to tell us of this situation earlier because of obvious possible jeopardy to prosecution, plus embarrassment to his Agency should the Bureau raise an objection to CIA's maintaining such coverage. The Director noted: "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion but on specific instances all too many in number. Yet there exists wistful belief that 'the leopard has changed his spots'."

In April, 1962, we received information on a strictly confidential basis from Jay Sourwine of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to the effect that an unidentified CIA representative had talked to Senator Eastland concerning an alleged move to place CIA in charge of all intelligence-gathering operations for the Government -- to include Soviet espionage in the U. S. The Director noted: "I am not surprised at the above alleged effort. There is no doubt in many quarters a desire to eliminate the FBI in dealing with espionage and subversion for we are a thorn not only in the side of communists but also the ADA and Fabian Socialists. CIA which failed again and again to know what is actually going on abroad could be counted upon to blunder the same way in the USA."

In April, 1963, we received information indicating that CIA Director John McCone was considering expansion of CIA operations in the United States -- specifically intelligence coverage and the development of sources in this country. The Director made a note on the memorandum recording this: "McCone is trying to do another 'Donovan.' If he injects himself into the U. S., the FBI gets out. Too many cooks spoil the broth."

In December, 1963, the Director inquired as to the nature and extent of intelligence operations wherein CIA had established contact with a diplomat, operated him in the U. S. with our coordination, and continued to operate him upon his having departed this country. Four such cases were cited. On the memorandum, the Director noted: "I have little confidence in CIA abiding by agreements if it serves its purpose better not to do so."

In January, 1964, CIA advised us it had reorganized its activities in the U. S. The Domestic Operations Division, CIA, had established field offices in this country under appropriate cover. A memorandum was prepared describing the history of CIA operations in the U. S. and recommending action designed to protect our interests. A letter went to CIA with ground rules which the Bureau expected CIA to follow in all matters requiring coordination. The Director noted: "OK, but I hope you are not being taken in. I can't forget CIA withholding the French espionage activities in the U. S. nor the false story concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, only to mention two of their instances of double dealing."

The New York Office, by letter 2/14/64, set forth its observations concerning a briefing given that office on the matter of CIA operations in the U. S. The Director commented: "I think this domestic operations expansion of CIA is very dangerous and will inevitably 'muddy' the waters."

In May, 1964, the Bureau reconsidered its stand with respect to permitting CIA to approach sources at foreign establishments in the United States for intelligence purposes. The following policy was proposed and subsequently approved:

(1) Where there was no indication a source would be leaving the United States, we would deny CIA clearance for contact until we had fully explored the person's potential for our own purposes. If we decided we had no

interest and CIA contact would not jeopardize any FBI investigations, we would grant CIA approval to proceed with its contact with proviso we be kept informed of information developed of possible interest to us.

(2) Where it appeared source would be returning to a foreign country shortly we would normally grant CIA clearance for preliminary contact with proviso we be kept informed of results. We reserved the right to take direct access to the source as our needs required.

(3) Where there was an overlapping of interests and source expected to continue in United States for fairly extended period of time, in those instances where CIA had entree and no Bureau investigation would be jeopardized we would permit CIA to explore matter and make preliminary contact keeping us advised of progress and getting our specific clearance before a direct recruitment approach; however, where factors indicated it would be to best Bureau interests to operate source, we would undertake the recruitment and keep CIA advised of information of interest to that Agency.

When these matters were submitted for approval Mr. Tolson commented, "Looks okay, but we will have to watch this very closely." The Director concurred in Mr. Tolson's remark.

D. THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U. S.

In 1941, the U. S. allegedly had in its possession practically all of the foreign intelligence it needed regarding military and strategic targets in Japan. The information was scattered among various individuals who had personal knowledge or was located in libraries, various Government agencies, private business firms, institutions, et cetera. Tragically, the U. S. Government did not have any mechanism to collect, record and evaluate such information. Intelligence was badly needed in 1941, and we paid dearly in lives and financial resources to accomplish certain missions because the information was not readily available.

Today, the need for foreign intelligence is greater than ever. The stakes of foreign policy have never been higher. The U. S., being a dominating world power, has assumed vast responsibilities enmeshed in delicate political situations throughout the world. The ever-existing threat of an atomic war with communist countries demands a continuing acquirement of knowledge so thatpolicies and courses of action can be designed in the most effective manner possible. The information needed applies to numerous fields of activity, a major area being scientific research and development. In this connection, the revolutionary break-throughs in the scientific category are occurring with unusually high frequency, and if the U. S. is to remain in the forefront, it is absolutely necessary that we obtain an accurate evaluation of the enemy's capabilities and intentions. We have been fortunate to collect high quality positive intelligence through sophisticated collection methods, i.e high altitude photography and research in this area is proceeding at an accelerated pace. Nevertheless, electronic gadgets and machines will never produce all that is required. We still need supplementary coverage on a heavy scale, and the human being still continues to be a vital source of information. The individual talks and volunteers information. He talks and his statements are intercepted. All of this produces valuable increments of intelligence. The individual can still provide badly needed data either through his voluntary contribution or through his unwitting divulging of intelligence. The importance of the individual is further emphasized when we realize that as each sophisticated collection technique is introduced, science also introduces newly designed countertechniques of covering, protecting, and camouflaging important assets. In essence, technology eventually hits an inpenetrable or leveling-off depth.

Foreign intelligence is not geographically restricted. Information regarding Chinese Communists can be obtained anywhere in the world, and even if it is of a fragmentary nature, the data can be of significant value. The demand for information is heavy and is sought by every agency in the Government. Because of this, it has been necessary for the U. S. Government to map a program of collection on a priority basis. This has been done through the creation of a committee which is attached to the U. S. Intelligence Board. The committee maintains a list of priorities on a current basis. A recent list of guidelines for the collection of foreign intelligence pertaining to scientific affairs in Communist China included approximately 170 items, i.e.[long-range planning of Communist China in the nuclear field; nature of research in oceanography; computer capabilities of Shantung University; climate modification and cloud physics research; development of meteorological rockets; development of nuclear weapons; location of uranium refineries; strength of Naval forces; intentions along the Sino-Indian border; types of equipment being supplied to Laos and North Vietnam.]

In the U. S. proper, the sources of foreign intelligence are voluminous. Most of these sources overtly provide information through newspapers, scientific publications, libraries, tourists, visiting professors and students, journalists, and immigrants. The compilation, collation, analysis, and reporting of such information involves an extensive program and, needless to say, the U. S. today does not have the capability of tapping all available sources on a current basis.

For the purpose of this paper, we are thinking about the search for knowledge considered vital for national survival. One could suggest that clandestine collection of intelligence is overemphasized and that our Government could readily protect its interests through overt collection and the employment of our best analysts and evaluators. If we take this approach, we may as well discount the importance of the Bureau's activities in the counterintelligence field, which essentially are of a clandestine nature and which have produced time and again vital intelligence. We, therefore, must move on the assumption that the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence is very definitely a most necessary element of our over-all intelligence capabilities.

In addition to the overt sources, there exists a rich potential in the U. S. among the foreign diplomatic establishments including the U. N., the officials of foreign governments, and visitors such as students, professors, and scientists. A certain amount of information from such sources can be obtained in an overt fashion, but the high quality data is normally acquired through clandestine means. This can be done through technical monitoring, development of live sources, access to records, files, et cetera. There are approximately 10,000 foreign officials in the U. S. assigned to embassies, consulates, trade missions, U. N., and other international organizations. This excludes dependents. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, 38,544 foreign government officials visited the U. S.; about 1500 of these came from communist-bloc countries. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, approximately 50,000 foreign students came to the U. S.; 733 of these came from the communist bloc. During the same fiscal year, there were 2,075,967 visitors from all countries. Everyone of the foregoing is a potential source of foreign intelligence. As can be readily accepted, the U. S. Government does not have a capability of assessing each and every one of these sources for foreign intelligence. We can say at this point that the FBI and CIA are just scratching the surface. It is recognized that a program designed to assess or attempt to recruit each potential source would be out of the question. Such a massive undertaking would not be compatible with U. S. Government foreign policy. There is no question that there must be selectivity of a judicious and prudent nature.

Since the U. S. is such a major power, Washington, D. C. is the center of diplomatic activity involving practically all foreign nations. The location of the U. N. in New York City presents us with another area of intensified activity. Most countries send their most able diplomats to the U. S. so we are confronted with hundreds of highly talented people. The day-to-day activities in diplomatic establishments, conferences, meetings, negotiations, liaison between countries, all create a tremendous reservoir of foreign intelligence potential.

E. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding regarding CIA's capabilities to collect foreign intelligence in the United States, we should first clarify that one of the components of the Agency which has offices in the United States does not engage in this particular activity. The Office of Security, which is responsible for personnel and physical security, maintains several offices in the United States under authorized Treasury Department cover. Personnel of this office conduct investigations of applicants, firms or individuals who may be utilized by CIA on a contract basis to support intelligence operations overseas.

The overt collection of intelligence by CIA is handled by the Domestic Contact Service (DCS) (formerly called Contact Division). CIA estimates that DCS has a capability of tapping approximately 15 per cent of the total potential of intelligence in the U. S. This Division has 18 field offices and 16 resident agencies in the United States, and each office is openly identified as being connected with CIA. Personnel totaling approximately 140 carry CIA credentials. The Division regularly has a number of officers from the various military services who are assigned to this Division on a temporary basis. These military officers concentrate on the collection of that foreign intelligence which relates to the immediate United States military needs. The personnel of DCS interview aliens, tourists, officials of import-export firms, students, scientists, and the information collected covers a very broad spectrum in the positive intelligence category. DCS claims to have contact with about 7200 organizations, institutions, or businesses and has approximately 60,000 contacts or sources of information. The information is reported in the form of "Information Reports," which is disseminated throughout the intelligence community. During 1965, DCS disseminated 26,000 such reports. DCS does not have any responsibilities in the clandestine collection of intelligence, and in that sense it is very specifically not operational. DCS definitely cannot engage in any activity of an internal security nature, and within CIA it is clearly understood that DCS is not to be operational under any circumstances. DCS has been the subject of some controversy within CIA. There is one school of thought which maintains that DCS should be an appendage of the Deputy Director of Plans, who is responsible for all clandestine operations. The other school which has prevailed holds to the line that DCS should be separate and continue under the supervision of the Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI). This situation not only has caused headaches for CIA but also for the Bureau because of situations which arise where the "left hand does not know what the right hand is doing."

DCS is essentially carrying out CIA's responsibilities emanating from National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 2 which has its roots in a similar directive issued under the National Intelligence Authority in 1946. It has been in business for approximately twenty years. Per agreement, DCS cannot interview an alien without first clearing with the Bureau. This is done on a daily basis. With regard to American citizens, Bureau approval is not required unless the Bureau has indicated a prior interest in the individual; however, DCS nevertheless submits name checks on Americans, and if it so happens that the subject of such an inquiry is a Bureau source or involved in a Bureau investigation, we are in a position to move to protect our interests. It should be noted that although DCS is engaged primarily in positive intelligence collection, it is required to be on the alert for sources who possibly might be useful to CIA's clandestine operations. For example, if DCS encounters an alien who can be utilized in an overseas operation, the lead is passed on to the appropriate division. At the present time, DCS alerts the newly created Domestic Operations Division (explained below) regarding potential sources.

Our current controls with regard to DCS are functioning efficiently. We regularly examine the status of this relationship, and we periodically make adjustments in order to make certain there is no "freewheeling" and to take advantage of the information which DCS gains and which is of interest to the Bureau. For example, we are currently working out arrangements where our field offices can contact the local DCS offices concerning Chinese aliens who might be of interest to us either as subjects for investigation or as potential informants. This liaison at the field level was deemed desirable so that we could get information at the "horse's mouth" rather than wait for a reply from CIA headquarters, which is often prolonged and, when transmitted, is sometimes stripped of pieces of information. This occurs because of the involved and sometimes complicated maze of bureaucratic compartmentation within CIA.

In the latter part of 1963, CIA created its Domestic Operations Division (DOD), which was to be responsible for any clandestine development of sources in the United States. Prior to the establishment of this Division, CIA activity in this field was managed from each individual area division at Washington headquarters. The pressing need for more clandestine sources, coupled with the recognition of the vast potential in the United States, prompted CIA to create a new division which would be responsible for all of the area division interests. DOD has headquarters at Washington, D. C., and currently has field offices at New York City, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Washington, D. C., proper. Approximately 40 intelligence officers are assigned to the task of engaging in assessment and/or recruitment of positive intelligence sources, primarily in the diplomatic field. Some of the personnel are assigned to the handling of firms or organizations which may be supporting certain CIA operations abroad. DOD personnel in the field operate under authorized Department of Defense cover. The heads of these field offices are known to us, and we have established a satisfactory liaison area at the field level.

DOD is also responsible for the handling of CIA agents (informants) who have been recruited abroad and who come to the United States for assignments either on a temporary basis or for the duration of a normal diplomatic assignment.

The creation of DOD within CIA was and still is a somewhat controversial Agency subject. DCS saw DOD as an interfering element. The area desks were reluctant to have a new division to take over their agents. Some of the DOD personnel are very capable and seasoned intelligence officers. Many of them are considered of mediocre capability, and there is a frequent rumor that other CIA divisions send their misfits to DOD. From CIA's standpoint there appears to be a definite need for a much stronger team within DOD.

Theoretically, DOD is required to be on the alert for all potential sources who can be used by CIA in its intelligence operations, and the approach is basically one of a long-range nature. DOD is required to make use of all leads emanating from fellow employees who may have developed social contacts or associations with foreigners abroad or who might meet potential sources in the United States. Since CIA personnel operate under diplomatic cover when abroad, they do get the opportunity to move in diplomatic circles. Similarly, undercover agents of CIA traveling throughout the world also make contacts which offer potential exploitation if and when the target stops in the United States.

Since January, 1964, when DOD actually began moving, it has recruited approximately ten individuals in the diplomatic field. Most of these were in the noncommunist-bloc area. All of those recruited appear to have been in a fairly low-level category. All of them were career diplomats, and there was no evidence that the individuals were connected with any intelligence service.

In addition to the activities of DCS and DOD, there is a certain amount of CIA operational movements which do not fall under either of the foregoing divisions. One example is the CIA base in Miami which was set up for CIA's operations directed against the Cuban Government. This base is used for the training and dispatching of agents into Cuba and to some extent into other countries in the Caribbean, particularly the Dominican Republic. This base is directly responsible to the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, which could be called the Latin American Division.

CIA also becomes involved in political and psychological warfare type of programs directed against targets in foreign countries. The Agency broadly refers to this activity as "covert action." The programs are essentially designed to influence individuals, organizations or governments through various news media, and this will include the utilization of "agents of influence." This activity falls under the International Organizations Division (IOD) of CIA, which has no responsibility to collect information. IOD does use people in the United States to help implement the overseas programs. Quite often the Agency uses cutouts or covers for such an operation. Although IOD does not engage in intelligence collection, it is a CIA division which should be kept in mind, since its activities quite often will be tangent to matters of interest to the Bureau. For example, IOD becomes involved in the World Youth Festival, where its objective is to neutralize communist influence. We, of course, have had an interest in the Festival because of the participation of Americans, including members of the CPUSA. Theoretically, IOD is required to coordinate closely with other appropriate components of CIA. We do not believe that this coordination has been effective enough.

There is no doubt that there are individuals in CIA who aspire to broaden the Agency's operational activities in the United States. Such individuals would like to see an arrangement similar to one currently in force in England where MI-6 has a free hand to assess and recruit all foreigners, including diplomats, where there is no evidence that they are engaged in intelligence activity. If such evidence is obtained, MI-6 is required to coordinate with MI-5. There are people in CIA who would like to see similar machinery and in addition would want the freedom to conduct certain investigations and maybe even institute technical surveillances.

In summary, CIA so far has a very limited capability to recruit foreign diplomatic sources in the United States, but the Agency appears to have done fairly well with a relatively small staff; however, it can be anticipated that this capability will increase. CIA's effectiveness will probably be adversely affected for some time to come because of the Agency's well-known deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, loose administration, and lack of skilled and talented personnel.

F. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI

1. Manpower Being Devoted

It is most difficult to give any specific figures as to how much manpower the FBI is currently devoting strictly to foreign intelligence collection, separate and apart from the Bureau's internal security and counterintelligence functions. Much of the foreign intelligence developed by the Bureau is an outgrowth of our internal security investigations and cannot be neatly separated in terms of manpower or time.

A substantial amount of our foreign intelligence activity is concentrated in two offices where most of the diplomatic establishments in the United States are located; namely, New York and Washington Field. Both offices were requested to furnish estimates as to how much manpower is being allocated to foreign intelligence matters, including both live sources developed and technical coverage. In both cases, the estimates provided were highly tentative and both offices stress that manpower commitments in this area fluctuate widely from week to week depending on international politics and other unpredictable factors. For instance, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, both offices greatly increased their normal manpower commitment to the development of current foreign intelligence. The present Dominican crisis which involves production of foreign intelligence to a large extent represents another "abnormal" situation.

However, for what it is worth, WFO and New York have estimated that at the present time they are allocating approximately 35 Agents and 20 clerical employees to the full time task of foreign intelligence collection. Virtually all of the clerical time and about 40 per cent of the Agent time is related to technical coverage and the balance is aimed at the development of live sources.

In addition, of course, all of the other offices, including our Legal Attaches abroad, have devoted manpower to foreign intelligence collection in varying degrees. Anagram operations conducted in different field offices have involved the assignment of as many as 10 or 12 Agents for temporary periods. In connection with its responsibilities in the Cuban and Latin-American fields, the Miami and San Juan offices have devoted considerable manpower to the development of foreign intelligence in recent years. The Chicago Office in connection with its handling of our top-level Solo informant has devoted manpower to the development of foreign intelligence. These represent only a few examples.

On an overall basis and bearing in mind the difficulty in citing any precise figures, it is estimated that the Bureau probably averages approximately 50 to 75 Agents and 25 to 30 clerks assigned primarily to foreign intelligence work.

2. Number of Microphone and Telephone Surveillances with Evaluation of Product

At present, Bureau has only one microphone surveillance in foreign intelligence field and this is in connection with a special National Security Agency project directed against Turkish coded communications. Concerning technical surveillances, we are now operating about 70 foreign intelligence installations on various diplomatic establishments in this country. The majority of these are in Washington Field and New York with scattered installations in Chicago, Miami, Pittsburgh, San Francisco and San Juan. Under current Bureau policy, we are limited to 80 foreign intelligence technical surveillances and no microphone surveillances with the exception of one on the Turkish United Nations Mission.

In addition, during recent years, we have maintained approximately 50 so-called "telex" surveillances on the teletype facilities of various foreign establishments. This has been done at the specific request of the National Security Agency, in connection with its efforts to break foreign codes and to read foreign government communications.

We have had excellent results from these technical installations. Any compilation of items of value to the U.S. Intelligence Community and policy-making officials developed through this coverage would run many hundreds of pages. The results have ranged from information regarding plans and activities of key foreign countries in the diplomatic field to information regarding intelligence, political, economic and military developments in the countries concerned. In many instances, we have been able to forewarn the White House, the State Department and other interested agencies of impending developments and to furnish data giving an insight into the thinking and strategy of key foreign officials and governments. This coverage has proved specially valuable during crisis periods such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and during the tense negotiations involving the Panama Canal in 1964. On many occasions, top-ranking United States officials have commented on the effectiveness of this data. The particular importance of this information has been its timeliness to current events as well as the fact that it represents a penetration of foreign diplomatic circles which is only infrequently available through live sources.

In some instances, of course, this type coverage on a particular foreign establishment or official has not paid off. We have had cases where this technique has been unproductive for sustained periods of time on a particular country. This is to be expected and we have sought to overcome this by rotating our installations, correlating our technical operations with shifting international developments and putting coverage on those countries which appear to offer the most promise for worthwhile intelligence.

3. Live Sources With Evaluation

At present we are making active efforts to develop live informant coverage in the diplomatic establishments of 37 non-Soviet bloc countries. This list of so-called "target countries" varies from time to time but essentially we are seeking informant coverage in countries considered critical from an intelligence standpoint such as those leaning towards the Soviet bloc or countries in which the United States has paramount political or military interests or which are otherwise of primary concern. The current list includes virtually all Latin-American countries, a number of Middle East countries, and scattered countries throughout Africa and the Far East.

Our program was initiated in the early 1950s, and we are now using some 50 sources (This number fluctuates due to transfers, resignations, etc.). In each case, we clear with State Department prior to designating any country as a "target" and we also clear with State prior to conducting interviews with employees at the "target" establishment. In a number of instances, including most Latin-American countries, State has asked us to restrict our efforts to American citizens. This, of course, is a highly limiting factor.

Over the years this live informant coverage has on many occasions produced foreign intelligence of real value. Our sources have frequently provided data regarding proposed political, diplomatic or economic action by the countries concerned, on occasion in advance of other forewarning to U.S. intelligence. They have also been able to furnish a considerable amount of information regarding the whereabouts, background and general activities of individual foreign officials of security interest, thereby saving investigative time. These sources have been especially valuable in connection with the Anagram Program and other sophisticated attacks on foreign establishments, providing us with data regarding the physical security, location of code rooms, etc., of the various foreign establishments.

In addition to so-called "target" countries which are in the non-Soviet bloc area, the Bureau has developed a number of informants and defectors-in-place in Soviet-bloc establishments who have been able to furnish a substantial amount of foreign intelligence. In the Soviet-bloc field, we have also developed a number of sources in quasi-official establishments, such as trade missions, who have produced valuable foreign intelligence. In the Soviet-bloc field, of course, our live informant development has been aimed essentially at internal security and counterintelligence needs of the Bureau.

It is significant that we have been able to operate for many years in the development of live sources in foreign diplomatic establishments, both Soviet bloc and non-bloc, without encountering any serious incidents embarrassing to the FBI or the United States Government.

In assessing the product of such live sources in a number of instances in the non-Soviet field, State Department has requested that we restrict our efforts to American citizens. To a considerable degree, this has limited the effectiveness of our program in the non-Soviet field since U.S. employees of foreign establishments will normally not have access to top-grade data. Thus, especially in the non-Soviet bloc field we are not tapping the full potential which exists for high-level foreign intelligence. This can only be realized through the development of high quality sources.

4. [Anagram Program

This material, which is a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation etc.

Anagram is code word for FBI program to penetrate foreign diplomatic establishments in U.S. for purpose of securing cryptographic material. This material is primarily of value to National Security Agency in its communications intelligence efforts. Since inception of program in 1954, we have conducted Anagram operations involving 38 different foreign countries and a total of 57 separate establishments. Approximately 10 FBI field offices have participated in the program. Our operations under this program have resulted in monetory savings to the Government estimated at better than $13,000,000 and it has provided data of incalculable intelligence value. While it has been of primary value to NSA, we have on occasion produced information of primary interest to the Bureau. For example, in April, 1963, we affected a successful penetration in the Polish field which produced material disclosing the activities of Polish Intelligence Service in this country.]

5. Double Agents and Informants

In a number of instances, Bureau double agents and informants, developed to assist us in connection with our internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, have been able to provide significant high-level information of foreign intelligence value.

For example, in the Soviet field, we have developed a number of top-level sources such as [Fedora and Tophat] who have provided current intelligence regarding the organizational structure, personnel, and operations of the KGB and GRU, both in the Soviet Union and abroad; a description of various technical equipment used by Soviet intelligence; data regarding current relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China; and data regarding Soviet foreign policy, political and military developments, etc. Similar information of foreign intelligence value has been developed through FBI informants, double agents and defectors-in-place operating against

Polish, Yugoslav, Czechoslovakian and other communist-bloc countries. For instance, in the Cuban field on several occasions, FBI informants have been able to develop high-level or current intelligence regarding conditions in Cuba, and policies of the Castro regime through personal contacts with ranking Cuban officials both in the U.S. and abroad.

Through our coverage of the Communist Party, USA, and related organizations we have also frequently produced foreign intelligence, although to a lesser extent than in our operations in the foreign nationality field. One of our best sources of foreign intelligence in the domestic area is our so-called Solo operation* wherein we have informants acting in a liaison capacity between the Communist Party, USA, and foreign communist groups, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We have developed information through this operation regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute, social and political conditions in various countries, both in and outside the Soviet bloc, and tactics of the international communist movement.

6. Additional Potential

As indicated in the foregoing subsections, the Bureau is currently producing a considerable volume of foreign intelligence through covert means, much of it of a significant nature. Most of this data is an outgrowth of informants, technical coverage and investigative programs targeted primarily to fulfill our internal security and counterintelligence objectives and relatively speaking, we have committed only a small percentage of our assets exclusively in the direction of foreign intelligence.

It is believed that the Bureau possesses considerable potential for the development of foreign intelligence which could be realized with a fairly modest expenditure of manpower and costs if we were to make foreign intelligence collection a primary aim. For example, with existing equipment and facilities, we could expand our technical coverage of foreign establishments to include a additional 30 to 40 foreign establishments provided we could assign about 25 additional personnel to this field. With the assignment of an additional 75 to 100 Agents, we could greatly intensify our foreign intelligence collection through live informants, primarily through the development and exploitation of additional sources at foreign diplomatic establishments. We could place more stress on foreign intelligence collection in our training programs and conferences to make more effective use of our already available ass We could, for example, add specialized classes on foreign intellige collection to our In-Service schedules or designate selected Bureau personnel to attend training sessions operated by other U.S. agenci regarding this subject.

* identifies a particularly sensitive foreign intelligence operation

G. AREAS OF CONFLICT, FBI - CIA

Any differences between FBI and CIA are first related to a basic problem existing in any country among the major powers, namely "How does a law enforcement agency coordinate its internal security functions with an intelligence organization which must operate as a clandestine service?" The very nature of the functions of the two organizations immediately introduces potential areas of conflict. One essentially operates overtly and the other covertly. This alone is enough to create an atmosphere fraught with controversies and confusion. Because each agency was molded differently and because responsibilities differ, there naturally will be conflicting approaches to national security objectives. For example, in the field of intelligence the Bureau is basically a counterintelligence body. CIA, to the contrary, has a much broader responsibility in intelligence, which includes collection of foreign intelligence, political and psychological warfare, inter-agency coordinating, evaluation, research, etc. Counter-intelligence within CIA is actually a relatively small component of the agency. Personnel in the two organizations is recruited under different criteria and standards. Training is likewise at variance. In a final analysis, the experienced FBI Agent and the seasoned CIA intelligence officer are not of the same mold but certainly are tailored as two entirely and distinctly different instruments. We should bear in mind that little has been done to introduce truly substantive cross-fertilization of outlook, approach and operational philosophy between the two agencies. This could be advocated from a Utopian point of view, but it also could be argued that there are distinct advantages to maintaining sound compartmentation.

Separate from the above basic and fundamental situation, the differences between FBI and CIA also relate to other factors such as:

1) FBI was first on the scene and was well established long before CIA came to life. This led to a conception in the early years that CIA was an intruder.

2) The seed of CIA was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an organization whose personnel, activities and free-wheeling were the sources of numerous conflicts

with the Bureau during World War II. It was during these years that an atmosphere of mistrust and lack of confidence was created.

3) CIA was established as our first over-all, worldwide intelligence agency. The events and the maneuvering which led to this certainly did not bring with them a harmonious relationship.

4) Unfortunately, CIA grew big and grew fast, particularly because of an unsettled atomic world and developments such as the Korean War. The Agency did not jell effectively as an organization, and with this came numerous difficulties, many of which exist to this day.

5) Each organization has lacked adequate knowledge of the other's operational machinery, objectives, and "ways and means of doing things."

6) An element of rivalry actually developed over the years, and this, when not tempered with prudence and sound judgment, creates unhealthy situations.

7) A growing tendency on the part of CIA to expand its operational activities not originally contemplated in the formation of that agency.

It can be recognized that with this background it has not been an easy matter to establish a good working relationship with CIA without frequent conflicts, and sometimes agonizing negotiations. It could be suggested that the ideal situation would be to remove CIA from the U. S. with the understanding that we would assume responsibility for any and all activity in the intelligence field. As described in another section of this report, such a move would be highly infeasible for the Bureau.

It is to our credit that despite the problems of the past there have been some highly constructive developments in FBI-CIA relations, particularly as they affect activities in the U. S. Several years ago arrangements were made whereby CIA's Office of Security could conduct applicant investigations without infringing upon our jurisdiction. For several years we have been permitting CIA to interview aliens for foreign intelligence information under ground rules which have been very successful. Our liaison mechanism has been functioning effectively. We have frequent conferences. Bureau personnel lectures before CIA officers. Dissemination of information is excellent. The atmosphere for negotiating and discussing unusually complicated problems is very good. Personnel can work in the same area with a minimum of problems, as evidenced in the Dominican Republic. We attend USIB meetings and are actively engaged in the work of several committees attached to USIB. All of this is commendable progress and certainly beneficial to national security.

All of the foregoing was set forth in the way of background in order to better understand the current source of differences with CIA, namely the Agency's desire to assess and recruit foreign intelligence sources in the U.S. in the foreign diplomatic establishments, including United Nations, and to some extent among foreign visitors. CIA fully acknowledges our internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities. This is clear-cut and free of any debatable question; however, CIA feels that we have no legally-established responsibility in foreign intelligence collection and that somebody (in this case, CIA) should be fully exploiting the foreign intelligence potential in the United States, bearing in mind that there are approximately 10,000 foreign officials and employees in this country. CIA argues that a foreign diplomat can be recruited anywhere in the world but maintains that there is no better place than the United States for assessment, recruitment, training and orientation of an informant. CIA further maintains that if the Agency moves on a target, such as an Argentine diplomat who may be a career officer not connected with a foreign intelligence service, there should not be any conflict because the activity is in no way related to the internal security functions of the Bureau. CIA has also expressed the attitude that in the communist-bloc field CIA should be permitted to assess and recruit those individuals not connected with an intelligence or internal security service.

There are some people in CIA who are of the opinion that in the field of foreign intelligence the Bureau should be exerting more effort to actually assist CIA in spotting sources and, when needed, give CIA support in developing an individual through such means as surveillances, neighborhood investigations, etc. When CIA is permitted to recruit a source in the U. S., the Agency takes the position that if the source can be of help to the Bureau we should levy requirements on CIA and not ask for access to the source unless it clearly appears that only through access we can properly discharge our responsibilities. CIA takes a very strong view that once a source is developed it is basically unsound to introduce another agency into the relationship. The developing agency may have used techniques peculiar to its own organization and may have developed a relationship under varied circumstances, and when a new agency is introduced this relationship with the source could be unfavorably disturbed. CIA does not dispute the fact that informant and Agent turnovers sometimes are absolutely necessary.

CIA maintains that if the Bureau is given access to a CIA source we would be responsible for the counterintelligence aspects, but if the source produces foreign intelligence CIA should be responsible for handling this information, including the dissemination. CIA's position is that it is better qualified to evaluate the information and correlate it with the foreign intelligence being developed abroad. For example, if a Nigerian source of CIA, also available to the Bureau, furnishes information regarding the Nigerian Foreign Office, CIA claims that it can better handle the report and dissemination.

Discussions and agreements with CIA, including the actions stemming from meetings with the representatives of that agency in November 1965, have resulted in a greatly improved coordinating machinery. There still are areas of potential conflict which will necessitate improvement. They are:

1) DOD personnel receives leads or tips pertaining to possible access to Soviet-bloc diplomats. This CIA Division pursues these leads and is inclined to take the position that such individuals contacted by CIA are their "CIA-controlled sources." If we permitted this to go on over a period of time, CIA would have a vast network of sources not directly available to the Bureau. This is basically unsound, and there is no reason CIA shouldn't immediately give us the lead or tip for exploitation. We can recognize that, depending upon circumstances, it might be favorable to us and CIA for the Agency to handle a particular individual, and if so, it would be clearly

coordinated. This would be most important if the individual in any way was connected with or associated with an intelligence service.

2) DOD is anxious to have freedom to assess and recruit Bloc diplomats not known to be engaged in intelligence activity. On the surface, this does not appear to present a problem, but realistically speaking it is impossible for us to know that a Soviet diplomat, not known to be engaged in intelligence activity one day, appears on the scene the following week as an agent or coopted agent. To give CIA wide latitude in this field could create a truly undesirable mess. We believe that if CIA is permitted to move on such targets it should be done on a selective basis and with maximum coordination.

3) CIA's organizational and operational deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, poor internal coordination, unsatisfactory records, all introduce headaches which undoubtedly will continue to exist for many years.

4) There continues to be an element of mistrust and misunderstanding between the two organizations because of the historical reasons described above.

5) Continuing lack of one agency's appreciation for the other's objectives, responsibilities and operational philosophy.

6) The absence of a clearly defined Bureau policy and objectives in the field of foreign intelligence collection. CIA really does not know the nature and the extent of our interests, and consequently this lends to confusion and misunderstanding.

H. CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA

1. According to SAC Letter 59 dated 5/24/49, CIA and FBI had reached agreement whereby clearance would be requested of FBI before CIA conducted an interview with an alien in the U.S. This clearance would consist of a review of Bureau files concerning individual in question.

According to same SAC Letter, agreement had been reached by the FBI and CIA whereby CIA was allowed to contact American businessmen without obtaining clearance from FBI in order to obtain positive foreign intelligence information and arrange covers for CIA personnel abroad. This agreement was based strictly on collection of foreign intelligence and positively did not allow for the formulation of a network of confidential informants for CIA in the U.S.

Regarding FBI-CIA agreement that CIA would clear with us prior to interviewing aliens in U.S., following documentation has been located. By letter 2/19/48 Director of CIA Hillenkoetter wrote Director and referred to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7, 2/12/48. This Directive states in part that CIA will be responsible for exploitation on highly selective basis within U.S. of business concerns, other nongovernmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information. Hillenkoetter commented that CIA had been interviewing foreign businessmen, immigrants and refugees on small scale, always clearing matter first with FBI office in area concerned. He asked Director's views as to possible expansion of this activity.

By letter 2/26/48 Director replied to Hillenkoetter. In part, this letter pointed out FBI had no objection to CIA interviewing individuals enumerated above for foreign intelligence purposes; however, it was suggested that prior to interview such individual matters be cleared with FBI Headquarters.

2. Bureau letter to CIA 1/16/64 confirmed results of meetings between CIA and Bureau via liaison in discussing reorganization of CIA's Domestic Operations Division (DOD). Letter recognized CIA needs (recruitment of sources in U.S. who may be used abroad; recruitment of diplomats, including UN representatives, who might be useful to CIA in overseas operations or who might be transferred to Soviet-bloc countries; training of agents recruited; handling of agents developed abroad who come to U.S. for a visit or assignment; and approaches to foreign officials and visitors to assess their potential as sources when they leave the U.S.). Our letter to CIA set forth the following ground rules to be followed in connection with CIA's operations in order to avoid operational conflicts and embarrassment:

a. CIA would not conduct investigation of any foreign official in U.S. and if CIA felt such investigation warranted, FBI should be consulted.

b. No foreign official would be approached for recruitment by CIA without its conferring with FBI.

c. When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for visit or assignment, FBI will be advised and two agencies will confer regarding handling of agent in this country, it being recognized each case has its individual peculiarities.

d. Before approaching any foreign official or visitor for recruitment assessment, CIA will clear with FBI.

3. As result of conference with CIA in January, 1966, the above "ground rules" were modified and expanded and agreed upon by both agencies early this year (Confirmed by letter to Admiral Raborn 2/7/66). New ground rules in summary are as follows:

a. CIA will not initiate investigation of any foreign official in U.S. without concurrence of FBI. (Comment: This is essentially same as (a) in January, 1964, ground rules. Only difference is that wording of this modification implies more sympathetic FBI attitude towards any proposed CIA investigations.)

b. CIA will seek FBI concurrence before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist bloc visitor in U.S. FBI will concur if CIA action does not conflict with any FBI operations. (Comment: This is similar to (b) and (c) ground rules adopted in January, 1964, with two differences. First, it drops requirement that CIA clear with us before approaching a non-Soviet visitor although it must still do so with regard to non-Soviet officials. Secondly, it specifically commits the FBI to concur if proposed CIA action does not conflict with FBI operations.)

c. CIA will advise FBI prior to meetings between CIA assets and foreign officials or communist bloc visitors of interest to FBI. (Comment: This was not included in previous set of ground rules.)

d. Agents of CIA who come to U.S. will be identified to FBI by name or appropriate description depending on national security interest involved.

e. When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for a visit or assignment, FBI will be advised and two agencies will confer regarding handling of agent in U.S. It is recognized each case will have individual peculiarities and governing principle will be positive intelligence weighed against internal security factors. CIA may, however, continue its contractual relationship for purpose of handling training, procurement of positive foreign intelligence, (underlining added) fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent and preparation for next assignment abroad.

f. Where CIA will be handling its agent in U.S., CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide FBI all information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters. Where CIA servicing is inadequate for FBI internal security interests, FBI will have direct access to agent. (Comment: Rules (d), (e) and (f) represent greatly expanded and refined version of rule (c) of January, 1964, agreement. Old ground rules provided considerable latitude with regard to who would handle CIA source in the U.S. and this has led to some disagreements with CIA. The current ground rules clearly provide for CIA to retain contact with its agents not only for training, financing, etc., but also for "procurement of positive foreign intelligence." In addition, they make it clear that the FBI should not ask for direct access unless there is a specific internal security need.)

4. In addition to the above, there is one agreement we have reached with CIA which is of possible relevance; namely, our recent agreement relative to treatment of Soviet students in the U.S. By way of background, there are a number of Soviet exchange students currently attending various U.S. universities. Each student, of course, is not only a possible Soviet intelligence agent but also a potential source for the U.S. after he returns to his homeland. Accordingly, both FBI and CIA have an interest in these students.

Per memo dated 1/14/64 we advised CIA via liaison on 1/20/64 that the Bureau would adopt following procedure relative to Soviet students here. FBI will take responsibility for collecting material regarding each student on expedite basis, furnishing results to CIA as developed. At logical point FBI will confer with CIA to decide on case-by-case basis re possible recruitment. If Bureau recruits Soviet student, we will resolve whether we should turn him over to CIA before he leaves U.S. Under this procedure, CIA will not make any inquiries (through its sources in U.S.) unless it has some unusual source in a university not available to FBI who could furnish data on the student. In latter case, we would allow CIA to obtain data and advise us.

The foregoing represent all of the major agreements we have reached to date with CIA with respect to CIA operations here in foreign intelligence field.

I. EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

1. Overt Collection Activities

It is evident from the National Security Act of 1947 and the succeeding National Security Council Intelligence Directives as well as the directives of the Director of Central Intelligence that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is charged with major responsibilities in the overt collection of foreign intelligence in the United States. In pursuit of this, CIA exploits non-governmental organizations and individuals, foreign language publications and aliens. Although CIA claims to have contacts with about 7,200 organizations and businesses as well as about 60,000 sources of information as a result of its overt activities for this purpose, CIA estimates it is reaching only 15 per cent of the foreign intelligence information available in this country.

The question we must consider here is whether the FBI should take over the overt collection of foreign intelligence in the United States, thereby making CIA operational only in areas outside the limits of FBI's jurisdiction. In this connection, the following would have to be considered:

(a) Reporting:

The Bureau is a fact-finding agency which has traditionally gathered evidence and presented its findings without bias or conclusions. This would not change. Intelligence developed by the FBI would be evaluated by the users in the intelligence community. Our report writing format might have to be geared to the needs and established procedures of the United States intelligence community.

(b) Coordination With Other Government Agencies:

Foreign intelligence is a commodity produced for the benefit of many separate agencies of the United States Government. Because of this, if the Bureau were to have full responsibility for the overt collection of foreign intelligence in this country, we would have to greatly expand our liaison services, not only for dissemination purposes but to assure that we are kept fully informed regarding all matters dealing with intelligence priorities.

Our role in preparation of National Intelligence Estimates would be more active as a result of our increased contribution under this program. It might be necessary to utilize the assistance of highly trained personnel of other agencies to assist us periodically on interviews dealing with complicated military or scientific matters.

(c) Manpower:

While no manpower requirements can be presently estimated should we assume full responsibility for overt foreign intelligence collection, CIA is currently using approximately 140 employees throughout the United States to interview individuals in connection with its overt intelligence gathering activities, and is reaching what it estimates to be only 15 per cent of available foreign intelligence information. These 140 CIA employees do not include personnel required at CIA Headquarters to correlate, evaluate and disseminate the data gathered in the field. We would want to more effectively exploit this intelligence potential.

To merely handle the necessary review of the vast number of foreign language publications would require many additional employees proficient in foreign languages and with backgrounds in scientific or technical fields.

(d) Selection and Training of Personnel:

To assume full responsibility for the overt collection of foreign intelligence in this country, would require that we vastly broaden our selection and training procedures. We would require applicants with degrees in the sciences, languages, history, government and economics. Our basic training and In-Service agenda would have to be geared to meet our new responsibilities. We would undoubtedly desire to utilize the services of outstanding lecturers from the agencies constituting our intelligence community, and in turn, we would wish to afford our personnel training at the War Colleges operated by the Department of Defense, and from time to time furnish them the opportunity of specialized training and briefings provided by the members of the U. S. Intelligence Board.

(e) Legislation:

CIA currently has the duty to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and to provide for appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government. This is set out in Title 50, USC, Section 403. The overt collection of foreign intelligence is not the subject of legislation but rather of National Security Council Intelligence Directives which would have to be revised in order to give the Bureau this authority now lodged with CIA.

(f) Organizational Changes:

To carry out a program committing the Bureau to the full responsibility for the overt collecting of foreign intelligence in this country would necessitate a substantial increase to the headquarters staffs of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Laboratory Divison, as well to the personnel assigned to the New York and Washington Field Offices where diplomatic establishments and international organizations are mainly located In all probability the creation of a new division at the Seat of Government devoted entirely to overt collection responsibilities, would be required.

(g) Observations:

The many responsibilities that would be ours under a program making the Bureau accountable for the overt collection of all foreign intelligence in this country would (1) require an enormous increase in our own personnel, trained in many specialized fields, or (2) the delegation of varied intelligence functions to other governmental agencies and close supervision of such agencies to insure efficient execution of the tasks levied upon them. These overt collection responsibilities would undoubtedly be subject to the scrutiny of many sources, some of them hostile, and we would have to face the charges, unjust though they might be, that the Bureau had ceased to perform the duties for which it was originally created and had developed into a gigantic bureaucratic octopus.

2. Clandestine Gathering Activities

There are no statutory provisions for the clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence in the United States. We have in the past produced substantial foreign intelligence while carrying out our present responsibilities.

CIA established its Domestic Operations Division (DOD) in 1963 and began to clandestinely gather foreign intelligence in this country. It now has six field offices with approximately

40 intelligence officers assigned to these matters. It is anticipated that DOD's efforts will become more extensive.

CIA estimates there are approximately 10,000 employees and dependents assigned to the diplomatic establishments and international organizations represented in this country by approximately 120 foreign nations. It can readily be seen that we would have to establish priorities and well-defined objectives in order to cope effectively with the problem presented by the vast number of persons and establishments which could be considered for clandestine coverage.

Today there are approximately 40 nations in addition to the Soviet-bloc countries, whose establishments in this country we consider "target" countries for the purpose of developing live sources therein. In the absence of more precise criteria, our initial efforts in a program designed to expand our clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence, could be directed against these "target" nations.

(a) Objectives:

Under a program confined to the clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence in this country, and consistent with the intelligence needs of this Government, we would have as our objectives:

(1) Increasing substantially the number of live sources of high quality in diplomatic establishments, trade missions, consular offices or international organizations located within the United States;

(2) Expanding our present technical and microphone coverage in such establishments.

We would, of course, maintain our "Anagram" program which has been so successful in the clandestine acquisition of the cryptographic systems of various foreign nations, as well as our "Telex" program which is the technical coverage we afford the teletype facilities of certain foreign countries.

same wording
as page 67.

(b) Observations:

While a program limited to the clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence would require a substantial increase in manpower, both in the field and at the Bureau's headquarters, as well as an expansion o_ our personnel selection and training procedures, our liaison responsibilities and our filing and data processing facilities, however; in none of these phases would the increase be nearly as great as that which would be required should we assume full responsibility for the overt gathering of such foreign intelligence.

J. GENERAL FINDINGS

The study conducted by the Committee has produced the following significant findings:

(1) There definitely is a vast potential for collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. available through overt and clandestine channels. Even with the available capabilities of existing agencies, there is a large reservoir of untapped sources.

(2) CIA has been authorized by statute and implementing directives to collect foreign intelligence in the U. S. through overt methods and has been involved in such collection since the establishment of the Agency. This includes review of foreign language press and interviews with selected individuals such as American businessmen, aliens, and students. In addition, CIA has established an elaborate system of processing, storing, evaluating, and disseminating this information.

(3) Such overt collection by CIA does not present any threat or infringement on FBI jurisdiction or operations. The present Bureau controls for such CIA activity are satisfactory.

(4) We concluded that it would be highly undesirable for the Bureau to become responsible for overt collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. The necessary reorganization, expansion of facilities and manpower, and heavy task of information collection and processing could place a damaging burden on the Bureau.

(5) There has never been any statutory or similar provision for the clandestine development by CIA of foreign intelligence in the United States. There are instances where the FBI has received specific assignments which encompassed foreign intelligence collection in the United States (SIS operations covering entire Western Hemisphere in World War II; present operations concerning Dominican Republic). There is no statute or directive which assigns or confirms exclusive FBI jurisdiction in clandestine development

of foreign intelligence in the United States. As a result of our internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, we have produced a volume of foreign intelligence covertly. In addition, either at the specific request of other U. S. agencies or on our own initiative in response to national intelligence needs, we have produced such intelligence. We have done this on a selective basis and have not assumed full responsibility in this area. As indicative of this, certain agreements have been made with CIA permitting that Agency to assess and recruit after coordination with the FBI covert foreign intelligence sources in the United States (principally for use abroad). We have reserved the right to take over such sources if internal security factors are paramount. In the absence of such factors, CIA is permitted to utilize these sources for foreign intelligence purposes.

(6) We concluded that the expanded development of clandestine foreign intelligence sources is essential if national security interests are to be effectively served.

(7) Exploitation of foreign diplomatic targets fortifies our efforts in the internal security and counterintelligence fields. Information developed increases over-all knowledge and produces leads or ties to intelligence activity being carried out by foreign intelligence and security services.

(8) The U. S. intelligence community currently does not provide an organization or a mechanism which can effectively exploit the intelligence potential in the foreign diplomatic field. There have been expressions of concern and certain limited action taken by FBI and CIA, but there has not been a well-organized or united effort and most important of all, there has been a decided lack of leadership directed toward attacking the problem and at the same time inducing an atmosphere of harmonious application of all available resources.

(9) We concluded there is an excellent opportunity for the Bureau to assume leadership in this matter and in so doing, enhance national security and

the capabilities of the Bureau. The time has arrived for us to adopt and implement a new concept toward foreign intelligence collection. It would be unwise if the Bureau did not move into a leading role and instead applied policy and tactics conforming with a "holding action." This, in our opinion, is not consistent with the reputation of a progressive and forward looking organization.

(10) The Bureau does have talent and capability to assume a more active role in clandestine collection of foreign intelligence. We have the potential to handle clandestine collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. in a more effective manner than any other agency. This can be done in a constructive and prudent manner.

(11) It is recognized that a new approach by the Bureau will involve operational risks. If one is to progress, he must take risks. We feel that we have the capability to succeed with a minimum of losses or debits.

(12) We feel that if we do not adopt a new role characterized with an aggressive approach, a door is left open for other agencies such as CIA to progressively introduce programs designed to fill the vacuum. CIA currently does not have the capability to inject a rapid "take-over" of operational areas. We do feel that such would be accelerated not by CIA's strength, but by our weaknesses.

(13) CIA is progressively expanding its objectives and capabilities to conduct clandestine intelligence operations in the U. S. This presents a potential for areas of conflict between CIA and FBI.

(14) We definitely must define our role in the field of clandestine foreign intelligence collection so that policy and objectives are clear-cut. Not only our own personnel but other agencies including CIA should know exactly where we stand.

(15) CIA can be permitted to develop clandestine sources of foreign intelligence under the

established ground rules which do protect Bureau interests. A new approach being recommended would heavily deter CIA from extensive development of clandestine sources and would really leave the Agency in a minor or subordinate role.

K. RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION

A penetrative and objective study of the Bureau's position has led us to conclude that the Bureau should play a much more active and influential role in the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in the United States. We are recommending the implementation of a plan which will lead to a valuable contribution to our national security effort and concurrently will improve our internal security capabilities. This plan presents a concept of an FBI as an Agency primarily responsible for internal security, but supplementing its coverage with a substantially expanded capability in the clandestine collection of positive intelligence. We believe that we have the capability of developing this new look knowing that at the same time we can institute a badly needed leadership to eliminate a gap in the acquirement of high-quality intelligence in the United States. The main features of this plan are:

1) Establishment of a list of foreign diplomatic targets consistent with the needs of the Government.

2) Expansion of our technical surveillance capabilities with emphasis on misurs.

3) Expansion of live sources characterized with selectivity and high-quality value.

4) The FBI assuming a role of leadership in the clandestine exploitation of positive intelligence in the U. S., and in so doing making maximum use of the talent and capabilities of other appropriate U. S. Agencies.

Authorization

The plan would be implemented under proper executive authorization (Presidential) and furthermore would be coordinated with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). A letter from the President authorizing the Bureau to expand its capabilities in clandestine positive intelligence collection, consistent with the needs of the government, would suffice. In order to avoid any misunderstanding or confusion within the intelligence community, USIB would be apprised of the Presidential authorization. The letter from the President would not require any details regarding the nature and the scope of the action to be taken by the Bureau but could be expressed in general terms. This same authorization could be further defined by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

It is realized that it would be necessary to discuss this plan with the President so that he fully understood the purpose, scope and the controlling features. With his approval, the plan could also be discussed with the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Selection of Targets

Priority on targets can be established by application of the following criteria:

1) Review of requests or requirements levied on us by the President and U. S. Intelligence Agencies.

2) Review of priority listed by the USIB. (This is done on a regular basis.)

3) Our own analysis and evaluation of international political developments. This primarily will be done at SOG, but we should be so organized that the field would be free to submit recommendations.

As of March, 1966, the following could be set forth as a tentative list of priority targets in the United States:

1) USSR

a. Indications of significant changes in Soviet policies, particularly with respect to relations with the West and with Communist China.

b. Background information illuminating the decisions of the 23rd Party Congress, especially indications of policy disputes or political rivalries; repercussions in other Communist parties.

c. Developments in Soviet space programs in the wake of Luna 9.

2) Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia

a. Chinese Communist, Soviet and North Vietnamese capabilities, intentions, and actions with respect to Vietnam/Laos and to US activities in the area.

b. Indications of Soviet deployment of surface-to-surface missiles to North Vietnam.

c. Changes in the attitudes and policies of influential South Vietnamese, especially Buddhist leaders, toward the war effort or the US.

d. Indications of a major change in Viet Cong/PAVN and Pathet Lao military capabilities and tactics.

e. Information pertaining to the location, size, and types of Chinese troop units in Indochina.

f. Evidence of Viet Cong/PAVN/Chinese Communist use of Cambodia as a sanctuary, operating base, or source of supply; Cambodian Government attitudes toward such uses.

3) Communist China

a. Military, logistic, transportation, and economic information bearing on Communist China's capability to fight a war in Southeast Asia and indications of Chinese intentions respecting direct involvement in this area.

b. Movements of Chinese submarines out of their normal bases or operating areas, particularly toward the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin.

c. Increased air defense capability, particularly production and deployment of advanced fighter/interceptor aircraft.

d. Military activities in other border areas.

4) France

a. French foreign policy, especially concerning NATO, the USSR, the war in Vietnam/Laos and estrangement or competition with the US.

5) The Dominican Republic

a. The character, strength, influence and potential of the contending parties and factions; their capabilities and intentions to conduct coups or insurrectionist activities; their attitudes toward the June elections; capabilities of the Provisional Government to maintain control.

6) India-Pakistan

a. Developments in Indo-Pakistani relations and attitudes toward the US, the USSR and Communist China.

7) Latin America

a. Evidence of increased external Communist assistance to insurgency movements in Latin America in the wake of the January conferences in Havana.

8) Indonesia and Malaysia/Singapore

a. Political aims of the Indonesian military; Sukarno's health and political intentions and capabilities; moves to rebuild a Communist party.

b. Indonesian intentions to continue or reduce the conflict with Malaysia.

c. Changes in Soviet or Chinese policy toward Indonesia resulting from the current internal conflict.

9) Thailand and Burma

a. Communist subversive activity and external support; government capabilities to oppose subversion.

10) Africa

a. African and Communist support to Southern Rhodesian black nationalists; nationalist capabilities to act against the Smith regime; white opposition to the Smith regime; South African and Portuguese assistance to the Smith regime.

b. Effect of recent coups on the stability of other African states.

11) Yemen

a. Evidence of intentions and actions of the UAR and Saudi Arabia with respect to the Yemeni situation.

Technical Surveillance of Targets

Coverage in this field will be divided into the following categories:

1) Technical Surveillances
2) Microphone Surveillances
3) More sophisticated electronic monitoring, i.e. code machines.

At the present time we are handling a very limited number of installations. With existing capabilities, we could virtually double our present technical coverage. Once we have established reasonable priority listing, it is believed we should systematically expand our operations. In this connection, the following should be borne in mind:

1) Heavy emphasis should be placed on microphone surveillances.

2) Today we are placing greater stress on coverage of official establishments. The new program asks for an expansion of coverage on individuals and/or residences of individuals. Here again selectivity will be a dominating characteristic.

3) The program should be so flexible that we would be able to deactivate any installation for security reasons or for non-productivity and whenever possible employ techniques which would permit easy reactivation.

4) Except for current intelligence requiring immediate dissemination, the product should be handled as communications intelligence and dissemination would be subjected to well-established Comint controls of the National Security Agency (NSA) plus any additional restrictions the Bureau felt should be imposed.

5) The product would be transmitted to NSA by us for dissemination within the intelligence community. NSA would be responsible for handling any needed translation. We must recognize that the program will produce voluminous information and the responsibility for processing the data should be fixed with an agency which is organized and equipped to handle the job. It is believed that if the Bureau assumed this responsibility we would be burdened with a gigantic task of information processing to the point that this element would adversely affect other phases of the program.

6) If the information collected by us suggested a potential for the development of an operation, i.e. double agent, the Bureau could assume complete control of this operation including the dissemination of the information.

7) Our involvement in the "sophisticated" category should be increased by expanded research and development bearing in mind we should be utilizing the most productive equipment available. The importance of this field cannot be exaggerated in light of the rapid developments in the scientific world.

Technical Surveillance Controls

Under this plan we could furnish the President and the Attorney General a listing of technical surveillance targets and do so on a periodic basis. This could even include an annual evaluation of the program.

Anagram Program (Clandestine collection of cryptographic material)

Same as 67

This has been one of the more productive programs handled by the Bureau throughout the years. We definitely believe that this program should continue and where feasible we should accelerate. The product would continue to be disseminated to NSA.

Live Sources

The category of "live sources" when broadly interpreted includes every individual from the casual contact to the controlled informant who is delivering high quality information at an obvious risk. At the present time, our sources in diplomatic establishments are for the most part American citizens. This situation is largely due to an undesirable arrangement where we must first obtain clearance from the State Department before we proceed to recruit any employee or officials of a diplomatic establishment. This places State in the "driver's seat" and that Department, therefore, is practically controlling our efforts. We feel that such an arrangement is certainly not conducive to producing the best results. In our opinion this can be removed by the President's advising the Secretary of State that the FBI is being authorized to develop penetrations in foreign diplomatic establishments without obtaining clearances from State. It would be understood that the Bureau would proceed in a discreet and secure manner. Periodic contact with the Secretary of State or other top State officials to discuss general developments and any potential problems will provide a mechanism for healthy coordination with State. We recognize that a source can turn "sour" and, therefore, there is the danger of potential embarrassment. However, it should be noted that our record in this regard has been outstanding over the years.

Any efficient investigative agency needs sources of all categories and we are no exception. Therefore, we should continue our present program of general source development, and this would include contacts who can produce information on an occasional basis or who might be in a position to be of assistance in a particular investigation. In diplomatic establishments the reception clerk, chauffeur, the maid, can always be of assistance.

However, the primary emphasis of this new program would be directed toward high quality sources, such as:

1) Code clerks
2) Officials who have access to files, records, or communications
3) Officials or employees who are in a position to penetrate communist-bloc circles or establishments
4) Members of foreign intelligence and security services.

Our existing programs of seeking penetrations in communist-bloc installations naturally must continue but will require an increased effort toward production of information relating to personality data, and this should be done on a larger number of individual targets. We realize that Bloc personnel does live in a fairly insulated world, and elementary investigative techniques do not produce voluminous and highly significant data. It is therefore believed that our techniques should become more sophisticated through additional coverage on the residences of individuals.

Such efforts naturally fall in line with our internal security responsibilities, but the coverage may also provide leads for development of sources in the positive intelligence field. Every Soviet is not a member of KGB or GRU, but he nevertheless could offer information of value, and he could be most useful on a long-range basis. Our program very definitely should have this philosophy in mind, and it is an element which must be impressed upon our personnel in our training programs. In this regard, we must recognize that at some point it may become necessary to turn over recruited sources to another agency such as CIA or one of the military services. Such turnover will, of course, depend on the circumstances. The guiding principle should be the preservation of the source under the best security.

In the non-communist bloc field we would concentrate on development of high-quality sources to meet the priority needs of the Government.

Training of Personnel

At the present time, our personnel are not properly oriented to effectively engage in a program as recommended. To accommodate to a new approach, it will be necessary to:

1) Include in our training classes lectures which will cover a more detailed picture of U. S. intelligence, its history, definition of terms, functions of intelligence agencies.

2) Include lectures regarding the foreign intelligence needs of the U. S. Government.

3) Use outstanding officials of other agencies to lecture on special intelligence matters. This would include the critical areas throughout the world.

4) Disseminate a bulletin to the field on a regular basis to emphasize foreign intelligence needs as they relate to our capabilities.

5) Institute a special In-Service class (once or twice per year) which will concentrate on foreign intelligence. This will be designed to develop the leaders or the specialists in the field.

6) Arrange for attendance of selected Bureau personnel to schools of other agencies such as State Department, CIA, and the military services.

7) Arrange for attendance of selected personnel at War Colleges.

8) Expand the training of Agents in the handling of technical surveillance installations.

Reporting Procedures

This program will not require any basic departure from our present reporting procedures. The Bureau should not become involved in evaluating, estimating, etc. We should endeavor to adhere to our traditional position of reporting the facts as collected. We may wish to give consideration to adding one feature to our regular reporting on individuals. This could be an annex for "Personality Data." The objective would be to maintain an up-to-date book on everything collected relating to the subject's character, habits, family life, interests, weaknesses, etc.

Language Capabilities

An expanded program for collection of foreign intelligence would require increased capability to handle foreign languages. As explained above, the material collected through technical surveillances should be handled as communications intelligence, and the major translating responsibility would, therefore, be placed on NSA.

We do, however, recognize that it is necessary to maintain a strong foreign language capability in the field wherever it may be useful to develop live sources. In offices such as New York City and Washington, D. C., we should expand the number of Agents who are fluent in French, Russian, Polish, Czech, German, Chinese, and Spanish. An office which is well equipped with a capability in the foregoing is generally able to handle most situations which arise.

Relations with Other Agencies

If this program is adopted, other intelligence agencies would be officially apprised of the Presidential authority granted to the FBI to collect foreign intelligence in the United States. Other agencies would be informed regarding the nature and the extent of the authority being delegated to the Bureau. It would be necessary to make clear that the Bureau was not assuming responsibility for the clandestine collection of all foreign intelligence in the United States, but we were taking a constructive step in an effort to increase the production of foreign intelligence through assets available to us. We would clearly point out that the FBI was not taking this approach as a solution to all of the problems relating to foreign intelligence collection in this country. We would emphasize that we would move against targets in line with established priorities and that we would do so on a selective basis. We would have it understood that operational activities would be properly coordinated wherever it was obviously necessary.

With regard to the handling of the product of technical surveillances, it would be necessary to effect a working agreement with NSA. To do this we might be obliged to discuss this at the USIB level so that NSA could obtain the required authority to support the hiring of additional personnel and purchase of equipment for the processing of our product. Our arrangement with NSA would include ground rules for processing, translation, and classification and dissemination.

Since any announcement that we were in the foreign intelligence field would prompt unusual interest and very likely queries, we should brief CIA regarding the objectives of our program. Our plan will not abrogate the existing ground rules which permit CIA to assess and recruit positive intelligence sources in this country under certain conditions. Since both Agencies will have foreign intelligence sources in the U.S., we undoubtedly will find it useful to work out an agreement whereby one Agency knows that the other has coverage in a particular area or establishment. We already receive the identities of CIA sources. It would not be necessary for us to identify our sources, but we could indicate to CIA that we had an asset in a particular area.

This would permit CIA to levy requirements on us. For example, if we recruited the Third Secretary of the French Embassy, CIA might wish to ask any number of questions dealing with the French political situation. If we felt that the request was reasonable, we could handle this through our source.

It will be noted that the program does not preclude CIA from development of foreign intelligence sources in the U. S. for fulfillment of CIA responsibilities. CIA will continue to operate under existing ground rules which are designed to protect Bureau interests.

We believe that if the program is implemented and jells we will be in a position to "spot" sources required by CIA and other agencies to discharge their responsibilities. This would apply to cases where the target was in the U. S. for a visit or if he had some specialized knowledge not related to our internal security responsibilities. These would be targets which other agencies could handle without interfering with our operations and without making us carry a load for another agency. This particular concept should include a Bureau attitude that any and every source handled by another agency in the U. S. potentially can be useful to us. We should have an outlook that all sources should be exploited to the fullest extent and under secure conditions. If another agency has a capability to open a door we should take advantage of the situation.

In those instances where CIA has a source in the United States, we should prod that agency to seek information of interest to the Bureau, and where obviously necessary we should arrange access to the CIA source. The important feature of this new concept is that we assume the role of projecting initiative, leadership and aggressiveness. Our position should be such that we push the other agencies to use their resources even to the point of healthy irritation.

We have looked at CIA as the "other agency" in this picture, but we should not neglect the potential of agencies such as ACSI, Air Force, ONI and State. All of them have entree to diplomatic circles. The day-to-day contacts which officials of these agencies have with personnel of foreign governments produce many "pieces" of personality data which, when added up over a period of time, can prove to be extremely useful. We should confer with these agencies regarding ways and means of recruiting sources either to be handled by us jointly or by one of the intelligence agencies. Here again, the Bureau can be the dominant and pushing source.

It is believed that if we moved along the lines described above, the Bureau, over a period of time, would have collected valuable information regarding numerous personalities and the inner workings of the many diplomatic establishments. The acquirement of data of this type creates operational strength. It places us in a position to exploit the development of new sources, bearing in mind that in planning our approaches we will be equipped with ammunition not gained through casual surveillances and observations. With the knowledge that we gain, we can plan high quality operations. It is interesting to note that during the past two years the information received from CIA's sources in the United States has been fairly voluminous and very definitely valuable. It is a good illustration of the Bureau's gaining useful data from another agency with a minimum of Bureau expense and effort, but still maintaining very effective control of our jurisdictional rights.

Undoubtedly related to the utilization of other agencies' resources is the considerably vast potential offered by friendly foreign security services. If the services of Great Britain, Germany, France, Holland, Italy, Australia and Canada provided us information collected in Washington, D. C. and New York resulting from contacts with communist-bloc officials, we would have another valuable source of information. We should bear in mind that we do spend hundreds and thousands of man-hours seeking such information through other difficult channels.

We should utilize the friendly liaison services along the lines described above.

Administrative Reorganization

The present administrative framework at the Seat of Government and in the field would not be adequate to implement the recommended program. Placing the additional load on our existing supervisory structure is, of course, out of the question. We definitely would require an increase in supervisory personnel in the Domestic Intelligence Division. In addition, there would be a need for more manpower in our Laboratory to handle expansion in the technical surveillance field. There would be a need for additional personnel to be assigned for the development of live sources in the field. It would be necessary to have field personnel assigned to technical surveillance installations on a continued basis and, of course, there would be a need for support related to such activities as preliminary security surveys.

It is outside the scope of this Committee's competency to outline any specific administrative reorganization and propose what personnel, equipment and facilities would be needed. We feel that this could be best handled only after the objectives of the program are approved. At that point, officials from the Seat of Government and the field could meet to map out the necessary reorganization. The extent of reorganization will hinge on our decision as to the pace we should set. We recommend that we proceed at a steady, even pace, making certain that we lay solid groundwork for all of our activity. We should refrain from becoming involved in a "crash" program unless national security interests obviously warrant such an approach.

In connection with any planning for reorganization, it would be unwise to proceed without first obtaining a reliable inventory of our current resources. Such an inventory would encompass the following: (1) The number of Agents currently assigned to strictly positive intelligence collection; (2) Our foreign language capabilities; (3) Our current sources and informants with an objective assessment of capabilities; (4) Number of supervisors at the Seat of Government currently handling positive intelligence matters.

In connection with any plans for reorganization, we should not neglect to give consideration to the problems which we will encounter as time goes on in the areas of information storage and retrieval. We, therefore, should realize that it would be unwise to exclude research or study regarding the computerizing of information.

L. ALTERNATIVES

In addition to the recommended plan set forth in preceeding sections, there are several alternative courses of action we might take:

1. We could take the position, and seek ways to implement it, that the entire field of foreign intelligence collection in the U. S., both overt and covert, should be handled by the FBI. Such an across-the-board approach would exclude CIA and other U. S. agencies from foreign intelligence collection in this country and would place exclusive responsibility and jurisdiction in this field on the FBI. As indicated in Section I, this would require a revamping of existing legislation and directives and would necessitate drastic changes in the Bureau's operations, including major increases in personnel and costs and a substantial expansion in our recruitment and training programs, and other reorganization. We do not feel this approach is warranted nor do we believe it would be a practical and sound one.

2. We could recommend that CIA continue to be responsible for overt collection of foreign intelligence in this country but that the FBI exclusively handle covert foreign intelligence collection. This has several obvious drawbacks. First, we would be assuming a wide range of heavy and fixed responsibilities which in many cases would be completely divorced from the Bureau's internal security and counterintelligence interests. Second, we would become to a large extent a service group for other U. S. agencies and departments (including CIA, State, the military and others) in the handling of a host of foreign intelligence requirements levied by other agencies. This would involve a considerable commitment of manpower, communication costs, etc. on the part of the Bureau. In addition, such an approach would necessitate significant changes in our recruitment and training procedures and would also place on our shoulders a definite accountability in connection with any failures in U. S. intelligence foreign collection. It is not believed that this approach is as sound or desirable as our recommended plan of action: namely, that we expand our foreign intelligence collection efforts but on a selective basis and without our assuming full responsibility.

3. We could endeavor to work out a division of responsibility and work in this area whereby the Bureau and CIA would each have certain primary areas of operation. For example, the FBI could make known its willingness to contribute more heavily in support of U. S. foreign intelligence collection efforts and propose this field be broken into two categories; namely, technical coverage (this would include Anagram operations) and live informant development among foreign diplomats. We could propose that the FBI continue to operate exclusively in the first category (technical coverage) with CIA continuing to stay entirely out of this field.

In this regard, the Bureau is better equipped than CIA to handle technical surveillances and Anagram operations by reason of our long experience and expertise in this area.

With regard to the second category (live sources) we could propose that CIA conduct no operations involving countries where the Bureau's counterintelligence interests are paramount or significant. This would include the Sino-Soviet-bloc countries and could also include certain other countries, such as the Dominican Republic, where we have already developed strong capabilities or where there are unique factors.

With regard to other countries (non-Bloc), we could propose that CIA should assume primary responsibility for developing live diplomatic sources. However, this would be with the clear proviso that, in the event the FBI should develop significant internal security interests, we would have the prerogative of levying requirements on CIA sources, having direct access to CIA sources when needed, or as a final step, developing our own sources if CIA could not satisify our needs.

This alternative plan would not involve as much manpower or other expense to the Bureau as our recommended plan. However, it would involve our approval of CIA operations in the live informant field and would risk CIA infringing on FBI interests. It is our consensus that this approach not be adopted.

4. We could recommend that the FBI could withdraw entirely from the field of covert foreign intelligence collection allowing CIA to handle all aspects, including Anagram operations and both live and technical coverage. We are strongly opposed to such an approach on the grounds that it would drastically diminish the FBI's role in the intelligence community, would give CIA carte blanche to operate in the U. S., and in many instances would certainly result in CIAs compromising on internal security and counterintelligence operations.

5. Finally, we could take no action to change the current situation and, in effect, adopt a "status quo" approach. We are opposed to this. As indicated in this study, U. S. Government needs for foreign intelligence are growing on an almost daily basis and CIA has made definite efforts to move more actively into this field. If we were to adopt a "status quo" attitude, it is only a question of time until this matter comes to a head; for example, in the U. S. Intelligence Board or the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. If and when this occurs, the decision as to the FBI's role would, of course, be subject to the thinking and aims of people outside the FBI, possibly including individuals who are not sympathetic to our views. We would not be in a position to maintain control of developments.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

AGENCY	FBI
RECORD NUMBER	124-10273-10289
RECORDS SERIES	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	62-116395-670

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR	FBI
FROM	JONES, M. A.
TO	BISHOP
TITLE	
DATE	02/17/69
PAGES	18

SUBJECTS :
FBI, DIRECTOR, AG A/O OTHERS, DISCUSSION, JFK, INVEST, LUNCHEON

DOCUMENT TYPE	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION	U
RESTRICTIONS	NOT ASSASSINATION RELATED
CURRENT STATUS	X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	08/03/94

OPENING CRITERIA :
INDEFINITE

COMMENTS :
BULKY, INC 3 MEMO, 2998 OF 3016 PAGES NAR

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 part 1 & 14

SSC Request
8/20/75

Part II

Item 3

For Access

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 9/15/67

FROM : G. C. Moore GCM

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Trainor

SUBJECT: LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MR. SARGENT SHRIVER, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY DURING WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1967

GCM

Attorney General's Staff Conference

My memorandum of 9/14/67 set forth for the Director's information data concerning antipoverty workers' involvement in racial disturbances for his possible use at the forthcoming luncheon conference mentioned above.

The following additional information received from the Dallas Office today is being submitted for the Director's consideration in connection with this luncheon.

In response to a request from Mr. Randolf Ratliff, Director of the Neighborhood Organization War on Poverty in Dallas, Texas, a representative of this Bureau explained the FBI's jurisdiction in racial matters to members of Ratliff's staff, who work in the poverty areas in Dallas County Texas, on 9/6/67. The Neighborhood Organization War on Poverty is funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity.

On 9/13/67 one of Ratliff's staff workers confidentially advised that after our representative had left the above meeting, Ratliff instructed his staff members to give the FBI no information and said that the FBI is the white man's police and they want nothing but "stool pigeons." This individual further alleged that all of Ratliff's 44 staff members were hand-picked by Ratliff and that most of them are racial agitators. He charged that Ratliff and most of the staff members are working at creating racial incidents in order to stir up local Negro

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-109673

EX 103

62-77856

TDR:fhd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

REC-9

15 OCT 19 1967

252

62 NOV 1 1967

RACIAL

communities. He further alleged that Ratliff is the driving force behind a program of racial agitation in Dallas County and that his statements to staff members are antiwhite and antipolice. He said it is his belief that Ratliff is trying to create a crisis in Dallas in order to receive additional antipoverty funds.

The source of the above information also alleged that in April of this year Ratliff was vigorously critical of the Dallas Police Department regarding the arrest of a 15-year-old Negro female on a charge of disturbing the peace and was in the process of organizing a march on city hall to protest the arrest when officials of the Office of Economic Opportunity learned of his activity and told him to desist. He stated that in another instance several months ago, Albert Lipscomb (phonetic), staff member, learned of a plot by a group of Negro men who were in possession of rifles and Molotov cocktails to initiate a riot. He claimed that Lipscomb personally prevented the riot by calming the Negro group and personally collecting the rifles and Molotov cocktails but that when Ratliff learned of Lipscomb's role in preventing the riot, he officially took credit for the action. Our source stated that Ratliff unofficially considers Lipscomb an "Uncle Tom."

The above information is being made available to Mrs. Stegall at the White House, Mr. Shriver of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and the Attorney General by letters dated 9/18/67.

ACTION:

Submitted for the Director's possible use.

CC' ch to Messrs: Branigan
Kurtz
Lampher
McCasli

Meehan
orstrom
urner
Wannall

November 18, 1954

SAC, Washington Field

RECORDED - 25

June

Director, FBI 65-63113-5 **PERSONAL ATTENTION**

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

As you are aware, at the present time our coverage on the intelligence efforts of foreign countries here in the United States is primarily aimed at the activities of Soviet and Communist bloc countries. This has been brought about by the fact that those countries represent the greatest threat to the security of our nation, both in the international and domestic fields.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a number of instances have been brought to our attention reflecting so-called "friendly nations" are engaging in direct intelligence activities against the United States. The case involving Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., who was engaged in furnishing top secret information from the National Security Agency to representatives of the Netherlands Government, fully portrays the inherent danger in such intelligence activities. Once vital information reaches another nation, our security with respect to such information is only as good as the security of the foreign government.

The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to alert you to the necessity of promptly bringing to the Bureau's attention any information developed indicating representatives of foreign countries are engaged in intelligence activities here. Our basic policy is to conduct investigations only in instances where we receive allegations indicating an individual representing a fo nation is engaging in activities in violation of our laws or oth wise constitutes a security menace.

CC: 2 - Boston	PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Chicago	PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Cleveland	PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Detroit	PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Los Angeles	PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - New Orleans	PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - New York	PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Philadelphia	PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Pittsburgh	PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - San Francisco	PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Seattle	PERSONAL ATTENTION

COMM — FBI
NOV 19 1954
MAILED 30

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

RJL:em
(33)

The duplimat for this letter is being retained in the office of Supervisor R. J. Lamphere.

DEC 29 1958

The Bureau is aware that the French, the British, the Israelis, the Germans, and a number of other nations either have regularly assigned intelligence representatives in the United States or, from time to time, send such representatives to the United States. In many instances such representatives deal with United States Government agencies on an official basis. At the same time, it is possible that such representatives are engaged in other intelligence activities while here. We are requesting other Government agencies who deal with intelligence representatives of foreign governments to keep us advised of the identities of foreign intelligence representatives in the United States. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is incumbent upon us to be alert to develop information on foreign intelligence representatives and to exploit any situation which may develop indicating such persons are endangering United States security.

CONFIDENTIAL

VIA LIAISON

Date: November 18, 1954

To: Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 - 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

This Bureau has received information in a number of instances in the recent past where representatives of so-called "friendly nations" have engaged in intelligence activities in violation of existing United States statutes and against the best interests of the United States. The case involving Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., wherein vital information from the National Security Agency was furnished to representatives of the Netherlands Government, illustrates the security menace to the United States Government in such activities.

We are aware of the identity of certain intelligence representatives of friendly countries who are stationed in the United States. We are aware that certain of these representatives officially represent their governments in dealing with agencies of the United States Government. In other instances, it has come to our attention that intelligence representatives of foreign governments make visits to the United States to confer with United States agencies. Frequently, however, we are not officially notified when such individuals come to the United States as intelligence representatives and, while other United States agencies are probably officially sponsoring the visits of such representatives, the possibility remains that such persons may, while in the United States, engage in intelligence missions which are not known to the United States agency sponsoring the visit.

RECEIVED ... 10 12 PM '54

Delivered to ... 11-19-54

SE 27

65-63113-1

RECORDED 15

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

RJL:em
(6)

CONFIDENTIAL

1 dopy to AAG William F. Tompkins

NOV 29

CONFIDENTIAL

We would, therefore, like to be notified by the recipients of this letter when information is received that an intelligence representative of a foreign government is coming to the United States. We would like to be advised in the event any agency sets up a liaison arrangement with such an intelligence representative and to be furnished with brief details of his approved activity. This information is needed in order to guide this Bureau in discharging its responsibilities and, at the same time, it will enable us to advise the appropriate agency in the event information is received that the intelligence representative is acting outside the scope of his approved activity. Similarly, any information concerning the activities of these intelligence representatives coming to the attention of any agency which would appear to be outside the scope of their prescribed activity should be brought to the attention of this Bureau. These data will assist us in eliminating unnecessary inquiries and in concentrating on those matters of this type which merit close attention.

We would like to have this information with respect to intelligence representatives now in the United States and, on a continuing basis, with respect to future arrivals. Of course, we desire to continue to be furnished data concerning suspected intelligence representatives who arrive and with whom no working arrangement exists.

The above request is also being directed separately to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Director of Special Investigations, the Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, and the National Security Agency.

CC: 1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

TO E.F. Hall, CIA
11/22/54

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Belmont

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

November 18, 1954

Director, FBI

5-1
2-1

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

There is attached hereto a copy of a letter to Mr. Dennis A. Flinn, Director, Office of Security, Department of State, Washington, D. C., in which there is being set forth the request that other agencies of the United States Government notify this Bureau when they have knowledge of the identities of intelligence representatives of so-called "friendly foreign nations" who are in the United States.

It was thought you would be interested in this as intelligence activities aimed against the United States, regardless of the country from which they emanate, do constitute a security hazard.

You will note from the attached letter that this request is also being directed to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Director of Special Investigations, the Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, and the National Security Agency.

Attachment

RJL:em
(5)

COMM - FBI
NOV 18 1954
MAILED 20

65-63413-3

NOV 19 1954
132

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
andy

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Rec'd by Liaison
12-14-54. SDE

14 December 1954

(9)

CONFIDENTIAL

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Reference is made to your letter dated 18 November 1954, Subject: Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations.

For your interim information, preliminary study of this particular problem is underway, although a firm plan for supplying the desired information in a uniform and expeditious manner and on a continuing basis has not been completed. However, in the course of our inquiry it has been observed that the National Security Agency in many cases would be able to supply additional data concerning the personalities involved in the form of biographical or background information which may be of further assistance to you in this particular effort. With your approval the scope of the information requested from this Agency will be enlarged to include this additional material when available.

I wish to assure you that your request is receiving our careful study and that a basic report will be forthcoming at an early date.

Sincerely,

Ralph J. Canine
RALPH J. CANINE
Lieutenant General, US Army
Director

4

RECORDED - 3 -6

18 DEC [illegible] 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

RTMENT OF THE AIR FORC
UARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FC
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

91146

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Received from OSI
Date 2/4/55

ATTN: Mr. Daniel J. Sullivan
Liaison Agent

RE: Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter, above subject, dated 18 November 1954.

This office is in receipt of a communication from the Directorate of Intelligence, U. S. Air Force which is quoted as follows:

> "In order to provide the Directorate of Special Investigations with the information necessary to satisfy the FBI request contained in the inclosed letter, the Directorate of Intelligence in the future will notify your office when foreign intelligence representatives visit the US at D/I invitation or under D/I sponsorship."

For your information, names of foreign intelligence representatives furnished by the Directorate of Intelligence will be checked in the Office of Special Investigations Central Indices for any additional information prior to transmission to your office. This office will, of course, bring to your attention any additional information received concerning visits to the United States of intelligence representatives of foreign governments.

RECORDED - 77

65-6 -7

EX-112

Sincerely,

17 FEB 8 1955

F. L. WELCH
Acting Chief, Counter Intelligence Div.
Directorate of Special Investigations
The Inspector General

3 15 1955

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ONI 05500.4
Op-921B
7 Feb 1955

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Rec'd. Liaison 2-18-55 WJW

ONI INTERNAL INSTRUCTION 05500.4

From: Director of Naval Intelligence
To: All Division, Branch, and Section Heads, ONI

Subj: Provision of information to the FBI on foreign intelligence representatives

1. Purpose. To provide for notification to the FBI of visits to the United States by intelligence representatives of foreign governments.

2. Discussion.

a. The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation has expressed the following requirements, in connection with the Bureau's internal security responsibilities:

(1) Notification of current or prospective visits of intelligence representatives of foreign governments to the United States, being sponsored by, or which are within the purview of, the Department of the Navy,

(2) Information as to any liaison arrangements with such visitors, and a brief summary of their approved activity,

(3) Information indicating activities on the part of a visitor outside the scope of his approved visit purpose,

(4) Any information on suspected intelligence representatives with whom no working arrangements exist. 65-63113

b. The FBI is aware of the identity of the foreign naval and air attaches accredited to the Department of the Navy, and of the general nature of the approved activities of such attaches. It is therefore considered that the FBI's requirements as to this category of intelligence representatives will normally be served by providing the Bureau with current rosters of accredited attaches and a current edition of the Office of Naval Intelligence Guide for such attaches, as well as notification as to the projected travel of Soviet and Satellite attaches. However, any other information as to the activities of attaches which are of an internal security nature and are outside their authorized scope, is of interest to the FBI and should be provided.

File 65-63113

3. Action.

AUG 20 1971

a. Op-92B2 will continue to provide the FBI with current information as to the identity of attaches accredited to the Department of

Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations

CONFIDENTIAL

XEROXED ORIGINAL-REF

the Navy, and with current information as to their approved activities (Guide for Foreign Naval Attaches and Foreign Air Attaches accredited to the Department of the Navy). Op-92B2 will also pass to the FBI, the State Department, and Op-921E, in accordance with current procedures, notifications of projected travel received from Soviet and Satellite attaches.

b. Other information indicating activities on the part of an attache which is in contravention of approved attache behavior will be brought to the attention of the Director of Naval Intelligence, via Op-92B2. If the Director determines that it has internal security aspects, Op-921E will pass the information to the FBI, by memorandum or through liaison.

c. Information of the nature discussed in paragraph 2.a. above (and concerning personnel other than accredited attaches) will be passed by memorandum from the Division Head concerned (or by Op-92B2, if appropriate, on visitors sponsored by the Director of Naval Intelligence or higher authority) to Op-921E, for forwarding to the FBI.

H C Daniel

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO
Op-921B/dtn
Ser 05491P92

CONFIDENTIAL

8 - FEB 1955

Re: Intell Coverage of Diplomatic [illegible] Foreign [illegible]

My dear Mr. Hoover:

Reference is made to your letter of November 13, 1954, wherein you advised that the Bureau would like to be notified when information is received that an intelligence representative of a foreign government is coming to the United States. Your letter requested details of any liaison arrangements with such representatives, of their approved activities, and of any activities appearing to be outside the scope of their approved missions.

As you are aware, most foreign countries have officially accredited Naval and Air Attaches for conducting appropriate liaison on naval and naval air matters with the Department of the Navy. These attaches and members of their staffs, with the sanction of the Department, make innumerable visits and contacts with naval representatives and representatives of private contractors to the Navy. It is assumed that, with the exception of the travel of Soviet and Satellite Attaches, your interest does not extend to the day-to-day activities of these representatives as long as such activities remain within normal and authorized bounds.

There is transmitted for your information a copy of the current monthly roster of Foreign Naval and Air Attaches, and a copy of the Office of Naval Intelligence Guide for such attaches. The roster will be provided you on a monthly basis henceforward.

Further, any information which may come to our attention and which suggests improper activities of an internal security nature by foreign Naval and Air Attaches will be provided promptly.

With respect to intelligence representatives visiting this country, you will be notified, in accordance with the request contained in your letter.

Sincerely,

Carl F. Espe

CARL F. ESPE
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence

RECORDED - 33

65-63113

16

INDEXED-33

EX-PROC.

FEB 7 1955

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Encl:
(1) Roster of Foreign Naval Attaches and Foreign Air Attaches accredited to the Department of the Navy, of 1 Jan 1955
(2) Guide for Foreign Naval Attaches and Foreign Air Attaches accredited to the Department of the Navy, of Jul 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATIONS TO
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

This document consists of 1 pages
No 1 of 9 Copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

October 10, 1955

SECRET

Dear Mr. Hoover:

On occasion it has proved important in connection with United States interests in and relations with the other American Republics to obtain intelligence information on activities taking place within the United States. Specifically, it is important that the Department keep track of the movements and contacts of selected Latin Americans while in this country when there are reasons to believe that subversive activities directed at the other Governments of this Hemisphere are being planned and coordinated here. Such activities are against the national interests of the United States in so far as they may result in developments which could endanger United States lives, threaten United States business interests and cause friction within the inter-American system.

In the past the FBI has always cooperated in furnishing the Department in specific Latin American cases with information available from established sources, but it has shown understandable reluctance to become involved to the extent of conducting direct surveillance in cases where there is no evidence of nor reason to suspect subversive activities directed against the United States or violation of United States laws. It is felt that while this information is helpful, it does not completely fill the gap in the intelligence information important in the conduct of foreign relations. It is understood that the CIA, while interested in foreign intelligence, does not carry out surveillance operations within the confines of the United States.

It would be most appreciated if you could express an opinion as to how surveillance of selected Latin American visitors to this country might be arranged on an individual case basis.

An identical letter is being sent to the CIA in the hope that a coordinated approach can be made.

Sincerely yours,

65-63113-34X

Robert Murphy

RECORDED - 14

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

SECRET

OCT 10 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman 10-18-55

DATE: 10-13-55

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Branigan
Liaison
Sanders

Tolson
Boardman ✓
Nichols
Belmont ✓
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: STATE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS FOR SURVEILLANCES OF LATIN AMERICANS

By letter of 10/10/55 Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State, noted that it is important that State keep track of movements and contacts of selected Latin Americans while in U.S. when there are reasons to believe subversive activities directed at other governments of this hemisphere are being planned and coordinated here. The letter notes that the FBI has cooperated in furnishing information from established sources but "has shown understandable reluctance to become involved to the extent of conducting direct surveillance in cases where there is no evidence of nor reason to suspect subversive activities directed against the United States or violation of United States laws." Letter requests opinion as to how surveillance of selected Latin American visitors might be arranged on individual case basis and notes that identical letter being sent to CIA in the hope a coordinated approach can be made.

In November, 1954, Bureau refused State request for surveillance of Pedro Estrada, Director, Venezuelan Security Police, who was brought here by State and escorted around by State Department Security Division agent. In August, 1955, State requested Bureau furnish as complete information as possible regarding movements of Colonel Romulo Fernandez* and his aide during 3 day stay in Miami. No request for surveillance made and State was advised none being conducted; individuals covered by other means and State furnished information developed. No other identifiable instances where State has requested or indicated possible desirability of physical surveillance.

Attached is suggested letter to State advising Bureau investigates promptly cases indicating subversive action against other Governments in this hemisphere using investigative techniques appropriate; that full-time surveillances require tremendous expenditures of manpower and in most cases more information can be obtained through other techniques but Bureau not reluctant to use physical surveillance when circumstances warrant; that when State has creditable information of type of activity referred to, it should be referred to Bureau in order that prompt investigation may be made; and that Bureau will consider physical surveillance when requested by State when agreed it is warranted. Attached letter also notes it would be desirable, appropriate and in accordance with U.S. laws that such individuals not be allowed to enter U.S. when reason to believe they would engage in such activities.

RECORDED - 14
INDEXED - 14

65-1963113-34X1

50 OCT 26 1955

Enclosure
10-14-55

*Venezuelan Army Chief of Staff

10 OCT 20 1955

ESS:mgh:amg:(6)
ess

DEC 27 1955 93

ESP

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

RECOMMENDATION:

It is suggested that the attached letter be forwarded to Mr. Murphy, the Deputy Undersecretary of State.

SECRET

cc - Boardman
- Belmont
- Branigan
- Liaison
- Sanders

65-63113-34X
~~62-37747-2204~~

October 14, 1955

VIA LIAISON

10/14/55
To Mr Murphy

Honorable Robert Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

Reference is made to your letter of October 10, 1955, which notes that it is important for the Department of State to keep track of the movements and contacts of selected Latin Americans while in this country when there are reasons to believe that subversive activities directed at the other governments of this hemisphere are being planned and coordinated in this country. Your letter also notes that this Bureau has shown an understandable reluctance to conduct direct surveillance of such Latin Americans where there is no evidence of nor reason to suspect subversive activities directed against the United States or violation of United States laws. You requested an opinion as to how surveillances of selected Latin American visitors to this country might be arranged on an individual case basis.

When there is creditable information available indicating that subversive activities directed at other governments of this hemisphere are being planned and coordinated in the United States, the FBI takes prompt investigative action in view of the probability of violations of the registration or neutrality provisions of United States laws. In conducting these investigations all logical investigative techniques are used, including physical surveillances where circumstances would warrant. Full-time physical surveillances require a tremendous expenditure of manpower, however, and are practicable only in connection with some phases of highly important cases in the security or criminal fields. In the greater majority of cases more actual information can be obtained through such investigative techniques as spot-type surveillance, the use of available sources of information and informants, the development of special sources in a particular case and the use of other highly confidential investigative techniques where appropriate. There is, however, no reluctance on the part of the FBI to conduct physical surveillances where the circumstances warrant such action.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Enclosure to memo Belmont to Boardman, 10/13/55, ESS:mgh:amc, re "STATE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS FOR SURVEILLANCES OF LATIN AMERICAN VISITORS TO THE UNITED STATES."

ESS:sku:amc
(7)

SECRET

Letter to Honorable Robert Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Department of State

When the State Department has creditable information that certain Latin Americans are in this country for the purpose of planning and coordinating subversive activities directed at either the United States or other governments of this hemisphere, it will be appreciated if such information is brought to the attention of the FBI immediately in order that an appropriate investigation may be promptly initiated. Every effort will be made in these cases to develop those aspects which may be of particular interest to the State Department and consideration will be given to the utilization of a physical surveillance when requested by the State Department where it is agreed that this type of coverage is warranted and necessary. As indicated in your letter, it will be necessary to consider these matters on an individual case basis.

In those instances where there is reason to believe that these individuals would engage in such activities while in the United States, it would appear to be most desirable, appropriate and in accordance with United States laws that they not be allowed to enter this country, in the absence of overriding diplomatic considerations.

Sincerely yours,

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

OCT 19 1955

The Honorable Robert Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

Reference is made to your letter of 10 October 1955, relative to the problem of conducting surveillance of certain Latin American nationals who might be suspected of carrying on subversive activities in the United States, directed against Latin American countries. In this regard you are correct in your understanding that the CIA does not conduct such surveillances within the confines of the United States. Mr. Hoover has furnished me a copy of his reply to your inquiry setting forth the FBI's jurisdiction and responsibilities in this matter.

We have been furnishing to the Department and to the FBI such intelligence information as we have obtained through our operations abroad bearing upon possible subversive activities of the type of person you describe, as such information became available to us. It would also be helpful if we could receive from time to time from the Department, leads which you may receive and which we could possibly follow up in the Latin American country against which subversive activities are being carried on.

In order to assist us in developing our coverage of this field, we would suggest that you designate someone in the Department of State who could confer with the appropriate persons in this Agency, and if you will let me know whom you will designate for this purpose, I will arrange to put him in touch with my representative. Also, if you see no objection, I will mention this matter to the members of the IAC as it is possible that the representatives in Latin America of the member agencies of the IAC might also be able to furnish useful information to the Department.

A copy of this reply is being sent to Mr. Hoover.

Sincerely,

Copy to Honorable J. Edgar Hoover

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

65-63113-36

ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 19, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

JUNE

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF "FRIENDLY" FOREIGN NATIONS

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

PURPOSE

To propose that the Bureau, with State Department approval, institute limited coverage on the official establishments of selected "friendly" foreign governments in this country, in order to obtain intelligence data to assist the United States in formulating its foreign policy.

THE PROBLEM

There is an intelligence gap existing in this country. The Bureau rather extensively covers the activities of the Soviet bloc, for the purpose of detecting espionage, subversion, and possible espionage, but also to gather intelligence information of value to our Government in formulating policy to deal with the Soviet bloc. We do not systematically cover other countries in like manner.

The problem has two aspects:

1. Intelligence reflecting the policies, planning and views of foreign governments, if obtainable within this country, should be secured and furnished to the high Government officials responsible for our relations with other countries.

RECORDED - 79

2. The Bureau, as the foremost intelligence agency operating within this country, is the agency with the responsibility to produce such intelligence, and failure to do so can subject us to criticism.

I think this should continue to be our policy. It must be for time being. H.

13 NOV 9 1955

PRESENT BUREAU COVERAGE

While we have from time to time instituted investigations and coverage on foreign establishments other than those of the Soviet bloc, such coverage generally has been restricted to instances where there appears to be a need from the security standpoint. For example, we have for a number of years had extensive coverage on

AHB:LL
(5)
Memo Belmont 10/21
cc--Mr. Boardman
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Branigan
cc--Mr. Roach

Israeli intelligence activities in the United States, which has indicated direct intelligence and espionage activity on the part of Israeli diplomatic representatives. In the spring of 1954, when the Guatemalan revolution was brewing, we opened rather extensive coverage of the Guatemalan Embassy and developed intelligence information of interest to other U. S. agencies. We have developed informants in the diplomatic establishments of China, Indonesia, Japan and Korea, and are making efforts to develop informants in the embassies of Ceylon and India.

CODE WORD

Through the Bureau's Program, designed to obtain the codes and cyphers of foreign countries, we have obtained code material of India, Israel, Nationalist China, Japan, Yugoslavia, The Philippines, Switzerland, Guatemala, West Germany, and Spain, which has been of inestimable value in the cryptanalysis field.

While we have stayed away from United Nations as such, and feel that we should continue to do so, we have established coverage of the Soviet Delegation to the UN, and we have developed informants among UN employees, who report on Soviet bloc activities to a limited extent.

OBSERVATIONS

1. The Bureau is an intelligence organization and a large portion of our prestige is the result of intelligence-type operations successfully handled. It is far better for us to consider this problem now rather than to have someone else raise the issue later and perhaps force us into a program we do not want.

2. While the coverage of the "friendly" diplomatic establishments referred to above has met with some success, particularly insofar as the Anagram Progran is concerned, the fact remains that there is no U. S. agency presently attempting to cover, on a continuing basis, the diplomatic establishments of "friendly" countries in the United States, to the extent that the United States might be aware of their intelligence activities in this country, their actual attitude toward the U.S., their relations with the Soviet bloc, and their plans in international affairs, particularly as they relate to the U.S.

3. International developments more and more reflect the need for such intelligence information, particularly relating to certain countries which are friendly at this time, but whose internal situations are such that their international positions could be changed, thereby affecting the world balances of power or causing serious international incidents which would embarrass the U.S. Through intelligence in advance, the U.S. may be able to avoid such problems.

I would want more documentation on this. - 2

OBSERVATIONS (continued)

4. Since January, 1954, CIA has indicated on four separate occasions a desire to explore the positive intelligence potentials of the United Nations.

Allen Dulles at his last visit mentioned this. H.

5. Certainly, there are dangers involved in any attempt to cover official establishments of "friendly" foreign countries. Coverage would have to be most discreet. We could not even attempt to utilize the same type of extensive coverage we have on the Soviet bloc.

6. If we went into a program of this nature, we would have to have funds. Regardless of how limited the coverage is, it will take money.

7. A program of this nature should be run by and within the control of the Bureau; however, it should have the blessings of high officials outside the Bureau and, particularly, the endorsement of the State Department.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That we institute a program designed to gather intelligence from "friendly" foreign official establishments in this country, starting on a highly restricted basis--namely, by installing wire taps and, where possible with full security, microphone coverage, on selected foreign establishments. Included in these establishments would be embassies and consulates, and delegations to the United Nations. The selection of the countries to be covered will be based on those indicated by the State Department to be "problem children" or the most fruitful potential sources of intelligence. Any further coverage beyond technical and microphone coverage will depend on what leads are developed through these sources and what can be done on a most discreet basis. We will continue our Anagram Program and will continue our efforts to develop informants within these establishments when such action can be done discreetly.

RECOMMENDATIONS (continued):

2. That Liaison discuss this matter with Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, pointing out to him that there is an intelligence gap and that this Bureau contemplates such limited coverage, with State Department endorsement and approval; that Mr. Murphy indicate those countries where at the present time State Department feels there is a need and a potential for such intelligence; that Mr. Murphy be advised that any needs of the Defense Department along this line should be funneled to the Bureau through the State Department.

2 I have no objection to your informally discussing this with Murphy merely to get his reaction so I might have benefit of it if Dulles ever speaks to me again about it. H.

3. After Mr. Murphy has been consulted, that we advise the Attorney General, in writing, of the intelligence gap presently existing, our proposal relative thereto, and the results of our conference with the State Department, indicating either that we are going ahead, with his approval (if the State Department endorses this program), or that we are not going ahead (if the State Department fails to endorse the program).

Not at this time. Let me have Murphy's reaction & then a final decision. H.

4. If it is decided that we should proceed with this program, we should point out to the Attorney General that additional funds will be necessary for its implementation.

I am opposed, as indicated on Page 1. L.

I don't see how AG could get funds for us. It can't be done. I am already having trouble trying to keep from impounding $70,000 over & above our supplemental for the economies & certainly he won't grant any additional funds for it. H.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 21, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

JUNE

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF "FRIENDLY" FOREIGN NATIONS

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Nichols ____
Belmont ____
Harbo ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Sizoo ____
Winterrowd ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

In accordance with the Director's instructions noted on my memorandum of October 19, 1955, Mr. Philcox of Liaison informally discussed with Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the possibility of intelligence coverage of official establishments of selected friendly foreign nations. At the outset and at the conclusion of the discussion Philcox made it very clear to Mr. Murphy that we were not approaching him with a definite proposal and we were not seeking a definite commitment from the Department of State at this time but we were merely seeking his informal reaction for our guidance in considering this problem. It was pointed out to Mr. Murphy that we already do have coverage of the establishments of the Soviet bloc countries. It was pointed out that we also have coverage of the Israeli Embassy because of the intelligence and espionage activities on the part of Israeli diplomatic representatives. It was pointed out that we also opened a rather extensive coverage of the Guatemalan Embassy in the Spring of 1954 when the Guatemalan revolution was brewing and developed intelligence information of interest to other U. S. agencies. Mr. Murphy was advised that there appears to be an intelligence gap in that no regular and concerted effort has been made to obtain information of interest regarding the plans, policies, and intentions of friendly foreign nations. It was pointed out that this information would, of course, be of more interest to the Department of State and the Defense Department than to the Bureau. Mr. Murphy was advised that this coverage would be limited to discreet technical surveillances and discreet limited investigations based upon information received.

Mr. Murphy said it appears to him that such coverage on a very limited basis has good possibilities. He stated that he is very happy to know that there is such good thinking on this subject. He stated that in the event such coverage should be instituted, it should be on a very limited basis and only in those establishments which are the real "trouble" areas. He said that, of course, the world situation changes fast and that the coverage would have to be gauged accordingly. In the event such coverage was instituted at the present time, the only establishments which he would recommend covering would be Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. (Israel is already covered.) He stated that no coverage would be advisable at this time on such countries as Greece, Turkey, Iran, or Iraq since the conditions in those countries are not

NWP:lw (8)

RECORDED - 73

1-Mr. Boardman 1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Hennrich 1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Sanders 1-Mr. Philcox
1-Liaison Section Tickler

sufficiently serious to warrant such coverage. He stated that such establishments as the Embassy of India could possibly be covered on a long-range basis because of India's extremely "neutralist" position. He said it is possible that considerable information of interest could be obtained through such coverage.

Mr. Murphy made it clear that he was not making any firm commitment at this time as to his complete approval or as to the countries which should be covered but he was merely giving his offhand reaction to the Bureau's questions. He stated that in the event the Bureau considers this more seriously he would, of course, like to have the opportunity to consult with other Department of State officials and furnish the Bureau with positive guidance and suggestions as to the countries to be covered. It was stressed to Mr. Murphy that this is merely in the exploratory stage and that we will contact him in the event we consider this possibility more seriously.

ACTION:

The foregoing is for your information. Cost figures based on the above facts are being compiled.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET This document consists of 1 pages
No. 1 of 2 Copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

October 2[illegible] 1955

93011

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I wish to thank you for your letter of October 14, 1955 in which you stated that there is no reluctance on the part of the FBI to conduct physical surveillance of selected Latin American visitors to this country where the circumstances warrant such action. Your assurances that every effort will be made in these cases to develop those aspects which may be of particular interest to the Department of State and that consideration will be given to the utilization of a physical surveillance when requested by the Department of State where it is agreed that this type of coverage is warranted and necessary, should prove helpful in handling these cases in the future.

When the Department of State has reason to believe that visiting Latin Americans may be engaged in planning and coordinating subversive activities directed at other governments of this hemisphere, such information will be brought to the attention of the FBI through established channels as heretofore, together with an explanation of the Department's objectives and requirements, in order that an appropriate investigation may be initiated.

The continued cooperation of the FBI is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy
Robert Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary

RECORDED - 7 65-63113-40X
27 OCT 28 1955

EX-115

OCT 28 1955

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover,
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

27 NOV 1955

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 18, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: STATE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS FOR SURVEILLANCES OF LATIN AMERICANS

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sanders
1 - Mr. Kuhrtz
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference is made to my memorandum of 10-13-55. By letter dated 10-10-55 Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, noted that it was important that State Department keep track of movements and contacts of selected Latin Americans while in the U.S. when there are reasons to believe subversive activities directed at other governments of this hemisphere are being planned and coordinated here. The letter noted that the FBI had cooperated in furnishing information from established sources but "has shown understandable reluctance to become involved to the extent of conducting direct surveillances in cases where there is no evidence of or reason to suspect subversive activities directed against the U.S. or violation of U.S. laws." A reply dated 10-14-55 was sent to Murphy. By letter dated 10-14-55 a copy of our letter to Murphy was sent to Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It should be noted that CIA also received a copy of Murphy's letter to us.

On 11-16-55 James Angleton of the CIA confidentially advised Liaison Agent Papich that Allen Dulles might make some comments concerning Murphy's letter before the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) meeting (*) week of 11-21-55. Our position concerning this matter was clearly set forth in our reply to Murphy 10-14-55. We advised that when there is creditable information available indicating that subversive activities directed at other governments of this hemisphere are being planned and coordinated in the U.S., the FBI takes prompt investigative action. We advised that in conducting these investigations all logical investigative techniques are used including physical surveillances where the circumstances warrant it. We made it clear that there was no reluctance on the part of the Bureau to conduct physical surveillances when deemed necessary but we also pointed out that there were instances where information could be obtained through other means than physical surveillances. We advised State that when that agency received creditable information concerning Latin Americans involved in subversive activities directed at either the U.S. or other governments, we would appreciate receiving the information immediately in order that an investigation could be promptly initiated. We stated that every effort would be made to develop those sources which might be of particular interest to State and that we would give consideration to the utilization of a physic surveillance when requested and when it was agreed that such type of coverag was warranted and necessary. We indicated that when considering these matters it would be necessary to evaluate each on an individual basis. State's attention was directed to the fact that where there was reason to believe that Latin Americans would be engaged in subversive activities while in the U.S. it would appear to be most desirable that they not be allowed to enter the country in the absence of overriding diplomatic considerations.

SJP:fjb (8)

(*) IAC meeting for week of November 21, 1955, cancelled.

INDEXED

RECORDED - 33

NOV 30 1955

NOT RECORDED

6 8 DEC 22 1955

Memo to Mr. Boardman
from Mr. Belmont

ACTION:

In the event this matter is brought up at the IAC meeting, we will be guided by our position described above and we will wait to hear what comments Mr. Dulles may make. We will be particularly on the alert for any maneuver which possibly might be forming as a result of joint CIA - State collaboration.

Right. H.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN

DATE: November 29, 1955

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At the IAC meeting on November 29, 1955, Mr. Dulles of CIA introduced a CIA paper, not on the agenda, going into developments in Afghanistan, with particular reference to strong indications that Afghanistan may be going into the Soviet camp. During the discussion, it appeared to be the opinion of the IAC group that the Soviet government is able to offer considerable advantages to Afghanistan in the way of trade routes bypassing Pakistan, with which Afghanistan is having difficulties, and through possible financial and military support. As a result, it was the feeling that there is a strong possibility Afghanistan will gradually fall within the control of the Soviets, although ostensibly remaining a sovereign state.

There were several changes suggested in the CIA paper, and Mr. Kuhrtz will get a copy of it for our benefit.

In line with our recent discussions, it is suggested that a memorandum be prepared, briefly posing the problem that Afghanistan may come under Soviet control and then reflecting what, if any, threat Afghanistan representatives or nationalist groups in the United States would pose from the internal security standpoint.

This may also provide an opportunity to again mention to Mr. Robert Murphy of the State Department the pending consideration by State as to whether we should establish coverage of certain "friendly" countries in the United States for intelligence purposes, utilizing the present situation in Afghanistan as a medium.

AHB:LL
(5)
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Hennrich
cc--Mr. Branigan
cc--Mr. M. W. Kuhrtz

FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS
TO DISSEMINATION
SEE FILE 62-90718-330

65-63113
NOT RECORDED
145 JAN 23 1956

12-5-55
DMD

12 JAN 20 1956

Office Memor m • UNITED STAT ERNMENT

TO : L.V. Boardman

FROM : A.H. Belmont

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN

DATE: December 5, 1955

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Philcox
Mr. Sanders
Mr. deBettencourt

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Afghanistan, about size of Texas, is landlocked country in Middle East, surrounded by USSR (north), Pakistan (south and east) and Iran (west). Traditionally, she has advantageously played off one great nation against another. At Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) meeting 11/29/55, possibility of Afghanistan gradually falling into Soviet control was discussed. IAC group of opinion that Soviet Government able to offer considerable advantages to Afghanistan through trade routes bypassing Pakistan, traditional rival of Afghanistan with which Afghanistan is having difficulties, and through possible financial and military support. As result, it was felt there is strong possibility Afghanistan will gradually fall within Soviet control, although ostensibly remaining sovereign state.

Afghanistan maintains Embassy in Washington, D. C., Consulate in New York City, and honorary consul in San Francisco. No information received Afghan officials in US engaged in political or subversive activities. During last 4 years no information received any Afghan groups in US engaged in subversive activities. No Afghan nationals on Security Index. In event Soviet economic gains in Afghanistan lead to political control of country, we would have to consider giving comparable coverage to Afghan diplomatic establishments and official personnel as now given to Soviet satellite official establishments.

If Afghanistan becomes openly pro-Soviet, we would have to consider dangerousness of Afghan nationals in US as regards internal security and initiate appropriate investigative action.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Liaison should call to attention Mr. Robert Murphy, State Department, discussion of IAC of Afghanistan, in connection with consideration by State as to whether we should establish coverage of certain "friendly" countries in US for intelligence purposes.

65-63113

NOT RECORDED
145 JAN 23 1956

109-12-321
JMD/omr/bcf BCF

17 JAN 19 1956

(6) FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO DISSEMINATION SEE 62-90718-

12-13-55

ORBK

59 JAN 27 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: December 13, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated 12-5-55 in the above-captioned matter. In connection with our coverage of certain "friendly" countries in U.S. for intelligence purposes, Liaison was instructed to contact Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and point out to him the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) thoughts concerning Afghanistan. Liaison was further instructed to ask State if they would care to consider the coverage of this country at this time.

Mr. Murphy is on annual leave for two weeks and before leaving advised Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section that any matters concerning this coverage of "friendly" countries should be taken up with William M. Rountree, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Department of State.. On 12-12-55 Mr. Bartlett discussed instant matter with Mr. Rountree. Mr. Rountree indicated that this coverage would be most interesting; however, he does not consider that it will be very productive in view of the fact that the Afghanistan Ambassador, Mr. Mohammad Kabir Ludin, is definitely pro-Western in his thinking and actions. Mr. Rountree stated he would like to have the Bureau cover this Embassy on a trial basis for 60 days and if that appears productive, we should then continue. He indicated that practically all the conversation would be in English; therefore, would present no translation problem.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Bureau set up coverage on the Afghanistan establishment in Washington for a trial period of 60 days.

OHB:fjb (8)

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Sanders
1 - Mr. deBettencourt
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bartlett

See Addendum on page 2

65-63113
NOT RECORDED
145 JAN 23 1956

17 JAN 19 1956

5- de Bettencourt

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman from Mr. Belmont

ADDENDUM: JMD:dmd 12-14-55

In view of above, Inspector Hennrich telephoned SAC Laughlin, WFO, 10 a.m., 12-14-55, instructing immediate survey be made to determine if technical coverage Afghan Embassy feasible and to immediately advise Bureau.

Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1956

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I want to express the Department's appreciation to you and the Bureau for the special coverage which you have been providing us during these recent weeks. The material has been immensely valuable to us in keeping abreast of fast-moving events and developments in the international situation and has been of great assistance to us in the formulation of policy.

I know that this work has meant extra hours and expense. Mr. Bartlett has been especially helpful to us during this period, and I want you to know particularly of our appreciation.

With best personal regards, I am

Yours sincerely,

Robert Murphy

12/6/56
Let AR
WRW

Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representation of Friendly Foreign Nations

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover,
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

WAB

RECORDED - 26 65-63113-61

EX-118

16 DEC 12 1956

EX-PROC.

NOV 30 1956

Tic: A wannall

SAC, Washington Field (Orig & 1) December 3, 1956

Director, FBI (65-63113) PERSONAL ATTENTION

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES

In the recent past, and particularly during the month of November, I have noted that your office has been forwarding a great volume of intelligence material to the Bureau. I have reference to the information produced by your established sources and relating to the tense international situations, especially those created by the crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Much of the material has been of a high intelligence nature or potential and, upon its receipt at the Bureau, has been given within-the-hour dissemination to other agencies and departments, particularly the Department of State. The latter Department has informed me that it has placed a high evaluation on some of this intelligence and has found it most useful in its day-to-day operations.

I am writing to you to stress the importance of continuing the flow of this vital information to the Bureau to enable us not only to maintain but to increase the efficiency of our operations in this field.

MAILED 6
1956
COMM-FBI

It is recognized that the establishment of additional sources for the production of this material and the servicing of these sources have called for an even greater application to their duties on the part of the personnel of your office assigned to this work. I request that you convey my personal appreciation to them for their past efforts in this connection and advise them that upon their continued efforts rests, to a large extent, the degree of success of this phase of the Bureau's over-all intelligence program.

WRW:pbb
(4)

- 59

RECORDED - 71

16 DEC 4 1956

EX-117

52 DEC 10 1956

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Tic:

SAC, New York (Orig & 1) December 3, 1956

Director, FBI (65-63113) PERSONAL ATTENTION

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE ~~OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES~~ of Diplomatic Representatives
Foreign Nations

In the recent past, and particularly during the month of November, I have noted that your office has been forwarding a great volume of intelligence material to the Bureau. I have reference to the information produced by your established sources and relating to the tense international situations, especially those created by the crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Much of the material has been of a high intelligence nature or potential and, upon its receipt at the Bureau, has been given within-the-hour dissemination to other agencies and departments, particularly the Department of State. The latter Department has informed me that it has placed a high evaluation on some of this intelligence and has found it most useful in its day-to-day operations.

I am writing to you to stress the importance of continuing the flow of this vital information to the Bureau to enable us not only to maintain but to increase the efficiency of our operations in this field.

It is recognized that the establishment of additional sources for the production of this material and the servicing of these sources have called for an even greater application to their duties on the part of the personnel of your office assigned to this work. I request that you convey my personal appreciation to them for their past efforts in this connection and advise them that upon their continued efforts rests, to a large extent, the degree of success of this phase of the Bureau's over-all intelligence program.

WRW:pbb
(4)

RECORDED-61

65-63113-58

16 DEC 4 1956

MAILED 8
DEC 3 1956
COMM-FBI

DEC 6 1956

wRW

CONFIDENTIAL

Tic: nall
igan
Belmont
Mr. Boardman

The Attorney General

December 6, 1956

Director, FBI

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES

RECORDED - 28 65-63113-61

As a result of action taken by this Bureau over a year ago, we, at the present time, have a well-functioning program designed to produce positive intelligence information in this country concerning various foreign nations. This intelligence information relates to the policy which these foreign nations are pursuing or developing in connection with various international matters.

With the development of the recent crises in the Middle East and Eastern Eurppe we found that our efforts in this field were especially rewarding. Through numerous sources which have been established during the past year we secured voluminous intelligence data which were given within-the-hour dissemination to other Governmental departments and officials.

Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy has addressed a letter to me concerning some of the intelligence information which has been sent to the Department of State during recent weeks. Mr. Murphy commented as follows:

> "I want to express the Department's appreciation to you and the Bureau for the special coverage which you have been providing us during these recent weeks. The material has been immensely valuable to us in keeping abreast of fast-moving events and developments in the international situation and has been of great assistance to us in the formulation of policy."

In view of the keen interest you have expressed in the past in the operations of this Bureau, I felt that you would like to be advised of the above.

65-63113

WRW:pbb
(7)

MEMO BELMONT TO
BOARDMAN 12/5/56
WRB: PBB:MS

MAILED 5
DEC 6 1956
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Sanders

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 5/16/58

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: *INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS*

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

We have program to develop sources in diplomatic establishments of friendly countries which has worked without a hitch until recent weeks when J. P. McDonnell of State Department first declined clearance for interview with two individuals at Embassy of Pakistan and later declined clearance for interviews with individuals at German and Turkish Embassies - all declinations being based primarily on fact that these countries are friendly and if interview reported to Embassy it could strain relations. We have notified field to discontinue efforts to develop sources at these Embassies as a result.

Sound counterintelligence coverage requires sources to produce not only investigative data but also intelligence data of value to us and other agencies in guiding policy and making decisions. Bureau is expected to produce intelligence data and we can anticipate criticism as well as operational moves by other agencies to fill vacuum if our operations do not produce necessary data. Sound source programs are based on long-range planning and require forward thinking to get results. Scrambling for sources in reaction to problems is too late and ineffective.

Vital part of our coverage of friendly nations is continuing development of informants and sources (persons) in diplomatic establishments in U.S. This is recognized intelligence technique and is aimed at all countries where need for data exists with emphasis on "trouble spot" countries that tend to drift toward, or are targets of, Soviet Bloc and those countries involved in situations with international ramifications. This program has paid off in sound benefits and existing sources represent effective outposts for gathering data in event of emergency as well as for investigative purposes.

Program is generally aimed at American employees and has been tightly controlled as evidenced by lack of repercussions from approaches. We first obtain State Department clearance to investigate prospect without revealing purpose. We then conduct extensive background investigation of prospect. If this reveals potential is good and risk element negligible, we secure State clearance for interview. First interview is conducted to assess potential, responsiveness

is

Enclosure
65-63113
1 - Belmont
1 - Roach
1 - Donahoe
1 - Mossburg
SBD:bbr (6)

REC-89

-89

EX-123

20 MAY 23 1958

70 MAY 26 1958

and willingness without directly requesting cooperation. Some offer to furnish data at outset. If they do not, dependent on results of first interview we authorize second interview to solicit cooperation.

Refusal of clearance for such interviews is the prerogative of State Department which must take into consideration question of international relations. Key point here is that while State Department may give clearance for investigation of prospect its subsequent denial of clearance for interview results in wasted investigative effort. It is clear we are going to have to give field some guidance to avoid this.

It is believed we can effectively handle this by carefully controlled selection of specific "trouble spot" countries where program of source development warranted. We can then clear our intentions with State Department before authorizing field to expend any investigative effort. This will put State Department on notice as to our objectives at outset and will eliminate the wasted motion of cleared investigations followed by denial of interview clearance.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached for approval is a letter to interested field offices guiding them along the line indicated above.

✓
This makes sense.

Mossburg
Sanders
Donahoe
May 20, 1958

SAC, Washington Field

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

Reference Bulet 11/18/54 which concerned responsibilities of the field to be alert to indications that diplomatic representatives of ostensibly friendly nations, outside the Soviet Bloc, are engaging in intelligence activities in the U.S.

Sound counterintelligence coverage requires sources to produce not only investigative data but also intelligence data of value to Bureau and other agencies in guiding policy and making decisions. Sound source programs are based on long-range planning and require forward thinking to get results. Vital part of our coverage of friendly nations is continuing development of informants and sources in diplomatic establishments in the U.S. This program has paid off in sound benefits and existing sources represent effective outposts for obtaining data in event of emergency and for investigative purposes.

State Department clearance is required prior to investigation, and again prior to interview, of a potential source employed in a diplomatic establishment. In recent weeks the State Department has declined clearance for interviews with potential sources in the diplomatic establishments of Pakistan, Germany and Turkey. These declinations have been based primarily on the fact that these countries are friendly and if interview reported to embassy involved it would strain diplomatic relations.

MAILED 4
MAY 20 1958

REC- 135

65-65113-90

MAY 22 1958

1 - Boston PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Chicago PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Cleveland PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Detroit PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Los Angeles PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - New Orleans PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - New York PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Philadelphia PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Pittsburgh PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - San Francisco PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Seattle PERSONAL ATTENTION

Copy to [illegible]
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 12/4/59
by [illegible]

SBD:bbr

MAY 27 1958

NOTE: See cover memo Donahoe to Belmont 5/16/58 same subject, SBD:bbr re this matter.

MAIL ROOM ☐

Recognizing the value as well as the sensitivity of this program, it is desired that the following procedures be put into effect. Effective immediately our efforts in the development of sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of friendly foreign nations should be based primarily on need and should be directed toward development of sources in diplomatic establishments of ostensibly friendly foreign countries (1) where there is definite indication specific country is drifting toward alignment with Soviet Bloc; (2) where situation in particular country involves serious political or military crisis with international ramifications or possible revolutionary activity and good potential exists for Bureau to produce valuable intelligence data through coverage of diplomatic establishments in U.S.; or (3) where there is a clear and present investigative need.

Bureau authority must be secured prior to initiating any program to develop sources and informants within diplomatic establishments of a specific country outside the Soviet Bloc at which time complete data must be furnished as to need and potential benefit of such a program. If such a program is justified, the Bureau will then discuss the matter with the State Department. Following State Department clearance, the Bureau will notify the interested field office to initiate the program. Bureau authority will still be required for the investigation and interview of each prospect since State Department clearance will be sought on each of these steps.

With respect to those friendly countries where an active program is not warranted, the field should be constantly alert to good source and informant possibilities. Where a good potential exists and the facts warrant, the situation should be brought to the attention of the Bureau promptly in order that State Department clearance may be sought to pursue the matter.

Letter to Washington Field
Re: Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic
Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations

All offices should be alert particularly to situations where there is an advance indication that an American is being considered for employment in a foreign diplomatic establishment since this offers an opportunity to develop a source or informant prior to actual employment.

Office Memorandum • UN RNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mossburg

DATE: 5-26-58

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

The captioned program consisting of the development of informants and sources in the diplomatic establishments of friendly nations, where warranted, has been a vital part of our intelligence coverage of such nations. In connection with the program, we have always obtained State Department clearance for investigation and interview of individuals considered as potential sources without revealing to State the purposes of same. Recently the State Department has declined clearance for interviews with individuals employed at the Pakistani, German and Turkish embassies (although we previously obtained State clearance for our investigations) based primarily on the fact these countries are friendly and if the interviews were reported to the embassies it might result in straining diplomatic relations. It is noted we discontinued efforts to develop sources in those establishments.

In order to eliminate wasting investigative effort we will obtain State approval to develop sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of a certain country before instituting the program in the field.

In this regard in view of the existing critical political situation in the Middle East, the involvement of Israel in that situation and the activities of Israeli intelligence in the U.S., it is believed we should obtain State clearance for the field to institute a program to endeavor to develop sources and informants in the Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C., the Israeli Consulate and UN Delegation in New York City. The principal Israeli intelligence agent in the U.S. known to the Bureau is Rafael Medan who is attached to the Israeli UN Delegation, New York City but who is frequently at the Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C. As a result of his intelligence activities we have under investigation approximately 15 other individuals in New York and Washington, D. C., known or suspected of being engaged in intelligence activities. is

1 - 65-58190 (Israeli Consulate, New York City)
1 - 105-10828 (Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C.)
1 - 62-77787-345 (Israeli Delegation to the UN)

EHM:et (8)

REC- 11 — 91

EX-101 23 JUN 5 1958

Memo Roach to Belmont 6/12/58 OHB/lyt

not instituted

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

66 JUN 12 1958

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont from Mr. Donahoe
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

ACTION:

It is recommended Bureau liaison representative orally clear with State Department our intentions to explore possibility of developing sources and informants on carefully selected basis at Israeli establishments previously mentioned with clear understanding we will seek State Department clearance for each investigation and interview.

EKM/HGm

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : *Mr. A. H. Belmont*

DATE: *June 2, 1958*

FROM : *Mr. R. R. Roach*

SUBJECT: *INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS*

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Donahoe to you dated May 26, 1958, in the above-captioned matter. Liaison was instructed to contact the Department of State and orally clear our intentions to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on carefully selected bases at the Israeli diplomatic establishments. It was also recommended that we clearly point out to State that we intend to seek State clearance for each investigation and each interview.

Instant matter was discussed on May 29, 1958, with Mr. J. P. McDonnell, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State. At that time he advised that he would discuss this matter with the Israeli Desk Officer and would advise the Bureau as soon as possible. On June 2, 1958, Mr. McDonnell advised Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section that State has no objection to the Bureau's proposed course of action of attempting to develop sources and informants at the Israeli diplomatic establishments in the United States. Mr. McDonnell pointed out that State feels that the U. S. citizens who are hired by the Israelis to work at their diplomatic establishments in the United States are given employment only after careful consideration of their nationalistic tendencies; that State feels that most of the U. S. citizens hired by the Israelis are pro-Israeli in their thinking and as a result the Bureau should proceed with caution. Mr. McDonnell further stated that the Bureau should check with State for clearance prior to investigation and interview. Mr. Bartlett advised Mr. McDonnell that this definitely would be done.

ACTION:

For information.

REC- 11
EX-101

92

23 JUN 5 1958

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

OHB:bjt
(9)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Mossberg
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Yellow 65-58190 (Israeli Consulate, New York City)
1 - Yellow 105-10828 (Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C.)
1 - Yellow 62-77787-345 (Israeli Delegation to the UN)
1 - Mr. Bartlett

6-4-58
3-NY

JUN 10 1958

rg

SAC, Washington Field 6-4-58

Director, FBI

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS
65-63113 (Bufile)

ISINT
65-58700 (Bufile)

ReBulet 5-19-58 captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations."

In view of the present political situation in the Middle East and the activities of the Israeli Intelligence Service in the U.S., the Bureau has obtained State Department clearance for the institution of a program to develop sources and informants at Israeli diplomatic establishments in the U.S.

On 6-2-58 Mr. J. P. McDonnell, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, at the time of granting this clearance, pointed out that the State Department feels the U.S. citizens who are hired by the Israelis to work at the diplomatic establishments in the U.S. are given employment only after careful consideration of their nationalistic tendencies; that the State Department feels that most of the U.S. citizens hired by the Israelis are pro-Israeli in their thinking and as a result the Bureau should proceed with caution in connection with this program.

As pointed out in relet, it will still be necessary for your office to obtain State Department clearance through the Bureau for an investigation or interview of prospective sources and informants considered in connection with this program. Investigations of possible sources and informants must be most thorough and discreet and must be handled in conformance with Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions. Interviews must be handled by experienced agents. The interviews should be well thought out in advance and conducted with tact and discreetness., When an individual you have interviewed agrees to cooperate, subsequent contacts should be handled in accord with existing is Bureau instructions and you should be alert to any indication that the informant may be a plant.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

3 - New York

REC- 11

EHM:et (9)

MAILED 9
JUN 4 - 1958
COMM-FBI

93

JUN 6 1958

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
amm
rotter
ease
ele. Room
olloman
andy

MAIL ROOM ☐

50 JUN 12 1958

Letter to SAC, Washington Field
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS
65-63113 (Bufile)
ISINT
65-58700 (Bufile)

The Bureau is aware of the delicate problem involved in developing sources and informants in the Israeli field, which problem has been pointed out in previous surveys made by the recipient offices. However, in view of the valuable information that may be obtained through the development of good sources in this field, the Bureau desires that you redouble your efforts in this regard. It is important that you keep in mind in connection with this matter the necessity of carefully handling all phases of the development of this program to assure that there will be no embarrassment to the Government and to the Bureau.

Office Mem... • UNITED ST. .ES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont
1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Bartlett
1 - Mossburg
1 - G. Moore

DATE: 6-6-58

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

Bartlett

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Since 10-10-56 we have had a program of developing sources at official establishments in U.S. of various Arab nations and have developed over 10 excellent sources at these various establishments. In connection with this program, we have always obtained State Department clearance for investigation and interview of the individual considered as a potential source without revealing to State the purpose of same. Although State to date has not declined clearance for interview of any individual under development as a source at an Arab establishment, recently State declined clearance for interviews with individuals employed at Pakistani, German and Turkish embassies although clearance had earlier been obtained from State to investigate these individuals. State Department's declination based primarily on fact these countries are friendly and if any interviews were reported to embassies diplomatic relations with country involved might be strained.

In order to eliminate wasting investigative effort on source development in an establishment at which State will not give clearance for interview, memorandum Donahoe to Belmont dated 5-16-58 recommended that we clear our intentions with State Department before authorizing field to expend any investigative effort in developing sources in a particular field since this will put State on notice as to our objectives at outset. That memorandum also stated that we should concentrate in this regard on a controlled selection of specific "trouble-spot" countries where program of source development is warranted.

In this regard, the existing critical political situation in Middle East definitely warrants that we continue our efforts to develop sources at all official establishments in U.S. of following Arab countries: United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria); Saudi Arabia; Iraq; Lebanon; Jordan; Iran; and Yemen.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ACTION:

It is recommended Bureau liaison representative orally clear with State Department our intentions to continue to explore possibility of developing sources and informants on carefully selected basis at the official establishments in U.S. of each of the above Arab countries with clear understanding we will seek State Department clearance for each individual investigation and interview.

65-63113-94

REC-83

1 - 105-23464 (Arab Intelligence Activities in the U.S.)

65-63113
GCM:et
(8)

1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memor JNITEL GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 10, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

Tolson ____
Nichols ____
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
Nease ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Donahoe to you dated June 6, 1958, in the above-captioned matter. Referenced memorandum recommended that Liaison orally clear with State the Bureau's intentions to continue to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis at the official establishments in the United States of the Arab countries and that the Bureau will seek State Department clearance for each individual investigation and interview prior to the action taken. The Arab countries involved are United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran and Yemen.

Instant matter was discussed on June 9, 1958, by Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section with Mr. J. P. McDonnell, State. Mr. McDonnell pointed out that the governments of some of the Arab countries such as Iraq and Lebanon are friendly toward the United States; and, of course, great care will have to be used in each investigation and interview; that State will consider each request by the Bureau for investigation and interview and, depending on the particular situation at the time, will attempt to give guidance to the Bureau as to the proper action to follow. Mr. McDonnell advised that he could not give an over-all approval at this time because the situation involving a particular country might change.

ACTION:

For the information of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

REC- 83

OHB:bjt
(6)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. C.C.Moore
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bartlett

15 JUN 18 1958

Let NY
2-WFO
6-16-58

not

63 JUN 20 1958

Tic: 1 - Moore

SAC, New York (105-21200)

6-16-58

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI (105-53464)

ARAB INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES
IS - MIDDLE EAST

ReBulet 10-10-56 captioned as above and reBulet 5-19-58 entitled "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Missions."

In line with the information set forth in referenced letter dated 5-19-58 the Department of State has been contacted relative to our program of developing sources and informants at official establishments in the U.S. of the following Arab countries: Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) and Yemen.

The State Department representative with whom this matter was discussed advised that although an over-all approval at this time could not be given because the situation involving a particular country might change, State Department will consider each request by the Bureau for investigation and interview and, depending on the particular situation at the time, will attempt to give guidance to the Bureau as to the proper action to follow. It was also pointed out by the State Department representative that the governments of some of the Arab countries such as Iraq and Lebanon are friendly toward the U.S. and consequently great care will have to be used in each investigation and interview.

In view of the above and in view of the continuing need for sources and informants in the various Arab establishments in the areas covered by your offices, you should continue in your efforts to develop sources at official establishments of the above-mentioned Arab countries. Request Bureau to obtain State Department clearance before each individual investigation and interview of persons considered for development as sources.

Washington Field and New York are instructed to submit a letter under instant caption within 30 days from the receipt of this letter showing under the name of each diplomatic establishment, of the above-mentioned Arab countries, the identities of all persons who have been developed as sources and those

65-63113-

NOT RECORDED
141 JUN 19 1958

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

2 - Washington Field (105-19602)

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Missions)

GCM:mcc (7) (SEE NOTE PAGE 2)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
ele. Room
lloman
ndy

MAIL ROOM ☐

under current development. Also set forth specific plans being taken by your offices to increase informant coverage at these Arab establishments.

This program must be given your close personal attention so that the Bureau will be able to be in the best possible position to learn of any activities of these Arab countries which may be against the best interest of the United States.

NOTE: Inasmuch as State Department in recent past has denied clearance for interviews with potential security informants employed at Pakistan, German and Turkish Embassies because such countries are friendly, memo Donahoe to Belmont dated 6-6-58 instructed Liaison to orally clear with State Department our intentions to continue to explore possibility of developing sources and informants on selected basis at official establishments in U.S. of above-mentioned Arab countries. This has been done in order to eliminate wasting investigative effort and source development prior to requesting an interview with the potential source for which State Department may decline to give clearance. Although State Department on 6-9-58 did not give over-all approval for this program they did state that they would consider each request for investigation and interview on an individual basis depending on particular situation at the time and State also did not say that clearance was denied for our efforts in developing informants at these Arab establishments. Consequently field being instructed to continue efforts to develop sources under this program.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 8-13-58

JUNE

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - Liaison
1 - Nasca

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Intelligence reports of other agencies in July, 1958, reflected a growing concern over Libya's position in the Middle East. Indications were that a coup may be attempted in Libya in the near future by pro-Nasser forces. (Memorandum Sullivan to Belmont 8-1-58, re "Precarious Position of Libya in Middle East").

A State Department representative on 8-7-58, while discussing Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy's recent trip to the Middle East, advised that Sudan, like Ethiopia and other countries in that area, is fearful of Egyptian subversive tactics. He noted that while Sudan and Ethiopia are basically friendly to the U. S. and the West, the Egyptians have been corrupting a number of officials of these countries by bribes. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont 8-8-58, re "Robert Murphy").

It is noted that on 8-7-58 we obtained State Department clearance to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants at official Sudanese establishments in the U. S, in view of data received indicating Nasser reportedly was making concentrated efforts to overthrow the Sudanese Government. The Field has been instructed to institute this program. (Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont 8-6-58, re "Sudan Activities").

Information published by CIA on 8-11-58 reflects that reliable sources are pessimistic over the outlook for the continued stability of Iran, and there is an undercurrent of rumors concerning changes in government and military hierarchy with reference to the desirability of a coup. CIA also published data on 8-9-58 indicating that the Saudi Arabian Government may make an accommodation with Nasser of the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) consisting of some type of association with the United Arab States (Egypt, Syria, and Yemen) or a revival of the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian military alliance. (CIA, Office of Current Intelligence Reports dated 8-9 and 8-11-58).

It is noted that a program for the development of sources and informants who can report on the activities of the official establishments of Iran and Saudi Arabia is already in effect.

59 SEP 4 1958

65-63113

REC-74

65-63113-120

VHN:mtb
(6)

SENT DIRECTOR
8-14-58

17 AUG 20 1958

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: Intelligence Coverage of
Diplomatic Representatives
of Friendly Foreign Nations
65-63113

The foregoing information gives us an indication that Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia may possibly fall into Nasser's camp and become alienated from the West. Since we are on notice of these possibilities, it would be well for the Bureau to consider the desirability of instituting programs aimed at increasing our coverage of the diplomatic establishments of these countries. Such coverage would include the development of sources and informants where such coverage does not already exist and possibly the installation of technical coverage. Such action taken by us now would place us in a much better position since we would be gathering and disseminating data of vital interest to the U. S. before a possible coup or similar event took place. This, of course, would be much more desirable than to have us implement such programs after a coup or similar event took place.

Deputy Under Secretary Murphy has recently returned from a trip to the Middle East where he discussed the Middle East crisis with a number of individuals, including the leaders of various Arabian countries. Murphy is in a position to give us a first-hand account of what future moves can be anticipated from Nasser in Nasser's efforts to achieve Arabian unity through subversion and political maneuvering. Murphy can also furnish us with the identities of any other countries that might be brought into Nasser's sphere of influence.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That our Department of State Liaison Representative contact Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and obtain his observations, gathered as a result of his trip to the Middle East, as to what further moves can be anticipated from Nasser with regard to Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, or any other African or Arabian country. Murphy should be advised that we desire to direct our intelligence coverage so as to obtain maximum benefit. His desires should be elicited as to whether technical coverage of any of the countries indicated should be instituted.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: Intelligence Coverage of
Diplomatic Representatives
of Friendly Foreign Nations
65-63113

2. While institution of a source and informant development program regarding Libya and Ethiopia appears warranted (we already have programs in effect with regard to Sudan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia), it is believed more practical to withhold seeking such clearance, which we would have to obtain from the office of Roderic O'Connor of Department of State, until after we obtain a first-hand idea from Murphy as to the extent and the nature of the problem.

SD/[illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

DATE: 8-18-58

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Nasca

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
Clayton ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

Nasca

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

WFO on 8-8-58 advised that since the revolution in Venezuela in January, 1958, the country has been ruled by a Junta. Newspaper media since the revolution have reported periodically that individuals who were political exiles during the regime of Marcos Perez Jimenez have been allowed to return to Venezuela and pursue their former political activities.

It has become apparent from daily news stories that Venezuela is presently in a state of political upheaval. Although the leader of the Junta, Admiral Larrazabal, has stated he has no political aspirations it has been pointed out by correspondents that he has recently given indication of this by touring the country and "wooing" the support of the communists. This reportedly has been done by statements attributed to Larrazabal that he could not conceive of a Venezuelan communist being controlled by the USSR since all Venezuelans are inherently patriotic and loyal to Venezuela. It has also been pointed out that the communists of Venezuela are being played up as the heroes of the recent revolution in that country. Some correspondents have stated that it is felt there will possibly be a military coup if the politicians of Venezuela do not soon set up a government acceptable to the military leaders. It is further noted that the Vice President and Mrs. Nixon experienced insults during their tour of Latin America, the most vicious of which occurred in Venezuela.

From the above, it appears that we should try to place ourselves in a position to obtain current intelligence data concerning the Venezuelan political situation. It is pointed out that there appears to be a possibility of the Venezuelan communists gaining more and more influence and power in that country and, therefore, shifting Venezuela to alignment with the Soviet Bloc. WFO noted that a confidential source has reported on several occasions a strong interest in Latin America by the Soviet Embassy. WFO has requested the Bureau obtain State clearance for WFO to initiate a program, looking toward the development of informants and sources within the Venezuelan Embassy, Washington, D. C. This should be done.

65-63113

REC- 45 65-63113-122

1 - 94-4-4761 (Embassy of Venezuela)

AUG 26 1958

VHN:lmc
(6)

57 SEP 2 19

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of
Friendly Foreign Nations
65-63113

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended Bureau Liaison representative orally clear with State Department our intentions to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis at the Venezuelan Embassy, Washington, D. C., and other Venezuelan establishments, if it should become necessary, with the clear understanding that we will seek State Department clearance for each individual investigation and interview.

8/19/58 JP McDonnell, State, advised that State has no objections to above proposal.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS (BRAZIL)

DATE: 9-2-58

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Nasca

Nasca

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy
W. C. Sullivan

WFO on 8-22-58 advised that although Brazil's President has recently indicated a stronger stand in favor of the U. S., various news media have reported that politically powerful nationalist and leftist groups do exist in Brazil and that until recently Brazil's President had avoided offending such groups.

Anti-U. S. feelings and demonstrations were exhibited in Brazil during the South American trip of Vice President and Mrs. Nixon and although the demonstrations did not attain the violence exhibited in some of the other South American countries, the demonstrations indicated the work of well-organized group or groups opposed to the U. S.

On 7-8-58, Wilson Velloso, Press Attache, Brazilian Embassy, who admitted former membership in the Communist Party of Brazil, upon interview at his request, stated that he had attempted to discuss his Communist Party activities with Brazilian officials but they indicated indifference to such information in 1951.

Velloso supposed the reason for the indifference was that his information was common knowledge; however, another explanation would be sanction of the Communist Party on the part of Brazilian officials, even though the Communist Party has been outlawed there. Velloso stated he knew of no communist influence at the Brazilian Embassy but stated that it was the tendency of Latin American countries at this time to play communist countries against noncommunist countries in an effort to obtain all they could in the nature of aid and assistance, inferring that the Brazilian Embassy would also attempt this practice. Velloso commented that he did not believe that such negotiations on the part of Latin American countries necessarily indicated that they were procommunist.

REC- 60 EX. - 133 SEP 11 1958 124

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

WFO noted a confidential source has advised that many South American countries were aligned with Russia in opposing the establishment of a European common market and that Brazil had indicated a strong opposition to the market. The source also advised that the Russian Embassy had indicated a strong interest in Latin America recently and had indicated a desire to establish diplomatic or economic relations with Brazil.

65-63113 122
60 SEP 24 1958
1 - 62-42007 (Embassy of Brazil)
[redacted]lmc (6)

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of
Friendly Foreign Nations (Brazil)
65-63113

In view of the above information, it would appear that Brazil could easily align itself with the Soviet-bloc countries and thereby create an international situation affecting the U. S. While there is no apparent indication at this time of a political upheaval in Brazil, Brazil's President's recent opposition to the nationalist and leftist groups in Brazil might tend to develop internal strife in Brazil, leading to such an upheaval.

From the above, it appears that we should try to place ourselves in a position to obtain current intelligence data concerning Brazil. WFO requested the Bureau to obtain State Department clearance for WFO to initiate a program looking toward the development of informants and sources within the Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D. C.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Bureau Liaison representative orally clear with State Department our intentions to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis at the Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D. C., and other Brazilian establishments, if it should become necessary, with the clear understanding that we will seek State Department clearance for each individual investigation and interview.

SD/hcm

✓

OK

9/5/58
JPMcDonnell, State, said
State has no objection.

- 2 -

DIRECTOR, FBI 9/26/58

SAC, NEW YORK (105-31090)

DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS
FROM BRAZIL
IS-BRAZIL

ReBulet to WFO, 5/20/58, captioned "INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS."

The Bureau is requested to obtain Department of State authorization for the development of sources and informants at the captioned establishment.

This request is being made in view of existence of strong Communist Party in Brazil and absence of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the USSR. It seems likely that New York City is a logical place for contacts between pro-Communist Brazilians and Russian officials. Also, news reports in recent months have indicated that there is strong sentiment for increasing commerical activity between Brazil and Russia especially in view of Brazil's increasingly precarious economic situation. It is felt that information concerning the background and activities of Brazilian officials in the New York area is of vital importance to the internal security of the United States.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

②- Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (105-31090)

MDC:nmn
(3)

65-63113

1-cc

65-63113

NOT RECORDED
172 OCT 23 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Middleton

DATE: 10/2/58

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS
IS - CH

The captioned program consists of development of informants and sources in the diplomatic establishments of friendly nations where warranted. In connection with this program, we have previously obtained State Department clearance for investigation and interview of the individual considered as a potential source without revealing to State the purpose of same. Recently State declined clearance for interviews with individuals employed at three embassies although clearance had earlier been obtained from State to investigate these individuals. In order to eliminate wasted investigative effort on source development in an establishment at which State will not give clearance for interview, since May, 1958, we have cleared our intentions with State Department before authorizing Field to expend investigative effort in developing sources in a particular field. (Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont 5/16/58). That memorandum also stated that we should concentrate in this regard on a controlled selection of specific "trouble-spot" countries where a program of source development is warranted.

In this regard the existing critical political situation in the Far East definitely warrants that we continue our efforts to develop sources at all official establishments in the U.S. of Nationalist China.

ACTION:

1. It is recommended Bureau Liaison Representative orally clear with State Department our intentions to explore possibility of developing sources and informants on carefully selected basis at the official establishments of Nationalist China in the U.S.

10/6/58 JP McDonnell, State advised & State has no objection, OKK

REC- 10 65-[illegible]-132

2. If above is approved, there is attached a letter to New York and Washington Field advising that State Department clearance is being requested.

12 OCT 16 1958

NAT. INV. SEC.

65-63113
1 - 62-77787-246
1 - 65-39605
Enclosure
JJM:egs (7)

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Liaiso.
1 - Middleton

SAC, New York (105-30508) (original & 3 for NY) 10/3/58

Director, FBI (65-63113)

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS
IS - CH

Re New York letters 9/22/58 captioned "Delegation to the United Nations from China, IS - CH," and "Consulate General of China, New York, New York, IS - CH."

For the information of New York and Washington Field Offices, the State Department is being requested for clearance to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis in the diplomatic establishments of Nationalist China in the U.S. The New York and Washington Field Offices will be advised of the decision reached by the State Department regarding the above request.

Extra copies of this communication are being furnished to the New York Office for its files 105-31022 regarding the Consulate General of China and 105-31020 regarding the Delegation to the United Nations from China. Extra copies are being furnished to the Washington Field Office for its files regarding the Consulate General of China, New York, New York, and 105-26760 regarding the Delegation to the United Nations from China.

4 - Washington Field (65-7796) 65-63113-128

REC-25

1 - 65-39605 (Consulate General of China, NY, NY)
1 - 62-77787-246 (Delegation to UN from China)

JJM:egs
(15)

EX-135

17 OCT 7 1958

NOTE: Cover memo Donahoe to Belmont 10/2/58, prepared JJM:egs, re same subject. NY by let 8/13/58 requested WFO to obtain the name & citizenship of employees at the Consulate General of China in NYC. NY by another let dated 8/15/58 advised WFO that upon review of INS files in NYC, WFO would be requested to obtain info from State Dept. regarding 4 known employees of the Delegation to the UN from China. Prior to WFO covering these leads at the State Department, State Department clearance should be obtained to explore possibility of developing sources.

MAILED 11
OCT 3 - 1958
COMM-FBI

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

lson
ardman
lmont
hr
se
ions
n
r
n
loom
m

MAIL ROOM ☐

43 OCT 14 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

DATE: October 8, 1958

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Little

Tolson ___
Boardman ___
Belmont ___
Mohr ___
Nease ___
Parsons ___
Rosen ___
Tamm ___
Trotter ___
Clayton ___
Tele. Room ___
Holloman ___
Gandy ___

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

During the recent investigation of Arthur S. Lall, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Indian Delegation to the UN, which was approved by the Department of State, it was determined by the New York Office that Lall was in frequent contact with the Soviet Delegation to the UN and the Egyptian Delegation to the UN. It was further determined that during the present year, Mohamed Riad, First Secretary, United Arab Republic Delegation to the UN, has conferred with Lall, presumably concerning the Middle East crisis. Furthermore, "The New York Times" of 9/29/58 carried an article stating that V. K. Krishna Menon, India's Defense Minister, while appearing on an ABC television program on 9/28/58 declared that Chiang Kai-shek is endeavoring to get the U.S. into a war in the Taiwan Strait crisis.

From the above, it would appear that while India ostensibly claims to be neutral, her official representatives are in constant contact with representatives of countries unfriendly to the U.S. and aligned with the Soviet bloc and also appear unfriendly to the U.S. It thus appears that we should try to place ourselves in a position to obtain current intelligence data concerning India's contacts with those nations unfriendly to us, as well as information on the current political situation in India and the activities of its representatives in the U. S. The New York Office has requested that the Bureau obtain State Department clearance for the New York Office to institute a program looking toward the development of informants and sources within the Indian Consulate General in New York City, as well as in the Indian Delegation to the UN. It is felt that this should be done and also sources and informants developed in the Embassy of India, Washington, D. C.

10/10/58 Discussed with J. McDonnell, State. He orally cleared our intentions.

RECOMMENDATION:

EX-136 REC-65 65-63113-134

OCT 20 1958

It is recommended that the Bureau liaison representative orally clear with the Department of State our intentions to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis at the Embassy of India, Washington, D. C., the Indian Consulate General, New York City, and the Indian Delegation to the UN, New York City with the specific understanding that we will seek State Department clearance for each individual investigation and interview.

65-63113

HWL:tw:clb
(6)

1 - 105-54374 (Consulate General of India, New York City)
1 - 105-New (Embassy of India)

1 - Mr. Cotter

SAC, New York (105-31096)
October 15, 1958

Director, FBI (65-59075)

CONSULATE GENERAL OF VENEZUELA,
NEW YORK CITY
INTERNAL SECURITY - VENEZUELA

Reurlet 9-26-58.

State Department clearance was previously obtained on 8-19-58 for program looking toward development of sources on carefully selected basis at Venezuelan Embassy, Washington, D. C., and other Venezuelan establishments in this country, if deemed necessary. Accordingly, you are authorized to proceed with such a program with respect to captioned establishment.

No active investigations or interviews with persons connected with the captioned establishment should be conducted without specific Bureau authority since the Bureau must obtain State Department clearance for each such investigation and interview.

① -- 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

RDC:tw
(5)

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
OCT 16 1958
MAILED

65-63113-
NOT RECORDED
162 OCT 23 1958

Tolson ______
Boardman ______
Belmont ______
Mohr ______
Nease ______
Parsons ______
Rosen ______
Tamm ______
Trotter ______
Clayton ______
Tele. Room ______
Holloman ______
Gandy ______
MAIL ROOM ☐

DEC 29 1958

59 OCT 23 1958

dleton

SAC, New York (105-30508) (Orig and 3)

October 16, 1958

Director, FBI (65-63113)-132

EX-102 REC-1

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS
IS - CH

ReBulet 10/3/58 to New York, cc WFO, captioned as above.

Mr. J. P. McDonnell of the State Department advised on 10/6/58 that the State Department has no objection to our exploring the possibilities of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis at the official establishments of Nationalist China in the U. S.

Extra copies of this communication are being furnished to the New York Office for its files 105-31022 regarding the Consulate General of China and 105-31020 regarding the Delegation to the United Nations from China. Extra copies are being furnished to the WFO for its files regarding the Consulate General of China, New York, New York, and 105-26760 regarding the Delegation to the United Nations from China.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

4 - Washington Field (65-7796)

1 - 65-39605 (Consulate General of China, New York, New York)

1 - 62-77787-246 (Delegation to the UN from China)

JJM:jlw
(12)

NOTE: In order to eliminate wasted investigative effort in source development in an establishment, at which State will not give clearance for interview, since May, 1958, we have cleared our intentions with State Department before authorizing field to expend investigative effort in developing sources in a particular field.

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

310

57 OCT 21 195

MAIL ROOM ☑

MAILED 31
OCT 15 1958
COMM-FBI

1 - Mr. Little

SAC, New York

10/17/58

Director, FBI

REC- 65

65-63113-134

EX-136

CONSULATE GENERAL OF INDIA
IS - INDIA
(Bureau File 105-54374)
(New York File 105-3991)

INDIAN DELEGATION TO THE UN
IS - INDIA
(Bureau File 105-New)

EMBASSY OF INDIA
IS - INDIA
(Bureau File ~~105-New~~)

Reurlet of 9/30/58 captioned "Consulate General of India, IS - India; Indian Delegation to the UN, IS - India", copies of same being furnished to the WFO. Further reference is made to Bulet of 5/19/58 captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations."

Department of State clearance was obtained 10/10/58 for the Bureau to institute a program aimed at the development of individuals, on a carefully selected basis, connected with the captioned Indian establishments in New York City and Washington, D. C., who can furnish information concerning Indian activities in the United States. This program must be conducted on a discreet basis and no active investigation or interviews with individuals connected with captioned establishments should be made without specific Bureau authority, as the Bureau must obtain specific State Department clearance for each investigation and interview as outlined in referenced Bulet of 5/19/58.

Your efforts in regard to this program should be submitted to the Bureau within thirty days together with your future plans for implementing informant coverage in the captioned institutions.

Extra copies of this letter are being furnished the New York and WFO Offices for each file carried in the caption.

MAILED 11
OCT 17 1958
COMM-FBI

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN
134-7117-3
105-54374

(3) - Washington Field Office
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

HWL:gds
(12)

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
Clayton ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

MAIL ROOM

DEC 29 1958

NOV 4 1958

- Cotter

SAC, New York (105-31099)

10-21-58

Director, FBI (62-103139)

CONSULATE GENERAL OF BRAZIL
NEW YORK CITY
IS - BRAZIL

Reurlet 9-26-58.

State Department clearance was previously obtained on 9-5-58 for a program looking toward development of sources on a carefully selected basis at Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D. C., and other Brazilian establishments in this country, if deemed necessary. Accordingly, you are authorized to proceed with such a program with respect to captioned establishment.

No active investigations or interviews with persons from captioned establishment should be conducted without specific Bureau authority since the Bureau must obtain State Department clearance for each such investigation and interview.

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

RDC:mtb
(5)

YELLOW DUPLICATE
OCT 21 1958
MAILED

4370

son
rdman
hom
se
ons
n
a
er
on
Room
man

DEC 29 1958

5 ~~6 OCT 24 1958~~

MAIL ROOM ☐

165-63113-
NOT RECORDED
162 OCT 23 1958

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-103139-2

ter

SAC, New York (105-31090)   10-21-58

Director, FBI (62-77787-205)

DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS
FROM BRAZIL, NEW YORK CITY
IS - BRAZIL

Reurlet 9-26-58.

State Department clearance was previously obtained on 9-5-58 for a program looking toward development of sources on a carefully selected basis at Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D. C., and other Brazilian establishments in this country, if deemed necessary. Accordingly, you are authorized to proceed with such a program with respect to captioned establishment.

No active investigations or interviews with persons from captioned establishment should be conducted without specific Bureau authority since the Bureau must obtain State Department clearance for each such investigation and interview.

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic
Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

RDC:mtb
(5)

ORIGINAL FILED IN

7370

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
OCT 21 1958
MAILED

65 DEC 29 1958

'olson
oardman
elmont
lohr
ease
arsons
osen
amm
rotter
layton
ele. Room
olloman
andy

MAIL ROOM ☐

63 OCT 24 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: November 10, 1958

FROM : MR. S. J. PAPICH

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations

COVERAGE OF NONCOMMUNIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

Reference is made to information recently furnished to the Bureau by a highly sensitive source being handled by the Washington Field Office (WFO) indicating that Soviet and satellite intelligence representatives have a keen interest in assistance being rendered by our "friends." They were referring to attaches from India, Indonesia, and United Arab Republic who apparently have been collecting certain types of information for the Soviet and satellite representatives.

The foregoing again confirms that the Soviets and the satellites realize that representatives of noncommunist diplomatic establishments can be of tremendous value to them. Naturally, a representative of the Indian Embassy has access to U. S. institutions and areas not usually accessible to the Soviets and satellites. Furthermore, a representative of such an embassy can mix in circles and have access to Americans and others without being placed under any particular suspicions. If such an individual is recruited by the Soviets, he can operate with an excellent cover. We previously have seen instances where the Soviets have taken an interest in representatives of Latin American countries apparently for the purpose of recruiting them as agents.

It is suggested that we might desire to re-examine our position with regard to the extent and nature of Soviet and satellite utilization of the personnel of other diplomatic establishments. Although we already have a certain degree of technical coverage, we might wish to give serious consideration to an expansion of the same. This may not be an appropriate time for suggesting such a project, but we cannot overlook a possible gap in our over-all counterintelligence coverage.

It is believed that an expansion of coverage of so-called friendly diplomatic establishments on a selective and flexible basis would be of extreme value to the Bureau because of the following:

EX. - 133 REC- 19 65-63113-145

1. Information developed could lead to the possible identity of important Soviet agents.

24 DEC 3 1958

SJP:jlk
(3)
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

file 65-63113

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 2.

57 DEC 5 1958

2. We can collect valuable intelligence information as we already have under established coverage. We actually may be in a position to outdo other agencies, such as CIA, in developing positive intelligence information as a by-product to our counterintelligence responsibilities.

3. Expanded coverage would serve as a strong deterrent to CIA entering into intelligence operations in the U. S.

4. Additional coverage will permit us to maintain a reasonable check on the over-all intelligence activities of our "friends." Without such a reasonable check, we can be inclined to operate in the dark waiting until something happens.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

ADDENDUM SBD:bbr 11/28/58

Ideas set forth here are good and we have gone over them carefully in Nationalities Intelligence Section. These ideas and other ideas which have arisen from discussion have been considered. However, with present necessity for economy and cut-backs in our security programs due to budgetary considerations, we do not feel any broad-scale expansion of intelligence coverage of friendly countries is feasible at this time. We must operate within the limitations set on technical coverage. Nevertheless, we can and will adjust available technical coverage to best meet needs. Lack of expansion at this time does not mean that we will not have coverage of specific situation which prompted this memo. Our coverage of Soviets and satellites, which developed original data, will serve to give us coverage of extent to which attaches of friendly countries are USED in accomplishing objectives of Soviets and satellites as will investigative coverage of specific attaches mentioned which is being implemented. In any such coverage we must remember the lack of restrictions

(continued on Page 3)

on Military, Air and Naval Attaches of friendly countries, and the liaison and freedom of action existing between them and counterparts at Pentagon. Bureau is not in position to effect control of their actions and information-gathering ability by investigation on general basis. What we are going to have to do is to attempt to build up substantial data against those attaches which Soviets and satellites are known to utilize and either attempt to compromise and use them or consider possible presentation of problem for State Department action.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Sanders
1 - Mossburg
1 - Callahan

DATE: 12-12-58

JUNE

Tolson ___
Boardman ___
Belmont ___
Mohr ___
Nease ___
Parsons ___
Rosen ___
Tamm ___
Trotter ___
Clayton ___
Tele. Room ___
Holloman ___
Gandy ___

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

SYNOPSIS:

This memorandum evaluates captioned program and recommends its continuation in the present form. Program provides for acquisition of positive intelligence and investigative information through three facets: (1) Receipt of notification from six other agencies of arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel of friendly foreign governments, (2) At specific request or with specific approval of Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy or official designated by him, maintenance of technical surveillances on official establishments of countries located in trouble areas, (3) With prior State Department approval, development of live sources within establishments of friendly countries, as Bureau's intelligence and investigative requirements demand extension of coverage.

Operation under first category, instituted November, 1954, is smooth and serving useful purpose in keeping us informed of identities of foreign intelligence personnel in U. S.; costs nominal, involving principally indexing procedures and small amount of supervisory time at Seat of Government.

Coverage under second category, first considered in October, 1955, and instituted two months later, has been source of highly valuable intelligence data as well as investigative information. State Department has made highly laudatory comments on value of material in formulation of foreign policy. Actual cost figures on technical surveillances conducted not available; noted, however, that in three years establishments of 14 separate foreign countries have been afforded technical coverage, mostly on short-term basis of one to three months but in five instances on continuing basis (Egypt since 12-23-55, France since 10-31-56, Syria since 8-16-57, and Iraq and Jordan since 7-16-58). Technical coverage of these establishments is designed to be elastic and tailored primarily to meet intelligence needs of our Government.

Development of live sources (catetory three above) is sound counterintelligence procedure of long standing. Our efforts in this field directed at friendly foreign countries were brought under captioned program in May, 1958, with adoption of policy that before continuing efforts previously instituted or undertaking future efforts involving country not previously considered, we would clear our intentions with State Department to avoid wasting investigative endeavors. We curr

65-63113
WRW:mtb
(6)

REC-10

14

18 DEC 17 1958

6 DEC 19 1958

have 21 live sources in establishments of eight countries and 62 potential sources now under development assigned in establishments of 12 countries. This phase of intelligence coverage is sound, enhances Bureau's prestige as intelligence agency, and is based on long-range planning. Costs involved are those arising from intensive, thorough field investigations of potential sources (generally American employees in foreign establishments). Such costs considered fully justified in view of our responsibilities in the internal security field and as an intelligence agency.

Examples cited to illustrate intermittent phases of captioned program, undertaken as need for coverage arises, and to explain manner in which other programs contribute to our coverage in this field.

Based on detailed analysis, it is concluded that captioned program is working efficiently and effectively with due regard for cost factors and administrative controls.

ACTION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form at this time. Reanalysis and re-evaluation of the program will be undertaken in six months.

DETAILS:

The purpose of this memorandum is to evaluate and analyze our program concerned with intelligence coverage of friendly foreign countries. The memorandum recommends the continuation of this program in its present form with provisions for re-evaluation and reanalysis in six months.

Basic Bureau policy is, and for several years has been, to conduct investigations of individuals representing "friendly" foreign countries (those outside the Soviet bloc) only in instances where we receive allegations that such individuals are engaging in activities in violation of our laws or otherwise constitute a security menace.
(65-63113-5)

This policy has been developed over years of experience. We are faced with the problem of having literally hundreds of representati of friendly foreign nations assigned to official and diplomatic establis ments in the U. S. and accredited to our Government in connection with their official duties. The problem of discharging our responsibility for the internal security of the country and warding off the menace whic could be created by a security threat issuing from any one of these foreign government officials necessitates the devising and following of some procedures which will place us in a position to acquire information regarding activities on the part of any such official which might be detrimental to this country's security.

The 1954 case involving Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., which resulted in compromising communications intelligence material with Netherlands officials, vividly brought to our attention the question whether we should maintain investigative coverage of the activities of all representatives of friendly foreign governments in the U. S. A careful study of the problem at that time left us with the conclusion that in order to establish such coverage as would effectively reveal an operation such as that occurring in the Petersen case, it would be necessary to maintain both technical and physical surveillances on diplomatic officials and official establishments in the U. S. of all friendly foreign countries. Noting that our intensified coverage of Soviets and satellites alone required over 600 Agents at that time, it was concluded that manpower expenditure would seem to negate following a similar program with regard to non-Soviet bloc officials and establishments. (65-63113-1)

Taking a more realistic approach, we immediately (November, 1954) did two things: (1) Alerted 12 key field offices to the problem and issued instructions designed to help cope with it. (2) Informed six other agencies of our Government of our responsibilities in this field and asked them to notify us of the arrivals in the U. S. of all foreign intelligence officials, even though their presence in this country might be under working arrangements with one of the six agencies involved. (65-63113-1 through 5)

Since November, 1954, we have coordinated into captioned program two positive counterintelligence procedures which have been in use for many years: (1) Technical surveillance coverage in the U. S. of official establishments of friendly foreign countries located in "tr areas. (65-63113-40) (2) Development of live sources in such estab ments. (65-63113-89)

This program has a twofold purpose, first, to acquire information concerning the identities and activities of official personne of foreign governments in the U. S.; secondly, to produce intelligence information concerning foreign countries which will assist the Bureau in its over-all intelligence responsibilities, the Department of State in formulating policy in the field of international relations, and other agencies in connection with their foreign intelligence functions. To accomplish this purpose, three separate and distinct facets are utilized, discussed in detail hereinafter.

(1) Acquisition of Information from Other Agencies as to Identities of Foreign Intelligence Personnel in U. S.

On 11-18-54 letters were directed to the Department of State; Central Intelligence Agency; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; Office of Naval Intelligence; Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force; and National Security Agency. A copy was furnished to Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, of the Department to advise him of the Bureau's action. These letters pointed out that information had been received in a number of instances indicating that representatives of so-called "friendly" nations had engaged in intelligence activities against the best interests of the U. S. The case involving Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., was cited as an example. It was noted that representatives of friendly countries in some instances were stationed here to represent their governments officially in dealing with U. S. agencies and in other instances intelligence representatives of these foreign countries frequently visited our country to confer with representatives of various U. S. agencies. It was observed that frequently the Bureau was not officially notified of the arrivals of many of these foreign government representatives and the possibility existed that such persons might while in this country engage in intelligence missions not known to the agencies of our Government sponsoring their visits.

In our letters of 11-18-54 we requested the six agencies involved to notify us when information was received that an intelligence representative of a foreign government was proceeding to the U. S. and also to let us know in the event any of these agencies set up a liaison arrangement with such foreign representatives. We pointed out this information was needed to guide us in discharging our responsibilities and, at the same time, to enable us to advise the interested agency the event we received information indicating a foreign intelligence representative was acting outside the scope of his approved activities. We asked that information of this latter nature be called to our attention if received by one of the recipient agencies to assist us in eliminating unnecessary inquiries and concentrating on matters deserving the most attention. We requested all six agencies to furnish us the identities of any foreign intelligence representatives then in the U. S. and to provide us on a continuing basis data with respect to future arrivals of such representatives, both in instances where working arrangements existed and otherwise. (65-63113-1 through 4)

Since our letters of 11-18-54, all six of the recipient agencies have furnished data of the nature requested. A current analysis of these data has shown that information provided by National Security Agency, while quite complete, has been of little operational value. This is occasioned by the fact that National Security Agency is not an operational agency and foreign government representatives entering the U. S. to consult with National Security Agency personnel would normally be expected to be connected with service agencies of their own governments; however, the data furnished by National Security Agency are of value. The names of the individuals furnished are indexed in our files and, if the coverage discussed in categories two and three below produces information indicating that any of these foreign intelligence representatives become operational contrary to the purpose for which they arrived in this country, we are in a position to identify them through indices checks and establish immediately the identity of the U. S.-sponsoring agency. Since November, 1954, we have learned of no instances through this procedure wherein foreign representatives admitted to this country under National Security Agency sponsorship have become operational or in any other manner created a security threat of investigative interest to the Bureau.

In many instances the information furnished by the five agencies other than National Security Agency has related to foreign intelligence personnel on an operational level and frequently is submitted under the name of the individual concerned. This is reviewed by the responsible supervisor, who checks files and takes any required action; such as, instituting investigation, referral to field for information, or marking for indexing. Opening of active cases on such foreign personnel is dependent upon the availability in our files or receipt of allegations of violations of our laws or activities constituting a security menace in line with our basic policy cited above.

This facet of captioned program is operating smoothly and no changes are required at this time. Its value in keeping us informed of the identities of foreign intelligence representatives presently in the U. S. at any given time is self-evident. Its costs are nominal, involving primarily only that amount required by the indexing of names and the reviewing of incoming material by Bureau supervisors. If field investigations are instituted, the only other costs would be those resulting from investigations which the Bureau must conduct to discharge its responsibilities in the internal security field.

(2) Maintenance of Technical Surveillances on Establishments of Selected Friendly Foreign Governments.

Recognizing a gap in our intelligence coverage of friendly governments, on 10-21-55 we discussed with Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy the question of instituting limited discreet technical surveillances on official establishments of selected foreign nations, principally those located in world trouble areas. Mr. Murphy was quite receptive to this idea, stating that limited coverage sufficiently flexible to change with changing world conditions might be highly desirable. After further discussions, it was agreed that a program "progressive" in nature would be instituted. By this Mr. Murphy explained that he did not feel that all desirable coverage should be instituted at a given date but rather that coverage should be instituted on one country at a time as moving events abroad might dictate. On this basis, this phase of captioned program was initially instituted based on a specific request from Mr. Murphy on 12-5-55 that we place technical surveillances on all Egyptian diplomatic establishments in U. S. (65-63113-37, 39, 40, 43, 48)

Since then, technical surveillances (with dates of duration) have been placed on establishments of the following countries at the specific request or with the specific approval of Mr. Murphy or an official of his office designated by him to act in this matter:

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

Country		Duration	File References
1.	Egypt	12-23-55 to present	65-58070-59, 64
2.	Afghanistan	1-3-56 to 3-10-56	65-60354-15, 50
3.	Brazil	7-18-56 to 9-19-56	100-407049-10, 24
4.	Syria	8-14-56 to 10-12-56	65-59148-31, 56, 73
		12-19-56 to 3-18-57	62-77787-286-24, 96, 41
		8-16-57 to present	
5.	Nicaragua	9-27-56 to 10-30-56	100-143895-76, 104
6.	Iraq	10-16-56 to 3-7-57	105-64215-3
		9-25-57 to 11-25-57	65-55156-28, 123, 160
		7-16-58 to present	62-77787-282-22, 38
7.	Bolivia	11-7-56 to 12-13-56	65-52316-21, 35
8.	India	11-28-56 to 1-16-57	62-77787-257-274, 297,
		~~7-24-58 to 8-7-58~~	325, 329
9.	Saudi Arabia	7-28-57 to 8-28-57	105-62769-7, 14
10.	Algeria	10-24-57 to 1-10-58	105-54593-16, 26, 36
11.	France	10-31-56 to present	65-30150-663, 1421, 1440
12.	Tunisia	3-4-58 to 10-16-58	65-64170-21, 45, 135
13.	Jordan	6-6-58 to 7-7-58	65-61885-104, 121
		7-16-58 to present	105-38566-29
14.	Yemen	7-19-58 to 9-25-58	105-58065-142, 186

The technical surveillance phase of captioned program is designed to be elastic and is tailored primarily to meet the intelligenc needs of our Government in making high-level decisions and in establishing U. S. policy to cope with international crises. That it has been successful in this respect is evidenced by highly laudatory comments and expressions of appreciation made by individuals of other departments principally of the Department of State. For example, on 11-29-56 Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy addressed a personal letter to the Director stating in part, "I want to express the Department's appreciation to you and the Bureau for the special coverage which you have been providing us during these recent weeks. The material has been immensely valuable to us in keeping abreast of fast-moving events and developments in the international situation and has been of great assistance to us in the formulation of policy. I know that this work has meant extra hours and expense...."

(65-63113-61)

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

Aside from producing high-level intelligence data, these technical surveillances have been the source of information regarding activities of foreign government representatives of such a nature as to require Bureau investigative attention. In such instances active investigations have been instituted.

Figures on the actual cost of the technical surveillances instituted under this program are not available. In the past the New York and Washington Field Offices, which have handled all of these technical surveillances, have estimated cost on a prorated basis by merely dividing total salaries of personnel handling all technical surveillances by the number of surveillances handled at the monitoring plants. To correct this No Number SAC Letter 58-N dated 11-21-58 ordered the field to submit cost figures in the future which more accurately portray actual cost of any particular technical surveillance. In the next semiannual evaluation of this program, therefore, actual cost figures will be available and will be reported.

(3) Development of Live Sources in Diplomatic Establishments of Friendly Foreign Countries.

For several years we have on a highly selected basis undertaken programs to develop live sources in official establishments of foreign countries when our investigative and intelligence needs have required extension of coverage. This has always been done on the most careful and discreet basis and the procedures followed in implementing such programs had gone forward without a hitch until May, 1958. In that month, the Department of State declined to give clearance for interviews with individuals at the Pakistani, German, and Turkish Embassies, after having granted specific clearances for investigations of these individuals. State Department declinations were based primarily on the fact that these three countries were friendly and that, if interviews of embassy personnel were reported to embassy officials, this could strain relations between those countries and the U. S. Refusal of clearance for such interviews was, of course, within the prerogative of the State Department which must take into consideration questions of international relations. However, the key point involved was that, while that Department had issued clearances for investigations of prospective informants, its subsequent denials for interviews with them had resulted in considerable wasted investigative efforts on our part. To avoid recurrences of instances of this nature, we adopted the policy of clearing our intentions with the Department of State before authorizing the field to expend any investigative effort. In this manner we put State Department on notice as to our objectives at the outset in order that when we return to State to secure clearance for the investigation and interview of a particular individual, we will not be denied clearance on the grounds of delicate international relations. (65-63113-89)

By letter dated 5-20-58, 12 offices in whose territories foreign official establishments are located were advised that our efforts in the development of sources and informants in establishments of friendly foreign nations should be based primarily on need and should be directed toward development of sources in the establishments of ostensibly friendly foreign countries (1) where there is definite indication the specific country is drifting toward alignment with the Soviet bloc; (2) where the situation in a particular country involves serious political or military crisis with international ramifications or possible revolutionary activity and good potential exists for the Bureau to produce valuable intelligence data through coverage of diplomatic establishments in the U. S; or (3) where there is a clear and present investigative need. The 12 offices were informed that Bureau authority must be secured prior to initiating any program to develop sources and informants within diplomatic establishments of a specific country outside the Soviet bloc, at which time completedata must be furnished as to need and potential benefit of such a program. The field was informed that, if such a program is justified, the Bureau will then discuss the matter with the State Department. Following State Department clearance, the Bureau will notify the interested field offices to initiate the program. However, further Bureau authority will still be required for the investigation and interview of each prospect, since State Department clearance will be sought in connection with each of these steps.
(65-63113-90)

Since our redirection of this phase of captioned program in May, 1958, with prior State Department clearance we have instituted action or continued action previously instituted to develop live sources in official establishments of the countries listed below. The first column beside the name of each country shows the number of presently active sources developed to date (including those developed prior to May, 1958) and the second column shows the number still under consideration.

Country	Developed To Date	Still Under Consideration	Serial Reference In 65-63113
1. Israel	1	2	93
2. United Arab Republic	4	2	95
3. Saudi Arabia	0	2	95
4. Iraq	2	7	95
5. Lebanon	2	2	95
6. Jordan	1	1	95
7. Iran	0	6	95
8. Yemen	2	0	95
9. Sudan	0	6	118-Green
10. Venezuela	0	3	122
~~11. Brazil~~	~~0~~	~~5~~	~~124~~
12. Nationalist China	7	10	132
13. India	2	16	134
14. Tunisia	0	0	135
	21	62	

The above figures refer to present and potential sources actually connected with official or diplomatic establishments. They do not relate to sources not connected with the establishments but actually reporting information regarding activities therein. The type of information the sources provide ranges all the way from data on movements and identities of officials to cryptographic material. These sources have on several past occasions provided information forming the basis for active investigations of foreign officials and/or their contacts.

Most of the work involved in this phase of captioned program rests with the field. Each person considered is the subject of a separate, thorough, intensive investigation. Our efforts are generally aimed at American employees in foreign establishments.and have been tightly controlled, as evidence by the lack of repercussions from the approaches we have made in the past.

Costs of this phase of our program are principally those arising from the field investigations and Agents' time in handling producing sources. Costs are considered fully justified since sound counterintelligence coverage requires sources which can produce not only investigative data but also intelligence information of value to us and other agencies in guiding policy and making decisions. The Bureau is expected to produce intelligence data and we can anticipate criticism as well as operational moves by other agencies to fill the vacuum if our operations do not produce necessary intelligence. Sound source programs are based on long-range planning and require forward thinking to get results. Scrambling for sources in reactions to problems would constitute a most undesirable substitute and give rise to justified criticism in a field where the Bureau takes pride in excelling.

Intermittent Phases and Tie In with Other Programs.

While captioned program currently follows three principal facets, as described hereinbefore, as the need arises we institute special types of coverage for some particular purposes.

EXCISED AS IT REFERS TO A PECULIARLY SENSITIVE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION

Another example of instituting special coverage on a need basis relates to a series of burglaries of foreign official establishments and residences which cropped up last summer in Washington and New York City. On 7-31-58 we alerted New York and Washington Field Offices to the possibility that the illegal entries may have been for something other than criminal purposes and instructed that these incidents be followed closely with local police authorities. We checked with the Central Intelligence Agency and were advised that Agency was not involved directly or indirectly. Through our coverage of various precincts of the local police departments, we have found that all but one of these burglaries have appeared to have been for criminal purposes; the one exception relates to the burglary of the residence of an Indian official in Washington. We are continuing to follow the latter incident with the police in an effort to determine if an intelligence operation was involved.
(65-63113-112, 118, 119, 123, 125, 12

65-63113

While the foregoing discussion portrays the types of coverage afforded under instant program, it by no means describes the full extent of our coverage of friendly foreign officials and establishments. For example, the **CODE WORD** produces voluminous intelligence data on these officials and establishments. Under the Intensification Program, as long ago as 6-9-53, SAC Letter 53-41 instructed the field to scrutinize carefully any associations and contacts between Soviet personnel and diplomatic representatives of other countries where there are indications that a person is being singled out for specific attention. A case of this nature was developed when a Soviet cultural attache in 1953 attempted to develop as agents for the Soviets two Iranian officials, one of whom we subsequently turned into a Bureau double agent. (65-63113-5) Under the program involving name checks by the Bureau and other intelligence agencies on all foreign government officials entering the U. S., we have the benefit of derogatory information on friendly foreign officials at the time they enter the U. S. This constitutes a type of coverage handled, not as a part of captioned program, but as a separate program in itself.

Conclusions.

Our program concerned with intelligence coverage of friendly foreign countries is operating effectively and efficiently. On a continuing basis, it produces information of value to our investigative requirements, to our intelligence requirements, and for budget purposes. For the most part, the program consists of a coordination of accepted investigative and intelligence procedures for the purpose of proper direction, redirection when indicated, and administrative controls. It has not required any over-all increase in manpower. From our current analysis, no changes are indicated at this time.

An informative memorandum has been prepared for supervisors in the Nationalities Intelligence Section, where all coverage of friendly foreign nations is handled, in order that they may be aware of the continuing need for coordination of this program and alert to any redirection which might increase its efficiency or improve our coverage.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

DATE: May 29, 1959

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Roach

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

We have controlled program designed to develop live sources in diplomatic establishments of countries outside Soviet bloc aimed at producing investigative and intelligence data on countries drifting toward Soviet bloc and on "trouble spot" countries where revolutionary or other activity has widespread international implications (such as Middle East crisis, Cuban revolution, Panamanian invasion, etc.). Program has paid off in sound benefits.

Recognizing delicacy of contacting and developing such sources and close interrelationship with problems of international relations and developments we consult State Department regularly on our objectives and intentions. For example, when we feel a particular country is logical target for development of sources in their establishments in U.S. we clear with State to be certain they agree and to insure that we are not running into risky foreign policy situation. If they agree to country as target we then clear with State on each investigation of potential source relating to that country. Providing investigation favorable we then go back again to obtain clearance from State for interview with potential source. These initial interviews are conducted under pretext with idea of assessing their attitude, stability, cooperativeness, etc. We then decide whether to go back and actually solicit cooperation in furnishing data.

We are running into problem here in that after State has cleared country as target and has cleared individual investigations they are too often declining clearance for interviews on basis potential results not commensurate with risk involved. This failure to clear final step after passing on risk aspect twice before results in wasteful expenditure of investigative time and these turndowns at this point are bound to have initiative-destroying effect on field offices.

We have been dealing with Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs in State which lacks real authority in this regard and must go back to geographical desks which are super-cautious, have no real concept of intelligence objectives, and tend to turn down interviews unnecessarily.

163

REC- 84

EX JUL 1 1959

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Roach
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Mr. Mossburg

65-63113

60 JUL 6 1959

SBD:tw (6)

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

To rectify this problem we propose that our liaison representative discuss this problem with Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy who has firm grasp of intelligence functions and with whom in past we have discussed and worked out means of effecting sensitive intelligence coverage both on our initiative and at his request. If he is receptive to clearing such matters personally we will work out practical method of clearing with him our country targets and individual investigations and interviews. We can point out to him that we approach entire problem with discretion and conduct initial interviews under suitable pretext. Murphy has the over-all knowledge to steer us away from extremely sensitive countries at outset rather than waiting for interviews to be proposed and at same time knows intelligence enough to realize risks must sometimes be taken. If we can work something out with Murphy it is believed we can get better results and still afford Bureau protection of State clearance.

ACTION:

Recommend our liaison representative O. H. Bartlett discuss this matter with Mr. Murphy along above lines to see if something practical can be worked out.

I think this is necessary

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Mer dum • UNITED S GOVERNMENT

TO : *A. H. Belmont*

DATE: *June 17, 1959*

FROM : *S. B. Donahoe*

SUBJECT: *INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES*

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
DeLoach ____
McGuire ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

This is controlled program to develop live sources in diplomatic establishments of countries outside Soviet bloc aimed at producing investigative and intelligence data on countries drifting toward Soviet bloc and on "trouble spot" countries.

We have recognized delicacy of developing sources within establishments of ostensibly friendly countries and in view of close interrelationship with questions of foreign policy we have in past regularly consulted Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs in State Department to be certain we were not running into risky foreign policy situation whereby, if State not consulted, State could later say our activities had posed serious problems. To insure our efforts did not run afoul of foreign policy considerations we adopted "3-step" procedure: (1) we had liaison check with State orally when we selected particular country as logical target; (2) if State agreed on target country we, by individual letters, secured State clearance prior to investigation of each potential source; and (3) if investigation favorable we, by individual letters, secured State clearance for initial interview with potential source to assess potential, reliability, stability, etc. This gave State three points where they could advise us our objectives were too risky considering foreign policy implications. As noted in my memo 5-29-59 this has not worked satisfactorily because State has consistently waited until step (3) to decline clearance after we had expended considerable effort. It was noted that in dealing with Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs we were dealing with super-cautious group which lacked real authority. In view of wasteful expenditure of effort created by this situation it was recommended we have liaison go to Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, who is knowledgeable of intelligence functions, to work out something practical.

On 6-2-59 this was discussed with Murphy by our liaison representative, O. H. Bartlett. Murphy did not know we had been having this problem and said he would appreciate our coming to him on these matters and depending on each individual case he would make determination. He suggested Bartlett come to him and give him facts by letterhead memo or any other system Bureau desired and he would then grant approval immediately or check where necessary.

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Roach
1 - Mr. Bartlett
SBD:tw (6)

REC- 84

JUL 1 1959

Memo to all supervisors
Nat Int Sec
6-29-59
WRW

60 JUL 6 1959

NAT. INT. SEC.

In view of Murphy's willingness to cooperate with us on this we have studied our system to see if we can streamline our "3-step" procedure to eliminate unnecessary paperwork for him and for Bureau and to reduce liaison contact with him on such matters to minimum so as not to tie up procedure with "red tape." We feel we can best do this, and still give us adequate safeguard of State clearance, by following procedure: (1) when we select country as logical target we will write memo outlining reasons and have liaison orally discuss with Murphy to determine if he agrees and at same time to secure his clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will, thereafter, select (liaison notation on memo will constitute Bureau record of clearance of country and individual investigations); (2) where we desire to interview a potential source we will prepare a letterhead memo which liaison will deliver to Murphy. This memo will indicate we propose to conduct interview under suitable pretext and will concisely summarize identity, background, citizenship, position occupied, and other pertinent factors disclosed during investigation. Liaison in delivering this memo will then note on yellow (Bureau copy) whether Murphy clears interviews or not and this will serve as Bureau record. If Murphy declines an individual clearance liaison will determine whether declination is strictly governed by facts relating to that case or whether Murphy feels foreign policy situation has changed to such extent we should stop our efforts concerning that particular country. This will eliminate needless effort.

We have completed investigation of Shanker Samuel Jairam Bhole, Assistant to Procurement Officer at Indian Embassy, who while born in India, is U.S. citizen as is his entire family. Investigation has been favorable and Bhole has reportedly been critical of Indian conditions and policies. Washington Field Office desires authority to interview him, will make no effort to direct his activities during initial contact, and foresees no possibility of embarrassment from this initial contact.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Recommend our liaison representative deliver attached letterhead memorandum on Bhole to Murphy to obtain his clearance for this proposed interview.

6/18/59 Matter discussed with Mr Murphy.
6/23/59 Mr Murphy approved interview of BHOLE.

(2) Recommend our liaison representative at same time discuss proposed system with Mr. Murphy to be certain it will meet his needs and if he is agreeable recommend we institute this procedure and eliminate contact with Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs on this program.

6/23/59 System agreeable with Mr. Murphy.

(3) At same time recommend liaison discuss with Mr. Murphy our existing target countries of United Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, India, Israel, Venezuela, Brazil and Nationalist China; determine if he agrees to these targets; and obtain clearance for discreet investigations of selected individuals as potential sources recognizing we will give him written data and seek specific individual clearance before we interview potential source.

DEM

6/18 & 23/59 Above target Countries discussed with Murphy. He advised OK to investigate proposed sources but he will want to take up interviews on a case basis; that a U.S. Citizen working for these Countries will present much less a problem than a National of one of these Countries. He said the facts surrounding these Nationals will determine if approval will be given for interview.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

DATE: June 25, 1959

JUNE

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (SEMIANNUAL EVALUATION)

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
DeLoach ____
McGuire ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

Re memo 12-12-58 evaluating captioned program and analyzing results since its inception. This is reevaluation and report on results during past six-month period.

Origin: Basic program inaugurated in 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958. Purpose: To provide for acquisition of positive intelligence and investigative information through three principal facets: (1) Receipt of notification from six other agencies of arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel of friendly foreign governments; (2) At specific request or with specific approval of Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy or official designated by him, maintenance of technical surveillances on official establishments in United States of countries located in trouble areas; (3) With prior State Department approval, development of live sources within establishments of friendly countries, as Bureau's intelligence and investigative requirements demand extension of coverage. Scope and Cost: (1) Under first category Bureau receives notification from other intelligence agencies of arrival of intelligence personnel in U.S. Handling of these notifications is confined to Seat of Government and principally involves review of any file references and indexing procedures at nominal costs. In appropriate instances field is alerted to presence of intelligence personnel but active investigation is not instituted in absence of information which would form basis for security-type case. (2) In past 6 months we have had technical coverage under second category covering 6 foreign countries, 2 of which now discontinued. Present coverage consists of technical surveillances on New York and Washington establishments of Iraq and United Arab Republic; French and Cuban embassies in Washington; and other Cuban establishments in Washington, New York and Miami. Based on latest available field estimates, the technical surveillances now in operation cost approximately $16,850 a month consisting almost entirely of salary of Bureau personnel. (3) Under live informant phase we now have 20 informants or sources actually connected with official foreign establishments in United States and additional 20 under consideration as potential informants or sources. Of the 20 currently in use, three are paid for actual services plus expenses and remaining 17 are cooperating with Bureau without cost to us. Entire monthly cost of this phase of Program in terms of payments to informants does not exceed $265. Tie-In With Other Programs: This program supplements, and is supplemented by, a number of programs which

WRW:bcf
(7)

REC-44

159

cc: Belmont
Mossburg
Wacks

cc: Donahoe
Cotter
Callahan

JUN 29 1959

JUL 8 1959

result in intelligence coverage of friendly foreign countries. The Anagram Program is a typical example. Our technical coverage frequently assists in an Anagram operation. The name-check program on holders of official and diplomatic visas covers many of the intelligence personnel coming under the first category of captioned program. Even the Intensification Program, which is directed against Soviet bloc officials and establishments, produces data on activities of friendly foreign officials and their contacts with communist officials. Magnitude: Program handled on Section-wide basis since it has ramifications touching work on any desk handling matters relating to noncommunist countries, depending upon world developments and intelligence requirements of Bureau and State Department. Past or Present Weaknesses: During past six months potential weakness developed in third category of this program - development of live sources. After securing approval of State officials in Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs to undertake program to develop live sources in official establishments of certain defined friendly countries we found such officials reluctant to approve interviews with persons we desired to approach in this connection, often citing as reason for refusal the fact that a friendly country was involved, which of course was known at outset. On 6-2-59 we discussed this problem with Robert Murphy who said he did not know we had been having this problem and would appreciate our contacting him on these matters and, depending on each individual case, he would make the determination. We are now handling these matters directly with Murphy under a procedure approved by him which will eliminate some paperwork required in past and reduce liaison contact with him to minimum so as not to tie up procedure with "red tape." This should strengthen this phase of program since past experience has shown Murphy has realistic and understanding attitude toward Bureau's intelligence operations as well as great appreciation of its results. Administrative Controls: Controls exercised on day-to-day basis through review of outgoing instructions to field relating to the various phases of program. Control file maintained to which copies of pertinent serials are regularly routed. Semiannual review of program encompasses complete review of control file. Adequacy and Currentness of Instructions: SAC letter 59-9 alerted field to necessity for recognizing responsibilities for intelligence coverage and seeing that agents handling security matters do so with interest and enthusiasm. Since last evaluation this program, memoranda to all Section Supervisors circularized 12-17-58 and 3-2-59 giving direction to phases of program and current memo prepared concerning new procedures for clearing third category matters with Robert Murphy. Over-all Value: For the most part, this program consists of a coordination of accepted investigative and intelligence procedures for the purpose of proper direction, redirection when indicated, and administrative controls. On a continuing basis it produces information of value to our investigative requirements, to our intelligence requirements and for budget purposes. Contemplated Action: From current evaluation and analysis, no changes are indicated at this time. We will closely follow all phases of our intelligence coverage to assure that changes and redirection are instituted as the need arises.

June 29, 1959

A. H. Belmont

S. B. Donahoe

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Schaefer

GHANA ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.
INTERNAL SECURITY - GHANA

Bureau by letter May 25, 1959, captioned "Ghana Activities in the U.S., Internal Security - Ghana" and "Guinea Activities in the U.S., Internal Security - Guinea," furnished Washington Field Office (WFO) and New York information received from Office of Naval Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency wherein it was indicated that there were strong nationalistic currents prevailing among native populations of African countries and indications of attempts of communist and Soviet infiltration into these movements. Thirteen Soviets were expected to arrive in Accra, Ghana, on May 12, 1959, to establish the USSR Embassy. It is felt that with embassies in both Guinea and Ghana, the USSR is in an excellent position from which to continue its constant and persistent efforts to increase Soviet influence and subversive activities in Western Africa.

WFO was instructed in above letter to advise Bureau whether it had any sources that could supply information in regard to Ghana. WFO in reply states it has no sources who could supply such information and, therefore, desires Bureau to obtain State Department clearance to institute a program with view toward developing informants and sources within the Embassy of Ghana, Washington, D. C.

Since WFO advised by letter 6-11-59 captioned "Guinea Activities in the United States, IS - Guinea" that Guinea at the present time does not have an establishment in Washington, D. C., no further action is being taken in that matter at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is requested Liaison contact Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and discuss with him orally the possibility of this Bureau instituting a program in an effort to develop informants and sources within all diplomatic establishments of the country of Ghana in the U.S. and at the same time secure his clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources within those diplomatic establishments of Ghana. At the present time there does not appear

1 65-63113-

NOT RECORDED
145 JUL 6 1959

VRS:gmh:dmd
(7)
105-78601
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

to be any anti-U.S. feeling in Ghana; however, with the Soviets keen interest in Western Africa their apparent intentions could be aimed at developing a pro-Soviet and an anti-U.S. attitude in those countries. Therefore, such a program as mentioned above appears to be warranted at this time.

1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Mr. Schaefer

SAC, WFO (105-30788)

July 10, 1959

Director, FBI (105-78601)

GHANA ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.
IS - GHANA

Reurlet 6/15/59.

State Department clearance for the Bureau to institute a program to develop informants and sources within all diplomatic establishments of the country of Ghana in the United States was granted 7/2/59. Bureau authority is hereby granted the Washington Field and New York Offices to conduct a survey regarding the identities of the individuals who can be utilized regarding captioned matter; and, thereafter, submit recommendations as to individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for such investigation in each individual case.

2 - New York (105-36204)
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

VRS:sen (8)

NOTE:

Since the Soviet Union now has an embassy in Ghana, it places it in an excellent position from which to conduct its constant and persistent efforts to increase Soviet influence and subversive activities in Western Africa. In view of this, and the fact the Soviets in this position could develop a pro-Soviet and an anti-United States attitude in that area, would make instant programs necessary at this time. Therefore, with State clearance furnished on 7/2/59, WFO and NY are being furnished with above instructions in an effort to afford Bureau adequate coverage in this matter.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W.C.Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
JUL 1 0 1959
MAILED

50 JUL 16 1959

Mr. A. H. Belmont September 9, 1959

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
Mr. S. B. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Mr. Schaefer

THAILAND ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
INTERNAL SECURITY - THAILAND

Memorandum Papich to Frohbose 8/31/59 captioned "Ruth Naomi Burney, IS-Thailand," disclosed subject personally acquainted with certain Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees and CIA giving consideration to utilizing her as source of political information. Subject born 6/29/30 and is a citizen of the U. S. She resides at 1647 Lamont Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., and is employed as telephone operator at Embassy of Thailand.

Memorandum Papich to Frohbose 9/4/59 captioned "Ruth Naomi Burney, IS-Thailand," stated Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, advised there is no close friendship existing between subject and other CIA employees. CIA indicated, however, it would like to approach subject with view of developing her as a source of information as she would have access to numerous conversations which could shed light on political conditions in Southeast Asia. Liaison has suggested that we look into this matter for possible development of subject as a Bureau source and in so doing would restrict CIA from any contact with her.

Bufiles do not contain any information identifiable with subject.

ACTION:

1. Requested liaison advise CIA that subject is of interest to us and that we are giving consideration to developing her as a source of information of this Bureau. CIA should also be informed that when subject is no longer of any interest to us CIA will be advised.

65-63113-

NOT RECORDED
117 SEP 28 1959

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
SEP 23 1959
MAILED

Tolson 105-New
Belmont
DeLoach VLS:mlj (9)
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons 1 - 65-58687 (Embassy of Thailand)
Rosen
Tamm 1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room 1 - 105-New (Ruth Naomi Burney)
Holloman
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: THAILAND ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
105-New

2. In view of the strategic location of Thailand and its proximity to Communist China and Laos, the current area of political unrest, believed sources developed within diplomatic establishments of Thailand could furnish pertinent information regarding political conditions and political trends in Southeast Asia. It is, therefore, requested Liaison discuss orally with an appropriate official in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, the possibility of this Bureau developing live sources within Thailand diplomatic establishments in the U.S. If it is approved, also secure clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will, thereafter select.

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
DeLoach ____
McGuire ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

A. H. Belmont

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Mr. Schaefer

9/10/59

S. B. Donahoe

LAOTIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.
INTERNAL SECURITY - LAOS

New York by letter 6/25/57 captioned "Laos Delegation to the United Nations, IS - Laos" advised that Mr. Clark McBurney, public relations officer for Hunter College, 68th Street and Park Avenue, New York City, was interviewed in connection with another matter. He stated his wife, Marie Jo McBurney, at that time was chief secretary of the Laos Delegation to the United Nations and in that position had access to files maintained by the Laotian Delegation. In addition, he stated his wife would be glad to help the FBI on a confidential basis should the need arise.

Bureau by letter 7/16/57 authorized New York to interview Mrs. McBurney to determine desirability of attempting to develop her as a potential confidential source. State Department clearance for this interview was obtained 7/11/57. Mrs. McBurney was cooperative and stated in event she came into possession of information of interest to the Bureau she would notify the New York Office.

New York by letter 8/28/59 advised it desired to recontact Mrs. McBurney to alert her to the interest of the Bureau and to secure an information which may be of interest to the United States Government. New York pointed out that McBurney as of 8/11/58 was still employed by the Laotian Delegation to the United Nations.

ACTION:

(1) Prior to having New York recontact McBurney regarding above felt we should have Liaison discuss orally with an appropriate official i the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, the possibility of this Bureau developing live sources within Laotian diplomat establishments in the U. S. If it is approved, Liaison should also secure clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will, thereafter, select. In view of the current political unrest in Laos its proximity to Communist China and possible future alignment with the Soviet Bloc, felt we should secure this clearance from Department of State in an effort to have sufficient sources of information at the various Laotian diplomatic establishments in the U. S.

65-63113

NOT RECORDED
145 SEP 30 1959

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

105-NEW

1 - 105-61978 (Laotian Delegation to the United Nations)
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

VHS:gds
(7)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: LAOTIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.
105-NEW

(2) In event above program is approved by the Department of State, New York will be furnished instructions relative to the development of McBurney as a source of information at the Laotian Delegation to the United Nations.

1 - Mr. Schaefer

SAC, WFO

9/23/59

Director, FBI

[illegible]

THAILAND ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
INTERNAL SECURITY - THAILAND

ReBulets 5/20/58 and 6/29/59 both captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations."

Recently, CIA via liaison channels advised it was giving consideration to utilizing one Ruth Naomi Burney as a source of political information. She was born 6/29/30 and is a citizen of the U. S. She resides at 1647 Lamont Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., and is employed as a telephone operator at the Embassy of Thailand. CIA disclosed Burney is personally acquainted with certain CIA employees; however, no close friendship exists between her and the CIA employees. The Bureau advised CIA that Burney is of interest to us, and that we are giving consideration to developing her as a source of information. In addition, CIA was also informed that when subject is no longer of any interest to us, CIA will be advised.

State Department clearance for the Bureau to institute a program to develop informants and sources within all diplomatic establishments of the country of Thailand in the U. S. was granted 9/15/59. Bureau authority is hereby granted Washington Field and New York Offices to conduct a survey regarding the identities of the individuals who can be utilized regarding captioned matter and, thereafter, submit recommendations as to individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for such investigation in each individual case. Include in your survey the names of sources and informants that are currently being used in the Thailand diplomatic establishments within your respective territories and/or the names of sources and informants not assigned to a Thailand diplomatic establishment who are in a position to furnish information regarding Thailand activities in the U. S. and in general.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

2 - New York

~~105-new~~
VRS:bwd (9)
~~1 - 65-58687~~ (Embassy of Thailand)
① - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)
1 - 105-new (Ruth Naomi Burney)

yellow dup

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

52 OCT 5 1959
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

The Bureau feels the above program is essential in view of the strategic location of Thailand and its proximity to Communist China and Laos, the current area of political unrest. It is felt sources developed within diplomatic establishments of Thailand could furnish pertinent information regarding political conditions and political trends in Southeast Asia which would be of considerable interest to other U. S. Government agencies.

In regard to Ruth Naomi Burney, WFO should open a separate 134 investigation on her to develop additional background information as required in Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions to make certain she is type of person we want to contact as a source. If the investigation is favorable, submit your request to the Bureau for State Department clearance to interview her. Bear in mind that when Burney is of no further interest to us, the Bureau should so advise CIA.

Bufiles fail to disclose any pertinent derogatory information identifiable with Ruth Naomi Burney.

NOTE:

Since State Department clearance has been received for the Bureau to institute a program in developing live sources within Thailand diplomatic establishments in the U. S., WFO and New York being so advised. State Department also furnished clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will select. In view of the information received from CIA via liaison regarding Burney, felt she is in a very good position for possible development as a source of pertinent information regarding Thailand activities in the U. S. and in general.

1 - Mr. Schaefer

SAC, Washington Field

9/24/59

65-63113

Director, FBI

(105-NEW)

LAOTIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.
IS - LAOS

ReBulets 5/20/58 and 6/29/59 both captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations."

State Department clearance for the Bureau to institute a program to develop informants and sources within all diplomatic establishments of the country of Laos in the U. S. was granted 9/15/59. Bureau authority is hereby granted Washington Field and New York Offices to conduct a survey regarding the identities of the individuals who can be utilized regarding captioned matter and, thereafter, submit recommendations as to individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for such investigation in each individual case. Include in your survey the names of sources and informants that are currently being used in the Laotian diplomatic establishments within your respective territories and/or the names of sources and informants not assigned to a Laotian diplomatic establishment who are in a position to furnish information regarding Laotian activities in the U. S. and in general.

The above program is essential in view of the current political unrest in Laos and its proximity to Communist China and possible future alignment with the Soviet Bloc. Sources developed within diplomatic establishments of Laos could furnish pertinent information regarding political conditions and political trends in Southeast Asia which would be of considerable interest to other U. S. Government agencies.

In regard to New York letter 8/28/59 captioned "Laotian Delegation to the UN, IS - Laos," Bureau feels that prior to recontacting Marie Jo McBurney, an employee of the Laotian Delegation to the UN as of 8/11/58, your prior investigation of

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
SEP 24 1959
MAILED

2 - New York

1 - 105-61978 (Laotian Delegation to the UN)
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)
1 - 134-6115 (Marie Jo McBurney)

VRS:gds (9)

(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
DeLoach ____
McGuire ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

her should be brought up to date along with reopening your 134-2338 file on her. Her name should be included in the survey mentioned above. If your investigation is favorable, submit your request to the Bureau for State Department clearance to interview her.

Bufiles fail to disclose any derogatory information identifiable with Marie Jo McBurney.

NOTE: Since State Department clearance has been received for the Bureau to institute a program in developing live sources within Laotian diplomatic establishments in the U.S., WFO and NY being so advised. State Department also furnished clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will select.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Donahoe
- 1 - Mr. James
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Cotter

A. H. Belmont

November 23, 1959

S. E. Donahoe

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

We have a controlled program aimed at developing live sources in diplomatic establishments of countries outside the Soviet bloc with a view to developing investigative and intelligence data in "trouble-spot areas." Under this program, we first discuss a proposed "target country" with State Department via liaison to be certain we are not running into a delicate foreign policy situation, and to be sure that State approves our general intention to develop sources regarding country concerned. At the present time, Cuba is not listed as a target country and we have not as yet discussed with State any program aimed at developing live sources in Cuban establishments in the U. S. While we have not previously sought to designate Cuba as a target country under our program, we do have numerous sources and informants, some of which report on activities of official Cuban personnel

1015

In view of increasing indications that the Castro regime in Cuba is moving farther and farther in a procommunist and possibly a pro-Soviet direction and in view of the increasing contacts between Cuban officials and representatives of the Soviet bloc, it is believed we should undertake a program to develop live sources in Cuban establishments here. In this regard, it is further noted that in recent months there have been a number of defections by Cuban officials from the Castro regime in protest of Castro's continued drift towards procommunist position. It is, therefore, felt that there is a strong possibility that we may be able to develop sources within Cuban establishments here who are dissatisfied with Castro government and who may be in position to furnish valuable intelligence data.

ACTION:

It is recommended that the Bureau's liaison representative discuss this situation orally with appropriate official of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs of State and determine whether State would have any objection to efforts by FBI to develop live informants in Cuban establishments in U. S. Of course, we will continue to seek individual clearance from State regarding specific interviews with potential sources.

OK

If State Department clearance is secured, appropriate instructions will be issued to the field.

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

RDC:bwd:jlw
(6)
109-12-210

65-63113

NOT RECORDED
17 DEC 9 1959

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62 DEC 15 1959

(Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries)

Office Mem n • UNITED S VERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: December 21, 1959

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

JUNE

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (SEMIANNUAL EVALUATION)

SYNOPSIS

Three principal phases of program operating smoothly with no weaknesses. Name checks made on foreign intelligence personnel on advice of arrival by other U.S. intelligence agencies; only nominal costs involved. Ten separate foreign official establishments of five different countries presently covered by technical surveillances at specific request of Deputy Under Secretary of State at estimated monthly cost of $20,539; over one-half of this cost, however, arises from coverage required to meet Bureau investigative and intelligence needs even if State request were lacking. Bureau presently has 27 live sources in foreign establishments and investigations on 26 additional potential sources. Costs involved in this phase arise principally from field investigations of potential sources and Agents' time in handling established sources and are considered fully justified. This program supplements and is supplemented by other intelligence programs, including CODEWORD and Intensification programs. It is handled on Section-wide basis and instructions to both Section and field found to be both current and adequate. Program provides data assisting State in formulating foreign policy and handling international relations and assisting Bureau in investigative and intelligence responsibilities, as well as budgetary purposes. Consideration will be given to possible expansion of program at next conference with field security supervisors, aimed at possible double agent and defector operations against officials of communist countries.

RECOMMENDATION

That program be continued in present form. Re-evaluation will be submitted in June, 1960.

WRW:bcf
(6)

cc: Belmont
Donahoe
Mossburg
Cotter
Wacks

REC- 23 62-63113-186

5 0 DEC 29 1959

5-WRW

DETAILS

Re memo 6-25-59 evaluating captioned program and analyzing preceeding six month's results. This is re-evaluation and report on results achieved since that date.

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE

Basic program inaugurated 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for acquisition of positive intelligence and investigative information through three principal facets:

1. Receipt of notification from six other agencies of arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel of friendly foreign governments

2. At specific request or with specific approval of Deputy Under Secretary of State or official designated by him, maintenance of technical surveillances on official establishments in United States of countries located in trouble areas.

3. With prior State Department approval, development of live sources within establishments of friendly countries, as Bureau's intelligence and investigative requirements demand extension of coverage.

SCOPE AND COST

1. Under first category Bureau receives notification from other intelligence agencies of arrival of intelligence personnel in U.S. Handling of these notifications is confined to Seat of Government and principally involves review of any file references and indexing procedures at nominal costs. In appropriate instances field is alerted to presence of intelligence personnel but active investigation is not instituted in absence of information which would form basis for security-type case.

2. Present technical surveillances under second category, with estimated monthly costs are as follows:

	SYMBOL	ESTIMATED MONTHLY COST
Cuba		
Embassy, D. C.		$2096
Consul and Attaches, D. C.		1497
Consul, NYC		2125
France		
Chancery, D. C.		5205
Germany		
Embassy, D. C.		3777
Iraq		
Chancery, D. C.		1089
UN and Consul, NYC		709
United Arab Republic		
Chancery, D. C.		1188
Attaches, D. C.		1427
UN, NYC		1426
Total estimated monthly cost		$20,539

Of this total estimated monthly cost, $126 covers cost of leased lines in New York City and the balance, $20,413, the prorated salaries of personnel working the plants. Over one-half of the estimated monthly expenditure covers technical surveillances which the Bureau would desire to maintain for its own intelligence and investigative requirements, even in the absence of requests by State Department for the coverage. The only two which do not qualify in this respect are the French Chancery and German Embassy coverage.

During the past six months two technical surveillances maintained under this phase of captioned program were discontinued. The coverage of the Cuban Consulate in Miami which was instituted 5/20/59 was discontinued 7/15/59 because it was not particularly productive. From 10/5/59 to 10/12/59 technical coverage was maintained on the Iranian Embassy in Washington to supplement special coverage of General Timur Bakhtiar, head of Iranian Security Police, at specific request of Mr. Robert Murphy of State Department.

3. With respect to the third category, we have specific State Department clearance to develop live sources in the establishments in the United States of the countries listed below. The actual sources developed to date and the potential sources currently under investigation with respect to each target country are noted under appropriate headings.

Country	Actual	Potential
Brazil	0	0*
China	6	3
Cuba	0*	1
Ghana	0	2
India	2	1
Iran	0	1
Iraq	3	2
Israel	1	2
Jordan	1	0
Laos	0	2
Lebanon	3	1
Pakistan	0	4
Saudi Arabia	0	2
Sudan	0	2
Thailand	0	1
United Arab Republic	6	0
Venezuela	0	2
Yemen	1	0
	23	26

*We are securing information from the husbands of two attaches in diplomatic establishments, one in the Brazilian Consulate, New York City, the other in the Cuban Embassy, Washington, who furnish information received from their respective wives and who have specifically requested that their wives not be contacted directly. In effect, the husbands are operating as cut-outs.

In addition to the 23 actual sources noted above, we have 4 live sources in Japanese establishments and 1 in a Malayan establishment, developed prior to the incorporation of this phase of our intelligence coverage into captioned program in May, 1958. Japan and Malaya are not presently target countries.

Costs of this phase of our program are principally those arising from field investigations of potential sources and Agents' time in handling producing sources. Costs are considered fully justified since sound counterintelligence coverage requires sources which can produce not only investigative data but also intelligence information of value to us and other agencies in guiding policy and making decisions.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements, and is supplemented by, a number of programs which result in intelligence coverage of friendly foreign countries. The Anagram Program is a typical example. Our technical coverage on past occasions has assisted CODE WORD *operations. The name-check program on holders of official and diplomatic visas covers many of the intelligence personnel who fall within the first category described above. Even the Intensification Program, which is directed against Soviet bloc officials and establishments, produces data on activities of friendly foreign officials and their contacts with communist officials.*

MAGNITUDE

Program handled on Section-wide basis since it has ramifications touching work on any desk handling matters relating to noncommunist countries, depending upon international developments and intelligence requirements of Bureau and State Department.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have cropped up in the past six months. Over-all program is operating smoothly and effectively.

FIELD EVALUATION AND EXPANSION CONSIDERATION

Bulet 6/29/59 requested 12 field offices directly or potentially involved in this program to evaluate live source development under third phase and offer suggestions for improvement. As result three specific questions arose for consideration.

1. Are our targets too restrictive?
2. Are our interview procedures too conservative?
3. Shall we endeavor to extend program to reach higher-level noncommunist officials and possibly communist officials?

The first question relates to whether we should attempt source developments in establishments outside Washington, New York City and San Francisco and whether we should alter present instructions that potential sources be limited almost exclusively to employees of foreign establishments who are U.S. citizens.

Second question relates to whether we should relax present requirement that all authorized interviews with potential sources be initially conducted under a suitable pretext, preferably in connection with a criminal matter unrelated to the employment of the person interviewed.

Third question relates to whether we should utilize present sources, who generally occupy clerical positions, to identify noncommunist officials who are (1) strongly pro-Western, and (2) in social or business contact with communist officials, for purpose of approaching the noncommunist officials and working through them to reach the communists for defection or double agent purposes.

From our experiences in this program, at this time it is not believed our targets are too restrictive, our interview procedures too conservative, nor should we try to reach higher-level officials, bearing in mind the risks involved. However, the experience of the field would be invaluable in a thorough discussion of these matters and accordingly they will be scheduled for discussion at next conference with field security supervisors and recommendations thereafter will be submitted.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls over this program are exercised on day-to-day basis through review of outgoing instructions to field relating to the various phases of program. Technical surveillances under phase 2 are subject to 90-day evaluation same as normal technicals instituted for Bureau investigative purposes. No interviews conducted under phase 3 without State Department clearance and prior Bureau authorization.

Field is required to submit regular letters concerning progress in developing live sources with respect to certain countries where efforts are most desirable.

Control file maintained to which copies of pertinent serials are regularly routed. Semiannual review of program encompasses complete review of control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions are current and adequate. During past 6 months two memoranda were sent to all Supervisors in Section (6-29-59 and 7-15-59) giving directions concerning handling of phase 3. Bulet to 12 offices 6-29-59 required survey and evaluation of this same phase, as noted hereinbefore. New York and Washington Field, which handle bulk of work under program, were issued background and guidance material by Bulet 12-7-59.

OVER-ALL VALUE

For the most part, this program consists of a coordination of accepted investigative and intelligence procedures for the purpose of proper direction, redirection when indicated, and administrative controls. On a continuing basis it produces information of value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and handling of international relations and to the Bureau in its investigative and intelligence responsibilities. Frequently, the data are most useful for budgetary purposes.

CONTEMPLATED ACTION

From current evaluation and analyses, no changes are indicated at this time. We will closely follow all phases of our intelligence coverage to assure that changes and redirection are instituted as the need arises.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 part 2 of 14

ACCESS
EXCISED

SSC - REQUEST August 20, 1975
PART II #2

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: May 27, 1960

FROM : D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE

Attached are brief memoranda of matters which may be brought up at the Attorney General's Staff Conference May 31, 1960.

Enclosures

IDM:mvr
(2)

Noted marked page -

ENCLOSURE

REC- 72

62 - 97852 - 174

24 JUN 2 1960

[illegible] Baumgardner to Mr. Belmont ✓

52 JUN 6 1960

May 27, 1960

1 - Parsons
2 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Cotter

RE: HOWARD LEWIS RUNDQUIST
WILLIAM J. SHERGALIS, ET AL.
REGISTRATION ACT - CUBA

The case involves U. S. plane piloted by two Americans, Rundquist and Shergalis, which was shot down March 21, 1960, while trying to smuggle four Cubans out of that country with resulting arrest of Rundquist and Shergalis. FBI source in Miami advised March 22, 1960, that incident was staged by Castro agents to provide Castro with basis for renewed attacks against U. S. for allowing illegal flights to Cuba. On March 23, 1960, this hoax was exposed when Shergalis gave statement to U. S. Embassy admitting role as Castro agent and implicating various Cubans in U. S. and Cuba. We conducted intensive investigation in this matter and developed substantial evidence showing that Rundquist-Shergalis flight was, in fact, instigated by Castro agents. Miami reports of April 1, April 6, April 15, and May 6, 1960, covering our investigation, have been furnished to Department and other interested agencies.

On May 3, 1960, Federal Grand Jury at Miami, which was convened on April 6, 1960, returned indictments against Shergalis and Hector Garcia Soto (Cuban Air Force employee at Miami who served as intermediary between Shergalis and Cuban intelligence officials) charging them with violations of Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. Indictments were also returned against Shergalis and Rundquist charging violations of Federal Aviation Act, administered by Federal Aviation Agency, for failure to file proper flight plan. Shergalis is still in custody of Cuban officials in that country, Cuban Government having rejected U. S. request that Shergalis and Rundquist be extradited to face charges in this country. At time indictments were returned, Garcia was in Cuba and, therefore, indictments were sealed and bench warrants were issued for arrest of Shergalis and Garcia.

Garcia returned to Miami on afternoon of May 4, 1960, and was arrested by our Miami Office at Miami International Airport. Press release was issued SAC, Miami, concerning arrest and subsequently on same date Department issued press release concerning indictments of Shergalis, Garcia and Rundquist. Arraignment of Garcia was originally scheduled for May 6, 1960, but was postponed until May 20, at request of defense attorney. Bond for Garcia was set at $10,000 and on afternoon of May 6, 1960, bond was posted with money, [redacted]

information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operations.

62-77956-174

ENCLOSURE

Prior to indictments, Departmental Attorney William Kenney confidentially advised Miami Office on May 2, 1960, that he had recommended that, in addition to indictments against Shergalis and Garcia, indictments also be sought against four other individuals involved in this matter; namely, Carlos Hernandez Lopez (Cuban national serving as assistant to Garcia as Cuban Air Force purchasing agent in Miami), Armando Jose Asencio (American citizen of Cuban extraction who admittedly met with Shergalis on Garcia's behalf on several occasions prior to March 21 flight), Roberto Millares (Cuban national who was present at several meetings between Shergalis and Cuban representatives), and Roberto Fernandez Rodriguez (Cuban Army intelligence representative who accompanied Shergalis to Cuba in February, 1960, and introduced him to Cuban intelligence officials).

No information has been received by Bureau indicating that State Department exerted any influence on Justice Department to limit prosecutive action to Shergalis and Garcia. It appears Department concluded that evidence was insufficient to support prosecution of Hernandez Lopez, Millares and Fernandez Rodriguez. It appears there would be some substantial evidence concerning Asencio's involvement, including his own admissions; however, Department may have decided not to seek indictment against Asencio on basis he will be utilized as Government witness at any future trial held in this case. Asencio has been cooperative and on one occasion agreed to technical coverage of a meeting he had with Garcia and Hernandez Lopez in his car.

On April 28, 1960, Carlos Hernandez Lopez was found in criminal contempt in U. S. District Court in Miami for failure to appear before Grand Jury on April 13, 1960, in response to subpoena in connection with Grand Jury hearings in this matter. On the same day he was fined $100. On May 3, 1960, Hernandez Lopez again failed to appear at a Grand Jury session and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Hernandez Lopez is reported to be in Cuba at this time. We have not interjected ourselves in efforts to locate him on contempt charges.

On May 20, 1960, Garcia was arraigned in U. S. District Court, Miami, and pled not guilty. A request by his attorney that Garcia be allowed to go to Cuba for the weekend and return to Miami on May 23, 1960, was denied.

May 26, 1960

DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES - FALSE REPORTS SUMMARY OF PROSECUTIONS

The following is a summary of the prosecutions under the false report section of the Destruction of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles Statute.

Attached hereto is a thumbnail sketch of each of the cases which are pending prosecution at this time.

Since the U. S. Attorneys' conference early in April, 1960, prosecution has been authorized in 16 of these cases. Arrests were made in 15 of these cases and in one case, the subject Vincent Joseph Micel, Boston, Massachusetts, was permitted to surrender following the return of a true bill of indictment. The Micel violation actually occurred on January 26, 1960, and he was arrested by local authorities. The Assistant U. S. Attorney, Boston, Massachusetts, deferred his prosecutive opinion pending the outcome of local charges. When local prosecution was subsequently discontinued, the case was presented to the Federal Grand Jury at Boston, Massachusetts, on May 19, 1960.

There are also four cases pending in which prosecution was authorized prior to April, 1960.

On May 19, 1960, Donald David Kitch, Portland, Oregon, District Manager for Western Oil Company, who, on May 12, 1960, made a false report while seeing his boss off on a United Air Lines flight in Portland, Oregon, entered a plea of guilty in U. S. District Court. Sentence was not imposed pending the completion of a presentence investigation and subject was released on his own recognizance. This conviction brings the total number of convictions to 17 since the effective date of this statute, July 14, 1956. These convictions, with the exception of the Kitch conviction, in which sentence is not yet imposed, have resulted in 6 years actual sentences, 10 years probationary sentences and $2,750 in fines.

In summary, it is noted that convictions have been obtained in 17 cases and prosecution is pending in 19 cases.

Enclosure

62-97856-174

ENCLOSURE

PENDING PROSECUTION - CASES DEVELOPED AFTER U. S. ATTORNEYS' CONFERENCE

JAMES KNOX VAN ARSDALE III, an advertising executive in Sarasota, Florida, who on April 6, 1960, advised a stewardess aboard an airborne Eastern Airlines plane just after departing Louisville, Kentucky, that he had a bomb in his possession, was arrested on April 7, 1960. He was released on bond returnable at Louisville, Kentucky, and the trial date has not been set.

FRED Y. CRONK, who on April 4, 1960, advised a stewardess aboard a Continental Airlines plane just prior to its departure from Denver, Colorado, that other passengers had a bomb in their possession, was arrested on April 7, 1960. He was released on $500 bond and no trial date has been set. Cronk is President, Cronk, Alexander and Associates, Inc., Petroleum Engineering Firm, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

WATERMAN F. BROWN, area representative for Bendix Aviation, Michigan City, Indiana, on April 11, 1960, advised a stewardess aboard an airborne Lake Central Airlines plane en route to South Bend, Indiana, that he had a bomb in his possession. He was arrested April 12, 1960, and released on $2,000 bond. On April 15, 1960, the U. S. Attorney advised that Waterman's case would be presented to a Federal Grand Jury in August, 1960.

JULIUS ROUDOLPH RADWANSKI, a sales engineer with the Wingate Construction Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, who on April 13, 1960, advised an airlines employee at Columbus, Ohio, that he had a bomb in his luggage, was arrested April 13, 1960. He was released on bond and on April 29, 1960, his attorney requested and was granted a delay until May 31, 1960, to file a motion to the information.

WILLIAM ANDERSON GRANT, employed as a tube bender, Apex Neon Sign Company, San Francisco, who on April 12, 1960, advised an airlines employee that a bomb was aboard a United Air Lines plane departing from the San Francisco International Airport, was arrested April 13, 1960. He was released on $500 bond and trial date had been set for May 10, 1960. He appeared in U. S. District Court, San Francisco, California, May 10, 1960, and entered a "not guilty" plea. He waived jury trial and trial has been set for June 9, 1960.

62-97856-174

ENCLOSURE

ROBERT CAREY CLARK, a resident of Raytown, Missouri, employed as an engineer at Teletype Corporation, who on April 14, 1960, advised an airlines clerk at the Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois, that he had a bomb in his luggage, was arrested on April 15,1960. Hearing held May 11, 1960, before U. S. Commissioner, who entered a finding of probable cause and subject released on $500 bond on own recognizance. On May 17, 1960, the Assistant U. S. Attorney, Chicago, Illinois, advised no trial date has been set and he has written to the Department for instructions.

JOHN PATRICK LANGAN, JR., bartender at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, who on January 16, 1960, advised an airlines employee at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, that a passenger aboard an Eastern Airlines plane had a bomb in his possession, was arrested April 19, 1960. No trial date has been set. Langan's father, John Patrick Langan, Sr., is a prominent South Orange, New Jersey, businessman who was an unsuccessful candidate for election to Congress in 1958.

JOSEPH ELDON TOOMEY, a dentist at Lompoc, California, who on April 22, 1960, advised an airlines employee at Los Angeles, California, that he had a bomb in his luggage, was arrested on April 25, 1960. An information is scheduled to be filed against Toomey in U. S. District Court, Los Angeles, California, on May 24, 1960, and he is to be arraigned on June 6, 1960.

PETER JOSEPH DI RENZO, a used-car dealer at North Attleboro, Massachusetts, who on May 2, 1960, as he was preparing to board a plane at Warwick, Rhode Island, advised an airlines employee that he had a bomb in his luggage, was arrested May 2, 1960. He was released on $500 bond.

BARBARA NICHOLSON, a 16-year-old Milwaukee, Wisconsin, high school junior, who on April 26, 1960, made an anonymous call to an Ozark Airlines employee, Moline, Illinois, in which she alleged a bomb was aboard a plane scheduled to depart that evening, was arrested May 2, 1960, and released on $3,000 bond. No trial date has been set.

PATRICK WILLIAM MC CUNE, a salesman, Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company, Fresno, California, who on April 27, 1960, advised an airlines employee that his wife may have placed a bomb in his luggage, was arrested May 5, 1960. An information is scheduled to be filed against McCune in U. S. District Court, Fresno, California, May 24, 1960. Arraignment date has not been set and may be delayed several weeks because of heavy court calendar.

JOSEPH ROSENBERG, a 41-year-old concert violinist, on May 12, 1960, made a false bomb threat regarding a Pan American jet airliner at Idlewild Airport, New York City. He was arrested May 12, 1960, and arraigned before the U. S. Commissioner, Brooklyn, New York, where he waived preliminary hearing and was released on $1,000 bond.

IRWIN SAMSON GIELGUD, a member of the Writers Guild of America and script writer for documentary-type films, on May 16, 1960, made a statement "Be careful of that, its explosives" to a stewardess aboard an American Airlines plane, Los Angeles, California, when the stewardess started to move subject's suitcase. Prosecution authorized May 17, 1960, and subject taken into custody by Bureau Agents at Wichita Falls, Texas, same date, arraigned before U. S. Commissioner, and released on $500 bond returnable to Los Angeles.

VINCENT JOSEPH MICEL, Boston, Massachusetts, sales promotion manager of Kennedy Clothiers, Inc., a large chain with stores in New England, on January 26, 1960, made a false bomb threat aboard an American Airlines plane at Boston. The subject was arrested by Massachusetts State Police, January 26, 1960, but local prosecution was subsequently discontinued. The Assistant U. S. Attorney, Boston, Massachusetts, who had deferred rendering a prosecutive opinion pending the outcome of the local prosecution, presented the case to a Federal Grand Jury at Boston, May 19, 1960, and a true bill was returned, May 23, 1960. This subject was not arrested by Bureau Agents following the return of the indictment since the Assistant U. S. Attorney notified subject's attorney of the indictment and permitted the subject to surrender voluntarily.

ARCHIBALD REGINALD DEWAR, operator of the Commercial Maintenance Service, Las Vegas, Nevada, and who advised he had been a congregational servant in the Jehovah's Witnesses religious sect, on May 24, 1960, made a false statement to a stewardess on a Trans World Airlines flight, number 514, San Francisco, California, when she was removing a box from a package rack above him to the effect, "Be careful, it is a bomb." Dewar was arrested by Bureau Agents on May 24, 1960, and was to be arraigned before a U. S. Commissioner in San Francisco, California.

PENDING PROSECUTION - CASES DEVELOPED PRIOR TO APRIL 1, 1960

JULIUS G. STAFF, employed by J. G. Shoes, New York, New York, who on June 23, 1958, advised the stewardess aboard a Trans World Airlines plane which had just departed from New York City that a bomb was aboard the plane, was indicted by Federal Grand Jury at Newark, New Jersey, April 17, 1959. Staff entered a plea of not guilty and due to a crowded court calendar, no trial date has been set. This matter has been followed closely with the U. S. Attorney and the Department and the potentially adverse effect of the delay on successful prosecution has been pointed out. At our specific request the Department instructed the U. S. Attorney in late March, 1960, to seek an early trial date in the matter. By letter April 27, 1960, the Newark Office has advised that the U. S. Attorney has been attempting contact with Staff's attorney, Congressman Cornelius E. Gallagher, in order to arrange a trial date.

RAYMOND JACOB OTTEN, an unemployed paint chemist, who commented to a passenger aboard a United Air Lines plane which had just departed from Chicago, Illinois, that "the mad bomber is aboard," entered a plea of not guilty March 1, 1960, and trial was scheduled for March 21, 1960. Otten who is an epileptic has suffered epileptic seizures since his plea was entered and has been granted two continuances. Assistant U. S. Attorney, Chicago, Illinois, advised May 17, 1960, that subject had filed a motion to dismiss and the Government's answer to this motion is due on May 23, 1960. A hearing on the motion is set for May 27, 1960, and the trial date for this case is now set for May 31, 1960.

LYNDEN KEITH MELLINGER, field engineer at Signode Steel Strapping Company, Chicago, Illinois, who advised an airlines clerk at Chicago, Illinois, that he had a bomb in his luggage, entered a plea of not guilty on April 4, 1960. Trial was scheduled for April 21, 1960, and on that date his attorney filed a motion to dismiss the information. On May 19, 1960, the motion to dismiss the information was denied in U. S. District Court, Chicago, Illinois, and the case continued to June 16, 1960.

PETER WILSON ASKEW, who advised an airlines clerk at New York City that a passenger aboard an Eastern Airlines plane had a bomb with him, was arrested March 19, 1960. Trial date has been set for June 6, 1960. Askew was honorably discharged from the U. S. Army as a first lieutenant on March 17, 1960.

May 26, 1960

VOTER REGISTRATION CASES UNDER CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1960

The Civil Rights Division has requested the delivery of demand letters to registration officials and subsequent inspections and copying of voter registration records in eight counties and parishes in Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina and Louisiana. The desired records were made available in South Carolina and Georgia.

In Louisiana a suit has been filed in Federal Court against the Attorney General, Mr. Joseph M. F. Ryan, Jr., and the Director of the FBI alleging Titles 3 and 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 are unconstitutional and requests an injunction enjoining the Attorney General and the FBI from proceeding under the Act. United States District Judge Ben C. Dawkins, Shreveport, Louisiana, signed an order on May 25, 1960, directing the Attorney General, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ryan and the Director to show cause at 9:30 a.m., June 20, 1960, why preliminary interlocutory injunction should not be granted. Judge Dawkins also signed a temporary restraining order to be effective until June 20, 1960.

In Alabama, in one instance, an injunction has been issued by Judge James A. Hare of the Fourth Judicial Circuit which covers Wilcox County, Alabama. This requires clarification of the Act before granting permission to inspect and copy voter registration records. The Attorney General, Mr. Ryan, plus the Special Agent in Charge of the Mobile Office and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge, are named in the injunction. No reply has been received to the demand letter in a second investigation although one has been promised on June 6, 1960.

62-97856-174

ENCLOSURE

UNKNOWN SUBJECT
RICHARD KENNETH KAUFMAN-VICTIM
EXTORTION, 5-26-60

Richard Kaufman, a student at Syracuse University, New York and son of Federal Judge Irving Kaufman, who presided during the trial of the Apalachin hoodlums, on 3-1-60, received an anonymous threatening phone call. The unknown caller made reference to victim's father and threatened "Just wait until we get hold of you." Kaufman received another call of a similar nature on 4-4-60 and on 4-5-60 received the first of 4 threatening letters, all postmarked Syracuse, New York. The last of these communications bore an April 12, 1960, date.

AUSA Kenneth Ray of the Northern District of New York, has indicated letters coupled with previous phone calls constituted a violation of the Federal Extortion Statute and his opinion was concurred in by the Department on April 8, 1960.

Extensive investigation has been conducted by our Albany Office in an effort to identify and locate the extortionist. To date, no positive information has been obtained, and no suspects have been developed. Of interest, however, is the fact that the rumors pervails among fellow students, faculty members, and advisors of the victim that he prepared the communications in question. While no direct evidence corroborating these rumors has been uncovered, writing paper and envelopes similar to that used in one of the communications found in the victim's room.

The Department has requested copies of all investigative reports. Judge Kaufman will be confidentially advised of the facts developed by our investigation, after which the reports will be disseminated to the Department.

HAS:mlr
(8)

62-97852-174

ENCLOSURE

May 27, 1960

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS
ADOLPH COORS, III - VICTIM
KIDNAPING; EXTORTION

Intensive investigation is being continued in this case with two principal objectives—the location and apprehension of Joseph Corbett, Jr., the prime suspect in this case who is carried as one of our ten most wanted fugitives, and the development of evidence to positively identify Corbett as Coors' abductor.

In our program acquainting the public with our interest in Corbett, material has been prepared and transmitted to the field which will be furnished to all newspapers in the United States. In our specialized circularization of persons and businesses with whom Corbett would most likely have contact, we have sent letters and Wanted Flyers to all individuals engaged in the prescribing and dispensing of eyeglasses, including contact lenses, as Corbett's eyesight requires that he wear glasses at all times.

The special squad in the Denver Division is currently engaged in investigation in the mountain area to the west and northwest of Denver with the objective of obtaining some information as to the site of a planned hide-out where the abductor would have taken Coors and indications as to where Coors' body could have been left.

62-97852-174

ENCLOSURE

May 26, 1960

STATUS OF JOHN GEORGE LEDES, ET AL.
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

This case relates to the association between Ledes, a former legal adviser to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner James C. Sargent and Joseph Abrams, a New York promoter of unsavory reputation. We completed an extensive investigation which determined that Ledes endeavored to assist Abrams with several SEC matters while Ledes was still with that agency. Abrams made loans to Ledes to finance properties which Ledes purchased.

The attorney for subject Abrams advised his client not to talk to us. The attorney for Ledes, James M. Mc Inerney, refused to make Ledes available for interview unless he, Mc Inerney, is present. We informed the Department and suggested that they consider calling Ledes before a Federal Grand Jury or interviewing him themselves in Mc Inerney's presence.

On May 13, 1960, Roger Connor, Executive Assistant to Assistant Attorney General Wilkey, advised that Joseph Abrams had been brought down from Danbury, Connecticut, Federal Correctional Institution to Washington, D. C., for appearance before a Federal Grand Jury here. The Grand Jury presentation by three Department attorneys started that date and is currently continuing. Leads growing out of the Grand Jury hearings are being received and are currently outstanding in Washington Field Office, New York, Atlanta and Miami. These matters are being given immediate and continuous attention.

62-97852-174

ENCLOSURE

May 26, 1960

LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959

Since February 2, 1960, when the Attorney General advised the agreement had been reached between the Departments of Labor and Justice as to this new labor law, 71 cases have been referred to us by the Criminal Division for investigation and 41 have been completed. Of the 3 cases received this week, two had been forwarded to the Criminal Division by the Department of Labor, which makes a total of 31 cases received from the Criminal Division upon referral from the Department of Labor.

These investigations involve (1) embezzlement of union funds, (2) convicted felons holding union office and (3) deprivation of rights of union members by force or violence. They are instituted only upon receipt of specific requests from the Criminal Division. The Department will render decisions as to prosecution. Top priority investigations have been ordered and close deadlines have been set.

In addition, there are 170 cases under investigation concerning the prohibition in the new law against communists holding union office. What is status of these cases?

By memorandum dated May 24, 1960, the Criminal Division forwarded us a copy of Labor Department's instructions to its field installations relative to procedures to be followed in handling complaints under the captioned law. These procedures are in agreement with revisions suggested by the Department of Justice and are designed to implement the Memorandum of Understanding which constitutes a general delegation of responsibility to Justice in the six specified areas covered by the Memorandum of Understanding.

memo. requested

Yes

62-97856-174

ENCLOSURE

May 27, 1960

ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY SUBCOMMITTEE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ESTES KEFAUVER, CHAIRMAN

Recently Senator Kefauver's Committee requested the Bureau to conduct name checks on 304 individuals reportedly associated with the boxing industry. Several of these names were duplicated on a prior request for a name check by Senator Kefauver's Committee. It appeared that the Committee might be conducting a fishing expedition by submitting such an extensive list. Accordingly, the matter was referred to the Department to answer the Committee's request.

On May 25, 1960, William G. Hundley, Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, telephonically advised that following a contact with the Kefauver Committee on that date the original request for name checks on 304 individuals had been reduced to a request for name checks on 30 individuals. Of these 30, Mr. Hundley pointed out that where any individual was the subject of pending prosecution, such as Frankie Carbo, it would be unnecessary for the Bureau to search its files concerning that individual. Mr. Hundley also advised the Committee representatives that it would not be possible in every instance to make name checks on an expeditious basis while the hearings were being conducted inasmuch as the time factor in making the name checks would depend upon the number of references involved. Mr. Hundley is sending a memorandum to the Bureau in the immediate future listing the names which the Committee has now requested be checked.

Upon receipt of Mr. Hundley's memorandum listing the names, the names will be checked and appropriate summaries prepared.

62-97852-174

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: October 5, 1959

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE
10:30 A.M., TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1959

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Pursuant to your instructions, there are attached from the Administrative Division, the Investigative Division, and the Domestic Intelligence Division those matters which it is felt the Director may wish to bring up at the Attorney General's Staff Conference on October 6.

Contact was had with all of the other divisions of the Bureau and they have indicated they have no problems which they feel should be presented at this time.

Enclosures (3)

NPC:hif
(8)

REC- 61 62-97856-159

DEC 8 1959

3-8

ENCLOSURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT	PAGE
Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 - FBI Cannot Absorb Costs.	1
Administration's 2% Savings Program - Fiscal Year 1960	1
Salary Retention Act, Public Law 85-737	2
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-257)	3
Federal Clearinghouse of Criminal Information	4
Need for Criminal-Type Legislation	5
Industrial Security Program	7
Port Security Program	8
Air Crewmen Screening Program	8
Personnel Security Program	8
Legislation Involving Security	9
Need For Executive Agencies to Implement Security Programs	10

62-97856-1579

ENCLOSURE

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

1. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959 - FBI CANNOT ABSORB ANY COSTS INCIDENT THERETO

The provisions of this new legislation, which was enacted by the 86th Congress, First Session, and approved by the President, become effective July 1, 1960.

Its purpose is to provide health insurance for Federal employees, annuitants, and their families. Employees will have the option of selecting from four health plans with a wide range of benefits. The legislation provides that the Government will contribute 50% of the premium cost of the plan selected, subject to stated minimum and maximum ranges.

We cannot accurately estimate the cost to the FBI of these new benefits until the Civil Service Commission has dealt with the insuring groups to determine the cost of the plans and until the employees have selected the desired coverage. Preliminary estimates, however, indicate an added cost of approximately $1,000,000 per year to the FBI as the employer's cost of these new benefits, based on the Bureau's experience derived from the operation of its present health coverage plan.

The appropriation request of this Bureau represents an absolute minimum figure. All avenues of possible savings were thoroughly explored in arriving at the minimum figure requested. As a result, it will be impossible for the FBI to absorb any part of the added cost resulting from the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959.

2. ADMINISTRATION'S 2% SAVINGS PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 1960

Budget Director Stans, in a letter dated September 21, 1959, to the Attorney General, stated the President had asked him to request the continued cooperation of the Attorney General in reducing civilian employment in the Government. The letter pointed out that during the fiscal year 1959 executive agencies effected a 2% reduction in employment and that the President would like to effect a similar reduction in the fiscal year 1960, and requests the Attorney General to give personal direction to the program and to plan his operations so as to accomplish it. The reduction would be effected by not filling vacancies as they occur and by not establishing new positions. The letter further directs that agency plans for personnel reductions or facts as to why an agency head believes the requested 2% reduction is impracticable be presented to the Budget Bureau with the October financial plan.

In connection with the 2% savings program in effect during the fiscal year 1959, the Bureau advised the Attorney General that it would be impossible to make any such reduction as the Bureau's operations were already on a "strict austerity" basis.

The Department cut our fiscal year 1961 budget request by $400,000, reducing it from $117,500,000 to $117,100,000, thereby eliminating 45 employees for the field (30 Special Agents and 15 clerks).

The Bureau is in no position to effect a 2% reduction in personnel during fiscal year 1960. Our work loads in all categories continue to be heavy with no sign of any abatement. Legislation enacted in the closing days of Congress, specifically the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, will further bolster our work volumes for which funds have not been provided and to attempt to reduce our personnel by 2% would seriously impair this Bureau's ability to discharge its responsibilities in all fields of work.

3. SALARY RETENTION ACT, PUBLIC LAW 85-737

This act provides a two-year period of salary retention for employees demoted through no fault of their own if they have occupied a higher paying position for two years or longer. This act has caused a most inequitable situation by requiring employees who accepted temporary promotions to be paid more than permanent employees who are doing identical work. By memorandum dated July 17, 1959, we urged the Department to recommend legislation so as to change this situation at the earliest possible time. To date no legislation has been introduced which would effect the desired correction of this inequitable situation.

INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

1. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-257)

The new labor law, as above, became effective upon its signing by the President on September 14, 1959.

The language in the Act conferred authority upon the Secretary of Labor to conduct investigations of the majority of the provisions contained in the law. Authority was also granted to the Secretary of Labor to enter into agreements with other agencies to handle investigations.

The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice during September, 1959, has held conferences with officials of the Department of Labor for the purpose of arriving at an agreement to be signed by the Departments of Justice and Labor specifying those criminal provisions of the law, as well as the prohibition against a member of the Communist Party holding office in a labor union, which the FBI will investigate.

Preliminary conferences indicate investigative jurisdiction of the following violations will be conferred upon the Bureau:

Embezzlement of union funds; payment by an employer of a fine imposed upon a labor union officer; prohibition against communists and convicted felons holding union office; picketing for extortion purposes; deprivation by force or violence of rights of union members; and retention by FBI of an amendment in the Act broadening the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.

The finalizing of the agreement between the Departments of Justice and Labor has not been effected. Until it is, we are not initiating investigations without a specific request from the Department of Justice.

We have, however, received 85 specific requests from the Criminal Division to determine whether certain convicted felons are holding office at this time in labor unions in violation of that section of the Act (Section 504).

We have also received 52 names of individuals who are reportedly labor union officials, from the Department, requesting a check of Bureau and Identification Division files. Eighteen such name checks have been completed. These were highly placed Teamster officials and trustees. We are not processing the remaining 34 names until the Department provides us with further identifying data as to the individuals.

2. FEDERAL CLEARINGHOUSE OF CRIMINAL INFORMATION

Various proposals have been brought forth in the past by individuals such as Senator Kefauver, Chief William Parker of the Los Angeles Police Department, Milton Wessel of the Department, and Senator McClellan for the establishment of a central Federal clearinghouse of information on crime. More recently New York State Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz has proposed a clearinghouse of information concerning frauds on the consumer and investor public.

Our position in the past has consistently been that there is no need for such a clearinghouse and that the necessary and desirable dissemination of criminal-type information is already being accomplished within the framework of existing law enforcement structures.

Some of the serious objections to such a proposed clearinghouse are that it would be an unwarranted intrusion of the Federal Government into local affairs. There is the possibility that such a clearinghouse would provide an official medium for the dissemination of unverified data consisting of rumor and gossip and that corrupt and irresponsible individuals would be presented with the opportunity to use such information for purposes of blackmail or extortion. In addition to the foregoing, the establishment of such a clearinghouse would constitute a costly superstructure on already existing facilities and could result in the establishment of a "black list" characterizing certain individuals as violators on the basis of information not completely verified or authenticated.

The Bureau already disseminates on a daily basis innumerable items of information to local, county, state and Federal agencies. This information may not only relate to matters over which we have jurisdiction but extends to any items which may be of interest to other agencies. The channels for dissemination of information are already established and the use of these channels by all agencies would appear to obviate the need for any central clearinghouse of information.

3. NEED FOR CRIMINAL-TYPE LEGISLATION

Since April 30, 1958, the Bureau has suggested certain items of legislation relative to establishing some effective curbs on the activities of racketeers. The most recent communication to the Department in this regard was a memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Walsh dated September 2, 1959, captioned "Legislative Program, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session." These legislative suggestions are as follows:

1. There appears to be a need for legislation to prohibit the interstate transportation of certain gambling paraphernalia, such as number slips and punch boards in addition to the present prohibition of interstate transportation of slot machines.

2. It also appears the interstate transmission of gambling information should be restricted to prohibit the transmission of gambling information in interstate or foreign commerce by any communication facility. Such legislation should also encompass the transmission of information as to the results of horse racing events until after a specified time had elapsed. The inability to have current race results would discourage the operations of bookmaking establishments.

3. Inasmuch as under the present provisions of the Internal Revenue Code income derived from illegal businesses and from gambling constitutes income which is taxable and assessed in the same manner as legitimate income, it appears that if the income from such illicit sources were taxed at vastly higher rates it might make such activities financially prohibitive. Inasmuch as certain individuals would attempt to avoid such taxes, it might be desirable to initiate legislation to provide substantial criminal penalties for the failure to pay such taxes.

4. It also appears legislation may be desirable to amend the White Slave Traffic Act in order that the prostitute herself could be prosecuted. There is considerable activity among those who are engaged in this livelihood and who go from state to state in order to ply their trade.

5. As an added weapon against organized crime, it appears it may be desirable to afford consideration to the enactment of a Federal habitual criminal act which would provide for mandatory sentences upon the commission of offenses within Federal jurisdiction.

In addition, the Bureau is in agreement with the Administration's theory of amending the Fugitive Felon Act to include damage by fire or explosives to religious or educational facilities. The House Judiciary Committee has failed to approve this proposal and has adopted a bill (H. R. 8601) which would prohibit damage to any building, structure, facility, vehicle or dwelling house.

It is our view that such legislation should be restricted to cover educational and religious facilities only. This was called to the Department's attention by the afore-mentioned memorandum dated September 2, 1959, captioned "Legislative Program, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session."

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

On March 12, 1959, the Director attended a conference in the Attorney General's office in connection with current security programs and matters collateral thereto. The Director expressed the view that security programs had been held in abeyance in the Department of Justice with the result that other agencies of the Government were taking advantage of such delays and offering as excuses for nonaction the fact that the Department of Justice had not yet indicated what should be done or should not be done in view of some decisions of the courts and anticipated decisions of the courts. The Director urged that basic action should be taken on certain of these programs. While some of these matters have been acted upon, others are still pending and are set forth below for the Director's information.

(1) Industrial Security Program - At the time of the March conference it was decided to wait until the Greene and Taylor cases had gone through the Supreme Court. This has now occurred and the Supreme Court has indicated that there was not proper authority for an Industrial Security Program flowing from the President or the Congress. The Court also strongly indicated that even with such authority that there was a need for confrontation of witnesses at such hearings. To meet this, the Administration is discouraging legislation and approaching the matter through an Executive Order, two drafts of which have been examined by the Department and the Bureau. The proposed Order appears impractical in some respects and Yeagley of the Department has advised us that the Attorney General and the Solicitor General do not like the Order as drafted, particularly the "special counsel" concept and Deputy Attorney General Walsh is being instructed to "bounce the Order back to the White House." By letter dated September 30, 1959, to the Attorney General, copies to Walsh and Yeagley, the Bureau went on record that while we would attempt to live up to any Order, the Department should carefully consider the position of the Department and the Bureau under the proposed Order in that we would be forced to turn down numerous requests to produce informants and sources for testimony or interview in view of our overriding responsibility to protect their identities in the interests of national security. This might open the Department and the Bureau up to criticism that we were not living up to the spirit of the Executive Order.

From the standpoint of the conference with the Attorney General on October 6, we think the Bureau's position should be that the Industrial Security Program problem should be settled either through Executive Order or legislation;

that whichever means is used must be practical and not merely drawn up in a visionary manner in an attempt to satisfy the Supreme Court but end up by placing the investigative agencies in an untenable position because they cannot comply with the spirit of the Order.

(2) Port Security Program - There has been no change in the Port Security Program with the exception that Treasury Department has drafted proposed legislation to enable the Coast Guard to subpoena and pay the travel expenses of witnesses to appear at Coast Guard hearings. Treasury has indicated this bill is in the Bureau of the Budget. At the March 12, 1959, conference the Director pointed out that positive action should be taken toward getting such legislation and the confrontation issue should not be used as an excuse to scrap the program because the FBI had supplied a substantial number of witnesses who could appear and testify. The Bureau's position should be the same; namely, that the wherewithal should be devised to carry forth the program instead of scrapping it. It should be borne in mind that in Port Security hearings as in many other security-type hearings the question of confrontation will continue to be an issue and the pattern set by the Executive Order in the Industrial Security Program will probably be applied to the other types of security hearings.

(3) Air Crewmen Screening Program - The Air Crewmen Screening Program is a program proposed by ICIS to screen crews of United States planes engaged in international flights and to screen all holders of Airmen's Certificates. The ICIS also proposed the Federal Communications Commission Radio Screening Program which would require the screening of all operators of radio transmitters. To our knowledge, nothing has been done on either of these programs since the March, 1959, conference with the Attorney General. While the FBI originally concurred that these programs would be helpful, we have not pushed them, believing this is a proper function of ICIS. It is believed the Bureau's position should be that a decision should be reached as to whether these programs should be implemented and they should not be allowed to hang fire on the basis that they might not be agreeable or acceptable to the Supreme Court. In other words, security programs should not be left in a status of hiatus because of pending judicial decisions.

(4) Personnel Security Program - The March, 1959 conference discussed the Personnel Security Program, particularly whether there should be legislation to provide for an over-all security program which would cover both sensitive

and nonsensitive areas. This is still an undecided issue although several bills have been introduced into Congress to remove the distinction between sensitive and nonsensitive areas of Federal employment. Undoubtedly, the Greene decision in the Supreme Court carrying the strong inference that confrontation is necessary in security-type hearings has slowed up consideration of legislation in this field by the Department. This is essentially a Departmental problem and we feel the Bureau's position again should be that the Department should meet these issues rather than coast along in a state of indecision.

(5) In the field of legislation involving security, by letter dated September 2, 1959, the Bureau proposed to Deputy Attorney General Walsh the following items, which the Director might wish to point out to the Attorney General. While bills were introduced into Congress on some of these items, legislation has not been completed as to any of them.

(a) It is desirable that Title 18, Section 791, United States Code, be amended to extend the jurisdiction of the Federal courts over acts of espionage against the United States wherever committed.

(b) Amendment of the Foreign Agents Registration Act to clarify and make more specific the definition of a "Foreign Principal" and to further clarify the exemption to registration afforded business representatives.

(c) Legislation is suggested which would permit the Secretary of State to consider security factors in the granting of passports; however, appropriate provisions should be made to protect FBI informants and sources in this connection. This matter is mentioned in the Bureau's memorandum to Walsh dated May 26, 1959, regarding H. R. 7006.

(d) Another suggestion is legislation to strengthen the Smith Act of 1940 by defining the word "organize" and the word "advocacy." A definition of "organize" was introduced as H. R. 2369 and as S. 1300. S. 1305 attempts to define "advocacy."

(e) Legislation is needed which would prohibit former Government employees from disclosing to unauthorized individuals certain information obtained by them in the course of their employment.

(f) Legislation is needed to amend the espionage laws so as to provide punishment for persons who gather and correlate data from legitimate sources for transmittal to foreign governments.

Domestic Intelligence Division

(6) In addition to the above, the Director may wish to point out to the Attorney General the tendency on the part of the Department of Justice, as well as Government departments in general, to shy away from pursuing logical courses of action in the security field rather than to implement necessary security programs, this tendency apparently based on attempts to anticipate decisions by the Supreme Court. The net effect of this is that the Supreme Court is not required to meet these issues and render decisions and thus, historically, to take responsibility for them. It is our feeling it is a far better course of action to attempt to implement those programs necessary for our national security and give ground grudgingly and only where forced to do so so that the record will show that the Department and the FBI sought to carry out their responsibilities in a proper manner.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: 12-11-70

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE IN CONNECTION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE THURSDAYS, 5:00 P.M.

In view of the approaching holiday season, material for captioned brief, unless otherwise advised to the contrary, will not be needed until after the first of the new year. Material will then be required for receipt in Crime Records Division by 12 noon, Tuesday, 1-5-71 for the next scheduled conference of 1-7-71.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Tolson
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Casper
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Walters
1 - Mr. Beaver
1 - Miss Gandy
1 - Miss Holmes
1 - M. A. Jones

REC-6 62-97252-210

6 DEC 15 1970

JHC:kjs (9)

DEC 18 1970

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

CDBS

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: 12/29/70

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE IN CONNECTION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE THURSDAYS, 5:00 P. M.

You will recall that captioned brief was discontinued during the Holiday Season. It is presumed these conferences will resume on Thursday, January 7, 1971. Accordingly, it is suggested that all Divisions revise and update their sections of the brief and submit such revisions to be received on or before noontime Tuesday, January 5th.

Attorney General's Staff Conference

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

WC

REC 70

62-97856-211

ST-100

JAN 5 1971

CRIME RESEARCH

1 - Mr. Tolson
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Casper
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Felt

1 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Walters
1 - Mr. Beaver
1 - Miss Gandy
1 - Miss Holmes
1 - M. A. Jones

364

DGH:mjj(9)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

V.pere

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: April 6, 1971

FROM : M. ~~A. Jones~~

changed 4-8-71 HWJ

SUBJECT: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE IN CONNECTION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE THURSDAYS, 5:00 P.M.

In connection with captioned brief, attached are amended pages A and C of the Table of Contents and pages 4-5, 8, 11, 12, 13A, 16, 24, 26A, 33, 34 and 35, which should be inserted in the brief. Page 36 should be deleted. These pages have been amended for the following reasons:

Pages A and C of the Table of Contents have been amended as a result of changes set out in details below.

Page 4-5, information in paragraph 3 changed to make more current.

Page 8, changed to update totals of Seat of Government employees.

Page 11, "Black Panther Party (BPP)" write-up revised to make more current.

Page 12, all items revised to update figures.

Page 13A, this is a new item which is considered timely.

Page 16, first paragraph revised to show current number of American aircraft hijacked along with those diverted to Cuba.

REC-66

Page 24, "Court-Approved Electronic Surveillances" item updated to show more current figures.

15 APR 13 1971

EX-112

CRIME RESEARCH

Enclosures (13)

1 - Mr. Mohr - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Sullivan - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Bishop - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Brennan - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Casper - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Conrad - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Dalbey - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Felt - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Gale - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Rosen - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Tavel - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Walters - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Beaver - Enclosures
1 - Miss Gandy - Enclosures
1 - Miss Holmes - Enclosures
1 - M.A. Jones - Enclosures

(CONTINUED - OVER)

M.A. Jones to Bishop Memo
RE: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE

Page 26A, item number (9) added as of current interest.

Page 33, figures in paragraph 1 updated; paragraph 3 revised to make more current.

Pages 34 and 35, both pages revised to update information.

TSB

WBS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES C VE MENT

Memorandum

Tolson ___
DeLoach ___
Walters ___
Mohr ___
Bishop ___
Casper ___
Callahan ___
Conrad ___
Felt ___
Gale ___
Rosen ___
Sullivan ___
Tavel ___
Soyars ___
Tele. Room ___
Holmes ___
Gandy ___

TO : Mr. DeLoach

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS CONFERENCE, JUNE 30, 1970

DATE: June 24, 1970

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Schutz
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Miss Gandy
1 - Miss Holmes

Attached find amended pages of brief on aircraft hijackings prepared for the Director's use at the conference with the Attorney General's staff on June 30, 1970, which will be chaired by the Deputy Attorney General, Richard G. Kleindienst.

Amendments to the brief were made necessary by the June 22, 1970, armed hijacking of Pan American World Airways flight to Cairo, Egypt, while en route from Beirut, Lebanon, to John F. Kennedy Airport, New York. The subject, Haxhi Hasan Xhafferi, a 32-year-old Albanian, was taken into custody at Cairo, Egypt, by Egyptian authorities after firing a shot in the cockpit. No one was injured. Our investigation of the matter is continuing.

Amended pages are as follows:

Page 7	Under A. Hijackings - most recent hijacking added to the 1970 column and the total for 1970 as well as grand total.
	Under B. Individuals Involved - the 1970 column and the totals for 1970 and grand total being increased by one.
Page 22	The total number of hijackings amended from 70 to 71.
Page 36	A brief summary of the Pan American flight hijacking 6-22-70, set forth.
Last page of index	Amended to incorporate the name of subject of most recent hijacking, Haxhi Hasan Xhafferi.

REC-43 62-

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

JUL 6 1970

Encs. (4)

H:ny
(11)

59 JUL 4 1970

III. STATISTICS RE HIJACKINGS SINCE JANUARY 1, 1968

A. Hijackings

	1968	1969	1970	Total
To Cuba	17	31	5	53
Other Destination		2	1	3
Aborted	3	6	5	14
TOTAL	20	39	11	70

A firearm was used in 53 of the 70 incidents and in 6 instances there was gunfire. In 1 of the incidents, 1 death and 2 injuries resulted. In the 2nd - 2 individuals were wounded. In the remaining 4, no one was injured.

B. Individuals Involved

	1968	1969	1970	Total
Latin	17	21	2	40
Fleeing Felons	3	7*		10
Black Militants	3	3		6
Others	8	26	10	44
TOTAL	31	57	12	100

* Includes one black militant.

XEROX
JUL 6 1970

62-97256-205

VII. HIJACKINGS OF U. S. PLANES

The following are summaries of all hijackings since January 1, 1968. There has been a total of 70 incidents of hijackings or attempts to hijack aircraft during this period. There were 56 hijackings and 14 aborted hijackings.

During 1968, there were 17 hijackings to Cuba and 3 aborted hijackings.

During 1969, there were 31 hijackings to Cuba, 1 to Damascus, 1 to Rome, and 6 aborted hijackings.

During 1970, thus far there have been 6 hijackings, 5 of which went to Cuba, and 1 to Lebanon, along with 5 aborted hijackings.

1968

NUMBER & DATE	NAME	AIRLINE
(1) - 2/17/68	THOMAS JAMES BOYNTON	Privately owned

From Marathon, Florida, to Cuba at gun point with pilot aboard. Process filed 2/20/68, Florida. Returned to United States through Canada, 11/2/69, pleaded guilty 5/12/70, and sentenced to 20 years 6/4/70.

(2) - 2/21/68	LAWRENCE MAHLON RHODES, JR.	Delta

From Tampa, Florida, to Cuba at gun point with 102 passengers and crew of 7 aboard. Fleeing felon at time of hijacking. Process filed 12/22/68, Miami, Florida. Surrendered himself at Madrid, Spain, 2/11/70. Entered plea of not guilty and is currently undergoing psychiatric examination.

62-77256-205

JUL 6 1970

1970

NUMBER & DATE	NAME	AIRLINE
(69) - 5/25/70	NELSON MOLINA	American

From Chicago, Illinois, to Cuba at gunpoint with 66 passengers and crew of 7. Process filed 5/27/70, New York. Still in Cuba.

(70) - 6/4/70	AUTHER GATES BARKLEY	TWA

From Phoenix, Arizona, to St. Louis, Missouri, with 51 passengers and 7 crew members. Demanded $100,000,000 or would destroy aircraft. Process filed 6/4/70, Alexandria, Virginia. Presently undergoing psychiatric evaulation.

62-97756-205

ENCLOSURE

Name	Page
Pastorcich, Roger Allen	25
Patterson, Gwendolyn Joyce	26
Patterson, James Joseph	26
Payano, Aristofarez Antonio Navarro	27
Perez, Jesus Rivera	33
Perry, Lester Ellsworth	32
Quesada, Graciela Calderon	11, 35
Reed, John M. (ASAC)	18
Rhodes, Lawrence Mahlon, Jr.	22
Richards, Oran Daniel	23
Sanchez, Hiran Courouneaux	30
Sanchez, Miguel Montesino	25
Sandlin, Robert Lee	29
Shorr, Henry Larry	33
Speruto, Salvatore	29
Stubbs, Clemmie	34
Torres, Domingo Diaz	32
Truitt, Alben William Barkley	24
Viera, Irardo Mendoza	25
Wagstaff, Joseph Alfred	35
Washington, Thomas George	11, 26, Exhibit #5
White, L.	27
Wiser, F. C.	Exhibit #3, Page 2
Zamora, Crecencio Parra	30

62-77856-20

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: January 12, 1967

FROM : R. E. Wick

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S LUNCHEON MEETING WITH ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL RAMSEY CLARK 1 P.M., FRIDAY, JANUARY 13, 1967

Miss Gandy has advised that in connection with Mr. Hoover's luncheon meeting with the Acting Attorney General tomorrow, it would be helpful if we could set forth for the Director's information any items which might come up for discussion.

The attached data prepared by the various Divisions throughout the Bureau may be helpful to Mr. Hoover in connection with the luncheon meeting.

Enclosures

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen

REW:par
(7)

"ENCL. BEHIND FILE"

62-22856-179

REC 27

5 FEB 2 1967

10 ENCLOSURE

CRIME RESEARCH

226

Budget

62-97856-179

FBI BUDGET REQUEST - FISCAL YEAR 1968

The Bureau's request for 1968 totals $186,574,000. It will provide for a personnel staff totaling 15,780 (6,638 agents and 9,142 clerks). The request makes provision for an increase of 569 full-year employees (106 agents and 463 clerks) when compared to 1967.

Of the additional employees, 165 (100 agents and 65 clerks) are for assignment to the field to assist in the handling of a heavy volume of civil rights work. (This is the second increment of a total increase of 300 agents and attendant clerical staff and equipment previously ordered by the President for civil rights work over a three-year period to be implemented at the rate of 100 agents a year.) The remaining 404 employees (6 agents and 398 clerks) are for assignment at our headquarters, the bulk to be utilized to handle the tremendous increase in name and fingerprint checks being received.

The request of $186,574,000 for 1968 is an increase of $4,249,000 when compared to the total requirements for the current fiscal year 1967 which includes $175,465,000 already appropriated and by a supplemental request totaling $6,860,000 brought about by costs growing out of new legislation increasing our payroll costs ($5,250,000) and by new legislation increasing the costs we must pay to transfer employees to meet the needs of the service ($1,610,000).

Most careful consideration was given to our request for additional personnel in 1968. We are absorbing much work and will endeavor to make further absorptions. When confronted with a one-million increase in fingerprint receipts, a 43% increase in name checks, a heavy amount of civil rights and other work, we have no alternative but to ask for additional manpower if we are to meet our responsibilities in these areas.

The Bureau's growing work is not limited to these particular areas by any means. The work of the FBI Laboratory mounted to a new all-time peak during the fiscal year 1966, numerous criminal classifications reached new highs, and our work in matters vital to the internal security of the country has continued to increase. We are going to do our best to handle the mounting work in these areas with our existing staff. In addition, new items of legislation continue to be passed adding to our work.

Indicative of our heavy volume of work is the fact that as of January 1, 1967, pending investigative matters throughout the field totaled 150,189, with 5% in a delinquent status. At that time, the average individual assignment in the field was nearly 26 matters as compared with 20 at that time in 1961.

OTHER WORK LOAD VOLUMES
FISCAL YEARS 1965 AND 1966

Fiscal Year	Investigative Matters Received	Fingerprint Checks	Name Checks	Laboratory Examinations
1966	718,850	6,964,816	2,426,665	284,304
1965	696,477	5,884,986	1,699,361	276,383
Increases (1966)	22,373 3%	1,079,830 18%	727,304 43%	7,921 3%

Special Investigative Division

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION

During the past few months the Department has launched into a program of review of past, current, and contemplated prosecutions to determine if such cases have been materially affected by the use of electronic listening devices. This has required the establishment of special microphone indices at Bureau Headquarters and voluminous correspondence with various field divisions to determine if individuals listed in the Department's inquiries were covered by FBI microphones. With regard to listed individuals on whom we have had some form of microphone coverage, we are so advising the Department and pertinent logs, together in some cases with other supporting material, are being obtained from the field for review by Departmental attorneys.

The Department made public the fact that such a review was under way in the filing of a memorandum with the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General in the Joseph Schipani case, November 30, 1966.

Set forth as follows are the brief circumstances regarding individual prosecutive situations in which, to date, the Department has made disclosures to various courts regarding the FBI's use of electronic listening devices of pertinence to those prosecutions.

Joseph Frank Schipani

Schipani is a New York hoodlum and a member of La Cosa Nostra who was convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment and fined $12,500 for violation of the income tax laws for the years 1956 through 1960. In response to the Department's request, they were provided with logs reporting those instances where Schipani was covered by an electronic surveillance. This electronic surveillance was not directly on Schipani but was in an office frequented by top La Cosa Nostra racket figures. On November 30, 1966, the Solicitor General requested the Supreme Court to vacate the judgment regarding Schipani of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court for a new trial. On December 12, 1966, the Supreme Court complied with the request of the Solicitor General. This was installed under the general authority of the Attorney General, as were all of the following unless otherwise specified.

Louis J. Taglianetti

The Department on December 27, 1966, filed a motion to remand in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the Louis J. Taglianetti appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Taglianetti, a member of the Raymond Patriarca "family" of La Cosa Nostra, was indicted on February 26, 1963, for income tax evasion for the years 1956, 1957, and 1958. He was found guilty on September 16, 1966. Taglianetti appealed but no brief had yet been filed.

The Department's motion indicated Taglianetti's conversations had been monitored by microphone surveillance at the place of business of a close associate (Raymond Patriarca) where Taglianetti and others met and that this establishment was being utilized for purposes connected with organized crime. On various occasions between March, 1962, when this microphone was installed with trespass under general authority of the Attorney General, until 1965, Taglianetti's conversations related to his income tax indictment. None of the information was used in evidence or was the source of leads to any evidence in the case.

The Department's motion noted that Taglianetti's case was within the ambit of the Supreme Court's decision in the Black case, decided November 7, 1966. The distinguishing feature between the two is the intrusion upon attorney-client conversations in the Black case, for which the Supreme Court vacated the conviction and granted a new trial. The Department's reasons for the motion to remand in Taglianetti was for the limited purpose of enabling the District Court to examine the facts and to determine whether Taglianetti's conviction should stand or a new trial be ordered.

The defense has now filed a motion for new trial claiming that, "The Government, having tasted the forbidden fruit of its illegal bugging and having withheld all knowledge thereof from the defendant, his counsel and the trial judge, cannot now preserve the conviction thus obtained because such forbidden fruit failed to produce a sweet taste." Hearings on these motions have not yet been scheduled.

FRANK DE NIRO, JR.
MICHAEL DE NIRO
LOUIS DE NIRO

The De Niro brothers were convicted 8/23/65 of conspiring to defraud the U. S. in evading estate taxes. They have appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Cleveland Office conducted a microphone surveillance from 2/19/64 to 6/16/64 in the office of the National Cigarette Service, Youngstown, Ohio, a vending machine company, operated by the De Niros. In response to the Department's request 10/14/66 we disclosed the circumstances of this surveillance to them by letter 10/18/66, and made available for review the surveillance logs. No information from this source was disseminated outside the Bureau.

The Department subsequently disclosed to the Court of Appeals by memorandum the existance of our microphone surveillance. Considerable reluctance was displayed by the Department to including in this memorandum our general authority for installation of electronic surveillances. They did not clearly record the dates concerning the manner in which the Department requested and was advised of our coverage. Our protests were clearly outlined in correspondence to the Department before this memorandum was filed. Ultimately our authority was recorded as a footnote. This microphone was installed under the general authority of the Attorney General.

Frank Peter Balistrieri

Balistrieri, the "boss" of Milwaukee's La Cosa Nostra "family," and as such the leader of organized crime in that area, was brought to trial in United States District Court, Springfield, Illinois, during October, 1966, on the basis of an indictment charging evasion of Federal income taxes. An early issue in this action was our microphone coverage of Balistrieri and certain of his associates. Microphone coverage had been established on Balistrieri's office, in an apartment maintained by his paramour, and in the office of hoodlum attorney Dominic Frinzi, all in Milwaukee, for various periods between 1961 and 1965. These installations were all made in line with general departmental authorization as outlined in the Department's memorandum filed with the Supreme Court in the Black case.

The defense has made a motion to suppress, based on this electronic coverage. After hearing testimony regarding these installations, including testimony of Bureau personnel, and reviewing logs of the coverage in question, the judge instructed that the trial should be commenced, with the defense having the right to renew its mortion after the trial, in the event evidence presented warrants such a proceedings.

Trial was undertaken on 10/17/66. On 11/29/66 Defense Attorney Walsh suffered a heart attack and further trial proceedings have been deferred until March 1, 1967. None of the information produced by this microphone was utilized in obtaining the indictment of Balistrieri.

Ronald David Carabbia

Carabbia was convicted 6/21/65 for violation of wagering tax laws and has appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. The Cleveland Office conducted a microphone surveillance at the Modern News Center and Novelties Company, Youngstown, from 1/22/62 until 3/22/62. Carabbia and his brothers operated a gambling game at this location. Activities covered by this surveillance included gambling with numerous participants. The voices of the individuals covered were never identified. It could not be determined if the appellant was or was not present during the operation of this source.

In response to the Department's inquiry, we disclosed to them by letter dated 11/1/66 the circumstances of this surveillance and made available for review all surveillance logs. By letter dated 1/9/67, the Department indicated its intention to disclose this microphone surveillance by memorandum to the U. S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. In three letters we have advised the Department of the brief operation of this source and that the individuals covered were never identified. The Department's proposed memorandum to the court notes, "There is a substantial question whether any conversations in which appellant participated were even monitored." In spite of this, the Department apparently feels it must disclose this surveillance. The Department failed to include our general authorization for installation of electronic surveillances over our protests. We feel that at the very least the general authorization of the Department should be in all briefs going to courts so there can be no accusation that the Bureau was operating in an uncontrolled and unrestrained manner.

Jack T. Rainwater

Jack T. Rainwater has conducted a large-scale numbers operation in the Miami, Florida area. He and six associates were convicted of state gambling violations in Florida courts based upon evidence furnished by the Internal Revenue Service and testimony of Internal Revenue Service agents.

In response to the Department's request they were provided with logs reporting those instances where Rainwater and one of his associates who also was convicted in state court, were monitored by an electronic surveillance. Neither of these individuals were the direct subject of an electronic surveillance.

On January 11, 1967, the Solicitor General disclosed to the Supreme Court that an electronic device had been utilized by Federal agents in the Rainwater matter.

Our installation in this matter was made under general authority of the Attorney General. Information from this source was disseminated to Internal Revenue Service who in turn disseminated to local authorities.

Charles Joseph Battaglia, Jr.

Battaglia is a Tucson, Arizona, La Cosa Nostra member who was closely affiliated with Joseph Bonanno a former La Cosa Nostra "Commission" member. A microphone for criminal intelligence purposes had been maintained on him under general Departmental authority. He was arrested by Bureau Agents for violation of the Hobbs Act in March, 1965, as a result of making threats in an effort to force a Tucson firm to utilize his vending machines. Following the granting of several continuances the trial judge in Federal District Court ordered Battaglia to appear for trial on the morning of January 11, 1967. The Department advised that they intended to inform the judge that Battaglia had been covered by microphone surveillances, but that the coverage had no bearing on the evidence to be produced in substantiation of the criminal charges against Battaglia. The Department further advised they were going to recommend that the judge proceed with the trial and at the conclusion thereof, if the judge feels it necessary, a hearing will be held to determine the validity of the Department's claim regarding the microphone evidence.

A hearing on this motion is scheduled for Monday, January 16, 1967, in Tucson, Arizona.

Edward L. Levinson, et. al., Civil Suit

On December 10, 1965, Edward Levinson, at that time one of the owners of the Fremont Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada, filed a $6,000,000 damage suit (later reduced to $4,200,000) against four Bureau Agents, charging invasion of privacy and asking injunctive relief against further invasion by use of electronic listening devices. Levinson filed a similar suit against the Central Telephone Company of Las Vegas and certain of its employees.

The case has recently been taken over personally by Assistant Attorney General Barefoot Sanders who is presently reviewing all of the material in connection with preparing a response to plaintiff's motions. No date has been set for trial in matter. The Bureau has been pressing the Department to take depositions in this case from such major hoodlums as Meyer Lansky and Gerardo Catena who have hidden interests in the Fremont Hotel.

Fred B. Black, Jr.

Fred B. Black, Jr., named as being hired by front men in Las Vegas to represent their interests in Washington, D. C., where Black was alleged to have influence, was convicted on May 5, 1965, of evading income taxes for the period of 1956 through 1959. After a number of appeals he petitioned the Supreme Court for issuance of a writ of certiorari which was denied on May 4, 1966.

On May 24, 1966, Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall filed a memorandum with the Supreme Court reporting a listening device had been placed in Black's hotel suite in 1963, but none of the evidence used in Black's trial was obtained as a result of the listening device. The Supreme Court on June 13, 1966, ordered a response by the Department to questions raised by the Court with regard to the initial memorandum filed by the Department which was answered on July 13, 1966, by supplemental memorandum.

This memorandum indicated the listening device, installed with trespass under general Departmental authorization had monitored conversations of Black and his attorney.

The United States Supreme Court on November 7, 1966, vacated the income tax conviction and granted a new trial, which will not be set until after the Robert Baker trial.

……

To date, the Bureau has received over 1,000 names of individuals of prosecutive interest for a determination if such subjects have been covered by FBI microphones. A number of problems have resulted.

One problem which has been encountered, and which can be expected to be even more serious in the future, is the lack of identifying data accompanying the names of individuals on whom the Department has made inquiry in these matters. For example, one list recently received included 475 names, in some cases with a minimum of identifying data and in others with no identifying data at all. In order that an accurate determination can be made whether an individual in question has, in fact, been covered by one of our microphones, it will be necessary that the Department provide adequate identifying data when submitting these names for review.

An attendant problem has arisen in certain inquiries in which the Department has made unreasonable requests for such reviews on extremely short notice. One of these involved a request for the results of the review later the same day it was received. Thoroughness and accuracy, of absolute necessity in this type review, make extremely rapid checks such as this in most cases impossible, and at best, a very dangerous procedure.

With regard to those situations in which the Department has made disclosures to the various courts, continuing reluctance has been evidenced on their part to inform the court of the fact that the installation in question has been utilized by the FBI under either specific authority from the Attorney General, or under the general Departmental authority which was granted. The Department has been repeatedly reminded of their reluctance in these individual situations.

The volume involved in this project has caused a decided strain on the Bureau in processing these numerous inquiries to date, and these problems become magnified when the enormity of the entire project is assessed, in view of indications by the Department that the full review may encompass as many as 30,000 names.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

FUGITIVE SECTION

Cassius Marcellus Clay

Cassius Clay, world's heavyweight boxing champion and Black Muslim, earlier this year filed a claim as a conscientious objector and more recently has applied to his draft board at Louisville, Kentucky, for a ministerial deferment as a minister of the Black Muslim religion. After a very extensive investigation by the Bureau, Clay's draft board denied his claim as a conscientious objector and placed him in a 1-A classification. Since the board's vote was unanimous, he has no further appeal as a conscientious objector. His ministerial deferment request will now have to be considered by his local board which our sources indicate will meet in the next few days. If the local board denies this request, Clay has the right to appeal.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
FEDERAL JUDGESHIP INVESTIGATIONS

ALFRED BURKA: On 1/11/67 we initiated an investigation of Alfred Burka, a District of Columbia attorney who is being considered for appointment as Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. Previous applicant investigation in 1953, which was favorable concerning Burka, showed his father was indicted in 1944 for violation of the Internal Revenue Code but the case was not prosecuted. Current investigation of Burka is pending.

WILLIAM COURTLEIGH GARDNER: Gardner, a District of Columbia attorney, is under consideration for appointment as Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. Investigation completed 1/12/67 was favorable except in 1965 and 1966 income tax liens totaling $6,828.54 were filed against him by the District of Columbia and the Federal Government for delinquent income taxes. These accounts have now been paid.

MILTON DANIEL KORMAN: Korman is under consideration for appointment as Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. He has been Assistant Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia since 1937. Investigation of Korman, which has been completed was favorable.

FRED LOUIS MC INTYRE: He is a candidate for the position of Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. We completed investigation of him 1/9/67 and it was favorable.

HAROLD FRANK REIS: Reis is Executive Assistant to the Attorney General. He is a candidate for a judgeship on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. He is a Kennedy supporter and has been the cause of discord between the Department and the Bureau concerning electronic surveillance matters.

Attached are background memoranda concerning the above individuals.

Enclosures (5)

Mr. Gale 1/11/67

W. V. Cleveland

ALFRED BURKA
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANT
JUDGE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

The Office of the Deputy Attorney General has requested investigation of Alfred Burka, who is under consideration for appointment as Judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions.

Burka, aged 38, was born in Washington, D. C., and received his LL.B. degree from Georgetown University Law School in 1951. He served in the United States Army from 1951 to 1953 when he was honorably released as a first lieutenant. He served as Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia 1953 to 1958 and since 1958 has been engaged in the practice of law in the District of Columbia and Bethesda, Maryland. He also served as Assistant States Attorney for Montgomery County, Maryland, from 1962 to 1965. This was part-time employment.

We conducted a Departmental Applicant investigation of Burka in 1953 when he was under consideration for appointment as Assistant United States Attorney. That investigation was favorable concerning Burka. Our inquiries disclosed, however, that his father, Israel S. Burka, and others were indicted by a Grand Jury in Washington, D. C., in December, 1944, for violation of the Internal Revenue Code because they failed to maintain proper records in respect to the sale and distribution of distilled spirits. It was also indicated that the defendants had listed addresses of people who supposedly purchased whiskey and that such addresses were fictitious. It was also shown they had listed names of people who supposedly purchased whiskey and that these people could not be identified. An offer of $4,000 was submitted by the defendants in compromise of civil and criminal liabilities. The compromise offer was accepted and the case was nol-prossed. Israel S. Burka also had a record of 38 traffic violations between

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Cleveland
(1) - Mr. Connell

JFC:jam
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

1936 and 1947 for which he forfeited sums ranging in amounts from $4 to $12. (77-38541)

Bureau files also show that in September, 1957, Alfred Burka, while Assistant United States Attorney, called upon the Director to pay his respects. He stated he had always held the Bureau in high esteem and he had very kind words to say about his contacts with our local office. In October, 1957, while serving as Assistant United States Attorney, he requested that the Director autograph a copy of the book "The FBI Story," for him and also give him an autographed photograph. His request was granted. (94-4-39-12248)

ACTION:

The field has been instructed to bring the previous investigation of Burka up to date. Appropriate memorandum will be submitted upon completion of our current inquiries.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Gale

DATE: 1/3/67

FROM : W. V. Cleveland

SUBJECT: WILLIAM COURTLEIGH GARDNER
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANT
ASSOCIATE JUDGE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

The Office of the Deputy Attorney General has requested investigation of William Courtleigh Gardner, who is under consideration for appointment as Associate Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions.

Background data furnished by the Department indicates Gardner, aged 49, was born in Springfield, Ohio. He served in the United States Army from 1942 to 1946. He received his A.B. degree from Howard University, Washington, D. C., in 1948 and his LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1951. From 1951 to the present he reportedly has practiced law in Washington, D. C. Gardner listed membership in various bar associations and civic organizations including present membership in the District of Columbia Special Police Trial Board.

Bureau files contain no information identifiable with Gardner.

ACTION:

The investigation of Gardner has been initiated. Appropriate memorandum will be submitted upon its completion.

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Connell

JFC:jmm
(6)

Mr. Gale 12/14/66

W. V. Cleveland

MILTON DANIEL KORMAN
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANT
JUDGE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

Investigation of Milton Daniel Korman, who is under consideration for appointment to the position of Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, has been completed.

BACKGROUND:

Korman, aged 62, received his law degree from Georgetown University in 1925. He practiced law in the District of Columbia, (D. C.), from 1925 to 1931, operated a taxicab company in Virginia 1931 to 1934 and thereafter practiced law in Washington, D. C., until 1937. From 1937 to date he has been an Assistant Corporation Counsel in D. C., and during the past year was Acting Corporation Counsel until the appointment of Charles T. Duncan, October, 1966.

PREVIOUS INVESTIGATION:

A Departmental Applicant investigation conducted concerning Korman in 1942, when he was being considered for a judicial position in D. C., was generally favorable; however, several individuals stated Korman was inclined to be dominating, loud, and blustering.

RESULTS OF CURRENT INVESTIGATION:

The previous investigation has been brought up to date. Numerous individuals including judges of the D. C. Court of General Sessions and United States District Court, the United States Attorney, D. C. Commissioners Walter Tobriner and John B. Duncan; Charles Duncan, present Corporation Counsel; and local bar officials recommended Korman He was described as a very competent attorney who is exceptionally well versed in the laws of the District of Columbia and fully qualified for a judicial position.

Korman was also recommended by several Congressmen, who are members of the House District of Columbia Committee, including Thomas G

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale

1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Connell

CONTINUED - OVER

JFC:jmm
(6)

Abernethy (Dem.), Mississippi, and Joel T. Broyhill (Rep.), Virginia.

Numerous professional associates and acquaintances who recommended Korman pointed out that in the 1950's Korman, as an Assistant Corporation Counsel, was placed in a position of having to defend segregation in the D. C. public schools because the laws at that time provided for a segregated school system. They stated because of this some individuals unjustifiably criticized Korman feeling he was too vigorous in defending segregation in the schools. These associates pointed out that Korman, as a member of the Corporation Counsel's Office, was obligated to defend the position of the District of Columbia at the time and was only doing his job. They further stated that Korman is not prejudiced in racial matters and if appointed judge would handle such matters fairly and without bias.

Korman was recommended by Negro attorneys as well as H. Carl Moultire, President, D. C. chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and Sterling Tucker, Executive Director of the Washington Urban League. Reverend Walter E. Fauntroy, Chairman of the Coalition of Conscience, Washington, D. C., who has limited knowledge of Korman, stated he would neither recommend or oppose Korman's appointment.

Korman was also recommended by representatives of the various religious faiths in Washington, D. C., with the exception of Rabbi Norman Gerstenfeld. Korman was a member of Rabbi Gerstenfeld's congregation until approximately 1952. Rabbi Gerstenfeld stated Korman, when a member of his congregation, was arrogant, uncongenial and created dissension among the members of the congregation. He said he does not feel Korman possesses judicial temperament and would not recommend him for a judicial position. Rabbi Gerstenfeld, however, stated he has had very limited contact with Korman for the past 14 years.

ACTION:

Reports containing the results of the investigation of Korman are being furnished to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOV[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Gale

DATE: 1/5/67

FROM : W. V. Cleveland

SUBJECT: FRED LOUIS MC INTYRE
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANT
JUDGE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

The investigation of Fred Louis McIntyre, candidate for the position of Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, has been completed with the exception of one agency record check.

We have brought up to date prior applicant type investigations of McIntyre conducted in 1950 and 1953. These investigations were favorable. McIntyre, aged 47, received his A.B. degree in 1948 and his LL.B. degree in 1950 from George Washington University. McIntyre was employed by the National Security Resources Board from 1950 to 1951; by the Defense Production Administration from 1951 to 1953; as an Assistant U. S. Attorney in the District of Columbia from 1953 to 1961 when he resigned to accept appointment as counsel for the District of Columbia Committee of the United States Senate, which position he presently holds. He has been a member of the District of Columbia Bar in good standing since November 3, 1950. He served in the United States Air Force from 1941 to 1946.

Senators and Representatives on the Senate and House District of Columbia Committees respectively, U. S. Court of Appeals and Federal District Court Judges, D. C. Court of General Sessions Judges, District Commissioners, bar association officials, local attorneys who have opposed applicant in court, civil rights and religious leaders, neighbors and social acquaintances highly recommended applicant for a judicial position. They stated he has a judicial temperament and would be impartial and unbiased in his decisions. His legal associates stated they have been impressed with applicant's emotional stability and his competence as a lawyer. They noted that he has had extensive experience before the various courts in the District of Columbia. His legal ethics were not questioned and his character, reputation, associates, and loyalty were stated to be above reproach.

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Bruggeman

RLB:jmm
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Gale
Re: Fred Louis McIntyre

ACTION:

The reports of the current investigation are being sent to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. The remaining agency check is being expedited and the results of this check will be sent to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General promptly upon receipt.

OEC

Mr. Gale 1/5/67

W. V. Cleveland

HAROLD FRANK REIS
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Reference is made to my memorandum of 1/3/67 advising that the Deputy Attorney General's Office had requested a name check and Internal Revenue Service record check on Reis and it was understood Reis is being considered for a judicial appointment to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. An up to date name check has been completed on Reis and disclosed the following pertinent information.

BACKGROUND: Reis was born on 7/22/16 in New York City. His parents were born in Russia and became naturalized citizens. He received a B.S. degree from City College of New York in 1937 and a LL.B. degree from Columbia University, New York City, in 1940. He was first employed by the Department on 8/29/41 as an attorney in the Criminal Division. He resigned 9/21/42 and was again appointed an attorney in the Office of Alien Property 8/3/43. He subsequently served in the Office of Legal Counsel and was appointed first assistant in that office on 8/31/60. On 2/1/61 he was designated Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel. He has served in his present position as Executive Assistant to the Attorney General since March, 1965.

RESULTS OF PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS: Reis was first investigated by the Bureau in 1942 at the request of the Department and that investigation was brought up to date in 1965. In 1960 we conducted an Atomic Energy Act applicant investigation of him in connection with his access to restricted Atomic Energy data. The Department is in possession of the reports of the above investigations.

Our investigation in 1942 disclosed that while Reis was at the City College of New York in 1936 he was listed as a member of the Politics Club which was reported as being headed by two boys associated with communist activities at the college. Reis's membership in this club was not verified and it was reported that the heads of the organization were known to put down the names of persons who were not members and not to put down the names of persons who were members.

Enclosures
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale

1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Bruggeman

RLB:jmm
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

In 1942 Reis was classified by his draft board as 3-A because of the dependency of his mother. His draft file contained an affidavit by a physician, who was a relative, to the effect that due to a congenital heart disease Reis should not engage in any strenuous physical effort. Several persons interviewed in 1942 said Reis was in good health and engaged in sports. Reis told another individual he was perfectly healthy. Reis never served in the Armed Forces and on 8/22/42, after a physical examination at an induction center, Reis was found physically disqualified for military service by reason of chronic, valvular heart disease, rheumatic, and was classified 4-F.

Two of the individuals listed by Reis as references in 1942 were members of the National Lawyers Guild which has been cited as a communist front.

Reis registered a preference for the American Labor Party in 1937, 1938 and 1940, while a resident of the Bronx in New York City. Although the communists put forth efforts to capture the entire American Labor Party throughout New York State they succeeded in capturing only the Manhattan and Brooklyn sections of the party.

OTHER REFERENCES TO REIS IN BUREAU FILES: On a press release of the Department announcing Reis's appointment as First Assistant in the Office of Legal Counsel the Director noted that Reis was the individual who selected Department representatives to accompany him (Reis) to a State Department conference in Puerto Rico ignoring the FBI. Reis was designated by the Attorney General in February, 1965, to serve as his alternate on the Presidents Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and as his alternate on the Presidents Council on Equal Opportunity. The Director noted concerning this designation of Reis to "watch this carefully as Reis is inclined to throw his weight around. H." On a background memorandum regarding Reis dated 6/21/66 the Director noted that Reis was "another foul ball. H."

A highly confidential source advised on 6/22/65 that Harry Wachtel, Executive Vice President of the Gandhi Society for Human Rights which furnishes legal assistance in certain civil rights cases, told Reverend Andrew Young, Executive Assistant to the President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, that he was to meet with Harold Reis who was described as "our best friend up there." This information was not approved for dissemination to the Department and has not previously been disseminated.

In a memorandum 10/10/66 to the Acting Attorney General, which was read by him but not retained by the Department, his attention was brought to the procedures being followed in connection with requests made by the Bureau for approval by him of technical surveillancescommonly known as wire taps. In this memorandum it was pointed out that Mr. Reis had wanted to know the basis on which wire tap continuation requests were sent to the Department every six months. It was pointed out that the procedure was based on the suggestion of former Attorney General Katzenbach and that former Attorney General Katzenbach had approved all of the continuation requests with the exception of one that was used in coverage of Martin Luther King which had been approved by former Attorney General Kennedy. Katzenbach declined to authorize the continuation of the wire tap on King. It was pointed out that previously highly sensitive matters of this kind were supposedly known in the Department only by the Attorney General; however, additional information concerning these matters was being requested by personnel in the Acting Attorney General's Office.

Mr. DeLoach was contacted by Reis on 10/3/66 and in their discussion Reis stated that he thought it had been a good idea to admit to the Supreme Court the usage of a microphone in the Black Case. Mr. DeLoach told him this was one of the most stupid blunders the Department had ever pulled and that there had been no necessity to admit the usage of a microphone. Reis said it had been a good idea to admit usage in this particular case since there was less tainted evidence in this case than in any other and that if the Supreme Court had been presented with a case which involved considerable "bedroom gossip" the Supreme Court would have had no alternative but to issue a sweeping declaration preventing usage of all electronic devices in the future. Reis stated he had assisted Attorney General Katzenbach with the preparation of the draft given to the Supreme Court in the Black Case.

Mr. DeLoach advised 10/11/66 Reis reportedly stated on one occasion that he owed considerable loyalty to Bobby Kennedy inasmuch as Kennedy had brought him into the Attorney General's Office and had given him a higher position and private office. Reis obviously is quite loyal to Bobby Kennedy. Mr. DeLoach stated it should also be noted that in a conversation with Acting Attorney General Clark on the night of October 10, 1966, Clark told him (Mr. DeLoach) that Reis in answer to a specific question had told Clark that "it was alright to wait a week or 10 days to approve requests for wire taps as sent over by the FBI" and Clark was straightened out on this matter. Clark stated he realizes he was wrong in depending on Reis for these facts.

On October 11, 1966, Mr. DeLoach stated he brought up the matter of Harold Reis and Jim Flug in the Attorney General's Office with Acting Attorney General Ramsey Clark. Mr. Clark was advised

618

that the Director and personnel in the FBI felt that Reis and Flug were the deliberate perpetrators of discord between the FBI and the Department. Mr. Clark was advised that obviously Reis had deliberately caused a great deal of unpleasantness in our dealings in the Black Case. Mr. DeLoach further told Mr. Clark that we not only had an intense dislike and distrust of Reis but that Justice Fortas of the Supreme Court had advised of his feelings concerning Reis and that Justice Fortas had even advised the President concerning this matter. Mr. Clark stated that he was was glad to get these facts and that he would take this matter under consideration.

ACTION: Attached is a memorandum to the Acting Attorney General referring to the Department's request for a name check and Internal Revenue Service record check concerning Reis and briefly summarizing the derogatory information developed by the three investigations conducted concerning Reis.

It is suggested that the attached memorandum to the Acting Attorney General be delivered to him by Mr. DeLoach and at that time the Acting Attorney General again be advised of our past unsatisfactory relations with Reis and he be furnished the information received from the highly confidential source indicating that persons connected with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference considered Reis "our best friend up there." Attached is a copy of Atlanta's memorandum 6/23/66 reporting the details of this information.

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale

- Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Bruggeman

The Acting Attorney General January 5, 1967

Director, FBI

HAROLD FRANK REIS
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. John T. Duffner, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General, dated December 30, 1966, requesting a name check and Internal Revenue Service record check concerning the captioned individual.

Our files show that Mr. Reis was the subject of applicant-type investigations requested by the Department in 1942 and 1950. In 1953, at the request of the Atomic Energy Commission, we brought up to date the prior investigations concerning Mr. Reis in connection with his clearance for access to restricted atomic energy data. The reports of these investigations have previously been furnished to the Department.

The investigations of Mr. Reis disclosed that in 1935 he was listed in the records of the City College of New York as a member of the Politica Club. This club was reported to have been headed by two individuals associated with communist activities at the City College of New York. Mr. Reis's membership in this club was not confirmed and it was reported that the leaders of the organization were known to erroneously index nonmembers as members and to refrain from indexing actual members.

Mr. Reis registered a preference for the American Labor Party in 1937, 1938, and 1940, while a resident of the Bronx in New York City. With regard to the American Labor Party, the House Committee on Un-American Activities has stated:

> "For years, the communists have put forth the greatest efforts to capture the entire American Labor Party throughout New York State. They succeeded in capturing

RLB:bab:jmm
(8)

> the Manhattan and Brooklyn sections of the American Labor Party but outside of New York City they have been unable to win control."

When reviewed in May, 1942, Mr. Reis's selective service file disclosed he had been classified 3A because of the dependency of his mother. His file contained an affidavit from a relative who was a physician to the effect that Reis should not engage in strenuous physical activity because of a congenital heart disease. Several persons interviewed in 1942 stated Mr. Reis was in good health and engaged in sports. Mr. Reis told another individual that he was perfectly healthy. In August, 1942, at an induction station, Mr. Reis was found physically disqualified for military service by reason of "chronic valvular heart disease, rheumatic," and was classified 4F.

Two of the individuals listed by Mr. Reis as references in 1942 were members of the National Lawyers' Guild which has been cited by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a communist front.

The Internal Revenue Service has advised that its records show that income tax returns were timely filed by Mr. Reis for the years 1963, 1964, and 1965. There was no record of unpaid taxes, liens, or intelligence investigations concerning these returns.

Domestic Intelligence Division

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES

As of January 12, 1967, the Bureau has 17 domestic intelligence telephone surveillances. These provide coverage of domestic subversive organizations and individuals. Furthermore, we have 59 foreign intelligence telephone surveillances. These provide coverage of diplomatic and official establishments of foreign countries. Also, we have coverage of 40 teletype facilities of diplomatic establishments. We do not have any microphone surveillances in operation.

All of the above electronic surveillances which we have in operation were approved in writing by the Acting Attorney General on December 29, 1966, for a period through March 31, 1967.

This page was removed since it involves discussion of a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation..

DOMINICAN SITUATION

The FBI was ordered into the Dominican Republic by the President in May, 1965, to develop information to be used in preventing communists from gaining control in that country. We set up a staff of ten Agents. In August, 1966, at White House instructions we established a permanent Legal Attache office there, staffed with three Agents.

The six-month-old government under Joaquin Balaguer has brought about a degree of stability. Nevertheless, there continue to be strong undercurrents of dissension. The rightists reportedly have considered plots to remove Balaguer. Juan Bosch's political party, loser in the June, 1966, election, has been most vocal in its opposition to Balaguer's programs. The communist groups have suffered much internal dissension but to accomplish a common cause could be expected to regroup as they have in the past. In fact, a student strike in Santo Domingo, which began January 9, 1967, has attracted strong communist support and has served as a rallying point for the extreme leftists. Within two days, seventy percent of the students in secondary schools had joined the strike.

This is but one of numerous problems which beset Balaguer, although to date he has been able to meet each one head on.

This page has been removed since it involves pending litigation

HERBERT WILLIAM BOECKENHAUPT

information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operation.

[redacted]

Boeckenhaupt, a Staff Sergeant, United States Air Force, entered military service in 1960. He is a cryptographic systems maintenance and repairman and possessed "Top Secret" clearance. On April 20, 1966, he was detected by FBI Agents in a clandestine meeting in suburban Virginia with Aleksey R. Malinin, Soviet Embassy employee and reportedly a Colonel of Soviet Military Intelligence.

On October 24, 1966, Boeckenhaupt was arrested by Air Force representatives at March Air Force Base, Riverside, California, for violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice in that he failed to report his contacts with representative of a foreign government (Malinin).

On October 31, 1966, a complaint was filed before the United States Commissioner, Los Angeles, charging Boeckenhaupt with conspiracy to commit espionage. He was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria, Virginia, on December 16, 1966, for conspiracy to commit espionage and for conspiracy to act as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Department of State. On January 9, 1967, his court-appointed attorney submitted data to the Clerk of the United States District Court, Alexandria, Virginia, requesting that Boeckenhaupt's trial be kept in the Central District of California, and that Boeckenhaupt not be removed to the Eastern District of Virginia to stand trial in this matter.

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, is currently writing a book to be entitled "Where Do We Go From Here" to be published in the spring. This book allegedly will deal with the resurgence of the "white backlash," "black power," and propose a course of action the Federal Government should take concerning the civil rights movement. King has been counseled by Stanley Levison, his principal advisor and long-time communist, to run for President of the United States in 1968. He has this suggestion under consideration and reportedly has made no decision. We maintain a wire tap on Stanley Levison to determine the degree of communist influence in the racial field.

STOKELY CARMICHAEL

Stokely Carmichael, Chairman, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, a highly militant civil rights organization, continues to make inflammatory statements advocating violence as a means of obtaining Negro objectives as well as urging Negroes not fight in Vietnam. At present, Carmichael is facing charges of "inciting to riot" in Atlanta, Georgia, and Selma, Alabama. He was convicted of these charges in Selma, Alabama; however, the conviction is currently under appeal by him. Carmichael recently underwent a physical reexamination to determine his suitability for military service. The results of this examination have not been made known.

General Investigative Division

ROBERT G. BAKER
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The most recent development relative to the trial of Baker is the disclosure in the afternoon edition of "The Evening Star," 1/12/67, that the Narcotics Bureau of the Treasury Department installed a "bug" in the Baker case. It is reported that this installation relates to the Department's admission during the trial that it had planted a microphone and transmitter on Wayne Bromley, a prime Government witness, in order to record the results of a meeting held on 3/26/65, at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel, Los Angeles, California, which was attended by Baker, Clifford Jones and Bromley. The article points out that the FBI had refused a request of the Department to cover this meeting. It also points out that according to Edward Bennett Williams, Baker's attorney, that in compliance with an order of Judge Gasch to turn over tapes and transcripts, only notes made by two monitors were received indicating the tape was not usable or available.

This meeting at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel is the meeting which was arranged during telephone calls on 3/25/65, between Bromley and Baker and Bromley and Jones which were monitored and tape recorded by the Bureau at the request of the Department, with the Department's assurance that such action was legal and with the written consent of Bromley. A complete transcript of these recordings was made available to the Department.

Although the Department did on 3/25/65, request that we monitor the meeting in Los Angeles, we refused to do so. Upon revelation during pretrial hearings that this meeting was monitored, Acting Attorney General Ramsey Clark was questioned as to who performed this monitoring. He stated that he had ascertained that upon the FBI's refusal to comply with the departmental request, the Department had then turned to either the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or the Bureau of Narcotics. He was certain that it was the Bureau of Narcotics.

The only other coverage of any conversations by Baker was accidental in nature and resulted from installations which had been placed on Fred B. Black in Washington, D. C.; the Fremont Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada, Edward Siegelbaum, Miami, Florida, (all in connection with organized crime matters) and the Dominican Embassy (in connection with security matters). Details concerning these installations were set forth in a summary memorandum regarding the Bureau's involvement in the prosecution of Baker dated 1/10/67.

Logs relative to the electronic surveillances on Black, the Fremont Hotel and Siegelbaum were furnished to the Department and excerpts were furnished to the trial judge who ordered that they be made available to the defense. These logs were the subject of pretrial hearings during November, 1966, following which the judge ruled that there was no causal relationship between the information in the logs and the charges in the indictment.

Logs concerning Baker's conversations intercepted on the Dominican Embassy installation were similarly furnished to the Department and to the trial judge who placed a protective order thereon and has instructed that any discussions relative to them must be held only in his chambers. Information as to the existence of these logs has been leaked to the press, presumably by Edward Bennett Williams to cause some action favorable to his client. His reporting to the trial judge that the FBI was responsible for this leak is absolutely ridiculous and is completely unfounded.

JAMES RIDDLE HOFFA; ET AL.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

James Riddle Hoffa and three others were convicted in Chattanooga Federal Court, 3/4/64, of obstruction of justice related to their efforts to tamper with certain members of the jury in a previous trial of Hoffa. These convictions were upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court on 12/12/66.

In response to a request from Assistant Attorney General Fred M. Vinson, Jr., we furnished a letter to the Acting Attorney General on 12/29/66, of instances in which the conversations of Hoffa and two other defendants were overheard through the use of electronic devices. Hoffa, his office, and his home were not the direct targets of any electronic devices in the development of this case, and the Acting Attorney General was so advised in our memorandum of 12/29/66. The instances in which he appeared to have been present at conversations monitored occurred in Detroit, Michigan, and Las Vegas, Nevada.

In 1961 and 1962 our Detroit office overheard three conversations of Hoffa. These conversations were broadcast to and from radio-telephones in automobiles operated by Teamsters Union personnel in the Detroit area. This was accomplished through the use of a tunable commercial-type FM radio receiver which was in operation in our Detroit office. No trespass was involved in this connection.

In addition, between 2/1 and 8/12/63, Hoffa appears to have participated in four telephone conversations with two Las Vegas hoodlum figures who were being covered by electronic eavesdropping devices (trespass involved). Hoffa's part of these conversations was not overheard.

Zeno Thomas Osborn, Jr., (Nashville lawyer and former attorney for Hoffa) was convicted 6/29/64, in Nashville Federal Court of obstruction of justice arising from his attempts to influence a potential juror in a forthcoming trial of Hoffa. In this investigation, a miniature recorder was concealed on a cooperative Government witness during a meeting with Osborn. This installation was made at the request of the Department and with the prior approval of the two Federal judges in Nashville. No trespass was involved, and the use of this installation was brought out fully during Osborn's trial. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court 12/12/66. The Department is fully aware of this installation and details of same were included in our letter to the Acting Attorney General 12/29/66.

At the specific request of former Attorney General Kennedy, a microphone surveillance (trespass required) was conducted on the Washington, D. C., hotel room of James E. Haggerty (former attorney for James Riddle Hoffa) during period 8/7/61, through 8/11/61. This coverage was for the specific purpose of identifying an alleged "contact" of Hoffa's in the Justice Department, whom Kennedy thought Haggerty would meet in Washington. Information concerning this coverage was included in our letter to the Acting Attorney General dated 12/29/66. In addition, in response to a letter from Vinson dated 12/29/66, we furnished the Acting Attorney General copies of logs prepared in connection with this coverage by memorandum dated 1/6/67.

JURY PANEL INVESTIGATIONS

On January 9, 1967, a letter was forwarded to the Acting Attorney General advising him that in view of the increasing sensitiveness to intrusion by the Federal Government into the rights of defendants in criminal trials and in order to assure that future requests for jury panel investigations would be made only in truly exceptional cases, investigations of this nature should not be undertaken by the Bureau except upon the specific written request of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General and that our field offices were being so instructed.

CIVIL RIGHTS MATTERS IN MISSISSIPPI

Two major civil rights cases are awaiting prosecutive action in Mississippi. One of these cases involves the murder of three civil rights workers near Philadelphia, Mississippi, in June, 1964, in which case eighteen subjects were previously indicted on civil rights charges by a Federal Grand Jury. The other case involves the shooting and burning of the residence of Vernon Ferdinand Dahmer, past president of the NAACP,near Hattiesburg, Mississippi, in January, 1966, resulting in the death of Dahmer. A Federal Grand Jury indicted fifteen members of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi relative to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Civil Rights Statute.

In view of a court decision subsequent to the above indictments, it was determined by the Government that all of the indictments in these two cases are faulty because certain minority groups including Negroes had been excluded from the grand jury. The Department has been pushing for early representations to a properly composed grand jury and had contemplated that both of these cases would be given to a Federal Grand Jury being empaneled 1/16/67.

On 1/3/67 U. S. District Judge Harold Cox advised SAC Roy Moore that he had instructed the U. S. Attorney to use the January grand jury for the purpose of checking into possible misuse of funds in the Headstart project sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity in Mississippi. The Judge referred to press accounts stating that the Government was providing additional money for this project although it has been alleged that several hundred thousand dollars of the initial appropriation was unaccounted for. Judge Cox said that he felt "first things come first" and therefore decided to use the grand jury to ferret out any possible fraud in connection with the failure to account for these funds. He stated he would advise SAC Moore when he convenes another grand jury to hear the civil rights cases. Judge Cox added that this will be done sometime in the near future but that no specific date has been set. It has been speculated in the press that if Judge Cox fails to promptly call a grand jury to hear the civil rights cases the Government will seek mandamus from the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the purpose of forcing Judge Cox to call a grand jury to hear these cases.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION REGARDING CRIMES AGAINST BANKING INSTITUTIONS

By letter to the Attorney General 3/1/65, we called attention to the rise in crimes against banking institutions and recommended the Department propose legislation which would require bank supervisory agencies to establish minimum security requirements for all banks under Federal Charter. A follow-up letter was sent on 3/29/65, and again on 3/1/66. The Department advised on 4/12/66, that a legislative proposal was being developed. A proposed bill was submitted for our review on 6/6/66, which we returned on 6/9/66, recommending no changes. In reply to our inquiry on 7/25/66, the Department, on 8/3/66, advised the Bill was under study by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General.

We inquired again on 10/6/66, and on 10/26/66, were advised that since the 89th Congress was so near an end, the legislation would be included on program for 90th Congress. By letter 11/28/66, we were advised that the Bill had been returned to the Criminal Division with certain observations and suggestions. On 1/9/67, we again called attention to the increase in violations. Current figures show that during calendar year 1966, violations increased to 1871, a new all-time high, surpassing the 1749 violations in calendar year 1965.

WALTER BERYL CHIPMAN, ET AL.
CRIME ON HIGH SEAS

Alvin Junior Cupp, who had received a five-year Federal term on 3/16/65, in Marquette, Michigan, furnished information to Chicago Agents pinpointing officials and "goons" of the Seamens International Union (SIU) responsible for the 1963 bombing of the Canadian freighter, "Howard L. Shaw" in Chicago, Illinois.

Upon Cupp's parole from prison 12/23/66, he was immediately contacted by union officials allegedly for the purpose of paying him off a promised $8,000 for maintaining his silence relative to the "Howard L. Shaw" bombing while in prison. The U. S. Attorney's office in Chicago requested that an electronic device be attached to Cupp's person to record conversations with union officials, anticipating evidence would be obtained whereby prosecution of these officials would be forthcoming. SAC, Chicago advised the U. S. Attorney on 1/4/67, that the Bureau could not accede to his request since the Solicitor General had publicly announced that all eavesdropping is illegal.

At approximately 9 P.M., 1/5/67, the Acting Attorney General called Mr. DeLoach relative to this case, indicating he felt this was a legal device and he could see no reason why it should not be used. Mr. DeLoach informed the Acting Attorney General if he felt this way he should put these views in writing, since the FBI could not afford to be criticized on one hand and then on the other hand be directed by the Department to enter into such procedures. The Acting Attorney General, upon a moment's reflection, stated that in view of the "psychological situation" he probably would not put this request in writing and perhaps would inform the Organized Crime Section of the Department not to request the FBI to utilize this device. We have since received no such request from the Acting Attorney General.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Bishop
DATE: 2-17-69

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND OTHERS FEBRUARY 20, 1969

Attorney General's Staff Conference

The Director has an appointment to have luncheon with the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and Mr. Ehrlichman, Legal Counsel to the President, on Thursday, February 20, 1969. There is attached a brief containing items of possible pertinent interest for the Director's use in connection with this luncheon meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For the Director's information.

Enclosure

TSB

File

1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Bishop - Enclosure

EX-10

DGH:pls/cmj
(6)

REC-23 62-97856-135

JUL 25 1969

CRIME RESEARCH

2 ENCLOSURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SYNOPSIS a - g

BUREAU STATISTICS

FBI Personnel 1
Overtime Services 1
National Crime 1
District of Columbia Crime 1
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 2

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Communist Party, USA 3
New Left Movement 3
Racial Unrest on College Campuses 4
Black Panther Party 4
Soviet and Satellite Espionage 4
United States - Communist China Relations 5
Israeli Intelligence 6
Assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy 7
Martin Luther King, Jr. 7

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS

Suggestions for the Reduction of Crime in the District of Columbia 9
Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. 10
Alleged Violations of Federal Corrupt Practices Act by 21 Political Committees 11
Sirhan Bishara Sirhan Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy 12
Gary Steven Krist; Ruth Eisemann-Schier; Barbara Jane Mackle - Victim: Kidnaping 13

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS

Discontinuance of Background Investigations on Clerical Applicants for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) 14

Martin Edward Underwood 15
Virginia Stanfill Savell 16
Donald Edwin Ganoung, Departmental Applicant, Consultant, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D. C. 17
William Henry Rentschler 18
Special Inquiry Investigations for the White House 19
Selective Service 20
Criminal Intelligence and Organized Crime 21
Recent Major Accomplishments 21
Dissemination Program 22
Department of Justice Task Forces on Organized Crime 22
La Cosa Nostra Leadership Changes 23
Department's Manual for use of Electronic Surveillance Under Title III of Omnibus Crime Control Bill 24

MISCELLANEOUS

ABC-TV Series 26

BRIEF

LUNCHEON MEETING WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL AND OTHERS

Thursday, February 20, 1969

SYNOPSIS

BUREAU STATISTICS

FBI Personnel As of 2/13/69 there were 6,929 Special Agents and 9,052 clerical employees for a total of 15,981 employees on the rolls of the FBI.

Overtime Services The overtime service by our investigative staff averages more than two and one-half hours each workday and during fiscal year 1968 totaled 3,845,461 hours, the equivalent of 1,849 additional employees on a full-year basis. This was a cost-free saving to the Government of over $14 million.

National Crime Crime Index for January-September, 1968, recorded a 19 percent increase. Largest increases noted in cities 250,000 to 1 million population where a 22 percent rise was recorded. There were an estimated 4.6 million serious crimes in the United States in 1968 compared to 3.8 million in 1967.

District of Columbia Crime For calendar year 1967, District had sixth highest crime rate among the 56 cities 250,000 and above. Crime figures for calendar year 1968 indicate District recorded an over-all gain of 25 percent in the number of serious offenses.

National Crime Information Center (NCIC) NCIC is a nationwide index of documented law enforcement information on crime and criminals. Began in January, 1967, with pilot operation. Now terminals in 47 states. Over 780,000 records in system and 33,000 messages handled daily in 24-hour operating day.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

INFORMATION tends to identify peculiarly sensitive ongoing Foreign Intelligence operations

[redacted]

New Left Movement has led a wave of extremism on our college campuses marked by growing violence. Part of world-wide revolutionary movement of students and young intellectuals. New Leftists from U. S. have played important roles in demonstrationsin foreign countries.

Racial Unrest on College Campuses Campuses throughout U. S. have been marked by racial unrest. Minority groups such as Black Student Union becoming increasingly militant and violent. Demands unreasonable. Other militant groups have joined in demonstrations and offer full support to minority groups.

Black Panther Party is most active, notorious and violence-prone black extremist group. Branches in 25 cities. Will possibly go underground. Minister of Education is George Mason Murray, a suspended instructor at San Francisco State College.

Soviet and Satellite Espionage The U. S. is the number one espionage target of Soviet Union and satellites. Intelligence operations coordinated by Soviet Union. Embassies and missions are focal points. As of February, 1969, approximately 230 Soviet and 117 satellite personnel operating. Consular Convention between U. S. and Soviet Union became effective July 13, 1968, and will probably increase capability for espionage.

Information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive foreign counterintelligence operations.

Assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy Essence of Clay Shaw trial in New Orleans lies/alleged connection between Oswald, David Ferrie (deceased) and Clay Shaw. Not established in exhaustive FBI investigation. Bureau maintaining "hands off" policy regarding Garrison investigation. Garrison mental stability is questionable. He received medical discharge from U. S. Army in 1951 for an emotional problem. Admitted to Army authorities that he had received psychiatric treatment.

Excision of material re King as it derives from electronic surveillance.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS

Suggestions for the Reduction of Crime in the District of Columbia. Should be an Enabling Statute which would allow juveniles to be handled as they are throughout U. S. Mandatory sentences recommended for crimes committed with the use of firearms. Registration of all convicted felons should be considered. Abolishment of capital punishment should be opposed until a life sentence means "life." Provisions of Bank Protection Act of 1968 should be accelerated.

Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. Intensive FBI investigation revealed killer of King on 4/4/68 to be James Earl Ray. Ray arrested by Scotland Yard 6/8/68. Extradited to U. S. and turned over to local authorities in Memphis, Tennessee, for State prosecution. Local trial scheduled for [illegible].

Alleged Violations of Federal Corrupt Practices Act by 21 Political Committees. We were instructed by former Assistant Attorney General Vinson to interview the Chairmen and Treasurers of 20 Republican Committees and one Democratic Committee that filed late reports with the Clerk of the House. White House staff members refused to be interviewed. Investigation going forward on expeditious basis. Department being kept advised.

Sirhan Bishara Sirhan Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Senator Kennedy killed [illegible] in Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles. Sirhan identified as assailant. Indicted and charged with murder. Trial began, Los Angeles Superior Court, [illegible].

Gary Steven Krist; Ruth Eisemann-Schier; Barbara Jane Mackle - Victim Kidnaping Mackle kidnaped from Atlanta, Georgia, motel 12-17-68 and $500,000 ransom demand made. FBI investigation resulted in her safe return and Krist and Eisemann-Schier identified as kidnappers. Krist apprehended and all-out investigation continuing to locate Eisemann-Schier. Krist will be tried by state and next appearance in court scheduled for 2-28-69.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) Since the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) was formed under the jurisdiction of the Department, the FBI has been conducting background investigations on its applicants and employees. This was done pursuant to Departmental Order #175-59, dated 4-1-59. However, the BNDD was discovered to be conducting some duplicate investigation of their clerical applicants. We objected to this wasted effort and expressed our views to the Department which countered with a proposal advanced by Associate BNDD Director Giordano, that we share parts of these investigations with them. By letter of 2-6-69, in reply to this proposal, we informed the Department that no additional requests for BNDD applicant investigations would be accepted, except those submitted under the provisions of the Federal Employee Security Program.

Martin Edward Underwood Underwood, an employee of the Department of Commerce, who was detailed to the White House in 1966 to serve as an advance man for former President Johnson, was removed from his office at the White House on 2-6-69, and the Department of Commerce has been instructed to inform him that his services are no longer required. Our investigation of Underwood, which was furnished the White House on 2-12-69, disclose that he had severe drinking problem until at least 1964.

Virginia Stanfill Savell We conducted a discreet inquiry of Savell in September, 1966, at the request of former Senator Kuchel (R) of California, for whom she then worked in his Los Angeles office. It had been alleged she was operating a bookie joint out of the Senator's office but our inquiry developed no information to substantiate this. However, it was reported that she was an alcoholic. Current investigation revealed Savel attempted to commit suicide in July, 1967, by overdose of sleeping pills.

Donald Edward Ganoung We have investigated Ganoung as a Departmental applicant for the position of consultant with the Law Enforcement Administration at Washington, D. C., the position he now holds. He has a degree in criminology and is a former Episcopalian priest who has worked among deviate elements. He has also been active in civil rights and antidraft demonstrations and twice was arrested in this connection. Divorced by his wife in 1967 after he had an affair with another woman, Ganoung also IRS [JFK Law 11(a)] [redacted] The results of our investigation of him were furnished to the Attorney General on 2/11/69.

William Henry Rentschler Rentschler, a candy company operator, has been extremely active in Illinois Republican Party politics. He carried on a notorious adulterous relationship which led to a divorce from a former wife. Our investigation of him revealed many prominent persons who would not recommend Rentschler for a position with the Government in view of his moral weaknesses and reported lack of business acumen. Our investigation not yet complete but summary memo furnished the White House on 2/10/69.

Special Inquiry Investigations for the White House Security officers of various Government agencies have expressed shock at the lack of knowledge or the total disregard of the provisions of the Federal Employee Security Program by the White House staff responsible for filling top-level positions with the new Administration. Most requests for investigation have been of persons already firmly established in their new jobs. When derogatory data is developed it is simply requested that the investigation be continued. Only one person is known to have been discharged as a result of derogatory information developed during investigation. Don Virdin, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), called Bureau 2/13/69 and indicated Bureau had checked through IRS only 8 of last 25 publicly announced Presidential appointees. Bureau has run checks of IRS on all requests received from White House on Presidential appointees and it would appear White House only asked for 8 of last 25 to be checked.

Selective Service These cases in recent years have broadened in scope with recurring schemes to obstruct the draft. We have 14,000 pending investigations, up 5,000 from a year ago. Fiscal year 1968 produced 809 convictions and the first seven months of this fiscal period have recorded 380 convictions, an increase over this period a year ago. An interesting case is summarized which involves an 18-year-old Californian whose mother, following his arraignment for failure to register for the draft, attempted to get a Restraining Order by contending that she was responsible for her son's actions and therefore should be punished rather than him. The Judge rejected her appeal and her son's trial is scheduled for March, 1969.

Criminal Intelligence and Organized Crime While our organized crime investigations are aimed at key members in the power structure, they have also struck hard in the lower echelons with progressively greater penetration into the heart of hoodlum activities - gambling operations. Fiscal year 1968 capped four consecutive record years in convictions of organized crime figures with 281. There are now 789 other hoodlum figures awaiting trial in Federal court thus indicating a continuance of the upward trend in convictions in fiscal year 1969. Recent major accomplishments in the organized crime field include the arrest or conviction of many top La Cosa Nostra leaders across the country. Our dissemination of criminal intelligence data to other Federal and local law enforcement agencies has broken the million mark in number of items in the past five years. This shared FBI data enabled other law enforcement agencies to conduct hundreds of raids, execute thousands of arrests, and recover millions of dollars in gambling funds or stolen property each year. Department Task Force Operations (also called Strike Force) have been formed in Detroit, Michigan; Brooklyn, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Chicago, Illinois; Miami, Florida; and Newark, New Jersey; since the original group at Buffalo, New York. We now maintain liaison with these Task Force groups and it has been recommended that we expand our liaison arrangements with Task Force. There have been La Cosa Nostra leadership changes in New York and Chicago.

Department's Manual for use of Electronic Surveillance Under Title III of Omnibus Crime Control Bill Attorney General has been furnished our views regarding Department's draft manual for use of electrical surveillance pursuant to Title III of Omnibus Crime Control Bill, the general provisions of which concern administrative regulations not specifically required by the statute itself. The manual's requirements would impose tremendous administrative and procedural restrictions on the FBI and other Federal agencies to the point that strict compliance might be self-defeating to the goal of maintaining discreet electronic surveillance coverage under court supervision for the purpose of obtaining admissible evidence against the leadership of organized crime and in other major investigative categories. Included would be requirements for review of an application for a court order at a number of levels within the Department, and by the Attorney General, before the application reached the judge, involving delay and the spreading of information about our use of this technique among a comparatively wide range of authorities. Included in our views was our belief that for the Government's ultimate success in making use of this evidence gathering procedure, restrictions must not apply which will create more limitations on law enforcement than the statute itself prescribes.

MISCELLANEOUS

ABC-TV Series "The FBI" is in its fourth year and production plans are going forward at the present time for a fifth season. Latest 30 Market Nielson Rating reflects it is second most popular show on air and has 26 million viewers. Plans being made to present on our program film on Mackle kidnaping case next season after prosecutive action is completed. Being shown in 43 different countries.

Details

↓ ↓ ↓

BUREAU STATISTICS

FBI Personnel

As of 2/13/69 there were 6,929 Special Agents and 9,052 clerical employees for a total of 15,981 employees on the rolls of the FBI.

Overtime Services

The overtime service by our investigative staff averages more than two and one-half hours each workday and during the fiscal year 1968 totaled 3,845,461 hours, the equivalent of 1,849 additional employees on a full-year basis. Taking into consideration the limited extent to which this overtime was compensated under fringe benefits regulations of the Civil Service Commission, there was a cost-free saving to the Government of over $14 million when compared to the value of the total overtime performed. This is a tremendous voluntary contribution by our investigative staff.

National Crime

While preliminary crime figures for calendar year 1968 are not yet available, for the period January through September, 1968, over the same period in 1967, the Crime Index nationwide recorded a 19 percent increase. The largest increases were noted in cities 250,000 to 1 million population where a 22 percent rise was recorded. Nationally, the violent crimes of murder, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault as a group increased 21 percent and the more voluminous property crimes of burglary, larceny $50 and over and auto theft rose 19 percent. There were an estimated 4.6 million serious crimes in the United States in 1968 compared to 3.8 million in 1967.

District of Columbia Crime

For calendar year 1967, Washington, D. C., had the sixth highest crime rate among the 56 cities 250,000 population and above. Crime figures for calendar year 1968 indicate that

Washington, D. C., recorded an over-all gain of 25 percent in the number of serious offenses.

National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

NCIC is a nationwide index of documented law enforcement information on crime and criminals. Its objective is to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement through the more efficient handling and exchange of information. In January, 1967, a pilot operation was begun with terminals in 15 local and state law enforcement agencies. NCIC now has 78 control terminals in 47 states, the District of Columbia and Canada. North Carolina and Wyoming will be added in the near future; however, Alaska will be delayed due to very high communication circuit costs. The files consist of stolen motor vehicles, license plates, firearms, other identifiable stolen property including securities, and wanted persons. Over 780,000 records are in the system and more than 33,000 messages are handled each day. Positive responses to inquiries wherein a record is furnished now exceed 220 each 24 hours. NCIC is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

INFORMATION tends to identify sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operations

New Left Movement

The New Left movement, an amorphous, undisciplined collection of malcontents, has led a wave of extremism on our college campuses which has been marked by growing violence and lawlessness. During the past year a surge of bombings and arsons, along lines advocated by New Left extremists, has accounted for over $2,000,000 in damages to property consisting mostly of college facilities and U. S. Government property. The New Left movement in this country is clearly an integral part of a worldwide revolutionary movement of students and young intellectuals. New Leftists from the United States have played an important role in demonstrations which have taken place in England, France, West Germany, Japan, and Mexico. They have established and maintained contacts with representatives of communist and other leftist organizations abroad through meetings, conferences, and correspondence; traveling to communist countries, such as Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, North Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.

*Classified "~~Top~~ Secret"

Downgraded to Secret
per CA8W57B22
on 2/24/2017

Racial Unrest on College Campuses

Campuses throughout the United States have been marked by racial unrest as exemplified by the current disruptions at San Francisco State College, San Francisco, California; and the University of California, Berkeley, California. Such groups as the Third World Liberation Front, a coalition of minority groups, and the Black Student Union are becoming increasingly militant and violence prone in presenting their demands to college authorities. Demands made by such groups include the establishment of a separate college for minority groups, particularly Negroes; the establishment of black courses; the hiring of minority group professors and administrators; and the control of hiring and firing of faculty members by students. At San Francisco State College over 400 individuals have been arrested during a current wave of disruption and attempts are being made to force the College to close. Students for a Democratic Society and other militant groups have joined in these demonstrations and offer full support to minority groups.

Black Panther Party

The Black Panther Party is the most active, notorious, violence-prone black extremist organization. In the past nine months it has established branches in 25 cities across the country with a hard-core membership of at least 1,200.

The latest development is the order from national headquarters to stop recruiting for a time in order to weed out informants and undesirables and concentrate on political indoctrination based on the writings of MAO Tse-tung of Communist China. There is also increasing discussion of the necessity for going underground.

The Black Panther Party Minister of Education George Mason Murray, a suspended instructor at San Francisco State College, holds a position on the Central Committee of the Black Student Union at that College. The Black Student Union instigated the campus unrest which has plagued this institution during the current school year.

Soviet and Satellite Espionage

The United States is the number one espionage target of the Soviet Union and its European satellites (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania). The intelligence operations of these satellites are coordinated against the United States by the Soviets. The embassies of these countries in Washington and their missions to the United Nations in New York are focal points for their espionage activities. As of February, 1969, there were approximately 230 Soviet personnel and 117 satellite personnel with intelligence assignments operating out of their respective official establishments.

This represents since February, 1959, a 210% increase in Soviet intelligence personnel and a 100% increase in satellite intelligence personnel.

A Consular Convention between the United States and the Soviet Union became effective July 13, 1968. This would grant diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction for Soviet Consular personnel in the United States and United States Consular personnel in the Soviet Union. On August 13, 1968, the Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed establishment of a Soviet Consulate General at San Francisco, California, in return for a United States Consulate General in Leningrad. There has been no progress in negotiations regarding establishment of Consulates since last August. Establishment of a Soviet Consulate in San Francisco will increase Soviet capability for espionage.

Information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign counterintelligence operations.

information contained on page 6 tends to identify peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operations.

61

INFormation tends to identify peculiarly sensitive ongoing
sensitive foreign intelligence operations.

Assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy

The essence of the Clay Shaw trial in New Orleans lies in the connection New Orleans District Attorney James C. Garrison is attempting to establish between Lee Harvey Oswald, David Ferrie (now deceased), and Clay Shaw. The principal witness has been Perry Russo who has said Oswald, Ferrie, and Shaw discussed assassinating President Kennedy at a meeting in Ferrie's apartment in New Orleans in September, 1963.

Immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy, the FBI received allegations of a connection between Ferrie and Oswald. These allegations were thoroughly and exhaustively investigated. No evidence was ever developed that Oswald and Ferrie were acquainted. Clay Shaw's name never came up in the investigation and the FBI never investigated him.

The FBI has held to a "hands-off" policy regarding Garrison's investigation. Although we are closely following Shaw's trial, we have no observers in the courtroom. It is noted that the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice has an unofficial observer in the courtroom.

Garrison's mental stability is questionable. He received a medical discharge in October, 1951, from the U. S. Army for an emotional problem. He admitted to Army authorities that he had received psychiatric treatment. Garrison was a Special Agent of the FBI for four months, resigning to re-enter military service in July, 1951.

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR

EXCISE OF MATERIAL RE KING derived From ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF King and derived from a peculiarly sensitive source in foreign intelligence operations.

information contained on page 8 tends to identify a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE REDUCTION OF CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

In connection with the juvenile problem in the District of Columbia, it is suggested that an Enabling Statute be passed which would allow juveniles to be handled in the District of Columbia as they are throughout the United States; publicize the names of the juveniles involved in serious crimes and maintain and make available juvenile records to law enforcement agencies. In areas of high crime, improved street lighting should be installed.

Mandatory sentences are recommended for crimes committed with the use of firearms or involving threats, and a habitual criminal statute might be effective. Consideration could be given to the registration of all convicted felons in the District, as well as a law requiring registration of firearms.

Authorities responsible for allowing prisoners to be released under the "Work Release Program" should thoroughly consider their prior records so that vicious felons will not be returned to the streets. In addition, prosecutors should not accept guilty pleas on one count while dismissing other counts; and abolition of capital punishment should be opposed until a life sentence means "life."

As a deterrent to bank robberies, District banks should on a voluntary basis accelerate the implementation of the provisions of the Bank Protection Act of 1968, and consideration should be given to the deployment of one police officer and a bank guard to selected institutions.

More stringent penalties should be invoked for violations of gambling laws, and sentences should be made stiffer for second offenders.

ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

The entire facilities of the FBI were committed to the investigation of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., in Memphis, Tennessee, on 4-4-68, and within five days the man then known as Eric S. Galt was developed as a prime suspect. From a check of latent fingerprints against those of white male fugitives for whom "wanted" notices had been placed in the files of the FBI Identification Division, James Earl Ray was determined to be the true identity of Eric S. Galt. At the request of the FBI, Canadian authorities determined that a Canadian passport had been issued to Ray in the name of Ramon George Sneyd, and on June 8, 1968, Ray was arrested by Scotland Yard when he presented the Sneyd passport to travel from London to Brussels. At the conclusion of extradition proceedings, Ray was returned to the United States in custody of FBI Agents and was turned over to local authorities in Memphis, Tennessee, for state prosecution. Local trial is scheduled for April 7, 1969.

ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT BY 21 POLITICAL COMMITTEES;
W. PAT JENNINGS, CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES - COMPLAINANT
TITLE 2, SECTION 244, USC, ELECTION LAWS

We were instructed by former Assistant Attorney General Vinson to interview the Chairmen and Treasurers of 20 Republican Committees and one Democratic Committee that filed late reports with the Clerk of the House of Representatives. There have been some delays in obtaining necessary information as well as locating the individuals to be interviewed. We have kept the Department fully advised of all developments.

Mr. Daniel W. Hofgren of the White House Staff declined to be interviewed, indicating the matter would have to be taken up with the General Counsel at the White House and the Attorney General. Hofgren indicated he was speaking on behalf of other employees of the White House. This, of course, has been reported to the Attorney General. We are going forward on an expeditious basis with all other interviews and current developments are being brought to the attention of the Department.

SIRHAN BISHARA SIRHAN ASSASSINATION OF SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY

On June 5, 1968, Senator Kennedy was shot and killed in the Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, California, following a political speech. Sirhan Bishara Sirhan was identified by witnesses as the assailant. He was indicted by a Los Angeles County grand jury and charged with murder. Trial began at Los Angeles Superior Court on January 7, 1969. A jury has been selected and the trial is presently in progress.

GARY STEVEN KRIST;
RUTH EISEMANN-SCHIER;
BARBARA JANE MACKLE - VICTIM
KIDNAPING

On December 17, 1968, 20-year-old Barbara Jane Mackle was abducted from an Atlanta, Georgia, area motel. A $500,000 ransom demand was subsequently made of her father, Robert Mackle, a Coral Gables, Florida, resident and business official. FBI investigation resulted in the safe return of Miss Mackle, who had been buried in a coffin-like box northeast of Atlanta, Georgia; the recovery of most of the ransom money; and the apprehension of one of the subjects, identified as Gary Steven Krist. An all-out investigation continues to locate Ruth Eisemann-Schier, the other subject in this case. Federal charges were filed in Miami, Florida, against subjects for violation of Extortion Statute, Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Statute, and the Aiding and Abetting Statute. The subjects were indicted in DeKalb County, Georgia, for kidnaping on January 13, 1969. The Bureau has furnished results of its investigations to local authorities and is cooperating in the state trial which will be held in this matter. Krist was brought before the circuit court in DeKalb County, Georgia, on February 7, 1969, at which time the court appointed two attorneys to represent him. One of the attorneys is James R. Venable, who has been for many years Imperial Wizard for the National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. A three-week delay was requested by the attorneys, and the judge set the next appearance for February 28, 1969.

February 17, 1969

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS
DISCONTINUANCE OF BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATIONS ON CLERICAL
APPLICANTS FOR THE BUREAU OF
NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
(BNDD)

The Bureau has been conducting background investigations on applicants and employees of the BNDD since that agency came under the jurisdiction of the Department. These investigations were conducted pursuant to Departmental Order #175-59 dated April 1, 1959.

Our Chicago Division learned that BNDD had been conducting preemployment checks to include credit and criminal investigation, interviews with former employers, supervisors, and references. On January 21, 1969, both Assistant Attorney General for Administration Pellerzi and Associate Director Giordano, BNDD, agreed with the Bureau's position that conducting duplicate investigations of clerical applicants for BNDD was a waste of time and money; however, on February 4, 1969, Mr. Giordano reversed his position and stated he wanted to run credit and criminal checks and contact the last two employers to see if they had any further interest in the clerical applicant. The Bureau would then be asked to complete the investigation. Mr. Giordano was told that BNDD should do their own clerical applicant investigations entirely or the FBI should do them entirely. The Director noted that he wanted no part of divided responsibility and this position was confirmed in our letter to Mr. Pellerzi dated February 6, 1969, copy attached. This letter advised that effective immediately we would not accept any additional requests for investigations of clerical applicants and that, if during the course of investigations of these people by BNDD, they should find subversive derogatory information, then the case should be referred to the Bureau for a full field investigation under the provisions of the Federal Employee Security Program.

Since February 6, 1969, we have not accepted any requests for investigation of clerical people for BNDD.

Enc. (1)

Mr. Leo M. Pellerzi
Assistant Attorney General for Administration

February 6, 1969

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Cleveland
(1) - Mr. Hartley

DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS
BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

With regard to the request of Mr. Giordano, Associate Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, that the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs be permitted to conduct credit and criminal checks and contact the last two employers in connection with clerical applicants, he was informed on February 4, 1969, of the undesirability of divided responsibility and duplication of investigative effort by the FBI and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. He was advised that it was felt that either they should handle these investigations entirely or the FBI should handle them entirely.

Please be advised that effective/immediately we will not accept any additional requests for investigations of clerical applicants since this Bureau wants no part of divided responsibility regarding these investigations or criticism for any possible duplication of investigative effort. If during the course of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs investigations of their clerical applicants subversive derogatory information is developed, it should be referred to this Bureau for a full field investigation under the provisions of the Federal Employee Security Program.

1 - Mr. Henry L. Giordano
Associate Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

NOTE: See cover memorandum J. H. Gale to DeLoach 2/6/69, same caption, WVC:dbh:msm.

WVC:msm:dbh
(9)

14a

MARTIN EDWARD UNDERWOOD

Underwood, aged 54, was employed for a number of years as a salesman in Illinois and Maryland. Since 1961 he has been employed by the United States Government, for the greater period by the Department of Commerce, and the Small Business Administration. He was detailed to the White House in 1966 as an advance man in connection with the travels of former President Johnson.

We conducted an investigation of Underwood for the White House in 1965 which revealed he had a serious drinking problem prior to the investigation and was considered an alcoholic at one time. He is unmarried and has had two divorces, the first of which was precipitated by his drinking. Several people interviewed in the 1965 investigation would not recommend Underwood because of his drinking on the West Coast in 1964. After President Johnson's departure Underwood continued to hold an office on the first floor of the Executive Office Building, apparently gaining the favor of Vice President Agnew. On February 6, 1969, Underwood was removed from his office and his White House pass has been taken. The White House has been in contact with the Department of Commerce, on whose payroll Underwood has been while working at the White House, and advised the Department of Commerce to inform Underwood his services are no longer required.

Persons interviewed during our current investigation state Underwood apparently stopped drinking in 1964 and no longer has the drinking problem. Results of current investigation were furnished White House in memorandum dated February 12, 1969. Several interviews and one agency check remain to be handled.

VIRGINIA STANFILL SAVELL

She was employed by former United States Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of California in his Los Angeles, California, office from August, 1961, to September, 1968. She is presently an assistant to Herbert G. Klein at the White House.

In September, 1966, at the request of Senator Kuchel, a very discreet inquiry was conducted into an allegation Senator Kuchel had received that Mrs. Savell was possibly operating a bookie joint out of the Senator's Los Angeles, California, office. The inquiry developed no information to substantiate the allegation. The investigation did develop information that Mrs. Savell reportedly was an alcoholic.

The current investigation to date has ascertained that the South Pasadena, California, Police Department records indicate Mrs. Savell attempted suicide on July 23, 1967. She reportedly took an overdose of sleeping capsules.

DONALD EDWIN GANOUNG
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANT
CONSULTANT
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Ganoung, aged 43, has B.A. degree in criminology and Bachelor of Divinity degree. He is former Episcopalian priest and has been active in attempting to rehabilitate sexual deviates and narcotics addicts in San Francisco; however, no one questioned his character in these connections. He is presently working as a consultant for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration with duty station in Washington, D. C.

Ganoung has also been active in civil rights and antidraft demonstrations and twice was arrested in this connection. He has worked with dissident groups and has grown a beard and worn beads in this connection. As a result of running around with another woman, his wife divorced him in 1967. The expenses of this affair, including alimony, forced him to file bankruptcy. He [redacted] A number of police officers in San Francisco area acquainted with Ganoung would not recommend him.

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

Ganoung is a protege of Wesley A. Pomeroy, Associate Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Pomeroy has been regarded as immature and insincere by former police acquaintances.

The results of our investigation of Ganoung were called to the attention of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General by letter dated February 11, 1969.

WILLIAM HENRY RENTSCHLER

William Henry Rentschler, aged 43, former newspaper reporter, has been co-owner and/or President of a candy company since 1956. He has been extremely active in Republican Party politics in Illinois for the past several years. He was involved in adulterous relationship with a woman other than his wife for approximately three years and later married that woman. This was a well known fact by those interviewed and Senator Dirksen said his involvement in notorious divorce action presents serious question of his suitability for employment by the Government. Senator Percy indicated Attorney General Mitchell recently told him Senator Dirksen had indicated Rentschler could not pass the rigid background investigation by the FBI. During the investigation Rentschler was described as articulate and an intelligent individual who is knowledgeable in the field of politics. Several persons pointed out he lacks business ability, fails to follow through on details and does not have a feeling for finances. Some individuals did not recommend him for a position of trust, some recommended him with reservations, and some recommended him highly. A summary memorandum containing the results of investigation to date was furnished to the White House on February 10, 1969. Outstanding investigation consisted of an interview of Maurice H. Stans, Secretary of Commerce, and several other individuals who have been unavailable for contact. Secretary Stans has been interviewed and states he cannot recommend Rentschler due to unfavorable hearsay information concerning his alleged financial irresponsibility and his moral life. Additional investigation is necessary based on information furnished by Secretary Stans.

SPECIAL INQUIRY INVESTIGATIONS FOR THE WHITE HOUSE

Conscientious security officers in various governmental agencies, many of whom are former Special Agents of the Bureau, have been shocked at the lack of knowledge or the total disregard of the provisions of the Federal Employee Security Program by the eight or nine individuals at the White House responsible for filling top-level positions in the new Administration. This first came to our attention shortly after November 6, 1968, when Franklin Benjamin Lincoln, Jr., and William Rittenhouse Harman moved into the Pentagon as the vanguard of the transition team. They had no clearance for highly classified information and when no request was forthcoming for a full field investigation of these persons, the security officer at the Pentagon requested the investigation.

This matter came to a head on February 10, 1969, when the Secretary of Commerce was told by the White House to write a letter certifying that prospective Assistant Secretaries were cleared politically and from a security standpoint. When the Department of Commerce was told we had received no request for a full field investigation, that Department was informed by the White House the FBI had done a "24-hour check." The Department of Commerce would not accept this since the Federal Employee Security Program requires that no critical sensitive jobs should be filled unless a full field investigation is first conducted.

Most of the requests for investigations received thus far from the White House are in connection with persons who have been publicly announced and are already firmly established in their jobs. As a result, instead of discontinuing investigation upon the development of derogatory data the White House requests the investigation be continued and at the present time we know of only one person the Administration has discharged. This was a stenographer in Mr. Ehrlichman's office by the name of Helen Galanoplos, who had two brothers and a sister-in-law who were members of the Communist Party.

In connection with White House investigations Don Virdin of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) called the Bureau on February 13, 1969. Virdin stated that IRS had checked their files in connection with the last 25 persons publicly announced and confirmed by the Senate. He stated that this check revealed that the Bureau had only asked for IRS information in connection with about 8 of these 25 people. He stated he felt this was strange because there was some rather interesting information in connection with some of these people, such as the fact that one of these individuals, whom he did not identify, had not filed an income tax return for the past three years. (We have run checks on all requests received from the White House on Presidential appointees and it would appear from the above that the White House only asked for us to conduct investigations on 8 of the last 25 publicly announced appointees.)

SELECTIVE SERVICE

Selective Service investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in recent years have broadened to cope with recurring schemes to obstruct the draft. At the present time, we have slightly over 14,000 pending investigations, compared to 9,000 a year ago.

In fiscal year 1968, 809 convictions were recorded as compared to 763 convictions the previous fiscal year. For the first seven months of fiscal year 1969, 380 convictions were recorded compared to 374 convictions recorded for a similar period in the preceding fiscal year. It appears that such a trend will continue during the current fiscal year.

There follows a brief summary of an investigation of interest concerning a Selective Service matter.

At San Francisco in October 1968, it was learned Erik Alfred Whitehorn, aged 18, had not registered with Selective Service because his mother, Evelyn Whitehorn, had refused to grant permission. For his failing to register, Whitehorn was indicted, on November 20, 1968.

Following arraignment and release on his own recognizance, a Complaint and Petition for Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against registration for the draft was filed in behalf of the subject. It claims if a person under 21 years of age cannot vote, control or dispose of his own property, serve on juries, marry, contract or litigate, then he cannot register for the draft without his parents' consent. Therefore, the mother, by teaching her son principles of morality and by influencing him to follow his own conscience, bears the main responsibility and should be punished instead of her son. The Judge hearing this case ruled that the son must stand trial for refusing to register for the draft and rejected the mother's appeals.

A date for the trial of Erik Whitehorn has been scheduled for March 19, 1969.

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME

The main thrust of our investigations of organized crime has been aimed at the key members in the power structure of La Cosa Nostra in order to secure their imprisonment and to disrupt leadership. We have also struck hard at the lower working level who are the money producing figures for the top echelon leaders. With progressively greater success, we have made deeper penetration into the heart of the hoodlum syndicate, the illegal gambling operations from which it draws much of its vast resources.

Prosecutions of hoodlums, gamblers, and vice figures for violating the laws within the Bureau's jurisdiction have been steadily increasing. For the fourth consecutive year, convictions have reached new highs, as evidenced by the fact that during Fiscal Year 1968, our drive against organized crime resulted in the conviction of 281 organized crime and gambling figures, compared with the 197 convictions during the preceding year. In addition, there are now 789 other individuals awaiting trial in Federal court. The substantial backlog of individuals awaiting further prosecution indicates that the upward trend of convictions will continue during Fiscal Year 1969. However, it is apparent that if we are to continue to be effective in our drive against the hoodlum element, prosecutions of these matters must necessarily receive high priority.

Recent Major Accomplishments

Among our most recent major accomplishments are: the conviction of Ernest Sansone, Chicago hoodlum, and five associates on February 12, 1969, in connection with a widespread race wire dissemination service; the arrest of John Philip Cerone, current top leader of organized crime in the Chicago area, along with two accomplices on February 7, 1969, in connection with the operation of a large-scale gambling organization; the conviction of West Coast hoodlum figure, John Roselli, on February 3, 1969, for running an interstate gambling operation; the conviction of William Daddano, described as the 5th ranking mobster in Chicago, and four accomplices on October 3, 1968, for bank robbery; the arrest on November 26, 1968, of La Cosa Nostra "commission" member Stefano Magaddino, and eight associates for Interstate Gambling Activity; the arrest on December 5, 1968, of Pittston, Pa., La Cosa Nostra "Boss" Russell Bufalino and two associates for conspiring to transport some $23,000 worth of stolen television sets interstate; the September 12, 1968, conviction of New Orleans La Cosa Nostra "boss" Carlos Marcello for attempting to assault a Federal officer; the March 21, 1968, arrest of New Jersey La Cosa Nostra "boss" Samuel Rizzo Decavalcante and two associates for conspiring to extort money from four gamblers, and the conviction on March 8, 1968, of New England area La Cosa Nostra chieftain Raymond Patriarca and one of his "captains," Henry Tameleo, for violating the Anti-Racketeering statute in connection with a gambling-murder case.

Dissemination Program

As a result of our dissemination program, 287,004 items of criminal intelligence "type" information were disseminated to other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies during Fiscal Year 1967, 300,244 such items were disseminated in Fiscal Year 1968, and during the first six months of the present Fiscal Year we have disseminated 153,214 items. Over one million such items have been disseminated during the past five years.

With respect to dissemination of information concerning local gambling operations to other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States for Fiscal Year 1968, a total of 721 raids took place; 3751 individuals were arrested of whom 1170 were convicted; paraphernalia seized amounted to $ 1,395,069 and United States currency confiscated amounted to $624,028. In the first six months of the present Fiscal Year 329 raids have taken place, 1787 individuals have been arrested, of whom 771 have been convicted; paraphernalia seized amounted to $221,021, and United States currency confiscated amounted to $273,701.

Department of Justice Task Forces on Organized Crime

In the Fall of 1966, the Criminal Division of the Department initiated the Task Force Operation (also called Strike Force) and the first one began operation in Buffalo, New York. These Task Forces consisted of a group comprised of Departmental attorneys and investigative personnel from several different Federal investigative agencies. The FBI was invited to assign personnel but declined because of its overall commitments requiring utilization of all of its Agents. However, we have extended complete cooperation in the form of information in investigative reports and have promptly handled all cases within our investigative jurisdiction that were referred to us from the Task Forces.

Since the initial Task Force at Buffalo, the Department has formed such groups in Detroit, Michigan; Brooklyn, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Chicago, Illinois; Miami, Florida; and Newark, New Jersey.

We now maintain liaison with the various Task Forces but not on a full-time basis.

It has been recommended that (1) we continue to cooperate on a full-time basis, from the standpoint of furnishing information to the various Task Forces, (2) that the Director indicate to the new Attorney General that we will be happy to assign an FBI Inspector to serve as liaison with the Department Task Force office in Washington, D. C., (3) that a supervisory employee would be assigned by each SAC to a specific Task Force when such Task Force is established within a given area where one of our field offices is located, for liaison purposes.

La Cosa Nostra Leadership Changes

In the New York City area where La Cosa Nostra "Commission" member Thomas Luchese died during 1967, no successor has been named to date, primarily because the FBI was responsible for the arrest and/or conviction of the four leading contenders, all "captains" or ranking members of the Luchese "family."

In Chicago, John Philip Cerone, who was being groomed as the top leader of La Cosa Nostra group in the Chicago area, was arrested on February 7, 1969, for Interstate Gambling Activities. Cerone was the interim Chicago leader for Sam Giancana, who fled to Latin America following his release from Federal prison and his successor, Sam Battaglia, who is in Federal prison for violating the Anti-Racketeering Act.

In New York, veteran New York hoodlum Paul Sciacca presently is the "boss" of a New York City La Cosa Nostra "family" once headed by the notorious, controversial Joseph Bonanno.

DEPARTMENT'S MANUAL FOR USE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNDER TITLE III OF OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL BILL

The Attorney General has been furnished our views with regard to the Department's draft manual for use of electronic surveillance pursuant to Title III. The general provisions of this lengthy manual, much of which concerned administrative regulations not specifically required by the statute itself, would impose tremendous administrative and procedural restrictions on the FBI and other Federal agencies to the point that strict compliance might be self-defeating to the goal of maintaining discreet electronic surveillance coverage under court supervision for the purpose of obtaining admissible evidence against the leadership of organized crime and in other major investigative categories. These requirements involve an investigative agent's application for intercept authority to be reviewed by a comparatively wide range of authorities including the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department, in many cases the United States Attorney, the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, and finally the Attorney General before the request even reached the court which, according to the provisions of this statute, is the ultimate authority and control in the use of this procedure. This process would, of necessity, be time-consuming, cumbersome, and, at certain points, repetitious, and would spread the knowledge of the use of this technique among a number of different governmental offices.

We noted that the draft manual made repeated reference to the problem of probable cause becoming "stale" and observed that the sheer weight of the deliberative process at various approving levels before it even reached the judge could alone result in the probable cause becoming "stale." We also noted that requirements involving daily memoranda to the United States Attorney concerning the progress of a court authorized surveillance and other similar administrative requirements would tend to place burdens on investigating agents which could detract from the ultimate purpose of our use of this technique.

In connection with the manual's requirement that an authorized surveillance be terminated when the subject of the surveillance departed the premises covered, we questioned that such a requirement was called for in the statute and whether

Congress, in providing this important added tool in the evidence gathering process, intended that such a restriction applied. We also noted that the draft suggested that in all cases when an application for an order is denied, those named in the application would be informed that the Government intended to subject them to electronic surveillance. With regard to denied applications, we contend that this notice requirement pertains only to those situations where emergency intercepts have been made without court order, and thereafter the court has denied the application and not to all applications which might be denied in the normal course of business pursuant to the main body of regulations in Title III.

We concluded our observations to the Attorney General that while it was appreciated that the drafting of guidelines in this matter presents extremely sensitive problems, it was believed that for the Government's ultimate success in making use of this evidence gathering procedure, restrictions must not apply which will create more limitations on law enforcement than the statute itself prescribes.

MISCELLANEOUS

ABC-TV Series "The FBI" television series, which is produced by QM Productions, in conjunction with Warner Brothers - Seven Arts, Inc., is shown over the facilities of the American Broadcasting Company Television Network. This program is completing its fourth year on the air and production plans are going forward at the present time for a fifth season. This series, which is based on actual FBI cases, has consistently occupied a strong position in the television ratings, the latest 30 Market Nielson Rating reflecting that it is the second most popular show on the air. It is estimated that the program has 26 million viewers each week.

In connection with "The FBI", plans are being made to present a two-hour program based on the Barbara Jean Mackle kidnaping case next season. Of course, this program will not be televised until all prosecutive action is completed.

Spot announcements are made following the program on a periodic basis, which announcements highlight individuals who are being sought by the FBI who are on the "Ten Most Wanted Fugitives" list.

SSC REQUEST

8/20/75

PART II

Item 1

Retain

Excised portions denoted in red.

Note - when, if ever, delivered - further deletion necessary in 9/24/68 - p 3, P 4

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

F B I

Date: 9/24/68

Transmit the following in CONFIDENTIAL
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-174254)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-New)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

(WF 1777-S) has advised that GALINA V. UTEKHINA, a cultural attache at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C.(WDC), has been conferring with source concerning the reaction of peace groups in the United States to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. UTEKHINA has met with Women Strike for Peace (WSP) and Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) groups and expressed interest in meeting people in the peace movement throughout the United States. She is also desirous of speaking before student groups.

UTEKHINA has advised source that she would like to arrange a two week's tour of Soviet cities for a delegation of WSP women. A group from WILPF has already been to the Soviet Union and have returned. UTEKHINA wanted to know what WSP's reaction to this proposal might be.

REC-34

③ - Bureau
3 - WFO
(1 - GALENA UTEKHINA)
(1 - 134-6831)

PHW:fet
(6)

C. C. - Bishop

AIRTEL

17 OCT 2 1968

EX-114

5-RDL

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
10/4/74

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

Source stated that the Soviet occupation has split the peace movement, and WSP in particular, that it might be better to postpone the invitation temporarily.

UTEKHINA told source that all expenses would be paid while in the Soviet Union. However, the delegates probably would have to arrange to pay their round trip air fare from the United States to Moscow, USSR, and return. The group would leave from New York City or Montreal, Canada. UTEKHINA stated it may be possible to fly the group via Soviet commercial craft in which case the cost of transportation might be borne by the Soviets.

Source discussed UTEKHINA's proposed with WSP leaders and it was agreed to bring this matter up at a Regional Conference of WSP which is being held in early October, 1968, with the idea of sending the delegation to the Soviet Union late in October or early November.

Source advised UTEKHINA that SARAH SHORESMAN on the West Coast, who is in charge of the WSP International Clearing House, would be in charge of making arrangements for the trip. She inquired of UTEKHINA what the air fare would be. UTEKHINA later telephoned to advise that a round trip ticket from New York to Moscow, Economy Tourist Class, is $730. UTEKHINA stated that if the source is interested, as an individual in going to the Soviet Union, she should contact RICHARD MORFORD at the Soviet-American Friendship Society, 156 5th Avenue, New York City, because there is a 21 day tour arranged by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship costing all together $795.

The latter has been verified by (WF 279-S*) on 9/20/68.

Source has indicated to UTEKHINA that if she goes to the Soviet Union she would like to go on to Hanoi, DRV, before returning to the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

Source is a white female, age 63, but very energetic and robust for her age. She is a widow who retired from the New York City school system after twenty years on the job. She is above average in educational attainment and speaks several foreign languages. She has traveled abroad on several occasions and has a remarkable ability to gain confidences and obtain information. She has outstanding characteristics, the mental facility, inclination and aptitute to enjoy success in her intelligence gathering assignments. She has been under FBI control for over two years during which time she has performed in an excellent manner.

Source is [the Washington Area Coordinator for WSP.] She performs volunteer work in the National WSP Office, 2140 P Street, N.W., WDC. She attends meetings of the National Consultative Council of WSP and is in contact with DAGMAR WILSON, founder and sppkesman for WSP, and other prominent Women in WSP.

Source is on very friendly terms with ALEXEI N. STEPUNIN, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy [who (NY 3653-S*) has described as an affiliate of the Committee for State Security (KGB).]

VLADIMIR PETROV, Associate Professor, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University, WDC, a WFO source (protect), has reported that GALENA V. UTEKHINA told source she is working mostly with student and women's groups in the U.S., and has expressed great interest in WSP.

Source has agreed to travel to the Soviet Union and/or North Vietnam on assignment if the opportunity is afforded to her. She recognizes that to do so would enhance her position in the world peace movement and would open up new and more valuable opportunities to penetrate foreign inspired subversive activities in the U.S. and abroad.

At the present time source is in communication with representatives of the Soviet Women's Committee in Moscow, USSR, and the Friendship Society in Tashkent, USSR, the

CONFIDENTIAL

NLF in London, England, and Algiers, Algiera, and with the Vietnamese Women's Union in Hanoi, DRV. She also communicates with The World Council of Peace in Vienna, Austria. If she were to go abroad, she would go with an established reputation as a peace worker.

WFO recommends that favorable consideration be given to paying approximately $750 to cover source's transportation abroad and, if not, that the Bureau refer this matter to another agency.

SAC, Washington Field

CONFIDENTIAL

9/30/68

REC-34

Director, FBI (105-174254) 98

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Internal Security
(route through for review)
2 - Mr. D. Ryan

EX-114

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

ReWFOairtel 9/24/68 advising of likelihood (WF 1777-S) will be invited to participate in a Women's Strike for Peace (WSP) tour to the Soviet Union.

You are requested to closely follow this matter with the informant to determine when specific plans are formulated by the WSP for a delegation to travel to the Soviet Union. When WSP plans for the travel to the Soviet Union are more definite, the Bureau will consider authorizing payments of funds for informant to participate in the travel. Of course, if possible, it would be highly desirable if informant could arrange for the Soviets or the WSP to assume all or a portion of her travel expenses.

1 - WFO (134-6831)
1 - 134-15133 (WF 1777-S)

DR:sib sib
(9)

NOTE:

MAILED 4
SEP 30 1968
COMM-FBI

(WF 1777-S) has been endeavoring to arrange travel through the Cultural Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., for a WSP tour to the Soviet Union. The WSP currently has under consideration such a tour which would take place in late October or early November. WFO estimates the cost of the travel of the informant to the Soviet Union and return, if she were to participate in the delegation, would be approximately $750. When final plans are made for the WSP tour, we will consider authorizing the payment of the funds or, in the event the consideration does not warrant sending a Bureau informant, conferring with CIA to determine if it would desire to subsidize the informant's travel. The WSP is a left-wing organization actively agitating against U. S. participation in Vietnam. Informant has been directed to establish contact with similar groups and individuals abroad.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

Classified by 6136 RES
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
12/4/

CONFIDENTIAL

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: 10/10/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-174254)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-48466) (P)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

C.D. Brennan

Re WFO airtel dated 9/24/68; Bulet dated 9/30/68, concerning possible travel to Soviet Union of (WF 1777-S.)

Women Strike for Peace (WSP) received a letter dated 8/15/68, from ZINAIDA FYODOROVA, Executive Secretary, Soviet Women's Committee, Moscow, USSR, extending to them an invitation from the Committee to send a delegation to the Soviet Union. FYODOROVA wrote that the Soviet Women's Committee will cover all the delegation's expenses during their two-week stay in the USSR, including travel inside the Soviet Union. She stated that unfortunately, the Soviet Women's Committee cannot pay any of the air fare between New York and Moscow.

The above invitation has been sanctioned by DAGMAR WILSON, founder of WSP and other WSP leaders who feel it is important to keep the lines of communication open between peace groups here and in the Soviet Union because of the

REC-40 1-706

3 - Bureau
2 - WFO EX 110
(1-134-6831-Sub.A)
PHW:dab
(4)
AIRTEL

105-174254-

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 5+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
10/4/94

10/15/68

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

Czech crisis. (WF 1777-S) has been designated to lead a delegation of four women. Source has been consulting with GALENA UTEKHINA, Soviet Embassy, concerning actual dates of travel and visas. UTEKHINA has indicated that she will have arrangements made and details from Moscow by early next week (October 13-19, 1968). As it stands now, the delegation will leave New York City as soon after the Presidential election as possible. The delegation will travel via Aeroflot or Pan American World Airways and in either case the round trip fare will be $548.00, which is the reduced off season rate.

Bureau authority is requested to advance to informant the cost of her round trip air fare from New York to Moscow and return, in the amount of $548.00.

It is recommended that this authority be granted inasmuch as it is believed that source will learn about activities in the peace groups in the Soviet Union which are directed toward influencing similar peace groups in the United States. Source undoubtedly will encounter information on her trip concerning foreign influence on the New Left in the United States and related activities.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: October 14, 1968

FROM : R. D. Cotter

Conf. Inf.

SUBJECT: WF 1777-S
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

C. D. Brennan

noted

Purpose is to secure authority for WF 1777-S to travel to Soviet Union as leader of Women Strike for Peace (WSP) delegation at an estimated cost of $548.

Informant, an intelligent retired schoolteacher, has been designated by WSP, active leftist anti-war group, to lead WSP delegation to Soviet Union in early 11/68. Invitation for trip extended by Soviet Women's Committee (SWC) and latter will assume expenses of delegation while in Soviet Union. Delegation members will be required to pay air transportation from New York City to Moscow ($548), and informant's expenses in this country will be covered by regular authorized expenses.

Delegation will confer with SWC with objective of keeping lines of communication between WSP and SWC open despite WSP criticism of Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Informant's travel will enable us to determine extent and means of Soviet influence on WSP and similar new-left groups while further positioning informant to develop intelligence of this type in the future.

UNREC COPY FILED IN

RECOMMENDATION:

WF 1777-S That attached letter be sent to WFO authorizing to travel to Soviet Union as leader of WSP delegation at expense of $548.

REC-31 134-15133-12

OK

15 OCT 18 1968

EX 106

WFO

Enclosure sent 10-15-68
134-15133
1 - 105-174254 (Cointel)

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. R.D. Cotter
1 - Mr. M.J. Rozamus
1 - Internal Security Section (route through for review)
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

5-Ryan

DR:sib
(8)

361

1968

SAC, Washington Field (134-6831) October 15, 1968

Director, FBI (134-15133)

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. R.D. Cotter
1 - Mr. M.J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

CONF. INFT.
WF 1777-S
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

ReWFairtel 10/10/68 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations, (Nationalities Intelligence)."

Authority granted to pay WF 1777-S $548 for air fare so she may travel to Soviet Union in 11/68 as head of Women Strike for Peace delegation, invited by Soviet Women's Committee. Brief informant to develop information relating to nature of Soviet influence of domestic new-left and alert her to possibility she might be approached abroad for Soviet intelligence use.

Keep Bureau advised of all pertinent developments.

1 - WFO (100-48466)

1 - 105-174254 (Cointel)
1 - Internal Security Section (route through for review)
1 - Mr. M.F. Row (6221 IB)

DR:sib sib
(12)

REC 82 134-15133-13

19 OCT 24 1968

EX-105

NOTE:

See memo R. D. Cotter to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 10/14/68, captioned same as above, and prepared by DR:sib.

olson
eLoach
ohr
shop
asper
allahan
onrad
elt
ale
osen
llivan
vel
otter
le. Room
lmes
nd

MAILED 21
OCT 15 1968
COMM-FBI

55 OCT 25 1968

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 5/23/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

REC

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-New)

WORLD CONGRESS OF WOMEN,
HELSINKI, FINLAND
JUNE 14-17, 1969
IS - R

Griffith

ReWFOairtel and LHM captioned, "WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE DELEGATION TO SOVIET UNION, NOVEMBER 11 - DECEMBER 2, 1968; IS - INFO CONCERNING", dated 12/20/68.

Re LHM, page 4, in reporting on conference between the Soviet Women's Committee (SWC) and Women Strike for Peace (WSP) delegation held in Moscow, USSR, on 11/27/68, states that the Soviet women feel very militant and will continue to feel this way until the last American soldier leaves Vietnamese soil. At this conference, the SWC stated a World Congress of Women (WCW) would be held in Helsinki, Finland, in June, 1969; that Vietnam would be the focus of attention. If the war ends by June, 1969, the Congress will discuss reconstruction of the damage, otherwise "all phases of work to end the war" will be discussed.

MCT-40 REC-87 105-194066

5 - Bureau
(62-107350)(WSP)
(105-174254)(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS)
(134-15133)
2 - Chicago (AM)(RM)
1 - Detroit (Info)(RM)
1 - Newark (Info)(RM)
2 - New York (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (RM)
2 - San Francisco (RM)(AM)
2 - Seattle (RM)(AM)
4 - WFO
(1-100-48466)(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS)
(1-100-39566)(WSP)
(1-134-6831)

4 JUN 5 1969

JPH:rjl
(21)

53 JUN 23 1969

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

(WF 1777-S,) who was the source of the above, was invited to attend the WCW by members of the SWC while she was with the WSP delegation in Moscow.

Since returning to the United States, source has been receiving literature, magazines, and letters from various women in Moscow associated with the SWC. Her last letter from ADA IVANOVA (who acted as interpreter for the delegation on their tour of the Soviet Union), dated 5/8/69, at Moscow, indicates IVANOVA expects to see her in Helsinki.

During the latter part of April, 1969, and to present time, WSP has been considering an official invitation received from the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), founded by SWC, to send ten observers to the WIDF convened WCW in Helsinki, 6/14-17/69. SARAH SHORESMAN, 904 Jimeno Road, Santa Barbara, California 93103, who heads the WSP International Clearing House, is handling arrangements for the WSP delegation to Helsinki. She has informed source that MARY CLARKE of Los Angeles, California, and TAIMI HALONEN of Seattle, Washington, will be going from the West Coast; a couple of women from Chicago, Illinois, names as yet unknown, from the Mid-West, and it is assumed a couple of women from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and New York City will accompany the group.

Locally, the WSP in Washington, D.C. (WDC), want a couple of its women to go but they do not have the finances to send them. Source has been cleared and backed by the Steering Committee to go since she has the financial ability to pay her own way. She has the reputation of vacationing in Europe each summer so that her motives in going to Helsinki have not been subject to question.

The SWC has advised source and WSP that the theme of the Congress is, "The Role of Women in the World Today". There will be five individual reports: Solidarity with the Women and Children of Vietnam; Women in the Family; Women at Work; Women in Society and Women in the Fight to Win and Defend National Independence, Democracy and Peace. Reports will be given by women from South Vietnam, Australia, U.S.S.R., Mexico, and Sudan.

The cost of attending the WCW in Helsinki, Finland, will amount to approximately $800., which includes round-trip air fare from WDC, registration fee of $20., and room and meals at $10 to $12 per day.

WFO recommends that the Bureau authorize sending (WF 1777-S) to the WCW in Helsinki, Finland, 6/14-17/69, and to authorize payment of her expenses up to $800., for this purpose.

Recommendation is based on the belief that the information gained at the WCW will give invaluable advance intelligence data concerning the forthcoming world directed Soviet peace offensive against the United States.

Second, source will be traveling with the leadership of the WSP, which undoubtedly will inhance her stature in the peace movement at home and abroad. This should pave the way for her advancement in Nationalities Intelligence matters.

Third, source will renew contacts made with members of the National Liberation Front, North Vietnamese and Soviets. It could be anticipated that she might, as a result, be invited to North Vietnam and/or the Soviet Union.

Since time if of the essence, the Bureau is respectfully requested to give WFO's recommendation expeditious attention.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/28/69

FROM : C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. M. F. Row
(6221 IB)
1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

SUBJECT: WORLD CONGRESS OF WOMEN
HELSINKI, FINLAND
JUNE 14 - 17, 1969
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

This is to recommend the advancement of $800 over and above the existing expense authorization to (WF 1777-S) which will enable us to have the benefit of informant's attendance at the above Congress.

We sent this informant to Moscow, USSR, in November, 1968, to attend a meeting between Women Strike for Peace (WSP) and the Soviet Women's Committee (SWC). At that time the SWC representatives stated the above Congress was to be held and that the Vietnam situation would be the main focus of attention. In the event hostilities were still going on the SWC said that the Congress would address itself to "all phases of work to end the war." In addition, the informant's visit was very fruitful and we continue to realize benefits from it through material she receives from contacts made at the conference.

Informant has been cleared by the steering committee of the WSP to attend the above Congress and can do so without raising any question as to the source of funds. Informant has advised that this Congress is to include delegates from all over the world including North and South Vietnam. She anticipates traveling with the leadership of the WSP and that she can renew contacts previously made with the National Liberation Front, the North Vietnamese and various Russian women.

Enclosure 5-29-69

1 - 134-15133 ((WF 1777-S))

REC 22

JUN 5 1969

FBG:djb
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

59 JUN 17 1969

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: WORLD CONGRESS OF WOMEN
HELSINKI, FINLAND
JUNE 14 - 17, 1969

This is another so-called peace conference similar to the one held in Sweden May 16 - 19, 1969. We sent one of our New York informants to this conference and received extremely valuable intelligence information regarding the current situation in South Vietnam as a result. It is probable that WF 1777-S will be in a position through her contacts to furnish equally valuable information. We currently pay WF 1777-S up to $200 per month for services and up to $75 per month for expenses.

The attendance of the informant at this conference can provide invaluable advanced intelligence data concerning the forthcoming Soviet-directed world-wide peace offensive against the United States. It will also afford us a live informant in a behind-the-scenes situation involving individuals from all over the world intent upon destroying the United States position as it pertains to Vietnam. It will also enable the informant to solidify previous contacts and to develop new ones among foreign leftist elements. We should avail ourselves of this excellent opportunity to produce positive intelligence information.

ACTION:

With your approval, the attached airtel authorizing the advancement of $800 to WF 1777-S will be directed to the Washington Field Office.

✓

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

5/28/69

Airtel

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

To: SAC, WFO (134-6831)

From: Director, FBI (134-15133)

CONF. INFT.
WF 1777-S

Reurairtel dated 5/23/69 captioned "World Congress of Women, Helsinki, Finland, June 14 - 17, 1969; IS - R."

Authority granted to advance the informant up to $800 over and above existing expense authorization to cover expenses connected with attendance at the World Congress of Women.

Insure the source is expeditiously and thoroughly debriefed upon return to the United States and advise Bureau of results. Secure an itemized list of expenses and any excess monies should be returned to your office by the informant.

1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

FBG:djb
(10)

FBG

NOTE:

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 5/28/69, captioned "World Congress of Women, Helsinki, Finland, June 14 - 17, 1969; IS - Miscellaneous," prepared by FBG:djb.

ST 102

REC-87

134-15133-15

4 JUN 5 1969

MAILED 10
MAY 29 1969
FBI
COMM-FBI

58 JUN 25 1969

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 11/12/70

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

Via ______________________
(Priority)

Memo R.L. Shackelford to C.D. Brennan (w/enc) FBG:cal 11/19/70

Airtel to WFO FBG:cal 11/20/70

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-52028) (P)

Shackelford
Griffith

STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM (SCV)
IS-MISC; VIDEM

On 11/10/70, WF 1777-S received via mail an official invitation to the SCV sponsored World Conference on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which will be held at Eriksdalsskolan, Ringvagen 66, Stockholm, Sweden, 11/28-30/70. A preparatory meeting will be held at 6 p.m., Friday, November 27th. The opening plenary session will take place on Saturday morning, 11/28/70.

Bureau authority is requested to send WF 1777-S to the World Conference and to advance source the sum of $775 for anticipated expenses, a strict accounting of which would be made upon source's return. Anticipated expenses are: Round trip airfare at $596.60; registration fee, $20.00; incidental expenses, including board and room at $158.40.

If granted, source would depart Kennedy International Airport, New York City, at 8:20 p.m., 11/26/70, via Scandanavian Airlines System, Inc., and arrive in Stockholm, Sweden, 11:10 a.m., 11/27/70. Departure from Stockholm would be on 12/1/70 consistent with SAS schedules.

3-Bureau
(1-134-15133)
2-WFO
(1-134-6831)

PHW:cjb
(5)

REC-79

NOV 24 19

1 XEROX
NOV 27 1970

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________M Per ______________

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED ST S NMENT

Memo ndum

1 - M. Sullivan
1 - M. . D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 11/19/70

FROM : R. L. Shackelford

1 - Mr. B. F. Rose
1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

SUBJECT: STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM (SCV)
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

PURPOSE:

This is to recommend that the Washington Field Office be authorized to advance the sum of $775 to WF 1777-S to enable this informant to attend a conference of the above group in Stockholm, Sweden, on 11/28-30/70.

BACKGROUND:

The SCV was organized in 1967 and is controlled to some extent by the Soviet-dominated World Council for Peace (WCP). The SCV, since its inception, has been one of the major sounding boards for anti-American propaganda in connection with the war in Vietnam. This group has also provided the North Vietnamese with a propaganda outlet and has enhanced the position of the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris Peace Talks.

The forthcoming conference in Stockholm will undoubtedly hammer out the details for additional moves and propaganda against the United States' position in Vietnam. It is, therefore, most desirable we afford these meetings live informant coverage. WF 1777-S is well established in the peace movement on a national and international scale having contacts with major women's groups throughout the United States and in the Soviet Union. This informant, in June, 1969, attended a meeting of the WCP in East Berlin on our behalf and furnished excellent intelligence information. She has received an official SCV invitation and is in a logical position to attend. This informant is a retired schoolteacher and can make this trip without creating any suspicion.

Enclosure 11-30-70

REC 18

57

100-453546

22 DEC 22 1970

1 - 134-15133
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

EX-105

FBG:cal
(8)

57 DEC 9 1970

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. Brennan
Re: Stockholm Conference on Vietnam
100-453546

Washington Field Office has advised that informant tentatively plans to depart on 11/26/70 in order to reach Stockholm on 11/27/70 in order to attend a preparatory meeting. Informant would depart Stockholm on 12/1/70 consistent with airline schedules. Anticipated expenses are: round trip air fare at $596.60; registration fee, $20; incidental expenses including room and board at $158.40.

OBSERVATION:

The extent to which foreign groups, such as the SCV and the WCP, have gone in the recent past to discredit the United States and their continuing propaganda barrage aimed at this country make it most desirable that we have firsthand information regarding future plans of this group. We will also be in a position to identify other United States citizens in attendance. For these reasons it is felt we should avail ourselves of the opportunity to utilize the informant's services as noted above. An airtel to Washington Field Office authorizing this informant to travel to Sweden is attached. Washington Field Office is being instructed to immediately debrief the informant upon her return and to obtain an exact accounting of expenses incurred.

ACTION:

With your approval, the attached airtel will be forwarded to Washington Field Office.

✓

WBS

11/20/70

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. B. F. Rose
1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

airtel

EX-106

To: SAC, WFO (100-52028)

REC-79

From: Director, FBI (100-453546) — 46

STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM (SCV)
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Reurairtel dated 11/12/70 captioned as above.

Authority is granted to advance (WF 1777-S) a sum of $775 for anticipated expenses in connection with this individual's travel to attend the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam sessions 11/27-30/70.

Informant should be immediately debriefed upon her return to the U.S. and the Bureau and interested offices should be furnished pertinent information in form suitable for dissemination. You should also obtain exact accounting of expenses incurred by the informant.

1 - 134-15133
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

FBG:cal
(10)

NOTE:

See memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. C. D. Brennan, captioned as above, dated 11/19/70, prepared by FBG:cal.

Tolson ____
Sullivan ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Brennan, C.D. ____
Callahan ____
Casper ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Tavel ____
Walters ____
Soyars ____
Room ____

MAILED 24
NOV 20 1970
COMM-FBI

7 DEC 1 1970

☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SSC REQUEST
8/20/75

PART II

Item 1

for access

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 9/24/68

Transmit the following in CONFIDENTIAL
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-174254)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-New)

C. D. Brennan
R. D. Cotter

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

INFORMANT has advised that GALINA V. UTEKHINA, a cultural attache at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C.(WDC), has been conferring with source concerning the reaction of peace groups in the United States to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. UTEKHINA has met with Women Strike for Peace (WSP) and Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) groups and expressed interest in meeting people in the peace movement throughout the United States. She is also desirous of speaking before student groups.

UTEKHINA has advised source that she would like to arrange a two week's tour of Soviet cities for a delegation of WSP women. A group from WILPF has already been to the Soviet Union and have returned. UTEKHINA wanted to know what WSP's reaction to this proposal might be.

REC-39

95

③ - Bureau
3 - WFO
(1 - GALENA UTEKHINA)
(1 - 134-6831)

17 OCT 2 1968

PHW:fet
(6)

EX-114

C. C. - Bishop

5-RR

AIRTEL

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
12/4/84

Approved: Special Agent in Charge Sent M Per

Source stated that the Soviet occupation has split the peace movement, and WSP in particular, that it might be better to postpone the invitation temporarily.

UTEKHINA told source that all expenses would be paid while in the Soviet Union. However, the delegates probably would have to arrange to pay their round trip air fare from the United States to Moscow, USSR, and return. The group would leave from New York City or Montreal, Canada. UTEKHINA stated it may be possible to fly the group via Soviet commercial craft in which case the cost of transportation might be borne by the Soviets.

Source discussed UTEKHINA's proposed with WSP leaders and it was agreed to bring this matter up at a Regional Conference of WSP which is being held in early October, 1968, with the idea of sending the delegation to the Soviet Union late in October or early November.

Source advised UTEKHINA that SARAH SHORESMAN on the West Coast, who is in charge of the WSP International Clearing House, would be in charge of making arrangements for the trip. She inquired of UTEKHINA what the air fare would be. UTEKHINA later telephoned to advise that a round trip ticket from New York to Moscow, Economy Tourist Class, is $730. UTEKHINA stated that if the source is interested, as an individual in going to the Soviet Union, she should contact RICHARD MORFORD at the Soviet-American Friendship Society, 156 5th Avenue, New York City, because there is a 21 day tour arranged by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship costing all together $795.

The latter has been verified by ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE on 9/20/68.

Source has indicated to UTEKHINA that if she goes to the Soviet Union she would like to go on to Hanoi, DRV, before returning to the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

Source is a white female, age 63, but very energetic and robust for her age. She is a widow who retired from the New York City school system after twenty years on the job. She is above average in educational attainment and speaks several foreign languages. She has traveled abroad on several occasions and has a remarkable ability to gain confidences and obtain information. She has outstanding characteristics, the mental facility, inclination and aptitute to enjoy success in her intelligence gathering assignments. She has been under FBI control for over two years during which time she has performed in an excellent manner.

Source is INFORMATION TENDS TO IDENTIFY SOURCE She performs volunteer work in the National WSP Office, 2140 P Street, N.W., WDC. She attends meetings of the National Consultative Council of WSP and is in contact with DAGMAR WILSON, founder and spokesman for WSP, and other prominent Women in WSP.

Source is on very friendly terms with ALEXEI N. STEPUNIN, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy INFORMATION TENDS TO IDENTIFY A PECULIARLY SENSITIVE ONGOING FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION.

VLADIMIR PETROV, Associate Professor, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University, WDC, a WFO source (protect), has reported that GALENA V. UTEKHINA told source she is working mostly with student and women's groups in the U.S., and has expressed great interest in WSP.

Source has agreed to travel to the Soviet Union and/or North Vietnam on assignment if the opportunity is afforded to her. She recognizes that to do so would enhance her position in the world peace movement and would open up new and more valuable opportunities to penetrate foreign inspired subversive activities in the U.S. and abroad.

At the present time source is in communication with representatives of the Soviet Women's Committee in Moscow, USSR, and the Friendship Society in Tashkent, USSR, the

CONFIDENTIAL

NLF in London, England, and Algiers, Algiera, and with the Vietnamese Women's Union in Hanoi, DRV. She also communicates with The World Council of Peace in Vienna, Austria. If she were to go abroad, she would go with an established reputation as a peace worker.

WFO recommends that favorable consideration be given to paying approximately $750 to cover source's transportation abroad and, if not, that the Bureau refer this matter to another agency.

SAC, Washington Field CONFIDENTIAL 9/30/68

REC-34

Director, FBI (105-174254) 98

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Internal Security
(route through for review)
2 - Mr. D. Ryan

EX-114

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ~~AND SPECIAL~~ OPERATIONS
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

ReWFOairtel 9/24/68 advising of likelihood INFORMANT will be invited to participate in a Women's Strike for Peace (WSP) tour to the Soviet Union.

You are requested to closely follow this matter with the informant to determine when specific plans are formulated by the WSP for a delegation to travel to the Soviet Union. When WSP plans for the travel to the Soviet Union are more definite, the Bureau will consider authorizing payments of funds for informant to participate in the travel. Of course, if possible, it would be highly desirable if informant could arrange for the Soviets or the WSP to assume all or a portion of her travel expenses.

~~1 - WFO (134-6831)~~
1 - 134-15133 INFORMANT

DR:sib
(9)

MAILED 4
SEP 30 1968
COMM-FBI

NOTE:

INFORMANT has been endeavoring to arrange travel through the Cultural Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., for a WSP tour to the Soviet Union. The WSP currently has under consideration such a tour which would take place in late October or early November. WFO estimates the cost of the travel of the informant to the Soviet Union and return, if she were to participate in the delegation, would be approximately $750. When final plans are made for the WSP tour, we will consider authorizing the payment of the funds or, in the event the consideration does not warrant sending a Bureau informant, conferring with CIA to determine if it would desire to subsidize the informant's travel. The WSP is a left-wing organization actively agitating against U. S. participation in Vietnam. Informant has been directed to establish contact with similar groups and individuals abroad.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
elt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
ullivan ____
avel ____
Trotter ____
ele. Room ____
olmes ____
Gan

Classified by 6136 RES
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
10/4/89

CONFIDENTIAL

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: 10/10/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-174254)

FROM: SA , WFO (100-48466) (P)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

C.D. Brennan

Re WFO airtel dated 9/24/68; Bulet dated 9/30/68, concerning possible travel to Soviet Union of INFORMANT

Women Strike for Peace (WSP) received a letter dated 8/15/68, from ZINAIDA FYODOROVA, Executive Secretary, Soviet Women's Committee, Moscow, USSR, extending to them an invitation from the Committee to send a delegation to the Soviet Union. FYODOROVA wrote that the Soviet Women's Committee will cover all the delegation's expenses during their two-week stay in the USSR, including travel inside the Soviet Union. She stated that unfortunately, the Soviet Women's Committee cannot pay any of the air fare between New York and Moscow.

The above invitation has been sanctioned by DAGMAR WILSON, founder of WSP and other WSP leaders who feel it is important to keep the lines of communication open between peace groups here and in the Soviet Union because of the

REC-40 1-7068

EX 110

3 - Bureau
2 - WFO
(1-134-6831-Sub.A)
PHW:dab
(4)
AIRTEL

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
10/4/74

10/15/68

2-17

Approved: ______________________ Sent __________ M Per __________
Special Agent in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

Czech crisis. INFORMANT has been designated to lead a delegation of four women. Source has been consulting with GALENA UTEKHINA, Soviet Embassy, concerning actual dates of travel and visas. UTEKHINA has indicated that she will have arrangements made and details from Moscow by early next week (October 13-19, 1968). As it stands now, the delegation will leave New York City as soon after the Presidential election as possible. The delegation will travel via Aeroflot or Pan American World Airways and in either case the round trip fare will be $548.00, which is the reduced off season rate.

Bureau authority is requested to advance to informant the cost of her round trip air fare from New York to Moscow and return, in the amount of $548.00.

It is recommended that this authority be granted inasmuch as it is believed that source will learn about activities in the peace groups in the Soviet Union which are directed toward influencing similar peace groups in the United States. Source undoubtedly will encounter information on her trip concerning foreign influence on the New Left in the United States and related activities.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: October 14, 1968

FROM : R. D. Cotter

Conf. Inf.

SUBJECT: INFORMANT
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

C. D. Brennan

Purpose is to secure authority for INFORMANT to travel to Soviet Union as leader of Women Strike for Peace (WSP) delegation at an estimated cost of $548.

Informant, an intelligent retired schoolteacher, has been designated by WSP, active leftist anti-war group, to lead WSP delegation to Soviet Union in early 11/68. Invitation for trip extended by Soviet Women's Committee (SWC) and latter will assume expenses of delegation while in Soviet Union. Delegation members will be required to pay air transportation from New York City to Moscow ($548), and informant's expenses in this country will be covered by regular authorized expenses.

Delegation will confer with SWC with objective of keeping lines of communication between WSP and SWC open despite WSP criticism of Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Informant's travel will enable us to determine extent and means of Soviet influence on WSP and similar new-left groups while further positioning informant to develop intelligence of this type in the future.

noted

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached letter be sent to WFO authorizing INFORMANT to travel to Soviet Union as leader of WSP delegation at expense of $548.

REC-31 134-15133-12

Enclosure sent 10-15-68

134-15133
1 - 105-174254 (Cointel)

OK

15 OCT 18 1968

EX 100

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. R.D. Cotter
1 - Mr. M.J. Rozamus
1 - Internal Security Section (route through for review)
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

WCS

DR:sib
(8)

5-R

UNREC COPY FILED IN

SAC, Washington Field (134-6831)

October 15, 1968

Director, FBI (134-15133)

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. R.D. Cotter
1 - Mr. M.J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

CONF. INFT.
INFORMANT
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

ReWFairtel 10/10/68 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations, (Nationalities Intelligence)."

Authority granted to pay INFORMANT $548 for air fare so she may travel to Soviet Union in 11/68 as head of Women Strike for Peace delegation, invited by Soviet Women's Committee. Brief informant to develop information relating to nature of Soviet influence of domestic new-left and alert her to possibility she might be approached abroad for Soviet intelligence use.

Keep Bureau advised of all pertinent developments.

1 - WFO (100-48466)

1 - 105-174254 (Cointel)
1 - Internal Security Section (route through for review)
1 - Mr. M.F. Row (6221 IB)

DR:sib sib
(12)

REC 82

134-1[illegible]-13

19 OCT 24 1968

EX-10[illegible]

NOTE:

See memo R. D. Cotter to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 10/14/68, captioned same as above, and prepared by DR:sib.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

lson
eLoach
hr
shop
sper
llahan
nrad
lt
le
en
llivan
vel
tter
e. Room
lmes
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MAILED 21
OCT 15 1968
COMM-FBI

55 OCT 29 1968

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 5/23/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-New)

WORLD CONGRESS OF WOMEN,
HELSINKI, FINLAND
JUNE 14-17, 1969
IS - R

REC

ReWFOairtel and LHM captioned, "WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE DELEGATION TO SOVIET UNION, NOVEMBER 11 - DECEMBER 2, 1968; IS - INFO CONCERNING", dated 12/20/68.

Re LHM, page 4, in reporting on conference between the Soviet Women's Committee (SWC) and Women Strike for Peace (WSP) delegation held in Moscow, USSR, on 11/27/68, states that the Soviet women feel very militant and will continue to feel this way until the last American soldier leaves Vietnamese soil. At this conference, the SWC stated a World Congress of Women (WCW) would be held in Helsinki, Finland, in June, 1969; that Vietnam would be the focus of attention. If the war ends by June, 1969, the Congress will discuss reconstruction of the damage, otherwise "all phases of work to end the war" will be discussed.

MCT-40 REC-87 105-194066

⑤ - Bureau
(62-107350)(WSP)
(105-174254)(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS)
(134-15133)
2 - Chicago (AM)(RM)
1 - Detroit (Info)(RM)
1 - Newark (Info)(RM)
2 - New York (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (RM)
2 - San Francisco (RM)(AM)
2 - Seattle (RM)(AM)
4 - WFO
(1-100-43466)(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS)
(1-100-39566)(WSP)
(1-134-6831)

4 JUN 5 1969

53 JUN 25 1969
(21)

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

INFORMANT, who was the source of the above, was invited to attend the WCW by members of the SWC while she was with the WSP delegation in Moscow.

Since returning to the United States, source has been receiving literature, magazines, and letters from various women in Moscow associated with the SWC. Her last letter from ADA IVANOVA who acted as interpreter for the delegation on their tour c the Soviet Union), dated 5/8/69, at Moscow, indicates IVANOVA expects to see her in Helsinki.

During the latter part of April, 1969, and to present time, WSP has been considering an official invitation received from the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), founded by SWC, to send ten observers to the WIDF convened WCW in Helsinki, 6/14-17/69. SARAH SHORESMAN, 904 Jimeno Road, Santa Barbara, California 93103, who heads the WSP International Clearing House, is handling arrangements for the WSP delegation to Helsinki. She has informed source that MARY CLARKE of Los Angeles, California, and TAIMI HALONEN of Seattle, Washington, will be going from the West Coast; a couple of women from Chicago, Illinois, names as yet unknown, from the Mid-West, and it is assumed a couple of women from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and New York City will accompany the group.

Locally, the WSP in Washington, D.C. (WDC), want a couple of its women to go but they do not have the finances to send them. Source has been cleared and backed by the Steering Committee to go since she has the financial ability to pay her own way. She has the reputation of vacationing in Europe each summer so that her motives in going to Helsinki have not been subject to question.

The SWC has advised source and WSP that the theme of the Congress is, "The Role of Women in the World Today". There will be five individual reports: Solidarity with the Women and Children of Vietnam; Women in the Family; Women at Work; Women in Society and Women in the Fight to Win and Defend National Independence, Democracy and Peace. Reports will be given by women from South Vietnam, Australia, U.S.S.R., Mexico, and Sudan.

The cost of attending the WCW in Helsinki, Finland, will amount to approximately $800., which includes round-trip air fare from WDC, registration fee of $20., and room and meals at $10 to $12 per day.

__________ WFO recommends that the Bureau authorize sending INFORMANT to the WCW in Helsinki, Finland, 6/14-17/69, and to authorize payment of her expenses up to $800., for this purpose.

Recommendation is based on the belief that the information gained at the WCW will give invaluable advance intelligence data concerning the forthcoming world directed Soviet peace offensive against the United States.

Second, source will be traveling with the leadership of the WSP, which undoubtedly will inhance her stature in the peace movement at home and abroad. This should pave the way for her advancement in Nationalities Intelligence matters.

Third, source will renew contacts made with members of the National Liberation Front, North Vietnamese and Soviets. It could be anticipated that she might, as a result, be invited to North Vietnam and/or the Soviet Union.

Since time if of the essence, the Bureau is respectfully requested to give WFO's recommendation expeditious attention.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/28/69

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. M. F. Row
(6221 IB)
1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: WORLD CONGRESS OF WOMEN
HELSINKI, FINLAND
JUNE 14 - 17, 1969
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

This is to recommend the advancement of $800 over and above the existing expense authorization to INFORMANT which will enable us to have the benefit of informant's attendance at the above Congress.

We sent this informant to Moscow, USSR, in November, 1968, to attend a meeting between Women Strike for Peace (WSP) and the Soviet Women's Committee (SWC). At that time the SWC representatives stated the above Congress was to be held and that the Vietnam situation would be the main focus of attention. In the event hostilities were still going on the SWC said that the Congress would address itself to "all phases of work to end the war." In addition, the informant's visit was very fruitful and we continue to realize benefits from it through material she receives from contacts made at the conference.

Informant has been cleared by the steering committee of the WSP to attend the above Congress and can do so without raising any question as to the source of funds. Informant has advised that this Congress is to include delegates from all over the world including North and South Vietnam. She anticipates traveling with the leadership of the WSP and that she can renew contacts previously made with the National Liberation Front, the North Vietnamese and various Russian women.

Enclosure [illegible] 5-29-69

1 - 134-15133 INFORMANT

REC 22

JUN 5 1969

FBG:djb
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

59 JUN 17 1969

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: WORLD CONGRESS OF WOMEN
HELSINKI, FINLAND
JUNE 14 - 17, 1969

This is another so-called peace conference similar to the one held in Sweden May 16 - 19, 1969. We sent one of our New York informants to this conference and received extremely valuable intelligence information regarding the current situation in South Vietnam as a result. It is probable that INFORMANT will be in a position through her contacts to furnish equally valuable information. We currently pay INFORMANT up to $200 per month for services and up to $75 per month for expenses.

The attendance of the informant at this conference can provide invaluable advanced intelligence data concerning the forthcoming Soviet-directed world-wide peace offensive against the United States. It will also afford us a live informant in a behind-the-scenes situation involving individuals from all over the world intent upon destroying the United States position as it pertains to Vietnam. It will also enable the informant to solidify previous contacts and to develop new ones among foreign leftist elements. We should avail ourselves of this excellent opportunity to produce positive intelligence information.

ACTION:

With your approval, the attached airtel authorizing the advancement of $800 to INFORMANT will be directed to the Washington Field Office.

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

5/28/69

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

Airtel

To: SAC, WFO (134-6831)

From: Director, FBI (134-15133)
CONF. INFT.
INFORMANT

Reurairtel dated 5/23/69 captioned "World Congress of Women, Helsinki, Finland, June 14 - 17, 1969; IS - R."

Authority granted to advance the informant up to $800 over and above exisäng expense authorization to cover expenses connected with attendance at the World Congress of Women.

Insure the source is expeditiously and thoroughly debriefed upon return to the United States and advise Bureau of results. Secure an itemized list of expenses and any excess monies should be returned to your office by the informant.

1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

FBG:djb
(10)

NOTE:

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 5/28/69, captioned "World Congress of Women, Helsinki, Finland, June 14 - 17, 1969; IS - Miscellaneous," prepared by FBG:djb.

ST 102

REC- 87

4 JUN 5 1969

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAILED 10
MAY 29 1969
COMM-FBI

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 11/12/70

Transmit the following in _______________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

Via _______________ _______________
(Priority)

Airtel to WFO 11/20/70

Memo R.C. Moore/ford to C.D. Brennan (w/enc) 11/19/70

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-52028) (P)

STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM (SCV)
IS-MISC; VIDEM

On 11/10/70, INFORMANT received via mail an official invitation to the SCV sponsored World Conference on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which will be held at Eriksdalsskolan, Ringvagen 66, Stockholm, Sweden, 11/28-30/70. A preparatory meeting will be held at 6 p.m., Friday, November 27th. The opening plenary session will take place on Saturday morning, 11/28/70.

Bureau authority is requested to send INFORMANT to the World Conference and to advance source the sum of $775 for anticipated expenses, a strict accounting of which would be made upon source's return. Anticipated expenses are: Round trip airfare at $596.60; registration fee, $20.00; incidental expenses, including board and room at $158.40.

If granted, source would depart Kennedy International Airport, New York City, at 8:20 p.m., 11/26/70, via Scandanavian Airlines System, Inc., and arrive in Stockholm, Sweden, 11:10 a.m., 11/27/70. Departure from Stockholm would be on 12/1/70 consistent with SAS schedules.

3-Bureau
(1-134-15133)
2-WFO
(1-134-6831)

REC-79

PHW:cjb
(5)

NOV 2[illegible]

XERC
NOV 27 1970

Approved _______________ Sent _______________ M Per _______________
Special Agent in Charge

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 2
010-106

UNITED ST. S ..NMENT

Memo ..ndum

1 - M . Sullivan
1 - M. .. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 11/19/70

FROM : R. L. Shackelford

1 - Mr. B. F. Rose
1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

SUBJECT: STOCKHOLM CO. ERENCE ON VIETNAM (SCV)
INTERNAL SEC. RITY - MISCELLANEOUS

PURPOSE:

This is to recommend that the Washington Field Office be authorized to advance the sum of $775 to INFORMANT to enable this informant to attend a conference of the above group in Stockholm, Sweden, on 11/28-30/70.

BACKGROUND:

The SCV was organized in 1967 and is controlled to some extent by the Soviet-dominated World Council for Peace (WCP). The SCV, since its inception, has been one of the major sounding boards for anti-American propaganda in connection with the war in Vietnam. This group has also provided the North Vietnamese with a propaganda outlet and has enhanced the position of the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris Peace Talks.

The forthcoming conference in Stockholm will undoubtedly hammer out the details for additional moves and propaganda against the United States' position in Vietnam. It is, therefore, most desirable we afford these meetings live informant coverage. INFORMANT is well established in the peace movement on a national and international scale having contacts with major women's groups throughout the United States and in the Soviet Union. This informant, in June, 1969, attended a meeting of the WCP in East Berlin on our behalf and furnished excellent intelligence information. She has received an official SCV invitation and is in a logical position to attend. This informant is a retired schoolteacher and can make this trip without creating any suspicion.

Enclosure 11-25-70

REC 18

57

100-453546

52 DEC 22 1970

1 - 134-15133
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

FBG:cal
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

57 DEC 9 1970

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. Brennan
Re: Stockholm Conference on Vietnam
100-453546

Washington Field Office has advised that informant tentatively plans to depart on 11/26/70 in order to reach Stockholm on 11/27/70 in order to attend a preparatory meeting. Informant would depart Stockholm on 12/1/70 consistent with airline schedules. Anticipated expenses are: round trip air fare at $596.60; registration fee, $20; incidental expenses including room and board at $158.40.

OBSERVATION:

The extent to which foreign groups, such as the SCV and the WCP, have gone in the recent past to discredit the United States and their continuing propaganda barrage aimed at this country make it most desirable that we have firsthand information regarding future plans of this group. We will also be in a position to identify other United States citizens in attendance. For these reasons it is felt we should avail ourselves of the opportunity to utilize the informant's services as noted above. An airtel to Washington Field Office authorizing this informant to travel to Sweden is attached. Washington Field Office is being instructed to immediately debrief the informant upon her return and to obtain an exact accounting of expenses incurred.

ACTION:

With your approval, the attached airtel will be forwarded to Washington Field Office.

✓

11/20/70

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. B. F. Rose
1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

airtel

EX-106

To: SAC, WFO (100-52028)

REC-79

From: Director, FBI (100-453546) - 45

STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM (SCV)
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Reurairtel dated 11/12/70 captioned as above.

Authority is granted to advance INFORMANT a sum of $775 for anticipated expenses in connection with this individual's travel to attend the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam sessions 11/27-30/70.

~~Informant should be immediately debriefed upon her~~ return to the U.S. and the Bureau and interested offices should be furnished pertinent information in form suitable for dissemination. You should also obtain exact accounting of expenses incurred by the informant.

1 - 134-15133
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

FBG:cal cal
(10) cal

✓

NOTE:

See memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. C. D. Brennan, captioned as above, dated 11/19/70, prepared by FBG:cal.

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Sars
Room

MAILED 24
NOV 20 1970
COMM-FBI

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM
MAY 1962
GSA

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Mohr DATE: April 8, 1970

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 1970, 5:00 P.M.

In accordance with the Director's instructions, I attended the captioned briefing which was commenced at 5:03 p.m. by the Attorney General who introduced the Director and the Director thereafter briefed all attendees on the work of the FBI. As the attendees arrived for the meeting I made available to each individual the bound FBI exhibit to which they could refer in following the Director's presentation. There were 29 departmental representatives present at this staff meeting. They were very attentive to the Director's presentation as indicated by the many questions following the Director's discussion. When the Director was providing the conference with the number of Negroes employed by the FBI, including Agent and clerical breakdown, Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst interrupted the Director and asked the Director to repeat these figures in order that he might record them.

At approximately 5:25 p.m. the Attorney General left the room to receive a telephone call. The Director questioned Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst as to whether he should continue or wait for the Attorney General's return. Mr. Kleindienst suggested the Director wait until the Attorney General returned.

Mr. Kleindienst asked the Director concerning his references to the volume of civil rights work - whether this included both civil and criminal investigations handled by the FBI under the Civil Rights Statutes and the Director replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Kleindienst then referred to the number of organized crime type cases the Director said are pending prosecutive action. He said are these all organized crime individuals. The Director replied they all have some connection with the many facets of organized crime. The Director went on to say many of these cases are pending a year or two and he felt if we had swift prosecution and substantial punishment a greater inroad could be made in removing the menace of organized crime. Mr. Kleindienst then commented that he felt that some of the

REC-89

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan

JJC:aga

10 APR 20 1970

CONTINUED - OVER

Left for Mr. Tolson

problem here might be due to the resourcefulness of the organized crime subject's attorneys. The Director replied that certainly this is true where such shysters as Edward Bennett Williams represent these characters and he uses every technical trick to avoid prosecution and conviction. The Director went on to say that Attorney Kuntsler does the same thing in his field.

At this point, Wilson's Deputy, Petersen, of the Criminal Division, took this opportunity to point out to Kleindienst that what is needed here are more Assistant United States Attorneys, whereupon the Solicitor General added that Federal judges were also needed. Kleindienst then asked Petersen if he had studied these cases and the reason for delay that Mr. Hoover referred to and Petersen stated he did not have these figures at the end of his tongue but he had a survey made and, as he recalled it, there were 185 of these type cases delinquent six months or more. The others were delayed because of some court motion or action. The Solicitor General asked whether there was any concentration of these cases and Petersen said the Southern District of New York. Kleindienst then asked Petersen how many Assistant United States Attorneys he needed to do the job and Petersen said he could not give him a figure; however, he said he felt the District of Columbia's, for example, staff could be increased by half again as many at least and other appropriate increases would be necessary in major metropolitan centers.

Mr. Hoover at this point, pointed out Senate Bill 30 is going to put the FBI, if passed, into the local gambling picture and that we, in order to fulfill our responsibility, will probably have to ask for an additional 600 Agents. He pointed out that he hoped that the Criminal Division would draw up appropriate guidelines to prevent local authorities from relinquishing their responsibilities to also investigate local gambling.

At approximately 5:35 p. m., Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst advised the conference that the Attorney General was called to the White House and requested the Director to proceed with the briefing. At approximately 5:55 p. m., the Director completed his briefing and was congratulated by the Deputy Attorney General for the excellent presentation and the Deputy then opened the floor for questions.

Memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr
Re: Attorney General's Staff Conference
Wednesday, April 8, 1970, 5:00 p.m.

Assistant Attorney General Leo M. Pellerzi, Administrative Division, referred to the FBI exhibits and in particular Exhibit No. 25 and questioned Mr. Hoover as to why the State of Virginia had such a high number of Laboratory examinations. Mr. Hoover explained that Virginia had no Laboratory and that that was the reason for the high usage of the FBI Laboratory. Mr. Hoover took this opportunity to explain the FBI's policy in not making our experts available when local experts have already examined the evidence or are going to testify as to the evidence. He also explained there are many "phonies" who are traveling about the country conducting examinations and testifying but we, in these cases, have briefed the prosecuting attorneys in advance. The Director explained that in such places as New York State where they have their own Laboratories they only use our Lab for the more sophisticated examinations.

Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst then questioned the Director as to the basic qualifications for the position of Special Agent. The Director explained that they all had to be either lawyers or accountants or college graduates majoring in science or language. The Director emphasized again that we have no discrimination and that we have many fine Negro Agents in the FBI, pointing out that only last week he gave a meritorious award to a Negro Agent from our Detroit Office who had developed valuable informants in the Black Panthers and related organizations in that area. Kleindienst then asked the Director approximately how many applicants we turn down for each Agent that we accept. The Director explained that for every 100 applicants 90 of them are turned down. He said that we carefully interview these men, investigate them, test them, and give them thorough physical examinations to make sure they meet our high standards. The Director told the conference that he has a standing rule that if any Agent in Charge recommends an Agent or clerk who is a hippie type; that is, long hair, sideburns, etc., this Agent in Charge is going to lose his office, and we are going to get rid of the applicant. He said he would not tolerate any hippie types in the FBI and do not want our Agents going into Federal court looking like hippies.

The Director pointed out that many of our young clerical employees are going on to school to become Agents, and he demands the same discipline of these young people. He also pointed out that some 6,000 people a day tour our facilities and we don't want them getting the idea the FBI has any hippie types. As a matter of fact, the Director said with a smile that he would like to declare open season on these hippies just like you have open season on the deer and shoot them.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Mr. Kleindienst was also interested in the scope of our work and in this regard the Director took this opportunity to point out that he did not believe the FBI should be investigating every bomb threat and that he hoped that if the new bomb legislation as proposed by the President is passed the Department's Criminal Division will set appropriate guidelines. The Director pointed out that many of these major cities have very excellent bomb squads and they are fully equipped to handle these complaints. He said why should the FBI be paralleling work done by competent local authorities. He said, of course, in the local areas where they have no people qualified, then this is a different matter. The Director said in all of these cases we are always willing to make our FBI Laboratory facilities and Identification facilities available as well as assist the local authorities by covering out-of-state leads.

Assistant Attorney General Johnnie M. Walters asked the Director if he could see any lessening of the problems that he talked about in the foreseeable future. The Director said in the organized crime field, if the steps he has recommended are taken, he feels there will be a decrease. With regard to the disorders in colleges and in the high schools and caused by the militants he said this is another story. The Director cited the incident of one of the subjects in the Chicago Seven trial appearance last night at American University and thereafter going to Catholic University and then leaving town. He said that apparently these university administrators will not call in the local police, and he said it was disgraceful how they threw rocks, destroyed property and set fires at American University. He then also cited the incident wherein attorney Kuntsler after he went out to Santa Barbara, California, gave a speech, and then left town, that Santa Barbara was the victim of three days of looting and burning. The Director cited the violence promised in New Haven when Bobby Seale is brought to trial whereupon the Solicitor General commented that the judge who is going to try that case was his law school roommate. The Director said that this is a very serious situation and it is entirely possible that violence will occur when Seale is tried. The Director pointed out that we have appropriately advised all local authorities of this possibility.

The Director then cited the tremendous problems that Judge Hoffman in Chicago had in handling the trial and said that one could hardly blame him for some of his actions in view of the provocative acts on the part of the subjects and the attorneys. The Director said he recalled that Judge Medina in New York, when he tried the Communist Party leaders, the experience was so trying that it actually broke his health. Peterson at this point injected a comment that his people are

(CONTINUED - OVER)

trying to find out whether in the New Haven Bobby Seale case the Panthers are going to try to kidnap the Department's representative whose name is Lynch or whether they are referring to the Attorney General of the State of California whose name is also Lynch and the Director said he felt it was the Department of Justice representative being referred to.

The Director took this opportunity speaking about retaliatory action to point out that he was very concerned over the kidnapping of diplomatic officials in South America and said he felt it would be repeated in this country. He hoped the guard force for the embassies and chanceries in the Nation's Capital would be promptly secured as the President is also very concerned about this.

In further reply to Mr. Walters' question, the Director also pointed out that he felt many of these college presidents needed to be more firm and take drastic action by expelling these students from the school, not giving them amnesty, and assisting the local prosecutors in prosecuting these people. The Solicitor General indicated that he also felt many of the faculty were also a contributing factor to this problem. The Director agreed. The Director pointed out that these student problems in the college or high school can be traced back to the parental responsibility. The Director said that District of Columbia policemen have told him that many young children are out on the street at all hours of the night and their parents don't even know, and in some instances, care where they are. The Director told them of the incident of where four of our Identification people were held up and a female employee raped and how the juvenile giant when arrested had a juvenile court record of four appearances without a single sentence and how the Director had requested the court to try him as an adult but they refused to do so. The Director referred to the fact that we have too many bleeding heart judges and told of the success Judge Loble has had in Montana in handling juvenile subjects.

CONTINUED -

George J. Reed, Chairman, Board of Parole, questioned Mr. Hoover as to the extent of Communist influence in all of this New Left, Black Panther, Students for a Democratic Society, and militant action that we are faced with. The Director explained that the Communist Party will join anything that will further its causes and that they get their orders directly from Moscow. He said their influence in some organizations is complete control and in others it is only one of participation but, he pointed out, they are always the most vocal and, consequently, are very influential in those groups that they participate in. He said the Black Panthers follow the philosophies of many international revolutionary Communists. The Director then cited the incident of the young girl who blew up her father's home in New York which she had turned into a bomb factory. He stated she started to get out of control when at Bryn Mawr she joined the Students for a Democratic Society, and now she has fled to Canada and we are unable to extradite her.

At this point Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst thanked Mr. Hoover for his outstanding presentation. He said he felt they all had a better knowledge of the FBI and a greater appreciation of the many problems from a security and crime standpoint facing our country. With that, the official part of the conference was adjourned. Many of the conferees came up and personally congratulated Mr. Hoover and thanked him for his presentation, including asking Mr. Hoover to autograph the FBI exhibit folder which had been passed out to each participant.

I feel this outstanding presentation on the part of the Director brought great credit and praise for our organization. Hopefully, it will act as an incentive to some of our counterparts in the Department to do a more aggressive job in fulfilling their duties in meeting their security and criminal responsibilities.

Submitted for information.

Casper ably covered this meeting.
H

FIELD OFFICES

ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
ALEXANDRIA
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
COLUMBIA
DALLAS
DENVER
DETROIT
EL PASO
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JACKSONVILLE
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LAS VEGAS
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE

FBI FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATI



DIRECTOR
J. EDGAR HOOVER

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR
JOHN P. MOHR

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
CLYDE A. TOLSON

DIVISION 2
TRAINING
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
J. J. CASPER

BUREAU MANUALS
CHIEF CLERKS' SCHOOLS
CLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS
CLERICAL RETRAINING COURSES
DEFENSE PLANS FOR DIVISION
DEFENSIVE TACTICS COURSES
EMPLOYEES' CONFERENCES
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY
FIELD POLICE SCHOOLS
FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING
FORMS MANAGEMENT
IN-SERVICE COURSES
LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES
LECTURE FILES
LEGAL RESEARCH
LIAISON:
  INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
  INTERAGENCY POLICE GROUP
  PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SOCIETY
  NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, OFFICE OF ACADEMIC ASSISTANCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NEW AGENTS' TRAINING
ORIENTATION COURSES FOR CLERKS
PHYSICAL TRAINING
POLICE INSTRUCTORS' COURSES
POLICE MANUALS
POLICE VISITORS
PUBLICATIONS REVIEW
RELATIONS WITH U.S. ATTORNEYS
SAC LETTERS AND BULLETINS
SHORTHAND COURSES
STENOGRAPHIC PROCEDURAL COURSES
SUGGESTION PROGRAM
SUPERVISOR TRAINING COURSE
TRAINING DOCUMENTS
TRAINING RESEARCH
TYPING TRAINING

QUANTICO:
FBI ACADEMY – TRAINING CENTER
FIELD FIREARMS RANGES AND TRAINING
FIREARMS INSPECTION AND REPAIR
FIREARMS TRAINING
RADIO STATIONS (SOG)

DIVISION 3
DMINISTRATIVE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
N. P. CALLAHAN

BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION:
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT
BUDGET AND FISCAL MATTERS
CONTRACTS AND LEASES
SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT, INVENTORIES

EXHIBITS SECTION:
ARTIST'S-CONCEPTION DRAWINGS
GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF INVESTIGATIVE AND STATISTICAL DATA
PREPARATION OF CREDENTIALS AND SPECIAL FORMS
TRAINING AIDS (DIAGRAMS, ILLUSTRATIONS AND DISPLAYS)
TRIAL EXHIBITS (CHARTS AND MODELS)

MECHANICAL SECTION:
AUTOMOTIVE POOL
PHOTOGRAPHY
PRINTING, PHOTOSTAT AND XEROX
SPACE MATTERS
SUPPLY AND STORAGE

PERSONNEL SECTION:
APPLICANT RECRUITING AND PLACEMENT
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
COMMENDATIONS AND AWARDS
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE
EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
HEALTH SERVICE
LEAVE
LIVING QUARTERS
PERFORMANCE RATINGS
PERSONNEL MATTERS
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
RETIREMENT MATTERS
VETERANS' COUNSELING
VOCATION AND AVOCATION RECORDS

VOUCHER-STATISTICAL SECTION:
ACCOUNTING REPORTS
COMPUTER SYSTEMS:
  DATA PROCESSING
  TELEPROCESSING
  OPERATIONS RESEARCH
  SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
PAYROLL
RETIREMENT RECORDS
STATISTICAL TABULATIONS
VOUCHERS

DIVISION 4
FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
W. S. TAVEL

RECORDS BRANCH:
CLASSIFYING SECTION
CONSOLIDATION SECTION
CORRELATION SECTION
FILE REVIEW SECTION
FILING SECTION
GENERAL INDEX SECTION
MESSENGER SECTION
NAME SEARCHING SECTION
NUMBERING SECTION
PERSONNEL RECORDS SECTION
RECORDING SECTION
ROUTING SECTION
SERVICE SECTION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION:
CODING UNIT
MAILING UNIT
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS (INTRA-BUREAU)
TELEGRAPH AND TELETYPE SERVICES
TELEPHONE SERVICES

READING ROOM:

DIVISION 7
LABORATORY
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
I. W. CONRAD

CRYPTANALYSIS AND TRANSLATION SECTION:
CRYPTANALYSIS
GAMBLING EXAMINATIONS
SCIENTIFIC DATA PROCESSING
SECURITY OF FBI COMMUNICATIONS
TRANSLATIONS

DOCUMENT SECTION:
CHARRED PAPER EXAMINATIONS
GAMBLING EXAMINATIONS
HANDWRITING AND HANDPRINTING
INDENTED WRITING
INK AND PENCIL EXAMINATIONS
OBLITERATED WRITING
PAPER EXAMINATIONS
PHOTOGRAPHIC EXAMINATIONS
PORTRAIT PARLE EXAMINATIONS
SHOEPRINT EXAMINATIONS
TIRETREAD EXAMINATIONS
TYPEWRITING AND OTHER MECHANICAL IMPRESSIONS

RADIO ENGINEERING SECTION:
CW RADIO NETWORK ENGINEERING
FM RADIO SYSTEMS
MAINTENANCE COORDINATION
MOBILE AND PORTABLE RADIO
RADIO FREQUENCY LIAISON COMMITTEES
EVIDENCE EXAMINATIONS

PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY SECTION:
BIOCHEMICAL
BIOLOGICAL
EXPLOSIVES
FIBERS AND HAIRS
GENERAL CHEMICAL
GLASS FRACTURES
GUNPOWDER TESTS
GUNS AND AMMUNITION
METALLURGICAL
NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS
NUMBER RESTORATION
PETROGRAPHIC OR GEOLOGIC
PHARMACOLOGICAL
SPECTROGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
TOOLMARKS
TOXICOLOGICAL
WOOD
X-RAY

DIVISION 1
IDENTIFICATION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
L. M. WALTERS

ALIEN REGISTRATION FINGERPRINT FILES
ARMY, NAVY, AIR, COAST GUARD, MARINE WARTIME SERVICE FINGERPRINTS, WORLD WAR II
OLD ARMY, NAVY, MARINE FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION FILES
CIVIL IDENTIFICATION FILES
CIVIL SERVICE FINGERPRINTS
CRIMINAL FINGERPRINT FILES
DEVELOPMENT OF LATENT FINGERPRINTS
DISASTER IDENTIFICATION SQUAD
FUGITIVE BULLETIN
GENERAL APPEARANCE FILE ON CONFIDENCE MEN, ETC.
GOVERNMENT FINGERPRINT FILES
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
MISSING PERSONS
NATIONAL FOOTPRINT FILE
NATIONAL NICKNAME FILE
NATIONAL UNIDENTIFIED LATENT FINGERPRINT FILE
SINGLE FINGERPRINT FILE
PROFESSIONAL FRAUDULENT CHECK PASSER'S FILE
WANTED NOTICES

DIVISION 10
INSPECTION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
W. MARK FELT

INSPECTIONS – FIELD AND SOG
SPECIAL PROJECTS
SURVEYS

FBI EXHIBITS SECTION

JANUARY 14, 1970

TION CHART

FIELD OFFICES

MEMPHIS
MIAMI
MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
NORFOLK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH
PORTLAND
RICHMOND
SACRAMENTO
ST. LOUIS
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
TAMPA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TOTAL 59

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR

CARTHA D. DeLOACH

DIVISION 5

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN

ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

SINO-SATELLITE SECTION:

65 ESPIONAGE
97 FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
105 INTERNAL SECURITY -- NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY (ALBANIA, BULGARIA, CHINA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMANY, HUNGARY, MONGOLIA, POLAND, ROMANIA, YOGOSLAVIA)

SOVIET SECTION:

65 ESPIONAGE
97 FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
105 INTERNAL SECURITY – NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION (ALL OTHER COUNTRIES):

117 ATOMIC ENERGY ACT – VIOLATIONS
65 ESPIONAGE
97 FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
110 FOREIGN ECONOMIC MATTERS
112 FOREIGN FUNDS
113 FOREIGN MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS
109 FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS
111 FOREIGN SOCIAL CONDITIONS
105 INTERNAL SECURITY – NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY
2 NEUTRALITY MATTERS
105 SECURITY MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY
PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

INTERNAL SECURITY & LIAISON BRANCH:

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION:

100 INTERNAL SECURITY (DOMESTIC SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS)
  COMMUNIST CONTROL ACT OF 1954
  INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
  SMITH ACT OF 1940
98 SABOTAGE
134 SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
100 SECURITY MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY (INDIVIDUALS)
14 SEDITION
66 SPECIAL RECORDS
61 TREASON AND RELATED STATUTES

LIAISON SECTION:

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC LIAISON
FOREIGN LIAISON MATTERS
LIAISON WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
66 DEFENSE PLANS
163 FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION

RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION:

100 COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS (CIRM)
100 } 157 } BLACK NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
157 HATE GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS
157 KLAN ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
170 RACIAL INFORMANTS

RESEARCH SECTION:

157 GENERAL RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
100 } 105 } COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MONOGRAPHS
CURRENT RESEARCH
STUDENT AGITATION

DIVISION 6

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ALEX ROSEN

CRI AL SECTION:

89 A TING OR KILLING A FEDERAL OFFICER
89 AS TING FOREIGN PERSONNEL
175 ASSAULTING THE PRESIDENT (OR VICE-PRESIDENT) OF THE UNITED STATES
153 AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT
91 BANK ROBBERY
71 BILLS OF LADING ACT
CONSPIRACY
164 CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT
70 CRIME ON INDIAN AND GOVERNMENT RESERVATIONS
45 CRIME ON THE HIGH SEAS
180 DESECRATION OF THE FLAG
149 DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES
157 DESTRUCTION OF INTERSTATE PROPERTY
9 EXTORTION
43 FALSE ADVERTISING OR MISUSE OF NAMES TO INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY
141 FALSE ENTRIES IN RECORDS OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS
63 FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
62 FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT
160 FEDERAL TRAIN WRECK STATUTE
4 FIREARMS ACT (A) NATIONAL (B) STATE FIREARMS CONTROL ASSISTANCE ACT (C) UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS
43 FRAUDULENT PRACTICES CONCERNING MILITARY AND NAVAL DOCUMENTS, AND SEALS AND SYMBOLS OF AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES
43 ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE, USE, POSSESSION OR SALE OF EMBLEMS AND INSIGNIA
78 ILLEGAL USE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS
142 ILLEGAL USE OF RAILROAD PASS
43 ILLEGAL WEARING OF UNIFORM
47 IMPERSONATION
178 INTERSTATE OBSCENE OR HARASSING TELEPHONE CALLS
148 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS
145 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER
146 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISON-MADE GOODS
103 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN CATTLE
26 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE OR AIRCRAFT
87 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
154 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS
90 IRREGULARITIES IN FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS
7 KIDNAPING
18 MAY ACT
NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY FILE
152 SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT
52 THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT, ROBBERY, AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
15 THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT
31 WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT

CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION:

176 ANTIRIOT LAWS
174 BOMBING MATTERS
44 CIVIL RIGHTS
173 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
CONSPIRACY
173 DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
173 DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
173 DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
173 DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
177 DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
56 ELECTION LAWS
50 INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY

NAME CHECK SECTION:

NAME CHECKS
SPECIAL MEMORANDA

ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD SECTION:

66 ACCOUNTING CONTROL
62 ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRIES
131 ADMIRALTY MATTERS
114 ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN MATTERS
92 ANTI-RACKETEERING
  HOBBS ACT
  LEA ACT
  INTERFERENCE WITH GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
60 ANTITRUST
93 ASCERTAINING FINANCIAL ABILITY
75 BONDSMEN AND SURETIES
58 BRIBERY
63 CENSUS MATTERS
58 CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CONSPIRACY
181 CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
69 CONTEMPT OF COURT
28 COPYRIGHT MATTERS
83 COURT OF CLAIMS
46 DEPENDENTS ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950
63 EIGHT-HOUR DAY LAW
46 FALSE CLAIMS – CIVIL
39 FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP
147 FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
[illegible] FEDERAL LENDING AND INSURANCE AGENCIES
119 FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT
29 FEDERAL RESERVE ACT
120 FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
46 FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
139 INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
6 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STRIKEBREAKERS
51 JURY PANEL INVESTIGATIONS
63 KICKBACK RACKET ACT
122 LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947
159 LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 (INVESTIGATIVE MATTER)
63 LANDS DIVISION MATTERS
36 MAIL FRAUD
8 MIGRATORY BIRD ACT
63 MISCELLANEOUS – CIVIL SUITS
49 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
72 OBSTRUCTION OF COURT ORDERS
72 OBSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
72 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
40 PASSPORT AND VISA MATTERS
27 PATENT MATTERS
74 PERJURY
125 RAILWAY LABOR ACT
10 RED CROSS ACT
46 RENEGOTIATION ACT – CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
63 SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT – 1940
63 TARIFF ACT OF 1930
63 UNREPORTED INTERSTATE SHIPMENT OF CIGARETTES
17 VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
63 WAGE AND HOUR LAW
156 WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

DIVISION 8

CRIME RECORDS

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
THOMAS E. BISHOP

CORRESPONDENCE AND TOURS SECTION:

CORRESPONDENCE ON GENERAL INQUIRIES
TOURS

CRIME RESEARCH SECTION:

CRIME RESEARCH
FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN
INVESTIGATOR
FBI NOTES
SPECIAL NAME CHECKS
TOP TEN FUGITIVE PROGRAM DATA
FUGITIVE PUBLICITY PROGRAMS
SPECIAL PROJECTS
LIBRARY
YOUTHFUL CRIMINALITY PROJECT
LIAISON:
  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
  FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION
  NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL
  NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING SECTION:

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS – CAREERS IN CRIME
NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER

DIVISION 9

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
J. H. GALE

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE -- ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION:

92 ANTI-RACKETEERING (INTELLIGENCE)
179 EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
162 INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES
143 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES
144 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF LOTTERY TICKETS
165 INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING INFORMATION
166 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF RACKETEERING
168 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF WAGERING PARAPHERNALIA
172 SPORTS BRIBERY
137 TOP-ECHELON CRIMINAL INFORMANTS

FUGITIVE SECTION:

115 BOND DEFAULT
76 CONDITIONAL RELEASE VIOLATORS
137 CRIMINAL INFORMANT MATTERS
42 DESERTERS AND DESERTER-HARBORING
76 ESCAPE AND RESCUE
76 ESCAPED FEDERAL PRISONERS
FUGITIVES
HARBORING
76 PAROLE VIOLATORS
76 PROBATION VIOLATORS
25 SELECTIVE SERVICE, INCLUDING FUGITIVE, RE-EMPLOYMENT, AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR CASES
88 UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID CUSTODY OR CONFINEMENT
88 UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID GIVING TESTIMONY
88 UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION

EMPLOYEES SECURITY AND SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION:

151 AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
73 APPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AND APPLICATIONS FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION OF SENTENCE
116 ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS)
151 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)
77 COAST GUARD SCREENING APPEAL BOARD
77 DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL AGENTS AND INSPECTORS FOR THE BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
77 DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS, INCLUDING DEPUTY MARSHALS AND CLERICAL POSITIONS IN BUREAU OF PRISONS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AND OTHER BRANCHES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INCLUDING CLERICAL POSITIONS OF THE BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
151 INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
138 LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
77 MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES
151 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
151 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
151 PEACE CORPS
140 SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
161 SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
151 UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
151 UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
151 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATION OF THE FBI

SEAT OF GOVERNMENT AND 59 FIELD OFFICES



DIRECTOR
BUREAU HEADQUARTERS
IDENTIFICATION
TRAINING
ADMINISTRATIVE
FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS
LABORATORY
INSPECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE
CRIME RECORDS
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE



56
46
10
34
1
8
9
37
33
18
39
36
12
14
45
43
6
42
50
59
3
17
22
13
48
53
57
47
25
49
30
40
27
26
11
2
41
31
28
29
7
5
15
52
44
23
55
16
19
35
24
38
20
21
51
58
4
32
54

1	ALBANY
2	ALBUQUERQUE
3	ALEXANDRIA
4	ANCHORAGE
5	ATLANTA
6	BALTIMORE
7	BIRMINGHAM
8	BOSTON
9	BUFFALO
10	BUTTE
11	CHARLOTTE
12	CHICAGO
13	CINCINNATI
14	CLEVELAND
15	COLUMBIA
16	DALLAS
17	DENVER
18	DETROIT
19	EL PASO
20	HONOLULU
21	HOUSTON
22	INDIANAPOLIS
23	JACKSON
24	JACKSONVILLE
25	KANSAS CITY
26	KNOXVILLE
27	LAS VEGAS
28	LITTLE ROCK
29	LOS ANGELES
30	LOUISVILLE
31	MEMPHIS
32	MIAMI
33	MILWAUKEE
34	MINNEAPOLIS
35	MOBILE
36	NEWARK
37	NEW HAVEN
38	NEW ORLEANS
39	NEW YORK
40	NORFOLK
41	OKLAHOMA CITY
42	OMAHA
43	PHILADELPHIA
44	PHOENIX
45	PITTSBURGH
46	PORTLAND
47	RICHMOND
48	SACRAMENTO
49	ST. LOUIS
50	SALT LAKE CITY
51	SAN ANTONIO
52	SAN DIEGO
53	SAN FRANCISCO
54	SAN JUAN
55	SAVANNAH
56	SEATTLE
57	SPRINGFIELD
58	TAMPA
59	WASHINGTON, D.C.

EXHIBIT NO. 2

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FBI FOREIGN LIAISON OPERATIONS

EXHIBIT NO. 2

The FBI maintains liaison posts abroad in 11 countries. These offices function in a liaison capacity in connection with criminal and security matters involving the Bureau's domestic responsibilities. In addition, the Bureau belongs to one international security committee and corresponds with police agencies all over the world except in countries controlled by the communists. In addition to the activities of its representatives abroad, the Bureau exchanges certain types of information with and, where warranted, arranges to have investigations conducted in the U. S. for law enforcement and intelligence agencies in many other foreign countries on a reciprocal basis.



NUMBER OF FBI REPRESENTATIVES STATIONED ABROAD (EXCLUSIVE OF CLERICAL PERSONNEL)

BERN	1
BONN	2
BUENOS AIRES	1
HONG KONG	2
LONDON	2
MADRID	1
MEXICO CITY	12
OTTAWA	2
PARIS	2
ROME	2
TOKYO	2
TOTAL	29



KEY
★ FBI REPRESENTATIVES STATIONED IN AMERICAN EMBASSIES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
● COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE FBI EXCHANGES INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED

EXCLUSIVE OF REIMBURSABLE APPLICANT WORK

FISCAL YEARS



EXHIBIT NO. 5

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FBI ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND APPROPRIATIONS

FISCAL YEARS 1967--1969





FBI EXHIBITS SECTION

EXHIBIT NO. 6



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

LENGTH OF SERVICE--FBI PERSONNEL

AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 1970, THERE WERE 17,001 EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING 7,545 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 9,456 CLERKS. OF THESE 6,258 (37%) HAD SERVED THE FBI TEN YEARS OR LONGER. OF THE SPECIAL AGENTS 4,267 (57%) HAD TEN OR MORE YEARS OF SERVICE; AND OF THE OTHER EMPLOYEES 1,991 (21%) HAD SERVED AT LEAST TEN YEARS.



FBI EXHIBITS SECTION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

EXHIBIT NO. 7

CRIME TREND
IN THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY-DECEMBER 1969 OVER JANUARY-DECEMBER 1968



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

PERCENT REPEATERS
BY TYPE OF CRIME IN 1963

PERSONS RELEASED IN 1963 AND REARRESTED WITHIN 5 YEARS



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

PERCENT REPEATERS
BY AGE GROUP



PERSONS RELEASED IN 1963 AND REARRESTED WITHIN 5 YEARS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

EXHIBIT NO. 10

NCIC NETWORK


WASHINGTON
SEATTLE (POLICE DEPT.)
OLYMPIA (STATE PATROL)
PORTLAND (POLICE DEPT.) (MULTNOMAH COUNTY ****S.O.)
OREGON
SALEM (STATE POLICE)
EUGENE
MONTANA
BILLINGS (POLICE DEPT.)
IDAHO
BOISE (STATE POLICE)
WYOMING
CHEYENNE (BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION)
NORTH DAKOTA
BISMARCK (BUREAU OF CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION)
SOUTH DAKOTA
PIERRE (DIVISION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION)
MINNESOTA
ST. PAUL (BUREAU OF CRIMINAL APPREHENSION)
WISCONSIN
MILWAUKEE (POLICE DEPT.)
MADISON (HIGHWAY PATROL)
MICHIGAN
EAST LANSING (STATE POLICE)
DETROIT **(P.D.)
(ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE (RCMP)
OTTAWA
MAINE
AUGUSTA (STATE POLICE)
VT.
N.H.
MONTPELIER (STATE POLICE)
CONCORD (STATE POLICE)
NEW YORK
ALBANY ***(NYSIIS) (STATE POLICE)
MASS.
BOSTON (POLICE DEPT.) (STATE POLICE)
R.I.
NORTH SCITUATE (STATE POLICE)
CONN.
HARTFORD (STATE POLICE)
NEW YORK (POLICE DEPT.)
PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH **(P.D.)
HARRISBURG (STATE POLICE)
N.J.
TRENTON (STATE POLICE)
PHILADELPHIA (POLICE DEPT.)
DEL.
DOVER (STATE POLICE)
MARYLAND
PIKESVILLE (STATE POLICE)
BALTIMORE (POLICE DEPT.)
WASHINGTON, D. C. (POLICE DEPT.) (PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL) (SECRET SERVICE) (NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE) (OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS)
1
CALIFORNIA
SACRAMENTO (HIGHWAY PATROL) (DEPT. OF JUSTICE)
NEVADA
CARSON CITY (STATE PATROL)
UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
COLORADO
DENVER (POLICE DEPT.)
4
NEBRASKA
OMAHA (POLICE DEPT.)
LINCOLN (DEPT. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT)
IOWA
3
DES MOINES (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
ILLINOIS
CHICAGO (POLICE DEPT.)
SPRINGFIELD (STATE POLICE)
INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS (POLICE DEPT.) (STATE POLICE)
OHIO
CLEVELAND
COLUMBUS *(S.H.P.)
CINCINNATI **(P.D.)
KANSAS
TOPEKA (HIGHWAY PATROL)
WICHITA (POLICE DEPT.)
MISSOURI
KANSAS CITY (POLICE DEPT.)
ST. LOUIS **(P.D.)
JEFFERSON CITY (STATE HIGHWAY PATROL)
KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE **(P.D.)
FRANKFORT (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON (STATE POLICE)
VIRGINIA
RICHMOND (STATE POLICE)
NORFOLK (POLICE DEPT.)
NORTH CAROLINA
GREENSBORO **(P.D.)
RALEIGH (STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION)
CHARLOTTE **(P.D.)
TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE (POLICE DEPT.) (DEPT. OF SAFETY)
MEMPHIS **(P.D.)
2
SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA (LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION)
ARIZONA
PHOENIX (HIGHWAY PATROL)
NEW MEXICO
SANTA FE (STATE POLICE)
ALBUQUERQUE (POLICE DEPT.)
OKLAHOMA
OKLAHOMA CITY (STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION)
TEXAS
DALLAS (POLICE DEPT.)
AUSTIN (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
HOUSTON (POLICE DEPT.)
ARKANSAS
LITTLE ROCK (STATE POLICE)
LOUISIANA
BATON ROUGE (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
NEW ORLEANS (POLICE DEPT.)
MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON (HIGHWAY SAFETY PATROL)
ALABAMA
BIRMINGHAM (POLICE DEPT.)
MONTGOMERY (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
GEORGIA
ATLANTA (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
SAVANNAH (POLICE DEPT.)
FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY) (DEPT. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT)
CLEARWATER (PINELLAS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE)
TAMPA (HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE)
MIAMI (DEPT. OF COMMUNICATIONS) (DADE COUNTY DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
ALASKA
JUNEAU
HAWAII
HONOLULU (POLICE DEPT.)

NCIC POLICY BOARD REGIONS

1 11 NORTHEASTERN STATES AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA – Population: 53,[illegible]14,000

2 13 SOUTHERN STATES – Population: 46,352,0[illegible]0

3 12 NORTH CENTRAL STATES – Population: 5[illegible],628,000

4 14 WESTERN STATES – Population: 44,467,00[illegible]

◉ Operational Terminal -- Computer
● Operational Terminal -- Manual
○ Planned Terminal (to be added)

(Shaded portions represent areas having immediate access to NCIC through local or state computers.)

*(S.H.P.) — (STATE HIGHWAY PATROL)
**(P.D.) — (POLICE DEPT.)
***(NYSIIS) — (NEW YORK STATE IDENTIFICATION AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM)
****(S.O.) — (SHERIFF'S OFFICE)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

BREAKDOWN OF RECORDS IN NCIC COMPUTER



AS OF MARCH 1, 1970

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

CONVICTIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND GAMBLING FIGURES AS RESULT OF FBI INVESTIGATION



AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 1970, A TOTAL OF 1,027 OTHER INDIVIDUALS WERE AWAITING PROSECUTION AS COMPARED WITH 330 AND 675 AT THE CLOSE OF FISCAL YEARS 1967 AND 1968, RESPECTIVELY.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR



SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

VIOLATIONS RECEIVED

EXHIBIT NO. 13



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY STATUTE

VIOLATIONS REPORTED



FBI

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

CIVIL RIGHTS CASES HANDLED

1965-1969





*ALL-TIME HIGH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

EXHIBIT NO. 146

NUMBER OF CIVIL RIGHTS CASES HANDLED

FISCAL YEAR 1969


WASH. 34
ORE. 12
CAL. 403
IDAHO 8
NEV. 42
MONT. 10
WYO. 7
UTAH 6
ARIZ. 28
COL. 25
N. MEX. 53
N. DAK. 4
S. DAK. 14
NEB. 3
KAN. 25
OKLA. 73
TEXAS 658
MINN. 21
IOWA 6
MO. 131
ARK. 83
LA. 250
WIS. 44
ILL. 336
MICH. 155
IND. 95
KY. 92
TENN. 302
MISS. 340
ALA. 440
OHIO 234
GA. 310
FLA. 369
S.C. 128
N.C. 133
VA. 112
W. VA. 21
PENN 274
N.Y. 253
ME. 7
VT. 1
N.H. 0
MASS. 30
R.I. 27
CONN. 48
N.J. 203
DEL. 12
MD. 33
(D.C.) 15
ALASKA 2
HAWAII 14
PUERTO RICO 3
VIRGIN ISLANDS 4
TOTAL 5,933

FBI EXHIBITS SECTION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FEDERAL RESERVE ACT

VIOLATIONS REPORTED

FISCAL YEARS



*ALL-TIME HIGH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

EXHIBIT NO. 16

TOTAL SOVIET-BLOC OFFICIAL PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES

INCLUDES OFFICIALS AND DEPENDENTS OF SOVIET UNION, BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, MONGOLIA, POLAND AND ROMANIA



DOES NOT INCLUDE COURIERS, MEMBERS OF SPECIAL DELEGATIONS AND OTHER OFFICIALS TEMPORARILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND NOT ASSIGNED TO OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

SOVIET-BLOC OFFICIAL PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES

(BREAKDOWN BY COUNTRIES)

TOTAL: 1,129

as of February 1, 1970



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FINGERPRINT RECEIPTS

FISCAL YEARS



FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

TYPES OF FINGERPRINTS ON FILE

TOTAL:
195,652,468
MARCH 1, 1970



ESTIMATED PERSONS REPRESENTED:

For the 59,891,756 prints in the criminal file 18,618,537
For the remaining prints totaling 135,760,712 all of which are in the civil file 66,101,524
TOTAL ESTIMATED PERSONS REPRESENTED 84,720,061

FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

CORRESPONDENCE, FORMS AND NAME CHECKS RECEIVED

FISCAL YEARS



FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

*ALL-TIME HIGH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

CASES INVOLVING LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATIONS

FISCAL YEARS



FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FUGITIVES IDENTIFIED BY FINGERPRINTS

FISCAL YEARS



FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

*ALL-TIME HIGH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

WANTED NOTICES POSTED AND CANCELLED

FISCAL YEARS



FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

*ALL-TIME HIGH

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

TOTAL FBI LABORATORY EXAMINATIONS

FISCAL YEARS

EXHIBIT NO 24



*ALL-TIME HIGH

FBI EXHIBITS SECTION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FBI LABORATORY EXAMINATIONS MADE FOR NON-FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

EXHIBIT NO. 25

FISCAL YEAR 1969


WASH 1,856
MONT. 1,528
N. DAK. 743
MINN. 308
ORE. 394
IDAHO 908
WYO. 884
S. DAK. 687
WIS. 3,642
MICH 461
NY 3,136
ME 379
VT
N H
MASS
CONN
621
248
441
553
1,446
2,754
1,230
5,252
4,281 (D.C.)
CAL. 2,134
NEV 781
UTAH 1,654
COL. 1,732
NEB. 1,402
IOWA 1,451
ILL. 2,239
IND. 1,173
OHIO 2,132
PENN 3,888
N J
MD
DEL
W VA 280
VA. 15,768
KAN. 1,010
MO. 423
KY. 1,476
ARIZ. 1,636
N. MEX. 2,283
OKLA. 998
TEXAS 797
ARK. 2,980
TENN. 3,104
N.C. 1,858
S.C. 766
MISS 1,453
ALA. 377
GA. 252
LA. 755
FLA. 4,037
CANAL ZONE 0
PUERTO RICO 140
ALASKA 2,390
HAWAII 175
VIRGIN ISLANDS, U.S.A. 359

FOREIGN

BAHAMAS	4
CANADA	118
ICELAND	7
PANAMA	2

TOTAL 93,786

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

EXHIBIT NO.

LOCAL POLICE TRAINING SCHOOLS

NUMBER OF SCHOOLS IN WHICH FBI PROVIDED TRAINING ASSISTANCE



OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: 3/18/70

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE IN CONNECTION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE WEDNESDAYS, 5:00 P.M.

Reference is made to my memorandum of 3/13/70, submitting a brief for the Director's use in connection with captioned conference. You were advised this material would be edited each week to insure that it was in a current status.

Done
There are attached amended pages 11, 12, 16, and 26 which should be inserted in the brief.

The change on page 11 is under the subheading "Stock and Bond Thefts," and the last sentence has been changed to reflect that the amount recovered is now $8,026,000 and that 29 individuals have been charged. The change on page 12 is the fact that the last sentence on the page has been added to show that the United States Attorney in Baltimore, with the approval of the Attorney General, plans to seek the indictment of Congressman Dowdy and two others on 3/31/70. The change on page 16 is in the first paragraph, reflecting that the Identification Division made an identification in connection with the Wilkerson bombing in New York. It also points out that Cathlyn Wilkerson and Kathy Boudin are among six other fugitives being sought by the FBI after they failed to appear to answer local felony charges in Chicago on 3/16/70 growing out of the October demonstrations. The change on page 26 was made to include additional Laboratory findings in regard to the Bel Air explosion.

62-115[illegible]-198

Enclosures (4)

EX-110 REC-30

5 MAR 19 1970

1 - Mr. Tolson - Enclosures
1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Walters - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Mohr - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Bishop - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Casper - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Conrad - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Felt - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Gale - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Rosen - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Sullivan - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Tavel - Enclosures
1 - Miss Gandy - Enclosures
1 - Miss Holmes - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Beaver - Enclosures
1 - M. A. Jones - Enclosures

57 MAR 2 6 1970

DGH:ceb (20)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Mohr
1-Mr. Bishop

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. DE LOACH

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : S. B. DONAHOE

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE
WEDNESDAY, 5:00 P.M.

The Attorney General's memorandum of 3/5/70 instituting weekly staff conferences listed a number of invitees. Among those who will attend are the following:

Benjamin F. Holman, Director,
Community Relations Service

Shiro Kashiwa, Assistant Attorney General,
Land and Natural Resources Division

Sol Lindenbaum, Executive Assistant to
the Attorney General

Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division

Herman G. Moeller, Director (Acting),
Bureau of Prisons

George J. Reed, Chairman,
Board of Parole

William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel

George H. Revercomb, Associate Deputy
Attorney General

REC 4 62-112856-199

APR 2 1970

Maurice A. Roberts, Chairman,
Board of Immigration Appeals

Donald E. Santarelli, Associate Deputy
Attorney General

SBD:amr

Continued.......Over

Lawrence Traylor, Pardon Attorney (Acting)

Johnnie McK. Walters, Assistant Attorney General,
Tax Division

Harlington Wood, Jr., Director, Executive Office
for United States Attorneys

ACTION:

For the information of the Director, a memorandum will be submitted each Wednesday morning concisely setting forth those items which might arise for discussion.

✓

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Gale

DATE: 7/6/67

FROM : W. V. Cleveland

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S LUNCHEON MEETING
WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FRIDAY, JULY , 1967

Attorney General's Staff Conference

In accordance with the request of the Crime Records Division, attached are original and seven copies of memoranda prepared by the Special Investigative Division containing information concerning items which might come up for discussion between the Director and the Attorney General at their luncheon meeting on Friday, July 7, 1967.

Summarily these memoranda deal with the following matters:

Warren Minor Christopher, new Deputy Attorney General; recent appointment of Simon Francis McHugh, Jr., a person of doubtful qualifications, as a member of the Subversive Activities Control Board; four year extension of Selective Service Act; investigation to locate killers of two border patrol officers in southern California; information concerning shooting by Bureau Agents of James Lee Kirby, a parole violator fugitive when apprehending him on 7/5/67; accomplishments in the drive against organized crime; the Department's disclosure policy in electronic surveillance matters and new guidelines from the Attorney General concerning the use of electronic surveillances in criminal matters; and gambling cases.

ACTION:

This memorandum and the attached memoranda should be routed to the Crime Records Division which is handling the overall co-ordination of this matter.

Enclosures

REC 18 62-97856-119

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale

1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Eddy
1 - Mr. McAndrews
1 - Mr. Connell

JUL 10 1967

JRC:jmm
(8)

74

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
DeLoach ✓
Mohr ✓
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt ✓
Gale ✓
~~Rosen~~
~~Sullivan~~
~~Tavel~~
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Bishop

FROM : M. A. Jones

DATE: 9-7-67

C D Brennan

Wannall

} P. 16

SUBJECT: LUNCHEON WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1967

SYNOPSIS:

Director has accepted Attorney General's luncheon invitation for Friday, September 8. Pertinent items of possible interest for discussion at luncheon include:

(1) The Attorney General (AG) called Mr. DeLoach on 9-5-67 concerning FBI's pending requests for approval of electronic surveillances. AG said he had contacted Clark Clifford and Walt Rostow at White House and also planned to meet with Dick Helms of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and General Carter of National Security Agency (NSA). AG said Clifford and Rostow were surprised FBI had so little coverage--and they hinted that because of FBI reluctance to use surveillances, it might be good idea to transfer FBI responsibilities in domestic intelligence to CIA. AG said he was opposed to this idea; that it would take time to bring Clifford and Rostow around, but FBI would come out ahead and he (the AG) would have more liberal hand in approving FBI requests.

Regarding above, Mr. DeLoach noted it would be premature to talk with Rostow or Clifford now; but after a decision has been reached, they could be confidentially briefed on such FBI operations. Information confidentially obtained reflects that Helms of CIA had a meeting scheduled with AG on 9-6-67--the subject of which probably was electronic surveillances.

EX 101 REC-65 62-97856-183

FBI has 31 telephone surveillances in FBI cases; 19 telephone surveillances at request of State Department, and 39 teletype surveillances at request of NSA. Four telephone surveillances and one NSA request for an FBI assistance in obtaining foreign codes are pending AG's approval.

SEP 1967

(2) On 7-19-67, the House passed H.R. 421, which provides Federal penalties for interstate travel with intent to incite a riot. Many persons question its practical and legal usefulness due to difficulty in proving intent. Our sources on the Hill indicate there is a hope the bill may be bottled up in committee--but that it will pass the Senate if it reaches the floor. We took no stand on the bill with the Department, but did cite examples of interstate travel to areas where strife developed. The bill could increase our investigative responsibilities substantially.

1 - Mr. Tolson
1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Rosen

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Miss Holmes

CONTINUED - OVER

(3) On 8-8-67, the House passed H.R. 5037, the Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance Act of 1967 (originally the Administration's "Safe Streets and Crime Control Act")--but with considerable changes. One amendment to the original Act would empower regional institutes to engage in police training--thus duplicating and competing with FBI police training. This matter has been brought to attention of FBI friends on Senate Judiciary Committee. Our Hill sources advise that Senators McClellan and Hruska plan to combine their bills regarding controlled use of wiretaps and eavesdropping devices and add this to H.R. 5037.

(4) AG has indicated desire to achieve about 400 convictions in organized crime field during this fiscal year. As of 9-7-67, a total of 382 individuals in this field were awaiting Federal prosecution. By letter of 7-27-67, we called the AG's attention to a situation wherein 23 persons arrested in New York for gambling law violations in 1964 were still awaiting final prosecutive action. To date, no reply has been received from AG.

(5) Latest two issues of "Life" magazine contain articles by Sandy Smith, former Chicago newsman, focusing attention on La Cosa Nostra leaders, as well as their political affiliations, and the need for electronic surveillances to cope with organized crime. Smith has extensive background and contacts qualifying him to write on organized crime. It is obvious he obtained help from such persons as Professor Robert Blakey of Notre Dame, formerly in the Organized Crime Section of Department.

(6) The "task force" organized under direction of Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of Department conducted an operation against bookmaker Ernest Reinhart in Niagara Falls, New York, area and learned from the Customs Service that the Niagara Falls Police Department was also interested in Reinhart's activities. According to officials of Niagara Falls Police Department, attorneys and others on the "task force" appeared at the police department and "took over" entire investigation. "Task force" was so inept that it "blew" the case against Reinhart, and "task force" surveillances were discovered by Reinhart and associates. Although Reinhart's gambling activities were across state lines from New York to Canada, our Buffalo Office was not notified. Pertinent details were brought to AG's attention by letter of 9-5-67, and we requested that "task force" be instructed to immediately advise FBI of matters within our jurisdiction.

CONTINUED - OVER

M. A. Jones To Bishop Memo
RE: LUNCHEON WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL

(7) For first month (July) of new fiscal year, FBI convictions decreased 189, or 22 percent. Decrease primarily due to: (a) shortage of judges and prosecutors, resulting in overcrowded court conditions, and (b) policy enunciated by Department's Criminal Division to reduce Federal prosecutions of juvenile offenders. In July, 1966, Assistant AG Vinson sent letter instructing U. S. Attorneys regarding diversion of subjects under age 21 to local authorities--which has principally been felt in Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle violations, where experience indicates about 65 percent of violators are under 21 and where FBI convictions decreased 109 in July, 1967, compared with July, 1966. For sometime, we have been advising AG whenever shortages of Federal judges or shortages in U. S. Attorneys Offices exist.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information in connection with the Director's luncheon with the Attorney General on Friday, September 8, 1967.

Handled.
H

TSB

ADDENDUM BY C. D. DeLOACH (CDD;hmm 9/7/67): The Coordinator of U. S. Attorneys, John W. Kern, III, stopped DeLoach in the Attorney General's Office on the morning of 9/7/67 and posed two questions: (1) Should U. S. Attorneys attend meetings of Federal Executive Boards (groups composed of all Federal agencies in various metropolitan areas) when meeting on monthly basis (2) If U. S. Attorneys joined and attended such meetings, should these U. S. Attorneys comply with recent requests by John Macy, Chairman,

(CONTINUED - OVER)

(DETAILS BEGIN ON PAGE 2)

Civil Service Commission, and sponsor a one-day seminar on law enforcement managed by Federal Executive Board groups.

Kern was told that it was, of course, desirable to have U. S. Attorneys participate in civic affairs but that U. S. Attorneys should not attempt to sponsor one-day seminars on the subject of law enforcement inasmuch as this would only promote confusion and chaos. Kern was also told that the FBI is already sponsoring such seminars and conferences and that in some instances representatives of the U. S. Attorneys' offices were invited to participate in these conferences. The subject of discussion this year is Legal Problems involving Law Enforcement Officers and the National Crime Information Center.

M. A. Jones to Bishop
RE: LUNCHEON WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL

DETAILS:

The Director has accepted an invitation for a luncheon with the Attorney General on Friday, September 8, 1967. There is contained in this memorandum succinct data concerning pertinent items which might be of interest for discussion on this occasion. The General Investigative, Special Investigative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions have contributed salient information for this memorandum.

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES:

On 9-5-67, the Attorney General called Mr. DeLoach regarding the Bureau's pending requests for approval of electronic surveillances. He said he had finally made contact with Clark Clifford and Walt Rostow at the White House on 8-31-67 and that he planned to meet with Dick Helms of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and General Carter of the National Security Agency (NSA) regarding this matter. The Attorney General said Clifford and Rostow knew little about electronic surveillances and were very surprised that the FBI had so little such coverage. He said that Clifford and Rostow, without saying so, hinted that because of FBI reluctance to use surveillances, it might be a good idea to transfer FBI responsibilities in domestic intelligence to CIA.

The Attorney General said he was opposed to this idea. He said it would take a little time to bring Clifford and Rostow around but that he believed the Department and the FBI would come out ahead in the discussions and that he, the Attorney General, will then have a more liberal hand in approving requests from the FBI. In this connection, Mr. DeLoach noted that it would be premature to talk with Clifford or Rostow at this point but after a decision has been reached, these two individuals could be briefed on a confidential basis regarding such FBI operations. It was also noted that it did not appear the Attorney General could adequately represent the FBI in his discussions with Clifford and Rostow.

We have confidentially obtained the information that Richard Helms, Director of the CIA, had a meeting scheduled with the Attorney General at 5 p.m., on Wednesday, September 6, 1967, and that the subject of the meeting was probably electronic surveillances.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

At the present time the Bureau has the following electronic surveillances in operation: (1) In Bureau cases, 31 telephone surveillances; (2) At the request of State Department, 19 telephone surveillances; (3) At the request of NSA, 39 teletype surveillances.

As of this date, there are four telephone surveillances pending approval by the Attorney General with subjects and dates of request to the Attorney General as follows: Ralph Alan Dale, since 3-27-67; Charles Morris, since 7-25-67; Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, since 8-2-67; Frederick Douglas Andrews, since 8-14-67. In addition, we have a request for FBI assistance on behalf of the NSA [redacted] pending with the Attorney General since 6-16-67. information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive foreign counterintelligence operation.

H. R. 421, INTERSTATE TRAVEL TO INCITE RIOTS:

This bill was passed by the House on 7-19-67. It provides for Federal prosecution of persons who travel interstate with the intent to incite a riot. Its practical and legal usefulness has been questioned by a number of people, including many Senators, due to the extreme difficulty in obtaining evidence to prove intent. Our Hill sources have advised there was a hope the Bill could be bottled up in committee unless it could be changed to make it more practical. These sources concede the Bill will pass the Senate without difficulty if it reaches the floor because many Senators would consider it politically unwise to vote against it. We took no stand on the Bill with the Department, but did cite examples of interstate travel by militant Negroes and hate group leaders to areas where strife developed. The Bill, if passed, could substantially increase our investigative responsibilities, depending, of course, on the policy established by the Department.

H. R. 5037, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1967:

This is the Administration's bill, originally called the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act, although it has been changed considerably by Republican-sponsored amendments made when the House passed the bill on 8-8-67. One of these amendments by Congressman Robert McClory (R.-Ill.) which changed Title 3 of the Bill, would empower the regional institutes to engage in police training. This would duplicate and compete with the extensive police training program we conduct on our own and in cooperation with local and state agencies. This has been brought to the attention of our friends on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Many of them have voiced agreement and stated they will take the necessary action to correct this wrong. Our Hill

(CONTINUED - OVER)

sources have advised that Senator John McClellan (D.-Ark.) and Senator Roman Hruska (R.-Neb.) plan to combine their bills authorizing controlled use of wiretaps and eavesdropping devices and to add this to H. R. 5037 in Committee. They feel wiretap legislation as a part of the Administration's crime bill will have an excellent chance for passage and possible acceptance by the President.

ORGANIZED CRIME:

As of September 7, 1967, there were a total of 382 individuals, involved in organized criminal activities, who have been arrested, indicted, or awaiting further prosecutive action in connection with violations of various Federal statutes.

By letter dated July 27, 1967, the Bureau called to the attention of the Attorney General a situation where 23 individuals arrested in New York for violations of the gambling laws in 1964 were still awaiting final prosecutive action. It was called to the attention of the Attorney General that prosecutive action taken at the earliest possible date with reference to these individuals would greatly assist in increasing accomplishments in the organized crime field during the present fiscal year. To date no response from the Attorney General has been received to this communication.

The Attorney General has indicated that he is desirous of achieving in the neighborhood of 400 convictions of individuals involved in organized crime during this fiscal year. With 382 such subjects already awaiting prosecution, the Attorney General's goal would appear to be readily available if vigorous prosecutive action is taken of these individuals at the earliest possible date by the Department.

"LIFE" MAGAZINE ARTICLE:

"Life" magazine has run articles for the last two weeks on La Cosa Nostra, which articles were written by Sandy Smith, former crime reporter for the "Chicago Tribune "* Smith has done an excellent job in these articles in focusing public attention on the Cosa Nostra leaders as well as their political affiliations and the need for electronic surveillances in order to cope with the menace of organized crime.

Smith is an outstanding investigative reporter who has a wealth of independent knowledge built up over the years on La Cosa Nostra. He also has tremendous contacts among the local and state police intelligence agencies throughout the country. In addition, it is obvious that he obtained considerable help from such persons as Professor Robert Blakey of Notre Dame, former Departmental Attorney in the Organized Crime Section, in

*and "Chicago Sun-Times."

(CONTINUED - OVER)

connection with this article. He also has used the information disclosed from our microphones in court cases in such cases as the Raymond Patriarca matter, etc.

DEPARTMENT TASK FORCE, BUFFALO, NEW YORK:

In October, 1966, under the direction of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department, a "task force" was organized as an investigative operation, supervised by Department Attorneys, and to which were assigned representatives from various Federal investigative agencies.

On August 21 and 23, 1967, the "task force" conducted investigative activity, including physical surveillances in the Niagara Falls, New York, area. The subject of its investigation was one Ernest Reinhart, a bookmaker from Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada, who was said to be making trips daily to Niagara Falls, New York, to establish regular contacts and gambling pickups from other known gamblers. The Niagara Falls, New York, Police Department, which was also investigating the activities of Reinhart, had requested the assistance of the United States Customs Service to develop sufficient evidence to establish a violation of the local gambling statute. A representative of the Customs Service notified the "task force" representatives of the local police department's interest in this matter and immediately thereafter, according to the officials of the Niagara Falls Police Department, attorneys and other members of the 'task force" appeared at the police department and "took over" the entire investigation.

SAC Neil J. Welch of our Buffalo Office has since determined from representatives of the Niagara Falls Police Department and the Customs Service that the investigative activity of the "task force" was so inept that the case against Reinhart was "blown." (In conducting a surveillance the task force utilized a panel truck and their actions, while in the panel truck, were such that they caused the truck to rock back and forth revealing to the gamblers who were watching, that people were inside the truck.) Surveillances conducted by the "task force," including attorneys assigned thereto, were readily discovered by Reinhart and his associates. Reinhart remarked to a customs agent at the border crossing that he would give the investigators a good run around.

Although Reinhart's gambling activities were being carried on between Canada and the United States, that is across state lines, in apparent violation of the Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Statute, the FBI Office at Buffalo was not notified. The FBI has a substantial investigative

(CONTINUED - OVER)

responsibility in the investigation of violations of this statute. In this instance, Customs Service, Internal Revenue Service, and the local Niagara Falls, New York, Police Department also have investigative responsibilities.

Pertinent details concerning this matter were brought to the attention of the Attorney General by our letter dated September 5, 1967, with the request that necessary instructions be issued to the "task force" personnel that matters within FBI jurisdiction be immediately reported to our Buffalo Office.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS - CONVICTIONS:

At the end of July, 1967, we had recorded 189 fewer convictions than were recorded during the first month of the prior fiscal year. This represents a decrease of 22%, which is primarily the result of two factors: (1) shortages of judges and prosecutors which result in overcrowded court conditions and (2) the policy enunciated by the Criminal Division of the Department to reduce prosecutions in Federal court relating to juvenile offenders.

In this connection, our potential for increasing conviction statistics was decimated as a result of a letter sent during July, 1966, by Assistant Attorney General Vinson instructing all U. S. Attorneys to give primary consideration to the diversion of subjects under 21 years of age to local authorities. These instructions are being followed by a majority of U. S. Attorneys and have hurt us principally in Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle violations where experience has shown that approximately 65% of all violators are under 21 years of age. At the end of July, 1967, we recorded 109 less convictions in this category as compared to the first month in the previous fiscal year.

We have for sometime been following the practice of advising the Attorney General whenever shortages of Federal judges, U. S. Attorneys or their assistants exist. For example, we recently sent the following letters to the Attorney General to bring to his attention shortages of judges or U. S. Attorneys in the indicated areas:

9-1-67, Southern District of Georgia;
8-16-67, Eastern District of Michigan;
8-7-67, District of Kansas;
8-3-67, District of New Jersey;
8-2-67, Southern and Northern Districts of Mississippi;
7-31-67, Western District of New York.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

M. A. Jones to Bishop
RE: LUNCHEON WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL

In connection with the situation in the Western District of New York, we originally called this to the Attorney General's attention on 3-30-67 and we have received no information indicating that an appointment has been made for the vacant judgeship. Considerable newspaper publicity has attended the failure to appoint a judge for this district.

With regard to the two vacant judgeships in the Eastern District of Michigan, it is noted that we first called this to the Attorney General's attention on 3-16-67 and we have not received any current information indicating these judgeships have been filled.

Each SAC has been instructed to keep the Bureau currently advised of any shortages of judges or U. S. Attorneys and we will continue to bring these matters to the attention of the Attorney General.

As an example of shortages which have been brought to the Attorney General's attention, in connection with the shortage of judges in the Southern District of Georgia, it is noted that as of September 1, 1967, there was a total of 87 Bureau cases awaiting prosecution involving 121 defendants. Of these 22 representing 32 subjects have been pending prosecution for more than six months.

It is also noted that in the District of New Jersey as of July 1, 1967, there were approximately 200 Bureau cases awaiting prosecutive action involving approximately 392 defendants. Our New York Office has also advised that it has 775 cases awaiting prosecution representing 874 subjects.

TEB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen ✓
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 9/14/67

FROM : G. C. Moore GCM

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Trainor

SUBJECT: LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MR. SARGENT SHRIVER, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY DURING WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1967

RUPPING

Attorney General's Staff Conference

The following data concerning the antipoverty workers' involvement in racial disturbances has been prepared for the Director's information and possible use at the forthcoming luncheon conference which will include the Attorney General and Mr. Shriver of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).

ALLEGATIONS OF INVOLVEMENT OF ANTIPOVERTY EMPLOYEES

There have been a number of allegations regarding the involvement of antipoverty employees in racial disturbances and involving the misuse of antipoverty funds in connection therewith. Allegations with respect to the misuse of these funds are exceptionally difficult to substantiate because the funds provided to local antipoverty agencies by OEO or other Federal agencies are usually furnished on a grant basis with the grants becoming the property of the local group at which time the Federal character of the funds is lost.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-111083

However, there have been instances wherein certain officials and employees of local agencies receiving Federal antipoverty grants have reportedly not conducted themselves in a manner conducive to law and order. Examples follow.

New York City

REC-9 62-99856-187

The largest privately-operated antipoverty program receiving Federal funds is said to be Haryou - Act in the Harlem area of New York City. Several of its employees are known to have subversive backgrounds or to have engaged in improper activities. Harriet Noel and John Anderson, members of the Revolutionary

Enclosure
TDR:fhd (7)

16 OCT 20 1967

CONTINUED - OVER

TRAINOR

59 OCT 31 1967

Action Movement, a clandestine all-Negro revolutionary group that calls for the overthrow of the U. S. Government by violence and which is procommunist Chinese-oriented, were suspended as employees of Haryou - Act following their arrest last June along with a number of members of the Jamaica Rifle and Pistol Club, a Revolutionary Action Movement front group, on charges including conspiracy to advocate anarchy. Another member of this rifle club who was arrested, Arthur Harris, was also suspended as an employee of an antipoverty organization in Jamaica, New York City, which is funded by OEO.

Newark, New Jersey

In Newark, antipoverty funds were reputedly utilized by the United Community Corporation to rent two station wagons used to transport people who had been encouraged to appear at meetings at the city hall to protest action of a city planning board. Reportedly, one of the vehicles was equiped with a loudspeaker and was used to make inflammatory remarks regarding the incumbent city administration. Also, it is reported that inflammatory posters prepared by the United Community Corporation had been circulated.

Syracuse, New York

Employees of the Crusade for Opportunity, an antipoverty agency funded by OEO, are alleged to have been involved in the racial disturbances which occurred in Syracuse, New York, 8/16-18/67. An officer of the Syracuse Police Department advised that a Crusade for Opportunity automobile bearing U. S. Government license plates was used by two Negro males and two Negro females to cruise through Negro neighborhoods in Syracuse on 8/15/67. They utilized a loudspeaker to advertise a meeting on 8/16/67 regarding the alleged rape of an 11-year-old Negro girl by a white man.

A field worker of this organization, Leroy Glenn Wright, was arrested during the first night's disturbance on 8/16/67 and charged with inciting to riot and resisting arrest.

over

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR
WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
MR. SARGENT SHRIVER, DIRECTOR OF THE
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
DURING WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1967

Washington, D. C.

Individuals affiliated with two organizations funded in part by OEO were involved in the disturbance which occurred in the House of Representatives on 8/7/67 in protest of the shelving of the so-called "Rat Bill." The leader, Jesse Gray, a former Communist Party organizer in Harlem and a militant black nationalist, is the head of the Harlem Back Street Youth, Incorporated, which was the recipient of OEO funds. Such funds have since been suspended. Gray and at least one other member of the above organization were arrested for their part in this disturbance. Also involved in this disturbance and arrested was Robert Bailey Ransom, an employee of Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) Associates, an OEO-funded organization.

Hate-type Schools

The New York City Police Department advised on 8/9/67 that the walls of a school handling a program entitled "Special Training in Reading" for children 8 to 10 years of age contained numerous hate slogans. Examples of the signs noted thereon were "Don't love them to death, shoot them to death; make revolution not war; burn, baby, burn; arm yourselves; Johnson is losing sleep; Newark, '67; Chicago South Side, '66; Watts, '65, and Harlem, '64." There was also a picture of President Johnson's face superimposed on an Army sergeant carrying a rifle captioned "Public Enemy Number One, Wanted for Murder." The committee handling this particular program was funded in part by OEO.

A somewhat similar situation occurred in Nashville, Tennessee, in connection with a "Liberation School" which has been in operation teaching 10- and 11-year-olds. Antipoverty funds from OEO had been earmarked for the school; however, the funds were withdrawn when national publicity resulted concerning this matter. Meantime, however, certain services including the rental of an automobile and school supplies had been furnished.

over
↓

MISUSE OF FBI INFORMATION BY OEO

In connection with the recent arrest by Kentucky authorities of Alan and Margaret McSurely, employees of the Southern Conference Education Fund, and Joseph T. Mulloy, an employee of an organization being funded by OEO, on a state sedition charge, someone in OEO apparently leaked to the press a report prepared by an OEO investigator which contained statements attributed to the FBI. An article concerning this matter appeared in the 9/1/67 issue of "The Evening Star."

The Director approved the lodging of a vigorous protest with OEO concerning the fact that information appearing in an FBI memorandum subsequently was published in "The Evening Star." In approving this action, he noted "Yes, and if they can't or won't give us the necessary assurances against leaks, we will cut off all investigative services to OEO."

Such a protest was lodged through liaison with Mr. Edgar May, Assistant Director, OEO, on 9/5/67 who advised that steps had been taken to insure that such did not recur in the future. A detailed memorandum is attached.

STATEMENTS AGAINST ESTABLISHED LAW AND ORDER

While no direct evidence has come to the Bureau's attention of outright seditious statements on the part of anti-poverty workers, allegations have been received of statements against established law and order and of statements tending to incite the people. Examples follow:

Marion S. Barry, Jr., former Washington Director of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, joined the United Planning Organization, Washington, D. C., as a $50-a-day consultant on 7/21/67. This organization is funded by OEO. On 6/30/67 Barry reportedly conducted a press conference on the steps of the 13th Precinct, Metropolitan Police Department, at which time he denounced the Police Department and stated that Negroes would continue to threaten the police until policemen are trained properly in how to deal with Negroes. Captain Al Prezio of the Troy, New York, Police Department, advised on 8/25/67 that Freeman Robinson, an employee of an antipoverty organization funded by OEO, uses the office of the antipoverty organization as a headquarters to conduct militant civil rights work and to recruit teen-agers to incite riots and arouse a Negro community on any issue that would create racial unrest.

Willie Wright, a duly-elected board member of the United Community Corporation, Newark, New Jersey, is alleged to have made statements concerning Negro rioting such as "To hell with President Johnson when he says something about not tolerating riots. We've tolerated these conditions for more than 400 years." He is also quoted as having said: "It is my firm conviction that in order to overcome the white man's complete human and legal jurisdiction over my black brothers and sisters, we are going to defend ourselves against all kinds of aggressions that are being perpetrated against us by the white man. I most emphatically want to make sure the majority of my black brothers and sisters have a piece of firepower in their home possessions to protect themselves against the most brutal atrocities to be seen anywhere committed by the New Jersey National Guard, the Newark and State Police in the recent rebellion in the City of Newark." The OEO has requested Wright's suspension pending its investigation of statements attributed to Wright.

"The Washington Post" of 9/13/67 contained an article by Columnist Roscoe Drummond captioned "Mayors Say OEO Programs Helped Suppress City Riots" in which he refers to a nationwide survey conducted by OEO in 64 cities, half of which had riots this summer. In citing OEO figures he pointed out that of 30,000 Community Action employees only 16 were arrested during the course of the riots and none were convicted. Poverty programs had 244 buildings in the hearts of the riot areas with none being burned or destroyed.

over ↓

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR
WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
MR. SARGENT SHRIVER, DIRECTOR OF THE
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
DURING WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1967

We have, of course, kept OEO promptly advised of all allegations received of misconduct on the part of antipoverty employees as well as allegations regarding the misuse of antipoverty funds. In accordance with the Director's instructions such information is also furnished the White House and the Attorney General.

ACTION:

Submitted for the Director's possible use.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOV NT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Mohr ✓
Parsons ✓
Belmont ✓
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire ✓
Rosen ✓
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: January 18, 1960

FROM : D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE

Attached are thumbnail memoranda of matters which may possibly be brought up at the Staff Conference on January 19, 1960.

Enclosures

IDM:hcw
(3)

There should have been memos re recent air crashes we are investigating. See that such are covered in the future.
H

EX 101

62-97156-162

REC-95

25 JAN 26 1960

INDEXED

ENCLOSURE

6 1960

January 18, 1960

STATUS OF SUN VALLEY, INC.
JAMES RIDDLE HOFFA; ET AL.
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION
OF STOLEN PROPERTY
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT

This is the case in which a half million dollars of Teamsters Union funds were transferred to a Florida bank in 1956, which then made loans in a similar amount to Sun Valley, Inc., a Florida real estate development in which Hoffa had an option to purchase 45 per cent of the stock. During the past week Hoffa furnished this option, which is dated April 15, 1955, to the McClellan Committee, claiming he had recently located it in his old records.

Teamsters Union records were subpoenaed for production before the grand jury in Washington, D. C. January 14, 1960. Some records were produced in response to the subpoena and others are said to be in the possession of the McClellan Committee. The Criminal Division will obtain such records from the McClellan Committee. Our Washington Field Office is making an accounting investigation of the records that were produced before the grand jury and will examine those the Criminal Division obtains from the McClellan Committee.

The Criminal Division has arranged to have another grand jury impanelled to take testimony in this case at Orlando, Florida, beginning February 15, 1960. The Criminal Division expects this grand jury will be in session at least sixty days.

62-97856-162

ENCLOSURE

January 18, 1960

THOMAS ALFRED EPPLEY, JR.
JACK COSGELLAW GRONER
JOSEPH MAYBIN GORE FRIEDRICHS
MAURICE EUGENE PURNELL
THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY

As a result of Bureau investigation, on January 11, 1960, captioned subjects, all students at Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, admitted stealing a radio antenna from a vehicle belonging to the Internal Revenue Service on the night of September 16-17, 1959. This antenna was valued at approximately $37.50.

Subjects apparently are members of prominent families, with Purnell the son of a prominent Dallas, Texas, attorney and Friedrichs related to Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee. Groner was a star football player who recently signed with the Dallas team of the new American Football League.

U. S. Attorney John Strickler at Roanoke, Virginia, insisted upon prosecution of all four for Theft of Government Property. Strickler in addition leaked the facts concerning this case to the local press indicating that arrests would be forthcoming.

In view of this matter being a potential source of embarrassment to both the Bureau and the Department, the facts were brought to the attention of the Criminal Division on January 12, 1960. The Criminal Division subsequently advised that they had discussed this matter by telephone with U. S. Attorney Strickler who reluctantly agreed to proceed against subjects by Grand Jury. The Department indicated they were upset with the manner in which Strickler released this information to the newspapers and that Mr. Hayden Crawford of the Department was to separately take up this matter with him.

The Proctor at Washington and Lee University has indicated that University officials are holding any action against subjects in abeyance and would await final action by the Grand Jury. All four subjects remain enrolled at Washington and Lee at this time.

62-97556 - 162

ENCLOSURE

January 18, 1960

MACK CHARLES PARKER

The Mack Charles Parker case was presented to a Federal Grand Jury in Biloxi, Mississippi, from January 4, 1960, through January 12, 1960. On January 14, 1960, the Federal Grand Jury advised Federal Judge Sidney C. Mize that they had reported a no true bill in connection with all possible violations in this matter.

62-71856-162

ENCLOSURE

January 18, 1960

STATUS OF JOHN GEORGE LEDES;
JOSEPH ABRAMS
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

This case was referred to us by the Attorney General on 12/31/59. It relates to the association between John George Ledes, a former legal advisor to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner James E. Sargent, and Joseph Abrams, a New York promoter of unsavory reputation.

We have reviewed voluminous SEC files here and in New York and have interviewed numerous persons in and out of SEC who handled cases involving Abrams' firms. We determined that Ledes endeavored to assist Abrams in several SEC matters while Ledes was still with that agency. We are now engaged in interviewing additional persons with possible pertinent knowledge of the association and in the detailed job of tracing Ledes' financial transactions through bank, realty and other records to pin down specifics of loans from Abrams to Ledes relative to financing properties purchased by Ledes. Abrams' loans may constitute payment of compensation to Ledes and thus bring their relationship within the scope of the Conflict of Interest Statutes.

It is noted we have been told that both Ledes and Abrams were associated with Tony Russo, ex-confidential assistant to former Attorney General Brownell. Russo has not been alleged to be involved in any irregularities in this matter.

The case is being given top priority in handling both in the field and at the Seat of Government.

62-97106 — 162

ENCLOSURE

January 18, 1960

STATUS OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE AND LABOR RELATING TO NEW LABOR LAW

The latest information we have received from the Department relative to the Memorandum of Understanding to be signed by the Secretary of Labor and the Attorney General relative to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, as far as it affects the Bureau, is that it is contemplated we will receive investigative jurisdiction with respect to the six categories of criminal violations as follows:

(1) Embezzlement of union funds.

(2) Picketing for extortion purposes.

(3) Deprivation by force of rights of union members.

(4) Communists and convicted felons prohibited from union positions.

(5) Payment by employer of fines imposed on labor officers.

(6) The amendment to Labor-Management Relations Act Statute of 1947 (previously under our jurisdiction) relating primarily to payments by employers to union officials.

62-77856-168

ENCLOSURE

1/18/60

FRANK GRIGGS, et al.
MELVIN W. SMITH - VICTIM
CIVIL RIGHTS

This is the case concerning which Acting Assistant Attorney General Joseph M. F. Ryan, Jr., Civil Rights Division, made a press release on 1/14/60 stating that the FBI has been requested to investigate this matter.

By memorandum 1/14/60, Mr. Ryan requested a preliminary investigation based upon a news article in the "Washington Post and Times Herald," 1/12/60, and an editorial in the same paper, 1/13/60, regarding an incident in Montgomery County Peoples Court wherein one Gordon L. Contee became violent when convicted of rape. He was subdued by officers but Melvin Smith, Contee's 19-year-old half brother, rushed forward from the audience and struck Frank Griggs, an officer who was subduing Contee. It was alleged that Smith was beaten by the officers while being taken to jail after his assault on Griggs.

Colonel James S. McAuliffe, superintendent, Montgomery County Police, Melvin L. Reese, Montgomery County Manager, and Luke Bennett, sheriff, have all been notified that the Bureau has undertaken investigation of this matter.

Pertinent court records were not available over the week end but will be reviewed 1/18/60. The Montgomery County Police Department reports have not yet been made available, but State's Attorney Leonard T. Kardy is meeting with County Manager Reese and County Police Superintendent McAuliffe 1/18/60 to discuss making these records available.

Subjects' attorneys have advised them to make no statement except in attorneys' presence. Subjects Griggs, Bechtel and Devries have advised they are represented by Barnard T. Welsh and will confer with him to determine whether they should furnish statements.

The victim has been interviewed and admits striking subject Griggs in the eye while in court and then running from the courtroom. He was caught in the hall and while being taken up a narrow stairway by Devries and an unknown officer, they met subjects Griggs, Offutt and Bechtel. Griggs, who had a night stick, allegedly said, "That's the one who hit me in the nose." As the victim passed Griggs, he was hit on the head with a hard object but did not see who hit him. As he turned around, Griggs hit him on the head with the night stick. Offutt then hit him with his fist above the left eye and Bechtel kicked him on the leg. Devries hit him on the back with his fist. The victim was not handcuffed at the time but denies that he offered any resistance.

62-9236 - 162

ENCLOSURE

Dr. William Frank treated the victim on 12/17/59 and found two superficial lacerations at the back of the head which were closed by two stitches each. No other injuries were noted and Smith complained of no other injuries. Officer Devries told Dr. Frank that the lacerations were caused by a night stick.

January 15, 1960

DAMAGE TO NUCLEAR SUBMARINE "NAUTILUS," NUCLEAR CRUISER "LONG BEACH" AND GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE "LUCE" SABOTAGE

The Boston Office is investigating three cases involving possible sabotage in connection with the three captioned vessels of the United States Navy.

Between 9-28-59 and 10-19-59 numerous cuts were found in the electrical cables of the nuclear submarine "Nautilus," which was being overhauled at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. On 11-12-59 foreign material was found in a pump on the "Nautilus." The Boston Office has interviewed the entire crew of the "Nautilus" and over 1,500 shipyard employees,submitted numerous cut cables for Laboratory examination and used the polygraph in connection with pertinent interviews.

On 1-5-60 nine small cuts were discovered in the degaussing cables (protection against magnetic mines) of the nuclear cruiser "Long Beach," which is being constructed at Quincy, Massachusetts. These cuts contain no identifying marks for Laboratory comparison with tools. As of 1-14-60, 2,144 of over 5,000 employees having access to this vessel had been interviewed.

On 12-28-59, 21 cuts were found in the fire control wiring of the guided missile frigate "Luce," which is also being constructed at Quincy, Massachusetts. This damage was not reported to us or to the Office of Naval Intelligence until 1-11-60 as the damage was originally considered probably inadvertent. In view of the other two cases involving cut cables, the Boston Office has opened an investigation on this matter also.

The type of damage involved or the lack of any attempt to hide or disguise the damage may be indicative of employees attempting to create more work or of disgruntled Navy personnel. The Boston Office has been instructed to afford these cases vigorous intensive investigation.

GWH:pwf
(5)

1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Hall

62-9756-162

January 15, 1960

BERNARD J. GOLDFINE

Although we are not involved in the Goldfine matter, this case is currently the subject of a great deal of discussion between the Tax Division and the Treasury Department.

The Goldfine tax fraud investigation, according to our Treasury sources, is scheduled to go before grand jury in Boston next month. Goldfine and his nine New England companies owe the Government approximately eight million dollars. This, of course, includes interest, 6%; delinquency penalties, 25%; and fraud penalty, 50%. You will recall that the approximate figure appeared in the newspapers and the Goldfine defense charged that this was an attempt on the part of the Government to try its case in the newspapers. No action was taken by Treasury to look into this alleged leak of information on the request of the Tax Division of Justice since the total figure of Goldfine's delinquency had been discussed with Goldfine and his tax attorneys. It was felt that they could have planted the story in the press. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has also established a tax case on Goldfine's son, Horace, which approximates $99,000 delinquency, and a similar case has been made on Mildred Paperman, Goldfine's confidential assistant.

Of course, as previously reported, IRS has established a failure to file criminal violation on Goldfine for the years 1955, 1956, and 1957. However, since this is a misdemeanor, Justice had waited until the tax fraud investigation was developed in order to go ahead with its prosecution. The one weakness in the tax fraud case is proving knowledge and culpability directly to Goldfine. IRS feels that he will argue that his tax affairs were handled by a competent tax firm and he had every right to feel that his tax affairs were being handled within the law.

In addition to the tax fraud investigation, the Inspection Service of IRS looked into the Goldfine matter to determine the extent of any irregularities or misconduct on the part of Revenue employees. The investigation has not developed any criminal violations on the part of IRS employees. The report does reflect gross administrative failures and irregularities in the handling of work in the Boston Region. Much of this was due to the fact that Goldfine assigned all of his tax matters in the New England area to Lawrence P. Harrington, a former IRS employee. Harrington

62-97156-162

ENCLOSURE

knew the policy and procedure of IRS and avoided those procedures which might detect Goldfine's delinquencies. In addition, he used Goldfine's high-level connections in scaring off IRS investigators whenever an inquiry was made concerning Goldfine's tax affairs. You will recall, the IRS investigation has developed gifts and monies paid to Sherman Adams, Senators Payne, Cotton, Bridges, Governor Furculo, and former Governor Dever of Massachusetts, as well as Congressman McCormack, and many other New England local and state political figures.

January 15, 1960

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM

Following the Supreme Court decision in the Greene case on June 29, 1959, prolonged efforts to prepare a Presidential Directive to establish a program under which private contractors may be granted access to classified data have culminated in a draft Order dated January 7, 1960. Budget is circulating this draft to all interested agencies. The more recent Bureau comments concerning this matter were forwarded by memorandum to AAG Yeagley, December 30, 1959; by memorandum to the Attorney General, with copies to Messrs. Walsh and Yeagley, January 6, 1960; by memorandum, January 11, 1960, to Mr. Yeagley; and by memorandum of January 14, 1960, to Assistant Attorney General Kramer, with copy to Mr. Yeagley. The last two of these communications both concerned the same draft which is now being circulated by Budget.

In brief, we have noted that under the proposed Order agencies may consider all of the pertinent information available regardless of source. Under Section 4 A 1 protection is afforded to regular confidential informants. Under Section 4 A 2 information from persons other than current informants may be considered if they cannot appear due to death, severe illness, or some such other good and sufficient cause. It is apparent that information from casual informants who refuse to testify cannot be used under this section.

Section 5 B, according to Mr. Yeagley, would allow use of data from wire taps, microphones, and other sensitive techniques. Mr. Yeagley has indicated, however, that such data would have to be produced in the form of actual quotations from the conversations rather than the paraphrased form in which we disseminate this information. We believe it will not be possible for us to furnish other than paraphrased information in most instances because of the absolute necessity of protecting our sources.

Even though data from casual informants and sensitive techniques may not be used as indicated above, Section 9 of the Order grants and affirms the department head concerned authority

62-77156 — 162

to exercise control over the Nation's military and defense secrets and nothing in the rest of the Order is deemed to limit or affect his responsibility and powers in this regard. Use of such authority and power will permit the department head to act in those instances in which derogatory data is available but cannot be utilized under the procedures established in the balance of the Order. We have observed to the Department that it has undoubtedly considered the public reaction should it turn out that it is necessary to use this summary power in a majority of cases.

We have several times reiterated that FBI will respect the confidence placed in it by both regular informants or other persons and will not disclose their identity without their specific permission. We have summarized by stating that from our standpoint, the Order as drafted, will permit us to furnish all available data to appropriate agencies as in the past and provides appropriate protection for our confidential informants. Data from any casual informants and from highly sensitive techniques will largely be usable only under Section 9. We have stated that the Bureau does not object to the proposed Order from an operational standpoint.

On January 14, John Doherty of the Department informed us of a very minor addition, proposed by Philip Areeda of the White House, which was discussed in memorandum of January 15. This addition would not affect the comments we have previously made concerning this Order.

January 15, 1960

PROTECTING IDENTITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
CONFRONTATION ISSUE

The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear arguments on two cases involving hearings and the right of confrontation on January 18, 1960. The cases involve Hannah vs. Larche and Hannah vs. Slawson. Solicitor General Rankin will argue the cases for the Government.

The cases involve the President's Civil Rights Commission which was established by the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1957 to investigate charges of citizens being discriminatorily deprived of the right to vote. The question raised for the Supreme Court is whether the Civil Rights Act of 1957 authorizes the Civil Rights Commission to conduct hearings wherein state registrars and private citizens accused of depriving others of the right to vote are denied notice of charges against them and confrontation.

Although the hearings held by the Civil Rights Commission are investigative rather than judicial or punitive such as the normal Government hearing, the argument and the Supreme Court decision in these cases could shed some light on the issue of confrontation as well as the investigative agency's right to protect the identity of confidential informants. This is particularly true in view of the current negotiations to produce an Executive Order in relation to the Industrial Security Program.

These are the two cases which the "Washington Post" commented upon editorially on December 14, 1959, supporting the Civil Rights Commission's hearing procedures in that it was necessary that the Commission protect their confidential informants from reprisals by segregationists. The "Washington Evening Star" on January 11, 1960, in reporting the Attorney General's first trip to argue a case before the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the Federal Civil Rights Act commented that the above cases would prove more difficult for the Government to argue and obtain a favorable decision.

62-97196 — 162

January 18, 1960

SEIZURE POWERS IN NEUTRALITY CASES

The Department for about a year has been negotiating to obtain for us seizure powers under Title 22, Section 401, United States Code, which would enable us to seize arms, munitions of war and other articles about to be exported in violation of law and follow through to final conclusion in the investigation of neutrality cases. This was to be accomplished through the issuance of an Executive Order conferring on the Attorney General powers to seize under this statute which in turn would be delegated to the FBI by the Attorney General.

On November 19, 1959, the Attorney General advised that the Treasury Department had agreed to the proposed Executive Order. The Department advised on December 23, 1959, that the proposed Executive Order had been sent by the Attorney General to the President through the director of the Bureau of the Budget for approval by letter dated December 16, 1959.

On January 15, 1960, pursuant to our inquiry concerning the current status of this matter, Assistant Attorney General Walter Yeagley advised that the proposed Executive Order is presently in the Bureau of the Budget which has sent it to certain agencies for comment. Yeagley advised that the Bureau of the Budget had heard from the Treasury Department but had not received replies from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Department of Defense and the State Department. He advised that he could not understand why the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization or the Department of Defense would have any comment on this and stated he was going to check with Mr. Levy at the Bureau of the Budget who is handling this matter in an effort to have it expedited.

62-77156 - 462

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOV ENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: February 8, 1960

FROM : D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE

Attached are brief memoranda of matters which may be brought up at the Staff Conference on February 9, 1960.

Enclosures

IDM:hcw
(2)

2/8

REC- 42 62-97756-168

EX-133

FEB 15 1960

14 ENCLOSURE

CRIME REC.

64 FEB 19 1960

February 5, 1960

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS
BOMBING OF KEHILATH ISRAEL SYNAGOGUE
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI
JANUARY 28, 1960

On January 28, 1960, approximately 10:30 p.m., an explosion occurred in the front courtyard of the Kehilath Israel Synagogue, 800 East Meyer Boulevard, Kansas City, Missouri. Property damage consisting of 51 plate-glass windows shattered, broken stained glass window and dented door amounting to approximately $5,000. Only occupants of synagogue were the janitor and his wife, neither of whom was injured. FBI Laboratory examination indicated characteristics of a dynamite explosion. Laboratory examiner flown to Kansas City to assist in examination of evidence.

Witnesses observed two automobiles leaving area at high rate of speed immediately after explosion. Identification made of occupants of automobile. Interviews being conducted. Other witnesses saw four youths running from vicinity of synagogue immediately after explosion. High school student has made statement that he and another student were responsible for the bombing; however, later denied that they were involved. Students are being interviewed. Approximately one month ago, several thousand blasting caps were stolen from company in Kansas City. Half of stolen caps recovered by Kansas City police in possession of teen-agers who are being considered as suspects in bombing.

Investigation determined a number of high school students in Kansas City area recently formed Nazi-type group. Members of group identified and interviewed. Two juvenile members are prime suspects.

FBI immediately offered the services of the Laboratory and the Identification Division to local authorities and is continuing to actively render every possible assistance to them.

A special squad of Special Agents has been formed and this case is being afforded intensive investigation by the Kansas City Division.

62-97636-168
ENCLOSURE

February 5, 1960

LOCAL 688
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS, AND WAREHOUSEMEN OF AMERICA,
AFL - CIO

ELECTION LAWS

This matter involves the reported contributions by Local 688 to the political campaigns of Federal candidates. Most of the contributions involved were apparently made from the political action committee account of Local 688. Contributions from such accounts would not normally constitute violations of Section 610, Title 18, U. S. Code; however, with respect to this case, the Department by memorandum of December 14, 1959, stated that it had been advised by the U. S. Attorney in St. Louis that the political action committee fund of Local 688 was actually a general fund of the union's which was raised from dues assessments and was not a fund derived from voluntary contributions. Section 610, Title 18, U. S. Code, prohibits contributions by labor unions to the campaigns of Federal candidates.

On November 2, 1959, the U. S. Attorney in St. Louis, Missouri, began subpoenaing a number of witnesses to appear before a Federal Grand Jury in St. Louis which conducted an inquiry concerning the captioned matter. In conjunction with the Grand Jury's inquiry, the Bureau, at the specific requests of the U. S. Attorney and of the Civil Rights Division, conducted certain investigation for the assistance of the U. S. Attorney in presenting this matter to the Grand Jury. Our investigation included interviews with Senator Wayne Morse (D.-Ore.), Senator Thomas Hennings (D. - Mo.), Congressman James Roosevelt (D. - Calif.) and Congressman Henry S. Reuss (D. - Wisc.).

On January 27, 1960, U. S. Attorney Webster and Assistant U. S. Attorney Bigler, St. Louis, advised that on January 26, 1960, they had sent a proposed indictment, together with a summary of the evidence, to the Department for its approval. They advised that they would like, if possible, to present the indictment to the Grand Jury in St. Louis on February 8, 1960. The U. S. Attorney said that the proposed indictment does not include a charge against James R. Hoffa. He said the evidence connecting Hoffa with the check payable to the Congressman Henry S. Reuss campaign seemed insufficient to support a charge against Hoffa. These officials mentioned that the proposed indictment includes 21 counts, involving 10 political contributions.

62-97856-168

ENCLOSURE

February 8, 1960

STATUS OF JOHN GEORGE LEDES;
JOSEPH ABRAMS
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

This case was referred to us by the Attorney General on 12-31-59. It relates to the association between Ledes, a former legal adviser to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner James C. Sargent and Abrams, a New York promoter of unsavory reputation. Ledes resigned from Reynolds and Company, New York brokers, on 1-28-60.

We have reviewed voluminous SEC files throughout the country and have interviewed numerous persons in and out of SEC who handled cases involving Abrams' firms. We determined that Ledes endeavored to assist Abrams in several SEC matters while Ledes was still with that agency. Abrams made loans to Ledes relative to financing properties purchased by Ledes. These loans may constitute payment of compensation to Ledes and thus bring their relationship within the scope of Conflict of Interest Statutes.

SEC Commissioner Sargent, who originally denied knowledge as to any connection between Ledes and Abrams, has since improved his memory considerably and now feels he may have been taken advantage of by Ledes. Sargent finally furnished a signed statement as to his recollection of these matters on 2-5-60. Sargent told us that Ledes had been in touch with Tony Russo who had arranged for former Attorney General Brownell to talk to Attorney General Rogers in July, 1958, about Sargent's ambition at the time to become U. S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. We have been told that both Ledes and Abrams were associated with Russo, ex-confidential assistant to Brownell. Russo has not been alleged to be involved in any irregularities in this matter.

Arrangements are now being made to interview subject Ledes in New York City. Arrangements are also being made to interview subject Abrams who is serving a 30-month sentence on Fraud Against the Government charges, as well as Abrams' uncle, Charles Gordon. These interviews, and subsequent record checks to verify information furnished by the subjects, will complete the investigation.

62-97856-168

February 5, 1960

MRS. SALLY THURMON HUCKS
MRS. VIOLET DAVIS
DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS AT WOODNER HOTEL
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Hucks, chief telephone operator at the Woodner Hotel, was indicted December 2, 1959, along with her assistant, Davis, for having obstructed justice by destroying records of the Woodner Hotel (telephone toll tickets concerning calls to and from Teamster officials) which had been subpoenaed by the McClellan Committee. The grand jury here in the District, which was hearing this case, has been recessed for several days and it is not expected to resume hearings until later this month. Upon resumption of the hearings, it is expected that additional testimony will be taken from co-defendant Davis, who appeared briefly at her own request before the grand jury during the week beginning February 1, 1960.

The additional hearings are aimed at developing further information showing that subject Hucks committed perjury before the McClellan Committee in denying ownership of a fur stole we located in Falls Church, Virginia. This stole allegedly was received by Hucks from James Hoffa and/or the Teamsters Union.

62-97856-168

February 5, 1960

LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959

At the Attorney General's Staff Meeting on February 2, 1960, the Director was advised that an agreement had been reached effective December 30, 1959, between the Departments of Labor and Justice as to the division of jurisdiction under the above-captioned law.

We issued detailed instructions on February 4, 1960, to all field offices, outlining our investigative responsibilities as well as instructions covering the investigations.

All cases to be investigated will first clear through the Criminal Division. As soon as we receive them here at the Seat of Government they are being immediately dispatched to the field. The cases are receiving top priority attention and two-week deadlines for completion of the investigations are being set.

62-97856-168

February 5, 1960

STATUS OF SUN VALLEY, INCORPORATED
JAMES RIDDLE HOFFA; ET AL.
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT

This is the case in which a half-million dollars of Teamsters Union funds were transferred to a Florida bank in 1956, which then made loans in a similar amount to Sun Valley, Incorporated, a Florida real estate development in which Hoffa had an option to purchase 45 per cent of the stock. A special grand jury will be impanelled at Orlando, Florida, on February 15, 1960, to consider this case.

Our Washington Field Office has completed examination of financial records of the Teamsters Union that were produced before the grand jury in Washington, D. C. and the results of such examination have been furnished to the Criminal Division. Pursuant to arrangements made by the Criminal Division, additional such records that had been in the possession of the McClellan Committee, were made available on February 4, 1960. These records are now being examined by our Washington Field Office and the deadline for completion of such examination is February 9, 1960. Other investigation requested by the Criminal Division in this case is being handled on a top priority basis.

62-97856-168

February 8, 1960

CRASH OF NATIONAL AIRLINES FLIGHT 967
GULF OF MEXICO, NOVEMBER 16, 1959
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE

On November 16, 1959, a plane with 42 persons aboard, owned by Delta Air Lines but staffed with a National Airlines crew, plunged into the Gulf of Mexico while on a flight from Tampa, Florida, to New Orleans, Louisiana. Only ten of the victims were identified and the other bodies have not been recovered.

On January 17, 1960, we initiated a full-scale investigation in this matter. It had been alleged that Dr. Robert V. Spears, an ex-convict with a long criminal record who had been reported as a passenger on the plane, had induced his friend and former partner in crime, William Allen Taylor of Tampa, Florida, to board the plane in his place. Spears had over $100,000 worth of insurance with his wife as beneficiary and Taylor purchased $37,500 worth of flight insurance just prior to the trip with his son as beneficiary.

From the first, our investigation was directed at finding Spears or Taylor since this appeared to be a key point in our investigation. Spears was located by Bureau Agents in Phoenix, Arizona, on January 20, 1960, and charged with the Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Motor Vehicle (ITSMV). Spears admitted Taylor took his place on the ill-fated plane and that following the crash he, Spears, tried to conceal his identity. He took Taylor's car, with his alleged permission, but admitted he had no authority to take it to Arizona and that he and his friend, Dr. William Turska, removed the identification number from it and tried to get a fraudulent title for the car. Spears, with Turska, contacted Mrs. Spears in Dallas, Texas, about January 7, 1960, and Mrs. Spears admitted that her husband persuaded her not to reveal the fact that he was alive so that the insurance policies could be paid to her as beneficiary.

On January 20, 1960, when Spears was arrested in Phoenix, Arizona, he was charged with the Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Motor Vehicle for taking Taylor's car from Florida to Arizona. He was taken to the U.S. Commissioner in Phoenix on that date and held on $35,000 bond. On February 1, 1960, Spears was brought before the U.S. District Judge in Phoenix and

62-97856-168

ENCLOSURE

charged by information with the interstate transportaion of Taylor's automobile. Spears waived indictment and entered a plea of guilty. His bond was continued at $35,000, and February 15, 1960, was set as the date for sentencing.

Physical evidence from the crash is extremely sparse. Since the examination of the limited physical material found did not indicate an explosion or the reason for the crash, it was hoped that the plane could be located in the Gulf. If the plane could be found and examined, it might reveal some definite physical evidence of the cause of the crash, particularly if a bomb was involved. On January 28, 1960, salvage operations were begun by the Navy in the Gulf of Mexico after sonar contact had located an object which was thought to be the plane. On February 5, 1960, however, the Navy discontinued salvage operations without locating the downed aircraft.

Following an interview with an abortionist in Dallas, Texas, who formerly associated with Dr. Spears, the Miami Office advanced the theory that Spears might have been in Tampa on November 13 to 15, 1959, for the purpose of preparing an abortion formula through a process which involves the cooking of dynamite to obtain nitroglycerin, and that Spears might have prevailed on Taylor to transport the formula to Dallas by plane in Spears' place. The explosion, if there was one, might have resulted from an accidental explosion of the abortion formula. The Laboratory has considered this theory and has advised that it knows of no instance of the use of nitroglycerin in preparations utilized to produce abortions. In addition, during a reinterview with the Dallas abortionist, he advised that all of the ingredients used by Spears in his abortion formula were stable and not volatile or explosive.

All persons contacted in this investigation have denied any knowledge of the wilful destruction of the plane. Nevertheless our investigation is being pressed to determine full facts and to uncover any violations of Federal laws which might have occurred. The United States Attorney at Phoenix has been kept fully advised and has under consideration the question of whether a prosecutable Federal case for mail fraud exists against Dr. Spears, his wife and/or Dr. Turska.

As of February 8, 1960, twenty-five investigative reports in this case have been made available to the Department and to the Civil Aeronautics Board.

February 8, 1960

CRASH OF NATIONAL AIRLINES DC-6B
BOLIVIA, NORTH CAROLINA
JANUARY 6, 1960
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES

On January 6, 1960, a National Airlines DC-6B plane crashed at Bolivia, North Carolina, killing all 34 occupants. The body of one passenger, Julian Andrew Frank, was found about 20 miles from the crash scene. Frank, a New York attorney, carried insurance of $997,500 and was reportedly engaged in fraudulent activities.

Investigation at the scene of the crash, including examination of available parts of the plane reassembled in a "mock up," has been conducted by Civil Aeronautics Board investigators. They have been unable to reach a definite conclusion as to the cause of the crash.

Frank's body, which was found near Kure Beach, North Carolina, bore only remnants of clothing. The body was mangled and the lower portion of the left arm and of both legs were missing. His luggage, which reportedly consisted of a zipper-type blue flight bag and a brown leather attache case, has not been located.

FBI Laboratory examination of Frank's right hand and part of his right arm, foreign material removed from his hand and arm and portions of clothing found on his body revealed no explosive residue. Pathologists who examined Frank's body have advised that his body had the appearance of having been subjected to a severe force of unusual nature and they believe his injuries resembled blast damage but they cannot definitely identify them as such. According to the pathologists, similar wounds have been observed on victims of land mine explosions.

FBI Laboratory examination of a life jacket found at Kure Beach on January 28, 1960, disclosed some nitrate present in a dirty smeared deposit in an area of the jacket in which were imbedded metal fragments from a zipper and pieces of blue material. Numerous small blue fragments from the life jacket and from unidentified clothing found at the crash scene were determined to be similar and appear to correspond to the material which composes blue flight bags sold by various airlines. These findings are consistent with what would be expected as a result of a detonation of a high-order type of explosive. These findings are not conclusive and additional material from the scene of the crash will be examined as received by the FBI Laboratory in an effort to reach a definite conclusion.

Extensive investigation of the activities of Frank has failed to develop any direct evidence to date that he was responsible for the crash. The investigation of his activities and of the activities of his associates is continuing. Thirty-two investigative reports have been disseminated to the Department and to the Civil Aeronautics Board.

62-97852-163

ENCLOSURE

February 5, 1960

DAMAGE TO NUCLEAR SUBMARINE "NAUTILUS," NUCLEAR CRUISER "LONG BEACH" AND GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE "LUCE" SABOTAGE

The Boston Office is investigating three cases involving possible sabotage to three vessels of the United States Navy.

Between 9-28-59 and 10-19-59, 279 cuts were found in the electrical cables of the nuclear submarine "Nautilus," which was being overhauled at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. It has been determined that 42 of these cuts could have been made accidentally. On 11-12-59 foreign material was found in a pump on the "Nautilus." The Boston Office has interviewed the entire crew of the "Nautilus" and over 1,500 shipyard employees. As many of the damaged cables as could be made available by the Navy have been submitted for Laboratory examination and additional specimens are being submitted when they can be made available by the Navy. The polygraph has been used in connection with the interviews of suspect individuals and additional interviews using the polygraph are being arranged.

On 1-15-60 nine small cuts were discovered in the degaussing cables (protection against magnetic mines) of the nuclear cruiser "Long Beach," which is being constructed at Quincy, Massachusetts. These cuts contain no identifying marks for Laboratory comparison with suspect tools. An average of 2,700 employees worked on this vessel daily and a total of approximately 5,000 employees had access to it. Over 3,100 individual employees have been interviewed and interviews are continuing.

On 12-28-59, 21 cut wires were found in the fire control wiring of the guided missile frigate "Luce", which is also under construction at Quincy, Massachusetts. This damage was not reported to us or to the Office of Naval Intelligence until 1-11-60 as the damage was originally considered inadvertent. Over 14,000 employees had access to the vessel. The employees assigned to the area of the damage have been identified and are being interviewed. Other employees known to have worked in the area are also being interviewed. The damaged wires have been forwarded to the FBI Laboratory for examination.

In connection with the damage on the "Long Beach" and "Luce" supervisory employees have expressed the opinion that this damage is of the nuisance and malicious mischief type rather than sabotage as the damage was not hidden and was readily apparent. The Boston Office has been instructed that despite these statements this damage has been

62-97856-168

DAMAGE TO NUCLEAR SUBMARINE "NAUTILUS," NUCLEAR CRUISER "LONG BEACH" AND GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE "LUCE"
SABOTAGE

reported to us by the Navy as sabotage and an intensive, exhaustive investigation must be conducted to identify the subjects.

Investigation concerning the "Long Beach" and "Luce" has been delayed by a strike at the shipyard where these vessels are under construction which began 1-23-60. Management representatives have been unable to enter the shipyard due to the picket line and thus personnel is not available to furnish the names and addresses of employees particularly those who worked aboard the "Long Beach" and are still employed. The Boston Office has been able to secure the names and addresses of terminated employees assigned to work on the "Long Beach" and is interviewing them.

The Boston Office has been instructed to afford these cases vigorous, intensive investigation. Reports are being disseminated to the Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence in all three cases and to the Atomic Energy Commission in the cases involving the two nuclear vessels.

February 8, 1960

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM

On February 2, 1960, the House passed H.R. 8121, introduced by Mr. Walter, which would authorize the Secretary of Defense to establish a program for screening employees of private contractors for access to classified information. The bill states that procedures prescribed by Defense shall be designed to protect from disclosure all information which, in the opinion of the Secretary of Defense, would affect the national security, safety, or public interest or would tend to compromise investigative sources or investigative methods. The bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and, if passed, would permit Defense to reinstitute the same program which was in effect at the time of the Supreme Court decision in the Greene Case. Defense could, however, institute a new program offering a maximum of confrontation while protecting sources or techniques in accordance with the terms of the bill.

On February 5, 1960, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley forwarded a new draft of the proposed Executive Order in this matter and stated it was the result of meetings with the Attorney General and the White House and that he hoped that it would be the final draft. This draft introduced four major changes.

The first of these would permit use of information from a so-called "casual" informant without confrontation if the informant could not appear due to death, severe illness, or some other cause determined by the head of the department to be good and sufficient. The underlined words have been added and would considerably broaden the circumstances under which information from such a source might be used.

A second change, however, would require that when an exception to confrontation was granted in the case of death or severe illness, as indicated above, the identity of the source be disclosed to the applicant. This requirement would apply only in the case of death or severe illness and would not apply to the new exception discussed in the previous paragraph. We have repeatedly told the Department that we must respect the

62-97856-168

confidence placed in us by persons who furnish us information and that we will not disclose their identities without their permission. In the case of death or severe illness, we will be unable to secure that permission and we do not understand why this requirement has been added.

A third change makes it possible for either the Attorney General or the Director to certify that an individual is a current confidential informant and that his disclosure would be detrimental to the national security. The previous draft required that this certification be made by the Attorney General and we consider this preferable. If the head of the investigative agency is permitted to furnish derogatory data and, at the same time, to decide whether the applicant is to have an opportunity to confront the source of that data, this procedure may be criticized both by the public and the courts. This matter was discussed with the Department by Mr. Belmont at a meeting in the Deputy Attorney General's Office on August 31, 1959, when it was agreed that both from a logical standpoint and the standpoint of the Supreme Court, certification concerning the need to protect an informant's identity should be made by the Attorney General in the case of the FBI or the appropriate department head in the case of other investigative agencies.

The fourth change clarifies the authority of the department head to deny or revoke access to classified data without regard to the balance of the Order. Although the previous draft granted this authority, the new language is an improvement as it removes all possible doubt as to its meaning.

Our observations concerning the four changes, as summarized above, were forwarded to Assistant Attorney General Yeagley by memorandum dated February 8, 1960.

February 8, 1960

SEIZURE POWERS IN NEUTRALITY CASES

The Department has been attempting to have issued an Executive Order which would give us power under Title 22, Section 401, United States Code, to seize arms, munitions of war and other articles about to be exported in violation of law and follow through to final conclusion in the investigation of neutrality cases. The Department advised on December 23, 1959, that the proposed Executive Order had been sent by the Attorney General to the President through the director of the Bureau of the Budget by letter dated December 16, 1959.

Pursuant to our inquiries, the Department determined that the proposed Executive Order had been sent by the Bureau of the Budget to the Defense, Commerce and State Departments and to the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. It had been previously cleared with Treasury by the Department. This matter has been closely followed with the Department and on February 3, 1960, we ascertained that the Budget Bureau has received replies from all these agencies offering no objection to the issuance of the Order. Commerce, however, in its letter to the Budget Bureau on February 1, 1960, a copy of which was furnished us by the Department on February 3, 1960, asked for assurances from the Department and the FBI that we understood Commerce has jurisdiction under the Export Control Act of 1949 and would keep the Commerce Department advised of any information developed of interest to that agency.

A letter was sent to the Department on February 5, 1960, suggesting that the Department send Commerce a letter similar to the one it previously furnished Treasury assuring that these seizure powers would be used only in neutrality cases and that, of course, the FBI would furnish Commerce any pertinent information developed. It is assumed that upon the receipt of that letter by Commerce the matter will then be cleared for the President's signature.

62-9756-165

2/8/60

This page has been removed since it involves discussion of a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation.

February 8, 1960

HENRY WINSTON
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
SMITH ACT OF 1940

Henry Winston was one of the eleven functionaries of the Communist Party, USA, who were convicted on October 14, 1949, on a charge of conspiracy to teach and advocate the violent overthrow of the United States Government in violation of the Smith Act of 1940. Sentenced to five years in prison and fined $10,000, Winston failed to surrender on July 2, 1951 to begin serving his sentence. He surrendered on March 5, 1956, and received an additional three-year contempt sentence, both sentences to be served in the U. S. Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana.

Since that time, the Communist Party, USA, has been conducting a continuous campaign to effect Winston's release either through parole, executive clemency or amnesty. Recently, this campaign was accelerated because Winston was alleged to be suffering from a brain tumor. On January 22, 1960, Winston was transferred to the U. S. Medical Center, Springfield, Missouri, where the presence of the brain tumor was confirmed. On January 30, 1960, he was removed under guard to the Montefiore Hospital, New York City, where he underwent surgery on February 2, 1960. The tumor was removed but as yet there has been no statement as to malignancy. The last hospital bulletin indicates his condition is satisfactory and his eyesight is improving.

On January 26, 1960, a parole hearing for Winston was held before the U. S. Board of Parole in Washington, D. C., and several known Communists and Communist sympathizers appeared at this hearing in Winston's behalf. Since the attorney representing Winston claimed that his briefcase containing petitions and signatures had been stolen, the Parole Board agreed to postpone the hearing for one week to enable him to duplicate the petitions.

Among the individuals appearing at the Parole hearing was Reverend Elder G. Hawkins of New York City, a strong supporter of Communist front organizations. Bureau files show that since 1940, Rev. Hawkins has been affiliated with, or has lent support to, ten organizations designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, as well as three other Communist front organizations. Following Rev. Hawkins return to New York, information was received that he plans to contact Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, the President's minister, to urge Rev. Elson to talk with the President regarding the possibility of a full parole for Winston. It was indicated that although Rev. Elson may not want to yield, Rev. Hawkins will "put the pressure on." (Liaison has been instructed to advise Rev. Elson of this possible contact by Rev. Hawkins and to confidentially advise him of Hawkins' subversive background.)

62-97156-168

information tends to identify an informant of ~~informant~~ the FBI

Through a confidential source of the Washington Field Office which covers the activities of Marcus Goldman, it was learned that on January 28, [illegible], Goldman contacted Bennett to determine what could be done for Winston. Bennett offered Goldman no encouragement, pointing out that it was not within his capacity to give Winston parole, as this matter is within the province of the Board of Parole. Marcus Goldman has a long history of communist associations and is considered by the Communist Party as a "financial angel." Goldman has indicated that at an unspecified period in the past he had been on friendly terms with Bennett and that they used to visit each other. Goldman further stated that the last time he wrote to Bennett he did not receive a reply and that Bennett now has him, Goldman, sized up and does not regard him as a friend of his.

February 5, 1960

STUART SUTOR, ET AL.,
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF
STOLEN PROPERTY; THEFT OF
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; FEDERAL
FIREARMS ACT; NEUTRALITY MATTERS;
CONSPIRACY

On October 14, 1958, 317 weapons were stolen from the National Guard Armory at Canton, Ohio. Approximately one-half of these weapons were seized by Federal Officers at Morgantown, West Virginia, as they were being flown to Florida for eventual sale to forces of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Investigation by Bureau Agents revealed that this theft was plotted and engineered by henchmen of Sam Mannarino, well-known racketeer in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area. Two of his principal lieutenants Joe Merola, former jewel thief and Norman Rothman a front man for American gambling interests in Cuba, were indicted along with the pilot of the plane, Stuart Sutor, and three other hoodlums from the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area. They were charged with violations of Theft of Government Property, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property, and Conspiracy.

On January 12, 1960, trial convened in U. S. District Court, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, before Visiting U. S. District Judge Rodger T. Foley of Judicial District, Las Vegas, Nevada. After a trial which involved the appearance of over 85 Government witnesses, all subjects were found guilty by the jury and on February 4, 1960, were sentenced by the court. Subjects Sutor, Merola, Rothman, Hanna, and Carlucci received 5-year prison terms. Joseph Giordano, one of the lesser figures received a 3-year term. In addition lengthy suspended sentences were imposed by the court on Sutor, Hanna, Carlucci, and Giordano.

The court immediately ordered all subjects remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal, refusing bail and all motions by the defense for new trial. It is expected that the defense will immediately appeal this case.

62-97856-16

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 part 3 of 14

SSC-Request-Access August 20, 1975

PART II #2

UNEXCISED

Excisions marked in red.

Retain

If delivery requested — should be cleared with other appropriate Divisions

Also, consider necessary classification.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: October 5, 1959

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE
10:30 A. M., TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1959

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Pursuant to your instructions, there are attached from the Administrative Division, the Investigative Division, and the Domestic Intelligence Division those matters which it is felt the Director may wish to bring up at the Attorney General's Staff Conference on October 6.

Contact was had with all of the other divisions of the Bureau and they have indicated they have no problems which they feel should be presented at this time.

Mohr

Enclosures ~~(3)~~

NPC:hif
(8)

REC- 61 62-97856-159

DEC 8 1959

3-8

ENCLOSURE

58 DEC

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT	PAGE
Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 - FBI Cannot Absorb Costs.	1
Administration's 2% Savings Program - Fiscal Year 1960	1
Salary Retention Act, Public Law 85-737	2
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-257)	3
Federal Clearinghouse of Criminal Information	4
Need for Criminal-Type Legislation	5
Industrial Security Program	7
Port Security Program	8
Air Crewmen Screening Program	8
Personnel Security Program	8
Legislation Involving Security	9
Need For Executive Agencies to Implement Security Programs	10

62-97856-159

ENCLOSURE

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

1. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959 - FBI CANNOT ABSORB ANY COSTS INCIDENT THERETO

The provisions of this new legislation, which was enacted by the 86th Congress, First Session, and approved by the President, become effective July 1, 1960.

Its purpose is to provide health insurance for Federal employees, annuitants, and their families. Employees will have the option of selecting from four health plans with a wide range of benefits. The legislation provides that the Government will contribute 50% of the premium cost of the plan selected, subject to stated minimum and maximum ranges.

We cannot accurately estimate the cost to the FBI of these new benefits until the Civil Service Commission has dealt with the insuring groups to determine the cost of the plans and until the employees have selected the desired coverage. Preliminary estimates, however, indicate an added cost of approximately $1,000,000 per year to the FBI as the employer's cost of these new benefits, based on the Bureau's experience derived from the operation of its present health coverage plan.

The appropriation request of this Bureau represents an absolute minimum figure. All avenues of possible savings were thoroughly explored in arriving at the minimum figure requested. As a result, it will be impossible for the FBI to absorb any part of the added cost resulting from the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959.

2. ADMINISTRATION'S 2% SAVINGS PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 1960

Budget Director Stans, in a letter dated September 21, 1959, to the Attorney General, stated the President had asked him to request the continued cooperation of the Attorney General in reducing civilian employment in the Government. The letter pointed out that during the fiscal year 1959 executive agencies effected a 2% reduction in employment and that the President would like to effect a similar reduction in the fiscal year 1960, and requests the Attorney General to give personal direction to the program and to plan his operations so as to accomplish it. The reduction would be effected by not filling vacancies as they occur and by not establishing new positions. The letter further directs that agency plans for personnel reductions or facts as to why an agency head believes the requested 2% reduction is impracticable be presented to the Budget Bureau with the October financial plan.

In connection with the 2% savings program in effect during the fiscal year 1959, the Bureau advised the Attorney General that it would be impossible to make any such reduction as the Bureau's operations were already on a "strict austerity" basis.

The Department cut our fiscal year 1961 budget request by $400,000, reducing it from $117,500,000 to $117,100,000, thereby eliminating 45 employees for the field (30 Special Agents and 15 clerks).

The Bureau is in no position to effect a 2% reduction in personnel during fiscal year 1960. Our work loads in all categories continue to be heavy with no sign of any abatement. Legislation enacted in the closing days of Congress, specifically the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, will further bolster our work volumes for which funds have not been provided and to attempt to reduce our personnel by 2% would seriously impair this Bureau's ability to discharge its responsibilities in all fields of work.

3. SALARY RETENTION ACT, PUBLIC LAW 85-737

This act provides a two-year period of salary retention for employees demoted through no fault of their own if they have occupied a higher paying position for two years or longer. This act has caused a most inequitable situation by requiring employees who accepted temporary promotions to be paid more than permanent employees who are doing identical work. By memorandum dated July 17, 1959, we urged the Department to recommend legislation so as to change this situation at the earliest possible time. To date no legislation has been introduced which would effect the desired correction of this inequitable situation.

INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

1. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-257)

The new labor law, as above, became effective upon its signing by the President on September 14, 1959.

The language in the Act conferred authority upon the Secretary of Labor to conduct investigations of the majority of the provisions contained in the law. Authority was also granted to the Secretary of Labor to enter into agreements with other agencies to handle investigations.

The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice during September, 1959, has held conferences with officials of the Department of Labor for the purpose of arriving at an agreement to be signed by the Departments of Justice and Labor specifying those criminal provisions of the law, as well as the prohibition against a member of the Communist Party holding office in a labor union, which the FBI will investigate.

Preliminary conferences indicate investigative jurisdiction of the following violations will be conferred upon the Bureau:

Embezzlement of union funds; payment by an employer of a fine imposed upon a labor union officer; prohibition against communists and convicted felons holding union office; picketing for extortion purposes; deprivation by force or violence of rights of union members; and retention by FBI of an amendment in the Act broadening the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.

The finalizing of the agreement between the Departments of Justice and Labor has not been effected. Until it is, we are not initiating investigations without a specific request from the Department of Justice.

We have, however, received 85 specific requests from the Criminal Division to determine whether certain convicted felons are holding office at this time in labor unions in violation of that section of the Act (Section 504).

We have also received 52 names of individuals who are reportedly labor union officials, from the Department, requesting a check of Bureau and Identification Division files. Eighteen such name checks have been completed. These were highly placed Teamster officials and trustees. We are not processing the remaining 34 names until the Department provides us with further identifying data as to the individuals.

2. FEDERAL CLEARINGHOUSE OF CRIMINAL INFORMATION

Various proposals have been brought forth in the past by individuals such as Senator Kefauver, Chief William Parker of the Los Angeles Police Department, Milton Wessel of the Department, and Senator McClellan for the establishment of a central Federal clearinghouse of information on crime. More recently New York State Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz has proposed a clearinghouse of information concerning frauds on the consumer and investor public.

Our position in the past has consistently been that there is no need for such a clearinghouse and that the necessary and desirable dissemination of criminal-type information is already being accomplished within the framework of existing law enforcement structures.

Some of the serious objections to such a proposed clearinghouse are that it would be an unwarranted intrusion of the Federal Government into local affairs. There is the possibility that such a clearinghouse would provide an official medium for the dissemination of unverified data consisting of rumor and gossip and that corrupt and irresponsible individuals would be presented with the opportunity to use such information for purposes of blackmail or extortion. In addition to the foregoing, the establishment of such a clearinghouse would constitute a costly superstructure on already existing facilities and could result in the establishment of a "black list" characterizing certain individuals as violators on the basis of information not completely verified or authenticated.

The Bureau already disseminates on a daily basis innumerable items of information to local, county, state and Federal agencies. This information may not only relate to matters over which we have jurisdiction but extends to any items which may be of interest to other agencies. The channels for dissemination of information are already established and the use of these channels by all agencies would appear to obviate the need for any central clearinghouse of information.

3. NEED FOR CRIMINAL-TYPE LEGISLATION

Since April 30, 1958, the Bureau has suggested certain items of legislation relative to establishing some effective curbs on the activities of racketeers. The most recent communication to the Department in this regard was a memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Walsh dated September 2, 1959, captioned "Legislative Program, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session." These legislative suggestions are as follows:

1. There appears to be a need for legislation to prohibit the interstate transportation of certain gambling paraphernalia, such as number slips and punch boards in addition to the present prohibition of interstate transportation of slot machines.

2. It also appears the interstate transmission of gambling information should be restricted to prohibit the transmission of gambling information in interstate or foreign commerce by any communication facility. Such legislation should also encompass the transmission of information as to the results of horse racing events until after a specified time had elapsed. The inability to have current race results would discourage the operations of bookmaking establishments.

3. Inasmuch as under the present provisions of the Internal Revenue Code income derived from illegal businesses and from gambling constitutes income which is taxable and assessed in the same manner as legitimate income, it appears that if the income from such illicit sources were taxed at vastly higher rates it might make such activities financially prohibitive. Inasmuch as certain individuals would attempt to avoid such taxes, it might be desirable to initiate legislation to provide substantial criminal penalties for the failure to pay such taxes.

4. It also appears legislation may be desirable to amend the White Slave Traffic Act in order that the prostitute herself could be prosecuted. There is considerable activity among those who are engaged in this livelihood and who go from state to state in order to ply their trade.

5. As an added weapon against organized crime, it appears it may be desirable to afford consideration to the enactment of a Federal habitual criminal act which would provide for mandatory sentences upon the commission of offenses within Federal jurisdiction.

In addition, the Bureau is in agreement with the Administration's theory of amending the Fugitive Felon Act to include damage by fire or explosives to religious or educational facilities. The House Judiciary Committee has failed to approve this proposal and has adopted a bill (H. R. 8601) which would prohibit damage to any building, structure, facility, vehicle or dwelling house.

It is our view that such legislation should be restricted to cover educational and religious facilities only. This was called to the Department's attention by the afore-mentioned memorandum dated September 2, 1959, captioned "Legislative Program, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session."

C1-1

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

On March 12, 1959, the Director attended a conference in the Attorney General's office in connection with current security programs and matters collateral thereto. The Director expressed the view that security programs had been held in abeyance in the Department of Justice with the result that other agencies of the Government were taking advantage of such delays and offering as excuses for nonaction the fact that the Department of Justice had not yet indicated what should be done or should not be done in view of some decisions of the courts and anticipated decisions of the courts. The Director urged that basic action should be taken on certain of these programs. While some of these matters have been acted upon, others are still pending and are set forth below for the Director's information.

(1) Industrial Security Program - At the time of the March conference it was decided to wait until the Greene and Taylor cases had gone through the Supreme Court. This has now occurred and the Supreme Court has indicated that there was not proper authority for an Industrial Security Program flowing from the President or the Congress. The Court also strongly indicated that even with such authority that there was a need for confrontation of witnesses at such hearings. To meet this, the Administration is discouraging legislation and approaching the matter through an Executive Order, two drafts of which have been examined by the Department and the Bureau. The proposed Order appears impractical in some respects and Yeagley of the Department has advised us that the Attorney General and the Solicitor General do not like the Order as drafted, particularly the "special counsel" concept and Deputy Attorney General Walsh is being instructed to "bounce the Order back to the White House." By letter dated September 30, 1959, to the Attorney General, copies to Walsh and Yeagley, the Bureau went on record that while we would attempt to live up to any Order, the Department should carefully consider the position of the Department and the Bureau under the proposed Order in that we would be forced to turn down numerous requests to produce informants and sources for testimony or interview in view of our overriding responsibility to protect their identities in the interests of national security. This might open the Department and the Bureau up to criticism that we were not living up to the spirit of the Executive Order.

From the standpoint of the conference with the Attorney General on October 6, we think the Bureau's position should be that the Industrial Security Program problem should be settled either through Executive Order or legislation;

C1-1

that whichever means is used must be practical and not merely drawn up in a visionary manner in an attempt to satisfy the Supreme Court but end up by placing the investigative agencies in an untenable position because they cannot comply with the spirit of the Order.

(2) Port Security Program - There has been no change in the Port Security Program with the exception that Treasury Department has drafted proposed legislation to enable the Coast Guard to subpoena and pay the travel expenses of witnesses to appear at Coast Guard hearings. Treasury has indicated this bill is in the Bureau of the Budget. At the March 12, 1959, conference the Director pointed out that positive action should be taken toward getting such legislation and the confrontation issue should not be used as an excuse to scrap the program because the FBI had supplied a substantial number of witnesses who could appear and testify. The Bureau's position should be the same; namely, that the wherewithal should be devised to carry forth the program instead of scrapping it. It should be borne in mind that in Port Security hearings as in many other security-type hearings the question of confrontation will continue to be an issue and the pattern set by the Executive Order in the Industrial Security Program will probably be applied to the other types of security hearings.

(3) Air Crewmen Screening Program - The Air Crewmen Screening Program is a program proposed by ICIS to screen crews of United States planes engaged in international flights and to screen all holders of Airmen's Certificates. The ICIS also proposed the Federal Communications Commission Radio Screening Program which would require the screening of all operators of radio transmitters. To our knowledge, nothing has been done on either of these programs since the March, 1959, conference with the Attorney General. While the FBI originally concurred that these programs would be helpful, we have not pushed them, believing this is a proper function of ICIS. It is believed the Bureau's position should be that a decision should be reached as to whether these programs should be implemented and they should not be allowed to hang fire on the basis that they might not be agreeable or acceptable to the Supreme Court. In other words, security programs should not be left in a status of hiatus because of pending judicial decisions.

(4) Personnel Security Program - The March, 1959 conference discussed the Personnel Security Program, particularly whether there should be legislation to provide for an over-all security program which would cover both sensitive

and nonsensitive areas. This is still an undecided issue although several bills have been introduced into Congress to remove the distinction between sensitive and nonsensitive areas of Federal employment. Undoubtedly, the Greene decision in the Supreme Court carrying the strong inference that confrontation is necessary in security-type hearings has slowed up consideration of legislation in this field by the Department. This is essentially a Departmental problem and we feel the Bureau's position again should be that the Department should meet these issues rather than coast along in a state of indecision.

(5) In the field of legislation involving security, by letter dated September 2, 1959, the Bureau proposed to Deputy Attorney General Walsh the following items, which the Director might wish to point out to the Attorney General. While bills were introduced into Congress on some of these items, legislation has not been completed as to any of them.

(a) It is desirable that Title 18, Section 791, United States Code, be amended to extend the jurisdiction of the Federal courts over acts of espionage against the United States wherever committed.

(b) Amendment of the Foreign Agents Registration Act to clarify and make more specific the definition of a "Foreign Principal" and to further clarify the exemption to registration afforded business representatives.

(c) Legislation is suggested which would permit the Secretary of State to consider security factors in the granting of passports; however, appropriate provisions should be made to protect FBI informants and sources in this connection. This matter is mentioned in the Bureau's memorandum to Walsh dated May 26, 1959, regarding H. R. 7006.

(d) Another suggestion is legislation to strengthen the Smith Act of 1940 by defining the word "organize" and the word "advocacy." A definition of "organize" was introduced as H. R. 2369 and as S. 1300. S. 1305 attempts to define "advocacy."

(e) Legislation is needed which would prohibit former Government employees from disclosing to unauthorized individuals certain information obtained by them in the course of their employment.

(f) Legislation is needed to amend the espionage laws so as to provide punishment for persons who gather and correlate data from legitimate sources for transmittal to foreign governments.

Domestic Intelligence Division

(6) In addition to the above, the Director may wish to point out to the Attorney General the tendency on the part of the Department of Justice, as well as Government departments in general, to shy away from pursuing logical courses of action in the security field rather than to implement necessary security programs, this tendency apparently based on attempts to anticipate decisions by the Supreme Court. The net effect of this is that the Supreme Court is not required to meet these issues and render decisions and thus, historically, to take responsibility for them. It is our feeling it is a far better course of action to attempt to implement those programs necessary for our national security and give ground grudgingly and only where forced to do so so that the record will show that the Department and the FBI sought to carry out their responsibilities in a proper manner.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: January 18, 1960

FROM : D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE

Attached are thumbnail memoranda of matters which may possibly be brought up at the Staff Conference on January 19, 1960.

Enclosures

IDM:hcw
(3)

There should have been memos re recent air crashes we are investigating. See that such are covered in the future.

EX 101

REC- 95

62-97156-162

25 JAN 26 1960

1 - ENCLOSURE

62 JAN 28 1960

January 18, 1960

STATUS OF SUN VALLEY, INC.
JAMES RIDDLE HOFFA; ET AL.
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION
OF STOLEN PROPERTY
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT

This is the case in which a half million dollars of Teamsters Union funds were transferred to a Florida bank in 1956, which then made loans in a similar amount to Sun Valley, Inc., a Florida real estate development in which Hoffa had an option to purchase 45 per cent of the stock. During the past week Hoffa furnished this option, which is dated April 15, 1955, to the McClellan Committee, claiming he had recently located it in his old records.

Teamsters Union records were subpoenaed for production before the grand jury in Washington, D. C. January 14, 1960. Some records were produced in response to the subpoena and others are said to be in the possession of the McClellan Committee. The Criminal Division will obtain such records from the McClellan Committee. Our Washington Field Office is making an accounting investigation of the records that were produced before the grand jury and will examine those the Criminal Division obtains from the McClellan Committee.

The Criminal Division has arranged to have another grand jury impanelled to take testimony in this case at Orlando, Florida, beginning February 15, 1960. The Criminal Division expects this grand jury will be in session at least sixty days.

62-97856-112
ENCLOSURE

January 18, 1960

THOMAS ALFRED EPPLEY, JR.
JACK COSGELLAW GRONER
JOSEPH MAYBIN GORE FRIEDRICHS
MAURICE EUGENE PURNELL
THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY

As a result of Bureau investigation, on January 11, 1960, captioned subjects, all students at Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, admitted stealing a radio antenna from a vehicle belonging to the Internal Revenue Service on the night of September 16-17, 1959. This antenna was valued at approximately $37.50.

Subjects apparently are members of prominent families, with Purnell the son of a prominent Dallas, Texas, attorney and Friedrichs related to Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee. Groner was a star football player who recently signed with the Dallas team of the new American Football League.

U. S. Attorney John Strickler at Roanoke, Virginia, insisted upon prosecution of all four for Theft of Government Property. Strickler in addition leaked the facts concerning this case to the local press indicating that arrests would be forthcoming.

In view of this matter being a potential source of embarrassment to both the Bureau and the Department, the facts were brought to the attention of the Criminal Division on January 12, 1960. The Criminal Division subsequently advised that they had discussed this matter by telephone with U. S. Attorney Strickler who reluctantly agreed to proceed against subjects by Grand Jury. The Department indicated they were upset with the manner in which Strickler released this information to the newspapers and that Mr. Hayden Crawford of the Department was to separately take up this matter with him.

The Proctor at Washington and Lee University has indicated that University officials are holding any action against subjects in abeyance and would await final action by the Grand Jury. All four subjects remain enrolled at Washington and Lee at this time.

62-91156-162

ENCLOSURE

January 18, 1960

MACK CHARLES PARKER

The Mack Charles Parker case was presented to a Federal Grand Jury in Biloxi, Mississippi, from January 4, 1960, through January 12, 1960. On January 14, 1960, the Federal Grand Jury advised Federal Judge Sidney C. Mize that they had reported a no true bill in connection with all possible violations in this matter.

62-91856-162

ENCLOSURE

January 18, 1960

STATUS OF JOHN GEORGE LEDES;
JOSEPH ABRAMS
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

This case was referred to us by the Attorney General on 12/31/59. It relates to the association between John George Ledes, a former legal advisor to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner James E. Sargent, and Joseph Abrams, a New York promoter of unsavory reputation.

We have reviewed voluminous SEC files here and in New York and have interviewed numerous persons in and out of SEC who handled cases involving Abrams' firms. We determined that Ledes endeavored to assist Abrams in several SEC matters while Ledes was still with that agency. We are now engaged in interviewing additional persons with possible pertinent knowledge of the association and in the detailed job of tracing Ledes' financial transactions through bank, realty and other records to pin down specifics of loans from Abrams to Ledes relative to financing properties purchased by Ledes. Abrams' loans may constitute payment of compensation to Ledes and thus bring their relationship within the scope of the Conflict of Interest Statutes.

It is noted we have been told that both Ledes and Abrams were associated with Tony Russo, ex-confidential assistant to former Attorney General Brownell. Russo has not been alleged to be involved in any irregularities in this matter.

The case is being given top priority in handling both in the field and at the Seat of Government.

62-97136 — 162

ENCLOSURE

January 18, 1960

STATUS OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE AND LABOR RELATING TO NEW LABOR LAW

The latest information we have received from the Department relative to the Memorandum of Understanding to be signed by the Secretary of Labor and the Attorney General relative to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, as far as it affects the Bureau, is that it is contemplated we will receive investigative jurisdiction with respect to the six categories of criminal violations as follows:

(1) Embezzlement of union funds.

(2) Picketing for extortion purposes.

(3) Deprivation by force of rights of union members.

(4) Communists and convicted felons prohibited from union positions.

(5) Payment by employer of fines imposed on labor officers.

(6) The amendment to Labor-Management Relations Act Statute of 1947 (previously under our jurisdiction) relating primarily to payments by employers to union officials.

62-97036 - 162

ENCL

1/18/60

FRANK GRIGGS, et al.
MELVIN W. SMITH - VICTIM
CIVIL RIGHTS

This is the case concerning which Acting Assistant Attorney General Joseph M. F. Ryan, Jr., Civil Rights Division, made a press release on 1/14/60 stating that the FBI has been requested to investigate this matter.

By memorandum 1/14/60, Mr. Ryan requested a preliminary investigation based upon a news article in the "Washington Post and Times Herald," 1/12/60, and an editorial in the same paper, 1/13/60, regarding an incident in Montgomery County Peoples Court wherein one Gordon L. Contee became violent when convicted of rape. He was subdued by officers but Melvin Smith, Contee's 19-year-old half brother, rushed forward from the audience and struck Frank Griggs, an officer who was subduing Contee. It was alleged that Smith was beaten by the officers while being taken to jail after his assault on Griggs.

Colonel James S. McAuliffe, superintendent, Montgomery County Police, Melvin L. Reese, Montgomery County Manager, and Luke Bennett, sheriff, have all been notified that the Bureau has undertaken investigation of this matter.

Pertinent court records were not available over the week end but will be reviewed 1/18/60. The Montgomery County Police Department reports have not yet been made available, but State's Attorney Leonard T. Kardy is meeting with County Manager Reese and County Police Superintendent McAuliffe 1/18/60 to discuss making these records available.

Subjects' attorneys have advised them to make no statement except in attorneys' presence. Subjects Griggs, Bechtel and Devries have advised they are represented by Barnard T. Welsh and will confer with him to determine whether they should furnish statements.

The victim has been interviewed and admits striking subject Griggs in the eye while in court and then running from the courtroom. He was caught in the hall and while being taken up a narrow stairway by Devries and an unknown officer, they met subjects Griggs, Offutt and Bechtel. Griggs, who had a night stick, allegedly said, "That's the one who hit me in the nose." As the victim passed Griggs, he was hit on the head with a hard object but did not see who hit him. As he turned around, Griggs hit him on the head with the night stick. Offutt then hit him with his fist above the left eye and Bechtel kicked him on the leg. Devries hit him on the back with his fist. The victim was not handcuffed at the time but denies that he offered any resistance.

62-9136 - 162

Dr. William Frank treated the victim on 12/17/59 and found two superficial lacerations at the back of the head which were closed by two stitches each. No other injuries were noted and Smith complained of no other injuries. Officer Devries told Dr. Frank that the lacerations were caused by a night stick.

January 15, 1960

DAMAGE TO NUCLEAR SUBMARINE "NAUTILUS," NUCLEAR
CRUISER "LONG BEACH" AND GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE "LUCE"
SABOTAGE

The Boston Office is investigating three cases involving possible sabotage in connection with the three captioned vessels of the United States Navy.

Between 9-28-59 and 10-19-59 numerous cuts were found in the electrical cables of the nuclear submarine "Nautilus," which was being overhauled at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. On 11-12-59 foreign material was found in a pump on the "Nautilus." The Boston Office has interviewed the entire crew of the "Nautilus" and over 1,500 shipyard employees, submitted numerous cut cables for Laboratory examination and used the polygraph in connection with pertinent interviews.

On 1-5-60 nine small cuts were discovered in the degaussing cables (protection against magnetic mines) of the nuclear cruiser "Long Beach," which is being constructed at Quincy, Massachusetts. These cuts contain no identifying marks for Laboratory comparison with tools. As of 1-14-60, 2,144 of over 5,000 employees having access to this vessel had been interviewed.

On 12-28-59, 21 cuts were found in the fire control wiring of the guided missile frigate "Luce," which is also being constructed at Quincy, Massachusetts. This damage was not reported to us or to the Office of Naval Intelligence until 1-11-60 as the damage was originally considered probably inadvertent. In view of the other two cases involving cut cables, the Boston Office has opened an investigation on this matter also.

The type of damage involved or the lack of any attempt to hide or disguise the damage may be indicative of employees attempting to create more work or of disgruntled Navy personnel. The Boston Office has been instructed to afford these cases vigorous intensive investigation.

GWH:pwf
(5)

1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Hall

62-77056-162

January 15, 1960

BERNARD J. GOLDFINE

Although we are not involved in the Goldfine matter, this case is currently the subject of a great deal of discussion between the Tax Division and the Treasury Department.

The Goldfine tax fraud investigation, according to our Treasury sources, is scheduled to go before grand jury in Boston next month. Goldfine and his nine New England companies owe the Government approximately eight million dollars. This, of course, includes interest, 6%; delinquency penalties, 25%; and fraud penalty, 50%. You will recall that the approximate figure appeared in the newspapers and the Goldfine defense charged that this was an attempt on the part of the Government to try its case in the newspapers. No action was taken by Treasury to look into this alleged leak of information on the request of the Tax Division of Justice since the total figure of Goldfine's delinquency had been discussed with Goldfine and his tax attorneys. It was felt that they could have planted the story in the press. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has also established a tax case on Goldfine's son, Horace, which approximates $99,000 delinquency, and a similar case has been made on Mildred Paperman, Goldfine's confidential assistant.

Of course, as previously reported, IRS has established a failure to file criminal violation on Goldfine for the years 1955, 1956, and 1957. However, since this is a misdemeanor, Justice had waited until the tax fraud investigation was developed in order to go ahead with its prosecution. The one weakness in the tax fraud case is proving knowledge and culpability directly to Goldfine. IRS feels that he will argue that his tax affairs were handled by a competent tax firm and he had every right to feel that his tax affairs were being handled within the law.

In addition to the tax fraud investigation, the Inspection Service of IRS looked into the Goldfine matter to determine the extent of any irregularities or misconduct on the part of Revenue employees. The investigation has not developed any criminal violations on the part of IRS employees. The report does reflect gross administrative failures and irregularities in the handling of work in the Boston Region. Much of this was due to the fact that Goldfine assigned all of his tax matters in the New England area to Lawrence P. Harrington, a former IRS employee. Harrington

62-97106-162

knew the policy and procedure of IRS and avoided those procedures which might detect Goldfine's delinquencies. In addition, he used Goldfine's high-level connections in scaring off IRS investigators whenever an inquiry was made concerning Goldfine's tax affairs. You will recall, the IRS investigation has developed gifts and monies paid to Sherman Adams, Senators Payne, Cotton, Bridges, Governor Furculo, and former Governor Dever of Massachusetts, as well as Congressman McCormack, and many other New England local and state political figures.

January 15, 1960

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM

Following the Supreme Court decision in the Greene case on June 29, 1959, prolonged efforts to prepare a Presidential Directive to establish a program under which private contractors may be granted access to classified data have culminated in a draft Order dated January 7, 1960. Budget is circulating this draft to all interested agencies. The more recent Bureau comments concerning this matter were forwarded by memorandum to AAG Yeagley, December 30, 1959; by memorandum to the Attorney General, with copies to Messrs. Walsh and Yeagley, January 6, 1960; by memorandum, January 11, 1960, to Mr. Yeagley; and by memorandum of January 14, 1960, to Assistant Attorney General Kramer, with copy to Mr. Yeagley. The last two of these communications both concerned the same draft which is now being circulated by Budget.

In brief, we have noted that under the proposed Order agencies may consider all of the pertinent information available regardless of source. Under Section 4 A 1 protection is afforded to regular confidential informants. Under Section 4 A 2 information from persons other than current informants may be considered if they cannot appear due to death, severe illness, or some such other good and sufficient cause. It is apparent that information from casual informants who refuse to testify cannot be used under this section.

Section 5 B, according to Mr. Yeagley, would allow use of data from wire taps, microphones, and other sensitive techniques. Mr. Yeagley has indicated, however, that such data would have to be produced in the form of actual quotations from the conversations rather than the paraphrased form in which we disseminate this information. We believe it will not be possible for us to furnish other than paraphrased information in most instances because of the absolute necessity of protecting our sources.

Even though data from casual informants and sensitive techniques may not be used as indicated above, Section 9 of the Order grants and affirms the department head concerned authority

62-77136 - 162

to exercise control over the Nation's military and defense secrets and nothing in the rest of the Order is deemed to limit or affect his responsibility and powers in this regard. Use of such authority and power will permit the department head to act in those instances in which derogatory data is available but cannot be utilized under the procedures established in the balance of the Order. We have observed to the Department that it has undoubtedly considered the public reaction should it turn out that it is necessary to use this summary power in a majority of cases.

We have several times reiterated that FBI will respect the confidence placed in it by both regular informants or other persons and will not disclose their identity without their specific permission. We have summarized by stating that from our standpoint, the Order as drafted, will permit us to furnish all available data to appropriate agencies as in the past and provides appropriate protection for our confidential informants. Data from any casual informants and from highly sensitive techniques will largely be usable only under Section 9. We have stated that the Bureau does not object to the proposed Order from an operational standpoint.

On January 14, John Doherty of the Department informed us of a very minor addition, proposed by Philip Areeda of the White House, which was discussed in memorandum of January 15. This addition would not affect the comments we have previously made concerning this Order.

January 15, 1960

PROTECTING IDENTITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS CONFRONTATION ISSUE

The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear arguments on two cases involving hearings and the right of confrontation on January 18, 1960. The cases involve Hannah vs. Larche and Hannah vs. Slawson. Solicitor General Rankin will argue the cases for the Government.

The cases involve the President's Civil Rights Commission which was established by the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1957 to investigate charges of citizens being discriminatorily deprived of the right to vote. The question raised for the Supreme Court is whether the Civil Rights Act of 1957 authorizes the Civil Rights Commission to conduct hearings wherein state registrars and private citizens accused of depriving others of the right to vote are denied notice of charges against them and confrontation.

Although the hearings held by the Civil Rights Commission are investigative rather than judicial or punitive such as the normal Government hearing, the argument and the Supreme Court decision in these cases could shed some light on the issue of confrontation as well as the investigative agency's right to protect the identity of confidential informants. This is particularly true in view of the current negotiations to produce an Executive Order in relation to the Industrial Security Program.

These are the two cases which the "Washington Post" commented upon editorially on December 14, 1959, supporting the Civil Rights Commission's hearing procedures in that it was necessary that the Commission protect their confidential informants from reprisals by segregationists. The "Washington Evening Star" on January 11, 1960, in reporting the Attorney General's first trip to argue a case before the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the Federal Civil Rights Act commented that the above cases would prove more difficult for the Government to argue and obtain a favorable decision.

62-97106 - 162

January 18, 1960

SEIZURE POWERS IN NEUTRALITY CASES

The Department for about a year has been negotiating to obtain for us seizure powers under Title 22, Section 401, United States Code, which would enable us to seize arms, munitions of war and other articles about to be exported in violation of law and follow through to final conclusion in the investigation of neutrality cases. This was to be accomplished through the issuance of an Executive Order conferring on the Attorney General powers to seize under this statute which in turn would be delegated to the FBI by the Attorney General.

On November 19, 1959, the Attorney General advised that the Treasury Department had agreed to the proposed Executive Order. The Department advised on December 23, 1959, that the proposed Executive Order had been sent by the Attorney General to the President through the director of the Bureau of the Budget for approval by letter dated December 16, 1959.

On January 15, 1960, pursuant to our inquiry concerning the current status of this matter, Assistant Attorney General Walter Yeagley advised that the proposed Executive Order is presently in the Bureau of the Budget which has sent it to certain agencies for comment. Yeagley advised that the Bureau of the Budget had heard from the Treasury Department but had not received replies from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Department of Defense and the State Department. He advised that he could not understand why the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization or the Department of Defense would have any comment on this and stated he was going to check with Mr. Levy at the Bureau of the Budget who is handling this matter in an effort to have it expedited.

62-97156 - 42

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOV[illegible]NT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Mohr ✓
Parsons ✓
Belmont ✓
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire ✓
Rosen ✓
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: February 8, 1960

FROM : D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE

Attached are brief memoranda of matters which may be brought up at the Staff Conference on February 9, 1960.

Enclosures

IDM:hcw
(2)

2/8

REC- 42 62-97756-168

EX-133

3 FEB 15 1960

14 ENCLOSURE

64 FEB 19 1960

CRIM. REC.

February 5, 1960

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS
BOMBING OF KEHILATH ISRAEL SYNAGOGUE
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI
JANUARY 28, 1960

On January 28, 1960, approximately 10:30 p.m., an explosion occurred in the front courtyard of the Kehilath Israel Synagogue, 800 East Meyer Boulevard, Kansas City, Missouri. Property damage consisting of 51 plate-glass windows shattered, broken stained glass window and dented door amounting to approximately $5,000. Only occupants of synagogue were the janitor and his wife, neither of whom was injured. FBI Laboratory examination indicated characteristics of a dynamite explosion. Laboratory examiner flown to Kansas City to assist in examination of evidence.

Witnesses observed two automobiles leaving area at high rate of speed immediately after explosion. Identification made of occupants of automobile. Interviews being conducted. Other witnesses saw four youths running from vicinity of synagogue immediately after explosion. High school student has made statement that he and another student were responsible for the bombing; however, later denied that they were involved. Students are being interviewed. Approximately one month ago, several thousand blasting caps were stolen from company in Kansas City. Half of stolen caps recovered by Kansas City police in possession of teen-agers who are being considered as suspects in bombing.

Investigation determined a number of high school students in Kansas City area recently formed Nazi-type group. Members of group identified and interviewed. Two juvenile members are prime suspects.

FBI immediately offered the services of the Laboratory and the Identification Division to local authorities and is continuing to actively render every possible assistance to them.

A special squad of Special Agents has been formed and this case is being afforded intensive investigation by the Kansas City Division.

62-97426-168
ENCLOSURE

February 5, 1960

LOCAL 688
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, AND WAREHOUSEMEN OF AMERICA, AFL - CIO

ELECTION LAWS

This matter involves the reported contributions by Local 688 to the political campaigns of Federal candidates. Most of the contributions involved were apparently made from the political action committee account of Local 688. Contributions from such accounts would not normally constitute violations of Section 610, Title 18, U. S. Code; however, with respect to this case, the Department by memorandum of December 14, 1959, stated that it had been advised by the U. S. Attorney in St. Louis that the political action committee fund of Local 688 was actually a general fund of the union's which was raised from dues assessments and was not a fund derived from voluntary contributions. Section 610, Title 18, U. S. Code, prohibits contributions by labor unions to the campaigns of Federal candidates.

On November 2, 1959, the U. S. Attorney in St. Louis, Missouri, began subpoenaing a number of witnesses to appear before a Federal Grand Jury in St. Louis which conducted an inquiry concerning the captioned matter. In conjunction with the Grand Jury's inquiry, the Bureau, at the specific requests of the U. S. Attorney and of the Civil Rights Division, conducted certain investigation for the assistance of the U. S. Attorney in presenting this matter to the Grand Jury. Our investigation included interviews with Senator Wayne Morse (D.-Ore.), Senator Thomas Hennings (D. - Mo.), Congressman James Roosevelt (D. - Calif.) and Congressman Henry S. Reuss (D. - Wisc.).

On January 27, 1960, U. S. Attorney Webster and Assistant U. S. Attorney Bigler, St. Louis, advised that on January 26, 1960, they had sent a proposed indictment, together with a summary of the evidence, to the Department for its approval. They advised that they would like, if possible, to present the indictment to the Grand Jury in St. Louis on February 3, 1960. The U. S. Attorney said that the proposed indictment does not include a charge against James R. Hoffa. He said the evidence connecting Hoffa with the check payable to the Congressman Henry S. Reuss campaign seemed insufficient to support a charge against Hoffa. These officials mentioned that the proposed indictment includes 21 counts, involving 10 political contributions.

62-97856-118

February 8, 1960

STATUS OF JOHN GEORGE LEDES;
JOSEPH ABRAMS
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

This case was referred to us by the Attorney General on 12-31-59. It relates to the association between Ledes, a former legal adviser to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner James C. Sargent and Abrams, a New York promoter of unsavory reputation. Ledes resigned from Reynolds and Company, New York brokers, on 1-28-60.

We have reviewed voluminous SEC files throughout the country and have interviewed numerous persons in and out of SEC who handled cases involving Abrams' firms. We determined that Ledes endeavored to assist Abrams in several SEC matters while Ledes was still with that agency. Abrams made loans to Ledes relative to financing properties purchased by Ledes. These loans may constitute payment of compensation to Ledes and thus bring their relationship within the scope of Conflict of Interest Statutes.

SEC Commissioner Sargent, who originally denied knowledge as to any connection between Ledes and Abrams, has since improved his memory considerably and now feels he may have been taken advantage of by Ledes. Sargent finally furnished a signed statement as to his recollection of these matters on 2-5-60. Sargent told us that Ledes had been in touch with Tony Russo who had arranged for former Attorney General Brownell to talk to Attorney General Rogers in July, 1958, about Sargent's ambition at the time to become U. S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. We have been told that both Ledes and Abrams were associated with Russo, ex-confidential assistant to Brownell. Russo has not been alleged to be involved in any irregularities in this matter.

Arrangements are now being made to interview subject Ledes in New York City. Arrangements are also being made to interview subject Abrams who is serving a 30-month sentence on Fraud Against the Government charges, as well as Abrams' uncle, Charles Gordon. These interviews, and subsequent record checks to verify information furnished by the subjects, will complete the investigation.

62-97856-168

February 5, 1960

MRS. SALLY THURMON HUCKS
MRS. VIOLET DAVIS
DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS AT WOODNER HOTEL
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Hucks, chief telephone operator at the Woodner Hotel, was indicted December 2, 1959, along with her assistant, Davis, for having obstructed justice by destroying records of the Woodner Hotel (telephone toll tickets concerning calls to and from Teamster officials) which had been subpoenaed by the McClellan Committee. The grand jury here in the District, which was hearing this case, has been recessed for several days and it is not expected to resume hearings until later this month. Upon resumption of the hearings, it is expected that additional testimony will be taken from co-defendant Davis, who appeared briefly at her own request before the grand jury during the week beginning February 1, 1960.

The additional hearings are aimed at developing further information showing that subject Hucks committed perjury before the McClellan Committee in denying ownership of a fur stole we located in Falls Church, Virginia. This stole allegedly was received by Hucks from James Hoffa and/or the Teamsters Union.

62-97856-/18

February 5, 1960

LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959

At the Attorney General's Staff Meeting on February 2, 1960, the Director was advised that an agreement had been reached effective December 30, 1959, between the Departments of Labor and Justice as to the division of jurisdiction under the above-captioned law.

We issued detailed instructions on February 4, 1960, to all field offices, outlining our investigative responsibilities as well as instructions covering the investigations.

All cases to be investigated will first clear through the Criminal Division. As soon as we receive them here at the Seat of Government they are being immediately dispatched to the field. The cases are receiving top priority attention and two-week deadlines for completion of the investigations are being set.

62-97856-108

February 5, 1960

STATUS OF SUN VALLEY, INCORPORATED
JAMES RIDDLE HOFFA; ET AL.
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT

This is the case in which a half-million dollars of Teamsters Union funds were transferred to a Florida bank in 1956, which then made loans in a similar amount to Sun Valley, Incorporated, a Florida real estate development in which Hoffa had an option to purchase 45 per cent of the stock. A special grand jury will be impanelled at Orlando, Florida, on February 15, 1960, to consider this case.

Our Washington Field Office has completed examination of financial records of the Teamsters Union that were produced before the grand jury in Washington, D. C. and the results of such examination have been furnished to the Criminal Division. Pursuant to arrangements made by the Criminal Division, additional such records that had been in the possession of the McClellan Committee, were made available on February 4, 1960. These records are now being examined by our Washington Field Office and the deadline for completion of such examination is February 9, 1960. Other investigation requested by the Criminal Division in this case is being handled on a top priority basis.

6-9 1556 KE

February 8, 1960

CRASH OF NATIONAL AIRLINES FLIGHT 967
GULF OF MEXICO, NOVEMBER 16, 1959
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE

On November 16, 1959, a plane with 42 persons aboard, owned by Delta Air Lines but staffed with a National Airlines crew, plunged into the Gulf of Mexico while on a flight from Tampa, Florida, to New Orleans, Louisiana. Only ten of the victims were identified and the other bodies have not been recovered.

On January 17, 1960, we initiated a full-scale investigation in this matter. It had been alleged that Dr. Robert V. Spears, an ex-convict with a long criminal record who had been reported as a passenger on the plane, had induced his friend and former partner in crime, William Allen Taylor of Tampa, Florida, to board the plane in his place. Spears had over $100,000 worth of insurance with his wife as beneficiary and Taylor purchased $37,500 worth of flight insurance just prior to the trip with his son as beneficiary.

From the first, our investigation was directed at finding Spears or Taylor since this appeared to be a key point in our investigation. Spears was located by Bureau Agents in Phoenix, Arizona, on January 20, 1960, and charged with the Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Motor Vehicle (ITSMV). Spears admitted Taylor took his place on the ill-fated plane and that following the crash he, Spears, tried to conceal his identity. He took Taylor's car, with his alleged permission, but admitted he had no authority to take it to Arizona and that he and his friend, Dr. William Turska, removed the identification number from it and tried to get a fraudulent title for the car. Spears, with Turska, contacted Mrs. Spears in Dallas, Texas, about January 7, 1960, and Mrs. Spears admitted that her husband persuaded her not to reveal the fact that he was alive so that the insurance policies could be paid to her as beneficiary.

On January 20, 1960, when Spears was arrested in Phoenix, Arizona, he was charged with the Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Motor Vehicle for taking Taylor's car from Florida to Arizona. He was taken to the U.S. Commissioner in Phoenix on that date and held on $35,000 bond. On February 1, 1960, Spears was brought before the U.S. District Judge in Phoenix and

62-97856-168

ENCLOSURE

charged by information with the interstate transportaion of Taylor's automobile. Spears waived indictment and entered a plea of guilty. His bond was continued at $35,000, and February 15, 1960, was set as the date for sentencing.

Physical evidence from the crash is extremely sparse. Since the examination of the limited physical material found did not indicate an explosion or the reason for the crash, it was hoped that the plane could be located in the Gulf. If the plane could be found and examined, it might reveal some definite physical evidence of the cause of the crash, particularly if a bomb was involved. On January 28, 1960, salvage operations were begun by the Navy in the Gulf of Mexico after sonar contact had located an object which was thought to be the plane. On February 5, 1960, however, the Navy discontinued salvage operations without locating the downed aircraft.

Following an interview with an abortionist in Dallas, Texas, who formerly associated with Dr. Spears, the Miami Office advanced the theory that Spears might have been in Tampa on November 13 to 15, 1959, for the purpose of preparing an abortion formula through a process which involves the cooking of dynamite to obtain nitroglycerin, and that Spears might have prevailed on Taylor to transport the formula to Dallas by plane in Spears' place. The explosion, if there was one, might have resulted from an accidental explosion of the abortion formula. The Laboratory has considered this theory and has advised that it knows of no instance of the use of nitroglycerin in preparations utilized to produce abortions. In addition, during a reinterview with the Dallas abortionist, he advised that all of the ingredients used by Spears in his abortion formula were stable and not volatile or explosive.

All persons contacted in this investigation have denied any knowledge of the wilful destruction of the plane. Nevertheless our investigation is being pressed to determine full facts and to uncover any violations of Federal laws which might have occurred. The United States Attorney at Phoenix has been kept fully advised and has under consideration the question of whether a prosecutable Federal case for mail fraud exists against Dr. Spears, his wife and/or Dr. Turska.

As of February 8, 1960, twenty-five investigative reports in this case have been made available to the Department and to the Civil Aeronautics Board.

February 8, 1960

CRASH OF NATIONAL AIRLINES DC-6B
BOLIVIA, NORTH CAROLINA
JANUARY 6, 1960
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES

On January 6, 1960, a National Airlines DC-6B plane crashed at Bolivia, North Carolina, killing all 34 occupants. The body of one passenger, Julian Andrew Frank, was found about 20 miles from the crash scene. Frank, a New York attorney, carried insurance of $997,500 and was reportedly engaged in fraudulent activities.

Investigation at the scene of the crash, including examination of available parts of the plane reassembled in a "mock up," has been conducted by Civil Aeronautics Board investigators. They have been unable to reach a definite conclusion as to the cause of the crash.

Frank's body, which was found near Kure Beach, North Carolina, bore only remnants of clothing. The body was mangled and the lower portion of the left arm and of both legs were missing. His luggage, which reportedly consisted of a zipper-type blue flight bag and a brown leather attache case, has not been located.

FBI Laboratory examination of Frank's right hand and part of his right arm, foreign material removed from his hand and arm and portions of clothing found on his body revealed no explosive residue. Pathologists who examined Frank's body have advised that his body had the appearance of having been subjected to a severe force of unusual nature and they believe his injuries resembled blast damage but they cannot definitely identify them as such. According to the pathologists, similar wounds have been observed on victims of land mine explosions.

FBI Laboratory examination of a life jacket found at Kure Beach on January 28, 1960, disclosed some nitrate present in a dirty smeared deposit in an area of the jacket in which were imbedded metal fragments from a zipper and pieces of blue material. Numerous small blue fragments from the life jacket and from unidentified clothing found at the crash scene were determined to be similar and appear to correspond to the material which composes blue flight bags sold by various airlines. These findings are consistent with what would be expected as a result of a detonation of a high-order type of explosive. These findings are not conclusive and additional material from the scene of the crash will be examined as received by the FBI Laboratory in an effort to reach a definite conclusion.

Extensive investigation of the activities of Frank has failed to develop any direct evidence to date that he was responsible for the crash. The investigation of his activities and of the activities of his associates is continuing. Thirty-two investigative reports have been disseminated to the Department and to the Civil Aeronautics Board.

62-97856-168

ENCLOSURE

February 5, 1960

DAMAGE TO NUCLEAR SUBMARINE "NAUTILUS," NUCLEAR CRUISER "LONG BEACH" AND GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE "LUCE" SABOTAGE

The Boston Office is investigating three cases involving possible sabotage to three vessels of the United States Navy.

Between 9-28-59 and 10-19-59, 279 cuts were found in the electrical cables of the nuclear submarine "Nautilus," which was being overhauled at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. It has been determined that 42 of these cuts could have been made accidentally. On 11-12-59 foreign material was found in a pump on the "Nautilus." The Boston Office has interviewed the entire crew of the "Nautilus" and over 1,500 shipyard employees. As many of the damaged cables as could be made available by the Navy have been submitted for Laboratory examination and additional specimens are being submitted when they can be made available by the Navy. The polygraph has been used in connection with the interviews of suspect individuals and additional interviews using the polygraph are being arranged.

On 1-15-60 nine small cuts were discovered in the degaussing cables (protection against magnetic mines) of the nuclear cruiser "Long Beach," which is being constructed at Quincy, Massachusetts. These cuts contain no identifying marks for Laboratory comparison with suspect tools. An average of 2,700 employees worked on this vessel daily and a total of approximately 5,000 employees had access to it. Over 3,100 individual employees have been interviewed and interviews are continuing.

On 12-28-59, 21 cut wires were found in the fire control wiring of the guided missile frigate "Luce", which is also under construction at Quincy, Massachusetts. This damage was not reported to us or to the Office of Naval Intelligence until 1-11-60 as the damage was originally considered inadvertent. Over 14,000 employees had access to the vessel. The employees assigned to the area of the damage have been identified and are being interviewed. Other employees known to have worked in the area are also being interviewed. The damaged wires have been forwarded to the FBI Laboratory for examination.

In connection with the damage on the "Long Beach" and "Luce" supervisory employees have expressed the opinion that this damage is of the nuisance and malicious mischief type rather than sabotage as the damage was not hidden and was readily apparent. The Boston Office has been instructed that despite these statements this damage has been

62-97556-168

DAMAGE TO NUCLEAR SUBMARINE "NAUTILUS," NUCLEAR CRUISER "LONG BEACH" AND GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE "LUCE" SABOTAGE

reported to us by the Navy as sabotage and an intensive, exhaustive investigation must be conducted to identify the subjects.

Investigation concerning the "Long Beach" and "Luce" has been delayed by a strike at the shipyard where these vessels are under construction which began 1-23-60. Management representatives have been unable to enter the shipyard due to the picket line and thus personnel is not available to furnish the names and addresses of employees particularly those who worked aboard the "Long Beach" and are still employed. The Boston Office has been able to secure the names and addresses of terminated employees assigned to work on the "Long Beach" and is interviewing them.

The Boston Office has been instructed to afford these cases vigorous, intensive investigation. Reports are being disseminated to the Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence in all three cases and to the Atomic Energy Commission in the cases involving the two nuclear vessels.

February 8, 1960

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM

On February 2, 1960, the House passed H.R. 8121, introduced by Mr. Walter, which would authorize the Secretary of Defense to establish a program for screening employees of private contractors for access to classified information. The bill states that procedures prescribed by Defense shall be designed to protect from disclosure all information which, in the opinion of the Secretary of Defense, would affect the national security, safety, or public interest or would tend to compromise investigative sources or investigative methods. The bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and, if passed, would permit Defense to reinstitute the same program which was in effect at the time of the Supreme Court decision in the Greene Case. Defense could, however, institute a new program offering a maximum of confrontation while protecting sources or techniques in accordance with the terms of the bill.

On February 5, 1960, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley forwarded a new draft of the proposed Executive Order in this matter and stated it was the result of meetings with the Attorney General and the White House and that he hoped that it would be the final draft. This draft introduced four major changes.

The first of these would permit use of information from a so-called "casual" informant without confrontation if the informant could not appear due to death, severe illness, or some other cause determined by the head of the department to be good and sufficient. The underlined words have been added and would considerably broaden the circumstances under which information from such a source might be used.

A second change, however, would require that when an exception to confrontation was granted in the case of death or severe illness, as indicated above, the identity of the source be disclosed to the applicant. This requirement would apply only in the case of death or severe illness and would not apply to the new exception discussed in the previous paragraph. We have repeatedly told the Department that we must respect the

62-97556-168

confidence placed in us by persons who furnish us information and that we will not disclose their identities without their permission. In the case of death or severe illness, we will be unable to secure that permission and we do not understand why this requirement has been added.

A third change makes it possible for either the Attorney General or the Director to certify that an individual is a current confidential informant and that his disclosure would be detrimental to the national security. The previous draft required that this certification be made by the Attorney General and we consider this preferable. If the head of the investigative agency is permitted to furnish derogatory data and, at the same time, to decide whether the applicant is to have an opportunity to confront the source of that data, this procedure may be criticized both by the public and the courts. This matter was discussed with the Department by Mr. Belmont at a meeting in the Deputy Attorney General's Office on August 31, 1959, when it was agreed that both from a logical standpoint and the standpoint of the Supreme Court, certification concerning the need to protect an informant's identity should be made by the Attorney General in the case of the FBI or the appropriate department head in the case of other investigative agencies.

The fourth change clarifies the authority of the department head to deny or revoke access to classified data without regard to the balance of the Order. Although the previous draft granted this authority, the new language is an improvement as it removes all possible doubt as to its meaning.

Our observations concerning the four changes, as summarized above, were forwarded to Assistant Attorney General Yeagley by memorandum dated February 8, 1960.

February 8, 1960

SEIZURE POWERS IN NEUTRALITY CASES

The Department has been attempting to have issued an Executive Order which would give us power under Title 22, Section 401, United States Code, to seize arms, munitions of war and other articles about to be exported in violation of law and follow through to final conclusion in the investigation of neutrality cases. The Department advised on December 23, 1959, that the proposed Executive Order had been sent by the Attorney General to the President through the director of the Bureau of the Budget by letter dated December 16, 1959.

Pursuant to our inquiries, the Department determined that the proposed Executive Order had been sent by the Bureau of the Budget to the Defense, Commerce and State Departments and to the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. It had been previously cleared with Treasury by the Department. This matter has been closely followed with the Department and on February 3, 1960, we ascertained that the Budget Bureau has received replies from all these agencies offering no objection to the issuance of the Order. Commerce, however, in its letter to the Budget Bureau on February 1, 1960, a copy of which was furnished us by the Department on February 3, 1960, asked for assurances from the Department and the FBI that we understood Commerce has jurisdiction under the Export Control Act of 1949 and would keep the Commerce Department advised of any information developed of interest to that agency.

A letter was sent to the Department on February 5, 1960, suggesting that the Department send Commerce a letter similar to the one it previously furnished Treasury assuring that these seizure powers would be used only in neutrality cases and that, of course, the FBI would furnish Commerce any pertinent information developed. It is assumed that upon the receipt of that letter by Commerce the matter will then be cleared for the President's signature.

62-9756- 165

uary 8, 1960

REQUEST TO REVIEW SOCIAL SECURITY RECORDS IN ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY SOVIET "ILLEGAL" ESPIONAGE AGENTS

From our experience gained in cases involving Soviet "illegal" agents, we know that the Soviet intelligence services instruct their "illegals" to apply for Social Security cards as a step in establishing a so-called "legal" identity. Examination of Social Security applications filed by several Soviet "illegal" agents known to us revealed certain foreign characteristics, such as style of handwriting and punctuation, and other items which would be susceptible of identification.

In view of the above, we explored with Social Security officials a program involving the screening of Social Security applications at its Federal repository in Baltimore. After some negotiation, Commissioner Mitchell advised he could not comply with our request. He felt Social Security must protect its records and our proposed program opened up Social Security records on too broad a basis.

By letter 1-18-60 we advised the Attorney General of our problem and the potential of our proposed program to detect "illegals." We informed the Attorney General we felt we should take this matter up with Secretary Flemming of Health Education and Welfare (Mitchell's boss).

On 1-19-60 the Attorney General called the Director and stated he could see no reason for the Bureau not to take this matter up with Flemming. He felt there should not be any reluctance to have us look over Social Security files in matters involving possible espionage. He stated that common sense should be the guide, and if everything did not work out, he wanted the Director to let him know so he could see what he could do.

On 1-28-60, Assistant Director Belmont, accompanied by Inspector D. E. Moore, delivered to Secretary Flemming the Director's letter which stated the reasons for our desire to screen Social Security records. Mr. Belmont briefly explained to Flemming the serious problem facing this country in uncovering Soviet agents clandestinely introduced into the United States. Flemming was advised of our previous discussions with Mitchell and told that we respected Mitchell's desire to restrict to the greatest possible extent any access to Social Security files. However, we felt the seriousness of the problem compelled us to carry the matter further. Flemming was told that Director Hoover had discussed this matter with the Attorney General who was vigorously of the belief that this matter should be pursued further.

Flemming said he was highly appreciative that we brought this matter to his attention; that due to pressing budget matters, it might take several days to consult with his officials on it, but that he would look into it carefully and let us know his decision.

Excised since it involves peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operations

62-97556/63

February 8, 1960

HENRY WINSTON
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
SMITH ACT OF 1940

0

Henry Winston was one of the eleven functionaries of the Communist Party, USA, who were convicted on October 14, 1949, on a charge of conspiracy to teach and advocate the violent overthrow of the United States Government in violation of the Smith Act of 1940. Sentenced to five years in prison and fined $10,000, Winston failed to surrender on July 2, 1951 to begin serving his sentence. He surrendered on March 5, 1956, and received an additional three-year contempt sentence, both sentences to be served in the U. S. Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana.

Since that time, the Communist Party, USA, has been conducting a continuous campaign to effect Winston's release either through parole, executive clemency or amnesty. Recently, this campaign was accelerated because Winston was alleged to be suffering from a brain tumor. On January 22, 1960, Winston was transferred to the U. S. Medical Center, Springfield, Missouri, where the presence of the brain tumor was confirmed. On January 30, 1960, he was removed under guard to the Montefiore Hospital, New York City, where he underwent surgery on February 2, 1960. The tumor was removed but as yet there has been no statement as to malignancy. The last hospital bulletin indicates his condition is satisfactory and his eyesight is improving.

On January 26, 1960, a parole hearing for Winston was held before the U. S. Board of Parole in Washington, D. C., and several known Communists and Communist sympathizers appeared at this hearing in Winston's behalf. Since the attorney representing Winston claimed that his briefcase containing petitions and signatures had been stolen, the Parole Board agreed to postpone the hearing for one week to enable him to duplicate the petitions.

Among the individuals appearing at the Parole hearing was Reverend Elder G. Hawkins of New York City, a strong supporter of Communist front organizations. Bureau files show that since 1940, Rev. Hawkins has been affiliated with, or has lent support to, ten organizations designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, as well as three other Communist front organizations. Following Rev. Hawkins return to New York, information was received that he plans to contact Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, the President's minister, to urge Rev. Elson to talk with the President regarding the possibility of a full parole for Winston. It was indicated that although Rev. Elson may not want to yield, Rev. Hawkins will "put the pressure on." (Liaison has been instructed to advise Rev. Elson of this possible contact by Rev. Hawkins and to confidentially advise him of Hawkins' subversive background.)

62-97156-168

On January 30, 1960, information was received from a confidential source of the New York Office that John Abt, attorney for the Communist Party and for Winston, stated that Director of Prisons James V. Bennett had agreed to the performing of the surgery on Winston at the Montefiore Hospital since he, Bennett, did not want to run the risk of having Winston die in a Federal penitentiary. According to Abt, Bennett is also alleged to have advised Roger Baldwin, an official of the American Civil Liberties Union, that Abt should make immediate application for a hardship parole for Winston which he, Bennett, would support. INFORMATION TENDS TO IDENTIFY AN INFORMANT OF FBI

Through a confidential source of the Washington Field Office which covers the activities of Marcus Goldman, it was learned that on January 28, 1960, Goldman contacted Bennett to determine what could be done for Winston. Bennett offered Goldman no encouragement, pointing out that it was not within his capacity to have Winston paroled, as this matter is within the province of the Board of Parole. Marcus Goldman has a long history of communist associations and is considered by the Communist Party as a "financial angel." Goldman has indicated that at an unspecified period in the past he had been on friendly terms with Bennett and that they used to visit each other. Goldman further stated that the last time he wrote to Bennett he did not receive a reply and that Bennett now has him, Goldman, sized up and does not want to be a friend of his.

February 5, 1960

STUART SUTOR, ET AL.,
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF
STOLEN PROPERTY; THEFT OF
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; FEDERAL
FIREARMS ACT; NEUTRALITY MATTERS;
CONSPIRACY

On October 14, 1958, 317 weapons were stolen from the National Guard Armory at Canton, Ohio. Approximately one-half of these weapons were seized by Federal Officers at Morgantown, West Virginia, as they were being flown to Florida for eventual sale to forces of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Investigation by Bureau Agents revealed that this theft was plotted and engineered by henchmen of Sam Mannarino, well-known racketeer in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area. Two of his principal lieutenants Joe Merola, former jewel thief and Norman Rothman a front man for American gambling interests in Cuba, were indicted along with the pilot of the plane, Stuart Sutor, and three other hoodlums from the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area. They were charged with violations of Theft of Government Property, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property, and Conspiracy.

On January 12, 1960, trial convened in U. S. District Court, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, before Visiting U. S. District Judge Rodger T. Foley of Judicial District, Las Vegas, Nevada. After a trial which involved the appearance of over 85 Government witnesses, all subjects were found guilty by the jury and on February 4, 1960, were sentenced by the court. Subjects Sutor, Merola, Rothman, Hanna, and Carlucci received 5-year prison terms. Joseph Giordano, one of the lesser figures received a 3-year term. In addition lengthy suspended sentences were imposed by the court on Sutor, Hanna, Carlucci, and Giordano.

The court immediately ordered all subjects remanded to the custody of the U. S. Marshal, refusing bail and all motions by the defense for new trial. It is expected that the defense will immediately appeal this case.

62-97256-16

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: May 27, 1960

FROM : D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE

Attached are brief memoranda of matters which may be brought up at the Attorney General's Staff Conference May 31, 1960.

Enclosures

IDM:mvr
(2)

Noted marked page.

ENCLOSURE

REC- 72

62-97856-174

24 JUN 2 1960

[illegible] Baumgardner to Mr Belmont

62 JUN 6 1960

May 27, 1960

1 - Parsons
2 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Cotter

RE: HOWARD LEWIS RUNDQUIST
WILLIAM J. SHERGALIS, ET AL.
REGISTRATION ACT - CUBA

The case involves U. S. plane piloted by two Americans, Rundquist and Shergalis, which was shot down March 21, 1960, while trying to smuggle four Cubans out of that country with resulting arrest of Rundquist and Shergalis. FBI source in Miami advised March 22, 1960, that incident was staged by Castro agents to provide Castro with basis for renewed attacks against U. S. for allowing illegal flights to Cuba. On March 23, 1960, this hoax was exposed when Shergalis gave statement to U. S. Embassy admitting role as Castro agent and implicating various Cubans in U. S. and Cuba. We conducted intensive investigation in this matter and developed substantial evidence showing that Rundquist-Shergalis flight was, in fact, instigated by Castro agents. Miami reports of April 1, April 6, April 15, and May 6, 1960, covering our investigation, have been furnished to Department and other interested agencies.

On May 3, 1960, Federal Grand Jury at Miami, which was convened on April 6, 1960, returned indictments against Shergalis and Hector Garcia Soto (Cuban Air Force employee at Miami who served as intermediary between Shergalis and Cuban intelligence officials) charging them with violations of Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. Indictments were also returned against Shergalis and Rundquist charging violations of Federal Aviation Act, administered by Federal Aviation Agency, for failure to file proper flight plan. Shergalis is still in custody of Cuban officials in that country, Cuban Government having rejected U. S. request that Shergalis and Rundquist be extradited to face charges in this country. At time indictments were returned, Garcia was in Cuba and, therefore, indictments were sealed and bench warrants were issued for arrest of Shergalis and Garcia.

Garcia returned to Miami on afternoon of May 4, 1960, and was arrested by our Miami Office at Miami International Airport. Press release was issued SAC, Miami, concerning arrest and subsequently on same date Department issued press release concerning indictments of Shergalis, Garcia and Rundquist. Arraignment of Garcia was originally scheduled for May 6, 1960, but was postponed until May 20, at request of defense attorney. Bond for Garcia was set at $10,000 and on afternoon of May 6, 1960, bond was posted with money, we confidentially learned, which had been put up by Cuban Consul General in Miami.

INFo tends to identify peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation.

62-97856-174

ENCLOSURE

Prior to indictments, Departmental Attorney William Kenney confidentially advised Miami Office on May 2, 1960, that he had recommended that, in addition to indictments against Shergalis and Garcia, indictments also be sought against four other individuals involved in this matter; namely, Carlos Hernandez Lopez (Cuban national serving as assistant to Garcia as Cuban Air Force purchasing agent in Miami), Armando Jose Asencio (American citizen of Cuban extraction who admittedly met with Shergalis on Garcia's behalf on several occasions prior to March 21 flight), Roberto Millares (Cuban national who was present at several meetings between Shergalis and Cuban representatives), and Roberto Fernandez Rodriguez (Cuban Army intelligence representative who accompanied Shergalis to Cuba in February, 1960, and introduced him to Cuban intelligence officials).

No information has been received by Bureau indicating that State Department exerted any influence on Justice Department to limit prosecutive action to Shergalis and Garcia. It appears Department concluded that evidence was insufficient to support prosecution of Hernandez Lopez, Millares and Fernandez Rodriguez. It appears there would be some substantial evidence concerning Asencio's involvement, including his own admissions; however, Department may have decided not to seek indictment against Asencio on basis he will be utilized as Government witness at any future trial held in this case. Asencio has been cooperative and on one occasion agreed to technical coverage of a meeting he had with Garcia and Hernandez Lopez in his car.

On April 28, 1960, Carlos Hernandez Lopez was found in criminal contempt in U. S. District Court in Miami for failure to appear before Grand Jury on April 13, 1960, in response to subpoena in connection with Grand Jury hearings in this matter. On the same day he was fined $100. On May 3, 1960, Hernandez Lopez again failed to appear at a Grand Jury session and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Hernandez Lopez is reported to be in Cuba at this time. We have not interjected ourselves in efforts to locate him on contempt charges.

On May 20, 1960, Garcia was arraigned in U. S. District Court, Miami, and pled not guilty. A request by his attorney that Garcia be allowed to go to Cuba for the weekend and return to Miami on May 23, 1960, was denied.

May 26, 1960

DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES - FALSE REPORTS SUMMARY OF PROSECUTIONS

The following is a summary of the prosecutions under the false report section of the Destruction of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles Statute.

Attached hereto is a thumbnail sketch of each of the cases which are pending prosecution at this time.

Since the U. S. Attorneys' conference early in April, 1960, prosecution has been authorized in 16 of these cases. Arrests were made in 15 of these cases and in one case, the subject Vincent Joseph Micel, Boston, Massachusetts, was permitted to surrender following the return of a true bill of indictment. The Micel violation actually occurred on January 26, 1960, and he was arrested by local authorities. The Assistant U. S. Attorney, Boston, Massachusetts, deferred his prosecutive opinion pending the outcome of local charges. When local prosecution was subsequently discontinued, the case was presented to the Federal Grand Jury at Boston, Massachusetts, on May 19, 1960.

There are also four cases pending in which prosecution was authorized prior to April, 1960.

On May 19, 1960, Donald David Kitch, Portland, Oregon, District Manager for Western Oil Company, who, on May 12, 1960, made a false report while seeing his boss off on a United Air Lines flight in Portland, Oregon, entered a plea of guilty in U. S. District Court. Sentence was not imposed pending the completion of a presentence investigation and subject was released on his own recognizance. This conviction brings the total number of convictions to 17 since the effective date of this statute, July 14, 1956. These convictions, with the exception of the Kitch conviction, in which sentence is not yet imposed, have resulted in 6 years actual sentences, 10 years probationary sentences and $2,750 in fines.

In summary, it is noted that convictions have been obtained in 17 cases and prosecution is pending in 19 cases.

Enclosure

62-97856-174

ENCLOSURE

PENDING PROSECUTION - CASES DEVELOPED AFTER U. S. ATTORNEYS' CONFERENCE

JAMES KNOX VAN ARSDALE III, an advertising executive in Sarasota, Florida, who on April 6, 1960, advised a stewardess aboard an airborne Eastern Airlines plane just after departing Louisville, Kentucky, that he had a bomb in his possession, was arrested on April 7, 1960. He was released on bond returnable at Louisville, Kentucky, and the trial date has not been set.

FRED Y. CRONK, who on April 4, 1960, advised a stewardess aboard a Continental Airlines plane just prior to its departure from Denver, Colorado, that other passengers had a bomb in their possession, was arrested on April 7, 1960. He was released on $500 bond and no trial date has been set. Cronk is President, Cronk, Alexander and Associates, Inc., Petroleum Engineering Firm, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

WATERMAN F. BROWN, area representative for Bendix Aviation, Michigan City, Indiana, on April 11, 1960, advised a stewardess aboard an airborne Lake Central Airlines plane en route to South Bend, Indiana, that he had a bomb in his possession. He was arrested April 12, 1960, and released on $2,000 bond. On April 15, 1960, the U. S. Attorney advised that Waterman's case would be presented to a Federal Grand Jury in August, 1960.

JULIUS ROUDOLPH RADWANSKI, a sales engineer with the Wingate Construction Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, who on April 13, 1960, advised an airlines employee at Columbus, Ohio, that he had a bomb in his luggage, was arrested April 13, 1960. He was released on bond and on April 29, 1960, his attorney requested and was granted a delay until May 31, 1960, to file a motion to the information.

WILLIAM ANDERSON GRANT, employed as a tube bender, Apex Neon Sign Company, San Francisco, who on April 12, 1960, advised an airlines employee that a bomb was aboard a United Air Lines plane departing from the San Francisco International Airport, was arrested April 13, 1960. He was released on $500 bond and trial date had been set for May 10, 1960. He appeared in U. S. District Court, San Francisco, California, May 10, 1960, and entered a "not guilty" plea. He waived jury trial and trial has been set for June 9, 1960.

62-97856-174

ENCLOSURE

ROBERT CAREY CLARK, a resident of Raytown, Missouri, employed as an engineer at Teletype Corporation, who on April 14, 1960, advised an airlines clerk at the Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois, that he had a bomb in his luggage, was arrested on April 15,1960. Hearing held May 11, 1960, before U. S. Commissioner, who entered a finding of probable cause and subject released on $500 bond on own recognizance. On May 17, 1960, the Assistant U. S. Attorney, Chicago, Illinois, advised no trial date has been set and he has written to the Department for instructions.

JOHN PATRICK LANGAN, JR., bartender at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, who on January 16, 1960, advised an airlines employee at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, that a passenger aboard an Eastern Airlines plane had a bomb in his possession, was arrested April 19, 1960. No trial date has been set. Langan's father, John Patrick Langan, Sr., is a prominent South Orange, New Jersey, businessman who was an unsuccessful candidate for election to Congress in 1958.

JOSEPH ELDON TOOMEY, a dentist at Lompoc, California, who on April 22, 1960, advised an airlines employee at Los Angeles, California, that he had a bomb in his luggage, was arrested on April 25, 1960. An information is scheduled to be filed against Toomey in U. S. District Court, Los Angeles, California, on May 24, 1960, and he is to be arraigned on June 6, 1960.

PETER JOSEPH DI RENZO, a used-car dealer at North Attleboro, Massachusetts, who on May 2, 1960, as he was preparing to board a plane at Warwick, Rhode Island, advised an airlines employee that he had a bomb in his luggage, was arrested May 2, 1960. He was released on $500 bond.

BARBARA NICHOLSON, a 16-year-old Milwaukee, Wisconsin, high school junior, who on April 26, 1960, made an anonymous call to an Ozark Airlines employee, Moline, Illinois, in which she alleged a bomb was aboard a plane scheduled to depart that evening, was arrested May 2, 1960, and released on $3,000 bond. No trial date has been set.

PATRICK WILLIAM MC CUNE, a salesman, Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company, Fresno, California, who on April 27, 1960, advised an airlines employee that his wife may have placed a bomb in his luggage, was arrested May 5, 1960. An information is scheduled to be filed against McCune in U. S. District Court, Fresno, California, May 24, 1960. Arraignment date has not been set and may be delayed several weeks because of heavy court calendar.

JOSEPH ROSENBERG, a 41-year-old concert violinist, on May 12, 1960, made a false bomb threat regarding a Pan American jet airliner at Idlewild Airport, New York City. He was arrested May 12, 1960, and arraigned before the U. S. Commissioner, Brooklyn, New York, where he waived preliminary hearing and was released on $1,000 bond.

IRWIN SAMSON GIELGUD, a member of the Writers Guild of America and script writer for documentary-type films, on May 16, 1960, made a statement "Be careful of that, its explosives" to a stewardess aboard an American Airlines plane, Los Angeles, California, when the stewardess started to move subject's suitcase. Prosecution authorized May 17, 1960, and subject taken into custody by Bureau Agents at Wichita Falls, Texas, same date, arraigned before U. S. Commissioner, and released on $500 bond returnable to Los Angeles.

VINCENT JOSEPH MICEL, Boston, Massachusetts, sales promotion manager of Kennedy Clothiers, Inc., a large chain with stores in New England, on January 26, 1960, made a false bomb threat aboard an American Airlines plane at Boston. The subject was arrested by Massachusetts State Police, January 26, 1960, but local prosecution was subsequently discontinued. The Assistant U. S. Attorney, Boston, Massachusetts, who had deferred rendering a prosecutive opinion pending the outcome of the local prosecution, presented the case to a Federal Grand Jury at Boston, May 19, 1960, and a true bill was returned, May 23, 1960. This subject was not arrested by Bureau Agents following the return of the indictment since the Assistant U. S. Attorney notified subject's attorney of the indictment and permitted the subject to surrender voluntarily.

ARCHIBALD REGINALD DEWAR, operator of the Commercial Maintenance Service, Las Vegas, Nevada, and who advised he had been a congregational servant in the Jehovah's Witnesses religious sect, on May 24, 1960, made a false statement to a stewardess on a Trans World Airlines flight, number 514, San Francisco, California, when she was removing a box from a package rack above him to the effect, "Be careful, it is a bomb." Dewar was arrested by Bureau Agents on May 24, 1960, and was to be arraigned before a U. S. Commissioner in San Francisco, California.

PENDING PROSECUTION - CASES DEVELOPED PRIOR TO APRIL 1, 1960

JULIUS G. STAFF, employed by J. G. Shoes, New York, New York, who on June 23, 1958, advised the stewardess aboard a Trans World Airlines plane which had just departed from New York City that a bomb was aboard the plane, was indicted by Federal Grand Jury at Newark, New Jersey, April 17, 1959. Staff entered a plea of not guilty and due to a crowded court calendar, no trial date has been set. This matter has been followed closely with the U. S. Attorney and the Department and the potentially adverse effect of the delay on successful prosecution has been pointed out. At our specific request the Department instructed the U. S. Attorney in late March, 1960, to seek an early trial date in the matter. By letter April 27, 1960, the Newark Office has advised that the U. S. Attorney has been attempting contact with Staff's attorney, Congressman Cornelius E. Gallagher, in order to arrange a trial date.

RAYMOND JACOB OTTEN, an unemployed paint chemist, who commented to a passenger aboard a United Air Lines plane which had just departed from Chicago, Illinois, that "the mad bomber is aboard," entered a plea of not guilty March 1, 1960, and trial was scheduled for March 21, 1960. Otten who is an epileptic has suffered epileptic seizures since his plea was entered and has been granted two continuances. Assistant U. S. Attorney, Chicago, Illinois, advised May 17, 1960, that subject had filed a motion to dismiss and the Government's answer to this motion is due on May 23, 1960. A hearing on the motion is set for May 27, 1960, and the trial date for this case is now set for May 31, 1960.

LYNDEN KEITH MELLINGER, field engineer at Signode Steel Strapping Company, Chicago, Illinois, who advised an airlines clerk at Chicago, Illinois, that he had a bomb in his luggage, entered a plea of not guilty on April 4, 1960. Trial was scheduled for April 21, 1960, and on that date his attorney filed a motion to dismiss the information. On May 19, 1960, the motion to dismiss the information was denied in U. S. District Court, Chicago, Illinois, and the case continued to June 16, 1960.

PETER WILSON ASKEW, who advised an airlines clerk at New York City that a passenger aboard an Eastern Airlines plane had a bomb with him, was arrested March 19, 1960. Trial date has been set for June 6, 1960. Askew was honorably discharged from the U. S. Army as a first lieutenant on March 17, 1960.

May 26, 1960

VOTER REGISTRATION CASES UNDER CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1960

The Civil Rights Division has requested the delivery of demand letters to registration officials and subsequent inspections and copying of voter registration records in eight counties and parishes in Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina and Louisiana. The desired records were made available in South Carolina and Georgia.

In Louisiana a suit has been filed in Federal Court against the Attorney General, Mr. Joseph M. F. Ryan, Jr., and the Director of the FBI alleging Titles 3 and 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 are unconstitutional and requests an injunction enjoining the Attorney General and the FBI from proceeding under the Act. United States District Judge Ben C. Dawkins, Shreveport, Louisiana, signed an order on May 25, 1960, directing the Attorney General, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ryan and the Director to show cause at 9:30 a.m., June 20, 1960, why preliminary interlocutory injunction should not be granted. Judge Dawkins also signed a temporary restraining order to be effective until June 20, 1960.

In Alabama, in one instance, an injunction has been issued by Judge James A. Hare of the Fourth Judicial Circuit which covers Wilcox County, Alabama. This requires clarification of the Act before granting permission to inspect and copy voter registration records. The Attorney General, Mr. Ryan, plus the Special Agent in Charge of the Mobile Office and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge, are named in the injunction. No reply has been received to the demand letter in a second investigation although one has been promised on June 6, 1960.

62-97856-174

ENCLOSURE

UNKNOWN SUBJECT
RICHARD KENNETH KAUFMAN-VICTIM
EXTORTION, 5-26-60

Richard Kaufman, a student at Syracuse University, New York and son of Federal Judge Irving Kaufman, who presided during the trial of the Apalachin hoodlums, on 3-1-60, received an anonymous threatening phone call. The unknown caller made reference to victim's father and threatened "Just wait until we get hold of you." Kaufman received another call of a similar nature on 4-4-60 and on 4-5-60 received the first of 4 threatening letters, all postmarked Syracuse, New York. The last of these communications bore an April 12, 1960, date.

AUSA Kenneth Ray of the Northern District of New York, has indicated letters coupled with previous phone calls constituted a violation of the Federal Extortion Statute and his opinion was concurred in by the Department on April 8, 1960.

Extensive investigation has been conducted by our Albany Office in an effort to identify and locate the extortionist. To date, no positive information has been obtained, and no suspects have been developed. Of interest, however, is the fact that the rumors pervails among fellow students, faculty members, and advisors of the victim that he prepared the communications in question. While no direct evidence corroborating these rumors has been uncovered, writing paper and envelopes similar to that used in one of the communications found in the victim's room.

The Department has requested copies of all investigative reports. Judge Kaufman will be confidentially advised of the facts developed by our investigation, after which the reports will be disseminated to the Department.

HAS:mlr
(8)

62-97856-174

ENCLOSURE

May 27, 1960

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS
ADOLPH COORS, III - VICTIM
KIDNAPING; EXTORTION

Intensive investigation is being continued in this case with two principal objectives—the location and apprehension of Joseph Corbett, Jr., the prime suspect in this case who is carried as one of our ten most wanted fugitives, and the development of evidence to positively identify Corbett as Coors' abductor.

In our program acquainting the public with our interest in Corbett, material has been prepared and transmitted to the field which will be furnished to all newspapers in the United States. In our specialized circularization of persons and businesses with whom Corbett would most likely have contact, we have sent letters and Wanted Flyers to all individuals engaged in the prescribing and dispensing of eyeglasses, including contact lenses, as Corbett's eyesight requires that he wear glasses at all times.

The special squad in the Denver Division is currently engaged in investigation in the mountain area to the west and northwest of Denver with the objective of obtaining some information as to the site of a planned hide-out where the abductor would have taken Coors and indications as to where Coors' body could have been left.

62-97852-174

ENCLOSURE

May 26, 1960

STATUS OF JOHN GEORGE LEDES, ET AL.
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

This case relates to the association between Ledes, a former legal adviser to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner James C. Sargent and Joseph Abrams, a New York promoter of unsavory reputation. We completed an extensive investigation which determined that Ledes endeavored to assist Abrams with several SEC matters while Ledes was still with that agency. Abrams made loans to Ledes to finance properties which Ledes purchased.

The attorney for subject Abrams advised his client not to talk to us. The attorney for Ledes, James M. Mc Inerney, refused to make Ledes available for interview unless he, Mc Inerney, is present. We informed the Department and suggested that they consider calling Ledes before a Federal Grand Jury or interviewing him themselves in Mc Inerney's presence.

On May 13, 1960, Roger Connor, Executive Assistant to Assistant Attorney General Wilkey, advised that Joseph Abrams had been brought down from Danbury, Connecticut, Federal Correctional Institution to Washington, D. C., for appearance before a Federal Grand Jury here. The Grand Jury presentation by three Department attorneys started that date and is currently continuing. Leads growing out of the Grand Jury hearings are being received and are currently outstanding in Washington Field Office, New York, Atlanta and Miami. These matters are being given immediate and continuous attention.

62-97852-174

ENCLOSURE

May 26, 1960

LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959

Since February 2, 1960, when the Attorney General advised the agreement had been reached between the Departments of Labor and Justice as to this new labor law, 71 cases have been referred to us by the Criminal Division for investigation and 41 have been completed. Of the 3 cases received this week, two had been forwarded to the Criminal Division by the Department of Labor, which makes a total of 31 cases received from the Criminal Division upon referral from the Department of Labor.

These investigations involve (1) embezzlement of union funds, (2) convicted felons holding union office and (3) deprivation of rights of union members by force or violence. They are instituted only upon receipt of specific requests from the Criminal Division. The Department will render decisions as to prosecution. Top priority investigations have been ordered and close deadlines have been set.

In addition, there are 170 cases under investigation concerning the prohibition in the new law against communists holding union office. what is status of these cases?

By memorandum dated May 24, 1960, the Criminal Division forwarded us a copy of Labor Department's instructions to its field installations relative to procedures to be followed in handling complaints under the captioned law. These procedures are in agreement with revisions suggested by the Department of Justice and are designed to implement the Memorandum of Understanding which constitutes a general delegation of responsibility to Justice in the six specified areas covered by the Memorandum of Understanding.

memo. requested

62-97856-174

ENCLOSURE

May 27, 1960

ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY SUBCOMMITTEE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ESTES KEFAUVER, CHAIRMAN

Recently Senator Kefauver's Committee requested the Bureau to conduct name checks on 304 individuals reportedly associated with the boxing industry. Several of these names were duplicated on a prior request for a name check by Senator Kefauver's Committee. It appeared that the Committee might be conducting a fishing expedition by submitting such an extensive list. Accordingly, the matter was referred to the Department to answer the Committee's request.

On May 25, 1960, William G. Hundley, Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, telephonically advised that following a contact with the Kefauver Committee on that date the original request for name checks on 304 individuals had been reduced to a request for name checks on 30 individuals. Of these 30, Mr. Hundley pointed out that where any individual was the subject of pending prosecution, such as Frankie Carbo, it would be unnecessary for the Bureau to search its files concerning that individual. Mr. Hundley also advised the Committee representatives that it would not be possible in every instance to make name checks on an expeditious basis while the hearings were being conducted inasmuch as the time factor in making the name checks would depend upon the number of references involved. Mr. Hundley is sending a memorandum to the Bureau in the immediate future listing the names which the Committee has now requested be checked.

Upon receipt of Mr. Hundley's memorandum listing the names, the names will be checked and appropriate summaries prepared.

62-97852-174

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt ✓
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: January 12, 1967

FROM : R. E. Wick

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S LUNCHEON MEETING WITH ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL RAMSEY CLARK 1 P.M., FRIDAY, JANUARY 13, 1967

Miss Gandy has advised that in connection with Mr. Hoover's luncheon meeting with the Acting Attorney General tomorrow, it would be helpful if we could set forth for the Director's information any items which might come up for discussion.

The attached data prepared by the various Divisions throughout the Bureau may be helpful to Mr. Hoover in connection with the luncheon meeting.

Enclosures

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen

REW:par
(7)

"ENCL. BEHIND FILE"

62-22856-179

REC 27

5 FEB 2 1967

CRIME RESEARCH

ENCLOSURE

226

62 FEB 13 1967

Budget

62-9854-177.

FBI BUDGET REQUEST - FISCAL YEAR 1968

The Bureau's request for 1968 totals $186,574,000. It will provide for a personnel staff totaling 15,780 (6,638 agents and 9,142 clerks). The request makes provision for an increase of 569 full-year employees (106 agents and 463 clerks) when compared to 1967.

Of the additional employees, 165 (100 agents and 65 clerks) are for assignment to the field to assist in the handling of a heavy volume of civil rights work. (This is the second increment of a total increase of 300 agents and attendant clerical staff and equipment previously ordered by the President for civil rights work over a three-year period to be implemented at the rate of 100 agents a year.) The remaining 404 employees (6 agents and 398 clerks) are for assignment at our headquarters, the bulk to be utilized to handle the tremendous increase in name and fingerprint checks being received.

The request of $186,574,000 for 1968 is an increase of $4,249,000 when compared to the total requirements for the current fiscal year 1967 which includes $175,465,000 already appropriated and by a supplemental request totaling $6,860,000 brought about by costs growing out of new legislation increasing our payroll costs ($5,250,000) and by new legislation increasing the costs we must pay to transfer employees to meet the needs of the service ($1,610,000).

Most careful consideration was given to our request for additional personnel in 1968. We are absorbing much work and will endeavor to make further absorptions. When confronted with a one-million increase in fingerprint receipts, a 43% increase in name checks, a heavy amount of civil rights and other work, we have no alternative but to ask for additional manpower if we are to meet our responsibilities in these areas.

The Bureau's growing work is not limited to these particular areas by any means. The work of the FBI Laboratory mounted to a new all-time peak during the fiscal year 1966, numerous criminal classifications reached new highs, and our work in matters vital to the internal security of the country has continued to increase. We are going to do our best to handle the mounting work in these areas with our existing staff. In addition, new items of legislation continue to be passed adding to our work.

Indicative of our heavy volume of work is the fact that as of January 1, 1967, pending investigative matters throughout the field totaled 150,189, with 5% in a delinquent status. At that time, the average individual assignment in the field was nearly 26 matters as compared with 20 at that time in 1961.

OTHER WORK LOAD VOLUMES
FISCAL YEARS 1965 AND 1966

Fiscal Year	Investigative Matters Received	Fingerprint Checks	Name Checks	Laboratory Examinations
1966	718,850	6,964,816	2,426,665	284,304
1965	696,477	5,884,986	1,699,361	276,383
Increases (1966)	22,373 3%	1,079,830 18%	727,304 43%	7,921 3%

Special Investigative Division

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION

During the past few months the Department has launched into a program of review of past, current, and contemplated prosecutions to determine if such cases have been materially affected by the use of electronic listening devices. This has required the establishment of special microphone indices at Bureau Headquarters and voluminous correspondence with various field divisions to determine if individuals listed in the Department's inquiries were covered by FBI microphones. With regard to listed individuals on whom we have had some form of microphone coverage, we are so advising the Department and pertinent logs, together in some cases with other supporting material, are being obtained from the field for review by Departmental attorneys.

The Department made public the fact that such a review was under way in the filing of a memorandum with the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General in the Joseph Schipani case, November 30, 1966.

Set forth as follows are the brief circumstances regarding individual prosecutive situations in which, to date, the Department has made disclosures to various courts regarding the FBI's use of electronic listening devices of pertinence to those prosecutions.

Joseph Frank Schipani

Schipani is a New York hoodlum and a member of La Cosa Nostra who was convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment and fined $12,500 for violation of the income tax laws for the years 1956 through 1960. In response to the Department's request, they were provided with logs reporting those instances where Schipani was covered by an electronic surveillance. This electronic surveillance was not directly on Schipani but was in an office frequented by top La Cosa Nostra racket figures. On November 30, 1966, the Solicitor General requested the Supreme Court to vacate the judgment regarding Schipani of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court for a new trial. On December 12, 1966, the Supreme Court complied with the request of the Solicitor General. This was installed under the general authority of the Attorney General, as were all of the following unless otherwise specified.

Louis J. Taglianetti

The Department on December 27, 1966, filed a motion to remand in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the Louis J. Taglianetti appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Taglianetti, a member of the Raymond Patriarca "family" of La Cosa Nostra, was indicted on February 26, 1963, for income tax evasion for the years 1956, 1957, and 1958. He was found guilty on September 16, 1966. Taglianetti appealed but no brief had yet been filed.

The Department's motion indicated Taglianetti's conversations had been monitored by microphone surveillance at the place of business of a close associate (Raymond Patriarca) where Taglianetti and others met and that this establishment was being utilized for purposes connected with organized crime. On various occasions between March, 1962, when this microphone was installed with trespass under general authority of the Attorney General, until 1965, Taglianetti's conversations related to his income tax indictment. None of the information was used in evidence or was the source of leads to any evidence in the case.

The Department's motion noted that Taglianetti's case was within the ambit of the Supreme Court's decision in the Black case, decided November 7, 1966. The distinguishing feature between the two is the intrusion upon attorney-client conversations in the Black case, for which the Supreme Court vacated the conviction and granted a new trial. The Department's reasons for the motion to remand in Taglianetti was for the limited purpose of enabling the District Court to examine the facts and to determine whether Taglianetti's conviction should stand or a new trial be ordered.

The defense has now filed a motion for new trial claiming that, "The Government, having tasted the forbidden fruit of its illegal bugging and having withheld all knowledge thereof from the defendant, his counsel and the trial judge, cannot now preserve the conviction thus obtained because such forbidden fruit failed to produce a sweet taste." Hearings on these motions have not yet been scheduled.

FRANK DE NIRO, JR.
MICHAEL DE NIRO
LOUIS DE NIRO

The De Niro brothers were convicted 8/23/65 of conspiring to defraud the U. S. in evading estate taxes. They have appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Cleveland Office conducted a microphone surveillance from 2/19/64 to 6/16/64 in the office of the National Cigarette Service, Youngstown, Ohio, a vending machine company, operated by the De Niros. In response to the Department's request 10/14/66 we disclosed the circumstances of this surveillance to them by letter 10/18/66, and made available for review the surveillance logs. No information from this source was disseminated outside the Bureau.

The Department subsequently disclosed to the Court of Appeals by memorandum the existance of our microphone surveillance. Considerable reluctance was displayed by the Department to including in this memorandum our general authority for installation of electronic surveillances. They did not clearly record the dates concerning the manner in which the Department requested and was advised of our coverage. Our protests were clearly outlined in correspondence to the Department before this memorandum was filed. Ultimately our authority was recorded as a footnote. This microphone was installed under the general authority of the Attorney General.

Frank Peter Balistrieri

Balistrieri, the "boss" of Milwaukee's La Cosa Nostra "family," and as such the leader of organized crime in that area, was brought to trial in United States District Court, Springfield, Illinois, during October, 1966, on the basis of an indictment charging evasion of Federal income taxes. An early issue in this action was our microphone coverage of Balistrieri and certain of his associates. Microphone coverage had been established on Balistrieri's office, in an apartment maintained by his paramour, and in the office of hoodlum attorney Dominic Frinzi, all in Milwaukee, for various periods between 1961 and 1965. These installations were all made in line with general departmental authorization as outlined in the Department's memorandum filed with the Supreme Court in the Black case.

The defense has made a motion to suppress, based on this electronic coverage. After hearing testimony regarding these installations, including testimony of Bureau personnel, and reviewing logs of the coverage in question, the judge instructed that the trial should be commenced, with the defense having the right to renew its mortion after the trial, in the event evidence presented warrants such a proceedings.

Trial was undertaken on 10/17/66. On 11/29/66 Defense Attorney Walsh suffered a heart attack and further trial proceedings have been deferred until March 1, 1967. None of the information produced by this microphone was utilized in obtaining the indictment of Balistrieri.

Ronald David Carabbia

Carabbia was convicted 6/21/65 for violation of wagering tax laws and has appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. The Cleveland Office conducted a microphone surveillance at the Modern News Center and Novelties Company, Youngstown, from 1/22/62 until 3/22/62. Carabbia and his brothers operated a gambling game at this location. Activities covered by this surveillance included gambling with numerous participants. The voices of the individuals covered were never identified. It could not be determined if the appellant was or was not present during the operation of this source.

In response to the Department's inquiry, we disclosed to them by letter dated 11/1/66 the circumstances of this surveillance and made available for review all surveillance logs. By letter dated 1/9/67, the Department indicated its intention to disclose this microphone surveillance by memorandum to the U. S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. In three letters we have advised the Department of the brief operation of this source and that the individuals covered were never identified. The Department's proposed memorandum to the court notes, "There is a substantial question whether any conversations in which appellant participated were even monitored." In spite of this, the Department apparently feels it must disclose this surveillance. The Department failed to include our general authorization for installation of electronic surveillances over our protests. We feel that at the very least the general authorization of the Department should be in all briefs going to courts so there can be no accusation that the Bureau was operating in an uncontrolled and unrestrained manner.

Jack T. Rainwater

Jack T. Rainwater has conducted a large-scale numbers operation in the Miami, Florida area. He and six associates were convicted of state gambling violations in Florida courts based upon evidence furnished by the Internal Revenue Service and testimony of Internal Revenue Service agents.

In response to the Department's request they were provided with logs reporting those instances where Rainwater and one of his associates who also was convicted in state court, were monitored by an electronic surveillance. Neither of these individuals were the direct subject of an electronic surveillance.

On January 11, 1967, the Solicitor General disclosed to the Supreme Court that an electronic device had been utilized by Federal agents in the Rainwater matter.

Our installation in this matter was made under general authority of the Attorney General. Information from this source was disseminated to Internal Revenue Service who in turn disseminated to local authorities.

Charles Joseph Battaglia, Jr.

Battaglia is a Tucson, Arizona, La Cosa Nostra member who was closely affiliated with Joseph Bonanno a former La Cosa Nostra "Commission" member. A microphone for criminal intelligence purposes had been maintained on him under general Departmental authority. He was arrested by Bureau Agents for violation of the Hobbs Act in March, 1965, as a result of making threats in an effort to force a Tucson firm to utilize his vending machines. Following the granting of several continuances the trial judge in Federal District Court ordered Battaglia to appear for trial on the morning of January 11, 1967. The Department advised that they intended to inform the judge that Battaglia had been covered by microphone surveillances, but that the coverage had no bearing on the evidence to be produced in substantiation of the criminal charges against Battaglia. The Department further advised they were going to recommend that the judge proceed with the trial and at the conclusion thereof, if the judge feels it necessary, a hearing will be held to determine the validity of the Department's claim regarding the microphone evidence.

A hearing on this motion is scheduled for Monday, January 16, 1967, in Tucson, Arizona.

Edward L. Levinson, et. al., Civil Suit

On December 10, 1965, Edward Levinson, at that time one of the owners of the Fremont Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada, filed a $6,000,000 damage suit (later reduced to $4,200,000) against four Bureau Agents, charging invasion of privacy and asking injunctive relief against further invasion by use of electronic listening devices. Levinson filed a similar suit against the Central Telephone Company of Las Vegas and certain of its employees.

The case has recently been taken over personally by Assistant Attorney General Barefoot Sanders who is presently reviewing all of the material in connection with preparing a response to plaintiff's motions. No date has been set for trial in matter. The Bureau has been pressing the Department to take depositions in this case from such major hoodlums as Meyer Lansky and Gerardo Catena who have hidden interests in the Fremont Hotel.

Fred B. Black, Jr.

Fred B. Black, Jr., named as being hired by front men in Las Vegas to represent their interests in Washington, D. C., where Black was alleged to have influence, was convicted on May 5, 1965, of evading income taxes for the period of 1956 through 1959. After a number of appeals he petitioned the Supreme Court for issuance of a writ of certiorari which was denied on May 4, 1966.

On May 24, 1966, Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall filed a memorandum with the Supreme Court reporting a listening device had been placed in Black's hotel suite in 1963, but none of the evidence used in Black's trial was obtained as a result of the listening device. The Supreme Court on June 13, 1966, ordered a response by the Department to questions raised by the Court with regard to the initial memorandum filed by the Department which was answered on July 13, 1966, by supplemental memorandum.

This memorandum indicated the listening device, installed with trespass under general Departmental authorization had monitored conversations of Black and his attorney.

The United States Supreme Court on November 7, 1966, vacated the income tax conviction and granted a new trial, which will not be set until after the Robert Baker trial.

....

To date, the Bureau has received over 1,000 names of individuals of prosecutive interest for a determination if such subjects have been covered by FBI microphones. A number of problems have resulted.

One problem which has been encountered, and which can be expected to be even more serious in the future, is the lack of identifying data accompanying the names of individuals on whom the Department has made inquiry in these matters. For example, one list recently received included 475 names, in some cases with a minimum of identifying data and in others with no identifying data at all. In order that an accurate determination can be made whether an individual in question has, in fact, been covered by one of our microphones, it will be necessary that the Department provide adequate identifying data when submitting these names for review.

An attendant problem has arisen in certain inquiries in which the Department has made unreasonable requests for such reviews on extremely short notice. One of these involved a request for the results of the review later the same day it was received. Thoroughness and accuracy, of absolute necessity in this type review, make extremely rapid checks such as this in most cases impossible, and at best, a very dangerous procedure.

With regard to those situations in which the Department has made disclosures to the various courts, continuing reluctance has been evidenced on their part to inform the court of the fact that the installation in question has been utilized by the FBI under either specific authority from the Attorney General, or under the general Departmental authority which was granted. The Department has been repeatedly reminded of their reluctance in these individual situations.

The volume involved in this project has caused a decided strain on the Bureau in processing these numerous inquiries to date, and these problems become magnified when the enormity of the entire project is assessed, in view of indications by the Department that the full review may encompass as many as 30,000 names.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

FUGITIVE SECTION

Cassius Marcellus Clay

Cassius Clay, world's heavyweight boxing champion and Black Muslim, earlier this year filed a claim as a conscientious objector and more recently has applied to his draft board at Louisville, Kentucky, for a ministerial deferment as a minister of the Black Muslim religion. After a very extensive investigation by the Bureau, Clay's draft board denied his claim as a conscientious objector and placed him in a 1-A classification. Since the board's vote was unanimous, he has no further appeal as a conscientious objector. His ministerial deferment request will now have to be considered by his local board which our sources indicate will meet in the next few days. If the local board denies this request, Clay has the right to appeal.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
FEDERAL JUDGESHIP INVESTIGATIONS

ALFRED BURKA: On 1/11/67 we initiated an investigation of Alfred Burka, a District of Columbia attorney who is being considered for appointment as Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. Previous applicant investigation in 1953, which was favorable concerning Burka, showed his father was indicted in 1944 for violation of the Internal Revenue Code but the case was not prosecuted. Current investigation of Burka is pending.

WILLIAM COURTLEIGH GARDNER: Gardner, a District of Columbia attorney, is under consideration for appointment as Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. Investigation completed 1/12/67 was favorable except in 1965 and 1966 income tax liens totaling $6,828.54 were filed against him by the District of Columbia and the Federal Government for delinquent income taxes. These accounts have now been paid.

MILTON DANIEL KORMAN: Korman is under consideration for appointment as Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. He has been Assistant Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia since 1937. Investigation of Korman, which has been completed was favorable.

FRED LOUIS MC INTYRE: He is a candidate for the position of Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. We completed investigation of him 1/9/67 and it was favorable.

HAROLD FRANK REIS: Reis is Executive Assistant to the Attorney General. He is a candidate for a judgeship on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. He is a Kennedy supporter and has been the cause of discord between the Department and the Bureau concerning electronic surveillance matters.

Attached are background memoranda concerning the above individuals.

Enclosures (5)

Mr. Gale 1/11/67

W. V. Cleveland

ALFRED BURKA
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANT
JUDGE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

The Office of the Deputy Attorney General has requested investigation of Alfred Burka, who is under consideration for appointment as Judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions.

Burka, aged 38, was born in Washington, D. C., and received his LL.B. degree from Georgetown University Law School in 1951. He served in the United States Army from 1951 to 1953 when he was honorably released as a first lieutenant. He served as Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia 1953 to 1958 and since 1958 has been engaged in the practice of law in the District of Columbia and Bethesda, Maryland. He also served as Assistant States Attorney for Montgomery County, Maryland, from 1962 to 1965. This was part-time employment.

We conducted a Departmental Applicant investigation of Burka in 1953 when he was under consideration for appointment as Assistant United States Attorney. That investigation was favorable concerning Burka. Our inquiries disclosed, however, that his father, Israel S. Burka, and others were indicted by a Grand Jury in Washington, D. C., in December, 1964, for violation of the Internal Revenue Code because they failed to maintain proper records in respect to the sale and distribution of distilled spirits. It was also indicated that the defendants had listed addresses of people who supposedly purchased whiskey and that such addresses were fictitious. It was also shown they had listed names of people who supposedly purchased whiskey and that these people could not be identified. An offer of $4,000 was submitted by the defendants in compromise of civil and criminal liabilities. The compromise offer was accepted and the case was nol-prossed. Israel S. Burka also had a record of 38 traffic violations between

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale

1 - Mr. Cleveland
(1) - Mr. Connell

JFC:jmm
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

1936 and 1947 for which he forfeited sums ranging in amounts from $4 to $12. (77-33541)

Bureau files also show that in September, 1957, Alfred Burka, while Assistant United States Attorney, called upon the Director to pay his respects. He stated he had always held the Bureau in high esteem and he had very kind words to say about his contacts with our local office. In October, 1957, while serving as Assistant United States Attorney, he requested that the Director autograph a copy of the book "The FBI Story," for him and also give him an autographed photograph. His request was granted. (94-4-39-12248)

ACTION:

The field has been instructed to bring the previous investigation of Burka up to date. Appropriate memorandum will be submitted upon completion of our current inquiries.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
[illegible]
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Gale

DATE: 1/3/67

FROM : W. V. Cleveland

SUBJECT: WILLIAM COURTLEIGH GARDNER
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANT
ASSOCIATE JUDGE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

The Office of the Deputy Attorney General has requested investigation of William Courtleigh Gardner, who is under consideration for appointment as Associate Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions.

Background data furnished by the Department indicates Gardner, aged 49, was born in Springfield, Ohio. He served in the United States Army from 1942 to 1946. He received his A.B. degree from Howard University, Washington, D. C., in 1948 and his LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1951. From 1951 to the present he reportedly has practiced law in Washington, D. C. Gardner listed membership in various bar associations and civic organizations including present membership in the District of Columbia Special Police Trial Board.

Bureau files contain no information identifiable with Gardner.

ACTION:

The investigation of Gardner has been initiated. Appropriate memorandum will be submitted upon its completion.

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Cornell

JFC:jmm
(6)

Mr. Gale 12/14/66

W. V. Cleveland

MILTON DANIEL KORMAN
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANT
JUDGE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

Investigation of Milton Daniel Korman, who is under consideration for appointment to the position of Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, has been completed.

BACKGROUND:

Korman, aged 62, received his law degree from Georgetown University in 1925. He practiced law in the District of Columbia, (D. C.), from 1925 to 1931, operated a taxicab company in Virginia 1931 to 1934 and thereafter practiced law in Washington, D. C., until 1937. From 1937 to date he has been an Assistant Corporation Counsel in D. C., and during the past year was Acting Corporation Counsel until the appointment of Charles T. Duncan, October, 1966.

PREVIOUS INVESTIGATION:

A Departmental Applicant investigation conducted concerning Korman in 1942, when he was being considered for a judicial position in D. C., was generally favorable; however, several individuals stated Korman was inclined to be dominating, loud, and blustering.

RESULTS OF CURRENT INVESTIGATION:

The previous investigation has been brought up to date. Numerous individuals including judges of the D. C. Court of General Sessions and United States District Court, the United States Attorney, D. C. Commissioners Walter Tobriner and John B. Duncan; Charles Duncan, present Corporation Counsel; and local bar officials recommended Korman He was described as a very competent attorney who is exceptionally well versed in the laws of the District of Columbia and fully qualified for a judicial position.

Korman was also recommended by several Congressmen, who are members of the House District of Columbia Committee, including Thomas

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Cleveland
① - Mr. Connell

CONTINUED - OVER

JFC:jmm
(6)

Abernethy (Dem.), Mississippi, and Joel T. Broyhill (Rep.), Virginia.

Numerous professional associates and acquaintances who recommended Korman pointed out that in the 1950's Korman, as an Assistant Corporation Counsel, was placed in a position of having to defend segregation in the D. C. public schools because the laws at that time provided for a segregated school system. They stated because of this some individuals unjustifiably criticized Korman feeling he was too vigorous in defending segregation in the schools. These associates pointed out that Korman, as a member of the Corporation Counsel's Office, was obligated to defend the position of the District of Columbia at the time and was only doing his job. They further stated that Korman is not prejudiced in racial matters and if appointed judge would handle such matters fairly and without bias.

Korman was recommended by Negro attorneys as well as H. Carl Moultire, President, D. C. chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and Sterling Tucker, Executive Director of the Washington Urban League. Reverend Walter E. Fauntroy, Chairman of the Coalition of Conscience, Washington, D. C., who has limited knowledge of Korman, stated he would neither recommend or oppose Korman's appointment.

Korman was also recommended by representatives of the various religious faiths in Washington, D. C., with the exception of Rabbi Norman Gerstenfeld. Korman was a member of Rabbi Gerstenfeld's congregation until approximately 1952. Rabbi Gerstenfeld stated Korman, when a member of his congregation, was arrogant, uncongenial and created dissension among the members of the congregation. He said he does not feel Korman possesses judicial temperament and would not recommend him for a judicial position. Rabbi Gerstenfeld, however, stated he has had very limited contact with Korman for the past 14 years.

ACTION:

Reports containing the results of the investigation of Korman are being furnished to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Gale

DATE: 1/5/67

FROM : W. V. Cleveland

SUBJECT: FRED LOUIS MC INTYRE
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANT
JUDGE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

The investigation of Fred Louis McIntyre, candidate for the position of Judge, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, has been completed with the exception of one agency record check.

We have brought up to date prior applicant type investigations of McIntyre conducted in 1950 and 1953. These investigations were favorable. McIntyre, aged 47, received his A.B. degree in 1948 and his LL.B. degree in 1950 from George Washington University. McIntyre was employed by the National Security Resources Board from 1950 to 1951; by the Defense Production Administration from 1951 to 1953; as an Assistant U. S. Attorney in the District of Columbia from 1953 to 1961 when he resigned to accept appointment as counsel for the District of Columbia Committee of the United States Senate, which position he presently holds. He has been a member of the District of Columbia Bar in good standing since November 3, 1950. He served in the United States Air Force from 1941 to 1946.

Senators and Representatives on the Senate and House District of Columbia Committees respectively, U. S. Court of Appeals and Federal District Court Judges, D. C. Court of General Sessions Judges, District Commissioners, bar association officials, local attorneys who have opposed applicant in court, civil rights and religious leaders, neighbors and social acquaintances highly recommended applicant for a judicial position. They stated he has a judicial temperament and would be impartial and unbiased in his decisions. His legal associates stated they have been impressed with applicant's emotional stability and his competence as a lawyer. They noted that he has had extensive experience before the various courts in the District of Columbia. His legal ethics were not questioned and his character, reputation, associates, and loyalty were stated to be above reproach.

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale

1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Bruggeman

RLB:jmm
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Gale
Re: Fred Louis McIntyre

ACTION:

The reports of the current investigation are being sent to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. The remaining agency check is being expedited and the results of this check will be sent to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General promptly upon receipt.

OEC

Mr. Gale 1/5/67

W. V. Cleveland

HAROLD FRANK REIS
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Reference is made to my memorandum of 1/3/67 advising that the Deputy Attorney General's Office had requested a name check and Internal Revenue Service record check on Reis and it was understood Reis is being considered for a judicial appointment to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. An up to date name check has been completed on Reis and disclosed the following pertinent information.

BACKGROUND: Reis was born on 7/22/16 in New York City. His parents were born in Russia and became naturalized citizens. He received a B.S. degree from City College of New York in 1937 and a LL.B. degree from Columbia University, New York City, in 1940. He was first employed by the Department on 8/29/41 as an attorney in the Criminal Division. He resigned 9/21/42 and was again appointed an attorney in the Office of Alien Property 5/3/43. He subsequently served in the Office of Legal Counsel and was appointed first assistant in that office on 8/31/60. On 2/1/61 he was designated Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel. He has served in his present position as Executive Assistant to the Attorney General since March, 1965.

RESULTS OF PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS: Reis was first investigated by the Bureau in 1942 at the request of the Department and that investigation was brought up to date in 1965. In 1960 we conducted an Atomic Energy Act applicant investigation of him in connection with his access to restricted Atomic Energy data. The Department is in possession of the reports of the above investigations.

Our investigation in 1942 disclosed that while Reis was at the City College of New York in 1935 he was listed as a member of the Politics Club which was reported as being headed by two boys associated with communist activities at the college. Reis's membership in this club was not verified and it was reported that the heads of the organization were known to put down the names of persons who were not members and got to put down the names of persons who were members.

Enclosures
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale

1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Bruggeman

CONTINUED - OVER

RLB:jmm
(6)

Memorandum to Mr. Gale
Re: Harold Frank Reis

In 1942 Reis was classified by his draft board as 3-A because of the dependency of his mother. His draft file contained an affidavit by a physician, who was a relative, to the effect that due to a congenital heart disease Reis should not engage in any strenuous physical effort. Several persons interviewed in 1942 said Reis was in good health and engaged in sports. Reis told another individual he was perfectly healthy. Reis never served in the Armed Forces and on 8/22/42, after a physical examination at an induction center, Reis was found physically disqualified for military service by reason of chronic, valvular heart disease, rheumatic, and was classified 4-F.

Two of the individuals listed by Reis as references in 1942 were members of the National Lawyers Guild which has been cited as a communist front.

Reis registered a preference for the American Labor Party in 1937, 1938 and 1940, while a resident of the Bronx in New York City. Although the communists put forth efforts to capture the entire American Labor Party throughout New York State they succeeded in capturing only the Manhattan and Brooklyn sections of the party.

OTHER REFERENCES TO REIS IN BUREAU FILES: On a press release of the Department announcing Reis's appointment as First Assistant in the Office of Legal Counsel the Director noted that Reis was the individual who selected Department representatives to accompany him (Reis) to a State Department conference in Puerto Rico ignoring the FBI. Reis was designated by the Attorney General in February, 1965, to serve as his alternate on the Presidents Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and as his alternate on the Presidents Council on Equal Opportunity. The Director noted concerning this designation of Reis to "watch this carefully as Reis is inclined to throw his weight around. H." On a background memorandum regarding Reis dated 6/21/66 the Director noted that Reis was "another foul ball. H."

A highly confidential source advised on 6/22/65 that Harry Wachtel, Executive Vice President of the Gandhi Society for Human Rights which furnishes legal assistance in certain civil rights cases, told Reverend Andrew Young, Executive Assistant to the President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, that he was to meet with Harold Reis who was described as "our best friend up there." This information was not approved for dissemination to the Department and has not previously been disseminated.

In a memorandum 10/10/66 to the Acting Attorney General, which was read by him but not retained by the Department, his attention was brought to the procedures being followed in connection with requests made by the Bureau for approval by him of technical surveillances commonly known as wire taps. In this memorandum it was pointed out that Mr. Reis had wanted to know the basis on which wire tap continuation requests were sent to the Department every six months. It was pointed out that the procedure was based on the suggestion of former Attorney General Katzenbach and that former Attorney General Katzenbach had approved all of the continuation requests with the exception of one that was used in coverage of Martin Luther King which had been approved by former Attorney General Kennedy. Katzenbach declined to authorize the continuation of the wire tap on King. It was pointed out that previously highly sensitive matters of this kind were supposedly known in the Department only by the Attorney General; however, additional information concerning these matters was being requested by personnel in the Acting Attorney General's Office.

Mr. DeLoach was contacted by Reis on 10/8/66 and in their discussion Reis stated that he thought it had been a good idea to admit to the Supreme Court the usage of a microphone in the Black Case. Mr. DeLoach told him this was one of the most stupid blunders the Department had ever pulled and that there had been no necessity to admit the usage of a microphone. Reis said it had been a good idea to admit usage in this particular case since there was less tainted evidence in this case than in any other and that if the Supreme Court had been presented with a case which involved considerable "bedroom gossip" the Supreme Court would have had no alternative but to issue a sweeping declaration preventing usage of all electronic devices in the future. Reis stated he had assisted Attorney General Katzenbach with the preparation of the draft given to the Supreme Court in the Black Case.

Mr. DeLoach advised 10/11/66 Reis reportedly stated on one occasion that he owed considerable loyalty to Bobby Kennedy inasmuch as Kennedy had brought him into the Attorney General's Office and had given him a higher position and private office. Reis obviously is quite loyal to Bobby Kennedy. Mr. DeLoach stated it should also be noted that in a conversation with Acting Attorney General Clark on the night of October 10, 1966, Clark told him (Mr. DeLoach) that Reis in answer to a specific question had told Clark that 'It was alright to wait a week or 10 days to approve requests for wire taps as sent over by the FBI" and Clark was straightened out on this matter. Clark stated he realizes he was wrong in depending on Reis for these facts.

On October 11, 1966, Mr. DeLoach stated he brought up the matter of Harold Reis and Jim Flug in the Attorney General's Office with Acting Attorney General Ramsey Clark. Mr. Clark was advised that the Director and personnel in the FBI felt that Reis and Flug were the deliberate perpetrators of discord between the FBI and the Department. Mr. Clark was advised that obviously Reis had deliberately caused a great deal of unpleasantness in our dealings in the Black Case. Mr. DeLoach further told Mr. Clark that we not only had an intense dislike and distrust of Reis but that Justice Fortas of the Supreme Court had advised of his feelings concerning Reis and that Justice Fortas had even advised the President concerning this matter. Mr. Clark stated that he was was glad to get these facts and that he would take this matter under consideration.

ACTION: Attached is a memorandum to the Acting Attorney General referring to the Department's request for a name check and Internal Revenue Service record check concerning Reis and briefly summarizing the derogatory information developed by the three investigations conducted concerning Reis.

It is suggested that the attached memorandum to the Acting Attorney General be delivered to him by Mr. DeLoach and at that time the Acting Attorney General again be advised of our past unsatisfactory relations with Reis and he be furnished the information received from the highly confidential source indicating that persons connected with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference considered Reis "our best friend up there." Attached is a copy of Atlanta's memorandum 6/23/66 reporting the details of this information.

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale

2 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Bruggeman

The Acting Attorney General January 5, 1967

Director, FBI

HAROLD FRANK REIS
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. John T. Duffner, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General, dated December 30, 1966, requesting a name check and Internal Revenue Service record check concerning the captioned individual.

Our files show that Mr. Reis was the subject of applicant-type investigations requested by the Department in 1942 and 1950. In 1953, at the request of the Atomic Energy Commission, we brought up to date the prior investigations concerning Mr. Reis in connection with his clearance for access to restricted atomic energy data. The reports of these investigations have previously been furnished to the Department.

The investigations of Mr. Reis disclosed that in 1935 he was listed in the records of the City College of New York as a member of the Politics Club. This club was reported to have been headed by two individuals associated with communist activities at the City College of New York. Mr. Reis's membership in this club was not confirmed and it was reported that the leaders of the organization were known to erroneously index nonmembers as members and to refrain from indexing actual members.

Mr. Reis registered a preference for the American Labor Party in 1937, 1938, and 1940, while a resident of the Bronx in New York City. With regard to the American Labor Party, the House Committee on Un-American Activities has stated:

> "For years, the communists have put forth the greatest efforts to capture the entire American Labor Party throughout New York State. They succeeded in capturing

RLB:bab:jmm
(8)

> the Manhattan and Brooklyn sections of the American Labor Party but outside of New York City they have been unable to win control."

When reviewed in May, 1942, Mr. Reis's selective service file disclosed he had been classified 3A because of the dependency of his mother. His file contained an affidavit from a relative who was a physician to the effect that Reis should not engage in strenuous physical activity because of a congenital heart disease. Several persons interviewed in 1942 stated Mr. Reis was in good health and engaged in sports. Mr. Reis told another individual that he was perfectly healthy. In August, 1942, at an induction station, Mr. Reis was found physically disqualified for military service by reason of "chronic valvular heart disease, rheumatic," and was classified 4F.

Two of the individuals listed by Mr. Reis as references in 1942 were members of the National Lawyers' Guild which has been cited by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a communist front.

The Internal Revenue Service has advised that its records show that income tax returns were timely filed by Mr. Reis for the years 1963, 1964, and 1965. There was no record of unpaid taxes, liens, or intelligence investigations concerning these returns.

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES

As of January 12, 1967, the Bureau has 17 domestic intelligence telephone surveillances. These provide coverage of domestic subversive organizations and individuals. Furthermore, we have 59 foreign intelligence telephone surveillances. These provide coverage of diplomatic and official establishments of foreign countries. Also, we have coverage of 40 teletype facilities of diplomatic establishments. We do not have any microphone surveillances in operation.

All of the above electronic surveillances which we have in operation were approved in writing by the Acting Attorney General on December 29, 1966, for a period through March 31, 1967.

TURKISH MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

In July, 1965, then Attorney General Katzenbach approved microphone surveillance coverage of Turkish United Nations Delegation. This installation, which involved trespass, was made in connection with our efforts on behalf of National Security Agency in program designed to penetrate communications equipment of Turkey. This installation was activated March 9, 1966, and Attorney General Katzenbach was notified of this March 14, 1966.

On December 30, 1966, pursuant to instructions of Director, we discontinued this surveillance and advised National Security Agency of our discontinuance. We requested National Security Agency to arrange for an orderly takeover of the installation. National Security Agency plans to discuss this matter with the White House in the immediate future and we are following closely through liaison.

This page was removed since it involves discussion of a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation

DOMINICAN SITUATION

The FBI was ordered into the Dominican Republic by the President in May, 1965, to develop information to be used in preventing communists from gaining control in that country. We set up a staff of ten Agents. In August, 1966, at White House instructions we established a permanent Legal Attache office there, staffed with three Agents.

The six-month-old government under Joaquin Balaguer has brought about a degree of stability. Nevertheless, there continue to be strong undercurrents of dissension. The rightists reportedly have considered plots to remove Balaguer. Juan Bosch's political party, loser in the June, 1966, election, has been most vocal in its opposition to Balaguer's programs. The communist groups have suffered much internal dissension but to accomplish a common cause could be expected to regroup as they have in the past. In fact, a student strike in Santo Domingo, which began January 9, 1967, has attracted strong communist support and has served as a rallying point for the extreme leftists. Within two days, seventy percent of the students in secondary schools had joined the strike.

This is but one of numerous problems which beset Balaguer, although to date he has been able to meet each one head on.

JUAN MARI BRAS

Juan Mari Bras, a San Juan attorney and Security Index subject, is the founder and current Secretary General of the Movimiento Pro-Independencia de Puerto Rico, which is the principal militant group seeking independence for Puerto Rico. He is involved in a Cuban intelligence network operating in Puerto Rico. Proof?

A telephone surveillance on Mari Bras was initially authorized by Attorney General Kennedy on October 4, 1963. By letter dated May 31, 1966, Attorney General Katzenbach was advised that Mari Bras was the attorney for a Selective Service violator. He authorized the continuance of the coverage on Mari Bras on June 7, 1966, and at that time requested that he be immediately informed of any interceptions of conversations involving the individuals who are parties or attorneys in the case. Acting Attorney General Clark approved the continuance of this surveillance on December 29, 1966. By letter dated January 9, 1967, ~~Clark questioned the continued necessity for this~~ surveillance since it had been necessary to dismiss or decline prosecution of some ten or twelve Selective Service violators. The Acting Attorney General was advised by letter dated January 10, 1967, that the telephone surveillance had been discontinued even though it had continued to provide valuable intelligence information.

The Government of Puerto Rico last month enacted a law calling for a plebiscite to be held on July 23, 1967, to determine if the people desire statehood, independence, or to continue the present commonwealth form of government. Facing certain defeat at the polls, the groups advocating independence have indicated that they will go to any length to prevent the holding of the plebiscite. Mari Bras has stated that the plebiscite could lead to civil war.

This page has been removed since it involves pending litigation.

HERBERT WILLIAM BOECKENHAUPT

information tends to identify peculiarly
sensitive ongoing intelligence operations

In early 1966 our Tophat informant, who is a defector-in-place in the Soviet Military Intelligence Service, identified Boeckenhaupt as an important Soviet intelligence agent. The identity of this source must be protected under all circumstances.

Boeckenhaupt, a Staff Sergeant, United States Air Force, entered military service in 1960. He is a cryptographic systems maintenance and repairman and possessed "Top Secret" clearance. On April 20, 1966, he was detected by FBI Agents in a clandestine meeting in suburban Virginia with Aleksey R. Malinin, Soviet Embassy employee and reportedly a Colonel of Soviet Military Intelligence.

On October 24, 1966, Boeckenhaupt was arrested by Air Force representatives at March Air Force Base, Riverside, California, for violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice in that he failed to report his contacts with representative of a foreign government (Malinin).

On October 31, 1966, a complaint was filed before the United States Commissioner, Los Angeles, charging Boeckenhaupt with conspiracy to commit espionage. He was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria, Virginia, on December 16, 1966, for conspiracy to commit espionage and for conspiracy to act as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Department of State. On January 9, 1967, his court-appointed attorney submitted data to the Clerk of the United States District Court, Alexandria, Virginia, requesting that Boeckenhaupt's trial be kept in the Central District of California, and that Boeckenhaupt not be removed to the Eastern District of Virginia to stand trial in this matter.

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, is currently writing a book to be entitled "Where Do We Go From Here" to be published in the spring. This book allegedly will deal with the resurgence of the "white backlash," "black power," and propose a course of action the Federal Government should take concerning the civil rights movement. King has been counseled by Stanley Levison, his principal advisor and long-time communist, to run for President of the United States in 1968. He has this suggestion under consideration and reportedly has made no decision. We maintain a wire tap on Stanley Levison to determine the degree of communist influence in the racial field.

STOKELY CARMICHAEL

Stokely Carmichael, Chairman, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, a highly militant civil rights organization, continues to make inflammatory statements advocating violence as a means of obtaining Negro objectives as well as urging Negroes not fight in Vietnam. At present, Carmichael is facing charges of "inciting to riot" in Atlanta, Georgia, and Selma, Alabama. He was convicted of these charges in Selma, Alabama; however, the conviction is currently under appeal by him. Carmichael recently underwent a physical re-examination to determine his suitability for military service. The results of this examination have not been made known.

General Investigative Division

ROBERT G. BAKER
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The most recent development relative to the trial of Baker is the disclosure in the afternoon edition of "The Evening Star," 1/12/67, that the Narcotics Bureau of the Treasury Department installed a "bug" in the Baker case. It is reported that this installation relates to the Department's admission during the trial that it had planted a microphone and transmitter on Wayne Bromley, a prime Government witness, in order to record the results of a meeting held on 3/26/65, at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel, Los Angeles, California, which was attended by Baker, Clifford Jones and Bromley. The article points out that the FBI had refused a request of the Department to cover this meeting. It also points out that according to Edward Bennett Williams, Baker's attorney, that in compliance with an order of Judge Gasch to turn over tapes and transcripts, only notes made by two monitors were received indicating the tape was not usable or available.

This meeting at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel is the meeting which was arranged during telephone calls on 3/25/65, between Bromley and Baker and Bromley and Jones which were monitored and tape recorded by the Bureau at the request of the Department, with the Department's assurance that such action was legal and with the written consent of Bromley. A complete transcript of these recordings was made available to the Department.

Although the Department did on 3/25/65, request that we monitor the meeting in Los Angeles, we refused to do so. Upon revelation during pretrial hearings that this meeting was monitored, Acting Attorney General Ramsey Clark was questioned as to who performed this monitoring. He stated that he had ascertained that upon the FBI's refusal to comply with the departmental request, the Department had then turned to either the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or the Bureau of Narcotics. He was certain that it was the Bureau of Narcotics.

The only other coverage of any conversations by Baker was accidental in nature and resulted from installations which had been placed on Fred B. Black in Washington, D. C.; the Fremont Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada; Edward Siegelbaum, Miami, Florida, (all in connection with organized crime matters) and the Dominican Embassy (in connection with security matters). Details concerning these installations were set forth in a summary memorandum regarding the Bureau's involvement in the prosecution of Baker dated 1/10/67.

Logs relative to the electronic surveillances on Black, the Fremont Hotel and Siegelbaum were furnished to the Department and excerpts were furnished to the trial judge who ordered that they be made available to the defense. These logs were the subject of pretrial hearings during November, 1966, following which the judge ruled that there was no causal relationship between the information in the logs and the charges in the indictment.

Logs concerning Baker's conversations intercepted on the Dominican Embassy installation were similarly furnished to the Department and to the trial judge who placed a protective order thereon and has instructed that any discussions relative to them must be held only in his chambers. Information as to the existence of these logs has been leaked to the press, presumably by Edward Bennett Williams to cause some action favorable to his client. His reporting to the trial judge that the FBI was responsible for this leak is absolutely ridiculous and is completely unfounded.

JAMES RIDDLE HOFFA; ET AL.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

James Riddle Hoffa and three others were convicted in Chattanooga Federal Court, 3/4/64, of obstruction of justice related to their efforts to tamper with certain members of the jury in a previous trial of Hoffa. These convictions were upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court on 12/12/66.

In response to a request from Assistant Attorney General Fred M. Vinson, Jr., we furnished a letter to the Acting Attorney General on 12/29/66, of instances in which the conversations of Hoffa and two other defendants were overheard through the use of electronic devices. Hoffa, his office, and his home were not the direct targets of any electronic devices in the development of this case, and the Acting Attorney General was so advised in our memorandum of 12/29/66. The instances in which he appeared to have been present at conversations monitored occurred in Detroit, Michigan, and Las Vegas, Nevada.

In 1961 and 1962 our Detroit office overheard three conversations of Hoffa. These conversations were broadcast to and from radio-telephones in automobiles operated by Teamsters Union personnel in the Detroit area. This was accomplished through the use of a tunable commercial-type FM radio receiver which was in operation in our Detroit office. No trespass was involved in this connection.

In addition, between 2/1 and 8/12/63, Hoffa appears to have participated in four telephone conversations with two Las Vegas hoodlum figures who were being covered by electronic eavesdropping devices (trespass involved). Hoffa's part of these conversations was not overheard.

Zeno Thomas Osborn, Jr., (Nashville lawyer and former attorney for Hoffa) was convicted 6/29/64, in Nashville Federal Court of obstruction of justice arising from his attempts to influence a potential juror in a forthcoming trial of Hoffa. In this investigation, a miniature recorder was concealed on a cooperative Government witness during a meeting with Osborn. This installation was made at the request of the Department and with the prior approval of the two Federal judges in Nashville. No trespass was involved, and the use of this installation was brought out fully during Osborn's trial. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court 12/12/66. The Department is fully aware of this installation and details of same were included in our letter to the Acting Attorney General 12/29/66.

At the specific request of former Attorney General Kennedy, a microphone surveillance (trespass required) was conducted on the Washington, D. C., hotel room of James E. Haggerty (former attorney for James Riddle Hoffa) during period 8/7/61, through 8/11/61. This coverage was for the specific purpose of identifying an alleged "contact" of Hoffa's in the Justice Department, whom Kennedy thought Haggerty would meet in Washington. Information concerning this coverage was included in our letter to the Acting Attorney General dated 12/29/66. In addition, in response to a letter from Vinson dated 12/29/66, we furnished the Acting Attorney General copies of logs prepared in connection with this coverage by memorandum dated 1/6/67.

JURY PANEL INVESTIGATIONS

On January 9, 1967, a letter was forwarded to the Acting Attorney General advising him that in view of the increasing sensitiveness to intrusion by the Federal Government into the rights of defendants in criminal trials and in order to assure that future requests for jury panel investigations would be made only in truly exceptional cases, investigations of this nature should not be undertaken by the Bureau except upon the specific written request of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General and that our field offices were being so instructed.

CIVIL RIGHTS MATTERS IN MISSISSIPPI

Two major civil rights cases are awaiting prosecutive action in Mississippi. One of these cases involves the murder of three civil rights workers near Philadelphia, Mississippi, in June, 1964, in which case eighteen subjects were previously indicted on civil rights charges by a Federal Grand Jury. The other case involves the shooting and burning of the residence of Vernon Ferdinand Dahmer, past president of the NAACP, near Hattiesburg, Mississippi, in January, 1966, resulting in the death of Dahmer. A Federal Grand Jury indicted fifteen members of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi relative to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Civil Rights Statute.

In view of a court decision subsequent to the above indictments, it was determined by the Government that all of the indictments in these two cases are faulty because certain minority groups including Negroes had been excluded from the grand jury. The Department has been pushing for early representations to a properly composed grand jury and had contemplated that both of these cases would be given to a Federal Grand Jury being empaneled 1/16/67.

On 1/3/67 U. S. District Judge Harold Cox advised SAC Roy Moore that he had instructed the U. S. Attorney to use the January grand jury for the purpose of checking into possible misuse of funds in the Headstart project sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity in Mississippi. The Judge referred to press accounts stating that the Government was providing additional money for this project although it has been alleged that several hundred thousand dollars of the initial appropriation was unaccounted for. Judge Cox said that he felt "first things come first" and therefore decided to use the grand jury to ferret out any possible fraud in connection with the failure to account for these funds. He stated he would advise SAC Moore when he convenes another grand jury to hear the civil rights cases. Judge Cox added that this will be done sometime in the near future but that no specific date has been set. It has been speculated in the press that if Judge Cox fails to promptly call a grand jury to hear the civil rights cases the Government will seek mandamus from the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the purpose of forcing Judge Cox to call a grand jury to hear these cases.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION REGARDING CRIMES AGAINST BANKING INSTITUTIONS

By letter to the Attorney General 3/1/65, we called attention to the rise in crimes against banking institutions and recommended the Department propose legislation which would require bank supervisory agencies to establish minimum security requirements for all banks under Federal Charter. A follow-up letter was sent on 3/29/65, and again on 3/1/66. The Department advised on 4/12/66, that a legislative proposal was being developed. A proposed bill was submitted for our review on 6/6/66, which we returned on 6/9/66, recommending no changes. In reply to our inquiry on 7/25/66, the Department, on 8/3/66, advised the Bill was under study by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General.

We inquired again on 10/6/66, and on 10/26/66, were advised that since the 89th Congress was so near an end, the legislation would be included on program for 90th Congress. By letter 11/28/66, we were advised that the Bill had been returned to the Criminal Division with certain observations and suggestions. On 1/9/67, we again called attention to the increase in violations. Current figures show that during calendar year 1966, violations increased to 1871, a new all-time high, surpassing the 1749 violations in calendar year 1965.

WALTER BERYL CHIPMAN, ET AL.
CRIME ON HIGH SEAS

Alvin Junior Cupp, who had received a five-year Federal term on 3/16/65, in Marquette, Michigan, furnished information to Chicago Agents pinpointing officials and "goons" of the Seamens International Union (SIU) responsible for the 1963 bombing of the Canadian freighter, "Howard L. Shaw" in Chicago, Illinois.

Upon Cupp's parole from prison 12/23/66, he was immediately contacted by union officials allegedly for the purpose of paying him off a promised $8,000 for maintaining his silence relative to the "Howard L. Shaw" bombing while in prison. The U. S. Attorney's office in Chicago requested that an electronic device be attached to Cupp's person to record conversations with union officials, anticipating evidence would be obtained whereby prosecution of these officials would be forthcoming. SAC, Chicago advised the U. S. Attorney on 1/4/67, that the Bureau could not accede to his request since the Solicitor General had publicly announced that all eavesdropping is illegal.

At approximately 9 P. M., 1/5/67, the Acting Attorney General called Mr. DeLoach relative to this case, indicating he felt this was a legal device and he could see no reason why it should not be used. Mr. DeLoach informed the Acting Attorney General if he felt this way he should put these views in writing, since the FBI could not afford to be criticized on one hand and then on the other hand be directed by the Department to enter into such procedures. The Acting Attorney General, upon a moment's reflection, stated that in view of the "psychological situation" he probably would not put this request in writing and perhaps would inform the Organized Crime Section of the Department not to request the FBI to utilize this device. We have since received no such request from the Acting Attorney General.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
DeLoach ✓
Mohr ✓
Wick ✓
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: March 16, 1967

FROM : R. E. Wick

ATTORNEY General's Staff Conference

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S LUNCHEON MEETING WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FRIDAY, MARCH 17, 1967

Mr. Tolson has instructed that a background memorandum be prepared in connection with the Director's scheduled luncheon meeting with the Attorney General on Friday, March 17, 1967.

All Divisions have been contacted and there is attached brief succinct data regarding items which might logically come up for discussion. An appropriate table of contents precedes the report.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the Director's information.

Enclosure

Handled.

1 - Mr. Tolson - Enclosure
1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Mohr - Enclosure

REC-38

EX-103

62-97856-180

HPL:par
(5)

MAR 23 1967

ENCLOSURE

"ENCL. BEHIND FILE"

61 MAR 27 1967

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. ITEMS OF CURRENT INTEREST

A. Attorney General's Testimony, House Judiciary Subcommittee, March 15, 1967 1-2

B. Press Release of March 15, 1967, Issued by Republican Congressmen's "Wednesday Club" Entitled "Are We Organized to Fight Crime?" 3-4

C. March 12, 1967, Television Interview of Attorney General 5-6

D. Uniform Crime Reports 1966 Preliminary Annual Release 7

E. Crime Legislation 8

F. National Conference on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 9

G. National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 10

II. INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

A. Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy by New Orleans District Attorney James C. Garrison 11

B. Subversive Activities on College Campuses 12

C. Travel of the President to Uruguay 13

D. Wire Taps and Other Coverage Utilized in the Internal Security Field 14

E. Counterespionage Work Against the Soviets 15

Page

II. INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (continued)

F. Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities 16

G. Communist Party, USA 17

H. Demonstrations Protesting United States Intervention in Vietnam 18

I. Dominican Situation 19

III. CRIMINAL MATTERS

A. Bombing of Yugoslav Diplomatic Establishments in the United States and Canada, January 29, 1967 20-21

B. James Riddle Hoffa, et al; Obstruction of Justice 22

C. Robert Earl Barnes, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property 23

D. Bombing Death of Wharlest Jackson at Natchez, Mississippi, on February 27, 1967, Civil Rights 24-25

E. Clifford A Jones, Perjury 26

F. Sam Holloway Bowers, Jr., et al; Burning of Property and Shooting, Forrest County, Mississippi, January 10, 1966 27

G. Murders of Three Civil Rights Workers 28

H. Shortages of U. S. District Judges and Shortages in the U. S. Attorneys' Offices 29

I. Request of Assistant Attorney General Vinson, March 14, 1967, re Lake County, Indiana, Crime Conditions 30

J. Wiretapping 31

K. Gambling Cases 32

L. Investigation of Senator Thomas J. Dodd 32a

Page

IV. AUXILIARY MATTERS

A. FBI National Academy, Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 33-34

B. Police Training 35

C. New FBI Academy 36

D. Executive Assignment System 37

E. "The FBI" -- Television Show, American Broadcasting Company, 8 P.M., Sunday Evenings 38

I. Items of Current Interest

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TESTIMONY
HOUSE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
MARCH 15, 1967

The "Washington Post" reported on March 16, 1967, that Attorney General Clark opened hearings before a House Judiciary subcommittee on March 15th relative to the Administration's request for 50 million dollars next year and 300 million dollars the following year to assist state and local governments in modernizing their law enforcement and corrective systems. Clark said that a successful war on crime depends not on making it easier for police to seek confessions but on improving their training and methods.

The Attorney General also said he had seen no evidence that court decisions limiting admission of confessions had hampered efficient law enforcement. Clark is reported to have opposed action reversing court orders that suspects be told of their rights and be offered counsel before being questioned.

Attorney General Clark said that since 1948 the FBI has followed generally the same interrogation procedures which the courts have now ordered the states to follow. The FBI has maintained a very high average of convictions, showing "what excellence in training and standards can do," Clark said.

Clark also said he hoped Congress would not go "too far on too little" until more evidence is in on the effect of the Supreme Court's decisions.

COMMENT

The Attorney General failed to consider the fact that FBI investigations are not normally hot pursuit, on-the-street situations. When the FBI interrogates a suspect or subject, usually considerable investigation has already been conducted and corroborative facts have been developed which greatly assist the course of the interrogation. On the contrary, police are frequently faced with fast-moving, developing situations on the street where there is no opportunity for the orderly accumulation of facts to supplement interrogation.

Congress is currently investigating the effect of the Miranda decision on law enforcement and public safety. Senator Birch Bayh (Democrat - Indiana) has been holding hearings around the country regarding Miranda; however, testimony he has received has been conflicting. Generally law enforcement officials testify that they have been handcuffed and defense lawyers and civil libertarians take the opposite view. As of this time, neither side has demonstrable statistical proof to substantiate its contentions. The absence of clear proof is due, at least partially, to the fact that Miranda is a new decision, being handed down on June 13, 1966. As of now there are few reported court decisions showing how trial courts will interpret the requirements laid down in Miranda.

PRESS RELEASE OF MARCH 15, 1967
ISSUED BY REPUBLICAN CONGRESSMEN'S "WEDNESDAY CLUB" ENTITLED "ARE WE ORGANIZED TO FIGHT CRIME?"

On March 15, 1967, a group of 21 generally liberal Republican Congressmen, members of the "Wednesday Club," issued a press release challenging the adequacy of the Federal Government's organization to fight crime effectively and called for expansion of the House Judiciary Committee's hearings considering crime legislation to examine this aspect of the war on crime. The gist of their argument is that a reorganization of Federal law enforcement and investigative agencies is needed to effectively carry on the war against crime. The press release suggests that there is "confusion, competition and duplication" among Federal law enforcement and investigative agencies which is hindering the war against crime and that this can be eliminated only through a complete reorganization of these agencies.

The entire argument of the "Wednesday Club" is based on a false premise. Traditionally and historically, law enforcement in this country has been the responsibility of local governments and states. The Federal law enforcement agencies make only approximately 50,000 arrests per year for Federal violations, while local and state police make over six million arrests for criminal acts, not including traffic offenses. Federal investigative agencies have very little jurisdictional control over the more than three million serious crimes committed in the United States in 1966. Reorganization of the Federal law enforcement agencies is not the answer to the crime problem. The real problem is at the local level where there are 40,000 investigative agencies, ranging from city constables to state police, and the problem of multiplicity of jurisdiction is within the state. From the standpoint of the FBI, there is daily liaison and exchange of information with all Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies; our important cooperative services are made available to all law enforcement agencies, both on the state and Federal level; and the FBI's National Crime Information Center is an example of the cooperation which exists among law enforcement agencies on all levels.

The press release of the "Wednesday Club" states that the FBI maintains an informal semi-autonomy from Administration regulations, although organizationally responsible to the Department of Justice, and cites as an example recent debates over wiretapping procedures. This statement is without any basis in fact. The Director's testimony before various legislative committees, as well as documentation produced by him in the recent "wiretapping" controversy, clearly shows that the FBI's use of wiretaps was done with the specific knowledge and approval of the Attorneys General and under strictly controlled conditions. There is no exercise of autonomy whatsoever by the FBI in this field.

The press release also charges that the FBI's involvement in the foreign intelligence field, such as the Dominican crisis in 1965, could detract from its domestic law enforcement and crime detection functions. This allegation also is factually unsupportable. FBI Agents were sent to the Dominican Republic in 1965 at the specific order of the President; only three Special Agents are presently there, functioning solely in a liaison capacity; statistical accomplishments by the FBI during this period have been at their highest levels.

The action of the "Wednesday Club" was an obvious attempt to secure a headline, which they incorrectly feel they have found in the question of Federal organization.

MARCH 12, 1967
TELEVISION INTERVIEW OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Attorney General Ramsey Clark was the guest of CBS program "Face the Nation" which was telecast in Washington over WTOP-TV, at 12:30 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, Sunday, March 12, 1967. This program was moderated by CBS newscaster Martin Agronsky assisted by correspondents George Herman of CBS and James Clayton of the "Washington Post."

The principal topics discussed during this interview of the Attorney General were: 1. The New Orleans investigation into the assassination of former President Kennedy; 2. Wiretapping; 3. The Supreme Court "Miranda" decision; 4. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell; and 5. The death penalty.

Several references were made to the Director and the FBI during this interview and all were favorable.

NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION

The Attorney General expressed his confidence in the Warren Commission conclusion, based on FBI investigation, that assassin Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in killing former President Kennedy. He commented that most--if not all--of the individuals mentioned in the New Orleans investigation were known to the FBI, which developed no evidence that they were involved in the assassination. Clark declined to comment on the mysterious individual known as "Bertrand" since New Orleans authorities were then holding court proceedings to determine his identity.

WIRETAPPING

Clark commented that there were 38 wiretaps presently authorized by his department, and that all of these were in national security-type cases. He emphasized that procedures for his authority in the use of all such devices have been improved, and he was satisfied that none would [redacted] be used without his approval.

"MIRANDA" DECISION

The Attorney General remarked that it was still too early to determine what effect this decision would have on law enforcement performance. He noted, however, that it has had no appreciable effect on FBI investigations which have for many years informed suspects of their constitutional rights prior to interrogation.

MARCH 12, 1967
TELEVISION INTERVIEW
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

POWELL

No decision has been reached by the Department concerning possible Federal violations committed by Powell, according to Clark. However, he expressed the hope that their determination might await any further action against Powell by Congress.

DEATH PENALTY

The Attorney General stated he would recommend the death penalty be abolished for certain Federal violations.

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
1966 PRELIMINARY ANNUAL RELEASE

On Wednesday, p.m., March 15, 1967, the FBI's preliminary crime reports for 1966 were released to the press.

This report highlighted the fact that crimes of violence were up 11%. There was a 9% increase in murder, a 10% increase in aggravated assault, a 10% increase in forcible rape, and a 14% increase in robbery. As a group, crimes against property increased 11% during 1966.

The sharpest crime increase was noted in the group of cities having less than 10,000 inhabitants. Crime in these cities rose 14%. Large cities with over 100,000 inhabitants had an average increase of 10%, while crime in rural areas was up 7% and crime in the suburbs rose 13%.

In the release dated March 15th the Director reiterated the need for adequate firearms legislation, noting that there was a 23% increase in 1966 in serious assaults where guns were used. The Director also highlighted the fact that six out of every ten murders were committed with the use of a firearm. 71% of these murders were committed with handguns, 17% with shotguns and 12% with rifles or other type firearm.

This crime report release also indicated that in 1966 police arrests of adults for all criminal acts (excluding traffic offenses) dropped 1%; however, arrests of persons under 18 years of age increased 9%.

Our preliminary annual release also noted that nationally, police solutions of crime index offenses averaged 25% and noted that police solved 89% of murders, 72% of aggravated assaults, 65% of forcible rapes, 35% of robberies and 21% of property offenses.

CRIME LEGISLATION

The Congress is presently holding hearings with respect to the President's request for crime legislation entitled "Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1967." This Act has its basis in many of the recommendations of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The report of the Commission entitled "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society" was released February 18, 1967. The proposed legislation would provide for a substantial financial aid program to local and state law enforcement agencies for the purpose of purchase of equipment, training, education and research. It would also establish in the Department of Justice an agency to administer the program headed by a Director of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance. Depending on how this new legislation would be administered within the Department of Justice, it will have an impact and could conflict with the FBI's long-standing cooperative services for local law enforcement.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

By letter dated March 10, 1967, the Attorney General requested FBI participation in a national conference of local and state law enforcement administrators to be held in the State Department Auditorium on March 28-29, 1967. This conference was called by the President and has as its purpose a discussion on how to implement the proposed crime legislation. Since this conference and any new crime legislation would affect directly the long-standing FBI cooperative services to local law enforcement, Assistant to the Director DeLoach, Assistant Director Casper and Inspector Jerome J. Daunt have been designated to attend. The Attorney General is being advised by letter dated March 17, 1967.

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER (NCIC)

The National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a computerized index of law enforcement information on crime and criminals, successfully began its pilot test operation on January 27, 1967. At the present time the following police agencies are directly on-line to the FBI computer:

Boston Police Department
Philadelphia Police Department
New York City Police Department
Washington, D. C., Metropolitan Police Department
Chicago Police Department
St. Louis Police Department
New Orleans Police Department
Maryland State Police
Virginia State Police
Georgia State Patrol
Texas Department of Public Safety, and
Denver FBI Field Office

These agencies are entering records on wanted persons, stolen motor vehicles, and identifiable stolen property. They are receiving replies to inquiries in a matter of seconds. For example, a police officer on the street in New Orleans through the use of his car radio is able to get information from the FBI computer here in Washington within 1 1/2 minutes. The California Department of Justice and the New York State Police are scheduled to join the NCIC system on March 20, 1967. The system has had a steady growth in building up the information that is stored in the computer, increasing the number of hours that the computer is "on the air" and in adding new participating police agencies.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY BY NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES C. GARRISON

In December, 1966, we received information that New Orleans District Attorney James C. Garrison was conducting an investigation of the assassination of the late President Kennedy. Garrison reportedly was attempting to develop evidence showing that David William Ferrie, a homosexual who was a former airlines pilot, and Lee Harvey Oswald conspired with anti-Castro Cubans to assassinate President Kennedy.

We were informed by several sources that Garrison was basing much of his investigation upon information furnished to him by Jack S. Martin and David Lewis. Martin is a private investigator in New Orleans and Lewis is a baggage handler at a New Orleans bus station. Both Martin and Lewis appear to be mental cases. During our investigation of the assassination, we thoroughly investigated allegations that Ferrie and Oswald were acquainted but we found no evidence to show this was true.

Garrison has made one arrest in his case - Clay L. Shaw, a homosexual who was former Director of the International Trade Mart in New Orleans. Shaw's name did not come up during our investigation of the assassination. Garrison claims Shaw is identical with one Clay Bertrand, an alleged contact of New Orleans attorney Dean Andrews. We never located Bertrand and Andrews' acquaintance with Bertrand highly doubted. We developed no information indicating Oswald knew Clay Shaw.

On March 14, 1967, during a preliminary hearing in New Orleans for Shaw, Garrison produced a mystery witness Perry Raymond Russo who alleged that he was present at a meeting when Leon Oswald, David Ferrie and Clay Shaw planned the assassination of President Kennedy. Russo identified Leon Oswald as identical to Lee Harvey Oswald. Russo admitted receiving psychiatric treatment since 1959 and his testimony at the preliminary hearing was highly contradictory to information he previously furnished to news media. Russo appears to be lying and during our investigation of the assassination, we developed no information indicating Oswald ever knew Russo.

James C. Garrison is an egomaniac, is politically ambitious and it appears his whole investigation was triggered by his desire for publicity. The Director has instructed that we have no contact with Garrison or any member of his staff and that we stay meticulously out of Garrison's investigation. It appears Garrison is looking for an attempt to dump his investigation on this Bureau and the Director has instructed that we should avoid such possibility "like a plague."

II. Intelligence Matters

✓

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

The field of education has long been a major target of the Communist Party. The communists' emphasis on students in the recent past was best expressed by the Party's General Secretary, Gus Hall, when he stated "Communism is big, really big, on college campuses now. You've got to play the ball game where the players are and the really good players are in college." Today there is considerable unrest and agitation on college campuses throughout the Nation. Subversive agitators constitute the major source behind this unrest and, from a long-range viewpoint, these campus subversives may well become seriously damaging to our national security. In light of this, the FBI will continue to carry out its defined responsibilities, whether they be on the college campus or elsewhere, while at the same time respect the spirit of academic freedom on which our college system is based.

The two major student and campus groups in the United States today are the communist-inspired W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America, with an approximate membership of 425 members, and the Students for a Democratic Society, with approximately 5,000 members. The Students for a Democratic Society has been described by Gus Hall as a new left group which the Party has "going for us."

Today there is a concerted effort on the part of student groups to "knock" the FBI and other Government agencies off the college campuses and to prevent such agencies from carrying out their assigned duties. For example, in early March, 1967, a handful of Students for a Democratic Society members at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, alleged that the FBI in conducting investigations on that campus was infringing on academic freedom by securing information from responsible campus officials and students. While we have interviewed officials and students at the University in matters within our jurisdiction the charges that the FBI was infringing on academic freedom are baseless.

Another example involves allegations made by a group of "liberal" faculty members at State University College, Brockport, New York. This group alleged that the FBI was having faculty members "spy" on other faculty members, again raising the cry of infringement of academic freedom. These charges also were baseless and without foundation.

TRAVEL OF THE PRESIDENT TO URUGUAY

At the request of the White House, a representative of this Bureau* recently traveled to Uruguay and participated in briefings, surveys, and discussions relating to security to be provided for the President when he attends the Summit Conference of heads of American States to be held in Punta Del Este, Uruguay, during the period 4/12-14/67. The same Bureau representative is returning to Uruguay to assist a White House group in the implementation of security measures prior to the President's arrival. A general assessment of the situation in Uruguay at the present time indicates that adequate security can be provided to the President if he restricts his travel to Punta Del Este. If he travels to Montevideo proper, security problems could arise because of a very militant Communist Party which already is manifesting its protests to the President's visit. The Communist Party in Uruguay practically controls the labor movement and potentially is in a position to paralyze facilities such as light, gas, water, and street transportation. Furthermore, there is a good potential for committing sabotage and inciting riots. Under the present plan, the President will not go into Montevideo proper. Security problems at Punta Del Este are greatly minimized because the geographic location and the resort-type atmosphere do not present any serious obstacles for instituting good security. The police and security services in Montevideo are not efficient by our standards, and it will take continuing prodding to make certain that the necessary security measures are carried out. The political stability of the Uruguayan Government is not good. There is a new Government which is shaky and is suffering economic problems. There have been a series of strikes during the last several weeks. We have been told that there will be between 1500 and 2500 newspapermen who will attend the conference. There may be some commotion among them because of inadequate housing and communication facilities. Newspaper reporters may also find it disappointing to find any news of real significance at Punta Del Este if there are no disturbing incidents.

* Special Agent Papich

WIRE TAPS AND OTHER COVERAGE UTILIZED IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY FIELD

Wire taps are utilized only in the internal security field and when absolutely essential to carrying out our investigative responsibilities. Their number varies and as of this date we have 42 wire taps in operation. In addition, at the specific request of the National Security Agency, we have electronic coverage on teletypes of 40 foreign diplomatic establishments.

The importance of utilizing wire taps in the internal security field cannot be overemphasized in view of the dangers that exist in the internal security of the United States. The intelligence data obtained from such coverage makes it possible to keep appropriate officials of our Government currently aware of the activities, plans, strategy, and tactics of subversive organizations and individuals. Also, information gathered from these sources is of immediate interest to the United States intelligence agencies and officials of the Government in the formulation of plans in the foreign policy field.

We are not utilizing any microphone surveillances, mail covers, or trash covers in connection with our investigations. We are utilizing security informants and confidential sources to provide us necessary coverage. Currently, we have 326 security informants who are members of the Communist Party and some of these are operating at the highest level. In view of the valuable coverage these informants provide us, we place a great deal of emphasis on their utilization. It may be interesting to note that during 1965, 15 of our security informants became members of the Communist Party and this was increased to 30 informants becoming members of the Party in 1966. In this connection, we noted that during those two years while 45 informants became members of the Party, 39 discontinued their association with the Party primarily due to personal reasons, thus leaving us a total gain of six informants in the Party.

INFORMATION tends to identify FBI informants

COUNTERESPIONAGE WORK AGAINST THE SOVIETS

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its intelligence organs constitute the major counterespionage problem confronting the FBI. The United States is the major target against which the Soviet espionage apparatus is directed. All information received from sources in a position to know confirms this. At this time 529 Soviet officials with 643 dependents are in the United States. Of these officials, 225 are known and suspected Soviet intelligence officers. There has been a steady annual increase in Soviet intelligence officers to this country.

We have achieved substantial success in penetrating the Soviet espionage apparatus. We are currently operating two Soviet intelligence officers as defectors-in-place (FEDORA and SHAMROCK). They are furnishing detailed information on Soviet intelligence operations and on Soviet policies pertaining to this country.

Another Soviet intelligence officer (TOPHAT) who was successfully operated by us, and who subsequently went home, was posted to a country in the Far East (Burma). Contact has been re-established with him and he continues to furnish information on Soviet moves and operations.

Three Soviet officials who were successfully operated by us during their duty tour in the United States are presently out of touch in the Soviet Union (NICKNACK, MITER, and KITTY HAWK). They constitute excellent potential for future exploitation if their government subsequently sends them on an assignment to another country.

information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operations

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Communist China today has no diplomatic establishment in the United States and its major intelligence efforts directed against this country emanate from two major sources, the United Nations and the New China News Agency office in Ottawa, Canada.

We have identified two ethnic Chinese employees of the United Nations Secretariat in New York as Chinese communist intelligence agents. The first, Paul You, is a Senior Interpreter engaged in collecting sensitive United Nations documents which are transmitted to Communist China through an accommodation address in Switzerland. FAN Chia-ching, also employed as Interpreter at United Nations, has been in close contact with the Chinese Communist Consulate in Geneva, Switzerland, and during recent months with a member of the U.S. military who has a "Top Secret" clearance and is knowledgeable in the field of ballistic missiles. FAN has been positively identified as a Chinese communist intelligence agent.

Through our liaison with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, we have learned that the Chinese communists are building a base in Canada for intelligence operations directed against this country. The New China News Agency (which is used as an arm of Chinese intelligence) in mid 1966 sent an agent to New York City and Washington, D. C., with the specific assignment of establishing a cover for a resident illegal agent.

A Bureau informant who has been directed against the Chinese communists since 1964 returned to the United States March 13, 1967, following a mission to mainland China in behalf of the FBI. This informant had a series of conferences with Chinese communist intelligence officials, has been recruited to operate in the United States in behalf of the Chinese communists, and was furnished a clandestine communications address in Canton, China. We, of course, will use this informant to uncover other Chinese communist illegal activities in this country.

In anticipation of Red China's admission to the United Nations, we have greatly stepped up our efforts in the past two years to build a solid base of quality informants to operate against the Chinese communists.

information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operations.

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

The Communist Party, USA, is operating in an atmosphere of optimism as a result of the March 3, 1967, decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Washington, D.C., which stated that the Party could not be forced to register under the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950. The feeling throughout the Party is that it has won its fight for existence and now must move to capitalize on this victory by becoming an effective force on the American scene.

Within this week the Party adopted various programs in an effort to move out of its isolation from the American people. It is working toward the establishment of a daily newspaper which is expected to be in operation in time to have an effect on the national elections in 1968. Originally, the Party planned to merge peace, labor, and civil rights groups into a new political party which would nominate a candidate for President of the United States in 1968. Now, the Communist Party is seriously considering running its own candidates for the offices of President and Vice President of the United States in 1968.

May 1, 1967, is to mark the institution of a massive recruiting drive by the Party to take advantage of the favorable Court decision and each Party district is being instructed to start making plans for this recruiting drive now. In addition, Party leaders have called for more infiltration by Party members into the trade union movement in an attempt to regain the power the Party had in this movement in the 1940's.

The Party believes that youth must be the central concentration for its work in the future. In order to have the most impact on the young generation and to gain recruits quickly, the Party must make an effective appeal to youth. Therefore, it is instituting a massive campaign against United States policy in Vietnam, instituting resistance to the military draft, and encouraging all types of demonstrations by youth. The Party also will start a movement to have Congress pass a bill guaranteeing full employment for all youth.

The Party considers recruiting of youth its most important project in 1967. Current plans call for doubling the number of youth in the Party during the Summer of 1967, and the nationwide establishment of Party schools to fully indoctrinate these youth recruits in the principles of Marxism.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Since United States aircraft attacked selected targets in North Vietnam following torpedo-boat assaults against destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in early August, 1964, there have been in the United States almost daily demonstrations to protest United States intervention in Vietnam. Many of these demonstrations have reached major proportions.

The Communist Party and other subversive groups such as the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America, a communist-inspired Marxist-oriented youth group; the Socialist Workers Party, which has been designated as subversive by the Attorney General, and its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Workers World Party, a communist splinter group and its youth affiliate, Youth Against War and Fascism; and the Progressive Labor Party, a pro-Chinese Marxist group, have actively supported and participated in demonstrations along with the Students for a Democratic Society, a militant youth group which has been described by Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, as a group which the Party has "going for us." Pacifist groups such as Women Strike for Peace, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Committee for Nonviolent Action, and the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy have also taken a leading role in sponsoring such demonstrations. Summaries showing the highlights of these demonstrations are furnished to the White House and other Government officials two or three times a week.

The Spring Mobilization Committee and the Student Mobilization Committee, both of which include members of the Communist Party and other subversive groups in their membership, are sponsoring demonstrations throughout the United States April 8-15, 1967. The focal point of the week-long activity will be massive demonstrations at New York City and San Francisco, California, on April 15. The Reverend James Bevel is the National Director of the Spring Mobilization Committee. Bevel is an official of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a civil rights group which is headed by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. The Student Mobilization Committee is the brainchild of Bettina Aptheker, a student at the University of California at Berkeley and a member of the Communist Party, USA, National Committee. An attempt is being made to have 500 individuals burn their draft cards at New York City during the demonstration on April 15, 1967, as a mass protest against the war and the draft.

O ✓

DOMINICAN SITUATION

✓

The FBI was ordered into the Dominican Republic by the President in May, 1965, to develop information to be used in preventing communists from gaining control in that country. At the height of the Dominican Revolution, we had a staff of 14 Agents. In August, 1966, at White House instructions, we established a permanent Legal Attache office there staffed with three Agents.

Since his inauguration July 1, 1966, Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer has brought about a degree of stability, however, there continues to be strong undercurrents of dissension. The rightists reportedly have considered plots to remove Balaguer. Juan Bosch's political party, the loser in the June, 1966, election, has been most vocal in its opposition to Balaguer's programs and only recently published a document which appears intended to set the stage for a vast movement of resistance against Balaguer. The communist groups have suffered much internal dissension but to establish a common cause could be expected to regroup as they have in the past. They possibly would be willing to let Bosch's political party provide the overt leadership.

III. Criminal Matters

For Flomos

BOMBING OF YUGOSLAV DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
JANUARY 29, 1967

Our investigation has developed a great deal of substantial information implicating the following individuals in a conspiracy to bomb Yugoslav diplomatic establishments in the United States and Canada on 1/29/67:

Reverend Radomir Chkautovic	Lebanon, Pennsylvania
Reverend Stojilko Kajevic	Youngstown, Ohio
Zivko Kajevic	Youngstown, Ohio
Djordje Djelic	Cleveland, Ohio
Milan Nikolic	Cleveland, Ohio
Desimir Marjanovic	Cleveland, Ohio
Miomir Radovanovic	Chicago, Illinois
Dragisa Kasikovic	Chicago, Illinois
Borislav Kornic	Los Angeles, California
Kosta Stanojevic	Toronto
Branco Stanojevic	Toronto
Branislav Petrov	Toronto
Becir Rakocevic	Toronto

We have evidence of meetings by the conspirators at Chicago, Illinois, 6/26-28/66; Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, 8/27-28/66; Libertyville, Illinois, 9/30 - 10/2/66; and Perrysburg, Ohio, 1/24-25/67.

Borislav Kornic has admitted to two different individuals that Kornic, Milan Nikolic, and Desimir Marjanovic bombed the San Francisco Consulate with explosives Marjanovic transported to Los Angeles from Cleveland, Ohio. One of the persons to whom Kornic made these admissions has testified at the grand jury; the other is not willing to testify at this time.

Other evidence includes proof that Stojilko Kajevic's automobile was used prior to the bombings in an attempt to buy dynamite and a pattern of long distance telephone calls between the suspects at pertinent times.

Presentation to a Federal Grand Jury, Washington, D. C., commenced 3/10/67 but the grand jury is available to hear this case only on Fridays. Additional witnesses are appearing 3/17/67 and it is anticipated further testimony will be given the grand jury 3/24/67 and possibly 3/31/67.

Brandon Alvey, the trial attorney handling this case, has described the Bureau's investigation as outstanding and said he has never before seen so much good information gathered in such a short time. Alvey states that if there was a statute making it a violation to bomb diplomatic establishments in the United States, the evidence now available would support a conspiracy conviction. There is no such statute; however, the statute the Department considers most applicable (Section 956, Title 18) makes it a violation to conspire in the United States to damage property owned by a foreign government in a foreign country.

To successfully prosecute under Section 956, it must be proven that the conspiracy originated in the United States. No violation would exist if the conspiracy originated in Canada even if subsequent discussions and other overt acts occurred in the United States. It is unlikely that this point can be established unless a confession is obtained from one of the conspirators. Alvey is making every effort to develop the necessary evidence on this point in examining witnesses before the grand jury and has laid the groundwork for possibly forcing testimony from one or more prime suspects by offering immunity coupled with a threat of contempt proceedings if testimony is withheld.

Trial attorney Alvey has indicated the grand jury is enthusiastic but he does not expect to obtain a true bill unless additional evidence is developed to prove the conspiracy to bomb the Canadian establishments originated in the United States. We are vigorously pursuing all logical possibilities to develop such information by continuing investigation.

JAMES RIDDLE HOFFA; ET AL.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Hoffa and three others are presently serving prison terms as a result of their conviction in Chattanooga Federal Court 3/4/64, on charges of obstruction of justice. The only legal issues presently pending are two motions in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Cincinnati, on which arguments were heard 2/7/67, and a motion for new trial filed in U. S. District Court, Chattanooga, 2/28/67 alleging the Government's use of wire tapping and electronic eavesdropping against Hoffa, his attorneys, and others. These charges, so far as the Bureau and its personnel are concerned, are completely false and the Government filed its response to this motion on 3/10/67. The Chattanooga court is expected to rule on this motion in the near future. Although Hoffa is now in prison, his attorneys have continued unsuccessfully to shop around the U. S. Supreme Court in an effort to have one of the Justices release Hoffa on bail pending disposition of the pending motions.

ROBERT EARL BARNES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY

Robert Earl Barnes is the notorious burglar with an extensive arrest record who was the main witness at the trial in District Court of 5 policemen charged with bribery and conspiracy. Trial, which ended March 11, 1967, resulted in the conviction of 3 District of Columbia police officers and the acquittal of the other 2.

Barnes has admitted to our Agents the theft on June 12, 1964, of a 34.10 carat diamond ring (appraised at $120,000) from Mrs. John R. McLean, a guest at the Lucayan Beach Hotel, Grand Bahamas Island. The diamond ring was transported by Barnes and an associate to New York City where it was sold. Some of the evidence has been presented to a Special Federal Grand Jury, however, prosecution of Barnes for the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property violation was held in abeyance pending completion of the trial of the police officers.

On March 13, 1967, Assistant U. S. Attorney Harold T. Sullivan, who is handling this matter, advised that it was the specific instruction of U. S. Attorney David Bress that prosecution of Barnes in connection with the McLean diamond should be pursued and pertinent witnesses are to be called before the Grand Jury.

This is being followed most closely.

MEETING WITH
ATTY GEN'L
MAR 17, 1967

BOMBING DEATH OF
WHARLEST JACKSON
AT NATCHEZ, MISSISSIPPI
ON FEBRUARY 27, 1967
CIVIL RIGHTS
BOMBING MATTERS

A full investigation is being conducted at the Department's request concerning the death of Wharlest Jackson at Natchez, Mississippi, as a result of a bomb exploding in his pickup truck as he left work at the Armstrong Tire and Rubber Company in Natchez shortly after 8 p.m. on February 27, 1967.

Jackson had been employed by the Armstrong Company since June, 1955. On February 20, 1967, he began training for a new job as a cement mixer, a type of position previously held only by white men. His particular job was a new position and was based on seniority. Jackson had held the position of treasurer in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in the Natchez branch and is survived by his wife and five children. George Metcalf, a Negro fellow employee, also active in the National Assocation for the Advancement of Colored People, who previously customarily rode to work with Jackson, was seriously injured in a similar type explosion in 1965.

On the scene examination by Laboratory experts indicates that a high-order explosive was detonated under the cab portion of Jackson's truck directly beneath the driver. Fragments of wire recovered at the scene appear to be wire from an electric blasting cap, indicating that such a cap may have been connected to and activated by the electric wiring system of the truck. Portionsof the wires to the brake light, tail light, and left rear turn indicator light, which were originally located on the inside of the left frame, are missing as a result of the explosion. No additional physical evidence has been disclosed to date.

Extensive investigation conducted under the on-the-scene supervision of Inspector Joseph A. Sullivan indicates that a group known as the Silver Dollar group is responsible for the bombing. The Silver Dollar group is reportedly a secret group of Mississippi and Louisiana Klansmen founded in June, 1965. One informant is presently a member of the group but to date has been unable to establish the identity of persons responsible for the bombing. Intensive efforts are being made to develop additional sources to furnish further penetration of the group and to trace the electric blasting cap probably used to detonate the explosive.

CLIFFORD A. JONES
PERJURY

Clifford A. Jones, former Lieutenant Governor of Nevada who is closely allied with Nevada gambling interests, was indicted January 5, 1966, on three counts of perjury as a result of his having testified falsely before the Bobby Baker grand jury. This testimony concerned payments Jones arranged through one of his companies of $10,000 to Baker through Wayne Bromley, a close associate of Baker. U. S. District Court Judge Gasch presently has taken under advisement pretrial motions of Jones for continuance of trial and change of venue.

On March 25, 1965, in response to request of Criminal Division, Bureau monitored telephone calls from Bromley to Jones and Baker. Bromley and his attorney had asked that this be done. Department held such monitoring would be legal. On March 26, 1965, Department requested we monitor meeting to be attended by Jones, Bromley, and Baker at a hotel in Los Angeles. Purpose of meeting was to get Bromley, a Government witness, to tailor his testimony to agree with testimony Jones had given. Bureau declined to monitor this meeting because of lack of security of the premises involved which presented a risk of disclosure of the coverage. Department then got Bureau of Narcotics to assist in monitoring of the meeting.

Recently we have responded to Department's request regarding Bureau electronic coverage of Jones. Such coverage involved twenty conversations over four Las Vegas and one Miami electronic device. All conversations were inconsequential and have no bearing on perjury charges against Jones. This coverage will be subject matter of future pretrial proceedings.

SAM HOLLOWAY BOWERS, JR., ET AL;
BURNING OF PROPERTY AND SHOOTING,
FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,
JANUARY 10, 1966;
VERNON FERDINAND DAHMER, SR., ET AL - VICTIMS
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

At approximately 2 a.m. on January 10, 1966, the residence and business of Vernon Ferdinand Dahmer, Sr., a 58-year-old Negro and past President of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Forrest County, Mississippi, was shot into and completely gutted by fire. Dahmer died the afternoon of the same date in a Hattiesburg, Mississippi, hospital.

Extensive around-the-clock investigation conducted by the FBI resulted in the indictment of 15 members of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan on June 22, 1966. The indictment charged these Klansmen with violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Civil Rights Statutes. Those indicted included Sam Holloway Bowers, Jr. imperial wizard of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi.

A motion was filed on behalf of 13 of the defendants to dismiss this indictment based upon an objection to the array of the jurors. Based upon this action the facts were re-presented to a Federal Grand Jury at Jackson, Mississippi, which resulted in the indictment of 12 members of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi on February 27, 1967. Lawrence Byrd, Sr., who was one of the original 15 indicted, was named as a co-conspirator but not as a defendant by the Federal Grand Jury on February 27, 1967.

This matter is presently pending prosecutive action.

MURDERS OF THREE CIVIL RIGHTS WORKERS

Civil Rights workers Michael Henry Schwerner and Andrew Goodman, both white, together with James Earl Chaney, Negro, were murdered near Philadelphia, Mississippi, on June 21-22, 1964.

On October 2, 1964, a Federal Grand Jury indicted 18 persons for Civil Rights violations pertaining to these murders. These indictments were dismissed October 7, 1966, on legal grounds on the basis that certain groups, including Negroes, were excluded from the grand jury panel. This case was re-presented to the Federal Grand Jury at Jackson, Mississippi, and on February 27, 1967, indictments were returned against 19 persons. They are presently free on bond. No trial date has been set.

Of the 19 persons indicted, 17 are identical to those previously indicted in this case. Jimmy Lee Townsend, who was 17 years old at the time of the murders, was the one who was previously indicted but not indicted at this time. In addition to those previously indicted, this grand jury indicted Ethel Glen "Hop" Barnett, former sheriff and present candidate for sheriff of Neshoba County, Mississippi, and Sam Holloway Bowers, Jr., Imperial Wizard, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi.

The following law enforcement officers were among those indicted: Lawrence Andrew Rainey, Sheriff of Neshoba County; Cecil Ray Price, Deputy Sheriff, Neshoba County, and Richard Andrew Willis, Patrolman, Philadelphia, Mississippi, Police Department.

SHORTAGES OF U. S. DISTRICT JUDGES

AND

SHORTAGES IN THE U. S. ATTORNEYS' OFFICES

We have, on a number of occasions, instructed the field to advise us of any shortage of U. S. Attorneys or Federal Judges, which is affecting our prosecutions.

In this connection, since September 1, 1966, we have written to the Department, pointing out a shortage of a Federal Judge or a U. S. Attorney in the Southern District of Ohio, the Middle District of Florida, the Eastern and Southern Districts of Illinois, the Eastern District of Louisiana, the District of Puerto Rico, the District of New Jersey, the Eastern District and Western District of Wisconsin, the Middle District of Tennessee, the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, the Eastern District of Michigan, and the Northern and Eastern Districts of Texas.

REQUEST OF ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL VINSON, MARCH 14, 1967, RE LAKE COUNTY, INDIANA, CRIME CONDITIONS

Assistant Attorney General Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Criminal Division, requested preparation of an extensive summary crime condition report concerning Lake County, Indiana. He asked for information on gambling, racketeering, counterfeiting, narcotics, shoplifting and other such matters. By letter to the Attorney General on March 16, 1967, we pointed out we no longer make such reports and our commitments preclude the preparation of such a study. This is apparently a "fishing expedition" type request for Vinson's and Petersen's Task Force. We advised them they have reports in gambling and racketeering-type cases in Lake County, Indiana, where recent prosecutive action has been taken against hoodlums.

The Department has embarked on a Crime Task Force Program which solicits the active participation of the various Federal investigative agencies. We informed the Department that there are inherent drawbacks to such a program and are not actively participating in it. We have, however, advised the Department that if matters within our jurisdiction arise during the Task Force Program, we will handle such upon referral of these matters to us. We have also agreed to conduct an indices and credit check of grand jury panel in the Buffalo area, which is to be convened for the Task Force in operation in that area.

Department attorney Peloquin advised a Canadian police official that the FBI was participating in a "buy back" of United States Postal Money Orders and we directed a letter to the Attorney General on March 8, 1967, pointing out that Peloquin had misinformed the Canadian authorities on our participation.

WIRETAPPING

The Attorney General testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on March 15, 1967, that microphone and wiretapping were unnecessary in connection with control of crime in the United States. Various bills to outlaw wiretapping and eavesdropping or to legalize such practices are pending in the Congress. We directed a letter to the Department dated March 6, 1967, concerning legislation proposed by Senator Eastland which would authorize wiretapping and use of microphones with court approval in organized crime investigations. We informed the Attorney General that such legislation would be very beneficial to our efforts in the field of organized crime and would appear to provide a statutory basis for practices now being followed in connection with use of such devices in national security matters. Microphones were of inestimable value in determining La Cosa Nostra weaknesses and day-to-day organizational moves, and enabled us to develop excellent informants, disseminate information to local authorities and to make counter moves to dry up La Cosa Nostra sources of income.

In connection with Departmental disclosures of our prior microphone coverage in cases presently before the trial and appeals courts, there has been to date no complete reversal of any of such cases which were actually brought to trial. In several cases, notably, Kolod-Alderisio in Denver, Colorado; Robert G. Baker in Washington, D. C.; Frank Peter Balistrieri in Springfield, Illinois; Charles Battaglia in Tucson, Arizona; and Gilbert Lee Beckley in Miami, Florida, disclosures were made and hearings held, and in each instance the court has ruled against the defendants and in favor of our position that these cases were not tainted. In the Black case and in the Schipani case in New York, the Supreme Court has remanded for retrial and these are still under consideration.

GAMBLING CASES

In our gambling cases, we have already recorded a total of 78 convictions thus far this fiscal year, which represents 30 more convictions than at a similar time last year. In addition, we have in excess of 350 individuals arrested and/or indicted and awaiting trial for violations of these statutes. As a result of our dissemination policies of gambling information to local authorities, we have directed telling blows against La Cosa Nostra members active in this field by virtue of numerous arrests made by local authorities.

During this fiscal year we have disseminated 159,823 items of criminal information to local authorities, which is an increase of 50,000 items over this same period last year.

SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
ELECTION LAWS

In early 1966 we conducted detailed investigations concerning six items of possible irregularities (Conflict of Interest) on the part of Senator Dodd. These investigations were conducted at the specific request of the Department following its review of voluminous documents made available by columnist Jack Anderson (Drew Pearson's leg man). These matters have been under consideration by the Department since May of 1966 when our investigations were completed.

Today (3/16/67) we received a letter from Assistant Attorney General Vinson requesting investigation concerning possible election laws violations based on testimony given before the Senate Select Committee on Standards and Conduct which is now holding hearings concerning Senator Dodd. Vinson's letter is being analyzed and appropriate recommendations will be submitted.

FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1965

The 79th Session of the FBI National Academy begins Monday, March 20, 1967. There will be 100 law enforcement officers in attendance with representatives from 45 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 7 foreign officers from 5 foreign countries (Australia, Canada, Colombia, Malaysia and Thailand). (The Attorney General presented diplomas to the graduating class of the 75th Session of the National Academy on May 26, 1965, when he was Deputy Attorney General.)

On January 25, 1967, the Director sent a memorandum to then Acting Attorney General Clark requesting that National Academy representatives be included under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 as soon as possible for financial assistance in helping to defray living expenses while attending the FBI National Academy. We referred Mr. Clark to previous correspondence on this same matter and a reply dated August 24, 1966, that indicated that such support would be appropriate under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act. The Director pointed out that while we anticipate having a continuing demand and desire to attend this Academy, we do not feel this factor should have a bearing on the allocation of funds under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act. It was assumed in the Attorney General's reply in August, 1966, that in view of the current limited capacity of the Academy plus the ample demand and desire of local agencies to send candidates it would be unnecessary at this time to be concerned about subsistence aid.

It was estimated that approximately $80,000 for subsistence and travel would be needed for the March class and that it would vary somewhat for each class and that if the Acting Attorney General approved this concept, the Director stated a request for a grant would be submitted on proper documents to the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance.

We have never received a reply to this memorandum even though we pointed out that several grants under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act have been awarded for the conduct of police seminars and have included funds for financial assistance of the attendees. The Director may wish to point out to the Attorney General that we are not asking for this money for the FBI but that the funds would be helpful to the agency sending the man to the National Academy. Although we have not conducted a nation-wide survey, we are aware that many departments do not submit applications to the National Academy because they do not have the funds to pay the living expenses of their officers while they would be in Washington.

34

POLICE TRAINING

Assistance in training matters continues to be one of the most sought after cooperative functions of the FBI. During calendar year 1966, the FBI assisted municipal, county and state law enforcement agencies in 5478 training endeavors, attended by 163,302 people. Over 1200 Special Agents of the FBI are trained as police instructors, and during 1966, they contributed 45,383 hours of instruction time, free of charge, at police training schools. Assistance is rendered in all types of schools, however, special emphasis is being placed on police administration and management, search and seizure, probable cause for arrest, due process in criminal interrogation, laboratory matters, crime scene search, collection and preservation of evidence, human relations in police management, and police-community relations.

NEW FBI ACADEMY

In May, 1965, the Director submitted a proposal to the Attorney General for the building of a new FBI Academy on the Marine Corps Base at Quantico, Virginia. This suggestion was immediately endorsed by the President and the Attorney General. The Director's proposal outlined that with the new facility, instead of training 200 local law enforcement officers annually at the FBI National Academy we could train 1, 200 and up to 1, 000 local law enforcement officers in specialized courses. The Congress has appropriated funds for the construction of this new facility.

The planning and engineering work on the site is in progress and it is anticipated that the contract for the construction of the Academy will be let sometime during the summer of 1967. It is believed that the new Academy will be ready for occupancy during fiscal year 1969.

IV. Auxiliary Matters

EXECUTIVE ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

Executive Order 11315 established an Executive Assignment System for filling positions in Grades 16, 17, and 18 of the General Schedule. The FBI was specifically excluded. The Director by statute has the authority to fill the 110 Supergrade positions allotted to the FBI. An inventory of skills of employees throughout the Government in Grades GS-15 through 18 is being established by the Civil Service Commission to fill vacancies in other agencies and it proposes to include in this inventory all such employees, including those in the FBI. This would make our executives available for consideration by other agencies although we are still exempt from having to consider employees of other agencies in filling our vacancies. The Department, therefore, was requested by letter dated December 21, 1966, to approve a letter to the Civil Service Commission requesting exclusion of FBI executives from the proposed inventory as retention by the FBI of its executives is considered essential. We have been following with the Department but the matter has not yet been acted upon by the Attorney General.

"THE FBI" -- TELEVISION SHOW
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY
8 P.M., SUNDAY EVENINGS

"The FBI" has been a highly successful television show which stars Efrem Zimbalist, Jr., as Inspector Erskine. The show has been renewed for its third year (1967-68).

The National Television Index ratings for the fourth quarter of 1966 show that "The FBI" had an audience of 13,230,000 homes for each program and that this was up one million from the 1965 season. The ratings also indicate that 29,350,000 view the program. More than 22 million of these viewers are above the age 18.

The series has been produced by Quinn Martin Productions in cooperation with Warner Brothers Studios at Burbank, California. The show is sponsored by the Ford Motor Company.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Gale

DATE: 7/6/67

FROM : W. V. Cleveland

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S LUNCHEON MEETING
WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FRIDAY, JULY 7, 1967

Attorney General's Staff Conference

In accordance with the request of the Crime Records Division, attached are original and seven copies of memoranda prepared by the Special Investigative Division containing information concerning items which might come up for discussion between the Director and the Attorney General at their luncheon meeting on Friday, July 7, 1967.

Summarily these memoranda deal with the following matters:

Warren Minor Christopher, new Deputy Attorney General; recent appointment of Simon Francis McHugh, Jr., a person of doubtful qualifications, as a member of the Subversive Activities Control Board; four year extension of Selective Service Act; investigation to locate killers of two border patrol officers in southern California; information concerning shooting by Bureau Agents of James Lee Kirby, a parole violator fugitive when apprehending him on 7/5/67; accomplishments in the drive against organized crime; the Department's disclosure policy in electronic surveillance matters and new guidelines from the Attorney General concerning the use of electronic surveillances in criminal matters; and gambling cases.

ACTION:

This memorandum and the attached memoranda should be routed to the Crime Records Division which is handling the overall co-ordination of this matter.

Enclosures

REC 18 62-97556-182

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale

1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Eddy
1 - Mr. McAndrews
1 - Mr. Connell

JUL 10 1967

JRC:jmm
(8)

74

7 JUL 1 1967

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt ✓
Gale ✓
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: 9-7-67

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: LUNCHEON WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1967

C D Brennan
G. Moore
Wannall
Brownfield

SYNOPSIS:

Director has accepted Attorney General's luncheon invitation for Friday, September 8. Pertinent items of possible interest for discussion at luncheon include:

(1) The Attorney General (AG) called Mr. DeLoach on 9-5-67 concerning FBI's pending requests for approval of electronic surveillances. AG said he had contacted Clark Clifford and Walt Rostow at White House and also planned to meet with Dick Helms of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and General Carter of National Security Agency (NSA). AG said Clifford and Rostow were surprised FBI had so little coverage--and they hinted that because of FBI reluctance to use surveillances, it might be good idea to transfer FBI responsibilities in domestic intelligence to CIA. AG said he was opposed to this idea; that it would take time to bring Clifford and Rostow around, but FBI would come out ahead and he (the AG) would have more liberal hand in approving FBI requests.

Regarding above, Mr. DeLoach noted it would be premature to talk with Rostow or Clifford now; but after a decision has been reached, they could be confidentially briefed on such FBI operations. Information confidentially obtained reflects that Helms of CIA had a meeting scheduled with AG on 9-6-67--the subject of which probably was electronic surveillances.

EX 101 REC-65 62-97852-1[illegible]

FBI has 31 telephone surveillances in FBI cases; 19 telephone surveillances at request of State Department, and 39 teletype surveillances at request of NSA. Four telephone surveillances and one NSA request for an FBI assistance in obtaining foreign codes are pending AG's approval.

(2) On 7-19-67, the House passed H.R. 421, which provides Federal penalties for interstate travel with intent to incite a riot. Many persons question its practical and legal usefulness due to difficulty in proving intent. Our sources on the Hill indicate there is a hope the bill may be bottled up in committee--but that it will pass the Senate if it reaches the floor. We took no stand on the bill with the Department, but did cite examples of interstate travel to areas where strife developed. The bill could increase our investigative responsibilities substantially.

1 - Mr. Tolson
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Miss Holmes

LJH/DWR:ksf

CONTINUED - OVER

(3) On 8-8-67, the House passed H.R. 5037, the Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance Act of 1967 (originally the Administration's "Safe Streets and Crime Control Act")--but with considerable changes. One amendment to the original Act would empower regional institutes to engage in police training--thus duplicating and competing with FBI police training. This matter has been brought to attention of FBI friends on Senate Judiciary Committee. Our Hill sources advise that Senators McClellan and Hruska plan to combine their bills regarding controlled use of wiretaps and eavesdropping devices and add this to H.R. 5037.

(4) AG has indicated desire to achieve about 400 convictions in organized crime field during this fiscal year. As of 9-7-67, a total of 382 individuals in this field were awaiting Federal prosecution. By letter of 7-27-67, we called the AG's attention to a situation wherein 23 persons arrested in New York for gambling law violations in 1964 were still awaiting final prosecutive action. To date, no reply has been received from AG.

(5) Latest two issues of "Life" magazine contain articles by Sandy Smith, former Chicago newsman, focusing attention on La Cosa Nostra leaders, as well as their political affiliations, and the need for electronic surveillances to cope with organized crime. Smith has extensive background and contacts qualifying him to write on organized crime. It is obvious he obtained help from such persons as Professor Robert Blakey of Notre Dame, formerly in the Organized Crime Section of Department.

(6) The "task force" organized under direction of Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of Department conducted an operation against bookmaker Ernest Reinhart in Niagara Falls, New York, area and learned from the Customs Service that the Niagara Falls Police Department was also interested in Reinhart's activities. According to officials of Niagara Falls Police Department, attorneys and others on the "task force" appeared at the police department and "took over" entire investigation. "Task force" was so inept that it "blew" the case against Reinhart, and "task force" surveillances were discovered by Reinhart and associates. Although Reinhart's gambling activities were across state lines from New York to Canada, our Buffalo Office was not notified. Pertinent details were brought to AG's attention by letter of 9-5-67, and we requested that "task force" be instructed to immediately advise FBI of matters within our jurisdiction.

CONTINUED - OVER

(7) For first month (July) of new fiscal year, FBI convictions decreased 189, or 22 percent. Decrease primarily due to: (a) shortage of judges and prosecutors, resulting in overcrowded court conditions, and (b) policy enunciated by Department's Criminal Division to reduce Federal prosecutions of juvenile offenders. In July, 1966, Assistant AG Vinson sent letter instructing U. S. Attorneys regarding diversion of subjects under age 21 to local authorities--which has principally been felt in Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle violations, where experience indicates about 65 percent of violators are under 21 and where FBI convictions decreased 109 in July, 1967, compared with July, 1966. For sometime, we have been advising AG whenever shortages of Federal judges or shortages in U. S. Attorneys Offices exist.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information in connection with the Director's luncheon with the Attorney General on Friday, September 8, 1967.

Handled.
H

TSB

ADDENDUM BY C. D. DeLOACH (CDD;hmm 9/7/67): The Coordinator of U. S. Attorneys, John W. Kern, III, stopped DeLoach in the Attorney General's Office on the morning of 9/7/67 and posed two questions: (1) Should U. S. Attorneys attend meetings of Federal Executive Boards (groups composed of all Federal agencies in various metropolitan areas) when meeting on monthly basis (2) If U. S. Attorneys joined and attended such meetings, should these U. S. Attorneys comply with recent requests by John Macy, Chairman,

(CONTINUED - OVER)

(DETAILS BEGIN ON PAGE 2)

M. A. Jones to Bishop
RE: LUNCHEON WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL

Civil Service Commission, and sponsor a one-day seminar on law enforcement managed by Federal Executive Board groups.

Kern was told that it was, of course, desirable to have U. S. Attorneys participate in civic affairs but that U. S. Attorneys should not attempt to sponsor one-day seminars on the subject of law enforcement inasmuch as this would only promote confusion and chaos. Kern was also told that the FBI is already sponsoring such seminars and conferences and that in some instances representatives of the U. S. Attorneys' offices were invited to participate in these conferences. The subject of discussion this year is Legal Problems involving Law Enforcement Officers and the National Crime Information Center.

DETAILS:

The Director has accepted an invitation for a luncheon with the Attorney General on Friday, September 8, 1967. There is contained in this memorandum succinct data concerning pertinent items which might be of interest for discussion on this occasion. The General Investigative, Special Investigative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions have contributed salient information for this memorandum.

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES:

On 9-5-67, the Attorney General called Mr. DeLoach regarding the Bureau's pending requests for approval of electronic surveillances. He said he had finally made contact with Clark Clifford and Walt Rostow at the White House on 8-31-67 and that he planned to meet with Dick Helms of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and General Carter of the National Security Agency (NSA) regarding this matter. The Attorney General said Clifford and Rostow knew little about electronic surveillances and were very surprised that the FBI had so little such coverage. He said that Clifford and Rostow, without saying so, hinted that because of FBI reluctance to use surveillances, it might be a good idea to transfer FBI responsibilities in domestic intelligence to CIA.

The Attorney General said he was opposed to this idea. He said it would take a little time to bring Clifford and Rostow around but that he believed the Department and the FBI would come out ahead in the discussions and that he, the Attorney General, will then have a more liberal hand in approving requests from the FBI. In this connection, Mr. DeLoach noted that it would be premature to talk with Clifford or Rostow at this point but after a decision has been reached, these two individuals could be briefed on a confidential basis regarding such FBI operations. It was also noted that it did not appear the Attorney General could adequately represent the FBI in his discussions with Clifford and Rostow.

We have confidentially obtained the information that Richard Helms, Director of the CIA, had a meeting scheduled with the Attorney General at 5 p.m., on Wednesday, September 6, 1967, and that the subject of the meeting was probably electronic surveillances.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

M. A. Jones to Bishop
RE: LUNCHEON WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL

At the present time the Bureau has the following electronic surveillances in operation: (1) In Bureau cases, 31 telephone surveillances; (2) At the request of State Department, 19 telephone surveillances; (3) At the request of NSA, 39 teletype surveillances.

As of this date, there are four telephone surveillances pending approval by the Attorney General with subjects and dates of request to the Attorney General as follows: Ralph Alan Dale, since 3-27-67; Charles Morris, since 7-25-67; Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, since 8-2-67; Frederick Douglas Andrews, since 8-14-67. In addition, we have a request for FBI assistance on behalf of the NSA for an anagram operation (obtaining foreign codes) pending with the Attorney General since 6-16-67.

INFORMATION tends to identify peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operations

H. R. 421, INTERSTATE TRAVEL TO INCITE RIOTS:

This bill was passed by the House on 7-19-67. It provides for Federal prosecution of persons who travel interstate with the intent to incite a riot. Its practical and legal usefulness has been questioned by a number of people, including many Senators, due to the extreme difficulty in obtaining evidence to prove intent. Our Hill sources have advised there was a hope the Bill could be bottled up in committee unless it could be changed to make it more practical. These sources concede the Bill will pass the Senate without difficulty if it reaches the floor because many Senators would consider it politically unwise to vote against it. We took no stand on the Bill with the Department, but did cite examples of interstate travel by militant Negroes and hate group leaders to areas where strife developed. The Bill, if passed, could substantially increase our investigative responsibilities, depending, of course, on the policy established by the Department.

H. R. 5037, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1967:

This is the Administration's bill, originally called the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act, although it has been changed considerably by Republican-sponsored amendments made when the House passed the bill on 8-8-67. One of these amendments by Congressman Robert McClory (R.-Ill.) which changed Title 3 of the Bill, would empower the regional institutes to engage in police training. This would duplicate and compete with the extensive police training program we conduct on our own and in cooperation with local and state agencies. This has been brought to the attention of our friends on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Many of them have voiced agreement and stated they will take the necessary action to correct this wrong. Our Hill

(CONTINUED - OVER)

sources have advised that Senator John McClellan (D.-Ark.) and Senator Roman Hruska (R.-Neb.) plan to combine their bills authorizing controlled use of wiretaps and eavesdropping devices and to add this to H. R. 5037 in Committee. They feel wiretap legislation as a part of the Administration's crime bill will have an excellent chance for passage and possible acceptance by the President.

ORGANIZED CRIME:

As of September 7, 1967, there were a total of 382 individuals, involved in organized criminal activities, who have been arrested, indicted, or awaiting further prosecutive action in connection with violations of various Federal statutes.

By letter dated July 27, 1967, the Bureau called to the attention of the Attorney General a situation where 23 individuals arrested in New York for violations of the gambling laws in 1964 were still awaiting final prosecutive action. It was called to the attention of the Attorney General that prosecutive action taken at the earliest possible date with reference to these individuals would greatly assist in increasing accomplishments in the organized crime field during the present fiscal year. To date no response from the Attorney General has been received to this communication.

The Attorney General has indicated that he is desirous of achieving in the neighborhood of 400 convictions of individuals involved in organized crime during this fiscal year. With 382 such subjects already awaiting prosecution, the Attorney General's goal would appear to be readily available if vigorous prosecutive action is taken of these individuals at the earliest possible date by the Department.

"LIFE" MAGAZINE ARTICLE:

"Life" magazine has run articles for the last two weeks on La Cosa Nostra, which articles were written by Sandy Smith, former crime reporter for the "Chicago Tribune "* Smith has done an excellent job in these articles in focusing public attention on the Cosa Nostra leaders as well as their political affiliations and the need for electronic surveillances in order to cope with the menace of organized crime.

Smith is an outstanding investigative reporter who has a wealth of independent knowledge built up over the years on La Cosa Nostra. He also has tremendous contacts among the local and state police intelligence agencies throughout the country. In addition, it is obvious that he obtained considerable help from such persons as Professor Robert Blakey of Notre Dame, former Departmental Attorney in the Organized Crime Section, in

*and "Chicago Sun-Times."

(CONTINUED - OVER)

connection with this article. He also has used the information disclosed from our microphones in court cases in such cases as the Raymond Patriarca matter, etc.

DEPARTMENT TASK FORCE, BUFFALO, NEW YORK:

In October, 1966, under the direction of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department, a "task force" was organized as an investigative operation, supervised by Department Attorneys, and to which were assigned representatives from various Federal investigative agencies.

On August 21 and 23, 1967, the "task force" conducted investigative activity, including physical surveillances in the Niagara Falls, New York, area. The subject of its investigation was one Ernest Reinhart, a bookmaker from Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada, who was said to be making trips daily to Niagara Falls, New York, to establish regular contacts and gambling pickups from other known gamblers. The Niagara Falls, New York, Police Department, which was also investigating the activities of Reinhart, had requested the assistance of the United States Customs Service to develop sufficient evidence to establish a violation of the local gambling statute. A representative of the Customs Service notified the "task force" representatives of the local police department's interest in this matter and immediately thereafter, according to the officials of the Niagara Falls Police Department, attorneys and other members of the 'task force" appeared at the police department and "took over" the entire investigation.

SAC Neil J. Welch of our Buffalo Office has since determined from representatives of the Niagara Falls Police Department and the Customs Service that the investigative activity of the "task force" was so inept that the case against Reinhart was "blown." (In conducting a surveillance the task force utilized a panel truck and their actions, while in the panel truck, were such that they caused the truck to rock back and forth revealing to the gamblers who were watching that people were inside the truck.) Surveillances conducted by the "task force," including attorneys assigned thereto, were readily discovered by Reinhart and his associates. Reinhart remarked to a customs agent at the border crossing that he would give the investigators a good run around.

Although Reinhart's gambling activities were being carried on between Canada and the United States, that is across state lines, in apparent violation of the Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Statute, the FBI Office at Buffalo was not notified. The FBI has a substantial investigative

(CONTINUED - OVER)

↓ ↓

responsibility in the investigation of violations of this statute. In this instance, Customs Service, Internal Revenue Service, and the local Niagara Falls, New York, Police Department also have investigative responsibilities.

Pertinent details concerning this matter were brought to the attention of the Attorney General by our letter dated September 5, 1967, with the request that necessary instructions be issued to the "task force" personnel that matters within FBI jurisdiction be immediately reported to our Buffalo Office.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS - CONVICTIONS:

At the end of July, 1967, we had recorded 189 fewer convictions than were recorded during the first month of the prior fiscal year. This represents a decrease of 22%, which is primarily the result of two factors: (1) shortages of judges and prosecutors which result in overcrowded court conditions and (2) the policy enunciated by the Criminal Division of the Department to reduce prosecutions in Federal court relating to juvenile offenders.

In this connection, our potential for increasing conviction statistics was decimated as a result of a letter sent during July, 1966, by Assistant Attorney General Vinson instructing all U. S. Attorneys to give primary consideration to the diversion of subjects under 21 years of age to local authorities. These instructions are being followed by a majority of U. S. Attorneys and have hurt us principally in Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle violations where experience has shown that approximately 65% of all violators are under 21 years of age. At the end of July, 1967, we recorded 109 less convictions in this category as compared to the first month in the previous fiscal year.

We have for sometime been following the practice of advising the Attorney General whenever shortages of Federal judges, U. S. Attorneys or their assistants exist. For example, we recently sent the following letters to the Attorney General to bring to his attention shortages of judges or U. S. Attorneys in the indicated areas:

9-1-67, Southern District of Georgia;
8-16-67, Eastern District of Michigan;
8-7-67, District of Kansas;
8-3-67, District of New Jersey;
8-2-67, Southern and Northern Districts of Mississippi;
7-31-67, Western District of New York.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

M. A. Jones to Bishop
RE: LUNCHEON WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL

In connection with the situation in the Western District of New York, we originally called this to the Attorney General's attention on 3-30-67 and we have received no information indicating that an appointment has been made for the vacant judgeship. Considerable newspaper publicity has attended the failure to appoint a judge for this district.

With regard to the two vacant judgeships in the Eastern District of Michigan, it is noted that we first called this to the Attorney General's attention on 3-16-67 and we have not received any current information indicating these judgeships have been filled.

Each SAC has been instructed to keep the Bureau currently advised of any shortages of judges or U. S. Attorneys and we will continue to bring these matters to the attention of the Attorney General.

As an example of shortages which have been brought to the Attorney General's attention, in connection with the shortage of judges in the Southern District of Georgia, it is noted that as of September 1, 1967, there was a total of 87 Bureau cases awaiting prosecution involving 121 defendants. Of these 22 representing 32 subjects have been pending prosecution for more than six months.

It is also noted that in the District of New Jersey as of July 1, 1967, there were approximately 200 Bureau cases awaiting prosecutive action involving approximately 392 defendants. Our New York Office has also advised that it has 775 cases awaiting prosecution representing 874 subjects.

TEB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 9/14/67

FROM : G. C. Moore

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Trainor

SUBJECT: LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MR. SARGENT SHRIVER, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY DURING WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1967

RUBBING

Attorney Generals Staff Conference

The following data concerning the antipoverty workers' involvement in racial disturbances has been prepared for the Director's information and possible use at the forthcoming luncheon conference which will include the Attorney General and Mr. Shriver of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).

ALLEGATIONS OF INVOLVEMENT OF ANTIPOVERTY EMPLOYEES

There have been a number of allegations regarding the involvement of antipoverty employees in racial disturbances and involving the misuse of antipoverty funds in connection therewith. Allegations with respect to the misuse of these funds are exceptionally difficult to substantiate because the funds provided to local antipoverty agencies by OEO or other Federal agencies are usually furnished on a grant basis with the grants becoming the property of the local group at which time the Federal character of the funds is lost.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62

However, there have been instances wherein certain officials and employees of local agencies receiving Federal antipoverty grants have reportedly not conducted themselves in a manner conducive to law and order. Examples follow.

New York City

REC-9 62-97756-117

The largest privately-operated antipoverty program receiving Federal funds is said to be Haryou - Act in the Harlem area of New York City. Several of its employees are known to have subversive backgrounds or to have engaged in improper activities. Harriet Noel and John Anderson, members of the Revolutionary

Enclosure

TDR:fhd (7)

OCT 30 1967

CONTINUED - OVER

Trainor

59 OCT 31 1967

Action Movement, a clandestine all-Negro revolutionary group that calls for the overthrow of the U. S. Government by violence and which is procommunist Chinese-oriented, were suspended as employees of Haryou - Act following their arrest last June along with a number of members of the Jamaica Rifle and Pistol Club, a Revolutionary Action Movement front group, on charges including conspiracy to advocate anarchy. Another member of this rifle club who was arrested, Arthur Harris, was also suspended as an employee of an antipoverty organization in Jamaica, New York City, which is funded by OEO.

Newark, New Jersey

In Newark, antipoverty funds were reputedly utilized by the United Community Corporation to rent two station wagons used to transport people who had been encouraged to appear at meetings at the city hall to protest action of a city planning board. Reportedly, one of the vehicles was equiped with a loudspeaker and was used to make inflammatory remarks regarding the incumbent city administration. Also, it is reported that inflammatory posters prepared by the United Community Corporation had been circulated.

Syracuse, New York

Employees of the Crusade for Opportunity, an antipoverty agency funded by OEO, are alleged to have been involved in the racial disturbances which occurred in Syracuse, New York, 8/16-18/67. An officer of the Syracuse Police Department advised that a Crusade for Opportunity automobile bearing U. S. Government license plates was used by two Negro males and two Negro females to cruise through Negro neighborhoods in Syracuse on 8/15/67. They utilized a loudspeaker to advertise a meeting on 8/16/67 regarding the alleged rape of an 11-year-old Negro girl by a white man.

A field worker of this organization, Leroy Glenn Wright, was arrested during the first night's disturbance on 8/16/67 and charged with inciting to riot and resisting arrest.

over

Washington, D. C.

Individuals affiliated with two organizations funded in part by OEO were involved in the disturbance which occurred in the House of Representatives on 8/7/67 in protest of the shelving of the so-called "Rat Bill." The leader, Jesse Gray, a former Communist Party organizer in Harlem and a militant black nationalist, is the head of the Harlem Back Street Youth, Incorporated, which was the recipient of OEO funds. Such funds have since been suspended. Gray and at least one other member of the above organization were arrested for their part in this disturbance. Also involved in this disturbance and arrested was Robert Bailey Ransom, an employee of Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) Associates, an OEO-funded organization.

Hate-type Schools

The New York City Police Department advised on 8/9/67 that the walls of a school handling a program entitled "Special Training in Reading" for children 8 to 10 years of age contained numerous hate slogans. Examples of the signs noted thereon were "Don't love them to death, shoot them to death; make revolution not war; burn, baby, burn; arm yourselves; Johnson is losing sleep; Newark, '67; Chicago South Side, '66; Watts, '65, and Harlem, '64." There was also a picture of President Johnson's face superimposed on an Army sergeant carrying a rifle captioned "Public Enemy Number One, Wanted for Murder." The committee handling this particular program was funded in part by OEO.

A somewhat similar situation occurred in Nashville, Tennessee, in connection with a "Liberation School" which has been in operation teaching 10- and 11-year-olds. Antipoverty funds from OEO had been earmarked for the school; however, the funds were withdrawn when national publicity resulted concerning this matter. Meantime, however, certain services including the rental of an automobile and school supplies had been furnished.

over ↓

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR
WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
MR. SARGENT SHRIVER, DIRECTOR OF THE
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
DURING WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1967

MISUSE OF FBI INFORMATION BY OEO

In connection with the recent arrest by Kentucky authorities of Alan and Margaret McSurely, employees of the Southern Conference Education Fund, and Joseph T. Mulloy, an employee of an organization being funded by OEO, on a state sedition charge, someone in OEO apparently leaked to the press a report prepared by an OEO investigator which contained statements attributed to the FBI. An article concerning this matter appeared in the 9/1/67 issue of "The Evening Star."

The Director approved the lodging of a vigorous protest with OEO concerning the fact that information appearing in an FBI memorandum subsequently was published in "The Evening Star." In approving this action, he noted "Yes, and if they can't or won't give us the necessary assurances against leaks, we will cut off all investigative services to OEO."

Such a protest was lodged through liaison with Mr. Edgar May, Assistant Director, OEO, on 9/5/67 who advised that steps had been taken to insure that such did not recur in the future. A detailed memorandum is attached.

STATEMENTS AGAINST ESTABLISHED LAW AND ORDER

While no direct evidence has come to the Bureau's attention of outright seditious statements on the part of anti-poverty workers, allegations have been received of statements against established law and order and of statements tending to incite the people. Examples follow:

Marion S. Barry, Jr., former Washington Director of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, joined the United Planning Organization, Washington, D. C., as a $50-a-day consultant on 7/21/67. This organization is funded by OEO. On 6/30/67 Barry reportedly conducted a press conference on the steps of the 13th Precinct, Metropolitan Police Department, at which time he denounced the Police Department and stated that Negroes would

over ↓

continue to threaten the police until policemen are trained properly in how to deal with Negroes. Captain Al Prezio of the Troy, New York, Police Department, advised on 8/25/67 that Freeman Robinson, an employee of an antipoverty organization funded by OEO, uses the office of the antipoverty organization as a headquarters to conduct militant civil rights work and to recruit teen-agers to incite riots and arouse a Negro community on any issue that would create racial unrest.

Willie Wright, a duly-elected board member of the United Community Corporation, Newark, New Jersey, is alleged to have made statements concerning Negro rioting such as "To hell with President Johnson when he says something about not tolerating riots. We've tolerated these conditions for more than 400 years." He is also quoted as having said: "It is my firm conviction that in order to overcome the white man's complete human and legal jurisdiction over my black brothers and sisters, we are going to defend ourselves against all kinds of aggressions that are being perpetrated against us by the white man. I most emphatically want to make sure the majority of my black brothers and sisters have a piece of firepower in their home possessions to protect themselves against the most brutal atrocities to be seen anywhere committed by the New Jersey National Guard, the Newark and State Police in the recent rebellion in the City of Newark." The OEO has requested Wright's suspension pending its investigation of statements attributed to Wright.

"The Washington Post" of 9/13/67 contained an article by Columnist Roscoe Drummond captioned "Mayors Say OEO Programs Helped Suppress City Riots" in which he refers to a nationwide survey conducted by OEO in 64 cities, half of which had riots this summer. In citing OEO figures he pointed out that of 30,000 Community Action employees only 16 were arrested during the course of the riots and none were convicted. Poverty programs had 244 buildings in the hearts of the riot areas with none being burned or destroyed.

over ↓

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR
WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
MR. SARGENT SHRIVER, DIRECTOR OF THE
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
DURING WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1967

We have, of course, kept OEO promptly advised of all allegations received of misconduct on the part of antipoverty employees as well as allegations regarding the misuse of antipoverty funds. In accordance with the Director's instructions such information is also furnished the White House and the Attorney General.

ACTION:

Submitted for the Director's possible use.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 9/15/67

FROM : G. C. Moore GCM

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Trainor

SUBJECT: LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MR. SARGENT SHRIVER, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY DURING WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1967

GCM

Attorney General's Staff Conference

My memorandum of 9/14/67 set forth for the Director's information data concerning antipoverty workers' involvement in racial disturbances for his possible use at the forthcoming luncheon conference mentioned above.

The following additional information received from the Dallas Office today is being submitted for the Director's consideration in connection with this luncheon.

In response to a request from Mr. Randolf Ratliff, Director of the Neighborhood Organization War on Poverty in Dallas, Texas, a representative of this Bureau explained the FBI's jurisdiction in racial matters to members of Ratliff's staff, who work in the poverty areas in Dallas County Texas, on 9/6/67. The Neighborhood Organization War on Poverty is funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity.

On 9/13/67 one of Ratliff's staff workers confidentially advised that after our representative had left the above meeting, Ratliff instructed his staff members to give the FBI no information and said that the FBI is the white man's police and they want nothing but "stool pigeons." This individual further alleged that all of Ratliff's 44 staff members were hand-picked by Ratliff and that most of them are racial agitators. He charged that Ratliff and most of the staff members are working at creating racial incidents in order to stir up local Negro

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-[illegible]

EX-103

62-77856

TDR:fhd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

REC-9

15 OCT 19 1967

256

62 NOV 1 1967

RACIAL

communities. He further alleged that Ratliff is the driving force behind a program of racial agitation in Dallas County and that his statements to staff members are antiwhite and antipolice. He said it is his belief that Ratliff is trying to create a crisis in Dallas in order to receive additional antipoverty funds.

The source of the above information also alleged that in April of this year Ratliff was vigorously critical of the Dallas Police Department regarding the arrest of a 15-year-old Negro female on a charge of disturbing the peace and was in the process of organizing a march on city hall to protest the arrest when officials of the Office of Economic Opportunity learned of his activity and told him to desist. He stated that in another instance several months ago, Albert Lipscomb (phonetic), staff member, learned of a plot by a group of Negro men who were in possession of rifles and Molotov cocktails to initiate a riot. He claimed that Lipscomb personally prevented the riot by calming the Negro group and personally collecting the rifles and Molotov cocktails but that when Ratliff learned of Lipscomb's role in preventing the riot, he officially took credit for the action. Our source stated that Ratliff unofficially considers Lipscomb an "Uncle Tom."

The above information is being made available to Mrs. Stegall at the White House, Mr. Shriver of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and the Attorney General by letters dated 9/18/67.

ACTION:

Submitted for the Director's possible use.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: 2-17-69

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE
IN CONNECTION WITH HIS
LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT WITH
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND OTHERS
FEBRUARY 20, 1969

Attorney General's Staff Conference

The Director has an appointment to have luncheon with the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and Mr. Ehrlichman, Legal Counsel to the President, on Thursday, February 20, 1969. There is attached a brief containing items of possible pertinent interest for the Director's use in connection with this luncheon meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For the Director's information.

Enclosure

File
TSB

1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Bishop - Enclosure

EX-1

DGH:pls/cmj
(6)

REC-23 62 - 97856 - 195

JUL 25 1969

CRIME RESEARCH

2 ENCLOSURE

AUG 21 1969

BRIEF

LUNCHEON MEETING WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL AND OTHERS

Thursday, February 20, 1969

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SYNOPSIS a - g

BUREAU STATISTICS

FBI Personnel 1
Overtime Services 1
National Crime 1
District of Columbia Crime 1
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 2

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Communist Party, USA 3
New Left Movement 3
Racial Unrest on College Campuses 4
Black Panther Party 4
Soviet and Satellite Espionage 4
United States - Communist China Relations 5
Israeli Intelligence 6
Assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy 7
Martin Luther King, Jr. 7

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS

Suggestions for the Reduction of Crime in the District of Columbia 9
Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. 10
Alleged Violations of Federal Corrupt Practices Act by 21 Political Committees 11
Sirhan Bishara Sirhan Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy 12
Gary Steven Krist; Ruth Eisemann-Schier; Barbara Jane Mackle - Victim: Kidnaping 13

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS

Discontinuance of Background Investigations on Clerical Applicants for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) 14

Martin Edward Underwood 15
Virginia Stanfill Savell 16
Donald Edwin Ganoung, Departmental Applicant, Consultant, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D. C. 17
William Henry Rentschler 18
Special Inquiry Investigations for the White House 19
Selective Service 20
Criminal Intelligence and Organized Crime 21
Recent Major Accomplishments 21
Dissemination Program 22
Department of Justice Task Forces on Organized Crime 22
La Cosa Nostra Leadership Changes 23
Department's Manual for use of Electronic Surveillance Under Title III of Omnibus Crime Control Bill 24

MISCELLANEOUS

ABC-TV Series 26

SYNOPSIS

BUREAU STATISTICS

FBI Personnel As of 2/13/69 there were 6,929 Special Agents and 9,052 clerical employees for a total of 15,981 employees on the rolls of the FBI.

Overtime Services The overtime service by our investigative staff averages more than two and one-half hours each workday and during fiscal year 1968 totaled 3,845,461 hours, the equivalent of 1,849 additional employees on a full-year basis. This was a cost-free saving to the Government of over $14 million.

National Crime Crime Index for January-September, 1968, recorded a 19 percent increase. Largest increases noted in cities 250,000 to 1 million population where a 22 percent rise was recorded. There were an estimated 4.6 million serious crimes in the United States in 1968 compared to 3.8 million in 1967.

District of Columbia Crime For calendar year 1967, District had sixth highest crime rate among the 56 cities 250,000 and above. Crime figures for calendar year 1968 indicate District recorded an over-all gain of 25 percent in the number of serious offenses.

National Crime Information Center (NCIC) NCIC is a nationwide index of documented law enforcement information on crime and criminals. Began in January, 1967, with pilot operation. Now terminals in 47 states. Over 780,000 records in system and 33,000 messages handled daily in 24-hour operating day.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

information tends to identify particularly sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operation

*Communist Party, USA clandestine communications with CP of Soviet Union penetrated by FBI. Reveals Soviets have furnished Party $6.5 million over past 10 years and now financing at approximately 1 million annually. *Classification "~~Top~~ Secret."

Downgraded
To Secret
11/15/16
MBS

New Left Movement has led a wave of extremism on our college campuses marked by growing violence. Part of world-wide revolutionary movement of students and young intellectuals. New Leftists from U. S. have played important roles in demonstrationsin foreign countries.

Racial Unrest on College Campuses Campuses throughout U. S. have been marked by racial unrest. Minority groups such as Black Student Union becoming increasingly militant and violent. Demands unreasonable. Other militant groups have joined in demonstrations and offer full support to minority groups.

Black Panther Party is most active, notorious and violence-prone black extremist group. Branches in 25 cities. Will possibly go underground. Minister of Education is George Mason Murray, a suspended instructor at San Francisco State College.

Soviet and Satellite Espionage The U. S. is the number one espionage target of Soviet Union and satellites. Intelligence operations coordinated by Soviet Union. Embassies and missions are focal points. As of February, 1969, approximately 230 Soviet and 117 satellite personnel operating. Consular Convention between U. S. and Soviet Union became effective July 13, 1968, and will probably increase capability for espionage.

Information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operations

*United States - Communist China Relations Professor LIN Ta-kaung, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, is foremost Chinese communist propagandist in Canada. Has been in contact with Kennedy Administration, Senator Eugene McCarthy and Professor Martin Peretz of Harvard re United States - Communist China relations. Hopes to influence Nixon Administration to vote for UN admission of Communist China. *Classified "Secret."

*Israeli Intelligence FBI currently investigating Dr. Zalmer Mordecai Shapiro, head of Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, Apollo, Pennsylvania. This company has Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) contracts and Shapiro cleared by AEC for "Top Secret." Investigation shows he in contact with at least one Israeli intelligence official and sympathetic toward Israel. *Classified "Secret."

Assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy Essence of Clay Shaw trial in New Orleans lies in alleged connection between Oswald, David Ferrie (deceased) and Clay Shaw. Not established in exhaustive FBI investigation. Bureau maintaining "hands off" policy regarding Garrison investigation. Garrison mental stability is questionable. He received medical discharge from U. S. Army in 1951 for an emotional problem. Admitted to Army authorities that he had received psychiatric treatment.

Excision of material re King as it derives from electronic surveillance

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Martin Luther King, Jr. [redacted]

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS

Suggestions for the Reduction of Crime in the District of Columbia Should be an Enabling Statute which would allow juveniles to be handled as they are throughout U. S. Mandatory sentences recommended for crimes committed with the use of firearms. Registration of all convicted felons should be considered. Abolishment of capital punishment should be opposed until a life sentence means "life." Provisions of Bank Protection Act of 1968 should be accelerated.

Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. Intensive FBI investigation revealed killer of King on 4/4/68 to be James Earl Ray. Ray arrested by Scotland Yard 6/8/68. Extradited to U. S. and turned over to local authorities in Memphis, Tennessee, for State prosecution. Local trial scheduled for 4/7/69.

Alleged Violations of Federal Corrupt Practices Act by 21 Political Committees We were instructed by former Assistant Attorney General Vinson to interview the Chairman and Treasurers of 20 Republican Committees and one Democratic Committee that filed late reports with the Clerk of the House. White House staff members refused to be interviewed. Investigation going forward on expeditious basis. Department being kept advised.

Sirhan Bishara Sirhan Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy Senator Kennedy, killed 6/5/68 in Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles. Sirhan identified as assailant. Indicted and charged with murder. Trial began, Los Angeles Superior Court on 1/7/69.

Gary Steven Krist; Ruth Eisemann-Schier; Barbara Jane Mackle - Victim Kidnaping Mackle kidnaped from Atlanta, Georgia, motel 12-17-68 and $500,000 ransom demand made. FBI investigation resulted in her safe return and Krist and Eisemann-Schier identified as kidnappers. Krist apprehended and all-out investigation continuing to locate Eisemann-Schier. Krist will be tried by state and next appearance in court scheduled for 2-28-69.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) Since the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) was formed under the jurisdiction of the Department, the FBI has been conducting background investigations on its applicants and employees. This was done pursuant to Departmental Order #175-59, dated 4-1-59. However, the BNDD was discovered to be conducting some duplicate investigation of their clerical applicants. We objected to this wasted effort and expressed our views to the Department which countered with a proposal advanced by Associate BNDD Director Giordano, that we share parts of these investigations with them. By letter of 2-6-69, in reply to this proposal, we informed the Department that no additional requests for BNDD applicant investigations would be accepted, except those submitted under the provisions of the Federal Employee Security Program.

Martin Edward Underwood Underwood, an employee of the Department of Commerce, who was detailed to the White House in 1966 to serve as an advance man for former President Johnson, was removed from his office at the White House on 2-6-69, and the Department of Commerce has been instructed to inform him that his services are no longer required. Our investigation of Underwood, which was furnished the White House on 2-12-69, disclose that he had severe drinking problem until at least 1964.

Virginia Stanfill Savell We conducted a discreet inquiry of Savell in September, 1966, at the request of former Senator Kuchel (R) of California, for whom she then worked in his Los Angeles office. It had been alleged she was operating a bookie joint out of the Senator's office but our inquiry developed no information to substantiate this. However, it was reported that she was an alcoholic. Current investigation revealed Savel attempted to commit suicide in July, 1967, by overdose of sleeping pills.

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

Donald Edward Ganoung We have investigated Ganoung as a Departmental applicant for the position of consultant with the Law Enforcement Administration at Washington, D. C., the position he now holds. He has a degree in criminology and is a former Episcopalian priest who has worked among deviate elements. He has also been active in civil rights and antidraft demonstrations and twice was arrested in this connection. Divorced by his wife in 1967 after he had an affair with another woman, Ganoung also [redacted] The results of our investigation of him were furnished to the Attorney General on 2/11/69.

William Henry Rentschler Rentschler, a candy company operator, has been extremely active in Illinois Republican Party politics. He carried on a notorious adulterous relationship which led to a divorce from a former wife. Our investigation of him revealed many prominent persons who would not recommend Rentschler for a position with the Government in view of his moral weaknesses and reported lack of business acumen. Our investigation not yet complete but summary memo furnished the White House on 2/10/69.

Special Inquiry Investigations for the White House Security officers of various Government agencies have expressed shock at the lack of knowledge or the total disregard of the provisions of the Federal Employee Security Program by the White House staff responsible for filling top-level positions with the new Administration. Most requests for investigation have been of persons already firmly established in their new jobs. When derogatory data is developed it is simply requested that the investigation be continued. Only one person is known to have been discharged as a result of derogatory information developed during investigation. Don Virdin, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), called Bureau 2/13/69 and indicated Bureau had checked through IRS only 8 of last 25 publicly announced Presidential appointees. Bureau has run checks of IRS on all requests received from White House on Presidential appointees and it would appear White House only asked for 8 of last 25 to be checked.

Selective Service These cases in recent years have broadened in scope with recurring schemes to obstruct the draft. We have 14,000 pending investigations, up 5,000 from a year ago. Fiscal year 1968 produced 809 convictions and the first seven months of this fiscal period have recorded 380 convictions, an increase over this period a year ago. An interesting case is summarized which involves an 18-year-old Californian whose mother, following his arraignment for failure to register for the draft, attempted to get a Restraining Order by contending that she was responsible for her son's actions and therefore should be punished rather than him. The Judge rejected her appeal and her son's trial is scheduled for March, 1969.

Criminal Intelligence and Organized Crime While our organized crime investigations are aimed at key members in the power structure, they have also struck hard in the lower echelons with progressively greater penetration into the heart of hoodlum activities - gambling operations. Fiscal year 1968 capped four consecutive record years in convictions of organized crime figures with 281. There are now 789 other hoodlum figures awaiting trial in Federal court thus indicating a continuance of the upward trend in convictions in fiscal year 1969. Recent major accomplishments in the organized crime field include the arrest or conviction of many top La Cosa Nostra leaders across the country. Our dissemination of criminal intelligence data to other Federal and local law enforcement agencies has broken the million mark in number of items in the past five years. This shared FBI data enabled other law enforcement agencies to conduct hundreds of raids, execute thousands of arrests, and recover millions of dollars in gambling funds or stolen property each year. Department Task Force Operations (also called Strike Force) have been formed in Detroit, Michigan; Brooklyn, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Chicago, Illinois; Miami, Florida; and Newark, New Jersey; since the original group at Buffalo, New York. We now maintain liaison with these Task Force groups and it has been recommended that we expand our liaison arrangements with Task Force. There have been La Cosa Nostra leadership changes in New York and Chicago.

Department's Manual for use of Electronic Surveillance Under Title III of Omnibus Crime Control Bill Attorney General has been furnished our views regarding Department's draft manual for use of electrical surveillance pursuant to Title III of Omnibus Crime Control Bill, the general provisions of which concern administrative regulations not specifically required by the statute itself. The manual's requirements would impose tremendous administrative and procedural restrictions on the FBI and other Federal agencies to the point that strict compliance might be self-defeating to the goal of maintaining discreet electronic surveillance coverage under court supervision for the purpose of obtaining admissible evidence against the leadership of organized crime and in other major investigative categories. Included would be requirements for review of an application for a court order at a number of levels within the Department, and by the Attorney General, before the application reached the judge, involving delay and the spreading of information about our use of this technique among a comparatively wide range of authorities. Included in our views was our belief that for the Government's ultimate success in making use of this evidence gathering procedure, restrictions must not apply which will create more limitations on law enforcement than the statute itself prescribes.

MISCELLANEOUS

ABC-TV Series "The FBI" is in its fourth year and production plans are going forward at the present time for a fifth season. Latest 30 Market Nielson Rating reflects it is second most popular show on air and has 26 million viewers. Plans being made to present on our program film on Mackle kidnaping case next season after prosecutive action is completed. Being shown in 43 different countries.

Details

↓ ↓ ↓

BUREAU STATISTICS

FBI Personnel

As of 2/13/69 there were 6,929 Special Agents and 9,052 clerical employees for a total of 15,981 employees on the rolls of the FBI.

Overtime Services

The overtime service by our investigative staff averages more than two and one-half hours each workday and during the fiscal year 1968 totaled 3,845,461 hours, the equivalent of 1,849 additional employees on a full-year basis. Taking into consideration the limited extent to which this overtime was compensated under fringe benefits regulations of the Civil Service Commission, there was a cost-free saving to the Government of over $14 million when compared to the value of the total overtime performed. This is a tremendous voluntary contribution by our investigative staff.

National Crime

While preliminary crime figures for calendar year 1968 are not yet available, for the period January through September, 1968, over the same period in 1967, the Crime Index nationwide recorded a 19 percent increase. The largest increases were noted in cities 250,000 to 1 million population where a 22 percent rise was recorded. Nationally, the violent crimes of murder, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault as a group increased 21 percent and the more voluminous property crimes of burglary, larceny $50 and over and auto theft rose 19 percent. There were an estimated 4.6 million serious crimes in the United States in 1968 compared to 3.8 million in 1967.

District of Columbia Crime

For calendar year 1967, Washington, D. C., had the sixth highest crime rate among the 56 cities 250,000 population and above. Crime figures for calendar year 1968 indicate that

Washington, D. C., recorded an over-all gain of 25 percent in the number of serious offenses.

National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

NCIC is a nationwide index of documented law enforcement information on crime and criminals. Its objective is to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement through the more efficient handling and exchange of information. In January, 1967, a pilot operation was begun with terminals in 15 local and state law enforcement agencies. NCIC now has 78 control terminals in 47 states, the District of Columbia and Canada. North Carolina and Wyoming will be added in the near future; however, Alaska will be delayed due to very high communication circuit costs. The files consist of stolen motor vehicles, license plates, firearms, other identifiable stolen property including securities, and wanted persons. Over 780,000 records are in the system and more than 33,000 messages are handled each day. Positive responses to inquiries wherein a record is furnished now exceed 220 each 24 hours. NCIC is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Communist Party, USA* information tends to identify sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operations

~~The FBI has penetrated the clandestine communications apparatus between the Communist Party, USA, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Through this penetration we know that the Soviets have furnished the Party over $6,500,000 over the past ten years. For the last two years the annual subsidy has been over $1,000,000 a year. This money is used to finance Party activities and publications. On February 2, 1969, the Party received $300,000 as the first installment of the subsidy for 1969 which is to be in excess of $1,000,000.~~

New Left Movement

The New Left movement, an amorphous, undisciplined collection of malcontents, has led a wave of extremism on our college campuses which has been marked by growing violence and lawlessness. During the past year a surge of bombings and arsons, along lines advocated by New Left extremists, has accounted for over $2,000,000 in damages to property consisting mostly of college facilities and U. S. Government property. The New Left movement in this country is clearly an integral part of a worldwide revolutionary movement of students and young intellectuals. New Leftists from the United States have played an important role in demonstrations which have taken place in England, France, West Germany, Japan, and Mexico. They have established and maintained contacts with representatives of communist and other leftist organizations abroad through meetings, conferences, and correspondence; traveling to communist countries, such as Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, North Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.

*Classified "~~Top~~ Secret"

Downgraded To
Secret
11/15/16
MSS

Racial Unrest on College Campuses

Campuses throughout the United States have been marked by racial unrest as exemplified by the current disruptions at San Francisco State College, San Francisco, California; and the University of California, Berkeley, California. Such groups as the Third World Liberation Front, a coalition of minority groups, and the Black Student Union are becoming increasingly militant and violence prone in presenting their demands to college authorities. Demands made by such groups include the establishment of a separate college for minority groups, particularly Negroes; the establishment of black courses; the hiring of minority group professors and administrators; and the control of hiring and firing of faculty members by students. At San Francisco State College over 400 individuals have been arrested during a current wave of disruption and attempts are being made to force the College to close. Students for a Democratic Society and other militant groups have joined in these demonstrations and offer full support to minority groups.

Black Panther Party

The Black Panther Party is the most active, notorious, violence-prone black extremist organization. In the past nine months it has established branches in 25 cities across the country with a hard-core membership of at least 1,200.

The latest development is the order from national headquarters to stop recruiting for a time in order to weed out informants and undesirables and concentrate on political indoctrination based on the writings of MAO Tse-tung of Communist China. There is also increasing discussion of the necessity for going underground.

The Black Panther Party Minister of Education George Mason Murray, a suspended instructor at San Francisco State College, holds a position on the Central Committee of the Black Student Union at that College. The Black Student Union instigated the campus unrest which has plagued this institution during the current school year.

Soviet and Satellite Espionage

The United States is the number one espionage target of the Soviet Union and its European satellites (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania). The intelligence operations of these satellites are coordinated against the United States by the Soviets. The embassies of these countries in Washington and their missions to the United Nations in New York are focal points for their espionage activities. As of February, 1969, there were approximately 230 Soviet personnel and 117 satellite personnel with intelligence assignments operating out of their respective official establishments.

This represents since February, 1959, a 210% increase in Soviet intelligence personnel and a 100% increase in satellite intelligence personnel.

A Consular Convention between the United States and the Soviet Union became effective July 13, 1968. This would grant diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction for Soviet Consular personnel in the United States and United States Consular personnel in the Soviet Union. On August 13, 1968, the Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed establishment of a Soviet Consulate General at San Francisco, California, in return for a United States Consulate General in Leningrad. There has been no progress in negotiations regarding establishment of Consulates since last August. Establishment of a Soviet Consulate in San Francisco will increase Soviet capability for espionage.

United States - Communist China Relations*

Professor LIN Ta-kuang, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, is the foremost Chinese communist propagandist in Canada. In August, 1968, LIN and Theodore C. Sorensen, former Special Counsel to President Kennedy, attended a meeting at the Nova Scotia farm of Cyrus Eaton to discuss United States-Communist China relations. In December, 1968, LIN entertained an individual believed to be Senator Eugene J. McCarthy and Professor Martin Peretz of Harvard University at his home in Montreal.

On January 6, 1969, LIN departed Canada for Hong Kong. While in Hong Kong, LIN was told that a "plan" allegedly proposed by Senator McCarthy would have to be referred to Peking for discussion and that Senator McCarthy or Peretz should travel to Paris, France, to confer with Chinese communist representatives there. On January 27, 1969, Peretz flew to Paris allegedly carrying a letter drafted by Senator McCarthy. He returned to the United States on February 4, 1969.

---

*Classified "Secret." Dissemination restricted by Royal Canadian Mounted Police to White House, Secretary of State, and Department of Justice.

information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operations.

information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operations

~~A conference planned for February, 1969, at McGill University is designed to influence President Nixon's Administration to vote for United Nations admission of Communist China and to recognize it diplomatically. Canadian and U. S. participants will include LIN and Sorensen. If initially successful, a follow-up conference to include Chinese Communist representatives is planned.~~

~~We are targeting a top-level informant against LIN to develop further information.~~

Israeli Intelligence*

~~The FBI currently has under investigation Dr. Zalman Mordecai Shapiro, head of Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC), Apollo, Pennsylvania. NUMEC processes uranium-235 for nuclear reactors and has Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) contracts. Shapiro has an AEC-approved clearance which entitles him to access to "Top Secret" atomic energy information.~~

~~During May, 1968, we instituted investigation of Shapiro following a request made by the Central Intelligence Agency of the Attorney General. Our purpose was to ascertain his connections with Israeli officials and, in particular, whether he is in contact with Israeli intelligence agents in this country. We learned that Shapiro actually is in contact with at least one Israeli intelligence agent assigned to the Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C., as well as with one senior official of Israeli military intelligence; with individuals associated with the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission; and with a number of United States citizens sympathetic towards Israel. We have definitely shown Shapiro's loyalty toward Israel and, in fact, he has considered whether to move to that country in order to assist Israel. Shapiro has commented that he will fight for Israel and frequently travels there and meets with Israeli Atomic Energy Commission officials as well as with other Israeli Government leaders.~~

~~It is anticipated that our investigation of Shapiro will be completed in the very near future, at which time we contemplate advising AEC, requesting that agency to advise this Bureau what administrative action it intends to take against Shapiro, bearing in mind he has the highest clearance for access to classified information granted by AEC and his company has AEC contracts.~~

---

*Classified "Secret."

information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operation

~~Results of our investigation have been furnished to the Central Intelligence Agency, AEC, and the Department of Justice.~~

Assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy

The essence of the Clay Shaw trial in New Orleans lies in the connection New Orleans District Attorney James C. Garrison is attempting to establish between Lee Harvey Oswald, David Ferrie (now deceased), and Clay Shaw. The principal witness has been Perry Russo who has said Oswald, Ferrie, and Shaw discussed assassinating President Kennedy at a meeting in Ferrie's apartment in New Orleans in September, 1963.

Immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy, the FBI received allegations of a connection between Ferrie and Oswald. These allegations were thoroughly and exhaustively investigated. No evidence was ever developed that Oswald and Ferrie were acquainted. Clay Shaw's name never came up in the investigation and the FBI never investigated him.

The FBI has held to a "hands-off" policy regarding Garrison's investigation. Although we are closely following Shaw's trial, we have no observers in the courtroom. It is noted that the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice has an unofficial observer in the courtroom.

Garrison's mental stability is questionable. He received a medical discharge in October, 1951, from the U. S. Army for an emotional problem. He admitted to Army authorities that he had received psychiatric treatment. Garrison was a Special Agent of the FBI for four months, resigning to re-enter military service in July, 1951.

Martin Luther King, Jr.*

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

~~*Detailed information about King's [redacted] [redacted] was furnished to the White House and the Attorney General on January 23, 1969. The Deputy Attorney General did not receive a copy.~~

None of material re King derived from electronic surveillance of King & derived from a peculiarly sensitive source in foreign intelligence operations.

[redacted]

~~King's widow and Stanley Levison are spearheading attempts to establish a national memorial to King. Efforts are also being made to declare King's birthday a national holiday. Further, arrangements have been made to have a bust of King put in the National Cathedral in Washington, D. C., as soon as the money is raised. It is absolutely ludicrous and ridiculous that such honors should even be given serious consideration in view of the~~ [redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

~~Stanley Levison, advisor to both King and King's widow, was identified as a secret Communist Party member as late as 1963.~~

information tends to identify a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE REDUCTION OF CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

In connection with the juvenile problem in the District of Columbia, it is suggested that an Enabling Statute be passed which would allow juveniles to be handled in the District of Columbia as they are throughout the United States; publicize the names of the juveniles involved in serious crimes and maintain and make available juvenile records to law enforcement agencies. In areas of high crime, improved street lighting should be installed.

Mandatory sentences are recommended for crimes committed with the use of firearms or involving threats, and a habitual criminal statute might be effective. Consideration could be given to the registration of all convicted felons in the District, as well as a law requiring registration of firearms.

Authorities responsible for allowing prisoners to be released under the "Work Release Program" should thoroughly consider their prior records so that vicious felons will not be returned to the streets. In addition, prosecutors should not accept guilty pleas on one count while dismissing other counts; and abolition of capital punishment should be opposed until a life sentence means "life."

As a deterrent to bank robberies, District banks should on a voluntary basis accelerate the implementation of the provisions of the Bank Protection Act of 1968, and consideration should be given to the deployment of one police officer and a bank guard to selected institutions.

More stringent penalties should be invoked for violations of gambling laws, and sentences should be made stiffer for second offenders.

ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

The entire facilities of the FBI were committed to the investigation of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., in Memphis, Tennessee, on 4-4-68, and within five days the man then known as Eric S. Galt was developed as a prime suspect. From a check of latent fingerprints against those of white male fugitives for whom "wanted" notices had been placed in the files of the FBI Identification Division, James Earl Ray was determined to be the true identity of Eric S. Galt. At the request of the FBI, Canadian authorities determined that a Canadian passport had been issued to Ray in the name of Ramon George Sneyd, and on June 8, 1968, Ray was arrested by Scotland Yard when he presented the Sneyd passport to travel from London to Brussels. At the conclusion of extradition proceedings, Ray was returned to the United States in custody of FBI Agents and was turned over to local authorities in Memphis, Tennessee, for state prosecution. Local trial is scheduled for April 7, 1969.

ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT BY 21 POLITICAL COMMITTEES;
W. PAT JENNINGS, CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - COMPLAINANT
TITLE 2, SECTION 244, USC, ELECTION LAWS

We were instructed by former Assistant Attorney General Vinson to interview the Chairmen and Treasurers of 20 Republican Committees and one Democratic Committee that filed late reports with the Clerk of the House of Representatives. There have been some delays in obtaining necessary information as well as locating the individuals to be interviewed. We have kept the Department fully advised of all developments.

Mr. Daniel W. Hofgren of the White House Staff declined to be interviewed, indicating the matter would have to be taken up with the General Counsel at the White House and the Attorney General. Hofgren indicated he was speaking on behalf of other employees of the White House. This, of course, has been reported to the Attorney General. We are going forward on an expeditious basis with all other interviews and current developments are being brought to the attention of the Department.

SIRHAN BISHARA SIRHAN
ASSASSINATION OF SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY

On June 5, 1968, Senator Kennedy was shot and killed in the Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, California, following a political speech. Sirhan Bishara Sirhan was identified by witnesses as the assailant. He was indicted by a Los Angeles County grand jury and charged with murder. Trial began at Los Angeles Superior Court on January 7, 1969. A jury has been selected and the trial is presently in progress.

GARY STEVEN KRIST;
RUTH EISEMANN-SCHIER;
BARBARA JANE MACKLE - VICTIM
KIDNAPING

On December 17, 1968, 20-year-old Barbara Jane Mackle was abducted from an Atlanta, Georgia, area motel. A $500,000 ransom demand was subsequently made of her father, Robert Mackle, a Coral Gables, Florida, resident and business official. FBI investigation resulted in the safe return of Miss Mackle, who had been buried in a coffin-like box northeast of Atlanta, Georgia; the recovery of most of the ransom money; and the apprehension of one of the subjects, identified as Gary Steven Krist. An all-out investigation continues to locate Ruth Eisemann-Schier, the other subject in this case. Federal charges were filed in Miami, Florida, against subjects for violation of Extortion Statute, Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Statute, and the Aiding and Abetting Statute. The subjects were indicted in DeKalb County, Georgia, for kidnaping on January 13, 1969. The Bureau has furnished results of its investigations to local authorities and is cooperating in the state trial which will be held in this matter. Krist was brought before the circuit court in DeKalb County, Georgia, on February 7, 1969, at which time the court appointed two attorneys to represent him. One of the attorneys is James R. Venable, who has been for many years Imperial Wizard for the National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. A three-week delay was requested by the attorneys, and the judge set the next appearance for February 28, 1969.

February 17, 1969

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS
DISCONTINUANCE OF BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATIONS ON CLERICAL
APPLICANTS FOR THE BUREAU OF
NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
(BNDD)

The Bureau has been conducting background investigations on applicants and employees of the BNDD since that agency came under the jurisdiction of the Department. These investigations were conducted pursuant to Departmental Order #175-59 dated April 1, 1959.

Our Chicago Division learned that BNDD had been conducting preemployment checks to include credit and criminal investigation, interviews with former employers, supervisors, and references. On January 21, 1969, both Assistant Attorney General for Administration Pellerzi and Associate Director Giordano, BNDD, agreed with the Bureau's position that conducting duplicate investigations of clerical applicants for BNDD was a waste of time and money; however, on February 4, 1969, Mr. Giordano reversed his position and stated he wanted to run credit and criminal checks and contact the last two employers to see if they had any further interest in the clerical applicant. The Bureau would then be asked to complete the investigation. Mr. Giordano was told that BNDD should do their own clerical applicant investigations entirely or the FBI should do them entirely. The Director noted that he wanted no part of divided responsibility and this position was confirmed in our letter to Mr. Pellerzi dated February 6, 1969, copy attached. This letter advised that effective immediately we would not accept any additional requests for investigations of clerical applicants and that, if during the course of investigations of these people by BNDD, they should find subversive derogatory information, then the case should be referred to the Bureau for a full field investigation under the provisions of the Federal Employee Security Program.

Since February 6, 1969, we have not accepted any requests for investigation of clerical people for BNDD.

Enc. (1)

Mr. Leo M. Pellerzi
Assistant Attorney General for Administration

February 6, 1969

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Cleveland
① - Mr. Hartley

DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS
BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

With regard to the request of Mr. Giordano, Associate Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, that the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs be permitted to conduct credit and criminal checks and contact the last two employers in connection with clerical applicants, he was informed on February 4, 1969, of the undesirability of divided responsibility and duplication of investigative effort by the FBI and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. He was advised that it was felt that either they should handle these investigations entirely or the FBI should handle them entirely.

Please be advised that effective/immediately we will not accept any additional requests for investigations of clerical applicants since this Bureau wants no part of divided responsibility regarding these investigations or criticism for any possible duplication of investigative effort. If during the course of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs investigations of their clerical applicants subversive derogatory information is developed, it should be referred to this Bureau for a full field investigation under the provisions of the Federal Employee Security Program.

1 - Mr. Henry L. Giordano
Associate Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

NOTE: See cover memorandum J. H. Gale to DeLoach 2/6/69, same caption, WVC:dbh:msm.

WVC:msm:dbh
(9)

14a

MARTIN EDWARD UNDERWOOD

Underwood, aged 54, was employed for a number of years as a salesman in Illinois and Maryland. Since 1961 he has been employed by the United States Government, for the greater period by the Department of Commerce, and the Small Business Administration. He was detailed to the White House in 1966 as an advance man in connection with the travels of former President Johnson.

We conducted an investigation of Underwood for the White House in 1965 which revealed he had a serious drinking problem prior to the investigation and was considered an alcoholic at one time. He is unmarried and has had two divorces, the first of which was precipitated by his drinking. Several people interviewed in the 1965 investigation would not recommend Underwood because of his drinking on the West Coast in 1964. After President Johnson's departure Underwood continued to hold an office on the first floor of the Executive Office Building, apparently gaining the favor of Vice President Agnew. On February 6, 1969, Underwood was removed from his office and his White House pass has been taken. The White House has been in contact with the Department of Commerce, on whose payroll Underwood has been while working at the White House, and advised the Department of Commerce to inform Underwood his services are no longer required.

Persons interviewed during our current investigation state Underwood apparently stopped drinking in 1964 and no longer has the drinking problem. Results of current investigation were furnished White House in memorandum dated February 12, 1969. Several interviews and one agency check remain to be handled.

VIRGINIA STANFILL SAVELL

She was employed by former United States Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of California in his Los Angeles, California, office from August, 1961, to September, 1968. She is presently an assistant to Herbert G. Klein at the White House.

In September, 1966, at the request of Senator Kuchel, a very discreet inquiry was conducted into an allegation Senator Kuchel had received that Mrs. Savell was possibly operating a bookie joint out of the Senator's Los Angeles, California, office. The inquiry developed no information to substantiate the allegation. The investigation did develop information that Mrs. Savell reportedly was an alcoholic.

The current investigation to date has ascertained that the South Pasadena, California, Police Department records indicate Mrs. Savell attempted suicide on July 23, 1967. She reportedly took an overdose of sleeping capsules.

DONALD EDWIN GANOUNG
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANT
CONSULTANT
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Ganoung, aged 43, has B.A. degree in criminology and Bachelor of Divinity degree. He is former Episcopalian priest and has been active in attempting to rehabilitate sexual deviates and narcotics addicts in San Francisco; however, no one questioned his character in these connections. He is presently working as a consultant for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration with duty station in Washington, D. C.

Ganoung has also been active in civil rights and antidraft demonstrations and twice was arrested in this connection. He has worked with dissident groups and has grown a beard and worn beads in this connection. As a result of running around with another woman, his wife divorced him in 1967. The expenses of this affair, including alimony, forced him to file bankruptcy. He [redacted] A number of police officers in San Francisco area acquainted with Ganoung would not recommend him.

Ganoung is a protege of Wesley A. Pomeroy, Associate Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Pomeroy has been regarded as immature and insincere by former police acquaintances.

The results of our investigation of Ganoung were called to the attention of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General by letter dated February 11, 1969.

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

WILLIAM HENRY RENTSCHLER

William Henry Rentschler, aged 43, former newspaper reporter, has been co-owner and/or President of a candy company since 1956. He has been extremely active in Republican Party politics in Illinois for the past several years. He was involved in adulterous relationship with a woman other than his wife for approximately three years and later married that woman. This was a well known fact by those interviewed and Senator Dirksen said his involvement in notorious divorce action presents serious question of his suitability for employment by the Government. Senator Percy indicated Attorney General Mitchell recently told him Senator Dirksen had indicated Rentschler could not pass the rigid background investigation by the FBI. During the investigation Rentschler was described as articulate and an intelligent individual who is knowledgeable in the field of politics. Several persons pointed out he lacks business ability, fails to follow through on details and does not have a feeling for finances. Some individuals did not recommend him for a position of trust, some recommended him with reservations, and some recommended him highly. A summary memorandum containing the results of investigation to date was furnished to the White House on February 10, 1969. Outstanding investigation consisted of an interview of Maurice H. Stans, Secretary of Commerce, and several other individuals who have been unavailable for contact. Secretary Stans has been interviewed and states he cannot recommend Rentschler due to unfavorable hearsay information concerning his alleged financial irresponsibility and his moral life. Additional investigation is necessary based on information furnished by Secretary Stans.

SPECIAL INQUIRY INVESTIGATIONS FOR THE WHITE HOUSE

Conscientious security officers in various governmental agencies, many of whom are former Special Agents of the Bureau, have been shocked at the lack of knowledge or the total disregard of the provisions of the Federal Employee Security Program by the eight or nine individuals at the White House responsible for filling top-level positions in the new Administration. This first came to our attention shortly after November 6, 1968, when Franklin Benjamin Lincoln, Jr., and William Rittenhouse Harman moved into the Pentagon as the vanguard of the transition team. They had no clearance for highly classified information and when no request was forthcoming for a full field investigation of these persons, the security officer at the Pentagon requested the investigation.

This matter came to a head on February 10, 1969, when the Secretary of Commerce was told by the White House to write a letter certifying that prospective Assistant Secretaries were cleared politically and from a security standpoint. When the Department of Commerce was told we had received no request for a full field investigation, that Department was informed by the White House the FBI had done a "24-hour check." The Department of Commerce would not accept this since the Federal Employee Security Program requires that no critical sensitive jobs should be filled unless a full field investigation is first conducted.

Most of the requests for investigations received thus far from the White House are in connection with persons who have been publicly announced and are already firmly established in their jobs. As a result, instead of discontinuing investigation upon the development of derogatory data the White House requests the investigation be continued and at the present time we know of only one person the Administration has discharged. This was a stenographer in Mr. Ehrlichman's office by the name of Helen Galanoplos, who had two brothers and a sister-in-law who were members of the Communist Party.

In connection with White House investigations Don Virdin of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) called the Bureau on February 13, 1969. Virdin stated that IRS had checked their files in connection with the last 25 persons publicly announced and confirmed by the Senate. He stated that this check revealed that the Bureau had only asked for IRS information in connection with about 8 of these 25 people. He stated he felt this was strange because there was some rather interesting information in connection with some of these people, such as the fact that one of these individuals, whom he did not identify, had not filed an income tax return for the past three years. (We have run checks on all requests received from the White House on Presidential appointees and it would appear from the above that the White House only asked for us to conduct investigations on 8 of the last 25 publicly announced appointees.)

SELECTIVE SERVICE

Selective Service investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in recent years have broadened to cope with recurring schemes to obstruct the draft. At the present time, we have slightly over 14,000 pending investigations, compared to 9,000 a year ago.

In fiscal year 1968, 809 convictions were recorded as compared to 763 convictions the previous fiscal year. For the first seven months of fiscal year 1969, 380 convictions were recorded compared to 374 convictions recorded for a similar period in the preceding fiscal year. It appears that such a trend will continue during the current fiscal year.

There follows a brief summary of an investigation of interest concerning a Selective Service matter.

At San Francisco in October 1968, it was learned Erik Alfred Whitehorn, aged 18, had not registered with Selective Service because his mother, Evelyn Whitehorn, had refused to grant permission. For his failing to register, Whitehorn was indicted, on November 20, 1968.

Following arraignment and release on his own recognizance, a Complaint and Petition for Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against registration for the draft was filed in behalf of the subject. It claims if a person under 21 years of age cannot vote, control or dispose of his own property, serve on juries, marry, contract or litigate, then he cannot register for the draft without his parents' consent. Therefore, the mother, by teaching her son principles of morality and by influencing him to follow his own conscience, bears the main responsibility and should be punished instead of her son. The Judge hearing this case ruled that the son must stand trial for refusing to register for the draft and rejected the mother's appeals.

A date for the trial of Erik Whitehorn has been scheduled for March 19, 1969.

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME

The main thrust of our investigations of organized crime has been aimed at the key members in the power structure of La Cosa Nostra in order to secure their imprisonment and to disrupt leadership. We have also struck hard at the lower working level who are the money producing figures for the top echelon leaders. With progressively greater success, we have made deeper penetration into the heart of the hoodlum syndicate, the illegal gambling operations from which it draws much of its vast resources.

Prosecutions of hoodlums, gamblers, and vice figures for violating the laws within the Bureau's jurisdiction have been steadily increasing. For the fourth consecutive year, convictions have reached new highs, as evidenced by the fact that during Fiscal Year 1968, our drive against organized crime resulted in the conviction of 281 organized crime and gambling figures, compared with the 197 convictions during the preceding year. In addition, there are now 789 other individuals awaiting trial in Federal court. The substantial backlog of individuals awaiting further prosecution indicates that the upward trend of convictions will continue during Fiscal Year 1969. However, it is apparent that if we are to continue to be effective in our drive against the hoodlum element, prosecutions of these matters must necessarily receive high priority.

Recent Major Accomplishments

Among our most recent major accomplishments are: the conviction of Ernest Sansone, Chicago hoodlum, and five associates on February 12, 1969, in connection with a widespread race wire dissemination service; the arrest of John Philip Cerone, current top leader of organized crime in the Chicago area, along with two accomplices on February 7, 1969, in connection with the operation of a large-scale gambling organization; the conviction of West Coast hoodlum figure, John Roselli, on February 3, 1969, for running an interstate gambling operation; the conviction of William Daddano, described as the 5th ranking mobster in Chicago, and four accomplices on October 3, 1968, for bank robbery; the arrest on November 26, 1968, of La Cosa Nostra "commission" member Stefano Magaddino, and eight associates for Interstate Gambling Activity; the arrest on December 5, 1968, of Pittston, Pa., La Cosa Nostra "Boss" Russell Bufalino and two associates for conspiring to transport some $23,000 worth of stolen television sets interstate; the September 12, 1968, conviction of New Orleans La Cosa Nostra "boss" Carlos Marcello for attempting to assault a Federal officer; the March 21, 1968, arrest of New Jersey La Cosa Nostra "boss" Samuel Rizzo Decavalcante and two associates for conspiring to extort money from four gamblers, and the conviction on March 8, 1968, of New England area La Cosa Nostra chieftain Raymond Patriarca and one of his "captains," Henry Tameleo, for violating the Anti-Racketeering statute in connection with a gambling-murder case.

Dissemination Program

As a result of our dissemination program, 287,004 items of criminal intelligence "type" information were disseminated to other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies during Fiscal Year 1967, 300,244 such items were disseminated in Fiscal Year 1968, and during the first six months of the present Fiscal Year we have disseminated 153,214 items. Over one million such items have been disseminated during the past five years.

With respect to dissemination of information concerning local gambling operations to other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States for Fiscal Year 1968, a total of 721 raids took place; 3751 individuals were arrested of whom 1170 were convicted; paraphernalia seized amounted to $1,395,069 and United States currency confiscated amounted to $624,028. In the first six months of the present Fiscal Year 329 raids have taken place, 1787 individuals have been arrested, of whom 771 have been convicted; paraphernalia seized amounted to $221,021, and United States currency confiscated amounted to $273,701.

Department of Justice Task Forces on Organized Crime

In the Fall of 1966, the Criminal Division of the Department initiated the Task Force Operation (also called Strike Force) and the first one began operation in Buffalo, New York. These Task Forces consisted of a group comprised of Departmental attorneys and investigative personnel from several different Federal investigative agencies. The FBI was invited to assign personnel but declined because of its overall commitments requiring utilization of all of its Agents. However, we have extended complete cooperation in the form of information in investigative reports and have promptly handled all cases within our investigative jurisdiction that were referred to us from the Task Forces.

Since the initial Task Force at Buffalo, the Department has formed such groups in Detroit, Michigan; Brooklyn, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Chicago, Illinois; Miami, Florida; and Newark, New Jersey.

We now maintain liaison with the various Task Forces but not on a full-time basis.

It has been recommended that (1) we continue to cooperate on a full-time basis, from the standpoint of furnishing information to the various Task Forces, (2) that the Director indicate to the new Attorney General that we will be happy to assign an FBI Inspector to serve as liaison with the Department Task Force office in Washington, D. C., (3) that a supervisory employee would be assigned by each SAC to a specific Task Force when such Task Force is established within a given area where one of our field offices is located, for liaison purposes.

La Cosa Nostra Leadership Changes

In the New York City area where La Cosa Nostra "Commission" member Thomas Luchese died during 1967, no successor has been named to date, primarily because the FBI was responsible for the arrest and/or conviction of the four leading contenders, all "captains" or ranking members of the Luchese "family."

In Chicago, John Philip Cerone, who was being groomed as the top leader of La Cosa Nostra group in the Chicago area, was arrested on February 7, 1969, for Interstate Gambling Activities. Cerone was the interim Chicago leader for Sam Giancana, who fled to Latin America following his release from Federal prison and his successor, Sam Battaglia, who is in Federal prison for violating the Anti-Racketeering Act.

In New York, veteran New York hoodlum Paul Sciacca presently is the "boss" of a New York City La Cosa Nostra "family" once headed by the notorious, controversial Joseph Bonanno.

DEPARTMENT'S MANUAL FOR USE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNDER TITLE III OF OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL BILL

The Attorney General has been furnished our views with regard to the Department's draft manual for use of electronic surveillance pursuant to Title III. The general provisions of this lengthy manual, much of which concerned administrative regulations not specifically required by the statute itself, would impose tremendous administrative and procedural restrictions on the FBI and other Federal agencies to the point that strict compliance might be self-defeating to the goal of maintaining discreet electronic surveillance coverage under court supervision for the purpose of obtaining admissible evidence against the leadership of organized crime and in other major investigative categories. These requirements involve an investigative agent's application for intercept authority to be reviewed by a comparatively wide range of authorities including the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department, in many cases the United States Attorney, the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, and finally the Attorney General before the request even reached the court which, according to the provisions of this statute, is the ultimate authority and control in the use of this procedure. This process would, of necessity, be time-consuming, cumbersome, and, at certain points, repetitious, and would spread the knowledge of the use of this technique among a number of different governmental offices.

We noted that the draft manual made repeated reference to the problem of probable cause becoming "stale" and observed that the sheer weight of the deliberative process at various approving levels before it even reached the judge could alone result in the probable cause becoming "stale." We also noted that requirements involving daily memoranda to the United States Attorney concerning the progress of a court authorized surveillance and other similar administrative requirements would tend to place burdens on investigating agents which could detract from the ultimate purpose of our use of this technique.

In connection with the manual's requirement that an authorized surveillance be terminated when the subject of the surveillance departed the premises covered, we questioned that such a requirement was called for in the statute and whether

Congress, in providing this important added tool in the evidence gathering process, intended that such a restriction applied. We also noted that the draft suggested that in all cases when an application for an order is denied, those named in the application would be informed that the Government intended to subject them to electronic surveillance. With regard to denied applications, we contend that this notice requirement pertains only to those situations where emergency intercepts have been made without court order, and thereafter the court has denied the application and not to all applications which might be denied in the normal course of business pursuant to the main body of regulations in Title III.

We concluded our observations to the Attorney General that while it was appreciated that the drafting of guidelines in this matter presents extremely sensitive problems, it was believed that for the Government's ultimate success in making use of this evidence gathering procedure, restrictions must not apply which will create more limitations on law enforcement than the statute itself prescribes.

MISCELLANEOUS

ABC-TV Series "The FBI" television series, which is produced by QM Productions, in conjunction with Warner Brothers - Seven Arts, Inc., is shown over the facilities of the American Broadcasting Company Television Network. This program is completing its fourth year on the air and production plans are going forward at the present time for a fifth season. This series, which is based on actual FBI cases, has consistently occupied a strong position in the television ratings, the latest 30 Market Nielson Rating reflecting that it is the second most popular show on the air. It is estimated that the program has 26 million viewers each week.

In connection with "The FBI", plans are being made to present a two-hour program based on the Barbara Jean Mackle kidnaping case next season. Of course, this program will not be televised until all prosecutive action is completed.

Spot announcements are made following the program on a periodic basis, which announcements highlight individuals who are being sought by the FBI who are on the "Ten Most Wanted Fugitives" list.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: April 30, 1969

FROM : A. Rosen

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Gale

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
WILL R. WILSON, CRIMINAL DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
APRIL 30, 1969

Attorney General's Staff Conference

SYNOPSIS: In accordance with your request, we have prepared a memorandum concerning items which the Director might care to use in connection with captioned matter. This has been coordinated with the Special Investigative Division.

Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Wilson is scheduled to be the featured speaker before the Federal Bar Association on April 30, 1969, at 12:30 p.m. The speech will be given in the National Lawyers Club and is entitled "Don Quixote Among the Mafia."

Attached for ready reference are more detailed writeups concerning the following matters:

Organized crime - Details of the Manhattan Joint Strike Force established by the Department are set forth, including the identities of the members of the supervisory council. In the Extortionate Credit Transaction case involving Albert M. Billiteri, the Attorney General on April 23, 1969, approved microphone and technical surveillance at two of Billiteri's key locations. Billiteri is a Buffalo, New York, La Cosa Nostra member.

Status of Antiriot Laws investigations in Chicago, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Washington, D. C. set forth. In addition, mention is made of recent campus disorders at Brandeis and American Universities.

REC 10

62-94786-11

Mention is made of the fact that we have written five letters to the Department requesting it's views concerning the prosecution of Dyer Act violations since there is a divergence of opinion among the United States Attorneys as to which cases should be prosecuted. Our last letter to the Attorney General dated March 5, 1969, has not been answered.

RIS:jny
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

14 JUL 25 1969

57 AUG 4 1969

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
Re: Director's Meeting with
Assistant Attorney General
Will R. Wilson

A number of case writeups are set forth which are believed to be of interest to the Department, particularly AAG Wilson. Included are fraud cases against the Universal Fibreglass Corporation (thirteen million dollar contract to produce mail delivery trucks); Youth Pride, Inc., Washington, D. C. (payroll padding); Chromcraft Corporation ("paper" corporations formed to act as subcontractors in connection with production of rocket launchers for United States Navy).

Writeups are also submitted concerning financier Louis Wolfson and his alleged dealings with Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas based upon information furnished by the Internal Revenus Service; the bribery case involving Congressman George H. Fallon (allegations received that payoffs totaling $200,000 were made to Congressman Fallon and Lawson B. Knott, Jr., former General Services administrator, in return for obtaining commitments for Government occupancy of office buildings). Our New York Office developed information that a theft ring existed at John F. Kennedy Airport, New York City, and it is anticipated Federal Grand Jury will indict 15 to 17 individuals. Attorney General Mitchell has reportedly expressed interest in this case (Sidney Steinschreiber; And Others, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property).

ACTION:

This is submitted for information, and attached are more detailed writeups concerning the above matters.

DETAILS - OVER

DETAILS:

ORGANIZED CRIME

ALBERT M. BILLITERI
EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

Billiteri is a Buffalo, New York La Cosa Nostra member in the "family" of "Commission" member Steve Magaddino, and operates a major loan-shark racket in the Buffalo area on behalf of Joseph Fino, the "underboss" of the Magaddino family. On 4/23/69, the Attorney General approved a recommendation for microphone and technical surveillance at two of Billiteri's key locations where this illegal activity is carried on. The Attorney General authorized a Department Attorney to handle the filing of affidavits with the Federal court in Buffalo, New York, to obtain the necessary court order for the electronic surveillance sought, pursuant to Title 3 of the Omnibus Crime Bill. The Department Attorney, in conjunction with our Buffalo office, was to make application to the court on 4/28/69, the necessary affidavits to be filed by a Bureau Agent. This is the first such application we have made pursuant to the provisions of Title 3.

MANHATTAN JOINT STRIKE FORCE

The Department has proposed a strike force with the stated objective of making a concentrated drive against organized crime in the borough of Manhattan in New York City. This apparently has been enlarged to include the Bronx in view of the inclusion of the Bronx County District Attorney on the Strike Force Council. This strike force is to be composed of Department Attorneys, members of the staffs of the District Attorneys of New York and Bronx Counties, members of the New York City Police Department and investigators from the various Federal investigative agencies, including the FBI. The Federal Government is to provide the office space and office equipment. A supervisory council has been named to make decisions of strategy and timing and approve all planning. The members of the Council have been named as Assistant Director in Charge John F. Malone of our New York office, the District Attorneys of New York and Bronx Counties, Police Commissioner of New York City, Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson, the Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement of the Treasury Department, the Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department, and the U. S. Attorney of the Southern District of New York.

ANTIRIOT LAWS

Chicago Cases

On March 20, 1969, the Federal Grand Jury at Chicago, Illinois, based upon extensive Bureau investigations, returned indictments against seven leaders of the New Left and one leader of the Black Panther Party all of whom were charged with Antiriot Laws violations in connection with the Chicago disturbances at the time of the Democratic National Convention. Trial has been set for September 24, 1969.

San Francisco Case

After extensive FBI investigation the Department commenced grand jury proceedings on April 23, 1969, at San Francisco in connection with Antiriot Laws violations allegedly committed by three Black Panthers who gave instructions in the use of firearms and explosives during a conference held by the Black Panther Party in San Francisco last November.

Philadelphia Case

We have conducted extensive investigation into Antiriot Laws violations in connection with the Black Power Conference held in Philadelphia in August and September, 1968. Approximately 3,000 to 4,000 Negroes from all over the country attended this conference during which five subjects provided instruction in the use of firearms and explosives for a closed meeting of approximately 70 persons.

Inauguration Disturbances

On April 18, 1969, the Department requested investigation of fifteen subjects who allegedly came to Washington, D. C., on inauguration day for the purpose of creating disorders. This investigation is being conducted on an expedite basis.

Campus Disorders

At the present time there are also a number of Antiriot Laws investigations being conducted with regard to recent campus disorders, most notably at Brandeis University where two professors from San Francisco State College allegedly contributed to the seizing of the Administration Building on January 8, 1969, and American University, Washington, D. C., where members of the Students for a Democratic Society allegedly traveled to Washington, D. C., and participated in seizing a building on the campus on April 23, 1969.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE INVESTIGATIONS (DYER ACT)

In the fall of 1967, the former Attorney General and his staff held conferences with various United States Attorneys (USA) here in Washington, D. C. Following these conferences, we learned of a divergence of opinion among USAs concerning the Department's views in prosecuting Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle (ITSMV) cases. Some had the opinion that only automobile theft ring cases should be prosecuted in Federal court while others were of the opinion that only cases having commercial aspects should be considered for such prosecution. Other USAs felt only cases possessing aggravated circumstances should be considered. Some continue to consider each case on its individual merits. During the period October, 1967, through May, 1968, we wrote four letters to the former Attorney General requesting the Department's views concerning the prosecution of these cases. In a letter dated April 12, 1968, to the Department, we set forth our views that prosecution of Dyer Act cases in Federal court should not be restricted to commercial matters and to adults, but rather that each case should be considered on its individual merits. None of these letters were answered. On March 5, 1969, we wrote the present Attorney General informing him of the divergence of opinion among USAs. This letter also requested the Attorney General furnish us his views concerning this matter; however, an answer has not been received to date.

UNIVERSAL FIBREGLASS CORPORATION
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

Following a partial audit by General Services Administration, we instituted an investigation, at Department's request, of alleged overcharges to the Government by Universal Fibreglass Corporation (Universal) on a $13 million contract to produce mail delivery trucks. All logical investigation has been completed and reported except the review of the Universal records. Access to the pertinent records was recently achieved through court action and an extensive audit is now being pressed. Criminal prosecution of several subjects is now indicated.

Congressman H. R. Gross (R-Iowa) has publicized this matter. Press items have indicated that the office of then Senator Hubert H. Humphries may have been instrumental in having the contract awarded to Universal.

YOUTH PRIDE, INC.
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

In January, 1969, following administrative investigations by General Accounting Office and Department of Labor, the Department requested we review subpoenaed records of Youth Pride, Inc., a Washington, D. C., organization funded by Labor Department to help underprivileged youths, to identify individuals participating in payroll padding in violation of Fraud Against the Government Statutes. Grand jury began hearing witnesses March 10, 1969.

CHROMCRAFT CORPORATION; ET AL.
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

We conducted an extensive investigation in this case of a multimillion dollar fraud scheme in which "paper" corporations were formed to act as subcontractors in connection with the production of rocket launchers for the U. S. Navy. Millions of dollars in overcharges to the Navy were channeled by subjects into Swiss bank accounts. On August 7, 1968, two corporations and four individuals, including Francis Rosenbaum, a Washington, D. C., tax attorney, were indicted in Washington, D. C., on charges of conspiring to defraud the Government of more than $4 million. Trial date is set for September 8, 1969. On January 29, 1969, civil suits were filed in Federal courts in Washington, D. C., and St. Louis, Missouri, demanding judgment for double damages arising from the fraud charges in the criminal indictment.

LOUIS WOLFSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING

At request of the Department, received April 17, 1969, we are ascertaining subscribers to some 400 telephone numbers in various parts of the United States called from the Florida farms of Louis Wolfson, who was recently convicted in two Securities and Exchange Commission cases in New York. Most of these have been determined and furnished Criminal Division. Remaining are being expedited and results being furnished to Department as received. Bureau records also checked with negative results regarding $20,000 check from Wolfson Family Foundation to Abe Fortas, Supreme Court Justice, dated January 3, 1966, and $20,000 check from Fortas to Wolfson Family Foundation dated December 22, 1966. Internal Revenue Service conducted investigation and determined $20,000 check to Fortas was allegedly for discrimination study and $20,000 returned to Wolfson Family Foundation by Fortas as study was not undertaken.

CONGRESSMAN GEORGE H. FALLON; ET AL.
BRIBERY

Investigation is being conducted of allegation made by Joseph J. Weiner, a Washington, D. C., mortgage broker, that payoffs totaling $200,000 were to be made to Congressman Fallon and Lawson B. Knott, Jr., former General Services Administration Administrator (GSA), in return for obtaining commitments from GSA for Government occupancy of office buildings in Baltimore, Maryland, and Durham, North Carolina, to be constructed by Piracci Construction Company, Baltimore, Maryland. Weiner was granted immunity by U. S. Attorney, Baltimore, from prosecution in Federal Housing Administration Matters case provided he was truthful in Congressman Fallon case. Investigation awaiting results of visit by Dominick Piracci and Weiner at GSA sometime in May, 1969.

SIDNEY STEINSCHREIBER;
AND OTHERS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF
STOLEN PROPERTY (ITSP)
THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT (TFIS)
CONSPIRACY

Captioned investigation concerns theft ring operating at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York City. Special Prosecutor Daniel P. Hollman, Department of Justice Task Force, is presenting evidence to Federal Grand Jury wherein 15 to 17 indictments anticipated probably April 30, 1969. Organized Crime Section of the Department of Justice and Attorney General Mitchell particularly interested.

In October, 1968, four individuals, including Steinschreiber and Mario Alessi, were arrested by the FBI in connection with theft of drugs. Since that time, Alessi, a Pan American Airways cargo supervisor, has been cooperating and named others in connection with pharmaceutical thefts amounting to over $100,000, as well as a series of general merchandise thefts, such as furs, jewelry, and firearms probably in excess of $250,000 involved. Alessi has identified Raymond Wood, U. S. Customs Examiner, as being involved. Wood has been interviewed, but denies complicity. Customs Agency has been apprised of Wood's alleged involvement.

This Bureau has long been aware of the serious problems of thievery at airports in the New York metropolitan area, particularly at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Special Agents of this Bureau are assigned on the scene at that airport and are actively handling investigations of violations within our jurisdiction. In performing our duties, we enjoy close working cooperation with other law enforcement agencies, with the airlines, and with the Airport Security Council formed in 1968 to cope with these problems.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Mohr
1-Mr. Bishop

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. DE LOACH

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : S. B. DONAHOE

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE
WEDNESDAY, 5:00 P. M.

The Attorney General's memorandum of 3/5/70 instituting weekly staff conferences listed a number of invitees. Among those who will attend are the following:

Benjamin F. Holman, Director,
Community Relations Service

Shiro Kashiwa, Assistant Attorney General,
Land and Natural Resources Division

Sol Lindenbaum, Executive Assistant to
the Attorney General

Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division

Herman G. Moeller, Director (Acting),
Bureau of Prisons

George J. Reed, Chairman,
Board of Parole

William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel

George H. Revercomb, Associate Deputy
Attorney General

REC 4

Maurice A. Roberts, Chairman,
Board of Immigration Appeals

Donald E. Santarelli, Associate Deputy
Attorney General

321

SBD:amr
(4)

Continued.......Over

Lawrence Traylor, Pardon Attorney (Acting)

Johnnie McK. Walters, Assistant Attorney General,
Tax Division

Harlington Wood, Jr., Director, Executive Office
for United States Attorneys

ACTION:

For the information of the Director, a memorandum will be submitted each Wednesday morning concisely setting forth those items which might arise for discussion.

✓

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: 3/18/70

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE IN CONNECTION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE WEDNESDAYS, 5:00 P.M.

Reference is made to my memorandum of 3/13/70, submitting a brief for the Director's use in connection with captioned conference. You were advised this material would be edited each week to insure that it was in a current status.

There are attached amended pages 11, 12, 16, and 26 which should be inserted in the brief.

The change on page 11 is under the subheading "Stock and Bond Thefts," and the last sentence has been changed to reflect that the amount recovered is now $8,026,000 and that 29 individuals have been charged. The change on page 12 is the fact that the last sentence on the page has been added to show that the United States Attorney in Baltimore, with the approval of the Attorney General, plans to seek the indictment of Congressman Dowdy and two others on 3/31/70. The change on page 16 is in the first paragraph, reflecting that the Identification Division made an identification in connection with the Wilkerson bombing in New York. It also points out that Cathlyn Wilkerson and Kathy Boudin are among six other fugitives being sought by the FBI after they failed to appear to answer local felony charges in Chicago on 3/16/70 growing out of the October demonstrations. The change on page 26 was made to include additional Laboratory findings in regard to the Bel Air explosion.

6 - 11856-198

REC-30

EX-110

5 MAR 19 1970

Enclosures (4)

1 - Mr. Tolson - Enclosures
1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Walters - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Mohr - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Bishop - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Casper - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Conrad - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Felt - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Gale - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Rosen - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Sullivan - Enclosures
✓ 1 - Mr. Tavel - Enclosures
1 - Miss Gandy - Enclosures
1 - Miss Holmes - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Beaver - Enclosures
1 - M. A. Jones - Enclosures

57 MAR 2[illegible] 1970

DGH:ceb (20)

OPTIONAL FORM
MAY 19
GSA
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: April 8, 1970

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 1970, 5:00 P.M.

In accordance with the Director's instructions, I attended the captioned briefing which was commenced at 5:03 p.m. by the Attorney General who introduced the Director and the Director thereafter briefed all attendees on the work of the FBI. As the attendees arrived for the meeting I made available to each individual the bound FBI exhibit to which they could refer in following the Director's presentation. There were 29 departmental representatives present at this staff meeting. They were very attentive to the Director's presentation as indicated by the many questions following the Director's discussion. When the Director was providing the conference with the number of Negroes employed by the FBI, including Agent and clerical breakdown, Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst interrupted the Director and asked the Director to repeat these figures in order that he might record them.

At approximately 5:25 p.m. the Attorney General left the room to receive a telephone call. The Director questioned Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst as to whether he should continue or wait for the Attorney General's return. Mr. Kleindienst suggested the Director wait until the Attorney General returned.

Mr. Kleindienst asked the Director concerning his references to the volume of civil rights work - whether this included both civil and criminal investigations handled by the FBI under the Civil Rights Statutes and the Director replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Kleindienst then referred to the number of organized crime type cases the Director said are pending prosecutive action. He said are these all organized crime individuals. The Director replied they all have some connection with the many facets of organized crime. The Director went on to say many of these cases are pending a year or two and he felt if we had swift prosecution and substantial punishment a greater inroad could be made in removing the menace of organized crime. Mr. Kleindienst then commented that he felt that some of the

62-

REC-89

10 APR 20 1970

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan

JJC:aga
(10)

Copy left for Mr. Tolson

CONTINUED - OVER

problem here might be due to the resourcefulness of the organized crime subject's attorneys. The Director replied that certainly this is true where such shysters as Edward Bennett Williams represent these characters and he uses every technical trick to avoid prosecution and conviction. The Director went on to say that Attorney Kuntsler does the same thing in his field.

At this point, Wilson's Deputy, Petersen, of the Criminal Division, took this opportunity to point out to Kleindienst that what is needed here are more Assistant United States Attorneys, whereupon the Solicitor General added that Federal judges were also needed. Kleindienst then asked Petersen if he had studied these cases and the reason for delay that Mr. Hoover referred to and Petersen stated he did not have these figures at the end of his tongue but he had a survey made and, as he recalled it, there were 185 of these type cases delinquent six months or more. The others were delayed because of some court motion or action. The Solicitor General asked whether there was any concentration of these cases and Petersen said the Southern District of New York. Kleindienst then asked Petersen how many Assistant United States Attorneys he needed to do the job and Petersen said he could not give him a figure; however, he said he felt the District of Columbia's, for example, staff could be increased by half again as many at least and other appropriate increases would be necessary in major metropolitan centers.

Mr. Hoover at this point, pointed out Senate Bill 30 is going to put the FBI, if passed, into the local gambling picture and that we, in order to fulfill our responsibility, will probably have to ask for an additional 600 Agents. He pointed out that he hoped that the Criminal Division would draw up appropriate guidelines to prevent local authorities from relinquishing their responsibilities to also investigate local gambling.

At approximately 5:35 p.m., Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst advised the conference that the Attorney General was called to the White House and requested the Director to proceed with the briefing. At approximately 5:55 p.m., the Director completed his briefing and was congratulated by the Deputy Attorney General for the excellent presentation and the Deputy then opened the floor for questions.

Memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr
Re: Attorney General's Staff Conference
Wednesday, April 8, 1970, 5:00 p.m.

Assistant Attorney General Leo M. Pellerzi, Administrative Division, referred to the FBI exhibits and in particular Exhibit No. 25 and questioned Mr. Hoover as to why the State of Virginia had such a high number of Laboratory examinations. Mr. Hoover explained that Virginia had no Laboratory and that that was the reason for the high usage of the FBI Laboratory. Mr. Hoover took this opportunity to explain the FBI's policy in not making our experts available when local experts have already examined the evidence or are going to testify as to the evidence. He also explained there are many "phonies" who are traveling about the country conducting examinations and testifying but we, in these cases, have briefed the prosecuting attorneys in advance. The Director explained that in such places as New York State where they have their own Laboratories they only use our Lab for the more sophisticated examinations.

Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst then questioned the Director as to the basic qualifications for the position of Special Agent. The Director explained that they all had to be either lawyers or accountants or college graduates majoring in science or language. The Director emphasized again that we have no discrimination and that we have many fine Negro Agents in the FBI, pointing out that only last week he gave a meritorious award to a Negro Agent from our Detroit Office who had developed valuable informants in the Black Panthers and related organizations in that area. Kleindienst then asked the Director approximately how many applicants we turn down for each Agent that we accept. The Director explained that for every 100 applicants 90 of them are turned down. He said that we carefully interview these men, investigate them, test them, and give them thorough physical examinations to make sure they meet our high standards. The Director told the conference that he has a standing rule that if any Agent in Charge recommends an Agent or clerk who is a hippie type; that is, long hair, sideburns, etc., this Agent in Charge is going to lose his office, and we are going to get rid of the applicant. He said he would not tolerate any hippie types in the FBI and do not want our Agents going into Federal court looking like hippies.

The Director pointed out that many of our young clerical employees are going on to school to become Agents, and he demands the same discipline of these young people. He also pointed out that some 6,000 people a day tour our facilities and we don't want them getting the idea the FBI has any hippie types. As a matter of fact, the Director said with a smile that he would like to declare open season on these hippies just like you have open season on the deer and shoot them.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Mr. Kleindienst was also interested in the scope of our work and in this regard the Director took this opportunity to point out that he did not believe the FBI should be investigating every bomb threat and that he hoped that if the new bomb legislation as proposed by the President is passed the Department's Criminal Division will set appropriate guidelines. The Director pointed out that many of these major cities have very excellent bomb squads and they are fully equipped to handle these complaints. He said why should the FBI be paralleling work done by competent local authorities. He said, of course, in the local areas where they have no people qualified, then this is a different matter. The Director said in all of these cases we are always willing to make our FBI Laboratory facilities and Identification facilities available as well as assist the local authorities by covering out-of-state leads.

Assistant Attorney General Johnnie M. Walters asked the Director if he could see any lessening of the problems that he talked about in the foreseeable future. The Director said in the organized crime field, if the steps he has recommended are taken, he feels there will be a decrease. With regard to the disorders in colleges and in the high schools and caused by the militants he said this is another story. The Director cited the incident of one of the subjects in the Chicago Seven trial appearance last night at American University and thereafter going to Catholic University and then leaving town. He said that apparently these university administrators will not call in the local police, and he said it was disgraceful how they threw rocks, destroyed property and set fires at American University. He then also cited the incident wherein attorney Kuntsler after he went out to Santa Barbara, California, gave a speech, and then left town, that Santa Barbara was the victim of three days of looting and burning. The Director cited the violence promised in New Haven when Bobby Seale is brought to trial whereupon the Solicitor General commented that the judge who is going to try that case was his law school roommate. The Director said that this is a very serious situation and it is entirely possible that violence will occur when Seale is tried. The Director pointed out that we have appropriately advised all local authorities of this possibility.

The Director then cited the tremendous problems that Judge Hoffman in Chicago had in handling the trial and said that one could hardly blame him for some of his actions in view of the provocative acts on the part of the subjects and the attorneys. The Director said he recalled that Judge Medina in New York, when he tried the Communist Party leaders, the experience was so trying that it actually broke his health. Peterson at this point injected a comment that his people are

(CONTINUED - OVER)

trying to find out whether in the New Haven Bobby Seale case the Panthers are going to try to kidnap the Department's representative whose name is Lynch or whether they are referring to the Attorney General of the State of California whose name is also Lynch and the Director said he felt it was the Department of Justice representative being referred to.

The Director took this opportunity speaking about retaliatory action to point out that he was very concerned over the kidnapping of diplomatic officials in South America and said he felt it would be repeated in this country. He hoped the guard force for the embassies and chanceries in the Nation's Capital would be promptly secured as the President is also very concerned about this.

In further reply to Mr. Walters' question, the Director also pointed out that he felt many of these college presidents needed to be more firm and take drastic action by expelling these students from the school, not giving them amnesty, and assisting the local prosecutors in prosecuting these people. The Solicitor General indicated that he also felt many of the faculty were also a contributing factor to this problem. The Director agreed. The Director pointed out that these student problems in the college or high school can be traced back to the parental responsibility. The Director said that District of Columbia policemen have told him that many young children are out on the street at all hours of the night and their parents don't even know, and in some instances, care where they are. The Director told them of the incident of where four of our Identification people were held up and a female employee raped and how the juvenile giant when arrested had a juvenile court record of four appearances without a single sentence and how the Director had requested the court to try him as an adult but they refused to do so. The Director referred to the fact that we have too many bleeding heart judges and told of the success Judge Loble has had in Montana in handling juvenile subjects.

CONTINUED -

George J. Reed, Chairman, Board of Parole, questioned Mr. Hoover as to the extent of Communist influence in all of this New Left, Black Panther, Students for a Democratic Society, and militant action that we are faced with. The Director explained that the Communist Party will join anything that will further its causes and that they get their orders directly from Moscow. He said their influence in some organizations is complete control and in others it is only one of participation but, he pointed out, they are always the most vocal and, consequently, are very influential in those groups that they participate in. He said the Black Panthers follow the philosophies of many international revolutionary Communists. The Director then cited the incident of the young girl who blew up her father's home in New York which she had turned into a bomb factory. He stated she started to get out of control when at Bryn Mawr she joined the Students for a Democratic Society, and now she has fled to Canada and we are unable to extradite her.

At this point Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst thanked Mr. Hoover for his outstanding presentation. He said he felt they all had a better knowledge of the FBI and a greater appreciation of the many problems from a security and crime standpoint facing our country. With that, the official part of the conference was adjourned. Many of the conferees came up and personally congratulated Mr. Hoover and thanked him for his presentation, including asking Mr. Hoover to autograph the FBI exhibit folder which had been passed out to each participant.

I feel this outstanding presentation on the part of the Director brought great credit and praise for our organization. Hopefully, it will act as an incentive to some of our counterparts in the Department to do a more aggressive job in fulfilling their duties in meeting their security and criminal responsibilities.

Submitted for information.

JPM

Casper ably covered this meeting.

H

FIELD OFFICES

ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
ALEXANDRIA
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
COLUMBIA
DALLAS
DENVER
DETROIT
EL PASO
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JACKSONVILLE
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LAS VEGAS
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE

FBI FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATI



DIRECTOR
J. EDGAR HOOVER

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR
JOHN P. MOHR

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
CLYDE A. TOLSON

DIVISION 2
TRAINING
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
J. J. CASPER

BUREAU MANUALS
CHIEF CLERKS' SCHOOLS
CLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS
CLERICAL RETRAINING COURSES
DEFENSE PLANS FOR DIVISION
DEFENSIVE TACTICS COURSES
EMPLOYEES' CONFERENCES
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY
FIELD POLICE SCHOOLS
FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING
FORMS MANAGEMENT
IN-SERVICE COURSES
LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES
LECTURE FILES
LEGAL RESEARCH
LIAISON:
  INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
  INTERAGENCY POLICE GROUP
  PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SOCIETIES
  NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, OFFICE OF ACADEMIC ASSISTANCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NEW AGENTS' TRAINING
ORIENTATION COURSES FOR CLERKS
PHYSICAL TRAINING
POLICE INSTRUCTORS' COURSES
POLICE MANUALS
POLICE VISITORS
PUBLICATIONS REVIEW
RELATIONS WITH U.S. ATTORNEYS
SAC LETTERS AND BULLETINS
SHORTHAND COURSES
STENOGRAPHIC PROCEDURAL COURSES
SUGGESTION PROGRAM
SUPERVISOR TRAINING COURSE
TRAINING DOCUMENTS
TRAINING RESEARCH
TYPING TRAINING

QUANTICO:
FBI ACADEMY – TRAINING CENTER
FIELD FIREARMS RANGES AND TRAINING
FIREARMS INSPECTION AND REPAIR
FIREARMS TRAINING
RADIO STATIONS (SOG)

DIVISION 3
ADMINISTRATIVE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
N. P. CALLAHAN

BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION:
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT
BUDGET AND FISCAL MATTERS
CONTRACTS AND LEASES
SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT, INVENTORIES

EXHIBITS SECTION:
ARTIST'S-CONCEPTION DRAWINGS
GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF INVESTIGATIVE AND STATISTICAL DATA
PREPARATION OF CREDENTIALS AND SPECIAL FORMS
TRAINING AIDS (DIAGRAMS, ILLUSTRATIONS AND DISPLAYS)
TRIAL EXHIBITS (CHARTS AND MODELS)

MECHANICAL SECTION:
AUTOMOTIVE POOL
PHOTOGRAPHY
PRINTING, PHOTOSTAT AND XEROX
SPACE MATTERS
SUPPLY AND STORAGE

PERSONNEL SECTION:
APPLICANT RECRUITING AND PLACEMENT
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
COMMENDATIONS AND AWARDS
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE
EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
HEALTH SERVICE
LEAVE
LIVING QUARTERS
PERFORMANCE RATINGS
PERSONNEL MATTERS
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
RETIREMENT MATTERS
VETERANS' COUNSELING
VOCATION AND AVOCATION RECORDS

VOUCHER-STATISTICAL SECTION:
ACCOUNTING REPORTS
COMPUTER SYSTEMS:
  DATA PROCESSING
  TELEPROCESSING
  OPERATIONS RESEARCH
  SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
PAYROLL
RETIREMENT RECORDS
STATISTICAL TABULATIONS
VOUCHERS

DIVISION 4
FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
W. S. TAVEL

RECORDS BRANCH:
CLASSIFYING SECTION
CONSOLIDATION SECTION
CORRELATION SECTION
FILE REVIEW SECTION
FILING SECTION
GENERAL INDEX SECTION
MESSENGER SECTION
NAME SEARCHING SECTION
NUMBERING SECTION
PERSONNEL RECORDS SECTION
RECORDING SECTION
ROUTING SECTION
SERVICE SECTION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION:
CODING UNIT
MAILING UNIT
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS (INTRA-BUREAU)
TELEGRAPH AND TELETYPE SERVICES
TELEPHONE SERVICES

READING ROOM:

DIVISION 7
LABORATORY
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
I. W. CONRAD

CRYPTANALYSIS AND TRANSLATION SECTION:
CRYPTANALYSIS
GAMBLING EXAMINATIONS
SCIENTIFIC DATA PROCESSING
SECURITY OF FBI COMMUNICATIONS
TRANSLATIONS

DOCUMENT SECTION:
CHARRED PAPER EXAMINATIONS
GAMBLING EXAMINATIONS
HANDWRITING AND HANDPRINTING
INDENTED WRITING
INK AND PENCIL EXAMINATIONS
OBLITERATED WRITING
PAPER EXAMINATIONS
PHOTOGRAPHIC EXAMINATIONS
PORTRAIT PARLE EXAMINATIONS
SHOEPRINT EXAMINATIONS
TIRETREAD EXAMINATIONS
TYPEWRITING AND OTHER MECHANICAL IMPRESSIONS

RADIO ENGINEERING SECTION:
CW RADIO NETWORK ENGINEERING
FM RADIO SYSTEMS
MAINTENANCE COORDINATION
MOBILE AND PORTABLE RADIO
RADIO FREQUENCY LIAISON COMMITTEES
EVIDENCE EXAMINATIONS

PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY SECTION:
BIOCHEMICAL
BIOLOGICAL
EXPLOSIVES
FIBERS AND HAIRS
GENERAL CHEMICAL
GLASS FRACTURES
GUNPOWDER TESTS
GUNS AND AMMUNITION
METALLURGICAL
NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS
NUMBER RESTORATION
PETROGRAPHIC OR GEOLOGIC
PHARMACOLOGICAL
SPECTROGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
TOOLMARKS
TOXICOLOGICAL
WOOD
X-RAY

DIVISION 1
IDENTIFICATION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
L. M. WALTERS

ALIEN REGISTRATION FINGERPRINT FILES
ARMY, NAVY, AIR, COAST GUARD, MARINE WARTIME SERVICE FINGERPRINTS, WORLD WAR II
OLD ARMY, NAVY, MARINE FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION FILES
CIVIL IDENTIFICATION FILES
CIVIL SERVICE FINGERPRINTS
CRIMINAL FINGERPRINT FILES
DEVELOPMENT OF LATENT FINGERPRINTS
DISASTER IDENTIFICATION SQUAD
FUGITIVE BULLETIN
GENERAL APPEARANCE FILE ON CONFIDENCE MEN, ETC.
GOVERNMENT FINGERPRINT FILES
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
MISSING PERSONS
NATIONAL FOOTPRINT FILE
NATIONAL NICKNAME FILE
NATIONAL UNIDENTIFIED LATENT FINGERPRINT FILE
SINGLE FINGERPRINT FILE
PROFESSIONAL FRAUDULENT CHECK PASSER'S FILE
WANTED NOTICES

DIVISION 10
INSPECTION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
W. MARK FELT

INSPECTIONS – FIELD AND SOG
SPECIAL PROJECTS
SURVEYS

FBI EXHIBITS SECTION

JANUARY 14, 1970

TION CHART

FIELD OFFICES

MEMPHIS
MIAMI
MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
NORFOLK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH
PORTLAND
RICHMOND
SACRAMENTO
ST. LOUIS
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
TAMPA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TOTAL 59

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR
CARTHA D. DeLOACH

DIVISION 5
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN

ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

SINO-SATELLITE SECTION:

65 ESPIONAGE
97 FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
105 INTERNAL SECURITY -- NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY (ALBANIA, BULGARIA, CHINA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMANY, HUNGARY, MONGOLIA, POLAND, ROMANIA, YOGOSLAVIA)

SOVIET SECTION:

65 ESPIONAGE
97 FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
105 INTERNAL SECURITY – NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION (ALL OTHER COUNTRIES):

117 ATOMIC ENERGY ACT – VIOLATIONS
65 ESPIONAGE
97 FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
110 FOREIGN ECONOMIC MATTERS
112 FOREIGN FUNDS
113 FOREIGN MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS
109 FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS
111 FOREIGN SOCIAL CONDITIONS
105 INTERNAL SECURITY – NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY
2 NEUTRALITY MATTERS
105 SECURITY MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY
PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

INTERNAL SECURITY & LIAISON BRANCH:
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION:

100 INTERNAL SECURITY (DOMESTIC SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS)
COMMUNIST CONTROL ACT OF 1954
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
SMITH ACT OF 1940
98 SABOTAGE
134 SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
100 SECURITY MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY (INDIVIDUALS)
14 SEDITION
66 SPECIAL RECORDS
61 TREASON AND RELATED STATUTES

LIAISON SECTION:

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC LIAISON
FOREIGN LIAISON MATTERS
LIAISON WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
66 DEFENSE PLANS
163 FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION

RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION:

100 COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS (CIRM)
100 } 157 } BLACK NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
157 HATE GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS
157 KLAN ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
170 RACIAL INFORMANTS

RESEARCH SECTION:

157 GENERAL RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
100 } 105 } COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MONOGRAPHS
CURRENT RESEARCH
STUDENT AGITATION

DIVISION 6
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ALEX ROSEN

CRIMINAL SECTION:

89 ASSAULTING OR KILLING A FEDERAL OFFICER
89 ASSAULTING FOREIGN PERSONNEL
175 ASSAULTING THE PRESIDENT (OR VICE-PRESIDENT) OF THE UNITED STATES
153 AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT
91 BANK ROBBERY
71 BILLS OF LADING ACT
CONSPIRACY
164 CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT
70 CRIME ON INDIAN AND GOVERNMENT RESERVATIONS
45 CRIME ON THE HIGH SEAS
180 DESECRATION OF THE FLAG
149 DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES
167 DESTRUCTION OF INTERSTATE PROPERTY
9 EXTORTION
43 FALSE ADVERTISING OR MISUSE OF NAMES TO INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY
141 FALSE ENTRIES IN RECORDS OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS
63 FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
62 FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT
160 FEDERAL TRAIN WRECK STATUTE
4 FIREARMS ACT (A) NATIONAL (B) STATE FIREARMS CONTROL ASSISTANCE ACT (C) UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS
43 FRAUDULENT PRACTICES CONCERNING MILITARY AND NAVAL DOCUMENTS, AND SEALS AND SYMBOLS OF AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES
43 ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE, USE, POSSESSION OR SALE OF EMBLEMS AND INSIGNIA
78 ILLEGAL USE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS
142 ILLEGAL USE OF RAILROAD PASS
43 ILLEGAL WEARING OF UNIFORM
47 IMPERSONATION
178 INTERSTATE OBSCENE OR HARASSING TELEPHONE CALLS
148 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS
145 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER
146 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISON-MADE GOODS
103 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN CATTLE
26 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE OR AIRCRAFT
87 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
154 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS
90 IRREGULARITIES IN FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS
7 KIDNAPING
18 MAY ACT
NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY FILE
152 SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT
52 THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT, ROBBERY, AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
15 THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT
31 WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT

CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION:

176 ANTIRIOT LAWS
174 BOMBING MATTERS
44 CIVIL RIGHTS
173 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
CONSPIRACY
173 DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
173 DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
173 DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
173 DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
177 DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
56 ELECTION LAWS
50 INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY

NAME CHECK SECTION:

NAME CHECKS
SPECIAL MEMORANDA

ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD SECTION:

66 ACCOUNTING CONTROL
62 ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRIES
131 ADMIRALTY MATTERS
114 ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN MATTERS
92 ANTI-RACKETEERING
HOBBS ACT
LEA ACT
INTERFERENCE WITH GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
60 ANTITRUST
93 ASCERTAINING FINANCIAL ABILITY
75 BONDSMEN AND SURETIES
58 BRIBERY
53 CENSUS MATTERS
58 CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CONSPIRACY
181 CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
69 CONTEMPT OF COURT
28 COPYRIGHT MATTERS
83 COURT OF CLAIMS
46 DEPENDENTS ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950
63 EIGHT-HOUR DAY LAW
46 FALSE CLAIMS – CIVIL
39 FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP
147 FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
86 FEDERAL LENDING AND INSURANCE AGENCIES
119 FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT
29 FEDERAL RESERVE ACT
120 FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
46 FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
139 INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
6 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STRIKEBREAKERS
51 JURY PANEL INVESTIGATIONS
63 KICKBACK RACKET ACT
122 LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947
159 LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 (INVESTIGATIVE MATTER)
63 LANDS DIVISION MATTERS
36 MAIL FRAUD
8 MIGRATORY BIRD ACT
63 MISCELLANEOUS – CIVIL SUITS
49 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
72 OBSTRUCTION OF COURT ORDERS
72 OBSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
72 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
40 PASSPORT AND VISA MATTERS
27 PATENT MATTERS
74 PERJURY
125 RAILWAY LABOR ACT
10 RED CROSS ACT
46 RENEGOTIATION ACT – CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
63 SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT – 1940
63 TARIFF ACT OF 1930
63 UNREPORTED INTERSTATE SHIPMENT OF CIGARETTES
17 VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
63 WAGE AND HOUR LAW
156 WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

DIVISION 8
CRIME RECORDS
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
THOMAS E. BISHOP

CORRESPONDENCE AND TOURS SECTION:

CORRESPONDENCE ON GENERAL INQUIRIES
TOURS

CRIME RESEARCH SECTION:

CRIME RESEARCH
FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN
INVESTIGATOR
FBI NOTES
SPECIAL NAME CHECKS
TOP TEN FUGITIVE PROGRAM DATA
FUGITIVE PUBLICITY PROGRAMS
SPECIAL PROJECTS
LIBRARY
YOUTHFUL CRIMINALITY PROJECT
LIAISON:
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL
NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING SECTION:

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS – CAREERS IN CRIME
NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER

DIVISION 9
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
J. H. GALE

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE -- ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION:

92 ANTI-RACKETEERING (INTELLIGENCE)
179 EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
162 INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES
143 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES
144 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF LOTTERY TICKETS
165 INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING INFORMATION
166 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF RACKETEERING
168 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF WAGERING PARAPHERNALIA
172 SPORTS BRIBERY
137 TOP-ECHELON CRIMINAL INFORMANTS

FUGITIVE SECTION:

115 BOND DEFAULT
76 CONDITIONAL RELEASE VIOLATORS
137 CRIMINAL INFORMANT MATTERS
42 DESERTERS AND DESERTER-HARBORING
76 ESCAPE AND RESCUE
76 ESCAPED FEDERAL PRISONERS
FUGITIVE
HARBORING
76 PAROLE VIOLATORS
76 PROBATION VIOLATORS
25 SELECTIVE SERVICE, INCLUDING FUGITIVE, RE-EMPLOYMENT, AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR CASES
88 UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID CUSTODY OR CONFINEMENT
88 UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID GIVING TESTIMONY
88 UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION

EMPLOYEES SECURITY AND SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION:

151 AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
73 APPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AND APPLICATIONS FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION OF SENTENCE
116 ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS)
151 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)
77 COAST GUARD SCREENING APPEAL BOARD
77 DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL AGENTS AND INSPECTORS FOR THE BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
77 DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS, INCLUDING DEPUTY MARSHALS AND CLERICAL POSITIONS IN BUREAU OF PRISONS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AND OTHER BRANCHES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INCLUDING CLERICAL POSITIONS OF THE BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
151 INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
138 LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
77 MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES
151 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
151 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
151 PEACE CORPS
140 SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
161 SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
151 UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
151 UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
151 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATION OF THE FBI

SEAT OF GOVERNMENT AND 59 FIELD OFFICES


DIRECTOR
BUREAU HEADQUARTERS
IDENTIFICATION
TRAINING
ADMINISTRATIVE
FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS
LABORATORY
INSPECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE
CRIME RECORDS
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE


56
46
10
34
33
18
1
8
9
37
39
36
12
14
45
43
6
59
3
42
50
48
53
17
25
57
22
13
49
30
47
40
27
26
11
41
2
28
31
29
44
52
7
5
15
55
23
16
19
35
24
38
21
20
51
4
58
32
54

1	ALBANY	11	CHARLOTTE	21	HOUSTON	31	MEMPHIS	41	OKLAHOMA CITY	51	SAN ANTONIO
2	ALBUQUERQUE	12	CHICAGO	22	INDIANAPOLIS	32	MIAMI	42	OMAHA	52	SAN DIEGO
3	ALEXANDRIA	13	CINCINNATI	23	JACKSON	33	MILWAUKEE	43	PHILADELPHIA	53	SAN FRANCISCO
4	ANCHORAGE	14	CLEVELAND	24	JACKSONVILLE	34	MINNEAPOLIS	44	PHOENIX	54	SAN JUAN
5	ATLANTA	15	COLUMBIA	25	KANSAS CITY	35	MOBILE	45	PITTSBURGH	55	SAVANNAH
6	BALTIMORE	16	DALLAS	26	KNOXVILLE	36	NEWARK	46	PORTLAND	56	SEATTLE
7	BIRMINGHAM	17	DENVER	27	LAS VEGAS	37	NEW HAVEN	47	RICHMOND	57	SPRINGFIELD
8	BOSTON	18	DETROIT	28	LITTLE ROCK	38	NEW ORLEANS	48	SACRAMENTO	58	TAMPA
9	BUFFALO	19	EL PASO	29	LOS ANGELES	3	NEW YORK	49	ST. LOUIS	59	WASHINGTON, D.C.
10	BUTTE	20	HONOLULU	30	LOUISVILLE	4	NORFOLK	50	SALT LAKE CITY		

EXHIBIT NO. 2

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FBI FOREIGN LIAISON OPERATIONS

EXHIBIT NO. 2

The FBI maintains liaison posts abroad in [illegible] countries. These offices function in a liaison capacity in connection with criminal and security matters involving the Bureau's domestic responsibilities. In addition, the Bureau belongs to one international security committee and corresponds with police agencies all over the world except in countries controlled by the communists. In addition to the activities of its representatives abroad the Bureau exchanges certain types of information with, and where warranted arranges to have investigations conducted in the U. S. for, law enforcement and intelligence agencies in many other foreign countries on a reciprocal basis.



NUMBER OF FBI REPRESENTATIVES STATIONED ABROAD (EXCLUSIVE OF CLERICAL PERSONNEL)

BERN	1
BONN	2
BUENOS AIRES	1
HONG KONG	2
LONDON	2
MADRID	1
MEXICO CITY	12
OTTAWA	2
PARIS	2
ROME	2
TOKYO	2
TOTAL	29



KEY

✻ FBI REPRESENTATIVES STATIONED IN AMERICAN EMBASSIES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

● COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE FBI EXCHANGES INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

FBI EXHIBITS SECTION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED

EXCLUSIVE OF REIMBURSABLE APPLICANT WORK

FISCAL YEARS



EXHIBIT NO. 5

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FBI ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND APPROPRIATIONS

FISCAL YEARS 1967 – 1969





FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

LENGTH OF SERVICE--FBI PERSONNEL

EXHIBIT NO. 6

AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 1970, THERE WERE 17,001 EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING 7,545 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 9,456 CLERKS. OF THESE 6,258 (37%) HAD SERVED THE FBI TEN YEARS OR LONGER. OF THE SPECIAL AGENTS 4,267 (57%) HAD TEN OR MORE YEARS OF SERVICE; AND OF THE OTHER EMPLOYEES 1,991 (21%) HAD SERVED AT LEAST TEN YEARS.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR



CRIME TREND
IN THE UNITED STATES

EXHIBIT NO. 7

JANUARY-DECEMBER 1969 OVER JANUARY-DECEMBER 1968



FBI EXHIBITS SECTION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

PERCENT REPEATERS
BY TYPE OF CRIME IN 1963

PERSONS RELEASED IN 1963 AND REARRESTED WITHIN 5 YEARS



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

PERCENT REPEATERS
BY AGE GROUP



PERSONS RELEASED IN 1963 AND REARRESTED WITHIN 5 YEARS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR

EXHIBIT NO. 10

NCIC NETWORK


WASHINGTON
SEATTLE (POLICE DEPT.)
OLYMPIA (STATE PATROL)
PORTLAND (POLICE DEPT.) (MULTNOMAH COUNTY **** S.O.)
OREGON
SALEM (STATE POLICE)
EUGENE
MONTANA
BILLINGS (POLICE DEPT.)
IDAHO
BOISE (STATE POLICE)
WYOMING
CHEYENNE (BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION)
CALIFORNIA
SACRAMENTO
NEVADA
CARSON CITY (STATE PATROL)
UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
COLORADO
DENVER (POLICE DEPT.)
4
ARIZONA
PHOENIX (HIGHWAY PATROL)
NEW MEXICO
SANTA FE (STATE POLICE)
ALBUQUERQUE (POLICE DEPT.)
NORTH DAKOTA
BISMARCK (BUREAU OF CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION)
SOUTH DAKOTA
PIERRE (DIVISION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION)
NEBRASKA
OMAHA (POLICE DEPT.)
LINCOLN (DEPT. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT)
KANSAS
TOPEKA (HIGHWAY PATROL)
WICHITA (POLICE DEPT.)
OKLAHOMA
OKLAHOMA CITY (STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION)
TEXAS
DALLAS (POLICE DEPT.)
AUSTIN (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
HOUSTON (POLICE DEPT.)
MINNESOTA
ST. PAUL (BUREAU OF CRIMINAL APPREHENSION)
IOWA
DES MOINES (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
3
MISSOURI
KANSAS CITY (POLICE DEPT.)
JEFFERSON CITY (STATE HIGHWAY PATROL)
ST. LOUIS **(P.D.)
ARKANSAS
LITTLE ROCK (STATE POLICE)
LOUISIANA
BATON ROUGE (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
NEW ORLEANS (POLICE DEPT.)
WISCONSIN
MILWAUKEE (POLICE DEPT.)
MADISON (HIGHWAY PATROL)
ILLINOIS
CHICAGO (POLICE DEPT.)
SPRINGFIELD (STATE POLICE)
MICHIGAN
EAST LANSING (STATE POLICE)
DETROIT **(P.D.)
INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS (POLICE DEPT.) (STATE POLICE)
OHIO
CLEVELAND
COLUMBUS *(S.H.P.)
CINCINNATI **(P.D.)
KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE **(P.D.)
FRANKFORT (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
W. VA.
CHARLESTON (STATE POLICE)
VIRGINIA
RICHMOND (STATE POLICE)
(ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE (RCMP)
OTTAWA
NEW YORK
ALBANY ***(NYSIIS) (STATE POLICE)
1
PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH **(P.D.)
HARRISBURG (STATE POLICE)
MAINE
AUGUSTA (STATE POLICE)
VT.
MONTPELIER (STATE POLICE)
N.H.
CONCORD (STATE POLICE)
MASS.
BOSTON (POLICE DEPT.) (STATE POLICE)
R.I.
NORTH SCITUATE (STATE POLICE)
CONN.
HARTFORD (STATE POLICE)
NEW YORK (POLICE DEPT.)
N.J.
TRENTON (STATE POLICE)
PHILADELPHIA (POLICE DEPT.)
DEL.
DOVER (STATE POLICE)
MARYLAND
PIKESVILLE (STATE POLICE)
BALTIMORE (POLICE DEPT.)
WASHINGTON, D. C. (POLICE DEPT.) (PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL) (SECRET SERVICE) (NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE) (OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS)
VA.
NORFOLK (POLICE DEPT.)
NORTH CAROLINA
RALEIGH (STATE BUREAU OF IN
GREENSBORO **(P.D.)
CHARLOTTE **(P.D.)
2
TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE (POLICE DEPT.) (DEPT. OF SAFETY)
MEMPHIS **(P.D.)
MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON (HIGHWAY SAFETY PATROL)
ALABAMA
BIRMINGHAM (POLICE DEPT.)
MONTGOMERY (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
GEORGIA
ATLANTA (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
SAVANNAH (POLICE DEPT.)
SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA (LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION)
FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE (DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY) (DEPT. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT)
CLEARWATER (PINELLAS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE)
TAMPA (HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE)
MIAMI (DEPT. OF COMMUNICATIONS) (DADE COUNTY DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY)
ALASKA
JUNEAU
HAWAII
HONOLULU (POLICE DEPT.)

NCIC POLICY BOARD REGIONS

1 11 NORTHEASTERN STATES AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA – Population: 53,814,000
2 13 SOUTHERN STATES – Population: 46,352,000
3 12 NORTH CENTRAL STATES – Population: 52,628,000
4 14 WESTERN STATES – Population: 44,467,000

*(S.H.P.) — (STATE HIGHWAY PATROL)
**(P.D.) — (POLICE DEPT.)
***(NYSIIS) — (NEW YORK STATE IDENTIFICATION AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM)
****(S.O.) — (SHERIFF'S OFFICE)

◉ Operational Terminal -- Computer
● Operational Terminal -- Manual
○ Planned Terminal (to be added)

(Shaded portions represent areas having immediate access to NCIC through local or state computers.)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

BREAKDOWN OF RECORDS IN NCIC COMPUTER



TOTAL
1,744,434

AS OF MARCH 1, 1970

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

CONVICTIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND GAMBLING FIGURES AS RESULT OF FBI INVESTIGATION



AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 1970, A TOTAL OF 1,027 OTHER INDIVIDUALS WERE AWAITING PROSECUTION AS COMPARED WITH 330 AND 675 AT THE CLOSE OF FISCAL YEARS 1967 AND 1968, RESPECTIVELY.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR



SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

VIOLATIONS RECEIVED

EXHIBIT NO. 13



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY STATUTE

VIOLATIONS REPORTED



FBI

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

CIVIL RIGHTS CASES HANDLED

1965-1969



FISCAL YEARS

*ALL-TIME HIGH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

NUMBER OF CIVIL RIGHTS CASES HANDLED

FISCAL YEAR 1969

EXHIBIT NO. 14b


WASH. 34
ORE. 12
CAL. 403
IDAHO 8
NEV. 42
MONT. 10
WYO. 7
UTAH 6
ARIZ. 28
COL. 25
N. MEX. 53
N. DAK. 4
S. DAK. 14
NEB. 3
KAN. 25
OKLA. 73
TEXAS 658
MINN. 21
IOWA 6
MO. 131
ARK. 83
LA. 250
WIS. 44
ILL. 336
MICH. 155
IND. 95
OHIO 234
KY. 92
TENN. 302
MISS. 340
ALA. 440
GA. 310
FLA. 369
S.C. 128
N.C. 133
VA. 112
W. VA. 21
PENN. 274
NY. 253
VT. 1
N.H. 0
ME. 7
MASS. 30
R.I. 27
CONN. 48
N.J. 203
DEL. 12
MD. 33
(D.C.) 15
ALASKA 2
HAWAII 14
PUERTO RICO 3
VIRGIN ISLANDS 4
TOTAL 5,933

FBI
EXHIBITS SECTION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FEDERAL RESERVE ACT

VIOLATIONS REPORTED

FISCAL YEARS



*ALL-TIME HIGH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

EXHIBIT NO. 16

TOTAL SOVIET-BLOC OFFICIAL PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES

INCLUDES OFFICIALS AND DEPENDENTS OF SOVIET UNION, BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, MONGOLIA, POLAND AND ROMANIA



DOES NOT INCLUDE COURIERS, MEMBERS OF SPECIAL DELEGATIONS AND OTHER OFFICIALS TEMPORARILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND NOT ASSIGNED TO OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

SOVIET-BLOC OFFICIAL PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES

(BREAKDOWN BY COUNTRIES)



TOTAL: 1,129

as of February 1, 1970

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FINGERPRINT RECEIPTS

FISCAL YEARS



FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

TYPES OF FINGERPRINTS ON FILE

TOTAL:
195,652,468
MARCH 1, 1970



ESTIMATED PERSONS REPRESENTED:

For the 59,891,756 prints in the criminal file	18,618,537
For the remaining prints totaling 135,760,712 all of which are in the civil file	66,101,524
TOTAL ESTIMATED PERSONS REPRESENTED	84,720,061

FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

CORRESPONDENCE, FORMS AND NAME CHECKS RECEIVED

FISCAL YEARS



FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

*ALL-TIME HIGH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

CASES INVOLVING LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATIONS

FISCAL YEARS



FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FUGITIVES IDENTIFIED BY FINGERPRINTS

FISCAL YEARS



FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

*ALL-TIME HIGH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

WANTED NOTICES POSTED AND CANCELLED

FISCAL YEARS



FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

*ALL-TIME HIGH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

EXHIBIT NO. 24

TOTAL FBI LABORATORY EXAMINATIONS

FISCAL YEARS



*ALL-TIME HIGH

FBI EXHIBITS SECTION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FBI LABORATORY EXAMINATIONS MADE FOR NON-FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

EXHIBIT NO. 35

FISCAL YEAR 1969


WASH. 1,856
MONT. 1,528
N. DAK. 743
MINN. 308
ORE. 394
IDAHO 908
WYO. 884
S. DAK. 687
WIS. 3,642
MICH. 461
NY 3,136
VT
NH
ME 379
621
248
441
553
1,446
2,754
1,230
5,252
4,281 (D.C.)
MASS.
CONN.
R.I.
N.J.
DEL.
MD.
CAL. 2,134
NEV. 781
UTAH 1,654
COL. 1,732
NEB. 1,402
IOWA 1,451
ILL. 2,239
IND. 1,173
OHIO 2,132
PENN 3,888
W. VA. 280
VA. 15,768
KAN. 1,010
MO. 423
KY. 1,476
TENN. 3,104
N.C. 1,858
S.C. 766
ARIZ. 1,636
N. MEX. 2,283
OKLA. 998
TEXAS 797
ARK. 2,980
MISS. 1,453
ALA. 377
GA. 252
LA. 755
FLA. 4,037
CANAL ZONE 0
PUERTO RICO 140
ALASKA 2,390
HAWAII 175
VIRGIN ISLANDS, U.S.A. 359

FOREIGN

BAHAMAS	4
CANADA	118
ICELAND	7
PANAMA	2

TOTAL 93,786

FBI EXHIBITS SECTION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U S
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
STATE POLICE
COUNTY SHERIFF
CITY POLICE

LOCAL POLICE TRAINING SCHOOLS

NUMBER OF SCHOOLS IN WHICH FBI PROVIDED TRAINING ASSISTANCE

EXHIBIT NO. 2[illegible]



OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: June 24, 1970

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS
CONFERENCE, JUNE 30, 1970

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Schutz
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Miss Gandy
1 - Miss Holmes

Attorney General's Staff Conference

Attached find amended pages of brief on aircraft hijackings prepared for the Director's use at the conference with the Attorney General's staff on June 30, 1970, which will be chaired by the Deputy Attorney General, Richard G. Kleindienst.

Amendments to the brief were made necessary by the June 22, 1970, armed hijacking of Pan American World Airways flight to Cairo, Egypt, while en route from Beirut, Lebanon, to John F. Kennedy Airport, New York. The subject, Haxhi Hasan Xhafferi, a 32-year-old Albanian, was taken into custody at Cairo, Egypt, by Egyptian authorities after firing a shot in the cockpit. No one was injured. Our investigation of the matter is continuing.

Amended pages are as follows:

Page 7	Under A. Hijackings - most recent hijacking added to the 1970 column and the total for 1970 as well as grand total. Under B. Individuals Involved - the 1970 column and the totals for 1970 and grand total being increased by one.
Page 22	The total number of hijackings amended from 70 to 71.
Page 36	A brief summary of the Pan American flight hijacking 6-22-70, set forth.
Last page of index	Amended to incorporate the name of subject of most recent hijacking, Haxhi Hasan Xhafferi.

COPY FILED IN

REC-43 62-

6-1

JUL 6 1970

Encs. (4)

59 JUL 4 1970

III. STATISTICS RE HIJACKINGS SINCE JANUARY 1, 1968

A. Hijackings

	1968	1969	1970	Total
To Cuba	17	31	5	53
Other Destination		2	1	3
Aborted	3	6	5	14
TOTAL	20	39	11	70

A firearm was used in 53 of the 70 incidents and in 6 instances there was gunfire. In 1 of the incidents, 1 death and 2 injuries resulted. In the 2nd - 2 individuals were wounded. In the remaining 4, no one was injured.

B. Individuals Involved

	1968	1969	1970	Total
Latin	17	21	2	40
Fleeing Felons	3	7*		10
Black Militants	3	3		6
Others	8	26	10	44
TOTAL	31	57	12	100

* Includes one black militant.

XEROX
JUL 6 1970

62-77756-203

VII. HIJACKINGS OF U. S. PLANES

The following are summaries of all hijackings since January 1, 1968. There has been a total of 70 incidents of hijackings or attempts to hijack aircraft during this period. There were 56 hijackings and 14 aborted hijackings.

During 1968, there were 17 hijackings to Cuba and 3 aborted hijackings.

During 1969, there were 31 hijackings to Cuba, 1 to Damascus, 1 to Rome, and 6 aborted hijackings.

During 1970, thus far there have been 6 hijackings, 5 of which went to Cuba, and 1 to Lebanon, along with 5 aborted hijackings.

1968

NUMBER & DATE	NAME	AIRLINE
(1) - 2/17/68	THOMAS JAMES BOYNTON	Privately owned

From Marathon, Florida, to Cuba at gun point with pilot aboard. Process filed 2/20/68, Florida. Returned to United States through Canada, 11/2/69, pleaded guilty 5/12/70, and sentenced to 20 years 6/4/70.

(2) - 2/21/68	LAWRENCE MAHLON RHODES, JR.	Delta

From Tampa, Florida, to Cuba at gun point with 102 passengers and crew of 7 aboard. Fleeing felon at time of hijacking. Process filed 12/22/68, Miami, Florida. Surrendered himself at Madrid, Spain, 2/11/70. Entered plea of not guilty and is currently undergoing psychiatric examination.

JUL 6 1970

62-77856-205

1970

NUMBER & DATE	NAME	AIRLINE
(69) - 5/25/70	NELSON MOLINA	American

From Chicago, Illinois, to Cuba at gunpoint with 66 passengers and crew of 7. Process filed 5/27/70, New York. Still in Cuba.

NUMBER & DATE	NAME	AIRLINE
(70) - 6/4/70	AUTHER GATES BARKLEY	TWA

From Phoenix, Arizona, to St. Louis, Missouri, with 51 passengers and 7 crew members. Demanded $100,000,000 or would destroy aircraft. Process filed 6/4/70, Alexandria, Virginia. Presently undergoing psychiatric evaulation.

62-77156-205

ENCLOSURE

Name	Page
Pastorcich, Roger Allen	25
Patterson, Gwendolyn Joyce	26
Patterson, James Joseph	26
Payano, Aristofarez Antonio Navarro	27
Perez, Jesus Rivera	33
Perry, Lester Ellsworth	32
Quesada, Graciela Calderon	11, 35
Reed, John M. (ASAC)	18
Rhodes, Lawrence Mahlon, Jr.	22
Richards, Oran Daniel	23
Sanchez, Hiran Courouneaux	30
Sanchez, Miguel Montesino	25
Sandlin, Robert Lee	29
Shorr, Henry Larry	33
Speruto, Salvatore	29
Stubbs, Clemmie	34
Torres, Domingo Diaz	32
Truitt, Alben William Barkley	24
Viera, Irardo Mendoza	25
Wagstaff, Joseph Alfred	35
Washington, Thomas George	11, 26, Exhibit #5
White, L.	27
Wiser, F. C.	Exhibit #3, Page 2
Zamora, Crecencio Parra	30

62-77656-20

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: 12-11-70

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE IN CONNECTION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE THURSDAYS, 5:00 P.M.

M A Jones

In view of the approaching holiday season, material for captioned brief, unless otherwise advised to the contrary, will not be needed until after the first of the new year. Material will then be required for receipt in Crime Records Division by 12 noon, Tuesday, 1-5-71 for the next scheduled conference of 1-7-71.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. Tolson
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Casper
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Walters
1 - Mr. Beaver
1 - Miss Gandy
1 - Miss Holmes
1 - M. A. Jones

OK

REC-6 62-97852-210

6 DEC 15 1970

JHC:kjs (9)

DEC 18 1970

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: 12/29/70

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE IN CONNECTION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE THURSDAYS, 5:00 P. M.

You will recall that captioned brief was discontinued during the Holiday Season. It is presumed these conferences will resume on Thursday, January 7, 1971. Accordingly, it is suggested that all Divisions revise and update their sections of the brief and submit such revisions to be received on or before noontime Tuesday, January 5th.

Attorney General's Staff Conf

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

WCS

REC 70

62-9-7826-211

ST-100

JAN 5 1971

CRIME RESEARCH

1 - Mr. Tolson
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Casper
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Felt

1 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Walters
1 - Mr. Beaver
1 - Miss Gandy
1 - Miss Holmes
1 - M. A. Jones

364

DGH:mjj(9)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: April 6, 1971

changed 4-8-71

FROM : M. ~~A. Jones~~

SUBJECT: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE IN CONNECTION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STAFF CONFERENCE THURSDAYS, 5:00 P.M.

In connection with captioned brief, attached are amended pages A and C of the Table of Contents and pages 4-5, 8, 11, 12, 13A, 16, 24, 26A, 33, 34 and 35, which should be inserted in the brief. Page 36 should be deleted. These pages have been amended for the following reasons:

PagesA and C of the Table of Contents have been amended as a result of changes set out in details below.

Page 4-5, information in paragraph 3 changed to make more current.

Page 8, changed to update totals of Seat of Government employees.

Page 11, "Black Panther Party (BPP)" write-up revised to make more current.

Page 12, all items revised to update figures.

Page 13A, this is a new item which is considered timely.

Page 16, first paragraph revised to show current number of American aircraft hijacked along with those diverted to Cuba.

REC- 66

Page 24, "Court-Approved Electronic Surveillances" item updated to show more current figures.

15 APR 13 1971

EX-112

CRIME RESEARCH

Enclosures (13)

1 - Mr. Mohr - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Sullivan - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Bishop - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Brennan - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Casper - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Conrad - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Dalbey - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Felt - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Gale - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Rosen - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Tavel - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Walters - Enclosures
1 - Mr. Beaver - Enclosures
1 - Miss Gandy - Enclosures
1 - Miss Holmes - Enclosures
1 - M.A. Jones - Enclosures

(CONTINUED - OVER)

M.A. Jones to Bishop Memo
RE: BRIEF FOR DIRECTOR'S USE

/ Page 26A, item number (9) added as of current interest.

Page 33, figures in paragraph 1 updated; paragraph 3 revised to make more current.

Pages 34 and 35, both pages revised to update information.

TSB

WBS

V

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 ptA 4 & 14

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. ITEMS OF CURRENT INTEREST

A. Attorney General's Testimony, House Judiciary Subcommittee, March 15, 1967 1-2

B. Press Release of March 15, 1967, Issued by Republican Congressmen's "Wednesday Club" Entitled "Are We Organized to Fight Crime?" 3-4

C. March 12, 1967, Television Interview of Attorney General 5-6

D. Uniform Crime Reports 1966 Preliminary Annual Release 7

E. Crime Legislation 8

F. National Conference on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 9

G. National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 10

II. INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

A. Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy by New Orleans District Attorney James C. Garrison 11

B. Subversive Activities on College Campuses 12

C. Travel of the President to Uruguay 13

D. Wire Taps and Other Coverage Utilized in the Internal Security Field 14

E. Counterespionage Work Against the Soviets 15

Page

II. INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (continued)

F. Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities 16

G. Communist Party, USA 17

H. Demonstrations Protesting United States Intervention in Vietnam 18

I. Dominican Situation 19

III. CRIMINAL MATTERS

A. Bombing of Yugoslav Diplomatic Establishments in the United States and Canada, January 29, 1967 20-21

B. James Riddle Hoffa, et al; Obstruction of Justice 22

C. Robert Earl Barnes, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property 23

D. Bombing Death of Wharlest Jackson at Natchez, Mississippi, on February 27, 1967, Civil Rights 24-25

E. Clifford A Jones, Perjury 26

F. Sam Holloway Bowers, Jr., et al; Burning of Property and Shooting, Forrest County, Mississippi, January 10, 1966 27

G. Murders of Three Civil Rights Workers 28

H. Shortages of U. S. District Judges and Shortages in the U. S. Attorneys' Offices 29

I. Request of Assistant Attorney General Vinson, March 14, 1967, re Lake County, Indiana, Crime Conditions 30

J. Wiretapping 31

K. Gambling Cases 32

L. Investigation of Senator Thomas J. Dodd 32a

Page

IV. AUXILIARY MATTERS

A. FBI National Academy, Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 33-34

B. Police Training 35

C. New FBI Academy 36

D. Executive Assignment System 37

E. "The FBI" -- Television Show, American Broadcasting Company, 8 P.M., Sunday Evenings 38

I. Items of Current Interest

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TESTIMONY
HOUSE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
MARCH 15, 1967

The "Washington Post" reported on March 16, 1967, that Attorney General Clark opened hearings before a House Judiciary subcommittee on March 15th relative to the Administration's request for 50 million dollars next year and 300 million dollars the following year to assist state and local governments in modernizing their law enforcement and corrective systems. Clark said that a successful war on crime depends not on making it easier for police to seek confessions but on improving their training and methods.

The Attorney General also said he had seen no evidence that court decisions limiting admission of confessions had hampered efficient law enforcement. Clark is reported to have opposed action reversing court orders that suspects be told of their rights and be offered counsel before being questioned.

Attorney General Clark said that since 1948 the FBI has followed generally the same interrogation procedures which the courts have now ordered the states to follow. The FBI has maintained a very high average of convictions, showing "what excellence in training and standards can do," Clark said.

Clark also said he hoped Congress would not go "too far on too little" until more evidence is in on the effect of the Supreme Court's decisions.

COMMENT

The Attorney General failed to consider the fact that FBI investigations are not normally hot pursuit, on-the-street situations. When the FBI interrogates a suspect or subject, usually considerable investigation has already been conducted and corroborative facts have been developed which greatly assist the course of the interrogation. On the contrary, police are frequently faced with fast-moving, developing situations on the street where there is no opportunity for the orderly accumulation of facts to supplement interrogation.

Congress is currently investigating the effect of the Miranda decision on law enforcement and public safety. Senator Birch Bayh (Democrat - Indiana) has been holding hearings around the country regarding Miranda; however, testimony he has received has been conflicting. Generally law enforcement officials testify that they have been handcuffed and defense lawyers and civil libertarians take the opposite view. As of this time, neither side has demonstrable statistical proof to substantiate its contentions. The absence of clear proof is due, at least partially, to the fact that Miranda is a new decision, being handed down on June 13, 1966. As of now there are few reported court decisions showing how trial courts will interpret the requirements laid down in Miranda.

PRESS RELEASE OF MARCH 15, 1967 ISSUED BY REPUBLICAN CONGRESSMEN'S "WEDNESDAY CLUB" ENTITLED "ARE WE ORGANIZED TO FIGHT CRIME?"

On March 15, 1967, a group of 21 generally liberal Republican Congressmen, members of the "Wednesday Club," issued a press release challenging the adequacy of the Federal Government's organization to fight crime effectively and called for expansion of the House Judiciary Committee's hearings considering crime legislation to examine this aspect of the war on crime. The gist of their argument is that a reorganization of Federal law enforcement and investigative agencies is needed to effectively carry on the war against crime. The press release suggests that there is "confusion, competition and duplication" among Federal law enforcement and investigative agencies which is hindering the war against crime and that this can be eliminated only through a complete reorganization of these agencies.

The entire argument of the "Wednesday Club" is based on a false premise. Traditionally and historically, law enforcement in this country has been the responsibility of local governments and states. The Federal law enforcement agencies make only approximately 50,000 arrests per year for Federal violations, while local and state police make over six million arrests for criminal acts, not including traffic offenses. Federal investigative agencies have very little jurisdictional control over the more than three million serious crimes committed in the United States in 1966. Reorganization of the Federal law enforcement agencies is not the answer to the crime problem. The real problem is at the local level where there are 40,000 investigative agencies, ranging from city constables to state police, and the problem of multiplicity of jurisdiction is within the state. From the standpoint of the FBI, there is daily liaison and exchange of information with all Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies; our important cooperative services are made available to all law enforcement agencies, both on the state and Federal level; and the FBI's National Crime Information Center is an example of the cooperation which exists among law enforcement agencies on all levels.

The press release of the "Wednesday Club" states that the FBI maintains an informal semi-autonomy from Administration regulations, although organizationally responsible to the Department of Justice, and cites as an example recent debates over wiretapping procedures. This statement is without any basis in fact. The Director's testimony before various legislative committees, as well as documentation produced by him in the recent "wiretapping" controversy, clearly shows that the FBI's use of wiretaps was done with the specific knowledge and approval of the Attorneys General and under strictly controlled conditions. There is no exercise of autonomy whatsoever by the FBI in this field.

The press release also charges that the FBI's involvement in the foreign intelligence field, such as the Dominican crisis in 1965, could detract from its domestic law enforcement and crime detection functions. This allegation also is factually unsupportable. FBI Agents were sent to the Dominican Republic in 1965 at the specific order of the President; only three Special Agents are presently there, functioning solely in a liaison capacity; statistical accomplishments by the FBI during this period have been at their highest levels.

The action of the "Wednesday Club" was an obvious attempt to secure a headline, which they incorrectly feel they have found in the question of Federal organization.

MARCH 12, 1967

TELEVISION INTERVIEW OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Attorney General Ramsey Clark was the guest of CBS program "Face the Nation" which was telecast in Washington over WTOP-TV, at 12:30 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, Sunday, March 12, 1967. This program was moderated by CBS newscaster Martin Agronsky assisted by correspondents George Herman of CBS and James Clayton of the "Washington Post."

The principal topics discussed during this interview of the Attorney General were: 1. The New Orleans investigation into the assassination of former President Kennedy; 2. Wiretapping; 3. The Supreme Court "Miranda" decision; 4. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell; and 5. The death penalty.

Several references were made to the Director and the FBI during this interview and all were favorable.

NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION

The Attorney General expressed his confidence in the Warren Commission conclusion, based on FBI investigation, that assassin Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in killing former President Kennedy. He commented that most--if not all--of the individuals mentioned in the New Orleans investigation were known to the FBI, which developed no evidence that they were involved in the assassination. Clark declined to comment on the mysterious individual known as "Bertrand" since New Orleans authorities were then holding court proceedings to determine his identity.

WIRETAPPING

Clark commented that there were 38 wiretaps presently authorized by his department, and that all of these were in national security-type cases. He emphasized that procedures for his authority in the use of all such devices have been improved, and he was satisfied that none would [illegible] be used without his approval.

"MIRANDA" DECISION

The Attorney General remarked that it was still too early to determine what effect this decision would have on law enforcement performance. He noted, however, that it has had no appreciable effect on FBI investigations which have for many years informed suspects of their constitutional rights prior to interrogation.

MARCH 12, 1967
TELEVISION INTERVIEW
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

POWELL

No decision has been reached by the Department concerning possible Federal violations committed by Powell, according to Clark. However, he expressed the hope that their determination might await any further action against Powell by Congress.

DEATH PENALTY

The Attorney General stated he would recommend the death penalty be abolished for certain Federal violations.

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
1966 PRELIMINARY ANNUAL RELEASE

On Wednesday, p.m., March 15, 1967, the FBI's preliminary crime reports for 1966 were released to the press.

This report highlighted the fact that crimes of violence were up 11%. There was a 9% increase in murder, a 10% increase in aggravated assault, a 10% increase in forcible rape, and a 14% increase in robbery. As a group, crimes against property increased 11% during 1966.

The sharpest crime increase was noted in the group of cities having less than 10,000 inhabitants. Crime in these cities rose 14%. Large cities with over 100,000 inhabitants had an average increase of 10%, while crime in rural areas was up 7% and crime in the suburbs rose 13%.

In the release dated March 15th the Director reiterated the need for adequate firearms legislation, noting that there was a 23% increase in 1966 in serious assaults where guns were used. The Director also highlighted the fact that six out of every ten murders were committed with the use of a firearm. 71% of these murders were committed with handguns, 17% with shotguns and 12% with rifles or other type firearm.

This crime report release also indicated that in 1966 police arrests of adults for all criminal acts (excluding traffic offenses) dropped 1%; however, arrests of persons under 18 years of age increased 9%.

Our preliminary annual release also noted that nationally, police solutions of crime index offenses averaged 25% and noted that police solved 89% of murders, 72% of aggravated assaults, 65% of forcible rapes, 35% of robberies and 21% of property offenses.

CRIME LEGISLATION

The Congress is presently holding hearings with respect to the President's request for crime legislation entitled "Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1967." This Act has its basis in many of the recommendations of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The report of the Commission entitled "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society" was released February 18, 1967. The proposed legislation would provide for a substantial financial aid program to local and state law enforcement agencies for the purpose of purchase of equipment, training, education and research. It would also establish in the Department of Justice an agency to administer the program headed by a Director of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance. Depending on how this new legislation would be administered within the Department of Justice, it will have an impact and could conflict with the FBI's long-standing cooperative services for local law enforcement.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

By letter dated March 10, 1967, the Attorney General requested FBI participation in a national conference of local and state law enforcement administrators to be held in the State Department Auditorium on March 28-29, 1967. This conference was called by the President and has as its purpose a discussion on how to implement the proposed crime legislation. Since this conference and any new crime legislation would affect directly the long-standing FBI cooperative services to local law enforcement, Assistant to the Director DeLoach, Assistant Director Casper and Inspector Jerome J. Daunt have been designated to attend. The Attorney General is being advised by letter dated March 17, 1967.

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER (NCIC)

The National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a computerized index of law enforcement information on crime and criminals, successfully began its pilot test operation on January 27, 1967. At the present time the following police agencies are directly on-line to the FBI computer:

Boston Police Department
Philadelphia Police Department
New York City Police Department
Washington, D. C., Metropolitan Police Department
Chicago Police Department
St. Louis Police Department
New Orleans Police Department
Maryland State Police
Virginia State Police
Georgia State Patrol
Texas Department of Public Safety, and
Denver FBI Field Office

These agencies are entering records on wanted persons, stolen motor vehicles, and identifiable stolen property. They are receiving replies to inquiries in a matter of seconds. For example, a police officer on the street in New Orleans through the use of his car radio is able to get information from the FBI computer here in Washington within 1 1/2 minutes. The California Department of Justice and the New York State Police are scheduled to join the NCIC system on March 20, 1967. The system has had a steady growth in building up the information that is stored in the computer, increasing the number of hours that the computer is "on the air" and in adding new participating police agencies.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY BY NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES C. GARRISON

In December, 1966, we received information that New Orleans District Attorney James C. Garrison was conducting an investigation of the assassination of the late President Kennedy. Garrison reportedly was attempting to develop evidence showing that David William Ferrie, a homosexual who was a former airlines pilot, and Lee Harvey Oswald conspired with anti-Castro Cubans to assassinate President Kennedy.

We were informed by several sources that Garrison was basing much of his investigation upon information furnished to him by Jack S. Martin and David Lewis. Martin is a private investigator in New Orleans and Lewis is a baggage handler at a New Orleans bus station. Both Martin and Lewis appear to be mental cases. During our investigation of the assassination, we thoroughly investigated allegations that Ferrie and Oswald were acquainted but we found no evidence to show this was true.

Garrison has made one arrest in his case - Clay L. Shaw, a homosexual who was former Director of the International Trade Mart in New Orleans. Shaw's name did not come up during our investigation of the assassination. Garrison claims Shaw is identical with one Clay Bertrand, an alleged contact of New Orleans attorney Dean Andrews. We never located Bertrand and Andrews' acquaintance with Bertrand highly doubted. We developed no information indicating Oswald knew Clay Shaw.

On March 14, 1967, during a preliminary hearing in New Orleans for Shaw, Garrison produced a mystery witness Perry Raymond Russo who alleged that he was present at a meeting when Leon Oswald, David Ferrie and Clay Shaw planned the assassination of President Kennedy. Russo identified Leon Oswald as identical to Lee Harvey Oswald. Russo admitted receiving psychiatric treatment since 1959 and his testimony at the preliminary hearing was highly contradictory to information he previously furnished to news media. Russo appears to be lying and during our investigation of the assassination, we developed no information indicating Oswald ever knew Russo.

James C. Garrison is an egomaniac, is politically ambitious and it appears his whole investigation was triggered by his desire for publicity. The Director has instructed that we have no contact with Garrison or any member of his staff and that we stay meticulously out of Garrison's investigation. It appears Garrison is looking for an attempt to dump his investigation on this Bureau and the Director has instructed that we should avoid such possibility "like a plague."

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

The field of education has long been a major target of the Communist Party. The communists' emphasis on students in the recent past was best expressed by the Party's General Secretary, Gus Hall, when he stated "Communism is big, really big, on college campuses now. You've got to play the ball game where the players are and the really good players are in college." Today there is considerable unrest and agitation on college campuses throughout the Nation. Subversive agitators constitute the major source behind this unrest and, from a long-range viewpoint, these campus subversives may well become seriously damaging to our national security. In light of this, the FBI will continue to carry out its defined responsibilities, whether they be on the college campus or elsewhere, while at the same time respect the spirit of academic freedom on which our college system is based.

The two major student and campus groups in the United States today are the communist-inspired W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America, with an approximate membership of 425 members, and the Students for a Democratic Society, with approximately 5,000 members. The Students for a Democratic Society has been described by Gus Hall as a new left group which the Party has "going for us."

Today there is a concerted effort on the part of student groups to "knock" the FBI and other Government agencies off the college campuses and to prevent such agencies from carrying out their assigned duties. For example, in early March, 1967, a handful of Students for a Democratic Society members at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, alleged that the FBI in conducting investigations on that campus was infringing on academic freedom by securing information from responsible campus officials and students. While we have interviewed officials and students at the University in matters within our jurisdiction the charges that the FBI was infringing on academic freedom are baseless.

Another example involves allegations made by a group of "liberal" faculty members at State University College, Brockport, New York. This group alleged that the FBI was having faculty members "spy" on other faculty members, again raising the cry of infringement of academic freedom. These charges also were baseless and without foundation.

TRAVEL OF THE PRESIDENT TO URUGUAY

At the request of the White House, a representative of this Bureau* recently traveled to Uruguay and participated in briefings, surveys, and discussions relating to security to be provided for the President when he attends the Summit Conference of heads of American States to be held in Punta Del Este, Uruguay, during the period 4/12-14/67. The same Bureau representative is returning to Uruguay to assist a White House group in the implementation of security measures prior to the President's arrival. A general assessment of the situation in Uruguay at the present time indicates that adequate security can be provided to the President if he restricts his travel to Punta Del Este. If he travels to Montevideo proper, security problems could arise because of a very militant Communist Party which already is manifesting its protests to the President's visit. The Communist Party in Uruguay practically controls the labor movement and potentially is in a position to paralyze facilities such as light, gas, water, and street transportation. Furthermore, there is a good potential for committing sabotage and inciting riots. Under the present plan, the President will not go into Montevideo proper. Security problems at Punta Del Este are greatly minimized because the geographic location and the resort-type atmosphere do not present any serious obstacles for instituting good security. The police and security services in Montevideo are not efficient by our standards, and it will take continuing prodding to make certain that the necessary security measures are carried out. The political stability of the Uruguayan Government is not good. There is a new Government which is shaky and is suffering economic problems. There have been a series of strikes during the last several weeks. We have been told that there will be between 1500 and 2500 newspapermen who will attend the conference. There may be some commotion among them because of inadequate housing and communication facilities. Newspaper reporters may also find it disappointing to find any news of real significance at Punta Del Este if there are no disturbing incidents.

* Special Agent Papich

WIRE TAPS AND OTHER COVERAGE UTILIZED IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY FIELD

Wire taps are utilized only in the internal security field and when absolutely essential to carrying out our investigative responsibilities. Their number varies and as of this date we have 42 wire taps in operation. In addition, at the specific request of the National Security Agency, we have electronic coverage on teletypes of 40 foreign diplomatic establishments.

The importance of utilizing wire taps in the internal security field cannot be overemphasized in view of the dangers that exist in the internal security of the United States. The intelligence data obtained from such coverage makes it possible to keep appropriate officials of our Government currently aware of the activities, plans, strategy, and tactics of subversive organizations and individuals. Also, information gathered from these sources is of immediate interest to the United States intelligence agencies and officials of the Government in the formulation of plans in the foreign policy field.

We are not utilizing any microphone surveillances, mail covers, or trash covers in connection with our investigations. We are utilizing security informants and confidential sources to provide us necessary coverage. Currently, we have [redacted] security informants who are members of the Communist Party and some of these are operating at the highest level. In view of the valuable coverage these informants provide us, we place a great deal of emphasis on their utilization. It may be interesting to note that during [redacted] of our security informants became members of the Communist Party and this was increased to [redacted] informants becoming members of the Party in [redacted]. In this connection, we noted that during those two years while [redacted] informants became members of the Party, [redacted] discontinued their association with the Party primarily due to personal reasons, thus leaving us a total gain of [redacted] informants in the Party.

INFORMATION tends to identify informants - FBI

COUNTERESPIONAGE WORK AGAINST THE SOVIETS

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its intelligence organs constitute the major counterespionage problem confronting the FBI. The United States is the major target against which the Soviet espionage apparatus is directed. All information received from sources in a position to know confirms this. At this time 529 Soviet officials with 643 dependents are in the United States. Of these officials, 225 are known and suspected Soviet intelligence officers. There has been a steady annual increase in Soviet intelligence officers to this country.

information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign counterintelligence operations.

II. Intelligence Matters

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Communist China today has no diplomatic establishment in the United States and its major intelligence efforts directed against this country emanate from two major sources, [redacted].

We have identified two ethnic Chinese employees of the United Nations Secretariat in New York as Chinese communist intelligence agents.

Information tends to identify peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operations..

In anticipation of Red China's admission to the United Nations, we have greatly stepped up our efforts in the past two years to build a solid base of quality informants to operate against the Chinese communists.

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

The Communist Party, USA, is operating in an atmosphere of optimism as a result of the March 3, 1967, decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Washington, D.C., which stated that the Party could not be forced to register under the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950. The feeling throughout the Party is that it has won its fight for existence and now must move to capitalize on this victory by becoming an effective force on the American scene.

Within this week the Party adopted various programs in an effort to move out of its isolation from the American people. It is working toward the establishment of a daily newspaper which is expected to be in operation in time to have an effect on the national elections in 1968. Originally, the Party planned to merge peace, labor, and civil rights groups into a new political party which would nominate a candidate for President of the United States in 1968. Now, the Communist Party is seriously considering running its own candidates for the offices of President and Vice President of the United States in 1968.

May 1, 1967, is to mark the institution of a massive recruiting drive by the Party to take advantage of the favorable Court decision and each Party district is being instructed to start making plans for this recruiting drive now. In addition, Party leaders have called for more infiltration by Party members into the trade union movement in an attempt to regain the power the Party had in this movement in the 1940's.

The Party believes that youth must be the central concentration for its work in the future. In order to have the most impact on the young generation and to gain recruits quickly, the Party must make an effective appeal to youth. Therefore, it is instituting a massive campaign against United States policy in Vietnam, instituting resistance to the military draft, and encouraging all types of demonstrations by youth. The Party also will start a movement to have Congress pass a bill guaranteeing full employment for all youth.

The Party considers recruiting of youth its most important project in 1967. Current plans call for doubling the number of youth in the Party during the Summer of 1967, and the nationwide establishment of Party schools to fully indoctrinate these youth recruits in the principles of Marxism.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Since United States aircraft attacked selected targets in North Vietnam following torpedo-boat assaults against destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in early August, 1964, there have been in the United States almost daily demonstrations to protest United States intervention in Vietnam. Many of these demonstrations have reached major proportions.

The Communist Party and other subversive groups such as the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America, a communist-inspired Marxist-oriented youth group; the Socialist Workers Party, which has been designated as subversive by the Attorney General, and its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Workers World Party, a communist splinter group and its youth affiliate, Youth Against War and Fascism; and the Progressive Labor Party, a pro-Chinese Marxist group,have actively supported and participated in demonstrations along with the Students for a Democratic Society, a militant youth group which has been described by Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, as a group which the Party has "going for us." Pacifist groups such as Women Strike for Peace, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Committee for Nonviolent Action, and the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy have also taken a leading role in sponsoring such demonstrations. Summaries showing the highlights of these demonstrations are furnished to the White House and other Government officials two or three times a week.

The Spring Mobilization Committee and the Student Mobilization Committee, both of which include members of the Communist Party and other subversive groups in their membership, are sponsoring demonstrations throughout the United States April 8-15, 1967. The focal point of the week-long activity will be massive demonstrations at New York City and San Francisco, California, on April 15. The Reverend James Bevel is the National Director of the Spring Mobilization Committee. Bevel is an official of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a civil rights group which is headed by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. The Student Mobilization Committee is the brainchild of Bettina Aptheker, a student at the University of California at Berkeley and a member of the Communist Party, USA, National Committee. An attempt is being made to have 500 individuals burn their draft cards at New York City during the demonstration on April 15, 1967, as a mass protest against the war and the draft.

DOMINICAN SITUATION

The FBI was ordered into the Dominican Republic by the President in May, 1965, to develop information to be used in preventing communists from gaining control in that country. At the height of the Dominican Revolution, we had a staff of 14 Agents. In August, 1966, at White House instructions, we established a permanent Legal Attache office there staffed with three Agents.

Since his inauguration July 1, 1966, Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer has brought about a degree of stability, however, there continues to be strong undercurrents of dissension. The rightists reportedly have considered plots to remove Balaguer. Juan Bosch's political party, the loser in the June, 1966, election, has been most vocal in its opposition to Balaguer's programs and only recently published a document which appears intended to set the stage for a vast movement of resistance against Balaguer. The communist groups have suffered much internal dissension but to establish a common cause could be expected to regroup as they have in the past. They possibly would be willing to let Bosch's political party provide the overt leadership.

III. Criminal Matters

BOMBING OF YUGOSLAV DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
JANUARY 29, 1967

Our investigation has developed a great deal of substantial information implicating the following individuals in a conspiracy to bomb Yugoslav diplomatic establishments in the United States and Canada on 1/29/67:

Reverend Radomir Chkautovic	Lebanon, Pennsylvania
Reverend Stojilko Kajevic	Youngstown, Ohio
Zivko Kajevic	Youngstown, Ohio
Djordje Djelic	Cleveland, Ohio
Milan Nikolic	Cleveland, Ohio
Desimir Marjanovic	Cleveland, Ohio
Miomir Radovanovic	Chicago, Illinois
Dragisa Kasikovic	Chicago, Illinois
Borislav Kornic	Los Angeles, California
Kosta Stanojevic	Toronto
Branco Stanojevic	Toronto
Branislav Petrov	Toronto
Becir Rakocevic	Toronto

We have evidence of meetings by the conspirators at Chicago, Illinois, 6/26-28/66; Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, 8/27-28/66; Libertyville, Illinois, 9/30 - 10/2/66; and Perrysburg, Ohio, 1/24-25/67.

Borislav Kornic has admitted to two different individuals that Kornic, Milan Nikolic, and Desimir Marjanovic bombed the San Francisco Consulate with explosives Marjanovic transported to Los Angeles from Cleveland, Ohio. One of the persons to whom Kornic made these admissions has testified at the grand jury; the other is not willing to testify at this time.

Other evidence includes proof that Stojilko Kajevic's automobile was used prior to the bombings in an attempt to buy dynamite and a pattern of long distance telephone calls between the suspects at pertinent times.

Presentation to a Federal Grand Jury, Washington, D. C., commenced 3/10/67 but the grand jury is available to hear this case only on Fridays. Additional witnesses are appearing 3/17/67 and it is anticipated further testimony will be given the grand jury 3/24/67 and possibly 3/31/67.

Brandon Alvey, the trial attorney handling this case, has described the Bureau's investigation as outstanding and said he has never before seen so much good information gathered in such a short time. Alvey states that if there was a statute making it a violation to bomb diplomatic establishments in the United States, the evidence now available would support a conspiracy conviction. There is no such statute; however, the statute the Department considers most applicable (Section 956, Title 18) makes it a violation to conspire in the United States to damage property owned by a foreign government in a foreign country.

To successfully prosecute under Section 956, it must be proven that the conspiracy originated in the United States. No violation would exist if the conspiracy originated in Canada even if subsequent discussions and other overt acts occurred in the United States. It is unlikely that this point can be established unless a confession is obtained from one of the conspirators. Alvey is making every effort to develop the necessary evidence on this point in examining witnesses before the grand jury and has laid the groundwork for possibly forcing testimony from one or more prime suspects by offering immunity coupled with a threat of contempt proceedings if testimony is withheld.

Trial attorney Alvey has indicated the grand jury is enthusiastic but he does not expect to obtain a true bill unless additional evidence is developed to prove the conspiracy to bomb the Canadian establishments originated in the United States. We are vigorously pursuing all logical possibilities to develop such information by continuing investigation.

JAMES RIDDLE HOFFA; ET AL.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Hoffa and three others are presently serving prison terms as a result of their conviction in Chattanooga Federal Court 3/4/64, on charges of obstruction of justice. The only legal issues presently pending are two motions in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Cincinnati, on which arguments were heard 2/7/67, and a motion for new trial filed in U. S. District Court, Chattanooga, 2/28/67 alleging the Government's use of wire tapping and electronic eavesdropping against Hoffa, his attorneys, and others. These charges, so far as the Bureau and its personnel are concerned, are completely false and the Government filed its response to this motion on 3/10/67. The Chattanooga court is expected to rule on this motion in the near future. Although Hoffa is now in prison, his attorneys have continued unsuccessfully to shop around the U. S. Supreme Court in an effort to have one of the Justices release Hoffa on bail pending disposition of the pending motions.

ROBERT EARL BARNES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY

Robert Earl Barnes is the notorious burglar with an extensive arrest record who was the main witness at the trial in District Court of 5 policemen charged with bribery and conspiracy. Trial, which ended March 11, 1967, resulted in the conviction of 3 District of Columbia police officers and the acquittal of the other 2.

Barnes has admitted to our Agents the theft on June 12, 1964, of a 34.10 carat diamond ring (appraised at $120,000) from Mrs. John R. McLean, a guest at the Lucayan Beach Hotel, Grand Bahamas Island. The diamond ring was transported by Barnes and an associate to New York City where it was sold. Some of the evidence has been presented to a Special Federal Grand Jury, however, prosecution of Barnes for the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property violation was held in abeyance pending completion of the trial of the police officers.

On March 13, 1967, Assistant U. S. Attorney Harold T. Sullivan, who is handling this matter, advised that it was the specific instruction of U. S. Attorney David Bress that prosecution of Barnes in connection with the McLean diamond should be pursued and pertinent witnesses are to be called before the Grand Jury.

This is being followed most closely.

MEETING WITH
ATTY GEN'L
MAR 17, 1967

BOMBING DEATH OF
WHARLEST JACKSON
AT NATCHEZ, MISSISSIPPI
ON FEBRUARY 27, 1967
CIVIL RIGHTS
BOMBING MATTERS

A full investigation is being conducted at the Department's request concerning the death of Wharlest Jackson at Natchez, Mississippi, as a result of a bomb exploding in his pickup truck as he left work at the Armstrong Tire and Rubber Company in Natchez shortly after 8 p.m. on February 27, 1967.

Jackson had been employed by the Armstrong Company since June, 1955. On February 20, 1967, he began training for a new job as a cement mixer, a type of position previously held only by white men. His particular job was a new position and was based on seniority. Jackson had held the position of treasurer in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in the Natchez branch and is survived by his wife and five children. George Metcalf, a Negro fellow employee, also active in the National Assocation for the Advancement of Colored People, who previously customarily rode to work with Jackson, was seriously injured in a similar type explosion in 1965.

On the scene examination by Laboratory experts indicates that a high-order explosive was detonated under the cab portion of Jackson's truck directly beneath the driver. Fragments of wire recovered at the scene appear to be wire from an electric blasting cap, indicating that such a cap may have been connected to and activated by the electric wiring system of the truck. Portions of the wires to the brake light, tail light, and left rear turn indicator light, which were originally located on the inside of the left frame, are missing as a result of the explosion. No additional physical evidence has been disclosed to date.

Extensive investigation conducted under the on-the-scene supervision of Inspector Joseph A. Sullivan indicates that a group known as the Silver Dollar group is responsible for the bombing. The Silver Dollar group is reportedly a secret group of Mississippi and Louisiana Klansmen founded in June, 1965. One informant is presently a member of the group but to date has been unable to establish the identity of persons responsible for the bombing. Intensive efforts are being made to develop additional sources to furnish further penetration of the group and to trace the electric blasting cap probably used to detonate the explosive.

CLIFFORD A. JONES
PERJURY

Clifford A. Jones, former Lieutenant Governor of Nevada who is closely allied with Nevada gambling interests, was indicted January 5, 1966, on three counts of perjury as a result of his having testified falsely before the Bobby Baker grand jury. This testimony concerned payments Jones arranged through one of his companies of $10,000 to Baker through Wayne Bromley, a close associate of Baker. U. S. District Court Judge Gasch presently has taken under advisement pretrial motions of Jones for continuance of trial and change of venue.

On March 25, 1965, in response to request of Criminal Division, Bureau monitored telephone calls from Bromley to Jones and Baker. Bromley and his attorney had asked that this be done. Department held such monitoring would be legal. On March 26, 1965, Department requested we monitor meeting to be attended by Jones, Bromley, and Baker at a hotel in Los Angeles. Purpose of meeting was to get Bromley, a Government witness, to tailor his testimony to agree with testimony Jones had given. Bureau declined to monitor this meeting because of lack of security of the premises involved which presented a risk of disclosure of the coverage. Department then got Bureau of Narcotics to assist in monitoring of the meeting.

Recently we have responded to Department's request regarding Bureau electronic coverage of Jones. Such coverage involved twenty conversations over four Las Vegas and one Miami electronic device. All conversations were inconsequential and have no bearing on perjury charges against Jones. This coverage will be subject matter of future pretrial proceedings.

SAM HOLLOWAY BOWERS, JR., ET AL;
BURNING OF PROPERTY AND SHOOTING,
FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,
JANUARY 10, 1966;
VERNON FERDINAND DAHMER, SR., ET AL - VICTIMS
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
CIVIL RIGHTS - ELECTION LAWS

At approximately 2 a.m. on January 10, 1966, the residence and business of Vernon Ferdinand Dahmer, Sr., a 58-year-old Negro and past President of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Forrest County, Mississippi, was shot into and completely gutted by fire. Dahmer died the afternoon of the same date in a Hattiesburg, Mississippi, hospital.

Extensive around-the-clock investigation conducted by the FBI resulted in the indictment of 15 members of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan on June 22, 1966. The indictment charged these Klansmen with violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Civil Rights Statutes. Those indicted included Sam Holloway Bowers, Jr. imperial wizard of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi.

A motion was filed on behalf of 13 of the defendants to dismiss this indictment based upon an objection to the array of the jurors. Based upon this action the facts were re-presented to a Federal Grand Jury at Jackson, Mississippi, which resulted in the indictment of 12 members of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi on February 27, 1967. Lawrence Byrd, Sr., who was one of the original 15 indicted, was named as a co-conspirator but not as a defendant by the Federal Grand Jury on February 27, 1967.

This matter is presently pending prosecutive action.

MURDERS OF THREE CIVIL RIGHTS WORKERS

Civil Rights workers Michael Henry Schwerner and Andrew Goodman, both white, together with James Earl Chaney, Negro, were murdered near Philadelphia, Mississippi, on June 21-22, 1964.

On October 2, 1964, a Federal Grand Jury indicted 18 persons for Civil Rights violations pertaining to these murders. These indictments were dismissed October 7, 1966, on legal grounds on the basis that certain groups, including Negroes, were excluded from the grand jury panel. This case was re-presented to the Federal Grand Jury at Jackson, Mississippi, and on February 27, 1967, indictments were returned against 19 persons. They are presently free on bond. No trial date has been set.

Of the 19 persons indicted, 17 are identical to those previously indicted in this case. Jimmy Lee Townsend, who was 17 years old at the time of the murders, was the one who was previously indicted but not indicted at this time. In addition to those previously indicted, this grand jury indicted Ethel Glen "Hop" Barnett, former sheriff and present candidate for sheriff of Neshoba County, Mississippi, and Sam Holloway Bowers, Jr., Imperial Wizard, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi.

The following law enforcement officers were among those indicted: Lawrence Andrew Rainey, Sheriff of Neshoba County; Cecil Ray Price, Deputy Sheriff, Neshoba County, and Richard Andrew Willis, Patrolman, Philadelphia, Mississippi, Police Department.

SHORTAGES OF U. S. DISTRICT JUDGES

AND

SHORTAGES IN THE U. S. ATTORNEYS' OFFICES

We have, on a number of occasions, instructed the field to advise us of any shortage of U. S. Attorneys or Federal Judges, which is affecting our prosecutions.

In this connection, since September 1, 1966, we have written to the Department, pointing out a shortage of a Federal Judge or a U. S. Attorney in the Southern District of Ohio, the Middle District of Florida, the Eastern and Southern Districts of Illinois, the Eastern District of Louisiana, the District of Puerto Rico, the District of New Jersey, the Eastern District and Western District of Wisconsin, the Middle District of Tennessee, the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, the Eastern District of Michigan, and the Northern and Eastern Districts of Texas.

REQUEST OF ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL VINSON, MARCH 14, 1967, RE LAKE COUNTY, INDIANA, CRIME CONDITIONS

Assistant Attorney General Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Criminal Division, requested preparation of an extensive summary crime condition report concerning Lake County, Indiana. He asked for information on gambling, racketeering, counterfeiting, narcotics, shoplifting and other such matters. By letter to the Attorney General on March 16, 1967, we pointed out we no longer make such reports and our commitments preclude the preparation of such a study. This is apparently a "fishing expedition" type request for Vinson's and Petersen's Task Force. We advised them they have reports in gambling and racketeering-type cases in Lake County, Indiana, where recent prosecutive action has been taken against hoodlums.

The Department has embarked on a Crime Task Force Program which solicits the active participation of the various Federal investigative agencies. We informed the Department that there are inherent drawbacks to such a program and are not actively participating in it. We have, however, advised the Department that if matters within our jurisdiction arise during the Task Force Program, we will handle such upon referral of these matters to us. We have also agreed to conduct an indices and credit check of grand jury panel in the Buffalo area, which is to be convened for the Task Force in operation in that area.

Department attorney Peloquin advised a Canadian police official that the FBI was participating in a "buy back" of United States Postal Money Orders and we directed a letter to the Attorney General on March 8, 1967, pointing out that Peloquin had misinformed the Canadian authorities on our participation.

WIRETAPPING

The Attorney General testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on March 15, 1967, that microphone and wiretapping were unnecessary in connection with control of crime in the United States. Various bills to outlaw wiretapping and eavesdropping or to legalize such practices are pending in the Congress. We directed a letter to the Department dated March 6, 1967, concerning legislation proposed by Senator Eastland which would authorize wiretapping and use of microphones with court approval in organized crime investigations. We informed the Attorney General that such legislation would be very beneficial to our efforts in the field of organized crime and would appear to provide a statutory basis for practices now being followed in connection with use of such devices in national security matters. Microphones were of inestimable value in determining La Cosa Nostra weaknesses and day-to-day organizational moves, and enabled us to develop excellent informants, disseminate information to local authorities and to make counter moves to dry up La Cosa Nostra sources of income.

In connection with Departmental disclosures of our prior microphone coverage in cases presently before the trial and appeals courts, there has been to date no complete reversal of any of such cases which were actually brought to trial. In several cases, notably, Kolod-Alderisio in Denver, Colorado; Robert G. Baker in Washington, D. C.; Frank Peter Balistrieri in Springfield, Illinois; Charles Battaglia in Tucson, Arizona; and Gilbert Lee Beckley in Miami, Florida, disclosures were made and hearings held, and in each instance the court has ruled against the defendants and in favor of our position that these cases were not tainted. In the Black case and in the Schipani case in New York, the Supreme Court has remanded for retrial and these are still under consideration.

GAMBLING CASES

In our gambling cases, we have already recorded a total of 78 convictions thus far this fiscal year, which represents 30 more convictions than at a similar time last year. In addition, we have in excess of 350 individuals arrested and/or indicted and awaiting trial for violations of these statutes. As a result of our dissemination policies of gambling information to local authorities, we have directed telling blows against La Cosa Nostra members active in this field by virtue of numerous arrests made by local authorities.

During this fiscal year we have disseminated 159,823 items of criminal information to local authorities, which is an increase of 50,000 items over this same period last year.

SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
ELECTION LAWS

In early 1966 we conducted detailed investigations concerning six items of possible irregularities (Conflict of Interest) on the part of Senator Dodd. These investigations were conducted at the specific request of the Department following its review of voluminous documents made available by columnist Jack Anderson (Drew Pearson's leg man). These matters have been under consideration by the Department since May of 1966 when our investigations were completed.

Today (3/16/67) we received a letter from Assistant Attorney General Vinson requesting investigation concerning possible election laws violations based on testimony given before the Senate Select Committee on Standards and Conduct which is now holding hearings concerning Senator Dodd. Vinson's letter is being analyzed and appropriate recommendations will be submitted.

32a

FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1965

The 79th Session of the FBI National Academy begins Monday, March 20, 1967. There will be 100 law enforcement officers in attendance with representatives from 45 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 7 foreign officers from 5 foreign countries (Australia, Canada, Colombia, Malaysia and Thailand). (The Attorney General presented diplomas to the graduating class of the 75th Session of the National Academy on May 26, 1965, when he was Deputy Attorney General.)

On January 25, 1967, the Director sent a memorandum to then Acting Attorney General Clark requesting that National Academy representatives be included under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 as soon as possible for financial assistance in helping to defray living expenses while attending the FBI National Academy. We referred Mr. Clark to previous correspondence on this same matter and a reply dated August 24, 1966, that indicated that such support would be appropriate under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act. The Director pointed out that while we anticipate having a continuing demand and desire to attend this Academy, we do not feel this factor should have a bearing on the allocation of funds under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act. It was assumed in the Attorney General's reply in August, 1966, that in view of the current limited capacity of the Academy plus the ample demand and desire of local agencies to send candidates it would be unnecessary at this time to be concerned about subsistence aid.

It was estimated that approximately $80,000 for subsistence and travel would be needed for the March class and that it would vary somewhat for each class and that if the Acting Attorney General approved this concept, the Director stated a request for a grant would be submitted on proper documents to the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance.

We have never received a reply to this memorandum even though we pointed out that several grants under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act have been awarded for the conduct of police seminars and have included funds for financial assistance of the attendees. The Director may wish to point out to the Attorney General that we are not asking for this money for the FBI but that the funds would be helpful to the agency sending the man to the National Academy. Although we have not conducted a nation-wide survey, we are aware that many departments do not submit applications to the National Academy because they do not have the funds to pay the living expenses of their officers while they would be in Washington.

34

POLICE TRAINING

Assistance in training matters continues to be one of the most sought after cooperative functions of the FBI. During calendar year 1966, the FBI assisted municipal, county and state law enforcement agencies in 5478 training endeavors, attended by 163,302 people. Over 1200 Special Agents of the FBI are trained as police instructors, and during 1966, they contributed 45,383 hours of instruction time, free of charge, at police training schools. Assistance is rendered in all types of schools, however, special emphasis is being placed on police administration and management, search and seizure, probable cause for arrest, due process in criminal interrogation, laboratory matters, crime scene search, collection and preservation of evidence, human relations in police management, and police-community relations.

NEW FBI ACADEMY

In May, 1965, the Director submitted a proposal to the Attorney General for the building of a new FBI Academy on the Marine Corps Base at Quantico, Virginia. This suggestion was immediately endorsed by the President and the Attorney General. The Director's proposal outlined that with the new facility, instead of training 200 local law enforcement officers annually at the FBI National Academy we could train 1,200 and up to 1,000 local law enforcement officers in specialized courses. The Congress has appropriated funds for the construction of this new facility.

The planning and engineering work on the site is in progress and it is anticipated that the contract for the construction of the Academy will be let sometime during the summer of 1967. It is believed that the new Academy will be ready for occupancy during fiscal year 1969.

EXECUTIVE ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

Executive Order 11315 established an Executive Assignment System for filling positions in Grades 16, 17, and 18 of the General Schedule. The FBI was specifically excluded. The Director by statute has the authority to fill the 110 Supergrade positions allotted to the FBI. An inventory of skills of employees throughout the Government in Grades GS-15 through 18 is being established by the Civil Service Commission to fill vacancies in other agencies and it proposes to include in this inventory all such employees, including those in the FBI. This would make our executives available for consideration by other agencies although we are still exempt from having to consider employees of other agencies in filling our vacancies. The Department, therefore, was requested by letter dated December 21, 1966, to approve a letter to the Civil Service Commission requesting exclusion of FBI executives from the proposed inventory as retention by the FBI of its executives is considered essential. We have been following with the Department but the matter has not yet been acted upon by the Attorney General.

"THE FBI" -- TELEVISION SHOW
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY
8 P.M., SUNDAY EVENINGS

"The FBI" has been a highly successful television show which stars Efrem Zimbalist, Jr., as Inspector Erskine. The show has been renewed for its third year (1967-68).

The National Television Index ratings for the fourth quarter of 1966 show that "The FBI" had an audience of 13,230,000 homes for each program and that this was up one million from the 1965 season. The ratings also indicate that 29,350,000 view the program. More than 22 million of these viewers are above the age 18.

The series has been produced by Quinn Martin Productions in cooperation with Warner Brothers Studios at Burbank, California. The show is sponsored by the Ford Motor Company.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 para 5 & 14

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: April 30, 1969

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL WILL R. WILSON, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APRIL 30, 1969

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Gale

Attorney General's Staff Conference

SYNOPSIS: In accordance with your request, we have prepared a memorandum concerning items which the Director might care to use in connection with captioned matter. This has been coordinated with the Special Investigative Division.

Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Wilson is scheduled to be the featured speaker before the Federal Bar Association on April 30, 1969, at 12:30 p. m. The speech will be given in the National Lawyers Club and is entitled "Don Quixote Among the Mafia."

Attached for ready reference are more detailed writeups concerning the following matters:

Organized crime - Details of the Manhattan Joint Strike Force established by the Department are set forth, including the identities of the members of the supervisory council. In the Extortionate Credit Transaction case involving Albert M. Billiteri, the Attorney General on April 23, 1969, approved microphone and technical surveillance at two of Billiteri's key locations. Billiteri is a Buffalo, New York, La Cosa Nostra member.

Status of Antiriot Laws investigations in Chicago, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Washington, D. C. set forth. In addition, mention is made of recent campus disorders at Brandeis and American Universities.

REC 19 62-97826-11

Mention is made of the fact that we have written five letters to the Department requesting it's views concerning the prosecution of Dyer Act violations since there is a divergence of opinion among the United States Attorneys as to which cases should be prosecuted. Our last letter to the Attorney General dated March 5, 1969, has not been answered.

RIS:jny
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

14 JUL 25 1969

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
Re: Director's Meeting with
Assistant Attorney General
Will R. Wilson

A number of case writeups are set forth which are believed to be of interest to the Department, particularly AAG Wilson. Included are fraud cases against the Universal Fibreglass Corporation (thirteen million dollar contract to produce mail delivery trucks); Youth Pride, Inc., Washington, D. C. (payroll padding); Chromcraft Corporation ("paper" corporations formed to act as subcontractors in connection with production of rocket launchers for United States Navy).

Writeups are also submitted concerning financier Louis Wolfson and his alleged dealings with Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas based upon information furnished by the Internal Revenus Service; the bribery case involving Congressman George H. Fallon (allegations received that payoffs totaling $200,000 were made to Congressman Fallon and Lawson B. Knott, Jr., former General Services administrator, in return for obtaining commitments for Government occupancy of office buildings). Our New York Office developed information that a theft ring existed at John F. Kennedy Airport, New York City, and it is anticipated Federal Grand Jury will indict 15 to 17 individuals. Attorney General Mitchell has reportedly expressed interest in this case (Sidney Steinschreiber; And Others, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property).

ACTION:

This is submitted for information, and attached are more detailed writeups concerning the above matters.

DETAILS - OVER

DETAILS:

ORGANIZED CRIME

ALBERT M. BILLITERI EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

Billiteri is a Buffalo, New York La Cosa Nostra member in the "family" of "Commission" member Steve Magaddino, and operates a major loan-shark racket in the Buffalo area on behalf of Joseph Fino, the "underboss" of the Magaddino family. On 4/23/69, the Attorney General approved a recommendation for microphone and technical surveillance at two of Billiteri's key locations where this illegal activity is carried on. The Attorney General authorized a Department Attorney to handle the filing of affidavits with the Federal court in Buffalo, New York, to obtain the necessary court order for the electronic surveillance sought, pursuant to Title 3 of the Omnibus Crime Bill. The Department Attorney, in conjunction with our Buffalo office, was to make application to the court on 4/28/69, the necessary affidavits to be filed by a Bureau Agent. This is the first such application we have made pursuant to the provisions of Title 3.

MANHATTAN JOINT STRIKE FORCE

The Department has proposed a strike force with the stated objective of making a concentrated drive against organized crime in the borough of Manhattan in New York City. This apparently has been enlarged to include the Bronx in view of the inclusion of the Bronx County District Attorney on the Strike Force Council. This strike force is to be composed of Department Attorneys, members of the staffs of the District Attorneys of New York and Bronx Counties, members of the New York City Police Department and investigators from the various Federal investigative agencies, including the FBI. The Federal Government is to provide the office space and office equipment. A supervisory council has been named to make decisions of strategy and timing and approve all planning. The members of the Council have been named as Assistant Director in Charge John F. Malone of our New York office, the District Attorneys of New York and Bronx Counties, Police Commissioner of New York City, Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson, the Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement of the Treasury Department, the Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department, and the U. S. Attorney of the Southern District of New York.

ANTIRIOT LAWS

Chicago Cases

On March 20, 1969, the Federal Grand Jury at Chicago, Illinois, based upon extensive Bureau investigations, returned indictments against seven leaders of the New Left and one leader of the Black Panther Party all of whom were charged with Antiriot Laws violations in connection with the Chicago disturbances at the time of the Democratic National Convention. Trial has been set for September 24, 1969.

San Francisco Case

After extensive FBI investigation the Department commenced grand jury proceedings on April 23, 1969, at San Francisco in connection with Antiriot Laws violations allegedly committed by three Black Panthers who gave instructions in the use of firearms and explosives during a conference held by the Black Panther Party in San Francisco last November.

Philadelphia Case

We have conducted extensive investigation into Antiriot Laws violations in connection with the Black Power Conference held in Philadelphia in August and September, 1968. Approximately 3,000 to 4,000 Negroes from all over the country attended this conference during which five subjects provided instruction in the use of firearms and explosives for a closed meeting of approximately 70 persons.

Inauguration Disturbances

On April 18, 1969, the Department requested investigation of fifteen subjects who allegedly came to Washington, D. C., on inauguration day for the purpose of creating disorders. This investigation is being conducted on an expedite basis.

Campus Disorders

At the present time there are also a number of Antiriot Laws investigations being conducted with regard to recent campus disorders, most notably at Brandeis University where two professors from San Francisco State College allegedly contributed to the seizing of the Administration Building on January 8, 1969, and American University, Washington, D. C., where members of the Students for a Democratic Society allegedly traveled to Washington, D. C., and participated in seizing a building on the campus on April 23, 1969.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE INVESTIGATIONS (DYER ACT)

In the fall of 1967, the former Attorney General and his staff held conferences with various United States Attorneys (USA) here in Washington, D. C. Following these conferences, we learned of a divergence of opinion among USAs concerning the Department's views in prosecuting Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle (ITSMV) cases. Some had the opinion that only automobile theft ring cases should be prosecuted in Federal court while others were of the opinion that only cases having commercial aspects should be considered for such prosecution. Other USAs felt only cases possessing aggravated circumstances should be considered. Some continue to consider each case on its individual merits. During the period October, 1967, through May, 1968, we wrote four letters to the former Attorney General requesting the Department's views concerning the prosecution of these cases. In a letter dated April 12, 1968, to the Department, we set forth our views that prosecution of Dyer Act cases in Federal court should not be restricted to commercial matters and to adults, but rather that each case should be considered on its individual merits. None of these letters were answered. On March 5, 1969, we wrote the present Attorney General informing him of the divergence of opinion among USAs. This letter also requested the Attorney General furnish us his views concerning this matter; however, an answer has not been received to date.

UNIVERSAL FIBREGLASS CORPORATION
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

Following a partial audit by General Services Administration, we instituted an investigation, at Department's request, of alleged overcharges to the Government by Universal Fibreglass Corporation (Universal) on a $13 million contract to produce mail delivery trucks. All logical investigation has been completed and reported except the review of the Universal records. Access to the pertinent records was recently achieved through court action and an extensive audit is now being pressed. Criminal prosecution of several subjects is now indicated.

Congressman H. R. Gross (R-Iowa) has publicized this matter. Press items have indicated that the office of then Senator Hubert H. Humphries may have been instrumental in having the contract awarded to Universal.

YOUTH PRIDE, INC.
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

In January, 1969, following administrative investigations by General Accounting Office and Department of Labor, the Department requested we review subpoenaed records of Youth Pride, Inc., a Washington, D. C., organization funded by Labor Department to help underprivileged youths, to identify individuals participating in payroll padding in violation of Fraud Against the Government Statutes. Grand jury began hearing witnesses March 10, 1969.

CHROMCRAFT CORPORATION; ET AL.
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

We conducted an extensive investigation in this case of a multimillion dollar fraud scheme in which "paper" corporations were formed to act as subcontractors in connection with the production of rocket launchers for the U. S. Navy. Millions of dollars in overcharges to the Navy were channeled by subjects into Swiss bank accounts. On August 7, 1968, two corporations and four individuals, including Francis Rosenbaum, a Washington, D. C., tax attorney, were indicted in Washington, D. C., on charges of conspiring to defraud the Government of more than $4 million. Trial date is set for September 8, 1969. On January 29, 1969, civil suits were filed in Federal courts in Washington, D. C., and St. Louis, Missouri, demanding judgment for double damages arising from the fraud charges in the criminal indictment.

LOUIS WOLFSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING

At request of the Department, received April 17, 1969, we are ascertaining subscribers to some 400 telephone numbers in various parts of the United States called from the Florida farms of Louis Wolfson, who was recently convicted in two Securities and Exchange Commission cases in New York. Most of these have been determined and furnished Criminal Division. Remaining are being expedited and results being furnished to Department as received. Bureau records also checked with negative results regarding $20,000 check from Wolfson Family Foundation to Abe Fortas, Supreme Court Justice, dated January 3, 1966, and $20,000 check from Fortas to Wolfson Family Foundation dated December 22, 1966. Internal Revenue Service conducted investigation and determined $20,000 check to Fortas was allegedly for discrimination study and $20,000 returned to Wolfson Family Foundation by Fortas as study was not undertaken.

CONGRESSMAN GEORGE H. FALLON; ET AL.
BRIBERY

Investigation is being conducted of allegation made by Joseph J. Weiner, a Washington, D. C., mortgage broker, that payoffs totaling $200,000 were to be made to Congressman Fallon and Lawson B. Knott, Jr., former General Services Administration Administrator (GSA), in return for obtaining commitments from GSA for Government occupancy of office buildings in Baltimore, Maryland, and Durham, North Carolina, to be constructed by Piracci Construction Company, Baltimore, Maryland. Weiner was granted immunity by U. S. Attorney, Baltimore, from prosecution in Federal Housing Administration Matters case provided he was truthful in Congressman Fallon case. Investigation awaiting results of visit by Dominick Piracci and Weiner at GSA sometime in May, 1969.

SIDNEY STEINSCHREIBER;
AND OTHERS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF
STOLEN PROPERTY (ITSP)
THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT (TFIS)
CONSPIRACY

Captioned investigation concerns theft ring operating at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York City. Special Prosecutor Daniel P. Hollman, Department of Justice Task Force, is presenting evidence to Federal Grand Jury wherein 15 to 17 indictments anticipated probably April 30, 1969. Organized Crime Section of the Department of Justice and Attorney General Mitchell particularly interested.

In October, 1968, four individuals, including Steinschreiber and Mario Alessi, were arrested by the FBI in connection with theft of drugs. Since that time, Alessi, a Pan American Airways cargo supervisor, has been cooperating and named others in connection with pharmaceutical thefts amounting to over $100,000, as well as a series of general merchandise thefts, such as furs, jewelry, and firearms probably in excess of $250,000 involved. Alessi has identified Raymond Wood, U. S. Customs Examiner, as being involved. Wood has been interviewed, but denies complicity. Customs Agency has been apprised of Wood's alleged involvement.

This Bureau has long been aware of the serious problems of thievery at airports in the New York metropolitan area, particularly at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Special Agents of this Bureau are assigned on the scene at that airport and are actively handling investigations of violations within our jurisdiction. In performing our duties, we enjoy close working cooperation with other law enforcement agencies, with the airlines, and with the Airport Security Council formed in 1968 to cope with these problems.

MR. A. H. BELMONT November 30, 1959

MR. F. A. FROHBOSE

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Donahoe to you dated November 23, 1959. In connection with the Bureau's control program aimed in developing live sources in diplomatic establishments of countries outside the Soviet bloc with a view to developing investigative and intelligence data in "trouble-spot areas," the Director approved a recommendation that Liaison discuss with State the problem of developing live informants in Cuban establishments in the U. S.

On November 30, 1959, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section discussed instant matter with Mr. J. P. McDonnell, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State. Mr. McDonnell advised that the Department of State had no objection to the Bureau attempting to develop live sources within the Cuban establishments in the U.S. Mr. McDonnell was advised that the Bureau would check with State on individual cases as to clearance for specific interviews. Mr. McDonnell said this would be completely in accord with the State Department thinking.

ACTION:

For information. Appropriate instructions will be issued to the field.

109-12-210
OHB:jlk
(8)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. James
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bartlett
① - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of
Friendly Foreign Countries)

-1014

ORIGINAL FILED IN

NOT RECORDED
117 DEC 9 1959

6

143

57 DEC 14 1959

1 - Mr. James

SAC, WFO

December 4, 1959

Director, FBI
(105-new)

CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.
IS - CUBA

Re Bulets 5/20/58 and 6/29/59 both captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations."

State Department clearance for Bureau to institute program to develop live informants and sources within all Cuban diplomatic establishments in the United States was granted on 11/30/59. Bureau authority is therefore granted to recipient offices to conduct a survey regarding the identities of individuals who can be utilized in this matter. On completion of this survey, the recipient offices should submit their recommendations as to the individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for investigation in each individual case. Include in your survey, the names of sources and informants that are currently being used in Cuban diplomatic establishments within your respective territories together with the names of sources and informants not assigned to an establishment but who are in a position to furnish information concerning Cuban Government activities in this country.

In view of the present situation in Cuba, this matter should be given preferred attention.

2 - Miami

2 - New York

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries)

FEJ:bcm
(9)

23

63 DEC 15 1959

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
DEC 4 1959
MAILED

65-63113

NOT RECORDED
150 DEC 11 1959

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

- Donahoe
- Edwards
1 - Liaison

A. H. Belmont

April 15, 1960

S. B. Donahoe

CEYLONESE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
IS - CEYLON

On 2/16/60 a source of WFO furnished information which disclosed that the current Ceylonese Ambassador to the United States R.S.S. Gunewardene, while assigned as ambassador in Rome in 1954, did not conceal his sympathies to representatives of the countries in the "peace camp" and that he was often in attendance at cultural and social events of the "Peoples Democratic States." This information was disseminated to State Department. In addition, WFO was requested to analyze the situation in its office as it pertained to coverage of Ceylon. Its views and recommendations regarding a program for the development of sources and informants in the embassy of Ceylon were requested.

WFO has advised that it has no coverage at Ceylonese establishments at the present time and that the entire Ceylonese non-diplomatic staff contains only four possibilities for developing such coverage. It recommended instituting investigation of these individuals for the purpose of exploiting their potential.

In view of the information concerning the Ceylonese Ambassador's past sympathies coupled with the Bureau's responsibilitie in security investigations regarding international trends or developments affecting the internal security of the U.S. and our responsibilities for keeping other interested agencies advised of current intelligence information, it is believed that we should consider the possibility of establishing appropriate coverage within the Ceylonese establishments in the U.S.

Recommendation:

That liaison discuss orally with an appropriate official in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs at Department of State, the possibility of the Bureau developing live sources within Ceylonese diplomatic establishments within the U.S. If it is approved, also secure clearance for very discreet investigation of potential sources which we will thereafter select.

65-63113

NOT RECORDED
141 AUG 3 1960

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

FLE:baj
(6)

105-85418

① - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

Mr. A. H. Belmont April 28, 1960

Mr. S. B. Donahoe

1 - Belmont
1 - Bartlett
1 - Donahoe
1 - Schaefer

BURMA ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.
IS - BURMA

The Washington Field Office (WFO) advised by letter 3/1/60 that SA Frank B. Still, Jr. met Mr. Harlan C. Westover, Chancellor, Embassy of Burma, Washington, D. C., at a cocktail party during the 1959 Christmas and New Year holidays. Westover appeared friendly and indicated he did most of the work for the First Secretary at the Embassy of Burma. His work consists mostly of handling the Embassy accounts and purchase agreements with American firms. WFO believes Westover would be amenable to further contact.

We are in need of additional informants in the Burmese field and WFO desires authority to conduct an investigation of Westover leading toward his development as a possible source or informant regarding Burmese matters.

OBSERVATIONS:

In view of the strategic location of Burma, which borders China, and the fact it is in an area of constant unrest, believe Westover, if developed as a source or informant, could furnish us information which may be of interest to the State Department and other U. S. Government agencies. The Bureau's responsibilities regarding developments affecting the internal security of the U. S. along with keeping other U. S. Government agencies informed of information received through our sources and informants warrants us at this time to secure State Department clearance for a program to develop adequate informant coverage within Burmese diplomatic establishments in the U. S.

RECOMMENDATION:

That liaison discuss orally with an appropriate official in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, the possibility of this Bureau developing live sources within Burmese diplomatic establishments in the U. S. If it is approved, also secure clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will thereafter select.

105-new
1 - 134-8930 (Harlan C. Westover)
1 - 65-58359 (Embassy of Burma)
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

VRS:bcm

65-63113-
NOT RECORDED
JUL 25 1960

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

57 AUG 5 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES G NT

Memora l

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont ✓
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 14, 1960

FROM : Mr. S. B. Donahoe

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Wacks

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

My memorandum 12/21/59 pointed out twelve field offices, directly or potentially involved under captioned program in the development of live sources within foreign official establishments in the U. S., had been requested to submit evaluations and suggestions regarding possible expansion of this phase of program. As a result three specific questions were raised. These were considered at Internal Security - Espionage Conference June 9-10, 1960, with results set forth hereinafter:

First question related to whether we should attempt source developments in establishments outside Washington, New York City, and San Francisco, where all existing sources currently operate, and whether we should alter present instructions that potential sources be limited almost exclusively to employees of foreign establishments who are U.S. citizens. Conference decided that official establishments outside Washington and New York City for the most part are of a commercial nature with honorary consuls, most of whom in fact are U.S. citizens. For this reason, in absence of a showing that valuable intelligence data might exist in establishments removed from these two cities, it would not be feasible to undertake extensive program to develop sources therein. With regard to expanding our targets to include for potential development individuals who are not U.S. citizens, Conference was of the opinion we should continue as in the past concentrating on U.S. citizens but giving consideration (taking into account any special circumstances involved) to making discreet approaches after thorough investigation to foreigners employed in these diplomatic establishments, this to be done on a highly selective basis.

Second question related to whether we should relax present requirement that all authorized interviews with potential sources be initially conducted under suitable pretext, preferably in connection with criminal matter unrelated to the employment of

WRW:gmh
(6)

EX 105

REC- 22

65-63113-192

59 JUN 23 1960

NAT. INT. SEC.

the person interviewed. The Conference was of the opinion that this requirement should not be relaxed since we are dealing in a most delicate area and must proceed with all possible precautionary measures. It was noted the procedures we have followed in the past have been successful and that alteration of such procedures is certainly not mandatory at this time.

Third question related to the possibility of utilizing sources which we have already developed to reach higher-level sources. In this connection, it may be noted most of our present sources occupy clerical or secretarial positions in the various establishments where they are employed. The Conference felt that on a highly selective basis we might be able to work through one or more of these lower-level employees to develop some official in the same establishment who would be willing to cooperate with the FBI. This would permit the acquisition of higher-level intelligence data relating to the specific country involved. The Conference was of the opinion that the New York and Washington Field Offices, which handle all but a very few of the sources already established, should be alert for any possibilities of stepping up our intelligence acquisition methods in this manner. Those two offices agreed to do this.

ACTION:

This disposes of the three questions raised in referenced memorandum. No further action is necessary.

WRW/ DEMB

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 16, 1960

FROM : Mr. S. B. Donahoe

JUNE

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Mossburg
1 - Callahan
1 - Cotter
1 - Wacks

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (SEMIANNUAL EVALUATION)

5-

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE:

Program inaugurated 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for acquisition of positive intelligence and investigative information through three principal phases. First phase concerns receipt of notification from other U.S. agencies of arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel of friendly governments. Second phase involves maintenance of technical surveillances of official establishments of foreign governments at State Department request. Third phase involves development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST:

First phase principally involves review of any file references and indexing procedures at Seat of Government at nominal costs. Under second phase, ten technical surveillances are currently being maintained covering official establishments of Cuba, France, Germany, and the United Arab Republic at a total estimated monthly cost of $19,866 (for details see Attachment A). Under third phase involving development of live sources, we presently have 24 actual and 27 potential sources in the establishments of 19 friendly foreign countries (for details see Attachment B). Costs of this phase are principally those arising from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling producing sources. Costs are considered fully justified since sound counterintelligence coverage requires sources which can produce.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS:

This program supplements and is supplemented by a number of programs which result in intelligence coverage; such as, CODE WORD Intensification Program, and name check program of holders of official and diplomatic visas.

MCT - 1

MAGNITUDE:

LOSURE

EX 108

REC- 16

6 11 - 193

Instant program has ramifications touching work on any desk handling matters relating to noncommunist countries, depending upon international developments and intelligence requirements of Bureau and State Department.

WRW:gmh (7)

Enc.

65-63113

JUN 30 1960

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES:

No weaknesses have cropped up in the past six months. Over-all program is operating smoothly and effectively.

REVIEW OF PROGRAM AT INTERNAL SECURITY - ESPIONAGE CONFERENCE 6/9-10/60:

At this Conference, captioned program was reviewed. Consideration was given to questions whether we should endeavor to develop sources at establishments outside Washington and New York City and whether we shoul relax our procedures to permit more direct approach during interviews with potential sources. Conference concluded that probability of there being important intelligence data within foreign official establishments outside Washington and New York City was too remote to warrant expenditure of manpower and money for purpose of endeavoring to expand program in this direction at this time. With regard to relaxing requirement that potentia sources be interviewed under suitable pretext, preferably of a criminal nature, Conference felt we are operating in too delicate an area to let down safeguards at this time. Conference agreed that New York and Washington Field Offices should, on a highly selective basis, endeavor to develop higher-level sources where situation permits such efforts by making approaches to them through sources currently being operated on lower levels (such as chauffeurs, clerks, secretaries, et cetera, in diplomatic establishments). This will be done.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS:

Controls are exercised on day-to-day basis through review of outgoing instructions to field. Technical surveillances are subject to 90-day evaluations. No interviews are conducted of potential sources without specific State Department clearance. Control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are regularly routed. Semiannual evaluation of program encompasses review of control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS:

Review of control file discloses instructions are current and adequate.

OVER-ALL VALUE:

For the most part, this program consists of a coordination of accepted investigative and intelligence procedures for the purpose of proper direction, redirection when indicated, and administrative contro

Memorandum Mr. Donahoe [illegible] Mr. Belmon
Re: Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries
(Semiannual Evaluation)
65-63113

On a continuing basis it produces information of value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and handling of international relations and to the Bureau in its investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

Recommended program be continued in present form. Re-evaluation will be submitted in December, 1960.

Intelligence Coverage of
Friendly Foreign Countries
Bufile 65-63113

Attachment A

The following technical surveillances are being maintained at the specific request or with the specific approval of the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State:

Country	Symbol	Estimated Monthly Cost
Cuba		
Embassy, D. C.		$2250
Consul and Attaches, D. C.		1606
Consul, NYC		2294
Consul, Miami		733
France		
Chancery, D. C.		5188
Germany		
Embassy, D. C.		3687
United Arab Republic		
Chancery, D. C.		1210
Attaches, D. C.		1369
UN, NYC		1529
Total Estimated Monthly Cost		$19,866

During past six months, technical coverage of the Iraqi Chancery in Washington and the Iraqi Consulate and UN office in New York City was discontinued as a part of this program.

Special technical coverage was maintained for the benefit of the State Department at the French Embassy residence from 4-15-60 to 4-29-60, which period included the time French President Charles deGaulle visited the United States.

1 193

ENCLOSURE

Intelligence Coverage of
Friendly Foreign Countries
Bufile 65-63113

Attachment B

With State Department approval we are developing live sources in official establishments of countries listed below. Actual sources developed to date and potential sources under investigation are shown in connection with each target country.

Country	Actual	Potential
Brazil	0	0*
China	6	1
Cuba	0	1
Ghana	0	1
India	1	2
Iran	1	2
IRaq	3	1
Israel	1	2
Jordan	1	0
Laos	0	2
Lebanon	2	0
Pakistan	0	11
Saudi Arabia	2	0
Sudan	1	2
Thailand	0	0
Tunisia	0	0
United Arab Republic	5	0
Venezuela	0	2
Yemen	1	0
	24	27

*Husband of attache in Brazilian Consulate, New York City, furnishes information received from his wife, thus operating as a cut-out.

In addition to the 24 actual sources noted above, we have 3 live sources in Japanese establishments and 1 in a Malayan establishment, developed prior to the incorporation of this phase of our intelligence coverage into captioned program in May, 1958. Japan and Malaya are not presently target countries.

– [illegible] - 193

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/21/62

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - Mossburg
1 - Callahan
1 - G.C.Moore
1 - Mullins
1 - Cotter

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

D E WRWAC

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE

This program was inaugurated in 1954 and was expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) Regular notification from the U. S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) Maintenance of technical surveillances of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) Development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST

The first phase consists chiefly of review of file references and indexing at Seat of Government at nominal expenses. Under the second phase, we are presently operating 19 technical surveillances covering official establishments of 10 non-Soviet-bloc countries at a total estimated monthly cost of $23,827. These countries are Brazil, Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Guinea, Indonesia, Israel, Netherlands, and Portugal. Coverage of 6 of these countries (Brazil, Congo, Guinea, Indonesia, Netherlands, Portugal) was prompted by Attorney General's expressed interest in January, 1962, in having Bureau increase technical surveillances to include establishments of various countries outside the Soviet Bloc. These surveillances are tentative in nature and, if they prove unproductive, they will be discontinued in favor of coverage on other critical countries. (For details of technical surveillance coverage, see attachment A.)

Under the third phase of this program, we currently have 41 actual and 32 potential live sources in the establishments of 29 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by State Department as "target" countries. (For details, see attachment B.) Costs of this phase are principally those arising from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling producing sources. Costs of program are considered fully justified based on value of information developed.

65-63113

Enclosures - 2

RDC:smf
(9)

ENCLOSURE

65-63113-292

REC 19

270 EX-106

17 MAY 23 1962

30 MAY

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including **CODE WORD** oviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U. S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering U. S.

MAGNITUDE

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and the current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and the State Department. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D. C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have developed during the past year. The program is operating smoothly and effectively.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillances are evaluated each 90 days. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance. A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVER-ALL VALUE

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Re-evaluation will be made in April, 1963.

Attachment A

The following technical surveillances are being maintained at the present time with the approval in each instance of the State Department. (Heretofore, in connection with periodic evaluations of this program, we have listed only tesurs requested specifically by State Department. Hereafter, we plan to list all tesurs covering non-Soviet bloc establishments, regardless of whether they were initiated in response to State request or were prompted by our own intelligence requirements. It is felt this is more realistic approach and will more comprehensively show the scope of our coverage.)

Country	Symbol	Estimated Monthly Cost
Brazil		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.		$2,403
UN Delegation, NYC		1,483
Congo		
UN Delegation, NYC		494
Cuba		
UN Delegation, NYC		510
Cuban Ambassador to UN, NYC		291
Dominican Republic		
Embassy, Washington, D.C.		920
Consulate, NYC		1,430
France		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.		3,583
Guinea		
UN Delegation, NYC		2,224
Embassy, Washington, D.C.		852
Indonesia		
UN Delegation, NYC		1,012
Embassy, Washington, D.C.		1,734
Ambassador, Washington, D.C.		116

65 - 6311 - 292

ENCLOSURE

Israel	
Embassy, Washington, D. C.	1,972
Consulate, NYC	1,235
Netherlands	
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	1,655
Ambassador, Washington, D.C.	236
Portugal	
UN Delegation, NYC	741
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	936
TOTAL ESTIMATED MONTHLY COST	$23,827

See memo Wannall to Sullivan, 5/21/62,
"Intelligence Coverage of Non-Soviet-Bloc
Countries (Annual Evaluation)."

Attachment B

With State Department approval we are developing live sources at the official establishments of the below-listed countries. Actual sources developed and potential sources under investigation are shown in connection with each country.

Country	Actual	Potential
Argentina	0	0
Bolivia	0	0
Brazil	2	1
Burma	1	1
Ceylon	0	1
Chile	0	0
China	4	1
Colombia	0	0
Congo	0	0
Costa Rica	0	0
Cuba	1	1
Dom. Republic	2	0
Ecuador	0	2
El Salvador	0	0
Ghana	1	0
Guatemala	0	0
Guinea	0	2
Haiti	0	0
Honduras	0	0
India	1	2
Indonesia	2	3
Iran	0	1
Iraq	0	2
Israel	1	1
Jordan	0	0
Korea	0	1
Laos	1	2
Lebanon	1	0
Malaya	1	0
Mali	1	2
Morocco	0	3
Nicaragua	0	0
Pakistan	1	0
Panama	0	0
Paraguay	0	0
Peru	0	0
Saudi Arabia	0	0

Enclosure

Country	Actual	Potential
Sudan	2	1
Syria	0	0
Thailand	1	0
Tunisia	1	1
United Arab Republic	5	1
Uruguay	1	0
Venezuela	1	0
Yemen	0	0
TOTALS	31	29

Enclosure

MR. A. H. BELMONT July 21, 1960

R. O. L'ALLIER

INDONESIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.
IS - INDONESIA

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Donahoe to you dated 6-15-60 in the above-captioned matter. Liaison was instructed to talk with State regarding the possibility of the Bureau's developing live sources within Indonesian diplomatic establishments in the U.S., and if approved secure clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which will be selected in the future.

Instant matter was discussed on 6-17-60 by Mr. Emond of the Liaison Section with Mr. Frank Meloy, Assistant to Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

On 7-19-60 Mr. Meloy advised Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section that after considering this matter State has come to the conclusion that the successful penetration of Indonesian diplomatic establishments within the U.S. would be of real interest to State; that the results would be interesting and useful and that State has decided to grant approval to the Bureau to proceed with this matter. This approval also carries with it, clearance for discreet investigations of potential sources.

ACTION:

For information.

65-63113

NO ORDED
184 AUG 2 1960

OHB:sap (8)

1-Parsons
1-Belmont
1-Donahoe
1-Schaefer
1-65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)
1-Liaison
1-Bartlett

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

51 AUG 3 1960

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

COPY

SAC, WFO (105-26155) July 28, 1960

Director, FBI (105-87125)

INDONESIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
IS - INDONESIA

ReBulet 4-28-60 captioned "Irma Viscal de Ginario, IS - Indonesia." Reference is also made to New York letter 6-2-60 and WFO letter 6-1-60 both captioned as above. Copy of referenced WFO letter is enclosed for the New York Office.

State Department clearance for the Bureau to institute a program to develop sources and informants within all Indonesian diplomatic establishments in the United States was granted 7-19-60. State Department advised that the successful penetration of Indonesian diplomatic establishments in the United States would be of real interest to it.

Therefore, Bureau authority is hereby granted the Washington Field and New York Offices to conduct an up-to-date survey regarding the identities of individuals connected with Indonesian diplomatic establishments in your respective territories who can be utilized regarding captioned matter; and, thereafter submit recommendations as to the individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for such investigation in each individual case. Bureau authority is not granted at this time for investigations of those individuals mentioned in relets until such time that an up-to-date office index check is made, local police and credit records are checked and a check made with established sources. Attempts should also be made to secure the individual's date and place of birth which, of course, will assist the Bureau in checking its indices regarding the individual you propose to investigate. Upon receipt of this information, the Bureau will then be in a better position to determine whether or not an investigation should be conducted.

WFO and New York should bear in mind that we should select only those persons for development as confidential sources and subsequent interview whom we can anticipate from our investigations will be responsive to our request for assistance. Such persons should be considered for interviews to present a minimum of risk in regard to their divulging to their employers any contacts by the FBI as such disclosure could result in serious repercussions between the Governments of Indonesia and the United States.

2 - New York (100-56137) (Enclosure) 65-[illegible]

NOT RECORDED
19

(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

VRS:sah
(6)
COPY 130

160

COPY

Letter to SAC, WFO
RE: INDONESIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
105-87125

It is the Bureau's feeling that contacts with persons with other than American citizenship and who have not displayed any loyalty to the United States Government or indicated sympathy with our investigative responsibilities are extremely risky and could result in impairing relations between the United States and Indonesia if a contact with the FBI was disclosed.

NOTE: Bureau in memo 6-15-60 captioned "Indonesian Activities in the United States, IS - Indonesia" pointed out that we needed informant coverage in the Indonesian field. It was also noted in the memo that there have been differences between the Indonesian Army and President Sukarno of Indonesia over the composition of the new Indonesian Parliament. Sukarno is said to have personally appointed certain communists to the new body. On 3-8-60 Khrushchev and Sukarno issued joint communiques calling for relaxation of tension, peaceful coexistence and general disarmament. The Soviets also recently extended a credit of $250,000,000 to Sukarno and both parties agreed to increase mutual trade and cultural exchanges. We requested liaison to discuss this matter with appropriate official at State with possibility of this Bureau developing live sources within Indonesian diplomatic establishments in the United States and, if approved, also secure clearance for discreet investigations of potential sources which we will thereafter select. As indicated in instant letter, State furnished approval for the above program on 7-19-60 which also afforded Bureau clearance to conduct discreet investigations of potential sources. WFO and New York being advised accordingly.

COPY

- Schaefer

SAC, WFO (105-34566)

July 29, 1960

Director, FBI (105-85418)

CEYLONESE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
IS - CEYLON

For the benefit of the New York Office a source of WFO furnished information on 2-16-60 which disclosed that the Ceylonese Ambassador to the U. S., R.S.S. Gunewardene, while assigned as Ambassador in Rome in 1954 did not conceal his sympathies to representatives of the countries in the "peace camp" and that he was often in attendance at cultural and social events of the "Peoples Democratic States." In view of this information WFO was requested to analyze its informant coverage pertaining to Ceylonese activities in the U. S. WFO's views and recommendations regarding a program for the development of sources and informants in the Embassy of Ceylon were requested. WFO advised it had no coverage at Ceylonese establishments at the present time and recommended instituting investigations of certain individuals for the purpose of exploiting their potential.

In view of the information concerning the Ceylonese Ambassador's past sympathies coupled with the Bureau's responsibilities in security investigations regarding international trends or developments affecting the internal security of the U. S. and our responsibilities for keeping other interested agencies advised of current intelligence information, we should at this time consider the possibility of establishing appropriate informant coverage within all Ceylonese diplomatic establishments in the U. S.

State Department clearance to institute a program to develop informants and sources within all Ceylonese diplomatic establishments in the U. S. was granted on 7-19-60. State Department related, however, that Ceylonese activities are of no particular interest to the Department of State, but in view of the past activities of Ceylon's Ambassador to the U. S., R.S.S. Gunewardene, State would have no objection to the Bureau developing live sources providing the target is a citizen of the U. S. State related that a contact of a

105-85418-5

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

2 - New York
VRS:ms
(7)

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
JUL 29 1960
MAILED

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Countries)

51 AUG 5 1960

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Ceylonese national would require a discussion with State of the individual case before taking any action.

Bureau authority is hereby granted the Washington Field and New York Offices to conduct a survey regarding the identities of individuals connected with Ceylonese diplomatic establishments within your respective territories who can be utilized regarding captioned matter; and, thereafter, submit recommendations as to the individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for such investigation in each individual case.

It is important that we should select only those individuals for development as confidential sources and possible subsequent interviews whom we can anticipate from our investigations will be responsive to our requests for assistance. The Bureau feels that contacts with persons with other than American citizenship and who have not displayed any loyalty to U. S. Government nor indicated sympathy with our investigative responsibilities, are extremely risky and could result in serious repercussions between the U. S. and Ceylon if a contact with the FBI was disclosed.

NOTE: With State Department clearance concerning the above program we are now in a position to develop live sources within all Ceylonese diplomatic establishments in the U. S. This, of course, will afford us another means of securing good information which would not otherwise be available to other interested U. S. Government agencies. WFO and New York being instructed accordingly.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES R

Memora

1 - Parsons
1 - Belmont
1 - Liaison
1 - Donahoe
1 - Mossburg

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont ✓
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Trotter
Evans
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 7, 1961

FROM : Mr. S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Boothe

L'Allier

Donahoe

In view of recent information received indicating Morocco has accepted Soviet military aid and will soon request the United States and France to remove its military bases from Morocco, the Department of State is being requested to grant clearance for us to institute a program to develop sources and informants in Moroccan diplomatic establishments in the United States.

Recent newspaper publicity has indicated a definite interest by the Soviets and Communist China in infiltrating various countries of Africa, which at the present time are in the throes of various nationalist moves. On 11-16-60 an article appeared in the Madrid daily newspaper "A.B.C." which stated the Moroccan Government had announced the acceptance of Soviet military aid. On 11-22-60 the same newspaper reported a Moroccan military mission was departing Morocco for Moscow on that date to discuss Soviet military aid. The same newspaper reported on the same date that a good-will mission from Morocco had been received by Khrushchev in Moscow. A United Press International release dated 12-5-60 stated that Morocco may soon demand removal of all United States and French military bases on her territory.

Madrid papers in October, 1960, related that Moroccan labor unions, which are communist infiltrated, planned to send representatives to Cuba and the same unions are urging the Moroccan Government to disband the Royal Moroccan Army and set up Castro-type militias.

OBSERVATIONS:

In view of the political developments in Morocco as indicated above, it is believed that we should institute a program to develop sources and informants at Moroccan diplomatic establishments in the United States for the purpose of obtaining intelligence data of assistance to the United States Government concerning Moroccan activities in the United States. Such sources will be in a position to furnish us information indicating possible Morrocan activities within our investigative jurisdiction.

65-63113-230

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-77787-235
62-103546
105-62915

to EHM 2-21-61

~~EHM:fag~~
(9)

52 FEB 28 1961

EX 104

REC- 22

9 FEB 24 1961

1 - 62-77787-235 (Moroccan UN Delegation, New York City)
1 - 62-103546 (Moroccan Consulate, New York City)
1 - 105-62915 (Moroccan Embassy, Washington, D.C.)

5

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

ACTION:

It is recommended liaison obtain State clearance for an FBI program to develop sources and informants at Moroccan diplomatic establishments in the United States in view of facts and observations set forth above.

OK

2-10-61 J P M'Donnell, State, advised clearance granted to proceed with above program. CHB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES C[illegible]NT

Memora[illegible]

- Parsons
- Belmont
- Donahoe
- Liaison
1 - Mossburg

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont ✓
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 24, 1961

FROM : Mr. S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

We are requesting State to grant clearance for us to conduct a program to develop sources and informants at diplomatic establishments in the United States of the Mali (Africa) Government in view of that Government's anti-Western and pro-Soviet-bloc attitude.

The Republic of Mali was admitted to the United Nations as a new republic in Africa on 9-28-60. The Office of Special Investigations (OSI), Department of the Air Force, has advised the "leftist-oriented government" of Mali apparently intends to establish ties with a number of Sino-Soviet-bloc countries. On 10-13-60 Mali recognized Communist China and OSI indicated that the Nationalist Chinese representatives in Mali would be asked to leave that country. In October, 1960, Soviet Russia recognized the new Republic of Mali and a Soviet delegation was due to arrive in Mali in late 1960. OSI has advised that Mali has consistently voted at the United Nations with the communist bloc on East-West issues.

The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) advised on 1-27-61 that Soviet-bloc activities in Mali were expected to increase. The Government of Mali has retained "radical, leftist and pro-Marxist" ministers in key posts including: interior, planning, information, transportation, communications, public laws and "leftist" Prime Minister Modibo Keita had retained portfolio of defense and security. ONI advised on 3-21-61 that Mali signed an economic and trade agreement with the USSR for a 44 million ruble loan. Mali is presently purchasing Soviet planes; has concluded an economic agreement with Communist China and is selling 90 per cent of its total exports to the communist bloc in 1961.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ACTION:

It is recommended that Bureau liaison contact the appropriate State Department representative and obtain clearance for the FBI to institute a program to develop sources and informants at diplomatic establishments in the United States of the Republic of Mali in view of the fact that Mali appears to be fast becoming a satellite of the Soviet bloc.

+ to WFO
EHM:gm
4-4-61

65-63113
EHM:fag
(9)
1 - 105-NEW (Republic of Mali Embassy)
1 - 62-77787-384 (Republic of Mali UN Delegation, New York City)
1 - 105-NEW (Republic of Mali Consulate)

REC-76

65-63113-232

APR 5 1961

58 APR 12 1961

Memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

It is also recommended that liaison secure State clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will hereafter select.

OK

3/29/61
OK on both counts per
J P McDonnell, State
OHB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont ✓
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 20, 1961

FROM : Mr. S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

① ②

We are requesting State to grant clearance for us to conduct a program to develop sources and informants at diplomatic establishments in the United States of the Government of the Republic of the Congo in view of political crisis existing in that country and in view of Soviet support and support of other African and pro-Soviet countries of procommunist political group in the Republic of the Congo.

The Republic of the Congo obtained its freedom from Belgium in 1960 and since that time has been involved in a political turmoil between opposing factions. The procommunist - pro-Soviet faction was represented by Patrice Lumumba who was killed in the Republic of the Congo during February, 1961. As a result of his death, procommunist and anti-Western demonstrations were held in the United States and in many countries of the world. Lumumba's Lieutenant Antoine Gizenga, who is pro-Soviet, has assumed Lumumba's position with the dissident group. In view of critical political situation existing in the Republic of the Congo and the fact that Soviet Russia and other pro-Soviet - African countries (Ghana, Mali and Guinea) are supporting the pro-Gizenga faction in the Republic of the Congo, it was believed desirable in late 1960 that we should endeavor to establish sources in diplomatic establishments of the Republic of the Congo in the United States. Through such sources it was believed we could obtain intelligence information of value to the United States Government and be in a position to promptly institute investigation of any matter coming within our jurisdiction through such coverage. Both New York and WFO have made inquiries in the past and were unable to ascertain that the Republic of the Congo had set up any diplomatic establishments in the United States. The New York Office has now determined that a temporary office for its United Nations Delegation has been set up at 145 East Forty-ninth Street, New York City, and New York has requested authority in order that investigation can be conducted to determine the identities of any personnel who would be suitable for development as sources and informants at this establishment.

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

65-63113

65-63113-237

REC 62

Let to NY cc WFO 5/9/61 EHM:fag

5 MAY 11 1961

EHM:fag
(7)
1 - Parsons
1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mossburg
1 - 105-97459-336 (Nationality Group Coverage - Republic of the Congo)

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

ACTION:

In view of the present controversial political situation in the Republic of the Congo and Soviet support for the procommunist political faction there, it is recommended that Bureau liaison contact the appropriate State Department representative and obtain clearance for the FBI to institute a program to develop sources and informants at diplomatic establishments in the United States of the Republic of the Congo. It is also recommended that liaison secure State clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will hereafter select.

OK

5/2/61
J P McDonnell, State, advised clearance granted to institute a program to develope sources & informants as outlined above and also to conduct discreet investigations of potential sources. - Bartlett

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 22, 1961

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (SEMIANNUAL EVALUATION)

JUNE

1 - W. C. Sullivan
1 - Donahoe
1 - Mossburg
1 - Callahan
1 - Cotter
1 - Moore, G. C.

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE

Program inaugurated 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for acquisition of positive intelligence and investigative information through three principal phases: (1) receipt of notification from other U.S. agencies of arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel of friendly governments; (2) maintenance of technical surveillances of official establishments of foreign governments at State Department request; and (3) development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST

First phase principally involves review of file references and indexing procedures at Seat of Government at nominal cost. Under second phase, five technical surveillances are currently being maintained covering official establishments of Cuba, France and the United Arab Republic at a total estimated monthly cost of $11,586. (For details see Attachment A). Under third phase we presently have 28 actual and 35 potential sources in the establishments of 26 nations approved by State Department as target countries. (For details see Attachment B). Costs of this phase are principally those arising from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling producing sources. Costs are considered fully justified since sound counter-intelligence coverage requires sources which can produce.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements and is supplemented by a number of programs which result in intelligence coverage; such as, CODE WORD Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S., and name check program covering holders of official and diplomatic visas.

REC. 44

[illegible] - 24

17 JUN 27 1961

Enclosures - 2

WRW:bcf
(7)

EX-107

MAGNITUDE

Instant program has ramifications touching work on any desk handling matters relating to noncommunist countries, depending upon international developments and intelligence requirements of Bureau and State Department. Principal field activity lies in Washington, D. C., and New York City, where majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have cropped up in the past six months. Over-all program is operating smoothly and effectively.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls are exercised on day-to-day basis through review of outgoing instructions to field. Technical surveillances are subject to 90-day evaluations. No interviews are conducted of potential sources without specific State Department clearance. Control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are regularly routed. Semiannual evaluation of program encompasses review of control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of control file discloses instructions are current and adequate.

OVER-ALL VALUE

For the most part, this program consists of a coordination of accepted investigative and intelligence procedures for the purpose of proper direction, redirection when indicated, and administrative controls. On a continuing basis it produces information of value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and handling of international relations and to the Bureau in its investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION

Recommended program be continued in present form. Reevaluation will be submitted in December, 1961.

WCS

ATTACHMENT A

The following technical surveillances are being maintained at the specific request or with the specific approval of the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State:

Country	Symbol	Estimated Monthly Cost
Cuba		
Delegation to Organization of American States, D.C.		$1674
Mission to United Nations, N.Y.		551
France		
Chancery, D.C.		4563
United Arab Republic		
Chancery, D.C.		3145
Delegation to United Nations, N.Y.		1653
Total Estimated Monthly Cost		$11,586

During the past six months technical coverage of four official Cuban establishments was discontinued when the establishments were closed by virtue of severence of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba. Coverage of the attache offices in Washington of the United Arab Republic was also dropped because of nonproductivity.

ENCLOSURE

ATTACHMENT B

With State Department approval we are developing live sources in official establishments of countries listed below. Actual sources developed and potential sources under investigation are shown in connection with each target country.

Country	Actual	Potential
Brazil	1	1*
Burma	0	3
Ceylon	0	2
China	3	1
Congo	0	0
Cuba	1	1
Ghana	1	2
Guinea	0	1
India	2	4
Indonesia	0	3
Iran	1	0
Iraq	1	1
Israel	2	5
Jordan	0	0
Laos	3	0
Lebanon	1	0
Mali	0	4
Morocco	0	2
Pakistan	3	0
Saudi Arabia	2	0
Sudan	2	0
Thailand	0	1
Tunisia	0	3
United Arab Republic	3	1
Venezuela	1	0
Yemen	1	0
Totals	28	35

*In addition to one actual informant and one potential informant in Brazilian establishments, we are operating as a cut-out the husband of an attache in the Brazilian Consulate, New York City, who furnishes data received from his wife.

We also have one live source in a Japanese establishment and one in a Malayan establishment, developed prior to the incorporation of this phase of our intelligence coverage into captioned program in May, 1958. Japan and Malaya are not present target countries. [illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES (r

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: October 12, 1961

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF ~~FRIENDLY~~ FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Moore
Donahoe

In my memorandum of 10-6-61 it was pointed out that we had proposed to the Department of State the expansion of this program to fifteen Central and South American countries. The program involves the developing of live sources in diplomatic establishments in the U.S. of foreign countries with emphasis on countries faced with communist subversion, Sino-Soviet bloc activity or revolutionary situations. We felt the existing situation in Latin America warranted this expansion. In view of the fact that U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, declined State clearance for this expansion it was recommended and approved we go on record with letters to Secretary of State Rusk and the Attorney General informing them of the program and its merit and pointing out we were unable to further implement this program in view of the State Department decision.

There is an additional factor here which warrants consideration. Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, with whom we discussed this matter at State, has been extremely cooperative with the Bureau from time to time. He was particularly helpful in connection with the opening of the office of the Legal Attache in Manila. In fact, on our behalf, he exerted pressure on the U.S. Ambassador there in order to secure his approval of the establishing of the office. He undoubtedly can be helpful in the future on such matters.

For the above reasons it is believed highly desirable to send a letter to Johnson directly rather than to Rusk. Johnson is a top-level official and we will have served our purpose by putting him on notice and outlining our views.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ACTION:

EX 100

REC 52

246

Attached are letters to Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson and the Attorney General.

Encs. sent 10-16-61
SBD:dmd
(7)
65-63113
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Donahoe

XEROX
OCT 20 1961

W.C.S.

OCT 20 1961

62 OCT 24 1961

SEE ADDENDUM ON NEXT PAGE

ADDENDUM BY MR. TOLSON 10/13/61

I am inclined to the view that we should not send the attached communications to the Attorney General and Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson concerning our proposal to expand our intelligence coverage in this country with respect to countries in Central and South America. After all, we presented the matter to Mr. Johnson, indicated what we could do and he, in turn, advised that the requested clearances would not be granted. It is not the Bureau's basic responsibility to develop information concerning these foreign countries. It is obvious that someone in the State Department to whom Johnson has talked is opposed to our doing this. We have been told that if there is a specific country or individual involved and a request was made by the Bureau, consideration would be given to such a request. I think that we should let the matter stand on that basis.

Mr. Belmont does not agree. This matter presently rests on an oral basis only and he feels that we should be on record.

✓

CT:DSS

I am approving
letter to Johnson &
memo to A.G.
K

SECRET

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans

The Attorney General

October 13, 1961

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

Director, FBI

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

It is felt you will be interested in recent developments relating to our efforts to expand and improve our capacity to produce data of intelligence and investigative value regarding countries in Central and South America.

An integral part of our intelligence and internal security coverage is the developing of individual sources within the diplomatic establishments in the United States of foreign countries. We endeavor to direct our efforts in those areas where such coverage is likely to be most beneficial. For this reason we concentrate on those countries faced with increased communist subversion, countries tending toward alignment with the Soviet-Sino bloc or countries involved in actual or potential revolutionary situations with international ramifications.

We are fully cognizant of the delicacy of such a program and have set up what we feel are sensible safeguards. In order to assure coordination with foreign policy objectives we request clearance from the Department of State before designating a particular country as a target. We then conduct most discreet investigations of carefully selected individuals, preferably citizens of the United States, who are connected with the diplomatic establishments of the particular country. When we feel there is a reasonable potential for success we then request clearance from the Department of State for an interview with the individual. As an additional safeguard the interview is conducted under a pretext, usually unrelated to our internal security responsibilities, in order to reduce substantially the possibility of any repercussions arising from the interview. Further contact, if any, depends upon our assessment of the attitude and reliability of the individual and the degree of cooperation volunteered.

As a result of this program, which has proceeded on a most careful and discreet basis, we have develo

FBI READING ROOM
OCT 13 3 25 PM '61

MAILED 4
OCT 16 1961
COMM-FBI

OCT 13

REC- 95

OCT 17 1961

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

65-63113

SBD: dmd (10)

See note page 3

SECRET

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

67 OCT 17 1961

attempting to develop sources with regard to a number of countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia as well as the countries of Cuba, Venezuela and Brazil.

The increasing political instability in the countries of Central and South America has been a serious cause for concern in view of the inroads made by communism, the efforts of the Castro regime in Cuba to export its revolutionary concepts and the increased efforts of the Sino-Soviet bloc to extend its influence in that area. In recognition of this situation we sought clearance from the Department of State for the designation of fifteen countries in that area as target countries under this program.

We consulted Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Mr. Francis E. Meloy, his Special Assistant. We were advised by Mr. Johnson in September, 1961, that careful consideration had been given the matter. He advised, however, that clearance would not be granted for the proposed expansion of this program although consideration would be given to any request we might make with regard to any specific country or individual. Mr. Johnson indicated it was felt that the diplomatic establishments in the United States of these countries were strictly on the outside with regard to pertinent developments in the home countries. He felt no real intelligence could be gained and the risk of developing sources outweighed any possible gain.

Our past experience has shown this program can produce intelligence data of value as well as investigative data of assistance in handling our internal security responsibilities. The development of informants in diplomatic establishments is a delicate and tedious process which requires careful planning. The most propitious time to implement such a program is prior to the point that the diplomatic establishment of a particular country is staffed solely by individuals who have no sympathy with the position or views of the United States.

SECRET

The Attorney General

In view of the decision of the Department of State we are unable to implement this program further with regard to the countries of Central and South America and in view of your interest in developments in that area it was felt you would like to know about the situation.

1 - Mr. Byron R. White
Deputy Attorney General

Note:

Classified "Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of our objectives in this program could result in severe damage to our foreign relations.

This letter has been written pursuant to memo, 10-6-61, Donahoe to Sullivan re Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries. The word "Friendly" has been omitted from the caption of this letter since it does not accurately apply to all of the countries involved in this program.

Cover memo prepared Donahoe to Sullivan re "INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES" dated 10-12-61 prepared by SBD:dmd.

SECRET

SECRET

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

October 13, 1961

BY LIAISON

OCT 13 3 25 PM '61
READING ROOM

Honorable U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

10/16/61
delivered

My dear Mr. Johnson:

Special Agent O. H. Bartlett has recently discussed with you and Mr. Francis E. Meloy our proposal to expand and improve our capacity to produce data of intelligence and investigative value regarding countries in Central and South America.

An integral part of our intelligence and internal security coverage is the developing of individual sources within the diplomatic establishments in the United States of foreign countries. We endeavor to direct our efforts in those areas where such coverage is likely to be most beneficial. For this reason we concentrate on those countries faced with increased communist subversion, countries tending toward alignment with the Soviet-Sino bloc or countries involved in actual or potential revolutionary situations with international ramifications.

We are fully cognizant of the delicacy of such a program and have set up what we feel are sensible safeguards. In order to assure coordination with foreign policy objectives we request clearance from the Department of State before designating a particular country as a target. We then conduct most discreet investigations of carefully selected individuals, preferably citizens of the United States, who are connected with the diplomatic establishments of the particular country. When we feel there is a reasonable potential for success we then request clearance from the Department of State for an interview with the individual. As an additional safeguard the

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

REC- 23

SDD:dmd (8)
65-63113 - 24

See note page 3

OCT 13 1961

SECRET

WCS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

interview is conducted under a pretext, usually unrelated to our internal security responsibilities, in order to reduce substantially the possibility of any repercussions arising from the interview. Further contact, if any, depends upon our assessment of the attitude and reliability of the individual and the degree of cooperation volunteered.

As a result of this program, which has proceeded on a most careful and discreet basis, we have developed or are attempting to develop sources with regard to a number of countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia as well as the countries of Cuba, Venezuela and Brazil.

The increasing political instability in the countries of Central and South America has been a serious cause for concern in view of the inroads made by communism, the efforts of the Castro regime in Cuba to export its revolutionary concepts and the increased efforts of the Sino-Soviet bloc to extend its influence in that area. This situation prompted us to initiate contact with the Department of State and to request clearance for the designation of fifteen countries in that area as target countries under this program.

Following his conversation with you and with Mr. Meloy on September 12, 1961, Mr. Bartlett informed me that after careful consideration you had advised clearance would not be granted for the proposed expansion although consideration would be given to any request we might make with regard to any specific country or individual. I understand that you feel the diplomatic establishments in the United States of these countries are strictly on the outside with regard to pertinent developments in the home countries and no real intelligence could be gained. It was the opinion of the Department of State that the risk of developing sources outweighed any possible gain.

Our past experience has shown this program can produce intelligence data of value as well as investigative data of assistance in handling our internal security responsibilities. The development of informants in diplomatic establishments is a delicate and tedious process which requires careful planning. The most propitious time to implement such a program is prior to the point that the diplomatic establishment of a particular country is staffed solely by individuals who have no sympathy with the position or views of the United States.

In view of the decision of the Department of State we are unable to implement this program further with regard to the countries of Central and South America. It was felt you would be interested in a review of this program and our views as to the merits of it.

Sincerely yours,

Note:

Classified "Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of our objectives in this program could result in severe damage to our foreign relations.

Cover memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan prepared on 10-12-61 re Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries by SBD/lmd.

1 - Mr. Leavitt
1 Mr. Donahoe

G

SAC, WFO 12/6/61

Director, FBI (105-97459-212)

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - ECUADOR

On 11/28/61 clearance was obtained from the Department of State for the Bureau to discreetly institute investigation designed to develop sources at the Ecuadorian establishments. Accordingly, recipient offices should institute a survey for the purpose of identifying persons employed at the Embassy of Ecuador, Washington, D. C., the Ecuadorian Mission to the United Nations, New York City, and the Consulate of Ecuador, New York City, particularly United States citizens, who might possess potential as sources or informants. Submit your requests for investigation in this regard in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau clearance to institute investigation in each individual case.

Submit the results of your initial survey under instant caption 30 days after receipt of this communication and thereafter on a 90-day basis setting forth progress being made to develop confidential sources and informants until such time as adequate coverage is assured.

Extra copies are being furnished WFO and New York for their files on the above-mentioned Ecuadorian diplomatic establishments.

4 - New York

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Nations)
1 - 62-57242 (Embassy of Ecuador, Washington, D. C.)
1 - 105-New (Ecuadorian Mission to the United Nations, New York City)
1 - 105-New (Consulate of Ecuador, New York City)

TWL:bjs
(14)

NOTE: On 11/28/61 Mr. J. P. McDonnell, Office of Security, Department of State, advised SA Orrin H. Bartlett that State Department approval was being granted the Bureau to develop sources and informants at the Embassy of Ecuador, Washington, D. C., and other Ecuadorian establishments if it should become necessary.

165-63113 -

NOT RECORDED
167 DEC 7 1961

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
DEC 5 - 1961
MAILED

64 DEC 12 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: April 9, 1962

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Wannall

Bartlett

The Attorney General has forwarded the attached letter from Secretary Rusk dated April 2, 1962. This letter is in response to one from the Attorney General dated March 20 and concerns the Attorney General's view as to the desirability of the FBI expanding its existing program of developing sources in diplomatic establishments of foreign countries. A letter by the Attorney General was sent after he was informed the State Department had declined to give clearance to our expanding this program to include coverage of additional Latin American countries.

Secretary Rusk in his letter agrees that all necessary steps should be taken to enhance the security of the United States and, therefore, has no objection to the program of preliminary discreet investigations. The Secretary does say that he is not convinced that a comprehensive program of penetration through foreign embassy personnel will yield intelligence of sufficient importance to be worthy of the high political risks. He adds, however, thatthis is something that can be looked into further after the preliminary investigations have been conducted.

The Attorney General mentioned orally that he was sending the letter and that, of course, we couldn't expect the State Department to totally reverse itself. The Attorney General suggested that we proceed with the preliminary investigations and thereafter if we encounter any further difficulties with the State Department, he would like to be informed.

165-63112

ACTION

ENCLOSURE / ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED
191 APR 30 1962

25 APR 27 1962

The Domestic Intelligence Division will proceed to implement this expanded program on a highly selective basis. This is the type of investigation which of necessity will be handled on a most discreet basis.

Memo Wannall to Sullivan w/enc 4/17/62 TWLiams

Let to AG 1-DAG 4/18/62 TWLiams

Let foll up not sent 2-NY 4/13/62 TWLiams

XEROX APR 27 1962

S-TWL

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Sullivan

CAE:sp

let to wfo 4-20-62

ORIGINAL FILED IN

SECRET April 2, 1962

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I have received your letter of March 20 concerning the desire of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to develop intelligence sources in the diplomatic establishments in the United States of an additional 15 Latin American countries, and I have had an opportunity to review the correspondence on this subject between the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Under Secretary Ball.

[illegible]

I share your belief that all necessary steps should be taken to enhance the security of the United States and I believe that it should be possible for the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to cooperate in the achievement of the objectives to which we are both committed. The Department of State therefore has no objection to the program which you propose in which preliminary investigations will be conducted by the FBI in this program in a discreet manner under which it would not be possible for these efforts to be traced to the United States Government or its representatives. Before open interviews are undertaken with individuals with a view to penetrating specific diplomatic establishments, however, the Department of State would like to discuss with the FBI these efforts at penetration on a case-by-case basis.

Under Secretary Ball's letter of January 18, 1962 gives a good summary of our reservations about an across-the-board effort with Latin American embassies. My chief concern is related to penetration through foreign nationals. It seems to me highly certain that a proportion

The Honorable
Robert F. Kennedy,
Attorney General.

[illegible]

SECRET

65-63113-

ENCLOSURE

of these would report such approaches to their own governments and create tensions between us and friendly Foreign Ministers and Presidents. Some would, of course, do their best to appear co-operative, with the full knowledge of their own governments. Having in mind other means of high reliability, I am not convinced that a comprehensive program of penetration through foreign embassy personnel will yield intelligence of sufficient importance to be worth the high political risks. However, that is something we can look into after your preliminary investigations have proceeded further.

I am asking my colleagues to follow closely the possibilities of fully exploiting the Special Security Committee recently established by the OAS as a result of a Punta del Este resolution. I personally hope that we can move without delay to a discreet but effective international cooperation against subversion and espionage, especially in the Caribbean area.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

1 - Wannall
1 - Leavitt

SAC, WFO 4/10/62

Director, FBI (105-97459-207)

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - CHILE
INTERNAL SECURITY - CHILE

A recent State Department report assessing the Communist Party of Chile (PCC) observes the basic objective of the PCC is to weaken Chile's ties with the U. S. and swing it toward the Soviet Union and other bloc countries. The same report notes the efforts of the Soviet Union and Communist China to increase trade with Chile but concludes that negotiations in this field are primarily a cover for political and intelligence operations and a means for carrying out functions of a diplomatic mission. The possibility exists that Chile could take a favorable position with regard to the Soviet Union and bloc countries.

The Bureau in order to be in a position to obtain current intelligence data concerning Chile on April 4, 1962, obtained State Department clearance to discreetly institute investigation designed to develop sources at the Chilean establishments.

Accordingly, the recipients should institute a survey for the purpose of identifying persons employed at the Embassy of Chile, Washington, D. C., the Chilean Mission to the United Nations and the Consulate of Chile, both in New York City, particularly United States citizens, who might possess potential as sources or informants. Submit your requests for investigation in this regard in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau clearance to institute investigation in each individual case.

Submit the results of your initial survey under instant caption to reach the Bureau by May 10, 1962, and thereafter on a 90-day basis setting forth progress being made to develop confidential sources and informants until such time as adequate coverage is assured.

2 - New York

NOT RECORDED
APR 10 1962

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Foreign Nations)
1 - 62-64318 (Embassy of Chile, Washington, D. C.)
1 - 105-new (Chilean Mission to the United Nations, New York City)
1 - 105-new (Consulate of Chile, New York City)

60 APR 17 1962
(11)

SEE NOTE ON PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Letter to SAC, WFO
RE: NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - CHILE
105-97459-207

NOTE:

On 4/4/62, Mr. Francis E. Meloy, State Department, advised SA Orrin H. Bartlett that State Department approval was being granted for the above-described investigation.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: January 23, 1962

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

JUNE

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. J.D. Donohue
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

BACKGROUND

The Attorney General on Saturday, 1-20-62, advised Assistant Director Evans he would like to receive this week the Director's views as to what additional technical coverage should be instituted on diplomatic establishments in Washington, D. C.

Regarding the above, the Attorney General had previously indicated on 1-11-62 he was thinking in terms of extending coverage on the smaller countries rather than the "Iron Curtain" countries. He felt coverage of the Iron Curtain countries was essential but their representatives were more alert to such coverage and he felt representatives of the smaller countries might talk more freely. He indicated he did not want coverage of our true friends, like the British. He hinted at possible coverage of the Indonesians. On 1-20-62 when Evans spoke with him he indicated he felt additional coverage of the African countries might be worthwhile.

PRESENT COVERAGE

In analysing proposals for increased coverage we have taken a look at what we already have. We have technical coverage in Washington and/or New York on eight countries of the type being considered, as follows: Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Ghana, Israel, Saudi Arabia (in Boston), United Arab Republic and West Germany. The Saudi Arabian coverage, on King Saud, will be discontinued this week since King Saud is leaving Boston en route to Florida and then is going home. State Department has advised it does not desire he be covered in Florida.

PROPOSED COVERAGE

Virtually every country is a logical target regarding which technical surveillance coverage might produce valuable intelligence data. We have in the past utilized this technique to cover various

Enc.
SBD:dmd
(8)
65-63113
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan

REC- 62

65-63113-269

17 JAN 31 1962

countries involved in political or military situations of particular interest to U.S. intelligence community and/or to the FBI. The technique must necessarily be considered an exploratory step since in some instances in the past our experience has shown the results are negligible and do not justify continuance while in other instance the coverage may be worthwhile for a long time.

We feel there are a number of countries regarding which coverage should be attempted to assess the potential value. While the Attorney General spoke in terms of "embassies" we feel simultaneous coverage is desirable, if possible, of the United Nations Delegations also in order to determine from which spot the best intelligence emanates.

With regard to African countries we suggest coverage at this time of four additional countries: (1) Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville); (2) Guinea; (3) Mali and (4) Morocco. The Congo is a key trouble spot in Africa. Guinea and Mali lean toward the Soviet bloc and are targets of Soviet-bloc subversion. There have been increasing Soviet inroads in Morocco and Moroccan territorial claims may pose serious problems in 1962.

With regard to Latin-American countries we propose coverage of five additional countries: (1) Brazil; (2) Argentina; (3) Mexico; (4) Venezuela and (5) Panama. It is felt Brazil, Argentina and Mexico represent excellent potential for acquisition of intelligence in view of their influential positions. Brazil itself is politically unstable. Venezuela and Panama are traditional trouble spots in Latin America.

With regard to Asian and Southeast Asian countries we propose coverage of six countries; (1) Indonesia; (2) Laos; (3) South Vietnam; (4) Thailand; (5) India and (6) Japan. Indonesia is a particular trouble spot at this time. Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand are all feeling the increased pressures of the Sino-Soviet bloc. India in the past has been the acknowledged leader of the neutralist nations. Japan, while oriented toward the West, has been beset by the problems of internal communism.

Regarding Western Europe we propose coverage of Portugal, a country beset by the problems posed by Angola, its colony in Africa, and the loss of Goa in Portuguese India. Its relations with the United States are strained at this time and anti-United States demonstrations have been permitted.

OBSERVATIONS

It cannot be said with any assurance that all of this coverage will be productive of valuable intelligence data. The diplomatic representatives in the U.S. of some countries are much more active and knowledgeable than those of others. With regard to some countries we may run into definite translation problems.

If the coverage were installed at the embassy and United Nations Delegation of each of the 16 countries mentioned above simultaneously, this would increase our number of technical surveillances by 32. We presently have 84 technical surveillances and one additional one is being installed. Of these 85, 81 are in Bureau cases and four are exclusively maintained at the request of the National Security Agency (NSA). We are also installing coverage of teletype facilities of seven additional establishments at NSA request, which will increase our count from 85 to 92. The addition of technical surveillances in instant matter will probably raise the total to 100 or more, of which 11 will be at NSA request. We have proposed that in the future we not include in our over-all count those technical surveillances which are maintained at the request of NSA.

The best way to test the potential in instant matter is to install coverage on six or eight establishments, see what we get, replace the unproductive coverage with new coverage of new establishments, and, in general, continually probe the potential of this coverage by changing our targets selectively.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Attached for approval is a letter to the Attorney General specifying the additional countries coverage of which we feel might be productive. We are advising the Attorney General that if he approves we will explore the feasibility of coverage of the embassy as well as the United Nations Delegation of each country. Thereafter, if the coverage is feasible, we will clear each proposed installation with State and with the Attorney General, as we have in the past.

2. It is recommended that we go ahead and authorize the New York and Washington Field Offices to conduct secure surveys as to feasibility of coverage of the establishments mentioned. This will enable us to move more rapidly if the Attorney General approves the proposed targets. If approved, New York and Washington Field will be so instructed.

OK

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: January 24, 1962

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

We are in receipt of a letter dated 1-18-62 from Under Secretary of State George W. Ball detailing the thinking of the State Department which prompted its prior withholding of clearance for us to endeavor to develop intelligence sources in the diplomatic establishments in the United States of fifteen Central and South American countries. This letter is in reply to our letter of 10-13-61 to Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs which set forth our views.

Attached for ready reference are my memoranda to you dated 10-6-61 and 10-12-61 which trace the background of this correspondence.

The letter from Mr. Ball contains nothing particularly new and is primarily a reiteration of previously expressed views of the State Department. It is a polite, reasonable expression of a difference of opinion with views which we hold. Since it deals with a most sensitive operation it is difficult to take strong issue with it even when disagreeing with some of the views expressed. It clearly indicates State wants to work with us on this program but wants to do so on a selective, case-by-case basis.

As a matter of fact we have in the past cleared with State Department before designating each individual country as a target for source development at which time we have specified why we felt the political situation warranted this action.

REC- 91 -266

However, we felt and still feel that the increasing political instability in the countries of Central and South America warranted a broadened and simultaneous effort to explore whether we could develop sources in their diplomatic establishments here. We were and are concerned about the inroads of communism, the influence of "Castroism" and the increased efforts ~~of the Sino-Soviet~~ bloc to extend its influence in the area.

5 FEB 1 1962

The insistence of the State Department on a country-by-country approach with presentation of reasonable evidence to show

Encs. [illegible] 1-25-62

G. C. Moore

65-63113
SBD:dmd
(7)

that data of value might be obtained which would outweigh the risks is essentially a short term view. Source development is definitely a long term proposition and the most advantageous time to initiate such an effort is before the country becomes a real trouble spot. In fact good sources in ostensibly "friendly" country establishments could possibly produce data pointing to impending trouble. We felt the situation in Latin America warranted the long term view. Getting down to "brass tacks" all the requested clearance would have meant is that State would have agreed to our conducting discreet inquiries regarding potential sources. Existing procedures provide (and we did not propose a change) that we not make a personal approach to a potential source without specific clearance from State. This gives State a firm opportunity to take the "cautious view" it desires to take.

The development of sources in diplomatic establishments is admittedly a delicate operation but can produce data of definite value. This is illustrated by several examples during the past year. Sources of this type have provided the first authentic confirmation of the assassination of the Dominican dictator, Generalissimo Trujillo; identified the Panamanian Ambassador to the Organization of American States as on the payroll of the Dominicans; provided data as to what the President of Pakistan would probably discuss with President Kennedy; furnished a code book utilized by Cuban diplomatic establishments in Cuba; and have provided voluminous valuable intelligence data in connection with our inquiries into Dominican lobbying activities in the U.S.

OBSERVATIONS:

It is felt we have made our views known in detail and on the record and it is not believed we should pursue the difference in views with State. This latter view is prompted by the fact that if we take strong issue and sway State to our point of view we will simply have State looking over our shoulder without any real backing on a sensitive operation. Ball's letter does not require a reply.

We advised the Attorney General by letter of 10-13-61 of the proposal and of the problem and it is believed we should apprise him of Ball's letter.

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FOREIGN
COUNTRIES
65-63113

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached is a letter to the Attorney General forwarding him a copy of Ball's letter and copies of prior correspondence for ready reference. We are advising the Attorney General that in view of our vital interest in the Latin-American situation we will endeavor to develop as effective coverage as possible within the framework of the limitations imposed by the State Department.

SECRET

The Attorney General

January 25, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

On October 13, 1961, I advised you of our discussions with the Department of State relative to expanding our existing program of developing sources within the diplomatic establishments of selected foreign countries so as to include fifteen additional countries in Central and South America. I advised you the Department of State would not grant clearance for the proposed expansion but indicated it would consider individual requests. Our views as to the merits of the program were outlined at that time.

On the above date we directed a letter to Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, expressing our views regarding the situation. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball has replied in a letter dated January 18, 1962, explaining and reiterating the views of the Department of State and indicating the Department of State desires to be helpful and cooperative.

REC'D-READING ROOM
JAN 25 10 41 AM '62

For ready reference I am attaching one copy each of the communications mentioned.

MAILED 2
JAN 25 1962
COMM-FBI

The development of sources in diplomatic establishments is admittedly a delicate operation but can produce data of definite value. This is illustrated by several examples during the past year. Sources of this type have provided the first authentic confirmation of the assassination of the Dominican dictator, Generalissimo Trujillo; identified the Panamanian Ambassador to Organization of American States as on the payroll of the Dominicans; provided data as to what the President of Pakistan would probably discuss with President Kennedy; furnished a code book utilized by Cuban diplomatic establishments in Cuba; and have provided ~~voluminous~~ valuable intelligence data in connection with our inquiries into Dominican lobbying activities in the United States.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

X 116

-63113

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

259

SBD:dmd (10)

REC- 17
SECRET 65-63113

22 JAN 30 1962

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

In view of our vital interest in the Latin-American situation we will endeavor to develop as effective coverage as is possible within the framework of the limitations imposed by the Department of State.

Enclosures - 3

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosures - 3)

Note: Cover memorandum from Donahoe to Sullivan prepared by SBD:dmd on 1-24-62 same subject.

The word "Friendly" has been dropped from former title of this program "Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries" since not all of our target countries can be construed as friendly and the present title is more accurate.

Classified "Secret" in view of reference to highly sensitive operation and in view of attachments.

SECRET

The Attorney General JUNE January 26, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE
OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

CD-READING
JAN 26 1 55 PM '62

Assistant Director C. A. Evans has advised me of your interest in increased technical surveillance coverage of diplomatic establishments of foreign countries in the United States, particularly of those countries outside the "Iron Curtain," and of your request on January 20, 1962, for my views as to what additional coverage should be instituted.

For several years we have been utilizing technical surveillance coverage of diplomatic establishments or representatives of countries outside the Soviet bloc. The technique has been utilized largely with respect to countries which were existing or potential trouble spots and has been aimed at producing intelligence data of interest not only to the FBI but also to other agencies in the intelligence community. At the present time we have such coverage in Washington, D. C., and/or New York City on the countries of Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Ghana, Israel, United Arab Republic and West Germany. Our past coverage has been probing and in recent years has involved coverage of eleven other countries.

MAILED 4
JAN 26 1962
COMM-FBI

While virtually every country is a logical intelligence target it is felt there are definite areas in which we might extend our technical surveillance coverage at this time to explore whether valuable intelligence data could be produced. It is believed that coverage of the diplomatic establishments of the particular countries in Washington, D. C., and at the United Nations will enable us to explore more accurately the potential of the coverage.

With regard to African countries we suggest coverage at this time of four additional countries: (1) Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville); (2) Guinea; (3) Mali and (4) Morocco. The Congo is a key trouble spot in Africa. Guinea and Mali lean toward the Soviet bloc and are targets of

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Malone ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Ingram ____
Gandy ____

EX-106
65-63113-267
REC-22

SBD:dmd:mvr
(10)

NOTE: Cover memorandum prepared from Donahoe to Sullivan re same subject dated 1/23/62. SBD:dmd
(Note continued page 2)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ SECRET

Soviet-bloc subversion. There have been increasing Soviet inroads in Morocco and Moroccan territorial claims may pose serious problems in 1962.

With regard to Latin-American countries we propose coverage of five additional countries: (1) Brazil; (2) Argentina; (3) Mexico; (4) Venezuela and (5) Panama. It is felt Brazil, Argentina and Mexico represent excellent potential for acquisition of intelligence in view of their influential positions. Brazil itself is politically unstable. Venezuela and Panama are traditional trouble spots in Latin America.

With regard to Asian and Southeast Asian countries we propose coverage of six countries: (1) Indonesia; (2) Laos; (3) South Vietnam; (4) Thailand; (5) India and (6) Japan. Indonesia is a particular trouble spot at this time. Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand are all feeling the increased pressures of the Sino-Soviet bloc. India in the past has been the acknowledged leader of the neutralist nations. Japan, while oriented toward the West, has been beset by the problems of internal communism.

Regarding Western Europe we propose coverage of Portugal, a country beset by the problems posed by Angola, its colony in Africa, and the loss of Goa in Portuguese India. Its relations with the United States are strained at this time and anti-United States demonstrations have been permitted.

We propose to test the potential of this coverage by installing it on six or eight establishments, seeing what we get, replacing the unproductive installations with new coverage of new establishments, and, in general, continually probing the potential by changing our targets selectively.

If you approve, we will explore the feasibility of the coverage outlined and thereafter request clearance from the Department of State as well as your authorization for each proposed installation.

NOTE: Classified "Secret" in view of detailed discussion of proposed tehcnical coverage.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, FBI

DATE: January 31, 1962

FROM : Andrew F. Oehmann
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

June ✓

Please refer to your memorandum of January 26, 1962, captioned as above.

Intelligence Coverage of [illegible]

The Attorney General has approved your proposal to test the potential of the increased technical surveillance referred to in your memorandum as set forth in the last two paragraphs thereof.

REC-72

65-63113-270

5-9

G.

17 FEB 7 1962

EX-PROC.

SECRET

38

JAN 31 1962

50 FEB 23 1962

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 4, 1963

FROM : W. R. Wannall

JUNE

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - Donohue
1 - G.C. Moore

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

With the approval of Attorney General (1/31/62) we instituted program to expand our use of technical surveillances on diplomatic establishments of countries outside Soviet bloc. Following is an analysis of this program and its current status:

We advised Attorney General 1/26/62 that on a selective and probing basis we would explore coverage of following countries under this program by instituting coverage on six or eight establishments at a time:

Argentina
Brazil
Republic of the Congo
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Japan
Laos
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Panama
Portugal
Thailand
Venezuela
South Vietnam

After necessary survey and State Department clearance in each instance, we initiated initial coverage during early March, 1962, and to date coverage on the following establishments has been instituted:

Embassy of Argentina
Embassy of Brazil
Brazilian Delegation to United Nations (UN)
Congolese Delegation to UN
Embassy of Guinea
Guinea Delegation to UN
Embassy of India
Indian Delegation to UN
Embassy of Indonesia
Indonesian Delegation to UN
Embassy of Japan
Embassy of Mali
Embassy of Mexico
Mexican Delegation to UN
Embassy of Portugal
Portuguese Delegation to UN

REC-58
65-63113-320
17 FEB 11 1963
5-4a

65-63113
GCM:ams
(7)

FEB 18 1963

9II - X3

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE OF
DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS
65-63113

Of the above-listed establishments, we still have as of this date current coverage on:

Embassy of Argentina
Embassy of Brazil
Brazilian Delegation to UN
Embassy of Japan
Embassy of Mexico

Coverage on other establishments on which we have had installations has been discontinued because of unproductivity. With respect to current coverage, the Brazilian and Argentinean establishments during the Cuban crisis and subsequent thereto have produced valuable data which has been furnished to Attorney General as well as to interested agencies. This intelligence information for the most part during the Cuban crisis pertained to reactions and actions of those Latin-American countries in connection with the Cuban situation. Coverage on the Embassy of Japan has not produced information of any significance to date. This particular surveillance on the Embassy of Japan is being analyzed separately within two weeks and determination will be made at that time as to whether it should be continued. Although information on above Mexican establishment has not produced much worthwhile data to date, Mexico's position in Latin-American affairs is such as to warrant our continuance of this coverage for the time being. In this regard, Washington Field Office within past week has been able to monitor additional lines at the Mexican Chancery which were not previously monitored because of other commitments. It is felt this additional coverage will be productive.

In addition to the above existing coverage, we are in the process of making a survey as to feasibility of placing coverage on the Venezuelan Embassy. It is noted that President Betancourt of Venezuela is making a visit to this country on 2/18/63 and technical coverage on the Venezuelan establishment may be able to provide pertinent data during this visit.

ACTION:

This program will be followed closely and will be reanalyzed in 90 days.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach ✓
Evans ✓
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan DATE: 2/21/63

FROM : W. R. Wannall

JUNE

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - J.D. Donohue
1 - G.C. Moore

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

On 1/31/62, with approval of Attorney General, we instituted program to expand our use of technical surveillances on diplomatic establishments of countries outside Soviet Bloc. In connection therewith we advised the Attorney General on 1/26/62 that on a selective and probing basis of six to eight establishments at a time we would explore coverage of 16 countries (selection being based on potential for intelligence acquisition and consideration of trouble-spot status).

To date we have at one time or another afforded coverage to all countries on this list except Laos, Morocco, Panama, Thailand and South Vietnam. At present time we have technical coverage on Brazilian Embassy, Brazilian United Nations Delegation, Argentinian Embassy, Mexican Embassy, Venezuelan Embassy, and are in the process of making installation at Venezuelan Delegation to United Nations.

ST-109 REC-27 325

In addition to technical coverage of countries mentioned in above list, we have during past year found it necessary to institute technical coverage on other countries not included in the list but outside of Soviet Bloc which suddenly developed as trouble spots or which for one reason or another developed a potential for intelligence acquisition which had to be explored immediately. For example, during Cuban crisis we instituted coverage on establishments of Chile, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, and Bolivia. During investigation of sugar lobbying activities, coverage was instituted on Haiti and Nicaragua. More recently because of tense conditions in Middle East brought about by Iraqi coup, we are instituting coverage of Embassy of Iraq. Likewise, because of changing conditions in Guatemala we have during past month instituted coverage on Embassy of Guatemala and the Ambassador's residence.

13 MAR ~~5~~ 8 1963

OBSERVATIONS:

In view thereof of changing world conditions, we should allow ourselves more flexibility in connection with our program of expanded technical coverage of non-Soviet-bloc countries and not restrict such coverage solely to countries upon a list prepared a year ago. Although

65-63113
Enclosure - Sent 2/25/63
GCM:slj
(7)

63 MAR 15 1963

the countries listed originally still are considered key countries under this program and all should be eventually covered for a trial period to test their potential, it would be more logical from time to time to cover other non-Soviet-Bloc countries not on the list which have developed into either trouble-spot areas or otherwise represent good potential for technical coverage. This would allow us to make the maximum use of our technical facilities.

ACTION:

If you approve, Attorney General will be advised as to the status of this over-all program and that in the future we will include additional countries requiring coverage because of changing world conditions.

O.K.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 30, 1963

FROM : W. R. Wannall

JUNE

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - Donohue
1 - G. Moore

With approval of Attorney General (1/31/62), we instituted program to expand use of technical surveillances on diplomatic establishments of countries outside Soviet bloc. Following is an analysis of this program and its current status:

We advised Attorney General 1/26/62 that on selective and probing basis we would explore coverage of following countries under this program by instituting coverage on six or eight establishments at a time:

Argentina
Brazil
Republic of Congo
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Japan
Laos
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Panama
Portugal
Thailand
Venezuela
South Vietnam

After necessary surveys and State clearance in each instance, initial coverage was initiated early March, 1962, and to date coverage on following establishments has been instituted:

Embassy of Argentina
Embassy of Brazil
Brazilian Delegation to United Nations (UN)
Congolese Delegation to UN
Embassy of Guinea
Guinea Delegation to UN
Embassy of India
Indian Delegation to UN
Embassy of Indonesia
Indonesian Delegation to UN
Embassy of Japan
Embassy of Mali
Embassy of Mexico
Mexican Delegation to UN
Embassy of Panama
Embassy of Portugal
Portuguese Delegation to UN
Embassy of Venezuela
Venezuelan Delegation to UN

Of the above-listed establishments, as of this date we have productive coverage on following (others discontinued as unproductive):

Embassy of Argentina
Embassy of Brazil
Embassy of Mexico
Embassy of Panama
Embassy of Venezuela

REC-52 339

65-63113
GCM:ams
(7)

6 MAY 20 1963

EX-114

17 MAY 3 1963

5-46

Out of the original sixteen countries on list furnished Attorney General 1/26/62, we have not instituted coverage on Laos, Morocco, Thailand and South Vietnam. We will endeavor to explore productive potential of these four countries as soon as such is feasible consistent with Bureau's over-all technical demands.

In addition to above, by letter to Attorney General 2/25/63 we advised we were expanding above coverage to include such additional non-Soviet-bloc countries, not on original list of sixteen but which have developed into either trouble-spot areas or otherwise represent good potential for technical coverage. Since 2/25/63 we have covered following establishments under this expanded category:

Embassy of Guatemala
Residence of Guatemalan Ambassador
Embassy of Nicaragua

This coverage on these three establishments to date has furnished worthwhile intelligence data and is still being maintained. We are in the process of instituting coverage on Embassies, UN Delegations and residences of Ambassadors of Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Republic, such coverage being instituted at State's request in view of critical situation developing in Middle East.

When above is installed, we will be covering currently sixteen different establishments under this expanded coverage of non-Soviet-bloc countries.

ACTION:

This program will be followed closely and will be reanalyzed in 90 days.

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall

Cooper
Callahan
Conrad ✓
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 16, 1963

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. D.F.X. Callahan
1 - Mr. Mossburg

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

File

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE

This program was inaugurated in 1954 and was expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) Regular notification from the U.S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) Maintenance of technical surveillances of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) Development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST

$26,680

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at Seat of Government at nominal expenses. Under second phase we are presently operating 25 technical surveillances covering establishments of 13 14 non-Soviet-bloc countries at total estimated monthly cost of ~~[illegible]~~. These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, ~~Yugoslavia~~ and Venezuela. For details of technical surveillance coverage see Attachment

Under third phase of program we currently have 35 actual and 31 potential live sources at establishments of 44 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by State Department as "target" countries. For details see Attachment B. Costs of this phase arise chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including CODE WORD Program, Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering U.S.

346

Encs.
RDC:dmd (8)
65-63113

1 - Mr. Mullins

REC 8
ST-101

22 MAY 24 1963

6 MAY 31 1963
ENCLOSURE

MAGNITUDE

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and the current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and the State Department. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D.C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have developed during the past year. The program is operating smoothly and effectively.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillance are evaluated each 90 days. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance. A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVER-ALL VALUE

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Re-evaluation will be made in May, 1964.

Attachment A

The following technical surveillances are being maintained at the present time with the approval in each instance of the State Department.

Country	Symbol	Estimated Monthly Cost
Argentina		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.		$3,027
Brazil		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.		3,307
Cuba		
Cuban Mission to UN, NYC		677
Cuban Ambassador to UN		247
Dominican Republic		
Embassy, Washington, D. C.		1,009
France		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.		3,313
Guatemala		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.		1,296
Ambassador's Residence Washington, D.C.		518
Haiti		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.		1,000 *
Ambassador, Washington, D.C.		1,000
Delegation to UN, NYC		1,000
Consulate, NYC		500

* These costs are tentative estimates based on similar surveillances. These 4 technical surveillances have all been installed since 5-1-6

[illegible]- 346

ENCLOSURE

Iraq	
Embassy, Washington, D. C.	2,329
Israel	
Embassy, Washington, D. C.	2,082
Consulate, NYC	1,200
Mexico	
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	605
Nicaragua	
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	1,202
Panama	
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	666
Yugoslavia	
Yugoslav Mission to UN, NYC	1,573
Yugoslav Consulate, NYC	2,157
Yugoslav Consulate, Pittsburgh	416
Yugoslav Consulate, Chicago	292
Yugoslav Consulate, San Francisco	380
Yugoslav Embassy, Washington, D. C.	2,659
Venezuela	
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	1,102
TOTAL ESTIMATED MONTHLY COST	~~$33,557~~ $26,080

Attachment B

With State Department approval we are developing live sources at the official establishments of the below-listed countries. Actual sources developed and potential sources under investigation are shown in connection with each country.

Country	Actual	Potential
Argentina	0	1
Bolivia	0	0
Brazil	2	1
Burma	1	1
Ceylon	1	0
Chile	0	0
China (Nationalist)	3	1
Colombia	0	0
Congo	0	0
Costa Rica	0	0
Cuba	1	0
Dominican Republic	1	0
Ecuador	0	0
El Salvador	0	0
Ghana	1	1
Guatemala	0	0
Guinea	0	0
Haiti	0	0
Honduras	0	1
India	0	0
Indonesia	2	2
Iran	1	6
Iraq	2	2
Israel	1	2
Jordan	0	0
Laos	2	0
Lebanon	1	0
Malaya	1	0
Mali	1	0
Morocco	0	3
Nicaragua	0	0
Pakistan	1	0
Panama	0	0

[illegible] - 346

ENCLOSURE

Paraguay	0	1
Peru	0	0
Saudi Arabia	1	0
Sudan	2	2
Thailand	0	0
Tunisia	0	1
United Arab Republic	6	5
United Syrian Rep.	1	1
Uruguay	1	0
Venezuela	1	0
Yemen	1	0
TOTALS	35	31

Memorandum

Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO: W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 18, 1964

JUNE

FROM: W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Mullins

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES
(ANNUAL EVALUATION)

This program was inaugurated in 1954 and was expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: 1) regular notification from the U.S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) maintenance of technical surveillances of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at Seat of Government at nominal expenses. Under second phase we are presently operating 46 technical surveillances covering establishments of 25 non-Soviet-bloc countries at total estimated monthly cost of $47,259.73. These countries are Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, British Guiana, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Greece, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. For details of technical surveillance coverage see Attachment A.

Under third phase of program we currently have 42 actual and 58 potential live sources at establishments of 47 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by State Department as "target" countries. For details see Attachment B. Costs of this phase arise chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including (CODE WORD) Program, Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering U.S.

65-63113
Enclosures
RDC:ams
(7)

REC- 33

11 MAY 20 1964

6 MAY 22 1964

MAGNITUDE

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and the current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and the State Department. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D.C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have developed during the past year. The program is operating smoothly and effectively.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillances are evaluated each 90 days. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance. A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVER-ALL VALUE

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Re-evaluation will be made in May, 1965.

PLC

Bill

JUN

Attachment A

The following technical surveillances are being maintained at the present time with the approval in each instance of the State Department:

Country	Symbol	Estimated Monthly Cost
Algeria		
Embassy, Washington, D. C.		$ 409.91
Argentina		
OAS, Washington, D.C.		409.83
Embassy, Washington, D.C. (Office of Naval Attache)		Not Available (New installati
Bolivia		
United Nations Delegation, NYC		339.00
Brazil		
Embassy, Washington, D.C.		3,483.58
UN Delegation, New York City		1,356.00
British Guiana		
Public Relations Office, NYC		169.50
Chile		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.		743.33
UN Delegation, New York City		508.50
China		
UN Delegation, New York City		678.00
Colombia		
UN Delegation, New York City		508.50
Cuba		
UN Delegation, New York City		684.00

433

Cyprus	
Embassy, Washington, D. C.	$ 393.67
UN Mission, New York City	339.00
Dominican Republic	
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	929.16
UN Delegation, New York City	169.50
Ecuador	
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	2,637.91
France	
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	2,018.75
Consulate, Washington, D.C.	1,269.00
Ambassador's Residence, WDC	538.33
Greece	
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	788.00
UN Delegation, New York City	678.00
Iraq	
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	1,288.50
UN Delegation, New York City	509.50
Israel	
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	3,242.83
Consulate, New York City	849.16
Japan	
UN Delegation, New York City	678.00
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	3,114.50
Mexico	
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	1,115.00
Nicaragua	
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	1,115.00

Panama	
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	$1,024.58
Ambassador to OAS, Washington, DC	Not Available (New Installation
UN Delegation, New York City	339.00
Syria	
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	1,360.00
Turkey	
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	1,182.00
UN Delegation, New York City	1,017.00
United Arab Republic	
UN Delegation, New York City	1,525.50
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	1,133.33
Venezuela	
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	1,844.25
Yugoslavia	
Consulate General, San Francisco	393.00
Consulate General, New York City	1,528.50
UN Mission, New York City	1,186.50
Consulate General, Chicago, Ill.	451.42
Consulate General, Pittsburgh, Pa.	590.85
Aleksandar Zambelli, Washington, DC	367.67
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	2,352.17
TOTAL ESTIMATED MONTHLY COST	47,259.73

JU

Attachment B

With State Department approval we are developing live sources at the official establishments of the below-listed countries. Actual sources developed and potential sources under investigation are shown in connection with each country.

Country	Actual	Potential
Argentina	0	2
Bolivia	0	0
Brazil	3	8
Burma	0	1
Ceylon	0	0
Chile	1	1
China	1	1
Colombia	0	5
Costa Rica	0	0
Cuba	1	0
Dominican Republic	4	3
Ecuador	0	0
El Salvador	0	0
Ghana	1	1
Guatemala	0	0
Guinea	0	2
Haiti	0	0
Honduras	0	2
India	0	0
Indonesia	3	0
Iran	3	7
Iraq	1	3
Israel	0	1
Jordan	0	2
Kenya	0	1
Laos	2	0
Lebanon	3	4
Malaya	1	0
Mali	0	1
Mexico	0	0
Morocco	0	2
Nicaragua	1	1
Pakistan	1	0
Panama	1	0
Paraguay	0	1
Peru	1	0
Republic of the Congo	0	1
Saudi Arabia	1	0

433

Country	Actual	Potential
Sudan	0	1
Syria	2	1
Thailand	1	0
Tunisia	0	0
United Arab Republic	5	4
Uruguay	1	0
Venezuela	3	1
Vietnam	0	1
Yemen	1	0
TOTALS	42	58

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVER NT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach ✓
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/1/63

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - Liaison
1 - Mossburg

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

We are recommending that State clearance be obtained in order that we may institute programs to develop sources and informants in the diplomatic establishments of certain African countries in the U. S.

In May, 1962, the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) indicated a need for coverage of 30 African countries particularly for intelligence regarding reactions to U. S. political, military and economic policy toward Africa.

B

In a memorandum dated 6/22/62 we pointed out that with State approval we had instituted an intelligence collection program through the development of sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of seven African countries and had instituted technical surveillance coverage at three of these establishments. At that time we recommended State Department clearance be obtained to develop sources and informants within the diplomatic establishments of 19 additional African countries in which USIB had expressed an interest. The State Department subsequently asked us to hold off our plans for such coverage until the USIB study was completed.

In July, 1962, the Deputy Attorney General was advised by the State Department that State would undoubtedly feel it necessary to turn down our request. We were subsequently advised that the Deputy Attorney General had discussed this matter with the Attorney General and that he felt strongly that the State Department should grant approval. We deferred to the Department's judgment when the Deputy Attorney General indicated he intended to make the Attorney General's feelings known to the State Department. We did not receive the necessary clearance requested from the State Department.

65-63113

65-63113-404

REC-54

EHM:klw
(6)

Brennan
Sullivan same caption 11/6/63.
GAB:chs

8 DEC 10 1963

59 DEC 13 1963

LIAISON

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

It is noted that our request of State involving 19 African countries was based on the needs of USIB. Since that time, we have had no further indication from USIB of its interests in the African area. However, based on current critical conditions presently existing in various African countries, it is believed that we should institute programs to develop sources in the diplomatic establishments in the U. S. of the following African countries: Somalia, Sudan, South Africa, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Tanganyika, Senegal and Nigeria.

ACTION:

It is recommended Liaison discuss this matter with State and obtain its approval for a program for us to develop sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of the above African countries with the understanding that State clearance will be obtained prior to our actually approaching any potential source or informant involved.

DEM/wrw

OK & let me know results H

ERC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan WCS

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 2-5-64

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G. Moore

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
NON SOVIET BLOC

Since Dominican Republic continues to be trouble-spot area primarily due to instability of Government and known efforts of extremists on the "Left" and "Right" to bring about a coup, State Department is being requested to grant clearance for us to initiate a program to develop sources and informants in Dominican diplomatic establishments in the U. S.

For a number of years we have had a program to develop live sources at official establishments of various key noncommunist countries which have been designated as "target" countries because of various factors, including evidence of Soviet or communist infiltration, importance in cold war and/or other international developments which make a particular country of special significance. In the past Dominican Republic, although meeting above criteria which would qualify it as a "target" country, has not been so designated as our coverage was considered quite adequate.

However, now that the Dominican Government is most unstable following the 9-25-63 overthrow of Juan Bosch, there has been a steady change in diplomatic personnel assigned to U. S. which makes it feasible for us to take additional steps to develop new sources in diplomatic establishments. In the past we have handled development of such potential sources in Dominican establishments by securing State Department clearance on an individual basis.

In order to streamline our procedures in this regard, it is felt we should now take necessary steps to make Dominican Republic a "target" country by securing appropriate State Department clearance for such source development.

2/7/64 H B Mills State checking
2/20/64 Mills advising State approved.

ACTION:

REC-133 65-63113-417

Liaison should obtain State clearance from appropriate State Department representative for FBI to conduct discreet investigations of potential security informants in Dominican diplomatic establishments in U.S. Liaison should advise State no interviews will be conducted with any potential source without first ~~obtaining~~ checking with State Department ~~clearance~~.

FEB 26 1964

65-63113
1 - 105-97459-211 (Nationality Group Coverage - Dominican Republic)

GCM:lab
(7)

1964

65-63113-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

1 - Wannall
1 - Ruehl

SAC, New York 3-26-64

Director, FBI (105-87453-370)

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE -
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
IS - VIETNAM
BUDED: 6-23-64

Effective immediately instant recipients are instructed to open new files bearing instant caption and submit letter to Bureau under this caption every 90 days setting forth progress made to develop confidential sources and informants at Vietnamese diplomatic establishments. Your initial letter should be forwarded to reach Bureau on or before 6-23-64. These 90-day letters should also indicate progress being made to develop sources and informants outside diplomatic establishments.

Be guided by instructions and observations set forth in Bulet to New York with copies for WFO dated 2-18-64, "Intelligence Coverage of Non-Soviet-Bloc Countries."

2 - WFO

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Noncommunist Countries)

VER:pdb
(8)

NOTE:

Bureau has program involving development of sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of friendly foreign nations when such would be in the best interest of U. S. Inasmuch as Vietnam is such a sensitive area, it was recommended Liaison obtain State clearance for Bureau to include Vietnam in this program. State approval was obtained 3-19-64.

Both New York and WFO are familiar with Bureau instructions and policy with regard to this type of coverage.

65-63113-

DUPLICATE YELLOW

NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 27 1964

72 APR 3 1964

150

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen ✓
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan WCS

DATE: 2/5/64

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Wannall
1 - Ruehl

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Believed State Department clearance should be obtained to add Republic of Vietnam to list of countries previously approved by State Department under captioned program.

Captioned program involves development by the FBI of confidential sources and informants in the diplomatic establishments of friendly foreign nations where (1) it appears that country is leaning toward the Soviet Bloc (2) where the situation in a particular country involves a serious political or military crisis (3) where there is a clear investigative need. At present time we are developing sources and informants in the diplomatic establishments of 44 friendly foreign nations with State Department approval.

At this time it is felt we should obtain State clearance to institute a program to develop sources and informants in South Vietnamese diplomatic establishments in the United States.

South Vietnam is an integral part of Asia where United States is deeply involved politically, economically and militarily to stem tide of Chinese Communists. South Vietnam within less than six months has had its president slain and been governed by two military juntas which gained control by coup d'etat. Any information which we can obtain regarding current political picture should prove of value.

RECOMMENDATION:

Liaison should obtain State clearance from appropriate State Department representative for FBI to conduct discreet investigations of Potential Security Informants in Vietnamese diplomatic establishments in United States. Liaison should advise State no interviews will be conducted with any potential source without first obtaining State Department clearance.

VER:slj
(6)

3/7/64
Discussed w/ H B Wells State
OHB

3/19/64
Wells advised State approves our program
OHB

MCT-1
REC- 23
1 MAR 27 1964

NY 3-25-64 let to NY
3-26-64 VER:pd
2-WFO

APR 2 1964

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 17, 1964

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Liaison
(Bartlett)
1 - Wannall
1 - Mossburg

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES

D. J. Brennan

We are recommending State Department clearance be obtained to institute a program to investigate potential sources employed at diplomatic establishments of Kenya in the U. S.

On 3-23-64 Mr. H. B. Wells, State Department, advised the Bureau the State Department was very suspicious of Burudi Nabwera, Ambassador from Kenya to the United Nations and Ambassador designate to the U. S. from Kenya. Mr. Wells pointed out Burudi is a henchman of Oginga Odinga, a prominent procommunist political leader in Kenya. Wells requested us to investigate Nabwera to determine his activities and contacts in the U. S. This investigation is presently being conducted.

The New York Office has requested State clearance be obtained to investigate Rene Baptiste, a chauffeur at the Kenya United Nations Mission, to determine his potential as a security informant. There are no U. S. nationals at this establishment and there is a need for source coverage there, particularly in view of the State Department's request that we investigate Nabwera. Bureau files contain no information that can be identified with Baptiste based on information available.

4-21-64 discussed with H B Wells, State
4-27-64 Wells approved Kenya as a target country.

ACTION:

It is recommended that Bureau Liaison contact the appropriate State Department representative to obtain clearance for us to institute discreet investigations of potential security informants at diplomatic establishments of Kenya in the U. S. who may be of assistance to us in our investigation of the Ambassador. State should be advised we will obtain clearance from that Department prior to actually contacting any potential source.

1 - 105-97459 Sub 325 (Nationality Group Coverage - Kenya)

REC-11 65-63113-430

EHM:jal
(8)

EX-108

12 MAY 1 1964

1 - 134-12633 (Rene Baptiste)

72 MAY 8 1964

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan WCS

DATE: July 21, 1964

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

1 - Liaison (Bartlett)
1 - Wannall
1 - Meier

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

D. J. Brennan

In view of recent Japanese developments, State Department is being requested for clearance for our initiation of program to develop live sources in Japanese official establishments.

For a number of years, we have had a program to develop live sources in official establishments of noncommunist countries, designated as "target" countries, because of presence of certain significant factors. Japan has not previously been designated as a "target" country.

State Department "Secret" Research Memorandum RFE-36, dated 6-17-64 on "Communist China's Policy for Establishing Diplomatic Relations," reports that Peiping's interest in expanding its network of diplomatic ties has significantly increased in past three years. Communist China now has diplomatic relations with 48 countries and, because of its recent successes and continued intensive efforts, it may soon overtake Nationalist China which has recognized 60 countries. According to the memorandum, this is liable to have immense effect on Chinese representation in international organizations, particularly the United Nations (UN). According to State Department, Japan is the number one target on Communist China's diplomatic horizon and an intensive step-by-step cultivation of Japan is under way. CIA's "Secret" Special Report, "The China Problem in Japanese Politics," dated 5-1-64, reports that in Japan supporters of the Japanese Government feel that development of Japan's informal relations will ripen into full-fledged diplomatic relations with Communist China.

The fact that trade between Japan and Communist China is on the increase certainly can be expected to encourage establishment of diplomatic relations between these countries in the not too far distant future. In 1963, this trade increased 60 per cent over 1962 and it is expected to take another big jump in 1964. Further, the Communist Party of Japan (CPJ) is urging close ties with China. This organization of approximately 105,000 members has taken the side of Communist China in its ideological war with the USSR.

REC 55 65-63113-443

18 JUL 31 1964

65-63113

EX 100

1 - 105-97459-234 (Nationality Group Coverage - Japan)

ACM:jal
(7)

7/24/64 H. B. Wells, INR, State, will check & respond upon approval. (See pg. 2)

67 AUG 6 1964

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-97459

Memorandum Wannall to Sullivan
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
65-63113

According to articles in the 7/9 and 19/64 issues of "The New York Times," the Japanese Government is not as strong now as in preceding years. Prestige of its Premier, Hayato Ikeda, re-elected to a third term 7-10-64, has been damaged by inflationary trends that have sent consumer prices up 20 per cent in past three years. His new cabinet has been called "weak" and "lightweight" due to his attempts to achieve balance among feuding elements in his own Liberal Democratic Party.

Japan is also buffeted by pressures from the USSR with which it has rather extensive trade relations. On 5-14-64, the USSR's First Deputy Premier, Anastas Mikoyan, made a surprise "good will" visit to Japan. He and members of his group met with Premier Ikeda and other highly placed Japanese officials. Real purpose behind his visit is unknown. Some claim his aim was merely an expansion of trade. Others believe USSR felt the trip was necessary so as to reinforce Russia's position with Japan because of increased relations between Japan and China.

OBSERVATIONS:

Industrially, Japan is the leading power in Asia and it wields considerable influence on lesser Asiatic countries. Capitulation by Japan to pressures of Communist China could have significant effect on such countries, possibly hastening their own recognition of Communist China and also the ultimate admission of Communist China to UN. We should do what we can to make available to State Department and other interested agencies, any information which would enable them to take appropriate steps. It is, therefore, recommended we secure State clearance for the development of live sources in Japanese official establishments in the U. S. This matter will be handled by Washington Field and New York Offices whose agents are experienced in such matters and can be relied upon to conduct themselves discreetly so as not to imperil cordial relations presently existing between U. S. and Japan. As a further safeguard, only American citizens employed in these establishments will be considered for development as informants.

7/27/64 Mr H. Bartlett Wells, IN-R State advised no objection to investigations as outlined below

ACTION:

If you approve, Liaison Section will obtain State Department clearance for FBI to conduct discreet investigations of American citizens employed in Japanese official establishments to determine their potential as security informants. Liaison should advise State Department that no interviews of such persons will be conducted without first checking with State Department.

OK

1 - Mr. Meier

SAC, New York (105-65930) 7/31/64

Director, FBI (105-97459-234)

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE
IS - JAPAN
(Buded: 10/30/64)

ReNYlet 7/7/64, no copy WFO, requesting authority to initiate nationality group coverage of Japanese establishments.

Through liaison channels on 7/27/64, State Department clearance was secured for this program. Accordingly, WFO and New York should ascertain identities of employees of the Japanese Embassy and UN Mission who are citizens of U.S. Any such person considered to have potential should be made the subject of an individual file and Bureau consulted prior to institution of background investigation.

The foregoing is not intended to limit the development of sources to individuals employed in Japanese establishments. Should you find that other areas of Japanese activity, such as organizations of Japanese nationals, require coverage you should not hesitate to initiate the necessary action.

Under caption of this letter, New York and WFO should advise Bureau by 10/30/64 and thereafter at 90-day intervals as to over-all progress made in this matter.

2 - WFO

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Non-Communist Countries)

ACM:epj:rth
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-924[illegible]

64 AUG 12 1964

60 AUG 5 1964 DUPLICATE YELLOW

Letter to SAC, New York
RE: NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE
105-97459-234

NOTE:

By memorandum W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan 7/21/64, captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Non-Communist Countries" it was recommended and approved that State Department clearance should be secured for the development of live sources in Japanese establishments. Clearance was secured from H. Bartlett Wells on 7/27/64 by SA W. J. McDonnell.

DIRECTOR, FBI 7/7/64

SAC, NEW YORK (105-65980) (P)

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - JAPAN
IS - JAPAN

This is to advise that there are reportedly five thousand Japanese nationals in various capacities in the New York City area, in addition to the numerous officials and employees at the Japanese Consulate and the Japanese Mission to the United Nations. It is felt that the Bureau, at this time, might consider authorizing the institution of nationality group coverage concerning Japan to further implement our current coverage. It is felt that with recent overtures from the Soviet Union regarding trade and cultural exchanges with Japan and, more important, trade relations being further extended between Japan and Red China that for these reasons Japanese coverage should be extended.

In view of the above, it is requested that authority be granted to institute nationality group coverage concerning Japan.

2 - BUREAU RM
1 - NEW YORK (105-65980)

RVP:EMD
(3)

65-63113-
NOT RECORDED
128 JUL 31 1964

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-97159-23-1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr ✓
Casper
Callahan
Conrad ✓
DeLoach ✓
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM : W. R. Wannall

DATE: September 30, 1964

1 - Liaison (Bartlett)
1 - Wannall
1 - Mossburg

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES

We are recommending that State clearance be obtained through liaison for an FBI program to develop sources and informants at Algerian diplomatic establishments in the United States.

At the present time, the Algerian Government, headed by Premier Ahmed Ben Bella, is receiving military aid and assistance from the Soviet-bloc and Cuba. Algerian military personnel are also receiving military training in those countries. The Algerian Communist Party, which supported Ben Bella's party in its fight against the French for Algerian independence, is gaining in numbers and influence. It would appear that intelligence information relating to Algerian activities both in the United States and abroad is of definite interest to the U.S. Government in view of Algeria's rising influence in North African political and military matters.

State has previously granted clearance for FBI programs to develop sources and informants in the diplomatic establishments in the United States of several African countries for the purpose of developing needed intelligence information. State clearance for these programs is limited to our investigating logical persons who may be so developed. Prior to actually contacting such persons to determine their potential, State clearance is again obtained for each person being considered. In the past, State has indicated it feels that because of the risks involved, we should only consider for development as sources, American citizens employed at African diplomatic establishments. However, State has indicated that where there is an investigative need for such a source, State would consider granting clearance for development of other than American citizens.

10/2/64
HB Hills

1/8/65
H Oaken State approved

ACTION:

It is recommended Bureau Liaison obtain State clearance for the FBI to institute a program to develop sources and informants in Algerian diplomatic establishments in the United States indicating we will, of course, obtain State clearance prior to interviewing any potential informant or source.

REC-55

65-63113-166

65-63113

EX-100

JAN 18 1965

1 - Nationality Group Coverage - Algeria

EHM:jal
(7)

JAN 21 1965

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~1 - Mr. Belmont~~
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/13/64

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Ruehl

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Believed State Department clearance should be obtained to add Cambodia to list of countries previously approved by State Department under captioned program.

Captioned program involves development by FBI of confidential sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of friendly foreign nations where (1) it appears that country is leaning toward Sino-Soviet-Bloc (2) where situation in particular country involves serious political or military crisis (3) where it is clear investigation needed. At present time we are developing sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of 45 friendly foreign nations with State Department approval.

It is believed we should, at this time, obtain State clearance to institute program to develop sources and informants in Cambodian diplomatic establishments in U. S.

Cambodia is integral part of Southeast Asian critical area where U. S. is deeply involved politically, economically, and militarily to stem tide of Chinese Communists. During 1963 Cambodia signed friendship treaty with Communist China; broke diplomatic relations with South Vietnam; publicly requested all U. S. economic and military aid programs be terminated; and in 1964 commenced receiving arms and equipment from Communist China. Any information which we can obtain regarding current attitude of Cambodia toward United States should be of value.

RECOMMENDATION:

Liaison obtain State Department clearance, from appropriate representative, for FBI to conduct discreet investigations of potential security informants in Cambodian diplomatic establishments in U. S. Liaison should advise State no interviews will be conducted with potential sources without first obtaining State Department clearance.

VER:ssh
(6)

XEROX
DEC 9 1964

11/18/64
REC- 40
65-63113-461

A. T. Wellborn State advised that there are no Cambodian Officials in DC & Embassy is occupied by Cambodian students OHB

4 DEC 8 1964

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

11/25 H C [illegible] State approved Cambodian [illegible] program as to [illegible]

56 DEC 10 1964

65-63113

SECRET

This document consists of 1 pages.
Number 1 of copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

November 25, 1964

Rec'd 11/30/64 from H O Ekern State OSIB

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bartlett, FBI

SUBJECT : Investigation of Cambodian UN Mission

The Department of State has no objection to FBI undertaking a discreet investigation or survey of the Cambodian Mission to the UN and its employees. However, great caution should be execised to see that the Cambodian representatives remain unaware of it. Our relations with Cambodia at this moment are extremely delicate, and we could not afford any operation involving any risk of disclosure.

HOE

Halvor O. Ekern

Intelligence Coverage of Non Communist Countries

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 134-13042

REC- 40

65-63113-462

EX-113

4 DEC 8 1964

SECRET

file 5-VeR

Place cc
-13043

56 DEC 10 1964 313

65-63113

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan WCS

DATE: 6/29/65

FROM : Mr. R. D. Cotter RDC

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

~~1 - Mr. Belmont~~
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Mullins
1 - Mr. Wacks
1 - Mr. Jaquiss

This program was inaugurated in 1954 and was expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) regular notification from the U.S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) maintenance of technical surveillance of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at Seat of Government at nominal expenses. Under second phase we are presently operating 52 technical surveillances covering establishments of 24 non-Soviet-bloc countries. These countries are Algeria, Argentina, Burma, Cambodia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, France, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Turkey, Thailand, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Tanzania.

Under third phase of program we currently have 85 actual and potential live sources at establishments of 49 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by State Department as "target" countries. Costs of this phase arise chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including CODE WORD Program, Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering U.S.

65-63113

RDC/mea
(10)

EX-100

REC 41

63113-489

6 JUL 2 1965

Memorandum for Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES
(ANNUAL EVALUATION)

MAGNITUDE

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and the current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and the State Department. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D. C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have developed during the past year. The program is operating smoothly and effectively.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillances are evaluated each 90 days. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance. A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVER-ALL VALUE

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Re-evaluation will be made in May, 1966.

DEMB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

: W. C. Sullivan DATE: 7/12/65

M : R. D. Cotter RDC

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. Jaquiss

ECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

D. J. Brennan

It is believed State Department clearance should be obtained to add Burma to list of countries approved by State Department under captioned program.

Captioned program involves development by FBI of confidential sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of friendly foreign nations where:

(1) It appears that country is leaning toward Sino-Soviet-bloc.

(2) Where situation within the particular country involves serious diplomatic or military crisis.

(3) Where it is clear investigation is needed.

It is believed we should at this time obtain State Department clearance to institute program to develop sources and informants at Burmese diplomatic establishments in the United States.

Burma is integral part of critical Southeast Asian area where United States is deeply involved politically, economically and militarily to stem the tide of Chinese Communist influence. The Burmese Government is carrying on protracted negotiations with the Burmese Communist Party, or White Flag, insurgents. Communist China has evidenced great interest in these talks. Any information we can obtain concerning Burma's attitude toward the United States or concerning the critical political and military situation in Southeast Asia should be of value.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

65-63113 REC-107 65-63113-491
1 - 105-97459 Sub 301 (Nationality Group ~~Coverage -~~ Asia)
1 - 105-97459 Sub 264 (Nationality Group Coverage - Burma)

18 JUL 22 1965

HJJ:gas
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

5 4 JUL 26 1965

Memo R. D. Cotter to W. C. Sullivan
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
65-63113

RECOMMENDATION:

Liaison obtain State Department Clearance from appropriate representative for FBI to conduct discreet investigation of potential security informants in Burmese diplomatic establishments in the United States. Liaison should advise State no interview will be conducted with potential sources without first obtaining State Department clearance.

7-14-65
A.T. Wellborn, State, advised. He is checking. OHB

7-20-
H O Eskern, State, advised State has no objection to our proposal, OHB

Mr. R. D. Cotter 1/20/66

Mr. E. H. Mossburg

1 - Mr. R.D. Cotter
1 - Mr. E.H. Mossburg

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE
ISRAEL

It is recommended that we continue our efforts to develop live sources and informants in Israeli diplomatic establishments in the United States.

State clearance was obtained on 6/2/58 for the FBI to develop sources and informants at Israeli diplomatic establishments. Our request for this clearance was based upon our need to combat the activities of Israeli intelligence agents operating out of the Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C., and the Israeli United Nations Delegation, New York City. At the same time, as a result of the Suez Crisis in 1957-1957, the possibility of war in the Middle East was prevalent and Israel occupied a central position in this sensitive area. Our needs for sources were based, therefore, upon FBI investigative needs and the need to obtain significant intelligence data for other U. S. Government agencies.

After instigating this program, we developed an extremely valuable informant who was an American citizen and who was employed at the Israeli Embassy. This informant was used for several years and furnished valuable information of assistance in our investigation of Israeli intelligence matters and significant intelligence data. She left the Israeli Embassy in 1963. At the present time we have developed several former employees of Israeli diplomatic establishments in the U. S. and persons who have operated in the past for the Israeli Intelligence Service. Some of these persons continue to have contacts with persons in Israeli establishments; however, we have no sources presently employed in Israeli diplomatic establishments in the U. S. This is partially explained by the sensitivity of the program; the fact that the Israel Security Service is extremely thorough in briefing its diplomatic employees concerning possible recruitment efforts by U. S. intelligence servicesand the employment by the Israelis of a very few U. S. citizens who would be logical targets for recruitment.

The risk of developing sources in Israeli establishments is comparable with similar efforts directed at Soviet diplomatic establishments. The Israeli Intelligence and Security Services are regarded as being

105-97459-345
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage) of Non-Soviet Bloc Countries
EHM:gas
(4)

CONTINUED - OVER

65-63113-
NOT RECORDED
102 JAN 25 1966

F152
55 FEB 3 1966

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-97459-345 37

extremely knowledgeable and efficient. Israel being a friendly country makes our recruitment efforts more difficult when we consider that an improper approach could present a most embarrassing situation for the U. S. Government.

At the current time we have under investigation certain known and suspected Israeli intelligence agents in the U. S. who either have connections with a Israeli establishment or are assigned to such an establishment; we are also currently conducting Registration Act investigations in which the Israeli Government or an Israeli establishment in the U. S. is reportedly acting as the foreign principal; Israel continues to occupy a delicate and dangerous position in the Middle East where she is surrounded by Arab nations seeking her extinction. The possibility of war in the Middle East involving Israel is continually present.

ACTION:

It is recommended that in view of the matters referred to above indicating a current need for FBI sources at Israeli diplomatic establishments in the United States that we continue our efforts in this regard.

Mr. R. D. Cotter 1/20/66

Mr. A. R. Jones

1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter
1 - Mr. E. H. Mossburg
1 - Mr. A. R. Jones

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE
MIDDLE EAST

This is an analysis of our program to develop informants in the diplomatic establishments in the U. S. of certain Middle East countries.

On June 23, 1959, State Department approved a program to develop informants in the diplomatic establishments in the U. S. of the following Middle East countries: Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAR and Yemen. These countries were selected because it was believed that they were drifting toward the Soviet bloc and because the Middle East had long been a volatile "trouble spot." The Middle East remains turbulent and unpredictable. Cyprus and the Arab-Israeli borders continue to be the major trouble spots but poor Iranian-Iraqi relations as well as the unresolved Yemeni question may also cause many problems. State indicated it was all right to investigate any proposed source but interviews would be considered on a case basis. State advised it did not desire us to use anyone other than Americans, but it would consider the use of non-Americans if there was an investigative interest involved. We have no investigative need for sources since there has been no information developed indicating any of these countries has conducted espionage or intelligence activities against the U. S.

At the present time the countries of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon appear to be firmly oriented toward the Western World and it does not appear that further efforts to develop sources at these establishments is warranted.

The oil-rich countries of Iran and Iraq are still being wooed strenuously by the Soviets and our efforts to develop sources should continu We have one good informant who works part time at the Embassy of Iran in Washington, D. C. Another informant who worked full time there recently resigned. We also have a symboled informant who works as a secretary at the Embassy of Iraq, Washington, D. C. A source who was employed at the Consulate General of Iran, New York City, recently resigned. New York has a good PSI at the Iraqi Consulate and another under development.

65-63113

Comparatively recent revolutions in Yemen and Syria show the continuing political instability in this area and offers opportunities for

Enclosure
105-97459-350
1 - ~~65-61113~~ 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage)
ARJ:gas (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

NOT RECORDED
199 JAN 24 1966

50 JAN 27 1966

the Soviets to gain additional influence and so our efforts to develop informants in these establishments should continue. We have a very good symboled informant in Washington, D. C., who continues to furnish information regarding the Royal Government of Yemen and if a coalition government between the Royal Government and the Yemen Republic Government occurs this informant may again be employed in the Yemen Arab Republic Embassy. WFO has a symboled informant who is available to furnish information concerning personnel of the Embassy of the Syria Arab Republic. New York has a PSI, who although not associated with the Syrian diplomatic establishment, is, however, in a position to obtain information regarding activities of Syrian diplomatic personnel there.

The UAR under President Nasser is still a volatile hot spot. Nasser continues to court both the Soviets and the Western World and at any time a full-scale war between the UAR and Israel could erupt so we should continue our efforts here. We have one symboled informant who furnishes information concerning personnel of the Embassy of UAR but this informant is not employed there. We had a symboled informant at the UAR Delegation to the United Nations but she was recently terminated when she left her employment to get married.

WFO has a good symboled informant at the Embassy of Lebanon who is employed as a secretary there. A former symboled informant who is an employee of the Lebanese Delegation to the United Nations is available to furnish coverage at the Lebanese diplomatic establishments in New York City. No further efforts to develop sources warranted.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That further efforts to develop sources at Jordanian, Lebanese and Saudi Arabian diplomatic establishments in the U. S. are not warranted and should be discontinued. Attached is a letter to WFO and New York advising these offices to discontinue their efforts in this regard.

(2) That our efforts to develop sources at the diplomatic establishments of Iran, Iraq, Syria, UAR and Yemen should continue.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Cotter

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 12, 1966

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Atkinson
1 - Mr. Harrell
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

JUNE

This program was initiated in 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as other information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) Regular notification from U. S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) Maintenance of technical surveillance of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) Development of live sources within such diplomatic establishments.

SCOPE AND COST:

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at the Seat of Government at nominal cost.

Under the second phase we are presently operating 27 technical surveillances covering establishments of 17 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The countries are: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Panama, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The cost of operating this phase of the program consists primarily of monitoring the technical installations involved and the translation of the intelligence product. These costs are analyzed each time the technical surveillance is justified (on a quarterly basis after the first month's operation). The cost appears to be fully justified based on value of data developed.

65-63113-506

REC 8

16 MAY 16 1966

Under the third phase of this program we currently have 45 approved live sources and 16 under investigation at establishments of 37 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by the State Department as "target" countries. Costs of this phase arises chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and Agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

GCM:cec/js
(8)
65-63113

(CONTINUED - OVER)

5-g

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS:

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including code word Program, Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering the U. S.

MAGNITUDE:

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and U. S. Government. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D. C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESS:

No weaknesses have developed during the past year.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS:

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillances are evaluated 30 days after the installation and each 90 days thereafter. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance.

A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes a review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTION:

A review of the control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVER-ALL VALUE:

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to State Department, the White House, other agencies and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Re-evaluation will be made in May, 1967.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison (Mr. Bartlett)
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Solomon

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: July 19, 1966

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

D. J. Brennan

Wannall

[illegible]

Jamaica, an independent nation since October, 1962, within the past year has been subjected to widespread civil disorders posing a substantial threat to the existing Government. There has been significant strengthening of subversive, communist and anti-Government forces within the country. Increasing inability of Government and police to cope with severe unrest has precipitated urgent plea for substantial U. S. assistance. On basis of indications of rapidly deteriorating internal situation in Jamaica, State Department is being requested to grant clearance for us to initiate program to develop sources and informants in Jamaican diplomatic establishments in the U. S.

For a number of years we have had program to develop live sources in official establishments of various noncommunist countries which have been designated "target" countries because of various factors including evidence of Soviet or communist infiltration, importance in the cold war and/or other international developments which make a particular country of special significance. Recent developments in Jamaica indicate that this country should be considered at this time for designation as a "target" country.

Grinding poverty and an extremely high unemployment rate make Jamaica a prime area for left-wing agitators. Consulate of Cuba in Kingston is focal point for procommunist and anti-Government agitation and activity. The recently organized Young Communist Organization (YCO), is reportedly receiving guidance and assistance from Cuban Consul, and is preparing to become spearhead for sabotage and terrorism. YCO has established training base in Jamaica and in mid-June made unsuccessful attempt to dynamite a major Government building. Communist elements are attempting to control the Ras Tafari Movement, a Jamaican black nationalist extremist cult with an estimated membership of twenty thousand. Cuban

Ltd to SAC, NYFO re: (Nationality Group Coverage — Jamaica)

65-63113
AHS:scr (7)

REC-15 65-63113-514

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - 105-97459-219 (Nationality ~~Group Coverage~~ - Jamaica)

77 AUG 12 1966

11 AUG ~~8~~ 9 1966

Consul, Kingston, recently made an urgent request of Havana for financial help to Ras Tafarians. In December, 1965, it was reported that Jamaica had received offers of aid from Soviet-bloc countries (not further defined) and recently Jamaican business firms were said to be planning to circumvent restrictions on trade with Cuba in connection with the proposed sale of sugar refining machinery to Cuba.

RECOMMENDATION:

Liaison, through contact with appropriate officials there, should seek State Department clearance for FBI to conduct discreet investigation of potential security informants in Jamaican diplomatic establishments in the U. S. Liaison should advise State no interviews will be conducted of any potential source without first obtaining specific State Department clearance.

ACTION:

If approved, to be referred to Liaison Section for handling.

7-20-66
AS Buford checking
AHB

7-27-66
Mr Buford said State has no objection,
AHB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison (Bartlett)

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/30/66

1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. Mossburg

M R. D. Cotter

ECT INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES

We are recommending that State clearance be obtained for a program to develop live sources at French diplomatic establishments in the United States.

BACKGROUND:

Captioned program involves development by FBI of live sources in diplomatic establishments of noncommunist countries where it appears that country is (1)leaning toward the Sino-Soviet bloc (2)where a situation in a particular country indicates a serious political and military crisis or (3)where there is an investigative need. Upon obtaining State clearance to investigate potential sources, the Field is advised to institute the program but no interviews of potential sources are conducted without first obtaining State clearance. The initial interviews with potential sources are conducted in the majority of cases through the use of pretexts.

NEED FOR SOURCES AT FRENCH ESTABLISHMENTS IN UNITED STATES:

Since January, 1966, relations between the United States and France appear to have become more strained. France has practically discontinued its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). President De Gaulle has publicly criticized United States policies in Vietnam. The United States Intelligence Board is currently considering whether or not it is in the best interests of the United States Government to continue to make United States intelligence data available to France. We have received allegations from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that a sensitive source reported the French Foreign Intelligence

65-63113
1 - 105-97459-231 (Nationality Group Coverage - France)

EHM:ngp ngp
(7)

UNREC COPY FILED IN

REC 65-63113-532

CONTINUED - OVER

JAN 4 1967

2 1967

Memorandum R. D. Cotter to W. C. Sullivan
RE: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES
65-63113

Service is training fifty "deep cover" intelligence agents to be dispatched to the United States to collect intelligence as France is no longer closely associated with NATO. CIA has also furnished information indicating two French diplomats, attached to the Materiel French Military Mission, are suspected intelligence agents.

ACTION:

It is recommended that Bureau Liaison contact appropriate officials at the Department of State to obtain State clearance for the FBI to conduct discreet investigations of potential security informants in French diplomatic establishments at the United States. Liaison should advise State no interviews will be conduct of any potential sources without first obtaining State Department clearance. + in writing.

OK H

Discussed with A S Buford 12/5/66
Will advise
wm

12/21/66 approved by
A S Buford State

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan WCS

JUNE

DATE: May 12, 1967

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Atkinson

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

Wannall

This program was initiated in 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as other information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) Regular notification from U. S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) Maintenance of technical surveillance of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) Development of live sources within such diplomatic establishments.

SCOPE AND COST:

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at the Seat of Government at nominal cost.

REC-40 65-63113-540

Under the second phase we are presently operating 10 technical surveillances covering establishments of 7 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The countries are: Algeria, China, Dominican Republic, France, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. In early February, 1967, 24 telephone surveillances on non-Soviet-bloc establishments were discontinued in accordance with the Director's instructions that the total number of telephone surveillances be substantially reduced. The cost of operating this phase of the program consists primarily of monitoring the technical installations involved and the translation of the intelligence product. These costs are analyzed each time the technical surveillance is justified (on a quarterly basis after the first month's operation). The cost appears to be fully justified based on value of data developed.

MAY 16 1967

Under the third phase of this program we currently have 35 approved live sources and 19 under investigation at establishments of 32 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by the State Department as "target" countries. Costs of this phase arises chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and Agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

65-63113
WHA:brr (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

5 - Atkinson

MAY 24 1967

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS:

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U. S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering the U. S.

MAGNITUDE:

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and U. S. Government. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D. C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESS:

No weaknesses have developed during the past year.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS:

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillances are evaluated 30 days after the installation and each 90 days thereafter. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance.

A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes a review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTION:

A review of the control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVERALL VALUE:

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to the White House, State Department, other agencies and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Reevaluation will be made in May, 1968.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JUNE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 14, 1968

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Atkinson

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

This program was initiated in 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as other information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) Regular notification from U. S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) Maintenance of telephone surveillance of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) Development of live sources within such diplomatic establishments.

SCOPE AND COST:

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at the Seat of Government at nominal cost.

Under the second phase we are presently operating 12 telephone surveillances covering establishments of 11 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The countries are: Algeria, China, Dominican Republic, France, India, Israel, Jordan, Panama, United Arab Republic, Venezuela and Vietnam. The cost of operating this phase of the program consists primarily of monitoring the technical installations involved and the translation of the intelligence product. These costs are analyzed each time the telephone surveillance is justified (on a quarterly basis after the first month's operation). The cost appears to be fully justified based on value of data developed.

Under the third phase of this program we currently have 51 approved live sources and 20 under investigation at establishments of 38 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by the State Department as "target" countries. Costs of this phase arise chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and Agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

65-63113

WHA:lam (8)

REC-23 65-63113-559

EX-115

CONTINUED - OVER

11 MAY 17 1968

SPEC ~~MAIL~~ RM.

5-Wks

194

MAY 31 1968

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS:

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U. S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering the U. S.

MAGNITUDE:

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and U. S. Government. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D. C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESS:

No weaknesses have developed during the past year.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS:

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Telephone surveillances are evaluated 30 days after the installation and each 90 days thereafter. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance.

A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes a review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTION:

A review of the control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVERALL VALUE:

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to the White House, State Department, other agencies and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Reevaluation will be made in May, 1969.

DEM

OPTIONAL F... 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

O : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 8, 1970

ROM : W. R. Wannall

UBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Walters ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Soyars ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

Attached herewith is a single copy of a write-up prepared in captioned matter during recent inspection of Domestic Intelligence Division (April, 1970).

The Inspector concluded that captioned program is productive and should be continued.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached memorandum serve as annual evaluation of instant program.

REC-29

Enclosure

AJD:ams
(4)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. O'Brien

65-63113-574

MAY 18 1970

S-O'B filer

65-63113

1 - ENCLOSURE

39

66 MAY

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (Bufile: 65-63113)

1. Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives

This program is aimed at developing positive intelligence information as well as data of value to FBI investigations. The program was inaugurated in 1954, expanded in 1955 and 1959, and during 1962 and 1963 additional coverage was approved.

The program has three principal phases as follows:

a. Regular notification to the FBI by other U. S. agencies regarding arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries. This phase consists chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal expense.

b. Maintenance of special coverage on official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with the approval of State Department and the Attorney General. We currently have special coverage on six diplomatic establishments of four non-Soviet-bloc countries and one additional installation as recently approved by the Attorney General. Countries currently covered are Panama, Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic. Our cost in operating this phase of the program is related to translation of the intelligence product and salary of personnel who man special coverage equipment. Costs are analyzed on an individual basis each time the special coverage is justified. This justification is based on the value of the data developed.

c. This phase relates to the development of live sources within diplomatic establishments of non-Soviet-bloc countries as well as the development of individuals so closely connected with official establishments they are able to

65-63113-274

ENCLOSURE

provide accurate up-to-date intelligence information. We now have 28 actual and 29 potential live sources at the establishments of 33 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The principal cost involved in this phase relates to Agent time devoted to investigations of sources and time spent in handling these sources.

2. Positive Results Achieved

This program has enabled us to provide the White House and the intelligence community a continuing flow of information affecting the national and international interests of the U. S. Specifically, this information has included details of the plans and activities of those countries involved in the Middle East crisis, details regarding the continuing crisis in Panama, developments related to the recent U. S.-Bolivia crisis, and substantial valuable information regarding developments in the Dominican Republic. In the areas mentioned above as well as in a number of other instances, information developed through this program and disseminated within the U. S. Government has provided recipients current information regarding international political scene and has assisted those responsible for policy-making decisions in these areas. Recently, the U. S. Ambassador to the UN and members of his staff expressed their appreciation for a continuing flow of pertinent data provided to them as regards the Middle East situation. This program produces information of the type necessary to enable the Bureau to fulfill its investigative and internal security responsibilities.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

Prior to Division re-organization (January, 1970), the Number One Man of the then Latin American Section served as coordinator of this program. In this capacity, he was in periodic contact with the Section Chief of the then Nationalities Intelligence Section and with individual supervisors concerning objectives and results achieved. Since Division re-organization, which brought matters involving all friendly foreign countries (except West Germany) under the present Nationalities Intelligence Section, the Number One Man of the Nationalities Intelligence Section serves as coordinator along these same lines.

Current Justification for Continuation

This program continues to produce information of substantial value as regards Bureau investigative and intelligence interests as well as the interests of other U. S. agencies. The information produced continues to pinpoint the FBI as a regular and most valuable source of intelligence information. It is recommended that this program be continued.

5. How Often Evaluated and Date of Last Justification

Program is evaluated annually. It was last justified by memorandum dated 5/27/69.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

: Mr. C. D. Brennan DATE: 5/5/71

OM : W. R. Wannall

JECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Attached herewith is a single copy of a write-up prepared in captioned matter during the inspection of this Division in January, 1971.

The Inspector concluded that captioned program is productive and should be continued.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached memorandum serve as annual evaluation of program.

AJD:hc
(4) hc
Enclosure

1-Mr. Brennan
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Harrell

1 · ENCLOSURE

ST-113
REC-39 [illegible] -583

11 MAY 7 1971

1315
2 MAY 14 1971

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(Bufile: 65-63113)

1. Background, Scope and Objectives

Program was inaugurated 1954 aimed at developing positive intelligence information, as well as data of value to FBI investigations. Expansion of the program took place in 1956 and 1959 and during 1962 and 1964, as well as in 1970, additional coverage was approved.

The program has three principal phases as follows:

a. Regular notification to the FBI by other U.S. agencies regarding arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet bloc countries. This phase consists chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal expense.

b. Maintenance of special coverage on official establishments of selected non-Soviet bloc countries with the approval of State Department and the Attorney General. We currently have special coverage on eleven diplomatic establishments of seven non-Soviet bloc countries and three additional installations as recently approved by the Attorney General. Countries currently covered are Panama, Israel, Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Chile, Bolivia and Peru. Our cost in operating this phase of the program is related to translation of the intelligence product and salary of personnel who man special coverage equipment. Costs are analyzed on an individual basis each time the special coverage is justified. This justification is based on the value of the data developed.

c. This phase relates to the development of live sources within diplomatic establishments of non-Soviet bloc countries as well as the development of individuals so closely connected with official establishments they are able to provide accurate up-to-date intelligence information. We now have 47 actual and 22 potential live sources

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
[illegible]/71
[illegible]
4-B

65-63113-583

ENCLOSURE

at the establishments of 25 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The principal cost involved in this phase relates to Agent time devoted to investigations of sources and time spent in handling these sources.

2. Positive Results Achieved

This program has enabled us to provide the White House and the highest level of the intelligence community a continuing flow of valuable foreign political information affecting the national and international interests of the U.S. The program was particularly productive in our coverage of such critical areas of tension as the Middle East crisis, the continuing crisis in Panama, and the recurrent political crises created in Latin America through the unseating and establishment of regimes in the various countries covered. In the areas mentioned, as well as in other high sensitivity areas, this program has served as a basis for obtaining information which has provided U.S. Government with current data regarding the international political scene and has contributed otherwise unobtainable information for the benefit of those responsible for policy decisions at the highest level of our Government. An example of the importance of this information is illustrated in the comments of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles W. Yost, made by him in a letter dated 11/18/70 to the Director. Ambassador Yost noted that the support given to the U.S. United Nations Mission by the Bureau was deeply appreciated by him and had afforded him privileged insight and perspective.

The quality of this program is further attested to by realization by the White House of the capabilities of the FBI to produce positive foreign political intelligence with resulting instructions to the Bureau to expand this capability abroad in select liaison positions. As a result of these instructions, our capability in furnishing foreign political information was expanded through the opening of six new liaison posts in Beirut, Lebanon; Caracas, Venezuela; La Paz, Bolivia; Copenhagen, Denmark; Managua, Nicaragua; and Tel Aviv, Israel. With this expansion, our overseas liaison Agents were increased from 28 to 42 with supporting clerical personnel being increased in number from 32 to 43. This move has increased the number of our foreign posts from 11 to 17. (More detailed comment regarding increase in liaison abroad is set forth in the work papers of this inspection under Section 4-E, Accomplishments - Special Coordination Unit.)

3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The program as it relates to all friendly foreign countries (except West Germany) is coordinated by the Number One Man of the Nationalities Intelligence Section working through the separate supervisors assigned to the individual country's desk within the Section.

4. Current Justification for Continuation

This program continues to produce information of substantial value relative to Bureau investigations as well as substantive foreign political information of vital interest to the White House and members of the intelligence community. The information continues to illustrate the FBI's ability to produce valuable intelligence information relative to foreign political matters and to solidify the Bureau's position as a valuable source of foreign intelligence data. It is recommended that this program be continued.

5. Periodic Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last justified by memorandum dated 5/8/70.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 pdf 6 of 14

SSC REQUEST
8/20/75
PART II
Item 3

Retain

Excised portions denoted in red

1071

CC' ch to Messrs: Branigan
Kurtz
Lampher
McCasli
Meehan
orstrom
urner
Vannall

November 18, 1954

SAC, Washington Field

RECORDED - 25

June

Director, FBI 65-63113-5 PERSONAL ATTENTION

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

As you are aware, at the present time our coverage on the intelligence efforts of foreign countries here in the United States is primarily aimed at the activities of Soviet and Communist bloc countries. This has been brought about by the fact that those countries represent the greatest threat to the security of our nation, both in the international and domestic fields.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a number of instances have been brought to our attention reflecting so-called "friendly nations" are engaging in direct intelligence activities against the United States. The case involving Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., who was engaged in furnishing top secret information from the National Security Agency to representatives of the Netherlands Government, fully portrays the inherent danger in such intelligence activities. Once vital information reaches another nation, our security with respect to such information is only as good as the security of the foreign government.

The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to alert you to the necessity of promptly bringing to the Bureau's attention any information developed indicating representatives of foreign countries are engaged in intelligence activities here. Our basic policy is to conduct investigations only in instances where we receive allegations indicating an individual representing a fo nation is engaging in activities in violation of our laws or oth wise constitutes a security menace.

CC: 2 - Boston PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Chicago PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Cleveland PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Detroit PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Los Angeles PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - New Orleans PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - New York PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Philadelphia PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Pittsburgh PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - San Francisco PERSONAL ATTENTION
2 - Seattle PERSONAL ATTENTION

COMM - FBI
NOV 19 1954
MAILED 30

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

RJL:em
(33)

The duplimat for this letter is being retained in the office of Supervisor R. J. Lamphere.

6 DEC 29 1958

The Bureau is aware that the French, the British, the Israelis, the Germans, and a number of other nations either have regularly assigned intelligence representatives in the United States or, from time to time, send such representatives to the United States. In many instances such representatives deal with United States Government agencies on an official basis. At the same time, it is possible that such representatives are engaged in other intelligence activities while here. We are requesting other Government agencies who deal with intelligence representatives of foreign governments to keep us advised of the identities of foreign intelligence representatives in the United States. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is incumbent upon us to be alert to develop information on foreign intelligence representatives and to exploit any situation which may develop indicating such persons are endangering United States security.

CONFIDENTIAL

VIA LIAISON

Date: November 18, 1954

To: Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 - 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

This Bureau has received information in a number of instances in the recent past where representatives of so-called "friendly nations" have engaged in intelligence activities in violation of existing United States statutes and against the best interests of the United States. The case involving Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., wherein vital information from the National Security Agency was furnished to representatives of the Netherlands Government, illustrates the security menace to the United States Government in such activities.

We are aware of the identity of certain intelligence representatives of friendly countries who are stationed in the United States. We are aware that certain of these representatives officially represent their governments in dealing with agencies of the United States Government. In other instances, it has come to our attention that intelligence representatives of foreign governments make visits to the United States to confer with United States agencies. Frequently, however, we are not officially notified when such individuals come to the United States as intelligence representatives and, while other United States agencies are probably officially sponsoring the visits of such representatives, the possibility remains that such persons may, while in the United States, engage in intelligence missions which are not known to the United States agency sponsoring the visit.

Delivered to Clare 11-19-54

65-63113-1

SE 27

RECORDED

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

RJL:em
(6)

CONFIDENTIAL

1 copy to AAG William F. Tompkins

NOV 29 1954

We would, therefore, like to be notified by the recipients of this letter when information is received that an intelligence representative of a foreign government is coming to the United States. We would like to be advised in the event any agency sets up a liaison arrangement with such an intelligence representative and to be furnished with brief details of his approved activity. This information is needed in order to guide this Bureau in discharging its responsibilities and, at the same time, it will enable us to advise the appropriate agency in the event information is received that the intelligence representative is acting outside the scope of his approved activity. Similarly, any information concerning the activities of these intelligence representatives coming to the attention of any agency which would appear to be outside the scope of their prescribed activity should be brought to the attention of this Bureau. These data will assist us in eliminating unnecessary inquiries and in concentrating on those matters of this type which merit close attention.

We would like to have this information with respect to intelligence representatives now in the United States and, on a continuing basis, with respect to future arrivals. Of course, we desire to continue to be furnished data concerning suspected intelligence representatives who arrive and with whom no working arrangement exists.

The above request is also being directed separately to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Director of Special Investigations, the Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, and the National Security Agency.

CC: 1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

TO E. F. Hall, CIA
11/22/54

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

CONFIDENTIAL

Belmont

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

November 18, 1954

Director, FBI

5-1

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

There is attached hereto a copy of a letter to Mr. Dennis A. Flinn, Director, Office of Security, Department of State, Washington, D. C., in which there is being set forth the request that other agencies of the United States Government notify this Bureau when they have knowledge of the identities of intelligence representatives of so-called "friendly foreign nations" who are in the United States.

It was thought you would be interested in this as intelligence activities aimed against the United States, regardless of the country from which they emanate, do constitute a security hazard.

You will note from the attached letter that this request is also being directed to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Director of Special Investigations, the Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, and the National Security Agency.

Attachment

RJL:em
(5)

RECEIVED ROOM NOV 10 12 59 PM '54

COMM - FBI
NOV 18 1954
MAILED 20

65-6343-3

NOV 19 1954
132

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Rec'd by Liaison
12-14-54 · 5DE

14 December 1954

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Reference is made to your letter dated 18 November 1954, Subject: Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations.

For your interim information, preliminary study of this particular problem is underway, although a firm plan for supplying the desired information in a uniform and expeditious manner and on a continuing basis has not been completed. However, in the course of our inquiry it has been observed that the National Security Agency in many cases would be able to supply additional data concerning the personalities involved in the form of biographical or background information which may be of further assistance to you in this particular effort. With your approval the scope of the information requested from this Agency will be enlarged to include this additional material when available.

I wish to assure you that your request is receiving our careful study and that a basic report will be forthcoming at an early date.

Sincerely,

Ralph J. Canine

RALPH J. CANINE
Lieutenant General, US Army
Director

4

RECORDED - 3 [illegible] -6

18 DEC [illegible] 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

ARTMENT OF THE AIR FORC
UARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FC
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

91146

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Received from OSI
Date 2/7/55

ATTN: Mr. Daniel J. Sullivan
Liaison Agent

RE: Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter, above subject, dated 18 November 1954.

This office is in receipt of a communication from the Directorate of Intelligence, U. S. Air Force which is quoted as follows:

> "In order to provide the Directorate of Special Investigations with the information necessary to satisfy the FBI request contained in the inclosed letter, the Directorate of Intelligence in the future will notify your office when foreign intelligence representatives visit the US at D/I invitation or under D/I sponsorship."

For your information, names of foreign intelligence representatives furnished by the Directorate of Intelligence will be checked in the Office of Special Investigations Central Indices for any additional information prior to transmission to your office. This office will, of course, bring to your attention any additional information received concerning visits to the United States of intelligence representatives of foreign governments.

RECORDED - 77

65-6[illegible] - 7

Sincerely,

EX-112

17 FEB 8 1955

F. L. WELCH
Acting Chief, Counter Intelligence Div.
Directorate of Special Investigations
The Inspector General

3 15 1955

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ONI 05500.4
Op-921B
7 Feb 1955

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Rec'd Liaison 2-18-55 WSW

ONI INTERNAL INSTRUCTION 05500.4

From: Director of Naval Intelligence
To: All Division, Branch, and Section Heads, ONI

Subj: Provision of information to the FBI on foreign intelligence representatives

1. Purpose. To provide for notification to the FBI of visits to the United States by intelligence representatives of foreign governments.

2. Discussion.

a. The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation has expressed the following requirements, in connection with the Bureau's internal security responsibilities:

(1) Notification of current or prospective visits of intelligence representatives of foreign governments to the United States, being sponsored by, or which are within the purview of, the Department of the Navy,

(2) Information as to any liaison arrangements with such visitors, and a brief summary of their approved activity,

(3) Information indicating activities on the part of a visitor outside the scope of his approved visit purpose,

(4) Any information on suspected intelligence representatives with whom no working arrangements exist.

65-63113

b. The FBI is aware of the identity of the foreign naval and air attaches accredited to the Department of the Navy, and of the general nature of the approved activities of such attaches. It is therefore considered that the FBI's requirements as to this category of intelligence representatives will normally be served by providing the Bureau with current rosters of accredited attaches and a current edition of the Office of Naval Intelligence Guide for such attaches, as well as notification as to the projected travel of Soviet and Satellite attaches. However, any other information as to the activities of attaches which are of an internal security nature and are outside their authorized scope, is of interest to the FBI and should be provided.

Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations

File 65-63113

AUG 20 1971

3. Action.

a. Op-92B2 will continue to provide the FBI with current information as to the identity of attaches accredited to the Department of

CONFIDENTIAL

XEROXED ORIGINAL RETAINED

the Navy, and with current information as to their approved activities (Guide for Foreign Naval Attaches and Foreign Air Attaches accredited to the Department of the Navy). Op-92B2 will also pass to the FBI, the State Department, and Op-921E, in accordance with current procedures, notifications of projected travel received from Soviet and Satellite attaches.

b. Other information indicating activities on the part of an attache which is in contravention of approved attache behavior will be brought to the attention of the Director of Naval Intelligence, via Op-92B2. If the Director determines that it has internal security aspects, Op-921E will pass the information to the FBI by memorandum or through liaison.

c. Information of the nature discussed in paragraph 2.a. above (and concerning personnel other than accredited attaches) will be passed by memorandum from the Division Head concerned (or by Op-92B2, if appropriate, on visitors sponsored by the Director of Naval Intelligence or higher authority) to Op-921E, for forwarding to the FBI.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO
Op-921B/dtn
Ser 05491P92

CONFIDENTIAL

8 - FEB 1955

Re: Intell Coverage of Diplomatic Repr [illegible] of [illegible] Foreign Govt.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

Reference is made to your letter of November 13, 1954, wherein you advised that the Bureau would like to be notified when information is received that an intelligence representative of a foreign government is coming to the United States. Your letter requested details of any liaison arrangements with such representatives, of their approved activities, and of any activities appearing to be outside the scope of their approved missions.

As you are aware, most foreign countries have officially accredited Naval and Air Attaches for conducting appropriate liaison on naval and naval air matters with the Department of the Navy. These attaches and members of their staffs, with the sanction of the Department, make innumerable visits and contacts with naval representatives and representatives of private contractors to the Navy. It is assumed that, with the exception of the travel of Soviet and Satellite Attaches, your interest does not extend to the day-to-day activities of these representatives as long as such activities remain within normal and authorized bounds.

There is transmitted for your information a copy of the current monthly roster of Foreign Naval and Air Attaches, and a copy of the Office of Naval Intelligence Guide for such attaches. The roster will be provided you on a monthly basis henceforward.

Further, any information which may come to our attention and which suggests improper activities of an internal security nature by foreign Naval and Air Attaches will be provided promptly.

With respect to intelligence representatives visiting this country, you will be notified, in accordance with the request contained in your letter.

Sincerely,

Carl F. Espe

CARL F. ESPE
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence

RECORDED - 33 65-63113

8

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

INDEXED-33

2 FEB 16 1955

EX-PROC
FEB 7 1955

Encl:
(1) Roster of Foreign Naval Attaches and Foreign Air Attaches accredited to the Department of the Navy, of 1 Jan 1955
(2) Guide for Foreign Naval Attaches and Foreign Air Attaches accredited to the Department of the Navy, of Jul 1954

COMMUNICATIONS TO
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

This document consists of 1 pages
No 1 of 9 Copies, Series B

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

October 10, 1955

SECRET

Dear Mr. Hoover:

On occasion it has proved important in connection with United States interests in and relations with the other American Republics to obtain intelligence information on activities taking place within the United States. Specifically, it is important that the Department keep track of the movements and contacts of selected Latin Americans while in this country when there are reasons to believe that subversive activities directed at the other Governments of this Hemisphere are being planned and coordinated here. Such activities are against the national interests of the United States in so far as they may result in developments which could endanger United States lives, threaten United States business interests and cause friction within the inter-American system.

In the past the FBI has always cooperated in furnishing the Department in specific Latin American cases with information available from established sources, but it has shown understandable reluctance to become involved to the extent of conducting direct surveillance in cases where there is no evidence of nor reason to suspect subversive activities directed against the United States or violation of United States laws. It is felt that while this information is helpful, it does not completely fill the gap in the intelligence information important in the conduct of foreign relations. It is understood that the CIA, while interested in foreign intelligence, does not carry out surveillance operations within the confines of the United States.

It would be most appreciated if you could express an opinion as to how surveillance of selected Latin American visitors to this country might be arranged on an individual case basis.

An identical letter is being sent to the CIA in the hope that a coordinated approach can be made.

Sincerely yours,

65-63113-34X-4

Robert Murphy

Robert Murphy

RECORDED - 14

EX-110

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

SECRET

OCT 10 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: 10-13-55

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Branigan
Liaison
Sanders

SUBJECT: STATE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS FOR SURVEILLANCES OF LATIN AMERICANS

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont ✓
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

By letter of 10/10/55 Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State, noted that it is important that State keep track of movements and contacts of selected Latin Americans while in U.S. when there are reasons to believe subversive activities directed at other governments of this hemisphere are being planned and coordinated here. The letter notes that the FBI has cooperated in furnishing information from established sources but "has shown understandable reluctance to become involved to the extent of conducting direct surveillance in cases where there is no evidence of nor reason to suspect subversive activities directed against the United States or violation of United States laws." Letter requests opinion as to how surveillance of selected Latin American visitors might be arranged on individual case basis and notes that identical letter being sent to CIA in the hope a coordinated approach can be made.

In November, 1954, Bureau refused State request for surveillance of Pedro Estrada, Director, Venezuelan Security Police, who was brought here by State and escorted around by State Department Security Division agent. In August, 1955, State requested Bureau furnish as complete information as possible regarding movements of Colonel Romulo Fernandez* and his aide during 3 day stay in Miami. No request for surveillance made and State was advised none being conducted; individuals covered by other means and State furnished information developed. No other identifiable instances where State has requested or indicated possible desirability of physical surveillance.

Attached is suggested letter to State advising Bureau investigates promptly cases indicating subversive action against other Governments in this hemisphere using investigative techniques appropriate; that full-time surveillances require tremendous expenditures of manpower and in most cases more information can be obtained through other techniques but Bureau not reluctant to use physical surveillance when circumstances warrant; that when State has creditable information of type of activity referred to, it should be referred to Bureau in order that prompt investigation may be made; and that Bureau will consider physical surveillance when requested by State when agreed it is warranted. Attached letter also notes it would be desirable, appropriate and in accordance with U.S. laws that such individuals not be allowed to enter U.S. when reason to believe they would engage in such activities.

RECORDED - 14
INDEXED - 14

~~65-[illegible]-2205~~
65-1943113-34XR

50 OCT 26 1955

Enclosure
Sent 10-14-55

*Venezuelan Army Chief of Staff

10 OCT 20 1955

ESS:mgh:amg:(6)

ESP

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

RECOMMENDATION:

It is suggested that the attached letter be forwarded to Mr. Murphy, the Deputy Undersecretary of State.

SECRET

cc - Boardman
- Belmont
- Branigan
- Liaison
- Sanders

65-63113-34X
~~[illegible]~~

October 14, 1955

VIA LIAISON

10/14/55
To Mr Murphy

Honorable Robert Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

Reference is made to your letter of October 10, 1955, which notes that it is important for the Department of State to keep track of the movements and contacts of selected Latin Americans while in this country when there are reasons to believe that subversive activities directed at the other governments of this hemisphere are being planned and coordinated in this country. Your letter also notes that this Bureau has shown an understandable reluctance to conduct direct surveillance of such Latin Americans where there is no evidence of nor reason to suspect subversive activities directed against the United States or violation of United States laws. You requested an opinion as to how surveillances of selected Latin American visitors to this country might be arranged on an individual case basis.

When there is creditable information available indicating that subversive activities directed at other governments of this hemisphere are being planned and coordinated in the United States, the FBI takes prompt investigative action in view of the probability of violations of the registration or neutrality provisions of United States laws. In conducting these investigations all logical investigative techniques are used, including physical surveillances where circumstances would warrant. Full-time physical surveillances require a tremendous expenditure of manpower, however, and are practicable only in connection with some phases of highly important cases in the security or criminal fields. In the greater majority of cases more actual information can be obtained through such investigative techniques as spot-type surveillance, the use of available sources of information and informants, the development of special sources in a particular case and the use of other highly confidential investigative techniques where appropriate. There is, however, no reluctance on the part of the FBI to conduct physical surveillances where the circumstances warrant such action.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Enclosure to memo Belmont to Boardman, 10/13/55, ESS:mgh:amc, "STATE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS FOR SURVEILLANCES OF LATIN AMERICAN VISITORS TO THE UNITED STATES."

ESS:mgh:amc
(7)

SECRET

Letter to Honorable Robert Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Department of State

When the State Department has creditable information that certain Latin Americans are in this country for the purpose of planning and coordinating subversive activities directed at either the United States or other governments of this hemisphere, it will be appreciated if such information is brought to the attention of the FBI immediately in order that an appropriate investigation may be promptly initiated. Every effort will be made in these cases to develop those aspects which may be of particular interest to the State Department and consideration will be given to the utilization of a physical surveillance when requested by the State Department where it is agreed that this type of coverage is warranted and necessary. As indicated in your letter, it will be necessary to consider these matters on an individual case basis.

In those instances where there is reason to believe that these individuals would engage in such activities while in the United States, it would appear to be most desirable, appropriate and in accordance with United States laws that they not be allowed to enter this country, in the absence of overriding diplomatic considerations.

Sincerely yours,

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

OCT 19 1955

The Honorable Robert Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

Reference is made to your letter of 10 October 1955, relative to the problem of conducting surveillance of certain Latin American nationals who might be suspected of carrying on subversive activities in the United States, directed against Latin American countries. In this regard you are correct in your understanding that the CIA does not conduct such surveillances within the confines of the United States. Mr. Hoover has furnished me a copy of his reply to your inquiry setting forth the FBI's jurisdiction and responsibilities in this matter.

We have been furnishing to the Department and to the FBI such intelligence information as we have obtained through our operations abroad bearing upon possible subversive activities of the type of person you describe, as such information became available to us. It would also be helpful if we could receive from time to time from the Department, leads which you may receive and which we could possibly follow up in the Latin American country against which subversive activities are being carried on.

In order to assist us in developing our coverage of this field, we would suggest that you designate someone in the Department of State who could confer with the appropriate persons in this Agency, and if you will let me know whom you will designate for this purpose, I will arrange to put him in touch with my representative. **Also, if you see no objection, I will mention this matter to the members of the IAC as it is possible that the representatives in Latin America of the member agencies of the IAC might also be able to furnish useful information to the Department.**

A copy of this reply is being sent to Mr. Hoover.

Sincerely,

Copy to Honorable J. Edgar Hoover

Allen W. Dulles
Director

65-63113

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 19, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

JUNE

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF "FRIENDLY" FOREIGN NATIONS

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

PURPOSE

To propose that the Bureau, with State Department approval, institute limited coverage on the official establishments of selected "friendly" foreign governments in this country, in order to obtain intelligence data to assist the United States in formulating its foreign policy.

THE PROBLEM

There is an intelligence gap existing in this country. The Bureau rather extensively covers the activities of the Soviet bloc, for the purpose of detecting espionage, subversion, and possible espionage, but also to gather intelligence information of value to our Government in formulating policy to deal with the Soviet bloc. We do not systematically cover other countries in like manner.

The problem has two aspects:

1. Intelligence reflecting the policies, planning and views of foreign governments, if obtainable within this country, should be secured and furnished to the high Government officials responsible for our relations with other countries.

RECORDED - 79 65-63115-40

2. The Bureau, as the foremost intelligence agency operating within this country, is the agency with the responsibility to produce such intelligence, and failure to do so can subject us to criticism.

18 NOV 9 1955

PRESENT BUREAU COVERAGE

While we have from time to time instituted investigations and coverage on foreign establishments other than those of the Soviet bloc, such coverage generally has been restricted to instances where there appears to be a need from the security standpoint. For example, we have for a number of years had extensive coverage on

AHB:LL
(5)
cc--Mr. Boardman
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Branigan
cc--Mr. Roach

Memo Belmont to Boardman HWP 10/21/55

I think this should continue to be our policy. [illegible] time going. H.

NOV 14 1955

Israeli intelligence activities in the United States, which has indicated direct intelligence and espionage activity on the part of Israeli diplomatic representatives. In the spring of 1954, when the Guatemalan revolution was brewing, we opened rather extensive coverage of the Guatemalan Embassy and developed intelligence information of interest to other U. S. agencies. We have developed informants in the diplomatic establishments of China, Indonesia, Japan and Korea, and are making efforts to develop informants in the embassies of Ceylon and India.

Through the Bureau's Anagram Program, designed to obtain the codes and cyphers of foreign countries, we have obtained code material of India, Israel, Nationalist China, Japan, Yugoslavia, The Philippines, Switzerland, Guatemala, West Germany, and Spain, which has been of inestimable value in the cryptanalysis field.

While we have stayed away from United Nations as such, and feel that we should continue to do so, we have established coverage of the Soviet Delegation to the UN, and we have developed informants among UN employees, who report on Soviet bloc activities to a limited extent.

OBSERVATIONS

1. The Bureau is an intelligence organization and a large portion of our prestige is the result of intelligence-type operations successfully handled. It is far better for us to consider this problem now rather than to have someone else raise the issue later and perhaps force us into a program we do not want.

2. While the coverage of the "friendly" diplomatic establishments referred to above has met with some success, particularly insofar as the Anagram Progran is concerned, the fact remains that there is no U. S. agency presently attempting to cover, on a continuing basis, the diplomatic establishments of "friendly" countries in the United States, to the extent that the United States might be aware of their intelligence activities in this country, their actual attitude toward the U.S., their relations with the Soviet bloc, and their plans in international affairs, particularly as they relate to the U.S.

3. International developments more and more reflect the need for such intelligence information, particularly relating to certain countries which are friendly at this time, but whose internal situations are such that their international positions could be changed, thereby affecting the world balances of power or causing serious international incidents which would embarrass the U.S. Through intelligence in advance, the U.S. may be able to avoid such problems.

I would want more documentation on this. - H

OBSERVATIONS (continued)

4. Since January, 1954, CIA has indicated on four separate occasions a desire to explore the positive intelligence potentials of the United Nations.

Allen Dulles at his last visit mentioned this. H.

5. Certainly, there are dangers involved in any attempt to cover official establishments of "friendly" foreign countries. Coverage would have to be most discreet. We could not even attempt to utilize the same type of extensive coverage we have on the Soviet bloc.

6. If we went into a program of this nature, we would have to have funds. Regardless of how limited the coverage is, it will take money.

7. A program of this nature should be run by and within the control of the Bureau; however, it should have the blessings of high officials outside the Bureau and, particularly, the endorsement of the State Department.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That we institute a program designed to gather intelligence from "friendly" foreign official establishments in this country, starting on a highly restricted basis--namely, by installing wire taps and, where possible with full security, microphone coverage, on selected foreign establishments. Included in these establishments would be embassies and consulates, and delegations to the United Nations. The selection of the countries to be covered will be based on those indicated by the State Department to be "problem children" or the most fruitful potential sources of intelligence. Any further coverage beyond technical and microphone coverage will depend on what leads are developed through these sources and what can be done on a most discreet basis. We will continue our Anagram Program and will continue our efforts to develop informants within these establishments when such action can be done discreetly.

RECOMMENDATIONS (continued):

2. That Liaison discuss this matter with Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, pointing out to him that there is an intelligence gap and that this Bureau contemplates such limited coverage, with State Department endorsement and approval; that Mr. Murphy indicate those countries where at the present time State Department feels there is a need and a potential for such intelligence; that Mr. Murphy be advised that any needs of the Defense Department along this line should be funneled to the Bureau through the State Department.

I have no objection to you informally discussing this with Murphy merely to get his reaction as I may have lunch with him & he is apt to speak to me again about it.
H.

3. After Mr. Murphy has been consulted, that we advise the Attorney General, in writing, of the intelligence gap presently existing, our proposal relative thereto, and the results of our conference with the State Department, indicating either that we are going ahead, with his approval (if the State Department endorses this program), or that we are not going ahead (if the State Department fails to endorse the program).

Not at this time. Let me have Murphy's reaction & then [illegible].
H.

4. If it is decided that we should proceed with this program, we should point out to the Attorney General that additional funds will be necessary for its implementation.

I don't see how we could get funds for us

It can't be done. Long already having trouble [illegible]

I am opposed, as indicated on Page 1
L

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 21, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

JUNE

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF "FRIENDLY" FOREIGN NATIONS

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

In accordance with the Director's instructions noted on my memorandum of October 19, 1955, Mr. Philcox of Liaison informally discussed with Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the possibility of intelligence coverage of official establishments of selected friendly foreign nations. At the outset and at the conclusion of the discussion Philcox made it very clear to Mr. Murphy that we were not approaching him with a definite proposal and we were not seeking a definite commitment from the Department of State at this time but we were merely seeking his informal reaction for our guidance in considering this problem. It was pointed out to Mr. Murphy that we already do have coverage of the establishments of the Soviet bloc countries. It was pointed out that we also have coverage of the Israeli Embassy because of the intelligence and espionage activities on the part of Israeli diplomatic representatives. It was pointed out that we also opened a rather extensive coverage of the Guatemalan Embassy in the Spring of 1954 when the Guatemalan revolution was brewing and developed intelligence information of interest to other U. S. agencies. Mr. Murphy was advised that there appears to be an intelligence gap in that no regular and concerted effort has been made to obtain information of interest regarding the plans, policies, and intentions of friendly foreign nations. It was pointed out that this information would, of course, be of more interest to the Department of State and the Defense Department than to the Bureau. Mr. Murphy was advised that this coverage would be limited to discreet technical surveillances and discreet limited investigations based upon information received.

Mr. Murphy said it appears to him that such coverage on a very limited basis has good possibilities. He stated that he is very happy to know that there is such good thinking on this subject. He stated that in the event such coverage should be instituted, it should be on a very limited basis and only in those establishments which are the real "trouble" areas. He said that, of course, the world situation changes fast and that the coverage would have to be gauged accordingly. In the event such coverage was instituted at the present time, the only establishments which he would recommend covering would be Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. (Israel is already covered.) He stated that no coverage would be advisable at this time on such countries as Greece, Turkey, Iran, or Iraq since the conditions in those countries are not

RECORDED - 7

NWP:lw (8)
1-Mr. Boardman 1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Hennrich 1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Sanders 1-Mr. Philcox
[illegible]ion Tickler

sufficiently serious to warrant such coverage. He stated that such establishments as the Embassy of India could possibly be covered on a long-range basis because of India's extremely "neutralist" position. He said it is possible that considerable information of interest could be obtained through such coverage.

Mr. Murphy made it clear that he was not making any firm commitment at this time as to his complete approval or as to the countries which should be covered but he was merely giving his offhand reaction to the Bureau's questions. He stated that in the event the Bureau considers this more seriously he would, of course, like to have the opportunity to consult with other Department of State officials and furnish the Bureau with positive guidance and suggestions as to the countries to be covered. It was stressed to Mr. Murphy that this is merely in the exploratory stage and that we will contact him in the event we consider this possibility more seriously.

ACTION:

The foregoing is for your information. Cost figures based on the above facts are being compiled.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

No. 1 of 9 Copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STA
WASHINGTON

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

October 2[illegible] 1955

93011

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I wish to thank you for your letter of October 14, 1955 in which you stated that there is no reluctance on the part of the FBI to conduct physical surveillance of selected Latin American visitors to this country where the circumstances warrant such action. Your assurances that every effort will be made in these cases to develop those aspects which may be of particular interest to the Department of State and that consideration will be given to the utilization of a physical surveillance when requested by the Department of State where it is agreed that this type of coverage is warranted and necessary, should prove helpful in handling these cases in the future.

When the Department of State has reason to believe that visiting Latin Americans may be engaged in planning and coordinating subversive activities directed at other governments of this hemisphere, such information will be brought to the attention of the FBI through established channels as heretofore, together with an explanation of the Department's objectives and requirements, in order that an appropriate investigation may be initiated.

The continued cooperation of the FBI is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy
Robert Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary

EX-118

RECORDED - 7 45-63113-40X
27 OCT 28 1955

EXP. OCT-28-1955

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover,
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

~~27 NOV 4 1955~~

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 18, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: STATE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS FOR SURVEILLANCES OF LATIN AMERICANS

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sanders
1 - Mr. Kuhrtz
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference is made to my memorandum of 10-13-55. By letter dated 10-10-55 Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, noted that it was important that State Department keep track of movements and contacts of selected Latin Americans while in the U.S. when there are reasons to believe subversive activities directed at other governments of this hemisphere are being planned and coordinated here. The letter noted that the FBI had cooperated in furnishing information from established sources but "has shown understandable reluctance to become involved to the extent of conducting direct surveillances in cases where there is no evidence of or reason to suspect subversive activities directed against the U.S. or violation of U.S. laws." A reply dated 10-14-55 was sent to Murphy. By letter dated 10-14-55 a copy of our letter to Murphy was sent to Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It should be noted that CIA also received a copy of Murphy's letter to us.

On 11-16-55 James Angleton of the CIA confidentially advised Liaison Agent Papich that Allen Dulles might make some comments concerning Murphy's letter before the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) meeting,⊛ week of 11-21-55. Our position concerning this matter was clearly set forth in our reply to Murphy 10-14-55. We advised that when there is creditable information available indicating that subversive activities directed at other governments of this hemisphere are being planned and coordinated in the U.S., the FBI takes prompt investigative action. We advised that in conducting these investigations all logical investigative techniques are used including physical surveillances where the circumstances warrant it. We made it clear that there was no reluctance on the part of the Bureau to conduct physical surveillances when deemed necessary but we also pointed out that there were instances where information could be obtained through other means than physical surveillances. We advised State that when that agency received creditable information concerning Latin Americans involved in subversive activities directed at either the U.S. or other governments, we would appreciate receiving the information immediately in order that an investigation could be promptly initiated. We stated that every effort would be made to develop those cases which might be of particular interest to State and that we would give consideration to the utilization of a physic surveillance when requested and when it was agreed that such type of coverag was warranted and necessary. We indicated that when considering these matters it would be necessary to evaluate each on an individual basis. State's attention was directed to the fact that where there was reason to believe that Latin Americans would be engaged in subversive activities while in the U.S. it would appear to be most desirable that they not be allowed to enter the country in the absence of overriding diplomatic considerations.

INDEXED
RECORDED 323
62-39742-2
NOV 30 1955

SJP:fjb (8)

⊛ IAC meeting for week of November 21, 1955, cancelled.

DEC 22 1955

NOT RECORDED

ACTION:

In the event this matter is brought up at the IAC meeting, we will be guided by our position described above and we will wait to hear what comments Mr. Dulles may make. We will be particularly on the alert for any maneuver which possibly might be forming as a result of joint CIA - State collaboration.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN

DATE: November 29, 1955

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At the IAC meeting on November 29, 1955, Mr. Dulles of CIA introduced a CIA paper, not on the agenda, going into developments in Afghanistan, with particular reference to strong indications that Afghanistan may be going into the Soviet camp. During the discussion, it appeared to be the opinion of the IAC group that the Soviet government is able to offer considerable advantages to Afghanistan in the way of trade routes bypassing Pakistan, with which Afghanistan is having difficulties, and through possible financial and military support. As a result, it was the feeling that there is a strong possibility Afghanistan will gradually fall within the control of the Soviets, although ostensibly remaining a sovereign state.

There were several changes suggested in the CIA paper, and Mr. Kuhrtz will get a copy of it for our benefit.

In line with our recent discussions, it is suggested that a memorandum be prepared, briefly posing the problem that Afghanistan may come under Soviet control and then reflecting what, if any, threat Afghanistan representatives or nationalist groups in the United States would pose from the internal security standpoint.

This may also provide an opportunity to again mention to Mr. Robert Murphy of the State Department the pending consideration by State as to whether we should establish coverage of certain "friendly" countries in the United States for intelligence purposes, utilizing the present situation in Afghanistan as a medium.

FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS
TO DISSEMINATION
SEE FILE 62-90718-330

AHB:LL
(5)
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Hennrich
cc--Mr. Branigan
cc--Mr. M. W. Kuhrtz

65-63113
NOT RECORDED
145 JAN 23 1956

12-5-55
DMD

17 JAN 20 1956

Office Memor m • UNITED STAT ERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : L.V. Boardman

DATE: December 5, 1955

FROM : A.H. Belmont

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Philcox
Mr. Sanders
Mr. deBettencourt

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan, about size of Texas, is landlocked country in Middle East, surrounded by USSR (north), Pakistan (south and east) and Iran (west). Traditionally, she has advantageously played off one great nation against another. At Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) meeting 11/29/55, possibility of Afghanistan gradually falling into Soviet control was discussed. IAC group of opinion that Soviet Government able to offer considerable advantages to Afghanistan through trade routes bypassing Pakistan, traditional rival of Afghanistan with which Afghanistan is having difficulties, and through possible financial and military support. As result, it was felt there is strong possibility Afghanistan will gradually fall within Soviet control, although ostensibly remaining sovereign state.

Afghanistan maintains Embassy in Washington, D. C., Consulate in New York City, and honorary consul in San Francisco. No information received Afghan officials in US engaged in political or subversive activities. During last 4 years no information received any Afghan groups in US engaged in subversive activities. No Afghan nationals on Security Index. In event Soviet economic gains in Afghanistan lead to political control of country, we would have to consider giving comparable coverage to Afghan diplomatic establishments and official personnel as now given to Soviet satellite official establishments.

If Afghanistan becomes openly pro-Soviet, we would have to consider dangerousness of Afghan nationals in US as regards internal security and initiate appropriate investigative action.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Liaison should call to attention Mr. Robert Murphy, State Department, discussion of IAC of Afghanistan, in connection with consideration by State as to whether we should establish coverage of certain "friendly" countries in US for intelligence purposes.

65-63113

NOT RECORDED
145 JAN 23 1956

109-12-321
JMD/omr/bcf BCF

(6) FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO DISSEMINATION SEE 62-90718-

17 JAN 19 1956

11-13-55

53 JAN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: December 13, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated 12-5-55 in the above-captioned matter. In connection with our coverage of certain "friendly" countries in U.S. for intelligence purposes, Liaison was instructed to contact Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and point out to him the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) thoughts concerning Afghanistan. Liaison was further instructed to ask State if they would care to consider the coverage of this country at this time.

Mr. Murphy is on annual leave for two weeks and before leaving advised Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section that any matters concerning this coverage of "friendly" countries should be taken up with William M. Rountree, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Department of State.. On 12-12-55 Mr. Bartlett discussed instant matter with Mr. Rountree. Mr. Rountree indicated that this coverage would be most interesting; however, he does not consider that it will be very productive in view of the fact that the Afghanistan Ambassador, Mr. Mohammad Kabir Ludin, is definitely pro-Western in his thinking and actions. Mr. Rountree stated he would like to have the Bureau cover this Embassy on a trial basis for 60 days and if that appears productive, we should then continue. He indicated that practically all the conversation would be in English; therefore, would present no translation problem.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Bureau set up coverage on the Afghanistan establishment in Washington for a trial period of 60 days.

OHB:fjb (8)

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Sanders
1 - Mr. deBettencourt
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bartlett

See Addendum on page 2

65-68113
NOT RECORDED
145 JAN 23 1956

17 JAN 19 1956

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman from Mr. Belmont

ADDENDUM: JMD:dmd 12-14-55

In view of above, Inspector Hennrich telephoned SAC Laughlin, WFO, 10 a.m., 12-14-55, instructing immediate survey be made to determine if technical coverage Afghan Embassy feasible and to immediately advise Bureau.

Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1956

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I want to express the Department's appreciation to you and the Bureau for the special coverage which you have been providing us during these recent weeks. The material has been immensely valuable to us in keeping abreast of fast-moving events and developments in the international situation and has been of great assistance to us in the formulation of policy.

I know that this work has meant extra hours and expense. Mr. Bartlett has been especially helpful to us during this period, and I want you to know particularly of our appreciation.

With best personal regards, I am

Yours sincerely,

Robert Murphy

12/6/56
Let
WRW AR.

12/5/56
WAB

Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representat of Friendly Foreign Nations

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover,
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

10

RECORDED - 26 65-63113-61

EX-117

16 DEC 12 1956

EX. PROC.

NOV 30 1956

Tic:

SAC, New York (Orig & 1) December 3, 1956

Director, FBI (65-63113) PERSONAL ATTENTION

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE of Diplomatic Representatives
OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES
Foreign Nations

In the recent past, and particularly during the month of November, I have noted that your office has been forwarding a great volume of intelligence material to the Bureau. I have reference to the information produced by your established sources and relating to the tense international situations, especially those created by the crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Much of the material has been of a high intelligence nature or potential and, upon its receipt at the Bureau, has been given within-the-hour dissemination to other agencies and departments, particularly the Department of State. The latter Department has informed me that it has placed a high evaluation on some of this intelligence and has found it most useful in its day-to-day operations.

I am writing to you to stress the importance of continuing the flow of this vital information to the Bureau to enable us not only to maintain but to increase the efficiency of our operations in this field.

It is recognized that the establishment of additional sources for the production of this material and the servicing of these sources have called for an even greater application to their duties on the part of the personnel of your office assigned to this work. I request that you convey my personal appreciation to them for their past efforts in this connection and advise them that upon their continued efforts rests, to a large extent, the degree of success of this phase of the Bureau's over-all intelligence program.

WRW:pbb
(4)

RECORDED-61 65-63113-58

16 DEC 4 1956

MAILED 8
DEC 3 1956
COMM-FBI

67 DEC 6 1956

Tic: M[illegible]wannall

SAC, Washington Field (Orig & 1) December 3, 1956

Director, FBI (65-63113) PERSONAL ATTENTION

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES

In the recent past, and particularly during the month of November, I have noted that your office has been forwarding a great volume of intelligence material to the Bureau. I have reference to the information produced by your established sources and relating to the tense international situations, especially those created by the crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Much of the material has been of a high intelligence nature or potential and, upon its receipt at the Bureau, has been given within-the-hour dissemination to other agencies and departments, particularly the Department of State. The latter Department has informed me that it has placed a high evaluation on some of this intelligence and has found it most useful in its day-to-day operations.

I am writing to you to stress the importance of continuing the flow of this vital information to the Bureau to enable us not only to maintain but to increase the efficiency of our operations in this field.

MAILED 6
1956
COMM-FBI

It is recognized that the establishment of additional sources for the production of this material and the servicing of these sources have called for an even greater application to their duties on the part of the personnel of your office assigned to this work. I request that you convey my personal appreciation to them for their past efforts in this connection and advise them that upon their continued efforts rests, to a large extent, the degree of success of this phase of the Bureau's over-all intelligence program.

WRW:pbb
(4)

RECORDED - 71 [illegible] - 59

16 DEC 4 1956

EX-117

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

52 DEC 10 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

Tic: nall
.igan
M. Belmont
Mr. Boardman

The Attorney General

December 6, 1956

Director, FBI

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES

RECORDED - 28

65-63113-61

As a result of action taken by this Bureau over a year ago, we, at the present time, have a well-functioning program designed to produce positive intelligence information in this country concerning various foreign nations. This intelligence information relates to the policy which these foreign nations are pursuing or developing in connection with various international matters.

With the development of the recent crises in the Middle East and Eastern Eurppe we found that our efforts in this field were especially rewarding. Through numerous sources which have been established during the past year we secured voluminous intelligence data which were given within-the-hour dissemination to other Governmental departments and officials.

Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy has addressed a letter to me concerning some of the intelligence information which has been sent to the Department of State during recent weeks. Mr. Murphy commented as follows:

> "I want to express the Department's appreciation to you and the Bureau for the special coverage which you have been providing us during these recent weeks. The material has been immensely valuable to us in keeping abreast of fast-moving events and developments in the international situation and has been of great assistance to us in the formulation of policy."

In view of the keen interest you have expressed in the past in the operations of this Bureau, I felt that you would like to be advised of the above.

MAILED 5
DEC 5 - 1956
COMM-FBI

65-63113

WRW:pbb
(7)

MEMO BELMONT TO
BOARDMAN 12-5-56
WMB: PBB:MS

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

DEC 1 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Sanders

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 5/16/58

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

We have program to develop sources in diplomatic establishments of friendly countries which has worked without a hitch until recent weeks when J. P. McDonnell of State Department first declined clearance for interview with two individuals at Embassy of Pakistan and later declined clearance for interviews with individuals at German and Turkish Embassies - all declinations being based primarily on fact that these countries are friendly and if interview reported to Embassy it could strain relations. We have notified field to discontinue efforts to develop sources at these Embassies as a result.

Sound counterintelligence coverage requires sources to produce not only investigative data but also intelligence data of value to us and other agencies in guiding policy and making decisions. Bureau is expected to produce intelligence data and we can anticipate criticism as well as operational moves by other agencies to fill vacuum if our operations do not produce necessary data. Sound source programs are based on long-range planning and require forward thinking to get results. Scrambling for sources in reaction to problems is too late and ineffective.

Vital part of our coverage of friendly nations is continuing development of informants and sources (persons) in diplomatic establishments in U.S. This is recognized intelligence technique and is aimed at all countries where need for data exists with emphasis on "trouble spot" countries that tend to drift toward, or are targets of, Soviet Bloc and those countries involved in situations with international ramifications. This program has paid off in sound benefits and existing sources represent effective outposts for gathering data in event of emergency as well as for investigative purposes.

Program is generally aimed at American employees and has been tightly controlled as evidenced by lack of repercussions from approaches. We first obtain State Department clearance to investigate prospect without revealing purpose. We then conduct extensive background investigation of prospect. If this reveals potential is good and risk element negligible, we secure State clearance for interview. First interview is conducted to assess potential, responsiveness

Enclosure
65-63113
1 - Belmont
1 - Roach
1 - Donahoe
1 - Mossburg
SBD:bbr (6)

REC. 89

EX - 123

-89

20 MAY 23 1958

and willingness without directly requesting cooperation. Some offer to furnish data at outset. If they do not, dependent on results of first interview we authorize second interview to solicit cooperation.

Refusal of clearance for such interviews is the prerogative of State Department which must take into consideration question of international relations. Key point here is that while State Department may give clearance for investigation of prospect its subsequent denial of clearance for interview results in wasted investigative effort. It is clear we are going to have to give field some guidance to avoid this.

It is believed we can effectively handle this by carefully controlled selection of specific "trouble spot" countries where program of source development warranted. We can then clear our intentions with State Department before authorizing field to expend any investigative effort. This will put State Department on notice as to our objectives at outset and will eliminate the wasted motion of cleared investigations followed by denial of interview clearance.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached for approval is a letter to interested field offices guiding them along the line indicated above.

✓

This makes sense.

H

ossburg
anders
onahoe
May 20, 1958

SAC, Washington Field

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

Reference Bulet 11/18/54 which concerned responsibilities of the field to be alert to indications that diplomatic representatives of ostensibly friendly nations, outside the Soviet Bloc, are engaging in intelligence activities in the U.S.

Sound counterintelligence coverage requires sources to produce not only investigative data but also intelligence data of value to Bureau and other agencies in guiding policy and making decisions. Sound source programs are based on long-range planning and require forward thinking to get results. Vital part of our coverage of friendly nations is continuing development of informants and sources in diplomatic establishments in the U.S. This program has paid off in sound benefits and existing sources represent effective outposts for obtaining data in event of emergency and for investigative purposes.

State Department clearance is required prior to investigation, and again prior to interview, of a potential source employed in a diplomatic establishment. In recent weeks the State Department has declined clearance for interviews with potential sources in the diplomatic establishments of Pakistan, Germany and Turkey. These declinations have been based primarily on the fact that these countries are friendly and if interview reported to embassy involved it would strain diplomatic relations.

MAILED 4
MAY 20 1958

REC- 135

65-62173-90

MAY 22 1958

1 - Boston **PERSONAL ATTENTION**
1 - Chicago **PERSONAL ATTENTION**
1 - Cleveland **PERSONAL ATTENTION**
1 - Detroit **PERSONAL ATTENTION**
1 - Los Angeles **PERSONAL ATTENTION**
1 - New Orleans **PERSONAL ATTENTION**
1 - New York **PERSONAL ATTENTION**
1 - Philadelphia **PERSONAL ATTENTION**
1 - Pittsburgh **PERSONAL ATTENTION**
1 - San Francisco **PERSONAL ATTENTION**
1 - Seattle **PERSONAL ATTENTION**

Copy to [illegible]
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 12/4/59
by [illegible]

SBD:bbr

7 MAY 27

NOTE: See cover memo Donahoe to Belmont 5/16/58 ~~same~~ subject, SBD:bbr re this matter.

MAIL ROOM ☐

Recognizing the value as well as the sensitivity of this program, it is desired that the following procedures be put into effect. Effective immediately our efforts in the development of sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of friendly foreign nations should be based primarily on need and should be directed toward development of sources in diplomatic establishments of ostensibly friendly foreign countries (1) where there is definite indication specific country is drifting toward alignment with Soviet Bloc; (2) where situation in particular country involves serious political or military crisis with international ramifications or possible revolutionary activity and good potential exists for Bureau to produce valuable intelligence data through coverage of diplomatic establishments in U.S.; or (3) where there is a clear and present investigative need.

Bureau authority must be secured prior to initiating any program to develop sources and informants within diplomatic establishments of a specific country outside the Soviet Bloc at which time complete data must be furnished as to need and potential benefit of such a program. If such a program is justified, the Bureau will then discuss the matter with the State Department. Following State Department clearance, the Bureau will notify the interested field office to initiate the program. Bureau authority will still be required for the investigation and interview of each prospect since State Department clearance will be sought on each of these steps.

With respect to those friendly countries where an active program is not warranted, the field should be constantly alert to good source and informant possibilities. Where a good potential exists and the facts warrant, the situation should be brought to the attention of the Bureau promptly in order that State Department clearance may be sought to pursue the matter.

All offices should be alert particularly to situations where there is an advance indication that an American is being considered for employment in a foreign diplomatic establishment since this offers an opportunity to develop a source or informant prior to actual employment.

Office Memorandum • UN RNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mossburg

DATE: 5-26-58

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

The captioned program consisting of the development of informants and sources in the diplomatic establishments of friendly nations, where warranted, has been a vital part of our intelligence coverage of such nations. In connection with the program, we have always obtained State Department clearance for investigation and intervie of individuals considered as potential sources without revealing to State the purposes of same. Recently the State Department has declined clearance for interviews with individuals employed at the Pakistani, German and Turkish embassies (although we previously obtained State clearance for our investigations) based primarily on the fact these countries are friendly and if the interviews were reported to the embassie it might result in straining diplomatic relations. It is noted we discontinued efforts to develop sources in those establishments.

In order to eliminate wasting investigative effort we will obta State approval to develop sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of a certain country before instituting the program in the field.

In this regard in view of the existing critical political situation in the Middle East, the involvement of Israel in that situation and the activities of Israeli intelligence in the U.S., it is believed we should obtain State clearance for the field to institute a program to endeavor to develop sources and informants in the Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C., the Israeli Consulate and UN Delegation in New York City. The principal Israeli intelligence agent in the U.S. known to the Bureau is Rafael Medan who is attached to the Israeli UN Delegation, New York City but who is frequently at the Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C. As a result of his intelligence activities we have under investigation approximately 15 other individuals in New York and Washington, D. C., known or suspected of being engaged in intelligence activities.

is

1 - 65-58190 (Israeli Consulate, New York City)
1 - 105-10828 (Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C.)
1 - 62-77787-345 (Israeli Delegation to the UN)

EHM:et (8)

REC- 11

-91

EX-101 23 JUN 5 1958

Memo Roach to Belmont 6/2/58 ONB/cgt

not [illegible]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

66 JUN 12 1958

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont from Mr. Donahoe
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

ACTION:

It is recommended Bureau liaison representative orally clear with State Department our intentions to explore possibility of developing sources and informants on carefully selected basis at Israeli establishments previously mentioned with clear understanding we will seek State Department clearance for each investigation and interview.

EKH/HGm

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 2, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Donahoe to you dated May 26, 1958, in the above-captioned matter. Liaison was instructed to contact the Department of State and orally clear our intentions to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on carefully selected bases at the Israeli diplomatic establishments. It was also recommended that we clearly point out to State that we intend to seek State clearance for each investigation and each interview.

Instant matter was discussed on May 29, 1958, with Mr. J. P. McDonnell, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State. At that time he advised that he would discuss this matter with the Israeli Desk Officer and would advise the Bureau as soon as possible. On June 2, 1958, Mr. McDonnell advised Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section that State has no objection to the Bureau's proposed course of action of attempting to develop sources and informants at the Israeli diplomatic establishments in the United States. Mr. McDonnell pointed out that State feels that the U. S. citizens who are hired by the Israelis to work at their diplomatic establishments in the United States are given employment only after careful consideration of their nationalistic tendencies; that State feels that most of the U. S. citizens hired by the Israelis are pro-Israeli in their thinking and as a result the Bureau should proceed with caution. Mr. McDonnell further stated that the Bureau should check with State for clearance prior to investigation and interview. Mr. Bartlett advised Mr. McDonnell that this definitely would be done.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ACTION:

For information.

REC- 11
EX-101

92

23 JUN 5 1958

OHB:bjt
(9)

6-6-58
3-NY

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Mossberg
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Yellow 65-58190 (Israeli Consulate, New York City)
1 - Yellow 105-10828 (Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C.)
1 - Yellow 62-77787-345 (Israeli Delegation to the UN)
1 - Mr. Bartlett

50 JUN 10 1958

irg

SAC, Washington Field

6-4-58

Director, FBI

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS
65-63113 (Bufile)

ISINT
65-58700 (Bufile)

ReBulet 5-19-58 captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations."

In view of the present political situation in the Middle East and the activities of the Israeli Intelligence Service in the U.S., the Bureau has obtained State Department clearance for the institution of a program to develop sources and informants at Israeli diplomatic establishments in the U.S.

On 6-2-58 Mr. J. P. McDonnell, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, at the time of granting this clearance, pointed out that the State Department feels the U.S. citizens who are hired by the Israelis to work at the diplomatic establishments in the U.S. are given employment only after careful consideration of their nationalistic tendencies; that the State Department feels that most of the U.S. citizens hired by the Israelis are pro-Israeli in their thinking and as a result the Bureau should proceed with caution in connection with this program.

As pointed out in relet, it will still be necessary for your office to obtain State Department clearance through the Bureau for an investigation or interview of prospective sources and informants considered in connection with this program. Investigations of possible sources and informants must be most thorough and discreet and must be handled in conformance with Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions. Interviews must be handled by experienced agents. The interviews should be well thought out in advance and conducted with tact and discreetness. When an individual you have interviewed agrees to cooperate, subsequent contacts should be handled in accord with existing Bureau instructions and you should be alert to any indication that the informant may be a plant.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

3 - New York

REC- 11

EHM:et (9)

93

MAILED 9
JUN 4 - 1958
COMM-FBI

JUN 6 1958

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
lohr
arsons
osen
amm
rotter
ease
ele. Room
olloman
andy

MAIL ROOM

Letter to SAC, Washington Field
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS
65-63113 (Bufile)
ISINT
65-58700 (Bufile)

The Bureau is aware of the delicate problem involved in developing sources and informants in the Israeli field, which problem has been pointed out in previous surveys made by the recipient offices. However, in view of the valuable information that may be obtained through the development of good sources in this field, the Bureau desires that you redouble your efforts in this regard. It is important that you keep in mind in connection with this matter the necessity of carefully handling all phases of the development of this program to assure that there will be no embarrassment to the Government and to the Bureau.

Office Mer....... • UNITED ST[illegible]TES GOVERNMENT

TO : *A. H. Belmont*

FROM : *S. B. Donahoe*

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Bartlett
1 - Mossburg
1 - G. Moore

DATE: *6-6-58*

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: *INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS*

Since 10-10-56 we have had a program of developing sources at official establishments in U.S. of various Arab nations and have developed over 10 excellent sources at these various establishments. In connection with this program, we have always obtained State Department clearance for investigation and interview of the individual considered as a potential source without revealing to State the purpose of same. Although State to date has not declined clearance for interview of any individual under development as a source at an Arab establishment, (recently State declined clearance for interviews with individuals employed at Pakistani, German and Turkish embassies although clearance had earlier been obtained from State to investigate these individuals. State Department's declination based primarily on fact these countries are friendly and if any interviews were reported to embassies diplomatic relations with country involved might be strained.

In order to eliminate wasting investigative effort on source development in an establishment at which State will not give clearance for interview, memorandum Donahoe to Belmont dated 5-16-58 recommended that we clear our intentions with State Department before authorizing field to expend any investigative effort in developing sources in a particular field since this will put State on notice as to our objectives at outset. That memorandum also stated that we should concentrate in this regard on a controlled selection of specific "trouble-spot" countries where program of source development is warranted.

In this regard, the existing critical political situation in Middle East definitely warrants that we continue our efforts to develop sources at all official establishments in U.S. of following Arab countries: United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria); Saudi Arabia; Iraq; Lebanon; Jordan; Iran; and Yemen.

ACTION:

It is recommended Bureau liaison representative orally clear with State Department our intentions to continue to explore possibility of developing sources and informants on carefully selected basis at the official establishments in U.S. of each of the above Arab countries with clear understanding we will seek State Department clearance for each individual investigation and interview.

65-63113-94

REC- 83

1 - 105-23464 (Arab Intelligence Activities in the U.S.)

[illegible] to Belmont
6-10-58

65-63113
GCM:et
(8)

JUN 20 1958

16 1958

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Office Memo[illegible] UNITED [illegible] GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 10, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

Donahoe

Tolson ____
Nichols ____
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
Nease ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Donahoe to you dated June 6, 1958, in the above-captioned matter. Referenced memorandum recommended that Liaison orally clear with State the Bureau's intentions to continue to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis at the official establishments in the United States of the Arab countries and that the Bureau will seek State Department clearance for each individual investigation and interview prior to the action taken. The Arab countries involved are United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran and Yemen.

Instant matter was discussed on June 9, 1958, by Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section with Mr. J. P. McDonnell, State. Mr. McDonnell pointed out that the governments of some of the Arab countries such as Iraq and Lebanon are friendly toward the United States; and, of course, great care will have to be used in each investigation and interview; that State will consider each request by the Bureau for investigation and interview and, depending on the particular situation at the time, will attempt to give guidance to the Bureau as to the proper action to follow. Mr. McDonnell advised that he could not give an over-all approval at this time because the situation involving a particular country might change.

ACTION:

For the information of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

OHB:bjt
(6)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. G.C.Moore
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bartlett

REC- 83

Lit NY
2-WFO

GCM/mwe
6-16-58

15 JUN 18 1958

not rec

63 JUN 20 1958

Tic: 1 - Moore

SAC, New York (105-21200) 6-16-58

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI (105-53464)

ARAB INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES
IS - MIDDLE EAST

ReBulet 10-10-56 captioned as above and reBulet 5-19-58 entitled "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Missions."

In line with the information set forth in referenced letter dated 5-19-58 the Department of State has been contacted relative to our program of developing sources and informants at official establishments in the U.S. of the following Arab countries: Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) and Yemen.

The State Department representative with whom this matter was discussed advised that although an over-all approval at this time could not be given because the situation involving a particular country might change, State Department will consider each request by the Bureau for investigation and interview and, depending on the particular situation at the time, will attempt to give guidance to the Bureau as to the proper action to follow. It was also pointed out by the State Department representative that the governments of some of the Arab countries such as Iraq and Lebanon are friendly toward the U.S. and consequently great care will have to be used in each investigation and interview.

In view of the above and in view of the continuing need for sources and informants in the various Arab establishments in the areas covered by your offices, you should continue in your efforts to develop sources at official establishments of the above-mentioned Arab countries. Request Bureau to obtain State Department clearance before each individual investigation and interview of persons considered for development as sources.

Washington Field and New York are instructed to submit a letter under instant caption within 30 days from the receipt of this letter showing under the name of each diplomatic establishment, of the above-mentioned Arab countries, the identities of all persons who have been developed as sources and those

2 - Washington Field (105-19602)

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Missions)

GCM:mcc (2) (SEE NOTE PAGE 2)

NOT RECORDED
141 JUN 19 1958

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐

under current development. Also set forth specific plans being taken by your offices to increase informant coverage at these Arab establishments.

This program must be given your close personal attention so that the Bureau will be able to be in the best possible position to learn of any activities of these Arab countries which may be against the best interest of the United States.

NOTE: Inasmuch as State Department in recent past has denied clearance for interviews with potential security informants employed at Pakistan, German and Turkish Embassies because such countries are friendly, memo Donahoe to Belmont dated 6-6-58 instructed Liaison to orally clear with State Department our intentions to continue to explore possibility of developing sources and informants on selected basis at official establishments in U.S. of above-mentioned Arab countries. This has been done in order to eliminate wasting investigative effort and source development prior to requesting an interview with the potential source for which State Department may decline to give clearance. Although State Department on 6-9-58 did not give over-all approval for this program they did state that they would consider each request for investigation and interview on an individual basis depending on particular situation at the time and State also did not say that clearance was denied for our efforts in developing informants at these Arab establishments. Consequently field being instructed to continue efforts to develop sources under this program.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 8-13-58

JUNE

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - Liaison
1 - Nasca

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Intelligence reports of other agencies in July, 1958, reflected a growing concern over Libya's position in the Middle East. Indications were that a coup may be attempted in Libya in the near future by pro-Nasser forces. (Memorandum Sullivan to Belmont 8-1-58, re "Precarious Position of Libya in Middle East").

A State Department representative on 8-7-58, while discussing Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy's recent trip to the Middle East, advised that Sudan, like Ethiopia and other countries in that area, is fearful of Egyptian subversive tactics. He noted that while Sudan and Ethiopia are basically friendly to the U. S. and the West, the Egyptians have been corrupting a number of officials of these countries by bribes. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont 8-8-58, re "Robert Murphy").

It is noted that on 8-7-58 we obtained State Department clearance to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants at official Sudanese establishments in the U. S, in view of data received indicating Nasser reportedly was making concentrated efforts to overthrow the Sudanese Government. The Field has been instructed to institute this program. (Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont 8-6-58, re "Sudan Activities").

Information published by CIA on 8-11-58 reflects that reliable sources are pessimistic over the outlook for the continued stability of Iran, and there is an undercurrent of rumors concerning changes in government and military hierarchy with reference to the desirability of a coup. CIA also published data on 8-9-58 indicating that the Saudi Arabian Government may make an accommodation with Nasser of the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) consisting of some type of association with the United Arab States (Egypt, Syria, and Yemen) or a revival of the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian military alliance. (CIA, Office of Current Intelligence Reports dated 8-9 and 8-11-58).

It is noted that a program for the development of sources and informants who can report on the activities of the official establishments of Iran and Saudi Arabia is already in effect.

59 SEP 4 1958

65-63113

VHN:mtb
(6)

SENT DIRECTOR
8-14-58

REC-74

65-63113-120

17 AUG 26 1958

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: Intelligence Coverage of
Diplomatic Representatives
of Friendly Foreign Nations
65-63113

The foregoing information gives us an indication that Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia may possibly fall into Nasser's camp and become alienated from the West. Since we are on notice of these possibilities, it would be well for the Bureau to consider the desirability of instituting programs aimed at increasing our coverage of the diplomatic establishments of these countries. Such coverage would include the development of sources and informants where such coverage does not already exist and possibly the installation of technical coverage. Such action taken by us now would place us in a much better position since we would be gathering and disseminating data of vital interest to the U. S. before a possible coup or similar event took place. This, of course, would be much more desirable than to have us implement such programs after a coup or similar event took place.

Deputy Under Secretary Murphy has recently returned from a trip to the Middle East where he discussed the Middle East crisis with a number of individuals, including the leaders of various Arabian countries. Murphy is in a position to give us a first-hand account of what future moves can be anticipated from Nasser in Nasser's efforts to achieve Arabian unity through subversion and political maneuvering. Murphy can also furnish us with the identities of any other countries that might be brought into Nasser's sphere of influence.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That our Department of State Liaison Representative contact Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and obtain his observations, gathered as a result of his trip to the Middle East, as to what further moves can be anticipated from Nasser with regard to Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, or any other African or Arabian country. Murphy should be advised that we desire to direct our intelligence coverage so as to obtain maximum benefit. His desires should be elicited as to whether technical coverage of any of the countries indicated should be instituted.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: Intelligence Coverage of
Diplomatic Representatives
of Friendly Foreign Nations
65-63113

2. While institution of a source and informant development program regarding Libya and Ethiopia appears warranted (we already have programs in effect with regard to Sudan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia), it is believed more practical to withhold seeking such clearance, which we would have to obtain from the office of Roderic O'Connor of Department of State, until after we obtain a first-hand idea from Murphy as to the extent and the nature of the problem.

SD/[illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 8-18-58

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Nasca

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

WFO on 8-8-58 advised that since the revolution in Venezuela in January, 1958, the country has been ruled by a Junta. Newspaper media since the revolution have reported periodically that individuals who were political exiles during the regime of Marcos Perez Jimenez have been allowed to return to Venezuela and pursue their former political activities.

It has become apparent from daily news stories that Venezuela is presently in a state of political upheaval. Although the leader of the Junta, Admiral Larrazabal, has stated he has no political aspirations it has been pointed out by correspondents that he has recently given indication of this by touring the country and "wooing" the support of the communists. This reportedly has been done by statements attributed to Larrazabal that he could not conceive of a Venezuelan communist being controlled by the USSR since all Venezuelans are inherently patriotic and loyal to Venezuela. It has also been pointed out that the communists of Venezuela are being played up as the heroes of the recent revolution in that country. Some correspondents have stated that it is felt there will possibly be a military coup if the politicians of Venezuela do not soon set up a government acceptable to the military leaders. It is further noted that the Vice President and Mrs. Nixon experienced insults during their tour of Latin America, the most vicious of which occurred in Venezuela.

From the above, it appears that we should try to place ourselves in a position to obtain current intelligence data concerning the Venezuelan political situation. It is pointed out that there appears to be a possibility of the Venezuelan communists gaining more and more influence and power in that country and, therefore, shifting Venezuela to alignment with the Soviet Bloc. WFO noted that a confidential source has reported on several occasions a strong interest in Latin America by the Soviet Embassy. WFO has requested the Bureau obtain State clearance for WFO to initiate a program, looking toward the development of informants and sources within the Venezuelan Embassy, Washington, D. C. This should be done.

65-63113

REC- 45 65-63113-122

1 - 94-4-4761 (Embassy of Venezuela)

4 AUG 26 1958

VHN:lmc
(6)

57 SEP 2 19

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of
Friendly Foreign Nations
65-63113

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended Bureau Liaison representative orally clear with State Department our intentions to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis at the Venezuelan Embassy, Washington, D. C., and other Venezuelan establishments, if it should become necessary, with the clear understanding that we will seek State Department clearance for each individual investigation and interview.

8/19/58 JP McDonnell, State, advised that State has no objections to above proposal.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS (BRAZIL)

DATE: 9-2-58

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Nasca

Nasca

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy
W. C. Sullivan

Roach

Baptist

WFO on 8-22-58 advised that although Brazil's President has recently indicated a stronger stand in favor of the U. S., various news media have reported that politically powerful nationalist and leftist groups do exist in Brazil and that until recently Brazil's President had avoided offending such groups.

Anti-U. S. feelings and demonstrations were exhibited in Brazil during the South American trip of Vice President and Mrs. Nixon and although the demonstrations did not attain the violence exhibited in some of the other South American countries, the demonstrations indicated the work of well-organized group or groups opposed to the U. S.

On 7-8-58, Wilson Velloso, Press Attache, Brazilian Embassy, who admitted former membership in the Communist Party of Brazil, upon interview at his request, stated that he had attempted to discuss his Communist Party activities with Brazilian officials but they indicated indifference to such information in 1951.

Velloso supposed the reason for the indifference was that his information was common knowledge; however, another explanation would be sanction of the Communist Party on the part of Brazilian officials, even though the Communist Party has been outlawed there. Velloso stated he knew of no communist influence at the Brazilian Embassy but stated that it was the tendency of Latin American countries at this time to play communist countries against noncommunist countries in an effort to obtain all they could in the nature of aid and assistance, inferring that the Brazilian Embassy would also attempt this practice. Velloso commented that he did not believe that such negotiations on the part of Latin American countries necessarily indicated that they were procommunist.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-60 EX.-133 SEP 11 1958

124

WFO noted a confidential source has advised that many South American countries were aligned with Russia in opposing the establishment of a European common market and that Brazil had indicated a strong opposition to the market. The source also advised that the Russian Embassy had indicated a strong interest in Latin America recently and had indicated a desire to establish diplomatic or economic relations with Brazil.

65-63113 122

60 SEP 24 1958

1 - 62-42007 (Embassy of Brazil)

WWK:lmc (6)

In view of the above information, it would appear that Brazil could easily align itself with the Soviet-bloc countries and thereby create an international situation affecting the U. S. While there is no apparent indication at this time of a political upheaval in Brazil, Brazil's President's recent opposition to the nationalist and leftist groups in Brazil might tend to develop internal strife in Brazil, leading to such an upheaval.

From the above, it appears that we should try to place ourselves in a position to obtain current intelligence data concerning Brazil. WFO requested the Bureau to obtain State Department clearance for WFO to initiate a program looking toward the development of informants and sources within the Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D. C.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Bureau Liaison representative orally clear with State Department our intentions to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis at the Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D. C., and other Brazilian establishments, if it should become necessary, with the clear understanding that we will seek State Department clearance for each individual investigation and interview.

SD/hcm

✓

OK

9/5/58
JPMcDonnell, State said
State has no objection.

DIRECTOR, FBI 9/26/58

SAC, NEW YORK (105-31090)

DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS
FROM BRAZIL
IS-BRAZIL

ReBulet to WFO, 5/20/58, captioned "INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS."

The Bureau is requested to obtain Department of State authorization for the development of sources and informants at the captioned establishment.

This request is being made in view of existence of strong Communist Party in Brazil and absence of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the USSR. It seems likely that New York City is a logical place for contacts between pro-Communist Brazilians and Russian officials. Also, news reports in recent months have indicated that there is strong sentiment for increasing commerical activity between Brazil and Russia especially in view of Brazil's increasingly precarious economic situation. It is felt that information concerning the background and activities of Brazilian officials in the New York area is of vital importance to the internal security of the United States.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

(2) - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (105-31090)

MDC:nmn
(3)

65-63113

1-cc

65-63113
NOT RECORDED
172 OCT 23 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Middleton

DATE: 10/2/58

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS
IS - CH

The captioned program consists of development of informants and sources in the diplomatic establishments of friendly nations where warranted. In connection with this program, we have previously obtained State Department clearance for investigation and interview of the individual considered as a potential source without revealing to State the purpose of same. Recently State declined clearance for interviews with individuals employed at three embassies although clearance had earlier been obtained from State to investigate these individuals. In order to eliminate wasted investigative effort on source development in an establishment at which State will not give clearance for interview, since May, 1958, we have cleared our intentions with State Department before authorizing Field to expend investigative effort in developing sources in a particular field. (Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont 5/16/58). That memorandum also stated that we should concentrat in this regard on a controlled selection of specific "trouble-spot" countries where a program of source development is warranted.

In this regard the existing critical political situation in the Far East definitely warrants that we continue our efforts to develop sources at all official establishments in the U.S. of Nationalist China.

ACTION:

1. It is recommended Bureau Liaison Representative orally clear with State Department our intentions to explore possibility of developing sources and informants on carefully selected basis at the official establishments of Nationalist China in the U.S.

10/6/58 J P McDonnell, State advised & State has no objection, OSK

EX-102 REC-10 65-63113-132

2. If above is approved, there is attached a letter to New York and Washington Field advising that State Department clearance is being requested.

12 OCT 16 1958

NAT. INT. SEC.

65-63113
1 - 62-77787-246
1 - 65-39605
Enclosure
JJM:egs (7)

1 - Belmont
1 - Donaho
1 - Liaiso
1 - Middleton

SAC, New York (105-30508) (original & 3 for NY) 10/3/58

Director, FBI (65-63113)

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS
IS - CH

Re New York letters 9/22/58 captioned "Delegation to the United Nations from China, IS - CH," and "Consulate General of China, New York, New York, IS - CH."

For the information of New York and Washington Field Offices, the State Department is being requested for clearance to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis in the diplomatic establishments of Nationalist China in the U.S. The New York and Washington Field Offices will be advised of the decision reached by the State Department regarding the above request.

Extra copies of this communication are being furnished to the New York Office for its files 105-31022 regarding the Consulate General of China and 105-31020 regarding the Delegation to the United Nations from China. Extra copies are being furnished to the Washington Field Office for its files regarding the Consulate General of China, New York, New York, and 105-26760 regarding the Delegation to the United Nations from China.

4 - Washington Field (65-7796) 65-63113-128

REC-25

1 - 65-39605 (Consulate General of China, NY, NY)
1 - 62-77787-246 (Delegation to UN from China)
JJM:egs
(15)

EX-135

17 OCT 7 1958

MAILED 11
OCT 3 - 1958
COMM-FBI

NOTE: Cover memo Donahoe to Belmont 10/2/58, prepared JJM:egs, re same subject. NY by let 8/13/58 requested WFO to obtain the name & citizenship of employees at the Consulate General of China in NYC. NY by another let dated 8/15/58 advised WFO that upon review of INS files in NYC, WFO would be requested to obtain info from State Dept. regarding 4 known employees of the Delegation to the UN from China. Prior to WFO covering these leads at the State Department, State Department clearance should be obtained to explore possibility of developing sources.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

lspn
ardman
lmont
nr
se
ons
n
r
n
loom
tn
MAIL ROOM ☐

63 OCT 14 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

DATE: October 8, 1958

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Little

Tolson	
Boardman	✓
Belmont	✓
Mohr	
Nease	
Parsons	
Rosen	
Tamm	
Trotter	
Clayton	
Tele. Room	
Holloman	
Gandy	

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS

During the recent investigation of Arthur S. Lall, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Indian Delegation to the UN, which was approved by the Department of State, it was determined by the New York Office that Lall was in frequent contact with the Soviet Delegation to the UN and the Egyptian Delegation to the UN. It was further determined that during the present year, Mohamed Riad, First Secretary, United Arab Republic Delegation to the UN, has conferred with Lall, presumably concerning the Middle East crisis. Furthermore, "The New York Times" of 9/29/58 carried an article stating that V. K. Krishna Menon, India's Defense Minister, while appearing on an ABC television program on 9/28/58 declared that Chiang Kai-shek is endeavoring to get the U.S. into a war in the Taiwan Strait crisis.

From the above, it would appear that while India ostensibly claims to be neutral, her official representatives are in constant contact with representatives of countries unfriendly to the U.S. and aligned with the Soviet bloc and also appear unfriendly to the U.S. It thus appears that we should try to place ourselves in a position to obtain current intelligence data concerning India's contacts with those nations unfriendly to us, as well as information on the current political situation in India and the activities of its representatives in the U. S. The New York Office has requested that the Bureau obtain State Department clearance for the New York Office to institute a program looking toward the development of informants and sources within the Indian Consulate General in New York City, as well as in the Indian Delegation to the UN. It is felt that this should be done and also sources and informants developed in the Embassy of India, Washington, D. C.

10/10/58 Discussed with J P McDonnell, State. He orally cleared our intentions.

RECOMMENDATION:

EX-136 REC- 65 65-63113-134

OCT 20 1958

It is recommended that the Bureau liaison representative orally clear with the Department of State our intentions to explore the possibility of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis at the Embassy of India, Washington, D. C., the Indian Consulate General, New York City, and the Indian Delegation to the UN, New York City with the specific understanding that we will seek State Department clearance for each individual investigation and interview.

65-63113

HWL:tw:clb
(6)

1 - 105-54374 (Consulate General of India, New York City)
1 - 105-New (Embassy of India)

1 - Mr. Cotter

SAC, New York (105-31096)

October 15, 1958

Director, FBI (65-59075)

CONSULATE GENERAL OF VENEZUELA,
NEW YORK CITY
INTERNAL SECURITY - VENEZUELA

Reurlet 9-26-58.

State Department clearance was previously obtained on 8-19-58 for program looking toward development of sources on carefully selected basis at Venezuelan Embassy, Washington, D. C., and other Venezuelan establishments in this country, if deemed necessary. Accordingly, you are authorized to proceed with such a program with respect to captioned establishment.

No active investigations or interviews with persons connected with the captioned establishment should be conducted without specific Bureau authority since the Bureau must obtain State Department clearance for each such investigation and interview.

(1) -- 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

RDC:tw
(5)

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
OCT 16 1958
MAILED

65-63113-
NOT RECORDED
162 OCT 23 1958

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman

DEC 29 1958

59 OCT 23 1958

dleton

SAC, New York (105-30508) (Orig and 3)

October 16, 1958

Director, FBI (65-63113) - 132

EX-102

REC- 1

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS
IS - CH

ReBulet 10/3/58 to New York, cc WFO, captioned as above.

Mr. J. P. McDonnell of the State Department advised on 10/6/58 that the State Department has no objection to our exploring the possibilities of developing sources and informants on a carefully selected basis at the official establishments of Nationalist China in the U. S.

Extra copies of this communication are being furnished to the New York Office for its files 105-31022 regarding the Consulate General of China and 105-31020 regarding the Delegation to the United Nations from China. Extra copies are being furnished to the WFO for its files regarding the Consulate General of China, New York, New York, and 105-26760 regarding the Delegation to the United Nations from China.

4 - Washington Field (65-7796)

1 - 65-39605 (Consulate General of China, New York, New York)

1 - 62-77787-246 (Delegation to the UN from China)

JJM:jlw
(12)

NOTE: In order to eliminate wasted investigative effort in source development in an establishment at which State will not give clearance for interview, since May, 1958, we have cleared our intentions with State Department before authorizing field to expend investigative effort in developing sources in a particular field.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

57 OCT 21 195

MAILED 31
OCT 15 1958
COMM-FBI

MAIL ROOM ☐

1 - Mr. Little

SAC, New York

10/17/58

REC- 65

EX-136

Director, FBI

65-63113-134

CONSULATE GENERAL OF INDIA
IS - INDIA
(Bureau File 105-54374)
(New York File 105-9981)

INDIAN DELEGATION TO THE UN
IS - INDIA
(Bureau File 105-New)

EMBASSY OF INDIA
IS - INDIA
(Bureau File ~~105-New~~)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-54374-

Reurlet of 9/30/58 captioned "Consulate General of India, IS - India; Indian Delegation to the UN, IS - India", copies of same being furnished to the WFO. Further reference is made to Bulet of 5/19/58 captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations."

Department of State clearance was obtained 10/10/58 for the Bureau to institute a program aimed at the development of individuals, on a carefully selected basis, connected with the captioned Indian establishments in New York City and Washington, D. C., who can furnish information concerning Indian activities in the United States. This program must be conducted on a discreet basis and no active investigation or interviews with individuals connected with captioned establishments should be made without specific Bureau authority, as the Bureau must obtain specific State Department clearance for each investigation and interview as outlined in referenced Bulet of 5/19/58.

MAILED 11
OCT 1 7 1958
COMM-FBI

Your efforts in regard to this program should be submitted to the Bureau within thirty days together with your future plans for implementing informant coverage in the captioned institutions.

Extra copies of this letter are being furnished the New York and WFO Offices for each file carried in the caption.

3 - Washington Field Office

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

HWL:gds
(12)

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
Clayton ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____

MAIL ROOM

DEC 29 1958

NOV 4 1958

- Cotter

SAC, New York (105-31099)

10-21-58

Director, FBI (62-103139)

CONSULATE GENERAL OF BRAZIL
NEW YORK CITY
IS - BRAZIL

Reurlet 9-26-58.

State Department clearance was previously obtained on 9-5-58 for a program looking toward development of sources on a carefully selected basis at Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D. C., and other Brazilian establishments in this country, if deemed necessary. Accordingly, you are authorized to proceed with such a program with respect to captioned establishment.

No active investigations or interviews with persons from captioned establishment should be conducted without specific Bureau authority since the Bureau must obtain State Department clearance for each such investigation and interview.

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

RDC:mtb
(5)

YELLOW DUPLICATE
OCT 21 1958
MAILED

son 4370
rdman
hom
DEC 29 1958
e
ons
n
n
er
on
Room
man

5 7 ~~OCT 24 1958~~

MAIL ROOM ☐

65-63113-
NOT RECORDED
162 OCT 23 1958

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-103139-

ter

SAC, New York (105-31090)

10-21-58

Director, FBI (62-77787-205)

DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS
FROM BRAZIL, NEW YORK CITY
IS - BRAZIL

Reurlet 9-26-58.

State Department clearance was previously obtained on 9-5-58 for a program looking toward development of sources on a carefully selected basis at Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D. C., and other Brazilian establishments in this country, if deemed necessary. Accordingly, you are authorized to proceed with such a program with respect to captioned establishment.

No active investigations or interviews with persons from captioned establishment should be conducted without specific Bureau authority since the Bureau must obtain State Department clearance for each such investigation and interview.

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic
Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

RDC:mtb
(5)

ORIGINAL FILED IN

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
OCT 21 1958
MAILED

7370

66 DEC 29 1958

63 OCT 24 1958

'olson
oardman
elmont
lohr
ease
arsons
osen
amm
rotter
layton
ele. Room
olloman
c

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: November 10, 1958

FROM : MR. S. J. PAPICH

SUBJECT: Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations
COVERAGE OF NONCOMMUNIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
Clayton ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

Reference is made to information recently furnished to the Bureau by a highly sensitive source being handled by the Washington Field Office (WFO) indicating that Soviet and satillite intelligence representatives have a keen interest in assistance being rendered by our "friends." They were referring to attaches from India, Indonesia, and United Arab Republic who apparently have been collecting certain types of information for the Soviet and satellite representatives.

The foregoing again confirms that the Soviets and the satellites realize that representatives of noncommunist diplomatic establishments can be of tremendous value to them. Naturally, a representative of the Indian Embassy has access to U. S. institutions and areas not usually accessible to the Soviets and satellites. Furthermore, a representative of such an embassy can mix in circles and have access to Americans and others without being placed under any particular suspicions. If such an individual is recruited by the Soviets, he can operate with an excellent coverage. We previously have seen instances where the Soviets have taken an interest in representatives of Latin American countries apparently for the purpose of recruiting them as agents.

It is suggested that we might desire to re-examine our position with regard to the extent and nature of Soviet and satellite utilization of the personnel of other diplomatic establishments. Although we already have a certain degree of technical coverage, we might wish to give serious consideration to an expansion of the same. This may not be an appropriate time for suggesting such a project, but we cannot overlook a possible gap in our over-all counterintelligence coverage.

It is believed that an expansion of coverage of so-called friendly diplomatic establishments on a selective and flexible basis would be of extreme value to the Bureau because of the following:

EX. - 133 REC- 19 65-63113-145

1. Information developed could lead to the possible identity of important Soviet agents.

24 DEC 8 1958

SJP:jlk
(3)
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

file 65-63113

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 2.

57 DEC 15 1958

2. We can collect valuable intelligence information as we already have under established coverage. We actually may be in a position to outdo other agencies, such as CIA, in developing positive intelligence information as a by-product to our counterintelligence responsibilities.

3. Expanded coverage would serve as a strong deterrent to CIA entering into intelligence operations in the U. S.

4. Additional coverage will permit us to maintain a reasonable check on the over-all intelligence activities of our "friends." Without such a reasonable check, we can be inclined to operate in the dark waiting until something happens.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

ADDENDUM SBD:bbr 11/28/58

Ideas set forth here are good and we have gone over them carefully in Nationalities Intelligence Section. These ideas and other ideas which have arisen from discussion have been considered. However, with present necessity for economy and cut-backs in our security programs due to budgetary considerations, we do not feel any broad-scale expansion of intelligence coverage of friendly countries is feasible at this time. We must operate within the limitations set on technical coverage. Nevertheless, we can and will adjust available technical coverage to best meet needs. Lack of expansion at this time does not mean that we will not have coverage of specific situation which prompted this memo. Our coverage of Soviets and satellites, which developed original data, will serve to give us coverage of extent to which attaches of friendly countries are used in accomplishing objectives of Soviets and satellites as will investigative coverage of specific attaches mentioned which is being implemented. In any such coverage we must remember the lack of restrictions

(continued on Page 3)

on Military, Air and Naval Attaches of friendly countries, and the liaison and freedom of action existing between them and counterparts at Pentagon. Bureau is not in position to effect control of their actions and information-gathering ability by investigation on general basis. What we are going to have to do is to attempt to build up substantial data against those attaches which Soviets and satellites are known to utilize and either attempt to compromise and use them or consider possible presentation of problem for State Department action.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Sanders
1 - Mossburg
1 - Callahan

DATE: 12-12-58

JUNE

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
Clayton ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

SYNOPSIS:

This memorandum evaluates captioned program and recommends its continuation in the present form. Program provides for acquisition of positive intelligence and investigative information through three facets: (1) Receipt of notification from six other agencies of arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel of friendly foreign governments, (2) At specific request or with specific approval of Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy or official designated by him, maintenance of technical surveillances on official establishments of countries located in trouble areas, (3) With prior State Department approval, development of live sources within establishments of friendly countries, as Bureau's intelligence and investigative requirements demand extension of coverage.

Operation under first category, instituted November, 1954, is smooth and serving useful purpose in keeping us informed of identities of foreign intelligence personnel in U. S.; costs nominal, involving principally indexing procedures and small amount of supervisory time at Seat of Government.

Coverage under second category, first considered in October, 1955, and instituted two months later, has been source of highly valuable intelligence data as well as investigative information. State Department has made highly laudatory comments on value of material in formulation of foreign policy. Actual cost figures on technical surveillances conducted not available; noted, however, that in three years establishments of 14 separate foreign countries have been afforded technical coverage, mostly on short-term basis of one to three months but in five instances on continuing basis (Egypt since 12-23-55, France since 10-31-56, Syria since 8-16-57, and Iraq and Jordan since 7-16-58). Technical coverage of these establishments is designed to be elastic and tailored primarily to meet intelligence needs of our Government.

Development of live sources (catetory three above) is sound counterintelligence procedure of long standing. Our efforts in this field directed at friendly foreign countries were brought under captioned program in May, 1958, with adoption of policy that before continuing efforts previously instituted or undertaking future efforts involving country not previously considered, we would clear our intentions with State Department to avoid wasting investigative endeavors. We current

65-63113
WRW:mtb
(6)

REC-10

- 148

DEC 17 1958

6 DEC 19 1958

65-63113

have 21 live sources in establishments of eight countries and 62 potential sources now under development assigned in establishments of 12 countries. This phase of intelligence coverage is sound, enhances Bureau's prestige as intelligence agency, and is based on long-range planning. Costs involved are those arising from intensive, thorough field investigations of potential sources (generally American employees in foreign establishments). Such costs considered fully justified in view of our responsibilities in the internal security field and as an intelligence agency.

Examples cited to illustrate intermittent phases of captioned program, undertaken as need for coverage arises, and to explain manner in which other programs contribute to our coverage in this field.

Based on detailed analysis, it is concluded that captioned program is working efficiently and effectively with due regard for cost factors and administrative controls.

ACTION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form at this time. Reanalysis and re-evaluation of the program will be undertaken in six months.

DETAILS:

The purpose of this memorandum is to evaluate and analyze our program concerned with intelligence coverage of friendly foreign countries. The memorandum recommends the continuation of this program in its present form with provisions for re-evaluation and reanalysis in six months.

Basic Bureau policy is, and for several years has been, to conduct investigations of individuals representing "friendly" foreign countries (those outside the Soviet bloc) only in instances where we receive allegations that such individuals are engaging in activities in violation of our laws or otherwise constitute a security menace.
(65-63113-5)

This policy has been developed over years of experience. We are faced with the problem of having literally hundreds of representatives of friendly foreign nations assigned to official and diplomatic establishments in the U. S. and accredited to our Government in connection with their official duties. The problem of discharging our responsibility for the internal security of the country and warding off the menace which could be created by a security threat issuing from any one of these foreign government officials necessitates the devising and following of some procedures which will place us in a position to acquire information regarding activities on the part of any such official which might be detrimental to this country's security.

The 1954 case involving Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., which resulted in compromising communications intelligence material with Netherlands officials, vividly brought to our attention the question whether we should maintain investigative coverage of the activities of all representatives of friendly foreign governments in the U. S. A careful study of the problem at that time left us with the conclusion that in order to establish such coverage as would effectively reveal an operation such as that occurring in the Petersen case, it would be necessary to maintain both technical and physical surveillances on diplomatic officials and official establishments in the U. S. of all friendly foreign countries. Noting that our intensified coverage of Soviets and satellites alone required over 600 Agents at that time, it was concluded that manpower expenditure would seem to negate following a similar program with regard to non-Soviet bloc officials and establishments. (65-63113-1)

Taking a more realistic approach, we immediately (November, 1954) did two things: (1) Alerted 12 key field offices to the problem and issued instructions designed to help cope with it. (2) Informed six other agencies of our Government of our responsibilities in this field and asked them to notify us of the arrivals in the U. S. of all foreign intelligence officials, even though their presence in this country might be under working arrangements with one of the six agencies involved. (65-63113-1 through 5)

Since November, 1954, we have coordinated into captioned program two positive counterintelligence procedures which have been in use for many years: (1) Technical surveillance coverage in the U. S. of official establishments of friendly foreign countries located in "trouble" areas. (65-63113-40) (2) Development of live sources in such establishments. (65-63113-89)

This program has a twofold purpose, first, to acquire information concerning the identities and activities of official personnel of foreign governments in the U. S.; secondly, to produce intelligence information concerning foreign countries which will assist the Bureau in its over-all intelligence responsibilities, the Department of State in formulating policy in the field of international relations, and other agencies in connection with their foreign intelligence functions. To accomplish this purpose, three separate and distinct facets are utilized, discussed in detail hereinafter.

(1) Acquisition of Information from Other Agencies as to Identities of Foreign Intelligence Personnel in U. S.

On 11-18-54 letters were directed to the Department of State; Central Intelligence Agency; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; Office of Naval Intelligence; Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force; and National Security Agency. A copy was furnished to Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, of the Department to advise him of the Bureau's action. These letters pointed out that information had been received in a number of instances indicating that representatives of so-called "friendly" nations had engaged in intelligence activities against the best interests of the U. S. The case involving Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., was cited as an example. It was noted that representatives of friendly countries in some instances were stationed here to represent their governments officially in dealing with U. S. agencies and in other instances intelligence representatives of these foreign countries frequently visited our country to confer with representatives of various U. S. agencies. It was observed that frequently the Bureau was not officially notified of the arrivals of many of these foreign government representatives and the possibility existed that such persons might while in this country engage in intelligence missions not known to the agencies of our Government sponsoring their visits.

In our letters of 11-18-54 we requested the six agencies involved to notify us when information was received that an intelligence representative of a foreign government was proceeding to the U. S. and also to let us know in the event any of these agencies set up a liaison arrangement with such foreign representatives. We pointed out this information was needed to guide us in discharging our responsibilities and, at the same time, to enable us to advise the interested agency the event we received information indicating a foreign intelligence representative was acting outside the scope of his approved activities. We asked that information of this latter nature be called to our attention if received by one of the recipient agencies to assist us in eliminating unnecessary inquiries and concentrating on matters deserving the most attention. We requested all six agencies to furnish us the identities of any foreign intelligence representatives then in the U. S. and to provide us on a continuing basis data with respect to future arrivals of such representatives, both in instances where working arrangements existed and otherwise. (65-63113-1 through 4)

Since our letters of 11-18-54, all six of the recipient agencies have furnished data of the nature requested. A current analysis of these data has shown that information provided by National Security Agency, while quite complete, has been of little operational value. This is occasioned by the fact that National Security Agency is not an operational agency and foreign government representatives entering the U. S. to consult with National Security Agency personnel would normally be expected to be connected with service agencies of their own governments; however, the data furnished by National Security Agency are of value. The names of the individuals furnished are indexed in our files and, if the coverage discussed in categories two and three below produces information indicating that any of these foreign intelligence representatives become operational contrary to the purpose for which they arrived in this country, we are in a position to identify them through indices checks and establish immediately the identity of the U. S.-sponsoring agency. Since November, 1954, we have learned of no instances through this procedure wherein foreign representatives admitted to this country under National Security Agency sponsorship have become operational or in any other manner created a security threat of investigative interest to the Bureau.

In many instances the information furnished by the five agencies other than National Security Agency has related to foreign intelligence personnel on an operational level and frequently is submitted under the name of the individual concerned. This is reviewed by the responsible supervisor, who checks files and takes any required action; such as, instituting investigation, referral to field for

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

information, or marking for indexing. Opening of active cases on such foreign personnel is dependent upon the availability in our files or receipt of allegations of violations of our laws or activities constituting a security menace in line with our basic policy cited above.

This facet of captioned program is operating smoothly and no changes are required at this time. Its value in keeping us informed of the identities of foreign intelligence representatives presently in the U. S. at any given time is self-evident. Its costs are nominal, involving primarily only that amount required by the indexing of names and the reviewing of incoming material by Bureau supervisors. If field investigations are instituted, the only other costs would be those resulting from investigations which the Bureau must conduct to discharge its responsibilities in the internal security field.

(2) Maintenance of Technical Surveillances on Establishments of Selected Friendly Foreign Governments.

Recognizing a gap in our intelligence coverage of friendly governments, on 10-21-55 we discussed with Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy the question of instituting limited discreet technical surveillances on official establishments of selected foreign nations, principally those located in world trouble areas. Mr. Murphy was quite receptive to this idea, stating that limited coverage sufficiently flexible to change with changing world conditions might be highly desirable. After further discussions, it was agreed that a program "progressive" in nature would be instituted. By this Mr. Murphy explained that he did not feel that all desirable coverage should be instituted at a given date but rather that coverage should be instituted on one country at a time as moving events abroad might dictate. On this basis, this phase of captioned program was initially instituted based on a specific request from Mr. Murphy on 12-5-55 that we place technical surveillances on all Egyptian diplomatic establishments in U. S. (65-63113-37, 39, 40, 43, 48)

Since then, technical surveillances (with dates of duration) have been placed on establishments of the following countries at the specific request or with the specific approval of Mr. Murphy or an official of his office designated by him to act in this matter:

Country		Duration	File References
1.	Egypt	12-23-55 to present	65-58070-59, 64
2.	Afghanistan	1-3-56 to 3-10-56	65-60354-15, 50
3.	Brazil	7-18-56 to 9-19-56	100-407049-10, 24
4.	Syria	8-14-56 to 10-12-56	65-59148-31, 56, 73
		12-19-56 to 3-18-57	62-77787-286-24, 96, 41
		8-16-57 to present	
5.	Nicaragua	9-27-56 to 10-30-56	100-143895-76, 104
6.	Iraq	10-16-56 to 3-7-57	105-64215-3
		9-25-57 to 11-25-57	65-55156-28, 123, 160
		7-16-58 to present	62-77787-282-22, 38
7.	Bolivia	11-7-56 to 12-13-56	65-52316-21, 35
8.	India	11-28-56 to 1-16-57	62-77787-257-274, 297,
		7-24-58 to 8-7-58	325, 329
9.	Saudi Arabia	7-28-57 to 8-28-57	105-62769-7, 14
10.	Algeria	10-24-57 to 1-10-58	105-54593-16, 26, 36
11.	France	10-31-56 to present	65-30150-663, 1421, 1440
12.	Tunisia	3-4-58 to 10-16-58	65-64170-21, 45, 135
13.	Jordan	6-6-58 to 7-7-58	65-61885-104, 121
		7-16-58 to present	105-38566-29
14.	Yemen	7-19-58 to 9-25-58	105-58065-142, 186

The technical surveillance phase of captioned program is designed to be elastic and is tailored primarily to meet the intelligence needs of our Government in making high-level decisions and in establishing U. S. policy to cope with international crises. That it has been successful in this respect is evidenced by highly laudatory comments and expressions of appreciation made by individuals of other departments, principally of the Department of State. For example, on 11-29-56 Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy addressed a personal letter to the Director stating in part, "I want to express the Department's appreciation to you and the Bureau for the special coverage which you have been providing us during these recent weeks. The material has been immensely valuable to us in keeping abreast of fast-moving events and developments in the international situation and has been of great assistance to us in the formulation of policy. I know that this work has meant extra hours and expense...."

(65-63113-61)

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

Aside from producing high-level intelligence data, these technical surveillances have been the source of information regarding activities of foreign government representatives of such a nature as to require Bureau investigative attention. In such instances active investigations have been instituted.

Figures on the actual cost of the technical surveillances instituted under this program are not available. In the past the New York and Washington Field Offices, which have handled all of these technical surveillances, have estimated cost on a prorated basis by merely dividing total salaries of personnel handling all technical surveillances by the number of surveillances handled at the monitoring plants. To correct this No Number SAC Letter 58-W dated 11-21-58 ordered the field to submit cost figures in the future which more accurately portray actual cost of any particular technical surveillance. In the next semiannual evaluation of this program, therefore, actual cost figures will be available and will be reported.

(3) Development of Live Sources in Diplomatic Establishments of Friendly Foreign Countries.

For several years we have on a highly selected basis undertaken programs to develop live sources in official establishments of foreign countries when our investigative and intelligence needs have required extension of coverage. This has always been done on the most careful and discreet basis and the procedures followed in implementing such programs had gone forward without a hitch until May, 1958. In that month, the Department of State declined to give clearance for interviews with individuals at the Pakistani, German, and Turkish Embassies, after having granted specific clearances for investigations of these individuals. State Department declinations were based primarily on the fact that these three countries were friendly and that, if interviews of embassy personnel were reported to embassy officials, this could strain relations between those countries and the U. S. Refusal of clearance for such interviews was, of course, within the prerogative of the State Department which must take into consideration questions of international relations. However, the key point involved was that, while that Department had issued clearances for investigations of prospective informants, its subsequent denials for interviews with them had resulted in considerable wasted investigative efforts on our part. To avoid recurrences of instances of this nature, we adopted the policy of clearing our intentions with the Department of State before authorizing the field to expend any investigative effort. In this manner we put State Department on notice as to our objectives at the outset in order that when we return to State to secure clearance for the investigation and interview of a particular individual, we will not be denied clearance on the grounds of delicate international relations. (65-63113-89)

By letter dated 5-20-58, 12 offices in whose territories foreign official establishments are located were advised that our efforts in the development of sources and informants in establishments of friendly foreign nations should be based primarily on need and should be directed toward development of sources in the establishments of ostensibly friendly foreign countries (1) where there is definite indication the specific country is drifting toward alignment with the Soviet bloc; (2) where the situation in a particular country involves serious political or military crisis with international ramifications or possible revolutionary activity and good potential exists for the Bureau to produce valuable intelligence data through coverage of diplomatic establishments in the U. S; or (3) where there is a clear and present investigative need. The 12 offices were informed that Bureau authority must be secured prior to initiating any program to develop sources and informants within diplomatic establishments of a specific country outside the Soviet bloc, at which time completedata must be furnished as to need and potential benefit of such a program. The field was informed that, if such a program is justified, the Bureau will then discuss the matter with the State Department. Following State Department clearance, the Bureau will notify the interested field offices to initiate the program. However, further Bureau authority will still be required for the investigation and interview of each prospect, since State Department clearance will be sought in connection with each of these steps. (65-63113-90)

Since our redirection of this phase of captioned program in May, 1958, with prior State Department clearance we have instituted action or continued action previously instituted to develop live sources in official establishments of the countries listed below. The first column beside the name of each country shows the number of presently active sources developed to date (including those developed prior to May, 1958) and the second column shows the number still under consideration.

Country	Developed To Date	Still Under Consideration	Serial Reference In 65-63113
1. Israel	1	2	93
2. United Arab Republic	4	2	95
3. Saudi Arabia	0	2	95
4. Iraq	2	7	95
5. Lebanon	2	2	95
6. Jordan	1	1	95
7. Iran	0	6	95
8. Yemen	2	0	95
9. Sudan	0	6	118-Green
10. Venezuela	0	3	122
11. Brazil	0	5	124
12. Nationalist China	7	10	132
13. India	2	16	134
14. Tunisia	0	0	135
	21	62	

The above figures refer to present and potential sources actually connected with official or diplomatic establishments. They do not relate to sources not connected with the establishments but actually reporting information regarding activities therein. The type of information the sources provide ranges all the way from data on movements and identities of officials to cryptographic material. These sources have on several past occasions provided information forming the basis for active investigations of foreign officials and/or their contacts.

Most of the work involved in this phase of captioned program rests with the field. Each person considered is the subject of a separate, thorough, intensive investigation. Our efforts are generally aimed at American employees in foreign establishments.and have been tightly controlled, as evidence by the lack of repercussions from the approaches we have made in the past.

Costs of this phase of our program are principally those arising from the field investigations and Agents' time in handling producing sources. Costs are considered fully justified since sound counterintelligence coverage requires sources which can produce not only investigative data but also intelligence information of value to us and other agencies in guiding policy and making decisions. The Bureau is expected to produce intelligence data and we can anticipate criticism as well as operational moves by other agencies to fill the vacuum if our operations do not produce necessary intelligence. Sound source programs are based on long-range planning and require forward thinking to get results. Scrambling for sources in reactions to problems would constitute a most undesirable substitute and give rise to justified criticism in a field where the Bureau takes pride in excelling.

Intermittent Phases and Tie In with Other Programs.

While captioned program currently follows three principal facets, as described hereinbefore, as the need arises we institute special types of coverage for some particular purposes. [For example, at the specific request on 1-22-57 of Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy (who stated Secretary of State Dulles was aware of the request and would discuss it with the President), we conducted highly delicate coverage at Blair House from 1-30-57 to 2-9-57 during a State visit of King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. Because of this coverage, we were able to furnish most important intelligence information to the President within minutes of its production. This is the only instance within our knowledge wherein this highly delicate coverage has been utilized; but, through arrangements effected by our Liaison Section and installations perfected by our Laboratory, we are in a position to afford similar-type coverage at Blair House almost at a moment's notice in the future if the President so desires. (62-104531)]

Another example of instituting special coverage on a need basis relates to a series of burglaries of foreign official establishments and residences which cropped up last summer in Washington and New York City. On 7-31-58 we alerted New York and Washington Field Offices to the possibility that the illegal entries may have been for something other than criminal purposes and instructed that these incidents be followed closely with local police authorities. We checked with the Central Intelligence Agency and were advised that Agency was not involved directly or indirectly. Through our coverage of various precincts of the local police departments, we have found that all but one of these burglaries have appeared to have been for criminal purposes; the one exception relates to the burglary of the residence of an Indian official in Washington. We are continuing to follow the latter incident with the police in an effort to determine [illegible] an intelligence operation was involved.

(65-63113-112, 118, 119, 123, 125, 129, [illegible]

While the foregoing discussion portrays the types of coverage afforded under instant program, it by no means describes the full extent of our coverage of friendly foreign officials and establishments. For example, the Anagram Program produces voluminous intelligence data on these officials and establishments. Under the Intensification Program, as long ago as 6-9-53, SAC Letter 53-41 instructed the field to scrutinize carefully any associations and contacts between Soviet personnel and diplomatic representatives of other countries where there are indications that a person is being singled out for specific attention. A case of this nature was developed when a Soviet cultural attache in 1953 attempted to develop as agents for the Soviets two Iranian officials, one of whom we subsequently turned into a Bureau double agent. (65-63113-5) Under the program involving name checks by the Bureau and other intelligence agencies on all foreign government officials entering the U. S., we have the benefit of derogatory information on friendly foreign officials at the time they enter the U. S. This constitutes a type of coverage handled, not as a part of captioned program, but as a separate program in itself.

Conclusions.

Our program concerned with intelligence coverage of friendly foreign countries is operating effectively and efficiently. On a continuing basis, it produces information of value to our investigative requirements, to our intelligence requirements, and for budget purposes. For the most part, the program consists of a coordination of accepted investigative and intelligence procedures for the purpose of proper direction, redirection when indicated, and administrative controls. It has not required any over-all increase in manpower. From our current analysis, no changes are indicated at this time.

An informative memorandum has been prepared for supervisors in the Nationalities Intelligence Section, where all coverage of friendly foreign nations is handled, in order that they may be aware of the continuing need for coordination of this program and alert to any redirection which might increase its efficiency or improve our coverage.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Mem andum • UNITED ST ES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 29, 1959

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Tolson
~~Belmont~~
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy
Roach

We have controlled program designed to develop live sources in diplomatic establishments of countries outside Soviet bloc aimed at producing investigative and intelligence data on countries drifting toward Soviet bloc and on "trouble spot" countries where revolutionary or other activity has widespread international implications (such as Middle East crisis, Cuban revolution, Panamanian invasion, etc.). Program has paid off in sound benefits.

Recognizing delicacy of contacting and developing such sources and close interrelationship with problems of international relations and developments we consult State Department regularly on our objectives and intentions. For example, when we feel a particular country is logical target for development of sources in their establishments in U.S. we clear with State to be certain they agree and to insure that we are not running into risky foreign policy situation. If they agree to country as target we then clear with State on each investigation of potential source relating to that country. Providing investigation favorable we then go back again to obtain clearance from State for interview with potential source. These initial interviews are conducted under pretext with idea of assessing their attitude, stability, cooperativeness, etc. We then decide whether to go back and actually solicit cooperation in furnishing data.

We are running into problem here in that after State has cleared country as target and has cleared individual investigations they are too often declining clearance for interviews on basis potential results not commensurate with risk involved. This failure to clear final step after passing on risk aspect twice before results in wasteful expenditure of investigative time and these turndowns at this point are bound to have initiative-destroying effect on field offices.

We have been dealing with Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs in State which lacks real authority in this regard and must go back to geographical desks which are super-cautious, have no real concept of intelligence objectives, and tend to turn down interviews unnecessarily.

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Roach
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Mr. Mossburg

65-63113

163

REC- 84

JUL 1 1959

60 JUL 6 1959

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

To rectify this problem we propose that our liaison representative discuss this problem with Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy who has firm grasp of intelligence functions and with whom in past we have discussed and worked out means of effecting sensitive intelligence coverage both on our initiative and at his request. If he is receptive to clearing such matters personally we will work out practical method of clearing with him our country targets and individual investigations and interviews. We can point out to him that we approach entire problem with discretion and conduct initial interviews under suitable pretext. Murphy has the over-all knowledge to steer us away from extremely sensitive countries at outset rather than waiting for interviews to be proposed and at same time knows intelligence enough to realize risks must sometimes be taken. If we can work something out with Murphy it is believed we can get better results and still afford Bureau protection of State clearance.

ACTION:

Recommend our liaison representative O. H. Bartlett discuss this matter with Mr. Murphy along above lines to see if something practical can be worked out.

I think this is necessary

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Me dum • UNITED S GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 17, 1959

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

This is controlled program to develop live sources in diplomatic establishments of countries outside Soviet bloc aimed at producing investigative and intelligence data on countries drifting toward Soviet bloc and on "trouble spot" countries.

We have recognized delicacy of developing sources within establishments of ostensibly friendly countries and in view of close interrelationship with questions of foreign policy we have in past regularly consulted Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs in State Department to be certain we were not running into risky foreign policy situation whereby, if State not consulted, State could later say our activities had posed serious problems. To insure our efforts did not run afoul of foreign policy considerations we adopted "3-step" procedure: (1) we had liaison check with State orally when we selected particular country as logical target; (2) if State agreed on target country we, by individual letters, secured State clearance prior to investigation of each potential source; and (3) if investigation favorable we, by individual letters, secured State clearance for initial interview with potential source to assess potential, reliability, stability, etc. This gave State three points where they could advise us our objectives were too risky considering foreign policy implications. As noted in my memo 5-29-59 this has not worked satisfactorily because State has consistently waited until step (3) to decline clearance after we had expended considerable effort. It was noted that in dealing with Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs we were dealing with super-cautious group which lacked real authority. In view of wasteful expenditure of effort created by this situation it was recommended we have liaison go to Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, who is knowledgeable of intelligence functions, to work out something practical.

On 6-2-59 this was discussed with Murphy by our liaison representative, O. H. Bartlett. Murphy did not know we had been having this problem and said he would appreciate our coming to him on these matters and depending on each individual case he would make determination. He suggested Bartlett come to him and give him facts by letterhead memo or any other system Bureau desired and he would then grant approval immediately or check where necessary.

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Roach
1 - Mr. Bartlett

REC- 84

JUL 1 1959

Memo to all supervisors Nat Int Sec 6-29-59 WRW

60 JUL 6 1959

NAT. INT. SEC.

In view of Murphy's willingness to cooperate with us on this we have studied our system to see if we can streamline our "3-step" procedure to eliminate unnecessary paperwork for him and for Bureau and to reduce liaison contact with him on such matters to minimum so as not to tie up procedure with "red tape." We feel we can best do this, and still give us adequate safeguard of State clearance, by following procedure: (1) when we select country as logical target we will write memo outlining reasons and have liaison orally discuss with Murphy to determine if he agrees and at same time to secure his clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will, thereafter, select (liaison notation on memo will constitute Bureau record of clearance of country and individual investigations); (2) where we desire to interview a potential source we will prepare a letterhead memo which liaison will deliver to Murphy. This memo will indicate we propose to conduct interview under suitable pretext and will concisely summarize identity, background, citizenship, position occupied, and other pertinent factors disclosed during investigation. Liaison in delivering this memo will then note on yellow (Bureau copy) whether Murphy clears interviews or not and this will serve as Bureau record. If Murphy declines an individual clearance liaison will determine whether declination is strictly governed by facts relating to that case or whether Murphy feels foreign policy situation has changed to such extent we should stop our efforts concerning that particular country. This will eliminate needless effort.

We have completed investigation of Shanker Samuel Jairam Bhole, Assistant to Procurement Officer at Indian Embassy, who while born in India, is U.S. citizen as is his entire family. Investigation has been favorable and Bhole has reportedly been critical of Indian conditions and policies. Washington Field Office desires authority to interview him, will make no effort to direct his activities during initial contact, and foresees no possibility of embarrassment from this initial contact.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Recommend our liaison representative deliver attached letterhead memorandum on Bhole to Murphy to obtain his clearance for this proposed interview.

6/18/59 Matter discussed with Mr Murphy.
6/23/59 Mr Murphy approved interview of BHOLE.

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

(2) Recommend our liaison representative at same time discuss proposed system with Mr. Murphy to be certain it will meet his needs and if he is agreeable recommend we institute this procedure and eliminate contact with Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs on this program.

6/22/59 System agreeable with Mr. Murphy.

(3) At same time recommend liaison discuss with Mr. Murphy our existing target countries of United Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, India, Israel, Venezuela, Brazil and Nationalist China; determine if he agrees to these targets; and obtain clearance for discreet investigations of selected individuals as potential sources recognizing we will give him written data and seek specific individual clearance before we interview potential source.

DEM

6/18 & 23/59 Above target countries discussed with Murphy. He advised OK. to investigate proposed sources but he will want to take up interview on a case basis; that a U.S. Citizen working for these countries will present much less a problem than a national of one of the countries. He said the facts surrounding these nationals will determine if approval will be given for interview. OHB

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 25, 1959

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

JUNE

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (SEMIANNUAL EVALUATION)

Re memo 12-12-58 evaluating captioned program and analyzing results since its inception. This is reevaluation and report on results during past six-month period.

Origin: Basic program inaugurated in 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958. Purpose: To provide for acquisition of positive intelligence and investigative information through three principal facets: (1) Receipt of notification from six other agencies of arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel of friendly foreign governments; (2) At specific request or with specific approval of Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy or official designated by him, maintenance of technical surveillances on official establishments in United States of countries located in trouble areas; (3) With prior State Department approval, development of live sources within establishments of friendly countries, as Bureau's intelligence and investigative requirements demand extension of coverage. Scope and Cost: (1) Under first category Bureau receives notification from other intelligence agencies of arrival of intelligence personnel in U.S. Handling of these notifications is confined to Seat of Government and principally involves review of any file references and indexing procedures at nominal costs. In appropriate instances field is alerted to presence of intelligence personnel but active investigation is not instituted in absence of information which would form basis for security-type case. (2) In past 6 months we have had technical coverage under second category covering 6 foreign countries, 2 of which now discontinued. Present coverage consists of technical surveillances on New York and Washington establishments of Iraq and United Arab Republic; French and Cuban embassies in Washington; and other Cuban establishments in Washington, New York and Miami. Based on latest available field estimates, the technical surveillances now in operation cost approximately $16,850 a month consisting almost entirely of salary of Bureau personnel. (3) Under live informant phase we now have 20 informants or sources actually connected with official foreign establishments in United States and additional 20 under consideration as potential informants or sources. Of the 20 currently in use, three are paid for actual services plus expenses and remaining 17 are cooperating with Bureau without cost to us. Entire monthly cost of this phase of Program in terms of payments to informants does not exceed $265. Tie-In With Other Programs: This program supplements, and is supplemented by, a number of programs which

WRW:bcf
(7)

cc: Belmont
Mossburg
Wacks

cc: Donahoe
Cotter
Callahan

REC- 44

[illegible] 159

JUN 29 1959

JUL 6 1959

result in intelligence coverage of friendly foreign countries. The Anagram Program is a typical example. Our technical coverage frequently assists in an Anagram operation. The name-check program on holders of official and diplomatic visas covers many of the intelligence personnel coming under the first category of captioned program. Even the Intensification Program, which is directed against Soviet bloc officials and establishments, produces data on activities of friendly foreign officials and their contacts with communist officials. Magnitude: Program handled on Section-wide basis since it has ramifications touching work on any desk handling matters relating to noncommunist countries, depending upon world developments and intelligence requirements of Bureau and State Department. Past or Present Weaknesses: During past six months potential weakness developed in third category of this program - development of live sources. After securing approval of State officials in Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs to undertake program to develop live sources in official establishments of certain defined friendly countries we found such officials reluctant to approve interviews with persons we desired to approach in this connection, often citing as reason for refusal the fact that a friendly country was involved, which of course was known at outset. On 6-2-59 we discussed this problem with Robert Murphy who said he did not know we had been having this problem and would appreciate our contacting him on these matters and, depending on each individual case, he would make the determination. We are now handling these matters directly with Murphy under a procedure approved by him which will eliminate some paperwork required in past and reduce liaison contact with him to minimum so as not to tie up procedure with "red tape." This should strengthen this phase of program since past experience has shown Murphy has realistic and understanding attitude toward Bureau's intelligence operations as well as great appreciation of its results. Administrative Controls: Controls exercised on day-to-day basis through review of outgoing instructions to field relating to the various phases of program. Control file maintained to which copies of pertinent serials are regularly routed. Semiannual review of program encompasses complete review of control file. Adequacy and Currentness of Instructions: SAC letter 59-9 alerted field to necessity for recognizing responsibilities for intelligence coverage and seeing that agents handling security matters do so with interest and enthusiasm. Since last evaluation this program, memoranda to all Section Supervisors circularized 12-17-58 and 3-2-59 giving direction to phases of program and current memo prepared concerning new procedures for clearing third category matters with Robert Murphy. Over-all Value: For the most part, this program consists of a coordination of accepted investigative and intelligence procedures for the purpose of proper direction, redirection when indicated, and administrative controls. On a continuing basis it produces information of value to our investigative requirements, to our intelligence requirements and for budget purposes. Contemplated Action: From current evaluation and analysis, no changes are indicated at this time. We will closely follow all phases of our intelligence coverage to assure that changes and redirection are instituted as the need arises.

June 29, 1959

A. H. Belmont

S. B. Donahoe

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Schaefer

GHANA ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.
INTERNAL SECURITY - GHANA

Bureau by letter May 25, 1959, captioned "Ghana Activities in the U.S., Internal Security - Ghana" and "Guinea Activities in the U.S., Internal Security - Guinea," furnished Washington Field Office (WFO) and New York information received from Office of Naval Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency wherein it was indicated that there were strong nationalistic currents prevailing among native populations of African countries and indications of attempts of communist and Soviet infiltration into these movements. Thirteen Soviets were expected to arrive in Accra, Ghana, on May 12, 1959, to establish the USSR Embassy. It is felt that with embassies in both Guinea and Ghana, the USSR is in an excellent position from which to continue its constant and persistent efforts to increase Soviet influence and subversive activities in Western Africa.

WFO was instructed in above letter to advise Bureau whether it had any sources that could supply information in regard to Ghana. WFO in reply states it has no sources who could supply such information and, therefore, desires Bureau to obtain State Department clearance to institute a program with view toward developing informants and sources within the Embassy of Ghana, Washington, D. C.

Since WFO advised by letter 6-11-59 captioned "Guinea Activities in the United States, IS - Guinea" that Guinea at the present time does not have an establishment in Washington, D. C., no further action is being taken in that matter at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is requested Liaison contact Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and discuss with him orally the possibility of this Bureau instituting a program in an effort to develop informants and sources within all diplomatic establishments of the country of Ghana in the U.S. and at the same time secure his clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources within those diplomatic establishments of Ghana. At the present time there does not appear

1 - 65-63113-

NOT RECORDED
145 JUL 6 1959

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

VRS:gmh:dmd
(7)
105-78601
(1) - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

to be any anti-U.S. feeling in Ghana; however, with the Soviets keen interest in Western Africa their apparent intentions could be aimed at developing a pro-Soviet and an anti-U.S. attitude in those countries. Therefore, such a program as mentioned above appears to be warranted at this time.

1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Mr. Schaefer

SAC, WFO (105-30788)

July 10, 1959

Director, FBI (105-78601)

GHANA ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.
IS - GHANA

Reurlet 6/15/59.

State Department clearance for the Bureau to institute a program to develop informants and sources within all diplomatic establishments of the country of Ghana in the United States was granted 7/2/59. Bureau authority is hereby granted the Washington Field and New York Offices to conduct a survey regarding the identities of the individuals who can be utilized regarding captioned matter; and, thereafter, submit recommendations as to individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for such investigation in each individual case.

2 - New York (105-36204)
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

VRS:sen (8)

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

NOTE:

Since the Soviet Union now has an embassy in Ghana, it places it in an excellent position from which to conduct its constant and persistent efforts to increase Soviet influence and subversive activities in Western Africa. In view of this, and the fact the Soviets in this position could develop a pro-Soviet and an anti-United States attitude in that area, would make instant programs necessary at this time. Therefore, with State clearance furnished on 7/2/59, WFO and NY are being furnished with above instructions in an effort to afford Bureau adequate coverage in this matter.

Mr. Tolson____
Mr. Belmont____
Mr. DeLoach____
Mr. McGuire____
Mr. Mohr____
Mr. Parsons____
Mr. Rosen____
Mr. Tamm____
Mr. Trotter____
Mr. W.C.Sullivan
Tele. Room____
Mr. Holloman____
Miss Gandy____

MEMO DUPLICATE
JUL 10 1959
MAILED

50 JUL 16 1959

Mr. A. H. Belmont

September 9, 1959

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Mr. Schaefer

Mr. S. B. Donahoe

THAILAND ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
INTERNAL SECURITY - THAILAND

Memorandum Papich to Frohbose 8/31/59 captioned "Ruth Naomi Burney, IS-Thailand," disclosed subject personally acquainted with certain Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees and CIA giving consideration to utilizing her as source of political information. Subject born 6/29/30 and is a citizen of the U. S. She resides at 1647 Lamont Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., and is employed as telephone operator at Embassy of Thailand.

Memorandum Papich to Frohbose 9/4/59 captioned "Ruth Naomi Burney, IS-Thailand," stated Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, advised there is no close friendship existing between subject and other CIA employees. CIA indicated, however, it would like to approach subject with view of developing her as a source of information as she would have access to numerous conversations which could shed light on political conditions in Southeast Asia. Liaison has suggested that we look into this matter for possible development of subject as a Bureau source and in so doing would restrict CIA from any contact with her.

Bufiles do not contain any information identifiable with subject.

ACTION:

1. Requested liaison advise CIA that subject is of interest to us and that we are giving consideration to developing her as a source of information of this Bureau. CIA should also be informed that when subject is no longer of any interest to us CIA will be advised.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-81069-

65-63113-
NOT RECORDED
117 SEP 28 1959

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
SEP 23 1959
MAILED

~~105-New~~
~~VI:S~~:mlj (9)

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

1 - 65-58687 (Embassy of Thailand)
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)
1 - 105-New (Ruth Naomi Burney)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

2. In view of the strategic location of Thailand and its proximity to Communist China and Laos, the current area of political unrest, believed sources developed within diplomatic establishments of Thailand could furnish pertinent information regarding political conditions and political trends in Southeast Asia. It is, therefore, requested Liaison discuss orally with an appropriate official in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, the possibility of this Bureau developing live sources within Thailand diplomatic establishments in the U.S. If it is approved, also secure clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will, thereafter select.

Tolson ______
Belmont ______
DeLoach ______
McGuire ______
Mohr ______
Parsons ______
Rosen ______
Tamm ______
Trotter ______
W.C. Sullivan ______
Tele. Room ______
Holloman ______
Gandy ______
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

A. H. Belmont

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Mr. Schaefer

9/10/59

S. B. Donahoe

LAOTIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.
INTERNAL SECURITY - LAOS

New York by letter 6/25/57 captioned "Laos Delegation to the United Nations, IS - Laos" advised that Mr.. Clark McBurney, public relations officer for Hunter College, 68th Street and Park Avenue, New York City, was interviewed in connection with another matter. He stated his wife, Marie Jo McBurney, at that time was chief secretary of the Laos Delegation to the United Nations and in that position had access to files maintained by the Laotian Delegation. In addition, he stated his wife would be glad to help the FBI on a confidential basis should the need arise.

Bureau by letter 7/16/57 authorized New York to interview Mrs. McBurney to determine desirability of attempting to develop her as a potential confidential source. State Department clearance for this interview was obtained 7/11/57. Mrs. McBurney was cooperative and stated in event she came into possession of information of interest to the Bureau she would notify the New York Office.

New York by letter 8/28/59 advised it desired to recontact Mrs. McBurney to alert her to the interest of the Bureau and to secure an information which may be of interest to the United States Government. New York pointed out that McBurney as of 8/11/58 was still employed by the Laotian Delegation to the United Nations.

ACTION:

(1) Prior to having New York recontact McBurney regarding above felt we should have Liaison discuss orally with an appropriate official in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, the possibility of this Bureau developing live sources within Laotian diplomat establishments in the U. S. If it is approved, Liaison should also secure clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will, thereafter, select. In view of the current political unrest in Laos its proximity to Communist China and possible future alignment with the Soviet Bloc, felt we should secure this clearance from Department of State in an effort to have sufficient sources of information at the various Laotian diplomatic establishments in the U. S.

65-63113

NOT RECORDED
145 SEP 30 1959

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
DeLoach ____
McGuire ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

105-NEW

1 - 105-61978 (Laotian Delegation to the United Nations)
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)
(7)

VHS:gds

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: LAOTIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.
105-NEW

(2) In event above program is approved by the Department of State, New York will be furnished instructions relative to the development of McBurney as a source of information at the Laotian Delegation to the United Nations.

1 - Mr. Schaefer

SAC, WFO

9/23/59

Director, FBI

65-63113-

THAILAND ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
INTERNAL SECURITY - THAILAND

ReBulets 5/20/58 and 6/29/59 both captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations."

Recently, CIA via liaison channels advised it was giving consideration to utilizing one Ruth Naomi Burney as a source of political information. She was born 6/29/30 and is a citizen of the U. S. She resides at 1647 Lamont Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., and is employed as a telephone operator at the Embassy of Thailand. CIA disclosed Burney is personally acquainted with certain CIA employees; however, no close friendship exists between her and the CIA employees. The Bureau advised CIA that Burney is of interest to us, and that we are giving consideration to developing her as a source of information. In addition, CIA was also informed that when subject is no longer of any interest to us, CIA will be advised.

State Department clearance for the Bureau to institute a program to develop informants and sources within all diplomatic establishments of the country of Thailand in the U. S. was granted 9/15/59. Bureau authority is hereby granted Washington Field and New York Offices to conduct a survey regarding the identities of the individuals who can be utilized regarding captioned matter and, thereafter, submit recommendations as to individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for such investigation in each individual case. Include in your survey the names of sources and informants that are currently being used in the Thailand diplomatic establishments within your respective territories and/or the names of sources and informants not assigned to a Thailand diplomatic establishment who are in a position to furnish information regarding Thailand activities in the U. S. and in general.

2 - New York

yellow dup

105-new
VRS:bwd (9)
~~1 - 65-58687~~ (Embassy of Thailand)
① - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)
1 - 105-new (Ruth Naomi Burney)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

52 OCT 5 1959

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ORIGINAL FILED IN

The Bureau feels the above program is essential in view of the strategic location of Thailand and its proximity to Communist China and Laos, the current area of political unrest. It is felt sources developed within diplomatic establishments of Thailand could furnish pertinent information regarding political conditions and political trends in Southeast Asia which would be of considerable interest to other U. S. Government agencies.

In regard to Ruth Naomi Burney, WFO should open a separate 134 investigation on her to develop additional background information as required in Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions to make certain she is type of person we want to contact as a source. If the investigation is favorable, submit your request to the Bureau for State Department clearance to interview her. Bear in mind that when Burney is of no further interest to us, the Bureau should so advise CIA.

Bufiles fail to disclose any pertinent derogatory information identifiable with Ruth Naomi Burney.

NOTE:

Since State Department clearance has been received for the Bureau to institute a program in developing live sources within Thailand diplomatic establishments in the U. S., WFO and New York being so advised. State Department also furnished clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will select. In view of the information received from CIA via liaison regarding Burney, felt she is in a very good position for possible development as a source of pertinent information regarding Thailand activities in the U. S. and in general.

1 - Mr. Schaefer

SAC, Washington Field

65-63113

9/24/59

Director, FBI

(105-NEW)

LAOTIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.
IS - LAOS

ReBulets 5/20/58 and 6/29/59 both captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations."

State Department clearance for the Bureau to institute a program to develop informants and sources within all diplomatic establishments of the country of Laos in the U. S. was granted 9/15/59. Bureau authority is hereby granted Washington Field and New York Offices to conduct a survey regarding the identities of the individuals who can be utilized regarding captioned matter and, thereafter, submit recommendations as to individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for such investigation in each individual case. Include in your survey the names of sources and informants that are currently being used in the Laotian diplomatic establishments within your respective territories and/or the names of sources and informants not assigned to a Laotian diplomatic establishment who are in a position to furnish information regarding Laotian activities in the U. S. and in general.

The above program is essential in view of the current political unrest in Laos and its proximity to Communist China and possible future alignment with the Soviet Bloc. Sources developed within diplomatic establishments of Laos could furnish pertinent information regarding political conditions and political trends in Southeast Asia which would be of considerable interest to other U. S. Government agencies.

In regard to New York letter 8/28/59 captioned "Laotian Delegation to the UN, IS - Laos," Bureau feels that prior to recontacting Marie Jo McBurney, an employee of the Laotian Delegation to the UN as of 8/11/59, your prior investigation of

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN [illegible]

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
SEP 24 1959
MAILED

2 - New York

1 - 105-61978 (Laotian Delegation to the UN)
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)
1 - 134-6115 (Marie Jo McBurney)

VRS:gds (9)

(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

OCT 2
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

her should be brought up to date along with reopening your 134-2338 file on her. Her name should be included in the survey mentioned above. If your investigation is favorable, submit your request to the Bureau for State Department clearance to interview her.

Bufiles fail to disclose any derogatory information identifiable with Marie Jo McBurney.

NOTE: Since State Department clearance has been received for the Bureau to institute a program in developing live sources within Laotian diplomatic establishments in the U.S., WFO and NY being so advised. State Department also furnished clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will select.

MR. A. H. BELMONT November 30, 1959

MR. F. A. FROHBOSE

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Donahoe to you dated November 23, 1959. In connection with the Bureau's control program aimed in developing live sources in diplomatic establishments of countries outside the Soviet bloc with a view to developing investigative and intelligence data in "trouble-spot areas," the Director approved a recommendation that Liaison discuss with State the problem of developing live informants in Cuban establishments in the U. S.

On November 30, 1959, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section discussed instant matter with Mr. J. P. McDonnell, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State. Mr. McDonnell advised that the Department of State had no objection to the Bureau attempting to develop live sources within the Cuban establishments in the U.S. Mr. McDonnell was advised that the Bureau would check with State on individual cases as to clearance for specific interviews. Mr. McDonnell said this would be completely in accord with the State Department thinking.

ACTION:

For information. Appropriate instructions will be issued to the field.

109-12-210
OHB:jlk
(8)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. James
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bartlett
① - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of
Friendly Foreign Countries)

ORIGINAL FILED IN

NOT RECORDED
127 DEC 9 1959

6/143

57 DEC 14 1959

1 - Mr. James

SAC, WFO

December 4, 1959

Director, FBI
(105-new)

CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.
IS - CUBA

Re Bulets 5/20/58 and 6/29/59 both captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations."

State Department clearance for Bureau to institute program to develop live informants and sources within all Cuban diplomatic establishments in the United States was granted on 11/30/59. Bureau authority is therefore granted to recipient offices to conduct a survey regarding the identities of individuals who can be utilized in this matter. On completion of this survey, the recipient offices should submit their recommendations as to the individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for investigation in each individual case. Include in your survey, the names of sources and informants that are currently being used in Cuban diplomatic establishments within your respective territories together with the names of sources and informants not assigned to an establishment but who are in a position to furnish information concerning Cuban Government activities in this country.

In view of the present situation in Cuba, this matter should be given preferred attention.

2 - Miami

2 - New York

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries)

FEJ:bcm
(9)

23

63 DEC 15 1959

143

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
DEC 4 1959
MAILED

65-63113

NOT RECORDED
150 DEC 11 1959

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Office Mem n • UNITED S VERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: December 21, 1959

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

JUNE

Tolson
Belmont ✓
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (SEMIANNUAL EVALUATION)

SYNOPSIS

Three principal phases of program operating smoothly with no weaknesses. Name checks made on foreign intelligence personnel on advice of arrival by other U.S. intelligence agencies; only nominal costs involved. Ten separate foreign official establishments of five different countries presently covered by technical surveillances at specific request of Deputy Under Secretary of State at estimated monthly cost of $20,539; over one-half of this cost, however, arises from coverage required to meet Bureau investigative and intelligence needs even if State request were lacking. Bureau presently has 27 live sources in foreign establishments and investigations on 26 additional potential sources. Costs involved in this phase arise principally from field investigations of potential sources and Agents' time in handling established sources and are considered fully justified. This program supplements and is supplemented by other intelligence programs, including (Anagram) and Intensification programs. It is handled on Section-wide basis and instructions to both Section and field found to be both current and adequate. Program provides data assisting State in formulating foreign policy and handling international relations and assisting Bureau in investigative and intelligence responsibilities, as well as budgetary purposes. Consideration will be given to possible expansion of program at next conference with field security supervisors, aimed at possible double agent and defector operations against officials of communist countries.

RECOMMENDATION

That program be continued in present form. Re-evaluation will be submitted in June, 1960.

WRW:bcf
(6)

cc: Belmont
Donahoe
Mossburg
Cotter
Wacks

REC- 23 65-6315-186

60 DEC 29 1959

5-WRW

DETAILS

Re memo 6-25-59 evaluating captioned program and analyzing preceeding six month's results. This is re-evaluation and report on results achieved since that date.

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE

Basic program inaugurated 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for acquisition of positive intelligence and investigative information through three principal facets:

1. Receipt of notification from six other agencies of arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel of friendly foreign governments
2. At specific request or with specific approval of Deputy Under Secretary of State or official designated by him, maintenance of technical surveillances on official establishments in United States of countries located in trouble areas.
3. With prior State Department approval, development of live sources within establishments of friendly countries, as Bureau's intelligence and investigative requirements demand extension of coverage.

SCOPE AND COST

1. Under first category Bureau receives notification from other intelligence agencies of arrival of intelligence personnel in U.S. Handling of these notifications is confined to Seat of Government and principally involves review of any file references and indexing procedures at nominal costs. In appropriate instances field is alerted to presence of intelligence personnel but active investigation is not instituted in absence of information which would form basis for security-type case.
2. Present technical surveillances under second category, with estimated monthly costs are as follows:

	SYMBOL	ESTIMATED MONTHLY COST
Cuba		
Embassy, D. C.	WF 1133-S*	$2096
Consul and Attaches, D. C.	WF 1134-S*	1497
Consul, NYC	NY 2494-S*	2125
France		
Chancery, D. C.	WF 987-S*	5205
Germany		
Embassy, D. C.	WF 1137-S*	3777
Iraq		
Chancery, D. C.	WF 985-S*	1089
UN and Consul, NYC	NY 2340-S*	709
United Arab Republic		
Chancery, D. C.	WF 1046-S*	1188
Attaches, D. C.	WF 1097-S*	1427
UN, NYC	NY 1678-S*	1426
Total estimated monthly cost		$20539

Of this total estimated monthly cost, $126 covers cost of leased lines in New York City and the balance, $20,413, the prorated salaries of personnel working the plants. Over one-half of the estimated monthly expenditure covers technical surveillances which the Bureau would desire to maintain for its own intelligence and investigative requirements, even in the absence of requests by State Department for the coverage. The only two which do not qualify in this respect are the French Chancery and German Embassy coverage.

During the past six months two technical surveillances maintained under this phase of captioned program were discontinued. The coverage of the Cuban Consulate in Miami which was instituted 5/20/59 was discontinued 7/15/59 because it was not particularly productive. From 10/5/59 to 10/12/59 technical coverage was maintained on the Iranian Embassy in Washington to supplement special coverage of General Timur Bakhtiar, head of Iranian Security Police, at specific request of Mr. Robert Murphy of State Department.

3. With respect to the third category, we have specific State Department clearance to develop live sources in the establishments in the United States of the countries listed below. The actual sources developed to date and the potential sources currently under investigation with respect to each target country are noted under appropriate headings.

Country	Actual	Potential
Brazil	0	0*
China	6	3
Cuba	0*	1
Ghana	0	2
India	2	1
Iran	0	1
Iraq	3	2
Israel	1	2
Jordan	1	0
Laos	0	2
Lebanon	3	1
Pakistan	0	4
Saudi Arabia	0	2
Sudan	0	2
Thailand	0	1
United Arab Republic	6	0
Venezuela	0	2
Yemen	1	0
	23	26

*We are securing information from the husbands of two attaches in diplomatic establishments, one in the Brazilian Consulate, New York City, the other in the Cuban Embassy, Washington, who furnish information received from their respective wives and who have specifically requested that their wives not be contacted directly. In effect, the husbands are operating as cut-outs.

In addition to the 23 actual sources noted above, we have 4 live sources in Japanese establishments and 1 in a Malayan establishment, developed prior to the incorporation of this phase of our intelligence coverage into captioned program in May, 1958. Japan and Malaya are not presently target countries.

Costs of this phase of our program are principally those arising from field investigations of potential sources and Agents' time in handling producing sources. Costs are considered fully justified since sound counterintelligence coverage requires sources which can produce not only investigative data but also intelligence information of value to us and other agencies in guiding policy and making decisions.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements, and is supplemented by, a number of programs which result in intelligence coverage of friendly foreign countries. The Anagram Program is a typical example. Our technical coverage on past occasions has assisted in Anagram operations. The name-check program on holders of official and diplomatic visas covers many of the intelligence personnel who fall within the first category described above. Even the Intensification Program, which is directed against Soviet bloc officials and establishments, produces data on activities of friendly foreign officials and their contacts with communist officials.

MAGNITUDE

Program handled on Section-wide basis since it has ramifications touching work on any desk handling matters relating to noncommunist countries, depending upon international developments and intelligence requirements of Bureau and State Department.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have cropped up in the past six months. Over-all program is operating smoothly and effectively.

FIELD EVALUATION AND EXPANSION CONSIDERATION

Bulet 6/29/59 requested 12 field offices directly or potentially involved in this program to evaluate live source development under third phase and offer suggestions for improvement. As result three specific questions arose for consideration.

1. *Are our targets too restrictive?*
2. *Are our interview procedures too conservative?*
3. *Shall we endeavor to extend program to reach higher-level noncommunist officials and possibly communist officials?*

The first question relates to whether we should attempt source developments in establishments outside Washington, New York City and San Francisco and whether we should alter present instructions that potential sources be limited almost exclusively to employees of foreign establishments who are U.S. citizens.

Second question relates to whether we should relax present requirement that all authorized interviews with potential sources be initially conducted under a suitable pretext, preferably in connection with a criminal matter unrelated to the employment of the person interviewed.

Third question relates to whether we should utilize present sources, who generally occupy clerical positions, to identify noncommunist officials who are (1) strongly pro-Western, and (2) in social or business contact with communist officials, for purpose of approaching the noncommunist officials and working through them to reach the communists for defection or double agent purposes.

From our experiences in this program, at this time it is not believed our targets are too restrictive, our interview procedures too conservative, nor should we try to reach higher-level officials, bearing in mind the risks involved. However, the experience of the field would be invaluable in a thorough discussion of these matters and accordingly they will be scheduled for discussion at next conference with field security supervisors and recommendations thereafter will be submitted.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls over this program are exercised on day-to-day basis through review of outgoing instructions to field relating to the various phases of program. Technical surveillances under phase 2 are subject to 90-day evaluation same as normal technicals instituted for Bureau investigative purposes. No interviews conducted under phase 3 without State Department clearance and prior Bureau authorization.

Field is required to submit regular letters concerning progress in developing live sources with respect to certain countries where efforts are most desirable.

Control file maintained to which copies of pertinent serials are regularly routed. Semiannual review of program encompasses complete review of control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions are current and adequate. During past 6 months two memoranda were sent to all Supervisors in Section (6-29-59 and 7-15-59) giving directions concerning handling of phase 3. Bulet to 12 offices 6-29-59 required survey and evaluation of this same phase, as noted hereinbefore. New York and Washington Field, which handle bulk of work under program, were issued background and guidance material by Bulet 12-7-59.

OVER-ALL VALUE

For the most part, this program consists of a coordination of accepted investigative and intelligence procedures for the purpose of proper direction, redirection when indicated, and administrative controls. On a continuing basis it produces information of value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and handling of international relations and to the Bureau in its investigative and intelligence responsibilities. Frequently, the data are most useful for budgetary purposes.

CONTEMPLATED ACTION

From current evaluation and analyses, no changes are indicated at this time. We will closely follow all phases of our intelligence coverage to assure that changes and redirection are instituted as the need arises.

- Donahoe
- Edwards
1 - Liaison

A. H. Belmont April 15, 1960

S. B. Donahoe

CEYLONESE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
IS - CEYLON

On 2/16/60 a source of WFO furnished information which disclosed that the current Ceylonese Ambassador to the United States R.S.S. Gunewardene, while assigned as ambassador in Rome in 1954, did not conceal his sympathies to representatives of the countries in the "peace camp" and that he was often in attendance at cultural and social events of the "Peoples Democratic States." This information was disseminated to State Department. In addition, WFO was requested to analyze the situation in its office as it pertained to coverage of Ceylon. Its views and recommendations regarding a program for the development of sources and informants in the embassy of Ceylon were requested.

WFO has advised that it has no coverage at Ceylonese establishments at the present time and that the entire Ceylonese non-diplomatic staff contains only four possibilities for developing such coverage. It recommended instituting investigation of these individuals for the purpose of exploiting their potential.

In view of the information concerning the Ceylonese Ambassador's past sympathies coupled with the Bureau's responsibilitie in security investigations regarding international trends or developments affecting the internal security of the U.S. and our responsibilities for keeping other interested agencies advised of current intelligence information, it is believed that we should consider the possibility of establishing appropriate coverage within the Ceylonese establishments in the U.S.

Recommendation:

That liaison discuss orally with an appropriate official in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs at Department of State, the possibility of the Bureau developing live sources within Ceylonese diplomatic establishments within the U.S. If it is approved, also secure clearance for very discreet investigation of potential sources which we will thereafter select.

65-63113-

NOT RECORDED
141 AUG 3 1960

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

FLE:baj
(6)

105-85418

① - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

Mr. A. H. Belmont

April 28, 1960

Mr. S. B. Donahoe

1 - Belmont
1 - Bartlett
1 - Donahoe
1 - Schaefer

BURMA ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.
IS - BURMA

The Washington Field Office (WFO) advised by letter 3/1/60 that SA Frank B. Still, Jr. met Mr. Harlan C. Westover, Chancellor, Embassy of Burma, Washington, D. C., at a cocktail party during the 1959 Christmas and New Year holidays. Westover appeared friendly and indicated he did most of the work for the First Secretary at the Embassy of Burma. His work consists mostly of handling the Embassy accounts and purchase agreements with American firms. WFO believes Westover would be amenable to further contact.

We are in need of additional informants in the Burmese field and WFO desires authority to conduct an investigation of Westover leading toward his development as a possible source or informant regarding Burmese matters.

OBSERVATIONS:

In view of the strategic location of Burma, which borders China, and the fact it is in an area of constant unrest, believe Westover, if developed as a source or informant, could furnish us information which may be of interest to the State Department and other U. S. Government agencies. The Bureau's responsibilities regarding developments affecting the internal security of the U. S. along with keeping other U. S. Government agencies informed of information received through our sources and informants warrants us at this time to secure State Department clearance for a program to develop adequate informant coverage within Burmese diplomatic establishments in the U. S.

RECOMMENDATION:

That liaison discuss orally with an appropriate official in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, the possibility of this Bureau developing live sources within Burmese diplomatic establishments in the U. S. If it is approved, also secure clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will thereafter select.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

63113-

NOT RECORDED
47 JUL 25 196

105-new
1 - 134-8930 (Harlan C. Westover)
1 - 65-58359 (Embassy of Burma)
1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)

KRS:bem

51 AUG 5 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES G NT

Memora... l

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 14, 1960

FROM : Mr. S. B. Donahoe

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Wacks

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

My memorandum 12/21/59 pointed out twelve field offices, directly or potentially involved under captioned program in the development of live sources within foreign official establishments in the U. S., had been requested to submit evaluations and suggestions regarding possible expansion of this phase of program. As a result three specific questions were raised. These were considered at Internal Security - Espionage Conference June 9-10, 1960, with results set forth hereinafter:

First question related to whether we should attempt source developments in establishments outside Washington, New York City, and San Francisco, where all existing sources currently operate, and whether we should alter present instructions that potential sources be limited almost exclusively to employees of foreign establishments who are U.S. citizens. Conference decided that official establishments outside Washington and New York City for the most part are of a commercial nature with honorary consuls, most of whom in fact are U.S. citizens. For this reason, in absence of a showing that valuable intelligence data might exist in establishments removed from these two cities, it would not be feasible to undertake extensive program to develop sources therein. With regard to expanding our targets to include for potential development individuals who are not U.S. citizens, Conference was of the opinion we should continue as in the past concentrating on U.S. citizens but giving consideration (taking into account any special circumstances involved) to making discreet approaches after thorough investigation to foreigners employed in these diplomatic establishments, this to be done on a highly selective basis.

Second question related to whether we should relax present requirement that all authorized interviews with potential sources be initially conducted under suitable pretext, preferably in connection with criminal matter unrelated to the employment of

WRW:gmh
(6)

EX 105

REC- 22

65-63113-192

59 JUN 23 1960

10 JUN 16 1960

NAT. INT. SEC.

the person interviewed. The Conference was of the opinion that this requirement should not be relaxed since we are dealing in a most delicate area and must proceed with all possible precautionary measures. It was noted the procedures we have followed in the past have been successful and that alteration of such procedures is certainly not mandatory at this time.

Third question related to the possibility of utilizing sources which we have already developed to reach higher-level sources. In this connection, it may be noted most of our present sources occupy clerical or secretarial positions in the various establishments where they are employed. The Conference felt that on a highly selective basis we might be able to work through one or more of these lower-level employees to develop some official in the same establishment who would be willing to cooperate with the FBI. This would permit the acquisition of higher-level intelligence data relating to the specific country involved. The Conference was of the opinion that the New York and Washington Field Offices, which handle all but a very few of the sources already established, should be alert for any possibilities of stepping up our intelligence acquisition methods in this manner. Those two offices agreed to do this.

ACTION:

This disposes of the three questions raised in referenced memorandum. No further action is necessary.

WRW/ DEMB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 16, 1960

FROM : Mr. S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (SEMIANNUAL EVALUATION)

JUNE

1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Mossburg
1 - Callahan
1 - Cotter
1 - Wacks

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE:

Program inaugurated 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for acquisition of positive intelligence and investigative information through three principal phases. First phase concerns receipt of notification from other U.S. agencies of arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel of friendly governments. Second phase involves maintenance of technical surveillances of official establishments of foreign governments at State Department request. Third phase involves development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST:

First phase principally involves review of any file references and indexing procedures at Seat of Government at nominal costs. Under second phase, ten technical surveillances are currently being maintained covering official establishments of Cuba, France, Germany, and the United Arab Republic at a total estimated monthly cost of $19,866 (for details see Attachment A). Under third phase involving development of live sources, we presently have 24 actual and 27 potential sources in the establishments of 19 friendly foreign countries (for details see Attachment B). Costs of this phase are principally those arising from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling producing sources. Costs are considered fully justified since sound counterintelligence coverage requires sources which can produce.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS:

This program supplements and is supplemented by a number of programs which result in intelligence coverage; such as, Anagram Program, Intensification Program, and name check program of holders of official and diplomatic visas.

MCT - 1

62115 - 193

EX 109

REC- 16

MAGNITUDE:

ENCLOSURE

Instant program has ramifications touching work on any desk handling matters relating to noncommunist countries, depending upon international developments and intelligence requirements of Bureau and State Department.

JUN 21 1960

WRW:gmh (7) gmh

Enc.

6 JUN 30 1960

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES:

No weaknesses have cropped up in the past six months. Over-all program is operating smoothly and effectively.

REVIEW OF PROGRAM AT INTERNAL SECURITY - ESPIONAGE CONFERENCE 6/9-10/60:

At this Conference, captioned program was reviewed. Consideration was given to questions whether we should endeavor to develop sources at establishments outside Washington and New York City and whether we should relax our procedures to permit more direct approach during interviews with potential sources. Conference concluded that probability of there being important intelligence data within foreign official establishments outside Washington and New York City was too remote to warrant expenditure of manpower and money for purpose of endeavoring to expand program in this direction at this time. With regard to relaxing requirement that potential sources be interviewed under suitable pretext, preferably of a criminal nature, Conference felt we are operating in too delicate an area to let down safeguards at this time. Conference agreed that New York and Washington Field Offices should, on a highly selective basis, endeavor to develop higher-level sources where situation permits such efforts by making approaches to them through sources currently being operated on lower levels (such as chauffeurs, clerks, secretaries, et cetera, in diplomatic establishments). This will be done.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS:

Controls are exercised on day-to-day basis through review of outgoing instructions to field. Technical surveillances are subject to 90-day evaluations. No interviews are conducted of potential sources without specific State Department clearance. Control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are regularly routed. Semiannual evaluation of program encompasses review of control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS:

Review of control file discloses instructions are current and adequate.

OVER-ALL VALUE:

For the most part, this program consists of a coordination of accepted investigative and intelligence procedures for the purpose of proper direction, redirection when indicated, and administrative controls.

On a continuing basis it produces information of value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and handling of international relations and to the Bureau in its investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

Recommended program be continued in present form. Re-evaluation will be submitted in December, 1960.

Intelligence Coverage of
Friendly Foreign Countries
Bufile 65-63113

Attachment A

The following technical surveillances are being maintained at the specific request or with the specific approval of the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State:

Country	Symbol	Estimated Monthly Cost
Cuba		
Embassy, D. C.	WF 1133-S*	$2250
Consul and Attaches, D. C.	WF 1134-S*	1606
Consul, NYC	NY 2494-S*	2294
Consul, Miami	MM 709-S* MM 710-S*	733
France		
Chancery, D. C.	WF 987-S*	5188
Germany		
Embassy, D. C.	WF 1137-S*	3687
United Arab Republic		
Chancery, D. C.	WF 1046-S*	1210
Attaches, D. C.	WF 1097-S*	1369
UN, NYC	NY 1678-S*	1529
	Total Estimated Monthly Cost	$19,866

During past six months, technical coverage of the Iraqi Chancery in Washington and the Iraqi Consulate and UN office in New York City was discontinued as a part of this program.

Special technical coverage was maintained for the benefit of the State Department at the French Embassy residence from 4-15-60 to 4-29-60, which period included the time French President Charles deGaulle visited the United States.

65-[illegible]-193

ENCLOSURE

Intelligence Coverage of
Friendly Foreign Countries
Bufile 65-63113

Attachment B

With State Department approval we are developing live sources in official establishments of countries listed below. Actual sources developed to date and potential sources under investigation are shown in connection with each target country.

Country	Actual	Potential
Brazil	0	0*
China	6	1
Cuba	0	1
Ghana	0	1
India	1	2
Iran	1	2
IRaq	3	1
Israel	1	2
Jordan	1	0
Laos	0	2
Lebanon	2	0
Pakistan	0	11
Saudi Arabia	2	0
Sudan	1	2
Thailand	0	0
Tunisia	0	0
United Arab Republic	5	0
Venezuela	0	2
Yemen	1	0
	24	27

*Husband of attache in Brazilian Consulate, New York City, furnishes information received from his wife, thus operating as a cut-out.

In addition to the 24 actual sources noted above, we have 3 live sources in Japanese establishments and 1 in a Malayan establishment, developed prior to the incorporation of this phase of our intelligence coverage into captioned program in May, 1958. Japan and Malaya are not presently target countries.

[illegible] - [illegible] - 193

ENCLOSURE

MR. A. H. BELMONT July 21, 1960

R. O. L'ALLIER

INDONESIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.
IS - INDONESIA

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Donahoe to you dated 6-15-60 in the above-captioned matter. Liaison was instructed to talk with State regarding the possibility of the Bureau's developing live sources within Indonesian diplomatic establishments in the U.S., and if approved secure clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which will be selected in the future.

Instant matter was discussed on 6-17-60 by Mr. Emond of the Liaison Section with Mr. Frank Meloy, Assistant to Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

On 7-19-60 Mr. Meloy advised Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section that after considering this matter State has come to the conclusion that the successful penetration of Indonesian diplomatic establishments within the U.S. would be of real interest to State; that the results would be interesting and useful and that State has decided to grant approval to the Bureau to proceed with this matter. This approval also carries with it, clearance for discreet investigations of potential sources.

ACTION:

For information.

65-63113-
NOT RECORDED
184 AUG 2 1960

OHB:sap (8)

1-Parsons
1-Belmont
1-Donahoe
1-Schaefer
1-65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Nations)
1-Liaison
1-Bartlett

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

51 AUG 3 1960
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

COPY

SAC, WFO (105-26155) July 28, 1960

Director, FBI (105-87125)

INDONESIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
IS - INDONESIA

ReBulet 4-28-60 captioned "Irma Viscal de Ginario, IS - Indonesia." Reference is also made to New York letter 6-2-60 and WFO letter 6-1-60 both captioned as above. Copy of referenced WFO letter is enclosed for the New York Office.

State Department clearance for the Bureau to institute a program to develop sources and informants within all Indonesian diplomatic establishments in the United States was granted 7-19-60. State Department advised that the successful penetration of Indonesian diplomatic establishments in the United States would be of real interest to it.

Therefore, Bureau authority is hereby granted the Washington Field and New York Offices to conduct an up-to-date survey regarding the identities of individuals connected with Indonesian diplomatic establishments in your respective territories who can be utilized regarding captioned matter; and, thereafter submit recommendations as to the individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for such investigation in each individual case. Bureau authority is not granted at this time for investigations of those individuals mentioned in relets until such time that an up-to-date office index check is made, local police and credit records are checked and a check made with established sources. Attempts should also be made to secure the individual's date and place of birth which, of course, will assist the Bureau in checking its indices regarding the individual you propose to investigate. Upon receipt of this information, the Bureau will then be in a better position to determine whether or not an investigation should be conducted.

WFO and New York should bear in mind that we should select only those persons for development as confidential sources and subsequent interview whom we can anticipate from our investigations will be responsive to our request for assistance. Such persons should be considered for interviews to present a minimum of risk in regard to their divulging to their employers any contacts by the FBI as such disclosure could result in serious repercussions between the Governments of Indonesia and the United States.

2 - New York (100-56137) (Enclosure) 65-

NOT RECORDED
19

(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

VRS:sah
(6)
COPY

130

160

COPY

Letter to SAC, WFO
RE: INDONESIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
105-87125

It is the Bureau's feeling that contacts with persons with other than American citizenship and who have not displayed any loyalty to the United States Government or indicated sympathy with our investigative responsibilities are extremely risky and could result in impairing relations between the United States and Indonesia if a contact with the FBI was disclosed.

NOTE: Bureau in memo 6-15-60 captioned "Indonesian Activities in the United States, IS - Indonesia" pointed out that we needed informant coverage in the Indonesian field. It was also noted in the memo that there have been differences between the Indonesian Army and President Sukarno of Indonesia over the composition of the new Indonesian Parliament. Sukarno is said to have personally appointed certain communists to the new body. On 3-8-60 Khrushchev and Sukarno issued joint communiques calling for relaxation of tension, peaceful coexistence and general disarmament. The Soviets also recently extended a credit of $250,000,000 to Sukarno and both parties agreed to increase mutual trade and cultural exchanges. We requested liaison to discuss this matter with appropriate official at State with possibility of this Bureau developing live sources within Indonesian diplomatic establishments in the United States and, if approved, also secure clearance for discreet investigations of potential sources which we will thereafter select. As indicated in instant letter, State furnished approval for the above program on 7-19-60 which also afforded Bureau clearance to conduct discreet investigations of potential sources. WFO and New York being advised accordingly.

COPY

- Schaefer

SAC, WFO (105-34566)

July 29, 1960

Director, FBI (105-85418)

CEYLONESE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
IS - CEYLON

For the benefit of the New York Office a source of WFO furnished information on 2-16-60 which disclosed that the Ceylonese Ambassador to the U. S., R.S.S. Gunewardene, while assigned as Ambassador in Rome in 1954 did not conceal his sympathies to representatives of the countries in the "peace camp" and that he was often in attendance at cultural and social events of the "Peoples Democratic States." In view of this information WFO was requested to analyze its informant coverage pertaining to Ceylonese activities in the U. S. WFO's views and recommendations regarding a program for the development of sources and informants in the Embassy of Ceylon were requested. WFO advised it had no coverage at Ceylonese establishments at the present time and recommended instituting investigations of certain individuals for the purpose of exploiting their potential.

In view of the information concerning the Ceylonese Ambassador's past sympathies coupled with the Bureau's responsibilities in security investigations regarding international trends or developments affecting the internal security of the U. S. and our responsibilities for keeping other interested agencies advised of current intelligence information, we should at this time consider the possibility of establishing appropriate informant coverage within all Ceylonese diplomatic establishments in the U. S.

State Department clearance to institute a program to develop informants and sources within all Ceylonese diplomatic establishments in the U. S. was granted on 7-19-60. State Department related, however, that Ceylonese activities are of no particular interest to the Department of State, but in view of the past activities of Ceylon's Ambassador to the U. S., R.S.S. Gunewardene, State would have no objection to the Bureau developing live sources providing the target is a citizen of the U. S. State related that a contact of a

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 105-85418-5

2 - New York
VRS:ms
(7)

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
JUL 29 1960
MAILED

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Diplomatic Representatives of Friendly Foreign Countries)

51 AUG 5 1960

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Ceylonese national would require a discussion with State of the individual case before taking any action.

Bureau authority is hereby granted the Washington Field and New York Offices to conduct a survey regarding the identities of individuals connected with Ceylonese diplomatic establishments within your respective territories who can be utilized regarding captioned matter; and, thereafter, submit recommendations as to the individuals to be investigated in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau authority for such investigation in each individual case.

It is important that we should select only those individuals for development as confidential sources and possible subsequent interviews whom we can anticipate from our investigations will be responsive to our requests for assistance. The Bureau feels that contacts with persons with other than American citizenship and who have not displayed any loyalty to U. S. Government nor indicated sympathy with our investigative responsibilities, are extremely risky and could result in serious repercussions between the U. S. and Ceylon if a contact with the FBI was disclosed.

NOTE: With State Department clearance concerning the above program we are now in a position to develop live sources within all Ceylonese diplomatic establishments in the U. S. This, of course, will afford us another means of securing good information which would not otherwise be available to other interested U. S. Government agencies. WFO and New York being instructed accordingly.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Parsons
1 - Belmont
1 - Liaison
1 - Donahoe
1 - Mossburg

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont ✓
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Trotter
Evans
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 7, 1961

FROM : Mr. S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

In view of recent information received indicating Morocco has accepted Soviet military aid and will soon request the United States and France to remove its military bases from Morocco, the Department of State is being requested to grant clearance for us to institute a program to develop sources and informants in Moroccan diplomatic establishments in the United States.

Recent newspaper publicity has indicated a definite interest by the Soviets and Communist China in infiltrating various countries of Africa, which at the present time are in the throes of various nationalist moves. On 11-16-60 an article appeared in the Madrid daily newspaper "A.B.C." which stated the Moroccan Government had announced the acceptance of Soviet military aid. On 11-22-60 the same newspaper reported a Moroccan military mission was departing Morocco for Moscow on that date to discuss Soviet military aid. The same newspaper reported on the same date that a good-will mission from Morocco had been received by Khrushchev in Moscow. A United Press International release dated 12-5-60 stated that Morocco may soon demand removal of all United States and French military bases on her territory.

Madrid papers in October, 1960, related that Moroccan labor unions, which are communist infiltrated, planned to send representatives to Cuba and the same unions are urging the Moroccan Government to disband the Royal Moroccan Army and set up Castro-type militias.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-77787-235 62-103546 105-62915

OBSERVATIONS:

In view of the political developments in Morocco as indicated above, it is believed that we should institute a program to develop sources and informants at Moroccan diplomatic establishments in the United States for the purpose of obtaining intelligence data of assistance to the United States Government concerning Moroccan activities in the United States. Such sources will be in a position to furnish us information indicating possible Morrocan activities within our investigative jurisdiction.

65-63113-230

EHM:rgr
(9)

52 FEB 28 1961

EX 104

REC- 22

FEB 24 1961

1 - 62-77787-235 (Moroccan UN Delegation, New York City)
1 - 62-103546 (Moroccan Consulate, New York City)
1 - 105-62915 (Moroccan Embassy, Washington, D.C.)

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

ACTION:

It is recommended liaison obtain State clearance for an FBI program to develop sources and informants at Moroccan diplomatic establishments in the United States in view of facts and observations set forth above.

OK

2-10-61 J.P.M' Donnell, State, advised clearance granted to proceed with above program.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES C[illegible]NT

Memora[illegible]l

- Parsons
- Belmont
- Donahoe
- Liaison
1 - Mossburg

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 24, 1961

FROM : Mr. S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

We are requesting State to grant clearance for us to conduct a program to develop sources and informants at diplomatic establishments in the United States of the Mali (Africa) Government in view of that Government's anti-Western and pro-Soviet-bloc attitude.

The Republic of Mali was admitted to the United Nations as a new republic in Africa on 9-28-60. The Office of Special Investigations (OSI), Department of the Air Force, has advised the "leftist-oriented government" of Mali apparently intends to establish ties with a number of Sino-Soviet-bloc countries. On 10-13-60 Mali recognized Communist China and OSI indicated that the Nationalist Chinese representatives in Mali would be asked to leave that country. In October, 1960, Soviet Russia recognized the new Republic of Mali and a Soviet delegation was due to arrive in Mali in late 1960. OSI has advised that Mali has consistently voted at the United Nations with the communist bloc on East-West issues.

The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) advised on 1-27-61 that Soviet-bloc activities in Mali were expected to increase. The Government of Mali has retained "radical, leftist and pro-Marxist" ministers in key posts including: interior, planning, information, transportation, communications, public laws and "leftist" Prime Minister Modibo Keita had retained portfolio of defense and security. ONI advised on 3-21-61 that Mali signed an economic and trade agreement with the USSR for a 44 million ruble loan. Mali is presently purchasing Soviet planes; has concluded an economic agreement with Communist China and is selling 90 per cent of its total exports to the communist bloc in 1961.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ACTION:

It is recommended that Bureau liaison contact the appropriate State Department representative and obtain clearance for the FBI to institute a program to develop sources and informants at diplomatic establishments in the United States of the Republic of Mali in view of the fact that Mali appears to be fast becoming a satellite of the Soviet bloc.

65-63113 - 232

65-63113
EHM:fag
(9)

REC- 73

APR 5 1961

1 - 105-NEW (Republic of Mali Embassy)
1 - 62-77787-384 (Republic of Mali UN Delegation, New York City)
1 - 105-NEW (Republic of Mali Consulate)

Memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

It is also recommended that liaison secure State clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will hereafter select.

OK

3/29/61
OK on both counts per
J P McDonnell, State
OHB

FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Tolson
- Parsons
- Mohr
- Belmont ✓
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Tavel
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 20, 1961

FROM : Mr. S. B. Donahoe

① D'Adrian

②

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

We are requesting State to grant clearance for us to conduct a program to develop sources and informants at diplomatic establishments in the United States of the Government of the Republic of the Congo in view of political crisis existing in that country and in view of Soviet support and support of other African and pro-Soviet countries of procommunist political group in the Republic of the Congo.

The Republic of the Congo obtained its freedom from Belgium in 1960 and since that time has been involved in a political turmoil between opposing factions. The procommunist - pro-Soviet faction was represented by Patrice Lumumba who was killed in the Republic of the Congo during February, 1961. As a result of his death, procommunist and anti-Western demonstrations were held in the United States and in many countries of the world. Lumumba's Lieutenant Antoine Gizenga, who is pro-Soviet, has assumed Lumumba's position with the dissident group. In view of critical political situation existing in the Republic of the Congo and the fact that Soviet Russia and other pro-Soviet - African countries (Ghana, Mali and Guinea) are supporting the pro-Gizenga faction in the Republic of the Congo, it was believed desirable in late 1960 that we should endeavor to establish sources in diplomatic establishments of the Republic of the Congo in the United States. Through such sources it was believed we could obtain intelligence information of value to the United States Government and be in a position to promptly institute investigation of any matter coming within our jurisdiction through such coverage. Both New York and WFO have made inquiries in the past and were unable to ascertain that the Republic of the Congo had set up any diplomatic establishments in the United States. The New York Office has now determined that a temporary office for its United Nations Delegation has been set up at 145 East Forty-ninth Street, New York City, and New York has requested authority in order that investigation can be conducted to determine the identities of any personnel who would be suitable for development as sources and informants at this establishment.

65-63113-237

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

65-63113

EHM:fag

(7)

1 - Parsons
1 - Belmont
1 - Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mossburg
1 - 105-97459-336 (Nationality Group Coverage - Republic of the Congo)

Let to NY cc WFO 3/9/61 EHM:fag

REC 2

5 MAY 11 1961

5

Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

ACTION:

In view of the present controversial political situation in the Republic of the Congo and Soviet support for the procommunist political faction there, it is recommended that Bureau liaison contact the appropriate State Department representative and obtain clearance for the FBI to institute a program to develop sources and informants at diplomatic establishments in the United States of the Republic of the Congo. It is also recommended that liaison secure State clearance for very discreet investigations of potential sources which we will hereafter select.

OK P

5/2/61
J P McDonnell, State, advised clearance granted to institute a program to develope sources & informants as outlined above and also to conduct discreet investigations of potential sources. -Bartlett

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVE ENT

Memorandum

Tolson ______
Belmont ______
Mohr ______
Callahan ______
Conrad ______
DeLoach ______
Evans ______
Malone ______
Rosen ______
Sullivan ______
Tavel ______
Trotter ______
Tele. Room ______
Ingram ______
Gandy ______

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 22, 1961

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (SEMIANNUAL EVALUATION)

JUNE

1 - W. C. Sullivan
1 - Donahoe
1 - Mossburg
1 - Callahan
1 - Cotter
1 - Moore, G. C.

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE

Program inaugurated 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for acquisition of positive intelligence and investigative information through three principal phases: (1) receipt of notification from other U.S. agencies of arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel of friendly governments; (2) maintenance of technical surveillances of official establishments of foreign governments at State Department request; and (3) development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST

First phase principally involves review of file references and indexing procedures at Seat of Government at nominal cost. Under second phase, five technical surveillances are currently being maintained covering official establishments of Cuba, France and the United Arab Republic at a total estimated monthly cost of $11,586. (For details see Attachment A). Under third phase we presently have 28 actual and 35 potential sources in the establishments of 26 nations approved by State Department as target countries. (For details see Attachment B). Costs of this phase are principally those arising from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling producing sources. Costs are considered fully justified since sound counter-intelligence coverage requires sources which can produce.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements and is supplemented by a number of programs which result in intelligence coverage; such as, Anagram Program, Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S., and name check program covering holders of official and diplomatic visas.

65-63113-240

REC-44

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures - 2

17 JUN 27 1961

WRW:bcf
(7)

EX-107

6 JUN 27 1961

Memorandum to W. C. Sullivan
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(SEMIANNUAL EVALUATION)

MAGNITUDE

Instant program has ramifications touching work on any desk handling matters relating to noncommunist countries, depending upon international developments and intelligence requirements of Bureau and State Department. Principal field activity lies in Washington, D. C., and New York City, where majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have cropped up in the past six months. Over-all program is operating smoothly and effectively.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls are exercised on day-to-day basis through review of outgoing instructions to field. Technical surveillances are subject to 90-day evaluations. No interviews are conducted of potential sources without specific State Department clearance. Control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are regularly routed. Semiannual evaluation of program encompasses review of control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of control file discloses instructions are current and adequate.

OVER-ALL VALUE

For the most part, this program consists of a coordination of accepted investigative and intelligence procedures for the purpose of proper direction, redirection when indicated, and administrative controls. On a continuing basis it produces information of value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and handling of international relations and to the Bureau in its investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION

Recommended program be continued in present form. Re-evaluation will be submitted in December, 1961.

dEM

WCS

ATTACHMENT A

The following technical surveillances are being maintained at the specific request or with the specific approval of the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State:

Country	Symbol	Estimated Monthly Cost
Cuba		
Delegation to Organization of American States, D.C.	WF 1262-S*	$1674
Mission to United Nations, N.Y.	NY 2965-S*	551
France		
Chancery, D.C.	WF 987-S*	4563
United Arab Republic		
Chancery, D.C.	WF 1046-S*	3145
Delegation to United Nations, N.Y.	NY 1678-S*	1653
Total Estimated Monthly Cost		$11,586

During the past six months technical coverage of four official Cuban establishments was discontinued when the establishments were closed by virtue of severence of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba. Coverage of the attache offices in Washington of the United Arab Republic was also dropped because of nonproductivity.

[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

ATTACHMENT B

With State Department approval we are developing live sources in official establishments of countries listed below. Actual sources developed and potential sources under investigation are shown in connection with each target country.

Country	Actual	Potential
Brazil	1	1*
Burma	0	3
Ceylon	0	2
China	3	1
Congo	0	0
Cuba	1	1
Ghana	1	2
Guinea	0	1
India	2	4
Indonesia	0	3
Iran	1	0
Iraq	1	1
Israel	2	5
Jordan	0	0
Laos	3	0
Lebanon	1	0
Mali	0	4
Morocco	0	2
Pakistan	3	0
Saudi Arabia	2	0
Sudan	2	0
Thailand	0	1
Tunisia	0	3
United Arab Republic	3	1
Venezuela	1	0
Yemen	1	0
Totals	28	35

*In addition to one actual informant and one potential informant in Brazilian establishments, we are operating as a cut-out the husband of an attache in the Brazilian Consulate, New York City, who furnishes data received from his wife.

We also have one live source in a Japanese establishment and one in a Malayan establishment, developed prior to the incorporation of this phase of our intelligence coverage into captioned program in May, 1958. Japan and Malaya are not presently target countries.

65-63113-870

DEM B

WC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES [illegible]T

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: October 12, 1961

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF ~~FRIENDLY~~ FOREIGN COUNTRIES

In my memorandum of 10-6-61 it was pointed out that we had proposed to the Department of State the expansion of this program to fifteen Central and South American countries. The program involves the developing of live sources in diplomatic establishments in the U.S. of foreign countries with emphasis on countries faced with communist subversion, Sino-Soviet bloc activity or revolutionary situations. We felt the existing situation in Latin America warranted this expansion. In view of the fact that U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, declined State clearance for this expansion it was recommended and approved we go on record with letters to Secretary of State Rusk and the Attorney General informing them of the program and its merit and pointing out we were unable to further implement this program in view of the State Department decision.

There is an additional factor here which warrants consideration. Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, with whom we discussed this matter at State, has been extremely cooperative with the Bureau from time to time. He was particularly helpful in connection with the opening of the office of the Legal Attache in Manila. In fact, on our behalf, he exerted pressure on the U.S. Ambassador there in order to secure his approval of the establishing of the office. He undoubtedly can be helpful in the future on such matters.

For the above reasons it is believed highly desirable to send a letter to Johnson directly rather than to Rusk. Johnson is a top-level official and we will have served our purpose by putting him on notice and outlining our views.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ACTION:

EX 100

REC 52

-246

Attached are letters to Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson and the Attorney General.

Encs. sent 10-16-61
SBD:dmd
(7)
65-63113
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - ~~Mr. Donahoe~~

XEROX
OCT 20 1961

56 OCT 20 1961

82 OCT 20 1961

SEE ADDENDUM ON NEXT PAGE

ADDENDUM BY MR. TOLSON 10/13/61

I am inclined to the view that we should not send the attached communications to the Attorney General and Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson concerning our proposal to expand our intelligence coverage in this country with respect to countries in Central and South America. After all, we presented the matter to Mr. Johnson, indicated what we could do and he, in turn, advised that the requested clearances would not be granted. It is not the Bureau's basic responsibility to develop information concerning these foreign countries. It is obvious that someone in the State Department to whom Johnson has talked is opposed to our doing this. We have been told that if there is a specific country or individual involved and a request was made by the Bureau, consideration would be given to such a request. I think that we should let the matter stand on that basis.

Mr. Belmont does not agree. This matter presently rests on an oral basis only and he feels that we should be on record.

CT:DSS

I am approving
letter to Johnson &
memo to A.G.
H

SECRET

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans

The Attorney General

October 13, 1961

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

Director, FBI

OCT 13 3 25 PM '61

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

It is felt you will be interested in recent developments relating to our efforts to expand and improve our capacity to produce data of intelligence and investigative value regarding countries in Central and South America.

An integral part of our intelligence and internal security coverage is the developing of individual sources within the diplomatic establishments in the United States of foreign countries. We endeavor to direct our efforts in those areas where such coverage is likely to be most beneficial. For this reason we concentrate on those countries faced with increased communist subversion, countries tending toward alignment with the Soviet-Sino bloc or countries involved in actual or potential revolutionary situations with international ramifications.

We are fully cognizant of the delicacy of such a program and have set up what we feel are sensible safeguards. In order to assure coordination with foreign policy objectives we request clearance from the Department of State before designating a particular country as a target. We then conduct most discreet investigations of carefully selected individuals, preferably citizens of the United States, who are connected with the diplomatic establishments of the particular country. When we feel there is a reasonable potential for success we then request clearance from the Department of State for an interview with the individual. As an additional safeguard the interview is conducted under a pretext, usually unrelated to our internal security responsibilities, in order to reduce substantially the possibility of any repercussions arising from the interview. Further contact, if any, depends upon our assessment of the attitude and reliability of the individual and the degree of cooperation volunteered.

MAILED 4
OCT 16 1961
COMM-FBI

REC- 95

As a result of this program, which has proceeded on a most careful and discreet basis, we have develo

OCT 17 1961

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

65-63113

SBD: dmd (10)

See note page 3

SECRET

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

67 OCT 17 1961

attempting to develop sources with regard to a number of countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia as well as the countries of Cuba, Venezuela and Brazil.

The increasing political instability in the countries of Central and South America has been a serious cause for concern in view of the inroads made by communism, the efforts of the Castro regime in Cuba to export its revolutionary concepts and the increased efforts of the Sino-Soviet bloc to extend its influence in that area. In recognition of this situation we sought clearance from the Department of State for the designation of fifteen countries in that area as target countries under this program.

We consulted Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Mr. Francis E. Meloy, his Special Assistant. We were advised by Mr. Johnson in September, 1961, that careful consideration had been given the matter. He advised, however, that clearance would not be granted for the proposed expansion of this program although consideration would be given to any request we might make with regard to any specific country or individual. Mr. Johnson indicated it was felt that the diplomatic establishments in the United States of these countries were strictly on the outside with regard to pertinent developments in the home countries. He felt no real intelligence could be gained and the risk of developing sources outweighed any possible gain.

Our past experience has shown this program can produce intelligence data of value as well as investigative data of assistance in handling our internal security responsibilities. The development of informants in diplomatic establishments is a delicate and tedious process which requires careful planning. The most propitious time to implement such a program is prior to the point that the diplomatic establishment of a particular country is staffed solely by individuals who have no sympathy with the position or views of the United States.

SECRET

The Attorney General

In view of the decision of the Department of State we are unable to implement this program further with regard to the countries of Central and South America and in view of your interest in developments in that area it was felt you would like to know about the situation.

1 - Mr. Byron R. White
Deputy Attorney General

Note:

Classified "Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of our objectives in this program could result in severe damage to our foreign relations.

This letter has been written pursuant to memo, 10-6-61, Donahoe to Sullivan re Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries. The word "Friendly" has been omitted from the caption of this letter since it does not accurately apply to all of the countries involved in this program.

Cover memo prepared Donahoe to Sullivan re "INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES" dated 10-12-61 prepared by SBD:dmd.

SECRET

SECRET

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

October 13, 1961

BY LIAISON

OCT 13 3 25 PM '61

Honorable U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

10/16/61 delivered

My dear Mr. Johnson:

Special Agent O. H. Bartlett has recently discussed with you and Mr. Francis E. Meloy our proposal to expand and improve our capacity to produce data of intelligence and investigative value regarding countries in Central and South America.

An integral part of our intelligence and internal security coverage is the developing of individual sources within the diplomatic establishments in the United States of foreign countries. We endeavor to direct our efforts in those areas where such coverage is likely to be most beneficial. For this reason we concentrate on those countries faced with increased communist subversion, countries tending toward alignment with the Soviet-Sino bloc or countries involved in actual or potential revolutionary situations with international ramifications.

We are fully cognizant of the delicacy of such a program and have set up what we feel are sensible safeguards. In order to assure coordination with foreign policy objectives we request clearance from the Department of State before designating a particular country as a target. We then conduct most discreet investigations of carefully selected individuals, preferably citizens of the United States, who are connected with the diplomatic establishments of the particular country. When we feel there is a reasonable potential for success we then request clearance from the Department of State for an interview with the individual. As an additional safeguard the

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

SBD:dmd (8)
REC- 23 65-63113 - 24

See note page 3

5 OCT 25 1961

SECRET

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

interview is conducted under a pretext, usually unrelated to our internal security responsibilities, in order to reduce substantially the possibility of any repercussions arising from the interview. Further contact, if any, depends upon our assessment of the attitude and reliability of the individual and the degree of cooperation volunteered.

As a result of this program, which has proceeded on a most careful and discreet basis, we have developed or are attempting to develop sources with regard to a number of countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia as well as the countries of Cuba, Venezuela and Brazil.

The increasing political instability in the countries of Central and South America has been a serious cause for concern in view of the inroads made by communism, the efforts of the Castro regime in Cuba to export its revolutionary concepts and the increased efforts of the Sino-Soviet bloc to extend its influence in that area. This situation prompted us to initiate contact with the Department of State and to request clearance for the designation of fifteen countries in that area as target countries under this program.

Following his conversation with you and with Mr. Meloy on September 12, 1961, Mr. Bartlett informed me that after careful consideration you had advised clearance would not be granted for the proposed expansion although consideration would be given to any request we might make with regard to any specific country or individual. I understand that you feel the diplomatic establishments in the United States of these countries are strictly on the outside with regard to pertinent developments in the home countries and no real intelligence could be gained. It was the opinion of the Department of State that the risk of developing sources outweighed any possible gain.

Our past experience has shown this program can produce intelligence data of value as well as investigative data of assistance in handling our internal security responsibilities. The development of informants in diplomatic establishments is a delicate and tedious process which requires careful planning. The most propitious time to implement such a program is prior to the point that the diplomatic establishment of a particular country is staffed solely by individuals who have no sympathy with the position or views of the United States.

In view of the decision of the Department of State we are unable to implement this program further with regard to the countries of Central and South America. It was felt you would be interested in a review of this program and our views as to the merits of it.

Sincerely yours,

Note:

Classified "Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of our objectives in this program could result in severe damage to our foreign relations.

Cover memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan prepared on 10-12-61 re Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries by SBD/dmd.

1 - Mr. Leavitt
1 - Mr. Donahoe

SAC, WFO 12/6/61

Director, FBI (105-97459-212)

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - ECUADOR

On 11/29/61 clearance was obtained from the Department of State for the Bureau to discreetly institute investigation designed to develop sources at the Ecuadorian establishments. Accordingly, recipient offices should institute a survey for the purpose of identifying persons employed at the Embassy of Ecuador, Washington, D. C., the Ecuadorian Mission to the United Nations, New York City, and the Consulate of Ecuador, New York City, particularly United States citizens, who might possess potential as sources or informants. Submit your requests for investigation in this regard in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau clearance to institute investigation in each individual case.

Submit the results of your initial survey under instant caption 30 days after receipt of this communication and thereafter on a 90-day basis setting forth progress being made to develop confidential sources and informants until such time as adequate coverage is assured.

Extra copies are being furnished WFO and New York for their files on the above-mentioned Ecuadorian diplomatic establishments.

4 - New York

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Nations)
1 - 62-57242 (Embassy of Ecuador, Washington, D. C.)
1 - 105-New (Ecuadorian Mission to the United Nations, New York City)
1 - 105-New (Consulate of Ecuador, New York City)

TWI:bjs
(14)

NOTE: On 11/28/61 Mr. J. P. McDonnell, Office of Security, Department of State, advised SA Orrin H. Bartlett that State Department approval was being granted the Bureau to develop sources and informants at the Embassy of Ecuador, Washington, D. C., and other Ecuadorian establishments if it [illegible] become necessary.

YELLOW DUPLICATE
DEC 5 - 1961
MAILED

RECORDED
157 DEC 1961

64 DEC 12 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: April 9, 1962

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Bartlett

The Attorney General has forwarded the attached letter from Secretary Rusk dated April 2, 1962. This letter is in response to one from the Attorney General dated March 20 and concerns the Attorney General's view as to the desirability of the FBI expanding its existing program of developing sources in diplomatic establishments of foreign countries. A letter by the Attorney General was sent after he was informed the State Department had declined to give clearance to our expanding this program to include coverage of additional Latin American countries.

Secretary Rusk in his letter agrees that all necessary steps should be taken to enhance the security of the United States and, therefore, has no objection to the program of preliminary discreet investigations. The Secretary does say that he is not convinced that a comprehensive program of penetration through foreign embassy personnel will yield intelligence of sufficient importance to be worthy of the high political risks. He adds, however, thatthis is something that can be looked into further after the preliminary investigations have been conducted.

The Attorney General mentioned orally that he was sending the letter and that, of course, we couldn't expect the State Department to totally reverse itself. The Attorney General suggested that we proceed with the preliminary investigations and thereafter if we encounter any further difficulties with the State Department, he would like to be informed.

165-63162

ENCLOSURE / ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED
191 APR 30 1962

25 APR 27 1962

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ACTION

The Domestic Intelligence Division will proceed to implement this expanded program on a highly selective basis. This is the type of investigation which of necessity will be handled on a most discreet basis.

Memo Wannall to Sullivan w/enc (sme) 4/17/62 TWilliams

Let to AG 1-DAG 4/18/62 TWilliams

Let follow-up not sent 2-NY 4/13/62 TWilliams

APR 27 1962 XEROX

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Sullivan

CAE:sp
5

let to wfo 4-20-62

S-Tml

SECRET April 2, 1962

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I have received your letter of March 20 concerning the desire of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to develop intelligence sources in the diplomatic establishments in the United States of an additional 15 Latin American countries, and I have had an opportunity to review the correspondence on this subject between the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Under Secretary Ball.

[illegible]

I share your belief that all necessary steps should be taken to enhance the security of the United States and I believe that it should be possible for the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to cooperate in the achievement of the objectives to which we are both committed. The Department of State therefore has no objection to the program which you propose in which preliminary investigations will be conducted by the FBI in this program in a discreet manner under which it would not be possible for these efforts to be traced to the United States Government or its representatives. Before open interviews are undertaken with individuals with a view to penetrating specific diplomatic establishments, however, the Department of State would like to discuss with the FBI these efforts at penetration on a case-by-case basis.

Under Secretary Ball's letter of January 18, 1962 gives a good summary of our reservations about an across-the-board effort with Latin American embassies. My chief concern is related to penetration through foreign nationals. It seems to me highly certain that a proportion

The Honorable
Robert F. Kennedy,
Attorney General.

[illegible]

SECRET

65-63113-

ENCLOSURE

of these would report such approaches to their own governments and create tensions between us and friendly Foreign Ministers and Presidents. Some would, of course, do their best to appear cooperative, with the full knowledge of their own governments. Having in mind other means of high reliability, I am not convinced that a comprehensive program of penetration through foreign embassy personnel will yield intelligence of sufficient importance to be worth the high political risks. However, that is something we can look into after your preliminary investigations have proceeded further.

I am asking my colleagues to follow closely the possibilities of fully exploiting the Special Security Committee recently established by the OAS as a result of a Punta del Este resolution. I personally hope that we can move without delay to a discreet but effective international cooperation against subversion and espionage, especially in the Caribbean area.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

1 - Wannall
1 - Leavitt

SAC, WFO 4/10/62

Director, FBI (105-97459-207)

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - CHILE
INTERNAL SECURITY - CHILE

A recent State Department report assessing the Communist Party of Chile (PCC) observes the basic objective of the PCC is to weaken Chile's ties with the U. S. and swing it toward the Soviet Union and other bloc countries. The same report notes the efforts of the Soviet Union and Communist China to increase trade with Chile but concludes that negotiations in this field are primarily a cover for political and intelligence operations and a means for carrying out functions of a diplomatic mission. The possibility exists that Chile could take a favorable position with regard to the Soviet Union and bloc countries.

The Bureau in order to be in a position to obtain current intelligence data concerning Chile on April 4, 1962, obtained State Department clearance to discreetly institute investigation designed to develop sources at the Chilean establishments.

Accordingly, the recipients should institute a survey for the purpose of identifying persons employed at the Embassy of Chile, Washington, D. C., the Chilean Mission to the United Nations and the Consulate of Chile, both in New York City, particularly United States citizens, who might possess potential as sources or informants. Submit your requests for investigation in this regard in separate 134 cases with a request for Bureau clearance to institute investigation in each individual case.

Submit the results of your initial survey under instant caption to reach the Bureau by May 10, 1962, and thereafter on a 90-day basis setting forth progress being made to develop confidential sources and informants until such time as adequate coverage is assured.

2 - New York

NOT RECORDED
17 APR 10 1962

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Foreign Nations)
1 - 62-64318 (Embassy of Chile, Washington, D. C.)
1 - 105-new (Chilean Mission to the United Nations, New York City)
1 - 105-new (Consulate of Chile, New York City)

60 APR 17 1962
[illegible]
(11)

10

SEE NOTE ON PAGE TWO

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Letter to SAC, WFO
RE: NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - CHILE
105-97459-207

NOTE:

On 4/4/62, Mr. Francis E. Meloy, State Department, advised SA Orrin H. Bartlett that State Department approval was being granted for the above-described investigation.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan DATE: 5/21/62

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - Mossburg
1 - Callahan
1 - G.C.Moore
1 - Mullins
1 - Cotter

D E Moore
Wannall

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE

This program was inaugurated in 1954 and was expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) Regular notification from the U. S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) Maintenance of technical surveillances of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) Development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST

The first phase consists chiefly of review of file references and indexing at Seat of Government at nominal expenses. Under the second phase, we are presently operating 19 technical surveillances covering official establishments of 10 non-Soviet-bloc countries at a total estimated monthly cost of $23,827. These countries are Brazil, Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Guinea, Indonesia, Israel, Netherlands, and Portugal. Coverage of 6 of these countries (Brazil, Congo, Guinea, Indonesia, Netherlands, Portugal) was prompted by Attorney General's expressed interest in January, 1962, in having Bureau increase technical surveillances to include establishments of various countries outside the Soviet Bloc. These surveillances are tentative in nature and, if they prove unproductive, they will be discontinued in favor of coverage on other critical countries. (For details of technical surveillance coverage, see attachment A.)

Under the third phase of this program, we currently have 41 actual and 32 potential live sources in the establishments of 29 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by State Department as "target" countries. (For details, see attachment B.) Costs of this phase are principally those arising from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling producing sources. Costs of program are considered fully justified based on value of information developed.

65-63113

Enclosures - 2

RDC:smf
(9)

ENCLOSURE

65-63113-292

REC 19

EX-106

17 MAY 23 1962

50 MAY

Memorandum Wannall to Sullivan
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES
(ANNUAL EVALUATION)
65-63113

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including (Anagram Program) Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U. S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering U. S.

MAGNITUDE

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and the current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and the State Department. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D. C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have developed during the past year. The program is operating smoothly and effectively.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillances are evaluated each 90 days. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance. A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVER-ALL VALUE

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

Memorandum Wannall to Sullivan
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES
(ANNUAL EVALUATION)
65-63113

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Re-evaluation will be made in April, 1963.

Attachment A

The following technical surveillances are being maintained at the present time with the approval in each instance of the State Department. (Heretofore, in connection with periodic evaluations of this program, we have listed only tesurs requested specifically by State Department. Hereafter, we plan to list all tesurs covering non-Soviet bloc establishments, regardless of whether they were initiated in response to State request or were prompted by our own intelligence requirements. It is felt this is more realistic approach and will more comprehensively show the scope of our coverage.)

Country	Symbol	Estimated Monthly Cost
Brazil		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 1333-S*	$2,403
UN Delegation, NYC	NY 3567-S*	1,483
Congo		
UN Delegation, NYC	NY 3569-S*	494
Cuba		
UN Delegation, NYC	NY 2965-S*	510
Cuban Ambassador to UN, NYC	NY 3428-S*	291
Dominican Republic		
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	WF 984-S*	920
Consulate, NYC	NY 1877-S*	1,430
France		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 987-S*	3,583
Guinea		
UN Delegation, NYC	NY 3568-S*	2,224
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	WF 1332-S*	852
Indonesia		
UN Delegation, NYC	NY 3566-S*	1,012
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	WF 1340-S*	1,734
Ambassador, Washington, D.C.	WF 1346-S*	116

65-63113-292

ENCLOSURE

Israel		
Embassy, Washington, D. C.	*WF 568-S**	*1,972*
Consulate, NYC	*NY 1137-S**	*1,235*
Netherlands		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	*WF 1348-S**	*1,655*
Ambassador, Washington, D.C.	*WF 1347-S**	*236*
Portugal		
UN Delegation, NYC	*NY 3570-S**	*741*
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	*WF 1337-S**	*936*
TOTAL ESTIMATED MONTHLY COST		*$23,827*

See memo Wannall to Sullivan, 5/21/62, "Intelligence Coverage of Non-Soviet-Bloc Countries (Annual Evaluation)."

Attachment B

With State Department approval we are developing live sources at the official establishments of the below-listed countries. Actual sources developed and potential sources under investigation are shown in connection with each country.

Country	Actual	Potential
Argentina	0	0
Bolivia	0	0
Brazil	2	1
Burma	1	1
Ceylon	0	1
Chile	0	0
China	4	1
Colombia	0	0
Congo	0	0
Costa Rica	0	0
Cuba	1	1
Dom. Republic	2	0
Ecuador	0	2
El Salvador	0	0
Ghana	1	0
Guatemala	0	0
Guinea	0	2
Haiti	0	0
Honduras	0	0
India	1	2
Indonesia	2	3
Iran	0	1
Iraq	0	2
Israel	1	1
Jordan	0	0
Korea	0	1
Laos	1	2
Lebanon	1	0
Malaya	1	0
Mali	1	2
Morocco	0	3
Nicaragua	0	0
Pakistan	1	0
Panama	0	0
Paraguay	0	0
Peru	0	0
Saudi Arabia	0	0

Enclosure
65-63113-292

Country	Actual	Potential
Sudan	2	1
Syria	0	0
Thailand	1	0
Tunisia	1	1
United Arab Republic	5	1
Uruguay	1	0
Venezuela	1	0
Yemen	0	0
TOTALS	31	29

Enclosure

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: January 23, 1962

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

JUNE

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. J.D. Donohue
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

BACKGROUND

The Attorney General on Saturday, 1-20-62, advised Assistant Director Evans he would like to receive this week the Director's views as to what additional technical coverage should be instituted on diplomatic establishments in Washington, D. C.

Regarding the above, the Attorney General had previously indicated on 1-11-62 he was thinking in terms of extending coverage on the smaller countries rather than the "Iron Curtain" countries. He felt coverage of the Iron Curtain countries was essential but their representatives were more alert to such coverage and he felt representatives of the smaller countries might talk more freely. He indicated he did not want coverage of our true friends, like the British. He hinted at possible coverage of the Indonesians. On 1-20-62 when Evans spoke with him he indicated he felt additional coverage of the African countries might be worthwhile.

PRESENT COVERAGE

In analysing proposals for increased coverage we have taken a look at what we already have. We have technical coverage in Washington and/or New York on eight countries of the type being considered, as follows: Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Ghana, Israel, Saudi Arabia (in Boston), United Arab Republic and West Germany. The Saudi Arabian coverage, on King Saud, will be discontinued this week since King Saud is leaving Boston en route to Florida and then is going home. State Department has advised it does not desire he be covered in Florida.

PROPOSED COVERAGE

Virtually every country is a logical target regarding which technical surveillance coverage might produce valuable intelligence data. We have in the past utilized this technique to cover various

Enc.
SBD:dmd
(8)
65-63113
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan

REC- 62

65-63113-269

17 JAN 31 1962

1-29-62

countries involved in political or military situations of particular interest to U.S. intelligence community and/or to the FBI. The technique must necessarily be considered an exploratory step since in some instances in the past our experience has shown the results are negligible and do not justify continuance while in other instance the coverage may be worthwhile for a long time.

We feel there are a number of countries regarding which coverage should be attempted to assess the potential value. While the Attorney General spoke in terms of "embassies" we feel simultaneous coverage is desirable, if possible, of the United Nations Delegations also in order to determine from which spot the best intelligence emanates.

With regard to African countries we suggest coverage at this time of four additional countries: (1) Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville); (2) Guinea; (3) Mali and (4) Morocco. The Congo is a key trouble spot in Africa. Guinea and Mali lean toward the Soviet bloc and are targets of Soviet-bloc subversion. There have been increasing Soviet inroads in Morocco and Moroccan territorial claims may pose serious problems in 1962.

With regard to Latin-American countries we propose coverage of five additional countries: (1) Brazil; (2) Argentina; (3) Mexico; (4) Venezuela and (5) Panama. It is felt Brazil, Argentina and Mexico represent excellent potential for acquisition of intelligence in view of their influential positions. Brazil itself is politically unstable. Venezuela and Panama are traditional trouble spots in Latin America.

With regard to Asian and Southeast Asian countries we propose coverage of six countries; (1) Indonesia; (2) Laos; (3) South Vietnam; (4) Thailand; (5) India and (6) Japan. Indonesia is a particular trouble spot at this time. Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand are all feeling the increased pressures of the Sino-Soviet bloc. India in the past has been the acknowledged leader of the neutralist nations. Japan, while oriented toward the West, has been beset by the problems of internal communism.

Regarding Western Europe we propose coverage of Portugal, a country beset by the problems posed by Angola, its colony in Africa, and the loss of Goa in Portuguese India. Its relations with the United States are strained at this time and anti-United States demonstrations have been permitted.

OBSERVATIONS

It cannot be said with any assurance that all of this coverage will be productive of valuable intelligence data. The diplomatic representatives in the U.S. of some countries are much more active and knowledgeable than those of others. With regard to some countries we may run into definite translation problems.

If the coverage were installed at the embassy and United Nations Delegation of each of the 16 countries mentioned above simultaneously, this would increase our number of technical surveillances by 32. We presently have 84 technical surveillances and one additional one is being installed. Of these 85, 81 are in Bureau cases and four are exclusively maintained at the request of the National Security Agency (NSA). We are also installing coverage of teletype facilities of seven additional establishments at NSA request, which will increase our count from 85 to 92. The addition of technical surveillances in instant matter will probably raise the total to 100 or more, of which 11 will be at NSA request. We have proposed that in the future we not include in our over-all count those technical surveillances which are maintained at the request of NSA.

The best way to test the potential in instant matter is to install coverage on six or eight establishments, see what we get, replace the unproductive coverage with new coverage of new establishments, and, in general, continually probe the potential of this coverage by changing our targets selectively.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Attached for approval is a letter to the Attorney General specifying the additional countries coverage of which we feel might be productive. We are advising the Attorney General that if he approves we will explore the feasibility of coverage of the embassy as well as the United Nations Delegation of each country. Thereafter, if the coverage is feasible, we will clear each proposed installation with State and with the Attorney General, as we have in the past.

2. It is recommended that we go ahead and authorize the New York and Washington Field Offices to conduct secure surveys as to feasibility of coverage of the establishments mentioned. This will enable us to move more rapidly if the Attorney General approves the proposed targets. If approved, New York and Washington Field will be so instructed.

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: January 24, 1962

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Donahoe

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

We are in receipt of a letter dated 1-18-62 from Under Secretary of State George W. Ball detailing the thinking of the State Department which prompted its prior withholding of clearance for us to endeavor to develop intelligence sources in the diplomatic establishments in the United States of fifteen Central and South American countries. This letter is in reply to our letter of 10-13-61 to Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs which set forth our views.

Attached for ready reference are my memoranda to you dated 10-6-61 and 10-12-61 which trace the background of this correspondence.

The letter from Mr. Ball contains nothing particularly new and is primarily a reiteration of previously expressed views of the State Department. It is a polite, reasonable expression of a difference of opinion with views which we hold. Since it deals with a most sensitive operation it is difficult to take strong issue with it even when disagreeing with some of the views expressed. It clearly indicates State wants to work with us on this program but wants to do so on a selective, case-by-case basis.

As a matter of fact we have in the past cleared with State Department before designating each individual country as a target for source development at which time we have specified why we felt the political situation warranted this action.

REC- 91 6311?-266

However, we felt and still feel that the increasing political instability in the countries of Central and South America warranted a broadened and simultaneous effort to explore whether we could develop sources in their diplomatic establishments here. We were and are concerned about the inroads of communism, the influence of "Castroism" and the increased efforts ~~of the Sino-Soviet~~ bloc to extend its influence in the area.

5 FEB 1 1962

The insistence of the State Department on a country-by-country approach with presentation of reasonable evidence to show

Encs. Rec'd 1-25-62
65-63113
SBD:dmd
(7)

G.C. Moore

that data of value might be obtained which would outweigh the risks is essentially a short term view. Source development is definitely a long term proposition and the most advantageous time to initiate such an effort is before the country becomes a real trouble spot. In fact good sources in ostensibly "friendly" country establishments could possibly produce data pointing to impending trouble. We felt the situation in Latin America warranted the long term view. Getting down to "brass tacks" all the requested clearance would have meant is that State would have agreed to our conducting discreet inquiries regarding potential sources. Existing procedures provide (and we did not propose a change) that we not make a personal approach to a potential source without specific clearance from State. This gives State a firm opportunity to take the "cautious view" it desires to take.

The development of sources in diplomatic establishments is admittedly a delicate operation but can produce data of definite value. This is illustrated by several examples during the past year. Sources of this type have provided the first authentic confirmation of the assassination of the Dominican dictator, Generalissimo Trujillo; identified the Panamanian Ambassador to the Organization of American States as on the payroll of the Dominicans; provided data as to what the President of Pakistan would probably discuss with President Kennedy; furnished a code book utilized by Cuban diplomatic establishments in Cuba; and have provided voluminous valuable intelligence data in connection with our inquiries into Dominican lobbying activities in the U.S.

OBSERVATIONS:

It is felt we have made our views known in detail and on the record and it is not believed we should pursue the difference in views with State. This latter view is prompted by the fact that if we take strong issue and sway State to our point of view we will simply have State looking over our shoulder without any real backing on a sensitive operation. Ball's letter does not require a reply.

We advised the Attorney General by letter of 10-13-61 of the proposal and of the problem and it is believed we should apprise him of Ball's letter.

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FOREIGN
COUNTRIES
65-63113

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached is a letter to the Attorney General forwarding him a copy of Ball's letter and copies of prior correspondence for ready reference. We are advising the Attorney General that in view of our vital interest in the Latin-American situation we will endeavor to develop as effective coverage as possible within the framework of the limitations imposed by the State Department.

SECRET

The Attorney General

January 25, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

On October 13, 1961, I advised you of our discussions with the Department of State relative to expanding our existing program of developing sources within the diplomatic establishments of selected foreign countries so as to include fifteen additional countries in Central and South America. I advised you the Department of State would not grant clearance for the proposed expansion but indicated it would consider individual requests. Our views as to the merits of the program were outlined at that time.

On the above date we directed a letter to Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, expressing our views regarding the situation. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball has replied in a letter dated January 18, 1962, explaining and reiterating the views of the Department of State and indicating the Department of State desires to be helpful and cooperative.

MAILED 2
JAN 25 1962
COMM-FBI

REC'D-READING ROOM
JAN 25 11 43 AM '62

For ready reference I am attaching one copy each of the communications mentioned.

The development of sources in diplomatic establishments is admittedly a delicate operation but can produce data of definite value. This is illustrated by several examples during the past year. Sources of this type have provided the first authentic confirmation of the assassination of the Dominican dictator, Generalissimo Trujillo; identified the Panamanian Ambassador to Organization of American States as on the payroll of the Dominicans; provided data as to what the President of Pakistan would probably discuss with President Kennedy; furnished a code book utilized by Cuban diplomatic establishments in Cuba; and have provided voluminous valuable intelligence data in connection with our inquiries into Dominican lobbying activities in the United States.

X. 116

259

-63113

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

SBD:dmd (10)

REC- 17
SECRET 65-63113

22 JAN 30 1962

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

In view of our vital interest in the Latin-American situation we will endeavor to develop as effective coverage as is possible within the framework of the limitations imposed by the Department of State.

Enclosures - 3

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosures - 3)

Note: Cover memorandum from Donahoe to Sullivan prepared by SBD:dmd on 1-24-62 same subject.

The word "Friendly" has been dropped from former title of this program "Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries" since not all of our target countries can be construed as friendly and the present title is more accurate.

Classified "Secret" in view of reference to highly sensitive operation and in view of attachments.

SECRET

The Attorney General **JUNE** January 26, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. J.D. Donohue
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE
OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

REC'D-READING ROOM
[illegible] 1 55 PM '62

Assistant Director C. A. Evans has advised me of your interest in increased technical surveillance coverage of diplomatic establishments of foreign countries in the United States, particularly of those countries outside the "Iron Curtain," and of your request on January 20, 1962, for my views as to what additional coverage should be instituted.

For several years we have been utilizing technical surveillance coverage of diplomatic establishments or representatives of countries outside the Soviet bloc. The technique has been utilized largely with respect to countries which were existing or potential trouble spots and has been aimed at producing intelligence data of interest not only to the FBI but also to other agencies in the intelligence community. At the present time we have such coverage in Washington, D. C., and/or New York City on the countries of Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Ghana, Israel, United Arab Republic and West Germany. Our past coverage has been probing and in recent years has involved coverage of eleven other countries.

MAILED 4
JAN 26 1962
COMM-FBI

While virtually every country is a logical intelligence target it is felt there are definite areas in which we might extend our technical surveillance coverage at this time to explore whether valuable intelligence data could be produced. It is believed that coverage of the diplomatic establishments of the particular countries in Washington, D. C., and at the United Nations will enable us to explore more accurately the potential of the coverage.

With regard to African countries we suggest coverage at this time of four additional countries: (1) Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville); (2) Guinea; (3) Mali and (4) Morocco. The Congo is a key trouble spot in Africa. Guinea and Mali lean toward the Soviet bloc and are targets of

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram

EX-103
65-63113-267
REC-22

NOTE: Cover memorandum prepared from Donahoe to Sullivan re same subject dated 1/23/62. SBD:dmd
(Note continued page 2)

SBD:dmd:mvr
(10)

XEROX COPY

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ SECRET

The Attorney General

Soviet-bloc subversion. There have been increasing Soviet inroads in Morocco and Moroccan territorial claims may pose serious problems in 1962.

With regard to Latin-American countries we propose coverage of five additional countries: (1) Brazil; (2) Argentina; (3) Mexico; (4) Venezuela and (5) Panama. It is felt Brazil, Argentina and Mexico represent excellent potential for acquisition of intelligence in view of their influential positions. Brazil itself is politically unstable. Venezuela and Panama are traditional trouble spots in Latin America.

With regard to Asian and Southeast Asian countries we propose coverage of six countries: (1) Indonesia; (2) Laos; (3) South Vietnam; (4) Thailand; (5) India and (6) Japan. Indonesia is a particular trouble spot at this time. Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand are all feeling the increased pressures of the Sino-Soviet bloc. India in the past has been the acknowledged leader of the neutralist nations. Japan, while oriented toward the West, has been beset by the problems of internal communism.

Regarding Western Europe we propose coverage of Portugal, a country beset by the problems posed by Angola, its colony in Africa, and the loss of Goa in Portuguese India. Its relations with the United States are strained at this time and anti-United States demonstrations have been permitted.

We propose to test the potential of this coverage by installing it on six or eight establishments, seeing what we get, replacing the unproductive installations with new coverage of new establishments, and, in general, continually probing the potential by changing our targets selectively.

If you approve, we will explore the feasibility of the coverage outlined and thereafter request clearance from the Department of State as well as your authorization for each proposed installation.

NOTE: Classified "Secret" in view of detailed discussion of proposed tehcnical coverage.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office M[illegible]dum • UNITED [illegible] GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, FBI

DATE: January 31, 1962

FROM : Andrew F. Oehmann
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

Please refer to your memorandum of January 26, 1962, captioned as above.

The Attorney General has approved your proposal to test the potential of the increased technical surveillance referred to in your memorandum as set forth in the last two paragraphs thereof.

REC-72

65-[illegible]-270

17 FEB 7 1962

5-9

EX-PROC.

50 FEB 16 1962

SECRET

38

JAN 31 1962

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 4, 1963

FROM : W. R. Wannall

JUNE

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - Donohue
1 - G.C. Moore

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

With the approval of Attorney General (1/31/62) we instituted program to expand our use of technical surveillances on diplomatic establishments of countries outside Soviet bloc. Following is an analysis of this program and its current status:

We advised Attorney General 1/26/62 that on a selective and probing basis we would explore coverage of following countries under this program by instituting coverage on six or eight establishments at a time:

Argentina
Brazil
Republic of the Congo
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Japan
Laos
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Panama
Portugal
Thailand
Venezuela
South Vietnam

After necessary survey and State Department clearance in each instance, we initiated initial coverage during early March, 1962, and to date coverage on the following establishments has been instituted:

Embassy of Argentina
Embassy of Brazil
Brazilian Delegation to United Nations (UN)
Congolese Delegation to UN
Embassy of Guinea
Guinea Delegation to UN
Embassy of India
Indian Delegation to UN
Embassy of Indonesia
Indonesian Delegation to UN
Embassy of Japan
Embassy of Mali
Embassy of Mexico
Mexican Delegation to UN
Embassy of Portugal
Portuguese Delegation to UN

REC-58

65-63113-320

17 FEB 11 1963

5-4a

EX-116

65-63113
GCM:ams
(7)

FEB 18 1963

Of the above-listed establishments, we still have as of this date current coverage on:

Embassy of Argentina
Embassy of Brazil
Brazilian Delegation to UN
Embassy of Japan
Embassy of Mexico

Coverage on other establishments on which we have had installations has been discontinued because of unproductivity. With respect to current coverage, the Brazilian and Argentinean establishments during the Cuban crisis and subsequent thereto have produced valuable data which has been furnished to Attorney General as well as to interested agencies. This intelligence information for the most part during the Cuban crisis pertained to reactions and actions of those Latin-American countries in connection with the Cuban situation. Coverage on the Embassy of Japan has not produced information of any significance to date. This particular surveillance on the Embassy of Japan is being analyzed separately within two weeks and determination will be made at that time as to whether it should be continued. Although information on above Mexican establishment has not produced much worthwhile data to date, Mexico's position in Latin-American affairs is such as to warrant our continuance of this coverage for the time being. In this regard, Washington Field Office within past week has been able to monitor additional lines at the Mexican Chancery which were not previously monitored because of other commitments. It is felt this additional coverage will be productive.

In addition to the above existing coverage, we are in the process of making a survey as to feasibility of placing coverage on the Venezuelan Embassy. It is noted that President Betancourt of Venezuela is making a visit to this country on 2/18/63 and technical coverage on the Venezuelan establishment may be able to provide pertinent data during this visit.

ACTION:

This program will be followed closely and will be reanalyzed in 90 days.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan DATE: 2/21/63

FROM : W. R. Wannall

JUNE

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - J.D. Donohue
1 - G.C. Moore

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

On 1/31/62, with approval of Attorney General, we instituted program to expand our use of technical surveillances on diplomatic establishments of countries outside Soviet Bloc. In connection therewith we advised the Attorney General on 1/26/62 that on a selective and probing basis of six to eight establishments at a time we would explore coverage of 16 countries (selection being based on potential for intelligence acquisition and consideration of trouble-spot status).

To date we have at one time or another afforded coverage to all countries on this list except Laos, Morocco, Panama, Thailand and South Vietnam. At present time we have technical coverage on Brazilian Embassy, Brazilian United Nations Delegation, Argentinian Embassy, Mexican Embassy, Venezuelan Embassy, and are in the process of making installation at Venezuelan Delegation to United Nations.

ST-109 REC-27 65-63113-325

In addition to technical coverage of countries mentioned in above list, we have during past year found it necessary to institute technical coverage on other countries not included in the list but outside of Soviet Bloc which suddenly developed as trouble spots or which for one reason or another developed a potential for intelligence acquisition which had to be explored immediately. For example, during Cuban crisis we instituted coverage on establishments of Chile, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, and Bolivia. During investigation of sugar lobbying activities, coverage was instituted on Haiti and Nicaragua. More recently because of tense conditions in Middle East brought about by Iraqi coup, we are instituting coverage of Embassy of Iraq. Likewise, because of changing conditions in Guatemala we have during past month instituted coverage on Embassy of Guatemala and the Ambassador's residence.

13 MAR ~~5~~ 8 1963

OBSERVATIONS:

In view thereof of changing world conditions, we should allow ourselves more flexibility in connection with our program of expanded technical coverage of non-Soviet-bloc countries and not restrict such coverage solely to countries upon a list prepared a year ago. Although

65-63113
Enclosure - Sent 2/22/63
GCM:slj
(7)

6 MAR 15 1963

the countries listed originally still are considered key countries under this program and all should be eventually covered for a trial period to test their potential, it would be more logical from time to time to cover other non-Soviet-Bloc countries not on the list which have developed into either trouble-spot areas or otherwise represent good potential for technical coverage. This would allow us to make the maximum use of our technical facilities.

ACTION:

If you approve, Attorney General will be advised as to the status of this over-all program and that in the future we will include additional countries requiring coverage because of changing world conditions.

O.K.
H

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 30, 1963

JUNE

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - Donohue
1 - G. Moore

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

With approval of Attorney General (1/31/62), we instituted program to expand use of technical surveillances on diplomatic establishments of countries outside Soviet bloc. Following is an analysis of this program and its current status:

We advised Attorney General 1/26/62 that on selective and probing basis we would explore coverage of following countries under this program by instituting coverage on six or eight establishments at a time:

Argentina
Brazil
Republic of Congo
Guinea
India
Indonesia

Japan
Laos
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Panama

Portugal
Thailand
Venezuela
South Vietnam

After necessary surveys and State clearance in each instance, initial coverage was initiated early March, 1962, and to date coverage on following establishments has been instituted:

Embassy of Argentina
Embassy of Brazil
Brazilian Delegation to United Nations (UN)
Congolese Delegation to UN
Embassy of Guinea
Guinea Delegation to UN
Embassy of India
Indian Delegation to UN
Embassy of Indonesia
Indonesian Delegation to UN

Embassy of Japan
Embassy of Mali
Embassy of Mexico
Mexican Delegation to UN
Embassy of Panama
Embassy of Portugal
Portuguese Delegation to UN
Embassy of Venezuela
Venezuelan Delegation to UN

Y

Of the above-listed establishments, as of this date we have productive coverage on following (others discontinued as unproductive):

Embassy of Argentina
Embassy of Brazil
Embassy of Mexico

Embassy of Panama
Embassy of Venezuela

REC- 52 339

65-63113
GCM:ams
(7)

6 MAY 20 1963

EX-114

17 MAY 3 1963

Out of the original sixteen countries on list furnished Attorney General 1/26/62, we have not instituted coverage on Laos, Morocco, Thailand and South Vietnam. We will endeavor to explore productive potential of these four countries as soon as such is feasible consistent with Bureau's over-all technical demands.

In addition to above, by letter to Attorney General 2/25/63 we advised we were expanding above coverage to include such additional non-Soviet-bloc countries, not on original list of sixteen but which have developed into either trouble-spot areas or otherwise represent good potential for technical coverage. Since 2/25/63 we have covered following establishments under this expanded category:

Embassy of Guatemala
Residence of Guatemalan Ambassador
Embassy of Nicaragua

This coverage on these three establishments to date has furnished worthwhile intelligence data and is still being maintained. We are in the process of instituting coverage on Embassies, UN Delegations and residences of Ambassadors of Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Republic, such coverage being instituted at State's request in view of critical situation developing in Middle East.

When above is installed, we will be covering currently sixteen different establishments under this expanded coverage of non-Soviet-bloc countries.

ACTION:

This program will be followed closely and will be reanalyzed in 90 days.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 16, 1963

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. D.F.X. Callahan
1 - Mr. Mossburg

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

JUNE

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE

This program was inaugurated in 1954 and was expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) Regular notification from the U.S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) Maintenance of technical surveillances of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) Development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST

$26,080

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at Seat of Government at nominal expenses. Under second phase we are presently operating ~~25~~ technical surveillances covering establishments of 13 ~~14~~ non-Soviet-bloc countries at total estimated monthly cost of ~~$33,557~~. These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, ~~Y[illegible]a~~ and Venezuela. For details of technical surveillance coverage see Attachment A.

Under third phase of program we currently have 35 actual and 31 potential live sources at establishments of 44 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by State Department as "target" countries. For details see Attachment B. Costs of this phase arise chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including Anagram Program, Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering U.S.

346

Encs.
RDC:dmd (8)
65-63113

1 - Mr. Mullins

REC 8
ST-101

22 MAY 24 1963

6 MAY 31 1963
ENCLOSURE

SITC. MAIL RM.

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES
(ANNUAL EVALUATION)

MAGNITUDE

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and the current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and the State Department. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D.C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have developed during the past year. The program is operating smoothly and effectively.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillances are evaluated each 90 days. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance. A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVER-ALL VALUE

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Re-evaluation will be made in May, 1964.

Attachment A

The following technical surveillances are being maintained at the present time with the approval in each instance of the State Department.

Country	Symbol	Estimated Monthly Cost
Argentina		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	WF 1397-S*	$3,027
Brazil		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	WF 1333-S*	3,307
Cuba		
Cuban Mission to UN, NYC	NY 3877-S*	677
Cuban Ambassador to UN	NY 3808-S*	247
Dominican Republic		
Embassy, Washington, D. C.	WF 984-S*	1,009
France		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	WF 987-S*	3,313
Guatemala		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	WF 1439-S*	1,296
Ambassador's Residence Washington, D.C.	WF 1440-S*	518
Haiti		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 1375-S*	1,000 *
Ambassador, Washington, D.C.	WF 1432-S*	1,000
Delegation to UN, NYC	NY 4005-S*	1,000
Consulate, NYC	NY 2583-S*	500

* These costs are tentative estimates based on similar surveillances. These 4 technical surveillances have all been installed since 5-1-63.

65-[illegible]-346

ENCLOSURE

Iraq		
Embassy, Washington, D. C.	WF 1446-S*	2,329
Israel		
Embassy, Washington, D. C.	WF 568-S*	2,082
Consulate, NYC	NY 1137-S*	1,200
Mexico		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	WF 1409-S*	605
Nicaragua		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	WF 970-S*	1,202
Panama		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	WF 1456-S*	666
~~Yugoslavia~~		
~~Yugoslav Mission to UN, NYC~~	~~NY 525-S*~~	~~1,573~~
~~Yugoslav Consulate, NYC~~	~~NY 628-S*~~	~~2,157~~
~~Yugoslav Consulate, Pittsburgh~~	~~PG 177-S*~~	~~416~~
~~Yugoslav Consulate, Chicago~~	~~CG 6427-S*~~	~~292~~
~~Yugoslav Consulate, San Francisco~~	~~SF 1808-S*~~	~~380~~
~~Yugoslav Embassy, Washington, D. C.~~	~~WF 1318-S*~~	~~2,659~~
Venezuela		
Chancery, Washington, D. C.	WF 1442-S*	1,102
TOTAL ESTIMATED MONTHLY COST		~~$33,557~~ $26,080

Attachment B

With State Department approval we are developing live sources at the official establishments of the below-listed countries. Actual sources developed and potential sources under investigation are shown in connection with each country.

Country	Actual	Potential
Argentina	0	1
Bolivia	0	0
Brazil	2	1
Burma	1	1
Ceylon	1	0
Chile	0	0
China (Nationalist)	3	1
Colombia	0	0
Congo	0	0
Costa Rica	0	0
Cuba	1	0
Dominican Republic	1	0
Ecuador	0	0
El Salvador	0	0
Ghana	1	1
Guatemala	0	0
Guinea	0	0
Haiti	0	0
Honduras	0	1
India	0	0
Indonesia	2	2
Iran	1	6
Iraq	2	2
Israel	1	2
Jordan	0	0
Laos	2	0
Lebanon	1	0
Malaya	1	0
Mali	1	0
Morocco	0	3
Nicaragua	0	0
Pakistan	1	0
Panama	0	0

[illegible] — 346

ENCLOSURE

Paraguay	0	1
Peru	0	0
Saudi Arabia	1	0
Sudan	2	2
Thailand	0	0
Tunisia	0	1
United Arab Republic	6	5
United Syrian Rep.	1	1
Uruguay	1	0
Venezuela	1	0
Yemen	1	0
TOTALS	35	31

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 18, 1964

FROM : W. R. Wannall

- JUNE

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES
(ANNUAL EVALUATION)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Mullins

This program was inaugurated in 1954 and was expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) regular notification from the U.S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) maintenance of technical surveillances of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at Seat of Government at nominal expenses. Under second phase we are presently operating 46 technical surveillances covering establishments of 25 non-Soviet-bloc countries at total estimated monthly cost of $47,259.73. These countries are Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, British Guiana, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Greece, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. For details of technical surveillance coverage see Attachment A.

Under third phase of program we currently have 42 actual and 58 potential live sources at establishments of 47 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by State Department as "target" countries. For details see Attachment B. Costs of this phase arise chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including (Anagram) Program, Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering U.S.

65-63113 433
Enclosures
RDC:ams
(7)

REC- 33

11 MAY 20 1964

2

6 MAY 22 1964

MAGNITUDE

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and the current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and the State Department. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D.C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have developed during the past year. The program is operating smoothly and effectively.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillances are evaluated each 90 days. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance. A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVER-ALL VALUE

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Re-evaluation will be made in May, 1965.

JUN

Attachment A

The following technical surveillances are being maintained at the present time with the approval in each instance of the State Department:

Country	Symbol	Estimated Monthly Cost
Algeria		
Embassy, Washington, D. C.	WF 1523-S*	$ 409.91
Argentina		
OAS, Washington, D.C.	WF 1496-S*	409.83
Embassy, Washington, D.C. (Office of Naval Attache)	WF 1567-S*	Not Available (New installation
Bolivia		
United Nations Delegation, NYC	NY 4210-S*	339.00
Brazil		
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	WF 1333-S*	3,483.58
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 3567-S*	1,356.00
British Guiana		
Public Relations Office, NYC	NY 4140-S*	169.50
Chile		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 1410-S*	743.33
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 4211-S*	508.50
China		
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 4093-S*	678.00
Colombia		
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 4348-S*	508.50
Cuba		
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 3877-S*	684.00

433

Cyprus		
Embassy, Washington, D. C.	WF 1548-S*	$ 393.67
UN Mission, New York City	NY 4371-S*	339.00
Dominican Republic		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 984-S*	929.16
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 2994-S*	169.50
Ecuador		
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	WF 1556-S*	2,637.91
France		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 987-S*	2,018.75
Consulate, Washington, D.C.	WF 1459-S*	1,269.00
Ambassador's Residence, WDC	WF 1228-S*	538.33
Greece		
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	WF 1549-S*	788.00
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 4358-S*	678.00
Iraq		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 1446-S*	1,288.50
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 2340-S*	509.50
Israel		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 690-S*	3,242.83
Consulate, New York City	NY 1137-S*	849.16
Japan		
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 4113-S*	678.00
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	WF 1382-S*	3,114.50
Mexico		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 1409-S*	1,115.00
Nicaragua		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 970-S*	1,115.00

Panama		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 1456-S*	$1,024.58
Ambassador to OAS, Washington, DC	WF 1547-S*	Not Available (New Installation)
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 4367-S*	339.00
Syria		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 1474-S*	1,360.00
Turkey		
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	WF 1550-S*	1,182.00
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 4359-S*	1,017.00
United Arab Republic		
UN Delegation, New York City	NY 1678-S*	1,525.50
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 1046-S*	1,133.33
Venezuela		
Chancery, Washington, D.C.	WF 1442-S*	1,844.25
Yugoslavia		
Consulate General, San Francisco	SF 1808-S*	393.00
Consulate General, New York City	NY 628-S*	1,528.50
UN Mission, New York City	NY 525-S*	1,186.50
Consulate General, Chicago, Ill.	CG 6427-S*	451.42
Consulate General, Pittsburgh, Pa.	PG 177-S*	590.85
Aleksandar Zambelli, Washington, DC	WF 1349-S*	367.67
Embassy, Washington, D.C.	WF 1318-S*	2,352.17
	TOTAL ESTIMATED MONTHLY COST	47,259.73

JUNE

Attachment B

With State Department approval we are developing live sources at the official establishments of the below-listed countries. Actual sources developed and potential sources under investigation are shown in connection with each country.

Country	Actual	Potential
Argentina	0	2
Bolivia	0	0
Brazil	3	8
Burma	0	1
Ceylon	0	0
Chile	1	1
China	1	1
Colombia	0	5
Costa Rica	0	0
Cuba	1	0
Dominican Republic	4	3
Ecuador	0	0
El Salvador	0	0
Ghana	1	1
Guatemala	0	0
Guinea	0	2
Haiti	0	0
Honduras	0	2
India	0	0
Indonesia	3	0
Iran	3	7
Iraq	1	3
Israel	0	1
Jordan	0	2
Kenya	0	1
Laos	2	0
Lebanon	3	4
Malaya	1	0
Mali	0	1
Mexico	0	0
Morocco	0	2
Nicaragua	1	1
Pakistan	1	0
Panama	1	0
Paraguay	0	1
Peru	1	0
Republic of the Congo	0	1
Saudi Arabia	1	0

433

Country	Actual	Potential
Sudan	0	1
Syria	2	1
Thailand	1	0
Tunisia	0	0
United Arab Republic	5	4
Uruguay	1	0
Venezuela	3	1
Vietnam	0	1
Yemen	1	0
TOTALS	42	58

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERN[illegible]T

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach ✓
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/1/63

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - Liaison
1 - Mossburg

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

We are recommending that State clearance be obtained in order that we may institute programs to develop sources and informants in the diplomatic establishments of certain African countries in the U. S.

BATO-BST

In May, 1962, the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) indicated a need for coverage of 30 African countries particularly for intelligence regarding reactions to U. S. political, military and economic policy toward Africa.

B

In a memorandum dated 6/22/62 we pointed out that with State approval we had instituted an intelligence collection program through the development of sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of seven African countries and had instituted technical surveillance coverage at three of these establishments. At that time we recommended State Department clearance be obtained to develop sources and informants within the diplomatic establishments of 19 additional African countries in which USIB had expressed an interest. The State Department subsequently asked us to hold off our plans for such coverage until the USIB study was completed.

In July, 1962, the Deputy Attorney General was advised by the State Department that State would undoubtedly feel it necessary to turn down our request. We were subsequently advised that the Deputy Attorney General had discussed this matter with the Attorney General and that he felt strongly that the State Department should grant approval. We deferred to the Department's judgment when the Deputy Attorney General indicated he intended to make the Attorney General's feelings known to the State Department. We did not receive the necessary clearance requested from the State Department.

65-63113

65-63113-404

REC- 54

memo Brennan to Sullivan, same caption, 11/6/63.
HB:chs

EHM:klw

8 DEC 10 1963

(6)

5 9 DEC 13 1963

LIAISON

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
65-63113

It is noted that our request of State involving 19 African countries was based on the needs of USIB. Since that time, we have had no further indication from USIB of its interests in the African area. However, based on current critical conditions presently existing in various African countries, it is believed that we should institute programs to develop sources in the diplomatic establishments in the U. S. of the following African countries: Somalia, Sudan, South Africa, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Tanganyika, Senegal and Nigeria.

ACTION:

It is recommended Liaison discuss this matter with State and obtain its approval for a program for us to develop sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of the above African countries with the understanding that State clearance will be obtained prior to our actually approaching any potential source or informant involved.

OK & let me know results H

DEM/wrw

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan WCS

DATE: 2/5/64

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Wannall
1 - Ruehl

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Believed State Department clearance should be obtained to add Republic of Vietnam to list of countries previously approved by State Department under captioned program.

Captioned program involves development by the FBI of confidential sources and informants in the diplomatic establishments of friendly foreign nations where (1) it appears that country is leaning toward the Soviet Bloc (2) where the situation in a particular country involves a serious political or military crisis (3) where there is a clear investigative need. At present time we are developing sources and informants in the diplomatic establishments of 44 friendly foreign nations with State Department approval.

At this time it is felt we should obtain State clearance to institute a program to develop sources and informants in South Vietnamese diplomatic establishments in the United States.

South Vietnam is an integral part of Asia where United States is deeply involved politically, economically and militarily to stem tide of Chinese Communists. South Vietnam within less than six months has had its president slain and been governed by two military juntas which gained control by coup d'etat. Any information which we can obtain regarding current political picture should prove of value.

RECOMMENDATION:

Liaison should obtain State clearance from appropriate State Department representative for FBI to conduct discreet investigations of Potential Security Informants in Vietnamese diplomatic establishments in United States. Liaison should advise State no interviews will be conducted with any potential source without first obtaining State Department clearance.

VER:slj
(6)

3/7/64
Discussed with H B Wells, State
ahs

3/19/64
Wells advised State approves our program.
ahs

MCT-1
REC-23
426
1 MAR 27 1964

NY 3-25-64 Let to NY
WFO 3-26-64 VER:pdl
2-WFO
APR 2 1964

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : **W. C. Sullivan** WCS

DATE: 2-5-64

FROM : **W. R. Wannall** WRW

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. G. Moore

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
NON SOVIET BLOC

Since Dominican Republic continues to be trouble-spot area primarily due to instability of Government and known efforts of extremists on the "Left" and "Right" to bring about a coup, State Department is being requested to grant clearance for us to initiate a program to develop sources and informants in Dominican diplomatic establishments in the U. S.

For a number of years we have had a program to develop live sources at official establishments of various key noncommunist countries which have been designated as "target" countries because of various factors, including evidence of Soviet or communist infiltration, importance in cold war and/or other international developments which make a particular country of special significance. In the past Dominican Republic, although meeting above criteria which would qualify it as a "target" country, has not been so designated as our coverage was considered quite adequate.

However, now that the Dominican Government is most unstable following the 9-25-63 overthrow of Juan Bosch, there has been a steady change in diplomatic personnel assigned to U. S. which makes it feasible for us to take additional steps to develop new sources in diplomatic establishments. In the past we have handled development of such potential sources in Dominican establishments by securing State Department clearance on an individual basis.

In order to streamline our procedures in this regard, it is felt we should now take necessary steps to make Dominican Republic a "target" country by securing appropriate State Department clearance for such source development.

2/7/64 HBWells State checking
2/20/64 Wells advised State approved.

ACTION:

REC-133 65-63113-417

Liaison should obtain State clearance from appropriate State Department representative for FBI to conduct discreet investigations of potential security informants in Dominican diplomatic establishments in U.S. Liaison should advise State no interviews will be conducted with any potential source without first ~~obtaining~~ checking with State Department ~~clearance~~.

FEB 26 1964

65-63113
1 - 105-97459-211 (Nationality Group Coverage - Dominican Republic)
GCM:lab
(7)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

65-63113-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 17, 1964

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Liaison
(Bartlett)
1 - Wannall
1 - Mossburg

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES

D. J. Brennan

We are recommending State Department clearance be obtained to institute a program to investigate potential sources employed at diplomatic establishments of Kenya in the U. S.

On 3-23-64 Mr. H. B. Wells, State Department, advised the Bureau the State Department was very suspicious of Burudi Nabwera, Ambassador from Kenya to the United Nations and Ambassador designate to the U. S. from Kenya. Mr. Wells pointed out Burudi is a henchman of Oginga Odinga, a prominent procommunist political leader in Kenya. Wells requested us to investigate Nabwera to determine his activities and contacts in the U. S. This investigation is presently being conducted.

The New York Office has requested State clearance be obtained to investigate Rene Baptiste, a chauffeur at the Kenya United Nations Mission, to determine his potential as a security informant. There are no U. S. nationals at this establishment and there is a need for source coverage there, particularly in view of the State Department's request that we investigate Nabwera. Bureau files contain no information that can be identified with Baptiste based on information available.

4-21-64 discussed with H.B. Wells, State
4-27-64 Wells approved Kenya as a target country.

ACTION:

It is recommended that Bureau Liaison contact the appropriate State Department representative to obtain clearance for us to institute discreet investigations of potential security informants at diplomatic establishments of Kenya in the U. S. who may be of assistance to us in our investigation of the Ambassador. State should be advised we will obtain clearance from that Department prior to actually contacting any potential source.

1 - 105-97459 Sub 325 (Nationality Group Coverage - Kenya)

EHM:jal
(8)

1 - 134-12633 (Rene Baptiste)

REC-11 65-63[illegible]-430

12 MAY 1 1964

72 MAY 8 1964

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

1 - Wannall
1 - Ruehl

SAC, New York 3-26-64

Director, FBI (105-87453-370)

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE -
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
IS - VIETNAM
BUDED: 6-23-64

Effective immediately instant recipients are instructed to open new files bearing instant caption and submit letter to Bureau under this caption every 90 days setting forth progress made to develop confidential sources and informants at Vietnamese diplomatic establishments. Your initial letter should be forwarded to reach Bureau on or before 6-23-64. These 90-day letters should also indicate progress being made to develop sources and informants outside diplomatic establishments.

Be guided by instructions and observations set forth in Bulet to New York with copies for WFO dated 2-18-64, "Intelligence Coverage of Non-Soviet-Bloc Countries."

2 - WFO

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Noncommunist Countries)

VER:pdb
(8)

NOTE:

Bureau has program involving development of sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of friendly foreign nations when such would be in the best interest of U. S. Inasmuch as Vietnam is such a sensitive area, it was recommended Liaison obtain State clearance for Bureau to include Vietnam in this program. State approval was obtained 3-19-64.

Both New York and WFO are familiar with Bureau instructions and policy with regard to this type of coverage.

DUPLICATE YELLOW

65-63113-
NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 27 1964

72 APR 3 1964

150

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: July 21, 1964

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Liaison
(Bartlett)
1 - Wannall
1 - Meier

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

In view of recent Japanese developments, State Department is being requested for clearance for our initiation of program to develop live sources in Japanese official establishments.

For a number of years, we have had a program to develop live sources in official establishments of noncommunist countries, designated as "target" countries, because of presence of certain significant factors. Japan has not previously been designated as a "target" country.

State Department "Secret" Research Memorandum RFE-36, dated 6-17-64 on "Communist China's Policy for Establishing Diplomatic Relations," reports that Peiping's interest in expanding its network of diplomatic ties has significantly increased in past three years. Communist China now has diplomatic relations with 48 countries and, because of its recent successes and continued intensive efforts, it may soon overtake Nationalist China which has recognized 60 countries. According to the memorandum, this is liable to have immense effect on Chinese representation in international organizations, particularly the United Nations (UN). According to State Department, Japan is the number one target on Communist China's diplomatic horizon and an intensive step-by-step cultivation of Japan is under way. CIA's "Secret" Special Report, "The China Problem in Japanese Politics," dated 5-1-64, reports that in Japan supporters of the Japanese Government feel that development of Japan's informal relations will ripen into full-fledged diplomatic relations with Communist China.

The fact that trade between Japan and Communist China is on the increase certainly can be expected to encourage establishment of diplomatic relations between these countries in the not too far distant future. In 1963, this trade increased 60 per cent over 1962 and it is expected to take another big jump in 1964. Further, the Communist Party of Japan (CPJ) is urging close ties with China. This organization of approximately 105,000 members has taken the side of Communist China in its ideological war with the USSR.

REC 55 65-63112-443

18 JUL 31 1964

65-63113

EX 100

1 - 105-97459-234 (Nationality Group Coverage - Japan)

ACM:jal
(7)

7/24/64 H. B. Wells, INR, State, Will check & respond upon

(See pg. 2)

67 AUG 6 1964

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

According to articles in the 7/9 and 19/64 issues of "The New York Times," the Japanese Government is not as strong now as in preceding years. Prestige of its Premier, Hayato Ikeda, re-elected to a third term 7-10-64, has been damaged by inflationary trends that have sent consumer prices up 20 per cent in past three years. His new cabinet has been called "weak" and "lightweight" due to his attempts to achieve balance among feuding elements in his own Liberal Democratic Party.

Japan is also buffeted by pressures from the USSR with which it has rather extensive trade relations. On 5-14-64, the USSR's First Deputy Premier, Anastas Mikoyan, made a surprise "good will" visit to Japan. He and members of his group met with Premier Ikeda and other highly placed Japanese officials. Real purpose behind his visit is unknown. Some claim his aim was merely an expansion of trade. Others believe USSR felt the trip was necessary so as to reinforce Russia's position with Japan because of increased relations between Japan and China.

OBSERVATIONS:

Industrially, Japan is the leading power in Asia and it wields considerable influence on lesser Asiatic countries. Capitulation by Japan to pressures of Communist China could have significant effect on such countries, possibly hastening their own recognition of Communist China and also the ultimate admission of Communist China to UN. We should do what we can to make available to State Department and other interested agencies, any information which would enable them to take appropriate steps. It is, therefore, recommended we secure State clearance for the development of live sources in Japanese official establishments in the U. S. This matter will be handled by Washington Field and New York Offices whose agents are experienced in such matters and can be relied upon to conduct themselves discreetly so as not to imperil cordial relations presently existing between U. S. and Japan. As a further safeguard, only American citizens employed in these establishments will be considered for development as informants.

7/27/64 Mr H. Bartlett Wells, IN-R
State advised no objection to investigations as outlined below

ACTION:

If you approve, Liaison Section will obtain State Department clearance for FBI to conduct discreet investigations of American citizens employed in Japanese official establishments to determine their potential as security informants. Liaison should advise State Department that no interviews of such persons will be conducted without first checking with State Department.

1 - Mr. Meier

SAC, New York (105-65930)   7/31/64

Director, FBI (105-97459-234)

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE
IS - JAPAN
(Buded: 10/30/64)

ReNYlet 7/7/64, no copy WFO, requesting authority to initiate nationality group coverage of Japanese establishments.

Through liaison channels on 7/27/64, State Department clearance was secured for this program. Accordingly, WFO and New York should ascertain identities of employees of the Japanese Embassy and UN Mission who are citizens of U.S. Any such person considered to have potential should be made the subject of an individual file and Bureau consulted prior to institution of background investigation.

The foregoing is not intended to limit the development of sources to individuals employed in Japanese establishments. Should you find that other areas of Japanese activity, such as organizations of Japanese nationals, require coverage you should not hesitate to initiate the necessary action.

Under caption of this letter, New York and WFO should advise Bureau by 10/30/64 and thereafter at 90-day intervals as to over-all progress made in this matter.

2 - WFO

1 - 65-63113 (Intelligence Coverage of Non-Communist Countries)

ACM:epj:rth
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

9
64 AUG 12 1964

60 AUG 5 1964 DUPLICATE YELLOW

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-97459-234-1

NOTE:

By memorandum W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan 7/21/64, captioned "Intelligence Coverage of Non-Communist Countries" it was recommended and approved that State Department clearance should be secured for the development of live sources in Japanese establishments. Clearance was secured from H. Bartlett Wells on 7/27/64 by SA W. J. McDonnell.

DIRECTOR, FBI 7/7/64

SAC, NEW YORK (105-65980) (P)

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - JAPAN
IS - JAPAN

This is to advise that there are reportedly five thousand Japanese nationals in various capacities in the New York City area, in addition to the numerous officials and employees at the Japanese Consulate and the Japanese Mission to the United Nations. It is felt that the Bureau, at this time, might consider authorizing the institution of nationality group coverage concerning Japan to further implement our current coverage. It is felt that with recent overtures from the Soviet Union regarding trade and cultural exchanges with Japan and, more important, trade relations being further extended between Japan and Red China that for these reasons Japanese coverage should be extended.

In view of the above, it is requested that authority be granted to institute nationality group coverage concerning Japan.

2 - BUREAU RM
1 - NEW YORK (105-65980)

RVP:EMD
(3)

65-63113 -

NOT RECORDED
128 JUL 31 1964

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-97852-23

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan

Tolson
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach ✓
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM : W. R. Wannall

DATE: September 30, 1964

1 - Liaison (Bartlett)
1 - Wannall
1 - Mossburg

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES

We are recommending that State clearance be obtained through liaison for an FBI program to develop sources and informants at Algerian diplomatic establishments in the United States.

At the present time, the Algerian Government, headed by Premier Ahmed Ben Bella, is receiving military aid and assistance from the Soviet-bloc and Cuba. Algerian military personnel are also receiving military training in those countries. The Algerian Communist Party, which supported Ben Bella's party in its fight against the French for Algerian independence, is gaining in numbers and influence. It would appear that intelligence information relating to Algerian activities both in the United States and abroad is of definite interest to the U.S. Government in view of Algeria's rising influence in North African political and military matters.

State has previously granted clearance for FBI programs to develop sources and informants in the diplomatic establishments in the United States of several African countries for the purpose of developing needed intelligence information. State clearance for these programs is limited to our investigating logical persons who may be so developed. Prior to actually contacting such persons to determine their potential, State clearance is again obtained for each person being considered. In the past, State has indicated it feels that because of the risks involved, we should only consider for development as sources, American citizens employed at African diplomatic establishments. However, State has indicated that where there is an investigative need for such a source, State would consider granting clearance for development of other than American citizens.

10/2/64
FB Wills

1/8/65
HO taken, State approved

ACTION:

It is recommended Bureau Liaison obtain State clearance for the FBI to institute a program to develop sources and informants in Algerian diplomatic establishments in the United States indicating we will, of course, obtain State clearance prior to interviewing any potential informant or source.

REC-55

65-63113

wcs

EX-100

JAN 18 1965

1 - Nationality Group Coverage - Algeria

EHM:jal
(7)

JAN 21 1965

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~1 - Mr. Belmont~~
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/13/64

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Ruehl

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Believed State Department clearance should be obtained to add Cambodia to list of countries previously approved by State Department under captioned program.

Captioned program involves development by FBI of confidential sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of friendly foreign nations where (1) it appears that country is leaning toward Sino-Soviet-Bloc (2) where situation in particular country involves serious political or military crisis (3) where it is clear investigation needed. At present time we are developing sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of 45 friendly foreign nations with State Department approval.

It is believed we should, at this time, obtain State clearance to institute program to develop sources and informants in Cambodian diplomatic establishments in U. S.

Cambodia is integral part of Southeast Asian critical area where U. S. is deeply involved politically, economically, and militarily to stem tide of Chinese Communists. During 1963 Cambodia signed friendship treaty with Communist China; broke diplomatic relations with South Vietnam; publicly requested all U. S. economic and military aid programs be terminated; and in 1964 commenced receiving arms and equipment from Communist China. Any information which we can obtain regarding current attitude of Cambodia toward United States should be of value.

RECOMMENDATION:

Liaison obtain State Department clearance, from appropriate representative, for FBI to conduct discreet investigations of potential security informants in Cambodian diplomatic establishments in U. S. Liaison should advise State no interviews will be conducted with potential sources without first obtaining State Department clearance.

VER:ssh
(6)

XEROX
DEC 9 1964

11/25 H C E[illegible] State
approved Cambodia: [illegible]
[illegible]

11/18/64 REC-40 65-63113-461
A. T. Wellborn State
advised that there are
no Cambodian officials
in DC & Embassy is
occupied by Cambodian
students OJHB

4 DEC 8 1964

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

56 DEC 10 1964 65-63113

SECRET This document consists of 1 pages.
Number 1 [illegible] copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

November 25, 1964

Recd 11/25/64 from HO Ekern State OHB

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bartlett, FBI

SUBJECT : Investigation of Cambodian UN Mission

The Department of State has no objection to FBI undertaking a discreet investigation or survey of the Cambodian Mission to the UN and its employees. However, great caution should be execised to see that the Cambodian representatives remain unaware of it. Our relations with Cambodia at this moment are extremely delicate, and we could not afford any operation involving any risk of disclosure.

HOE

Halvor O. Ekern

Intelligence Coverage of Non Communist Countries

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 134-13093

REC-40 65-63113-462

4 DEC 8 1964

[illegible]

SECRET

file 5-VER

Place cc 134-13093

56 DEC 10 1964 313

65-63113

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan WCS

FROM : Mr. R. D. Cotter

DATE: 6/29/65

~~1 - Mr. Belmont~~
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Mullins
1 - Mr. Wacks
1 - Mr. Jaquiss

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

This program was inaugurated in 1954 and was expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) regular notification from the U.S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) maintenance of technical surveillances of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) development of live sources within such establishments.

SCOPE AND COST

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at Seat of Government at nominal expenses. Under second phase we are presently operating 52 technical surveillances covering establishments of 24 non-Soviet-bloc countries. These countries are Algeria, Argentina, Burma, Cambodia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic France, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Turkey, Thailand, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Tanzania.

Under third phase of program we currently have 85 actual and potential live sources at establishments of 49 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by State Department as "target" countries. Costs of this phase arise chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including Anagram Program, Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering U.S.

65-63113

RDC/mea
(10)

EX-100

REC 41

65-63113-489

6 JUL 2 1965

Memorandum for Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES
(ANNUAL EVALUATION)

MAGNITUDE

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and the current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and the State Department. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D. C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

No weaknesses have developed during the past year. The program is operating smoothly and effectively.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillances are evaluated each 90 days. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance. A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVER-ALL VALUE

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to State Department in its formulation of foreign policy and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Re-evaluation will be made in May, 1966.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Tolson ✓
- Belmont ✓
- Mohr
- DeLoach
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan ✓
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

: W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 7/12/65

M : R. D. Cotter RDC

ECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. Jaquiss

It is believed State Department clearance should be obtained to add Burma to list of countries approved by State Department under captioned program.

Captioned program involves development by FBI of confidential sources and informants in diplomatic establishments of friendly foreign nations where:

(1) It appears that country is leaning toward Sino-Soviet-bloc.

(2) Where situation within the particular country involves serious diplomatic or military crisis.

(3) Where it is clear investigation is needed.

It is believed we should a[illegible] time obtain State Department clearance to institute pr[illegible]o develop sources and informants at Burmese diplomati[illegible]ishments in the United States.

Burma is integral part of critical Southeast Asian area where United States is deeply involved politically, economically and militarily to stem the tide of Chinese Communist influence. The Burmese Government is carrying on protracted negotiations with the Burmese Communist Party, or White Flag, insurgents. Communist China has evidenced great interest in these talks. Any information we can obtain concerning Burma's attitude toward the United States or concerning the critical political and military situation in Southeast Asia should be of value.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

65-63113
1 - 105-97459 Sub 301 (Nationality Group Coverage - Asia)
1 - 105-97459 Sub 264 (Nationality Group Coverage - Burma)

REC-107 65-63113-491

18 JUL 22 1965

HJJ:gas
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

54 JUL 26 1965

Memo R. D. Cotter to W. C. Sullivan
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
65-63113

RECOMMENDATION:

Liaison obtain State Department Clearance from appropriate representative for FBI to conduct discreet investigation of potential security informants in Burmese diplomatic establishments in the United States. Liaison should advise State no interview will be conducted with potential sources without first obtaining State Department clearance.

7-14-65
A T Wellborn, State, advised.
He is checking. OHB

7-20-
H O Eckern, State, advised
State has no objection to our
proposal. OHB

Mr. R. D. Cotter 1/20/66

Mr. E. H. Mossburg

1 - Mr. R.D. Cotter
1 - Mr. E.H. Mossburg

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE
ISRAEL

It is recommended that we continue our efforts to develop live sources and informants in Israeli diplomatic establishments in the United States.

State clearance was obtained on 6/2/58 for the FBI to develop sources and informants at Israeli diplomatic establishments. Our request for this clearance was based upon our need to combat the activities of Israeli intelligence agents operating out of the Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C., and the Israeli United Nations Delegation, New York City. At the same time, as a result of the Suez Crisis in 1957-1957, the possibility of war in the Middle East was prevalent and Israel occupied a central position in this sensitive area. Our needs for sources were based, therefore, upon FBI investigative needs and the need to obtain significant intelligence data for other U. S. Government agencies.

After instigating this program, we developed an extremely valuable informant who was an American citizen and who was employed at the Israeli Embassy. This informant was used for several years and furnished valuable information of assistance in our investigation of Israeli intelligence matters and significant intelligence data. She left the Israeli Embassy in 1963. At the present time we have developed several former employees of Israeli diplomatic establishments in the U. S. and persons who have operated in the past for the Israeli Intelligence Service. Some of these persons continue to have contacts with persons in Israeli establishments; however, we have no sources presently employed in Israeli diplomatic establishments in the U. S. This is ~~partially~~ explained by the sensitivity of the program; the fact that the Israel Security Service is extremely thorough in briefing its diplomatic employees concerning possible recruitment efforts by U. S. intelligence servicesand the employment by the Israelis of a very few U. S. citizens who would be logical targets for recruitment.

The risk of developing sources in Israeli establishments is comparable with similar efforts directed at Soviet diplomatic establishments. The Israeli Intelligence and Security Services are regarded as being

105-97459-345
(1) - 65-63113C (Intelligence Coverage) OF NON-SOVIET Bloc COUNTRIES
EHM:gas
(4)

CONTINUED - OVER

65-63113-
NOT RECORDED
102 JAN 25 1966

F152
55 FEB 3 1966

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-97459-3116 37

extremely knowledgeable and efficient. Israel being a friendly country makes our recruitment efforts more difficult when we consider that an improper approach could present a most embarrassing situation for the U. S. Government.

At the current time we have under investigation certain known and suspected Israeli intelligence agents in the U. S. who either have connections with a Israeli establishment or are assigned to such an establishment; we are also currently conducting Registration Act investigations in which the Israeli Government or an Israeli establishment in the U. S. is reportedly acting as the foreign principal; Israel continues to occupy a delicate and dangerous position in the Middle East where she is surrounded by Arab nations seeking her extinction. The possibility of war in the Middle East involving Israel is continually present.

ACTION:

It is recommended that in view of the matters referred to above indicating a current need for FBI sources at Israeli diplomatic establishments in the United States that we continue our efforts in this regard.

Mr. R. D. Cotter 1/20/66

Mr. A. R. Jones

1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter
1 - Mr. E. H. Mossburg
1 - Mr. A. R. Jones

NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE
MIDDLE EAST

This is an analysis of our program to develop informants in the diplomatic establishments in the U. S. of certain Middle East countries.

On June 23, 1959, State Department approved a program to develop informants in the diplomatic establishments in the U. S. of the following Middle East countries: Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAR and Yemen. These countries were selected because it was believed that they were drifting toward the Soviet bloc and because the Middle East had long been a volatile "trouble spot." The Middle East remains turbulent and unpredictable. Cyprus and the Arab-Israeli borders continue to be the major trouble spots but poor Iranian-Iraqi relations as well as the unresolved Yemeni question may also cause many problems. State indicated it was all right to investigate any proposed source but interviews would be considered on a case basis. State advised it did not desire us to use anyone other than Americans, but it would consider the use of non-Americans if there was an investigative interest involved. We have no investigative need for sources since there has been no information developed indicating any of these countries has conducted espionage or intelligence activities against the U. S.

At the present time the countries of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon appear to be firmly oriented toward the Western World and it does not appear that further efforts to develop sources at these establishments is warranted.

The oil-rich countries of Iran and Iraq are still being wooed strenuously by the Soviets and our efforts to develop sources should continu We have one good informant who works part time at the Embassy of Iran in Washington, D. C. Another informant who worked full time there recently resigned. We also have a symboled informant who works as a secretary at the Embassy of Iraq, Washington, D. C. A source who was employed at the Consulate General of Iran, New York City, recently resigned. New York has a good PSI at the Iraqi Consulate and another under development.

65-63113

Comparatively recent revolutions in Yemen and Syria show the continuing political instability in this area and offers opportunities for

Enclosure
105-97459-350
1 - ~~65-61113~~ (Intelligence Coverage)
ARJ:gas (5)

50 JAN 27 1966

CONTINUED - OVER

NOT RECORDED
189 JAN 24 1966
FEB 3 1966

Memorandum for Mr. R. D. Cotter
RE: NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE
105-97459-350

the Soviets to gain additional influence and so our efforts to develop informants in these establishments should continue. We have a very good symboled informant in Washington, D. C., who continues to furnish information regarding the Royal Government of Yemen and if a coalition government between the Royal Government and the Yemen Republic Government occurs this informant may again be employed in the Yemen Arab Republic Embassy. WFO has a symboled informant who is available to furnish information concerning personnel of the Embassy of the Syria Arab Republic. New York has a PSI, who although not associated with the Syrian diplomatic establishment, is, however, in a position to obtain information regarding activities of Syrian diplomatic personnel there.

The UAR under President Nasser is still a volatile hot spot. Nasser continues to court both the Soviets and the Western World and at any time a full-scale war between the UAR and Israel could erupt so we should continue our efforts here. We have one symboled informant who furnishes information concerning personnel of the Embassy of UAR but this informant is not employed there. We had a symboled informant at the UAR Delegation to the United Nations but she was recently terminated when she left her employment to get married.

WFO has a good symboled informant at the Embassy of Lebanon who is employed as a secretary there. A former symboled informant who is an employee of the Lebanese Delegation to the United Nations is available to furnish coverage at the Lebanese diplomatic establishments in New York City. No further efforts to develop sources warranted.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That further efforts to develop sources at Jordanian, Lebanese and Saudi Arabian diplomatic establishments in the U. S. are not warranted and should be discontinued. Attached is a letter to WFO and New York advising these offices to discontinue their efforts in this regard.

(2) That our efforts to develop sources at the diplomatic establishments of Iran, Iraq, Syria, UAR and Yemen should continue.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Cotter

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 12, 1966

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Atkinson
1 - Mr. Harrell
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

JUNE

This program was initiated in 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as other information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) Regular notification from U. S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) Maintenance of technical surveillance of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) Development of live sources within such diplomatic establishments.

SCOPE AND COST:

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at the Seat of Government at nominal cost.

Under the second phase we are presently operating 27 technical surveillances covering establishments of 17 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The countries are: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Panama, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The cost of operating this phase of the program consists primarily of monitoring the technical installations involved and the translation of the intelligence product. These costs are analyzed each time the technical surveillance is justified (on a quarterly basis after the first month's operation). The cost appears to be fully justified based on value of data developed.

65-63113-306

REC 8

16 MAY 17 1966

Under the third phase of this program we currently have 45 approved live sources and 16 under investigation at establishments of 37 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by the State Department as "target" countries. Costs of this phase arises chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and Agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

GCM:cec/js
(8)
65-63113

(CONTINUED - OVER)

5-9

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS:

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including Anagram Program, Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering the U. S.

MAGNITUDE:

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and U. S. Government. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D. C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESS:

No weaknesses have developed during the past year.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS:

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillances are evaluated 30 days after the installation and each 90 days thereafter. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance.

A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes a review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTION:

A review of the control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVER-ALL VALUE:

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to State Department, the White House, other agencies and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Re-evaluation will be made in May, 1967.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

JUNE

DATE: May 12, 1967

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Atkinson

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

Wannall

This program was initiated in 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as other information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) Regular notification from U. S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) Maintenance of technical surveillance of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) Development of live sources within such diplomatic establishments.

SCOPE AND COST:

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at the Seat of Government at nominal cost.

EX-112 REC-40 65-63113-540

Under the second phase we are presently operating 10 technical surveillances covering establishments of 7 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The countries are: Algeria, China, Dominican Republic, France, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. In early February, 1967, 24 telephone surveillances on non-Soviet-bloc establishments were discontinued in accordance with the Director's instructions that the total number of telephone surveillances be substantially reduced. The cost of operating this phase of the program consists primarily of monitoring the technical installations involved and the translation of the intelligence product. These costs are analyzed each time the technical surveillance is justified (on a quarterly basis after the first month's operation). The cost appears to be fully justified based on value of data developed.

MAY 16 1967

Under the third phase of this program we currently have 35 approved live sources and 19 under investigation at establishments of 32 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by the State Department as "target" countries. Costs of this phase arises chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and Agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

65-63113
WHA:brr (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

5 - Atkinson

62 MAY 24 1967

Memorandum to M[illegible] W. C. Sullivan
RE: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES
65-63113

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS:

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U. S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering the U. S.

MAGNITUDE:

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and U. S. Government. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D. C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESS:

No weaknesses have developed during the past year.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS:

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Technical surveillances are evaluated 30 days after the installation and each 90 days thereafter. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance.

A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes a review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTION:

A review of the control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVERALL VALUE:

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to the White House, State Department, other agencies and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Reevaluation will be made in May, 1968.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison (Mr. Bartlett)
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Solomon

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: July 19, 1966

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF [illegible] REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN NATIONS
NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Jamaica, an independent nation since October, 1962, within the past year has been subjected to widespread civil disorders posing a substantial threat to the existing Government. There has been significant strengthening of subversive, communist and anti-Government forces within the country. Increasing inability of Government and police to cope with severe unrest has precipitated urgent plea for substantial U. S. assistance. On basis of indications of rapidly deteriorating internal situation in Jamaica, State Department is being requested to grant clearance for us to initiate program to develop sources and informants in Jamaican diplomatic establishments in the U. S.

For a number of years we have had program to develop live sources in official establishments of various noncommunist countries which have been designated "target" countries because of various factors including evidence of Soviet or communist infiltration, importance in the cold war and/or other international developments which make a particular country of special significance. Recent developments in Jamaica indicate that this country should be considered at this time for designation as a "target" country.

Grinding poverty and an extremely high unemployment rate make Jamaica a prime area for left-wing agitators. Consulate of Cuba in Kingston is focal point for procommunist and anti-Government agitation and activity. The recently organized Young Communist Organization (YCO), is reportedly receiving guidance and assistance from Cuban Consul, and is preparing to become spearhead for sabotage and terrorism. YCO has established training base in Jamaica and in mid-June made unsuccessful attempt to dynamite a major Government building. Communist elements are attempting to control the Ras Tafari Movement, a Jamaican back nationalist extremist cult with an estimated membership of twenty thousand. Cuban

Ltd to SAC, NY, WFO RE: (NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - JAMAICA)

65-63113
AHS:scr (7)

REC-15 65-63113-514

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - 105-97459-219 (Nationality ~~Group Coverage~~ - Jamaica)

77 AUG 12 1966

11 AUG ~~8~~ 9 1966

Cotter

Consul, Kingston, recently made an urgent request of Havana for financial help to Ras Tafarians. In December, 1965, it was reported that Jamaica had received offers of aid from Soviet-bloc countries (not further defined) and recently Jamaican business firms were said to be planning to circumvent restrictions on trade with Cuba in connection with the proposed sale of sugar refining machinery to Cuba.

RECOMMENDATION:

Liaison, through contact with appropriate officials there, should seek State Department clearance for FBI to conduct discreet investigation of potential security informants in Jamaican diplomatic establishments in the U. S. Liaison should advise State no interviews will be conducted of any potential source without first obtaining specific State Department clearance.

ACTION:

If approved, to be referred to Liaison Section for handling.

7-20-66
A S Buford checking
OHB

7-27-66
Mr Buford said State has no objection!
OHB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison (Bartlett)

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/30/66

1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. Mossburg

R. D. Cotter

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

We are recommending that State clearance be obtained for a program to develop live sources at French diplomatic establishments in the United States.

BACKGROUND:

Captioned program involves development by FBI of live sources in diplomatic establishments of noncommunist countries where it appears that country is (1)leaning toward the Sino-Soviet bloc (2)where a situation in a particular country indicates a serious political and military crisis or (3)where there is an investigative need. Upon obtaining State clearance to investigate potential sources, the Field is advised to institute the program but no interviews of potential sources are conducted without first obtaining State clearance. The initial interviews with potential sources are conducted in the majority of cases through the use of pretexts.

NEED FOR SOURCES AT FRENCH ESTABLISHMENTS IN UNITED STATES:

Since January, 1966, relations between the United States and France appear to have become more strained. France has practically discontinued its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). President De Gaulle has publicly criticized United States policies in Vietnam. The United States Intelligence Board is currently considering whether or not it is in the best interests of the United States Government to continue to make United States intelligence data available to France. We have received allegations from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that a sensitive source reported the French Foreign Intelligence

65-63113
1 - 105-97459-231 (Nationality Group Coverage - France)

EHM:ngp
(7)

REC 65-63113-532

CONTINUED - ~~OVER~~

JAN 4 1967

UNREC COPY FILED IN 105-97459

2 1967

Service is training fifty "deep cover" intelligence agents to be dispatched to the United States to collect intelligence as France is no longer closely associated with NATO. CIA has also furnished information indicating two French diplomats, attached to the Materiel French Military Mission, are suspected intelligence agents.

ACTION:

It is recommended that Bureau Liaison contact appropriate officials at the Department of State to obtain State clearance for the FBI to conduct discreet investigations of potential security informants in French diplomatic establishments at the United States. Liaison should advise State no interviews will be conducted of any potential sources without first obtaining State Department clearance. + in writing.

OK H

Discussed with A S Buford 12/5/66
Will advise
cgm

12/21/66 approved by
A S Buford State

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JUNE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 14, 1968

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. Atkinson

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (ANNUAL EVALUATION)

This program was initiated in 1954 and expanded in 1955 and 1958 to provide for the acquisition of positive intelligence data as well as other information which would assist FBI investigations through three principal phases: (1) Regular notification from U. S. intelligence agencies as to arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries; (2) Maintenance of telephone surveillance of official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with approval of State Department; and (3) Development of live sources within such diplomatic establishments.

SCOPE AND COST:

The first phase consists chiefly of file reviews and indexing at the Seat of Government at nominal cost.

Under the second phase we are presently operating 12 telephone surveillances covering establishments of 11 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The countries are: Algeria, China, Dominican Republic, France, India, Israel, Jordan, Panama, United Arab Republic, Venezuela and Vietnam. The cost of operating this phase of the program consists primarily of monitoring the technical installations involved and the translation of the intelligence product. These costs are analyzed each time the telephone surveillance is justified (on a quarterly basis after the first month's operation). The cost appears to be fully justified based on value of data developed.

Under the third phase of this program we currently have 51 approved live sources and 20 under investigation at establishments of 38 non-Soviet-bloc countries approved by the State Department as "target" countries. Costs of this phase arise chiefly from field investigations of potential sources and Agents' time in handling active sources. These costs are fully justified based on value of data developed.

65-63113
WHA:lam (8)

REC-23 65-63113-559

EX-115

CONTINUED - OVER

11 MAY 17 1968

SPEC. MAIL RM.

5-[illegible]

194

MAY 24 1968

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES
65-63113

TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS:

This program supplements and is supplemented by various other programs aimed at developing intelligence coverage, including Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U. S., and name check programs regarding foreign officials entering the U. S.

MAGNITUDE:

This program has ramifications affecting the work on many desks handling matters relating to non-Soviet-bloc countries, depending on international developments and current intelligence requirements of both the Bureau and U. S. Government. The principal field activity is at New York City and Washington, D. C., where the majority of diplomatic establishments are located.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESS:

No weaknesses have developed during the past year.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS:

Controls are exercised on a day-to-day basis through a review of outgoing instructions to the field. Telephone surveillances are evaluated 30 days after the installation and each 90 days thereafter. No interviews of potential live sources are conducted without specific State Department clearance.

A control file is maintained to which copies of pertinent correspondence are routed. Annual evaluation includes a review of this control file.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTION:

A review of the control file reveals that instructions are current and adequate at this time.

OVERALL VALUE:

This program on a continuous basis produces information of considerable value to the White House, State Department, other agencies and to the Bureau in handling our investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended this program be continued in its present form. Reevaluation will be made in May, 1969.

WIG DFM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

: Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 5/5/71

OM : W. R. Wannall

JECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Attached herewith is a single copy of a write-up prepared in captioned matter during the inspection of this Division in January, 1971.

The Inspector concluded that captioned program is productive and should be continued.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached memorandum serve as annual evaluation of program.

AJD:hc
(4) hc
Enclosure

1-Mr. Brennan
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Harrell

ENCLOSURE

ST-113
REC-39 583

11 MAY 7 1971

1315
2 MAY 14 1971

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(Bufile: 65-63113)

1. Background, Scope and Objectives

Program was inaugurated 1954 aimed at developing positive intelligence information, as well as data of value to FBI investigations. Expansion of the program took place in 1958 and 1959 and during 1962 and [illegible], as well as in 1970, additional coverage was approved.

The program has three principal phases as follows:

a. Regular notification to the FBI by other U.S. agencies regarding arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet bloc countries. This phase consists chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal expense.

b. Maintenance of special coverage on official establishments of selected non-Soviet bloc countries with the approval of State Department and the Attorney General. We currently have special coverage on eleven diplomatic establishments of seven non-Soviet bloc countries and three additional installations as recently approved by the Attorney General. Countries currently covered are Panama, Israel, Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Chile, Bolivia and Peru. Our cost in operating this phase of the program is related to translation of the intelligence product and salary of personnel who man special coverage equipment. Costs are analyzed on an individual basis each time the special coverage is justified. This justification is based on the value of the data developed.

c. This phase relates to the development of live sources within diplomatic establishments of non-Soviet bloc countries as well as the development of individuals so closely connected with official establishments they are able to provide accurate up-to-date intelligence information. We now have 47 actual and 22 potential live sources

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
[illegible]:jp
4-H

65-63113-583

ENCLOSURE

at the establishments of 25 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The principal cost involved in this phase relates to Agent time devoted to investigations of sources and time spent in handling these sources.

2. Positive Results Achieved

This program has enabled us to provide the White House and the highest level of the intelligence community a continuing flow of valuable foreign political information affecting the national and international interests of the U.S. The program was particularly productive in our coverage of such critical areas of tension as the Middle East crisis, the continuing crisis in Panama, and the recurrent political crises created in South America through the unseating and establishment of regimes in the various countries covered. In the areas mentioned, as well as in other fringe nationality areas, this program has served as a basis for obtaining information which has provided U.S. Government with current data regarding the international political scene and has contributed otherwise unobtainable information for the benefit of those responsible for policy decisions at the highest level of our Government. An example of the importance of this information is illustrated in the comments of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles W. Yost, made by him in a letter dated 11/13/70 to the Director. Ambassador Yost noted that the support given to the U.S. United Nations Mission by the Bureau was deeply appreciated by him and had afforded him privileged insight and perspective.

The quality of this program is further attested to by realization by the White House of the capabilities of the FBI to produce positive foreign political intelligence with resulting instructions to the Bureau to expand this capability abroad in select liaison positions. As a result of these instructions, our capability in furnishing foreign political information was expanded through the opening of six new liaison posts in Beirut, Lebanon; Caracas, Venezuela; La Paz, Bolivia; Copenhagen, Denmark; Managua, Nicaragua; and Tel Aviv, Israel. With this expansion, our overseas liaison Agents were increased from 25 to 42 with supporting clerical personnel being increased in number from 32 to 40. This move has increased the number of our foreign posts from 11 to 17. (More detailed comment regarding increase in liaison abroad is set forth in the work papers of this inspection under Section 4-E, Accomplishments - Special Coordination Unit.)

3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The program as it relates to all friendly foreign countries (except West Germany) is coordinated by the Number One Man of the Nationalities Intelligence Section working through the separate supervisors assigned to the individual country's desk within the Section.

4. Current Justification for Continuation

This program continues to produce information of substantial value relative to Bureau investigations as well as substantive foreign political information of vital interest to the White House and members of the intelligence community. The information continues to illustrate the FBI's ability to produce valuable intelligence information relative to foreign political matters and to solidify the Bureau's position as a valuable source of foreign intelligence data. It is recommended that this program be continued.

5. Periodic Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last justified by memorandum dated 5/8/70.

OPTIONAL FO
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

O : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 8, 1970

ROM : W. R. Wannall

UBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

Attached herewith is a single copy of a write-up prepared in captioned matter during recent inspection of Domestic Intelligence Division (April, 1970).

The Inspector concluded that captioned program is productive and should be continued.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached memorandum serve as annual evaluation of instant program.

REC- 29

Enclosure

AJD:ams
(4)

65-63112-514

MAY 18 1970

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. O'Brien

S-O-B File

65-63113

ENCLOSURE

35

66 MAY

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(Bufile: 65-63113)

4-H

1. Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives

This program is aimed at developing positive intelligence information as well as data of value to FBI investigations. The program was inaugurated in 1954, expanded in 1955 and 1959, and during 1962 and 1963 additional coverage was approved.

The program has three principal phases as follows:

a. Regular notification to the FBI by other U. S. agencies regarding arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet-bloc countries. This phase consists chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal expense.

b. Maintenance of special coverage on official establishments of selected non-Soviet-bloc countries with the approval of State Department and the Attorney General. We currently have special coverage on six diplomatic establishments of four non-Soviet-bloc countries and one additional installation as recently approved by the Attorney General. Countries currently covered are Panama, Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic. Our cost in operating this phase of the program is related to translation of the intelligence product and salary of personnel who man special coverage equipment. Costs are analyzed on an individual basis each time the special coverage is justified. This justification is based on the value of the data developed.

c. This phase relates to the development of live sources within diplomatic establishments of non-Soviet-bloc countries as well as the development of individuals so closely connected with official establishments they are able to

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
4/6/70
FXO:dgo
4-H

65-63113-274

ENCLOSURE

provide accurate up-to-date intelligence information. We now have 28 actual and 29 potential live sources at the establishments of 33 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The principal cost involved in this phase relates to Agent time devoted to investigations of sources and time spent in handling these sources.

2. Positive Results Achieved

This program has enabled us to provide the White House and the intelligence community a continuing flow of information affecting the national and international interests of the U. S. Specifically, this information has included details of the plans and activities of those countries involved in the Middle East crisis, details regarding the continuing crisis in Panama, developments related to the recent U. S.-Bolivia crisis, and substantial valuable information regarding developments in the Dominican Republic. In the areas mentioned above as well as in a number of other instances, information developed through this program and disseminated within the U. S. Government has provided recipients current information regarding international political scene and has assisted those responsible for policy-making decisions in these areas. Recently, the U. S. Ambassador to the UN and members of his staff expressed their appreciation for a continuing flow of pertinent data provided to them as regards the Middle East situation. This program produces information of the type necessary to enable the Bureau to fulfill its investigative and internal security responsibilities.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

Prior to Division re-organization (January, 1970), the Number One Man of the then Latin American Section served as coordinator of this program. In this capacity, he was in periodic contact with the Section Chief of the then Nationalities Intelligence Section and with individual supervisors concerning objectives and results achieved. Since Division re-organization, which brought matters involving all friendly foreign countries (except West Germany) under the present Nationalities Intelligence Section, the Number One Man of the Nationalities Intelligence Section serves as coordinator along these same lines.

Current Justification for Continuation

This program continues to produce information of substantial value as regards Bureau investigative and intelligence interests as well as the interests of other U. S. agencies. The information produced continues to pinpoint the FBI as a regular and most valuable source of intelligence information. It is recommended that this program be continued.

5. How Often Evaluated and Date of Last Justification

Program is evaluated annually. It was last justified by memorandum dated 5/27/69.

62-116395-670 | ~~*~~ 9 encl. 61 | SFP:eks 8/29/75

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the SSC request dated August 20, 1975, for FBI materials and specifically, to Part II, which called for access to materials by August 29, 1975. Encld for ur approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum in response to Part II. A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for ur records.

74

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - USA, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - Secret Service, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston (Via Courier)
1 - OSI, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - NISO, Chicago (RM)

Report of: SA LELAND G. RICHIE
Office: CHICAGO
Date: 11/19/69

Field Office File #:
Bureau File #:

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Character:
RACIAL MATTERS
SMITH ACT OF 1940
SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Synopsis:

Black Panther Party (BPP) leaders in Illinois, call for people to arm themselves, have a proleterian revolution and refer to police as "fascist pigs." Three members of Chicago Chapter of BPP arrested during August, 1969, for unlawful use of weapons; three members of Chicago Chapter of BPP arrested at Indianapolis, Indiana, and charged with larceny, one of these individuals also charged with violation of 1935 Firearms Act; seven members of Chicago BPP arrested at Chicago BPP Headquarters during October, 1969, following shooting incident. BPP literature accuses United States of being racist and fascist and police of being brutal. Chicago BPP attempting to organize a People's Free Medical Care Center. Breakfast for Children Program reportedly almost non-existent. During October, 1969, leaders of the Communist Party met with Chicago BPP members to exchange ideas. FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, at rally sponsored by African-American Heritage Association during October, 1969, at Chicago.

- P -

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
declassification.

DETAILS:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents [illegible]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Pages
I.	REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BPP LEADERS	2-20
II.	ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM OR POLICIES	20-23
III.	TEACHING OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM	23-24
IV.	DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM	24-34
V.	EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY	35-40
VI.	BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM AND PEOPLE'S FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER	40-49
VII.	EVIDENCE OF BPP ATTEMPTS TO AFFILIATE OR FORM COALITIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS	49-53

Characterizations of the Black Panther Party (BPP), The Students For A Democratic Society (SDS), and the African - American Heritage Association (AAHA) are set forth in the appendix section of this report.

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BPP LEADERS

A press conference was held in Grant Park, Chicago, Illinois, on July 31, 1969, by members of the BPP and the SDS. This press conference was recorded by Special Agents (SA) GORDON S. BROOKS, JAMES E. HANLON, and RICHARD J. OTT and the following is a transcription of the remarks made by RUFUS WALLS, Deputy Minister of Information of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP:

> "Black Panther Party Illinois. This is Field Marshal BOB LEE, this is the Deputy Minister of Defense BOBBY RUSH. I want to say the pigs dropped on our office this morning about two o'clock. They just jumped out of the car, no reason at all. I think they were on a trip or something or drunk and just started shooting up there in the office and (inaudible) stairs, but the people started shooting back. We tell all the people to arm themselves against these fascist pigs and it's a true indication by what action happened at the Panther headquarters that if those Panthers hadn't been armed they would have been murdered dead, all of them. They went up there in that office, stole money, took axes and chopped up all the machines, poured gasoline on the floor, on the food we had for the breakfast for children program and literally set it afire. This is what we're dealing with in this country. We've been telling the people all along that we're living in a fascist state. We know it because we've been under fascism for 400 years and you can't tell

us nothing else. And the people who don't know it will know soon, if they don't get themselves some pieces also and augh we just gonna go and so and we ain't gonna let these pigs stop us because we are the vanguard and we're gonna continue to be the vanguard as long as the people are oppressed, as long as there's racism, capitalism, imperialism, we will always be the vanguards cause we're tired of this s--- (obscene). We're getting tired of it. We're gonna get that office, I don't know if we can get that one back together, but we're gonna have another one today and it's gonna be functioning to let the pigs know that they're not gonna stop us and we're gonna have everything that we have now and we're gonna have more and we're gonna continue to teach proletarian revolution in this country and we're gonna continue to teach people to resist this pig power structure by any means necessary. We're going to continue to teach the people (inaudible). We're going to do that and everything we can to stop all this brutality, murder, fear and repression that Mayor DALEY, J. EDGAR HOOVER, Pig NIXON, is waging on the people in this country and we're tired of it, but I know it's gonna be some Panthers dying. We ain't worried 'bout that. We dying anyway. Like people dying in the (inaudible) today from the diseases raised by the genocide program of those so-called Houses of Correction and jails, prisons. All this is genocide. My brothers in Vietnam, thirty per cent, forty per cent people fighting that war are black people. This is genocide. Lot of people say, you know, there's gonna be violence and there's gonna be bloodshed. We're about surviving in this country, that's all that matters. There ain't gonna be no more asking for nothing and ain't gonna be no more begging cause this ain't gonna get us nothing. We've been doing it too long, we're not gonna ask the oppressors for no freedom, cause we know that is a stage of security. Not gonna sit here, praying cause we are armed with the Marx and Lenin Theory and I mean we are armed, really (inaudible) and armed with it politically and getting it into practice we gonna educate, be re-educate, everybody in this country. We gonna have coalition. Anybody who wants to be a revolutionary anti-American, anything else, just stop by and see the Black Panther Party, we'll teach you, we'll teach you the rules of the different power structures, unless the pigs out here don't like what I'm saying, you can go to hell (inaudible) to to hell and I'm not just standing here talking to hear myself, I want everybody to know that, cause we're made, crazy, and cold and calculating. I want you to know that and when you come to our office, you better have your best, you better have your target practice, cause we got ours and I'm not saying anything or trying to get armed we are armed, I want you to know that and all the revolutionaries out here or those who desire to be revolutionaries I say all power to the people. All power to the people. Anybody can't dig that, just walk on, just walk on.

Questions (inaudible).

See augh the police say anything. The police are the aggressors. They're out of order at the beginning as our Minister of Information says, ELDRIDGE CLEAVER says, they have no right and of course, they have no right that the oppressed is bound to respect cause they're out of order from the beginning. They have no right over there in the black communities. They're only over there to brutalize, to murder and to protect the vicious, capitalistic, vicious system that your curses have set up.

Questions (inaudible).

I think (inaudible), by the Constitution of the United States (inaudible).

Questions (inaudible).

You said were there two men inside the office with shotguns and I'm saying if there were they were within their rights to have shotguns in that office, and I can imagine what would have happened during the pigs' attack on the office, it was without any type of provocation. I can imagine if those brothers had not had the weapons to defend themselves. This is the essence of the, of the actions right there. Whether or not if they had not been armed, whether the pigs would have opened fire not knowing that those brothers (inaudible) had the strategic weapons to resist them and the proper technical equipment to defend themselves. No knowing, had those pigs been allowed to enter the office, what would have happened to those brothers up there.

This is the question right here.

Questions (inaudible).

The pigs had been building up their courage all day. They have been harassing people all day. They have arrested five of them across the street in the parking lot. Earlier that day they had been sitting out in front of the office getting boozed up and insulting people walking along the street. They have been building this up all day and I knew they would probably come down sometime sooner or later.

Questions (inaudible).

(Inaudible) no in the same car they were coming back and forth around the office. They had a whole squadrol of pigs (inaudible) earlier that afternoon (inaudible) on some trumped up charge, it was just something that was building up. You can judge when the pigs are ready to make an attack, you can judge by their actions cause they, they, you know got to have courage and still within them they have to build that up with booze and they have to become very emotional and wild.

Questions. You say they were harassing people on the street?

Right, right, righto.

Questions. You mentioned before a great deal about defense, what about retaliation? You plan retaliatory action?

No, no. We're not trying (inaudible). Now what we're going to do as far as (inaudible) to insure that the occupation troops are withdrawn from the community. I want to re-emphasize this (inaudible). We're going to exhaust all legal means. We're going to have a national committee to combat fascism. Righto.

Questions (inaudible)."

The following article captioned, "Panther Chief FRED HAMPTON Tells Party's Goals," appeared in the August

23 - 29, 1969, edition of the Chicago Defender, a Chicago, Illinois newspaper:

> "'While the buffoons are busy going to the moon, we're down here on earth giving free food and medical services to oppressed people,' asserted Fred Hampton, deputy chairman of the Illinois Black Panther Party in an interview with the Daily Defender at week's end.
>
> 'But Nixon,' Hampton continued, 'is an international bully who can't fool anybody no matter how many fools he sends to the moon cause we're going to be dealing with the problems on earth.'
>
> For almost three hours, the youthful head of the militant organization held a free-wheeling talk session that ran the gaunt from harsh criticism of repressive tactics against the Panther Party to profuse words of praise for the Panthers' free breakfast program and soon-to-be opened free health center on the Westside.
>
> Not only did Hampton assail anyone slightly connected with the Chicago Police Department ('fascist pigs'), but he also got in hardhitting jabs at 'apathetic blacks,' SCLC's Operation Breadbasket and other subjects.
>
> Accompanying Hampton in the interview were Deputy Party Chairman of Defense Bobby Rush and Minister of Health Ronald Sanchel, who described plans for the opening the first of September of a free health center at 3852 W. 16th st.

'What we're doing for the people just heightens the contradictions of charges made against the Panther Party,' said Sanchel, a slightly built youth of 19.

According to Sanchel, a survey of the Westside community indicated that residents wanted the center to provide, in order of importance, pediatrics, obstetrics, dentistry and general medical care.

'We're asking for donations from medical and drug companies and for doctors and nurses to provide services free of charge,' said the young director matter of factly.

'So far, we have 12 doctors signed up for the staff and we're in pretty good shape for our beginning staff of nurses,' he said, 'but we need lab and X-Ray technicians and of course, money.' Members of the party are also being trained as technicians, he said.

Free car service to and from the center will also be provided, Sanchel added. Plans also call for expansion of the center to include comprehensive medical care.

In addition to money, building materials for rehabilitation of the center's quarters are needed desperately, he said. 'This is one obstacle that we faced in opening up the center earlier because the building that we secured needed so much repair, and we've been working on it daily,' Sanchel stated.

Hampton and Rush looked on approvingly as Sanchel enthusiastically discussed the health center. Hampton, 20, was recently released on $10,000 bond pending an appeal of a two to five year jail sentence on April 7 of a robbery of an ice cream truck in Maywood.

Assailing the conviction, he launched into an attack on the court system, prisons and a 'capitalistic society full of fascist, demagogue politicians, avaricious businessmen and racist pig police.'

'My case shouldn't have even been tried by Judge Sidney Jones,' Hampton asserted. 'Jones had just acquitted this guy Kamberos whose car killed a kid.

'And everybody was talking about a mistrial. Yet, I'm convicted of stealing some ice cream and my appeal is to be answered in two months, imagine that, two months. . . robbery of some ice cream takes precedence over any other case including murder.'

During his three months in Menard state prison, Hampton said he was kept in isolation, denied eye glasses and medical care. 'You should see how they treat us in prison,' he said. Anyone who doesn't get any mail or any visitors is kicked around and pretty soon you don't see that prisoner anymore. And there wasn't one black guard at Menard. Now check that out.

Hampton was asked: What do you think will curb the harassment of the Panthers.

'First we have to educate the people as to who their enemy really is and it ain't us. Next show them how to defend themselves against the pig power structure and then they'll be ready to defend us and themselves the next time we're attacked' Hampton answered.

What about the charges of Panther intimidation and threats made to black people? was another question posed to the Panther leader.

Rush answered this question. 'Yes, we are armed but this is our constitutional right and it is only in self defense. We don't believe in harassing anybody to make them join our party and we purge individualists who are racists and don't want to abide by our program. And if anyone has a complaint about this kind of thing he or she should come to the office and we'll punish the person in front of the complainant,' he said.

When asked about their feelings toward SCLC's Operation Breadbasket, Hampton said that organization should have initiated the free feeding program.

'Jesse Jackson spoke at our convention in California a few weeks ago and he should put into action what he said there because he got two standing ovations when he spoke,' Hampton said.

'And Jesse should be telling the people about people like Hanrahan, Mayor Richard J. Daley and Police Gang Intelligence Unit head (Edward) Buckney and the atrocities they're perpetuating on black people.

'In fact,' Hampton continued, 'Jesse should get on the radio and make a (public service) tape in direct opposition to what Hanrahan's telling the people to do about the gangs.' (Hampton was apparently referring to Hanrahan's public service announcements which advise Chicago citizens to lodge complaints with his office if they were intimidated or harassed by gang members.)

'All these pigs do is label a gang and then the people start believing that mess and next thing, all the young warriors, the youths who will fight the power structure are thrown in jail, indicted and put away for good. . . . these people had better get hip to what's happening and stop going around believing these fascist pigs.

'And the next time the pigs attack our headquarters, there's going to be a lot of dead pigs. We didn't fire back when the FBI busted in 'cause we wanted to show the people who the enemy really is. But the next time, the people will defend us,' Hampton declared.

'One thing's for sure,' said Hampton confidently, 'the Black Panther Party is not going to be suppressed no matter what the pigs like Hanrahan, Daley, Buckney, and (Cook County Jail Supt.) Winston Moore do.

'We're the vanguard of the people and we say more power to the people and the people are our first and most important concern.'"

On August 29, 1969, a rally was held in Grant Park, Chicago, Illinois, to commemorate the confrontations between the Chicago Police Department (PD) and the demonstrators during the Democratic National Convention held during August, 1968. SA SAMUEL P. WALLACE made a tape recording of speeches at the above rally on August 29, 1969, and the following are the remarks made by FRED HAMPTON at this rally:

FRED HAMPTON

"Now first of all I don't know if it's true. Somebody told me that a young man, I don't even know (inaudible) make a special request (inaudible) all you got to do is come on up here and get it. (Inaudible) everybody in our work shop (inaudible) in our work shop.

And the people in our work shop (inaudible) because the people in our work shop got high. Everybody in our work shop got high. We feel high. (inaudubla) to talk about here now. We know, we know what it's all about. We know it's about depression. We know it's about depression. We know it's about fascism. We know it's about guns. We know it's about (inaudible). (Inaudible) I want to leave a message with you anarchists. You frauds, you idiots, fools. You understand that like you go off and see people (inaudible). The Black Panther Party doesn't endorse any criminal acts. We believe anytime you lead people to (inaudible) it's a crime. (Inaudible) at the same time I'd fight that poor (obscene) (inaudible). (Inaudible) Chicago, Black Panther Party (inaudible) anywhere around the world. (Inaudible) pages of history books who will be coming to Chicago, his name is BOBBY SEALE. (Inaudible) he's the (inaudible) of the Black Panther Party. You want to know what it is? (Inaudible) . . . step out of the pages of the history books. (Inaudible). (Inaudible). . . BOBBY SEALE crash that (inaudible) with his gun ready to (inaudible). (Inaudible). . . there's a problem. Out there the people wanted a stop sign in the community. People (inaudible) grievance to the government. The government said 'No. There ain't no stop sign. We don't care how many them niggers being ran over. We not gonna put no stop sign up.' HUEY (?) went and got his shot gun, got him a house (hammer?), got both stop signs (inaudible). Then he went down to the corner with both stop signs, a hammer (inaudible) put up them stop signs. The people are very (inaudible). Next time the people, next time the people have a problem, people being (inaudible). (Inaudible) got them both stop signs (inaudible) and the people went down there put up those stop signs (inaudible). And it ain't stopped yet. (Inaudible) that peace sign in California and now it's all over the world. That's international peace sign. The peace sign (inaudible). The peace goes on and on and on no matter where you go. It might not sound so loud, but if you listen for it you hear that peace. That peace (inaudible) revolutionary (inaudible). Yeah, yeah. Ain't that right? Yeah. You can kill a revolutionary but you can't kill a revolution. You can run a freedom fighter out of the country but you can't run freedom fighting out of the country. You can shoot a liberator but you can't shoot a liberation. If you do (inaudible) so maybe that don't explain. Solution, that don't solve it. Solution or no solution. (Inaudible) that's the Black Panther Party. (Inaudible). (Inaudible) Black Panther paper. (Inaudible) buy the Black Panther Party paper. (Inaudible) that's right. You might as well buy one of our papers. I'm high. I'm high. Ain't you high? Are you high? Are you high? Are you high? Oh, I'm high. Oh, I'm high, ect. Darling, darling, do it. You don't want to do it right. You gonna be high or you gonna be lower or you gonna be a faggot (?) or what? You gonna be high. Oh, I'm high, ect. We're gonna bring out another brother now. Brother I got to introduce his name is RENNIE DAVIS. I think everybody here should know him. The brother is the project director for the riots of the Democratic Convention. You remember the Democratic Convention? You remember when all those pigs - those blue uniforms on -

> those mechanical (obscene) came down and stomped on the people in the street. We gonna do away with those crazy dog cops and (inaudible). (Inaudible) rights of the democratic community. (Inaudible) present a good friend of mine, a brother of mine don't keep his hands off me, knock his hands off me I . . . so's you all, you understand, all you young men, all you (inaudlbe) attack now as soon as I leave. I'm gonna leave in a minute. As soon as I leave ya all attack me going this way. Ya understand. And I want to show you (inaudible). I been in prison for the last four months, and I think I do better physically than I ever been in my life. Ya understand. I was tired when I left (inaudible). I'm not tired anymore, and I'm high (inaudible). Let me give you, let me give you brother RENNIE DAVIS. Thank you all (inaudible)."

Source advised that he attended a closed meeting at the church on West Armitage Street, Chicago, Illinois, wherein the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican youth gang, has its headquarters. This meeting was on the evening of September 10, 1969, and between 125 and 150 individuals purporting to be members or sympathizers with the BPP, the Young Lords and the Young Patriots, whose membership is comprised of the Applachian poor on Chicago's near north side, were in attendance.

Source advised the meeting was in memorial to LARRY ROBERSON, a BPP member who died during the week of September 8 to 12, 1969, and who had been wounded by police officers which resulted in his hospitalization. The meeting was also in memorial of HO CHI MINH who had recently died.

FRED HAMPTON, Chairman, Illinois BPP, spoke and his remarks referred to the writings of MAO TSE TUNG, statements by ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, Minister of Defense, BPP as contained in CLEAVER's book, "Soul on Ice." HAMPTON stated the killing of one brother by the "pig" police would not stop the revolution. HAMPTON did not become specific but did say that forces were at work attempting to divide the party (BPP). HAMPTON's remarks also referred to the fact that the death of ROBERSON would not stop the work of the party.

Following HAMPTON, BOB RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP, spoke saying that he was glad that DIRKSEN (Senator EVERETT DIRKSEN) was dead. He stated that the pigs (meaning the police) would have to be dealt with by actions that they are familiar with in order to insure the fair treatment of the oppressed people. The source felt that RUSH was saying that force was needed to be used against police, although he did not say it.

9/11/69)

On September 21, 1969, the "Joliet Herald News," under the caption "Black Panthers Are Organizing Here," printed the following story concerning the news conference held on September 20, 1969, at Mr. STUBBS' residence:

> "Joliet's Black Panther organization, after a year allegedly working underground here, plans to 'come out of the ground.'
>
> That was a disclosure Saturday during the press conference by ROBERT CAMPBELL, 24, of Chicago, a reported section leader of the organization. The conference was at the home of JAMES STUBBS, 22, 528 South Water Street, a reported 'local Captain of Defense' with the Panthers.
>
> CAMPBELL said one of the purposes of the organization is to control incidents of

alleged police brutality in the black community.

'If he (police) comes to us talking of love, we will also talk of love' CAMPBELL said. 'But, if he comes to talk with a .357 magnum (a high velocity gun), we will also talk with a .357 magnum.'

CAMPBELL used the jargin of 'pigs' and 'mechanical fools' in referring to police.

'The Constitution gives the right to any person to bear arms and every member 'Black Panthers' is required to have four guns' he said.

In response to other questions, CAMPBELL said the Black Panthers are opposed to Capitalism, Fascism and violence.

'We plan to have breakfast for children because Capitalism cannot feed all children' CAMPBELL said.

Asked how the breakfast would be financed, CAMPBELL said, 'It would be done through the sale of newspapers and through donations from people.'

'We also plan to set up health clinics in the black community' CAMPBELL added.

He said the Black Panther group is organizing in Joliet because the people wanted us to come here.

When asked about qualifications for membership, CAMPBELL declined to make any statement, saying only that not everyone can qualify, but they can give support to the organization.

CAMPBELL was not certain where the headquarters for the Joliet Black Panthers would be located. But organizationally, as is Panther procedure, local officers would be under State Chapters and Section Leader Direction.

Asked if the Black Panthers would try to obtain their objectives to political action, CAMPBELL answered that they did not intend to work at local levels but rather through top level political figures in achieving their goals."

On October 16, 1969, the current issue of "The Proviso Herald," a weekly newspaper, distributed in the Maywood, Illinois area, carried an article entitled, "HAMPTON, GRAHAM, Blast Poverty Bias," which reads as follows:

> "Thirty-nine years ago, the Melrose Park village board denied the request of a group of black residents to build a church within the village, claiming it would attract 'the colored element from Maywood and Chicago.'
>
> Last Tuesday, Proviso area blacks met in the First Baptist Church of Melrose Park, a Negro church, to discuss other 'problems of black people in the suburbs.'
>
> The small crowd (about 35 or 40) ranged from intense Black Panthers with high and wide Afro haircuts to middle aged suburban couples.
>
> FRED HAMPTON, chairman of the Illinois Black Panthers, was scheduled to appear along with the Rev. GEORGE CLEMENTS; Dr. CHARLES HURST, dean of Malcolm X college; and BILL GRAHAM of Maywood's Human Relations commission.

HURST and CLEMENTS didn't show, so GRAHAM led off with a multi-pronged attack on what the federal and local government is and is not doing.

He blasted the proposed family planning program, saying that the pill, 'which is not yet safe, is going to be shoved down our throats.'

'When genocide can be forced upon us, there is some question as to the sanity of a system that would allow this,' he said.

GRAHAM, calmly but angrily, called the elementary schools in dist. 89 'a network of failure factories,' and high school dist. 209 'racist oriented.'

He also cited poor housing for low and low middle income families where 'rats play hopscotch with a dead roach,' and 'a welfare system where recipients have to storm the welfare office to get what they're entitled to on paper.'

RON SATCHEL, health minister of the Illinois Black Panthers, gave a brief talk on the organization's free breakfast program and free health care center.

He also scored family planning, saying that 'increasing population isn't the problem, but the maldistribution of food.'

But it was FRED HAMPTON who dominated the meeting. With the skill of a practiced surgeon, he dissected mid-twentieth century American society.

'Fascism is what we have in this country today,' he heatedly began, 'and there are three integral parts: the avaricious businessman, the demagogic politician, and the racist pig dog policeman.'

HAMPTON, embattled in the courts on assault charges, said one of the worst dangers for blacks is their belief in the white power structure's 'false values.'

'Athletics and entertainment are the biggest form of exploitation there is,' he cried, blasting the likes of WILT CHAMBERLAIN and singer JAMES BROWN as helping to perpetuate a dangerous myth.

'Hell, with all this work to be done, we got no time for playing.'

The Panther chairman said that everyone has the right to defend himself, so if people don't want the Panthers to have guns, all guns should be thrown in the ocean and not turned in to Chicago police sup. JAMES CONLISK 'so that he can sell them.'

'When you mix explosive chemicals and put them in a keg,' he continued, 'you can march around it, picket it, slap petitions on it, but it's still explosive. You have to get inside at the chemicals, the cause.'

HAMPTON said he knew his theories weren't very popular.

'But look, I'm 21, if you think that it has all happened in 21 years and that I did it, then you should take me out and shoot me. But

> you and I know these situations have been around for a long time, and the only people who can change anything is us, the people.'
>
> He pleaded for unity among all poor people of every color to unite against capitalism, 'we've had too many wars on poverty, let's have some wars on the rich.'"

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM OR POLICIES

On August 9, 1969, WILLIE CALVIN, Captain of Defense, and RICHARD L. "ARDAY" BLACK, both members of the Chicago chapter of the Illinois BPP, appeared at the Chicago chapter of the BPP headquarters on this date with three .30 caliber M-1 carbines, appearing to be brand new. These individuals indicated that they had recently purchased these weapons in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

On August 13, 1969, JOHN "BEAVER" WILLIAMS, a member of the West Suburban Branch of the BPP, CALVIN, BLACK, JOHN "OBAR" BRAKES, Sergeant on Defense Staff of Chicago chapter of the BPP, WILLIAM O'NEAL, Chief of Staff, and RONALD "DOC" SATCHEL, Deputy Minister of Health, all of the Illinois BPP, traveled to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on this date in an automobile owned by WILLIAMS. These individuals allegedly went to the Milwaukee BPP headquarters and picked up JESSE JAMES, reportedly the Head of Security of the Milwaukee BPP. This entire group then proceeded to a sporting goods store in Milwaukee and the BPP members from Milwaukee purchased 14 .30 caliber M-1 carbines for the group from Chicago. The Chicago members of the BPP then took the members of the BPP from Milwaukee back to their headquarters and the BPP members from Chicago departed for Chicago.

8/9 & 13/69)

On August 14, 1969, Sergeant WILLIAM KLUSAK, Oak Brook, Illinois PD, advised that RICHARD BLACK and JOHN WILLIAMS were arrested on this date for unlawful use of weapons and among other items, the following were found in their possession:

BLACK had a .30 caliber M-1 carbine, serial number 19875, and WILLIAMS had a .30 caliber M-1 carbine, serial number 19405.

On August 14, 1969, source reported that JOHN BRAKES, RICHARD BLACK, WILLIE CALVIN, WILLIAM O'NEAL, and JOHN WILLIAMS all went to a wooded area west of Oak Brook, Illinois, to try out five carbines that they had recently obtained. While shooting in the area a police car pulled up with one officer and this officer caught WILLIAMS and BLACK while the other BPP members hid in the weeds and trees. These three BPP members had considered killing the lone officer, however, they had changed their mind after O'NEAL had suggested that other officers would be arriving on the scene shortly because of all the shooting that they had been doing. O'NEAL, BRAKES, and CALVIN then left the area as other officers appeared on the scene.

8/14/69)

On September 30, 1969, three members of the BPP in Chicago were in Indianapolis to take control of the Indianapolis Chapter of the BPP and to help straighten out the problems that existed there. On the afternoon of September 30, 1969, the three members from Chicago, Illinois; namely, WILLIE CALVIN, JEWEL COOK, and his brother, CLEVELAND COOK, were arrested by the Indianapolis PD for theft of an automobile battery. The three were scheduled to go to court in the morning on October 1, 1969.

Lieutenant SHELDON LASKEY, Special Investigations Division, Indianapolis PD, advised on October 1, 1969, that the Indianapolis PD had arrested three BPP members from Chicago on charges of Offense Against Property Act Larceny, and one of the individuals, CLEVELAND COOK, for violation of the 1935 Firearms Act. The other two arrested were JEWEL L. COOK, brother of CLEVELAND, and WILLIE J. CALVIN. The automobile they were driving was registered to CLEVELAND COOK, and a gun was found in the glove compartment. Lieutenant LASK[illegible] advised that the three appeared in Marion County Municipal Court on the morning of October 1, 1969, and they were all held on bond; JEWEL COOK and WILLIE CALVIN on $3,500 surety bond, and CLEVELAND COOK on $7,500 surety bond.

(., 9/30/69)

Officer TUNK, Chicago, Illinois PD, advised on October 3, 1969, that seven Negro males were arrested at BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, during the early morning hours on October 3, 1969, following a shooting incident. Those arrested were:

JEREL HAW INS
BRADLEY GREEN
WADE STEI EY
BILLY BRO KS
MORRIS BR WN
HARRY MOOR
TERRANCE WATSON

Officer WANER, Chicago PD, advised on October 4, 1969, that an Officer SHANLEY, Chicago PD, was injured in front of BPP Headquarters by a shotgun blast fired by an unknown individual. Officer WANER stated the shotgun blast was believed to have originated from Panther Headquarters. Officer SHANLEY was taken to Illinois Research Hospital.

Captain JOYCE, 13th Police District, advised subsequently that additional police patrols had been sent into the vicinity of Panther Headquarters and additional reinforcements were to be maintained in the general area. Captain JOYCE concluded saying the injury to Officer SHANLEY was possibly only superficial and could be a result of a ricochet from the shotgun blast.

Officer LARA, Chicago PD, subsequently advised on October 4, 1969, that further information developed by the PD regarding the shooting at Panther Headquarters reflects the police were responding to a telephone call alleging shots had been fired from Panther Headquarters. Officer LARA stated he and Officer SHANLEY, above, investigated the call when Officer SHANLEY was hit by concrete torn up as a result of a shotgun blast which originated from the roof of Panther Headquarters. This shot was in the rear of the headquarters and not directly on Madison Street which runs in front of the headquarters. Officer LARA concluded saying that he and other officers arrived after their first shot, entered Panther Headquarters and arrested seven male Negroes and confiscated a .30 caliber carbine and a shotgun.

The above shooting incident occurred at Panther Headquarters earlier as a result of trouble which recently has developed between the Vice Lords (VL), a Negro youth gang on Chicago's west side, and the BPP. Recently the VL had approached the BPP Chapter wanting to be "cut in" on the medical center which the Panthers are currently organizing. This medical center, according to the Panthers, will be for all needy individuals on Chicago's west side who need medical and dental care.

A representative of the VL contacted FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, and instructed HAMPTON the

Panthers were to do no further work on a medical center headquarters or continue with the Panther's plans to open the medical center. This VL representative stated if the Panthers did open the medical center on their own and not allow the VL to participate, then the VL would "burn it down." HAMPTON instructed this person of the VL that the medical center was for the people and the VL or anyone else was not going to prevent the people from having the benefit of this medical center.

During the early hours of October 3, 1969, two cars loaded with VL members drove by Panther Headquarters and fired into the front of the building. BPP members in Panther Headquarters at that time grabbed available weapons, according to the source, went to the roof and when VL vehicles again passed Panther Headquarters, they fired upon them. The source stated that as the BPP members fired, the police cars appeared in the area and some shots were fired at the police cars. Source concluded saying that when the police cars appeared, the VL vehicles left the area.

(, 10/4/69)

III. TEACHING OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

The Chicago Chapter of the BPP is holding political orientation classes every Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday evening at 7:15 p.m. at the Church of the Epiphany, 201 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago. These classes have not been well attended recently and some have been cancelled for lack of attendance.

Pursuant to policy decisions reached at a national conference held in Oakland, California, during mid-July, 1969, the BPP has begun promoting the formation of national committees to fight fascism. These committees are to be set up in various large cities throughout the United States. The committees are to consist of both black and white people.

(, /2 /69)

On September 15, 1969, there was a political orientation class of the BPP held at the Precious Blood Church, Congress and Western Avenue, Chicago. Approximately 12 to 15 people were in attendance. The class primarily concerned reading and discussion of a pamphlet by HUEY NEWTON entitled "HUEY Talks to the People" or something to that effect. Some of the issues discussed were the white revolutionary and the role they should play, and working with whites and the black revolutionary movement.

The essence of the discussion was that the true role of the white revolutionary was to work within the white community, which was referred to as the mother country, and give support to the struggles waged by the BPP and other black revolutionary groups within the black community, which is referred to as the colony. It was also suggested that when the revolutionaries in the colony come under attack of the police powers, that the correct thing for the white revolutionaries to do would be to cause trouble in the mother country so as to weaken the police forces or divert their energies.

(, 9/17/69)

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

On August 18, 1969, made available a copy of the following leaflet captioned, "Notice To

All Middle Class Black People (who think they have made it)," which was obtained at the BPP Headquarters in Chicago on August 15, 1969:

> "What happens to the Black Panthers, who have recently been under attack by the FBI in several cities, should be the concern of all Blacks, according to Georgia State legislator Julian Bond. Bond spoke to about 1,200 persons at the Medical Committee Concerned with Civil Rights during their first annual benefit Banquet in Philadelphia, Pa. 'You might not care what happens to the Black Panthers, although you ought to, and you ought to wonder that if you don't speak out when the Panthers are attacked, who will speak out when you are attacked,' Bond said.

Article reprinted from
Jet magazine 7/17/69

Brothers and Sisters do not be fooled into thinking you will not be attacked, for just as sure as many innocent Japanese-Americans suffered in Concentration Camps during World War II, the same fate awaits many of us who attempt to remain secluded from the reality of oppression of Black People in Racist America today. Your fate is based simply on the color of your skin, and if you think I'm lying, then explain why there were not any German-Americans in those Concentration Camps. And don't tell me that your good American government is in-capeable of commiting the crime of Genocide against Black People, because I don't see any Indians.

UNITY Brothers and Sisters, remember that word? Yea, you probably thought about it when you read those lies in the Chicago daily newspapers about a 'suspected' gang member shooting another brother, and you asked yourself 'Why don't the brothers get to_gether?' Well why don't you ask yourself this question, 'What the (obscene) I doing to bring about Black Unity?' Then you better get out in the street and get a new political education, because in the 1970's the people gon' run it, the people gon' have the power, the super-rich capitalist pigs will have no more flunkies, or there won't be anything left to run.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
REVOLUTIONARY BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS TO ALL BRAINWASHED BROTHERS"

On September 15, 1969, made available a copy of the following leaflet captioned, "Fascist Pigs Kill Black Youth:"

Saturday September 13 at 6:45 P.M. the fascist pig cops shot James Hoy (3314 W. Monroe St.) two times in the head while his hands were up. James Hoy was murdered by a pig who hides behind badge #12611 and drives car #70-30. James Hoy, 17, is another example of murder, brutality, and torture of Black People in this fascist capitalistic country! Pig Mayor Daley, Pig Chief Conlisk, and Hammerhead states attorney Hanrahan are directly responsible for the subhuman actions of these mad maniacs who occupy our communities. There were witnesses who say the Pigs shot James Hoy with his hands up. Charles Cox, 20, was beaten to death by the pigs in a cell at Fillmore Station; Linda Anderson, 17, was murdered by a fool pig who shot blindly, threw her down for no reason or cause. James Johnson, 18, was murdered by Daley's mad pigs at 15th and Keeler, and Larry Roberson, a member of the Vanguard, was killed as he was helping the people, but Larry Roberson was a Panther and he shot two pigs before he was overcome!

We, the Black Panther Pary, will stand by the people to remove these mad beasts! We say in #7 of the Ten Point Program:

> "We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people."

The second ammendment of the Consitution gives us a right to bare arms to protect ourselves when this government doesn't recognize the Rights of the People. It is crystal clear that this filthy government is killing off the black youth, and we will not go without a fight!

Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton says, "If you kill a few you get a little satisfaction. If you kill some more, you get some more satisfaction. But when you kill them all, you get complete satisfaction."

MOVE WITH THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

Illinois Chapter, Black Panther Party
2350 West Madison St., Chicago

On September 18, 1969, CG T-[illegible] made available a copy of the following leaflet captioned, "Stop Fascism," issued by the Illinois Chapter of the BPP:

STOP FASCISM

Fascism is the power of finance capital itself--- the greedy businessman, the demagogic politician(one who leads the people by appealing to prejudices and passions), and the racist dog cop. Each of which carries out the oppression and exploitation of the working class people in the guise of democracy.

The BLACK PANTHER PARTY, THE VANGUARD PARTY, finds it our duty to educate the poor and oppressed people to the form that this capitalistic, racist system is taking--- FASCISM. Cold blooded fascism is exemplified in the assaination of Malcolm X, the imprisonment of Huey P. Newton for his political beleifs, the assainasion of Martin Luther King, the occupation of Wilmington, Delaware for one year after the death of King, the 14,000 throops at the Chicago Democratic Convention, the necessity for the exile of Eldrigde Cleaver, the national repression of the Black Panther Party, the attack on the Republic of New Africa"s Convention, the brutal attack on the people of Berkley by 7,000 national guardsmen, and the representatives of all progressive elements that are struggling to wrest the power out of the hands of the oppressor and return it to the people.

We, the masses of the people, must unite around this commo enemy of fascism toregain the power of the people. We, as a people, have been stripped of our power as a result of oppression and exploitation. Before we can regain that power and begin to control our own destinies this system must suffer a revolutionary change for the good of all the people.

" Power cocedes nothing without demand ". Without our demand to neutralize or surpress the power of this system, we will in turn suffer defeat under fascism and lose our move for liberation to return the power to the people.

ILL. CHPTR.
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
4837 S. STATE
BO8=3070 or 243-8276

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
PEOPLE OF THE WORLD UNITE!
STOP FASCISM IN AMERICA!!

" THE REVOLTIONARY WAR IS A WAR OF THE MASSES; IT CAN BE WAGED ONLY BY MOBILIZING THE MASSES AND RELYING ON THEM "

MAO TSE TUNG

On October 23, 1969, made available a copy of the following pamphlet captioned, "Ministry of Information Bulletin - Illinois Chapter - Black Panther Party - Volume I, Number 4:"

MIN[illegible]

BULLETIN

ILLINOIS CHAPTER

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

VOL. 1

NO. 4

STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN BOBBY SEALE TO JUDGE JULIUS J. HOFFMANN



I, Bobby G. Seale, submit the following in my handwriting to Judge Julius Hoffman of this Court in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division of the U.S.A., where presently the trial of so-called 'Conspiracy to Riot' is being held, 9-26-69, and I, Bobby G. Seale, being one of the defendants of eight have been, by denied motion, the right to speak out in my behalf where my constitutional right to have 'Legal Counsel of my choice who is effective,' namely Charles R. Garry, who is on record in this court as my defense counsel that I have made agreement with by my choice only that he will assist me in my defense during this trial.

I submit to Judge Julius Hoffman that the trial be postponed until a later date where I, Bobby G. Seale, can have the 'Legal Counsel of my choice who is effective' Attorney Charles R. Garry, and if my constitutional rights are not respected by this court then other lawyers on record here representing me, except Charles R. Garry, do not speak for me or represent me as of this date, 9-26-69. I fire them now until Charles R. Garry can be made available as chief counsel in this trial of so-called 'Conspiracy to Riot' and in fact be my legal counsel of choice who is effective in assisting me in my defense. The only attorney I know of who can defend me and be effective is Charles R. Garry, who is presently my attorney on record in this court.

If I am continuously denied this constitutional right of legal defense counsel of my choice who is effective by the Judge of this court, then I can only see Judge Hoffman as a blatant racist of this U.S. Court with gross prejudicial error toward all defendants and myself in particular.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

CHICAG[illegible] COURTS-EXE[illegible]SE IN FUTILITY

It is now crystal clear to the masses of the people at home and abroad that the United States is a downright fascist country. This has been exemplified with the commencement of the trial of the so-called 'Conspiracy 8' on September 24th in Chicago.

The fascist judge, 'Adolph' Julius J. Hoffman has promised that this will be the trial of the decade. It is obvious that this is the last stage and the turning point in American history when the iron hand of the dictatorship will be displayed.

This mock trial would not be possible without the inclusion of the Black Panther Party. The fascist Gestapo pigs have railroaded our Chairman on another trumped-up charge. Having kidnapped him from San Francisco these lunatics took him by car to Chicago 12 days prior to the trial. They had him sleeping in various county jails throughout the journey. Jails not fit for any form of habitation. The result is that Chairman Bobby Seale arrived in Chicago sick from the rot and mess of the jails to face the SS and the Gestapo army.

These fascist madmen have refused to to allow him to see a doctor and it is obvious that they intend murdering the Chairman by any means necessary.

It would be deviating not to keep to the pattern set. Charles R. Garry, Chairman Bobby Seale's attorney, has requested a postponement of the trial as he had to go to the hospital for an operation and is unable to be present in Chicago. 'Adolph Hitler' Hoffman has of course refused the request and Chairman Bobby Seale faces the fascists without an attorney.

The judge has gone through the process of a dictatorial jury selection in which absurd questions like "[illegible]" were the qualifications necessary to sit on the jury. Relevant facts like "are these people true representatives of the peer group of the defendants" were thrown out as being immaterial and irrelevant.

This is a warning for us to intensify the struggle, to heighten our awareness, to come together as it is clear that this mockery of a system will not deem any justice and that the time is imminent for us to move from all directions.

It is also the time for us to understand that the education of the masses must be intensified. The action on the part of the mother country radicals in antagonizing the



[illegible] outside the courthouse shows that their level of awareness must be raised from a lower level [illegible].

[illegible] the power structure [illegible] the Black Panther Party has been [illegible] for some time. The annihilation of the Party and the murder of all its leaders. However we should understand that the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] We should learn from his example [illegible] freedom. Huey's freedom [illegible] political prisoners [illegible] the massive repression.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Connie Matthews

FREE HUEY

FREE BOBBY

FREE
LARRY WHITE

FREE
ALVIN JEFFREYS

FREE ALL
POLITICAL
PRISONERS

SEIZ THE TIME

GROUNDWORK FOR FASCISM

America has taken step one of Fascism relatively calmly. Amidst a few murmers of "death of freedom of the press", the fascist power structure, formerly condoned and supported by the mass media, has turned on its former lap-dogs. Needless to say the mass media and the Chicago power structure have never gotten along too well. The relationship was similar to that of a banker and a whore with the media doing all the flat-backing; but alas the floozies have been kicked out of the bed, and with memories of the last "convention" beating fresh in their memories, they have remained, in the main, dutifully silent.

Roy "Masai" Hewitt
Minister of Education

The mass media has not been able nor seen fit to defend the Constitution when it is applied to members of the Black Panther Party, S.D.S., The Young Lords, Los Siete de la Raza, Ahmed Evans, and a multitude of other "negative elements". (It is neither a secret nor a surprise that news coverage of the years of repression has been more concerned with profit than truth.) It is a strange paradox of a [illegible] that now the "Constitution" offers no aid or help to those who did not defend it. With the arrest Friday of nine newsmen in Chicago for allegedly violating the picture taking-or-[illegible] law, the Federal Government [illegible] that freedom of the press is at best a some-time thing depending on the whims of the ruling class. Strange how most papers, radio, and T.V. stations found this blatant act of fascism only of secondary importance, if any at all. The fact that "it could never happen in America" was not debated pro or con; the fact that this "ban" was formerly confined to "Nazi Germany" or "racist South Africa" was also easily ignored.

This failure of the human senses in men, who have professional reputations for being sharp, can only be viewed as cowardice or complicity. While this same "profession" failed to give proper context to their own miserable plight, they were on their jobs when it came time to spread "approved" government-issue lies about the Black Panther Party, The Young Lords, and the Young Patriots allegedly "awaiting a load of machine guns", that everyone (F.B.I., C.I.A., State and City pigs) seemed to know about, except the so-called "suspects". They were also quite skillful in seeing to that this news was broadcast everywhere but Chicago.

This was compounded by the fact that:

1. They failed to give any cry of alarm when our Chairman, Bobby Seale was kidnapped in an obvious frame-up attempt.

2. They failed to give scope or context to the Berkeley Pig Department's admitted plan to raid the National Headquarters of the Black Panther Party, with no survivors (suicide).

3. In recent months there has been an escalation of terror, murder, raids, and lies on the Black Panther Party, and the news media has been relatively silent. There were no cries of a "credibility gap" as there had been in Viet Nam. No cries of the Government stifling the news were to be heard.

THE CHICAGO SET-UP

The fact that there have been three raids on Panther homes in Chicago in the last three weeks and one Panther (Larry Roberson) murdered, has almost totally eluded the sharp-eyed, keen-nosed news beagles. Also the fact that in all these raids weapons were seized, has likewise escaped the stalwart defenders of "the American way". This is no easy task since some of those raids were daylight raids, and involved as many as 75 uniformed, cloaking, fascist Pigs, with helicopters flying close-air support while pigs ran amuck. As of press time, the last Panther home raided was Bob Rush's (Dep. Minister of Defense for the state of Illinois) at [illegible] o'clock Saturday morning September [illegible]. The pigs allegedly had a warrant for Bob Rush's arrest, but he wasn't home so they ripped off his gun, and left. Since then Bob Rush has functioned in the community as usual, but Daley's fascists seem to have lost or forgotten their "warrant."

These events should be viewed in light of the fact the "alleged" machine-guns are about to arrive at any moment; the Illinois National Guard (as fine a bunch of fascists as ever lived) is on stand-by; unlike the Convention, this time the mass media has been effectively hobbled, blinded, and silenced; the "dissidents" have been effectively disarmed. The only ones who know about any shipment of arms, are the pigs and the pig-controlled media; the [illegible] has already hinted that the aim of the "dissidents" may include seizing the Pentagon; and you have the ground-work and the alibi for a massive St. Valentine's Day Massacre by fascist pigs posing as "servants of the people."

If any of those "Clark Kent" types has the guts of a mustard seed, they will write of Pig Daley in terms reserved for Hess, Himler, Eichman, and Co., but they would still be dying. A plot as monsterous and massive as this should not be alluded to a brain as small as Daley's, not even to the most chicken-hearted of so-called newsmen.

The plot to destroy the Black Panther Party, and thereby crush the whole movement of dissent is directed by Tricky-Dick Nixon, and his number one hatchet man, Attorney General John Mitchell. Under their direction a federal task force set-up "to keep an eye on the Panthers", has inflicted a reign of terror and lies upon the Black Panther Party from coast to coast.

It is no surprise to the Black Panther Party that "it (Fascism) has happened here", the only question is, "how long will the people put up with it?"

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Masai Hewitt,
Minister of Education
Black Panther Party

Judge Adolph Julius Hoffman, 74 years old, has been named as the 'hanging' judge for the trial of the Conspiracy Eight. The defendants are charged with conspiracy to incite a riot in 1968. cite a riot in 1968, before the democratic convention. Chairman Bobby Seale, National Chairman of the Black Panther Party, and the other 8 defendants face 10 years imprisonment and $20,000 fine if they are convicted.

Judge Adolph Hoffman stands on his record as a fascist. He has continually propagated this fascist moribund judicial system upon any and all advocates of socialism and or collectivism. This judge always finds any defendants guilty who have views which differ in the slightest degree from his and his other reactionary paper cartoon characters.

On Thursday, September 25, 1969, the trial and selection of the jury began. Judge Hoffman & Co. exerted all efforts to deny Chairman Bobby and all the other defendants any and all motions presented by their defense attorneys. Once again it is most important that we recognize fascism for what it actually is. The 'hangman' only allowed pigs, nazi's and paramilitary right participants [illegible] bing [illegible] groups was immediately [illegible] jury.

The judge and state's attorney Foran have an expert plan. They are obviously not aware that we the people and even the members of the Black Panther Party no longer fear their astronomical intimidation. We will go forth no matter what the sacrifice to propagandize and educate the masses of people. It is impossible to deceive the masses for any extended period of time, and their time has most assuredly run out. The spirit of the people is greater than the man's technology and the spirit of the Vanguard can never be crushed. An idea that is freed and liberation what has been born and started to grow cannot be stopped when its time has come to mature.

INTENSIFY THE STRUGGLE
SEIZE THE TIME
FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS.

Sister Coe, Ed. Cadre
Illinois Chapter, Black Panther Party

LETTER TO BOBBY FROM HIS WIFE

Bobby:

The fascist pigs have kidnapped you, and are trying to railroad you on trumped-up charges. The ransom for you Bobby, is the annihilation of all Panther members and headquarters. If the pig power structure had any knowledge of political economy, and the hardships of oppressed people, then they wouldn't act like racists, but like Judge Sherwin, who freed our Eldridge.

The Panther Party has, is, and will go forth into the community and educate the masses of the people about the rapings, the exploitations and the murders which the ruling class have subjected us to. The working class has a high infant mortality rate, death from starvation, and the suicide rate has been on a steady increase. All this is part and parcel of making sure that the coins still jingle in the pockets of the bourgeoisie jackasses. Therefore, it is only logical that the avaricious businessmen, the demagogic politicians, the murderous racist pig cops, can do nothing more than murder us, when we show the people the correct ideology.

The pigs have, and will go forth to hire, organizations (who are tools for the government) to kill members of the Black Panther Party. Remember when it was mentioned that there have been too many legalized judicial murders in the court room? Judge Hoffman is the true example of a legal hangman.

Bobby, I love you, and I'm going to try and tell the masses of people what you've been rapping to me in the past. Your spirit is strong. It's like that ever-pounding beat within the souls of Black people which says, their spirit will never die, because you, Bobby, and Huey P. Newton started a fire within the masses, that the pigs will never put out.

Your other half,
Artie

JUDGE JULIUS J. HOFFMAN

WHO ARE THE REAL CONSPIRATORS

"As a Black Man in America, I can't get a fair trial in a RACIST COURT"...Chairman Bobby Seale

This was the theme of the court proceedings of the Conspiracy Eight. From the hand picked jury (eight middle aged, white suburbanites, two house negroes and two big businessmen—all registered voters) to the constant denial by Julius 'Adolph Eichman' Hoffman of all the defense motions.

Before the selection of the racist, Nazi-ridden jury was made, they were allowed to read newspapers in the ceremonial courtroom. Later, Hoffman, pig Nixon's chief fund raiser and right hand lackey in Illinois, told the prospective jurors not to read newspapers, listen to TV or talk with each other.

The special category of jurors, all registered voters, were in contradiction to the political morales of the defendants. The defendants, demonstrators against the bourgeois political process and a socialist revolutionary, an advocate of the people's dictatorship (proletarian democracy) are going to be tried by people who support and participate in that same bourgeois political process. This unrepresentative, illegal and unconstitutional jury is illustrative of the court proceedings here in fascist America. THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY demands that all defendants be tried in a court by a jury of their peer group and not lily-white suburbanites, right-wingers, black lackies, and capitalist businessmen. This overt misrepresentation of the community illustrates the 'conspiracy' against the defendants in general and the Chairman in particular. [illegible] this is the only conspiracy [illegible] was spent in dismissing prospective black jurors and working class people. The 'conspiracy' became evident as the government dismissed people who because of their class [illegible] ney, and Julius Hoffman, pig Judge, conspired and removed the conspiracy staff from from the defense counsel table.

Kunstler acknowledged Hoffman's effort to intimidate all defense them fort to intimidate all defense counsel. [illegible] the fascist tee-totaler warned him to watch the language that he uses (not to talk of objective reality).

It will be impossible for a true revolutionary, Chairman Bobby, to get a fair trial from a bourgeois reactionary. This fascist bourgeois state (Babylon) is using the courts to 'fall' the revolutionary machine. But it won't work, the Vanguard Party, the motive force of the revolutionary movement has already began to motivate, mobilize and energize the once sleeping masses. The trial of Chairman Bobby shows the people that unless they are in power to control all legislative and judicial processes (proletarian democracy), their leaders will be railroaded and the Vanguard will be slowed down.

William J. (Jobawaukee) Campbell, Chief pig circuit judge and 'Adolph' Hoffman have schemed together to stifle any and all communication and information on the trial. No press releases, press statements, photographs, pictures or tapes can be made by the defendants to express their view of the legal lynching. The Chairman isn't even allowed to speak to the press in the presence of the mechanical monsters (U.S. Marshalls). 'Adolph' has said that he isn't there to satisfy public interest but will 'run the court as I see fit.' (A bourgeois reactionary and fascist oppressor can only give a bourgeois reactionary verdict and run a trial in the manner of Nazi fascists.)

Adolph's fascist tactics became more [illegible] proceedings [illegible] defense [illegible]

SEE NEXT PAGE

[illegible]

FREE BREAKFASTS FOR CHILDREN



Last week the demagogic bourgeoisie press carried an article which stated that the Black Panther Party in the City of Chicago was no longer feeding hungry school children. The article also stated that the Party was using the breakfast money and food for their own personal use. This is totally incorrect. The Black Panther Party refuses to accept the ideology of the capitalist pig power structure which starves [illegible] of its population and uses food funds to send their astronauts to the moon for the purpose of heightening exploitation.

The people and the Black Panther Party say there's something terribly wrong when [illegible] pigs have nothing more to do than [illegible] our Breakfast Centers and spy on and intimidate the hungry school children, who attend our centers by the hundreds each morning.

Not only do the Breakfast Centers provide free breakfasts but they also serve as a place where children receive revolutionary political education and also immediate first aid treatment. We believe anything the people want and need can be gained through revolutionary struggle and until the people realize this we will continue to lighten the oppressive load that this pig power structure has placed on the people.

[illegible] the Black Panther Party's Breakfast for Children Program will continue in oppressed communities as long as the masses find it necessary. And we say to the pigs who wallow in the [illegible] pen next to some of the Breakfast Centers, our offices and etc. beware! The boot of the people is much too [illegible] go back home where you belong. [illegible] pigs, it's a people's thing!

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

Sister [illegible]

BAIL MONEY IS NEEDED TO FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS
SEND MONEY TO
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
ILL CHAPTER
2350 W MADISON
243-8276

FREE HEALTH CARE

The BLACK PANTHER PARTY is establishing a FREE PEOPLE'S MEDICAL CLINIC to satisfy the medical needs of our community. We understand that the capitalist [illegible] will never provide adequate medical service so the BLACK PANTHER PARTY has moved to establish another community program in which all oppressed people can be involved.

Technical assistance, supplies and donations can be brought to the office of the ILLINOIS CHAPTER of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY 2350 West Madison Street. For further information call 243-[illegible]

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

CONSPIRATORS cont.

One attorney, Gerald Lefcourt, is the chief counsel for the New York 21 and must return to New York to fight for their freedom. The only reason he can give for locking the attorneys up is Chairman Bobby's insistance upon having Charles Garry as his counsel. This is blackmail, piracy, genuine and unadorned.

One must understand the significance of the courts here in Babylon. There aren't too many more pigs they can hire, or too many more laws that they can pass, but the fascist power structure can call grand jury hearings and issue indictments forever. They are using the court system to frustrate the revolutionary struggle and imprison the manpower needed to carry the revolution through to the end.

Pig Nixon, Hoffman, and Hoover, we have uncovered your 'conspiracy' against the people. The people of the whole world see through your fascist lies and your kangaroo court. You smell of pig manure and your true nature is evident to all who see you wallow in the mire. Keep your hands off Bobby mother---. Keep your hands off the people. You are on the verge of extinction. The people are waiting for the opportune time to hang you for your astronomical crimes. You and all reactionaries are doomed. Give up Adolph Hoffman, we are too revolutionary proletarian intoxicated to be astronomically intimidated.

Justice To Those Who Deserve Justice
Death To Those Who Deserve Death
Free All Political Prisoners
Seize the Time Off the Pig

Lt. [illegible]
[illegible] Information, Illinois Chapter BPP

SUBSCRIPTION FORM

Support Your Newspaper--

Subscribe Today!

Enter [illegible]

	National Subscriptions	Foreign Subscriptions
3 MONTHS (13 ISSUES)	$2.50	$3.00
6 MONTHS (26 ISSUES)	$5.00	$6.00
ONE YEAR (52 ISSUES)	$7.50	$9.00

(please print)

NAME

ADDRESS

[illegible]

[illegible] ZIP #

PLEASE MAKE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER TO MINISTRY OF INFORMATION BLACK PANTHER PARTY, [illegible] Cotton House San Francisco CA [illegible]

211

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY

On August 12, 1969, SAM NAPIER, from the National Office of the BPP, was informed by LIDA HARRISON, from the Illinois BPP Office, that LIDA had $700 for the National BPP Office and NAPIER indicated that she should send it to the National Office at once by telegram. NAPIER also indicated that he would send 5,000 papers to the Illinois BPP headquarters next time instead of the 10,000 copies that had been sent previously.

', 8/12/69)

On August 14, 1969, SAM NAPIER of the National Office informed LIDA HARRISON and MAURICE BROWN of the Illinois BPP that the BPP papers should have arrived in Chicago via United Air Lines on one of three flights that afternoon. He was told that the papers had not arrived. NAPIER stated that the bill of lading number was United 599 1753 and that there were 67 boxes costing $470.21.

HARRISON indicated that most of the money is available for 14,000 papers and SAM indicated that they had received money which covered 4,000 papers. SAM indicated that he did not think SDS was doing a good job in reproducing posters. SAM emphatically lectured HARRISON and BROWN along the line that members should come in daily and pick up papers by at least 9:00 a.m. He stated that it was not too early for capitalists do it daily for their jobs, so a revolutionary organization should be able to do as much in order to initiate a revolution. BROWN was told by SAM to tell BOBBY RUSH and all the others to get off their fannies and get down to the office by 9:00 a.m. as they should not be spending their nights at night clubs and parties.

(8/14/69)

LR

On August 16, 1969, JEWEL COOK of the Illinois Black Panther Party (BPP), requested information from JUNE HILLIARD at the National Headquarters of the BPP concerning whether a person is allowed to work in the BPP Office after being purged from the BPP. HILLIARD told COOK that after a person is purged they are not allowed to work in the office.

8/16/69)

On August 18, 1969, STEPHANIE FISHER of the Illinois BPP, informed JUNE HILLIARD of the National Office of the BPP that she desired information on BPP decentralization plans, committees, sub-committees, and also whether they should use the city or state charter. HILLIARD informed FISHER that he would send an outline to FISHER .

8/18/69)

On August 18, 1969, JUNE HILLIARD of the BPP National Headquarters in San Francisco, California, informed FRED HAMPTON of the Illinois BPP that the National Office had received a letter from Indiana indicating that that chapter was being used for parties and social events. HILLIARD instructed HAMPTON to send someone from Chicago to Indiana to check into the situation.

8/18/69)

On August 20,1969, SAM NAPIER, National Office of the BPP, inquired of FRED HAMPTON as to whether or not the money had been sent and HAMPTON indicated that $675 had been sent to the National Office that morning.

8/20/69)

LR:

On August 21, 1969, United Air Lines advised the Chicago Office of the BPP that a shipment of newspapers had been received for the Chicago BPP Headquarters from San Francisco, California. The shipment consisted of 44 boxes weighing 2,333 pounds, and the freight charges were $374.00.

8/21/69)

On August 23, 1969, SAM NAPIER of the National BPP Headquarters, advised MAURICE BROWN of the Chicago BPP Headquarters that 13 boxes of papers had been sent to Chicago via United Air Lines bill of lading number 61121423. BROWN indicated that he had been working for the past week full time at Spiegel's in Chicago. He was told by NAPIER that he had to send in more money for the papers, double or triple, in order to obtain additional papers. BROWN indicated that there were a number of people in jail in Chicago, that money was needed for repairs and other purposes. NAPIER told him to send in more money and that he would get more papers and the problems would be solved. He warned that if more money was not sent in, Chicago would only receive 5,000 papers the coming week. BROWN still indicated that there was a crisis situation in Chicago whereupon NAPIER remarked that other places have the same problems or worse and that Chicago should quit messing around with the national organization's money.

8/23/69)

On August 27, 1969, MAURICE BROWN of the Chicago BPP, was in contact with an unknown female at the National Headquarters of the BPP in San Francisco and this unknown female advised BROWN that SAM NAPIER desired to know how much money the Illinois Chapter of the BPP would be sending to his headquarters as it was necessary to submit an order for printing. BROWN stated that the financial situation had been discussed regarding that matter and the Illinois Chapter was unable to send any money at the present time inasmuch as the money was needed for other things.

On August 27, 1969, JUNE HILLIARD of the National BPP Office, informed FRED HAMPTON that as a result of the mass confusion concerning the SDS, that the BPP should not participate in the rally being sponsored by the SDS in Chicago during October, 1969.

8/27/69)

On August 28, 1969, SAM NAPIER of the National BPP Headquarters, advised the Chicago BPP Headquarters that there were 3,000 newspapers that had been sent from the West Coast to Chicago that day on United Air Lines flight 922, arriving in Chicago at 4:22 p.m. NAPIER indicated that the airbill was number 6112201 and the cost was $84.50.

8/28/69)

On September 16, 1969, MAURICE BROWN from the Illinois BPP Headquarters, informed an unknown individual at the National Headquarters of the BPP that the Illinois Chapter had sent $2,050 to the National Office for newspapers. He requested that 18,000 papers be sent to them the coming week and BROWN complained that the papers were arriving in Chicago too late and the unknown individual advised him that he would do something about this situation. BROWN added that the BPP in Chicago would attempt to send another $200 to the BPP National Headquarters.

9/16/69)

LR:

On September 18, 1969, SAM NAPIER from the BPP National Headquarters, informed BARBARA SANKEY of the Illinois BPP that the BPP papers had been shipped to Chicago via American Airlines flight 826, which would arrive in Chicago at 3:00 p.m. on that date. The airbill number was given as 2596882 and the cost as $423.50.

9/18/69)

On September 23, 1969, SAM NAPIER from the National BPP Headquarters, informed MAURICE BROWN of the Illinois BPP that more buttons and posters regarding BOBBY SEALE were available. BROWN indicated that Chicago could use these items inasmuch as a lot of people would be in Chicago on September 24, 1969. He also added that the Chicago Chapter of the BPP was sending $450 to National Headquarters on September 23, 1969, for BPP papers. NAPIER indicated that he was sending some old papers to Chicago, whereupon BROWN remarked that there were between 6,000 to 7,000 copies of last week's edition that had not been sold. NAPIER then indicated that there was no reason to send 20,000 papers to Chicago if they are not being sold and he would, therefore, cut down on the number of papers being sent to Chicago.

9/23/69)

On September 25, 1969, an unknown male from the National Office of the BPP informed LIDA HARRISON of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP that 32 boxes of BPP newspapers had been sent to the Illinois Chapter via flight number 122 of the American Airlines on September 25, 1969, and cost of the papers was listed as $317.26.

9/25/69)

LR

On October 4, 1969, this source advised that he had obtained information indicating that a shipment of 11 boxes of material from the National Office of the BPP to the Illinois Chapter of the BPP had been sent via airlines and that the charges for the Illinois Branch of the BPP would be $103.40.

10/4/69)

On October 7, 1969, LIDA HARRISON from the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, Chicago, Illinois, informed a representative of the National Headquarters that she was informing them that the Illinois Chapter desired 20,000 copies of the new issue of the BPP newspaper and that Chicago was sending $250 to headquarters. The individual from National Headquarters remarked that the airbill for a current shipment coming via United Air Lines was OL6SF022954271. The individual from National Headquarters indicated that the BPP had initiated a new procedure for sending material to other offices, which was the reason for her giving the bill number as set forth.

10/7/69)

VI. BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM AND PEOPLE'S FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER

On August 25, 1969, LOCKETT BEARD informed MAURICE BROWN of the Illinois BPP that there was no one at the site of the Breakfast Program in Chicago and BEARD inquired whether the BPP was having any problems with this program. BEARD was informed by BROWN that the Breakfast Program had been stopped and BEARD stated that nobody involved in the program apparently knew of this.

8/25/69)

LR:

On September 15, 1969, made available a copy of the following leaflet captioned, "Support the People's Free Medical Care Center":

[illegible] CARE CENTER:

BAD HEALTH CARE is pa... of the way of life in the black community and in the Latin community. This fact is proved by all statistics:

**The life expectancy of U.S. blacks is 7 years less than whites.

**The infant mortality of children in Chicago poverty areas is among the highest in the country.

**In public hospitals throughout the U.S., black and Latin women are forced to submit to sterilization following childbirths.

**In the U.S., "health care" is a profit--making industry and not a human right for all people.

LACK OF GOOD DECENT HEALTH CARE is one of the many ways this racist capitalist system oppresses the people, and tries to keep us too weak to fight for our rights.

THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY understands the immediate needs for good health care. To serve these needs, the Black Panther Party is establishing the PEOPLE'S FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER. By serving the health needs of the people, the Black Panther Party is setting an example as they have in the Breakfast--for--Children Programs they have started all over the country.

WHY DO WE NEED THE PEOPLE'S FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER?

The People's Free Medical Care Center is the first step in getting rid of the barbaric fee--for--service merchandizing of medical care which takes place in the capitalist economy. Capitalism is the system which claims to provide health services for the people, but which is really ruled by the profit motive. In the People's Free Medical Care Center, care will be given to the people on the basis of need, and not on the basis of ability to pay. The Center is much more than free medical care, however --- more than welfare or charity --- for the Center will be run according to the needs of the people it serves.

The doctors at the Center, instead of running it and dominating it, will be in the position (where they belong) of serving the people.

(over, please)

In this capitalis[illegible]ealth care system, women are [illegible]ecially oppressed, both as patients and as the lowest-paid, hard-working hospital workers. Black women are used as "teaching material" for medical students to do surgery on. They are used as "guinea pigs" for the testing of new drugs. There is no consideration for the personal dignity or health of the woman. Obstetrical and gynecological care are given far too little attention. Routine, unnecessary sterilizations and widespread misinformation are the results of the racist, male-dominated health industry.

The PEOPLE'S FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER in its commitment to SERVE THE PEOPLE will give high priority to the care and prevention of sickness in all women.

* * *

This week, supporters and members of the Black Panther Party will be distributing leaflets to let the people know about the Center. Much help is needed if the Center is to stay open and functioning at the best level.

On Friday and Saturday we will be here to ask for donations for the support of the People's Free Medical Care Center. Please remember to pass the word and look for the people with collection cans.

If you can donate technical assistance (all health workers are welcome to volunteer time at the Center), or supplies, or funds, o. if you can help us with leafletting and collecting money, please contact the:

ILLINOIS CHAPTER OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, 2350 West Madison Street,
Chicago, Ill. 60612

For further information, please call: 243—8276 or 638—7715.

* * *

THE HOSPITALS MUST SERVE THE PEOPLE!
GOOD HEALTH CARE IS A HUMAN RIGHT!
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

* * *

SUPPORT PEOPLES FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER!

LR:

On September 15, 1969, made available a copy of the following leaflet captioned, "Free Breakfast for Children":

FREE BREAKFAST FOR CHILDRE

The Black Panther Party is starting a Free Breakfast for Children Program at St. Andrew's Episcopal Church, 48 N. Hoyne. We realize that the capitalist system does not care enough about the people or their needs to provide the basics of life: food, clothing, and shelter. But the Black Panther Party says we are here to serve the needs of the people, to educate the people, and to fight for the people.

We are also starting a Free Health Clinic to meet the medical needs of the people of the oppressed Black colonies. Any donations of food, supplies, or money for the Health Center or the Breakfast for Children Program would be greatly appreciated.

THE BREAKFAST PROGRAM WILL START:

THURSDAY.............SEPTEMBER 18

ST. ANDREWS CHURCH

48 N. HOYNE

7:00 to 9:00 a.m.

Illinois Chapter Black Panther Party
2350 W. Madison
243-8276

On September 18, 1969, issue of the Chicago Tribune, Chicago, Illinois, newspaper, page 5, Column 1, contained the following article:

"Find Panthers Feed Only a Few Children

The Black Panther party's program to feed breakfast to school children is almost non-existent in Chicago, a Tribune investigation disclosed yesterday.

Altho Fred Hampton, the party's Illinois chairman, claims that 3,000 to 3,500 children are being fed at three locations each week, it was found that on some days the centers were never opened and on others only a handful of children showed up.

Solicit Food and Cash

Local and federal law enforcement agencies, which have been closely watching the Panthers' activities, have also discovered that the Panthers continue to solicit food, milk, and cash donations for the program from merchants and other business men thruout the city.

One merchant, who regularly donates large amounts of food for the program, recently told investigators that when he visited one of the centers, the few children present were being read excerpts from what he said was the Communist Manifesto before the breakfast was served.

List 3 Locations

The Panthers list their breakfast centers in the Trinity Lutheran church, 4837 State Street, the Jackson Boulevard Christian church, 2412 Jackson blvd., and the Better Boys Foundation club, 1512 S. Pulaski rd.

All three of the feeding centers were visited Tuesday and not one of them was open to feed children.

LR:

At the Trinity church, two small boys and six teen-agers waited outside for more than an hour but nobody came with the key to open the building. One of the boys finally went to a nearby grocery and purchased a bag of potato chips which he shared with his companion.

Children Walk By

Altho the church is located near DuSable High school, 4934 Wabash Av., the Farren Elementary school, 5055 State st., and across the street from the Taylor homes housing project, hundreds of youngsters walked past without even bothering to stop.

Other youngsters made brief stops in the nearby grocery and a restaurant before going on to school.

No Breakfasts Lately

At the Jackson boulevard, church the door was locked. Investigators' reports noted that the church has been opened for the free breakfasts only sporadically during the last month.

At 1512 S. Pulaski, there were no signs of any feeding program in progress. A teen-age youth sweeping the stairway said that "they haven't been feeding kids here for several weeks." He said he had heard reports that the program would be starting again soon.

Yesterday, 22 children of grade school age were counted going into the Trinity church for breakfast. On other occasions, investigators noted children leaving the building with half-eaten sandwiches and then throwing them in a wastebasket on the sidewalk. Since the program was begun at the church two months ago, detectives said a high of 45 children (and on some days only four or five) were fed there.

Church Predicts Change

In the case of the Trinity church, investigators learned that the Panthers took over the building. The pastor left in January and the building is now open only for Sunday services.

The Rev. Kenneth Young, an official of the Missouri synod's northern Illinois district of the Lutheran church, refused to comment on reports that the Panthers had been asked to vacate the building last Saturday.

I have no comment at this time", he said. But there may be some developments concerning the building next week.

The breakfast-for-children program was started by the Panthers national headquarters in Oakland last April, and several feeding centers were established in the San Francisco bay area.

However, authorities on the west coast told The Tribune that only small numbers of children are being fed there."

This source advised on October 6, 1969, that he had determined that FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, Chicago, Illinois, had informed representatives of the National Chapter of the BPP in California that the BPP in Chicago was encountering some problems in connection with the establishment of their health clinic. It was the sources understanding in that regard that HAMPTON had remarked that the Vice Lords, a Chicago West Side Youth Gang, had disrupted activities at the health clinic that day and in thatconnection had ordered the Minister of Health of the Chicago BPP Chapter and an electrician performing work at the clinic to leave the establishment that afternoon. HAMPTON according to the source, had indicated that the clinic was not open as some work had to be done prior to its opening.

This source further advised that it was his understanding that HAMPTON had indicated that the Vice Lords have a strong hold in the area of the clinic, but despite this the BPP would go ahead and open it in order to make an impression upon the people in the community. HAMPTON also reportedly remarked that if need be the BPP would execute executive mandate number 3. It was not known what that mandate meant.

The source added that there were a number of factors that HAMPTON had described which pertained to the situation concerning the situation among which was an alleged war between the Blackstone Rangers and other Chicago youth gangs and the Vice Lords.

The source further advised that the BPP in Chicago planned to have the clinic opened in about three days or a week and that if the Lords move in to the clinic, it would be moved to a different area in order to avoid a confrontation. HAMPTON informed the individual at National Headquarters, according to what the source had been able to determine, that he felt the situation would work out and that the BPP in Chicago was going ahead with the plans concerning their clinic.

(10/6/69)

VII. EVIDENCE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY ATTEMPTS TO AFFILIATE OR FORM COALITIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS

On September 8, 1969, STEPHANIE FISHER of the Chicago BPP Headquarters contacted JUNE HILLIARD of the BPP National Headquarters, and informed HILLIARD that a brother from St. Paul, Minnesota, named RONNIE REID, had been in contact with Chicago BPP Headquarters claiming he had received authorization from the National Office to initiate a United Front Against Fascism Organization and a Lunch for Children Program.

LR:

HILLIARD stated the name of REID was familiar and the National BPP Headquarters had advised all individuals calling in with requests that they could establish a United Front Against Fascism Organization and initiate organizations in their communities. Once these programs are initiated, they were instructed to report their activities to the National Office of the BPP. HILLIARD stated he did not recall authorizing any one from St. Paul to initiate any program but as long as they are doing it and not using the name of the BPP, there was nothing the BPP could do about it.

9/8/69)

On October 10, 1969, at about 11:00 a.m., CHARLENE MITCHELL, Field Secretary, National Black Liberation Commission (NBLC), CP, USA, in company with two leaders of the Illinois Communist Party (CP), met with several members of the BPP including FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, at BPP Headquarters, Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of exchanging ideas in the struggle for black liberation as well as finalizing plans for MITCHELL to be the main speaker at the "End the War Now" Rally on October 12, 1969, in Chicago, Illinois, which affair is being sponsored by the African-American Heritage Association (AAHA) (a characterization of which is contained hereinafter). HAMPTON is also to be one of the speakers at the above mentioned rally.

General discussion at BPP Headquarters in Chicago indicated that the BPP and CP have a concurrent theory toward the anti-riot law trial currently in process in Chicago, Illinois, in that neither want to become involved in any violence or possible arrest situations.

FRED HAMPTON stated that the demonstrations by the BPP at the Federal Building in Chicago during the trial are for the purpose of telling the facts to the people. He stated that BPP is somewhat allied with the faction of MIKE KLONSKY, current member of the National Interim Committee (NIC) of the SDS and current leader of the Revolutionary Youth Movement II (RYM II) faction of SDS, but that the current leadership of SDS, called the Weatherman faction, are a "bunch of damn fools".

HAMPTON claimed that the BPP is the vanguard in this country whereupon CHARLENE MITCHELL questioned this statement stating that actually the vanguard are those who work on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist outlook.

Further discussion brought out that preparations are being made by the BPP to circulate petitions for community control of the local police departments and that a survey indicates that the people in the ghetto are very enthusiastic over this idea.

Concerning the establishment of a National Defense Organization, CHARLENE MITCHELL stated that prospects are good for calling a national conference of such an organization where possibly branches of the organization can be established in the major cities in this country. In this connection, MITCHELL spoke of ANGELA DAVIS, a California CP professor at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) where attempts had been made to dismiss her, but that people rallied to her support and that such broad defense support should also be established for BOBBY SEALE, Chairman, National BPP, who is one of the defendants in the anti-riot trial in Chicago.

HAMPTON felt that the BPP program should appeal to the masses, including such projects as breakfasts for school schildren and work toward the establishment of health centers since the communities cannot absorb large quantities of ideology, but must be assisted where personal needs exist.

Another conclusion of this meeting is that the CP and BPP are not "sticking their necks out for anybody", particularly in connection with the antiriot trial in Chicago.

On October 12, 1969, an "End the War Now" Rally, sponsored by the AAHA was held at the Joe Louis Theater, 35th and State Streets, Chicago, Illinois.

Approximately 225 people attended. CP and non-CP people were in attendance.

CHARLENE MITCHELL introduced FRED HAMPTON as one of the speakers.

HAMPTON stated that the government has no right to have BOBBY SEALE in jail or to try him. The BPP is serving the people in the community by feeding school children and soon plans to complete a medical center.

HAMPTON stated that the Chicago Police Department has raided the Illinois BPP Headquarters in Chicago so often that now it is almost becoming a museum. People want to see how the building has been shot up. The BPP, however, will continue to grow since they are the vanguard.

HAMPTON stated that we must stop the war in Vietnam. Women and children are being killed in Vietnam while here the "pigs" are doing the same thing.

CHARLENE MITCHELL, the main speaker, first described herself as the first black woman to ever run for president of the United States. She stated that recently she had been in Africa where America is still furnishing arms to the oppressors in Africa. She said that here, at home in America, there are growing fascist-like attacks on all people, especially the black people and black organizations, who are struggling for freedom and existence. Her speech was well received and she was given a big applause.

A collection was taken at this affair and netted $103.00.

(10-12-66

APPENDIX

AFRICAN-AMERICAN HERITAGE ASSOCIATION

A source advised on May 14, 1969, that the African-American Heritage Association (AAHA) was known as the Afro-American Heritage Association until February, 1961. It was founded by ISHMAEL FLORY around 1958 and incorporated in the State of Illinois as a non-profit organization. It was founded ostensibly for the purpose of teaching African history and culture to American Negroes. AAHA is strongly influenced by the Communist Party (CP) of Illinois. It is represented by both communist and non-communist members and some people with strong Negro nationalistic tendencies. This organization reflects CP policy on some issues and opposes CP policy on others; for example, the CP rejects the concept of Afro-American as a reference term to the American Negro and rejects aspects of nationalism, both of which are reflected in the AAHA program. FLORY is a member of the CP of Illinois and theoretically under the discipline of the CP. He is the guiding force in AAHA and controls policy and decisions in AAHA. CP representatives occasionally are featured at AAHA affairs.

A second source advised on May 14, 1969, that the headquarters of AAHA are presently located at 416 West 63rd Street, Chicago, Illinois.

The above source advised that the Afr'Am Book Store, a branch of the Modern Book Store, is also located at AAHA and that this book store is managed by ISHMAEL FLORY.

A third source advised on May 8, 1969, that ISHMAEL FLORY, a current CP member, continues to be the leader of AAHA and as such makes policies and decisions for AAHA. The South Central Freedom of the Press Committee, CP of Illinois, also participates in formulating the policies of AAHA.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also
Known As Black Panther Party
for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

NEW DAY BOOKS, INC., dba
Modern Book Store (MBS)

On April 22, 1969, a source advised MBS today is the direct line successor to the original Workers Book Store, 23 South Lincoln Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, established by the Communist Party (CP) in the 1920's ostensibly under the ownership of SAM HAMMERSMARK, a charter member of the CP.

The aim and purpose of the MBS is to act as a receiver and purveyor for Marxist-Leninist literature as well as publications of the CPUSA.

While from its origin and through the present time MBS has been publicly announced as privately owned and operated, it is covertly controlled by the CP. The CP subsidizes the MBS from time to time, purchases literature through this outlet and makes up financial losses sustained therewith. The CP utilizes the MBS as a working point for CP of Illinois functionaries in regard to organizational and educational activities.

A second source advised on April 18, 1969, that MBS is presently located at 3230 North Broadway, Chicago, and that as of this date NATALIE MYERS, CP of Illinois State Board and CPUSA National Committee member, was the manager of the MBS.

A third source advised on April 21, 1969, that the CP of Illinois during April, 1967, opened a new branch of the MBS located at 416 West 63rd Street, Chicago, which uses the name of Afr'Am Book Store and is managed by ISHMAEL FLORY, a current member of the CP of Illinois.

The second source advised on April 18, 1969, that New Day Books, Inc., is presently operating a mail order business at Room 1969, 608 South Dearborn, Chicago, and LOU DISKIN is in charge of the office at this location.

The second source advised on April 18, 1969, that LOU DISKIN as of that date was a member of the CP of Illinois State Committee and the CPUSA National Committee.

Records of the Secretary of State, Springfield, Illinois, reflect that as of August 20, 1968, New Day Books, Incorporated, was incorporated in the State of Illinois, the corporation's registered agent is NATALIE MYERS and their registered office is located at 3230 North Broadway, Chicago.

56

1 APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. MICHAEL KLONSKY, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power and does not support the polices of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

75

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
November 17, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A characterization of the BPP is contained in the appendix section.

On November 14, 1969, , who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, and three or four other Chicago area BPP members traveled to Carbondale, Illinois, in a 1966 black two-door Oldsmobile 98, where Hampton allegedly spoke before a group of approximately 300 students at Southern Illinois University (SIU).

Hampton's speech allegedly consisted of BPP history, theory and practice, followed by a question and answer period.

Hampton allegedly received a $600 check written on SIU payable to Fred Hampton as admission to the speech was free.

______ advised that arrangements were allegedly made for this speech with the help of one Reggie Brown, who is described as a male Negro, about 19 years old, light skinned, natural hair, wearing glasses. the only known BPP member at SIU, through the Black Student Union (BSU) at the University.) This person is allegedly a BPP member from New York, New York, a student at SIU, and one who sells approximately 1,000 BPP newspapers on campus per week.

The above Chicago Panthers returned to Chicago on November 15, 1969.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

United States Attorney
Chicago, Illinois

United States Secret Service
Chicago, Illinois

Office of Special Investigations
Chicago, Illinois

Region I, 113th Military
Intelligence Group
Evanston, Illinois

1 APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also
Known As Black Panther Party
for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

76

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois 60604
November 17, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM

On July 2, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Gary Tyler, Captain, Illinois BPP, recently spoke in behalf of the Breakfast For Children Program urging donations in their behalf.

, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on July 3, 1969, that the BPP was attempting to lease a store front at 2350 West Madison to operate the Breakfast For Children Program but because the owner would not donate the store front and was requiring $250 a month rent, the Panthers did not believe they could use this site.

A characterization of the BPP is attached as an appendix page.

On July 14, 1969, advised that Stephanie Fisher had indicated she wanted to make a trip to California and was planning to go into the community and solicit funds in behalf of the Breakfast For Children Program and utilize these funds for her air transportation.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM

On July 29, 1969, advised that Wanda Ross and Barbara Sankey are the only two BPP members who appear to have any remaining interest in the Breakfast For Children Program.

On August 19, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Trinity Lutheran Church, 4837 South State, was being utilized as a location for the Breakfast For Children Program but its success was due to the efforts of residents of the area rather than the BPP.

On October 13, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Better Boys Foundation, 1512 South Pulaski, was no longer serving breakfast to the children but any young Negroes appearing in the morning could get a sandwich from people that regularly frequent the Foundation. The BPP appears to be absent from the premises.

On November 4, 1969, advised that the Holy Family Lutheran Church, Larrabee and Hobbie, Chicago, Illinois, was being utilized for political education classes by the BPP and those that attended received something to eat but the actual Breakfast For Children Program is not in effect by the BPP, Chicago, Illinois.

Copies of this Letterhead Memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois
Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois
Region 1, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

77

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 11/26/69

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

Copies of LHM are being furnished to the USA, OSI, USSS and 133th Military. The Chicago Police Department and Illinois State Attorney's Office have also been orally advised of the contents of this LHM.

RMM/amr

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

78

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
November 26, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix page for characterization of the BPP.

On November 23, 1969, ______, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on November 22, 1969, Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, and Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, both of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, related that they had received permission from the National BPP Central Committee to "purge" all Chicago area BPP members, except for themselves, and this "purge" would take place at the general meeting on November 23, 1969.

NO

Source stated that both indicated the "purge" is necessary in order to re-establish party discipline, to break up cliques within the Party and more specifically to rid the Party of some of the worthless members and leaders such as Jewel Cook, Field Secretary, and Billy Brooks, Deputy Minister of Education, both of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP.

Source stated that both indicated this "purge" would make it possible to form an elite, trusted, well disciplined group of Panthers from the most devoted of those "purged". The "purged" members will be referred to as Panther Friends and all rank will be deleted.

Declassified 4/4/75
per 6607

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your

Source stated that both indicated that during the re-organization, the members will be required to help in all BPP programs, sell one hundred eighty papers per week, be available for Party work daily at 10:00 a.m. and be punctual at all meetings and functions or be permanently expelled from the Party.

Source stated that both explained that in actuality the only change is referring to the membership by the name of Panther Friends or Friends of Panthers from the former name of Panthers, that BPP activities will continue with the same individuals as before and each individual's standing will be based upon that person's participation in BPP activities.

On November 24, 1969, advised that at a general BPP meeting, called by Hampton and Rush, the above information was announced jointly by Rush and Hampton. Source stated that both indicated before any member, except themselves, could refer to themselves as a Panther, they would first have to earn the right to the name by preforming the above functions.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the United States Attorney, Office of Special Investigation, United States Secret Service, and 113th Military Intelligence Group.

CON

1 APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

* CON

FD-36 . 5-22-64)

79

F B I

Date: 12/2/69

Transmit the following in

Via

TO : DIRECTOR AND SAC, SPRINGFIELD

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO)✓ (P)

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP). RM.

SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED TODAY THREE MEMBERS BPP INVOLVED IN SHOOTING WITH OFFICERS, CG PD, about noon today AT EIGHT ZERO FIVE FIVE SOUTH MERRILL AVENUE. JEANIE REED, ANTHONY HARRIS, AND LYNN FRENCH, WERE AT THAT ADDRESS.

COMMANDER FRANK NOLAN, FOURTH DISTRICT, CG PD, ADVISED THAT BASED ON DISTURBANCE COMPLAINT OF LANDLORD, ABOVE ADDRESS, OFFICERS ATTEMPTED INVESTIGATION AND WERE MET WITH GUN FIRE FROM HARRIS ARMED WITH TWO ~~[illegible]~~ FORTYFIVE AUTOMATIC PISTOLS. NO OFFICERS INJURED, HOWEVER, HARRIS, DURING PROCESS OF ARREST, INJURED AND TAKEN TO SOUTH CHICAGO COMMUNITY HOSPITAL. EUGENIA REED AND LYNN FRENCH ALSO ARRESTED. ALL THREE CHARGED WITH AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, ATTEMPTED MURDER, AND ARMED VIOLENCE.

CES

Approved:

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

NO FURTHER INCIDENTS. CG PD AFFORDING ADDITIONAL PATROL IN NEIGHBORHOOD. AREA OF ARRESTS CALM.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

80

FBI

Date: 12/4/69

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ____________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-165706 Sub 9) AND SAC, SPRINGFIELD
SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, RM-BPP.

CHICAGO PD SOURCE ADVISED INSTANT THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS WERE ARRESTED AS RESULT OF SHOOT-OUT AT TWO THREE THREE SEVEN WEST MONROE STREET, CHICAGO, AT FIVE AM THIS DATE, WHEN POLICE ATTEMPTED TO SERVE POSSESSION OF WEAPONS WARRANT; BRENDA HARRIS, NEGRO FEMALE, EIGHTEEN, RESIDING EIGHTEEN FORTY EIGHT SOUTH HAMLIN AVENUE, [redacted] WOUNDED; VERNLIN BREWER, NEGRO FEMALE, SEVENTEEN, RESIDING ONE TWENTY FIVE WEST ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH STREET, [redacted] WOUNDED; RONALD SATCHEL, NEGRO MALE, NINETEEN, DEPUTY MINISTER OF HEALTH, ILLINOIS BPP, [redacted] WOUNDED; BLAIR ANDERSON, NEGRO MALE, EIGHTEEN, RESIDING SIX NINE FOUR THREE JUSTINE STREET, [redacted] WOUNDED.

ARS:pas

Approved: ____ Sent [illegible] M Per [illegible]

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ________________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________________ ________________________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

DEBRA JOHNSON, NEGRO FEMALE, NINETEEN; LEWIS TRULOCK, NEGRO MALE, THIRTY NINE, LEGAL COUNSEL; HAROLD KEITH BELL, NEGRO MALE, THREE SEVENTEEN HOWARD STREET, ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS. WITH EXCEPTION OF BREWER AND ANDERSON, ABOVE MEMBERS ILLINOIS BPP.

CHICAGO PD SOURCE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED MARK CLARK, NEGRO MALE, TWENTY TWO, FROM PEORIA, ILLINOIS BPP, AS BEING INDIVIDUAL KILLED ALONG WITH FRED ALLEN HAMPTON, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP.

PD SOURCE ALSO ADVISED ~~TWO~~ ONE POLICE OFFICER~~S~~ SLIGHTLY WOUNDED AS RESULT OF GUNFIRE, BUT ~~[illegible]~~ TREATED HOSPITAL AND RELEASED. ONE POLICE OFFICER SLIGHTLY WOUNDED BY FLYING GLASS.

SOURCE ALSO ADVISED NINE SHOTGUNS, ~~TWO~~ one CARBINE RIFLE~~S~~, one 22 CALIBER Rifle, ~~FIVE~~ SIX HAND GUNS, ~~ONE THOUSAND~~ approximately TWO THOUSAND ROUNDS AMMUNITION, CONFISCATED.

VICINITY OF SHOOTING REMAINS NORMAL WITH PD AFFORDING ADDED COVERAGE.

PERTINENT AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

Approved: ____________________ Sent __________M Per __________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

81

FBI

Date: 12-4-69

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY. RM-BPP.

OFFICER DAY, CGPD, ADVISED INSTANT COOK COUNTY STATES ATTORNEY POLICE ATTEMPTED TO SERVE POSSESSION OF WEAPONS WARRANT FIVE AM THIS DATE AT TWO THREE THREE SEVEN WEST MONROE. POLICE WERE ME~~E~~T WITH GUN FIRE. SHOOTING RESULTED IN DEATH OF TWO MALE NEGROES AND WOUNDING TWO OTHER MALE NEGROES, OND FEMALE NEGRO, AND ONE POLICE OFFICER WOUNDED IN LEG. ONE MALE NEGRO TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED BY PD AS FRED HAMPTON, CHAIRMAN ILLINOIS BPP.

DAY ADVISED NO IMMEDIATE DISTURBANCE AREA OF SHOOTING. CGPD HAS SENT EXTRA UNITS INTO AREA.

PERTINENT AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

82

FBI

Date: 12/4/69

Transmit the following in ______________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE ______________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI ( ) SAC, SPRINGFIELD

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO)

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), RM-BPP. OO: SAN FRANCISCO.

COOK COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY'S POLICE ADVISED INSTANT DEPUTY CHAIRMAN FRED ALLEN HAMPTON, ILLINOIS BPP, POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS BEING KILLED AS RESULT OF SHOOTING AT TWO THREE THREE SEVEN WEST MONROE STREET, CHICAGO, FIE AM THIS DATE WHEN POLICE ATTEMPTED TO SERVE POSSESSION OF WEAPONS WARRANT.

TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS OTHER PANTHER KILLED IS ONE MARK CLARK , MEMBER, PEORIA, ILLINOIS BPP. CLARK BELIEVED IN TOWN TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM ILLINOIS BPP ON THE OPERATION OF [illegible]E PEORIA, ILLINOIS BRANCH.

ALSO ARRESTED BUT NOT INJURED WERE HAROLD KEITH BELL, CAPTAIN OF DEFENSE, ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS BRANCH, BPP; LEWIS TRULOCK, LEGAL COUNSEL, ILLINOIS BPP; DEBRA JOHNSON, RECENTLY APPOINTED LIEUTENANT OF FINANCE, ILLINOIS CHAPTER, BPP. THREE INDIVIDUALS CHARGED AT THIS TIME WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION

ARS

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ________________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ________________________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

OF WEAPONS. ADDITIONAL CHARGES POSSIBLY WILL BE FILED.

VICINITY OF SHOOTING REMAINS NORMAL AT THIS TIME AND NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED TO DATE INDICATING VIOLENCE AS RESULT OF SHOOTING. PD AFFORDING AREA ADDED COVERAGE.

PERTINENT AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

Approved: ________________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

(Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 12/4/69

83

Transmit the following in ____________________ (Type

TELETYPE

Via ____________________ ____________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR AND SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, RM - BPP.

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT IN CONNECTION WITH [illegible] MORNING RAID ON BLACK PANTHER PARTY Locat [redacted], TWO THREE THREE SEVEN WEST MONROE STREET, CHICAGO, BY COOK COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY'S POLICE WHICH RESULTED IN KILLING OF FRED HAMPTON, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP, NUMEROUS UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS HAVE CONTACTED PANTHER HEADQUARTERS, TWENTY THREE FIFTY WEST MONROE STREET. INDIVIDUALS [illegible] CONTACTING PANTHER HEADQUARTERS REQUESTED INFORMATION REGARDING FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS AND ALL WERE INSTRUCTED THEY SHOULD NOT BE "SYMPATHETIC" BUT SHOULD FURNISH MONEY FOR BAIL FUND.

SOURCE ALSO ADVISED CHICAGO PANTHERS IN CONTACT WITH NUMEROUS CHICAGO RADIO STATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO SECURE AIR TIME ON "TALK PROGRAM" TO DISCUSS PANTHER VERSION OF HAMPTON'S DEATH. TO DATE, NO COMMITMENTS MADE BY LOCAL RADIO STATIONS.

ARS:

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

SOURCE CONTINUED SAYING CHICAGO BPP ISSUED NEWS RELEASE CLAIMING HAMPTON MURDERED WHILE HE SLEPT IN BED. SOURCE DEVELOPED NO INFO RE POSSIBLE FUTURE DEMONSTRATIONS AS RESULT OF HAMPTON KILLING OR ANY PLANNED VIOLENCE.

A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT ONLY ACTIVITIES BEING PLANNED BY CHICAGO BPP ARE CONCERNED WITH COLLECTION OF BAIL MONEY. CHICAGO PANTHER LEADERS HAVE DISCUSSED POSSIBILITY OF MAKING MOTION PICTURE DEPICTING LIFE AND KILLING OF HAMPTON. NO DEFINITE PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE REGARDING THIS.

CHICAGO PD CONTINUES TO AFFORD VICINITY ABOVE ADDRESSES ADDED COVERAGE. AREA NORMAL AS OF FOUR PM INSTANT.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

84

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
December 4, 1969

FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON

Attached hereto is information furnished concerning a speech by Frederick Allen Hampton, Chairman, Illinois Black Panther Party, on November 23, 1969, at Chicago, Illinois.

A characterization of the Black Panther Party is attached hereto.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 12/4/69

LUIS KUTNER, Attorney at Law, 105 West Adams Street, advised that on November 23, 1969, he and his wife were present at the University of Illinois Circle Campus, Room A2, for a program sponsored by Women's International League For Peace and Freedom, Chicago Metropolatin Branch. KUTNER stated that he arrived at approximately 1:40 p.m. with his wife and the meeting was already in progress and it was attended by between 30 and 40 individuals, most of whom were elderly women who were allegedly members of the League.

KUTNER stated that the first speaker was Reverend GEORGE E. RIDDICK, who spoke on Operation Breadbasket, a division of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). KUTNER stated that RIDDICK spoke until approximately 3:00 p.m. and the next speaker was FRED HAMPTON, Chairman, Black Panther Party (BPP) of Illinois.

KUTNER stated that HAMPTON described himself as the Chairman of the Illinois BPP, and identified one other Panther who was present as the minister of defense. KUTNER stated that during HAMPTON's speech he visually acknowledged the presence in the audience of one other Panther who was not identified by name or title.

KUTNER stated that HAMPTON spoke about the BPP as a revolutionary party that was recognized throughout the world. During the speech and while describing the party as a revolutionary party, HAMPTON indicated that the party has guns to be used for peace and self-defense, and these guns are at the HAMPTON residence as well as BPP Headquarters on West Madison Street.

KUTNER stated that HAMPTON spoke about President NIXON as an individual who has betrayed the United States and was a member of the "capitalistic establishment". KUTNER stated that on three or four occasions HAMPTON made the following statement:

On 11/24/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA DANIEL F. BODINE:nan Date dictated 12/1/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

"Nixon must die" These statements were made, according to KUTNER, to accentuate HAMPTON's statement that the BPP was a revolutionary party, but HAMPTON's statements concerning weapons were not made at the same time "Nixon must die".

KUTNER stated that HAMPTON spoke until approximately 3:40 p.m., and KUTNER stated he went to the meeting when he heard that a speaker from the BPP was on the program inasmuch as KUTNER has taken a personal interest in the BPP because of its "ranting and raving" and this personal interest on the part of KUTNER has reached the point where he would like to take legal action to silence the BPP. KUTNER stated that he intends to bring a civil action against the BPP, utilizing Title 42, U.S. Code, Section 1893.

KUTNER advised that the only other individual present that he knew by name was a woman by the name of BERTHA JENKINSON, who is the secretary of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and she resides at 921 Cornelia Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. KUTNER advised that seated directly in front of him was a young while male, accompanied by two Negro females, and this white male had a Norelco tape recorder which he appeared to be using to record HAMPTON's statements. KUTNER stated that he could not further identify this individual nor could he identify others who were present.

KUTNER included by stating that he believed speakers like HAMPTON were psychotic, and it is only when they are faced with court action that they stop their "ranting and raving". KUTNER concluded by stating that HAMPTON indicated he was 21 years of age and recently sentenced from two to five years for armed robbery for stealing ice cream bars for children. KUTNER described

HAMPTON as being Negro male, medium to heavy build, with sideburns and a beard, dressed in a dark sweater. KUTNER advised that he was furnishing this information because of its possible violation of Federal law.

FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON

Contact with first and second confidential sources, both of whom have furnished reliable information in the past, failed to determine any knowledge on the part of either source in any direct conversation between David Hilliard,Chief of Staff, Black Panther Party, San Francisco, California, and Hampton, Chairman, Illinois Black Panther Party, in regards to the context of Hampton's speech.

On December 4, 1969, Frederick Allen Hampton died as a result of gunshot wounds received in a shoot out with local authorities, Chicago, Illinois, on the morning of December 4, 1969.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to:

United States Attorney, Chicago

U. S. Secret Service, Chicago

Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston

1 APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

85

FBI

Date: 12/5/69

Transmit the following in

Via TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY. RM, - BPP. OO: SAN FRANCISCO.

CHICAGO PD SOURCE ADVISED INSTANT APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED TEN BLACK ORGANIZATIONS MET AT WOODLAWN MENNONITE CHURCH, FORTYSIX TWELVE SOUTH WOODLAWN AVENUE, AFTERNOON INSTANT, TO FORMULATE PLANS FOR PRESENTING "CASE FOR BLACK PEOPLE" BEFORE UNITED NATIONS. GROUPS REPRESENTED AT MEETING CIRCULATED PETITION SUPPORTING BPP ATTORNEY CHARLES GARY'S PLAN CARRIED BY NEWS SERVICES, DECEMBER FOUR LAST, THAT GARY INTENDED TO APPEAR BEFORE UNITED NATIONS AND CHARGE UNITED STATES WITH "GENOCIDE OF MILITANT BLACKS."

MEETING DISPERSED WITHOUT ANY INCIDENTS BEING REPORTED OR ARRESTS MADE.

THE ABOVE SOURCE STATED ~~M~~ ABOVE MEETING CALLED AS RESULT OF RAID CONDUCTED DECEMBER FOUR LAST BY STATES ATTORNEY POLICE ON BPP APARTMENT TWENTYTHREE THIRTYSEVEN WEST MONROE STREET, CHICAGO, WHICH RESULTED IN DEATH OF FRED HAMPTON, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS, BPP, AND

ARS

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via __________ ____________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

MARK CLARK, PEORIA, ILLINOIS, BPP LEADER. RAID ALSO RESULTED IN ARREST OF SEVEN INDIVIDUALS TO BE CHARGED BY COOK COUNTY GRAND JURY WITH ATTEMPTED MURDER. VARIOUS FIREARMS WERE CONFISCATED ALSO.

ABOVE PD SOURCE ALSO ADVISED OPERATION BREADBASKET, ECONOMIC ARM OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, WILL SPONSOR ANNUAL PARADE AND MOTORCADE DECEMBER SIX NEXT FROM NINE TO TWELVE NOON. THEME OF PARADE IS "BLACK CHRISTMAS" AND APPROXIMATELY THREE TO FIVE THOUSAND MARCHERS ARE ANTICIPATED TO PARTICIPATE, TO MARCH ALONG SOUTH COTTAGE GROVE AVENUE.

CHICAGO RACIAL SOURCES HAVE DEVELOPED NO INFORMATION TO DATE INDICATING PLANNED VIOLENCE BY CHICAGO BPP OVER DEATH OF HAMPTON.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

Approved: ____________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

86

12/8/69

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

Information regarding the filing of murder charges against Cook County States Attorney EDWARD HANRAHAN and those police officers involved in the raid at the Panther apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, on 12/4/69 was orally furnished Chicago PD.

ARS

87

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois 60604

December 8, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Reference is made to Chicago Memorandum dated December 5, 1969, captioned as above, reflecting information concerning the raid on the Black Panther Party (BPP) apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, on the early morning of December 4, 1969, by officers of the Cook County States Attorney's Office. The raid resulted in the death of Fred Allen Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, and Mark Clark, Peoria Illinois BPP leader. Also, seven BPP members were arrested, four of them receiving wounds. Two Chicago police officers were slightly injured.

A characterization of the BPP and Students For A Democratic Society (SDS) are attached as an Appendix hereto. Sources utilized in the characterizations and those set forth in this Memorandum have all furnished reliable information in the past.

source advised on December 5, 1969, approximately 200 high school students from Calumet High School, 8131 South May Street; Crane High School, 2245 West Jackson Boulevard; Kenwood High School, 4959 South Blackstone Avenue, staged a walkout at the above schools in-memoriam of Fred Hampton. Calumet and Crane High Schools have 99% Negro student bodies. The Kenwood High School is 65% Negro.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

. also advised that Orr High School, 1040 North Keeler Avenue, which is 23% Negro, received approximately 21 broken windows from vandals. No arrests were reported in any of the above walkouts or the above vandalism.

The same date Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed approximately 75 of the above high school Negro youths conduct a demonstration in the vicinity of the Civic Center located in Chicago's Loop area. The purpose of this demonstration was in-memoriam to Fred Hampton. The youths marched from the Civic Center to Grant Park located on the East side of Chicago's Loop area and dispersed without incident.

Agents of the FBI also observed on the same date Sidney Lens, leader of the Chicago Peace Council (CPC) which has been publicly identified as a coalition organization comprised of six activist groups in the Chicago area, accompanied by approximately 30 hippie-type individuals conduct a vigil inmemoriam to Hampton at the Civic Center from 12 Noon to 1:00 pm. The group dispersed without incident.

A Chicago Police Department source (PD) advised on December 5, 1969, representatives of approximately 110 black organizations held a meeting at the Woodlawn Mennonite Church, 4612 South Woodlawn Avenue, that afternoon for the purpose of formulating a plan to present "case for black people"before the United Nations (UN). The organizations represented at the meeting circulated a petition supporting BPP Attorney Charles Garry's plan carried by news services following the raid on the Panther

---

apartment, located at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, which calls for an appearance before the UN to formally charge the United States with "Genocide of Militant Blacks". The meeting dispersed without any incidents or arrests being reported.

The above PD source also advised that Operation Breadbasket, the economic arm of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), would sponsor their annual parade and motorcade on December 6, 1969, from 9:00 am to 12 Noon. As in earlier years the theme of the parade would be "Black Christmas'. Approximately 3,000 to 5,000 marchers were anticipated to participate in the march along South Cottage Grove Avenue on Chicago's South Side. This same PD source advised on December 6, 1969, the parade did take place without any incidents or arrests being reported.

Chief of Police Jack Ziegler, Chicago Heights, Illinois PD advised on December 5, 1969, approximately 200 black youths disrupted morning classes at Bloom Township High School resulting in the dismissal of school for the day. The youths indicated the disruption was caused because of memorial services for Hampton. The high school is 25% Negro. No arrests or injuries were reported.

On December 5, 1969, A Bureau Agent of the FBI advised that at approximately 2:15 pm about 75 Northwestern (NW) University students led by members of SDS from NW conducted a demonstration in Downtown Evanstion, Illinois, protesting the death of Hampton. During the demonstration Evanston Police Officers attempted to keep the demonstrators on the sidewalk which resulted in some of the demonstrators resisting the Police. Several demonstrators commenced shoving Lieutenant Tom Joyce of the Evanston PD. Several blows were struck, however, no injuries were suffered by Lieutenant Joyce and the demonstrators.

This incident culminated in the arrest of four demonstrators who were charged with disorderly conduct. Following the arrest the demonstrators moved their demonstration to the Evanston PD to protest the arrest of their group.

During the demonstration at the Evanston PD the number of demonstrators rose to approximately 100. The demonstrators left the PD at approximately 3:45 pm and proceeded again to the business district and attempted to remove an American flag from the Downtown flagpole. The demonstrators were stopped by citizens. A fight resulted and six more demonstrators were arrested and their charges ranged from aggravated battery, disorderly conduct to resisting arrest. All those arrested were either NW or Kendall College students.

Following the later arrests a group of approximately 40 NW students returned to the PD to make bond for those arrested. The crowd dispersed at 5:15 pm without further incident or arrests being made.

On December 6, 1969, Officer James Neilson, Chicago PD, advised that Robert Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP, publicly surrendered at Noon to Commanders Robert Harness and George Sims of the Second and 11th Police Districts, respectively. Rush was charged with failure to register a firearm as a result of a raid on his residence, 2030 South State Street, on December 5, 1969. The surrender took place on the stage of the Capital Theatre, 79th and South Halsted Streets during an Operation Breadbasket meeting that was in progress and attended by mostly Negroes. No incidents were reported or arrests made as a result of the above arrest and those at the Theatre remained calm.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

[redacted]

On December 6, 1969, the Chicago PD source and [redacted] advised various memorial services were being held in the ghetto area of Chicago for Hampton but no incidents or arrests were reported. The PD source also advised that Hampton was waked at the A.A. Rayner and Sons Funeral Parlor, 3654 West Roosevelt Road during the evening of December 7, 1969.

Chief of Police Dominic Cimino, Melrose Park, Illinois PD, advised on December 6, 1969, services for Hampton were to be held from 7:00 to 9:00 pm on December 8, 1969, at the First Baptist Church, 2141 Main Street, Melrose Park. Following the services, the body would be shipped to an unknown address in Louisiana.

[redacted] Captain Wilbert Samuel, Maywood, Illinois PD advised on December 8, 1969, that Hampton would be waked an additional day at the funeral parlor and the services would be held during the same time and at the same location on December 9, 1969.

[redacted] advised on December 7, 1969, a meeting was called by Reverend Tom Streiter, Trustee, Village of Maywood, Illinois, and attended by Maywood Mayor Leonard Chabala and eight others at which it was decided to meet with Illinois Attorney General William J. Scott to discuss charging the 14 police officers involved in the raid in which Hampton was killed, with murder. Source also advised the group would request Attorney General Scott to investigate Edward Hanrahan, Cook County States Attorney and his role in directing the raid upon the BPP apartment. Source also advised that Streiter held a press conference following the above meeting at which he charged the evidence collected at the BPP apartment clearly indicated the police were the only ones doing the shooting

The above sources have developed no information to date indicating the Chicago BPP is planning or contemplating any type of retaliatory action at this time because of Hampton's death.

The following agencies are being furnished a copy of this Memorandum:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois

Region 1, 113th Military Intelligence Group,
Evanston, Illinois

88

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
December 11, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Reference is made to Chicago memorandum dated December 9, 1969, and captioned as above.

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is attached as an appendix hereto. Sources utilized in the characterization and those set forth below have all furnished reliable information in the past.

The Chicago Police Department (PD) source advised on December 9, 1969, approximately 150-200 school age youths were in the vicinity of 3654 West Roosevelt Road, the location of the A. A. Rayner and Sons Funeral Parlor, where Fred Hampton's body is located. The youths were in the area to pay their respects to Hampton. The source stated the youths were calm and no problems were anticipated.

As has been set forth in referenced memorandum, Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, was shot and killed on the morning of December 4, 1969 when officers of the Cook County State's Attorney's office conducted a raid on a BPP apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, for the purpose of serving a possession of weapons warrant. Chief of Police Dominick Cimino, Melrose Park, Illinois, PD also advised on the above date Hampton's body would be moved from the funeral parlor between five and seven p.m. to the First Baptist Church, 2114 Main Street, Melrose Park. Services were scheduled for seven to nine p.m. that evening.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Chief Cimino stated that following the service, Hampton's body would be removed to O'Hare International Airport for shipment to Haynesville, Louisiana. The body will be transported on Delta Airlines Flight 359, departing Chicago at 9:15 a.m., December 10, 1969, arriving Shreveport, Louisiana, at 1:30 p.m., the same date.

advised on the same date that students staged walkouts at both the Crane High School, 2245 West Jackson Boulevard, and the DuSable High School, 4934 South Wabash, in memory of Hampton. No incidents were reported, nor were any arrests made.

also advised that students at Parker High School, 6800 South Stewart Avenue, with one hundred per cent Negro enrollment, and Hirsch High School, 7740 South Ingleside, with ninety-nine per cent Negro enrollment, held memorial assemblies for Fred Hampton, deceased chairman of the Illinois Chapter BPP, on December 10, 1969. No incidents were reported. nor were any arrests made.

further advised that Orr High School, 1040 North Keeler Avenue, which has a sixty-four per cent white enrollment, was the scene of fist fights on December 10, 1969, between Negro and white students. The school closed at 12:20 p.m., following the arrival of the Chicago PD at the school. The PD calmed down the situation at Orr High School and it remained calm. No serious injuries or property damage was reported. At least six students were arrested.

On December 9, 1969, a Maywood, Illinois, Police Department source advised funeral services for Hampton commenced at approximately seven p.m. at the above Baptist Church and were concluded at 8:55 p.m. The attending crowd numbered approximately 3,000, and included youth gang members, as well as militant black and white leaders.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

advised on the same date, Reverend Ralph Abernathy of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Reverend Jesse Jackson, director of Operation Breadbasket, the economic arm of SCLC, delivered eulogies at the service. Abernathy told those present the nation (United States), which had conquered Nazi Germany was now following the same course. He also stated he would establish a Fred Hampton scholarship for those Panthers who wanted to study law. Abernathy also said if the government succeeds in destroying the BPP, the SCLC and other black organizations are next.

Reverend Jackson, during his brief remarks, urged the blacks to gain economic power by making sacrifices. He said blacks should sacrifice by taking money normally spent on food, shelter and clothing for their children, to be applied to the establishment of a non-facist society.

Source stated that Bobby Lee Rush, BPP Deputy Minister of Defense, stated that Hampton had been possessed with the power to enable the people to see the power structure was conducting genocide against the blacks. Rush stated Hampton was killed, not because the power structure was strong, but the Panthers were weak. Rush specifically criticized Jackson, along with other black militants, for not showing support for Hampton and the BPP until after Hampton was murdered.

Also present at services were Dr. Benjamin Spock, former baby doctor and anti-war figure, along with Jeff Fort, leader of the Black P Stone Nation, a Negro youth gang on Chicago's South side, and Jose "Cha Cha" Jiminez, chairman of the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican youth gang.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The above Maywood PD source advised that following the services, a few shots were heard and several unidentified gang members purporting to be Blackstone Rangers told police that individuals, whom they could, or would, not identify allegedly belonging to the Disciples, another South side youth gang, and whose members were in attendance at the services, had fired a shotgun at the vehicle in which the Rangers were riding. No injuries were reported, nor any arrests made and the area was normal shortly after the services ended.

The body, according to the Maywood PD source was then moved to O'Hare Airport and placed into the care of Delta Airlines without further incidents.

The Chicago PD source furnished the description of the following list of firearms confiscated during the raid on the above Panther apartment on December 4, 1969:

One Colt 45 caliber automatic, Serial #7111, Model # 1927;

One Sears Roebuck 20 guage shotgun, Model # 21, no serial number;

One Springfield 12 guage shotgun, Model #67H, no serial number;

One high standard 12 guage shotgun, marked "Riot 20-6, Model #K1200;"

One Browning shotgun, 12 guage, serial #H15423;

One high standard 12 guage shotgun, marked "Flit King Brush Model K1200;"

One Remington 12 guage shotgun, Serial #70740V, Model #870;

One Ithaca sawed-off shotgun, no further description;

One Ithaca 12 guage shotgun, serial #1019400;

One U. S. Carbine 30 caliber revolver, serial number 16573;

One Springfield 22 caliber rifle, no serial number;

One Astra medium 9mm automatic revolver, serial number 41558;

One Llama caliber 7mm automatic pistol, serial number 443695;

One Colt 38 caliber revolver, serial number 547;

One Smith and Wesson 38 caliber revolver, no serial number;

One Smith and Wesson 32 caliber long revolver, serial number 4423;

One Marksmen Pehetthon caliber 177, no serial number;

One high standard 12 guage shotgun, marked "Riot 20-6 Model K1200."

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois;
United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois;
Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

1 APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

89

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
December 4, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on December 2, 1969, that three members of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP) had been involved in a shooting incident with officers of the Chicago Police Department at noon on that date. Source advised that the shooting incident occurred at 8055 South Merrill Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. The source identified the Black Panthers as Jeannie Reed and Lynn French, who reside at that address, and Anthony Harris, who is a member of the BPP at Peoria, Illinois, who is visiting Chicago

Commander Frank Nolan, Fourth District, Chicago Police Department, advised on the same date that officers of the Chicago Police Department had been dispatched to the above address to investigate a complaint made by the landlord regarding a disturbance taking place there. Upon arrival at the above address, the investigating officers were met by Anthony Harris, who was armed with two .45 semi-automatic pistols. Harris commenced firing at the officers, but no one was hit. Harris, while resisting arrest, was injured and was taken to the South Chicago Community Hospital for treatment. All three subjects were charged with aggravated assault, attempted murder, armed violence and resisting arrest. Commander Nolan stated that the subjects were identified as Anthony Harris, Eugenia Reed and Lynn French. Commander Nolan stated that the Chicago Police Department would afford additional patrol coverage in the neighborhood and that subsequent to the above incident, the area remained calm.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not [illegible] distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

On December 3, 1969, Officer J. Fuss, Review Officer, Fourth District, Chicago Police Department, advised that there were no disturbances or incidents in the vicinity of 8055 South Merrill, subsequent to the shooting incident, which took place there on December 2, 1969.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago;
United States Secret Service, Chicago;
Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

90

Copy to: 1-NISO (RM)
1-U.S. Secret Service (Via Courier)
1-Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston (Via Courier)
1-OSI (Via Courier)

Report of: SA ALAN R. STEPHENS

Office: CHICAGO

Date: 12/18/69

Field Office File #:

Bureau File #:

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Character: RACIAL MATTERS; SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY; REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Synopsis: Speech of FRED HAMPTON, former Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, given 9/24/69, Grant Park Band Shell, Chicago, Illinois, set forth in detail. Speech of FRED HAMPTON on 10/9/69 at Federal Building Plaza, Chicago, Illinois, set forth. Confidential source, reliable in past, advised 11/19/69, weapons being kept first floor apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, by BPP. As result of information furnished by source, raid on above apartment conducted 12/4/69, resulting in death of FRED HAMPTON and other BPP leader and arrest of seven other BPP members. Information set forth regarding other activities involving shootings in which BPP members have been involved. Confidential source, reliable in the past, reports political orientation classes conducted by BPP concerned with teaching to those present arguments to counter the classic racist doctrine that all whites are evil and cannot be saved except by extermination.

- P -

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BPP LEADERS 3 - 11

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM OR POLICIES 12-21

III. TEACHING OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 22

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 23-27

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY 28-29

VI. EVIDENCE OF BPP ATTEMPTS TO AFFILIATE OR FORM COALITIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS 29-32

DETAILS:

The following characterizations are set forth in the appendix section of this report:

Black Panther Party (BPP)
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BPP LEADERS

At approximately 2:00 PM in the vicinity of the Grant Park Band Shell, Chicago, a tape recording was made by Special Agent (SA) EDWARD H. SZWEDA, JR. of a speech given by an individual believed to be FRED HAMPTON. Speech given on September 24, 1969.

Fred Hampton

Mother (obscene) know he gonna die before this trial is over. Yea. A little mother (obscene) (inaudible) midget faggot facist. This motion will be denied. He will deny all the motions mother (obscene) because revolutionaries don't believe in that bull (obscene) any mother (obscene) way. You can deny (obscene) but that you grow young again. You know that will never happen. So I believe the mother (obscene) is so old you just sit around and try and get young again cause you know when you get to so many numbers, you understand, on any type of machine, the mother (obscene) goes back to zero.

Right, right, (obscene) so I'm expecting the mother (obscene) to be born again while the trial is going on. Right, have to babysit everybody, right old stupid mother (obscene) he don't have any business trying to judge no mother (obscene) body.

In his mother (obscene) years, you understand, he is living in the rough rider epa (ph) round living, round with Teddy Roosevelt and all them old stupid mother (obscene). That's right. He comes to court he is so flabbergasted by all that new technical (obscene) they got in the (obscene) court room because when he started judging the stupid mother (obscene) probably had to ride a jackass, you understand, to his job. Anybody who would ride a jackass and smoking his cigar, and that is what you call a jackass riding a jackass and that is what you call with a cigar in his mouth: fire on one end and fool on the other, and the only thing now, only thing that makes a difference is now he is an old fool. An old fool is worst than a young fool, in a way, but in a way they are better because they got less time to be fools if they're old. They got less time to be a fool. That's right, if the mother (obscene) is so good in investigating let him find that old decrepit birth certificate he lost around 100 mother (obscene) years ago. Let the mother (obscene) investigate that. Let him indict the mother (obscene) that let him live this long.

The mother (obscene) is going out to take the case to the (obscene) Cook County Hospital to try it. We gonna put him in an iron lung, and we'll (inaudible) the mother (obscene) and is no telling why I'll latch that mother (obscene) on there cause I don't know the lung from the head. Put our Minister of Health on that stupid mother (obscene). You heard about our Minister of Health Dr. Steelgood (ph). You heard about Ronald Thatcher (ph).

We took a poll in the community and all them avaricious, greedy ass mother (obscene) whose more interested in public wealth than public health and we put little RON Thatcher in the community and the people came back singing the same thing that Aretha (ph) was singing. They were singing "don't pity no doctor." Filling me up with all those (obscene) pills that (obscene) ain't gonna cure none of my ills. Send me Nat Feelgood and little Ron Thatcher from the Black Panther Party (BPP) and that is what we did. We opened up that clinic we is looken for. We gonna be treating people no matter what it is as a matter of fact, if Magoo gets picked we'll treat his old, stupid, decrepit, and senile mother (obscene) ass cause we are looken for some new test cases. That's right. (Obscene) Judge Methuselah (ph) and (obscene) of these facist pigs is out here cause they're all maniacs. They are all waiten to rain down upon us, and wipe us out. They don't understand there is more people than there are pigs. They don't understand they can wipe out all they want to (obscene) see cause they have to go into the toliet paper business to try to wipe out the party, and they ain't got enough mother (obscene) wood or whatever they make that little thin bull (obscene) out of to wipe the BPP out. They ain't got enough of it because we don't use toliet paper any way. We use this capitalist mother (obscene) dollar bills, so why don't they put some in the (inaudible) so we won't be walking around with our asses unwiped. We can't wipe our asses with no quarters, nickles, or dimes. We need some paper. We don't look to see if it's a 20 or 1 or not because it all feels the same.

Our Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver says, anything that is paper it'll burn and that is the truth, it'll burn. We understand the power of the gun (obscene that bull (obscene) ass money. I'm going to have to leave.

Don't go. Don't go (crowd).

No, I've got to go. I've got to be in court this afternoon, myself. I'm glad I don't have to face this facist overhere. I'm opportune, I get to face a younger facist. He is only around 73. Let's (obscene) all these facists. Especially these granddaddy facists and lets hope with all the bull (obscene) metaphysical (ph) power that some of you people have, that Hoffman will stroke and choke before trial is over. All power to the people.

On October 9, 1969, a rally of the Revolutionary Youth Movement of SDS was held at the Federal Building Plaza, Chicago, Illinois, and the remarks of FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, were obtained by SAs SHERROD LEE MC DANIEL and CRISPIN L. SMITH.

HAMPTON's remarks are set forth as follows:

(Shouts from the crowd to speak louder).

All right, the first thing I did when I got up here was see a police officer from the Gang Intelligence Unit of the police department observing the people.

Let me make it very clear that the Black Panther Party supported the action of the RYM II faction of SDS, of SDS. We don't support the people who are anarchistic, opportunistic, sovinistic and most of all Custeristic. That's right, custeristic. We don't dig people leading people .... people are not prepared for....(inaudible)........ It doesn't make any differences because we .... we know that we are organized and if we are educated all that we have to do is learn the political line, learn those railraod tracks, that is what we call the theory and no matter how hard it may seem, it stays off those tracks. All we have to do is in any given situation is to move from a basic ideology that a revolution is an applied to use art and if we are going to work we are going to work in that direction. We have to understand that we have to move politically and move organizationally and if we don't move that way, we don't move anyway whatsoever. If you struggle, you should struggle properly. You should stand up struggling, stand up .... and if you don't stand up struggling, you don't deserve to win. Anybody can understand that.

Lot of people say that we shouldn't struggle, but we did if we expect to win. In fact..the only way we can win is if you struggle, but a lot of times you could be just wasting your time. We have to spend our time on revolution. We have got to spend our time on the street. We are in the process now of eliminating the states, we are in the process now of eliminating the dictator and the pigs know this is their last hope. They know it and they are getting frantic. They are a bunch of frantic, facist faggits, they know that. They know that because -- you know how a man is who is slipping off a mountain and grabs on --- grabs anything and holds on ----- you know why he does that----and the pigs see very clearly ----right down here at the Federal Building. They see very clearly that when the people get educated. (Some references to judges, ADOLF HITLER, MUSSOLINI, attorney general) ...that the people are going to stop this (obscene), we are the only ones that can stop it, god dammit, we got to keep on educating, organizing..........complaining that we are the that have the power. We had the power. The power was supposed to be ours.

(Inaudible)

We want a government of the people, by the people and for the people (inaudible) (obscene) of the pigs, by the pigs and for the pigs. (Cheering)

(Inaudible)

(Police Orders)

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM OR POLICIES

advised on November 15, 1969, JEWEL COOK, his brother CLEVE COOK and WILLIE CALVIN were sentenced in Indianapolis, Indiana, the preceding day stemming from their arrests in September, 1969. All are members of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP. JEWEL COOK received a 15-day sentence and a $85 fine. CLEVE COOK received a 30-day sentence and a $85 fine. CALVIN paid an $85 fine.

On November 19, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that allegedly the following items are being kept in the first-floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago:

5 carbines with 50,000 rounds of ammunition

1 case of 30 shot clips for the carbines

3 gas masks

3 smoke bombs, more explosive type

2 or more loud speakers

5 Ithica riot shot guns, plus ammunition

9 regular 12 gauge shot guns, plus ammunition

4 38 revolvers, plus ammunition

1 357 magnum, plus ammunition

Source stated that all these weapons were allegedly purchased on legal Illinois State Gun Registration Cards issued to female BPP members who have never been arrested.

Source stated that the above apartment serves as a "Panther Crib," meaning that it is available to any BPP member for use, such as sleeping or eating. Source stated that the following individuals are among the most frequently seen at this address:

FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman;

BILLY BROOKS, Deputy Minister of Education;

RONALD SATCHEL, Deputy Minister of Health;

LOUIS TRULOCK, Legal Counselor; all Illinois BPP officials, as well as ALVIN JEFFERIES, ROBERT CAMPBELL and numerous female BPP members including DEBRA JOHNSON who is allegedly pregnant by HAMPTON.

At approximately 3:15 am, November 13, 1969, a spokesman from the Deputy Superintendent's Office, Chicago Police Department (PD), Chicago, Illinois, advised that moments earlier officers responding to a report of a "man with a shotgun" at 5802 Calumet, Chicago, located in a south side Negro ghetto, were met with gunfire from at least two male Negroes.

The first three officers to arrive at the scene were JOHN GILHOOLY, white male, age 21; MICHAEL BRADY, white male, age 26; and, DANIEL COFFMAN, white male, age 26. All three officers were shot, according to the CPD spokesman, before they got their guns out of their holsters.

GILHOOLY and BRADY were approaching the building from the front when a Negro male with a shotgun and a male Negro with a carbine fired on them. GILHOOLY subsequently died on November 14, 1969, from his wounds and BRADY received a head wound which he was treated at a local hospital and released. COFFMAN received gunshot wounds in the leg, hand and chest and is hospitalized.

Scores of policemen then responded and firing continued for almost one-half hour. Six other CPD officers received wounds as a result of this gunfight:

Frank Rappaport, white male, age 36, who was killed by a shotgun blast in the face;

Donald Miley, white male, age unavailable, shot in face and arm by a shotgun blast and lost his right eye; is hospitalized and his condition is serious;

Philip Prerost, white male, age 27, who is in satisfactory condition with shotgun pellets in his arm, chest, and legs;

Jack Stewart, white male, age 27, who is in satisfactory condition with a concussion caused by a blow from a stone or brick evidently dislodged by gunfire;

Ronald Comparin, white male, age 27, who is in satisfactory condition with a gunshot wound in the left arm;

James Dodd, white male, age 31, who was treated and released for a gunshot wound in the left leg.

Rappaport reportedly was shot once by an assailant in hiding. Another CPD officer then saw a male Negro run up to Rappaport who was lying on the ground and shoot him in the face with a shotgun. This officer then shot and killed the assailant who was later identified as Spurgeon J. Winters, Jr., Negro male, age 19, of 5647 South Perry, Chicago.

Another suspect in the shooting, Lance S. Bell, Negro male, age 20, of 5809 South Indiana, Chicago, was shot and captured in the alley behind the shooting incident. Bell was wounded in the leg and right arm and has been charged with murder. He is currently incarcerated at the Bridewell Hospital, Chicago.

The police report on the incident reflects that the incident was apparently the result of a previous personal altercation between Bell and one James Caldwell, male Negro, 5804 South Calumet, who is a guard at the Cook County Jail, Chicago.

As a result of this altercation, Bell, Winters, and possibly others went to Caldwell's home looking for him. He was not at home, and Caldwell's wife then called the CPD. It was this call that the officers were responding to.

The area outside the scene of the shooting remained calm and no large crowds gathered.

A spokesman for the Deputy Superintendent's Office, CPD, advised that the CPD is in the process of attempting to determine how many people actually took part in the shooting and is looking for at least one and possibly two male Negroes, details unknown, whom they believe took part in this shooting.

On November 13, 1969, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Bell, although carried as a member of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), is not a trusted member of that Party inasmuch as he is and was suspected of being an informant for the Black P Stone Rangers, a local Negro youth gang. Bell has been inactive for several months, almost since joining the Party, due to this suspicion.

This source advised that Winters, also known as Jake Winters, was a close associate of the BPP but was not a member. He was very knowledgeable in weaponry and is suspected of stealing several weapons from BPP headquarters.

Source advised, however, that the BPP is now claiming that both Bell and Winters were upstanding BPP members and are attempting to obtain their photographs and will publish the story concerning captioned incident in the BPP newspaper in the near future.

who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on December 2, 1969, that three members of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP had been involved in a shooting incident with officers of the Chicago PD at noon on that date. Source advised that the shooting incident occurred at 8055 South Merrill Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. The source identified the Black Panthers as JEANNIE REED and LYNN FRENCH, who reside at that address, and ANTHONY HARRIS, who is a member of the BPP at Peoria, Illinois, who is visiting Chicago.

Commander FRANK NOLAN, Fourth District, Chicago PD, advised on the same date that officers of the Chicago PD had been dispatched to the above address to investigate a complaint made by the landlord regarding a disturbance taking place there. Upon arrival at the above address, the investigating officers were met by ANTHONY HARRIS, who was armed with two .45 semi-automatic pistols. HARRIS commenced firing at the officers, but no one was hit. HARRIS, while resisting arrest, was injured and was taken to the South Chicago Community Hospital for treatment. All three subjects were charged with aggravated assault, attempted murder, armed violence and resisting arrest. Commander NOLAN stated that the subjects were identified as ANTHONY HARRIS, EUGENIA REED and LYNN FRENCH. Commander NOLAN stated that the Chicago PD would afford additional patrol coverage in the neighborhood and that subsequent to the above incident, the area remained calm.

On December 3, 1969, Officer J. FUSS, Review Officer, Fourth District, Chicago PD, advised that there was no disturbances or incidents in the vicinity of 8055 South Merrill, subsequent to the shooting incident, which took place there on December 2, 1969.

A Chicago PD source advised on December 4, 1969, that officers of the Cook County State's Attorney's Office conducted an early morning raid on a BPP apartment located at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois. The officers, armed with a search warrant and weapons, approached the above location at 5:00 am, on the above date, and in attempting to gain admission in order to serve the warrant, were met with shotgun fire.

The gun battle that ensued resulted in the death of Fred Allen Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois Chapter, BPP, and Mark Clark, a BPP leader from Peoria, Illinois. Seven individuals were arrested as a result of the raid. Those arrested were:

Brenda Harris, Negro female, age 18, residing at 1848 South Hamlin. Harris received a gunshot wound in the hand and right leg.

Verlina Brewer, Negro female, age 17, residing at 125 West 107th Street. Brewer was wounded in the legs.

Blair Anderson, Negro male, age 18, residing at 6943 South Justine. Anderson received a groin and leg wound.

Ronald (Doc) Satchel, Negro male, age 19, Deputy Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, listing 2337 West Monroe Street as his address. Satchel was wounded in the right leg, right flank, and right hand.

Deborah Johnson, Negro female, age 19, Lieutenant of Finance, Illinois BPP, listing 2337 West Monroe Street as her residence.

Lewis Trulock, Negro male, age 19, Legal Counsel, residing at 1900 West Jackson Boulevard.

Harold Bell, Negro male, age 23, Captain of Defense, Illinois BPP, residing at 317 Howard Street, Rockford, Illinois.

According to the Police Department source, the individuals arrested will be charged before the Cook County Grand Jury with attempted murder.

Sergeant Daniel Groth, Cook County State's Attorney Police, advised on the above date he had led the other officers in conducting the raid and stated that when he approached the door to the apartment, he knocked and identified himself as a police officer and stated he was in possession of a search warrant to search the premises. Groth stated that upon receiving no response, he repeated his demand for entry and after seveal minutes had passed, forced the door open. Sergeant Groth stated he was accompanied by four police officers with four additional officers

entering through the back door of the apartment. Upon entering the apartment, Groth spotted a woman with a shotgun. The woman fired the shotgun and the police returned the fire. Sergeant Groth stated the firing of the shotgun created enough light in the darkness to illuminate a man standing behind the door, also armed with a shotgun. One of the officers exchanged shots with this man. The individual was hit and was later identified as that of Mark Clark. Groth stated at this point he called for the Panthers to surrender and heard a man's voice reply, "Shoot it out". The statement was made from someplace in the apartment. Shooting again resumed and one of the officers, John Ciszewski, shouted that he had been shot. (Officer Ciszewski received minor wounds, was treated at the hospital, and released.) Later, Sergeant Groth heard a man shout "Shoot it out with the pigs". Shortly thereafter, the gunfire ceased and those arrested as set forth above surrendered to the police.

At this point, Sergeant Groth stated a body, later identified as Fred Hampton, was found in one of the bedrooms. Sergeant Groth stated a loaded .45 pistol was found in Hampton's hand, and a shotgun was found near his side. Another officer, Edward Carmody, received a wound in the hand by flying glass and was treated and released from the hospital.

A search of the apartment located nine shotguns, one carbine rifle, one .22 caliber rifle, six hand guns, and approximately one to two thousand rounds of ammunition. According to Sergeant Groth, one of the shotguns taken in the raid had been reported stolen from a police car on April 6, 1969.

advised on the above date the only activities being planned by the Chicago BPP Chapter was with respect to the collection of bail money for the remaining Chicago Panther leaders, and also discussed the possibility of making a motion picture depicting the life and killing of Fred Hampton. No definite plans have been formulated regarding this matter. also advised on the above date that numerous unidentified individuals have been in contact with Panther Headquarters, 2350 West Monroe Street, requesting information pertaining to what funeral arrangements had been made. All those contacting the Headquarters were instructed that they should not be sympathetic toward the Panthers because of the killing of Hampton, but should furnish money to be used for bail on those arrested.

This source also stated the local chapter had been in contact with numerous Chicago radio stations in an effort to secure air time on "talk program" type shows in order to discuss the Panther version of Hampton's death. No commitments have been made by local radio stations.

advised on the above date the National Chapter of the BPP issued a press release to news media in San Francisco, California, concerning the above raid. Source stated the release reported that at 5:00 a.m., on December 4, 1969, Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman of the Chicago Chapter, BPP, and Mark Clark, a Defense Captain of the Peoria, Illinois, BPP, were murdered, assassinated by special forces of the Office of State's Attorney, Chicago, Illinois. The release also stated that several other Panthers were injured, and that Hampton's wife, who is eight months pregnant, was arrested.

The release stated the special forces officers allegedly broke in the back door of Hampton's residence, forced their way in, charged into the bedroom, and murdered Hampton in bed without giving him a chance to get up. The release also alleges the officers did not have a search warrant, but merely stated they (the officers) were searching for illegal weapons.

The release also stated that gunshots had not been fired by BPP personnel and that all of the shots fired by the police were in the bedrooms.

The release concluded the next course of action by the BPP will be to intensify information to the people because another revolutionary brother had been slain in the streets by the fascist "pigs" of this counrty and the people have to seize the time and take power.

On December 5, 1969, Sergeant Halleran, 21st Police District, Chicago, Illinois, advised that on that date, at 5:30 a.m. that morning, a raid had been conducted on the apartment of Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP. The apartment is located at 2030 South State Street, Chicago, and was unoccupied at the time of the raid. The whereabouts of Rush is unknown.

Sergeant Halleran stated the raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by a local court, alleging that weapons were in this apartment. Recovered during the search was a .22 caliber Derringer-type pistol, approximately two hundred rounds of ammunition, BPP and other literature, and a small amount of marijuana. The raid was conducted without incident and no arrests or injuries were reported. The area in the vicinity of the above apartment was normal.

III. TEACHING OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

advised on November 14, 1969, he attended a political orientation class at the Precious Blood Church, Western and Congress Streets, Chicago, on October 29, 1969. About 30 individuals were in attendance.

The major discussion centered on arguments to counter the classic racist doctrine that all whites are evil by nature and cannot be saved except by extermination. The counter argument was that a multiplicity of reasons are responsible for the white race's technological advantage over the non-white race, but the white man's system of economics makes him the monster he is. It was also argued that capitalism and imperialism by their very nature causes the white man to act as he does. The race or color of his skin has nothing to do with his actions. Source was unable to identify the leader of the above class.

also advised on November 14, 1969, a political orientation class of the BPP was held on November 3, 1969, at the Precious Blood Church, Western and Congress Streets, Chicago, Illinois, with approximately 20-30 people present.

The class dealt with the last two issues of the BPP newspaper. There was considerable discussion concerning an open letter to the BPP in which the Panthers were criticized for their defense of "Fatch", an Arab guerrilla movement.

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

furnished the following leaflet on November 30, 1969:

"Special News Bulletin, 11/19/69, Jake Winters".

Illinois Chapter Black Panther Party

Special News Bulletin
November 19, 1969

Jake Winters

"The Racist Dog Policeman must withdraw immediately from our communities, cease their wanton murder and brutality and torture of Black People or face the wrath of the Armed People."

Because of this statement made by Huey P. Newton, our minister of defense, and point 7 of the ten point program and platform that says, " We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people", we must stand firm on the ten point program which was canvassed from the Black community by the founders of the Black Panther Party, Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale.

JAKE WINTERS, a brother, a much beloved brother, a revolutionary, a Black Panther made of red-hot nigger steel, and the baddest son of slaves that ever came from the womb of woman. I have said these things about JAKE WINTERS, because they are already a fact. It's objective reality, proven by words and actions in defending the Black community.

On November 13, 1969, JAKE WINTERS stood face to face and toe to toe, his shotgun in his hand, with Pig Daley's murderous task force. He defined political power by blowing away racist pig Frank Rappaport and racist pig John Gilhooley and retired 8 other reactionary racist pigs before he was shot down.

It is also a proven fact and reality that Daley's task force makes daily and weekly raids on the Black community. They murdered little John Soto, 16 years old. They murdered Michael Soto, 20 years old, and shot wildly and unconcerned through every window in one of the buildings in the Henry Honer project, injuring scores of children. They murdered Jimmy Tucker and untold others.

JAKE WINTERS understood that the only way to stop fascist pig forces from invading and slaughtering Black people and people period and that is by defending yourself with arms in hand! He didn't talk about Black Capitalism for surviving nor did he talk about teaching "Pork Chop" culture Nationalism for surviving like Ron Karenga's US organization in L.A. JAKE WINTERS was 18 years old and he made a far greater commitment than most men will ever make in their entire life time. This brother was an honor student, a graduate of Engleworth High School who turned down five scholarships to work for the People. He helped as much as he possibly could at the Free Breakfast for Children Centers, plus he worked 7 days a week at the Post Office to bring in money to keep the Centers operating.

JAKE WINTERS is the highest personification of Huey P. Newton and Malcolm X. The spirit of these revolutionaries is manifested in each member of the Black Panther Party and we will always remember JAKE WINTERS. Because of JAKE WINTERS we will intensify the struggle; because of JAKE WINTERS we will continue serving the poor oppressed people -- the Proletariat.

LONG LIVE THE SPIRIT OF JAKE WINTERS
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
RIGHT ON, JAKE
SEIZE THE TIME

DEPUTY MINISTER OF INFORMATION
R. CHAKA WALLS
ILLINOIS CHAPTER BLACK PANTHER PARTY
2350 W. MADISON CHICAGO , ILLINOIS

FUNDS NEEDED FOR BREAKFAST PROGRAM

24-A

on December 10, 1969, furnished the following leaflets:

"Chairman Fred Lives";
"We Mourn the Murder of Fred Hampton".

CHAIRMAN FRED LIVES



At 5 a.m., December 4, Nixon and Daley's avaricious pigs brutally slaughtered the Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party, and a member of the Peoria branch. The pigs, with their usual tactics, attacked an apartment where 9 Panthers were sleeping. The result of the raid: Fred Hampton and Mark Clark dead, four others critically wounded, and three others arrested and charged with attempted murder for defending themselves.

Chairman Fred was shot 7 times, Ronald "Doc" Sachel, Minister of Health and in charge of the Free Medical Clinic, is in critical condition, shot 5 times. Deborah Johnson, an 8 1/2-month pregnant sister, is in jail. The pigs won't let the lawyers see her or any of the other political prisoners.

This is the second attack on a Panther apartment in 3 days. On December 2, 80 pigs attacked and brutally beat 3 Panthers including another expectant mother, Lynn French. Tony Harris was beaten so badly that he was later unable to recognize his own wife. And just three weeks ago, Panther Jake Winters was gunned down defending the black community.

These murders show clearly the fascist tactics that the gestapo Daleys, racist Hoffmans, warmongering Nixons and money-hungry Rockefellers use against the Black Panther Party, progressive people, and the poor, oppressed masses who are demanding their basic needs: land, bread, housing, clothing, education, justice and peace.

The members of the Black Panther Party were right in defending themselves. Jake Winters' revolutionary actions were just and necessary. Any people whose constitutional rights are trampled upon by the oinking pig power structure have a right to pick up the gun.

We call upon all people to unite in stopping these monstrosities--the murders of Chairman Fred, Mark Clark, Jake Winters, and all our Vietnamese brothers and sisters.

SEIZE the TIME

RALLY: 3pm, Sat., Dec. 6 at 201 S. Ashland

FUNDS NEEDED TO FREE POLITICAL PRISONERS

MAIL CHECKS TO THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, 2350 W. MADISON
FOR MORE INFORMATION, CALL 243-8276 or 348-2246/7.

WE MOURN THE MURDER OF FRED HAMPTON.

MURDER. Isn't that what you have to call it when a man is gunned down in bed?

FASCISM. POLICE STATE. Isn't that what you have to call it when police can make their own "laws" and act as judge, jury, and executioner?

OUTRAGE. GRIEF. ANGER. FRUSTRATION. ANGUISH. If we -- white, middle class, "respectable" people -- feel this way, how do you think poor and oppressed black people feel, when they see an outspoken and courageous young leader brutally killed by the forces of so-called "law-n-order"?

A society that lives by the sword will be torn apart by the sword. The ancient law is still true: What you sow, you shall reap. Sure: members of the Black Panther Party have said they have the right of armed self-defense. But how many of the rest of us also keep guns around the house "just in case"? Isn't it, then, hypocritical for white society to decry the stockpiling of guns only when it's done by black people?

GENOCIDE. Isn't that what you have to call it when there's a systematic deadly attack on a whole group of people... whether it's the Jews in Germany, the villagers of Song My in Vietnam, or the members of the Black Panther Party in Chicago?

IN TIMES LIKE THESE, TO BE SILENT IS TO BE AN ACCOMPLICE.

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY

advised on November 15, 1969, a JUDY DEBRA (phonetic) from BPP National Distribution Headquarters informed an unknown female of the Illinois Chapter BPP the shipment of newspapers would be arriving in Chicago that date via American Airlines Flight Number 822. She added the shipment consisted of 23 cartons and the charges were $158.60.

advised on November 5, 1969, American Airlines, under Air Bill SFO-443-2503, by National Distribution, 1336 Filmore Street, San Francisco, California, had a shipment of newspapers consigned to MORRIS BROWN, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. There were 24 cartons and the amount needed to obtain the shipment was $267.02.

advised on November 13, 1969, American Airlines Freight, O'Hare Field, Chicago, advised STEPHANIE FISHER at BPP Headquarters, Chicago, American Airlines was in receipt of 28 cartons from San Francisco, California, and the charge was $304.67.

advised on November 23, 1969, BEVERLINA POWELL informed HAROLD HOLMES at National BPP Headquarters the Illinois Chapter of the BPP desired to order 25,000 Panther papers, 50 copies of "Soul on Ice", 50 copies of ELAINE BROWN's album and 500 boxes of Christmas cards.

advised on November 30, 1969, LUCKY (last name unknown) from National BPP Distribution informed JEANNIE REED of the Illinois BPP that Chicago had not sent three boxes of prepaid Christmas cards via Air Bill Number 26470802, United Air Lines.

advised on December 3, 1969, GWENN (last name unknown) from National BPP Headquarters advised FRED HAMPTON, Illinois BPP, that DAVID HILLIARD, National Chief of Staff, BPP, had been arrested that afternoon in California by the FBI (actually Secret Service) on a Federal Grand Jury indictment. It was indicated the indictment pertained to a statement HILLIARD made at a moratorium concerning RICHARD NIXON.

advised on December 4, 1969, EUGENE CHARLES, Chicago BPP, advised JUNE HILLIARD, National BPP Headquarters, that FRED HAMPTON's apartment had been broken into by state's attorney's police and HAMPTON along with MARK CLARK of the Peoria, Illinois, BPP had been shot and killed in bed. It was stated HAMPTON and CLARK were murdered in cold blood and bullet holes had gone through the bed mattress and pillows and windows had been broken out. CHARLES was instructed to obtain photographs of HAMPTON and the apartment and immediately forward them to National BPP Headquarters for the Panther newspaper.

VI. EVIDENCE OF BPP ATTEMPTS TO AFFILIATE OR FORM COALITIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS

advised on November 7, 1969, BARBARA SANKEY, Illinois BPP, had contacted JEFF JONES at the SDS National Office, Chicago, to advise SDS that the BPP needed approximately $200 to $300 as operating money.

advised on December 7, 1969, a representative of the Communist Party (CP) informed PHYLLIS MONTGOMERY the CP had held a bazaar that date and had a considerable amount of food left over which they would like to donate to the BPP. It was agreed the BPP could use the food.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. MICHAEL KLONSKY, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power and does not support the polices of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
December 15, 1969

Title	BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Character	RACIAL MATTERS; SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY; REBELLION AND INSURRECTION.
Reference	is made to report of Special Agent Alan R. Stephens dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside

91

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
DEC 31 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

JOAN GRAY

Reference is made to memorandum dated October 8, 1969.

A characterization of the following organizations appear in the appendix section of this memorandum:

Black Panther Party (BPP)
Students For A Democratic Society (SDS)
Young Socialist Alliance (YSA)

On September 29, 1969, reliable in the past, advised that Joan Gray was working for the BPP in its program to decentralize the Chicago Police Department (CPD). More specifically she was in charge of interesting members of the clergy to support such a program. On this same date this source advised that the subject is still attending Roosevelt University in Chicago.

On September 30, 1969, this source advised that subject's home telephone number is 667-0909.

On October 16, 1969, advised that Gray in attempting to interest local clergy members to support the BPP goal of decentralization of local Police Departments had in conjunction with others set up a Religious Committee to Fight Fascism.

On October 30 and 31, 1969, this source advised that subject along with Fred Hampton, Chairman, Illinois Chapter of the BPP, and possibly other BPP members from Chicago, were planning to travel to various locations in Canada in connection with speeches to be made by Hampton in the middle of November while in Canada.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

JOAN GRAY

On November 5, 1969, also reliable in the past, advised that on that date the following BPP members departed O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, at 11:40 p.m., on American Airlines, Flight 151, which was scheduled to arrive in San Francisco, California, at 1:53 a.m., November 6, 1969:

Fred Hampton
Joan Gray
Artie Seale and son,
the wife and children of Bobby Seale, National BPP Chairman.

The source advised that the purpose of their trip to San Francisco was unknown other than to contact the National BPP Central Committee in Berkeley, California.

On November 7, 1969, , reliable in the past, advised on that date Fred Hampton and a female using the name Stephanie Fisher had obtained reservations on United Air Lines to depart Oakland, California at 11:30 a.m. and arrive Chicago 5:20 p.m., November 9, 1969. It was not known if the individual using the name Fisher was identical to the subject.

On November 9, 1969, advised that Hampton and Gray returned from Berkeley, California, where Hampton allegedly had several meetings with the members of the National Central Committee of the BPP.

On that same date advised that Hampton and Gray had left California and would arrive in Chicago at 4:50 p.m. that date, via American Airlines, Flight 682.

On November 1, 1969, advised that subject had been confined to Billings Hospital in Chicago after having been hit on the head during an attack. Further details were unknown by source at this time.

JOAN GRAY

On November 2, 1969, advised that on the previous day subject and others had been beaten up at the headquarters of the YSA by a group of white people described by subject to be Minutemen. Gray's injuries although not serious were a result of this beating.

On November 4, 1969, advised that subject was still active in the BPP's attempts to gain community control of the Chicago Police Department inasmuch as she was still attempting to persuade Chicago clergymen to back the BPP's goal in this regard.

On November 5, 1969, advised that subject was still a Field Lieutenant in the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, headquartered at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois.

On November 18, 1969, advised that subject was attempting to have SDS Headquarters in Chicago print posters advocating decentralization of the Police Department and community control of it.

On November 20, 1969, this same source advised that SDS had agreed to print up 100 copies of a poster advocating such goals.

During October, November and December, 1969, advised that subject frequents the Headquarters of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP on an almost daily basis.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois;
U.S. Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois;
Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

JOAN GRAY

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1 APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. MICHAEL KLONSKY, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power and does not support the polices of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

1 APPENDIX

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May, 1960, issue of the "Young Socialist" (YS), page 1, column 3, disclosed that during April 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled "The Young Socialist Alliance" (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated that this organization was formed by the nationwide supporter clubs of the publication YS.

The above issue, page 6, set forth the Founding Declaration of the YSA. This declaration stated that the YSA recognizes the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political leadership on class struggle principles of revolutionary socialism.

On March 10, 1967, a source advised that the YSA was formed during 1957, by youth of various left socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The source further advised that the YSA has recently become more open about admitting that it is the youth group of the SWP and that an SWP representative has publicly stated that the YSA is the SWP's youth group.

The National Headquarters of the YSA are located in Rooms 532-536, 41 Union Square West, New York City.

On October 31, 1967, a second source advised that at the 22nd National Convention of the SWP held in New York City from October 26, 1967, to October 29, 1967, it was stated that the YSA remained as the main recruiting ground for new SWP members.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A characterization of "Young Socialist" is set out separately.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

92

F B I

Date: 1/5/70

Transmit the following in

Via TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP). RM.- BPP.

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED PRESS CONFERENCE HELD THIS DATE BY BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF ILLINOIS BPP, AT EPIPHANY CHURCH, TWO ZERO ONE SOUTH ASHLAND AVENUE, CHICAGO. RUSH ISSUED STATEMENT CRITICIZING PERSONS CONDUCTING INQUEST INTO DEATH OF FRED HAMPTON, WHO WAS SLAIN BY COOK COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEYS POLICE DECEMBER FOUR LAST. RUSH ALLEGED THIS WAS A POLITICAL ASSASSINATION.

RUSH CLAIMS TO HAVE PROOF THAT HAMPTON'S BODY CONTAINED SUFFICIENT AMOUNTS OF DRUGS AFTER HIS DEATH TO HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HAMPTON TO HAVE BEEN AWAKE AT TIME HE WAS KILLED, AS CLAIMED BY STATE ATTORNEYS POLICE. RUSH CLAIMS DRUGS WERE ADMINISTERED BY POLICE AGENT IN FOOD EATEN BY HAMPTON SOMETIME EARLIER.

RUSH MADE NUMEROUS REMARKS CRITICIZING OTHER LOCAL OFFICIALS INCLUDING MAYOR RICHARD DALEY, STATES ATTORNEY EDWARD HANRAHAN

RAC

(

Apprc

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

AND COOK COUNTY CORONER ANDREW TOMAN.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent M Per

93

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No

Chicago, Illinois
January 6, 1970

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Characterizations of the Black Panther Party (BPP) and the Afro American Heritage Association (AAHA) are attached as an appendix hereto. Sources utilized in the characterizations and those set forth below have all furnished reliable information in the past.

[redacted] advised on January 2, 1970, a rally was scheduled for 3:00 p.m., on January 4, 1970, at the Afro-Arts Theater, 3937 South Drexel Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois. The rally was in memorial to Fred Hampton, the deceased deputy chairman, Illinois BPP, who was killed on December 4, 1969, during a raid conducted by the Cook County States Attorney's Police. Source also advised the BPP tentatively planned to announce the opening of their "People's Medical Center." The purpose of which will be to offer free treatment to residents of the ghetto.

The source also advised Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP, Robert Lucas, leader of the Black Liberation Alliance, a militant Negro organization which evolved from the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and Chicago Alderman A. A. "Sammy" Rayner were being advertised as speakers. Source stated that entertainment was to be provided and contributions solicited. The money obtained from the contributions would be used in defense of BPP members arrested during the raid in which Hampton was killed.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Source

advised on January 5, 1970, that approximately 1500 people of all ages with about 25 per cent white attended the rally at the Afro-Arts Theater. A Negro musical group call the "Pharaohs" furnished the entertainment. Approximately $2,686.00 was collected.

[illegible]

Source stated that Ish Flory, leader of the AAHA, called the meeting to order and presided as the master of ceremony. Flory spoke concerning his own AAHA and the BBP, and explained how these two organizations were helping the people. Flory also stated that conditions between the races were improving.

Alderman Rayner eulogized Hampton and spoke of his work with the BPP.

Following Alderman Rayner, an unidentified Blackstone Ranger, a Negro youth gang on Chicago's south side, was introduced, according to source, and spoke out against the "pigs" police and characterized downtown Chicago as being another Rome. This person also stated, according to the source, that if the BPP and the Rangers had been united, Hampton would have been alive today. He concluded stating the Blackstone Rangers ran the community.

Cluade Lightfoot, Chairman of the Illinois Communist Party, Communist Party, USA, spoke concerning Martin Luther King and his non-violent programs which Lightfoot stated did not work. Lightfoot stated that now that the Negro has jobs and is in a position of power, he can now strike, stop production and service in almost any area of the economy. He told the young people present that they should go home and tell their parents, "you struck for higher wages, now strike to force a halt to killings."

Following Lightfoot, source stated that Russ Meek, a militant west side Negro, stated that he had spoken before many church groups concerning Hampton and stated that he was for the people.

Meek stated that everyone should be armed and that when their door is broken down, people can and should defend themselves. He concluded saying that the "pigs" are out to get everyone.

Bobby Rush, according to source, stated he was not the chairmain of the BPP, but was the minister of defense of the Illinois BPP, and had no intention of becoming the chairman. Rush spoke concerning the aims of the BPP and what the organization was attempting to do. He also spoke concerning how the Panthers were being pushed around and killed.

Source stated that Ronald "Doc" Satchel, Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, spoke concerning the Panther medical center which was opened at 3:00 p.m., that afternoon offering medical treatment to the ghetto residents.

Source stated that several other unidentified individuals addressed those in attendance merely eulogizing Hampton and gave some history and previous activities of the BPP.

Source stated the rally concluded without any incidents.

The following agencies are being furnished a copy of this memorandum:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

AFRICAN-AMERICAN HERITAGE ASSOCIATION

A source advised on May 14, 1969, that the African-American Heritage Association (AAHA) was known as the Afro-American Heritage Association until February, 1961. It was founded by ISHMAEL FLORY around 1958 and incorporated in the State of Illinois as a non-profit organization. It was founded ostensibly for the purpose of teaching African history and culture to American Negroes. AAHA is strongly influenced by the Communist Party (CP) of Illinois. It is represented by both communist and non-communist members and some people with strong Negro nationalistic tendencies. This organization reflects CP policy on some issues and opposes CP policy on others; for example, the CP rejects the concept of Afro-American as a reference term to the American Negro and rejects aspects of nationalism, both of which are reflected in the AAHA program. FLORY is a member of the CP of Illinois and theoretically under the discipline of the CP. He is the guiding force in AAHA and controls policy and decisions in AAHA. CP representatives occasionally are featured at AAHA affairs.

A second source advised on May 14, 1969, that the headquarters of AAHA are presently located at 416 West 63rd Street, Chicago, Illinois.

The above source advised that the Afr'Am Book Store, a branch of the Modern Book Store, is also located at AAHA and that this book store is managed by ISHMAEL FLORY.

A third source advised on May 8, 1969, that ISHMAEL FLORY, a current CP member, continues to be the leader of AAHA and as such makes policies and decisions for AAHA. The South Central Freedom of the Press Committee, CP of Illinois, also participates in formulating the policies of AAHA.

94

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois
January 12, 1970

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

On January 5, 1970, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois Chapter of the BPP, held a press conference this date at the Epiphany Church, 201 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago, wherein he criticized an inquest scheduled to convene January 6, 1970, to conduct an investigation into the death of Fred Hampton.

Hampton held the position of Deputy Chairman, Illinois Chapter of the BPP, and was killed on 12/4/69, during a gun battle between members of the BPP and the Cook County, Illinois States Attorney's Police, as the latter attempted to serve a search warrant for possession of illegal weapons to the occupants of 2337 West Monroe, First Floor, Chicago, Illinois.

Source stated that Rush referred to Hampton's death as a "political assassination." Further, Rush alleged that a former Illinois State pathologist for the coroner's office, Dr. Victor Levine, hired by Hampton's family, tested Hampton's blood and found between 4.1 and 4.8 of seconal (a barbiturate) present which amount would have made it impossible for Hampton to have gotten out of bed or engaged in a gun battle.

Source stated that Rush announced that BPP members subpoenaed to appear at this inquest would give only their name, age and address as any further admission would be a violation of their civil rights inasmuch as they were already charged with attempted murder. Rush

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

referred to the inquest as illegally constituted because its members were not sworn in within view of Hampton's body and that the jury as well as others handling the inquest, are not predisposed toward finding out the truth.

Rush also called for persons who supported the BPP to gather at the Criminal Court Building, 2600 South California, Chicago, at 10:00 a.m. on January 6, 1970, for the purpose of demonstrating this support.

On the morning of January 6, 1970, Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed approximately 15 individuals, two of which were Negro, acting under the auspices of the Chicago Peace Council (CPC), commence demonstrating at the above court building. The demonstrators carried signs bearing the words, "No Whitewash" and "Stop the Killing."

The CPC is a local coalition organization composed of various peace groups.

Agents observed Sylvia Kushner, Executive Secretary of the CPC announce that the demonstration was to protest the systematic harrassment and genocide of the BPP. She also stated that this inquest, according to the CPC belief, will be a "whitewash."

This demonstation concluded at approximately 11:00 a.m., without any arrests or incidents reported.

On January 6, 1970, advised that Ronald Satchel, Deputy Minister of Health, Louis Truelock, Legal Counselor, both of the Illinois Chapter and Harold Bell, Captain of Defense, Rockford Branch of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, all arrested on December 4, 1969, by the Illinois States Attorney's Police, at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, appeared at the inquest and refused to answer any questions other than their name, ages and addresses. Source stated that the BPP lawyers then told the inquest that their clients will have nothing more to do with the public inquest. Source stated that all BPP members then left.

Source stated that James Clark, brother of deceased Mark Clark, a BPP member from Peoria, Illinois, who was also killed during the above gun battle, and William Hampton, the brother of deceased Fred Hampton, testified that they had identified the respective bodies at the morgue and also told when they last saw their respective brother alive.

On January 6, 1970, Sergeant Hartman, Cook County Sheriff's Police, advised that Detective E. Egan of the Chicago Police Department, was called as witness before this inquest and stated that he arrived at the scene on December 4, 1969, in response to a police radio announcement that a police officer had been shot at 2337 West Monroe.

Sergeant Hartman advised that no arrests were reported.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, Office of Special Investigations, Naval Investigative Service Office and the 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

1 APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

95

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - NISC (RM)
1 - U.S. SECRET SERVICE (Via Courier)
1 - REGION I, 113TH MI GROUP, EVANSTON, ILLINOIS (Via Courier)
1 - OSI (Via Courier)

Report of: SA ALAN R. STEPHENS
Office: CHICAGO
Date: January 16, 1970

Field Office File #:
Bureau File #:

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Character: RACIAL MATTERS; SMITH ACT OF 1940; SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY; REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Synopsis: Speech of JOAN GRAY, Chicago BPP member, given 12/31/69, at Chicago's Civic Center, set forth in details. Chicago BPP Chapter, according to source, received $2,686 at rally held 1/4/70, at Afro-Arts Theater, 3937 South Drexel Blvd., Chicago. CP of Ill. Chairman CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT present. Confidential sources report political orientation classes, attended in past, teach BPP Ten Point Program, use MAO's Red Book, and BPP papers as teaching aids. Numerous documents, distributed by Chicago BPP, set forth.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BPP LEADERS 3

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM OR POLICIES 17

III. TEACHING OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 18

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM 19

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY 69

VI. EVIDENCE OF BPP ATTEMPTS TO AFFILIATE OR FORM COALITIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS 70

DETAILS:

The following characterization is set forth in the appendix section of this report:

Black Panther Party (BPP)

I. REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM AND POLICIES AS EXPRESSED BY BPP LEADERS

A rally by students from the Chicago City College system was held at 12:00 Noon on December 31, 1969, at Chicago's Civic Center for the purpose of protesting the "political assassination" of FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK, BPP leaders killed in a raid conducted by Cook County States Attorny's Police on December 4, 1969.

The following speech by Panther member JOAN GRAY was obtained by Special Agents (SA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):

JOAN GRAY

More power to the people. Ah, you'll have to excuse me today if I don't talk too loud, I'm not feeling too good out here in all this weather, but like brother said it's good to have black people out here. (Inaudible) but it's unconsiderable for the rest of us. When we talk about Chairman FRED and stopping the murders like the murder of Chairman FRED, I wonder do we realize what we mean when we say we want to end the police brutality of murder of black people in our communities. What does it take to get rid of this? What does it take to make sure there is not any more Chairman FREDs, not any more MICHAEL SOTOs, JOHN SOTOs, CHARLES JACKSONs. It takes power brothers and sisters. Power is the ability (inaudible) and make it act in a desired manner. Power is when a big (inaudible) comes at you with a gun and you look at him with equal power which is a gun. That way your even see, that he can't tell you what to do and you can make him act in a desired manner. You can make him get the hell out of your community, or else you can put him right down and with the rest of the people

4

that he had killed and murdered in the ground. When we talk about Chairman FRED HAMPTON, we don't need to seriously talk about what a bad brother he was, what a bad brother he, what a lot of beautiful treats he gave to black and oppressed people. We can look around us at the Black Panther Party program and see that. We need to (inaudible word) and start talking about what we are going to do to avenge the death of Chairman FRED HAMPTON. How are we gonna make sure that his death wasn't in vain. There's a whole lot of things to be done in the black community. Brother JAMES (inaudible) off party much not to mention to talk about him when we mention it. What else is there for black people to do when we look around us and see ourselves being wiped out, nothing but pick up a gun. And the brother over there when I was walking up the street talking about he couldn't relate the (inaudible) and Black Panther Party should get rid of their guns. Black people should get rid of their guns. This man is a fool or pig. As long as pigs have guns then we'll have guns. It's inhuman to tell black people to put down their guns when these (inaudible) maniacs are coming in our community on a (inaudible) ready to kill us. It's nothing but a pig or fool who would say something like that. Black people must unite and charge the United States Government not only just HANRAHAN but all the way from the top down to the bottom. Every damn pig charge him with (inaudible) and that's what it is, a systematic wipe out of black people in this country, and all of us will have to be there before its genocide (inaudible).

All of us will have to be there. Genocide doesn't just mean physical murder, economic murder, psychological murder. All of these things combined make genocide on our black people. We must try the United States Government if we are to go to United Nations and although (garbled) we must try them with genocide of our people and demand a halt to it. And we don't demand a halt to it by marching down State Street with signs. We don't demand a halt to it by sitting in. We don't demand a halt to it by praying in and loving in. That man doesn't respect that. He doesn't respect anything but the same thing that he uses and that's a gun. We must remember all the (garbled) brothers and sisters in the Black Panther Party and in the black community that have stood up and said no more. I'm not a slave, I'm not a fool, I'm a man, I'm a woman and I'm not going to allow you to brutalize me and terrorize me. Remember JAKE WINTERS (phonetic) one of the (garbled) (obscene) the Black Panther Party has ever had. JAKE WINTERS, that brother was an honest student from Englewood High School. He could've went to any college he wanted to. This brother saw that the pig was (garbled) continuously (obscene) over him and his rights and his people. And he did what all black people and oppressed people should do. He defended himself (garbled). You go and ask the widows of the pigs he killed how they feel about JAKE WINTERS and you see terror shake in their hearts. And the hearts (garbled) when we mention JAKE WINTERS, they shake because they know what JAKE was. We have to remember Santa Claus, a (garbled) revolutionary brother who's in jail now. The pigs are trying to charge him with the murder of the two pigs that were killed in the incident with JAKE. We must defend this brother. We must (garbled) this brother on our minds and on our lips and demand that he be set free. Demand that the pigs realize that if he did anything it was in defense of his self-defense. It was in defense of black people, in defense of the Black Panther Party and in the defense of all human rights. When we talk about brothers and sisters in jail, I hope you realize that you in jail by standing right here on this corner. Everybody in fascist (phonetic) Babalon is in jail because nobody in fascist (phonetic) Babalon is free. We can relate to the brothers in Cook County Jail, Cook County Hospital, and all the other pig hospitals, and we know that while they're there, the ones who have the ideology are going to continue to (garbled) the brothers in jail as to what's going on. We demand that all black people be freed from all counties, cities and jails because for one thing they have no business there. None of them had a decent trial. And all were tried by, the majority were tried by men (garbled) or crutches and canes and hearing aids and the majority of the black people in there are young. We say we want all black people tried by (garbled) people from the black community. (Garbled) of all white, and I'm not a racist, but (garbled) of all white

90 year old fool come in a courtroom and attempt to try a young black man from a poor, oppressed black community. And the same (garbled) fool attempt to try a person who is white and from a community like Uptown when he lives on the North Shore and doesn't have to worry about anything but whether or not he has to play cricket or watch TV for two hours instead of reading three hours. There's a contradiction somewhere. The only way we gonna solve these contradictions, the only way we gonna remove these contradictions is through an arms struggle. You can't relate to violence, I'm sorry for you, we don't relate to violence either, when it's uneven violence. We don't relate to violence when people say we must go on the streets and just arbitrarily shoot down all people

that we see that might look like pigs. We don't relate to that. But we say anything that brings about liberation for black people is justified. If you're sincere about liberation, then you'll do anything that's necessary that gets you liberation and that's pick up a gun. We have a breakfast for children program and we have a health center. These are programs to show the people that socialism can work. Well these programs aren't gonna solve the problems of the people. We understand that too.

JOAN GRAY (continued):

So all of you out there who say, well I'll support the BPP by supporting their programs, but I won't support the BPP's program of picking up guns, you might as well not support them at all because picking up guns is the primary objective, arming the people is the primary objective. The breakfast program is fine, the health clinic is fine, but you all use it has a way out. You set back in your house unarmed, then Hanrahan walks in there on you and shoots you down in your bed. Its not just Black Panthers that are getting killed, and don't think FRED HAMPTON was killed because he was a Panther, don't think BOBBY SEAL was gagged in court because he was a Panther. He was a black man. He was a black man and any person like him who understands the nature of these racist pigs that we're dealing with know that he's out to systematically wipe out all black people. He is systematically out here to wipe out all the black people. Next he'll wipe out the oppressed people. Then what will be left. We look at the JONES... We got a whole load of comedians here. I remember a speech Chairman FRED gave once before at a rally.

Some fools in the audience wanted to make a joke at RONALD SATCHEL, our Deputy Minister of Health. They had a whole lot of little funny people in the audience that had to laugh. Chairman FRED reminded them that there's nothing funny about the situations going on. We had a whole lot of funny (no sound on tape for a couple of seconds)..... This is what we call cutural nationalism. We got a train they named the (no sound on tape again).....Don't reach back into the 1800's for ideology that's old and gone to solve the problems of Babylon right here and now. You go to the gas chamber and gag in Swahili, while the rest of use are gagging in English. It don't make no damn difference, we'll be dead either way. I'll conclude now. Oh ya! Right on. The brothers told me to mention that we have a new chairman.

His name is Chairman FRED TAYLOR SAMUEL J. Captain JOHNSON that stands for JOHNSON's baby, (inaudible). (Inaudible) ..... 7½ pound baby boy and we know this brother is going to be a bear for you, and JAMES mentioned that we don't want this brother to be age 21 and slain. If we can't vouch for brother JOHN, a new brother FRED, if we can't vouch for all the other revolutionary babies that will be coming into this world that are on their way here now, that are arriving every minute, if we don't make sure that this brother does not have to be slain (inaudible). All power belongs to you. We will have to remember that the whole lot of us; the whole lot of us past 50 wont live anyway to see what's going on. All of us past 70 are on our way out anyway, so we can't relate to you. We can relate to just the (inaudible) and the programs at hand and you relate to the struggle (inaudible). Lets not leave too much left for this half of the struggle, we'll just do our part while we can now, so they'll have that much less to do. Just remember that and if you love Chairman FRED, you love the Black Panther Party. You love Chairman FRED, you love that new little baby boy, that little baby man. You love that man that loves new revolutionary (inaudible) than you do everything in your power to make sure that he has a fit future. Even his future means fighting. Make sure that if an arms struggle, make sure that the majority of the mass of the people are out and with you fighting. Make sure he wont have a State Street to walk down and stand in for rallies. Don't let the situation still be at that level by the time that baby reaches age where he can actually fight. That's our job, that's what we have to do if we want to talk about Chairman FRED. Lets keep that in mind. We say all power to the people. Long live the spirit of Deputy Chairman FRED (inaudible).

advised on January 5, 1970, that approximately 1,500 people of all ages, with about 25 per cent white, attended a rally held at the Afro-Arts Theater, 3937 South Drexel Boulevard, Chicago. Approximately 2,686 was collected. The rally was in memorial to FRED HAMPTON, deceased Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP.

CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT, Chairman of the Illinois Communist Party (CP), CP, United States of America (USA), spoke concerning the non-violent programs of MARTIN LUTHER KING, saying these programs did not work. LIGHTFOOT stated the Negro now has jobs and is in a position of power. He said the Negro could strike, stop production, and service in the community, in almost any area of the economy.

According to BOBBY RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP, addressed the audience concerning the aims of the BPP and what the organization was attempting to do. He also spoke concerning how the Panthers were being pushed around and killed.

concluded saying that RONALD "DOC" SATCHEL, Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, spoke concerning the Panther medical center which was opened at 3:00 p.m. that afternoon for the purpose of offering medical treatment to ghetto residents.

II. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM OR POLICIES

Since the December 4, 1969, raid on a BPP apartment, as noted in section one, the Chicago Chapter of the BPP has not been involved in any acts of violence in furtherance of revolutionary programs or policies.

III. TEACHING OF REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

advised on December 15, 1969, that he had attended in the past a few political orientation classes conducted by Chicago BPP leaders. CG T- stated that BOBBY RUSH normally discussed the BPP Ten Point Program to determine whether those in attendance had committed the Ten Points to memory as required. also advised that FRED HAMPTON usually discussed "Quotations From Chairman MAO's Red Book" and had those in attendance give their views. In conclusion stated that "Essays of Huey" and military discipline were discussed by the Panther leaders.

advised on December 1, 1969, he had attended a political orientation class of the BPP at the Precious Blood Church, South Western Avenue and West Congress Expressway. The class was taught by FRED HAMPTON and the material used was from the latest issue of "The Black Panther," the official newspaper of the BPP. HAMPTON stated that those in attendance should not get involved with the police unless they intended to win. HAMPTON stated every time a Panther dies, a policeman should die. He said a Panther without a gun should not be called a Panther and would probably be purged from the party. HAMPTON admonished the members present not to wear Panther buttons unless they were prepared to die. He concluded saying the masses would have a revolution even if they had to be pursuaded by the barrel of a gun.

IV. DOCUMENTS URGING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

On December 19, 1969, made available a copy of the following documents distributed by the Chicago Chapter of the BPP:

Handbill entitled, "Indict Hanrahum."

Bulletin entitled, "BPP, Statement To The Black Community."

Ministry of Information bulletin entitled, "Statement To The People On The Assassination of Fred Hampton And Mark Clark."

INDICT HANRAHAN !!


EDWARD V. HANRAHAN

Racist pig Edward V.Hanrahan has publicly justified the cold-blooded murder of two members of the Ill.branch of the Black Panther Party - Fred Hampton Deputy Chairman and Mark Clark.He has even gone so far as to praise his "men" for their"bravery".

The deaths of brothers Mark and Fred are not isolated incidents. At least 35 members of the Black Panther Party have been killed in the past 18 months. They have also murdered thousands of other black and brown people. The black community recognizes these murders for exactly what they are - part of a policy og genocide - the wiping out in whole or in part of a race of people. Amerika 1970 is more and more looking like Nazi Germany 1940. We are witnessing the coming of fascism!

The Black Panthers say that the gov't.does not meet the needs of the people and they are working,as revolutionaries,to create a society that does meet those needs. Their program shows people how institutions could serve the people.

— children in black communities go to school hungry
THE PANTHERS GIVE THEM FREE BREAKFASTS!

— people wait for hours togain admission to a hospital where they get inadequate treatment and are humiliated for being poor.
THE PANTHERS ARE ESTABLISHING A FREE MEDICAL CLINIC!

IN this situation Pig Hanrahan was the one who "pulled the trigger"- he ordered his men to invade Fred's home in the middle of the night and murder him. This pig must be stopped; he must be indicted for murder! - - if he is not the people will deal with him!

DEMONSTRATE AT HANRAHAN'S HOME ((1830 N. Nagle))

date; SATURDAY , DECEMBER 13
time; 1 PM
place; MEET AT NARRAGANSETT (6400 W.) and NORTH (1600 N.)
MARCH TO HANRAHAN'S HOUSE

the spirit of fred lives !!

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
BULLETIN
ILL CHAPTER 2350 W MADISON



red Hampton, 21, Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party

STATEMENT TO THE BLACK COMMUNIT

DALEY AND HANRAHAN, FOLLOWING THE ORDERS OF NIXON AND AGNEW, SENT THEIR PIGS TO MURDER CHAIRMAN FRED. THEY BROKE INTO HIS HOME. MURDERED HIM IN BED WHILE HE SLEPT. BUT THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH, THEY DECIDED TO TRY TO KILL EVERYONE THERE. THEY FIRED THROUGH THE FRONT DOOR AND KILLED MARK CLARK. THEY BURST INTO THE FRONT ROOM AND THEN SHOT TWO MORE BROTHERS AND THEN SHOT TWO EIGHTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK WOMEN. THEY DESTROYED EVERYTHING IN THE HOUSE AND STOLE $1500 THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY HAD GIVEN FOR THE FREE PEOPLE'S MEDICAL CARE CLINIC.

THIS IS WHY WE DEMAND THE DECENTRALIZATION OF THE POLICE (COMMUNITY CONTROL OF POLICE), SO THAT THE PEOPLE CAN CONTROL THE PIGS IN THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD AND NO PIGS WOULD GET THE OPPORTUNITY TO MURDER OUR PEOPLE AND KILL OUR YOUTH. WE MUST HAVE COMMUNITY CONTROL OF POLICE(DECENTRALIZATION OF POLICE), TO KEEP THOSE EVIL PIGS FROM DESTROYING BLACK PANTHERS IN PARTICULAR AND BLACK PEOPLE IN GENERAL.

THE PEOPLE MUST INDICT HANRAHAN AND IMPEACH NIXON AND AGNEW.

WITH THE INTENTION OF LEAVING EVERYONE DEAD. THOSE PIGS SHOT AND WOUNDED FOUR YOUNG BROTHERS AND SISTERS AND THEN ARRESTED THREE THAT THEY HAD MISSED KILLING. WHEN THE THREE WERE TAKEN TO JAIL, THE TWO BROTHERS WERE BEATEN AND THE SISTER, 8 MONTHS PREGNANT, WAS THROWN IN A COLD CELL WITH NOTHING ON BUT A HOUSECOAT AND HOUSE SHOES. SHE HAS BEEN DENIED MEDICAL CARE, PRECIOUS PRE-NATAL CARE THAT IS NECESSARY FOR HER CHILD TO SURVIVE.

TWO SISTERS WERE LINED UP AGAINST THE WALL AND ONE WAS SADISTICALLY SHOT IN THE BUTTOCKS BY THOSE MAD DOGS. THE OTHER SISTER WAS SHOT IN THE LEGS AND THEN THROWN IN THE WAGON. THE PIGS THEN LINED UP TWO BROTHERS, BLAIR AN[illegible]SON AND OUR REVOLUTIONARY DEPUTY MINISTER OF HEALTH, RON 'DOC' SATCHEL, AND SHOT THEM IN THE BACK, STOMACH, KIDNEYS AND LEGS. BOTH BROTHERS WENT TO SURGERY AND ARE IN SERIOUS CONDITION, UNDER ARMED GUARD AND WATCH, IN THE COOK COUNTY HOSPITAL. THE LAST TIME



ALL

POWER

TO

THE

PEOPLE

WE HAD A WOUNDED BROTHER IN THE HOSPITAL THE PIG HIM TO DEATH WHILE HE LAID THERE WAITING FOR FU MEDICAL ATTENTION.

THE EXECUTION SQUAD SENT BY HANRAHAN AND WAS JUST LIKE THE ONE SENT BY THE FEDERAL GOVER TO MURDER OUR VIETNAMESE BROTHERS OF PINKVILLE. ANIMALS, PYROMANIACS, CAME DOWN ON THE BLACK COI TY WITH AUTOMATIC RIFLES AND MACHINE GUNS. THEY INTO THE BLACK COMMUNITY IN AN ILLINOIS BELL TELE TRUCK FOLLOWED BY SQUADS OF POLICE SQUADROLS A

INDICT HANRAHAN !

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION



BULLETIN

BLACK PANTHER PARTY ILLINOIS CHAPTER



2350 W MADISON 243-8276 NO. 7

VOL. 1

STATEMENT TO THE PEOPLE ON THE ASSASSINATION OF FRED HAMPTON AND MARK CLAF

CHAIRMAN FRED AND MARK CLARK WERE MURDERED BY HANRAHAN'S PIG FORCE

IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR THAT DEPUTY CHAIRMAN FRED MPTON AND PEORIA DEFENSE CAPTAIN MARK CLARK WERE RDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY HANRAHAN'S SPECIAL PIG SQUAD— ORDERS RECEIVED FROM THE NIXON-MITCHELL-AGNEW RE- ME. THERE WAS NO SHOOT-OUT; ONLY A SHOOT-IN. THE TACK ON DEPUTY CHAIRMAN FRED'S HOME WAS AN INTENTION KILL EVERYONE THERE.

THE MURDEROUS DOG PIGS KILLED THE CHAIRMAN WHILE LAID ASLEEP IN HIS BED. THEY BROKE INTO HIS HOME, IN E-DARK OF THE NIGHT, THE SAME WAY THE KLU KLUX KLAN D THE BLACK LEGIONAIRRES BROKE INTO THE HOMES OF ACK PEOPLE AND MURDERED THEM IN THEIR SLEEP. THE CIST PIG THAT KILLED THE CHAIRMAN ADMITTED PREVIOUS- LY A POLICE INVESTIGATION THAT HE IS A MEMBER OF THE



statement to the people con't

IE UNITS. THEY BLOCKED OFF THE ENTIRE AREA AND THEN
VED ON THE APARTMENT. AND THEN THEY WANT YOU AND
TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE ONLY TRYING TO SERVE A
ARCH WARRANT—WITH MACHINE GUNS AND CANINE DOGS!!!

THIS FRENZIED PLOT, THIS PRE-MEDITATED MURDER IS CON-
TENT WITH THEIR POLICY IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY—"KILL
L, BURN ALL, DESTROY ALL." THOSE LYING, TREACHEROUS,
CK FOLLOWERS OF WALLACE AND NIXON WERE SIMPLY ON
OTHER 'SEARCH AND DESTROY' MISSION; THEY KILLED FRED
D MARK LIKE THEY KILLED LARRY ROBERSON AND JAKE
NTERS—PANTHERS AND SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE. THEY
RDERED THEM JUST LIKE THEY MURDERED LINDA ANDERSON,
YNE BLACK, CHARLES COX, AND MICHAEL AND JOHN SOTO,
D HUNDREDS OF OTHERS.

WE HAVE TO PUT A STOP TO THIS INTENTIONAL SLAUGHTER
BLACK PEOPLE. WE HAVE TO SHOW NIXON AND AGNEW THAT
EN THOUGH THEY SAID THEY WERE GOING TO MURDER A FEW
NDRED PANTHERS WE WILL NOT LET THAT HAPPEN. LET'S
GIN TO ARM OURSELVES FOR OUR OWN SURVIVAL. PIECE UP!!!

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN STILL LIVES!!!
REVOLUTION IN OUR LIFE TIME!!!
PIECE UP!!!



EDWARD
CARMODY



JOHN
CISZEWSKI



STATE'
EDWA
HANR

MURDERERS!

CHAIRMAN FRED HAMPTON

On Thursday morning, December 4, 1969, Hammerhead Hanrahan's Maniac squad murdered in cold blood, the Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party . . . in cold blood, and as all pigs do, they didn't give him a chance. They knew that Fred was one of the baddest brothers in the world and one of the baddest M.F.'s off the block. He came down from the mountain top and clearly showed that he wanted to be with the people. (The people he loved and fought for every day of his life.) [illegible]





BOBBY RUSH

ESCAPES BEING MURDERED

e dirty rascist dogs that murdered Fred Ham-
d Mark Clark tried to murder our Deputy
of Defense, Bobby Rush. Murdering Fred
k was not enough blood spilt, so less than
ours after they killed Fred in his sleep and
d k in cold blood; those treacherous
ve down on Bobby Rush's crib in an at-
o kill him and his wife and kids, but he
here, he had moved his family and escaped
hter.

e pigs have no respect for our people. Hav-
d in murdering our Deputy Minister of De-
ey threw drugs into his apartment and then
him with possession of narcotics.

at kind of society is this where the victim
d like a criminal; where a man is murdered
ep and then charged with attempted mur-
aggravated battery: this fascist capitalist
has to be brought to its knees. We, Black
wil never be free in this society that is
w. nd racial genocide.

e pigs who murdered Michael and John Soto
ain to commit back-to-back murders with
n and Bobby Rush. When will we learn
capitalists (Nixon, Agnew, LBJ, Mitchell,
n, and Daley) are ben on destroying black
When will you admit that you are more a
w than you were in 1619 (in 1619 they
have shotguns, 357 magnums, helicopters,
guns and canine dogs)? When will you
and realize that an unarmed people are
subject to slavery (or to be murdered) at
n moment?

cism (the racist dog cop, the avaricious
businessman, the demogogic lying politic-

He helped found our Free Breakfast Program and along with "Doc"-worked to establish a Free People's Medical Clinic. Fred took his valuable time to try to teach each and every member of the Black Panther Party and the masses what is to be done, and the proper road towards liberation, freedom, and strategic means of resisting the power structure.

Fred taught us so much and gave us everything, including his life, so that someday we will have the power to determine our own destiny and everything in our Ten Point Program, our major political objective, and love and respect for all people will become a reality.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

OUR REVOLUTIONARY DEP. MINISTER OF HEALTH RONALD 'DOC' SATCHELL

'point-blank murd

LONG LIVE THE SPIRIT OF JAKE WINTERS



SPURGEON "JAKE" WINTERS

THE BEAT GOES ON - - -

Deputy Chairman, Fred Hampton, Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party with headquarters at 2350 W. Madison was murdered, shot to death Dec. 4, Thursday morning at approximately 4:45am, in his home at 2337 W. Monroe. There is valid evidence that Chairman Fred along with Mark Clark, Defense Captain Peoria Branch of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party, were murdered. Mark Clark, 22, was a profound revolutionary brother. He is responsible for the Peoria Branch being at the level it is at now. He started the Breakfast for Children Program in Peoria and before his death, started moving on a Free Health Clinic.

The shots, which were fired only from the guns of the Fascist, Racist maniac pigs under the gestapo guidance of pig Halfman Hanrahan, were found lodged in the walls, proved who fired the shot. It showed, positively, no shots were fired from the inside, especially none from Chairman Fred's room. He was openly and viciously murdered in his sleep. He didn't have a chance to fire a shot nor even take ONE pig along with him.

His death proves how murder hungry, how scared, how disrespectful Tricky Dick Nixon's fascist pigs are, in regards to poor oppressed Black People and especially those which belong to the Black Panther Party or any organization fighting to change this low lifed decadent society existing in fascist AMERIKKKA!!!

After the murdering, wounding a
were over the pigs confiscated appr
$1,500 and also shotguns, rifles, carbi
pieces and over 1,000 rounds of ammuni

The pigs stated that Chairman Fr
who stayed at his crib were storing and
this arsenal to kill pigs with. OF COUR
standing when you know that pigs are lo
beasts with no regard for law, justice or
of people; that unarmed people are subje
ery at any given time; that you are dedic
lutionaries as the Chairman and his con
against this Fascist, Racist syste nd a
italistic, Blood thirsty Politicians and gre
cious Businessmen, you have to arm yo
the SOUL means of SELF-DEFENSE A
SURVIVAL!!

What does all this mean? What do
show the Black Panther Party members
masses of People? It says SIEZE THE
cause before you realize, TIME WILL BE

ALL POWER TO THE
BECAUSE POWER BELONGS IN THE
OF THE P
RIGHT-ON CHAIRMAN FRED. YOUR
WI NEV
BUT LIKE THE EVOL
WILL CONTINUE TO GROW AND

FREE BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN



BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN

Our Breakfast for Children p
feeding a lot of children and t
understand our Breakfast for
program. We sayin' something
we saying that theory's cool,
with no practice ain't shit.
have both of them--the two go
We have a theory about feeding
What'd we do? We put it into
That's how people learn. A lot
don't know how serious the
They think the children we
really hungry. I don't


WHAT DO YOU WANT
A BOX OF DYNAMITE AND A CASE OF MATCHES

THE FOUR BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN CENTERS ARE LOCATED AT THE FOLLOWING:

48 N. HOYNE, ST. ANDREWS CHURCH
4837 S. STATE, TRINITY CHURCH
1101 N. LARABEE, MANIERE CHURCH
13384 S. LANGLEY, ALTGELD GARDENS
THE YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION!!!

everybody should be eating. Why? I
of capitalism.

What are we doing? The Break
Children program. We are running
socialistic manner. People came a
our program, saw it in a socialis
tion not even knowing it was soc
People are gonna take our progr
tell us to go on to a higher leve
gonna take that program and wo
a socialistic manner. What'd the p
He say, "nigger--you like commu
"no sir, I'm scared of it." "Yo
socialism?" "No Sir, I'm scared
"You like the breakfast for c
program?" "Yes sir, I'd die f
Pig said, "Nigger, that progra
socialistic program." "I don't
fuck if it's Communism. You p
hands on that program m erfuck
I'll blow your motherfucking brain
And he knew it. We been educatin
not by reading matter, but throu
servation and participation. By
him come in and work our pro
Not theory and theory alone, but
and practice. The two go togeth
no only thought about the Marxist-L
theory--we put it into practice. T
what the Black Panther Party is

Chairman of the Illinois Chapter
the Black Panther Party Fred Har

SERVING AND MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE HAS CAUSED FASCIST PIGS TO ATTEMPT TO WIPE OUT THE PEOPLE'S ARMY. STOP BLACK PANTHER PARTY FROM SERVING THE PEOPLE THROUGH RELE PROGRAMS, STOP THE INSTITUTION OF DECENTRALIZING THE PIG DEPARTMENT AND INSTITUTING THE PEOPLE'SPOLICE FORCE TO CUT DOWN ON WANTON MURDER AND BRUTALITY OF OPPRESSED PEOPLE.

REGARDLESS OF THE VICIOUS ATTACKS AND FEEBLE ATTEMPTS BY THE POWER STRUCTURE, THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY WILL CON TO MOVE ON. ILL. CHAPTER BPP

RED LIVES

Dear Friend:

Let's paraphrase Pastro Martin Niemoller's description of Nazi Germany:

First they came for the Panthers But I was not a Panther, so I did not defend them

Then they came for the student activists,

Then they came for the black people But I was not black, so I did not defend them.

Then they came for trade unions, But I was not a trade unionist, so I did not defend them.

Then they came for the teachers But I was not a teacher, so I did not defend them.



And did you voluntarily accept a free, hot meal from known Black Panthers at nine a.m., September nine, nineteen hun'ert an' sixty-nine?"

FREE HEALTH CARE

The BLACK PANTHER PARTY is establishing a FREE PEOPLE'S MEDICAL CLINIC to satisfy the medical needs of our community. We understand that the capitalists in America will never provide adequate medical service-so the BLACK PANTHER PARTY has moved to establish another com-

ple can be involved.

Technical assistance, supplies, and donations can be brought to the office of the ILLINOIS CHAPTER of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, 2350 West Madison Street. For further information, call 243-8276.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

GAN BY CHAIRMAN F
SEND CHECKS OR MO
ORDERS



SUBSCRIPTION FORM



Suppor
Your
Newsp

Subs
Toda

Enter my subscription for (check box):

		National Subscriptions
3 MONTHS: (13 ISSUES)	☐	$2.50
6 MONTHS: (26 ISSUES)	☐	$5.00
ONE YEAR: (52 ISSUES)	☐	$7.50

(please print)

NAME ____________________

ADDRESS ____________________

CITY ____________________

STATE/ZIP # __________ COUNTRY ____

PLEASE MAIL CHECK OR MONEY ORDER TO: MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, BLAC
Box 2[illegible], Custom House [illegible]



Platform and Program

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

**7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY an
of black people.**

We believe we can end police brutality in our black comm
ganizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to de
black community from racist police oppression and brutality.
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a
arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm
for self-defense.

**8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal,
and city prisons and jails.**

We believe that all black people should be released fro
jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and imp

**9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be trie
a jury of their peer group or people from their black con
defined by the Constitution of the United States.**

We believe that the courts should follow the United States
so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amen
U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer
is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geog
vironmental, historical and racial background. To do this the
forced to select a jury from the black community from whi
defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by ali
that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man"
community.

**10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, just
And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supe
cite to be held throughout the black colony in which only
subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of de
will of black people as to their national destiny.**

When, in the course of human events, it becomes nece
people to dissolve the political bands which have connect
another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the
equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God e
decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they
the causes which impel them to the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unali
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men,
just powers from the consent of the governed; that, wheneve
government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new governme
foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in
to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and h
dence, indeed, will dictate that governments long estal
be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly,
hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, w
sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms
are accustomed. But, when a long train of abuses and usu
suing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce t
solute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw of
ment, and to provide new guards for their future security.

furnished the following documents on January 11, 1970:

"History Of The BPP" (not completed)

HISTORY OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The Black Panth Party began as a respons to repeated instances of police violence in the black community. The party was inspired by the Black Panther Party of Lowndes County Alabama (The Lowndes County Freedom Oranization) which organized black people in the South to obtain basic rights such as the right to vote. The symbol of the Lowndes County Freedom Organization was the Black Panther.

The black panther, as explained by Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton, is an animal who will not attack. If attacked, the black panther backs up until he has no more room to back. Then, the black panther will strike out at his assailant and wipe him out. Newton says that the Black Panther Party will not attack unless pushed up against the wall- where nothing else is possible but to attack its assailants - in order to live. This principle of armed self-defense which is basic to the Black Panther Party, will be explained in a document below.

The Black Panther Party, started by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale while students at Merritt College in Oakland, set out originally to legally patrol the police. They carried weapons as provided by law and stayed the legal distance from the police whom they watched. The result of this surveillance was a decrease in brutality against members of th black community and increased harrassment of the Black Panther Party by the police.

The leaders of the Black Panther Party (originally called the Black Panther Party for Self Defense) soon realized that the police did not make the ultimate decisions as to whom they attacked and why. The police acted as the law enforcement agency for those who made the political progr cal decisions. Thus, the Black Panther Party evolved a political to deal with the type of political decisions which allowed the police to harrass the black communities and which have resulted in the dreadfu living conditions of black people in this country. (Details of this program may be found in a document below).

Huey Newton has said that the Black Panther Party is the vanguard party of the mass of black people. The black community has not yet bee sufficiently educated to verbalize its demands and to act upon them in a meaningful way. But because they know the nature of the oppression under which they suffer, they identify with the Black Panther Party as the spokesman which articulates their demands. The support for the Black Panther Party increases daily as the black community witnesses wh happens to those who speak for them- the intense brutality and harrass ment levied against the Black Panthers by the police- and the refusal of the power structure even to heed the demands of the black community.

In addition to support for the Black Panther Party from the black community locally, groups have been set up all over the country. Internationally, support is evidenced by rallies in Tanzania, Africa, and statements supporting the Black Panthers made by African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure. Both these men have publicly supported the demand that Huey Newton be set free.

As Minister of Communication, Kathleen Cleaver has said, since the murder of Black Panther treasurer, Bobby Hutton, and the jailing of innumerable Panthers, including Eldridge Cleaver, and , of course, leader Huey Newton, support and membership in the Panther Party has increased geometrically. Numerous white groups such as the Medical Committee for Human Rights, the John Brown Society, The Peace and Freedom Party, Whites Against Racism, Whites for Huey, ministerial students, lawyers and other members of the white community have publicly stated that they support the program of the Black Panther Party and want Huey Newton released from jail.

PROGRAM OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
(WHAT WE WANT AND WHAT WE BELIEVE)

The program is usually divided into one section of ten points entitled "What We Want" and then ten paragraphs explaining these points in a section entitled "What We Believe". For the sake of clarity, we have put each one of the ten points in "What We Want" immediately above its corresponding paragraph in "What We Believe":

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligate to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe xxxx that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the white man of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty-million black people: therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an imm[illegible]iate end to [illegible]CE BRUTAL[illegible]Y and MURDER of Black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therfore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self defense.

8. We want freedom for all Black men held in federal, state, county and city pridons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all Black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their Black Communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We Believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th' Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the ~~ma~~ black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of Nature and Nature's God entitled them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires thaty they should decaare the causes which impel them to separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

Prudence, indeed, will dicaate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that manking are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpation, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such a government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

POLITICS AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY

The Black Panther Party program and platform is a result of the analysis that the Party, and especially its leader, Huey Newton, has made of the nature of politics in America.

The way to political change is through power. This is the nature of the black power movement exemplified by Stokeley Carmichael in that term. What does this meadn? Huey Newton has said that politics is war without bloodshed and that war is an extension of politics with bloodshed. The reason that the Reconstruction attempt to put blacks into office from the South failed was because the black legislators, intelligent, well-educated men, had no powerful constituency behind them. If you represent a powerless group in the legislature, then you wield no power. What is a powerful group? According to Minister of Defense, Newton, a powerful group is one which, if it doesn't get what it wants, can deliver a consequence. There are several ways in which this kind of power is obtained. One way is to own the land. This is feudal power. It is exercised by farmers who, when they do not get what they want, can let the crops rot in the field. This is the kind of consequence that rates attention and action. The second way of gaining power is economic: ownership of the businesses. In America the slaves were freed with the promise, by the Freedmen's Bureau, of forty acres and two mules. Had this promise been fulfilled, the black man would have had land power and the ability to inflict a a consequence. The promise, of course, was never fulfilled.

What about businesses? The businesses in the black community are owned by the white man. Thus, even the economic boycott is difficult because there are not sufficient black-owned businesses to serve as and alternative center for purchasing basic needed goods.

To ask the blacks to redress their grievances by running for office does not pose a realistic solution. It is true that members of the Black Panther Party - Huey Newton for Congress in the 7th Congressional District - Bobby Seale for Assembly in the 17th Assembly District in Alameda County - and Kathleen LCleaver for Assembly in th 18th Assembly District in San Francisco - are running for office on the Peace and Freedom Party ticket, but this is only to have a forum to articulate the grievances of the black community. Why? Because as stated above the black politician without a powerful constituency just warms a chair in the legislature.

If the black community cannot gain economic or land-power, how can they hope to have changes of their conditions? Minister of Defense Huey Newton says that the only other source of power left is that of the ability to inflict destruction as a consequence. Thus, the black people must arm in a political fashion. The black people must be able to deal with the occupation police forces in their communities when they are attacked. The alternative is to have the police chosen by the black community, live in the black community, and serve the needs of the black community as that community sees them. This would mean that the police would no longer act merely to defend the interests of the white businessman and slumlord.

However, the blacks do not limit themselves to discussion of power from the gun. The Black Panther Party has a political program which it would like to see e[illegible]cted for the benefit of black people. See below for the program.

WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE BLACK MAN IN AMERICA TODAY?

Eldridge Cleaver, Black Panther Minister of Information has stated that the black man is a colonial subject and that black America is a colony within white America. The fact that the colonial subjects are dispersed throughout the country does not make their colonial subjugation any the less real. Cleaver has stated that: "Black people in North America have always been plagues by a dual status. We were both slave and Christian, we were both free and segregated, we are both integrated and colonized. In the past this duality has worked to our disadvantage. It kept us running around in circles. Today we propose to turn it to our advantage, in the manner that we have turned our blackness from a disadvantage into a rallying point of advantage."

Huey Newton has said that the black man in America today is a man of confusion. He is of the lower socio-economic background. He has withdrawn from his hostile enviroment which he daily faces and denies his own ability. He has been taught that he is inferior and he blames himself. He tries to change this image through his style of life - his desire for flashy material possessions. He is asked to respect a law which does not respect him. Those who believe in cultural nationalism try to answer his problem by turning him back to the time of the eleventh century in Africa. However, his freedom cannot come from such an identification. His freedom will come from identifying with the revolutionary struggles of people of color all over the world, including Africa today. The black man, according to Cleaver, has a common culture and a common history. All the lacks to be a nation is land.

What is the History of the Black Man in America?

The history of the present attitude of the whites toward blacks in this country has deep psychological roots, according to Newton. It dates to the time, hundreds of years ago, when the white Europeans first came into contact with black Africans. It relates to cultural differences. The Europeans who came to Africa worshipped one god - a god who was all-good. This was his absolutism. Man was said to have been created in the image of the all-good god and therefore could do no evil. Man's instinctual sexual drives were deemed ungod-like and were repressed. Such evil was deemed to come from outside man - the result of demons, devils, and witches - who were burned at the stake.

On the other hand, the Africans below the Sahara, mostly black, had a differant form of worship. Their god was both good and bad. They believed in dualism. Their god had two or more heads - one good and one bad. The African had to avoid being like the bad head and must get into the favor of the good head. However, he did not deny part of his being as coming from outside himself. Thus, his sexual drives were part of him - not evil demons from the outside.

When the Europeans came to Africa they enslaved the blacks south of the Sahara who believed in dualism. They were told by the church that the "good" Africans north of the Sahara, who believed in a single god, were more in line with the European belief and should not be enslaved.

Newtion points o[illegible] that this sick mentality [illegible]oes deeper than an economic system. It is a psychology that must be rooted out of the white ~~xxxxxxxx~~ race before the blacks can live in a society with white people. Thus, when Stokely Carmichael said that socialism is not meant for black people, he did not mean that he approved of what the capitalist system of economics was doing to the black communities. What he was saying is that even with an economic system that provided for all the people, if there were still racism, the black man would not be able to live as a man.

The Europeans raped Africa economically and took the black men as slaves to America. The black man has, to this day, not been treated as an equal to the white man - in any way. As was pointed out above, even after the Emancipation Proclamation the black man was not given his economic and political rights. In fact, after Reconstruction, the Southern politicians convinced the Northern politicians that the Black legislators 9who had insignificant power anyway) should not maintain even that token status. And, as can be seen in the electoral struggles goin on in black communities in the South today - the politicians still won't even allow the token representation!

As James Baldwin said, " To be black and conscious in America is to be in a constant state of rage." The whites cannot know what it is like to live as a black man in America - in white society. What we can know is the nature of the conditions that must be changed to give the black man his long overdue human rights.

WHY FREE HUEY NEWTON?

1. The Political Reasons. Huey P. Newton is a political prisoner. He is in jail today, accused of killing an Oakland policeman, not because he committed this crime, which he did not, but because he is the Minister of Defense of the Black Panther Party. Since the inception of the Party the Oakland police have tried to harrass it out of existence. As the Party became stronger, the police tactics became more vicious. The police have long had the license numbers and descriptions of all the cars driven by members of the Black Panther Party.

On the night of October 28, 1967, Police Officer Frey stopped an automobile which he knew to be a car on the list of those driven by Black Panthers. He stopped the car for an alleged traffic violation, the nature of which has never been discloes. In his testimony before the Grand Jury, Officer Heanes, the police officer who was summoned by Frey to come to his assistance after he stopped the Panther car, said that Newton DID NOT HAVE A GUN. Attorney Charles Garry has indicated that the evidence points to the real possibility that both officers fired at each other and the Officer Heanes' bullets killed Officer Frey.

The police have always, in the black community, claimed the right to exercise indiscriminate violence. It was for this reason that the Black Panther Party was originally formed. Before October 28th the Oakland police had harrassed Newton on numerous occasions and had threatened his life. On October 28 Newton was arrested and shot in the stomach because he stood for change in the black community.

The black community knows that Huey Newton and the Panthers have raised a crucaal issue - control of black communities by black people. They recognize that it is the police who perpetrate violence on a daily basis in order to maintain their illegitimate control over black ghettoes. They recognize that the actions of the Panthers constitute legitimate self-defense against a police force more interested in political repression and "keeping the niggers in their place" than in catching criminals. And they recognize the indictment of Huey Newton as an attempt not only to wipe out an heroic black resistance leader, but to also intimidate and crush the movement for self-determination for all black people. If black political leaders are not actually assassinated, as were Medgar Evers, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King - then the government finds ways of confining and neutralizing them as in the cases of H.Rap Brown and LeRoi Jones. That is why the black community stands behind the concept FREE HUEY. They mean that Huey Newton was harrassed and threatened and finally shot because he is a political leader; that he was arrested and thrown in jail because he is a political leader, that he faces the gas chamber because he is a political leader. These are important points for the white as well as the black community. The same type of harrassment has taken place against whites who have opposed this government: the case of the Oakland 7 arrested on conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor: a felony. It has happened to those who very peacefully tried to protest the policies represented by Dean Rusk, when he appeared at the Fairmount Hotel - demonstrators who were kicked, beaten and MACED by the S. F. police while they were RUNNING AWAY - trying to follow orders to disperse. The list could go on endlessly. Protest the government- and risk your physical safety - that is the message to whites and blacks alike.

II. The Legal Reasons. Huey Newton was indicted by the Alameda County Grand Jury - a jury chosen by the 20 judges on the Alameda County Superior Court, arbitrarily. Judge Dieden, and others, have admitted that this system results in judges choosing their friends, or political campaign contributors to serve on this "honorary" position. Three volumes of hearings taken by the Assembly Committee on Governmental Efficiency last year (1967) have pages of testimony to this effect. The persons chosen to serve are, overwhelmingly, white, over 50, retired, or still-active business and professional men and their wives.

This method of selection is clearly contrary to many cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, which cases indicated that a jury of one's peers had to consist of a CROSS-SECTION of the community and could not SYSTEMATICALLY EXCLUDE black people from serving. The Grand Jury violated both of these fundamental principles. However, when Newton's attorneys presented this evidence to the courts of California, through the California Supreme court, they were denied redress - WITHOUT EVEN SO MUCH AS A WRITTEN OPINION explaining why.

Furthermore, the method of indictment denied Newton fundamental rights which the California Supreme Court has held are required in criminal cases and which are given in the Preliminary Hearing.

A district attorney in California may proceed in a felony case wither by indictment or by information. Indictment is a procedure whereby the D. A. asks the county grand jury to return an indictment on evidence presented to them by the D. A. The D. A. may present whatever evidence he chooses at his sole discretion. The grand jury may summon witnesses, but it only does so very rarely. The defendant is not present except if he testifies - and this is usually undesirable because he waives his 5th amendment rights in doing so. Furthermore, the defendant's attorney is not allowed to be present at the proceedings. The proceedings are secret. There is no right for the defense at all in a grand jury proceeding.

A preliminary hearing is a hearing before a municipal court judge who must decide whether or not to turn the case over to the superior court for trial. The defendant may have an attorney at this proceeding. and usually does. The attorney may challenge the judge for bias; may cross-examine the prosecution witnesses; may call his own witnesses; may have discovery of the prosecutions' evidence; may question the def fendant, and so forth.

The way of proceding - through the grand jury, or by way of preliminary hearing - is at the sole and arbitrary discretion of the district attorney. There are no guidelines set down either in the California Constitution or in the Penal Code to guide his choice.

The district attorney of Alameda County has used the grand jury very rarely. He used it only in a little over 1% of the cases in 1966. He testified before the Assembly Governmental Efficiency Committee that he like to use it in complicated cases such as those involving assessor frauds or in cases involving child molestation. Neither was true in the Newton case. Others at that hearing testified that the grand jury was often used where the district attorney had a poor case or didn't have enough facts to withstand exposure to the preliminary hearing. This was true in the Newton case. To this date the prosecution has released no information as to its version of the Newton events. This runds counter to its usual procedure of seeking maximum publicity to prejudice the defense case in a serious criminal matter (cf. the Hutton case). The reason? They haven't made up their story yet. They are hoping that the defense attorneys will let slip therir version of the case so that the D.A. can then fit his version to counter that one.

The Grand Jury for the last five or more years has NOT ONCE refused an indictment sought by the District Attorney. How can any defendant in a set-up like that have any chance?

The Grand Jury indictment also serves to prejudice the later jury because they have the aura of upstandking citizens. If they felt the defendant was probably guilty, what will the petit jury have to think?

111. Treatment at Kaiser. When Huey Newton arrived at Kaiser Hospital he was in agony from a bullet in his stomach. It took the emergency room nurse FIFTEEN MINUTES before she would allow him to see a doctor. She wanted forms filled out. She did not believe he was really hurt. Finally, according to her testimony before the Grand Jury, Newton threw his blood-soaked shirt at her to convince her of his pain.

While Newton was doubled over in pain, and before she would let him see a doctor, the nurse call the police. When Newton was finally allowed to see a doctor, the police arrived and pulled his hands over his head - an agonizing position for a man with a bullet in his stomach - and handcuffed him to the gurney on which he was lying. They shoved him and kicked the gurney.

When Newton was transferred to Highland Hospital, his police guards kicked his bed and shoved him around in the hopes that they could prevent his wound from healing.

HUEY NEWTON BIOGRAPHY

Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense of the Black Panther Party, was born on February 17, 1942 in Louisiana. He came to California in 1945 and resided in [illegible]akland on Brush Street. [illegible] attended the Santa Fe and Lafayette elementary schools in Oakland. He went to Woodrow Wilson Jr. High School and then attended Oakland Technical High. His childhood was the same as that of most black youths. He was never given the opportunity to do skilled work but worked very diligently as a seasonal cannery worker from his graduation from high school onward.

Huey Newton learned to read well at the age of 16. This was when his high school counselors told him he was not college material. He set out to show them that no white man could tell him what he was capable of doing.

Huey went to Oakland City College and got an AA degree with an excellent gradepoint average. He spent one and one-half years in San Francisco Law School. He left law school to organize full-time for black liberation.

While Huey and Bobby Seale, Chairman of the Black Panther Party, were at Merritt College they formed the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. They patrolled the black community to keep the police from brutalizing the black people. Newton and Seale taught the blacks on the block their legal rights. They felt that the Panther program had to be implemented practically. This meant starting with Point No. 7 of the Black Panther Party program to work toward "an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people."

Shortly thereafter young Bobby Hutton inquired about what Bobby and Huey were doing. They explained the idea of the Black Panther Party and its operations to Bobby Hutton, who then became the first black youth to join the Party. He was appointed Party Treasurer. He served the black community faithfully until his murder at the hands of the Oakland police on April 6, 1968.

WHY SELF DEFENSE?

The Black Panther Party has advocated that everyone in the black community have a gun to defend himself. It should be made very clear that this does NOT mean that black people should have guns in order to come into the white community and "shoot it up". In fact there are NO reported incidents of Black Panthers coming into ANY community and using their weapons other than to defend their own lives.

The police forces in the black community are composed of men who live in white communities. They are hired as occupation forces to patrol the black community to protect white business and land interests. This is brought home very clearly by the fact that policemen~~x~~ in the ghetto try to stay away from incidents in which only blacks are involved. For example, if two black ganga are rumored to be planning a rumble, the police refuse to act to stop it. If black kids are fighting among themselves, the police stay away. If a black woman complains to the police that her husband has threatened violence against her, the police tell her to call a lawyer. When the lawyer tries to ~~x~~ intervene, the police say they do not like to get involved in domestic disputes. The list goes on endlessly. Furthermore, the police are often involved in the local rackets - the numbers gaimes, rake-offs from dope and prostitution and so forth. However, should a black man fight a white man the police come in immediately. At schools where black and white children fight in the schoolyards the black children are taken off to spend days in Juvenile Hall while the white children are, at most, given a citation to take home to their parents. Often, black mxmxmx people are picked up at random for alleged traffic violations. If a black man or boy is seen running away from a place where the police believe a crime has been committed (usually a property crime), they shoot first and ask questions later. The incidents of this in Berkely, and Oakland and San Francisco are numerous. In fact it is incidents such as these that have been the trigger in almost all the so-called "riots" that have occurred in this country since Watts.

The position of the Black Panther Party was graphically illustrated when after Martin Luther King's assassination, Bobby Seale, chairman of the Party, went around Oakland in a sound truck urging black people to stay home and not become involved in violence. Why? Not because there was no reason for revolt, but because the Black Panthers know that such spontaneous rebellion results in death for black people and no changes in their conditions of life. Such violence is sporadic, short-lived, and costly. However, it is also very clear that non-violent tactics have resulted in no change either. In fact, before his death, Martin Luther King indicated that the Poor Peoples' March on Washington was his FINAL attempt to use non-violent tactics to get what his people have been deined for 400 years. After that, Dr. King indicated, all he could see was fascism. And he could not urge people to remain non-violent in the face of that.

Why do the Panthers Beleeve the Black Community will be Annihilated?

The white community is prepared for genocide. Whites all over this nation are arming themselves to protect their community from an invasion of blacks. This is so even though not one white community has yet been invaded or even threatened with such invasion. This is true even though whites claim that even if there were an invasion of blacks they would be beaten almost immediately. Why are they armed? Fear. Fear that stems from a lack of understanding of the Watts incidents, fear that stems from a lack of understanding of what it is like to be black in this country. Fear of militancy øx thøxhløøkøx Xhøyxdøxnøtxshøøsøxwhøxwix that asks for change NOW. In part the fear comes because the whites know that they themselves are powerless to get change that would appease the militancy of the blacks. They have no more control over their government than do black people. They do not choose who will run for office - that is a back-room political decision. They know that when they vote for a candidate they must rely not on knowledge of his position, but on faith that he will govern well. So when they are afraid they do not rely on their government - they buy guns.

Not only the white man as an individual is armed. Police departments all over this nation are stockpilling weapons which, in their horror, are matched by those used by the army in Vietnam. Why the stockpile? For the Second Civil War. This is the way Esquire Magazine saw it in their March 1968 issue, in an article of that title by Garry Wills. Reporter Wills visited police chiefs all over the country to find out what they were plainning with regard to possible violence in the black communities. Remember when you read this that the black people are arming for self-defense with guns.

A listing of the weapons being stockpiled included: tanks, armored personnel carriers, jeeps with gun mounts, command armored cars built for Vietnam use,gas of all kinds including MACE, now felt by the federal drug administration to be far more dangerous than tear gas, bared bayonets, M-1 rifles, helicopters, tear gas grenades, shotguns, police dogs, shock batons, machine guns, assault guns which shoot through walls. The list could go on and on. Some of the more unusual weapons included "non-lethal" flame-throwers, shound devices which cause people to release their bowels, or lose their equilibrium, adhesives which cause parts of the body to stick together which if moved cause large areas of flesh to be torn away, foam, invisible gases, ~~axd~~ odors detectible by dogs, plastic confetti, traquilizers, electric sluices, hoses, gagging gases, and on and on.

This list of weapons is far too lengthy and horrifying to be a mere reaction to black peoples' desire to defend their homes and lives. This listing of weapons is such as to wipe out entire areas of a pop-!ulation, such as is being done in Vietnam. One cannot use tanks and machine guns, sbund devices, and flame throwers, selectively against snipers. These weapns either wipe out large areas of people or they aren't used at all.

During all the past riots tbe National Guard and the local police shot indiscriminately at blck people. Innocent women and children were injured as well as people only suspected of looting. Capital punishment was extended to those who appeared at the wrong place at the wrong time. No crime at all was necessary. Further riot contingency plans included the request in Detroit for $9,000,000 for riot equipment. Where snipers are suspected, the article indicated that entire buildings wer razed to the ground. These dead, the article went on, are not amonh those listed as casualties.

The psychology of the police interviewed by Wills was that potential riots must be squelched. This means that police patrol the ghetto and look for "suspicious" activities. Who could blame the police for using violence to squelch a potential riot? Only those who might question the nature of such activity in the first place and who might question the right of an individual man with a gun to pass judgment on another man without benefit for trial. In Los Angeles in July of 1967, ~~the shot~~ a Black Muslim temple was ~~hx~~ pock-marked with machine guns. The police claimed that they suspected that the Temple was the hiding place for guns. Naturally, the shot first and asked questions later. The result? No guns found.In this case, because of widespread publicity, Major Yorty was forces to apologize publicly for the outrageous conduct of the police. However, such raids continue regularly in the black community by the police. The police are getting "tough". To quote Cook County Sheriff Wood (Chicago): "When we had our Maywood riot, I went around telling my men on the bullhorn, so all those on the street could hear, that any rioter who raised his hands above his head would be guilty of aggravated assault, and should be fire on. I also told my men to shoot carefully- we didn't have extra men to take wounded off to hospitals." Compare this with what happened to Denzil Dowell, above, and Bobby Hutton (see below). A further interesting comparison was a statement made by Herr Goring, who issued these "shoot first" orders: ". . .for failure to act is a graver fault that errors made in action."

Ehen the Berkelgy police broke into the home of Panther Chairman Bobby Seale at 3:30 am on phoney charges of conspiracy to commit murder - charges that the police could never substantiate enough even to press - Huey P. Newton issued Mandate No. 3:

> Because of the St. Valentine Day massacre of February 14, 1929, in which outlaws donned the uniforms of Policemen, posed as such, and thereby gained entrance to locked doors controlled by rival outlaws with whom they were contending for control of the bootlegging industry in Chicago; and because these gansters, gaining entry through their disguise as Policemen, proceeded to exterminate their rivals with machinegun fire, we believe that prudence

would dictate that one should be alert when opening one's door to strangers, lat at night, in the wee morning - even when these strangers wear the uniform of policement. History teaches us that the man in the uniform may or may not be a policeman authorized to enter the homes of the people.

AND

Taking notice of the fact that (1) on January 16, 1968, at 3:30am, members of the San Francisco Police Dept. kicked down the door and made an illegal entry, and search of the home of Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information. These Pigs had no search warrant, no arrest warrant, and were therefore not authorized to enter. They were not invited in. Permission for them to enter was explicitly denied by the Minister of Information. Present were Sister Kathleen Cleaver, our Communications Secretary and wife to our Minister of Information, and Brother Emory Douglas, our Revolutionary Artist.

Taking further notice of the fact that (2) on February 25, 1968, several uniformed gestapos of the Berkeley Pig Department, accompanied by several other white men in plainclothes, bearing an assortment of shotguns, rifles, and service revolvers, made a forceful, unlawful entry and search of the home of Bobby Seale, Chairman of our Party, and his wife, Sister Artie Seale. These Pigs had no warrant either to search or to arrest. When asked by Chairman Bobby to produce a warrant, they arrogantly stated that they did not need one. They had no authortty to enter - what they did have was the power of the gun. Thus we are confronted with a critical situation. Our organization has received serious threats from certain racist elements of White America, including the Oakland, Berkeley, and San Francisco Pig Departments. Threats to take our lives, to exterminate us. We cannot determine when any of these elements, or a combination of them, may move to implement these threats. We must be alert to the danger at all times. We will not fall victim to a St. Valentine's Massacre. Therefore those who approach our doors in the manner of outlaws, who seek to enter our homes illegally, unlawfully and in a rowdy fashion, those who kick our doors down with no authority and seek to ransack our homes in violation of our HUMAN RIGHTS, will henceforth be treated as outlaws, as gangsters, as evildoers. We have no way of determining that a man in uniform involved in a forced outlaw entry into our home is in fact a Guardian of the Law. He is acting like a lawbreaker and we must make an appropriate response.

We draw the line at the threshold of our doors. It is therefore mandated as a general order to all members of the LBlack Panther Party for Self Defense that all members must acquire the technical equipment to defend their homes and their dependents and shall do so. Any member of the Party having such technical equipment who fails to defend his threshhold shall be expelled from the Party for Life.

It can be seen from this Mandate and from the speeches of members of the Party that the Black Panthers are engaged in SELF DEFENSE. Anyone who gives any thought to what has happened in the black community all over the country, in terms of police brutality, and anyone who reads the newspapers can see what is happening especially to the Black Panther Party in this area (s[illegible] below for details) must [illegible]nclude that the very least that black people must do to continue living in this country is to protect their persons from attack. As the Black Panthers have said, it is the man behind the gun who is dangerous. Black Panthers do not accidentlly shoot each other or anyone else. If they use weapons it is when they are personally attacked. If the whites have already declared war on the black people and are forming huge million-dollar arsenals, what kind of response do they expect from the black community? As Stokeley Carmichael has said, the blacks are not going to die the way the Jews in Europe died. The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising will be the example to follow - not the quiet exodus to the furnaces.

Many people object to the notion of the gun saying that there are other ways to stop violence - that the blacks should gain political and economic power. However, as will be shown,below, it makes power to get power. If violence is to be prevented, the whites have the immediate obligation to stop the police from using their array of weapons against the blacks. To ask the blacks to turn the other cheek and get killed is a plea that is immoral and foolish.

THE SACRAMENTO INCIDENT

Because the Black Panther Party has exercised its constitutional right to bear arms, Assemblyman Mufford decided that this right would have to be curbed. He introduced a bill "prohibiting instruction in the use of firearms for the purpose of rioting, and prohibiting the carrying of loaded firearms on public streets and in public places by all except peace officers, guards, and members of the armed forces." (S. F. Chronicle Story, 5/3/57). As most people know the second amendment to the United States Constitution says that "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." The purpose of this amendment was to prevent the very thing that Mulford"s bill tries to set up: the regulation of the people's right to be free. What is the nature of this right? Huey Newton stated it very clearly when he said that if the people are unarmed, and if the government has a regular police force and a military force, the people are slaves to the government or are subject to slavery at any time. Newton's conclusion" so long as the police are armed, the black people should be armed. As Newton said: "Ninety percent of the reason we carried guns in the first place was educational. We set the example. We made black people aware that they have the right to carry guns."

Why Go to Sacramento with Guns?

There is some history to the Sacramento incident of which most people are unaware.

On April 1, 1967, a young black man named Denzil Dowell, aged 22 years, was killed by a member of the Contra Costa Sheriff's department. Denzil Powell was killed with his hands raised over his head. His family was denied the right to photograph his body and the right to have his clothes returned to them. Denzil Dowell was unarmed. Furthermore the sheriffs knew that he was suffering from an unjured hip which would prevent him from escaping from the scene of the crime. WHY WAS HE KILLED? As with the killing of Panther Bobby Hutton (see below) there is no reason - other than that he was black.

On April 18, 1967, the Black Panther representatives, bearing arms, went to see District Attorney Nejedly of Contra Costa County to ask for an investigation of Denzil Dowell's death. The District Attorney said that he would hold such an investigation and would recommend that the sheriff who shot Dowell be removed from duty pending the investigation.

On April 19, 1967, representatives of the Black Panthers and some other interested persons met with the sheriff. He refused to allow the Panthers to enter his office carrying guns. Because Panther leader Huey Newton felt the conference was so important, he and the other Panthers gave up their right to wear a gun and removed the guns before talking to the sheriff. The sheriff refused to remove the man who shot Dowell pending the investigation. Further he refused to instruct his men not to kill suspects in crimes involving only property. (The situation in the Dowell killing). The undersheriff instructed the Panthers that if they wished changes made, the should go to Sacramento and speak to the Legislaute. This same undersheriff Ramsey went to the Assembly and spoke in favor of the Mulford bill - and in doing so referred specifically to the need for the bill to deal with the Black Panthers.

In response to this conference and to the Mulford bill itseff, Minister of Defense Huey Newton wrote a statement which Panther Chairman Bobby Seale delivered on the steps of the capitol in Sacramento on May 2, 1967. The statement is as follows:

> The Black Panther Party for Self Defense calls upon the American people in general and the black people in particular to take careful note of the racist California Legislature which is now considering legislation aimed at keeping the black people disarmed and powerless at the very same time that racist police agencies throughout the country are intensifying the terror, brutality, murder and repression of black people.
>
> At the same time that the American government is waging a racist war of genocide in Vietnam, the concentration camps in which Japanese Americans were interned during World War Two are being renovated and expanded. Since America has historically reserved the most barbaric treatment for non-white people, we are forced to conclude that these concentration camps are being prepared for black people, who are determined to gain their freedom by and means necessary. The enslavement of black people from the very beginning of this country, the genocide practiced on the American Indians and the confining of the survivors on reservations, the savage lynching of thousands of black men and women, the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and now the cowardly massacre in Vietnam, all testify to the fact that towards people of color the racist power structure of America has but one policy: repression, genocide, terror and the big stick.
>
> Black people have begged, prayed, petitioned, demonstrated and everything else to get the racist power structure of America to right the wrongs which have historically been perpetrated against black people. All of these efforts have been answered by more repression, deceit, and hypocrisy. As the agression of the racist American government escalates in Vietnam, the police agencies of America escalate the repression of black people throughout the ghettos of America. Vicious police dogs, cattle prods and increased patrols have beoome familiar sights in black communities. City Hall turns a feaf ear to the pleas of black people for relief from this increasing terror.

> The Black Panther arty for Self Denfense be eves that the time has come for black people to arm themselves against thhis terror before it is too late. The pending Mulford Act brings the hour of doom one step nearer. A people who have suffered so mush for so long at the hands of a racist society, must draw the line somewhere. We believe that the black communities of America' must rise up as one man to halt the progression of a trend that leads inevitably to their total destruction.

In the section on Self Defense, above, further explanation for the use of guns was given. However, it should be pointed out here that the genocide of the black people in this country is sometihing that white people should fear for their own sakes as well as for the welfare of the black race. Those of you who are old enough to remember the pre-World War 11 history will recall that when Hitler came to power in Germany he started exterminating his political enemies by picking on the leadership (as the Oakland police are picking off the leadership of the Black Panther Party). He then, when this was not stopped by popular outrage and action, went on to kill millions and millions of those whom he defined as enemies. A government which can exterminate one group at will can exterminate many. When Stalin, in the Soviet Union, felt it necessary to exterminate enemies, he btated on a small scale. When he found that he could continue this technique, the purges became wider and wider in scope. Although Huey Newton feels the concentration camps will be filled with black people, those of us who are white and are outraged at this possibility feel that they can be enlarded to include whites, too! Remember that the National Socialist definition of "Jew" was pretty all-inclusive. IN the South , whites have been referred to as "white Nigger".

On May2, 1967, the Black Panthers went to Sacramento, carrying guns legally. They went to the Assemblg observation section led by a crew of television men and reporters. When they were directed to the observer box, the Assembly members requested that the guards remove the television cameras, not the guns. The capitol police were, at all times, aware of the fact that the Black Panbhers were armed. Had the Panthers entered the Assembly with guns to do any shooting, they had ample opportunity. However, this was not their purpose. They came to protest the Mulford bill, which was explicitly directed against tehm, and to deliver the above-quoted statement of Huey Newton on the genocidal nature of the American government.

Because the Panthers weee legally carrying guns, they could not be arrested while at the capitol. However, as they were leaving Sacramento, the police dug up an old Fish and Game law that dealt with loaded weapons in a vehicle. The law was enacted to prevent accidents when hunters carried guns. The Panthers were having their cars serviced at a gas station when the police arrested 23 of them for violation of the Fish and LGame code. The Panthers did not resist arrest, even though they were armed and were numerous. After being arrested, the Panthers were thrown into the drunk tank of the jail with neither beds nor blankets. They were treated just like the animals for the killing of which regulations were made in the Fish and Game law.

As Huey Newton predicted, the press response to the incident was to distort what happened and to raise the spectre of violence. The press called the Panthers thugs and indicated that they came to Sacramento only to disrupt the proceedings of the Assembly. However, as Newton pointed out, the young black people on the block at home have been called [illegible]odlums and thugs all the[illegible] lives. Thus, when they heard what the papers called the Panthers they wanted to know what these "hoodlums" were up to, carrying guns. Thus, the Panther message was spread in the black community almost because of the press distortions.

As to press accounts calling the Panthers miliant and anti-white, these were false charges. The documents below indicate that the Panthers are not a racist organization and will form coalitions with white groups who are willing to support the Panther platform and who will work to end racism.

The Mulford bill was enacted into law as a special bill and has been used, predictably since then, to harrass members of the Black Panther Party. Attorneys feel that the bill is clearly unconstitutional. However, as will be shown below, lack of funds, as well as the nature of the court system, prevent the unconstitutionality from being adequately tested. Eight members of the Black Panther Party served jail sentences on the phoney charge. The rest did not serve time because the district attorney indicated that if eight would serve ~~xxxxx~~ he would not press charges against the rest. It should be noted that this type of justice is not limited to the Black Panthers. Every day black people are arrested on charges which are false or unsubstantiated. Because of lack of funds many of them serve jail sentences. Many of those who can afford attorneys are found guilty by all-white juries and judges. Since Sacramento, the Panthers have been constantly harrassed. See below for further details.

THE MURDER OF BOBBY HUTTON AND THE ARREST OF THE PANTHER 8

On Sunday, April 7, the Black Panther Party had planned a picnic barbecue to raise money for the defense of Huey P. Newton. Saturday night Eldridge Cleaver, Bobby Hutton, and a number of other Panthers were driving around Oakland to collect food that the sisters had prepared. Their mission was interrupted when sereral squad cars of Oakland police intercepted and ambushed the Panthers in their own community. Today, Eldridge Cleaver is behind bars, possibly for life. Bobby Hutton is dead - murdered by the Oakland pigs when he tried to surredder from the gas-filled, burning house. Seven other Panthers plus Cleaver face Grand Jury indictments for attempted murder, indictments based on false information provided by the pigs and extorted confessions from the imprisoned Panthers.

The following information came out in an interview a San Francisco Chronicle reporter had with Cleaver in jail:

Bobby Hutton, aged 17, was killed by police bullets - he was told to run for a squad car and, while his hands were raised and he was unarmed, officers shot him down.

With one or two exeptions, the arsenal of guns the police claim was taken from the scene of the shoot-out was actually taken from a parked Panther's car's locked trunk, miles away, and hours later.

Following the police ambush of the Panthers, cops made no attempt to immediately allow Cleaver and Hutton out of the house they were holed up in. Instead they poured a fusillade of bullets in through its walls.

Eldridge Cleaver was not carrying a gun. "I was never armed", he said, "because Huey P. Newton had laid down orders that, as a parolee, I should not be armed."

Although the pigs and the racist press repeatedly tried to call the ambush a Panther se-up, within two minutes after the police had stopped and pulled their weapons at 2905 Union Street, an entire two-block area was blocked. . . and dozens of Emeryville and Oakland police officers had (supposedly answering a call for reinforcements) appeared on the scene, thoroughly equipped with riot helmets, OVERKILL weapons, tear gas bombs. . .

Cleaver's account of the incident indicated that the trouble began around 9:30 p.m. when a squad car pulled alongside 3 Panther cars parked on 28th Street. Cleaver saw a cop get out of a squad car, which had suddenly pulled up, "heard some loud talk" from a cop "and suddenly a gun exploded right in my face." Cleaver said he and Bobby "lit out" through an alleyway and through a side door into the basement of a house that had no connection with the Panthers. "We laid down on our backs and the cops started firing. I could see their bullets coming in through a beaverboard partition about a foot above my face."

A concrete foundation of the building partially protected them and it was probably a ricochet that later wounded Cleaver. A tear gas cannister also hit him in the chest. "The gas was thick now and Bobby took off my clothing to see where I was hit. I was bleeding from my foot and coughing."

Finally a tear gas cartridge or something else fired by the police set fire to the basement and the side of the house. "We couldn"t stand it anymore and I yelled, "We're coming out". Cleaver limped out of the house, with Bobby holding his arm to support him. Out in the alleyway,". . .we both fell down when they (the cops) told us to and cops from the street (perhaps 15 yards away) approached us. They kicked us and cursed us for about five minutes - while we were lying on the ground." At this time Cleaver was wearing only his socks, all his other clothing having been stripped off by Bobby in a search for wounds. "Then the cops told us to get up and start running for the squad car." LCleaver was unable to because of the leg wound, and he fell. "Bobby started running - he ran about 10 yards - and they started shoothin him. I heard 12 shots; it was hard ~~a~~ to tell for sure. He had his hands high in the air until he died."

Cleaver was taken to Highland Hospital emergency room, then rushed off to San 1Quentin, and then, as soon as his lawyer arrived, was whisked off to Vacaville supposedly for "medical attention", although San 1Quentin has some of the finest medical facilities in the State prison system. At Vacaville, Cleaver has been kept;in total isolation "maximum security", with his wife and lawyers given only curtailed visits, and no other visitors allowed. It was only the power of Establishment Press which finally got the Chronicle reporter an interview with him.

Exobitantly high bail was set for all the arrested Panthers - $63,00 for Cleaver (which is irrelevant since his parole was revoked thus automatically confining him for the next four years) and $40,00 each for the other seven. Cleaver's parole was revoked at 3 a.m. the night of April 7 and there was no hearing.

The LGrand Jury testimony against the 9 Panthers who were arrested that night, at the scene of the shoot-out, in homes nearby, or in their cars, includes alleged "confessions" by them that they had been out "looking to do some shooting" and other statements. All such statements are difficult or impossible to believe would have been voluntarily given by any Black Panther arrested for shooting at cops. As in the Newton case, the Grand Jury was blatantly employed to deny the defendants their right to a preliminary hearing (see article "Why Free Huey Newton").

Attorney LCharles R. 1Garry has filed affidavits of the Panthers arrested in a suit against the City of Oakland, the Chief of Police and the Mayor of Oakland, seeking to enjoin the DA from any further prosecutions of the Panthers. The affidavits charged brutalization of the Panthers by the police, Intimidation and lying. Some Panthers did make brief statements to a man they were told was their lawyer, who had been brought in "because Garry and other Panther attorneys had no interest in the case" (a complere fabrication). The"lawyer" turned out later to be a cop. Another Panther was beaten on the soles of his feet until he made a statement. A third Panther said he had never made any statement to the police at all, and that it was pure lies on their part when they attributed statements to him. The complete statements in the affidavits indicate that the cop harrassment and brutalization were designed to(1) "confuse and deceive each of the brothers and turn them against each other and on Eldridge Cleaver by blatantly lying to them: (2) to get statements from them which would build up as much evidence against Eldridge Cleaver as possible."

This actions of the police in attempting to extort these confessions makes it quite clear that their target was the leadership of the Panthers - in this case, Eldridge Cleaver. Like most elements of the power structure they are working on the assumption that if you ~~can~~ can destroy the leadership you can cripple the movement. As usual, they failed to see the extent to which the struggle in the black community grows out of the needs of that entire community. Oppression in the black community is not going to be gone or forgotten when the leaders of the Black Panther Party are jailed or shot. The people are not going to stop fighting.

On Sunday, April 7, several hundred people turned out in DeFremery Park at ~~a~~ the barbecue picnic for the Huey P. Newton Defense Fund.

POLICE HARASSMENT OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

A sample of Incidents

1. From October, 1966, to October , 1967, Huey Newton has been harassed by the Oakland police-had been stopped on innumerable occasions without reasonable cause.

2. Spring and summer, 1967-This was the most intense period of harassment for the Panthers. It took place after a demonstration by Panthers carrying rifles at the Stat Legislature in Sacremento during Assembly debate on a bill which would restrict a citizen's right to bear arms. During this period, Panthers were repeatedly stopped in cars and on the street; many were arrested; homes were entered illegally by police.

3. May 22, 1967-Bobby Seale went to the Oakland County Courthouse to bail Huey Newton out of jail. He was leaning against a retaining wall outside carrying a "legal" shotgun. He was arrested and charged with an obscure law, dating back to the 1800's,

adjacent a jail.

4. June 2, 1967-Warre[illegible]ucker was arrested by th[illegible]erkeley police. He was accused of fighting a white boy. He was not allowed the two phone calls that any prisoner is required by law to have. He was separated from the other inmates, He was tried, convicted and sent to Santa Rita where he was told not to engage in any political discussion. He was forced to work on the farm section and to cut his "Afro" hair style. He pointed out that the Berkeley police have pictures of Huey Newton and Bobby Seale which are captioned "Approach with Caution".

5. October 28, 1967-Huey Newton wounded and arrested in a shooting incident in Oakland in which Oakland Officer Frey was killed and Officer Heanes wounded.

6. January 15, 1968-National Captain David Hilliard arrested while passing out leaflets at Oakland Tech.

7. January 16, 1968-At 3:30 a.m. San Francisco policemen broke down the door of Eldridge Cleaver's apartment at 850 Oak St., San Francisco, and searched the apartment-without a warrant. Eldridge, his wife, Kathleen, and Panther Revolutionary Artist Emory Douglas were present.

8. February 5, 1968-At 1:00 a.m. a Panther and his girlfriend were arrested for "disturbing the peace", after a rally at which Dr. Spock and James Forman spoke. They were beaten in jail.

9. February 24, 1968-Panther Jimmy Charley approached a policeman who was in the act of assaulting a black person, and questioned the officer. He was promptly arrested and charged with "resisting arrest".

10. February 25, 1968-At 3:30 a.m. police broke down the door of Bobby Seale's home, where Bobby and his wife, Artie, were in bed asleep. There was no warrant. Police said they were acting on a complaint implicating Bobby in a vague "conspiracy to commit murder" charge, which was promptly dropped for lack of evidence. Shotgun-toting police confiscated weapons and arrested Mr. and Mrs. Seale. Four other Panthers, in a car nearby, were also arrested a short time later, and charged with misdemeanors. Mr. and Mrs. Seale face trial on charges of possessing illegal weapons, including possession of guns with serial numbers filed off. Seale contends that the police filed off the serial numbers after the arrest. Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale, before forming the Black Panther Party carefully studied and analyzed the law pertaining to carrying guns and taught these laws to new members of the Black Panther Party-they were anything but unaware of the law and followed the law in all respects.

11. Third and fourth weeks of February, 1968-A rash ofxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx arrests of black men either in the Panthers or identified with them. One of the incidents took place in front of the Natural shop on San Pablo St. in Oakland. This incident happened when police stopped the car of a black youth on an alleged traffic violation in front of the shop. Policemen pulled the youth from the car, threw him against

the car door an eat him brutally. Abou en Panthers and their associates gath d around to protest and e arrested. This rash of arrests incided with the visit of tokeley Carmichael to the Bay Area.

12. April 3, 1968-Police entered Father Neil's church in Oakland where the Panthers were holding a meeting. A black youth associated with the Panthers (but not authorized by them to possess a gun) was, according to police, drunk and waving a gun outside the church. Police surrounded the church and entered it, about twelve of them in threatening manner. They were accompanied, inexplicably, by a white priest and a black clergyman, both from Oakland. David Hilliard came out of the out of the sanctuary and refused to allow police to enter the sanctuary. Upon seeing Hilliard, police lowered their guns and cast their eyes about, looking for someone else. The Panthers are convinced they were looking for Bobby Seale.

13. April 5, 1968-San Diego police crashed down the door of Ken Denman, PFP leader and Panther organizer in San Diego. They had no warrant.

14. April 6, 1968-Several Panthers in cars in west Oakland on Saturday night, April 6, were approached by two policemen and menaced with guns. When the Panthers tried to defend themselves, shooting began, and the Panthers ran into a nearby house. After about 90 minutes of shooting by some 50 members of the Oakland P. D. who set fire to the house and filled it with tear gas, the Panthers were forced to surrender. With floodlights covering the house, Bobby Hutton walked out with his hands up. Someone gelled that he had a gun, and he was shot. He was not armed; no gun was found anywhere near his body. Eldridge Cleaver, wounded in the leg, and eyes badly burned by tear gas, came out. In total, nine persons were arrested, including Panther National Captain David Hilliard. Two policemen were wounded slightly.

15. April 9, 1968- Two Black Panther women were going about Oakland in a car putting up posters announcing the candidacy of Huey Newton for Congress and Bobby Seale for Assembly on the Peace and Freedom ticket. Twelve policemen with shotguns stopped their car and searched it - without probable cause. Throughout the day, patrol cars circled the Newton-Seale campagin headquarters. Sam Napier and other Panthers were physically stopped by police from putting up campaign posters. Police have been spotted by Oakland residents tearing down Newton-Seale posters.

16. April 13, 1968-Four members of the Black Panther Party were returning from Bobby Hutton's funeral when they were arrested on suspicion of robbery. Since it was Friday, they were to be kept over the weekend before they could be arraigned. This is a typical police procedure - it means three days detention instead of overnight before a court appearance. The robbery took place on Monday. Furthermore the robbery car was driven by one person with one passenger. Four people were arrested Friday. The car was in the shop being repaired at the time of the alleged robbery. On Sudday, after a weekend of work by Attorney Alex Hoffmann, the "suspects" were released - they couldn't be identified as having even a remote connection with the alleged robbery. When arrested

the car door and beat him brutally. About ten Panthers and their associates gathered around to protest and were arrested. This rash of arrests coincided with the visit of Stokeley Carmichael to the Bay Area.

12. April 3, 1968-Police entered Father Neil's church in Oakland where the Panthers were holding a meeting. A black youth associated with the Panthers (but not authorized by them to possess a gun) was, according to police, drunk and waving a gun outside the church. Police surrounded the church and entered it, about twelve of them in threatening manner. They were accompanied, inexplicably, by a white priest and a black clergyman, both from Oakland. David Hilliard came out of the out of the sanctuary and refused to allow police to enter the sanctuary. Upon seeing Hilliard, police lowered their guns and cast their eyes about, looking for someone else. The Panthers are convinced they were looking for Bobby Seale.

13. April 5, 1968-San Diego police crashed down the door of Ken Denman, PFP leader and Panther organizer in San Diego. They had no warrant.

14. April 6, 1968-Several Panthers in cars in west Oakland on Saturday night, April 6, were approached by two policemen and menaced with guns. When the Panthers tried to defend themselves, shooting began, and the Panthers ran into a nearby house. After about 90 minutes of shooting by some 50 members of the Oakland P. D. who set fire to the house and filled it with tear gas, the Panthers were forced to surrender. With floodlights covering the house, Bobby Hutton walked out with his hands up. Someone gelled that he had a gun, and he was shot. He was not armed: no gun was found anywhere near his body. Eldridge Cleaver, wounded in the leg, and eyes badly burned by tear gas, came out. In total, nine persons were arrested, including Panther National Captain David Hilliard. Two policemen were wounded slightly.

15. April 9, 1968- Two Black Panther women were going about Oakland in a car putting up posters announcing the candidacy of Huey Newton for Congress and Bobby Seale for Assembly on the Peace and Freedom ticket. Twelve policemen with shotguns stopped their car and searched it - without probable cause. Throughout the day, patrol cars circled the Newton-Seale campagin headquarters. Sam Napier and other Panthers were physically stopped by police from putting up campaign posters. Police have been spotted by Oakland residents tearing down Newton-Seale posters.

16. April 13, 1968-Four members of the Black Panther Party were returning from Bobby Hutton's funeral when they were arrested on suspicion of robbery. Since it was Friday, they were to be kept over the weekend before they could be arraigned. This is a typical police procedure - it means three days detention instead of overnight before a court appearance. The robbery took place on Monday. Furthermore the robbery car was driven by one person with one passenger. Four people were arrested Friday. The car was in the shop being repaired at the time of the alleged robbery. On Sudday, after a weekend of work by Attorney Alex Hoffmann, the "suspects" were released - they couldn't be identified as having even a remote connection with the alleged robbery. When arrested

Document entitled, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work."

Document entitled, "We Demand Community Control of Police."

Document entitled, "Fred Hampton - Mark Clark Inquest."

The above documents were furnished by on January 11, 1970.

RECTIFY THE PARTY'S STYLE OF WORK

The Party School opens today and I wish it every success.

I would like to say something about the problem of our Party's tyle of work.

Why must there be a revolutionary party? There must be a revo-utionary party because the world contains enemies who oppress the eople and the people want to throw off enemy oppression. In the ra of capitalism and imperialism, just such a revolutionary party s the Communist Party is needed. Without such a party it is simply mpossible for the people to throw off enemy oppression. We are ommunists, we want to lead the people in overthrowing the enemy, and o we must keep our ranks in good order, we must march in step, our roops must be picked troops and our weapons good weapons. ithout these conditions the enemy cannot be overthrown.

What is the problem now facing our Party? The general line of the Party is correct and presents no problem, and the Party's work has been fruitful. The Party has several hundred thousand members who are leading the people in extremely hard and bitter struggles against the enemy. This is plain to everybody and beyond all doubt.

Then is there or is there not any problem still facing our Party? I say there is and, in a certain sense, the problem is quite serious.

What is the problem? It is the fact that there is something in the minds of a number of our comrades which strikes one as not quite right, not quite proper.

In other words, there is still something wrong with our style of study, with our style in the Party's internal and external relations and with our style of writing. By something wrong with the style of study we mean the malady of subjectivism. By something wrong with our style in Party relations we mean the malady of sectarianism. By something wrong with the style of writing we mean the malady of stereotyped Party writing. All these are wrong, they are ill winds, but they are not like the wintry north winds that sweep across the whole sky. Subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing are no longer the dominant styles, but merely gusts of contrary wind, ill winds from the air-raid tunnels. It is bad, however, that such winds should still be blowing in the Party. We must seal off the passages which produce them. Our whole Party should undertake the job of sealing off these passages, and so should the Party School. These three ill winds, subjectivism, sectarianism and stereo-typed Party writing, have their historical origins. Although no longer dominant in the whole Party, they still constantly create trouble and assail us. Therefore, it is necessary to resist them and to study, analyse, and elucidate them.

Fight subjectivism in order to rectify the style of study, fight sectarianism in order to rectify the style in Party relations, and fight Party stereotypes in order to rectify the style of writing--such is the task before us.

To accomplish the task of overthrowing the enemy, we must accomplish the task of rectifying these styles within the Party. The style of study and the style of writing are also the Party's style of work. Once our Party's style of work is put completely right, the people all over the country will learn from our example. Those outside the Party who have the same kind of bad style will, if they are good and honest people, learn from our

REFORM OUR STUDY

May 1941

I propose that we should reform the method and the system of study throughout the Party. The reasons are as follows:

I.

The twenty years of the Communist Party of China have been twenty years in which the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism has become more and more integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. If we recall how superficial and meager our understanding of Marxism-Leninism and of the Chinese revolution was during our Party's infancy, we can see how much deeper and richer it is now. For a hundred years, the finest sons and daughters of the disaster-ridden Chinese nation fought and sacrificed their lives, one stepping into the breach as another fell, in quest of the truth that would save the country and the people. This moves us to song and tears. But it was only after World War I and the October Revolution in Russia that we found Marxism-Leninism, the best of truths, the best of weapons for liberating our nation And the Communist Party of China has been the initiator, propagandist and organizer in the wielding of this weapon. As soon as it was linked with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism gave an entirely new complexion to the Chinese revolution. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, our Party, basing itself on the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, has taken a further step in its study of the concrete practice of this war and in its study of China and the world today, and has also made a beginning in the study of Chinese history. These are all very good signs.

II.

However, we still have shortcomings, and very big ones too. Unless we correct these shortcomings, we shall not, in my opinion, be able to take another step forwar in our work and in our great cause of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.

First, take the study of current conditions. We have achieved some success in our study of present domestic and international conditions, but for such a large political party as ours, the material we have collected is fragmentary and our research work unsystematic on each and every aspect of these subjects, whether it be the political, military, economic or cultural aspect. Generally speaking, in the last twenty years, we have not done systematic and thorough work in collecting and studying material on these aspects, and we are lacking in a climate of investigation and study of objective reality. To behave like "a blindfolded man catching sparrows" or a "blind man groping for fish," to be crude and careless, to indulge in verbiage, to rest content with a smattering of knowledge--such is the extremely bad style of work that still exists among many comrades in our Party, a style utterly opposed to the fundamental spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin have taught us that it is necessary to study conditions conscientiously and to proceed from objective reality and not from subjective wishes; but many of our comrades act in direct violation of this truth.

Second, take the study of history. Although a few Party members and sympathizers have undertaken this work, it has not been done in an organized way. Many Party members are still in a fog about Chinese history, whether of the last hundred years or of ancient times. There are many Marxist-Leninist scholars who cannot open their mouths without citing ancient Greece; but as for their own ancestors--sorry, they have been forgotten. There is no climate of serious study either of current conditions or of past history.

III.

In order to explain this idea further, I should like to contrast two opposite attitudes.

First, there is the subjectivist attitude. With this attitude, a person does not make a systematic and thorough study of the environment, but works by sheer subjective enthusiasm and has a blurred picture of the face of China today. With this attitude, he chops up history, knows only ancient Greece but not China and is in a fog about the China of yesterday and the day before yesterday. With this attitude a person studies Marxist-Leninist theory in the abstract and without any aim. He goes to Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin not to seek the stand, viewpoint and method with which to solve the theoretical and tactical problems of the Chinese revolution but to study theory purely for theory's sake. He does not shoot the arrow at the target but shoots at random. Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin have taught us that we should proceed from objective realities and that we should derive laws from them to serve as our guide to action. For this purpose we should, as Marx has said, appropriate the material in detail and subject it to scientific analysis and synthesis.[3] Many of our people do not act in this way but do the opposite. A good number of them are doing research work but have no interest in studying either the China of today or the China of yesterday and confine their interest to the study of empty "theories" divorced from reality. Many others are doing practical work, but they too pay no attention to the study of objective conditions, often rely on sheer enthusiasm and substitute their personal feelings for policy. Both kinds of people, relying on the subjective, ignore the existence of objective realities. When making speeches, they indulge in a long string of headings, A, B, C, D, 1, 2, 3, 4, and when writing articles, they turn out a lot of verbiage. They have no intention of seeking truth from facts, but only a desire to curry favour by claptrap. They are flashy without substance, brittle without solidity. They are always right, they are the Number One authority under Heaven, "imperial envoys" who rush everywhere. Such is the style of work of some comrades in our ranks. To govern one's own conduct by this style is to harm oneself, to teach it to others is to harm others, and to use it to direct the revolution is to harm the revolution. To sum up, this subjectivist method which is contrary to science and Marxism-Leninism is a formidable enemy of the Communist Party, the working class, the people and the nation; it is a manifestation of impurity in Party spirit. A formidable enemy stands before us, and we must overthrow him. Only when subjectivism is overthrown can the truth of Marxism-Leninism prevail, can Party spirit be strengthened, can the revolution be victorious. We must assert that the absence of a scientific attitude, that is, the absence of the Marxist-Leninist approach of uniting theory and practice, means that Party spirit is either absent or deficient.

There is a couplet which portrays this type of person. It runs:

> The reed growing on the wall--top-heavy, thin-stemmed and shallow of root;
> The bamboo shoot in the hills--sharp-tongued, thick-skinned and hollow inside.

Is this not an apt description of those who do not have a scientific attitude, who can only recite words and phrases from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and who enjoy a reputation unwarranted by any real learning? If anyone really wishes to cure himself of this malady, I advise him to commit this couplet to memory or to show still more courage and paste it on the wall of his room. Marxism-Leninism is a science, and science means honest, solid knowledge; there is no room for playing tricks. Let us, then, be honest.

Secondly, there is the Marxist-Leninist attitude. With this attitude, a person applies the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism to the systematic and thorough investigation and study of the environment. He does not work by enthusiasm alone, but, as Stalin says, combines revolutionary sweep with practicalness.[4] With this example and correct their mistakes, and thus the whole nation will be influenced. So [illegible]ng as our Communist ranks [illegible]re in good order and march in step, so long as our troops are picked troops and our weapons are good weapons, any enemy, however powerful, can be overthrown.

Let me speak now about subjectivism.

Subjectivism is an improper style of study; it is opposed to Marxism-Leninism and is incompatible with the Communist Party. What we want is the Marxist-Leninist style of study. What we call style of study means not just style of study in the schools but in the whold Party. It is a question of the method of thinking of comrades in our leading bodies, of all cadres and Party members, a question of our attitude towards Marxism-Leninism, of the attitude of all Party comrades in their work. As such, it is a question of extraordinary, indeed of primary, importance.

Certain muddled ideas find currency among many people. There are, for instance, muddled ideas about what is a theorist, what is an intellectual and what is meant by linking theory and practice.

Let us first ask, is the theoretical level of our Party high or low? Recently more Marxist Lenist works have been translated and more people have been reading them. That is a very good thing. But can we therefore a say that the theoretical level of our Party has been greatly raised? True, the level is now somewhat higher than before. But our theoretical front is very much out of harmony with the rich content of the Chinese revolutionary movement, and a comparison of the two shows that the theoretical side is lagging far behind. Generally speaking, our theory cannot as yet keep pace with our revolutionary practice, let alone lead the way as it should. We have not yet raised our rich and varied practice to the proper theoretical plane. We have not yet exmined all the problems of revolutionary practice--or even the important ones--and raised them to a theoretical plane. Just think, how many of us have created theories worthy of the name on China's economics, politics, military affairs or culture, theories which can be regarded as scientific and comprehensive, and not crude and sketchy? Especially in the field of economic theory: Chinese capitalism has had a century of development since the opium War, and yet not a single theoretical work had been produced which accords with the realities of China's economic problems, for instance, the theoretical level is already high? Can we say that our Party kxx already has economic theorists worthy of the name? Certainly not. We have read a great many Marxist-Lenist books, but can we claim, then, that we have theorists? We cannot. For Marxism-Leninism is the theory created by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on the basis of practice, their general conclusion drawn from historical and revolutionary reality. If we merely read their works but do not proceed to study the realities of China's history and revolution in the light of their theory or do not make any effort th think through China's revolutionary practice carefully in terms of theory, we should not be so presumptuous as to call ourselves Marxist theorists. Our achievements on the theoretical front will be very poor indeed if, as members of the Communist Party of China, we close our eyes to China's problems and can only memorize isolated conclusions or principles from Marxist writings. If all a person can do is to commit Marxist economics or philosophy to memory, reciting glibly from Chapter I to Chapter X, but is utterly unable to apply them, can he be considered a Marxist theorist? No! He cannot. What kind of theorists do w[illegible] want? We want theorists [illegible]o can, in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method, correctly interpret the practical problems arising in the course of history and revolution and give scientific explanations and theoretical elucidations of China's economic, political, military, cultural and other problems. Such are the theorists we want. To be a theorist of this kind, a person must have a true grasp of the essence of Marxism-Leninism, of the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method and of the theories of Lenin and Stalin on the colonial revolution and the Chinese revolution, and he must be able to apply them in a penetrating and scientific analysis of China's practical problems and discover the laws of development of these problems, Such are the theorists we really need.

The Central Committee of our Party has now made a decision calling upon our comrades to learn how to apply the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method in the serious study of Chinas history, and of China's economics, politics, military affairs and culture, and to analyse every problem concretely on the basis of detailed material and then draw theoretical conclusions. This is the responsibility we must shoulder.

Our comrades in the Party School should not regard Marxist theory as lifeless dogma. It is necessary to master Marxist theory and apply it, master it for the sole purpose of applying it. If you can apply the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint in elucidating one or two practical problems, you shoule be commended and credited with some achievement. The more problems you elucidate and the more comprehensively and profuondly you do so, the greater will be your achievement. Our Party School should also lay down yhr xxxx rule to grade students good or poor accoring to how they look at China's problems after they have studied Marxism-Leninism, according to whether or not they see the problems clearly and whether or not they see them at all.

Next let us talk about the question of the "intellectuals". Since China is a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country and her culture is not well developed, intellectuals are particularly treasured On this question of the intellectuals, the Central Committee of the Party made the decision over two years ago that we should win over the great numbers of intellectuals and, insofar as they are revolutionary and willing to take part in the resistance to Japan, welcome them one and all. It is entirely right for us to esteem intellectuals, for without revolutionary intellectuals the revolution cannot triumph. But we all know there are many intellectuals xxx xx who fancy themselves very learned and assume airs of erudition without realizing that such airs are bad and harmful and hinder their own progress. They ought to be aware of the trugh that actually many so-called intellectuals are, relatively speaking, most ignorant and the workers and peasants sometimes know more than they do. Here some will say, "Ha! You are turning things upside down and talking nonsense." But, xxxp comrades don't get excited; there is some sense in what I am saying.

What is Knowledge? Ever since class society came into being The world has known only two kinds of knowledge, knowledge of the struggle for production and knowledge of the class struggle, Natural science and social science are the crystalizations of these two kinds of knowledge, and philosophy is the generalization and summation of the knowledge of nature and the knowledge of society. Is there any other kind of knowledge? No. Now let us take a look at certain students, thode brought up in schools that abe completely cut off from the practical activities of society. What about them? A person goes through a primary school of this kind all the way through to a university of the same kind, graduates and is reckoned to have a stock of learning. But all he has is booklearning; he has not yet taken part in any practical activities or applied what he has learned to any field of life. Can such a person be regarded asa completely developed intellectual? Hardly so, in my opinion, because his knowledge is still incomplete. What then is relatively complete knowledge? All relatively complete knowledge is formed in two stages: The first stage is perceptual knowledge, the second is rational knowledge, the latter being the development of the former to a higher level. What sort of knowledge is thw student's booklearning? Even supposing all their knowledge is truth, it is still not kmowledge acquired through thier own personal experience, but consists of theories set down by thier predecessors in summarizing experience of the struggle for production and of the class struggle. It is entirely necessary that students should acquire this kind of knowledge, but it must be understood that as far as they are concerned such knowledge is in a sense s still one sided, something which has been verified by others but not yet by themselves. What is most important is to be good at applying this knowledge in life and in practice. Therefore, I advise those who have only booklearning but as yet no contact with reality, and also those with little practical experience, to realize their own short comings and become a little more modest.

How can those who havs only booklaerning be turned into intellectuals in the true sense? The only way is to get them to take part in practical work and become practical workers, to get those engaged in theoretical work to study important practical problems. In this way our ~~xxx~~ aim can be attained.

What I have said will probably make some people angry. They will say, "According to your explanation, even Marx would not be regarded as an intellectual." I say they are wrong. Marx took part in the practice of the revolutionary movement and also created revolutionary theory. Beginning with the commodity, the simplest element of capitalism, he made a thorough study of the economic strĭcture of capitalist society. Millions of people saw and handled commodities every day but were so used to them that they took no notice. Marx alone studied commodities scientifically. He carried out a tremendous work of research into their actual development and derived a nature, history and proletarian revolution and created dialectical materialism, hostorical materialism and the theory of proletarian revolution. Thus Marx became a most completely developed intellectual, representing the acme of human wisdom; he was fundamentally different from those who have only book-learning. Marx undertook detailed investigations and studies in the course of practical struggles, formed generalizations and then verified his conclusions by testing them in practical struggles--this is what we call theoretical work. Our Party needs a large number of comrades who will learn how to do such work. In our Party there are many comrades who can learn to do this kind of theoretical research; most of them are intelligent and promising and we should value them. But they must follow correct principles and not repeat the mistake of the past. They must discard dogmatism and not confine themselves to ready-made

3. As for education for cadres whether at work or in schools for cadres, a policy should be established of focusing such education on the study of the practical problems of the Chinese revolution and using the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism as the guide, and the method of studying Marxism-Leninism statically and in isolation should be discarded. Moreover, in studying Marxism-Leninism, we should use the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course as the principal material. It is the best synthesis and summing up of the world communist movement of the past hundred years, a model of the integration of theory and practice, and so far the only comprehensive model in the whole world. When we see how Lenin and Stalin integrated the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Soviet revolution and thereby developed Marxism, we shall know how we should work in China.

We have made many detours. But error is often the precursor of what is correct. I am confident that in the context of the Chinese revolution and the world revolution, which is so intensely alive and so richly varied, this reform of our study will certainly yield good results.

NOTES

1. Fuhsien County is about seventy kilometres south of Yenan.

2. The Border Region currency consisted of the currency notes issued by the Bank of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. The Kuomintang currency was the paper currency issued by the four big Kuomintang bureaucrat-capitalist banks from 1935 onwards with British and U.S. imperialist support. Comrade Mao Tse-tung was referring to the fluctuations in the rates of exchange between these two currencies.

3. See Karl Marx, "Afterword to the Second German Edition" (January 24, 1873) of Capital in which he wrote: "The latter (the method of inquiry) has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connection. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described." (Capital, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, Vol. I, p. 19.)

4. See J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism" (April-May 1924), Problems of Leninism, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1952, p. 80.

* * * * * * * * *

Comrade Mao Tse-tung made this report to a cadres' meeting in Yenan. The report and the two articles, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work" and "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing," are Comrade Mao Tse-tung's basic works on the rectification movement. In these he summed up, on the ideological plane, past differences in the Party over the Party line and analyzed the petty-bourgeois ideology and style which, masquerading as Marxism-Leninism, were prevalent in the Party, and which chiefly manifested themselves in subjectivist and sectarian tendencies, their form of expression being stereotyped Party writing. Comrade Mao Tse-tung called for a Party-wide movement of Marxist-Leninist education to rectify style of work in accordance with the ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism. His call very quickly led to a great debate between proletarian and petty-bourgeois ideology inside and outside the Party. This consolidated the position of proletarian ideology inside and outside the Party, enabled the broad ranks of cadres to take a great step forward ideologically and the Party to achieve unprecedented unity.

If people are not on guard, do not realize that such one-sidedness is a shortcoming and do not strive to overcome it, they are liable to go astray.

However, of the two kinds of subjectivism, dogmatism is still the greater danger in our Party. For dogmatists can easily assume a Marxist guide to bluff, capture and make servitors of cadres of working-class and peasant origin who cannot easily see through them; they can also bluff and ensnare the naive youth. If we overcome dogmatism, cadres with book-learning will readily join with those who have experience and will take to the study of practical things, and then many good cadres who integrate theory with experience, as well as some real theorists, will emerge. If we overcome dogmatism, the comrades with practical experience will have good teachers to help them raise their experience to the level of theory and so avoid empiricist errors.

Besides muddled ideas about the "theorist" and the "intellectual", there is a muddled idea among many comrades about "linking theory and practice", a phrase they have on their lips every day. They talk constantly about "linking", but actually they mean "separating", because they make no effort at linking. How is Marxist-Leninist theory to be linked with the practice of the Chinese revolution? To use a common expression, it is by "shooting the arrow at the target". As the arrow is to the target, so is Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese revolution. Some comrades, however, are "shooting without a target", shooting at random, and such people are liable to harm the revolution. Others merely stroke the arrow fondly, exclaiming, "What a fine arrow! What a fine arrow!," but never want to shoot it. These people are only connoisseurs of curios and have virtually nothing to do with the revolution. The arrow of Marxism-Leninism must be used to shoot at the target of the Chinese revolution. Unless this point is made clear, the theoretical level of our Party can never be raised and the Chinese revoltuion can never be victorious.

Our comrades must understand that we study Marxism-Leninism not for display, nor because there is any mystery about it, but solely because it is the science which leads the revolutionary cause of the proletariat to victory. Even now, there are not a few people who still regard odd quotations from Marxist-Leninist works as a ready-made panacea which, once acquired, can easily cure all maladies. These people show childish ignorance, and we should enlighten them. It is precisely such ignorant people who take Marxism-Leninism as a religious dogma. To them we should say bluntly, "Your dogma is worthless." Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin have repeatedly stated that our theory is not a dogma but a guide to action. But such people prefer to forget this statement which is of the greatest, indeed the utmost, importance. Chinese Communists can be regarded as linking theory with practice only when they become good at applying the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method and the teachings of Lenin and Stalin concerning the Chinese revolution and when, furthermore, through serious research into the realities of China's history and revolution they do creative theoretical work to meet China's needs in different spheres. Merely talking about linking theory and practice without actually doing anything about it is of no use, even if one goes on talking for a hundred years. To oppose the subjectivist, one-sided approach to problems, we must demolish dogmatist subjectiveness and one-sidedness.

So much for today about combating subjectivism in order to rectify the style of study throughout the party.

Let me now speak about the question of sectarianism.

Having been steeled for twenty years, our Party is no longer dominated by sectarianism. Remnants of sectarianism, however, are still found both in the Party's internal relations and in its external relations. Sectarian tendencies in internal relations lead to exclusiveness towards people outside the Party and hinder inner-Party unity and solidarity, while sectarian tendencies in external relations lead to exclusiveness towards people outside the Party and hinder the Party in its task of uniting the whole people. Only by uprooting this evil in both its aspects can the Party advance unimpeded in its great task of achieving unity among all Party comrades and among all the people of our country.

What are the remnants of inner-Party sectarianism? They are mainly as follows:

First, the assertion of "independence". Some comrades see only the interests of the part and not the whole; they always put undue stress on that part of the work for which they themselves are responsible and always wish to subordinate the interests of the whole to the interests of their own part. They do not understand the Party½s system of democratic centralism; they do not realize that the Communist Party not only needs democracy but needs centralization even more. They forget the system of democratic centralism in which the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, the part to the whole and the entire membership to the Central Committee. Chang Kuo-tao asserted his "independence" of the Central Committee of the Party and as a result "asserted" himself into betraying the Party and became a Kuomintang agent. Although the sectarianism we are now discussing is not of this extremely serious kind, it must still be guarded against and we must do away completely with all manifestations of disunity. We should encourage comrades to take the interests of the whole into account. Every Party member, every branch of work, every statement and every action must proceed from the interests of the whole Party; it is absolutely impermissible to violate this principle.

Those who assert this kind of "independence" are usually wedded to the doctrine of "me first" and are generally wrong on the question of the relationship between the individual and the Party. Although in words they profess respect for the Party, in practice they put themselves first and the Party second. What are these people after? They are after fame and position and want to be in the limelight. Whenever they are put in charge of a branch of work, they assert their "independence". With this aim, they draw some people in, push others out and resort to boasting, flattery and touting among the comrades, thus importing the vulgar style of the bourgeois political parties into the Communist Party. It is their dishonesty that causes them to come to grief. I believe we should do things honestly, for without an honest attitude it is absolutely impossible to accomplish anything in this world. Which are the honest people? Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin are honest, men of science are honest. Which are the dishonest people? Trotsky, Bukharin, Chen Tu-hsiu and Chang Kuo-tao are extremely dishonest; and those who assert "independence" out of personal or sectional interest are dishonest too. All sly people, all those [illegible]e a scientific attitude in their work, fancy them-

3. As for education for cadres whether at [illegible] in schools for cadres, a po- cy should be established of f[illegible]using such education on the study of the practical oblems of the Chinese revolut[illegible]n and using the basic principl[illegible] of Marxism-Lenin- as the guide, and the method of studying Marxism-Leninism statically and in iso- ion should be discarded. Moreover, in studying Marxism-Leninism, we should use History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course the principal material. It is the best synthesis and summing up of the world munist movement of the past hundred years, a model of the integration of theory practice, and so far the only comprehensive model in the whole world. When we how Lenin and Stalin integrated the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete actice of the Soviet revolution and thereby developed Marxism, we shall know how should work in China.

We have made many detours. But error is often the precursor of what is correct. am confident that in the context of the Chinese revolution and the world revolu- on, which is so intensely alive and so richly varied, this reform of our study ll certainly yield good results.

NOTES

1. Fuhsien County is about seventy kilometres south of Yenan.

2. The Border Region currency consisted of the currency notes issued by the nk of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. The Kuomintang currency s the paper currency issued by the four big Kuomintang bureaucrat-capitalist banks om 1935 onwards with British and U.S. imperialist support. Comrade Mao Tse-tung s referring to the fluctuations in the rates of exchange between these two cur- ncies.

3. See Karl Marx, "Afterword to the Second German Edition" (January 24, 1873) Capital in which he wrote: "The latter (the method of inquiry) has to appropriate material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out ir inner connection. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be equately described." (Capital, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, Vol. I, p. 19.)

4. See J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism" (April-May 1924), Problems Leninism, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1952, p. 80.

* * * * * * * *

Comrade Mao Tse-tung made this report to a cadres' meeting in Yenan. The re- rt and the two articles, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work" and "Oppose Stereo- ped Party Writing," are Comrade Mao Tse-tung's basic works on the rectification vement. In these he summed up, on the ideological plane, past differences in the rty over the Party line and analyzed the petty-bourgeois ideology and style which, squerading as Marxism-Leninism, were prevalent in the Party, and which chiefly nifested themselves in subjectivist and sectarian tendencies, their form of ex- ession being stereotyped Party writing. Comrade Mao Tse-tung called for a Party- de movement of Marxist-Leninist education to rectify style of work in accordance th the ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism. His call very quickly led to great debate between proletarian and petty-bourgeois ideology inside and outside Party. This consolidated the position of proletarian ideology inside and out- de the Party, enabled the broad ranks of cadres to take a great step forward ideo- gically and the Party to achieve unprecedented unity.

selves resourceful and clever, but in fact they are most stupid and will come to no good. Students in our Party School must pay attention to this problem. We must build a centralized, unified Party and make a clean sweep of all unprincipled factional struggles. We must combat individualism and sectarianism so as to enable our whole Party to march in step and fight for one common goal.

Cadres from the out[illegible]de and th se from the loc[illegible]ity must unite a combat sectarian tendencies. Very careful attention must be given t the relations between outside and local cadres because many anti-Japanese base areas were established only after the arrival of the Eighth Route Army or the New Fourth Army and much of the local work developed only after the arrival of outside cadres.,Our comrades must understand that in these conditions it is possible for our base areas to be consolidated and for our Party to take root there only when the two kinds of cadres unite as one and when a large nu number of local cadres develope and are promoted; otherwise it is impossible. Both the outside and local cadres have their strong and weak points, and to make progress they must overcome their own weak points by learning from each others strong points. The outside cadr are generally not up yo the local cadres in familiarity with loca conditions and links with the masses.. Take me for instance. Althou I have been in northern Shensi 5 or 6 years, I am far behind the l local comrades in understanding local conditions and in links with the people here. Our comrades going to the anti-Japanese base areas in Shansi, Hopei, Shantung and other provinces must pay attention to this. Moreover, even within the same base area,owing to the fact that some districts develop earlier and others later, there is a difference between the local cadres and ghose from outside it. Cadres who come from a more developed to a less developed district are also outside cadres in relation to that locality , and they,too should pay great attention to fostering and helping local cadres. Generally speaking, in places where outside cadres are in charge, it is they who should bear the main responsibility if their relations with the local cadres are not good. And the chief comrades in charge should bear greater responsiblilty. The ateention paid to th this problem in some places is still very inadequate. Some people look down on the local cadre and ridicule them, saying "What do the locals know? Clodhoppers!" Such people utterly fail to understand the importance of local cadres; they know neither the latters stron points nor their own weaknesses and adopt an incorrect, sectarian attitude. All outside cadres must cherish the local cadres and give them constant help and must not be permitted to ridicule or attack them. Of course, the local cadres on their part must learn from the strong points of the outside cadres and rid themselves of inappropriate, nafrow views so that they and the outside cadres become as one, with no distinction between "them' and 'us',and thus avoid sectarian tendencies.

The same applies to the relationship between cadres in army service and other cadres working in the locality. They must be complet completely united and must oppose sectarian tendencies. The army ccadres must help the local cadres, and vice-versa. If there is friction between them, each should make allowances for the other and carry out proper self-criticism. Generally speaking, in places where army cadre are actually in position of leadership, it is they who should bear the main responsibility if their relations with the local cadre are not good. Only when the army cadres understand their own resposibility and are modest in their attitude towards the local cadres can the conditions be created for smooth progress of our war effort and our work of construction in the base areas.

The same applies to the relationship among different army units, different localities and different departments.... We must oppose the tendency toward selfish departmentalism by which the interest of one's own unit are looked after to the exclusion of those of others. Whoever is indifferent to the [illegible] of others," refuses to transfer cadres to other uniys on request or releases only the inferior ones, "using the neighbor's field for [illegible] as an outlet for his overflow", and does not give the slightest consideration to other departments, localities and people---such a person is a selfish departmentalist who has entirely lost the spiri of communism. Lack of consideration for the whole and complete indifference to other departments, localitiesd people are the characteristics of aRish departmentalist. We must intensify our efforts to educate such people and to make them understand that selfish departmentaKism is a sectarian tendency which will become very dangerous, if allowed to develop.

Another problem is the relation between old and new cadres. Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, our Party has grown enourmously, and large numbers of new cadres have emerged; that is a very good thing. In his report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B.) Comrade Stalin said,"..... there are never enough old cadres, there are far less than [illegible] required, and they are partly going out of commission owing to the operation of the laws of nature." Here he was discussing the cadres situation and not only the laws of nature. If our Party does not have a great many new cadres working in unity And co-operation with the old cadres, our cause will come to a stop. All old cadres, therefore, should welcome the new ones with the utmost enthusiasm and show them the warmest solicitude. True, new cadres have their shortcomings..They have not been long in the revolution and lack experience; and unaxoidably some have brouhgt with them vestiges of the unwholesome ideology of the old society, remnants of the ideology of petty-bourgeoouis individualism. But such shortcomings can be gradually eliminated through education and tempering in the revolutionX. The strong points of the new cadres, as Stalin said, is that they are acutely sensitive to what is new and are therefore enthusiastic and active to a high degree--the very qualities that some of the old cadres lack,.Cadres, new and old, should respect each other.,learn from each other, and overcome their own shortcomings by learning from each others strong points, so as to unite as one in the common cause and guard against sectarian tendencies. Generally speaking, in places where the old cadres are mainly in charge, it is they who should bear the chief responsibility if relations with the new cadres are not good.

All the above—relations between the part and the whole, relations between the individual and the Party, relations between outside and local cadres, relations between army cadres and other cadres working in the locality, relations between this and that army unit, between this and that locality, between this and that department and relations between old and new cadres---are relations withi the Party. In all relations it is necessary to enhance the spirit of communism and guard against sectarian tendencies, so that the ranks of our Party will be in good order, march in step, and therefore fight well. This is a very important problem which we must solve tho oughly in rectifying the Party's style of work. Sectarianism is an expression of subjectivism in organizational relations; if we want to get rid of subjectivism and promote the Marxist-Leninist spirit of seeking truth from facts, we must sweep the remnants of sectarianism out of the Party and proceed from the principle that the Party's interests are above personal or sectional interests, so that the Party can attain a complete solidarity and unity.

RIGHT ON!

The remnants of sectarianism must be eliminated from the Party;s external as well as its internal relations. The reason is this: we cannot defeat the enemy by merely uniting the comrades throughout the Party, we can defeat the enemy only by uniting the people throughout the country. For twenty years the Communist Party of China has done great and arduous work in the cause of uniting the people of the whole country, and the achievements in this work since the outbreak of the War of Resistance are even greater than in the past. This does not mean, however, that all our comrades already have a correct style in dealing with the masses and are free from sectarian tendencies, No. In fact, sectarian tendencies still exist among a number of comrades, and in some cases to a very serious degree. Many of our comrades, tend to be overbearing in their relations with non-Party people, look down upon them, despise or refuse to respect them or appreciate their strong points This is indeed a sectarian tendency. After reading a few Marxist books, such comrades become more arrogant instead of more modest, and invariably dismiss others as no good without realizing that in fact their own knowledge is only half-baked. Our comrades must realize the truth that Communist Party members are at all times a minority as compared with non-Party people, Supposing one out of every hundred persons were a Communist, then there would be 4,500,000 Communists among China's population of 450,000,000. Yet even if our membership reached this huge figure, Communists would still form only one per cent of the whole population, while 99% would be non-Party people. What reason can we then have for not co-operating with non-Party people? As regards all those who wish to co-operate with us, we have only the duty of co-operating and absolutely no right to shut them out. But some Party members do not understand this and look down upon, or even shut out, those who wish to co-operate with us. There are no grounds whatsoever for doing so. Have Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin given us any grounds? They have not.On the contrary, they have always earnestly enjoined us to form close ties with the masses and not divorce ourselves from them. Or has the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China given us any grounds? No. Among all its resolutions there is not a single one that says we may divorce ourselves from the masses and so isolate ourselves, On the contrary, the Central Committee has always told us to form close ties with the masses and not to divorce ourselves from them. Thus any action divorcing us from the masses has no justification at all and is simply the mischievous result of the sectarian ideas some of our comrades have themselves concocted. As such sectarianism remains very serious among some of our comrades and still obstructs the application of the Party line, we should carry out extensive education within the Party to meet this problem. Above all, we should make our cadres really understand how serious the problem is and how utterly impossible it is to overthrow the enemy and attain the goal of the revoltuion unless Party members unite with the non-Party cadres and with non-Party people.

All sectarian ideas are subjectivist and are incompatible with the real needs of the revolution; hence the struggle against sectarianism and the struggle against subjectivism should go on simultaneously.

There is no time today to talk about the question of stereotyped Party writing; I shall discuss it at another meeting. Stereotyped Party writing is a vehicle for filth, a form of expression for subjectivism and sectarianism. It does people harm and damages the revolution, and we must get rid of it completely.

To combat subjectivism we must propagate materialism and dialectics. However, there are many comrades in our Party who lay no stress on the propaganda either of materialism or of dialectics Some tolerate subjectivist propaganda and regard it with equanimity. They think they believe in Marxism, but make no effort to propagate materialism and do not give it a thought or express any opinion when they hear or read subjectivist stuff. This is not the attitude of a Communist. It allows many of our comrades to be poisoned by subjectivist ideas, which numb their sensitivity. We should therefore launch a campaign of enlightenment withing the Party to free the minds of our comrades from the fog of subjectivism and dogmatism and should call upon them to boycott subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing. Such evils are like Japanese goods, for only our enemy wishes us to preserve them and continue to befuddle ourselves with them; so we should advocate a boycott against them, just as we boycott Japanese goods. We should boycott all the wares of subjectivism, sectarianism, and stereotyped Party writing, make their sale difficult, and not allow their purveyors to ply their trade by exploiting the low theoretical level in the Party. Our comrades must develop a good nose for this purpose; they should take a sniff at everthing and distinguish the good from the bad before they decide whether to welcome it or boycott it. Communists must always go into the whys and wherefores of anything, use their own heads and carefully think over whether or not it corresponds to reality and is really well founded; on no account should they follow blindly and encourage slavishness.

Finally, in opposing subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing we must have in mind two purposes: first, "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones", and second, "cure the sickness to save the patient". The mistakes of the past must be exposed without sparing anyone's sensitilities; it is necessary to analyse and criticize what was bad in the past with a scientific attitude so that work in the future will be done more carefully and done better. This is what is meant by "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones". But our aim in exposing errors and critizing shortcomings, like that of a doctor curing a sickness, is solely to save the patient and not to doctor him to death. A person with appendicitis is saved when the surgeon removes his appendix. So long as a person who has made mistakes does not hide his sickness for fear of treatment or persist in his mistakes until he is beyond cure, so long as he honestly and sincerely wishes to be cured and to mend his ways, we should welcome him and cure his sickness so that he can become a good comrade. We can never succeed if we just let ourselves go, one must never be rough and rash but must adopt the approach of "curing the sickness to save the patient" which is the only correct and effective method.

I have taken this occasion of the opening of the Party School to speak at length, and I hope comrades will think over what I have said.

WE DEMAND COMMUNITY CONTROL OF POLICE

We who live in Chicago, State of Illinois, must face an increasingly evident truth: we have no control over the institutions which govern our lives. For our survival and the survival of our freedoms, we must now demand control of these forces, particularly that one which we confront daily in our communities and which often makes the final decision regarding our lives. . . or deaths: the POLICE DEPARTMENT.

These racist police have been used as forces working against the people and in cahoots with the corrupt political figures. These lying politicians and murdering, brutalizing police, joined by the greedy businessmen like Hunt and DuPont, are in control of our destinies. It is become an "AMERICAN TRADITION" for police to prevent the American people from protesting these intolerable conditions. This "AMERICAN TRADITION" is reaching astronomical heights and becoming an "AMERICAN NIGHTMARE" because the 'three-in one' described above needs to suppress the ever-growing activity of oppressed people to be free once their eyes are opened to the truth about why a Black youth is shot in the back for throwing rocks at the railroad tracks; why Black and oppressed people work for $2.00 an hour, 10 hours a day and still not make enough to provide for his family with enough left over for the leisures we have been brainwashed into thinking are necessities(color t.v.s and cadillacs) by the system's master Brainwasher, the BOOB TUBE.

What can we do about it? We act as if we've ecome immune to the sight of police using violence to break up peaceful demonstaations, using violence to break the heads and spirits of our people. We can't allow these horror--ridden conditions to continue to exist. The police are already moving for autonomous power in this country. That means they won't have to answer to anybody not even the lying politician and the greedy businessman (let alone oppredsed people) for their actions. They will be free to come in our communities on their daily search-and-destroy missions unchecked to wipe us out indiscriminately, confident that their actions not only won't be condemned by their superiors but will in fact be commended and praised by them! An exaggeration? Not by any means, a fact made painfully clear when we look at the pre-dawn assassination of Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark: the vicious murder of Michael and John Soto, Charkes Jackson and countless others.

For the people to have control over these police and their functions the political asylem given the police by the political forces such as Daley and Hanrahan (remember shoot-to-kill and the war on gangs) must be destroyed and the police made sensitive to the needs of each community.

The COMMUNITY CONTROL OF POLICE PETITION to be circulated soon is designed to establish that kind of control through a complete reorganization of the Police Department. All police officials will be elected by the peopl all policemen will be required to live in the areas they work in.

Other demands for the Community Control of Police are:

1. We demand all police out of our schools brutalizing and intimidating our children.

2. We demand all police out of the factories during strikes when workers are demanding a betterment of situation and working conditions.

3. We demand all CHA and housing authority police out of our projects unless desired by the people, in which case they will be controlled by the people and fit all requirements of regular police.

4. A repeal to Mayor Daley's shoot-to-kill order.

5. An end to excessively high bails designed to keep Black and oppressed people in jails.

6. An end to the present total police structure. A People"s Police to be instituted in its place. The city will be sectioned and each major area have a separate police department, autonomous and completely controlled by the people.

7. All laws regulating police services in the past to be rendered ineffective, and the new laws made by the Board of Police Commissioners to be elected by the people.

8. We demand that the people have the power to hire and fire police officials and other policemen when they show their actions are not in the interests of the people.

We see these demands as reasonable, and long overdue. We see it as the duty of all people, politicians, etc., who profess to be concerned about the needs of the people to recognize it as their inescapable duty to fight for and suppor Community Control of Police.

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT: NATIONAL COMMITEES TO COMBAT FASCISM

c/o BLACK PANTHER PARTY

2350 W. Madison

243-8276

This genocide against Black people in particular and oppressed people in general must come to a halt. SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE THE TIME SEIZES YOU!

BPP
2350 W. MADISON
243—8246

BULLETIN

TUESDAY 1/6/70

FRED HAMPTOM-MARK CLARK INQUEST

THE FRED HAMPTON, MARK CLARK INQUEST BEGAN TODAY WITH OBVIOUS ATTEMPTS BY THE DALEY-CONLISK-HANRAHAN PIG STRUCTURE TO PUT A SMOKESCREEN OVER THE WHOLE ISSUE.

THE WHITE-WASHING, AN ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY THE ACTIONS OF DALEY AND HIS IRISH SIDE-KICK HANRAHAN, BEGAN WITH THE PRESENCE OF AN ILLEGAL AND, UNCONSTITUTIONAL JURY. THE JURY WAS COMPOSED OF MIDDLE-CLASS SENIOR CITIZENS WHO HAVE NO IDEA OF THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF POOR, OPPRESSED, BLACK PEOPLE. THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES US THE RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY A PEER GROUP (PEOPLE FROM OUR SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES). BUT THE JURY, HAND-PICKED BY, DALEY'S LACKIE, CORONER ANDREW TOMAN IS TRULY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

IN ADDITION TO THE WHITE-WASH JURY, DALEY/HANRAHAN HAVE SELECTED ASST. STATES ATTY. THOMAS HETT (A MAN WHO LAST YEAR THREATENED TO QUIT BECAUSE OF HANRAHAN'S LIES CONCERNING THE MURDER OF MICHAEL AND JOHN SOTO, TO COVER UP THE CRIMES AND TAKE THE HEAT OFF THE REAL MURDERERS, MAYOR (SHOOT TO KILL) DALEY AND EDWARD (WAR ON YOUNG PEOPLE) HANRAHAN: MONDAY, THE PARTY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT DEPUTY CHAIRMAN FRED WAS DRUGGED BEFORE HE WAS MURDERED. THE TEST WAS MADE BY A PATHOLOGIST HIRED BY THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN'S FAMILY WHO CLAIMED THAT "I FOUND BETWEEN 4.1 AND 4.5 PER CENT OF SECONAL PRESENT." THIS IS ENOUGH TO PREVENT ANY MAN FROM MOVING OR RAISING HIMSELF FROM A SLEEP TO ENGAGE IN A SHOOT-UP.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, FRED HAMPTON
MURDERED -- DECEMBER '69

MARK CLARK

THE NEWS CONFERENCE THAT WAS HELD TO DISCLOSE THIS INFORMATION WAS BLACKED OUT TO KEEP THE PUBLIC FROM GETTING THIS INFORMATION. WE CLAIM THAT AN INFILTRATOR SLIPPED THE DRUG TO FRED, BECAUSE THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN (LIKE ALL PANTHERS) DIDN'T USE DRUGS. THIS ALSO SHOWS THAT THE DEMOCRATS OF CHICAGO ARE IN CAHOOTS WITH THE REPUBLICANS OF THE WHITE HOUSE SINCE J. EDGAR HOOVER ADMITTED THAT HE PAYS (EITHER MONEY OR UNDER THREAT OF INCARCERATION) AGENTS TO INFILTRATE THE PEOPLE'S PARTY.

WE ARE ASKING THE PEOPLE TO COME TO THE INQUEST AND SEE FOR THEMSELVES THAT THE FASCIST-RACIST POWER STRUCTURE DOESN'T RESPECT US OR INTEND TO GIVE US DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

BE AT THE INQUEST EACH DAY.

THE INQUEST BEGINS 10:00 am EACH MORNING. IT IS LOCATED AT 2600 S. CALIFORNIA.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!!!!

V. EVIDENCE OF NATIONAL UNITY

advised on December 8, 1969, an unknown female representing the BPP in Cleveland, Ohio, contacted JOAN GRAY of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, advising that representatives of the Cleveland Chapter had collected $300 for the bail fund in Chicago. This person was instructed to send the money to the BPP, 2350 West Madison Street (BPP headquarters).

advised on December 12, 1969, a DEBBIE RAYNER from Cleveland, Ohio, informed PHYLLIS MONTGOMERY of the Illinois BPP that she (RAYNER) was helping to collect money for bond on behalf of the BPP prisoners. $40 had been sent during the past three days. RAYNER also indicated $127.58 more was being sent on December 15, 1969.

BEVERLINA POWELL of the Illinois BPP, according to who advised on December 17, 1969, contacted the National Headquarters of the BPP to advise them the "pigs" had sealed the apartment of Chairman FRED HAMPTON that morning.

also advised the same date that MORRIS BROWN of the Illinois BPP contacted the National Distribution Headquarters of the BPP to advise that $1,700 had been sent for payment on newspapers, $250 for records, and $50 for buttons. BROWN also requested some posters (not further identified) and 27,000 copies of the BPP newspaper.

advised on January 13, 1970, that SHARON (Last Name Unknown) from the National BPP Headquarters, instructed the Chicago BPP Office they (Chicago BPP) should send all available photographs of BPP members who have been "assassinated" immediately to the National Office.

VI. EVIDENCE OF BPP ATTEMPTS TO AFFILIATE OR FORM COALITIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS

advised on December 10, 1969, a bazaar had been sponsered by the CP of Illinois on December 6, 1969, at which party leaders were present.

stated EUGENE CHARLES, Chicago BPP member, addressed the group, describing the conditions which were found after the murder of HAMPTON and CLARK. CHARLES stated that the police had surrounded the house for blocks, that telephone and lights in the stores were shut off, and that the shooting was a planned murder. CHARLES stated that HAMPTON had informed the Chicago Panthers that should he be killed, not to cry over his death but to prepare to defend themselves. CHARLES stated Panthers have made up their minds to die fighting. At the conclusion of this speech, CHARLES was presented a check for $150 to help defray some of the expenses the Panthers would be meeting as a result of the deaths.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

71*

96

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Chicago, Illinois
January 21, 1970

DAVID HILLIARD

Hilliard has been publicly identified as the National Black Panther Party Chief of Staff.

See appendix for the characterization of the Black Panther Party.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/15/70

Mr. ED SCOTCH, General Manager, WCIU-TV, Channel 26, Room 1207, 141 West Jackson, Chicago, made available a tape recording of the MARTY FAYE panel discussion show on Saturday night, December 20, 1969, featuring BOBBY RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois Chapter of Black Panther Party, and DAVID HILLIARD, Chief of Staff, National Black Panther Party, as well as Mr. CHARLES GARRY, an attorney for the Black Panther Party.

The attached is a transcription of this recording.

On 1/5/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA DONALD E. HALTER/kmb Date dictated 1/9/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Marty Faye Show, 12/20/69

MARTY FAYE: Good evening. As usual the two hours, the Volare Taylor (phonetic) Trio standing by. As our guests tonight we did a previous taping with the inimitable Mr. ALFRED HITCHCOCK which we'll hope we'll have time to show you in a little while, and (garbled) tonight we have Miss CARLA THOMAS (phonetic) great soul singer. She's appearing over at Mister Kelly's. And we have Mr. DAVE HILLIARD who is the National Chairman of the Black Panther Party, Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, okay. Chief of Staff. I just found out you were coming. Chief of Staff. Okay. Black Panther Party. We have Mr. CHARLES GARRY who is the attorney for the Panther Party. As you recall Mr. GARRY was also the attorney for BOBBY SEALE but unfortunately because of an operation he couldn't make it into Chicago for Judge HOFFMAN, and you know the rest of that story, but he's here tonight. We have Mr. BOBBY RUSH who is the Illinois Chairman of the Black Panther Party. Deputy Minister of Defense. Okay. I got one out of three. It's not bad. Miss ARLENE HUGHES (phonetic), Chicago celebrated psychic. We have Mr. GEORGE PENECOSTIN (phonetic) and DONALD CLEMEN (phonetic) tonight who are the stars of the play in town called "The Boys in the Band." Mr. MORRIS RENNEK (phonetic), author of the new book called "Siam Miami" (phonetic) and SONNY BROWN (phonetic) who represents the Atlas Galleries and we'll show you too in a little while some magnificant paintings that you'll be able to buy in various stores that are just out of this world and so reasonable. That's the way the show's set for tonight. As I said we'll be here for two hours and we hope that you'll enjoy, we'll try to make it as enjoyable as possible for you.

Now then, I was just informed tonight that we were very fortunate in getting you to come up and talk with us tonight. All over the news, of course, we have the commission come in from Congress and how they ran up a brick wall. But tell me this right now, according to the man from the Illinois Civil Liberties Union, he said that in his conversations with JERRIS LEONARD, which was summarily denied, he said that it was Mr. JERRIS LEONARD's conversation with him where Mr. LEONARD, I guess, said that they were going to get the Black Panthers, hoodlums, gangsters, or whatever he called them. Of course everything is out of context. You tell me, would you please Mr. HILLIARD, you're the Chief of Staff of the Black Panther Party. Do you believe that the Justice Department, the United States Government, its official arm, its law arm, is out to get the Black Panther Party violently?

DAVE HILLIARD: How do you say this? We have a documentation of harassments and murders of our Party members that date back to 1968, and the harassments precedes the year of 1968. So that with this physical evidence and with the murders beginning with little BOBBY HADDEN (phonetic) and some 26 members of our Party that have been viciously murdered in our communities. I think that this serves as a (garbled) indictment that the United States Government with all other branches and agencies out to destroy the Black Panther Party with violence.

FAYE: I want to ask you this please. The Black Panther Party, are your aims finally, your final aims to overthrow the United States Government in its present form?

HILLIARD: Our final aim is to realize the system that would guarantee employment, education, fair housing, and to give the people the power to control the so-called representatives of government and (garbled) system that we're presently living under now. That's our final aim. Of course to recognize socialism as being the one system by which people can control the means of production in our communities and socialism as a weapon to allow the people to give full (garbled) their energies in all areas. But the ultimacy of our program is all power to the people--a democratic centralized government as outlined in the (garbled) Constitution.

FAYE: Are you comparing your particular credo against another country or one that's brand new, one that does not look like any other country's form of socialism?

HILLIARD: First you have to understand that the ideology and the program of the Black Panther Party is a program that was put together from the historical experiences of black people in this country. But our situation in this country is a very particular situation because first of all we're subject to the most inhumane hostilities up to this point in history. I think that the Indians are the only other nationality of people that had been meted (phonetic) out such atrocities so that it becomes very important for people to recognize the Black Panther Party's program and their legitimate demands for justice as being the ultimacy of our program.

FAYE: Do you believe that the human race as a whole is capable of warmth, understanding, kindness, compassion, freedom, honesty to all people, black, white, yellow, red, no matter what color of their skin, do you believe that the human race is capable of such a society?

HILLIARD: I think that with proper information that the human race can be all those things that you mentioned but the very fact that the media, the television as one example, serves as a tool to distort and to politically deform individuals so the people cannot get the right information that's necessary for them to be the epitome of humanity as you so describe.

FAYE: I'm smiling at that because here you are, you're right in the same camp with AGNEW and because AGNEW says the same thing, that the media distorts and discolors and, you want all media, how you gonna stake (phonetic) the media out, according to whose truths?

HILLIARD: All that we say is that the service, the ideological service, people like yourself, the journalists, that these people should record facts as they are and not to distort them. All that we're saying is that the television cameramen, the journalists, that their critiques, that their political essays, that their (garbled) essays for the Nobel Peace Prize should project the very realistic situation without distortion. Now I do not see how you can possibly put us in the same camp with AGNEW. AGNEW is a fascist, a man that's responsible for the occupation of a .....

(garbled voices here)

FAYE: I put you in the same.....I disagreed with what you're saying and if I disagree I'm going to break in.

HILLIARD: I think that the people have a right and I think that I have a right to say what I mean without you breaking in. This is another weapon that you use.

FAYE: Oh come now!

HILLIARD: You don't give people a chance to explain .....

FAYE: You don't give people a chance. You haven't been here.

HILLIARD: (garbled) make sense with you now (phonetic).

FAYE: Well, the only reason that you're here, the only reason that you're here is because we allow these channels (phonetic) at all times to be open to people with something to say. And I think that without media the HADDEN (phonetic) killing would never have been played up as it was. Never. It would have been just shoved under the carpet and nobody would have known about it if not for the newspapers, if not for radio or television.

HILLIARD: Let's say this. Let's say that what the media has projected in regards to FRED HAMPTON, the Deputy Minister of our Party here in Chicago has not been (garbled) indictment against the police officers here in Chicago that has only told the people a part of what happened in that house but still in all it gives justifies, justifies the murder that took place in that house so that you cannot tell me that this media has been in the service of the people. This media is another tool for the system. It's not in the service of the people.

FAYE: No. I disagree with you completely. I'll turn now to Mr. GARRY. As an attorney, Mr. GARRY, I'd like your opinion please, if you believe if the media, if not for the media or, do you think because of the media things have been changed around because of this?

CHARLES GARRY: Well I have tremendous faith and confidence in a free press and a free press is exactly what it means. The difficulties that we've had in the dissemination of information from the Black Panther Party is being able to tell the truth. It's true that since MARK CLARK and FRED HAMPTON were murdered and the Los Angeles police overstayed their police authority that the press media has been giving dissemination to the things that the community has been aware of for a long long time. The Black Panther Party has had a program for almost three years. They have projected humanness, qualities, genuineness and the only time that the media has ever been interested is if some particular member of the Black Panther Party did something that shocked the white racist community. Then the media would be interested. But when the Black Panther Party would call a press conference and talk about breakfast for children, talk about the health program, they would talk about projection of a better life in this world including the United States, the media was silent. The reporters were there but their bosses never printed the story, the television cameras never grinded out the project that the Black Panthers were projecting. It's true that today after the death of a valiant fighter and a valiant leader like FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK and others, they're interested and they should be interested. The working press is interested. You are interested. But somehow or other we get sidetracked. I read today in the "United States News and World Report" an account of the Black Panther Party. That was not a bilateral article. It's one-sided. It's lopsided. I'm sure J. EDGAR HOOVER could have written the same article and said amen "United States News and World Report." But these are the things we're talking about. We don't want to control press. DAVID HILLIARD and the

Black Panther Party is not advocating a controlled press. But they are advocating a free press. We don't care what you say about the Black Panther Party providing you allow the Black Panther Party to state its position. You can make all the editorial comments you want to. They don't care because they understand the free expression of ideas. This is the area we are talking about when we talk about the free press is not really a free press. Many of the press have had to take stories away in the last three years because at the advertisers didn't particularly appreciate the editorial point of view or the news point of view. This is the area we're talking about. And we're not in the same bag as the Vice President of the United States.

FAYE: Well I meant to say in the same bag he was very critical of the media too, saying that they were lopsided as well. And on the other hand you say they are lopsided too. And so we have both ends of the spectrum saying that the press, the media, is lopsided (garbled) where the middle road is.

GARRY: No. We're saying it differently.

FAYE: That I appreciate of course.

GARRY: We're saying that we are not permitted to get our story out unless there's something that's shocking such as someone being killed or someone making a nasty remark about somebody. We are saying that all we want is to be able to tell our side of the story. AGNEW says that you should not criticize the President of the United States as though he has some particular halo hanging over his head. We're not saying that. We don't care how much you criticize the Black Panther Party providing you give us an equal opportunity to respond and be able to tell our side of the story, to be able to say that racism is here, that the Black Panther Party is subjected to genocide by the armed forces of the United States. When

I say the armed forces I'm talking about the Department of Justice and the state police authorities.

FAYE: All right, Mr. GARRY, because you weren't here I guess to defend BOBBY SEALE and that's a whole rigamarole here with the conspiracy 8 which is now the conspiracy 7 and so on, that BOBBY SEALE is now in jail serving a contempt of court sentence. How are you going to fight that action?

GARRY: We intend to appeal that of course. We think that the conduct of the court, when the facts are known, are going to be shown it was barbaric, atrocious and not in the highest standards of American judicial process. When a judiciary forgets its role and becomes a partisan, then we don't have justice as we understand it in America. While we're talking about justice, I have some great criticisms to make of American justice. I don't want to compare it with any other country because I've never been in any other country.....

FAYE: Fair enough.

GARRY: .....as far as justice is concerned. But I say that justice today in America, in relationship to at least 50 million people, that includes the blacks, the ghetto blacks, the ghetto browns, the ghetto reds, the ghetto yellows, and the ghetto whites do not get justice in our American courts. I was indeed surprised that the Attorney General of Canada, addressing a group of judges in their conference in San Francisco, said practically the same thing that I'm saying today. We have not upgraded our law where it represents the contemporary needs of the people today.

FAYE: Breaking it down you're saying that if a man is poor and he goes before a judge for any charge, chances are he'll go to jail.

GARRY: Yes. Not only will he go to jail, he will create records on small matters so that later on because of these small matters that have been accumulated, doesn't make any difference whether he's guilty or innocent. Many of these men and women who plead guilty are in fact innocent. We have what we call a bargain day. A man is charged with a crime. Say he's charged with petty theft. He's completely innocent of it. He goes to a lawyer. The lawyer says I will defend you but it will take three days of a jury trial. I wouldn't trust a judge says the judge because he has got fixed opinion. I would suggest you get a jury trial. The jury trial will take three days. The attorney will say I will have to charge you at least $300 a day. That's $900. He, the client, has already put up $150 to $200 in bail premiums. The three days in court will cost him his job. He says man I can't do that. He says okay, he said, I'll tell you what I can do. I know the District Attorney pretty well. He's a pretty good guy. I can fix it so you'll pay a $75 fine and will be on probation for six months and that'll end it. The guy said fine. Expediency, compromise. Is the man guilty? Has the man had an opportunity for a fair trial? Has he been properly represented? In the HUEY NEWTON case, Minister of Defense of the Black Panther Party, it took 13 weeks to try that case. A battery of lawyers with me as trial counsel worked day and night for almost a year and a half in preparing that case. Tremendous amount of investigation was done. If the client was able to pay for it, it would have cost a little over a million dollars in legal time. Little over a million dollars. And the verdict was a compromise verdict. He was convicted of manslaughter for killing a police officer. If it costs a million dollars for a HUEY NEWTON to get a fair trial, which is not a good result because the man was completely innocent, it was a compromise verdict, if it costs a million dollars for a black militant to get a fair trial, then I say our judicial system today is irrelevant to the needs of the people and it's about time we change it. It's about time we realize it and call a spade a spade when in fact it is a spade.

MARTY FAYE Now I would like to ask you BOBBY, were you with the group of Congressmen that were in town? And, when they had the hearing, of course, the Assistant United States Attorney said that he couldn't talk, and they were after him pretty good, especially when he was confronted by Congressman POWELL about the fact that a statement was made to the "Chicago Tribune", why couldn't it be made to your group. But he made a very interesting point. The Assistant Attorney said this particular group was not empowered by Congress to really be effective or to be legal. And, if this is so, then I'd like to know how, you know how, these Congressmen got together to come in for the hearing in the first place. Do you know?

BOBBY RUSH Well, I think that it would be, that what was happening as far as the black people are concerned, it goes that the feeling ah, ah, the black people had expressed and they knew it

The black people, they are the elected officials of their constituancy. And the constituancy, which is primarily black, and they had moved to come and to find, to investigate matters, to find out what was really going on, I think. (Garbled)

MARTY FAYE Do you think, ah, you know the whole thing right now is almost like, if it weren't so tragic, you see, it would be ludicrously funny, if it weren't so tragic. It's almost like Keystone Cops, you know, there's a 4:30 a.m.

MARTY FAYE

There's killings, the apartment is left open, and now the coroner wants to close it, and now they reopen it. And so many different groups are getting together trying to investigate the thing. Mr. GARRY, do you know if anyone at all is legally empowered to test this out?

CHARLES GARRY

Ah, let me answer the question in this way. We demanded a Congressional body to investigate what happened in Chicago and in Los Angeles, and what's happening to the Black Panther Party throughout the United States. We cherish... there's a concerted effort, a conspiracy, to commit genocide on the Black Panther Party and we said we demanded the hearing by Congress, but we said that we wanted Congressmen and Congresswomen who were not part of the House Committee on Un-American Activities or the House Committee on Internal Security or some other form of garbage that's been handout out over a period of years. We said we wanted men of good-will, women of good-will in Congress to do this. The black Congressmen came to our call. We also stated we intended to file a petition in the United Nations charging the United States as a nation within a nation of committing concerted genocide on the Black Panther Party and particularly in recent months, and we intend to file that petition. We told the committee today, this afternoon, that we intended to cooperate with them in any way they wanted to. We've also indicated that we intend to cooperate with the committee that was formed recently, the Commission, they call themselves, where former Justice GOLDBERG is at the head of it. With all of these committees, we intend to cooperate one hundred percent, but we also intend to have a caveat. We intend to have a caveat to this extent so that there will not be a whitewash of what we know to be the facts. And no one is going to change those facts.

MARTY FAYE

DAVE, do you think the Black Panthers would have had any trouble at all if they hadn't said, ah, change the system of government?

DAVE HILLIARD

I don't think that we would have had to suffer, ah, the atrocities that have been needed out to our party thus far, I think that just like most of the black organizations that have now become puppets, or other areas within the system, we too, would have been endarked and possibly given some grants, by the Federal government. But the very fact that we are opposed to the system of capitalism, because of this exploit of our nature, I think that this is the main reason for all the repression against our party, and our ability to organize across the racial line.

MARTY FAYE

Yes, but you see, the government doesn't go through a considered effort to wipe out the Socialist Party in the United States.

DAVE HILLIARD

That is because the Socialist Party in the new United States is endorsed by the government of the United States. To make a very distinct difference between people that advocate socialism through theory and people that practice it by the very example - our breakfast program, the free health clinic, our very program, so that our demands are historical demands that have been felt out and that have been yearned for by a people in this country since their embarkation. That's why I say that ideological experience of blacks in this country. Nothing more than that.

MARTY FAYE

Mr. GARRY, what are you doing in Chicago?

CHARLES GARRY

I'm down here with Mr. HILLIARD to meet with the members of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party this evening, which we've already met. Tomorrow morning we intend to have a conference of warriors throughout the United States, discussing this repression against the Black Panther Party and also against white and brown people, and tomorrow night DAVE and I MXXXXMXXM are going to be speaking at a mass meeting in Cleveland, Ohio.

MARTY FAYE

Can I ask you sir, how your fees are paid?

CHARLES GARRY

Our fees are paid by gratitude, being able to make a contribution to a better world. Until I got involved with the Black Panther Party I was bringing in between $150 - 200,000 a year in fees to the firm I'm with. Since October 27, 1968, I've brought in $34,000 and our costs alone in the HUEY NEWTON case were over $70,000. I'm not talking about expenses and the cost of defending and representing members of the Black Panther Party, ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, BOBBY SEALE and all others. The firm I'm with is financially being horribly drained. But, we are getting the gratitude, the gratitude of being able to do something within yourselves, to make a contribution, for the responsibilities that the white society has had for 400 years and has failed. And it is our responsibility, and I hope my fellow white citizens of America, will join us and make some contributions, financially. The Black Panther Party needs money. Our firm needs some money to be able to carry on. Other lawyers are in this fight. WILLIAM KUNTSLER, LEONARD WEINGLASS, are in that courtroom before Judge HOFFMAN day in and day out, and I'm satisfied that that Judge, no matter what the verdict is, intends to send BILL KUNTSLER and LEONARD WEINGLASS to jail for contempt of court.

DAVID HILLIARD

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois.

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois.

Office of Special Investigations, Chicago, Illinois.

United States Naval Investigative Service Office, Chicago, Illinois.

Region 1, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which furthe describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

41

DIRECTOR, FBI 1/28/70

SAC, SPRINGFIELD

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
PEORIA, ILLINOIS
RM - BPP

One copy of this LHM has also been furnished to USA, Springfield, Illinois; Secret Service, Springfield, Illinois; NISO, Chicago, Illinois; OSI, Chanute Air Force Base, Rantoul, Illinois; and 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

JD/1

98

SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS
JANUARY 23, 1970

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
PEORIA, ILLINOIS

On December 14, 1969, [redacted] advised that the Peoria, Illinois branch of the Black Panther Party (BPP) has been holding meetings for the past several months at 415 Monson Street, Peoria, Illinois.

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is included in the Appendix of this memorandum.

[redacted] advised that as of December 1, 1969, the following were members of the Peoria, Illinois BPP:

Mark Clark, leader
Leon Harps, second in command
Anthony Harris
Edward McChriston
Bonnie (Last Name Unknown)

[redacted] advised that several other local Negroes attended several of the meetings but would not consider them to be members of the BPP. [redacted] stated that all of the above mentioned Panthers possess weapons, kind or make unknown to him, as he is not familiar with weapons. [redacted] advised that he has never seen nor heard them speak of having any stockpile of weapons in the Peoria, Illinois area. [redacted] advised that all of the above Panthers were unemployed and evidently obtained money by stealing, or selling newspapers (the Black Panthers). He advised he does not know of any crimes that they might have committed.

[redacted] stated that the BPP, Peoria, Illinois, was not very functional and was in need of funds and members. [redacted] advised that to the best of his knowledge, the BPP was not receiving any financial support from anyone or any other organization.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
PEORIA, ILLINOIS

In relation to the killings of Mark Clark and Fred Hampton, in Chicago, Illinois, on December 4, 1969, further advised that Clark and Harris departed Peoria, Illinois, together on or about December 1, 1969. advised that Clark borrowed a car, a 1965 Ford Mustang, in order to help move Harris to Rockford, Illinois. advised that Clark, after dropping Harris off in Rockford, Illinois, was to go to Chicago, Illinois, for instructions in operating the BPP in Peoria, Illinois. He advised that evidently Harris decided to accompany Clark to Chicago, Illinois, as Harris was arrested in Chicago on December 2, 1969. He advised in the event Harris makes bond, he will probably return to Rockford, Illinois. advised that another Panther, Edward McChriston from the Peoria, Illinois branch of the BPP also went to Chicago, Illinois, in late November, 1969, as a warrant was issued for his arrest as he failed to appear in court on local charges. advised that McChriston may also be residing in the Rockford, Illinois, area as he has relatives in the area.

advised that since the death of Mark Clark on December 4, 1969, until present date, December 14, 1969, the Peoria, Illinois branch of the BPP has not held any meetings and that the new leader of the Peoria, Illinois BPP will be Leon Harps.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
PEORIA, ILLINOIS

In relation to the killings of Mark Clark and Fred Hampton, in Chicago, Illinois, on December 4, 1969, further advised that Clark and Harris departed Peoria, Illinois, together on or about December 1, 1969. advised that Clark borrowed a car, a 1965 Ford Mustang, in order to help move Harris to Rockford, Illinois. advised that Clark, after dropping Harris off in Rockford, Illinois, was to go to Chicago, Illinois, for instructions in operating the BPP in Peoria, Illinois. He advised that evidently Harris decided to accompany Clark to Chicago, Illinois, as Harris was arrested in Chicago on December 2, 1969. He advised in the event Harris makes bond, he will probably return to Rockford, Illinois. advised that another Panther, Edward McChriston from the Peoria, Illinois branch of the BPP also went to Chicago, Illinois, in late November, 1969, as a warrant was issued for his arrest as he failed to appear in court on local charges. advised that McChriston may also be residing in the Rockford, Illinois, area as he has relatives in the area.

advised that since the death of Mark Clark on December 4, 1969, until present date, December 14, 1969, the Peoria, Illinois branch of the BPP has not held any meetings and that the new leader of the Peoria, Illinois BPP will be Leon Harps.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

99

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - U. S. Secret Service, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois (Via Courier)
1 - OSI, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - NISO, Chicago (RM)

Report of: ALAN R. STEPHENS
Date: February 6, 1970
Office: Chicago, Illinois

Field Office File #:
Bureau File #:

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
CHICAGO DIVISION

Character: RACIAL MATTERS - ORGANIZATION

Synopsis: The Chicago, Illinois Chapter, BPP continues to be Headquartered at 2350 West Madison Street. Source reports the West Suburban and Joliet branches, no longer function. On 12/4/69 officers of the Cook County State's Attorney's police conducted an early morning raid at a Panther apartment, located at 2337 West Monroe Street. A gun battle ensued, resulting in the death of FRED ALLEN HAMPTON, Deputy Chiarman, Illinois BPP, and MARK CLARK, Peoria, Illinois BPP leader. As a result of this raid and the publicity generated, the Chicago BPP has been reported by a source of having received $40,000 in donations. Sources report an increase on the part of the Communist Party (CP) of Illinois of trying to develop a close relationship between the two organization.

- P -

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967 O - 273-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. ORIGIN, PURPOSES AND LOCATION OF BPP CHAPTERS ----- 2 - 8
  A. Origin -- 2
  B. Purposes, Aims and Rules of Chicago BPP Chapter ---------------------------------- 2 - 7
  C. Location of BPP Branches --------------------- 7 - 8

II. IDENTITY OF LEADERS AND MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION ---- 8 - 10
  A. Officers of Chicago Chapter BPP --------------- 8 - 9
  B. Officers of Rockford Branch BPP --------------- 10

III. INFORMATION REGARDING VIOLENT ACTS, WEAPONS, PLANS AND AIMS OF BPP ------------------------------ 10 - 27

IV. PUBLICATIONS ------------------------------------ 27 - 76

V. ACTIVITIES -------------------------------------- 77 - 82

VI. BPP CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER MILITANT GROUPS -------- 83

VII. FINANCES --------------------------------------- 83 - 84

VIII. CONTACTS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY OR OTHER GROUPS ----- 84 - 86

IX. ARRESTS OF BPP MEMBERS -------------------------- 86 - 107

I. ORIGIN, PURPOSES AND LOCATION OF BPP CHAPTERS

A. Origin

The Chicago Chapter of the BPP was organized on August 25, 1968, at a meeting at 6110 South Dorchester Street, Chicago, Illinois. This meeting was attended by approximately 10 Negro males. The purpose of the meeting was to dissolve the then current Chicago branch of SNCC and to organize a Chicago Chapter of the BPP.

8/27/68)

The BPP did not have a headquarters until space was acquired at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, in November, 1968. The space acquired was the second and third floor of the building at the above address.

11/20/68)

Source advised the Illinois Bell Telephone Company assigned telephone number 243-8276 to the BPP above address.

3/27/69)

B. Purposes, Aims and Rules of Chicago BPP Chapter

On November 1, 1968, BOBBY LEE RUSH, Deputy Minister of State, Chicago BPP, flew to National Headquarters, Oakland, California, where he met with ELDRIDGE and KATHLEEN CLEAVER and BOBBY GEORGE SEALE. The CLEAVERS and SEALE are members of the Central Committee of the National BPP.

On November 4, 1968, RUSH returned to Chicago and stated that the Chicago Chapter would follow the policy of the National BPP in all regards.

11/7/68)

On May 1, 1969, Chicago Chapter of BPP advised BPP members the following ten points continue to reflect "What We Want - What We Believe":

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our black community.

2. We want full employment for our people.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the white men of our black community.

4. We want decent housing fit for shelter of human beings.

5. We want education for our people that will expose the true nature of this decadent American society.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

7. We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in Federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black community as defined by the constitution of the United States.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace, and as our major political objective, a United Nations supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

5/2/69)

On May 1, 1969, the Chicago chapter of the BPP circulated the following Rules of the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois:

Every member of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY throughout this country of racist America must abide by these rules as functional members of this party. CENTRAL COMMITTEE members, CENTRAL STAFFS, and LOCAL STAFFS, including all captions subordinate to either national, state, and local leadership of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY will enforce these rules. Length of suspension or other disciplinary action necessary for violation of these rules will depend on national decisions by national,

state or state area, and local committees and staffs where said rules or rules of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY were violated.

Every member of the party must know these verbatum by heart, and apply them daily. Each member must report any violation of these rules to their leadership or they are conter-revolutionary and are also subjected to suspension by the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

THE FOLLOWING RULES ARE:

1. No party member can have narcotics or weed in his possession while doing party work.
2. Any party member found shooting narcotics will be expelled from this party.
3. No party member can be drunk while doing daily party work.
4. No party member will violate rules relating to office and meetings of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, ANYWHERE.
5. No party member will use, or fire a weapon of any kind unnecessarily or accidentally at anyone other than the enemy.
6. No party member can join any other army force other than the BLACK LIBERATION ARMY.
7. No party member can have a weapon in his possession while drunk or loaded off narcotics or weed.
8. No party member will commit any crimes against other party members or BLACK people at all, and cannot steal or take from the people, not even a needle or a piece of thread.

9. When arrested BLACK PANTHER MEMBERS will give only name and address and will sign nothing. Legal first aid must be understood by all Party members.
10. The Ten Point Program and platform of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must be known and understood by each Party member.
11. Party communications must be national and local.
12. The 10-10-10 program should be known by all members and also understood by all members.
13. All Finance officers operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.
14. Each person submit report of daily work.
15. Each Sub-Section Leader, Section Leader, and Captain must submit Daily reports of work.
16. All Panthers must learn to operate and service weapons correctly.
17. All Leadership personnel who suspends or expells a member must submit this information to the Editor for the newspaper pertaining to suspension, so that it will be published in the paper and known by all chapters and branches.
18. Political Education Classes are manditory.
19. Only office personnel assigned to respective offices each day should be there. All others are to sell papers and do Political work out in the community, including Captains, Section Leaders and etc.
20. COMMUNICATION--all chapters must submit weekly reports in writing to the National Headquarters.
21. All Branches must implement First Aid and/or Medical Cadres.
22. All Chapters, Branches, and components of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must submit a monthly Financial Report to the Ministry of Finance and also the Central Committee.

23. Everyone in leadership positions must read no less than two hours per day to keep abreast of the changing political situation.

24. No chapter or branch shall accept grants, poverty funds, money or any other aid from any government agency without contacting the National Headquarters.

25. All chapters must adhere to the policy and ideology laid by the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

26. All branches must submit weekly reports in writing to their respective Chapters.

5/2/69)

C. Location of BPP Branches

West Suburban Branch

There is no longer a West Suburban Branch of the BPP.

1/31/70)

Rockford, Illinois, Branch

There is no Rockford, Illinois BPP branch office as such; however, meetings have been held at 529 Pierpoint Avenue, Rockford. This address is the location known as the House of Simba or House of Bo Simba.

Chicago, Illinois Branch

Source advised the Chicago Chapter of the BPP currently operates one South side office. The office formerly located at 48th and South State Street has been closed. The one South side office is located at 1222 West 109th Street and is manned by SAMUEL LEROY LATSON. This office operates by a pay telephone located near there and does not have authority to contact the National Office of the BPP. This location is merely used for the BPP newspaper distribution and to keep the name of the BPP known on Chicago's South side.

1/31/70)

Joliet, Illinois Branch

Source advised the BPP - Joliet had confined activity to selling newspapers. Source stated the headquarters, as previously reported at 528 South Water Street, is not being used and that JAMES DAVID STUBBS has left the area.

. 11/12/69)

On December 19, 1969 and January 19, 1970, Sergeant HOWARD MARTINSON, Joliet, Illinois, Police Department (PD) advised the BPP headquarters had been closed and there had been no activity in the Joliet area by the BPP.

II. IDENTITY OF LEADERS AND MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION

A. Officers of Chicago Chapter, BPP

As of January 31, 1970, the following individuals listed in alphabetical order were reported by sources as officers of the Central Staff of the Illinois Chapter BPP. Sources noted all members were purged in November, 1969, with the exception of the then Deputy Chairman FRED HAMPTON and BOBBY LEE RUSH, present Deputy Minister of Defense. Sources stated all members were reinstated to Panther status in December, 1969; however, the only officers left are as follows:

BROOKS, BILLY LAMAR, born July 18, 1948. BROOKS commonly known as "CHE" and is the Deputy Minister of Education, Illinois BPP.

CALVIN, WILLIE JAMES, born March 6, 1948, Captain of Defense, Chicago Branch of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP. Only rank on local level.

CAMPBELL, ANN. CAMPBELL is Treasurer of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP.

COOK, JURLD L., born November 17, 1941, Field Secretary, Illinois Chapter BPP. COOK, commonly known as JEWEL.

HARVEY, MERRILL DENNIS, born July 4, 1946, Captain of Defense, in exile.

KING, YVONNE, Field Secretary, Illinois Chapter BPP, in exile.

JUNIOR, NATHANIEL WALTER, born October 21, 1946, Field Secretary Illinois Chapter BPP incarcerated.

MAY, CHRISTINA DARLENE, born October 20, 1949, Deputy Minister of Culture, Illinois Chapter of BPP, in exile.

O'NEAL, WILLIAM MC KINLEY, born December 9, 1949, Chief of Staff, Illinois Chapter BPP.

RUSH, BOBBY LEE, born November 23, 1946, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois Chapter BPP.

SATCHEL, RONALD J., born June 22, 1950. SATCHEL, commonly known as "DOC," is the Deputy Minister of Health, Illinois Chapter BPP.

WALLS, RUFUS C., born September 6, 1940. WALLS, commonly known as "CHAKA," is Deputy Minister of Information, Illinois Chapter of the BPP.

Sources advised during January, 1970, that it would be impossible to furnish any type of membership list because of recent police action. The source did state the BPP continues to have numerous sympathizers. Due to HAMPTON's death and current local and Federal litigation in general, there can be no estimate of a correct BPP membership.

(, 1/70)
(, 11/22/69)

B. Officers of the Rockford Branch BPP

During January, 1970, the following individuals listed in alphabetical order were reported by source as officers of the Rockford Branch, Illinois BPP:

BELL, HAROLD KEITH, born November 29, 1946, Captain of Defense.

HAWKINS, CHARLES LARRY, born July 31, 1951, Field Lieutenant.

HUNTER, DELRIDGE LAVERN, born January 8, 1941, Captain of Education.

KENT, WILLIE T., aka MONK TEBA, born October 28, 1945, Captain of Information.

The source has reported that the Rockford Branch has approximately ten to fifteen members. The source also advised the Rockford Chapter follows the philosophy of MAO TSE TUNG and programs of the National Chapter BPP.

1/70)

III. INFORMATION REGARDING VIOLENT ACTS, WEAPONS, PLANS AND AIMS OF BPP

At approximately 3:15 a.m., November 13, 1969, a spokesman from the Deputy Superintendents Office, Chicago PD, Chicago, Illinois, advised that moments earlier officers responding to a report of a "man with a shotgun" at 5802 Calumet, Chicago, located in a south side Negro ghetto, were met with gunfire from at least two male Negroes.

The first three officers to arrive at the scene were JOHN GILHOOLY, white male, age 21; MICHAEL BRADY, white male, age 26, and DANIEL COFFMAN, white male, age 26. All three officers were shot, according to the Chicago PD spokesman, before they got their guns out of their holsters.

GILHOOLY and BRADY were approaching the building from the front when a Negro male with a shotgun and a male Negro with a carbine fired on them. GILHOOLY subsequently died on November 14, 1969, from his wounds and BRADY received a head wound for which he was treated at a local hospital and released. COFFMAN received gunshot wounds in the leg, hand and chest and is hospitalized.

Scores of policemen then responded and firing continued for almost one-half hour. Six other Chicago PD officers received wounds as a result of this gunfight:

FRANK RAPPAPORT, white male, age 36, who was killed by a shotgun blast in the face;

DONALD MILEY, white male, age unavailable, shot in face and arm by a shotgun blast and lost his right eye; is hospitalized and his condition is serious;

PHILIP PREROST, white male, age 27, who is in satisfactory condition with shotgun pellets in his arm, chest and legs;

JACK STEWART, white male, age 27, who is in satisfactory condition with a concussion caused by a blow from a stone or brick evidently dislodged by gunfire;

RONALD COMPARIN, white male, age 27, who is in satisfactory condition with a gunshot wound in the left arm;

JAMES DODD, white male, age 31, who was treated and released for a gunshot wound in the left leg.

RAPPAPORT reportedly was shot once by an assailant in hiding. Another Chicago PD officer then saw a male Negro run up to RAPPAPORT who was lying on the ground and shoot him in the face with a shotgun. This officer then shot and killed the assailant, who was later identified as SPURGEON J. WINTERS, JR., Negro male, age 19, of 5647 South Perry, Chicago.

Another suspect in the shooting, LANCE S. BELL, Negro male, age 20, of 5809 South Indiana, Chicago, was shot and captured in the alley behind the shooting incident. BELL was wounded in the leg and right arm and has been charged with murder. He is currently incarcerated at the Bridewell Hospital, Chicago.

The police report on the incident reflects that the incident was apparently the result of a previous personal altercation between BELL and one JAMES CALDWELL, male Negro, 5804 South Calumet, who is a guard at the Cook County Jail, Chicago.

As a result of this altercation, BELL, WINTERS, and possibly others went to CALDWELL's home looking for him. He was not at home, and CALDWELL's wife then called the Chicago PD. It was this call that officers of the PD were responding to.

The area outside the scene of the shooting remained calm and no large crowds gathered.

A spokesman for the Deputy Superintendent's Office, Chicago PD, advised that the Chicago PD is in the process of attempting to determine how many people actually took part in the shooting and is looking for at least one and possibly two male Negroes, details unknown, whom they believe took part in this shooting.

A source advised that BELL, although carried as a member of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, is not a trusted member of that Party inasmuch as he is and was suspected of being an informant for the Black P Stone Rangers, a local Negro youth gang. BELL has been inactive for several months, almost since joining the Party, due to this suspicion.

This source advised that WINTERS, also known as JAKE WINTERS, was a close associate of the BPP, but was not a member. He was very knowledgeable in weaponry and is suspected of stealing several weapons from BPP headquarters.

Source advised, however, that the BPP is now claiming that both BELL and WINTERS were upstanding BPP members and are attempting to obtain their photographs and will publish the story concerning the incident in the BPP newspaper in the near future.

, 11/13/69)

Source advised that allegedly the following items are being kept in the first-floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago:

5 carbines with 50,000 rounds of ammunition

1 case of 30 shot clips for the carbines

3 gas masks

3 smoke bombs, non-explosive type

2 or more loud speakers

5 Ithica riot shot guns, plus ammunition

9 regular 12 guage shot guns, plus ammunition

4 .38 revolvers, plus ammunition

1 357 magnum, plus ammunition.

Source stated that all these weapons were allegedly purchased on legel Illinois State Gun Registration Cards issued to female BPP members, who have never been arrested.

Source stated that the above apartment serves as a "Panther Crib," meaning that it is available to any member of the BPP for use, such as sleeping or eating. Source stated that the following individuals are among the most frequently seen at this address:

FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman;

BILLY BROOKS, Deputy Minister of Education;

RONALD SATCHEL, Deputy Minister of Health;

LOUIS TRULOCK, Legal Counselor; all Illinois BPP Officials, as well as ALVIN JEFFERIES, ROBERT CAMPBELL and numerous female BPP members including, **DEBRA JOHNSON, who is allegedly pregnant by HAMPTON.**

11/13/69)

Source advised that three members of the BPP were involved in a shooting on December 2, 1969, with police officers at 8055 South Merrill Avenue, Chicago. **JEANNIE** REED, ANTHONY HARRIS and LYNN **FRENCH** were those Panthers involved. HARRIS, from Peoria, Illinois, was armed with two .45 automatic pistols. The PD was attempting to investigate the complaint, based upon the landlords allegation that a disturbance had occurred in the area.

12/2/69)

Source advised that three members of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP had been involved in a shooting incident with officers of the Chicago PD at noon on that date. Source advised that the shooting incident occurred at 8055 South Merrill Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. The source identified the BPP members as JEANNIE REED and LYNN FRENCH, who reside at that address, and ANTHONY HARRIS, who is a member of the BPP at Peoria, Illinois, who is visiting Chicago.

, 12/2/69)

Commander FRANK NOLAN, Fourth District, Chicago PD, advised on the same date that officers of the Chicago PD had been dispatched to the above address to investigate a complaint made by the landlord regarding a disturbance taking place there. Upon arrival at the above address, the investigating officers were met by ANTHONY HARRIS, who was armed with two .45 semi-automatic pistols. Harris commenced firing at the officers, but no one was hit. HARRIS, while resisting arrest, was injured and taken to the South Chicago Community Hospital for treatment. All three subjects were charged with aggravated assault, attempted murder, armed violence and resisting arrest. Commander NOLAN stated that the subjects were identified as ANTHONY HARRIS, EUGENIA REED and LYNN FRENCH. Commander NOLAN stated the Chicago PD would afford additional patrol coverage in the neighborhood and that subsequent to the above incident the area remained calm.

On December 3, 1969, Officer J. FUSS, Review Officer, Fourth District, Chicago PD, advised that there were no disturbances or incidents in the vicinity of 8055 South Merrill, subsequent to the shooting incident, which took place there on December 2, 1969.

A Chicago PD source advised on December 4, 1969, that officers of the Cook County State's Attorney Office conducted an early morning raid on a BPP apartment located at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. The officers, armed with a search warrant and weapons, approached the above location at 5:00 a.m., on the above date, and in attempting to gain admission in order to serve the warrant, were met with shotgun fire.

The gun battle that ensued resulted in the death of FRED ALLEN HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, and MARK CLARK, a BPP leader from Peoria, Illinois. Seven individuals were arrested as a result of the raid. Those arrested were:

BRENDA HARRIS, Negro female, age 18, residing at 1848 South Hamlin. HARRIS received a shotgun wound in the hand and right leg.

VERLINA BREWER, Negro female, age 17, residing at 125 West 107th Street. BREWER was wounded in the legs.

BLAIR ANDERSON, Negro male, age 18, residing at 6943 South Justine. ANDERSON received a groin and leg wound.

RONALD (DOC) SATCHEL, Negro male, age 19, Deputy Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, listing 2337 West Monroe Street, as his address. SATCHEL was wounded in the right leg, right flank, and right hand.

DEBORAH JOHNSON, Negro female, age 19, Lieutenant of Finance, Illinois BPP, listing 2337 West Monroe Street, as her residence.

LEWIS TRULOCK, Negro male, age 19, Legal Counsel, residing at 1900 West Jackson Boulevard.

HAROLD BELL, Negro male, age 23, Captain of Defense, Illinois BPP, residing at 317 Howard Street, Rockford, Illinois.

According to the PD source, the individuals arrested will be charged before the Cook County Grand Jury with attempted murder.

Sergeant DANIEL GROTH, Cook County State's Attorney Police, advised on the above date he had led the other officers in conducting the raid and stated that when he approached the door to the apartment, he knocked and identified himself as a police officer and stated he was in possession of a search warrant to search the premises. GROTH stated that upon receiving no response, he repeated his demand for entry and after several minutes had passed, forced the door open. Sergeant GROTH stated he was accompanied by four police officers with four additional officers entering through the back door of the apartment. Upon entering the apartment, GROTH spotted a woman with a shotgun. The woman fired the shotgun and the police returned the fire. Sergeant GROTH stated the firing of the shotgun created enough light in the darkness to illuminate a man standing behind the door, also armed with a shotgun. One of the officers exchanged shots with this man. The individual was hit and was later identified as that of MARK CLARK. GROTH stated at this point he called for the Panthers to surrender and heard a man's voice reply, "Shoot it out." The statement was made from someplace in the apartment. Shooting again resumed and one of the officers, JOHN CISZEWSKI, shouted that he had been shot. (Officer CISZEWSKI received minor wounds, was treated at the hospital, and released.) Later, Sergeant GROTH heard a man shout, "Shoot it out with the pigs." Shortly thereafter, the gunfire ceased and those arrested, as set forth above, surrendered to the police.

At this point, Sergeant GROTH stated a body, later identified as FRED HAMPTON, was found in one of the bedrooms. Sergeant GROTH stated a loaded .45 pistol was found in HAMPTON's hand, and a shotgun was found near his side. Another officer, EDWARD CARMODY, received a wound in the hand by flying glass and was treated and released from the hospital.

A search of the apartment located nine shotguns, one carbine rifle, one .22 caliber rifle, six hand guns, and approximately one to two thousand rounds of ammunition. According to Sergeant GROTH, one of the shotguns taken in the raid had been reported stolen from a police car on April 6, 1969.

Source advised on the above date the only activities being planned by the Chicago BPP Chapter was with respect to the collection of bail money for the remaining Chicago Panther leaders, and also discussed the possibility of making a motion picture depicting the life and killing of FRED HAMPTON. No definite plans have been formulated regarding this matter.

, 12/4/69)

Source advised on the above date that numerous unidentified individuals have been in contact with Panther Headquarters, 2350 West Monroe Street, requesting information pertaining to what funeral arrangements had been made. All those contacting the Headquarters were instructed that they should not be sympathetic toward the Panthers because of the killing of HAMPTON, but should furnish money to be used for bail on those arrested.

This source also stated the local chapter had been in contact with numerous Chicago radio stations in an effort to secure air time on "talk program" type shows in order to discuss the Panther version of HAMPTON's death. No commitments have been made by local radio stations.

12/4/69)

advised on the above date the National Chapter of the BPP issued a press release to news media in San Francisco, California, concerning the above raid. Source stated the release reported that at 5:00 a.m., on December 4, 1969, FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman of the Chicago Chapter BPP, and MARK CLARK, a Defense Captain of the Peoria, Illinois, BPP, were murdered, assassinated by special forces of the Office of State's Attorney, Chicago, Illinois. The release also stated that several other Panthers were injured, and that HAMPTON's wife, who is eight months pregnant, was arrested.

The release stated the special forces officers allegedly broke in the back door of HAMPTON's residence, forced their way in, charged into the bedroom, and murdered HAMPTON in bed without giving him a chance to get up. The release also alleges the officers did not have a search warrant, but merely stated they (the officers) were searching for illegal weapons.

The release also stated that gunshots had not been fired by BPP personnel and that all of the shots fired by the police were in the bedrooms.

The release concluded the next course of action by the BPP will be to intensify information to the people because another revolutionary brother had been slain in the streets by the fascist "pigs" of this country and the people have to seize the time and take power.

On December 5, 1969, Sergeant HALLERAN, 21st Police District, Chicago, Illinois, advised that on that date, at 5:30 AM that morning, a raid had been conducted on the apartment of BOBBY RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP. The apartment is located at 2030 South State Street, Chicago, and was unoccupied at the time of the raid. The whereabouts of RUSH is unknown.

Sergeant HALLERAN stated the raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by a local court, alleging that weapons were in this apartment. Recovered during the search was a .22 caliber Derringer-type pistol, approximately two hundred rounds of ammunition, BPP and other literature, and a small amount of marijuana. The raid was conducted without incident and no arrests or injuries were reported. The area in the vicinity of the above apartment was normal.

Source advised on December 5, 1969, approximately 200 high school students from Calumet High School, 8131 South May Street; Crane High School, 2245 West Jackson Boulevard; Kenwood High School, 4959 South Blackstone Avenue, staged a walkout at the above schools in memoriam of FRED HAMPTON. Calumet and Crane High Schools have 99% Negro student bodies. The Kenwood High School is 65% Negro.

Source also advised that Orr High School, 1040 North Keeler Avenue, which is 23% Negro, received approximately 21 broken windows from vandals. No arrests were reported in any of the above walkouts or the above vandalism.

12/5/69)

The same date Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed approximately 75 of the above high school Negro youths conduct a demonstration in the vicinity of the Civic Center located in Chicago's Loop area. The purpose of this demonstration was in memoriam to FRED HAMPTON. The youths marched from the Civic Center to Grant Park located on the East Side of Chicago's Loop area and dispersed without incident.

Agents of the FBI also observed on the same date SIDNEY LENS, leader of the Chicago Peace Council (CPC) which has been publicly identified as a coalition organization comprised of six activist groups in the Chicago area, accompanied by approximately 30 hippie-type individuals, conduct a vigil in memoriam to HAMPTON at the Civic Center from 12 Noon to 1:00 PM. The group dispersed without incident.

A Chicago PD source advised on December 5, 1969, representatives of approximately 110 black organizations held a meeting at the Woodlawn Mennonite Church, 4612 South Woodlawn Avenue, that afternoon for the purpose of formulating a plan to present "case for black people" before the United Nations (UN). The organizations represented at the meeting circulated a petition supporting BPP Attorney CHARLES GARRY's plan carried by news services following the raid on the Panther apartment located at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, which calls for an appearance before the UN to formally charge the United States with "Genocide of Militant Blacks." The meeting dispersed without any incidents or arrests being reported.

Chief of Police JACK ZIEGLER, Chicago Heights, Illinois PD advised on December 5, 1969, approximately 200 black youths disrupted morning classes at Bloom Township High School resulting in the dismissal of school for the day. The youths indicated the disruption was caused because of memorial services for HAMPTON. The high school is 25 per cent Negro. No arrests or injuries were reported.

On December 5, 1969, a Bureau Agent of the FBI advised that at approximately 2:15 PM about 75 Northwestern University (NW) students led by members of SDS from NW conducted a demonstration in Downtown Evanston, Illinois, protesting the death of HAMPTON. During the demonstration, Evanston police officers attempted to keep the demonstrators on the sidewalk which resulted in some of the demonstrators resisting the police. Several demonstrators commenced shoving Lieutenant TOM JOYCE of the Evanston PD. Several blows were struck, however, no injuries were suffered by Lieutenant JOYCE and the demonstrators.

This incident culminated in the arrest of four demonstrators who were charged with disorderly conduct. Following the arrest, the demonstrators moved their demonstration to the Evanston PD to protest the arrest of their group.

During the demonstration at the Evanston PD the number of demonstrators rose to approximately 100. The demonstrators left the PD at approximately 3:45 PM and proceeded again to the business district and attempted to remove an American flag from the downtown flagpole. The demonstrators were stopped by citizens. A fight resulted and six more demonstrators were arrested and their charges ranged from aggravated battery, disorderly conduct to resisting arrest. All those arrested were either NW or Kendall College students.

Following the later arrests a group of approximately 40 NW students returned to the PD to make bond for those arrested. The crowd dispersed at 5:15 PM without further incident or arrests being made.

On December 6, 1969, Officer JAMES NEILSON, Chicago PD, advised that ROBERT RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP, publicly surrendered at Noon to Commanders ROBERT HARNESS and GEORGE SIMS of the Second and 11th Police districts, respectively. RUSH was charged with failure to register a firearm as a result of a raid on his residence, 2030 South State Street, on December 5, 1969. The surrender took place on the stage of the Capital Theatre, 79th and South Halsted Streets, during an Operation Breadbasket meeting that was in progress and attended by mostly Negroes. No incidents were reported or arrests made as a result of the above arrest and those at the Theatre remained calm.

Sources advised various memorial services were being held in the ghetto area of Chicago for HAMPTON, but no incidents or arrests were reported The PD source also advised that HAMPTON was waked at the A. A. Rayner and Sons Funeral Parlor, 3654 West Roosevelt Road, during the evening of December 7, 1969.

12/6/69)
12/6/69)

Chief of Police DOMINIC CIMINO, Melrose Park, Illinois, PD advised on December 6, 1969, services for HAMPTON were to be held from 7:00 to 9:00 PM on December 8, 1969, at the First Baptist Church, 2141 Main Street, Melrose Park. Following the services, the body would be shipped to an unknown address in Louisiana.

Captain WILBERT SAMUEL, Maywood, Illinois, PD advised on December 8, 1969, that HAMPTON would be waked an additional day at the funeral parlor and the services would be held during the same time and at the same location on December 9, 1969.

Source advised on December 7, 1969, a meeting was called by Reverend TOM STREITER, Trustee, Village of Maywood, Illinois, and attended by Maywood Mayor LEONARD CHABALA and eight others at which it was decided to meet with Illinois Attorney General WILLIAM J. SCOTT to discuss charging the 14 police officers involved in the raid in which HAMPTON was killed, with murder. Source also advised the group would request Attorney General SCOTT to investigate EDWARD HANRAHAN, Cook County States Attorney, and his role in directing the raid upon the BPP apartment. Source also advised that STREITER held a press conference following the above meeting at which he charged the evidence collected at the BPP apartment clearly indicated the police were the only ones doing the shooting.

12/7/69)

The Chicago PD source advised on December 9, 1969, approximately 150 - 200 school age youths were in the vicinity of 3654 West Roosevelt Road, the location of the A. A. Rayner and Sons Funeral Parlor, where FRED HAMPTON's body is located. The youths were in the area to pay their respects to HAMPTON. The source stated the youths were calm and no problems were anticipated.

Source advised that students staged walkouts at both the Crane High School, 2245 West Jackson Bouelvard, and the DuSable High School, 4934 South Wabash, in memory of HAMPTON. No incidents were reported, nor were any arrests made.

Source also advised that students at Parker High School, 6800 South Stewart Avenue, with one hundred per cent Negro enrollment, and Hirsch High School, 7740 South Ingleside, with ninety-nine per cent Negro enrollment, held memorial assemblies for FRED HAMPTON, deceased chairman of the Illinois Chapter BPP, on December 10, 1969. No incidents were reported, nor were any arrests made.

Source further advised that Orr High School, 1040 North Keeler Avenue, which has a sixty-four per cent white enrollment, was the scene of fist fights on December 10, 1969, between Negro and white students. The school closed at 12:20 PM, following the arrival of the Chicago PD at the school. The PD calmed down the situation at Orr High School and it remained calm. No serious injuries or property damage was reported. At least six students were arrested.

12/9/69)

On December 9, 1969, a Maywood, Illinois, PD source advised funeral services for HAMPTON commenced at approximately seven PM at the First Baptist Church, 2114 Main Street, Melrose Park, and were concluded at 8:55 PM. The attending crowd numbered approximately 3,000, and included youth gang members, as well as militant black and white leaders.

Source advised on the same date, Reverend RALPH ABERNATHY of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Reverend JESSE JACKSON, Director of Operation Breadbasket, the economic arm of SCLC, delivered eulogies at the service. ABERNATHY told those present the nation (United States), which had conquered Nazi Germany was now following the same course. He also stated he would establish a FRED HAMPTON scholarship for those Panthers who wanted to study law. ABERNATHY also said if the government succeeds in destroying the BPP, the SCLC and other black organizations are next.

Reverend JACKSON, during his brief remarks, urged the blacks to gain economic power by making sacrifices. He said blacks should sacrifice by taking money normally spent on food, shelter and clothing for their children, to be applied to the establishment of a non-fascist society.

Source stated that BOBBY LEE RUSH, BPP Deputy Minister of Defense, stated that HAMPTON had been possessed with the power to enable the people to see the power structure was conducting genocide against the blacks. RUSH stated HAMPTON was killed, not because the power structure was strong, but the Panthers were weak. RUSH specifically criticized JACKSON, along with other black militants, for not showing support for HAMPTON and the BPP until after HAMPTON was murdered.

Also present at services were Dr. BENJAMIN SPOCK, former baby doctor and anti-war figure, along with JEFF FORT, leader of the Black P Stone Nation, a Negro youth gang on Chicago's south side, and JOSE "CHA CHA" JIMINEZ, Chairman of the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican youth gang.

(, 12/9/69)

The above Maywood PD source advised that following the services, a few shots were heard and several unidentified gang members purporting to be Blackstone Rangers told police that individuals, whom they could, or would, not identify , allegedly belonging to the Disciples, another south side youth gang, and whose members were in attendance at the services, had fired a shotgun at the vehicle in which the Rangers were riding. No injuries were reported, nor any arrests made and the area was normal shortly after the services ended.

The body, according to the Maywood PD source, was then moved to O'Hare Airport and placed into the care of Delta Airlines without further incidents.

The Chicago PD source furnished the description of the following list of firearms confiscated during the raid on the above Panther apartment on December 4, 1969:

One Colt 45 caliber automatic, Serial #7111, Model #1927;

One Sears Roebuck 20 guage shotgun, Model #21, no serial number;

One Springfield 12 guage shotgun, Model #67H, no serial number;

One high standard 12 guage shotgun, marked "Riot 20-6, Model #K1200;"

One Browning shotgun, 12 guage, serial #H15423;

One high standard 12 guage shotgun, marked "Flit King Brush Model K1200;"

One Remington 12 guage shotgun, serial #70740V, Model #870;

One Ithaca sawed-off shotgun, no further description;

One Ithaca 12 guage shotgun, serial #1019400;

One U. S. Carbine 30 caliber revolver, serial #16573;

One Springfield 22 caliber rifle, no serial number;

One Astra medium 9mm automatic revolver, serial #41558;

One Llama caliber 7mm automatic pistol, serial #443695;

One Colt 38 caliber revolver, serial #547;

One Smith and Wesson 38 caliber revolver, no serial number;

One Smith and Wesson 32 caliber long revolver, serial number 4423;

One Marksmen Pehetthon caliber 177, no serial number;

One high standard 12 guage shotgun, marked "Riot 20-6 Model K1200."

Source stated members of the Illinois BPP, since the shooting of FRED HAMPTON, are attempting to purchase all weapons in names of those members who have a legal Illinois Firearms Registration Card and no criminal record.

12/12/69)

IV. PUBLICATIONS

On December 19, 1969, made available a copy of the following documents distributed by the Chicago Chapter of the BPP:

Handbill entitled, "Indict Hanrahan;"

Bulletin entitled, "BPP, Statement To The Black Community;"

Ministry of Information Bulletin entitled, "Statement To the People On The Assassination of FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK."

INDICT HANRAHAN !!


EDWARD V. HANRAHAN

Racist pig Edward V.Hanrahan has publicly justified the cold-blooded murder of two members of the Ill.btanch of the Black Panther Party - Fred Hampton Deputy Chairman and Mark Clark.He has even gone so far as to praise his "men" for their"bravery".

The deaths of brothers Mark and Fred are not isolated incidents. At least 35 members of the Black Panther Party have been killed in the past 18 months. They have also murdered thousands of other black and brown people. The black community recognizes these murders for exactly what they are - part of a policy of genocide - the wiping out in whole or in part of a race of people. Amerika 1970 is more and more looking like Nazi Germany 1940. We are witnessing the coming of fascism!

The Black Panthers say that the gov't.does not meet the needs of the people and they are working,as revolutionaries,to create a society that does meet those needs. Their program shows people how institutions could serve the people.

-- children in black communities go to school hungry
THE PANTHERS GIVE THEM FREE BREAKFASTS!
-- people wait for hours togain admission to a hospital where they get inadequate treatment and are humiliated for being poor.
THE PANTHERS ARE ESTABLISHING A FREE MEDICAL CLINIC!

IN this situation Pig Hanrahan was the one who "pulled the trigger"- he ordered his men to invade Fred's home in the middle of the night and murder him. This pig must be stopped; he must be indicted for murder! - - if he is not the people will deal with him!

DEMONSTRATE AT HANRAHAN'S HOME ((1830 N. Nagle))

date; SATURDAY , DECEMBER 13
time; 1 PM
place; MEET AT NARRAGANSETT (6400 W.) and NORTH (1600 N.)
MARCH TO HANRAHAN'S HOUSE

the spirit of fred lives !!

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
BULLETIN
ILL CHAPTER 2350W MADISON



d Hampton, 21, Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party

STATEMENT TO THE BLACK COMMUNIT

DALEY AND HANRAHAN, FOLLOWING THE ORDERS OF NIXON AND AGNEW, SENT THEIR PIGS TO MURDER CHAIRMAN FRED. THEY BROKE INTO HIS HOME, MURDERED HIM IN BED WHILE HE SLEPT. BUT THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH, THEY DECIDED TO TRY TO KILL EVERYONE THERE. THEY FIRED THROUGH THE FRONT DOOR AND KILLED MARK CLARK. THEY BURST INTO THE FRONT ROOM AND THEN SHOT TWO MORE BROTHERS AND THEN SHOT TWO EIGHTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK WOMEN. THEY DESTROYED EVERYTHING IN THE HOUSE AND STOLE $1500 THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY HAD GIVEN FOR THE FREE PEOPLE'S MEDICAL CARE CLINIC.

THIS IS WHY WE DEMAND THE DECENTRALIZATION OF THE POLICE (COMMUNITY CONTROL OF POLICE), SO THAT THE PEOPLE CAN CONTROL THE PIGS IN THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD AND NO PIGS WOULD GET THE OPPORTUNITY TO MURDER OUR PEOPLE AND KILL OUR YOUTH. WE MUST HAVE COMMUNITY CONTROL OF POLICE(DECENTRALIZATION OF POLICE), TO KEEP THOSE EVIL PIGS FROM DESTROYING BLACK PANTHERS IN PARTICULAR AND BLACK PEOPLE IN GENERAL.

THE PEOPLE MUST INDICT HANRAHAN AND IMPEACH NIXON AND AGNEW.



WITH THE INTENTION OF LEAVING EVERYONE DEAD. THOSE PIGS SHOT AND WOUNDED FOUR YOUNG BROTHERS AND SISTERS AND THEN ARRESTED THREE THAT THEY HAD MISSED KILLING. WHEN THE THREE WERE TAKEN TO JAIL, THE TWO BROTHERS WERE BEATEN AND THE SISTER, 8 MONTHS PREGNANT, WAS THROWN IN A COLD CELL WITH NOTHING ON BUT A HOUSECOAT AND HOUSE SHOES. SHE HAS BEEN DENIED MEDICAL CARE, PRECIOUS PRE-NATAL CARE THAT IS NECESSARY FOR HER CHILD TO SURVIVE.

TWO SISTERS WERE LINED UP AGAINST THE WALL AND ONE WAS SADISTICALLY SHOT IN THE BUTTOCKS BY THOSE MAD DOGS. THE OTHER SISTER WAS SHOT IN THE LEGS AND THEN THROWN IN THE WAGON. THE PIGS THEN LINED UP TWO BROTHERS, BLAIR AN[illegible]ON AND OUR REVOLUTIONARY DEPUTY MINISTER OF HEALTH, RON 'DOC' SATCHEL,, AND SHOT THEM IN THE BACK, STOMACH, KIDNEYS AND LEGS. BOTH BROTHERS WENT TO SURGERY AND ARE IN SERIOUS CONDITION, UNDER ARMED GUARD AND WATCH, IN THE COOK COUNTY HOSPITAL. THE LAST TIME

WE HAD A WOUNDED BROTHER IN THE HOSPITAL THE F
HIM TO DEATH WHILE HE LAID THERE WAITING FOR
MEDICAL ATTENTION.

THE EXECUTION SQUAD SENT BY HANRAHAN AN
WAS JUST LIKE THE ONE SENT BY THE FEDERAL GOV
TO MURDER OUR VIETNAMESE BROTHERS OF PINKVILL
ANIMALS, PYROMANIACS, CAME DOWN ON THE BLACK C
TY WITH AUTOMATIC RIFLES AND MACHINE GUNS. THE
INTO THE BLACK COMMUNITY IN AN ILLINOIS BELL TE
TRUCK FOLLOWED BY SQUADS OF POLICE SQUADROLS



ALL
POWER
TO
THE
PEOPLE

INDICT HANRAHAN !

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
BULLETIN
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
ILLINOIS CHAPTER
2350 W MADISON 243-8276 NO. 7
VO 1



STATEMENT TO THE PEOPLE ON TH
ASSASSINATION
OF FRED HAMPTON AND MARK CLA

CHAIRMAN FRED AND MARK CLARK WERE MURDERED BY HANRAHAN'S PIG FORCE

IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR THAT DEPUTY CHAIRMAN FRED AMPTON AND PEORIA DEFENSE CAPTAIN MARK CLARK WERE URDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY HANRAHAN'S SPECIAL PIG SQUAD— ORDERS RECEIVED FROM THE NIXON-MITCHELL-AGNEW RE-ME. THERE WAS NO SHOOT-OUT; ONLY A SHOOT-IN. THE TTACK ON DEPUTY CHAIRMAN FRED'S HOME WAS AN INTENTION KILL EVERYONE THERE.

THE MURDEROUS DOG PIGS KILLED THE CHAIRMAN WHILE LAID ASLEEP IN HIS BED. THEY BROKE INTO HIS HOME, IN E DARK OF THE NIGHT, THE SAME WAY THE KLU KLUX KLAN D THE BLACK LEGIONAIRRES BROKE INTO THE HOMES OF LACK PEOPLE AND MURDERED THEM IN THEIR SLEEP. THE [illegible] KILLED THE CHAIRMAN ADMITTED PREVIOUS-



statement to the people con't

INE UNITS. THEY BLOCKED OFF THE ENTIRE AREA AND THEN OVED ON THE APARTMENT. AND THEN THEY WANT YOU AND E TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE ONLY TRYING TO SERVE A EARCH WARRANT—WITH MACHINE GUNS AND CANINE DOGS!!!

THIS FRENZIED PLOT, THIS PRE-MEDITATED MURDER IS CONISTENT WITH THEIR POLICY IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY—"KILL LL, [illegible]N ALL, DESTROY ALL." THOSE LYING, TREACHEROUS, ACK[illegible] FOLLOWERS OF WALLACE AND NIXON WERE SIMPLY ON NOTHER 'SEARCH AND DESTROY' MISSION; THEY KILLED FRED ND MARK LIKE THEY KILLED LARRY ROBERSON AND JAKE INTERS—PANTHERS AND SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE. THEY URDERED THEM JUST LIKE THEY MURDERED LINDA ANDERSON, AYNE BLACK, CHARLES COX, AND MICHAEL AND JOHN SOTO, ND HUNDREDS OF OTHERS.

WE HAVE TO PUT A STOP TO THIS INTENTIONAL SLAUGHTER F BLACK PEOPLE. WE HAVE TO SHOW NIXON AND AGNEW THAT VEN THOUGH THEY SAID THEY WERE GOING TO MURDER A FEW UNDRED PANTHERS WE WILL NOT LET THAT HAPPEN. LET'S EGIN TO ARM OURSELVES FOR OUR OWN SURVIVAL. PIECE UP!!!

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN STILL LIVES!!!
REVOLUTION IN OUR LIFE TIME!!!
PIECE UP!!!



EDWARD
CARMODY



JOHN
CISZEWSKI



ST
ED
HA

MURDERERS



CHAIRMAN FRED HAMPTON

On Thursday morning, December 4, 1969, Hammerhead Hanrahan's Maniac squad murdered in cold blood, the Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party . . . in cold blood, and as all pigs do, they didn't give him a chance. They knew that Fred was one of the baddest brothers in the world and one of the baddest M.F.'s off the block. He came down from the mountain top and clearly showed that he wanted to be with the people. (The people he loved and fought for every



BOBBY RUSH

ESCAPES BEING MURDERED

ne dirty rascist dogs that murdered Fred Ham- nd Mark Clark tried to murder our Deputy r of Defense, Bobby Rush. Murdering Fred rk was not enough blood spilt, so less than hours after they killed Fred in his sleep and ed [illegible] n cold blood; those treacherous rove[illegible]wn on Bobby Rush's crib in an at- to [illegible] him and his wife and kids, but he there, he had moved his family and escaped ghter.

ne pigs have no respect for our people. Hav- ed in murdering our Deputy Minister of De- hey threw drugs into his apartment and then him with possession of narcotics.

hat kind of society is this where the victim ed like a criminal; where a man is murdered leep and then charged with attempted mur- d aggravated battery: this fascist capitalist has to be brought to its knees. We, Black will never be free in this society that is n [illegible] d racial genocide.

e [illegible] murdered Michael and John Soto gain to commit back-to-back murders with on and Bobby Rush. When will we learn e capitalists (Nixon, Agnew, LBJ, Mitchell, en, and Daley) are bent on destroying black ? When will you admit that you are more a ow than you were in 1619 (in 1619 they have shotguns, 357 magnums, helicopters, e runs and canine dogs)? When will you p and realize that an unarmed people are r subject to slavery (or to be murdered) at n moment?,

nism (the racist dog cop, the avaricious businessman, the demogogic lying politic-

along with "Doc" worked to establish a Free People's Medical Clinic. Fred took his valuable time to try to teach each and every member of the Black Panther Party and the masses what is to be done, and the proper road towards liberation, freedom, and strategic means of resisting the power structure.

Fred taught us so much and gave us everything, including his life, so that someday we will have the power to determine our own destiny and everything in our Ten Point Program, our major political objective, and love and respect for all people will become a reality.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE



OUR REVOLUTIONARY DEP. MINISTER OF HEALTH RONALD 'DOC' SATCHELL

point-blank mur

LONG LIVE THE SPIRIT OF JAKE WINTERS



SPURGEON "JAKE" WINTERS

THE BEAT GOES ON

Deputy Chairman, Fred Hampton, Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party with headquarters at 2350 W. Madison was murdered, shot to death Dec. 4, Thursday morning at approximately 4:45am, in his home at 2337 W. Monroe. There is valid evidence that Chairman Fred along with Mark Clark, Defense Captain Peoria Branch of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party, were murdered. Mark Clark, 22, was a profound revolutionary brother. He is responsible for the Peoria Branch being at the level it is at now. He started the Breakfast for Children Program in Peoria and before his death, started moving on a Free Health Clinic.

The shots, which were fired only from the guns of the Fascist, Racist maniac pigs under the gestapo guidance of pig Halfman Hanrahan, were found lodged in the walls, proved who fired the shot. It showed, positively, no shots were fired from the inside, especially none from Chairman Fred's room. He was openly and viciously murdered in his sleep. He didn't have a chance to fire a shot nor even take ONE pig along with him.

His death proves how murder hungry, how scared, how disrespectful Tricky Dick Nixon's fascist pigs are, in regards to poor oppressed Black People and especially those which belong to the Black Panther Party or any organization fighting to change this low lifed decadent society existing in fascist AMERIKKKA!!!

After the murdering; woundi
were over the pigs confiscated
$1,500 and also shotguns, rifles,
pieces and over 1,000 rounds of amr
The pigs stated that Chairma
who stayed at his crib were storin
this arsenal to kill pigs with. OF C
standing when you know that pigs a
beasts with no regard for law, justic
of people; that unarmed people are
ery at any given time; that you are
lutionaries as the Chairman and his
against this Fascist, Racist system a
italistic, Blood thirsty Politicians an
cious Businessmen, you have to arr
the SOUL means of SELF-DEFEN
SURVIVAL!!

What does all this mean? Wha
show the Black Panther Party men
masses of People? It says SIEZE T
cause before you realize, TIME WILL

ALL POWER TO T
BECAUSE POWER BELONGS IN
OF T
RIGHT-ON CHAIRMAN FRED. Y
WILL
BUT LIKE THE RE
WILL CONTINUE TO GROW A

FREE BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN



BREAKFAST FOR CHIL

Our Breakfast for Chil
feeding a lot of children
understand our Breakfast
program. We sayin' somet
we saying that theory's c
with no practice ain't
have both of them--the t
We have a theory about fee
What'd we do? We put it
That's how people learn.
don't know how serious
They think the children
really hungry.


Son What Do You Want For Christmas
A Box of Dynamite And A Case of Matches

everybody should be eating. Wi
of capitalism.

What are we doing? The Br
Children program. We are ru
socialistic manner. People ca
our program, saw it in a soci
tion not even knowing it was
People are gonna take our pr
tell us to go on to a higher
gonna take that program and
a socialistic manner. What'd t
He say, "nigger--you like co
"no sir, I'm scared of it."
socialism?" "No Sir, I'm sca
"You like the breakfast for
program?" "Yes sir, I'd d
Pig said, "Nigger, that pro
socialistic program." "I do
fuck if it's Communism. You
hands on that program mother
I'll blow your motherfucking b
And he knew it. We been educ
not by reading matter, but th
servation and participation.
him come in and work our
Not theory and theory alone,
and practice. The two go tog
no only thought about the Marxis
theory--we put it into practic
what the Black Panther Party

Chairman of the Illinois Chapt
the Black Panther Party Fred

THE FOUR BREAKFAST FOR CHILDREN CENTERS ARE LOCATED AT THE FOLLOWING:

46 N. HOYNE, ST. ANDREWS CHURCH
4837 S. STATE, TRINITY CHURCH
1101 N. LARABEE, MANIERE CHURCH
13384 S. LANGLEY, ALTGELD GARDENS
THE YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION!!!

RED LIVES

SERVING AND MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE HAS CAUSE
FASCIST PIGS TO ATTEMPT TO WIPE OUT THE PEOPLE'S ARMY. STO
BLACK PANTHER PARTY FROM SERVING THE PEOPLE THROUGH RE
PROGRAMS, STOP THE INSTITUTION OF DECENTRALIZING THE PIG
DEPARTMENT AND INSTITUTING THE PEOPLE'SPOLICE FORCE TO C
DOWN ON WANTON MURDER AND BRUTALITY OF OPPRESSED PEOPL

REGARDLESS OF THE VICIOUS ATTACKS AND FEEBLE ATTEMPT
BY THE POWER STRUCTURE, THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY WILL C
TO MOVE ON. ILL. CHAPTER BPP

Dear Friend:

Let's paraphrase Pastro Martin Niemoller's description of Nazi Germany:

First they came for the Panthers But I was not a Panther, so I did not defend them

Then they came for the student activists,

Then they came for the black people But I was not black, so I did not defend them.

Then they came for trade unions, But I was not a trade unionist, so I did not defend them.

Then they came for the teachers But I was not a teacher, so I did not defend them.



did you voluntarily accept a free, hot meal from known Black Panthers at nine a.m., September nine, nineteen hun'ert an' sixty-nine?"

FREE HEALTH CARE

The BLACK PANTHER PARTY is lishing a FREE PEOPLE'S MEDICAL IC to satisfy the medical needs of our munity. We understand that the capitaln America will never provide adequate cal service to the BLACK PANTHER TY has moved to establish another community people can be involved.

Technical assistance, supplies, and donations can be brought to the office of the ILLINOIS CHAPTER of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, 2350 West Madison Street. For further information, call 243-8276.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

GAN BY CHAIRMAN FR

SEND CHECKS OR MO

ORDERS



SUBSCRIPTION FORM



Support Your Newspap

Subsc Today

Enter my subscription for (check box):

	National Subscriptions	S
3 MONTHS: (13 ISSUES) .... ☐	$2.50	(
6 MONTHS: (26 ISSUES) .... ☐	$5.00	(
ONE YEAR: (52 ISSUES) .... ☐	$7.50	(

(please print)

NAME ________________

ADDRESS ________________

CITY ________________

STATE/ZIP # ________ COUNTRY ______

PLEASE MAIL CHECK OR MONEY ORDER TO: MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, BLACK PA
Box 2967, Custom House, San Francis

Platform and Program



1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

**7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY a
of black people.**

We believe we can end police brutality in our black comm
ganizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to de
black community from racist police oppression and brutality.
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a
arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm
for self-defense.

**8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, s
and city prisons and jails.**

We believe that all black people should be released fro
jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and imp

**9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be trie
a jury of their peer group or people from their black com
defined by the Constitution of the United States.**

We believe that the courts should follow the United States
so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amenc
U.S. Consitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer g
is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geog
vironmental, historical and racial background. To do this the
forced to select a jury from the black community from whi
defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all
that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man"
community.

**10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justi
And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supe
cite to be held throughout the black colony in which only t
subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of det
will of black people as to their national destiny.**

When, in the course of human events, it becomes neces
people to dissolve the political bands which have connecte
another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the
equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God er
decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they sl
the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are c
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalie
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happir
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, c
just powers from the consent of the governed; that, wheneve
government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new governme
foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in
to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and ha
dence, indeed, will dictate that governments long estal
be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, a
hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, wi
sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms t
are accustomed. But, when a long train of abuses and usur
suing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce th
solute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off
ment, and to provide new guards for their future security.

furnished the following documents on January 11, 1970:

"History Of The BPP" (not completed)

The Black Panther Party began as a response to repeated instances of police violence in the black community. The party was inspired by the Black Panther Party of Lowndes County Alabama (The Lowndes County Freedom Oranization) which organized black people in the South to obtain basic rights such as the right to vote. The symbol of the Lowndes County Freedom Organization was the Black Panther.

The black panther, as explained by Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton, is an animal who will not attack. If attacked, the black panther backs up until he has no more room to back. Then, the black panther will strike out at his assailant and wipe him out. Newton says that the Black Panther Party will not attack unless pushed up against the wall- where nothing else is possible but to attack its assailants - in order to live. This principle of armed self-defense which is basic to the Black Panther Party, will be explained in a document below.

The Black Panther Party, started by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale while students at Merritt College in Oakland, set out originally to legally patrol the police. They carried weapons as provided by law and stayed the legal distance from the police whom they watched. The result of this surveillance was a decrease in brutality against members of th black community and increased harrassment of the Black Panther Party by the police.

The leaders of the Black Panther Party (originally called the Black Panther Party for Self Defense) soon realized that the police did not make the ultimate decisions as to whom they attacked and why. The police acted as the law enforcement agency for those who made the political decisions. Thus, the Black Panther Party evolved a political prog to deal with the type of political decisions which allowed the police to harrass the black communities and which have resulted in the dreadfu living conditions of black people in this country. (Details of thes program may be found in a document below).

Huey Newton has said that the Black Panther Party is the vanguard party of the mass of black people. The black community has not yet bee sufficiently educated to verbalize its demands and to act upon them in a meaningful way. But because they know the nature of the oppression under which they suffer, they identify with the Black Panther Party as the spokesman which articulates their demands. The support for the Black Panther Party increases daily as the black community witnesses wh happens to those who speak for them- the intense brutality and harrassment levied against the Black Panthers by the police- and the refusal of the power structure even to heed the demands of the black community.

In addition to support for the Black Panther Party from the black community locally, groups have been set up all over the country. Internationally, support is evidenced by rallies in Tanzania, Africa, and statements supporting the Black Panthers made by African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure. Both these men have publicly supported the demand that Huey Newton be set free.

As Minister of Communication, Kathleen Cleaver has said, since the murder of Black Panther treasurer, Bobby Hutton, and the jailing of innumerable Panthers, including Eldridge Cleaver, and , of course, leader Huey Newton, support and membership in the Panther Party has increased geometrically. Numerous white groups such as the Medical Committee for Human Rights, the John Brown Society, The Peace and Freedom Party, Whites Against Racism, Whites for Huey, ministerial students, lawyers and other members of the white community have publicly stated that they support the program of the Black Panther Party and want Huey Newton released from jail.

PROGRAM OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
(WHAT WE WANT AND WHAT WE BELIEVE)

The program is usually divided into one section of ten points entitled "What We Want" and then ten paragraphs explaining these points in a section entitled "What We Believe". For the sake of clarity, we have put each one of the ten points in "What We Want" immediately above its corresponding paragraph in "What We Believe":

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligate to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe xxxx that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the white man of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty-million black people: therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an [illegible]immediate end to [illegible]E BR[illegible]ALITY and MURDER of Black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therfore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self defense.

8. We want freedom for all Black men held in federal, state, county and city pridons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all Black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their Black Communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We Believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the ma black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of Nature and Nature's God entitled them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires thaty they should decaare the causes which impel them to separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

Prudence, indeed, will dicaate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that manking are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpation, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such a government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

POLITICS AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY

The Black Panther Party program and platform is a result of the analysis that the Party, and especially its leader, Huey Newton, has made of the nature of politics in America.

The way to political change is through power. This is the nature of the black power movement exemplified by Stokeley Carmichael in that term. What does this meadn? Huey Newton has said that politics is war without bloodshed and that war is an extension of politics with bloodshed. The reason that the Reconstruction attempt to put blacks into office from the South failed was because the black legislators, intelligent, well-educated men, had no powerful constituency behind them. If you represent a powerless group in the legislature, then you wield no power. What is a powerful group? According to Minister of Defense, Newton, a powerful group is one which, if it doesn't get what it wants, can deliver a consequence. There are several ways in which this kind of power is obtained. One way is to own the land. This is feudal power. It is exercised by farmers who, when they do not get what they want, can let the crops rot in the field. This is the kind of consequence that rates attention and action. The second way of gaining power is economic: ownership of the businesses. In America the slaves were freed with the promise, by the Freedmen's Bureau, of forty acres and two mules. Had this promise been fulfilled, the black man would have had land power and the ability to inflict a a consequence. The promise, of course, was never fulfilled.

What about businesses? The businesses in the black community are owned by the white man. Thus, even the economic boycott is difficult because there are not sufficient black-owned businesses to serve as and alternative center for purchasing basic needed goods.

To ask the blacks to redress their grievances by running for office does not pose a realistic solution. It is true that members of the Black Panther Party - Huey Newton for Congress in the 7th Congressional District - Bobby Seale for Assembly in the 17th Assembly District in Alameda County - and Kathleen LCleaver for Assembly in th 18th Assembly District in San Francisco - are running for office on the Peace and Freedom Party ticket, but this is only to have a forum to articulate the grievances of the black community. Why? Because as stated above the black politician without a powerful constituency just warms a chair in the legislature.

If the black community cannot gain economic or land-power, how can they hope to have changes of their conditions? Minister of Defense Huey Newton says that the only other source of power left is that of the ability to inflict destruction as a consequence. Thus, the black people must arm in a political fashion. The black people must be able to deal with the occupation police forces in their communities when they are attacked. The alternative is to have the police chosen by the black community, live in the black community, and serve the needs of the black community as that community sees them. This would mean that the police would no longer act merely to defend the interests of the white businessman and slumlord.

However, the blacks do not limit themselves to discussion of power from the gun. The Black Panther Party has a political program which it would like to see enacted for the benefit of black people. See below for the program.

WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE BLACK MAN IN AMERICA TODAY?

Eldridge Cleaver, Black Panther Minister of Information has stated that the black man is a colonial subject and that black America is a colony within white America. The fact that the colonial subjects are dispersed throughout the country does not make their colonial subjugation any the less real. Cleaver has stated that: "Black people in North America have always been plagues by a dual status. We were both slave and Christian, we were both free and segregated, we are both integrated and colonized. In the past this duality has worked to our disadvantage. It kept us running around in circles. Today we propose to turn it to our advantage, in the manner that we have turned our blackness from a disadvantage into a rallying point of advantage."

Huey Newton has said that the black man in America today is a man of confusion. He is of the lower socio-economic background. He has withdrawn from his hostile enviroment which he daily faces and denies his own ability. He has been taught that he is inferior and he blames himself. He tries to change this image through his style of life - his desire for flashy material possessions. He is asked to respect a law which does not respect him. Those who believe in cultural nationalism try to answer his problem by turning him back to the time of the eleventh century in Africa. However, his freedom cannot come from such an identification. His freedom will come from identifying with the revolutionary struggles of people of color all over the world, including Africa today. The black man, according to Cleaver, has a common culture and a common history. All he lacks to be a nation is land.

What is the History of the Black Man in America?

The history of the present attitude of the whites toward blacks in this country has deep psychological roots, according to Newton. It dates to the time, hundreds of years ago, when the white Europeans first came into contact with black Africans. It relates to cultural differences. The Europeans who came to Africa worshipped one god - a god who was all-good. This was his absolutism. Man was said to have been created in the image of the all-good god and therefore could do no evil. Man's instinctual sexual drives were deemed ungod-like and were repressed. Such evil was deemed to come from outside man - the result of demons, devils, and witches - who were burned at the stake.

On the other hand, the Africans below the Sahara, mostly black, had a differant form of worship. Their god was both good and bad. They believed in dualism. Their god had two or more heads - one good and one bad. The African had to avoid being like the bad head and must get into the favor of the good head. However, he did not deny part of his being as coming from outside himself. Thus, his sexual drives were part of him - not evil demons from the outside.

When the Europeans came to Africa they enslaved the blacks south of the Sahara who believed in dualism. They were told by the church that the "good" Africans north of the Sahara, who believed in a single god, were more in line with the European belief and should not be

Newton points out that this sick mentality goes deeper than an economic system. It is a psychology that must be rooted out of the white xxxxxxxxX race before the blacks can live in a society with white people. Thus, when Stokely Carmichael said that socialism is not meant for black people, he did not mean that he approved of what the capitalist system of economics was doing to the black communities. What he was saying is that even with an economic system that provided for all the people, if there were still racism, the black man would not be able to live as a man.

The Europeans raped Africa economically and took the black men as slaves to America. The black man has, to this day, not been treated as an equal to the white man - in any way. As was pointed out above, even after the Emancipation Proclamation the black man was not given his economic and political rights. In fact, after Reconstruction, the Southern politicians convinced the Northern politicians that the Black legislators 9who had insignificant power anyway) should not maintain even that token status. And, as can be seen in the electoral struggles goin on in black communities in the South today - the politicians still won't even allow the token representation!

As James Baldwin said, " To be black and conscious in America is to be in a constant state of rage." The whites cannot know what it is like to live as a black man in America - in white society. What we can know is the nature of the conditions that must be changed to give the black man his long overdue human rights.

WHY FREE HUEY NEWTON?

1. The Political Reasons. Huey P. Newton is a political prisoner. He is in jail today, accused of killing an Oakland policeman, not because he committed this crime, which he did not, but because he is the Minister of Defense of the Black Panther Party. Since the inception of the Party the Oakland police have tried to harrass it out of existence. As the Party became stronger, the police tactics became more vicious. The police have long had the license numbers and descriptions of all the cars driven by members of the Black Panther Party.

On the night of October 28, 1967, Police Officer Frey stopped an automobile which he knew to be a car on the list of those driven by Black Panthers. He stopped the car for an alleged traffic violation, the nature of which has never been disclosed. In his testimony before the Grand Jury, Officer Heanes, the police officer who was summoned by Frey to come to his assistance after he stopped the Panther car, said that Newton DID NOT HAVE A GUN. Attorney Charles Garry has indicated that the evidence points to the real possibility that both officers fired at each other and the Officer Heanes' bullets killed Officer Frey.

The police have always, in the black community, claimed the right to exercise indiscriminate violence. It was for this reason that the Black Panther Party was originally formed. Before October 28th the Oakland police had harrassed Newton on numerous occasions and had threatened his life. On October 28 Newton was arrested and shot in the stomach because he stood for change in the black community.

The black community knows that Huey Newton and the Panthers have raised a crucaal issue - control of black communities by black people. They recognize that it is the police who perpetrate violence on a daily basis in order to maintain their illegitimate control over black ghettoes. They recognize that the actions of the Panthers constitute legitimate self defense against a police force more interested in political repression and "keeping the niggers in their place" than in catching criminals. And they recognize the indictment of Huey Newton as an attempt not only to wipe out an heroic black resistance leader, but to also intimidate and crush the movement for self-determination for all black people. If black political leaders are not actually assassinated, as were Medgar Evers, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King - then the government finds ways of confining and neutralizing them as in the cases of H.Rap Brown and LeRoi Jones. That is why the black community stands behind the concept FREE HUEY. They mean that Huey Newton was harrassed and threatened and finally shot because he is a political leader; that he was arrested and thrown in jail because he is a political leader, that he faces the gas chamber because he is a political leader. These are important points for the white as well as the black community. The same type of harrassment has taken place against whites who have opposed this government: the case of the Oakland 7 arrested on conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor: a felony. It has happened to those who very peacefully tried to protest the policies represented by Dean Rusk, when he appeared at the Fairmount Hotel - demonstrators who were kicked, beaten and MACED by the S. F. police while they were RUNNING AWAY - trying to follow orders to disperse. The list could go on endlessly. Protest the government- and risk your physical safety - that is the message to whites and blacks alike.

II. The Legal Reasons. Huey Newton was indicted by the Alameda County Grand Jury - a jury chosen by the 20 judges on the Alameda County Superior Court, arbitrarily. Judge Dieden, and others, have admitted that this system results in judges choosing their friends, or political campaign contributors to serve on this "honorary" position. Three volumes of hearings taken by the Assembly Committee on Governmental Efficiency last year (1967) have pages of testimony to this effect. The persons chosen to serve are, overwhelmingly, white, over 50, retired, or still-active business and professional men and their wives.

This method of selection is clearly contrary to many cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, which cases indicated that a jury of one's peers had to consist of a CROSS-SECTION of the community and could not SYSTEMATICALLY EXCLUDE black people from serving. The Grand Jury violated both of these fundamental principles. However, when Newton's attorneys presented this evidence to the courts of California, through the California Supreme court, they were denied redress - WITHOUT EVEN SO MUCH AS A WRITTEN OPINION explaining why.

Furthermore, the method of indictment denied Newton fundamental rights which the California Supreme Court has held are required in criminal cases and which are given in the Preliminary Hearing.

A district attorney in California may proceed in a felony case wither by indictment or by information. Indictment is a procedure whereby the D. A. asks the county grand jury to return an indictment on evidence presented to them by the D. A. The D. A. may present whatever evidence he chooses at his sole discretion. The grand jury may summon witnesses, but it ondy does so very rarely. The defendant is not present except if he testifies - and this is usually undesirable because he waives his 5th amendment rights in doing so. Furthermore, the defendant's attorney is not allowed to be present at the proceedings. The proceedings are secret. There is no right for the defense at all i[illegible] grand jury proceeding.

A preliminary hearing is a hearing before a municipal court judge who must decide whether or not to turn the case over to the superior court for trial. The defendant may have an attorney at this proceeding, and usually does. The attorney may challenge the judge for bias; may cross-examine the prosecution witnesses; may call his own witnesses; may have discovery of the prosecutions' evidence; may question the def fendant, and so forth.

The way of proceding - through the grand jury, or by way of preliminary hearing - is at the sole and arbitrary discretion of the district attorney. There are no guidelines set down either in the California Constitution or in the Penal Code to guide his choice.

The district attorney of Alameda County has used the grand jury very rarely. He used it only in a little over 1% of the cases in 1966. He testified before the Assembly Governmental Efficiency Committee that he like to use it in complicated cases such as those involving assessor frauds or in cases involving child molestation. Neither was true in the Newton case. Others at that hearing testified that the grand jury was often used where the district attorney had a poor case or didn't have enough facts to withstand exposure to the preliminary hearing. This was true in the Newton case. To this date the prosecution has released no information as to its version of the Newton events. This runds counter to its usual procedure of seeking maximum publicity to prejudice the defense case in a serious criminal matter (cf. the Hutton case). The reason? They haven't made up their story yet. They are hoping that the defense attorneys will let slip therir version of the case so that the D.A. can then fit his version to counter that one.

The Grand Jury for the last five or more years has NOT ONCE refused an indictment sought by the District Attorney. How can any defendant in a set-up like that have any chance?

The Grand Jury indictment also serves to prejudice the later jury because they have the aura of upstandking citizens. If they felt the defendant was probably guilty, what will the petit jury have to think?

III. Treatment at Kaiser. When Huey Newton arrived at Kaiser Hospital he was in agony from a bullet in his stomach. It took the emergency room nurse FIFTEEN MINUTES before she would allow him to see a doctor. She wanted forms filled out. She did not believe he was really hurt. Finally, according to her testimony before the Grand Jury, Newton threw his blood-soaked shirt at her to convince her of his pain.

While Newton was doubled over in pain, and before she would let him see a doctor, the nurse call the police. When Newton was finally allowed to see a doctor, the police arrived and pulled his hands over his head - an agonizing position for a man with a bullet in his stomach - and handcuffed him to the gurney on which he was lying. They shoved him and kicked the gurney.

When Newton was transferred to Highland Hospital, his police guards kicked his bed and shoved him around in the hopes that they could prevent his wound from healing.

HUEY NEWTON BIOGRAPHY

Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense of the Black Panther Party, was born on February 17, 1942 in Louisiana. He came to California in 1945 and resided [illegible] Oakland on Brush Street. [illegible] attended the Santa Fe and Lafayette elementary schools in Oakland. He went to Woodrow Wilson Jr. High School and then attended Oakland Technical High. His childhood was the same as that of most black youths. He was never given the opportunity to do skilled work but worked very diligently as a seasonal cannery worker from his graduation from high school onward.

Huey Newton learned to read well at the age of 16. This was when his high school counselors told him he was not college material. He set out to show them that no white man could tell him what he was capable of doing.

Huey went to Oakland City College and got an AA degree with an excellent gradepoint average. He spent one and one-half years in San Francisco Law School. He left law school to organize full-time for black liberation.

While Huey and Bobby Seale, Chairman of the Black Panther Party, were at Merritt College they formed the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. They patrolled the black community to keep the police from brutalizing the black people. Newton and Seale taught the blacks on the block their legal rights. They felt that the Panther program had to be implemented practically. This meant starting with Point No. 7 of the Black Panther Party program to work toward "an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people."

Shortly thereafter young Bobby Hutton inquired about what Bobby and Huey were doing. They explained the idea of the Black Panther Party and its operations to Bobby Hutton, who then became the first black youth to join the Party. He was appointed Party Treasurer. He served the black community faithfully until his murder at the hands of the Oakland police on April 6, 1968.

WHY SELF DEFENSE?

The Black Panther Party has advocated that everyone in the black community have a gun to defend himself. It should be made very clear that this does NOT mean that black people should have guns in order to come into the white community and "shoot it up". In fact there are NO reported incidents of Black Panthers coming into ANY community and using their weapons other than to defend their own lives.

The police forces in the black community are composed of men who live in white communities. They are hired as occupation forces to patrol the black community to protect white business and land interests. This is brought home very clearly by the fact that policemen in the ghetto try to stay away from incidents in which only blacks are involved. For example, if two black gangs are rumored to be planning a rumble, the police refuse to act to stop it. If black kids are fighting among themselves, the police stay away. If a black woman complains to the police that her husband has threatened violence against her, the police tell her to call a lawyer. When the lawyer tries to intervene, the police say they do not like to get involved in domestic disputes. The list goes on endlessly. Furthermore, the police are often involved in the local rackets - the numbers gaimes, rake-offs from dope and prostitution and so forth. However, should a black man fight a white man the police come in immediately. At schools where black and white children fight in the schoolyards the black children are taken off to spend days in Juvenile Hall while the white children are, at most, given a citation to take home to their parents. Oft[illegible], black mxxxxx people are picked up at random for alleged traffi[illegible]iolations. If a black m[illegible] or boy is seen running away from a pl[illegible] where the police believe [illegible]rime has been committed (usually a property crime), they shoot first and ask questions later. The incidents of this in Berkely, and Oakland and San Francisco are numerous. In fact it is incidents such as these that have been the trigger in almost all the so-called "riots" that have occurred in this country since Watts.

The position of the Black Panther Party was graphically illustrated when after Martin Luther King's assassination, Bobby Seale, chairman of the Party, went around Oakland in a sound truck urging black people to stay home and not become involved in violence. Why? Not because there was no reason for revolt, but because the Black Panthers know that such spontaneous rebellion results in death for black people and no changes in their conditions of life. Such violence is sporadic, short-lived, and costly. However, it is also very clear that non-violent tactics have resulted in no change either. In fact, before his death, Martin Luther King indicated that the Poor Peoples' March on Washington was his FINAL attempt to use non-violent tactics to get what his people have been deined for 400 years. After that, Dr. King indicated, all he could see was fascism. And he could not urge people to remain non-violent in the face of that.

Why do the Panthers Believe the Black Community will be Annihilated

The white community is prepared for genocide. Whites all over this nation are arming themselves to protect their community from an invasion of blacks. This is so even though not one white community has yet been invaded or even threatened with such invasion. This is true even though whites claim that even if there were an invasion of blacks they would be beaten almost immediately. Why are they armed? Fear. Fear that stems from a lack of understanding of the Watts incidents, fear that stems from a lack of understanding of what it is like to be black in this country. Fear of militancy xx thaxhxaskax Xhayxdaxnaxxshaaaxahaxwxx that asks for change NOW. In part the fear comes because the whites know that they themselves are powerless to get change that would appease the militancy of the blacks. They have no more control over their government than do black people. They do not choose who will run for office - that is a back-room political decision. They know that when they vote for a candidate they must rely not on knowledge of his position, but on faith that he will govern well. So when they are afraid they do not rely on their government they buy guns.

Not only the white man as an individual is armed. Police departments all over this nation are stockpilling weapons which, in their horror, are matched by those used by the army in Vietnam. Why the stockpile? For the Second Civil War. This is the way Esquire Magazine saw it in their March 1968 issue, in an article of that title by Garry Wills. Reporter Wills visited police chiefs all over the country to find out what they were plainning with regard to possible violence in the black communities. Remember when you read this that the black people are arming for self-defense with guns.

A listing of the weapons being stockpiled included: tanks, armored personnel carriers, jeeps with hun mounts, command armored cars built for Vietnam use, gas of all kinds including MACE, now felt by the federal drug administration to be far more dangerous than tear gas, bared bayonets, M-1 rifles, helicopters, tear gas grenades, shotguns, police dogs, shock batons, machine guns, assault guns which shoot through walls. The list could go on and on. Some of the more unusual weapons included "non-lethal" flame-throwers, shound devices which cause people to release their bowels, or lose their equilibrium, adhesives which cause parts of the body to stick together which if moved cause large areas of flesh to be torn away, foam, invisible gases, ~~and~~ odors detectible by dogs, plastic confetti, traquilizers, electric sluices, hoses, gagging gases, and on and on.

This list of weapons is far too lengthy and horrifying to be a mere reaction to black peoples' desire to defend their homes and lives. This listing of weapons is such as to wipe out entire areas of a population, such as is being done in Vietnam. One cannot use tanks and machine guns, sound devices, and flame throwers, selectively against snipers. These weapns either wipe out large areas of people or they aren't used at all.

During all the past riots the National Guard and the local police shot indiscriminately at blck people. Innocent women and children were injured as well as people only suspected of looting. Capital punishment was extended to those who appeared at the wrong place at the wrong time. No crime at all was necessary. Further riot contingency plans included the request in Detroit for $9,000,000 for riot equipment. Where snipers are suspected, the article indicated that entire buildings wer razed to the ground. These dead, the article went on, ane not amonh those listed as casualties.

The psychology of the police interviewed by Wills was that potential riots must be squelched. This means that police patrol the ghetto and look for "suspicious" activities. Who could blame the police for using violence to squelch a potential riot? Only those who might question the nature of such activity in the first place and who might question the right of an individual man with a gun to pass judgment on another man without benefit for trial. In Los Angeles in July of 1967, ~~the shot~~ a Black Muslim temple was ~~hx~~ pock-marked with machine guns. The police claimed that they suspected that the Temple was the hiding place for guns. Naturally, the shot first and asked questions later. The result? No guns found.In this case, because of widespread publicity, Major Yorty was forces to apologize publicly for the outrageous conduct of the police. However, such raids continue regularly in the black community by the police. The police are getting "tough". To quote Cook County Sheriff Wood (Chicago): "When we had our Maywood riot, I went around telling my men on the bullhorn, so all those on the street could hear, that any rioter who raised his hands above his head would be guilty of aggravated assault, and should be fire on. I also told my men to shoot carefully- we didn't have extra men to take wounded off to hospitals." Compare this with what happened to Denzil Dowell, above, and Bobby Hutton (see below) A further interesting comparison was a statement made by Herr Goring, who issued these "shoot first" orders: ". . .for failure to act is a graver fault that errors made in action."

Ehen the Berkelyy police broke into the home of Panther Chairman Bobby Seale at 3:30 am on phoney charges of conspiracy to commit murder - charges that the police could never substantiate enough even to press - Huey P. Newton issued Mandate No. 3:

> Because of the St. Valentine Day massacre of February 14, 1929, in which outlaws donned the uniforms of Policemen, posed as such, and thereby gained entrance to locked doors controlled by rival outlaws with whom they were contending for control of the bootlegging industry in Chicago; and because these gansters, gaining entry through their disguise as Policemen, proceeded to exterminate their rivals with machinegun fire, we believe that prudence

would dictate that one should be alert when opening one's door to strangers, lat at night, in the wee morning - even when these strangers wear the uniform of policement. History teaches us that the man in the uniform may or may not be a policeman authorized to enter the homes of the people.

AND

Taking notice of the fact that (1) on January 16, 1968, at 3:30am, members of the San Francisco Police Dept. kicked down the door and made an illegal entry, and search of the home of Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information. These Pigs had no search warrant, no arrest warrant, and were therefore not authorized to enter. They were not invited in. Permission for them to enter was explicitly denied by the Minister of Information. Present were Sister Kathleen Cleaver, our Communications Secretary and wife to our Minister of Information, and Brother Emory Douglas, our Revolutionary Artist.

Taking further notice of the fact that (2) on February 25, 1968, several uniformed gestapos of the Berkeley Pig Department, accompanied by several other white men in plainclothes, bearing an assortment of shotguns, rifles, and service revolvers, made a forceful, unlawful entry and search of the home of Bobby Seale, Chairman of our Party, and his wife, Sister Artie Seale. These Pigs had no warrant either to search or to arrest. When asked by Chairman Bobby to produce a warrant, they arrogantly stated that they did not need one. They had no authortty to enter - what they did have was the power of the gun. Thus we are confronted with a critical situation. Our organization has received serious threats from certain racist elements of White America, including the Oakland, Berkeley, and San Francisco Pig Departments. Threats to take our lives, to exterminate us. We cannot determine when any of these elements, or a combination of them, may move to implement these threats. We must be alert to the danger at all times. We will not fall victim to a St. Valentine's Massacre. Therefore those who approach our doors in the manner of outlaws, who seek to enter our homes illegally, unlawfully and in a rowdy fashion, those who kick our doors down with no authority and seek to ransack our homes in violation of our HUMAN RIGHTS, will henceforth be treated as outlaws, as gangsters, as evildoers. We have no way of determining that a man in uniform involved in a forced outlaw entry into our home is in fact a Guardian of the Law. He is acting like a lawbreaker and we must make an appropriate response.

We draw the line at the threshold of our doors. It is therefore mandated as a general order to all members of the Black Panther Party for Self Defense that all members must acquire the technical equipment to defend their homes and their dependents and shall do so. Any member of the Party having such technical equipment who fails to defend his threshhold shall be expelled from the Party for Life.

It can be seen from this Mandate and from the speeches of members of the Party that the Black Panthers are engaged in SELF DEFENSE. Anyone who gives any thought to what has happened in the black community all [illegible] country, in terms of police brutality, and anyone who reads the newspapers can see what is happening especially to the Black Panther Party in this area (see below for details) must conclude that the very least that black people must do to continue living in this country is to protect their persons from attack. As the Black Panthers have said, it is the man behind the gun who is dangerous. Black Panthers do not accidentlly shoot each other or anyone else. If they use weapons it is when they are personally attacked. If the whites have already declared war on the black people and are forming huge million-dollar arsenals, what kind of response do they expect from the black community? As Stokeley Carmichael has said, the blacks are not going to die the way the Jews in Europe died. The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising will be the example to follow - not the quiet exodus to the furnaces.

Many people object to the notion of the gun saying that there are other ways to stop violence - that the blacks should gain political and economic power. However, as will be shown, below, it takes power to get power. If violence is to be prevented, the whites have the immediate obligation to stop the police from using their array of weapons against the blacks. To ask the blacks to turn the other cheek and get killed is a plea that is immoral and foolish.

THE SACRAMENTO INCIDENT

Because the Black Panther Party has exercised its constitutional right to bear arms, Assemblyman Mufford decided that this right would have to be curbed. He introduced a bill "prohibiting instruction in the use of firearms for the purpose of rioting, and prohibiting the carrying of loaded firearms on public streets and in public places by all except peace officers, guards, and members of the armed forces." (S. F. Chronicle Story, 5/3/57). As most people know the second amendment to the United States Constitution says that "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." The purpose of this amendment was to prevent the very thing that Mulford's bill tries to set up: the regulation of the people's right to be free. What is the nature of this right? Huey Newton stated it very clearly when he said that if the people are unarmed, and if the government has a regular police force and a military force, the people are slaves to the government or are subject to slavery at any time. Newton's conclusion: so long as the police are armed, the black people should be armed. As Newton said: "Ninety percent of the reason we carried guns in the first place was educational. We set the example. We made black people aware that they have the right to carry guns."

Why Go to Sacramento with Guns?

There is some history to the Sacramento incident of which most people are unaware.

On April 1, 1967, a young black man named Denzil Dowell, aged 22 years, was killed by a member of the Contra Costa Sheriff's department. Denzil Dowell was killed with his hands raised over his head. His family was denied the right to photograph his body and the right to have his clothes returned to them. Denzil Dowell was unarmed. Furthermore the sheriffs knew that he was suffering from an unjured hip which would prevent him from escaping from the scene of the crime. WHY WAS HE KILLED? As with the killing of Panther Bobby Hutton (see below) there is no reason - other than that he was black.

On April 18, 1967, the Black Panther representatives, bearing arms, went to see District Attorney Hejedly of Contra Costa County to ask for an investigation of Denzil Dowell's death. The District [illegible] hat he would hold such an investigation and would [illegible] commend that the sheriff who shot Dowell be removed from duty pending the investigation.

On April 19, 1967, representatives of the Black Panthers and some other interested persons met with the sheriff. He refused to allow the Panthers to enter his office carrying guns. Because Panther leader Huey Newton felt the conference was so important, he and the other Panthers gave up their right to wear a gun and removed the guns before talking to the sheriff. The sheriff refused to remove the man who shot Dowell pending the investigation. Further he refused to instruct his men not to kill suspects in crimes involving only property. (The situation in the Dowell killing). The undersheriff instructed the Panthers that if they wished changes made, the should go to Sacramento and speak to the Legislaute. This same undersheriff Ramsey went to the Assembly and spoke in favor of the Mulford bill - and in doing so referred specifically to the need for the bill to deal with the Black Panthers.

In response to this conference and to the Mulford bill itseff, Minister of Defense Huey Newton wrote a statement which Panther Chairman Bobby Seale delivered on the steps of the capitol in Sacramento on May 2, 1967. The statement is as follows:

> The Black Panther Party for Self Defense calls upon the American people in general and the black people in particular to take careful note of the racist California Legislature which is now considering legislation aimed at keeping the black people disarmed and powerless at the very same time that racist police agencies throughout the country are intensifying the terror, brutality, murder and repression of black people.
>
> At the same time that the American government is waging a racist war of genocide in Vietnam, the concentration camps in which Japanese Americans were interned during World War Two are being renovated and expanded. Since America has historically reserved the most barbaric treatment for non-white people, we are forced to conclude that these concentration camps are being prepared for black people, who are determined to gain their freedom by and means necessary. The enslavement of black people from the very beginning of this country, the genocide practiced on the American Indians and the confining of the survivors on reservations, the savage lynching of thousands of black men and women, the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and now the cowardly massacre in Vietnam, all testify to the fact that towards people of color the racist power structure of America has but one policy: repression, genocide, terror and the big stick.
>
> Black people have begged, prayed, petitioned, demonstrated and everything else to get the racist power structure of America to rig the wrongs which have historically been perpetrated against black people. All of these efforts have been answered by more repression, deceit, and hypocrisy. As the agression of the racist American government escalates in Vietnam, the police agencies of America escalate the repression of black people throughout the ghettos of America. Vicious police dogs, cattle prods and increased patrols have become familiar sights in black communities. City Hall turns a feaf ear to the pleas of black people for relief from this increasing terror.

> The Black Panth[illegible] Party for Self Denfense be[illegible]eves that the time has come for black people to arm themselves against thhis terror before it is too late. The pending Mulford Act brings the hour of doom one step nearer. A people who have suffered so much for so long at the hands of a racist society, must draw the line somewhere. We believe that the black communities of America' must rise up as one man to halt the progression of a trend that leads inevitably to their total destruction.

In the section on Self Defense, above, further explanation for the use of guns was given. However, it should be pointed out here that the genocide of the black people in this country is sometihing that white people should fear for their own sakes as well as for the welfare of the black race. Those of you who are old enough to remember the pre-World War II history will recall that when Hitler came to power in Germany he started exterminating his political enemies by picking on the leadership (as the Oakland police are picking off the leadership of the Black Panther Party). He then, when this was not stopped by popular outrage and action, went on to kill millions and millions of those whom he defined as enemies. A government which can exterminate one group at will can exterminate many. When Stalin, in the Soviet Union, felt it necessary to exterminate enemies, he btated on a small scale. When he found that he could continue this technique, the purges became wider and wider in scope. Although Huey Newton feels the concentration camps will be filled with black people, those of us who are white and are outraged at this possibility feel that they can be enlarged to include whites, too! Remember that the National Socialist definition of "Jew" was pretty all-inclusive. IN the South , whites have been referred to as "white Nigger"

On May2, 1967, the Black Panthers went to Sacramento, carrying guns legally. They went to the Assembly observation section led by a crew of television men and reporters. When they were directed to the observer box, the Assembly members requested that the guards remove the television cameras, not the guns. The capitol police were, at all times, aware of the fact that the Black Panbhers were armed. Had the Panthers entered the Assembly with guns to do any shooting, they had ample opportunity. However, this was not their purpose. They came to protest the Mulford bill, which was explicitly directed against tehm, and to deliver the above-quoted statement of Huey Newton on the genocidal nature of the American government.

Because the Panthers weee legally carrying guns, they could not be arrested while at the capitol. However, as they were leaving Sacramento, the police dug up an old Fish and Game law that dealt with loaded weapons in a vehicle. The law was enacted to prevent accidents when hunters carried guns. The Panthers were having their cars serviced at a gas station when the police arrested 23 of them for violation of the Fish and LGame code. The Panthers did not resist arrest, even though they were armed and were numerous. After being arrested, the Panthers were thrown into the drunk tank of the jail with neither beds nor blankets. They were treated just like the animals for the killing of which regulations were made in the Fish and Game law.

As Huey Newton predicted, the press response to the incident was to distort what happened and to raise the spectre of violence. The press called the Panthers thugs and indicated that they came to Sacramento only to disrupt the proceedings of the Assembly. How-[illegible]ton pointed out, the young black people on the block at home have been calle hoodlums and thugs all thei ives. Thus, when they heard what the papers called the Panthers they wanted to know what these "hoodlums" were up to, carrying guns. Thus, the Panther message was spread in the black community almost because of the press distortions.

As to press accounts calling the Panthers miliant and anti-white, these were false charges. The documents below indicate that the Panthers are not a racist organization and will form coalitions with white groups who are willing to support the Panther platform and who will work to end racism.

The Mulford bill was enacted into law as a special bill and has been used, predictably since then, to harrass members of the Black Panther Party. Attorneys feel that the bill is clearly unconstitutional. However, as will be shown below, lack of funds, as well as the nature of the court system, prevent the unconstitutionality from being adequately tested. Eight members of the Black Panther Party served jail sentences on the phoney charge. The rest did not serve time because the district attorney indicated that if eight would serve ~~xxmxb~~ he would not press charges against the rest. It should be noted that this type of justice is not limited to the Black Panthers. Every day black people are arrested on charges which are false or unsubstantiated. Because of lack of funds many of them serve jail sentences. Many of those who can afford attorneys are found guilty by all-white juries and judges. Since Sacramento, the Panthers have been constantly harrassed. See below for further details.

THE MURDER OF BOBBY HUTTON AND THE ARREST OF THE PANTHER-8

On Sunday, April 7, the Black Panther Party had planned a picnic barbecue to raise money for the defense of Huey P. Newton. Saturday night Eldridge Cleaver, Bobby Hutton, and a number of other Panthers were driving around Oakland to collect food that the sisters had prepared. Their mission was interrupted when sereral squad cars of Oakland police intercepted and ambushed the Panthers in their own community. Today, Eldridge Cleaver is behind bars, possibly for life. Bobby Hutton is dead - murdered by the Oakland pigs when he tried to surredder from the gas-filled, burning house. Seven other Panthers plus Cleaver face Grand Jury indictments for attempted murder, indictments based on false information provided by the pigs and extorted confessions from the imprisoned Panthers.

The following information came out in an interview a San Francisco Chronicle reporter had with Cleaver in jail:

Bobby Hutton, aged 17, was killed by police bullets - he was told to run for a squad car and, while his hands were raised and he was unarmed, officers shot him down.

With one or two exeptions, the arsenal of guns the police claim was taken from the scene of the shoot-out was actually taken from a parked Panther's car's locked trunk, miles away, and hours later.

Following the police ambush of the Panthers, cops made no attempt to immediately allow Cleaver and Hutton out of the house they were holed up in. Instead they poured a fusillade of bullets in through its walls.

Eldridge Cleaver was not carrying a gun. "I was never armed", he said, "because Huey P. Newton had laid down orders that, as a parolee, I should not be armed."

Although the pigs and the racist press repeatedly tried to call the ambush a Panther se-up, within two minutes after the police had stopped and pulled their weapons at 2905 Union Street, an entire two-block area was blocked. . . and dozens of Emeryville and Oakland police officers had (supposedly answering a call for reinforcements) appeared on the scese, thoroughly equipped with riot helmets, OVERKILL weapons, tear gas bombs. . .

Cleaver's account of the incident indicated that the trouble began around 9:30 p.m. when a squad car pulled alongside 3 Panther cars parked on 28th Street. Cleaver saw a cop get out of a squad car, which had suddenly pulled up, "heard some loud talk" from a cop "and suddenly a gun exploded right in my face." Cleaver said he and Bobby "lit out" through an alleyway and through a side door into the basement of a house that had no connection with the Panthers. "We laid down on our backs and the cops started firing. I could see their bullets coming in through a beaverboard partition about a foot above my face."

A concrete foundation of the building partially protected them and it was probably a ricochet that later wounded Cleaver. A tear gas cannister also hit him in the chest. "The gas was thick now and Bobby took off my clothing to see where I was hit. I was bleeding from my foot and coughing."

Finally a tear gas cartridge or something else fired by the police set fire to the basement and the side of the house. "We couldn't stand it anymore and I yelled, "We're coming out".
Cleaver limped out of the house, with Bobby holding his arm to support him. Out in the alleyway,". . .we both fell down when they (the cops) told us to and cops from the street (perhaps 15 yards away) approached us. They kicked us and cursed us for about five minutes - while we were lying on the ground." At this time Cleaver was wearing only his socks, all his other clothing having been stripped off by Bobby in a search for wounds. "Then the cops told us to get up and start running for the squad car." LCleaver was unable to because of the leg wound, and he fell. "Bobby started running - he ran about 10 yards - and they started shoothin him. I heard 12 shots; it was hard to tell for sure. He had his hands high in the air until he died."

Cleaver was taken to Highland Hospital emergency room, then rushed off to San lQuentin, and then, as soon as his lawyer arrived, was whisked off to Vacaville supposedly for "medical attention", although San lQuentin has some of the finest medical facilities in the State prison system. At Vacaville, Cleaver has been kept;in total isolation "maximum security", with his wife and lawyers given only curtailed visits, and no other visitors allowed. It was only the power of Establishment Press which finally got the Chronicle reporter an interview with him.

Exobitantly high bail was set for all the arrested Panthers - $63,00 for Cleaver (which is irrelevant since his parole was revoked thus automatically confining him for the next four years) and $40,00 each for the other seven. Cleaver's parole was revoked at 3 a.m. the night of April 7 and there was no hearing.

The LGrand Jury testimony against the 9 Panthers who were arrested that night, at the scene of the shoot-out, in homes nearby, or in their cars, includes alleged "confessions" by them that they had been out "looking to do some shooting" and other statements. All such statements are difficult or impossible to believe would have been voluntarily given by any Black Panther arrested for shooting at cops. As in the Newton case, the Grand Jury was blatantly employed to deny the defendants their right to a preliminary hearing (see article "Why Free Huey Newton").

Attorney Charles R. Garry has filed affidavits of the Panthers arrested in a suit against the City of Oakland, the Chief of Police and the Mayor of Oakland, seeking to enjoin the DA from any further prosecutions of the Panthers. The affidavits charged brutalization of the Panthers by the police, intimidation and lying. Some Panthers did make brief statements to a man they were told was their lawyer, who had been brought in "because Garry and other Panther attorneys had no interest in the case" (a complete fabrication). The "lawyer" turned out later to be a cop. Another Panther was beaten on the soles of his feet until he made a statement. A third Panther said he had never made any statement to the police at all, and that it was pure lies on their part when they attributed statements to him. The complete statements in the affidavits indicate that the cop harrassment and brutalization were designed to(1) "confuse and deceive each of the brothers and turn them against each other and on Eldridge Cleaver by blatantly lying to them; (2) to get statements from them which would build up as much evidence against Eldridge Cleaver as possible."

This actions of the police in attempting to extort these confessions makes it quite clear that their target was the leadership of the Panthers - in this case, Eldridge Cleaver. Like most elements of the power structure they are working on the assumption that if you can destroy the leadership you can cripple the movement. As usual, they failed to see the extent to which the struggle in the black community grows out of the needs of that entire community. Oppression in the black community is not going to be gone or forgotten when the leaders of the Black Panther Party are jailed or shot. The people are not going to stop fighting.

On Sunday, April 7, several hundred people turned out in DeFremery Park at ~~a~~ the barbecue picnic for the Huey P. Newton Defense Fund.

POLICE HARASSMENT OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

A sample of Incidents

1. From October, 1966, to October , 1967, Huey Newton has been harassed by the Oakland police-had been stopped on innumerable occasions without reasonable cause.

2. Spring and summer, 1967-This was the most intense period of harassment for the Panthers. It took place after a demonstration by Panthers carrying rifles at the State Legislature in Sacremento during Assembly debate on a bill which would restrict a citizen's right to bear arms. During this period, Panthers were repeatedly stopped in cars and on the street; many were arrested; homes were entered illegally by police.

3. May 22, 1967-Bobby Seale went to the Oakland County Courthouse to bail Huey Newton out of jail. He was leaning against a retaining wall outside carrying a "legal" shotgun. He was arrested and charged with an obscure law, dating back to the 1800's,

making it a crime to smuggle guns into a jail, or possess a gun adjacent a jail.

4. June 2, 1967-Harr[illegible] Tucker was arrested by the [illegible]erkeley police. He was accused of fighting a white boy. He was not allowed the two phone calls that any prisoner is required by law to have. He was separated from the other inmates, He was tried, convicted and sent to Santa Rita where he was told not to engage in any political discussion. He was forced to work on the farm section and to cut his "Afro" hair style. He pointed out that the Berkeley police have pictures of Huey Newton and Bobby Seale which are captioned "Approach with Caution".

5. October 28, 1967-Huey Newton wounded and arrested in a shooting incident in Oakland in which Oakland Officer Frey was killed and Officer Heanes wounded.

6. January 15, 1968-National Captain David Hilliard arrested while passing out leaflets at Oakland Tech.

7. January 16, 1968-At 3:30 a.m. San Francisco policemen broke down the door of Eldridge Cleaver's apartment at 850 Oak St., San Francisco, and searched the apartment-without a warrant. Eldridge, his wife, Kathleen, and Panther Revolutionary Artist Emory Douglas were present.

8. February 5, 1968-At 1:00 a.m. a Panther and his girlfriend were arrested for "disturbing the peace", after a rally at which Dr. Spock and James Forman spoke. They were beaten in jail.

9. February 24, 1968-Panther Jimmy Charley approached a policeman who was in the act of assaulting a black person, and questioned the officer. He was promptly arrested and charged with "resisting arrest".

10. February 25, 1968-At 3:30 a.m. police broke down the door of Bobby Seale's home, where Bobby and his wife, Artie, were in bed asleep. There was no warrant. Police said they were acting on a complaint implicating Bobby in a vague "conspiracy to commit murder" charge, which was promptly dropped for lack of evidence. Shotgun-toting police confiscated weapons and arrested Mr. and Mrs. Seale. Four other Panthers, in a car nearby, were also arrested a short time later, and charged with misdemeanors. Mr. and Mrs. Seale face trial on charges of possessing illegal weapons, including possession of guns with serial numbers filed off. Seale contends that the police filed off the serial numbers after the arrest. Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale, before forming the Black Panther Party carefully studied and analyzed the law pertaining to carrying guns and taught these laws to new members of the Black Panther Party-they were anything but unaware of the law and followed the law in all respects.

11. Third and fourth weeks of February, 1968-A rash ofxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx arrests of black men either in the Panthers or identified with them. One of the incidents took place in front of the Natural shop on San Pablo St. in Oakland. This incident happened when police stopped the car of a black youth on an alleged traffic violation in front of the sho[illegible]cemen pulled the youth from the car, threw him against

the car door and beat him brutally. About ten Panthers and their associates gathered around to protest and were arrested. This rash of arrests coincided with the visit o[illegible]keley Carmichael to the Bay Area.

12. April 3, 1968-Police entered Father Neil's church in Oakland where the Panthers were holding a meeting. A black youth associated with the Panthers (but not authorized by them to possess a gun) was, according to police, drunk and waving a gun outside the church. Police surrounded the church and entered it, about twelve of them in threatening manner. They were accompanied, inexplicably, by a white priest and a black clergyman, both from Oakland. David Hilliard came out of the out of the sanctuary and refused to allow police to enter the sanctuary. Upon seeing Hilliard, police lowered their guns and cast their eyes about, looking for someone else. The Panthers are convinced they were looing for Bobby Seale.

13. April 5, 1968-San Diego police crashed down the door of Ken Denman, PFP leader and Panther organizer in San Diego. They had no warrant.

14. April 6, 1968-Several Panthers in cars in west Oakland on Saturday night, April 6, were approached by two policemen and menaced with guns. When the Panthers tried to defend themselves, shooting began, and the Panthers ran into a nearby house. After about 90 minutes of shooting by some 50 members of the Oakland P. D. who set fire to the house and filled it with tear gas, the Panthers were forced to surrender. With floodlights covering the house, Bobby Hutton walked out with his hands up. Someone yelled that he had a gun, and he was shot. He was not armed; no gun was found anywhere near his body. Eldridge Cleaver, wounded in the leg, and eyes badly burned by tear gas, came out. In total, nine persons were arrested, including Panther National Captain David Hilliard. Two policemen were wounded slightly.

15. April 9, 1968- Two Black Panther women were going about Oakland in a car putting up posters announcing the candidacy of Huey Newton for Congress and Bobby Seale for Assembly on the Peace and Freedom ticket. Twelve policemen with shotguns stopped their car and searched it - without probable cause. Throughout the day, patrol cars circled the Newton-Seale campaign headquarters. Sam Napier and other Panthers were physically stopped by police from putting up campaign posters. Police have been spotted by Oakland residents tearing down Newton-Seale posters.

16. April 13, 1968-Four members of the Black Panther Party were returning from Bobby Hutton's funeral when they were arrested on suspicion of robbery. Since it was Friday, they were to be kept over the weekend before they could be arraigned. This is a typical police procedure - it means three days detention instead of overnight before a court appearance. The robbery took place on Monday. Furthermore the robbery car was driven by one person with one passenger. Four people were arrested Friday. The car was in the shop being repaired at the time of the alleged robbery. On Sunday, after a weekend of work by Attorney Alex Hoffmann, the "suspects" were released - they couldn't be identified as having even a remote connection with the alleged robbery. When arrested

Document entitled, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work."

Document entitled, "We Demand Community Control of Police."

Document entitled, "Fred Hampton - Mark Clark Inquest."

The above documents were furnished by on January 11, 1970.

12

RECTIFY THE PARTY'S STYLE OF WORK

The Party School opens today and I wish it every success.

I would like to say something about the problem of our Party's style of work.

Why must there be a revolutionary party? There must be a revolutionary party because the world contains enemies who oppress the people and the people want to throw off enemy oppression. In the era of capitalism and imperialism, just such a revolutionary party as the Communist Party is needed. Without such a party it is simply impossible for the people to throw off enemy oppression. We are Communists, we want to lead the people in overthrowing the enemy, and so we must keep our ranks in good order, we must march in step, our troops must be picked troops and our weapons good weapons. Without these conditions the enemy cannot be overthrown.

What is the problem now facing our Party? The general line of the Party is correct and presents no problem, and the Party's work has been fruitful. The Party has several hundred thousand members who are leading the people in extremely hard and bitter struggles against the enemy. This is plain to everybody and beyond all doubt.

Then is there or is there not any problem still facing our Party? I say there is and, in a certain sense, the problem is quite serious.

What is the problem? It is the fact that there is something in the minds of a number of our comrades which strikes one as not quite right, not quite proper.

In other words, there is still something wrong with our style of study, with our style in the Party's internal and external relations and with our style of writing. By something wrong with the style of study we mean the malady of subjectivism. By something wrong with our style in Party relations we mean the malady of sectarianism. By something wrong with the style of writing we mean the malady of stereotyped Party writing. All these are wrong, they are ill winds, but they are not like the wintry north winds that sweep across the whole sky. Subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing are no longer the dominant styles, but merely gusts of contrary wind, ill winds from the air-raid tunnels. It is bad, however, that such winds should still be blowing in the Party. We must seal off the passages which produce them. Our whole Party should undertake the job of sealing off these passages, and so should the Party School. These three ill winds, subjectivism, sectarianism and stereo-typed Party writing, have their historical origins. Although no longer dominant in the whole Party, they still constantly create trouble and assail us. Therefore, it is necessary to resist them and to study, analyse, and elucidate them.

Fight subjectivism in order to rectify the style of study, fight sectarianism in order to rectify the style in Party relations, and fight Party stereotypes in order to rectify the style of writing--such is the task before us.

To accomplish the task of overthrowing the enemy, we must accomplish the task of rectifying these styles within the Party. The style of study and the style of writing are also the Party's style of work. Once our Party's style of work is put completely right, the people all over the country will learn from our example. Those outside the Party who have the same kind of bad style will, if they are good and honest people, learn from our

REFORM OUR STUDY

May 1941

I propose that we should reform the method and the system of study throughout the Party. The reasons are as follows:

I.

The twenty years of the Communist Party of China have been twenty years in which the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism has become more and more integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. If we recall how superficial and meager our understanding of Marxism-Leninism and of the Chinese revolution was during our Party's infancy, we can see how much deeper and richer it is now. For a hundred years, the finest sons and daughters of the disaster-ridden Chinese nation fought and sacrificed their lives, one stepping into the breach as another fell, in quest of the truth that would save the country and the people. This moves us to song and tears. But it was only after World War I and the October Revolution in Russia that we found Marxism-Leninism, the best of truths, the best of weapons for liberating our nation And the Communist Party of China has been the initiator, propagandist and organizer in the wielding of this weapon. As soon as it was linked with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism gave an entirely new complexion to the Chinese revolution. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, our Party, basing itself on the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, has taken a further step in its study of the concrete practice of this war and in its study of China and the world today, and has also made a beginning in the study of Chinese history. These are all very good signs.

II.

However, we still have shortcomings, and very big ones too. Unless we correct these shortcomings, we shall not, in my opinion, be able to take another step forwar in our work and in our great cause of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.

First, take the study of current conditions. We have achieved some success in our study of present domestic and international conditions, but for such a large political party as ours, the material we have collected is fragmentary and our research work unsystematic on each and every aspect of these subjects, whether it be the political, military, economic or cultural aspect. Generally speaking, in the last twenty years, we have not done systematic and thorough work in collecting and studying material on these aspects, and we are lacking in a climate of investigation and study of objective reality. To behave like "a blindfolded man catching sparrows" or a "blind men groping for fish," to be crude and careless, to indulge in verbiage, to rest content with a smattering of knowledge--such is the extremely bad style of work that still exists among many comrades in our Party, a style utterly opposed to the fundamental spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin have taught us that it is necessary to study conditions conscientiously and to proceed from objective reality and not from subjective wishes; but many of our comrades act in direct violation of this truth.

Second, take the study of history. Although a few Party members and sympathizers have undertaken this work, it has not been done in an organized way. Many Party members are still in a fog about Chinese history, whether of the last hundred years or of ancient times. There are many Marxist-Leninist scholars who cannot open their mouths without citing ancient Greece; but as for their own ancestors—sorry, they have been forgotten. There is no climate of serious study either of current conditions or of past history.

III.

In order to explain this idea further, I should like to contrast two opposite attitudes.

First, there is the subjectivist attitude. With this attitude, a person does not make a systematic and thorough study of the environment, but works by sheer subjective enthusiasm and has a blurred picture of the face of China today. With this attitude, he chops up history, knows only ancient Greece but not China and is in a fog about the China of yesterday and the day before yesterday. With this attitude a person studies Marxist-Leninist theory in the abstract and without any aim. He goes to Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin not to seek the stand, viewpoint and method with which to solve the theoretical and tactical problems of the Chinese revolution but to study theory purely for theory's sake. He does not shoot the arrow at the target but shoots at random. Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin have taught us that we should proceed from objective realities and that we should derive laws from them to serve as our guide to action. For this purpose we should, as Marx has said, appropriate the material in detail and subject it to scientific analysis and synthesis.[3] Many of our people do not act in this way but do the opposite. A good number of them are doing research work but have no interest in studying either the China of today or the China of yesterday and confine their interest to the study of empty "theories" divorced from reality. Many others are doing practical work, but they too pay no attention to the study of objective conditions, often rely on sheer enthusiasm and substitute their personal feelings for policy. Both kinds of people, relying on the subjective, ignore the existence of objective realities. When making speeches, they indulge in a long string of headings, A, B, C, D, 1, 2, 3, 4, and when writing articles, they turn out a lot of verbiage. They have no intention of seeking truth from facts, but only a desire to curry favour by claptrap. They are flashy without substance, brittle without solidity. They are always right, they are the Number One authority under Heaven, "imperial envoys" who rush everywhere. Such is the style of work of some comrades in our ranks. To govern one's own conduct by this style is to harm oneself, to teach it to others is to harm others, and to use it to direct the revolution is to harm the revolution. To sum up, this subjectivist method which is contrary to science and Marxism-Leninism is a formidable enemy of the Communist Party, the working class, the people and the nation; it is a manifestation of impurity in Party spirit. A formidable enemy stands before us, and we must overthrow him. Only when subjectivism is overthrown can the truth of Marxism-Leninism prevail, can Party spirit be strengthened, can the revolution be victorious. We must assert that the absence of a scientific attitude, that is, the absence of the Marxist-Leninist approach of uniting theory and practice, means that Party spirit is either absent or deficient.

There is a couplet which portrays this type of person. It runs:

The reed growing on the wall--top-heavy, thin-stemmed and shallow of root;
The bamboo shoot in the hills--sharp-tongued, thick-skinned and hollow
inside.

Is this not an apt description of those who do not have a scientific attitude, who can only recite words and phrases from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and who enjoy a reputation unwarranted by any real learning? If anyone really wishes to cure himself of this malady, I advise him to commit this couplet to memory or to show still more courage and paste it on the wall of his room. Marxism-Leninism is a science, and science means honest, solid knowledge; there is no room for playing tricks. Let us, then, be honest.

Secondly, there is the Marxist-Leninist attitude. With this attitude, a person applies the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism to the systematic and thorough investigation and study of the environment. He does not work by enthusiasm alone, but, as Stalin says, combines revolutionary sweep with practicalness.[4] With this kind of theorists [illegible] want? We want theori[illegible]ho can, in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method, correctly interpret the practical problems arising in the course of history and revolution and give scientific explanations and theoretical elucidations of China's economic, political, military, cultural and other problems. Such are the theorists we want. To be a theorist of this kind, a person must have a true grasp of the essence of Marxism-Leninism, of the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method and of the theories of Lenin and Stalin on the colonial revolution and the Chinese revolution, and he must be able to apply them in a penetrating and scientific analysis of China's practical problems and discover the laws of development of these problems. Such are the theorists we really need.

The Central Committee of our Party has now made a decision calling upon our comrades to learn how to apply the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method in the serious study of Chinas history, and of China's economics, politics, military affairs and culture, and to analyse every problem concretely on the basis of detailed material and then draw theoretical conclusions. This is the responsibility we must shoulder.

Our comrades in the Party School should not regard Marxist theory as lifeless dogma. It is necessary to master Marxist theory and apply it, master it for the sole purpose of applying it. If you can apply the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint in elucidating one or two practical problems, you shoule be commended and credited with some achievement. The more problems you elucidate and the more comprehensively and profuondly you do so, the greater will be your achievement. Our Party School should also lay down yhr xxxx rule to grade students good or poor accoring to how they look at China's problems after they have studied Marxism-Leninism, according to whether or not they see the problems clearly and whether or not they see them at all.

Next let us talk about the question of the "intellectuals". Since China is a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country and her culture is not well developed, intellectuals are particularly treasured On this question of the intellectuals, the Central Committee of the Party made the decision over two years ago that we should win over the great numbers of intellectuals and, insofar as they are revolutionary and willing to take part in the resistance to Japan, welcome them one and all. It is entirely right for us to esteem intellectuals, for without revolutionary intellectuals the revolution cannot triumph. But we all know there are many intellectuals xxx xx who fancy themselves very learned and assume airs of erudition without realizing that such airs are bad and harmful and hinder their own progress. They ought to be aware of the trugh that actually many so-called intellectuals are, relatively speaking, most ignorant anda the workers and peasants sometimes know more than they do. Here some will say, "Ha! You are turning things upside down and talking nonsense." But, xxxp comrades don't get excited; there is some sense in what I am saying.

What is Knowledge? Ever since class society came into being The world has known only two kinds of knowledge, knowledge of the struggle for production and knowledge of the class struggle. Natural science and social science are the crystalizations of these two kinds of knowledge, and philosophy is the generalization and summation of the knowledge of nature and the knowledge of society. Is there any other kind of knowledge? No. Now let us

example and correct their mistakes, and thus the whole nation will
12 be influenced. S[illegible] as our Communist r[illegible]e in good order and march in step, [illegible]ong as our troops are picked troops and our weapons are good weapons, any enemy, however powerful, can be overthrown.

Let me speak now about subjectivism.

Subjectivism is an improper style of study; it is opposed to Marxism-Leninism and is incompatible with the Communist Party. What we want is the Marxist-Leninist style of study. What we call style of study means not just style of study in the schools but in the whold Party. It is a question of the method of thinking of comrades in our leading bodies, of all cadres and Party members, a question of our attitude towards Marxism-Leninism, of the attitude of all Party comrades in their work. As such, it is a question of extraordinary, indeed of primary, importance.

Certain muddled ideas find currency among many people. There are, for instance, muddled ideas about what is a theorist, what is an intellectual and what is meant by linking theory and practice.

Let us first ask, is the theoretical level of our Party high or low? Recently more Marxist Lenist works have been translated and more people have been reading them. That is a very good thing. But can we therefore n say that the theoretical level of our Party has been greatly raised? True, the level is now somewhat higher than before. But our theoretical front is very much out of harmony with the rich content of the Chinese revolutionary movement, and a comparison of the two shows that the theoretical side is lagging far behind. Generally speaking, our theory cannot as yet keep pace with our revolutionary practice, let alone lead the way as it should. We have not yet raised our rich and varied practice to the proper theoretical plane. We have not yet exmined all the problems of revolutionary practice--or even the important ones--and raised them to a theoretical plane. Just think, how many of us have created theories worthy of the name on China's economics, politics, military affairs or culture, theories which can be regarded as scientific and comprehensive, and not crude and sketchy? Especially in the field of economic theory: Chinese capitalism has had a century of development since the opium War, and yet not a single theoretical work had been produced which accords with the realities of China's economic problems, for instance, the theoretical level is already high? Can we say that our Party kxx already has economic theorists worthy of the name? Certainly not. We have read a great many Marxist-Lenist books, but can we claim, then, that we have theorists? We cannot. For Marxism-Leninism is the theory created by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on the basis of practice, their general conclusion drawn from historical and revolutionary reality. If we merely read their works but do not proceed to study the realities of China's history and revolution in the light of their theory or do not make any effort to think through China's revolutionary practice carefully in terms of theory, we should not be so presumptuous as to call ourselves Marxist theorists. Our achievements on the theoretical front will be very poor indeed if, as members of the Communist Party of China, we close our eyes to China's problems and can only memorize isolated conclusions or principles from Marxist writings. If all a person can do is to commit Marxist economics or philosophy to memory, reciting glibly from Chapter I to Chapter X, but is utterly unable to apply them, can he be considered a Marxist theorist? No! He cannot. What take a look at certain students, thode brought up in schools that abe completely cut off from the practical activities of society. What about them? A person goes through a primary school of this kind all the way through to a university of the same kind, graduates and is reckoned to have a stock of learning. But all he has is booklearning; he has not yet taken part in any practical activities or applied what he has learned to any field of life. Can such a person be regarded asa completely developed intellectual? Hardly so, in my opinion, because his knowledge is still incomplete. What then is relatively complete knowledge? All relatively complete knowledge is formed in two stages: The first stage is perceptual knowledge, the second is rational knowledge, the latter being the development of the former to a higher level. What sort of knowledge is thw student's booklearning? Even supposing all their knowledge is truth, it is still not kmowledge acquired through thier own personal experience, but consists of theories set down by thier predecessors in summarizing experience of the struggle for production and of the class struggle. It is entirely necessary that students should acquire this kind of knowledge, but it must be understood that as far as they are concerned such knowledge is in a sense s still one sided, something which has been verified by others but not yet by themselves. What is most important is to be good at applying this knowledge in life and in practice. Therefore, I advise those who have only booklearning but as yet no contact with reality, and also those with little practical experience, to realize their own short comings and become a little more modest.

How can those who havw only booklaerning be turned into intellectuals in the true sense? The only way is to get them to take part in practicwl work and become practical workers, to get those engaged in theoretical work to study important practical problems. In this way our ~~xxx~~ aim can be attained.

What I have said will probably make some people angry. They will say, "According to your explanation, even Marx would not be regarded as an intellectual." I say they are wrong. Marx took part in the practice of the revolutionary movement and also created revolutionary theory. Beginning with the commodity, the simplest element of capitalism, he made a thorough study of the economic structure of capitalist society. Millions of people saw and handled commodities every day but were so used to them that they took no notice. Marx alone studied commodities scientifically. He carried out a tremendous work of research into their actual development and derived a nature, history and proletarian revolution and created dialectical materialism, hostorical materialism and the theory of proletarian revolution. Thus Marx became a most completely developed intellectual, representing the acme of human wisdom; he was fundamentally different from those who have only book-learning. Marx undertook detailed investigations and studies in the course of practical struggles, formed generalizations and then verified his conclusions by testing them in practical struggles--this is what we call theoretical work. Our Party needs a large number of comrades who will learn how to do such work. In our Party there are many comrades who can learn to do this kind of theoretical research; most of them are intelligent and promising and we should value them. But they must follow correct principles and not repeat the mistake of the past. They must discard dogmatism and not confine themselves to ready-made

3. As for education for [illegible]es whether at [illegible] in sch[illegible] for cadres, a po-
licy should be established o[illegible] focusing such education on the [illegible]udy of the practical problems of the Chinese revolution and using the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism as the guide, and the method of studying Marxism-Leninism statically and in isolation should be discarded. Moreover, in studying Marxism-Leninism, we should use the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course as the principal material. It is the best synthesis and summing up of the world communist movement of the past hundred years, a model of the integration of theory and practice, and so far the only comprehensive model in the whole world. When we see how Lenin and Stalin integrated the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Soviet revolution and thereby developed Marxism, we shall know how we should work in China.

We have made many detours. But error is often the precursor of what is correct. I am confident that in the context of the Chinese revolution and the world revolution, which is so intensely alive and so richly varied, this reform of our study will certainly yield good results.

NOTES

1. Fuhsien County is about seventy kilometres south of Yenan.

2. The Border Region currency consisted of the currency notes issued by the ank of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. The Kuomintang currency as the paper currency issued by the four big Kuomintang bureaucrat-capitalist banks rom 1935 onwards with British and U.S. imperialist support. Comrade Mao Tse-tung as referring to the fluctuations in the rates of exchange between these two currencies.

3. See Karl Marx, "Afterword to the Second German Edition" (January 24, 1873) f Capital in which he wrote: "The latter (the method of inquiry) has to appropriate he material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out heir inner connection. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be dequately described." (Capital, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, Vol. I, p. 19.)

4. See J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism" (April-May 1924), Problems Leninism, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1952, p. 80.

* * * * * * * *

Comrade Mao Tse-tung made this report to a cadres' meeting in Yenan. The report and the two articles, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work" and "Oppose Stereoyped Party Writing," are Comrade Mao Tse-tung's basic works on the rectification ovement. In these he summed up, on the ideological plane, past differences in the arty over the Party line and analyzed the petty-bourgeois ideology and style which, squerading as Marxism-Leninism, were prevalent in the Party, and which chiefly anifested themselves in subjectivist and sectarian tendencies, their form of exression being stereotyped Party writing. Comrade Mao Tse-tung called for a Partyide movement of Marxist-Leninist education to rectify style of work in accordance ith the ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism. His call very quickly led to great debate between proletarian and petty-bourgeois ideology inside and outside e Party. This consolidated the position of proletarian ideology inside and outide the Party, enabled the broad ranks of cadres to take a great step forward ideoogically and the Party to achieve unprecedented unity.

If people are not on [illegible]rd, do not realize that such one-sidedness is a shortcoming and do not strive to overcome [illegible]t, they are liable to go astray..

However, of the two kinds of subjectivism, dogmatism is still the greater danger in our Party. For dogmatists can easily assume a Marxist guide to bluff, capture and make servitors of cadres of working-class and peasant origin who cannot easily see through them; they can also bluff and ensnare the naive youth. If we overcome dogmatism, cadres with book-learning will readily join with those who have experience and will take to the study of practical things, and then many good cadres who integrate theory with experience, as well as some real theorists, will emerge. If we overcome dogmatism, the comrades with practical experience will have good teachers to help them raise their experience to the level of theory and so avoid empiricist errors.

Besides muddled ideas about the "theorist" and the "intellectual", there is a muddled idea among many comrades about "linking theory and practice", a phrase they have on their lips every day. They talk constantly about "linking", but actually they mean "separating", because they make no effort at linking. How is x Marxist-Leninist theory to be linked with the practice of the Chinese revolution? To use a common expression, it is by "shooting the arrow at the target". As the arrow is to the target, so is Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese revolution. Some comrades, however, are "shooting without a target", shooting at random, and such people are liable to harm the revolution. Others merely sx stroke the arrow fondly, exclaiming, "What a fine arrow! What a fine arrow!," but never want to shoot it. These people are only connoisseurs of curios and have virtually nothing to do with the revolution. The arrow of Marxism-Leninism must be used to shoot at the target of the Chinese revolution. Unless this point is made clear, the theoretical level of our Party can never be raised and the Chinese revoltuion can never be victorious.

Our comrades must understand that we study Marxism-Leninism not for display, nor because there is any mystery about it, but solely because it is the science which leads the revolutionary cause of the proletariat to victory. Even now, there are not a few people who still regard odd quotations from Marxist-Leninist works as a ready-made panacea which, once acquired, can easily cure all maladies. These people show childish ignorance, and we should enlighten them. It is precisely such ignorant people who take Marxism-Leninism as a religious dogma. To them we should say bluntly, "Your dogma is worthless." Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin have repeatedly stated that our theory is not a dogma but a guide to action. But such people prefer to forget this xx statement which is of the greatest, indeed the utmost, importance. Chinese Communists can be regarded as linking theory with practice only when they become good at applying the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method and the teachings of Lenin and Stalin concerning the Chinese revolution and when, furthermore, through serious research into the realities of China's history and revolution they do creative theoretical work to meet China's needs in different spheres. Merely talking about linking theory and practice without actually doing anything about it is of no use, even if one goes on talking for a hundred years. To oppose the subjectivist, one-sided approach to problems, we must demolish dogmatist subjectiveness and one-sidedness.

So much for today about combating subjectivism in order to rectify the style of study throughout the party.

Let me now speak about the question of sectarianism.

Having been steeled for twenty years, our Party is no longer dominated by sectarianism. Remnants of sectarianism, however, are still found both in the Party's internal relations and in its external relations. Sectarian tendencies in internal relations lead to exclusiveness towards people outside the Party and hinder inner-Party unity and solidarity, while sectarian tendencies in external relations lead to exclusiveness towards people outside the Party and hinder the Party in its task of uniting the whole people. Only by uprooting this evil in both its aspects can the Party advance unimpeded in its great task of achieving unity among all Party comrades and among all the people of our country.

What are the remnants of inner-Party sectarianism? They are mainly as follows:

First, the assertion of "independence". Some comrades see only the interests of the part and not the whole; they always put undue stress on that part of the work for which they themselves are responsible and always wish to subordinate the interests of the whole to the interests of their own part. They do not understand the Party's system of democratic centralism; they do not realize that the Communist Party not only needs democracy but needs centralization even more. They forget the system of democratic centralism in which the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, the part to the whole and the entire membership to the Central Committee. Chang Kuo-tao asserted his "independence" of the Central Committee of the Party and as a result "asserted" himself into betraying the Party and became a Kuomintang agent. Although the sectarianism we are now discussing is not of this extremely serious kind, it must still be guarded against and we must do away completely with all manifestations of disunity. We should encourage comrades to take the interests of the whole into account. Every Party member, every branch of work, every statement and every action must proceed from the interests of the whole Party; it is absolutely impermissible to violate this principle.

Those who assert this kind of "independence" are usually wedded to the doctrine of "me first" and are generally wrong on the question of the relationship between the individual and the Party. Although in words they profess respect for the Party, in practice they put themselves first and the Party second. What are these people after? They are after fame and position and want to be in the limelight. Whenever they are put in charge of a branch of work, they assert their "independence". With this aim, they draw some people in, push others out and resort to boasting, flattery and touting among the comrades, thus importing the vulgar style of the bourgeois political parties into the Communist Party. It is their dishonesty that causes them to come to grief. I believe we should do things honestly, for without an honest attitude it is absolutely impossible to accomplish anything in this world. Which are the honest people? Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin are honest, men of science are honest. Which are the dishonest people? Trotsky, Bukharin, Chen Tu-hsiu and Chang Kuo-tao are extremely dishonest; and those who assert "independence" out of personal or sectional interest are dishonest too. All sly people, all those who do not have a scientific attitude in their work, fancy themselves resourceful and clever, but in fact they are most stupid and will come to no good. Students in our Party School must pay attention to this problem. We must build a centralized, unified Party and make a clean sweep of all unprincipled factional struggles. We must combat individualism and sectarianism so as to enable our whole Party to march in step and fight for one common goal.

combat sectarian tendencies. Very careful attention must be given t the relations between outside and local cadres because many anti-Japanese base areas were established only after the arrival of the Eighth Route Army or the New Fourth Army and much of the local work developed only after the arrival of outside cadres, Our comrades must understand that in these conditions it is possible for our base areas to be consolidated and for our Party to take root there only when the two kinds of cadres unite as one and when a large nu number of local cadres develope and are promoted; otherwise it is impossible. Both the outside and local cadres have their strong and weak points, and to make progress they must overcome their own weak points by learning from each others strong points. The outside cadr are generally not up yo the local cadres in familiarity with loca conditions and links with the masses.. Take me for instance. Althou I have been in northern Shensi 5 or 6 years, I am far behind the l local comrades in understanding local conditions and in links with the people here. Our comrades going to the anti-Japanese base areas in Shansi, Hopei, Shantung and other provinces must pay attention to this. Moreover, even within the same base area, owing to the fact that some districts develop earlier and others later, there is a difference between the local cadres and those from outside it. Cadres who come from a more developed to a less developed district are also outside cadres in relation to that locality, and they, too should pay great attention to fostering and helping local cadres. Generally speaking, in places where outside cadres are in charge, it is they who should bear the main responsibility if their relations with the local cadres are not good. And the chief comrades in charge should bear greater responsibility. The ateention paid to th this problem in some places is still very inadequate. Some people look down on the local cadre and ridicule them, saying "What do the locals know? Clodhoppers!" Such people utterly fail to understand the importance of local cadres; they know neither the latters stron points nor their own weaknesses and adopt an incorrect, sectarian attitude. All outside cadres must cherish the local cadres and give them constant help and must not be permitted to ridicule or attack them. Of course, the local cadres on their part must learn from the strong points of the outside cadres and rid themselves of inappropriate, narrow views so that they and the outside cadres become as one, with no distinction between "them" and 'us', and thus avoid sectarian tendencies.

The same applies to the relationship between cadres in army service and other cadres working in the locality. They must be complet completely united and must oppose sectarian tendencies. The army ccadres must help the local cadres, and vice-versa. If there is friction between them, each should make allowances for the other and carry out proper self-criticism. Generally speaking, in places where army cadre are actually in position of leadership, it is they who should bear the main responsibility if their relations with the local cadre are not good. Only when the army cadres understand their own resposibility and are modest in their attitude towards the local cadres can the conditions be created for smooth progress of our war effort and our work of construction in the base areas.

The same applies to the relationship among different army units, different localities and different departments... We must oppose the tendency toward selfish departmentalism by which the interest of one's own unit are looked after to the exclusion of those of others, w[illegible] r is indiff[illegible] th[illegible] others, refuses to transfer cadres to other units on request or releases only the inferior ones, "using the neighbor's field as an outlet for his overflow", and does not give the slightest consideration to other departments, localities and people----such a person is a selfish departmentalist who has entirely lost the spiri of communism, Lack of consideration for the whole and complete indifference to other departments, localitiesa people are the characteristics of aNish departmentalist, We must intensify our efforts to educate such people and to make them understand that selfish departmentakism is a sectarian tendency which will become very dangerous, if allowed to develop,

Another problem is the rolation between old and new cadres. Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, our Party has grown enourmously, and large numbers of new cadres have emerged; that is a very good thing. In his report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B.) Comrade Stalin said,"..... there are never enough old cadres, there are far less than ... required, and they are partly going out of commission owing to the operation of the laws of nature." Here he was discussing the cadres situation and not only the laws of nature. If our Party does not have a great many new cadres working in unity And co-operation with the old cadres, our cause will come to a stop. All old cadres, therefore, should welcome the new ones with the utmost enthusiasm and show them the warmest solicitude. True, new cadres have their shortcomings..They have not been long in the revolution and lack experience; and unaxoidably some have brouhgt with them vestiges of the unwholesome ideology of the old society, remnants of the ideology of petty-bourgeouis individualism. But such shortcomings can be gradually eliminated through education and tempering in the revolutionX, The strong points of the new cadres, as Stalin said, is that they are acutely sensitive to what is new and are therefore enthusiastic and active to a high degree--the very qualitges that some of the old cadres lack,.Cadres, new and old, should respect each other,.learn from each other, and overcome their own shortcomings by learning from each others strong points, so as to unite as one in the common cause and guard against sectarian tendencies, Generally speaking, in places where the old cadres are mainly in charge, it is they who should bear the chief responsibility if relations with the new cadres are not good.

All the above--relations between the part and the whole, relations between the individual and the Party, relations between outside and local cadres, relations between army cadres and other cadres working in the locality, relations between this and that army unit, between this and that locality, between this and that department and relations between old and new cadres---are relations withi the Party, In all relations it is necessary to enhance the spirit of communism and guard against sectarian tendencies, so that the ranks of our Party will be in good order, march in step, and therefore fight well. This is a very important problem which we must solve thoroughly in rectifying the Party's style of work, Sectarianism is an expression of subjectivism in organizational relations; if we want to get rid of subjectivism and promote the Marxist-Leninist spirit of seeking truth from facts, we must sweep the remnants of sectarianism out of the Party and proceed from the principle that the Party's interests are above personal or sectional interests, so that the Party can attain a complete solidarity and unity.

RIGHT ON!

The remnants of sectarianism must be eliminated from the Party's external as well as its internal relations. The reason is this: we cannot defeat the enemy by merely uniting the comrades throughout the Party, we can defeat the enemy only by uniting the people tharoughout the country. For twenty years the Communist Party of China has done great and arduous work in the cause of uniting the people of the whole country, and the achievements in this work since the outbreak of the War of Resistance are even greater than in the past. This does not mean, however, xthat all our comrades already have a correct style in dealing with the masses and are free from sectarian tendencies, No. In fact, sectarian tendencies still exist among a number of comrades, and in some cases to a very serious degree. Many of our comrades, tend to be overbearing in their relations with non-Party people, look down upon them, despise or refuse to respect them or appreciate their strong points This is indeed a sectarian tendency. After reading a few Marxist books, such comrades become more arrogant instead of more modest, and invariably dismiss others as no good withoug realizing that in fact their own knowledge is only half-baked. Our comrades must realize the truth that Communist Party members are at all times a minority as compared with non-Party people. Supposing one out of every hundred persons were a Communist, then there would be xxxx 4,500,000 Communists among China's population of 450,000,000. Yet even if our membership reached this huge figure, Communists would still form only one per cent of the whole population, while 99% would be non-Party people. What reason can we then have for not co-operating with non-Party people? As regards all those who wish to xxl xxl co-operate with us, we have only the duty of co-operating and absolutely no right to shut them out. But some Party members do not understand this and look down upon, or even shut out, those who wish to co-operate with us. There are no grounds whatsoever for doing so. Have Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin given us any grounds? They have not. On the contrary, they have always earnestly enjoined us to form close ties with the masses and not divorce ourselves from them. Or has the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China given us any grounds? No. Among all its resolutions there is not a single one that says we may divorce ourselves from the masses and so isolate ourselves, On the contrary, the Central Committee has always told us to form close ties with the masses and not to divorce ourselves from them. Thus any action divorcing us from the masses has no justification at all and is simply the mischievous result of the sectarian ideas some of our comrades have themselves concocted. As such sectarianism remains very serious among some of our comrades and still obstructs the application of the Party line, we should carry out extensive education within the Party to meet this problem. Above all, we should make our cadres really understand how serious the problem is and how utterly impossible it is to overthrow the enemy and attain the goal of the revaltuion unleas Party members unite with the non-Party cadres and with non-Party people.

All sectarian ideas are subjectivist and are incompatible with the real needs of the revolution; hence the struggle against sectarianism and the struggle against subjectivism should go on simultaneously.

There is no time today to talk about the question of stereotyped Party writing; I shall discuss it at another meeting. Stereotyped Party writing is a vehicle for filth, a form of expression for subjectivism and sectarianism. It does people harm and damages the revolution, and we must get rid of it completely.

To combat subjectivism we must propagate materialism and dialectics. However, there are many comrades in our Party who lay no stress on the propaganda either of materialism or of dialectics. Some tolerate subjectivist propaganda and regard it with equanimity. They think they believe in Marxism, but make no effort to propagate materialism and do not give it a thought or express any opinion when they hear or read subjectivist stuff. This is not the attitude of a Communist. It allows many of our comrades to be poisoned by subjectivist ideas, which numb their sensitivity. We should therefore launch a campaign of enlightenment withing the Party to free the minds of our comrades from the fog of subjectivism and dogmatism and should call upon them to boycott subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing. Such evils are like Japanese goods, for only our enemy wishes us to preserve them and continue to befuddle ourselves with them; so we should advocate a boycott against them, just as we boycott Japanese goods. We should boycott all the wares of subjectivism, sectarianism, and stereotyped Party writing, make their sale difficult, and not allow their purveyors to ply their trade by exploiting the low theoretical level in the Party. Our comrades must develop a good nose for this purpose; they should take a sniff at everthing and distinguish the good from the bad before they decide whether to welcome it or boycott it. Communists must always go into the whys and wherefores of anything, use their own heads and carefully think over whether or not it corresponds to reality and is really well founded; on no account should they follow blindly and encourage slavishness.

Finally, in opposing subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing we must have in mind two purposes: first, "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones", and second, "cure the sickness to save the patient". The mistakes of the past must be exposed without sparing anyone's sensibilities; it is necessary to analyse and criticize what was bad in the past with a scientific attitude so that work in the future will be done more carefully and done better. This is what is meant by "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones". But our aim in exposing errors and critizing shortcomings, like that of a doctor curing a sickness, is solely to save the patient and not to doctor him to death. A person with appendicitis is saved when the surgeon removes his appendix. So long as a person who has made mistakes does not hide his sickness for fear of treatment or persist in his mistakes until he is beyond cure, so long as he honestly and sincerely wishes to be cured and to mend his ways, we should welcome him and cure his sickness so that he can become a good comrade. We can never succeed if we just let ourselves go, one must never be rough and rash but must adopt the approach of "curing the sickness to save the patient" which is the only correct and effective method.

I have taken this occasion of the opening of the Party School to speak at length, and I hope comrades will think over what I have said.

We who li[illegible] in Chicago, State of Ill[illegible]ois, must face an increasingly evident truth: we have no control over the institutions which govern our lives. For our survival and the survival of our freedoms, we must now demand control of these forces, particularly that one which we confront daily in our communities and which often makes the final decision regarding our lives. . . or deaths: the POLICE DEPARTMENT.

These racist police have been used as forces working against the people and in cahoots with the corrupt political figures. These lying politicians and murdering, brutalizing police, joined by the greedy businessmen like Hunt and DuPont, are in control of our destinies. It is become an "AMERICAN TRADITION" for police to prevent the American people from protesting these intolerable conditions. This "AMERICAN TRADITION" is reaching astronomical heights and becoming an "AMERICAN NIGHTMARE" because the 'three-in one' described above needs to suppress the ever-growing activity of oppressed people to be free once their eyes are opened to the truth about why a Black youth is shot in the back for throwing rocks at the railroad tracks; why Black and oppressed people work for $2.00 an hour, 10 hours a day and still not make enough to provide for his family with enough left over for the leisures we have been brainwashed into thinking are necessities(color t.v.s and cadillacs) by the system's master Brainwasher, the BOOB TUBE.

What can we do about it? We act as if we've become immune to the sight of police using violence to break up peaceful demonstrations, using violence to break the heads and spirits of our people. We can't allow these horror--ridden conditions to continue to exist. The police are already moving for autonomous power in this country. That means they won't have to answer to anybody not even the lying politician and the greedy businessman (let alone oppredsed people) for their actions. They wi be free to come in our communities on their daily search-and-destroy missions unchecked to wipe us out indiscriminately, confident that their actions not only won't be condemned by their superiors but will in fact be commended and praised by them! An exaggeration? Not by any means, a fact made painfully clear when we look at the pre-dawn assassination of Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark: the vicious murder of Michael and John Soto, Charkes Jackson and countless others.

For the people to have control over these police and their function the political asylem given the police by the political forces such as Daley and Hanrahan (remember shoot-to-kill and the war on gangs) must be destroyed and the police made sensitive to the needs of each community.

The COMMUNITY CONTROL OF POLICE PETITION to be circulated soon is designed to establish that kind of control through a complete reorganization of the Police Department. All police officials will be elected by the peopl all policemen will be required to live in the areas they work in.

Other demands [illegible] the Community Control of [illegible]lice are:

1. We demand all police out of our schools brutalizing and intimidating our children.

2. We demand all police out of the factories during strikes when workers are demanding a betterment of situation and working conditions.

3. We demand all CHA and housing authority police out of our projects unless desired by the people, in which case they will be controlled by the people and fit all requirements of regular police.

4. A repeal to Mayor Daley's shoot-to-kill order.

5. An end to excessively high bails designed to keep Black and oppressed people in jails.

6. An end to the present total police structure. A People"s Police to be instituted in its place. The city will be sectioned and each major area have a separate police department, autonomous and completely controlled by the people.

7. All laws regulating police services in the past to be rendered ineffective, and the new laws made by the Board of Police Commissioners to be elected by the people.

8. We demand that the people have the power to hire and fire police officials and other policemen when they show their actions are not in the interests of the people.

We see these demands as reasonable, and long overdue. We see it as the duty of all people, politicians, etc., who profess to be concerned about the needs of the people to recognize it as their inescapable duty to fight for and suppor Community Control of Police.

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT: NATIONAL COMMITEES TO COMBAT FASCISM

c/o BLACK PANTHER PARTY

2350 W. Madison

243-8276

This genocide against Black people in particular and oppresse people in general must come to a halt. SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE THE TIME SEIZES YOU!

2350 W. MADISON

243—8246

TUESDAY 1/6/70

FRED HAMPTOM-MARK CLARK INQUEST

THE FRED HAMPTON, MARK CLARK INQUEST BEGAN TODAY WITH OBVIOUS ATTEMPTS BY THE DALEY-CONLISK-HANRAHAN PIG STRUCTURE TO PUT A SMOKESCREEN OVER THE WHOLE ISSUE.

THE WHITE-WASHING, AN ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY THE ACTIONS OF DALEY AND HIS IRISH SIDE-KICK HANRAHAN, BEGAN WITH THE PRESENCE OF AN ILLEGAL AND, UNCONSTITUTIONAL JURY. THE JURY WAS COMPOSED OF MIDDLE-CLASS SENIOR CITIZENS WHO HAVE NO IDEA OF THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF POOR, OPPRESSED, BLACK PEOPLE. THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES US THE RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY A PEER GROUP (PEOPLE FROM OUR SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES). BUT THE JURY, HAND-PICKED BY, DALEY'S LACKIE, CORONER ANDREW TOMAN IS TRULY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

IN ADDITION TO THE WHITE-WASH JURY, DALEY/HANRAHAN HAVE SELECTED ASST. STATES ATTY. THOMAS HETT (A MAN WHO LAST YEAR THREATENED TO QUIT BECAUSE OF HANRAHAN'S LIES CONCERNING THE MURDER OF MICHAEL AND JOHN SOTO, TO COVER UP THE CRIMES AND TAKE THE HEAT OFF THE REAL MURDERERS, MAYOR (SHOOT TO KILL) DALEY AND EDWARD (WAR ON YOUNG PEOPLE) HANRAHAN. MONDAY, THE PARTY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT DEPUTY CHAIRMAN FRED WAS DRUGGED BEFORE HE WAS MURDERED. THE TEST WAS MADE BY A PATHOLOGIST HIRED BY THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN'S FAMILY WHO CLAIMED THAT "I FOUND BETWEEN 4.1 AND 4.5 PER CENT OF SECONAL PRESENT." THIS IS ENOUGH TO PREVENT ANY MAN FROM MOVING OR RAISING HIMSELF FROM A SLEEP TO ENGAGE IN A SHOOT-UP.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, FRED HAMPTON
MURDERED -- DECEMBER '69

MARK CLARK

THE NEWS CONFERENCE THAT WAS HELD TO DISCLOSE THIS INFORMATION WAS BLACKED OUT TO KEEP THE PUBLIC FROM GETTING THIS INFORMATION. WE CLAIM THAT AN INFILTRATOR SLIPPED THE DRUG TO FRED, BECAUSE THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN (LIKE ALL PANTHERS) DIDN'T USE DRUGS. THIS ALSO SHOWS THAT THE DEMOCRATS OF CHICAGO ARE IN CAHOOTS WITH THE REPUBLICANS OF THE WHITE HOUSE SINCE J. EDGAR HOOVER ADMITTED THAT HE PAYS (EITHER MONEY OR UNDER THREAT OF INCARCERATION) AGENTS TO INFILTRATE THE PEOPLE'S PARTY.

WE ARE ASKING THE PEOPLE TO COME TO THE INQUEST AND SEE FOR THEMSELVES THAT THE FASCIST-RACIST POWER STRUCTURE DOESN'T RESPECT US OR INTEND TO GIVE US DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

BE AT THE INQUEST EACH DAY

THE INQUEST BEGINS 10:00 am EACH MORNING. IT IS LOCATI AT 2600 S. CALIFORNIA.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

V. ACTIVITIES

Source advised a political orientation class was held at the Precious Bloor Church, Western and Congress Parkway, Chicago, on October 29, 1969. The major discussion centered on arguments to counter classic racists arguments that all whites are evil by nature and cannot be saved, except by extermination. The counter argument was that a multiplicity of reasons are responsible for the white racist technological advantage over the non-white races, but it is his system of economics which makes him the monster he is.

11/14/69)

Source advised a political orientation class was held at the above church on November 3, 1969, with approximately 20 - 30 people present. The class dealt with the last two issues of "The Black Panther," the official newspaper of the BPP. Much discussion was given to "Fatch," an Arab guerilla movement. There was also considerable discussion concerning an open letter to the BPP, in which Panthers were criticized for the defense of "Fatch." The class was admonished to prepare a paper on Zionism and racism.

11/14/69)

Source advised a political orientation class was held on November 28, 1969, at the People's Church, 201 South Ashland, Chicago, Illinois. Several of the BPP leadership, including RUSH and SATCHEL, were present. This meeting appeared to be more of a general meeting than a political orientation meeting, since many complaints were lodged against the general attitude of the members and nothing was discussed regarding political philosophy.

12/2/69)

Source advised the political orientation classes, which the source had attended were normally presided over by BOBBY RUSH, who normally discussed the BPP ten-point program to ascertain whether those in attendance had committed the ten points to memory. Source stated FRED HAMPTON had, in the past, discussed statements from Chairman's MAO "Red Book," and had those in attendance offer their views. The source also stated "Essays of Huey," and military discipline were discussed by the Panther leaders.

12/15/69)

Source stated that during November, 1969, FRED HAMPTON, accompanied by two other individuals, using the names of JEWEL COOK and STEPHANIE FISHER traveled to Canada for a five-day speaking engagement at several Canadian colleges.

This source stated that in fact HAMPTON was accompanied by WILLIE CALVIN and JERI ELDRIDGE.

Source further advised that HAMPTON was alleged to be receiving approximately $3,000 plus travel expenses for the speaking engagements.

The source further advised that HAMPTON, CALVIN and ELDRIDGE departed Edmondton, Canada, on November 20, 1969, following their speaking engagements and CALVIN and ELDRIDGE were apprehended by Canadian officials for using false identification when they entered Canada.

, 11/12/69,
11/16/69, 11/18/69,
11/21/69)

Mr. CHARLES F. CARROLL, United States Immigration, Winnipeg, Canada, telephonically advised the Minneapolis Office of the FBI, saying two individuals, claiming BPP membership, were being deported by Canadian officials on November 21, 1969. He identified these individuals as WILLIE CALVIN, also known as JEWEL COOK, born June 8, 1948, and JELDEAN ELDRIDGE, also known as STEPHANIE FISHER, born December 23, 1947. These individuals were being deported because they had used false identification upon entering Canada earlier.

Source advised FRED HAMPTON and three or four other Chicago BPP members traveled to Carbondale, Illinois, on approximately November 14, 1969, where HAMPTON allegedly spoke before a group of about 300 students at Southern Illinois University. According to source, HAMPTON's speech allegedly consisted of BPP history, theory and practice, which was followed by a question and answer period. HAMPTON allegedly received $600 for the speaking engagement..

11/14/69)

Source advised that the Breakfast for Children Program was currently only operating at 48 North Hoyne Street, Chicago. Source stated the BPP was attempting to have the parents of the children take over the feeding, so the Panthers could move on to other areas, not further discussed.

, 12/12/69)

Source stated that during the time the children are eating, a BPP member will draw a figure on a blackboard and ask the children to identify that figure. The response desired is a white man and then the children are asked, "What is a white man to you?" The children are to reply, "a pig." At this point, a second figure is drawn depicting this figure shooting the first figure. Children are asked what is happening and the children are expected to respond, "a black man is shooting a pig" because we shoot all "pigs."

, 12/12/69)

Source stated that only the following location is being used for the Breakfast for Children program:

> The St. Andrew's Episcopal Church, 48 North Hoyne Street, which has been in operation since late December, 1969. About 35 children are fed at the church.

, 1/5/70)

A Chicago PD source advised on December 23, 1969, a blue ribbon coroner's jury would be convened on January 6, 1970, to conduct an inquest into the deaths of FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK.

The same PD source advised on January 21, 1970, the jury had returned a verdict of justifiable homicide in the deaths of HAMPTON and CLARK.

Source advised there is no current effort underway by the Illinois BPP to establish a Committee to Combat Facism, in the Chicago area. Source further stated there is no indication the Illinois BPP will change its name to the Committee to Combat Facism.

, 12/23/69)

Special Agents of the FBI observed a noon rally held at Chicago's Civic Center, Loop area, staged for the purpose of conducting a memorial to FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK. Approximately 11 speakers addressed the group, which numbered about 75. BOBBY RUSH challenged State's Attorney EDWARD HANRAHAN to a duel, saying HANRAHAN could name his weapon. The remarks of RUSH stem from previous statements wherein RUSH alleged that HANRAHAN had ordered the assassinations of HAMPTON and CLARK. WILLIE CALVIN also addressed the group and called upon those present to continue their struggle for freedom.

Source advised on January 5, 1970, that approximately 1500 people of all ages with about 25 per cent white attended the rally at the Afro-Arts Theater. A Negro musical group called the "Pharaohs" furnished the entertainment. Approximately $2,686. was collected.

Source stated that ISH FLORY, leader of the Afro-American Heritage Association (AAHA), called the meeting to order and presided as the master of ceremony. FLORY spoke concerning his own AAHA and the BPP, and explained how these two organizations were helping the people. FLORY also stated that conditions between the races were improving.

Alderman RAYNER eulogized HAMPTON and spoke of his work with the BPP.

Following Alderman RAYNER, an unidentified Blackstone Ranger, a Negro youth gang on Chicago's south side, was introduced, according to source, and spoke out against the "pigs" police and characterized downtown Chicago as being another Rome. This person also stated, according to the source, that if the BPP and the Rangers had been united, HAMPTON would have been alive today. He concluded stating the Blackstone Rangers ran the community./

CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT, Chairman of the Illinois Communist Party, Communist Party (CP), USA, spoke concerning MARTIN LUTHER KING and his non-violent programs which LIGHTFOOT stated did not work. LIGHTFOOT stated that now that the Negro has jobs and is in a position of power, he can now strike, stop production and service in almost any area of the economy. He told the young people present that they should go home and tell their parents, "You struck for higher wages, now strike to force a halt to killings."

Following LIGHTFOOT, source stated that RUSS MEEK, a militant west side Negro, stated that he had spoken before many church groups concerning HAMPTON and stated that he was for the people.

MEEK stated that everyone should be armed and that when their door is broken down, people can and should defend themselves. He concluded saying that the "pigs" are out to get everyone.

BOBBY RUSH, according to the source, stated he was not the chairman of the BPP, but was the minister of defense of the Illinois BPP, and had no intention of becoming the chairman. RUSH spoke concerning the aims of the BPP and what the organization was attempting to do. He also spoke concerning how the Panthers were being pushed around and killed.

Source stated that RONALD "DOC" SATCHEL, Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, spoke concerning the Panther medical center, which was opened at 3:00 PM, that afternoon offering medical treatment to the ghetto residents.

Source stated that several other unidentified individuals addressed those in attendance merely eulogizing HAMPTON and gave some history and previous activities of the BPP.

Source stated the rally concluded without any incidents.

(, 1/5/70)

Source advised that BPP members ROBERT BRUCE and NATHANIEL JUNIOR, both wanted by the Chicago PD and JUNIOR also being wanted on a Federal fugitive warrant in connection with a bond default matter, surrendered that date to the Cook County Circuit Court, Chicago. Both individuals were also charged locally for conspiracy to commit kidnapping.

11/7/69)

On December 22, 1969, a Federal Grand Jury was impaneled at Chicago, Illinois, to investigate the December 4, 1969, raid in an effort to ascertain whether the civil rights of the BPP members in the apartment at the time, had been violated.

VI. BPP CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER MILITANT GROUPS

Sources advised that BPP had contacted the local office of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) requesting money because the BPP needed between two and three hundred dollars for operating funds.

, 11/7/69)
, 11/7/69)

VII. FINANCES

Chicago BPP Chapter operates on funds received from the following sources:

(1) Speaker fees and honorariums received by BPP leaders for appearances at educational institutions and other public gatherings.

(2) Monthly assessments of BPP members, as well as fees charged for processing applications for membership in Chicago BPP Chapter.

(3) Donations and contributions given at BPP rallies or by individuals sympathetic to BPP objectives.

(4) No information developed indicating Chicago Chapter BPP has received any funds from National Chapter of BPP, from any foreign government or individual from a foreign country, or an organization operated in a foreign country.

National Headquarters of the BPP, Oakland, California, has allowed the Chicago Chapter to use proceeds from the sale of the Panther newspaper to defray expenses incurred for bonding members out of jail. The Chicago Chapter is in dire financial disorder.

10/69)

Source advised the National BPP, Berkeley, California, sent, on November 15, 1969, 23 cartons of newspapers to Chicago. The charges were $158.60.

11/14/69)

Source stated the Illinois BPP sent $2,000 to National BPP. $1700 was in payment for newspapers, $250 for records and $50 for buttons. Chicago chapter also requested 27,000 papers be sent to Chicago.

12/17/69)

Source advised LUCY MONTGOMERY, former wife of a prominent Chicago attorney and minority group sympathizer was alleged to have donated $2,000 to the BPP for a medical center.

, 11/19/69)

Source also stated the BPP had approximately $3,000 in cash, the money being received from the return of various bonds.

11/19/69)

Source stated that allegedly the BPP had received in total donations since the death of HAMPTON approximately $40,000., the largest donation being received from the University of Wisconsin the week of January 12, 1970, in the amount of $4,000.

, 1/9/70)

VIII. CONTACTS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY AND OTHER GROUPS

Source stated that a CP of Illinois meeting was held on October 18, 1969, and attended by National Officers CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT and CHARLENE MITCHELL. At this meeting it was stated the CP lacks influence in black communities and there was no direct relationship of communists working in the BPP.

. 10/22/69)

Source stated that representatives of the CP of Illinois contacted BPP Headquarters to advise that they had held a bazaar that date and had a considerable amount of food left and wanted to donate it to the BPP. The food was accepted.

12/7/69)

Source advised on December 6, 1969, a world bazaar was held by the CP of Illinois attended by several leading national CP leaders. Source stated a representative of the Panthers arrived and was introduced as EUGENE CHARLES. CHARLES stated, according to the source, the police had surrounded the house in which FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK were killed prior to the raid and shut off all telephone lines in the area. CHARLES stated that it was a planned murder and that HAMPTON had stated, prior to the raid, that this could possibly happen, but the Panthers should not cry over his death, but should prepare to defend themselves. CHARLES concluded saying the pigs can kill us all, but the revolution cannot be killed. CHARLES was presented a check in the amoung of $150.00 to help defray the expenses of the Panthers.

, 12/10/69)
, 12/12/69)

Source stated CHARLENE MITCHELL of the CP Black Liberation Committee, New York would open an office at 417 East 47th Street, Chicago, Illinois. This location would be the headquarters from which the CP will attempt to form a BPP defense committee and organize a BPP defense committee conference for March 7-8, 1970. Source stated the CP will not solicit cooperation using the CP name, but would work in the name of the BPP.

1/20/70)

Source advised a meeting of the Emergency Citizen's Committee for Defense of the BPP was held at 7:30 PM on January 20, 1970, at the Afro-American Book Store, 416 West 63rd Street, Chicago. Source stated there were two items on the agenda. The first point concerned the "National Conference Against

Repression and for the Defense of the BPP." It was announced that this conference would take place on March 7, 1970. One of the resolutions regarding this conference was passed earlier on January 10, 1970, at a meeting held at the Roberts Motel, Chicago, which concerned "The Right to Exist of the BPP in the Context of Growing Racism and Fascism in the United States."

The source stated the second point would concern a benefit for HUEY P. NEWTON, Chairman of the BPP, to be held February 14, 1970. It is hoped, according to the source, the University of Illinois, Circle Campus, would be the location for this benefit. The program would consist of the playing of a tape by ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, National Leader of the BPP, and discuss the exchange of some U. S. prisoners of war in Vietnam for the freedom of NEWTON and BOBBY SEALE, National Leader of the BPP.

, 1/21/70)

IX. ARRESTS OF BPP MEMBERS

Set forth below in alphabetical order are individuals who have been reported by sources to be current, past and purged BPP members:

Aikens, Willie
Arrested: 12/18/68
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapons
Disposition: Dismissed

Anderson, Blair
Arrested: 9/10/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapons
Disposition: One year supervision

Arrested: 10/15/69
Charge: Theft
Disposition: One year probation with
15 days served in the
House of Correction

Baker, Anthony Wayne
Arrested: 4/12/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapons and
Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Station adjustment and
released to parents

Bell, Lance S.
Arrested: 1/3/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: $50 fine

Arrested: 1/18/69
Charge: Investigation robbery
Disposition: Dismissed

Arrested: 1/27/69
Charge: Minor drinking
Disposition: $25 fine

Arrested: 6/4/69
Charge: Unlawful Possession and Selling Narcotics
Disposition: Discharged

Bibbs, Lockett Phillin
Arrested: 6/4/69
Charge: Harboring Federal Fugitive
Disposition: Dismissed

Black, Richard Lornell
Arrested: 12/14/69
Charge: Discharging of Firearms
Disposition: Allowed to plead guilty for disorderly conduct, fined $65 plus $25 cost

Brooks, Billy LaMar
Arrested: 12/27/68
Charge: Aggravated Battery and Battery
Disposition: One year probation of which 21 days served in the House of Correction

Arrested: 2/7/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct and Resisting Arrest
Disposition: Not guilty resisting arrest, guilty disorderly conduct, paid $50 fine plus $30.20 cost

Calvin, Willie James
Arrested: 9/30/69
Charge: Petty Larceny; Violation of Firearms Act
Disposition: Paid $85 fine and Firearms Act Violation dismissed

Charles, Eugene Jr.
Arrested: 2/26/69
Charge: Criminal Trespass to Property
Disposition: Fined $250

Collins, Azala
Arrested: 2/20/69
Charge: Criminal Trespass
Disposition: Referred to Juvenile Court

Cook, Cleve
Arrested: 9/30/69
Charge: Petty Larceny and Violation of Firearms Act
Disposition: 30 days in jail and $85 fine

Cook, Jurld L.
Arrested: 9/30/69
Charge: Petty Larceny
Disposition: 15 days jail and $85 fine

Corbett, James L.
Arrested: 11/20/68
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapons and Failure to Register a Weapon
Disposition: $300 fine

Daniels, June Gregory
Arrested: 3/3/69
Charge: Obstruction of traffic, Failure to Obey Police Officers, and Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Forfeited bond and charges dropped

Dickson, Bruce Allan
Arrested: 6/4/69
Charge: Harboring a Federal Fugitive
Disposition: Dismissed

Dozier, Emanuel
Arrested: 5/19/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Discharged

Arrested: 6/20/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Leave to file denied

Arrested: 8/4/69
Charge: Failure to Register Firearm;
Aggravated Assault
Disposition: Four years probation

Arrested: 12/9/69
Charge: Grand Theft - Auto
Disposition: Striken with leave to
reinstate

Dunbar, William E.
Arrested: 2/25/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapon and
Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: All charges dismissed

Dunn, William Otis Emanual
Arrested: 2/7/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Released on $200 bond

Arrested: 2/9/69
Charge: Defrauding an Innkeeper, Theft,
and Conspiracy to commit theft
Disposition: On 4/22/69, trial held.
Guilty of disorderly conduct,
fined $50 plus $30.20 cost.

Eldridge, Jeldean
Arrested: 2/9/69
Charge: Theft, Conspiracy to commit theft, and Defrauding an Innkeeper
Disposition: Plead guilty to Defrauding Innkeeper and fined $20 plus $15 cost. All other charges dismissed.

Gaddis, Henry Danton
Arrested: 2/25/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Public Ways
Disposition: Dismissed

Gray, Joseph
Arrested: 8/27/69
Charge: Aggravated Battery
Disposition: Bond forfeited and warrant issued.

Graves, Andrea
Arrested: 6/4/69
Charge: Harboring a Federal Fugitive
Disposition: Dismissed

Hobbs, Stephen
Arrested: 7/24/69
Charge: Battery and Trespass
Disposition: Discharged

Hampton, Fred
Convicted of Armed Robbery and was released on appeal bond when he was killed 12/4/69, during raid by Cook County State's Attorney's Police.

Hawkins, Charles Larry
Arrested 1/4/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Paid $10 fine

Holt, Harvey
Arrested: 6/4/69
Charge: Harboring a Federal Fugitive
Disposition: Dismissed

Jeffries, Alvin
Arrested: 1/26/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Leave to file denied

Arrested: 5/18/69
Charge: Loitering
Disposition: Leave to file denied

Arrested: 5/20/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Discharged

Arrested: 7/17/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: $20 fine and no cost

Junior, Nathaniel Walter
Arrested: 2/9/69
Charge: Defrauding an Innkeeper
Disposition: Plead guilty, paid $25 fine and $15 cost

Kent, Willie T.
Arrested: 12/9/69
Charge: Auto Theft
Disposition: Dropped

Kolheim, Joseph Tyrone
Arrested: 11/21/68
Charge: Disorderly Conduct, Resisting Arrest, Battery
Disposition: Fined $100

Arrested: 12/18/68
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapons
Disposition: Dismissed

Arrested: 4/23/69
Charge: Criminal Damage to Property
Disposition: Dismissed, $15 court cost

Maxwell, Terry S.
Arrested: 4/12/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Released to parents

May, Christina Darlene
Arrested: 2/9/69
Charge: Defrauding an Innkeeper, Theft and Conspiracy to commit theft
Disposition: Paid $25 fine and $15 court cost

McCarthy, Michael
Arrested: 4/2/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Leave to file denied

Arrested: 6/4/69
Charge: Harboring a Federal Fugitive
Disposition: Released

Miles, John I.
Arrested: 12/18/68
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapons
Disposition: Nolle Process

Mister, Richard E.
Arrested: 3/29/69
Charge: Investigation of shooting a police officer, Aiding a Fugitive
Disposition: Dismissed

Moody, Larry L.
Arrested: 6/2/69
Charge: Robbery
Disposition: No bill by Grand Jury

Neil, Thomas
Arrested: 2/17/69
Charge: Aggravated Assault
Disposition: Dropped without process

O'Neal, William Mc Kinley
Arrested: 11/30/68
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapons
Disposition: Striken without leave to reinstate

Arrested: 1/22/69
Charge: Disorderly, Unregistered Gun, Unlawful Use of Weapon
Disposition: Leave to file denied

Arrested: 2/5/69
Charge: Criminal Trespass of a Vehicle
Disposition: Probation until February of 1970

Patterson, Ronald
Arrested: 3/26/69
Charge: Harassing and allegedly throwing rocks at white students
Disposition: Charges dropped

Perkins, Gregory Darryl
Arrested: 4/16/69
Charge: Breaking windows
Disposition: Fined $300

Preston, John
Arrested: 7/30/69
Charge: Possession of Marijuana
Disposition: Released to the custody of the area youth detail

Roberson, Larry
Died as a result of hepititis while recovering from gun shot wound received in gun fight with the Chicago Police Department.

Robinson, Fred
Arrested: 8/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: $25 fine

Rollins, Randall Vincent
Arrested: 5/3/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Leave to file denied

Rush, Bobby Lee
Arrested: 2/9/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapons, No Firearms Registration, Defrauding an Innkeeper
Disposition: Paid $25 fine and $15 court cost for Defrauding an Innkeeper; $200 fine for no registration; and 6 months in jail for Unlawful Use of Weapon. Currently free pending appeal bond.

Satchel, Ronald J.
Arrested: 2/9/69
Charge: Theft
Disposition: Fined $25 and $15 court cost

Arrested: 3/25/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapons and Possession of Unregistered Weapon
Disposition: Dismissed

Scott, Eric Brian
Arrested: 2/28/69
Charge: Theft of Services
Disposition: $20 fine

Smiley, Robert Lee
Received at the Illinois State Farm, 7/11/69, on a sentence from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County, Kankakee, Illinois.

Stewart, James
Arrested: 1/14/69
Charge: Suspicion of having been involved in Armed Robbery
Disposition: Charges dropped

Veal, James
Arrested: 4/1/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapon
Disposition: Guilty and sentenced to 6 months Vandalia Prison Farm

Walls, Rufus C.
Arrested: 1/22/69
Charge: Aggravated Battery
Disposition: Discharged

Ward, Jesse
Arrested: 6/4/69
Charge: Harboring
Disposition: Dismissed

Washington, Georgia
Arrested: 6/4/69
Charge: Harboring a Federal Fugitive
Disposition: Dismissed

Arrested: 9/18/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Dismissed

Watson, Terrance E.
Arrested: 5/8/69
Charge: Possession of Marijuana
Disposition: Non-suit

White, James Edward
Arrested: 4/28/69
Charge: Conspiracy to commit kidnaping; Unlawful Use of Weapon; Burglary; Kidnaping; and Aggravated Battery
Disposition: Found guilty of Federal Firearms charge against him and remanded custody of United States Attorney General.

White, Robert Stanley
Arrested: 2/9/69
Charge: Theft of Services; Conspiracy to Defrauding an Innkeeper
Disposition: Fined $25 and $15 court cost for Defrauding an Innkeeper; remaining charges dismissed.

Arrested: 3/12/69
Extradicted to Detroit on Armed Robbery charge. Found guilty, pending sentence.

Williams, John
Arrested: 8/14/69
Charge: Reckless Conduct, Disorderly Conduct, Possession of Firearms without gun owner's identification card
Disposition: Posted $100 bond

Set forth below are those former, present, and purged BPP members who have litigation pending:

Anderson, Blair
Arrested: 12/4/69
Charge: Attempted Murder
Disposition: Pending

Anderson, Robert
Arrested: 5/15/69
Charge: Arrested because vehicle in which he was riding contained two pistols and quantity of narcotics when stopped
Disposition: Pending

Angrum, Wilmer Lee
Arrested: 4/27/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapon
Disposition: Pending

Arrested: 6/10/69
Charge: Conspiracy and Attempt to Commit Murder
Disposition: Pending

Austin, Jesse
Arrested: 1/4/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Pending

Austin, Theodore
Arrested: 4/23/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct; Battery; Criminal Trespass to Property
Disposition: Pending

Bell, Harold Keith
Arrested: 4/25/69
Charge: Violation of City Ordinances

Arrested: 12/4/69
Charge: Attempted Murder
Disposition: Both charges pending

Bell, Lance S.
Arrested: 11/13/69
Charge: Two counts Murder
Disposition: Charges pending

Bostick, Robert
Arrested: 5/15/69
Charge: Auto in which riding contained two pistols and quantity of narcotics
Disposition: Pending

Brakes, Clifton L.
Arrested: 9/10/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapon; Failure to Register
Disposition: Pending

Brakes, John
Arrested: 7/30/69
Charge: Possession of Narcotics
Disposition: Pending

Briggs, David Lee
Arrested: 3/25/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapons
Disposition: Failed to appear and warrant issued. Pending

Brown, Floyd
Arrested: 4/12/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapon
Disposition: Out on bond, pending court date

Brown, Morris
Arrested: 10/4/69
Charge: Attempted Murder dismissed, Resisting Arrest, Unlawful Use of Weapon
Disposition: Pending

Bruce, Robert Jerry
Arrested: 4/27/69
Charge: Kidnaping and Conspiracy to Commit Murder
Disposition: Pending

Campbell, Robert L.
Arrested: 3/25/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapon
Disposition: Pending

Carswell, James Melvin
Arrested: 10/11/69
Charge: Armed Robbery
Disposition: On appeal bond pending trial

Corbett, James L.
Arrested: 9/3/69
Charge: Attempted Murder; Aggravated Battery.
Disposition: Pending

Dunnigan, Jerry
Arrested: 6/8/69
Charge: Kidnaping; Conspiracy and an Attempt to Commit Murder
Disposition: Pending

Also wanted by Police for two robberies.

French, Lynn C.
Arrested: 12/2/69
Charge: Aggravated Assault, Attempted Murder, Armed Violence
Disposition: Waiting trial

Gray, Joseph
Arrested: 4/30/69
Charge: Robbery
Disposition: Indicted; pending trial

Graves, Andrea
Arrested: 6/8/69
Charge: Obstructing Police;
Possession of Narcotics
Disposition: Pending

Green, Brad
Arrested: 4/11/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct

Arrested: 10/4/69
Charge: Attempted Murder and
Resisting Arrest
Disposition: Pending

Harris, Brenda
Arrested: 6/8/69
Charge: Interferring with Police

Arrested: 12/4/69
Charge: Attempted Murder
Disposition: Pending

Harrison, Michael L.
Arrested: 3/28/69
Charge: Unlawful Carrying of Concealed
Weapon
Disposition: Pending

Harvey, Merrill Dennis
Arrested: 6/9/69
Charge: Kidnaping; Conspiracy to Commit
Murder and Assault

Arrested: 6/11/69
Charge: Violation of Federal Firearms Act
Dispsosition: Pending

Hawkins, Charles Larry
Arrested: 4/25/69
Charge: Disorderly Conduct
Disposition: Pending

Hawkins, Gerel
Arrested: 10/4/69
Charge: Attempted Murder; Resisting Arrest;
Unlawful Use of Weapon
Disposition: Pending

Hayman, Joseph
Arrested: 7/31/69
Charge: Attempted Murder
Disposition: Pending

Holt, Harvey
Arrested: 6/16/69
Charge: Rape
Disposition: Warrant issued 8/26/69 for
his failure to appear for trial.

Jeffries, Alvin
Arrested: 7/31/69
Charge: Attempted Murder
Disposition: Pending trial

Johnson, Deborah
Arrested: 12/4/69
Charge: Attempted Murder
Disposition: Pending

Johnson, Jackie
Arrested: 6/26/69
Charge: Murder and Armed Robbery
Disposition: Pending

Johnson, Walter M.
Arrested: 6/8/69
Charge: Obstructing Police and
Possession of Narcotics
Disposition: Pending

Junior, Nathaniel Walter
Arrested: 6/9/69
Charge: Kidnaping and assault with intent to
commit murder

Arrested: 6/11/69
Charge: Violation of Federal Firearms Act
Disposition: Pending

King, Yvonne A.
Arrested: 6/9/69
Charge: Kidnaping and Conspiracy in an Attempt to commit murder
Disposition: Pending

Latson, Samuel Leroy
Arrested: 2/24/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of a Public Way

Arrested: 3/25/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of a Weapon

Arrested: 9/9/69
Charge: Carrying a loaded shotgun in a car

Arrested: 10/25/69
Charge: Carrying a concealed weapon and not having a firearms owner's registration card

Disposition: All charges pending.

Matis, Charles
Arrested: 6/9/69
Charge: Assault and Battery; Kidnaping
Disposition: Pending

May, Christina Darlene
Arrested: 6/9/69
Charge: Kidnaping and Assault to commit Murder
Disposition: Pending

Mays, Tom
Arrested: 7/30/69
Charge: Possession of Marijuana
Disposition: Pending

Mister, Richard E.
Arrested: 7/10/69
Charge: Attempted Murder
Disposition: Pending trial

Moody, Roger
Arrested: 7/31/69
Charge: Possession of Drugs
Disposition: Pending

Moore, Grady Lee
Arrested: 7/16/69
Charge: Attempted Murder, Possession of Narcotics and Aggravated Battery
Disposition: Pending

O'Neal, William Mc Kinley
Arrested: 4/27/69
Charge: Aggravated Battery, Conspiracy to Commit Murder and Conspiracy
Disposition: Pending

Arrested: 5/20/69
Charge: Possession of Narcotics
Disposition: Pending

Arrested: 6/10/69
Charge: Conspiracy and Unlawful Use of a Weapon
Disposition: Pending

Powell, Lincoln Charles
Arrested: 7/15/69
Charge: Battery on complaint of his wife
Disposition: Pending

Powell, Richard Nathaniel
Arrested: 4/28/69
Charge: Conspiracy to commit Kidnaping, Murder, and Assault
Disposition: Out on bond pending trial

Reed, Eugenia Louise
Arrested: 12/2/69
Charge: Attempted Murder, Armed Violence, Aggravated Assault, Resisting Arrest
Disposition: Pending

Rich, Sandra
Arrested: 1/22/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapon

Arrested: 6/9/69
Charge: Possession of Narcotics and Resisting Arrest
Disposition: Pending

Rollins, Randall Vincent
Arrested: 7/27/69
Charge: Murder
Disposition: Cook County Jail without bond pending trial.

Royster, Aaron
Arrested: 3/21/69
Charge: Aggravated Battery
Disposition: Pending

Rush, Bobby Lee
Arrested: 4/2/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapon
Disposition. On $3,000 bond

Shinn, Alvino
Arrested: 3/28/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of Weapon and Failure to Register Firearms

Arrested: 4/22/69
Charged with shooting two individuals
Disposition: Pending

Shinn, Iris
Arrested: 3/28/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of a Weapon
Disposition: Pending

Smiley, Donald
Arrested: 9/10/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of a Weapon and
Failure to Register a Firearm
Disposition: Pending

Stedney, Wade Frison
Arrested: 10/4/69
Charge: Attempted Murder; Firing at
a Police Officer

Arrested: 1/20/70
Charge: Reduced to Resisting Arrest and
Obstructing a Police Officer
Disposition: Pending

Tyler, Bobby
Arrested: 3/25/69
Charge: Unlawful Use of a Weapon
Disposition: Pending

Valentine, David A.
Arrested: 6/10/69
Charge: Conspiracy to Commit Murder and
Unlawful Use of a Weapon
Disposition: Pending

Wade, Wesley E.
Arrested: 7/16/69
Charge: Aggravated Battery and
Intimidation of a Police Officer
Disposition: True Bill returned 10/14/69,
trial pending

Walton, Harlon Drew
Arrested: 4/17/69
Charge: Kidnaping; Conspiracy and Attempt
to commit murder
Disposition: Pending

Ward, Jesse
Arrested: 6/9/69
Charge: Possession of Drugs
Disposition: Pending

Arrested: 8/4/69
Charge: Conspiracy to commit murder
Disposition: Out on bond

Washington, Georgia
Arrested: 9/22/69
Charge: Failure to Register a Weapon
Disposition: Pending

Watson, Terrance E.
Arrested: 10/4/69
Charge: Attempted Murder
Disposition: Trial pending

White, Larry W.
Arrested: 7/2/69
Charge: Possession of Marijuana

Arrested: 7/31/69
Charge: Injured and involved in a shooting

Arrested: 8/4/69
Charge: Attempted Murder

Disposition: On 8/29/69, indicted by Cook County Grand Jury on Attempted Murder and out on bond

White, Michael
Arrested: 3/29/69
Charge: Attempted Murder and aggravated battery and Unlawful Use of a Weapon
Disposition: Out on bond pending trial

Arrested: 4/12/69
Charge: Violation of Federal Firearms Act
Disposition: Free on bond pending trial

Williams, John
Arrested: 10/1/69
Charge: Armed Robbery
Disposition: Pending trial

The following agencies are being characterized in the appendix section of this report:

Black Panther Party (BPP)
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
Afro-American Heritage Association

ALL MEMBERS OF THE BPP MUST BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS IN VIEW OF DESIRE OF ALL MEMBERS TO HAVE FIREARMS.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which furth describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as presently regarded, came into being at a founding convention held June, 1962, at Port Huron, Michigan. From an initial posture of "participatory democracy" the line of the national leadership has revealed a growing Marxist-Leninist adherence which currently calls for the building of a revolutionary youth movement. Concurrently, the program of SDS has evolved from civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war stance to an advocacy of a militant anti-imperialist position. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as the leaders of worldwide struggles against United States imperialism whereas the Soviet Union is held to be revisionist and also imperialist.

At the June, 1969, SDS National Convention, Progressive Labor Party (PLP) forces in the organization were expelled. As a result, the National Office (NO) group maintained its National Headquarters at 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, and the PLP faction set up headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts. This headquarters subsequently moved to Boston. Each group elected its own national officers, which include three national secretaries and a National Interim Committee of eight. Both the NO forces and the PLP forces claim to be the true SDS. Both groups also print their versions of "New Left Notes" which sets forth the line and the program of the particular faction. The NO version of "New Left Notes" was recently printed under the title "The Fire Next Time" to achieve a broader mass appeal.

Two major factions have developed internally within the NO group, namely, the Weatherman or Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) I faction, and the RYM II faction. Weatherman is action-oriented upholding Castro's position that the duty of revolutionaries is to make revolution. Weatherman is regarded by RYM II as an adventuristic, elitist faction which denies the historical role of the working class as the base for revolution. RYM II maintains that revolution, although desired, is not possible under present conditions, hence

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

emphasizes organizing and raising the political consciousness of the working class upon whom they feel successful revolution depends. Although disclaiming control and domination by the Communist Party, USA, leaders in these two factions have in the past proclaimed themselves to be communists and to follow the precepts of a Marxist-Leninist philosophy, along pro-Chinese communist lines.

A second source has advised that the PLP faction which is more commonly known as the Worker Student Alliance is dominate and controlled by members of the PLP, who are required to identify themselves with the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist philosophy of the PLP. They advocate that an alliance between workers and students is vital to the bringing about of a revolution in the United States.

SDS regions and university and college chapters, although operating under the outlines of the SDS National Constitution, are autonomous in nature and free to carry out independent policy reflective of local conditions. Because of this autonomy internal struggles reflecting the major factiona interests of SDS have occurred at the chapter level since the beginning of the 1969-70 school year.

1

APPENDIX

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

The "New York Times" city edition, Tuesday, April 20, 1965, page 27, reported that a new party of "revolutionary socialism" was formally founded on April 18, 1965, under the name of the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) which had been known as the Progressive Labor Movement.

According to the article, "The Progressive Labor Movement was founded in 1962, by MILTON ROSEN and MORTIMER SCHEER after they were expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for assertedly following the Chinese Communist line."

A source advised on June 3, 1968, that the PLP held its Second National Convention in New York City, May 31 to June 2, 1968, at which time the PLP reasserted its objective of the establishment of a militant working class movement based on Marxism-Leninism. This is to be accomplished through the Party's over-all revolutionary strategy of raising the consciousness of the people and helping to provide ideological leadership in the working class struggle for state power.

The source also advised that at the Second National Convention MILTON ROSEN was unanimously re-elected National Chairman of the PLP and LEVI LAUB, FRED JEROME, JARED ISRAEL, WILLIAM EPTON, JACOB ROSEN, JEFFREY GORDON, and WALTER LINDER were elected as the National Committee to lead the PLP until the next convention.

The PLP publishes "Progressive Labor," a bimonthly magazine; "World Revolution," a quarterly periodical; and "Challenge-Desafio," a monthly newspaper.

The April, 1969, issue of "Challenge-Desafio" sets forth that "Challenge is dedicated to the peoples fight for a new way of life--where the working men and women control their own homes and factories; where they themselves make up the entire government on every level and control the schools, courts, police and all institutions which are now used to control them."

Source advised on May 8, 1969, that the PLP utilizes an address of General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn, New York, and also utilizes an office in Room 617, 1 Union Square West, New York, New York.

1

APPENDIX

AFRICAN-AMERICAN HERITAGE ASSOCIATION

A source advised on May 14, 1969, that the African-American Heritage Association (AAHA) was known as the Afro-American Heritage Association until February, 1961. It was founded by ISHMAEL FLORY around 1958 and incorporated in the State of Illinois as a non-profit organization. It was founded ostensibly for the purpose of teaching African history and culture to American Negroes. AAHA is strongly influenced by the Communist Party (CP) of Illinois. It is represented by both communist and non-communist members and some people with strong Negro nationalistic tendencies. This organization reflects CP policy on some issues and opposes CP policy on others; for example, the CP rejects the concept of Afro-American as a reference term to the American Negro and rejects aspects of nationalism, both of which are reflected in the AAHA program. FLORY is a member of the CP of Illinois and theoretically under the discipline of the CP. He is the guiding force in AAHA and controls policy and decisions in AAHA. CP representatives occasionally are featured at AAHA affairs.

A second source advised on May 14, 1969, that the headquarters of AAHA are presently located at 416 West 63rd Street, Chicago, Illinois.

The above source advised that the Afr'Am Book Store, a branch of the Modern Book Store, is also located at AAHA and that this book store is managed by ISHMAEL FLORY.

A third source advised on May 8, 1969, that ISHMAEL FLORY, a current CP member, continues to be the leader of AAHA and as such makes policies and decisions for AAHA. The South Central Freedom of the Press Committee, CP of Illinois, also participates in formulating the policies of AAHA.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
February 6, 1970

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. CG 157-1291

Title	**BLACK PANTHER PARTY** **CHICAGO DIVISION**
Character	**RACIAL MATTER - ORGANIZATION**
Reference	**Report of SA ALAN R. STEPHENS, dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 pcA 7 8 14

21

F B I

Date: 5/23/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ✓SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP). RM.

SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT THAT A MOCK TRIAL WOULD BE HELD IN MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, ON MAY TWENTY-FOUR AND TWENTY-FIVE, NEXT. PURPOSE OF MOCK TRIAL IS FOR FRED HAMPTON, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, BPP, WHO IS TO APPEAR IN COURT, MAY TWENTY-SIX, NEXT, FOR SENTENCING ON ROBBERY CONVICTION.

SOURCE STATED THAT MEMBERS OF STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, THE YOUNG LORDS, LOCAL PUERTO RICAN YOUTH GANG, THE YOUNG PATRIOTS, A NEAR NORTH ~~MIXED~~ SIDE YOUTH ~~GANG~~ GROUP, AND THE BPP WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS MOCK TRIAL.

CHICAGO PD, MAYWOOD PD, AND MILITARY ADVISED.

RMM/

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

20

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: MAY 2 7 1969

FROM : SA JAMES W. GERBLICH

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS
1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

Informant advised as follows on May 16, 1969:

The mock trial to be held in Maywood of FRED HAMPTON by the Black Panther Party (BPP) will be held one week before the new sentencing date or on the weekend before that date.

GREGORY PERKINS bought one of the guns from HAMPTON and NEAL THOMAS bought one of the guns.

Informant observed one of the guns was an old nickel plated .22 caliber revolver, "H&R Arms Co., Young American Double Action, serial #108162".

JWG

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Informant stated that 4 of the guns HAMPTON had were similar to the above and 6 others were newer, but he believed all were .22 caliber.

Informant made available a flyer "Black Panther Party (Western Suburbs) Newsletter", no date.

There was a meeting in the early evening on May 16, 1969, at ROBERT BRUCE's house, 28 South 15th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois. Present were HAMPTON (for only a few minutes), BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, NATHANIEL JUNIOR, NEAL THOMAS, JAMES SIKES, also known as "SANTA CLAUS", DAVID VALENTINE, WILMA and MATHEW ANGRUM and PETE HAMMACK.

MATHEW ANGRUM advised he was threatened by Captain SAMUEL of the Maywood Police Department, who told him he should get out of the BPP before he got himself into a lot of trouble. PETER HAMMACK said he had been asked by Captain SAMUEL if he was a Black Panther and he said he was.

At the meeting they discussed the building they were trying to get for a BPP headquarters in Maywood and HAMPTON was angry because they didn't get the building probably because someone warned the owners of trouble if they rented it to the BPP.

HAMPTON sent BRUCE and HAMMACK to see the president of the Madison Chemical Company in Maywood to tell him to help get a building rented for the BPP or else the BPP is going to make it rough for the Madison Chemical Company. HAMPTON claimed it is more dangerous to have Madison Chemical Company in the Village of Maywood than a BPP headquarters.

Informant advised as follows on May 19, 1969:

There will be a BPP meeting at BRUCE's house tonight. Members of the BPP are going around Maywood today telling youths not to go to school on today or tomorrow, May 20, in honor of MALCOLM X's birthday. NEAL THOMAS, GREGORY PERKINS and JAMES SIKES had shopping bags full of flyers telling the youths to stay home from school.

Informant subsequently advised on May 19 that the meeting was held at BRUCE's house on May 19.

Informant overheard a private conversation between HAMPTON and NATHANIAL during the meeting on May 19, at BRUCE's house. They were discussing the fact that there were several cases of hand grenades at BPP headquarters, 2350 Madison in Chicago. They were selling the grenades for 3 for $19.00. They also talked about a number of weapons at 2350 Madison and between the grenades and the weapons there was a storage problem developing. (Above information furnished to Sgt. RONALD SIECZKOWSKI, Gang Intelligence, Chicago Police Department).

Also present at the meeting were WALTER ALLEN, ROBERT BRUCE, GREGORY PERKINS, JAMES SIKES, NEAL THOMAS, MATHEW and WILMA ANGRUM, and PETE HAMMACK.

Informant advised as follows on May 21, 1969:

No place or date has definitely been set as yet for the mock trial of HAMPTON but it will be on Friday or Saturday night, May 23 or 24, 1969.

Informant advised he expects both NATHANIAL JUNIOR and DENNIS HARVEY will show up at the BPP meeting in Summit, Illinois, tonight, May 21, 1969, which will be held at "The Hub." The address is not recalled by informant but it is the same place where the dance was held on May 9, 1969.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

19

FBI

Date: 5/27/69

Transmit the following in ________________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE ________________________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ✓SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) RM - BPP

RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED INSTANT BOBBY RUSH, CHICAGO BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), LEADER STATED PURPOSE OF BPP PRESS CONFERENCE INSTANT DATE TO ADVISE NEWS MEDIA THAT FRED HAMPTON, WHO WAS SENTENCED TWO TO FIVE YEARS, MAY TWENTY SIX LAST ON ROBBERY CONVICTION IS A POLITICAL PRISONER OF RACIST PIGS. RUSH STATED RACIST PIGS ARE REPRESSING REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS SUCH AS BPP, STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS) AND YOUNG LORDS, WHICH IS A NEAR NORTH side of CHICAGO YOUTH GANG OF PUERTO RICAN EXTRACTION.

RUSH ADVISED PROOF THAT HAMPTON IS A POLITICAL PRISONER ~~[illegible]~~ IS That JUDGE SIDNEY JONES REFUSED HAMPTON AN APPEAL BOND ON MAY TWENTY SIX LAST, HOWEVER, JUDGE JONES RECENTLY PERMITTED AN APPEAL BOND FOR FOUR CONVICTED RACIST MURDERERS ~~[illegible]~~ IN CICERO ILLINOIS. RUSH ADVISED REFUSAL OF JONES TO PERMIT HAMPTON APPEAL BOND ON AN ALLEGED CONVICTION OF THEFT OF SEVENTY ONE DOLLARS WORTH OF ICE CREAM WHICH HE GAVE TO POOR BLACK CHILDREN IS PROOF THAT JONES WAS TOLD BY RACIST PIGS TO SEND HAMPTON TO JAIL OR LOOSE HIS JUDGESHIP.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

RUSH ADVISED NO PLANS FOR RALLIES OR DEMONSTRATIONS AT THIS TIME IN CONNECTION WITH HAMPTON'S SENTENCE.

RUSH STATED INVESTIGATION SHOULD BE CONDUCTED AS TO WHY RACIST PIGS ARE REPRESSING BPP, SDS AND OTHER REVOLUTIONARIES.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

18

FBI

Date: 5/26/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

TELTYPE URGENT

Via ______________________
(Priority)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY. RM.

A RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED INSTANT MEMBERS OF BPP, CHICAGO, PLAN ON HOLDING PRESS CONFERENCE NINE AM FIVE TWENTY-SEVEN NEXT, CONCERNING SENTENCING OF FREDRICK ALLEN HAMPTON in local court Maywood Ill. THIS DATE TO DASH FIVE YEARS ON ROBBERY CONVICTION. MILITARY ADVISED.

APM/

17

5/26/69

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON. RM.

SERGEANT PHILLIP HARTIGAN, COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S POLICE, ADVISED INSTANT HAMPTON SENTENCED TWO - FOUR YEARS ON ROBBERY CONVICTION THIS PM, BY JUDGE SIDNEY JONES, MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS. NO APPEAL BOND AND HAMPTON TO BE INCARCERATED ILLINOIS STATE PENITENTIARY, JOLIET, ILLINOIS, THIS PM. MILITARY ADVISED.

RTP:

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

16

FBI

Date 5-24-69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE ______________________
(Priority)

TO DIRECOTR

FROM CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) RM

[redacted] ADVISED MAY TWENTYTHREE LAST THAT AL LAST NAME UNKNOWN (LNU), NEGRO FEMALE, CONTACTED FRED HAMPTON, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP AND RELATED SHE WAS BEING FLUNKED IN A COURSE AT CRANE JUNIOR COLLEGE, CHICAGO, SCENE OF RACIAL DISTURBANCES IN PAST, BY INSTRUCTOR FIRST NAME UNKNOWN NOVAR. STATED WOULD APPROACH CHARLES HURST, PRESIDENT, CRANE COLLEGE MONDAY NEXT AND IF COULD NOT GET GRADE CHANGED TO PASSING MARK, SHE WOULD KILL NOVAR.

HAMPTON FINALLY RECALLED AL LNU, ATTEMPTED TO DISCOURAGE HER REGARDING ABOVE THREAT. DESPITE WARNING BY HAMPTON THAT CONVERSATION MIGHT BE OVERHEARD, AL LNU RELATED ABOVE STORY. SHE RELATED UPON HAMPTON'S REQUEST THAT SHE COULD BE REACHED AT SIXTY ONE EAST FORTYSIXTH STREET, CHICAGO, THROUGH TELEPHONE NUMBERS THREE SEVEN THREE DASH FOUR EIGHT TWO SEVEN AND DA SIX DASH NINE SIX EIGHT SIX. INDICATED LATTER NUMBER IS EMPLOYER WHERE SHE WILL BE SATURDAY INSTANT.

Approved

SERVICE PROVIDED BY ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY ADVISED INSTANT THREE SEVEN THREE DASH FOUR EIGHT TWO SEVEN LISTED TO ALBERTA M. GRAZES, SIXTYONE EAST FORTYSIXTH STREET AND DA SIX DASH NINE SIX EIGHT SIX TO ADDISON COIFFEURE DESIGN, FOUR FIVE FOUR EAST THIRTYFIFTH STREET, BOTH CHICAGO.

COLLEGE UNION VOICE, LOCAL COLLEGE NEWSPAPER, NOVEMBER TWELVE LAST INDICATED LEON NOVAR WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER FROM WILSON CAMPUS FOR NOT COMPLYING WITH THE "SPIRIT" OF AN AGGREEMENT BETWEEN WILSON SOCIAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT AND THE AFRO-AMERICAN HISTORY CLUB TO INCLUDE TEXTS

END PAGE TWO

BY BLACK AUTHORS IN COURSE READINGS.

END

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

May 15, 1969

15

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The following information is being submitted regarding visits by Chicago Black Panther members to Beloit, Wisconsin, on March 23, 1969, and to Racine, Wisconsin, on March 27, 1969:

On March 24, 1969, information was received by a source of the Milwaukee Office, who has furnished reliable information in the past, that a trip to Beloit, Wisconsin, by members of the Chicago Black Panther Party (BPP) was sponsored by the Beloit College Afro-American Student Union. The speakers were Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman of the Illinois State Chapter of the BPP, as well as Bobby Rush, Deputy Defense Minister for the Illinois State Chapter of the BPP.

> Above source indicated this date that the Afro American Student Union, Beloit College, is an organization of black students mainly oriented toward promoting black culture on campus.
>
> A characterization of the BPP is attached hereto.

This source stated further that the program at Beloit College took place at the College Chapel and was attended by approximately 150 individuals. Source stated that Hampton said that the purpose of the BPP was to organize and educate masses of black people. Hampton advised further that the BPP is a political party.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The above source indicated that following the speeches, there was a presentation of "black music and black dances." There were no incidents whatsoever in connection with this program, and the Beloit College paid the BPP for appearing on this occasion.

An article appeared in the "Beloit Daily News," a newspaper published daily at Beloit, Wisconsin, on March 24, 1969, entitled, "Revolution." The article carried the sub-caption, "The Black Panthers View 1969 as Year of Change in America." The article quoted an unnamed spokesman for the Chicago BPP as having said the following at an "exposure" program at the Beloit College Chapel:

"It seems hard for some people to understand that this country is going toward the brink." The article indicated that Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman of the BPP of Illinois, had stated that black people in 1969 are going to cause a change in America, and that the BPP is going to cause this change. Hampton further challenged the blacks to take the initiative in bringing about the change instead of relying on whites to change things for them. Hampton also stated that revolution was imminent, but he was quoted as saying that revolution does not mean that black people would take over because he said if black people took over, then there would be another revolution because of the white people. He indicated the revolution was just a means of "radical change."

This article further indicated that Alvino Shinn, Deputy Minister of Finance, BPP of Illinois, classified the BPP as basically a propaganda unit. Shinn stated, "Our philosophy is based on Marxism, but that doesn't mean we're communists." Shinn further denounced capitalism and stated that the black people did not want to be fooled any longer by talk of democracy. He stated that democracy means imprisonment.

The article said that Hampton talked of means that may be employed in the "revolution." He predicted, "Guns will prove to be the final answer, because whites carry guns into the ghetto." He was further quoted as saying, "You stop guns with guns."

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

A second confidential source of the Milwaukee Office, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information on April 30, 1969:

On March 27, 1969, he determined that the Dominican College, Racine, Wisconsin, was sponsoring a program this evening to be held at Breakers Building, and that the program was to spotlight Negro culture. It was noted that at the parking lot around Breakers Building were parked numerous vehicles bearing Illinois and Wisconsin license plates.

The program was attended by an undetermined number of students, most of whom were young whites, men and women. Many appeared to be "hippies," and there were several who appeared to be part of the staff at the College. An unidentified Negro female took charge of the program, and she announced that the program would entail a short skit to show the Negro image as it had been in the past and then a talk and a discussion would be presented by Chicago Black Panther members to show the present day Negro status. The skit was a highly emotional two-part presentation depicting the slave factions on the plantation and the beating of a colored girl with a leather strap by a white slave master. Much reference was made to "Niggers" and to "Dirty Niggers." Much hysterical praying and crying was done by the sole Negro female participant in the play.

Following the play, several unidentified Black Panthers then showed a newsreel, which depicted all the various modern police weapons, including tear gas, mace, and the new Smith and Wesson dart tranquilizer guns. The movie depicted various riot situations, but the sounds being made by participants were largely inaudible. Nevertheless, various distinct statements were made by people in the film in reference to what was being done to a Negro female. They said she was beaten in the head by a policeman and then someone said that a Negro male had been shot in the back by a policeman.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Subsequent to the film, a young unidentified Negro male, who was introduced as the Security Agent for the Black Panthers, arose and stated that "Sh__ is going to hit the fan this summer." He stated Racine is isolated from Chicago by distance, but that the members of Chicago Black Panthers had come to help them organize at Racine. He then introduced the Secretary of the BPP, a Negro female, whose name source could not recall, who discussed the meaning of the aforementioned film. She was then responsible for showing a second film which depicted the ten point program of the Black Panthers. She expressed to the crowd a displeasure with them because she heard some snickering regarding some of the points depicted in this film, particularly the points that all Negroes should be freed from prisons at once, no matter the crime, and that they should all be draft exempt.

The source indicated that during the speech by the Security Chief of the Black Panthers, he welcomed all the students to the meeting as well as "all the FBI, CIA, and PD personnel" that might be in the group.

The above source left the meeting as it was breaking up, and he indicated that no incidents were reported during the meeting or subsequent to the meeting. He indicated further that he had observed some of the vehicles parked at the College and had noted some propaganda material lying on the seats of some of the automobiles. He indicated specifically that he had seen a stack of papers from the People Free Republic of China and other books entitled simply, "Propaganda."

The above source advised further on this date that the visit by the Black Panthers at the College had been paid by the Student Council of Dominican College. This money was allegedly raised through collections. This money was also to pay for Black Panther newspapers and other literature which had been passed out by the six Black Panther members who had attended the meeting.

ONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December 1966 in Oakland, Calif., to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland Police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere!

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "...we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, Calif. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

APPENDIX

CONFIDENTIAL

14

5/15/69

AIRTEL AIRMAIL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, MILWAUKEE

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM - BPP

Copies of the enclosed LHM are also being furnished MIG, Milwaukee, MIG, Evanston, Illinois, OSI, Milwaukee, OSI, Chicago, NIS, Milwaukee, NIS, Chicago, Secret Service, Milwaukee, and USA, Milwaukee. Also enclosed for above-listed agencies is one copy each of Chicago LHMs dated 3/26/69 and 4/1/69.

RAB

13

5/19/69

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: SAC CHICAGO

RACIAL TENSIONS, CHICAGO CITY COLLEGES, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, NINETEEN SIXTY NINE. RM

SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED INSUFFICIENT INFO TO EVALUATE RELIABILITY, ADVISED THIS DATE THAT THE PROPOSED PICKETING AT CRANE JUNIOR COLLEGE, CHICAGO, DID NOT TAKE PLACE AS SCHEDULED BUT THAT A RALLY WAS PLANNED FOR THE COLLEGE ON THE NIGHT OF MAY NINETEEN INSTANT. RALLY, WHICH WILL FEATURE BLACK PANTHER PARTY MEMBER FRED HAMPTON AS THE MAIN SPEAKER WILL EMPHASIZE BLACK UNITY, AS WELL AS THE RENAMING OF THE COLLEGE TO "MALCOLM X COLLEGE."

MILITARY ADVISED. CHICAGO PD COGNIZANT.

DFB

12

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
May 21, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

RACIAL TENSIONS, CHICAGO
CITY COLLEGES, CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS, 1969

On May 20, 1969, a source who has furnished insufficient information to evaluate reliability, advised a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that a meeting was held from 7:15 p.m. to 8:45 p.m., on the night of May 19, 1969, at Crane Junior College, 2245 West Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois. The purpose of this meeting, which was attended by approximately 300 persons, was to pay tribute to Malcom X, a slain Negro leader, and this meeting was sponsored by the Black Panther Party (BPP) of Chicago.

A characterization of the BPP is attached.

Source identified Fred Hampton as the main speaker, and one of the leaders of the BPP in Chicago. Hampton directed his comments concerning his love and respect for Malcom X and his philosophies, and then continued with the majority of his speech directed to the organizational activities of the BPP. Hampton indicated that "black people should join gun clubs so that they can deal with the 'pigs'." Hampton further commented that the black people must learn the language of the "pigs", and by this, he meant that if the police utilize shotguns, then the black people themselves should utilize shotguns.

Source stated that many persons in attendance were identifiable with the BPP by dress, although the source could not identiy them by name, as well as many young Negroes who either are students at the college or adjoining high school, or were just people in the neighborhood that heard about the meeting. Source stated that Dr. Charles Hurst, President of Crane Junior College, made a few brief comments.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

RACIAL TENSIONS, CHICAGO CITY COLLEGE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, 1969

Source concluded by stating that the general theme of the meeting, in addition to paying tribute to Malcom X, was to gain support for the re-naming of Crane Junior College to Malcom X College.

Source advised that the scheduled picketing outside the college in behalf of the name change by the BPP scheduled for the afternoon of May 19, 1969, did not take place other then having a few BPP members pass out mimeographed papers announcing the night-time meeting.

One copy each of this memorandum is being furnished to United States Attorney, U. S. Secret Service, Both Chicago, and Region 1, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STAT[illegible] GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO SAC, CHICAGO DATE: 5/21/69

FROM SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS
1969
RM

The informant has declined to furnish a signed statement but attests to the veracity of the information.

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

Informant furnished the following information on May 8, 1969:

There was a BPP meeting on May 7, 1969, at ROBERT BRUCE's house, 28 South 15th Avenue, Maywood. FRED HAMPTON was there for only a few minutes and gave out 200 flyers to be passed out around town concerning a mock trial of himself to be held on May 9, 1969. Present were BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, WILMA and MATTHEW ANGRUM, TYRONE GLADNEY, and NEAL THOMAS. THOMAS sells the newspaper "Black Panther" around town for 25 cents a copy.

On May 9, 1969, informant made available the following material:

One copy of "The Black Panther" newspaper dated April 20, 1969.

JWG

One copy of "The Black Panther" newspaper dated May 4, 1969.

One copy of a flyer "Honor of Political Prisoners" dated May 9, 1969.

One copy of "To the Oppressed People etc." no date.

One copy of "In the Summer of 1968 etc." no date.

Informant advised on May 9, 1969, that there will be a dance to raise funds in Argo tonight (May 9, 1969), and, therefore, the mock trial has been postponed. One of the flyers gives the time and place of the dance.

FRED HAMPTON will be sentenced on May 13, 1969, and on that date the Black Panthers intend to cause disturbances in Maywood, according to talk at the meeting on May 7, 1969.

Informant advised on May 14, 1969 as follows:

The dance last Friday night was strictly a social fund raising event and there was no trouble.

There was a meeting of the BPP on the evening of May 12, 1969, at BRUCE's house. Present were HAMPTON, BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, the ANGRUMs, DAVID VALENTINE, NEAL THOMAS and several young teenage boys. They were still talking about possibly blowing up the Maywood Police Station when HAMPTON is sentenced but they did not mention where they would get the explosives or how they would do it. HAMPTON's sentencing has been postponed until a later date. The informant believes the plot to blow up the station is just talk.

HAMPTON obtained ten used pistols, some .22 caliber and has sold them to members of the BPP in Maywood and Chicago.

GREGORY PERKINS said that whenever HAMPTON or NATHANIEL JUNIOR are being sought on warrants, they live in at the BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison, in Chicago, until they can get the bond money and surrender with their attorneys.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

10

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 2 - USA, CHICAGO

Report of: SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL **Office:** CHICAGO
Date: May 15, 1969

Title: BARRY ALAN LEWIN

Character: ANTIRIOT LAWS; RACIAL MATTERS - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Synopsis: Subject's supervisor states LEWIN is above-average employee and has no access to products he sells. One MARK STIENER spoke to SDS on 10/11/68 at Yale University. AUSA advised no apparent prosecutable violation exists under Title 18, Section 231 (a) (1) at this time.

- C -

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DETAILS:

On the indicated dates, attempts were made to interview the following individuals and messages were left to have these persons contact however, no response to date has been received:

FRED HAMPTON
804 South 17 Avenue,
Maywood, Illinois
April 9, 18, 24, May 1, 1969

NATHANIEL JUNIOR
7501 West 64 Street,
Argo, Illinois
April 16, 24, 1969

BOBBY RUSH
2030 South State Street,
Chicago, Illinois
April 9, 18, 24, May 7, 1969

BARRY LEWIN,
5840 North Sheridan Road,
Chicago, Illinois
April 14, 23, 30, May 6, 1969

WILLIAM O'NEAL
3811 West End Avenue
April 9, 21, 1969

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date April 14, 1969

1

ROBERT D. ZAYIA, 7221 North Oconto, telephone number NE 1-5338, Roche Laboratories Division, Hoffman-La Roche, Incorporated, advised that he is the immediate supervisor over BARRY ALAN LEWIN, who has been employed as a medical salesman for this corporation since approximately December, 1967. He stated that he has been LEWIN's supervisor since January, 1968.

He stated that during the year of 1968, he worked with LEWIN approximately eight or nine days in order to observe and help LEWIN cover his sales area consisting of about 220 physicians in buildings located at 25 and 55 East Washington, 939 North LaSalle, 106 or 130 South Michigan.

He stated that during this time he has had very little, if any, social contact with LEWIN, and therefore, does not feel qualified to make any comments concerning LEWIN's "philosophical beliefs or practices."

He stated that in his limited personal contacts with LEWIN, he recieved the impression that LEWIN is a liberal thinker, an avid reader, and highly intelligent. He stated that he also recalls that LEWIN worked with the groups giving medical treatment to the injured demonstrators during the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago during August, 1968. He stated that he is not acquainted with any of LEWIN's personal friends and does not know how close of a relationship LEWIN has with any of the other 22 salesmen under his (ZAYIA's) direction.

He stated that he recalls LEWIN allegedly attended Yale University, however, did not graduate. He stated that he also recalls that LEWIN may have studied for one semester in Germany. He continued that he is not aware of LEWIN's hobbies or any of his social activities, such as clubs or organizations to which he might belong.

On 4/10/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by Date dictated 4/11/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2

He stated that he has received no complaints from any of LEWIN's physician customers and considers LEWIN overall to be an above-average employee. He stated that nothing has come to his attention which might cause him to question LEWIN's moral character or loyalty to the United States of America.

He stated that LEWIN is considered by him to be one of his better salesmen. He stated that LEWIN received approximately $1,800.00 in bonuses for his work during 1968, and his base salary is approximately $8,000.00 per year. He stated that LEWIN is provided with a company vehicle for company business and is allowed to use this for personal business by paying the company a specified amount for mileage. He stated that until either February or March, 1969, this vehicle was a 1967 or 1968 dark green Ford. He advised that one of LEWIN's unknown friends wrecked this vehicle in one of the above months, and LEWIN rented a Hertz vehicle until he recently received a Plymouth.

He stated that each salemen submits a schedule each week indicating whom they contacted on the specific day of the week. He stated that the salesmen generally work Monday thru Friday, however, LEWIN occasionally makes a Saturday call on a customer.

He stated that LEWIN does not have access to any of the products which he sells as the company delivers directly to the customer.

The following investigation was conducted at New Haven, Connecticut:

On April 22, 1969, Mrs. OLIVIA ROSS, Alumni Records Office, Yale University, advised that the subject was an ex-member of the class of 1968, entering Yale in the fall of 1964, and leaving in the spring of 1965. She stated that no reason was recorded for his leaving. She stated that records show that he was a member of Branford College and resided at 368 Wright Street, New Haven.

She stated that records list LEWIN as being born on November 29, 1964, at Chicago, Illinois, a citizen of the United States, a 1964 graduate of Nicholas Senn High School, Chicago, Illinois, and his permanent home address as 400 East Randolph Street, Chicago.

She continued, that the records list his religion as Jewish, his father as ROBERT MITCHELL LEWIN, 3172 Sheridan Road, Chicago, salesman for Feature Ring Company, and his mother as ELAINE THERESE BRUNNER LEWIN, 400 East Randolph Street, Chicago, clerical worker. She stated that the records shown his father and mother as separated.

She stated that LEWIN received a $1050 General University Scholarship and a $250 Yale Scholarship; Trust of Illinois Scholarship. She related that hewas also given a $200 loan by Yale University and was provided with an on-campus job which paid $400 per year.

On April 22, 1969, Officer RAYMOND FROLICH, Records Division, New Haven Police Department (PD), advised that he could locate no record in this Division identifiable with the subject or his known aliases.

On April 22, 1969, Detective WILLIAM MC MAHON, Intelligence Unit, New Haven PD, advised a search of the records of this unit indicate that one MARK STIENER spoke on the organization of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) before a group consisting of 50 or 60 Yale Students on October 11, 1968, at 201 Harkness Hall, Yale University. He stated that STIENER's remarks were directed to the plans of SDS had, finances and student support. According to Detective MC MAHON, this group also discussed the Chicago riots, police brutality, and how to conduct more peaceful marches.

1

The following investigation was conducted by IC JOSEPH D. HAMMITT at Springfield, Illinois:

Lt. Col. GEORGE A. STEWART, Selective Service Headquarters, Springfield, Illinois advised on April 25, 1969 that BARRY ALAN LEWIN, SSN 11-12-46-47, date of birth November 29, 1946, registered with Local Board #12, 536 S. Clark Street, Chicago, Illinois on December 7, 1964 and the address reflected on Form 3 was 400 E. Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois.

On April 28, 1969, IC MERTON R. ANDERSON, Jr., determined that no identifiable record for the subject could be located at the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office.

On April 28, 1969, IC BERNARD P. BLAIS, determined that no identifiable record for the subject could be located at the Retail Merchants Credit Association in Los Angeles.

On April 29, 1969, IC MILLARD T. ANDERSON, determined that no identifiable record for the subject could be located at the Los Angeles Police Department.

5-1b

REPORT
# of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Date: May 5, 1969

FBI File No.

Lab. No.

Re: BARRY ALAN LEWIN, aka
Barry Lewin, Berry Lewin,
Mark Steiner
ARL; RM - BPP

Specimens received 4/21/69

Qc1 Photocopies of two pieces of paper bearing handwriting and hand printing beginning "PANTHER STAFF..." ending "...is ever to call me."

Qc2 Photocopies of two pieces of paper bearing handwriting and hand printing beginning "Bring Pot. Permanganate..." ending "...9-10 AM"

Kc1 Two photocopies of a chemical formula written by BARRY ALAN LEWIN

Result of examination:

Due to the indistinctness of the writings on the submitted photocopies and due to an insufficient amount of comparable writing, a definite conclusion was not reached whether BARRY ALAN LEWIN, Kc1, wrote the questioned handwriting and hand printing on Qc1 and Qc2.

The submitted specimens are being retained at the Bureau.

On May 14, 1969, this matter was discussed with Assistant United States Attorney RICHARD SCHULTZ, Northern District of Illinois, Chicago, at which time he noted that no apparent prosecutable violation exists under Title 18, Section 231 (a) (1), based on a review of this matter and on information available at this time. He stated that in the best interests of the government, this matter does not merit further investigation at this time.

U[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT O[illegible]USTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
May 13, 1969

MAURICE MONLEY

On April 26, 1969, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Monley visits the headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP) infrequently. He is not a threat to Bobby Rush or Fred Hampton for the leadership of the BPP and is not even considered a BPP member.

On March 26, 1969, the records of the Chicago Credit Bureau were examined and no information regarding Monley was located.

On May 6, 1969, the records of the Bureau of Records and Communications, Chicago Police Department, were checked and no arrest record was located for Monley.

A description of the BPP is attached to this memorandum.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

8

DIRECTOR, FBI 5/13/69

SAC, CHICAGO

MAURICE MONLEY, aka
Abdul Kenyatta
RM

Copies of said LHM are being furnished to United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, Naval Investigative Service Office, and Office of Special Investigation, all of Chicago, Illinois, and Region I. 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

WJB

7

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois 60604

May 2, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A characterization of the BPP appears in the appendix section of this memorandum.

During April, 1969, a source, with whom insufficient contact has been made to determine reliability, advised that the following individuals are or were members of the BPP Chicago Chapter:

Ronald Patterson, formerly as minister, no longer member;

John Miles, former security staff member, not active recently, but still considered a member;

Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP;

Jerry Dunnigan, Security Staff;

Eric Scott, also known as "Bear", former member, believed to have been a Field Secretary (Marshal);

Ann Campbell, Secretary to various ministers on the Central Staff of the BPP and possibly on the security staff;

Chris Miles, alleged wife of John Miles, no longer a member;

Henry English, former Minister of Finance

Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP and second in command after Rush;

Rufus Walls, Deputy Minister of Information;

Nathaniel Junior, Field Secretary (Marshal);

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Willie Aikens, current associate;

Willie Calvin, member, not known if still active;

William O'Neal, Chief of Security;

Joseph Kolheim, member, activity not known;

Ted Boston, Field Secretary (Marshal) formerly on the Security Staff;

Billy Dunn, also known as "Bones", member of the Security Staff;

Diane Dunn, alleged wife of Billy Dunn, member of the Security Staff;

Robert Campbell, believed member of the Security Staff;

Sandra Rich, member, believed from California, believed on the Security Staff.

James Steward, formerly on the Security Staff, resides in Maywood, Illinois, area.

The source also advised that the Panthers and the Blackstone Rangers, a local Chicago south side Negro youth gang, have met on occasion for the purpose of forming a coalition, however, the results to date have been negative. The source stated that one such meeting resulted in the arrest of several BPP members as well as Rangers during December, 1968.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

United States Attorney, Office of Special Investigation, 113th MI Group, Region 1, Evanston, Illinois, United States Secret Service and the Naval Investigative Service Office.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
April 30, 1969

6

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A characterization of the BPP appears in the appendix section of this memorandum.

Agent Edward Conroy, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Unit (ATTU), advised on April 17, 1968, that Nathaniel Junior, Field Secretary (Marshal), and Merrill Harvey, both BPP members, Argo, Illinois, area, were released on $5,000 Own Recognizance bond on this date in connection with their being arrested on April 11, 1969, for purchasing machine guns from ATTU Agents.

He stated on April 25, 1969, these individuals appeared in Federal Court, 219 South Dearborn, Chicago, in connection with charges concerning the above arrests and the court continued the same Own Recognizance (OR) bond despite the United States Attorney's plea for a substantial bond increase. The court set the date of June 2, 1969, for hearing motions and a trial date of June 23, 1969, regarding this matter. He stated that Michael White, also a BPP member from the Argo, Illinois, area remained incarcerated in default of one hundred thousand dollar bond regarding this arrest.

On April 25, 1969, Sergeant Sbarbaro, Cook County Sheriff's Police, advised that Junior was arrested on this date as he departed the above hearing by the Cook County Sheriff's Police and charged with the unlawful possession of narcotics. He stated that this arrest was based on a warrant and indictment number 69-1101, charging Junior as above.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conlucsions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that lawyers representing Junior, Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, and William O'Neal, Chief of Security, both BPP members of the Chicago Chapter, appeared in local Chicago Court on this date regarding the arrests of Rush, O'Neal, and Junior, on January 22, 1969, by the Chicago Police Department, for unlawful use of weapons, possession of marijuana, and disorderly conduct, whereupon the court granted a continuance of this matter until June 17, 1969.

This source also advised on this date that plans are being made to have a BPP rally at the Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn, Chicago, Illinois, May 1, 1969, in support of the bond proceedings for Huey Newton, National Minister of Defense, BPP. The program is to begin at 12:00 noon and the following are scheduled to participate as speakers:

Fred Hampton, Chairman, Illinois BPP

Charles Hurst, President, Crane Junior College, Chicago, Illinois

Mike Klonsky, Student for a Democratic Society (SDS). See appendix section for characterization of SDS.

Cha Cha Jimenez, Young Lords, a local Chicago Puerto Rican youth gang operating on the near north side.

The source stated no known violence is planned for this demonstration and Panthers attending have been told not to carry firearms.

On April 27, 28, 1969, Captain Anthony Corbo, Summit, Illinois, advised that the following Negro males all alleged members of the BPP, were arrested on April 27, 28, 1969, and charged with unlawful use of weapons, robbery, aggravated battery, and conspiracy to commit murder:

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Wilmer Lee Angrum, 305 South 11th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois, 5'9" tall, 150 pounds, brown eyes, black hair, born April 20, 1950, Cook County, Social Security Number 320-42-6495. A pistol revolver, star, caliber 7.65 found in his possession.

David A. Valentine, 405 South 8th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois, 5'10" tall, 195 pounds, brown eyes, black hair, born December 26, 1951, at Nashville, Tennessee, Illinois driver's license number V453-1615-1367, scars on left arm. An automatic pistol, Harrington and Richardson, Model 732, caliber .32 was found in his possession.

William M. O'Neal, Jr., 1544 Springfield Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, 5'11" tall, 165 pounds, brown eyes, black hair, born December 9, 1943, at Memphis, Tennessee, Social Security Number 323-44-2413, Illinois driver's license number O 540-9334-3350, scars on finger. No weapon found on person.

James Edward White, 7500 West 64th Street, Summit, Illinois, 5'11", 180 pounds, brown eyes, black hair, born July 17, 1944, at Cook County, Illinois, Social Security Number 322-34-7118, Iowa driver's license number 322-34-7118. Found in his possession was a knife and a sawed off shotgun, Stevens model 6-100, 12 gauge.

Richard Nathaniel Powell, 7430 West 63rd Place, Summit, Illinois, 70" tall, 170 pounds, black hair, brown eyes, born July 22, 1946, at Chicago, Illinois, Social Security Number 329-38-5422, left index finger amputated. No weapon found in possession. Powell arrested at his home several hours after the above were arrested.

Captain Corbo adivsed that the above persons were arrested upon the basis of a complaint signed by Albert Mackey, 7621 West 64th Street, Summit, Illinois, which in part indicates that eight or ten Negro males beat both Mackey and his friend Marjorie Curry, 7500 West 64th Street, Summit. This group also took his 16 gauge shotgun.

Captain Corbo stated that Mackey related that a vehicle containing several Negro youths who were present at the beating, left the scene and took Curry with them. This vehicle was described as a 1965 Pontiac Grand Prix, color maroon. Mackey also stated that the persons beating both him and Curry also threatened their lives if they did not produce a gun they were looking for.

Captain Corbo stated that Mackey also advised that Dennis Harvey, 7418 West 64th Street, Summit, and Richard Powell, 7430 West 63rd Place, Summit, were present during the beating. Harvey was among those taking Mackey and Curry to Nathaniel Junior's, 7501 West 64th Street, Summit, where Harvey told Junior that they were going to kill Mackey and Curry if they did not produce the gun they wanted. According to Captain Corbo, Mackey continued that Junior gave the "OK" to kill them both even though Junior told Harvey that Mackey had nothing to do with it, just Curry.

Captain Corbo advised that the Third District of the Chicago Police Department reported that they picked Curry up during the early morning hours of April 28, 1969, and admitted her to the hospital. He advised that initial information indicates she has a fractured arm, has been beaten about the face, and head, as well as several burns about her body.

Captain Corbo advised that the ATTU has charged James White with violation of the Gun Control Act and will attempt to immediately have the bonds of Harvey and Junior revoked and place them under arrest as a result of their participation in the above incident.

Captain Corbo advised that the investigation concernin this matter was not yet completed and more accurate details may be available at a later date. He said that Mackey did not require any medical treatment and had no visible wounds or marks as a result of his alleged beating. He further advised that Merrill Harvey and Dennis Harvey are one in the same as the full name is Merrill Dennis Harvey; however,

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Mackey refers to this person as Dennis Harvey. He also noted that Mackey's description of the 1965 Pontiac leaving scene taking Curry is similar to a vehicle owed by an alleged BPP member from Maywood, Illinois; namely, Robert Bruce.

In view of above, Nathaniel Junior, Merris Dennis Harvey, Michael White, Bobby Rush, William M. O'Neal, Jr., Wilmer Lee Angrum, David A. Valentine, James Edward White, should be considered armed and dangerous.

Captain Corbo advised that Valentine, O'Neal, James White, Angrum, and Powell appeared this date at the 5th District Circuit Court, Cook County, Oak Lawn, Illinois, and were remanded to the Cook County Jail in lieu of $10,000 bond each except James White, whose bond is $5,000. He stated the date for the hearing is set for May 7, 1969.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney
Office of Special Investigations
Region I, 113th MI Group
Naval Investigative Service Office
United States Secret Service

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. The SDS is an association of young people on the left and has a current program of protesting the draft, promoting a campaign for youth to develop a conscientious objector status, denouncing United States intervention in the war in Vietnam and to "radically transform" the university community and provide for its complete control by students. GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, when interviewed by a representative of United Press International in San Francisco, California, on May 14, 1965, described the SDS as a part of the "responsible left" which the Party has "going for us." At the June, 1965, SDS National Convention, an anti-communist proviso was removed from the SDS constitution. In the October 7, 1966, issue of "New Left Notes," the official publication of SDS, an SDS spokesman stated that there are some communists in SDS and they are welcome. The national headquarters of this organization as of July 24, 1968, was located in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

UN ED STATES DEPARTMENT O USTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA ON

29

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - Secret Service, Chicago (RM)
1 - Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, (Via Courier)
1 - OSI, Chicago (RM) (Via Courier)
1 - NISO, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - USA, Chicago (Via Courier)

Report of:	SA HUBERT M. HART	Office:	Chicago
Date:	5/23/69		
Field Office File #:		Bureau File #:	

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Character: RACIAL MATTERS

Synopsis: Chicago headquarters of BPP located at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Chicago area branches Argo, Harvey, Maywood and Rockford, all in Illinois. Total estimate of BPP members, Chicago area between 100 to 130 members with 30 members considered active. Chicago BPP adheres to policy of National BPP as expressed by National BPP leaders. Chicago BPP operates on funds received from speaking engagements, assessments, and donations. Chicago BPP attempting to recruit Negro youth gangs with limited success. Chicago BPP leaders arrested and litigation pending.

- P -

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DETAILS:

Characterizations of the following organizations which are referred to below are contained in the appendix section of this report:

Black Panther Party (BPP)
Nation of Islam
Students for a Democratic Society
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America
Young Socialist Alliance - Chicago

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, CHAPTER OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A. Location of Chicago BPP Headquarters

In mid-November, 1968, ROBERT LEE RUSH, better known as BOBBY LEE RUSH, Deputy Minister of State, Chicago Chapter of BPP, rented the second and third floor of building located at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. RUSH stated this space is to be utilized as headquarters for Chicago Chapter of BPP.

11/20/68)

Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Chicago, Illinois, assigned telephone number 243-7960, to BOBBY RUSH, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. This phone is only telephone in headquarters of Chicago Chapter of BPP.

12/1868)

On January 27, 1969, RUSH's telephone service at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, which is Chicago BPP headquarters, was terminated by Illinois Bell Telephone Company, for failure to pay telephone bill of approximately $300.00.

1/28/69)

RUSH stated on January 27, 1969, that Chicago Police Department officers were responsible for BPP loss of telephone service.

1/28/69)

Telephone service at BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, was recently reinstituted upon payment of $200.00 for deposit and $87.00 for outstanding telephone bills. Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Chicago, assigned telephone number 243-8276, to the BPP, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

3/27/69)

Chicago Chapter of BPP was organized on August 25, 1968, at meeting held at 6110 South Dorchester Street, Chicago, Illinois, which was attended by approximately 10 male Negroes. Purpose of the meeting was to dissolve Chicago Branch of Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and to organize a Chicago Chapter of BPP.

8/27/68)

BPP at Chicago did not have headquarter space until ROBERT RUSH rented space at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, in November, 1968.

11/20/68)

Headquarters for Chicago Chapter of the BPP continues to be located at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, having listed telephone number 243-8276.

5/19/69)

B. Location of Branch Headquarters of the BPP in Chicago Area

BPP Branches of the Chicago BPP Chapter have recently been formed in following Illinois cities, which are suburbs of Chicago, other than Rockford, Illinois, which is located 90 miles northwest of Chicago, Illinois:

Argo, Illinois
Harvey, Illinois
Maywood, Illinois
Rockford, Illinois

4/8/69)

C. Stated Aims and Purposes of Chicago BPP Chapter

On November 1, 1968, BOBBY LEE RUSH, Deputy Minister of State, Chicago Chapter, BPP, flew to BPP National Headquarters, Oakland, California, where he met with ELDRIDGE and KATHLEEN CLEAVER and BOBBY GEORGE SEALE. CLEAVERs and SEALE are members of Central Committee of National BPP.

On November 4, 1968, RUSH returned to Chicago from Oakland, California, and stated Chicago Chapter would follow National Headquarter BPP policy in all regards.

11/7/68)

On January 24, 1969, BOBBY LEE RUSH appeared on televised show Channel 7, Chicago, Illinois, at which time he stated he was Deputy Minister of State, Chicago Chapter BPP. RUSH stated Chicago Chapter BPP's aims and purposes are identical to aims and purposes of BPP as publicly stated by National BPP leaders, Berkeley, California.

RUSH stated "The Black Panther," official newspaper of BPP, which is further described as "Black Community News Service," sets forth stated purposes of BPP, to which Chicago Chapter of BPP fully subscribes.

1/25/69)

On May 1, 1969, Chicago Chapter of BPP advised BPP members the following ten points continue to reflect "What We Want - What We Believe":

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our black community.

2. We want full employment for our people.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the white men of our black community.

4. We want decent housing fit for shelter of human beings.

5. We want education for our people that will expose the true nature of this decadent American society.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

7. We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in Federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black community as defined by the constitution of the United States.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace, and as our major political objective, a United Nations supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

5/2/69)

The following two articles by RUFUS WALLS, who is the Minister of Information, Chicago Chapter BPP, appeared in the first spring semester edition of the "Phoenix", an underground-type newspaper published by Negro militants at Crane Junior College, 2250 West Van Buren, Chicago, Illinois. The newspaper was distributed on Crane campus on February 12, 1969.

"BLACK CAPITALISM

"First, we must understand the true term used for Capitalism. It denotes the economic system set up by Flanders in the 13th century and Florence in the 14th century which mainly was long distance trading. Their histories shed light on the conditions as developed by the total Western World. The English woolen industry really spearheaded Capitalism as a social and economic system for private profit until it became the roots of all evils. The selfish owners expanded their means of production by creating civil wars, murdering and raping Asia, Africa, Latin America and even their own motherland while America assisted in the most barbaric acts ever perpetrated by man!

"Under Capitalism, all decisions concerning production and who will get the profit is always made by the rich (sic) In America, it is a handful of White Anglo-Saxons (JOHNSONS, KENNEDYS, ROCKEFELLERS, and a few more) who are making decisions for all ethnic groups. Under Capitalism, the working class (95%) have no choice but to sell their energy or better yet their backs for token economic gains. In order to be a Capitalist, one must have capital and Black People have no capital nor own any means of production. We are a Capitalist people! We are a landless people! We are the poorest of the poor! Why are we in this bag? Historically the Black colony was created for the purpose of super-exploitation. Being a product of the system--a system that enslaved our forefather--a system that burned Black people alive, lynched and crushed pregnant Black women to death! A system that keeps us on a reservation and the bureaucrats who uphold and perpetuate this system don't give a damn if bread is on the reservation or not! What is ironic when we try to get off the reservation, they think they are justified in killing us!

"If Black people or a handful in essence--one in every ten thousand should be given franchises to set up a monstrous machine in the Black colony it would be a counterpart to the tyrannical white Anglo Saxon's. Who would they exploit! It is understandable while the pig (sic) NIXON so readily endorsed Black Capitalism. Are we so blind until we cannot see that this is just another smoke screen to deny us of total equality?

"We believe and understand that the term Capitalism as well as so-called Black Capitalism is irrelevant to us. For the simple reason there will only be a few more material goods, a few more advantages, a few more privileges; so those who run the show are going to do a little bit better!. What will happen to the Black have-nots in this country? We must tune our minds in on promoting the interest of the Black have-nots who are the majority in this country. The people must control the material goods, the means of production if they are ever to abolish exploitation of money hungry pirates.

"We know, slick NIXON knows, and we Black Panthers must inform and educate the people through activity. Activity through any means possible to bring about radical reforms if we are to survive as a people!!"

"RUFUS C. WALLS"

"BLACK MAN, LISTEN!

"I think there are many profound, incisive, and elusive things that Black men find hard to say to other Black men; but I'm inclined to believe it's the small things of life we find hard to say to each other--small but important things that will mode our destiny. I'm going to say some of the small things that are very important dealing with our future. Brace yourself brothers, I'm going to give you the lay of the land!

"Here-we-are trapped in a monstrous unprecedented dilemma that's crushing the life out of us! Stripped of all manhood, no authority to make any laws concerning our lives nor authority to say when our children are to go to school or what kind of education they are to receive. Horrifying! Yet I hear and read so much negative lip protest and so much negative literary protest. Begging for political justice from the enemy, I say it's futile to ask the oppressor for freedom because he can't free us even if he wanted to in a Capitalistic system. As long as we continue to beg and rage, they will only give us arguments and continue to say we're uncool and not ready. This really hurts when they say we are not ready because it's the--notorious truth--Black men don't beg, they demand!

"We must redefine the term Black Man just as MALCOLM X and HUEY P. NEWTON did and stand firm on our beliefs and if necessary let there be rivers of blood in maintaining our beliefs. As a Black Man or those whom are conscious of self and environment, it is our responsible to re-educate the people in which they will know what avenues to approach toward alternating the Black Colony in which the masses will benefit.

"First, we must heighten the contradictions around the so-called law and that jive constitution. We must politically stimulate the minds of our people where as they will understand that what is really happening to them and why? Our teachings must focus on national as well as international issues so we can equate and analyze our situation with other oppressed nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. We must heighten the contradictions around the history in which we were white washed by the power structure's monstrous--misleading communication system--dogmatic papers and books, irrelevant television series, and naive radio programs.

"Second, we must emphasize and highly stress that all Black Teachers, Artists and Clergymen praise and glorify Black Freedom fighters who have been murdered or incarcerated by hands of the enemy. From HARRIET TUBMAN--MARCUS GARVEY--MALCOLM X--DR. KING to HUEY P. NEWTON; this must be done for pride and dignity. These methods of teaching must be profound and incisive in order to bear ripe fruit. This is needed to stimulate the mind. Hence, the mind will be transformed toward self-emancipation.

"This package carries the seeds for transplanting a new nation of Black People. A package that will fuse Black Solidarity, a package that will produce undying love and courage where as it's people will not compromise, nor give one iota to the enemy.. They will understand and know what they will be giving--their freedom!

"Look! Black Man, this is the only way to lift the yoke of bondage that is oppressing as in this decadent oligarchy society. I see and understand we're dealing with inhuman elements (pigs) who have long dehumanized each other by their racist beaucratic Capitalistic system which has plagued a paranois atmosphere throughout the entire world!

"by
"RUFUS C. WALLS"

2/13/69)

The following article by RUFUS WALLS, appeared in recent issue of the "Phoenix" and was distributed on Crane Junior College campus on April 1 and 2, 1969:

"PIG POLICE IN BLACK COMMUNITY

"We are living in a police state (Fascism); not only do pigs forcibly subdue all Black Orientated organizations, but they are allowed to freely walk the streets of our black communities and use any means at their disposal (clubs, mace, 357 Magnums, etc.) in order to contain and brutalize Black people.

"We must take a stand! We must be prepared for the consequences. We must face these pigs just as HUEY P. NEWTON did in this present state of police oppression. (Pig Barbarianism) Why are so many police in the Black Community? Why is the stop and frisk law only applicable to Black People? Why are our Federal, state, county and city jails only filled and splattered with the blood of Black People? Why must our Black People unnecessarily face constant police harassment and agitation? Why are missiles bordering every Black Community in the country?

"Why are so many so-called riot control weapons being stockpiled? We must understand and deal with the fact that our community is now facing the unmerciful gestapo--the occupational army--namely the Pig Police. In order to deal with the tail--we must first deal with the head boar--Tricky Dick Daily whose only claim to fame is the exploitation of Black People! We must support, unite and call upon all people to destroy these pigs swiftly and in whole without mercy. Not only must we move on the pigs but the money hungry pirates who own stores--grocery, clothing, hardwares, restaurants, currency exchanges, business events, real estate, etc., whom are not sensitive and loyal to the Black Community.

No longer can we sit back and accept humiliation and exploitation of these racist money hungry pirates.

"We must know, understand, deal with the system that has created these horrible conditions for Black People. Capitalism is the mother that nursed this monster into being. Yes! Capitalism created this Fascist Police State along with the dehumanization processes that has murdered millions of Black People and mentally crippled millions of Black People. This system must be destroyed before it destroys all of us. The beast is on her last leg and she is pulling us down into a bottomless cesspool with her. This beast is falling because of the lies she has told and the blood shed all over the world.

"Yes!: She is falling and she knows it! She knows the oppressed people are sick and tired of her barbaric, oppressive policy. We must, for survival sake, create a new front in the Black Community just like the one in Viet Nam!

"RUFUS WALLS"

4/10/69)

Reference to "TRICKY DICK DAILY" in WALLS' article above probably refers to Chicago's Mayor RICHARD DALEY.

4/10/69)

On February 14, 1969, FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman, BPP, Chicago Chapter, spoke at Old Town's Boy's Club, 1207 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

HAMPTON explained the BPP ten points and described the BPP as a military group. He stated the purpose of BPP is to correct the abuses in this society visited upon the Blacks and to build a powerful Black society, which can deal effectively with the white beast.

All Blacks should have guns so that when the man comes to your door you could blow him away. Whites have been committing genocide for 400 years and now the Blackman is beginning to fight back. White education is meant only to use, control and corrupt Black youth and foil their minds. After Black youths are under control, then the whiteman will move on Black adults.

HAMPTON, noting several white adults in the audience, asked them, in obscene terms, what they were doing at a Black meeting. An elderly white woman, in tears, stated she and her friends meant no harm and were just trying to be helpful. The crowd, practically all of Negro race, appeared stunned by HAMPTON's statement to the whites.

2/17/69)

1

D. RULES OF THE CHICAGO CHAPTER OF THE BPP

On May 1, 1969, Chicago chapter of the BPP circulated the following Rules of the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois:

Every member of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY throughout this country of racist America must abide by these rules as functional members of this party. CENTRAL COMMITTEE members, CENTRAL STAFFS, and LOCAL STAFFS, including all captains subordinate to either national, state, and local leadership of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY will enforce these rules. Length of suspension or other disciplinary action necessary for violation of these rules will depend on national decisions by national, state or state area, and local committees and staffs where said rules or rules of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY were violated.

Every member of the party must know these verbatum by heart, and apply them daily. Each member must report any violation of these rules to their leadership or they are conter-revolutionary and are also subjected to suspension by the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

THE FOLLOWING RULES ARE:

1. No party member can have narcotics or weed in his possession while doing party work.
2. Any party member found shooting narcotics will be expelled from this party.
3. No party member can be drunk while doing daily party work.
4. No party member will violate rules relating to office and meetings of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, ANYWHERE
5. No party member will use, or fire a weapon of any kind unnecessarily or accidentally at anyone other than the enemy.
6. No party member can join any other army force other than the BLACK LIBERATION ARMY.

2

7. No party member can have a weapon in his possession while drunk or loaded off narcotics or weed.
8. No party member will commit any crimes against other party members or BLACK people at all, and cannot steal or take from the people, not even a needle or a piece of thread.
9. When arrested BLACK PANTHER MEMBERS WILL give only name and address and will sign nothing. Legal first aid must be understood by all Party members.
10. The Ten Point Program and platform of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must be known and understood by each Party member.
11. Party communications must be national and local.
12. The 10-10-10- program should be known by all members and also understood by all members.
13. All Finance officers operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.
14. Each person submit report of daily work.
15. Each Sub-Section Leader, Section Leader, and Captain must submit Daily reports of work.
16. All Panthers must learn to operate and service weapons correctly.
17. All Leadership personnel who suspends or expells a member must submit this information to the Editor for the newspaper pertaining to suspension, so that it will be published in the paper and known by all chapters and branches
18. Political Education Classes are manditory.
19. Only office personnel assigned to respective offices each day should be there. All others are to sell papers and do Political work out in the community, including Captains, Section Leaders, and etc.
20. COMMUNICATION--all chapters must submit weekly reports in writing to the National Headquarters.
21. All Branches must implement First Aid and or Medical Cadres.

3

22. All Chapters, Branches, and components of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must submit a monthly Financial Report to the Ministry of Finance and also the Central Committee.
23. Everyone in leadership positions must read no less than two hours per day to keep abreast of the changing political situation.
24. No chapter or branch shall accept grants, poverty funds, money, or any other aid from any government agency without contacting the National Headquarters.
25. All chapters must adhere to the policy and ideology laid by the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.
26. All Branches must submit weekly reports in writing to their respective Chapters.

5/2/69)

On May 1, 1969, the Chicago Chapter of the BPP circulated list, set forth below, of "Mandatory Readings" for Chicago BPP members:

1. Platform Program
2. Rules of legal First-Aid
3. Essays from Minister of Defense
4. Red Book Principles (Quotations from Mao)
5. Wretched of the Earth. FRANTZ FANON
6. Neocolonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism - K. NKRUMAH
7. Communist Manifest - KARL MARX
8. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism - V. I. LENIN
9. State and Revolution - V. I. LENIN

4

10. What is to Be Done - V. I. LENIN

11. Autobiography of Malcolm X

12. The Ballot or the Bullet - Malcolm X

14. Revolution in the Revolution - Regis Debray

15. The Challenge of the Congo - K. Nkruma

16. Guerilla Warfar - Che Guevara

17. Axioms of Kwame Nkruma - K. Nkruma

18. Periodicals - newspaper

    Black Panther Party - Black Community Newspaper Service
    National Guardian - International Perspective
    Muhammad Speaks (newspaper)
    Ramparts (magazine)
    Granma (official journal of the Communist Party of Cuba)
    Tricontinental (journal of the Organization of Solidarity of the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
    Minority of One - magazine.

5/2/69)

On May 14, 1969, the Chicago Chapter of the BPP distributed to BPP members the following "Mandatory Readings" from Quotations of MAO (Red Book):

Mandatory Reading from the Red Book

1. Curriculum Black Panther Party Political Education Classes Self-cultivation P. 237-250

2. War and Peace P.58

3. Discipline P. 254

4. Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers P. 72.

5. The Mass Line P. 118
6. The People's War P. 88
7. Criticism and Self Criticism P. 258
8. Cadres P. 276
9. Investigation and Study P. 230
10. Relations Between the Army and the People P. 253
11. Revolutionary Heroism P. 181
12. Dare to Struggle Dare to Win P. 82
13. Study P. 304
14. Culture and Art P. 299.

5/14/69)

It was learned on May 1, 1969, that Chicago Chapter of the BPP was holding Political Orientation Classes for BPP members at 8:00 p.m. on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. For BPP members unable to attend classes during the week, classes are held on Sundays, noon to six p.m.

Karate classes for BPP members are held every Tuesday and Thursday evening from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m.

All BPP classes are held at Chicago BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

5/1/69)

E. OFFICERS OF CHICAGO CHAPTER OF BPP

On January 28, 1969, ROBERT LEE RUSH, better known as BOBBY LEE RUSH was Deputy Minister of Defense and FRED HAMPTON was Deputy Chairman of BPP. RUFUS WALLS was Minster of Education.

Remaining officers for Chicago Chapter of BPP

6

in process of being selected, and subject to change at all times.

1/29/69)

Leadership of BPP Chapter at Chicago, Illinois, is under constant challenge by various militant Negroes, all of whom desire to be in position of authority of BPP at Chicago, Illinois. Leadership of BPP on any given date impossible to know inasmuch as various Negroes claim to be leader of groups, all claiming association with Panthers. However, HAMPTON and RUSH would appear to be individuals with strongest following at this time who have support of National BPP leaders.

1/20/69)

On December 6, 1968, Chicago BPP officers were ROBERT ALFONZO BROWN, Midwest Director, BOBBY LEE RUSH, Minister of Defense, and FRED HAMPTON, Suburban Director. ABDUL KENYATTA, leader of the Mau Maus, Chicago Negro Youth Gang, accused BROWN, RUSH, and HAMPTON of using BPP Headquarters for sex parties. KENYATTA challenged them to act like revolutionists not lovers. KENYATTA stated he was going to contact National Headquarters of BPP to complain about BROWN, RUSH, and HAMPTON, and seek new leadership for BPP at Chicago.

12/6/68)

In early January, 1969, ROBERT ALFONZO BROWN was Midwest Director of BPP at Chicago, Illinois, JOSEPH L. MONTGOMERY was Field Marshal, BPP, Chicago, THOMAS CLYDE CARTER was BPP Field Director, Chicago's South Suburbs, and DREW FERGUSON was BPP Field Director, Chicago's West Side, however, all have been removed from leadership capacity in Chicago BPP. Only HAMPTON and RUSH continue to hold positions of responsibility in BPP activity at Chicago at this time.

1/28/69)

7

As of April, 1969, the following individuals are members of the Central Staff of the Chicago Chapter of the BPP, and are leaders of BPP acitivites at Chicago, at this time:

BOBBY RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense
FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman
ANN CAMPBELL, Acting Communication Secretary
RUFUS WALLS, Deputy Minister of Information
BILLY BROOKS, Deputy Minister of Education
RONALD STACHEL, Deputy Minister of Health
CHRISTINA MAY, Deputy Minister of Culture
YVONNE KING, Deputy Minister of Labor.

The following are also officers of Chicago Chapter of the BPP:

NATHANIEL JUNIOR, Field Secretary
JEWELL COOK, Field Secretary
BOB LEE, Field Secretary
TED BOSTON, Field Secretary
WILLIAM O'NEAL, Chief, Security Section.

4/27/69)

F. OFFICERS OF BRANCHES OF THE CHICAGO CHAPTER OF BPP

Argo, Illinois, branch of BPP

MICHAEL WHITE
DENNIS HARVEY
WILLIAM MC CLINTON
NATHANIEL JUNIOR (also Field Secretary, Chicago BPP Chapter)

4/27/69)

8

Harvey, Illinois, branch of BPP

JAMES VEAL, Acting Captain of Defense

4/8/69)

Maywood, Illinois, branch of BPP

ROBERT BRUCE, Acting Chairman
PETER HAMMACH, Acting Captain of Information

4/8/69)

Rockford, Illinois, branch of BPP

C. LINCOLN POWELL, Minister of Information
HAROLD BELL, Captain of Defense
MONK TEBA, Co-Captain of Defense
JOSEPH WILLISMS, Security Officer
CHARLES HAWKINS, Field Marshal
DELRIDGE HUNTER, Minister of Education

4/30/69)

G. MEMBERSHIP OF CHICAGO CHAPTER OF BPP

The Chicago Chapter of BPP has an estimated membership of 100 to 130 members which includes BPP members in BPP branches under Chicago BPP Chapter. Approximately 30 members are considered to be active in BPP metters in Chicago area.

Estimate of membership as to branches is as follows:

Chicago BPP Chapter - 100 to 130 members
Argo, Illinois, BPP Branch- 8 to 12 members

9

Harvey, Illinois, BPP Branch-5 members
Maywood, Illinois, BPP Branch-10 to 15 members
Rockford, Illinois, BPP Branch-10 to 15 members.

4/23/69)
5/20/69)

All members of BPP Branches are also considered members of Chicago Chapter of BPP. Some members hold offices in Chicago BPP Chapter as well as in their respective BPP Branch.

4/23/69)
5/20/69)

H. FINANCES AND ACTIVITIES OF CHICAGO BPP CHAPTER

Chicago BPP Chapter operates on funds received from the following sources:

(1) Speaker fees and honorariums received by BPP leaders for appearances at educational institutions and other public gatherings.

(2) Monthly assessments of BPP members, as well as fees charged for processing applications for membership in Chicago BPP Chapter.

(3) Donations and contributions given at BPP rallies or by individuals sympathetic to BPP objectives.

(4) No information developed indicating Chicago Chapter BPP has received any funds from National Chapter of BPP, from any foreign government or individual from a foreign country, or an organization operated in a foreign country.

2/26/69)
2/28/69)
2/26/69)
2/26/69)

10

Expenses incurred by Chicago BPP Chapter would appear to be limited at this time to maintain headquarter space, air travel, and bail bonds. Chicago BPP Chapter is not known to have any salaried employees. Financial aspects of Chicago BPP Chapter appears to be handled by several BPP leaders at Chicago, with general Chicago BPP members unaware of financial conditions of Chicago BPP Chapter.

2/28/69)
2/28/69)

It was learned that Chicago Chapter of BPP now pays a salary of $80.00 a month to Central Staff members of Chicago BPP Chapter.

3/26/69)

FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman of Illinois BPP and leader of Chicago PBB Chapter, has been receiving from $300.00 to $600.00 for his appearances at various universities and college campuses.

When members of the Chicago BPP Chapter appear at a location where one of their members is to speak, they usually charge an admission fee. If the proceeds from the admittance fee is not considered sufficient, BPP members will take up a collection before the affair is over.

2/21/69)

FRED HAMPTON, Chicago BPP leader, has been receiving $800.00 to $1,000.00 for his appearances at various universities and college campuses.

1/16/69)

Student groups at Northeastern Illinois State College, 5500 North St. Louis Street, Chicago, will pay $200.00 or more for BPP members to speak to their groups.

12/10/68)

11

FRED HAMPTON, BOBBY LEE RUSH, and RUFUS WALLS, all Chicago BPP leaders, are main BPP speakers on college campuses as well as at other public appearances in the Chicago area.

2/28/69)

BPP leaders, all from Chicago BPP Chapter, unless otherwise indicated, appeared as speakers at the following educational institutions on dates and places indicated below:

November 15, 1968, Crane Junior College, 2250 West Van Buren Street, Chicago, Illinois.

November 26, 1968, the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus, Chicago, Illinois.

November 26, 1968, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois. (AARON DIXON, Black Panther leader from Seattle, Washington, guest speaker).

December 10, 1968, Northeastern Illinois State College, 5500 North St. Louis, Chicago, Illinois.

January 8, 1969, Roosevelt University, 480 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

Mid-January, 1969, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus, Chicago, Illinois.

January 14, 1969, YMCA College, 211 West Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois.

February 4, 1969, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana Campus, Champaign, Illinois.

February 8, 1969, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana Campus, Champaign, Illinois.

February 10, 1969, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus, Chicago, Illinois.

February 17, 1969, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana Campus, Champaign, Illinois.

12

February 17, 1969, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus, Chicago, Illinois.

February 17, 1969, Crane Junior College, 2250 West Van Buren Street, Chicago, Illinois.

February 18, 1969, Crane Junior College, 2250 West Van Buren Street, Chicago, Illinois.

February 20, 1969, Northeastern Illinois State College, 5500 North St. Louis Street, Chicago, Illinois.

February 20, 1969, Chicago State Teachers College, 6800 South Stewart, Chicago, Illinois.

February 25, 1969, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois.

2/28/69)

March 7, 1969, Loop City College, Chicago, Illinois.

3/10/69)

March 23, 1969, Beloit College, Beloit, Wisconsin.

3/24/69)

March 23, 1969, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois.

3/25/69)

13

March 26, 1969, Roosevelt University, Chicago, Illinois.

3/28/69)

March 27, 1969, Dominican College, Racine, Wisconsin.

3/28/69)

April 2, 1969, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

4/2/69)

April 18, 1969, Northwestern University, Evanston. Illinois.

4/18/69)

May 9, 1969, DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois.

5/9/69)

On November 8, 1968, Chicago BPP Chapter held a meeting at Jackie's Candy Store, 7155 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

Approximately 50 Negroes, both male and female, were present, all were assessed $1.00 for dues.

11/12/68)

Chicago BPP Chapter charges a fee of $1.00 from each new recruit for processing recruit's application for BPP.

12/6/68)

14

Chicago BPP Chapter assesses each member of BPP $10.00 per month to be used to meet BPP office expenses. This assessment has met with some resistance from members of the Chicago BPP Chapter.

12/6/68)

On November 27, 1968, a meeting of approximately 45 young Negroes, both male and female, was held at Chicago, Illinois. FRED HAMPTON spoke to the group about BPP activities and suggested that individuals in the group should commit various types of crimes, such as robberies, burglaries, etc. HAMPTON advised the group that they should pay $10.00 per month to the Chicago BPP Chapter from the proceeds of their criminal activities.

11/30/68)

On January 4, 1969, RICHARD PRYOR, Negro Comedian, who was appearing at a night club in Chicago, Illinois, gave $1,000.00 in United States currency to BOBBY RUSH in the presence of 10 or 12 members of the Chicago BPP Chapter. PRYOR joined Chicago BPP Chapter on January 3, 1969.

1/5/69)

St. Dorothy's Roman Catholic Church, 450 East 78th Street, Chicago, Illinois, has recently donated an undetermined amount of money to Chicago BPP Chapter.

12/18/68)

Pastor or St. Dorothy's Church is Reverend ROLLAND LAMBERT, Negro, who was recently assigned as pastor. Reverend GEORGE CLEMENTS, Negro militant, has been assistant pastor at St. Dorothy's Church. Negro militants, including members of the Chicago BPP Chapte , have held news conferences calling JOHN CARDINAL CODY, Archbishop of Chicago, a "white racist" because he appointed LAMBERT pastor at St. Dorothy's Church instead of CLEMENTS. Reverend CLEMENTS has been closely associated with Negro militants at Chicago, Illinois, including members of the Chicago BPP Chapter.

12/27/68)

15

On November 30, 1968, RUSSELL MEEK, Negro militant, Chicago television and radio personality, was guest speaker at the Chicago BPP headquarters. MEEK has made a better than average monetary contribution to Chicago BPP Chapter, exact amount unknown.

12/6/68)

On December 20, 1968, FRED HAMPTON and BOBBY RUSH, both leaders Chicago BPP Chapter, spoke to a group of white people in the 900 block of Diversey Street, Chicago, Illinois. A collection, totaling $330.00 was taken to help free members of the BPP who had been arrested in Chicago, Illinois, several days earlier.

12/26/68)

On January 24, 1969, HOWARD MILLER, Chicago radio and television personality, and JEFF CAMEN (phonetic), who is employed with MILLER at radio station WCFL, Chicago, Illinois, gave BOBBY RUSH $300.00 for FRED HAMPTON's expenses. HAMPTON was scheduled to appear on MILLER's television show on January 24, 1969, when arrested by Chicago Police Officers in lobby of television studio on outstanding warrant.

HOWARD ALK, Chicago, Illinois, reportedly gave $100.00 to HAMPTON on January 24, 1969, to assist in defraying his expenses in connection with his arrest on January 24, 1969.

1/25/69)

Reportedly, SAM RAYNOR, Alderman, Chicago, Illinois, has indicated to members of the Chicago BPP Chapter that he would assist them in a monetary way if they should need assistance.

2/28/69)

16

On February 17, 1969, one DAN STERN, believed associated with the Garfield Organization, a West Side Chicago community organization, whose purpose was to rehabilitate, improve, and stabilize the Garfield community, but which is now defunct, gave a check in the amount of $650.00 to the Chicago BPP Chapter. The check may have represented contributions from a number of individuals residing in the Garfiled area on Chicago's West Side.

2/28/69)

It was learned on April 18, 1969, that Chicago BPP Chapter received $2,500.00 from the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), additional details unknown.

4/27/69)

Rent on space utilized by Chicago BPP Chapter is $150.00 a month, which is paid by RUSH.

2/27/69)

On December 18, 1968, BOBBY LEE RUSH, FRED HAMPTON, and HENRY ENGLISH, all Chicago BPP leaders, opened a checking account at Sears Bank and Trust Company, Homan at Arthington Streets, Chicago, Illinois, 60624. Checking account was opened under the name Black Panther Party, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60612.

The agreement RUSH, HAMPTON, and ENGLISH signed with the bank stipulated any checks drawn against the Black Panther account must contain the signatures of two individuals. The only persons authorized to sign checks were RUSH, HAMPTON, or ENGLISH.

On December 18, 1968, an initial deposit was made to this account in the amount of $301.00. On December 31, 1969, the account had a balance of $10.00 which represented

17

the balance after a check for $86.00 dated December 24, 1968, and a check for $205.00 dated December 31, 1968, had been drawn against the account.

On January 31, 1969, the account had a balance of $36.60. Deposits were made of $180.00 on January 2, 1969, and $45.00 on January 16, 1969. Withdrawals from the account by checks were made on January 8, 1969, in amount of $50.00, January 10, 1969, in amount of $42.00, and January 18, 1969, in amount of $100.00. The difference between the deposits, withdrawals, and balance represents service charges.

On February 28, 1969, the balance in the account was $34.04 with no deposits or withdrawals having been made during February, 1969..

On March 31, 1969, the balance in the BPP account was $463.54. A deposit of $500 was made on March 1, 1969, and a deposit of $437.50 was made on March 25, 1969. On March 14, 1969, a check payable to FRED HAMPTON and signed by HAMPTON and RUSH was drawn against the account.

On April 30, 1969, the balance in BPP account was $79.48. On April 2, 1969, ALVINO SHINN, Chicago BPP member cashed check for $300 against BPP account which was payable to him. This check was signed by FRED HAMPTON and BOBBY LEE RUSH.

On April 2, 1969, check payable to BOBBY LEE RUSH for $78.00 was drawn against BPP account. This check was signed by FRED HAMPTON and BOBBY LEE RUSH.

5/2/69)

I. Publications of Chicago Chapter BPP

The Chicago Chapter of BPP does not have any regularly scheduled publication, however, on several occasions, they have distributed leaflets in connection with appearances of BPP members at university or college campuses.

4/23/69)
5/20/69)

J. Security Measures of Chicago BPP

It was recently learned that following security measures have been taken at Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois:

All windows and doors will be equipped with an alarm system, containing a siren device. The front window, main entrance, will be equipped with bullet-proof steel. The main entrance will be equipped with an electrical device that will electrocute any unwanted intruders and front hallway will be equipped with gas device that will kill in matter of seconds.

12/68)

Recently it was learned Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, has a panel board in their office which has the following on it:

BLUEPRINT FOR THE ALARM SYSTEMS

1. Complete system on-off switch.
2. Siren - police alarm.
3. Door-buzzer.

4. Electrical-steps

5. Electrocution-door handles switch.

6. Gas switch.

7. All station warning device

8. Window alarms

9. The electric chair

10. Nerve gas switch

11. Acid switch

12. Oil on steps release switch

13. All intercom systems alert

14. Minister of Defense's main office

15. Deputy Chairman's office

16. Main bulletproof door alarm system

This switchboard blueprint is to be used as a directory of the control board.

1/21/69)

The Chicago BPP Chapter recently installed a two-way base radio unit operating out of headquarters at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago. They have at least two vehicles equipped with two-way mobile units.

3/27/69)

Two German Shephards are kept at Chicago BPP Headquarters for security purposes.

, 3/21/69)

K. Uniforms and Firearms of Chicago BPP

Members of the Chicago BPP normally do not wear uniforms in public, however, on several occasions, when BPP leaders spoke at university and college campuses, members of BPP were observed displaying firearms and dressed in jackets and berets. At several public demonstrations, members also seen BPP conventional uniform.

4/23/69)
5/20/69)

All members of BPP must be considered possibly armed and dangerous in view of desire of all to have firearms.

5/20/69)

L. Attorneys

Recently learned that Chicago BPP members utilize attorneys KERMIT COLEMAN, DUKE WILLIAMS, and DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, all residing Chicago area, in connection with legal problems.

In February, 1969, above attorneys advised Chicago BPP leaders their services would be free to any BPP member requesting legal assistance.

2/18/69)

M. Breakfasts Sponsored by Chicago BPP

Chicago BPP has held several free breakfasts for Negro children recently, however, they do not have a regular plan for free breakfasts.

5/20/69)

II. CHICAGO BPP RELATIONS WITH ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER GROUPS

A. Chicago BPP and SDS

On January 10, 1969, Chicago BPP leaders spoke to group at University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, which was sponsored by SDS Chapter at University of Illinois.

1/10/69)

On February 10, 1969, leaders of SDS and BPP at Chicago discussed plans to hold rallies on February 16, 1969, and February 17, 1969, throughout the United States in honor of birthday of HUEY P. NEWTON, National BPP leader, who is presently serving a 2-15 year prison sentence.

2/10/69)

On April 9, 1969, rally held at Chicago, Illinois, which was jointly sponsored by SDS and BPP members from Chicago. Purpose was to raise money for individuals under indictment as result of disturbances at Democratic Convention which was held at Chicago, August, 1968.

BOBBY SEALE, National BPP leader, spoke to group, as did FRED HAMPTON and BOBBY RUSH, Chicago BPP leaders.

4/9/69)

It was learned on April 6, 1969, that Chicago Chapter of SDS is going to do mass leafletting on April 8, 1969, in Chicago universities and colleges. The leaflets are in support of the Black Panther Party and especially in support of BOBBY LEE RUSH, leader of Chicago BPP who is to be tried on a murder charge.

SDS show of support is also for 19 Chicago BPP members who were recently arrested as well as for BOBBY SEALE, National BPP leader, who has been indicted for crossing state lines to incite a riot.

4/9/69)

On April 12, 1969, it was learned Chicago Chapter of SDS has furnished money to Chicago BPP leaders whenever BPP needs money.

4/15/69)

On April 15, 1969, Chicago BPP leaders met with Chicago SDS leaders at SDS Chicago Headquarters, for purpose of leaders of both groups to be more familiar with each others.

4/17/69)

On April 29, 1969, it was learned Chicago BPP had formed a coalition with Chicago Chapter of SDS and Youth Lords.

4/29/69)

The Young Lords is a Chicago youth gang consisting of approximately 55 males of Puerto Rican origin between the ages of 14-20 years, located on Chicago's near north side.

4/30/69)

On May 6, 1969, SDS members, BPP members and members of the Latin Kings and Latin Queens, Puerto Rican street gangs on Chicago's near north side, joined the Young Lords in demonstrating against Chicago police in connection with shooting of Puerto Rican youth on May 4, 1969, by an off-duty Chicago police officer.

5/6/69)

B. Chicago BPP and Blackstone Rangers (BR)

Blackstone Rangers (BR) is a Negro youth gang located on Chicago's south side.

5/20/69)

On December 18, 1968, members of Chicago Chapter BPP and members of BR met to discuss possibility of combining their organizations. No agreement was reached.

12/19/68)

On December 18, 1968, thirty Negroes, including three females, all believed to be members of BPP met with approximately 100 Negro youths, all believed to be members of the BR, Negro Youth gang, which operates on Chicago's south side, at First Presbyterian Church, 6400 South Kimbark Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

BR members displayed various weapons to BPP members at church, prior to JEFF FORT, leader of BR meeting with FRED HAMPTON and BOBBY LEE RUSH, leaders of BPP. Discussion between BR and BPP leaders was concerned with whether BR and BPP should join forces. FORT indicated BR was not anxious to join BPP, but would consider BPP joining BR.

12/19/68)

On December 26, 1968, several members of Chicago BPP, including FRED HAMPTON, met JEFF FORT, leader of BR, who was accompanied by 30 BR, at restaurant-tavern, Chicago, Illinois. FORT told HAMPTON, if BPP members did not join the BR, they had better stay out of BR territory in Chicago.

12/30/68)

On December 27, 1968, FORT told HAMPTON the Panthers had until noon December 28, 1968, to join Rangers, as Rangers, or stay out of Ranger territory on Chicago's south side. HAMPTON told FORT he had until noon December 28, 1968, to have BR join Panthers, as Panthers, or stay out of their territory.

12/30/68)

On January 6, 1969, Central Committee of the BPP at Chicago met and decided to conduct no activity or attempt to recruit members from BR territory. BPP leaders do not plan, as of this time, to meet with JEFF FORT or any members of BR.

1/6/69)

On January 14, 1969, FRED HAMPTON and BOBBY RUSH, leaders of BPP at Chicago, Illinois, appeared on radio program, Radio Station WVON, Chicago. HAMPTON stated BPP was currently in the process of educating BR at Chicago. JEFF FORT, leader of BR immediately telephonically contacted WVON and stated HAMPTON confused as far as educating BR. FORT stated BR are educating BPP, and this was understanding reached when leaders of BR and BPP met at Chicago Church several weeks ago.

1/15/69)

On January 15, 1969, FRED HAMPTON, BPP leader, Chicago, accused JEFF FORT, Leader of BR of being responsible for the deaths of more Negroes than the Ku Klux Klan or police at meeting in Maywood, Illinois (Chicago suburb). HAMPTON said FORT is "in" with Chicago's Mayor DALEY, because when he is arrested he is always released.

On January 15, 1969, HAMPTON said he is the new MALCOLM X.

1/16/69)

The friction and hatred between well organized Negro youth gangs and BPP at Chicago is so great, it seems unlikely BPP will be able to obtain any unity among substantial numbers of black individuals at Chicago, in near future or possibly at any time.

1/28/69)

On January 17, 1969, FRED HAMPTON, Chicago BPP leader, advised at BPP rally on January 17, 1969, held at Chicago that JEFF FORT, leader of BR, Negro youth gang, Chicago's south side, had sent him a message that he (FORT) would blow off HAMPTON's head if HAMPTON continues going into BR territory.

HAMPTON indicated he desired to join forces with BR, but FORT is opposed to joining with BPP.

1/28/69)

On January 29, 1969, FRED HAMPTON, Chicago BPP leader, met with JEFF FORT, leader of BR. HAMPTON told FORT, Rangers should join forces with BPP, but FORT refused to consider it. FORT told HAMPTON to stay out of Chicago. HAMPTON told FORT that he was worse than white racists in holding back progress of Black People.

2/3/69)

On March 12, 1969, it was learned there is bad blood between the BR and the BPP at Chicago. A gang war between BPP and BR is not beyond imagination.

3/12/69)

On April 8, 1969, it was learned Chicago BPP has been negotiating with BR regarding an alliance, but JEFF FORT, leader of BR is proving to be stumbling block.

4/9/69)

On April 24, 1969, Chicago BPP held meeting at Englewood High School, Chicago, Illinois. BILLY BROOKS, Chicago BPP member, advised students aim of BPP was to gain control of city through recruitment of Negro teenagers and Negro youth gangs. BROOKS stated two Negro youth gangs, The Devil's Disciples, and the Cobrastones have already aligned themselves with the BPP. BROOKS stated BPP is trying to convert BR to join BPP.

4/29/69)

On May 9, 1969, it was learned Chicago BPP has issued on ultimatum to the BR that they should join the BPP or else. BR have no intention of joining Chicago BPP.

5/9/69)

C. Chicago BPP and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA)

The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) held National Convention at Chicago, Illinois, November 28, 1968, to December 1, 1968.

On November 29, 1968, ROBERT BROWN, Leader of Chicago BPP spoke to YSA convention. BROWN spoke for over one hour on importance of winning "the black masses to black socialism."

11/30/68)

From November 28, 1968, to December 1, 1968, the 8th National Convention of the YSA was held at Chicago, Illinois. Of the 791 persons registered, ROBERT BROWN of Chicago, only individual who identified himself as representing the BPP from Chicago.

YSA speakers stated at convention "the YSA supports the BPP as a black political party. Group like this (BPP) will unite the Black People in a struggle against the policies of today's government and will be essential in the formation of the Socialist Revolution.

12/5/68)

On January 29, 1969, at a meeting of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Chicago, Illinois, one of the speakers stated the YSA and SWP had bad communication with the BPP.

1/22/69)

On February 25, 1969, YSA, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, sponsored a panel-type discussion entitled "Black Liberation Front".

Moderator of the panel was PAUL BOUTELLE, a member of the New York Socialist Workers Party.

FRED HAMPTON, Chicago BPP leader, was guest speaker.

2/25/69)

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

D. Chicago BPP and Nation of Islam (NOI)

On February 9, 1969, a meeting of NOI held at Chicago, Illinois. Muslim speaker stated "No brother or sister is to get involved with the BPP or with any other black militant organization as they have no leaders, don't know what they are doing, or where they are going.

2/12/69)

On February 23, 1969, the 1969 Annual Muslim Convention was held at Chicago, Illinois. ELIJAH MUHAMMAD, National Leader, Nation of Islam, criticized the BPP and the Blackstone Rangers as being immature and not ready for a movement like the Black Muslims.

2/24/69)

E. Chicago BPP and W.E.B. Du Bois Club (DCA)

On February 1, 1969, the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America (DCA) held a meeting at Chicago, Illinois, which was attended by 6-7 members of the Chicago BPP.

2/3/69)

F. Chicago BPP and Vice Lords

On February 5, 1969, and February 6, 1969, leaders of Vice Lords, Chicago west side Negro youth gang, met with Chicago leaders of BPP and offered to join forces with BPP. BPP leaders suggested Vice Lords continue to work as Vice Lords but as a coalition with BPP.

2/7/69)

It was learned that BPP leaders at Chicago have expressed fear that Negro youth gangs in Chicago have informers in their groups, and BPP must exercise care in accepting BPP membership.

2/10/69)

G. Chicago BPP and Communist Party (CP)

On April 9, 1969, at a meeting of Communist Party of Illinois (CP), held at Chicago, Illinois, a CP leader stated he objected to BPP because it is a group apparently asking to become black capitalists. Any group that seeks to join the capitalist system, in one form or another, will lose support of CP. CP leader stated he recently heard a BPP spokesman express satisfaction that the Viet Nam war was continuing, because United States may be defeated, which is wrong because it is the sons of working men who are doing the fighting.

4/10/69)

1

III. TRAVEL AND ARRESTS OF CHICAGO BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A. Travel of Chicago BPP

On November 1, 1968, BOBBY LEE RUSH flew to National Headquarters, Oakland, California, where he met national leaders of BPP. RUSH returned to Chicago on November 4, 1968.

11/7/68)

On March 8, 1969, BOBBY LEE RUSH and WILLIAM O'NEAL, both leaders, Chicago BPP Chapter, arrived San Francisco by air, having departed Chicago, Illinois, at 4:00 p.m., March 8, 1969. RUSH and O'NEAL were in contact with national leaders of BPP at Berkeley, California, and returned to Chicago on the evening of March 13, 1969.

3/14/69)

Chicago BPP members have not utilized commercial transportation outside of Chicago other than on two trips to National Headquarters, San Francisco and Berkeley, California, in November, 1968, and March, 1969.

Chicago BPP members have made several trips in personally owned vehicles, and on one occasion in a privately owned aircraft to the Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, area.

2/28/69)

In March, 1969, Chicago BPP members traveled to Detroit, Michigan, for conference with BPP members.

3/21/69)

2

B. Arrests of Chicago BPP Members

On December 18, 1968, 12 male Negroes, who identified themselves as members of the BPP, were arrested in a parking lot at Chicago, Illinois, and charged with unlawful use of weapons, disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, and creating a nuisance.

The bond for the above arrested Negroes was initially set at $7,500 but subsequently reduced to $1,500. They paid $150 which represented 10% of the bond for each and they were released.

On January 22, 1969, five male Negroes, who identified themselves as BPP members, were arrested at the Afro Arts Theatre, Chicago, Illinois and charged with possession of marijuana and disorderly conduct.

Bond for the above Negroes was set at $1,000 and all were released upon payment of $100. Charges were subsequently dismissed.

On January 24, 1969, FRED HAMPTON, leader, Chicago BPP Chapter, was arrested in the lobby of WCFL Radio and Television Station, Chicago, Illinois, on a warrant which was issued at Maywood, Illinois, on July 25, 1968, charging HAMPTON with "mob action".

On March 6, 1969, HAMPTON was found "not guilty" in jury trial on above charge. HAMPTON was free on bond prior to trial and subsequent to arrest having paid $700 on the $7,000 bond which was set.

3/7/69)

On January 22, 1969, BOBBY RUSH, leader of Chicago BPP was arrested by Chicago Police Officers and charged with "unlawful use of weapon", "possession of marijuana" and "disorderly conduct".

RUSH released on $1,000 bond, court date on charges March 3, 1969.

1/22/69)

3

On February 8, 1969, BOBBY LEE RUSH, Chicago BPP leader, was arrested by Urbana, Illinois, Police Department on charge of unlawful use of weapons and no firearms registration identification card. RUSH was released upon payment of $200, which represented 10% of the $2,000 bond set. RUSH was fined $25.00 and cost of $15.00.

3/7/69)

On February 9, 1969, BOBBY LEE RUSH, WILLIAM O. DUNN, ROBERT BRUCE, TED BOSTON and RONALD SATCHEL, all Chicago BPP members, were arrested by the Illinois State Police, Pesotum, Illinois, and charged with defrauding an innkeeper, theft and conspiracy to commit theft. Six Negro females who accompanied above BPP members were subsequently arrested and similarly charged. All were incarcerated in the Champaign County Jail, Urbana, Illinois.

(Forrest Clark,
Illinois State
Police, Pesotum,
Illinois 2/9/69)

On February 7, 1969, BILLY BROOKS and WILLIAM DUNN, both members of Chicago's BPP, were arrested by University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana Campus, Champaign, Illinois, Police Department, for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.

The Black Student Association (BSA), University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois, enlisted the air of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in posting $200 bond for the two BPP members arrested. The BSA is a student group comprised of individuals of the Negro race in attendance at the University of Illinois.

3/7/69)

On March 25, 1969, five Chicago BPP members were arrested at Chicago, Illinois, and charged with failure to registe firearms and unlawful use of weapons.

4

On March 28, 1969, five Chicago BPP members were arrested at Chicago and charged with unlawful use of weapons.

On April 2, 1969, four Chicago BPP members were arrested at Robbins, Illinois (Chicago suburb) on charges of unlawful use of weapons and conspiracy to commit murder.

On April 12, 1969, four members of Chicago BPP were arrested. Charge was attempting to purchase machine guns.

On April 27, 1969, five members of Chicago BPP were arrested at Summit, Illinois (Chicago suburb) and charged with unlawful use of weapons, conspiracy to commit murder, robbery and aggravated assault.

In regard to above arrests, all BPP members cases are still in litigation. All above arrestees were leaders in BPP at Chicago, Illinois.

5/20/69)

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

NATION OF ISLAM

A source advised on May 3, 1968, that the Nation of Islam (NOI) is an all Negro organization originating in Detroit, Michigan, in the early 1930s. ELIJAH MUHAMMAD is the leader of the NOI and self-styled "Messenger of Allah" in that he claims Allah (God) selected him to lead the so-called Negro out of slavery in the wilderness of North America by establishing an independent black nation within the United States. Headquarters of the NOI is located at Muhammad's Temple (or Mosque) Number 2, 5335 South Greenwood Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

MUHAMMAD teaches there is no such thing as a Negro, that the so-called Negroes are slaves of the white race, referred to as "devils," in the United States; and that the white race because of its exploitation of the so-called Negro will be destroyed by Allah in an approaching "War of Armageddon," a war between God and the devil.

Officials and members of the NOI, including MUHAMMAD, have refused to comply with provisions of the Selective Service Act, stating that they respect laws of the United States as long as they do not conflict with the laws of the NOI, but do not believe the government should force them to participate in wars from which they have nothing to gain.

In the late 1950s MUHAMMAD, acting on legal advice, tempered NOI teachings against the white man and the government to avoid possible prosecution; however, basic tenets remain the same. He de-emphasized religious teachings in the NOI and emphasized economic benefits derived by so-called Negroes who join the NOI. MUHAMMAD believed this would create more interest in his programs and, of course, new followers.

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. The SDS is an association of young people on the left and has a current program of protesting the draft, promoting a campaign for youth to develop a conscientious objector status, denouncing United States intervention in the war in Vietnam and to "radically transform" the university community, and provide for its complete control by students. GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, when interviewed by a representative of United Press International in San Francisco, California, on May 14, 1965, described the SDS as a part of the "responsible left" which the Party has "going for us." At the June, 1965, SDS National Convention, an anti-communist proviso was removed from the SDS constitution. In the October 7, 1966, issue of "New Left Notes," the official publication of SDS, an SDS spokesman stated that there are some communists in SDS and they are welcome. The national headquarters of this organization as of July 24, 1968, was located in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), headquartered at 360-362 Nelson Street, S. W., Atlanta, Georgia, is a nonmembership organization, which was born out of the sit-in movement that erupted across the South beginning in 1960.

Today SNCC identifies itself as an organization in the revolutionary vanguard. It advocates that to be successful it is necessary to develop a revolutionary ideology and revolutionary program.

According to SNCC the year 1967 marked a historic milestone in the struggle for the liberation of black people in the United States and the year that revolutionaries throughout the world began to understand more fully the impact of the black movement. SNCC declared that "liberation will come only when there is final destruction of this mad octopus--the capitalistic system of the United States with all its life-sucking tentacles of exploitation and racism that choke the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The realities of black life, together with the recognition instilled in SNCC workers forced its members to further popularize the legitimacy of self-defense and rebellions when oppression became too great."

From May, 1966, until May, 1967, Stokely Carmichael was National Chairman of SNCC. As of July, 1968, Carmichael resided in Washington, D. C., where he was affiliated with SNCC and active as temporary chairman of a black coalition group. In May, 1967, Carmichael was replaced by Hubert Geroid Brown, commonly known as H. Rap Brown, who served until June, 1968.

In June, 1968, at the Staff and Central Committee meeting of SNCC held in Atlanta, Georgia, it was decided to restructure the organization by equalization of responsibility by creating ten deputy or vice chairmanships. The primary purpose for this change is to take law enforcement pressure off any single individual.

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC), CHICAGO BRANCH

A source advised in May, 1968, that the Chicago Branch of SNCC was an affiliate of the national SNCC with headquarters located in Atlanta, Georgia. It was a non-membership type group headed in Chicago by ROBERT ALFONZO BROWN, a 19 year old male Negro, with the title of Midwest Region Director. BROWN maintained strict loyalty to STOKELY CARMICHAEL, Recruiter and Organizer and former National Director of SNCC. BROWN attempted to align Chicago's SNCC activities within the framework of CARMICHAEL's policies.

In a speech at Chicago on March 25, 1968, CARMICHAEL commented as follows: "The white people are preparing to commit genocide against the black race. What are we feeling so moral about? We know the honky got everything. He got it by stealing it. He's not going to give you anything. We got to take it. These brothers on the streets every day take it, but they're taking it for themselves. Let's organize them and let them take it for our people."

This source advised on August 27, 1968, that officials of the Chicago Branch of SNCC disbanded that branch on August 25, 1968, and as of that time it was no longer in existence. Its leaders became associated with the Black Panther Party at that time.

APPENDIX

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates were told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention.

The second source advised in September, 1966, that Mike Zagarell, CPUSA Youth Director, stated that in Negro communities the Party still supported the plan to build "left" socialist centers and to solidify the Party base through the DCA. This source also advised in September, 1966, that Daniel Rubin, CPUSA National Organizational Secretary, stated the Party believes the DCA should have a working class outlook and be a mass organization favorable to socialism, socialist countries and Marxism, and in April, 1967, Gus Hall, CPUSA General Secretary, indicated that the DCA primary emphasis should be on developing mass resistance to the draft.

A third source advised in September, 1967, that Jarvis Tyner was elected Chairman of the DCA on September 10, 1967, near the conclusion of the Third National Convention of the DCA held in New York, New York, from September 8-10, 1967.

A fourth source advised on July 26, 1968, that Jarvis Tyner continues in his position as Chairman of the DCA.

This fourth source also advised on July 26, 1968, that Jarvis Tyner is a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

This fourth source further advised on July 26, 1968, that the headquarters of the DCA is located at 34 West 17th Street, New York, New York.

1

APPENDIX

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF CHICAGO (DCC)

On May 3, 1965, a source advised that on June 30, 1964, a group of young people who attended the founding convention of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) met in Chicago and adopted a statement of purpose and constitution forming the DCC as an affiliate of the national DCA.

A second source advised on April 17, 1968, that the DCC Organizing Committee, which was set up by the DCA to further DCA activities in the Chicago area, is dormant. GERALD KIRK, who is a member of the Communist Party of Illinois and the coordinator of DCC activities, is the only officer and member. At this time the DCC has no aims or purposes and does not maintain a headquarters.

The second source advised there are no other DCC clubs in the area and that during the past year DCC activity has been almost nonexistent.

1

APPENDIX

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May, 1960, issue of the "Young Socialist" (YS), page 1, column 3, disclosed that during April 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled "The Young Socialist Alliance" (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated that this organization was formed by the nationwide supporter clubs of the publication YS.

The above issue, page 6, set forth the Founding Declaration of the YSA. This declaration stated that the YSA recognizes the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political leadership on class struggle principles of revolutionary socialism.

On March 10, 1967, a source advised that the YSA was formed during 1957, by youth of various left socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The source further advised that the YSA has recently become more open about admitting that it is the youth group of the SWP and that an SWP representative has publicly stated that the YSA is the SWP's youth group.

The National Headquarters of the YSA are located in Rooms 532-536, 41 Union Square West, New York City.

On October 31, 1967, a second source advised that at the 22nd National Convention of the SWP held in New York City from October 26, 1967, to October 29, 1967, it was stated that the YSA remained as the main recruiting ground for new SWP members.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A characterization of "Young Socialist" is set out separately.

1

APPENDIX

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE-CHICAGO

A source advised in late November, 1959, that the Young Socialist Alliance-Chicago (YSA-C), formerly known as Young Socialist Supporters, had its origin in a series of informal discussions held in Chicago prior to June, 1959, among individuals who were close to the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The YSA-C as of November, 1959, proclaimed itself to be a city-wide revolutionary youth organization designed to build socialism in America and aimed toward youth on college campuses in the Chicago area and as being independent of all adult groupings.

According to a second source in April, 1968, the YSA-C was considered the youth group of the Chicago Branch SWP and affiliated with the national organization of the YSA in New York. The YSA-C officers as of April, 1968, were current members of the Chicago SWP.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY CHICAGO BRANCH

In May, 1968, a source advised that it was his understanding that the currently active Chicago Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was one of the founding branches of the SWP at a 1938 Chicago Trotskyist Convention, and it follows the aims and principles of the SWP which maintains national headquarters in New York City.

Members of the Chicago Branch serve as SWP national functionaries, and per capita membership dues and a sustaining fund quota are sent by this branch on a monthly basis to SWP national headquarters.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CONFIDENTIAL

6/13/69

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS, MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, 1969
RM

Is also being forwarded to the USA, U.S. Secret Service, Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

31

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
June 13, 1969

RACIAL TENSIONS, MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, 1969

On June 12, 1969, Captain Robert Samuels, Acting Chief of Police, Maywood, Illinois, Police Department, advised an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that a rally was held from approximately 2:30 p.m. until 4:00 p.m. on that date at the Lido Theater located at Fifth Avenue and Warren Street. According to Captain Samuels, the purpose of the rally was to raise money for legal fees, obtain signatures on petitions,demanding the release of Frederick Allen Hampton, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), who was currently confined to the Menard State Penitentiary, Menard, Illinois.

Attached as an appendix is a characterization of the BPP.

Captain Samuels further advised that approximately 60 individuals of both the Caucasian and Negro races attended the meeting and the group dispersed without incident. Captain Samuels stated that a rally was generally regarded in Maywood as a failure inasmuch as it did not draw a significant crowd or provoke news coverage.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

-2-

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

IBERIA HAMPTON, et al.,)
)
Plaintiffs,)
)
vs.)
)
EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, et al.,)
)
Defendants.)

Civil Action No. 70-C-1384
(Consolidated)

STATE OF ILLINOIS)
) SS:
COUNTY OF COOK)

AFFIDAVIT OF SPECIAL AGENT HUBERT M. HART

Hubert M. Hart, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says as follows:

1. He is a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, and is currently assigned to the Chicago Division, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois.

2. In May, 1969, he was assigned to the Chicago Division of the FBI. In the usual course of his assigned duties he wrote a report dated May 23, 1969, entitled "Black Panther Party (BPP). Racial Matters."

3. The last three paragraphs of page 28 and page 29 of the report mentioned in paragraph two concerns a checking account of the Black Panther Party.

This information was orally received by the affiant in confidence on May 2, 1969, from a source with the understanding that the identity of the source would not be divulged.

Further affiant says not.

Hubert M. Hart
Special Agent, Federal Bureau
of Investigation
Chicago, Illinois

Subscribed and Sworn to
before me this _____ day
of May, 1975, at
Chicago, Illinois
My commission expires ______________

60

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
October 20, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Characterizations of the BPP and Students For A Democratic Society (SDS) are attached as an appendix hereto. Source utilized in the characterizations and sources set forth in this memorandum have all furnished reliable information in the past.

advised on October 4, 1969, that Fred Hampton, Chairman, Illinois BPP, announced to Chicago news media representatives the BPP would protest the arrest of seven negro males at Panther Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, earlier that date. Hampton stated the Chicago Police Department by the arrest, continued to harrass the Chicago Chapter of the BPP and Hampton called for a massive rally to be held at the Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, on October 7, 1969, at 12:00 noon.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed on October 7, 1969, that at 11:00 a.m., a group of negroes identifying themselves as BPP members, arrived at the Federal Building Plaza. These individuals commenced handing out literature entitled "Government Conspiracy to Destroy Black Panther Party". The pamphlet criticized the Chicago Police Department and referred to them as "pig Daley's imperialistic mad dogs" and also stated "The continued raids, jailing and murdering of Panthers proves there is a Government conspiracy to destroy the revolutionary leaders in Babylon (America)".

advised the same date, that the BPP rally scheduled for noon that date, was called to emphasize the fact that the Chicago BPP was backing Bobby Seale, National Chairman BPP, in an attempt to gain community backing for the BPP. The BPP has been instructed that any member becoming involved in any militant action would be purged from the Party, according to the source.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

As reported by public news media, Bobby Seale, along with seven other defendants, is currently standing trial for alleged violation of the federal antiriot law statute on charges stemming from the Democratic National Convention meeting in Chicago, in August, 1968.

As of 11:45 a.m., Agents of the FBI observed BPP members setting up loud speaker equipment in the plaza area of the Federal Building.

advised the same date, the Young Lords, a local black youth gang operating on Chicago west side, had met the preceeding day, October 6, 1969, and decided not to participate in the BPP demonstration that day.

At 12:30 p.m., FBI Agents observed approximately 75 persons from the BPP and new left groups in the Plaza area of the Federal Building, along with approximately 200 to 225 spectators. Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP, addressed the group and followed the theme, government should be tried for conspiracy against the BPP and offered as evidence the numerous raids on the BPP Offices throughout the United States.

Artie Seale, the wife of Bobby Seale, read a statement to the group that was inaudible.

Allen Holmes, also known as Omar, was observed by FBI Agents as addressing the crowd and stated the real conspiracy was between Mayor Daley (Mayor Richard J. Daley, Chicago), the pigs, President Nixon and John Mitchell, United States Attorney General, in their efforts to crush the BPP. Holmes stated the people of the United States must organize against police brutality and not stand for raids against the BPP as conducted in the past by the Chicago pigs (police). Holmes stated the next time the "pigs" shoot Chicago BPP Headquarter's door down, they will get a surprise. He stated that the people should fight capitalism with socialism, racism with solidarity, and concluded by making an appeal for the citizens of Chicago and those attending the rally, to help the BPP build.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The above rally was dismissed without incident.

On October 10, 1969, FBI Agents observed 20 to 25 hippie-type individuals passing out leaflets in front of the Cook County Hospital, 1835 West Harrison Street, Chicago. The leaflets indicated a rally would be held that date at the hospital, sponsored by the Revolutionary Youth Movement II (RYM II) faction of SDS, Young Lords and the BPP.

The demonstration occurred about 2:30 p.m., and Lynn French, a Chicago BPP member, addressed the group, saying the BPP could perform a better service for indigent people in the ghettos instead of the Cook County Hospital, if they (BPP) were allowed to operate a day care and health center. The crowd meeting at the Cook County Hospital was orderly and at the conclusion of the rally, the crowd dispersed without incident.

have all advised during the early part of October, 1969, that a coalition does in fact exist between the BPP, the Young Lords and the Young Patriots, a white youth gang of displaced southerners, and RYM II faction of SDS. RYM II faction of SDS is led by Mike Klonsky, former National Secretary of SDS. All sources felt the coalition existed and would continue to exist only as long as the BPP felt that it could receive some benefits from such a coalition. Sources felt that the coalition had deteriorated because of the refusal of the BPP to engage in any activity with these other groups unless the BPP was benefited.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. MICHAEL KLONSKY, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power and does not support the policies of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

59

10/20/69

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

One copy of the LHM is being disseminated locally to the USA and U.S. Secret Service, both Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

58

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
October 17, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

MEETING OF WEST SUBURBAN CIVIL WELFARE AT FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH, 2114 MAIN STREET, MELROSE PARK, ILLINOIS, OCTOBER 14, 1969

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is attached in the appendix pages.

On October 16, 1969, the current issue of "The Proviso Herald", a weekly newspaper, distributed in the Maywood, Illinois area, carried an article entitled, "Hampton, Graham, blast Poverty Bias", which reads as follows:

> "Thirty-nine years ago, the Melrose Park village board denied the request of a group of black residents to build a church within the village, claiming it would attract 'the colored element from Maywood and Chicago.'
>
> Last Tuesday, Proviso area blacks met in the First Bapstist church of Melrose Park, a Negro church, to discuss other 'problems of black people in the suburbs.'
>
> The small crowd (about 35 or 40) ranged from intense Black Panthers with high and wide Afro haircuts to middle aged suburban couples.
>
> Fred Hampton, chairman of the Illinois Black Panthers, was scheduled to appear along with the Rev. George Clements; Dr. Charles Hurst, dean of Malcolm X college; and Bill Graham of Maywood's Human Relations commission.
>
> Hurst and Clements didn't show, so Graham led off with a multi-pronged attack on what the federal and local government is and is not doing.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

MEETING OF WEST SUBURBAN CIVIL
WELFARE AT FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH,
2114 MAIN STREET, MELROSE PARK,
ILLINOIS, OCTOBER 14, 1969

He blasted the proposed family planning program, saying that the bill, 'which is not yet safe, is going to be shoved down our throats.'

'When genocide can be forced upon us, there is some question as to the sanity of a system that would allow this,' he said.

Graham, calmly but angrily, called the elementary schools in dist. 89 'a network of failure factories,' and high school dist. 209 'racist oriented.'

He also cited poor housing for low and low middle income families where 'rats play hopscotch with a dead roach,' and'a welfare system where recipients have to storm the welfare office to get what they're entitled to on paper.'

Ron Satchel, health minister of the Illinois Black Panthers, gave a brief talk on the organization's free breakfast program and free health care center.

He also scored family planning, saying that 'increasing population isn't the problem, but the maldistribution of food.'

But it was Fred Hampston who dominated the meeting. With the skill of a practiced surgeon, he dissected mid-twentieth century American society.

'Facism is what we have in this country today,' he heatedly began, 'and there are three integral parts; the avaricious businessman, the demagogic politician, and the racist pig dog policeman.'

MEETING OF WEST SUBURBAN CIVIL
WELFARE AT FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH,
2114 MAIN STREET, MELROSE PARK,
ILLINOIS, OCTOBER 14, 1969

Hampston, embattled in the courts on assault charges, said one of the worst dangers for blacks is their belief in the white power structure's 'false values.'

'Athletics and entertainment are the biggest form of exploitation there is,' he cried, blasting the likes of Wilt Chamberlain and singer James Brown as helping to perpetuate a dangerous myth.

'Hell, with all this work to be done, we got no time for playing.'

The Panther chairman said that everyone has the right to defend himself, so if people don't want the Panthers to have guns, all guns should be thrown in the ocean and not turned in to Chicago police sup. James Conlisk 'so that he can sell them.'

'When you mix explosive chemicals and put them in a keg,' he continued, 'you can march around it, picket it, slap petitions on it, but it's still explosive. You have to get inside at the chemicals, the cause.'

Hampton said he knew his theories weren't very popular.

'But look, I'm 21, if you think that it has all happened in 21 years and that I did it, then you should take me out and shoot me. But you and I know these situations have been around for a long time, and the only people who can change anything is us, the people.'

MEETING OF WEST SUBURBAN CIVIL
WELFARE AT FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH,
2114 MAIN STREET, MELROSE PARK,
ILLINOIS, OCTOBER 14, 1969

He pleaded for unity among all poor people of every color to unite against capitalism, 'we've had too many wars on poverty, let's have some wars on the rich."

On October 16, 1969, Dominic Cimino, Chief of Police, Melrose Park, Illinois, and Captain Wilburt Samuel, Acting Chief of Police, Maywood, Illinois, advised they had no information concerning the meeting held on October 14, 1969, at Melrose Park, Illinois, other than there were no incidents or arrests in connection with the meeting.

This information being disseminated to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group,
Evanston, Illinois

MEETING OF WEST SUBURBAN CIVIL
WELFARE AT FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH,
2114 MAIN STREET, MELROSE PARK,
ILLINOIS, OCTOBER 14, 1969

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

> "Black men, Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

57

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

Chicago, Illinois
October 14, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Demonstrations and Events that Occurred Relative to Trial October 3 through October 7, 1969 at Chicago, Illinois

The following organizations mentioned in the body of this communication are characterized in the appendix section attached hereto:

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

Progressive Labor Party (PLP)

Black Panther Party (BPP)

National Socialist White Peoples Party (NSWPP)

Friday, October 3, 1969

As of 10:00 a.m., October 3, 1969, Special Agents (SAs) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and officers of the Chicago Police Department (PD) reported that no demonstration activity or individuals identified as being associated with activity regarding the trial of the eight individuals being tried in United States District Court, Chicago, for criminal conspiracy to violate the

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Federal Anti-riot Laws (ARL) of 1968 as the result of their activities during the violent confrontations which occurred during the DNC held in Chicago in August, 1968, which is commonly referred to as "The Conspiracy 8" trial, were observed during the late evening of October 2 or through the early morning hours of October 3, 1969, in the vicinity of the Federal Building, Chicago.

At 10:00 a.m., on October 3, 1969, SAs of the FBI who observed the lobby area and outside plaza area of the Federal Building, Chicago, reported observing only normal activities and that no protest groups were observed on the scene.

On October 3, 1969, at 11:45 a.m., SAs of the FBI reported that the area of the Federal Building, Chicago, remained calm and no demonstration activity observed.

On October 3, 1969, a Deputy U.S. Marshal (USM) on security duty in the lobby area of the Federal Building, Chicago, advised that Frank E. Zabielski, who frequently appears in the building for the alleged harrassment of various government agencies, was arrested in the lobby of the building at 10:30 a.m. on October 3, 1969, when a loaded .45 automatic side arm in a holster was found in the briefcase he was carrying. The USM Office, Chicago, transferred custody of Zabielski to the Chicago PD for local prosecution.

On October 3, 1969, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Jack B. Schmetter of Chicago advised that Jeff Haas, self-identified as an attorney representing the Revolutionary Youth Movement II (RYM II) faction of SDS, contacted him. Haas reported that RYM II plans a rally in the plaza area of the Federal Building, Chicago on October 9, 1969, from 12 noon to 3:00 p.m., and expected to assemble a crowd numbering 5,000 persons.

On October 3, 1969, at 12:35 p.m., SAs of the FBI reported the lobby area and outside plaza of the Federal Building, Chicago, appeared calm with normal activity and no demonstration participants observed.

A first source reported that during the noon recess of "The Conspiracy 8" trial on October 3, 1969, Rennard "Rennie" Davis, one of the defendants in the trial, held a press conference in Room 204A of the Federal Building, Chicago. Davis has publicly described himself as one of the early members of SDS, and a project director of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, currently known as the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC). The NMC has been publicly identified as an organization which specializes in forming and directing coalitions of anti-Vietnam War groups throughout the nation for massive anti-war expressions and was the organization that directed demonstration activities during the 1968 DNC at Chicago as well as the march on the Pentagon October, 1967, Washington, D.C., and the Spring Mobilization of April, 1967, in New York City.

During the news conference Rennie Davis introduced Robert Levin, Assistant Professor, Merrimac College, North Andover, Massachusetts, and one other individual. Both individuals asserted that they had been mistaken for Jerry Rubin, one of the eight principal defendants in "The Conspiracy 8" trial being conducted in Chicago. These individuals stated during August, 1968, at the time of the DNC, they had been mistaken on numerous occasions as being Rubin because of their alleged resemblance to him. These persons were making statements to contradict testimony given that day by Sergeant Murray of the Chicago PD, who testified as to his observing Rubin in Lincoln Park instigating controntations by hippie-type individuals with Chicago police officers. Both of these individuals stated on the occasions mentioned by Sergeant Murray that Rubin had been ill and was not in Lincoln Park and that, in fact, both of these people had been in Lincoln Park on that occasion and that the Chicago PD had followed one of these persons for days under the mistaken belief that the individual was Rubin.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

On October 3, 1969, a second source advised that on October 2, 1969, a meeting was held in the Student Union Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, sponsered by the Workers-Students Alliance Faction of SDS, which is dominated by the Progressive Labor Party. The meeting was attended by approximately 74 persons. At the meeting those in attendance were urged to attend a rally at 12 noon, Saturday, October 4, 1969, in Chicago. Source advised the rally was to begin at Buckingham Fountain in Grant Park, Chicago, which would be followed by a march to the Federal Building, Chicago. Those interested in making the trip to Chicago were asked to be at a train stop by 6:00 p.m. October 3, 1969, at Farmland, on the Michigan State University (MSU) campus.

At 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1969, SAs of the FBI reported that observations of the lobby area and outside vicinity of the Federal Building, Chicago, revealed the areas to be calm with no demonstration activities being observed.

On October 3, 1969, a third source advised that Kathy Boudin, staff worker of the SDS National Office in Chicago, and Robert H. Roth, SDS Activist, were arrested by the Chicago Police Department during the late evening of October 2, 1969, and charged with mob action and aggravated battery. The arrests occurred as a result of their activity in a confrontation with police officers on September 24, 1969, which occurred in the vicinity of the Federal Building, Chicago.

The second source further advised that warrants of arrest were obtained for similar charges by the Chicago PD for Carlie Tanner, employed on the National Staff of SDS, Chicago, as well as SDS activist Jean Yonemura, Marsha Steinberg and Charlotte Masy. All charges supported by warrants eminated from the same September 24, 1969 confrontation with Chicago police officers.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRAILS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

On October 3, 1969, a fourth source, who previously furnished information concerning a discussion by unidentified persons on September 30, 1969, at the SDS National Office, Chicago, regarding placement of a bomb in the Federal Building, Chicago, was unable to identify photographs of SDS National Officers or other leading SDS activities as participants in the discussion concerning the Federal Building bomb plan.

The fourth source did advise that the bomb discussion was originated as a result of discussion concerning the specific action intended by SDS, Weatherman Faction, for the October 10, 1969 activities of that faction called "Attack on the Courts." The fourth source stated the original discussion concerning the Federal Bomb Plan did not specifically concern the trial being conducted in the building regarding "The Conspiracy 8" defendants. The bomb plan outlined was directed to the general SDS plans on October 10, 1969, for their advertised "Attack on the Courts."

At 7:00 p.m. on October 3, 1969, a fifth source reported that persons occupying office space, consisting of four rooms on the forth floor at 28 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, under the name of "The conspiracy" have placed sheet steel behind the glass door entrance to that office space. "The Conspiracy" is an exclusive organization composed of eight individuals who refer to themselves as the "Conspiracy 8" indicted during March, 1969, by the Federal Grand Jury, at Chicago, for conspiring to violate the ARL of 1968 as a result of their individual activities during the violent confrontations which accompanied the DNC during August, 1968, in Chicago. The organization was formed for the purpose of soliciting funds for the legal defense of the eight individuals indicted and to plan activities to be carried out for the purpose of calling world wide attention to the trial.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE
TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED
FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
(DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

The fifth source reported earlier source heard one of the occupants of "The Conspiracy" office space state,"Looks like the dirty pigs got in here last night." The fifth source also reported personally observing from an adjacent room approximately 100 quart bottles filled with an unidentified liquid. The bottles were not capped did not have an odor and no wicks or other materials were noted associated with them. The bottles were sitting on the floor and on two eight foot tables in the room. Source stated based on such a brief observation, a speculation could not be made as to whether the bottles were incendiary devices.

Courtroom Activity

The trial of "The Conspiracy 8" reconvened at 10:05 a.m. on October 3, 1969, in United States District Court, Federal Building, Chicago. No disturbances or unusual incidents occurred during trial proceedings.

During the morning session the Defense conducted cross examination of a Chicago Police Sergeant Robert Murray regarding his testimony concerning observations in Lincoln Park during the 1968 DNC activities. To offset Sergeant Murray's testimony, Defense brought in to the court room a similar appearing white male, wearing a motorcycle helmet in an effort to confuse Murray's testimony as to his identifying Jerry Rubin's, one of the trial defendants, activity in Lincoln Park. Defense raised objections to testimony of other police officer witnesses claiming their testimony in surveiling the trial defendants violates the defendant's constitutional rights of privacy. Court recessed on October 3, 1969 to reconvene at 10 a.m. on October 7, 1969.

Court was not scheduled to reconvene on Monday October 6, 1969 because of a prior court appearance commitment of one of the defense attorneys William Kunstler, and because of a prior dental appointment of defense attorney Leonard Weinglass.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Saturday, October 4, 1969

As of 8:00 a.m., October 4, 1969, SAs of the FBI and Officers of the Chicago PD reported that no demonstration activity or individuals associated with activities regarding the trial of "The Conspiracy 8" were observed during the late evening of October 3, 1969, or through the early morning hours of October 4, 1969, in the vicinity of the Federal Building, Chicago.

As of 10:00 a.m. on October 4, 1969, SAs of the FBI reported that there were no indications observed of preparations being made or people gathering for an announced rally at Buckingham Fountain, Grant Park, Chicago, by the Worker-Student Alliance Faction of SDS, which is dominated by the PLP.

On October 4, 1969, at 10:00 a.m. SAs of the FBI and officers of the Chicago PD reported that no unusual activities or gathering of people were observed at or in the vicinity of the Federal Building, Chicago.

The Chicago PD reported on October 4, 1969, that during the early morning hours of October 4, 1969, a Chicago PD officer was wounded by gun fire from the Chicago Black Panther Party (BPP) Chapter Headquarter on the West Side of the City. During this incident the Chicago PD arrested seven Negro males and confiscated two weapons from BPP Headquarters space. The Chicago PD reported the incident does not appear to be directly related to the trial but does add tension in the community because Bobby Seale, National Chairman of the BPP, is one of the defendants in the "Conspiracy 8" trial.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.

A sixth source reported on October 4, 1969, that Fred Hampton, Chairman Illinois Chapter BPP, Chicago, ammounced to the news media that the BPP was voicing a strong protest of the arrest of the seven male blacks at the Chicago BPP Headquarters by the Chicago PD. Hampton accused the police of continuing their harassment of BPP and called_ for a massive rally at the Federal Building, Chicago, on Tuesday, October 7, 1969, at 12:00 noon by members of the BPP and "everyone else" in the community to focus attention on the wrongful acts of the Chicago PD against the BPP. The rally called by Hampton appears directed primarily to the Chicago PD rather than being associated with the trial of "The Conspiracy 8".

At 11:45 a.m., October 4, 1969, SAs of the FBI observed approximately 100 demonstrators gathered at Buckingham Fountain, Grant Park, Chicago. Fred Kushner, Leader of the PLP dominated Workers-Student Alliance Faction of SDS was observed at the fountain with the demonstrators. The area remained calm, no incidents occurred and no arrests were made.

On October 4, 1969, at 12:30 p.m. SAs of the FBI observed approximately 200 individuals gathered at Buckingham Fountain, Grant Park, Chicago. Cathy Rakochy, PLP member and Randee Russell, a member of the SDS Chpater at the University of Chicago, were observed to address the assembled crowd. Both delivered speeches critical of United States Policy in carrying on the war in Viet Nam.

Following these speeches, those in attendance, who were identified as members of the Workers-Student Alliance Faction of SDS, conducted a guerilla theater presentation.

The skits consisted of individuals in bizarre costumes ridiculing prominant figures in the United States, such as S.I. Hayakawa of San Francisco State College, Governor Nelson Rockefeller, of New York State, and United States Senator Eugene Mc Carthy. The skit depicted a football game between "the establishment" and the "anti-establishment". The establishment lost the contest by a six to zero score.

At 1:10 p.m. on October 4, 1969, the demonstrators began to march from Buckingham Fountain to the Federal Building, Chicago. No incidents or arrests occurred during the activities at this rally in Grant Park.

At 1:22 p.m. on October 4, 1969, SAs of the FBI observed demonstrators who marched from Grant Park, Chicago, arrive at the Federal Building, Chicago. The building was closed subject to normal Saturday activities and the demonstrators did not attempt to invade the interior or the structure. The demonstrators assembled, marched in an orderly fashion around the Federal Building, Chicago, and chanted for United States withdrawal from Viet Nam. A brief speech was delivered by Robert Siegal, SDS activist, University of Illinois, Circle Campus, Chicago, who urged those in attendance, estimated to be about 300 in number, to join SDS in opposing United States World Imperialism. After a rally of about 15 minutes at the Federal Building, the demonstrators began their march for return to Grant Park, where, according to an announcement, they were to reassemble in small groups for work shop discussions. The demonstrators were orderly, no incidents occurred and no arrests were made.

At 2:00 p.m., on October 4, 1969, SAs of the FBI reported that the demonstrators had returned in an orderly fashion from the Federal Building, Chicago, to Grant Park,

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICATED FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

On arrival at the Park, the demonstrators broke up in to small groups to discuss anti-war issues.

By 4:00 p.m., on October 4, 1969, only about 40 demonstrators remained in the park. Discussion groups conducted in an orderly manner, no incidents occurred and no arrests were reported.

As of 5:00 p.m., on October 4, 1969, SAs of the FBI reported that all demonstrators had departed Grant Park, that no incidents had occurred and no arrests were made.

Sunday, October 5, 1969

As of 8:00 a.m., October 5, 1969, SAs of the FBI and officers of the Chicago PD reported that no demonstration activities or individuals associated with activity regarding "The Conspiracy 8" trial were observed during the evening of October 4, 1969, or through the early morning hours of October 5, 1969, in the vicinity of the Federal Building, Chicago, Illinois.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE
TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED
FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
(DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

On October 5, 1969, Sergeant Ronald Kelly of the Chicago PD advised that two members of SDS from California, identified as Daniel M. Brucker, a white male, born March 25, 1942, of Somis, California, and Dennis L. Sleeth, a white male, born January 6, 1941, 1120 West 115th Street, Gardena, California, were arrested during the late evening hours of October 4, 1969 in the "Old Town" area of the city in the vicinity of SDS National Action headquarters at 701 Armitage, Chicago.

These two individuals were in a 1959 Ford Ranchero, with 1969 California license M73501, which contained weapons consealed behind the seat of the vehicle. The weapons were described as a Beretta Jaguar .22 Caliber Semi-automatic Piston, Serial Number 15501, with 50 rounds of .22 caliber long rifle ammunition. One Winchester 20 Gauge Single Shot Shotgun, no seial number with 25 rounds of 20 gauge ammunition. Also recovered were five Samurai swords and 13 daggers. These individuals were charged with unlawful use of weapons and failure to register the fire arms in their possession. They were released on $1,000 bond each, which was posted by SDS members, Chicago.

It was reported on October 5, 1969, by SAs of the FBI and officers of the Chicago PD that the area in the vicinity of the Federal Building, Chicago, appeared normal throughout the day, Sunday, and through the late evening hours. The Chicago PD patroled the area during this time on a routine basis.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Monday, October 6, 1969

It was reported at 8:00 a.m., on October 6, 1969, by SAs of the FBI and Officers of the Chicago PD, that the area in the vicinity of the Federal Building, Chicago, appeared normal throughout the early morning hours of October 6, 1969. The Chicago PD patrolled the area during this period on a routine basis.

As previously noted, the trail of "The Conspiracy 8" in USDC, Chicago, had been recessed from Friday, October 3, 1969, to be resumed at 10:00 a.m., on Tuesday, October 7, 1969; consequently, there were no "The Conspiracy 8" trial proceedings on this day, Monday, October 6, 1969, in USDC, Chicago.

On October 6, 1969, Frank Wehner, of the Deputy Superintendent's Office of the Chicago PD, advised that Lon Dyson of WLS Radio News Station, Chicago, advised the Chicago PD that he had received an anonymous call reporting that a bomb would go off at the Civic Center Building, Chicago, at 6:00 a.m., on October 6, 1969.

On October 6, 1969, during the early morning hours, the Chicago PD Bomb and Arson Squad thoroughly searched the Civic Center Building, Chicago, and failed to find a bomb or any type explosive device. A physical surveillance of the building was maintained by the Chicago PD throughout the day.

On October 6, 1969, Frank Wehner, of the Deputy Superintendent's Office of the Chicago PD, advised that an explosion occurred at 11:10 p.m., October 6, 1969, at the police statue located at Haymarket Square, Chicago. The statue was that of a police officer, erected to the memory

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

of seven Chicago PD officers killed as the result of an explosion of a black powder bomb during the 1886 Haymarket Square riots in Chicago. The statue was knocked from its pedestal and broken into several parts. Approximately 50 windows in the area were shattered. No injuries were reported as a result of the explosion. No suspects were developed and no arrest had been effected as of that time.

The Haymarket Square, where the police statue was erected, was the mobilization area for the scheduled march on October 11, 1969, by the "Weatherman" faction of the SDS.

Tuesday, October 7, 1969

It was reported at 8:00 a.m., on October 7, 1969, by SAs of the FBI and Officers of the Chicago PD, that the area in the vicinity of the Federal Building, Chicago, appeared normal throughout the early morning hours of October 7, 1969. The Chicago PD patrolled the area during this period on a routine basis.

A seventh source advised on October 7, 1969, that several members of the Nationalist Socialist White Peoples Party (NSWPP) met in Chicago on October 5, 1969, with Robert Lloyd, a national leader of the group, of Arlington, Virginia, who spoke about the recent National Socialist Congress and recruiting of new members for the organization. According to the source, following this meeting several members of NSWPP, led by Frank Collins, discussed disrupting the SDS demonstration scheduled for October 8, 1969, at the Federal Building, Chicago. No specific time for this activity was agreed to, but Collins indicated the NSWPP had pressure fire extinguishers which he would at-

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE
TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED
FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
(DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

tempt loading with red paint to spray on the demonstrators.

At 11:00 a.m., on October 7, 1969, SAs of the FBI observed a group of blacks, identifying themselves as BPP members, arrive at the outdoor plaza of the Federal Building, Chicago. The group was observed to pass out literature entitled "Government Conspiracy to Destroy Black Panther Party". The pamphlet criticized the Chicago PD, referring to police officers as "pig Daly's imperialistic mad dogs" and reported "the continued raids, jailing and murdering of Panthers proves it is a government conspiracy to destroy the revolutionary leaders at Babylon (America)."

An eighth source advised on October 7, 1969, that a BPP rally was scheduled to be held on October 7, 1969, to emphasize support of Bobby Seale, National Chairman of BPP, in an attempt to gain community backing for BPP. The BPP has been instructed by its leadership that any member becoming involved in militant action will be instantly purged from the Party.

At 11:45 a.m., on October 7, 1969, SAs of the FBI observed BPP members setting up loudspeaker equipment in the outdoor plaza area of the Federal Building, Chicago. Approximately 75 to 100 demonstration participants were observed in the vicinity of the plaza area.

At 12:30 p.m., on October 7, 1969, SAs of the FBI observed about 75 members of BPP as well as approximately 225 spectators, gathered in the plaza of the Federal Building, Chicago. On this occasion, Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP Chapter, Chicago, addressed those assembled, advising that the United States Government should be tried for conspiracy against BPP because of the numerous raids on BPP offices throughout the country. Rufus Walls, Deputy Minister of Information, Illinois BPP Chapter, Chicago, was observed by SAs of the FBI to be

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

among those present at this rally.

SAs of the FBI also observed Robert (Bob) Stewart, Chicago leader of Youth Against War and Facism, a youth organization opposing United States imperialism, carrying a sign which read "Racist pig Daly stop facist raids, free the Panthers now".

At 12:45 p.m., on October 7, 1969, during this rally, SAs of the FBI observed Artie Seale, wife of Bobby Seale, one of "The Conspiracy 8" defendants and National Chairman of BPP, read in a very low voice, an inaudible statement to those assembled. At 12:52 p.m., on October 7, 1969, SAs of the FBI observed Allen Holmes, who is called "Omar", speak to the BPP gathering stating that the real conspiracy was between Mayor Daly, the pigs, President Nixon and United States Attorney General John Mitchell, in their combined efforts to crush the BPP. Omar stated the people of the United States must organize against police brutality and oppose raids against the BPP as conducted in the past by the Chicago pigs. He stated the next time the pigs shoot the Chicago BPP Headquarters door down, they will get a surprise. It was pointed out people should fight capitalism with socialism, racism with solidarity and ended his talk by making an appeal for all Chicago citizens and those attending the rally, to help BPP build.

As of 1:30 p.m., on October 7, 1969, SAs of the FBI and Officers of the Chicago PD reported the demonstrators remained orderly, no incidents had occurred and no arrests had been made.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

A ninth source advised on October 7, 1969, that the RYM II faction of SDS had set up its coordination center at the Church of the Holy Covenant, 925 West Diversey, Chicago, as a communication center for its planned national action for October, 1969, in Chicago. Source reports RYM II has agreed to the following activities:

October 9, 1969	Demonstration from 3:00 until 5:00 pm at International Harvester Tractor Works
October 10, 1969	Demonstration from 2:30 to 4:30 pm at Cook County Hospital to focus attention on hospital discrimination against the poor.
October 11, 1969	A mass march to begin at 2:00 pm from "Peoples Park", Armitage and Halsted Streets, Chicago, to proceed through Latin-American neighborhood. This march being held and sponsored with BPP and the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican youth street gang of Chicago.

The third source advised on October 7, 1969, that both RYM II and "Weatherman" factions of SDS, will use a common legal defense composed of attorneys Mark Kadish and Leonard Carlin, who are associated with the Chicago Peace Council. The Chicago Peace Council is a coordinating organization for establishment of common policy adopted by leaderships of various anti-Vietnam war groups of the Chicago area.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

The third source also advised that the Medical Committee for Human Rights has set up first aid medical stations at Armitage and Halsted Streets, Chicago, for the RYM II activity and at 343 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, for the "Weatherman" faction of SDS. These stations were established in anticipation of possible injury to participants in demonstrations sponsored by each faction of SDS. It is noted that the Medical Committee for Human Rights established similar facilities for alleged demonstration casualties during the 1968 DNC at Chicago.

As of 1:30 p.m., on October 7, 1969, SAs of the FBI observed William Charles Ayers, National Educational Secretary, of SDS, at the outdoor plaza area of the Federal Building, Chicago.

At 1:40 p.m., on October 7, 1969, SAs of the FBI observed Rennard (Rennie) Davis, one of the defendants at "The Conspiracy 8" trial, address the assembled crowd at the Federal Court Building, Chicago, advising that demonstrations would take place on October 17, 1969, throughout the United States, by an Ad Hoc committee of lawyers. He also announced that on October 25, 1967, all law students would walk out of their classes. He also called for the population of Chicago to meet at the Civic Center on November 3, 1969, indicating the purpose of that demonstration would be to protest the current "The Conspiracy 8" trial in the hope that the proceeding would be terminated. On this occasion, Davis was heard to state, "We sure showed the cops last night. Ha! Ha! The Haymarket." It is noted that a statue of a police officer was extensively damaged by explosion at Haymarket Square in Chicago, during the preceeding evening, October 6, 1969. Davis further stated

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

"This city hasn't seen anything yet. We're going to destroy all symbols of the police system". On this occasion, SAs of the FBI observed Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP Chapter, Chicago, called for everyone to meet at the Federal Building, Chicago, every Tuesday at noon, until the trial ends. He observed "Don't worry about going to school, working or anything else, just meet here every Tuesday".

At 2:15 p.m., on October 7, 1969, the demonstrators departed in small groups and the Federal Building plaza area returned to a normal appearance. No incidents occurred or arrests made during this activity.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

On October 7, 1969, Richard Elrod, Assistant Corporation Concil, City of Chicago, advised he was contacted on October 6, 1969, by Mark Kadish, who identified himself as an attorney, and stated he wanted to represent the demonstrators who would participate in the Weatherman and RYM II SDS factions, October 8 through 11, 1969, activity scheduled to occur in Chicago.

Kadish advised on this occasion that he and 20 other attorneys, including 10 from Ohio and 10 from Wisconsin, desired to be notified when demonstrators were arrested. Kadish was advised by City of Chicago court officials that any arrests that might be made would involve individuals, not organizations, and that any request for an attorney would have to be made on an individual basis by the persons arrested. Kadish was further advised in the event those arrested desired an attorney they would, of course, be permitted to have one. Kadish was told that he and his group would not, however, be allowed to assume legal representation for demonstrators who might be arrested on a mass basis.

Elrod further advised that Kadish requested that permits be granted so that SDS demonstrations could take place on the dates indicated at the following locations:

10/9/69 - Vicinity of International
Harvester Tractor Works
2600 West 31st Street
Chicago

10/10/69 - Pasteur Park,
Located across street from
Cook County Hospital
1835 West Harrison Street
Chicago

10/11/69 - Peoples Park at
Armitage and Halsted Streets
Chicago

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

As of 11:40 p.m., October 7, 1969, Special Agents of the FBI and officers of the Chicago PD reported during the late afternoon and evening hours of October 7, 1969, the areas of the Federal Building, Civic Center Building and parks which were sites of all recent demonstration activities, appeared to be calm with no massing of people, demonstrations, rallies, incidents or arrests.

Courtroom Activity

On October 7, 1969, at 10:00 a.m. the trial of "The Conspiracy 8" was reconvened for the first time since being recessed during the late afternoon of October 3, 1969, in United States District Court, Chicago. The trial was resumed without incident or demonstrations.

A brief recess was granted on motion by defense attorneys in midmorning, at which time associates of the defendants distributed a press release to reporters which explained in legal form the position of defendants attorneys' arguments opposing testimony of a Chicago PD surveillance concerning defendant Jerry Rubin and his activities during the 1968 DNC at Chicago. Court reconvened and trial proceeded without incident until noon recess.

The trial reconvened after lunch recess at 2:14 p.m. on October 7, 1969, at which time defense attorneys again requested USDC Judge Julius Hoffmann to allow more visitors in the court room. The court denied the request noting that the space was taken and he intended to insure sufficient seating capacity for all members of the press. The trial proceeded with the introduction of government witnesses and cross-examination by defense attorneys. The defense again raised the question of unauthorized police surveillances of the conspiracy defendants during the 1968 DNC in Chicago as being a violation of their constitutional right of privacy.

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (DNC) OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

The defense's point was again overruled by Judge Hoffmann. Judge Hoffmann then admonished defense attorney Kunstler for his behavior during the court's remarks and for the posture of the defendants at the defense table during the trial. The court recessed at 4:30 p.m. on October 7, 1969, without incident to reconvene at 10:00 a.m. the following morning.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. MICHAEL KLONSKY, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power and does not support the policies of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

APPENDIX

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

The "New York Times" city edition Tuesday, April 20, 1965, page 27, reported that a new party of "revolutionary socialism" was formally founded on April 18, 1965, under the name of the PLP, which had been known as the Progressive Labor Movement.

According to the article, "The Progressive Labor Movement was founded in 1962, by Milton Rosen and Mortimer Scheer after they were expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for assertedly following the Chinese Communist line."

A source advised on June 3, 1968, that the PLP held its Second National Convention in New York City May 31 to June 2, 1968, at which time the PLP reasserted its objective of the establishment of a militant working class movement based on Marxism-Leninism. This is to be accomplished through the Party's overall revolutionary strategy of raising the consciousness of the people and helping to provide ideological leadership in the working class struggle for state power.

The source also advised that at the Second National Convention Milton Rosen was unanimously re-elected National Chairman of the PLP and Levi Laub, Fred Jerome, Jared Israel, William Epton, Jacob Rosen, Jeffrey Gordon and Walter Linder were elected as the National Committee to lead the PLP until the next convention.

The PLP publishes "Progressive Labor," a bimonthly magazine; "World Revolution," a quarterly periodical; and "Challenge-Desafio," a monthly newspaper.

The August, 1968, issue of "Challenge-Desafio" sets forth that "above all, this paper is dedicated to the fight for a new way of life-where the working men and women own and control their homes, factories, the police, courts, and the entire Government on every level."

The source advised on June 3, 1968, that the PLP utilizes an address of General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn, New York, and also utilizes an office in Room 617, 1 Union Square West, New York, New York.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

NATIONAL SOCIALIST WHITE PEOPLE'S PARTY, Also known as The American Nazi Party, Chicago, Illinois

A source advised on November 14, 1960, that on that date a meeting was held in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of organizing a Chicago Unit of the American Nazi Party (ANP) which maintains headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL, National Commander, ANP, took charge of this meeting.

On May 22, 1966, MATTHIAS KOEHL, self-identified as lieutenant, ANP, Chicago, advised that the ANP in Chicago is to a degree autonomous although it remains subject to the final authority of GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL and ANP national headquarters.

A second and third source advised in December, 1966, that a directive was received from the national headquarters in Arlington during December, 1966, advising that the official name of the organization beginning January, 1967, would be National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP).

During November and December, 1968, the second and third source advised that the Chicago unit of the NSWPP has no headquarters in Chicago. At this time MATTHIAS KOEHL, mentioned above, appointed FRANK COLIN, Midwest Coordinator, and RICHARD TEDOR, Assistant Coordinator, of the NSWPP in this area. Several meetings have been held recently in Chicago to develop a program of activity.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
October 14, 1969

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

Title DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS INDICTED FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION OF 1968 IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Character

Reference **Reference is made to letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above**

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

54

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois 60604
October 13, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The Black Panther Party (BPP) is described on the appendix page attached hereto. All sources utilized herein have furnished reliable information in the past.

On October 12, 1969, advised that it was his understanding that Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, Chicago, Illinois, had indicated that the BPP planned to conduct a rally at the Federal Building, Chicago, each Tuesday at noon, as long as the Federal Anti-Riot Conspiracy Trial was being held.

further advised that he had learned that the BPP planned to have as many black people as they could at the Federal Building in Chicago at 7:00 AM on Wednesday, October 22, 1969, in order that they would have priority in obtaining seats in the courtroom where the Anti-Riot Conspiracy Trial was being held. The source added that the purpose of attendance of black people in the court on October 22, 1969, was, according to the information available to him, that such date was the birthday of Bobby Seale, National Chairman of the BPP, and one of the defendants in the Anti-Riot Conspiracy Trial.

advised that based on information available to him the BPP planned no action in the above regard which might cause a disturbance of any type.

Declassified for
4/4/75
6607

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Copies of this Letterhead Memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney,
Chicago, Illinois

United States Secret Service,
Chicago, Illinois

Region I, 113th Military
Intelligence Group,
Evanston, Illinois

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 pdA 8 8 14

FD 302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 5, 1969

On June 4, 1969 SA RAMON W. STRATTON was present at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois, when arrests were made for harboring a fugitive from justice, in building occupied by an organization calling themselves the Black Panthers. Special Agent in Charge MARLIN W. JOHNSON of the Chicago Federal Bureau of Investigation office instructed SA STRATTON to conduct a lawful search of the building in which the arrests were made, with assistance of other Special Agents of the FBI.

Posters, pamphlets, printed material and machines were observed on the walls, floors, desks and chairs and it appeared to SA STRATTON that these items would be subject to seizure under a search warrant issued in conformance with Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in conjunction with violations of Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 2383, 2384 and 2385.

Section 2383 relates to rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof or in giving aid and comfort thereto.

Section 2384 relates to conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, etc.

Section 2385 relates to willfully advocating, etc. the overthrow of the Government of the United States and the printing, etc. of material, and the organizing, etc. of persons for such purposes.

SA STRATTON therefore directed that certain materials be seized and preserved as evidence of violations of laws of the United States, possibly being committed in presence of Agents, both as mere evidence and as material designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as means of committing a criminal offense (Rule 41 (b)) and material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3103a).

On 6-4-69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA RAMON W. STRATTON:rws Date dictated 6-5-69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

The foregoing documents were seized and are being held as evidence at the Chicago Office of the FBI.

A characterization of the BPP is attached as an appendix hereto.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney,
Chicago, Illinois

United States Secret Service,
Chicago, Illinois

Office of Special Investigations,
Chicago, Illinois

United States Naval Investigative
Service Office, Chicago, Illinois

Region I, 113th Military
Intelligence Group,
Evanston, Illinois

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/6/69

Incidental to a search to locate federal fugitives at 2350 West Madison Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the premises of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), the following documents were located in a brown record box which was in the private office on the southeast corner of the second floor of that building:

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs DAVID M. FRAHM and ROBERT J. TOMPKINS DMF Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
June 6, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

On June 4, 1969, Agents of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), incidental to the executing of federal warrants at 2350 West Madison Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the headquarters of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), seized the following documents:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-3

FBI

Date: 6/6/69

Transmit the following in ______________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________ (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (157-1291)

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM concerning captioned matter and particularly the "Suggested Plan For the Complete Breakdown of the State of Illinois Power Structure," or alleged war plans for the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP).

In view of the special significance of this information, it is set forth as a separate LHM and a more comprehensive LHM concerning all of the items seized during the FBI raid on 6/4/69 of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, Chicago, follows.

In addition, one copy each is being forwarded to the USA, U.S. Secret Service, OSI, NISO, Chicago and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

DEF:

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

On June 4, 1969, SA EDWARD KINZER, Jr., signed the aforementioned complaint before United States Commissioner JAMES T. BALOG. On June 4, 1969, Assistant United States Attorney ETTEN advised that all of the above eight subjects appeared before Commissioner BALOG and were released on own recognizance bond. The male individuals' bond was set at $4,000 and the female subjects at $3,000. the case was continued until 3:00 p.m. on June 20, 1969.

F RAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIO

1

Date June 6, 1969

GEORGIA WASHINGTON was placed under arrest at 2350 West Madison. She was immediately advised of her rights by SA JACK D. VAHRENWALD. She advised she understood her rights, but refused to execute a warning and waiver form.

WASHINGTON was shown photographs of the following individuals:

GEORGE SAMS, JR.
FBI Number 493 526 F

LONNIE MC LUCAS
FBI Number 546 916 E

LANDON ROBERT WILLIAMS
FBI Number 229 544 G

RORY B. HITHE.

WASHINGTON advised that she had never seen any of these individuals and their names were not familiar to her. She advised that she did not wish to make any further statement.

The following description of WASHINGTON was obtained by observation and interview:

Sex	Female
Race	Negro
Date of Birth	January 22, 1951
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'4"
Weight	155 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Social Security Number	352-42-7813

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

SA BRUCE F. KNIPP and
SA JACK D. VAHRENWALD/JDV

by

Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Date 6/4/69

1

On June 4, 1969, at Chicago, Illinois, JESSE WARD, 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois, was while being interviewed in the Chicago Office of the FBI, given a body search and the following items were found:

One book entitled "The Thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung" by MAO TSE-TUNG, which bore a red soft leather cover.

One pamphlet entitled "Along the Socialist or Capitalist Road?", printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, and dated August 15, 1967.

A pamphlet entitled "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything" by YAO WEN-YUAN, printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1968.

A pamphlet entitled "China's Great Revolution and The Soviet Union's Great Tragedy" by RENMIN RIBAO (People's Daily) Observer dated June 4, 1967. This pamphlet was printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1967.

A pamphlet entitled "Statement By Comrade Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, In Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression". This pamphlet was printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, in 1968, and it bore a date of April 16, 1968.

With the exception of the last named pamphlet, the other three pamphlets bore the following worded stamp:

"A copy of this material has been filed with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File#

by SAs EUGENE J. CONNOLLY and CHARLES E. BRUNNER EJC Date dictated 6/4/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/4/69

1

JESSE WARD, 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois, was interviewed by Special Agents EUGENE J. CONNOLLY and CHARLES E. BRUNNER who identified themselves to him as Special Agents of the FBI. Prior to commencement of the interview, WARD was furnished form FD-395, "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" which he read and refused to sign. He stated that he understood his rights as they were written on the form and as he read them, but he would not sign anything because he does not know or understand what he is doing and because it is against the rules of the Black Panther Party. WARD furnished the following information:

His name is JESSE WARD and he resides at 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois. He is a member of the Black Panther Party of Illinois. Other than call the interviewing Agents numerous obscene names, he refused to furnish any other information.

The following description of WARD was obtained through observation and interrogation on June 4, 1969:

Name	JESSE WARD
Address	721 North Troy
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Height	6' - 6'1"
Weight	175 - 180 lbs.
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black, bushy American cut
Age	Approximately 19
Complexion	Medium dark
Scars and marks	2" scar, upper left lip
Characteristics	Wears glasses; wears a wispy goatee and mustache

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs EUGENE J. CONNOLLY and CHARLES E. BRUNNER EJC Date dictated 6/4/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

4 15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 6/6/69

LARRY MAURICE ROBERSON, 3326 West Fulton Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was interviewed by Special Agents (SA) DONALD W. OXLEY and RICHARD L. KNEIBERT, who identified themselves to him as SAs of the FBI. Prior to the commencement of the interview, ROBERSON was furnished Form FD-395 "Interrogation; Advice of Rights Form" which he carefully read and refused to sign. He stated that he understood what his rights were but that he did not desire to sign any legal document. ROBERSON furnished the following information:

ROBERSON furnished SAs with his name, address, and basic descriptive information. He refused to make any further statements to the Agents regarding the Black Panther Party or his involvement with the Party. He denied any knowledge of GEORGE SAMS, Jr.

The following description was obtained through observation and interview:

Name	LARRY MAURICE ROBERSON, also known as Robinson
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Age	20
Date of Birth	12/26/48
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Nationality	United States
Height	5'11"
Weight	202 Pounds
Build	Medium
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Medium-dark
Scars and Marks	1½" scar right knee
Father's Address	3326 West Fulton Street Chicago, Illinois
Occupation	Unemployed
Marital Status	Single

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs DONALD W. OXLEY/mel. and RICHARD L. KNEIBERT Date dictated 6/[illegible]/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FED RAL [illegible] OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/10/69

On June 4, 1969, Special Agent (SA) GORDON S. BROOKS and SA HERMAN H. SCOTT arrested PATRICK KEEN at the headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), 2350 West Madison Street.

KEEN was subsequently transported by Bureau automobile to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office at 219 South Dearborn Street, where he was photographed, fingerprinted and interviewed concerning his association with the BPP and with the subject GEORGE SAMS, JR.

KEEN was provided with a copy of a Warning and Waiver Form which he read and stated he understood, but declined to sign.

KEEN provided the following information:

He stated that he has been a member of the BPP for approximately three weeks and advised that on the night of June 3-4, 1969, he was the Officer of the Day (OD) at BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois. He advised that as the OD he had been in charge of the BPP office,

KEEN observed a photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR. and stated that he did not know SAMS by name nor did he recognize the photograph. He stated that he had never seen the person in the photograph in the BPP office.

KEEN advised that a couple of weeks ago, he had gone into the BPP office and had heard someone talking loudly in another room in the office. He stated that he made inquiries about the person making the noise and was told that the man's name was WADDELL and that he was from BPP headquarters on the West coast. He added, however, that he did not actually observe WADDELL and, therefore, would be unable to state whether or not this person was identical with the photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA GORDON S. BROOKS
SA HERMAN H. SCOTT GSB Date dictated 6/5/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA N

Date June 9, 1969

1

HARVEY D. HOLT was arrested at the headquarters of the Chicago Office of the Black Panther Party, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. He was informed that he was being arrested for harboring a fugitive from justice wanted by Federal authorities. He was informed of the identities of the below named agents as agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

HOLT was informed that he did not have to say anything, that anything he did say could be used against him later in a court of law, that he was entitled to contact an attorney and to talk to him before talking to the arresting agents, and that if he could not afford an attorney the Federal District Court would appoint one for him.

The above rights were exhibited to HOLT in written form, and he executed a waiver of rights. He furnished no information other than the following background information:

Name	HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, aka, Harvey D. Holt, Dwight Holt
Date of birth	10/8/43
Place of birth	Bay St. Louis, Missouri
Height	5' 9"
Weight	165 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Scars and marks	Mustache; blemishes on right shoulder; a small pencil-line scar under each nostril; left ear pierced.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs STEPHEN E. DELANTY and JOHN F. MILLER Date dictated 6/9/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1

Date June 5, 1969

ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Office, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969, by Special Agents (SA) RICHARD A. CARR and JOHN J. LOUGHNEY, JR. Prior to being interviewed GRAVES was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and was furnished with a form entitled, "Interrogation; Advice of Rights", which she read. After reading this form GRAVES stated she understood her rights and declined to sign the form.

GRAVES admitted she is a member of the Black Panther Party, however, declined to state how long she had been a member.

GRAVES was displayed photographs of GEORGE SAMS, JR. and RORY B. HITHE and stated she does not know either of them and has never seen them.

GRAVES refused to answer any further questions with the exception of some questions regarding her background and description.

An examination of GRAVES' personal effects disclosed the following items:

One aerosol spray can of "Protect-U" defensive spray, which was retained.

A piece of paper bearing telephone number 873-1429.

Card listing person to notify in case of emergency as Grandmother BURTON, 8440 Vernon, telephone number RA3-4239, and ST3-9523.

Card indicating GRAVES had completed course in Red Cross Home Nursing at Peace Memorial Hospital, June 26, 1968.

Card indicating GRAVES is a registered Practical Nurse.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs JOHN J. LOUGHNEY, JR. and RICHARD A. CARR Date dictated 6/5/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[illegible]DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT[illegible]

1

Date June 10, 1969

After being advised of the identities and official capacities of the arresting officers, BRUCE ALLAN DICKSON was arrested for harboring a Federal fugitive at 5:58 AM, June 4, 1969, at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois. He was immediately orally advised of his rights as contained in "Interrogation; Advice of Rights; Your Rights" Form. He declined to make a statement and refused to give his identity. He was then transported in Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Radio Car Number 180, to FBI Headquarters, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, for processing by Special Agents KELLY V. ENGLAND and RICHARD S. SWENSEN.

At FBI Headquarters, DICKSON was again advised of his rights as contained in the "Your Rights" Form, and he stated he understood his rights, but refused to be interviewed other than giving his name and his home address, which he listed as being 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois.

The following is a description of subject obtained through interview and observation:

Name	BRUCE ALLAN DICKSON
Date of birth	Refused to give
Place of birth	Refused to give
Former Employment	Janitor
Residence	2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois
Race	Negro
Sex	Male
Height	6 feet, 1 inch
Weight	165 - 170 pounds
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Build	Medium
Complexion	Light
Scars	9 inch scar on upper left arm with stitching scars on either s 1 inch scar on left shoulder bl ½ inch circular scar inside elb left arm ½ inch circular scar back of el

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA KELLY V. ENGLAND and
SA RICHARD S. SWENSEN/RSS

Date dictated 6/10/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 6, 1969

1

On June 4, 1969, SAs JOHN W. HOUSLEY, HERMAN H. SCOTT, and SHERMAN NOBLE, JR., arrested LOCKETT P. BIBBS on the sidewalk in front of 2350 West Madison. This address houses the offices of the Chicago Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and BIBBS was about to enter same at the time he was arrested.

BIBBS was subsequently transported by Bureau automobile to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office at 219 South Dearborn, where he was photographed, fingerprinted, and provided with a printed warning and waiver form which he read but declined to sign.

BIBBS was interviewed by SAs HOUSLEY, JEROME T. COLLINS, and JOSEPH J. STUMPF regarding his association with the BPP and he advised as follows:

BIBBS stated he has been a member of the BPP for about four or five months. He then amended his statement regarding his membership with the BPP and advised he is merely a friend of the party and works for them. He stated, however, he has never formally joined the BPP. BIBBS stated that at the time of his arrest he was about to enter the offices of the BPP to help supervise their "Breakfast for Children Program." He stated that his duties are to set tables and help serve the children as they are being fed. He stated that the BPP tries to help the people in the neighborhood and he feels it is a very good and worthwhile organization. He advised that he has never seen any guns or other weapons in the BPP headquarters and that he has never seen a member of the BPP carrying a gun on his person.

BIBBS was shown a photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR., and stated he did not know SAMS by name or photograph. BIBBS advised he had been in the BPP headquarters several times during the previous evening, but again denied having seen SAMS on the premises.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs JOHN W. HOUSLEY, HERMAN H. SCOTT, SHERMAN NOBLE, JR., JEROME T. COLLINS, and JOSEPH J. STUMPF - JWH

Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

This investigation was predicated upon receipt of information from the New Haven Division reflecting that GEORGE SAMS, JR., had been charged with the holding and subsequent murder of one, ALEX RACKLEY for several days in May, 1969, during which time he was tortured, scalded with boiling water, beaten, burned, and subsequently murdered. An authorized complaint was filed May 27, 1969, before United States Commissioner (USC) ARTHUR H. LATIMER at New Haven, Connecticut, by SA ROBERT C. PUCKETT. A Commissioner's warrant was issued for his arrest on May 27, 1969, charging violation of Title 18, Section 1073, United States Code.

On June 3 and 4, 1969, information was received that the subject had been, and was then, as late as 12:30 a.m., on June 4, 1969, in the Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. He further advised that the subject was expected to remain there at least for the remainder of that night.

At approximately 5:00 a.m., on June 4, 1969, Agents of the Chicago Office surrounded the premises at BPP Headquarters. SA R. B. YADON, Jr., telephonically informed a person answering the telephone at this address that a warrant was outstanding for the arrest of subject, GEORGE SAMS, Jr., and three other individuals. SA YADON attempted to elicit cooperation of those within the BPP Headquarters without success. After approximately 30 minutes, the occupants of this building were ordered out on the street and were placed under arrest. These eight individuals identified themselves as follows:

LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS
BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON
ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES
HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT
PATRICK KEEN
LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON
JESSIE WARD
GEORGIA WASHINGTON.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 5, 1969

On June 4, 1969 SA RAMON W. STRATTON was present at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois, when arrests were made for harboring a fugitive from justice, in building occupied by an organization calling themselves the Black Panthers. Special Agent in Charge MARLIN W. JOHNSON of the Chicago Federal Bureau of Investigation office instructed SA STRATTON to conduct a lawful search of the building in which the arrests were made, with assistance of other Special Agents of the FBI.

Posters, pamphlets, printed material and machines were observed on the walls, floors, desks and chairs and it appeared to SA STRATTON that these items would be subject to seizure under a search warrant issued in conformance with Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in conjunction with violations of Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 2383, 2384 and 2385.

Section 2383 relates to rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof or in giving aid and comfort thereto.

Section 2384 relates to conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, etc.

Section 2385 relates to willfully advocating, etc. the overthrow of the Government of the United States and the printing, etc. of material, and the organizing, etc. of persons for such purposes.

SA STRATTON therefore directed that certain materials be seized and preserved as evidence of violations of laws of the United States, possibly being committed in presence of Agents, both as mere evidence and as material designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as means of committing a criminal offense (Rule 41 (b)) and material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3103a).

On 6-4-69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA RAMON W. STRATTON:rws Date dictated 6-5-69

...recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and it... be distributed outside your agency.

The foregoing documents were seized and are being held as evidence at the Chicago Office of the FBI.

A characterization of the BPP is attached as an appendix hereto.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney,
Chicago, Illinois

United States Secret Service,
Chicago, Illinois

Office of Special Investigations,
Chicago, Illinois

United States Naval Investigative
Service Office, Chicago, Illinois

Region I, 113th Military
Intelligence Group,
Evanston, Illinois

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/6/69

Incidental to a search to locate federal fugitives at 2350 West Madison Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the premises of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), the following documents were located in a brown record box which was in the private office on the southeast corner of the second floor of that building:

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs DAVID M. FRAHM and ROBERT J. TOMPKINS DMF Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITE ATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

F ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATI
Chicago, Illinois
June 6, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

On June 4, 1969, Agents of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), incidental to the executing of federal warrants at 2350 West Madison Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the headquarters of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), seized the following documents:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-3

FBI

Date: 6/6/69

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via A I R T E L ______________________ (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (157-1281)

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM concerning captioned matter and particularly the "Suggested Plan For the Complete Breakdown of the State of Illinois Power Structure," or alleged war plans for the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP).

In view of the special significance of this information, it is set forth as a separate LHM and a more comprehensive LHM concerning all of the items seized during the FBI raid on 6/4/69 of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, Chicago, follows.

In addition, one copy each is being forwarded to the USA, U.S. Secret Service, OSI, NISO, Chicago and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

(DMF.

Approved: ______________________ Special Agent in Charge Sent ______________ M Per ______________

On June 4, 1969, SA EDWARD KINZER, Jr., signed the aforementioned complaint before United States Commissioner JAMES T. BALOG. On June 4, 1969, Assistant United States Attorney ETTEN advised that all of the above eight subjects appeared before Commissioner BALOG and were released on own recognizance bond. The male individuals' bond was set at $4,000 and the female subjects at $3,000. the case was continued until 3:00 p.m. on June 20, 1969.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 6, 1969

GEORGIA WASHINGTON was placed under arrest at 2350 West Madison. She was immediately advised of her rights by SA JACK D. VAIRENWALD. She advised she understood her rights, but refused to execute a warning and waiver form.

WASHINGTON was shown photographs of the following individuals:

GEORGE SAMS, JR.
FBI Number 493 526 F

LONNIE MC LUCAS
FBI Number 546 916 E

LANDON ROBERT WILLIAMS
FBI Number 229 544 G

RORY B. HITHE.

WASHINGTON advised that she had never seen any of these individuals and their names were not familiar to her. She advised that she did not wish to make any further statement.

The following description of WASHINGTON was obtained by observation and interview:

Sex	Female
Race	Negro
Date of Birth	January 22, 1951
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'4"
Weight	155 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Social Security Number	352-42-7813

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA BRUCE F. KNIPP and
SA JACK D. VAIRENWALD/JDV Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Date 6/4/69

1

On June 4, 1969, at Chicago, Illinois, JESSE WARD, 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois, was while being interviewed in the Chicago Office of the FBI, given a body search and the following items were found:

One book entitled "The Thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung" by MAO TSE-TUNG, which bore a red soft leather cover.

One pamphlet entitled "Along the Socialist or Capitalist Road?", printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, and dated August 15, 1967.

A pamphlet entitled "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything" by YAO WEN-YUAN, printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1968.

A pamphlet entitled "China's Great Revolution and The Soviet Union's Great Tragedy" by RENMIN RIBAO (People's Daily) Observer dated June 4, 1967. This pamphlet was printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1967.

A pamphlet entitled "Statement By Comrade Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, In Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression". This pamphlet was printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, in 1968, and it bore a date of April 16, 1968.

With the exception of the last named pamphlet, the other three pamphlets bore the following worded stamp:

"A copy of this material has been filed with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs EUGENE J. CONNOLLY and CHARLES E. BRUNNER EJC Date dictated 6/4/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

EDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT N

Date 6/4/69

1

JESSE WARD, 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois, was interviewed by Special Agents EUGENE J. CONNOLLY and CHARLES E. BRUNNER who identified themselves to him as Special Agents of the FBI. Prior to commencement of the interview, WARD was furnished form FD-395, "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" which he read and refused to sign. He stated that he understood his rights as they were written on the form and as he read them, but he would not sign anything because he does not know or understand what he is doing and because it is against the rules of the Black Panther Party. WARD furnished the following information:

His name is JESSE WARD and he resides at 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois. He is a member of the Black Panther Party of Illinois. Other than call the interviewing Agents numerous obscene names, he refused to furnish any other information.

The following description of WARD was obtained through observation and interrogation on June 4, 1969:

Name	JESSE WARD
Address	721 North Troy
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Height	6' - 6'1"
Weight	175 - 180 lbs.
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black, bushy American cut
Age	Approximately 19
Complexion	Medium dark
Scars and marks	2" scar, upper left lip
Characteristics	Wears glasses; wears a wispy goatee and mustache

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs EUGENE J. CONNOLLY and CHARLES E. BRUNNER EJC Date dictated 6/4/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

4 15 64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 6/6/69

LARRY MAURICE ROBERSON, 3326 West Fulton Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was interviewed by Special Agents (SA) DONALD W. OXLEY and RICHARD L. KNEIBERT, who identified themselves to him as SAs of the FBI. Prior to the commencement of the interview, ROBERSON was furnished Form FD-395 "Interrogation; Advice of Rights Form" which he carefully read and refused to sign. He stated that he understood what his rights were but that he did not desire to sign any legal document. ROBERSON furnished the following information:

ROBERSON furnished SAs with his name, address, and basic descriptive information. He refused to make any further statements to the Agents regarding the Black Panther Party or his involvement with the Party. He denied any knowledge of GEORGE SAMS, Jr.

The following description was obtained through observation and interview:

Name	LARRY MAURICE ROBERSON, also known as Robinson
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Age	20
Date of Birth	12/26/48
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Nationality	United States
Height	5'11"
Weight	202 Pounds
Build	Medium
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Medium-dark
Scars and Marks	1½" scar right knee
Father's Address	3326 West Fulton Street Chicago, Illinois
Occupation	Unemployed
Marital Status	Single

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs DONALD W. OXLEY/cmb and RICHARD L. KNEIBERT Date dictated 6/[illegible]/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Date 6/10/69

On June 4, 1969, Special Agent (SA) GORDON S. BROOKS and SA HERMAN H. SCOTT arrested PATRICK KEEN at the headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), 2350 West Madison Street.

KEEN was subsequently transported by Bureau automobile to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office at 219 South Dearborn Street, where he was photographed, fingerprinted and interviewed concerning his association with the BPP and with the subject GEORGE SAMS, JR.

KEEN was provided with a copy of a Warning and Waiver Form which he read and stated he understood, but declined to sign.

KEEN provided the following information:

He stated that he has been a member of the BPP for approximately three weeks and advised that on the night of June 3-4, 1969, he was the Officer of the Day (OD) at BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois. He advised that as the OD he had been in charge of the BPP office,

KEEN observed a photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR. and stated that he did not know SAMS by name nor did he recognize the photograph. He stated that he had never seen the person in the photograph in the BPP office.

KEEN advised that a couple of weeks ago, he had gone into the BPP office and had heard someone talking loudly in another room in the office. He stated that he made inquiries about the person making the noise and was told that the man's name was WADDELL and that he was from BPP headquarters on the West coast. He added, however, that he did not actually observe WADDELL and, therefore, would be unable to state whether or not this person was identical with the photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA GORDON S. BROOKS
SA HERMAN H. SCOTT GSB

Date dictated 6/5/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 9, 1969

HARVEY D. HOLT was arrested at the headquarters of the Chicago Office of the Black Panther Party, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. He was informed that he was being arrested for harboring a fugitive from justice wanted by Federal authorities. He was informed of the identities of the below named agents as agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

HOLT was informed that he did not have to say anything, that anything he did say could be used against him later in a court of law, that he was entitled to contact an attorney and to talk to him before talking to the arresting agents, and that if he could not afford an attorney the Federal District Court would appoint one for him.

The above rights were exhibited to HOLT in written form, and he executed a waiver of rights. He furnished no information other than the following background information:

Name	HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, aka, Harvey D. Holt, Dwight Holt
Date of birth	10/8/43
Place of birth	Bay St. Louis, Missouri
Height	5' 9"
Weight	165 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Scars and marks	Mustache; blemishes on right shoulder; a small pencil-line scar under each nostril; left ear pierced.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs STEPHEN E. DELANTY and JOHN F. MILLER Date dictated 6/9/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 5, 1969

ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Office, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969, by Special Agents (SA) RICHARD A. CARR and JOHN J. LOUGHNEY, JR. Prior to being interviewed GRAVES was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and was furnished with a form entitled, "Interrogation; Advice of Rights", which she read. After reading this form GRAVES stated she understood her rights and declined to sign the form.

GRAVES admitted she is a member of the Black Panther Party, however, declined to state how long she had been a member.

GRAVES was displayed photographs of GEORGE SAMS, JR. and RORY B. HITHE and stated she does not know either of them and has never seen them.

GRAVES refused to answer any further questions with the exception of some questions regarding her background and description.

An examination of GRAVES' personal effects disclosed the following items:

One aerosol spray can of "Protect-U" defensive spray, which was retained.

A piece of paper bearing telephone number 873-1429.

Card listing person to notify in case of emergency as Grandmother BURTON, 8440 Vernon, telephone number RA3-4239, and ST3-9523.

Card indicating GRAVES had completed course in Red Cross Home Nursing at Peace Memorial Hospital, June 26, 1968.

Card indicating GRAVES is a registered Practical Nurse.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs JOHN J. LOUGHNEY, JR. and RICHARD A. CARR Date dictated 6/5/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT N

1

Date June 10, 1969

After being advised of the identities and official capacities of the arresting officers, BRUCE ALLAN DICKSON was arrested for harboring a Federal fugitive at 5:58 AM, June 4, 1969, at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois. He was immediately orally advised of his rights as contained in "Interrogation; Advice of Rights; Your Rights" Form. He declined to make a statement and refused to give his identity. He was then transported in Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Radio Car Number 180, to FBI Headquarters, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, for processing by Special Agents KELLY V. ENGLAND and RICHARD S. SWENSEN.

At FBI Headquarters, DICKSON was again advised of his rights as contained in the "Your Rights" Form, and he stated he understood his rights, but refused to be interviewed other than giving his name and his home address, which he listed as being 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois.

The following is a description of subject obtained through interview and observation:

Name	BRUCE ALLAN DICKSON
Date of birth	Refused to give
Place of birth	Refused to give
Former Employment	Janitor
Residence	2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois
Race	Negro
Sex	Male
Height	6 feet, 1 inch
Weight	165 - 170 pounds
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Build	Medium
Complexion	Light
Scars	9 inch scar on upper left arm with stitching scars on either s 1 inch scar on left shoulder bl ½ inch circular scar inside elb left arm ½ inch circular scar back of el

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # ______

by SA KELLY V. ENGLAND and SA RICHARD S. SWENSEN/RSS Date dictated 6/10/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

EDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIO

Date June 6, 1969

1

On June 4, 1969, SAs JOHN W. HOUSLEY, HERMAN H. SCOTT, and SHERMAN NOBLE, JR., arrested LOCKETT P. BIBBS on the sidewalk in front of 2350 West Madison. This address houses the offices of the Chicago Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and BIBBS was about to enter same at the time he was arrested.

BIBBS was subsequently transported by Bureau automobile to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office at 219 South Dearborn, where he was photographed, fingerprinted, and provided with a printed warning and waiver form which he read but declined to sign.

BIBBS was interviewed by SAs HOUSLEY, JEROME T. COLLINS, and JOSEPH J. STUMPF regarding his association with the BPP and he advised as follows:

BIBBS stated he has been a member of the BPP for about four or five months. He then amended his statement regarding his membership with the BPP and advised he is merely a friend of the party and works for them. He stated, however, he has never formally joined the BPP. BIBBS stated that at the time of his arrest he was about to enter the offices of the BPP to help supervise their "Breakfast for Children Program." He stated that his duties are to set tables and help serve the children as they are being fed. He stated that the BPP tries to help the people in the neighborhood and he feels it is a very good and worthwhile organization. He advised that he has never seen any guns or other weapons in the BPP headquarters and that he has never seen a member of the BPP carrying a gun on his person.

BIBBS was shown a photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR., and stated he did not know SAMS by name or photograph. BIBBS advised he had been in the BPP headquarters several times during the previous evening, but again denied having seen SAMS on the premises.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

SAs JOHN W. HOUSLEY, HERMAN H. SCOTT,
SHERMAN NOBLE, JR., JEROME T. COLLINS,
by and JOSEPH J. STUMPF - JWH Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

This investigation was predicated upon receipt of information from the New Haven Division reflecting that GEORGE SAMS, JR., had been charged with the holding and subsequent murder of one, ALEX RACKLEY for several days in May, 1969, during which time he was tortured, scalded with boiling water, beaten, burned, and subsequently murdered. An authorized complaint was filed May 27, 1969, before United States Commissioner (USC) ARTHUR H. LATIMER at New Haven, Connecticut, by SA ROBERT C. PUCKETT. A Commissioner's warrant was issued for his arrest on May 27, 1969, charging violation of Title 18, Section 1073, United States Code.

On June 3 and 4, 1969, information was received that the subject had been, and was then, as late as 12:30 a.m., on June 4, 1969, in the Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. He further advised that the subject was expected to remain there at least for the remainder of that night.

At approximately 5:00 a.m., on June 4, 1969, Agents of the Chicago Office surrounded the premises at BPP Headquarters. SA R. B. YADON, Jr., telephonically informed a person answering the telephone at this address that a warrant was outstanding for the arrest of subject, GEORGE SAMS, Jr., and three other individuals. SA YADON attempted to elicit cooperation of those within the BPP Headquarters without success. After approximately 30 minutes, the occupants of this building were ordered out on the street and were placed under arrest. These eight individuals identified themselves as follows:

LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS
BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON
ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES
HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT
PATRICK KEEN
LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON
JESSIE WARD
GEORGIA WASHINGTON.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - USA, Chicago
1 - USA, New Haven

Report of: SA EDWARD KINZER, JR. **Office:** Chicago, Illinois
Date: June 12, 1969

Field Office File #: **Bureau File #:**

Title:
GEORGE SAMS, JR.;
LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS;
BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON;
ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES;
HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT;
PATRICK KEEN;
LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON;
JESSIE WARD;
GEORGIA WASHINGTON

Character: UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION - MURDER; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER; KIDNAPING; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT KIDNAPING; BINDING; HARBORING

Snopsis: On 6/3 and 4/69, information was received that subject GEORGE SAMS, JR. was being secreted at the Headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), Chicago, which during the early morning hours of 6/4/69, Chicago Agents attempted to gain access to this office in an attempt to locate subject. After repeated attempts to gain cooperation of members of the BPP, all occupants ordered out of premises. Arrested and charged with harboring subject GEORGE SAMS, JR., in violation of Title 18, Section 1071, United States Code, were subjects LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS, BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON, ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES, HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, PATRICK KEEN, LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON, JESSIE WARD, AND GEORGIA WASHINGTON. AUSA, Chicago authorized filing of these charges before United States Commissioner, Chicago, on 6/4/69. All subjects appeared before United States Commissioner that day and released on bond for reappearance on 6/20/69. A search incidental to subjects' arrests and in connection with search for fugitive, resulted in seizure by Agents of 13 guns, large quantities of ammunition, swords, gasmasks, office machines, books and quantities of records, posters, and literature. SUBJECT SAMS REPORTEDLY ENFORCER FOR BPP AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLAIR ANDERSON

Anderson is to be bailed out of jail per instructions of the BPP lawyers. However, ANDERSON will not be allowed to be reinstated as a BPP member.

3/3/70 BILLY BROOKS

BROOKS is allegedly getting the feeling that he is not trusted by the membership and leaders of the Chicago area BPP.

3/4/70 HOWARD ALK

ALK is currently at his place in Michigan reviewing some film concerning the BPP.

HOWARD ALK, MIKE GRAY, FILM GROUP, INC.

GRAY has private pilot license and will fly up to see ALK on 3/11/70.

The Film Group, Incorporated is allegedly moving from their current address.

3/5/70 LOUIS TRUELOCK, ROBERT DEMARY

The BPP membership feel that these two BPP members are either informants for the pigs or will be trouble for the party. General feeling is that they should have been left in jail as they are doing various things without authorization from the Party.

3/5/70 JEWEL COOK, JOAN WOLFSON

COOK is sleeping with WOLFSON on occasion.

3/9/70 BILLY BROOKS, TRAVEL OF BPP LEADERSHIP

BROOKS will possibly leave for San Francisco, California, on 3/11/70. The only reason he is going is because he has never been there.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - USA, Chicago
1 - USA, New Haven

Report of: SA EDWARD KINZER, JR. **Office:** Chicago, Illinois
Date: June 12, 1969

Field Office File #: **Bureau File #:**

Title:

GEORGE SAMS, JR.;
LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS;
BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON;
ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES;
HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT;
PATRICK KEEN;
LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON;
JESSIE WARD;
GEORGIA WASHINGTON

Character: UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION - MURDER; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER; KIDNAPING; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT KIDNAPING; BINDING; HARBORING

Snopsis: On 6/3 and 4/69, information was received that subject GEORGE SAMS, JR. was being secreted at the Headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), Chicago, which during the early morning hours of 6/4/69, Chicago Agents attempted to gain access to this office in an attempt to locate subject. After repeated attempts to gain cooperation of members of the BPP, all occupants ordered out of premises. Arrested and charged with harboring subject GEORGE SAMS, JR., in violation of Title 18, Section 1071, United States Code, were subjects LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS, BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON, ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES, HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, PATRICK KEEN, LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON, JESSIE WARD, AND GEORGIA WASHINGTON. AUSA, Chicago authorized filing of these charges before United States Commissioner, Chicago, on 6/4/69. All subjects appeared before United States Commissioner that day and released on bond for reappearance on 6/20/69. A search incidental to subjects' arrests and in connection with search for fugitive, resulted in seizure by Agents of 13 guns, large quantities of ammunition, swords, gasmasks, office machines, books and quantities of records, posters, and literature. SUBJECT SAMS REPORTEDLY ENFORCER FOR BPP AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

- P -

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLAIR ANDERSON

Anderson is to be bailed out of jail per instructions of the BPP lawyers. However, ANDERSON will not be allowed to be reinstated as a BPP member.

3/3/70 BILLY BROOKS

BROOKS is allegedly getting the feeling that he is not trusted by the membership and leaders of the Chicago area BPP.

3/4/70 HOWARD ALK

ALK is currently at his place in Michigan reviewing some film concerning the BPP.

HOWARD ALK, MIKE GRAY, FILM GROUP, INC.

GRAY has private pilot license and will fly up to see ALK on 3/11/70.

The Film Group, Incorporated is allegedly moving from their current address.

3/5/70 LOUIS TRUELOCK, ROBERT DEMARY

The BPP membership feel that these two BPP members are either informants for the pigs or will be trouble for the party. General feeling is that they should have been left in jail as they are doing various things without authorization from the Party.

3/5/70 JEWEL COOK, JOAN WOLFSON

COOK is sleeping with WOLFSON on occasion.

3/9/70 BILLY BROOKS, TRAVEL OF BPP LEADERSHIP

BROOKS will possibly leave for San Francisco, California, on 3/11/70. The only reason he is going is because he has never been there.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: MAR 18 1970

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM-BPP

who has provided reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information

and which appropriate has been disseminated as well as orally furnished to the proper local or federal agency, advised as follows on the indicated dates:

3/2/70 WILLIE CALVIN, RAYMOND HEWITT, CLARENCE TERRY, TRAVEL BPP LEADERS.

CALVIN was assigned to be HEWITT and companion known only as "T.C.", security guard when they came through

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: MAR 18 1970

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM-BPP

who has provided reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information

and which appropriate has been disseminated as well as orally furnished to the proper local or federal agency, advised as follows on the indicated dates:

3/2/70 WILLIE CALVIN, RAYMOND HEWITT, CLARENCE TERRY, TRAVEL BPP LEADERS.

CALVIN was assigned to be HEWITT and companion known only as "T.C.", security guard when they came through

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOV NMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 3/10/70

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM - BPP

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. One copy of this LHM is being furnished the following agencies: United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston.

The LHM is classified confidential to protect above source of continuing value.

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

SUBPOENAS HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE

red Hampton and Mark Clark were murdered by State's Attorney Hanrahan and his cohorts.. These gangsters and urderous hoodlums used the old Klu Klux Klan tactic of killing a few niggers to keep the rest in line. When the igs saw the people were concerned about the deaths they tried to justify their actions by holding a rigged inque t the inquest you could see the pigs were lying because each one had a different story. But still the old decrepi and picked, upper class, racist jury found the verdict to be JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE. Come to the people's quest to find out the truth. Then it will be up to the people to see and decide that justice is done.

WE WELCOME ALL PEOPLE TO WITNESS THIS INQUEST

SUNDAY, MARCH 8, 1970
2:00 p.m.
FIRST Congregational Church
40 No. ASHLAND

INISTRY OF
NFORMATION

Ill. Chapter
Black Panther Party 243-8276
2350 w. Madison 738-0778

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago;
United States Secret Service, Chicago;
Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston.

In view of the above and past activities of above BPP members, all should be considered armed and dangerous.

UNITED STATES GOV NMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 3/10/70

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM - BPP

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. One copy of this LHM is being furnished the following agencies: United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston.

The LHM is classified confidential to protect above source of continuing value.

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY



SUBPOENAS HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE

ed Hampton and Mark Clark were murdered by State's Attorney Hanrahan and his cohorts.. These gangsters and
urderous hoodlums used the old Klu Klux Klan tactic of killing a few niggers to keep the rest in line. When the
s saw the people were concerned about the deaths they tried to justify their actions by holding a rigged inque
the inquest you could see the pigs were lying because each one had a different story. But still the old decrepi
nd picked, upper class, racist jury found the verdict to be JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE. Come to the people's
uest to find out the truth. Then it will be up to the people to see and decide that justice is done.

WE WELCOME ALL PEOPLE TO WITNESS THIS INQUEST

SUNDAY, MARCH 8, 1970
2:00 p.m.
FIRST Congregational Church
40 No. ASHLAND

INISTRY OF
FORMATION

Ill. Chapter
Black Panther Party
2350 w. Madison

243-8276
738-0778

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago;
United States Secret Service, Chicago;
Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston.

In view of the above and past activities of above BPP members, all should be considered armed and dangerous.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 3/5/70

OM : SAC, CHICAGO (P)

JBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM - BPP

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. Copies of this LHM are being furnished the USA. The Chicago, Illinois, Police Department, and the Cook County, Illinois, States Attorney's Office, are aware of information contained in this LHM.

LHM classified confidential as information contained therein could reasonably result in the identification of above confidential sources of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness.

RMI

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 3/5/70

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (P)

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM - BPP

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. Copies of this LHM are being furnished the USA. The Chicago, Illinois, Police Department, and the Cook County, Illinois, States Attorney's Office, are aware of information contained in this LHM.

LHM classified confidential as information contained therein could reasonably result in the identification of above confidential sources of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness.

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No

Chicago, Illinois
March 5, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of the BPP.

On March 4, 1970,

advised that the Chicago, Illinois, area BPP members in connection with the Emergency Conference to Defend the Rights of the BPP to Exist, which is being held in Chicago, Illinois, during March 6 through 8, 1970, will advertise the March 5, 1970, issue of the "Chicago Sun-Times," a local daily newspaper, for all persons, particularly the police officials involved, with information regarding the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Illinois BPP Chapter leaders on December 4, 1969, during a police raid, to present themselves on March 8, 1970, to "testify" at "The People's Inquest" concerning their deaths. Sources stated that this "inquest" is to be held at the First Congregational Church, 40 North Ashland, Chicago, Illinois.

The following advertisement appeared on page 89 of the above newspaper dated March 5, 1970:

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of th
Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No

Chicago, Illinois
March 5, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of the BPP.

On March 4, 1970,

advised that the Chicago, Illinois, area BPP members in connection with the Emergency Conference to Defend the Rights of the BPP to Exist, which is being held in Chicago, Illinois, during March 6 through 8, 1970, will advertise the March 5, 1970, issue of the "Chicago Sun-Times," a local daily newspaper, for all persons, particularly the police officials involved, with information regarding the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Illinois BPP Chapter leaders on December 4, 1969, during a police raid, to present themselves on March 8, 1970, to "testify" at "The People's Inquest" concerning their deaths. Sources stated that this "inquest" is to be held at the First Congregational Church, 40 North Ashland, Chicago, Illinois.

The following advertisement appeared on page 89 of the above newspaper dated March 5, 1970:

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of th
Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

70?

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 1/7/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM

who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information,

and which, where appropriate, has been disseminated as well as orally furnished to the proper local or Federal agency, advised as follows on 12/23/69:

MIKE GRAY, HOWARD ALK, Film Group, Inc., BERNADINE DORHN, SLIM COLEMAN, DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, JAMES MONTGOMERY, SKIPPY ANDREWS, DON STANG.
SKIP

GRAY, ALK, four other unknown white, males, all employees of Film Group, Inc., took movies and photographs of the interior and exterior of 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, on 12/4/69, after the shoot-out with the police, at the direction of CUNNINGHAM, MONTGOMERY, ANDREWS, and STANG. This was done prior to the public being allowed to enter.

DORHN, COLEMAN, several Panthers names unrecalled as well as NBC, WGN, WNUS, WCFL and WVON representatives were required to wait outside while this was being done.

(The fact that these photographs were taken by GRAY, ALK, and four other white males, all employees of Film Group, Inc., as well as the names of the news agencies present was the only information disseminated to the Ill. States Attorney's Office and the Federal Departmental Attorneys presently conducting a FGJ hearing into this shooting.)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-102-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

70?

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 1/7/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM

who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information.

and which, where appropriate, has been disseminated as well as orally furnished to the proper local or Federal agency, advised as follows on 12/23/69:

MIKE GRAY, HOWARD ALK, Film Group, Inc., BERNARDINE DORHN, SLIM COLEMAN, DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, JAMES MONTGOMERY, SKIPPY ANDREWS, DON STANG.

SKIP

GRAY, ALK, four other unknown white, males, all employees of Film Group, Inc., took movies and photographs of the interior and exterior of 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, on 12/4/69, after the shoot-out with the police, at the direction of CUNNINGHAM, MONTGOMERY, ANDREWS, and STANG. This was done prior to the public being allowed to enter.

DORHN, COLEMAN, several Panthers names unrecalled as well as NBC, WGN, WNUS, WCFL and WVON representatives were required to wait outside while this was being done.

(The fact that these photographs were taken by GRAY, ALK, and four other white males, all employees of Film Group, Inc., as well as the names of the news agencies present was the only information disseminated to the Ill. States Attorney's Office and the Federal Departmental Attorneys presently conducting a FGJ hearing into this shooting.)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1/5/70

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (P)

BLACK PANTHER PARTY. RM-BPP.

SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ILLINOIS CHAPTER, BPP, TO MAKE NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT INSTANT TO LOCAL MEDIA THAT PANTHERS HAVE INDEPENDENT PATHOLIGIST REPORT INDICATING FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP AS RESULT OF ILLINOIS STATE'S ATTORNEY'S POLICE RAID DECEMBER FOUR LAST) HAD RECEIVED A DRUG THROUGH EATING APPROXIMATELY EIGHT HOURS BEFORE DEATH. INDICATION IS PANTHERS WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH ILLINOIS COOK COUNTY CORONER'S GRAND JURY SCHEDULED TO CONVENE JANUARY SIX NEXT, TWENTY SIX HUNDRED SOUTH CALIFORNIA, HOWEVER, WILL SUBMIT PATHOLIGIST REPORT. RUSH ALSO CALLED FOR BPP SUPPORTERS TO APPEAR FOR DEMONSTRATION AT ABOVE ADDRESS JANUARY SIX NEXT.

NO VIOLENCE ANTICIPATED OR KNOWN PLANNED BY BPP. APPROPRIATE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

1/5/70

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (P)

BLACK PANTHER PARTY. RM-BPP.

SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ILLINOIS CHAPTER, BPP, TO MAKE NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT INSTANT TO LOCAL MEDIA THAT PANTHERS HAVE INDEPENDENT PATHOLIGIST REPORT INDICATING FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP AS RESULT OF ILLINOIS STATE'S ATTORNEY'S POLICE RAID DECEMBER FOUR LAST) HAD RECEIVED A DRUG THROUGH EATING APPROXIMATELY EIGHT HOURS BEFORE DEATH. INDICATION IS PANTHERS WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH ILLINOIS COOK COUNTY CORONER'S GRAND JURY SCHEDULED TO CONVENE JANUARY SIX NEXT, TWENTY SIX HUNDRED SOUTH CALIFORNIA, HOWEVER, WILL SUBMIT PATHOLIGIST REPORT. RUSH ALSO CALLED FOR BPP SUPPORTERS TO APPEAR FOR DEMONSTRATION AT ABOVE ADDRESS JANUARY SIX NEXT.

NO VIOLENCE ANTICIPATED OR KNOWN PLANNED BY BPP. APPROPRIATE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

RMM

1/2/70

TELETYPE

TO : DIRECTOR FBI

FROM: SAC CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY. RM - BPP. OO: SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE (RELIABLE IN PAST) ADVISED INSTANT RALLY SCHEDULED FOR THREE P.M., JANUARY FOUR, NEXT, AFFRO-ARTS THEATER, THIRTY NINE THIRTY SEVEN SOUTH DREXEL BOULEVARD, CHICAGO. RALLY IN MEMORIAL TO FRED HAMPTON, DECEASED DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP, KILLED DECEMBER FOUR, LAST, IN RAID CONDUCTED BY COOK COUNTY STATES ATTORNEY'S POLICE.

SOURCE ALSO ADVISES BPP TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO ANNOUNCE OPENING OF "PEOPLES MEDICAL CENTER," PURPOSE OF WHICH WILL BE TO FREELY TREAT GHETTO RESIDENTS.

SOURCE STATES BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ILLINOIS BPP, BOB LUCAS, LEADER BLACK LIBERATION ALLIANCE, AND CHICAGO ALDERMAN A. A. "SAMMY" RAYNER BEING ADVERTISED AS SPEAKERS. ENTERTAINMENT WILL ALSO BE PROVEDED ACCORDING TO SOURCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS SOLICITED. MONEY OBTAINED

ARS

1/2/70

TELETYPE

TO : DIRECTOR FBI

FROM: SAC CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY. RM - BPP. OO: SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT RALLY SCHEDULED FOR THREE P.M., JANUARY FOUR, NEXT, AFFRO-ARTS THEATER, THIRTY NINE THIRTY SEVEN SOUTH DREXEL BOULEVARD, CHICAGO. RALLY IN MEMORIAL TO FRED HAMPTON, DECEASED DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP, KILLED DECEMBER FOUR, LAST, IN RAID CONDUCTED BY COOK COUNTY STATES ATTORNEY'S POLICE.

SOURCE ALSO ADVISES BPP TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO ANNOUNCE OPENING OF "PEOPLES MEDICAL CENTER," PURPOSE OF WHICH WILL BE TO FREELY TREAT GHETTO RESIDENTS.

SOURCE STATES BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ILLINOIS BPP, BOB LUCAS, LEADER BLACK LIBERATION ALLIANCE, AND CHICAGO ALDERMAN A. A. "SAMMY" RAYNER BEING ADVERTISED AS SPEAKERS. ENTERTAINMENT WILL ALSO BE PROVEDED ACCORDING TO SOURCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS SOLICITED. MONEY OBTAINED

ARS

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 12/10/59

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM - BPP

who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information, and which, were appropriate, has been disseminated as well as orally furnished to the appropriate local or federal agency. advised as follows on the indicated dates:

DATE	INOFRMATION
12/1/69	DIANE PRETTE, BOB LEE This person is not known to be a Panther, however, is one of the girls whom LEE stays with on Cleveland. She is a Female Negro, about 21 years old, 5'6", slender, light skinned, approximately 118 pounds.

RMM:

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The release also stated that gunshots had not been fired by BPP personnel and that all of the shots fired by the police were in the bedrooms.

The release concluded the next course of action by the BPP will be to intensify information to the people because another revolutionary brother had been slain in the streets by the fascist "pigs" of this counrty and the people have to seize the time and take power.

On December 5, 1969, Sergeant Halleran, 21st Police District, Chicago, Illinois, advised that on that date, at 5:30 a.m. that morning, a raid had been conducted on the apartment of Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP. The apartment is located at 2030 South State Street, Chicago, and was unoccupied at the time of the raid. The whereabouts of Rush is unknown.

Sergeant Halleran stated the raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by a local court, alleging that weapons were in this apartment. Recovered during the search was a .22 caliber Derringer-type pistol, approximately two hundred rounds of ammunition, BPP and other literature, and a small amount of marijuana. The raid was conducted without incident and no arrests or injuries were reported. The area in the vicinity of the above apartment was normal.

The following agencies are being furnished a copy of this memorandum:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois;

U.S. Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois; and

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

Serial number information regarding weapons confiscated by police during the raid as set forth in the LHM are being obtained and appropriate action will be taken with respect to possible ARL violation.

Information set forth in the enclosed LHM concerning statements by Sergeant DANIEL GROTH with respect to the shooting of Deputy Chairman FRED HAMPTON reflects that HAMPTON was found in the rear bedroom with a loaded .45 pistol in his hand and a shotgun by his side. GROTH advised that an individual appeared in the doorway and later was identified as HAMPTON with both the shotgun and the pistol in his hand firing at police officers. As a result of this, the officers returned the fire, killing HAMPTON.

While Police Department, according to the Intelligence Unit, has developed no specific information regarding any planned violence as a result of the raid and death of two Panthers, the Police Department is affording the area in the vicinity of Panther Headquarters with added coverage. Racial sources of the Chicago Office have developed no information to date indicating any planned violence is under consideration at this time. along with has advised that no definite plans regarding possible demonstrations or other activities will be formulated until after the funeral of HAMPTON. Chicago will continue to follow closely the activities of the Panther Party and advise the Bureau and interested offices of any future pertinent developments.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GO MENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 12/10/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM - BPP

who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information, and which, were appropriate, has been disseminated as well as orally furnished to the appropriate local or federal agency. advised as follows on the indicated dates:

DATE	INOFRMATION
12/1/69	DIANE PRETTE, BOB LEE This person is not known to be a Panther, however, is one of the girls whom LEE stays with on Cleveland. She is a Female Negro, about 21 years old, 5'6", slender, light skinned, approximately 118 pounds.

RMM:

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The release also stated that gunshots had not been fired by BPP personnel and that all of the shots fired by the police were in the bedrooms.

The release concluded the next course of action by the BPP will be to intensify information to the people because another revolutionary brother had been slain in the streets by the fascist "pigs" of this counrty and the people have to seize the time and take power.

On December 5, 1969, Sergeant Halleran, 21st Police District, Chicago, Illinois, advised that on that date, at 5:30 a.m. that morning, a raid had been conducted on the apartment of Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP. The apartment is located at 2030 South State Street, Chicago, and was unoccupied at the time of the raid. The whereabouts of Rush is unknown.

Sergeant Halleran stated the raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by a local court, alleging that weapons were in this apartment. Recovered during the search was a .22 caliber Derringer-type pistol, approximately two hundred rounds of ammunition, BPP and other literature, and a small amount of marijuana. The raid was conducted without incident and no arrests or injuries were reported. The area in the vicinity of the above apartment was normal.

The following agencies are being furnished a copy of this memorandum:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois;

U.S. Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois; and

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

Serial number information regarding weapons confiscated by police during the raid as set forth in the LHM are being obtained and appropriate action will be taken with respect to possible ARL violation.

Information set forth in the enclosed LHM concerning statements by Sergeant DANIEL GROTH with respect to the shooting of Deputy Chairman FRED HAMPTON reflects that HAMPTON was found in the rear bedroom with a loaded .45 pistol in his hand and a shotgun by his side. GROTH advised that an individual appeared in the doorway and later was identified as HAMPTON with both the shotgun and the pistol in his hand firing at police officers. As a result of this, the officers returned the fire, killing HAMPTON.

While Police Department, according to the Intelligence Unit, has developed no specific information regarding any planned violence as a result of the raid and death of two Panthers, the Police Department is affording the area in the vicinity of Panther Headquarters with added coverage. Racial sources of the Chicago Office have developed no information to date indicating any planned violence is under consideration at this time. along with has advised that no definite plans regarding possible demonstrations or other activities will be formulated until after the funeral of HAMPTON. Chicago will continue to follow closely the activities of the Panther Party and advise the Bureau and interested offices of any future pertinent developments.

FBI

Date: 12/5/69

smit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (P)

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM-BPP
OO: San Francisco

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM suitable for dissemination. Two copies of the LHM are being furnished the and Divisions in lieu of their interest in this matter.

One copy of the LHM is being designated locally to USA and U.S. Secret Service, both Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

ARS

Approved: Special Agent in Charge
Sent M
Per

FBI

Date: 12/5/69

smit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (P)

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM-BPP
OO: San Francisco

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM suitable for dissemination. Two copies of the LHM are being furnished the and Divisions in lieu of their interest in this matter.

One copy of the LHM is being designated locally to USA and U.S. Secret Service, both Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

ARS

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 12/12/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM - BPP

On 11/21/69, information from LHM of same date furnished to USA, U.S.S.S., OSI, all Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

This LHM contained information concerning weapons, allegedly legally purchased and other related items being kept in the first floor apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. This apartment is available to any BPP member and names of BPP members most frequently seen at this address were also set forth. It was not known to whom the apartment was actually rented; however, the rent was paid from BPP funds. All persons mentioned were described as armed and extremely dangerous.

The contents of this LHM was orally given to the Chicago Police Department and the Illinois States Attorney's office.

11/23/69 Source advised that Panthers aware Chicago Police Gang Intelligence Unit planning raid on above apartment on 11/25/69 and above items being moved out of apartment. Movie cameras being set up to take pictures of the raid and only two pregnant girls will be in the apartment.

11/24/69 SAC JOHNSON advised Director LYONS of source information of 11/23/69. Director LYONS verified the source information concerning the date of the planned raid and stated that he was cancelling the raid.

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman;

Billy Brooks, Deputy Minister of Education;

Ronald Satchel, Deputy Minister of Health;

Louis Trulock, Legal Counselor; all Illinois BPP officials, as well as Alvin Jefferies, Robert Campbell and numerous female BPP members including Debra Johnson who is allegedly pregnant by Hampton.

Source added that it is not known to whom the apartment is actually rented; however, the rent is actually paid from BPP funds.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois;

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois;

Office of Special Investigations, Chicago, Illinois;

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

IN VIEW OF ABOVE INFORMATION AND PAST ACTIVITIES OF BPP MEMBERS MENTIONED ABOVE ALL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

101-11.8

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 12/12/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM - BPP

On 11/21/69, information from LHM of same date furnished to USA, U.S.S.S., OSI, all Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

This LHM contained information concerning weapons, allegedly legally purchased and other related items being kept in the first floor apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. This apartment is available to any BPP member and names of BPP members most frequently seen at this address were also set forth. It was not known to whom the apartment was actually rented; however, the rent was paid from BPP funds. All persons mentioned were described as armed and extremely dangerous.

The contents of this LHM was orally given to the Chicago Police Department and the Illinois States Attorney's office.

11/23/69 Source advised that Panthers aware Chicago Police Gang Intelligence Unit planning raid on above apartment on 11/25/69 and above items being moved out of apartment. Movie cameras being set up to take pictures of the raid and only two pregnant girls will be in the apartment.

11/24/69 SAC JOHNSON advised Director LYONS of source information of 11/23/69. Director LYONS verified the source information concerning the date of the planned raid and stated that he was cancelling the raid.

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman;

Billy Brooks, Deputy Minister of Education;

Ronald Satchel, Deputy Minister of Health;

Louis Trulock, Legal Counselor; all Illinois BPP officials, as well as Alvin Jefferies, Robert Campbell and numerous female BPP members including Debra Johnson who is allegedly pregnant by Hampton.

Source added that it is not known to whom the apartment is actually rented; however, the rent is actually paid from BPP funds.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois;

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois;

Office of Special Investigations, Chicago, Illinois;

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

IN VIEW OF ABOVE INFORMATION AND PAST ACTIVITIES OF BPP MEMBERS MENTIONED ABOVE ALL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DATE: 11/21/69

O :DIRECTOR, FBI

ROM : SAC, CHICAGO

UBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

Enclosed forthe Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated and captioned as above. Copies of this LHM are also being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago; OSI, Chicago; United States Secret Service; and Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, all Illinois.

The Chicago Police Department and AFTD has been furnished the contents of information set forth in this LHM as well as the Illinois States Attorney's Office.

CG T-1 is

No matter is being opened in the Chicago Office concerning this matter inasmuch as information indicates the weapons were apparently legally purchased, under the terms of existing Firearms laws, possession of same is apparently rampart throughout BPP members and apartment rent is paid with EPP funds.

Chicago is following this matter closely and if further information developed warranting investigation, Chicago will immediately institute same.

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

PETERSON, CHERYL

This Panther resides at 2337 West Monroe and works out of the South Side BPP Office.

JORDAN, NADINE

This person is a teacher at Malcolm X College, is friendly to some BPP members, however, is not known to be a Panther.

STINSON, PAUL

This person is a BPP member, however, has not been seen in Chicago area for a while. He was not very active.

FISHER, STEPHANIE

FISHER is the correct name. She is the Lieutenant of Communications of the Chicago Branch of the Illinois BPP, takes all notes for various appointments, is well informed on all BPP members and activities.

ELDRIDGE, JERI

She currently resides at 2337 West Monroe, always has a veneral disease and is considered a flunky.

JOHNSON, RONALD

JOHNSON is no longer known to be functioning as a BPP member, his vehicle license is 502-519 and his phone number is 681-1032.

WALTON, HARLON

Talk among Panthers first indicated that this person was a Panther, however, inquiry now indicates that this person never was a Panther, but close friends of some of those Panthers indicted by the Illinois Cook County Grand Jury on June 9, 1969. Further a search of available BPP membership application record files failed to locate any person by this name.

HAYMON, JOSEPH

This is a Panther who is no longer functioning.

EDELEN, CAROL

This person is a Panther serving on the Communications Cadre. She is about 20 years old, 5'7", weighing about 130 pounds and light skinned.

BARRETT, AUDREY

This Panther has two addresses, 1826 South Millard, telephone 522-9634, and 3420 West 16th Street, telephone 522-9867.

KING, STEVE; SAM LATSON

This Panther works on the south side for the BPP; he is about 21 years old, 5'6", 145-150 pounds, smokes reefers and is well-known by SAM LATSON.

MC DONALD, RAYMOND M.

Search of available BPP membership applications shows this person residing at 7538 South May, telephone number 651-8790, however, is unknown to source.

MARTIS, CHARLES; FRED HAMPTON

Photo from CB 2676380 of Chicago Police Department records is MARTIS. Original talk among BPP leaders after Illinois Cook County Grand Jury indictments indicated this person to be a BPP member, however, current indications are that this person has never been a BPP member. This person is a close friend of HAMPTON's.

GEARY, CHUCK

This person is a young Patriot member, but is not well known.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

O :DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/21/69

ROM :SAC, CHICAGO

UBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

Enclosed forthe Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated and captioned as above. Copies of this LHM are also being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago; OSI, Chicago; United States Secret Service; and Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, all Illinois.

The Chicago Police Department and AFTD has been furnished the contents of information set forth in this LHM as well as the Illinois States Attorney's Office.

CG T-1 is

No matter is being opened in the Chicago Office concerning this matter inasmuch as information indicates the weapons were apparently legally purchased, under the terms of existing Firearms laws, possession of same is apparently rampart throughout BPP members and apartment rent is paid with BPP funds.

Chicago is following this matter closely and if further information developed warranting investigation, Chicago will immediately institute same.

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

PETERSON, CHERYL

This Panther resides at 2337 West Monroe and works out of the South Side BPP Office.

JORDAN, NADINE

This person is a teacher at Malcolm X College, is friendly to some BPP members, however, is not known to be a Panther.

STINSON, PAUL

This person is a BPP member, however, has not been seen in Chicago area for a while. He was not very active.

FISHER, STEPHANIE

FISHER is the correct name. She is the Lieutenant of Communications of the Chicago Branch of the Illinois BPP, takes all notes for various appointments, is well informed on all BPP members and activities.

ELDRIDGE, JERI

She currently resides at 2337 West Monroe, always has a veneral disease and is considered a flunky.

JOHNSON, RONALD

JOHNSON is no longer known to be functioning as a BPP member, his vehicle license is 502-519 and his phone number is 681-1032.

WALTON, HARLON

Talk among Panthers first indicated that this person was a Panther, however, inquiry now indicates that this person never was a Panther, but close friends of some of those Panthers indicted by the Illinois Cook County Grand Jury on June 9, 1969. Further a search of available BPP membership application record files failed to locate any person by this name.

HAYMON, JOSEPH

This is a Panther who is no longer functioning.

EDELEN, CAROL

This person is a Panther serving on the Communications Cadre. She is about 20 years old, 5'7", weighing about 130 pounds and light skinned.

BARRETT, AUDREY

This Panther has two addresses, 1826 South Millard, telephone 522-9634, and 3420 West 16th Street, telephone 522-9867.

KING, STEVE; SAM LATSON

This Panther works on the south side for the BPP; he is about 21 years old, 5'6", 145-150 pounds, smokes reefers and is well-known by SAM LATSON.

MC DONALD, RAYMOND M.

Search of available BPP membership applications shows this person residing at 7538 South May, telephone number 651-8790, however, is unknown to source.

MARTIS, CHARLES; FRED HAMPTON

Photo from CB 2676380 of Chicago Police Department records is MARTIS. Original talk among BPP leaders after Illinois Cook County Grand Jury indictments indicated this person to be a BPP member, however, current indications are that this person has never been a BPP member. This person is a close friend of HAMPTON's.

GEARY, CHUCK

This person is a young Patriot member, but is not well known.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 11/6/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify

advised as follows on the dates indicated:

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

10/9/69 FRED HAMPTON, MIKE KLONSKY, RYM II OF SDS.

HAMPTON has decided to support the actions of RYM II but not necessarily participate in those actions. KLONSKY was the major reason HAMPTON took any position at all, the reason being that KLONSKY gives the Panthers whatever they want.

10/9/69 RON SATCHEL, FRED HAMPTON, JEWEL COOK, WILLIAM O'NEAL, LYNN FRENCH, JOHN WILLIAMS, RICHARD BLACK, JOAN GRAY, STEPHNEY FISHER, MIKE KLONSKY, RYM I AND RYM II OF SDS.

KLONSKY stopped at BPP Headquarters on 10/8/69, and, according to HAMPTON, related to HAMPTON that the RYM I planned on causing some "shit" at Lincoln Park during their rally scheduled for 10/8/69. HAMPTON had SATCHEL, COOK and himself stay at the BPP office and sent the others to observe the "shit" which would allegedly take place at Lincoln Park, requesting when it started all were to call the office.

10/9/69 BOBBY RUSH.

RUSH is appearing in court at Urbana, Illinois, today concerning his appeal regarding his six month weapons conviction. If incarcerated, the Panthers will hold a rally.

Springfield telephonically advised that RUSH received a continuance until October 28, 1969.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 11/6/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify

advised as follows on the dates indicated:

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

10/9/69 FRED HAMPTON, MIKE KLONSKY, RYM II OF SDS.

HAMPTON has decided to support the actions of RYM II but not necessarily participate in those actions. KLONSKY was the major reason HAMPTON took any position at all, the reason being that KLONSKY gives the Panthers whatever they want.

10/9/69 RON SATCHEL, FRED HAMPTON, JEWEL COOK, WILLIAM O'NEAL, LYNN FRENCH, JOHN WILLIAMS, RICHARD BLACK, JOAN GRAY, STEPHNEY FISHER, MIKE KLONSKY, RYM I AND RYM II OF SDS.

KLONSKY stopped at BPP Headquarters on 10/8/69, and, according to HAMPTON, related to HAMPTON that the RYM I planned on causing some "shit" at Lincoln Park during their rally scheduled for 10/8/69. HAMPTON had SATCHEL, COOK and himself stay at the BPP office and sent the others to observe the "shit" which would allegedly take place at Lincoln Park, requesting when it started all were to call the office.

10/9/69 BOBBY RUSH.

RUSH is appearing in court at Urbana, Illinois, today concerning his appeal regarding his six month weapons conviction. If incarcerated, the Panthers will hold a rally.

Springfield telephonically advised that RUSH received a continuance until October 28, 1969.

ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: OCT 30 1969

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify but attests to the accuracy of the following information.

advised on the dates indicated:

10/8/69 LYNN FRENCH, MANUEL DOZIER.

These persons will more or less represent the BPP at an alleged rally sponsored by SDS at the International Harvester Plant, 2600 South California, 10/9/69.

5010-108-01

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[illegible]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: OCT 30 1969

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify but attests to the accuracy of the following information.

advised on the dates indicated:

10/8/69 LYNN FRENCH, MANUEL DOZIER.

These persons will more or less represent the BPP at an alleged rally sponsored by SDS at the International Harvester Plant, 2600 South California, 10/9/69.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FE[illegible]RAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATI[illegible]

1

Date June 11, 1970

On June 9, 1970, upon the writer's return to duty from extended sick leave, an attempt was made to examine the evidence in this case maintained under custody of the Chicago Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office in Room 2114 of the Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois. However, the key originally assigned to the Chicago FBI Office to this room by K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Civil Rights Attorney, United States Department of Justice, would no longer open the lock.

Mrs. HENRIETTA SINSKY, Room 280, Federal Building, Office of General Services Administration (GSA), advised on June 10, 1970, that GSA had received authorization from Mr. JACK MEYER, in charge of property for United States Attorney's (USA) Office, Room 1500, Federal Building, to clean this room and to change the lock. She does not recall the exact date this was completed, but that it was approximately during the last week in May, 1970.

Mrs. SINSKY with the writer entered Room 2114 on June 10, 1970, and observed that the room had been cleaned of all surplus boxes and packaging materials and that there remained in the room three items each containing the sticker "Evidence Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C."

An examination of these items by the writer disclosed they contained the following items:

Box number one, 18 inches by 22 inches by 5 inches, contained a package with a notation, "Photographs of Q 162 through Q 167 Mattresses of Q 31 Hassock (PC-C3999FA)" The box had been returned from the FBI Laboratory, Washington, D.C. under date March 2, 1970, and contained the following information on the invoice of contents:

"'Bullets, bullet fragments and lead fragments removed from mattresses Q 162 through Q 167.' Radiographs of Q 162 through Q 167 mattresses. Radiographs of hassock Q 31 (PC-C3999FA)."

On 6/9,10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS Date dictated 6/10/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI
LABORATORY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: February 26, 1970
FBI File No.
Lab. No.

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED) ET AL
VICTIMS - SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received on 2/17/70 and were personally delivered by Special Agent John P. Riley

Q281	Left hand cast of Hampton
Q232	Right hand cast of Hampton

Also Submitted: Control sample of paraffin taken from Hampton

Results of examination:

A microscopic examination of Q281 and Q282 revealed no unburned gunpowder fragments.

Specimens Q281 and Q282 were examined by neutron activation analysis for the elements antimony and barium. Antimony and barium are components of most primer mixtures and can be deposited on the hand when a firearm is discharged. From the results of the examination, it could not be determined whether Hampton had discharged a firearm.

Q18 Red plastic disc found on floor of rear bedroom
Q19 Shot pellet removed from shot hole designated Number 2 in east wall of back bedroom
Q20 Lead core from copper-jacketed bullet from base of south wall in back bedroom
Q21 Scrapings from bloodstain on unmounted door in dining room
Q22 Scrapings from bloodstain on bed frame in rear bedroom
Q23 Scrapings from bloodstain on north wall in rear bedroom
Q24 Scrapings from bloodstain on south wall of living room
Q25 Shotgun wad from under bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall
Q26 Part of door through entrance to living room from entrance hall

Specimens received 1/12/70. personally delivered by SA Evan E. Hodge

Q27 Bullet jacket fragment recovered from southwest corner of kitchen, on floor
Q28 - Q29 Two cartridges recovered from clothes bundle in entrance hall
Q30 Blood sample removed from black eight-drawer dresser in living room

Specimens received 1/21/70, under cover of letter dated 1/12/70

Q31 Hassock
Q32 Man's suit coat
Q33 - Q37 Five packages of tablets
Q38 Pillbox
Q39 Packet containing two orange tablets or candies

Results of examination:

The shot pattern in the piece of plasterboard, Q1, from the wall to the right of the front entrance door was produced by a contact or near contact shot. The pieces of

(continued on next page)

45

7-1b'

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: January 27, 1970
FBI File No.
Lab. No.

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH; JAMES
DAVIS; JOHN CISZEWSKI; EDWARD CARMODY,
ET AL, Chicago Police Officers; FRED A.
HAMPTON (deceased); MARK CLARK (deceased);
BRENDA HARRIS; VERLINA BREWER;
BLAIR J. ANDERSON; RONALD SATCHEL; ET AL -
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ VICTIMS; SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 12/31/69, personally delivered by SA Robert M. Zimmers

Q1 Piece of plasterboard from inside wall to right of front entrance door
Q2 Three pieces of lead from hole in northeast corner of entrance hallway
Q3 Wad from bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall
Q4 Two pieces of lead from northeast frame of closet in front bedroom
Q5 - Q9 Five bullets removed from behind holes in east wall of front bedroom
Q10 Bullet from south wall of front bedroom
Q11 Bullet from behind hole designated Number 6 in south wall of front bedroom
Q12 Bullet from behind hole in baseboard on south wall of front bedroom
Q13 Mutilated bullet and bullet fragment from stud behind hole designated Number 3 on south wall of front bedroom
Q14 Bullet from behind hole designated Number 39 in south wall of front bedroom
Q15 Pieces of lead from behind uppermost shot hole in the center of the north wall of front bedroom
Q16 Pieces of lead from lower shot hole in the center of the north wall of front bedroom
Q17 Lead and copper fragments removed from leg of night table in back bedroom

(continued on next page)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D.C. 20537

REPORT
of the
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

January 6, 1970

YOUR FILE NO.
FBI FILE NO.
LATENT CASE NO.

TO: SAC, Chicago

RE: SGT. DANIEL GROTH, JAMES DAVIS.
JOHN CISZEWSKI, EDWARD CARMODY. ET AL.
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, POLICE OFFICERS - SUBJECTS;
FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED)
MARK CLARK (DECEASED)
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA BREWER
BLAIN ANDERSON
RONALD STACHEL, ET AL. - VICTIMS;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

REFERENCE: Evidence personally delivered to FBI Laboratory on 12-31-69 by SA Robert M. Zimmers
EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: Chicago
SPECIMENS: Q26, portion of door

The listed Q specimen is described in the Laboratory report, which is being furnished separately, and will include disposition of the item.

No latent prints of value present or developed on specimen.

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover, Director

THIS REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/25/70

1.

Mrs. ANNIE WHITE, 2237 South Keeler, Chicago, Illinois, was located at the above address and served with a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena calling for her appearance before the Federal Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois at 11:00 AM, February 25, 1970.

Mrs. WHITE advised that she had been employed at the Cook County Hospital since approximately 1951 until December, 1969. She said that her supervisor while employed at the County Hospital was Miss MABEL WILSON. She stated that while employed at Cook County Hospital, she had been a clerk assigned to the Trauma Unit. She further advised that during the week of December 1, 1969, she recalls being ill one day during this week or two days perhaps, and that if she did work during that week, it was the 3:00 to 11:00 shift.

Mrs. WHITE advised that she is presently employed at Sears Roebuck as a sales clerk at Homan Avenue.

33

On 2/24/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # ______

by SAs EDWARD F. BLOCH and ROBERT LEE ALEXANDER:EHE Date dictated 2/25/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/25/70

1.

Miss JOAN SOLBECK, Employment Supervisor, Cook County School of Nursing, 1900 West Polk Street, Chicago, advised that a search of their records revealed a personnel file for ANNIE WHITE, 2237 South Keeler, Chicago, Illinois.

Miss SOLBECK advised that ANNIE WHITE entered on duty at the hospital as a clerical employee on November 29, 1951. She stated that the file further revealed that WHITE was terminated on June 2, 1956, and again rehired, exact date unknown. She said that WHITE again terminated her employment at County Hospital on December 29, 1969. Miss SOLBECK said that while employed at Cook County Hospital, WHITE was under the direct supervision of Miss MABEL WILSON, RN, and that her specific duties were that of a clerk assigned to the Trauma Unit. Miss SOLBECK said that the personnel file further revealed that WHITE was born October 11, 1930, at Hartwell, Florida. Her Social Security Number is 354-24-5846. Her telephone number is listed as 762-0129, which is the telephone number of her mother, Mrs. ANNIE B. GURDY, 2237 South Keeler.

Miss SOLBECK advised that from a review of the County payroll records, the following is tobe noted regarding WHITE's employment during the week of December 1, 1969:

December 1	Sick
December 2	3:00 to 11:00 shift
December 3	3:00 to 11:00 shift
December 4	Sick
December 5	Sick
December 6	Day off
December 7	Day off
December 8	Vacation day
December 9	Vacation day
December 10	Vacation day

Miss SOLBECK stated that WHITE has recently filled out an application for reinstatement and that this application is presently being considered.

On 2/24/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # ____

by SAs EDWARD F. BLOOM and
ROBERT LEE ALEXANDER:EFB

Date dictated 2/25/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 3/3/70

Photographs of interior of 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, were taken in the presence of Special Agents JOHN J. GOLDEN, WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, JR. and CHARLES E. CALFEE and Deputy U. S. Marshal LORENZO FOWLER.

On 2/20/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, JR. and SA JOHN J. GOLDEN / Date dictated 2/27/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/26/70

At 6:00 PM, an autopsy was performed on the body of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON by Dr. CHARLES PETTY, pathologist from Dallas, Texas. The autopsy was performed at the Veterans Administration Hospital, Shreveport, Louisiana. Those in attendance, according to a list provided by JOSEPH KEENE, U. S. Marshal, Shreveport, Louisiana, were as follows:

For the State of Illinois:

1) THOMAS HETT, Assistant State Attorney

2) NICK MOTHERWAY, Assistant State Attorney

3) Dr. JERRY KEARNS, Cook County Coroner's Office

4) Dr. WILLIAM MAVRELIS, Pathologist

For the HAMPTON family:

1) FRANCIS E. ANDREW, Attorney

2) Dr. DAVID SPAIN, Pathologist

3) Dr. EARL CALDWELL, Pathologist

For the U. S. Government:

1) Dr. CHARLES PETTY

2) JERRIS LEONARD, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of Justice

3) JAMES TURNER, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U. S. Department of Justice

4) DONALD E. WALTER, U. S. Attorney, Shreveport, Louisiana

5) JAMES GARDNER, Deputy U. S. Marshal

On 2/16/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File #

30

by SA PATRICK R. COONEY Date dictated 2/20/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FED[illegible]AL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/26/70

Photographs were taken during the autopsy of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON at the Veterans Administration Hospital, utilizing a speedgraphic camera with flash attachment and Poloroid adapter. Poloroid color sheet film was used.

On 2/16/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File #

by SA PATRICK E. COONEY Date dictated 2/20/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/26/70

Prior to the autopsy of the body of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON, impressions of the right index finger of HAMPTON were obtained using a common black ink pad and a sheet of white unlined paper.

The purpose of the impressions was to effect identification.

On 2/16/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File #

by SA Patrick R. Cooney Date dictated 2/20/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 2-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date February 18, 1970

A piece of the door jamb and wall board behind same was removed from the left side of the door frame of the livingroom at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. The cut of the piece of door jamb was made at 52 inches and 64 inches from the floor.

In addition, to Special Agents JOHN J. GOLDEN and R. B. YADEN, also present were Deputy United States Marshals HENRY YARBROUGH and LORENZO FOWLER, plus Sergeant ERICKSON, Star Number 1014 and Patrolman VENEIGH, Star Number 9073 of the Chicago Police Department.

The above articles were removed at the request of Mr. K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division.

27

On 2/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs JOHN J. GOLDEN and R.B. YADEN: JJG Date dictated 2/16/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1.

Date February 12, 1970

Dr. EDWARD DREYFUS, Medical Director, Neighborhood Health Center, Office of Economic Opportunity, 529 29th Street, advised he has records reflecting that CHERYL PETERSON, 2859 Humboldt Street, Denver, Colorado, visited this center on August 9, 1969 and was diagnosed as being anemic. She was given two prescriptions on that date which were filled at this center, one pertained to iron tablets and the other to vitamin tablets.

She also visited this center on August 19, 1969 in connection with a possible pregnancy and was advised by the examining doctor she was not pregnant.

Dr. DREYFUS advised that his records reflect she is a Negro female; born May 25, 1951 in the State of Illinois; Social Security Number 330-44-6208; parents, Mr. and Mrs. SOLON PETERSON, 1516 South Kostner, Chicago, Illinois; marital status single.

Dr. DREYFUS stated that CHERYL PETERSON failed to return for a reappointment set for two months after she was last in the center and that mail sent to her by the center to the above Denver address was returned marked addressee moved, no forwarding address.

He advised further that his records do not indicate that CHERYL PETERSON has any connection with the Black Panther Party or FRED A. HAMPTON, MARK CLARK, BRENDA HARRIS, VERLINA A. BREWER, BLAIR J. ANDERSON, RONALD SATCHEL, DEBROAH JOHNSON, LOUIS TRULOCK or HAROLD BELL.

On 2/12/70 at Denver, Colorado File #

by SA RICHARD L. CAMPBELL
SA JOHN H. GALLIE RLC Date dictated 2/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

ROGER A. THOMAS, registered pharmacist, Illinois license 5127769, employed with Par Pharmacy, 1202 East 53rd Street, Chicago, Illinois, advised that prescription number 216313 was prescribed for LYNN FRENCH by Doctor JONES, 5321 South Woodlawn, phone 667-0909. Mr. THOMAS advised that the prescription contained 40 tablets of 40,000 units of penicillin. Mr. THOMAS advised the prescription was signed by LOUIS MARACUS on July 29, 1969.

Mr. THOMAS advised that all prescriptions filed at their pharmacy are filed by number and no records are maintained by name only. Mr. THOMAS advised that he does not recall the following persons obtaining prescriptions at this store:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. ANDERSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA FREDERICK F. STAHL and SA C. LEONARD .. TREVIRANUS FFS Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

LEO HALL, JR., pharmacist, Stineway Drugs, 2400 Madison, Chicago, Illinois, advised that all their prescriptions are filed by number only and no records are kept on names of persons obtaining prescriptions at their store.

Mr. HALL was furnished the following names and advised that he does not recall any of these individuals obtaining prescriptions at their store:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. JOHNSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File#

by SA FREDERICK F. STAHL and SA C. [illegible] TREVIRANUS FFS Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

WILLIAM J. DAVIS, registered pharmacist, Walgreens Drug Store, 2300 West Madison, advised that their prescriptions are filed in number order only and no records are kept concerning prescriptions in name only.

Mr. DAVIS advised that he has seen FRED A. HAMPTON, deceased, and another member of the Black Panther Party in Walgreens purchasing cigarettes and so forth, but does not recall the following people ever obtaining prescriptions at Walgreens:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. ANDERSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA FREDERICK F. STAHL AND SA C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS FFS Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FE RAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

TOM HETT, States Attorney's Office, 26th and California, Chicago, Illinois, furnished the following list of guns seized on the Black Panther raid at 2337 West Monroe on December 4, 1969:

1. Colt 45 cal automatic 5" blue model 1927 Argentina S/N # 7111

   Shipped June 9, 1969 to M&M Sporting Goods, 3823 N. Richards, Milwaukee, by Casavanova's Milwaukee.

They have the gun on their books but do not have it in their possession and have never reported it stolen. They say they will report it now.

2. Sears Roebuck 20 ga pump 28" blue steel model 21 No serial number so cannot be traced.

3. Springfield 12 ga pump 28" blue steel model 67H No serial number so it cannot be traced.

4. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so it cannot be traced.

5. Browning High Standard 12 ga auto load model standard H15423

   Sold by Browning Mfg. to Sears Roebuck on Oct. 13, 1954. Sears is located at 403 S. State, Chicago, Illinois. Sears does not keep records that far back so unable to trace Further.

6. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so unable to trace.

7. Remington 12 ga pump model 870 S/N 20240V Unable to trace because Remington threw out its records for guns made in 1950.

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

SA FREDERICK F. STAHL and SA C. LEONARD
. TREVIRANUS FFS Date dictated 2/13/70

by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/31/70

On the early afternoon of January 28, 1970, SA ROBERT W. BUCHER, Elmira, New York FBI Resident Agency, personally turned over to SA WALTER H. RICE, JR., FBI Laboratory, Washington, D. C., at Washington, D. C., the below-described two (2) items, which HERBERT L. MAC DONELL, Davis Road, Corning, New York, had turned over to SA BUCHER on the evening of January 27, 1970, at MAC DONELL's residence in Corning, New York:

#1 One (1) one-inch by three-inch microscope slide labeled "HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Head."

#2 One (1) one-inch by three-inch glass microscope slide labeled "HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Base."

On 1/28/70 at Washington, D. C. File #

by SA ROBERT W. BUCHER Date dictated 1/29/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

MAC DONELL advised that the above-described two slides were of material removed by him from the slug shown in Photos #104, which he had introduced into evidence before the Federal Grand Jury sitting at Chicago, Illinois.

MAC DONELL exhibited a number of color photographs which he stated he had taken in connection with his examination of the residence at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, and made the comment that there is something "very pertinent" to be concluded from the examination of the gun powder marks, which appear on the inside of the entrance door to the apartment and further, that he believes that he is the only one who has realized the particular significance of these powder marks.

- 1 -

Date 1/31/70

On the afternoon of January 27, 1970, HERBERT L. MAC DONELL, Davis Road, Corning, New York, was contacted at his place of employment in Corning, at which time he advised he possessed certain microscope slides concerning his examination of a Chicago, Illinois residence in December, 1969, and was willing to turn these slides over to the FBI, as he had been directed to do so by an attorney with the United States Department of Justice. Arrangements were made to obtain these slides from MAC DONELL on the evening of January 27, 1970, as he stated they were presently at his residence.

On the evening of January 27, 1970, MAC DONELL turned over to Special Agent ROBERT W. BUCHER of the FBI, two-one-inch by three-inch glass microscope slides, which had been marked and were described by MAC DONELL as follows:

(1) Labled HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Head. These are scrapings from the head of the slug removed from the East wall of the Northeast (living) room of 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois. This by HERBERT L. MAC DONELL, on December 8, 1969. This piece of evidence described by the MAC DONELL listas "F." The mounting medium is Canada Balsam.

(2) Labeled HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Base. A Portion of the wooden fibers removed from the base of the slug described under number one above. The mounting medium is Canada Balsam.

The above two described microscope slides were received from MAC DONELL at his residence, Davis Road, Corning, New York, and a receipt was furnished MAC DONELL at that time.

17

On 1/27/70 at Corning, New York File #

by SA ROBERT W. BUCHER Date dictated 1/29/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

furnished SA TREVIRANUS. All copies of this inventory were signed by SA TREVIRANUS, ANDREW and KADISH.

Date January 23, 1970

1

At the Cook County Courthouse, 26th and California Avenue, Room 452, known as the Special Grand Jury Room, an inventory under order of Cook County Judge JOHN POWERS was instituted of evidence surrendered by FRANCIS E. ANDREW, Attorney, and his Investigative Assistant VICTORY KADISH, representing the Black Panther Party of Illinois.

Also present during the taking of this inventory were the following:

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Department of Justice, Attorney, Civil Rights Division;

JOHN E. RUSSELL, Investigator, Cook County State's Attorney's Office;

NANCY DEMPSEY, from the law office of FRANCIS E. ANDREW, 2156 North Halsted, Chicago.

Miss KADISH advised she was the agent for ANDREW, that she had personally handled the evidence, had assisted ANDREW in securing the evidence from the Black Panther Party (BPP) apartment, 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, on December 4 and 5, 1969, and had originally inventoried the evidence.

It is noted that the inventory of this evidence, which was turned over to the FBI, commenced at 6:10 PM, January 19, 1970, and was completed at 11:58 PM, January 19, 1970.

Following the making of an inventory of this evidence, it was receipted for by SA C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS, FRANCIS E. ANDREW and VICTORY KADISH The original of the receipt was furnished to ANDREW and a copy was

15

On 1/19/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

SAs C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS, ALTON E. BRAMBLETT,
GERALD C. THEIS, JAMES E. ANDERSON,
by ROBERT T. MURPHY, JR., and LAMONT PUGH Date dictated 1/21/70
CLT

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency, it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date January 21, 1970

1

Photos of a vent located in the living room at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, were made January 13, 1970, in the presence of Special Agent WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, Jr., K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, United States Department of Justice, Deputy Marshal LORENZO FOWLER, and HENRY YARBROUGH, and Sergeant JAMES COLLINS, Star Number 1819, Chicago Police Department.

14

On 1/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA JOHN J. GOLDEN Date dictated 1/15/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 1/14/70

On January 13, 1970, the grating in the floor of the front room of the first floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, was measured.

This grating is located 15¼ inches from the south wall and 52 inches from the west wall of the front room.

The metal frame in the floor measures 20½ inches from east to west and 17 inches from north to south. The grating fitted inside of this frame measures 13½ inches from north to south and 15 inches from east to west. The grating rests on a ½ inch steel lip which reduces the opening to 13 inches by 14½ inches. The drop from the floor containing the grating to the floor below is 115 inches. The basement is full of garbage and debris. Directly under the opening was a large vehicle tire, an old overcoat and several pieces of duct work. The grating lifted out of the frame very easily.

13

On 1/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA WILLIAM J. DOWNEY Date dictated 1/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date January 16, 1970

On January 9, 1970, photographs were taken of kitchen door and rear entrance and porch of building at 2335 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. Present during filming were Special Agents ROBERT ZIMMERS, EVAN HODGE, WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, JR., JESSE H. QUEEN, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney, and Mrs. MURPHY, resident of this address.

12

On 1/9/70 at Chicago, Illinois File#

by SA JOHN J GOLDEN Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date January 16, 1970

Photographs were taken at 2337 West Monroe on January 7, 1970. Present were Special Agents WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, Jr., FREDERICK F. STAHL, JOHN R. BASSETT, JOHN E. DALLMAN and EVAN HODGE, Visual Information Specialists, Federal Bureau of Investigation HORACE HAFNER and THOMAS PEYTON, K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney and ANTHONY J. SCIAFFRA, Deputy Coroner.

On 1/7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA JOHN J GOLDEN Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date January 16, 1970

On January 6, 1970, photographs were taken at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. Present were United States Department of Justice Attorney K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Deputy Coroner ANTHONY J. SCIAFERA, Special Agent EVAN HODGE, HORACE HAFNER and THOMAS PEYTON, Visual Information Specialists, Special Agents JOHN E. DALLMAN, JOHN R. BASSETT, ROBERT T. MURPHY, FREDERICK F. STAHL, EDWIN PETER KRIEGER, Depty Marshal PETE WILSON, Deputy Marshal GENE BINIAK and MILTON BRANCH, attorney representing the Attorney General of the United States.

On 1/6/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA JOHN J. GOLDEN Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/14/70

On January 7, 1970, during a search of the kitchen located in the apartment at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, a white plastic bottle containing pills, prescription number 216313 for LYNN FRENCH, dated July 29, 1969, was located on the kitchen table.

On 1/6/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #.

by SA JOHN E. DALLMAN Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Date 1/14/70

On January 6, 1970, during a search of the kitchen located in the apartment at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, a copper bullet jacket was located in the southwest corner of the room. The jacket was under a piece of cloth tacked to the door frame and floor.

On 1/6/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA JOHN E. DALLMAN Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDE[illegible]. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/16/70

A shed attached to the residence located at 2335 West Monroe Street, was examined for the purpose of noting and recording any bullet and/or shot holes.

Pertinent measurements and trajectory patterns were taken. No projectiles were recovered and no items were removed from the premises.

7

On 1/6-7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA EVAN E. HODGE Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/16/70

Pursuant to an on-the-scene examination of the premises located at 2337 West Monroe Street on January 6. and 7, 1970, the following items were removed from the premises for subsequent Laboratory examination:

1. Copper fragment recovered from south west corner of kitchen.
2. Two cartridges recovered from bundle of clothing in entrance hall.
3. Blood sample removed from black eight-drawer dresser in living room.

These items were listed with Deputy Coroner ANTHONY SCIARAFFA, Cook County, Illinois, and with his permission removed from the premises.

On 1/6-7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA EVAN E. HODGE Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/9/70

On December 21, 1969, Officers AUGUST BLUE, Badge 200, and JOHN DENEEN, Badge 8, States Attorneys Police of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois, brought two doors to the address 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. One door was for the front bedroom and one door with one panel missing was for the entrance to the first floor apartment.

Officers BLUE and DENEEN stayed with the doors and did not turn them over to the FBI.

On 12/31/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, JR. Date dictated 1/6/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/8/70

1.

Special Agents ROBERT M. ZIMMERS and EVAN E. HODGE of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory, made an on-the-scene examination of bullet holes found in the apartment located at 2337 West Monroe Street, and made a trajectory pattern to show directions of the shots fired and made pertinent measurements to show the locations of the holes.

A number of items of evidence were collected for subsequent laboratory examination. These items were listed with Deputy Coroner ANTHONY SCIARAFFA, Cook County, Illinois, and with his permission removed from the premises for transmittal to the FBI Laboratory. The items recovered are as follows:

1. Piece of wallboard from inside wall to right of front entrance door.
2. Three pieces of lead from hole in northeast corner of entrance hallway.
3. Wad from bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall.
4. Two pieces of lead from northeast frame of closet in front bedroom.
5. Five bullets removed from behind holes in east wall of front bedroom.
6. Bullet from south wall of front bedroom.
7. Bullet from behind hole designated Number 6 in south wall of front bedroom.
8. Bullet from behind hole in baseboard on south wall of front bedroom.

12/22/69;
12/29-31/69;
On 1/8/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # ________

SAs ROBERT M. ZIMMERS and
by EVAN E. HODGE/EEH Date dictated 1/8/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FED[illegible]AL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIO[illegible]

Date June 11, 1970

On June 9, 1970, upon the writer's return to duty from extended sick leave, an attempt was made to examine the evidence in this case maintained under custody of the Chicago Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office in Room 2114 of the Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois. However, the key originally assigned to the Chicago FBI Office to this room by K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Civil Rights Attorney, United States Department of Justice, would no longer open the lock.

Mrs. HENRIETTA SINSKY, Room 280, Federal Building, Office of General Services Administration (GSA), advised on June 10, 1970, that GSA had received authorization from Mr. JACK MEYER, in charge of property for United States Attorney's (USA) Office, Room 1500, Federal Building, to clean this room and to change the lock. She does not recall the exact date this was completed, but that it was approximately during the last week in May, 1970.

Mrs. SINSKY with the writer entered Room 2114 on June 10, 1970, and observed that the room had been cleaned of all surplus boxes and packaging materials and that there remained in the room three items each containing the sticker "Evidence Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C."

An examination of these items by the writer disclosed they contained the following items:

Box number one, 18 inches by 22 inches by 5 inches, contained a package with a notation, "Photographs of Q 162 through Q 167 Mattresses of Q 31 Hassock (PC-C3999FA)" The box had been returned from the FBI Laboratory, Washington, D.C. under date March 2, 1970, and contained the following information on the invoice of contents:

"'Bullets, bullet fragments and lead fragments removed from mattresses Q 162 through Q 167.' Radiographs of Q 162 through Q 167 mattresses. Radiographs of hassock Q 31 (PC-C3999FA)."

On 6/9,10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS Date dictated 6/10/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI
LABORATORY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Date: February 26, 1970
FBI File No.
Lab. No.

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED) ET AL
VICTIMS - SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received on 2/17/70 and were personally delivered by Special Agent John P. Riley

Q281 Left hand cast of Hampton
Q282 Right hand cast of Hampton

Also Submitted: Control sample of paraffin taken from Hampton

Results of examination:

A microscopic examination of Q281 and Q282 revealed no unburned gunpowder fragments.

Specimens Q281 and Q282 were examined by neutron activation analysis for the elements antimony and barium. Antimony and barium are components of most primer mixtures and can be deposited on the hand when a firearm is discharged. From the results of the examination, it could not be determined whether Hampton had discharged a firearm.

Q18 Red plastic disc found on floor of rear bedroom
Q19 Shot pellet removed from shot hole designated Number 2 in east wall of back bedroom
Q20 Lead core from copper-jacketed bullet from base of south wall in back bedroom
Q21 Scrapings from bloodstain on unmounted door in dining room
Q22 Scrapings from bloodstain on bed frame in rear bedroom
Q23 Scrapings from bloodstain on north wall in rear bedroom
Q24 Scrapings from bloodstain on south wall of living room
Q25 Shotgun wad from under bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall
Q26 Part of door through entrance to living room from entrance hall

Specimens received 1/12/70, personally delivered by SA Evan E. Hodge

Q27 Bullet jacket fragment recovered from southwest corner of kitchen, on floor
Q28 - Q29 Two cartridges recovered from clothes bundle in entrance hall
Q30 Blood sample removed from black eight-drawer dresser in living room

Specimens received 1/21/70, under cover of letter dated 1/12/70

Q31 Hassock
Q32 Man's suit coat
Q33 - Q37 Five packages of tablets
Q38 Pillbox
Q39 Packet containing two orange tablets or candies

Results of examination:

The shot pattern in the piece of plasterboard, Q1, from the wall to the right of the front entrance door was produced by a contact or near contact shot. The pieces of

(continued on next page)

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: January 27, 1970
FBI File No.
Lab. No.

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH; JAMES DAVIS; JOHN CISZEWSKI; EDWARD CARMODY, ET AL, Chicago Police Officers; FRED A. HAMPTON (deceased); MARK CLARK (deceased); BRENDA HARRIS; VERLINA BREWER; BLAIR J. ANDERSON; RONALD SATCHEL; ET AL - ////////// VICTIMS; SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 12/31/69, personally delivered by SA Robert M. Zimmers

Q1 Piece of plasterboard from inside wall to right of front entrance door
Q2 Three pieces of lead from hole in northeast corner of entrance hallway
Q3 Wad from bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall
Q4 Two pieces of lead from northeast frame of closet in front bedroom
Q5 - Q9 Five bullets removed from behind holes in east wall of front bedroom
Q10 Bullet from south wall of front bedroom
Q11 Bullet from behind hole designated Number 6 in south wall of front bedroom
Q12 Bullet from behind hole in baseboard on south wall of front bedroom
Q13 Mutilated bullet and bullet fragment from stud behind hole designated Number 3 on south wall of front bedroom
Q14 Bullet from behind hole designated Number 39 in south wall of front bedroom
Q15 Pieces of lead from behind uppermost shot hole in the center of the north wall of front bedroom
Q16 Pieces of lead from lower shot hole in the center of the north wall of front bedroom
Q17 Lead and copper fragments removed from leg of night table in back bedroom

(continued on next page)

Washington, D. C. 20537

REPORT
of the
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

January 6, 1970

YOUR FILE NO.
FBI FILE NO.
LATENT CASE NO.

TO: SAC, Chicago

RE: SGT. DANIEL GROTH, JAMES DAVIS,
JOHN CISZEWSKI, EDWARD CARMODY, ET AL.
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, POLICE OFFICERS - SUBJECTS;
FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED)
MARK CLARK (DECEASED)
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA BREWER
BLAIN ANDERSON
RONALD STACHEL, ET AL. - VICTIMS;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

REFERENCE: Evidence personally delivered to FBI Laboratory on 12-31-69 by SA Robert M. Zimmers
EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: Chicago
SPECIMENS: Q26, portion of door

The listed Q specimen is described in the Laboratory report, which is being furnished separately, and will include disposition of the item.

No latent prints of value present or developed on specimen.

35

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover, Director

THIS REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/25/70

1.

Mrs. ANNIE WHITE, 2237 South Keeler, Chicago, Illinois, was located at the above address and served with a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena calling for her appearance before the Federal Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois at 11:00 AM, February 25, 1970.

Mrs. WHITE advised that she had been employed at the Cook County Hospital since approximately 1951 until December, 1969. She said that her supervisor while employed at the County Hospital was Miss MABEL WILSON. She stated that while employed at Cook County Hospital, she had been a clerk assigned to the Trauma Unit. She further advised that during the week of December 1, 1969, she recalls being ill one day during this week or two days perhaps, and that if she did work during that week, it was the 3:00 to 11:00 shift.

Mrs. WHITE advised that she is presently employed at Sears Roebuck as a sales clerk at Homan Avenue.

33

On 2/24/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs EDWARD F. BLOOM and ROBERT LEE ALEXANDER:EMB Date dictated 2/25/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD [illegible] (Rev. 4-[illegible]-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/25/70

1.

Miss JOAN SOLBECK, Employment Supervisor, Cook County School of Nursing, 1900 West Polk Street, Chicago, advised that a search of their records revealed a personnel file for ANNIE WHITE, 2237 South Keeler, Chicago, Illinois.

Miss SOLBECK advised that ANNIE WHITE entered on duty at the hospital as a clerical employee on November 29, 1951. She stated that the file further revealed that WHITE was terminated on June 2, 1956, and again rehired, exact date unknown. She said that WHITE again terminated her employment at County Hospital on December 29, 1969. Miss SOLBECK said that while employed at Cook County Hospital, WHITE was under the direct supervision of Miss MABEL WILSON, RN, and that her specific duties were that of a clerk assigned to the Trauma Unit. Miss SOLBECK said that the personnel file further revealed that WHITE was born October 11, 1930, at Hartwell, Florida. Her Social Security Number is 354-24-5846. Her telephone number is listed as 762-0129, which is the telephone number of her mother, Mrs. ANNIE B. GURDY, 2237 South Keeler.

Miss SOLBECK advised that from a review of the County payroll records, the following is to be noted regarding WHITE's employment during the week of December 1, 1969:

December 1	Sick
December 2	3:00 to 11:00 shift
December 3	3:00 to 11:00 shift
December 4	Sick
December 5	Sick
December 6	Day off
December 7	Day off
December 8	Vacation day
December 9	Vacation day
December 10	Vacation day

Miss SOLBECK stated that WHITE has recently filled out an application for reinstatement and that this application is presently being considered.

On 2/24/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # ______

by SAs EDWARD F. BLOOM and ROBERT LEE ALEXANDER:EFB Date dictated 2/25/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

F[illegible]ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIO[illegible]

Date 3/3/70

Photographs of interior of 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, were taken in the presence of Special Agents JOHN J. GOLDEN, WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, JR. and CHARLES E. CALFEE and Deputy U. S. Marshal LORENZO FOWLER.

On 2/20/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, JR. and SA JOHN J. GOLDEN / Date dictated 2/27/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/26/70

At 6:00 PM, an autopsy was performed on the body of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON by Dr. CHARLES PETTY, pathologist from Dallas, Texas. The autopsy was performed at the Veterans Administration Hospital, Shreveport, Louisiana. Those in attendance, according to a list provided by JOSEPH KEENE, U. S. Marshal, Shreveport, Louisiana, were as follows:

For the State of Illinois:

1) THOMAS HETT, Assistant State Attorney

2) NICK MOTHERWAY, Assistant State Attorney

3) Dr. JERRY KEARNS, Cook County Coroner's Office

4) Dr. WILLIAM MAVRELIS, Pathologist

For the HAMPTON family:

1) FRANCIS E. ANDREW, Attorney

2) Dr. DAVID SPAIN, Pathologist

3) Dr. EARL CALDWELL, Pathologist

For the U. S. Government:

1) Dr. CHARLES PETTY

2) JERRIS LEONARD, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of Justice

3) JAMES TURNER, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U. S. Department of Justice

4) DONALD E. WALTER, U. S. Attorney, Shreveport, Louisiana

5) JAMES GARDNER, Deputy U. S. Marshal

On 2/16/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File #

30

by SA PATRICK R. COONEY Date dictated 2/20/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/25/70

Photographs were taken during the autopsy of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON at the Veterans Administration Hospital, utilizing a speedgraphic camera with flash attachment and Poloroid adapter. Poloroid color sheet film was used.

On 2/16/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File #

by SA PATRICK E. COONEY Date dictated 2/20/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/26/70

Prior to the autopsy of the body of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON, impressions of the right index finger of HAMPTON were obtained using a common black ink pad and a sheet of white unlined paper.

The purpose of the impressions was to effect identification.

On 2/16/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File #

by SA Patrick R. Cooney Date dictated 2/20/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date February 18, 1970

A piece of the door jamb and wall board behind same was removed from the left side of the door frame of the livingroom at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. The cut of the piece of door jamb was made at 52 inches and 64 inches from the floor.

In addition, to Special Agents JOHN J. GOLDEN and R. B. YADEN, also present were Deputy United States Marshals HENRY YARBROUGH and LORENZO FOWLER, plus Sergeant ERICKSON, Star Number 1014 and Patrolman VENEIGH, Star Number 9073 of the Chicago Police Department.

The above articles were removed at the request of Mr. K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division.

On 2/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs JOHN J. GOLDEN and R.B. YADEN: JJG Date dictated 2/16/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1.

Date February 12, 1970

Dr. EDWARD DREYFUS, Medical Director, Neighborhood Health Center, Office of Economic Opportunity, 529 29th Street, advised he has records reflecting that CHERYL PETERSON, 2359 Humboldt Street, Denver, Colorado, visited this center on August 9, 1969 and was diagnosed as being anemic. She was given two prescriptions on that date which were filled at this center, one pertained to iron tablets and the other to vitamin tablets.

She also visited this center on August 19, 1969 in connection with a possible pregnancy and was advised by the examining doctor she was not pregnant.

Dr. DREYFUS advised that his records reflect she is a Negro female; born May 25, 1951 in the State of Illinois; Social Security Number 330-44-6208; parents, Mr. and Mrs. SOLON PETERSON, 1516 South Kostner, Chicago, Illinois; marital status single.

Dr. DREYFUS stated that CHERYL PETERSON failed to return for a reappointment set for two months after she was last in the center and that mail sent to her by the center to the above Denver address was returned marked addressee moved, no forwarding address.

He advised further that his records do not indicate that CHERYL PETERSON has any connection with the Black Panther Party or FRED A. HAMPTON, MARK CLARK, BRENDA HARRIS, VERLINA A. BREWER, BLAIR J. ANDERSON, RONALD SATCHEL, DEBROAH JOHNSON, LOUIS TRULOCK or HAROLD BELL.

On 2/12/70 at Denver, Colorado File #

by SA RICHARD L. CAMPBELL
SA JOHN H. GALLIE RLC Date dictated 2/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

ROGER A. THOMAS, registered pharmacist, Illinois license 5127769, employed with Par Pharmacy, 1202 East 53rd Street, Chicago, Illinois, advised that prescription number 216313 was prescribed for LYNN FRENCH by Doctor JONES, 5321 South Woodlawn, phone 667-0909. Mr. THOMAS advised that the prescription contained 40 tablets of 40,000 units of penicillin. Mr. THOMAS advised the prescription was signed by LOUIS MARACUS on July 29, 1969.

Mr. THOMAS advised that all prescriptions filed at their pharmacy are filed by number and no records are maintained by name only. Mr. THOMAS advised that he does not recall the following persons obtaining prescriptions at this store:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. ANDERSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL

25

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA FREDERICK F. STAHL and SA C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS FFS Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

LEO HALL, JR., pharmacist, Stineway Drugs, 2400 Madison, Chicago, Illinois, advised that all their prescriptions are filed by number only and no records are kept on names of persons obtaining prescriptions at their store.

Mr. HALL was furnished the following names and advised that he does not recall any of these individuals obtaining prescriptions at their store:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. JOHNSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA FREDERICK F. STAHL and SA C. [illegible] TREVIRANUS FFS Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

WILLIAM J. DAVIS, registered pharmacist, Walgreens Drug Store, 2300 West Madison, advised that their prescriptions are filed in number order only and no records are kept concerning prescriptions in name only.

Mr. DAVIS advised that he has seen FRED A. HAMPTON, deceased, and another member of the Black Panther Party in Walgreens purchasing cigarettes and so forth, but does not recall the following people ever obtaining prescriptions at Walgreens:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. ANDERSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL

23

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA FREDERICK F. STAHL AND SA C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS FFS Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

TOM HETT, States Attorney's Office, 26th and California, Chicago, Illinois, furnished the following list of guns seized on the Black Panther raid at 2337 West Monroe on December 4, 1969:

1. Colt 45 cal automatic 5" blue model 1927 Argentina S/N # 7111

   Shipped June 9, 1969 to M&M Sporting Goods, 3823 N. Richards, Milwaukee, by Casavanova's Milwaukee.

They have the gun on their books but do not have it in their possession and have never reported it stolen. They say they will report it now.

2. Sears Roebuck 20 ga pump 28" blue steel model 21 No serial number so cannot be traced.
3. Springfield 12 ga pump 28" blue steel model 67H No serial number so it cannot be traced.
4. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so it cannot be traced.
5. Browning High Standard 12 ga auto load model standard H15423

   Sold by Browning Mfg. to Sears Roebuck on Oct. 13, 1954. Sears is located at 403 S. State, Chicago, Illinois. Sears does not keep records that far back so unable to trace Further.

6. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so unable to trace.
7. Remington 12 ga pump model 870 S/N 20240V Unable to trace because Remington threw out its records for guns made in 1950.

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

SA FREDERICK F. STAHL and SA C. LEONARD . TREVIRANUS FFS Date dictated 2/13/70

by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

- 1 -

Date 1/31/70

On the early afternoon of January 28, 1970, SA ROBERT W. BUCHER, Elmira, New York FBI Resident Agency, personally turned over to SA WALTER H. RICE, JR., FBI Laboratory, Washington, D. C., at Washington, D. C., the below-described two (2) items, which HERBERT L. MAC DONELL, Davis Road, Corning, New York, had turned over to SA BUCHER on the evening of January 27, 1970, at MAC DONELL's residence in Corning, New York:

#1 One (1) one-inch by three-inch microscope slide labeled "HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Head."

#2 One (1) one-inch by three-inch glass microscope slide labeled "HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Base."

On 1/28/70 at Washington, D. C. File#

by SA ROBERT W. BUCHER Date dictated 1/29/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

MAC DONELL advised that the above-described two slides were of material removed by him from the slug shown in Photos #104, which he had introduced into evidence before the Federal Grand Jury sitting at Chicago, Illinois.

MAC DONELL exhibited a number of color photographs which he stated he had taken in connection with his examination of the residence at 337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, and made the comment that there is something "very pertinent" to be concluded from the examination of the gun powder marks, which appear on the inside of the entrance door to the apartment and further, that he believes that he is the only one who has realized the particular significance of these powder marks.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/31/70

On the afternoon of January 27, 1970, HERBERT L. MAC DONELL, Davis Road, Corning, New York, was contacted at his place of employment in Corning, at which time he advised he possessed certain microscope slides concerning his examination of a Chicago, Illinois residence in December, 1969, and was willing to turn these slides over to the FBI, as he had been directed to do so by an attorney with the United States Department of Justice. Arrangements were made to obtain these slides from MAC DONELL on the evening of January 27, 1970, as he stated they were presently at his residence.

On the evening of January 27, 1970, MAC DONELL turned over to Special Agent ROBERT W. BUCHER of the FBI, two-one-inch by three-inch glass microscope slides, which had been marked and were described by MAC DONELL as follows:

(1) Labled HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Head. These are scrapings from the head of the slug removed from the East wall of the Northeast (living) room of 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois. This by HERBERT L. MAC DONELL, on December 8, 1969. This piece of evidence described by the MAC DONELL listas "F." The mounting medium is Canada Balsam.

(2) Labeled HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Base. A Portion of the wooden fibers removed from the base of the slug described under number one above. The mounting medium is Canada Balsam.

The above two described microscope slides were received from MAC DONELL at his residence, Davis Road, Corning, New York, and a receipt was furnished MAC DONELL at that time.

On 1/27/70 at Corning, New York File #

by SA ROBERT W. BUCHER Date dictated 1/29/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

furnished SA TREVIRANUS. All copies of this inventory were signed by SA TREVIRANUS, ANDREW and KADISH.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date January 23, 1970

1

At the Cook County Courthouse, 26th and California Avenue, Room 452, known as the Special Grand Jury Room, an inventory under order of Cook County Judge JOHN POWERS was instituted of evidence surrendered by FRANCIS E. ANDREW, Attorney, and his Investigative Assistant VICTORY KADISH, representing the Black Panther Party of Illinois.

Also present during the taking of this inventory were the following:

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Department of Justice, Attorney, Civil Rights Division;

JOHN E. RUSSELL, Investigator, Cook County State's Attorney's Office;

NANCY DEMPSEY, from the law office of FRANCIS E. ANDREW, 2156 North Halsted, Chicago.

Miss KADISH advised she was the agent for ANDREW, that she had personally handled the evidence, had assisted ANDREW in securing the evidence from the Black Panther Party (BPP) apartment, 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, on December 4 and 5, 1969, and had originally inventoried the evidence.

It is noted that the inventory of this evidence, which was turned over to the FBI, commenced at 6:10 PM, January 19, 1970, and was completed at 11:58 PM, January 19, 1970.

Following the making of an inventory of this evidence, it was receipted for by SA C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS, FRANCIS E. ANDREW and VICTORY KADISH The original of the receipt was furnished to ANDREW and a copy was

On 1/19/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

SAs C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS, ALTON E. BRAMBLETT,
GERALD C. THEIS, JAMES E. ANDERSON,
by ROBERT T. MURPHY, JR., and LAMONT PUGH Date dictated 1/21/70
CLT

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date January 21, 1970

1

Photos of a vent located in the living room at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, were made January 13, 1970, in the presence of Special Agent WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, Jr., K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, United States Department of Justice, Deputy Marshal LORENZO FOWLER, and HENRY YARBROUGH, and Sergeant JAMES COLLINS, Star Number 1819, Chicago Police Department.

14

On 1/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

SA JOHN J. GOLDEN Date dictated 1/15/70

ndations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 1/14/70

On January 13, 1970, the grating in the floor of the front room of the first floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, was measured.

This grating is located 15¼ inches from the south wall and 52 inches from the west wall of the front room.

The metal frame in the floor measures 20½ inches from east to west and 17 inches from north to south. The grating fitted inside of this frame measures 13½ inches from north to south and 15 inches from east to west. The grating rests on a ½ inch steel lip which reduces the opening to 13 inches by 14½ inches. The drop from the floor containing the grating to the floor below is 115 inches. The basement is full of garbage and debris. Directly under the opening was a large vehicle tire, an old overcoat and several pieces of duct work. The grating lifted out of the frame very easily.

On 1/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA WILLIAM J. DOWNEY Date dictated 1/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date January 16, 1970

On January 9, 1970, photographs were taken of kitchen door and rear entrance and porch of building at 2335 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. Present during filming were Special Agents ROBERT ZIMMERS, EVAN HODGE, WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, JR., JESSE H. QUEEN, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney, and Mrs. MURPHY, resident of this address.

12

On 1/9/70 at Chicago, Illinois File#

by SA JOHN J GOLDEN Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1

Date January 16, 1970

Photographs were taken at 2337 West Monroe on January 7, 1970. Present were Special Agents WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, Jr., FREDERICK F. STAHL, JOHN R. BASSETT, JOHN E. DALLMAN and EVAN HODGE, Visual Information Specialists, Federal Bureau of Investigation HORACE HAFNER and THOMAS PEYTON, K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney and ANTHONY J. SCIAFFRA, Deputy Coroner.

1

On 1/7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA JOHN J GOLDEN Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date January 16, 1970

On January 6, 1970, photographs were taken at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. Present were United States Department of Justice Attorney K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Deputy Coroner ANTHONY J. SCIAFFRA, Special Agent EVAN HODGE, HORACE HAFNER and THOMAS PEYTON, Visual Information Specialists, Special Agents JOHN E. DALLMAN, JOHN R. BASSETT, ROBERT T. MURPHY, FREDERICK F. STAHL, EDWIN PETER KRIEGER, Depty Marshal PETE WILSON, Deputy Marshal GENE BINIAK and MILTON BRANCH, attorney representing the Attorney General of the United States.

10

On 1/6/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA JOHN J. GOLDEN Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/14/70

On January 7, 1970, during a search of the kitchen located in the apartment at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, a white plastic bottle containing pills, prescription number 216313 for LYNN FRENCH, dated July 29, 1969, was located on the kitchen table.

On 1/6/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #.

by SA JOHN E. DALLMAN Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/14/70

On January 6, 1970, during a search of the kitchen located in the apartment at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, a copper bullet jacket was located in the southwest corner of the room. The jacket was under a piece of cloth tacked to the door frame and floor.

On 1/6/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA JOHN E. DALLMAN Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/16/70

A shed attached to the residence located at 2335 West Monroe Street, was examined for the purpose of noting and recording any bullet and/or shot holes.

Pertinent measurements and trajectory patterns were taken. No projectiles were recovered and no items were removed from the premises.

7

On 1/6-7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA EVAN E. HODGE Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/16/70

Pursuant to an on-the-scene examination of the premises located at 2337 West Monroe Street on January 6 and 7, 1970, the following items were removed from the premises for subsequent Laboratory examination:

1. Copper fragment recovered from south west corner of kitchen.
2. Two cartridges recovered from bundle of clothing in entrance hall.
3. Blood sample removed from black eight-drawer dresser in living room.

These items were listed with Deputy Coroner ANTHONY SCIARAFFA, Cook County, Illinois, and with his permission removed from the premises.

On 1/6-7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA EVAN E. HODGE Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/9/70

On December 21, 1969, Officers AUGUST BLUE, Badge 200, and JOHN DENEEN, Badge 8, States Attorneys Police of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois, brought two doors to the address 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. One door was for the front bedroom and one door with one panel missing was for the entrance to the first floor apartment.

Officers BLUE and DENEEN stayed with the doors and did not turn them over to the FBI.

On 12/31/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, JR. Date dictated 1/6/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/8/70

1.

Special Agents ROBERT M. ZIMMERS and EVAN E. HODGE of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory, made an on-the-scene examination of bullet holes found in the apartment located at 2337 West Monroe Street, and made a trajectory pattern to show directions of the shots fired and made pertinent measurements to show the locations of the holes.

A number of items of evidence were collected for subsequent laboratory examination. These items were listed with Deputy Coroner ANTHONY SCIARAFFA, Cook County, Illinois, and with his permission removed from the premises for transmittal to the FBI Laboratory. The items recovered are as follows:

1. Piece of wallboard from inside wall to right of front entrance door.
2. Three pieces of lead from hole in northeast corner of entrance hallway.
3. Wad from bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall.
4. Two pieces of lead from northeast frame of closet in front bedroom.
5. Five bullets removed from behind holes in east wall of front bedroom.
6. Bullet from south wall of front bedroom.
7. Bullet from behind hole designated Number 6 in south wall of front bedroom.
8. Bullet from behind hole in baseboard on south wall of front bedroom.

On 12/22/69; 12/29-31/69; 1/8/70 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs ROBERT M. ZIMMERS and EVAN E. HODGE/EEH Date dictated 1/8/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:
1 - AAG JERRIS LEONARD, Chief of Civil Rights
Division at Chicago
1 - USA, Chicago (Attention: AUSA ROBERT J. BREAKSTONE)

Report of: C. LEONARD TREVILLIAN Office: Chicago
Date: 4/7/70

Field Office File #: Bureau File #:

Title:
SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH;
ET AL -
SUBJECTS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS

Character:
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Synopsis:
Investigation conducted by FBI at BPP apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago; FBI Identification Division and FBI Lab reports set forth. FGJ adjourned 3/12/70 and reconvened 4/7/70.

-P-

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

4. Llama 7.65 millimeter, serial number 443695, was purchased on August 20, 1969, by David Young, member of the Black Panther Party, Milwaukee, Illinois. On February 12, 1970, Douglas Merrick, Service Manager, Stoeger Arms Corporation, Hackensack, New Jersey, advised that the above firearms was shipped on October 10, 1968, to the Ken Goods Center, 49-10 West North Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Mr. Dedich advised that the Ithaca 12 gauge, sawed off 13 inch barrel, serial number 175084, was not registered with the National Firearms Registration, Washington, D. C., or were any of the above firearms registered with the National Firearms Registration file in Washington, D. C.

Mr. Dedich stated that since the Ithaca 12 gauge, sawed off 13 inch shotgun, serial number 175084, was manufactured by Ithaca in 1908, and no records are kept by the company; this does not violate the Federal Firearms Act. Mr. Dedich furnished additional information concerning the above firearms:

Colt 38 caliber, 4½ inch barrel, serial number 219414, is a Navy revolver 38, and was shipped to Simons Hardware, St. Louis, Missouri, on September 12, 1903 - too old to obtain any additional information.

On February 3, 1970, Wayne Wadman, Customer Service, Browning Arms Company, Morgan, Utah, advised that their records show that their Browning shotgun, 12 gauge, bearing serial number H15423, was shipped from their plant at St. Louis, Missouri on October 13, 1954, to the Sears and Roebuck Store, 403 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois - records at Sears and Roebuck Store, 403 South State Street, are destroyed after five years.

SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Peter Dedich, Special Agent, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 36 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois, advised that their investigation concerning the firearms recovered by the States Attorney's Office at 2337 West Monroe Street, reflected that their department succeeded in tracing down only four of the 19 guns recovered. The four traceable firearms are as follows:

1. 32 caliber S and W model 30-1, serial number 730073, was sold on October 29, 1963 to Brown Supply Company, 416 South Adams Street, Peoria, Illinois. On September 19, 1964, Brown Supply Company sold the firearm to H. Mayo, 501 Hamilton Boulevard, Peoria, Illinois. Mayo owns and operates a restaurant, described as a white male, blond hair, blue eyes, 5' 9", 150 pounds.

2. Colt 45 caliber auto pistol, model 1927, serial number 7111. This weapon was sold by Casavanova's, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to M and M Sporting Goods Store, 3823 North Richards, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The firearms was sold to M and M Sporting Goods June 9, 1969, and the stores books and records for the firearms report on their inventory, but have no record of the sale and it is their belief that the gun has been stolen.

3. Carbine 30 caliber M1, serial number 16573, was purchased on August 21, 1969, by Darkin M. Gentry, head of the Black Panther Party, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - AAG JERRIS LEONARD, Chief of Civil Rights
Division at Chicago
1 - USA, Chicago (Attention: AUSA ROBERT J. [illegible])

Report of: C. LEONARD TREVILLANUS Office: Chicago
Date: 4/7/70

Field Office File #: Bureau File #:

Title: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH;
ET AL -
SUBJECTS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS

Character: SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Synopsis: Investigation conducted by FBI at BPP apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago; FBI Identification Division and FBI Lab reports set forth. FGJ adjourned 3/12/70 and reconvened 4/7/70.

-P-

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

4. Llama 7.65 millimeter, serial number 443695, was purchased on August 20, 1969, by David Young, member of the Black Panther Party, Milwaukee, Illinois. On February 12, 1970, Douglas Merrick, Service Manager, Stoeger Arms Corporation, Hackensack, New Jersey, advised that the above firearms was shipped on October 10, 1968, to the Ken Goods Center, 49-10 West North Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Mr. Dedich advised that the Ithaca 12 gauge, sawed off 13 inch barrel, serial number 175084, was not registered with the National Firearms Registration, Washington, D. C., or were any of the above firearms registered with the National Firearms Registration file in Washington, D. C.

Mr. Dedich stated that since the Ithaca 12 gauge, sawed off 13 inch shotgun, serial number 175084, was manufactured by Ithaca in 1908, and no records are kept by the company; this does not violate the Federal Firearms Act. Mr. Dedich furnished additional information concerning the above firearms:

Colt 38 caliber, 4½ inch barrel, serial number 219414, is a Navy revolver 38, and was shipped to Simons Hardware, St. Louis, Missouri, on September 12, 1903 - too old to obtain any additional information.

On February 3, 1970, Wayne Wadman, Customer Service, Browning Arms Company, Morgan, Utah, advised that their records show that their Browning shotgun, 12 gauge, bearing serial number H15423, was shipped from their plant at St. Louis, Missouri on October 13, 1954, to the Sears and Roebuck Store, 403 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois - records at Sears and Roebuck Store, 403 South State Street, are destroyed after five years.

SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Peter Dedich, Special Agent, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 36 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois, advised that their investigation concerning the firearms recovered by the States Attorney's Office at 2337 West Monroe Street, reflected that their department succeeded in tracing down only four of the 19 guns recovered. The four traceable firearms are as follows:

1. 32 caliber S and W model 30-1, serial number 730073, was sold on October 29, 1963 to Brown Supply Company, 416 South Adams Street, Peoria, Illinois. On September 19, 1964, Brown Supply Company sold the firearm to H. Mayo, 501 Hamilton Boulevard, Peoria, Illinois. Mayo owns and operates a restaurant, described as a white male, blond hair, blue eyes, 5' 9", 150 pounds.

2. Colt 45 caliber auto pistol, model 1927, serial number 7111. This weapon was sold by Casavanova's, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to M and M Sporting Goods Store, 3823 North Richards, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The firearms was sold to M and M Sporting Goods June 9, 1969, and the stores books and records for the firearms report on their inventory, but have no record of the sale and it is their belief that the gun has been stolen.

3. Carbine 30 caliber M1, serial number 16573, was purchased on August 21, 1969, by Darkin M. Gentry, head of the Black Panther Party, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/17/70

TOM HETT, States Attorney's Office, 26th and California, Chicago, Illinois, furnished the following list of guns seized on the Black Panther raid at 2337 West Monroe on December 4, 1969:

1. Colt 45 cal automatic 5" blue model 1927 Argentina S/N # 7111

   Shipped June 9, 1969 to M&M Sporting Goods, 3823 N. Richards, Milwaukee, by Casavanova's Milwaukee.

They have the gun on their books but do not have it in their possession and have never reported it stolen. They say they will report it now.

2. Sears Roebuck 20 ga pump 28" blue steel model 21 No serial number so cannot be traced.
3. Springfield 12 ga pump 28" blue steel model 67H No serial number so it cannot be traced.
4. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so it cannot be traced.
5. Browning High Standard 12 ga auto load model standard H15423

   Sold by Browning Mfg. to Sears Roebuck on Oct. 13, 1954. Sears is located at 403 S. State, Chicago, Illinois. Sears does not keep records that far back so unable to trace Further.
6. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so unable to trace.
7. Remington 12 ga pump model 870 S/N 20240V Unable to trace because Remington threw out its records for guns made in 1950.

On 2/10/70 at Chicago., Illinois File #

by SA FREDERICK F. STAHL and SA C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS FFS Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/17/70

TOM HETT, States Attorney's Office, 26th and California, Chicago, Illinois, furnished the following list of guns seized on the Black Panther raid at 2337 West Monroe on December 4, 1969:

1. Colt 45 cal automatic 5" blue model 1927 Argentina S/N # 7111

   Shipped June 9, 1969 to M&M Sporting Goods, 3823 N. Richards, Milwaukee, by Casavanova's Milwaukee.

They have the gun on their books but do not have it in their possession and have never reported it stolen. They say they will report it now.

2. Sears Roebuck 20 ga pump 28" blue steel model 21 No serial number so cannot be traced.

3. Springfield 12 ga pump 28" blue steel model 67H No serial number so it cannot be traced.

4. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so it cannot be traced.

5. Browning High Standard 12 ga auto load model standard H15423

   Sold by Browning Mfg. to Sears Roebuck on Oct. 13, 1954. Sears is located at 403 S. State, Chicago, Illinois. Sears does not keep records that far back so unable to trace Further.

6. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so unable to trace.

7. Remington 12 ga pump model 870 S/N 20240V Unable to trace because Remington threw out its records for guns made in 1950.

On 2/10/70 at Chicago..Illinois File #

by SA FREDERICK F. STAHL and SA C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS FFS Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
March 6, 1970

Mr. Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
U. S. Court House and
Federal Office Building
219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sergeant Daniel R. Groth,
Et Al
Chicago Police Officers
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased)
Et Al - Victims
Summary Punishment -
Civil Rights

Dear Mr. Foran:

Enclosed herewith are two copies of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) concerning information as to the history of all the Black Panther guns recovered by the States Attorney's Office from Fred Hampton's apartment December 4, 1969.

The enclosed information is being furnished in accordance with the request of Mr. Juris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General in Chicago, who is handling the Federal Grand Jury presentation in the above captioned matter.

Very truly yours,

M. W. JOHNSON
Special Agent in Charge

2 - Addressee
① - Chicago
FFS

3. Records of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company in response to Item Number 1 covering the period October 14, 1969, through December 13, 1969, consisting of 13 items together with a Xerox copy of the same consisting of 7 pages.

The subpoena was executed by Special Agent Jerry H. Breidenfeld of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by delivery to Mrs. Rosemary Thomas, Security Department, Illinois Bell Telephone System, 225 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois. At that time Mrs. Thomas advised it would be necessary to secure these records from the warehouse, and that the earliest response would be on or about March 2, 1970.

On March 5, 1970, Mrs. Thomas advised Special Agent Breidenfeld she had received the necessary information in response to the subpoena.

On March 5, 1970, Mrs. Rosemary Thomas made available the telephone toll tickets and bills in response to the subpoena with regard to Telephone Number 243-2017 at 2337 West Monroe Street. Mrs. Thomas advised, however, that only the period from October 14 through December 13, 1969, could be complied with inasmuch as the period just preceding October 14, 1969, is being contested by the subscriber at this time, and she could not make these records available.

In accordance with this subpoena, she explained that the records of the Illinois Bell Telephone System disclosed the identities of the following telephone numbers, and that in the event the identities of other numbers called are desired, it would be necessary that an appropriate subpoena be issued to the various telephone companies covering those cities:

1. Telephone number called: 309-673-2150, called on October 20, 1969, listed to Joe Eugene Fields and Cora Fields, 218 West 7th Street, Peoria, Illinois.

2. Telephone number called: 309-676-4303, called on October 20, 1969, listed to Joe E. Sturdivant, 1834 West Marlin, Peoria, Illinois.

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
March 6, 1970

Mr. Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
U. S. Court House and
Federal Office Building
219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sergeant Daniel R. Groth,
Et Al
Chicago Police Officers
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased)
Et Al - Victims
Summary Punishment -
Civil Rights

Dear Mr. Foran:

Enclosed herewith are two copies of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) concerning information as to the history of all the Black Panther guns recovered by the States Attorney's Office from Fred Hampton's apartment December 4, 1969.

The enclosed information is being furnished in accordance with the request of Mr. Juris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General in Chicago, who is handling the Federal Grand Jury presentation in the above captioned matter.

Very truly yours,

M. W. JOHNSON
Special Agent in Charge

2 - Addressee
① - Chicago
FFS

3. Records of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company in response to Item Number 1 covering the period October 14, 1969, through December 13, 1969, consisting of 13 items together with a Xerox copy of the same consisting of 7 pages.

The subpoena was executed by Special Agent Jerry H. Breidenfeld of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by delivery to Mrs. Rosemary Thomas, Security Department, Illinois Bell Telephone System, 225 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois. At that time Mrs. Thomas advised it would be necessary to secure these records from the warehouse, and that the earliest response would be on or about March 2, 1970.

On March 5, 1970, Mrs. Thomas advised Special Agent Breidenfeld she had received the necessary information in response to the subpoena.

On March 5, 1970, Mrs. Rosemary Thomas made available the telephone toll tickets and bills in response to the subpoena with regard to Telephone Number 243-2017 at 2337 West Monroe Street. Mrs. Thomas advised, however, that only the period from October 14 through December 13, 1969, could be complied with inasmuch as the period just preceding October 14, 1969, is being contested by the subscriber at this time, and she could not make these records available.

In accordance with this subpoena, she explained that the records of the Illinois Bell Telephone System disclosed the identities of the following telephone numbers, and that in the event the identities of other numbers called are desired, it would be necessary that an appropriate subpoena be issued to the various telephone companies covering those cities:

1. Telephone number called: 309-673-2150, called on October 20, 1969, listed to Joe Eugene Fields and Cora Fields, 218 West 7th Street, Peoria, Illinois.

2. Telephone number called: 309-676-4303, called on October 20, 1969, listed to Joe E. Sturdivant, 1334 West Marlin, Peoria, Illinois.

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
March 5, 1970

Mr. Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
United States Court House
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sergeant Daniel R. Groth,
Et Al;
Chicago Police Officers;
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased),
Et Al -
Victims
Summary Punishment -
Civil Rights

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to a subpoena duces tecum from the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, January session, 1970, Number 69GJ3144, which was furnished this office on February 12, 1970.

Enclosed herewith are the following items:

1. The original subpoena, mentioned above, which was directed to the president or other managing officer, Illinois Bell Telephone System, 225 West Randolph, Chicago, Illinois.

2. Two copies of a form which acknowledge the delivery and receipt of the subpoena dated February 13, 1970.

2 - Addressee (Enc. 23)
2- Chicago
CLT

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
March 5, 1970

Mr. Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
United States Court House
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sergeant Daniel R. Groth,
Et Al;
Chicago Police Officers;
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased),
Et Al -
Victims
Summary Punishment -
Civil Rights

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to a subpoena duces tecum from the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, January session, 1970, Number 69GJ3144, which was furnished this office on February 12, 1970.

Enclosed herewith are the following items:

1. The original subpoena, mentioned above, which was directed to the president or other managing officer, Illinois Bell Telephone System, 225 West Randolph, Chicago, Illinois.

2. Two copies of a form which acknowledge the delivery and receipt of the subpoena dated February 13, 1970.

2 - Addressee (Enc. 23)
27- Chicago
CLT

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
February 13, 1970

Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
United States Court House
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sgt. Daniel R. Groth, Et Al;
Chicago Police Officers;
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased),
Et Al - Victims
Summary Punishment - Civil Rights

Dear Mr. Foran:

Enclosed herewith is the May 19, 1969 issue of "The Black Panther" which was quoted from, according to an article which appeared in the "Chicago Tribune" of January 29, 1970, Page 4, Column 7, Section 2B.

This article, dateline Washington, January 28 (AP), pointed out that a Yonkers, New York detective, William E. Grogan, intelligence officer, told a Secret Senate hearing last June that members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) were under orders to fortify their homes and repel any police raids "by any means necessary."

Grogan offered in evidence a statement by Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, addressed "To whom it may concern" described by Newton as a summary of an "executive mandate" that had gone out to Panthers. It said:

"Those who approach our doors in the manner of outlaws, who seek to enter our homes illegally, unlawfully, and in a rowdy fashion, those who kick our doors down with no authority and seek to ransack our homes in violation of

2 - Addressee
1 - Chicago
CLT

6A

It is noted that neither DENNIS CUNNINGHAM nor WARREN WOLFSON, Attorney Spokesman for the victims in this case, contacted, as agreed to, the Chicago Office to permit FBI access to the BPP apartment or interview of the victims, respectively, as of midnight, December 16, 1969.

It is noted that the following were present on December 13, 1969, at the Chicago Office of the FBI when SAC M.W. JOHNSON telephonically contacted USA THOMAS A. FORAN, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department JAMES D. CONLISK, States Attorney EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, as well as WARREN WOLFSON, representing victim BRENDA HARRIS, and attorney DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, representing the Black Panther Party (BPP):

Assistant Special Agent in Charge JOHN M. REED;
Supervisor LEO E. PEDROTTY;
Special Agent C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
February 13, 1970

Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
United States Court House
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sgt. Daniel R. Groth, Et Al;
Chicago Police Officers;
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased),
Et Al - Victims
Summary Punishment - Civil Rights

Dear Mr. Foran:

Enclosed herewith is the May 19, 1969 issue of "The Black Panther" which was quoted from, according to an article which appeared in the "Chicago Tribune" of January 29, 1970, Page 4, Column 7, Section 2B.

This article, dateline Washington, January 28 (AP), pointed out that a Yonkers, New York detective, William E. Grogan, intelligence officer, told a Secret Senate hearing last June that members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) were under orders to fortify their homes and repel any police raids "by any means necessary."

Grogan offered in evidence a statement by Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, addressed "To whom it may concern" described by Newton as a summary of an "executive mandate" that had gone out to Panthers. It said:

"Those who approach our doors in the manner of outlaws, who seek to enter our homes illegally, unlawfully, and in a rowdy fashion, those who kick our doors down with no authority and seek to ransack our homes in violation of

2 - Addressee
1 - Chicago
CLT

6A

It is noted that neither DENNIS CUNNINGHAM nor WARREN WOLFSON, Attorney Spokesman for the victims in this case, contacted, as agreed to, the Chicago Office to permit FBI access to the BPP apartment or interview of the victims, respectively, as of midnight, December 16, 1969.

It is noted that the following were present on December 13, 1969, at the Chicago Office of the FBI when SAC M.W. JOHNSON telephonically contacted USA THOMAS A. FORAN, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department JAMES D. CONLISK, States Attorney EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, as well as WARREN WOLFSON, representing victim BRENDA HARRIS, and attorney DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, representing the Black Panther Party (BPP):

Assistant Special Agent in Charge JOHN M. REED;
Supervisor LEO E. PEDROTTY;
Special Agent C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

1070 PDA 9 8 14

49

10/4/69

TELETYPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

DEMTRI, IS-M.

DAVID DELLINGER, ET AL, ARL - CONSPIRACY.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. RM.

RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED, INSTANT, FRED HAMPTON, CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP, MADE ANNOUNCEMENT TO NEWS MEDIA TODAY, PROTESTING ARREST OF SEVEN MALE NEGROES AT BPP HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO, BY CG PD EARLIER TODAY. HAMPTON ACCUSED THE POLICE OF CONTINUING HARRASSMENT OF BPP AND CALLED FOR MASSIVE RALLY AT THE FEDERAL BUILDING, CHICAGO, ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER SEVEN, NEXT, AT TWELVE NOON BY MEMBERS OF THE BPP AND BY "EVERYONE ELSE" IN THE COMMUNITY. HAMPTON GAVE NO INDICATION THAT ANY VIOLENCE WOULD ACCOMPANY THIS PROTEST DEMONSTRATION.

no

BOBBY SEALE, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, BPP, IS CURRENTLY ON TRIAL IN CAPTIONED A R L CASE, HOWEVER, RALLY CALLED BY HAMPTON APPEARS PRIMARILY DIRECTED AT CG PD, RATHER THAN THE TRIAL OF SEALE. TRIAL OF SEALE AND SEVEN OTHER DEFENDENTS, HOWEVER, WILL

RM

10/4/69

RECONVENE ON OCTOBER SEVEN, NEXT, IN FEDERAL BUILDING,+WHERE HAMPTON'S PROPOSED RALLY WILL TAKE PLACE AND THIS RALLY WILL ADD TO TENSION IN THE COMMUNITY.

USA, MILITARY, SECRET SERVICE, CHICAGO PD, GSA, BUILDING GUARDS, AND ACTING JUDGE, USDC, CHICAGO, ADVISED.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

47

F B I

Date: 9/17/69

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE ____________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP). RM

A SOURCE RELIABLE IN PAST ADVISED TODAY, HE LEARNED FROM FRED HAMPTON, CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS CHAPTER BPP, THAT HAMPTON RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM NATIONAL BPP HEADQUARTERS TO ARRANGE MASS DEMONSTRATION NOON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER TWENTY, NEXT, AT FEDERAL BUILDING, TWO ONE NINE SOUTH DEARBORN, CHICAGO. THEME OF DEMONSTRATION SAID TO BE " WHERE IS BOBBY." HAMPTON INDICATED HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SOLICIT COOPERATION OF CHICAGO PEACE GROUPS, NAMES NOT GIVEN.

BOBBY SEALE, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, BPP, SCHEDULED TO APPEAR CHICAGO, SEPTEMBER TWENTY-FOUR, NEXT, FOR TRIAL

CES

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

ON CHARGES OF CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE ANTI-RIOT LAWS [redacted], SUCH CHARGES ARISING RESULT OF NINETEEN SIXTY-EIGHT DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION.

USA, SECRET SERVICE AND MILITARY ADVISED.

CHICAGO PD AWARE.

Approved: ______________ Sent ______ M Per ______________

CONFIDENTIAL

46

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Springfield, Illinois
September 5, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
PEORIA, ILLINOIS

On August 29, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on August 30, 1969 Russ Meek, a black power advocate from Chicago, Illinois, will speak at the Freedom Hall, 321 West First Avenue, Peoria, Illinois. He advised that Meek was requested to come to Peoria, Illinois by Peoria, Illinois local United Front Group as well as the Peoria Afro-American Black Peoples Federation (PAABPF). He advised that for all practical purposes the Peoria Afro-American Black Peoples Federation is now defunct and that it is now synonymous with the Peoria, Illinois United Front Group.

Source further advised that on August 31, 1969 at approximately 5:00 PM, a Black Panther Party rally is to be held at the Freedom Hall, 321 First Avenue, Peoria, Illinois. He advised that local guest speakers are to be James Polk and Reverend Blaine Ramsey, local coordinators of Peoria, Illinois United Front as well as Horace Jones, a member of Bradley University Black Student Alliance, Peoria, Illinois. He advised that other guest speakers include Black Panther Party members Jewell Cook, Field Secretary, and Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, officers of the Illinois State Black Panther Party. He advised that both Cook and Hampton are from the Chicago, Illinois area. He advised that local Peoria, Illinois Black Panther Party members Henry Howard, and Mark Clark, are also to speak at the rally.

Characterizations of the Black Panther Party and the Peoria Afro-American Black Peoples Federation appear in the appendix

advised that he does not expect any violence at the rally but due to the militant nature of the Black Panther Party, problems could arise and violence could erupt.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and de-
classification

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
PEORIA, ILLINOIS

On August 30, 1969 mentioned above, advised that there was no meeting held at the Freedom Hall, 321 First Avenue, Peoria, Illinois. He advised that Russ Meek did not speak in Peoria, Illinois as scheduled and stated that either Meek declined the invitation or that Meek is to speak tomorrow, August 31, 1969, in conjunction with the Black Panther Party rally. He advised that he doubts seriously that James Polk or Reverend Blaine Ramsey, local co-ordinators of the Peoria, Illinois United Front, will speak at the BPP rally. He advised that the purpose of the BPP rally is to recruit members from the Peoria, Illinois area in order to form an organization in Peoria, Illinois. He advised he still expects no violence at the BPP rally.

On August 31, 1969, mentioned above, advised that members of the Black Panther Party in Peoria, Illinois, held a rally at Freedom Hall, 321 First Avenue, Peoria, Illinois. He advised that the only scheduled guest speaker who spoke other than local Peoria, Illinois Black Panther Party members was Reverend Blaine Ramsey, local co-ordinator of the Peoria, Illinois United Front. He advised that James Polk, Fred Hampton, Jewell Cook and Russ Meek did not speak at the rally and to the best of his knowledge was not present in Peoria on August 31, 1969. He advised that approximately one hundred persons attended the rally. He advised that the crowd consisted mainly of Negro juveniles, curiousity seekers and approximately six white persons. He advised that news reporters were admitted at the rally and all males were searched by two young local Peoria Black Panther Party members.

further advised that Reverend Blaine Ramsey, co-ordinator of the Peoria, Illinois United Front, gave support to the Black Panther Party group in their constitutional right to speak and meet but disagreed with the Black Panther philosophy of violence in accomplishing Negro equality. He advised that Reverend Ramsey, who was first to speak at the rally, left the rally as soon as his speech was terminated. He advised that Horace Jones asked for the black people to lend support to the

---

United Front as well as the Panthers in order to achieve black leadership in the community. He advised that local Peoria Black Panther Party members Henry Howard and Mark Clark spoke on the Black Panther Party beliefs as well as their platform, program and rules of the party. He advised that the rally was very peaceful and no disturbances or violence arose as a result of the rally.

On September 2, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that at 5:00 PM on August 31, 1969, a rally was held at the Freedom Hall, 321 First Avenue, Peoria, Illinois, which was sponsored and promoted by affiliates of the Black Panther Party. Two members of the Black Panther Party in Peoria, Illinois, Henry Howard and Mark Clark, are currently engaging in recruiting activities for the Black Panthers and are considered vanguards for the Black Panthers to acquaint area Negroes with the purposes and aims of the Black Panthers. He advised that approximately one hundred area Negroes attended the Black Panther Party rally on August 31, 1969. He advised that the first speaker was Reverend Blaine Ramsey of the War Chapel, AME Church, Peoria, Illinois, who spoke about the freedom of speech and assembly but voiced disagreement with the Black Panther philosophy of violence to accomplish Negro equality. Reverend Ramsey remarked however that the voice of the Panthers should be heard and that their ideas and thoughts should be considered as long as they face issues on a democratic basis and present common issues in an open and peaceful manner rather than resort to violence and disruption. He advised another speaker at the rally was Horace Jones, a member of the United Front and the Black Student Alliance at Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois. He further advised that he is not aware of any Negro from the Peoria, Illinois area with the exception of Mark Clark, who has actually joined the Black Panther Party. He advised that Henry Howard is from California and supposedly came to Peoria, Illinois in order to recruit Negroes into the Black Panther Party. He advised that Clark, a long time Peoria resident, has been selling the Black Panther paper within the Negro districts of Peoria for approximately two weeks and is concentrating on the Negro youth. He further publicized that if the area Negro organizations such as the NAACP, United Front, and the Human Relations Commission failed to make any inroads for Negro equality in housing, the building trades, etc. then the appeal of the Black Panther Party will become a reality with the young Negroes bent on direct action and violence.

advised that the rally was a peaceful rally.

The September 1, 1969 issue of the Peoria Journal Star newspaper, a local Peoria, Illinois newspaper, contained an article captioned"Chicago Panthers Fail to Show Up Here". The article reveals that approximately one hundred twenty five persons, almost all Negro, attended a Black Panther Party rally on August 31, 1969 at the Freedom Hall located at First and State Street, Peoria, Illinois. The article further revealed that Chairman Henry Howard explained that the visiting Chicago leaders of the Black Panther Party expected for the rally had been detained and then introduced the Reverend Blaine Ramsey and Horace Jones, who gave the principal talks at the rally. Reverend Ramsey is quoted as saying that the United Front, a Peoria civil rights coalition organization, had taken the position of supporting the constitutional freedom of the Panthers to meet and speak. Ramsey further stated that he stressed that the goals of the black people require peace and order from within and without and "he who lives by the gun and sword shall die by the gun and sword". The article further reveals that Henry Howard stated that the Panthers teach that there is a combination of racism and exploitation and that blacks first must realize what is being done to them. The news article further reveals that Horace Jones exhorted the black community to accept leadership from the United Front and from the Panthers and not to settle for nickels and dimes. Fred Hulbert discussed applications for the theory of karate

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
PEORIA, ILLINOIS

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther", which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service", states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "...we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

2

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
PEORIA, ILLINOIS

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
PEORIA, ILLINOIS

PEORIA AFRO-AMERICAN BLACK PEOPLES FEDERATION (PAABPF)

On January 7, 1969, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Peoria Afro-American Black Peoples Federation (PAABPF) is a local all Negro Peoria, Illinois organization. The PAABPF holds weekly meetings every Sunday at their "Freedom Hall", 321st Avenue, Peoria, Illinois. He advised the purpose of the PAABPF is to organize the Negroes in order to help themselves. The PAABPF emphasizes to its members that black is beautiful and preaches to its members that before the Negro can advance and gain total freedom, the Negro must first achieve self respect, dignity, and pride.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

...SAC
...ASAC
...CC
...ASST CC
...STENO. S
...C-#1
...C-#2
...C-#3
...C-#4
...C-#5
...C-#6
...C-#7
...S-#1
...S-#2
...S-#3
...S-#4
✓..S-#5

45

FBI

Date: 9/5/69

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SPRINGFIELD

SUBJECT : BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
PEORIA, ILLINOIS
RM

One copy each of this LHM has also been furnished to USA, Springfield; United States Secret Service, Springfield, Illinois; NISO, Chicago, Illinois; OSI, Rantoul, Illinois, and 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

JDF:

44

[illegible]

SS SPRNGFLD

....SAC
....ASAC
~~....SS~~
....ASST C
....STENO
....C-#1
....C-#2
....C-#3
....C-#4
....C-#5
....C-#6
....C-#7
....S-#1
....S-#2
....S-#3
....S-#4
~~....S-#5~~

TO DIRECTOR AND CHICAGO

FROM SPRINGFIELD

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, PEORIA, ILLINOIS. RM.

ON AUGUST TWENTYNINE, INSTANT, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED ON AUGUST THIRTY, NEXT, RUSS MEEK, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS BLACK POWER ADVOCATE, WILL SPEAK AT THE FREEDOM HALL, THREE TWO ONE WEST FIRST AVENUE, PEORIA, ILLINOIS. MEEK WAS REQUESTED TO COME TO PEORIA, ILLINOIS BY LOCAL UNITED FRONT COORDINATORS, AS WELL AS THE PEORIA AFRO AMERICAN BLACK PEOPLES FEDERATION (PAABPF), WHICH IS NOW SYNONYMOUS WITH THE UNITED FRONT GROUP.

SAME SOURCE FURTHER ADVISED ON AUGUST THIRTYONE, NEXT AT APPROXIMATELY FIVE P.M., A BLACK PANTHER PARTY RALLY IS TO BE HELD AT THE FREEDOM HALL, THREE TWO ONE FIRST AVENUE, PEORIA ILLINOIS. THE GUEST SPEAKERS ARE TO BE JAMES POLK AND REV.

END OF PAGE ONE

BLAINE RAMSEY, LOCAL COORDINATORS OF PEORIA, ILLINOIS UNITED FRONT AS WELL AS HORACE JONES, A BRADLEY BLACK STUDENT ALLIANCE MEMBER. BLACK PANTHER PARTY MEMBERS, HENRY HOWARD AND MARK CLARK OF PEORIA, ILLINOIS, AS WELL AS JEWELL COOK, FIELD SECRETARY AND FRED HAMPTON, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE CHICAGO BLACK PANTHER PARTY ARE ALSO MAIN SPEAKERS AT THE RALLY.

SOURCES ADVISE THEY DO NOT EXPECT ANY VIOLENCE BUT DUE TO MILITANT NATURE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY, VIOLENCE COULD ERUPT.

END PAGE TWO

43

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. [redacted]

Chicago, Illinois

AUG 29 1969

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The BPP and the Students For a Democratic Society (SDS) are described on the appendix page attached hereto. All sources utilized in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

On August 27, 1969 provided the following:

Officials of the BPP decided that that organization should publicly disavow any connection with SDS and SDS National Action Day in Chicago, Illinois, on October 11, 1969.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois
Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois
Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Declassified per 6607 4/4/75
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded From~~
~~Automatic Downgrading~~
~~and Declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ". . . we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

CONFIDENTIAL

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. MICHAEL KLONSKY, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power and does not support the policies of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

42

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - Secret Service, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois (Via Courier)
1 - NISO, Chicago (RM)
1 - OSI, Chicago (Via Courier)

Report of: SA DANIEL F. BODINE Office: CHICAGO
Date: 8/ 21 /69

Field Office File #: Bureau File #:

Title:

RONALD JEROME SATCHEL

Character:

RACIAL MATTERS - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Synopsis:

SATCHEL, utilizing alias DOC, continues active within the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois. Birth date verified and SATCHEL continues as Minister of Health on the Central Committee of the Illinois Black Panther Party. ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

- P -

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from
Automatic downgrading
and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor con

[redacted]

DETAILS:

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is attached as an appendix to this report.

I. Current Background

A. Date and Place of Birth

A review of the records of the State of Ohio, Department of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics, Cleveland, Ohio, reflect that RONALD JEROME SATCHEL, Certificate of Birth Number 11505, discloses that he was born June 22, 1950, as the illegitimate child of CLARA SATCHEL, Cleveland, Ohio.

B. Residence

During July, 1969, confidential source verified that SATCHEL continues to reside at 6846 South Clyde, Chicago, Illinois.

C. Occupation

During July, 1969, confidential source advised that SATCHEL has no gainful employment but devotes full-time to his position as Minister of Health for the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois.

D. Arrests

On July 29, 1969, a review of the Chicago Police Department files in the name RONALD J. SATCHEL disclose no arrests since March 25, 1969, but the record disclosed that the following dispositions took place on April 3, 1969:

[redacted]

The January 30, 1969, arrests were aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct, which resulted in one year's probation and a $90 fine on the aggravated assault and disorderly conduct charges but the charge of resisting arrest was dismissed.

The March 25, 1969, arrest for unlawful use of a weapon and possession of an unregistered gun which were also dismissed.

The Chicago Police Department file discloses that SATCHEL had been assigned Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Number 756 977 G.

II. Current Activities

On March 26, 1969, 1 advised that SATCHEL was one of several Black Panther Party members arrested by the Chicago Police Department in possession of unregistered weapons.

On April 1, 1969, . advised SATCHEL continues to carry a pistol described as a .32 automatic.

On April 2, 1969, advised that SATCHEL is one of the Black Panther Party members who is always armed and is always looking to assist fellow members with any trouble that they may encounter.

On April 2, 1969, advised that RONALD SATCHEL is utilizing the alias, "DOC", inasmuch as his current Black Panther Party title is Minister of Health.

On April 15, 1969, advised that as of April 14, 1969, SATCHEL was designated permanent Minister of Health for the Black Panther Party.

On April 19, 1969, advised that SATCHEL continues to attend all Black Panther Party functions and is one of the most active members of the party.

On April 22, 1969, advised that records furnished to Black Panther Party Headquarters designated SATCHEL as the official Minister of Health.

On May 22, 1969, advised that RONALD SATCHEL was one of thirty Black Panther Party members attending a party for the Black Panther Party on May 18, 1969.

On June 3, 1969, advised that RONALD SATCHEL regularly appears at Black Panther Party Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, prior to 6:00 a.m., each day.

On June 4, 1969, during a raid on Black Panther Party Headquarters, Chicago, Illinois, by federal agents in an effort to apprehend a federal fugitive believed to be on the premises, an Application for a State of Illinois Firearm Owner's Identification Application was located on the premises and it contains the following information:

Name	RONALD JEROME SATCHEL
Residence	6846 South Clyde
Social Security Number	354-42-2605

On July 3, 1969, advised that a couple members of the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois, headed by SATCHEL, are attempting to obtain space to operate a medical clinic for underprivileged Negroes.

On July 7, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was one of the Black Panther Party speakers to address a group assembled at Garfield Park, Chicago, Illinois, on July 4, 1969, and he spoke of police (pig) harassment of the Black Panther Party, Chicago.

On July 8, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was attempting to obtain the premises, 3852 West Madison, to set up space for a medical clinic.

On July 8, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was attempting to formulate a medical program to handle the following three categories:

1) First aid classes.

2) Establishment of community health centers in the black community.

3) Dealing with poor health which continues to be predominant in black communities.

On July 8, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was on the duty roster for the Black Panther Party for the week beginning July 6, 1969.

On July 15, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was attempting to establish a medical program entitled, "People's Medical Care Center, Inc.", with the ultimate goal of incorporating it as a non-profit corporation.

On July 29, 1969, advised that SATCHEL and several other members of the Black Panther Party, Chicago, observed a white male parked with a Negro female on Chicago's west side and it was not until a fellow member of the Black Panther Party talked SATCHEL out of doing physical harm to the white male that SATCHEL released the individual.

On July 29, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was one of several Black Panther Party members that traveled on July 26, 1969, to East Moline, Illinois, on official Black Panther Party business.

On August 4, 1969, advised that SATCHEL is working full-time at his position as Minister of Health in an effort to establish the Black Panther Party health clinic in Chicago.

On August 7, 1969, advised that SATCHEL is making personal contact with various Negro doctors in the Chicago area in an effort to obtain professional support for the Black Panther Party health center.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

41

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1- U.S. Secret Service, Chicago (Via Courier)
1- Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston (Via Courier)
1- OSI (Via Courier)
1- NISO (Registered Mail)

Report of: SA ALAN R. STEPHENS
Office: Chicago
Date: AUG 8 1969

Field Office File #:
Bureau File #:

Title:
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
CHICAGO DIVISION

Character:
RACIAL MATTERS - ORGANIZATION

Synopsis:

Headquarters of the Chicago Black Panther Party (BPP) Chapter continues to be located at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Chicago area branches have been consolidated into the West Suburban Branch of the BPP. A branch currently exists in Rockford, Illinois. Sources report approximately 30-40 active members with numerous sympathizers in the Chicago BPP Chapter. During June and July, 1969, Chicago Panthers have been involved in acts of violence wherein police officers have been wounded. In June, 1969, 16 Panther members were indicted by Cook County on charges ranging from kidnapping to conspiracy to commit murder. During early June, 1969, a raid was conducted by the FBI on Panther headquarters. Panther headquarters was found, as a result of the raid, to contain numerous weapons, ammunition and gas masks. Sources report Chicago chapter deeply in debt, with membership on the decline as a result of continued investigation and arrests by the Chicago Police Department and FBI. ALL MEMBERS OF THE BPP MUST BE CONSIDERED POSSIBLY ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

- P -

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic down-
grading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Origin, Purposes and Location of BPP Chapters 2
  A. Origin 2
  B. Purposes, Aims and Rules of Chicago BPP Chapter 3
  C. Location of BPP Branches 7

II. Identity of Leaders and Membership Information 7
  A. Officers of Chicago Chapter BPP 8
  B. Officers of West Suburban Chapter BPP 10
  C. Officers of Rockford Branch BPP 11

III. Information Regarding Violent Acts, Weapons, Plans and Aims of BPP 11-25

IV. Publications 26

V. Activities 27-31

VI. BPP Connections with other Militant Groups 31

VII. Finances 34

VIII. Contacts with CP or other Groups 36

DETAILS:

Characterizations of the organizations set forth below are attached as an appendix hereto:

Black Panther Party (BPP)

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

Progressive Labor Party (PLP)

I. ORIGIN, PURPOSES AND LOCATION OF BPP CHAPTERS

A. Origin

The Chicago Chapter of the BPP was organized on August 25, 1968, at a meeting at 6110 South Dorchester Street, Chicago, Illinois. This meeting was attended by approximately 10 Negro males. The purpose of the meeting was to dissolve the then current Chicago branch of SNCC and to organize a Chicago Chapter of the BPP.

8/27/68)

The BPP did not have a headquarters until space was acquired at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, in November, 1968. The space acquired was the second and third floor of the building at the above address.

11/20/68)

Source advised the Illinois Bell Telephone Company assigned telephone number 243-8276 to the BPP above address.

3/27/69)

B. Purposes, Aims and Rules of Chicago BPP Chapter

On November 1, 1968, BOBBY LEE RUSH, Deputy Minister of State, Chicago BPP, flew to National Headquarters, Oakland, California, where he met with ELDRIDGE and KATHLEEN CLEAVER and BOBBY GEORGE SEALE. The CLEAVERs and SEALE are members of the Central Committee of the National BPP.

On November 4, 1968, RUSH returned to Chicago and stated that the Chicago Chapter would follow the policy of the National BPP in all regards.

11/7/68)

On May 1, 1969, Chicago Chapter of BPP advised BPP members the following ten points continue to reflect "What We Want - What We Believe":

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our black community.
2. We want full employment for our people.
3. We want an end to the robbery by the white men of our black community.
4. We want decent housing fit for shelter of human beings.
5. We want education for our people that will expose the true nature of this decadent American society.
6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

7. We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in Federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black community as defined by the constitution of the United States.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace, and as our major political objective, a United Nations supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

5/2/69)

On May 1, 1969, the Chicago chapter of the BPP circulated the following Rules of the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois:

Every member of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY throughout this country of racist America must abide by these rules as functional members of this party. CENTRAL COMMITTEE members, CENTRAL STAFFS, and LOCAL STAFFS, including all captions subordinate to either national, state, and local leadership of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY will enforce these rules. Length of suspension or other disciplinary action necessary for violation of these rules will depend on national decisions by national,

state or state area, and local committees and staffs where said rules or rules of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY were violated.

Every member of the party must know these verbatum by heart, and apply them daily. Each member must report any violation of these rules to their leadership or they are conter-revolutionary and are also subjected to suspension by the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

THE FOLLOWING RULES ARE:

1. No party member can have narcotics or weed in his possession while doing party work.
2. Any party member found shooting narcotics will be expelled from this party.
3. No party member can be drunk while doing daily party work.
4. No party member will violate rules relating to office and meetings of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, ANYWHERE.
5. No party member will use, or fire a weapon of any kind unnecessarily or accidentally at anyone other than the enemy.
6. No party member can join any other army force other than the BLACK LIBERATION ARMY.
7. No party member can have a weapon in his possession while drunk or loaded off narcotics or weed.
8. No party member will commit any crimes against other party members or BLACK people at all, and cannot steal or take from the people, not even a needle or a piece of thread.

9. When arrested BLACK PANTHER MEMBERS will give only name and address and will sign nothing. Legal first aid must be understood by all Party members.
10. The Ten Point Program and platform of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must be known and understood by each Party member.
11. Party communications must be national and local.
12. The 10-10-10 program should be known by all members and also understood by all members.
13. All Finance officers operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.
14. Each person submit report of daily work.
15. Each Sub-Section Leader, Section Leader, and Captain must submit Daily reports of work.
16. All Panthers must learn to operate and service weapons correctly.
17. All Leadership personnel who suspends or expells a member must submit this information to the Editor for the newspaper pertaining to suspension, so that it will be published in the paper and known by all chapters and branches.
18. Political Education Classes are manditory.
19. Only office personnel assigned to respective offices each day should be there. All others are to sell papers and do Political work out in the community, including Captains, Section Leaders and etc.
20. COMMUNICATION--all chapters must submit weekly reports in writing to the National Headquarters.
21. All Branches must implement First Aid and/or Medical Cadres.
22. All Chapters, Branches, and components of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must submit a monthly Financial Report to the Ministry of Finance and also the Central Committee.

23. Everyone in leadership positions must read no less than two hours per day to keep abreast of the changing political situation.
24. No chapter or branch shall accept grants, poverty funds, money, or any other aid from any government agency without contacting the National Headquarters.
25. All chapters must adhere to the policy and ideology laid by the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.
26. All Branches must submit weekly reports in writing to their respective Chapters.

5/2/69)

C. Location of BPP Branches

West Suburban Branch

Branches of the Chicago BPP previously reported at Argo, Harvey and Maywood, Illinois, have all been consolidated into the West Suburban Branch. This branch has no office as such, but uses the Chicago Chapter Office at 2350 West Madison Street.

7/69)

Rockford, Illinois Branch

There is no Rockford, Illinois BPP branch office as such; however, meetings have been held at 529 Pierpoint Avenue, Rockford. This address is the location known as the House of Simba or House of Bo Simba.

7/69)

II. IDENTITY OF LEADERS AND MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION

A. Officers of Chicago Chapter BPP

As of July, 1969, the following individuals listed in alphbetical order were reported by sources as officers of the Central Staff of the Chicago Chapter BPP:

BARKER, JEWEL CAMPBELL, born November 3, 1927. Allegedly serves as a sponsor or counselor to the Illinois BPP.

BOSTON, TED, true name is ROBERT STANLEY WHITE. BOSTON born September 7, 1945. Field Secretary for Illinois BPP.

BROOKS, BILLY LAMAR, born July 18, 1945. BROOKS commonly known as "CHE" and is the Deputy Minister of Education Illinois BPP.

CALVIN, WILLIE JAMES, born March 6, 1948, Captain of Defense of Illinois BPP.

CAMPBELL, ANN. CAMPBELL is Communications Secretary, Illinois BPP.

CHARLES, EUGENE, JR., born May 20, 1948, and is Lieutenant of Information, Illinois BPP.

COLLINS, AZALA, born August 23, 1951, and is Lieutenant of Health, Illinois BPP.

COOK, JURLD L., born November 17, 1941, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP. COOK, commonly known as JEWEL, is currently Acting Deputy Chairman.

EDWARDS, ROSIE ANN, born January 4, 1938, Counselor of Women.

GADDIS, HENRY DANTON, born March 2, 1950, and is Field Lieutenant, Illinois BPP.

GRAY, JOAN, born July 29, 1940, and is Field Lieutenant, Illinois BPP.

HAMPTON, FRED, born August 30, 1948, and is Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP. HAMPTON currently incarcerated on conviction of robbery receiving two to five year sentence.

KING, YVONNE, Central Secretary, Illinois BPP.

JUNIOR, NATHANIEL WALTER, born October 21, 1946, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP.

LATSON, SAMUEL LEROY, born December 26, 1949, Field Lieutenant, Illinois BPP.

LEE, ROBERT E., born December 16, 1942, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP.

MAY, CHRISTINA DARLENE, born October 20, 1949, Deputy Minister of Culture and Acting Deputy Minister of Finance.

MC CARTHY, MICHAEL, Lieutenant of Education, Illinois BPP.

O'NEAL, WILLIAM MC KINLEY, born December 9, 1949, Chief of Staff, Illinois BPP.

RUSH, BOBBY LEE, born November 23, 1946, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP.

SANKEY, BARBARA ANN, born February 7, 1949, Lieutenant of Finances, Illinois BPP.

SATCHEL, RONALD J., born June 22, 1950, SATCHEL, commonly known as "DOC", is the Deputy Minister of Health.

THOMAS, HENRY, Field Lieutenant, Illinois BPP.

TYLER GERRY L., born June 1, 1951, Illinois Distribution Manager of the BPP paper.

WALLS, RUFUS C., born September 6, 1940. WALLS, commonly known as "CHAKA", is Deputy Minister of Information, Illinois BPP.

B. Officers of West Suburban Chapter BPP

As of July, 1969, the following individuals listed in alphabetical order were reported by sources as officers of the West Suburban Chapter of Illinois BPP:

ALLEN, WALTER, commonly known as "COUNT", is Captain of Finance.

BRUCE, ROBERT, born November 28, 1947, is Chairman.

HAMMACK, LOUIS JAMES, also known as "PETE", born February 13, 1949, is Captain of Information.

HARVEY, MERRILL DENNIS, born July 4, 1946, Captain of Defense.

Sources have advised it is not possible at this time to estimate the number of members in the West Suburban Branch since it is almost inactive due to the recent arrests and indictments of BPP members set forth later in this report.

These sources have all advised during July, 1969, that it would be impossible at this time to furnish any sort of membership list because of recent police action by the Chicago Police Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These sources did state there were numerous sympathizers.

7/69
7/69
7/69
7/69)

C. Officers of Rockford Branch BPP

During July, 1969, the following individuals listed in alphabetical order were reported by sources as officers of the Rockford Branch, Illinois BPP:

BELL, HAROLD KEITH, born November 29, 1946, Captain of Defense.

HAWKINS, CHARLES LARRY, born July 31, 1951, Field Lieutenant.

HUNTER, DELRIDGE LAVERN, born January 8, 1941, Captain of Education.

POWELL, LINCOLN CHARLES, born January 26, 1942, Captain of Information.

The sources have reported that the Rockford Branch has approximately ten to fifteen members. The sources also have advised the Rockford Chapter follows the philosophy of MAO TSE TUNG and programs of the National Chapter BPP.

7/22/69
7/22/69)

III. INFORMATION REGARDING VIOLENT ACTS, WEAPONS, PLANS AND AIMS OF BPP

Source advised GEORGE SAMS, JR., a federal fugitive wanted for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for a crime of murder, was being secreted at BPP headquarters, Chicago.

6/3 and 4/69)

During the early morning hours of June 4, 1969, Special Agents of the FBI conducted a raid on panther headquarters in an effort to locate and apprehend GEORGE SAMS, JR. Eight panthers at the headquarters at the time were arrested and charged with harboring. SAMS was not found on the premises.

During a search of the headquarters following the arrest, Special Agents seized 13 guns, a large quantity of ammunition, swords, gas masks, office machinery, books, a quantity of records, posters and BPP literature.

Found during the search of panther headquarters was the following plan set forth in its entirety concerning the suggested plan for the complete breakdown of the Illinois power structure:

Suggested Plan for the Complete Break Down of the State of Ill. Power Structure.

Problem:

Complete victory for People Revolution in Ill.

Theory:

To cause Chotic condition, and place pig in position to take repressive measures toward the masses of the people, and thereby chase the mass of people into the revolutionary's camp. Plan to be used when party reaches this level.

Destruction of: (All hit at same time)

A. Communication (Blame Pig)

1. Telephone

2. Radio

3. T.V.

B. Power (Blame Pig)

1. Light

2. Gas

C. Industrial Complex (Blame Pig)

1. Factories, etc.

D. Food Distribution (Blame Pig)

1. Non-Perishables (first)

2. Perishables (second)

E. Transportation

1. Inner city (State) bus Depot, train Depot (tracks), buses, taxi.

2. Outer city (State) /Same as inner7

3. Air-trans, airports, air fields

4. Water-trans, (Docks)

5. Hy-ways

6. Gas stations (all fuel)

Execution of: (All hit at same time)

A. City Officials (State)

1. Admin. (top)

2. Police (rank)

3. Military (rank)

a. State

b. Federal

4. Dangerous elements in community, petty leaders of enemy ideology.

Other Areas:

A. Gun Shops (Collected for distribution)

B. Police Storage (to deprive pig and supply party)

C. Military Storage (to deprive pig, Joliet, Ill. ammo)

D. Cripple Fire Dept.

Other Suggestions: Need for a Chapter in North Chicago (Great Lake Naval Training Center, and its near Ft. Sheridan), East St. Louis, Ill. (Scotts A.F.B.) The basic job to disrupt military organization before they can mobilize.

Get the Plans of city's sewage system through bribery, extortion or any means necessary.

A. Secure place for Headquarters.

SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION OF SECTION

I. Problem:

  A. Separation from Main Body.

II. Cause:

  A. Movement to present level.

III. Theory:

  A. Section to function as physical independent arm of Main Body and as one of the overall arms of the Main Body.

IV.. Practice:

  A. Commander

  B. Intelligence

    1. Internal

    2. External

  C. Political

  D. Medical

  E. Communications

  F. Supply

A, B, C, D, E, and F must receive their training from the respective staffs of the Main Body, and come back to section and function in that capacity in their respective sections.

NOTES

A. **Commander:** Section Leader, See that section function smoothly.

B. **Intelligence:**

- a. Internal: To know the weakness and strength of each member, and estimate his actions in any given situation. To expose all counter-revolutionary forces and actions within the section. This position is to remain secret from all members except Section Leader and high level of Main Body.
- b. External: To gather intelligence material in sectional area.

C. **Political:** (Sub-Section Leader)
Teaching and maintaining a high level of Political Ideology at sectional level of party.

D. **Medical:** Primary job, aiding injured member of section. Secondary job, aiding the injured of the mass of the people.

E. **Communications:** Handling communications between Section and Main Body and within Section and (in grave times) between people and section.

F. **Supply:** Collection and distribution of supplies.

OTHER SUGGESTIONS

1. Comrade Court: To handle minor violations (Major violations are handled by Main Body), Democratic Court.

2. Sectional Citations: To be given to sections who are outstanding in relating to the people, sell papers and etc. This will build Sectional Historical pride and increase morale.

3. Sectional Title Namer: Example night fighters, Big Black five, etc. This will also help build morale.

MILITARY TRAINING SCHEDULE

A four week mandatory class for all members (Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday) with the exclusion of all non-members. Two classes should be conducted by a small military staff, classes conducted expressing party ideology, and stressing military discipline at all times! Upon the entering of the classroom of the military instructor all talking should cease and all trainers should take a firm attentative standing position and remain in this manner until given the order to be seated. All classes or class activities should begin with: All Power the People and victory to the People's Revolution. The main purpose of the class is to give every party member a basic practical knowledge of the military phase of the Peoples' struggle. There should be no absenteeism from the Political Education Classes (no excuses), reason being a military mind without a people's ideology is a hired killer and the people don't need no more pigs. Classes should be conducted in an orderly manner at all times.

STRUCTURE OF THE CLASSES

I. Discipline

A. Discipline is the exact execution of orders resulting from an intelligent, willing obedience rather than one based solely upon habit or fear. Discipline is necessary to secure orderly action which alone can triumph over the seemingly impossible conditions of battle. The party members mu t be able to recognize and face fear because fear is the enemy of discipline. Fear unchecked will lead to panic and a unit that panics is no longer a discipline unit but a mob. There is no sane person who is without fear, but with good discipline and high morale all can face danger. Punishment of individual members for breacher of discipline is sometimes necessary, but only to reform or eliminate those who are unfit to serve the People's Revolution.

1. To be learned verbatim and understood thoroughly.
    a) Discipline of the Party (Redbook)
    b) 3 Main Rules of Discipline (Redbook)
    c) 8 Points of Attention
2. Chain of Command
    a) Trying to understand problems with self first, and if no success, go to next ranking member.
3. Military Respect
    a) People Respect
    b) Party Respect
    c) Rank Respect

II. Integration of Military and Political Ideology

1. Correcting the false idea that there is a contradiction between military and political ideology.
2. Teaching that the People's Liberation Army cannot exist without the people, the people have nothing without a socialist ideology, so the people is socialist ideology, the People's Liberation Army must have a socialist ideology in order to relate to the people, if its to serve the people as their military arm.

III. Weapontry

A. Knowledge Of

1. Range
2. Rate of Fire
3. Loading
4. Unloading

  5. External Parts
     a) Care
  6. Internal Parts
     a) Care
     b) Disassemble (time limit)
     c) Assemble (time limit)

B. Handgun
  1. Holding
  2. Breathing
  3. Pulling trigger

C. Rifle
  1. Correct position
  2. Holding (shoulder and arms)
  3. Breathing
  4. Pulling trigger

D. Shotgun
  1. Correct position
  2. Holding
  3. Breathing
  4. Pulling trigger

E. Automatic Weapons
  1. Correct position

2. Holding
3. Breathing
4. Pulling trigger
5. Correct firing

F. Shooting
   1. Correct alignment
   2. Weather conditions
   3. Distance
   4. Firing

G. Knowledge of Enemy Weapontry
   1. Police
   2. State
      a) Police
      b) Military
   3. Federal
      a) FBI
      b) CIA
      c) Military

IV. Guard Duty

1. Why

2. How

a) Condition Red

b) Condition Black

V. Sectional Tactics (In detail for Section and Sub Leaders)

1. Deployment

a) Position

b) Advancement

c) Retreat

2. The Cell

a) 2 riflemen, 1 auto-riflemen

VI. Field Training

1. Living in and by the element

2. Adhesiveness with fellow members

3. There should be at least a three day campout with ration for one meal and a condition of red during the whole camp out.

VII. Enemy Interrogation

1. Rights of Soldier

A. Name, People's Liberation Army (Army)

B. Never has right in surrender

C. Right and duty to escape

D. Geneva agreement

VIII. A test should be given at the end of the four week period of the material covered; if trainee fails he should be given the training over once again and if he fails again something else should be found for him to do for the people.

Area and weeks of suggested study class.

Weeks:

1. I, II
2. III, IV, V
3. IV, V
4. VI, VII and test

I

Sergeant EUGENE CONNOLLY, Area Four Task Force, Chicago Police Department, advised on June 9, 1969, that 11 panther members were arrested after leaving panther headquarters during the evening of June 8, 1969. They were charged with obstructing police. A search of the automobile they were in revealed hypodermic needles, one marijuana cigarette and chemicals described by the police as being ingredients for incendiary bombs.

Source advised 16 BPP members were indicted on June 9, 1969, and charged with kidnapping, conspiracy in an attempt to commit murder and several other local charges. They are:

FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP.

RICHARD POWELL, member of the West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.

WILLIAM O'NEAL, Chief of Staff, Illinois BPP.

WILMER ANGRUM, member of the West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.

JAMES WHITE, member of the West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.

DAVID VALENTINE, member of the West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.

BILLY BROOKS, Deputy Minister of Education, Illinois BPP.

HARLON WALTON, member of the West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.

ROBERT BRUCE, Captain Chairman, West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP

MERRILL HARVEY, Captain Defense, West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.

NATHANIEL JUNIOR, Major, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP.

YVONNE KING, Major, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP.

CHRISTINA MAY, Deputy Minister of Culture and Acting Deputy Minister of Finance, both Illinois BPP.

GERRY DUNNIGAN, Captain of Security, Illinois BPP.

CHARLES MARTIS, member West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.

WILLIAM IVORY, member West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.

Source advised the following persons are still being sought in connection with the above crimes:

ROBERT BRUCE
MERRILL HARVEY
NATHANIEL JUNIOR
YVONNE KING
CHRISTINA MAY
GERRY DUNNIGAN
CHARLES MARTIS
WILLIAM IVORY

6/10/69)

Officer PAT GLEASON, Deputy Superintendent's Office, Chicago Police Department, advised on July 16, 1969, two panthers, GRADY LEE MOORE and LARRY ROBERSON, were arrested and charged with attempted murder, possession of narcotics, aggravated battery and unlawful use of a weapon. Officer GLEASON stated that two police officers were investigating a burglary in progress and were hindered in doing so by the two panthers. The officers ordered the two to leave, resulting in ROBERSON taking a gun and firing several shots and hitting both officers and one bystander. ROBERSON was seriously wounded by one of the officers and both continue in custody.

Officer WEHNER, Deputy Superintendent's Office, Chicago Police Department, advised on July 31, 1969, five police officers were wounded at panther headquarters as a result of gunfire following an argument between the police and panthers.

Police arrested JOSEPH HAYMAN, ALVIN JEFFERY, and LARRY WHITE, all panther members. Police also recovered a 12 gage shotgun with a 16½" barrell, three revolvers, two automatic pistols, one hunting knife and a quantity of ammunition. According to Officer WEHNER, following the arrest, a fire broke out which was later extinguished by the Chicago Police Department, but damage to panther headquarters was considerable.

Security at Panther Headquarters

Source advised the BPP continues to closely screen individuals entering their headquarters. An officer of the day (OD) is continually on duty; however, no elaborate security measures are in effect at this time.

7/69)

IV. PUBLICATIONS

The Chicago Chapter of the BPP has no regularly scheduled publications; however, on occasion leaflets have been distributed in connection with appearances by members at various functions.

7/69
7/69)

Source advised the Chicago BPP exhibits a film captioned "American Revolution II".

6/17/69)

ROBERT VAILLANCOUR, 8924 South 51st Street, Oak Lawn, Illinois, advised on June 25, 1969, he had attended the previous night a movie at the Three-Penny Cinema, 2424 North Lincoln Avenue. A film entitled, "American Revolution II" was exhibited. He described the film as being anti-police, and anti-establishment in content.

1

V. ACTIVITIES

Captain WILBERT SAMUELS, Maywood, Illinois, Police Department advised on May 26, 1969, a mock trial was held at the Maywood City Hall on May 24, and 25, 1969, with the permission of Maywood Mayor LEONARD A. CHABALA. Approximately 140 individuals participated with about 70 Negros, 55 white and 15 Mexicans being noted; the purpose of the mock trial concerned a recent trial of FRED HAMPTON, who was convicted and sentenced from two to five years on a charge of robbery. The mock trial found HAMPTON innocent.

Source advised a meeting of the BPP was held at the Charles Knap's Restaurant, 5th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois, on May 28, 1969. Approximately 20 BPP members were present along with the Latin Brown Berets, a youth gang. Purpose of this meeting was to raise money for bond regarding FRED HAMPTON's recent conviction.

6/5/69)

Source advised a meeting was held on June 5, 1969, at 1423 South 11th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois. Members of the BPP discussed the recent raid on Panther Headquarters in Chicago, by the FBI.

6/6/69)

Source advised the BPP was sponsoring a "Breakfast for Children Program," at several locations in Chicago, and the officers of the local Chicago Chapter decided to continue this program as long as food continued to be furnished on a volunteer basis. Source further advised the program was relaxed for the summer months.

, 6/10/69)

Source advised the BPP, in connection with their "Breakfast for Children Program," utilizes two West Side locations. Source stated about 200 children have participated in the program at the 1512 South Pulaski Avenue location, and approximately 150 children participated in the program at the 3906 West Lexington Street location. Source stated no effort by the Panthers to indoctrinate the children was made at the latter location. Source did state that the Panthers attempted to express the Panthers' philosophy on several occasions at the breakfast located at 1512 South Pulaski Avenue, but no regularly scheduled instructional course was pursued.

, 6/5/69)

Captain ROBERT SAMUELS, Acting Chief of Police, Maywood Police Department, advised on June 12, 1969, a rally was held at the Lido Theater, 5th Avenue and Warren Street, Maywood. The rally was held to obtain legal fees and signatures for petitions in seeking the release of FRED HAMPTON, who was currently incarcerated. There were 60 individuals present with both white and Negros making up those in attendance. No incidents were reported.

Source advised that on June 28, 1969, approximately nine BPP members travelled to Danville, Illinois, to attend a "Black Culture Day," on June 29, 1969. BOB RUSH spoke to those in attendance, telling of the problems the Panthers faced in Chicago, and about the

3

recent raid on Panthers Headquarters by the FBI.

6/30/69)

Source advised on June 18, 1969, a special "security meeting" was held at BPP Headquarters with about 20 members present. SAM NAPIER, National Distribution Officer was present and reported that the National Office at Oakland, California, wanted the Chicago Chapter to "tighten up" on security. Source stated this was apparently in response to the recent raid on Panther Headquarters by the FBI and the belief by some officials that some members were furnishing information to outside agencies.

6/19/69)

Source advised a meeting was held at Panther Headquarters to discuss a conference to be held in San Francisco, California, during the latter part of July, 1969, entitled "United Front Against Facism." Those in attendance were urged to attend the conference. Source advised there were approximately 40 to 50 individuals at the meeting.

6/30/69)

Source advised that on June 20, 1969, five Chicago BPP members travelled to Detroit, Michigan, to help re-organize the Detroit BPP Chapter, which had been ordered to cease operations by the National Office earlier that month.

6/30/69)

4

Source advised that on June 20, 1969, 15 BPP members forcibly entered the SDS Convention in progress at that time and read a statement to all present that the BPP demanded the PLP not deviate from the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Panthers wanted the PLP to change its position on the right to self-determination and stand in concert with the oppressed people.

6/21/69)

Source advised JEFF HAAS, Attorney, was in contact with officials of the Chicago BPP Chapter regarding the intention of the Chicago Panthers to institute a new program for "Peoples Medical Care Center, Incorporated." This program, to start in the future, will provide medical and dental care for all oppressed people. HAAS, according to source, was drawing up incorporation papers for this medical center.

7/11/69)

Source advised HOWARD ALK, CARLETTA FIELDS, RUFUS WALLS, JOAN GRAY, STEPHANY FISHER, MICHAEL MC CARTHY, EUGENE CHARLES, WILLIE CALVIN, HANK GADDIS, BEVELINA POWELL, JEWELL COOK, CASANDRA BYNUM, BARBARA SANKEY, BOB LEE and BRENDA WILLIS travelled to the BPP conference in California, from July 18 - 21, 1969. All return to Chicago during the period of July 22 - 24, 1969. Source advised all of the above individuals are members of the Chicago BPP with the exception of HOWARD ALK. ALK, according to source, is a white male connected with Film Group, Incorporated, a local movie and recording company.

7/24/69)

5

Captain WILBERT SAMUELS, Maywood Police Department, advised on July 26, 1969, approximately 13 persons (10 Negros who identified themselves as BPP members) appeared at Third Avenue and Oak Street, Maywood, for the purpose of holding a press conference. BOB RUSH announced plans of the BPP to have petitions signed by Maywood citizens in an effort to have the park and swimming pool at that location renamed in honor of FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, currently incarcerated.

On July 28, 1969, source advised six Chicago BPP members travelled to East Moline, Illinois, allegedly to meet with 100 to 150 members of a local Negro youth group to discuss possibly forming a BPP Branch there.

7/30/69)

The Chicago Chapter of the BPP generally conducts political orientation classes stressing "quotations from Chairman MAO TSE-TUNG," at 201 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, on Monday, Wednesday and Friday evenings. However, due to numerous recent arrests and indictments of BPP members as well as the FBI raid on Panther Headquarters June 4, 1969, these meetings are now infrequent.

CG T-3,
CG T-5,
7/22/69)

VI. BPP CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER MILITANT GROUPS

6

Source advised BPP members attended an SDS protest held at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus on May 27, 1969. SDS was protesting against a Major Cities Police Department Command Officers Conference, then in progress.

5/27/69)

On May 29, 1969, a group of Maywood BPP members met with the Latin Brown Berets, a youth gang, wanting their help in a protest demonstration wherein the Panthers were to protest the recent jailing of FRED HAMPTON. The Brown Berets refused.

6/3/69)

Source advised MIKE KLONSKY, National Security Officer, SDS, contacted the Panthers to arrange for a speaker for the SDS Convention underway at that time. KLONSKY wanted the BPP speaker to inject spirit into the Convention and "rile up" those present.

6/18/69)

RUFUS WALLS was reported by source to have advised SAM SMITH, a reporter for the Chicago Daily Defender, a local newspaper aimed at the Negro community, the BPP agrees with SDS and not PLP because "we can't go along with any organization that doesn't believe in black self-determination." WALLS advised SMITH the Panthers have a coalition with SDS, the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican youth gang on Chicago's North Side, and the Young Patriots, a white gang comprised of Appalachian whites.

6/23/69)

7

During the SDS Convention MIKE KLONSKY reported that SDS and the BPP have a close relationship.

BOB RUSH spoke at the Convention and read from Mao's Red Book to the effect that the role of women is to help in the revolution. This was in reply to a comment of a prior Panther speaker who had stated the roll of women in the Movement is to use "sexual relations" to revolutionize. At the time this statement was met with great disapproval among those in attendance.

Source advised that on June 20, 1969, Panthers attended the SDS Convention taking over the platform and criticizing PLP for saying they were against Black Self-Determination.

6/19 and 20/69)

Source advised the Panthers have a coalition with the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican youth gang on Chicago's North Side.

4/20/69)

JESSE JACKSON, leader of Operation Breadbasket, the economic arm of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference contacted BOB RUSH to advise RUSH that he had been offered 300 loaves of bread from a company and wanted to donate this bread to the Panthers for use in their "Breakfast for Children Program."

6/27/69)

Source advised RENNIE DAVIS contacted Panther Headquarters and talked with JEWELL COOK

8

because DAVIS had understood that COOK was very upset about the Panthers not being included in a delegation going to Hanoi, North Viet Nam, to seek the release of three American pilots. DAVIS stated that DAVE DILLINGER wanted a Panther representative, but was refused by the North Vietnamese. (Sourceshaving knowledge of SDS matters have advised this information was false and DAVIS merely said this to the Panthers to appease them).

7/15/69)

DAVE DILLINGER is National Chairman of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam. National Mobilization Committee is an anti-war organization active during the Democratic National Convention protests in Chicago during August, 1968. RENNIE DAVIS is the National Coordinator of the National Mobilization Committee.

7/31/69)

VII. FINANCES

Chicago BPP Chapter operates on funds received from the following sources:

(1) Speaker fees and honorariums received by BPP leaders for appearances at educational institutions and other public gatherings.

(2) Monthly assessments of BPP members, as well as fees charged for processing applications for membership in Chicago BPP Chapter.

(3) Donations and contributions given at BPP rallies or by individuals sympathetic to BPP objectives.

(4) No information developed indicating Chicago Chapter BPP has received any funds from National Chapter of BPP, from any foreign government or individual from a foreign country, or an organization operated in a foreign country.

National Headquarters of the BPP, Oakland, California, has allowed the Chicago Chapter to use proceeds from the sale of the Panther newspaper to defray expenses incurred for bonding members out of jail. The Chicago Chapter is in dire financial disorder.

CG T-5,
7/69)

SAM NAPIER, in Chicago to meet with the Panthers, determined the Chicago Chapter owed $7,000 to the National Office for the receipt of the Black Panther newspaper. NAPIER did say that this amount did not take into account unknown items that the National Headquarters owed Chicago.

7/9/69)

BOB RUSH was reported by the source to have stated the Chicago Chapter was indebted to the National Office in the amount of $4,000 on newspaper sales. He also stated that with the suspension of the "Breakfast for Children Program," for the summer months, people in the ghetto had stopped donating money to the Panthers.

7/11/69)

A State Board Meeting of the Communist Party (CP) of Illinois, was held on June 17, 1969, and it was agreed

10

by the State Committee that the Party should borrow some money and make donations to selected organizations. $100 was to go to the Chicago BPP.

6/18/69)

VIII. CONTACTS WITH CP OR OTHER GROUPS

A meeting of the South Side Club of the CP of Illinois was held on May 28, 1969, and those present were advised that at the recent National CP Convention, members were asked to associate with industry, the BPP and SDS.

6/2/69)

FRANCES GABOW, self-admitted CP member, contacted BOB RUSH to arrange a meeting with RUSH where a gift could be turned over to him.

6/17/69)

ALL MEMBERS OF THE BPP MUST BE CONSIDERED POSSIBLY ARMED AND DANGEROUS IN VIEW OF DESIRE OF ALL MEMBERS TO HAVE FIREARMS.

5/20/69)

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

The "New York Times" city edition Tuesday, April 20, 1965, page 27, reported that a new party of "revolutionary socialism" was formally founded on April 18, 1965, under the name of the PLP, which had been known as the Progressive Labor Movement.

According to the article, "The Progressive Labor Movement was founded in 1962, by Milton Rosen and Mortimer Scheer after they were expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for assertedly following the Chinese Communist line."

A source advised on June 3, 1968, that the PLP held its Second National Convention in New York City May 31 to June 2, 1968, at which time the PLP reasserted its objective of the establishment of a militant working class movement based on Marxism-Leninism. This is to be accomplished through the Party's overall revolutionary strategy of raising the consciousness of the people and helping to provide ideological leadership in the working class struggle for state power.

The source also advised that at the Second National Convention Milton Rosen was unanimously re-elected National Chairman of the PLP and Levi Laub, Fred Jerome, Jared Israel, William Epton, Jacob Rosen, Jeffrey Gordon and Walter Linder were elected as the National Committee to lead the PLP until the next convention.

The PLP publishes "Progressive Labor," a bimonthly magazine; "World Revolution," a quarterly periodical; and "Challenge-Desafio," a monthly newspaper.

The August, 1968, issue of "Challenge-Desafio" sets forth that "above all, this paper is dedicated to the fight for a new way of life— where the working men and women own and control their homes, factories, the police, courts, and the entire Government on every level."

The source advised on June 3, 1968, that the PLP utilizes an address of General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn, New York, and also utilizes an office in Room 617, 1 Union Square West, New York, New York.

1 **APPENDIX**

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. Michael Klonsky, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power and does not support the policies of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), headquartered at 360-362 Nelson Street, S. W., Atlanta, Georgia, is a nonmembership organization, which was born out of the sit-in movement that erupted across the South beginning in 1960.

Today SNCC identifies itself as an organization in the revolutionary vanguard. It advocates that to be successful it is necessary to develop a revolutionary ideology and revolutionary program.

According to SNCC the year 1967 marked a historic milestone in the struggle for the liberation of black people in the United States and the year that revolutionaries throughout the world began to understand more fully the impact of the black movement. SNCC declared that "liberation will come only when there is final destruction of this mad octopus-- the capitalistic system of the United States with all its life-sucking tentacles of exploitation and racism that choke the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The realities of black life, together with the recognition instilled in SNCC workers forced its members to further popularize the legitimacy of self-defense and rebellions when oppression became too great."

From May, 1966, until May, 1967, Stokely Carmichael was National Chairman of SNCC. As of July, 1968, Carmichael resided in Washington, D. C., where he was affiliated with SNCC and active as temporary chairman of a black coalition group. In May, 1967, Carmichael was replaced by Hubert Gerold Brown, commonly known as H. Rap Brown, who served until June, 1968.

In June, 1968, at the Staff and Central Committee meeting of SNCC held in Atlanta, Georgia, it was decided to restructure the organization by equalization of responsibility by creating ten deputy or vice chairmanships. The primary purpose for this change is to take law enforcement pressure off any single individual.

[illegible]

40

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
August 8, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

WALTER ALLEN

Investigation in this matter was predicated upon receipt of information from a confidential source who has furnished reialble information in the past to the effect that Walter Allen, who also uses the alias Count, had been passing out Black Panther Party (BPP) applications in Maywood, Illinois, and is allegedly an Illinois BPP member.

A characterization of the BPP is included in the appendix attached hereto.

BACKGROUND

Residence

Captain Wilbert Samuels, Maywood, Illinois Police Department, advised on April 29, 1969, Walter Allen resides at 1915 South 14th Avenue, Broadview, Illinois.

Employment

A second confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past advised on April 2, 1969, Walter Allen, who also uses the name Count, is allegedly employed at a wire company in the Broadview, Illinois area.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Credit

The records of the Chicago Credit Bureau, Incorporated, as checked on August 5, 1969, relfect no information concerning Walter Allen.

Criminal

The records of the Bureau of Records and Communications, Chicago Police Department, as checked on August 6, 1969, reflect no information concerning Walter Allen.

The records of the Maywood, Illinois Police Department, as reviewed on August 6, 1969, reflect no information concerning Walter Allen.

Descriptive Information

The following composite description of Walter Allen was furnished by the above two confidential sources.

Name:	Walter Allen
Alias:	Count
Race:	Negro
Sex:	Male
Height:	5'4" - 5'7"
Weight:	120 - 140 pounds
Age:	20 - 22
Complexion:	Dark

Activities

The first confidential source mentioned above advised on December 31, 1968, Walter Allen had been passing out BPP applications in Maywood, Illinois, and that he was allegedly a member of the BPP.

This source subsequently advised Allen is a member of the Illinois BPP and between January 16, 1969, and June 15, 1969, he attended approximately 19 BPP meetings in the Maywood - Broadview area.

WALTER ALLEN

The second confidential source mentioned above advised on February 9, 1969, that Walter Allen, with several other Illinois BPP members, traveled to Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, on February 8, 1969, after several other Illinois BPP members had been arrested in that City.

The second confidential source advised on February 23, 1969, Walter Allen had been at De Kalb, Illinois, with other Illinois BPP members on that date for an unknown purpose.

The first confidential source mentioned above advised on March 19, 1969, Walter Allen carries a .32 caliber pistol in his automobile.

The second confidential source mentioned above advised on April 8, 1969, Walter Allen is the Acting Captain of Finance for the Maywood, Illinois, area branch of the Illinois BPP.

The second confidential source mentioned above advised on April 9, 1969, that Walter Allen was present when the Illinois BPP held a meeting with the Egyptian Cobras, a local Chicago Negro youth gang concerning cooperation between these groups.

This source advised on April 15, 1969, that on April 12, 1969, Walter Allen and other Illinois BPP members were advised by the Illinois BPP central staff to "liberate" whoever and whatever of its money to help set the Panthers arrested on April 11, 1969, free. These individuals took this to mean they were to rob, steal, et cetera, in order to obtain bail money. This group then left Chicago and drove as far south as Champaign, Illinois, but located no person or place which appeared to be an easy prey for a robbery.

The second confidential source mentioned above advised on May 6, 1969, that Walter Allen and another Illinois BPP member stated on May 5, 1969, that if Fred

Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, was sentenced on local charges on May 13, 1969, they were going to blow up the Maywood, Illinois, police station. This source advised no further action was taken by these individuals in this matter and source believed this was just talk by Allen and the other individual.

The first confidential source mentioned above advised on May 23, 1969, Walter Allen and several other Illinois BPP members went to the residence of an individual who had a shotgun that allegedly belonged to the Panthers and when this individual would not produce the shotgun, they beat him up. The group also found and took the shotgun.

The third confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on June 13, 1969, that Walter Allen, who also uses the name Count, has been bringing marijuana to the Illinois BPP Headquarters in Chicago.

The second confidential source mentioned above advised on July 7, 1969, Walter Allen is the Captain of Finance in the West Suburban Branch of the Illinois BPP.

Copies of this communication are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois
United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois
Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

39

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
JUL 31 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

CONCERNED YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS
SCOTT COUNTY, IOWA
ROCK ISLAND COUNTY, ILLINOIS

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is included in the appendix attached to this memo.

On July 2, 1969, Archiel J. Roets, Chief of Police, East Moline, Illinois, advised he had received information on that date that a group of BPP members from Chicago, Illinois, was allegedly to visit East Moline on about July 26, 1969, apparently in behalf of the Concerned Youth Organizations (CYO). Chief Roets advised the CYO was recently founded at East Moline, Illinois, for community betterment of the Negro youth; however, leadership was diverted from the minister who founded the organization and is presently in the hands of a small group who tend toward militancy.

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on July 30, 1969, that on July 26, 1969, Bob Lee, Gary Tyler, Ron Satchel, Rose Edwards, Adrian King, and another unknown female, all members and/or officers of the Illinois BPP traveled from Chicago, Illinois, to East Moline, Illinois, on BPP business.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

In East Moline, Illinois, this group allegedly met with about 100 to 150 members of a local Negro youth group, name unknown. At the meeting, the two groups discussed the possible aligning of the East Moline group with the Illinois BPP.

Captain Gary Tyler, from Chicago, spoke and told the East Moline group about BPP philosophy and policy. The East Moline youth group generally agreed with BPP philosophy and indicated they would possibly be interested in aligning themselves with the BPP.

Further discussions were held, and the East Moline group selected a representative, Greg (last name unknown), who was to return to Chicago with the BPP members, where he would take instructions concerning BPP philosophy and the possible establishment of a BPP chapter in East Moline, Illinois.

The Chicago BPP members returned to Chicago on July 27, 1969.

Copies of this memo are being furnished to the following agencies: U. S. Attorney, Chicago, Illinois; U. S. Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois; and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

38

F B I

Date 7/31/69

Transmit the following in ________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

CONCERNED YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS (CYO)
SCOTT COUNTY, IOWA
ROCK ISLAND COUNTY, ILLINOIS
RM

DRH:

Approved: Rac
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

[redacted]. Copies of this LHM are being furnished locally to the U. S. Attorney and U. S. Secret Service, both Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

[redacted], The source advised the following persons met with Chicago BPP members and that they are interested in aligning the youth group in East Moline, Illinois, with the Illinois BPP.

LILLIE HARRIS, aka "Big Lil"
Negro female, 25 years old,
5' 9" tall, 170 pounds, resides
1623 Crawford, Galesburg, Illinois

WILLIAM HENRY
Negro male, 21 years old, 6' 0"
tall, 165 pounds, resides 323
West Sixth, East Moline, Illinois

FRANK ROBINSON
Negro male, 24 years old, 5' 8"
tall, 142 pounds, resides in
Galesburg, Illinois, drives a
1966 blue Chevrolet

JEROME DAVIS
Negro male, 24 years old, 6' 0"
tall, 200 pounds, works as a
salesman for an "Afro" shop in
East Moline, Illinois

ODESSA JACKSON
Negro female, 19 years old, 5' 4"
tall, 120-125 pounds, resides at
1625 Fifth Avenue, East Moline,
Illinois, and has been employed in
a hospital in East Moline as a
nurses' aide.

The source advised the above-listed individuals are in some type of leadership positions in the East Moline youth group, name unknown to source.

37

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-1291

Chicago, Illinois 60604
July 28, 1969

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

For characterization of BPP see Appendix Page.

A source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that the Illinois BPP is planning to hold a press conference at 11:00 am on July 26, 1969, at 3rd Avenue and Oak Street in Maywood, Illinois, the purpose of which is to emphasize that the residents of Maywood desire to have the new swimming pool being erected at this address named after Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP who is currently incarcerated, Menard, Illinois

On July 26, 1969 Chief Wilbert Samuels, Maywood, Illinois, Police Department, advised that approximately 13 persons, three white and 10 Negroes identifying themselves as members of the Illinois BPP appeared at the above address at approximately 11:15 am for the purpose of holding the above press conference. Chief Samuels stated that Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP, announced plans for the Illinois BPP to have petitions signed by the Maywood citizens in order to have the park and swimming pool located at this address named Hampton Park in honor of Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP who is currently incarcerated as set forth above.

Declassified
4/4/75 by 6607

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Group I~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP

Captain Samuels stated that no major news media appeared for this conference and the above group of individuals remained in the area approximately 45 minutes then departed. He stated there were no incidents or disturbances in connection with this conference and no future plans were announced concerning these petitions.

Copies of the Letterhead Memorandum are being furnished to the following organizations:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois

Region 1, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

36

7/25/69

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

[redacted]

Copies of the LHM are also being furnished to US Secret Service and USA, both Chicago, and Region 1, 113th MI Group, Evanston, who were orally advised of information on 7/25/69. Maywood and Chicago PD were also orally advised of the contents of this LHM.

[illegible]:

35

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
July 22, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
CHICAGO DIVISION

A confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on July 18, 1969, the Illinois Black Panther Party (BPP) was planning a press conference to be held in Maywood, Illinois, at 11:00 a.m. on July 19, 1969. The purpose of this conference was to propose renaming Maywood, Illinois to Hampton Park, Illinois, in honor of Fred Hampton, imprisoned Deputy Chairman of the Illinois BPP.

Lieutenant William Stanley, Maywood, Illinois, Police Department, advised on July 19, 1969, that the press conference scheduled for that date in Maywood, Illinois, did not take place. He advised the Maywood Police Department remains alert for any possible future planned activities by the BPP.

Copies of the memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois
U. S. Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois
Region 1, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

34

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Chicago, Illinois
July 18, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP).

A source, or agency which investigates gang activities in the Chicago, Illinois, area advised that the following individuals were indicted by the Illinois Cook County Grand Jury on June 9, 1969, charged with Kidnapping, conspiracy in an attempt to commit murder and several other local charges:

Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP.
Richard Powell, member of the West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.
William O'Neal, Chief of Staff, Illinois BPP.
Wilmer Angrum, member of the West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.
James White, member of the West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.
David Valentine, member of the West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.
Billy Brooks, Deputy Minister of Education, Illinois BPP.
Harlon Walton, member of the West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.
Robert Bruce, Captain Chairman, West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Merrill Harvey, Captain Defence, West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.
Nathaniel Junior, Major, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP.
Yvonne King, Major, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP.
Christiana May, Deputy Minister of Culture and Acting Deputy Minister of Finance, both Illinois BPP.
Gerry Dunnigan, Captain of Security, Illinois BPP.
Charles Martis, member West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.
William Ivory, member West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP.

The various titles set forth above were furnished during June and July, 1969, by a source who has furnished reliable information in the past.

The first source advised that the following persons are still being sought in connection with the above crimes: Bruce, Harvey, Junior, King, May, Dunnigan, Martis, Ivory, and all are considered armed and dangerous.

Harvey and Junior are currently Federal fugitives based upon the fact that a bench warrant was issued by the United States District Court Judge Joseph P. Perry at Chicago, Illinois, on April 28, 1969, and both were indicted for violation of Title 18, Section 3146 and 3152 by a Federal Grand Jury, Chicago, on June 12, 1969. These cases were referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by the United States Marshal's Office on July 3, 1969.

Copies of this memo are being furnished the United States Attorney, Chicago, and Region 1, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

33

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
July 7, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

For characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP), see the appendix pages.

On July 2, 1969, advised that the BPP would hold a rally at Lincoln Park on North Avenue in Chicago on July 4, 1969, which would begin at approximately 4:00 p.m. Sources stated that David Hilliard, Chief of Staff, National Black Panther Party, Berkeley, California, would be among various speakers to participate in this rally. advised that allegedly plans were being made for lesser rallies to be held at Washington Park and possibly Garfield Park, both Chicago, on July 4, 1969.

advised that the Panthers had been ordered to keep the rallies orderly and not to attempt any confrontation with the police, and in addition, were told not to bring any firearms.

advised on July 7, 1969, that the Illinois BPP held a rally at Lincoln Park in Chicago which began at approximately noon on July 4, 1969. Approximately 500 persons were in attendance at this rally.

Bob Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP, spoke briefly concerning his recent conviction for unlawful use of weapon and his upcoming appeal. He also told about plans by the BPP to attempt to take Captain William Buckney, Head of the Chicago Police Department Gang Intelligence Unit, to court, charging him with conspiracy to supress political independence. Rush also spoke briefly on BPP policies and programs.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FILED

Bob Lee, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP, also spoke at this rally and told about a play concerning the black revolution which he is supposedly working on and will attempt to have produced in Chicago, Illinois. Lee also spoke about Eldridge Cleaver, BPP National Minister of Information who is now in exile in Cuba. He stated that Cleaver was not being treated as a true revolutionary in Cuba and that none of the black revolutionaries in Cuba had rights or were being treated as revolutionaries.

This source advised a second BPP rally was held at approximately 2:00 p.m. on July 4, 1969, at Garfield Park on the west side of Chicago. Attendance at this rally was about 500 and there were no noticed incidents or disturbances. Bob Rush spoke again at this rally and told about BPP programs on the west side of Chicago, which are supposedly designed to improve the city and clean up the neighborhoods. He also spoke about BPP programs which would lead to BPP cooperation with other organizations interested in black progress.

Gary Tyler, Captain, Illinois BPP newspaper distributor, spoke and told about the BPP Breakfast For Children Program. He stated the BPP needs donations for this program and also needs people to donate time to this program. Tyler also stated he recommended black people to come to the BPP Headquarters to learn more about BPP programs and not to believe just what they heard from the news media.

Rufus Walls, Deputy Minister of Information, Illinois BPP, spoke concerning the conviction of Bob Rush for unlawful use of weapon, and of Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, for armed robbery. He stated the BPP is in need of money to finance their various programs and to help make bond as well as provide funds for legal appeals based on the numerous recent "political arrests".

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Ronald Stachel, Deputy Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, spoke concerning "the pig harassment" of the BPP and smiliar organizations in Chicago and in the nation. Satchel also mentioned the BPP disassociation and disapproval of certain local Chicago groups, including youth gangs.

On July 4 and July 7, 1969, advised that the National Office of the BPP telephonically advised the Chicago BPP officers on July 3 and July 4, 1969, that Hilliard would not be able to make the trip to Chicago, Illinois, to speak at the Lincoln Park BPP rally at 4:00 pm on July 4, 1969, however, the National Office has instructed Raymond Hewitt, Deputy Minister of Information, Los Angeles BPP, to fulfill this speaking engagement.

stated that the above Chicago Panthers did allegedly speak at two lessor rallies, however, when the Chicago Panthers noted that it was too late in the day for anyone representing National BPP to arrive in time for the main BPP rally at 4:00 pm they became disinterested.

stated that of the Chicago area Panther leaders only Lee allegedly attended the 4:00 pm rally. This source stated that other Chicago area Panthers adopted the attitude that July 4 was not really a day to be celebrated by the Negroes anyway inasmuch as they were not liberated and still, in fact, are slaves of the current "power structure".

advised that to their knowledge no Panthers from other chapters in the United States attended the above rallies or were even in the Chicago area. These sources expressed the opinion that even attendance by the local Chicago Panthers was very poor at these rallies.

Copies of the LHM are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois
Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group,
Evanston, Illinois

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

32

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - U.S. SECRET SERVICE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS (VIA COURIER)
1 - USA, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS (VIA COURIER)
1 - REGION I, 113TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, EVANSTON, ILLINOIS (VIA COURIER)

CONFIDENTIAL

Report of: SA RICHARD T. HESLIN
Office: Chicago, Illinois
Date: 11/18/69

Field Office File #:
Bureau File #:

Title: YOUNG PATRIOTS

Character: RACIAL MATTERS

Synopsis: The Young Patriots (YP) was formed in August, 1968 by CHUCK GEARY, a leader in Uptown Chicago. The group was founded to act as a youth movement within GEARY's plans of building civic pride in the Uptown area in order to help its poor people. The present headquarters of the YP is at 1421 West Wilson, Chicago, Illinois. On 12/1/69, the headquarters will be moved to 860 Buena Street, Chicago, Illinois. YP is a youth group opposing racism and encouraging a coalition of all races in order to alleviate poverty. Most Young Patriots are poor whites from the Appalachian Region of the United States.

- P -

DETAILS

This case was predicated upon receipt of information that the Young Patriots (YP) had become allied with the Black Panther Party (BPP) and had potential of developing into a basic revolutionary group.

(5/15/69

I. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Headquarters

All literature distributed by the YP shows their headquarters as 1421 Wilson Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

On December 1, 1969, the headquarters will be moved to 860 Buena Street, Chicago, Illinois. The new headquarters were obtained since they were larger and more secure.

, 11/12/69)

Charter

There is no known charter or strict organizational structure for the YP.

Membership

The membership list of the YP is kept on 3x5 cards in the YP Headquarters. Along with names of members, this box contains the names of individuals sympathetic to the YP.

11/3/69)

Membership varies but is usually approximately 10 to 20 members with 5 to 6 hard-core members.

9/29/69)

Objectives

The following list of objectives is distributed freely by the YP to any individual asking about them.

(, 9/29/69)

YOUNG PATRIOT'S PROGRAM

1. CLASS

We see that the key to truly understanding and improving our situation is to truly understand the nature of class society. We see that in America and in the world that those who have money control those who do not. WEALTH-POWER! We feel that the wealth of the world should be shared equally among all people. The workers or the masses of the people produce the wealth and they should control it. We see that our allies are those who have nothing and our enemies are those who have too much.

2. WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE

We believe that all people are entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care. We believe that businessmen should not make a profit on the things that we need to survive. We demand decent and adequate housing at a low cost for poor people. We demand safe, clean day care centers for mothers who work. We demand that mothers who want to raise their children in their own home be paid for this vital work.

3. PIGS & PIG POWER STRUCTURE

We demand the end to the pigs murdering and brutalizing our people. The pigs are the tool of the rich man. The pigs are in our community to protect the property of robber-baron landlords and avaricious businessmen and not the lives or the interests of the people who live in the community. We call the police pigs because they oppress the people. The world belongs to the people not the pigs.

4. SCHOOLS -- EDUCATION

We understand that the main purpose of the educational system as it now stands is to make people fit smoothly into the capitalistic class society. We understand that the children of poor people are trained to be poor people--the children of factory workers are trained to work in factories--the children of rich people are trained to take their parents places. The present educational system is irrelevant to the true needs and desires of the people. The schools are run like prisons because this society is a prison. We demand that all people know their true history. We demand that all people have the opportunity to develop their abilities.

5. DRAFT

We oppose the draft because it means poor and working class men fighting rich mens wars. We oppose imperialistic wars of agression such as the one in Viet Nam. We believe that all patriotic men and women should serve only in the army of liberation. Rich people can buy their way out of the draft, but poor and working class people have no choice. We demand that the old rich men who create the wars should fight them and that the young men should stay home and construct a new society.

6. UNION

Labor unions are a good thing. But we still know that the majority of Americans work long hours under bad conditions for poor wages and never have nothing to show for it. We demand an end to discrimination on the job and in the union. Men and women of all races should get equal wages and better working conditions.

7. EXPLOITATION OF THE COMMUNITY

We understand that the businessmen in the community make their living off of us. We understand that we make the products that they sell back to us. We demand that if businessmen intend to stay in the community they treat us as brothers and do not cheat us by charging prices we can't afford. We demand that if businessmen make profits in the community, these profits be invested in the community in the form of goods and services.

8. RACISM

Racism is a tool of capitalism to make people fight among themselves, instead of fighting together for their freedom. Divisions of race and sex serve the interests of the rich, ruling class and not of the people.

9. RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

We demand the release of all political prisoners. We understand that the majority of so-called "criminals" in our concentration-camp prisons are victims of our class society. Justice is a luxury that only rich men can afford. These people should be released to build a new society rather than hidden away for society's mistakes.

10. CULTURAL NATIONALISM

We believe that to fight only for the interests of your close cultural brothers and sisters is not in the interest of all the people, and in fact perpetuates racism. All power to the poor and working people! Cultural nationalism does not solve the political problems of the oppressed people, but only perpetuates exploitations - capitalism makes millions on love beads, afro-shirts, and cowboy hats. Cultural nationalism is a tool of capitalist exploitation.

11. REVOLUTIONARY SOLIDARITY

Revolutionary solidarity with all oppressed peoples of all countries and races defeats the divisions created by the narrow interests of cultural nationalism.

Monopoly capitalism and corrupt Russian-socialism are enemies of the interests of the oppressed people throughout the world.



Peoples Bulletin #9 . . . Young Patriots Serve and Protect . . . What the Young Patriots Are About

People Have to show us that we wre doing some good for the neighborhood. When people help us they help themself. We want to help all people who need help. People have to tell us what they want and we will do all we can to make it come true.

The Young Patriots are here to help you get what is yours and what you need.

WE WANT TOTAL FREEDOM!

Freedom to work where you want.

Freedom to get a trade without the harassment of worry about the money you had to pay for it.

Freedom to get what you want and what you need.

Freedom to live the way you want.

The government do not help anybody and never will. Because it care not for people, it care for money. Millionaires made their money off the poor people. They do not care for people, only what people can make for them.

ALL POWER TO
THE PEOPLE !

On September 18, 1969, when Special Agents (SAs) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were conducting a neighborhood investigation, Mrs. WILLIAM FESPERMAN, wife of the then leader of the Young Patriots answered a door and when interviewed furnished the following information:

The YP has three main programs. The first is a "Free Pantry Program" which operates out of the Patriot's Office and until that time, September 18, 1969, had fed 400 people. There is a proposed medical clinic which was scheduled to open before the end of 1969. At that time, an alternate school was being run by the Patriots in which Mrs. FESPERMAN was a teacher. The school had an enrollment of fourteen children.

Mrs. FESPERMAN stated that the group is not prone to violence and that their idea of violence was similar to that of the BPP. They would not attack anyone but if they were victimized by police brutality, they would defend themselves. Mrs. FESPERMAN declined to furnish any other information regarding the YP.

The YP are attempting to organize the people of the Uptown area of Chicago. Once the people are organized, they intend to use their vote in local elections in order to defeat the building of high rise apartments in the Uptown area of Chicago and force absentee landlords to rebuild the area. The main unifying force of the YP is their belief that they are victims of police brutality. Although very few of the youths within the group have ever been arrested, and none of their leaders have ever been arrested, they claim they are constantly stopped on the street, searched and harrassed by the police.

9/25/69)

National and State Officers

Prior to November 1, 1969, WILLIAM FESPERMAN, also known as PREACHERMAN, was a self-styled leader and spokesman for the YP. His second-in-command was CRAIG WALDEN, Minister of Defense of the YP. Third-in-command was BOBBY MC GUINNESS, Minister of Education, and fourth-in-command was PAT FELTON, field secretary.

11/12/69)

A New York chapter has started and has become active and militant. This chapter is headed by ARTHUR TURKO who has made such statements as once the YP in New York obtains an office, the YP would have to "blow away" any pigs who try to force their way in.

10/6/69)

FESPERMAN was purged from the YP in early November, 1969, along with his wife, DARLENE.

(, 11/3/69)

The YP purged FESPERMAN due to his violent attitudes and speeches which drew attention to the Patriots as a revolutionary type organization. The Patriots are attempting to rid themselves of this reputation.

11/12/69)

Acquisition of Weapons

No weapons have ever been seen inside the YP Headquarters.

11/12/69)

II. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES

On November 11, 1968, a small group known as the Uptown Goodfellows, who eventually evolved into the YP staged a peaceful march from Wilson Avenue to Chicago Police Department to protest police brutality in Chicago. Leaflets distributed by the marchers show that the march was meant to be peaceful. The march occurred without incident.

8/10/68)

On April 4, 1969, JACK BOYKIN, also known as JUNEBUG, at that time leader of the YP, appeared on live television during riots occurring then asking the people of Uptown to remain calm and not take part in the riots. He stated that the riots, which occured on the anniversary of the death of Martin Luther King were a plot by the police to kill poor people. BOYKIN is no longer a YP member.

, 4/4/69)

On May 6, 1969, a group of twenty youths primarily made up of Black Panthers, members of the Young Lords Organization (YLO) and YP took part in a demonstration at Mc Cormick Theological Seminary, Fullerton and Halsted Streets, Chicago, Illinois. No violence occurred. The demonstration protested lack of church participation in social problems. YLO is a Puerto Rican street gang in Chicago.

(5/15/69

When members of the BPP held a mock trial for FRED HAMPTON, Chairman of the Illinois Chapter, on charges of robbery, one of the organizations present were members of the YP, whose identities were not know at that time.

, 5/23/69)

Members of the YP on June 27, 1969, held a rally at the Office of Uptown Federal Savings to protest charges by an officer of that firm that they were a gang. No violence occurred during the demonstration. Approximately ten individuals took part.

6/25/69)

On June 30, 1969, leaders of the BPP, Young Lords, Young Patriots and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) held a meeting attempting to form a coalition of leftist type groups.

6/30/69)

On July 12, 1969, leaders of the same groups again met at BPP Headquarters still trying to form a coalition.

7/12/69)

On July 2, 1969 members of the Young Patriots and Young Lords held a peace rally in Lincoln Park in Chicago. No arrests resulted.

(Chicago Daily News, 7/2/69)

From August to November, 1969, WILLIAM FESPERMAN and CRAIG WALDEN representing the YP traveled with BOBBY LEE, Field Secretary of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP to Washington, D.C.; New York City; Richmond, Virginia; Chapel Hill, North Carolina; San Francisco, California; Portland, Oregon and Seattle, Washington. In each city, all three speakers gave discussions concerning police brutality, the need for poor people to organize regardless of race against the rich and the need for the United States to abandon the War in Viet Nam. At each speech, the movie "American Revolution, II" was shown. This movie reflects the organization of the YP by the Black Panthers. It shows scenes of the Chicago riots during the Democratic National Convention of 1968 and contains speeches concerning police brutality.

August through
November, 1969)

On August 10, 1969, at a meeting of the SDS, the split between SDS and the BPP was discussed. It was decided that if this split should occur the YP would side with the BPP. This meeting contained 10 to 15 people and it was decided that the YP had more in common with the poor Black Panthers than with the college students of SDS.

8/13/69)

On August 17, 1969, at a meeting of SDS, RENNIE DAVIS informed the meeting that as of that time the YP and the BPP had broken off from the SDS. DAVIS is a co-founder of SDS.

8/26/69)

The YP was organized by CHARLES GEARY, usually called CHUCK GEARY as a youth group to assist him in his plans to organize the poor of uptown Chicago.

9/9/69

Since being organized by GEARY, the YP has acted as his cheering section at Uptown civic meetings. During the summer of 1969, 40 to 50 would attend these meetings but recently no more than 8 or 10 show up at the meetings. The YP acts as a voting block for GEARY'S programs and attempts to shout down opposition to him.

9/9/69)

On October 3, 1969, FRED HAMPTON criticized the YP as being a youth group that was not politically orientated. FRED HAMPTON is the Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP that has been attempting to form the Patriots into a white ally to the Black Panthers.

10/3/69)

On October 6, 1969, ARTHUR TURKO, leader of the YP in New York City, criticized the YP in Chicago, stating that they were more like a street gang and not politically orientated. TURKO stated that he believed the Patriots had approximately ten hard-core members with fifty fringe members.

10/6/69)

In an attempt to demonstrate a coalition between youth groups, the Young Patriots, Young Lords and Revolutionary Youth Movement II (RYM II) Faction of SDS met on October 6, 1969, to plan peaceful demonstrations at the Chicago Federal Building to protest police raids on the Illinois Chapter of BPP. The RYM II faction of SDS is headed by MIKE KLONSKY, former SDS National secretary.

10/6/69)
8/26/69)

On October 23, 1969, JERI ELDRIDGE of the BPP, FESPERMAN of the YP and an unknown representative of the Young Lords held a meeting and gave speeches at the Northeastern College Cafeteria, Chicago, Illinois. All speakers urged unity among the poor of all races against the rich.

10/23/69)

The BPP held classes on October 23, 1969, in Oakland for BOBBY MC GUINNESS and WILLIAM FESPERMAN of the YP in Chicago. These classes were to instruct the YP in the organizational structure of the BPP.

, 10/23/69)

On November 1, 1969, the Young Patriots publicized a Health Clinic at 1140 Sunnyside, Chicago, Illinois. On its first day, the clinic treated approximately 25 to 30 persons giving inoculations against measles and other childhood diseases and counseling women on pre-natal care. Doctors in the area contributed their time to the clinic and money and drugs were provided by another source. This clinic plans to be open every Saturday to provide free health care for persons in the area. The YP furnished manual labor to the clinic.

, 11/6/69)

On November 18, 1969, the clinic was again opened and approximately 35 persons were given medical aid.

11/12/69)

The YP maintains a permanent clothing drive where residents of the area can drop off old clothes. These clothes are distributed free of charge to any individual asking for help. YP goes from store to store asking donations of food. This food is also kept at the YP Headquarters and distributed to any individual asking for it.

11/5/69)

Meetings

The YP met approximately once a week at their headquarters at 1421 West Wilson. The meetings lasted approximately three to four hours. Generally the participants exchange comments about police brutality, the need to rid the Uptown area of absentee landlords and plan such activities as a Health Clinic and Breakfast for Children Program. Normally, 10 to 15 persons arrive for the meetings and the meetings have no strict parliamentary rules. Usually during the meetings, the participants drink beer and wine and conclude the meeting without any formal plans being made.

, 11/12/69)

III. PUBLICATIONS AND PROPAGANDA

The YP issues fliers on an irregular basis and distributes them free to anyone who will accept one. These fliers have been used in the past to advertise demonstrations, publicize charges they make of police brutality and inform the people of their activities. Attached to this report are seven fliers typical of those issued by the YP.

11/12/69)

TH YOUNG PATRIOTS ORGANIZATIO
1421 W. Wilson
334-8957

We do Not Like to See War
between the Peoples
of Uptown!

The trouble at Montrose and Sheridan does not help any of the people of Uptown, Puerto Rican or Hillbilly.

We all share the same bad conditions in our neighborhood and we know that our enemy is not each other. Dig!

The Young Patriots (Hillbillies) and The Young Lords (Puerto Ricanos) stand arm in arm to defeat the bad conditions (hunger, poor housing, few jobs, cop harassement) in our neighborhoods.

People of the neighborhood,
Unite AND DEFEAT THE REAL ENEMY
or he will destroy us all or laugh while we kill off each other. Dig it!

Poverty and prejudice made us all class brothers.

ALL Power belongs to the People!

Brown Power to Brown People
Red Power to Red People
yellow Power to yellow People
White Power to White People
Black Power to Black People

No power to the Cops and all
these they protect!
Right ON!!!

A Day of Mourning in Uptown

Monday, August 4

March starts at 1354 W. Wilson. 2500 people will lose their homes. Join the march led by the Uptown People's Planning Coalition at 2:00 p. m. We will protest this "murder" of the people's hopes and dreams by the Uptown Community Conservation Council. Here is a map of the march:


March starts here at 1354 W Wilson
Magnolia
Lawrence
X March ends here
Montrose
N
Gunnison
Sheridan
Hazel

YOUNG PATRIOTS

SERVE AND
PROTECT


FIGHT FOR YOUR FREEDOM!

PEOPLES' BULLITEN NO. 6 — PIGS NOW BEAT WOMEN

Chuck Geary was out of town Wednesday night-the pigs knew that Chuck was out of town. About 1:30 a.m. 5 squad cars and onevan pulled up in front of his house, (4501 Clifton) where his wife, daughter, and son were in a group of about 8 people in front of the house. Officers Johnson and Shiro (20th dist.) asked them who they were. Then the pigs became insulting so Martha Geary took their badge numbers and names. Johnson took her by the hair of her head and threw her into the paddy wagon. Her son Eddie and her daughter Marcelle were taken too, when they tried to help their mother. Eddies head somehow got banged against the sidewalk. No one else in the group was arrested when they tried to help Martha, only the Gearys-on charges of DISTURBING THE PEACE (taking a pig's badge #) and curfew (Eddie was with his mother in front of his own house, which is no violation.). Mrs. Geary was very badly bruised all over her body and was taken to Weiss Memorial Hospital for first aid.

Pigs have always brutalized the men and young guys in our community but now they're starting on women!

The pigs protect the interest of the rich people in Uptown, not the poor people. They treat us like animals. Police should come from our community. They should be responsible to us and live with us. If a policeman had to come back to his home in in the community at night, he would think twice about beating up on his neighbor's wife and kids.

The Young Patriots charge the pigs with DISTURBING THE PEACE in our community. When the pigs start protecting the poor people they will be called police.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

YOUNG PATRIOTS



FIGHT FOR YOUR FREEDOM!

YOUNG PATRIOTS SERVE AND PROTECT

PEOPLE'S BULLETIN #3------------A VICTORY FOR THE PEOPLE!

The purpose of this people's bulletin is to announce a victory of the poor people of Uptown over the rich pigs who run our lives. We of the Young Patriots are proud to say that the college which th the rich pigs wanted for Clifton & Racine is not going through! THIS IS A FACT!! The rich pigs themselves had to admit that they could not go against the united will of the people to fight for their freedom.

We won this victory because we were determined to fight with everything we have for our freedom. We were determined to pick up the gun to protect our homes and families! The rich people knew this and they were scared----THEY BACKED OFF!! This just shows what united people can do to better their lives if they are willing to fight!!

This is nothing new to Americans---Americans have always been freedom-fighters, and we are Americans! But we are real Americans like the men who founded and built this country. Not like the pig-Americans who cheated and lied their way into control of everything. We are not like these pig-Americans who put aside the real idea of America---freedom---for their own ideas---greed and selfishness.

We of the Young Patriots are proud of the People of Uptown. We are proud that the people put aside their racism so that the black, white, brown, yellow and red people could fight together for their freedom. We are proud that people put aside their fear of the pigs guns and clubs and stood up to the pig and said:

WE WANT OUR FREEDOM!!!!!!

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!!!!!

H[illegible]RLES' EDUCATION BULLETIN

YOU SPENT $62.57 ON FOREIGN AID LAST YEAR! WHAT HAS IT DONE FOR YOU

An example of what happened to your tax money:
In 1965, four American students visited Guatemala. They made a point of interviewing an official of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), which handles most U.S. foreign aid. The AID gouges $ 2,300,000,000 from U.S. taxpayers each year. The students were interested in what we get in return.

One of the students asked the AID man what sort of things were being done to help the Guatemalan people. The official replied, "Well, actually that's not our direct responsibility. You see, the real purpose of AID is to open up this country to American business investment." The students were shocked, but the AID man went on to tell them why he thought this was a good thing. Pointing to a construction site, he said, "See that housing project? We got a U.S. construction company to come down here and build low cost housing units for local workers and their families."

One of the students asked the man, "How much do you charge for one?"
AID man: "$2,500 altogether, but that's in small monthly payments."
Student: "How much does it cost to build one?"
AID man: "Well, the companies have to make a profit . . . ."
Student: "Come on, how much?"
AID man: "About $800 a piece."

What has happened here?
A U.S. taxpayer is milked of $800. The government gives the money to AID, which turns it over to an American construction company. Now the stuffed-shirt businessman who gets this money goes down to Guatemala, hires workers there for 30¢ an hour to build a house, and then charges these workers $2,500 to live in it.

This has happened:
1 The American working man is conned out of money
2 A Guatemalan worker is forced to work for starvation wages, mortgages his life away for a home, and begins to hate the U.S. for screwin him and his country
3 A rich businessman who owns an international construction company makes $1,700 clear, tax free profit while undertaking no risk and investing almost no money.

Why does this happen?
U.S. Government dominates small foreign countries to serve the need of the very rich, the small class of hogs that actually runs this country. The working people of the entire world are bled by this ruling class. That is why they revolt in Cuba, Vietnam, Bolivia, and Guatemala. And that is why they say, "Yankee go home!"

YOUNG PATRIOTS
Government must serve the People!
1421 Wilson

WHERE DOES YOUR TAX MONEY GO?

Lying politicians say it goes to Poor people, Negroes, Mexicans . .

The hell it does!

It goes to Guns, bombs, interest, airplanes, and fat businessmen.

The average working man in Illinois makes $6,530 a year. (The poor women dont make but $3,684 average) A married man and housewife pay an average

$ 1,099.50	Federal income tax
110.00	Surtax
287.32	Social security
$ 1,496.82	FEDERAL TAXES

Where does it go?

Warfare, arms, military	$ 660
(Vietnam portion of above)	($ 234)
Interest on national debt	$ 130
Commerce and transport	$ 73
International affairs	$ 43
Space exploration	$ 41

$ 950 for crap that doesn't do the common people one bit of good. And look at the crumbs left for our welfare:

Elementary and high schools	$ 19
Welfare	$ 31
Low income housing	$ 7.50
Medicare	$ 51
Medicaid & ADC medical	$ 21
All other health programs	$ 19
Retirement and social security	$ 210

There's plenty of money for business and war, but not much for us.

WHY ARE THINGS LIKE THIS?
Because the forces that run this country are front men for BIG MONEY - the working people and poor people are bilked, conned, and bled to finance war, pay interest to the rich, support profits of big business, and fling chunks of metal into the sky!

The country is being run for the good of the rich ruling class that owns the banks, real estate, aircraft and gun factories, chain stores, and so forth. They serve themselves without regard for what the common people want or need. Until we working people and common Joes rise up and demand control over our jobs, our communities, our government, OUR LIVES - it will never be any different.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

YOUNG PATRIOTS ORGANIZATION -- WE SERVE THE PEOPLE
WE ARE THE PEOPLE
BRING YOUR PROBLEMS TO US

1421 Wilson Ave.



WHO HAS THE POWER?

1. Who likes the U.S. Government?
   Those who it helps.

2. Who does it help?
   Owners of big businesses- banks, factories, chain stores.

3. What are these people called?
   Boss. Capitalist. Parasite. Bloodsucker. Ruling class.

4. How many capitalists are there?
   Damn few. The richest 1% owns 76% of all stock. The top 99 families alone are worth 37 Billion Dollars.

5. What does that mean to us?
   Since these rich pigs have the money, they can say where it goes, who gets it, and how much they get.

6. What are the results of this?
   1 out of 3 Americans is underfed.
   Not enough schools.
   Not enough houses.
   Not enough medical care.
   Rotten air and poisoned water.
   Wars that kill our youth, widow our women, and turn half the world against us: Vietnam. Korea. Dominican Republic.

7. Why do we blame the capitalists?
   Look who holds the power in this country. Look where our "leaders" spend our money. These multi-millionaires made their fortunes off other men's sweat and labor. They didn't give a damn about us then, when they took the profits. They don't share the wealth that we produced. They make the decisions; we do the work and pay the taxes.

Something must be done. The Young Patriots Organization is about doing it. All Power to the People!

Young Patriots
We Fight for Freedom!
1421 Wilson

IV. FINANCES

Anyone wishing to show the film "American Revolution II" must pay the YP and BPP $150.00 per showing and allow a representative of the YP and BPP to give a talk and take up a collection at the showing.

9/8/69)

According to the "Chicago Daily News" on June 14, 1969, the film "American Revolution II" was shown at the Threepenny Theater, 2424 Lincoln Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. At each showing, the YP and BPP took up a collection and these collections averaged $80.00 per showing. Aside from this, during the first two weeks, the theater, which only holds 478 seats, grossed $13,000.00 in admission tickets only.

Local stores and citizens donate clothes and food to the free food and free clothing programs and doctors have been providing their services free at the YP Free Health Clinic.

11/5/69)

A characterization of the BPP and SDS is attached.

1 APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also
Known As Black Panther Party
for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

CONFIDENTIAL

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. MICHAEL KLONSKY, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power and does not support the polices of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
June 11, 1969

RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS
1969

On June 10, 1969, Captain Wilbert Samuels, Acting Chief of Police. Maywood, Illinois, Police Department, advised an agent of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (FBI) that pamphlets were being distributed in Maywood, announcing a "Free Fred Hampton" the imprisoned Black Panther Party (BPP) Illinois Chapter Deputy Chairman, on June 12, 1969.

Attached as an appendix is a characterization of the BPP.

Captain Samuels stated that Hampton is incarcerated at the Illinois State Prison at Joliet, Illinois, on a two - five year sentence as the result of Hampton's recent conviction on a robbery charge in Cook County Circuit Court. Captain Samuels furnished the following copy of the rally pamphlet:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FREE CHAIRMAN FRED

FREE CHAIRMAN FRED

FREE
CHAIRMAN FRED
RALLY

IN TRIBUTE TO FRED HAMPTON, A 'POLITICAL PRISONER', THERE WILL BE A RALLY HELD IN HIS HONOR

"A DAY OF TRUTH"

THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1969

BEGINNING: 2:P.M. - 5:45 P.M.
HELD AT: LIDO THEATRE
LOCATION: 5TH AVENUE + WARREN STREET

LOCAL AND NATIONAL SPEAKERS

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
N.A.A.C.P.
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS
ASSOCIATES AND RELATIVES
AND OTHERS

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
FREE CHAIRMAN FRED
FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

"ABOUT FRED"

As a result of an act of repression by America"s "Pig Power Structure;" there now exists another "Political Prisoner."

As of May 26, 1969, America once again has kidnapped from the oppressed masses, a man concerned solely with our liberation and freedom. Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party, Chairman Fred Hampton is temporarily (jailed) in a 'well known' Illinois Concentration Camp. We say "temporarily jailed" because we know and fully understand that once you, the masses, realize just what Fred Hampton stands for , fights for, and what U.S. capitalism and U.S. imperalism stands for, you too will strive to FREE CHAIRMAN FRED; AND ALL OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS.

In regards to accomplishing 'our' mission, we ask for your support in attending the planned rally in Honor of Chairman Fred Hampton. As well as a day of enjoyment, this will also be a day of education for all. And it may even be a day of bringing about more unity to oppressed people of America.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
(WESTERN SUBURBS)

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 part 10 of 14

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNI[illegible] STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]ICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

27

Copy to:
1 - USA, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - Secret Service, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston (Via Courier)
1 - OSI, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - NISO, Chicago (RM)

Report of: SA HUBERT M. HART
Office: CHICAGO
Date: 6/13/69

Field Office File #:
Bureau File #:

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Character: RACIAL MATTERS
SMITH ACT OF 1940
SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY,
REBELLION AND INSURRECTION

Synopsis: At 12:30 a.m., 6/4/69, source, reliable, advised GEORGE SAMS, JR., Federal Fugitive was at Chicago BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Shortly after 5:00 a.m., 6/4/69, Chicago FBI Agent telephonically advised Chicago BPP O.D. (officer of day) that warrants were outstanding for four BPP members, one or more believed to be at BPP headquarters. Agent heard statements, "I'll kill you," "Give me that shotgun" and other similar statements in background. After repeated attempts to obtain cooperation of BPP members at BPP headquarters all BPP members ordered out and 8 individuals were arrested by FBI Agents and charged with Harboring. Statements such as "in the revolution one wins or dies" was made by BPP member. A handwritten twelve page memorandum captioned "Suggested Plan for the Complete Breakdown of the State of Illinois Power Structure" labeled "Top Secret", as well as other BPP pamphlets and literature were obtained in search of BPP headquarters for SAMS. Weapons, ammunition, tear gas bombs, gas masks, knives and other items obtained.

- P -

Declassifi
4/4/75 by

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1

DETAILS:

Characterizations of the following organizations which are referred to below are contained in the Appendix Section of this report:

Black Panther Party (BPP)

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

On May 27, 1969, Chief Inspector STEPHEN AHERN, New Haven, Connecticut Police Department, requested FBI assistance to locate GEORGE SAMS, JR., also known as ROBERT WADELL SMITH, DETROIT GEORGE, and GEORGE CAMP, who had fled the State of Connecticut.

Inspector AHERN advised that GEORGE SAMS, JR. was wanted on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by the Superior Court for the County of New Haven, at New Haven, Connecticut, on May 27, 1969, charging him with the crimes of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, kidnaping, conspiracy to commit kidnaping, and binding with intent to commit a crime.

Inspector AHERN further advised that the State of Connecticut would extradite the subject from wherever he might be located.

Inspector AHERN advised that investigation by the New Haven, Connecticut Police Department had disclosed that GEORGE SAMS, JR. had brought ALEX RACKLEY from New York City to New Haven, Connecticut, for the purpose of being tried by a kangaroo court of the BPP in New Haven, Connecticut.

2

Inspector AHERN advised that RACKLEY had been suspected by the New Haven Chapter of the BPP of being a police informant, for which he was tortured and murdered. RACKLEY's mutilated body was disposed of in a swamp near Middlefield, Connecticut.

On May 27, 1969, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA JOHN V. CASSIDENTO, District of Connecticut, New Haven, Connecticut, authorized the filing of a complaint charging GEORGE SAMS, JR. with violation of Title 18, Section 1073, United States Code. Specifically GEORGE SAMS, JR. was charged with unlawful flight to avoid prosecution (UFAP) - murder; conspiracy to commit murder; kidnaping; conspiracy to commit kidnaping; and binding with intent to commit a crime.

On May 27, 1969, an authorized complaint was filed by SA ROBERT C. PUCKETT before United States Commissioner ARTHUR H. LATIMER at New Haven, Connecticut, who issued a warrant for GEORGE SAMS, JR.'s arrest on May 27, 1969.

A male individual who referred to himself as "DETROIT GEORGE" was at Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on May 26, 1969.

5/26/69)

A male individual who used the name WADDELL (phonetic) was at Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on May 26, 1969.

5/26/69)

A male individual who was referred to as WADDELL (phonetic) was at Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on May 29, 1969.

5/29/69)

3

A male individual who was referred to as WADDELL (phonetic) is being held in the Chicago BPP "Political Jail" at Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. WADDELL reportedly raped a sister Panther and is to be expelled from the BPP.

6/2/69)

Source identified a photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR., also known as ROBERT WADELL SMITH, DETROIT GEORGE, and GEORGE CAMP, as a person he knows who uses the name of WADDELL (phonetic) and who is now at Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

Source further advised it is common knowledge among Chicago area BPP members that WADDELL is fleeing from some serious crime and is being held a BPP prisoner at Chicago Chapter BPP jail at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

Source stated that Chicago BPP's Central Staff members are aware WADDELL is being sought for the crime of murder in another state and is actually being held in Chicago BPP Chapter jail for raping a BPP member in Detroit, Michigan, recently.

6/3/69)

WADDELL was to be released from Chicago BPP jail on June 3, 1969.

6/3/69)

At 12:30 AM, June 4, 1969, GEORGE SAMS, JR. was then at Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, and expected to remain there during the remainder of the night.

6/4/69)

1.

At approximately 5:00 a.m., June 4, 1969, Special Agents (SA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Chicago Office surrounded the premises of Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. SA R. B. YADON, JR., telephonically informed a person answering the telephone at Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, that a warrant was outstanding for the arrest of GEORGE SAMS, JR., and three other individuals. SA YADON attempted to elicit cooperation of those within BPP Headquarters, without success.

After approximately 30 minutes, the occupants of Chicago BPP Headquarters were ordered out on the street and were placed under arrest. Eight individuals from BPP Headquarters were arrested.

On June 4, 1969, Assistant United States Attorney NICHOLAS J. ETTEN, United States Attorney's Office, Chicago, Illinois, authorized the filing of a complaint charging eight individuals arrested with Harboring and Concealing, GEORGE SAMS, JR., in violation of Title 18, Section 1071, United States Code.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/9/69

1

At 5:05 A.M. on June 4, 1969, a telephone call was placed by SA R. B. YADON to Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago. The call was answered by an unidentified female who verified the number of the BPP organization. A request of this individual was made to speak with the person in command and an unidentified male answered the telephone stating he was the "O.D." (officer of the day).

SA YADON advised this individual that he was representing the FBI and that the FBI held arrest warrants for four BPP members, namely GEORGE SAMS, Jr.; RORY B. HITHE; LANDON R. WILLIAMS and LONNIE MC LUCAS. He advised that these warrants charge the above-listed individuals with Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution for Murder; Conspiracy to Commit Murder and Kidnapping. He further advised the "O.D." that the FBI had information indicating one or more of these individuals was at that location, that the headquarters were surrounded by FBI personnel and that he should open the front door. This individual stated that none of these persons were there and he was again instructed to open the door. The individual left the phone unattended, with the line open, and sounds of movement and arguing could be heard. The phone was then answered by a woman with male voices in the background, one stating "I'll kill them", followed by obscene language. A man then came on the phone to indicate they would let one man come in and he was advised that this was not acceptable; he was again instructed to open the door and leave the premises. The male individual indicated that they were negotiating and then stated, "We are coming out"; however, persons in the room continued arguing and one individual was heard to say "Give me that shotgun".

During the course of the telephone being left open, SA YADON heard what appeared to him to be a noise made by a shotgun action being racked.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # CG

by SA R. B. YADON/mam Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

After several minutes the individual identified as "O.D." stated "I'm coming out".

Still another male individual came to the phone and stated "In the revolution, one wins or dies. The state and it's people is stronger than the pig technology - dig it? (obscene) You pig in you mother (obscene) If you come here to get me, I'm going to kill you mother (obscene).

SA YADON instructed this individual that he should come out immediately; the individual left the phone off the hook and several moments later, SAC M. W. JOHNSON informed SA YADON that he was in the Headquarters.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/9/69

1

On June 4, 1969, Special Agents of the Chicago FBI Office surrounded the Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, after receiving information that GEORGE SAMS, Jr., wanted for local charges of murder and other lesser charges at New Haven, Connecticut, was located at that address. A telephone call was made to this headquarters and individuals in the building were subsequently ordered out of the building when they refused to cooperate with FBI Agents after being told over the telephone of the purpose of the action being taken.

Upon being ordered from the building, an individual who identified himself as "O.D.", indicated he was coming out and subsequently did leave the building. This individual was later identified as PATRICK KEEN and he was brought to the command car where he was permitted to give instructions for his fellow members to leave the building.

Six individuals came out of the BPP Headquarters on instructions of FBI Agents and PATRICK KEEN. As these individuals left the building, each shouted obscenities at Agents on the street and they all made statements about "the revolution", with several stating "in the revolution, one wins or dies". PATRICK KEEN, during his efforts to get his fellow members from the building, also made the statement that "in the revolution, one wins or dies". He also stated that people in the building were "true revolutionaries" and would not come out of the building on orders of the FBI or any other law enforcement official but would die before they would obey. He stated they are not subject to "your laws". He also said over the bullhorn, to his comrades, that they should come out so they could work for the revolution.

In addition to the "O.D." and the six persons who came from the building, there was an eighth person who was detained as he entered the headquarters, just prior to the telephone call being made, and he was later

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAC M. W. JOHNSON and SAs RALPH D. HARMON, JOHN T. O'NEAL and EARNIE L. WALDRUP/mam Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

arrested along with the seven other individuals.

Date June 9, 1969

1

In connection with a search of the Black Panther Party Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, on June 4, 1969, five photographs were seen lying on a table in the second floor front office. It was immediately observed that the background in these photographs appeared similar to that in these premises. It was likewise noted that the pictures of this individual appeared to be identical to subject, GEORGE SAMS, Jr.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # CG

by SA EARNIE L. WALDRUP and SA EDWARD KINZER, JR. Date dictated 6/13/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1.

On the following three pages are five xerox copies of photographs of individual which was taken at Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, based on background appearing in photos, and referred to in preceeding page. Also a zerox copy of photograph of section of Chicago BPP Headquarters.

Original photographs mentioned above are being retained by Federal Bureau of Investigation, Chicago.













1.

Two xerox copies of photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR., Federal Fugitive, charged with violation of Title 18, Section 1073, United States Code.





EDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIG ON

Date June 9, 1969

A yellow legal pad, Wilson Jones Pad number 7438, was seized from the top of the reception desk of the Illinois Black Panther Party Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969. This reception desk is located directly inside the second floor entrance to the Black Panther Party Headquarters, which is located at the above address.

This pad, consisting of 19 pages, contains a log for incoming and outgoing telephone calls, made to and from the above described Black Panther Party Headquarters, during the dates from May 25, 1969, until May 31, 1969, inclusive.

Specifically noted in this log were the following entries:

Date	Time	Message
5/26/69	12:40 P.M.	Detroit Chapter called, WADELL took call
5/26/69	1:10 P.M.	LEROY called WADELL
5/26/69	3:45 P.M.	LEROY called WADELL
5/29/69	2:25 P.M.	WADELL called
5/29/69	3:50 P.M.	WADELL called
5/29/69	6:15 P.M.	WADELL called

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # CG

by SA CARL H. DONNELLY/ Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Date June 5, 1969

On June 4, 1969 SA RAMON W. STRATTON was present at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois, when arrests were made for harboring a fugitive from justice, in building occupied by an organization calling themselves the Black Panthers. Special Agent in Charge MARLIN W. JOHNSON of the Chicago Federal Bureau of Investigation office instructed SA STRATTON to conduct a lawful search of the building in which the arrests were made, with assistance of other Special Agents of the FBI.

Posters, pamphlets, printed material and machines were observed on the walls, floors, desks and chairs and it appeared to SA STRATTON that these items would be subject to seizure under a search warrant issued in conformance with Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in conjunction with violations of Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 2383, 2384 and 2385.

Section 2383 relates to rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof or in giving aid and comfort thereto.

Section 2384 relates to conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, etc.

Section 2385 relates to willfully advocating, etc. the overthrow of the Government of the United States and the printing, etc. of material, and the orgnizing, etc. of persons for such purposes.

SA STRATTON therefore directed that certain materials be seized and preserved as evidence of violations of laws of the United States, possibly being committed in presence of Agents, both as mere evidence and as material designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as means of committing a criminal offense (Rule 41 (b)) and material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3103a).

On 6-4-69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA RAMON W. STRATTON Date dictated 6-5-69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

In conducting this search, the following matters were considered:

The arrests were completed between approximately 5:30 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. and it would not be possible to prepare detailed affidavits for search warrant and appear before the U.S. Commissioner or a District Court judge for several hours.

The building had been prepared with electrical devices and with solid steel doors and iron doors and bars placed over entrances, exits and windows, thusly preventing any entrance without breaking and entering and with use of firearms. Several weapons were present and seized and it is known to Agents that this organization calling themselves the Black Panthers has consistently stated that attempts to search or to effect arrests would be violently resisted, even with firearms.

That attempts to enter the building had met with no co-operation of any kind from persons in the building, and any future attempts to enter would undoubtedly be met in the same way, necessitating an armed force sufficient to effect the execution of a search warrant, thus making it impractical to obtain and effect a search by warrant on the same day.

Likelihood of destruction of evidence and removal of evidence while the paperwork necessary for a search by search warrant was being accomplished and filed.

Tenseness of the general neighborhood due to prior racial disorders.

RAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA

Date June 6, 1969

A search was conducted incidental to arrest, of the second floor of a building at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois, occupied by a Negro group known as the Black Panthers. The search began at 6:09 a.m. and ended at 7:56 a.m. on June 4, 1969. The following Special Agents participated directly in the search:

ANTHONY F. DE LORENZO
CARL H. DONNELLY
DAVID M. FRAHM
WILLIAM J. DOWNEY, JR.
JOHN J. GOLDEN
DAVID R. HILL
LEONARD F. KACZMAREK
EDWARD KINZER, JR.
KENNETH A. LANG
JOHN T. OSBORNE
RICHARD G. STILLING
JOHN H. WILMES

The second floor consisted of a kitchen, two baths, one small storage room, a reception room, one large main office room, which contained several desks, file cabinets, book cases and a furnace, and one small office room which contained one desk. The rooms on the second floor were in complete disarray, including the small storage room in which clothing was strewn about, before the search began.

The following items were obtained:

1 A. Box of miscellaneous political periodicals, records and educational material.
2 A. Brown paper box containing correspondence, letters and note books.
3 A. Blue box containing general correspondence, bills paid and unpaid.
4 A. Box containing miscellaneous Party letter head paper, telephone numbers and political books.

On 6-4-69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA LEONARD F. KACZMAREK Date dictated 6-5-69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

5 A. Box containing number of MAO TSE-TUNG books, Selective Service records and other political books and address cards.

6 A. One black brief case containing books, calander book, assorted periodicals and papers.

7 A. Box containing books from Public Library, bag of Amcill (Synthetic Penecilin), miscellaneous Black Party correspondence and records.

8 A. Box of books from Public Library and papers.

9 A. One Midland Model 13-120, two-way Transceivers; Serial Number 60104618; one Midland Transceiver, Model 13-722, no serial number; one Midland Transceiver, Model 13-722, no serial number; one Sears Reflex Super Camera, C-160, Serial Number 13709; one Midland Transceiver, 13-120, Serial Number 60104619; two Starfire Solid State Transceivers; one bag containing 6 rolls of film; one Poloroid Camera, Model J 66, Serial Number J 222763.

10A. Box of 49 posters removed from the walls on the second floor.

11A. Box containing gas mask, Railroad flare; package containing cherry bombs, railroad markers; one bagcontaining 5 pounds of black charcoal wood powder.

12A. One homemade device- metal and rubber tubing.

13A. Two flags white in color with a black panther and "Free Huey" depicted.

14A. Two pieces of plastic board with the United States Constitution and obsceneties thereon.

15A. One wooden box containing tire iron, and cans of apparent cleaning solutions.

16A. One wooden desk drawer with notebooks, books, miscellaneous political books including quotes from MAO TSE-TUNG.

17A. One Smith-Corona Electric 120 Portable Typewriter, Serial Number 6 LE 2-181597, with carrying case.

18A. One Remington Rand electric typewriter, Serial Number SPP-4-1073J.

19A. One Olympia portable typewriter, gray-tan color, Serial Number 266 4858 with carrying case.

20A. One Smith-Corona portable typewriter, Serial Number 6 T 222 6386.

21A. One Smith-Corona Electron 110 portable typewriter, Serial Number 6SEV-109139.

22A. IBM Electric Typewriter, Serial Number 4045602.

ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT N

Date June 5, 1969

A search was conducted incidental to arrest, of the third or top floor of a building at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois, which building and floor was occupied by a Negro group known as the Black Panthers. The search lasted from 6:10 a.m. to 7:39 a.m. on June 4, 1969. The following Special Agents participated directly in the search under the direction of SA RAMON W. STRATTON, while other Special Agents, including JOHN H. WILMES, who took photographs, were present off and on during the search:

THOMAS J. GREEN
ROBERT E. HALL
ROBERT KLEINSCHMIDT
WILLIAM M. O'BRIEN
ROBERT J. TOMPKINS, JR.

The third floor was in complete disarray when the search commenced. There were 23 boxes of chocolate nuggets, all open, some full and some used, with the candy in various stages of deterioration. There were more than 200 boxes, mostly sealed, of dry cereal. There were more than 40 boxes of bread, many of which were crushed from being piled on top of each other. There were many other boxes containing various types of food. Some of the food containers were open and contents had been spilled on the other food and on the floor. Much of the food had simply been thrown in the southeast corner of the room in no order and without regard for consequences to the food. The southwest corner of the room contained piles of a great variety of items including tools, hinges, radios, mats, rugs, papers, glass, etc.

The following items were seized:

1. Brief case, black color, with membership lists, records and a tape.

2. Large Box full of Black Panther magazines.

3. Large Box full of miscellaneous literature.

4. Large Box mostly full of Black Panther magazines.

On 6-4-69 at Chicago, Illinois File # ______

by SA RAMON W. STRATTON: Date dictated 6-5-69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

5. Medium Box of records from desk.

6. Small Box of conspiracy buttons in sack and miscellaneous literature.

7. Small Box with library pamphlets from table.

8. Small Box Black Panther magazines.

9. Large Box of magazines "The Movement."

10. Adolph Richman silver stole (shoulder size).

11. Medium Box of miscellaneous literature.

12. Large Box of Huey Newton essays.

13. Large Box of Huey Newton essays.

14. Medium Box of "Introduction" pamphlets.

15. Large Box of Black Panther magazines.

16. Large Box of Huey Newton pamphlets.

17. Large Box of Huey Newton pamphlets.

18. Large Box of Huey Newton pamphlets.

19. Large Box of Huey Newton pamphlets.

20. Large Box of Black Panther magazines.

21. Large Box of Black Panther magazines.

22. Large Box of posters and miscellaneous papers from walls, floor and coats.

23. Large Box of magazines "The Movement."

24. Medium Box of chemicals, knives, gas masks, and a flame thrower (home made).

25. Public address system (home made).

26. One "Liberator 300" mimeograph machine.

27. One AB Dick "Fluid Duplicator" #215.

28. One "Liberator 200" mimeograph machine.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/6/69

1

In connection with the arrest of various individuals at the Black Panther Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, the following items were found incidental to the arrest of these individuals:

One fully loaded Smith and Wesson .38 Special Revolver, Serial Number K 232030. Found on the desk of Minister of Defense Office, 2nd floor front.

One Universal Company, .30 caliber "Enforcer", Serial Number 143213; found on the desk in Minister of Defense Office, 2nd floor front.

One Mauser rifle, Serial Number 2Q9454; found on 2nd floor main room;

One Sears, Roebuck and Company, Model 300, 12 gauge shotgun, Serial Number 15447; found in Minister of Defense office, 2nd floor;

One Remington Model 514 .22 caliber rifle, no serial number; found in Minister of Defense Office, 2nd floor front room.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA ANTHONY F. DE LORENZO/ Date dictated 6/5/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 6/6/69

The following described weapons were found on a table in the second floor front of the Black Panther Party headquarters, 2350 West Madison, as a result of a search incidential to arrest of several individuals:

Make	Model	Caliber	Serial Number
Winchester	94	.30/.30	2988253
Winchester	270	.22	479632
Remington	US 1917 Enfield	.30/.06	344449

The above weapons were found in an unloaded condition.

A fully loaded .38 Special Caliber Military and Police Model, Smith-Wesson Revolver was found on a stairway landing in the front part of the above premises between the second and the third floors. This weapon had serial number S810035.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA MICHAEL A. GARRETT, II Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 6, 1969

1

In connection with the search incidental to the arrest of various individuals at Black Panther Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, the following two guns were found fully loaded at the main entrance of the second floor:

High Standard Manufacturing Corporation
Model Ten-Series A Police Shotgun
Serial Number 010728

Browning Arms Company 16 gauge shotgun
Serial Number on barrel 46417
Serial Number on receiver R3812

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA EARNIE L. WALDRUP/ Date dictated 6/5/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 6, 1969

On June 6, 1969, eight persons were arrested at the Black Panther Party Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Incidental to these arrests, a search of the headquarters was conducted, and Special Agent DAVID R. HILL located a "Young American Double Action" H & R Arms Company .32 caliber S & W cartridge revolver bearing serial number 166758. This revolver was located in the desk in the "Chairman's Office" on the second floor of the building and was not loaded.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA DAVID R. HILL/ Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 5, 1969

One 7.65 mm caliber Mauser semiautomatic pistol, serial number 394266, with seven loaded rounds in the magazine and one loaded round in the chamber was recovered from the middle desk drawer of the Black Panther Office of the Day Desk in the middle second floor office of the Black Panther Headquarters.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # CG

by SA DAVID M. FRAHM Date dictated 6/4/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1

Sergeant ROLAND SIECZKOWSKI, Chicago Police Department, advised on June 9, 1969, that the following described four weapons which are included in thirteen weapons obtained at Chicago Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters were listed in Chicago Police Department records as having been stolen.

SMITH and WESSEN, 38 Special Serial Number 573764.

Above weapons reported stolen on April 11, 1969, from LOUISA MC GEORGE, 1353 South Karlov, Chicago, Illinois.

12 guage shotgun, Model 10, Serial Number 010728, reported stolen from United States Mails, August, 1968.

Remington rifle, Model 514, 22 caliber reported stolen November 23, 1968, by Virginia State Police, Salem, Virginia.

Sears Roebuck, Model 300, 12 guage shotgun reported stolen on June 7, 1968, by New York Police Department.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 6, 1969

1

A search of the premises located at 2350 West Madison Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was conducted incidental to the arrest of eight Black Panther Party Members. The search took place on June 4, 1969, between 6:30 a.m. and 7:39 a.m. The search yielded the following items of ammunition:

Shotgun Cartridges

1 box 25 x 20 gauge shotgun shells	=	25
2 boxes 25 x 16 gauge shotgun shells	=	50
4 boxes 25 x 12 gauge shotgun shells	=	100
13 loose 16 gauge shotgun shells	=	13
40 loose 20 gauge shotgun shells	=	40
Total		228 shells

Rifle and Handgun Cartridges

83 x .38 caliber cartridge
188 x 30.06 caliber cartridge
233 x 7.62 x .33 caliber cartridge
73 x 3.80 automatic caliber cartridge
46 x .22 caliber cartridge
30 x .25 x .35 caliber cartridge
21 x .45 caliber cartridge
9 x .32 automatic caliber cartridge
1 x 30.30 Winchester caliber cartridge
1 x .32 Remington caliber cartridge
1x 6.0 Remington caliber cartridge.
Total 686.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA DONALD W. OXLEY Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/6/69

The following items were taken in a search incidental to an arrest of various individuals at Black Panther Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois:

KNIVES

Three (3) Machetes
One (1) two foot hand sword
Two (2) bayonets
Two (2) pen knives
One (1) oblong bar ten inches long which is an unknown
    piece of metal
One (1) butcher knife

OTHER ITEMS:

One (1) night stick
One (1) tear gas smoke bomb M18
5 Railroad torpedoes
One bag black charcoal
One clip for .32 automatic
One 15-round clip for .30 caliber carbine
Two gas masks
Two red fuses
One bottle potassium Chlorate
One green bottle of unidentified substance
One package of paraffin
One bottle of benzenl
One bottle marked C103 Kech

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA ANTHONY F. DE LORENZO/ Date dictated 6/5/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIG ON

1

Date June 5, 1969

The following United States (US) currency and coin was recovered from the second floor headquarters of the Illinois Black Panther Party (BPP) at 2350 West Madison Avenue on June 4, 1969:

Twelve Twenty Dollar bills	$240.00
Thirty-six Ten Dollar bills	360.00
Thirty-one Five Dollar bills	155.00
One Hundred and Fifty-seven One Dollar bills	157.00
Three 50¢ Pieces	1.50
One Hundred and Forty-nine Quarters	37.25
One Hundred and Nineteen Dimes	11.90
One Hundred and Seven Nickels	5.35
One Hundred and Thirty-eight Pennies	1.38
Total US Currency	$969.38
Also recovered was one Canadian Five Cent Piece	.05
Total	$969.43

Above money was scattered throughout the office and was taken for safe-keeping.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA DAVID M. FRAHM Date dictated 6/4/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agen
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 6/10/69

On June 4, 1969, the following typewriters were seized from the second floor office of the Illinois Black Panther Party Headquarters at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois:

1 - IBM Selectric Model 72, Serial Number 4045602

1 - Smith Corona SCM Electra 120, Serial Number 6LE2-181597

1 - Smith Corona SCM Electra 110, Serial Number 6SEV-109139

1 - Olympia Portable, Serial Number 2664858

1 - Smith Corona Galaxie II Portable without case, Serial Number GT2-226386

1 - Remington Rand Electric, Serial Number E2274677.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA DAVID M. FRAHM: Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1.

On June 9, 1969, Sergeant ROLAND SIECZKOWSKI, Chicago Police Department (CG PD) advised following described typewriters, which were included in typewriters obtained at Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters on June 4, 1969, were reported as stolen.

IBM Selectric Model 72, SN4045602, reported stolen January 6, 1969. CG PD RD number H-192395.

Smith Corona, SCM Electra 120, SN 6LE2 - 181597 stolen March 13, 1967. CG PD RD number F - 073794.

Remington Rand Electric, SN E2274677, stolen May 9, 1969. CG PD RD number HI 56966.

1.

On the following page is a xerox copy of photograph of guns, knives, ammunition, and some posters which were obtained at Chicago Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters on June 4, 1969.

Also appearing on following page is xerox copy of photograph taken at Chicago BPP Headquarters on June 4, 1969, showing some of posters mentioned hereinafter.

Original photographs are being retained by Federal Bureau of Investigation, Chicago.





21.

1.

On following two pages are four xerox copies of photographs taken at Chicago Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters on June 4, 1969, showing some of posters mentioned hereinafter.

Original photographs are being maintained by Federal Bureau of Investigation, Chicago.


If you're not part of the solution... you're part of the problem.
All Power to the People
SHOOTS OUT OF THE BARREL OF A GUN


WASH ROOM
OLYMPIA




EXIT

1

The following five pages sets forth:

(a) Xerox copy of Illinois Black Panther Party stationery, which indicates identity of BPP leaders at Chicago, Illinois

(b) Illinois Black Panther Party Platform and Program

(c) Duties of the Officer of the Day

(d) List of Eleven Office Rules, this list was a large poster, 18" by 25", prominently displayed on walls of Chicago BPP headquarters.

Numerous copies of materials (a, b, and c) were observed at Chicago BPP headquarters, all were 8½" by 11½." Above copies were obtained at Chicago BPP headquarters on June 4, 1969.

ILLINOIS BLACK PANTHER PARTY
CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS
2350 W. Madison St. Chicago, Illinois 60612 (312)-243-

CENTRAL STAFF

DEPUTY MINISTER
OF DEFENSE
Bobby Rush

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
Fred Hampton

COMMUNICATIONS
SECRETARY

DEPUTY MINISTER
OF INFORMATION
Rufus "Chaka" Walls

DEPUTY MINISTER
OF EDUCATION
Billy "Che" Brooks

DEPUTY MINISTER
OF HEALTH
Ronald Satchel

DEPUTY MINISTER
OF CULTURE
Christina May

DEPUTY MINISTER
OF LABOR
Yvonne King

DEPUTY MINISTER
OF FINANCE

FIELD SECRETARIES
Nathaniel Junior
Jewell Cook
Bob Lee
Ted Boston

"ILLINOIS BLACK PANTHER PARTY PLATFORM AND PROGRAM

1. WE WANT FREEDOM. WE WANT POWER TO DETERMINE THE DESTINY OF OUR BLACK COMMUNITY.

   We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. WE WANT FULL EMPLOYMENT FOR OUR PEOPLE.

   We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white american businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. WE WANT AN END TO THE ROBBERY BY THE WHITE MAN OF OUR BLACK COMMUNITY.

   We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The american racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. WE WANT DECENT HOUSING, FIT FOR SHELTER OF HUMAN BEINGS.

   We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. WE WANT EDUCATION FOR OUR PEOPLE THAT EXPOSES THE TRUE NATURE OF THIS DECADENT AMERICAN SOCIETY. WE WANT EDUCATION THAT TEACHES US OUR TRUE HISTORY AND OUR ROLE IN THIS PRESENT DAY SOCIETY.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. WE WANT ALL OPPRESSED MEN TO BE EXEMPT FROM MILITARY SERVICE.

We believe that black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world, who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of america. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary."

41

ILLINOIS BLACK PANTHER PARTY
2350 W. Madison St.
Chicago, Illinois 60612

January 2, 1969

Power to the People
Black Power to Black People
Panther Power to the Vanguard

DEFENSE DIRECTIVE NUMBER TWO:

DUTIES OF THE OFFICER OF THE DAY

1. The O.D. will implement all necessary security measures to keep the racist dog pig and all other enemies of the people out of the Party office. (Locks locked, piece loaded and ready, gas turned off, etc.)

2. The O.D. will insure that he is able to contact members of the Central Committee at a moment's notice.

3. The O.D. will insure that the office is kept clean and orderly during his tour of duty.

4. The O.D. will insure that there is no lounging around in the office during his tour of duty.

5. The O.D. will insure that all telephone calls into the office are channelled properly.

6. The O.D. will insure that only "Authorized" phone calls are made on the Party phone.

7. The O.D. will authorize personal phone calls only on an "emergency" basis.

8. The O.D. will insure that the person following him on the roster is notified of this.

9. The O.D. will insure that he is acquainted with the Party's Daily Business as to insure that he will be able to make the correct decision.

10. The O.D. will insure that all Party and office rules are enforced. He will also insure that the Party Log Book is properly filled out.

Bobby L. Rush
Dep. Min. of Defense

1. No Horse Playing in the offic

2. No one is authorized to be in the office unless on business.

3. Security measures must be maintain at all times.

4. The office must be kept clean, neat an orderly at all times.

5. No unauthorized calls will be made on the office phone.

6. Only persons working in the office wil be allowed to eat in the office.

7. Office hours 10 A.M. — 10 P.M.

8. No one is to tamper with office equipment unless authorized.

9. All visitors and members on official business must report to the receptionist

10. No unauthorized person is allowed behind the counter.

11. No one is to stay in the office overnight unless authorized By the O.D.

1

The following six pages sets forth copies of materials obtained at Chicago BPP headquarters on June 4, 1969. All materials were available in sufficient quantities to suggest likelihood of distribution. Materials described as follows:

(a) "The People vs. FRED HAMPTON." This circular indicates dissatisfication with U.S. judicial system.

(b) Petition to Free Fred Hampton, a Political Prisoner.

(c) The People vs. the Pig.

(d) The People's Court

(e) Frame-Up

(f) BPP Support of Young Lords. The Young Lords is a Puerto Rican Youth Gang located on Chicago's near north side. CHA CHA JIMENEZ is leader of Young Lords. JAMES LAMB is a Chicago Police Officer and HANRAHAN probably refers to Cook County Chicago States Attorney EDWARD HANRAHAN, who met with group on May 13, 1969.

1

"THE PEOPLE VS. FRED HAMPTON

'"We want all people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their communities, as defined by the constitution of the United States."'

"This is the ninth point of the Black Panther Party's Ten-Point Program. The constitution says that a person is to be judged by those of the same socio-economic status. How can a petty bourgeois banker understand how a janitor liberates (steals) some food to feed his starving family? This is the type of injustice every oppressed person is subjected to within the "halls of justice". All Black People are oppressed because we do not control the means of production and distribution. The oppressors, the pig power structure controls our destiny-they determine who lives in our communities, what businesses are allowed in our communities, and what politicians are to serve the people.

" We, of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party, understand that Fred Hampton, our Deputy Chairman, was unjustly tried by the pig power structure of Illinois. Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton, a member of the Maywood Community, will be tried in court of his peer group defined by the constitution of the United States.

"The members of the Black Panther Party will be calling on you to support and endorse this just trial. The case will be tried in the Western Suburbs some time in the beginning of May. The Black Panther Party will keep the community informed as to the court date and place of the trial.

"For further information contact:
"Yvonne King, Deputy Minister of La
"243-8276"

45

PETITION TO FREE FRED HAMPTON, A POLITICAL PRISONER

We, the undersigned People of this nation, hereby petition for the immediate release of Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party. We believe that he is in prison solely because of his political belief, that all power in this nation should be in the hands of all the People of this nation. We know that he is innocent of the alleged robbery he was sentenced for. We know that he received an unfair trial. Most of all, we believe that denying him liberty before the appeal courts have finally determined whether he received a fair trial is a direct attempt to silence and punish him for his beliefs without any proof that he committed even one crime againost the people.

Name Address

1. ____________________
2. ____________________
3. ____________________
4. ____________________
5. ____________________
6. ____________________
7. ____________________
8. ____________________
9. ____________________
10. ____________________
11. ____________________
12. ____________________
13. ____________________
14. ____________________
15. ____________________
16. ____________________
17. ____________________
18. ____________________
19. ____________________
20. ____________________

PEOPLE'S COURT OF CHICAGO

THE PEOPLE

VS

THE PIG


I HAD TO SHOOT THAT BOY YER HONOR, HE COULD HAVE ~~HAD~~ A GUN OR SOMTHIN!
OF COURSE! NICE WORK, PATROLHOG ROBERTS... YOU CAN GO NOW.

INDICTMENT

of Pig Lamb for the murder of our bret
MANUEL RAMO

TRIAL DATE

6:30 P.M. Tuesday, May 13, 1969

COURT

Armitage and Halsted

THE PEOPLE'S COURT

Manuel Ramos, a Revolutionary Brother, was murdered in cold blood by the off-duty racist dog police. This same pig creates disorder in our schools, and vamps on us when we stand up for what is ours, as Manuel did. We make demands for better conditions in our schools. Manuel made a demand for the people. He said, "Man, I believe all people should have power whether they're Black, Brown, or White." And for that he was assassinated.

Manuel's murder is no exception. Everyday our brothers and sisters are murdered and vamped on by the pigs.

--Charles Cox, beaten to death by two pigs in the pigsty last week.
--Lil' Bobby Hutton, shot 18 times in the back, because he demanded justice for all people.
--Ron Nelson, whose pig murderer Nuccio was convicted by the people, but put back on the streets by the racist pig power structure and their lacky kangaroo courts.
--And thousands of other brothers and sisters whose murderers remain armed and loose and dangerous on the streets.

The people are now demanding some of the "law and order and justice" that the pig power structure talks about so much.

We have organized a march on the 18th district pigsty, where the head hog, State Attorney Hanrahan will be and demand action against assassin Pig Lamb Now. . . . .

--We demand the indictment and conviction of Pig Lamb for murder

--We demand the release of our brothers arrested to cover up murderer Lamb

The people have let the pigs rule and terrorize us for too long. They have kept up divided and confused thru racism. We must stop fighting each other and take on our real enemy -- the racist power structure and their army of pigs. We must act together and demand that their jive laws work for us -- the People.

We know that the courts have never worked for us. That they are controlled by the same pig power structure that sends its army of pigs to murder and harass us. We will demand that they give us justice . . . but when they do not we will take it.

THE PEOPLE SHALL HAVE LIBERTY AND JUSTICE - by any means necessary!

The People's Court and Rally will be --- Tuesday May 13, 1969 at 6:30 P.M.
Armitage and Halsted
Speakers will be there from
Black Panther Party Young Lords Organization Young Patriots NOC-LVYC

FRAME-UP!

On Monday May 12 the National Office of SDS was raided by Chicago pigs and fireman who broke through the front door and attacked staff people and SDS members. Five were arrested ; Mike Klonsky - national Secretary , Tim McCarthy , Ed Jennings , Les Coleman , Dave Slavin. They were charged with absurd charges , ranging from "battery on an officer" to "interfering with a fireman" to "inciting mob action." Bail was set at $12,000. In addition the five were restricted from leaving the state of Illinois.

On Thursday May 22 a hearing will be held to decide if the travel restrictions against the five should be lifted. Eveyone should attend this hearing to demand that these restrictive and unnecessary forms of harassment be lifted.

DATE - THURSDAY , MAY 22

TIME - 10;30 AM

PLACE - Court - corner Monroe and Racine

BE THERE! BE THERE! BE THERE!

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

BLACK POWER TO BLACK PEOPLE

LATIN POWER TO LATIN PEOPLE

HMH
6

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

SUPPORTS YOUNG LORDS CHA CHA

JIMENEZ

IN THEIR MARCH TUESDAY MAY 13 6:30

ARMTIAGE & HALSTED

DEMANDS THE ARREST OF

JAME LAMB MURDERER OF A

REVOLUTIONARY YLO BROTHER

MANUAL RAMOS

POLICE COMMUNITY WORKSHOP

WITH PONTIUS PILATE

HANRAHAN

50

HMH,
1

The following six pages sets forth copies of materials obtained at Chicago BPP headquarters on June 4, 1969. All materials were available in sufficient quantities to suggest likelihood of distribution. Materials described as follows:

(a) "Collaborating with the Enemy." A critical attack on U.S. Government, state and local governments, as well as officials of those branches of government.

(b) "Climax" - This circular criticizes capitalistic system.

(c) "To the Oppressed People". Criticism of Capitalism.

(d) "Sing Each Verse Three Times". Song referring to "off the pig."

1
HMH
1

"COLLABORATING WITH THE ENEMY

"The Government of the U.S. is trying desparately to maintain her domination over oppressed peoples in this pig society. One of her first tactics is to base herself an official collaborators and reactionary elements. These traitors-sons are singled out, given concessions, and placed on the national news media to denounce the revolutionary movement and the peoples aspirations for freedom. The government has made a concensus of its loyal and faithful traitors-sons, mobilized them to make declarations and condemnations on radio, TV, and in the papers to the effect of denouncing the peoples' rights to self-defense in the face of brutal pig attacks. The Black Panther Party has uncovered this scheme to keep the people at the mercy of this vicious pig power structure. We see this stepped-up campaign against the revolutionary peoples party as an attempt to cut off the "sound" population from the revolutionary body. The pig power structure knows that if the people follow the Black Panther Party, they will be unable to exploit, oppress, and murder us at will. These same traitors who denounced the people's legal right to be free, endorse the cynical, inhuman, deviate methods used to suppress the people.

"The traitors-sons are helping the enemy pigs in their national propaganda scheme to promote black capitalism, knowing from the start, that the resulting black capitalism is neo-colonialism. These collaborators, these black pigs, these white traitors are to be found on national, state, and local levels. They can be found in Congress, in pig Nixon's cabinet, in the supreme court, in state legislative bodies, and in local arms of national civil rights organizations. They will tell you that the problem is economic and social; that they will vigorously try to solve the housing question and end poverty, knowing well that these problems will never be solved as long as there is capitalism. They treat the demand for national liberation as if it is a manifestation of social discontent. They move with the illusions that their promises to improve living conditions will be sufficient to bring back order and peace. They misinterpret the peoples national consciousness and ignore it in order to receive their concessions from the pigs. They are helping those avaricious capitalist pigs run their con games on the people. As long as these enemy pigs exist, the power structure and their running dogs will use them to point the masses in the wrong direction.

"The Black Panther Party will forever educate the masses to their deviate tricks and they, too, will have to face the wrath of the armed people. The Black Panther Party, the beacon light to freedom, will show the people how to resist the efforts of these collaborators, these traitor-sons, these enemy soldiers.

"A pig is a pig is a pig.

"ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

"YUSUN

"Illinois chapter journalist"

"CLIMAX"

"For a revolutionary atmosphere to exist, contradictions must be heightened to the point where there are two separate and immobile forces, one stimulating revolution-longing about a new established rule for the people; and the other is filled with inconsistency trying to maintain the present status quo.

"We are in the beginning of this revolutionary atmosphere. It is time for Black people to stop the "Civil Rights Game" and learn that the pigs are "playing" for keeps. For 400 years we have been told to be non-violent to the American people so we can arouse their moral feeling. They aren't arousing moral feeling in Viet Nam, Thailand, South and Latin America. You don't see American soldiers holding sit-ins or demonstrations in Saigon or Hue. They don't carry peace signs over Hanoi. The pigs aren't riding around with pslams when the patrol our community. Those are 12-gauge pump shotguns - good for controlling a mob of angry niggers and were brought into existence only for the mass murder of black people.

"In the Geneva Convention it was said that using 12-gauge shotguns were illegal in time of warfare and were inhuman on people.
WHAT ARE WE CONSIDERED BY THEM?

"Everyone Tonto, but no one remembers that in Spanish Tonto means stupid. For years and years, the oppressor has been calling us Tonto and we never knew it.

"But lets talk of the necessity of revolution. For one thing we don't have freedom. We have never and never will be able to control our destiny in this capitalist society. Our people have never seen full employment. They won't ever. The people do the hardest work and receive the least pay. We are constantly being robbed in our community by capitalist pigs who thrive off exploitation and like vultures live off our blood. Decent housing has never been a reality for Black people while avaricious businessmen collect $125 rent and can't fix the faucet. In school we never receive an education. But we want one. We want one that teaches us our true history and our role in present day society. One that exposes the true nature of this racist, decadent society. Black folk have always been fighting Uncle Sam's wars and never received recognition at home. We can never receive fair and impartial trials, because the white man can never understand the average reasoning Black man. We have never been tried by people of our own peer group or people from our Black community and defended by their jive-ass constitution of the United States. We'll never have land, the basis for independence, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice, or peace while we exist in this society. NEED MORE BE SAID.

"'POLITICAL POWER GROWS OUT
OF THE BARREL OF A GUN--'
Mao Tse-Tung

"'WHEN A SLAVE KILLS THE
SLAVEMASTER IT SERVES AS
A CLEANSING PROCESS, BECAUSE
A MAN IS BORN AND THE OPPRESSO
IS GONE--'
Huey P. Newton

" POWER TO THE PEOPLE
PANTHER POWER TO THE VANGUARD

"ILLINOIS BLACK PANTHER PARTY
2350 W. Madison
-8276"

TO THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE

Intelligence is enhanced by one's ability to observe objectively, participate objectively, and form an objective opinion.

The capitalistic power structure over a period of 340 some odd years has tole oppressed people in various degrees or rhetoric that we as a subhuman animal are unintelligent, uncouth, buffoons, shiftless, etc. As members of the Black Panther Party we are inclined to see the masses of oppressed communities going through a period of subjective observation, subjective participation and formulating subjective opinions. Consequently adhering to the dehumanizing rhetoric instilled in oppressed peoples minds for 340 some odd Years? The Western suburb area (Argo, LaGrange, Maywood) is functioning somewhat on the same level at the mass media, to destroy the people and the peoples party, the Black Panther Party. The mass media strictly deals with one-sided subjective news to be read and listened to solely for the satisfaction of the capitalistic population mainly because it is run by the capitalistic power structure.

You've already been told you are second class citizens, 20th century slaves; you've already been denied first class food, housing, clothing, education, health, but you have the newve to expect first class news concerning the Black Panther Party. Why, because you are behaving on mass psychological un-intelligent state, subjective observation, subjective participation and consequently subjective opinion.

The Black Panther Party circulates newsletters, newspapers, and Black Panther ideology in oppressed communities (Argo, LaGrange, Maywood). Newsletters are thrown away, newspapers go unread, Black Panther ideology is received but not tuned-in to minds and ears.

Consequently you observe the Black Panther Party members in a subjective, non-tuned in manner, as gangbusters, hoodlums, cut-throats, illiterates and mercenaries of the oppressed communities. You don't participate in an objective, intelligent manner. You go about forming subjective, unintelligent conclusions and opinions about the People's Party. You see it is you, you the oppressed people that make the peoples party gangbusters, hoodlums, cut-throats, illiterates, and mercenaries!

WE ARE NOT AGAINST THE PEOPLE, WE ARE FOR THE PEOPLE. THAT IS WHY WE SAY "ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE."

To rid yourself of this dehumanizing unintelligent, subjective observation, participation, opinion and conclusion, observe objectively the Black Panther Party, participate objectively with the Black Panther Party, form objective conclusions and opinions. Then and only then can we, the Vanguard Party go about liberating you.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
PANTHER POWER TO THE VANGUARD

Western Suburban Chapter
The Black Panther Party
State of Illinois

HMH/
1

Sing Each Verse Three Times

1. The revolution has come-off the pig!
Time to pick up the gun-off the pig!

2. No More Brothers In Jail-off the pig!
The pigs Are gonna catch Hell-off the pig

3. We're Gonna use our own strategy-off the pig
In this Decadent Society-off the pig!

4. The Pigs Are gonna go Down-off the Pig!
We're gonna fight for our Ground-off the pig!

5. No more Pigs in our Community-off the pig!
No more Pig Brutality-off the pig!

57

HMH
2

The following six pages sets forth copies of materials obtained at Chicago BPP headquarters on June 4, 1969. All materials were available in sufficient quantities to suggest likelihood of distribution. Materials deal with BPP plan to provide free food to hungry children.

HMH
1

"ILLINOIS BLACK PANTHER PARTY
2350 West Madison
Chicago, Illinois 60612

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERNED:

"You have no doubt heard about the Black Panther Party. If you haven't, the Black Panther Party is the vanguard party of the oppressed people. We have taken upon ourselves the task of getting what the people want, getting what the people need, getting what the people deserve.

"In meeting the wants, needs and just rewards of the people, we have initiated a Breakfast for School Children Program which will be free to hungry children-- children who go to school without food in their stomachs; and a Defense Fund for the many Brothers placed in jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

"We, the Black Panther Party know that both these causes are of such magnitude as to warrant the immediate attention of the entire community. We realize that its hard enough to go to school, but for a child to have to go to school on an empty stomach is criminal. Criminal because some super rich capitalist won"t pay decent wages or hire qualified people today to do a job to make enough money to feed their children. At the same time we realize the courts have been unjust and unconstitutional in their handling of Black people brought before them. The pig power structure in this country is focusing it's blood thirsty attacks on the leaders of the Black Panther Party in all states. It is most important that these leaders remain among the people. They must be allowed to tell the truth about this decadent system.

"We come to you, knowing you are fair and asking for your support for these two worthy causes. We are asking for donations of food for these hungry children and money contributions for the Defense Fund. Your donation may be small or large--it will all be appreciated. We of the Black Panther Party thank you for your donation if there is one.

HMH
2

"POWER TO THE PEOPLE
"CHAKA
"MINISTER OF INFORMATION

"For further information call 243-8276"

IHHI/
8

[illegible]LINOIS BLACK PANTHER P[illegible]Y
2350 W. MADISON STREET
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, 60612

The Black Panther Party atuned to the needs of Black People--is implementing a Breakfast for Children 's program. This program is designed to feed children from 7-9 a.m. before they go to school. We have various centers covering the west and south and north sides from which to work--but we are in need of more funds and food. The breakfast themselves are free to the children at our expense and this why in order to substain it, we must have donations of food and money.

We are appealing to Businessmen to support this most worthy program either in the form of financial support or donations of food and other perishable goods. There can be no doubt in your mind as to the necessity of this program and there should be no doubt as to the sincerity of the Panthers. The Black Panther Party is here to serve the needs of Black People--with your help our program can be accelerated and be made beneficial to every child in the ghettos of Chicago.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

ADDED NOTE: We have one fully operating center at 1512 S. Pulaski--with a few tentative others, hinging upon the question food supply.
Daily we feed approx. 200 children with an expectancy o more

WE CORDIALYY INVITE YOU TO COME AND OBSERVE OUR PROGRAM IN ACTION.

HMIL
7

I inois Black Panther P y
2350 W. Madison St.
Chicago, Illinois 60612

We are primarily a Revolutionary Vanguard Army, but we must relate and move with the needs of the people. Due to the system's adverse position against Black People--many Black children go to school hungry. Therefore the Black Panther Party atuned to the needs of Black People--feels it is necessary to enact a Breakfast for Children Program.

This program will begin April 1, we now have a west-side base to work from--what is primarily involved is to get space accessible to neighboring schools and feed our children form 7-9 a.m.

We have no working base on the southside--and we cannot ignore the needs of our oppressed Brothers and Sisters. Therefore we are asking you to donate your church hall or any space that would house from one to three hundred children.

We would appreciate you assistance in our implementing this beautiful program.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

[illegible]LINOIS BLACK PANTHER [illegible]RTY
2350 W. Madison Street
Chicago, Illinois

March 11, 1969

ATTENTION:

Dear Sir:

In reference to the conversation between you and Miss Ross some months ago I am submitting this report as to the reason for the Black Panthers Fund Raising Drive for the B/lack community. We have a number of programs for the community which through your assistance we would like to see implemented.

Some of which are:

- Breakfast for Children Program
- Law Firm Center
- Free Health Clinics
- Food Buying Club (which we have, but which is not being operated on a larg basis)
- Economics Assistance to ADC Mothers
- Day Care Nursery
- Tenant's Union for the upkeep of the buildings

We have at present limited vehicles by which to makethis materialize to:

- Rallies
- Minimal Donations
- Proceeds from Posters, Papers, Pamphlets, etc.

These as you see are very limited for the programs we have in mind. We are not asking you for money; simply your assistance in securing a financial base for the Black community. With the many resources that you have at hand -- in implementing many of our communi objectives would be a definite boost.

Sincerely,
Alvino Suing
Deputy Minister of Finance

The pigs can threaten us with jail, exile and murder us, but as long as the Black Panther Party exists, we will feed our children.

The centers on the westside (1512 South Pulaski), southside (503 East 37th) and northside (1400 North Cleveland) will continue to operate from 7 a.m. to 9 a.m. and new centers will be opened to fit the needs of the people.

Soon, we will open up a free health clinic, another thing which the people need.

And in the words of deputy Chairman Fred Hampton:

> "You can jail a revolutionary,
> but you can't jail revolution.
> You can kill a liberator,
> but you can't kill liberation.
> You can run a freedom fighter around the country,
> but you can't run freedom.
> Because, if you do, you come up with questions that don't question,
> answers that don't answer, conclusions that don't conclude, explanations that don't explain and endings that don't end."

So, the pigs can refuse to let us use the centers built for the people, they can deny us all the permits and other little bits of so-called "legality" to keep us from opening up a free health clinic and breakfast centers but, the BLACK PANTHER PARTY will continue to serve the needs of the people.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
PANTHER POWER TO THE VANGUARD

An eight page document captioned "Suggested Plan for the Complete Breakdown of the State of Illinois Power Structure" was located in a brown record box which was in the private office on the southeast corner of the second floor of the building occupied by the Chicago Black Panther Party (BPP). The office where this document was located is under the sole jurisdiction and control of the Chicago BPP.

The document which is set forth in full in the appendix section of this report set forth information indicating the BPP would seek to cause chaotic conditions in the State of Illinois by the destruction of communication, power and transportation systems. The document indicated the execution of city and state officials should occur as well as crippling the fire department.

The document also sets forth information concerning "Suggested Organization of Section and a 'military' training schedule." The document was labeled "Top Secret."

HMH
4

The following seven pages are reproductions of posters (approximately 18½" X 25") which were prominently displayed on walls of Chicago BPP headquarters on June 4, 1969.



"WE ARE ADVOCATES OF THE ABOLITION OF WAR . . . WE DO NOT WANT WAR; BUT WAR CAN ONLY BE ABOLISHED THROUGH WAR AND IN ORDER TO GET RID OF THE GUN IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE UP THE GUN."

Chairman Mao





HE came from the mountaintop down into the valley — so he could keep saying —

"I am a REVOLUTIONARY"

HOT TOWN —
PIGS IN THE STREETS . . .



BUT THE STREETS .
BELONG TO THE PEOPLE !

DIG IT ?

POLITICAL POWER



Wednesday, April 9 9:30 a

BOBBY SEALE

National Chairman,

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

ON TRIAL

Be at the trial

Federal Building

Jackson & Dearborn

Wednesday, April 9 9:30

Be at the rally

201 S. Ashland (the church)

Wednesday at 7:00 pm

Bobby Seale will speak.

GROWS OUT OF THE BARREL OF A GUN


EVERYONE MUST
BE A
GUERRILLA

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
2350 W. MADISON
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

POLITICAL POWER


FREEDOM
JUSTICE and
HUMANI

GROWS OUT OF THE BARREL OF A GUN

HMH
5

The following 20 pages are reproductions of posters (approximately 15" X 20") quoting MAO Tse-tung, which were promently displayed on walls of Chicago BPP headquarters on June 4, 1969.

The socialist system will eventually replace the capitalist system; this is an objective law independent of man's will. However much the reactionaries try to hold back the wheel of history, sooner or later revolution will take place and will inevitably triumph.

MAO TSE-TUNG



The days of imperialism are numbered. The imperialists have committed all manner of evils and all the oppressed peoples of the whole world will never forgive them.

MAO TSE-TUNG

76

Marxism consists of thousands of truths, but they all boil down to the one sentence, "It is right to rebel." . . . And from this truth there follows resistance, struggle, the fight for socialism.

MAO TSE-TUNG

People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs! People of the world, be courageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties and advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people. Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed.

MAO TSE-TUNG

What imperialism fears most is the awakening of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples, the awakening of the peoples of all countries. We should unite and drive U.S. imperialism from Asia, Africa and Latin America back to where it came from.

MAO TSE-TUNG

We should support whatever the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy supports.

MAO TSE-TUNG

All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful.

MAO TSE-TUNG

We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the entire people.

MAO TSE-TUNG

82



We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the entire people.

MAO TSE-TUNG

The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.

MAO TSE-TUNG

What is a true bastion of iron? It is the masses, the millions upon millions of people who genuinely and sincerely support the revolution.

MAO TSE-TUNG



The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon.

MAO TSE-TUNG

The oppressed peoples and nations must not pin their hopes for liberation on the "sensibleness" of imperialism and its lackeys. They will only triumph by strengthening their unity and persevering in their struggle.

MAO TSE-TUNG



Marxism consists of thousands of truths, but they all boil down to the one sentence, "It is right to rebel." . . . And from this truth there follows resistance, struggle, the fight for socialism.

MAO TSE-TUNG



Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution.

MAO TSE-TUNG

The oppressed peoples and nations must not pin their hopes for liberation on the "sensibleness" of imperialism and its lackeys. They will only triumph by strengthening their unity and persevering in their struggle.

MAO TSE-TUNG

We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun.

MAO TSE-TUNG



The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history.

MAO TSE-TUNG

Everything reactionary is the same; if you don't hit it, it won't fall. This is also like sweeping the floor; as a rule, where the broom does not reach, the dust will not vanish of itself.

MAO TSE-TUNG



In times of difficulty we must not lose sight of our achievements, must see the bright future and must pluck up our courage.

MAO TSE-TUNG

94

A 16 page pamphlet entitled "Huey Newton Talks to the Movement," was observed at Chicago BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969.

Hundreds perhaps thousands of copies of this pamphlet were observed. Quantity of pamphlet would indicate likelihood of plans for distribution.

Pamphlet sets forth NEWTON's comments, observations and philosophy regarding the BPP Movement in the United States.

NEWTON also discusses cultural nationalism, Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, as well as his observations concerning the "liberals" and white revolutionaries. The entire pamphlet is being set forth in the appendix section of this report.

A 26 page pamphlet entitled "Essays from the Minister of Defense Huey Newton," was observed at the Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois on June 4, 1969.

Hundreds of these pamphlets were contained in open boxes in a manner that suggested they were available for general distribution.

The pamphlet is a collection of speeches and writings of HUEY NEWTON. Articles indicated that the pamphlet claims to have a collection of truths, principles, and beliefs of the BPP.

This pamphlet's introduction states "The Black Panther Party is a vanguard party for Africans in the United States. Introduction indicates what we believe in is armed revolution, a permanent revolution, the creation of as many Vietnams as are necessary to defeat United States racism and imperialism throughout the world."

Specific articles related to "the correct handling of a revolution," and "In defense of self-defense."

The entire pamphlet is being set forth in the appendix section of this report.

HMH/
8

An eight page pamphlet entitled "Major City Police Departments Command Officer Conferences" with sub-heading (on second page) "The Pig Institute," was observed at Chicago BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois on June 4, 1969.

Numerous copies of this pamphlet were observed and quantity would suggest the likelihood of plans for general distribution.

This pamphlet makes reference to conferences sponsored by The Criminal Justice Curriculum under a $79,000 grant from the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance.

The pamphlet also sets forth information as to their (the writer's) interpretation as "what police activites are about" and lists several items under caption "Police repression directed against the Black Panther Party."

Contents of this pamphlet is highly critical of police officers making constant references to police officers as "pigs." Pamphlet also indicates identity of BPP members allegedly victims of police repression.

The entire pamphlet is being set forth in the appendix section of this report.

9

HMH
9

The following four pages entitled "In Defense of Self-Defense: The Correct Handling of a Revolution" sets forth information indicating the BPP, the vanguard party, must provide leadership for the people as they are looking now for guidance to extend and strengthen their resistance struggle against the power structure oppression.

Numerous copies of this pamphlet were observed at Chicago BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969.

"In Defense o[illegible]f Defense:
The Correct [illegible]ndling of a Revolution."

Most human behavior is learned behavior. Most things the human being learns are gained through an indirect relationship to the obec Humans do not act from instinct as lower animals do. Those things learned indirectly many times stimulate very effective responses to what might be later a direct experience. At this time the black masses are handling the resistanse incorrectly. The bothers in East Oakland learned from Watts a means of resistance fighting by amassing the people in the streets, throwing bricks and molotov cocktails to destroy property and creat disruption. The brothers and sisters in the streets were herded into a small area by the gestopo police and immediatly contained by brotal vel- violence of the oppressor's storm troops. This manner of resistance is sporadic, short-lived, and costly in violenceof the Oppressor's against the people. This method has been transmitted to all the gettos of the black nation across the country. The first man who threw a molotov cocktail is not personally known by the masses, but yet the action was respected and followed by the people.

The Vangard Party must provide leadership for the people. It must teach the correct strategic methods os prolonged resstance through literature and activites. If the activites of the party are respected by the people, the people will follow the example. ~~the~~ This knowledge will propaly be gained insecond-hand by the masses just as the above mentioned was gained indirectly. When the people learn that it is no longer advantageous for them to resist by going into the streets in the activities of the gurrilla warfare method, they will quickly follow this example.

But first, they must respect the party which is transmitting this message. When the Vanguard group destorys the machinery of the oppressor by dealing with him in small groups of three and for, and then escapes the might of the oppressor by ~~dealing~~the masses will adhere to this correct strategy. When the masses will be overjoyed and hear that a gestpo ~~polp~~ police has been executed while sipping coffee at a counter, and the revolutionary executioner fled without bieng traced, the masses will see the validity of this type of approach to resistance. It is not necessary to organize thirty million Black people in primary groups of two's and three's but it is important for the party to show the people how to go about revolution. During slavery, in which no vanguard party existed and froms of communication were severly restricted and insufficient, many slave revolts occurred.

There are basically thr e ways one can learn; Through study, through observation, and through actual experience. The black community is basically composed of activists. The community learns through activity, either through abservation of or participation in the activity. To study and learn is good but theactual experience is the best means of learning. Theparty must engage in activities t at will teach the people. The black community is basically not a reading community. There fore it is very significant that the vanguard group first be activists. Without this knowledge of the black community, one could not gain the fundamental knowledge of the black revolution in racist America.

The main fuction of the party is to awaken the people and to teach them the strategic method of resisting the power structure, which is prepared not only to combat the resistance of the people with massive brutality, but to totally annihilate the black community, the black population.

If it is learned by the power structure that black people have"x" amount of guns in their possession, this will not stimulate the power structure to prepare itself with guns, because it is already more than prepared.

The end result of this education will be positive for Black people in their reisitance and negative for the power structure in its oppression, because the party always exemplifies revolutionary defiance. If the party is not going to make the people aware of the tools of liberation and the strategic method that is to be used, there will be no means by which the people will be mobilized properly.

The relationship between the vanguard party and the masses is a secondary relationship. The relationship between the members of the vanguard party is a primary relationship. It is important that the members of the vanguard group maintain a face-toface- relationship with each other. This is important if the party machinery is to be effective. It is impossible to put together functional party machinery or programs without this direct relationship. The members of the vanguard group should be tested revolutionaries. This will minimize the danger of Uncle Tom informers and opportunists.

The main purpose of vanguard group should be to raise the consciousness of the masses through educational programs and certain physical activities the party will participate in. The sleeping masses must be bombarded with the correct approach to struggle through the activities of the vanguard party. Therefore, the masses must know that the party exists. The party must use all means available to get this information across to the masses. If the masses do not have knowledge of the party, it will be impossible for the masses to follow the program of the party.

The vanguard party is never underground in the beginning of its existence, because this would limit its effectiveness and educational processes. How can you teach people if the people do not know the and respect you? The party must exist above ground as long as thedog power structure will allow, and hopefully when the party is forced to go underground the message of the party will already have been put across to the people. The vanguard party's activities on the surface will necessarily be shortlived.

This is why it is so important that the party make a tremendous impact upon the people before it is driven into secrecy.

At this time, the people know the party exists, and they will seek out further information on the activities of this underground party.

Many would-be revolutionaries work under the fallacious illusion that the vanguard party is to [illegible] seefet organization that [illegible] power structure knows nothing about, and the masses know nothing about, except for occasional letters that come to their homes by night. Underground parties cannot distribute leaflets announcing an underground meeting. These are contradictions and inconsistencies of the so-called revolutionaries. The so-called revolutionaries are in fact afraid of the very danger that they are advocating for the people. These so-called revolutionaries want the people to say what they themselves are afraid to do. This makes the so-called revolutionary a coward and a hypocrite.

If these imposters would investigate the history of revolution, they would see that the vanguard group always starts out above ground and is later driven underground by the aggressor. The Cuban Revolution exemplifies this fact; when Fidel Castro started to resist the butcher Batista and the American running dogs, he started by speaking on the campus of the University of Havana in public. He was later driven to the hills. His impact upon the dispossessed people of Cuba was very great and received with much respect. When he went into secrecy, Cuban people searched him out. People went ot the hills to find him and his band of twelve. Castro handled the revolutionary struggle correctly. If the Chinese Revolution is investigated, it will be seen that the Communist Party was quite on the surface so that they would be able to muster support from the masses. There are many areas one can read about to learn the correct approach, such as the revolution in Kenya, the Algerian Revolution, Fanon's THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH, the Russian Revolution, the works of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and a host of others.

A revolutionary must realize that if he is sincere, death is imminent due to the fact th at the things he is saying and doing areextremely dangerous. Without this realization, it is impossible to proceed as a revolutionary. The masses are constantly looking for a guide, a Messiah, to liberate them from the hands of the oppressor. The vanguard party must exemplify the characteristics of worthy leadership. Millions and millions of oppressed people might not know members of the vanguard party, personally or directly, but they will gain through an indirect acquaintance the proper strategy for liberation via the mass media and the physical activities of the party. It is of prime importance that the vanguard pafty develop a political organ, such as a newspaper produced by the party, as well as employ strategically revolutionary art and destruction of the oppressor's machinery. For example, Watts. The economy and property of the oppressor was destroyed to such an extent that no matter how the oppressor tried to whitewash the activities of the black brothers, the real nature and the real cause of the activity was communicated to every black community. For further example, no matter how the oppressor tries to distort and confuse the message of Brother Stokely Carmichael, Black people all over the country understand it perfectly and welcome it.

The Black Panther Party for Self Defense teaches that in thefinal analysis, the amount of guns and defense weapons, such as hand grenades, bazookas, and other necessary equipment, will be supplied by taking these weapons from the power structure, as exemplified by the Viet Cong. Therefore, the greater the military preparation on the part of the oppressork the greater is the availability of weapons for the black community. It is believed by some hypocrites that when the people are taught by the vanguard group to prepare for resistance, this only brings the man down on them with increasing violence and brutality; but the fact of the matter is that when the man becomes more oppressive, this only heightens the revolutionary fervor. The people never make revolution. The oppressors by their brutal actions cause the resistance by the people. The vanguard party only teaches the correct methods of resistance. So. if things can get worse for opp[illegible] people, then they will f[illegible]l no need for revolution or resistance. The complaint of the hypocrites that the Black Panther Party for Self Defense if exposing the people to deeper suffering is an incorrect observation People have proved that they will not tolerate any more oppression b y the racist dpg police through their rebellions in the black communities across the country. The people are looking now for guidance.. to extend and strenghthen their resistance struggle.

A nine page pamphlet captioned "Political Education Kit" for BPP members was observed at Chicago BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois on June 4, 1969.

Numerous copies of this pamphlet were observed and the large quantity would suggest likelihood of plans for distribution.

The Political Education Kit for BPP members from BPP Central Headquarters, Post Office Box 8641, Emeryville Branch, Oakland, California, states among other things that "primary objectives of our party: to establish revolutionary political power for black people.

"The Black Panther Party is an armed body for carrying out the political task of the revolution."

This pamphlet also states stipulations and other disciplinary actions to be taken against BPP members upon violation of party rules as well as setting forth the various positions of the party at the state level and duties of some of these positions.

The entire document is being set forth in the appendix section of this report.

A five page memorandum captioned "National Organizational Structuer, Black Panther Party" was observed at Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969.

Numerous copies of this memorandum were observed.

Memorandum sets forth the three-level organizational structure of the Black Panther Party.

The first level lists the officers and various ranks of the National Central Committee of Black Panther Party.

The second level lists the officers and various ranks of the Central Staff of any state level Black Panther Party Chapter.

The third level refers to the Central Staff of any local city branch of Black Panther and lists the officers and ranks of individuals in such a group.

The entire memorandum is being set forth in the appendix section of this report.

1

A 23-page pamphlet captioned "Black Panther Coloring Book", was observed at the BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969.

Numerous copies of this pamphlet were observed.

The "Black Panther Coloring Book" is a series of pictures for children to color.

The pictures attack the white male, white slave owner, white policeman, and white store owner. Photographs indicate white "pigs" are afraid of black adults and attacks black children. The entire book contains photographs referring to the white man as a "pig".

The entire complete pamphlet is being set forth in the appendix section of this report.

1

The following four-pages sets forth the contents of BPP pamphlet entitled "Black Panther Party Platform and Program - What We Want - What We Believe."

Numerous copies of this pamphlet were observed at the Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969.

The pamphlet sets forth the "ten point" program of the BPP.

OCTOBER 1966

BLACK PANTHER PARTY PLATFORM and PROGRAM



WHAT WE WANT

WHAT WE BELIEVE



FREE HUEY

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the white man of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights: that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But, when a long train of abuses and unsurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

#6



POWER TO THE PEOPLE

HMH
1

A metal pin, one and three-eights inches in diameter, colored yellow, with the single word, "Conspiracy!" printed in black across the center of the pin was observed at Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969.

A large number of identical pins were observed, suggesting the likelihood of planned distribution.

1

The following two pages are xerox copies of xerox posters (approximately 8½" by 11") which were displayed on the walls of the Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969. Both posters were in regard to police officers. Photographs on both posters were poor reproductions, however, printing suggested that San Francisco Police Officer MICHAEL O'BRIEN is a "pig". O'BRIEN's poster indicated he was wanted by the BPP for the murder of brother GEORGE BASSKET.

The second poster was a poor photographic reproduction of a coffin carrying the body of a police officer and captioned "all power to the people."

WANTED

FOR MURDER

S.F. PIG MICHAEL O'BRIEN

DESCRIPTION

231 LBS.
5' 11"
43 APPROX.
(~~BLONDE~~) BLUE
BLONDE
MALE PIG

FOR THE MURDER
OF BRO. GEORGE
BASSKET

4785 - 18th. STREET
SAN FRANCISCO. CALIF.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE



[TRIBUNE Staff Photo]

Pallbearers carry coffin of Detective Jerome Stubig from Immaculate Conception church.

2 Slain Policemen

114

1

One copy of a 29-page Report of Special Agent EDWARD KINZER, JR., dated June 12, 1969, at Chicago, Illinois, is being set forth in the appendix section of this report.

The report is titled GEORGE SAMS, JR., aka; LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS; BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON; ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES; HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT; PATRICK KEEN; LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON; JESSIE WARD; GEORGIA WASHINGTON; who are the individuals who were arrested at the Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969, and charged with harboring and concealing GEORGE SAMS, JR. at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1071.

This report bears the character of Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution - Murder; Conspiracy to Commit Murder; Kidnaping; Conspiracy to Commit Kidnaping; Binding; and Harboring.

This report sets forth the results of the interviews of BPP individuals who were arrested on June 4, 1969, as well as a copy of a complaint against individuals arrested at the Chicago BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969.

1

APPENDIX SECTION

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. Michael Klonsky, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power and does not support the policies of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), headquartered at 360-362 Nelson Street, S. W., Atlanta, Georgia, is a nonmembership organization, which was born out of the sit-in movement that erupted across the South beginning in 1960.

Today SNCC identifies itself as an organization in the revolutionary vanguard. It advocates that to be successful it is necessary to develop a revolutionary ideology and revolutionary program.

According to SNCC the year 1967 marked a historic milestone in the struggle for the liberation of black people in the United States and the year that revolutionaries throughout the world began to understand more fully the impact of the black movement. SNCC declared that "liberation will come only when there is final destruction of this mad octopus-- the capitalistic system of the United States with all its life-sucking tentacles of exploitation and racism that choke the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The realities of black life, together with the recognition instilled in SNCC workers forced its members to further popularize the legitimacy of self-defense and rebellions when oppression became too great."

From May, 1966, until May, 1967, Stokely Carmichael was National Chairman of SNCC. As of July, 1968, Carmichael resided in Washington, D. C., where he was affiliated with SNCC and active as temporary chairman of a black coalition group. In May, 1967, Carmichael was replaced by Hubert Geroid Brown, commonly known as H. Rap Brown, who served until June, 1968.

In June, 1968, at the Staff and Central Committee meeting of SNCC held in Atlanta, Georgia, it was decided to restructure the organization by equalization of responsibility by creating ten deputy or vice chairmanships. The primary purpose for this change is to take law enforcement pressure off any single individual.

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC), CHICAGO BRANCH

A source advised in May, 1968, that the Chicago Branch of SNCC was an affiliate of the national SNCC with headquarters located in Atlanta, Georgia. It was a non-membership type group headed in Chicago by ROBERT ALFONZO BROWN, a 19 year old male Negro, with the title of Midwest Region Director. BROWN maintained strict loyalty to STOKELY CARMICHAEL, Recruiter and Organizer and former National Director of SNCC. BROWN attempted to align Chicago's SNCC activities within the framework of CARMICHAEL's policies.

In a speech at Chicago on March 25, 1968, CARMICHAEL commented as follows: "The white people are preparing to commit genocide against the black race. What are we feeling so moral about? We know the honky got everything. He got it by stealing it. He's not going to give you anything. We got to take it. These brothers on the streets every day take it, but they're taking it for themselves. Let's organize them and let them take it for our people."

This source advised on August 27, 1968, that officials of the Chicago Branch of SNCC disbanded that branch on August 25, 1968, and as of that time it was no longer in existence. Its leaders became associated with the Black Panther Party at that time.

1

SUGGESTED PLAN FOR THE COMPLETE BREAK DOWN OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS POWER STRUCTURE

Problem:

Complete victory for People Revolution in Illinois.

Theory:

To cause chaotic condition, and place pig in position to take repressive measures toward the masses of the people, and thereby chase the mass of people into the revolutionary's camp. Plan to be used when party reaches this level.

Destruction of: (All hit at same time)

A. Communication (Blame pig)
   1. Telephone
   2. Radio
   3. TV
B. Power (Blame pig)
   1. Light
   2. Gas
C. Industrial complex (Blame pig)
   1. Factories, etc.
D. Food distribution (Blame pig)
   1. Non-perishables (first)
   2. Perishables (second)
E. Transportation
   1. Inner city (State) bus depot, train depot (tracks), buses, taxi.
   2. Outer city (State) (same as inner)
   3. Air transportation, airports, airfields
   4. Water transportation (docks)
   5. Highways
   6. Gas stations (all fuel)

Execution of: (All hit at same time)

- A. City Officials (State)
  - 1. Administrative (top)
  - 2. Police (rank)
  - 3. Military (rank)
    - a. State
    - b. Federal
  - 4. Dangerous elements in community, petty leaders of enemy ideology

Other Areas:

- A. Gun Shops (collected for distribution)
- B. Police storage (to deprive pig and supply party)
- C. Military storage (to deprive pig, Joliet, Illinois ammo)
- D. Cripple fire department

Other Suggestions:

Need for a chapter in North Chicago. (Great Lake Naval Training Center and its near Fort Sheridan), East St. Louis, Illinois (Scott Air Force Base). The basic job to disrupt military organization before they can mobilize.

Get the plans of city's sewerage system through bribery, extortion or any method necessary.

A secure place for headquarters.

HMH
1

SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION OF SECTION

I. Problem:

A. Separation from main body.

II. Cause:

A. Movement to present level.

III. Theory:

A. Section to function as physical independent arm of main body and as one of the overall arms of the main body.

IV. Practice:
- A. Commander
- B. Intelligence
  - 1. Internal
  - 2. External
- C. Political
- D. Medical
- E. Communications
- F. Supply

A, B, C, D, E and F must receive their training from the respective staffs of the main body, and come back to section and function in that capacity in their respective sections.

Notes

A. Commander: Section Leader, see that section functions smoothly.
B. Intelligence:
  A. Internal, to know the weakness and strength of each member and estimate his actions in any given situation. To expose all counter-revolutionary forces and actions within the section. This position is to remain secret from all members, except Section Leader and high level of main body.

B. External: to gather intelligence material in sectional area.

C. Political: (Sub-Section Leader) Teaching and maintaining a high level of political ideology of party at section of each.

D. Medical: Primary job, aiding injured members of section. Secondary job, aiding the injured of the mass of the people.

F. Communications: Handling communications between sections and main body and within section, and (in grave times) between people and section.

G. Supply: Collection and distribution of supplies.

Other Suggestions

1. Comrade Court, to handle minor violations (major violations are handled by main body), Democratic Court.

2. Sectional Citations, to be given to sections who are outstanding in relating to the people, sell papers, etc. This will build sectional historical pride and increase morale.

3. Sectional title names. Example: Night Fighters, Big Black Five, etc. This will also help build morale.

HMH
1

MILITARY TRAINING SCHEDULE

A four week mandatory class for all members (Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday) with the exclusion of all non-members. Two classes should be conducted by a small military staff, classes conducted expressing party ideology, and stressing military discipline at all times. Example: Upon the entering of the classroom of the military instructor, all talking should cease and all trainees should take a firm attentive standing position, and remain in this manner until given the order to be seated. All classes or class activities should begin with: All power the people and victory to the people's revolution. The main purpose of the class is to give every party member a basic practical knowledge of the military phase of the peoples' struggle. There should be no absenteeism from the Political Education Classes (no excuses), reason being a military mind without a people's ideology is a hired killer, and the people don't need no more pigs. Classes should be conducted in an orderly manner at all times.

Structure of the Classes

I. Discipline:

A. Discipline is the exact execution of orders resulting from an intelligent, willing obedience, rather than one based solely upon habit or fear. Discipline is necessary to secure orderly action which alone can triumph over the seemingly impossible condition of battle. The party members must be able to recognize and face fear because fear is the enemy of discipline. Fear unchecked will lead to panic and a unit that panics is no longer a disciplined unit, but a mob. There is no sane person who is without fear, but with good discipline and high morale all can face danger. Punishment of individual members for breaches of discipline are sometimes necessary, but only to reform or eliminate those who are unfit to serve the people's revolution.

1. To be learned verbatim and understood thoroughly:

a. Discipline of the Party (Red Book)

b. three main rules of discipline (Red Book)
c. eight points of attention

2. Chain of Command

   a. Trying to understand problems with self first, and if no success, go to next ranking member.

3. Military Respect

   a. people respect
   b. Party respect
   c. rank respect

II. Intergradation of Military and Political Ideology.

1. Correcting the false idea that there is a contradiction between military and political ideology.
2. Teaching that the People's Liberation Army cannot exist without the people, the people have nothing without a socialist ideology, so the people are socialist ideology, the People's Liberation Army must have a socialist ideology in order to relate to the people, if it is to serve the people as their military arm.

III. Weaponry

A. Knowledge of
   1. Range
   2. Rate of fire
   3. Loading
   4. Unloading
   5. External parts
      a. care
   6. Internal parts
      a. care
      b. disassemble (time limit)
      c. assemble (time limit)

B. Handgun
   1. Holding

- 2. Breathing
- 3. Pulling trigger

- C. Rifle
  - 1. Correct position
  - 2. Holding (shoulder and arms)
  - 3. Breathing
  - 4. Pulling trigger
- D. Shotgun
  - 1. Correct position
  - 2. Holding
  - 3. Breathing
  - 4. Pulling trigger
- E. Automatic Weapons
  - 1. Correct position
  - 2. Holding
  - 3. Breathing
  - 4. Pulling trigger
  - 5. Correct firing
- F. Shooting
  - 1. Correct alignment
  - 2. Weather conditions
  - 3. Distance
  - 4. Firing
- G. Knowledge of Enemy Weaponry
  - 1. Police
  - 2. State
    - a. Police
    - b. Military
  - 3. Federal
    - a. FBI
    - b. CIA
    - c. Military

IV. Guard Duty
- 1. Why
- 2. How
  - a. condition (red)
  - b. condition (black)

V. Sectional Tactics (In detail for section and sub-leaders)
   1. Deployment
      a. position
      b. advancement
      c. retreat
   2. The Cell
      a. two riflemen, one auto riflemen

VI. Field Training
   1. Living in and by the elements.
   2. Adhesiveness with fellow members.
   3. There should be at least a three day camp out with rations for one meal, and a condition of red during the whole camp out.

VII. Enemy Interrogation
   1. Rights of Soldier
      a. Name, People Liberation Army
      b. Never has right to surrender
      c. Right and duty to escape
      d. Geneva Agreement

VIII. A test should be given at the end of the four week period of the material covered. If trainee fails he should be given the training over once again, and if he fails again something else should be found for him to do for the people.

VI. Area and weeks of suggested study class

   1. I, II
   2. III, IV, V
   3. IV, V
   4. VI, VII and test.

HUEY NEWTON TALKS TO THE MOVEMENT







Huey Newton interview
originally published in
THE MOVEMENT
August 1968

Printed by
Students for a
Democratic Society
August 1968

ORDER MORE COPIES FROM:

SDS, 1608 W. Madison, Chicago
Illinois 60612
THE MOVEMENT, 449 14th St.,
San Francisco, California

Huey Newton photos: Jeff Blankfort
Back page photo: Stephen Shames

HUEY NEWTON TALKS TO THE MOVEMENT ABOUT THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, CULTURAL NATIONALISM, SNCC, LIBERALS AND WHITE REVOLUTIONARIES

THE MOVEMENT: The question of nationalism is a vital one in the black movement today. Some have made a distinction between cultural nationalism and revolutionary nationalism. Would you comment on the differences and give us your views?

HUEY P. NEWTON: There are two kinds of nationalism, revolutionary nationalism and reactionary nationalism. Revolutionary nationalism is first dependent upon a people's revolution with the end goal being the people in power. Therefore to be a revolutionary nationalist you would by necessity have to be a socialist. If you are a reactionary nationalist you are not a socialist and your end goal is the oppression of the people.

Cultural nationalism, or pork chop nationalism, as I sometimes call it, is basically a problem of having the wrong political perspective. It seems to be a reaction instead of responding to political oppression. The cultural nationalists are concerned with returning to the old African culture and thereby regaining their identity and freedom. In other words, they feel that the African culture will automatically bring political freedom. Many times cultural nationalists fall into line as reactionary nationalists.

Papa Doc in Haiti is an excellent example of reactionary nationalism. He oppresses the people but he does promote the African culture. He's against anything other then black, which on the surface seems very good, but for him it is only to mislead the people. He merely kicked out the racists and replaced them with himself as the oppressor. Many of the nationalists in this country seem to desire the same ends.

The Black Panther Party, which is a revolutionary group of black people, realizes that we have to have an identity. We have to realize our black heritage in order to give us strength to move on and progress. But as far as returning to the old African culture, it's unnecessary and it's not advantageous in many respects. We believe that culture itself will not liberate us. We're going to need some stronger stuff.

Revolutionary Nationalism

A good example of revolutionary nationalism was the revolution in Algeria when Ben Bella took over. The French were kicked out but it was a people's revolution because the people ended up in power. The leaders that took over were not interested in the profit motive where they could exploit the people and keep them in a state of slavery. They nationalized the industry and plowed the would-be profits into the community. That's what socialism is all about in a nutshell. The people's representatives are in office strictly on the leave of the people. The wealth of the country is controlled by the people and they are considered whenever modifications in the industries are made.

The Black Panther Party is a revolutionary Nationalist group and we see a major contradiction between capitalism in this country and our interests. We realize that this country became very rich upon slavery and that slavery is capitalism in the extreme. We have two evils to fight, capitalism and racism. We must destroy both racism and capitalism.

MOVEMENT: Directly related to the question of nationalism is the question of unity within the black community. There has been some question about this since the Black Panther Party has run candidates against other black candidates in recent California elections. What is your position on this matter?

HUEY: Well a very peculiar thing has happened. Historically you got what Malcolm X calls the field nigger and the house nigger. The house nigger had some privileges, a little more. He got the worn-out clothes of the master and he didn't have to work as hard as the field black. He came to respect the master to such an extent until he identified with the master because he got a few of the leftovers that the field blacks did not get. And through this identity with him, he saw the slavemaster's interest as being his interest. Sometimes he would even protect the slavemaster more than the slavemaster would protect himself. Malcolm makes the point that if the master's house happened to catch on fire the house Negro will work harder than the master to put the fire out and save the master's house. While the field Negro, the field blacks was praying that the house burned down. The house black identified with the master so much that when the master would get sick the house Negro would say, "Master, we's sick!"

Black Bourgeoisie

The Black Panther Party are the field blacks, we're hoping the master dies if he gets sick. The Black bourgeoisie seem to be acting in the role of the house Negro. They are pro-administration. They would like a few concessions made, but as far as the overall setup, they have a little more material goods, a little more advantage, a few more privileges than the black have-nots; the lower class. And so they identify with the power structure and they see their interests as the power structure's interest. In fact, it's against their interest.

The Black Panther Party was forced to draw a line of demarcation. We are for all of those who are for the promotion of the interests of the black have-nots, which represents about 98% of blacks here in America. We're not controlled by the white mother country radicals nor are we controlled by the black bourgeoisie. We have a mind of our own and if the black bourgeoisie cannot align itself with our complete program, then the black bourgeoisie sets itself up as our enemy. And they will be attacked and treated as such.

MOVEMENT: The Black Panther Party has had considerable contact with white radicals since its earliest days. What do you see as the role of these white radicals?

HUEY: The white mother country radical is the offspring of the children of the beast that has plundered the world exploiting all people, concentrating on the people of color. These are children of the beast that seek now to be redeemed because they realize that their former heroes, who were slave masters and murderers, put forth ideas that were only facades to hide the treachery they inflicted upon the world. They are turning their backs on their fathers.

The white mother country radical, in resisting the system, becomes somewhat of an abstract thing because he's not oppressed as much as black people are. As a matter of fact his oppression is somewhat abstract simply because he doesn't have to live in a reality of oppression.

Black people in America and colored people throughout the world suffer not only from exploitation, but they suffer from racism. Black people here in America, in the black colony, are oppressed because we're black and we're exploited. The whites are rebels, many of them from the middle class and as far as any overt oppression this is not the case. So therefore I call their rejection of the system somewhat of an abstract thing. They're looking for new heroes. They're looking to wash away the hypocrisy that their fathers have presented to the world. In doing this they see the people who are really fighting for freedom. They see the people who are really standing for justice and equality and peace throughout the world. They are the people of Vietnam, the people of Latin America, the people of Asia, the people of Africa, and the black people in the black colony here in America.

White Revolutionaries

This presents somewhat of a problem in many ways to the black revolutionary especially to the cultural nationalist. The cultural nationalist doesn't understand the white revolutionaries because he can't see why anyone white would turn on the system. So they think that maybe this is some more hypocrisy being planted by white people.

I personally think that there are many young white revolutionaries who are sincere in attempting to realign themselves with mankind, and to make a reality out of the high moral standards that their fathers and forefathers only expressed. In pressing for new heroes the young white revolutionaries found the heroes in the black colony at home and in the colonies throughout the world.

The young white revolutionaries raised the cry for the troops to withdraw from Vietnam, hands off Latin America, withdraw from the Dominican Republic and also to withdraw from the black community or the black colony. So you have a situation in which the young white revolutionaries are attempting to identify with the oppressed people of the colonies and against the exploiter.

The problem arises then in what part they can play. How can they aid the colony? How can they aid the Black Panther Party or any other black revolutionary group? They can aid the black revolutionaries first by simply turning away from the establishment, and secondly by choosing their friends. For instance, they have a choice between whether they will be a friend of Lyndon Baines Johnson or a friend of Fidel Castro. A friend of Robert Kennedy or a friend of Ho Chi Minh. And these are direct opposites. A friend of mine or a friend of Johnsons. After they make this choice then the white revolutionaries have a duty and a responsibility to act.

The Imperialistic or capitalistic system occupies areas. It occupies Vietnam now. They occupy them by sending soldiers there, by sending policeman there. The policemen or soldiers are only a gun in the establishment's hand. They make the racist secure in his racism. The gun in the establishment's hand makes the establishment secure in its exploitation. The first problem it seems is to remove the gun from the establishment's hand. Until lately the white radical has seen no reason to come into conflict with the policemen in his own community. The reason I said until recently is because there is friction now in the mother country between the young white revolutionaries and the police. Because now the white revolutionaries are attempting to put some of their ideas into action, and there's the rub. We say that it should be a permanent thing.

Black people are being oppressed in the colony by white policemen, by white racists. We are saying they must withdraw. We realize that it is not only the Oakland police department but rather the security forces in general. On April 6 it wasn't just the Oakland police department who ambushed the Panthers. It was the Oakland police department, the Emeryville police department and I wouldn't be surprised if there were others. When the white revolutionaries went down to close up the Army terminal in October 1965 it wasn't the Oakland police by themselves who tried to stop them. It was the Oakland police, the Berkeley police, the Highway Patrol, the Sherriff's Department and the national guard was standing by. So we see that they're all part of one organization. They're all a part of the security force to protect the status quo; to make sure that the institutions carry out their goals. They're here to protect the system.

As far as I'm concerned the only reasonable conclusion would be to first realize the enemy, realize the plan, and then when something happens in the black colony--when we're attacked and ambushed in the black colony--then the white revolutionary students and intellectuals and all the other whites who support the colony should respond by defending us, by attacking the enemy in their community. Every time that we're attacked in our community there should be a reaction by the white revolutionaries; they should respond by defending us, by attacking part of the security force. Part of that security force that is determined to carry out the racist ends of the American institutions.

As far as our party is concerned, the Black Panther Party is an all black party, because we feel as Malcolm X felt that there can be no black-white unity until

"WE DON'T HATE WHITE PEOPLE, WE HATE THE OPPRESSOR: IF THE OPPRESSOR HAPPENS TO BE WHITE, THEN WE HATE HIM."

there first is black unity. We have a problem in the black colony that is particular to the colony, but we're willing to accept aid from the mother country as long as the mother country radicals realize that we have, as Eldridge Cleaver says in SOUL ON ICE, a mind of our own. We've regained our mind that was taken away from us and we will decide the political as well as the practical stand that we'll take. We'll make the theory and we'll carry out the practice. It's the duty of the white revolutionary to aid us in this.

So the role of the mother country radical, and he does have a role, is to first choose his friend and his enemy and after doing this, which it seems he's already done, then to not only articulate his desires to regain his moral standard and align himself with humanity, but also to put this into practice by attacking the protectors of the institutions.

MOVEMENT: You have spoken a lot about dealing with the protectors of the system, the armed forces. Would you like to elaborate on why you place so much emphasis on this?

HUEY: The reasons that I feel very strongly about dealing with the protectors of the system is simply because without this protection from the army, the police and the military, the institutions could not go on in their racism and exploitation. For instance, as the Vietnamese are driving the American imperialist troops out of Vietnam, it automatically stops the racist imperialist institutions of America from oppressing that particular country. The country cannot implement its racist program without the guns. And the guns are the military and the police. If the military were disarmed in Vietnam, then the Vietnamese would be victorious.

We are in the same situation here in America. Whenever we attack the system the first thing the administrators do is to send out their strongarm men. If it's a rent-strike, because of the indecent housing we have, they will send out the police to throw the furniture out the window. They don't come themselves. They send their protectors. So to deal with the corrupt exploiter you are going to have to deal with his protector, which is the police who take orders from him. This is a must.

MOVEMENT: Would you like to be more specific on the conditions which must exist before an alliance or coalition can be formed with predominantly white groups? Would you comment specifically on your alliance with the California Peace and Freedom Party?

HUEY: We have an alliance with the Peace and Freedom Party. The Peace and Freedom Party has supported our program in full and this is the criterion for a coalition with the black revolutionary group. If they had not supported our program in full, then we would not have seen any reason to make an alliance with them, because we are the reality of the oppression. They are not. They are only oppressed in an abstract way; we are oppressed in the real way. We are the real slaves! So it's a problem that we suffer from more than anyone else and it's our problem of liberation. Therefore we should decide what measures and what tools and what programs to use to become liberated. Many of the young white revolutionaries realize this and I see no reason not to have a coalition with them.

MOVEMENT: Other black groups seem to feel that from past experience it is impossible for them to work with whites and impossible for them to form alliances. What do you see as the reasons for this and do you think that the history of the Black Panther Party makes this less of a problem?

SNCC and liberals

HUEY: There was somewhat of an unhealthy relationship in the past with the white liberals supporting the black people who were trying to gain their freedom. I think that a good example of this would be the relationship that SNCC had with its white liberals. I call them white liberals because they differ strictly from the white radicals. The relationship was that the whites controlled SNCC for a very long time. From the very start of SNCC until here recently whites were the mind of SNCC. They controlled the program of SNCC with money and they controlled the ideology, or the stands SNCC would take. The blacks in SNCC were completely controlled program-wise; they couldn't do any more than these white liberals wanted them to do, which wasn't very much. So the white liberals were not working for self-determination for the black community. They were interested in a few concessions from the power structure. They undermined SNCC's program.

Stokely Carmichael came along and realizing this started to follow Malcolm X's program of Black Power. This frightened many of the white liberals who were supporting SNCC. Whites were afraid when Stokely came along with Black Power and said that black people have a mind of their own and that SNCC would be an all-black organization and that SNCC would seek self-determination for the black community. The white liberals withdrew their support leaving the organization financially bankrupt. The blacks who were in the organization, Stokely and H. Rap Brown, were left very angry with the white liberals who had been aiding them under the disguise of being sincere. They weren't sincere.

The result was that the leadership of SNCC turned away from the white liberal, which was very good. I don't think they distinguished between the white liberal and the white revolutionary, because the white revolutionary is white also and they are very much afraid to have any contact whatsoever with white people. Even to the point of denying that the white revolutionaries could give support, by supporting the programs of SNCC in the mother country. Not by making any programs, not by being a member of the organization, but simply by resisting. Just as the Vietnamese people realize that they are supported whenever other oppressed people throughout the world resist. Because it helps divide the troops. It drains the country militarily and economically. If the mother country radicals are sincere then this will definitely add to the attack that we are making on the power structure. The Black Panther Party's program is a program where we recognize that the revolution in the mother country will definitely aid us in our freedom and has everything to do with our struggle!

Hate the Oppressor

I think that one of SNCC's great problems is that they were controlled by the traditional administrator: the omnipotent administrator, the white person. He was the mind of SNCC. And so SNCC regained its mind, but I believe that it lost its political perspective. I think that this was a reaction rather than a response. The Black Panther Party has NEVER been controlled by white people. The Black Panther Party has always been a black group. We have always had an integration of mind and body. We have never been controlled by whites and therefore we don't fear the white mother country radicals. Our alliance is one of organized black groups with organized white groups. As soon as the organized white groups do not do the things that would benefit us in our struggle for liberation, that will be our departure point. So we don't suffer in the hangup of a skin color. We don't hate white people; we hate the oppressor. And if the oppressor happens to be white then we hate him. When he stops oppressing us then we no longer hate him. And right now in America you have the slave-master being a white group. We are pushing him out of office through revolution in this country. I think the responsibility of the white revolutionary will be to aid us in this. And when we are attacked by the police or by the military then it will be up to the white mother country radicals to attack the murderers and to respond as we respond, to follow our program.

Slave Masters

MOVEMENT: You indicate that there is a psychological process that has historically existed in white-black relations in the U.S. that must change in the course of revolutionary struggle. Would you like to comment on this?

HUEY: Yes. The historical relationship between black and white here in America has been the relationship between the slave and the master; the master being the mind and the slave the body. The slave would carry out the orders that the mind demanded him to carry out. By doing this the master took the manhood from the slave because he stripped him of a mind. He stripped black people of their mind. In the process the slave-master stripped himself of a body. As Eldridge puts it the slave master became the omnipotent administrator and the slave became the supermasculine menial. This puts the omnipotent administrator into the controlling position or the front office and the supermasculine menial into the field.

The whole relationship developed so that the omnipotent administrator and the supermasculine menial became opposites. The slave being a very strong body doing all the practical things, all of the work becomes very masculine. The omnipotent administrator in the process of removing himself from all body functions realizes later that he has emasculated himself. And this is very disturbing to him. So the slave lost his mind and the slave-master his body.

Penis Envy

This caused the slave-master to become very envious of the slave because he pictured the slave as being more of a man, being superior sexually, because

"TO BE A REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALIST YOU WOULD BY NECESSITY HAVE TO BE A SOCIALIST"



the penis is part of the body. The omnipotent administrator laid down a decree when he realized that his plan to enslave the black man had a flaw, when he discovered that he had emasculated himself. He attempted to bind the penis of the slave. He attempted to show that his penis could reach further than the supermasculine menial's penis. He said "I, the omnipotent administrator can have access to the black woman." The supermasculine menial then had a psychological attraction to the white woman (the ultra feminine freak) for the simple reason that it was forbidden fruit. The omnipotent administrator decreed that this kind of contact would be punished by death. At the same time in order to reinforce his sexual desire, to confirm, to assert his manhood, he would go into the slave quarters and have sexual relations with the black women (the self-reliant Amazon). Not to be satisfied but simply to confirm his manhood. Because if he can only satisfy the self-reliant Amazon then he would be sure that he was a man. Because he doesn't have a body, he doesn't have a penis, he psychologically wants to castrate the black man. The slave was constantly seeking unity within himself: a mind and a body. He always wanted to be able to decide, to gain respect from his woman. Because women want one who can control. I give this outline to fit into a framework of what is happening now. The white power structure today in America defines itself as the mind. They want to control the world. They go off and plunder the world. They are the policemen of the world exercising control especially over people of color.

Re-capture the Mind

The white man cannot gain his manhood, cannot unite with the body because the body is black. The body is symbolic of slavery and strength. It's a biological thing as he views it. The slave is in a much better situation because his not being a full man has always been viewed psychologically. And it's always easier to make a psychological transition than a biological one. If he can only recapture his mind, recapture his balls, then he will lose all fear and will be free to determine his destiny. This is what is happening at this time with the rebellion of the world's oppressed people against the controller. They are regaining their mind and they're saying that we have a mind of our own. They're saying that we want freedom to determine the destiny of our people, thereby uniting the mind with their bodies. They are taking the mind back from the omnipotent administrator, the controller, the exploiter.

In America black people are also chanting that we have a mind of our own. We must have freedom to determine our destiny. It's almost a spiritual thing, this unity, this harmony. This unity of the mind and of the body, this unity of man within himself. Certain slogans of Chairman Mao I think demonstrate this theory of uniting the mind with the body within the man. An example is his call to the intellectuals to go to the countryside. The peasants in the countryside are all bodies, they're the workers. And he sent the intellectuals there because the dictatorship of the proletariat has no room for the omnipotent administrator; there's no room for the exploiter. So therefore he must go to the countryside to regain his body; he must work. He is really done a favor, because the people force him to unite his mind with his body by putting them both to work. At the same time the intellectual teaches the people political ideology, he educates them, thus uniting the mind and the body in the peasant. Their minds and bodies are united and they control their country. I think this is a very good example of this unity and it is my idea of the perfect man.

The Guerrilla

MOVEMENT: You mentioned at another point that the guerrilla was the perfect man and this kind of formulation seems to fit in directly with the guerrilla as a political man. Would you like to comment on this?

HUEY: Yes. The guerrilla is a very unique man. This is in contrast to Marxist-Leninist orthodox theories where the party controls the military. The guerrilla is not only the warrior, the military fighter; he is also the military commander as well as the political theoretician. Debray says "poor the pen without the guns, poor the gun without the pen". The pen being just an extension of the mind; a tool to write down concepts, ideas. The gun is only an extension of the body, the extension of our fanged teeth that we lost through evolution. It's the weapon, it's the claws that we lost, it's the body. The guerrilla is the military commander and the political theoretician all in one.

In Bolivia Che said that he got very little help from the Communist Party there. The Communist Party wanted to be the mind, the Communist Party wanted to have full control of the guerrilla activity. But yet weren't taking part in the practical work of the guerrillas. The guerrilla on the other hand is not only united within himself, but he also attempts to spread this to the people by educating the villagers, giving them political perspective, pointing out things, educating them politically, and arming the people. Therefore the guerrilla is giving the peasants and workers a mind. Because they've already got the body you get a unity of the mind and the body. Black people here in America, who have long been the workers, have regained our minds and we now have a unity of mind and body.

MOVEMENT: Would you be willing to extend this formula in terms of white radicals; to say that one of their struggles today is to get back their bodies.

HUEY: Yes. I thought I made that clear. The white mother country radical by becoming an activist is attempting to regain his body. By being an activist and not the traditional theoretician who outlines the plan, as the Communist Party has been trying to do for ever so long, the white mother country radical is regaining his body. The resistance by white radicals in Berkeley during the past three nights is a good indication that the white radicals are on the way home. They have identified their enemies. The white radicals have integrated theory with practice. They realize the American system is the real enemy but in order to attack the American system they must attack the ordinary cop. In order to attack the educational system they must attack the ordinary teacher. Just as the Vietnamese people to attack the American system must attack the ordinary soldier. The white mother country radicals now are regaining their bodies and they're also recognizing that the black man has a mind and that he is a man.

MOVEMENT: Would you comment on how this psychological understanding aids in the revolutionary struggle?

HUEY: You can see that in statements until recently black people who haven't been enlightened have defined the white man by calling him "the MAN". "The Man" is making this decision, "The Man" this and "The Man" that. The black woman found it difficult to respect the black man because he didn't even define himself as a man! Because he didn't have a mind, because the decision maker was outside of himself. But the vanguard group, the Black Panther Party along with all revolutionary black groups have regained our mind and our manhood. Therefore we no longer define the omnipotent administrator as "the Man" . . . or the authority as "the MAN". Matter of fact the omnipotent administrator along with his security agents are less than a man because WE define them as pigs!

I think that this is a revolutionary thing in itself. That's political power. That's power itself. Matter of fact what is power other than the ability to define phenomenon and then make it act in a desired manner? When black people start defining things and making it act in a desired manner, then we call this Black Power!

MOVEMENT: Would you comment further on what you mean by Black Power?

HUEY: Black Power is really people's power. The Black Panther Program, Panther Power as we call it, will implement this people's power. We have respect for all of humanity and we realize that the people should rule and determine their destiny. Wipe out the controller. To have Black Power doesn't humble or subjugate anyone to slavery or oppression. Black Power is giving power to people who have not had power to determine theirdestiny. We advocate and we aid any people who are strugling to determine their destiny. This is regardless of color. The Vietnamese say Vietnam should be able to determine its own destiny. Power of the Vietnamese people. We also chant power of the Vietnamese people. The Latins are talking about Latin America for the Latin Americans. Cuba Si and Yanqui, Non. It's not that they don't want the Yankees to have any power they just don't want them to have power over them. They can have power over themselves. We in the black colony in America want to be able to have power over our destiny and that's black power.



MOVEMENT: A lot of white radicals are romantic about what Che said: "In a revolution one wins or dies . . ." For most of us it is really an abstract or theoretical question. It's a real question for you and we'd like you to rap about how you feel about it.

HUEY: Yes. The revolutionary sees no compromise. We will not compromise because the issue is so basic. If we compromise one iota we will be selling our freedom out. We will be selling the revolution out. And we refuse to remain slaves. As Eldridge says in SOUL ON ICE "a slave who dies of natural causes will not balance two dead flies on the scales of eternity." As far as we're concerned we would rather be dead than to go on with the slavery that we're in. Once we compromise we will be compromising not only our freedom, but also our manhood. We realize that we're going up against a highly technical country, and we realize that they are not only paper tigers, as Mao says, but real tigers too because they have the ability to slaughter many people. But in the long run, they will prove themselves paper tigers because they're not in line with humanity; they are divorced from the people. We know that the enemy is very powerful and that our manhood is at stake, but we feel it necessary to be victorious in regaining ourselves, regaining our manhood. And this is the basic point. So either we will do this or we won't have any freedom. Either we will win or we will die trying to win.

Mood of Black People

MOVEMENT: How would you characterize the mood of Black people in America today? Are they disenchanted, wanting a larger slice of the pie, or alienated, not wanting to integrate into a burning house, not wanting to integrate into Babylon? What do you think it will take for them to become alienated and revolutionary?

HUEY: I was going to say disillusioned, but I don't think we were ever under the illusion that we had freedom in this country. This society is definitely a decadent one and we realize it. Black people are realizing it more and more. We cannot gain our freedom under the present system; the system that is carrying out its plans of institutionalized racism. Your question is what will have to be done to stimulate them to revolution. I think it's already being done, it's a matter of time now for us to educate them to a program and show them the way to liberation. The Black Panther Party is the beacon light to show black people the way to liberation.

You notice the insurrections that have been going on throughout the country, in Watts, in Newark, in Detroit. They were all responses of the people demanding that they have freedom to determine their destiny, rejecting exploitation. Now the Black Panther Party does not think that the traditional riots, or insurrections that have taken place are the answer. It is true they have been against the Establishment, they have been against authority and oppression within their community, but they have been unorganized. However, black people learned from each of these insurrections.

They learned from Watts. I'm sure the people in Detroit were educated by what happened in Watts. Perhaps this was wrong education. It sort of missed the mark. It wasn't quite the correct activity, but the people were educated through the activity. The people of Detroit followed the example of the people in Watts, only they added a little scrutiny to it. The people in Detroit learned that the way to put a hurt on the administration is to make Molotov cocktails and to go into the street in mass numbers. So this was a matter of learning. The slogan went up "Burn, baby, burn". People were educated through the activity and it spread throughout the country. The people were educated on how to resist, but perhaps incorrectly.

Educate Though Activity

What we have to do as a vanguard of the revolution is to correct this through activity. The large majority of black people are either illiterate or semi-literate. They don't read. They need activity to follow. This is true of any colonized people. The same thing happened in Cuba where it was necessary for twelve men with a leadership of Che and Fidel to take to the hills and then attack the corrupt administration; to attack the army who were the protectors of the exploiters in Cuba. They could have leafleted the community and they could have written books, but the people would not respond. They had to act and the people could see and hear about it and therefore become educated on how to respond to oppression.

In this country black revolutionaries have to set an example. We can't do the same things that were done in Cuba because Cuba is Cuba and the U S is the U.S. Cuba has many terrains to protect the guerrilla. This country is mainly urban. We have to work out new solutions to offset the power of the country's technology and communication; its ability to communicate very rapidly by telephone and teletype and so forth. We do have solutions to these problems and they will be put into effect. I wouldn't want to go into the ways and means of this, but we will educate through action. We have to engage in action to make the people want to read our literature. Because they are not attracted to all the writing in this country; there's too much writing. Many books makes one weary.

Threat from Reformers

MOVEMENT: Kennedy before his death, and to a lesser extent Rockefeller and Lindsay and other establishment liberals have been talking about making reforms to give black people a greater share in the pie and thus stop any developing revolutionary movement. Would you comment on this?

HUEY: I would say this: If a Kennedy or Lindsay or anyone else can give decent housing to all of our people; if they can give full employment to our people with a high standard; if they can give full control to black people to determine the destiny of their community; if they can give fair trials in the court system by turning over the structure to the community; if they can end their exploitation of people throughout the world; if they can do all of these things they would have solved the problems. But I don't believe that under this present system, under capitalism, that they will be able to solve these problems.

People Must Control

I don't think black people should be fooled by their come-ons because every one who gets in office promises the same thing. They promise full employment and decent housing; the Great Society, the New Frontier. All of these names, but no real benefits. No effects are felt in the black community, and black people are tired of being deceived and duped. The people must have full control of the means of production. Small black businesses cannot compete with General Motors. That's just out of the question. General Motors robbed us and worked us for nothing for a couple hundred years and took our money and set up factories and became fat and rich and then talks about giving us some of the crumbs. We want full control. We're not interested in anyone promising that the private owners are going to all of a sudden become human beings and give these things to our community. It hasn't ever happened and, based on empirical evidence, we don't expect them to become Buddhists over night.

MOVEMENT: We raised this question not because we feel that these reforms are possible, but rather to get your ideas on what effects such attempted reforms might have on the development of a revolutionary struggle.

HUEY: I think that reforms pose no real threat. The revolution has always been in the hands of the young. The young always inherit the revolution. The young population is growing at a very rapid rate and they are very displeased with the authorities. They want control. I doubt that under the present system any kind of program can be launched that will be able to buy off all these young people. They have not been able to do it with the poverty program, the great society, etc. This country has never been able to employ all of its people simply because it's too interested in private property and the profit motive. A bigger poverty program is just what it says it is, a program to keep people in poverty. So I don't think that there is any real threat from the reforms

MOVEMENT: Would you like to say something about the Panther's organizing especially in terms of the youth?

HUEY: The Panthers represent a cross section of the black community. We have older people as well as younger people. The younger people of course are the ones who are seen on the streets. They are the activists. They are the real vanguard of change because they haven't been indoctrinated and they haven't submitted. They haven't been beaten into line as some of the older people have. But many of the older people realize that we're waging a just fight against the oppressor. They are aiding us and they are taking a part in the program.

Jail

MOVEMENT: Tell us something about your relations with the prisoners in the jail.

HUEY: The black prisoners as well as many of the white prisoners identify with the program of the Panthers. Of course by the very nature of their being prisoners they can see the oppression and they've suffered at the hands of the Gestapo. They have reacted to it. The black prisoners have all joined the Panthers, about 95% of them. Now the jail is all Panther and the police are very worried about this. The white prisoners can identify with us because they realize that they are not in control. They realize there's someone controlling them and the rest of the world with guns. They want some control over their lives also. The Panthers in jail have been educating them and so we are going along with the revolution inside of the jail.

MOVEMENT: What has been the effect of the demonstrations outside the jail calling for "Free Huey"?

HUEY: Very positive reactions. One demonstration, I don't remember which one, a couple of trustees, white trustees, held a cardboard sign out the laundry window reading "Free Huey". They say people saw it and responded to it. They were very enthusiastic about the demonstrators because they too suffer from being treated unfairly by the parole authorities and by the police here in the jail.

Open or Underground

MOVEMENT: The Panthers organizing efforts have been very open up until this point. Would you like to comment about the question of an underground political organization versus an open organization at this point in the struggle?

HUEY: Yeah. Some of the black nationalist groups feel that they have to be underground because they'll be attacked. But we don't feel that you can romanticize being underground. They say we're romantic because we're trying to live revolutionary lives, and we are not taking precautions. But we say that the only way we would go underground is if we're driven underground. All real revolutionary movements are driven underground. Take the revolution in Cuba. The agitation that was going on while Fidel was in law school was very much above ground. Even his existence in the hills was, so to speak, an above the ground affair because he was letting it be known who was doing the damage and why he was doing the damage. To catch him was a different story. The only way we can educate the people is by setting an example for them. We feel that this is very necessary.

This is a pre-revolutionary period and we feel it is very necessary to educate the people while we can. So we're very open about this education. We have been attacked and we will be attacked even more in the future but we're not going to go underground until we get ready to go underground because we have a mind of our own. We're not going to let anyone force us to do anything. We're going to go underground after we educate all of the black people and not before that time. Then it won't really be necessary for us to go underground because you can see black anywhere. We will just have the stuff to protect ourselves and the strategy to offset the great power that the strong-arm men of the establishment have and are planning to use against us.

White Organizing

MOVEMENT: Your comments about the white prisoners seemed encouraging. Do you see the possibility of organizing a white Panther Party in opposition to the establishment possibly among poor and working whites?

HUEY: Well as I put it before Black Power is people's power and as far as organizing white people we give white people the privilege of having a mind and we want them to get a body. They can organize themselves. We can tell them what they should do, what their responsibility is if they're going to claim to be white revolutionaries or white mother country radicals, and that is to arm themselves and support the colonies around the world in their just struggle against imperialism. But anything more than that they will have to do on their own.

142

Students for a Democratic Society

subscribe to
new left notes

find what SDS is about
learn our plans for the future
read the ongoing debates inside the organization
read about your brothers and sisters in other parts of the country

$5 for members ($1 for sub, $4 for dues)
$10 for non-members

_____I would like to join SDS and receive New Left Notes (dues $5/year)
_____Send me _____ more copies of this pamphlet at 15¢ each
_____Send me a complete list of SDS publications
_____Send me further info on SDS

(name) ______________________________
(address) ______________________________
(city, state, and zip) ______________________________

1608 West Madison, Chicago 60612 (312-666-3874)

FREE HUEY
FREE HUEY



SUBSCRIBE TO THE MOVEMENT!

Please send me the next 12 issues of THE MOVEMENT Enclosed is $2.00

NAME

ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP

MAIL TO THE MOVEMENT
449 14th STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF 94103

144

75c



ESSAYS FROM
THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE
HUEY NEWTON

INTRODUCTION

"Essays From the Minister of Defense" is a collection of truths, principles and beliefs practiced by the Black Panther Party. The writings come from the pen of Huey Newton, the Minister of Defense of the Black Panther Party but the spirit of the writings, the faith expressed and the undying love for black people exhibited therein comes from the souls of colonized black people. The people are the heroes.

The Black Panther Party is a vanguard party for we Africans in U.S. What we believe in is armed revolution, a permanent revolution, the creation of as many Viet Nams as are necessary to defeat U.S. racism and imperialism throughout the world. As you read "Essays From the Minister of Defense" you will begin to understand the principles for the armed revolution that is beginning in the U.S. If you carry out the principles, you will be a people's warrior, and will be bringing black people and the oppressed people everywhere closer to freedom, justice, and equality throughout the world. The Minister of Defense is currently held in Alameda County jail.

Our slogan is Huey will be set free by any means necessary and if he is not set free the sky is the limit.

George Murray
Minister of Education
Black Panther Party

IN DEFENSE OF SELF DEFENSE 2

By Huey P. Newton

Introduction:

Huey P. Newton's column in THE BLACK PANTHER newspaper was entitled "In Defense of Self Defense." The following articles by the Minister of Defense were taken from those columns.

* * * * * *

"In Defense of Self Defense." June 20, 1967.

Laws and rules have always been made to serve people. Rules of society are set up by people so that they will be able to function in a harmonious way. In other words, in order to promote the general welfare of society, rules and laws are established by men. Rules should serve men, and not men serve rules. Much of the time, the laws and rules which officials attempt to inflict upon poor people are non-functional in relation to the status of the poor in society.

These officials are blind to the fact that people should not respect rules that are not serving them. It is the duty of the poor to write and construct rules and laws that are in their better interests. This is one of the basic human rights of all men.

Before 1776, white people were colonized by the English. The English government had certain laws and rules that the colonized Americans viewed as not in their best interests but as a colonized people. At that time the English government felt that the colonized Americans had no right to establish laws to promote the general welfare of the people living here in America. The colonized American felt he had no choice but to raise the gun in defense of the welfare of the colonized people. At this time, he made certain laws insuring his protection from external and internal aggressions from governments and agencies. One such form of protection was the Declaration of Independence, which states: "...whenever any government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such forms as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

Now these same colonized white people, these ex-slaves, robbers, and thieves, have denied the colonized black man the right to even speak of abolishing this oppressive system which the white colonized American created. They have carried their madness to the four corners of the earth, and now there is universal rebellion against their continued rule and power. The Black people in America are the only people who can free the world, loosen the yoke of colonialism and destroy the war machine. As long as the wheels of the imperialistic war machine are turning there is no country that can defeat this monster of the West. But Black people can make a malfunction of this machine from within. Black people can destroy the machinery that's enslaving the world. America cannot stand to fight every Black country in the world and fight a civil war at the same time. It is militarily impossible to do both of these things at once.

The slavery of Blacks in this country provides the oil for the machinery of war that America uses to enslave the peoples of the world. Without this oil the machinery cannot function. We are the driving shaft; we are in such a strategic position in this machinery that, once we become dislocated, the functioning of the remainder of the machinery breaks down.

Penned up in the ghettos of America, surrounded by his factories and all the physical components of his economic system, we have been made into "the wretched of the earth," who are relegated to the position of spectators while the white racists run their international con game on the suffering peoples. We have been brainwashed to believe that we are powerless and that there is nothing we can do for ourselves to bring about a speedy liberation for our people. We have been taught that we must please our oppressors, that we are only ten per cent of the population, and therefore, we must confine our tactics to categories calculated not to disturb the sleep of our tormentors.

The power structure inflicts pain and brutality upon the peoples and then provides controlled outlets for the pain in ways least likely to upset them or interfere with the process of exploitation. The people must repudiate the channels established as tricks and deceitful snares by the exploiting oppressors. The people must oppose everything the oppressor supports and support everything that he opposes. If Black people go about their struggle for liberation in the way that the oppressor dictates and sponsors, then we will have degenerated to the level of grovelling flunkies for the oppressor himself. When the oppressor makes a vicious attack against freedom fighters because of the way that such freedom fighters choose to go about their liberation, then we know we are moving in the direction of our liberation. The racist dog oppressors have no rights which oppressed Black people are bound to respect. As long as the racist dogs pollute the earth with the evil of their actions, they do not deserve any respect at all, and the rules of their game, written in the people's blood, are beneath contempt.

The oppressor must be harassed until his doom. He must have no peace by day or by night. The slaves have always outnumbered the slavemasters. The power of the oppressor rests upon the submission of the people. When Black people really unite and rise up in all their splendid millions, they will have the strength to smash injustice. We do not understand the power in our numbers. We are millions and millions of Black people scattered across the continent and throughout the Western hemisphere. There are more Black people in America than the total population of many countries that now enjoy full membership in the United Nations. They have power and their power is based primarily on the fact that they are organized and united with each other. They are recognized by the powers of the world.

We, with all our numbers, are recognized by no one. In fact, we do not even recognize our own selves. We are unaware of the potential power latent in our numbers. In 1967, in the midst of a hostile racist nation whose hidden racism is rising to the surface at a phenomenal speed, we are still so blind to our critical fight for our very survival that we are continuing to function in petty, futile ways. Divided, confused, fighting among ourselves, we are still in the elementary stage of throwing rocks, sticks, empty wine bottles and beer cans at racist cops who lie in wait for a chance to murder unarmed Black people. The racist cops have worked out a system for suppressing these spontaneous rebellions that flare up from the anger, frustration, and desperation of the masses of Black people. We can no longer afford the dubious luxury of the terrible casualties wantonly inflicted upon us by the cops during these spontaneous rebellions.

Black people must now move, from the grassroots up through the perfumed circles of the Black bourgeoisie, to seize by any means necessary a proportionate share of the power vested and collected in the structure of America. We must organize and unite to combat by long resistance the brutal force used against us daily. The power structure depends upon the use of force within retaliation. This is why they have made it a felony to teach guerilla warfare. This is why they want the people unarmed.

The racist dog oppressor fears the armed people; they fear most of all Black people armed with weapons and the ideology of the Black Panther Party For Self Defense. An unarmed people are slaves or are subject to slavery at any given moment. If a government is not afraid of the people it will arm the people from foreign aggression. Black people are held captive in the midst of their oppressors. There is a world of difference between thirty million unarmed, submissive Black people and thirty million Black people armed with freedom and defense guns and the strategic methods of liberation.

When a mechanic wants to fix a broken-down car engine, he must have the necessary tools to do the job. When the people move for liberation, they must have the basic tool of liberation: the gun. Only with the power of the gun can the Black masses halt the terror and brutality perpetuated against them by the armed racist power structure; and in one sense only by the power of the gun can the whole world be transformed into the earthly paradise dreamed of by the people from time immemorial. One successful practitioner of the art and science of national liberation and self defense, Brother Mao Tse-tung, put it this way: "We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun."

The blood, sweat, tears and suffering of Black people are the foundations of the wealth and power of the United States of America. We were forced to build America, and if forced to, we will tear it down. The immediate result of this destruction will be suffering and bloodshed. But the end result will be the perpetual peace for all mankind.

July 3, 1967

"In Defense of Self Defense"

Historically, the power structure has demanded that Black leaders cater to their desires and to the ends of the imperialistic racism of the oppressor. The power structure has endorsed those Black leaders who have reduced themselves to nothing more than apologizing parrots. They have divided the so-called black leaders within the political arena. The oppressors sponsor radio programs, give space in their racist newspapers, and have shown them the luxury enjoyed only by the oppressor. The Black leaders serve the oppressor by purposely keeping the people submissive and passive — non-violent. At any moment that these so-called Black leaders respond to the cries of the suffering and downtrodden, unemployed and welfare recipients who hunger for liberation by any means necessary.

Historically, there have been a few Black men who have rejected the handouts of the oppressor and who have refused to spread the oppressor's treacherous principles of deceit, gradual indoctrination and brainwashing, and who have refused to indulge in the criminal activity of teaching submission, fear, and love for an enemy who hates the very color black and is determined to commit genocide on an international scale.

There has always existed in the Black colony of Afro-America a fundamental difference over which tactics from the broad spectrum of alternatives Black people should employ in their struggle for national liberation.

One side of this difference contends that Black people are in the peculiar position where, in order to gain acceptance into the "mainstream" of American life, they must employ no tactic that will anger the oppressor whites. This view holds that Black people constitute a hopeless minority and that salvation for Black people lies in developing brotherly relations. There are certain tactics that are taboo. Violence against the oppressor must be avoided at all costs, because the oppressor will retaliate with superior violence. So Black people may protest, but not protect. They can complain, but not cut and shoot. In short, Black people must at all costs remain non-violent.

On the other side of the difference, we find that the point of departure is the principle that the oppressor has no rights that the oppressed is bound to respect. Kill the slavemaster, destroy him utterly, move against him with implacable fortitude. Break his oppressive power by any means necessary. Men who have stood before the Black masses and recommended this response to the oppression have been held in fear by the oppressor. The Blacks in the colony who were wed to the non-violent alternative could not relate to the advocates of implacable opposition to the oppressor. Because the oppressor always prefers to deal with the less radical, i.e., less dangerous, spokesmen for his subjects. He would prefer that his subjects had no spokesmen at all, or better yet, he wishes to speak for them himself. Unable to do this practically, he does the next best thing, and endorses spokesmen who will allow him to speak through them to the masses. Paramount amongst his imperatives is to see to it that implacable spokesmen are never allowed to communicate their message to the masses. They are never allowed to communicate their message to the masses. Their oppressor will resort to any means necessary to silence the implacables.

The oppressor, the endorsed spokesmen, and the implacables form the three points of a triangle of death. The oppressor looks upon the endorsed spokesmen as a tool to use against the implacables to keep the masses passive within the acceptable limits of the tactics he is capable of containing. The endorsed spokesmen look upon the oppressor as a guardian angel who can always be depended upon to protect them from the wrath of the implacables, while he looks upon the implacables as dangerous and irresponsible madmen who, by angering the oppressor, will certainly provoke a blood bath in which they themselves might get washed away. The implacables view both the oppressors and the endorsed leaders as his deadly enemies. If anything, he has a more profound hatred for the endorsed leaders than he has for the oppressor himself, because the implacables know that they can deal with the oppressor only after they have driven the endorsed spokesmen off the scene.

Historically, the endorsed spokesmen have always held the upper hand on the implacables. In Afro-American history, there are shining brief moments when the implacables have outmaneuvered the oppressor and the endorsed spokesmen and gained the attention of the Black masses. The Black masses, recognizing the implacables in the depths of their despair, respond magnetically to the implacables and bestow a devotion and loyalty to them that frightens the oppressor and endorsed spokesmen into a panic-stricken frenzy, and they leap into a rash act -- murder, imprisonment, or exile -- to silence the implacables and to get their show back on the road.

The masses of Black people have always been deeply entrenched and involved in the basic necessities of life. They have not had time to abstract their situation. Abstractions come only with leisure. The people have not had the luxury of leisure. Therefore, the people have been very aware of the true definition of politics: politics are merely the desire of individuals and groups to satisfy first, their basic needs -- food, shelter and clothing, and security for themselves and their loved ones. The Black leaders endorsed by the power structure have attempted to sell the people the simple-minded theory that politics is holding a political office; being able to move into a $40,000 home; being able to sit near white people in a restaurant (while in fact the Black masses have not been able to pay the rent of a $40.00 rat-infested hovel).

The Black leaders have led the community to believe that brutality and force could be ended by subjecting the people to this very force of self-sacrificing demonstrations. The Black people realize brutality and force can only be inflicted if there is submission. The community has not responded in the past or in the present to the absurd and erroneous, deceitful tactics of so-called legitimate Black leaders. The community realizes that force and brutality can only be eliminated by counter force through self defense. Leaders who have recommended these tactics have never had the support and following of the downtrodden black masses who comprise the bulk of the community. Grassroots -- the downtrodden of the Black community, even though they rejected the hand-picked handkerchief heads endorsed by the power structure, the people have not had the academic or administrative knowledge to form themselves in long resistance to the brutality.

Marcus Garvey and Malcolm X were the two Black men of the twentieth century who posed an implacable challenge to both the oppressor and the endorsed spokesmen that could be dealt with in any other way than precisely the foul manner recorded by history. Malcolm, in our time, stood on the threshhold with the oppressor and the endorsed spokesmen in a bag that they couldn't get out of. Malcolm, implacable to the ultimate degree, held out to the Black masses the historical, stupendous victory of Black collective salvation and liberation from the chains of the oppressor and the treacherous embrace of the endorsed spokesmen. Only with the gun were the black masses denied this victory. But they learned from Malcolm that with the gun, they can recapture their dreams and bring them into reality.

The heirs of Malcolm now stand millions strong on their corner of the triangle, facing the racist dog oppressor and the soulless endorsed spokesmen. The heirs of Malcolm have picked up the gun and, taking first things first, are moving to expose the endorsed spokesmen for the Black masses to see them for what they are and always have been. The choice offered by the heirs of Malcolm to the endorsed spokesmen is to repudiate the oppressor and to crawl back to their people

But first, they must respect the party which is transmitting this message. When the Vanguard group destroys the machinery of the oppressor by dealing with him in small groups of three and four, and then escapes the might of the oppressor, the masses will be overjoyed and will adhere to this correct strategy. When the masses hear that a gestapo policeman has been executed while sipping coffee at a counter, and the revolutionary executioners fled without being traced, the masses will see the validity of this type of approach to resistance. It is not necessary to organize thirty million Black people in primary groups of two's and three's but it is important for the party to show the people how to go about revolution. During slavery, in which no vanguard party existed and forms of communication were severely restricted and insufficient, many slave revolts occurred.

There are basically three ways one can learn: through study, through observation, and through actual experience. The black community is basically composed of activists. The community learns through activity, either through observation of or participation in the activity. To study and learn is good but the actual experience is the best means of learning. The party must engage in activities that will teach the people. The black community is basically not a reading community. Therefore it is very significant that the vanguard group first be activists. Without this knowledge of the black community, one could not gain the fundamental knowledge of the black revolution in racist America.

The main function of the party is to awaken the people and to teach them the strategic method of resisting the power structure, which is prepared not only to combat the resistance of the people with massive brutality, but to totally annihilate the black community, the black population.

If it is learned by the power structure that black people have "x" amount of guns in their possession, this will not stimulate the power structure to prepare itself with guns, because it is already more than prepared.

The end result of this education will be positive for Black people in their resistance and negative for the power structure in its oppression, because the party always exemplifies revolutionary defiance. If the party is not going to make the people aware of the tools of liberation and the strategic method that is to be used, there will be no means by which the people will be mobilized properly.

The relationship between the vanguard party and the masses is a secondary relationship. The relationship between the members of the vanguard party is a primary relationship. It is important that the members of the vanguard group maintain a face-to-face relationship with each other. This is important if the party machinery is to be effective. It is impossible to put together functional party machinery or programs without this direct relationship. The members of the vanguard group should be tested revolutionaries. This will minimize the danger of Uncle Tom informers and opportunists.

The main purpose of vanguard group should be to raise the consciousness of the masses through educational programs and certain physical activities the party will participate in. The sleeping masses must be bombarded with the correct approach to struggle through the activities of the vanguard party. Therefore, the masses must know that the party exists. The party must use all means available to get this information across to the masses. If the masses do not have knowledge of the party, it will be impossible for the masses to follow the program of the party.

The vanguard party is never underground in the beginning of its existence, because this would limit its effectiveness and educational processes. How can you teach people if the people do not know and respect you? The party must exist above ground as long as the dog power structure will allow, and hopefully when the party is forced to go underground the message of the party will already have been put across to the people. The vanguard party's activities on the surface will necessarily be short-lived.

This is why it is so important that the party make a tremendous impact upon the people before it is driven into secrecy.

At this time, the people know the party exists, and they will seek out further information on the activities of this underground party.

Many would-be revolutionaries work under the fallacious illusion that the vanguard party is to be a secret organization that the power structure knows nothing about, and the masses know nothing about, except for occasional letters that come to their homes by night. Underground parties cannot distribute leaflets announcing an underground meeting. These are contradictions and inconsistencies of the so-called revolutionaries. The so-called revolutionaries are in fact afraid of the very danger that they are advocating for the people. These so-called revolutionaries want the people to say what they themselves are afraid to say, and the people to do what they themselves are afraid to do. This makes the so-called revolutionary a coward and a hypocrite.

If these imposters would investigate the history of revolution, they would see that the vanguard group always starts out above ground and is later driven underground by the aggressor. The Cuban Revolution exemplifies this fact; when Fidel Castro started to resist the butcher Batista and the American running dogs, he started by speaking on the campus of the University of Havana in public. He was later driven to the hills. His impact upon the dispossessed people of Cuba was very great and received with much respect. When he went into secrecy, Cuban people searched him out. People went to the hills to find him and his band of twelve. Castro handled the revolutionary struggle correctly. If the Chinese Revolution is investigated, it will be seen that the Communist Party was quite on the surface so that they would be able to muster support from the masses. There are many areas one can read about to learn the correct approach, such as the revolution in Kenya, the Algerian Revolution, Fanon's THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH, the Russian Revolution, the works of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and a ~~host~~ of others.

A revolutionary must realize at if he is sincere, death is imminent due to the fact that the things he is saying and doing are extremely dangerous. Without this realization, it is impossible to proceed as a revolutionary. The masses are constantly looking for a guide, a Messiah, to liberate them from the hands of the oppressor. The vanguard party must exemplify the characteristics of worthy leadership. Millions and millions of oppressed people might not know members of the vanguard party

personally or directly, but they will gain through an indirect acquaintance the proper strategy for liberation via the mass media and the physical activities of the party. It is of prime importance that the vanguard party develop a political organ, such as a newspaper produced by the party, as well as employ strategically revolutionary art and destruction of the oppressor's machinery. For example, Watts. The economy and property of the oppressor was destroyed to such an extent that no matter how the oppressor tried to whitewash the activities of the black brothers, the real nature and the real cause of the activity was communicated to every black community. For further example, no matter how the oppressor tries to distort and confuse the message of Brother Stokely Carmichael, Black people all over the country understand it perfectly and welcome it.

The Black Panther Party for Self Defense teaches that in the final analysis, the amount of guns and defense weapons, such as hand grenades, bazookas, and other necessary equipment, will be supplied by taking these weapons from the power structure, as exemplified by the Viet Cong. Therefore, the greater the military preparation on the part of the oppressor, the greater is the availability of weapons for the black community. It is believed by some hypocrites that when the people are taught by the vanguard group to prepare for resistance, this only brings the man down on them with increasing violence and brutality; but the fact of the matter is that when the man becomes more oppressive, this only heightens the revolutionary fervor. The people never make revolution. The oppressors by their brutal actions cause the resistance by the people. The vanguard party only teaches the correct methods of resistance. So, if things can get worse for oppressed people, then they will feel no need for revolution or resistance. The complaint of the hypocrites that the Black Panther Part for Self Defense is exposing the people to deeper suffering is an incorrect observation. People have proved that they will not tolerate any more oppression by the racist dog police through their rebellions in the black communities across the country. The people are looking now for guidance to extend and strengthen their resistance struggle.

FEAR AND DOUBT

By Huey P. Newton

May 15, 1967

The lower socio-economic Black male is a man of confusion. He faces a hostile environment and is not sure that it is not his own sins that have attracted the hostilities of society. All his life he has been taught (explicitly and implicitly) that he is an inferior approximation of humanity. As a man, he finds himself void of those things that bring respect and a feeling of worthiness. He looks around for something to blame for his situation, but because he is not sophisticated regarding the socio-economic milieu and because of negativistic parental and institutional teachings, he ultimately blames himself.

When he was a child, his parents told him that they were not affluent because "we didn't have the opportunity to become educated," or "we did not take advantage of the educational opportunities that were offered to us." They tell their children that things will be different for them if they are educated and skilled, but that there is absolutely nothing other than this occasional warning (and often not even this) to stimulate education. Black people are great worshippers of education, even the lower socio-economic Black person, but at the same time, they are afraid of exposing themselves to it. They are afraid because they are vulnerable to having their fears verified; perhaps they will find that they can't compete with white students. The Black person tells himself that he could have done much more if he had really wanted to. The fact is, of course, that the assumed educational opportunities were never available to the lower socio-economic Black person due to the unique position assigned him in life.

It is a two-headed monster that haunts this man. First, his attitude is that he lacks innate ability to cope with the socio-economic problems confronting him, and second, he tells himself that he has the ability but he simply has not felt strongly enough to try to acquire the skills needed to manipulate his environment. In a desperate effort to assume self-respect, he rationalizes that he is lethargic; in this way, he denies a possible lack of innate ability. If he openly attempts to discover his abilities, he and others may see him for what he is - or is not, and this is the real fear. He then withdraws into the world of the invisible, but not without a struggle. He may attempt to make himself visible by processing his hair, acquiring a "boss mop", or driving a long car, even though he can't afford it. He may father several illegitimate children by several different women in order to display his masculinity. But in the end, he realizes that he is ineffectual in his efforts.

Society responds to him as a thing, a beast, a non-entity, something to be ignored or stepped on. He is asked to respect laws that do not respect him. He is asked to digest a code of ethics that acts upon him but not for him. He is confused and in a constant state of rage, of shame and doubt. This psychological set permeates all his interpersonal relationships. It determines his view of the social system. His psychological development has been prematurely arrested. This doubt begins at a very early age and continues through his life. The parents pass it on to the child and the social system reinforces the fear, the shame, and the doubt. In the third or fourth grade, he may find that he shares the classroom with white students, but when the class is engaged in reading exercises, all the Black students find themselves in a group at a table reserved for slow readers. This may be quite an innocent effort on the part of the school system. The teacher may not realize that the Black students feared (in fact, feel certain) that Black means dumb and white means smart. The children do not realize that the head start the children got at home is what accounts for the situation. It is generally accepted that the child is the father of the man; this holds true for the lower socio-economic Black people.

With whom, with what can he, a man, identify? As a child he had no permanent male figure with whom to identify: as a man, he sees nothing in society with which he can identify as an extension of himself. His life is built on mistrust, shame, doubt, guilt, inferiority, role confusion, isolation and despair. He feels that he is something less than a man, and it is evident in his conversation: "the white man is 'THE MAN', he got everything, and he knows everything, and a nigger ain't nothing." In a society where a man is valued according to occupation and material possessions, he is without possessions. He is unskilled and more often than not, either marginally employed or unemployed. Often his wife (who is able to secure a job as a maid cleaning for white people) is the breadwinner. He is, therefore, viewed as quite worthless by his wife and children. He is ineffectual both in and out of the home. He cannot provide for or protect his family. He is invisible, a non-entity. Society will not acknowledge him as a man. He is a consumer and not a producer. He is dependent upon the white man ('THE MAN') to feed his family, to give him a job, educate his children, serve as the model that he tries to emulate. He is dependent and he hates 'THE MAN' and he hates himself. Who is he? Is he a very old adolescent or is he the slave he used to be?

What did he do to be so BLACK and blue?

EXECUTIVE MANDATE NO. 1
STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE

Delivered May 2, 1967, at Sacramento, California, State Capitol Building

The Black Panther Party for Self Defense calls upon the American people in general and the Black people in particular to take careful note of the racist California Legislature which is now considering legislation aimed at keeping the Black people disarmed and powerless at the very same time that racist police agencies throughout the country are intensifying the terror, brutality, murder and repression of Black people.

At the same time that the American government is waging a racist war of genocide in Vietnam, the concentration camps* in which Japanese Americans were interned during World War II are being renovated and expanded. Since America has historically reserved the most barbaric treatment for non-white people, we are forced to conclude that these concentration camps are being prepared for Black people who are determined to gain their freedom by any means necessary. The enslavement of Black people from the very beginning of this country, the genocide practiced on the American Indians and the confining of the survivors on reservations, the savage lynching of thousands of Black men and women, the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and now the cowardly massacre in Vietnam, all testify to the fact that towards people of color the racist power structure of America has but one policy: repression, genocide, terror, and the big stick.

Black people have begged, prayed, petitioned, demonstrated and everything else to get the racist power structure of America to right the wrongs which have historically been perpetrated against Black people. All of these efforts have been answered by more repression, deceit, and hypocrisy. As the aggression of the racist American government escalates in Vietnam, the police agencies of America escalate the repression of Black people throughout the ghettos of America. Vicious police dogs, cattle prods and increased patrols have become familiar sights in black communities. City Hall turns a deaf ear to the pleas of Black people for relief from this increasing terror.

The Black Panther Party for Self Defense believes that the time has come for Black people to arm themselves against this terror before it is too late. The pending Mulford Act brings the hour of doom one step nearer. A people who have suffered so much for so long at the hands of a racist society, must draw the line somewhere. We believe that the Black communities of America must rise up as one man to halt the progression of a trend that leads inevitably to their total destruction.

19

--Huey P. Newton
Minister of Defense

*See "Concentration Camps U.S.A." by Charles R. Allen, Jr., and "American Concentration Camps" by Boswell.

EXECUTIVE MANDATE NO. 2:
STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE

Delivered June 29, 1967.

So Let This Be Heard . . .

Brother Stokely Carmichael:

Because you have distinguished yourself in the struggle for the total liberation of Black people from oppression in racist white America;

Because you have acted courageously and shown great fortitude under the most adverse circumstances;

Because you have proven yourself as a true revolutionary guided by a great feeling of love for our people;

Because you have set such a fine example, in the tradition of Brother Malcolm, or dedicating your entire life to the struggle of Black Liberation, inspiring our youth and providing a model for others to emulate;

Because you have refused to serve in the oppressor's racist mercenary, aggressive war machine, showing that you know who your true friends and enemies are;

Because of your new endeavor to organize and liberate the Crown Colony of Washington, D.C., you will inevitably be forced to confront, deal with, and conquer the racist Washington Police Department which functions as the protector of the racist dog power structure, occupying the Black Community in the same manner and for the same reasons that the racist U.S. Armed Forces occupy South Vietnam;

You are hereby drafted into the Black Panther Party for Self Defense, invested with the rank of Field Marshall, delegated the following authority, power, and responsibility:

> To establish revolutionary law, order and justice in the territory lying between the Continental Divide East to the Atlantic Ocean; North of the Mason-Dixon Line to the Canadian Border; South of the Mason-Dixon Line to the Gulf of Mexico.

....So Let It Be Done.

--Huey P. Newton
Minister of Defense

June 29, 1967

EXECUTIVE MANDATE NO. 3: STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE

Delivered on March 1, 1968.

SO LET THIS BE HEARD:

Because of the St. Valentine Day massacre of February 14, 1929, in which outlaws donned the uniforms of Policemen, posed as such, and thereby gained entrance to locked doors controlled by rival outlaws with whom they were contending for control of the bootlegging industry in Chicago; and because these gangsters, gaining entry through their disguise as Policemen, proceeded to exterminate their rivals with machinegun fire, we believe that prudence would dictate that one should be alert when opening one's door to strangers. late at night, in the wee hours of the morning -- even when these strangers wear the uniform of policemen. History teaches us that the man in the uniform may or may not be a policeman authorized to enter the homes of the people.

AND

Taking notice of the fact that (1) on January 16, 1968, at 3:30 A.M., members of the San Francisco Police Department kicked down the door and made an illegal entry and search of the home of Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information. These Pigs had no search warrant, no arrest warrant, and were therefore not authorized to enter. They were [illegible] permission for them to enter was explicitly denied by the Minister of Information. Present were Sister Kathleen Cleaver, our Communications Secretary and wife to our Minister of Information, and Brother Emory Douglas, our Revolutionary Artist.

Taking further notice of the fact that (2) on February 25, 1968, several uniformed gestapos of the Berkeley Pig Department, accompanied by several other white men in plainclothes, bearing an assortment of shotguns, rifles, and service revolvers, made a forceful, unlawful entry and search of the home of Bobby Seale, Chairman of our Party, and his wife, Sister Artie Seale. These Pigs had no warrant either to search or to arrest. When asked by Chairman Bobby to produce a warrant, they arrogantly stated that they did not need one. They had no authority to enter -- what they did have was the power of the gun. Thus we are confronted with a critical situation. Our organization has received serious threats, from certain racist elements of White America, including the Oakland, Berkeley, and San Francisco Pig Departments. Threats to take our lives, to exterminate us. We cannot determine when any of these elements, or a combination of them, may move to implement these threats. We must be alert to the danger at all times. We will not fall victim to a St. Valentine's Massacre. Therefore, those who approach our doors in the manner of outlaws, who seek to enter our homes illegally, unlawfully and in a rowdy fashion, those who kick our doors down with no authority and seek to ransack our homes in violation of our HUMAN RIGHTS, will henceforth be treated as outlaws, as gangsters, as evildoers. We have no way of determining that a man in a uniform involved in a forced outlaw entry into our home is in fact a Guardian of the Law. He is acting like a lawbreaker and we must make an appropriate response.

We draw the line at the threshold of our doors. It is therefore mandated as a general order to all members of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense that all members must acquire the technical equipment to defend their homes and their dependents and shall do so. Any member of the Party having such technical equipment who fails to defend his threshold shall be expelled from the Party for Life.

....SO LET THIS BE DONE.

—Huey P. Newton
Minister of Defense

MARCH 1, 1968

HUEY ON ANARCHISTS AND INDIVIDUALISTS AS RELATED TO REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE AND THE BLACK LIBERATION MOVEMENT

We should understand there is a difference between the rebellion of the anarchists and the black revolution or liberation of the black colony.

This is a class society, it always has been. This reactionary class society places its limitations on individuals; not just in terms of their occupation, but also regarding self expression, being mobile, and being free to really be creative and do anything they want to do.

The class society prevents this. This is true not only for the mass of the lower or subjugated class. It is also true within the ruling class, the master class. That class also limits the freedom of the individual souls of the people which comprise it.

In the upper class, the individuals always try to free themselves from these limitations — the artificial limitations placed upon him through external sources, namely, some hierarchy that goes by the name of State or Governmental Administration.

In America, we have not only a class society, we also have a caste system, and black people are fitted into the lowest caste. They have no mobility for going up the class ladder. They have no privilege to enter into the ruling structure at all.

Within the ruling class they're objecting (resisting?), because the people have found that they're completely subjected to the will of the administration and to the manipulators. This brings about a very strange phenomenon in America. That is, many of the rebelling white students and the anarchists are the offspring of this master class. Surely most of them have a middle class background and some even upper-class. They see the limitations imposed upon them and now they're striving, as all men strive, to get freedom of the soul. Freedom of expression, and freedom of movement, without the artificial limitations from antique values.

Blacks and colored people in America, confined within the caste system, are discriminated against as a whole group of people. It s not a question of individual freedom, as it is for the children of the upper classes. We haven't reached the point of trying to free ourselves individually because we're dominated and oppressed as a group of people.

Part of the people of this country -- which is a great part -- part of the youth themselves. But they're not doing this as a group of people. Because as a group they're already free to an extent. Their problem is not a group problem really, because they can easily integrate into the structure. Potentially they're mobile enough to do this. They're the educated ones, the "future of the country," and so forth. They can easily gain a certain amount of power over the society by integrating into the rulership circle.

But they see that even within the rulership circle there are still antique values that have no respect for individualism. They find themselves subjugated. No matter what class they're in they find themselves subjugated because of the nature of this class society. So their fight is to free the individual's soul.

This brings about another problem. They're being ruled by an alien source that has nothing to do with freedom of individual expression. They want to escape this, to overturn this, but they see no need to form a structure or a real, disciplined vanguard movement. Their reasoning is that by setting up a disciplined organization they feel they'd be replacing the old structure with other limitations. They fear they'd be setting themselves up as directing the people, therefore limiting the individual again.

But what they don't understand, or it seems that they don't understand, is as long as the military-industrial complex exists, then the structure of oppression of the individual continue. An individual would be threatened even if he were to achieve his freedom he's seeking. He'll be threatened because there will be an organized lower group there ready to strip him of his individual freedom at any moment.

In Cuba they had a revolution, they had a vanguard group that was a disciplined group, and they realized that the state won't disappear until imperialism is completely wiped out, structurally and also philosophically, or the bourgeois thoughts won't be changed. Once imperialism is wiped out they can have their communist state and the state or territorial boundaries will disappear.

In this country the anarchists seem to feel that if they just express themselves individually and tend to ignore the limitations imposed on them, without leadership and without discipline they can oppose the very disciplined, organized, reactionary state. This is not true. They will be oppressed as long as imperialism exists. You cannot oppose a system such as this to oppose it with orgainzation that's even more extremely disciplined and dedicated than the structure you're opposing.

I can understand the anarchists wanting to go directly from state to non-state, but historically it's incorrect. As far as I m concerned, thinking of the recent French Revolution, the reason the French uprising failed is simply because the anarchists in the country, who by definition had no organization, had no people that were reliable enough as far as the mass of the people were concerned, to replace DeGaulle and his government. Now, the people were skeptical about the Communist Party and the other progressive parties, because they didn't side with the people of medium living. They lagged behind the people, so they lost the respect of the people, and the people looked for guidance from the students and anarchists.

But the anarchists were unable to offer a structural program to replace the DeGaulle government. So the people were forced to turn back to DeGaulle. It wasn't the people's fault, it was Colin Bendit's fault and all the other anarchists who felt they could just go from state to non state.

In this country -- getting back home to North America now -- we can side with the student radicals. We would try to encourage them and persuade them to organize and weid a sharp cutting tool.

In order to do this they would have to be disciplined and they would have at least some philosophical replacement of the system. This is not to say that this itself will free the individual. The individual will not be free until the state does not exist at all, and I think — I don't want to be redundant — this cannot be replaced by the anarchists right away.

As far as the blacks are concerned, we are not hung up on attempting to actualize or express our individual souls because we're oppressed not as individuals but as a whole group of people. Our evolution, or our liberation, is based first on freeing our group. Freeing our group to a certain degree. After we gain our liberation, our people will not be free. I can imagine in the future that the blacks will rebel against the organized leadership that the blacks themselves have structured. They will see there will be limitations, limiting their individual selves, and limiting their freedom of expression. But this is only after they become free as a group.

This is what makes our group different from the white anarchist — besides he views his group as already free. Now he's striving for freedom of his individual self. This is the big difference. We're not fighting for freedom of our individual selves, we're fighting for a group freedom. In the future there will probably be a rebellion where blacks will say, "Well, our leadership is limiting our freedom, because of the rigid discipline. Now that we've gained our freedom, we will strive for our individualistic freedom that has nothing to do with organized group or state." And the group will be disorganized, and it should be.

But at this point we stress discipline, we stress organization, we do not stress psychedelic drugs, and all the other things that have to do with just the individual expansion of the mind. We're trying to gain true liberation of a group of people, and this makes our struggle somewhat different from the whites.

Now, how is it the same. It's the same in the fact that both of us are striving for freedom. They will not be free — the white anarchists will not be free — until we are free so that makes our fight their fight really. The imperialists and the bourgeois bureaucratic capitalistic system would not give them individual freedom while they keep a whole group of people based upon race color oppressed as a group. How can they expect to get individual freedom when the imperialists oppress whole nations of people? Until we gain liberation as a group they won't gain any liberation as an individual person. So this makes our fight the same, and we must keep this in perspective, and always see the similarities and differences in it.

There's a tremendous amount of difference in it, and there's a due amount of similarities between the two cases. Both are striving for freedom, and both are striving for liberation of their people, only one is advanced to a degree higher than the other. The anarchists are advanced a step higher, but only in theory. But as actuality of conditions, they shouldn't be advanced higher because they should see the necessity of wiping out the imperialistic structure by organizing groups just as we must be organized.



ESSAYS FROM
THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE
HUEY NEWTON



major city police departments command officer conferences

John Brown Caucus, SDS -- U. of Illinois, Chicago Circle
in cooperation with Chicago Regional SDS





TITLE: Major City Police Departments Command Officer Conferences

SPONSOR: Criminal Justice Curriculum (under a $79,000 grant from Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA)

PROGRAM: 15 one-week conferences over a two-year period--it is "the first project ever conducted in the United States". The first conference is to be held May 25-30 and is entitled "Recruitment and Retention of Police Personnel". (This certainly sounds innocent enough; take the example of the Oakland Police Dept. They use the most modern, computerized psychogical and sociological testing methods to duplicate exactly the racist pigs they now have. Oakland then retains them with the highest wage scale and fringe benefits in the country (even

3 better than Chicago). That's real progress: ask Oakland Panthers Huey Newton, Bobby Hutton or Eldridge Cleaver.)

PARTICIPANTS: Command-level officers from the nation's 32 largest cities.

LOCATION: University of Illinois at Chicago Circle: the conferences are to be located in Chicago because this location is "geographically centrally located an ideal base for criminal justice training." Chicago also happens to be the home of "Shoot to Kill" Daley and the most computerized and motorized Pig Dept. and one of the most victimized and brutalized black and Latin communities in the country.

DIRECTOR: Richard A. Wild, a small-town police chief from Michigan who concluded his Masters paper at Michigan State University's Police School with the recommendation that MSU should start teaching required courses in

(1) police pursuit driving
(2) riot and crowd control
(3) firearms training in all police weapons

JUSTIFICATION: The director of the program states that "UICC has acknowledged its role as an urban center university with a responsibility to assist in the solution of urban problems". In reality, the University does not feel a responsibility to serve the people of the community, but the racist power structure. The solution of urban problems can mean anything from a radical restructuring of our society to genocide against the black community. Given that the racist power structure hasn't yet made a serious effort to solve the most serious problems and that in many ways the maintenance of their power depends on the continued existence of these problems, the first alternative seems unlikely. Given the nature of the new police weapons—MACE, cattle prods, armored cars, tear and vomit gas—and the increasing repression directed against the black community, the second alternative —genocide—is more likely.



What Police Institutes Are About

The pigs are coming down on the people. The racist power structure is getting "uptight" because large numbers of black, brown and white people are understanding what this country and the pigs are all about. The more we understand, the harder we fight. And the harder we fight, the greater is the threat to the political, economic and social control of this country by the racist power structure. And when the people in power feel threatened they respond in the only way they can—with force and violence.

As the number of black rebellions, campus revolts, labor strikes, welfare marches and sit-ins, rent strikes, etc., increase, the power structure and its pigs become increasingly incapable of stopping the people and are forced to develop newer, more sophisticated methods to control them. That is what police institutes like the one at the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle and the one on police technology at IIT are all about.

"Just Doin' My Job"

We often hear about how the cop is "just doing his job". That's certainly true enough; but what exactly is his "job"? The actions of the police in the black and brown communities make that clear. Try telling any ghetto dweller that the police are in his community to protect the people. He knows that is a lie—they are there to protect private property, to function as an "occupying army" to protect the property of the outside—generally white—businessman. When the "showdown" between property and people's lives comes the pigs will always side with the businessman. The order that Daley gave last April—"Shoot to kill"—was no mistake. Ogilvie's statement upon sending in the National Guard—"Property Must Be Protected"—meant the same thing—the property of storeowners and slumlords is to be maintained at the cost of human lives.

Pigs serve three repressive functions in what we will call the black and brown internal colonies. This is not to say that the pigs are not repressive in white neighborhoods; the brutal attacks on white youth—students, dropouts, gang kids, and to an increasing extent white workers—should dispel that idea. The pigs function in a similar manner in white neighborhoods but it is obvious that the repression brought down on the black and brown communities is not only more intense given the nature of this racist society, but it is of

The Pig Institute

5 a qualitatively different nature from the way whites are treated.

The police function first to maintain "law and order"; the law which the capitalist class has developed to protect its wealth and property and the order which it needs to maintain its power. The pigs are the armed force which is used to "Serve and Protect" the rulers of this country. Police are assigned to patrol the neighborhoods, schools, hangouts and parks. Any deviation from their ideas as to what constitutes "good behavior" is met with brutal force. They occupy and surround the high schools (black, brown and white) to keep any opposition to the rotten educational system from "getting out of hand". Actually they act more like guards in a prison, which is what the high schools function as. In the past year they have increased the size of the gang intelligence unit (GIU) from 38 to over 200. The GIU watches, spies on, harasses and intimidates anyone they define as being a member of a "gang".

Second, police act to destroy the dignity and spirit of resistance which is so widespread in the black and brown communities. They verbally and physically abuse and intimidate people on the street—men, women, and young people are forced to undergo constant harassment, intimidation and coercion—stop and frisk, curfew violations, no standing on corners, women just walking down the street at night humiliated or arrested for prostitution. The street becomes the cops' turf.

The people who run this country are either unwilling or unable to meet the needs of the people; they are more concerned with maintaining their wealth and power.

The people need and are demanding:

*equality and an end to discrimination

*an end to the fighting and dying in wars which are fought to protect the rulers' business interests

*jobs which provide a decent standards of living with acceptable (that is human) working conditions

*an end to police brutality and repression

*decent food, clothing, and housing

*a radically different educational system—one which doesn't consist of poor facilities, teachers functioning as cops, the tracking system, exclusion of black and brown students, and useless distorted course content


"I'VE LIVED HERE IN THIS CITY FOR OVER 40 YEARS!...AND NEVER ONCE HAVE I BEEN BRUTALIZED BY THE POLICE!!"

In order to meet their needs people begin to organize and fight. When this happens the pigs

6 reveal their third function: that of stopping any movement which threatens the racist power structure. Any organization which seriously attempts to meet the needs of the people will be attacked and if possible destroyed. The pigs will use "any means necessary": from arrests on absurd trumped-up charges to infiltrating organizations and framing people to beatings and murder.

The repression directed against radical and revolutionary groups in the past few months has been overwhelming. In Chicago the Black Panther Party and the Young Lords Organization have experienced police harassment to the greatest extent. The Black Panther Party has been organizing continually to meet the needs of the black community. They have set up a Breakfast for Children program in which they feed several hundred children free breakfast each day (often their only hot meal) and are setting up a free Health Care program. The Panthers have always spoken against racism, urging black and brown people, white working class and young people to fight against the real enemy—the racist power structure. As a result, the Panthers have become the targets of a special program of repression—the shooting and jailing of Huey P. Newton, the attempt to jail Eldridge Cleaver, the murder of at least 15 Panthers around the country, the arrest of 21 in New York on conspiracy charges, and the jailing of more than 30 Panthers in one week in Chicago are specifics of that repression.

The Young Lords, a militant Puerto Rican youth group, has also involved itself in the fight for its people's needs. They have organized a program of opposition to the urban renewal



POLICE REPRESSION DIRECTED AGAINST THE

—Huey P. Newton: attacked, shot, jailed and sente

—Eldridge Cleaver: parole revoked, hounded out of

—Bobby Seale: indicted for "inciting a riot" at Dem

—Bobby Hutton: shot 19 times and killed by Oakland

—15 Panthers around this country murdered by pig

—Fred Hampton: convicted of "robbery"—allege
distributing them to neighborhood kids

—"Bunchy" Carter and John Huggins: murdered by

—Bobby Rush: arrested 4 times, 3 of them on gun c

—21 New York Panthers: indicted for "conspir
$2,000,000 bail

—3 Chicago Panthers: indicted for "conspiracy" t
bail

—2 Chicago Panthers: while carrying out the
property"

—19 Chicago Panthers: arrested in Chicago on
having license plates attached with regulation
pointed at angles rather than straight ahead" t

8

7 program in Lincoln Park which expels Latin families from their homes and apartments to be replaced by upper-middle-income white professionals. The pigs have come down hard on the Lords as a result of their involvement in these struggles. Cha Cha Jimenez, president of the YLO, has been arrested at least 10 times in the past few months on charges ranging from disorderly conduct to curfew violations to mob action. Lords are continually harassed on the streets by the pigs.

We occasionally hear it said that the fault lies with the individual policeman, and that he needs to be "educated". But the hatred for the police comes not as a result of the actions of the individual cop but as a response to the functions (outlined above) which the police play. Those of us who were in the park during the Convention this summer or who live in black or Spanish communities know that it doesn't matter if a cop is a PhD or a grade school dropout because once he puts on the uniform, he begins to "do his job".

The police have not acquired any new functions; they have historically been tools of the ruling class. They helped the slaveowners to keep the slaves "in their place" and prevented slave rebellions. They served the industrial bosses and robber barons, men like Jay Gould and Andrew Carnegie, in breaking strikes—stopping picket lines, protecting scabs and brutally beating, sometimes killing, striking men and women. They helped the company owners during the thirties when working men and women fought for unions and a decent standard of living. Even today they help to suppress wildcat strikes.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

ed to 2-15 years

the country

ocratic National Convention

, Calif. pigs

s

dly stealing 400 ice cream bars and

two police agents in Calif.

harges

acy" to blow up department stores—

purchase illegal weapons—$225,000

garbage arrested for "stealing city

ne day on charges ranging from "not
nuts and bolts" to "headlights of car
us creating a "safety hazard"

WHAT TO DO

It should be clear that the police institute will not in any way benefit the black and Latin communities, the working people or the youth of this country; will not in any way help to solve the serious problems we face—racial inequality, imperialist wars, poverty. In fact, by emphasizing a policy of overwhelming police power and continued repression it may aggravate the problems.

We must expose and educate people to understand the role of this institute and the pigs. We must demand that this institute be stopped.

While we demand that the police institute get off the Chicago Circle campus, it is not because we see the University as some sort of "ivory tower" which must be protected from outside influences. The university—with its police institutes, war research, military and corporate recruiting, ROTC—is as much a part of the racist power structure as any other institution. We want the pig institute off the campus as a first step to stopping it permanently. If it is moved off the campus and into the community we will organize to stop it there. Our program should be based on the demand: STOP THE PIG INSTITUTE.



Power to the People

Black Power to Black People

Latin Power to Latin People

for more information, contact Chicago Regional SDS, 641-0932

ack Panther P y

CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS

P. O. BOX 8641 • EMERYVILLE BRANCH • OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

845-0103 - 845-0104

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Minister of Defense
HUEY P. NEWTON

Chairman
BOBBY SEALE

Minister of Information
ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

National Hdq. Captain
DAVID HILLIARD

Field Marshals
UNDERGROUND

Minister of Education
GEORGE MURRAY

Minister of Finance
MELVIN NEWTON

*Minister of Foreign Affairs

*Minister of Justice

*Prime Minister
~~STOKELY CARMICHAEL~~

Communications Secretary
KATHLEEN CLEAVER

Minister of Culture
EMORY DOUGLAS

POLITICAL EDUCATION KIT
for Black Panther Party Members

Primary Objective of Our Party:

To establish Revolutionary Political Power
for Black People

The Black Panther Party is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Especially at the present, the Black Panther Party should certianly not confine itself to only fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, our Party must also shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses arming Black people, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up party organizations. The Black Panther Party defends itself with guns and force not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting looses its meaning and the Black Panther Party looses the reason for its existence.

• • • • • • • • • • •

CARDINAL RULE: Have Faith in the People and Faith in the Party.

• • • • • • • • • • •

MOTTO: We are the advocates of the abolition of War. We do not want War, but war can only be abolished through War, and in order to get rid of the Gun, it is necessary to take up the Gun.

Power to the People

Panther Power to the Vanguard

STIPULATIONS ON SUSPENSIONS AND OTHER DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN AGAINST BLACK PANTHER PARTY MEMBERS UPON VIOLATION OF PARTY RULES BELOW INDICATED. SUCH ACTIONS SHALL BE TAKEN WITH THE INTENTION OF KEEPING THE PARTY FUNCTIONAL BY ELIMINATING NON-FUNCTIONAL AND IRRESPONSIBLE MEMBERS.

RULE NO. 1 "No party member can have narcotics or weed in his posession while doing party work." (Violation of this rule will result in EXPULSION)

RULE NO. 2. "Any party member found shooting narcotics will be expelled from this party." (Such disciplinary action will be enforced)

RULE NO. 3. "No party member can be DRUNK while doing daily party work. (Violations of this rule will result in a) 30-day working suspension.* A second infringement of this rule will result in EXPULSION. It is further stipulated that the officer in charge make a progress report on the member undergoing this suspension.

RULE NO. 4. "No party member will violate rules relating to office work, general meetings of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, and meetings of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY ANYWHERE."

Office Rules:

a) No drinking
b) No misuse of party facilities or equipment
c) Obey all orders of the Officer of the Day without argument

Violation of the above rules and refusal to attend required meetings shall result in the following:

a) 2-week working suspension for first violation
b) 6-month suspension for second violation
c) EXPULSION for violation of any other party rule while on suspension for violation of rule #4

RULE NO. 5. "No party member will USE, POINT, or FIRE a weapon of any kind unnecessarily or accidently at anyone. (Violation of this rule will result in EXPULSION)

RULE NO. 8. "No party member will commit any crimes against other party members or BLACK people at all, and cannot steal or take from the people, not even a needle or a piece of thread. (Violation of this rule will result in EXPULSION)

RULE NO. 9. "When arrested BLACK PANTHER MEMBERS will give only name, address, and will sign nothing. Legal first-aid must be understood by all Party members. (Any member who violates this rule is considered to be a traitor and shall be dealt with as such. This person is to be EXPELLED from the Party)

*CRITERION FOR WORKING SUSPENSION

1. Must attend every political education class assigned during period of suspension.
2. Must report to the office on time everyday without exception during period of suspension for assignment of work.
3. Officer of the Day will assign work and supervise closely those persons on suspension.
4. Officer of the Day will review activities of the person on suspension and at the end of the suspension his recommendation will determine whether that person will be reinstated or expelled.

d. Check on application of what has been studied by his squad members. This should be checked constantly through observation of street training and what they learn from the masses in the community.

7. Sub-section leaders must collect daily reports from his squad members and then relay them to his section leader.

Authority **Rank**

10. SECTION - LEADERS SERGEANT

1. Coordinate the distribution of propaganda materials to all Sub-section leaders:

Kind of materials:	Newspaper Leaflets Posters etc.

2. Dispatch crews or whole squads to do specific political work assigned to you by your Captains.

3. If ordered implement security or take responsibility for security.

4. When a Section Leader is in charge of an office of the B.P.P., he will run that office like all other officers are run abiding by rules and Party political line and organizational operations of the party.

   a. Keeping office clean
   b. No drinking in building
   c. No narcotic in or about office, etc.

5. Must have knowledge of all existing Panther members squads, and sub-section leaders in his section.

6. (Section leaders are Drill leaders and must schedule weekly trips where all Panther members in his section get drill practice.

7. Section leaders must set up political education classes for new members joining the party who are in his section, and keep a record as to what new members have completed their six week training, successfully

RANK

Authority

LIEUTENANT

9. SECURITY

"THIS OPERATION IS HANDLED COMPLETELY UNDERGROUND".

Rank

Authority

CAPTAIN

8. COORDINATORS

1. Coordinate all political and organizational work and assign the said work to said section leaders.
2. Check complaints from community.
3. Handle contradictions among members, the party and the community.
4. Hold meetings of Section Leaders, coordinate rallies, dinners, other public functions.
5. Direct Security.
6. Head section leaders political education classes.
7. Captains do everything necessary.

	Authority	Rank
11.	SUB-SECTION LEADER	CORPORAL

No Panther member who is a sub-section leader will have this authority unless duley appointed by a Captain or coordinator in conjuction with his section leader.

1. Sub-Section Leader must build and construct a squad of Panther members who are dedicated and have successfully completed their six (6) weeks training.

2. He must maintain daily contact with his squad and also with his section leader or Captain.

3. Must know the where abouts of his squad. 24 hours a day and know how to contact them. Must also know how to contact his section leader and report to him daily.

4. Must spend at least two (2) hours a day study and keep up with all daily news so as to keep political aware.

5. Should work in the community where he lives, or is assigned to conduct propaganda, know the community problems, and know the existing business establishments by catagories in his sub-section and the general number of residents.

6. Must keep a check on all the Panther members of his squad in the areas of:
   - a. How well they do their propaganda work.
   - b. Firing practice in private sessions known only to them (and field stripping of weapons).
   - c. How well they know the rules and other materials of the party line.

12. Panther Members
NO ONE IS A PANTHER MEMBER IN GOOD STANDING UNTIL THEY HAVE COMpleted the six week training sucessfully.

1. Reading of the Black Panther Newspaper every issue, and especially before selling.
2. Each person must submit to their section leaders or captains daily reports of work.
3. Each Panther must know Chain of Command and the General duties of all Rank and File members of the Black Panther Party.
4. All Panthers are to practice criticism and self-criticism as it is related to organizational and political work.
5. All Panthers must do Daily Political Work and Organizational work, as work is assigned to them.
6. All Panthers do at least two hours study a day. And keep up with the daily news.
7. All Panthers continue political education classes as they progress to higher levels of political education with the Party.
8. All Panthers must keep sharp on firing practice; keeping their weapons cleaned in private; understanding and practicing safety of weapons at all times.
9. All Panthers must obey all orders given to them and carry out their duties in a responsible fashion.

NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

II. SECOND LEVEL

CENTRAL STAFF OF ANY STATE LEVEL BLACK PANTHER PARTY CHAPTER

1. Deputy to Minister of Defense
2. Deputy Chairman
3. Field Secretaries (Majors)
4. Communications Secretary (Major)

(Other Deputy Ministerial officers hold rank of Major)

2.-A. Deputy Minister Information
2.-B. Deputy Minister of Education
2.-C. Deputy Minister of Health
2.-D. Deputy Minister of Eco. Developme
2.-E. Deputy Minister of Culture
2.-F. Deputy Minister of Religion
2.-G. Deputy Minister of Labor
2.-H. Deputy Minister of Finance

(Continued Rank and File

5. Captain (Coordinators and Security Heads)
6. Security (Lieutenants)
7. Section Leaders (Sergeants)
8. Sub Section Leaders (Corporal)
9. Panther Member (Private)
10. Panther in 6-week training (Buck Private)

STATE LEVEL ADVISORY COUNCIL TO THE CENTRAL STAFF
(Community People and Research)

1. Police, Jails and Courts
2. Brothers and Sisters in Prison
3. Political and Economic Analysis
4. Unemployment
5. Housing
6. Publications, Communication Media (T.V., Radio, Films, Books)
7. Inter-state Relations & Third World (Indian, Mexican, Oriental, Puerto Rican, ect.)
8. Draft of Black men into U.S. Miltia
9. Education
10. Welfare
11. Arming Black Community
12. Funding Raising
13. Relations with Black Bourgeoisie & Black Establishment

On Subjectivism

Subjectivism exists to a serious degree among some Party members, causing great harm to the analysis of the political situation and the guidance of the work. The reason is that subjective analysis of a political situation and subjective guidance of work inevitably result either in opportunism or in putschism. As for subjective criticism, loose and groundless talk or suspiciousness, such practices inside the Party often breed unprincipled disputes and undermine the Party organization.

Another point that should be mentioned in connection with inner-Party criticism is that some comrades ignore the major issues and confine their attention to minor points when they make criticism. They do not understand that the main task of criticism is to point out political and organizational mistakes. As to personal shortcomings, unless they are related to political and organizational mistakes, there is no need to be overcritical and to embarass the comrades concerned. Moreoever, once such criticism develops, there is the great danger that the Party members will concentrate entirely on minor faults, and everyone will become timid and overcautious and forget the Party's political tasks.

The main method of correction is to educate Party members so that a political and ~~ext xix~~ scientific spirit pervades their thinking and their Party life. To this end we must: (1) teach Party members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method in analysing a political situation and appraising the class forces, instead of making a subjective analysis and appraisal; (2) direct the attention of Party members to social and economic investigation and study, so as to determine the tactics of struggle and methods of work, and help comrades to understand that without investigation of actual conditions they will fall into the pit of fantasy and putschism; and (3) in inner-Party criticism, guard against subjectivism, arbitratiness and the vulgarization of criticism; statements should be based on facts and criticism should centre on politics.

HMH.
1

NATI[illegible]AL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTU[illegible]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

(Three-level Organizational Structure)

I. FIRST LEVEL

NATIONAL CENTRAL COMMITTE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

1. MINISTER OF DEFENSE
2. CHAIRMAN
3. MINISTER OF INFORMATION
4. CHIEF OF STAFF(Colonel)
5. COMMUNICATIONS SECRETARY Lt. Colonel)
6. FIELD MARSHALLS (Lt. Colonels)

(Other Ministerial Officers hold rank of Lt. Colonel)

A. Minister of Education
B. Minister of Health
C. Minister of Finance
D. Minister of Justice
E. Prime Minister
F. Minister of Foreign Affairs
G. Minister of Economic Devel.
H. Minister of Culture
I. Minister of Religion
J. Minister of Labor

(continued Rank and File)

7. Assistants to Central Committee (Majors)
   A. Assistant to Chief of Staff
   B. Distributing Manager
   C. Finance Manager
   D. Assistant to Ministry of Economic Development
   E. Assistant to Ministy of Culture (Revolutionary Artist)
   F. Assistant to Ministry of Health
   G. Assistants to Ministry of Education
   H. Assistant to Ministry of Religion
   I. Assistant to Ministry of Labor

NATIONAL ADVISORY CABINET to the Central Committee (Community People and Research)

1. Police, Jails and Courts
2. Brothers and Sisters in Prison, on probation, and on parole
3. Political and Economic Analysis
4. Unemployment
5. Housing
6. Publications, Communications Media (T.V., Radio, Films, Books)
7. International Relations and Third World
8. Draft of Black men into U.S. Military
9. Education
10. Welfare and Health
11. Arming the Black Community

J. Assistants to Communications Secretary

8. Coordinator and Security Heads (Captains)

9. Secruity (Lieutenants)

10. Section Leaders (Sergeants)

11. Sub Section Leaders (Corporals)

12. Panther Members (Privates)

13. Panthers in 6-week training (Buck Privates)

12. Fund Raisi[illegible]

13. Domestic Relations and Black Bourgeoisie

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

II. SECOND LEVEL

CENTRAL STAFF OF ANY STATE LEVEL BLACK PANTHER PARTY CHAPTERS

1. Deputy to Minister of Defense

2. Deputy Chairman

3. Field Secretaries

   (Majors)

4. Communications Secretary

   (Major)

(Continued Rank and File)

5. Captain (Coordinators and Security Heads)

6. Security (Lieutenants)

7. Section Leaders (Sergeants)

8. Sub Section Leaders

   (Corporal)

9. Panther Member (Private)

10. Panther in 6-week training (Buck Private)

(Other Deputy Ministerial officers hold the rank of Major)

2.-A. Deputy Minister of Information
2.-B. Deputy Minister of Education
2.-C. Deputy Minister of Health
2.-D. Deputy Minister of Eco. Development
2.-E. Deputy Minister of Culture
2.-F. Deputy Minister of Religion
2.-G. Deputy Minister of Labor
2.-H. Deputy Minister of Finance

STATE LEVEL ADVISORY COUNCIL TO THE CENTRAL STAFF
(community People and Research)

COMMUNITIES:

1. Police, Jails and Courts
2. Brothers and Sisters in Prison
3. Political and Economic Analysis
4. Unemployment
5. Housing
6. Publications, Communication Media (T.V., Radio, Films, Books)
7. Inter-state relations & Third World (Indian, Mexican, Oriental, Puerto Rican, etc.)
8. Draft of Black men into U.S. Military
9. Education
10. Welfare
11. Arming Black Community
12. Fund Raising
13. Relations with Black Bourgeoisie Black Establishment

TIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL STR TURE

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

HMH/
4

III. THIRD LEVEL

CENTRAL STAFF OF ANY LOCAL CITY BRANCH OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

1. Defense Captain
2. Field Lieutenants
3. Secretary, Central Staff

These Officers hold the rank of Lieutenant

3-A. Information Lieutenant
3-B. Education Lieutenant
3-C. Health Lieutenant
3-D. Finance Lieutenant
3-E. Economic Development Lt.
3-F. Culture Lieutenant
3-G. Religion Lieutenant
3-H. Labor Lieutenant

(continued rand and file)

4. Section Leaders (Sergeants)
5. Sub-Section Leaders (Corporals)
6. Panther Members (Privates)
7. Panthers in training (Buck Privates)

LOCAL CITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
(Community People and Research)

1. Police, jails, and court
2. Brothers and sisters in jail, on parole or probation
3. Political and economic Analysis
4. Unemployment
5. Housing
6. Publications, Communications media (T.V., radio, films, books)
7. Inter-city relations and Third World (Indians, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Orientals, Arabs, etc.
8. Draft of Black men into U.S. military
9. Education
10. Welfare and Health
11. Arming Black Community
12. Fund Raising

13. Relations with Black Bourgeoisie and Black Establishment

BLACK PANTHER



193

COLORING BOOK

94



...HAD STRONG WARRIORS AND BEAUTIFUL CITIES.



[illegible] MAN [illegible] CAME [illegible]



THEY MADE SLAVES OF THE BEAUTIFUL BLACK WARRIORS AND BROUGHT THEM TO AMERICA.



BLACK MOTHERS AND FATHERS WERE TAKEN FROM EACH OTHER AND SOLD OFF TO THE [illegible] MAN



THE STRONG BLACK MAN DIDN'T LIKE BEING A SLAVE SO HE FOUGHT THE

199



NAT TURNER, A STRONG SLAVE, SHOWS THE BLACK MAN NOT TO FEAR THE WHITE SLAVE OWNER



"OFF THE PIG" BEAUTIFUL BLACK MEN!



THIS IS A PIG. HE TRYS TO CONTROL BLACK PEOPLE.

201


SUBURBS
PIG
PIG
SEEMER

THE PIG TRYS TO PROTECT THE WHITE STORES IN BLACK COMMUNITIES THAT ROB BLACK PEOPLE.



BLACK BROTHERS ARE TIRED OF THE WHITE MAN IN BLACK COMMUNITIES

100-



HUEY P. NEWTON, LEADER OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. ORGANIZED THE


PIG
TEEMER
20 5

BLACK BROTHERS PR [illegible] ACK CHILDREN



BROTHERS AND SISTERS DEAL WITH THE WHITE STORE OWNER THAT ROBS BLACK PEOPLE



[illegible] BLACK PANTHER DEFENDS HIS FAMILY



"BEWARE OF THE PIG," BROTHERS AND SISTERS



THE JUNIOR PANTHER DEFENDS HIS MOTHER

210



THE PIG IS AFRAID OF THE BLACK MAN. HE



THE BLACK PANTHER THINKS AND LOVES BLACK PEOPLE



PIG
PIG
PIG
LEEMER

THE ONLY GOOD PIG, IS A DEAD PIG


PIG
PIG
WEMER

THE PIG IS AFRAID OF BLACK CHILDREN BECAUSE THEY ARE BRAVE WARRIORS


PIG
TEEMER

215


PIG
PIG
EMER

POWER COMES THROUGH THE BARREL OF A GUN

14 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: SA EDWARD KINZER, JR. **Office:**
Date: June 12, 1969

Field Office File #: **Bureau File #:**

Title:

GEORGE SAMS, JR.;
LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS;
BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON;
ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES;
HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT;
PATRICK KEEN;
LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON;
JESSIE WARD;
GEORGIA WASHINGTON

Character: UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION - MURDER; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER; KIDNAPING; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT KIDNAPING; BINDING; HARBORING

Synopsis: On 6/3 and 4/69, information was received that subject GEORGE SAMS, JR. was being secreted at the Headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), Chicago, which during the early morning hours of 6/4/69, Chicago Agents attempted to gain access to this office in an attempt to locate subject. After repeated attempts to gain cooperation of members of the BPP, all occupants ordered out of premises. Arrested and charged with harboring subject GEORGE SAMS, JR., in violation of Title 18, Section 1071, United States Code, were subjects LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS, BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON, ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES, HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, PATRICK KEEN, LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON, JESSIE WARD, AND GEORGIA WASHINGTON. AUSA, Chicago authorized filing of these charges before United States Commissioner, Chicago, on 6/4/69. All subjects appeared before United States Commissioner that day and released on bond for reappearance on 6/20/69. A search incidental to subjects' arrests and in connection with search for fugitive, resulted in seizure by Agents of 13 guns, large quantities of ammunition, swords, gasmasks, office machines, books and quantities of records, posters, and literature. SUBJECT SAMS REPORTEDLY ENFORCER FOR BPP AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

This investigation was predicated upon receipt of information from the New Haven Division reflecting that GEORGE SAMS, JR., had been charged with the holding and subsequent murder of one, ALEX RACKLEY for several days in May, 1969, during which time he was tortured, scalded with boiling water, beaten, burned, and subsequently murdered. An authorized complaint was filed May 27, 1969, before United States Commissioner (USC) ARTHUR H. LATIMER at New Haven, Connecticut, by SA ROBERT C. PUCKETT. A Commissioner's warrant was issued for his arrest on May 27, 1969, charging violation of Title 18, Section 1073, United States Code.

On June 3 and 4, 1969, information was received that the subject had been, and was then, as late as 12:30 a.m., on June 4, 1969, in the Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. He further advised that the subject was expected to remain there at least for the remainder of that night.

At approximately 5:00 a.m., on June 4, 1969, Agents of the Chicago Office surrounded the premises at BPP Headquarters. SA R. B. YADON, Jr., telephonically informed a person answering the telephone at this address that a warrant was outstanding for the arrest of subject, GEORGE SAMS, Jr., and three other individuals. SA YADON attempted to elicit cooperation of those within the BPP Headquarters without success. After approximately 30 minutes, the occupants of this building were ordered out on the street and were placed under arrest. These eight individuals identified themselves as follows:

LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS
BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON
ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES
HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT
PATRICK KEEN
LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON
JESSIE WARD
GEORGIA WASHINGTON.

EDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA ON

Date June 6, 1969

1

On June 4, 1969, SAs JON W. HOUSLEY, HERMAN H. SCOTT, and SHERMAN NOBLE, JR., arrested LOCKETT F. BIBBS on the sidewalk in front of 2350 West Madison. This address houses the offices of the Chicago Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and BIBBS was about to enter same at the time he was arrested.

BIBBS was subsequently transported by Bureau automobile to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office at 219 South Dearborn, where he was photographed, fingerprinted, and provided with a printed warning and waiver form which he read but declined to sign.

BIBBS was interviewed by SAs HOUSLEY, JEROME T. COLLINS, and JOSEPH J. STUMPF regarding his association with the BPP and he advised as follows:

BIBBS stated he has been a member of the BPP for about four or five months. He then amended his statement regarding his membership with the BPP and advised he is merely a friend of the party and works for them. He stated, however, he has never formally joined the BPP. BIBBS stated that at the time of his arrest he was about to enter the offices of the BPP to help supervise their "Breakfast for Children Program." He stated that his duties are to set tables and help serve the children as they are being fed. He stated that the BPP tries to help the people in the neighborhood and he feels it is a very good and worthwhile organization. He advised that he has never seen any guns or other weapons in the BPP headquarters and that he has never seen a member of the BPP carrying a gun on his person.

BIBBS was shown a photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR., and stated he did not know SAMS by name or photograph. BIBBS advised he had been in the BPP headquarters several times during the previous evening, but again denied having seen SAMS on the premises.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # CG

SAs JON W. HOUSLEY, HERMAN H. SCOTT,
SHERMAN NOBLE, JR., JEROME T. COLLINS,
by and JOSEPH J. STUMPF JWH: Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

The following description was obtained by observation and interrogation:

Name	LOCKETT PHILLIP BIBBS
Aliases	"LUCKY"
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Age	41
Dated of Birth	June 7, 1927
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Nationality	American
Height	6'0"
Weight	160 pounds
Build	Slim
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complextion	Dark
Teeth	Fair
Scars and Marks	12" scar right knee; 1" scar bridge of nose
Residence	
Present	None
Past	2525 West Jackson
Occupation	Machine operator
Employment	
Present	None
Past	Chicago Molded Products Corporation, 1020 North Kolmar
Marital status	Separated - wife - LOUISE BIBBS nee GOLPHIN
Military Service	1945-1947; 1951-1954 United States Army US 460 45 367
Education	4 years high school, did not graduate, last school Du Sable

Selective Service Number	US 460 45 367
Social Security Number	326-20-3293
Relatives	
Wife	LOUISE BIBBS nee GOLFHIN
Child	ROBELIA DOBSON, 95th Street
Father	LOCKETT BIBBS, Port Clinton, Ohio 1121 State
Mother	MARGARET BIBBS 54-- South State Chicago, Illinois Apartment 412
Sisters	MARILYN WINDFIELD 6400 South Woodlawn GWENDOLYN EVANS 102nd and Peoria Chicago, Illinois
Admitted Prior Arrest Record	3 years probation for burglary, November, 1966, at Chicago. Advises he is still on probation.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 10, 1969

After being advised of the identities and official capacities of the arresting officers, BRUCE ALLAN DICKSON was arrested for harboring a Federal fugitive at 9:58 AM, June 4, 1969, at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois. He was immediately orally advised of his rights as contained in "Interrogation; Advice of Rights; Your Rights' Form. He declined to make a statement and refused to give his identity. He was then transported in Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Radio Car Number 160, to FBI Headquarters, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, for processing by Special Agents KELLY V. ENGLAND and RICHARD S. SWENSEN.

At FBI Headquarters, DICKSON was again advised of his rights as contained in the "Your Rights" Form, and he stated he understood his rights, but refused to be interviewed other than giving his name and his home address, which he listed as being 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois.

The following is a description of subject obtained through interview and observation:

Name	BRUCE ALLAN DICKSON
Date of birth	Refused to give
Place of birth	Refused to give
Former Employment	Janitor
Residence	2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois
Race	Negro
Sex	Male
Height	6 feet, 1 inch
Weight	165 - 170 pounds
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Build	Medium
Complexion	Light
Scars	9 inch scar on upper left arm with stitching scars on either side 1 inch scar on left shoulder blade ½ inch circular scar inside elbow left arm ½ inch circular scar back of elbow

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

SA KELLY V. ENGLAND and
SA RICHARD S. SWENSEN/

by

Date dictated 6/10/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Scars	left arm ½ inch scar left wrist 1½ inch scar across right wrist

ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 5, 1969

ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Office, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969, by Special Agents (SA) RICHARD A. CARR and JOHN J. LOUGHNEY, JR. Prior to being interviewed GRAVES was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and was furnished with a form entitled, "Interrogation, Advice of Rights", which she read. After reading this form GRAVES stated she understood her rights and declined to sign the form.

GRAVES admitted she is a member of the Black Panther Party, however, declined to state how long she had been a member.

GRAVES was displayed photographs of GEORGE SAMS, JR. and RORY B. HITHE and stated she does not know either of them and has never seen them.

GRAVES refused to answer any further questions with the exception of some questions regarding her background and description.

An examination of GRAVES' personal effects disclosed the following items:

One aerosol spray can of "Protect-U" defensive spray, which was retained.

A piece of paper bearing telephone number 875-1429.

Card listing person to notify in case of emergency as Grandmother BURTON, 8440 Vernon, telephone number RA3-4255, and ST3-9523.

Card indicating GRAVES had completed course in Red Cross Home Nursing at Peace Memorial Hospital, June 26, 1968.

Card indicating GRAVES is a registered Practical Nurse.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs JOHN J. LOUGHNEY, JR. and RICHARD A. CARR: Date dictated 6/5/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Two letters bearing return address on United States Department of Army, Official Business envelopes of RONALD DAVIS, Drawer A, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 66027. Both letters mailed postage free. Telephone numbers 243-8276, or 243-8376, and 873-1429 were handwritten on envelope.

A piece of paper bearing telephone number 379-7746.

Card for membership in the Majestic Social Club in name of DIANN BROOKS. Written on back of card was "ELAINE ROBERTSON, 8019 S. Kimbark, 734-7035."

The following descriptive and background data was obtained from interview and observation:

Name	ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES
Race	Negro
Sex	Female
Date of Birth	October 3, 1947
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'5"
Weight	120 pounds
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Dark
Grandmother	MAGGIE BURTON, 8440 Vernon, Chicago, Illinois

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 9, 1969

1

HARVEY D. HOLT was arrested at the headquarters of the Chicago Office of the Black Panther Party, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. He was informed that he was being arrested for harboring a fugitive from justice wanted by Federal authorities. He was informed of the identities of the below named agents as agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

HOLT was informed that he did not have to say anything, that anything he did say could be used against him later in a court of law, that he was entitled to contact an attorney and to talk to him before talking to the arresting agents, and that if he could not afford an attorney the Federal District Court would appoint one for him.

The above rights were exhibited to HOLT in written form, and he executed a waiver of rights. He furnished no information other than the following background information:

Name	HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, aka, Harvey D. Holt, Dwight Holt
Date of birth	10/8/43
Place of birth	Bay St. Louis, Missouri
Height	5' 9"
Weight	165 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Scars and marks	Mustache; blemishes on right shoulder; a small pencil-line scar under each nostril; left ear pierced.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs STEPHEN E. DELANTY and JOHN F. MILLER/ Date dictated 6/9/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2.

Marital status	Single
Selective Service No.	11-53-43-197
Social Security No.	349-36-2478
Drivers license	Illinois, number H43032443287
Employment	Present: St. Malachy Catholic Church, Chicago, Illinois, Gym Supervisor Prior: Automatic Electric Properties, Incorporated, Northlake, Illinois
Education	Presently a student at Wilson Campus, Chicago City College, 7047 South Stewart, Chicago, Illinois, entered January 31, 1969
Admitted prior arrests	Traffic violation, January, 1969, while driving a Chevrolet, 1958 Illinois drivers license HM 3154, Chicago Vehicle Tag 4295039

The following is an inventory of personal property in the possession of HOLT at the time of his arrest:

A. Cash - $18.82

B. A General Motors car key

C. A set of keys

D. Ball point pen

E. An envelope addressed to HOLT at the above address bearing the return address, Wilson Campus, Chicago City College.

F. A box of pills, explained by HOLT to be for the treatment of gonorrhea.

G. A comb

H. A wallet containing the following:

1. A Certificate of Proficiency issued at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, identifying HOLT as a Heating Equipment Operator.

2. Auto insurance identification card issued by Parliment Insurance Company, Chicago, Illinois, telephone LO 1-6460.

3. A photograph showing two Negro females with the notation, "fashion show" on the back.

4. A card from Motors Insurance Corporation, stamped Midway Chevrolet Company, 6522 Cottage Grove Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

5. A United States Government Motor Vehicle Operator's License issued at Fort Carson, Colorado.

6. An original membership card in the "Black Brothers of 'Unity'", president ERVINE AKBAR, telephones, 287-0658, 9.

7. St. Phillip Basilica High School commencement exercise admission card.

8. Social Security card showing number 349-36-2478.

9. Veterans Administration card number 24669326.

10. Identification card issued by Wilson Campus, Chicago City College, 7047 South Stewart, Chicago.

11. Traffic ticket dated January 31, 1969, indicating HOLT was at that time driving a Chevrolet, Illinois license HM 3154, Chicago Vehicle Tag 4295039.

12. A guest identification card issued by the Clinton Job Corps Center, to one MARVIN WEST, born July 23, 1943, 3112 West 15th Place, Chicago Illinois (HOLT explained that his photo, which appears on this card, was put on the wrong card by the Job Corps Center by mistake).

13. An Illinois Bell Telephone receipt for telephone number 277-3612, for the address 4102 West 16th Street, dated May 2, 1969.

14. A telephone dial tag containing the above number.

15. A scrap of paper bearing the name MALONE 684-4620, 6703 Merr....(illegible).

16. A scrap of paper bearing the names PAT MITCHUM, HENRY, 6112 Kimbark, 667-6016.

17. Five receipts from the Westlane Hotel for rental of Apartment 410 to one HARVEY COLT. The receipts are dated April 14, 1969, April 21, 1969, April 26, 1969, May 5, 1969, and May 10, 1969. (HOLT explained the above name was merely a spelling error on the part of the hotel).

18. A scrap of paper bearing the name ED LEWIS, 626-8764.

19. A receipt for a $1.00 registration fee to the Black University.

20. A receipt for an American Express money order in the amount of $80.00 dated February 10, 1968, payable to Mc Cabe Realty.

21. A card of ROBERT L. GREEN, Republic Precinct Captain, 5018 West Van Buren Street, Chicago, Illinois.

22. Chicago Public Library card number 391846.

23. GMAC card bearing the name C. L. HARRIS, 10046 South Western Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

24. A receipt from the Northlake Currency Exchange, 23 North Wolf Road, Northlake, Illinois, dated March 16, 1968, for a money order payable to Mc Cabe Realty.

25. A scrap of paper bearing the name KATHIE, 826-8125, and the notation "met at JERRY's house".

26. A card from the Chicago Commission on Urban Opportunity, with the name CARSON R. BROWN, Program Assistant Unit Coordinator, 400 South Peoria, Chicago, Illinois, telephone 243-4315.

27. A notice of attempt to deliver certified mail April 23, 1969.

28. A card from BEN ELLIS Optical Laboratory, 140 North State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Room 602, telephone 372-9253.

29. Army meal card showing HOLT's RA number to be 16-769-553.

30. An address book containing the following entries:

a. On the front page were listed the following telephone numbers: 826-9107, 722-4678, 943-3458, 751-0733.

b. ARRGERINA, 422 South 12th Avenue, 344-6417.

c. ANNET and WELL, 826-3678.

d. BARBARA WILLIAMS, 378-8761.

e. B.S.A. office 922-3580 x 421.

f. A & E 379-4300 x 141.

g. ARLENE, 533-6541.

h. BRENDA, 928-6794.

i. AL, 533-5010.

j. ANNE, 722-4384.

k. BOO, 265-1909.

l. CHARMAINE, 666-6523.

m. DOUGLAS BLANCHARD, 521-0850.

n. DIANE B., 1646 West 14th Place, 243-6586.

o. DOSS (Shell Station) SE 3-9342, 243-3095.

p. DOROTHY TURNER, 642-9782.

q. DELORIS, 261-4997.

r. Count 19, 522-1273.

s. ETHEL GRIFFIN, 667-7607.

t. FANNIE, 337-5163.

u. FRANK, 277-7724.

v. JOAN GREY, 704 East 51st Street, KE 6-2854.

w. WILLIE HAWKINS, 4258 West Adams, 826-2440.

x. WILLIE HOLMAN, 56 North Long, 261-2117.

y. GEORGE (JONES), 287-1087.

z. JOAN, HU 3-6620.

aa. LYNN and FRENCH, 5301 South Maryland,
667-0115.

bb. MOSE, 1404 East 76th, 955-8890.

7.

cc. MILDRED WILLIAM, 421-6426.

dd. MOTHER (job), ST 2-1500 x 191, Wieboldts

ee. MARIE (DORIS) G., 6660 South Mich., 487-7127.

ff. PEGGY TAFT, 4112 Adams, 826-0631.

gg. JAMES PURNELL, 553-0094.

hh. Office, SE 3-9638.

ii. P. Office, 243-8276.

jj. PAM, 738-0336.

kk. REGINA, 1296 A Washburn, CA 6-6425.

ll. ROSEMARY, 722-0989.

mm. TOMMIE, 343-7530, 343-7763.

nn. L. C. SMITH, 221-1814.

oo. WM. SCANLAN, NE 8-5461.

pp. SYLVESTER, ES 8-1868; a number 429 was listed also.

qq. OSCAR TANNER, 7059 South Halsted, 994-4430 x 106.

rr. MARVIN WELLS, bus: 268-8081, home: 747-0256.

ss. VERON HENDERSON, 7712 Drexel.

tt. On the last page were the following notations: SE 3-9638, G.T. 287-1087, St. Malachy SE 3-1068.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/10/69

On June 4, 1969, Special Agent (SA) GORDON S. BROOKS and SA HERMAN H. SCOTT arrested PATRICK KEEN at the headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), 2350 West Madison Street.

KEEN was subsequently transported by Bureau automobile to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office at 219 South Dearborn Street, where he was photographed, fingerprinted and interviewed concerning his association with the BPP and with the subject GEORGE SAMS, JR.

KEEN was provided with a copy of a Warning and Waiver Form which he read and stated he understood, but declined to sign.

KEEN provided the following information:

He stated that he has been a member of the BPP for approximately three weeks and advised that on the night of June 3-4, 1969, he was the Officer of the Day (OD) at BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois. He advised that as the OD he had been in charge of the BPP office,

KEEN observed a photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR. and stated that he did not know SAMS by name nor did he recognize the photograph. He stated that he had never seen the person in the photograph in the BPP office.

KEEN advised that a couple of weeks ago, he had gone into the BPP office and had heard someone talking loudly in another room in the office. He stated that he made inquiries about the person making the noise and was told that the man's name was WADDELL and that he was from BPP headquarters on the West coast. He added, however, that he did not actually observe WADDELL and, therefore, would be unable to state whether or not this person was identical with the photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

SA GORDON S. BROOKS
by SA HERMAN H. SCOTT GSB Date dictated 6/5/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

KEEN declined to further discuss his activities within the BPP or activities of the BPP itself.

The following description was obtained by interview and observation:

Name	PATRICK KEEN
Alias	PAT KEEN
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Date of birth	March 4, 1949
Place of birth	Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'11"
Weight	170 lbs.
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Dark
Nationality	American
Scars and marks	Birth mark oblong shape one inch by 3/4 inch; upper right leg, front
Peculiarities	Wears glasses (tinted)
Education	Graduated John Marshall High School, Chicago, Illinois, 1967; Roosevelt University, Chicago 1967; De Paul University, Chicago, 1967-68; Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois, 1968-69 (Completed two years college, major: music)
Employment	None
Social Security Number	334-45-8580
Selective Service No.	11-49-49-45
Selective Service Classification	1A
Address	3335 West Fullerton, Chicago, Illinois
Previous addresses	1640 South Spaulding,Chicago, Ill. 170 North Le Claire, Chicago, Ill.
Marital status	Single
Mother	CLARA KEEN, 3335 West Fullerton, Chicago, Ill.
Father	THEODORE KEEN, same address

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 6/6/69

LARRY MAURICE ROBERSON, 3326 West Fulton Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was interviewed by Special Agents (SA) DONALD W. OXLEY and RICHARD L. KNEIBERT, who identified themselves to him as SAs of the FBI. Prior to the commencement of the interview, ROBERSON was furnished Form FD-395 "Interrogation; Advice of Rights Form" which he carefully read and refused to sign. He stated that he understood what his rights were but that he did not desire to sign any legal document. ROBERSON furnished the following information:

ROBERSON furnished SAs with his name, address, and basic descriptive information. He refused to make any further statements to the Agents regarding the Black Panther Party or his involvement with the Party. He denied any knowledge of GEORGE SAMS, Jr.

The following description was obtained through observation and interview:

Name	LARRY MAURICE ROBERSON, also known as Robinson
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Age	20
Date of Birth	12/26/[illegible]
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Nationality	United States
Height	5'11"
Weight	202 Pounds
Build	Medium
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Medium-dark
Scars and Marks	1½" scar right knee
Father's Address	3326 West Fulton Street Chicago, Illinois
Occupation	Unemployed
Marital Status	Single

On [illegible] at Chicago, Illinois File # [illegible]

by SA DONALD W. OXLEY and SA RICHARD L. KNEIBERT Date dictated [illegible]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

234

Education	Completed John Marshall High School, Chicago, August, 1966, Lincoln University, Jefferson City, Missouri, September, 1966-1969
Selective Service Number	11-49-48-1930
Social Security Number	346-42-1930
Father	HENRY BELL ROBERSON
Mother	DORIS JEAN ROBERSON Nee MITCHELL
Brother	DERRICK LEROY ROBERSON, age 15 (Above individuals residing at 3326 West Fulton)
Prior Arrests	Admitted 1969 Chicago declined to state reason for arrest.

EDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT

Date 6/4/69

1

JESSE WARD, 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois, was interviewed by Special Agents EUGENE J. CONNOLLY and CHARLES E. BRUNNER who identified themselves to him as Special Agents of the FBI. Prior to commencement of the interview, WARD was furnished form FD-395, "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" which he read and refused to sign. He stated that he understood his rights as they were written on the form and as he read them, but he would not sign anything because he does not know or understand what he is doing and because it is against the rules of the Black Panther Party. WARD furnished the following information:

His name is JESSE WARD and he resides at 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois. He is a member of the Black Panther Party of Illinois. Other than call the interviewing Agents numerous obscene names, he refused to furnish any other information.

The following description of WARD was obtained through observation and interrogation on June 4, 1969:

Name	JESSE WARD
Address	721 North Troy
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Height	6' - 6'1"
Weight	175 - 180 lbs.
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black, bushy American cut
Age	Approximately 19
Complexion	Medium dark
Scars and marks	2" scar, upper left lip
Characteristics	Wears glasses; wears a wispy goatee and mustache

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SAs EUGENE J. CONNOLLY and CHARLES E. BRUNNER EJC: Date dictated 6/4/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

236

Date 6/4/69

1

On June 4, 1969, at Chicago, Illinois, JESSE WARD, 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois, was while being interviewed in the Chicago Office of the FBI, given a body search and the following items were found:

One book entitled "The Thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung" by MAO TSE-TUNG, which bore a red soft leather cover.

One pamphlet entitled "Along the Socialist or Capitalist Road?", printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, and dated August 15, 1967.

A pamphlet entitled "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything" by YAO WEN-YUAN, printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1968.

A pamphlet entitled "China's Great Revolution and The Soviet Union's Great Tragedy" by RENMIN RIBAO (People's Daily) Observer dated June 4, 1967. This pamphlet was printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1967.

A pamphlet entitled "Statement By Comrade Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, In Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression". This pamphlet was printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, in 1968, and it bore a date of April 16, 1968.

With the exception of the last named pamphlet, the other three pamphlets bore the following worded stamp:

"A copy of this material has been filed with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

SAs EUGENE J. CONNOLLY and
CHARLES E. BRUNNER EJC: 6/4/69
by Date dictated

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Justice, Washington, D. C., where the registration statement of China Books and Periodicals, 2929-24th Street, San Francisco, 10, California, as an agent of Guozi Shudian of Peking, China, is available for inspection. The fact of registration does not indicate approval of this material by the Government of the United States."

Also taken during the search were: one pair of tweezers; one felt tip blue pen; one blank firearms registration form; and numerous assorted papers which WARD declined to accept and requested they be discarded by the searching Agents. All of the items taken from WARD were returned to him except the pair of tweezers which were given to the United States Marshal.

In addition, WARD had in his possession the following items which were not taken: fifty cents in change comprised of one quarter, three nickels and one dime; one cigarette lighter; five books of matches; one pack of Kool cigarettes; one scrap of paper bearing the notation DIANE JONES, 2822 California, telephone number 326-6189; one scrap of paper bearing the notation "has been changed" 201 South Ashland, Political Orientation MWF 8:00; one scrap of paper bearing the notation BEVERLEY, 722-5960, 4122 North Wilcox.

DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT

1

Date June 6, 1969

GEORGIA WASHINGTON was placed under arrest at 2350 West Madison. She was immediately advised of her rights by SA JACK D. VAHRENWALD. She advised she understood her rights, but refused to execute a warning and waiver form.

WASHINGTON was shown photographs of the following individuals:

GEORGE SAMS, JR.
FBI Number 493 526 F

LONNIE MC LUCAS
FBI Number 546 916 E

LANDON ROBERT WILLIAMS
FBI Number 229 544 G

RORY B. HITHE.

WASHINGTON advised that she had never seen any of these individuals and their names were not familiar to her. She advised that she did not wish to make any further statement.

The following description of WASHINGTON was obtained by observation and interview:

Sex	Female
Race	Negro
Date of Birth	January 22, 1951
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'4"
Weight	155 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Social Security Number	352-42-7813

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File #

by SA BRUCE F. KNIPP and
SA JACK D. VAHRENWALD

Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Employment	Typist for Security Plating Company 2645 West Fulton
Present Address	2350 West Madison
Former Address	4317 West Wilcox
Education	Presently enrolled in night school at Austin High School
Mother	MARY WASHINGTON Address unknown
Father	Unknown
Brothers and Sisters	None
Previous admitted arrests	Arrested by Chicago Police Department early in 1968 was held for a few hours and then released, reason for arrest unknown.

WASHINGTON had the following names and addressed in her purse:

BARBARA A. SANKEY
2156 West Monroe
Chicago, Illinois
Employment Mc Master-Car Supply Company
PO Box 4355

Brother WOODS
DA 8-3123
At home 344-4540.

On June 4, 1969, the facts of this case were presented to Assistant United States Attorney NICHOLAS J. ETTEN authorized the filing of a complaint charging subjects LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS, BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON, ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES, HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, PATRICK KEEN, LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON, JESSIE WARD, and GEORGIA WASHINGTON with Harboring and concealing subject, GEORGE SAMS, Jr., in violation of Title 18, Section 1071, United States Code.

United States District Court

FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION NJE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v

ARVEY DWIGHT HOLT; LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON;
ESSIE WARD; LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS;
RUCE ALLEN DICKSON; PATRICK KEEN;
ORGIA WASHINGTON; ANDREA GRAVES

Commissioner's Docket No.
Case No.
COMPLAINT for VIOLATION of 2014
U.S.C. Title 18
Section 1071

BEFORE JAMES T. BALOG, Name of Commissioner
219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Ill., Address of Commissioner

The undersigned complainant being duly sworn states:

That on or about June 4, 1969, at Chicago in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,

(1) HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT; LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON; JESSIE WARD; LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS; BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON; PATRICK KEEN; GEORGIA WASHINGTON; ANDREA GRAVES

(2) having notice and with knowledge that a federal warrant of arrest had been issued for the apprehension of George Sams, Jr., also known as Robert Wadell Smith, on a omplaint charging George Sams, Jr. with unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for the crime f murder, a violation of the laws of the United States, wilfully and knowingly, and for th urpose of preventing his arrest on said warrant and for the purpose of preventing his iscovery, did harbor and conceal George Sams, Jr. at 2350 W. Madison St., Chicago, Illinoi in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1071.

And the complainant states that this complaint is based on
SEE ATTACHED SHEET

And the complainant further states that he believes that

are material witnesses in relation to this charge.

EDWARD KINZER Signature of Complainant.

Special Agent, F.B.I. Official Title.

Sworn to before me, and subscribed in my presence, ..., 19 .

.... United States Commissioner.

---

(1) Insert name of accused.
(2) Insert statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.

242

And the complainant states that this complaint is based on information supplied to complainant by Roy Mitchell, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Agent Mitchell stated to your complainant that in the early morning hours of June 4, 1969, he was contacted by a confidential informant who on numerous occasions has supplied information to Agent Mitchell which has proven to be reliable. The confidential informant stated to Mitchell that George Sams, Jr., also known as Robert Wadell Smith, was then in a second floor office of a building at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, which office is known by your complainant to be the Chicago headquarters of the Black Panther Party. Complainant further states that he is familiar with the aforesaid George Sams, Jr. and that said individual is known by him to be a member of the National Black Panther Party. Complainant further states that he has knowledge that a federal criminal complaint and arrest warrant are presently outstanding at New Haven, Connecticut, charging the said George Sams, Jr. with the federal felony offense of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for murder, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1073. Complainant further states that on June 4, 1969 shortly after being informed of the aforesaid information supplied by the confidential informant, he and other agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation proceeded to the building at 2350 West Madison Street. All defendants who were then in the second floor Black Panther Office of the aforesaid building were informed by Agents of the F.B.I. that the said Agents were in possession of a warrant for the arrest of George Sams, Jr. All defendants were then requested to leave the building. For a period of approximately 30 minutes all defendants refused to comply with this request, refused to permit access to the building and refused to answer Agents' questions as to whether or not George Sams, Jr. was present in the building.

Complainant further states that pursuant to a search of the aforesaid Black Panther Party Office incident to the arrest of defendants, several photographs depicting George Sams, Jr. were seized. Complainant further states that he recognizes the background in each of these photographs as being the inside of the office of the Black Panther Party, 2350 W. Madison St., Chicago, Illinois.

Complainant further states that he has personal knowledge of the aforesaid information.

NJE:

On June 4, 1969, SA EDWARD KINZER, Jr., signed the aforementioned complaint before United States Commissioner JAMES T. BALOG. On June 4, 1969, Assistant United States Attorney ETTEN advised that all of the above eight subjects appeared before Commissioner BALOG and were released on own recognizance bond. The male individuals' bond was set at $4,000 and the female subjects at $3,000. the case was continued until 3:00 p.m. on June 20, 1969.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

U[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT O[illegible]J[illegible]TICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
June 13, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title	BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
Character	RACIAL MATTERS SMITH ACT OF 1940 SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, REBELLION AND INSURRECTION
Reference	Report of Special Agent Hubert M. Hart, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 part 11 & 14

SSC LETTER 8/20/75
PART II
ITEMS # 4 and 5

AND

PART IV
ITEM # 2 g and h

SSC LETTER 8/20/75
PART II
ITEMS # 4 and 5

AND

PART IV
ITEM # 2 g and h

SSC Access

TELEGRAM
SPECIAL

TU WU

DEPT
ADMIN

DEC 8 5 12 PM '69

WUA053 (37)AB261 KB436

K VEF157 AS PDB 32 EX TDVE CHICAGO ILL 8 251P CST

US ATTNY GEN JOHN MICHELL DLEY 75 JUSTICE DEPT WASH DC

WE OF THE NAACP ARE EXTREMELYALARMED, CONCERNED, AND CONFUSED RELATIVE TO THE CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS AND FACTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SLAYING OF MARK CLARK AND FRED HAMPTON BY COOK COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFCALS IN DEC 4, 1969. PURSUANT TO THE SAME INCIDENT, WE DEMAND THAT AN ADEQUATE, THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND THAT THE RESULT OF SUCH INVESTIGATION BE MADE KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE A TENSE, ANXIOUS SITUATION. WE SIMPLY WILL NOT TOLERATE A MODERN DAY LYNCHING AND SHOULD THE RESULTS OF YOUR INVESTIGATION PROVE A VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS WE SHALL USE MAXIMUM RESOURCES TO PURSUE THE APPREHENSION AND PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE. PLEASE ADVISE

JOHN GWYNN, NAACP, ILLINOIS STATE PRES PEORIA ILL, DR L H HOLMAN, NAACP NATL BOARD MEMBR, JOLIET, ILL AND SYD FINLEY, NAACP, NATL OFFICE FIELD DIRECTOR, 53 WEST JACKSON BLVD ROOM 1038 CHICAGO ILL

(257).

514P EST DEC 8 69

OFFICE OF THE
RECEIVED
DEC 9 - 1969
ATTORNEY GENERAL

42-11420

206

ENCLOSURE

TELEGRAM SPECIAL

DEPT.
ADMINIS

DEC 8 5 12 PM

TU WU

WUA053 (37)AB261 KB436

K VEF157 AS PDB 32 EX TDVE CHICAGO ILL 8 251P CST

US ATTNY GEN JOHN MICHELL DLEY 75 JUSTICE DEPT WASH DC

WE OF THE NAACP ARE EXTREMELYALARMED, CONCERNED, AND CONFUSED RELATIVE TO THE CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS AND FACTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SLAYING OF MARK CLARK AND FRED HAMPTON BY COOK COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFCALS IN DEC 4, 1969. PURSUANT TO THE SAME INCIDENT, WE DEMAND THAT AN ADEQUATE, THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND THAT THE RESULT OF SUCH INVESTIGATION BE MADE KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE A TENSE, ANXIOUS SITUATION. WE SIMPLY WILL NOT TOLERATE A MODERN DAY LYNCHING AND SHOULD THE RESULTS OF YOUR INVESTIGATION PROVE A VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS WE SHALL USE MAXIMUM RESOURCES TO PURSUE THE APPREHENSION AND PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE. PLEASE ADVISE

JOHN GWYNN, NAACP, ILLINOIS STATE PRES PEORIA ILL, DR L H HOLMAN, NAACP NATL BOARD MEMBR, JOLIET, ILL AND SYD FINLEY, NAACP, NATL OFFICE FIELD DIRECTOR, 53 WEST JACKSON BLVD ROOM 1038 CHICAGO ILL

(257).

514P EST DEC 8 69

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RECEIVED
DEC 9 - 1969

42-114-206

ENCLOSURE

DEC 11 1969

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

JL:KVE:abh:ms

Jerris Leonard
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

DJ 144-23-971

13-831-387

Sergeant Daniel Groth,
James Davis, John Ciszewski,
Edward Carmody, et al, Chicago, Illinois
Police Officers, Subjects;
Fred Hampton, Mark Clark,
Brenda Harris, Verlina Brewer,
Blair Anderson and Ronald Satchel etal -
Victims
Summary Punishment
CIVIL RIGHTS

This refers to your memoranda of December 5 and December 8, 1969 entitled "Black Panther Party Activity, Chicago, Illinois."

In connection with this matter, I am enclosing herewith two copies of a telegram of December 5, 1969 to the Department from John Gwynn of the Illinois State Branch, NAACP and other officials of that organization. We have also received a telegram from Thomas Picou, Managing Editor, Chicago Daily Defender, Whitney M. Young, Jr., Executive Director, National Urban League and from a number of individuals of Maywood, Illinois, all of these communications generally alleging that the shooting and killing of members of the Black Panther organization were, on or about December 4, 1969, unnecessary, unjustified and of questionable legality. They request that an investigation be made of the matter.

In view of the circumstances, please conduct a preliminary investigation so that we may determine whether violations of 18 U.S.C. 242 and 241 are involved. The investigation should include, but need not be limited to, the following.

1. Identify and interview all persons, including the allegedly wounded individuals who were present when the police conducted the Black Panther Party raid at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, on December 4.

2. Identify the police officers who took part in the raid and interview the subjects named above.

3. We understand that two autopsies on victim Fred Hampton's body were performed, one by the Coroner and one by a group of physicians headed by Dr. Victor Levine of Northwestern University. Obtain copies of each report.

4. Ascertain whether a state or local investigation is being conducted or has been conducted, and furnish us with a copy of any available report of such investigation. In this connection, inspect the official records and ascertain the charges placed against the victim and the status of same.

5. Inspect the premises of 2337 West Monroe Street, the location of the raid, and note and photograph any physical evidence such as bullet holes, blood, the general arrangement, location and condition of the furniture, windows etc. In connection with any bullet holes noted, determine if possible, the direction of the bullets, with particular reference as to whether they were apparently fired from the outside doors and windows toward the interior of the apartment and from the interior toward the outside doors and windows. Please furnish us with a diagram of the premises noting the particular location therein where victims Hampton and Clark were allegedly shot.

If victims or other persons in the premises at the time of the raid decline to be interviewed, please notify me immediately without waiting for the completion of the report of this investigation.

DEC 11 1969

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

JL:[illegible]

Jerris Leonard
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

DJ 146-23-971

12-031-387

Sergeant Daniel Groth,
James Davis, John Ciszewski,
Edward Carmody, et al, Chicago, Illinois
Police Officers, Subjects;
Fred Hampton, Mark Clark,
Brenda Harris, Verlina Brewer,
Blair Anderson and Ronald Satchel et al -
Victims
Summary Punishment
CIVIL RIGHTS

This refers to your memoranda of December 5 and December 8, 1969 entitled "Black Panther Party Activity, Chicago, Illinois."

In connection with this matter, I am enclosing herewith two copies of a telegram of December 5, 1969 to the Department from John [illegible] of the Illinois State Branch, NAACP and other officials of that organization. We have also received a telegram from Thomas Picou, Managing Editor, Chicago Daily Defender, Whitney M. Young, Jr., Executive Director, National Urban League and from a number of individuals of Maywood, Illinois, all of these communications generally alleging that the shooting and killing of members of the Black Panther organization were, on or about December 4, 1969, unnecessary, unjustified and of questionable legality. They request that an investigation be made of the matter.

In view of the circumstances, please conduct a preliminary investigation so that we may determine whether violations of 18 U.S.C. 242 and 241 are involved. The investigation should include, but need not be limited to, the following.

1. Identify and interview all persons, including the allegedly wounded individuals who were present when the police conducted the Black Panther Party raid at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, on December 4.

2. Identify the police officers who took part in the raid and interview the subjects named above.

3. We understand that two autopsies on victim Fred Hampton's body were performed, one by the Coroner and one by a group of physicians headed by Dr. Victor Levine of Northwestern University. Obtain copies of each report.

4. Ascertain whether a state or local investigation is being conducted or has been conducted, and furnish us with a copy of any available report of such investigation. In this connection, inspect the official records and ascertain the charges placed against the victim and the status of same.

5. Inspect the premises of 2337 West Monroe Street, the location of the raid, and note and photograph any physical evidence such as bullet holes, blood, the general arrangement, location and condition of the furniture, windows etc. In connection with any bullet holes noted, determine if possible, the direction of the bullets, with particular reference as to whether they were apparently fired from the outside doors and windows toward the interior of the apartment and from the interior toward the outside doors and windows. Please furnish us with a diagram of the premises noting the particular location therein where victims Hampton and Clark were allegedly shot.

If victims or other persons in the premises at the time of the raid decline to be interviewed, please notify me immediately without waiting for the completion of the report of this investigation.

G-122 (12-11-67)

FBI

Date: 12/12/69

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: SAC, CHICAGO

From: Director, FBI

SGT. DANIEL GROTH; JAMES DAVIS;
JOHN CISZEWSKI, EDWARD CARMODY, ET AL
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS POLICE OFFICERS - SUBJECTS;
FRED HAMPTON; MARK CLARK; BRENDA HARRIS;
VERLINA BREWER; BLAIR ANDERSON;
RONALD SATCHEL, ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Enclosed are two copies of a self-explanatory Departmental letter dated 12/11/69 and two copies of its enclosure.

Complete the requested investigation in accordance with the provisions of Section 27, Volume II, Manual of Instructions, and surep within ten days of the receipt of this communication.

State in the first paragraph of the details of your report that it contains the results of a ☐ limited ☒ preliminary investigation and underscore the word ☐ limited ☒ preliminary

Advise ☒ all persons interviewed
☒ appropriate officials at the outset that this investigation is being conducted at the specific request of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of Justice, referring to him by name as well as title.

Remarks: If victims or other persons in the premises at the time of the raid decline to be interviewed, you should immediately advise the Bureau.

Enc. (4)

Sent Via

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

0-122 (12-11-67)

FBI

Date: 12/12/69

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

TO: SAC, CHICAGO

From: Director, FBI

SGT. DANIEL GROTH; JAMES DAVIS;
JOHN CISZEWSKI, EDWARD CARMODY, ET AL
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS POLICE OFFICERS - SUBJECTS;
FRED HAMPTON; MARK CLARK; BRENDA HARRIS;
VERLINA BREWER; BLAIR ANDERSON;
RONALD SATCHEL, ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Enclosed are two copies of a self-explanatory Departmental letter dated 12/11/69 and two copies of its enclosure.

Complete the requested investigation in accordance with the provisions of Section 27, Volume II, Manual of Instructions, and surep within ten days of the receipt of this communication.

State in the first paragraph of the details of your report that it contains the results of a ☐ limited ☒ preliminary investigation and underscore the word ☐ limited ☒ preliminary

Advise ☒ all persons interviewed
☒ appropriate officials at the outset that this investigation is being conducted at the specific request of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of Justice, referring to him by name as well as title.

Remarks: If victims or other persons in the premises at the time of the raid decline to be interviewed, you should immediately advise the Bureau.

Enc. (4)

Sent Via

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - USA, Chicago
(Attn: AUSA ROBERT J. BREAKSTONE)

Report of: SA C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS Office: Chicago

Date: 12/22/69

Field Office File #: Bureau File #:

Title: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH;
ET AL -
SUBJECTS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (Deceased);
ET AL - VICTIMS

Character: SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Synopsis: By letter dated 12/11/69, from AAG JERRIS LEONARD, Civil Rights Division, a preliminary investigation was requested to determine whether violations of 18, USC, Sections 242 and 241 are involved in the shooting of FRED A. HAMPTON and MARK CLARK by the Cook County States Attorney's Police raid on the Black Panther Party (BPP) apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, on 12/4/69. SAC M. W. JOHNSON personally advised USA THOMAS A. FORAN, Superintendent of Chicago Police Department JAMES D. CONLISK, and Cook County States Attorney EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, of the requested investigation. HANRAHAN stipulated that all 14 officers in the raid would be made available for interview provided an official from his office was present and that a copy of the interview was made available. SAC M. W. JOHNSON also contacted Attorney WARREN WOLFSON representing victim BRENDA HARRIS, who was to consult with other victims attorneys and to advise if they will make their clients available for interview. SAC M.W. JOHNSON also contacted DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, Attorney for BPP, who desired an attorney be present during FBI examination of BPP apartment. On 12/17/69, CUNNINGHAM advised SAC M.W. JOHNSON that "it is polically impossible for the BPP to voluntarily cooperate" with any FBI investigation. AAG JERRIS LEONARD in Chicago on 12/18/69, advised he would personally handle FGJ inquiry into this matter. On 12/22/69, FBI examination commenced of the premises at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, and FGJ commenced receiving evidence in this case.

- P -

ither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI

1

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

This report contains the results of a preliminary investigation in accordance with departmental letter to the Bureau dated December 11, 1969, regarding the above captioned matter. This departmental letter, which was forwarded by Mr. JERRIS LEONARD, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, is summarized as follows:

The Department received a telegram dated December 5, 1969, from JOHN GWYNN of the Illinois State Branch, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and other officials of that organization. The Department also received a telegram from THOMAS PICOU, Managing Editor, "Chicago Daily Defender," WHITNEY M. YOUNG, Jr., Executive Director, National Urban League, and a number of individuals of Maywood, Illinois. All of these communications generally alleged that the shooting and killing of members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) on or about December 4, 1969, was unnecessary, unjustified, and of questionable legality. They requested that an investigation be made of the matter.

The departmental letter requested the FBI to conduct a preliminary investigation so that the Department could determine whether violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 242 and 241, were involved. It was stated that the investigation should include, but not be limited to, the following:

1. Identify and interview all persons, including the allegedly wounded individuals who were present when the police conducted the Black Panther Party raid at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, on December 4, 1969.

2

2. Identify the police officers who took part in the raid and interview the subjects named above.

3. It is understood that two autopsies on victim FRED HAMPTON's body were performed, one by the coroner and one by a group of physicians headed by Dr. VICTOR LEVINE of Northwestern University. Obtain copies of each report.

4. Ascertain whether a state or local investigation is being conducted or has been conducted, and furnish us with a copy of any available report of such investigation. In this connection, inspect the official records and ascertain the charges placed against the victim and the status of same.

5. Inspect the premises of 2337 West Monroe Street, the location of the raid, and note and photograph any physical evidence, such as bullet holes, blood, the general arrangement, location and condition of the furniture, windows, etc. In connection with any bullet holes noted, determine, if possible, the direction of the bullets, with particular reference as to whether they were apparently fired from the outside doors and windows toward the interior of the apartment and from the interior toward the outside doors and windows. A diagram of the premises, noting the particular location therein where victims FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK were allegedly shot, is to be furnished.

3

The Department's letter requested that if the victims or other persons in the premises at the time of the raid declined to be interviewed, Mr. JERRIS LEONARD, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, should be notified immediately without waiting for the completion of the report of this investigation.

It is noted that the telegram of December 5, 1969, addressed to United States Attorney General JOHN MITCHELL reads as follows:

> We of the NAACP are extremely alarmed, concerned, and confused relative to the contradictory statements and facts in connection with the slaying of MARK CLARK and FRED HAMPTON by Cook County law enforcement officials on December 4, 1969. Pursuant to the same incident, we demand that an adequate, thorough investigation and that the results of such investigation be made known to the public in order to alleviate a tense, anxious situation. We simply will not tolerate a modern day lynching; and should the results of your investigation prove a violation of civil rights, we shall use maximum resources to pursue the apprehension and punishment of those responsible.

Upon receipt of the departmental letter on December 13, 1969, M. W. JOHNSON, Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Chicago Office, personally advised United States Attorney (USA) THOMAS A. FORAN of the requested investigation. SAC JOHNSON informed JAMES D. CONLISK, Jr., Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, of the requested investigation. CONLISK stated that he had no objection to police officers assigned to the State's Attorney's Office being interviewed by the FBI, but he suggested that Cook County State's Attorney EDWARD V. HANRAHAN be contacted as these officers were working for him at the time of the raid.

SAC JOHNSON contacted Cook County State's Attorney HANRAHAN, who advised he would make all 14 officers involved in the raid available for interview immediately, provided an official from his office was present during these interviews and that copies of the results of the interviews in the form of either a signed statement or the Bureau's interview report form would be made available to him. HANRAHAN added that making such copies available to the police officer being interviewed would suffice. HANRAHAN pointed out that demands have been made for these police officers to be charged with murder in connection with the killing of BPP members FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK.

Cook County Coroner ANDREW J. TOMAN has announced he is calling a "blue ribbon" coroner's jury to look into this matter. Because of this, HANRAHAN deemed it necessary to grant the interviews of the police officers only under the above stated conditions.

SAC JOHNSON personally contacted Attorney WARREN WOLFSON at 30 North La Salle Street, Chicago, Illinois. WOLFSON advised he represents victim BRENDA HARRIS. WOLFSON stated that all of the victims, except DEBORAH JOHNSON, are either in jail or in custody at the Cook County Hospital and that since the other victims are represented by other attorneys, he desired to consult with these attorneys concerning the granting of interviews by the FBI.

[redacted]

WOLFSON stated that all of the victims had been charged by Cook County authorities with serious crimes; and as the victims are in custody, the attorneys themselves have not had the opportunity for thorough interviews of their clients. WOLFSON stated he wanted to emphasize the fact that statements in the news media credited to the victims and their attorneys are not necessarily true as the attorneys have not authorized such statements. WOLFSON further stated that due to the seriousness of the charges pending against the victims, their attorneys would undoubtedly desire to be present during any FBI interviews.

WOLFSON further stated that he would be most reluctant to authorize an FBI interview with his client, BRENDA HARRIS, until he personally had an opportunity to completely interview her. Also, WOLFSON stated that due to the local charges placed against his client, he would insist upon obtaining a copy of the results of any FBI interview. He was sure that the other attorneys of the victims would feel the same way.

WOLFSON agreed to contact the other attorneys as soon as possible and would advise SAC JOHNSON whether the interviews of the victims would be permitted.

It is noted that in connection with the Department's request for an investigation at the premises of 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, where the raid of December 4, 1969, occurred, these premises are under the complete control of the BPP.

On December 13, 1969, SAC JOHNSON contacted DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, Attorney for the BPP. CUNNINGHAM advised

[redacted]

that he saw no objection to making these premises available to the FBI, but he desired to first consult with other attorneys, whom he did not identify, and stated he would call SAC JOHNSON later that weekend. CUNNINGHAM said he would try to make the premises available by Monday afternoon, December 15, 1969, or by the morning of December 16, 1969. CUNNINGHAM desired either he or his representative to be present during the FBI investigation at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois.

On December 13, 1969, the above was discussed with USA THOMAS A. FORAN, Northern District of Illinois (NDI), who stated that although he was not in a position to recommend Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) action at this time, he would give the matter further consideration. USA FORAN stated it was his feeling that the requests by State's Attorney HANRAHAN and the victims' lawyers regarding the interviews should be complied with in view of the pending charges which exist in regards to the 14 police officers and the seven victims in this matter.

On December 14, 1969, DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, BPP Attorney, contacted SAC JOHNSON at 4:30 p.m. and stated that after consulting with "most of the attorneys involved," it was decided that additional consultation was necessary by them before the FBI would be given access to the premises at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois. CUNNINGHAM advised that the attorneys are meeting at 5:00 p.m. on December 15, 1969, at which time a decision would be made.

CUNNINGHAM stated, however, it is his unofficial opinion that access to these premises by the FBI will be authorized for Tuesday morning, December 16, 1969, and that he would call SAC JOHNSON immediately following the above described meeting with the other attorneys.

[redacted]
6A

It is noted that neither DENNIS CUNNINGHAM nor WARREN WOLFSON, Attorney Spokesman for the victims in this case, contacted, as agreed to, the Chicago Office to permit FBI access to the BPP apartment or interview of the victims, respectively, as of midnight, December 16, 1969.

It is noted that the following were present on December 13, 1969, at the Chicago Office of the FBI when SAC M.W. JOHNSON telephonically contacted USA THOMAS A. FORAN, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department JAMES D. CONLISK, States Attorney EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, as well as WARREN WOLFSON, representing victim BRENDA HARRIS, and attorney DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, representing the Black Panther Party (BPP):

Assistant Special Agent in Charge [redacted]
Supervisor [redacted]
Special Agent [redacted]

[redacted]
7

On December 13, 1969, Officer DAY of the Deputy Superintendent's Office, Chicago Police Department, advised that RONALD SATCHEL had been released that day on $25,000 bond, which was made at the 13th District of the Police Department.

It is noted that DEBORAH JOHNSON, the girlfriend of FRED A. HAMPTON (deceased), who is eight months pregnant, was previously released on $25,000 bond.

On December 17, 1969, JAMES MONTGOMERY, attorney representing the Black Panther Party, telephonically contacted Special Agent PAUL R. ELOFSON at the Chicago Office, to advise that police officers had arrived at 2337 West Monroe Street, that morning, and they had informed BOBBY RUSH, Deputy Defense Minister of the Illinois Black Panther Party, that they had a search warrant for the purpose of searching the outer halls of the building. According to MONTGOMERY, the officers were asked to leave, and they departed. However, the officers returned shortly thereafter, at which time the officers refused Black Panther Party members access to the apartment. MONTGOMERY stated that he was notifying the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in view of his belief that the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Department of Justice was looking into the shooting incident.

At 3:27 p.m., on December 17, 1969, DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, attorney for the Black Panther Party, telephonically contacted Special Agent in Charge, M. W. JOHNSON, to advise that attorneys for the Black Panther Party and victims had decided they did not feel the Justice Department would help them, and therefore, they were taking the position they would not voluntarily cooperate with any Federal Bureau of Investigation investigation. CUNNINGHAM stated that this

[redacted]

8

decision was based upon newspaper articles reporting a Federal investigation of the Black Panther Party. CUNNINGHAM further stated that this decision was actually reached on Monday night, December 15, 1969, but that he had been "too busy" to contact Special Agent in Charge JOHNSON.

CUNNINGHAM further informed Special Agent in Charge JOHNSON that undoubtedly the Federal Government could obtain access to the premises at 2337 West Monroe Street, through legal action, and that "of course they could not prevent that." CUNNINGHAM stated that "it is politically impossible for the Black Panther Party to voluntarily cooperate."

CUNNINGHAM also informed Special Agent in Charge JOHNSON that the Cook County States Attorney's Police, "using some kind of warrant" were at the above Monroe Street premises at approximately 10:30 a.m., on December 17, 1969, and that they were denying everyone access to these premises, unless they could present a lease agreement. CUNNINGHAM further stated that he recognized that this latter was not involved with any Federal Bureau of Investigation investigation.

[redacted]

1

On December 18, 1969, Assistant Attorney General JERRIS LEONARD, together with Department Attorney JAMES TURNER, First Assistant United States Attorney JACK B. SCHMETTERER, met with Acting Chief Judge EDWIN A. ROBSON of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. It is noted that Chief Federal District Judge WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL was ill and that Judge ROBSON was Acting Chief Judge in his absense.

At this meeting the decision was made, subject to the approval of Chief Judge CAMPBELL, that the December, 1969, Federal Grand Jury will be held over to hear testimony in this case. A special charge will be issued this grand jury on December 22, 1969. Assistant Attorney General LEONARD advised that one or two witnesses may appear before this grand jury on approximately December 23, 1969, following which the grand jury will be adjourned until approximately January 5, 1970.

Assistant Attorney General LEONARD advised that he would personally handle the presentation of this matter to the Federal Grand Jury and that he would be assisted by Departmental Attorney JAMES TURNER, WILLIAM O'CONNOR and JESSIE QUEEN, all of whom are from Washington, D.C. Also assisting him would be MILTON BRANCH, Assistant United States Attorney from Denver, Colorado.

United States Attorney Thomas A. Foran at Chicago has subsequently advised Special Agent in Charge MARLIN W. JOHNSON that he completely concurrs in the above described Federal Grand Jury procedure in this case. Mr. FORAN designated ROBERT J. BREAKSTONE as a representative from the United State's Attorney's Office at Chicago to work with Mr. LEONARD.

First Assistant United States Attorney JACK B. SCHMETTERER advised on the evening of December 18, 1969, that Chief Judge WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL did concur with Acting Judge EDWIN A. ROBSON's decision to hold the December, 1969, Federal Grand Jury to hear this matter.

[redacted]

1

First Assistant United States Attorney SCHMETTERER advised at 4:05 p.m. on December 19, 1969, that he had been in contact with Cook County Coroner ANTHONY J. TOMAN. TOMAN advised Mr. SCHMETTERER that as the premises at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, had now been sealed and under his control, that he would grant access to the FBI at any time for the purpose of examination.

It is noted that an FBI examination of these premises commenced on the morning of December 22, 1969.

Mr. SCHMETTERER advised on December 22, 1969, that the December, 1969, Federal Grand Jury was extended and commenced receiving into evidence the official reports of the Cook County Coroner's Office of the deaths of FRED A. HAMPTON and MARK CLARK on December 4, 1969. This evidence was made available to the Federal Grand Jury by KYRAM PHELAN from the coroner's office. It is noted that on December 22, 1969, Special Agent [redacted] [redacted] of the Chicago Office was sworn in and made an agent of this Federal Grand Jury.

[redacted]

1

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The following account of the Cook County State's Attorney's raid upon the Black Panther Party (BPP) apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, on December 4, 1969, is summarized from news media reports:

The State's Attorney's police, under the direction of Cook County State's Attorney EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, secured a search warrant, based upon information supplied by informants, from Criminal Court Judge ROBERT COLLINS to search the first floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois. It was alleged that there was a gun cache in this apartment.

At 4:45 a.m. on December 4, 1969, 14 officers from the State's Attorney's police broke into this first floor apartment, which consists of two bedrooms and one bath, with a front and rear entrance. They allegedly encountered gunfire resistance; and following a shootout, FRED HAMPTON, Illinois Chairman of the BPP, lay dead in his bed and Peoria, Illinois, BPP leader MARK CLARK was found dead in the living room of this apartment.

There were nine members of the BPP in this apartment; and of the seven surviving, two men and two women had been wounded. Of the nine BPP members in the apartment, six were men and three were women. One woman, DEBORAH JOHNSON, age 19, the alleged girl friend of HAMPTON, is eight months pregnant. The seven surviving members of the BPP were arrested and charged with attempted murder and aggravated battery and were taken into custody.

The following four had bullet wounds and were taken to the Cook County Hospital:

[redacted]

1

Sergeant GROTH furnished the following identifying data concerning the seven victims in this case:

BRENDA HARRIS, Age 18, born August 16, 1951, 1848 South Hamlin, Chicago, Illinois

VERLINA A. BREWER, Age 17, born January 11, 1952, 125 West 107th Street, Chicago, Illinois, or 2139 Yorktown Drive, Ann Arbour, Michigan.

Sergeant GROTH advised that BREWER was a mental patient in Ann Arbour, Michigan, prior to her coming to Chicago and that her parents had reported her as a missing person.

BLAIR J. ANDERSON, Age 18, born November 22, 1951, 6943 South Justine, Chicago, Illinois.

Sergeant GROTH advised that ANDERSON had previously been arrested on September 10, 1969, in connection with a Black Panther Party "shoot out".

RONALD SATCHEL, Age 19, born June 22, 1950, 6846 South Clyde, Chicago, Illinois.

The following victims were taken to the Cook County Jail:

DEBORAH JOHNSON, Age 19, born November 26, 1950, 6750 South Parnell, Chicago, Illinois.

LOUIS TRULOCK, Age 39, born May 6, 1930, 1900 West Jackson, Chicago, Illinois.

HAROLD BELL, Age 23, born November 29, 1946, 1317 Howard Court, Rockford, Illinois.

Two of the States Attorney's Police officers who were hurt are JOHN CICZEWSKI, who was shot in the leg, and EDWARD CARMODY, who had injuries to his hand as a result of flying glass.

[redacted]

1

The following are the identities of the States Attorney's Police, who participated in the raid as made available on December 22, 1969, by Sergeant DANIEL R. GROTH, Cook County States Attorney's Police:

Sergeant DANIEL R. GROTH - Star Number 1698
Officer JOSEPH GORMAN - Star Number 2515
Officer GEORGE JONES - Star Number 12644
Officer ROBERT HUGHES - Star Number 8790
Officer JAMES DAVIS - Star Number 11426
Officer WILLIAM KELLY - Star Number 6985
Officer EDWARD CARMODY - Star Number 2517
Officer JOHN CISZEWSKI - Star Number 12489
Officer PHILIP JOSEPH - Star Number 12637
Officer JOHN MARUSICH - Star Number 5389
Officer FRED HOWARD. Star Number 11673
Officer LYNWOOD HARRIS, Star Number 6764
Officer WILLIAM CORBETT, Star Number 7077
Officer RAY BRODERICK, Star Number 10136

Officers JONES, DAVIS, HOWARD, JOSEPH, and HARRIS are of the Negro race.

Sergeant GROTH advised that all of these officers would be available to respond to any subpoena directed to them in care of the Cook County States Attorney, 2600 South California Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - USA, Chicago
(Attn: AUSA ROBERT J. BREAKSTONE)

Report of: SA C. LEONARD TREVIRANUS　　Office: Chicago
Date: 12/22/69

Field Office File #:　　Bureau File #:

Title: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH;
ET AL -
SUBJECTS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (Deceased);
ET AL - VICTIMS

Character: SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Synopsis: By letter dated 12/11/69, from AAG JERRIS LEONARD, Civil Rights Division, a preliminary investigation was requested to determine whother violations of 18, USC, Sections 242 and 241 are involved in the shooting of FRED A. HAMPTON and MARK CLARK by the Cook County States Attorney's Police raid on the Black Panther Party (BPP) apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, on 12/4/69. SAC M. W. JOHNSON personally advised USA THOMAS A. FORAN, Superintendent of Chicago Police Department JAMES D. CONLISK, and Cook County States Attorney EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, of the requested investigation. HANRAHAN stipulated that all 14 officers in the raid would be made available for interview provided an official from his office was present and that a copy of the interview was made available. SAC M. W. JOHNSON also contacted Attorney WARREN WOLFSON representing victim BRENDA HARRIS, who was to consult with other victims attorneys and to advise if they will make their clients available for interview. SAC M.W. JOHNSON also contacted DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, Attorney for BPP, who desired an attorney be present during FBI examination of BPP apartment. On 12/17/69, CUNNINGHAM advised SAC M.W. JOHNSON that "it is polically impossible for the BPP to voluntarily cooporate" with any FBI investigation. AAG JERRIS LEONARD in Chicago on 12/18/69, advised he would personally handle FGJ inquiry into this matter. On 12/22/69, FBI examination commenced of the premises at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, and FGJ commenced receiving evidence in this case.

other recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI

1

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

This report contains the results of a preliminary investigation in accordance with departmental letter to the Bureau dated December 11, 1969, regarding the above captioned matter. This departmental letter, which was forwarded by Mr. JERRIS LEONARD, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, is summarized as follows:

The Department received a telegram dated December 5, 1969, from JOHN GWYNN of the Illinois State Branch, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and other officials of that organization. The Department also received a telegram from THOMAS PICOU, Managing Editor, "Chicago Daily Defender," WHITNEY M. YOUNG, Jr., Executive Director, National Urban League, and a number of individuals of Maywood, Illinois. All of these communications generally alleged that the shooting and killing of members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) on or about December 4, 1969, was unnecessary, unjustified, and of questionable legality. They requested that an investigation be made of the matter.

The departmental letter requested the FBI to conduct a preliminary investigation so that the Department could determine whether violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 242 and 241, were involved. It was stated that the investigation should include, but not be limited to, the following:

1. Identify and interview all persons, including the allegedly wounded individuals who were present when the police conducted the Black Panther Party raid at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, on December 4, 1969.

2. Identify the police officers who took part in the raid and interview the subjects named above.

3. It is understood that two autopsies on victim FRED HAMPTON's body were performed, one by the coroner and one by a group of physicians headed by Dr. VICTOR LEVINE of Northwestern University. Obtain copies of each report.

4. Ascertain whether a state or local investigation is being conducted or has been conducted, and furnish us with a copy of any available report of such investigation. In this connection, inspect the official records and ascertain the charges placed against the victim and the status of same.

5. Inspect the premises of 2337 West Monroe Street, the location of the raid, and note and photograph any physical evidence, such as bullet holes, blood, the general arrangement, location and condition of the furniture, windows, etc. In connection with any bullet holes noted, determine, if possible, the direction of the bullets, with particular reference as to whether they were apparently fired from the outside doors and windows toward the interior of the apartment and from the interior toward the outside doors and windows. A diagram of the premises, noting the particular location therein where victims FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK were allegedly shot, is to be furnished.

3

The Department's letter requested that if the victims or other persons in the premises at the time of the raid declined to be interviewed, Mr. JERRIS LEONARD, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, should be notified immediately without waiting for the completion of the report of this investigation.

It is noted that the telegram of December 5, 1969, addressed to United States Attorney General JOHN MITCHELL reads as follows:

> We of the NAACP are extremely alarmed, concerned, and confused relative to the contradictory statements and facts in connection with the slaying of MARK CLARK and FRED HAMPTON by Cook County law enforcement officials on December 4, 1969. Pursuant to the same incident, we demand that an adequate, thorough investigation and that the results of such investigation be made known to the public in order to alleviate a tense, anxious situation. We simply will not tolerate a modern day lynching; and should the results of your investigation prove a violation of civil rights, we shall use maximum resources to pursue the apprehension and punishment of those responsible.

Upon receipt of the departmental letter on December 13, 1969, M. W. JOHNSON, Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Chicago Office, personally advised United States Attorney (USA) THOMAS A. FORAN of the requested investigation. SAC JOHNSON informed JAMES D. CONLISK, Jr., Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, of

[redacted]

the requested investigation. CONLISK stated that he had no objection to police officers assigned to the State's Attorney's Office being interviewed by the FBI, but he suggested that Cook County State's Attorney EDWARD V. HANRAHAN be contacted as these officers were working for him at the time of the raid.

SAC JOHNSON contacted Cook County State's Attorney HANRAHAN, who advised he would make all 14 officers involved in the raid available for interview immediately, provided an official from his office was present during these interviews and that copies of the results of the interviews in the form of either a signed statement or the Bureau's interview report form would be made available to him. HANRAHAN added that making such copies available to the police officer being interviewed would suffice. HANRAHAN pointed out that demands have been made for these police officers to be charged with murder in connection with the killing of BPP members FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK.

Cook County Coroner ANDREW J. TOMAN has announced he is calling a "blue ribbon" coroner's jury to look into this matter. Because of this, HANRAHAN deemed it necessary to grant the interviews of the police officers only under the above stated conditions.

SAC JOHNSON personally contacted Attorney WARREN WOLFSON at 30 North La Salle Street, Chicago, Illinois. WOLFSON advised he represents victim BRENDA HARRIS. WOLFSON stated that all of the victims, except DEBORAH JOHNSON, are either in jail or in custody at the Cook County Hospital and that since the other victims are represented by other attorneys, he desired to consult with these attorneys concerning the granting of interviews by the FBI.

WOLFSON stated that all of the victims had been charged by Cook County authorities with serious crimes; and as the victims are in custody, the attorneys themselves have not had the opportunity for thorough interviews of their clients. WOLFSON stated he wanted to emphasize the fact that statements in the news media credited to the victims and their attorneys are not necessarily true as the attorneys have not authorized such statements. WOLFSON further stated that due to the seriousness of the charges pending against the victims, their attorneys would undoubtedly desire to be present during any FBI interviews.

WOLFSON further stated that he would be most reluctant to authorize an FBI interview with his client, BRENDA HARRIS, until he personally had an opportunity to completely interview her. Also, WOLFSON stated that due to the local charges placed against his client, he would insist upon obtaining a copy of the results of any FBI interview. He was sure that the other attorneys of the victims would feel the same way.

WOLFSON agreed to contact the other attorneys as soon as possible and would advise SAC JOHNSON whether the interviews of the victims would be permitted.

It is noted that in connection with the Department's request for an investigation at the premises of 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, where the raid of December 4, 1969, occurred, these premises are under the complete control of the BPP.

On December 13, 1969, SAC JOHNSON contacted DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, Attorney for the BPP. CUNNINGHAM advised

[redacted]

that he saw no objection to making these premises available to the FBI, but he desired to first consult with other attorneys, whom he did not identify, and stated he would call SAC JOHNSON later that weekend. CUNNINGHAM said he would try to make the premises available by Monday afternoon, December 15, 1969, or by the morning of December 16, 1969. CUNNINGHAM desired either he or his representative to be present during the FBI investigation at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois.

On December 13, 1969, the above was discussed with USA THOMAS A. FORAN, Northern District of Illinois (NDI), who stated that although he was not in a position to recommend Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) action at this time, he would give the matter further consideration. USA FORAN stated it was his feeling that the requests by State's Attorney HANRAHAN and the victims' lawyers regarding the interviews should be complied with in view of the pending charges which exist in regards to the 14 police officers and the seven victims in this matter.

On December 14, 1969, DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, BPP Attorney, contacted SAC JOHNSON at 4:30 p.m. and stated that after consulting with "most of the attorneys involved," it was decided that additional consultation was necessary by them before the FBI would be given access to the premises at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois. CUNNINGHAM advised that the attorneys are meeting at 5:00 p.m. on December 15, 1969, at which time a decision would be made.

CUNNINGHAM stated, however, it is his unofficial opinion that access to these premises by the FBI will be authorized for Tuesday morning, December 16, 1969, and that he would call SAC JOHNSON immediately following the above described meeting with the other attorneys.

[redacted]
6A

It is noted that neither DENNIS CUNNINGHAM nor WARREN WOLFSON, Attorney Spokesman for the victims in this case, contacted, as agreed to, the Chicago Office to permit FBI access to the BPP apartment or interview of the victims, respectively, as of midnight, December 16, 1969.

It is noted that the following were present on December 13, 1969, at the Chicago Office of the FBI when SAC M.W. JOHNSON telephonically contacted USA THOMAS A. FORAN, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department JAMES D. CONLISK, States Attorney EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, as well as WARREN WOLFSON, representing victim BRENDA HARRIS, and attorney DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, representing the Black Panther Party (BPP):

Assistant Special Agent in Charge [redacted]
Supervisor [redacted]
Special Agent [redacted]

[redacted]

7

On December 13, 1969, Officer DAY of the Deputy Superintendent's Office, Chicago Police Department, advised that RONALD SATCHEL had been released that day on $25,000 bond, which was made at the 13th District of the Police Department.

It is noted that DEBORAH JOHNSON, the girlfriend of FRED A. HAMPTON (deceased), who is eight months pregnant, was previously released on $25,000 bond.

On December 17, 1969, JAMES MONTGOMERY, attorney representing the Black Panther Party, telephonically contacted Special Agent PAUL R. ELOFSON at the Chicago Office, to advise that police officers had arrived at 2337 West Monroe Street, that morning, and they had informed BOBBY RUSH, Deputy Defense Minister of the Illinois Black Panther Party, that they had a search warrant for the purpose of searching the outer halls of the building. According to MONTGOMERY, the officers were asked to leave, and they departed. However, the officers returned shortly thereafter, at which time the officers refused Black Panther Party members access to the apartment. MONTGOMERY stated that he was notifying the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in view of his belief that the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Department of Justice was looking into the shooting incident.

At 3:27 p.m., on December 17, 1969, DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, attorney for the Black Panther Party, telephonically contacted Special Agent in Charge, M. W. JOHNSON, to advise that attorneys for the Black Panther Party and victims had decided they did not feel the Justice Department would help them, and therefore, they were taking the position they would not voluntarily cooperate with any Federal Bureau of Investigation investigation. CUNNINGHAM stated that this

[redacted]

8

decision was based upon newspaper articles reporting a Federal investigation of the Black Panther Party. CUNNINGHAM further stated that this decision was actually reached on Monday night, December 15, 1969, but that he had been "too busy" to contact Special Agent in Charge JOHNSON.

CUNNINGHAM further informed Special Agent in Charge JOHNSON that undoubtedly the Federal Government could obtain access to the premises at 2337 West Monroe Street, through legal action, and that "of course they could not prevent that." CUNNINGHAM stated that "it is politically impossible for the Black Panther Party to voluntarily cooperate."

CUNNINGHAM also informed Special Agent in Charge JOHNSON that the Cook County States Attorney's Police, "using some kind of warrant" were at the above Monroe Street premises at approximately 10:30 a.m., on December 17, 1969, and that they were denying everyone access to these premises, unless they could present a lease agreement. CUNNINGHAM further stated that he recognized that this latter was not involved with any Federal Bureau of Investigation investigation.

[redacted]

1

On December 18, 1969, Assistant Attorney General JERRIS LEONARD, together with Department Attorney JAMES TURNER, First Assistant United States Attorney JACK B. SCHMETTERER, met with Acting Chief Judge EDWIN A. ROBSON of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. It is noted that Chief Federal District Judge WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL was ill and that Judge ROBSON was Acting Chief Judge in his absense.

At this meeting the decision was made, subject to the approval of Chief Judge CAMPBELL, that the December, 1969, Federal Grand Jury will be held over to hear testimony in this case. A special charge will be issued this grand jury on December 22, 1969. Assistant Attorney General LEONARD advised that one or two witnesses may appear before this grand jury on approximately December 23, 1969, following which the grand jury will be adjourned until approximately January 5, 1970.

Assistant Attorney General LEONARD advised that he would personally handle the presentation of this matter to the Federal Grand Jury and that he would be assisted by Departmental Attorney JAMES TURNER, WILLIAM O'CONNOR and JESSIE QUEEN, all of whom are from Washington, D.C. Also assisting him would be MILTON BRANCH, Assistant United States Attorney from Denver, Colorado.

United States Attorney Thomas A. Foran at Chicago has subsequently advised Special Agent in Charge MARLIN W. JOHNSON that he completely concurrs in the above described Federal Grand Jury procedure in this case. Mr. FORAN designated ROBERT J. BREAKSTONE as a representative from the United State's Attorney's Office at Chicago to work with Mr. LEONARD.

First Assistant United States Attorney JACK B. SCHMETTERER advised on the evening of December 18, 1969, that Chief Judge WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL did concur with Acting Judge EDWIN A. ROBSON's decision to hold the December, 1969, Federal Grand Jury to hear this matter.

[redacted]

1

First Assistant United States Attorney SCHMETTERER advised at 4:05 p.m. on December 19, 1969, that he had been in contact with Cook County Coroner ANTHONY J. TOMAN. TOMAN advised Mr. SCHMETTERER that as the premises at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, had now been sealed and under his control, that he would grant access to the FBI at any time for the purpose of examination.

It is noted that an FBI examination of these premises commenced on the morning of December 22, 1969.

Mr. SCHMETTERER advised on December 22, 1969, that the December, 1969, Federal Grand Jury was extended and commenced receiving into evidence the official reports of the Cook County Coroner's Office of the deaths of FRED A. HAMPTON and MARK CLARK on December 4, 1969. This evidence was made available to the Federal Grand Jury by KYRAM PHELAN from the coroner's office. It is noted that on December 22, 1969, Special Agent [redacted] [redacted] of the Chicago Office was sworn in and made an agent of this Federal Grand Jury.

[redacted]

1

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The following account of the Cook County State's Attorney's raid upon the Black Panther Party (BPP) apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, on December 4, 1969, is summarized from news media reports:

The State's Attorney's police, under the direction of Cook County State's Attorney EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, secured a search warrant, based upon information supplied by informants, from Criminal Court Judge ROBERT COLLINS to search the first floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois. It was alleged that there was a gun cache in this apartment.

At 4:45 a.m. on December 4, 1969, 14 officers from the State's Attorney's police broke into this first floor apartment, which consists of two bedrooms and one bath, with a front and rear entrance. They allegedly encountered gunfire resistance; and following a shootout, FRED HAMPTON, Illinois Chairman of the BPP, lay dead in his bed and Peoria, Illinois, BPP leader MARK CLARK was found dead in the living room of this apartment.

There were nine members of the BPP in this apartment; and of the seven surviving, two men and two women had been wounded. Of the nine BPP members in the apartment, six were men and three were women. One woman, DEBORAH JOHNSON, age 19, the alleged girl friend of HAMPTON, is eight months pregnant. The seven surviving members of the BPP were arrested and charged with attempted murder and aggravated battery and were taken into custody.

The following four had bullet wounds and were taken to the Cook County Hospital:

[redacted]

1

Sergeant GROTH furnished the following identifying data concerning the seven victims in this case:

BRENDA HARRIS, Age 18, born August 16, 1951, 1848 South Hamlin, Chicago, Illinois

VERLINA A. BREWER, Age 17, born January 11, 1952, 125 West 107th Street, Chicago, Illinois, or 2139 Yorktown Drive, Ann Arbour, Michigan.

Sergeant GROTH advised that BREWER was a mental patient in Ann Arbour, Michigan, prior to her coming to Chicago and that her parents had reported her as a missing person.

BLAIR J. ANDERSON, Age 18, born November 22, 1951, 6943 South Justine, Chicago, Illinois.

Sergeant GROTH advised that ANDERSON had previously been arrested on September 10, 1969, in connection with a Black Panther Party "shoot out".

RONALD SATCHEL, Age 19, born June 22, 1950, 6046 South Clyde, Chicago, Illinois.

The following victims were taken to the Cook County Jail:

DEBORAH JOHNSON, Age 19, born November 26, 1950, 6750 South Parnell, Chicago, Illinois.

LOUIS TRULOCK, Age 39, born May 6, 1930, 19[illegible] West Jackson, Chicago, Illinois.

HAROLD BELL, Age 23, born November 29, 1946, 1317 Howard Court, Rockford, Illinois.

Two of the States Attorney's Police officers who were hurt are JOHN CICZEWSKI, who was shot in the leg, and EDWARD CARMODY, who had injuries to his hand as a result of flying glass.

[redacted]

1

The following are the identities of the States Attorney's Police, who participated in the raid as made available on December 22, 1969, by Sergeant DANIEL R. GROTH, Cook County States Attorney's Police:

Sergeant DANIEL R. GROTH - Star Number 1698
Officer JOSEPH GORMAN - Star Number 2515
Officer GEORGE JONES - Star Number 12644
Officer ROBERT HUGHES - Star Number 8790
Officer JAMES DAVIS - Star Number 11426
Officer WILLIAM KELLY - Star Number 6985
Officer EDWARD CARMODY - Star Number 2917
Officer JOHN CISZEWSKI - Star Number 12489
Officer PHILIP JOSEPH - Star Number 12637
Officer JOHN MARUSICH - Star Number 5389
Officer FRED HOWARD. Star Number 11673
Officer LYNWOOD HARRIS, Star Number 6764
Officer WILLIAM CORBETT, Star Number 7077
Officer RAY BRODERICK, Star Number 10136

Officers JONES, DAVIS, HOWARD, JOSEPH, and HARRIS are of the Negro race.

Sergeant GROTH advised that all of these officers would be available to respond to any subpoena directed to them in care of the Cook County States Attorney, 2600 South California Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

[redacted]

February 3, 1970

[redacted]

Mr. James Murray
First Assistant State's Attorney
2600 South California
Chicago, Illinois 60608

Re: Inquiries Regarding Information for January 1970 Federal Grand Jury

Dear Mr. Murray:

I appreciate your courtesy in meeting with us today, and in making members of your staff available for our conference. This letter will confirm certain understandings reached in our meeting.

I understand that you will furnish a supplement memorandum correcting the memo of January 19, 1970, regarding the serial number of Officer Gorman's pistol. As you will recall, the serial number reflected on the January 19, 1970, memo is different from the serial number reflected on the FBI receipt, which latter number Sgt.Delaney checked and found coinciding with the number on the weapon.

It is my understanding that the following actions will be taken with regard to the indicated items in my

cc: Corres. File
O'Connor
FBI ✓

January 29, 1970, memo to you:

1. You will provide an inventory of the 485 rounds of 12 gauge ammunition and the 80 rounds of 20 gauge ammunition listed on inventory #752930, specifying brand, load, and number.

2. You will provide reports for the period 10/6/69 - 12/8/69, prepared by the officers involved.

3. You will advise as to any bands and zones, other than band 2, for transmission.

4. Sgt. Delaney has furnished us the following information: 25-#8 REMUMC Shurshot 12 gauge 3-1-8 shells and 15-Maximum Load 0 Buck Federal HiPower 12 gauge shells were issued. Returned were: 7 rounds of the #8, and of these 5 remain in his custody; 5 rounds of the 0 Buck, which are retained in a box with initials JJC on the box. Also issued were 110 rounds of Remington 230 grain center fire .45 cal. ammunition; 50 rounds were returned in a box, 8 returned in one magazine, and 4 loose rounds were returned. Box is index #6645. Should there be any corrections in any of this information, I understand you will advise us.

5. Nothing was written except search warrant.

6. Nothing available.

7. Chicago Police Department may have earlier records; State's Attorney's Office has none other than already furnished.

8. 9F #10269 was brought in by Officer Corman and delivered by him to Mr. Smith to Mr. Sadunas to Mr. Zaw for micro-analysis of blood stains on stock, then returned and assigned the above number.

9. No copies of bonds are retained in State's Attorney's Office. Information may be obtained from clerks Mr. Marcantelli and Mr. Grassman. Records on indictments 682046, 683037 and 691842 are available in clerk's office at 26th & California.

10. You will ascertain whether clothes are available and will arrange for preservation of same.

11. You will inquire and advise me of such parttime employment.

12. Absolutely none by State's Attorney's Office, and none were available to State's Attorney's Office from any source whatsoever.

13. State's Attorney's Office has none. Deputy Superintendent John Mulcrone can provide.

14. Your Mr. Jalovec will call me.

15. Sketch was provided.

16. Mr. Jalovec was informed by a federal employe whom he will name to me. Sgt. Groth may consider course of action if asked before Grand Jury.

17. News release provided. Information will be developed at Friday 2/6/70 arraignment proceeding, which will be available to us.

18. No paraffin tests were done.

19. No pills or medical items other than those listed in previously provided report, were obtained at the premises at 2337 W. Monroe. No plaster was removed and retained in connection with evidence search, by State's Attorney's police.

It is my further understanding that the weapons seized at 2337 W. Monroe on December 4, 1969, will be transported to the FBI Lab, for examination, by vehicle departing on February 4, 1970. Sgt. Delaney has advised me that the final REA weapons shipment, sent today, to the FBI, was under receipt #40-01-08.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

JAMES P. TURNER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

[redacted]

[redacted]

February 3, 1970

Mr. James Murray
First Assistant State's Attorney
2600 South California
Chicago, Illinois 60608

Re: Inquiries Regarding Information for January 1970 Federal Grand Jury

Dear Mr. Murray:

I appreciate your courtesy in meeting with us today, and in making members of your staff available for our conference. This letter will confirm certain understandings reached in our meeting.

I understand that you will furnish a supplement memorandum correcting the memo of January 19, 1970, regarding the serial number of Officer Gorman's pistol. As you will recall, the serial number reflected on the January 19, 1970, memo is different from the serial number reflected on the FBI receipt, which latter number Sgt. Delaney checked and found coinciding with the number on the weapon.

It is my understanding that the following actions will be taken with regard to the indicated items in my

cc: Corres. File
O'Connor
FBI

January 29, 1970, memo to you:

1. You will provide an inventory of the 435 rounds of 12 gauge ammunition and the 80 rounds of 20 gauge ammunition listed on inventory #752030, specifying brand, load, and number.

2. You will provide reports for the period 10/6/69 - 12/8/69, prepared by the officers involved.

3. You will advise as to any bands and zones, other than band 2, for transmission.

4. Sgt. Delaney has furnished us the following information: 25-#8 REMUMC Shurshot 12 gauge 3-1-8 shells and 15-Maximum Load 0 Buck Federal HiPower 12 gauge shells were issued. Returned were: 7 rounds of the #8, and of these 5 remain in his custody; 5 rounds of the 0 Buck, which are retained in a box with initials JJC on the box. Also issued were 110 rounds of Remington 230 grain center fire .45 cal. ammunition; 50 rounds were returned in a box, 8 returned in one magazine, and 4 loose rounds were returned. Box is index #6645. Should there be any corrections in any of this information, I understand you will advise us.

5. Nothing was written except search warrant.

6. Nothing available.

7. Chicago Police Department may have earlier records; State's Attorney's Office has none other than already furnished.

8. 9F #10269 was brought in by Officer Corman and delivered by him to Mr. Smith to Mr. Sadunas to Mr. Zaw for micro-analysis of blood stains on stock, then returned and assigned the above number.

9. No copies of bonds are retained in State's Attorney's Office, Information may be obtained from clerks Mr. Marcantelli and Mr. Grassman. Records on indictments 682046, 693037 and 691842 are available in clerk's office at 26th & California.

10. You will ascertain whether clothes are available and will arrange for preservation of same.

11. You will inquire and advise me of such parttime employment.

12. Absolutely none by State's Attorney's Office, and none were available to State's Attorney's Office from any source whatsoever.

13. State's Attorney's Office has none. Deputy Superintendent John Mulcrone can provide.

14. Your Mr. Jalovec will call me.

15. Sketch was provided.

16. Mr. Jalovec was informed by a federal employee whom he will name to me. Sgt. Groth may consider course of action if asked before Grand Jury.

17. News release provided. Information will be developed at Friday 2/6/70 arraignment proceeding, which will be available to us.

18. No paraffin tests were done.

19. No pills or medical items other than those listed in previously provided report, were obtained at the premises at 2337 W. Monroe. No plaster was removed and retained in connection with evidence search, by State's Attorney's police.

It is my further understanding that the weapons seized at 2337 W. Monroe on December 4, 1969, will be transported to the FBI Lab, for examination, by vehicle departing on February 4, 1970. Sgt. Delaney has advised me that the final REA weapons shipment, sent today, to the FBI, was under receipt #40-01-08.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

JAMES P. TURNER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
February 13, 1970

[redacted]

Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
United States Court House
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sgt. Daniel R. Groth, Et Al;
Chicago Police Officers;
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased),
Et Al - Victims
Summary Punishment - Civil Rights

Dear Mr. Foran:

Enclosed herewith is the May 19, 1969 issue of "The Black Panther" which was quoted from according to an article which appeared in the "Chicago Tribune" of January 29, 1970, Page 4, Column 7, Section 2B.

This article, dateline Washington, January 28 (AP), pointed out that a Yonkers, New York detective, William E. Grogan, intelligence officer, told a Secret Senate hearing last June that members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) were under orders to fortify their homes and repel any police raids "by any means necessary."

Grogan offered in evidence a statement by Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, addressed "To whom it may concern" described by Newton as a summary of an "executive mandate" that had gone out to Panthers. It said:

"Those who approach our doors in the manner of outlaws, who seek to enter our homes illegally, unlawfully and in a rowdy fashion, those who kick our dors down with no authority and seek to ransack our homes in violation of

2 - Addressee
1 - Chicago

our human rights, will henceforth be treated as outlaws, as gangsters, as evil doers.

"We have no way of determining," it said, "that a man in uniform involved in a forced outlaw entry into our home is in fact a guardian of the law. He is acting like a lawbreaker and we must make an appropriate response.

"We draw the line at the threshold of our doors. It is therefore mandated as a general order to all members the Black Panthers party that all members must acquire technical equipment to defend their homes and their dep and shall do so."

According to the article, this was taken from the May 19, 1969 issue of "The Black Panther", the party newspaper. Grogan, the article continued, said in testi released by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, January 29, 1970:

"The substance of this document, by my interpreta of reading, is that if any police officer, uniformed or in possession of a legal search warrant or not, comes t door of any Black Panther member and attempts to enter house against the wishes of said member, the mandate st that said Black Panther member has the authority to shoot and kill the policeman."

The article closed by stating that Newton is serving a 2 to 15 year prison sentence for manslaughter in the shooting of an Oakland, California, policeman.

Very truly yours,

M. W. JOHNSON
Special Agent in Charge

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
February 13, 1970

[redacted]

Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
United States Court House
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sgt. Daniel R. Groth, Et Al;
Chicago Police Officers;
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased),
Et Al - Victims
Summary Punishment - Civil Righ

Dear Mr. Foran:

Enclosed herewith is the May 19, 1969 issue of "The Black Panther" which was quoted from according to an article which appeared in the "Chicago Tribune" of January 29, 1970, Page 4, Column 7, Section 2B.

This article, dateline Washington, January 28 (AP), pointed out that a Yonkers, New York detective, William E. Grogan, intelligence officer, told a Secret Senate hearing last June that members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) were under orders to fortify their homes and repel any police raids "by any means necessary."

Grogan offered in evidence a statement by Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, addressed "To whom it may concern" described by Newton as a summary of an "executive mandate" that had gone out to Panthers. It said:

"Those who approach our doors in the manner of outlaws, who seek to enter our homes illegally, unlawfull and in a rowdy fashion, those who kick our doors down wit no authority and seek to ransack our homes in violation o

2 - Addressee
1 - Chicago

our human rights, will henceforth be treated as outlaws, as gangsters, as evil doers.

"We have no way of determining," it said, "that a man in uniform involved in a forced outlaw entry into our home is in fact a guardian of the law. He is acting like a lawbreaker and we must make an appropriate response.

"We draw the line at the threshold of our doors. It is therefore mandated as a general order to all members of the Black Panthers party that all members must acquire the technical equipment to defend their homes and their dependents and shall do so."

According to the article, this was taken from the May 19, 1969 issue of "The Black Panther", the party newspaper. Grogan, the article continued, said in testimony released by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, January 29, 1970:

"The substance of this document, by my interpretation of reading, is that if any police officer, uniformed or not, in possession of a legal search warrant or not, comes to the door of any Black Panther member and attempts to enter the house against the wishes of said member, the mandate states that said Black Panther member has the authority to shoot and kill the policeman."

The article closed by stating that Newton is serving a 2 to 15 year prison sentence for manslaughter in the shooting of an Oakland, California, policeman.

Very truly yours,

M. W. JOHNSON
Special Agent in Charge

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
March 5, 1970

[redacted]

Mr. Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
United States Court House
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sergeant Daniel R. Groth,
Et Al;
Chicago Police Officers;
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased),
Et Al -
Victims
Summary Punishment -
Civil Rights

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to a subpoena duces tecum from the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, January session, 1970, Number 69GJ3144, which was furnished this office on February 12, 1970.

Enclosed herewith are the following items:

1. The original subpoena, mentioned above, which was directed to the president or other managing officer, Illinois Bell Telephone System, 225 West Randolph, Chicago, Illinois.

2. Two copies of a form which acknowledge the delivery and receipt of the subpoena dated February 13, 1970.

2 - Addressee (Enc. 23)
2 - Chicago

3. Records of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company in response to Item Number 1 covering the period October 14, 1969, through December 13, 1969, consisting of 13 items together with a Xerox copy of the same consisting of 7 pages.

The subpoena was executed by Special Agent [redacted] of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by delivery to [redacted] Security Department, Illinois Bell Telephone System, 225 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois. At that time [redacted] advised it would be necessary to secure these records from the warehouse, and that the earliest response would be on or about March 2, 1970.

On March 5, 1970, [redacted] advised Special Agent [redacted] had received the necessary information in response to the subpoena.

On March 5, 1970, [redacted] made available the telephone toll tickets and bills in response to the subpoena with regard to Telephone Number 243-2017 at 2337 West Monroe Street. [redacted] advised, however, that only the period from October 14 through December 13, 1969, could be complied with inasmuch as the period just preceding October 14, 1969, is being contested by the subscriber at this time, and she could not make these records available.

In accordance with this subpoena, [redacted] explained that the records of the Illinois Bell Telephone System disclosed the identities of the following telephone numbers, and that in the event the identities of other numbers called are desired, it would be necessary that an appropriate subpoena be issued to the various telephone companies covering those cities:

1. Telephone number called: 309-673-2150, called on October 20, 1969, listed to Joe Eugene Fields and Cora Fields, 218 West 7th Street, Peoria, Illinois.

2. Telephone number called: 309-676-4393, called on October 20, 1969, listed to Joe E. Sturdivant, 1834 West Marlin, Peoria, Illinois.

3. Telephone number called: 309-676-3174, called October 28, 1969, listed to Rosie Grismore, 516 North Sanford, Peoria, Illinois.

When the original records transmitted herewith have served their purpose, they should be returned directly by you to the Illinois Bell Telephone System.

Very truly yours,

M. W. JOHNSON
Special Agent in Charge

12-3

AY	SPEC CALL		CLAIM	L1
ENT.	1 WAY		CLOSE	L2
OT	2 WAY		FROM PAY	WO
OT	RESTO			PV
OLL. ALL	LA	O.O. ISS		CA

200 UNITS Cl. Serv. 203 CrClD Tel 243-2017

RED JOHNSON
537 W MONROE
LR 1
HICAGO IL 60612

S	11	65
U	44	48
LD	49	60
D		
O	18	48
T	20	08
E		
	144	29

.S. 12.33 AC 7.75

OV 13 69 000 81 616 Total

Additional Units charged as follows:
1034 108@4 3/4¢ 926@4 1/4¢

Call for arr

12/1	144	29
BAL.		
/		
BAL.		

* Additional charge due to State and City taxes.

COMMERCIAL STUB

FORM 4442-T
(1-65)

43-2017 OTHER: Explanation of charges or credits

11/13 PG 1 BUS. OFF. COPY

SEE NOTE*	ITEM	RATE	PERIOD FROM MO.		TO MO.		CHARGE OR CREDIT	DUE TO TAXES *	TOTAL CHARGE OR CREDIT
				DAY		DAY			
	SERVICE TO DATE OF BILL	11 65	10	15	11	13	10 48	92	11 40
	CHARGE FOR CONNECTING						8 00	70	8 70
	US TAX								1 14

NOTE: UNITS, TERMINAL, JOB ORDER, CUSTOMER'S PURCHASE ORDER OR SERVICE ORDER NUMBER OR NAME OF DIRECTORY.

TOTAL 21 24

1.

	CITY AND STATE		AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.	AMOUNT	MIN		TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
020	DE KALB	ILL	815	[illegible]6 7256	35	12		131243 2017	3
031	SAN FRAN	CAL	415	922 0095	475	11K	1558		
031	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705	355	8K	1649		
102	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705	210	8B	2325		

AMOUNT SUBJ. TO ADD'L CHGE 13.65 TOTAL 4960

	CITY AND STATE		AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.		AMOUNT	MIN		TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
1028	PEORIA	ILL	309	676 3174		85	4K		1317243 2017	2
1029	BLMNGTNILL		COLL		N	55	3B4			
1029	BLMNGTNILL		COLL	556 2627	N	55	3B4			
1101	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705		310	12B	2317		
1102	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705		185	92	0204		
1105	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705		155	3K	1606		
1105	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705		155	3K	1625		
1111	CHAMPNURBN	ILL	217	332 4485		45	1S	1812		
1111	CHAMPNURBN	ILL	217	332 4485		570	56B	2049		
	CALLS	FROM		243 2018						
1014	LOSANGELES	CAL	213	752 0701		110	2S	1831		
1014	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 0103		110	2S	1837		
1014	LOSANGELES	CAL	213	235 4127		110	1S	1842		
1014	LOSANGELES	CAL	213	734 0280		110	3S	1844		
1014	DE KALB	ILL	815	756 7256		70	6B	2244		
1016	DETROIT	MICH	313	866 6031		60	12	0030		

AMOUNT SUBJ TO ADD'L CHGE TOTAL

NOV

	CITY AND STATE		AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.	AMOUNT	MIN		TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
1014	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 0103	155	1K		1443243 2017	1
1014	OAKLAND	CAL	415	655 6281	275	6K	1445		
1016	NEW YORK	NY	212	864 8951	235	6K	1305		
1018	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 1945	85	3B	1235		
1018	OAKLAND	CAL	415	655 6281	135	5B	1238		
1020	PEORIA	ILL	309	673 2150	50	1S	1736		
1020	PEORIA	ILL	309	673 2150	50	1S	1745		
1020	PEORIA	ILL	309	676 4393	50	2S	1750		
1021	OAKLAND	CAL	415	834 4329	110	1S	1718		
1021	ROCKFORD	ILL	815	964 5256	60	5B	2142		
1025	ANN ARBOR	MICH	313	662 1387	60	1B	0721		
1025	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 1945	85	1B	0942		
1026	CARBONDALE	ILL	618	549 6985	65	4B	2004		
1027	CARBONDALE	ILL	618	549 6985	140	9B	1958		
1027	[illegible]		415	845 0103	110	4B	2300		

PREF. PAY	SPEC CALL	CLAIM	L 1
LD TRMT	DEN 1 WAY	CLOSE	L 2
REM NOT.	DEN 2 WAY	FROM PAY.	W O
DEN NOT.	RESTD		P V
COLL CALL	L A	O.O. ISS. 12/30 ABDN	C A

200 UNITS Cl. Serv. 203 CrCl D Tel 243-2017

FRED JOHNSON
2337 W MONROE
FLR 1
CHICAGO IL 60612

U.S. 13.04 AC* 3.84

DEC 13 69 000 81 616

S	11	65
U	27	88
LD	87	00
D		
O		
T	16	88
B		
Total	143	41

Additional Units charged as follows:
642 120@4 3/4¢ 522@4 1/4

/		
BAL.		
/		
BAL.		

* Additional charge due to State and City taxes.

COMMERCIAL STUB

126	BERKELEY CAL	415	48 6705	65	22		)557243 2017	3
126	BERKELEY CAL	415	[illegible]5 1945	155	2K		[illegible]003	
126	BERKLY CAL	COLL	[illegible]48 6705	155	1K4	VB30[illegible]4816		
126	BERKELEY CAL	415	848 6705	65	38		2301	
128	INDPLS IND	COLL	633 2972	70	3K4	K935121021		
201	SANBARBARA CAL	805	965 6024	65	12		0023	
204	BERKELEY CAL	415	848 6705	85	42		0014	
	CALLS FROM		243 2018					
115	CARBONDALE ILL	618	549 6985	50	1B		1147	
117	LAKEZURICH ILL		438 2720	35	1K		1225	
118	REGINA SASK	306	543 0240	140	1B		2128	
126	BERKELEY CAL	415	845 0103	65	32		0000	
126	BERKELEY CAL	415	845 0103	65	12		0035	
126	BERKELEY CAL	415	848 6705	155	1K		0952	

AMOUNT SUBJ. TO ADD'L CHGE 4.25 TOTAL 8700

DATE	CITY AND STATE	AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.	AMOUNT	MIN	CODE	TIME	TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
118	REGINA SASK	306	543 0240	475	6L1			243 2017	2
118	STOON SAS	COLL	244 5564	N 345	7B4				
119	EDTN ALT	COLL	439 8868	N 185	2S4				
120	WINIPEGMAN	COLL	942 6411	N 185	4B4				
121	WINNIPEG MAN	204	942 6411	2390	952		0138		
121	WINNIPEG MAN	204	942 6411	175	3K		0951		
121	BERKELEY CAL	415	845 1945	155	1K		1329		
121	WINIPEGMAN	COLL	942 6411	N 190	3K4				
121	WINIPEGMAN	COLL	942 6411	N 825	20B4				
121	WINIPEGMAN	COLL	943 5862	N 190	3K4				
121	WINIPEGMAN	COLL		N 190	1K4				
122	MPLS MIN	COLL		60	2B4	S72910094 1			
122	KNOXVL TEN	COLL		65	1B4	G32952211 2			
124	INDPLS IND	COLL	633 2972	70	1K4	K93212873 5			
124	INDPLS IND	COLL	926 6970	125	5C4	K93707203 0			
126	SSFRAN CAL	COLL	873 9951	155	1KD		1102		

AMOUNT SUBJ. TO ADD'L CHGE TOTAL

DEC

DATE	CITY AND STATE	AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.	AMOUNT	MIN	CODE	TIME	TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
1112	INDPLS IND	COLL	925 5268	70	1K4	K91902488	5	243 2017	1
1113	BERKELEY CAL	415	845 1945	195	4K		1125		
1113	INDPLS IND	COLL	925 4157	70	3K4	K91902487	9		
1113	BERKELEY CAL	415	848 6705	155	1K		1603		
1113	BERKELEY CAL	415	845 1945	195	4K		1604		
1114	CARBNDLILL	COLL	549 7985	N 65	3B4				
1114	CARBNDLILL	COLL	549 6985	N 80	4B4				
1114	CARBNDLILL	COLL	549 6985	N 110	6B4				
1114	MTVRNONILL	COLL		85	2S4				
1115	BERKELEY CAL	415	848 6705	110	4B		2132		
1116	MPLS MIN	COLL		105	6B4	S7221345	53		
1117	INDPLS IND	COLL	926 0904	55	3B4	K9231978	44		
1117	SASKATOON SASK	306	244 5564	150	1B		2253		
1117	WINIPEGMAN	COLL	786 4801	N 145	2B4				
1118	[illegible] D	317	631 0058	70	1K		[illegible]549		

FORM 1303 (11-63)

COLLECTION AGENCY CARD

TEL. NO. 243-2017

NAME Fred Johnson

REFER CALLS, LETTERS, & IBT PAYMENTS TO AGENCY, WABASH 2-8587

$109.10

PAYMENTS

AMT.	DATE	BAL. DUE	AMT.	DATE	BAL. DUE

REF'D 1-27-70 SUIT APPRVD.

PREF PAY	SPEC CALL	CLAIM
ED TRMT	DEN 1 WAY	CLOSE
REAL NOT.	DEN 2 WAY	FROM PAY
DEN NOT.	RESTO	
COLL CALL	LA / OO ISS	

FINAL BILL Cl. Serv. 203 CrCl D Tel. 243-2017

FRED JOHNSON
2337 W MONROE
FLR 2
CHICAGO IL 60612

U.S. .36CR AC .42CR

JAN 23 70 7000 82 636 Total

Additional Units charged as follows:

● Additional charge due to State and City taxes.

COMMERCIAL STUB

FORM [illegible]
(1-65)

OTHER: Explanation of charges or credits

43-2017 01/13 PG 1 BUS.OFF.C[illegible]

SEE NOTE	ITEM	RATE	PERIOD FROM TO	CHARGE OR CREDIT	DUE TO TAXES	TOTAL CHARGE OR CREDIT
	SERVICE PREVIOUSLY BILLED	11	6512300113	4 66	41	5 07CR
	DEPOSIT			30 00		30 00CR
	INTEREST ON DEPOSIT			38		38CR
	US TAX					51CR

NOTE: UNITS, TERMINAL, JOB ORDER, CUSTOMER'S PURCHASE ORDER OR SERVICE ORDER NUMBER OR NAME OF DIRECTORY.

TOTAL 35 96CR

JAN

DATE	CITY AND STATE	AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.	AMOUNT	MIN		TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
	FINAL ACCOUNI						243 2017	1
213	TUKAHBRXVL NY	914	337 0700	150	78	0853		

AMOUNT SUBJ TO ADD'L CHGE

TOTAL 150

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
March 5, 1970

[redacted]

Mr. Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
United States Court House
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sergeant Daniel R. Groth,
Et Al;
Chicago Police Officers;
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased),
Et Al -
Victims
Summary Punishment -
Civil Rights

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to a subpoena duces tecum from the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, January session, 1970, Number 69GJ3144, which was furnished this office on February 12, 1970.

Enclosed herewith are the following items:

1. The original subpoena, mentioned above, which was directed to the president or other managing officer, Illinois Bell Telephone System, 225 West Randolph, Chicago, Illinois.

2. Two copies of a form which acknowledge the delivery and receipt of the subpoena dated February 13, 1970.

2 - Addressee (Enc. 23)
2 - Chicago

3. Records of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company in response to Item Number 1 covering the period October 14, 1969, through December 13, 1969, consisting of 13 items together with a Xerox copy of the same consisting of 7 pages.

The subpoena was executed by Special Agent [redacted] of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by delivery to [redacted], Security Department, Illinois Bell Telephone System, 225 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois. At that time [redacted] advised it would be necessary to secure these records from the warehouse, and that the earliest response would be on or about March 2, 1970.

On March 5, 1970, [redacted] advised Special Agent [redacted] had received the necessary information in response to the subpoena.

On March 5, 1970, [redacted] made available the telephone toll tickets and bills in response to the subpoena with regard to Telephone Number 243-2917 at 2337 West Monroe Street. [redacted] advised, however, that only the period from October 14 through December 13, 1969, could be complied with inasmuch as the period just preceding October 14, 1969, is being contested by the subscriber at this time, and she could not make these records available.

In accordance with this subpoena, [redacted] explained that the records of the Illinois Bell Telephone System disclosed the identities of the following telephone numbers, and that in the event the identities of other numbers called are desired, it would be necessary that an appropriate subpoena be issued to the various telephone companies covering those cities:

1. Telephone number called: 309-673-2150, called on October 20, 1969, listed to Joe Eugene Fields and Cora Fields, 218 West 7th Street, Peoria, Illinois.

2. Telephone number called: 309-676-4393, called on October 20, 1969, listed to Joe E. Sturdivant, 1834 West Marlin, Peoria, Illinois.

3. Telephone number called: 309-676-3174, called October 28, 1969, listed to Rosie Grismore, 516 North Sanford, Peoria, Illinois.

When the original records transmitted herewith have served their purpose, they should be returned directly by you to the Illinois Bell Telephone System.

Very truly yours,

M. W. JOHNSON
Special Agent in Charge

12-3

	SPEC CALL	CLAIM	L1
	CLN 1 WAY	CLOSE	L2
	GEN 2 WAY	FROM PAY	WO
	RESTD		PY
COLL.	LA OO ISS		CA

200 UNITS Cl. Serv. 203 CrClD Tel 243-2017
RED JOHNSON
537 W MONROE
LR 1
HICAGO IL 60612

S. 12.33 AC 7.75

OV 13 69 000 81 616 Total

S	11	65
U	44	48
LD	49	60
D		
O	18	48
T	20	08
B		
Total	144	29

Additional Units charged as follows:
1034 108@4 3/4¢ 926@4 1/4¢

Call for arrg

12/1	144	29
BAL.		
/		
BAL.		

* Additional charge due to State and City taxes.

COMMERCIAL STUB

FORM 4442-T
(1-65)

OTHER: Explanation of charges or credits

43-2017 11/13 PG 1 BUS. OFF. COPY

SEE NOTE*	ITEM	RATE	PERIOD FROM MO DAY	PERIOD TO MO DAY	CHARGE OR CREDIT	DUE TO TAXES *	TOTAL CHARGE OR CREDIT
	SERVICE TO DATE OF BILL	11 65	10 15	11 13	10 48	92	11 40
	CHARGE FOR CONNECTING				8 00	70	8 70
	US TAX						1 14

NOTE: UNITS, TERMINAL, JOB ORDER CUSTOMER'S PURCHASE ORDER OR SERVICE ORDER NUMBER OR NAME OF DIRECTORY.

TOTAL 21 24

	CITY AND STATE		AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.		AMOUNT	MIN	TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
020	DE KALB	ILL	815	[illegible]6 7256		35	12	0131243 2017	3
031	SAN FRAN	CAL	415	922 0095		475	11K	1558	
031	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705		355	8K	1649	
102	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705		210	8B	2325	

AMOUNT SUBJ TO ADD'L CHGE 13.65 TOTAL 4960

	CITY AND STATE		AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.		AMOUNT	MIN	TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
*1028	PEORIA	ILL	309	676 3174		85	4K	1317243 2017	2
1029	BLMNGTNILL		COLL		N	55	3B4		
1029	BLMNGTNILL		COLL	556 2627	N	55	3B4		
1101	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705		310	12B	2317	
1102	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705		185	92	0204	
1105	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705		155	3K	1606	
1105	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705		155	3K	1625	
1111	CHAMPNURBN	ILL	217	332 4485		45	1S	1812	
1111	CHAMPNURBN	ILL	217	332 4485		570	56B	2049	
	CALLS	FROM		243 2018					
1014	LOSANGELES	CAL	213	752 0701		110	2S	1831	
1014	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 0103		110	2S	1837	
1014	LOSANGELES	CAL	213	235 4127		110	1S	1842	
1014	LOSANGELES	CAL	213	734 0280		110	3S	1844	
1014	DE KALB	ILL	815	756 7256		70	6B	2244	
1016	DETROIT	MICH	313	866 6031		60	12	0030	

AMOUNT SUBJ TO ADD'L CHGE TOTAL

NOV

	CITY AND STATE		AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.		AMOUNT	MIN	TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
1014	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 0103		155	1K	1443243 2017	1
1014	OAKLAND	CAL	415	655 6281		275	6K	1445	
1016	NEW YORK	NY	212	864 8951		235	6K	1305	
1018	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 1945		85	3B	1235	
1018	OAKLAND	CAL	415	655 6281		135	5B	1238	
1020	PEORIA	ILL	309	673 2150		50	1S	1736	
1020	PEORIA	ILL	309	673 2150		50	1S	1745	
1020	PEORIA	ILL	309	676 4393		50	2S	1750	
1021	OAKLAND	CAL	415	834 4329		110	1S	1718	
1021	ROCKFORD	ILL	815	964 5256		60	5B	2142	
1025	ANN ARBOR	MICH	313	662 1387		60	1B	0721	
1025	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 1945		85	1B	0942	
1026	CARBONDALE	ILL	618	549 6985		65	4B	2004	
1027	CARBONDALE	ILL	618	549 6985		140	9B	1958	
1027	[illegible]		415	845 0103		110	4B	2300	

PREF. PAY	SPEC CALL	CLAIM	L 1
LD TEMT	DEN 1 WAY	CLOSE	L 2
REM NOT.	DEN 2 WAY	FROM PAY.	W O
DEN NOT.	RESTD		P V
COLL CALL	L A	O.O. ISS. 12/30 ABDN	C A

200 UNITS Cl. Serv. 203 CrCl D Tel. 243-2017

FRED JOHNSON
2337 W MONROE
FLR 1
CHICAGO IL 60612

U.S. 13.04 AC 3.84

DEC 13 69 000 81 616

S	11	65
U	27	88
LD	87	00
D		
O		
T	16	88
B		
Total	143	41

Additional Units charged as follows:
642 120@4 3/4¢ 522@4 1/4

/		
BAL.		
/		
BAL.		

* Additional charge due to State and City taxes.

COMMERCIAL STUB

DATE	CITY AND STATE		AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.	AMOUNT	MIN		TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
126	BERKELEY	CAL	415	48 6705	65	22		0557243 2017	3
126	BERKELEY	CAL	415	[illegible]5 1945	155	2K	[illegible]1003		
126	BERKLY CAL		COLL	[illegible]48 6705	155	1K4	VB30[illegible]4816		
126	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705	65	3B	2301		
128	INDPLS IND		COLL	633 2972	70	3K4	K935121021		
201	SANBARBARA	CAL	805	965 6024	65	12	0023		
204	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705	85	42	0014		
	CALLS	FROM		243 2018					
115	CARBONDALE	ILL	618	549 6985	50	1B	1147		
117	LAKEZURICH	ILL		438 2720	35	1K	1225		
118	REGINA	SASK	306	543 0240	140	1B	2128		
126	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 0103	65	32	0000		
126	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 0103	65	12	0035		
126	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705	155	1K	0952		

AMOUNT SUBJ. TO ADD'L CHGE 4.25 TOTAL 8700

CLASS

TYPE

LONG DISTANCE SERVICE

DATE	CITY AND STATE		AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.	AMOUNT	MIN		TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
118	REGINA	SASK	306	543 0240	475	6L1		243 2017	2
118	STOON	SAS	COLL	244 5564	N 345	7B4			
119	EDTN	ALT	COLL	439 8868	N 185	2S4			
120	WINIPEGMAN		COLL	942 6411	N 185	4B4			
121	WINNIPEG	MAN	204	942 6411	2390	952	0138		
121	WINNIPEG	MAN	204	942 6411	175	3K	0951		
121	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 1945	155	1K	1329		
121	WINIPEGMAN		COLL	942 6411	N 190	3K4			
121	WINIPEGMAN		COLL	942 6411	N 825	20B4			
121	WINIPEGMAN		COLL	943 5862	N 190	3K4			
121	WINIPEGMAN		COLL		N 190	1K4			
122	MPLS	MIN	COLL		60	2B4	S729100941		
122	KNOXVL	TEN	COLL		65	1B4	G329522112		
124	INDPLS	IND	COLL	633 2972	70	1K4	K932128735		
124	INDPLS	IND	COLL	926 6970	125	5C4	K937072030		
126	SSFRAN	CAL	COLL	873 9951	155	1KD	1102		

AMOUNT SUBJ. TO ADD'L CHGE TOTAL

CLASS

TYPE

LONG DISTANCE SERVICE

DEC

DATE	CITY AND STATE		AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.	AMOUNT	MIN		TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
1112	INDPLS	IND	COLL	925 5268	70	1K4	K919024885	243 2017	1
1113	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 1945	195	4K	1125		
1113	INDPLS	IND	COLL	925 4157	70	3K4	K919024879		
1113	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705	155	1K	1603		
1113	BERKELEY	CAL	415	845 1945	195	4K	1604		
1114	CARBNDLILL		COLL	549 7985	N 65	3B4			
1114	CARBNDLILL		COLL	549 6985	N 80	4B4			
1114	CARBNDLILL		COLL	549 6985	N 110	6B4			
1114	MTVRNONILL		COLL		85	2S4			
1115	BERKELEY	CAL	415	848 6705	110	4B	2132		
1116	MPLS	MIN	COLL		105	6B4	S722134553		
1117	INDPLS	IND	COLL	926 0904	55	3B4	K923197844		
1117	SASKATOON	SASK	306	244 5564	150	1B	2253		
1117	WINIPEGMAN		COLL	786 4801	N 145	2B4			
1118	[illegible]D		317	631 0058	70	1K	1549		

CLASS

TYPE

FORM 1303 (11-63)

COLLECTION AGENCY CARD

TEL. NO. 243-2017

NAME Fred Johnson

REFER CALLS, LETTERS, & IBT PAYMENTS TO AGENCY, WABASH 2-5587

$109.10

PAYMENTS

AMT.	DATE	BAL. DUE	AMT.	DATE	BAL. DUE

REF'D 1-27-70 SUIT APPRVD.

PREF PAY	SPEC CALL	CLAIM
ED TEMT	DEN 1 WAY	CLOSE
REM. NOT.	DEN 2 WAY	FROM PAY
DEN NOT.	RESTO	
COLL CALL	LA / OO ISS	

FINAL BILL Cl. Serv. 203 CrCl D Tel. 243-2017

FRED JOHNSON
2337 W MONROE
FLR 3
CHICAGO IL 60612

U.S. .36CR AC .42CR

JAN 23 70 7000 82 636 Total

1 50
35 04
143

Additional Units charged as follows:
@

• Additional charge due to State and City taxes.

COMMERCIAL STUB

FORM [illegible]

OTHER: Explanation of charges or credits

43-2017 01/13 PG 1 BUS.OFF.[illegible]

SEE NOTE	ITEM	RATE	PERIOD FROM TO	CHARGE OR CREDIT	DUE TO TAXES	TOTAL CHARGE OR CREDIT
	SERVICE PREVIOUSLY BILLED	11	6512300113	4 66	41	5 07CR
	DEPOSIT			30 00		30 00CR
	INTEREST ON DEPOSIT			38		38CR
	US TAX					51CR

NOTE: UNITS, TERMINAL, JOB ORDER, CUSTOMER'S PURCHASE ORDER OR SERVICE ORDER NUMBER OR NAME OF DIRECTORY.

TOTAL 35 96CR

JAN

DATE	CITY AND STATE	AREA OR TYPE	TELEPHONE NO.	AMOUNT	MIN				TELEPHONE NO.	PAGE
	FINAL ACCOUNT								243 2017	1
213	TUKAHBRXVL NY	914	337 0700	150	78			0853		

AMOUNT SUBJ TO ADD'L CHGE

TOTAL 150

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
March 6, 1970

[redacted]

Mr. Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
U. S. Court House and
Federal Office Building
219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sergeant Daniel R. Groth,
Et Al
Chicago Police Officers
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased)
Et Al - Victims
Summary Punishment -
Civil Rights

Dear Mr. Foran:

Enclosed herewith are two copies of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) concerning information as to the history of all the Black Panther guns recovered by the States Attorney's Office from Fred Hampton's apartment December 4, 1969.

The enclosed information is being furnished in accordance with the request of Mr. Juris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General in Chicago, who is handling the Federal Grand Jury presentation in the above captioned matter.

Very truly yours,

M. W. JOHNSON
Special Agent in Charge

2 - Addressee
(1) - Chicago

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
March 6, 1970

[redacted]

Mr. Thomas A. Foran
United States Attorney
Department of Justice
Fifteenth Floor - South
U. S. Court House and
Federal Office Building
219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Attention: Assistant United States Attorney
Robert J. Breakstone

Re: Sergeant Daniel R. Groth,
Et Al
Chicago Police Officers
Fred A. Hampton (Deceased)
Et Al - Victims
Summary Punishment -
Civil Rights

Dear Mr. Foran:

Enclosed herewith are two copies of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) concerning information as to the history of all the Black Panther guns recovered by the States Attorney's Office from Fred Hampton's apartment December 4, 1969.

The enclosed information is being furnished in accordance with the request of Mr. Juris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General in Chicago, who is handling the Federal Grand Jury presentation in the above captioned matter.

Very truly yours,

M. W. JOHNSON
Special Agent in Charge

2 - Addressee
(1) - Chicago

[redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
March 6, 1970

SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Tom Hett, States Attorney's Office, 26th and California, furnished the following information, which is set forth:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Chicago, Illinois
March 6, 1970

[redacted]

SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Tom Hett, States Attorney's Office, 26th and California, furnished the following information, which is set forth:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/17/70

TOM HETT, States Attorney's Office, 26th and California, Chicago, Illinois, furnished the following list of guns seized on the Black Panther raid at 2337 West Monroe on December 4, 1969:

1. Colt 45 cal automatic 5" blue model 1927 Argentina S/N # 7111

   Shipped June 9, 1969 to M&M Sporting Goods, 3823 N. Richards, Milwaukee, by Casavanova's Milwaukee.

They have the gun on their books but do not have it in their possession and have never reported it stolen. They say they will report it now.

2. Sears Roebuck 20 ga pump 28" blue steel model 21 No serial number so cannot be traced.
3. Springfield 12 ga pump 28" blue steel model 7H No serial number so it cannot be traced.
4. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so it cannot be traced.
5. Browning High Standard 12 ga auto load model standard H15423

   Sold by Browning Mfg. to Sears Roebuck on Oct. 13, 1954. Sears is located at 403 S. State, Chicago, Illinois. Sears does not keep records that far back so unable to trace Further.

6. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so unable to trace.
7. Remington 12 ga pump model 870 S/N 202407 Unable to trace because Remington threw out its records for guns made in 1950.

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

8. Ithaca 12 ga sawed off 13" S/N 175084
Mfg. by Ithaca in 1906 and no records were
kept at that time

9. Ithaca 12 ga pump 20" parkerized model 37
S/N 1019900. This gun has not been cleared
but is believed to be stolen from Chicago PD.

10. Carbine 30 cal 18" M-1 autoload S/N 16573
Purchased on Aug. 21, 1969, by Dakin M. Gentry
Head Black Panther Party, Milwaukee

11. Springfield 22 cal 24" autoload model 87A
Unable to trace because of lack of serial
number.

12. Astra 9mm 5 ¼ model 600-43 pistol #41558

13. Llama 7.65 mm S/N 443695
Purchased by David Young on Aug. 20, 1969
Black Panther, Milwaukee

14. Colt 38 cal 4 ½ Rev. S/N 219414
It was a "New Navy Revolver" and was sent by
Mfg. to Simmons Hardware in St. Louis on Sept.
12, 1903. Due to the date it would be unable.

15. Smith & Wesson 38 cal. 6 ½" Rev Model M & P
S/N 46272. This gun was made and shipped to
Folsom Arms Co., New York City, on or around
Nov. 5, 1904. Due to the date involved it would
be too hard to trace.

16. S &W 32 cal 2" model 30-1 S/N 730073. This
gun was shipped to Brown Supply Co., 416 S.
Adams St., Peoria, and was sold on 9/19/64 to
H. Mayo, 501 Hamilton Blvd., Peoria. This man
is not listed in the phone book and was not
known to Brown's.

17. .177 cal. Marksman Repeater model spring
operated, air pistol, no serial number.

18. 12 ga Stevens model 520 pump shotgun

serial number 84940.

19. 12 ga High Standard Riot model K-1200 six shot pump shotgun, no serial number, blood on gun.

SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Mr. Hett also furnished the following information concerning department special order number 68-25, issued April 8, 1968, concerning registration of firearms by members of the Chicago Police Department. Mr. Hett advised that as far as he knows, that all guns used by the States Attorneys Police Officers were registered according to the above special order. Information concerning registration of firearms with the State of Illinois is as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

ROSS V. RANDOLPH
Director

FIREARM OWNER'S IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

Manley D. Hawks
Superintendent

SENATE BILL 1350

75th General Assembly - 1967
Approved August 3, 1967
Effective July 1, 1968

SENATE BILL 1351

75th General Assembly - 1967
Approved August 3, 1967
Effective August 3, 1967

HOUSE BILL 1258

75th General Assembly - 1967
Approved August 3, 1967
Effective August 3, 1967

Section 2. (a) No person may acquire or possess any firearm or any firearm ammunition within this State without having in his possession a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his name by the Department of Public Safety under the provisions of this Act.

(b) The provisions of this Section regarding the possession of firearms and firearm ammunition shall not apply to:

(1) United State's Marshals, while engaged in the operation of their official duties;

(2) Members of the Armed Forces of the United States or the National Guard, while engaged in the operation of their official duties;

(3) Federal officials required to carry firearms, while engaged in the operation of their official duties;

(4) Law enforcement officials of this or any other jurisdiction, while engaged in the operation of their official duties;

(5) Nonresident hunters during hunting season, with valid nonresident hunting licenses and while in an area where hunting is permitted; however, at all other times and in all other places such persons must have their firearms unloaded and enclosed in a case;

(6) Nonresidents while on a firing or shooting range recognized by the Department of Public Safety; however, such persons must at all other times and in all other places have their firearms unloaded and enclosed in a case;

(7) Nonresidents, while at a firearm showing or display recognized by the Department of Public Safety; however, at all other times and in all other places such persons must have their firearms unloaded and enclosed in a case;

(8) Nonresidents, whose firearms are unloaded and enclosed in a case; and

(9) Nonresidents, who are currently licensed or registered to possess a firearm in their resident state.

(10) Unemancipated minors while in the custody and immediate control of their parent or legal guardian or other person in loco parentis to such minor; Provided, however, that such parent or legal guardian or other person in loco parentis to such minor shall have a currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card.

New Regulations Prescribed Covering Possession of Firearms.

Be It Ordained by the City Council of the City of Chicago:

SECTION 1. The Municipal Code of the City of Chicago is amended by adding Chapter 11.2 as follows:

Chapter 11.2

Possession of Firearms

11.2-1. It shall be unlawful for any person to carry in any vehicle or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business, any rifle, shotgun, or other firearm; provided that this section shall not apply to:

(1) Peace officers or any person summoned by any such officers to assist in making arrests or preserving the peace while he is actually engaged in assisting such officer.

(2) Wardens, superintendents and keepers of prisons, penitentiaries, jails, and other institutions for the detention of persons accused or convicted of an offense, while in the performance of their official duty.

(3) Members of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or the Illinois National Guard or the Reserve Officers Training Corps, while in the performance of their official duty.

(4) Special agents employed by a railroad to perform police functions, or employees of a detective agency, watchman-guard or patrolman agency, licensed by the State of Illinois, while actually engaged in the performance of the duties of their employment or commuting between their homes and places of employment.

(5) Agents and investigators of the Illinois Crime Investigating Commission authorized by the Commission to carry weapons, while on duty in the course of any investigation for the Commission.

(6) Manufacture, transportation, or sale of weapons to persons authorized under law to possess such.

(7) Members of any club or organization organized for the purpose of practicing shooting at targets upon established target ranges, whether public or private, while such members are using their firearms on such target ranges.

(8) Duly authorized military or civil organizations while parading, with the special permission of the governor.

(9) Licensed hunters or fishermen while engaged in hunting or fishing.

(10) Transportation of weapons broken down in a non-functioning state or not immediately accessible.

11.2-2. Any person violating the provisions of Section 11.2-1 shall be fined $500.00.

SECTION 2. This ordinance shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and due publication.

6,11

ILLINOIS STATUTES DON'T PREEMPT GUN FIELD CONTROL FROM CITIES

Chicago ordinance-curbing ordinance sustained against constitutional, statutory arguments by Illinois Supreme Court:

Chicago's all-embracing gun control ordinance requiring detailed information on every firearms transfer and registration of already possessed guns, and prohibiting anyone from taking a gun out of his house or place of business — is unsuccessfully attacked by individuals and a sporting goods store. The Illinois Supreme Court sustains the ordinance against allegations that the state has pre-empted the gun control field, and that the ordinance violates the Second Amendment. The court is also unimpressed by arguments that the ordinance is vague and confusing, that it unlawfully delegates legislative power to a city official and that it is an unreasonable exercise of the police power. (Brown v. Chicago, 5/28/69)

Digest of Opinion: The pre-emption argument is without merit. The state statute deals with registration of owners only, whereas the ordinance is for registration of weapons themselves. There is no inconsistency or repugnancy between the two.

Although the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, gun control that does not impair the efficiency of the state's active, organized militia (National Guard) does not violate the Amendment.

"Plaintiffs argue that the definition of 'firearms' in the ordinances is broader than the one in the statute, and that even hough a person obeys all the requirements of the latter he vill not necessarily be protected thereby from prosecution or violating the ordinances. This does not constitute a valid bjection. As we have indicated, the statute and the ordinan es have differing objectives."

Because the ordinance requires registration of a silencer, and the state's statute makes it a crime to possess one, the circuit court below held the silencer provision an unconstitutional violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. But that does not affect the constitutionality of the rest of the ordinance, since the silencer provision is severable.

A seller is required to register voluminous detailed information about the purchaser, and the weapon and "other relevant information deemed necessary by the City Collector." The plaintiffs claim that the "deeming" provision unlawfully confers legislative power on the City Collector.

"The position cannot be sustained. The discretion is not to be construed as being uncontrolled. It can be exercised only within limits which are relevant to the purpose of identification and is, we think, subject to adequate standards. * * *

"The city collector in administering the ordinance is in a position to determine more advantageously when and what further descriptive information is needed. * * *

"Plaintiffs argue at length that strict gun laws do not tend to reduce crime, and statistics and excerpts from reports of surveys are quoted to show that legal restrictions are easily circumvented by experienced criminals. The shameful fact is pointed out that it is unsafe to walk alone at night in many neighborhoods, and parks, and it is suggested that firearms might often be necessary for self protection. These arguments, whatever validity they might have, are not appropriately addressed to this court. They relate to matters of legislative instead of judicial concern, and bear on the advisability of the present provisions rather than on their validity." Klingbiel, J.

(Brown v. Chicago; Ill SupCt, 5/28/69)

-18-69

9

SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

[redacted], Special Agent, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 36 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois, advised that their investigation concerning the firearms recovered by the States Attorney's Office at 2337 West Monroe Street, reflected that their department succeeded in tracing down only four of the 19 guns recovered. The four traceable firearms are as follows:

1. 32 caliber S and W model 30-1, serial number 730073, was sold on October 29, 1963 to Brown Supply Company, 416 South Adams Street, Peoria, Illinois. On September 19, 1964, Brown Supply Company sold the firearm to H. Mayo, 501 Hamilton Boulevard, Peoria, Illinois. Mayo owns and operates a restaurant, described as a white male, blond hair, blue eyes, 5' 9", 150 pounds.

2. Colt 45 caliber auto pistol, model 1927, serial number 7111. This weapon was sold by Casavanova's, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to M and M Sporting Goods Store, 3823 North Richards, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The firearms was sold to M and M Sporting Goods June 9, 1969, and the stores books and records for the firearms report on their inventory, but have no record of the sale and it is their belief that the gun has been stolen.

3. Carbine 30 caliber M1, serial number 16573, was purchased on August 21, 1969, by Darkin H. Gentry, head of the Black Panther Party, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

4. Llama 7.65 millimeter, serial number 443695, was purchased on August 20, 1969, by David Young, member of the Black Panther Party, Milwaukee, Illinois. On February 12, 1970, [redacted] Service Manager, Stoeger Arms Corporation, Hackensack, New Jersey, advised that the above firearms was shipped on October 10, 1968, to the Ken Goods Center, 49-10 West North Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

[redacted] advised that the Ithaca 12 gauge, sawed off 13 inch barrel, serial number 175084, was not registered with the National Firearms Registration, Washington, D. C.. or were any of the above firearms registered with the National Firearms Registration file in Washington, D. C.

[redacted] stated that since the Ithaca 12 gauge, sawed off 13 inch shotgun, serial number 175084, was manufactured by Ithaca in 1908, and no records are kept by the company; this does not violate the Federal Firearms Act. Mr. Dedich furnished additional information concerning the above firearms:

Colt 38 caliber, 4½ inch barrel, serial number 219414, is a Navy revolver 38, and was shipped to Simons Hardware, St. Louis, Missouri, on September 12, 1903 - too old to obtain any additional information.

On February 3, 1970, [redacted], Customer Service, Browning Arms Company, Morgan, Utah, advised that their records show that their Browning shotgun, 12 gauge, bearing serial number H15423, was shipped from their plant at St. Louis, Missouri on October 13, 1954, to the Sears and Roebuck Store, 403 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois - records at Sears and Roebuck Store, 403 South State Street, are destroyed after five years.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/17/70

TOM HETT, States Attorney's Office, 26th and California, Chicago, Illinois, furnished the following list of guns seized on the Black Panther raid at 2337 West Monroe on December 4, 1969:

1. Colt 45 cal automatic 5" blue model 1927 Argentina S/N # 7111

   Shipped June 9, 1969 to M&M Sporting Goods, 3823 N. Richards, Milwaukee, by Casavanova's Milwaukee.

They have the gun on their books but do not have it in their possession and have never reported it stolen. They say they will report it now.

2. Sears Roebuck 20 ga pump 28" blue steel model 21 No serial number so cannot be traced.

3. Springfield 12 ga pump 28" blue steel model 67H No serial number so it cannot be traced.

4. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so it cannot be traced.

5. Browning High Standard 12 ga auto load model standard H15423

   Sold by Browning Mfg. to Sears Roebuck on Oct. 13, 1954. Sears is located at 403 S. State, Chicago, Illinois. Sears does not keep records that far back so unable to trace Further.

6. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so unable to trace.

7. Remington 12 ga pump model 870 S/N 20240T Unable to trace because Remington threw out its records for guns made in 1950.

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

8. Ithaca 12 ga sawed off 13" S/N 175084 Mfg. by Ithaca in 1908 and no records were kept at that time

9. Ithaca 12 ga pump 20" parkerized model 37 S/N 1019900. This gun has not been cleared but is believed to be stolen from Chicago PD.

10. Carbine 30 cal 18" M-1 autoload S/N 16573 Purchased on Aug. 21, 1969, by Dakin M. Gentry Head Black Panther Party, Milwaukee

11. Springfield 22 cal 24" autoload model 87A Unable to trace because of lack of serial number.

12. Astra 9mm 5 ¼ model 600-43 pistol #41558

13. Llama 7.65 mm S/N 443695 Purchased by David Young on Aug. 20, 1969 Black Panther, Milwaukee

14. Colt 38 cal 4 ½ Rev. S/N 219414 It was a "New Navy Revolver" and was sent by Mfg. to Simmons Hardware in St. Louis on Sept. 12, 1903. Due to the date it would be unable.

15. Smith & Wesson 38 cal. 6 ½" Rev Model M & P S/N 46272. This gun was made and shipped to Folsom Arms Co., New York City, on or around Nov. 5, 1904. Due to the date involved it would be too hard to trace.

16. S &W 32 cal 2" model 30-1 S/N 730073. This gun was shipped to Brown Supply Co., 416 S. Adams St., Peoria, and was sold on 9/19/64 to H. Mayo, 501 Hamilton Blvd., Peoria. This man is not listed in the phone book and was not known to Brown's.

17. .177 cal. Marksman Repeater model spring operated, air pistol, no serial number.

18. 12 ga Stevens model 520 pump shotgun

serial number 84940.

19. 12 ga High Standard Riot model K-1200 six shot pump shotgun, no serial number, blood on gun.

SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Mr. Hett also furnished the following information concerning department special order number 68-25, issued April 8, 1968, concerning registration of firearms by members of the Chicago Police Department. Mr. Hett advised that as far as he knows, that all guns used by the States Attorneys Police Officers were registered according to the above special order. Information concerning registration of firearms with the State of Illinois is as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

ROSS V. RANDOLPH
Director

FIREARM OWNER'S IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

Manley D. Hawks
Superintendent

SENATE BILL 1350

75th General Assembly - 1967
Approved August 3, 1967
Effective July 1, 1968

SENATE BILL 1351

75th General Assembly - 1967
Approved August 3, 1967
Effective August 3, 1967

HOUSE BILL 1258

75th General Assembly - 1967
Approved August 3, 1967
Effective August 3, 1967

Section 2. (a) No person may acquire or possess any firearm or any firearm ammunition within this State without having in his possession a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his name by the Department of Public Safety under the provisions of this Act.

(b) The provisions of this Section regarding the possession of firearms and firearm ammunition shall not apply to:

(1) United State's Marshals, while engaged in the operation of their official duties;

(2) Members of the Armed Forces of the United States or the National Guard, while engaged in the operation of their official duties;

(3) Federal officials required to carry firearms, while engaged in the operation of their official duties;

(4) Law enforcement officials of this or any other jurisdiction, while engaged in the operation of their official duties;

(5) Nonresident hunters during hunting season, with valid nonresident hunting licenses and while in an area where hunting is permitted; however, at all other times and in all other places such persons must have their firearms unloaded and enclosed in a case;

(6) Nonresidents while on a firing or shooting range recognized by the Department of Public Safety; however, such persons must at all other times and in all other places have their firearms unloaded and enclosed in a case;

(7) Nonresidents, while at a firearm showing or display recognized by the Department of Public Safety; however, at all other times and in all other places such persons must have their firearms unloaded and enclosed in a case;

(8) Nonresidents, whose firearms are unloaded and enclosed in a case; and

(9) Nonresidents, who are currently licensed or registered to possess a firearm in their resident state.

(10) Unemancipated minors while in the custody and immediate control of their parent or legal guardian or other person in loco parentis to such minor; Provided, however, that such parent or legal guardian or other person in loco parentis to such minor shall have a currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card.

New Regulations Prescribed Covering Possession of Firearms.

Be It Ordained by the City Council of the City of Chicago:

SECTION 1. The Municipal Code of the City of Chicago is amended by adding Chapter 11.2 as follows:

Chapter 11.2

Possession of Firearms

11.2-1. It shall be unlawful for any person to carry in any vehicle or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business, any rifle, shotgun, or other firearm; provided that this section shall not apply to:

(1) Peace officers or any person summoned by any such officers to assist in making arrests or preserving the peace while he is actually engaged in assisting such officer.

(2) Wardens, superintendents and keepers of prisons, penitentiaries, jails, and other institutions for the detention of persons accused or convicted of an offense, while in the performance of their official duty.

(3) Members of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or the Illinois National Guard or the Reserve Officers Training Corps, while in the performance of their official duty.

(4) Special agents employed by a railroad to perform police functions, or employees of a detective agency, watchman-guard or patrolman agency, licensed by the State of Illinois, while actually engaged in the performance of the duties of their employment or commuting between their homes and places of employment.

(5) Agents and investigators of the Illinois Crime Investigating Commission authorized by the Commission to carry weapons, while on duty in the course of any investigation for the Commission.

(6) Manufacture, transportation, or sale of weapons to persons authorized under law to possess such.

(7) Members of any club or organization organized for the purpose of practicing shooting at targets upon established target ranges, whether public or private, while such members are using their firearms on such target ranges.

(8) Duly authorized military or civil organizations while parading, with the special permission of the governor.

(9) Licensed hunters or fishermen while engaged in hunting or fishing.

(10) Transportation of weapons broken down in a non-functioning state or not immediately accessible.

11.2-2. Any person violating the provisions of Section 11.2-1 shall be fined $500.00.

SECTION 2. This ordinance shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and due publication.

6-11

B

ILLINOIS STATUTES DON'T PREEMPT GUN FIELD CONTROL FROM CITIES

Chicago ordinance-curbing ordinance sustained against constitutional, statutory arguments by Illinois Supreme Court.

Chicago's all-embracing gun control ordinance requiring detailed information on every firearms transfer and registration of already possessed guns, and prohibiting anyone from taking a gun out of his house or place of business is unsuccessfully attacked by individuals and a sporting goods store. The Illinois Supreme Court sustains the ordinance against allegations that the state has pre-empted the gun control field, and that the ordinance violates the Second Amendment. The court is also unimpressed by arguments that the ordinance is vague and confusing, that it unlawfully delegates legislative power to a city official and that it is an unreasonable exercise of the police power. (Brown v. Chicago, 5/28/69)

Digest of Opinion: The pre-emption argument is without merit. The state statute deals with registration of owners only, whereas the ordinance is for registration of weapons themselves. There is no inconsistency or repugnancy between the two.

Although the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, gun control that does not impair the efficiency of the state's active, organized militia (National Guard) does not violate the Amendment.

"Plaintiffs argue that the definition of 'firearms' in the ordinances is broader than the one in the statute, and that even though a person obeys all the requirements of the latter he will not necessarily be protected thereby from prosecution or violating the ordinances. This does not constitute a valid objection. As we have indicated, the statute and the ordinances have differing objectives."

Because the ordinance requires registration of a silencer, and the state's statute makes it a crime to possess one, the circuit court below held the silencer provision an unconstitutional violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. But that does not affect the constitutionality of the rest of the ordinance, since the silencer provision is severable.

A seller is required to register voluminous detailed information about the purchaser, and the weapon and "other relevant information deemed necessary by the City Collector." The plaintiffs claim that the "deeming" provision unlawfully confers legislative power on the City Collector.

"The position cannot be sustained. The discretion is not to be construed as being uncontrolled. It can be exercised only within limits which are relevant to the purpose of identification and is, we think, subject to adequate standards. * * *

"The city collector in administering the ordinance is in a position to determine more advantageously when and what further descriptive information is needed. * * *

"Plaintiffs argue at length that strict gun laws do not tend to reduce crime, and statistics and excerpts from reports and surveys are quoted to show that legal restrictions are easily circumvented by experienced criminals. The shameful fact is pointed out that it is unsafe to walk alone at night in many neighborhoods, and parks, and it is suggested that firearms might often be necessary for self protection. These arguments, whatever validity they might have, are not appropriately addressed to this court. They relate to matters of legislative instead of judicial concern, and bear on the advisability of the present provisions rather than on their validity." Klingbiel, J.

(Brown v. Chicago; Ill SupCt, 5/28/69)

-18-69

SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

[redacted], Special Agent, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 36 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois, advised that their investigation concerning the firearms recovered by the States Attorney's Office at 2337 West Monroe Street, reflected that their department succeeded in tracing down only four of the 19 guns recovered. The four traceable firearms are as follows:

1. 32 caliber S and W model 30-1, serial number 730073, was sold on October 29, 1963 to Brown Supply Company, 416 South Adams Street, Peoria, Illinois. On September 19, 1964, Brown Supply Company sold the firearm to H. Mayo, 501 Hamilton Boulevard, Peoria, Illinois. Mayo owns and operates a restaurant, described as a white male, blond hair, blue eyes, 5' 9", 150 pounds.

2. Colt 45 caliber auto pistol, model 1927, serial number 7111. This weapon was sold by Casavanova's, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to M and M Sporting Goods Store, 3823 North Richards, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The firearm was sold to M and M Sporting Goods June 9, 1969, and the stores books and records for the firearms report on their inventory, but have no record of the sale and it is their belief that the gun has been stolen.

3. Carbine 30 caliber M1, serial number 16573, was purchased on August 21, 1969, by Darkin M. Gentry, head of the Black Panther Party, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

4. Llama 7.65 millimeter, serial number 443695, was purchased on August 20, 1969, by David Young, member of the Black Panther Party, Milwaukee, Illinois. On February 12, 1970, [redacted], Service Manager, Stoeger Arms Corporation, Hackensack, New Jersey, advised that the above firearms was shipped on October 10, 1968, to the Ken Goods Center, 49-10 West North Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

[redacted] advised that the Ithaca 12 gauge, sawed off 13 inch barrel, serial number 175084, was not registered with the National Firearms Registration, Washington, D. C., or were any of the above firearms registered with the National Firearms Registration file in Washington, D. C.

[redacted] stated that since the Ithaca 12 gauge sawed off 13 inch shotgun, serial number 175084, was manufactured by Ithaca in 1908, and no records are kept by the company; this does not violate the Federal Firearms Act. Mr. Dedich furnished additional information concerning the above firearms:

Colt 38 caliber, 4½ inch barrel, serial number 219414, is a Navy revolver 38, and was shipped to Simons Hardware, St. Louis, Missouri, on September 12, 1903 - too old to obtain any additional information.

On February 3, 1970, [redacted], Customer Service, Browning Arms Company, Morgan, Utah, advised that their records show that their Browning shotgun, 12 gauge, bearing serial number H15423, was shipped from their plant at St. Louis, Missouri on October 13, 1954, to the Sears and Roebuck Store, 403 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois - records at Sears and Roebuck Store, 403 South State Street, are destroyed after five years.

FD-263 (Rev. 3-[illegible]-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:
1 - AAG JERRIS LEONARD, Chief of Civil Rights Division at Chicago
1 - USA, Chicago (Attention: AUSA ROBERT J. [illegible])

Report of: [redacted] Office: Chicago
Date: 4/7/70

Field Office File #: [redacted] Bureau File #: [redacted]

Title: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH
ET AL -
SUBJECTS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS

Character: SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Synopsis: Investigation conducted by FBI at BPP apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago; FBI Identification Division and FBI Lab reports set forth. FGJ adjourned 3/12/70 and reconvened 4/7/70.

-P-

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its [illegible]
to your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/8/70

1.

Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory, made an on-the-scene examination of bullet holes found in the apartment located at 2337 West Monroe Street, and made a trajectory pattern to show directions of the shots fired and made pertinent measurements to show the locations of the holes.

A number of items of evidence were collected for subsequent laboratory examination. These items were listed with Deputy Coroner ANTHONY SCIARAFFA, Cook County, Illinois, and with his permission removed from the premises for transmittal to the FBI Laboratory. The items recovered are as follows:

1. Piece of wallboard from inside wall to right of front entrance door.
2. Three pieces of lead from hole in northeast corner of entrance hallway.
3. Wad from bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall.
4. Two pieces of lead from northeast frame of closet in front bedroom.
5. Five bullets removed from behind holes in east wall of front bedroom.
6. Bullet from south wall of front bedroom.
7. Bullet from behind hole designated Number 6 in south wall of front bedroom.
8. Bullet from behind hole in baseboard on south wall of front bedroom.

On 12/22/69;
12/29-31/69;
1/8/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 1/8/70

...either recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned ...
...be distributed outside your agency.

2.
[redacted]

9. Mutilated bullet and bullet fragments from stud behind hole designated Number 3 on south wall of front bedroom.

10. Bullet from behind hole designated Number 39 in south wall of front bedroom.

11. Pieces of lead from behind uppermost shot hole in north wall of front bedroom.

12. Pieces of lead from lower shot hole in north wall of front bedroom.

13. Lead and copper fragments removed from leg of night table in back bedroom.

14. Red plastic dish found on floor of rear bedroom.

15. Shot pellet removed from shot hole designated Number 2 in east wall of back bedroom.

16. Lead core from copper-jacketed bullet from base of south wall in back bedroom.

17. Scrapings from blood stain on unattached door in dinning room.

18. Scrapings from blood stain on bed frame in rear bedroom.

19. Scrapings from blood stain on north wall in rear bedroom.

20. Scrapings from blood stain on south wall of living room.

21. Shotgun wad from under bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall.

3. [redacted]

22. Part of door through entrance to living room from entrance hall.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/9/70

On December 21, 1969, Officers AUGUST BLUE, Badge 200, and JOHN DENEEN, Badge 8, States Attorneys Police of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois, brought two doors to the address 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. One door was for the front bedroom and one door with one panel missing was for the entrance to the first floor apartment.

Officers BLUE and DENEEN stayed with the doors and did not turn them over to the FBI.

On 12/31/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/6/70

by

This ... neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; ... be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/16/70

Pursuant to an on-the-scene examination of the premises located at 2337 West Monroe Street on January 6 and 7, 1970, the following items were removed from the premises for subsequent Laboratory examination:

1. Copper fragment recovered from south west corner of kitchen.
2. Two cartridges recovered from bundle of clothing in entrance hall.
3. Blood sample removed from black eight-drawer dresser in living room.

These items were listed with Deputy Coroner ANTHONY SCIARAFFA, Cook County, Illinois, and with his permission removed from the premises.

On 1/6-7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/16/70

A shed attached to the residence located at 2335 West Monroe Street, was examined for the purpose of noting and recording any bullet and/or shot holes.

Pertinent measurements and trajectory patterns were taken. No projectiles were recovered and no items were removed from the premises.

7

On 1/6-7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/14/70

On January 6, 1970, during a search of the kitchen located in the apartment at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, a copper bullet jacket was located in the southwest corner of the room. The jacket was under a piece of cloth tacked to the door frame and floor.

On 1/6/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SA [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

ither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/14/70

On January 7, 1970, during a search of the kitchen located in the apartment at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, a white plastic bottle containing pills, prescription number 216313 for LYNN FRENCH, dated July 29, 1969, was located on the kitchen table.

9

On 1/6/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # CG 44-1502

by SA [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

...neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency... be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date January 16, 1970

On January 6, 1970, photographs were taken at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. Present were United States Department of Justice Attorney K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Deputy Coroner ANTHONY J. SCIAFFRA, Special Agent [redacted] [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted], Visual Information Specialists, Special Agents [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] [redacted]. Depty Marshal [redacted], Deputy Marshal [redacted] and MILTON BRANCH, attorney representing the Attorney General of the United States.

10

On 1/6/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

...ther recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; ... is distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date January 16, 1971

Photographs were taken at 2337 West Monroe on January 7, 1970. Present were Special Agents [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted], Visual Information Specialists, Federal Bureau of Investigation [redacted] and [redacted], K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney and ANTHONY J. SCIAFFRA, Deputy Coroner.

On 1/7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date January 16, 1970

On January 9, 1970, photographs were taken of kitchen door and rear entrance and porch of building at 2335 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. Present during filming were Special Agents [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] [redacted]R., JESSE H. QUEEN, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney, and [redacted], resident of this address.

On 1/9/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 1/14/70

On January 13, 1970, the grating in the floor of the front room of the first floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, was measured.

This grating is located 15½ inches from the south wall and 52 inches from the west wall of the front room.

The metal frame in the floor measures 20½ inches
from east to west and 17 inches from north to south.
The grating fitted inside of this frame measures 13½ inches
from north to south and 15 inches from east to west. The
grating rests on a ½ inch steel lip which reduces the
opening to 13 inches by 14½ inches. The drop from the
floor containing the grating to the floor below is 115 inches.
The basement is full of garbage and debris. Directly under
the opening was a large vehicle tire, an old overcoat and
several pieces of duct work. The grating lifted out of the
frame very easily.

13

On 1/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by [redacted] Date dictated 1/13/70

...neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; ... to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date January 21, 197

1

Photos of a vent located in the living room at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, were made January 13, 1970, in the presence of Special Agent [redacted], K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, United States Department of Justice, Deputy Marshal [redacted] and HENRY YARBROUGH, and Sergeant JAMES COLLINS, Star Number 1819, Chicago Police Department.

14

On 1/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/15/7

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date January 23, 1970

1

At the Cook County Courthouse, 26th and California Avenue, Room 452, known as the Special Grand Jury Room, an inventory under order of Cook County Judge JOHN POWERS was instituted of evidence surrendered by FRANCIS E. ANDREW, Attorney, and his Investigative Assistant VICTORY KADISH, representing the Black Panther Party of Illinois.

Also present during the taking of this inventory were the following:

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Department of Justice, Attorney, Civil Rights Division;

JOHN E. RUSSELL, Investigator, Cook County State's Attorney's Office:

NANCY DEMPSEY, from the law office of FRANCIS E. ANDREW, 2156 North Halsted, Chicago.

Miss KADISH advised she was the agent for ANDREW, that she had personally handled the evidence, had assisted ANDREW in securing the evidence from the Black Panther Party (BPP) apartment, 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, on December 4 and 5, 1969, and had originally inventoried the evidence.

It is noted that the inventory of this evidence, which was turned over to the FBI, commenced at 6:10 PM, January 19, 1970, and was completed at 11:58 PM, January 19, 1970.

Following the making of an inventory of this evidence, it was receipted for by SA [redacted] FRANCIS E. ANDREW and VICTORY KADISH. The original of the receipt was furnished to ANDREW and a copy was

On 1/19/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted], [redacted],
([redacted]
by [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 1/23/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

furnished SA [redacted]. All copies of this inventory were signed by SA [redacted], ANDREW and KADISH.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

- 1 -

Date 1/31/70

On the afternoon of January 27, 1970, [redacted] [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], New York, was contacted at his place of employment in [redacted] at which time he advised he possessed certain microscope slides concerning his examination of a Chicago, Illinois residence in December, 1969, and was willing to turn these slides over to the FBI, as he had been directed to do so by an attorney with the United States Department of Justice. Arrangements were made to obtain these slides from [redacted] on the evening of January 27, 1970, as he stated they were presently at his residence.

On the evening of January 27, 1970, [redacted] turned over to Special Agent [redacted] of the FBI, two-one-inch by three-inch glass microscope slides, which had been marked and were described by [redacted] as follows:

(1) Labled HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Head. These are scrapings from the head of the slug removed from the East wall of the Northeast (living) room of 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois. This by [redacted] on December 8, 1969. This piece of evidence described by the [redacted] listas "F." The mounting medium is Canada Balsam.

(2) Labeled HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Base. A Portion of the wooden fibers removed from the base of the slug described under number one above. The mounting medium is Canada Balsam.

The above two described microscope slides were received from [redacted] at his residence, [redacted] [redacted] New York, and a receipt was furnished [redacted] at that time.

On 1/27/70 at [redacted], New York File # [redacted]

[redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/29/70

...ther recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; ... distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that the above-described two slides were of material removed by him from the slug shown in Photos #104, which he had introduced into evidence before the Federal Grand Jury sitting at Chicago, Illinois.

[redacted] exhibited a number of color photographs which he stated he had taken in connection with his examination of the residence at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, and made the comment that there is something "very pertinent" to be concluded from the examination of the gun powder marks, which appear on the inside of the entrance door to the apartment and further, that he believes that he is the only one who has realized the particular significance of these powder marks.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/31/70

On the early afternoon of January 28, 1970, SA [redacted] New York FBI Resident Agency, personally turned over to SA [redacted], JR., FBI Laboratory, Washington, D. C., at Washington, D. C., the below-described two (2) items, which [redacted] [redacted], [redacted], New York, had turned over to SA [redacted] on the evening of January 27, 1970, at [redacted] residence in [redacted], New York:

#1 One (1) one-inch by three-inch microscope slide labeled "HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Head."

#2 One (1) one-inch by three-inch glass microscope slide labeled "HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Base."

On 1/28/70 at Washington, D. C. File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/29/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agen
e distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/17/70

1

TOM HETT, States Attorney's Office, 26th and California, Chicago, Illinois, furnished the following list of guns seized on the Black Panther raid at 2337 West Monroe on December 4, 1969:

1. Colt 45 cal automatic 5" blue model 1927 Argentina S/N # 7111

   Shipped June 9, 1969 to M&M Sporting Goods, 3823 N. Richards, Milwaukee, by Casavanova's Milwaukee.

They have the gun on their books but do not have it in their possession and have never reported it stolen. They say they will report it now.

2. Sears Roebuck 20 ga pump 28" blue steel model 21 No serial number so cannot be traced.

3. Springfield 12 ga pump 28" blue steel model 67H No serial number so it cannot be traced.

4. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so it cannot be traced.

5. Browning High Standard 12 ga auto load model standard H15423

   Sold by Browning Mfg. to Sears Roebuck on Oct. 13, 1954. Sears is located at 403 S. State, Chicago, Illinois. Sears does not keep records that far back so unable to trace Further.

6. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so unable to trace.

7. Remington 12 ga pump model 870 S/N 20240V Unable to trace because Remington threw out its records for guns made in 1950.

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

[redacted] Date dictated 2/13/70

neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; to be distributed outside your agency

[redacted]

8. Ithaca 12 ga sawed off 13" S/N 175084. Mfg. by Ithaca in 1908 and no records were kept at that time

9. Ithaca 12 ga pump 20" parkerized model 37 S/N 1019900. This gun has not been cleared but is believed to be stolen from Chicago PD.

10. Carbine 30 cal 18" M-1 autoload S/N 16573 Purchased on Aug. 21, 1969, by Dakin M. Centr Head Black Panther Party, Milwaukee

11. Springfield 22 cal 24" autoload model 87A Unable to trace because of lack of serial number.

12. Astra 9mm 5 ¼ model 600-43 pistol #41558

13. Llama 7.65 mm S/N 443695 Purchased by David Young on Aug. 20, 1969 Black Panther, Milwaukee

14. Colt 38 cal 4 ½ Rev. S/N 219414 It was a "New Navy Revolver" and was sent by Mfg. to Simmons Hardware in St. Louis on Sept. 12, 1903. Due to the date it would be unable.

15. Smith & Wesson 38 cal. 6 ½" Rev Model M & P S/N 46272. This gun was made and shipped to Folsom Arms Co., New York City, on or around Nov. 5, 1904. Due to the date involved it would be too hard to trace.

16. S &W 32 cal 2" model 30-1 S/N 730073. This gun was shipped to Brown Supply Co., 416 S. Adams St., Peoria, and was sold on 9/19/64 [illegible] H. Mayo, 501 Hamilton Blvd., Peoria. This [illegible] is not listed in the phone book and was not known to Brown's.

17. .177 cal. Marksman Repeater model spring operated, air pistol, no serial number.

18. 12 ga Stevens model 520 pump shotgun

3

[redacted]

serial number 84940.

19. 12 ga High Standard Riot model K-1200 six shot pump shotgun, no serial number, blood on gun.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

[redacted] registered pharmacist, Walgreens Drug Store, 2300 West Madison, advised that their prescriptions are filed in number order only and no records are kept concerning prescriptions in name only.

[redacted] advised that he has seen FRED A. HAMPTON, deceased, and another member of the Black Panther Party in Walgreens purchasing cigarettes and so forth, but does not recall the following people ever obtaining prescriptions at Walgreens:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. ANDERSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL ?

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] AND SA [redacted]
[redacted] Date dictated 2/13/70

...recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency... distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

[redacted], pharmacist, Stineway Drugs, 240 Madison, Chicago, Illinois, advised that all their prescriptions are filed by number only and no records are kept on names of persons obtaining prescriptions at their store.

[redacted] was furnished the following names and advised that he does not recall any of these individuals obtaining prescriptions at their store:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. JOHNSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]
[redacted] Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/17/70

1

[redacted], registered pharmacist, Illinois license 5127769, employed with Par Pharmacy, 1202 East 53rd Street, Chicago, Illinois, advised that prescription number 216313 was prescribed for LYNN FRENCH by Doctor JONES, 5321 South Woodlawn, phone 667-0909. [redacted] advised that the prescription contained 40 tablets of 40,000 units of penicillin. [redacted] advised the prescription was signed by LOUIS MARACUS on July 29, 1969.

[redacted] advised that all prescriptions filed at their pharmacy are filed by number and no records are maintained by name only. [redacted] advised that he does not recall the following persons obtaining prescriptions at this store:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. ANDERSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL "

On 2/10/70 Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]
[redacted] Date dictated 2/13/70

either recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your
to be distributed outside your agency

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date February 12, 1970

1.

[redacted] Medical Director, Neighborhood Health Center, Office of Economic Opportunity, 529 29th Street, advised he has records reflecting that CHERYL PETERSON, 2859 Humboldt Street, Denver, Colorado, visited this center on August 9, 1969 and was diagnosed as being anemic. She was given two prescriptions on that date which were filled at this center, one pertained to iron tablets and the other to vitamin tablets.

She also visited this center on August 19, 1969 in connection with a possible pregnancy and was advised by the examining doctor she was not pregnant.

[redacted] advised that his records reflect she is a Negro female; born May 25, 1951 in the State of Illinois; Social Security Number 330-44-6208; parents, Mr. and Mrs. SOLON PETERSON, 1516 South Kostner, Chicago, Illinois; marital status single.

[redacted] stated that CHERYL PETERSON failed to return for a reappointment set for two months after she was last in the center and that mail sent to her by the center to the above Denver address was returned marked addressee moved, no forwarding address.

He advised further that his records do not indicate that CHERYL PETERSON has any connection with the Black Panther Party or FRED A. HAMPTON, MARK CLARK, BRENDA HARRIS, VERLINA A. BREWER, BLAIR J. ANDERSON, RONALD SATCHEL, DEBROAH JOHNSON, LOUIS TRULOCK or HAROLD BELL.

On 2/12/70 at Denver, Colorado File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 2/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date February 18, 1970

A piece of the door jamb and wall board behind same was removed from the left side of the door frame of the livingroom at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. The cut of the piece of door jamb was made at 52 inches and 64 inches from the floor.

In addition, to Special Agents [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] also present were Deputy United States Marshals [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted], plus Sergeant ERICKSON, Star Number 1014 and Patrolman VENEIGH, Star Number 9073 of the Chicago Police Department.

The above articles were removed at the request of Mr. K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division.

On 2/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 2/16/70

ther recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/26/70

Prior to the autopsy of the body of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON, impressions of the right index finger of HAMPTON were obtained using a common black ink pad and a sheet of white unlined paper.

The purpose of the impressions was to effect identification.

28

On 2/15/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 2/20/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; [illegible] distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/26/70

Photographs were taken during the autopsy of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON at the Veterans Administration Hospital, utilizing a speedgraphic camera with flash attachment and Poloroid adapter. Poloroid color sheet film was used.

On 2/16/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 2/20/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/26/70

At 6:00 PM, an autopsy was performed on the body of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON by Dr. CHARLES PETTY, pathologist from Dallas, Texas. The autopsy was performed at the Veterans Administration Hospital, Shreveport, Louisiana. Those in attendance, according to a list provided by [redacted] U. S. Marshal, Shreveport, Louisiana, were as follows:

For the State of Illinois:

1) THOMAS HETT, Assistant State Attorney

2) NICK MOTHERWAY, Assistant State Attorney

3) Dr. JERRY KEARNS, Cook County Coroner's Office

4) Dr. WILLIAM MAVRELIS, Pathologist

For the HAMPTON family:

1) FRANCIS E. ANDREW, Attorney

2) Dr. DAVID SPAIN, Pathologist

3) Dr. EARL CALDWELL, Pathologist

For the U. S. Government:

1) Dr. CHARLES PETTY

2) JERRIS LEONARD, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of Justice

3) JAMES TURNER, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U. S. Department of Justice

4) DONALD E. WALTER, U. S. Attorney, Shreveport, Louisiana

5) [redacted] Deputy U. S. Marshal

On 2/16/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File # [redacted]

30

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 2/20/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 3/3/70

Photographs of interior of 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, were taken in the presence of Special Agents [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted], [redacted] and Deputy U. S. Marshal [redacted].

On 2/20/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by [redacted], and SA [redacted] / [redacted] Date dictated 2/27/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/25/70

1.

[redacted] Employment Supervisor, Cook County School of Nursing, 1900 West Polk Street, Chicago, advised that a search of their records revealed a personnel file for ANNIE WHITE, 2237 South Keeler, Chicago, Illinois.

[redacted] advised that ANNIE WHITE entered on duty at the hospital as a clerical employee on November 29, 1951. She stated that the file further revealed that WHITE was terminated on June 2, 1956, and again rehired, exact date unknown. She said that WHITE again terminated her employment at County Hospital on December 29, 1969. [redacted] said that while employed at Cook County Hospital, WHITE was under the direct supervision of [redacted] RN, and that her specific duties were that of a clerk assigned to the Trauma Unit. [redacted] said that the personnel file further revealed that WHITE was born October 11, 1930, at Hartwell, Florida. Her Social Security Number is 354-24-5846. Her telephone number is listed as 762-0129, which is the telephone number of her mother, Mrs. ANNIE B. GUMBY, 2237 South Keeler.

[redacted] advised that from a review of the County payroll records, the following is to be noted regarding WHITE's employment during the week of December 1, 1969:

December 1	Sick
December 2	3:00 to 11:00 shift
December 3	3:00 to 11:00 shift
December 4	Sick
December 5	Sick
December 6	Day off
December 7	Day off
December 8	Vacation day
December 9	Vacation day
December 10	Vacation day

[redacted] stated that WHITE has recently filled out an application for reinstatement and that this application is presently being considered.

On 2/24/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted] and [redacted]

by Date dictated 2/25/70

recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/25/70

1. Mrs. ANNIE WHITE, 2237 South Keeler, Chicago, Illinois, was located at the above address and served with a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena calling for her appearance before the Federal Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois at 11:00 AM, February 25, 1970.

Mrs. WHITE advised that she had been employed at the Cook County Hospital since approximately 1951 until December, 1969. She said that her supervisor while employed at the County Hospital was Miss MABEL WILSON. She stated that while employed at Cook County Hospital, she had been a clerk assigned to the Trauma Unit. She further advised that during the week of December 1, 1969, she recalls being ill one day during this week or two days perhaps, and that if she did work during that week, it was the 3:00 to 11:00 shift.

Mrs. WHITE advised that she is presently employed at Sears Roebuck as a sales clerk at Homan Avenue.

On 2/24/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted] and [redacted] EHM/ap Date dictated 2/25/70

...the recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency

[redacted]

Report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Identification Division, Latent Fingerprint Section, and of the FBI Laboratory are set forth hereafter:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C. 20537

REPORT

of the

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

January 6, 1970

YOUR FILE NO.
FBI FILE NO.
LATENT CASE NO. [redacted]

TO: SAC, Chicago

RE: SGT. DANIEL GROTH, JAMES DAVIS,
JOHN CISZEWSKI, EDWARD CARMODY, ET AL.
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, POLICE OFFICERS - SUBJECTS;
FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED)
MARK CLARK (DECEASED)
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA BREWER
BLAIN ANDERSON
RONALD STACHEL, ET AL. - VICTIMS;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

REFERENCE: Evidence personally delivered to FBI Laboratory on 12-31-69 by SA [redacted]

EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: Chicago

SPECIMENS: Q26, portion of door

The listed Q specimen is described in the Laboratory report, which is being furnished separately, and will include disposition of the item.

No latent prints of value present or developed on specimen.

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover, Director

FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7-1L

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Date: January 26, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

Re: SERGEANT DANIEL GROTH; JAMES DAVIS;
JOHN CISZEWSKI; EDWARD CARMODY; et al
Chicago, Illinois, Police Officers -
Subjects; FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED); MARK
CLARK (DECEASED); BRENDA HARRIS;
[redacted] VERLINA BREWER, BLAIR ANDERSON;
RONALD STACHEL; et al - Victims;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Results of examination: (refer to diagram on page 6)

1. In the entrance hallway, two shot patterns are represented.

A. One shot fired from inside the hallway was fired laterally across the front door. This shot was fired from a shotgun using a shotshell loaded with Number 7 1/2 or 8 shot. The gauge of the shotgun is not known. Pieces of lead shot were recovered.

B. One shot is represented by a large hole in the southwest corner of the entrance hallway, 6' 7 1/2" above the floor. The hole is typical of one that could have been produced by a rifled slug. No slug was recovered. The trajectory of the missile producing this hole leads from an area in the northwest corner of the living room, through the doorway between the living room and entrance hallway, through the hole in the southwest corner of the entrance hallway into the stairway leading to an upstairs apartment to the west wall of the stairway. The shot with the trajectory described could have produced the hole in the panel of the living room door as shown in photographs made available for examination. The panel with the hole was missing from the door at the time the door was made available for examination.

(continued on next page)

2. In the living room, forty-two bullet entrance holes were noted in the south wall, a bullet entrance hole was noted in the left side of the living room doorframe, a bullet entrance hole was found in a white four-drawer dresser in the living room with an accompanying exit hole in the back of the dresser, an impression of a bullet that keyholed and struck one of the dresser drawers of a black double dresser but did not exit the dresser and an area in the northwest corner of the living room approximately 80" from the floor that had been previously explored that could have represented either a bullet hole or shot pattern.

A. The bullets producing the forty-two entrance holes in the south wall of the living room all entered the front bedroom. Some penetrated the south wall of the front bedroom traveling through the partition and entered the back bedroom. It was possible, by plotting bullet trajectories from the living room through both north and south wall partitions in the front bedroom, to establish that nineteen of the forty-two bullets fired into the south wall of the living room entered the back bedroom.

B. One of the bullets fired through the south wall of the living room entered the closet in the front bedroom and exited through the closet in the back bedroom.

C. The bullet hole in the left doorframe of the living room door was 57 1/4" from the floor. The bullet had been removed previously. Its trajectory was nearly at right angles to the doorframe and level with the floor.

No bullets or lead shot were recovered in the living room.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

3. In addition to bullet holes in the front bedroom that were produced by bullets passing through the front bedroom from shots fired in the living room, there were three shot patterns on the north wall of the front bedroom, six bullet holes in the east wall of the front bedroom, three bullet holes through the east wall of the closet in the front bedroom and five bullet holes in a dresser in the front bedroom.

A. Two shot patterns in the north wall of the front bedroom were produced by one or more shotguns firing shotshells loaded with Number 7 1/2 or 8 shot. These patterns were 47" and 56" from the northwest corner of the front bedroom and 42" and 31" from the floor respectively. The trajectory of these shots established that they were fired from the hallway through the open door to the front bedroom. Pieces of lead shot were recovered from both holes.

B. The third shot pattern on the north wall of the front bedroom was produced by a shotgun firing a shotshell loaded with 00 Buck. It was established that the trajectory of the shot producing this pattern led from the doorway between the kitchen and dining room to a point in the east wall of the dining room near the northeast corner, 14 1/4" from the ceiling, passing through the wall into and through the plasterboard portion of the closet above the closet entrance opening, to the north wall of the front bedroom. The pattern on the north wall of the front bedroom was 80 1/2" above the floor level. Pieces of lead shot were recovered.

C. Six bullet holes in the east wall of the front bedroom were produced by shots fired from the hallway through the open door to the front bedroom. Five caliber .45 Auto bullets were recovered from behind these holes. These were identified as having been fired from the same weapon. The trajectories of two of these shots led to two holes in the edge of the open door exposed to the hallway.

(continued on next page)

D. Three bullet holes were in the east wall of the closet in the front bedroom. The shots producing these holes were fired from the hallway through the open door to the front bedroom. They penetrated the east wall of the closet, went through the south wall of the front bedroom and exited into the back bedroom. The trajectory of one of these bullets led to the right side of the window-frame of the left window in the back bedroom, the trajectory of another of the bullets led to the baseboard on the south wall of the back bedroom. The trajectory of the third shot led to and may have exited through the left window of the back bedroom.

E. There were eight holes in a six-drawer black dresser in the front bedroom. Three of these holes appeared to have been in the trajectory path of bullets fired through the south wall of the living room. The position of the dresser in the back bedroom appeared fixed on the basis of these trajectories. The trajectories of four other holes in the dresser led to shots fired into the front bedroom from the hallway through the open door to the front bedroom. All four of the bullets producing these holes lodged in the dresser and were apparently recovered by previous search.

In the right end of the dresser is a depression characteristic of one produced by a bullet ricochet. Its trajectory could not be established.

4. In the back bedroom were two shot patterns on the east wall 74" above floor level. The shots producing these holes appeared to have been fired from a direction of the door leading

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

to the back bedroom. The shot patterns are typical of those produced by buckshot. The area had been previously explored but one shot pellet remained at the time of the Laboratory examination of the scene, and it was removed for examination.

All other holes appearing in the back bedroom have been logically associated by trajectories from shot sources fired elsewhere in the apartment.

5. A part of the building at 2335 West Monroe Street, property next door to the apartment where the shooting occurred, is an enclosure referred to as a shed. This enclosure is over a porch leading to the back door of the apartment at 2335 West Monroe Street. On the side of this enclosure is a shot pattern typical of one produced by buckshot. The shot producing this pattern appeared to have been fired from the direction of the right window in the back bedroom.

Inside the enclosure was an indentation in the side of a washing machine stored there that could have been produced by buckshot, but nothing was found in the impression to permit its identification with buckshot.

In the kitchen door was a hole that penetrated the door. The trajectory of the missile producing this hole led to a corner of the kitchen. No projectiles were found. The enclosure and kitchen of the premises referred to had been previously explored.

No holes having the appearance of bullet holes were in the kitchen or dining room other than the shot hole near the northeast corner of the dining room that has been described above.

It was not possible to determine the sequence of the shots fired in the apartment.

(continued on next page)


SHED
Porch
SINK
GAS RANGE
Kitchen
REFRIG
South Bedroom
Dining Room
North Bedroom
Bathroom
ENTRANCE HALL
GAS HEATER
Living Room
ENTRANCE FOYER
Porch
S
E
N

LIVING ROOM
DOOR LEADING TO ENTRANCE HALL
[illegible]
[illegible]
CEILING HEIGHT [illegible]
NORTH BEDROOM
DOOR LEADING INTO BEDROOM
[illegible]
[illegible] DOORWAY HT-81"
CEILING HEIGHT [illegible]
SOUTH BEDROOM
CEILING HEIGHT-95"
[illegible]
DINING ROOM
CEILING HEIGHT 97"
DOOR LEADING TO KITCHEN
HT-[illegible] WIDTH 33 THICK [illegible]
KITCHEN
CEILING HEIGHT-97"
DOOR LEADING TO BACK PORCH
HT-76" WIDTH- THICK-[illegible]
DOORWAY HT-
ENTRANCE FOYER
CEILING HEIGHT-[illegible]
DOOR LEADING TO ENTRANCE HALL
HT-[illegible] WIDTH- THICK-1½"
DOORWAY HT-
DOOR LEADING TO MONROE ST
HT-[illegible] WIDTH- THICK-[illegible]
DOORWAY HT-
ENTRANCE HALL
CEILING HEIGHT-95½"

41

2337 W. MONROE ST.
Page 6

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago [redacted]

Date: January 26, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

Re: SGT. DANIEL GROTH; JAMES DAVIS;
JOHN CISZEWSKI; EDWARD CARMODY; et al.
Chicago, Ill. Police Officers - Subjects;
FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED); MARK CLARK (DECEASED);
BRENDA HARRIS; VERLINA BREWER; BLAIR ANDERSON;
RONALD STACHEL et al. - VICTIMS SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGH

Specimens received 1/21/70

K1	.357 Magnum Colt revolver, Serial Number 16779 (Corbett)
K2	.38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 790280 (Howard)
K3	.38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver, Serial Number V-401642 (Howard)
K4	.357 Magnum Colt revolver, Serial Number 20275 (Davis)
K5	.38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver, Serial Number C-334879 (Kelly)
K6	.38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver, Serial Number C-174386 (Marusich)
K7	.38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 369988 (Marusich)
K8	.38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 36064 (Carmody)
K9	.38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver, Serial Number 7455 (Harris)
K10	.38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 7991 (Broderick)
K11	.38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver, Serial Number 183979 (Groth)
K12	.38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 857237 (Groth)
K13	.38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 627788 (Hughes)
K14	.38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 39731 (Hughes)
K15	.357 Magnum Smith and Wesson revolver, Serial Number S-188411 (Gorman)

(continued on next page)

42

K16 .357 Magnum Colt revolver, Serial Number 56827 (Ciszewski)

K17 .38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver, Serial Number 451863 (Jones)

K18 .38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 59493 (Jones)

K19 .38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver, Serial Number K-671261 (Joseph)

K20 .38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 59456 (Joseph)

Result of examination:

The above weapons were test fired in the Laboratory and the test bullets and cartridge cases obtained from these weapons will be retained in the Laboratory for future comparison purposes.

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: January 27, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]
[redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH; JAMES DAVIS; JOHN CISZEWSKI; EDWARD CARMODY, ET AL, Chicago Police Officers; FRED A. HAMPTON (deceased); MARK CLARK (deceased); BRENDA HARRIS; VERLINA BREWER; BLAIR J. ANDERSON; RONALD SATCHEL; ET AL - //////////VICTIMS; SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 12/31/69, personally delivered by SA [redacted]
[redacted]

- Q1 Piece of plasterboard from inside wall to right of front entrance door
- Q2 Three pieces of lead from hole in northeast corner of entrance hallway
- Q3 Wad from bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall
- Q4 Two pieces of lead from northeast frame of closet in front bedroom
- Q5 - Q9 Five bullets removed from behind holes in east wall of front bedroom
- Q10 Bullet from south wall of front bedroom
- Q11 Bullet from behind hole designated Number 6 in south wall of front bedroom
- Q12 Bullet from behind hole in baseboard on south wall of front bedroom
- Q13 Mutilated bullet and bullet fragment from stud behind hole designated Number 3 on south wall of front bedroom
- Q14 Bullet from behind hole designated Number 39 in south wall of front bedroom
- Q15 Pieces of lead from behind uppermost shot hole in the center of the north wall of front bedroom
- Q16 Pieces of lead from lower shot hole in the center of the north wall of front bedroom
- Q17 Lead and copper fragments removed from leg of night table in back bedroom

(continued on next page)

44

Q18 Red plastic disc found on floor of rear bedroom
Q19 Shot pellet removed from shot hole designated Number 2 in east wall of back bedroom
Q20 Lead core from copper-jacketed bullet from base of south wall in back bedroom
Q21 Scrapings from bloodstain on unmounted door in dining room
Q22 Scrapings from bloodstain on bed frame in rear bedroom
Q23 Scrapings from bloodstain on north wall in rear bedroom
Q24 Scrapings from bloodstain on south wall of living room
Q25 Shotgun wad from under bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall
Q26 Part of door through entrance to living room from entrance hall

Specimens received 1/12/70, personally delivered by SA [redacted] [redacted]

Q27 Bullet jacket fragment recovered from southwest corner of kitchen, on floor
Q28 - Q29 Two cartridges recovered from clothes bundle in entrance hall
Q30 Blood sample removed from black eight-drawer dresser in living room

Specimens received 1/21/70, under cover of letter dated 1/12/70 [redacted])

Q31 Hassock
Q32 Man's suit coat
Q33 - Q37 Five packages of tablets
Q38 Pillbox
Q39 Packet containing two orange tablets or candies

Results of examination:

The shot pattern in the piece of plasterboard, [illegible], from the wall to the right of the front entrance door was produced by a contact or near contact shot. The pieces of

(continued on next page)

lead shot, Q2, removed from the hole in the entrance hall, which hole was produced by the same shot producing the shot pattern in Q1, are either Number 7 1/2 or 8 in size based upon their weight.

The Q3 wad, found among the clothing wrapped in the chenille bedspread in the entrance hallway, is the over-powder wad from a 12-gauge shotshell. Over-powder wads of this design are in Winchester-Western shotshells.

The two pieces of lead shot, Q4, are comparable in weight to 00 Buck in size. These were removed from the framework inside the closet in the front bedroom.

The following bullets are all .45 Auto, identified as having been fired from the same weapon:

Specimens Q5 through Q9 - Found by Laboratory representatives at the scene behind the bullet holes in the east wall of the front bedroom.

Specimen Q10 - Removed from the south wall of the front bedroom by Laboratory representatives at the scene.

Specimen Q12 - Removed from behind hole designated Number 6 in the south wall of the front bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

Specimen Q14 - Removed from behind hole designated Number 3F in the south wall of the front bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

The general rifling characteristics on the above bullets, consisting of six lands and grooves, right twist, are like those produced by a .45 semiautomatic Carbine manufactured by the Eagle Gun Company, Incorporated, Stratford, Connecticut.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

The following bullets found by Laboratory representatives at the scene are caliber .30 carbine:

Specimen Q11 - From behind hole Number 6 in the south wall of the front bedroom.

Specimen Q13 - Mutilated bullet and bullet fragment from a stud behind hole designated Number 3 on south wall of front bedroom.

Specimen Q17 - Copper and lead fragments from a night table in the back bedroom, possibly from the hole designated Number 11 in back bedroom.

Specimen Q20 - Lead core from metal-jacketed bullet, comparable in size to those of caliber .30 carbine bullets, from the base of the south wall in the back bedroom.

Specimen Q27 - Jacket fragment from caliber .30 carbine metal-jacketed bullet found on floor in southwest corner of the kitchen.

The above bullets and bullet fragments having general rifling characteristics were those produced by a gun barrel or gun barrels rifled with twelve lands and grooves, right twist. The absence of individual characteristics on the bullet specimens precluded the possibility of determining whether or not they were fired from the same weapon. Further, on the basis of insufficient markings, it would not be possible to identify the caliber .30 carbine bullets with the particular weapon firing them. General rifling characteristics of twelve lands and grooves, right twist, are common with barrels in .30 USA Carbines M1 and .30 carbines by Universal Firearms Company.

(continued on next page)

Specimen Q15 consists of four pieces of lead shot identified as Number 8 shot. These were removed from the uppermost shot pattern in the center of the north wall of the front bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

Specimen Q16 consists of eight pieces of lead shot identified as Number 8 shot. These were removed from the lower shot pattern in the center of the north wall of the front bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

Specimen Q18 is a red plastic disc of the same size and type found in some 12-gauge shotshells manufactured by the Federal Cartridge Corporation, Minneapolis, Minnesota. This disc was found on the floor in the back bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

Specimen Q19 is a shot pellet identified as 00 Buck. This shot pellet was removed from the right shot pattern on the east wall of the back bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

One of the cartridges, designated specimen Q28, is a foreign-made .30 carbine cartridge. It was manufactured in Netherland by "Wapen and Munitiefabriek N. V." - 1959. Some loading marks of doubtful value for identification purposes are present.

The other cartridge, designated specimen Q29, is a Western-Winchester .380 Auto. Limited loading marks of doubtful value for identification purposes are present.

The Q28 and Q29 cartridges were recovered in the clothing wrapped in the chenille bedspread that was on the floor in the entrance hallway by Laboratory representatives.

Group "O" human blood was identified in specimens Q21, Q22, Q23 and Q24.

[redacted]

(continued on next page)

Group "B" blood was identified in specimen Q30.

No blood was identified in specimen Q25.

Specimens Q21 through Q24 and Q30 are scrapings of what appeared to be bloodstains taken by Laboratory representatives from the following locations:

Specimen Q21 - From an unmounted door described as a barricade, on the dining room floor.

Specimen Q22 - From a bed frame in the rear bedroom.

Specimen Q23 - From the north wall in the rear bedroom.

Specimen Q24 - From the south wall of the living room.

Specimen Q30 - From the eight-drawer black dresser in the living room.

From a radiographic examination of the Q31 hassock, it was concluded that no bullets or shot pellets were lodged therein.

In the left sleeve of the suit coat, Q32, is a hole having the appearance of a bullet entrance hole. Other holes, in alignment, were in the coat. These holes were in the lower left pocket and in the lower left corner of the back of the coat. No gunpowder residue was found. White paint, splattered while wet on the bottom of the coat, suggests the coat may have been hanging in the front bedroom closet at the time of the raid as two one-gallon cans of white paint were ruptured by gunfire and considerable paint was found on the floor of the closet.

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Date: January 29, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

Re: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH; JAMES DAVIS; JOHN CISZEWSKI; EDWARD CARMODY, ET AL, Chicago Police Officers; FRED A. HAMPTON (deceased); MARK CLARK (deceased); BRENDA HARRIS; VERLINA BREWER; BLAIR J. ANDERSON; RONALD SATCHEL; ET AL - VICTIMS; SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 1/21/70

Q31	Hassock
Q32	Man's suit coat
Q33 - Q37	Five packages of tablets
Q38	Pillbox
Q39	Packet containing two orange tablets or candies

Results of examination:

The yellow tablets in the Q33 through Q35 cards were found to correspond in physical appearance and chemical composition to Provest. The product is an oral contraceptive prepared by the Upjohn Company.

The Q36 plastic vial was found to contain the barbituric acid derivative phenobarbital. The compound is used as a sedative and hypnotic.

The Q37 plastic vial was found to contain an iron supplement tablet, vitamin tablets and two penicillin tablets. No hypnotics were found in this specimen.

The Q38 empty pillbox contains a prescription label with the word "Octaplex" thereon. "Octaplex" is the trade name for a multivitamin preparation.

The Q39 orange pills were found to be candy.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20537

REPORT
of the
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

February 6, 1970

YOUR FILE NO.
FBI FILE NO. [redacted]
LATENT CASE NO.

TO: SAC, Chicago

RE: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH
ET AL.;
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL. - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

REFERENCE: Letter 2/2/70
EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: Chicago
SPECIMENS: One junction box with attached wire

This supplements and confirms Butel of February 5, 1970.

No latent impressions of value were developed on the enclosed specimen.

51

Enc.

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover, Director

THIS REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7-1b

REPORT
of the
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Date: February 9, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (Deceased) ET AL
VICTIMS;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT

Specimens received: 1/27/70 and were personally delivered by Special Agent Walter H. Rice from Chicago

Q135	Blood sample from Cook County Coroner marked, TOX #69-2171 (FGJ, Chicago, exhibit #33)
Q136	Blood sample from Cook County Coroner described as blood sample from Clark TOX #69-2170 (FGJ, Chicago, exhibit #34)
Q137	Blood sample taken by Doctor Victor Levine described as blood of Hampton, marked "Dr. Levine's sample" C-69 #1
Q138	Blood sample taken by Doctor Victor Levine described as blood of Hampton marked C-69 #2

Results of examination:

Chemical and instrumental examinations were made of the various blood specimens, Q135 through Q138. The examinations did not disclose the presence of any barbiturate, including secobarbital; or, of a neutral drug such as meprobamate, glutethimide (Doriden), methyprylon (Noludar) and phenacetin.

No examinations were made for basic drug substances such as the amphetamines, cocaine and other alkaloids because the quantities of blood were too limited to identify those classes of drugs.

A very low level of ethyl alcohol was found present in one blood specimen, Q137, the loose blood from Hampton's body cavity. The amount of alcohol identified in that specimen ordinarily has limited toxicological significance since the presence of such a low level of alcohol is consistent with that which may be formed by decomposition of tissue after death. No alcohol was found in specimens Q135, Q136 and Q138.

(continued on next page)

Group "O" human blood was identified in Q135, Q137 and Q138. Group "B" human blood was identified in Q136. Due to the condition of the submitted blood, no additional serological tests were conducted.

[redacted]

Washington, D. C. 20537

REPORT
of the
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

February 17, 1970

YOUR FILE NO.
FBI FILE NO.
LATENT CASE NO. [redacted]

TO: SAC, Chicago

RE: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL.;
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED), ET AL. - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

REFERENCE: Letter 2-3-70
EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: Chicago
SPECIMENS: Q144, empty wine bottle

The listed Q specimen is described in the Laboratory report, which is being furnished separately and will include disposition.

No latent prints of value present or developed on specimen.

54

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover, Director

THIS REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To:	FBI, Chicago [redacted]	Date:	February 25, 1970
		FBI File No.	[redacted]
		Lab. No.	[redacted]

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL;
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON, (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/18/70

Q184	Unfired 12-gauge shotshell, Federal Hi-Power, 00 Buck FBI #31 (1)
Q185	Cartridge marked "VE 1-61N 7 62" FBI #34 (2)
Q186	Cartridge marked ".32 S&W R-P" FBI #44 (3)
Q187	Cartridges, two, marked ".32 S&W R-P" FBI #221 (4)
Q188	Unfired 12-gauge shotshell, Remington Shurshot FBI #225 (5)
Q189	Unfired 16-gauge shotshell, Sears Roebuck, Extra Range FBI #238 (6)

Results of examination:

No fired or unfired shotshells like the unfired 12-gauge Federal Hi-Power, 00 Buck, Maximum Load shotshell, Q184, (FBI #31) were present among the shotshells received for examination. A small amount of a white paint on the shell tube of Q184 suggests it may have been near the middle bedroom closet where considerable white paint was spilled. Two paint cans in this area appeared to have been struck by bullets that passed completely through the cans of paint.

Specimen Q185 (FBI #34) is a .30 carbine cartridge manufactured in France. No bullets, cartridge cases or cartridges representative of this type of ammunition were received for examination in this case.

Specimens Q186 and Q187 (FBI #44 and #221 respectively) represent three Remington-Peters .32 S & W cartridges. No

(continued on next page)

bullets cartridge cases or cartridges representative of ammunition of this type were received for examination in this case.

Specimen Q188 (FBI #225) is an unfired 12-gauge Remington Shurshot, 3-1-8, shotshell and the same type ammunition as that represented by the fired shotshells previously submitted and referred to as specimens Q122, Q124, Q125 and Q126. Shot wads like Q48 and Q50 are in shotshells of this type.

No ammunition like the unfired 16-gauge Sears Xtra Range shotshell, Q189 (FBI #238) was among the items received for examination in this case. No 16-gauge weapons were received for examination.

[redacted]

FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: February 26, 1970

To: FBI, Chicago

FBI File No. [redacted]

Lab. No. [redacted]

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED) ET AL
VICTIMS - SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received on 2/17/70 and were personally delivered by Special Agent [redacted]

Q281	Left hand cast of Hampton
Q282	Right hand cast of Hampton

Also Submitted: Control sample of paraffin taken from Hampto

Results of examination:

A microscopic examination of Q281 and Q282 revealed no unburned gunpowder fragments.

Specimens Q281 and Q282 were examined by neutron activation analysis for the elements antimony and barium. Antimony and barium are components of most primer mixtures and can be deposited on the hand when a firearm is discharged. From the results of the examination, it could not be determined whether Hampton had discharged a firearm.

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Date: February 27, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL;
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS-
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/17/70

Q280 Section of doorjamb with underlying piece of plasterboard

Results of examination:

The hole in the section of doorjamb, specimen Q280, is comparable in size to one that could be produced by a caliber .38 or .38 Special size bullet and has the appearance of a bullet hole.

A microscopic examination of the hole revealed minute metallic smears which were analyzed spectrographically and found to be composed of lead. However, these smears are too limited in quantity for detailed compositional analysis and/or comparison purposes.

of the

LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: March 3, 1970
FBI File No.
Lab. No. [redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL GROTH AND OTHERS,
POLICE OFFICERS;
FRAD HAMPTON, MARK CLARK AND
OTHERS - VICTIMS;
CIVIL RIGHTS

Specimens received 2/9/70

Q153	Paint from hallside of door (#8)
Q154	Paint from top surface of door nearer hinged side (#10)
Q155	Paint from top surface of door near opening side (#11)
Q156	Paint from top panel of door, outside face (#12).
Q157	Paint from door edge near top hinge (#17)
K47	Paint from top inside door facing (#1)
K48	Paint from top inside door facing (#2)
K49	Paint from top inside door facing (#3)
K50	Paint from wall of bathroom (#4)
K51	Paint from wall of bathroom (#5)
K52	Paint from door facing on hall side (#7)
K53	Paint from door facing on hall side (#9)
K54	Paint from door facing on hall side (#13)
K55	Paint from hall wall (#15)
K56	Paint from hall wall (#16)
K57	Paint from bathroom wall (#14)
K58	Hinge half from door facing, top
K59	Hinge half from door, top
K60	Hinge half from door, bottom

Results of examination:

The bathroom door of the first level apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, exhibited a natural or varnish finish and bears many paint spatters deposited as a result of painting of surrounding areas.

The door and door frames are very old and show physical signs of having been salvaged from other use. Some of the individual pieces of the door frame appear to have originated from other sources based upon the paint colors and layer structures present or absent on each part.

An examination of specimens K58, K59, K60 and Q153, Q154, Q155, Q156 and Q157 from the hinge components and door

(continued on next page)

respectively, reveal three paints which are similar in physical characteristics and composition and indicate that the door and hinge were painted at least three times as a unit.

An examination of the door facing both inside and outside the bathroom (specimens K47, K48, K49, K52, K53, K54) shows that there are at least three paint layers present on some of the parts (top horizonal pieces) which individually match various globules or droplets of paint on the door.

This indicates that parts of the frame were painted at least three times integrally with the door.

The bathroom walls bear two layers of paint, one of which appears to have been applied before the door was erected since this layer appears under the hinges. The top layer of bathroom paint was deposited on the inside door facing and dropped in some areas onto the door, indicating the door had been erected before the top layer of the bathroom finish was applied.

No paint was found on the door and door facing similar to a two-layered paint finish on the hall walls.

It was not possible from an examination of the paints examined on the hall wall or the bathroom walls to determine when the paints were applied.

An examination of other doors in the apartment failed to reveal any doors with which the bathroom door could have been interchanged.

[redacted]

FD-263 (Rev. 3-[illegible]-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:
1 - AAG JERRIS LEONARD, Chief of Civil Rights Division at Chicago
1 - USA, Chicago (Attention: AUSA ROBERT J. [illegible])

Report of: [redacted] Office: Chicago
Date: 4/7/70

Field Office File #: [redacted] Bureau File #: [redacted]

Title:
SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH;
ET AL -
SUBJECTS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS

Character: SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Synopsis: Investigation conducted by FBI at BPP apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago; FBI Identification Division and FBI Lab reports set forth. FGJ adjourned 3/12/70 and reconvened 4/7/70.

-P-

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents
de your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/8/70

1.

Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory, made an on-the-scene examination of bullet holes found in the apartment located at 2337 West Monroe Street, and made a trajectory pattern to show directions of the shots fired and made pertinent measurements to show the locations of the holes.

A number of items of evidence were collected for subsequent laboratory examination. These items were listed with Deputy Coroner ANTHONY SCIARAFFA, Cook County, Illinois, and with his permission removed from the premises for transmittal to the FBI Laboratory. The items recovered are as follows:

1. Piece of wallboard from inside wall to right of front entrance door.
2. Three pieces of lead from hole in northeast corner of entrance hallway.
3. Wad from bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall.
4. Two pieces of lead from northeast frame of closet in front bedroom.
5. Five bullets removed from behind holes in east wall of front bedroom.
6. Bullet from south wall of front bedroom.
7. Bullet from behind hole designated Number 6 in south wall of front bedroom.
8. Bullet from behind hole in baseboard on south wall of front bedroom.

On 12/22/69; 12/29-31/69; 1/3/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 1/8/70

either recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is [illegible]
be distributed outside your agency

2.

[redacted]

9. Mutilated bullet and bullet fragments from stud behind hole designated Number 3 on south wall of front bedroom.

10. Bullet from behind hole designated Number 39 in south wall of front bedroom.

11. Pieces of lead from behind uppermost shot hole in north wall of front bedroom.

12. Pieces of lead from lower shot hole in north wall of front bedroom.

13. Lead and copper fragments removed from leg of night table in back bedroom.

14. Red plastic dish found on floor of rear bedroom.

15. Shot pellet removed from shot hole designated Number 2 in east wall of back bedroom.

16. Lead core from copper-jacketed bullet from base of south wall in back bedroom.

17. Scrapings from blood stain on unattached door in dinning room.

18. Scrapings from blood stain on bed frame in rear bedroom.

19. Scrapings from blood stain on north wall in rear bedroom.

20. Scrapings from blood stain on south wall of living room.

21. Shotgun wad from under bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall.

3 [redacted]

22. Part of door through entrance to living room from entrance hall.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/9/70

On December 21, 1969, Officers AUGUST BLUE, Badge 200, and JOHN DENEEN, Badge 8, States Attorneys Police of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois, brought two doors to the address 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. One door was for the front bedroom and one door with one panel missing was for the entrance to the first floor apartment.

Officers BLUE and DENEEN stayed with the doors and did not turn them over to the FBI.

On 12/31/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/6/70

This ... neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; ... be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/16/70

Pursuant to an on-the-scene examination of the premises located at 2337 West Monroe Street on January 6 and 7, 1970, the following items were removed from the premises for subsequent Laboratory examination:

1. Copper fragment recovered from south west corner of kitchen.
2. Two cartridges recovered from bundle of clothing in entrance hall.
3. Blood sample removed from black eight-drawer dresser in living room.

These items were listed with Deputy Coroner ANTHONY SCIARAFFA, Cook County, Illinois, and with his permission removed from the premises.

On 1/6-7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/16/70

A shed attached to the residence located at 2335 West Monroe Street, was examined for the purpose of noting and recording any bullet and/or shot holes.

Pertinent measurements and trajectory patterns were taken. No projectiles were recovered and no items were removed from the premises.

7

On 1/6-7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/14/70

On January 7, 1970, during a search of the kitchen located in the apartment at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, a white plastic bottle containing pills, prescription number 216313 for LYNN FRENCH, dated July 29, 1969, was located on the kitchen table.

On 1/6/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # CG 44-1502

by SA [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date January 16, 1970

On January 6, 1970, photographs were taken at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. Present were United States Department of Justice Attorney K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Deputy Coroner ANTHONY J. SCIAFFRA, Special Agent [redacted] [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted] Visual Information Specialists, Special Agents [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted]. Deputy Marshal [redacted], Deputy Marshal [redacted] and MILTON BRANCH, attorney representing the Attorney General of the United States.

On 1/6/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

This do... ...ther recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; ...n distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date January 16, 1970

Photographs were taken at 2337 West Monroe on January 7, 1970. Present were Special Agents [redacted] [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted], Visual Information Specialists, Federal Bureau of Investigation [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted], K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney and ANTHONY J. SCIAFFRA, Deputy Coroner.

On 1/7/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; be distributed outside your agency

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date January 16, 1970

On January 9, 1970, photographs were taken of kitchen door and rear entrance and porch of building at 2335 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. Present during filming were Special Agents [redacted], [redacted], [redacted]. [redacted]., JESSE H. QUEEN, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney, and [redacted], resident of this address.

12

On 1/9/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by [redacted] Date dictated 1/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 1/14/70

On January 13, 1970, the grating in the floor of the front room of the first floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, was measured.

This grating is located 15¼ inches from the south wall and 52 inches from the west wall of the front room.

The metal frame in the floor measures 20½ inches from east to west and 17 inches from north to south. The grating fitted inside of this frame measures 13½ inches from north to south and 15 inches from east to west. The grating rests on a ½ inch steel lip which reduces the opening to 13 inches by 14½ inches. The drop from the floor containing the grating to the floor below is 115 inches. The basement is full of garbage and debris. Directly under the opening was a large vehicle tire, an old overcoat and several pieces of duct work. The grating lifted out of the frame very easily.

On 1/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by [redacted] Date dictated 1/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date January 21, 1970

1

Photos of a vent located in the living room at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, were made January 13, 1970, in the presence of Special Agent [redacted], K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, United States Department of Justice, Deputy Marshal [redacted] and HENRY YARBROUGH, and Sergeant JAMES COLLINS, Star Number 1819, Chicago Police Department.

14

On 1/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/15/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date January 23, 1970

1

At the Cook County Courthouse, 26th and California Avenue, Room 452, known as the Special Grand Jury Room, an inventory under order of Cook County Judge JOHN POWERS was instituted of evidence surrendered by FRANCIS E. ANDREW, Attorney, and his Investigative Assistant VICTORY KADISH, representing the Black Panther Party of Illinois.

Also present during the taking of this inventory were the following:

K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Department of Justice, Attorney, Civil Rights Division;

JOHN E. RUSSELL, Investigator, Cook County State's Attorney's Office;

NANCY DEMPSEY, from the law office of FRANCIS E. ANDREW, 2156 North Halsted, Chicago.

Miss KADISH advised she was the agent for ANDREW, that she had personally handled the evidence, had assisted ANDREW in securing the evidence from the Black Panther Party (BPP) apartment, 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, on December 4 and 5, 1969, and had originally inventoried the evidence.

It is noted that the inventory of this evidence, which was turned over to the FBI, commenced at 6:10 PM, January 19, 1970, and was completed at 11:58 PM, January 19, 1970.

Following the making of an inventory of this evidence, it was receipted for by SA [redacted] FRANCIS E. ANDREW and VICTORY KADISH. The original of the receipt was furnished to ANDREW and a copy was

On 1/19/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], by [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 1/23/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

furnished SA [redacted]. All copies of this inventory were signed by SA [redacted], ANDREW and KADISH.

- 1 -

Date 1/31/70

On the afternoon of January 27, 1970, [redacted] [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], New York, was contacted at his place of employment in [redacted] at which time he advised he possessed certain microscope slides concerning his examination of a Chicago, Illinois residence in December, 1969, and was willing to turn these slides over to the FBI, as he had been directed to do so by an attorney with the United States Department of Justice. Arrangements were made to obtain these slides from [redacted] on the evening of January 27, 1970, as he stated they were presently at his residence.

On the evening of January 27, 1970, [redacted] turned over to Special Agent [redacted] of the FBI, two-one-inch by three-inch glass microscope slides, which had been marked and were described by [redacted] as follows:

(1) Labled HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Head. These are scrapings from the head of the slug removed from the East wall of the Northeast (living) room of 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois. This by [redacted] on December 8, 1969. This piece of evidence described by the [redacted] lists as "F." The mounting medium is Canada Balsam.

(2) Labeled HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Base. A Portion of the wooden fibers removed from the base of the slug described under number one above. The mounting medium is Canada Balsam.

The above two described microscope slides were received from [redacted] at his residence, [redacted] [redacted] New York, and a receipt was furnished [redacted] at that time.

On 1/29/70 at [redacted], New York File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/29/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that the above-described two slides were of material removed by him from the slug shown in Photos #104, which he had introduced into evidence before the Federal Grand Jury sitting at Chicago, Illinois.

[redacted] exhibited a number of color photographs which he stated he had taken in connection with his examination of the residence at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, and made the comment that there is something "very pertinent" to be concluded from the examination of the gun powder marks, which appear on the inside of the entrance door to the apartment and further, that he believes that he is the only one who has realized the particular significance of these powder marks.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/31/70

On the early afternoon of January 28, 1970, SA [redacted] New York FBI Resident Agency, personally turned over to SA [redacted] JR., FBI Laboratory, Washington, D. C., at Washington, D. C., the below-described two (2) items, which [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], New York, had turned over to SA [redacted] on the evening of January 27, 1970, at [redacted] residence in [redacted], New York:

#1 One (1) one-inch by three-inch microscope slide labeled "HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Head."

#2 One (1) one-inch by three-inch glass microscope slide labeled "HLMacD, 12/10/69, F Base."

On 1/28/70 at Washington, D. C. File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 1/29/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 3-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

TOM HETT, States Attorney's Office, 26th and California, Chicago, Illinois, furnished the following list of guns seized on the Black Panther raid at 2337 West Monroe on December 4, 1969:

1. Colt 45 cal automatic 5" blue model 1927 Argentina S/N # 7111

   Shipped June 9, 1969 to M&M Sporting Goods, 3823 N. Richards, Milwaukee, by Casavanova's Milwaukee.

They have the gun on their books but do not have it in their possession and have never reported it stolen. They say they will report it now.

2. Sears Roebuck 20 ga pump 28" blue steel model 21 No serial number so cannot be traced.

3. Springfield 12 ga pump 28" blue steel model 67H No serial number so it cannot be traced.

4. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so it cannot be traced.

5. Browning High Standard 12 ga auto load model standard H15423

   Sold by Browning Mfg. to Sears Roebuck on Oct. 13, 1954. Sears is located at 403 S. State, Chicago, Illinois. Sears does not keep records that far back so unable to trace Further.

6. High standard 12 ga pump model K-1200 No serial number so unable to trace.

7. Remington 12 ga pump model 870 S/N 20240V Unable to trace because Remington threw out its records for guns made in 1950.

20

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

[redacted] Date dictated 2/13/70

neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
to be distributed outside your agency.

2

[redacted]

8. Ithaca 12 ga sawed off 13" S/N 175084
Mfg. by Ithaca in 1908 and no records were
kept at that time

9. Ithaca 12 ga pump 20" parkerized model 37
S/N 1019900. This gun has not been cleared
but is believed to be stolen from Chicago PD.

10. Carbine 30 cal 18" M-1 autoload S/N 16573
Purchased on Aug. 21, 1969, by Dakin M. Centr
Head Black Panther Party, Milwaukee

11. Springfield 22 cal 24" autoload model 87A
Unable to trace because of lack of serial
number.

12. Astra 9mm 5 ¼ model 600-43 pistol #41558

13. Llama 7.65 mm S/N 443695
Purchased by David Young on Aug. 20, 1969
Black Panther, Milwaukee

14. Colt 38 cal 4 ½ Rev. S/N 219414
It was a "New Navy Revolver" and was sent by
Mfg. to Simmons Hardware in St. Louis on Sep
12, 1903. Due to the date it would be unable.

15. Smith & Wesson 38 cal. 6 ½" Rev Model M & P
S/N 46272. This gun was made and shipped to
Folsom Arms Co., New York City, on or around
Nov. 5, 1904. Due to the date involved it wo
be too hard to trace.

16. S &W 32 cal 2" model 30-1 S/N 730073. This
gun was shipped to Brown Supply Co., 416 S.
Adams St., Peoria, and was sold on 9/19/64
H. Mayo, 501 Hamilton Blvd., Peoria. This
is not listed in the phone book and was not
known to Brown's.

17. .177 cal. Marksman Repeater model spring
operated, air pistol, no serial number.

18. 12 ga Stevens model 520 pump shotgun

21

3

[redacted]

serial number 84940.

19. 12 ga High Standard Riot model K-1200 six shot pump shotgun, no serial number, blood on gun.

[illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

[redacted] registered pharmacist, Walgreens Drug Store, 2300 West Madison, advised that their prescriptions are filed in number order only and no records are kept concerning prescriptions in name only.

[redacted] advised that he has seen FRED A. HAMPTON, deceased, and another member of the Black Panther Party in Walgreens purchasing cigarettes and so forth, but does not recall the following people ever obtaining prescriptions at Walgreens:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. ANDERSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL ?

23

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] AND SA [redacted]
[redacted] Date dictated 2/13/70

... recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; ... distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

[redacted], pharmacist, Stineway Drugs, 240 Madison, Chicago, Illinois, advised that all their prescriptions are filed by number only and no records are kept on names of persons obtaining prescriptions at their store.

[redacted] was furnished the following names and advised that he does not recall any of these individuals obtaining prescriptions at their store:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. JOHNSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL

24

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 2/13/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 2/17/70

[redacted] registered pharmacist, Illinois license 5127769, employed with Par Pharmacy, 1202 East 53rd Street, Chicago, Illinois, advised that prescription number 216313 was prescribed for LYNN FRENCH by Doctor JONES, 5321 South Woodlawn, phone 667-0909. [redacted] advised that the prescription contained 40 tablets of 40,000 units of penicillin. [redacted] advised the prescription was signed by LOUIS MARACUS on July 29, 1969.

[redacted] advised that all prescriptions filed at their pharmacy are filed by number and no records are maintained by name only. [redacted] advised that he does not recall the following persons obtaining prescriptions at this store:

FRED A. HAMPTON
MARK CLARK
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA A. BREWER
BLAIR J. ANDERSON
RONALD SATCHEL
DEBORAH JOHNSON
LOUIS TRULOCK
HAROLD BELL "

On 2/10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 2/13/70

either recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency
be distributed outside your agency

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date February 12, 1970

1.

[redacted] Medical Director, Neighborhood Health Center, Office of Economic Opportunity, 529 29th Street, advised he has records reflecting that CHERYL PETERSON, 2859 Humboldt Street, Denver, Colorado, visited this center on August 9, 1969 and was diagnosed as being anemic. She was given two prescriptions on that date which were filled at this center, one pertained to iron tablets and the other to vitamin tablets.

She also visited this center on August 19, 1969 in connection with a possible pregnancy and was advised by the examining doctor she was not pregnant.

[redacted] advised that his records reflect she is a Negro female; born May 25, 1951 in the State of Illinois; Social Security Number 330-44-6203; parents, Mr. and Mrs. SOLON PETERSON, 1516 South Kostner, Chicago, Illinois; marital status single.

[redacted] stated that CHERYL PETERSON failed to return for a reappointment set for two months after she was last in the center and that mail sent to her by the center to the above Denver address was returned marked addressee moved, no forwarding address.

He advised further that his records do not indicate that CHERYL PETERSON has any connection with the Black Panther Party or FRED A. HAMPTON, MARK CLARK, BRENDA HARRIS, VERLINA A. BREWER, BLAIR J. ANDERSON, RONALD SATCHEL, DEBROAH JOHNSON, LOUIS TRULOCK or HAROLD BELL.

On 2/12/70 at Denver, Colorado File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 2/12/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date February 18, 1970

A piece of the door jamb and wall board behind same was removed from the left side of the door frame of the livingroom at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. The cut of the piece of door jamb was made at 52 inches and 64 inches from the floor.

In addition, to Special Agents [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted], also present were Deputy United States Marshals [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted], plus Sergeant ERICKSON, Star Number 1014 and Patrolman VENEIGH, Star Number 9073 of the Chicago Police Department.

The above articles were removed at the request of Mr. K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division.

On 2/13/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 2/16/70

ther recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/26/70

Prior to the autopsy of the body of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON, impressions of the right index finger of HAMPTON were obtained using a common black ink pad and a sheet of white unlined paper.

The purpose of the impressions was to effect identification.

On 2/15/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 2/20/70

neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; distributed outside your agency

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/26/70

Photographs were taken during the autopsy of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON at the Veterans Administration Hospital, utilizing a speedgraphic camera with flash attachment and Poloroid adapter. Poloroid color sheet film was used.

On 2/16/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 2/20/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/26/70

At 6:00 PM, an autopsy was performed on the body of FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON by Dr. CHARLES PETTY, pathologist from Dallas, Texas. The autopsy was performed at the Veterans Administration Hospital, Shreveport, Louisiana. Those in attendance, according to a list provided by [redacted] U. S. Marshal, Shreveport, Louisiana, were as follows:

For the State of Illinois:

1) THOMAS BETT, Assistant State Attorney
2) NICK MOTHERWAY, Assistant State Attorney
3) Dr. JERRY KEARNS, Cook County Coroner's Office
4) Dr. WILLIAM MAVRELIS, Pathologist

For the HAMPTON family:

1) FRANCIS E. ANDREW, Attorney
2) Dr. DAVID SPAIN, Pathologist
3) Dr. EARL CALDWELL, Pathologist

For the U. S. Government:

1) Dr. CHARLES PETTY
2) JERRIS LEONARD, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of Justice
3) JAMES TURNER, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U. S. Department of Justice
4) DONALD E. WALTER, U. S. Attorney, Shreveport, Louisiana
5) [redacted] Deputy U. S. Marshal

On 2/16/70 at Shreveport, Louisiana File #

[redacted]

30

by [redacted] Date dictated 2/20/70

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 3/3/70

Photographs of interior of 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, were taken in the presence of Special Agents [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] and Deputy U. S. Marshal [redacted].

On 2/20/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by [redacted], and SA [redacted] / [redacted] Date dictated 2/27/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 [illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/25/70

1.

[redacted] Employment Supervisor, Cook County School of Nursing, 1900 West Polk Street, Chicago, advised that a search of their records revealed a personnel file for ANNIE WHITE, 2237 South Keeler, Chicago, Illinois.

[redacted] advised that ANNIE WHITE entered on duty at the hospital as a clerical employee on November 29, 1951. She stated that the file further revealed that WHITE was terminated on June 2, 1956, and again rehired, exact date unknown. She said that WHITE again terminated her employment at County Hospital on December 29, 1969. [redacted] said that while employed at Cook County Hospital, WHITE was under the direct supervision of [redacted] RN, and that her specific duties were that of a clerk assigned to the Trauma Unit. [redacted] said that the personnel file further revealed that WHITE was born October 11, 1930, at Hartwell, Florida. Her Social Security Number is 354-24-5846. Her telephone number is listed as 762-0129, which is the telephone number of her mother, Mrs. ANNIE B. GUMBY, 2237 South Keeler.

[redacted] advised that from a review of the County payroll records, the following is to be noted regarding WHITE's employment during the week of December 1, 1969:

December 1	Sick
December 2	3:00 to 11:00 shift
December 3	3:00 to 11:00 shift
December 4	Sick
December 5	Sick
December 6	Day off
December 7	Day off
December 8	Vacation day
December 9	Vacation day
December 10	Vacation day

[redacted] stated that WHITE has recently filled out an application for reinstatement and that this application is presently being considered.

On 2/24/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted] and

by [redacted] Date dictated 2/25/70

r recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 2/25/70

1\.

Mrs. ANNIE WHITE, 2237 South Keeler, Chicago, Illinois, was located at the above address and served with a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena calling for her appearance before the Federal Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois at 11:00 AM, February 25, 1970.

Mrs. WHITE advised that she had been employed at the Cook County Hospital since approximately 1951 until December, 1969. She said that her supervisor while employed at the County Hospital was Miss MABEL WILSON. She stated that while employed at Cook County Hospital, she had been a clerk assigned to the Trauma Unit. She further advised that during the week of December 1, 1969, she recalls being ill one day during this week or two days perhaps, and that if she did work during that week, it was the 3:00 to 11:00 shift.

Mrs. WHITE advised that she is presently employed at Sears Roebuck as a sales clerk at Homan Avenue.

On 2/24/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted] and
by [redacted] [illegible]/sp Date dictated 2/25/70

ier recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
outside your agency.

[illegible]

Report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Identification Division, Latent Fingerprint Section, and of the FBI Laboratory are set forth hereafter:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20537

REPORT
of the
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

January 6, 1970

YOUR FILE NO.
FBI FILE NO.
LATENT CASE NO. [redacted]

TO: SAC, Chicago

RE: SGT. DANIEL GROTH, JAMES DAVIS,
JOHN CISZEWSKI, EDWARD CARMODY, ET AL.
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, POLICE OFFICERS - SUBJECTS;
FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED)
MARK CLARK (DECEASED)
BRENDA HARRIS
VERLINA BREWER
BLAIN ANDERSON
RONALD STACHEL, ET AL. - VICTIMS;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

REFERENCE: Evidence personally delivered to FBI Laboratory on 12-31-69 by SA [redacted]
EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: Chicago
SPECIMENS: Q26, portion of door

The listed Q specimen is described in the Laboratory report, which is being furnished separately, and will include disposition of the item.

No latent prints of value present or developed on specimen.

35

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover, Director

FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7-16

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Date: January 26, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

Re: SERGEANT DANIEL GROTH; JAMES DAVIS;
JOHN CISZEWSKI; EDWARD CARMODY; et al
Chicago, Illinois, Police Officers -
Subjects; FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED); MARK
CLARK (DECEASED); BRENDA HARRIS;
[redacted] VERLINA BREWER, BLAIR ANDERSON;
RONALD STACHEL; et al - Victims;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Results of examination: (refer to diagram on page 6)

1. In the entrance hallway, two shot patterns are represented.

A. One shot fired from inside the hallway was fired laterally across the front door. This shot was fired from a shotgun using a shotshell loaded with Number 7 1/2 or 8 shot. The gauge of the shotgun is not known. Pieces of lead shot were recovered.

B. One shot is represented by a large hole in the southwest corner of the entrance hallway, 6' 7 1/2" above the floor. The hole is typical of one that could have been produced by a rifled slug. No slug was recovered. The trajectory of the missile producing this hole leads from an area in the northwest corner of the living room, through the doorway between the living room and entrance hallway, through the hole in the southwest corner of the entrance hallway into the stairway leading to an upstairs apartment to the west wall of the stairway. The shot with the trajectory described could have produced the hole in the panel of the living room door as shown in photographs made available for examination. The panel with the hole was missing from the door at the time the door was made available for examination.

(continued on next page)

2. In the living room, forty-two bullet entrance holes were noted in the south wall, a bullet entrance hole was noted in the left side of the living room doorframe, a bullet entrance hole was found in a white four-drawer dresser in the living room with an accompanying exit hole in the back of the dresser, an impression of a bullet that keyholed and struck one of the dresser drawers of a black double dresser but did not exit the dresser and an area in the northwest corner of the living room approximately 80" from the floor that had been previously explored that could have represented either a bullet hole or shot pattern.

A. The bullets producing the forty-two entrance holes in the south wall of the living room all entered the front bedroom. Some penetrated the south wall of the front bedroom traveling through the partition and entered the back bedroom. It was possible, by plotting bullet trajectories from the living room through both north and south wall partitions in the front bedroom, to establish that nineteen of the forty-two bullets fired into the south wall of the living room entered the back bedroom.

B. One of the bullets fired through the south wall of the living room entered the closet in the front bedroom and exited through the closet in the back bedroom.

C. The bullet hole in the left doorframe of the living room door was 57 1/4" from the floor. The bullet had been removed previously. Its trajectory was nearly at right angles to the doorframe and level with the floor.

No bullets or lead shot were recovered in the living room.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

3. In addition to bullet holes in the front bedroom that were produced by bullets passing through the front bedroom from shots fired in the living room, there were three shot patterns on the north wall of the front bedroom, six bullet holes in the east wall of the front bedroom, three bullet holes through the east wall of the closet in the front bedroom and five bullet holes in a dresser in the front bedroom.

A. Two shot patterns in the north wall of the front bedroom were produced by one or more shotguns firing shotshells loaded with Number 7 1/2 or 8 shot. These patterns were 47" and 56" from the northwest corner of the front bedroom and 42" and 31" from the floor respectively. The trajectory of these shots established that they were fired from the hallway through the open door to the front bedroom. Pieces of lead shot were recovered from both holes.

B. The third shot pattern on the north wall of the front bedroom was produced by a shotgun firing a shotshell loaded with 00 Buck. It was established that the trajectory of the shot producing this pattern led from the doorway between the kitchen and dining room to a point in the east wall of the dining room near the northeast corner, 14 1/4" from the ceiling, passing through the wall into and through the plasterboard portion of the closet above the closet entrance opening, to the north wall of the front bedroom. The pattern on the north wall of the front bedroom was 80 1/2" above the floor level. Pieces of lead shot were recovered.

C. Six bullet holes in the east wall of the front bedroom were produced by shots fired from the hallway through the open door to the front bedroom. Five caliber .45 Auto bullets were recovered from behind these holes. These were identified as having been fired from the same weapon. The trajectories of two of these shots led to two holes in the edge of the open door exposed to the hallway.

(continued on next page)

D. Three bullet holes were in the east wall of the closet in the front bedroom. The shots producing these holes were fired from the hallway through the open door to the front bedroom. They penetrated the east wall of the closet, went through the south wall of the front bedroom and exited into the back bedroom. The trajectory of one of these bullets led to the right side of the window-frame of the left window in the back bedroom, the trajectory of another of the bullets led to the baseboard on the south wall of the back bedroom. The trajectory of the third shot led to and may have exited through the left window of the back bedroom.

E. There were eight holes in a six-drawer black dresser in the front bedroom. Three of these holes appeared to have been in the trajectory path of bullets fired through the south wall of the living room. The position of the dresser in the back bedroom appeared fixed on the basis of these trajectories. The trajectories of four other holes in the dresser led to shots fired into the front bedroom from the hallway through the open door to the front bedroom. All four of the bullets producing these holes lodged in the dresser and were apparently recovered by previous search.

In the right end of the dresser is a depression characteristic of one produced by a bullet ricochet. Its trajectory could not be established.

4. In the back bedroom were two shot patterns on the east wall 74" above floor level. The shots producing these holes appeared to have been fired from a direction of the door leading

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

to the back bedroom. The shot patterns are typical of those produced by buckshot. The area had been previously explored but one shot pellet remained at the time of the Laboratory examination of the scene, and it was removed for examination.

All other holes appearing in the back bedroom have been logically associated by trajectories from shot sources fired elsewhere in the apartment.

5. A part of the building at 2335 West Monroe Street, property next door to the apartment where the shooting occurred, is an enclosure referred to as a shed. This enclosure is over a porch leading to the back door of the apartment at 2335 West Monroe Street. On the side of this enclosure is a shot pattern typical of one produced by buckshot. The shot producing this pattern appeared to have been fired from the direction of the right window in the back bedroom.

Inside the enclosure was an indentation in the side of a washing machine stored there that could have been produced by buckshot, but nothing was found in the impression to permit its identification with buckshot.

In the kitchen door was a hole that penetrated the door. The trajectory of the missile producing this hole led to a corner of the kitchen. No projectiles were found. The enclosure and kitchen of the premises referred to had been previously explored.

No holes having the appearance of bullet holes were in the kitchen or dining room other than the shot hole near the northeast corner of the dining room that has been described above.

It was not possible to determine the sequence of the shots fired in the apartment.

(continued on next page)


SHED
Porch
SINK
GAS RANGE
Kitchen
REFRIG
South Bedroom
Dining Room
North Bedroom
Bathroom
ENTRANCE HALL
GAS HEATER
Living Room
ENTRANCE FOYER
Porch
LIVING ROOM
NORTH BEDROOM
SOUTH BEDROOM
DINING ROOM
KITCHEN
ENTRANCE FOYER
ENTRANCE HALL
CEILING HEIGHT - 95½"
S
E
41
W. MONROE ST.

6

7-1b

REPORT
of the
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

[redacted]

Date: January 26, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL GROTH; JAMES DAVIS;
JOHN CISZEWSKI; EDWARD CARMODY; et al.
Chicago, Ill. Police Officers - Subjects;
FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED); MARK CLARK (DECEASED);
BRENDA HARRIS; VERLINA BREWER; BLAIR ANDERSON;
RONALD STACHEL et al. - VICTIMS SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Specimens received 1/21/70

K1 .357 Magnum Colt revolver, Serial Number 16779 (Corbett)

K2 .38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 790280 (Howard)

K3 .38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver,
Serial Number V-401642 (Howard).

K4 .357 Magnum Colt revolver, Serial Number 20275 (Davis)

K5 .38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver,
Serial Number C-334879 (Kelly)

K6 .38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver,
Serial Number C-174386 (Marusich)

K7 .38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 369388 (Marusich)

K8 .38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 36064 (Carmody)

K9 .38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver,
Serial Number 7455 (Harris)

K10 .38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 7991 (Broderick)

K11 .38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver,
Serial Number 183979 (Groth)

K12 .38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 857237 (Groth)

K13 .38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 627788 (Hughes)

K14 .38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 39731 (Hughes)

K15 .357 Magnum Smith and Wesson revolver,
Serial Number S-188411 (Gorman)

(continued on next page)

K16 .357 Magnum Colt revolver, Serial Number 56827 (Ciszewski)

K17 .38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver, Serial Number 451863 (Jones)

K18 .38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 59493 (Jones)

K19 .38 Special Smith and Wesson revolver, Serial Number K-671261 (Joseph)

K20 .38 Special Colt revolver, Serial Number 59456 (Joseph)

Result of examination:

The above weapons were test fired in the Laboratory and the test bullets and cartridge cases obtained from these weapons will be retained in the Laboratory for future comparison purposes.

[redacted]

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: January 27, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH; JAMES DAVIS; JOHN CISZEWSKI; EDWARD CARMODY, ET AL, Chicago Police Officers; FRED A. HAMPTON (deceased); MARK CLARK (deceased); BRENDA HARRIS; VERLINA BREWER; BLAIR J. ANDERSON; RONALD SATCHEL; ET AL - ////////// VICTIMS; SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 12/31/69, personally delivered by SA [redacted]
[redacted]

Q1 Piece of plasterboard from inside wall to right of front entrance door
Q2 Three pieces of lead from hole in northeast corner of entrance hallway
Q3 Wad from bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall
Q4 Two pieces of lead from northeast frame of closet in front bedroom
Q5 - Q9 Five bullets removed from behind holes in east wall of front bedroom
Q10 Bullet from south wall of front bedroom
Q11 Bullet from behind hole designated Number 6 in south wall of front bedroom
Q12 Bullet from behind hole in baseboard on south wall of front bedroom
Q13 Mutilated bullet and bullet fragment from stud behind hole designated Number 3 on south wall of front bedroom
Q14 Bullet from behind hole designated Number 39 in south wall of front bedroom
Q15 Pieces of lead from behind uppermost shot hole in the center of the north wall of front bedroom
Q16 Pieces of lead from lower shot hole in the center of the north wall of front bedroom
Q17 Lead and copper fragments removed from leg of night table in back bedroom

(continued on next page)

Q18 Red plastic disc found on floor of rear bedroom

Q19 Shot pellet removed from shot hole designated Number 2 in east wall of back bedroom

Q20 Lead core from copper-jacketed bullet from base of south wall in back bedroom

Q21 Scrapings from bloodstain on unmounted door in dining room

Q22 Scrapings from bloodstain on bed frame in rear bedroom

Q23 Scrapings from bloodstain on north wall in rear bedroom

Q24 Scrapings from bloodstain on south wall of living room

Q25 Shotgun wad from under bundle of clothing wrapped in chenille bedspread on floor of entrance hall

Q26 Part of door through entrance to living room from entrance hall

Specimens received 1/12/70, personally delivered by SA [redacted]

[redacted]

Q27 Bullet jacket fragment recovered from southwest corner of kitchen, on floor

Q28 - Q29 Two cartridges recovered from clothes bundle in entrance hall

Q30 Blood sample removed from black eight-drawer dresser in living room

Specimens received 1/21/70, under cover of letter dated 1/12/70

[redacted])

Q31 Hassock

Q32 Man's suit coat

Q33 - Q37 Five packages of tablets

Q38 Pillbox

Q39 Packet containing two orange tablets or candies

Results of examination:

The shot pattern in the piece of plasterboard, I, from the wall to the right of the front entrance door was produced by a contact or near contact shot. The pieces of

(continued on next page)

lead shot, Q2, removed from the hole in the entrance hall, which hole was produced by the same shot producing the shot pattern in Q1, are either Number 7 1/2 or 8 in size based upon their weight.

The Q3 wad, found among the clothing wrapped in the chenille bedspread in the entrance hallway, is the over-powder wad from a 12-gauge shotshell. Over-powder wads of this design are in Winchester-Western shotshells.

The two pieces of lead shot, Q4, are comparable in weight to 00 Buck in size. These were removed from the framework inside the closet in the front bedroom.

The following bullets are all .45 Auto, identified as having been fired from the same weapon:

Specimens Q5 through Q9 - Found by Laboratory representatives at the scene behind the bullet holes in the east wall of the front bedroom.

Specimen Q10 - Removed from the south wall of the front bedroom by Laboratory representatives at the scene.

Specimen Q12 - Removed from behind hole designated Number 5 in the south wall of the front bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

Specimen Q14 - Removed from behind hole designated Number 39 in the south wall of the front bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

The general rifling characteristics on the above bullets, consisting of six lands and grooves, right twist, are like those produced by a .45 semiautomatic Carbine manufactured by the Eagle Gun Company, Incorporated, Stratford, Connecticut.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

The following bullets found by Laboratory representatives at the scene are caliber .30 carbine:

Specimen Q11 - From behind hole Number 6 in the south wall of the front bedroom.

Specimen Q13 - Mutilated bullet and bullet fragment from a stud behind hole designated Number 3 on south wall of front bedroom.

Specimen Q17 - Copper and lead fragments from a night table in the back bedroom, possibly from the hole designated Number 11 in back bedroom.

Specimen Q20 - Lead core from metal-jacketed bullet, comparable in size to those of caliber .30 carbine bullets, from the base of the south wall in the back bedroom.

Specimen Q27 - Jacket fragment from caliber .30 carbine metal-jacketed bullet found on floor in southwest corner of the kitchen.

The above bullets and bullet fragments having general rifling characteristics were those produced by a gun barrel or gun barrels rifled with twelve lands and grooves, right twist. The absence of individual characteristics on the bullet specimens precluded the possibility of determining whether or not they were fired from the same weapon. Further, on the basis of insufficient markings, it would not be possible to identify the caliber .30 carbine bullets with the particular weapon firing them. General rifling characteristics of twelve lands and grooves, right twist, are common with barrels in .30 USA Carbines M1 and .30 carbines by Universal Firearms Company.

(continued on next page)

Specimen Q15 consists of four pieces of lead shot identified as Number 8 shot. These were removed from the uppermost shot pattern in the center of the north wall of the front bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

Specimen Q16 consists of eight pieces of lead shot identified as Number 8 shot. These were removed from the lower shot pattern in the center of the north wall of the front bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

Specimen Q18 is a red plastic disc of the same size and type found in some 12-gauge shotshells manufactured by the Federal Cartridge Corporation, Minneapolis, Minnesota. This disc was found on the floor in the back bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

Specimen Q19 is a shot pellet identified as 00 Buck. This shot pellet was removed from the right shot pattern on the east wall of the back bedroom by Laboratory representatives.

One of the cartridges, designated specimen Q28, is a foreign-made .30 carbine cartridge. It was manufactured in Netherland by "Wapen and Munitiefabriek N. V." - 1959. Some loading marks of doubtful value for identification purposes are present.

The other cartridge, designated specimen Q29, is a Western-Winchester .380 Auto. Limited loading marks of doubtful value for identification purposes are present.

The Q28 and Q29 cartridges were recovered in the clothing wrapped in the chenille bedspread that was on the floor in the entrance hallway by Laboratory representatives.

Group "O" human blood was identified in specimens Q21, Q22, Q23 and Q24.

[redacted]

(continued on next page)

Group "B" blood was identified in specimen Q30.

No blood was identified in specimen Q25.

Specimens Q21 through Q24 and Q30 are scrapings of what appeared to be bloodstains taken by Laboratory representatives from the following locations:

Specimen Q21 - From an unmounted door described as a barricade, on the dining room floor.

Specimen Q22 - From a bed frame in the rear bedroom.

Specimen Q23 - From the north wall in the rear bedroom.

Specimen Q24 - From the south wall of the living room.

Specimen Q30 - From the eight-drawer black dresser in the living room.

From a radiographic examination of the Q31 hassock, it was concluded that no bullets or shot pellets were lodged therein.

In the left sleeve of the suit coat, Q32, is a hole having the appearance of a bullet entrance hole. Other holes, in alignment, were in the coat. These holes were in the lower left pocket and in the lower left corner of the back of the coat. No gunpowder residue was found. White paint, splattered while wet on the bottom of the coat, suggests the coat may have been hanging in the front bedroom closet at the time of the raid as two one-gallon cans of white paint were ruptured by gunfire and considerable paint was found on the floor of the closet.

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Date: January 29, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

Re: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH; JAMES DAVIS; JOHN CISZEWSKI; EDWARD CARMODY, ET AL, Chicago Police Officers; FRED A. HAMPTON (deceased); MARK CLARK (deceased); BRENDA HARRIS; VERLINA BREWER; BLAIR J. ANDERSON; RONALD SATCHEL; ET AL - VICTIMS; SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 1/21/70

Q31 Hassock
Q32 Man's suit coat
Q33 - Q37 Five packages of tablets
Q38 Pillbox
Q39 Packet containing two orange tablets or candies

Results of examination:

The yellow tablets in the Q33 through Q35 cards were found to correspond in physical appearance and chemical composition to Provest. The product is an oral contraceptive prepared by the Upjohn Company.

The Q36 plastic vial was found to contain the barbituric acid derivative phenobarbital. The compound is used as a sedative and hypnotic.

The Q37 plastic vial was found to contain an iron supplement tablet, vitamin tablets and two penicillin tablets. No hypnotics were found in this specimen.

The Q38 empty pillbox contains a prescription label with the word "Octaplex" thereon. "Octaplex" is the trade name for a multivitamin preparation.

The Q39 orange pills were found to be candy.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20537

REPORT
of the
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

February 6, 1970

YOUR FILE NO.
FBI FILE NO. [redacted]
LATENT CASE NO.

TO: SAC, Chicago

RE: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH
ET AL.;
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL. - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

REFERENCE: Letter 2/2/70
EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: Chicago
SPECIMENS: One junction box with attached wire

This supplements and confirms Butel of February 5, 1970.

No latent impressions of value were developed on the enclosed specimen.

51

Enc.

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover, Director

THIS REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7-1b

REPORT
# of the
LABORATORY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Date: February 9, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (Deceased) ET AL
VICTIMS;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT

Specimens received 1/27/70 and were personally delivered by Special Agent Walter H. Rice from Chicago

Q135	Blood sample from Cook County Coroner marked, TOX #69-2171 (FGJ, Chicago, exhibit #33)
Q136	Blood sample from Cook County Coroner described as blood sample from Clark TOX #69-2170 (FGJ, Chicago, exhibit #34)
Q137	Blood sample taken by Doctor Victor Levine described as blood of Hampton, marked "Dr. Levine's sample" C-69 #1
Q138	Blood sample taken by Doctor Victor Levine described as blood of Hampton marked C-69 #2

Results of examination:

Chemical and instrumental examinations were made of the various blood specimens, Q135 through Q138. The examinations did not disclose the presence of any barbiturate, including secobarbital; or, of a neutral drug such as meprobamate, glutethimide (Doriden), methyprylon (Noludar) and phenacetin.

No examinations were made for basic drug substances such as the amphetamines, cocaine and other alkaloids because the quantities of blood were too limited to identify those classes of drugs.

A very low level of ethyl alcohol was found present in one blood specimen, Q137, the loose blood from Hampton's body cavity. The amount of alcohol identified in that specimen ordinarily has limited toxicological significance since the presence of such a low level of alcohol is consistent with that which may be formed by decomposition of tissue after death. No alcohol was found in specimens Q135, Q136 and Q138.

(continued on next page)

Group "O" human blood was identified in Q135, Q137 and Q138. Group "B" human blood was identified in Q136. Due to the condition of the submitted blood, no additional serological tests were conducted.

[redacted]

53

Washington, D. C. 20537

REPORT
of the
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

February 17, 1970

YOUR FILE NO.
FBI FILE NO.
LATENT CASE NO.
[redacted]

TO: SAC, Chicago

RE: SERGEANT DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL.;
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED), ET AL. - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

REFERENCE: Letter 2-3-70
EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: Chicago
SPECIMENS: Q144, empty wine bottle

The listed Q specimen is described in the Laboratory report, which is being furnished separately and will include disposition.

No latent prints of value present or developed on specimen.

John Edgar Hoover, Director

THIS REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of the

FBI

LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago [redacted]

Date: February 25, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL;
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON, (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/18/70

Q184	Unfired 12-gauge shotshell, Federal Hi-Power, 00 Buck FBI #31 (1)
Q185	Cartridge marked "VE 1-61N 7 62" FBI #34 (2)
Q186	Cartridge marked ".32 S&W R-P" FBI #44 (3)
Q187	Cartridges, two, marked ".32 S&W R-P" FBI #221 (4)
Q188	Unfired 12-gauge shotshell, Remington Shurshot FBI #225 (5)
Q189	Unfired 16-gauge shotshell, Sears Roebuck, Extra Range FBI #238 (6)

Results of examination:

No fired or unfired shotshells like the unfired 12-gauge Federal Hi-Power, 00 Buck, Maximum Load shotshell, Q184, (FBI #31) were present among the shotshells received for examination. A small amount of a white paint on the shell tube of Q184 suggests it may have been near the middle bedroom closet where considerable white paint was spilled. Two paint cans in this area appeared to have been struck by bullets that passed completely through the cans of paint.

Specimen Q185 (FBI #34) is a .30 carbine cartridge manufactured in France. No bullets, cartridge cases or cartridges representative of this type of ammunition were received for examination in this case.

Specimens Q186 and Q187 (FBI #44 and #221 respectively) represent three Remington-Peters .32 S & W cartridges. No

(continued on next page)

55

bullets, cartridge cases or cartridges representative of ammunition of this type were received for examination in this case.

Specimen Q188 (FBI #225) is an unfired 12-gauge Remington Shurshot, 3-1-8, shotshell and the same type ammunition as that represented by the fired shotshells previously submitted and referred to as specimens Q122, Q124, Q125 and Q126. Shot wads like Q48 and Q50 are in shotshells of this type.

No ammunition like the unfired 16-gauge Sears Xtra Range shotshell, Q189 (FBI #238) was among the items received for examination in this case. No 16-gauge weapons were received for examination.

FBI LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: February 26, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED) ET AL
VICTIMS - SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received on 2/17/70 and were personally delivered by Special Age [redacted]

Q281 Left hand cast of Hampton
Q232 Right hand cast of Hampton

Also Submitted: Control sample of paraffin taken from Hampto

Results of examination:

A microscopic examination of Q281 and Q282 revealed no unburned gunpowder fragments.

Specimens Q281 and Q282 were examined by neutron activation analysis for the elements antimony and barium. Antimony and barium are components of most primer mixtures and can be deposited on the hand when a firearm is discharged. From the results of the examination, it could not be determined whether Hampton had discharged a firearm.

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date:	February 27, 1970
FBI File No.	[redacted]
Lab. No.	[redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL;
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS-
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/17/70

Q280 Section of doorjamb with underlying piece of plasterboar

Results of examination:

The hole in the section of doorjamb, specimen Q280, is comparable in size to one that could be produced by a caliber .38 or .38 Special size bullet and has the appearance of a bullet hole.

A microscopic examination of the hole revealed minute metallic smears which were analyzed spectrographically and found to be composed of lead. However, these smears are too limited in quantity for detailed compositional analysis and/or comparison purposes.

Of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL GROTH AND OTHERS,
POLICE OFFICERS;
FRAD HAMPTON, MARK CLARK AND
OTHERS - VICTIMS;
CIVIL RIGHTS

Date: March 3, 1970
FBI File No.
Lab. No. [redacted]

Specimens received 2/9/70

Q153	Paint from hallside of door (#8)
Q154	Paint from top surface of door nearer hinged side (#10)
Q155	Paint from top surface of door near opening side (#11)
Q156	Paint from top panel of door, outside face (#12),
Q157	Paint from door edge near top hinge (#17)
K47	Paint from top inside door facing (#1)
K48	Paint from top inside door facing (#2)
K49	Paint from top inside door facing (#3)
K50	Paint from wall of bathroom (#4)
K51	Paint from wall of bathroom (#5)
K52	Paint from door facing on hall side (#7)
K53	Paint from door facing on hall side (#9)
K54	Paint from door facing on hall side (#13)
K55	Paint from hall wall (#15)
K56	Paint from hall wall (#16)
K57	Paint from bathroom wall (#14)
K58	Hinge half from door facing, top
K59	Hinge half from door, top
K60	Hinge half from door, bottom

Results of examination:

The bathroom door of the first level apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois, exhibited a natural or varnish finish and bears many paint spatters deposited as a result of painting of surrounding areas.

The door and door frames are very old and show physical signs of having been salvaged from other use. Some of the individual pieces of the door frame appear to have originated from other sources based upon the paint colors and layer structures present or absent on each part.

An examination of specimens K58, K59, K60 and Q153, Q154, Q155, Q156 and Q157 from the hinge components and door

(continued on next page)

respectively, reveal three paints which are similar in physical characteristics and composition and indicate that the door and hinge werd painted at least three times as a unit.

An examination of the door facing both inside and outside the bathroom (specimens K47, K48, K49, K52, K53, K54) shows that there are at least three paint layers present on some of the parts (top horizonal pieces) which individually match various globules or droplets of paint on the door.

This indicates that parts of the frame were painte at least three times integrally with the door.

The bathroom walls bear two layers of paint, one of which appears to have been applied before the door was erected since this layer appears under the hinges. The top layer of bathroom paint was deposited on the inside door facing and dropped in some areas onto the door, indicating the door had been erected before the top layer of the bathroom finish was applied.

No paint was found on the door and door facing similar to a two-layered paint finish on the hall walls.

It was not possible from an examination of the paints examined on the hall wall or the bathroom walls to determine when the paints were applied.

An examination of other doors in the apartment failed to reveal any doors with which the bathroom door could have been interchanged.

7-1b

REPORT
of the
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: March 3, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL;
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED) ET AL -
VICTIMS; SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 3/2/70

Q283 .45 Auto bullet from knee of Verlina Brewer

Results of examination:

Specimen Q283 is a .45 Auto bullet that was identified as having been fired from the .45 Thompson Submachine gun, serial number 5954 previously submitted and referred to as specimen K21.

61

REPORT
# of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: 3/4/70
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No.

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/11/70

Q162	Double bed mattress - Wonder Rest FBI #301 (1)
Q163	Box springs twin size, blue striped FBI #302 (2)
Q164	Mattress - Slumber Industries #97765, blue-white-twin size FBI #303 (3)
Q165	Box springs - Slumber Industries #97929 blue-white design, twin size FBI #306 (4)
Q166	Mattress, Posture Firm, twin size FBI #307 (5)
Q167	Mattress, yellow and gray, twin size FBI #308 (6)

Results of examination:

A radiograph of the Q162 mattress revealed the presence of a bullet in the center of the mattress, 10½ inches from the end which is the end opposite the label "Restonic Dr. Fuller." A probe of the mattress in this area was made and a .30 Carbine Norma bullet was recovered. The absence of sufficient individual characteristics on this specimen precluded the possibility of identifying it with the particular weapon firing it. The general rifling characteristics on this bullet, consisting of twelve lands and grooves, right twist, are the same as those on test bullets fired from the .30 caliber Universal Carbine, Serial Number 66174, specimen K27.

A radiograph of the Q162 mattress revealed the presence of small metallic particles in the lower left side of the mattress. A probe of this area was made and three very small lead fragments, the sources of which are not known, were found. Corresponding holes of entrance in the mattress cover were noted.

No other metal fragments in this mattress were detected in the radiographs.

No foreign metal particles were found in the radiographs of the Q163 specimen.

(continued on next page)

A radiograph of the Q164 mattress revealed the presence of considerable metallic particles. Accompanying holes were in the mattress cover. The areas from which metallic particles were removed were appropriately marked on the mattress and the particles removed are described as follows:

From area #7 - A .45 Auto bullet identified as having been fired from the .45 Thompson Submachine gun, Serial Number 5954, referred to as specimen K21.

From area #10 - A copper-colored steel fragment and a lead fragment. The steel fragment is from a .30 Carbine bullet jacket. The bullet represented by this fragment has general rifling characteristics consisting of twelve lands and grooves, right twist, like those on test bullets obtained from the .30 caliber Universal Carbine, K27. There were insufficient marks on the fragment to permit identification.

The lead fragment is from the lead core of a .30 Carbine bullet.

From area #11 - Two copper-colored steel fragments from one or more .30 Carbine bullets. Both have general rifling characteristics like those on test bullets from the K27 Carbine. Neither has any marks of value for identification.

From area #12 - One copper-colored steel fragment and three small lead fragments. The steel fragment had a land impression comparable in width to those on the test bullets obtained from the K27 Carbine. The fragments possessed no marks of value for identification. It was not possible to establish the specific source of the lead fragments.

From area #13 - One silver-colored steel fragment, one

(continued on next page)

copper-colored steel fragment and three very small lead fragments. The steel fragments are from Norma and Winchester .30 Carbine bullets respectively. They both have general rifling characteristics like those on test bullets obtained from the K27 Carbine, but neither have suitable marks for identification purposes. It was not possible to establish the specific source of the lead fragments.

From area #14 - One copper-colored steel fragment and three lead fragments. The steel fragment has several land impressions comparable in size to those on test bullets obtained from the K27 Carbine, but there are insufficient marks of value for identification. One piece of lead is from the lead core of a jacketed bullet. The specific source or sources of the other two lead fragments could not be established.

From area #15 - One small silver-colored steel fragment having a land impression comparable in size to those on test bullets obtained from the K27 Carbine. There were no marks on this fragment to permit identification.

From area #16 - A lead fragment from the lead core of a jacketed bullet of unknown size and type.

From area #18 - A copper-colored steel fragment with general rifling characteristics like those on test bullets obtained from the K27 Carbine. There were insufficient marks on this fragment present to permit identification.

From area #19 - One small copper-colored steel fragment and two small lead fragments, the specific sources of which could not be established.

A radiograph of the Q165 specimen revealed the presence of metallic particles in one end.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

The metallic fragments were removed and the specimen appropriately marked.

Removed from the area marked "1" was a lead fragment the specific source of which could not be established.

Removed from the area marked "2" was a copper-colored steel fragment from a .30 Carbine bullet having general rifling characteristics like those on test bullets fired from the [illegible] Carbine, but there were insufficient marks on this fragment for identification.

A radiograph of the Q166 mattress revealed no foreign metallic particles embedded therein. No holes of significance were in the mattress cover.

A radiograph of the Q167 mattress revealed the presence of two objects that appeared to be bullets. These objects were removed and the mattress appropriately marked.

From the area marked "R-1," in one corner of the mattress, and from the area marked "R-8," in the center of the mattress, were .45 Auto bullets which were identified as having been fired from the .45 Thompson Submachine gun, Serial Number 5954, referred to as specimen K21.

Fibers representative of those in the mattresses were obtained for use in logical comparison with fibers found on other objects recovered from the scene.

Group "0" human blood was identified on the Q1[illegible] and Q166 mattresses. Grouping tests conducted on the human bloodstains on Q164 were inconclusive. No blood was identified on Q163, Q165 and Q167.

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: 3/4/70
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No.

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL,
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRAD A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/12/70

Q168	Pillow FBI #12 (1)
Q169	Part of a bloodstained sheet FBI #49 (2)
Q170	Pink blanket FBI #50 (3)
Q171	Pieces of cotton FBI #64 (4)
Q172	White sheet FBI #66 (5)
Q173	White sheet FBI #72 (6)
Q174	Blue-green sheet FBI #73 (7)
Q175	Green blanket FBI #78 (8)
Q176	Plaster fragments FBI #171 (9)
Q177	Part of a white bedsheet, torn, FBI #180 (10)
Q178	Part of a white pillowcase, torn, FBI #244 (11)
Q179	Brown blanket and white chenille bedspread FBI #249 (12)
Q180	White sheet FBI #250 (13)
Q181	White sheet FBI #254 (14)
Q182	Green thermo blanket, FBI #257 (15)
Q183	Brown and maroon quilt, FBI #258 (16)

Results of examination:

The hole in one surface of the Q168 pillow could be a wear hole. No bullet or shot pellet was found in the pillow stuffing.

Where the blood is heavily concentrated on the Q169 sheet, several holes are present. It was not possible to determine what produced these holes.

Two groups of small holes, each in a pattern and each in the same relative position were in the Q173 sheet, Q170 pink blanket and Q175 green blanket. In one of the holes in Q173 was a clump of mattress padding in which a lead fragment was embedded. The lead fragment weighed 25.6 grains and while mutilated and suffering obvious weight loss, bore some characteristics of a shot pellet, the original size of which could not be determined.

(continued on next page)

In the Q172, Q174, Q176, Q180, Q181 specimens and Q178 pillowcase, no holes that could be associated with bullet or shot pellet holes were found. On the surface of Q176 was a small flattened lead fragment, the source of which could not be determined.

In the partial bed sheet, Q177, was a cluster of holes each approximately three-tenths of an inch in diameter. These holes could represent a pattern produced by a buckshot load from a shotgun. Based upon the shot spread, the weapon could have been approximately fifteen to twenty feet from the sheet when discharged.

Numerous holes were in the chenille bedspread and brown blanket, Q179. The heavy black rings around several of these holes in the bedspread could be bullet lubricant. The sizes of these holes are comparable to what may have been produced by bullets. Other holes could have been produced by shot pellets, but the specific sources of the objects producing these holes could not be identified.

There were several holes in the green blanket, Q182, the sources of which could not be determined.

Specimen Q183 was so torn from obvious wear that it would be impossible to distinguish holes caused by wear from those caused either by bullets or pellets.

Group "O" human blood was identified on Q168, Q169, Q173, Q175, Q177 through Q180, Q182 and Q183. Grouping tests conducted on the human bloodstains on Q172, Q174 and Q181 were inconclusive. Human blood which was too limited in amount for grouping purposes was identified on Q170, Q171 and Q176.

Representative fibers from each of the above-listed specimens were obtained for logical comparisons with fibers adhering to bullets and lead fragments recovered in this case.

[redacted]

'67

7-15

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Date: March 5, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No.

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH
ET AL,
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/12/70

Q158	Wood panel 10" by 24", FBI #304
Q159	Door panel, FBI #309
Q160	Wood splinters, FBI #132
Q161	Window shutters, FBI #305

Results of examination:

The large hole in the Q159 panel is comparable in size to one produced in tests by a 12-gauge rifled slug. The pock-marked area surrounding this hole appears to have been caused by the displacement of varnish that was struck forcibly by powder residue. This same pattern was obtained when test shots were fired in the Q158 panel. The pattern on Q159 is comparable to one that would be obtained when the shotgun muzzle was from 12" to 18" from the panel and nearly perpendicular to the panel when discharged. Entrance was in the pock-marked side of the panel.

The small hole in Q159 has the appearance of a bullet hole and could have been produced by a caliber .38 bullet fired from the side of the panel opposite that into which the object producing the large hole was fired. The shot producing the hole was fired from left to right at an angle of about 15° from the panel surface and about 15° downward.

Material taken from the large hole in specimen Q159 was analyzed spectrographically and found to exhibit a minute quantity of foreign lead.

(continued on next page)

The small hole in specimen Q159 bore deposits of a gray metallic material. A microscopic examination of these deposits was made and no copper-like metal smears or particles were present. However, a spectrographic examination of these deposits revealed the presence of foreign lead, copper and antimony.

The copper coating and underlying lead of the Q253 bullet previously examined were analyzed and compared with the deposits surrounding the small hole in Q159. The copper coating of the Q253 bullet contains tin which was not detected in the deposits around the small hole in specimen Q159.

Gray smears which were found surrounding the holes in specimen Q161 were analyzed spectrographically and found to consist of foreign copper with extremely minute quantities of lead.

Two holes which could have been produced by caliber .30 Carbine bullets are present in the Q161 shutters. Each hole is about .3" in diameter. Entrance was on the blue-painted side of the shutters. The projectile causing the hole in the right shutter entered at an angle of approximately 72° (with reference to the face of the shutters), traveling from right to left. This hole was 10 1/8" from the bottom and 4 7/8" from the right edge. The line of fire was approximately horizontal.

The hole in the left shutter is 10 3/8" from the bottom and 1 3/4" from the left edge. The projectile causing this hole was traveling nearly horizontally from right to left at an angle of approximately 60° from the panel surface.

No other holes or impressions in the Q161 shutters that have the appearance of bullet or shot holes were found.

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: March 5, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH
ET AL,
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED),
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/18/70

Q190	Caliber .45 Auto bullet, FBI #3
Q191	Unfired shotshell (two pieces), FBI #4
Q192	Fired 12-gauge Federal Hi-Power shotshell, FBI #8
Q193	Caliber .45 Auto bullet, FBI #9
Q194-197	Three .45 Auto cartridge cases and one fired 12-gauge Federal Hi-Power shotshell, FBI #10
Q198	Bullet, caliber .45 Auto, FBI #14
Q199	Lead fragments, shotgun pellets, shotgun wad, FBI #15
Q200	Bullet, .45 Auto, FBI #16
Q201	Metal fragment, FBI #17
Q202	Two lead pellets, FBI #18
Q203	Lead pellet, FBI #19
Q204	Metal fragment, FBI #20
Q205	Bullet, .45 Auto, FBI #21
Q206	Metal fragment, FBI #22
Q207	Shotgun primer cup, FBI #23
Q208	Metal fragment, FBI #24
Q209	Metal fragment, FBI #25
Q210	Bullet, .45 Auto, FBI #26
Q211	Metal fragment, FBI #27
Q212	Cartridge case marked "TW69", FBI #28
Q213	Metal fragment, FBI #29
Q214	Two metal fragments, FBI #30
Q215	Metal fragment, FBI #32
Q216	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #33
Q217	Two .45 Auto cartridge cases, FBI #35
Q218	Caliber .45 Auto bullet, FBI #36
Q219	Metal fragment, FBI #37
Q220	Cartridge case marked "WCC 52", FBI #38

(continued on next page)

Q221	Metal fragment, FBI #39
Q222	.45 Auto bullet, FBI #40
Q223	Metal fragment, FBI #41
Q224	Unfired 12-gauge shotshell, Federal Monark, FBI #42
Q225	Brass fragment, FBI #43
Q226	.30 caliber bullet, FBI #46
Q227	.45 Auto caliber case, FBI #47
Q228	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #48
Q229	Lead fragment, FBI #101
Q230	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #102
Q231	Lead fragment, FBI #103
Q232	Lead fragment, FBI #104
Q233	Lead fragment, FBI #105
Q234	.30 Carbine bullet, FBI #106
Q235	.45 Auto bullet in plastic vial, FBI #118
Q236	Caliber .30 Carbine cartridge case, FBI #117
Q237	Lead fragment, FBI #119
Q238	Pink capsule, FBI #120
Q239	Metal fragment, FBI # 121
Q240	Plastic vial containing green and brown leaves. FBI #122
Q241	Lead fragment, FBI #123
Q242	Shotgun wad, FBI #124
Q243	.30 Carbine cartridge case marked "WCC 52", FBI #125
Q244	Lead fragment in plastic vial, FBI #126
Q245	Metal fragment in plastic vial, FBI #128
Q246	Lead fragment, FBI #129
Q247	Two shot pellets, FBI #130
Q248	Shotgun wad, FBI #133
Q249	Shotgun wad, FBI #134
Q250	Lead fragment, FBI #135
Q251	Bullet fragment, FBI #137
Q252	12-gauge fired shotshell, Federal Hi-Power, FBI #138
Q253	.38 Special bullet, FBI #139
Q254	Shotgun wad, plastic, FBI #140
Q255	.45 Auto bullet, FBI #142
Q256	Two .32 S&W Long cartridge cases, FBI #143
Q257	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #144
Q258	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #145
Q259	.30 Carbine cartridge case marked "WCC 52", FBI #146
Q260	Metal fragment, FBI #147

(continued on next page)

Q261	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #148
Q262	Metal fragment in wrapper marked "AA", FBI #149
Q263	Metal fragment, FBI #150
Q264	Pamphlet "Family Guide Emergency Health", FBI #208
Q265	Book - "First Aid"for your family, FBI #209
Q266	Book - "Toward the African Revolution", FBI #210
Q267	Lead fragment, FBI #220
Q268	Sixteen shot pellets, FBI #222
Q269	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #223
Q270	Lead pellet, FBI #226
Q271	Lead fragment, FBI #227
Q272	Shot pellets, FBI #228
Q273	Lead fragment, FBI #230
Q274	Lead fragment, FBI #232
Q275	.45 Auto bullet, FBI #233
Q276	Shot pellets, FBI #234
Q277	.38 Special bullet, FBI #237
Q278	.45 Auto bullet, FBI #239
Q279	Suit, FBI #252

Results of examination:

CALIBER .45 AUTO BULLETS

The specimens referred to above as Q190, Q198, Q20 Q205, Q210, Q218, Q222, Q235, Q251, Q275 and Q278 are all .45 Auto lead bullets that were identified as having been fi in the .45 Thompson submachine gun, serial number 5954, previously referred to as specimen K21.

Specimen Q193 is a mutilated .45 Auto bullet with the same general rifling characteristics as on those referred to in the preceding paragraph. However, specimen Q193 did not have sufficient individual characteristics to permit identifica

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

CALIBER .45 AUTO CARTRIDGE CASES

The specimens referred to as Q195, Q196, Q197, [illegible] Q217 (two cartridge cases marked Q217A and Q217B), Q227, [illegible] Q230, Q257, Q258, Q261 and Q269 are all Remington-Peters .45 Auto cartridge cases that were identified as having been fired in the .45 Thompson submachine gun, serial number 5954, previously referred to as specimen K21.

CALIBER .30 CARBINE CARTRIDGE CASES

The specimens referred to as Q220, Q236, Q243 and Q259 are all .30 Carbine cartridge cases that were identified as having been fired in the .30 caliber Universal Carbine, serial number 66174, previously referred to as specimen K27.

Specimens Q220, Q243 and Q259 represent ammunition made for U. S. Military use by Winchester and Q236 was manufactured by Norma.

CALIBER .32 S&W LONG CARTRIDGE CASES

In specimen Q256 are two Winchester-Western .32 S&W Long cartridge cases having the same type firing pin impressions as those in the .32 S&W Long cartridge cases previously submitted and referred to as specimens Q93 through Q99. None of these cartridge cases possessed marks to permit identification with the weapon firing them. Their firing pin impressions are different from those on test cartridge cases obtained from the K43 weapon, a .32 S&W Long Smith and Wesson revolver, serial number 730073, the only weapon submitted capable of firing ammunition of this type.

CALIBER 7.62 MM NATO CARTRIDGE CASE

Specimen Q212 is a cartridge case removed from its construction assembly line prior to its completion. It represents an unfinished 7.62 mm Nato cartridge from Twin Cities Army Ammunition Plant, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

CALIBER .30 CARBINE BULLETS

Specimens previously submitted and referred to as Q40, Q41 and Q52 were identified as having been fired from the same .30 Carbine as specimens Q226, Q234 and Q245 listed above. Specimens Q234 and Q245 were identified as having been fired in the caliber .30 Universal Carbine, serial number 66174, referred to previously as K27. It follows, therefore, that specimens Q40, Q41, Q52 and Q226 were also fired from the caliber .30 Universal Carbine, serial number 66174, specimen K27.

Specimen Q226 is a bullet of the type loaded into Winchester Military .30 Carbine cartridges and specimens Q234 and Q245 are bullets of the type loaded into Norma .30 Carbine cartridges.

12-GAUGE FIRED SHOTSHELLS

Specimens Q192, Q194 and Q252 are 12-gauge Federal Hi-Power, Maximum Load 0 Buck, fired shotshells identified as having been fired in the 12-gauge Remington Wingmaster Model 870 shotgun, serial number 70216 V, referred to previously as specimen K23.

12-GAUGE UNFIRED SHOTSHELLS

Specimen Q191 is an unfired 12-gauge Federal Monarch one-ounce #5, shotshell. The brass portion was separated from the shell tube. The primer was intact. Both pieces were enveloped in white paint. This shotshell apparently fell in the puddle of white paint on the floor of the closet in the middle bedroom.

Specimen Q224 is an unfired 12-gauge Federal Monarch Field Load, one-ounce #5, shotshell. This specimen was likewise enveloped in white paint and apparently fell in the puddle of white paint on the floor of the closet in the middle bedroom.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

.38 SPECIAL BULLETS

Specimen Q233 is a Remington-Peters type .38 Special lead bullet that was identified as having been fired from the .38 Special Colt revolver, serial number 857237, previously submitted and referred to as K12, carried by Officer Groth. Specimen Q233 weighed 152.35 grains. Standard weight is 158 grains.

Specimen Q246 is a badly mutilated Remington-Peters type .38 Special lead bullet fired from a .38 Special revolver with Colt-type rifling. It was not possible, from the limited marks present, to identify this bullet with any of the weapons submitted. It could not have been fired from the Colt revolver referred to as specimen K41. Specimen Q246 weighs 155.4 grains. Standard weight is 158.0 grains.

Specimens Q253 and Q277 are Western-Winchester type .38 Special copper-coated lead bullets that were identified as having been fired from the same caliber .38 Special Colt revolver, but it was not possible to identify them as having been fired from any of the submitted Colt revolvers. Specimen Q253 weighs 198.0 grains. Specimen Q277 weighs 199.69 grains. Standard weight is 200 grains.

SHOTGUN WADS FROM SCENE

Specimen Q199 contained a 12-gauge shotgun wad composed of purple paper fibers and is like the under shot wads in 12-gauge Remington Express, 00 Buck, shotshells.

Specimen Q242 is a composition wad like those in 12-gauge Federal Hi-Power and 12-gauge Federal Monark shotshells.

Specimen Q248 is a cardboard over powder wad like those in 12-gauge Remington-Peters, 00 Buck, shotshells.

Specimen Q254 is the plastic over powder wad like those in 12-gauge Remington Express, 00 Buck, shotshells.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

LARGE LEAD FRAGMENT

Specimen Q237 is a large flattened lead fragment weighing 346.0 grains. There is nothing characteristic about its size or shape, in its present condition, to permit identification of its source. If Q237 is a rifled slug, there is evidence of weight loss. At 346.0 grains in its present condition, and considering its weight loss, if a rifled slug it would fall in the classification of a 12-gauge rifled slug. Its present weight, without considering weight loss is equal to an unmutilated 16-gauge rifled slug. A 16-gauge rifled slug (approximately 7/8 of an ounce) weighs 345.125 grains (Western Super X 16-gauge rifled slug). A 12-gauge rifled slug (approximately one ounce) weighs 402.25 grains (Western Super X 12-gauge rifled slug).

SHOT PELLETS COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO 00 BUCK

The shot pellets submitted that are comparable in size and/or weight to 00 Buck shot pellets are Q202, Q211, Q213, Q223, Q241, Q250, shot pellet removed from Q264 book, two shot pellets removed from Q266 book, Q270 and Q276.

SHOT PELLETS COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO 0 BUCK

The shot pellets submitted that are comparable in size and/or weight to 0 Buck shot pellets are: Q201, Q209, Q231 and Q232.

SHOT PELLETS COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO 1 BUCK

In specimen Q214 are two shot pellets comparable in weight to 1 Buck shot. They are both too deformed for accurate measurement.

SHOT PELLETS COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO #5 SHOT

There are sixteen shot pellets in specimen Q268 and eighteen shot pellets in Q272 none of which are mutilated. These may have come from the unfired 12-gauge Federal Monark, Field Load #5, shotshell, Q224, as some of the pellets, like Q224 are coated with white paint.

(continued on next page)

SHOT PELLET COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO #7 1/2 SHOT

One shot pellet, Q239, was comparable in size to #7 1/2 shot. Some weight loss was evident and while the measurable diameter was comparable to that of #7 1/2 shot, its weight was slightly less than standard for #7 1/2 shot.

SHOT PELLET COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO #8 SHOT

One shot pellet, Q203, was found to be comparable in size and weight to #8 shot. This pellet was not deformed and did not possess markings normally present on a shot pellet that had been fired from a shotgun.

LEAD FRAGMENTS THAT COULD NEITHER BE ASSOCIATED WITH SHOT PELLETS NOR BULLET FRAGMENTS

The following specimens are mutilated, deformed and fractured lead fragments which could not be identified as to source:

Specimens Number	Weight (in grains)	Specimen Number	Weight (in grains)
Q204	24.25	Q262	29.875
Q206	52.375	Q263	25.0
Q208	28.4	Q267	11.2
Q215	.625		
Q219	44.6	Q271	34.9
Q221	12.75	Q273	18.125
Q229	35.9	Q274	5.25
Q244	6.63		
Q247 (2 pieces)	.4 & .9		
Q260	33.75		

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS SUBMITTED

Specimen Q207 is a copper cup into which a shotgun primer is seated. This specimen has suffered no apparent damage.

(continued on next page)

Specimen Q225 is a distorted brass primer cup that appears to have separated from a cartridge or shotshell, as a result of a primer "blowback". This occurs when the powder charge is ignited by some means other than normal firing of a cartridge or shotshell and resulting pressure blows the primer.

EXAMINATION OF DAMAGED BOOKS

The book "Family Guide Emergency Health Care", Q264, was struck by a 00 Buck pellet. The pellet entered the upper left hand corner of the front of the book, penetrating the first twenty-six pages. A 00 Buck shot pellet was removed from the book at this point.

The book entitled "First Aid", Q265, had a hole in the top left corner that could have been produced by a small shot pellet, size not known. No pellets were found in the book and no exit holes were found. The hole in the middle right side of the cover appears to have been made by a tapered pointed instrument, such as a pencil, penetrating the cover from the inside to the outside. There is no indication this hole was produced either by a shot pellet or by a bullet.

The book "Toward the African Revolution" by Frantz Fanon, was struck by two 00 Buck shot pellets that entered the top right corner of the book. The two pellets were recovered along with a small piece of steel with white enameled surface. This steel fragment was cupped in such a manner to suggest one of the pellets recovered struck an intervening object, tearing the steel fragment from it and carrying it into the book. It was found on the same page as the two 00 Buck shot pellets.

Another hole was in the right edge of this book where a shot pellet of unknown size struck the book. A black deposit resembling graphite like the graphite with which shot pellets are coated was on the pages of the book where penetration occurred. No shot pellet was found.

(continued on next page)

EXAMINATION OF SUIT OF CLOTHES

Specimen Q279, a suit of clothes consisting of a coat and one pair of pants on a wire hanger was found to have been struck with #8 shot from two shotgun charges. One charge struck the lower left front of the coat below the pocket opening. The shot penetrated the pants near the belt line and through the rear pocket which was probably hanging downward from the pants on the hanger. The pellets exited through the lower left back of the coat. The shot dispersal is typical of that which would be fired at roughly a 45° angle to the right of the front of the coat. The pattern is typical of one produced at a distance of from six to nine feet.

A second charge struck the lower portion of the right sleeve. An exit hole was in the back of the right sleeve and a small number of pellets entered the lower right front of the coat below the pocket opening. The shot producing the hole in the sleeve was fired at approximately right angles to the material of the sleeve, also at a distance of from six to nine feet based on shot dispersal. It was not possible to determine from what direction within the premises the shots producing the holes in the suit were fired as it is not known where the suit was hanging at the time the shots were fired.

EXAMINATION OF PINK CAPSULE AND PLANT MATERIAL

Chemical and instrumental examinations of the capsule, specimen Q238, showed the presence of propoxyphene hydrochloride. Propoxyphene hydrochloride, an analgesic and narcotic, is dispensed in capsules similar to specimen Q238 by Eli Lilly and Company under the trade name "DARVON". A portion of this material was consumed in the examination.

The plant material, specimen Q240, did not contain any marijuana. This specimen was consumed in the examination.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

BLOOD EXAMINATIONS

Human blood which was too limited in amount for grouping purposes was identified on specimens Q192, Q197. Q201, Q210, Q226 and Q275. No blood was identified on Q190, Q233 and Q234.

WOOD EXAMINATIONS

The wood on the Q206 bullet and the wood on the Q134 slide previously submitted are softwoods such as pine, spruce or fir which are too small for species identification.

The wood fragments on Q231 and Q246 are pine such as sugar pine, Idaho white pine or northern white pine. These fragments are too small for species identification.

The wood on the Q134 slide, the wood found on Q206, Q231 and Q246 could not have originated from the three ply plywood of the Q159 panel previously submitted which consists of birch outer layers and an American sweetgum inner layer.

No wood of value was found on Q214.

EXAMINATIONS OF FIBERS

Fibers were found on the following bullets and metal fragments: Q200, Q201, Q210, Q213, Q215, Q223, Q237, Q244, Q245, Q251 and Q260.

Several sisal fibers were adhering to Q260. These fibers have the same appearance as fibers in the composition of the Q164 and Q167 mattresses and could have come from one of them.

No other fibers were found in the above-listed bullets and metal fragments that could be associated with the mattress, bedding or clothing submitted previously.

(continued on next page)

White cotton fibers were present on Q200, Q201, Q213, Q215 and Q245; however, white cotton fibers are too common and possess too few individual microscopic characteristics to be associated with a particular source.

Other fibers for which no source could be found were black synthetic fibers on Q200; a yellow-green cotton fiber, a white woolen fiber and a green paper fiber on Q201; a white synthetic fiber and three green paper fibers on Q210; a black woolen fiber, a red cotton fiber and a green paper fiber on Q215; a black woolen fiber on Q233; an orange woolen fiber on Q237 and a blue acrylic fiber on Q251.

Fragments of foam were adhering to Q233. These foam fragments are different from the foam in the composition of the Q167 specimen.

Fragments of tan paper were adhering to Q237. These paper fragments are different from the paper in the composition of the Q165 specimen.

PAINT EXAMINATIONS:

Specimen Q208 bears deposits of paint which exhibit the following layer structure:

(1) Light brown varnish
(2) Beige paint
(3) Dark brown paint

Specimen Q218 exhibits deposits of a blue paint intermixed with plaster-like material.

Specimens Q219 and Q235 exhibit thin contaminated deposits of a gray paint-like material which is too contaminated for comparison purposes.

Specimen Q237 bears heavy deposits of a gold metallic nitrocellulose lacquer paint.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

The following specimens were examined for the presence of glass, gypsum board and plaster:

(1) Q211, Q213 and Q214 - glass found on or in these specimens.
(2) Q193, Q204, Q208, Q210, Q218, Q226, Q237, Q239 and Q275 - gypsum was found on or in these specimens.
(3) Q201, Q204, Q209, Q219, Q229, Q232, Q235, Q241, Q244, Q245, Q246, Q250, Q253, Q267, Q271 and Q273 - lime-gypsum-sand plaster was found on or in these specimens.

Specimens Q190, Q200, Q231, Q242 and Q255 each had a trace of a white material which was too limited in amount for significant comparison purposes.

No glass, gypsum or plaster was found on or in Q212, Q251 or Q261.

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: March 17, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SERGEANT DANIEL GROTH, et. al.,
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS, SUBJECTS;
FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED), et. al.
VICTIMS;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Specimens received

Q284 Caliber .380 Auto bullet from Northwest corner of living room

Results of examination:

From a preliminary examination of specimen Q284 it was possible to identify it as a caliber .380 Auto bullet having general rifling characteristics consisting of six lands and grooves, right twist.

The nose of this bullet was compressed at an angle consistent with that of a bullet striking a brick wall at the angle represented by the trajectory of a bullet that produced the hole in a piece of timber in the northwest corner of the living room at the premises, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois.

It was concluded that none of the weapons received for examination could have fired Q284.

7-1b

REPORT
of the
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: March 3, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL;
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED) ET AL -
VICTIMS; SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 3/2/70

Q283 .45 Auto bullet from knee of Verlina Brewer

Results of examination:

Specimen Q283 is a .45 Auto bullet that was identified as having been fired from the .45 Thompson Submachine gun, serial number 5954 previously submitted and referred to as specimen K21.

61

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: 3/4/70
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No.

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/11/70

Q162	Double bed mattress - Wonder Rest FBI #301 (1)
Q163	Box springs twin size, blue striped FBI #302 (2)
Q164	Mattress - Slumber Industries #97765, blue-white-twin size FBI #303 (3)
Q165	Box springs - Slumber Industries #97929 blue-white design, twin size FBI #306 (4)
Q166	Mattress, Posture Firm, twin size FBI #307 (5)
Q167	Mattress, yellow and gray, twin size FBI #308 (6)

Results of examination:

A radiograph of the Q162 mattress revealed the presence of a bullet in the center of the mattress, 10½ inches from the end which is the end opposite the label "Restonic Dr. Fuller." A probe of the mattress in this area was made and a .30 Carbine Norma bullet was recovered. The absence of sufficient individual characteristics on this specimen precluded the possibility of identifying it with the particular weapon firing it. The general rifling characteristics on this bullet, consisting of twelve lands and grooves, right twist, are the same as those on test bullets fired from the .30 caliber Universal Carbine, Serial Number 66174, specimen K27.

A radiograph of the Q162 mattress revealed the presence of small metallic particles in the lower left side of the mattress. A probe of this area was made and three very small lead fragments, the sources of which are not known, were found. Corresponding holes of entrance in the mattress cover were noted.

No other metal fragments in this mattress were detected in the radiographs.

No foreign metal particles were found in the radiographs of the Q163 specimen.

(continued on next page)

A radiograph of the Q164 mattress revealed the presence of considerable metallic particles. Accompanying holes were in the mattress cover. The areas from which metallic particles were removed were appropriately marked on the mattress and the particles removed are described as follows:

From area #7 - A .45 Auto bullet identified as having been fired from the .45 Thompson Submachine gun, Serial Number 5954, referred to as specimen K21.

From area #10 - A copper-colored steel fragment and a lead fragment. The steel fragment is from a .30 Carbine bullet jacket. The bullet represented by this fragment has general rifling characteristics consisting of twelve lands and grooves, right twist, like those on test bullets obtained from the .30 caliber Universal Carbine, K27. There were insufficient marks on the fragment to permit identification.

The lead fragment is from the lead core of a .30 Carbine bullet.

From area #11 - Two copper-colored steel fragments from one or more .30 Carbine bullets. Both have general rifling characteristics like those on test bullets from the K27 Carbine. Neither has any marks of value for identification.

From area #12 - One copper-colored steel fragment and three small lead fragments. The steel fragment had a land impression comparable in width to those on the test bullets obtained from the K27 Carbine. The fragments possessed no marks of value for identification. It was not possible to establish the specific source of the lead fragments.

From area #13 - One silver-colored steel fragment, one

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

copper-colored steel fragment and three very small lead fragments. The steel fragments are from Norma and Winchester .30 Carbine bullets respectively. They both have general rifling characteristics like those on test bullets obtained from the K27 Carbine, but neither have suitable marks for identification purposes. It was not possible to establish the specific source of the lead fragments.

From area #14 - One copper-colored steel fragment and three lead fragments. The steel fragment has several land impressions comparable in size to those on test bullets obtained from the K27 Carbine, but there are insufficient marks of value for identification. One piece of lead is from the lead core of a jacketed bullet. The specific source or sources of the other two lead fragments could not be established.

From area #15 - One small silver-colored steel fragment having a land impression comparable in size to those on test bullets obtained from the K27 Carbine. There were no marks on this fragment to permit identification.

From area #16 - A lead fragment from the lead core of a jacketed bullet of unknown size and type.

From area #18 - A copper-colored steel fragment with general rifling characteristics like those on test bullets obtained from the K27 Carbine. There were insufficient marks on this fragment present to permit identification.

From area #19 - One small copper-colored steel fragment and two small lead fragments, the specific sources of which could not be established.

A radiograph of the Q165 specimen revealed the presence of metallic particles in one end.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

The metallic fragments were removed and the specimen appropriately marked.

Removed from the area marked "1" was a lead fragment, the specific source of which could not be established.

Removed from the area marked "2" was a copper-colored steel fragment from a .30 Carbine bullet having general rifling characteristics like those on test bullets fired from the [illegible] Carbine, but there were insufficient marks on this fragment for identification.

A radiograph of the Q166 mattress revealed no foreign metallic particles embedded therein. No holes of significance were in the mattress cover.

A radiograph of the Q167 mattress revealed the presence of two objects that appeared to be bullets. These objects were removed and the mattress appropriately marked.

From the area marked "R-1," in one corner of the mattress, and from the area marked "R-8," in the center of the mattress, were .45 Auto bullets which were identified as having been fired from the .45 Thompson Submachine gun, Serial Number 5954, referred to as specimen K21.

Fibers representative of those in the mattresses were obtained for use in logical comparison with fibers found on other objects recovered from the scene.

Group "O" human blood was identified on the Q1[illegible] and Q166 mattresses. Grouping tests conducted on the human bloodstains on Q164 were inconclusive. No blood was identified on Q163, Q165 and Q167.

[redacted]

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: 3/4/70
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No.

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH, ET AL,
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/12/70

Q168	Pillow FBI #12 (1)
Q169	Part of a bloodstained sheet FBI #49 (2)
Q170	Pink blanket FBI #50 (3)
Q171	Pieces of cotton FBI #64 (4)
Q172	White sheet FBI #66 (5)
Q173	White sheet FBI #72 (6)
Q174	Blue-green sheet FBI #73 (7)
Q175	Green blanket FBI #78 (8)
Q176	Plaster fragments FBI #171 (9)
Q177	Part of a white bedsheet, torn, FBI #180 (10)
Q178	Part of a white pillowcase, torn, FBI #244 (11)
Q179	Brown blanket and white chenille bedspread FBI #249 (12)
Q180	White sheet FBI #250 (13)
Q181	White sheet FBI #254 (14)
Q182	Green thermo blanket, FBI #257 (15)
Q183	Brown and maroon quilt, FBI #258 (16)

Results of examination:

The hole in one surface of the Q168 pillow could be a wear hole. No bullet or shot pellet was found in the pillow stuffing.

Where the blood is heavily concentrated on the Q169 sheet, several holes are present. It was not possible to determine what produced these holes.

Two groups of small holes, each in a pattern and each in the same relative position were in the Q173 sheet, Q170 pink blanket and Q175 green blanket. In one of the holes in Q173 was a clump of mattress padding in which a lead fragment was embedded. The lead fragment weighed 25.6 grains and while mutilated and suffering obvious weight loss, bore some characteristics of a shot pellet, the original size of which could not be determined.

(continued on next page)

In the Q172, Q174, Q176, Q180, Q181 specimens and Q178 pillowcase, no holes that could be associated with bullet or shot pellet holes were found. On the surface of Q176 was a small flattened lead fragment, the source of which could not be determined.

In the partial bed sheet, Q177, was a cluster of holes each approximately three-tenths of an inch in diameter. These holes could represent a pattern produced by a buckshot load from a shotgun. Based upon the shot spread, the weapon could have been approximately fifteen to twenty feet from the sheet when discharged.

Numerous holes were in the chenille bedspread and brown blanket, Q179. The heavy black rings around several of these holes in the bedspread could be bullet lubricant. The sizes of these holes are comparable to what may have been produced by bullets. Other holes could have been produced by shot pellets, but the specific sources of the objects producing these holes could not be identified.

There were several holes in the green blanket, Q182, the sources of which could not be determined.

Specimen Q183 was so torn from obvious wear that it would be impossible to distinguish holes caused by wear from those caused either by bullets or pellets.

Group "O" human blood was identified on Q168, Q169, Q173, Q175, Q177 through Q180, Q182 and Q183. Grouping tests conducted on the human bloodstains on Q172, Q174 and Q181 were inconclusive. Human blood which was too limited in amount for grouping purposes was identified on Q170, Q171 and Q176.

Representative fibers from each of the above-listed specimens were obtained for logical comparisons with fibers adhering to bullets and lead fragments recovered in this case.

67

[redacted]

7-15

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

To: FBI, Chicago

Date: March 5, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No.

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH
ET AL,
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/12/70

Q158	Wood panel 10" by 24", FBI #304
Q159	Door panel, FBI #309
Q160	Wood splinters, FBI #132
Q161	Window shutters, FBI #305

Results of examination:

The large hole in the Q159 panel is comparable in size to one produced in tests by a 12-gauge rifled slug. The pock-marked area surrounding this hole appears to have been caused by the displacement of varnish that was struck forcibly by powder residue. This same pattern was obtained when test shots were fired in the Q158 panel. The pattern on Q159 is comparable to one that would be obtained when the shotgun muzzle was from 12" to 18" from the panel and nearly perpendicular to the panel when discharged. Entrance was in the pock-marked side of the panel.

The small hole in Q159 has the appearance of a bullet hole and could have been produced by a caliber .38 bullet fired from the side of the panel opposite that into which the object producing the large hole was fired. The shot producing the hole was fired from left to right at an angle of about 15° from the panel surface and about 15° downward.

Material taken from the large hole in specimen Q159 was analyzed spectrographically and found to exhibit a minute quantity of foreign lead.

(continued on next page)

The small hole in specimen Q159 bore deposits of a gray metallic material. A microscopic examination of these deposits was made and no copper-like metal smears or particles were present. However, a spectrographic examination of these deposits revealed the presence of foreign lead, copper and antimony.

The copper coating and underlying lead of the Q253 bullet previously examined were analyzed and compared with the deposits surrounding the small hole in Q159. The copper coating of the Q253 bullet contains tin which was not detected in the deposits around the small hole in specimen Q159.

Gray smears which were found surrounding the holes in specimen Q161 were analyzed spectrographically and found to consist of foreign copper with extremely minute quantities of lead.

Two holes which could have been produced by caliber .30 Carbine bullets are present in the Q161 shutters. Each hole is about .3" in diameter. Entrance was on the blue-painted side of the shutters. The projectile causing the hole in the right shutter entered at an angle of approximately 72° (with reference to the face of the shutters), traveling from right to left. This hole was 10 1/8" from the bottom and 4 7/8" from the right edge. The line of fire was approximately horizontal.

The hole in the left shutter is 10 3/8" from the bottom and 1 3/4" from the left edge. The projectile causing this hole was traveling nearly horizontally from right to left at an angle of approximately 60° from the panel surface.

No other holes or impressions in the Q161 shutters that have the appearance of bullet or shot holes were found.

[redacted]

7-1b

REPORT
of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: March 5, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH
ET AL,
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED)
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

Specimens received 2/18/70

Q190	Caliber .45 Auto bullet, FBI #3
Q191	Unfired shotshell (two pieces), FBI #4
Q192	Fired 12-gauge Federal Hi-Power shotshell, FBI #8
Q193	Caliber .45 Auto bullet, FBI #9
Q194-197	Three .45 Auto cartridge cases and one fired 12-gauge Federal Hi-Power shotshell, FBI #10
Q198	Bullet, caliber .45 Auto, FBI #14
Q199	Lead fragments, shotgun pellets, shotgun wad, FBI #15
Q200	Bullet, .45 Auto, FBI #16
Q201	Metal fragment, FBI #17
Q202	Two lead pellets, FBI #18
Q203	Lead pellet, FBI #19
Q204	Metal fragment, FBI #20
Q205	Bullet, .45 Auto, FBI #21
Q206	Metal fragment, FBI #22
Q207	Shotgun primer cup, FBI #23
Q208	Metal fragment, FBI #24
Q209	Metal fragment, FBI #25
Q210	Bullet, .45 Auto, FBI #26
Q211	Metal fragment, FBI #27
Q212	Cartridge case marked "TW69", FBI #28
Q213	Metal fragment, FBI #29
Q214	Two metal fragments, FBI #30
Q215	Metal fragment, FBI #32
Q216	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #33
Q217	Two .45 Auto cartridge cases, FBI #35
Q218	Caliber .45 Auto bullet, FBI #36
Q219	Metal fragment, FBI #37
Q220	Cartridge case marked "WCC 52", FBI #38

(continued on next page)

Q221	Metal fragment, FBI #39
Q222	.45 Auto bullet, FBI #40
Q223	Metal fragment, FBI #41
Q224	Unfired 12-gauge shotshell, Federal Monark, FBI #42
Q225	Brass fragment, FBI #43
Q226	.30 caliber bullet, FBI #46
Q227	.45 Auto caliber case, FBI #47
Q228	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #48
Q229	Lead fragment, FBI #101
Q230	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #102
Q231	Lead fragment, FBI #103
Q232	Lead fragment, FBI #104
Q233	Lead fragment, FBI #105
Q234	.30 Carbine bullet, FBI #106
Q235	.45 Auto bullet in plastic vial, FBI #118
Q236	Caliber .30 Carbine cartridge case, FBI #117
Q237	Lead fragment, FBI #119
Q238	Pink capsule, FBI #120
Q239	Metal fragment, FBI # 121
Q240	Plastic vial containing green and brown leaves. FBI #122
Q241	Lead fragment, FBI #123
Q242	Shotgun wad, FBI #124
Q243	.30 Carbine cartridge case marked "WCC 52", FBI #125
Q244	Lead fragment in plastic vial, FBI #126
Q245	Metal fragment in plastic vial, FBI #128
Q246	Lead fragment, FBI #129
Q247	Two shot pellets, FBI #130
Q248	Shotgun wad, FBI #133
Q249	Shotgun wad, FBI #134
Q250	Lead fragment, FBI #135
Q251	Bullet fragment, FBI #137
Q252	12-gauge fired shotshell, Federal Hi-Power, FBI #138
Q253	.38 Special bullet, FBI #139
Q254	Shotgun wad, plastic, FBI #140
Q255	.45 Auto bullet, FBI #142
Q256	Two .32 S&W Long cartridge cases, FBI #143
Q257	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #144
Q258	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #145
Q259	.30 Carbine cartridge case marked "WCC 52", FBI #146
Q260	Metal fragment, FBI #147

(continued on next page)

Q261	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #148
Q262	Metal fragment in wrapper marked "AA", FBI #149
Q263	Metal fragment, FBI #150
Q264	Pamphlet "Family Guide Emergency Health", FBI #208
Q265	Book - "First Aid"for your family, FBI #209
Q266	Book = "Toward the African Revolution", FBI #210
Q267	Lead fragment, FBI #220
Q268	Sixteen shot pellets, FBI #222
Q269	.45 Auto cartridge case, FBI #223
Q270	Lead pellet, FBI #226
Q271	Lead fragment, FBI #227
Q272	Shot pellets, FBI #228
Q273	Lead fragment, FBI #230
Q274	Lead fragment, FBI #232
Q275	.45 Auto bullet, FBI #233
Q276	Shot pellets, FBI #234
Q277	.38 Special bullet, FBI #237
Q278	.45 Auto bullet, FBI #239
Q279	Suit, FBI #252

Results of examination:

CALIBER .45 AUTO BULLETS

The specimens referred to above as Q190, Q198, Q20[illegible]. Q205, Q210, Q218, Q222, Q235, Q251, Q275 and Q278 are all .45 Auto lead bullets that were identified as having been fired in the .45 Thompson submachine gun, serial number 5954, previously referred to as specimen K21.

Specimen Q193 is a mutilated .45 Auto bullet with the same general rifling characteristics as on those referred to in the preceding paragraph. However, specimen Q193 did not have sufficient individual characteristics to permit identificatio

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

CALIBER .45 AUTO CARTRIDGE CASES

The specimens referred to as Q195, Q196, Q197, Q2[illegible] Q217 (two cartridge cases marked Q217A and Q217B), Q227, Q22[illegible] Q230, Q257, Q258, Q261 and Q269 are all Remington-Peters .45 Auto cartridge cases that were identified as having been fired in the .45 Thompson submachine gun, serial number 5954, previously referred to as specimen K21.

CALIBER .30 CARBINE CARTRIDGE CASES

The specimens referred to as Q220, Q236, Q243 and Q259 are all .30 Carbine cartridge cases that were identified as having been fired in the .30 caliber Universal Carbine, serial number 66174, previously referred to as specimen K27.

Specimens Q220, Q243 and Q259 represent ammunition made for U. S. Military use by Winchester and Q236 was manufactured by Norma.

CALIBER .32 S&W LONG CARTRIDGE CASES

In specimen Q256 are two Winchester-Western .32 S&W Long cartridge cases having the same type firing pin impressions as those in the .32 S&W Long cartridge cases previously submitted and referred to as specimens Q93 through Q99. None of these cartridge cases possessed marks to permit identification with the weapon firing them. Their firing pin impressions are different from those on test cartridge cases obtained from the K43 weapon, a .32 S&W Long Smith and Wesson revolver, serial number 730073, the only weapon submitted capable of firing ammunition of this type.

CALIBER 7.62 MM NATO CARTRIDGE CASE

Specimen Q212 is a cartridge case removed from the construction assembly line prior to its completion. It represents an unfinished 7.62 mm Nato cartridge from Twin Cities Army Ammunition Plant, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

(continued on next page)

CALIBER .30 CARBINE BULLETS

Specimens previously submitted and referred to as Q40, Q41 and Q52 were identified as having been fired from the same .30 Carbine as specimens Q226, Q234 and Q245 listed above. Specimens Q234 and Q245 were identified as having been fired in the caliber .30 Universal Carbine, serial number 66174, referred to previously as K27. It follows, therefore, that specimens Q40, Q41, Q52 and Q226 were also fired from the caliber .30 Universal Carbine, serial number 66174, specimen K27.

Specimen Q226 is a bullet of the type loaded into Winchester Military .30 Carbine cartridges and specimens Q234 and Q245 are bullets of the type loaded into Norma .30 Carbine cartridges.

12-GAUGE FIRED SHOTSHELLS

Specimens Q192, Q194 and Q252 are 12-gauge Federal Hi-Power, Maximum Load 0 Buck, fired shotshells identified as having been fired in the 12-gauge Remington Wingmaster Model 870 shotgun, serial number 70216 V, referred to previously as specimen K23.

12-GAUGE UNFIRED SHOTSHELLS

Specimen Q191 is an unfired 12-gauge Federal Monarch one-ounce #5, shotshell. The brass portion was separated from the shell tube. The primer was intact. Both pieces were enveloped in white paint. This shotshell apparently fell in the puddle of white paint on the floor of the closet in the middle bedroom.

Specimen Q224 is an unfired 12-gauge Federal Monarch Field Load, one-ounce #5, shotshell. This specimen was likewise enveloped in white paint and apparently fell in the puddle of white paint on the floor of the closet in the middle bedroom.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

.38 SPECIAL BULLETS

Specimen Q233 is a Remington-Peters type .38 Special lead bullet that was identified as having been fired from the .38 Special Colt revolver, serial number 857237, previously submitted and referred to as K12, carried by Officer Groth. Specimen Q233 weighed 152.35 grains. Standard weight is 158 grains.

Specimen Q246 is a badly mutilated Remington-Peters type .38 Special lead bullet fired from a .38 Special revolver with Colt-type rifling. It was not possible, from the limited marks present, to identify this bullet with any of the weapons submitted. It could not have been fired from the Colt revolver referred to as specimen K41. Specimen Q246 weighs 155.4 grains. Standard weight is 158.0 grains.

Specimens Q253 and Q277 are Western-Winchester type .38 Special copper-coated lead bullets that were identified as having been fired from the same caliber .38 Special Colt revolver, but it was not possible to identify them as having been fired from any of the submitted Colt revolvers. Specimen Q253 weighs 198.0 grains. Specimen Q277 weighs 199.69 grains. Standard weight is 200 grains.

SHOTGUN WADS FROM SCENE

Specimen Q199 contained a 12-gauge shotgun wad composed of purple paper fibers and is like the under shot wads in 12-gauge Remington Express, 00 Buck, shotshells.

Specimen Q242 is a composition wad like those in 12-gauge Federal Hi-Power and 12-gauge Federal Monark shotshells.

Specimen Q248 is a cardboard over powder wad like those in 12-gauge Remington-Peters, 00 Buck, shotshells.

Specimen Q254 is the plastic over powder wad like those in 12-gauge Remington Express, 00 Buck, shotshells.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

LARGE LEAD FRAGMENT

Specimen Q237 is a large flattened lead fragment weighing 346.0 grains. There is nothing characteristic about its size or shape, in its present condition, to permit identification of its source. If Q237 is a rifled slug, there is evidence of weight loss. At 346.0 grains in its present condition, and considering its weight loss, if a rifled slug it would fall in the classification of a 12-gauge rifled slug. Its present weight, without considering weight loss is equal to an unmutilated 16-gauge rifled slug. A 16-gauge rifled slug (approximately 7/8 of an ounce) weighs 345.125 grains (Western Super X 16-gauge rifled slug). A 12-gauge rifled slug (approximately one ounce) weighs 402.25 grains (Western Super X 12-gauge rifled slug).

SHOT PELLETS COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO 00 BUCK

The shot pellets submitted that are comparable in size and/or weight to 00 Buck shot pellets are Q202, Q211, Q213, Q223, Q241, Q250, shot pellet removed from Q264 book, two shot pellets removed from Q266 book, Q270 and Q276.

SHOT PELLETS COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO 0 BUCK

The shot pellets submitted that are comparable in size and/or weight to 0 Buck shot pellets are: Q201, Q209, Q231 and Q232.

SHOT PELLETS COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO 1 BUCK

In specimen Q214 are two shot pellets comparable in weight to 1 Buck shot. They are both too deformed for accurate measurement.

SHOT PELLETS COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO #5 SHOT

There are sixteen shot pellets in specimen Q268 and eighteen shot pellets in Q272 none of which are mutilated. These may have come from the unfired 12-gauge Federal Monark, Field Load #5, shotshell, Q224, as some of the pellets, like Q224 are coated with white paint.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

SHOT PELLET COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO #7 1/2 SHOT

One shot pellet, Q239, was comparable in size to #7 1/2 shot. Some weight loss was evident and while the measurable diameter was comparable to that of #7 1/2 shot, its weight was slightly less than standard for #7 1/2 shot.

SHOT PELLET COMPARABLE IN SIZE AND/OR WEIGHT TO #8 SHOT

One shot pellet, Q203, was found to be comparable in size and weight to #8 shot. This pellet was not deformed and did not possess markings normally present on a shot pellet that had been fired from a shotgun.

LEAD FRAGMENTS THAT COULD NEITHER BE ASSOCIATED WITH SHOT PELLETS NOR BULLET FRAGMENTS

The following specimens are mutilated, deformed and fractured lead fragments which could not be identified as to source:

Specimens Number	Weight (in grains)	Specimen Number	Weight (in grains)
Q204	24.25	Q262	29.875
Q206	52.375	Q263	25.0
Q208	28.4	Q267	11.2
Q215	.625		
Q219	44.6	Q271	34.9
Q221	12.75	Q273	18.125
Q229	35.9	Q274	5.25
Q244	6.63		
Q247 (2 pieces)	.4 & .9		
Q260	33.75		

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS SUBMITTED

Specimen Q207 is a copper cup into which a shotgun primer is seated. This specimen has suffered no apparent damage.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

Specimen Q225 is a distorted brass primer cup that appears to have separated from a cartridge or shotshell, as a result of a primer "blowback". This occurs when the powder charge is ignited by some means other than normal firing of a cartridge or shotshell and resulting pressure blows the primer.

EXAMINATION OF DAMAGED BOOKS

The book "Family Guide Emergency Health Care", Q264. was struck by a 00 Buck pellet. The pellet entered the upper left hand corner of the front of the book, penetrating the first twenty-six pages. A 00 Buck shot pellet was removed from the book at this point.

The book entitled "First Aid", Q265, had a hole in the top left corner that could have been produced by a small shot pellet, size not known. No pellets were found in the book and no exit holes were found. The hole in the middle right side of the cover appears to have been made by a tapered pointed instrument, such as a pencil, penetrating the cover from the inside to the outside. There is no indication this hole was produced either by a shot pellet or by a bullet.

The book "Toward the African Revolution"by Frantz Fanon, was struck by two 00 Buck shot pellets that entered the top right corner of the book. The two pellets were recovered along with a small piece of steel with white enameled surface. This steel fragment was cupped in such a manner to suggest one of the pellets recovered struck an intervening object, tearing the steel fragment from it and carrying it into the book. It was found on the same page as the two 00 Buck shot pellets.

Another hole was in the right edge of this book where a shot pellet of unknown size struck the book. A black deposit resembling graphite like the graphite with which shot pellets are coated was on the pages of the book where penetration occurred. No shot pellet was found.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

EXAMINATION OF SUIT OF CLOTHES

Specimen Q279, a suit of clothes consisting of a coat and one pair of pants on a wire hanger was found to have been struck with #8 shot from two shotgun charges. One charge struck the lower left front of the coat below the pocket opening. The shot penetrated the pants near the belt line and through the rear pocket which was probably hanging downward from the pants on the hanger. The pellets exited through the lower left back of the coat. The shot dispersal is typical of that which would be fired at roughly a 45° angle to the right of the front of the coat. The pattern is typical of one produced at a distance of from six to nine feet.

A second charge struck the lower portion of the right sleeve. An exit hole was in the back of the right sleeve and a small number of pellets entered the lower right front of the coat below the pocket opening. The shot producing the hole in the sleeve was fired at approximately right angles to the material of the sleeve, also at a distance of from six to nine feet based on shot dispersal. It was not possible to determine from what direction within the premises the shots producing the holes in the suit were fired as it is not known where the suit was hanging at the time the shots were fired.

EXAMINATION OF PINK CAPSULE AND PLANT MATERIAL

Chemical and instrumental examinations of the capsule, specimen Q238, showed the presence of propoxyphene hydrochloride. Propoxyphene hydrochloride, an analgesic and narcotic, is dispensed in capsules similar to specimen Q238 by Eli Lilly and Company under the trade name "DARVON". A portion of this material was consumed in the examination.

The plant material, specimen Q240, did not contain any marijuana. This specimen was consumed in the examination.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

BLOOD EXAMINATIONS

Human blood which was too limited in amount for grouping purposes was identified on specimens Q192, Q197. Q201, Q210, Q226 and Q275. No blood was identified on Q190, Q233 and Q234.

WOOD EXAMINATIONS

The wood on the Q206 bullet and the wood on the Q134 slide previously submitted are softwoods such as pine, spruce or fir which are too small for species identification.

The wood fragments on Q231 and Q246 are pine such as sugar pine, Idaho white pine or northern white pine. These fragments are too small for species identification.

The wood on the Q134 slide, the wood found on Q206, Q231 and Q246 could not have originated from the three ply plywood of the Q159 panel previously submitted which consists of birch outer layers and an American sweetgum inner layer.

No wood of value was found on Q214.

EXAMINATIONS OF FIBERS

Fibers were found on the following bullets and metal fragments: Q200, Q201, Q210, Q213, Q215, Q223, Q237, Q244, Q245, Q251 and Q260.

Several sisal fibers were adhering to Q260. These fibers have the same appearance as fibers in the composition of the Q164 and Q167 mattresses and could have come from one of them.

No other fibers were found in the above-listed bullets and metal fragments that could be associated with the mattress, bedding or clothing submitted previously.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

White cotton fibers were present on Q200, Q201. Q213, Q215 and Q245; however, white cotton fibers are too common and possess too few individual microscopic characteristics to be associated with a particular source.

Other fibers for which no source could be found were black synthetic fibers on Q200; a yellow-green cotton fiber, a white woolen fiber and a green paper fiber on Q201; a white synthetic fiber and three green paper fibers on Q210; a black woolen fiber, a red cotton fiber and a green paper fiber on Q215; a black woolen fiber on Q233; an orange woolen fiber on Q237 and a blue acrylic fiber on Q251.

Fragments of foam were adhering to Q233. These foam fragments are different from the foam in the composition of the Q167 specimen.

Fragments of tan paper were adhering to Q237. These paper fragments are different from the paper in the composition of the Q165 specimen.

PAINT EXAMINATIONS:

Specimen Q208 bears deposits of paint which exhibit the following layer structure:

(1) Light brown varnish
(2) Beige paint
(3) Dark brown paint

Specimen Q218 exhibits deposits of a blue paint intermixed with plaster-like material.

Specimens Q219 and Q235 exhibit thin contaminated deposits of a gray paint-like material which is too contaminated for comparison purposes.

Specimen Q237 bears heavy deposits of a gold metallic nitrocellulose lacquer paint.

(continued on next page)

[redacted]

The following specimens were examined for the presence of glass, gypsum board and plaster:

(1) Q211, Q213 and Q214 - glass found on or in these specimens.

(2) Q193, Q204, Q208, Q210, Q218, Q226, Q237, Q239 and Q275 - gypsum was found on or in these specimens.

(3) Q201, Q204, Q209, Q219, Q229, Q232, Q235, Q241, Q244, Q245, Q246, Q250, Q253, Q267, Q271 and Q273 - lime-gypsum-sand plaster was found on or in these specimens.

Specimens Q190, Q200, Q231, Q242 and Q255 each had a trace of a white material which was too limited in amount for significant comparison purposes.

No glass, gypsum or plaster was found on or in Q212, Q251 or Q261.

7-1b

REPORT
# of the
FBI
LABORATORY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Date: March 17, 1970
FBI File No. [redacted]
Lab. No. [redacted]

To: FBI, Chicago

Re: SERGEANT DANIEL GROTH, et. al.,
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS, SUBJECTS;
FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED), et. al.
VICTIMS;
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CIVIL RIGHTS

Specimens received

Q284 Caliber .380 Auto bullet from Northwest corner of living room

Results of examination:

From a preliminary examination of specimen Q284 it was possible to identify it as a caliber .380 Auto bullet having general rifling characteristics consisting of six lands and grooves, right twist.

The nose of this bullet was compressed at an angle consistent with that of a bullet striking a brick wall at the angle represented by the trajectory of a bullet that produced the hole in a piece of timber in the northwest corner of the living room at the premises, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois.

It was concluded that none of the weapons received for examination could have fired Q284.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 11, 1970

On June 9, 1970, upon the writer's return to duty from extended sick leave, an attempt was made to examine the evidence in this case maintained under custody of the Chicago Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office in Room 2114 of the Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois. However, the key originally assigned to the Chicago FBI Office to this room by K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Civil Rights Attorney, United States Department of Justice, would no longer open the lock.

Mrs. HENRIETTA SINSKY, Room 280, Federal Building, Office of General Services Administration (GSA), advised on June 10, 1970, that GSA had received authorization from Mr. JACK MEYER, in charge of property for United States Attorney's (USA) Office, Room 1500, Federal Building, to clean this room and to change the lock. She does not recall the exact date this was completed, but that it was approximately during the last week in May, 1970.

Mrs. SINSKY with the writer entered Room 2114 on June 10, 1970, and observed that the room had been cleaned of all surplus boxes and packaging materials and that there remained in the room three items each containing the sticker "Evidence Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C."

An examination of these items by the writer disclosed they contained the following items:

Box number one, 18 inches by 22 inches by 5 inches, contained a package with a notation, "Photographs of Q 162 through Q 167 Mattresses of Q 31 Hassock (PC-C3999FA)" The box had been returned from the FBI Laboratory, Washington, D.C. under date March 2, 1970, and contained the following information on the invoice of contents:

"'Bullets, bullet fragments and lead fragments removed from mattresses Q 162 through Q 167.' Radiographs of-Q 162 through Q 167 mattresses. Radiographs of hassock Q 31 (PC-C3999FA)."

On 6/9,10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

[redacted] by SA [redacted] Date dictated 6/10/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Box number two consisted of the following:

1. Man's black with white pin dot suit coat identified as FBI Laboratory number Q 32. Also included on the marking were two letter "Z's" to indicate that possibly the coat might have been examined by SA ROBERT ZIMMERS, FBI Laboratory, who did the balistics examinations in this case.

2. A 8½ inch by 11 inch manilla envelope containing FBI Laboratory items Q 21, Q 22, Q 23, Q 24, and Q 30.

3. A box approximately 6 inches by 8 inches by 1 inch containing FBI Laboratory items "Q 153 through Q 157 K47-K60 PC-C4471LU."

4. One unopened box approximately 4½ inches by 5½ inches by 1 inch marked "Q 133 and Q 134 MAC DONELL Slides."

5. One cardboard carton approximately 13½ inches by 11 inches by one inch containing a piece of plasterboard identified as "Q 1."

6. One card identified as "Q 281" approximately 5 inches by 7½ inches by 3/4 inches.

7. Small envelope approximately 3 inches by 5 inches containing FBI Laboratory "Q 28 and Q 29 - 2 cartrages from clothes bundle in entrance hall."

8. One package, wrapped, approximately 13 inches by 7 inches by 2 inches containing identification "Q 281."

9. One brick wrapped in brown paper identified as "Q 139."

10. "Q 26" consisted of a piece of wood, approximately 11½ inches by 4½ inches by 1 3/4 inches wrapped in brown paper.

Item number three consisted of a shopping bag containing invoices returned from the FBI Laboratory of numerous items previously submitted, as well as large manilla envelopes which had originally been received on January 19, 1970, by the writer from FRANCIS G. ANDRES, attorney for the Black Panther Party.

All of the above items are to be retained in the bulky exhibit file until such time that all litagation in this matter has been completed, it being noted that on June 10, 1970, a civil suit was filed in Federal District Court by Mrs. IBERIA HAMPTON, mother of deceased FRED HAMPTON, seeking damages in HAMPTON's death of $3,755,000.

On June 10, 1970, Mr. JACK MEYER, in charge of porperties, Office of USA, Room 1500, Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, (353-5302) advised that he authorized the changing of the locks in Room 2114 of the Federal Building during approximately the last week in May when the Office of the Building Manager of GSA assured him the "room was cleaned."

1148 PMURGENT 12-19-69

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHICAGO [redacted] 1P

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), RM.

TOM PANUSH, RECORDS OFFICER, COOK COUNTY JAIL, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ADVISED INSTANT THAT FOLLOWING RELEASED INSTANT ON BOND: BRENDA HARRIS, FIVE THOUSAND (FIVE HUNDRED CASH), LEWIS TRULOCK, TWO FIVE THOUSAND (TWO FIVE HUNDRED CASH), HAROLD BELL, FIVE THOUSAND (FIVE HUNDRED CASH), BLAIR ANDERSON, FIVE THOUSAND (FIVE HUNDRED CASH).

ABOVE ARRESTED DECEMBER FOUR, LAST, BY CHICAGO PD, AFTER SHOOT OUT AT TWO THREE THREE SEVEN WEST MONROE, CHICAGO, WHICH RESULTED IN DEATH OF FRED ALLEN HAMPTON, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP, AND MARK CLARK, LT., ILLINOIS BPP, AT PEORIA, ILLINOIS.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - USA, Chicago
1 - USA, New Haven

Report of: SA [redacted]
Office: Chicago, Illinois
Date: June 12, 1969

Field Office File #: [redacted]
Bureau File #:

Title:
GEORGE SAMS, JR.;
LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS;
BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON;
ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES;
HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT;
PATRICK KEEN;
LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON;
JESSIE WARD;
GEORGIA WASHINGTON

Character: UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION - MURDER; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER; KIDNAPING; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT KIDNAPING; BINDING; HARBORING

Snopsis: On 6/3 and 4/69, information was received that subject GEORGE SAMS, JR. was being secreted at the Headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), Chicago, which during the early morning hours of 6/4/69, Chicago Agents attempted to gain access to this office in an attempt to locate subject. After repeated attempts to gain cooperation of members of the BPP, all occupants ordered out of premises. Arrested and charged with harboring subject GEORGE SAMS, JR., in violation of Title 18, Section 1071, United States Code, were subjects LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS, BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON, ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES, HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, PATRICK KEEN, LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON, JESSIE WARD, AND GEORGIA WASHINGTON. AUSA, Chicago authorized filing of these charges before United States Commissioner, Chicago, on 6/4/69. All subjects appeared before United States Commissioner that day and released on bond for reappearance on 6/20/69. A search incidental to subjects' arrests and in connection with search for fugitive, resulted in seizure by Agents of 13 guns, large quantities of ammunition, swords, gasmasks, office machines, books and quantities of records, posters and literature. SUBJECT SAMS REPORTEDLY ENFORCER FOR BPP AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

This investigation was predicated upon receipt of information from the New Haven Division reflecting that GEORGE SAMS, JR., had been charged with the holding and subsequent murder of one, ALEX RACKLEY for several days in May, 1969, during which time he was tortured, scalded with boiling water, beaten, burned, and subsequently murdered. An authorized complaint was filed May 27, 1969, before United States Commissioner (USC) ARTHUR H. LATIMER at New Haven, Connecticut, by SA [redacted]. A Commissioner's warrant was issued for his arrest on May 27, 1969, charging violation of Title 18, Section 1073, United States Code.

On June 3 and 4, 1969, information was received that the subject had been, and was then, on June 4, 1969, in the Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

At approximately 5:00 a.m., on June 4, 1969, Agents of the Chicago Office surrounded the premises at BPP Headquarters. SA [redacted], telephonically informed a person answering the telephone at this address that a warrant was outstanding for the arrest of subject, GEORGE SAMS, Jr., and three other individuals. SA [redacted] attempted to elicit cooperation of those within the BPP Headquarters without success. After approximately 30 minutes, the occupants of this building were ordered out on the street and were placed under arrest. These eight individuals identified themselves as follows:

LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS
BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON
ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES
HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT
PATRICK KEEN
LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON
JESSIE WARD
GEORGIA WASHINGTON.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 6, 1969

1

On June 4, 1969, SAs [redacted], [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted]., arrested LOCKETT P. BIBBS on the sidewalk in front of 2350 West Madison. This address houses the offices of the Chicago Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and BIBBS was about to enter same at the time he was arrested.

BIBBS was subsequently transported by Bureau automobile to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office at 219 South Dearborn, where he was photographed, fingerprinted, and provided with a printed warning and waiver form which he read but declined to sign.

BIBBS was interviewed by SAs [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted] regarding his association with the BPP and he advised as follows:

BIBBS stated he has been a member of the BPP for about four or five months. He then amended his statement regarding his membership with the BPP and advised he is merely a friend of the party and works for them. He stated, however, he has never formally joined the BPP. BIBBS stated that at the time of his arrest he was about to enter the offices of the BPP to help supervise their "Breakfast for Children Program." He stated that his duties are to set tables and help serve the children as they are being fed. He stated that the BPP tries to help the people in the neighborhood and he feels it is a very good and worthwhile organization. He advised that he has never seen any guns or other weapons in the BPP headquarters and that he has never seen a member of the BPP carrying a gun on his person.

BIBBS was shown a photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR., and stated he did not know SAMS by name or photograph. BIBBS advised he had been in the BPP headquarters several times during the previous evening, but again denied having seen SAMS on the premises.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted], [redacted],
[redacted], [redacted],
by and [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

2

The following description was obtained by observation and interrogation:

Name	LOCKETT PHILLIP BIBBS
Aliases	"LUCKY"
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Age	41
Dated of Birth	June 7, 1927
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Nationality	American
Height	6'0"
Weight	160 pounds
Build	Slim
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complextion	Dark
Teeth	Fair
Scars and Marks	12" scar right knee; 1" scar bridge of nose
Residence	
Present	None
Past	2525 West Jackson
Occupation	Machine operator
Employment	
Present	None
Past	Chicago Molded Products Corporation, 1020 North Kolmar
Marital status	Separated - wife - LOUISE BIBBS nee GOLPHIN
Military Service	1945-1947; 1951-1954 United States Army US 460 45 367
Education	4 years high school, did not graduate, last school Du Sable

[redacted]

3

Selective Service Number	US 460 45 367
Social Security Number	326-20-3293
Relatives	
Wife	LOUISE BIBBS nee GOLPHIN
Child	ROBELIA DOBSON, 95th Street
Father	LOCKETT BIBBS, Port Clinton, Ohio 1121 State
Mother	MARGARET BIBBS 54-- South State. Chicago, Illinois Apartment 412
Sisters	MARILYN WINDFIELD 6400 South Woodlawn GWENDOLYN EVANS 102nd and Peoria Chicago Illinois
Admitted Prior Arrest Record	3 years probation for burglary, November, 1966, at Chicago. Advises he is still on probation.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 10, 1969

After being advised of the identities and official capacities of the arresting officers, BRUCE ALLAN DICKSON was arrested for harboring a Federal fugitive at 5:58 AM, June 4, 1969, at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois. He was immediately orally advised of his rights as contained in "Interrogation; Advice of Rights; Your Rights" Form. He declined to make a statement and refused to give his identity. He was then transported in Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Radio Car Number 180, to FBI Headquarters, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, for processing by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted].

At FBI Headquarters, DICKSON was again advised of his rights as contained in the "Your Rights" Form, and he stated he understood his rights, but refused to be interviewed other than giving his name and his home address, which he listed as being 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois.

The following is a description of subject obtained through interview and observation:

Name	BRUCE ALLAN DICKSON
Date of birth	Refused to give
Place of birth	Refused to give
Former Employment	Janitor
Residence	2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois
Race	Negro
Sex	Male
Height	6 feet, 1 inch
Weight	165 - 170 pounds
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Build	Medium
Complexion	Light
Scars	9 inch scar on upper left with stitching scars on 1 inch scar on left shoul ½ inch circular scar ins left arm ½ inch circular scar back

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SA [redacted] and
SA [redacted]

by Date dictated 6/10/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2/CG [redacted]

Scars	left arm ½ inch scar left wrist 1½ inch scar across right wrist

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 5, 1969

ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Office, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969, by Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] Prior to being interviewed GRAVES was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and was furnished with a form entitled, "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" which she read. After reading this form GRAVES stated she understood her rights and declined to sign the form.

GRAVES admitted she is a member of the Black Panther Party, however, declined to state how long she had been a member.

GRAVES was displayed photographs of GEORGE SAMS, JR. and RORY B. HITHE and stated she does not know either of them and has never seen them.

GRAVES refused to answer any further questions with the exception of some questions regarding her background and description.

An examination of GRAVES' personal effects disclosed the following items:

One aerosol spray can of "Protect-U" defensive spray, which was retained.

A piece of paper bearing telephone number 873-1429.

Card listing person to notify in case of emergency as Grandmother BURTON, 8440 Vernon, telephone number RA3-4233, and ST3-9523.

Card indicating GRAVES had completed course in Red Cross Home Nursing at Peace Memorial Hospital, June [illegible], 1968.

Card indicating GRAVES is a registered Practical Nurse.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted] and Date dictated 6/5/69

by [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2 [redacted]

Two letters bearing return address on United States Department of Army, Official Business envelopes of RONALD DAVIS, Drawer A, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 66027. Both letters mailed postage free. Telephone numbers 243-8276, or 243-8376, and 873-1429 were handwritten on envelope.

A piece of paper bearing telephone number 379-7746.

Card for membership in the Majestic Social Club in name of DIANN BROOKS. Written on back of card was "ELAINE ROBERTSON, 8019 S. Kimbark, 734-7025."

The following descriptive and background data was obtained from interview and observation:

Name	ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES
Race	Negro
Sex	Female
Date of Birth	October 3, 1947
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'5"
Weight	120 pounds
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Dark
Grandmother	MAGGIE BURTON, 8440 Vernon, Chicago, Illinois

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 9, 1969

HARVEY D. HOLT was arrested at the headquarters of the Chicago Office of the Black Panther Party, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. He was informed that he was being arrested for harboring a fugitive from justice wanted by Federal authorities. He was informed of the identities of the below named agents as agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

HOLT was informed that he did not have to say anything, that anything he did say could be used against him later in a court of law, that he was entitled to contact an attorney and to talk to him before talking to the arresting agents, and that if he could not afford an attorney the Federal District Court would appoint one for him.

The above rights were exhibited to HOLT in written form, and he executed a waiver of rights. He furnished no information other than the following background information:

Name	HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, aka, Harvey D. Holt, Dwight Holt
Date of birth	10/8/43
Place of birth	Bay St. Louis, Missouri
Height	5' 9"
Weight	165 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Scars and marks	Mustache; blemishes on right shoulder; a small pencil-like scar under each nostril; left ear pierced.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 6/9/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

2

Marital status	Single
Selective Service No.	11-53-43-197
Social Security No.	349-36-2478
Drivers license	Illinois, number H43032443287
Employment	Present: St. Malachy Catholic Church, Chicago, Illinois, Gym Supervisor Prior: Automatic Electric Properties, Incorporated, Northlake, Illinois
Education	Presently a student at Wilson Campus, Chicago City College, 7047 South Stewart, Chicago, Illinois, entered January 31, 1969
Admitted prior arrests	Traffic violation, January, 1969, while driving a Chevrolet, 1968 Illinois drivers license HM 3154, Chicago Vehicle Tag 4295003

The following is an inventory of personal property in the possession of HOLT at the time of his arrest:

A. Cash - $18.82

B. A General Motors car key

C. A set of keys

D. Ball point pen

E. An envelope addressed to HOLT at the above address bearing the return address, Wilson Campus, Chicago City College.

F. A box of pills, explained by HOLT to be for the treatment of gonorrhea.

G. A comb

H. A wallet containing the following:

[redacted]

3

1. A Certificate of Proficiency issued at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, identifying HOLT as a Heating Equipment Operator.

2. Auto insurance identification card issued by Parliment Insurance Company, Chicago, Illinois, telephone LO 1-6460.

3. A photograph showing two Negro females with the notation, "fashion show" on the back.

4. A card from Motors Insurance Corporation, stamped Midway Chevrolet Company, 6522 Cottage Grove Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

5. A United States Government Motor Vehicle Operator's License issued at Fort Carson, Colorado.

6. An original membership card in the "Black Brothers of 'Unity'", president ERVINE AKBAR, telephones, 287-0658, 9.

7. St. Phillip Basilica High School commencement exercise admission card.

8. Social Security card showing number 349-35-2473.

9. Veterans Administration card number 24669325.

10. Identification card issued by Wilson Campus, Chicago City College, 7047 South Stewart, Chicago.

11. Traffic ticket dated January 31, 1969, indicating HOLT was at that time driving a Chevrolet, Illinois license HM 3154, Chicago Vehicle Tag 4295039.

12. A guest identification card issued by the Clinton Job Corps Center, to one MARVIN WEST, born July 23, 1943, 3112 West 15th Place, Chicago Illinois (HOLT explained that his photo, which appears on this card, was put on the wrong card by the Job Corps Center by mistake).

[redacted]

4.

13. An Illinois Bell Telephone receipt for telephone number 277-3612, for the address 4102 West 16th Street, dated May 2, 1969.

14. A telephone dial tag containing the above number.

15. A scrap of paper bearing the name MALONE 684-4620, 6703 Merr....(illegible).

16. A scrap of paper bearing the names PAT MITCHUM, HENRY, 6112 Kimbark, 667-6016.

17. Five receipts from the Westlane Hotel for rental of Apartment 410 to one HARVEY COLT. The receipts are dated April 14, 1969, April 21, 1969, April 26, 1969, May 5, 1969, and May 10, 1969. (HOLT explained the above name was merely a spelling error on the part of the hotel).

18. A scrap of paper bearing the name ED LEWIS, 626-8764.

19. A receipt for a $1.00 registration fee to the Black University.

20. A receipt for an American Express money order in the amount of $80.00 dated February 10, 1968, payable to Mc Cabe Realty.

21. A card of ROBERT L. GREEN, Republic Precinct Captain, 5018 West Van Buren Street, Chicago, Illinois.

22. Chicago Public Library card number 391846.

23. GMAC card bearing the name C. L. HARRIS, 10046 South Western Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

[redacted]

5.

24. A receipt from the Northlake Currency Exchange, 23 North Wolf Road, Northlake, Illinois, dated March 16, 1968, for a money order payable to Mc Cabe Realty.

25. A scrap of paper bearing the name KATHIE, 826-8125, and the notation "met at JERRY's house".

26. A card from the Chicago Commission on Urban Opportunity, with the name CARSON R. BROWN, Program Assistant Unit Coordinator, 400 South Peoria, Chicago, Illinois, telephone 243-4315.

27. A notice of attempt to deliver certified mail April 23, 1969.

28. A card from BEN ELLIS Optical Laboratory, 140 North State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Room 602, telephone 372-9253.

29. Army meal card showing HOLT's RA number to be 16-769-553.

30. An address book containing the following entries:

a. On the front page were listed the following telephone numbers: 826-9107, 722-4678, 943-3455, 751-0733.

b. ARRGERINA, 422 South 12th Avenue, 344-6417.

c. ANNET and WELL, 826-3678.

d. BARBARA WILLIAMS, 378-8761.

e. B.S.A. office 922-3580 x 421.

f. A & E 379-4300 x 141.

g. ARLENE, 533-6541.

[redacted]

6.

h. BRENDA, 928-6794.

i. AL, 533-5010.

j. ANNE, 722-4384.

k. BOO, 265-1909.

l. CHARMAINE, 666-6523.

m. DOUGLAS BLANCHARD, 521-0850.

n. DIANE B., 1646 West 14th Place, 243-6586.

o. DOSS (Shell Station) SE 3-9342, 243-3095.

p. DOROTHY TURNER, 642-9782.

q. DELORIS, 261-4997.

r. Count 19, 522-1273.

s. ETHEL GRIFFIN, 667-7607.

t. FANNIE, 337-5163.

u. FRANK, 277-7724.

v. JOAN GREY, 704 East 51st Street, KE 6-2854.

w. WILLIE HAWKINS, 4258 West Adams, 826-2440.

x. WILLIE HOLMAN, 56 North Long, 261-2117.

y. GEORGE (JONES), 287-1087.

z. JOAN, HU 3-6620.

aa. LYNN and FRENCH, 5301 South Maryland, 667-0115.

bb. MOSE, 1404 East 76th, 955-8890.

[redacted]

7.

cc. MILDRED WILLIAM, 421-6426.

dd. MOTHER (job), ST 2-1500 x 191, Wieboldts

ee. MARIE (DORIS) G., 6660 South Mich., 487-7127.

ff. PEGGY TAFT, 4112 Adams, 826-0631.

gg. JAMES PURNELL, 553-0094.

hh. Office, SE 3-9638.

ii. P. Office, 243-8276.

jj. PAM, 738-0336.

kk. REGINA, 1296 A Washburn, CA 6-6425.

ll. ROSEMARY, 722-0989.

mm. TOMMIE, 343-7530, 343-7763.

nn. L. C. SMITH, 221-1814.

oo. WM. SCANLAN, NE 8-5461.

pp. SYLVESTER, ES 8-1868; a number 429 was listed also

qq. OSCAR TANNER, 7059 South Halsted, 994-4430 x 115.

rr. MARVIN WELLS, bus: 268-8081, home: 747-0256.

ss. VEKON HENDERSON, 7712 Drexel.

tt. On the last page were the following
notations: SE 3-9638, G.T. 287-1087,
St. Malachy SE 3-1068.

Date 6/10/69

On June 4, 1969, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] arrested PATRICK KEEN at the headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), 2350 West Madison Street.

KEEN was subsequently transported by Bureau automobile to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office at 219 South Dearborn Street, where he was photographed, fingerprinted and interviewed concerning his association with the BPP and with the subject GEORGE SAMS, JR.

KEEN was provided with a copy of a Warning and Waiver Form which [illegible] read and stated he understood, but declined to sign.

KEEN provided the following information:

He stated that he has been a member of the BPP for approximately three weeks and advised that on the night of June 3-4, 1969, he was the Officer of the Day (OD) at BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois. He advised that as the OD he had been in charge of the BPP office.

KEEN observed a photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR. and stated that he did not know SAMS by name nor did he recognize the photograph. He stated that he had never seen the person in the photograph in the BPP office.

KEEN advised that a couple of weeks ago, he had gone into the BPP office and had heard someone talking loudly in another room in the office. He stated that he made inquiries about the person making the noise and was told that the man's name was WADDELL and that he was from BPP headquarters on the West coast. He added, however, that he did not actually observe WADDELL and, therefore, would be unable to state whether or not this person was identical with the photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SA [redacted]
by SA [redacted] Date dictated 6/5/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2

CG [redacted]

KEEN declined to further discuss his activities within the BPP or activities of the BPP itself.

The following description was obtained by interview and observation:

Name	PATRICK KEEN
Alias	PAT KEEN
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Date of birth	March 4, 1949
Place of birth	Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'11"
Weight	170 lbs.
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Dark
Nationality	American
Scars and marks	Birth mark oblong shape one inch by 3/4 inch; upper right leg, front
Peculiarities	Wears glasses (tinted)
Education	Graduated John Marshall High School, Chicago, Illinois, 1967; Roosevelt University, Chica 1967; De Paul University, Chicag 1967-68; Wheaton College, Wheaton Illinois, 1968-69 (Completed two years college, major: music)
Employment	None
Social Security Number	334-45-8580
Selective Service No.	11-49-49-45
Selective Service Classification	1A
Address	3335 West Fullerton, Chicago, Illinois
Previous addresses	1640 South Spaulding, Chicago. Il 170 North Le Claire, Chicago, Il
Marital status	Single
Mother	CLARA KEEN, 3335 West Fullerton. Chicago, Ill.
Father	THEODORE KEEN, same address

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 6/6/69

LARRY MAURICE ROBERSON, 3326 West Fulton Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was interviewed by Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] who identified themselves to him as SAs of the FBI. Prior to the commencement of the interview, ROBERSON was furnished Form FD-395 "Interrogation; Advice of Rights Form" which he carefully read and refused to sign. He stated that he understood what his rights were but that he did not desire to sign any legal document. ROBERSON furnished the following information:

ROBERSON furnished SAs with his name, address, and basic descriptive information. He refused to make any further statements to the Agents regarding the Black Panther Party or his involvement with the Party. He denied any knowledge of GEORGE SAMS, Jr.

The following description was obtained through observation and interview:

Name	LARRY MAURICE ROBERSON, also known as Robinson
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Age	20
Date of Birth	12/26/48
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Nationality	United States
Height	5'11"
Weight	202 Pounds
Build	Medium
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Medium-dark
Scars and Marks	1½" scar right knee
Father's Address	3326 West Fulton Street Chicago, Illinois
Occupation	Unemployed
Marital Status	Single

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 6/[illegible]/69

neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned

2 [redacted]

Education	Completed John Marshall High School, Chicago, August, 1966, Lincoln University, Jefferson City, Missouri, September, 1966-1969
Selective Service Number	11-49-48-1930
Social Security Number	346-42-1930
Father	HENRY BELL ROBERSON
Mother	DORIS JEAN ROBERSON Nee MITCHELL
Brother	DERRICK LEROY ROBERSON, age 15 (Above individuals residing at 3326 West Fulton)
Prior Arrests	Admitted 1969 Chicago declined to state reason for arrest.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/4/69

1

JESSE WARD, 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois, was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] who identified themselves to him as Special Agents of the FBI. Prior to commencement of the interview, WARD was furnished form FD-395, "Interrogation: Advice of Rights" which he read and refused to sign. He stated that he understood his rights as they were written on the form and as he read them, but he would not sign anything because he does not know or understand what he is doing and because it is against the rules of the Black Panther Party. WARD furnished the following information:

His name is JESSE WARD and he resides at 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois. He is a member of the Black Panther Party of Illinois. Other than call the interviewing Agents numerous obscene names, he refused to furnish any other information.

The following description of WARD was obtained through observation and interrogation on June 4, 1969:

Name	JESSE WARD
Address	721 North Troy
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Height	6' - 6'1"
Weight	175 - 180 lbs.
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black, bushy American cut
Age	Approximately 19
Complexion	Medium dark
Scars and marks	2" scar, upper left lip
Characteristics	Wears glasses; wears a wis goatee and mustache

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 6/4/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/4/69

On June 4, 1969, at Chicago, Illinois, JESSE WARD, 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois, was while being interviewed in the Chicago Office of the FBI, given a body search and the following items were found:

One book entitled "The Thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung" by MAO TSE-TUNG, which bore a red soft leather cover.

One pamphlet entitled "Along the Socialist or Capitalist Road?", printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, and dated August 15, 1967.

A pamphlet entitled "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything" by YAO WEN-YUAN, printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1968.

A pamphlet entitled "China's Great Revolution and The Soviet Union's Great Tragedy" by RENMIN RIBAO (People's Daily) Observer dated June 4, 1967. This pamphlet was printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1967.

A pamphlet entitled "Statement By Comrade Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, In Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression". This pamphlet was printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, in 1968, and it bore a date of April 16, 1968.

With the exception of the last named pamphlet, the other three pamphlets bore the following worded stamp:

"A copy of this material has been filed with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted] and

by [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 6/4/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2 [redacted]

Justice, Washington, D. C., where the registration statement of China Books and Periodicals, 2929-24th Street, San Francisco, 10, California, as an agent of Guozi Shudian of Peking, China, is available for inspection. The fact of registration does not indicate approval of this material by the Government of the United States."

Also taken during the search were: one pair of tweezers; one felt tip blue pen; one blank firearms registration form; and numerous assorted papers which WARD declined to accept and requested they be discarded by the searching Agents. All of the items taken from WARD were returned to him except the pair of tweezers which were given to the United States Marshal.

In addition, WARD had in his possession the following items which were not taken: fifty cents in change comprised of one quarter, three nickels and one dime; one cigarette lighter; five books of matches; one pack of Kool cigarettes; one scrap of paper bearing the notation DIANE JONES, 2822 California, telephone number 326-6189; one scrap of paper bearing the notation "has been changed" 201 South Ashland, Political Orientation MWF 8:00; one scrap of paper bearing the notation BEVERLEY, 722-5960, 4122 North Wilcox.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 6, 1969

GEORGIA WASHINGTON was placed under arrest at 2350 West Madison. She was immediately advised of her rights by SA [redacted]. She advised she understood her rights, but refused to execute a warning and waiver form.

WASHINGTON was shown photographs of the following individuals:

GEORGE SAMS, JR.
FBI Number 493 526 F

LONNIE MC LUCAS
FBI Number 546 916 E

LANDON ROBERT WILLIAMS
FBI Number 229 544 G

RORY B. HITHE.

WASHINGTON advised that she had never seen any of these individuals and their names were not familiar to her. She advised that she did not wish to make any further statement.

The following description of WASHINGTON was obtained by observation and interview:

Sex	Female
Race	Negro
Date of Birth	January 22, 1951
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'4"
Weight	155 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Social Security Number	352-42-7813

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] and
SA [redacted]

Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; [illegible] to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]
2

Employment	Typist for Security Plating Company 2645 West Fulton
Present Address	2350 West Madison
Former Address	4317 West Wilcox
Education	Presently enrolled in night school at Austin High School
Mother	MARY WASHINGTON Address unknown
Father	Unknown
Brothers and Sisters	None
Previous admitted arrests	Arrested by Chicago Police Department early in 1968 was held for a few hours and then released, reason for arrest unknown.

WASHINGTON had the following names and addresses in her purse:

BARBARA A. SANKEY
2156 West Monroe
Chicago, Illinois
Employment Mc Master-Car Supply Company
PO Box 4355

Brother WOODS
DA 8-3123
At home 344-4540.

[redacted]

On June 4, 1969, the facts of this case were presented to Assistant United States Attorney NICHOLAS J. ETTEN, authorized the filing of a complaint charging subjects LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS, BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON, ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES, HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, PATRICK KEEN, LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON, JESSIE WARD, and GEORGIA WASHINGTON with Harboring and concealing subject, GEORGE SAMS, Jr., in violation of Title 18, Section 1071, United States Code.

Form A.O. 91 (Rev.12-1-63)

Com[illegible]

United States District Court

FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

NJE:[illegible]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ARVEY DWIGHT HOLT; LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON; ESSIE WARD; LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS; RUCE ALLEN DICKSON; PATRICK KEEN; EORGIA WASHINGTON; ANDREA GRAVES	Commissioner's Docket No. Case No. COMPLAINT for VIOLATION of [illegible] U.S.C. Title 18 Section 1071

BEFORE JAMES T. BALOG, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Ill.

Name of Commissioner — Address of Commissioner

The undersigned complainant being duly sworn states:

That on or about June 4, 1969, at Chicago in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,

HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT; LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON; JESSIE WARD; LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS;
[1] BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON; PATRICK KEEN; GEORGIA WASHINGTON; ANDREA GRAVES
having notice and with knowledge that a federal warrant of arrest had been issued xdid[2] for the apprehension of George Sams, Jr., also known as Robert Wedell Smith on a complaint charging George Sams, Jr. with unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for the crime of murder, a violation of the laws of the United States, wilfully and knowingly, and for the purpose of preventing his arrest on said warrant and for the purpose of preventing his discovery, did harbor and conceal George Sams, Jr. at 2350 W. Madison St., Chicago, Illinois in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1071.

And the complainant states that this complaint is based on SEE ATTACHED Sheet

And the complainant further states that he believes that

are material witnesses in relation to this charge.

[redacted]

Signature of Complainant

Special Agent, F.B.I.

Official Title

Sworn to before me, and subscribed in my presence, , 19

United States Commissioner

And the complainant states that this complaint is based on information supplied to complainant by Roy Mitchell, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Agent Mitchell stated to your complainant that in the early morning hours of June 4, 1969, he was contacted by a confidential informant who on numerous occasions has supplied information to Agent Mitchell which has proven to be reliable. The confidential informant stated to Mitchell that George Sams, Jr., also known as Robert Madell Smith, was then in a second floor office of a building at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, which office is known by your complainant to be the Chicago headquarters of the Black Panther Party. Complainant further states that he is familiar with the aforesaid George Sams, Jr. and that said individual is known by him to be a member of the National Black Panther Party. Complainant further states that he has knowledge that a federal criminal complaint and arrest warrant are presently outstanding at New Haven, Connecticut, charging the said George Sams, Jr. with the federal felony offense of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for murder, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1073. Complainant further states that on June 4, 1969 shortly after being informed of the aforesaid information supplied by the confidential informant, he and other agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation proceeded to the building at 2350 West Madison Street. All defendants who were then in the second floor Black Panther Office of the aforesaid building were informed by Agents of the F.B.I. that the said Agents were in possession of a warrant for the arrest of George Sams, Jr. All defendants were then requested to leave the building. For a period of approximately 30 minutes all defendants refused to comply with this request, refused to permit access to the building and refused to answer Agents' questions as to whether or not George Sams, Jr. was present in the building.

Complainant further states that pursuant to a search of the aforesaid Black Panther Party office incident to the arrest of defendants, several photographs depicting George Sams, Jr. were seized. Complainant further states that he recognizes the background in each of these photographs as being the inside of the office of the Black Panther Party, 2350 W. Madison St., Chicago, Illinois.

Complainant further states that he has personal knowledge of the aforesaid information.

RJE:alf

[redacted]

On June 4, 1969, [redacted], signed the aforementioned complaint before United States Commissioner JAMES T. BALOG. On June 4, 1969, Assistant United States Attorney ETTEN advised that all of the above eight subjects appeared before Commissioner BALOG and were released on own recognizance bond. The male individuals' bond was set at $4,000 and the female subjects at $3,000. the case was continued until 3:00 p.m. on June 20, 1969.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 11, 1970

On June 9, 1970, upon the writer's return to duty from extended sick leave, an attempt was made to examine the evidence in this case maintained under custody of the Chicago Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office in Room 2114 of the Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois. However, the key originally assigned to the Chicago FBI Office to this room by K. WILLIAM O'CONNOR, Civil Rights Attorney, United States Department of Justice, would no longer open the lock.

Mrs. HENRIETTA SINSKY, Room 280, Federal Building, Office of General Services Administration (GSA), advised on June 10, 1970, that GSA had received authorization from Mr. JACK MEYER, in charge of property for United States Attorney's (USA) Office, Room 1500, Federal Building, to clean this room and to change the lock. She does not recall the exact date this was completed, but that it was approximately during the last week in May, 1970.

Mrs. SINSKY with the writer entered Room 2114 on June 10, 1970, and observed that the room had been cleaned of all surplus boxes and packaging materials and that there remained in the room three items each containing the sticker "Evidence Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C."

An examination of these items by the writer disclosed they contained the following items:

Box number one, 18 inches by 22 inches by 5 inches, contained a package with a notation, "Photographs of Q 162 through Q 167 Mattresses of Q 31 Hassock (PC-C3999FA)" The box had been returned from the FBI Laboratory, Washington, D.C. under date March 2, 1970, and contained the following information on the invoice of contents:

"'Bullets, bullet fragments and lead fragments removed from mattresses Q 162 through Q 167.' Radiographs of Q 162 through Q 167 mattresses. Radiographs of hassock Q 31 (PC-C3999FA)."

On 6/9,10/70 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

[redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 6/10/70

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Box number two consisted of the following:

1. Man's black with white pin dot suit coat identified as FBI Laboratory number Q 32. Also included on the marking were two letter "Z's" to indicate that possibly the coat might have been examined by SA ROBERT ZIMMERS, FBI Laboratory, who did the balistics examinations in this case.

2. A 8½ inch by 11 inch manilla envelope containing FBI Laboratory items Q 21, Q 22, Q 23, Q 24, and Q 30.

3. A box approximately 6 inches by 8 inches by 1 inch containing FBI Laboratory items "Q 153 through Q 157 K47-K60 PC-C4471LU."

4. One unopened box approximately 4½ inches by 5½ inches by 1 inch marked "Q 133 and Q 134 MAC DONELL Slides."

5. One cardboard carton approximately 13½ inches by 11 inches by one inch containing a piece of plasterboard identified as "Q 1."

6. One card identified as "Q 281" approximately 5 inches by 7½ inches by 3/4 inches.

7. Small envelope approximately 3 inches by 5 inches containing FBI Laboratory "Q 28 and Q 29 - 2 cartrages from clothes bundle in entrance hall."

8. One package, wrapped, approximately 13 inches by 7 inches by 2 inches containing identification "Q 281."

9. One brick wrapped in brown paper identified as "Q 139."

10. "Q 26" consisted of a piece of wood, approximately 11½ inches by 4½ inches by 1 3/4 inches wrapped in brown paper.

[redacted]

3

Item number three consisted of a shopping bag containing invoices returned from the FBI Laboratory of numerous items previously submitted, as well as large manilla envelopes which had originally been received on January 19, 1970, by the writer from FRANCIS G. ANDRES, attorney for the Black Panther Party.

All of the above items are to be retained in the bulky exhibit file until such time that all litagation in this matter has been completed, it being noted that on June 10, 1970, a civil suit was filed in Federal District Court by Mrs. IBERIA HAMPTON, mother of deceased FRED HAMPTON, seeking damages in HAMPTON's death of $3,755,000.

On June 10, 1970, Mr. JACK MEYER, in charge of porperties, Office of USA, Room 1500, Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, (353-5302) advised that he authorized the changing of the locks in Room 2114 of the Federal Building during approximately the last week in May when the Office of the Building Manager of GSA assured him the "room was cleaned."

8 PMURGENT 12-10-69

DIRECTOR

OM CHICAGO [redacted] 1P

ACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), RM.

TOM PANUSH, RECORDS OFFICER, COOK COUNTY JAIL, CHICAGO, LLINOIS, ADVISED INSTANT THAT FOLLOWING RELEASED INSTANT ON OND: BRENDA HARRIS, FIVE THOUSAND (FIVE HUNDRED CASH), LEWIS RULOCK, TWO FIVE THOUSAND (TWO FIVE HUNDRED CASH), HAROLD BELL, FIVE THOUSAND (FIVE HUNDRED CASH), BLAIR ANDERSON, FIVE THOUSAND (FIVE HUNDRED CASH).

ABOVE ARRESTED DECEMBER FOUR, LAST, BY CHICAGO PD, AFTER SHOOT OUT AT TWO THREE THREE SEVEN WEST MONROE, CHICAGO, WHICH RESULTED IN DEATH OF FRED ALLEN HAMPTON, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP, AND MARK CLARK, LT., ILLINOIS BPP, AT PEORIA, ILLINOIS.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:
1 - USA, Chicago
1 - USA, New Haven

Report of: SA [redacted]
Office: Chicago, Illinois
Date: June 12, 1969

Field Office File #: [redacted]
Bureau File #:

Title:
GEORGE SAMS, JR.;
LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS;
BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON;
ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES;
HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT;
PATRICK KEEN;
LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON;
JESSIE WARD;
GEORGIA WASHINGTON

Character: UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION - MURDER; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER; KIDNAPING; CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT KIDNAPING; BINDING; HARBORING

Snopsis: On 6/3 and 4/69, information was received that subject GEORGE SAMS, JR. was being secreted at the Headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), Chicago, which during the early morning hours of 6/4/69, Chicago Agents attempted to gain access to this office in an attempt to locate subject. After repeated attempts to gain cooperation of members of the BPP, all occupants ordered out of premises. Arrested and charged with harboring subject GEORGE SAMS, JR., in violation of Title 18, Section 1071, United States Code, were subjects LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS, BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON, ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES, HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, PATRICK KEEN, LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON, JESSIE WARD, AND GEORGIA WASHINGTON. AUSA, Chicago authorized filing of these charges before United States Commissioner, Chicago, on 6/4/69. All subjects appeared before United States Commissioner that day and released on bond for reappearance on 6/20/69. A search incidental to subjects' arrests and in connection with search for fugitive, resulted in seizure by Agents of 13 guns, large quantities of ammunition, swords, gasmasks, office machines, books and quantities of records, posters and literature. SUBJECT SAMS REPORTEDLY ENFORCER FOR BPP AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

- P -

neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
ontents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

This investigation was predicated upon receipt of information from the New Haven Division reflecting that GEORGE SAMS, JR., had been charged with the holding and subsequent murder of one, ALEX RACKLEY for several days in May, 1969, during which time he was tortured, scalded with boiling water, beaten, burned, and subsequently murdered. An authorized complaint was filed May 27, 1969, before United States Commissioner (USC) ARTHUR H. LATIMER at New Haven, Connecticut, by SA [redacted]. A Commissioner's warrant was issued for his arrest on May 27, 1969, charging violation of Title 18, Section 1073, United States Code.

On June 3 and 4, 1969, information was received that the subject had been, and was then, on June 4, 1969, in the Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

At approximately 5:00 a.m., on June 4, 1969, Agents of the Chicago Office surrounded the premises at BPP Headquarters. SA [redacted], telephonically informed a person answering the telephone at this address that a warrant was outstanding for the arrest of subject, GEORGE SAMS, Jr., and three other individuals. SA [redacted] attempted to elicit cooperation of those within the BPP Headquarters without success. After approximately 30 minutes, the occupants of this building were ordered out on the street and were placed under arrest. These eight individuals identified themselves as follows:

LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS
BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON
ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES
HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT
PATRICK KEEN
LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON
JESSIE WARD
GEORGIA WASHINGTON.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 6, 1969

1

On June 4, 1969, SAs [redacted], [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted]., arrested LOCKETT P. BIBBS on the sidewalk in front of 2350 West Madison. This address houses the offices of the Chicago Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and BIBBS was about to enter same at the time he was arrested.

BIBBS was subsequently transported by Bureau automobile to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office at 219 South Dearborn, where he was photographed, fingerprinted, and provided with a printed warning and waiver form which he read but declined to sign.

BIBBS was interviewed by SAs [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted] regarding his association with the BPP and he advised as follows:

BIBBS stated he has been a member of the BPP for about four or five months. He then amended his statement regarding his membership with the BPP and advised he is merely a friend of the party and works for them. He stated, however, he has never formally joined the BPP. BIBBS stated that at the time of his arrest he was about to enter the offices of the BPP to help supervise their "Breakfast for Children Program." He stated that his duties are to set tables and help serve the children as they are being fed. He stated that the BPP tries to help the people in the neighborhood and he feels it is a very good and worthwhile organization. He advised that he has never seen any guns or other weapons in the BPP headquarters and that he has never seen a member of the BPP carrying a gun on his person.

BIBBS was shown a photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR., and stated he did not know SAMS by name or photograph. BIBBS advised he had been in the BPP headquarters several times during the previous evening, but again denied having seen SAMS on the premises.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SAs [redacted], [redacted], [redacted]., [redacted], and [redacted] - [redacted] Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

2

The following description was obtained by observation and interrogation:

Name	LOCKETT PHILLIP BIBBS
Aliases	"LUCKY"
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Age	41
Dated of Birth	June 7, 1927
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Nationality	American
Height	6'0"
Weight	160 pounds
Build	Slim
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complextion	Dark
Teeth	Fair
Scars and Marks	12" scar right knee; 1" scar bridge of nose
Residence	
Present	None
Past	2525 West Jackson
Occupation	Machine operator
Employment	
Present	None
Past	Chicago Molded Products Corporation, 1020 North Kolmar
Marital status	Separated - wife - LOUISE BIBBS nee GOLPHIN
Military Service	1945-1947; 1951-1954 United States Army US 460 45 367
Education	4 years high school, did not graduate, last school Du Sable

[redacted]
3

Selective Service Number	US 460 45 367
Social Security Number	326-20-3293
Relatives	
Wife	LOUISE BIBBS nee GOLPHIN
Child	ROBELIA DOBSON, 95th Street
Father	LOCKETT BIBBS, Port Clinton, Ohio 1121 State
Mother	MARGARET BIBBS 54-- South State. Chicago, Illinois Apartment 412
Sisters	MARILYN WINDFIELD 6400 South Woodlawn GWENDOLYN EVANS 102nd and Peoria Chicago Illinois
Admitted Prior Arrest Record	3 years probation for burglary, November, 1966, at Chicago. Advises he is still on probation.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 10, 1969

After being advised of the identities and official capacities of the arresting officers, BRUCE ALLAN DICKSON was arrested for harboring a Federal fugitive at 5:58 AM, June 4, 1969, at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois. He was immediately orally advised of his rights as contained in "Interrogation; Advice of Rights; Your Rights" Form. He declined to make a statement and refused to give his identity. He was then transported in Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Radio Car Number 180, to FBI Headquarters, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, for processing by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted].

At FBI Headquarters, DICKSON was again advised of his rights as contained in the "Your Rights" Form, and he stated he understood his rights, but refused to be interviewed other than giving his name and his home address, which he listed as being 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois.

The following is a description of subject obtained through interview and observation:

Name	BRUCE ALLAN DICKSON
Date of birth	Refused to give
Place of birth	Refused to give
Former Employment	Janitor
Residence	2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois
Race	Negro
Sex	Male
Height	6 feet, 1 inch
Weight	165 - 170 pounds
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black
Build	Medium
Complexion	Light
Scars	9 inch scar on upper left arm with stitching scars on either 1 inch scar on left shoulder ½ inch circular scar inside elbow left arm ½ inch circular scar back of elb

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] and
SA [redacted]

Date dictated 6/10/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2
CG [redacted]

Scars	left arm ½ inch scar left wrist 1½ inch scar across right wrist

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 5, 1969

ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Office, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois, on June 4, 1969, by Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] Prior to being interviewed GRAVES was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and was furnished with a form entitled, "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" which she read. After reading this form GRAVES stated she understood her rights and declined to sign the form.

GRAVES admitted she is a member of the Black Panther Party, however, declined to state how long she had been a member.

GRAVES was displayed photographs of GEORGE SAMS, JR. and RORY B. HITHE and stated she does not know either of them and has never seen them.

GRAVES refused to answer any further questions with the exception of some questions regarding her background and description.

An examination of GRAVES' personal effects disclosed the following items:

One aerosol spray can of "Protect-U" defensive spray, which was retained.

A piece of paper bearing telephone number 873-1429.

Card listing person to notify in case of emergency as Grandmother BURTON, 8440 Vernon, telephone number RA3-4233, and ST3-9523.

Card indicating GRAVES had completed course in Red Cross Home Nursing at Peace Memorial Hospital, June 1968.

Card indicating GRAVES is a registered Practical Nurse.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 6/5/69

by [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2 [redacted]

Two letters bearing return address on United States Department of Army, Official Business envelopes of RONALD DAVIS, Drawer A, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 66027. Both letters mailed postage free. Telephone numbers 243-8276, or 243-8376, and 873-1429 were handwritten on envelope.

A piece of paper bearing telephone number 379-7746.

Card for membership in the Majestic Social Club in name of DIANN BROOKS. Written on back of card was "ELAINE ROBERTSON, 8019 S. Kimbark, 734-7025."

The following descriptive and background data was obtained from interview and observation:

Name	ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES
Race	Negro
Sex	Female
Date of Birth	October 3, 1947
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'5"
Weight	120 pounds
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Dark
Grandmother	MAGGIE BURTON, 8440 Vernon, Chicago, Illinois

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 9, 1969

HARVEY D. HOLT was arrested at the headquarters of the Chicago Office of the Black Panther Party, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. He was informed that he was being arrested for harboring a fugitive from justice wanted by Federal authorities. He was informed of the identities of the below named agents as agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

HOLT was informed that he did not have to say anything, that anything he did say could be used against him later in a court of law, that he was entitled to contact an attorney and to talk to him before talking to the arresting agents, and that if he could not afford an attorney the Federal District Court would appoint one for him.

The above rights were exhibited to HOLT in written form, and he executed a waiver of rights. He furnished no information other than the following background information:

Name	HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, aka, Harvey D. Holt, Dwight Holt
Date of birth	10/8/43
Place of birth	Bay St. Louis, Missouri
Height	5' 9"
Weight	165 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Scars and marks	Mustache; blemishes on right shoulder; a small pencil-like scar under each nostril; left ear pierced.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 6/9/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]
2

Marital status	Single
Selective Service No.	11-53-43-197
Social Security No.	349-36-2478
Drivers license	Illinois, number H43032443287
Employment	Present: St. Malachy Catholic Church, Chicago, Illinois, Gym Supervisor Prior: Automatic Electric Properties, Incorporated, Northlake, Illinois
Education	Presently a student at Wilson Campus, Chicago City College, 7047 South Stewart, Chicago, Illinois, entered January 31, 1969
Admitted prior arrests	Traffic violation, January, 1969, while driving a Chevrolet, 1968 Illinois drivers license BM 3154, Chicago Vehicle Tag 4295033

The following is an inventory of personal property in the possession of HOLT at the time of his arrest:

A. Cash - $18.82

B. A General Motors car key

C. A set of keys

D. Ball point pen

E. An envelope addressed to HOLT at the above address bearing the return address, Wilson Campus, Chicago City College.

F. A box of pills, explained by HOLT to be for the treatment of gonorrhea.

G. A comb

H. A wallet containing the following:

[redacted]
3

1. A Certificate of Proficiency issued at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, identifying HOLT as a Heating Equipment Operator.

2. Auto insurance identification card issued by Parliment Insurance Company, Chicago, Illinois, telephone LO 1-6460.

3. A photograph showing two Negro females with the notation, "fashion show" on the back.

4. A card from Motors Insurance Corporation, stamped Midway Chevrolet Company, 6522 Cottage Grove Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

5. A United States Government Motor Vehicle Operator's License issued at Fort Carson, Colorado.

6. An original membership card in the "Black Brothers of 'Unity'", president ERVINE AKBAR, telephones, 287-0658, 9.

7. St. Phillip Basilica High School commencement exercise admission card.

8. Social Security card showing number 349-35-2478.

9. Veterans Administration card number 24669325.

10. Identification card issued by Wilson Campus, Chicago City College, 7047 South Stewart, Chicago.

11. Traffic ticket dated January 31, 1969, indicating HOLT was at that time driving a Chevrolet, Illinois license HM 3154, Chicago Vehicle Tag 4295039.

12. A guest identification card issued by the Clinton Job Corps Center, to one MARVIN WEST, born July 23, 1943, 3112 West 15th Place, Chicago Illinois (HOLT explained that his photo, which appears on this card, was put on the wrong card, by the Job Corps Center by mistake).

[redacted]
4.

13. An Illinois Bell Telephone receipt for telephone number 277-3612, for the address 4102 West 16th Street, dated May 2, 1969.

14. A telephone dial tag containing the above number.

15. A scrap of paper bearing the name MALONE 684-4620, 6703 Merr....(illegible).

16. A scrap of paper bearing the names PAT MITCHUM, HENRY, 6112 Kimbark, 667-6016.

17. Five receipts from the Westlane Hotel for rental of Apartment 410 to one HARVEY COLT. The receipts are dated April 14, 1969, April 21, 1969, April 26, 1969, May 5, 1969, and May 10, 1969. (HOLT explained the above name was merely a spelling error on the part of the hotel).

18. A scrap of paper bearing the name ED LEWIS, 626-8764.

19. A receipt for a $1.00 registration fee to the Black University.

20. A receipt for an American Express money order in the amount of $80.00 dated February 10, 1968, payable to Mc Cabe Realty.

21. A card of ROBERT L. GREEN, Republic Precinct Captain, 5018 West Van Buren Street, Chicago, Illinois.

22. Chicago Public Library card number 391846.

23. GMAC card bearing the name C. L. HARRIS, 10046 South Western Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

[redacted]

5.

24. A receipt from the Northlake Currency Exchange, 23 North Wolf Road, Northlake, Illinois, dated March 16, 1968, for a money order payable to Mc Cabe Realty.

25. A scrap of paper bearing the name KATHIE, 826-8125, and the notation "met at JERRY's house".

26. A card from the Chicago Commission on Urban Opportunity, with the name CARSON R. BROWN, Program Assistant Unit Coordinator, 400 South Peoria, Chicago, Illinois, telephone 243-4315.

27. A notice of attempt to deliver certified mail April 23, 1969.

28. A card from BEN ELLIS Optical Laboratory, 140 North State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Room 602, telephone 372-9253.

29. Army meal card showing HOLT's RA number to be 16-769-553.

30. An address book containing the following entries:

a. On the front page were listed the following telephone numbers: 826-9107, 722-4678, 943-3455, 751-0733.

b. ARRGERINA, 422 South 12th Avenue, 344-6417.

c. ANNET and WELL, 826-3678.

d. BARBARA WILLIAMS, 378-8761.

e. B.S.A. office 922-3580 x 421.

f. A & E 379-4300 x 141.

g. ARLENE, 533-6541.

[redacted]

6.

h. BRENDA, 928-6794.

i. AL, 533-5010.

j. ANNE, 722-4384.

k. BOO, 265-1909.

l. CHARMAINE, 666-6523.

m. DOUGLAS BLANCHARD, 521-0850.

n. DIANE B., 1646 West 14th Place, 243-6586.

o. DOSS (Shell Station) SE 3-9342, 243-3095.

p. DOROTHY TURNER, 642-9782.

q. DELORIS, 261-4997.

r. Count 19, 522-1273.

s. ETHEL GRIFFIN, 667-7607.

t. FANNIE, 337-5163.

u. FRANK, 277-7724.

v. JOAN GREY, 704 East 51st Street, KE 6-2854.

w. WILLIE HAWKINS, 4258 West Adams, 826-2440.

x. WILLIE HOLMAN, 56 North Long, 261-2117.

y. GEORGE (JONES), 287-1087.

z. JOAN, HU 3-6620.

aa. LYNN and FRENCH, 5301 South Maryland, 667-0115.

bb. MOSE, 1404 East 76th, 955-8890.

[redacted]

7.

cc. MILDRED WILLIAM, 421-6426.

dd. MOTHER (job), ST 2-1500 x 191, Wieboldts

ee. MARIE (DORIS) G., 6660 South Mich., 487-7127.

ff. PEGGY TAFT, 4112 Adams, 826-0631.

gg. JAMES PURNELL, 553-0094.

hh. Office, SE 3-9638.

ii. P. Office, 243-8276.

jj. PAM, 738-0336.

kk. REGINA, 1296 A Washburn, CA 6-6425.

ll. ROSEMARY, 722-0989.

mm. TOMMIE, 343-7530, 343-7763.

nn. L. C. SMITH, 221-1814.

oo. WM. SCANLAN, NE 8-5461.

pp. SYLVESTER, ES 8-1868; a number 429 was listed also

qq. OSCAR TANNER, 7059 South Halsted, 994-4430 x 135.

rr. MARVIN WELLS, bus: 268-8081, home: 747-0256.

ss. VERON HENDERSON, 7712 Drexel.

tt. On the last page were the following notations: SE 3-9638, G.T. 287-1087, St. Malachy SE 3-1068.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/10/69

On June 4, 1969, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] [redacted] and SA [redacted] arrested PATRICK KEEN at the headquarters of the Black Panther Party (BPP), 2350 West Madison Street.

KEEN was subsequently transported by Bureau automobile to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office at 219 South Dearborn Street, where he was photographed, fingerprinted and interviewed concerning his association with the BPP and with the subject GEORGE SAMS, JR.

KEEN was provided with a copy of a Warning and Waiver Form which [illegible] read and stated he understood, but declined to sign.

KEEN provided the following information:

He stated that he has been a member of the BPP for approximately three weeks and advised that on the night of June 3-4, 1969, he was the Officer of the Day (OD) at BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois. He advised that as the OD he had been in charge of the BPP office.

KEEN observed a photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR. and stated that he did not know SAMS by name nor did he recognize the photograph. He stated that he had never seen the person in the photograph in the BPP office.

KEEN advised that a couple of weeks ago, he had gone into the BPP office and had heard someone talking loudly in another room in the office. He stated that he made inquiries about the person making the noise and was told that the man's name was WADDELL and that he was from BPP headquarters on the West coast. He added, however, that he did not actually observe WADDELL and, therefore, would be unable to state whether or not this person was identical with the photograph of GEORGE SAMS, JR.

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SA [redacted]
by SA [redacted] Date dictated 6/5/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2
CG [redacted]

KEEN declined to further discuss his activities within the BPP or activities of the BPP itself.

The following description was obtained by interview and observation:

Name	PATRICK KEEN
Alias	PAT KEEN
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Date of birth	March 4, 1949
Place of birth	Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'11"
Weight	170 lbs.
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Dark
Nationality	American
Scars and marks	Birth mark oblong shape one inch by 3/4 inch; upper right leg, front
Peculiarities	Wears glasses (tinted)
Education	Graduated John Marshall High School, Chicago, Illinois, 1967; Roosevelt University, Chic 1967; De Paul University, Chicag 1967-68; Wheaton College, Wheato Illinois, 1968-69 (Completed two years college, major: music)
Employment	None
Social Security Number	334-45-8580
Selective Service No.	11-49-49-45
Selective Service Classification	1A
Address	3335 West Fullerton, Chicago, Illinois
Previous addresses	1640 South Spaulding, Chicago, Il 170 North Le Claire, Chicago, Il
Marital status	Single
Mother	CLARA KEEN, 3335 West Fullerton. Chicago, Ill.
Father	THEODORE KEEN, same address

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 6/6/69

LARRY MAURICE ROBERSON, 3326 West Fulton Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was interviewed by Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] who identified themselves to him as SAs of the FBI. Prior to the commencement of the interview, ROBERSON was furnished Form FD-395 "Interrogation; Advice of Rights Form" which he carefully read and refused to sign. He stated that he understood what his rights were but that he did not desire to sign any legal document. ROBERSON furnished the following information:

ROBERSON furnished SAs with his name, address, and basic descriptive information. He refused to make any further statements to the Agents regarding the Black Panther Party or his involvement with the Party. He denied any knowledge of GEORGE SAMS, Jr.

The following description was obtained through observation and interview:

Name	LARRY MAURICE ROBERSON, also known as Robinson
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Age	20
Date of Birth	12/26/48
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Nationality	United States
Height	5'11"
Weight	202 Pounds
Build	Medium
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Medium-dark
Scars and Marks	1½" scar right knee
Father's Address	3326 West Fulton Street Chicago, Illinois
Occupation	Unemployed
Marital Status	Single

On [illegible]/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated [illegible]/[illegible]/69

neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned

2 [redacted]

Education	Completed John Marshall High School, Chicago, August, 1966., Lincoln University, Jefferson City, Missouri, September, 1966-1969
Selective Service Number	11-49-48-1930
Social Security Number	346-42-1930
Father	HENRY BELL ROBERSON
Mother	DORIS JEAN ROBERSON Nee MITCHELL
Brother	DERRICK LEROY ROBERSON, age 15 (Above individuals residing at 3326 West Fulton)
Prior Arrests	Admitted 1969 Chicago declined to state reason for arrest.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/4/69

JESSE WARD, 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois, was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] who identified themselves to him as Special Agents of the FBI. Prior to commencement of the interview, WARD was furnished form FD-395, "Interrogation: Advice of Rights" which he read and refused to sign. He stated that he understood his rights as they were written on the form and as he read them, but he would not sign anything because he does not know or understand what he is doing and because it is against the rules of the Black Panther Party. WARD furnished the following information:

His name is JESSE WARD and he resides at 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois. He is a member of the Black Panther Party of Illinois. Other than call the interviewing Agents numerous obscene names, he refused to furnish any other information.

The following description of WARD was obtained through observation and interrogation on June 4, 1969:

Name	JESSE WARD
Address	721 North Troy
Sex	Male
Race	Negro
Height	6' - 6'1"
Weight	175 - 180 lbs.
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Black, bushy American cut
Age	Approximately 19
Complexion	Medium dark
Scars and marks	2" scar, upper left lip
Characteristics	Wears glasses; wears a wisp goatee and mustache

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted] and
[redacted] [redacted]

by Date dictated 6/4/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/4/69

On June 4, 1969, at Chicago, Illinois, JESSE WARD, 721 North Troy, Chicago, Illinois, was while being interviewed in the Chicago Office of the FBI, given a body search and the following items were found:

One book entitled "The Thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung" by MAO TSE-TUNG, which bore a red soft leather cover.

One pamphlet entitled "Along the Socialist or Capitalist Road?", printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, and dated August 15, 1967.

A pamphlet entitled "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything" by YAO WEN-YUAN, printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1968.

A pamphlet entitled "China's Great Revolution and The Soviet Union's Great Tragedy" by RENMIN RIBAO (People's Daily) Observer dated June 4, 1967. This pamphlet was printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1967.

A pamphlet entitled "Statement By Comrade Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, In Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression". This pamphlet was printed by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, in 1968, and it bore a date of April 16, 1968.

With the exception of the last named pamphlet, the other three pamphlets bore the following worded stamp:

"A copy of this material has been filed with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

SAs [redacted] and [redacted]

by [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 6/4/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2
[redacted]

Justice, Washington, D. C., where the registration statement of China Books and Periodicals, 2929-24th Street, San Francisco, 10, California, as an agent of Guozi Shudian of Peking, China, is available for inspection. The fact of registration does not indicate approval of this material by the Government of the United States."

Also taken during the search were: one pair of tweezers; one felt tip blue pen; one blank firearms registration form; and numerous assorted papers which WARD declined to accept and requested they be discarded by the searching Agents. All of the items taken from WARD were returned to him except the pair of tweezers which were given to the United States Marshal.

In addition, WARD had in his possession the following items which were not taken: fifty cents in change comprised of one quarter, three nickels and one dime; one cigarette lighter; five books of matches; one pack of Kool cigarettes; one scrap of paper bearing the notation DIANE JONES, 2822 California, telephone number 326-6189; one scrap of paper bearing the notation "has been changed" 201 South Ashland, Political Orientation MWF 8:00; one scrap of paper bearing the notation BEVERLEY, 722-5960, 4122 North Wilcox.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date June 6, 1969

GEORGIA WASHINGTON was placed under arrest at 2350 West Madison. She was immediately advised of her rights by SA [redacted]. She advised she understood her rights, but refused to execute a warning and waiver form.

WASHINGTON was shown photographs of the following individuals:

GEORGE SAMS, JR.
FBI Number 493 526 F

LONNIE MC LUCAS
FBI Number 546 916 E

LANDON ROBERT WILLIAMS
FBI Number 229 544 G

RORY B. HITHE.

WASHINGTON advised that she had never seen any of these individuals and their names were not familiar to her. She advised that she did not wish to make any further statement.

The following description of WASHINGTON was obtained by observation and interview:

Sex	Female
Race	Negro
Date of Birth	January 22, 1951
Place of Birth	Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'4"
Weight	155 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Social Security Number	352-42-7813

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] and
SA [redacted]

Date dictated 6/6/69

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

2

Employment	Typist for Security Plating Company 2645 West Fulton
Present Address	2350 West Madison
Former Address	4317 West Wilcox
Education	Presently enrolled in night school at Austin High School
Mother	MARY WASHINGTON Address unknown
Father	Unknown
Brothers and Sisters	None
Previous admitted arrests	Arrested by Chicago Police Department early in 1968 was held for a few hours and then released, reason for arrest unknown.

WASHINGTON had the following names and addresses in her purse:

BARBARA A. SANKEY
2156 West Monroe
Chicago, Illinois
Employment Mc Master-Car Supply Company
PO Box 4355

Brother WOODS
DA 8-3123
At home 344-4540.

[redacted]

On June 4, 1969, the facts of this case were presented to Assistant United States Attorney NICHOLAS J. ETTEN, authorized the filing of a complaint charging subjects LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS, BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON, ANDREA BEVERLY GRAVES, HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT, PATRICK KEEN, LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON, JESSIE WARD, and GEORGIA WASHINGTON with Harboring and concealing subject, GEORGE SAMS, Jr., in violation of Title 18, Section 1071, United States Code.

Form A.O. 91 (Rev.12-1-60)

Com

United States District Court

FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

NJE:ll

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT; LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON; JESSIE WARD; LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS; BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON; PATRICK KEEN; GEORGIA WASHINGTON; ANDREA GRAVES	Commissioner's Docket No. Case No. COMPLAINT for VIOLATION of [illegible] U.S.C. Title 18 Section 1071

BEFORE JAMES T. BALOG, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Ill.
Name of Commissioner / Address of Commissioner

The undersigned complainant being duly sworn states:

That on or about June 4, 1969, at Chicago in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,

(1) HARVEY DWIGHT HOLT; LARRY MAURICE ROBINSON; JESSIE WARD; LOCKETT PHILIP BIBBS; BRUCE ALLEN DICKSON; PATRICK KERN; GEORGIA WASHINGTON; ANDREA GRAVES

xdid(2) having notice and with knowledge that a federal warrant of arrest had been issued for the apprehension of George Sams, Jr., also known as Robert Wadell Smith on a complaint charging George Sams, Jr. with unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for the crime of murder, a violation of the laws of the United States, wilfully and knowingly, and for the purpose of preventing his arrest on said warrant and for the purpose of preventing his discovery, did harbor and conceal George Sams, Jr. at 2350 W. Madison St., Chicago, Illinois, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1071.

And the complainant states that this complaint is based on
SEE ATTACHED SHEET

And the complainant further states that he believes that

are material witnesses in relation to this charge.

[redacted]
Signature of Complainant

Special Agent, F.B.I.
Official Title

Sworn to before me, and subscribed in my presence, ..., 19....

United States Commissioner

And the complainant states that this complaint is based on information supplied to complainant by Roy Mitchell, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Agent Mitchell stated to your complainant that in the early morning hours of June 4, 1969, he was contacted by a confidential informant who on numerous occasions has supplied information to Agent Mitchell which has proven to be reliable. The confidential informant stated to Mitchell that George Sams, Jr., also known as Robert Wadell Smith, was then in a second floor office of a building at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, which office is known by your complainant to be the Chicago headquarters of the Black Panther Party. Complainant further states that he is familiar with the aforesaid George Sams, Jr. and that said individual is known by him to be a member of the National Black Panther Party. Complainant further states that he has knowledge that a federal criminal complaint and arrest warrant are presently outstanding at New Haven, Connecticut, charging the said George Sams, Jr., with the federal felony offense of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for murder, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1073. Complainant further states that on June 4, 1969 shortly after being informed of the aforesaid information supplied by the confidential informant, he and other agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation proceeded to the building at 2350 West Madison Street. All defendants who were then in the second floor Black Panther Office of the aforesaid building were informed by Agents of the F.B.I. that the said Agents were in possession of a warrant for the arrest of George Sams, Jr. All defendants were then requested to leave the building. For a period of approximately 30 minutes all defendants refused to comply with this request, refused to permit access to the building and refused to answer Agents' questions as to whether or not George Sams, Jr. was present in the building.

Complainant further states that pursuant to a search of the aforesaid Black Panther Party office incident to the arrest of defendants, several photographs depicting George Sams, Jr. were seized. Complainant further states that he recognizes the background in each of these photographs as being the inside of the office of the Black Panther Party, 2350 W. Madison St., Chicago, Illinois.

Complainant further states that he has personal knowledge of the aforesaid information.

[redacted]

On June 4, 1969, [redacted], signed the aforementioned complaint before United States Commissioner JAMES T. BALOG. On June 4, 1969, Assistant United States Attorney ETTEN advised that all of the above eight subjects appeared before Commissioner BALOG and were released on own recognizance bond. The male individuals' bond was set at $4,000 and the female subjects at $3,000. the case was continued until 3:00 p.m. on June 20, 1969.

FBI

Date: 6/6/69

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (157-1291)

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM concerning captioned matter and particularly the "Suggested Plan For the Complete Breakdown of the State of Illinois Power Structure," or alleged war plans for the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP).

In view of the special significance of this information, it is set forth as a separate LHM and a more comprehensive LHM concerning all of the items seized during the FBI raid on 6/4/69 of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, Chicago, follows.

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UN[illegible] STATES DEPARTMENT O[illegible]STICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
June 6, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

On June 4, 1969, Agents of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), incidental to the executing of federal warrants at 2350 West Madison Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the headquarters of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), seized the following documents:

[redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/6/69

Incidental to a search to locate federal fugitives at 2350 West Madison Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the premises of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), the following documents were located in a brown record box which was in the private office on the southeast corner of the second floor of that building:

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] DMF/bab Date dictated 6/6/69

neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
be distributed outside your agency.

10x
SECRET

Suggested Plan for the Complete Break Down of the [illegible] Power Structure.

Problem:
Complete victory for People's Revolution in [illegible].

Theory: To cause Chaos and [illegible] and place pig in position to take repressive measures against the masses of the people, and thereby chase the masses of people into the revolutionary camp. Plan to be used when party reaches this level.

Destruction of: (All [illegible] [illegible])

A. Communication (Blame Pig)
  1. Telephone
  2. Radio
  3. T.V.
B. Power (Blame Pig)
  1. Light
  2. Gas
C. Industrial complex (Blame Pig)
  1. Factories, etc.
D. Food Distribution (Blame Pig)
  1. non-perishable (first)
  2. perishable (second)
E. Transportation
  1. Jersey city ([illegible]) [illegible], [illegible] ([illegible]), [illegible]
  2. C[illegible] city ([illegible]) Same as [illegible]

-4-

3. Air-trans, airports, [illegible]
4. Water-trans, (Boats)
5. Hi-ways
6. Gas stations (& oil)

Execution of: (All hit at same time)
A. City Officials (State,
1. Admin. (tops)
2. Police (chief)
3. Military (rank)
a. State
b. Federal
4. Dangerous elements in communities, political leaders of enemy ideology

Other Areas:
A. Gun Shops (collection for distribution
B. Police Storage (to deprive [illegible] and supply party)
C. Military Storage (to deprive [illegible], collect, [illegible] ammo
D. Nipple Hill Depot.

Other Suggestions:
Need for a Chapter in North Dakota (Devils Lake Guard training center and also near Ft. Sheridan), [illegible] Sioux S.D. (Ellsworth A.F.B.) the basic job to disrupt military organization before they can mobilize.
[illegible] the Plans of city's [illegible] through bribery, extortion, or any [illegible],

[illegible]

O Little Plan for Kz.

Suggested Organization of Section

I. Problem:
  A. Separation from Main Body.
II. Cause:
  A. Movement to present [illegible]
III. Theory:
  A. Section to function as a semi independent arm of Main Body and as one of the overall arms of the Main Body
IV. Practice:
  A. Commander
  B. Intelligence
    1. Internal
    2. External
  C. Political
  D. Medical
  E. Communications
  F. Supply

A, B, C, D, E, and F. must receive their training from the respective cells of the Main Body, and come back to section and function in that capacity in there respective sections.

Notes

A. Commander: Section Leader, to see that section function smoothly.
B. Intelligence:
  a. Internal, to know the weakness and strength of each member, and to evaluate his actions in any given situation. to expose all [illegible]

revolutionary forces and action within the section. This position is to remain secret from all members except Section Leader and High Level of Main Body.

b. External: to gather intelligence material in Sectional area.

C. Political: (Sub-Section Leader) Teaching and maintaining a high level of Political Ideology of party

D. Medical: Primary job, aiding injured members of section. Secondary job, aiding the injured of the mass of the people

E. Communication: Handling communication between Section and Main Body and within Section, and (the grape lines) between people and Section

F. Supply: Collection and distribution of supplies.

Other Suggestion

1. Comrade Court, to handle minor violations (major violations are handled by Main Body), Democratic Court
2. Sectional Citations, to be given to sections who are outstanding in relating to the people, military operation and etc. This will build sectional psychological pride and increase morale.
3. Sectional title names, Example: Night fighters, Big Black five, and etc.

will also help build morale.

Military Training Schedule

A 4 weeks mandatory class for all members, (Tue, Thur, and Sun) with the exclusion of all non-members. Classes should be conducted by a quali military staff; classes conducted expressing party ideology, and stressing military discipline at all times! Ex. Upon the entering of the class room of the military instructor all talking should cease and all trainees should take a firm attention standing position and remain in this manner until given the order to be seated. All classes or class activities should begin with; All Power to the People and Victory to the People's Revolution. The main purpose of the class is to give every party member a basic practical knowledge of military phase of the Peoples' Struggle. There should be no absenteeism from the Political Education Classes (Tuesday) reason being a military mind without a people's ideology is a hired killer and the people don't need no more pigs. Classes should be conducted in an orderly manner at all times.

Structure of the Classes

I. Discipline:

a. Discipline is the exact execution of orders resulting from an intelligent willing obedience rather than one based solely upon habit or fear. Discipline is necessary to assure orderly, [illegible] which alone can triumph over the seemingly impossible conditions of battle. The party members must be able to recognize and face fear because fear is the enemy of discipline. Fear unchecked will lead to panic and a unit that panics is no longer a disciplined unit but a mob. There is no sane person who is without fear, but with good discipline and high morale all can face danger. Punishment of individual members for breaches of discipline are sometimes necessary, but only to reform or eliminate those who are unfit to serve the People's Revolution.

① To be learned verbatim and understood throughly
  - ⓐ Discipline of the Party ([illegible])
  - ⓑ 3 Main Rules of Discipline ([illegible])
  - ⓒ 8 Points of Attention

② Chain of Command
  - ⓐ Trying to understand problems with self first, and if no [illegible] go to next ranking member

③ Military Respect
  - ⓐ People Respect
  - ⓑ Party Respect
  - ⓒ Rank Respect

II. Intergration of Military and Political ideology.

① Correcting the false idea that there is a contradiction between Military and Political ideas

II-

② Teaching that the People's Liberation Army cannot exist without the people, the people have nothing without a socialist ideology, so the people is socialist ideology, the People's Liberation Army must have a socialist ideology in order to relate to the people, if its to serve the people as their military arm.

III. Weaponry
- A. Knowledge of
  - 1. Range
  - 2. Rate of fire
  - 3. Loading
  - 4. Unloading
  - 5. External Parts
    - ⓐ care
  - 6. Internal Parts
    - ⓐ care
    - ⓑ dis-assemble (time limit)
    - ⓒ assemble (time limit)
- B. Handgun
  - 1. Holding
  - 2. Breathing
  - 3. Pulling Trigger
- C. Rifle
  - 1. Correct Position
  - 2. Holding [illegible]
  - 3. Breathing

IV

4. Pulling trigger

C. Shotgun
  1. Correct Position
  2. Holding
  3. Breathing
  4. Pulling trigger

D. Automatic Weapons
  1. Correct Position
  2. Holding
  3. Breathing
  4. Pulling trigger
  5. Constant firing

E. Shooting
  1. Correct alinement
  2. Weather conditions
  3. Distance
  4. firing

F. Knowledge of Enemy Weapons
  1. Police
  2. State
    (a) Police
    (b) military
  3. Federal
    (a) FBI
    (b) CIA
    (c) Military

IV. Guard Duty
  1. Why
  2. How
    (a) Condition [illegible]
    (b) Condition dark

V. Sectional tactics (In detail for section and sub. leaders)
  1. Deployment
    a. position
    b. Advancement
    c. Retreat
  2. The cell
    a. 2 riflemen, 1 auto-riflemen

VI. Field Training
  1. Living in and by the Elements
  2. Togetherness with fellow marines
  3. There should be at least a three day camp out, with rations for one meal, and a condition of red during the whole camp out.

VII. Enemy Interrogation
  1. Rights of soldiers
    A. Name, People Liberation
      [illegible] (army)
    B. Never the right to surrender
    C. Right and Duty to escape
    D. Geneva Agreements

VIII. A test should be given at the end of the four week period of the individual [illegible] of training. [illegible] should be given the training over once again and if he fails something else should be found for him to do in the [illegible].

Wks Areas and weeks of suggested study in:

1. I, II
2. III, IV, V
3. IV, V
4. VI, VII and tests

The foregoing documents were seized and are being held as evidence at the Chicago Office of the FBI.

A characterization of the BPP is attached as an appendix hereto.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FBI

Date: 6/6/69

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (157-1291)

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM concerning captioned matter and particularly the "Suggested Plan For the Complete Breakdown of the State of Illinois Power Structure," or alleged war plans for the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP).

In view of the special significance of this information, it is set forth as a separate LHM and a more comprehensive LHM concerning all of the items seized during the FBI raid on 6/4/69 of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, Chicago, follows.

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UN[illegible] STATES DEPARTMENT O[illegible]STICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
June 6, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

On June 4, 1969, Agents of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), incidental to the executing of federal warrants at 2350 West Madison Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the headquarters of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), seized the following documents:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 6/6/69

Incidental to a search to locate federal fugitives at 2350 West Madison Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the premises of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), the following documents were located in a brown record box which was in the private office on the southeast corner of the second floor of that building:

On 6/4/69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] DMF/bab Date dictated 6/6/69

...either recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; ... be distributed outside your agency.

10x
SECRET

Suggested Plan for the Complete Break down of the [illegible] Power Structure.

Problem:
Complete victory for People Revolution in [illegible].

Theory: To cause Chaos [illegible] & place pig in position to take repressive measures toward the masses of the people, and thereby chase the mass of people into the revolutionary camp. Plan to be used when party reaches this level.

Destruction of: (All at once [illegible]

a. Communication (Blame Pig
   1. Telephone
   2. Radio
   3. T.V.
B. Power (Blame Pig)
   1. Light
   2. Gas
C. Industrial Complex (Blame Pig
   1. Factories, etc.
D. Food Distribution (Blame Pig)
   1. non-Perishables (first)
   2. Perishables (second)
E. Transportation
   1. [illegible] city (Hole) [illegible], [illegible] (trains), [illegible]
   2. [illegible] city (Hole) Same as [illegible]

3. Air-trans, airports, airfields
4. Water-trans, (Boats)
5. Hy-ways
6. Gas stations (& oil)

Execution of: (All hit at same time)
A. City Officals (State)
  1. Admin (top)
  2. Police (rank)
  3. Military (rank)
    a. State
    b. Federal
  4. Dangerous elements in communities, pitty leaders of enemy ideology

Other Areas:
A. Gun Shops (collected for distribution)
B. Police Storage (to deprive pig and supply party)
C. Military Storage (to deprive pig, collect all ammo)
D. [illegible] Hide Depots

Other Suggestions:
Need for a Chapter in North Chicago (Great Lake Naval Training Center and also near Ft. Sheridan), & in [illegible] S.D. ([illegible] A.F.B.) the basic job to disrupt military organization [illegible] they can't mobilize.
Keep the Plans of city's neutralization through bribery, extortion, or any means.

Missing

O [illegible] Plan for [illegible]

Suggested Disposition of Section

I. Problem:
  A. Separation from Main Body
II. Cause:
  A. Movement to prevent [illegible]
III. Theory:
  A. Section to function as a [illegible] independent arm of Main Body and as one of the overall arms of the Main Body
IV. Practice:
  A. Commander
  B. Intelligence
    1. Internal
    2. External
  C. Political
  D. Medical
  E. Communications
  F. Supply

A, B, C, D, E, and F must receive their training from the respective cells of the Main Body, and come back to section and function in that capacity in there respective sections.

Notes

A. Commander: Section Leader, see that section function smoothly.
B. Intelligence:
  a. Internal, to know the weakness and strength of each member, and evaluate his actions in any given situation. to expose all [illegible]

revolutionary forces and actions within the section. This position is to remain secret from all members except Section Leader and High level of Main Body.

b. Externally, to gather intelligence material in Sectional area.

C. Political: (Sub-Section Leader) Teaching and maintaining a high level of Political Ideology of party

D. Medical: Primary job, aiding injured members of section. Secondary job, aiding the injured of the mass of the people

E. Communication: Handling communications between Section and Main Body and within Section, and (the grape lines) between people and Section

F. Supply: Collection and distribution of supplies.

Other Suggestions

1. Comrade Court, to handle minor violations (major violations are handled by Main Body), Democratic Court
2. Sectional Citations, to be given to sections who are outstanding in relations to the people, self-sacrifice and etc. This will build sectional psychological pride and increase morale.
3. Sectional title names, Example: Night fighters, Big Black five, etc. etc.

will also help build morale

Military Training Schedule

A 4 weeks mandatory class for all members, (Tue, Thur, and Sun) with the exclusion of all non-members. Classes should be conducted by a qualified military staff, classes conducted expressing party ideology, and stressing military discipline at all times! Ex. Upon the entering of the class room of the military instructor all talking should cease and all trainees should take a firm military standing position and remain in this manner until given the order to be seated. All classes or class activities should begin with; All Power to the People and victory to the People's Revolution. The main purpose of the class is to give every party member a basic practical training of the military phase of the Peoples' Struggle. There should be no absenteeism from the Political Education Classes (the main reason being a military mind without a people's ideology is a hired killer and the people don't need no more pigs. Classes should be conducted in an orderly manner at all times.

Structure of the Classes

I. Discipline:

a. Discipline is the exact execution of orders resulting from an intelligent willing obedience rather than one based solely upon habit or fear. Discipline is necessary to secure order, [illegible] which alone can triumph over the seemingly impossible conditions of battle. The party members must be able to recognize and face fear because fear is the enemy of discipline. Fear unchecked will lead to panic and a unit that panics is no longer a disciplined unit but a mob. There is no sane person who is without fear, but with good discipline and high morale all can face danger. Punishment of individual members for breaches of discipline are sometimes necessary, but only to reform or eliminate those who are unfit to serve the People's Revolution.

① To be learned verbatim and understood throughly
  - ⓐ Discipline of the Party ([illegible]
  - ⓑ 3 Main Rules of Discipline ([illegible]
  - ⓒ 8 Points of Attention

② Chain of Command
  - ⓐ Trying to understand problems with self first, and if no success go to next ranking member

③ Military Respect
  - ⓐ People Respect
  - ⓑ Party Respect
  - ⓒ Rank Respect

II. Integration of Military and Political ideology.

① Correcting the false idea that there is a contradiction between Military and Political ideas

II-

② Teaching that the People's Liberation Army cannot exist without the people, the people have nothing without a socialist ideology, so the people is socialist ideology, the People's Liberation Army must be a socialist ideology in [illegible] to relate to the people, if its to serve the people as their military arm.

III. Weaponry
- A. Knowledge of
  - 1. Range
  - 2. Rate of fire
  - 3. Loading
  - 4. Unloading
  - 5. External Parts
    - ⓐ care
  - 6. Internal Parts
    - ⓐ care
    - ⓑ dis-assemble (time limit)
    - ⓒ assemble (time limit)
- B. Handgun
  - 1. Holding
  - 2. Breathing
  - 3. Pulling trigger
- C. Rifle
  - 1. Correct Position
  - 2. Holding (Shoulder [illegible])
  - 3. Breathing

IV

4. Pulling trigger

C. Shotgun

1. Correct Position

2. Holding

3. Breathing

4. Pulling trigger

D. Automatic Weapons

1. Correct Position

2. Holding

3. Breathing

4. Pulling trigger

5. Correct firing

E. Shooting

1. Correct alinement

2. Weather conditions

3. Distance

4. firing

F. Knowledge of Enemy Weapons

1. Police

2. State

(a) Police

(b) militia

3. Federal

(a) FBI

(b) CIA

(c) Military

IV. Guard Duty

1. Why

2. How

(a) condition light

(b) condition dark

V.

V. Sectional tactics (In detail for section and sub. leaders)
  1. Deployment
    a. position
    b. Advancement
    c. Retreat
  2. The cell
    a. 2 riflemen, 1 auto-rifleman

VI. Field Training
  1. Living in and by the Elements
  2. Familiarness with fellow marines
  3. There should be atleast a three day camp out, with rations for one meal, and conditions of red during the whole camp out.

VII. Enemy Interrogation
  1. Rights of Soldiers
    A. Name, People Liberation
      [illegible] (Army)
    B. Never the right to surrender
    C. Right and Duty to escape
    D. Geneva Agreements

VIII. A test should be given at the end of the four week period of the entire course of training. [illegible] he should be given the training over once again and if he fails the [illegible] something else should be found for him to do [illegible]

V

Wks Areas and weeks of suggested study in:

1. I, II
2. III, IV, V
3. IV, V
4. VI, VII and tests

The foregoing documents were seized and are being held as evidence at the Chicago Office of the FBI.

A characterization of the BPP is attached as an appendix hereto.

APPENDIX

1

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 5, 1969

On June 4, 1969 SA [redacted] was present at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois, when arrests were made for harboring a fugitive from justice, in building occupied by an organization calling themselves the Black Panthers. Special Agent in Charge MARLIN W. JOHNSON of the Chicago Federal Bureau of Investigation office instructed SA [redacted] to conduct a lawful search of the building in which the arrests were made, with assistance of other Special Agents of the FBI.

Posters, pamphlets, printed material and machines were observed on the walls, floors, desks and chairs and it appeared to SA [redacted] that these items would be subject to seizure under a search warrant issued in conformance with Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in conjunction with violations of Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 2383, 2384 and 2385.

Section 2383 relates to rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof or in giving aid and comfort thereto.

Section 2384 relates to conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, etc.

Section 2385 relates to willfully advocating, etc. the overthrow of the Government of the United States and the printing, etc. of material, and the organizing, etc. of persons for such purposes.

SA [redacted] therefore directed that certain materials be seized and preserved as evidence of violations of laws of the United States, possibly being committed in presence of Agents, both as mere evidence and as material designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as means of committing a criminal offense (Rule 41 (b)) and material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3103a).

On 6-4-69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 6-5-69

neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency
to be distributed outside your agency.

2
[redacted]

In conducting this search, the following matters were considered:

The arrests were completed between approximately 5:30 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. and it would not be possible to prepare detailed affidavits for search warrant and appear before the U.S. Commissioner or a District Court judge for several hours.

The building had been prepared with electrical devices and with solid steel doors and iron doors and bars placed over entrances, exits and windows, thusly preventing any entrance without breaking and entering and with use of firearms. Several weapons were present and seized and it is known to Agents that this organization calling themselves the Black Panthers has consistently stated that attempts to search or to effect arrests would be violently resisted, even with firearms.

That attempts to enter the building had met with no co-operation of any kind from persons in the building, and any future attempts to enter would undoubtedly be met in the same way, necessitating an armed force sufficient to effect the execution of a search warrant, thus making it impractical to obtain and effect a search by warrant on the same day.

Likelihood of destruction of evidence and removal of evidence while the paperwork necessary for a search by search warrant was being accomplished and filed.

Tenseness of the general neighborhood due to prior racial disorders.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date June 5, 1969

On June 4, 1969 SA [redacted] was present at 2350 West Madison, Chicago, Illinois, when arrests were made for harboring a fugitive from justice, in building occupied by an organization calling themselves the Black Panthers. Special Agent in Charge MARLIN W. JOHNSON of the Chicago Federal Bureau of Investigation office instructed SA [redacted] to conduct a lawful search of the building in which the arrests were made, with assistance of other Special Agents of the FBI.

Posters, pamphlets, printed material and machines were observed on the walls, floors, desks and chairs and it appeared to SA [redacted] that these items would be subject to seizure under a search warrant issued in conformance with Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in conjunction with violations of Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 2383, 2384 and 2385.

Section 2383 relates to rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof or in giving aid and comfort thereto.

Section 2384 relates to conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, etc.

Section 2385 relates to willfully advocating, etc. the overthrow of the Government of the United States and the printing, etc. of material, and the organizing, etc. of persons for such purposes.

SA [redacted] therefore directed that certain materials be seized and preserved as evidence of violations of laws of the United States, possibly being committed in presence of Agents, both as mere evidence and as material designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as means of committing a criminal offense (Rule 41 (b)) and material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3103a).

On 6-4-69 at Chicago, Illinois File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 6-5-69

neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your
to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

In conducting this search, the following matters were considered:

The arrests were completed between approximately 5:30 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. and it would not be possible to prepare detailed affidavits for search warrant and appear before the U.S. Commissioner or a District Court judge for several hours.

The building had been prepared with electrical devices and with solid steel doors and iron doors and bars placed over entrances, exits and windows, thusly preventing any entrance without breaking and entering and with use of firearms. Several weapons were present and seized and it is known to Agents that this organization calling themselves the Black Panthers has consistently stated that attempts to search or to effect arrests would be violently resisted, even with firearms.

That attempts to enter the building had met with no co-operation of any kind from persons in the building, and any future attempts to enter would undoubtedly be met in the same way, necessitating an armed force sufficient to effect the execution of a search warrant, thus making it impractical to obtain and effect a search by warrant on the same day.

Liklihood of destruction of evidence and removal of evidence while the paperwork necessary for a search by search warrant was being accomplished and filed.

Tenseness of the general neighborhood due to prior racial disorders.

[illegible]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted] DATE: OCT 30 1969

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify but attests to the accuracy of the following information,

advised on the dates indicated:

10/8/69 LYNN FRENCH, MANUEL DOZIER.

These persons will more or less represent the BPP at an alleged rally at the International Harvester Plant, 2600 South California, 10/9/69.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted]

10/7/69 RON SATCHEL, FRED N. JOHNSON, FRED HAMPTON, DEBRA JOHNSON

These Panthers, JOHNSON pregnant by HAMPTON, are residing at 2337 West Monroe Street and HAMPTON is using the name FRED M. JOHNSON.

LOUIS TRULOCK

This Panther resides on the second floor, Room 10, in a building located on the corner of Jackson and Monroe. This person is allegedly very adapt to picking locks, is also very knowledgeable in the art of robbery.

[redacted]

10/9/69 FRED HAMPTON,

HAMPTON has decided to support the actions of but not necessarily participate in those actions. was the major reason HAMPTON took any position at all, the reason being that gives the Panthers whatever they want.

10/9/69 RON SATCHEL, FRED HAMPTON, JEWEL COOK, WILLIAM O'NEAL, LYNN FRENCH, JOHN WILLIAMS, RICHARD BLACK, JOAN GRAY, STEPHNEY FISHER,

[redacted]

stopped at BPP Headquarters on 10/8/69, and, according to HAMPTON, related to HAMPTON that the planned on causing some "shit" at Lincoln Park during their rally scheduled for 10/8/69. HAMPTON had SATCHEL, COOK and himself stay at the BPP office and sent the others to observe the "shit" which would allegedly take place at Lincoln Park, requesting when it started all were to call the office.

10/9/69 BOBBY RUSH.

RUSH is appearing in court at Urbana, Illinois, today concerning his appeal regarding his six month weapons conviction. If incarcerated, the Panthers will hold a rally.

Springfield telephonically advised that RUSH received a continuance until October 28, 1969.

[redacted]

10/15/69 BEVELINA POWELL

POWELL resides at 6819 East End Avenue.

10/28/69 LUCY MONTGOMERY, JEWEL COOK, BPP FINANCES

MONTGOMERY gave COOK a check for $260 which money will allegedly be used to rent him a new apartment. MONTGOMERY also gave the BPP a $75 check.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

DATE: OCT 30 1969

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

[redacted] who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify but attests to the accuracy of the following information,

[redacted]

[redacted] advised on the dates indicated:

10/8/69 LYNN FRENCH, MANUEL DOZIER.

These persons will more or less represent the BPP at an alleged rally [redacted] at the International Harvester Plant, 2600 South California, 10/9/69.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted]

10/7/69 RON SATCHEL, FRED N. JOHNSON, FRED HAMPTON, DEBRA JOHNSON

These Panthers, JOHNSON pregnant by HAMPTON, are residing at 2337 West Monroe Street and HAMPTON is using the name FRED M. JOHNSON.

LOUIS TRULOCK

This Panther resides on the second floor, Room 10, in a building located on the corner of Jackson and Monroe. This person is allegedly very adapt to picking locks, is also very knowledgeable in the art of robbery.

[redacted]

10/9/69 FRED HAMPTON, [redacted]

[redacted] HAMPTON has decided to support the actions of [redacted] but not necessarily participate in those actions. [redacted] was the major reason HAMPTON took any position at all, the reason being that [redacted] gives the Panthers whatever they want.

10/9/69 RON SATCHEL, FRED HAMPTON, JEWEL COOK, WILLIAM O'NEAL, LYNN FRENCH, JOHN WILLIAMS, RICHARD BLACK, JOAN GRAY, STEPHNEY FISHER, [redacted]

[redacted] stopped at BPP Headquarters on 10/8/69, and, according to HAMPTON, related to HAMPTON that the [redacted] planned on causing some "shit" at Lincoln Park during their rally scheduled for 10/8/69. HAMPTON had SATCHEL, COOK and himself stay at the BPP office and sent the others to observe the "shit" which would allegedly take place at Lincoln Park, requesting when it started all were to call the office.

10/9/69 BOBBY RUSH.

RUSH is appearing in court at Urbana, Illinois, today concerning his appeal regarding his six month weapons conviction. If incarcerated, the Panthers will hold a rally.

Springfield telephonically advised that RUSH received a continuance until October 28, 1969.

[redacted]

10/15/69 BEVELINA POWELL

POWELL resides at 6819 East End Avenue.

10/28/69 LUCY MONTGOMERY, JEWEL COOK, BPP FINANCES

MONTGOMERY gave COOK a check for $260 which money will allegedly be used to rent him a new apartment. MONTGOMERY also gave the BPP a $75 check.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STAT[illegible]OVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

DATE: 11/6/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

[redacted] who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information.

[redacted]

[redacted] advised as follows on the dates indicated:

[redacted]

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted]

11/2[illegible]/69 LOGAN, MARVIN; JESSE WARD

LOGAN is a good friend of WARD's. LOGAN is considered a member of the BPP, is not very functional and is considered by most members as a fool or just stupid. He is not privileged to any "inside" information.

MARSHALL, HARRY JAMES

This person is not a Panther, but is a friend of a Panther. This person appeared at BPP Headquarters, Chicago, on or about October 24, 1969, in his military uniform. The BPP members for some reason do not like him.

LEWIS, RAY

This person is a BPP member, about 21 or 22 years old, 5'10", brown skinned, 150-155 pounds, goatee. It is not known where this person resides but is possibly from the Peoria, Illinois, area originally.

SCOTT, JAMES

SCOTT is either a new member or what is called a friend of the BPP (one who supports the BPP but not considered a member). He is about 20 years old, 5'9", 180 pounds and dark skinned. He is not well known.

BRAKES, CLIFTON

This person is a former BPP member who has allegedly resigned. He is not well known.

ROBINSON, JOHN

This person is not well known. His BPP membership application indicates that he resides at 1208 West 64th Street, telephone number WA-5-1248 and shows him to be an expert in Karate.

SANDERS, CHARLES

This name is familiar as connected with the BPP, however, nothing specific is recalled.

[redacted]

PETERSON, CHERYL

This Panther resides at 2337 West Monroe and works out of the South Side BPP Office.

JORDAN, NADINE

This person, [redacted] is friendly to some BPP members, however, is not known to be a Panther.

STINSON, PAUL

This person is a BPP member, however, has not been seen in Chicago area for a while. He was not very active.

FISHER, STEPHANIE

FISHER is the correct name. She is the Lieutenant of Communications of the Chicago Branch of the Illinois BPP, takes all notes for various appointments, is well informed on all BPP members and activities.

ELDRIDGE, JERI

She currently resides at 2337 West Monroe [redacted]

JOHNSON, RONALD

JOHNSON is no longer known to be functioning as a BPP member, his vehicle license is 502-519 and his phone number is 681-1032.

WALTON, HARLON

Talk among Panthers first indicated that this person was a Panther, however, inquiry now indicates that this person never was a Panther, but close friends of some of those Panthers indicted by the Illinois Cook County Grand Jury on June 9, 1969. Further a search of available BPP membership application record files failed to locate any person by this name.

[redacted]

MAYNON, JOSEPH

This is a Panther who is no longer functioning.

EDELEN, CAROL

This person is a Panther serving on the Communications Cadre. She is about 20 years old, 5'7", weighing about 130 pounds and light skinned.

BARRETT, AUDREY

This Panther has two addresses, 1826 South Millard, telephone 522-9634, and 3420 West 16th Street, telephone 522-9867.

KING, STEVE; SAM LATSON

This Panther works on the south side for the BPP; he is about 21 years old, 5'6", 145-150 pounds, and is well-known by SAM LATSON.

MC DONALD, RAYMOND M.

Search of available BPP membership applications shows this person residing at 7538 South May, telephone number 651-8790, however, is unknown to source.

MARTIS, CHARLES; FRED HAMPTON

Photo from CB 2676380 of Chicago Police Department records is MARTIS. Original talk among BPP leaders after Illinois Cook County Grand Jury indictments indicated this person to be a BPP member, however, current indications are that this person has never been a BPP member. This person is a close friend of HAMPTON's.

[redacted]

BOSTICK, ROBERT

This Panther is 19 or 20 years and is known as RALPH and is assigned to the Health Cadre.

BROWN, ANDREW; JESSE WARD

This Panther works for the BPP on the south side, is a close friend of WARD's. He is dark-skinned, 5'11", weighs about 180 and likes to box.

ROYSTER, AARON

This Panther resides at 1310 Washburne, telephone number 829-9161, is allegedly an expert in guerrilla warfare. He was born in 1942, is about 6'1" to 2" and weighs about 200 pounds. He works for the BPP on the south side.

AUSTIN, THEODORE

This person is allegedly a BPP member, however, is unknown by name.

CLARK, ALAN BRUCE

There is an ALLEN (phonetic) (LNU) who fits general description of this person who is a BPP member.

WELCH, LOUIS

This person has been to Illinois BPP Headquarters several times, is not well-known and is not very functional. no membership application, among those available was located, but WELCH is considered as a member.

CROSS, EVA

This person is a Panther, but not well-known.

BLAIR, THOMAS

This person has been at Illinois BPP Headquarters, but is not well-known. It is thought that he drives a 1957 tan Ford.

[redacted]

RICHARDSON, CHARLES

Membership application available lists this person's address as 1919 Warren, telephone number SE-8-2547. RICHARDSON is not well-known.

AMOS, JAMES LEE; AMOS, HYSAN JAMES

Photo from Chicago Police Department, IR 103617, viewed and identifies the above persons as one in the same.

LAIRD, ROBERT LEE

This person is considered a friend of the BPP and not a member. He resides at 2015 West St. Charles Road, Maywood, telephone number 344-4929, or 628 South 15th Avenue, Maywood.

SAVAGE, WILLIAM

This person is not well-known. Available BPP membership application indicates he resides at 7412 South Kenwood Avenue, telephone 288-4969.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted] DATE: 11/6/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

[redacted] who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information.

[redacted] advised as follows on the dates indicated:

[redacted]

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted]

11/2/69 LOGAN, MARVIN; JESSE WARD

LOGAN is a good friend of WARD's. LOGAN is considered a member of the BPP, is not very functional and is considered by most members as a fool or just stupid. He is not privileged to any "inside" information.

MARSHALL, HARRY JAMES

This person is not a Panther, but is a friend of a Panther. This person appeared at BPP Headquarters, Chicago, on or about October 24, 1969, in his military uniform. The BPP members for some reason do not like him.

LEWIS, RAY

This person is a BPP member, about 21 or 22 years old, 5'10", brown skinned, 150-155 pounds, goatee. It is not known where this person resides but is possibly from the Peoria, Illinois, area originally.

SCOTT, JAMES

SCOTT is either a new member or what is called a friend of the BPP (one who supports the BPP but not considered a member). He is about 20 years old, 5'9", 180 pounds and dark skinned. He is not well known.

BRAKES, CLIFTON

This person is a former BPP member who has allegedly resigned. He is not well known.

ROBINSON, JOHN

This person is not well known. His BPP membership application indicates that he resides at 1208 West 64th Street, telephone number WA-5-1248 and shows him to be an expert in Karate.

SANDERS, CHARLES

This name is familiar as connected with the BPP, however, nothing specific is recalled.

[redacted]

PETERSON, CHERYL

This Panther resides at 2337 West Monroe and works out of the South Side BPP Office.

JORDAN, NADINE

This person, [redacted] is friendly to some BPP members, however, is not known to be a Panther.

STINSON, PAUL

This person is a BPP member, however, has not been seen in Chicago area for a while. He was not very active.

FISHER, STEPHANIE

FISHER is the correct name. She is the Lieutenant of Communications of the Chicago Branch of the Illinois BPP, takes all notes for various appointments, is well informed on all BPP members and activities.

ELDRIDGE, JERI

[redacted] She currently resides at 2337 West Monroe [redacted]

JOHNSON, RONALD

JOHNSON is no longer known to be functioning as a BPP member, his vehicle license is 502-519 and his phone number is 681-1032.

WALTON, HARLON

Talk among Panthers first indicated that this person was a Panther, however, inquiry now indicates that this person never was a Panther, but close friends of some of those Panthers indicted by the Illinois Cook County Grand Jury on June 9, 1969. Further a search of available BPP membership application record files failed to locate any person by this name.

[redacted]

MAYNON, JOSEPH

This is a Panther who is no longer functioning.

EDELEN, CAROL

This person is a Panther serving on the Communications Cadre. She is about 20 years old, 5'7", weighing about 130 pounds and light skinned.

BARRETT, AUDREY

This Panther has two addresses, 1826 South Millard, telephone 522-9634, and 3420 West 16th Street, telephone 522-9867.

KING, STEVE; SAM LATSON

This Panther works on the south side for the BPP; he is about 21 years old, 5'6", 145-150 pounds, and is well-known by SAM LATSON.

MC DONALD, RAYMOND M.

Search of available BPP membership applications shows this person residing at 7538 South May, telephone number 651-8790, however, is unknown to source.

MARTIS, CHARLES; FRED HAMPTON

Photo from CB 2676380 of Chicago Police Department records is MARTIS. Original talk among BPP leaders after Illinois Cook County Grand Jury indictments indicated this person to be a BPP member, however, current indications are that this person has never been a BPP member. This person is a close friend of HAMPTON's.

[redacted]

BOSTICK, ROBERT

This Panther is 19 or 20 years and is known as RALPH and is assigned to the Health Cadre.

BROWN, ANDREW; JESSE WARD

This Panther works for the BPP on the south side, is a close friend of WARD's. He is dark-skinned, 5'11", weighs about 180 and likes to box.

ROYSTER, AARON

This Panther resides at 1310 Washburne, telephone number 829-9161, is allegedly an expert in guerrilla warfare. He was born in 1942, is about 6'1" to 2" and weighs about 200 pounds. He works for the BPP on the south side.

AUSTIN, THEODORE

This person is allegedly a BPP member, however, is unknown by name.

CLARK, ALAN BRUCE

There is an ALLEN (phonetic) (LNU) who fits general description of this person who is a BPP member.

WELCH, LOUIS

This person has been to Illinois BPP Headquarters several times, is not well-known and is not very functional. no membership application, among those available was located, but WELCH is considered as a member.

CROSS, EVA

This person is a Panther, but not well-known.

BLAIR, THOMAS

This person has been at Illinois BPP Headquarters, but is not well-known. It is thought that he drives a 1957 tan Ford.

[redacted]

RICHARDSON, CHARLES

Membership application available lists this person's address as 1919 Warren, telephone number SE-8-2547. RICHARDSON is not well-known.

AMOS, JAMES LEE; AMOS, HYSAN JAMES

Photo from Chicago Police Department, IR 103617, viewed and identifies the above persons as one in the same.

LAIRD, ROBERT LEE

This person is considered a friend of the BPP and not a member. He resides at 2015 West St. Charles Road, Maywood, telephone number 344-4929, or 628 South 15th Avenue, Maywood.

SAVAGE, WILLIAM

This person is not well-known. Available BPP membership application indicates he resides at 7412 South Kenwood Avenue, telephone 288-4969.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/21/69

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated and captioned as above.

The Chicago Police Department has been furnished the contents of information set forth in this LHM as well as the Illinois States Attorney's Office.

CG T-1 is ____________

No matter is being opened in the Chicago Office concerning this matter inasmuch as information indicates the weapons were apparently legally purchased, under the terms of existing Firearms laws, possession of same is apparently rampart throughout BPP members and apartment rent is paid with BPP funds.

Chicago is following this matter closely and if further information developed warranting investigation, Chicago will immediately institute same.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
November 21, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

On November 19, 1969, CG T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that allegedly the following items are being kept in the first-floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago:

5 carbines with 50,000 rounds of ammunition

1 case of 30 shot clips for the carbines

3 gas masks

3 smoke bombs, non-explosive type

2 or more loud speakers

5 Ithica riot shot guns, plus ammunition

9 regular 12 gauge shot guns, plus ammunition

4 38 revolvers, plus ammunition

1 357 magnum, plus ammunition

Source stated that all these weapons were allegedly purchased on legal Illinois State Gun Registration Cards issued to female BPP members who have never been arrested.

Source stated that the above apartment serves as a "Panther Crib," meaning that it is available to any BPP member for use, such as sleeping or eating. Source stated that the following individuals are among the most frequently seen at this address:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman;

Billy Brooks, Deputy Minister of Education;

Ronald Satchel, Deputy Minister of Health;

Louis Trulock, Legal Counselor; all Illinois BPP officials, as well as Alvin Jefferies, Robert Campbell and numerous female BPP members including Debra Johnson who is allegedly pregnant by Hampton.

Source added that it is not known to whom the apartment is actually rented; however, the rent is actually paid from BPP funds.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

[redacted]

IN VIEW OF ABOVE INFORMATION AND PAST ACTIVITIES OF BPP MEMBERS MENTIONED ABOVE ALL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/21/69

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated and captioned as above.

[redacted]

The Chicago Police Department has been furnished the contents of information set forth in this LHM as well as the Illinois States Attorney's Office.

CG T-1 is

No matter is being opened in the Chicago Office concerning this matter inasmuch as information indicates the weapons were apparently legally purchased, under the terms of existing Firearms laws, possession of same is apparently rampart throughout BPP members and apartment rent is paid with BPP funds.

Chicago is following this matter closely and if further information developed warranting investigation, Chicago will immediately institute same.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
November 21, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

On November 19, 1969, CG T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that allegedly the following items are being kept in the first-floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago:

5 carbines with 50,000 rounds of ammunition

1 case of 30 shot clips for the carbines

3 gas masks

3 smoke bombs, non-explosive type

2 or more loud speakers

5 Ithica riot shot guns, plus ammunition

9 regular 12 gauge shot guns, plus ammunition

4 38 revolvers, plus ammunition

1 357 magnum, plus ammunition

Source stated that all these weapons were allegedly purchased on legal Illinois State Gun Registration Cards issued to female BPP members who have never been arrested.

Source stated that the above apartment serves as a "Panther Crib," meaning that it is available to any BPP member for use, such as sleeping or eating. Source stated that the following individuals are among the most frequently seen at this address:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman;

Billy Brooks, Deputy Minister of Education;

Ronald Satchel, Deputy Minister of Health;

Louis Trulock, Legal Counselor; all Illinois BPP officials, as well as Alvin Jefferies, Robert Campbell and numerous female BPP members including Debra Johnson who is allegedly pregnant by Hampton.

Source added that it is not known to whom the apartment is actually rented; however, the rent is actually paid from BPP funds.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

IN VIEW OF ABOVE INFORMATION AND PAST ACTIVITIES OF BPP MEMBERS MENTIONED ABOVE ALL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 12/12/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM - BPP

This LHM contained information concerning weapons, allegedly legally purchased and other related items being kept in the first floor apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. This apartment is available to any BPP member and names of BPP members most frequently seen at this address were also set forth. It was not known to whom the apartment was actually rented; however, the rent was paid from BPP funds. All persons mentioned were described as armed and extremely dangerous.

The contents of this LHM was orally given to the Chicago Police Department and the Illinois States Attorney's office.

11/23/69 Source advised that Panthers aware Chicago Police Gang Intelligence Unit planning raid on above apartment on 11/25/69 and above items being moved out of apartment. Movie cameras being set up to take pictures of the raid and only two pregnant girls will be in the apartment.

11/24/69 advised Director LYONS of source information of 11/23/69. Director LYONS verified the source information concerning the date of the planned raid and stated that he was cancelling the raid.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted]

12/1/69 Source advised that weapons were being moved back into 2337 West Monroe Street advised Director LYONS of this information.

12/1 and 2/69 Source information above (12/1/69) was orally given to the Illinois State's Attorney's office and information furnished on 11/21/69, was refurnished, as well as the fact that one sawed-off shotgun, exact length unknown, and a stolen riot police shotgun were in the apartment.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 12/12/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM - BPP

[redacted]

This LHM contained information concerning weapons, allegedly legally purchased and other related items being kept in the first floor apartment, 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. This apartment is available to any BPP member and names of BPP members most frequently seen at this address were also set forth. It was not known to whom the apartment was actually rented; however, the rent was paid from BPP funds. All persons mentioned were described as armed and extremely dangerous.

The contents of this LHM was orally given to the Chicago Police Department and the Illinois States Attorney's office.

11/23/69 Source advised that Panthers aware Chicago Police Gang Intelligence Unit planning raid on above apartment on 11/25/69 and above items being moved out of apartment. Movie cameras being set up to take pictures of the raid and only two pregnant girls will be in the apartment.

11/24/69 [redacted] advised Director LYONS of source information of 11/23/69. Director LYONS verified the source information concerning the date of the planned raid and stated that he was cancelling the raid.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted]

12/1/69 Source advised that weapons were being moved back into 2337 West Monroe Street advised Director LYONS of this information.

12/1 and 2/69 Source information above (12/1/69) was orally given to the Illinois State's Attorney's office and information furnished on 11/21/69, was refurnished, as well as the fact that one sawed-off shotgun, exact length unknown, and a stolen riot police shotgun were in the apartment.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 11/21/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM-BPP

Re Chicago letter to Bureau dated 11/21/69.

Attached is a detail of the address at 2337 West Monroe Street, first floor apartment, as furnished by [redacted] on November 19, 1969, which information was orally furnished to the Chicago Police Department and Illinois State Attorney's Office:

[redacted]

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan


Room of Hampton and Johnson when they stay night
Room of Truelock when he stays night
Closet
Closet
Closet
bed
bed
bed
mattress
Hall
Chairs stacked
Door stripped to increase
Door

1st floor at
2337 W. Monroe


N
Madison
Vacant
Lot
MONROE
WESTERN
S

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 11/21/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM-BPP

Re Chicago letter to Bureau dated 11/21/69.

Attached is a detail of the address at 2337 West Monroe Street, first floor apartment, as furnished by on November 19, 1969, which information was orally furnished to the Chicago Police Department and Illinois State Attorney's Office:

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan


Room of Hampton and Johnson they sleep here
Room of Truelock Brewer slept here
Closet
Closet
Closet
Hall
Mattress
bed
bed
bed
Chairs & table
Door exits to hallway —upstairs apt.

1st floor at 2337 W. Monroe


N
Emp Hdqs
Madison
vacant lot
Monroe
2331
Western
Bulkley
Alley
S

FBI

Date: 12/5/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted] (P)

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM--BPP
OO: San Francisco

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM suitable for dissemination. Two copies of the LHM are being furnished the and Divisions in lie of their interest in this matter.

Serial number information regarding weapons confiscated by police during the raid as set forth in the LHM are being obtained and appropriate action will be taken with respect to possible ARL violation.

[redacted]

Information set forth in the enclosed LHM concerning statements by Sergeant DANIEL GROTH with respect to the shooting of Deputy Chairman FRED HAMPTON reflects that HAMPTON was found in the rear bedroom with a loaded .45 pistol in his hand and a shotgun by his side. GROTH advised that an individual appeared in the doorway and later was identified as HAMPTON with both the shotgun and the pistol in his hand firing at police officers. As a result of this, the officers returned the fire, killing HAMPTON.

While Police Department, [redacted] has developed no specific information regarding any planned violence as a result of the raid and death of two Panthers, the Police Department is affording the area in the vicinity of Panther Headquarters with added coverage. [redacted] sources of the Chicago Office have developed no information to date indicating any planned violence is under consideration at this time. [redacted] along with [redacted] has advised that no definite plans regarding possible demonstrations or other activities will be formulated until after the funeral of HAMPTON. Chicago will continue to follow closely the activities of the Panther Party and advise the Bureau and interested offices of any future pertinent developments.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
December 5, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is attached as an appendix hereto. Confidential sources utilized in this characterization and those set forth below have all furnished reliable information in the past.

Reference is made to Chicago memorandum dated November 21, 1969, captioned as above, reflecting information from CG T-1, who advised that allegedly firearms were being kept in the first floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois.

A Chicago Police Department source advised on December 4, 1969, that officers of the Cook County State's Attorney Office conducted an early morning raid on a BPP apartment located at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. The officers, armed with a search warrant and weapons, approached the above location at 5:00 a.m., on the above date, and in attempting to gain admission in order to serve the warrant, were met with shotgun fire.

The gun battle that ensued resulted in the death of Fred Allen Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois Chapter, BPP, and Mark Clark, a BPP leader from Peoria, Illinois. Seven individuals were arrested as a result of the raid. Those arrested were:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Brenda Harris, Negro female, age 18, residing at 1848 South Hamlin. Harris received a gunshot wound in the hand and right leg.

Verlina Brewer, Negro female, age 17, residing at 125 West 107th Street. Brewer was wounded in the legs.

Blair Anderson, Negro male, age 18, residing at 6943 South Justine. Anderson received a groin and leg wound.

Ronald (Doc) Satchel, Negro male, age 19, Deputy Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, listing 2337 West Monroe Street as his address. Satchel was wounded in the right leg, right flank, and right hand.

Deborah Johnson, Negro female, age 19, Lieutenant of Finance, Illinois BPP, listing 2337 West Monroe Street as her residence.

Lewis Trulock, Negro male, age 19, Legal Counsel, residing at 1900 West Jackson Boulevard.

Harold Bell, Negro male, age 23, Captain of Defense, Illinois BPP, residing at 317 Howard Street, Rockford, Illinois.

According to the Police Department source, the individuals arrested will be charged before the Cook County Grand Jury with attempted murder.

Sergeant Daniel Groth, Cook County State's Attorney Police, advised on the above date he had led the other officers in conducting the raid and stated that when he approached the door to the apartment, he knocked and identified himself as a police officer and stated he was in possession of a search warrant to search the premises. Groth stated that upon receiving no response, he repeated his demand for entry and after seveal minutes had passed, forced the door open. Sergeant Groth stated he was accompanied by four police officers with four additional officers

entering through the back door of the apartment. Upon entering the apartment, Groth spotted a woman with a shotgun. The woman fired the shotgun and the police returned the fire. Sergeant Groth stated the firing of the shotgun created enough light in the darkness to illuminate a man standing behind the door, also armed with a shotgun. One of the officers exchanged shots with this man. The individual was hit and was later identified as that of Mark Clark. Groth stated at this point he called for the Panthers to surrender and heard a man's voice reply, "Shoot it out". The statement was made from someplace in the apartment. Shooting again resumed and one of the officers, John Ciszewski, shouted that he had been shot. (Officer Ciszewski received minor wounds, was treated at the hospital, and released.) Later, Sergeant Groth heard a man shout "Shoot it out with the pigs". Shortly thereafter, the gunfire ceased and those arrested as set forth above surrendered to the police.

At this point, Sergeant Groth stated a body, later identified as Fred Hampton, was found in one of the bedrooms. Sergeant Groth stated a loaded .45 pistol was found in Hampton's hand, and a shotgun was found near his side. Another officer, Edward Carmody, received a wound in the hand by flying glass and was treated and released from the hospital.

A search of the apartment located nine shotguns, one carbine rifle, one .22 caliber rifle, six hand guns, and approximately one to two thousand rounds of ammunition. According to Sergeant Groth, one of the shotguns taken in the raid had been reported stolen from a police car on April 6, 1969.

CG T-1 advised on the above date the only activities being planned by the Chicago BPP Chapter was with respect to the collection of bail money for the remaining Chicago Panther leaders, and also discussed the possibility of making a motion picture depicting the life and killing of Fred Hampton. No definite plans have been formulated regarding this matter. CG T-6 also advised on the above date that numerous unidentified individuals have been in contact with Panther Headquarters, 2350 West Monroe Street, requesting information pertaining to what funeral arrangements had been made. All those contacting the Headquarters were instructed that they should not be sympathetic toward the Panthers because of the killing of Hampton, but should furnish money to be used for bail on those arrested.

This source also stated the local chapter had been in contact with numerous Chicago radio stations in an effort to secure air time on "talk program" type shows in order to discuss the Panther version of Hampton's death. No commitments have been made by local radio stations.

SF T-16 advised on the above date the National Chapter of the BPP issued a press release to news media in San Francisco, California, concerning the above raid. Source stated the release reported that at 5:00 a.m., on December 4, 1969, Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman of the Chicago Chapter, BPP, and Mark Clark, a Defense Captain of the Peoria, Illinois, BPP, were murdered, assassinated by special forces of the Office of State's Attorney, Chicago, Illinois. The release also stated that several other Panthers were injured, and that Hampton's wife, who is eight months pregnant, was arrested.

The release stated the special forces officers allegedly broke in the back door of Hampton's residence, forced their way in, charged into the bedroom, and murdered Hampton in bed without giving him a chance to get up. The release also alleges the officers did not have a search warrant, but merely stated they (the officers) were searching for illegal weapons.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The release also stated that gunshots had not been fired by BPP personnel and that all of the shots fired by the police were in the bedrooms.

The release concluded the next course of action by the BPP will be to intensify information to the people because another revolutionary brother had been slain in the streets by the fascist "pigs" of this counrty and the people have to seize the time and take power.

On December 5, 1969, Sergeant Halleran, 21st Police District, Chicago, Illinois, advised that on that date, at 5:30 a.m. that morning, a raid had been conducted on the apartment of Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP. The apartment is located at 2030 South State Street, Chicago, and was unoccupied at the time of the raid. The whereabouts of Rush is unknown.

Sergeant Halleran stated the raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by a local court, alleging that weapons were in this apartment. Recovered during the search was a .22 caliber Derringer-type pistol, approximately two hundred rounds of ammunition, BPP and other literature, and a small amount of marijuana. The raid was conducted without incident and no arrests or injuries were reported. The area in the vicinity of the above apartment was normal.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FBI

Date: 12/5/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted] (P)

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM-BPP
OO: San Francisco

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM suitable for dissemination. Two copies of the LHM are being furnished the and Divisions in lieu of their interest in this matter.

[redacted]

Serial number information regarding weapons confiscated by police during the raid as set forth in the LHM are being obtained and appropriate action will be taken with respect to possible ARL violation.

[redacted]

Information set forth in the enclosed LHM concerning statements by Sergeant DANIEL GROTH with respect to the shooting of Deputy Chairman FRED HAMPTON reflects that HAMPTON was found in the rear bedroom with a loaded .45 pistol in his hand and a shotgun by his side. GROTH advised that an individual appeared in the doorway and later was identified as HAMPTON with both the shotgun and the pistol in his hand firing at police officers. As a result of this, the officers returned the fire, killing HAMPTON.

While Police Department, [redacted] has developed no specific information regarding any planned violence as a result of the raid and death of two Panthers, the Police Department is affording the area in the vicinity of Panther Headquarters with added coverage. [redacted] sources of the Chicago Office have developed no information to date indicating any planned violence is under consideration at this time. [redacted] along with [redacted] has advised that no definite plans regarding possible demonstrations or other activities will be formulated until after the funeral of HAMPTON. Chicago will continue to follow closely the activities of the Panther Party and advise the Bureau and interested offices of any future pertinent developments.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
December 5, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is attached as an appendix hereto. Confidential sources utilized in this characterization and those set forth below have all furnished reliable information in the past.

Reference is made to Chicago memorandum dated November 21, 1969, captioned as above, reflecting information from CG T-1, who advised that allegedly firearms were being kept in the first floor apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois.

A Chicago Police Department source advised on December 4, 1969, that officers of the Cook County State's Attorney Office conducted an early morning raid on a BPP apartment located at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. The officers, armed with a search warrant and weapons, approached the above location at 5:00 a.m., on the above date, and in attempting to gain admission in order to serve the warrant, were met with shotgun fire.

The gun battle that ensued resulted in the death of Fred Allen Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois Chapter, BPP, and Mark Clark, a BPP leader from Peoria, Illinois. Seven individuals were arrested as a result of the raid. Those arrested were:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Brenda Harris, Negro female, age 18, residing at 1848 South Hamlin. Harris received a gunshot wound in the hand and right leg.

Verlina Brewer, Negro female, age 17, residing at 125 West 107th Street. Brewer was wounded in the legs.

Blair Anderson, Negro male, age 18, residing at 6943 South Justine. Anderson received a groin and leg wound.

Ronald (Doc) Satchel, Negro male, age 19, Deputy Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, listing 2337 West Monroe Street as his address. Satchel was wounded in the right leg, right flank, and right hand.

Deborah Johnson, Negro female, age 19, Lieutenant of Finance, Illinois BPP, listing 2337 West Monroe Street as her residence.

Lewis Trulock, Negro male, age 19, Legal Counsel, residing at 1900 West Jackson Boulevard.

Harold Bell, Negro male, age 23, Captain of Defense, Illinois BPP, residing at 317 Howard Street, Rockford, Illinois.

According to the Police Department source, the individuals arrested will be charged before the Cook County Grand Jury with attempted murder.

Sergeant Daniel Groth, Cook County State's Attorney Police, advised on the above date he had led the other officers in conducting the raid and stated that when he approached the door to the apartment, he knocked and identified himself as a police officer and stated he was in possession of a search warrant to search the premises. Groth stated that upon receiving no response, he repeated his demand for entry and after seveal minutes had passed, forced the door open. Sergeant Groth stated he was accompanied by four police officers with four additional officers

entering through the back door of the apartment. Upon entering the apartment, Groth spotted a woman with a shotgun. The woman fired the shotgun and the police returned the fire. Sergeant Groth stated the firing of the shotgun created enough light in the darkness to illuminate a man standing behind the door, also armed with a shotgun. One of the officers exchanged shots with this man. The individual was hit and was later identified as that of Mark Clark. Groth stated at this point he called for the Panthers to surrender and heard a man's voice reply, "Shoot it out". The statement was made from someplace in the apartment. Shooting again resumed and one of the officers, John Ciszewski, shouted that he had been shot. (Officer Ciszewski received minor wounds, was treated at the hospital, and released.) Later, Sergeant Groth heard a man shout "Shoot it out with the pigs". Shortly thereafter, the gunfire ceased and those arrested as set forth above surrendered to the police.

At this point, Sergeant Groth stated a body, later identified as Fred Hampton, was found in one of the bedrooms. Sergeant Groth stated a loaded .45 pistol was found in Hampton's hand, and a shotgun was found near his side. Another officer, Edward Carmody, received a wound in the hand by flying glass and was treated and released from the hospital.

A search of the apartment located nine shotguns, one carbine rifle, one .22 caliber rifle, six hand guns, and approximately one to two thousand rounds of ammunition. According to Sergeant Groth, one of the shotguns taken in the raid had been reported stolen from a police car on April 6, 1969.

CG T-1 advised on the above date the only activities being planned by the Chicago BPP Chapter was with respect to the collection of bail money for the remaining Chicago Panther leaders, and also discussed the possibility of making a motion picture depicting the life and killing of Fred Hampton. No definite plans have been formulated regarding this matter. CG T-6 also advised on the above date that numerous unidentified individuals have been in contact with Panther Headquarters, 2350 West Monroe Street, requesting information pertaining to what funeral arrangements had been made. All those contacting the Headquarters were instructed that they should not be sympathetic toward the Panthers because of the killing of Hampton, but should furnish money to be used for bail on those arrested.

This source also stated the local chapter had been in contact with numerous Chicago radio stations in an effort to secure air time on "talk program" type shows in order to discuss the Panther version of Hampton's death. No commitments have been made by local radio stations.

SF T-16 advised on the above date the National Chapter of the BPP issued a press release to news media in San Francisco, California, concerning the above raid. Source stated the release reported that at 5:00 a.m., on December 4, 1969, Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman of the Chicago Chapter, BPP, and Mark Clark, a Defense Captain of the Peoria, Illinois, BPP, were murdered, assassinated by special forces of the Office of State's Attorney, Chicago, Illinois. The release also stated that several other Panthers were injured, and that Hampton's wife, who is eight months pregnant, was arrested.

The release stated the special forces officers allegedly broke in the back door of Hampton's residence, forced their way in, charged into the bedroom, and murdered Hampton in bed without giving him a chance to get up. The release also alleges the officers did not have a search warrant, but merely stated they (the officers) were searching for illegal weapons.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The release also stated that gunshots had not been fired by BPP personnel and that all of the shots fired by the police were in the bedrooms.

The release concluded the next course of action by the BPP will be to intensify information to the people because another revolutionary brother had been slain in the streets by the fascist "pigs" of this counrty and the people have to seize the time and take power.

On December 5, 1969, Sergeant Halleran, 21st Police District, Chicago, Illinois, advised that on that date, at 5:30 a.m. that morning, a raid had been conducted on the apartment of Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP. The apartment is located at 2030 South State Street, Chicago, and was unoccupied at the time of the raid. The whereabouts of Rush is unknown.

Sergeant Halleran stated the raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by a local court, alleging that weapons were in this apartment. Recovered during the search was a .22 caliber Derringer-type pistol, approximately two hundred rounds of ammunition, BPP and other literature, and a small amount of marijuana. The raid was conducted without incident and no arrests or injuries were reported. The area in the vicinity of the above apartment was normal.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted] DATE: 12/10/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM - BPP

[redacted] who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information

[redacted]

advised as follows on the indicated dates:

DATE	INOFRMATION
12/1/69	DIANE PRETTE, BOB LEE This person is not known to be a Panther, however, is one of the girls whom LEE stays with on Cleveland. She is a Female Negro, about 21 years old, 5'6", slender, light skinned, approximately 118 pounds.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted]

CYNTHIA HOWELL, PAMELA HANNAH

Photographes of [redacted] and [redacted] are both of HOWELL. HOWELL allegedly took identification of HANNAH with HANNAH's knowledge when she (HOWELL) went to California, allegedly to have a baby.

12/3/69 BILLY BROOKS, JEWEL COOK

These persons were announced as permanently expelled, however, COOK has been reinstated in his former position and it is rumored that BROOKS upon his released from jail will also be reinstated.

FRED HAMPTON, PHYLLIS MONTGOMERY

HAMPTON is spending some nights with this girl, address unknown.

12/6/69 FRED HAMPTON, A. A. RAYNER, BPP

HAMPTON's family want HAMPTON buried in Haynesville (phonetic), Louisiana, where the family burial lot is; however, the Panthers are attempting to gain permission to have him buried in the Chicago, Illinois, area. The body is being taken by A. A. Rayner Funeral Parlor, 3654 West Roosevelt Road, Chicago, and allegedly an independent autopsy will or is being done as BPP leaders, unknown alleged community and Illinois government leaders, as well as BPP lawyers, feel the bullet holes in walls at 2337 West Monroe, do not back police story of shooting on 12/4/69. The BPP lawyers allegedly dug bullets from the walls.

HOWARD ALK, FRED HAMPTON, BPP

ALK has taken several photographs of shooting site and will incorporate this into a movie yet to be given a title.

FRED HAMPTON

Body will be available for public viewing at the First Baptist Church, Melrose Park, Illinois, either 12/7 or 8/69.

TOM STREITER, FRED HAMPTON, PAUL SMITH

STREITER, a minister in Maywood, Illinois, and SMITH a neighbor of HAMPTON's family were among those at the above meeting with HAMPTON's family on 12/5/69, and both individuals that they do not believe the police story concerning the shooting and will attempt to cause an investigation into the incident to be conducted.

[redacted]

BPP GENERAL ORDERS

Chicago area BPP leaders have warned all members that if they are arrested for any activity which they activated, they will be premantly expelled from the party. This order is allegedly good until canceled. It was made with the idea that Panthers should not ruin any chances to bring charges against the police officers conducting the raid at 2337 West Monroe on 12/4/69.

12/7/69

JEWEL COOK, RUFUS WALLS, WILLIE CALVIN, BOBBY RUSH

It appears that the BPP in the Chicago area will be run by the above individuals.

WILLIAM "BILL" HAMPTON, FRED HAMPTON

Rumors are that WILLIAM HAMPTON, brother of FRED, will be taking FRED's place as Deputy Chairman, Illinois Chapter of BPP. According to Chicago area BPP leaders, this will not happen as HAMPTON's position for BPP publicity must be preserved. Further the BPP theory of his death may be harmed if his position was filled.

BPP FINANCES

As a result of the publicity of the raid on 2337 West Monroe by the police on 12/4/69, the BPP has allegedly recieved

$19,000 in promised donations, $11,500 of which has either been given in check or cash; HAMPTON's family has also received several thousand. None of this money has been seen, only the Chicago BPP leaders word that this is the amount.

12/9/69

JEWEL COOK, BOBBY RUSH, WILLIE CALVIN, BEVELINA POWELL, HOWARD ALK, MARK CLARK

These people allegedly traveled to Peoria, Illinois, on 12/8/69, taking $1,000 to the family of CLARK for funeral expenses.

FINANCES, FRED HAMPTON

The Panthers allegedly received $2,000 on 12/8/69, in donations given at the funeral home where HAMPTON rests.

FINANCES

Rumor is that the BPP has deposited $6,000 in a savings account at an unknown bank.

FRED HAMPTON, A. A. RAYNER

HAMPTON's body will be removed from Rayner's Funeral Home to the First

[redacted]

Baptist Church, 2114 Main Street, Melrose Park, via motorcade at about 5:30 p.m., 12/9/69, where services will be conducted then body will be flown to Haynesville, Louisiana.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G[illegible]MENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

DATE: 12/10/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM - BPP

[redacted] who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information.

[redacted] advised as follows on the indicated dates:

DATE	INOFRMATION
12/1/69	DIANE PRETTE, BOB LEE This person is not known to be a Panther, however, is one of the girls whom LEE stays with on Cleveland. She is a Female Negro, about 21 years old, 5'6", slender, light skinned, approximately 118 pounds.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted]

CYNTHIA HOWELL, PAMELA HANNAH

Photographes of [redacted] and [redacted] are both of HOWELL. HOWELL allegedly took identification of HANNAH with HANNAH's knowledge when she (HOWELL) went to California, allegedly to have a baby.

12/3/69 BILLY BROOKS, JEWEL COOK

These persons were announced as permanently expelled, however, COOK has been reinstated in his former position and it is rumored that BROOKS upon his released from jail will also be reinstated.

FRED HAMPTON, PHYLLIS MONTGOMERY

HAMPTON is spending some nights with this girl, address unknown.

12/6/69 FRED HAMPTON, A. A. RAYNER, BPP

HAMPTON's family want HAMPTON buried in Haynesville (phonetic), Louisiana, where the family burial lot is; however, the Panthers are attempting to gain permission to have him buried in the Chicago, Illinois, area. The body is being taken by A. A. Rayner Funeral Parlor, 3654 West Roosevelt Road, Chicago, and allegedly an independent autopsy will or is being done as BPP leaders, unknown alleged community and Illinois government leaders, as well as BPP lawyers, feel the bullet holes in walls at 2337 West Monroe, do not back police story of shooting on 12/4/69. The BPP lawyers allegedly dug bullets from the walls.

HOWARD ALK, FRED HAMPTON, BPP

ALK has taken several photographs of shooting site and will incorporate this into a movie yet to be given a title.

FRED HAMPTON

Body will be available for public viewing at the First Baptist Church, Melrose Park, Illinois, either 12/7 or 8/69.

TOM STREITER, FRED HAMPTON, PAUL SMITH

STREITER, a minister in Maywood, Illinois, and SMITH a neighbor of HAMPTON's family were among those at the above meeting with HAMPTON's family on 12/5/69, and both individuals that they do not believe the police story concerning the shooting and will attempt to cause an investigation into the incident to be conducted.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BPP GENERAL ORDERS

Chicago area BPP leaders have warned all members that if they are arrested for any activity which they activated, they will be premantly expelled from the party. This order is allegedly good until canceled. It was made with the idea that Panthers should not ruin any chances to bring charges against the police officers conducting the raid at 2337 West Monroe on 12/4/69.

12/7/69

JEWEL COOK, RUFUS WALLS, WILLIE CALVIN, BOBBY RUSH

It appears that the BPP in the Chicago area will be run by the above individuals.

WILLIAM "BILL" HAMPTON, FRED HAMPTON

Rumors are that WILLIAM HAMPTON, brother of FRED, will be taking FRED's place as Deputy Chairman, Illinois Chapter of BPP. According to Chicago area BPP leaders, this will not happen as HAMPTON's position for BPP publicity must be preserved. Further the BPP theory of his death may be harmed if his position was filled.

BPP FINANCES

As a result of the publicity of the raid on 2337 West Monroe by the police on 12/4/69, the BPP has allegedly recieved

$19,000 in promised donations, $11,500 of which has either been given in check or cash; HAMPTON's family has also received several thousand. None of this money has been seen, only the Chicago BPP leaders word that this is the amount.

12/9/69 JEWEL COOK, BOBBY RUSH, WILLIE CALVIN, BEVELINA POWELL, HOWARD ALK, MARK CLARK

These people allegedly traveled to Peoria, Illinois, on 12/8/69, taking $1,000 to the family of CLARK for funeral expenses.

FINANCES, FRED HAMPTON

The Panthers allegedly received $2,000 on 12/8/69, in donations given at the funeral home where HAMPTON rests.

FINANCES

Rumor is that the BPP has deposited $6,000 in a savings account at an unknown bank.

FRED HAMPTON, A. A. RAYNER

HAMPTON's body will be removed from Rayner's Funeral Home to the First

[redacted]

Baptist Church, 2114 Main Street, Melrose Park, via motorcade at about 5:30 p.m., 12/9/69, where services will be conducted then body will be flown to Haynesville, Louisiana.

1/2/70

TELETYPE

TO : DIRECTOR FBI

FROM: SAC CHICAGO [redacted]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY. RM - BPP. OO: SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT RALLY SCHEDULED FOR THREE P.M., JANUARY FOUR, NEXT, [illegible] AFFRO-ARTS THEATER, THIRTY NINE THIRTY SEVEN SOUTH DREXEL BOULEVARD, CHICAGO. RALLY IN MEMORIAL TO FRED HAMPTON, DECEASED DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP, KILLED DECEMBER FOUR, LAST, IN RAID CONDUCTED BY COOK COUNTY STATES ATTORNEY'S POLICE.

SOURCE ALSO ADVISES BPP TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO ANNOUNCE OPENING OF "PEOPLES MEDICAL CENTER," [illegible] PURPOSE OF WHICH WILL BE TO FREELY TREAT GHETTO RESIDENTS.

SOURCE STATES [illegible] BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ILLINOIS BPP, BOB LUCAS, LEADER BLACK LIBERATION ALLIANCE, AND CHICAGO ALDERMAN A. A. "SAMMY" RAYNER BEING ADVERTISED AS SPEAKERS. ENTERTAINMENT WILL ALSO BE PROVIDED ACCORDING TO SOURCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS SOLICITED. MONEY OBTAINED

PAGE TWO

WILL BE USED IN DEFENSE OF BPP MEMBERS ARRESTED DURING ABOVE RAID WHEN HAMPTON WAS KILLED.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

1/2/70

TELETYPE

TO : DIRECTOR FBI

FROM: SAC CHICAGO [redacted]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY. RM - BPP. OO: SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT RALLY SCHEDULED FOR THREE P.M., JANUARY FOUR, NEXT, AFFRO-ARTS THEATRE, THIRTY NINE THIRTY SEVEN SOUTH DREXEL BOULEVARD, CHICAGO. RALLY IN MEMORIAL TO FRED HAMPTON, DECEASED DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP, KILLED DECEMBER FOUR, LAST, IN RAID CONDUCTED BY COOK COUNTY STATES ATTORNEY'S POLICE.

SOURCE ALSO ADVISES BPP TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO ANNOUNCE OPENING OF "PEOPLES MEDICAL CENTER," PURPOSE OF WHICH WILL BE TO FREELY TREAT GHETTO RESIDENTS.

SOURCE STATES BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ILLINOIS BPP, BOB LUCAS, LEADER BLACK LIBERATION ALLIANCE, AND CHICAGO ALDERMAN A. A. "SAMMY" RAYNER BEING ADVERTISED AS SPEAKERS. ENTERTAINMENT WILL ALSO BE PROVIDED ACCORDING TO SOURCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS SOLICITED. MONEY OBTAINED

PAGE TWO

WILL BE USED IN DEFENSE OF BPP MEMBERS ARRESTED DURING ABOVE RAID WHEN HAMPTON WAS KILLED.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

1/5/70

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY. RM-BPP.

SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ILLINOIS CHAPTER, BPP, TO MAKE NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT INSTANT TO LOCAL MEDIA THAT PANTHERS HAVE INDEPENDENT PATHOLIGIST REPORT INDICATING FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP AS RESULT OF ILLINOIS STATE'S ATTORNEY'S POLICE RAID DECEMBER FOUR LAST) HAD RECEIVED A DRUG THROUGH EATING APPROXIMATELY EIGHT HOURS BEFORE DEATH. INDICATION IS PANTHERS WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH ILLINOIS COOK COUNTY CORONER'S GRAND JURY SCHEDULED TO CONVENE JANUARY SIX NEXT, TWENTY SIX HUNDRED SOUTH CALIFORNIA, HOWEVER, WILL SUBMIT PATHOLIGIST REPORT. RUSH ALSO CALLED FOR BPP SUPPORTERS TO APPEAR FOR DEMONSTRATION AT ABOVE ADDRESS JANUARY SIX NEXT.

NO VIOLENCE ANTICIPATED OR KNOWN PLANNED BY BPP. APPROPRIATE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

1/5/70

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY. RM-BPP.

SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ILLINOIS CHAPTER, BPP, TO MAKE NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT INSTANT TO LOCAL MEDIA THAT PANTHERS HAVE INDEPENDENT PATHOLIGIST REPORT INDICATING FRED HAMPTON (DECEASED DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP AS RESULT OF ILLINOIS STATE'S ATTORNEY'S POLICE RAID DECEMBER FOUR LAST) HAD RECEIVED A DRUG THROUGH EATING APPROXIMATELY EIGHT HOURS BEFORE DEATH. INDICATION IS PANTHERS WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH ILLINOIS COOK COUNTY CORONER'S GRAND JURY SCHEDULED TO CONVENE JANUARY SIX NEXT, TWENTY SIX HUNDRED SOUTH CALIFORNIA, HOWEVER, WILL SUBMIT PATHOLIGIST REPORT. RUSH ALSO CALLED FOR BPP SUPPORTERS TO APPEAR FOR DEMONSTRATION AT ABOVE ADDRESS JANUARY SIX NEXT.

NO VIOLENCE ANTICIPATED OR KNOWN PLANNED BY BPP. APPROPRIATE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

70?

TO : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted] DATE: 1/7/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM

who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information.

advised as follows on 12/23/69:

MIKE GRAY, HOWARD ALK, Film Group, Inc., BERNADINE DORHN, SLIM COLEMAN, DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, JAMES MONTGOMERY, SKIPPY ANDREWS, DON STANG.
SKIP

GRAY, ALK, four other unknown white males, all employees of Film Group, Inc., took movies and photographs of the interior and exterior of 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, on 12/4/69, after the shoot-out with the police, at the direction of CUNNINGHAM, MONTGOMERY, ANDREWS, and STANG. This was done prior to the public being allowed to enter.

DORHN, COLEMAN, several Panthers names unrecalled as well as NBC, WGN, WNUS, WCFL and WVON representatives were required to wait outside while this was being done.

(The fact that these photographs were taken by GRAY, ALK, and four other white males, all employees of Film Group, Inc., as well as the names of the news agencies present was the only information disseminated to the Ill. States Attorney's Office and the Federal Departmental Attorneys presently conducting a FGJ hearing into this shooting.)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

(70?)

TO : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

DATE: 1/7/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM

[redacted] who has furnished reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information.

[redacted] advised as follows on 12/23/69:

MIKE GRAY, HOWARD ALK, Film Group, Inc., BERNADINE DORHN, SLIM COLEMAN, DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, JAMES MONTGOMERY, SKIPPY ANDREWS, DON STANG.
Skip

GRAY, ALK, four other unknown white males, all employees of Film Group, Inc., took movies and photographs of the interior and exterior of 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, on 12/4/69, after the shoot-out with the police, at the direction of CUNNINGHAM, MONTGOMERY, ANDREWS, and STANG. This was done prior to the public being allowed to enter.

DORHN, COLEMAN, several Panthers names unrecalled as well as NBC, WGN, WNUS, WCFL and WVON representatives were required to wait outside while this was being done.

(The fact that these photographs were taken by GRAY, ALK, and four other white males, all employees of Film Group, Inc., as well as the names of the news agencies present was the only information disseminated to the Ill. States Attorney's Office and the Federal Departmental Attorneys presently conducting a FGJ hearing into this shooting.)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

2/20/70

SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM-BPP

[redacted] who has provided reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to accuracy of the following

[redacted]

advised on 2/20/70.

According to various stories circulating among BPP leaders and lawyers concerning podice raid on 12/4/69, at 2337 West Monroe Street, is that BRENDA HARRIS fired the first shot from a shotgun after the police announced that they were police officers and there to serve a search warrant for possession of illegal weapons.

Source stated that SKIP ANDREW, BPP lawyer, telephonically advisdd BPP leaders on this date that those surviving above raid are to appear at the Federal Grand Jury hearing on 2/24/70 after 2:00 p.m. at 219 South Dearborn, and all are instructed to plead the Fifth Amendment.

SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

2/20/70

SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM-BPP

who has provided reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to accuracy of the following

advised on 2/20/70.

According to various stories circulating among BPP leaders and lawyers concerning podice raid on 12/4/69, at 2337 West Monroe Street, is that BRENDA HARRIS fired the first shot from a shotgun after the police announced that they were police officers and there to serve a search warrant for possession of illegal weapons.

Source stated that SKIP ANDREW, BPP lawyer, telephonically advisdd BPP leaders on this date that those surviving above raid are to appear at the Federal Grand Jury hearing on 2/24/70 after 2:00 p.m. at 219 South Dearborn, and all are instructed to plead the Fifth Amendment.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 3/5/73

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM - BPP

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above.

The Chicago, Illinois, Police Department and the Cook County, Illinois, States Attorney's Office, are aware of information contained in this LHM.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
March 5, 1970

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of the BPP.

[illegible] "Chicago Sun-Times" [illegible]

The following advertisement appeared on page 89 of the above newspaper dated March 5, 1970:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of
Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT

ATTENTION!

JAMES DAVIS
EDWARD CARMODY
WILLIAM CORMAN
RAY BRODERICK
JOHN MARUSICH
FRED HOWARD
WILLIAM KELLY
EDWARD V. HANRAHAN

DANIEL GROTH
JOHN CISZEWSKI
ROBERT HUGHES
GEORGE JONES
LYNWOOD HARRIS
WILLIAM CORBETT
PHILIP JOSEPH (State's Attorney's Police)
RICHARD S. JALOVEC (State's Attorney's)

You are asked to appear and testify
with
THE PANTHER SURVIVORS
before

THE PEOPLE'S INQUEST

into the Killings of
FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK
Sunday, March 8, 1970 at 2:00 p.m.
First Congregational Church 40 No. Ashland, Chicago

*Subpoenas have been issued by the will of the people.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 3/5/73

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM - BPP

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above.

The Chicago, Illinois, Police Department and the Cook County, Illinois, States Attorney's Office, are aware of information contained in this LHM.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois
March 5, 1970

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.* [redacted]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of the BPP.

[redacted] "Chicago Sun-Times," [redacted]

The following advertisement appeared on page 89 of the above newspaper dated March 5, 1970:

[redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of
Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT

ATTENTION!

JAMES DAVIS	DANIEL GROTH
EDWARD CARMODY	JOHN CISZEWSKI
WILLIAM GORMAN	ROBERT HUGHES
RAY BRODERICK	GEORGE JONES
JOHN MARUSICH	LYNWOOD HARRIS
FRED HOWARD	WILLIAM CORBETT
WILLIAM KELLY	PHILIP JOSEPH (State's Attorney's Police)
EDWARD V. HANRAHAN	RICHARD S. JALOVEC (State's Attorney's)

You are asked to appear and testify
with
THE PANTHER SURVIVORS
before

THE PEOPLE'S INQUEST

into the Killings of
FRED HAMPTON and MARK CLARK
Sunday, March 8, 1970 at 2:00 p.m.
First Congregational Church 40 No. Ashland, Chicago

*Subpoenas have been issued by the will of the people.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GO[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 3/10/70

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM - BPP

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above.

UN[illegible] STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]TICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
March 10, 1970

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

On March 8 and 9, 1970, CG T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on March 8, 1970, approximately 700 people, majority of whom were Negroes, gathered at the First Congregational Church, 40 North Ashland, Chicago, Illinois, where the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP) held "the People's Inquest." The "jury" of the "Inquest" consisted of four men and eight women, three of whom were white and nine of whom were black, all allegedly selected from among the persons attending the Emergency Conference, held earlier this date, but more properly by the Chicago, Illinois, BPP leadership. The "coroner," allegedly appointed by the BPP leaders, was Doctor Charles D. Hurst, President of Malcolm X Community College, Chicago, Illinois.

The BPP is characterized in the appendix section attached hereto.

Jewel Cook, Field Secretary, Illinois Chapter, BPP, acted as the "prosecutor," that is, he acted as "the People's lawyer."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

The movie, which allegedly was shown on television that is supposedly the reinaction of the raid at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, on December 4, 1969, by those police officers who actually conducted that raid, was shown at the "Inquest" inasmuch as these officers did not respond to "The People's Subpoena" directed to each to appear before this "Inquest."

Brenda Harris, a BPP survivor of the above raid, told this "Inquest" that she and Mark Clark (deceased BPP leader from Peoria, Illinois) were asleep in the front room of the first floor apartment at the above address, when awakened by a knock on the door. She said that Clark responded by saying, "Just a minute, who is there?" She stated that as she and Clark started toward the door to open it, the door burst open and persons entering were firing guns at them. She stated that Clark was killed and she was wounded. In addition to being wounded, she also claimed to have been beaten and threatened by the raiders.

Ronald Satchel, a BPP survivor of the above raid, stated that he was asleep in the first bedroom toward the front of the apartment, was awakened by shots, started to put on his pants to see what was happening, was hit by five bullets before he could get into his pants. He also stated that he was handcuffed, pulled out of the bedroom, as well as kicked and cursed by the raiders and then, though badly wounded, was forced to walk out of the apartment to a squad car.

Donette Brewer, a BPP survivor of the above raid, stated that in addition to being kicked and cursed, even though wounded, she fell from the stretcher as the raiders roughly carried her down the front steps of the above apartment.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Debra Johnson, a BPP survivor of the above raid, stated that she was in the back bedroom of the above apartment, asleep with Fred Hampton (deceased Deputy Chairman, Illinois Chapter of the BPP) who was also asleep when she heard gunfire. She stated that Hampton raised his head, then lowered it slowly almost immediately and closed his eyes. She stated that a moment later, he was shot as she tried to move him to cover. She stated that Hampton might have been asleep when he was killed.

Harold Bell, a BPP survivor of the above raid, from the Rockford, Illinois, BPP Branch of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, stated that he ran back to where Hampton was sleeping to awaken him, but was pulled from the room before he could do this.

Blair Anderson, a former BPP member and survivor of the above raid, stated that he was asleep in the same room as Satchel when awakened by gunshots. He stated that he immediately crawled under the bed. He stated that he was kicked, beaten and cursed by the police.

Louis Truelock, a BPP survivor of the above raid, was the only survivor who did not appear before the "Inquest."

Source stated that allegedly the reasons Truelock was not allowed to "testify" was due to the alleged reason that he failed to attend any of the alleged secret meetings between the BPP lawyers and the above survivors to rehearse what they were to say at this "Inquest." Further, allegedly Truelock claims he was the one who attempted to awaken Hampton which is not in agreement with Johnson's and Bell's "testimony" above.

Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois Chapter of the BPP, introduced the "coroner," "the People's Lawyer," and those "testifying."

Source stated that the "coroner" related that the "jury" found the above BPP survivors "innocent" of any crime and the raiders "guilty of murder." The "coroner" stated, "We, the people, now ask for appropriate action by the State and hold State's Attorney Hanrahan and his men in contempt of the people."

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

THE PEOPLE'S INQU

INTO THE KILLING OF

FRED HAMPTON - MARK CLAR

THESE PIGS ARE COMMANDED TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY WITH THE PANTHER SURVIVO



EDWARD V. HANRAH

- *James Davis
- Ray Broderick
- William Kelly
- Robert Hughes
- William Corbett
- Edward Carmody
- John Marusich
- Daniel Groth
- George Jones
- Philip Joseph
- William Gorman
- Fred Howard
- John Ciszewski
- Lynwood Harris
- Richard S. Jalovec

GRINNING POLICEMAN and fellow officers carry body of slain Illinois Black Panther leader Fred Hampton, 21, out of Chicago west side apartment. At least one of the raiding policemen has been identified as a member of the Chicago-area Klu Klux Klan. This allegation has not been mentioned or discussed by white press, though it could shed light on the motives of the man who invaded Hampton's apartment and shot him and Mark Clark, 22, to death.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

SUBPOENAS HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY THE WILL OF THE PEOPL

Fred Hampton and Mark Clark were murdered by State's Attorney Hanrahan and his cohorts.. These [illegible] and murderous hoodlums used the old Klu Klux Klan tactic of killing a few niggers to keep the rest in line. [illegible] the pigs saw the people were concerned about the deaths they tried to justify their actions by holding a [illegible]. At the inquest you could see the pigs were lying because each one had a different story. But still the [illegible] hand picked, upper class, racist jury found the verdict to be JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE. Come to the [illegible] inquest to find out the truth. Then it will be up to the people to see and decide that justice is done.

WE WELCOME ALL PEOPLE TO WITNESS THIS INQUEST

SUNDAY, MARCH 1, 1970
2:00 p.m.
FIRST Congregational Church
40 No. ASHLAND

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

Ill. Chapter
Black Panther Party
2350 w. Madison

243-8276
738-0778

[redacted]

In view of the above and past activities of above BPP members, all should be considered armed and dangerous.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 3/10/70

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM - BPP

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above.

UN[illegible] STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]TICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
March 10, 1970

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

On March 8 and 9, 1970, CG T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on March 8, 1970, approximately 700 people, majority of whom were Negroes, gathered at the First Congregational Church, 40 North Ashland, Chicago, Illinois, where the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP) held "the People's Inquest." The "jury" of the "Inquest" consisted of four men and eight women, three of whom were white and nine of whom were black, all allegedly selected from among the persons attending the Emergency Conference, held earlier this date, but more properly by the Chicago, Illinois, BPP leadership. The "coroner," allegedly appointed by the BPP Leaders, was Doctor Charles D. Hurst, President of Malcolm X Community College, Chicago, Illinois.

The BPP is characterized in the appendix section attached hereto.

Jewel Cook, Field Secretary, Illinois Chapter, BPP, acted as the "prosecutor," that is, he acted as "the People's lawyer."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The movie, which allegedly was shown on television that is supposedly the reinaction of the raid at 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, on December 4, 1969, by those police officers who actually conducted that raid, was shown at the "Inquest" inasmuch as these officers did not respond to "The People's Subpoena" directed to each to appear before this "Inquest."

Brenda Harris, a BPP survivor of the above raid, told this "Inquest" that she and Mark Clark (deceased BPP leader from Peoria, Illinois) were asleep in the front room of the first floor apartment at the above address, when awakened by a knock on the door. She said that Clark responded by saying, "Just a minute, who is there?" She stated that as she and Clark started toward the door to open it, the door burst open and persons entering were firing guns at them. She stated that Clark was killed and she was wounded. In addition to being wounded, she also claimed to have been beaten and threatened by the raiders.

Ronald Satchel, a BPP survivor of the above raid, stated that he was asleep in the first bedroom toward the front of the apartment, was awakened by shots, started to put on his pants to see what was happening, was hit by five bullets before he could get into his pants. He also stated that he was handcuffed, pulled out of the bedroom, as well as kicked and cursed by the raiders and then, though badly wounded, was forced to walk out of the apartment to a squad car.

Donette Brewer, a BPP survivor of the above raid, stated that in addition to being kicked and cursed, even though wounded, she fell from the stretcher as the raiders roughly carried her down the front steps of the above apartment.

Debra Johnson, a BPP survivor of the above raid, stated that she was in the back bedroom of the above apartment, asleep with Fred Hampton (deceased Deputy Chairman, Illinois Chapter of the BPP) who was also asleep when she heard gunfire. She stated that Hampton raised his head, then lowered it slowly almost immediately and closed his eyes. She stated that a moment later, he was shot as she tried to move him to cover. She stated that Hampton might have been asleep when he was killed.

Harold Bell, a BPP survivor of the above raid, from the [illegible], Illinois, BPP Branch of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, stated that he ran back to where Hampton was sleeping to awaken him, but was pulled from the room before he could do this.

Blair Anderson, a former BPP member and survivor of the above raid, stated that he was asleep in the same room as Satchel when awakened by gunshots. He stated that he immediately crawled under the bed. He stated that he was kicked, beaten and cursed by the police.

Louis Truelock, a BPP survivor of the above raid, was the only survivor who did not appear before the "Inquest."

Source stated that allegedly the reasons Truelock was not allowed to "testify" was due to the alleged reason that he failed to attend any of the alleged secret meetings between the BPP lawyers and the above survivers to rehearse what they were to say at this "Inquest." Further, allegedly Truelock claims he was the one who attempted to awaken Hampton which is not in agreement with Johnson's and Bell's "testimony" above.

Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois Chapter of the BPP, introduced the "coroner," "the People's Lawyer," and those "testifying."

Source stated that the "coroner" related that the "jury" found the above BPP survivors "innocent" of any crime and the raiders "guilty of murder." The "coroner" stated, "We, the people, now ask for appropriate action by the State and hold State's Attorney Hanrahan and his men in contempt of the people."

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

PEOPLE'S INQU

INTO THE KILLING OF

RED HAMPTON · MARK CLA

THESE PIGS ARE COMMANDED TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY WITH THE PANTHER SURVIVO

EDWARD V. HANRAH

* James Davis
Ray Broderick
William Kelly
Robert Hughes
William Corbett
Edward Carmody
John Marusich
Daniel Groth
George Jones
Philip Joseph
William Gorman
Fred Howard
John Ciszewski
Lynwood Harris
Richard S. Jalovec

GRINNING POLICEMAN and fellow officers carry body of slain Illinois Black Panther leader Fred Hampton, 21, out of Chicago west side apartment. At least one of the raiding policemen has been identified as a member of the Chicago-area Klu Klux Klan. This allegation has not been mentioned or discussed by white press, though it could shed light on the motives of the man who invaded [illegible] and shot him and Mark Clark, 27, to death.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY



SUBPOENAS HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY THE WILL OF THE PEOPL

Fred Hampton and Mark Clark were murdered by State's Attorney Hanrahan and his cohorts.. These [illegible] and murderous hoodlums used the old Klu Klux Klan tactic of killing a few niggers to keep the rest in line. [illegible] the pigs saw the people were concerned about the deaths they tried to justify their actions by holding a rigged [illegible] At the inquest you could see the pigs were lying because each one had a different story. But still the old [illegible] hand picked, upper class, racist jury found the verdict to be JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE. Come to the [illegible]'s inquest to find out the truth. Then it will be up to the people to see and decide that justice is done.

WE WELCOME ALL PEOPLE TO WITNESS THIS INQUEST

SUNDAY, MARCH 1, 1970
2:00 p.m.
FIRST Congregational Church
40 No. ASHLAND

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

Ill. Chapter
Black Panther Party
2350 w. Madison

243-8276
738-0778

In view of the above and past activities of above BPP members, all should be considered armed and dangerous.

1 APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which furth describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

DATE: MAR 18 1970

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM-BPP

[redacted] who has provided reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information.

[redacted]

[redacted] advised as follows on the indicated dates:

[redacted]

3/2/70 WILLIE CALVIN, RAYMOND HEWITT, CLARENCE TERRY, TRAVEL BPP LEADERS.

CALVIN was assigned to be HEWITT and companion known only as "T.C.", security guard when they came through

[redacted]

Chicago on 3/1/70 enroute to Canada. CALVIN met them at O'Hare International Airport, stayed with them about one hour and they departed Chicago for Toronto on United Airline Flight number 640 at about 8:30 a.m. on 3/1/70 after a one hour lay over. CALVIN related that during the hour conversation nothing specific was discussed as one female with him was not a Panther. CLAVIN stated that they did not leave the airport or make any contact with anyone else.

[redacted]

3/2/70 ROBERT CAMPBELL, ROGER MOODY, RALPH BOSTICK

These persons were assigned to cover some demonstration at the Western Electric Plant, 22nd and Cermak on this date, however, no one showed for the demonstration.

3/2/70 ISMAEL FLORY, J. B. BOOSE, BPP COMMUNITY CENTER

BOOSE is in charge of the People's Community Center which is to be opened at ISMAEL FLORY'S office on west 63rd Street.

3/2/70 J. B. BOOSE, JAMES ELDERS, ROBERT CAMPBELL ROGER MOODY

These persons are BPP section leaders for the designated areas:

ELDERS	West side
CAMPBELL	Jew town area
MOODY	North side
BOOSE	South side

[redacted]

BLAIR ANDERSON

Anderson is to be bailed out of jail per instructions of the BPP lawyers. However, ANDERSON will not be allowed to be reinstated as a BPP member.

3/3/70 BILLY BROOKS

BROOKS is allegedly getting the feeling that he is not trusted by the membership and leaders of the Chicago area BPP.

3/4/70 HOWARD ALK

ALK is currently at his place in Michigan reviewing some film concerning the BPP.

HOWARD ALK, MIKE GRAY, FILM GROUP, INC.

GRAY has private pilot license and will fly up to see ALK on 3/11/70.

The Film Group, Incorporated is allegedly moving from their current address.

3/9/70 BILLY BROOKS, TRAVEL OF BPP LEADERSHIP

BROOKS will possibly leave for San Francisco, California, on 3/11/70. The only reason he is going is because he has never been there.

3/9/70 BOBBY RUSH, SONNY RUSH, TRAVEL OF BPP LEADERSHIP

RUSH and his wife will depart for San Francisco, California, tonight. The purpose of this trip is not known.

3/9/70 WILLIE CALVIN, BERADINE GRAYSON, MEDICAL CENTER

CALVIN is sleeping with GRAYSON who is a former panther and is working in the Medical Center.

3/10/70 JOAN GRAY

GRAY traveled to De Kalb, Illinois, on 3/9/70, where she had some unknown speech to deliver.

LOUIS TRUELOCK, FRED HAMPTON, H. BELL.

TRUELOCK was allegedly on security guard at 2337 West Monroe as 12/4/69, when the police raided. The security guard must be awake at all times it is therefore, probably true that he is the person who attempted to wake HAMPTON as he claims and not BELL.

3/10/70 The following are now known as Panther Pads which means they are available to any BPP member. Each member is required to have access to at least one weapon.

7801 South Sangamon Street, 2nd floor
Chicago, Illinois, usual residents
RUFUS and WANDA WALLS
MIKE and JOAN MC CATHY

1509 South Kenneth, 1st and 3rd floor,
Chicago, Illinois
Usual residents, JEWEL COOK, 3rd floor, and wife, PEARL, who is not BPP member.
JOAN GRAY, 1st floor
STEPHANIE FISHER, 1st floor
WILLIE CALVIN, 1st floor
BEVERLINA POWELL, 1st floor
LONNIE HALL, 1st floor
JERI ELDRIDGE, 1st floor
BOBBY RUSH, 1st floor or 3rd floor
SANDRA DAVIS, 1st floor not BPP member but lives with BPP members.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

DATE: MAR 18 1970

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM-BPP

[redacted]

[redacted] who has provided reliable information in the past, will not testify, but attests to the accuracy of the following information.

[redacted]

[redacted] advised as follows on the indicated dates:

[redacted]

3/2/70 WILLIE CALVIN, RAYMOND HEWITT, CLARENCE TERRY, TRAVEL BPP LEADERS.

CALVIN was assigned to be HEWITT and companion known only as "T.C.", security guard when they came through

[redacted]

Chicago on 3/1/70 enroute to Canada. CALVIN met them at O'Hare International Airport, stayed with them about one hour and they departed Chicago for Toronto on United Airline Flight number 640 at about 8:30 a.m. on 3/1/70 after a one hour lay over. CALVIN related that during the hour conversation nothing specific was discussed as one female with him was not a Panther. CLAVIN stated that they did not leave the airport or make any contact with anyone else.

[redacted]

3/2/70 ROBERT CAMPBELL, ROGER MOODY, RALPH BOSTICK

These persons were assigned to cover some demonstration at the Western Electric Plant, 22nd and Cermak on this date, however, no one showed for the demonstration.

3/2/70 ISMAEL FLORY, J. B. BOOSE, BPP COMMUNITY CENTER

[redacted], BOOSE is in charge of the People's Community Center which is to be opened at ISMAEL FLORY'S office on west 63rd Street.

3/2/70 J. B. BOOSE, JAMES ELDERS, ROBERT CAMPBELL ROGER MOODY

These persons are BPP section leaders for the designated areas:

ELDERS	West side
CAMPBELL	Jew town area
MOODY	North side
BOOSE	South side

[redacted]

BLAIR ANDERSON

Anderson is to be bailed out of jail per instructions of the BPP lawyers. However, ANDERSON will not be allowed to be reinstated as a BPP member.

3/3/70 BILLY BROOKS

BROOKS is allegedly getting the feeling that he is not trusted by the membership and leaders of the Chicago area BPP.

3/4/70 HOWARD ALK

ALK is currently at his place in Michigan reviewing some film concerning the BPP.

HOWARD ALK, MIKE GRAY, FILM GROUP, INC.

GRAY has private pilot license and will fly up to see ALK on 3/11/70.

The Film Group, Incorporated is allegedly moving from their current address.

3/9/70 BILLY BROOKS, TRAVEL OF BPP LEADERSHIP

BROOKS will possibly leave for San Francisco, California, on 3/11/70. The only reason he is going is because he has never been there.

3/2/70 **BOBBY RUSH, SONNY RUSH, TRAVEL OF BPP LEADERSHIP**

RUSH and his wife will depart for San Francisco, California, tonight. The purpose of this trip is not known.

3/9/70 **WILLIE CALVIN, BERADINE GRAYSON, MEDICAL CENTER**

CALVIN is sleeping with GRAYSON who is a former panther and is working in the Medical Center.

3/10/70 **JOAN GRAY**

GRAY traveled to De Kalb, Illinois, on 3/9/70, where she had some unknown speech to deliver.

LOUIS TRUELOCK, FRED HAMPTON, H. BELL.

TRUELOCK was allegedly on security guard at 2337 West Monroe as 12/4/69, when the police raided. The security guard must be awake at all times it is therefore, probably true that he is the person who attempted to wake HAMPTON as he claims and not BELL.

3/10/70 The following are now known as Panther Pads which means they are available to any BPP member. Each member is required to have access to at least one weapon.

7801 South Sangamon Street, 2nd floor
Chicago, Illinois, usual residents
RUFUS and WANDA WALLS
MIKE and JOAN MC CATHY

1509 South Kenneth, 1st and 3rd floor,
Chicago, Illinois
Usual residents, JEWEL COOK, 3rd floor, and wife, PEARL, who is not BPP member.
JOAN GRAY, 1st floor
STEPHANIE FISHER, 1st floor
WILLIE CALVIN, 1st floor
BEVERLINA POWELL, 1st floor
LONNIE HALL, 1st floor
JERI ELDRIDGE, 1st floor
BOBBY RUSH, 1st floor or 3rd floor
SANDRA DAVIS, 1st floor not BPP member but lives with BPP members.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 part 12 & 14

61

10/22/69

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

DEMTRI, IS - M.

DAVID DELLINGER, ET AL ARL - CONSPIRACY.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, RM.

BUAGENTS OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY THIRTY MEMBERS OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), CHICAGO CHAPTER, PARTICIPATING IN DEMONSTRATION IN PLAZA OF FEDERAL BUILDING, CHICAGO, AT ONE PM INSTANT. GROUP OF TEN BPP MEMBERS DISCONTINUED MARCHING IN PLAZA AND ALL GATHERED AROUND FRED HAMPTON DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS CHAPTER BPP. AFTER CONFERRING FOR APPROXIMATELY TEN MINUTES, GROUP PRESENTED THEMSELVES AT ENTRANCE OF FEDERAL BUILDING FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING ADMISSION TO COURTROOM WHERE CONSPIRACY TRIAL OF BOBBY GEORGE SEALE AND SEVEN OTHER DEFENDANTS IS IN SESSION. USMs ADMITTED FIFTEEN BPP MEMBERS AFTER SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS. REMAINDER OF GROUP, INCLUDING HAMPTON, THEN DISPERSED AND LEFT AREA OF FEDERAL BUILDING.

AS OF ONE THIRTY PM AREA OF FEDERAL BUILDING RETURNED TO NORMAL.

RAC:css

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________ ______________________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

SOURCES ADVISED ABOVE INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO DAVID HILLARD, NATIONAL BPP CHIEF OF STAFF, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, BY BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ILLINOIS BPP. RUSH ONLY BPP MEMBER KNOWN TO ATTEND MEETING THIS AM.

USA, SECRET SERVICE, MILITARY AND CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT ADVISED.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

61

10/22/69

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

DEMTRI, IS - M.

DAVID DELLINGER, ET AL ARL - CONSPIRACY.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, RM.

BUAGENTS OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY THIRTY MEMBERS OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), CHICAGO CHAPTER, PARTICIPATING IN DEMONSTRATION IN PLAZA OF FEDERAL BUILDING, CHICAGO, AT ONE PM INSTANT. GROUP OF TEN BPP MEMBERS DISCONTINUED MARCHING IN PLAZA AND ALL GATHERED AROUND FRED HAMPTON DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS CHAPTER BPP. AFTER CONFERRING FOR APPROXIMATELY TEN MINUTES, GROUP PRESENTED THEMSELVES AT ENTRANCE OF FEDERAL BUILDING FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING ADMISSION TO COURTROOM WHERE CONSPIRACY TRIAL OF BOBBY GEORGE SEALE AND SEVEN OTHER DEFENDANTS IS IN SESSION. USMs ADMITTED FIFTEEN BPP MEMBERS AFTER SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS. REMAINDER OF GROUP, INCLUDING HAMPTON, THEN DISPERSED AND LEFT AREA OF FEDERAL BUILDING.

AS OF ONE THIRTY PM AREA OF FEDERAL BUILDING RETURNED TO NORMAL.

RAC:DSS

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ____________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

SOURCES ADVISED ABOVE INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO DAVID HILLARD, NATIONAL BPP CHIEF OF STAFF, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, BY BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ILLINOIS BPP. RUSH ONLY BPP MEMBER KNOWN TO ATTEND MEETING THIS AM.

USA, SECRET SERVICE, MILITARY AND CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT ADVISED.

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

62

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/28/69

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

[redacted], Copies are also being furnished the following agencies, United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, Office of Special Investigations, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Region I, Evanston, Illinois.

The Chicago Police Department has been orally advised of the contents of the LHM.

RMM

1.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum

62

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/28/69

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

[redacted], Copies are also being furnished the following agencies, United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, Office of Special Investigations, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Region I, Evanston, Illinois.

The Chicago Police Department has been orally advised of the contents of the LHM.

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
October 28, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

On October 25, 1969, _ reliable information in the past, advised that David Hilliard, National BPP Chief of Staff, from San Francisco, California. Emory Douglas, National BPP Minister of Culture, Elaine Brown, both believed to be from Los Angeles, Brown believed to be travelling with Douglas, and an unknown Negro female about 23 or 24 years old, approximately 5'6", slender, around 125 pounds, light skinned, with hair cut short, all arrived at O'Hare Airport, via American Airlines at 10:30 PM on this date. advised that converstation indicated all travelled under unknown alias and city of departure unknown, but state of departure was California.

advised that Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP, Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, Barbara Sankey, Lieutenant of Finance, Chicago Chapter, Illinois BPP, John Seale, San Francisco BPP member and brother of Bobby Seale, Chairman, National BPP, Artie Seale, wife of Bobby Seal and other unknown Illinois BPP members met the above group at the airport. Hampton related that they had just came from a fund raising party given by Lucy Montgomery, 1754 North Wells Street, Chicago, who publicly supports the so called "New Left" both philosphically and financially, where $1500.96 was raised for the Illinois BPP.

Hampton also related that arrangements have been made for Hilliard to speak at Dr. Herbert Hazelkorn's 2700 Wilmette, Wilmette, Illinois on October 26, 1969 to a group of Jewish people who would probably donate a large sum of money to the Illinois BPP.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

stated on October 26, 1969 that Hilliard, Rush, Hampton, John Seale. Artie Seale, Douglas, William O'Neal, Chief ofStaff, Illinois BPP. Ronald Stachel, Deputy Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, Stephanie Fisher, Chicago Chapter BPP member, Jewel Cook, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP and Louis Trulock, Legal Counselor, Illinois BPP and other unknown Illinois BPP members went to Hazelkorn's residence were Hilliard spoke before a group of approximately 75 white people.

Hilliard gave a short history of the BPP but his main speech concerned the right of the Arab people to rise against the country of Israel inasmuch as Israel has always attempted to suppress the Arabs.

advised that as a result of Hilliard speaking for the Arab nation and indicating that the BPP backed the Arab nation, no money was given to the BPP by this group.

advised that Hilliard is scheduled to speak at the Malcolm X Campus of the Chicago City Colleges at 1:00 PM on October 27, 1969 for a fee of $1,000 which is being paid to the Illinois BPP by the Malcolm X Campus Bookstore which is run by the students of this campus.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

advised that BPP leaders have indicated that Winston Moore, Warden of the Cook County Jail has agreed to let 1700 BPP papers per week be sold to the inmates, no further details known at this time.

Copies of this memo are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney

Office of Special Investigations,

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois,

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

On October 27, 1969, advised that Hilliard spoke at the Malcolm X campus on this date to a group of about 125 to 150 persons. Hilliard spoke on capitalism and imperialism. Hilliard's speech was restricted to the BPP interpretation of these words and was not militant. CG T-1 stated Hilliard only spoke about 30 minutes.

stated that after Hilliard's speech, Hilliard, Brown, Douglas and the unknown Negro female were taken to O'Hare Field where they boarded a plane for California, city unknown, which departed O'Hare about 5:30 p.m.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

63

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
October 28, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

On October 25, 1969, reliable information in the past, advised that David Hilliard, National BPP Chief of Staff, from San Francisco, California. Emory Douglas, National BPP Minister of Culture, Elaine Brown, both believed to be from Los Angeles, Brown believed to be travelling with Douglas, and an unknown Negro female about 23 or 24 years old, approximately 5'6", slender, around 125 pounds, light skinned, with hair cut short, all arrived at O'Hare Airport, via American Airlines at 10:30 PM on this date. advised that converstation indicated all travelled under unknown alias and city of departure unknown, but state of departure was California.

advised that Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP, Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, Barbara Sankey, Lieutenant of Finance, Chicago Chapter, Illinois BPP, John Seale, San Francisco BPP member and brother of Bobby Seale, Chairman, National BPP, Artie Seale, wife of Bobby Seal and other uknown Illinois BPP members met the above group at the airport. Hampton related that they had just came from a fund raising party given by Lucy Montgomery, 1754 North Wells Street, Chicago, who publicly supports the so called "New Left" both philosphically and financially, where $1500.96 was raised for the Illinois BPP.

Hampton also related that arrangements have been made for Hilliard to speak at Dr. Herbert Hazelkorn's 2700 Wilmette, Wilmette, Illinois on October 26, 1969 to a group of Jewish people who would probably donate a large sum of money to the Illinois BPP.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

stated on October 26, 1969 that Hilliard, Rush, Hampton, John Seale, Artie Seale, Douglas, William O'Neal, Chief ofStaff, Illinois BPP, Ronald Stachel, Deputy Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, Stephanie Fisher, Chicago Chapter BPP member, Jewel Cook, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP and Louis Trulock, Legal Counselor, Illinois BPP and other unknown Illinois BPP members went to Hazelkorn's residence were Hilliard spoke before a group of approximately 75 white people.

Hilliard gave a short history of the BPP but his main speech concerned the right of the Arab people to rise against the country of Israel inasmuch as Israel has always attempted to suppress the Arabs.

advised that as a result of Hilliard speaking for the Arab nation and indicating that the BPP backed the Arab nation, no money was given to the BPP by this group.

advised that Hilliard is scheduled to speak at the Malcolm X Campus of the Chicago City Colleges at 1:00 PM on October 27, 1969 for a fee of $1,000 which is being paid to the Illinois BPP by the Malcolm X Campus Bookstore which is run by the students of this campus.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

64

O : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/13/69

ROM : SAC, CHICAGO

UBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

Copies of this LHM are ~~also being~~ furnished the following agencies: USA, OSI, USSS and 113th MI. The Chicago PD has been orally advised of the contents of this LHM.

RMM:

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

64

O : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/13/69

ROM : SAC, CHICAGO

UBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

Copies of this LHM are ~~also being~~ furnished the following agencies: USA, OSI, USSS and 113th MI. The Chicago PD has been orally advised of the contents of this LHM.

RMM:

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

605

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
November 13, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

On November 9, 1969, , who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP and Joan Gray, Field Lieutenant, Chicago Branch, Illinois Chapter BPP, returned from Berkeley, California, where Hampton allegedly had several meetings with the members of the National Central Committee of the BPP.

stated that according to Hampton, the National BPP and all BPP Chapters are in bad financial condition at this time. Hampton also related, according to that if David Hilliard, National BPP Chief of Staff goes to jail, Hampton will be appointed to fill Hilliard's position.

Source stated that no other details concerning the above are available at this time.

Copies of this memo are being furnished the United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, 113th MI Group, and OSI.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

605

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
November 13, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

On November 9, 1969, , who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP and Joan Gray, Field Lieutenant, Chicago Branch, Illinois Chapter BPP, returned from Berkeley, California, where Hampton allegedly had several meetings with the members of the National Central Committee of the BPP.

stated that according to Hampton, the National BPP and all BPP Chapters are in bad financial condition at this time. Hampton also related, according to that if David Hilliard, National BPP Chief of Staff goes to jail, Hampton will be appointed to fill Hilliard's position.

Source stated that no other details concerning the above are available at this time.

Copies of this memo are being furnished the United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, 113th MI Group, and OSI.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

66

10/30/69

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

DEMTRI, IS-M; DAVID DELLINGER, ET AL. ARL-CONSPIRACY.

DAVID DELLINGER AND OTHER DEFENDANTS IN "CONSPIRACY EIGHT" TRIAL CURRENTLY BEING HEARD USDC, CG, HAVE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED PLANNED RALLY, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER ONE NEXT, ONE PM, CIVIC CENTER BUILDING PLAZA, CG. RALLY TO BE EXPRESSION OF PROTEST TO "STOP THE TRIAL" BECAUSE PROCEEDING IS ACT OF VENGEANCE AGAINST DEFENDANTS, ABRIDGEMENT OF LEGAL RIGHTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPRESSION OF DISSENT. WILL ALSO ATTEMPT FUND COLLECTION FOR LEGAL DEFENSE. SEVEN OF THE EIGHT DEFENDANTS, NOT IN POLICE CUSTODY, ARE TO BE PRESENT AT RALLY, SOME TO SPEAK ON "STOP THE TRIAL" THEME. FRED HAMPTON, CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP, TO APPEAR IN BEHALF OF BOBBY SEALE, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, BPP, ALSO ONE OF TRIAL DEFENDANTS WHO IS RETAINED IN POLICE CUSTODY DURING TRIAL ON MURDER CHARGE. HAMPTON TO READ STATEMENT

GGP

PREPARED BY SEALE AT RALLY. ANNOUNCED RALLY SPONSORS ARE "THE CONSPIRACY", TRIAL PROTEST ORGANIZATION OF DEFENDANTS, NEW MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM, NATIONAL ANTI-WAR GROUP OF DELLINGER'S, AND CHICAGO PEACE COUNCIL, A CG LEADERSHIP ORGANIZATION OF ANTI-WAR AND PROTEST GROUP COALITIONS.

USA, SECRET SERVICE AND MILITARY ADVISED.

66

10/30/69

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

DEMTRI, IS-M; DAVID DELLINGER, ET AL. ARL-CONSPIRACY.

DAVID DELLINGER AND OTHER DEFENDANTS IN "CONSPIRACY EIGHT" TRIAL CURRENTLY BEING HEARD USDC, CG, HAVE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED PLANNED RALLY, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER ONE NEXT, ONE PM, CIVIC CENTER BUILDING PLAZA, CG. RALLY TO BE EXPRESSION OF PROTEST TO "STOP THE TRIAL" BECAUSE PROCEEDING IS ACT OF VENGEANCE AGAINST DEFENDANTS, ABRIDGEMENT OF LEGAL RIGHTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPRESSION OF DISSENT. WILL ALSO ATTEMPT FUND COLLECTION FOR LEGAL DEFENSE. SEVEN OF THE EIGHT DEFENDANTS, NOT IN POLICE CUSTODY, ARE TO BE PRESENT AT RALLY, SOME TO SPEAK ON "STOP THE TRIAL" THEME. FRED HAMPTON, CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP, TO APPEAR IN BEHALF OF BOBBY SEALE, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, BPP, ALSO ONE OF TRIAL DEFENDANTS WHO IS RETAINED IN POLICE CUSTODY DURING TRIAL ON MURDER CHARGE. HAMPTON TO READ STATEMENT

GGP

PREPARED BY SEALE AT RALLY. ANNOUNCED RALLY SPONSORS ARE "THE CONSPIRACY", TRIAL PROTEST ORGANIZATION OF DEFENDANTS, NEW MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM, NATIONAL ANTI-WAR GROUP OF DELLINGER'S, AND CHICAGO PEACE COUNCIL, A CG LEADERSHIP ORGANIZATION OF ANTI-WAR AND PROTEST GROUP COALITIONS.

USA, SECRET SERVICE AND MILITARY ADVISED.

FD-263 (Rev. 3-3-59)

67

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:
1 - U.S. Secret Service, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois (Via Courier)
1 - OSI, Chicago (Via Courier
1 - NISO, Chicago (RM)

CONFIDENTIAL

Report of: SA ALAN R. STEPHENS
Date: November 7, 1969
Office: Chicago, Illinois

Field Office File #:
Bureau File #:

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
CHICAGO DIVISION

Character: RACIAL MATTERS - ORGANIZATION

Synopsis: Headquarters of the Chicago Chapter, BPP, continues to be located at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Sources report West Suburban Chapter as being inactive at this time. During Antiriot Law Conspiracy trial currently being tried at this time in Chicago, the BPP has conducted several demonstrations at the Federal Building alleging constitutional rights of BOBBY SEALE, National BPP and one of eight defendants, being violated. ALL MEMBERS OF THE BPP MUST BE CONSIDERED POSSIBLY ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

- P -

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. ORIGIN, PURPOSES AND LOCATION OF BPP CHAPTERS ----- 2
  A. Origin -- 2
  B. Purposes, Aims and Rules of Chicago BPP Chapter ---------------------------------- 2
  C. Location of BPP Branches ---------------------- 7

II. IDENTITY OF LEADERS AND MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION ---- 8
  A. Officers of Chicago Chapter BPP --------------- 8
  B. Officers of West Suburban Chapter BPP --------- 10
  C. Officers of Rockford Branch BPP --------------- 11
  D. Officers of Joliet Branch BPP ----------------- 12

III. INFORMATION REGARDING VIOLENT ACTS, WEAPONS, PLANS AND AIMS OF BPP ----------------------------- 12

IV. PUBLICATIONS ----------------------------------- 15

V. ACTIVITIES ------------------------------------- 16

VI. BPP CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER MILITANT GROUPS -------- 24

VII. FINANCES --------------------------------------- 25

VIII. CONTACTS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY OR OTHER GROUPS ----- 26

I. ORIGIN, PURPOSES AND LOCATION OF BPP CHAPTERS

A. Origin

The Chicago Chapter of the BPP was organized on August 25, 1968, at a meeting at 6110 South Dorchester Street, Chicago, Illinois. This meeting was attended by approximately 10 Negro males. The purpose of the meeting was to dissolve the then current Chicago branch of SNCC and to organize a Chicago Chapter of the BPP.

3/27/68)

The BPP did not have a headquarters until space was acquired at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, in November, 1968. The space acquired was the second and third floor of the building at the above address.

11/20/68)

Source advised the Illinois Bell Telephone Company assigned telephone number 243-8276 to the BPP above address.

3/27/69)

B. Purposes, Aims and Rules of Chicago BPP Chapter

On November 1, 1968, BOBBY LEE RUSH, Deputy Minister of State, Chicago BPP, flew to National Headquarters, Oakland, California, where he met with ELDRIDGE and KATHLEEN CLEAVER and BOBBY GEORGE SEALE. The CLEAVERs and SEALE are members of the Central Committee of the National BPP.

On November 4, 1968, RUSH returned to Chicago and stated that the Chicago Chapter would follow the policy of the National BPP in all regards.

(______1, 11/7/68)

On May 1, 1969, Chicago Chapter of BPP advised BPP members the following ten points continue to reflect "What We Want - What We Believe":

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our black community.
2. We want full employment for our people.
3. We want an end to the robbery by the white men of our black community.
4. We want decent housing fit for shelter of human beings.
5. We want education for our people that will expose the true nature of this decadent American society.
6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

7. We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in Federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black community as defined by the constitution of the United States.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace, and as our major political objective, a United Nations supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

. 5/2/69)

On May 1, 1969, the Chicago chapter of the BPP circulated the following Rules of the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois:

Every member of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY throughout this country of racist America must abide by these rules as functional members of this party. CENTRAL COMMITTEE members, CENTRAL STAFFS, and LOCAL STAFFS, including all captions subordinate to either national, state, and local leadership of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY will enforce these rules. Length of suspension or other disciplinary action necessary for violation of these rules will depend on national decisions by national,

state or state area, and local committees and staffs where said rules or rules of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY were violated.

Every member of the party must know these verbatum by heart, and apply them daily. Each member must report any violation of these rules to their leadership or they are conter-revolutionary and are also subjected to suspension by the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

THE FOLLOWING RULES ARE:

1. No party member can have narcotics or weed in his possession while doing party work.
2. Any party member found shooting narcotics will be expelled from this party.
3. No party member can be drunk while doing daily party work.
4. No party member will violate rules relating to office and meetings of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, ANYWHERE.
5. No party member will use, or fire a weapon of any kind unnecessarily or accidentally at anyone other than the enemy.
6. No party member can join any other army force other than the BLACK LIBERATION ARMY.
7. No party member can have a weapon in his possession while drunk or loaded off narcotics or weed.
8. No party member will commit any crimes against other party members or BLACK people at all, and cannot steal or take from the people, not even a needle or a piece of thread.

9. When arrested BLACK PANTHER MEMBERS will give only name and address and will sign nothing. Legal first aid must be understood by all Party members.
10. The Ten Point Program and platform of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must be known and understood by each Party member.
11. Party communications must be national and local.
12. The 10-10-10 program should be known by all members and also understood by all members.
13. All Finance officers operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.
14. Each person submit report of daily work.
15. Each Sub-Section Leader, Section Leader, and Captain must submit Daily reports of work.
16. All Panthers must learn to operate and service weapons correctly.
17. All Leadership personnel who suspends or expells a member must submit this information to the Editor for the newspaper pertaining to suspension, so that it will be published in the paper and known by all chapters and branches.
18. Political Education Classes are manditory.
19. Only office personnel assigned to respective offices each day should be there. All others are to sell papers and do Political work out in the community, including Captains, Section Leaders and etc.
20. COMMUNICATION--all chapters must submit weekly reports in writing to the National Headquarters.
21. All Branches must implement First Aid and/or Medical Cadres.
22. All Chapters, Branches, and components of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must submit a monthly Financial Report to the Ministry of Finance and also the Central Committee.

23. Everyone in leadership positions must read no less than two hours per day to keep abreast of the changing political situation.
24. No chapter or branch shall accept grants, poverty funds, money, or any other aid from any government agency without contacting the National Headquarters.
25. All chapters must adhere to the policy and ideology laid by the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.
26. All Branches must submit weekly reports in writing to their respective Chapters.

(, 5/2/69)

C. Location of BPP Branches

West Suburban Branch

This branch was previously reported as having no office space as such, but merely used the Chicago Chapter Office at 2350 West Madison Street. Source advised this branch is inactive at this time because of recent arrests and indictments of BPP members.

; 7/69 and 10/69)

Rockford, Illinois Branch

There is no Rockford, Illinois BPP branch office as such; however, meetings have been held at 529 Pierpoint Avenue, Rockford. This address is the location known as the House of Simba or House of Bo Simba.

Chicago, Illinois Branch

Source advised the Chicago Chapter of the BPP currently operates two South side offices. The one office was located at 48 and South State Street and has two female BPP members at the office during the day time. The other office is located at 1222 West 109th Street and is manned by SAMUEL LEORY LATSON. Both of these offices operate by a pay telephone located near there and neither have the authority to contact the National Office of the BPP. Locations are merely used for the BPP newspaper distribution and to keep the name of the BPP known on Chicago's South side.

10/69)

Joliet, Illinois Branch

Source advised that while there is no office as such for this branch several meetings of individuals purporting to be BPP members have met at the home of JAMES DAVID STUBBS, 528 South Water Street, Joliet.

; 10/69)

II. IDENTITY OF LEADERS AND MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION

A. Officers of Chicago Chapter BPP

As of July, 1969, the following individuals listed in alphabetical order were reported by sources as officers of the Central Staff of the Chicago Chapter BPP:

BROOKS, BILLY LAMAR, born July 18, 1948. BROOKS commonly known as "CHE" and is the Deputy Minister of Education, Illinois BPP and acts as Field Secretary.

CALVIN, WILLIE JAMES, born March 6, 1948, Captain of Defense, Chicago Chapter Illinois BPP.

CAMPBELL ANN. CAMPBELL is Communications Secretary Illinois BPP. CAMPBELL is on Health CADRE and works with BPP lawyers.

CHARLES, EUGENE, JR., born May 20, 1948, and is Lieutenant of Health, Illinois BPP.

COOK, JURLD L., born November 17, 1941, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP. COOK, commonly known as JEWEL.

EDWARDS, ROSIE ANN, born January 4, 1938, Counselor of Women.

GRAY, JOAN, born July 29, 1949, and is Field Lieutenant, Illinois BPP.

HAMPTON, FRED, born August 30, 1948, and is Deputy Chairman, Illinois, BPP.

KING, YVONNE, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP, in exile.

JUNIOR, NATHANIEL WALTER, born October 21, 1946, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP, in exile.

LATSON, SAMUEL LEROY, born December 26, 1949, Field Lieutenant, Illinois BPP.

MAY, CHRISTINA DARLENE, born October 20, 1949, Deputy Minister of Culture, in exile.

MC CARTHY, MICHAEL, born 1949, Lieutenant of Education, Illinois BPP, is helping BROOKS fulfill responsibilities of Deputy Minister of Education position.

MC CARTHY, MICHAEL, Lieutenant of Education, Illinois BPP.

O'NEAL, WILLIAM MC KINLEY, born December 9, 1949, Chief of Staff, Illinois BPP.

RUSH, BOBBY LEE, born November 23, 1946, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP.

SANKEY, BARBARA ANN, born February 7, 1949, Lieutenant of Finances, Illinois BPP.

SATCHEL, RONALD J., born June 22, 1950, SATCHEL, commonly known as "DOC", is the Deputy Minister of Health.

THOMAS, HENRY, Field Lieutenant, Illinois BPP.

WALLS, RUFUS C., born September 6, 1940. WALLS, commonly known as "CHAKA", is Deputy Minister of Information, Illinois BPP.

B. Officers of West Suburban Chapter BPP

As of July, 1969, the following individuals listed in alphabetical order were reported by sources as officers of the West Suburban Chapter of Illinois BPP:

BRUCE, ROBERT, born November 28, 1947, is Chairman (Captain) in exile.

HARVEY, MERRILL DENNIS, born July 4, 1946, Captain of Defense in exile.

Sources have advised the West Suburban Branch is inactive due to the recent arrests and indictments of BPP members.

Sources have all advised during October, 1969 that it would be impossible to furnish any type of membership list because of recent police action. The sources did state the BPP continues to have numerous sympathizers.

C. Officers of Rockford Branch BPP

During July, 1969, the following individuals listed in alphabetical order were reported by sources as officers of the Rockford Branch, Illinois BPP:

BELL, HAROLD KEITH, born November 29, 1946, Captain of Defense.

HAWKINS, CHARLES LARRY, born July 31, 1951, Field Lieutenant, and Captain of Information.

HUNTER, DELRIDGE LAVERN, born January 8, 1941, Captain of Education.

DIXON, BRUCE, on Chicago Chapter Illinois BPP Education Staff, is doing work in Rockford in connection with that branch.

The sources have reported that the Rockford Branch has approximately ten to fifteen members. The sources also have advised the Rockford Chapter follows the philosophy of MAO TSE TUNG and programs of the National Chapter BPP.

10/69
10/69)

D. Officers of Joliet Branch BPP

Source advised during October, 1969, that JAMES DAVID STUBBS who resides at 528 South Water Street, Joliet, Illinois, would be considered the organizer of the branch in Joliet. Source said there are four members of this branch, with STUBBS being the only officer.

10/69)

STUBBS has publicly identified himself as the Captain of Defense, Joliet Branch, Illinois BPP.

III. INFORMATION REGARDING VIOLENT ACTS, WEAPONS, PLANS AND AIMS OF BPP

Source advised WILLIE CALVIN, Captain of Defense and RICHARD L. "ARDAY" BLACK, both BPP members, were seen at BPP headquarters with three .30 caliber M-1 Carbines.

8/8/69)

Source advised JOHN "BEAVER" WILLIAMS, a member of the West Suburban branch along with CALVIN, BLACK and JOHN "OBAR" BREAKS, Sergeant of Defense staff, travelled to Milwaukee, Wisconsin on the pretext of purchasing some .30 caliber M-1 Carbines.

8/13/69)

Sergeant WILLIAM KLUSAK, Oakbrook, Illinois Police Department, advised on August 14, 1969 that BLACK and WILLIAMS were arrested and charged with unlawful use of weapons. At the time of his arrest, BLACK had in his possession a .30 caliber M-1 Carbine, Serial Number 18875. WILLIAMS had in his possession on arrest a .30 caliber M-1 Carbine Serial Number 19405.

Source advised three individuals, alleged Chicago BPP members attended a meeting in Milwaukee, Wisconson. When these individuals left the meeting they had in their possession, two M-1 Carbines allegedly purchased from an unidentified BPP member in Milwaukee. These three individuals stated they were returning to Chicago.

; 8/18/69)

Source advised that JOSEPH GRAY and DONALD SMILEY, BPP members were arrested with three other individuals earlier that date and charged with unlawful use of weapons and aggravated assault for shooting at ANDREW BLAIR, a Negro male, residing at 6943 South Justine Street, Chicago. BLAIR, at the time of shooting, was walking through the Chicago Housing Authority Project located at 5041 South Federal Street. BLAIR was not injured at the time of his arrest. SMILEY was in possession of a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol. GRAY possessed a .22 caliber revolver.

; 9/11/69)

Source advised they had learned that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had recently found plastic bombs, sawed off shotguns and smoke bombs as a result of a raid on an apartment in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. The source stated three men were believed to have been residing at the apartment and were identified by the RCMP as ROBERT BRUCE, NATHANIEL JUNIOR and DENNIS HARVEY, Chicago BPP members in exile. BRUCE is wanted in Chicago on kidnapping and assault with intent to commit murder charges according to the sources. These sources also advised JUNIOR and HARVEY are wanted on bond default charges after they failed to appear in court as a result of charges filed earlier, charging them with attempting to purchase machine guns.

;10/1/69
;10/1/69)

The Indianapolis Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) advised on October 1, 1969, JEWEL COOK, WILLIE CALVIN and CLEVELAND COOK were all arrested in Indianapolis, Indiana, where they had travelled to help the Indianapolis BPP Chapter get back on its feet. The three individuals are BPP Chicago members. These three, according to the Indianapolis Division were arrested for larceny and violation of a local firearms act. In the vehicle they were travelling in, a .38 Colt Snubnose revolver bearing Serial Number 223772 was found.

This gun was reported stolen in Chicago on March 24, 1969. Source advised the above individuals were incarcerated in Indianapolis, Indiana on charges of unlawful possession of a weapon and stealing a car battery. The three, according to the source, were in Indianapolis to assist in re-organizing that BPP chapter.

(10/2/69)

Officer FUNK, Chicago, Illinois Police Department (PD), advised on October 3, 1969, that seven Negro males were arrested at BPP Headquarters following a shooting incident that date during the early morning hours.

Officer WANER, Chicago PD, advised on October 4, 1969 that officer SHAMLEY was injured by a shotgun blast believed to have originated at BPP Headquarters.

Officer LARA, Chicago PD, subsequently advised on October 4, their investigation reflects that the PD responded to a call from an anonymous caller regarding gun shots at Panther Headquarters. When the police arrived, shooting occurred and upon entering Panther Headquarters, seven BPP members were arrested, one shotgun and one .30 caliber Carbin was confiscated.

Source advised the shooting had occurred at Panther Headquarters during the Headquarters during the early morning hours of October 4, 1969 because of trouble recently developing between Vice Lords and the BPP. Source stated the Vice Lords were a Negro youth gang operating on Chicago's West side and had approached the Panthers "wanting

to be cut in" on a medical center which the Panthers had announced would open soon. BPP refused to allow the Vice Lords any "part of the action". The Vice Lords told the BPP to either stop work and not attempt to operate the medical center or if the Panthers did open the center the Vice Lords would "burn it down". As a result of this earlier conflict between the Vice Lords and Panthers, a car loaded with Vice Lords drove by Panther Headquarters early that morning and fired shots at the headquarters. The Panthers returned the fire and the PD,arrived when the Vice Lords were making a second pass by headquarters. When the Vice Lords spotted the police they left the area and the police returned the fire of the Panthers, subsequently resulting in the arrest of seven members.

; 10/4/69)

IV. PUBLICATIONS

Source, on October 23, 1969, furnished a copy of a pamphlet captioned "Ministry of Information Bulletin, Illinois Chapter, Black Panther Party, Vol. 1, No.4". This "bulletin", which is contained in the appendix section of this memorandum,appears to be reprints of articles published earlier in the "BPP" newspaper. Source advised that while this issue was number four, it is the only bulletin to his knowledge prepared by the Illinois Chapter. Source also stated this is not to be a regular publication and no future issues have been discussed among party heirarchy.

(; 10/23/69)

Source also furnished on October 23, 1969, a leaflet which is attached to the appendix, captioned "Support Bobby Seale and the Conspiracy "8".

The Chicago Chapter of the BPP has no regularly scheduled publications, however, on occasion, leaflets have been distributed in connection with appearances by members at various functions.

V. ACTIVITIES

WILLIE JAMES CALVIN, also known as "Jew Man" Captain of Defense and JEWEL COOK, Field Secretary, Chicago BPP, travelled to Indianapolis, Indiana to ascertain why the Indianapolis Chapter had purged so many members, during August, 1969.

8/20/69).

Source advised the Chicago BPP continues to hold political orientation classes, Monday, Wednesday and Friday at 7:15 PM at the Church of the Epiphany, 201 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago. These classes consist of instruction on the ten point program of the BPP. Recently the classes have been poorly attended.

(8/28/69
9/4/69)

Source advised he had attended a closed meeting at a church on West Armitage Street, where the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican youth gang, maintains its headquarters. The meeting was held on September 10, 1969 and 125 to 150 people were present. Those in attendance represented members and sympathizers of the BPP, the Young Lords and the Young Patriots. According to source, the Young Patriots, is a youth gang whose membership is comprised of Appalachian poor on Chicago's near North side.

The meeting was held in Memory of LARRY ROBERSON, a BPP member who had died during the week of September 8-12, 1969, following a gun shot wound by police officers.

FRED HAMPTON spoke and referred to MAO Tse-tung, and ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, Minister of Defense, National BPP. HAMPTON stated the killing of one brother by the "Pigs" (police) doesn't stop the revolution.

9/11/69)

Sources advised a rally was held at the American University, Washington, D.C., on September 13, 1969, with approximately 700 to 800 people in attendance. The theme of all speakers was to the effect that a revolution was going on at that time and that all oppressed people should be armed. BOB LEE, Secretary of the BPP,Chicago spoke. LEE contained his remarks to the above and exhibited the film "American Revolution II" which is described as an anti-police and anti-establishment film.

9/13/69)

Source advised on September 14, 1969, the BPP sponsored a rally at the Intermediate School, 201, 125th Street, Madison Avenue, New York City, New York. Between 400 and 500 people attended and most were either black or Puerto Rican. BOB LEE spoke after showing the "American Revolution II" film and his remarkes were concerned with the "Facist Pig Tactics" used by police to suppress the desire of the people.

9/15/69)

The Chicago "Tribune" a daily Chicago newspaper in its Four Star Final edition on September 18, 1969, printed an article regarding the BPP Breakfast for Children Program. The article reflects the program as being almost non-existent in Chicago. The article also stated that FRED HAMPTON states the program feeds 3,000 to 3,500 children, but investigation determined that on some days the locations were not opened and on other days only handfuls of children showed up. The article concluded, saying the neighborhood merchants who had previously donated to the program had all but ceased donations.

Source advised the Breakfast for Children Program is run by BARBARA SANKEY, and JOAN GRAY.

The location of their Breakfast for Children Program is North Hoyne Street and West Washington Boulevard. While BPP is currently claiming to feed 100 children each day, in fact the program has almost ceased to operate.

;10/69)

Source advised BOB LEE was in Richmond, Virginia on September 18, 1969 on BPP business. He spoke at Chapel Hill, North Carolina on September 19, 1969. Speeches, according to source, followed the same text as set forth in the New York speech and also criticized the power structure as plotting to destroy the BPP.

9/19/69)

Source advised that the National Office of the BPP, Oakland, California has directed the Illinois BPP leaders to expect to more or less help the National Office in training, directing and in general be responsible for all BPP activities east of the Mississippi River.

;9/30/69)

This source advised that the above is not in effect at this time.

10/21/69)

Source advised that members of the "Chicago Daily Defender" a newspaper slanted to the Negro community, had contacted FRED HAMPTON to advise him that two jurors previously selected for the anti-riot conspiracy trial underway in Chicago wherein eight defendants, one of whom his BOBBY SEALE, National BPP Officer, was being tried for violations steming from the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago during August, 1968, had received threatening letters signed "The Panthers." HAMPTON, after contacting the National Office, denied any knowledge of these threatening

letters and issued a press release alleging that the letters were another means of the establishment in its plot to put the Panthers in a bad light.

9/30/69).

Source advised that FRED HAMPTON had announced to the news media in Chicago that the BPP would protest the arrest of seven of its members at Panther Headquarters early that day. HAMPTON stated that by these arrests the Chicago PD presented its continued harassment of the BPP. HAMPTON called for a massive rally to be held at the Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, 12:00 noon on October 7, 1969.

10/4/69)

Source advised that a rally on October 7, 1969 which had been called to emphasize the fact the Chicago BPP was backing BOBBY SEALE. The rally was also in an attempt to gain community support for the BPP. Source stated BPP leaders had instructed that any member becoming involved in any militant action would be purged from the party.

10/7/69)

Special Agents of the FBI on October 7, 1969, at 11:00 AM, observed a group of Negro males, identifying themselves as BPP members, arrived at the Federal Building. These Panthers commenced handing out literature "Government Conspiracy to Destroy BPP". The pamphlets criticized the Chicago PD and referred to them as "Pig Daley's Imperialistic Mad Dogs", and also stated "the continued raids, jailing and murdering of Panthers proves there is a government conspiracy to destroy revolutionary leaders in Babylon (America)."

At the height of the rally, about 75 BPP and New Left people, along with 200 to 225 individuals were observed in the plaza area of the Federal Building. BOB RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense spoke along the theme that the government should be on trial for conspiracy against the BPP. RUSH offered the raids on Panther offices throughout the nation as evidence. The rally was dismissed without incident.

Agents of the FBI observed a demonstration at Cook County Hospital, 1835 West Harrison Street, Chicago. This demonstration was sponsored, according to leaflet, by the Young Lords, the BPP and the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM II) faction of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), on October 10, 1969. LYNN FRENCH, Chicago BPP member, spoke and stated that the BPP could perform a better service for the indigent people of the ghetto, instead of the Cook County Hospital, if the BPP was allowed to obtain a day care and health center. The group dispersed without incident.

Source advised that a discussion among BPP leaders was held regarding the formation of a committee against facism. During the discussion, it was mentioned the committee would most probably be comprised of one representative from the BPP and one from each of the organizations in which the BPP is currently in coalition. They are the Young Lords and the Young Patriots and the RYM-II faction, SDS. To date no committee has been formed.

; 10/10/68)

On October 22, 1969, Special Agents of the FBI observed approximately 30 BPP members demonstrating at the Federal Building in Chicago and shouting "free Bobby, free Bobby." Twelve of the BPP members began a series of close order drills and marched around the plaza area of the Federal Building. The demonstration lasted from 12:00 noon to 1:30 PM when United States Marshals (USM) allowed 15 members to enter the Federal Building to attend court session at the conspiracy trial underway as set forth above.

All the members were searched prior to being allowed to enter. No incident or arrests were reported.

Source advised the Illinois Chapter of the BPP had announced a rally for October 25, 1969 at the Federal Building, Chicago. Purpose of the rally was to protest "racist trial and miscarriage of justice perpetrated on BOBBY SEALE by the Federal Judge JULIUS HOFFMAN at the Federal Anti-riot Conspiracy trial currently being held at the Federal Building.

10/21/69)

On October 25, 1969, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed at 12:25 p.m. approximately 25 White persons, 35 Negroes had gathered in the Federal Building plaza. These individuals had apparently gathered for the previously announced rally to protest the above described trial.

Protestors were observed carrying signs reading "Get Out of Vietnam Now", "Free Huey", "Free Bobby", "Stop Facist Raids", "Free Panthers Now", "Youth Against Facism", "Racist Pig Daley".

At 1:00 p.m., FBI Agents observed a group of 15 Negroes carrying 10 BPP flags commence marching back and forth in the Federal Building plaza area. The group chanted "Your left, your right, now back up the gun. Free Bobby." At 1:05 p.m., this group commenced marching around the Federal Building and circled the building five times. About 1:20 p.m., speeches commenced on the southeast corner of the Federal Building plaza. Ronald Satchel, Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, spoke regarding the west side medical center project of the BPP. He said the project was to be "people controlled" and "community controlled". He demanded the political prisoners Huey Newton and Bobby Seale should be freed. He also blamed the problems of the poor Negro on the capitalistic system in this country. He concluded saying that members of the BPP were not opportunists but revolutionists.

violating Seale's Constitutional Rights by not permitting Seale to have an attorney of his choice or by permitting Seale to represent himself during the trial. He stated that people should be educated to the fact they have a right to bear arms as set forth in the United States Constitution. Walls held up a copy of Chairman Mao Tse Tung's "Redbook" stating ideology set forth in this book is the ideology of the BPP. He concluded saying the day will come when Panthers will be everywhere.

At 2:10 p.m., speeches concluded and the crowd dispersed. No incidents or arrests occurred.

ARS,
1

FRED HAMPTON, according to the source, advised the National Headquarters, Oakland, California, that Chicago was encountering problems in connection with the opening of its health clinic. HAMPTON stated the clinic was not opened as some work remained. HAMPTON stated the Vice Lords have good control over the area in the vicinity of the clinic, but the Panthers intend to open the clinic anyway.

10/6/69)

Source advised on October 25, 1969, that representatives of the National Office of the BPP were arriving that date from California. Source further advised that BOB RUSH, FRED HAMPTON and others met EMORY DOUGLAS, National BPP Minister of Culture; DAVID HILLIARD, National BPP Chief of Staff, and two Negro females at O'Hare International Airport. HAMPTON advised the group that arrangements had been made for HILLIARD to speak at the residence of Dr. HERBERT HAZELKORN, 2700 Wilmette, Wilmette, Illinois, on October 26, 1969, to a group of Jewish people who would probably donate a large sum of money to the Illinois BPP.

The following day, source advised that HILLIARD, accompanied by RUSH and HAMPTON and other BPP members, travelled to HAZELKORN's residence where HILLIARD spoke before a group of approximately 75 white people. HILLIARD gave a short history of the BPP, but his main speech concerned the right of the Arab people to rise against the country of Israel inasmuch as Israel has always attempted to suppress the Arabs. The BPP received no money from this group.

10/25 and 26/69)

Source advised HILLIARD spoke at Malcolm X Junior College, formerly Crane Junior College, on Chicago's west side to a group of about 125 to 150 people. HILLIARD spoke on capitalism and imperialism and restricted his speech to the BPP interpretation of these words. The speech was not militant and lasted approximately 30 minutes. He is alleged

2

to have received a fee of $1,000 from the Malcolm X Campus Bookstore which is run by students of the College. This speech occurred on October 27, 1969.

, 10/27/69)

Agents of the FBI, on October 29, 1969, observed eight members of the BPP in the plaza area of the Federal Building, Chicago. As of 7:30 a.m., the group numbered approximately 20. These individuals, by 8:30 a.m., totaled 51, 16 of whom were white. At 8:45 a.m., 35 Negroes and 10 whites were admitted to the Federal Building and after being searched by United States Marshals, were allowed to attend the antiriot law conspiracy trial as spectators.

On October 29, 1969, the Security Department of the Illinois State Union, Normal, Illinois, advised the Springfield Office of the FBI that a meeting sponsored by the RYM-II faction of SDS would be attended by FRED HAMPTON. Subsequently, the Security Office of the Illinois State Union advised that HAMPTON did speak that evening and denounced the trial of BOBBY SEALE in Chicago, giving a brief history and outline of the BPP and urged the audience to come to Chicago on November 1, 1969, to demonstrate at the Federal Building for BOBBY SEALE. No incidents occurred at this meeting.

VI. BPP CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER MILITANT GROUPS

Source advised on August 25, 1969, he had obtained a leaflet being distributed in Chicago captioned "In Memorium; 8/28/69" indicating "The Conspiracy" and the "Chicago Peace Council" would sponsor a demonstration that day from 5 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. at Grant Park, Chicago.

8/25/69)

"The Conspiracy" is an organization which has described itself as being comprised of eight individuals

3

indicted for criminal trespass in violation of Antiriot Laws statute as a result of activities that occurred during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

The "Chicago Peace Council" is a coalition organization comprised of peace activist groups in the Chicago area.

, 8/25/69)

The leaflet, according to the source, included the BPP, Young Lords, Young Patriots, Young Comancheros, all Chicago youth street gangs, and "The Conspiracy" as sponsoring this rally.

At the rally, FRED HAMPTON spoke concerning his recent imprisonment and local BPP activities. No incidents or arrests were reported during this demonstration.

(, 8/25/69)

Sources advised on October 29, 1969, that a coalition does exist, in fact, between the BPP, Young Lords, Young Patriots and the RYM-II faction of SDS. RYM-II faction is led by MIKE KLONSKY, former National Secretary of SDS. Sources felt the coalition existed and would continue to exist only as long as the BPP felt it could receive some benefit from such a coalition. The sources did advise the coalition had deteriorated because of the refusal in the past of the BPP to engage in any activity with these groups unless the BPP received some benefit.

10/29/69)
(10/29/69)

VII. FINANCES

Chicago BPP Chapter operates on funds received from the following sources:

4

(1) Speaker fees and honorariums received by BPP leaders for appearances at educational institutions and other public gatherings.

(2) Monthly assessments of BPP members, as well as fees charged for processing applications for membership in Chicago BPP Chapter.

(3) Donations and contributions given at BPP rallies or by individuals sympathetic to BPP objectives.

(4) No information developed indicating Chicago Chapter BPP has received any funds from National Chapter of BPP, from any foreign government or individual from a foreign country, or an organization operated in a foreign country.

National Headquarters of the BPP, Oakland, California, has allowed the Chicago Chapter to use proceeds from the sale of the Panther newspaper to defray expenses incurred for bonding members out of jail. The Chicago Chapter is in dire financial disorder.

10/69)
10/69)

Source advised FRED HAMPTON stated on October 25, 1969, that while at a fund raising party given by LUCY MONTGOMERY, 1754 North Wells Street, Chicago, he received $1,500.96 for the Illinois BPP. MONTGOMERY has been publicly identified as a supporter of the so-called "New Left" both philosophically and financially.

10/25/69)

VIII. CONTACTS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) OR OTHER GROUPS

Source advised on October 10, 1969, CHARLENE MITCHELL, Field Secretary, National Black Liberation Commission (NBLC),

5

CP, USA, met with FRED HAMPTON and other BPP leaders at BPP Headquarters. The meeting was for the purpose of exchanging ideas in the struggle for black liberation.

Both the BPP and CP agree they have a concurrent theory toward the antiriot law trial currently in progress in Chicago in that neither wants to become involved in any violence nor possible threat situation.

Both groups agreed that neither should nor would "stick their necks out for anybody," particularly in connection with the antiriot trial in Chicago.

10/10/69)

ALL MEMBERS OF THE BPP MUST BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS IN VIEW OF DESIRE OF ALL MEMBERS TO HAVE FIREARMS.

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

BULLETIN

ILLINOIS CHAPTER

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

VOL. 1

NO. 4

STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN BOBBY SEALE TO JUDGE JULIUS J. HOFFMANN



I, Bobby G. Seale, submit the following in my handwriting to Judge Julius Hoffman of this Court in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division of the U.S.A., where presently the trial of so-called 'Conspiracy to Riot' is being held, 9-26-69, and I, Bobby G. Seale, being one of the defendants of eight have been, by denied motion, the right to speak out in my behalf where my constitutional right to have 'Legal Counsel of my choice who is effective,' namely Charles R. Garry, who is on record in this court as my defense counsel that I have made agreement with by my choice only that he will assist me in my defense during this trial.

I submit to Judge Julius Hoffman that the trial be postponed until a later date where I, Bobby G. Seale, can have the 'Legal Counsel of my choice who is effective,' Attorney Charles R. Garry, and if my constitutional rights are not respected by this court then other lawyers on record here representing me, except Charles R. Garry, do not speak for me or represent me as of this date, 9-26-69. I fire them now until Charles R. Garry can be made available as chief counsel in this trial of so-called 'Conspiracy to Riot' and in fact be my legal counsel of choice who is effective in assisting me in my defense. The only attorney I know of who can defend me and be effective is Charles R. Garry, who is presently my attorney on record in this court.

If I am continuously denied this constitutional right of legal defense counsel of my choice who is effective by the Judge of this court, then I can only see Judge Hoffman as a blatant racist of this U.S. Court with gross prejudicial error toward all defendants and myself in particular.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

CHICAG[illegible] FUTILITY

It is now crystal clear to the masses of the people at home and abroad that the United States is a downright fascist country. This has been exemplified with the commencement of the trial of the so called 'Conspiracy 8' on September 24th in Chicago.

The fascist judge, 'Adolph' Julius J. Hoffman has promised that this will be the trial of the decade. It is obvious that this is the last stage and the turning point in American history when the iron hand of the dictatorship will be displayed.

This mock trial would not be possible without the inclusion of the Black Panther Party. The fascist Gestapo pigs have railroaded our Chairman on another trumped-up charge. Having kidnapped him from San Francisco these lunatics took him by car to Chicago 12 days prior to the trial. They had him sleeping in various county jails throughout the journey. Jails not fit for any form of habitation. The result is that Chairman Bobby Seale arrived in Chicago sick from the rot and mess of the jails to face the SS and the Gestapo army.

These fascist madmen have refused to to allow him to see a doctor and it is obvious that they intend murdering the Chairman by any means necessary.

It would be deviating not to keep to the pattern set. Charles R. Garry, Chairman Bobby Seale's attorney [illegible] postponement of the trial [illegible] the hospital for an operation [illegible] to be present in Chicago. 'Adolph' Hitler Hoffman has of course refused the request and Chairman Bobby Seale faces the fascists without an attorney.

The judge has gone through the [illegible] of a dictatorial jury selection [illegible] questions like [illegible] were the qualifications necessary [illegible] sit on the jury. Relevant facts like [illegible] these people true representatives of the peer group of the defendants [illegible] were thrown out as being immaterial and irrelevant.

This is a warning for us to intensify the struggle to heighten our awareness [illegible] together as it is clear that this mockery of a system will not deem any justice and that the time is imminent for us to move from all directions.

It is also the time for us to understand that the [illegible] of the masses must be intensified. The action on the part of the mother country radicals in antagonizing the



[illegible] outside [illegible] level of a [illegible] from a lower level [illegible]

[illegible] power structure [illegible] Black Panther Party has been [illegible] for some time. The [illegible] of the Party and the murder of all its leaders [illegible] we should [illegible] that [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] to defend [illegible] freedom. Huey's freedom [illegible] political [illegible] the masses repression

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Connie Matthews

GROUNDWORK FOR FASCISM

America has taken step one of Fascism relatively calmly. Amidst a few murmurs of "death of freedom of the press", the fascist power structure, formerly condoned and supported by the mass media, has turned on its former lap-dogs. Needless to say the mass media and the Chicago power structure [illegible] have never gotten along too well. The relationship was similar to that of a banker and a whore with the media doing all the flat-backing. And also the flowers have been kicked out of the bed, and with memories of the last "convention" beating fresh in their minds, they have remained, in the main, dutifully silent.

Ray "Masai" Hewitt
Minister of Education

The mass media has not seen able nor seen fit to defend the Constitution when it is applied to members of the Black Panther Party, S.D.S., The Young Lords, Los Siete de la Raza, Ahmed Evans, and a multitude of other "negative elements". It is neither a secret nor a surprise that news coverage of the years of repression has been more concerned with profit than truth. It is a strange paradox [illegible] the "[illegible]" [illegible] or help to those who [illegible] fend it. With the arrest Friday of nine newsmen in Chicago for allegedly violating the picture taking-or-something act, the Federal Government proved that freedom of the press is at best a sometime thing depending on the whims of the ruling class. Strange how most papers, radio, and T.V. stations found this blatant act of fascism only of secondary importance, if any at all. The fact that "it could never happen in America" was not debated pro or con; the fact that this "ban" was formerly confined to "Nazi Germany" or "racist South Africa" was also easily ignored.

This failure of the human senses in men, who have professional reputations for being sharp, can only be viewed as cowardice or complicity. While this same "profession" failed to give proper context to their own miserable plight, they were on their jobs when it came time to spread "approved" government-issue lies about the Black Panther Party, The Young Lords, and the Young Patriots allegedly "awaiting a load of machine guns", that ever one (F.B.I., C.I.A., State and City pigs) seemed to know about, except the so-called "suspects". They were also quite skillful in seeing to it that this news was broadcast everywhere but Chicago.

This was compounded by the fact that:

1. They failed to give any cry of alarm when our Chairman, Bobby Seale was kidnapped in an obvious frame-up attempt.

2. They failed to give scope or context to the [illegible] Department's [illegible] plan to raid the National Headquarters of the Black Panther Party, with no survivors intended.

3. In recent months there has been an escalation of terror, murder, raids, [illegible] lies on the Black Panther Party, and the news media has been relatively silent. There were no cries of a "credibility gap" as there had been in Viet Nam. No cries of the Government stifling the news were to be heard.

THE CHICAGO SET-UP

The fact that there have been three raids on Panther homes in Chicago in the last three weeks and one Panther (Larry Roberson) murdered, has almost totally eluded the sharp-eyed, keen-nosed news beagles. Also the fact that in all these raids weapons were seized, has likewise escaped the stalwart defenders of "the American way". This is no easy task since some of those raids were daylight raids, and involved as many as [illegible] uniformed, smirking, Fascist Pigs, with helicopters flying close-air support while pigs ran amuck. As of press time, the last Panther home raided was [illegible] Rush's (Dep. Minister of Defense for the State of Illinois) at [illegible] o'clock Saturday morning September [illegible]. The pigs allegedly had a warrant for [illegible] Rush's arrest, but he wasn't home so they ripped off his gun, and left. Since then [illegible] has surrendered to the community as usual, but Daley's fascists [illegible] forgotten their "warrant."

These events should be viewed in light of the fact the "alleged" machine-gun [illegible] the Illinois National Guard (as fine a bunch of fascists as ever lived) is on stand-by; unlike the Convention, this time the mass media has been effectively hobbled, blinded, and silenced; the "dissidents" have been effectively disarmed. The only ones who know about any shipment of arms, are the pigs and the pig-[illegible] media; the [illegible] coalition has already hinted that the plan of the "dissidents" may include seizing the Pentagon; and you have the ground-work and the alibi for a massive St. Valentine's Day Massacre by fascist pigs posing as "servants of the people."

If any of those "Clark Kent" types has the guts of a mustard seed, they will write of Pig Daley in terms reserved for Hess, Himler, Eichman, and Co., but they would still be lying. A plot as monsterous and massive as this should not be alluded to a brain as small as Daley's, not even to the most chicken-hearted of so-called newsmen.

The plot to destroy the Black Panther Party, and thereby crush the whole movement of dissent is directed by Tricky-Dick Nixon, and his number one hatchet man, Attorney General John Mitchell. Under their direction a federal task force set up "to keep an eye on the Panthers", has inflicted a reign of terror and lies upon the Black Panther Party from coast to coast.

It is no surprise to the Black Panther Party that "it (fascism) has happened here", the only question is "how long will the people [illegible]"

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Masai Hewitt,
Minister of Education
Black Panther Party

FREE HUEY

FREE BOBBY

FREE
LARRY WHITE

FREE
ALVIN JEFFREYS

FREE ALL
POLITICAL
PRISONERS

SEIZE THE TIME

Judge Adolph Julius Hoffman, 74 years old, has been named as the 'hanging judge' for the trial of the Conspiracy Eight. The 8 defendants are charged with conspiracy to incite a riot in 1968,

cite a riot in 1968, before the democratic convention. Chairman Bobby Seale, National Chairman of the Black Panther Party, and the other 8 defendants face 10 years imprisonment and $20,000 fine if they are convicted.

Judge Adolph Hoffman stands on his record as a fascist. He has continually propagated this fascist moribund judicial system upon any and all advocates of socialism and or collectivism. This judge always finds any defendants 'guilty' who have views which differ in the slightest degree from his and his other reactionary paper cartoon characters.

On Thursday, September 25, 1969, the trial and selection of the jury began. Judge Hoffman (K Goo exerted all efforts to deny Chairman bobby and all the other defendants any and all motions presented by their defense attorneys. Once again it is most important that we recognize fascism for what it actually is. The 'hangman' only allowed pigs, man's and paramilitary right participants to remain on the jury. [illegible] being [illegible] of the defendants' peer group was immediately dismissed from the jury.

The judge and state's attorney Foran have an expert plan. They are obviously not aware that we the people, and we the members of the Black Panther Party no longer tolerate astronomical intimidation. We will go forth no matter what the sacrifice to propagandise and educate the masses of people. It is impossible to deceive the masses for any extended period of time, and their time has most assuredly run out. "The spirit of the people is greater than the man's technology" and the spirit of the Vanguard can never be crushed. An idea like freedom and liberation which has been born and started to grow – cannot be stopped when its time has come to mature.

INTENSIFY THE STRUGGLE
SEIZE THE TIME
FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

Sister Coe, Ed. Cadre
Illinois Chapter, Black Panther Party



JUDGE JULIUS J. HOFFMAN

LETTER TO BOBBY FROM HIS WIFE

Bobby:

The fascist pigs have kidnapped you, and are trying to railroad you on trumped-up charges. The ransom for you Bobby, is the annihilation of all Panther members and headquarters. If the pig power structure had any knowledge of political economy, and the hardships of oppressed people, then they wouldn't act like racists, but like Judge Sherwin, who freed our Eldridge.

The Panther Party has, is, and will go forth into the community and educate the masses of the people about the rapings, the exploitations and the murders which the ruling class have subjected us to. The working class has a high infant mortality rate, death from starvation, and the suicide rate has been on a steady increase. All this is part and parcel of making sure that the coins still jingle in the pockets of the bourgeoisie jackasses. Therefore, it is only logical that the avaricious businessmen, the demagogic politicians, the murderous racist pig cops, can do nothing more than murder us, when we show the people the correct ideology.

The pigs have, and will go forth to hire, organizations (who are tools for the government) to kill members of the Black Panther Party. Remember when it was mentioned that there have been too many legalized judicial murders in the court room? Judge Hoffman is the true example of a legal hangman.

Bobby, I love you, and I'm going to try and tell the masses of people what you've been rapping to me in the past. Your spirit is strong. It's like that ever-pounding beat within the souls of Black people which says, their spirit will never die, because you, Bobby, and Huey P. Newton started a fire within the masses, that the pigs will never put out.

Your other half,
Artie

WHO ARE THE REAL CONSPIRATORS

"As a Black Man in America, I can't get a fair trial in a RACIST COURT"...Chairman Bobby Seale

This was the theme of the court proceedings of the Conspiracy Eight. From the hand picked jury (eight middle aged, white suburbanites, two house negroes, and two big businessmen–all registered voters) to the constant denial by Julius 'Adolph Eichman' Hoffman of all the defense motions.

Before the selection of the racist, Nazi-ridden jury was made, they were allowed to read newspapers in the ceremonial courtroom. Later, Hoffman, pig Nixon's chief fund raiser and right hand lackey in Illinois, told the prospective jurors not to read newspapers, listen to TV, or talk with each other.

The special category of jurors, all registered voters, were in contradiction to the political morales of the defendants. The defendants, demonstrators against the bourgeois political process, and a socialist revolutionary, an advocate of the people's dictatorship (proletarian democracy) are going to be tried by people who support and participate in that same bourgeois political process. This unrepresentative, illegal and unconstitutional jury is illustrative of the court proceedings here in fascist America. THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY demands that all defendants be tried in a court by a jury of their peer group and not lilly white suburbanites, right-wingers, black lackies, and capitalist businessmen. This overt misrepresentation of the community illustrates the 'conspiracy' against the defendants in general and the Chairman in particular – this is the only conspiracy. was spent in dismissing prospective black jurors and working class people. The conspiracy became evident as the government [illegible] people who because of their class [illegible] inner city residents would be [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] (Thomas Foran [illegible] Attorney, and Julius Hoffman, pig Judge) conspired and removed the conspiracy staff from from the defense counsel table.

Kuntsler acknowledged Hoffman's effort to intimidate all defense then fort to intimidate all defense counsel then the fascist tee-totaler warned him to watch the language that he uses (not to talk of objective reality).

It will be impossible for a true revolutionary, Chairman Bobby, to get a fair trial from a bourgeois reactionary. This fascist bourgeous state (Babylon) is using the courts to fall the revolutionary machine. But it won't work, the Vanguard Party, the motive force of the revolutionary movement, has already began to motivate, mobilize and energize the once sleeping masses. The trial of Chairman Bobby shows the people that unless they are in power to control all legislative and judicial processes (proletarian democracy), their leaders will be railroaded and the Vanguard will be slowed down.

William J. (Jobawaukee) Campbell, Chief pig circuit judge and 'Adolph' Hoffman have schemed together to stifle any and all communication and information on the trial. No press releases, press statements, photographs, pictures or tapes can be made by the defendants to express their view of the legal lynching. The Chairman isn't even allowed to speak to the press in the presence of the mechanical monsters (U.S. Marshalls). 'Adolph' has said that he isn't there to satisfy public interest but will 'run the court as I see fit.' (A bourgeois reactionary and fascist oppressor can only give a bourgeois reactionary verdict and run a trial in the manner of Nazi fascists.)

Adolph [illegible] became [illegible] [illegible] for the defense

SEE NEXT PAGE

FREE BREAKFASTS FOR CHILDREN

Last week the demagogic bourgeoisie press carried an article which stated that the Black Panther Party in the City of Chicago was no longer feeding hungry school children. The article also stated that the Party was using the Breakfast money and food for their own personal use. This is totally incorrect, the Black Panther Party refuses to accept the ideology of the capitalist pig power structure which starve [illegible] of its population and uses food funds to send their astro-pigs to the moon for the purpose of "imaginating exploration."

The people and the Black Panther Party say there's something terribly wrong when Daley's Stockyard pigs have nothing more to do than sit in front of our breakfast centers and spy on and intimidate the hungry school children, who attend our centers by the hundreds each morning.

Not only do the Breakfast Centers provide free breakfasts but they also serve as a place where children receive revolutionary culture, education and also immediate first aid treatment. We believe anything the people want and need can be gained through revolutionary struggle and until the people realize this we will continue to lighten the oppressive load that this pig power structure has placed on the people.

So the Black Panther Party's Breakfast for Children Program will continue in oppressed communities as long as the masses find it necessary. And we say to the pigs who wallow in the pig pen cars in front of the Breakfast Centers, our offices and cribs, Beware! The beat of the people is much too fast, so go back home where you belong. Watch out pigs, it's a people's thing!

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS
Sister Beverlina

BAIL MONEY IS NEEDED TO FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS
SEND MONEY TO
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
ILL CHAPTER
2350W MADISON
243-8276

FREE HEALTH CARE

The BLACK PANTHER PARTY is establishing a FREE PEOPLE'S MEDICAL CLINIC to satisfy the medical needs of our community. We understand that the capitalists in America will never provide adequate medical service so the BLACK PANTHER PARTY has moved to establish another community program in which all oppressed people can be involved.

Technical assistance, supplies, and donations can be brought to the office of the ILLINOIS CHAPTER of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, 2350 West Madison Street. For further information, call 243-8276
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

CONSPIRATORS cont.

One attorney, Gerald Lefcourt, is the chief counsel for the New York 21 and must return to New York to fight for their freedom. The only reason he can give for locking the attorneys up is Chairman Bobby's insistance upon having Charles Garry as his counsel. This is blackmail, piracy, genuine and unadorned.

One must understand the significance of the courts here in Babylon. There aren't too many more pigs they can hire, or too many more laws that they can pass, but the fascist power structure can call grand jury hearings and issue indictments forever. They are using the court system to frustrate the revolutionary struggle and imprison the manpower needed to carry the revolution through to the end.

Pig Nixon, Hoffman, and Hoover, we have uncovered your "conspiracy" against the people. The people of the whole world see through your fascist lies and your kangaroo court. You smell of pig manure and your true nature is evident to all who see you wallow in the mire. Keep your hands off Bobby mother——. Keep your hands off the people. You are on the verge of extinction. The people are waiting for the opportune time to hang you for your astronomical crimes. You and all reactionaries are doomed. Give up 'Adolph' Hoffman, we are 'too revolutionary proletarian intoxicated to be astronomically intimidated.'

Justice To Those Who Deserve Justice
Death To Those Who Deserve Death
Free All Political Prisoners
Seize the Time, Off the Pig

Lt. Eugene Charles
Information [illegible] Illinois Chapter, BPP

SUBSCRIPTION FORM

Support Your Newspaper--
Subscribe Today!

Enter my subscription for [illegible]

	National Subscriptions	Foreign Subscriptions
3 MONTHS (13 ISSUES)	$2.50	$3.00
6 MONTHS (26 ISSUES)	$5.00	$6.00
ONE YEAR (52 ISSUES)	$7.50	$9.00

(please print)

NAME

ADDRESS

CITY

STATE ZIP

SIGNATURE

PLEASE MAKE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER TO MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Box 2967 Custom House, San Francisco, CA 94126

THE CONSPIRACY "8"

BOBBY SEALE - Father of the

FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN

FATHER OF FREE MEDICAL CENTER

> " IF I AM CONTINUOUSLY DENIED THIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF LEGAL DEFENSE, COUNSEL OF MY CHOICE WHO IS EFFECTIVE, BY THE JUDGE OF THIS COURT, THEN I CAN ONLY SEE JUDGE HOFFMAN AS A BLATANT RACIST OF THIS U.S. COURT WITH GROSS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TOWARD ALL DEFENDANTS AND MYSELF IN PARTICULAR."
>
> BOBBY SEALE, CHAIRMAN
> BLACK PANTHER PARTY

FREE ALL POLITCAL PRISONERS

People's Rally SAT.

OCT. 25, 12:00 NOON

Jackson at Dearborn

COME SEE 'BOUT BOBBY

SEIZE THE TIME

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. MICHAEL KLONSKY, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power and does not support the polices of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC), CHICAGO BRANCH

A source advised in May, 1968, that the Chicago Branch of SNCC was an affiliate of the national SNCC with headquarters located in Atlanta, Georgia. It was a non-membership type group headed in Chicago by ROBERT ALFONZO BROWN, a 19 year old male Negro, with the title of Midwest Region Director. BROWN maintained strict loyalty to STOKELY CARMICHAEL, Recruiter and Organizer and former National Director of SNCC. BROWN attempted to align Chicago's SNCC activities within the framework of CARMICHAEL's policies.

In a speech at Chicago on March 25, 1968, CARMICHAEL commented as follows: "The white people are preparing to commit genocide against the black race. What are we feeling so moral about? We know the honky got everything. He got it by stealing it. He's not going to give you anything. We got to take it. These brothers on the streets every day take it, but they're taking it for themselves. Let's organize them and let them take it for our people."

This source advised on August 27, 1968, that officials of the Chicago Branch of SNCC disbanded that branch on August 25, 1968, and as of that time it was no longer in existence. Its leaders became associated with the Black Panther Party at that time.

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), headquartered at 360-362 Nelson Street, S. W., Atlanta, Georgia, is a nonmembership organization, which was born out of the sit-in movement that erupted across the South beginning in 1960.

Today SNCC identifies itself as an organization in the revolutionary vanguard. It advocates that to be successful it is necessary to develop a revolutionary ideology and revolutionary program.

According to SNCC the year 1967 marked a historic milestone in the struggle for the liberation of black people in the United States and the year that revolutionaries throughout the world began to understand more fully the impact of the black movement. SNCC declared that "liberation will come only when there is final destruction of this mad octopus--the capitalistic system of the United States with all its life-sucking tentacles of exploitation and racism that choke the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The realities of black life, together with the recognition instilled in SNCC workers forced its members to further popularize the legitimacy of self-defense and rebellions when oppression became too great."

From May, 1966, until May, 1967, Stokely Carmichael was National Chairman of SNCC. As of July, 1968, Carmichael resided in Washington, D. C., where he was affiliated with SNCC and active as temporary chairman of a black coalition group. In May, 1967, Carmichael was replaced by Hubert Gerold Brown, commonly known as H. Rap Brown, who served until June, 1968.

In June, 1968, at the Staff and Central Committee meeting of SNCC held in Atlanta, Georgia, it was decided to restructure the organization by equalization of responsibility by creating ten deputy or vice chairmanships. The primary purpose for this change is to take law enforcement pressure off any single individual.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
November 7, 1969

Title	BLACK PANTHER PARTY CHICAGO DIVISION
Character	RACIAL MATTERS - ORGANIZATION
Reference	Report of Special Agent Alan R. Stephens dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-263 (Rev. 3-3-59)

67

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:
1 - U.S. Secret Service, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois (Via Courier)
1 - OSI, Chicago (Via Courier
1 - NISO, Chicago (RM)

CONFIDENTIAL

Report of: SA ALAN R. STEPHENS
Office: Chicago, Illinois
Date: November 7, 1969

Field Office File #:
Bureau File #:

Title: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
CHICAGO DIVISION

Character: RACIAL MATTERS - ORGANIZATION

Synopsis: Headquarters of the Chicago Chapter, BPP, continues to be located at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Sources report West Suburban Chapter as being inactive at this time. During Antiriot Law Conspiracy trial currently being tried at this time in Chicago, the BPP has conducted several demonstrations at the Federal Building alleging constitutional rights of BOBBY SEALE, National BPP and one of eight defendants, being violated. ALL MEMBERS OF THE BPP MUST BE CONSIDERED POSSIBLY ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

- P -

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. ORIGIN, PURPOSES AND LOCATION OF BPP CHAPTERS ----- 2
  A. Origin -- 2
  B. Purposes, Aims and Rules of Chicago BPP Chapter ---------------------------------- 2
  C. Location of BPP Branches ---------------------- 7

II. IDENTITY OF LEADERS AND MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION ---- 8
  A. Officers of Chicago Chapter BPP --------------- 8
  B. Officers of West Suburban Chapter BPP --------- 10
  C. Officers of Rockford Branch BPP --------------- 11
  D. Officers of Joliet Branch BPP ----------------- 12

III. INFORMATION REGARDING VIOLENT ACTS, WEAPONS, PLANS AND AIMS OF BPP --------------------------- 12

IV. PUBLICATIONS ----------------------------------- 15

V. ACTIVITIES --------------------------------------- 16

VI. BPP CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER MILITANT GROUPS -------- 24

VII. FINANCES --------------------------------------- 25

VIII. CONTACTS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY OR OTHER GROUPS ----- 26

I. ORIGIN, PURPOSES AND LOCATION OF BPP CHAPTERS

A. Origin

The Chicago Chapter of the BPP was organized on August 25, 1968, at a meeting at 6110 South Dorchester Street, Chicago, Illinois. This meeting was attended by approximately 10 Negro males. The purpose of the meeting was to dissolve the then current Chicago branch of SNCC and to organize a Chicago Chapter of the BPP.

3/27/68)

The BPP did not have a headquarters until space was acquired at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, in November, 1968. The space acquired was the second and third floor of the building at the above address.

11/20/68)

Source advised the Illinois Bell Telephone Company assigned telephone number 243-8276 to the BPP above address.

3/27/69)

B. Purposes, Aims and Rules of Chicago BPP Chapter

On November 1, 1968, BOBBY LEE RUSH, Deputy Minister of State, Chicago BPP, flew to National Headquarters, Oakland, California, where he met with ELDRIDGE and KATHLEEN CLEAVER and BOBBY GEORGE SEALE. The CLEAVERs and SEALE are members of the Central Committee of the National BPP.

On November 4, 1968, RUSH returned to Chicago and stated that the Chicago Chapter would follow the policy of the National BPP in all regards.

(_____1, 11/7/68)

On May 1, 1969, Chicago Chapter of BPP advised BPP members the following ten points continue to reflect "What We Want - What We Believe":

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our black community.
2. We want full employment for our people.
3. We want an end to the robbery by the white men of our black community.
4. We want decent housing fit for shelter of human beings.
5. We want education for our people that will expose the true nature of this decadent American society.
6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

7. We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in Federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black community as defined by the constitution of the United States.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace, and as our major political objective, a United Nations supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

. 5/2/69)

On May 1, 1969, the Chicago chapter of the BPP circulated the following Rules of the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois:

Every member of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY throughout this country of racist America must abide by these rules as functional members of this party. CENTRAL COMMITTEE members, CENTRAL STAFFS, and LOCAL STAFFS, including all captions subordinate to either national, state, and local leadership of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY will enforce these rules. Length of suspension or other disciplinary action necessary for violation of these rules will depend on national decisions by national,

state or state area, and local committees and staffs where said rules or rules of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY were violated.

Every member of the party must know these verbatum by heart, and apply them daily. Each member must report any violation of these rules to their leadership or they are conter-revolutionary and are also subjected to suspension by the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

THE FOLLOWING RULES ARE:

1. No party member can have narcotics or weed in his possession while doing party work.
2. Any party member found shooting narcotics will be expelled from this party.
3. No party member can be drunk while doing daily party work.
4. No party member will violate rules relating to office and meetings of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, ANYWHERE.
5. No party member will use, or fire a weapon of any kind unnecessarily or accidentally at anyone other than the enemy.
6. No party member can join any other army force other than the BLACK LIBERATION ARMY.
7. No party member can have a weapon in his possession while drunk or loaded off narcotics or weed.
8. No party member will commit any crimes against other party members or BLACK people at all, and cannot steal or take from the people, not even a needle or a piece of thread.

9. When arrested BLACK PANTHER MEMBERS will give only name and address and will sign nothing. Legal first aid must be understood by all Party members.
10. The Ten Point Program and platform of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must be known and understood by each Party member.
11. Party communications must be national and local.
12. The 10-10-10 program should be known by all members and also understood by all members.
13. All Finance officers operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.
14. Each person submit report of daily work.
15. Each Sub-Section Leader, Section Leader, and Captain must submit Daily reports of work.
16. All Panthers must learn to operate and service weapons correctly.
17. All Leadership personnel who suspends or expells a member must submit this information to the Editor for the newspaper pertaining to suspension, so that it will be published in the paper and known by all chapters and branches.
18. Political Education Classes are manditory.
19. Only office personnel assigned to respective offices each day should be there. All others are to sell papers and do Political work out in the community, including Captains, Section Leaders and etc.
20. COMMUNICATION--all chapters must submit weekly reports in writing to the National Headquarters.
21. All Branches must implement First Aid and/or Medical Cadres.
22. All Chapters, Branches, and components of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY must submit a monthly Financial Report to the Ministry of Finance and also the Central Committee.

23. Everyone in leadership positions must read no less than two hours per day to keep abreast of the changing political situation.
24. No chapter or branch shall accept grants, poverty funds, money, or any other aid from any government agency without contacting the National Headquarters.
25. All chapters must adhere to the policy and ideology laid by the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY.
26. All Branches must submit weekly reports in writing to their respective Chapters.

(1, 5/2/69)

C. Location of BPP Branches

West Suburban Branch

This branch was previously reported as having no office space as such, but merely used the Chicago Chapter Office at 2350 West Madison Street. Source advised this branch is inactive at this time because of recent arrests and indictments of BPP members.

; 7/69 and 10/69)

Rockford, Illinois Branch

There is no Rockford, Illinois BPP branch office as such; however, meetings have been held at 529 Pierpoint Avenue, Rockford. This address is the location known as the House of Simba or House of Bo Simba.

Chicago, Illinois Branch

Source advised the Chicago Chapter of the BPP currently operates two South side offices. The one office was located at 48 and South State Street and has two female BPP members at the office during the day time. The other office is located at 1222 West 109th Street and is manned by SAMUEL LEORY LATSON. Both of these offices operate by a pay telephone located near there and neither have the authority to contact the National Office of the BPP . Locations are merely used for the BPP newspaper distribution and to keep the name of the BPP known on Chicago's South side.

10/69)

Joliet, Illinois Branch

Source advised that while there is no office as such for this branch several meetings of individuals purporting to be BPP members have met at the home of JAMES DAVID STUBBS, 528 South Water Street, Joliet.

; 10/69)

II. IDENTITY OF LEADERS AND MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION

A. Officers of Chicago Chapter BPP

As of July, 1969, the following individuals listed in alphabetical order were reported by sources as officers of the Central Staff of the Chicago Chapter BPP:

BROOKS, BILLY LAMAR, born July 18, 1948. BROOKS commonly known as "CHE" and is the Deputy Minister of Education, Illinois BPP and acts as Field Secretary.

CALVIN, WILLIE JAMES, born March 6, 1948, Captain of Defense, Chicago Chapter Illinois BPP.

CAMPBELL ANN. CAMPBELL is Communications Secretary Illinois BPP. CAMPBELL is on Health CADRE and works with BPP lawyers.

CHARLES, EUGENE, JR., born May 20, 1948, and is Lieutenant of Health, Illinois BPP.

COOK, JURLD L., born November 17, 1941, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP. COOK, commonly known as JEWEL.

EDWARDS, ROSIE ANN, born January 4, 1938, Counselor of Women.

GRAY, JOAN, born July 29, 1949, and is Field Lieutenant, Illinois BPP.

HAMPTON, FRED, born August 30, 1948, and is Deputy Chairman, Illinois, BPP.

KING, YVONNE, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP, in exile.

JUNIOR, NATHANIEL WALTER, born October 21, 1946, Field Secretary, Illinois BPP, in exile.

LATSON, SAMUEL LEROY, born December 26, 1949, Field Lieutenant, Illinois BPP.

MAY, CHRISTINA DARLENE, born October 20, 1949, Deputy Minister of Culture, in exile.

MC CARTHY, MICHAEL, born 1949, Lieutenant of Education, Illinois BPP, is helping BROOKS fulfill responsibilities of Deputy Minister of Education position.

MC CARTHY, MICHAEL, Lieutenant of Education, Illinois BPP.

O'NEAL, WILLIAM MC KINLEY, born December 9, 1949, Chief of Staff, Illinois BPP.

RUSH, BOBBY LEE, born November 23, 1946, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois BPP.

SANKEY, BARBARA ANN, born February 7, 1949, Lieutenant of Finances, Illinois BPP.

SATCHEL, RONALD J., born June 22, 1950, SATCHEL, commonly known as "DOC", is the Deputy Minister of Health.

THOMAS, HENRY, Field Lieutenant, Illinois BPP.

WALLS, RUFUS C., born September 6, 1940. WALLS, commonly known as "CHAKA", is Deputy Minister of Information, Illinois BPP.

B. Officers of West Suburban Chapter BPP

As of July, 1969, the following individuals listed in alphabetical order were reported by sources as officers of the West Suburban Chapter of Illinois BPP:

BRUCE, ROBERT, born November 28, 1947, is Chairman (Captain) in exile.

HARVEY, MERRILL DENNIS, born July 4, 1946, Captain of Defense in exile.

Sources have advised the West Suburban Branch is inactive due to the recent arrests and indictments of BPP members.

Sources have all advised during October, 1969 that it would be impossible to furnish any type of membership list because of recent police action. The sources did state the BPP continues to have numerous sympathizers.

C. Officers of Rockford Branch BPP

During July, 1969, the following individuals listed in alphabetical order were reported by sources as officers of the Rockford Branch, Illinois BPP:

BELL, HAROLD KEITH, born November 29, 1946, Captain of Defense.

HAWKINS, CHARLES LARRY, born July 31, 1951, Field Lieutenant, and Captain of Information.

HUNTER, DELRIDGE LAVERN, born January 8, 1941, Captain of Education.

DIXON, BRUCE, on Chicago Chapter Illinois BPP Education Staff, is doing work in Rockford in connection with that branch.

The sources have reported that the Rockford Branch has approximately ten to fifteen members. The sources also have advised the Rockford Chapter follows the philosophy of MAO TSE TUNG and programs of the National Chapter BPP.

10/69
10/69)

D. Officers of Joliet Branch BPP

Source advised during October, 1969, that JAMES DAVID STUBBS who resides at 528 South Water Street, Joliet, Illinois, would be considered the organizer of the branch in Joliet. Source said there are four members of this branch, with STUBBS being the only officer.

10/69)

STUBBS has publicly identified himself as the Captain of Defense, Joliet Branch, Illinois BPP.

III. INFORMATION REGARDING VIOLENT ACTS, WEAPONS, PLANS AND AIMS OF BPP

Source advised WILLIE CALVIN, Captain of Defense and RICHARD L. "ARDAY" BLACK, both BPP members, were seen at BPP headquarters with three .30 caliber M-1 Carbines.

8/8/69)

Source advised JOHN "BEAVER" WILLIAMS, a member of the West Suburban branch along with CALVIN, BLACK and JOHN "OBAR" BREAKS, Sergeant of Defense staff, travelled to Milwaukee, Wisconsin on the pretext of purchasing some .30 caliber M-1 Carbines.

8/13/69)

Sergeant WILLIAM KLUSAK, Oakbrook, Illinois Police Department, advised on August 14, 1969 that BLACK and WILLIAMS were arrested and charged with unlawful use of weapons. At the time of his arrest, BLACK had in his possession a .30 caliber M-1 Carbine, Serial Number 18875. WILLIAMS had in his possession on arrest a .30 caliber M-1 Carbine Serial Number 19405.

Source advised three individuals, alleged Chicago BPP members attended a meeting in Milwaukee, Wisconson. When these individuals left the meeting they had in their possession, two M-1 Carbines allegedly purchased from an unidentified BPP member in Milwaukee. These three individuals stated they were returning to Chicago.

; 8/18/69)

Source advised that JOSEPH GRAY and DONALD SMILEY, BPP members were arrested with three other individuals earlier that date and charged with unlawful use of weapons and aggravated assault for shooting at ANDREW BLAIR, a Negro male, residing at 6943 South Justine Street, Chicago. BLAIR, at the time of shooting, was walking through the Chicago Housing Authority Project located at 5041 South Federal Street. BLAIR was not injured at the time of his arrest. SMILEY was in possession of a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol. GRAY possessed a .22 caliber revolver.

; 9/11/69)

Source advised they had learned that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had recently found plastic bombs, sawed off shotguns and smoke bombs as a result of a raid on an apartment in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. The source stated three men were believed to have been residing at the apartment and were identified by the RCMP as ROBERT BRUCE, NATHANIEL JUNIOR and DENNIS HARVEY, Chicago BPP members in exile. BRUCE is wanted in Chicago on kidnapping and assault with intent to commit murder charges according to the sources. These sources also advised JUNIOR and HARVEY are wanted on bond default charges after they failed to appear in court as a result of charges filed earlier, charging them with attempting to purchase machine guns.

;10/1/69
;10/1/69)

The Indianapolis Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) advised on October 1, 1969, JEWEL COOK, WILLIE CALVIN and CLEVELAND COOK were all arrested in Indianapolis, Indiana, where they had travelled to help the Indianapolis BPP Chapter get back on its feet. The three individuals are BPP Chicago members. These three, according to the Indianapolis Division were arrested for larceny and violation of a local firearms act. In the vehicle they were travelling in, a .38 Colt Snubnose revolver bearing Serial Number 223772 was found.

This gun was reported stolen in Chicago on March 24, 1969. Source advised the above individuals were incarcerated in Indianapolis, Indiana on charges of unlawful possession of a weapon and stealing a car battery. The three, according to the source, were in Indianapolis to assist in re-organizing that BPP chapter.

(10/2/69)

Officer FUNK, Chicago, Illinois Police Department (PD), advised on October 3, 1969, that seven Negro males were arrested at BPP Headquarters following a shooting incident that date during the early morning hours.

Officer WANER, Chicago PD, advised on October 4, 1969 that officer SHAMLEY was injured by a shotgun blast believed to have originated at BPP Headquarters.

Officer LARA, Chicago PD, subsequently advised on October 4, their investigation reflects that the PD responded to a call from an anonymous caller regarding gun shots at Panther Headquarters. When the police arrived, shooting occurred and upon entering Panther Headquarters, seven BPP members were arrested, one shotgun and one .30 caliber Carbin was confiscated.

Source advised the shooting had occurred at Panther Headquarters during the Headquarters during the early morning hours of October 4, 1969 because of trouble recently developing between Vice Lords and the BPP. Source stated the Vice Lords were a Negro youth gang operating on Chicago's West side and had approached the Panthers "wanting

to be cut in" on a medical center which the Panthers had announced would open soon. BPP refused to allow the Vice Lords any "part of the action". The Vice Lords told the BPP to either stop work and not attempt to operate the medical center or if the Panthers did open the center the Vice Lords would "burn it down". As a result of this earlier conflict between the Vice Lords and Panthers, a car loaded with Vice Lords drove by Panther Headquarters early that morning and fired shots at the headquarters. The Panthers returned the fire and the PD,arrived when the Vice Lords were making a second pass by headquarters. When the Vice Lords spotted the police they left the area and the police returned the fire of the Panthers, subsequently resulting in the arrest of seven members.

; 10/4/69)

IV. PUBLICATIONS

Source, on October 23, 1969, furnished a copy of a pamphlet captioned "Ministry of Information Bulletin, Illinois Chapter, Black Panther Party, Vol. 1, No.4". This "bulletin", which is contained in the appendix section of this memorandum,appears to be reprints of articles published earlier in the "BPP" newspaper. Source advised that while this issue was number four, it is the only bulletin to his knowledge prepared by the Illinois Chapter. Source also stated this is not to be a regular publication and no future issues have been discussed among party heirarchy.

((10/23/69)

Source also furnished on October 23, 1969, a leaflet which is attached to the appendix, captioned "Support Bobby Seale and the Conspiracy "8".

The Chicago Chapter of the BPP has no regularly scheduled publications, however, on occasion, leaflets have been distributed in connection with appearances by members at various functions.

V. ACTIVITIES

WILLIE JAMES CALVIN, also known as "Jew Man" Captain of Defense and JEWEL COOK, Field Secretary, Chicago BPP, travelled to Indianapolis, Indiana to ascertain why the Indianapolis Chapter had purged so many members, during August, 1969.

8/20/69).

Source advised the Chicago BPP continues to hold political orientation classes, Monday, Wednesday and Friday at 7:15 PM at the Church of the Epiphany, 201 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago. These classes consist of instruction on the ten point program of the BPP. Recently the classes have been poorly attended.

(8/28/69
9/4/69)

Source advised he had attended a closed meeting at a church on West Armitage Street, where the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican youth gang, maintains its headquarters. The meeting was held on September 10, 1969 and 125 to 150 people were present. Those in attendance represented members and sympathizers of the BPP, the Young Lords and the Young Patriots. According to source, the Young Patriots, is a youth gang whose membership is comprised of Appalachian poor on Chicago's near North side.

The meeting was held in Memory of LARRY ROBERSON, a BPP member who had died during the week of September 8-12, 1969, following a gun shot wound by police officers.

FRED HAMPTON spoke and referred to MAO Tse-tung, and ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, Minister of Defense, National BPP. HAMPTON stated the killing of one brother by the "Pigs" (police) doesn't stop the revolution.

9/11/69)

Sources advised a rally was held at the American University, Washington, D.C., on September 13, 1969, with approximately 700 to 800 people in attendance. The theme of all speakers was to the effect that a revolution was going on at that time and that all oppressed people should be armed. BOB LEE, Secretary of the BPP,Chicago spoke. LEE contained his remarks to the above and exhibited the film "American Revolution II" which is described as an anti-police and anti-establishment film.

9/13/69)

Source advised on September 14, 1969, the BPP sponsored a rally at the Intermediate School, 201, 125th Street, Madison Avenue, New York City, New York. Between 400 and 500 people attended and most were either black or Puerto Rican. BOB LEE spoke after showing the "American Revolution II" film and his remarkes were concerned with the "Facist Pig Tactics" used by police to suppress the desire of the people.

9/15/69)

The Chicago "Tribune" a daily Chicago newspaper in its Four Star Final edition on September 18, 1969, printed an article regarding the BPP Breakfast for Children Program. The article reflects the program as being almost non-existent in Chicago. The article also stated that FRED HAMPTON states the program feeds 3,000 to 3,500 children, but investigation determined that on some days the locations were not opened and on other days only handfuls of children showed up. The article concluded, saying the neighborhood merchants who had previously donated to the program had all but ceased donations.

Source advised the Breakfast for Children Program is run by BARBARA SANKEY, and JOAN GRAY.

| |

The location of their Breakfast for Children Program is North Hoyne Street and West Washington Boulevard. While BPP is currently claiming to feed 100 children each day, in fact the program has almost ceased to operate.

;10/69)

Source advised BOB LEE was in Richmond, Virginia on September 18, 1969 on BPP business. He spoke at Chapel Hill, North Carolina on September 19, 1969. Speeches, according to source, followed the same text as set forth in the New York speech and also criticized the power structure as plotting to destroy the BPP.

9/19/69)

Source advised that the National Office of the BPP, Oakland, California has directed the Illinois BPP leaders to expect to more or less help the National Office in training, directing and in general be responsible for all BPP activities east of the Mississippi River.

|;9/30/69)

This source advised that the above is not in effect at this time.

| 10/21/69)

Source advised that members of the"Chicago Daily Defender" a newspaper slanted to the Negro community, had contacted FRED HAMPTON to advise him that two jurors previously selected for the anti-riot conspiracy trial underway in Chicago wherein eight defendants, one of whom his BOBBY SEALE, National BPP Officer, was being tried for violations steming from the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago during August, 1968, had received threatening letters signed "The Panthers." HAMPTON, after contacting the National Office, denied any knowledge of these threatening

letters and issued a press release alleging that the letters were another means of the establishment in its plot to put the Panthers in a bad light.

9/30/69).

Source advised that FRED HAMPTON had announced to the news media in Chicago that the BPP would protest the arrest of seven of its members at Panther Headquarters early that day. HAMPTON stated that by these arrests the Chicago PD presented its continued harassment of the BPP. HAMPTON called for a massive rally to be held at the Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, 12:00 noon on October 7, 1969.

10/4/69)

Source advised that a rally on October 7, 1969 which had been called to emphasize the fact the Chicago BPP was backing BOBBY SEALE. The rally was also in an attempt to gain community support for the BPP. Source stated BPP leaders had instructed that any member becoming involved in any militant action would be purged from the party.

10/7/69)

Special Agents of the FBI on October 7, 1969, at 11:00 AM, observed a group of Negro males, identifying themselves as BPP members, arrived at the Federal Building. These Panthers commenced handing out literature "Government Conspiracy to Destroy BPP". The pamphlets criticized the Chicago PD and referred to them as "Pig Daley's Imperialistic Mad Dogs", and also stated "the continued raids, jailing and murdering of Panthers proves there is a government conspiracy to destroy revolutionary leaders in Babylon (America)."

At the height of the rally, about 75 BPP and New Left people, along with 200 to 225 individuals were observed in the plaza area of the Federal Building. BOB RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense spoke along the theme that the government should be on trial for conspiracy against the BPP. RUSH offered the raids on Panther offices throughout the nation as evidence. The rally was dismissed without incident.

Agents of the FBI observed a demonstration at Cook County Hospital, 1835 West Harrison Street, Chicago. This demonstration was sponsored, according to leaflet, by the Young Lords, the BPP and the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM II) faction of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), on October 10, 1969. LYNN FRENCH, Chicago BPP member, spoke and stated that the BPP could perform a better service for the indigent people of the ghetto, instead of the Cook County Hospital, if the BPP was allowed to obtain a day care and health center. The group dispersed without incident.

Source advised that a discussion among BPP leaders was held regarding the formation of a committee against facism. During the discussion, it was mentioned the committee would most probably be comprised of one representative from the BPP and one from each of the organizations in which the BPP is currently in coalition. They are the Young Lords and the Young Patriots and the RYM-II faction, SDS. To date no committee has been formed.

; 10/10/68)

On October 22, 1969, Special Agents of the FBI observed approximately 30 BPP members demonstrating at the Federal Building in Chicago and shouting "free Bobby, free Bobby." Twelve of the BPP members began a series of close order drills and marched around the plaza area of the Federal Building. The demonstration lasted from 12:00 noon to 1:30 PM when United States Marshals (USM) allowed 15 members to enter the Federal Building to attend court session at the conspiracy trial underway as set forth above.

All the members were searched prior to being allowed to enter. No incident or arrests were reported.

Source advised the Illinois Chapter of the BPP had announced a rally for October 25, 1969 at the Federal Building, Chicago. Purpose of the rally was to protest "racist trial and miscarriage of justice perpetrated on BOBBY SEALE by the Federal Judge JULIUS HOFFMAN at the Federal Anti-riot Conspiracy trial currently being held at the Federal Building.

10/21/69)

On October 25, 1969, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed at 12:25 p.m. approximately 25 white persons, 35 Negroes had gathered in the Federal Building plaza. These individuals had apparently gathered for the previously announced rally to protest the above described trial.

Protestors were observed carrying signs reading "Get Out of Vietnam Now", "Free Huey", "Free Bobby", "Stop Facist Raids", "Free Panthers Now", "Youth Against Facism", "Racist Pig Daley".

At 1:00 p.m., FBI Agents observed a group of 15 Negroes carrying 10 BPP flags commence marching back and forth in the Federal Building plaza area. The group chanted "Your left, your right, now back up the gun. Free Bobby." At 1:05 p.m., this group commenced marching around the Federal Building and circled the building five times. About 1:20 p.m., speeches commenced on the southeast corner of the Federal Building plaza. Ronald Satchel, Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, spoke regarding the west side medical center project of the BPP. He said the project was to be "people controlled" and "community controlled". He demanded the political prisoners Huey Newton and Bobby Seale should be freed. He also blamed the problems of the poor Negro on the capitalistic system in this country. He concluded saying that members of the BPP were not opportunists but revolutionists.

violating Seale's Constitutional Rights by not permitting Seale to have an attorney of his choice or by permitting Seale to represent himself during the trial. He stated that people should be educated to the fact they have a right to bear arms as set forth in the United States Constitution. Walls held up a copy of Chairman Mao Tse Tung's "Redbook" stating ideology set forth in this book is the ideology of the BPP. He concluded saying the day will come when Panthers will be everywhere.

At 2:10 p.m., speeches concluded and the crowd dispersed. No incidents or arrests occurred.

ARS,
1

FRED HAMPTON, according to the source, advised the National Headquarters, Oakland, California, that Chicago was encountering problems in connection with the opening of its health clinic. HAMPTON stated the clinic was not opened as some work remained. HAMPTON stated the Vice Lords have good control over the area in the vicinity of the clinic, but the Panthers intend to open the clinic anyway.

10/6/69)

Source advised on October 25, 1969, that representatives of the National Office of the BPP were arriving that date from California. Source further advised that BOB RUSH, FRED HAMPTON and others met EMORY DOUGLAS, National BPP Minister of Culture; DAVID HILLIARD, National BPP Chief of Staff, and two Negro females at O'Hare International Airport. HAMPTON advised the group that arrangements had been made for HILLIARD to speak at the residence of Dr. HERBERT HAZELKORN, 2700 Wilmette, Wilmette, Illinois, on October 26, 1969, to a group of Jewish people who would probably donate a large sum of money to the Illinois BPP.

The following day, source advised that HILLIARD, accompanied by RUSH and HAMPTON and other BPP members, travelled to HAZELKORN's residence where HILLIARD spoke before a group of approximately 75 white people. HILLIARD gave a short history of the BPP, but his main speech concerned the right of the Arab people to rise against the country of Israel inasmuch as Israel has always attempted to suppress the Arabs. The BPP received no money from this group.

10/25 and 26/69)

Source advised HILLIARD spoke at Malcolm X Junior College, formerly Crane Junior College, on Chicago's west side to a group of about 125 to 150 people. HILLIARD spoke on capitalism and imperialism and restricted his speech to the BPP interpretation of these words. The speech was not militant and lasted approximately 30 minutes. He is alleged

2

to have received a fee of $1,000 from the Malcolm X Campus Bookstore which is run by students of the College. This speech occurred on October 27, 1969.

, 10/27/69)

Agents of the FBI, on October 29, 1969, observed eight members of the BPP in the plaza area of the Federal Building, Chicago. As of 7:30 a.m., the group numbered approximately 20. These individuals, by 8:30 a.m., totaled 51, 16 of whom were white. At 8:45 a.m., 35 Negroes and 10 whites were admitted to the Federal Building and after being searched by United States Marshals, were allowed to attend the antiriot law conspiracy trial as spectators.

On October 29, 1969, the Security Department of the Illinois State Union, Normal, Illinois, advised the Springfield Office of the FBI that a meeting sponsored by the RYM-II faction of SDS would be attended by FRED HAMPTON. Subsequently, the Security Office of the Illinois State Union advised that HAMPTON did speak that evening and denounced the trial of BOBBY SEALE in Chicago, giving a brief history and outline of the BPP and urged the audience to come to Chicago on November 1, 1969, to demonstrate at the Federal Building for BOBBY SEALE. No incidents occurred at this meeting.

VI. BPP CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER MILITANT GROUPS

Source advised on August 25, 1969, he had obtained a leaflet being distributed in Chicago captioned "In Memorium; 8/28/69" indicating "The Conspiracy" and the "Chicago Peace Council" would sponsor a demonstration that day from 5 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. at Grant Park, Chicago.

8/25/69)

"The Conspiracy" is an organization which has described itself as being comprised of eight individuals

3

indicted for criminal trespass in violation of Antiriot Laws statute as a result of activities that occurred during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

The "Chicago Peace Council" is a coalition organization comprised of peace activist groups in the Chicago area.

, 8/25/69)

The leaflet, according to the source, included the BPP, Young Lords, Young Patriots, Young Comancheros, all Chicago youth street gangs, and "The Conspiracy" as sponsoring this rally.

At the rally, FRED HAMPTON spoke concerning his recent imprisonment and local BPP activities. No incidents or arrests were reported during this demonstration.

, 8/25/69)

Sources advised on October 29, 1969, that a coalition does exist, in fact, between the BPP, Young Lords, Young Patriots and the RYM-II faction of SDS. RYM-II faction is led by MIKE KLONSKY, former National Secretary of SDS. Sources felt the coalition existed and would continue to exist only as long as the BPP felt it could receive some benefit from such a coalition. The sources did advise the coalition had deteriorated because of the refusal in the past of the BPP to engage in any activity with these groups unless the BPP received some benefit.

10/29/69)
10/29/69)

VII. FINANCES

Chicago BPP Chapter operates on funds received from the following sources:

4

(1) Speaker fees and honorariums received by BPP leaders for appearances at educational institutions and other public gatherings.

(2) Monthly assessments of BPP members, as well as fees charged for processing applications for membership in Chicago BPP Chapter.

(3) Donations and contributions given at BPP rallies or by individuals sympathetic to BPP objectives.

(4) No information developed indicating Chicago Chapter BPP has received any funds from National Chapter of BPP, from any foreign government or individual from a foreign country, or an organization operated in a foreign country.

National Headquarters of the BPP, Oakland, California, has allowed the Chicago Chapter to use proceeds from the sale of the Panther newspaper to defray expenses incurred for bonding members out of jail. The Chicago Chapter is in dire financial disorder.

10/69)
10/69)

Source advised FRED HAMPTON stated on October 25, 1969, that while at a fund raising party given by LUCY MONTGOMERY, 1754 North Wells Street, Chicago, he received $1,500.96 for the Illinois BPP. MONTGOMERY has been publicly identified as a supporter of the so-called "New Left" both philosophically and financially.

10/25/69)

VIII. CONTACTS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) OR OTHER GROUPS

Source advised on October 10, 1969, CHARLENE MITCHELL, Field Secretary, National Black Liberation Commission (NBLC),

5

CP, USA, met with FRED HAMPTON and other BPP leaders at BPP Headquarters. The meeting was for the purpose of exchanging ideas in the struggle for black liberation.

Both the BPP and CP agree they have a concurrent theory toward the antiriot law trial currently in progress in Chicago in that neither wants to become involved in any violence nor possible threat situation.

Both groups agreed that neither should nor would "stick their necks out for anybody," particularly in connection with the antiriot trial in Chicago.

10/10/69)

ALL MEMBERS OF THE BPP MUST BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS IN VIEW OF DESIRE OF ALL MEMBERS TO HAVE FIREARMS.

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
BULLETIN
ILLINOIS CHAPTER
VOL. 1 BLACK PANTHER PARTY NO. 4

STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN BOBBY SEALE TO JUDGE JULIUS J. HOFFMANN

I, Bobby G. Seale, submit the following in my handwriting to Judge Julius Hoffman of this Court in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division of the U.S.A., where presently the trial of so-called 'Conspiracy to Riot' is being held, 9-26-69, and I, Bobby G. Seale, being one of the defendents of eight have been, by denied motion, the right to speak out in my behalf where my constitutional right to have 'Legal Counsel of my choice who is effective,' namely Charles R. Garry, who is on record in this court as my defense counsel that I have made agreement with by my choice only that he will assist me in my defense during this trial.

I submit to Judge Julius Hoffman that the trial be postponed until a later date where I, Bobby G. Seale, can have the 'Legal Counsel of my choice who is effective,' Attorney Charles R. Garry, and if my constitutional rights are not respected by this court then other lawyers on record here representing me, except Charles R. Garry, do not speak for me or represent me as of this date, 9-26-69. I fire them now until Charles R. Garry can be made available as chief counsel in this trial of so-called "Conspiracy to Riot' and in fact be my legal counsel of choice who is effective in assisting me in my defense. The only attorney I know of who can defend me and be effective is Charles R. Garry, who is presently my attorney on record in this court.

If I am continuously denied this constitutional right of legal defense counsel of my choice who is effective by the Judge of this court, then I can only see Judge Hoffman as a blatant racist of this U.S. Court with gross prejudicial error toward all defendants and myself in particular.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

CHICAG[illegible] [illegible]

FUTILITY

It is now crystal clear to the masses of the people at home and abroad that the United States is a downright fascist country. This has been exemplified with the commencement of the trial of the so called 'Conspiracy 8' on September 24th in Chicago.

The fascist judge, 'Adolph' Julius J. Hoffman has promised that this will be the trial of the decade. It is obvious that this is the last stage and the turning point in American history when the iron hand of the dictatorship will be displayed.

This mock trial would not be possible without the inclusion of the Black Panther Party. The fascist Gestapo pigs have railroaded our Chairman on another trumped-up charge. Having kidnapped him from San Francisco these lunatics took him by car to Chicago 12 days prior to the trial. They had him sleeping in various county jails throughout the journey. Jails not fit for any form of habitation. The result is that Chairman Bobby Seale arrived in Chicago sick from the rot and mess of the jails to face the SS and the Gestapo army.

These fascist madmen have refused to to allow him to see a doctor and it is obvious that they intend murdering the Chairman by any means necessary.

It would be deviating [illegible] to keep to the pattern set. Charles R. Garry, Chairman Bobby Seale's attorney [illegible] postponement of the trial [illegible] the hospital for an [illegible] to be present in Chicago. 'Adolph Hitler' Hoffman has of course refused the request and Chairman Bobby Seale faces the fascists without [illegible] attorney.

The judge [illegible] through the [illegible] of a dictatorial jury selection [illegible] questions like [illegible] were [illegible] what were the qualifications [illegible] sit on the jury. Relevant facts like [illegible] these people true representatives of the peer group of the defendants [illegible] were thrown [illegible] as being immaterial and irrelevant.

This is a warning for [illegible] intensify the struggle to heighten our awareness [illegible] together as it is clear that this mockery of a system will not deem any justice and that the time is imminent for us to move from all directions.

It is also the time for us to understand that the [illegible] of the masses must be intensified. The action on the part of the mother country radicals in antagonizing the [illegible] attitude [illegible] their level of [illegible] from a lower level [illegible]

[illegible] power structure [illegible] Panther Party has [illegible] some time. The [illegible] of the Party and the murder of all its leaders [illegible] we should [illegible] that [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] to [illegible] which [illegible] freedom [illegible] Huey's freedom [illegible] political [illegible] and [illegible] repression.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Connie Matthews



GROUNDWORK FOR FASCISM

America has taken step one of Fascism relatively calmly. Amidst a few murmurs of "threats of freedom of the press", the fascist power structure, formerly condoned and supported by the mass media, has turned on its former lackeys. Needless to say the mass media and their fascist power structure have never gotten along so well. The relationship was similar to that of a banker and a whore with the media doing all the [illegible] [illegible] also the flowers have been kicked out of the bed, and with memories of the last "convention" resting fresh in their memories, they have remained, in the main, dutifully silent.



Ray "Masai" Hewitt
Minister of Education

The mass media has not been able nor seen fit to defend the Constitution when it is applied to members of the Black Panther Party, S.D.S., The Young Lords, Los Siete de la Raza, Ahmed Evans, and a multitude of other "negative elements" (It is neither a secret nor a surprise that news coverage of the years of repression has been more concerned with profit than truth.) It is a strange paradox [illegible] the "Constitution" [illegible] or help [illegible] from it. With the arrest Friday of Rime newsmen in Chicago for allegedly violating the picture taking-or-videotaping [illegible], the Federal Government [illegible] that freedom of the press is at best a sometime thing depending on the whims of the ruling class. Strange how most papers, radio, and T.V. stations found this blatant act of fascism only of secondary importance, if any at all. The fact that "it could never happen in America" was not sobered [illegible] or cond the fact that this "ban" was formerly confined to "Nazi Germany" or "racist South Africa" was also easily ignored.

This failure of the human senses in men, who have professional reputations for being sharp, can only be viewed as cowardice or complicity. While this same "profession" failed to give proper context to their own miserable plight, they were on their jobs when it came time to spread "approved" government-issue lies about the Black Panther Party, The Young Lords, and the Young Patriots allegedly "awaiting a load of machine guns", that every one (F.B.I., C.I.A., State and City pigs) seemed to know about, except the so-called "suspects". They were also quite skillful in seeing to it that this news was broadcast everywhere but Chicago.

This was compounded by the fact that:

1. They failed to give any cry of alarm when our Chairman, Bobby Seale was kidnapped in an obvious frame-up attempt.

2. They failed to give scope or context to the [illegible] Department's admitted plan to raid the National Headquarters of the Black Panther Party, with no survivors intended.

3. In recent months there has been an escalation of terror, murder, raids, [illegible] lies on the Black Panther Party, and the news media has been relatively silent. There were no cries of [illegible] as there had been in Viet Nam. No cries of the Government stifling the news were to be heard.

THE CHICAGO SET-UP

The fact that there have been three raids on Panther homes in Chicago in the last three weeks and one Panther (Larry Roberson) murdered, has almost totally eluded the sharp-eyed, keen-nosed news beagles. Also the fact that in all these raids weapons were seized, has likewise escaped the stalwart defenders of "the American way". This is no easy task since some of these raids were daylight raids, and involved as many as [illegible] uniformed, armed, Fascist Pigs, with helicopters flying close-air support while pigs ran amuck. As of press time, the last Panther home raided was [illegible] (Dep. Minister of Defense for the State of Illinois) at [illegible] o'clock Saturday morning (September [illegible]). The pigs allegedly had a warrant for [illegible] arrest, but [illegible] so they ripped off his gun, and left, since then [illegible] in the community as usual, but [illegible] fascists [illegible] their "warrant."

These [illegible] should be viewed in light of the fact the "alleged" [illegible] [illegible] Illinois National Guard (as fine a bunch of racists as ever lived) is on stand-by; unlike the Convention, this time the mass media has been effectively muzzled, blinded, and silenced; the "dissidents" have been effectively disarmed. The only ones who know about any shipment of arms, are the pigs and the pig-controlled-media; the media-pig coalition has already hinted that the plan of the "dissidents" may include seizing the Pentagon; and you have the ground-work and the alibi for a massive St. Valentine's Day Massacre by fascist pigs posing as "servants of the people."

If any of those "Clark Kent" types has the guts of a mustard seed, they will write of Pig Daley in terms reserved for Hess, Himmler, Eichman, and Co., but they would still be lying. A plot as monsterous and massive as this should not be alluded to a brain as small as Daley's, not even by the most chicken-hearted of so-called newsmen.

The plot to destroy the Black Panther Party, and thereby crush the whole movement of dissent is directed by Tricky-Dick Nixon, and his number one hatchet man, Attorney General John Mitchell. Under their direction a federal task force set up "to keep an eye on the Panthers", has inflicted a reign of terror and lies upon the Black Panther Party from coast to coast.

It is no surprise to the Black Panther Party that "it (fascism) has happened here", the only question is "how long will the people [illegible]"

[illegible]
[illegible] Hewitt,
Minister of Education
Black Panther Party

FREE HUEY

FREE BOBBY

FREE
LARRY WHITE

FREE
ALVIN JEFFREYS

FREE ALL
POLITICAL
PRISONERS

SEIZE THE TIME

Judge Adolph Julius Hoffman, 74 years old, has been named as the 'hanging judge' for the trial of the Conspiracy Eight. The 8 defendants are charged with conspiracy to incite a riot in 1968,
cite a riot in 1968, before the democratic convention. Chairman Bobby Seale, National Chairman of the Black Panther Party, and the other 8 defendants face 10 years imprisonment and $20,000 fine if they are convicted.

Judge Adolph Hoffman stands on his record as a fascist. He has continually propagated this fascist moribund judicial system upon any and all advocates of socialism and or collectivism. This judge always finds any defendants 'guilty' who have views which differ in the slightest degree from his and his other reactionary paper cartoon characters.

On Thursday, September 25, 1969, the trial and selection of the jury began. Judge Hoffman McGoo exerted all efforts to deny Chairman Bobby and all the other defendants any and all motions presented by their defense attorneys. Once again it is most important that we recognize fascism for what it actually is. The 'hangman' only allowed pigs, [illegible] and paramilitary right participants to remain on the jury. 'Any person [illegible] a member of the defendants' peer group was immediately disqualified from the jury.'

The judge and state's attorney Foran have an expert plan. They are obviously not aware that we the people, and we the members of the Black Panther Party no longer tolerate astronomical intimidation. We will go forth no matter what the sacrifice to propagandize and educate the masses of people. It is impossible to deceive the masses for any extended period of time and their time has most assuredly run out. 'The spirit of the people is greater than the man's technology' and the spirit of the Vanguard can never be crushed. An idea like freedom and liberation which has been born and started to grow cannot be stopped when its time has come to mature.

INTENSIFY THE STRUGGLE
SEIZE THE TIME
FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

Sister Cae, Ed. Cadre
Illinois Chapter, Black Panther Party

JUDGE JULIUS J. HOFFMAN

LETTER TO BOBBY FROM HIS WIFE

Bobby:

The fascist pigs have kidnapped you, and are trying to railroad you on trumped-up charges. The ransom for you Bobby, is the annihilation of all Panther members and headquarters. If the pig power structure had any knowledge of political economy, and the hardships of oppressed people, then they wouldn't act like racists, but like Judge Sherwin, who freed our Eldridge.

The Panther Party has, is, and will go forth into the community and educate the masses of the people about the rapings, the exploitations and the murders which the ruling class have subjected us to. The working class has a high infant mortality rate, death from starvation, and the suicide rate has been on a steady increase. All this is part and parcel of making sure that the coins still jingle in the pockets of the bourgeoisie jackasses. Therefore, it is only logical that the avaricious businessmen, the demagogic politicians, the murderous racist pig cops, can do nothing more than murder us, when we show the people the correct ideology.

The pigs have, and will go forth to hire, organizations (who are tools for the government) to kill members of the Black Panther Party. Remember when it was mentioned that there have been too many legalized judicial murders in the court room? Judge Hoffman is the true example of a legal hangman.

Bobby, I love you, and I'm going to try and tell the masses of people what you've been rapping to me in the past. Your spirit is strong. It's like that ever-pounding beat within the souls of Black people which says, their spirit will never die, because you, Bobby, and Huey P. Newton started a fire within the masses, that the pigs will never put out.

Your other half
Artie

WHO ARE THE REAL CONSPIRATORS

"As a Black Man in America, I can't get a fair trial in a RACIST COURT"...Chairman Bobby Seale

This was the theme of the court proceedings of the Conspiracy Eight. From the hand picked jury (eight middle aged, white suburbanites, two house negroes, and two big businessmen—all registered voters) to the constant denial by Julius 'Adolph Eichman' Hoffman of all the defense motions.

Before the selection of the racist, Nazi-ridden jury was made, they were allowed to read newspapers in the ceremonial courtroom. Later, Hoffman, pig Nixon's chief fund raiser and right hand lackey in Illinois, told the prospective jurors not to read newspapers, listen to TV, or talk with each other.

The special category of jurors, all registered voters, were in contradiction to the political morales of the defendants. The defendants, demonstrators against the bourgeois political process, and a socialist revolutionary, an advocate of the people's dictatorship (proletarian democracy), are going to be tried by people who support and participate in that same bourgeois political process. This unrepresentative, illegal and unconstitutional jury is illustrative of the court proceedings here in fascist America. THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY demands that all defendants be tried in a court by a jury of their peer group and not lilly white suburbanites, right-wingers, black lackies, and capitalist businessmen. This overt misrepresentation of the community illustrates the 'conspiracy' against the defendants in general and the Chairman in particular. This is the only conspiracy was spent in dismissing prospective black jurors and working class people. The conspiracy became evident as the government [illegible] people who because of their class [illegible]

ney, and Julius Hoffman, pig Judge) conspired and removed the conspiracy staff from from the defense counsel table.

Kunstler acknowledged Hoffman's effort to intimidate all defense-then
fort to intimidate all defense counsel then the fascist tee-totaler warned him to watch the language that he uses (not to talk of objective reality).

It will be impossible for a true revolutionary, Chairman Bobby, to get a fair trial from a bourgeois reactionary. This fascist bourgeois state (Babylon) is using the courts to fail the revolutionary machine. But it won't work, the Vanguard Party, the motive force of the revolutionary movement, has already began to motivate, mobilize and energize the once sleeping masses. The trial of Chairman Bobby shows the people that unless they are in power to control all legislative and judicial processes (proletarian democracy), their leaders will be railroaded and the Vanguard will be slowed down.

William J. (Jobawaukee) Campbell, Chief pig circuit judge and 'Adolph' Hoffman have schemed together to stifle any and all communication and information on the trial. No press releases, press statements, photographs, pictures or tapes can be made by the defendants to express their view of the legal lynching. The Chairman isn't even allowed to speak to the press in the presence of the mechanical monsters (U.S. Marshalls). 'Adolph' has said that he isn't there to satisfy public interest but will 'run the court as I see fit.' (A bourgeois reactionary and fascist oppressor can only give a bourgeois reactionary verdict and run a trial in the manner of Nazi fascists.)

[illegible]

SEE NEXT PAGE

FREE BREAKFASTS FOR CHILDREN

Last week the demagogic bourgeoisie press carried an article which stated that the Black Panther Party in the City of Chicago was no longer feeding hungry school children. The article also stated that the Party was using the Breakfast money and food for their own personal use. This is totally incorrect, the Black Panther Party refuses to accept the ideology of the capitalist pig power structure which starves [illegible] of its population and uses food funds to send their astro-pigs to the moon for the purpose of "heightening exploitation."

The people and the Black Panther Party say there's something terribly wrong when Daley's Stockyard pigs have nothing more to do than sit in front of our breakfast centers and spy on and intimidate the hungry school children, who attend our centers by the hundreds each morning.

Not only do the Breakfast Centers provide free breakfasts but they also serve as a place where children receive revolutionary culture, education and also immediate first aid treatment. We believe anything the people want and need can be gained through revolutionary struggle and until the people realize this we will continue to lighten the oppressive load that this pig power structure has placed on the people.

So the Black Panther Party's Breakfast for Children Program will continue in oppressed communities as long as the masses find it necessary. And we say to the pigs who wallow in the pig pen cars in front of the Breakfast Centers, our offices and cribs, Beware! The beat of the people is much too fast, so go back home where you belong. Watch out pigs, it's a people's thing!

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS
Sister Beverline

BAIL MONEY IS NEEDED TO FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

SEND MONEY TO,

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
ILL CHAPTER
2350 W MADISON
243-8276

FREE HEALTH CARE

The BLACK PANTHER PARTY is establishing a FREE PEOPLE'S MEDICAL CLINIC to satisfy the medical needs of our community. We understand that the capitalists in America will never provide adequate medical service so the BLACK PANTHER PARTY has moved to establish another community program in which all oppressed people can be involved.

Technical assistance, supplies, and donations can be brought to the office of the ILLINOIS CHAPTER of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, 2350 West Madison Street. For further information, call 243-8276

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

CONSPIRATORS cont.

One attorney, Gerald Lefcourt, is the chief counsel for the New York 21 and must return to New York to fight for their freedom. The only reason he can give for locking the attorneys up is Chairman Bobby's insistence upon having Charles Garry as his counsel. This is blackmail, piracy, genuine and unadorned.

One must understand the significance of the courts here in Babylon. There aren't too many more pigs they can hire, or too many more laws that they can pass, but the fascist power structure can call grand jury hearings and issue indictments forever. They are using the court system to frustrate the revolutionary struggle and imprison the man power needed to carry the revolution through to the end.

Pig Nixon, Hoffman, and Hoover, we have uncovered your "conspiracy" against the people. The people of the whole world see through your fascist lies and your kangaroo court. You smell of pig manure and your true nature is evident to all who see you wallow in the mire. Keep your hands off Bobby mother------. Keep your hands off the people. You are on the verge of extinction. The people are waiting for the opportune time to hang you for your astronomical crimes. You and all reactionaries are doomed. Give up 'Adolph' Hoffman, we are 'too revolutionary proletarian intoxicated to be astronomically intimidated.'

Justice To Those Who Deserve Justice
Death To Those Who Deserve Death
Free All Political Prisoners
Seize the Time, Off the Pig

Lt. Eugene Charles
Information [illegible] Illinois Chapter BPP

SUBSCRIPTION FORM

Support Your Newspaper--
Subscribe Today!

Enter my subscription [illegible]

	National Subscriptions	Foreign Subscriptions
3 MONTHS: (13 ISSUES)	$2.50	$3.00
6 MONTHS: (26 ISSUES)	$5.00	$6.00
ONE YEAR: (52 ISSUES)	$7.50	$9.00

(please print)

NAME

ADDRESS

CITY

STATE [illegible]

PLEASE MAKE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER TO: MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Box 2967 Custom House San Francisco CA 94126

THE CONSPIRACY "8"

BOBBY SEALE - Father of the

FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN

FATHER OF FREE MEDICAL CENTER

" IF I AM CONTINUOUSLY DENIED THIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF LEGAL DEFENSE, COUNSEL OF MY CHOICE WHO IS EFFECTIVE, BY THE JUDGE OF THIS COURT, THEN I CAN ONLY SEE JUDGE HOFFMAN AS A BLATANT RACIST OF THIS U.S. COURT WITH GROSS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TOWARD ALL DEFENDANTS AND MYSELF IN PARTICULAR."

BOBBY SEALE, CHAIRMAN
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

FREE ALL POLITCAL PRISONERS

People's Rally SAT.

OCT. 25, 12:00 NOON

Jackson at Dearborn

COME SEE 'BOUT BOBBY

SEIZE THE TIME

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. MICHAEL KLONSKY, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power nd does not support the polices of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC), CHICAGO BRANCH

A source advised in May, 1968, that the Chicago Branch of SNCC was an affiliate of the national SNCC with headquarters located in Atlanta, Georgia. It was a non-membership type group headed in Chicago by ROBERT ALFONZO BROWN, a 19 year old male Negro, with the title of Midwest Region Director. BROWN maintained strict loyalty to STOKELY CARMICHAEL, Recruiter and Organizer and former National Director of SNCC. BROWN attempted to align Chicago's SNCC activities within the framework of CARMICHAEL's policies.

In a speech at Chicago on March 25, 1968, CARMICHAEL commented as follows: "The white people are preparing to commit genocide against the black race. What are we feeling so moral about? We know the honky got everything. He got it by stealing it. He's not going to give you anything. We got to take it. These brothers on the streets every day take it, but they're taking it for themselves. Let's organize them and let them take it for our people."

This source advised on August 27, 1968, that officials of the Chicago Branch of SNCC disbanded that branch on August 25, 1968, and as of that time it was no longer in existence. Its leaders became associated with the Black Panther Party at that time.

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), headquartered at 360-362 Nelson Street, S. W., Atlanta, Georgia, is a nonmembership organization, which was born out of the sit-in movement that erupted across the South beginning in 1960.

Today SNCC identifies itself as an organization in the revolutionary vanguard. It advocates that to be successful it is necessary to develop a revolutionary ideology and revolutionary program.

According to SNCC the year 1967 marked a historic milestone in the struggle for the liberation of black people in the United States and the year that revolutionaries throughout the world began to understand more fully the impact of the black movement. SNCC declared that "liberation will come only when there is final destruction of this mad octopus--the capitalistic system of the United States with all its life-sucking tentacles of exploitation and racism that choke the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The realities of black life, together with the recognition instilled in SNCC workers forced its members to further popularize the legitimacy of self-defense and rebellions when oppression became too great."

From May, 1966, until May, 1967, Stokely Carmichael was National Chairman of SNCC. As of July, 1968, Carmichael resided in Washington, D. C., where he was affiliated with SNCC and active as temporary chairman of a black coalition group. In May, 1967, Carmichael was replaced by Hubert Gerold Brown, commonly known as H. Rap Brown, who served until June, 1968.

In June, 1968, at the Staff and Central Committee meeting of SNCC held in Atlanta, Georgia, it was decided to restructure the organization by equalization of responsibility by creating ten deputy or vice chairmanships. The primary purpose for this change is to take law enforcement pressure off any single individual.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
November 7, 1969

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY
CHICAGO DIVISION

Character RACIAL MATTERS - ORGANIZATION

Reference Report of Special Agent Alan R. Stephens dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD- (Rev. 5-22-64)

68

FBI

Date: 11/7/69

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______ ____ ______________ ____________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI AND SACS SAN FRANCISCO
WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP). RM.

DEMNOV.

SOURCES, RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT, MEETING ALLEGEDLY SCHEDULED BY THE "CONSPIRACY EIGHT," "NEW MOBILIZATION PEOPLE" FOR OCTOBER SIX LAST CANCELLED. ~~WHICH~~ SOURCE STATED MEETING TOOK PLACE INSTANT AM AT CONSPIRACY OFFICE 25 E. JACKSON CG. ~~WHERE~~ BPP ~~WAS~~ ASKED TO SUPPORT "THE CONSPIRACY," AN ORGANIZATION FORMED BY THOSE DEFENDANTS CURRENTLY ON TRIAL CHICAGO ~~REGARDING~~ FOR ANTIRIOT LAW VIOLATIONS. BPP SUPPORT SOUGHT BY THE CONSPIRACY FOR A RALLY CONSISTING OF THE "YIPPIES" AND WEATHERMAN FACTION OF SDS TO BE HELD FOLLOWING THE PEACEFUL MORATORIUM RALLY ON NOVEMBER FIFTEEN NEXT AT THE JUSTICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. BPP OFFICIALS RELATED THEY COULD NOT SUPPORT "THE CONSPIRACY" ON THE FIFTEENTH UNLESS THE "CONSPIRACY" BEGAN SUPPORTING THE BPP AT THEIR VARIOUS RALLIES.

RMM:

Approved: _

FD-...(Rev. 5-22-64)

68

F B I

Date: 11/7/69

Transmit the following in ______________ ______________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______ ____ ______________ ______________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI AND SACS SAN FRANCISCO
WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP). RM.

DEMNOV.

SOURCES RELIABLE IN PAST, ADVISED INSTANT, MEETING ALLEGEDLY SCHEDULED BY THE "CONSPIRACY EIGHT," "NEW MOBILIZATION PEOPLE" FOR OCTOBER SIX LAST CANCELLED. ~~WHICH~~ SOURCE STATED MEETING TOOK PLACE INSTANT AM AT CONSPIRACY OFFICE 28 E. JACKSON CG, ~~WHERE~~ BPP ~~WAS~~ ASKED TO SUPPORT "THE CONSPIRACY," AN ORGANIZATION FORMED BY THOSE DEFENDANTS CURRENTLY ON TRIAL CHICAGO ~~REGARDING~~ FOR ANTIRIOT LAW VIOLATIONS. BPP SUPPORT SOUGHT BY THE CONSPIRACY FOR A RALLY CONSISTING OF THE "YIPPIES" AND WEATHERMAN FACTION OF SDS TO BE HELD FOLLOWING THE PEACEFUL MORATORIUM RALLY ON NOVEMBER FIFTEEN NEXT AT THE JUSTICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. BPP OFFICIALS RELATED THEY COULD NOT SUPPORT "THE CONSPIRACY" ON THE FIFTEENTH UNLESS THE "CONSPIRACY" BEGAN SUPPORTING THE BPP AT THEIR VARIOUS RALLIES.

RMM:

Approved: _

69

FBI

Date: 11/7/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM captioned as above. Enclosed for San Francisco are designated copies of this LHM. Copies also being furnished the USM, 113th Mil., OSI, USSS. The CG PD and the Ill. States Attorney were orally advised of the contents of the LHM.

RMM:

Approved ______________ Sent ______________
Special Agent in Charge

69

FBI

Date: 11/7/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM captioned as above. Enclosed for San Francisco are designated copies of this LHM. Copies also being furnished the USM, 113th Mil., OSI, USSS. The CG PD and the Ill. States Attorney were orally advised of the contents of the LHM.

RMM:

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois 60604

70

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

November 7, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

See appendix for characterization of Black Panther Party (BPP).

On November 5, 1969, __________, both of whom have furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the following BPP members departed O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, at 11:40 p.m., on American Airlines Flight 151, which will arrive in San Francisco at 1:53 a.m., November 6, 1969:

Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP

Joan Gray, Field Lieutenant, Chicago Branch of the Illinois BPP

Artie Seale and son, the wife and child of Bobby Seale, National BPP Chairman

Sources advised that the purpose of Hampton and Gray's trip to San Francisco is unknown, other than to contact the National BPP Central Committee in Berkeley, California.

Copies of this memo are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney

United States Secret Service

Office of Special Investigation

113th Military

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also
Known As Black Panther Party
for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois 60604
November 7, 1969

70

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

See appendix for characterization of Black Panther Party (BPP).

On November 5, 1969, ____________, both of whom have furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the following BPP members departed O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, at 11:40 p.m., on American Airlines Flight 151, which will arrive in San Francisco at 1:53 a.m., November 6, 1969:

Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP

Joan Gray, Field Lieutenant, Chicago Branch of the Illinois BPP

Artie Seale and son, the wife and child of Bobby Seale, National BPP Chairman

Sources advised that the purpose of Hampton and Gray's trip to San Francisco is unknown, other than to contact the National BPP Central Committee in Berkeley, California.

Copies of this memo are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney

United States Secret Service

Office of Special Investigation

113th Military

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

71

F B I

Date: 11/5/69

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM;
DEMNOV

Copies of this LHM are also being furnished the USA, USSS, 113th Military and OSI. The Chicago PD has also been orally advised of the contents of this LHM.

RMM

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

71

F B I

Date: 11/5/69

Transmit the following in ______
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM;
DEMNOV

[redacted]

Copies of this LHM are also being furnished the USA, USSS, 113th Military and OSI. The Chicago PD has also been orally advised of the contents of this LHM.

RMM

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge Sent ______ M Per ______

72

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
November 5, 1969

NEW MOBILIZATION COMMITTE TO END THE WAR IN VIET NAM (NMC)

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The NMC is a National organization which specializes in forming coalitions for anti-war activities.

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

On November 1, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on November 1, 1969, Raymond "Masai" Hewitt, Minister of Education, Los Angeles Chapter of the BPP, arrived at O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois about 5:30 PM accompanied by his alleged wife Shirley.

advised that MASAI related to the Chicago BPP officers that he was here at the expense of the Executive Committee of the NMC to attend a highly closed meeing of this group wherein he was to be appointed a co-chairman of the West Coast Regional Committee of the NMC.

advised that this meeting was to be held at Sidney Lens, 5436 Hyde Park Boulevard, Chicago, beginning at 6:00 PM on November 1, 1969.

advised that BPP members, including Hewitt, his wife, Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Fred Hampton Deputy Chairman, both of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP and four other Chicago BPP members arrived at this meeting about 7:00 PM.

advised that approximately sixteen white persons all alleged members of the NMC, including Rennie Davis,

This document contain neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

a defendant in the current anti-riot law trial being held in Chicago, Sidney Peck, an organizer and National Co-chairman of the NMC from Cleveland, Ohio, Sidney Lens, National Co-chairman of NMC and Terence Halliman, present West Coast organizer of the NMC were already present at Lens' home and did not want to let any BPP members into the meeting except Hewitt, however, the Panthers forced their way into the meeting with Hewitt's approval. Source stated that allegedly Hewitt, and other Chicago BPP leaders had decided prior to attending the meeting that all would attend or none would attend. Further, according to source, they decided that unless the NMC changed their philosophy to the Panther philosophy Hewitt would not accept the co-chairmanship.

[redacted] advised that upon entry of the BPP members the NMC group immediately started arguing among themselves and during the confusion the Panther helped themselves to the food which had upon their entry, been refused to them.

[redacted] stated that Lens and Peck told Hewitt that they had wanted Panther representation on this committee for over a year.

Source stated that Hewitt indicated that the Panther philosophy was too much different than the philosophy of this group and in addition the Panthers feel that this group is responsible for Bobby Seale, National BPP Chairman, being a defendant in the current anti-riot law trial in Chicago. Hewitt, according to source, related that Seale was advised not to come to Chicago during the Democratic National Convention, August, 1968 by the National BPP Central Committee, however, he came anyway.

Source stated that nothing was accomplished at this meeting as Hewitt finally told the group that the NMC revolution is based on Bourgeoise Philosophy whereas the BPP is one based on the prolelariat, therefore, if the NMC really wants BPP representation, the NMC must change its philosophy. Source stated that due to the numerous disagreements among the NMC group and their mistreatment of the BPP members present, the BPP members walked out about 9:15 PM. Source stated that another meeting may possibly take place, however, no date was mentioned.

On November 3, 1969, stated that Hampton related that he had talked with Charles Garry, BPP lawyer in San Francisco, California, on November 2, 1969, who related that on November 3, 1969, a petition would be filed in the Federal Court, Chicago, on behalf of Bobby Seale in an attempt to have him unbound, ungagged and let him represent himself until such time as Garry is able to appear himself. Hampton also indicated that Garry related that he was been and continues to advise William Kuntsler, lawyer for defendants in current anti-riot law trial, of what steps to take in this regard. Hampton further indicated that Garry implied that he would not appear on Seale's behalf until the case is under appeal regardless of how fast he recovers from his operation.

On November 3, 1969, Hewitt spoke to demonstrators at the Federal Building, Chicago, Illinois, according to Hewitt stated that "Niggers have no rights, that the white power structure is bound to respect", that "politicial power comes from the barrel of a gun", that current "conspiracy eight" trial in Chicago should be halted, the defendants set free and that world revolutionaries everywhere demand that the United States government drop all charges against them. Hewitt also demanded that the American government exchange the freedom of Huey Hewton, National BPP Minister of Defense and Bobby Seale for Vietnamese war prisoners.

advised that Hewitt is not known to have met a second time with the above group representing the NMC, however, did talk with one Sylvia Kushner, Secretary of Chicago Peace Counsel (CPC) and self-identified member of Communist Party of Illinois, 14th floor, 300 block of Dearborn, Chicago, on this date.

CPC is organization composed of representatives of Peace Groups of the Chicago area who specialize in forming coalitions of those groups for anti-war activities.

Kushner, according to source, told Hewitt that Sidney Peck advised her to tell Hewitt that he and numerous members of the NMC had met and decided not to further support the "conspiracy eight", referring to those defendants in the above trial and not to support any BPP member for the position of co-chairman of the West coast Regional committee of the NMC.

Source stated that Artie Seale will allegedly be allowed to read a letter supposedly from Bobby Seale at the NMC rally to be held in Washington D.C., November 15, 1969. Source gathered from conversation that she will be the only BPP member requested to participate in this rally.

further advised that remarks have been made that Artie Seale will be briefed by the National BPP leaders on what to say at this rally and will not necessarily read the letter as agreed by Peck and the NMC. In this regard, CG T-1 speculates that she will probably read alleged letter from Bobby Seale which will point out the difference between the BPP and NMC philosophy. Source also is of the opinion that the future BPP newspaper will carry articles pointing out these differences.

On November 4, 1969 advised that Hewitt and his wife departed Chicago on November 4, 1969, en route to San Francisco, California, on American Airlines Flight 457 arriving in San Francisco 2:15 p.m.

Copies of this Letterhead Memorandum are being furnished the United States Attorney, United States Secret Service and OSI and 113th Military Intelligence.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

72

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
November 5, 1969

NEW MOBILIZATION COMMITTE TO END THE WAR IN VIET NAM (NMC)

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The NMC is a National organization which specializes in forming coalitions for anti-war activities.

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

On November 1, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on November 1, 1969, Raymond "Masai" Hewitt, Minister of Education, Los Angeles Chapter of the BPP, arrived at O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois about 5:30 PM accompanied by his alleged wife Shirley.

advised that MASAI related to the Chicago BPP officers that he was here at the expense of the Executive Committee of the NMC to attend a highly closed meeing of this group wherein he was to be appointed a co-chairman of the West Coast Regional Committee of the NMC.

advised that this meeting was to be held at Sidney Lens, 5436 Hyde Park Boulevard, Chicago, beginning at 6:00 PM on November 1, 1969.

advised that BPP members, including Hewitt, his wife, Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Fred Hampton Deputy Chairman, both of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP and four other Chicago BPP members arrived at this meeting about 7:00 PM.

advised that approximately sixteen white persons all alleged members of the NMC, including Rennie Davis.

This document contain neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

a defendant in the current anti-riot law trial being held in Chicago, Sidney Peck, an organizer and National Co-chairman of the NMC from Cleveland, Ohio, Sidney Lens, National Co-chairman of NMC and Terence Halliman, present West Coast organizer of the NMC were already present at Lens' home and did not want to let any BPP members into the meeting except Hewitt, however, the Panthers forced their way into the meeting with Hewitt's approval. Source stated that allegedly Hewitt, and other Chicago BPP leaders had decided prior to attending the meeting that all would attend or none would attend. Further, according to source, they decided that unless the NMC changed their philosophy to the Panther philosophy Hewitt would not accept the co-chairmanship.

advised that upon entry of the BPP members the NMC group immediately started arguing among themselves and during the confusion the Panther helped themselves to the food which had upon their entry, been refused to them.

stated that Lens and Peck told Hewitt that they had wanted Panther representation on this committee for over a year.

Source stated that Hewitt indicated that the Panther philosophy was too much different than the philosophy of this group and in addition the Panthers feel that this group is responsible for Bobby Seale, National BPP Chairman, being a defendant in the current anti-riot law trial in Chicago. Hewitt, according to source, related that Seale was advised not to come to Chicago during the Democratic National Convention, August, 1968 by the National BPP Central Committee, however, he came anyway.

Source stated that nothing was accomplished at this meeting as Hewitt finally told the group that the NMC revolution is based on Bourgeoise Philosophy whereas the BPP is one based on the prolelariat, therefore, if the NMC really wants BPP representation, the NMC must change its philosophy. Source stated that due to the numerous disagreements among the NMC group and their mistreatment of the BPP members present, the BPP members walked out about 9:15 PM. Source stated that another meeting may possibly take place, however, no date was mentioned.

NMC
BPP

On November 3, 1969, stated that Hampton related that he had talked with Charles Garry, BPP lawyer in San Francisco, California, on November 2, 1969, who related that on November 3, 1969, a petition would be filed in the Federal Court, Chicago, on behalf of Bobby Seale in an attempt to have him unbound, ungagged and let him represent himself until such time as Garry is able to appear himself. Hampton also indicated that Garry related that he was been and continues to advise William Kuntsler, lawyer for defendants in current anti-riot law trial, of what steps to take in this regard. Hampton further indicated that Garry implied that he would not appear on Seale's behalf until the case is under appeal regardless of how fast he recovers from his operation.

On November 3, 1969, Hewitt spoke to demonstrators at the Federal Building, Chicago, Illinois, according to Hewitt stated that "Niggers have no rights, that the white power structure is bound to respect", that "politicial power comes from the barrel of a gun", that current "conspiracy eight" trial in Chicago should be halted, the defendants set free and that world revolutionaries everywhere demand that the United States government drop all charges against them. Hewitt also demanded that the American government exchange the freedom of Huey Hewton, National BPP Minister of Defense and Bobby Seale for Vietnamese war prisoners.

advised that Hewitt is not known to have met a second time with the above group representing the NMC, however, did talk with one Sylvia Kushner, Secretary of Chicago Peace Counsel (CPC) and self-identified member of Communist Party of Illinois, 14th floor, 300 block of Dearborn, Chicago, on this date.

CPC is organization composed of representatives of Peace Groups of the Chicago area who specialize in forming coalitions of those groups for anti-war activities.

Kushner, according to source, told Hewitt that Sidney Peck advised her to tell Hewitt that he and numerous members of the NMC had met and decided not to further support the "conspiracy eight", referring to those defendants in the above trial and not to support any BPP member for the position of co-chairman of the West coast Regional committee of the NMC.

Source stated that Artie Seale will allegedly be allowed to read a letter supposedly from Bobby Seale at the NMC rally to be held in Washington D.C., November 15, 1969. Source gathered from conversation that she will be the only BPP member requested to participate in this rally.

further advised that remarks have been made that Artie Seale will be briefed by the National BPP leaders on what to say at this rally and will not necessarily read the letter as agreed by Peck and the NMC. In this regard, CG T-1 speculates that she will probably read alleged letter from Bobby Seale which will point out the difference between the BPP and NMC philosophy. Source also is of the opinion that the future BPP newspaper will carry articles pointing out these differences.

On November 4, 1969 advised that Hewitt and his wife departed Chicago on November 4, 1969, en route to San Francisco, California, on American Airlines Flight 457 arriving in San Francisco 2:15 p.m.

Copies of this Letterhead Memorandum are being furnished the United States Attorney, United States Secret Service and OSI and 113th Military Intelligence.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

73

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 157-1291

Chicago, Illinois
November 4, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

On October 30, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, both of the Illinois BPP, Cleveland Cook, BPP member of the Chicago Branch of the Illinois BPP, and other BPP members traveled to Normal, Illinois, during the evening hours of October 29, 1969, via a 1964 maroon, two-door Bonneville Pontiac, bearing unrecalled 1969 Illinois license.

NO

stated that Hampton spoke before a mixed group of approximately 300 students in the University Union Building at Illinois State University (ISU), Normal, Illinois, where an admission of 85 cents per person was charged. This speech lasted about 45 minutes. The group then went to Wesley Hall where Hampton spoke to about 75 persons, black and white, for about an hour. The group then went to a Fraternal House where Hampton talked with about 10 black persons.

Hampton's speech was the same at all three functions. He spoke on the history and philosophy of the BPP, and denounced the current antiriot law trial in Chicago, Illinois. Hampton also announced plans for a demonstration at the Federal Building, Chicago, Illinois, for 12:00 noon, Saturday, November 1, 1969, and invited all to come.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

73

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. 157-1291

Chicago, Illinois
November 4, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

On October 30, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, both of the Illinois BPP, Cleveland Cook, BPP member of the Chicago Branch of the Illinois BPP, and other BPP members traveled to Normal, Illinois, during the evening hours of October 29, 1969, via a 1964 maroon, two-door Bonneville Pontiac, bearing unrecalled 1969 Illinois license.

No

stated that Hampton spoke before a mixed group of approximately 300 students in the University Union Building at Illinois State University (ISU), Normal, Illinois, where an admission of 85 cents per person was charged. This speech lasted about 45 minutes. The group then went to Wesley Hall where Hampton spoke to about 75 persons, black and white, for about an hour. The group then went to a Fraternal House where Hampton talked with about 10 black persons.

Hampton's speech was the same at all three functions. He spoke on the history and philosophy of the BPP, and denounced the current antiriot law trial in Chicago, Illinois. Hampton also announced plans for a demonstration at the Federal Building, Chicago, Illinois, for 12:00 noon, Saturday, November 1, 1969, and invited all to come.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

________ stated that the Illinois BPP was paid solely from the admissions charged and received a total of approximately $500.00.

Source stated that Cook was arrested for a traffic violation during the evening.

________ advised that one Mark Clark, BPP leader Peoria, Illinois, made arrangements for this speech.

Source stated one Leon Harps, BPP leader Peoria, Illinois, is responsible for distributing the Black Panther Paper and one Edward McChriston, appears to be responsible for the Illinois BPP Branch in Peoria, Illinois.

Source stated that the Chicago group arrived back in Chicago about 6:00 a.m. on October 30, 1969.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois;

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois;

Office of Special Investigations, Chicago, Illinois;

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

USA, SECRET SERVICE, MILITARY, USM, CHIEF JUDGE, OSI, AND FEDERAL GUARDS NOTIFIED.

CG 157-1291

USA, SECRET SERVICE, MILITARY, USM, CHIEF JUDGE, OSI, AND FEDERAL GUARDS NOTIFIED.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 part 13 & 14

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
May 28, 1969

23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Characterizations of the Black Panther Party (BPP) and Students for a Democratic Sociaty (SDS) are contained in the appendix of this memorandum.

On May 26, 1969, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that leaders of the Chicago BPP chapter planned on holding a press conference at 9:00 a.m., May 27, 1969, regarding the sentencing of Fredrick Allen Hampton, Chicago leader of the BPP, on May 26, 1969, at Maywood, Illinois. Source advised that Hampton was sentenced to serve two to five years in connection with having been found guilty on a robbery charge.

On May 27, 1969, source advised Bobby Rush, Chicago leader of the BPP, advised members of the Chicago news media that Fred Hampton, who was sentenced to two to five years on May 26, 1969, on a robbery conviction, is a political prisoner of "racist pigs." Rush stated "racist pigs" are repressing revolutionary groups such as the BPP, SDS and Young Lords.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Group I~~
Excluded from
automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Declassif
4/7/75 by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Source advised the Young Lords is a Chicago youth gang whose members are primarily of Puerto Rican extraction and are principally located in an area on the near North side of Chicago.

Source further stated that Rush told representatives of the Chicago news media on May 27, 1969, that proof that Hampton is a political prisoner is indicated by the fact that Judge Sidney Jones, who pronounced the two to five year sentence on Hampton, refused to grant an Appeal Bond to Hampton when requested by Hampton's legal counsel. Rush stated that the same Judge Sidney Jones recently permitted an Appeal Bond for four convicted racist murderers in Cicero, Illinois, but refused to grant an Appeal Bond for Hampton, who was sentenced on an "alleged" conviction of theft of $71.00 worth of ice cream, which he gave to poor Black children.

Rush told representatives of the Chicago news media that Judge Jones was told by Chicago "racist pigs" to send Hampton to jail or lose his judgeship.

Rush further advised representatives of the Chicago news media that the Chicago BPP does not have any current plans for rallies or demonstrations in connection with Hampton's sentence. Rush stated an investigation should be conducted as to why "racist pigs" are repressing BPP, SDS, and other revolutionaries.

The following news article concerning the BPP press conference concerning the above matter appeared on page three in the late May 27, 1969, edition of Chicago's "Today," a newspaper published in Chicago, Illinois:

CONFIDENTIAL

Panther plea hits judge's leniency

BY JEFF LYON

AN IMMEDIATE appeal bond is being sought for Illinois Black Panthers Chairman Fred Hampton, who has been sentenced to 2 to 5 years in prison by Criminal court Judge Sidney Jones Jr. for a $71 holdup of a Good Humor man.

Attorneys for Hampton, 20, will base their demand for appeal bond on two grounds, according to Bobby Rush, Panther minister of defense.

"One will be Judge Jones' action recently in letting off George Kamberos, the restaurant owner, who was accused of killing a 15-year-old boy with his car — the man whose driver's license had been suspended three times and revoked twice," said Rush.

"THE OTHER will be the fact that the four Cicero white youths who killed a black, Jerome Huey, in 1966 were allowed out on appeal bond after their conviction," he noted.

Rush, in a news conference in Panther headquarters, 2350 Madison st., said "Sissy Jones" had been "pressured by Dodohead Daley and his gang of merry mutts" to get Hampton off the streets.

"But he won't be gone for long," Rush added.

Ald. A. A. [Sammy] Rayner [6th] also appeared at the conference to say Hampton "is my brother, and in trouble, and I'm with him."

HAMPTON, of 804 S. 17th st., Maywood, was sentenced by Jones yesterday. Hampton, held without bond pending appeal, was denied a motion for a new trial after testimony was introduced that Hampton advocates armed revolution.

Hampton was convicted by a jury April 7 of robbing an ice cream truck driver last July 10 in the Irving school playground in Maywood. Good Humor man Nelson T. Suitt testified his truck was looted of $71 worth of ice cream bars by youngsters after Hampton jumped into the truck cab and struck and choked him.

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois

U. S. Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. The SDS is an association of young people on the left and has a current program of protesting the draft, promoting a campaign for youth to develop a conscientious objector status, denouncing United States intervention in the war in Vietnam and to "radically transform" the university community, and provide for its complete control by students. GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, when interviewed by a representative of United Press International in San Francisco, California, on May 14, 1965, described the SDS as a part of the "responsible left" which the Party has "going for us." At the June, 1965, SDS National Convention, an anti-communist proviso was removed from the SDS constitution. In the October 7, 1966, issue of "New Left Notes," the official publication of SDS, an SDS spokesman stated that there are some communists in SDS and they are welcome. The national headquarters of this organization as of July 24, 1968, was located in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

24

FBI

Date: 6/10/69

Transmit the following in ______________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE ______________ (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP). RM.

SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, REPORTS INDICTMENTS RETURNED BY COOK COUNTY GRAND JURY, CHICAGO, JUNE NINE LAST CHARGING FOLLOWING SIXTEEN CHICAGO AREA BLACK PANTHERS WITH UNLAWFUL USE OF WEAPONS AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT KIDNAPING AND AGGRAVATED BATTERY:

FRED HAMPTON, JAMES WHITE, RICHARD POWELL, CHARLES DAVID VALENTINE, WILLIAM O'NEAL, MATTHEW INGRAM, NATHANIEL JUNIOR, MERRILL DAVID HARVEY, BILLY BROOKS, JERRY DUNNIGAN, CHRISTINA MAY, YVONNE KING, HARLAN WALTON, ROBERT BRUCE, CHARLES MARTIN, AND WILLIAM IVORY.

SOURCE NOTES THAT HAMPTON, WHITE, AND POWELL ALREADY CONFINED AND INGRAM, VALENTINE, AND O'NEAL ARRESTED EARLY THIS AM IN MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS. TEN PANTHERS ARE STILL BEING SOUGHT BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

SEA

USA, SECRET SERVICE AND MILITARY ADVISED.

DMF/

25

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois 60604
June 11, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Sergeant Eugene Connolly, Area 4, Task Force, Chicago Police Department, advised on June 9, 1969, eleven members of the Chicago Black Panther Party (BPP) were observed leaving the BPP headquarters at 2350 West Madison, during the evening of June 8, 1969. These individuals were stopped in an automobile at Jackson and Wolcott Streets by Chicago Police Officers at 8:15 p.m. and arrested for obstructing police.

A search determined that the group was in possession of hypodermic needles and one marijuana cigarette They also had in their possession chemicals in glass pint bottles described by the Police Department has being ingredients for incendiary bombs. As these chemicals were not mixed, the subjects were not charged with possession of explosives, however, they were charged with possession of narcotics and obstructing police.

The area of the arrests remained calm and there were no injuries or disturbances.

The following persons were arrested by the Chicago Police Department:

Michelle Williams, age 16, Negro female, residence, 5541 West Quincy Street, Chicago;

Andrea Graves, female Negro, age 21, residence, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago;

Donna Washington, female Negro, age 17, residence 6215 South Wabash, Chicago;

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Brenda Harris, female Negro, age 17, residence, 1848 South Hamlin, Chicago;

Sandra Rich, female Negro, age 19, residence, 7703 East End Avenue, Chicago;

Jesse Ward, male Negro, date of birth 1951, residence 1721 South Troy, Chicago;

Randall Rollins, male Negro, date of birth 1951, residence 5705 South May, Chicago;

Terry Watson, male Negro, date of birth 1949, residence 2350 West Madison, Chicago;

Walter Johnson, Negro male, date of birth 1951, residence 2350 West Madison, Chicago;

Samuel Latson, Negro male, date of birth 1949, residence 2350 West Madison, Chicago; and

Carsell Jones, Negro male, date of birth 1951, residence 4445 South Evans, Chicago.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, both Chicago, and Region 1, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

SAC, CHICAGO 10/31/69

SA CARYL E. SHUPE

FRED HAMPTON
RM - BPP

One MIKE DREXLER of WCFL News, Chicago, was informed by FRED HAMPTON, Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP) that the march on that date at the Federal Building in Chicago was to show a continual relentlessness on the part of the BPP to bring attention to the public of the type of repressive forces who were attempting to handicap such individuals as Chairman BOBBY SEALE of the BPP currently on trial at the Federal Building in Chicago on Anti-riot Conspiracy charges. HAMPTON stated that what was wrong was that the people take individuals like SEALE, lock them up and charge them with a crime and that the real criminals are the people who put them in jail. He added that the reason the BPP was being attacked so much was not because they are armed but because the truthlessness were being heard but were not being attacked. HAMPTON stated that the BPP knows that the masses of people will join forces with them to denounce the Fascism that is taking place at the Federal Building. He added that BOBBY SEALE was on trial only because he was trying to help people and that the Fascists have shown that anyone trying to

CES:

FRED also stated that the BPP was going to the Federal Building that day to show the contradictions in the present system. He indicated also in that regard that BOBBY SEALE was clearly being denied his constitutional right of counsel of his own choice and the right to defend himself. He indicated that the whole thing was not even a trial. He then informed DREXLER that if DREXLER desired to contact ELDRIDGE CLEAVER at the Hotel Alleti in Algeria, he could obtain plenty of additional information regarding the above.

2

12/14/69

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR AND SACS, WASHINGTON FIELD AND SAN FRANCISCO

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

NEW NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE AGAINST THE WAR IN VIET NAM, DEMONSTRATIONS IN WASHINGTON, D. C., NOVEMBER THIRTEEN-FIFTEEN, NINETEEN SIXTY NINE,

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP). RM-BPP,

SOURCE, RELIABLE, ADVISED INSTANT, FRED HAMPTON, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS CHAPTER, BPP, INFORMED RICHARD LEVY, FROM WASHINGTON, D. C., NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED, THAT HE, HAMPTON, WOULD NOT BE IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ON NOVEMBER FIFTEEN NEXT.

HAMPTON ADVISED LEVY, BPP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, DID NOT APPROVE BPP PARTICIPATION IN ANY WASHINGTON, D. C. MORATORIUM ACTIVITIES NOVEMBER FIFTEEN NEXT. LEVY REPORTEDLY SURPRISED AT HAMPTON'S ATTITUDE AND WAS REFERRED BY HAMPTON TO DAVID HILLIARD,

RTP

NATIONAL CHIEF OF STAFF, BPP, IN CALIFORNIA, REGARDING ANY CHANGE IN BPP POLICY.

PERTINENT AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

3

4/24/69

AIRTEL

[redacted]

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: LOUIS RANDOLPH WILLIAMS, aka;
ET AL
ARL

[redacted]

One copy of this LHM to be furnished to United States Attorney, San Francisco.

[redacted]

[redacted]

HHS

[redacted]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

4

April 24, 1969

LOUIS RANDOLPH WILLIAMS;
ET AL
ANTI-RIOT LAWS

a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on November 22, 1968, that Randy Williams conducted a Black Panther Party (BPP) training session regarding firearms and explosives on November 18, 1968, at Berkeley, California: that among those attending was Bobby Lee Rush of the Chicago, Illinois, BPP. Attached hereto in the Appendix section is a characterization of the BPP.

On November 25, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information to the Chicago, Illinois, Office of the FBI in the past, made available the following BPP Destruction Kit instructions which he obtained from Bobby Lee Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Chicago Chapter, BPP.

On April 22, 1969, Chicago source advised the aforementioned instructions were received from Rush several days prior to making them available. Bobby Lee Rush made the instructions available at a meeting of the BPP, held at Jackie's Candy Store, 7155 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Rush advised he had returned from a meeting of National Headquarters BPP in Oakland, California, and had brought the instructions back for study by select members of BPP.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Rush furnished copies of instructions to Robert Alonzo Brown, Fred Hampton, Maurice Monley, Joseph L. Montgomery, and Clarence Price and each set of instructions was marked for accountability identification.

BLACK

PANTHER

PARTY

DESTRUCTION

KIT

Take an old sock (large). Soak in a mixture of 3 parts potassium chlorate to two parts sugar, moistened with water. Allow sock to be thoroughly soaked in mixture, then dry. Keep dry cosk away from heat. CUATION: POTASSIUM CHLORATE IS VERY VOLATILE. IT CAN IGNITE ALMOST SPONTANEOUSLU IN THIS MIXTURE. IT CAN BE IGNITED OR DETONATED BY A SINGLE SPARK, OR EXCESSIVE HEAT, OR MERELY BY THE FRICTION OF STIRRING THE INGREDIENTS TOGETHER. HANDLE WITH UTMOST CAUTION.

With a hydrometer, take acid from container and fill 1/5 to 1/4 of a quart bottle. (Coke bottles don't break easily. Test out the type of bottle you'll use by throwing it at things & see if it breaks). Pour gasoline carefully through funnel into bottle until full. Paur slowly because it could bubble and heat up.

Cap the bottle with a regular stopper preferably the kind with a rubber plunger cause acid eats away at plastic, metal. Hold bottle carefully upright, don't juggle it.

When ready to use, place bottle inside sock soaked in the potassium chlorate/sugar mix knotted at top. Throw. On impact, when glass is shattered, the bomb will explode as the sulfuric acid reacts with the mixture in the sock. The gasoline will spread the flame.

The simple firebomb is a bottle of gasoline with a rag stuffed into the top. When the rag is set on fire, the bottle is thrown. When the bottle breaks, the fumes are spread, and the fire from the burning rag ignites the fumes, causing a fireball.

To make a firebomb without having to throw it, a device must be attached to the bottle if gasoline which will explode the bottle at a given time, spreading the fumes and furnishing a spark with which to ignite these fumes.

In order to make such a "timed firebomb", the basic ingredients are: one half gallon or gallon jug or hi-grade gasoline, to which attach a piece tape:
One small time explosive which is made from these ingredients are 1 Jetex fuse, 1 CO2 cartridge. Any brand of black powder from any rifle pistol or shotgun shell) A long cigarette (like Tareyton 100's)

For purchasing these-- the jetex fuse is used for model racing cars and can be bought at any hobby shop. The black powder can be bought at any gun shop, and is used for old muskets and flintlock pistols. CO2 cartridge at gunshop.

Directions:
Step 1. Put gasoline in bottle and seal top with screw-on metal cap or tight cork. Set bottle aside.
Step 2. Take CO2 cartridge and puncture with nail.

CAUTION: Hold cartridge with pliers when puncturing or effect on fingers holding CO2 cartridge will be unpleasant. It is perfectly safe with pliers but hold pliers tightly on CO2 cartridge.

Step 3. Using tinfoil funnel, fill the cartridge with black powder - to the top.
Step 4. Insert the fuse - at least 11/4 in. inside the powder filled cartridge. To be sure that the device will go off, use two fuses with two cigarettes. That way you know it'll go.
Step 5. Time your cigarette. Know how many minutes it takes to burn down. (With the longs, 12-15 min.)
Step 6. Affix the cartridge to the bottle. Do not attach cigarette (at desired lenght) until ready to mix.
Step 7. Take your device to its destination. You are now ready to use it.
Step 8. Wrap fuse around lit cigarette at desired length. When placing device, be sure the cigarette is not touching anything between the fuse and the lit end, as that will put the cigarette out. To protect burning cigarette, use tape. (See diagram 4).

DIAGRAM:

Step 2



Step 3



Step 4



Steps 6 +



Step 9. Proceeding with all deliberate speed, leave the area at once.

GRENADES AND BOMBS, ANTI-PROPERTY AND ANTI-PERSONNEL

No. 1. The very small, home-made grenade is exactly the same a the small explosive device used to set off the firebomb.

It is the CO2 cartridge as described in the preceeding directions, only instead of using a cigarette to time the fuse, you can light the fuse and throw it. This little CO 2 cartridge just as it is doesn't do a lot of damage, but it can be dressed up to become a very lethal weapon. It can be made into a deadly anti-personnel weapon or a very dangerous bomb.

The small CO2 cartridge can be dressed up by filling with 3/4 black powder and 3/4 shot, or needles. This is obvioulsy anti-personnel and will penetrate when the CO2 explodes, but still is not big enough to kill. It has certain advantages, however. It can be taped to a window, even with your hands behind your back, and left burning with the trusty cigarette. Or it could be taped, with the cigarette to the fuel tank of a car. If thrown into a car, it is guaranteed to bruise the occupants and empty the car of all personnel in record time. Further, the CO2 is so small it can easily be concealed on pour person.

Now, to make an actual grenade, a weapon that kills, the following can be done:

Take a used, empty aerosol can, pull off the little plastic spray device, and with a hammer and nail pound the little plastic nipple down into the can. Use a punch or screwdriver with hammer to widen the hole and make it large enough so that large shot can be inserted through the hole. Then fill with 3/4 black powder and 1/4 bullets or small-headed nails. Insert fuse, and light when ready to throw. The fuse should be an inch and a half in length and should leave your hand when it has burned to an inch.

CAUTION: The explosive force of this weapon is great. It is even more dangerous than a standard army grenade. Needless to say, a too-short fuse will result in a scattered grenade-holder. A too-long fuse will result in the person or persons at whom you have thrown it to have a chance to throw it back and blow you to fragments. A guerilla with lousy aim in close quarters can kill His brothers. This thing is equivalent to about 12 shotgun blasts at once. If thrown into a car it will blow to bits the car and everything in it, human or otherwise. If thrown in the open, it will kill within a 25 ft. radius and mim within 100 ft. It is a good idea to familiarize yourself with this weapon by practicing with a sand-filled facsimile. Try this, and see how long the fuse takes. You cannot afford to misuse this in any way, as its a real motherfucker of a weapon.

To make a bomb use the same principle as for the grenade, only instead of lighting the fuse and throwing it, you use the cigarette and set the thing down. For a strictly anti-property bomb, you don't need the shot or nails. Just the black powder. A large amount of commercial dynamite is made with black powder and that's exactly the kind of bomb you're building here. With this thing, the sky's the limit. You can make it as big as you like, depending only on the size of the container, the can that you use. A large tar-bucket full, for instance, would demolish most any building. This is a versatile thing, can be scaled to the size you want. Used in conjunction with gasoline, or set near any fuel tank or explosive container, the blast would take an entire plant and lay it down. Perhaps the greatest advantage here is that all ingredients can be bough legally, at gun shops, hobby shops even five and tens.

A number of different formulas for a molotov cocktail:

1. one third motor oil, two thirds gasoline.

2. one third sugar, two thirds gasoline.

3. one third soap powder, two thirds gasoline with a dash of oil.

4. one third naptha (moth flakes), two thirds gasoline. (This will result in a primitive napalm.)

A tampax will also do satisfactorily as the wick. The wick should be soaked in gasoline prior to ignition. The bottle should be as thin as possible. (The guerrilla should experiment with different mistures.)


Dirt + small amount of soap powder
Gasoline (from pump)
Bottle 1 gal.
Gauze (Clothesline)
1/3
2/3

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

22

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
May 27, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

On May 23, 1969, the source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that a mock trial would be held in Maywood, Illinois, on May 24 and 25, 1969. According to source the purpose of this mock trial was to re-try Frederick Allen Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Central Committee, Black Panther Party (BPP) of Illinois, on a robbery charge for which Hampton was previously convicted and on which Hampton was scheduled to be sentenced on May 26, 1969, in Cook County Circuit Court. Source explained that at the mock trial Hampton would be tried before a jury of persons whom he considered to be his peers in accordance with the doctrine of the BPP. Source stated that members of not only the BPP but the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), The Young Lords, a local near north side gang of Chicago Puerto Rican youths, The Young Patriots, a near north side Chicago youth group, would participate in this mock trial.

Attached are characterizations of the BPP and the SDS.

On May 23, 1969, an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI apprised Captain Wilbert Samuels of the Maywood, Illinois, Police Department of the impending mock trial for Hampton.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

On May 26, 1969, Captain Samuels of the Maywood, Illinois, Police Department advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that Fred Hampton's mock trial took place on May 24 and 25, 1969, at the Maywood village hall with the permission of the newly elected Maywood Mayor Leonard A. Chabala. Captain Samuels further stated that during the mock trial, the Maywood Police Department was under instructions from Mayor Chabala to stayaway from that trial and not to be observed in the vicinity of the village hall. According to Captain Samuels, Mayor Chabala indicated that he believed that if the participants of the mock trial were left alone there would be no trouble and Mayor Chabala stated that he was so confident in Fred Hampton and the fact that Fred Hampton and his followers would be orderly, that he (Chabala) would resign if there was any trouble at the trial. Captain Samuels reported that approximately 140 individuals participated in the trial on both the evenings of May 24 and 25, 1969, and that of these groups approximately 70 were Negro, 55 Caucasians and 15 Mexicans. Captain Samuels related that Hampton appeared not only as defendant in the mock trial but acted as his own defense attorney. Captain Samuels further related that local Maywood restaurant operator "Tacos Charlie" Krop and newly elected Maywood village trustee, Reverend Thomas Streitor served on the jury. According to Captain Samuels, at the completion of the two evenings sessions, Fred Hampton was found innocent of the charge of robbery.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

In addition, Captain Samuels noted that Black Panther leaders Bobby Lee Rush, Yvonne King and Ann Campbell attended both sessions of the mock trial.

According to Captain Samuels, Reverend Streitor at the completion of the mock trial reportedly lauded the mock trial and Hampton's acquittal and indicated that the mock trial was a more fair presentation of American justice than the actual robbery trial in Cook County Court where Fred Hampton was previously convicted. Captain Samuels further related that while Maywood Police units were withheld from the mock trial site at the village hall, during the mock trial two unidentified BPP members mounted guard at the village hall entrance throughout the trial. Captain Samuels stated that no disturbances occurred during or immediately after the mock trial.

On May 26, 1969, Detective George Slinkman, Maywood Police Department, advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that while Maywood residents Mrs. Joan Elbert and Mrs. Thomas Streitor, wife of Reverend Streitor testified as character references for Fred Hampton at Hampton's robbery sentencing hearing before Judge Sidney A. Jones, Cook County Circuit Court, Chicago, Illinois, on that date, Judge Jones sentenced Hampton to two to five years in the State Penitentiary. Detective Slinkman further related that Judge Jones refused to grant a request that Hampton be released on appeal bond. According to Detective Slinkman, Hampton voluntarily took the stand during the proceedings and was questioned as follows by Judge Jones:

Question: Do you advocate armed violence?

Answer: Yes

Question: Do you advocate the violent overthrow of the United States Government?

Answer: Yes

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Detective Slinkman reported that upon hearing these replies from Hampton, Judge Jones stated that in view of these answers, he did not see how he could permit Hampton to remain on the street and any request for release on appeal bond was denied.

On May 27, 1969, Captain Samuels, Maywood Police Department advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that the previous night in Maywood had been quiet in spite of the news of Fred Hampton's sentencing; however, Captain Samuels indicated that on that morning four unidentified Black Panthers passed out the following pamphlets outside the Proviso East High School building located in Maywood:

Appeal To The People

On March 26, 1969 Fred Hampton was jailed on the alleged crime of robbery.

Fred Hampton has represented the people in various position from Pres. of the N.A.A.C.P. Youth Council current present positi of Chair of the Black Panther Party State of Ill.

This is an unjust and unfair trail. Since no U. S. court system has ever allowed any black person the right of trail by his peer group or people from his black community as defined by the constitution U.S. This constitution has never been beneficial to anyone except the ruling class.

In effect Chairman Fred is now a Political Prisoner was he jailed because he was a criminal, or menace to the community, No, Because he was a champion of the people.
Chairman Fred was about educating of the people to this capitalistic, racist, oppressive, dogmatic, pig power stucture. He was about putting power in the hands of the people where the powe belongs, He has proven that justice and freedom for a ll does not exist here in America. He has demonstrated the lies of the American democracy and its true nature.

Our experiences have shown us that American Democracy does not exist, and is a myth and a bunch of Bull------!!
We appeal to all people to become aware of the moyive injustice of the Pig Power-structure.

"The People, and the People alone are the motive force in the making of world history".

Mao Tse Tung

You can jailed a liberator but you cannot jail a liberatio
You can kill a revolutionary but youcannot kill a revolutionary".

Chair. Fred Hampton

And this is why we say
Black power to black people
White power to white people
Red power to red people
Purple power to purple people
Which is why we say ;
All
Power to
All People

From the desk of Infra.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Captain Samuels further advised that these Panthers then called on the high school principal and asked for permission to use the school-wide public address system to broadcast a plea to "cool it". Captain Samuels related that the principal denied this request and ordered the four from the high school premises and Captain Samuels noted that there was no further incident.

On May 27, 1969, Detective Sergeant Philip Hardiman, Cook County Sheriff's Police, Chicago, Illinois, advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that Fred Hampton was currently confined at the Cook County Jail pending transfer to a state penitentiary.

Copies of this letterhead memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. The SDS is an association of young people on the left and has a current program of protesting the draft, promoting a campaign for youth to develop a conscientious objector status, denouncing United States intervention in the war in Vietnam and to "radically transform" the university community, and provide for its complete control by students. GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, when interviewed by a representative of United Press International in San Francisco, California, on May 14, 1965, described the SDS as a part of the "responsible left" which the Party has "going for us." At the June, 1965, SDS National Convention, an anti-communist proviso was removed from the SDS constitution. In the October 7, 1966, issue of "New Left Notes," the official publication of SDS, an SDS spokesman stated that there are some communists in SDS and they are welcome. The national headquarters of this organization as of July 24, 1968, was located in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

__________ stated that the Illinois BPP was paid solely from the admissions charged and received a total of approximately $500.00.

Source stated that Cook was arrested for a traffic violation during the evening.

__________ advised that one Mark Clark, BPP leader Peoria, Illinois, made arrangements for this speech.

Source stated one Leon Harps, BPP leader Peoria, Illinois, is responsible for distributing the Black Panther Paper and one Edward McChriston, appears to be responsible for the Illinois BPP Branch in Peoria, Illinois.

Source stated that the Chicago group arrived back in Chicago about 6:00 a.m. on October 30, 1969.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois;

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois;

Office of Special Investigations, Chicago, Illinois;

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group,
Evanston, Illinois.

1 APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

5

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 4/30/69

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

Copies of this LHM are also being furnished the USA, U. S. Secret Service, OSI, NISO, all Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston.

It is noted that Chicago telephonically disseminated the information contained in this LHM to the appropriate local and Federal agencies upon receipt of same.

RMM,

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

IN VIEW OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS LHM, NATHANIEL JUNIOR, MERRILL DENNIS HARVEY, MICHAEL WHITE, BOBBY RUSH, WILLIAM M. O'NEAL, JR., WILMER LEE ANGRUM, DAVID A. VALENTINE, JAMES EDWARD WHITE, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

55

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
SEP 24 1969

KENNETH EARL BELL

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is contained in the Appendix Section of this communication.

I. BACKGROUND

Residence

On September 22, 1969, Captain Wilbert Samuels, Acting Chief of Police, Maywood Police Department, Maywood, Illinois, advised that Bell has just recently moved from 157 South 18th Avenue to 149 South 18th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois.

Employment

Chief Samuels advised on the above date that Bell continues to work odd jobs on a part-time basis and has just been re-admitted as a student at Proviso High School, Maywood, Illinois.

Criminal Record

Chief Samuels advised that subject has not been re-arrested by the Maywood Police Department since those arrests previously noted. No dispositions were listed on his records for those arrests previously reported

On the same criminal record, on September 10, 1969, the records of the Chicago Police Department, Bureau of Records and Communications, were checked concerning subject,

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your a

but they contained nothing identifiable with him.

Credit Record

On September 10, 1969, the files of the Chicago Credit Bureau, Incorporated were checked concerning subject, but their records contained nothing identifiable with him.

II. ACTIVITIES

On November 30, 1968, , reliable in the past, advised that Fred Hampton, the prime force behind recent racial disturbances in Maywood, Illinois is still making efforts to obtain firearms. According to source, Hampton, with associates Marvin Carter, Kenny Bell, "Bubble" Rice, Paul Wade, and others, drove into Chicago on November 27, 1968. Source stated the group attended a party in the basement of a residence somewhere in Chicago along with about 45 other young Negro men and women. Source stated that Hampton spoke to the group and that a Chicago Negro male, known only as Ralph, also spoke to the group According to source, Hampton and Ralph discussed the Black Panthers at length and it appeared that many at the party were in fact Black Panthers. Source reported that Hampton and Ralph suggested that groups be set up to commit various types of crimes such as robberies, burglaries, etc., and that these groups pay $10.00 per month fees from their criminal activity proceeds into the Black Panther treasury.

On December 26, 1968, Captain Wilbert Samuels, Maywood Police Department, advised that investigation by his Police Department indicates that Kenneth Earl Bell, then residing at 157 South 18th Avenue, and who then drove a maroon sports car, 1968 Illinois registration HJ 8646, was a member of the Chicago Chapter of the BPP. Samuels further stated that Bell is an associate of Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, and has been observed in Maywood, wearing the BPP uniform of a black beret and army fatigue jacket.

On February 20, 1969, advised Bell attended a meeting on February 18, 1969, at Robert Bruce's house, along with Bruce who is an officer in the West Suburban Branch, Illinois Chapter of the BPP, Fred Hampton and approximately 12 others. The main purpose of this meeting was to plan a "big push" against white people that summer to move them out of the black neighborhoods and business areas. Details were not discussed.

On April 29, 1969, Captain Samuels advised that investigation conducted by his Police Department has shown that Bell continues to be a member of the BPP in Maywood, continues to reside at that time at 157 South 18th Avenue, Maywood, and drives a maroon sports car with 1969 Illinois registration DT 3935.

During July, 1969, advised that Bell is a rank and file member of the West Suburban Branch of the Illinois BPP. They stated that this branch is responsible to the Chicago Chapter of the Illinois BPP, which is located at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. These sources stated that this branch has never established an office as such and, therefore, uses the Chicago Chapter Office. Sources stated that this branch, therefore, helps the Chicago Chapter in attempting to establish programs as required by the National Office of the BPP such as the Breakfast for Children, Community Controlled Police answerable to local citizen's committees, a Community Health Clinic,as well as attending the Chicago Chapter Political Organization classes which generally stress "Quotations From Chairman MAO Tse-tung."

Sources stated that it is not possible to estimate the number of members in the branch as the branch is almost inactive due to the numerous recent arrests and indictments of members.

Copies of the memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Secret Service, Chicago
Naval Investigative Service Office, Chicago
Office of Special Investigations, Chicago
Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group,
Evanston, Illinois

KENNETH EARL BELL

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

56

56

FBI

Date: 10/14/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: DEMTRI
IS - M

GGP:

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being furnished to the United States Attorney and U. S. Secret Service, Chicago, and to Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois, in view of those agencies' interests in this matter.

Interested agencies and individuals such as the United States Attorney, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Marshal, General Services Administration, Chief U.S. District Judge, all of Chicago and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois, were notified of the events and activities set forth in the enclosed LHM as they occurred.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Chicago, Illinois
October 7, 1969

57

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The BPP is described in the appendix page attached hereto. All sources utilized herein have furnished reliable information in the past.

advised on October 4, 1969, that Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP had reportedly remarked that date that in the early morning hours the BPP Office of the Illinois Chapter located at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, had been raided by what he termed some furious dwarf brained raving maniacs, for the purpose of attempting to destroy the BPP work such as its breakfast for children program and free medical help program. Hampton indicated that he hoped all of the American people would denounce the frantic American fascistsand show their support of the BPP by supporting a massive demonstration to be held at the Federal Building in Chicago at 12:00 noon on October 7, 1969.

further advised that according to information available to him the BPP Office had been attacked or raided by the Chicago Police Department (CPD) for the purpose of destroying it.

Declassified 4/4/75 per 6607

~~CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

and to cut off communications. It was the understanding of the source that a BPP Rally would be held at 201 South Ashland Avenue, the evening of October 4, 1969, for the purpose of calling on the people to support the BPP program by donating office equipment, money, health supplies and food in order that the Party program of feeding and helping the people could be continued.

added that Hampton had allegedly remarked that the police in their raid had acted like they were sloppy drunk when they came to attack the BPP Office. He stated that they reminded him of bald headed fascist idiots and that when the BPP brothers came out of their headquarters they were beaten and one brother Terry Watson had been beaten to the ground and was presently confined to the Cook County Illinois Hospital where he was chained hand and foot. further stated that he had been told that the CPD had entered the BPP Office, shot it up and then used medical supplies intended to be used to treat ailing persons, for the purpose of starting a fire.

also learned that Stephanie Fisher had remarked in connection with the CPD raid that those arrested and beaten up were Billy Brooks, Terry Watson, Brad Green, Wade (Last Name Unknown) and a couple of others.

further remarked that the police had taken a shotgun and a carbine from BPP Headquarters in connection with the raid. It was also stated that the CPD had blocked off the area in all directions, approximately 6 blocks. Hampton remarked, according to the source, following the raid that they would be turning; the phone off at headquarters and would be working elsewhere. The source was unable to confirm this fact, although it was indicated that BPP business could be handled through telephone numbers 288-0414 and 829-7365. mentioned in connection with the above incident that one Candy Furst from New York had requested information of Fred Hampton as to details of what happened during the raid. According to the source Fred informed Furst that 40 to 50 police had entered the BPP Office and that there were many outside who were drunk. Hampton allegedly remarked that one officer shot another officer in the face with a shotgun and also remarked that the National Guard (NG) was also involved. The source learned that when Furst inquired as to whether there would be any plans for more precautions following this raid Hampton reportedly replied that the next time they would have more ammunition.

further stated that Furst reportedly inquired of Hampton as to whether the Panthers would participate on October 11, 1969, concerning the Federal Anti-Riot Conspiracy Trial in Chicago whereupon Hampton replied in the negative.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

52

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
October 6, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is attached as an appendix hereto. Sources utilized in this characterization and the confidential source set forth in the memorandum have all furnished reliable information in the past.

Officer Funk, Chicago Police Department (PD), advised on October 3, 1969, that seven Negro males were arrested at BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, following a shooting incident during the early morning hours of that date.

The identities of those arrested along with their description and addresses were obtained from Officer Funk and . Those arrested are as follows:

Jerel Hawkins, Negro male, born 1949, residence 2547 West Warren Boulevard;

Bradley Green, Negro male, born 1946, residence 7600 South Stewart Street;

Wade Stedney, Negro male, born 1945, residence 6044 South Eberhart Avenue;

Billy Brooks, Negro male, born 1948, residence 1320 South Kedvale Street (Brooks, also known as "Che", is deputy minister of information, Chicago BPP);

Morris Brown, Negro male, born 1949, residence 1821 South Springfield Street;

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP):

Harry Moody, Negro male, age 23, residence 6715 South Oglesby;

Terrance Watson, Negro male, age 19, residence ~~2145 West Lake~~ Street.

The above individuals have been reported by as members of the Chicago Chapter BPP.

Officer Waner, Chicago PD, advised on October 4, 1969, that an Officer Shanley, Chicago PD, was injured in front of BPP Headquarters by a shotgun blast fired by an unknown individual. Officer Waner stated the shotgun blast was believed to have originated from Panther Headquarters. Officer Shanley was taken to Illinois Research Hospital.

Captain Joyce, 13th Police District, advised subsequently that additional police patrols had been sent into the vicinity of Panther Headquarters and additional reinforcements were to be maintained in the general area. Captain Joyce concluded saying the injury to Officer Shanley was possibly only superficial and could be a result of a ricochet from the shotgun blast.

Officer Lara, Chicago PD, subsequently advised on October 4, 1969, that further information developed by the PD regarding the shooting at Panther Headquarters reflects the police were responding to a telephone call alleging shots had been fired from Panther Headquarters. Officer Lara stated he and Officer Shanley, above, investigated the call when Officer Shanley was hit by concrete torn up as a result of a shotgun blast which originated from the roof of Panther Headquarters. This shot was in the rear of the headquarters and not directly on Madison Street which runs in front of the headquarters. Officer Lara concluded saying that he and other officers arrived after their first shot, entered Panther Headquarters and arrested seven male Negroes and confiscated a .30 caliber carbine and a shotgun.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

As of 5:45 am on October 4, 1969, the vicinity surrounding Panther Headquarters was calm.

On October 4, 1969, advised the shooting incident occurred at Panther Headquarters earlier as a result of trouble which recently has developed between the Vice Lords (VL), a Negro youth gang on Chicago's west side, and the BPP. Recently the VL had approached the BPP Chapter wanting to be "cut in" on the medical center which the Panthers are currently organizing. This medical center, according to the Panthers, will be for all needy individuals on Chicago's west side who need medical and dental care.

stated that a representative of the VL contacted Fred Hampton, deputy chairman, Illinois BPP, and instructed Hampton the Panthers were to do no further work on a medical center headquarters or continue with the Panther's plans to open the medical center. This VL representative stated if the Panthers did open the medical center on their own and not allow the VL to participate, then the VL would "burn it down". Hampton instructed this person of the VL that the medical center was for the people and the VL or anyone else was not going to prevent the people from having the benefit of this medical center.

stated during the early hours of October 4, 1969, two cars loaded with VL members drove by Panther Headquarters and fired into the front of the building. BPP members in Panther Headquarters at that time grabbed available weapons, according to the source, went to the roof and when VL vehicles again passed Panther Headquarters, they fired upon them. The source stated that as the BPP members fired, the police cars appeared in the area and some shots were fired at the police cars. Source concluded saying that when the police cars appeared, the VL vehicles left the area.

This memorandum is being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney and United States Secret Service, both Chicago, Illinois, and Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

6-22-84

53

FBI

Date: 10/13/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

copies are also being furnished to the USA, USSS, both Chicago, as well as Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

| /X/ \CEE

The Chicago Police Department, USM, GSA, Federal Building Guards, and the acting Chief Judge, NDI, have been orally advised of the information contained in the LHM.

FBI

Date 10/7/69

50

ansmit the following in (Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

1U \CES

It is noted, however, that information in the enclosed LHM has been furnished the United States Attorney and Secret Service Chicago, and Region I 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois, orally.

48

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
September 29, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

~~SECRET~~

The Black Panther Party (BPP) is described in the appendix page attached hereto.

All sources utilized herein have furnished reliable information in the past.

On September 26, 1969, advised that he had learned that one CYNTHIA KELLY, a Reporter for the Canadian Broadcasting Company, had requested and received an appointment to interview FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP at the Chicago Headquarters of that organization. It was the source's understanding that KELLY claimed that in attempts to obtain information regarding racial and other radical groups in Chicago to date, she had developed no information other then that of an irrational and explosive nature.

The source further indicated that the interview between KELLY and HAMPTON would be conducted on September 26, 1969.

The above information is being provided the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois;
United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois; and
Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group,
Evanston, Illinois.

Declassified per 4/4/75 6607.

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

SECRET

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is [illegible] 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. BPP branches have been [illegible] at various locations throughout the United [illegible]

SECRET

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

670 Part 14 8 14

120

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]CE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
April 21, 1970

BLAIR J. ANDERSON

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is attached as an appendix to this memorandum.

On April 4, 1970, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Blair Anderson was in jail after being arrested at 61st and Racine for selling BPP newspapers.

On April 10, 1970, a clerk of the court, 2600 South California, Chicago, advised that Blair Anderson had been arrested on April 4, 1970, at a Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) station at 61st and Racine for blocking the entrance. He stated that bond was originally set at $2,500 but on April 9, 1970, was reduced to $250, and that Anderson posted bond and was released.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney
Chicago, Illinois

U. S. Secret Service
Chicago, Illinois

Region I, 113th MI Group
Evanston, Illinois

Subject Should Be Considered Armed and Dangerous.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1. APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
May 26, 1970

/121

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

BLAIR J. ANDERSON

Reference is made to Chicago memorandum dated April 21, 1970, and captioned as above.

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is attached as an appendix hereto.

On April 14, 1970, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Blair Anderson, who was previously purged from the BPP, has now submitted his resignation.

On May 8, 1970, Edward V. Hanrahan, Cook County States Attorney, announced he is dropping all outstanding indictments against the survivors ofthe December 4, 1969, raid in which Fred Hampton, Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP, was killed. It is noted that Blair J. Anderson was a survivor of the above mentioned raid.

On May 11, 1970, a clerk of the Court, Jury Court, 2600 South California, Chicago, Illinois, advised that on May 1, 1970, Magistrate Lawrence Genesen dismissed a disorderly conduct charge against Blair Anderson which stemmed from an April 4, 1970, arrest for selling BPP newspapers on a Chicago Transit Authority elevated platform.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago;
U. S. Secret Service, Chicago;
Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

UNIT[illegible] STATES DEPARTMENT OF J[illegible]TICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
September 10, 1969

/122

HAROLD KEITH BELL

The Rockford, Illinois, Police Department records show Harold K. Bell, also known as "The Cat", 317 Howard Avenue, Rockford, Illinois, was arrested on April 25, 1969, on a disorderly conduct charge in that he was part of a demonstration within 150 feet of West High School while school was in session. As of September 3, 1969, this matter had not yet been adjudicated.

Bell is further described as being a male, Negro, born November 29, 1946, at Memphis, Tennessee, 6'2" tall, 195 pounds, brown eyes, black hair, dark complexion, and unemployed.

Captain Doug Hall advised that at the time of this arrest, Bell had in his possession a copy of "Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-Tung," published in Peking, China, 1966.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

The April 28, 1969, edition of the "Rockford Morning Star," a Rockford, Illinois, daily newspaper, contained an article by reporter Jerry Idaszak concerning the Black Panther Party (BPP) in Rockford, Illinois. In the article Charles Lincoln Powell, Minister of Information of the BPP identified Harold Bell as the Captain of Defense of the Rockford Branch of the BPP.

Characterization of BPP attached.

Bell was arrested on May 12, 1969, in a high speed chase with Rockford Police and charged with five traffic violations. Found in the vicinity of his car was a loaded .32 caliber revolver and an unloaded shotgun. He was not charged with unlawful use of weapons since the weapons were found outside the car and could not be identified with Bell.

On July 7, 1969, who had furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Harold Bell is the Captain of Defense of the Rockford Branch of the BPP.

On July 22, 1969, who also furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Harold Bell is the Captain of Defense of the Rockford Branch of the BPP. They advised further that the Rockford Branch follows the teachings of Mao Tse-Tung and the programs of the National Chapter of the BPP including the breakfast and health programs. This branch is responsible to the Chicago Chapter of the BPP.

who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on various dates that Harold Bell from the Rockford Branch had contacted the Chicago Headquarters on July 13, 18, 25, 27, 29; August 7 and 8, 1969. These contacts mainly concerned financial matters in connection with the BPP newspaper.

The records of Stern's Pawn Shop, 411 West State Street, Rockford, Illinois, were reviewed and reflect the following purchases made by Harold K. Bell:

July 18, 1969	.380 Eibar Pistol, Serial Number 64736 .38 EIG, RG Pistol, Serial Number 166447

	.12 gauge New Haven shotgun, no serial number 1 box .38 ammunition 1 box .12 gauge shells 1 box .22 LR shells
August 4, 1969	1 box .38 ammunition
September 5, 1969	returned .380 Eibar pistol and purchased .32 Beretta, Puma Model with 6" barrel, Serial Number L21594. 1 box .32 ammunition

The records of the Identification Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reflect Bell has FBI Number 886 387 G and as of July 14, 1969, has no other arrests than appearing above.

Copies furnished to:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group,
Evanston, Illinois.

SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

123

2/20/70

DIRECTOR, FBI

SAC, DETROIT

CHANGED
DONNETTE VERLINA BREWER, aka.,
Laverne Brewer
Cookie
RM - BPP

Two copies of the LHM are being furnished G-2 and Secret Service, and one copy of the LHM is being furnished USA, all Detroit, Michigan.

WJB

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

124

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Detroit, Michigan
February 20, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: Donnette Verlina Brewer

All sources utilized in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

The Chicago Police Department advised in December, 1969, that Verlina Brewer, Negro female, age 17, was wounded by a gun shot during a shoot-out on December 4, 1969, between the Cook County States Attorney's Police and occupants of the apartment of Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP). Hampton and another BPP official were killed in that shoot-out.

A characterization of the BPP is contained in the appendix attached hereto.

On December 11, 1969, confidential source number one advised that Donnette Verlina Brewer had returned to her home in Michigan and was living with her parents who were arranging to have a bullet removed from her leg. It was learned that Brewer resided at 2139 Yorktown, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

On December 22, 1969, Captain Walter Hawkins, Ann Arbor Police Department, advised his department's records indicate Donnette Verlina Brewer, who was born January 10, 1952, is the daughter of William Brewer, 2139 Yorktown, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Her name has been referred to the Ann Arbor Police Department on several occasions due to subject's continually running away from home.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded From Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

Re: Donnette Verlina Brewer

On December 22, 1970, a review of the records of the Ann Arbor Credit Bureau indicated that William Brewer, 2139 Yorktown, Ann Arbor, Michigan, is employed as a Social Worker at the Veteran's Administration Hospital, Ann Arbor, Michigan. William Brewer's wife, Verlina, is employed as a Staff Nurse at the Wayne County Children's Development Center in Northville, Michigan. William Brewer's Social Security Number is 430-16-1718.

On January 7, 1970, confidential source number two advised that Donnette Verlina "Laverne" Brewer is reputed to be the Lieutenant of Health of the Black Berets in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Confidential source number two advised the Black Berets are a group of 15 to 20 Negro males and females in the Ann Arbor, Michigan area who have formed an organization patterned after the Black Panther Party (BPP).

A characterization of the BPP is contained in the appendix attached hereto.

On January 29, 1970, an interview with Donnette Brewer regarding her presence in the apartment of Fred Hampton on December 4, 1969, when Fred Hampton was killed, by Alexa Canady, a reporter for the University of Michigan newspaper "The Michigan Daily", appeared in that day's edition of the paper on page four. The following is a Xerox copy of that article:

67

'They came in shooting and killed Mar

By ALEXA CANADY

DONNETTEA BREWER at 18 has lost a child and has had her husband killed in Vietnam. Now she walks with a limp from the submachine gun bullet that shattered her knee when the Illinois State's Attorney's men raided a Black Panther apartment in Chicago on Dec. 4.

The petite girl who limped up the stairs went unrecognized for a few moments because she did not fit the stereotype Black Panther image America has created and we have believed.

Donnettea is not allowing her impending trial on Feb. 27 to keep her from her many concerns.

She is trying to help set up a free health clinic in Detroit similar to clinics the Panthers have set up in other cities. She is also working with some Ann Arbor youths, trying to teach them the social practices and ideology of the Black Panther Party.

She plans to visit northern Michigan soon, in hopes of setting up a free breakfast program for the Indian children there, possibly also to bring some of the sick down to the free health clinic in Detroit.

ALL OF THE introductory information and discussion I had with Donnettea left me unprepared for the story that she had come to tell me. Ever since I first heard about the police raid on the Panthers in Chicago, I have had nagging doubts about what happened there.

But even this doubt left me unprepared for the horror of her account of what really happened.

Her account needs no editing, no explanation. It is related here as she told it to me:

"That night we had exposed an infiltrator in the party, so Fred Hampton, Deborah Johnson, Brenda Harris, Ron Satcheal, Blair Anderson, Mark Clark, Truelock, another brother and myself came home to Madison St.

"Fred was in a really depressed mood because we have a lot of internal problems in the party, and infiltrators, and people not doing their work. So Fred went to bed early.

"**ABOUT FOUR IN** the morning somebody came knocking at the door and security asked who it was. They said it was Tommy. We replied, 'We don't know no Tommy.' They said 'Black' motherfuckers, let us in!'

"They came in shooting and killed Mark and injured Brenda in the hand and in the leg. Brenda's hand is permanently deformed.

"Then they proceeded to Fred's room and killed him in his bed. They walked past the bedroom where Blair, Ron and I were, and some pig hollered out, 'Somebody's shooting out of this room' — which was a lie because there were no weapons in the room.

"With the door closed and the light off, they shot in the room for ten minutes straight with submachine guns.

"Blair was shot in the leg and four times in the groin. Ron was shot in the arm, leg and the kidney. I was shot twice in the butt and once in the knee.

"**WE FINALLY** surrendered because we were hurt so bad.

"The police must have used sleeping gas or had someone put some sleeping pills in our food because most of us didn't even hear the pigs come in. And when I was shot I didn't feel it, and I was shot with a submachine gun.

"When I started walking out -- not knowing that I was shot -- I fell to the floor and a black state attorney's policeman pointed a submachine gun at my head and said 'get up, motherfucker.'

"I asked one of the police could I stop some of the brothers from bleeding and see if I could save Fred by artificial respiration. He said, 'No, motherfucker. Get up against the wall.'

After the raid, when Donnettea was in the hospital, the police's attitude and the treatment given her remained poor.

She explained that she had two guards even though "I had a full-length cast on my left leg. My right leg was chained to the bed, and in the beginning both my hands were also chained to the bed.

"The police constantly tried to intimidate me so they could make me mad and have more charges against me," she claimed.

BESIDES INTIMIDATION, Donnettea also raises serious questions about the health care she received.

"When I got to the detention home, they took away all my pain medication, and my crutches and put me in isolation . . . and gave me no food or water for four days," she recalled.

When Donnattea returned to her parents' home in Ann Arbor, she had to go to St. Joseph's Hospital to have the bullet removed from her knee.

"The doctor told me if I wouldn't have gotten that bullet out o fmy leg in a couple of days, I would have lost my leg," she said.

Donnettea's version of the police raid has been corroborated by much of the physical evidence in the apartment — although the police claim that they entered the apartment only after they were fired on by the Panthers.

Slowly, more and more doubts began to grow in people's minds. These doubts were increased when police photographs of the apartment that purported to show bullet holes which indicated that the Panther's initiated the gunfire were shown to really be pictures of nail holes in the wall. The doubts were partially confirmed by the fake photographs and a furor began to grow over the slaying of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, and reached into unexpected quarters.

The funeral of Hampton saw such m crates as Dr. Ralph Abernathy dec that there is a systematic program genocide against the blacks. Roy Wil of the NAACP called for a special inve gation of the raid.

IT MATTERS LITTLE at this p what the grand juries decide, for no will believe them.

What does matter is the prevention further such raids, and th [illegible] trial of the seven people who n[illegible] to survive the raid.

The prevention of future raids was de a severe blow by the decision last w by a coroner's jury that the murder Fred Hampton and Mark Clark was ju ifiable homicide because the policem "believed that they might be harm themselves."

During the inquest, Sergeant Groth, t leader of the raid, was asked why t police didn't use tear gas. His answ was "there wasn't any available."

Donnattea says that earlier when t same question was asked he respond "because we didn't think of it."

THIS TYPE OF action by [illegible] polic and its absolution by the co [illegible]'s in bodes poorly for the future.

Donnattea has not seen the last Chicago.

On Feb. 27 she and the six other s vivors of the raid must appear before federal grand jury on the charges of a tempted murder and aggravated batter The future does not look too brig for Donnattea, but she still refuses be intimidated and urges others to "sta up for what you believe in."

And she continues working "because w should all realize that being blac people and poor people in general, w have been oppressed in this country fo hundreds of years."

• Alexa Canady

Re: Donnette Verlina Brewer

On February 13, 1970, confidential source number three advised that Donnette Brewer and three Negro males departed Detroit on that date en route to the Bronx, New York Chapter of the BPP. At the time of their departure Brewer commented that she is wanted in Chicago, Illinois in connection with the resistance offered the police officers on December 4, 1969 at the time Fred Hampton was killed and that she is going "underground" in New York City to avoid prosecution.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

APPENDIX

1

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland Police Officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther", which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service", states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "...we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-Tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

2

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

125

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
February 27, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is attached hereto.

On February 25, 1969, a source, who has provided reliable information in the past, furnished the following:

David Hilliard, member of the National Central Committee of the BPP, National Chairman of the BPP, and leader of the San Francisco, California, chapter of the BPP, was in contact with leaders of the Chicago BPP on February 25, 1969. Hilliard indicated to Chicago BPP leaders that the California BPP had a package which is to be hand-delivered to an unknown person or persons in West Berlin, Germany.

Source stated Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman of the Illinois BPP, Bobby Lee Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Illinois BPP, Nathaniel Junior, Field Secretary of the Chicago BPP Chapter, William O'Neal, Chief of Security, Chicago BPP chapter, Cassandra Bynum, Rush's Secretary, Chicago BPP Chapter, Ronald J. Satchell, Minister of Health, Chicago BPP, are being considered as the group from which two Chicago BPP members will be selected for a trip to Germany on February 25 or 26, 1969.

Source further advised that BPP leaders listed above who do not go to Germany supposedly will travel to California on February 25, 1969, or February 26, 1969.

Source stated he does not have any information which would indicate the contents of the package that Hilliard made reference to nor did he have any knowledge as to the purpose of the proposed trips to West Berlin or California.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
classification

Joseph Noonan, United States Secret Service, Chicago, advised on February 25, 1969, that he had received information on February 25, 1969, that reportedly Fred Hampton and Bobby Lee Rush, both leaders in the Chicago BPP Chapters are supposed to have air reservations on British European Airways (BEA), Flight 1624, departing Frankfurt, Germany, to West Berlin, Germany, on February 26, 1969.

Source advised on February 25, 1969, that none of the Chicago BPP leaders mentioned above are known to have an United States passport.

On February 25, 1969, Mrs. Gertrude Wild, Administrative Assistant, United States Passport Office, State Department, Chicago, Illinois, advised that records available to her failed to reflect any record of a passport or passport applications for any of the Chicago BPP members listed above.

Source further advised on February 25, 1969, that Bobby Rush, Fred Hampton, Nathaniel Junior, and William O'Neal, mentioned above, all have outstanding court cases against them in Chicago, Illinois. Source indicated that all have stated they fear that they may be arrested by Chicago police officers if they attempt to leave the Chicago court jurisdiction without permission of the court. Source advised that Fred Hampton indicated to his attorney that he will not be in Chicago court on February 26, 1969.

Bob Ders, Manager, Trans World Airlines (TWA), O'Hare Field, Chicago, Illinois, advised on February 25, 1969, that none of the Chicago BPP members, referred to above, have reservations on TWA or Pan American flights for February 25 or 26, 1969, or on any other date. Ders stated that TWA and Pan American are the only airlines serving Chicago, Illinois, that have non-stop flights from Chicago, Illinois, to Frankfurt, Germany.

Ders further advised on February 25, 1969, that it would be impossible for anyone to leave Chicago, Illinois, on any flight after 2:00 PM, February 25, 1969, that would connect with BEA Flight 1624 scheduled to depart Frankfurt, Germany, for West Berlin, Germany, at 7:30 AM (Frankfurt, Germany, time) and arriving in West Berlin 8:30 AM (West Berlin time), February 26, 1969.

Source advised at 2:00 PM, February 25, 1969, that all of the Chicago BPP members listed above were currently in Chicago, Illinois.

Source advised on February 25, 1969, that Chicago BPP individuals referred to above are described as follows:

Fred Hampton, male, Negro, born August 30, 1948, 6' tall, 200 pounds, black hair, brown eyes, resides at 804 South 17th Street, Maywood, Illinois.

Bobby Lee Rush, born November 23, 1946, male, Negro, black hair, brown eyes, 6'1" tall, 195 pounds, resides at 2030 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois.

Nathaniel Junior, male, Negro, born October 21, 1946, black hair, brown eyes, 6' tall, 145 pounds, resides at 7511 West 64th Street, Chicago, Illinois.

William O'Neal, male, Negro, born December 3, 1949, black hair, brown eyes, 5'10" tall, 150 pounds, resides at 3811 West End Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

Ronald Satchell, male, Negro, born June 22, 1950, black hair, brown eyes, 6'1" tall, 170 pounds, resides at 6846 South Clyde Street, Chicago, Illinois.

Cassandra Bynum, female, Negro, black hair, brown eyes, 5'4" tall, 130 pounds, resides at 7031 South Clyde Street, Chicago, Illinois.

Source advised in the late afternoon of February 25, 1969, that due to confusion among Chicago BPP leaders it appears that none of the Chicago BPP leaders or members of the Chicago BPP will travel to West Berlin, Germany.

Source further advised that June Hilliard, allegedly a brother of David Hilliard, Chief of Staff, National BPP, San Francisco, California, reportedly will travel to Berlin. Source advised that the time and mode of transportation of June Hilliard is unknown.

Source stated in the late afternoon of February 25, 1969, that Rush, Hampton, Junior, O'Neal, Stachell, and Bynum are currently in Chicago, Illinois, and there is no indication any of them contemplate any travel to either Germany or California or of any distance anywhere in the immediate future.

The second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in the late afternoon of February 25, 1969, that June Hilliard is probably identical to Roosevelt Hilliard who is often known as June, June Bug Teddy, who is a brother of David Hilliard, national chairman of the BPP.

The second source stated Roosevelt Hilliard works in the National BPP headquarters located in Berkeley, California, and is considered an assistant to the National BPP Chairman, Bobby Seale.

Roosevelt Hilliard resides at 1608 Chestnut Street, Oakland, California, and is described as follows:

Race	Negro
Sex	Male
Date of birth	January 16, 1937
Place of birth	Jackson, Alabama
Height	5'7" tall
Weight	145 pounds
Hair	Black, semi-natural hair which is receding at the forehead
Complexion	Dark
Characteristics	Frequently has a mustache

The second source advised on February 25, 1969, that Roosevelt Hilliard was to a BPP class in Berkeley, California, on the evening of February 24, 1969.

Records of the Passport Section, United States State Department, San Francisco, California, failed to reflect either a passport or a passport application for Roosevelt Hilliard as of February 25, 1969.

Bob Ders, Manager, TWA Airlines, O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, advised on February 25, 1969, that Pan American Airlines has daily flights from San Francisco, California, to Frankfurt, Germany, leaving San Francisco at 8:45 AM and 10:00 AM (San Francisco time). Ders advised that Pan American records failed to reflect any reservations for Roosevelt Hilliard for Frankfurt, Germany, on February 25 or 26, 1969, or for any other time under his name.

Information set forth above has been furnished to the United States Secret Service, United States Attorney, Naval Investigative Service Office, Office of Special Investigation, all of Chicago, Illinois; and Region I, Military Intelligence, Evanston, Illinois.

FRED HAMPTON, BOBBY RUSH, AND NATHANIEL JUNIOR, MENTIONED ABOVE, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED POSSIBLY ARMED AND DANGEROUS IN VIEW OF THEIR PAST ACTIVITIES WHICH INDICATED THEY REPORTEDLY HAVE ACCESS TO FIREARMS.

1 APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

126

3/20/69

[redacted]

TELETYPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] AND SAC, DETROIT

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), RM

SOURCE, RELIABLE, ADVISED INSTANT, FRED HAMPTON, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, CLEVE COOK, FIELD SECRETARY (MARSHAL) AND RONALD SATCHEL, MINISTER OF HEALTH, ALL CHICAGO BPP MEMBERS, DEPARTED CHICAGO, INSTANT, EN ROUTE DETROIT, MICHIGAN. MAY ATTEMPT CONTACK WITH ROBERT WHITE, FIELD SECRETARY (MARSHAL) AND DETROIT CHAPTER, BPP WHO IS IN PRISON. GROUP TRAVELLING IN COOK'S ONE NINE SIX FOUR MAROON PONTIAC, BEARING UNKNOWN SIXTY-NINE ILL. PLATES. ALLEGEDLY HAMPTON AND SATCHEL ARE ARMED.

YVONNE KING, ACTING MINISTER OF LABOR, CHICAGO BPP, AND SATCHEL ALLEGEDLY WERE IN DETROIT OVER WEEKEND THREE FIFTEEN TO SEVENTEEN LAST. STAYED WITH WHITE'S PARENTS. WHITE'S UNCLE IS ALLEGEDLY TED WILLIAMS, WEALTHY EX-HUSBAND OF ARETHA FRANKLIN-NATIONALLY KNOWN NEGRO VOCALIST. HE ALLEGEDLY PROVIDED MONEY FOR KING AND SATCHEL'S FLIGHT BACK TO CHICAGO.

[redacted]

CHICAGO POLICE COGNIZANT. USA, SECRET SERVICE, MILITARY ADVISED.

FBI

Date: 3/24/69

127

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

One copy of the LHM is also being furnished the following agencies:

RMM:

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

United States Secret Service, United States Attorney, NISO, OSI, all Chicago and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois. Chicago Police Department was advised of the contents of the LHM.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

128

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois
March 26, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

On March 20, 1969. a source. who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised Yvonne King, acting Minister of Labor and Ronald Satchel, Minister of Health, both of the Chicago Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP) allegedly were in Detroit, Michigan, over the weekend of March 15 - 17, 1968, where they allegedly stayed with Robert Stanley White's parents. White is a Field Secretary (Marshal) of the Chicago Chapter, originally from Detroit and currently incarcerated in Detroit on an armed robbery charge.

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

While in Detroit King and Satchel allegedly contacted White. White's uncle is allegedly Ted Williams, wealthy ex-husband of Aretha Franklin, nationally known Negro vocalist , and allegedly provided money for King's and Satchel's flight back to Chicago on March 17, 1969.

On March 21, 1969, this source advised that Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, allegedly armed, Jewell and Cleve Cook, brothers both Field Secretaries (Marshals) and Michael Harrison, all Chicago BPP Chapter members, departed Chicago about 7:00 a.m. on March 20, 1969 via Cleve Cook's 1964 Maroon Pontiac, bearing unknown 1969 Illinois plates, en-route Detroit, Michigan, where they were to contact Robert White as well as the Detroit, Michigan, BPP Chapter. This group is scheduled to return to Chicago on March 21, 1969.

Source continued that the following Chicago Chapter BPP members departed Chicago, via indicated vehicles, en-route to Champaign - Urbana, Illinois, where the indicated person was to appear in court regarding their arrest in that area during February 8 - 9, 1969:

Declassified 4-4-75 by 6607

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automati
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Billy Brooks, Minister of Education (possibly court)

William Dunn, Lieutenant Security Staff, drove his 1964 lavender GTO Pontiac, bearing unknown 1969 Illinois license (court)

Bob Lee, Section leader, drove his 1967 green Mustang, bearing unknown 1969 Illinois plates

Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense (court)

James Stewart, Lieutenant Security Staff

Nathaniel Junior, Field Secretary (Marshal) (court)

This group was accompanied by their white lawyer Dennie Cunningham and all are scheduled to return to Chicago March 21 or 22, 1969.

Copies of this memo are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney

U. S. Secret Service

Office of Special Investigations

Naval Investigation Service Office

113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

1 APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

129

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - U.S. Secret Service, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois (Via Courier)
1 - NISO, Chicago (RM)
1 - OSI, Chicago (Via Courier)

Report of: SA DONALD A. SCHLAEFER
Office: Chicago, Illinois
Date: March 31, 1969

Field Office File #:
Bureau File #:

Title: RONALD JEROME SATCHEL

Character: RACIAL MATTER - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Synopsis: RONALD JEROME SATCHEL, Negro male, born 6/22/50, resides at 6846 South Clyde Avenue, Chicago, and attends University of Illinois, Chicago. He has been identified as Minister of Health on the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party in Chicago. He is apparently a trusted associate of Black Panther Party leadership in Chicago and has been active in functions of the group. Description set forth.

- P -

Declassified
4-4-75 by 6607

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DETAILS:

This investigation is predicated upon information received that RONALD SATCHEL, 6846 South Clyde Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was a member of the Black Panther Party (BPP).

A characterization of the BPP is attached to this communication, as an appendix.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Name and Birth

On February 9, 1969, the records of the Champaign County, Illinois, Sheriff's Office, Urbana, Illinois, showed that RONALD JEROME SATCHEL was born on June 22, 1950, at Cleveland, Ohio.

B. Residence

On February 4, 1969, who has knowledge of the subject and BPP activities in the Chicago, Illinois, area, advised that RONALD SATCHEL resides at 6846 South Clyde Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

C. Occupation

The 1968-1969 Student Directory of the University of Illinois, Circle Campus, Chicago, Illinois, listed RONALD JEROME SATCHEL, 6846 South Clyde Avenue, Chicago, as a first year student at this school during this school year.

D. Credit Records

On February 11, 1969, the records of the Chicago Credit Bureau, Incorporated, were caused to be searched. No information identifiable with the subject was located.

E. Police Records

On February 14, 1969, the records of the Identification Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington, D.C., were searched. They showed, under FBI number 756 977 G, that the fingerprints of RONALD JEROME SATCHEL were submitted on January 30, 1969, by the Chicago Police Department for aggravated assault and resisting arrest.

SATCHEL's fingerprints were also submitted on February 9, 1969, by the Sheriff's Office, Urbana, Illinois, for conspiracy to commit theft of service. (Details of this arrest are set forth under the heading of Activities.)

On February 12, 1969, the records of the Chicago Police Department were searched, and they showed, under number IR 227462, that RONALD J. SATCHEL, Negro male, born June 22, 1950, was arrested on January 30, 1969, by the Chicago, Illinois, Transit Authority officers for aggravated assault, disorderly conduct and resisting arrest when he disregarded officer's warnings to stop bothering subway passengers.

II. MEMBERSHIP

On February 4, 1969, advised that RONALD SATCHEL, 6846 South Clyde Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was a member of the BPP in Chicago, Illinois. He reportedly held the position of Minister of Health on the Central Committee of the BPP in Chicago. This Central Committee consists of fourteen members.

III. ACTIVITIES

In February, 1969, advised that in the first week of February, 1969, members of the BPP in Chicago went to the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana Campus, for the purpose of establishing a BPP in that area.

On February 4 or 5, 1969, four other BPP members reportedly flew to the Urbana-Champaign area to deliver BPP posters to the four BPP members who had previously travelled from Chicago to that area.

On February 8, 1969, who has knowledge of BPP activities in the Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, area, advised that on the night of February 7, 1969, several members of the BPP were at the Illini Union on the campus of the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign. They met with representatives of the Black Student Association from that campus. During this evening, two of these BPP members were arrested by the University of Illinois Police Department for disorderly conduct.

On February 8, 1969, advised that on the night of February 7, 1969, word was reportedly received at the BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, that several of their members had been arrested in Urbana. It was requested that as many BPP members as possible proceed at once to Urbana.

Following this, approximately nine BPP members, including the subject, travelled from Chicago to Urbana. After arrival, most of them, including the subject, planned to remain in the area until after the court appearance of the BPP members arrested at the University of Illinois.

On February 9, 1969, FOREST CLARK, Trooper, Illinois State Police, Pesotum, Illinois, which is in the Urbana area, advised that he received a call at approximately noon on February 9, 1969, that individuals had "skipped" from the Holiday Inn motel at Rantoul, Champaign County, Illinois. He was furnished a description of the vehicles of the persons involved.

At about 12:11 p.m. on this date, he stopped these two cars, both operated by Negro youths from the Chicago area. The total number of occupants of the two cars was eleven.

LARRY JOHNSON, Champaign County, Illinois, States Attorney, Urbana, Illinois, authorized charging all eleven individuals with three charges: defrauding an innkeeper, theft and conspiracy to commit theft. One of those arrested was RONALD JEROME SATCHEL, Negro male, born June 22, 1950, in Cleveland, Ohio, residing at 6846 South Clyde Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

According to police investigation, four of these persons, claiming to be members of the BPP, checked into two rooms at the Holiday Inn at Rantoul, Illinois, on Saturday night, February 8, 1969. The motel manager observed 15 persons entering the two rooms on Saturday night, and 15 persons leaving the rooms on Sunday morning. The arrests were made thereafter.

On February 10, 1969, ROBERT CLARK, Chief Deputy, Champaign County, Illinois, Sheriff's Office, advised that RONALD SATCHEL and the others arrested as reported above appeared in Magistrate Court, Urbana, Illinois, on this date. They all pled guilty to defrauding an innkeeper. They were each fined $25.00 and $15.00 court cost and released. They were represented by DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, Attorney, 1841 North Dayton Street, Chicago.

On February 25, 1969, advised that the BPP headquarters in California had been in touch with the BPP headquarters in Chicago and had an undescribed package which needed to be delivered to unknown person or persons in West Berlin, Germany. Two members of the Chicago BPP were needed to deliver this package.

The leadership of the BPP in Chicago was considering SATCHEL, among others, to deliver this package. Reportedly, those being considered who did not deliver this package would travel to BPP headquarters in California.

This source subsequently advised that due to some confusion among Chicago BPP leaders, it appeared that no BPP members would travel to Germany, and also there appeared to be no contemplated travel to California by SATCHEL or other BPP members.

616

On the evening of February 25, 1969, about five BPP members, including SATCHEL, travelled to De Kalb, Illinois, the location of the University of Northern Illinois, for the alleged purpose of contacting someone referred to as "the Teacher."

On March 20, 1969, advised that RONALD SATCHEL, Minister of Health, and YVONNE KING, acting Minister of Labor of the BPP of Chicago, reportedly travelled to Detroit, Michigan, during the weekend of March 15 - 17, 1969. They stayed with the parents of ROBERT STANLEY WHITE in Detroit. WHITE is Field Secretary of the BPP in Chicago. He was originally from Detroit and is presently incarcerated in Detroit on charges of armed robbery.

While in Detroit, KING and SATCHEL allegedly contacted WHITE. WHITE's wealthy uncle reportedly furnished funds for KING and SATCHEL to fly back to Chicago on March 17, 1969.

The following description was obtained during the course of this investigation:

Name	RONALD JEROME SATCHEL
Alias	Ronald J. Satchel
Race	Negro
Sex	Male
Date of Birth	June 22, 1950
Place of Birth	Cleveland, Ohio
Height	5'6"
Weight	124 pounds
Build	Medium
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Dark brown
Scars and Marks	Pockmarked forehead
Marital Status	Single
Residence	6846 South Clyde Avenue Chicago, Illinois (third floor apartment)
Phone Number	643-1854

Occupation	First year student at University of Illinois, Circle Campus, Chicago, Illinois
Mother	CLARA BRIDGES 6846 South Clyde Avenue, wife of FLOYD BRIDGES, an employee of Republic Steel, Chicago
FBI Number	756 977 G
Chicago Police Department Number	IR 227462.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois
March 31, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title	RONALD JEROME SATCHEL
Character	RACIAL MATTER - BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Reference	Report of Special Agent Donald A. Schlaefer dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-376 (Rev. 11-12-65)

March 31, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.

2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.

3. ☒ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.

4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.

5. ☒ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:
   - (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
   - (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
   - (c) ☒ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.

6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☐ enclosed ☐ is not available
☒ may be available through ~~subsequent communication~~

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

DAS

(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)

130

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
April 4, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RACIAL TENSIONS,
HARVEY, ILLINOIS

On April 2, 1969, Chief Leroy Knapp, Harvey, Illinois Police Department (PD), advised that six young male Negroes were wounded (two considered seriously) by gunshots fired during an early morning confrontation in Robbins, Illinois, an all Negro community, between members of the Harvey, Illinois "P. Stone" Rangers, a local Negro youth gang, and local Negro youths from Robbins. Chief Knapp stated that it appears that the recruiting attempts by the "P. Stone" Rangers on April 1, 1969, in Robbins, had failed and they returned to Robbins about midnight.

On April 2, 1969, Chief Aaron Stout, Robbins, Illinois PD, advised that investigation indicates that during the last day or so, a group of Negro youths, possibly Blackstone Rangers, a south side Chicago Negro youth gang, came to Winston's Tavern and Skin's Tavern, attempting to recruit local Negro youths. He stated that it was reported that one of the owners of one of the above taverns or a member of the Black Panther Party (BPP) was present and "flattened" several of the recruits.

He stated that as a result of this incident, it is alleged that the Rangers returned to Robbins during the night of April 1, 1969, and entered a tavern owned by Merrial Chandler, male, Negro, age 50, 141st and Claire, Robbins, and shot Chandler, as well as Joseph Emery, male, Negro, age 17, 13010 Monticello, Robbins, and Willie Covington, male, Negro, age 17, 3141 West 139th Street, Robbins.

Declassifie
4-4-75 by 660

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RACIAL TENSIONS,
HARVEY, ILLINOIS

He stated that subsequently another group arrived in Robbins at another location where it was reported that Alvino Shinn from Chicago, shot Johnnie Brooks, male, Negro, and Turk Patterson, Negro, male, addresses unknown. Shinn was then shot by the Robbins PD.

Chief Stout stated that as a result of the above shootings, the following persons have thus far been arrested:

James Veal, Negro, male, age 29, born 1939, 3711 Maxey Court, Robbins.

Leonard Lucas, Negro, male, age 36, born 1933, 1320 South Throop, Chicago.

Ivory Lampkins, Negro, male, age 27, born 1943, 3721 West 137th Street, Robbins.

Albino Shinn, Negro, male, age 22, 3210 Fulton, Chicago.

Bobby Rush, Negro, male, age 22, 2030 South State.

Chief Stout stated that Rush was arrested when Rush came walking into the Robbins PD demanding to see one of those arrested. Chief Stout stated that he noticed Rush was wearing a shoulder holster and he therefore, asked him to come into his office at which time Rush gave him a .45 caliber automatic, nickel plated, serial number 281877.

On April 2, 1969, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised receipt of the information from a person known to be a member of high standing in the Chicago Chapter of the BPP:

See appendix for characterization of the BPP.

James Veal, Acting Captain of Defense, BPP, Harvey, Illinois, area, allegedly called the Chicago Chapter BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison, shortly after midnight of April 2, 1969, requesting help from the Chicago BPP Headquarters inasmuch as he was "pinned down" by "P. Stone" Rangers.

Source stated that approximately ten Chicago Panthers including Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Alvino Shinn, Minister of Finance, and Leonard Lucas, in two automobiles, proceeded to the vicinity of Veal's residence, Robbins, Illinois.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RACIAL TENSIONS,
HARVEY, ILLINOIS

Source stated that the group spotted Veal's vehicle before reaching his home and as they approached this vehicle walking, shouts of "shoot them down, kill them" were heard. One shot was fired in the direction of the shouts and, then, shooting started from every direction.

Source continued that allegedly the Panthers were caught in a cross fire between police officers and the group near Veal's vehicle, suspected of being "P. Stone" Rangers.

Source stated that during this shooting one of the Panther vehicles' tires were flattened and this vehicle was left at the scene. According to the source some of the Panthers fled in the second car and some fled through the swamp.

Later during April 2, 1969, the following law enforcement officials advised that the above area is calm:

Chief Stout.
Lieutenant Frank Hulac, Cook County Sheriff's Office, on standby alert.
Lieutenant George Wilson, District 4, Illinois State Police, on standby alert.
Lieutenant Harry Harczak, Blue Island, Illinois PD, neighboring community.
Chief Knapp, neighboring community.

On April 3, 1969, Chief Stout advised receipt of a report at 1:30 p.m., on this date from St. Francis Hospital, Blue Island, Illinois, that Robert Bynum, Negro, male, age 18, had been shot in the right thigh above the knee.

Chief Stout stated that investigation revealed Bynum was shot by unknown person or persons while walking on the street in the vicinity of 139th and Monticello, Robbins, Illinois, about 12:45 p.m., this date.

Chief Stout further advised that Bynum has been determined to be absent without leave from the Fifth Area of the United States Army. Bynum gave the address of 14025 Grace.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, RUSH, SHINN, LUCAS AND LAMPKINS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RACIAL TENSIONS,
HARVEY, ILLINOIS

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois
Office of Special Investigations, Chicago, Illinois.
United States Naval Investigative Service Office, Chicago, Illinois.
Region 1, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.
United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois.

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

(Rev. 5-22-64)

131

FBI

Date: 7/10/69

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RACIAL MATTERS

Copies of the LHM are being furnished the USA, Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois. The Chicago PD was also orally furnished information contained in this LHM.

RMM

Approved: ____________________ Sent __________ M Per __________
Special Agent in Charge

132

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
July 10, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is set forth in the appendix of this memorandum.

On July 8, 1969, the source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that a report on the progress of the Illinois BPP, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, dated March 1, 1969, was forwarded to David Hilliard, Chief of Staff, National Headquarters, BPP, 3106 Shattuck, Berkeley, California, on an unknown date and report was signed by Iris E. Shinn, Communications Secretary. Source stated this report in part reads as follows:

> "Dear David:
>
> "The following is a communications report on the progress of the party here in Illinois.
>
> "The Deputy Minister of Economic Development, Ron Patterson; and the Deputy Minister of Labor, Eric 'Bear' Scott, were voted off the central staff. Reasons for this are that since they recently opened an outside office they have been doing nothing but bullshit. They were both doing nothing to either better the lot of black people or heighten the contradictions of this racist (obscene.) They're staffs were doing nothing, because they were doing nothing. At this writing both these positions are open and also the position of Deputy Minister of Religion, who resigned.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

"We have gotten together a staff of lawyers who will be on call for party cases and who will try to put a stop to false arrests by being on the scene as soon as possible after the arrest.

"The telephones should be operating by the middle of next week. This was an extreme error on my part for not coming to you for monetary assistance soon as we knew we couldn't get money.

Ministry of Education

"Classes in Political Education are currently being taught by Deputy Minister Billy 'Che' Brooks until he gets another teacher. 'Che' and his staff are in the process of formulating a program to deal directly with the community. 'Che' was recently in Urbana at the University where he helped to set-up the educational part of the chapter there. He has also been instrumental in getting relavent courses taught in the schools here on college, high school and elementary levels. He is catching hell due to the nature of this racist (obscene) institution, but the Panthers will see him through.

Ministry of Health

"This ministry, headed by Deputy Minister Ronald 'Doc' Satchel is formulating programs dealing in three aspects; (1) first aid classes for members of the party and the community; (2) establishing community health centers throughout the black community; (3) dealing with the poor health conditions dominent in the communities.

"First aid classes are to be held on Wednesdays from 7-8 PM, and since Deputy Minister of

> Health has only recently been appointed there has been only one class. These classes are being taught by Bernadine Grayson, a student nurse. 'Doc' is in the process of getting a functional staff, and has also contact a Dr. Quentin Young who claims to have worked with members of the Party on the coast.

Ministry of Culture

> "The Ministry of Culture is now working on setting up a playground across the street from the Party's office here in Chicago. As of now, the Minister of Culture Christina "Chuckles" May has not heard from the wholesalers she has contacted.
>
> "She and her staff are now working on posters that will shake up this racist dog pig. She is also working to supply the Party with buttons with our slogans to distribute in the community.
>
> "She is instituting a revolutionary cultural program in the Black communities to orient Black people to some of their revolutionary leaders, ideals, etc."

Ministry of Information

On February 23, 1969, the Deputy Minister of Information, Rufus "Chaka" Walls, prepared handbills informing the people of the great multitude of racist police action in the black community, pointing out the inhumane equipment these "pigs" are using to supress black people. This handbill also noted the extreme exploitation of the black community and gave details and facts of the black people being victims of overt capitalism and racism.

On February 21, 1969, "Chaka" spoke at Crane College in commeration of the death of Malcolm X. He spoke on revolution and [illegible]. In addition to this speech he also spoke at Roosevelt University on this date in defence of the black student union at that university. This speech was directed at the radical whites to illicit backing of the black student demands.

Field Secretaries

Major Jewel Cook, Field Secretary of Chicago, and his staff have been making progress in obtaining coalitions with various other groups in the Chicago area. At this time his staff is focusing their major attention on the west side of Chicago inasmuch as the central staff feels that these people are together at the time and has a black populus of approximately 500,000 people. Therefore, it is up to the Panthers to do their job and we will be out and taking care of business.

Nathaniel Junior, also a Field Secretary, helped to organize a coalition with the Young Lords, a local Puerto Rican youth group operating on the north side of Chicago. They have agreed to structure their organization similar to the structure of the BPP. Junior, Robert Lee, and Hank Gaddis will be in direct contact with the Young Lords and some of their members have been attending our political education classes.

Deputy Chairman

The Deputy Chairman, Fred Hampton, within the last few weeks, has been the major spokesman for the party. He has actively attempted to bring the political ideology of the party to the people and has spoken at the University of Chicago, Illinois Circle Campus twice, Northwestern, Northern Illinois University, Hyde Park High School, Chicago Teacher's South, Wilson Junior College, Roosevelt University, George Williams College, Lake Forest, and to various other white and brown groups. Hampton tries to allow no onlookers to be members of our party (an active member or no member at all) "nothing comes to a sleeper but a dream."

RE: BPP

As you are aware the charges were dismissed against Brothers Raymond Hewitt and Dexter Woods. While here they showed us the need and importance of the political education classes as well as proper study of the various materials. Brother Hewitt taught a political education class and later at "Chaka's" crib we had a rap session and went a little deeper into the ideology.

Yours in revolution

Iris A. Shinn
Communication Secretary

This source noted that Iris Shinn and her husband Alvino Shinn became inactive members in April, 1969, appealed to the Illinois Central Committee to be reinstated as active members during this same month, and the appeal was denied.

This source stated that of the persons mentioned in the above report the following are no longer members of the Illinois BPP:

Chepus Childs, resigned from the Illinois Central Staff, formerly Deputy Minister of Religion
Ronald Patterson
Eric Scott, also known as "Bear"
Alvino Shinn
Iris Shinn

Copies of this Letterhead Memorandum are going to following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois
Region 1, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

Cover Sheet for Informant Report or Material
FD-306 (Rev. 3-13-68)

TO : SAC, CHICAGO
FROM : SA DAVID R. HILL
SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM

133

Date prepared 7/29/69		
Date received 7/16/69	Received from (name or symbol number)	Received by SA DAVID R. HILL

INFORMATION IN REPORT WAS FURNISHED TO CHICAGO PD IN SUCH A MANNER AS NOT TO COMPROMISE SOURCE

DRH

Chicago, Illinois
July 16, 1969

It was learned that on the night of July 10, 1969, GARY TYLER, RONALD SATCHELL and ROSE EDWARDS drove to the area of the 31st Street Beach, Chicago. There they found a white male parked in a car with a Negro female. SATCHELL and TYLER decided to kill the white boy and rob him, however, they were talked out of killing him by EDWARDS. TYLER and SATCHELL did, however, rob him and verbally abused the couple. It is not known how much money they got. All of above are BPP members.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

134

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: OCT 9 1969

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

and which where appropriate has been disseminated as well as orally furnished to the appropriate local or Federal agency, advised on the dates indicated:

RMM,

2010-108-02

ADRIAN KING (9/15/69)

This person is a panther of the Chicago Chapter, however, not well known.

RONNIE HOWARD

This name is not familiar as being a panther.

RUFUS PRUITT

This name is not familiar as being a panther.

ROBERT SMILEY, DONALD SMILEY,
JOHN BRAKES, RICHARD BLACK

ROBERT SMILEY is the older brother of DONALD SMILEY.

During 1969, the above BPP members drove to Kankakee, Illinois, and participated in a holdup of a filling station; however, ROBERT SMILEY was only one caught and is serving six months in Vandalia prison.

MARCELLUS GREEN

This name is not familiar.

PHILLIP BARRON SHUMAN

This person by name and description is unknown.

ILLINOIS BPP (9/15/69)

The BPP bought two vehicles on 8/26/69, at the Western Sales, located on Western and Adams. These vehicles are described as a 1960 dark green Rambler and a 1959 light green Chevy bearing 1969 Illinois license TA 1621.

MEDICAL CENTER, QUINTON YOUNG (Dr.),
Dr. EDSEL HUDSON, Dr. KAST, Dr. HERBERT ODUM,
Dr. CLYDE PHILLIPS

(9/16/69)

These doctors are involved in some manner with the BPP medical center; however, the extent of their involvement is unknown.

YOUNG lists the following data:

1512 East 55th Street, office HY 3-8313, home MU 4-3951; 1418 East 55th, Union Health Center TA 9-4224.

HUDSON lists 663-7000.

KAST lists (LASH) office FR 2-4400 or NE 8-7715, home MI 3-8916, 3306 West Roosevelt Road.

ODUM lists 651-8000 and is a dentist.

PHILLIPS lists 663-6000.

WEST TOWN CURRENCY EXCHANGE, (9/18/69)
2410 West Madison

The Panthers generally cash all donations they receive at this location. Further, most money orders are purchased by the Chicago area Panthers at this address.

SEARS BANK AND TRUST,
925 Homan

This is the bank that the BPP uses.

RUFUS WALLS, WANDA ROSS

These two Panthers were married on 8/23/69, at a BPP wedding. It is not known if this is a legally performed wedding.

DENNIS CUNNINGHAM

This BPP lawyer drives a red and white Volkswagen, bearing 1969 Illinois license DR 4708.

DON STANG

This BPP lawyer's vehicle bears 1969 Illinois tag FN 2891.

(9/18/69) LYNN FRENCH, GEORGIA WASHINGTON, CHERYL PETERSON

These persons all reside at 6106 South Ellis, telephone number 955-6658.

(9/20/69) ACE COLLINS, RON SATCHEL, MEDICAL CENTER

This Panther who was serving on the Health Staff resigned her position because she felt that she was doing all the work and SATCHEL was just loafing. She was subsequently purged from the BPP sometime during the middle of 9/69.

HANK GADDIS (9/23/69)

This person is no longer a BPP member.

JULIAN ROBERTS (9/24/69)

This person is a former member.

BRUCE DIXON, ROCKFORD BRANCH (9/24/69)

DIXON has been in Rockford, Illinois, allegedly helping the BPP Branch in that area. He returned to Chicago on 9/23/69.

ROBERT BOSTICK, aka (9/24/69)
Ralph Bostick

This Panther resides at 4348 West Monroe, has telephone number 626-5776 and has something to do with Austin High School.

RICARDO JAMES

Inquiry among Chicago Panthers has determined that this person is a Panther, about 19 years old, 5'9", 160 pounds, brown skinned, always wears fatigues, natural hair style and does serve or did serve on the Information Staff. His current whereabouts are unknown.

BOBBY RUSH (9/28/69)

RUSH's wife is suing him for divorce.

TRULOCK, FRED HAMPTON (9/30/69)

This person appeared at BPP Headquarters, several times during the past few weeks and today HAMPTON gave him the title of Legal Counselor. This means that he will keep track of the various court dates, notifying the Panther as well as the lawyer. This person is allegedly a former cellmate of HAMPTON and allegedly wrote several legal papers for various prisoners while in jail. He is attempting to encourage HAMPTON to use more terrorist tactics and inhumane treatment in BPP activities.

(9/30/69) RON SATCHEL, RUFUS WALLS, MEDICAL CENTER

SATCHEL is generally staying at WALLS' residence on North Orleans. SATCHEL is being given alot of pressure because the Medical Center is not yet opened for business.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

135

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:
1 - Secret Service, Chicago (Via Courier)
1 - Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois (Via Courier)
1 - NISO, Chicago (RM)
1 - OSI, Chicago (Via Courier)

Report of: SA DANIEL F. BODINE
Office: CHICAGO
Date: 8/21/69

Field Office File #:
Bureau File #:

Title:

RONALD JEROME SATCHEL

Character:

RACIAL MATTERS - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Synopsis:

SATCHEL, utilizing alias DOC, continues active within the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois. Birth date verified and SATCHEL continues as Minister of Health on the Central Committee of the Illinois Black Panther Party. ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

- P -

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from
Automatic downgrading
and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI.

DETAILS:

A characterization of the Black Panther Party (BPP) is attached as an appendix to this report.

I. Current Background

A. Date and Place of Birth

A review of the records of the State of Ohio, Department of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics, Cleveland, Ohio, reflect that RONALD JEROME SATCHEL, Certificate of Birth Number 11505, discloses that he was born June 22, 1950, as the illegitimate child of CLARA SATCHEL, Cleveland, Ohio.

B. Residence

During July, 1969, confidential source verified that SATCHEL continues to reside at 6846 South Clyde, Chicago, Illinois.

C. Occupation

During July, 1969, confidential source advised that SATCHEL has no gainful employment but devotes full-time to his position as Minister of Health for the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois.

D. Arrests

On July 29, 1969, a review of the Chicago Police Department files in the name RONALD J. SATCHEL disclose no arrests since March 25, 1969, but the record disclosed that the following dispositions took place on April 3, 1969:

The January 30, 1969, arrests were aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct, which resulted in one year's probation and a $90 fine on the aggravated assault and disorderly conduct charges but the charge of resisting arrest was dismissed.

The March 25, 1969, arrest for unlawful use of a weapon and possession of an unregistered gun which were also dismissed.

The Chicago Police Department file discloses that SATCHEL had been assigned Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Number 756 977 G.

II. Current Activities

On March 26, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was one of several Black Panther Party members arrested by the Chicago Police Department in possession of unregistered weapons.

On April 1, 1969, advised SATCHEL continues to carry a pistol described as a .32 automatic.

On April 2, 1969, advised that SATCHEL is one of the Black Panther Party members who is always armed and is always looking to assist fellow members with any trouble that they may encounter.

On April 2, 1969, advised that RONALD SATCHEL is utilizing the alias, "DOC", inasmuch as his current Black Panther Party title is Minister of Health.

On April 15, 1969, advised that as of April 14, 1969, SATCHEL was designated permanent Minister of Health for the Black Panther Party.

On April 19, 1969, advised that SATCHEL continues to attend all Black Panther Party functions and is one of the most active members of the party.

On April 22, 1969, advised that records furnished to Black Panther Party Headquarters designated SATCHEL as the official Minister of Health.

On May 22, 1969, advised that RONALD SATCHEL was one of thirty Black Panthor Party members attending a party for the Black Panther Party on May 18, 1969.

On June 3, 1969, advised that RONALD SATCHEL regularly appears at Black Panther Party Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, prior to 6:00 a.m., each day.

On June 4, 1969, during a raid on Black Panther Party Headquarters, Chicago, Illinois, by federal agents in an effort to apprehend a federal fugitive believed to be on the premises, an Application for a State of Illinois Firearm Owner's Identification Application was located on the premises and it contains the following information:

Name	RONALD JEROME SATCHEL
Residence	6846 South Clyde
Social Security Number	354-42-2605

On July 3, 1969, advised that a couple members of the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois, headed by SATCHEL, are attempting to obtain space to operate a medical clinic for underprivileged Negroes.

On July 7, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was one of the Black Panther Party speakers to address a group assembled at Garfield Park, Chicago, Illinois, on July 4, 1969, and he spoke of police (pig) harassment of the Black Panther Party, Chicago.

On July 8, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was attempting to obtain the premises, 3852 West Madison, to set up space for a medical clinic.

On July 8, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was attempting to formulate a medical program to handle the following three categories:

1) First aid classes.

2) Establishment of community health centers in the black community.

3) Dealing with poor health which continues to be predominant in black communities.

On July 8, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was on the duty roster for the Black Panther Party for the week beginning July 6, 1969.

On July 15, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was attempting to establish a medical program entitled, "People's Medical Care Center, Inc.", with the ultimate goal of incorporating it as a non-profit corporation.

On July 29, 1969, advised that SATCHEL and several other members of the Black Panther Party, Chicago, observed a white male parked with a Negro female on Chicago's west side and it was not until a fellow member of the Black Panther Party talked SATCHEL out of doing physical harm to the white male that SATCHEL released the individual.

On July 29, 1969, advised that SATCHEL was one of several Black Panther Party members that traveled on July 26, 1969, to East Moline, Illinois, on official Black Panther Party business.

On August 4, 1969, advised that SATCHEL is working full-time at his position as Minister of Health in an effort to establish the Black Panther Party health clinic in Chicago.

On August 7, 1969, advised that SATCHEL is making personal contact with various Negro doctors in the Chicago area in an effort to obtain professional support for the Black Panther Party health center.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
August 21, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Title RONALD JEROME SATCHEL

Character RACIAL MATTERS - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Reference is made to the report of Special Agent Daniel F. Bodine dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

4/8/70 136

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: FBI LABORATORY,
SA ROBERT ZIMMERS

FROM: SAC CHICAGO

SUBJECT: SGT. DANIEL R. GROTH,
ET AL,
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS;
FRED A. HAMPTON (DECEASED),
ET AL - VICTIMS
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT - CR

AAG JERRIS LEONARD, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, at Chicago, advised SAC MARLIN W. JOHNSON in strictest confidence that no indictments of police officers are planned in captioned matter. AAG LEONARD has a firm commitment to meet with EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, States Attorney, Cook County, Illinois, within one week, whereupon on basis of Federal District Court order, HANRAHAN will receive testimony of States Attorney's Police before FGJ.

The above is based upon an agreement whereby HANRAHAN will dismiss the local indictment against Black Panther Party (BPP) members. HANRAHAN is to be given 30 days to dismiss this local indictment which will be based upon the change in testimony of JOHN SIDUNAS of the Chicago Police Department Crime Lab.

Subsequent to this dismissal, BPP victims will then be subpoenaed before the FGJ for their testimony in this case.

Several days later Harvey Johnson, operating director of the Chicago Crime Commission was reported as having accompanied police on a second search of the apartment on December 17 and 18. The story quotes ~~Johnson~~ as saying that new evidence had been discovered supporting the police version in the form of bird shot pellets fired from within the apartment in the direction of the raiding officers. Johnson attributed the pellets to non-police weapons "because any policeman who used birdshot would be laughed out of the station." The pellets were reportedly found in the north wall of the front bedroom. A search failed to turn up the deer slug allegedly fired through the door. This story also reflected that Coroner Toman had sealed the premises on December 17, some two weeks after the incident. (Chicago Tribune 12/19)

On December 19, the Daily Defender again ran the Rush charges. In this story Rush not only claimed that Hampton and Clark had been murdered but that it was the product of a conspiracy "in retaliation for the killing of two white policemen by Panthers in a recent shootout on the Southside." The story said Rush claimed that "officer John Cizewski, a member of Hanrahan's raiding squad is brother of policeman Charles Gilhouly, who was killed in the Southside gun battle with Panthers."

(to be continued)

I. Introduction

II. The Grand Jury's Investigation and Findings

  A. Background

  B. Events Preceding Grand Jury Investigation

  C. Modus Operandi of Grand Jury Investigation

  D. Planning the Raid

  E. Preservation of Crime Scene

  F. The Chicago PD Crime Scene Investigation

  G. The Panther Investigation

  H. The Cause of Death

  I. The IID Investigation

  K. The Inquest

  L. Cook County Grand Jury

  M. Other Investigations

  N. FBI Report on Ballistics and other Evidence

  O. Testimony of Officers

III. Analysis of Applicable Criminal Statutes

IV. Discussion and Recommendations

  A. Potential Law Violations

  B. Law Enforcement Problems

    1. Concept of SAO Police

    2. Pre-Trial Publicity

    3. Coroner's Office

    4. Chicago PD Crime Lab

    5. Internal Inspections Division

  C. Other Problems

    1. Defense Counsel

    2. News Media

Report of the January 1970 Grand Jury

~~I.~~ INTRODUCTION

At 4:45 a.m., December 4, 1969, fourteen Chicago police officers assigned to the Cook County States Attorneys Office, executed a search warrant for illegal weapons at 2337 West Monroe, in a flat ~~known to be~~ rented by members of the Black Panther Party. Nine people were in the apartment. Two were killed instantly in the gunfire which broke out: Fred Hampton, the militant and controversial Chairman of the Black Panther Party of Illinois, and Mark Clark, a Panther member from Peoria. Four other occupants were wounded, but survived. Two police officers sustained minor injuries.

Public reaction was prompt and polarized. The States Attorneys Office accounts, at first sketchy and then more detailed, related that the officers were fired upon as they sought entry, that they returned the fire and secured the premises after an intense gun battle with the occupants. The officers recovered 19 weapons, including a stolen police shotgun, a sawed off shotgun, and various handguns. A large quantity of ammunition was seized. According to their account ~~they~~ The officers had no knowledge that Fred Hampton was in the apartment, but did report that Hampton was found lying on a bed with an automatic pistol and a shotgun next to his body.

Black Panther spokesmen immediately claimed that Hampton and Clark were victims of a Chicago-style political assassination pursuant to an official national policy of genocide. Newsmen, students, public officials, and neighborhood residents were given guided tours of the apartment. Panther guides claimed the physical evidence proved that the police did all the shooting.

The competing accounts were given equal and extensive coverage in all media. Responsible leaders, black and white, demanded impartial investigations; Negro congressmen announced their own investigation; a special "Blue Ribbon" coroner's inquest was scheduled; a citizens group headed by former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg was formed to investigate; the Chicago Black Patrolmen's League determined that the police account was untrue and promised to find and expose the facts; the Illinois Attorney General agreed to look into the matter; the Internal Investigations Division of the Chicago Police Department initiated an investigation. Letters, telegrams, delegations and editorials all called on the U. S. Department of Justice to initiate an investigation to determine if there had been a violation of the civil rights of the apartment occupants.

On December 19, 1969, United States Attorney General John Mitchell appointed Assistant Attorney General Jerris Leonard and a special bi-racial team of experienced federal prosecutors to collect all of the facts with respect to the incident and present them to a federal grand jury.

This report contains the findings of the grand jury after hearing nearly 100 witnesses and considering over 120 exhibits containing police records, photographs, moving pictures, transcripts of testimony before other bodies, voluminous investigative and scientific reports and reports of investigative interviews with over 100 potential witnesses who were not called.

The first part of this report consists of the detailed statement of the investigative approach used, the various factual disputes, the results of the FBI's ballistics examination, and the results of other investigations. The second portion of the report contains a discussion of federal law as it applies to the facts as found by the grand jury. The final portion contains a discussion of the very serious law enforcement problems disclosed by the facts together with the Grand Jury's recommendations on possible solutions.

During the course of the factual presentation frequent reference will be made to the publicity given some of the events. While not normally a subject of grand jury consideration, the unique circumstances of this case indicate that the media was used by various persons involved ~~as a way to convince~~

a publica

a.cicise

Arc

B

accou.nt

facts; t

into the

of the c

question.

all call

an inves

lation a

II - Investigation + Finding

A.) The Police and the Panthers

(background of relations between the two)

B. Events preceding federal grand jury investigation

Between the time of this incident on December 4, 1969, and the impaneling of this grand jury on January 5, 1970, the air was full of charges and counter-charges concerning what happened. A description of the spiraling escalation of public explanations, disputes, versions and commentary is instructive in understanding the way the grand jury investigation proceeded and serves to give useful background for some of the factual problems it found.

The first public reports of what happened came from the States Attorney Police (through Assistant State's Attorney Jalovec,) Acting on information supplied by an informant, the officers obtained a search warrant for the premises to look for a cache of Black Panther weapons. After announcing their office and seeking entry, the officers were fired upon. They returned the fire, several times pausing to call for surrender. The occupants shouted "shoot it out," continued to fire and an intensive shoot-out ensued. Fred Hampton was found dead in a back bedroom from which gunfire had been seen, and Mark Clark was found in the living room. Nineteen weapons and large stores of ammunition were seized and the survivors were charged with attempted murder. Officers Ciszewski and Carmody were wounded in the gun fight. (Chicago Today 12/4)

This account was immediately challenged by Bobby Rush, described as the number 2 Panther in Illinois in a story datelined December 4. Under the

[illegible]

[illegible]

headline "Pal Claims Panther Chief Murdered in Bed," a reporter described a tour given newsmen by Rush showing the only bullet holes "in the spread and mattress of Hampton's blood splattered bed room." Rush was quoted as charging "Hampton was murdered in bed while he slept, since he was a light sleeper, some pig [policeman] must have come in the back door and murdered him with a silencer"(Chicago Today, Dec. 4, 1969).

The basic controversy continued to receive extensive coverage in every media. On December 7, defense attorney Frances Andrew was quoted as saying a private autopsy showed that Hampton was "murdered while he was asleep and Renault Robinson, head of the Afro-American Patrolmen's League reportedly said after touring the site that it appeared the men were killed "for no reason in a police set-up." (Chicago Sun Times 12/7). By December 8, Mayor Chalila of suburban Maywood, where Hampton had grown up, announced that three of the Villages Trustees and seven of the nine man Human Relations Commission issued a statement demanding that State Attorr [illegible] al [illegible] seek murder indictments against the officers for a "blatant act of legitimatized murder." The charges were based on evidence indicating police [illegible] all the shooting. (Sun-Times 12/8)

On December [illegible], States Attorney Hanrahan, at a news conference, restated the basic police version.

saying that a more detailed statement would be improper in view of criminal charges pending against survivors. "We were then [after the raid] and still are convinced that our officers used good judgment, considerable restraint, and professional discipline." (Chicago Tribune 12/9)

Mr. Hanrahan's statement had little effect on the burgeoning controversy. On the same day the above article appeared, another paper was reporting that nine Democratic Congressmen had requested the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence to investigate the matter. They asked the President to extend the Commission for this purpose and in a letter to the Commission reportedly set out the basis for their concern: "There were indications that Hampton was killed while still in bed, and that a private autopsy on his body indicates he was in a reclining position when the bullets entered and left the body." This article also quoted Assistant State's Attorney Jalovec as rejecting any possibility of using lie detector tests to resolve the disputes: "We don't put either suspects or policemen on the polygraph. It is not done." (Chicago Today, 12/9)

On December 10, it was reported that the police Internal Inspections Division, charged with looking into allegations of police misconduct, would not investigate because, according to Director Harry Ervanian, "the IID has no jurisdiction in a case handled by the States Attorney's Office. States Attorney Hanrahan was quoted as expressing surprise over the exemption of his men. (Chicago Sun Times 12/10)

The following day, however, Police Superintendent Conlisk announced that the Internal Investigations Division had begun an investigation. Director Ervanian explained that all background information would be reviewed including "arrest records from the raid, physical evidence, statements from witnesses, and photographs of the apartment." He reportedly said it was too early to tell whether it would be necessary to require the officers to take lie detector tests. (Chicago Today 12/11)

On December 10, a major escalation of the intensive news coverage began when the Chicago Daily News published an account provided by Black Panther defense attorneys headlined "Panther Story of Killings." In pertinent part the story set forth the following:

> "There was a knock on the front door of the apartment at 4:40 a.m. Thursday. The occupants asked, 'Who is it?' They received a brief reply. The occupants again asked, 'Who?'
>
> After a short delay, Mark Clark, 22, of Peoria, a Downstate Panther leader, went to the door just as the plainclothes policemen forced their way in.

to refut

(Chicago

---

incensiv

This account was matched in The following day's issue of the Chicago Tribune in ~~published~~ an exclusive detailed account given by the officers. "State's Attorney Edward V. Hanrahan made the policemen available for interviews [to] refute what he termed ~~as~~ an orgy of sensationalism in the press and on television." The exclusive Tribune story also contained photographs supplied by Hanrahan and his top assistants Jalovec and Boyle, "which they said conclusively proved the Panthers opened the battle by firing a shotgun blast thru the apartment door."

In this story, the leader of the raid, Sgt. Daniel Groth, said that he and Assistant States Attorney Jalovec had both received confidential information on December 2, that a cache of weapons was in the apartment. "According to the informants, at least three shotguns had been observed in the flat. Neither, however, made any mention of Hampton's or Clark's frequenting the apartment, Sgt. Groth said."

At 4:45 p.m., on December 3, according to the story, "Jalovec obtained a search warrant from Judge Robert Collins of Criminal Court, citing the facts obtained from the informants."

—In the story, Sgt. Groth told of planning the raid and selecting the early morning hours to avoid an incident and to provide safety for his men and neighbors. Groth's account of the way the shooting started was the most detailed one to date:

pg missing 2

Then police spotted a third Panther member in the room, Ronald Satchel, 19, of 2337 Monroe st., who also surrendered. He also had been wounded.

In both bedrooms, police found large stores of arms and ammunition. In Hampton's back bedroom, four boxes of ammunition. In Hampton's back bedroom, four boxes of shotgun shells were found as well as shotguns, a rifle, and hand guns. Similar caches were in the front bedroom, some of it in a flight bag.

On the evening of December 11, the exposure of detailed accounts again increased. Using a mock-up of the apartment built in the States Attorney's office, a 28 minute televised reenactment was presented on WBBM-TV. In the reenactment each officer acted out and described his part in the raid. The essentials were the same as had been presented in the Tribune exclusive, except that in the reenactment officer Gorman described how he and officer Davis, blocked from proceeding down the hallway by Panther gunfire, fired their weapons (45 caliber sub-machine gun and a 30 caliber carbine respectively) through the living room wall and into the bedroom area. According to a Daily News television columnist the following day, the reenactment was given to WBBM with the provision that "nearly the entire police version be broadcast without interruption." He also reported that "other local TV stations reported they had been offered the same story possibility, but news directors there say they had refused to work under Hanrahan's restrictions."

The media controversy reached a new high on December 12 when the Sun Times exposed the fact that the pictures that accompanied the Tribune "exclusive" had been erroneously described. After visiting the apartment the Sun Times reporter claimed that the picture of bullet holes near the kitchen door were in fact nail holes and that the photo purporting to show the bathroom door (proving that the Panthers had fired from the front bedroom) was in fact a picture of the door to the front bedroom which had been struck by police bullets fired through the living room wall. The State's Attorney's office and the Tribune both acknowledged the mistake, but no explanation of how it occurred was provided.

There was also a further development with respect to the use of polygraph tests. A front page headline in Chicago Today proclaimed "Hanrahan Lie Test Challenge to Panthers." The story quoted a press conference statement by the State's Attorney that he had refused a request by the officers to take lie detector tests "for fear that granting it would suggest some doubt on our part." Mr. Hanrahan was quoted as challenging the occupants to submit to such tests
[illegible]
[illegible] -TV.
[illegible]
[illegible]

saying that if they did so permission would be granted for the officers to do likewise (Chicago Today 12/11). The next day the same paper quoted Panther leader Rush as rejecting the challenge because "I wouldn't trust the people who would be administering the lie test...and once the police get you and lock you up in a room, they can get you to say anything they want you to say." Rush also repeated his earlier allegations of a planned police murder. He described how the police arrived in an unmarked truck full of machine guns and cordoned off the block. "Like buzzards waiting for the kill, they waited outside until the lights went off *** Using a detaled map of the apartment," Rush said, Patrolman Edward Carmody and John Cizewski were to shoot Fred while a detail led by Sgt. Daniel Groth were taking care of business in the front." Rush concluded that murder indictments should be issued against Hanrahan, Richard Jalovec and Judge Collins. (Chicago Today 12/12)

Recapitulations and summaries of the various stories appeared almost daily in all of the Chicago papers. On December 16, Mayor Daley pledged full support for the upcoming inquest and Coroner Toman announced that a special "blue ribbon" coroner's jury of three black and three white citizens was being selected. (Chicago Sun Times 12/16)

FBI

Date: 2/6/70

137

ransmit the following in ______
(Type in plaintext or code)

ia AIRTEL ______
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
MEDICAL CENTER
RM - BPP

DEH

Approved: ______ Sent ______
Special Agent in Charge

138

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
February 6, 1970

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) MEDICAL CENTER

A characterization of the BPP is attached.

On February 6, 1970, Robert Grossman, Assistant Supervisor, Municipal Court Records, Civic Center, Chicago, Illinois, advised that on Thursday, February 5, 1970, at 2:30 p.m. Circuit Court Judge Raymond F. Trafelete, Room 1308,dismissed a suit filed by Assistant Corporation Counsel Manuel Port on behalf of Dr. Murray C. Brown, Counselor, Board of Health,City of Chicago, against Jeffrey H. Haas, Attorney for BPP. The suit charged the BPP Medical Center at 3850-52 West 16th Street, Chicago, with operating a medical clinic without a license.

On February 5, 1970, Raymond O'Malley, Investigator, Corporation Counsel Office, City Hall, Chicago, advised that on January 4, 1970, the BPP Medical Center Clinic opened at 3850-52 West 16th Street, Chicago. The Panthers refer to this place as "The Spurgeon 'Jake' Winters People's Medical Center, Inc." and is named in honor of Winters,a BPP member who was fatally shot in a gun battle with the Chicago Police on November 13, 1969. The clinic is staffed by people in sympathy with BPP aims and purposes. Ronald "Doc" Satchel is the BPP member in charge of the clinic. Dr. Quentin Young and Dr. Eric C. Kast are assisting in the clinic's operations as volunteer physicians. Dr. Young is a member of the Medical Committee for Human Rights, a Chicago social agency and Dr. Kast is a member of the Lawndale Association for Social Health, Chicago, southside social agency.

O'Malley stated on January 21, 1970, a summons was issued by Deputy City Collector Lawrence J. Goss on behalf of a complaint filed by Dr. Murray C. Brown, City Health Commissioner,indicating that the BPP clinic was in violation of city ordinance for operating without Dispensary Permit.

The attached article entitled "Black Panther Medical Center Stays Open Despite City Threats" appeared in the January 26, 1970, edition of the Chicago Defender, a weely edition newspaper.

Black Panther Medical Center Stays Open Despite City Threats

By TONI ANTHONY

The Black Panther Medical Center, 2350-52 W. 16th st., remains open to serve the people despite efforts last week by the City Health Department to close the new facility.

Officially named the Spurgeon Jake Winters People's Medical Care Center, in memory of Jake Winters, the 19-year-old Panther party member killed in the Nov. 13, 1969 shoot-out with Chicago police at 59th and Calumet, the medical center is the realization of slain Illinois Black Panther Party Chairman Fred Hampton's dream—free medical service to the poor.

The Panther Medical Center opened its doors to the public on Jan. 5. It is staffed by volunteer professional nurses and doctors, who are specialists in their respective fields.

The young men and women at 2350-52 W. 16th st. are dedicated--to the forgotten Americans; the unhealthy and infirm, and to the prevention and eradication of disease in the ghetto. The goverement says it can't be done. These youthful volunteers, doctors and nurses say it can, and are proving it, in what is one of the most unique medical centers in the nation--the Spurgeon Jake Winters People's Medical Center, staffed and directed by the Black Panther Party of Illinois.

While Chicago and the federal government are locked in debate over the welfare state, and pre-occupied with subsidizing commissions to study the Panther Party, with inadequate hospitals and incomplete medical facilities, is "dealing" with the problem.

Death and devastating disease are stark realities for West Lawndale residents, many of whom have never seen a physician in their adult lives.

The Panther Medical Center, located in the heart of this impoverished area, represents a ray of hope for these abandoned and hopeless citizens— [illegible] opportunity for some young man to realize the promise of maturity as a result of the dedication of these young men "to the people," the manifestation of Fred Hampton's dream.

The Panther center operates on a seven day basis. Some parents bring their children for treatment, and others come in to be treated themselves. The doctors see every kind of problem--from trauma, and infectious diseases, to psychiatric and female problems.

Community residents serve as clerks, and some are training to become laboratory technicians. The most unique job in the medical center is that of "The People's Advocate", which is similar to the function of a caseworker, and provided by the Panther Party to guide patients through the procedures of the center, making sure that they receive the medical attention they need, and to solve any non-medical problem patients may have, from finding housing to tracking down deliquent welfare checks.

The doctors who staff the center are enthusiastic about "the People's Advocate." Said one doctor, "in most hospitals the patient has to fend for himself. If he doesn't make it for his appointment, or can't find the pharmacy, he's left by the wayside. What's different and exciting to me here is that the party provides a person who makes sure that the patient's interests are served."

However, the City Health Department has challenged the center's right to operate, ostensibly because it lacks a city permit, and officials have been summoned to appear in circuit court Feb. 5 to show cause why they don't need a license.

Ronald "Doc" Satchel, one of the chief organizers of the center, denies that his facility is either a clinic or dispensary, which he feels exempts them from a city license requirement. Satchel called the center "an extension of our volunteer, licensed physicians' private practice. Under the law, these doctors can dispense drugs in their names," added Satchel.

Official sources have subtly passed the word to community residents that the medical center is closed. It is not, and remains open daily to the public.

Dr. Quentin Young, a physician at the center, and a member of the Medical Committee for Human Rights, expressed "anger and outrage" at the City Health Department's tactics. "The Board of Health has now been transformed into a police agency," exclaimed Dr. Young. "I fear that Dr. Brown (City Health Commissioner) has become a political tool of the 'Mayor's office."

Dr. Young said that he and other volunteer doctors worked from 7 p.m. to 12 midnight last week, immunizing 3,000 people against diptheria. "We're pleased to serve the people," said Young. "It's an absolute catastrophe that this should occur."

"The City's medical care system has failed so tragically that the people were forced to develop one of their own, and now the city is using its regulatory system to crush it. The City is really saying that the people shouldn't have medical care," added Dr. Young.

The doctors in the clinic have voted to protest the city's efforts to curb and discredit the Center. Dr. Young called the law requiring free medical clinics to have a license "an illegal class statue, which applies only to free clinics and the poor."

"We say this law doesn't apply to us, and is being applied in a repressive way in an effort to curb this new form of health care, which is so desperately needed," said Dr. Young.

Dr. Eric Kast, another volunteer physician, and a member of the Lawndale Association for

CHICAGO DEFENDER
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

DATE: 1-26-70

PAGE: 5 COL: 2

EDITION: WEEKLY

EDITOR: JOHN SENGSTACKE

CHICAGO OFFICE

Social Health, said his reaction to the summons was "harassment by the City Health Department."

"Instead of helping us, the city is hindering us, which is very deplorable," said Dr. Kast. He pointed out that the need for medical facilities in Lawndale are great, and no other facilities exist. "We will continue to operate as long as possible, and give free service to those who need it most," vowed Dr. Kast.

The murderer gave no warning as the door was opened [illegible] directly into the eye of P [illegible] then fled into the night. [illegible] an arch-criminal insults the streets

[illegible] Jones

People, we must learn to defend ourselves and be wary of any un-

TIONARY SPIRIT OF STERLING

Illinois Chapter
Black Panther Party

"RIGHT ON" TO THE SPURGEON 'JAKE' WINTERS FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER

"Service for survival." So strongly does the Black Panther Party believe this that what has resulted, besides our Free Breakfast for Children Program, is the Spurgeon "Jake" Winters Free People's Medical Care Center, at 3350 W. 16th.



Jake Winters

Dedicated on December 25, and in contrast to most goods and services rendered on that day (in that their usefulness expires the same day), the People's Medical Care Center will consistently meet the needs of the people (combat the problem of illness) this year and in years to come.

The significance of the medical center lies not only in the fact that it will be freely serving the people at a time when soaring medical expenses are becoming the norm, but also because it is an example of socialistic service--the people own and control the health clinic; consequently, it will act in their interest.

Named in honor of Spurgeon "Jake" Winters, a member of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party, murdered by a fascist pig on November 13, the center will officially open on January 4, 1970.

Ronald "Doc" Satchell (wounded and presently hospitalized as a result of a police shoot-in in which Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton and Defense Captain Mark Clark were murdered) along with other members of the Black Panther Party, is responsible for solicitation for and interior decoration of the medical center. Most of the equipment was donated.

The medical center includes four examining rooms, a pharmacy, an X-ray room, a dental room, a clerical office, and a reception area. Obstetricians, gynocologists, dentists, pediatricians, optometrists, regular medical doctors, registered nurses, lab-technicians, people's advocates, receptionists, and clerks will comprise the staff. The Center will be open Monday-Friday and also on Sunday.

The Free Medical Care Center is once again an example of what Deputy Chairman Fred has said: "The beat of the people goes on". No matter how much intimidation the Black Panther Party receives, we're going to continue to struggle against the evils of this system, one way being, opposing expensive medical care with free medical care.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
Illinois Chapter
Black Panther Party

NOTE: Donations, equipment, etc. which are needed so that the Center can be improved, can be given by contacting the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party, 2350 W. Madison, Chicago, Illinois, 243-8276. Checks and money orders are to be made out to the Free People's Medical Care Center.

by that jive
cold-blooded
people in
pigs who
people and
essly are the
charged with

pigs. We have
to save the
Bell. We
those pigs
is designed
ts.
brother that
something,

facing the
trumped-up
attempted
battery.
the aid of
true ser-
a member
Party. We
revolu-
snatched from

keepers of
often run
wanton-
and
brothers
No. 7 of the
Ten-Point
We
to police

157-4117

The Spurgeon 'Jake' Winters Free Peoples Medical Care Center, Incorporated

The Black Panther Party has been planning a Free People's

Satchell our

and wants the Free People's Medical Center to open as soon as possible.

So, we of the Black Panther Party saw that the fascist pigs have failed in their attempt to stop the completion of the Medical Center by viciously trying to murder our Deputy Minister of Health.

The Medical Center will open the first week of January 1970. We are asking the people to come out and see just what is being done.

ALL POWE TO THE PEOPLE!

SEIZE THE TIME!

Illinois Chapter
Black Panther Party

SUPPORT THE PEOPLE'S CLINICS

SPURGEON 'JAKE' WINTERS

FREE MEDICAL CARE

SUPPORT THE PEOPLES FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER

BAD HEALTH CARE is part of the way of life in the black community and in the Latin community. This fact is proved by all statistics:

**The life expectancy of U.S. blacks is 7 years less than whites.

**The infant mortality of children in Chicago poverty areas is among the highest in the country.

**In public hospitals throughout the U.S., black and Latin women are forced to submit to sterilization following childbirths.

**In the U.S., "health care" is a profit-making industry and not a human right for all people.

LACK OF GOOD DECENT HEALTH CARE is one of the many ways this racist capitalist system oppresses the people, and tries to keep us too weak to fight for our rights.

THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY understands the immediate needs for good health care. To serve these needs, the Black Panther Party is establishing the PEOPLE'S FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER. By serving the health needs of the people, the Black Panther Party is setting an example as they have in the Breakfast-for-Children Programs they have started all over the country.

WHY DO WE NEED THE PEOPLE'S FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER?

The People's Free Medical Care Center is the first step in getting rid of the barbaric fee-for-service merchandizing of medical care which takes place in the capitalist economy. Capitalism is the system which claims to provide health services for the people, but which is really ruled by the profit motive. In the People's Free Medical Care Center, care will be given to the people on the basis of need, and not on the basis of ability to pay. The Center is much more than free medical care, however --- more than welfare or charity --- for the Center will be run according to the needs of the people it serves.

The doctors at the Center, instead of running it and dominating it, will be in the position (where they belong) of serving the people.

(over, please)

In this capitalist health care system, women are especially oppressed, both as patients and as the lowest-paid, hard-working hospital workers. Black women are used as "teaching material" for medical students to do surgery on. They are used as "guinea pigs" for the testing of new drugs. There is no consideration for the personal dignity or health of the woman. Obstetrical and gynecological care are given far too little attention. Routine, unnecessary sterilizations and widespread misinformation are the results of the racist, male-dominated health industry.

The PEOPLE'S FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER in its commitment to SERVE THE PEOPLE will give high priority to the care and prevention of sickness in all women.

* * *

This week, supporters and members of the Black Panther Party will be distributing leaflets to let the people know about the Center. Much help is needed if the Center is to stay open and functioning at the best level.

On Friday and Saturday we will be here to ask for donations for the support of the People's Free Medical Care Center. Please remember to pass the word and look for the people with collection cans.

If you can donate technical assistance (all health workers are welcome to volunteer time at the Center), or supplies, or funds, o. if you can help us with leafletting and collecting money, please contact the:

ILLINOIS CHAPTER OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, 2350 West Madison Street,
Chicago, Ill. 60612
For further information, please call: 243-8276 or 638-7715.

* * *

THE HOSPITALS MUST SERVE THE PEOPLE!

GOOD HEALTH CARE IS A HUMAN RIGHT!

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

* * *

SUPPORT PEOPLES FREE MEDICAL CARE CENTER!

BLACK PANTHER PARTY MEDICAL CENTER

The attached article entitled, "Right On To The Spurgeon 'Jake' Winters Free Medical Care Center", appeared in the January 10, 1970, edition of the BPP paper a newspaper published in Berkeley, California.

On September 15, 1969, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, made available the attached BPP leaflet entitled "Support the Peoples' Free Medical Care Center" which source obtained at BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago.

A copy of this memo is being furnished to the following local agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago

United States Secret Service, Chicago

Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Chicago, Illinois 60604

139

March 18, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECDBPP)

The following organizations are described on the Appendix Pages attached hereto:

Black Panther Party (BPP)
Chicago Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights (CCDBR)
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
National Lawyers' Guild (NLG)

All sources utilized herein have furnished reliable information in the past.

On February 16, 1970, a source advised that an ECDBPP conference was scheduled to be held at the Church of the Epiphany, 201 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, from March 6 through March 8, 1970. This Conference was to provide further evidence that the Communist Party, United States of America (CP, USA) was interested in the BPP. The decision to hold this Conference was made on January 10, 1970, at the Roberts Motel, 79th Street and Vincennes Avenue, Chicago, at which meeting Charlene Mitchell, William L. Patterson and Ishmael Flory representing the CP,USA and Dick Gregory, Chicago Civil Right activist and Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Illinois Chapter, BPP, Chicago, were present.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECDBPP)

The purpose of the Conference was agreed to be the establishment of a "context of growing racism and fascism in the US", in which connection the BPP was to have a right to exist.

This source further advised that another meeting at which the organization of the ECDBPP was discussed was held on January 21, 1970, in Chicago and among those in attendance were CP of Illinois members Flory, Roberta Bruce, BPP members, Lorean Poindexter and Mrs. Lucy Montgomery. Poindexter was a member of the CP, USA in Illinois from 1961 through 1963 and Lucy Montgomery is the wife of a Chicago attorney and has contributed generously to the financial support of the SDS. It was agreed at this meeting that Poindexter should be the coordinator for the National Conference and that the headquarters should be at 417 East 47th Street, Chicago.

The source further advised on February 16, 1970, that the National Conference of the ECDBPP would focus on the facts of a nationwide repression against the BPP, the repression of the BPP as part of a developing pattern toward a police state and the ways and means to defend the right of the BPP to exist.

On March 9, 1970, a second source advised that the ECDBPP met at 840 West 14th Place in Chicago, Illinois, the site of Malcolm X College at 9:00 am on March 7, 1970. Approximately 900 to 1,000 persons attended this session and of that number approximately 575 were registered as delegates and the remainder were spectators. There were representatives registered from 23 states.

The second source added that Father William Hogan of Holy Angel's Church, Chicago, served as temporary chairman for the morning session and in that capacity introduced Angie Dickerson of the World Peace Council, New York City, who served as chairman. Dickerson delivered a welcome address.

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND
THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER
PARTY TO EXIST (ECDBPP)

The second source further stated that at this session David Hilliard, National Chief of Staff of the BPP, spoke regarding the organization of the Panthers. He was followed by Doctor Quentin Young, Head of the Medical Committee on Human Rights (MCHR) in Chicago, who spoke briefly regarding the BPP program of medical care and their luncheon program for ghetto children.

The Medical Committee on Human Rights was described in testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities Hearings during October, 1968, as being founded in 1964 to aid civil rights workers injured while serving in the South and which more recently aided injured demonstrators during the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago in 1968. Doctor Quentin Young, in connection with testimony regarding the MCHR declined to state he was a member of the CP, USA on the basis such would be a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The second source further advised that Charles Garry, a BPP attorney from San Francisco, California, then spoke at the morning session of the Conference and in that connection stated he brought greetings from Huey Newton, National Minister of Defense of the BPP and Bobby Seale, National Chairman of that organization.

He then spoke briefly regarding the legal ramifications relating to trials of BPP members and accused the courts of using fascist tactics in that connection and was accusing the juries of being racists. Garry called for unity of all minorities to end repression. Bobby Rush, representing the BPP of Chicago, then briefly commented concerning Panther activities in the Chicago area.

The second source further advised that following these opening speeches a temporary Steering Committee was set up which represented a cross section of the United States. This Steering Committee was under the leadership of Richard Criley, Executive Secretary of the CCDBR. It was then announced that the Conference would be adjourned until afternoon at which time it would be resumed by having workshops on the following subjects:

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND
THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER
PARTY TO EXIST (ECDBPP)

---

1. Demonstrative Action to the United Nations Against Repression
2. National Defense Funds
3. Community Action
4. Racism and Repression

The first workshop was under the leadership of William Patterson; the second under the leadership of Lucy Montgomery; the third under the leadership of Richard Criley and the fourth under the leadership of Arthur Kinoy, Professor from Rutgers University Law School, **Brunswick, New Jersey.**

At the workshop relating to Community Action it was decided that a National Committee for the exchange of ideas and literature as well as for news media, photographs and visual aids should be established. The purpose of this workshop was to show the true facts of how repression was occuring throughout the nation. This workshop was attended by approximately 300 people who represented 50 or 60 different organizations.

The evening session of the Conference, held on March 7, 1970, consisted of speeches by Arthur Kinoy, Sammy Rayner, a Chicago City Alderman and Congressional candidate, Reverend Calvin Morris of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), Nathan Wright, a Sociologist from New York and Jerry Lefcourt, an attorney involved in the defense of BPP members on trial in New York. All of these speeches, other than the one by Sammy Rayner, related to the theme of repression on the part of the courts against the BPP.

The overall crowd in attendance at the session held on March 7, 1970, consisted of approximately 40% black people, 50% white people and the balance being made up of Puerto Ricans, Mexicans and Orientals. Approximately 50% of the crowd appeared to be under the age of 35. The CP of Illinois was well represented in that a majority of the members of the State Board and State Committee were present. These individuals, however, took no active part in the proceedings.

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECDBPP)

On March 10, 1970, a third source advised that on Sunday, March 8, 1970, the second session of the ECDBPP was held at Malcolm X College, Newberry Street and 14th Place, Chicago. The session began at 11:00 am. The following members of the CP of Illinois were in attendance at this session:

Claude Lightfoot
Ishmael Flory
Frances Gabow
Lester Wickstrom
Dan Queen
Dotty Davies
Charles Sotis
Nate Sharp
Frances Curry
Sylvia Schwartz
Sarah Silver
Jay Schaffner
Charley Wilson
Jack Spiegel

In addition, Ed Johnson and Bessie Choll from Chicago were in attendance.

A fouth source advised during December, 1969 that Ed Johnson and Bessie Choll regularly participated in weekly vigils sponsored by Women For Peace held on Saturdays in the Loop area of Chicago. The source added that the Women For Peace, Chicago area, was founded in Chicago on November 1, 1961, along with other Women For Peace groups throughout the country for the purpose of petitioning all Governments "to end the arms race, not the human race", conduct peace vigils for the purpose of ending the Vietnam war, abolishing the draft and abolishing the "US military foreign policy".

The third source advised on March 10, 1970, that additional individuals were in attendance at the March 8, 1970, morning session. They are as follows:

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECDBPP)

Angie Dickerson, New York
Al Evanoff, New York
David Hilliard, Berkeley, California
Irving Sarnoff, Los Angeles
Doris Turner, New York
Reverend Charles Yerkes, New York
Calvin Hicks, Massachusetts
Reverend Lee H. Ball, New York
Reverend Billy Robinson, Akron, Ohio
Dick Criley, Chicago
Lucy Montgomery, Chicago
Bobby Rush, Chicago
Shirley Chisholm, New York
Flo Kennedy, New York
Charlene Mitchell, New York
Mr. Ball, Detroit
Reverend C.T. Vivian, Chicago
Franklin Alexander, Los Angeles
David Faigen, Chicago
Doctor Charles Hurst, Chicago
Herb Wright, Chicago
Randy Howard, Chicago

The source added that Al Evanoff was chairman of the morning session on March 8, 1970, and in that connection introduced David Faigen who reported on the Community Workshop. Mr. Faigen stated that his group recommended a mass demonstration to be held in New Haven, Connecticut on July 4 through 6, 1970. In addition, the following recommendations were made:

1. A national clearing house for audio-visual material for mass education
2. A national news letter
3. A center for literature and information furnishing articles and reprints
4. A speakers Bureau
5. A continuation committee from the Emergency Conference

Following the remarks of David Faigen, Charles Yerkes of New York, gave the following report as made available by the Committee on a National Defense Fund. In that communication he stated that the following program was

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND
THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER
PARTY TO EXIST (ECDBPP)

---

recommended:

1. A National Defense Organization should be established to free all black Panthers

2. Assist in financing all court costs

3. Plan large demonstrations

4. The National Staff of the BPP should have the authority to decide on priority of funds

5. A goal large enough to eliminate all bail bondsmen

6. A leaflet to explain the need for funds

7. Locate organizations having flowing assets which could be ready to provide money when needed

8. Request trade unions to provide money

9. Be in constant touch with the NLG

Doris Turner from Local 1199 of the Hospital Workers Union in New York, then spoke and stated that her Local had donated $1,000 to the BPP Defense Fund.

Mr. Ball from Detroit, Michigan, reported on the panel discussing demonstrative action. In that connection he said that the United States Government should be charged with genocide at the United Nations. He added that various department stores in New York should be picketed.

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECDBPP)

Reverend C.T. Vivian was the next speaker who stated that in order to save ourselves the BPP had to be saved. He emphasized that self-interest was involved. He said that a planned program should be made which would insure the survival of the various black and radical groups in order that decisions dealing with various issues might be made. He also stressed the unification of youths and members of the working class.

The Reverend Billy Robinson from Akron, Ohio, then made an appeal for funds.

David Hilliard then spoke briefly and remarked that he did not need any organizations including the CP to tell him how to run the BPP. He added that the only way to deal with the mass media was to run them down and shoot them if necessary to keep them from telling lies.

A Professor Hicks from Brandeis University in Massachusetts gave a report on racists. In that connection he called for regional and local conferences on a broader basis; that current Congressional investigation regarding the BPP be stopped; political prisoners be released from jail; war on the judicial system, discussion of current issues.

Dick Criley then gave a credentials report concerning the conference and stated that 540 people had registered representing 128 organizations from 23 states plus one individual from Canada and one from East Germany. He then stated that plans were being formulated for the continuation of Emergency Conference to transfer its headquarters to New York, New York, where Angie Dickerson would be in charge. He stated that the Committee should be empowered to enlarge itself. The morning session of March 8, 1970, then ended at 2:00 pm.

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

On March 11, 1970, the first source advised that the ECD BPP was held in Chicago from March 6-8, 1970. This source provided the following information concerning that conference.

On Friday evening March 6, 1970, registration for the conference was held at the Church of the Epiphany, 201 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago. In addition a film was shown at 8:00. There was no further activity on that date.

On March 7, 1970, registration for the conference was continued at Malcolm X College, 840 West 14th Place, Chicago, from 9:00 to 10:00 AM. In that connection a total registration of 457 individuals was made. Since some of the persons did not register, sponsors figured that a total of 500 persons were present. Twenty-three states sent representatives to the conference along with 128 organizations which were represented.

At the March 8, 1970 morning session Father William Hogan of Chicago presided and in his remarks stated that all must join together against repression in order to preserve freedom. Angie Dickerson from the World Peace Council, New York City, also spoke and stated that the Emergency Conference then being held was enduring a most crucial period during which the United States was engaged in a racist war in Vietnam and a war against those who struggle for the full guarantees of the Constitution of the United States. She stated that the BPP is at the center of this struggle and refused to be destroyed just like the people of Vietnam refuse to be destroyed. She proclaimed that the Emergency Conference emphasizes that the BPP has the right to exist as a Party.

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND
THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

The next speaker was Alphonse Hill, a representative of Malcolm X College who welcomed everybody in the name of the school.

David Hilliard, Chief of Staff of the BPP, Berkeley California then then spoke and in his remarks stated that the time is short for the BPP, but that the black people were going to have a Party as the masses without the BPP is like an army without a headquarters. Hilliard added that the time is long passed for making alliances with the BPP; that the time is passed for words and speeches and fund raising programs and that the alternative was that action must be taken. Hilliard called upon the conference to act, not to use a lot of rhetoric. Dr. Quentin Young of the MCHR then spoke and gave a history of the development of the BPP Health Care Center. He stated that health care for people in America is collapsing and cannot be solved in a standard way. He added that the answer is community control and organization of health care.

Richard Criley of the CCDBR then gave a report from the nominating committee and made suggestions for a steering committee for the conference. The makeup of the steering committee is as follows:

Richard Criley
Chicago Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights

Lorne Cress-Moore
Emergency Conference Committee

Angie Dickerson
Emergency Conference Committee and World
Peace Council, New York, New York

Charlene Mitchell
Communist Party, USA

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

Christine Johnson
African-American Heritage Association

Bobby Rush
Chairman
Illinois BPP
Chicago, Illinois

Father William Hogan
Association of Catholic Priests

Lucy Montgomery

Rabbi Robert A. Siegal
Chicago, Illinois

Reverend Charles Yerkes
New York, New York

Reggie Brooks
Akron University
Akron, Ohio

Irving Sarnoff
Los Angeles Peace Council
Los Angeles, California

Mickie Lemer
"The Conspiracy"
Chicago, Illinois

Al Evanoff
District 65
Distributive Workers of America and
Fifth Avenue Parade Committee, New
York, New York

Arthur Kinoy
Professor
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND
THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

Emory Douglass
Berkeley, California

Doris Turner
Vice President
Local 1199
Hospital Workers Union
New York, New York

Frank Angel
Detroit, Michigan

Andrew Carpenter
New York, New York

Tom Flower
Secretary
Peace Education, American Friends Service Committee
for Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, San Antonio,
Texas

D. Mirando
New Haven, Connecticut

Bryan Hogan
Tennessee

Reverend Billy Robinson
Unity Baptist Church
Akron, Ohio

The next speaker was Charles Garry a San Francisco, California Attorney for the BPP who brought greetings from Huey Newton and Bobby Seale. Garry stated that the situation faced by the conference is out to cope with the solution rather than know the problem. He said that the power structure in the United States is taking advantage of hysteria and is bringing about a fascist state, American style. According to Garry every white person is a racist and every male individual is a supremist. He stated that economic oppression leads to all other kinds of oppression and unless this is recognized no progress can be made. He added that the BPP states that the United States is carrying on an imperialist war both inside and outside America, but that racism cannot be fought with racism but must be fought with socialism.

The first source stated that he determined that Richard Criley and Jack Kling in discussing Garry's speech disagreed with Garry's stating that every white was a racist inasmuch as the Communist Party (CP) USA does not believe such is the case. The first source then stated that the next speaker was Jerry Lefcourt, Attorney for the 21 BPP members on trial in New York City at that time. Lefcourt gave a run-down of the circumstances of the trial.

The first source then stated that the afternoon session of the conference was divided into four workshops which were as follows:

I Demonstrative Actions to the United Nations and Other Demonstrative Actions Against Repression

Chairman: William Patterson
Communist Party, USA

II National Defense Fund

Chairman: Lucy Montgomery
Chicago, Illinois

III Community Action and Education

Co-chairmen: Richard Criley
Chicago, Illinois

Lorne Cress-Moore
Chicago, Illinois

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND
THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

IV Racism and Repression

Chairman: Calvin Hicks
Brandeis University
Waltham, Massachuseets

The first source added that at the March 7, 1970 conference the additional individuals spoke:

Reverend Calvin Morris, Chicago, Illinois who represented the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. In that connection Morris remarked that all must join in the defense philosophically of the BPP, adding that everyone in a repressive society is threatened. He stated that talk is insufficient and that revolution must take place.

Dr. Nathan Wright, Jr., Professor of Urban Affairs, State University of New York then spoke and characterized the threat of counterviolence as being violence was incorrect. He added that it is the American tradition to arm for counter-attack, and that those in positions of power, who advocate law and order obtained their positions by reason of violence. He stated that unless the black people are given equity then they should say no to the "masters".

Arthur Kinoy, an Attorney and Professor at Rutgers University Law School, New Jersey, stated that the BPP has the central task in operating the movement of the people at the present time. He said that the enemy moves out of weakness and fear and are afraid of movements in the ghettos and universities as well as being afraid of the peace movement. He added that the ruling class was unable to solve the problems of sub-society and in that connection emphasized that the BPP because of their power structure was vital in defending the rights of minority peoples. He called upon the conference to plan for the political defense of the BPP under a national campaign. Sammy Rayner from Chicago then spoke briefly calling for the election of more black Congressmen.

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND
THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

The afternoon session of the conference consisted of speakers of the Chicago "Conspiracy 7" who had recently been on trial in Chicago for violating Federal Anti-Riot Laws and who were then free on appeal of their convictions. One of the speakers was Tom Hayden of that group, who stated that racists fears come through in reverse. By way of example, he said that a person who is a racist and fears a revolutionary will create illegal acts, what usually happens is that illegal acts happen against the revolutionary. Hayden also remarked that if the peace movement is unable to end the war within the United States it can never end the war in Vietnam. He emphasized that a massive educational campaign must be organized within the United States to bring the Vietnam issue to a point of action.

Hayden's talk was followed by comments on the "Conspiracy 7" trial by the following defendants: David Dellinger, Jerry Rubin and John Froines.

The first source advised on March 11, 1970 that the Sunday, March 8 session of the above convention was held at Malcolm X College and that the chairman was Al Evanoff of New York City.

At this session Doris Turner, Vice-President of Local 1199 of the Hospital Workers Union in New York City called for black-white unity and indicated that the real enemy of the people was the economic establishment. She stated that her local union had contributed $1,000 to the BPP Defense Fund.

David Hilliard of the BPP then spoke briefly concerning that organization.

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

The Reverend C. T. Vivian from Chicago then spoke and stated that the question of the BPP defense was a question of self-interest for everyone. He added that the conference was not being held to plan the defense, but rather to plan a program for survival. He called for the 1970's to be the years of defense of civil liberties in America. During this session reports were given on the four workshops held on March 7, 1970. The essence of these reports are as follows:

A Brother Paul (last name unknown) from Detroit, Michigan gave a report on the demonstrative actions to the United Nations and other demonstrative actions toward repression. In this connection he stated that the workshop resolved, after charging the American government with genocide against black people, to petition the United Nations for redress of grievances on the question of racism. He added that the workshop called for organizing picket lines in front of department stores in the various cities.

The Reverend Charles Yerkes of New York City gave a report on the National Defense Fund Workshop and stated that this workshop resolved that a defense organization to free all BPP members should be established by the conference. Among the things suggested were the following:

1) Assist in the immediate court fight regarding bail for Panther defendants;

2) To conduct an educational and fund-raising campaign;

3) To conduct massive demonstrations for the purpose of publicity;

4) To provide national coordination of defense groups;

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND
THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

5) To provide that the national staff of the BPP should decide on the priority of all funds;

6) The national defense organization, in proceeding with the above actions, should do so in coordination with the National Lawyers Guild and should raise money through trade unions, community institutions, etc.

David Fagen then delivered a report on the community action and education workshop in which he stated that this workshop called for a massive educational campaign on repression and that some of the means that should be carried out in the campaign were the following:

1) That a national center and clearing house should be established for audio-visual materials; films, tapes, records, etc.;

2) That a national newsletter be established;

3) That a center for literature and information, articles and reprints, for local communities be established;

4) That a speakers bureau be established.

The second aspect of this workshop was a report by Lorne Cress-Moore of Chicago on community action. In that connection she called for the setting up of a Continuations Committee to be enpowered to organize the mechanism for a massive demonstration to be held in New Haven, Connecticut on July 4-6, 1970 in connection with a trial there of Bobby Seale.

Professors Calvin Hicks of Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts then gave a report on the fourth workshop entitled "Racism and Repression. In that connection

Hicks stated that the workshop was conducted with the idea that it was not felt that white people were going to move forward. He said the workshop recommended that regional and urban conferences on repression be organized and he called for support of workshops on "we charge genocide". He also called for the development of revolutionary schools which would not only have standard curriculum but also a revolutionary curriculum.

In addition to the above, Ishmael Flory presented a resolution to the effect that the Emergency Conference go on record as endorsing a World Peace Council against repression to be held in 1970.

The Reverend Billy Robinson from Akron, Ohio then made an appeal for funds to be turned over to the Emergency Conference Committee. It was indicated that the funds would be used at the discretion of the Continuations Committee to pay bills and other expenses in connection with the conference and for the purpose of setting up a permanent office. Among the announced contributions or pledges made during this session were the following:

The Black Ministers Conference of Ohio	$100
Flo Kennedy, House Parties of New York	$150
Dr. Nathan Wright, Jr., Albany New York	$100
National Committee, Communist Party, USA	$100
Robert Hilliard, Denver, Colorado	$ 25

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

Los Angeles Committee for Defense of the Bill of Rights	$200
New Jersey Committee Against Repression	$100
Brooklyn Committee for Defense of the Black Panther Party	$100
Sidney Peck Defense Fund of Cleveland, Ohio	$ 50
Chicago Revolutionary Youth Movement	$ 50
Young Workers Liberation League of New York	$ 50
Committee Versus Nazism	$ 25
Cleveland Black Panther Party Defense Committee	$100
NAACP of Pennsylvania	$ 50
Black United Students, Akron, Ohio	$ 50
Tacoma, Washington, Committee in Defense of the Black Panther Party	$100
Marxist Women's Liberation (this is a new group around Marjorie Kinsella)	$ 25
United Farm Workers	$ 25
New University Conference	$ 50
Tacoma, Washington, Urban League	$100

CONFIDENTIAL

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

The first source added on March 11, 1970 that Richard Criley announced the following additional members of the Steering Committee:

Carol Henry, BPP, San Francisco, California
Reverend Quincy Cooper, Black Methodist Church, New York, New York
Robert Turner, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Nancy Hendricks, Nashville, Tennessee.

The source added that among those in attendance at the March 8, 1970 morning session of the conference was Livingston Wingate, Executive Director, New York Urban League, who gave greetings. In addition the following were asked to serve on the Continuations Committee:

Eric Seis, Executive Director, NLG.
Jerry Lefcourt, New York Attorney
Marton Kennan, New York
Peter Orris, New Haven, Connecticut

CONFIDENTIAL

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

On March 8, and March 9, 1970, a fifth source provided the following. This information was substantiated by a sixth source on March 11, 1970. On March 8, 1970, approximately 700 people, predominantly blacks, attended a "People's Inquest" held at the First Congregational Church, 40 North Ashland Avenue, which inquest was being conducted by the Illinois Chapter of the BPP. These sources advised that the "jury" for the "Inquest" consisted of four men and eight women, three whites and nine blacks all reportedly selected from those attending the Emergency Conference. The "coroner" appointed to conduct the "inquest" was Dr. Charles G. Hurst, President of Malcolm X College.

Jewel Cook, Field Secretary of the Illinois Chapter, BPP, performed the duties of the "prosecution".

At this affair a movie was shown which reportedly was a reconstruction of the police raid held on December 4, 1969 at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, at which time BPP leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark were slain, as a result of a shoot out at that time. In connection with the "inquest" the following survivors of the above mentioned raid and "shoot out" testified. Brenda Harris indicated she had been asleep in the front room of the first floor apartment at the above address when she was awakened by a knock on the door at which time Mark Clark inquired as to who was knocking. She stated that at that time the door burst open and the persons entering here fired guns at the individuals inside the apartment. In that connection Harris testified that Clark was killed and she was wounded.

Ronald Satchel, another BPP survivor of the raid testified that he had been sleeping in the apartment when he was awakened by shots and before he new what was happening he had been hit by five bullets. He added that he was then handcuffed, pulled out of the apartment, kicked and cursed by the police, even though he was badly wounded.

Another survivor of the raid was Harold Bell from Rockford, Illinois, He stated that he had been pulled from the room before he could come to the assistance of Fred Hampton. Blair Anderson,a former BPP member and a survivor of the raid stated that he had been beaten and cursed by the police even though not wounded. Deborah Johnson, another survivor of the raid testified that she had been in the back room of the apartment with Fred Hampton and that as Hampton raised his head he was shot by the raiders. She testified that it was possible that Hampton was asleep when he was killed.

Donette Brewer, another survivor of the raid testified that in addition to being kicked and cursed, even though wounded she fell from a stretcher as the raiders roughly carried her down the steps of the apartment.

Louis Truelock, another survivor of the raid did not testify before the "Inquest".

Sources five and six stated that the "coroner" pronounced that the "jury" had found the BPP survivors innocent of any crime and that the raiders were guilty of murder. The "coroner" reportedly remarked that we the people now ask for appropriate action by the state and hold States Attorney Edward Hanrahan and his police in contempt of the people.

Both sources stated that the "inquest" was actually a complete farce and could not have been accurate as to detail inasmuch as it was based entirely on information of the survivors of the raid.

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY TO EXIST (ECD) (BPP)

On March 14, 1970, the second source advised that at a meeting of the Illinois District of the CP leadership held on March 13, 1970, in Chicago to discuss the results of the March 7-8 conference it was stated that there appeared to be a decision in the BPP plans concerning CP support for that organization. In that connection it was stated that David Hilliard did not feel that the BPP needed support from the CP, but that Bobby Seale and Huey Newton felt that they should go along with the CP.

It was unanimously agreed at this meeting that the conference was a success and that the CP feels it should be the vanguard in any future action. It was indicated that efforts would be made to attempt to unite all leftist groups in the cause of the conference. In addition it was agreed that national headquarters should be moved to New York City under the leadership of Angie Dickerson. It was felt that the CP should continue to guide but not to dominate any future similar functions.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following offices:

United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois

Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group
Evanston, Illinois.

1 APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

CHICAGO COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (CCDBR)

The CCDBR maintains headquarters in Rooms 801-803, 431 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois.

A source advised in July, 1960, that RICHARD CRILEY, then a member of the Civil Liberties Commission of the Communist Party (CP) of Illinois, met with key leaders of the CP and was authorized by the CP to form a new organization with broad mass support so long as the new organization would protect the Party interests.

This source advised in October, 1960, that on October 28, 1960, CRILEY reported to the CP leadership that the CCDBR had been organized. He outlined its aims and purposes as being to obtain mass support to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities and to defend Smith Act and Taft-Hartley victims. He said there would be no formal affiliation with any other national organization having the same purposes. The CP leadership agreed with the general direction of the CCDBR as outlined by CRILEY.

A second source advised on October 31, 1960, that the CCDBR was formally organized on October 26, 1960, with RICHARD CRILEY as Executive Secretary after he motivated organizing the meeting of October 26, 1960.

A third source advised on May 20, 1969, that the original stated purposes of the CCDBR continue to be adhered to, with CRILEY continuing as the motivating force behind the Committee. The Board of Directors, however, now includes many individuals in the religious, educational and labor fields who are not known as CP members.

1 **APPENDIX**

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as presently regarded, came into being at a founding convention held June, 1962, at Port Huron, Michigan. From an initial posture of "participatory democracy" the line of the national leadership has revealed a growing Marxist-Leninist adherence which currently calls for the building of a revolutionary youth movement. Concurrently, the program of SDS has evolved from civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war stance to an advocacy of a militant anti-imperialist position. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as the leaders of worldwide struggles against United States imperialism whereas the Soviet Union is held to be revisionist and also imperialist.

At the June, 1969, SDS National Convention, Progressive Labor Party (PLP) forces in the organization were expelled. As a result, the National Office (NO) group maintained its National Headquarters at 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, and the PLP faction set up headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts. This headquarters subsequently moved to Boston. Each group elected its own national officers, which include three national secretaries and a National Interim Committee of eight. Both the NO forces and the PLP forces claim to be the true SDS. Both groups also print their versions of "New Left Notes" which sets forth the line and the program of the particular faction. The NO version of "New Left Notes" was recently printed under the title "The Fire Next Time" to achieve a broader mass appeal.

Two major factions have developed internally within the NO group, namely, the Weatherman or Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) I faction, and the RYM II faction. Weatherman is action-oriented upholding Castro's position that the duty of revolutionaries is to make revolution. Weatherman is regarded by RYM II as an adventuristic, elitist faction which denies the historical role of the working class as the base for revolution. RYM II maintains that revolution, although desired, is not possible under present conditions, hence

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

emphasizes organizing and raising the political consciousness of the working class upon whom they feel successful revolution depends. Although disclaiming control and domination by the Communist Party, USA, leaders in these two factions have in the past proclaimed themselves to be communists and to follow the precepts of a Marxist-Leninist philosophy, along pro-Chinese communist lines.

A second source has advised that the PLP faction which is more commonly known as the Worker Student Alliance is dominated and controlled by members of the PLP, who are required to identify themselves with the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist philosophy of the PLP. They advocate that an alliance between workers and students is vital to the bringing about of a revolution in the United States.

SDS regions and university and college chapters, although operating under the outlines of the SDS National Constitution, are autonomous in nature and free to carry out independent policy reflective of local conditions. Because of this autonomy internal struggles reflecting the major factional interests of SDS have occurred at the chapter level since the beginning of the 1969-70 school year.

CONFIDENTIAL

1.

APPENDIX

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

The "New York Times" city edition, Tuesday, April 20, 1965, page 27, reported that a new party of "revolutionary socialism" was formally founded on April 18, 1965, under the name of the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) which had been known as the Progressive Labor Movement.

According to the article, "The Progressive Labor Movement was founded in 1962, by MILTON ROSEN and MORTIMER SCHEER after they were expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for assertedly following the Chinese Communist line."

A source advised on June 3, 1968, that the PLP held its Second National Convention in New York City, May 31 to June 2, 1968, at which time the PLP reasserted its objective of the establishment of a militant working class movement based on Marxism-Leninism. This is to be accomplished through the Party's over-all revolutionary strategy of raising the consciousness of the people and helping to provide ideological leadership in the working class struggle for state power.

The source also advised that at the Second National Convention MILTON ROSEN was unanimously re-elected National Chairman of the PLP and LEVI LAUB, FRED JEROME, JARED ISRAEL, WILLIAM EPTON, JACOB ROSEN, JEFFREY GORDON, and WALTER LINDER were elected as the National Committee to lead the PLP until the next convention.

The PLP publishes "Progressive Labor," a bimonthly magazine; "World Revolution," a quarterly periodical; and "Challenge-Desafio," a monthly newspaper.

The April, 1969, issue of "Challenge-Desafio" sets forth that "Challenge is dedicated to the peoples fight for a new way of life--where the working men and women control their own homes and factories; where they themselves make up the entire government on every level and control the schools, courts, police and all institutions which are now used to control them."

Source advised on May 8, 1969, that the PLP utilizes an address of General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn, New York, and also utilizes an office in Room 617, 1 Union Square West, New York, New York.

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

The House Committee on Un-American Activities, House report 3123, September 21, 1950, cites the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) as a communist front which is the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party (CP) and has never failed to rally to the legal defense of the CP and individual members thereof, including known espionage agents.

A source advised on February 1, 1969, that from the speeches made and the workshops and panel discussions held at a recent Midwest Conference of the NLG, it clearly appeared that the NLG is being developed from a "complacent, old left type organization" into a strong active supporter of the "new left."

A second source advised during April, 1969, that the President of the NLG spoke at an NLG banquet held in New York City on April 12, 1969, stating that the NLG has organized young people to work in a radical movement which is seeking to destroy a corrupt, violent society and replace it with one which will benefit all.

A third source advised on April 17, 1969, that the President of the New York Chapter of the NLG spoke at the above banquet stating that the purpose of the NLG is to advance the "social revolution" taking place in this country. In furtherance of this purpose, the NLG has established Student Guild Chapters and given counsel to draft resistors and military personnel seeking peace.

As of July 23, 1969, the NLG National Office was located at 5 Beekman Street, New York, New York.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Rev. 5-23-66)

140

RECORD OF INFORMATION FURNISHED OTHER AGENCIES

Orally 1/15/69 (date) By Telephone ________ (date) Written Communication ________ (date)

Information concerning:

Fred Allen Hampton

Information furnished from File, Serial, and Page Number:

Information furnished was obtained:

☐ during course of Bureau investigation

☒ from informants

☐ from complainants or other sources

Information furnished to:

Capt W. Samuel - Maywood P.D.

Number of items disseminated: 1

Remarks:

Capt. advised where Hampton, a Chicago P.D. fugitive, is reportedly staying in Chicago furnished. Capt. Samuels will relay info to C.I.U., Chicago.

James W. Gebbie
Special Agent

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

141

FBI

Date: 1/16/69

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SPRINGFIELD

SUBJECT : BLACK PANTHER PARTY
RM

Copies of the LHM have been disseminated to the following:

OSI, Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois

113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois

NISO, Chicago, Illinois

Secret Service, Springfield, Illinois

USA, Eastern District of Illinois,
East St. Louis, Illinois

USA, Southern District of Illinois,
Springfield, Illinois

CJ

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Springfield, Illinois

January 16, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

142

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The January 11, 1969 issues of "The Daily Illini", University of Illinois newspaper, on pages 1 and 2, and Champaign-Urbana, Illinois "Courier", on page 3, reported as follows:

Officials of the Black Panther Party (BPP) in Chicago, Illinois, including Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, and Diane Dunn, Secretary of Labor, appeared at the University of Illinois on the evening of January 10, 1969. Their appearance on campus was sponsored by the Black Students Association and Students For A Democratic Society. The audience was racially mixed numbering between two hundred and three hundred but including only about twelve white people. BPP security guards were stationed at each of the four doors to the lecture hall in the Natural History Building where the above individuals spoke. Photographs were discouraged by Brother O'Neal, the BPP security officer and an unidentified "Daily Illini" photographer who persisted in efforts to take photographs was escorted from the room. Several whites left the meeting late in the evening when Hampton indicated they might do so if they wished. Later, Hampton and Rush instructed all whites to leave the room, which they did, prior to the holding of a strategy session about the "problem".

Intemperate language was common and the tone threatening. Diane Dunn, who is married to another member of BPP and six months pregnant, was quoted as stating that she could "whip any three honkies in the room." In clearing the room of all whites at the end of the meeting, Brother O'Neal reportedly said, "We might have a job to do here, if you honkies don't get out right now." Hampton advised blacks to arm themselves because "there's no telling when the mad dog white is going to bite you and give you rabies." Rush reportedly quoted Mao Tse-tung stating "political power flows from the barrel of a gun."

Rush presented a ten point program of black demands including the following:

1. An end to the "white man's robbing of the black by such vices as dope and prostitution."

2. Exemption of all blacks from military service.

3. Freedom for all black convicts.

4. All black jury trials for black men.

5. United Nations supervised black plebescite to determine black destiny.

In this regard Rush said, "And the first thing we're going to do is to put Mayor Daley on welfare."

6. Freedom for all oppressed blacks.

7. Full employment for all blacks and "an end of the robbery of the black community by the white capitalist pigs."

8. Decent housing.

9. Relevant education to show the history of the black man and "how the white man took everything he has from the black."

10. An end to "cop brutality and murder" referring to police officers as "racist pigs".

In commenting on military service, Rush said they were not going to circulate petitions or burn draft cards. He added "when they come for us, we gonna give them a gun." Rush said that he regretted a seeming lack of cooperation between campus and community blacks relating to the current black issue and stated "I notice the black students here don't relate with the black community. That's sad because if you are not part of the solution, you're part of the problem."

Hampton reportedly stated "let's start violence. The white man is in power so he can stop it." Hampton also called on blacks to reject capitalism as offered by the white man stating "if a white man offers you black capitalism, don't take it - it's evil if he offers it. He offered slavery."

Diane Dunn spoke of the role of the black woman in the "revolution" stating as follows:

"The role of the black woman is to push her man, to be behind him all the way. Without a woman, he is nothing."

Hampton talked about organizing a BPP in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois at which point John Lee Johnson, a black leader in the so-called "North End" of Champaign, said that everyone who wanted to join should see him. Johnson said that recruiting efforts would be undertaken and asked how many would join at which time a large number of hands were raised.

The January 12, 1969 issue of the "Courier", on page 18, reported that the group of individuals representing BPP, who visited the University of Illinois and the "North End" reportedly left the area on the evening of January 11, 1969 to return to Chicago. It was reported that the purpose of the visit of these individuals to Champaign-Urbana was to recruit local members for the organization. It was further reported that local persons, who were not identified, were contacted for details of the activities and said they could not comment without violating BPP security of the confidence placed in them.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of two to fifteen years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther", which further describes itself as "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contains quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. The SDS is an association of young people on the left and has a current program of protesting the draft, promoting a campaign for youth to develop a conscientious objector status, denouncing United States intervention in the war in Vietnam, and to "radically transform" the university community, and provide for its complete control by students. Gus Hall, General Secretary, Community Party, USA, when interviewed by a representative of United Press International in San Francisco, California, on May 14, 1965, described the SDS as a part of the "responsible left" which the Party has "going for us". At the June, 1965 SDS National Convention, an anticommunist proviso was removed from the SDS constitution. In the October 7, 1966 issue of "New Left Notes, the official publication of SDS, an SDS spokesman stated that there are some communists in SDS and they are welcome. The national headquarters of this organization as of July 24, 1968, was located in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

143

FBI

Date: 1/24/69

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______ (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BERRY LEWIN, aka
Barry Lewin,
Mark Steiner
RM

RMM

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, Office of Special Investigations, United States Naval Intelligence Service, all Chicago, and Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

Pertinent information orally furnished to Chicago Police Department Intelligence Division.

144

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
January 24, 1969

BERRY LEWIN

During September and October, 1968,

furnished numerous three by five cards bearing names and addresses. Source advised that these cards were in the possession of Michael Kenneth Klonsky, self-admitted National Secretary of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). One such card sets forth the following information:

"Barry Lewin, 275-6937, Med. relief group, Mayor's office - filmed interview to show (marked out) our side of demos last week. Is straight and doesn't want to mess up if he does it. Wants to know best stuff to say".

A characterization of the SDS is attached.

On January 16, 1969,

Lewin, a white male, is planning to depart Chicago at 3:00 P.M. on January 17, 1969, in a 1968 Ford, green Galaxie 500, license unknown, enroute to Washington, D.C., for the Inauguration ceremonies on January 20, 1969. Lewin may be accompanied by three or four unidentified individuals.

This source stated that Lewin is a chemist employed by the Hoffman La Roche Pharmaceutical

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Laboratories in Chicago, whose headquarters are in Nuttley, New Jersey.

On January 17, 1969, this source related that Lewin, while experimenting with chemicals in his home, had caused an explosion resulting in extensive damage. Lewin has also allegedly offered to sell 50 gallon drums of tear gas for $100. Lewin allegedly resides at 4850 North Sheridan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

On January 22, 1969, , advised that a Berry Lewin or Barry Lewin, a white male, about 5'8", weighing 125 to 130 pounds, extra long (not quite "hippie" style) brown hair, pointed face, approximately 23 years old and who generally wears a suit or sport clothes, is allegedly close friends with Fred Hampton, Suburban Minister of State and Chairman of the Central Committee, Bobby Rush, Minister of State and Nathaniel Junior, all of the Chicago Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP).

A characterization of the BPP is attached.

Source related that talk among the Panthers indicates this individual is married, has one child, works as a chemical salesman for the Hoffman Chemical Company where he makes around $8,000 a year. Lewin, according to this source, drives a 1968 green Ford with unknown Illinois license, which is allegedly furnished by his employer.

Source related that Lewin's parents, unknown, do not agree with Lewin's political outlooks which are unknown to the source.

Source continued that Lewin has given the BPP money, a mimeograph machine and has taken movies and recordings of Hampton and Rush speaking. These were taken for use in showing to various white groups which are unknown to source.

Source stated that Lewin is allegedly very knowledgeable in chemistry and is teaching some selected members of the BPP, particularly, Junior, how to make chemical incendiary devices.

Junior, according to source, related that he has not seen Lewin in the last day or so as he believes Lewin travelled to Washington, D.C., to witness the Presidential Inauguration.

Source advised that the BPP does not really trust Lewin but will take advantage of whatever he has to offer them.

The following agencies are being furnished a copy of this letterhead memorandum:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois; United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois; Office of Special Investigations, Chicago, Illinois; United States Naval Investigative Service Office, Chicago, Illinois; 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

1 APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. The SDS is an association of young people on the left and has a current program of protesting the draft, promoting a campaign for youth to develop a conscientious objector status, denouncing United States intervention in the war in Vietnam and to "radically transform" the university community, and provide for its complete control by students. GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, when interviewed by a representative of United Press International in San Francisco, California, on May 14, 1965, described the SDS as a part of the "responsible left" which the Party has "going for us." At the June, 1965, SDS National Convention, an anti-communist proviso was removed from the SDS constitution. In the October 7, 1966, issue of "New Left Notes," the official publication of SDS, an SDS spokesman stated that there are some communists in SDS and they are welcome. The national headquarters of this organization as of July 24, 1968, was located in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

145

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
January 29, 1969

FRED ALLEN HAMPTON

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

On January 24, 1969, advised on this date that Fred Hampton, Suburban Minister of State, Black Panther Party (BPP), was arrested during the evening of this date by the Chicago Police Department on a warrant issued for Hampton's failing to keep a previous court date concerning a charge of mob action stemming from the summer months of 1968, in Maywood, Illinois.

Source advised that Hampton appeared at the ABC Channel 7, TV Station, Chicago, where he was to make a taped debate with Howard Miller, well-known Chicago television and radio personality, which debate was to be shown on January 25, 1969, via Channel 32, UHF, Chicago, Illinois.

Source related that approximately 25 members of the BPP accompanied Hampton to Channel 7, were present during his arrest; however, gave the Police no trouble.

Source related that Hampton's bond was being arranged and it is anticipated that Hampton would be released on this date.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Re: Fred Allen Hampton
Black Panther Party (BPP)

Source indicated that Mr. Miller was somewhat disturbed at the Chicago Police Department for effecting this arrest during the process of a live taped debate.

Source stated that shortly after Hampton was arrested, an individual identifing himself as Howard Alk, claiming to be a member of the White Panther Party, **appeared and offered to donate $600 for Hampton's bond.**

Source related that Bobby Lee Rush, Minister of State, BPP, was interviewed by Mr. Miller in place of Hampton. Source also indicated that the BPP Chief of Security, William O'Neal, sat in on this interview with Rush; however, would answer no questions.

A characterization of the BPP is in the Appendix of the memorandum.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies: United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, Office of Special Investigations, Naval Investigative Service Office, all Chicago, and Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois
January 27, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title	FRED ALLEN HAMPTON
	BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
Character	RACIAL MATTER
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

146

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
February 7, 1969

DELMOS RAYMOUND WARD
RACIAL MATTERS

On October 7, 1968, the Chicago Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) received the following arrest record of subject under FBI number 877-193F from the Identification Division of the FBI in Washington, D.C.:

Date	Department Arresting	Charge	Disposition
10/23/66	Maywood, Ill. PD	Burglary	3 yrs. probation
12/37/66	Chicago, Ill. PD	Burglary	5 yrs. probation 1st 10 days H of
4/4/67	Chicago, Ill. PD	Theft	discharged
6/26/67	Cook County Jail Chicago, Ill.	Burglary	none listed
9/26/67	Cook County Jail Chicago, Ill.	Burglary	5 yrs. probation with 1st 10 days H of C
11/17/67	Cook County Jail	Violation of Probation	none listed
12/15/67	Chicago, Ill. PD	Theft	12/28/67 disposition Bond Forfei ure warrant issu on charge of battery and thef
1/24/68	Cook County Sheriff's PD, Chicago, Ill.	Burglary	10/26/68 Grand Jury indictment No. 68-632

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DELMOS RAYMOUND WARD

Date	Department Arresting	Charge	Disposition
7/11/68	Chicago, Ill. PD	Armed Robbery warrant	none listed
8/27/68	Chicago, Ill. PD	Disorderly conduct, unlawful use weapon	none listed

On July 24, 1968, _ _ advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that Ward and Frederick Allen Hampton (Hampton identified by source as prime factor in recent racial disturbances in Maywood, Illinois), met with 50-75 youths on July 23, 1968, at the Irving School at 16th Avenue and Warren Avenue, Maywood, Illinois, and discussed the forming of a "black syndicate". While was unable to furnish anything further concerning this meeting, did note that Ward had recently been arrested for his involvement in a fur robbery.

On July 24, 1968, an Agent of the Chicago Division of the FBI reviewed the records of the Maywood, Illinois, Police Department and the following descriptive data of Ward was disclosed under Maywood Police Department Number 5034:

Date of Birth	May 2, 1948 Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'9"
Weight	160 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Marital Status	Single
Social Security Number	371-52-9922
Residence	134 South 12th Avenue Maywood, Illinois

DELMOS RAYMOUND WARD

Employment	Recreational Supervisor Maywood, Illinois

On July 31, 1968, advised an Agent of the Chicago Division of the FBI that Ward and Hampton and other Negro youths in Maywood were forming a "black syndicate" to extort money from Maywood businessmen.

On July 31, 1968, Detective George Slinkman, Maywood, Illinois Police Department, advised that his department was in receipt of information to the effect that Maywood Negro youths had been soliciting $50 donations for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Youth Council in Maywood in the last few days. However, Detective Slinkman advised that while he understood several merchants had actually paid the group, none of these merchants would file a complaint with the Maywood Police Department.

On August 6, 1968, advised an Agent of the Chicago Division of the FBI that Ward and Hampton and other Negro youths in Maywood had discussed setting of some fires in Maywood but no specific plans were made.

On August 7, 1968, advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that Ward and Hampton had discussed an armed robbery of a Convenient Food Mart which had netted them and other Negro youths $800 cash. According to Hampton displayed $500 and claimed that he had driven the get-away car. related that Hampton had indicated that he planned to use his share of the loot to purchase additional guns.

On August 7, 1968, an Agent of the Chicago Division of the FBI contacted both the Bellwood and Maywood, Illinois, Police Departments and learned that two Negroes had robbed the Convenient Food Store at 25th and Van Buren, Bellwood, Illinois, on August 7, 1968. Both departments were apprised of the substance of Ward and Hampton's comments concerning the robbery and the fact that Hampton had $500 cash in his possession.

On September 6, 1968, advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that Ward had been employed in the past by Avis Rent-a-Car at O'Hare Field, Chicago, Illinois.

On September 6, 1968, a review of the records of U.S. Commissioner James T. Balog, Chicago, Illinois, revealed that on January 16, 1968, an Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution - Armed Robbery warrant was issued for the arrest of Ward and an associate. This charge arose from Ward's alleged participation in a January 10, 1968, armed robbery of the Hopf Fur Company at 17 North State Street, Chicago, Illinois, in which approximately $20,000 worth of furs were taken. Further review of Commissioner Balog's records reflected that the federal warrant for Ward's arrest was dismissed when Ward was arrested by Cook County Sheriff's Police in Cook County on January 24, 1968.

On January 19, 1968, advised an Agent of the Chicago Division of the FBI that Ward was the third robber involved in the armed robbery of the Hopf Fur Company in Chicago, Illinois, on January 12, 1968.

On October 31, 1968, Mr. James Tabor, Supervisor, Auto Registration Section, Illinois Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois, advised an Agent of the Springfield Office of the FBI that a review of the Auto Registration Records for the State of Illinois for the years 1967 and 1968, failed to reveal any motor vehicles registered or titled to subject.

DELMOS RAYMOUND WARD

On November 6, 1968, Mrs. Marie Dickerson, Supervisor, Drivers' License Section, Illinois Secretary of States Office, Springfield, Illinois, advised an Agent of the Springfield Office of the FBI that a review of the records of her section failed to disclose either drivers' license or chauffeur's license having been issued to subject.

On November 15, 1968, advised that Ward, at a meeting with other Maywood Negro youths had indicated that he was in possession of a firearm and had recently used it in the "stick-up".

On November 19, 1968, advised that Ward and other Maywood Negro youths were discussing a possible armed robbery in Maywood, Illinois, and further believed that Ward was now actually a member of the Black Panther Party.

On December 3, 1968, Anne Syputa. Personnel Manager, Avis Rent-a-Car, 10319 Bell Plaine, Schiller Park, Illinois, advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that there was no record of Ward ever having been employed by her firm.

On December 3, 1968, Maywood Recreation District Director William Couns, 1101 South 11th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois, advised there was no record of Ward ever having been employed by that company.

On December 26, 1968, Captain Wilbert Samuels, Maywood, Illinois, Police Department, advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that investigation by his department indicated that Delmos Ward was a member of the Black Panther Party.

On January 26, 1969, Captain Wilbert Samuels, Maywood, Illinois, Police Department, advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that Ward had been arrested on an armed robbery charge on January 17, 1969, by the Chicago Police Department.

DELMOS RAYMOUND WARD

On January 29, 1969, a review of the records of the Chicago Police Department revealed that Delmos R. Ward, Chicago Police IR #155946, was arrested on January 17, 1969, on a charge of armed robbery, per robbery case report number H008327. Reportedly on January 9, 1969, four Negroes accosted the victim at the intersection of Pulaski and Harrison Avenues, Chicago, and forced their way into victim's auto at knifepoint and took $7 and the auto from the victim. Chicago Police records indicate that one of the Negroes was subsequently identified as Ward and an Armed Robbery Warrant #378412 was issued in Cook County Court, Branch 43, on January 15, 1969, and that subsequently Ward was arrested by Chicago Police Officers at 655 Lake Street, Oak Park, Illinois, on January 17, 1969.

Records further reflect that Ward indicating he was employed by Dual Fastner, Franklin Park, Illinois, was released on $5,000 bond and a court date on January 28, 1969, in Branch 43, was set for Ward.

On February 4, 1969, Detective Eldgish Waters, Area Four, Robbery, Chicago, Illinois, Police Department, advised an Agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that Ward's January 28, 1969, court date in Branch 43, had been continued to February 4, 1969, and on that date further continued to March 20, 1969. According to Detective Waters, Ward remains free on $5,000 bond.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

U. S. Secret Service
Chicago, Illinois

Group I, 113th Military Intelligence Group
Evanston, Illinois

DELMOS RAYMOUND WARD SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROU

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

7

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

147

FBI

Date: 2/7/69

Transmit the following in Plaintext
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE Urgent
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR
SAC, SAN FRANCISCO
SAC, SPRINGFIELD

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP). RM.

SOURCE, INSTANT, ADVISED EDDY PERRY, AKA PEBLO, ALLEGED, LEADER IN THE VICE LORDS (VL), CHICAGO WEST SIDE STREET GANG, AND FOUR OTHER UNKNOWN ALLFGED VL MET WITH BPP FEBRUARY FIVE AND SIX LAST OFFERING TO CHANGE NAME TO BPP AND JOIN FORCES. SOURCE OF OPINION ABOVE REPRESENT. SUB GANGS OF VL NATION AND ENTIRE NATION NOT REPRESENTED.

FRED HAMPTON, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN BPP, CHICAGO, AND OTHER BPP MEMBERS SUGGESTED VL KEEP OWN NAME AND GROUPS FORM

RMM:

[illegible] (Rev. [illegible]-64)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ________________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via ____________ ________________________________
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

COALITION. HAMPTON WANTED LEADERS OF BOTH GROUPS TO MEET WITH BOBBY RUSH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, BPP, CHICAGO BEFORE ANY FINAL DECISIONS MADE. NEXT MEETING TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR A.M. FEBRUARY EIGHT NEXT, AND THEREAFTER, ANNOUNCEMENT TO CHICAGO PRESS IF COALITION FORMED.

SOURCE RELATED RUSH, BILLY AND DIANE DUNN AND TED BOSTON EXPECTED TO RETURN FROM UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS (UOI), CHAMPAIGN- URBANA INSTANT. ROY EVANS WHO ALLEDGEDLY FLEW NATHANIEL JUNIOR, BILLY BROOKS, PETER HAMMACH, TO UOI EARLY IN WEEK WITH POSTERS TO GIVE RUSH WHO WAS THERE HELPING TO FORM BPP CHAPTER ARE ALSO EXPECTED TO RETURN INSTANT.

SOURCE STATED THAT DAVID HILLIARD, CHIEF OF STAFF, AND THOSE UNKNOWN MEMBERS WHO GENERALLY TRAVEL WITH HIM ARE ALLEGEDLY SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE CHICAGO FEBRUARY SIXTEEN NEXT TO PARTICIPATE IN A BPP RALLY TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY FOURTEEN THROUGH SEVENTEEN NEXT AT SENATE THEATER CHICAGO.

Approved: ________________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

(Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date:

ransmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

ia ____________________
(Priority)

PAGE THREE

MILITARY AND CHICAGO PD ADVISED.

Approved: ____________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
ial Agent in Charge

148

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Rockford, Illinois
February 5, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

LINCOLN CHARLES POWELL

During January, 1969, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that a person known source to be a member in high standing in the Black Panther Party (BPP), related that Fred Hampton, Deput Chairman, Nathaniel Junior, and other BPP members from the Chicago Chapter of the BPP came to Rockford, Illinois, during January, 1969, where they met Lincoln Charles Powell and others, also BPP members, at Powell's residence, 1009 40th Avenue, Rockford, Illinois.

Source continued that Powell, according to his source, claimed that he could obtain weapons for the BPP from Miami, Florida, area where he was recently employed. Powell allegedly claimed that he purchased 14 Enforcer pistols, 30 caliber, two cases of ammunition, having a total cost of over $1,800 from a gun store near Miami during October, 1968, which items were received in Chicago by a representative of Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) from New York.

Source furnished a copy of the following "Mandate" during January, 1969, which was allegedly first seen in the possession of Powell, according to his source.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Declassified 4/4/75 by

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BLACK ROCKFORD
EXECUTIVE REVOLUTIONARY MANDATE NO. 1
- FREEDOM BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY -

UPON CLAIMING MANHOOD WE SEEK TO MAINTAIN IT BY CHALLENGING THE "RACISTS" ELEMENTS HERE, TO "WAR". WE HAVE BARED OUR CHEST TO YOU, AND DARE YOU TO STRIKE IT. WE SUGGEST AND WILL SUPPORT ANY "BEING" WHO WILL LASH OUT AND FIGHT THE SICKNESS HERE KNOWN AS RACISM, PERTINENT TO US AS "ANTI-BLACK MANHOOD AND SURVIVAL."

WE WILL FIGHT TO THE DEATH IF NECESSARY, ANYONE OR ANY ELEMENT WHICH TRIES TO PREVENT THE VICTIMS OF THIS DECADENT RACIST SYSTEM HERE IN ROCKFORD, FROM ATTAINING THEIR FULL RIGHTS.

WE WILL IN THE HONEST SPIRIT OF "WAR" FIGHT THOSE "RACIST AND THEIR RUNNING DOG BLACK DEMAGOGUE LACKIES", WHO CONTROL OUR PROGRAMS AND EFFORTS, FOR THEIR OWN "PERSONAL GAIN." IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THERE ARE MANY "SO CALLED" RESPONSIBLE PROGRAMS (I.E. STAGNANT PROGRAMS) DESIGNED TO HELP RELIEVE THE PROBLEMS THAT BLACK PEOPLE FACE, BUT, THE PROGRAMS, THEMSELVES ARE IN THE HANDS OF PEOPLE WHO ARE THE PERPETUATORS OF OUR PROBLEMS.

WE CHALLENGE ALL "BLACK LEADERS", SAYING THAT THEY SHOULD DEMONSTRATE LEADERSHIP MOVES RELEVANT TO THEIR "PEOPLE", AND NOT TO THE REACTIONARIES WHO CONTROL US FROM DOWNTOWN.

WE ARE ANGRY! IN REFERENCE TO THE "PRESENT" AND OUR OBVIOUS FUTURE, MEANING THAT, IF WE REMAIN PASSIVE AND IDLE AS WE ARE, DEATH IS INEVITABLE. IF WE MUST DIE, IT WILL NOT BE A SELFISH ONE PERPETUTRATED BY "GREED", BUT A SELF SATISFYING ONE FOR OUR PEOPLE, SO THAT AT LEAST SOME OF US MIGHT LIVE TO BE FREE.

OUR MANDATE IS ASKING FOR "FREEDOM BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY", AND WE ARE NOT AFRAID TO DIE FOR OUR PEOPLE.

BLACK CONTROL OVER BLACK DESTINY!

FREEDOM LOVERS, PLEASE SUPPORT THE FORCES OF BLACK LIBERATION!

LINCOLN CHARLES POWELL

Source stated that subsequent contacts with his source indicates that Powell has made the following tentative arrangements with the Panthers from Chicago:

Powell's employer is allegedly sending him on a company buying trip to Florida during February, 1969, probably on the 14th. While on this trip Powell will purchase the Enforcers, sold as pistols in Florida, from a white man, at an unknown gun shop in either the Miami or Jacksonville areas, ship them back to Chicago with the alleged goods he will purchase for his company, allegedly via Trans World Airlines (TWA) Airlines and turn them over to the Panthers.

Source related that no plans are known for the Chicago Panthers to make any further contact with Powell until the guns are delivered. Source is not aware of any payment being given to Powell by the Chicago Panthers and has heard that the Chicago Panthers are very short on money.

A second source, who has furnished insufficient information to determine reliability, but is in a position to know, advised that Powell has made at least two trips to Florida since moving to Rockford, Illinois, allegedly for the purpose of selling his house.

During January, 1969, the personnel records of the Sundstrand Corporation, Rockford, Illinois, were found to contain the following pertinent background information regarding Powell:

Name	Lincoln Charles Powell
Sex	Mal4
Race	Negroid
Date of Birth	November 26, 1942
Place of Birth	Daytona Beach, Florida
Height	6'1"
Weight	160 pounds
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown
Social Security Number	450-72-2513
Selective Service Number	36-136-369, Local Board 136, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 4-A Classification

Marital Status	Married, wife, Brenda Birden, born March 24, 1944, at Greensboro, North Carolina
Education	September, 1957 - June, 1958 Bartram High School, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania September, 1958 - May, 1960 Oakwood College Academy, Huntsville, Alabama November, 1960 - February, 1961 Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois September, 1965 - December, 1965 Cambria Adult School, Los Angeles, California January, 1966 - April, 1966 Los Angeles Valley College, Van Nuys, California
Military	Enlisted on September 27, 1960, in the Air Force for four years, from 870 Monaca Road, Monaca (Beaver), Pennsylvania, assigned service number AF 1 698 859 and honorably discharged from Lockborne Air Force Base, Ohio, on February 2, 1962, as a conscientious objector for convenience of the Government, last duty assignment 801st Acft. Support Squadron, SAC. Address at time of discharge 178 Whitethorne Avenue, Columbus, Ohio. Received secret classification in 1961.
Residences	1950 - 1951, 1836 Catherine Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 1951 - May, 1956, 2310 Grays Ferry Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; May, 1956 - April, 1961, 5522 Addison Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;

LINCOLN CHARLES POWELL

April, 1961 - March, 1962, 178 Whitethorne Avenue, Columbus, Ohio;

March, 1962 - April, 1962, 211 South Ash Street, Moses Lake, Washington;

April, 1962 - July, 1962, 217 Dogwood Avenue, Moses Lake, Washington;

July, 1962 - July, 1963, 178 Whitethorne Avenue, Columbus, Ohio;

July, 1963 - February, 1964, 222 Whitethorne Avenue, Columbus, Ohio;

February, 1964 - June, 1964, 718 West 105th Street, Los Angeles, California;

June, 1964 - October, 1965, 9531 South Figheroa number 5, Los Angeles, California;

October, 1965 - April, 1966, 7310 Haskell Avenue number 5, Van Nuys, California;

April, 1966 - July, 1967, 1111 South Street, Titusville, Florida;

July, 1967 - March, 1968, 951 Gibson Street, Titusville, Florida;

March, 1968 - June, 1968, 722 Aurora Avenue, Cocoa, Florida;

June, 1968 - present, 2620 11th Street, Rockford, Illinois, 846 Montague Street, Rockford, Illinois;

Current - 1009 40th Avenue, Rockford, Illinois

Employment

September, 1960 - February, 1962, United States Air Force;

March, 1962 - July, 1962, Technician, Federal Electric Corporation, Moses Lake, Washington;

August, 1962 - March, 1963, Brick mason, Phillip Gallichio, Grove City, Ohio;

March, 1963 - January, 1964, Surgical technician, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio;

February, 1964 - April, 1964, unemployed;

April, 1964 - May, 1965, Test inspector, Parker Aircraft Company, Los Angeles, California;

March, 1965 - April, 1966, Hydraulic tester, Weston Hydraulics Limited, F. Rowlett, supervisor, 7500 Tyrone Avenue, Van Nuys, California;

April, 1966 - May, 1968, Technician, Bendix Launch Support Division, H. Braumiller and Jeth Matthews, supervisors, 2223 or 2243 South Washington, Titusville, Florida. Secret classification for National Aeronautics and Space Administration by Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Box 2499, Columbus, Ohio;

June 17, 1968 - current, Technical writer, Sundstrand Corporation, Rockford, Illinois, secret classification July 17, 1968, by DISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

LINCOLN CHARLES POWELL

Relatives (listed June, 1966)

Sanford Powell (Father)
Address and date of birth unknown;

Frank Berry (Step-father)
5522 Addison Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Born February 23, 1925, at
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;

Le Edwarna Berry (Mother)
Born July 12, 1922, at Blakely,
Georgia; same address;

Saundra Berry (Sister)
Born December 7, 1944, at Daytona
Beach, Florida; same address;

Rita Berry (Sister)
Born March 14, 1946, at Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; same address;

Mary Agnes Berry (Sister)
Born February 23, 1951, at Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; same address

Raymond Berry (Brother)
Born January 21, 1950, at Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; same address;

References (in 1966)

Walter Davis, known five years,
3426 Benson Highway, Tucson, Arizona;

Leondis Cottingham, known ten years,
5518 Addison, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;

William Boyer, known six years,
525 Clarendon Avenue, Columbus,
Ohio;

Jesse Wilson, known six years,
217 South Wheatland Avenue,
Columbus, Ohio;

Charles Watson, known three years,
717 West 105th Street, Los Angeles,
California;

CONFIDENTIAL

Arrests

January 4, 1961, Richmond, Indiana, suspicion of AWOL, released to military, returned to base;

September, 1963, Columbus, Ohio, suspicion of auto theft, no charges filed, released;

December 11, 1965, Los Angeles, California, petty theft, assault and battery, impersonating an officer, all charges dismissed on March 29, 1966;

September 15, 1966, improper driver's license, $15 or three days;

September 2, 1967, reckless driving reduced to careless driving, $25 or five days, four points;

September 2, 1967, disorderly conduct, nolle prossed;

September 20, 1967, assault and battery, nolle prossed;

January 14, 1968, careless driving, dismissed;

September 15 through January 14, 1968, arrests all in Titusville, Florida.

Copies of the enclosed letterhead memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois
United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois
Office of Special Investigations, Chicago, Illinois
United States Naval Intelligence Service Office, Chicago, Illinois
Region 1, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

149

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
February 11, 1969

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The following information, in summary form, was learned during the first nine days of February, 1969, by a source who has furnished reliable information in the past:

See the attached appendix for a characterization of the BPP.

During the first week of February, 1969, the following Chicago BPP members went to the University of Illinois, Champaign - Urbana, in a 1964 GTO, orchid purple Pontiac, bearing an unknown Illinois license, owned by the Dunn's (below), where they were to contact John Lee Johnson and Steve Jackson, residents in Champaign - Urbana area, regarding the establishment of a BPP in that area:

Bobby Lee Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense

Billy "Bones" Dunn

Diane Dunn

Ted Boston

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Declassified
4/4/15 by 667

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Group I~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The latter three are all lieutenants on the Security Staff of the BPP.

On approximately the 4th or 5th of February, 1969, the following Chicago Panthers flew to the Champaign - Urbana area via private airplane. Allegedly to deliver posters to the above group:

Le Roy Evans, pilot of the airplane (returned, date unknown)

Billy Brooks, Minister of Education

Peter Hammach, Section leader from Maywood, Illinois (returned on 2/8/69, see below)

Nathaniel Junior, Field Secretary, rank major

On February 7 and 8, the following Chicago Panthers travelled to Champaign - Urbana area via the indicated vehicles, some of whom returned as indicated:

Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman

Robert Bruce, Organizer, Maywood, Illinois, driving his 1965 black over maroon Pontiac, bearing unknown Illinois license

Cleve Cook, Field Secretary, driving his 1964 maroon Pontiac (returned)

Ann Campbell, alleged girlfriend of Hampton (returned)

Christina May, Minister of Cultural Development

Ronald Satchel, Minister of Health

Casandra Bynum, allegedly Rush's secretary

James Stewart, assistant leader of the Security Staff (returned)

This group allegedly registered into rooms 240 and 241 of the Shearton Motel, Champaign - Urbana, under the fictious name of John Anderson, 2605 South Carter, Detroit, Michigan.

As a result of the alleged arrest on February 8, 1969, of Rush and Boston for either attempted murder or a shoot-out of some kind several other Panthers were attempting to obtain transportation and money to travel to Champaign; however, this trip was called off when it was learned that Rush was only charged with the unlawful use of a weapon then released on $200 bond and Boston was not charged.

However, on February 9, 1969, the following Chicago Panthers and a white lawyer, who has represented Panthers in the Chicago area in the past, travelled, via rented vehicle, to Champaign as a result of several of the Panthers remaining in Champaign - Urbana area having been arrested on some charge concerning an innkeeper, those indicated returned to Chicago:

William O'Neal, Chief of Security (returned)

Jerry Dunnigan, Lieutenant on Security Staff

Ann Campbell (returned)

Peter Hammach

Dennis Cunningham, Lawyer

During the above period, Eddy Perry, also known as Peblo, a self-described leader in the Vice Lords (VL), a Negro street group operating in Chicago's west side, and four other unknown alleged leaders in the VL Nation, met with several leaders of the Chicago BPP wherein the VL leaders suggested changing their names to BPP and the two groups combine. However, the BPP leaders suggested that both groups remain separate and merely form a coalition.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Nothing was really decided at this meeting, except to meet again on February 8, 1969, after which any decision would be announced to the Chicago Press. This meeting did not take place due to the above Panther problems in the Champaign - Urbana area. The source's opinion is that the above alleged VL leaders do not represent the VL Nation and no other meeting is presently scheduled.

Further, during the above period, this source related that DAVID HILLIARD, Chief of Staff of the National BPP in Berkeley, California, is allegedly scheduled to arrive in Chicago on February 16, 1969, with several other unknown Panthers who generally travel with HILLIARD. The alleged purpose of HILLIARD's trip is to participate in a Chicago BPP rally which was tentatively scheduled to take place between February 14 - 17, 1969, at the Senate Theater in Chicago. This source advised that subsequent information indicates this rally will be held on February 17, 1969, at the Crane High School in Chicago.

Copies of this Letterhead Memorandum are being furnished to the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Office of Special Investigations, 113th Military Intelligence, Naval Investigative Service Office, and United States Secret Service

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois
February 11, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Character

Reference is made to memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

150

FBI

Date: 2/13/69

ransmit the following in ________________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL
____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE - DE KALB
IS - SWP

Secret Service, USA, both Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois, are being furnished a copy of the LHM, via courier.

HGM

Approved: ________________________ Sent ________________ M Per ________________

al Agent in Charge

151

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
February 13, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA)

On February 12, 1969, __________ advised that the YSA at Northern Illinois University, De Kalb, Illinois, plans to sponsor a Black Power Panel on February 25, 1969. This Panel is to take place at 7:00 PM at the Carl Sandburg Auditorium on the campus. Speakers expected to appear include the following:

Bob Lucas, Black Liberation Alliance

Fred Hampton, Illinois Black Panther Party

Jim Harvey, UMOJA, Black Student Center, Chicago

Paul Boutelle, recent candidate for Vice President of the United States for the Socialist Workers Party

Anas Luqman, Malcolm X Black Hand Society, Chicago

The Socialist Workers Party has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The source advised the auditorium has a seating capacity of 900 and the YSA expects a good attendance and plans leafleting to advertise the Panel.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Springfield, Illinois

February 14, 1969

152

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

With regard to the visit of representatives of the Black Panther Party (BPP), Chicago, Illinois, to Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, on February 10 and 11, 1969, the following is to be noted:

On January 14, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that he had determined that a meeting was held on January 11, 1969, at the Douglas Center, a youth center at Champaign, Illinois, at which John Lee Johnson was trying to develop interest in the organizing of a BPP chapter at Champaign-Urbana, Illinois. related that reliable information had come to his attention that although Johnson was attempting to establish himself as a local leader of Black Panthers, the local leader would probably be Stevie Jackson, or Alonzo Mitchell. further advised that at 6:00 p.m. on January 11, 1969, Stevie Jackson and Alonzo Mitchell had a meeting at the Chief Illini Motel, Urbana, Illinois, with representatives of the BPP from Chicago, Illinois.

The January 14, 1969, issue of the "Courier", a Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, newspaper, on page 3, reported that University of Illinois officials apparently will examine events surrounding the visit of three members of the Illinois BPP last weekend to see if campus space use regulations were violated.

The article continued that according to Robert W. Evans, Director of Public Information, University of Illinois, arrangements for the use of the meeting room were apparently made by the University of Illinois Chapter of Students For A Democratic Society (SDS). Evans also

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded From Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

was quoted as saying that Vic Berkey, SDS President, had made the reservation for a public lecture by Rush, the Illinois Panthers' Deputy Minister of Defense and Hampton, Deputy State Chairman. (See Appendix regarding SDS).

According to Berkey, the event was arranged in close sponsorship with the Black Students Association (BSA), although SDS issued the official invitation.

The article quoted David Addison, BSA President, as saying that his group was involved only in a "perfunctory" way. Addison stated that "our role largely was confined to making contacts between SDS and black students on campus".

Page 3 of the same issue of the "Courier" also reported that John Lee Johnson, a community organizer in Champaign's North End, denied Monday a statement attributed to him in Saturday's "Courier" about recruiting members locally for the BPP.

Johnson said he asked only how many persons present would be willing to join the party Monday morning, and did not invite anyone interested in membership to see him.

Commenting on the appearance here of representatives of the Chicago-based Illinois BPP, Johnson indicated his personal feeling is that the Panthers represent "nothing new", and that "black people all over must be willing to exercise all resources to achieve freedom".

The article continued to quote Johnson as saying, "There is no need for a beret or a black jacket in order to attain this". "If there is a decision that a Panther Party is to be the uniform organization of Champaign County, black people themselves shall determine that, not I".

The January 14, 1969, issue of "The Daily Illini", a student newspaper of the University of Illinois, Champaign-

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Urbana, Illinois, on page 3, reported that Vic Berkey, member of SDS, dismissed rumors of his "abduction" by two Black Panther members as "baseless". The article continued as follows:

The rumors began Friday after Berkey had a meeting with Illinois Black Panthers, Fred Hampton and Bob Rush. Hampton and Rush had agreed to speak on campus but had been promised a certain amount of money for doing so.

Berkey said that the Chicago Regional SDS "implied a commitment that we weren't aware of". Although the money promised Hampton and Rush "began at $1000 because that is the way you do things", Berkey said that the commitment is now substantially less. He would not reveal the sum of money that SDS owes the Panthers, but he said that SDS organizationally will fulfill its commitment, "as we always do".

When Hampton and Rush arrived on campus and found that the money was not forthcoming, they were upset, and Berkey went into a meeting with them to try and straighten things out. The Panthers were also angry because some black students were supposed to arrange housing for them and failed to do so.

During the time that Berkey was out of communication, rumors began to arise that he had been abducted because of the failure to pay Hampton and Rush. Berkey said that the Panthers and SDS enjoy a good relationship but that people often do not know how to relate to the Panthers. Berkey said, "they have done the best organizing of any black group in Chicago, but many people still attribute to them the characteristics and actions of a street gang".

On January 16, 1969, , who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on January 14, 1969, John Lee Johnson, held a meeting at the Douglas Center, Champaign, Illinois, at which the following individuals were present:

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Rochelle Broome
Vernon Harmon
Al Mitchell
Maurice McKinley
Ivory Taliferro, Jr.
Leedy Lipscomb (phonetic)
Buddy Lipscomb (phonetic)
Emile (last name unknown)
Ronnie Brown
Steve Dorsey

advised that Johnson had held the meeting to try to create more interest in establishing a Black Panther Chapter at Champaign-Urbana. advised that the individuals expressing interest in joining a Black Panther organization were Broome, Harmon, Mitchell, McKinley, and Taliferro. He advised that the other individuals present did not appear to have too much interest in the BPP, and appeared to be there out of curiousity. He advised that in addition to the above individuals, he thought there were two or three airmen from Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois, however, he was not certain of this. Also at the meeting was an ex-convict from Chicago, Illinois, whom he recognized as being an individual that had been arrested in Rantoul, Illinois, for robbing a filling station.

further related that he had heard that some "Black Panthers" had been in Champaign, Illinois, the week prior to the meeting, and he had heard that they had beat up John Lee Johnson. Also advised that after the meeting on January 14, 1969, Maurice McKinley beat Johnson and that the fight was a dispute concerning who was going to be the local leader of the Black Panther organization.

On January 16, 1969, Eldon Quick, Chief of Police, Rantoul, Illinois Police Department, advised in June, 1966, there were two Negro males arrested at Rantoul, Illinois, for armed robbery in connection with the robbery of a filling station. He advised that they were Oliver L. Dority and J. C. Tribbett, both from Chicago, Illinois.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

On January 16, 1969, Paul Pope, Deputy Sheriff, Champaign County Sheriff's Office, Urbana, Illinois, advised that Oliver L. Dority was sentenced on June 30, 1966, to one to twenty years at Illinois State Penitentiary, Joliet, Illinois, and Tribbett was sentenced on October 3, 1966, to a term of one to twenty-five years at the Illinois State Penitentiary, Joliet, Illinois.

On January 16, 1969, State Parole Agent Paul North, Division of Supervision of Parolee's, Department of Public Safety, Champaign, Illinois, advised that Tribbett had been paroled from Illinois State Penitentiary, however, his parole had been revoked, and he had been incarcerated at Chicago, Illinois, since November 29, 1968. North advised that Oliver L. Dority had been paroled on August 20, 1968, from Illinois State Penitentiary, Joliet, Illinois, and he was currently being supervised from the Chicago Office of the Division of Supervision of Parolee's, located at 160 North LaSalle. The address of Dority's wife was listed as 1410 West 14th Street, Apartment 608, Chicago, Illinois. Dority was described as a Negro male, born November 23, 1945, at Chicago, Illinois, 5'9", 145 pounds, black hair, brown eyes.

On January 29, 1969, and January 31, 1969, Special Agent Gerald Keyes, Office of Special Investigations, Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois, advised that an airman residing in a barracks at Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois, had heard an airman, Willy Benjamin Blake, Jr., express some interest in Black Panther activity.

On January 17, 1969, advised that John Lee Johnson was going to try to organize interested individuals at Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, Danville, Illinois, and Decatur, Illinois, into one Black Panther organization. T-2 advised that Johnson had merely expressed this intention, and he thought that Johnson had spoken with one or two individuals at Danville, Illinois, however, he did not think that anything concrete had been done.

On February 3, 1969, Nick Makris, Owner, Chief Illini Motel, Urbana, Illinois, advised that on February 2, 1969, a group of Negroes registered at the motel under the name William Johnson, 6341 South Laflin, Chicago, Illinois, and the vehicle they were operating was indicated to be a 1964 GTO, Iris Mist, bearing Illinois license CS2793. Makris advised that there were two or three individuals in the party, however, he thought that more individuals were actually staying in the room. Makris advised that the party was assigned to Room 17, and that the following telephone calls had been placed from Room 17 through the motel switchboard:

332-2584
333-1862
344-5966

On February 4, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that telephone number 332-2584 was subscribed to by Laquida Glover and Darreyl Young, Room 106, Busey Hall, 1111 West Nevada Street, Urbana, Illinois, and that both of these individuals were freshman students at the University of Illinois.

advised that telephone number 333-1862 was installed in the Counseling Office at Busey Hall and was available to any occupant of Busey Hall. further advised that telephone number 344-5966 was subscribed to by David Addison. 1107 West Green Street, Urbana, Illinois, Apartment 221. advised that Addison was the President of Black Students Association (BSA), a recognized student organization of the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois.

On February 4, 1969, Nick Makris, Owner, Chief Illini Motel, Urbana, Illinois, advised that an individual in Room 17 had placed a telephone call to telephone number (812) 232-0993, Chicago, Illinois. Makris further advised that he had determined that the individuals in Room 17 were planning a meeting for the night of February 4, 1969, which was to be held somewhere on the campus of the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, Illinois.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

On February 4, 1969, advised that in the morning on February 4, 1969, Vincent T. Cullers, Education Committee, Black Students Association, University of Illinois, had requested and had been granted space for a meeting to be held from 8:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. on February 4, 1969, in Room 213 of the Illini Union, student union building of the University of Illinois.

On February 4, 1969, , who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised the following BPP members flew from Midway Airport in a private plane departing approximately 2:00 p.m., February 4, 1969, en route to the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, in order to deliver posters to Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, BPP:

Roy Evans, pilot
Billy Brooks
Pete Hammach
Nathaniel Junior

advised that the individuals were to return to Chicago on February 4, 1969.

On February 5, 1969, Nick Makris, Owner, Chief Illini Motel, Urbana, Illinois, advised that none of the above individuals registered at his motel. He advised that the occupants of Room 17 had indicated that they would stay one more night.

On February 5, 1969, Louis Dyson, Owner, Illini Airport, U. S. Highway 45, Urbana, Illinois, advised that Roy Evans was unknown to him, and he had no record of any aircraft belonging to Evans being serviced at his airport. Dyson advised that inquiries at any airport concerning an aircraft should be made with a description of the aircraft and the "N" number if available.

On February 5, 1969, advised that he attended a meeting at Room 213 of the Illini Union at which there were approximately twenty to thirty Negroes, whom he assumed were college students. He advised the meeting began about

8:30 p.m. at which time talks were made by two or three individuals, trying to stimulate interest in a Black Panther organization. advised that the meeting at the Illini Union broke up at approximately 9:30 p.m., at which time three Negro males and one Negro female, who were Black Panthers from Chicago, Illinois, left the meeting to go to some location to meet a fourth Black Panther from Chicago.

advised that the meeting reconvened at approximately 11:00 p.m. in the basement of Lincoln Avenue Residence Hall, a dormitory of the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, and the meeting lasted until approximately 1:50 a.m. February 6, 1969. He advised that at the continued meeting more general talks were made concerning the organization and aims of the Black Panther Party. He advised that the following individuals, who are residents of University residence halls, were at the meeting in the basement of Lincoln Avenue Residence Hall. He added that the following list constituted only a part of the group that was in attendance:

Sarah Barber,
Wardahl Residence Hall,
Room 607;

Gloria Brown,
Wardahl Residence Hall,
Room 226;

Rosemary Brown,
Wardahl Residence Hall,
Room 226;

Loretta Catto,
Wardahl Residence Hall,
Room 607;

Pamela Clifton,
Wardahl Residence Hall,
Room 604;

Connie Eggleston,
Wardahl Residence Hall,
Room 604;

Barbara Herron,
Wardahl Residence Hall,
Room 924;

Sandra Hill,
Wardahl Residence Hall,
Room 712;

Linda Banks,
Wardahl Residence Hall,
Room 712;

Sharon Thomas,
Wardahl Residence Hall,
Room 1125;

Jerry Jenkins,
Townsend Residence Hall,
Room 345;

George Rembert,
Townsend Residence Hall,
Room 439;

Marshall Sullivan,
Townsend Residence Hall,
Room 207;

Steve Carey,
316 South Prairie,
Apartment 104.

advised that there were three BPP members at these meetings, which he heard referred to by nicknames, "Bones", "Jimmy Hook", and "B.J.".

On February 6, and 7, 1969, Nick Makris, Owner, Chief Illini Motel, Urbana, Illinois, advised that the group of individuals occupying Room 17 at his motel were supposed to stay the night of February 5, 1969, however, they left the motel approximately 11:30 a.m. on February 5, 1969, taking all of their personal effects with them.

Makris advised that the following telephone numbers had been called by occupants of Room 17:

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

356-7236
356-3612
356-3620
356-6112
333-2304
(312) 528-1500
(312) 221-9550

On February 9, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised he observed an undated memorandum on the letterhead of Black Students Association, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, captioned "The Illinois Black Panther Party". According to this memorandum purported to be a report submitted by Ted Boston, Lieutenant of Security, and William Dunn, Lieutenant of Security, of the BPP, Chicago, Illinois, to Captain O'Neil, Security Department, BPP. This memorandum concerned activities of BPP in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, stated that they arrived at approximately 3:45 p.m., February 2, 1969, and set up their base of operations at Chief Illini Motel.

However, it was reported that on February 5, 1969, it was necessary to change the base of operations to Courtesy Motel, Urbana, Illinois, because of investigative interest taken in them by local police authorities.

It was reported that during the week, Deputy Minister of Defense Bobby Rush, was accompanied at all times by at least one armed member of security. It was further reported that shortly after moving to the Courtesy Motel, Field Marshall Nathaniel Junior and two other unnamed members of security arrived in the area.

On February 10, 1969, Katherine Neal, Courtesy Motel, Urbana, Illinois, advised that on February 5, 1969, a group of Negroes checked into the Courtesy Motel under the name William Johnson, 6317 South Laflin, Chicago, Illinois, and the vehicle he was using was indicated to be a Pontiac bearing Illinois license CS-2793. The group stayed at the motel the night of February 5, 1969, and the night of February 6, 1969, checking out of the motel on February 7, 1969. She advised that two local calls were placed by the group to telephone number 356-4693 and telephone number 333-2304, and two calls to

Chicago were placed to telephone numbers 528-0500 and 663-0423.

On February 8, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on the night of February 7, 1969, some "Black Panthers" were at the Illini Union, where they met with representatives of the Black Students Association. Two of the Black Panthers, Billie Brooks and William Dunn were arrested by the University of Illinois Police Department for disorderly conduct.

advised that the Black Students Association enlisted the aid of SDS in posting bond for the two Panthers.

He further advised that after Brooks and Dunn were released on $200 bond, the Black Panthers, telephonically contacted someone in Chicago, Illinois, requesting that three car-loads of Black Panthers be sent to Champaign-Urbana, Illinois. advised that the Panthers were staying at the Sheraton Motor Inn, Urbana, Illinois.

On February 8, 1969, Linda Rosson, Clerk, Sheraton Motor Inn, Urbana, Illinois, advised that there was no one registered at the Sheraton under the names mentioned above, however, a group of Negroes were checked into the motel late in the evening of February 7, 1969, or early in the morning on February 8, 1969, by the night clerk.

On February 8, 1969, Sergeant Earl Anderson, University of Illinois Police Department, Urbana, Illinois, advised that at approximately 8:00 p.m. on February 7, 1969, two uniformed officers of the University of Illinois Police Department were on duty in the Illini Union, when Billie Brooks shouted obscenities at the police officers and Brooks drew his fist back at one of the officers. A scuffle ensued with Brooks being arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest and William Dunn being arrested for disorderly conduct. Sergeant Anderson advised that extra police officers were assigned to the Illini Union and no further incidents occurred. Sergeant Anderson further described Billie Brooks, 1320 Kedoel, Chicago,

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Illinois, as a Negro male, born July 18, 1948, 5'11", 165 pounds, black hair, brown eyes. He described William Dunn, 7351 Princeton Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, as having the alias, "Bones", 5'8", 165 pounds.

Regarding the request for BPP personnel requested from Chicago, Illinois, this information was orally furnished to representatives of 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois; United States Secret Service, Springfield, Illinois; Office of Special Investigations, Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois; and the United States Attorney, East St. Louis, Illinois.

The February 8, 1969, issue of "The Daily Illini", on page 1, reported as follows:

Two members of the Illinois BPP were arrested at 8:00 p.m. Friday in the ground floor west corridor of the Illini Union on charges of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.

William Brooks, Black Panther Minister of Education, was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. William Dunn, Panther Lieutenant, was charged with disorderly conduct, Champaign County Police reported.

According to a statement issued by the Black Students Association(BSA), Brooks was sitting with three or four girls outside the bowling lanes. Two University Police passed them, then came back and one pointed his finger in Brooks' face, calling him a "bad ass" BSA charged.

BSA said there was no provocation and that the "sisters" stood between the officers and Brooks to defend Brooks. BSA feels the harrassment was brought about because the youths were black and in full Panther uniform.

BSA charged Dunn was arrested as he approached an officer to ask why Brooks was being arrested, and that several police immediately approached the scene.

An eye witness reported that one of the girls, while talking in the group, fell back against the bowling lane window pane, thus attracting the attention of the

University police. He said he then saw the officer point his finger and say something to one of the black students.

He said the student then shouted a profanity at the officer.

Bail was set at $200 for both men. Some $87 was collected by BSA and SDS members Friday night.

On February 8, 1969, advised that he was at the Illini Union at approximately 9:30 p.m. on February 7, 1969, and he had heard that two of the Black Panthers had been arrested. He stated that there was no subsequent activity, and he had heard of no retaliatory measures planned by BPP members.

On February 8, 1969, Dick Atkins, Night Clerk, Sheraton Motor Inn, Urbana, Illinois, advised that none of the above mentioned individuals were registered at the Sheraton, however, at 3:30 a.m. on February 8, 1969, a group of Negroes were registered at the Sheraton in Rooms 240 and 241 under the one name, Anderson, 2605 South Carter Street, Detroit, Michigan.

With regard to the above information furnished by Atkins, has advised that the BPP members registered at the Sheraton Motor Inn were under the name, John Anderson, 2605 South Carter, Detroit, Michigan, which the informant said was a fictitious name.

On February 9, 1969, Lieutenant Lonnie Waller, Urbana, Illinois Police Department, advised that at approximately 10:30 p.m. on February 8, 1969, two separate groups were staying at the Sheraton Motor Inn, one group Negro, and the other group Caucasian, and an incident arose between the two groups. Urbana Police Officers were on the scene during routine patrol, when a group of white males were seen running out of the Sheraton Motor Inn. One or two of these individuals approached the police officers and reported that a shooting had occurred. The officers responded by proceeding to the second floor of the Sheraton Motor Inn and a group of approximately twenty Negroes, males and females, were seen dispersing in varied directions from Rooms 240 and 241. Ted Boston and Bobby Lee Rush were stopped in the hallway, at which time, a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver was observed protruding from a piece of luggage in the possession of Rush.

Investigation at the scene determined that two shots had been fired with no one injured. Rush and Boston were taken to the Urbana Police Station, however, only Bobby Lee Rush, 2030 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois, described as a Negro male, born November 23, 1946, was charged with unlawful use of weapons and having no Firearms Registration identification card.

Boston was released and Rush was immediately released, when he posted 10% of a $2000 bond.

After Boston and Rush were released, the Urbana Police Department determined from the Chicago, Illinois Police Department that the revolver, which was confiscated from Rush, had been stolen at Chicago, Illinois. Lieutenant Waller advised that his department was to contact a Detective Magnaritz, Area 2, Chicago, Illinois Police Department, concerning the possibility of charging Rush with an additional offense.

Waller further advised that investigation had been conducted to determine the cause of the shooting, and from their investigation it appeared that the group of Caucasians and group of Negroes had met in the hall in the Sheraton Motor Inn, and a "pushing match" had ensued, and a fight developed. Waller advised that Billy Brooks, a member of the BPP, had gone to Burnham City Hospital, Champaign, Illinois, with a swollen nose, which he reportedly received as a result of the fight at the Sheraton Motor Inn. Waller further advised that a physician at Burnham City Hospital had advised that Brooks was not seriously injured.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Waller continued to relate that later in the evening, the Urbana Police Department surveilled the Sheraton Motor Inn, and two cars containing Bobby Rush and Ted Boston, with an undetermined number of associates, were observed to proceed North on U. S. Highway 45 towards Chicago, Illinois. The two cars were observed until they reached Thomasboro, Illinois, at which time the surveillance was discontinued.

On February 9, 1969, Forest Clark, Trooper, Illinois State Police, Pesotum, Illinois, advised that he received a call at approximately Noon on February 9, 1969, that individuals had "skipped" from the Holiday Inn at Rantoul, Illinois, and he was furnished a description of the vehicles. At approximately 12:11 p.m. he stopped two cars, one a late model black vinyl over maroon Pontiac, bearing 1968 Illinois license PW2936, operated by Robert J. Bruce, 28 South 15th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois, and the second vehicle, a 1964 lavender GTO, bearing 1968 Illinois license CS2793, operated by William O. Dunn, 7351 South Princeton, Chicago, Illinois.

Clark advised that the total number of occupants of the two vehicles were eleven, and that Larry Johnson, Champaign County State's Attorney, Urbana, Illinois, had authorized the charging of all eleven individuals with three charges, defrauding an innkeeper, theft, and conspiracy to commit theft.

Clark further advised that Johnson had considered having search warrants issued to search the vehicles for any stolen property from the motel. However, the vehicles were impounded since the operators had been arrested, and the vehicles were inventoried routinely pursuant to impoundment. Clark advised that there were no weapons found in the vehicles.

Clark advised that on February 9, 1969, all eleven individuals that he had stopped in the two vehicles were arrested, charged as above, and incarcerated in the Champaign County Jail, Urbana, Illinois.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

On February 9, and 10, 1969, the records of the Champaign County Sheriff's Office, Urbana, Illinois, and the Urbana, Illinois Police Department, disclosed the following descriptive data of the individuals arrested.

Fred Hampton

Race: Negro
Sex: Male
Residence: 804 South 17th Street,
Maywood, Illinois
Date of Birth: August 30, 1948
Height: 6'0"
Weight: 200 pounds
Hair: Black
Eyes: Brown
Marital Status: Single
Nearest Relative: Mother, Iberia,
804 South 17th Street,
Maywood, Illinois
Occupation: Student, Crane College

Donna J. Washington

Race: Negro
Sex: Female
Residence: Sonder Residence Hall,
Room 125, Pennsylvania Avenue,
Urbana, Illinois
Height: 5'0"
Weight: 118 pounds
Date of Birth: December 26, 1951
Place of Birth: Chicago, Illinois
Hair: Black
Eyes: Brown
Marital Status: Single
Nearest Relative: Imogene, 6215 South Wabash,
Chicago, Illinois
Occupation: Student, University of Illinois

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Robert J. Bruce

Race: Negro
Sex: Male
Residence: 28 South 15th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois
Date of Birth: November 28, 1947
Place of Birth: Chicago, Illinois
Height: 6'2"
Weight: 165 pounds
Hair: Black
Eyes: Brown
Marital Status: Married, wife Jean (two children)
Occupation: Material Handler - International Harvester, Broadview, Illinois
Vehicle: 1965 Pontiac

Ted Boston

Race: Negro
Sex: Male
Residence: 6535 South Woodlawn Street, Chicago, Illinois
Date of Birth: September 7, 1945
Place of Birth: Chicago, Illinois
Height: 5'11½"
Weight: 155 pounds
Marital Status: Single
Occupation: Student, Crain Junior College

Nathaniel W. Junior

Race: Negro
Sex: Male
Residence: 7511 West 64th Street, Chicago, Illinois
Date of Birth: October 21, 1946
Place of Birth: Detroit, Michigan
Height: 6'
Weight: 145 pounds
Hair: Black
Eyes: Brown

Marital Status: Single
Occupation: Student, Central YMCA,
Chicago, Illinois

Ronald Jerome Satchel

Race: Negro
Sex: Male
Residence: 6846 South Clyde Street,
Chicago, Illinois
Date of Birth: June 22, 1950
Place of Birth: Cleveland, Ohio
Height: 5'6"
Weight: 124 pounds
Hair: Black
Eyes: Brown
Marital Status: Single
Nearest Relative: Mother, Clara Bridges,
6846 South Clyde Street,
Chicago, Illinois
Occupation: Student, University of Illinois
Circle Campus, Chicago, Illinois

Christina May

Race: Negro
Sex: Female
Residence: 11358 South Bishop,
Chicago, Illinois
Date of Birth: October 20, 1949
Place of Birth: Chicago, Illinois
Height: 5'1"
Weight: 120 pounds
Hair: Brown
Eyes: Brown
Marital Status: Single
Nearest Relative: Father, Ezzie, 11358 South Bishop,
Chicago, Illinois
Occupation: Student, University of Illinois,
Chicago, Illinois

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Jeldean Eldridge

Race: Negro
Sex: Female
Residence: Lincoln Avenue Residence Hall,
Room 161, 1005 Lincoln,
Urbana, Illinois
Date of Birth: December 23, 1949
Height: 5'7"
Weight: 134 pounds
Hair: Black
Eyes: Brown
Marital Status: Married
Nearest Relative: Father, Ashley,
8327 South Green,
Chicago, Illinois
Occupation: Student, University of Illinois

Phyllis Elaine Clarke

Race: Negro
Sex: Female
Residence: 13072 South Evans,
Chicago, Illinois
Date of Birth: March 24, 1951
Place of Birth: Chicago, Illinois
Height: 5'5"
Weight: 145 pounds
Hair: Black
Eyes: Brown
Marital Status: Single
Nearest Relative: Pauline Clarke,
13072 South Evans,
Chicago, Illinois
Occupation: Student, University of Illinois
Room 127 Saunders Hall,
901 College Court,
Urbana, Illinois

William Otis Emanual Dunn, also known as "Bones"

Race: Negro
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: December 18, 1946
Place of Birth: Chicago, Illinois

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Residence: 7351 South Princeton, Chicago, Illinois
Height: 5'8"
Weight: 163 pounds
Hair: Brown
Eyes: Brown

Bobby Lee Rush

Race: Negro
Sex: Male
Residence: 2030 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois
Date of Birth: November 23, 1946
Place of Birth: Georgia
Height: 6'1"
Weight: 195 pounds
Hair: Black
Eyes: Brown

On February 9, 1969, Forest Clark, Trooper, Illinois State Police, Pesotum, Illinois, advised that during the inventory of Bruce's Pontiac, several rounds of .22 caliber ammunition were found in the trunk compartment, and Bruce would be charged additionally with not having a firearm owner's registration identification card.

On February 10, 1969, advised that Walter Jones and Main (phonetic) Jones, two brothers, were operating a 1966 Bonneville, black vinyl over black, bearing 1968 Illinois license MT4499. advised that they were transporting BPP personnel between Chicago, Illinois, and Champaign-Urbana, Illinois. further advised that he had been approached by Harry Chambers, a local Negro resident of Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, and Chambers advised that he would pay him if he would provide transportation for Black Panthers between Chicago, Illinois, and Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, if the transportation was needed.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

further advised that a "power play" is developing between John Lee Johnson and the BPP representatives from Chicago, Illinois. According to Johnson feels that the BPP organization at Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, is being organized between the Black Panthers from Chicago and black students at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, without due consideration to the Negroes of the North End section of Champaign, Illinois. advised that there are several Negro families in Champaign, Illinois, who moved to this area from Tennessee. Johnson has gathered behind him fifteen to twenty young Negro members of these families, ranging in ages from fourteen to twenty, and on the evening of February 9, 1969, Johnson sent some of these youths to the vicinity of the campus of the University of Illinois, and two or three individuals were beat up by these youths. According to , Johnson is creating this activity to show the Black Panthers from Chicago, Illinois, that he has a backing in the community.

advised that Ivory Taliferro, Jr., who previously attended a meeting held by John Lee Johnson, was driving a 1960 Oldsmobile, blue, with Illinois license ET353. He further advised that Ronnie Brown, a local Negro resident, was seen in the 1966 Bonneville with Walter Jones, and it would appear that Brown was taking a greater interest in the BPP activity in Champaign, Illinois.

On February 10, 1969, advised that on February 9, 1969, BSA held a meeting at the Illini Union, at which time David Addison, President of BSA, was removed as President, and a student by the last name of Chandler was elected President.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Black Panther Party

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of two to fifteen years on a conviction of man-slaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther", which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service", states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5 , 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contains quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Students for a Democratic Society

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. The SDS is an association of young people on the left and has a current program of protesting the draft, promoting a campaign for youth to develop a conscientious objector status, denouncing United States Intervention in the war in Vietnam, and to "radically transform" the university community, and provide for its complete control by students. Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, when interviewed by a representative of United Press International in San Francisco, California, on May 14, 1965, described the SDS as a part of the "responsible left" which the Party has "going for us.". At the June, 1965, SDS National Convention, an anticommunist proviso was removed from the SDS constitution. In the October 7, 1966, issue of "New Left Notes," the official publication of SDS, an SDS spokesman stated that there are some communists in SDS and they are welcome. The national headquarters of this organization as of July 24, 1968, was located in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

APPENDIX

153

FBI

Date: 2/19/69

ransmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

ia ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: "THIRD WORLD UNITY CONFERENCE,"
OLIVET PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, 2/14 - 16/69
RM

1 copy each of said LHM has been furnished to USA and U.S. Secret Service, both Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois

RAC

154

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
February 19, 1969

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

"THIRD WORLD UNITY CONFERENCE,"
OLIVET PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,
FEBRUARY 14 - 16, 1969

A confidential source advised on February 13, 1969, that Luis John Cuza, Leader of the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican youth gang located on the near North side of Chicago, was heard to comment that he first formulated plans for the February 14, 1969, Youth Conference at a meeting held in his home early in January, 1969. Several persons were present during this meeting, and it was decided to seek help from the "Community Renewal Society" and it's sponsoring church, to obtain money in order to hold this conference. Cuza planned to obtain the use of the Olivet Presbyterian Church, 1443 North Cleveland Avenue, as a conference site. At a meeting of the same people several days later, Cuza announced that he obtained the use of that church for February 14, 15, and 16, 1969. Cuza said he planned to have Charles Koen, militant black leader from St. Louis, and Midwest Director of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), in attendance. Cuza said that at this conference he expected members of the various Latin American and Puerto Rican youth gangs to attend. Cuza said the purpose of the conference would be to create a brotherhood between black and Latin people, and this would be a brotherhood workshop.

For a characterization of SNCC, see the attached appendix page.

The above source advised Cuza approached Charles Koen as to whether or not he could attend this three-day conference, and Koen stated he would try to come. Koen stated that as Midwest Director of SNCC, he travels throughout the United States and has visited Los Angeles, New York, Washington, D.C., and St. Louis. Koen stated he has met with

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

"THIRD WORLD UNITY CONFERENCE,"
OLIVET PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,
FEBRUARY 14 - 16, 1969

many nationally-known militant black nationalist groups. Koen's objective is to set up a meeting of the leadership of various groups so that common objectives and policies could be determined and to prevent these groups from working at cross purposes. Koen did not give any details as to the time or location of this meeting, but did state it was to be kept as secret as possible to avoid attention from any police or government authorities.

The above source made available a leaflet announcing the Third World Unity Conference, a copy of which is attached near the end of this communication.

A second confidential source advised on February 17, 1969, that the Third World Unity Conference was held as scheduled at the Olivet Presbyterian Church, 1443 North Cleveland Avenue, Chicago. The conference was sponsored by Black Active and Determined (BAD), a Negro youth group located on the near North side of Chicago, and by the Young Lords. The conference began at 7:30 p.m. on February 14, 1969. All persons were searched for weapons prior to being admitted to the conference. This source made available a schedule for the conference, a copy of which is attached near the end of this communication. Speakers at this session of the conference were Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Chicago Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and Luis Cuza, Leader of the Young Lords.

For a characterization of the BPP, see the attached appendix page.

Hampton spoke about the BPP and stated he was seeking recruits for that organization. The source estimated the attendance at this session at about 20 persons, 13 of whom were blacks and 7 Puerto Ricans. The meeting ended at 9 p.m.

The second source advised that the conference was resumed on February 15, 1969, and the speakers were Hampton and Russ Meek, a militant black radio and television personality in Chicago, who spoke concerning police brutality. Approximately

50 persons attended this session, 35 of whom were black and 15 Latin Americans. Hampton again spoke of recruiting members for the BPP. Following the speeches, the meeting broke up into various workshops.

A third source advised on February 17, 1969, that this conference resumed it's meeting on February 16, 1969, and consisted primarily of several workshops. He noted that the majority of the participants appeared to be members of the Young Lords, and discussion centered mainly on police brutality. The meeting ended without incident.

On February 17, 1969, a representative of the Chicago Police Department, Chicago, Illinois, advised that department had patroled the vicinity of the Olivet Presbyterian Church, and that no unusual incidents were reported in connection with the conference being held there.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC), CHICAGO BRANCH

A source advised in May, 1968, that the Chicago branch of the SNCC is an affiliate of the national SNCC with headquarters located in Atlanta, Georgia. It is a non-membership type group headed in Chicago by ROBERT ALFONZO BROWN, a 19 year old male Negro, with the title of Midwest Region Director. BROWN maintains strict loyalty to STOKELY CARMICHAEL, Recruiter and Organizer and former National Director of SNCC. BROWN attempts to align Chicago's SNCC activities within the framework of CARMICHAEL's policies.

In a speech at Chicago on March 25,1968, CARMICHAEL commented as follows:

"The white people are preparing to commit genocide against the black race. What are we feeling so moral about? We know the honky got everything. He got it by stealing it. He's not going to give you anything. We got to take it. These brothers on the streets every day take it, but they're taking it for themselves. Let's organize them and let them take it for our people."

The source advised the Chicago branch of the SNCC operates from BROWN's residence. BROWN and several associates attempt to implement CARMICHAEL's policies through contacts in the Negro youth gangs, student groups, and black power oriented organizations to influence opposition to white power structures through boycott and intimidation methods.

APPENDIX

1

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), headquartered at 360-362 Nelson Street, S. W., Atlanta, Georgia, is a nonmembership organization, which was born out of the sit-in movement that erupted across the South beginning in 1960.

Today SNCC identifies itself as an organization in the revolutionary vanguard. It advocates that to be successful it is necessary to develop a revolutionary ideology and revolutionary program.

According to SNCC the year 1967 marked a historic milestone in the struggle for the liberation of black people in the United States and the year that revolutionaries throughout the world began to understand more fully the impact of the black movement. SNCC declared that "liberation will come only when there is final destruction of this mad octopus--the capitalistic system of the United States with all its life-sucking tentacles of exploitation and racism that choke the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The realities of black life, together with the recognition instilled in SNCC workers forced its members to further popularize the legitimacy of self-defense and rebellions when oppression became too great."

From May, 1966, until May, 1967, Stokely Carmichael was National Chairman of SNCC. As of July, 1968, Carmichael resided in Washington, D. C., where he was affiliated with SNCC and active as temporary chairman of a black coalition group. In May, 1967, Carmichael was replaced by Hubert Geroid Brown, commonly known as H. Rap Brown, who served until June, 1968.

In June, 1968, at the Staff and Central Committee meeting of SNCC held in Atlanta, Georgia, it was decided to restructure the organization by equalization of responsibility by creating ten deputy-or vice chairmanships. The primary purpose for this change is to take law enforcement pressure off any single individual.

ATTENTION

BROTHERS AND SISTERS

THIRD WORLD UNITY CONFERENCE

BLACK and LATINS UNITE

GUEST SPEAKERS
WORK SHOPS
ENTERTAINMENT
REFRESHMENTS

FEBRUARY 14, 1969 FRIDAY, 7:30 P.M.
ALSO FEBRUARY 15TH AND 16TH AT 10:00A.M.

OLIVET PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH
1443 N. CLEVELAND

SPONSORED BY

Black Active and Determined

AND

Young Lords

THIRD WORLD UNITY CONFERENCE
FEBRUARY 14, 15, 16, 1969
OLIVET PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH 1443 NORTH CLEVELAND
BLACK, ACTIVE, and DETERMINED
YOUNG LORDS

Friday, February 14

7:30 p.m. Registration & Orientation
8:15 p.m. Opening Speaker

Saturday, February 15

10:00 a.m. Registration
11:00 a.m. Speaker
11:30 a.m. Workshops
1:00 p.m. Lunch Break
2:00 p.m. Speaker
3:00 p.m. Community Work

8:00 p.m. Dance

Sunday, February 16

10:00 a.m. Brief Workshop Review
11:00 a.m. General Session
1:00 p.m. Break
2:00 p.m. General Session
4:00 p.m. Closing Remarks

WORKSHOPS:

A. Black Students and the Developement of a Black Educational System

B. Third World; Impact on White Contemporary Society

C. Black Community Organization

D. Latin American Community Organization

E. Latin's Workshop

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
February 19, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title "THIRD WORLD UNITY CONFERENCE,"
OLIVET PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,
FEBRUARY 14 - 16, 1969

Character RACIAL MATTERS

Reference Airtel and letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

155

2/26/69
PLAINTEXT

TELETYPE DEFERRED

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM: SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

RACIAL TENSIONS, MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, NINETEEN SIXTY NINE.

RM. [redacted]

CAPTAIN WILBERT SAMUELS, MAYWOOD, ILL., PD, REPORTED INSTANT UNIDENTIFIED PERSON OR PERSONS SPLASHED UNIDENTIFIED FLAMABLE LIQUID ON LOADING DOCK AND NEARBY EMPTY TRAILER, MADISON CHEMICAL COMPANY, MAYWOOD, EARLY THIS A.M. AND IGNITED SAME. MAYWOOD FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONDED TWO FORTY EIGHT A.M. INSTANT EXTINGUISHING FIRE. TRUCK AND TRAILER CHARRED. DAMAGES ESTIMATED ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS. NO SPECIFIC SUSPECTS. INVESTIGATION CONTINUING. MAYWOOD PD AWARE OF PREVIOUS REPORTS OVER LAST YEAR FROM CHICAGO SOURCE, RELIABLE IN PAST, TO EFFECT FRED HAMPTON AND ASSOCIATES DISCUSSED POSSIBLITY OF TORCHING MADISON CHEMICAL COMPANY. SAME SOURCE HAS IDENTIFIED HAMPTON AS ONE OF CURRENT LEADERS IN BLACK PANTHER PARTY, CHICAGO. MILITARY ADVISED.

DMF

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOV[illegible]MENT

Memorandum

156

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: FEB 25 1969

FROM : SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS,
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS 1968 - 1969,
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

One LEROY JONES was with FRED HAMPTON and PAUL WADE at the College Campus over the past week end and helped them to start trouble. Informant learned this from PAUL WADE who also advised they (WADE and HAMPTON) went to the College after WADE had received a telephone call from a girl, not identified, who asked HAMPTON to come and speak at the campus.

JWG:

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

HAMPTON was paid $900.00 and JONES was paid $2,500.00 for their appearances at the campus according to PAUL WADE, and this money came from parties and dances at the campus.

There is a party which will be held tonight in Maywood to celebrate the birthday of HUEY NEWTON. There will be a meeting tomorrow night (2/18/69) at ROBERT BRUCE's house.

The party was held on 2/17/69, at "The Nursery" and about 25 BPP members were present including HAMPTON, BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, PETER HAMMACK, and WESLEY WADE. A collection of $60.00 was taken and sent to NEWTON.

There was a meeting on 2/18/69, at BRUCE's house with 15 persons in attendance, including a few girls. HAMPTON, BRUCE, ALLEN, KENNY BELL, TYRONE GLADNEY, WESLEY WADE, and one JOE BROWN were present. BROWN has been out of military service for about 6 months and is believed to be living in Broadview, Illinois. The main purpose of the meeting was to plan a big push against white people this summer to move them out of the black neighborhoods and business areas everywhere, Maywood included. Details were not discussed. A flyer will be passed out soon about this matter.

FRED HAMPTON does not want Negro youths going into military service. When he hears that someone has been drafted he tells them not to go, particularly if they are members of the BPP.

He talked to MARCELLES LACY and JOE WATTS, two Negro youths from Maywood, when they were drafted, but they both went into the service anyway.

157

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
February 26, 1969

RACIAL TENSIONS, NORTHERN
ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
DE KALB, ILLINOIS

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA)

On February 25, 1969 a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past supplied the following information:

A panel-type discussion entitled "Black Liberation Front" which was sponsored by the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) of Northern Illinois University, De Kalb, Illinois, was held in Sandburg Hall at said university on that night. The audience numbered approximately 450 persons of whom 100 were Negroes, 150 were "hippie-type" individuals and 200 curiosity seekers.

The moderator of the panel was Paul Boutelle, a member of the New York Socialist Workers Party. The members of the panel were Robert Lucas, President of the Black Liberation Alliance, James Harvey, UMOJA, Anas Luqman, Executive Director of the Malcolm X Black Hand Society of the World, Incorp., Frederick Allen Hampton, Deputy Chairman of the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois, Ron March, leader of the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement, William Allen of the Concerned Transit Workers, Georgia English, a black nationalist from Chicago, and Reverend George Edgar Reddick of Operation Breadbasket. All of the above named persons are Negroes.

Each of the above persons spoke for 15 minutes after which a question and answer period followed which lasted about one hour. The topic of the discussion was peaceful means through which Negroes can obtain the things they seek. However, Hampton, using some profanity, talked of taking militant action against the white society and advocating the elimination of whites.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside ~~your agency~~

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED

RACIAL TENSIONS, NORTHERN
ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
DE KALB, ILLINOIS

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA)

The panel discussion took place between 7:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. and it ended without incident.

A second confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the crowd at the meeting was overwhelmingly white with only a smattering of Negroes.

This source stated that Frederick Hampton, who arrived at the meeting late,was the final speaker. He enumerated the 10 point program of the Black Panther Party. He said that whatever white people advocate, blacks should oppose and blacks should bear arms only against whites. He added that peace is possible only through a gun barrel and if a white comes to him bearing arms he will lay him out.

A white girl in the audience asked Hampton if he was advocating killing whites and getting guns to defend against whites. When he answered in the affirmative, she said "Are we that bad?" He then related how blacks have been treated by whites and that they would no longer stand it. She asked how blacks expected to accomplish this since they are a minority race. He said"That's a lie" and he began to scream at her, calling her a "hippie" and then asked her if she wanted him to make love to her. She began to weep and left the hall.

A white male listener, referring to statements about military force, asked Hampton if they really had guns. He answered "I'm not going to tell you what we have but don't fool with us." When the man asked other questions, Hampton told him to leave as the girl did.

The audience then became excited and began asking questions at all panelists without first being recognized. Many shouted their displeasure at the tone and

and content of the remarks of the speakers, especially Hampton. At that point, Boutelle, the moderator, declared the meeting adjourned.

After the meeting adjourned, without further incident, several of the panel members went to the black student offices on the campus where about 125 black students were present. Hampton told them the blacks have to take over because whites will not give them there rights. He told them to stop attending white schools, to read Marx and Malcolm, prepare for the revolution, and get guns.

Said second source advised that the Black Liberation Alliance is a recently organized militant Negro organization comprised primarily of former members of the Chicago branch of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) who defected from CORE during the latter part of 1968.

Malcolm X was a black nationalist who was killed in New York City on February 21, 1965 during a rally of his followers. The Malcolm X Black Hand Society of the World, Incorp. was formed in Chicago, Illinois in the summer of 1968 for the announced purpose of perpetuating his memory and to stress black unity.

The Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement was the black caucus of the Detroit United Auto Workers Union and the Concerned Transit Workers were Negro bus drivers who conducted a wildcat strike of the Chicago Transit Authority in the summer of 1968.

Operation Breadbasket is the economic program of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

James Harvey is a militant black nationalist who has been active as spokesman for militant black student organizations.

RACIAL TENSIONS, NORTHERN
ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
DE KALB, ILLINOIS

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA)

Characterizations of YSA, YSA, Chicago and Black Panther Party are attached to this memorandum. The Socialist Workers Party has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Copies of this memoranum are being furnished to United States Attorney, and United States Secret Service, both Chicago, and Region I, 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois.

1

APPENDIX

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May, 1960, issue of the "Young Socialist" (YS), page 1, column 3, disclosed that during April 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled "The Young Socialist Alliance" (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated that this organization was formed by the nationwide supporter clubs of the publication YS.

The above issue, page 6, set forth the Founding Declaration of the YSA. This declaration stated that the YSA recognizes the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political leadership on class struggle principles of revolutionary socialism.

On March 10, 1967, a source advised that the YSA was formed during 1957, by youth of various left socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The source further advised that the YSA has recently become more open about admitting that it is the youth group of the SWP and that an SWP representative has publicly stated that the YSA is the SWP's youth group.

The National Headquarters of the YSA are located in Rooms 532-536, 41 Union Square West, New York City.

On October 31, 1967, a second source advised that at the 22nd National Convention of the SWP held in New York City from October 26, 1967, to October 29, 1967, it was stated that the YSA remained as the main recruiting ground for new SWP members.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A characterization of "Young Socialist" is set out separately.

1

APPENDIX

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE-CHICAGO

A source advised in late November, 1959, that the Young Socialist Alliance-Chicago (YSA-C), formerly known as Young Socialist Supporters, had its origin in a series of informal discussions held in Chicago prior to June, 1959, among individuals who were close to the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The YSA-C as of November, 1959, proclaimed itself to be a city-wide revolutionary youth organization designed to build socialism in America and aimed toward youth on college campuses in the Chicago area and as being independent of all adult groupings.

According to a second source in April, 1968, the YSA-C was considered the youth group of the Chicago Branch SWP and affiliated with the national organization of the YSA in New York. The YSA-C officers as of April, 1968, were current members of the Chicago SWP.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

158

SAC, CHICAGO [redacted] 3/4/69

SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS
1969
RM

[redacted]

Where appropriate, the information set forth has been disseminated to local authorities.

Informant advised on February 20, 1969, the following:

Informant made available a copy of a four page flyer "Black Panther Weekend Newsletter" dated February 1, 1969, and a copy of "The Black Panther" newspaper dated February 17, 1969. He advised the next meeting would be on February 24, 1969, at the home of ROBERT BRUCE, 28 South 15th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois.

[redacted]

JWG

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
March 4, 1969

JAMES HAROLD IVORY

On December 20, 1969, Captain Wilbert Samuels, Maywood, Illinois, Police Department, advised an agent of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that Ivory's Mob Action trial was transferred from Oak Park, Illinois, into Chicago, Illinois, and continued.

On January 13, 1969, a representative of the Chicago Office of the FBI reviewed the records of the Chicago, Illinois, Police Department concerning James Ivory's June 6, 1964, disorderly arrest and it was determined that the record of this arrest was on microfilm and not readable.

On February 26, 1969, Captain Samuels, Maywood, Illinois, Police Department, advised an agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that Ivory's Mob Action trial commenced in Cook County Court on that date and that the jury selection will commence on February 27, 1969.

On February 28, 1969, Captain Samuels advised an agent of the Chicago Office of the FBI that the jury has been selected at Ivory's Mob Action trial and it continues. However, Captain Samuels noted Ivory's attorney moved that any testimony by Maywood Village Counsel Robert Grundin be not allowed and the motion was granted. Captain Samuels explained that Grundin would have testified of how at Chamber of Commerce Dinner two days after the July 30, 1968, mob action incident but prior to Ivory's arrest, Ivory bragged to a group at the dinner of how he (Ivory) had led the Maywood Negro youths to the Village Hall on July 30, 1968.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Re: JAMES HAROLD IVORY

A copy of this memorandum has been furnished to the following agencies:

United States Secret Service
Chicago, Illinois

Region I
113th Military Intelligence Group
Evanston, Illinois

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

160

: SAC, CHICAGO DATE: 3/10/69

OM : SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

BJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOODM ILLINOIS - 1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

FRED HAMPTON spoke before a group of about two hundred Negro youths and adults at the Irving School, 16th and Madison, Maywood, on Friday night, 2/28/69. This was sponsored by a sorority, and was about Negro history.

JWG.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

BPP meetings will be held at ROBERT BRUCE's house, 28 South 15th Avenue, Maywood, on Monday, Wednesday and Friday nights from now on. HAMPTON met with BPP members G. PERKINS, BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, PETE HAMMACK, T. GLADNEY, MATTHEW and WILMA ANGRUM (previously thought to be INGRAM) at BRUCE's house, 3/3/69. They discussed a rally to be held in the near future.

Informant advised on 3/5/69:

FRED HAMPTON is attempting to locate an individual who used to make ammunition in Maywood. HAMPTON wants to see if the individual will make ammunition and sell it to him.

HAMPTON also has been going to various gun shops in the suburban towns around Chicago and is trying to buy pistols. He has even offered to pay more than the list price.

On 3/4/69, HAMPTON stated he has had little luck in obtaining new guns, but has purchased a few used guns from private citizens.

Informant advised on 3/6/69:

At the meeting on 3/5/69, at BRUCE's house, HAMPTON stated he has a deal whereby he can purchase 16 twenty-five caliber automatics for $700. He wants all the BPP members to chip in and split the cost and each would get a gun. There were 12 members at this meeting including WESLEY WADE, BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, ALLEN's wife, TYRONE GLADNEY, PETE HAMMACK, JOANNE (LNU), and others unknown to informant.

HAMPTON stated that on Friday night, 3/7/69, all the members would meet at BRUCE's then they will go to the Irving School and gather Negroes along the way for a rally. He wants posters made up also, announcing the rally.

WALTER ALLEN is described as about twenty years old, very dark complected, short, and thin. He is not employed.

ROBERT BRUCE is employed, place unknown.

GREGORY PERKINS was married a month ago, moved to a new address (formerly 1019 South 14th Avenue, Maywood), and is employed by Jewel Foods. He is a member of the BPP.

MURTHY WADE is still employed at Commonwealth Edison, and resides at 1711 St. Charles Road, Maywood.

KENNETH BELL still lives at his same address, attends school, and works at odd jobs.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

161

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 3/18/69

FROM : SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS
1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

Informant advised on March 7, 1969:

FRED HAMPTON said he will institute a 6 week training course for BPP members to begin in a couple of weeks. This will be to help the members learn the rules, their rights when arrested and maybe some training in the use of firearms. He will have three teachers. HAMPTON also said he wants to get some of the new rapid fire army rifles.

]

JWG/

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Informant advised on March 11, 1969:

There was a BPP meeting on March 10 at ROBERT BRUCE's house with 30-35 BPP members present. Five or six girls were present this time. HAMPTON played 3 or 4 tapes from ELDRIGE CLEAVER who said on the tapes that the BPP must get HUEY NEWTON out of jail. CLEAVER promised that if NEWTON is gotten out of jail in one way or another, then he, CLEAVER, will personally walk up to President NIXON and slap him in the face. CLEAVER also said on the tape that the Negro made the mistake of burning their own property when MARTIN LUTHER KING was killed whereas they should have burned property of the whites. He wants Negroes to stop stealing from other Negroes and committing crimes against Negroes.

Informant advised on March 13, 1969:

There was a meeting on March 12, 1969, at ROBERT BRUCE's house, 28 South 15th Avenue. Present were: HAMPTON, BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, TYRONE GLADNEY, WESLEY WADE, GREGORY PERKINS, WILMA and MATHEW AUGRUM, PETER HAMMACK, 4 girls, 3 young men from Argo-Summit and several others for a total of about 25. All are BPP members. NEIL THOMAS is a Sergeant-at-Arms for these meetings.

At the beginning of the meeting, TED ALLEN, a Negro real estate agent in Maywood showed up and said that in view of past threats and harrassment by HAMPTON, he has decided to leave Maywood and move to California. He then left the meeting.

HAMPTON said that DON WILLIAMS is still trying to get office space for the BPP in Maywood. WILLIAMS is not a member of the BPP but appears to be sympathetic to HAMPTON and his causes, including the BPP.

PETE HAMMACK said he wants to get himself arrested for some type of BPP activity and then sue the arresting authorities so that the trial will be the BPP against the state which will result in great publicity for the BPP and its goals.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

162

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 3/24/69

FROM : SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, 1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to Local Authorities.

Informant advised on 3/13/69:

JWG

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Informant made available copies of 6 flyers being passed out by the BPP in Maywood. These were entitled "Ten Point Program," "6 Week Vocabulary Test," "Responsibilities of Provate," "8 Points of Attention," "Attention - Letter from Black Panther Acting Deputy Minister of Education," and "Definitions - Minister of Education."

Informant advised on 3/17/69:

FRED HAMPTON has obtained through DON WILLIAMS, the old 5 & 10¢ Store at 17th and Madison. The BPP will set up a suburban headquarters here at the beginning of April.

DON WILLIAMS is not a member of the BPP.

Informant advised on 3/19:

There was a meeting at ROBERT BRUCE's house, 28 South 15th Avenue on 3/17/. Present were HAMPTON, BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, PETER HAMMACK, WESLEY WADE, "BOBBY" CARSWELL, TYRONE GLADNEY, WILMA and MATHEW ANGRUM, three unknown males from Argo-Summit.

One JIMMY PERRY (Pb) from La Grange was at the meeting and it appears he will try to gather a group of youths from La Grange to join the BPP.

Informant subsequently advised on 3/19:

A meeting was held at BRUCE's house on 3/19 with the same individuals present as on 3/17 except there were also present three girls and four boys from Argo-Summit. There also were two older men in their late 20's or early 30's present, but their identities are unknown.

The discussion at both meetings was about the rules and regulations of the B.P.P. and the ways to attract new members.

FRED HAMPTON left the meeting early, alone.

ROBERT BRUCE and WALLER ALLEN each have a .32 caliber pistol in their cars.

163

SAC, CHICAGO 3/28/69

SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS
1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

Informant furnished the following information on 3/21/69:

FRED HAMPTON and several other members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) intended to travel to the High School Basketball playoff games. If Proviso East High School loses, there may be on opportunity to cause some type of trouble.

Informant advised on 3/23/69:

In view of the fact Proviso East High School won the State Championship, no occasion arose for the BPP to cause an incident and they returned to Maywood.

Informant advised on 3/25/69:

HAMPTON went to Evanston on 3/24/69 and met with one GEORGE (LNU) who manages the "House of Black". GEORGE (LNU) spoke of holding BPP meeting at the "House of Black"

JWG

if a BPP group is formed in Evanston. He asked HAMPTON how money was gathered to support BPP activities and HAMPTON told him about holding parties and dances and charging admission. HAMPTON gave as an example an event to be held in Maywood on the night of 3/27/69 which will be a "show" wherein speakers will talk about Negro histroy and there will be an exhibition of Negro dancing and the admission is $1.00. This is how money is gathered to support the BPP.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

164

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 4/4/69

FROM : SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, 1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

Informant advised on 3/27:

There was a meeting of the BPP on 3/26 from 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. at the home of ROBERT BRUCE, 28 South 15th Avenue, Maywood. Present were FRED HAMPTON, ROBERT BRUCE, TYRONE GLADNEY, WALTER ALLEN, PETER HAMMACK, MATHEW ARRGRUM, WILMA ARRGRUM and several girls.

HAMPTON mentioned that the Tasty Freeze is open again at 12th and Madison and he believes that the alleged Negro owners are only fronts, for the real owners who are white. If this is the case, then it should be burned out again. The BPP members discussed the best time to burn anything is at the late evening change of shifts at the police departments.

JWG

Informant advised on 3/28:

MARVIN CARTER is a member of the BPP. He does not make all the meetings because of his job at International Harvester but he comes to the meetings whenever he isn't working.

Informant advised on 3/30:

HAMPTON has mentioned that the BPP in Argo-Summit has a large membership and is led by one NATHANIEL JUNIOR, supposedly his true name. HAMPTON has stated that this summer the BPP members will all carry guns and will drive out the white people from Maywood, La Grange and Argo-Summit.

Informant advised on 4/1:

NATHANIEL JUNIOR, FRED HAMPTON, WESLEY WADE, ROBERT BRUCE, TYRONE GLADNEY, WALTER ALLEN, PETER HAMMACK, MATHEW ARRGRUM, WILMA ARRGRUM, "SANTA CLAUS", NEAL THOMAS, and NORMAN WEST and several girls were at the BPP meeting at BRUCE's house, 28 South 15th Avenue, Maywood, on the evening of 3/31/69.

The discussion involved not causing any trouble in Maywood until after the upcoming election for mayor.

NATHANIEL JUNIOR is about 24 years of age, 5'9", single, wears his hair natural, has a thin moustache.

165

FBI

Date: 4/7/69

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON. RM.

HAMPTON FOUND GUILTY JURY TRIAL INSTANT BEFORE COOK COUNTY CIRCUIT JUDGE SIDNEY A. JONES, JR., CHICAGO. WAS CHARGED WITH JULY TEN LAST ROBBERY MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS. HAMPTON RELEASED ON TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS BOND PENDING MAY THIRTEEN NEXT SENTENCING DATE. MILITARY AND SECRET SERVICE ADVISED

DMF

F B I

Date: 4-18-69

166

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE DEFERRED
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

NORTHWESTERN STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS) IS-SDS

SOURCE, RELIABLE ADVISED APRIL SEVENTEEN LAST SDS MEETING AT NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY TOOK PLACE FROM EIGHT TO TEN PM THAT DATE WITH FRED HAMPTON, CHICAGO BLACK PANTHER PARTY MEMBER A SPEAKER.

MEETING TOOK PLACE WITHOUT INCIDENT.

NAVAL R.O.T.C. MEETING AT NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY (NU) TOOK PLACE AS SCHEDULED.

NO DISORDERS BETWEEN GROUPS. NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS.

NU CAMPUS CALM.

USA, MILITARY, SECRET SERVICE ADVISED.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
April 17, 1969

167

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

RACIAL TENSIONS, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY (NU), EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

On April 16, 1969, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that 21 Negro students of Northwestern University (NU) began a so called hunger strike in front of Rebecca Crown Center, NU, at 3:00 p.m. on that date. The demonstration was in protest of disiplinary action taken by the University Disipline Committee against 21 black students who were suspended or placed on probation for participating in a raid on the Triangle Fraternity House at NU on March 4, 1969. The raid resulted in extensive property damage and injuries to several white members of that fraternity. The hunger strikers carried signs including one stating, "Feed Us Justice." The demonstration was peaceful throughout the afternoon and early evening. News media were on the scene.

The source further advised that Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at NU have announced that 21 white students will join the Negroes on April 17, 1969, in support of their protests. The white students expected to harass administration officers by furnishing them with "body guards" in order to "protect" them from the student body because of their actions.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

RE: RACIAL TENSIONS, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, ETC.

Source further advised that SDS will conduct a meeting at 7:30 p.m. on April 17, 1969, at Tech Hall on the NU Campus and that Fred Hampton, leader of the Black Panther Party, Chicago, Illinois, will be the speaker. This meeting will be held in the same building and at the same time that a meeting is scheduled for the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corp. Source stated that it is possible that the latter meeting may be disrupted by SDS.

On April 17, 1969, a second confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the above mentioned Negro hunger strikers remained in the plaza in front of Rebecca Crown Center all night on the night of April 16 - 17, 1969, and were joined by approximately 100 white students some of whom carried lighted candles. The demonstration was entirely peaceful and no incidents or arrests occurred.

"The Chicago Sun-Times", a daily Chicago newspaper, in it's issue of April 17, 1969, stated that Julian Bond, the first Negro elected to the State of Georgia Legislature, spoke briefly to the 21 black students on the night of April 16, 1969. Bond urged the Negro students to continue their protest. Bond, according to the article, stopped at NU prior to a scheduled speech which he made at Kendall College, Evanston, Illinois.

Descriptions of the Black Panther Party and SDS are attached to this memorandum.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, and Naval Investigative Service Office, all Chicago; and to the Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. The SDS is an association of young people on the left and has a current program of protesting the draft, promoting a campaign for youth to develop a conscientious objector status, denouncing United States intervention in the war in Vietnam and to "radically transform" the university community, and provide for its complete control by students. GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, when interviewed by a representative of United Press International in San Francisco, California, on May 14, 1965, described the SDS as a part of the "responsible left" which the Party has "going for us." At the June, 1965, SDS National Convention, an anti-communist proviso was removed from the SDS constitution. In the October 7, 1966, issue of "New Left Notes," the official publication of SDS, an SDS spokesman stated that there are some communists in SDS and they are welcome. The national headquarters of this organization as of July 24, 1968, was located in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

168

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 4/30/69

FROM : SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, 1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information set forth has been disseminated to local authorities.

Informant advised SA JAMES W. GERBLICK on April 11, 1969:

FRED HAMPTON said that BOBBY SEALE was at a meeting of the Black Panther Party (BPP) in Maywood on April 9, 1969. He is in Chicago because of some Court problems. SEALE wants to get some help from the BPP in California.

Informant advised he knows of no BPP member in Maywood named "NICK" nor anyone named "DENNIS".

FRED HAMPTON now has someone traveling with him and HAMPTON said he is a "bodyguard".

Informant will attempt to identify him.

JWG

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Informant advised SA DAVID R. STRUCK on April 16, 1969:

Several individuals, all Negro youths, broke the windows in the Tastee-Freeze at 12th and Madison. The identities of the youths are not known to informant.

On April 14, 1969, a meeting was held at ROBERT BRUCE's house, in Maywood. Present were the following BPP members; FRED HAMPTON, ROBERT BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, TYRONE GLADNEY, MATTHEW ANGRUM and NATHANIAL JUNIOR. Nothing was planned or decided at the meeting and the discussion centered around HAMPTON being sentenced on May 13, 1969.

Informant advised SA ROBERT PEVAHOUSE on April 22, 1969:

The owner of the Tastee-Freeze identified GREGORY PERKINS as one of the persons who broke his windows and has signed a complaint against him. PERKINS intends to talk to the BPP about possible retaliation against the owner for signing the complaint.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

169

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: MAY 13 1969

FROM : SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS 1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Informant furnished the following information on May 6, 1969:

There was a Black Panther Party (BPP) meeting at ROBERT BRUCE's house on the evening of May 2, 1969. Present were FRED HAMPTON, BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, GREGORY PERKINS, TYRONE GLADNEY, MATTHEW ANGRUM, NEAL THOMAS and DAVID VALENTINE. Several other young Negro males were present whose identities are unknown to the informant. PERKINS claimed he had talked to the owner of the Tastee-Freeze at 12th and Madison and the owner said he would drop the charges against PERKINS and LEN WATTS for the damage they had done. The case comes up in court on May 21, 1969.

There was a meeting of the BPP at BRUCE's house on May 5, and the same individuals were present as on May 2. The informant stated that some of the older, married members, like CARSWELL, the WADE brothers seemed to have become afraid of coming to the meeting and afraid of possible future trouble because of their involvement with the BPP. He stated some of these members may drop out.

The informant also noted that NATHANIAL JUNIOR was not present. Informant heard that the trouble in Summit-Argo wherein the woman was burned and beaten arose because she would not produce a gun she had been keeping for someone else.

Informant heard from a former girl friend in Summit that NATHANIAL JUNIOR was trying to kill the woman and a boy. One DENNIS HARVEY, also of Summit was with JUNIOR and HAMPTON was giving orders. During the torture and beating JUNIOR and the others were scared off when they heard someone coming.

At the meeting on May 5, 1969, BRUCE and ALLEN stated that if HAMPTON is sentenced on May 13, to a term in prison they were going to try to blow up the Maywood Police station .

There will be a BPP trial on this coming Friday night May 9, 1969, for FRED HAMPTON. This trial is in keeping with the BPP rules that say that a BPP member must be tried by black persons of his own standing in the community and the trial in court with white judges and juries is an improper trial. The time and place of the trial are not yet known but present will be members of the BPP from Chicago, Summit, Maywood and possibly California. HAMPTON expressed hope that BOBBY SEALE would also be there.

HAMPTON continues to want Sergeant SAMSON to be the next Chief of Police, There is a rumor around Maywood, however, that Captain WILBERT SAMUAL will be appointed. HAMPTON doesn't want him to be the Chief of Police, because he is not a Negro.

170

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
May 21, 1969

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

MALCOLM X BLACK HAND SOCIETY OF THE WORLD, INCORPORATED

On May 20, 1969, a Chicago Police Department source, which has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that a memorial birthday celebration for the late Malcolm X, was held on the night of May 19, 1969, at the Capitol Theater, 7941 South Halsted, Chicago, Illinois, and this celebration was sponsored by the Malcolm X Black Hand Society of the World, Inc., whose leader is W. C. Anas Luqman.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Malcolm X Black Hand Society of the World, Inc., was organized in May, 1968. The first public meeting was held at Senate Theater, 3128 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, on May 20, 1968, The purpose of the Malcolm X Black Hand Society of the World, Inc., was to perpetuate the teachings of Malcolm X and to stress black unity in membership which is limited to blacks only and there are no chapters or affiliations outside of Chicago.

Malcolm X is fully described in the characterizations pertaining to Muslim Mosque, Incorporated (MMI), and Organization of Afro-American Unity, Inc., (OAAU) in the Appendix Section.

This source reported that the affair at the Capitol Theater was attended by approximately 350 persons with no more than 10 being white and it lasted from approximately 9:00 until midnight This source identified the speakers as:

Fred Hampton, Negro male
Member of the Black Panther Party (BPP), Chicago

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to distributed outside your agency.

Dick Gregory, Negro male
Militant civil rights activist and entertainer

Russ Meek, Negro male
Black Panther advocate

Carolyn Rodgers, Negro female
black poetess

W. C. Anas Luqman, Negro male
Leader of the Malcolm X Black Hand Society of the World, Inc.

On May 20, 1969, a second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information to a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):

Source advised that approximately 300 persons attended a memorial celebration for Malcolm X at the Capitol Theater. Source stated that W. C. Anas Luqman was the first speaker and he spoke concerning the necessity of all black people to unite together, stating that Malcolm X was the beginning of this black unity movement which is set up to lead the blacks out of ignorance and into vitalized lives. Luqman described Malcolm X as a "black prince".

Source continued that Russ Meek spoke at great lengths about the necessity of blacks having to start getting together and stop selling out to the whites. Meek's comments concerned blacks getting arms and learning such things as karate to help kill the oppressors. Meek spoke about each Negro becoming acquainted with his neighbors so that he may seek shelter and hiding when whites move against him. Meek stated that all blacks were not helping their black brothers and the white man can still overpower the Negro and throw him in jail any time he wants to. Meek spoke concerning the Black Panther Party (BPP), and the fact that this party has scared many whites who do not know where they will strike next.

Source indicated that various honorary awards were granted to Negroes in attendance and these awards presented by the Malcolm X Black Hand Society of the World, Inc., went to Dick Gregory, Huey Newton, and Bobby Seale, both BPP members and which awards were accepted by Fred Hampton. Several other of these awards were given to persons who the source could not identify.

A characterization of the BPP is attached.

Source advised that Carolyn Rodgers read some of her poems, two of which were entitled "I Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet" and "Poem For Malcolm".

Source identified Fred Hampton of the Chicago BPP as the next speaker and Hampton expressed his great love and respect for Malcolm X and for his philosophies, stating that Malcolm X had gone to the mountain top but had come back to realize that he was still a "suppressed nigger". Hampton stated that Malcolm X saw that change was necessary and from that point in Hampton's speech, he gave a typical BPP speech concerning the necessity for Negroes arming themselves to beat back the oppressor. Hampton concluded by stating that he was a revolutionary, with the comments "all power to the people, all power to the BPP, Panther power".

Source stated that Dick Gregory was the last speaker but limited his comments to the necessity for black people organizing themselves in their own behalf and indicated he was in sympathy with the BPP.

Source advised that because of inclement weather, the scheduled picnic to precede the evening rally at the Capitol Theater did not take place, other than a few members of the Malcolm X Black Hand Society of the World, Inc., being present to direct those appearing to attend the nighttime rally.

A copy of this communication is being furnished to the United States Attorney and U. S. Secret Service, both Chicago, and Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois

1

APPENDIX

MUSLIM MOSQUE, INCORPORATED (MMI)

The March 13, 1964, edition of "The New York Times," a daily newspaper published in New York, New York, contained an article on page 20 which indicated that MALCOLM X (LITTLE), former national official of the Nation of Islam (NOI) who broke with the NOI on March 8, 1964, publicly announced in New York City on March 12, 1964, that he had formed the Muslim Mosque, Incorporated (MMI). The MMI, according to the article, would be a broadly based politically oriented black nationalist movement for Negroes, only, financed by voluntary contributions. In this public statement, MALCOLM X urged Negroes to abandon the doctrine of non-violence when it is necessary to defend themselves in the civil rights struggle, and he also suggested that Negroes form rifle clubs to protect their lives and property in time of emergencies in areas where the government is unable or unwilling to protect them.

Incorporation papers of the MMI filed on March 16, 1964, with the Business Section, Clerk of Courts, New York County, New York, New York, reflect that the MMI was incorporated under the Religious Corporation Law of the State of New York to work for the imparting of the Islamic Faith and Islamic Religion in accordance with "accepted Islamic principles." The principal place of worship to be located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York, New York.

The May 23, 1964, edition of the "New York Amsterdam News," a weekly Negro newspaper published in New York City, contained an article by columnist JAMES BOOKER in which he indicated that he had heard that the visit by MALCOLM X with Muslim leaders during his African tour has changed him to become [illegible] in his anti-white feelings and to become more religious.

On October 6, 1964, a confidential source advised that the MMI is apparently affiliated with the true orthodox Islamic Religion through its affiliation with the Islamic Foundation (of New York), 1 Riverside Drive, New York City. The only teachings of the MMI are on the Islamic Religion.

2

MUSLIM MOSQUE, INCORPORATED (MMI)

This confidential source advised on May 17, 1965, that the headquarters of the MMI are located in Suite 128, Hotel Theresa, 2090 Seventh Avenue, New York, New York, where they were established on March 16, 1964. These headquarters are shared with the Organization of Afro-American Unity Incorporated (OAAU) which was also headed by MALCOLM X.

MALCOLM X was assassinated on February 21, 1965, while addressing an OAAU rally at the Audubon Ballroom, Broadway and 166th Street, New York City.

This same confidential source advised on September 8, 1965, that the activities of the MMI following the death of MALCOLM X were limited to the teaching of classes in the Islamic Religion and a class in judo for self-protection. These classes were held regularly until the latter part of July, 1965, when they were discontinued. Since then, the MMI has held no meetings and there has been absolutely no activity by the MMI which appears to be completely "dead."

APPENDIX

1 APPENDIX

ORGANIZATION OF AFRO-AMERICAN UNITY, INCORPORATED (OAAU)

On June 28, 1964, MALCOLM X LITTLE, founder and leader of the Muslim Mosque, Incorporated (MMI), publicly announced the formation of a new, all Negro, militant civil rights action group to be known as the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU), with himself as Chairman. This announcement was made at a public rally held by the MMI in the Audubon Ballroom, Broadway and 166th Street, New York City.

A printed and published statement of basic OAAU aims read by MALCOLM X at this meeting indicates that it shall include "all" people of African descent in the Western Hemisphere, as well as "our" brothers and sisters on the African continent. It is patterned after the "letter and spirit" of the Organization of African Unity established (by African heads of States) at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May, 1963.

A recording of the remarks of MALCOLM X at this meeting indicates that the aim of the OAAU is to eliminate differences between Negroes so they can work together for "human rights," while the initial objective is to "internationalize" the American civil rights movement by taking it to the United Nations. LITTLE condemned the non-violent civil rights movement and claims that Negroes should be taught to protect themselves, when and if necessary. The OAAU will sponsor a program for Negroes in education, politics, culture, economics, and social reform.

MALCOLM X was assassinated on February 21, 1965, while addressing an OAAU rally at the Audubon Ballroom, New York City.

On April 13, 1965, a confidential source advised that on March 26, 1965, the OAAU filed a Certificate of Incorporation with the Department of State, State of New York, Albany, New York, and henceforth, the organization's true name will be Organization of Afro-American Unity, Incorporated.

On April 29, 1968, a second confidential source advised that the president and head of the OAAU is ELLA COLLINS, a half-sister of the late MALCOLM X, who resides a great majority of the time in Boston, Massachusetts.

On April 28, 1968, this same source advised that the OAAU headquarters is still located at 224 West 139th Street, New York, New York. Meetings have not been held in several months and the organization appears to be breaking up and no longer functioning.

1 **APPENDIX**

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

> "Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, "... we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

171

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 5/21/69

FROM : SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS
1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

Informant furnished the following information on May 8, 1969:

There was a BPP meeting on May 7, 1969, at ROBERT BRUCE's house, 28 South 15th Avenue, Maywood. FRED HAMPTON was there for only a few minutes and gave out 200 flyers to be passed out around town concerning a mock trial of himself to be held on May 9, 1969. Present were BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, WILMA and MATTHEW ANGRUM, TYRONE GLADNEY, and NEAL THOMAS. THOMAS sells the newspaper "Black Panther" around town for 25 cents a copy.

On May 9, 1969, informant made available the following material:

One copy of "The Black Panther" newspaper dated April 20, 1969.

C

JWG:

One copy of "The Black Panther" newspaper dated May 4, 1969.

One copy of a flyer "Honor of Political Prisoners" dated May 9, 1969.

One copy of "To the Oppressed People etc." no date.

One copy of "In the Summer of 1968 etc." no date.

Informant advised on May 9, 1969, that there will be a dance to raise funds in Argo tonight (May 9, 1969), and, therefore, the mock trial has been postponed. One of the flyers gives the time and place of the dance.

FRED HAMPTON will be sentenced on May 13, 1969, and on that date the Black Panthers intend to cause disturbances in Maywood, according to talk at the meeting on May 7, 1969.

Informant advised on May 14, 1969 as follows:

The dance last Friday night was strictly a social fund raising event and there was no trouble.

There was a meeting of the BPP on the evening of May 12, 1969, at BRUCE's house. Present were HAMPTON, BRUCE, WALTER ALLEN, the ANGRUMs, DAVID VALENTINE, NEAL THOMAS and several young teenage boys. They were still talking about possibly blowing up the Maywood Police Station when HAMPTON is sentenced but they did not mention where they would get the explosives or how they would do it. HAMPTON's sentencing has been postponed until a later date. The informant believes the plot to blow up the station is just talk.

HAMPTON obtained ten used pistols, some .22 caliber and has sold them to members of the BPP in Maywood and Chicago.

GREGORY PERKINS said that whenever HAMPTON or NATHANIEL JUNIOR are being sought on warrants, they live in at the BPP headquarters, 2350 West Madison, in Chicago, until they can get the bond money and surrender with their attorneys.

172

6/4/69

SAC, CHICAGO

SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS,
1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

Informant advised on 5/22:

One CHARLES KROP, who lives at 1715 South 6th Avenue, runs a restaurant in the 600 block of South 5th Avenue, in Maywood. He is a white man, married to a Mexican woman. He is the leader apparently of the "Brown Berets." The Black Panthers are using a room behind the restaurant to meet occasionally.

FRED HAMPTON stated the Brown Berets are joining the Panthers during their meeting to determine if they have mutual interests.

JWG

Informant stated there are rumors around Argo-Summit that NATHANIEL JUNIOR and DENNIS HARVEY are seeking a way to go to Cuba before they are arrested. Informant stated he believes JUNIOR is at 2350 West Madison hiding out.

Informant advised the BPP meeting on 5/21 was held at Chuck's Record Shop, 1019 South 17th. The only thing discussed was the mock trial to be held at the Old Lutheran Seminary, 1644 South 11th Avenue, on Saturday night at 8:00 p.m. This building is used by the O.E.O. and apparently someone made it available to the BPP.

Informant advised on 5/24:

The place of the mock trial was changed to the Village Hall in Maywood for 5/24, and 25/69, at 8:00 p.m. All persons are invited.

FRED HAMPTON expects to be sentenced on 5/26, and needs $3,000-$4,000 bond money to stay out of jail during his appeal.

Informant advised on 5/26/69:

The mock trial went smoothly Saturday and Sunday night. More than 100 people attended, half black and half white. HAMPTON was found "not guilty." HAMPTON was his own lawyer. No violence occurred.

Informant advised on 5/28/69:

ROBERT BRUCE is very unhappy because FRED HAMPTON was kept in jail without an appeal bond. He tried to get the BPP to meet and discuss ways of raising bond money, but was unsuccessful on 5/26, and 5/27.

BRUCE said the BPP should wait about a week or a week and a half to see if HAMPTON will get out on bond. After that, if he is not out, then there will be plans made for destruction of property in Maywood.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

173

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 6/11/69

FROM : SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS,
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, 1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

Informant advised on June 5, 1969, the following:

There was a meeting of the BPP at Charles Krap's Restaurant on 5th Avenue in Maywood on the night of May 28, 1969. About 20 BPP members were present as well as several Brown Berets. They had large photos of FRED HAMPTON and were going to put them into several shops in Maywood as part of a "Free HAMPTON" Campaign. The meeting was actually held in the old photo store next to the restaurant which is closed and boarded up. It is entered through the restaurant.

BOBBY CARSWELL and GREGORY PERKINS are the two BPP members who are spearheading the campaign to raise money for HAMPTON's bond.

The informant stated he thinks "TACO CHARLIE", who is CHARLES KROP, is somewhat crazy.

JWG

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROBERT BRUCE is now too scared to do anything and it appears he wants to be less involved in the BPP.

PERKINS and THOMAS BLAIR planned to visit HAMPTON in jail, date unknown.

During the weekend of May 31-June 1, 3 or 4 BPP members went around in Maywood and got 200 names on a petition to free FRED HAMPTON. HAMPTON's older brother, MURTHY WADE, "BOBBY" CARSWELL and NEAL THOMAS, are the ones who obtained the petitions.

CARSWELL said that "TACO CHARLIE" has promised to get ammunition for the BPP. He apparently has a card of some type which enables him to buy guns and ammunition. He seems to do everything CARSWELL asks him to do.

Informant advised on June 6, 1969:

There was a meeting on June 5, 1969, at the home of GENE MOORE, 1423 South 11th Avenue. He is a supporter of FRED HAMPTON, but not a member of the BPP.

About 50 Negroes were present, mostly BPP members and they were all angry about the FBI raid on BPP headquarters in Chicago.

The discussion centered around the fact that the raid must have been set up by someone inside. They also claimed the purpose of the raid was to get the petitions for HAMPTON's release so he would be kept in jail. They were all angry about the "theft" of the money and typewriters by the FBI.

CARSWELL said that NATHANIEL JUNIOR and HARVEY had left the headquarters two days before the raid and had "gone south".

The BPP does not trust "TACO CHARLIE". Some members feel he will eventually turn against the Negroes

A new petition will be circulated by the BPP to get DUFFY removed from the Maywood PD. He is the officer who testified against HAMPTON at his recent trial.

A rally is planned for FRED HAMPTON on June 12, 1969, at 2:00 PM at the Lido Theatre in Maywood. All will be invited and money will be collected for HAMPTON's release.

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

174

TO : SAC, CHICAGO DATE: 6/17/69

FROM : SA JAMES W. GERBLICK

SUBJECT: RACIAL TENSIONS
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, 1969
RM

Where appropriate, the information has been disseminated to local authorities.

Informant advised on 6/9/69:

The equipment and records from Black Panther Party (BPP) Headquarters, 2350 West Madison, Chicago, were transferred to Chuck's Record Shop on 17th Avenue, south of Madison Street in Maywood for storage. This record shop is run by PETER HAMMACH. These records are what was left after the FBI raid on BPP Headquarters.

Informant made available a flyer captioned "Deputy Chairman FRED taken political prisoner," and a copy of "The Black Panther" newspaper 6/7/69.

Informant advised on 6/12/69:

JWG

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The rally for FRED HAMPTON was held on this date, 6/12/69, from 3:00 PM to 5:45 PM at the Lido Theatre in Maywood. The microphones and sound system were set up by GREGORY PERKINS who then left to go to work. The rally was run by WILLIAM HAMPTON, FRED's older brother. There were nearly 200 people present including whites, blacks, and Mexicans. Represented were the BPP from Chicago, the Brown Berets, someone from SDS who made a speech, several students from a college somewhere, a few clergymen including a Negro preacher from Melrose Park who read a note from FRED HAMPTON's mother.

LEO HOWARD spoke, WILLIAM HAMPTON spoke, an SDS leader spoke, a representative from the Brown Berets spoke and PAUL WADE spoke. All spoke about the plights of HAMPTON and a collection was taken up. There was much concern about the fact that HAMPTON was moved to some jail about 300 miles away.

PAUL WADE spoke and said they should all go to where HAMPTON is and break him out of jail. He also said that if the police invade any Negro homes that the Negroes should shoot it out with the police if they are entering illegally.

A collection was taken for HAMPTON.

ROBERT BRUCE is around town somewhere in hiding. He is being sought on a Chicago Kidnapping Warrant. He is one of the sixteen indicted for this crime.

Informant advised that NEAL THOMAS had withheld money collected for the BPP and they were going to kill him, but he pleaded for his life and the BPP decided to give him another chance.

Informant advised on 6/15/69.

ROBERT BRUCE was at WALTER ALLEN's house in Broodview this morning. He will probably be at a meeting at "Toco Charlies" restaurant, Maywood, at 8:00 PM tonight. This meeting was called to discuss ways of getting money to help BRUCE get out of Maywood to Chicago.

175

SAC, CHICAGO 7/22/69

SA JAMES V. GERBLICK

RACIAL TENSIONS,
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, 1969
RM

The information herein has been disseminated to local authorities where appropriate.

Informant advised on 7/11/69:

PAUL WADE, ALLEN HATHWAY and BILL BURNETTE returned to Maywood on 7/11 from their trip to the East Coast which included Boston, Newark, and Washington, D.C.

PAUL WADE said he had called the BPP headquarters in California and will travel there in two or three weeks to enlist their aid in a plan to get FRED HAMPTON out of jail even if they have to break him out. Those who will go to California will be PAUL WADE, GREGORY PERKINS and WALTER ALLEN. There have been several holdups in Maywood, in the past week and there is a possibility the following individual was involved (rumors heard by informant) one FNU HUMPHERY, who was released from jail on about 7/3/69.

Informant advised on 7/17/69:

On 7/16 the Maywood Police Department was called to assist in a repossession of furniture from WESLEY WADE's after WADE had refused to return the furniture. Then WADE fought off the Maywood Police when they kicked in the door. He was arrested and PAUL WADE was very angry about the Police breaking down the door.

He may enlist others to aid him in some type of retaliation.

Informant subsequently advised on 7/17/69:

PAUL WADE and one CLAYTON KENDALL (PB) from California are out looking for the policeman who broke in the door at WESLEY WADE's house.

PAUL WADE has a .38 caliber pistol and may use it if he becomes angry enough.

PAUL WADE said that one THOMAS O'NEAL (PB) is a leader of the BPP in Washington Police Department and he is formerly from Maywood.

MICHAEL HENDERSON has been released from jail and is back in Maywood.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

176

FBI

Date: 8/8/69

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

FRED HAMPTON. RM-BPP

SOURCE, RELIABLE, ADVISED AUGUST SEVEN LAST, THAT HAMPTON'S ATTORNEY WOULD APPEAR LOCAL COURT AUGUST EIGHT INSTANT IN ATTEMPT TO HAVE HAMPTON FREED ON APPEAL BOND DURING APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION, MAY TWENTY SIX LAST, FOR ARMED ROBBERY CHARGE, MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS. SOURCE ADVISED LAWYER APPEARED INSTANT AND HAMPTON'S BOND REDUCED TO TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS. SOURCE ADVISED BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), CHICAGO, ANTICIPATES HAMPTON WILL BE FREE PRIOR TO AUGUST TWELVE NEXT. HAMPTON IS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILLINOIS BPP. CG PD, USA, SECRET SERVICE AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ADVISED.

RMM:

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

177

F B

Date: 8/14/69

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

FRED HAMPTON, RM-BPP.

SOURCE, RELIABLE, ADVISED INSTANT, THAT HAMPTON AND ATTORNEYS APPEARED LOCAL COURT, INSTANT, AND HAMPTON'S BOND, REGARDING INDICTMENTS RETURNED BY ILLINOIS COOK COUNTY GRAND JURY, JUNE NINE, LAST ~~NINETEEN SIXTY NINE~~, WAS REDUCED TO TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS. SOURCE STATED BPP HAS THE ONE THOUSAND CASH AND HAMPTON WILL BE FREED, INSTANT. SOURCE ADVISED BPP, IN ADDITION TO ABOVE BOND MONEY, HAS ALREADY PUT UP APPROXIMATELY THIRTY FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS CASH FOR OTHER CHARGES CONCERNING HAMPTON, INCLUDING APPEAL BOND REGARDING CONVICTION MAY TWENTY SIX, LAST ~~NINETEEN SIXTY NINE~~, FOR ROBBERY.

CHICAGO PD, USA, SECRET SERVICE, AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ADVISED.

RMM:

178

8/15/69

PLAINTEXT

TELETYPE URGENT

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

ORGANIZATION OF BLACK AMERICAN CULTURE (OBAC), (BLACK UNITED FESTIVAL, AUGUST SIXTEEN NEXT, DIXMOOR, ILLINOIS). RM.

SOURCE, RELIABLE, ADVISED INSTANT OBAC, GROUP SPONSORING BLACK CULTURAL ENRICHMENT PROGRAMS IN CHICAGO AREA, PLANNING FESTIVAL AUGUST SIXTEEN NEXT AT DIXMOOR PARK, ONE FOUR ZERO AND WOODS STREET, DIXMOOR, ILLINOIS.

FESTIVAL TO BE CENTERED AROUND AN EXHIBITION OF BLACK ART AND CRAFT. FESTIVAL SCHEDULE TWELVE NOON TO FIVE PM; SEVEN PM TO ELEVEN PM.

EVENING SESSIONS TO FEATURE SPEAKERS: RUSS MEEK, REPRESENTING BLACK IMPEACHMENT COMMITTEE (BIC); BOB LUCAS REPRESENTING BLACK LIBERATION ALLIANCE (BLA); LEONARD SENGALI REPRESENTING BLACKSTONE RANGERS, CHICAGO NEGRO YOUTH GANG; FRED HAMPTON REPRESENTING BLACK PANTHER PARTY. BPP OF ILLINOIS. MATILDA HAYWOOD, FEMALE NEGRO SINGER, ASSOCIATE OF RUSS MEEK IS SCHEDULED TO ENTERTAIN.

JIM

OBAC HAS OBTAINED LOCAL PERMIT FROM AUTHORITIES TO USE THE PARK. HAS AGREED TO CONCLUDE AFFAIR BY ELEVEN PM, REGULAR CLOSING HOUR OF PARK. SOURCE ADVISED NO INDICATION ANY DISTURBANCE SHOULD OCCUR AT ABOVE AFFAIR.

RELIABLE SOURCE HAS ADVISED IN PAST RUSS MEEK, NEGRO MILITANT HAS MADE SPEECHES IN CHICAGO AREA EXPRESSING HATRED FOR WHITES. MEEK CLAIMS LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ARE DETERMINED TO EXTERMINATE BLACK PEOPLE. HAS URGED NEGROES TO ARM THEMSELVES. BIC IS "PAPER" ORGANIZATION CREATED BY MEEK WITHOUT ANY ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP.

BLA, COMMUNITY ACTION GROUP FOCUSING ON LOCAL ORGANIZING THROUGH LOCAL COMMUNITY COUNCILS, WORKING ON DAILY BASIS WITH MEMBERS BLACK COMMUNITY ON HOUSING, EDUCATION, HEALTH AND WELFARE PROBLEM . MILITARY ADVISED.

179

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
August 19, 1969

ORGANIZATION OF BLACK
AMERICAN CULTURE (OBAC)
(BLACK UNITED FESTIVAL,
AUGUST 16, 1969, DIXMOOR,
ILLINOIS)

On August 15, 1969, a first source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Organization of Black American Culture (OBAC), a group that sponsors black cultural enrichment programs in the Chicago area and maintains office space at 77 East 35th Street, Chicago, planned to hold a festival at Dixmoor Park, 140th and Wood Streets, Dixmoor, Illinois, on August 16, 1969.

The festival is being called the Black United Festival. It is to be centered around an exhibition of black art and crafts. Two sessions are scheduled, one in the afternoon from 12:00 noon until 5:00 p.m. and the other in the evening from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. The evening session is to feature the following speakers: Russ Meek, representing the Black Impeachment Committee (BIC); Bob Lucas, representing the Black Liberation Alliance (BLA); Leonard Sengahli, representing the Blackstone Rangers, a Chicago Negro youth gang; and Fred Hampton, representing the Black Panther Party (BPP) of Illinois. Matilda Haywood, a female Negro singer, an associate of Russ Meek, is scheduled to entertain.

A characterization of the BPP is attached hereto.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OBAC (BLACK UNITED FESTIVAL,
AUGUST 16, 1969, DIXMOOR, ILLINOIS)

The source advised that OBAC has obtained a local permit from local authorities to use the park. OBAC has agreed to conclude the affair by 11:00 p.m. which is considered the regular closing hour for the park.

This source advised that there is no indication that any disturbance should occur at this affair.

A second source, an agency which collects intelligence data in the Chicago area, has advised in the past that Russ Meek is a militant Negro who has made a number of speeches in the Chicago area expressing hatred for whites. Meek has claimed that law enforcement officers are determined to exterminate black people. Meek has also urged that Negroes arm themselves.

According to this source, the Black Impeachment Committee (BIC) is a "paper" organization which has been created by Meek. BIC is without any active membership.

The Black Liberation Alliance (BLA) is a community action group focusing attention on local organizing through local community councils, working on a daily basis with members of the black community on such problems as housing, education, health and welfare problems.

On August 16, 1969, Clifford Wood, Chief of Police, Dixmoor, Illinois, advised that festival activity at Dixmoor Park between the hours of 12:00 noon and 5:00 p.m. was limited to a group of about eight to ten persons, all Negro, setting up public address-type equipment.

Chief Wood stated that at about 7:45 p.m. a group of about 50 to 75 persons, all Negro, both male and female, had gathered in the park. The number of individuals in attendance fluctuated inasmuch as people were constantly arriving and constantly leaving during the evening session of the festival.

Chief Wood stated that festival activity consisted of entertainment by a singer, and a number of short speeches, the subject matter of which pertained to solving Negro problems. There were demonstrations of African-style dancing and performances of African-type music.

Chief Wood stated that by 11:00 p.m., August 16, 1969, the festival activities were over and all individuals who had attended had left the park area. There were no incidents in connection with the festival and no arrests were made. The activity in the area of the park was normal throughout the festival session.

On August 18, 1969, the first source advised that the evening session of the Black United Festival at Dixmoor Park on August 16, 1969, began at approximately 7:30 p.m. that date. Activity consisted of a number of speeches, entertainment by Negro singer Matilda Haywood, demonstrations of African dance styles and African music styles, a karate demonstration and a "singing session".

This source stated that the number of persons in attendance fluctuated as individuals came and left the area constantly during the activities. He estimated that there may have been from 250 to 300 individuals in attendance.

The source advised that Russ Meek spoke. He talked about the raid that was conducted on BPP Headquarters at 2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on June 4, 1969. He termed such activity by the FBI as unwarranted harassment of the BPP. Meek also discussed the incident which took place on July 31, 1969, at BPP Headquarters when officers of the Chicago Police Department engaged in a shooting incident with Negro males who were in BPP Headquarters space. Meek indicated that this was another example of unnecessary harassment on the part of law enforcement officials against the BPP. Meek indicated that Negroes should oppose such activity on the part of law enforcement officials.

This source stated that Rufus Walls, Minister of Information, Illinois Chapter of the BPP, also spoke. Walls complained about harassment on the part of law enforcement officials against the BPP. Walls claimed members of the BPP know that the FBI has been placing informers in the BPP. He claimed that the FBI did not prosecute any of the eight members of the BPP who were arrested on June 4, 1969, at BPP Headquarters, Chicago, because the FBI did not desire to disclose the identity of any FBI informers in the BPP. Walls claimed that the BPP knows who the FBI informant is. Walls also mentioned the BPP Breakfast for Children Program. He asked those attending that if they were able to they should make a financial contribution to this program. A collection was taken up.

Bob Lucas of the BLA also spoke. He discussed the activities of the Coalition for United Community Action (CUCA), a consortium of about 60 community, civic and other neighborhood organizations in the Chicago area which has been demonstrating at a number of building construction sites in Chicago in protest of racial discrimination in the construction industry. Lucas indicated that the Negroes in suburban areas of Chicago should support the activities of CUCA. Lucas stated that CUCA has been able to utilize the services of some of the Negro youth gangs in Chicago to help picket construction sites.

Lucas stated that "We have a method of jamming police communications". However, he did not further elaborate on this statement other than adding that if police officials are unable to communicate they would have a difficult time in determining the activities of the demonstrators.

'Lucas stated that in his view it is likely that riots or disturbances could take place in Chicago at anytime during the remainder of this year.

Lucas indicated that Negroes should be prepared to defend themselves in cases of emergency, even to the extent of instructing their women in the use of firearms.

Leonard Sengahli, representing the Blackstone Rangers, a Negro youth gang operating principally on the south side of Chicago, spoke. He stressed that the Negro people should unite in their efforts to correct injustices. He indicated that only through unity will Negroes be able to solve their problems. He said that if everybody stays together, their efforts will be successful; but if they divide into a number of different groups, they will fail in their objectives.

This source stated that throw-away type sheets bearing the title "Black Panther Party" on which were printed a BPP version of the incident which took place at BPP Headquarters, Chicago, between members of the BPP and the Chicago Police on July 31, 1969, indicating that the BPP demands an end to police brutality and the murder of black people were available.

A second throw-away type sheet captioned "Pig Harassment" with the name, address and telephone number of the Illinois Chapter of the BPP printed thereon indicated that the BPP was interested in land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace and that politicians have given them nothing but oppression in return. The throw-away type sheet indicated "Daley's fascist pigs have continually harassed the Panther Party in the Panther's attempts to meet the needs of the people".

OBAC (BLACK UNITED FESTIVAL, AUGUST 16, 1969, DIXMOOR, ILLINOIS)

According to the source, the festival ended at approximately 11:00 p.m., August 16, 1969. The source said that he was not aware of any incidents taking place during the festival.

On August 18, 1969, Sheriff Joseph Woods, Cook County Sheriff's Office, made available a report concerning the festival prepared by officers of the department. This report indicated that approximately 150 people were in the park area.

Robert Lucas was one of the speakers. Lucas was reported to have stated "If the police are unable to communicate, they won't know where we are". This report indicated that the speakers requested the assistance of suburban people in case of riots so that police would be too busy and unable to concentrate in any one area. The speakers also indicated the importance of destroying police communication centers, the possibility of putting sugar in police gas tanks, causing traffic jams on expressways and derailing trains coming through the suburban areas. The report indicated that they also gave instructions as to how to make black powder bombs, however, the report did not indicate the identity of those giving such instructions.

Robert Lucas discussed expanding efforts to close down construction sites in the Chicago area and stated that they would not be stopped by a court injunction. He requested the help of suburban youth gangs to assist in keeping construction sites closed.

The report concluded indicating that other activities at the rally included karate demonstrations and folk singing demonstrations.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney and United States Secret Service, both Chicago, Illinois, and Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby George Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ". . . we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

180

11/24/69

CODE

TELETYPE URGENT

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO

FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON. THREAT AGAINST THE PRESIDENT.

LUIS KUTNER, ATTORNEY AT LAW, ONE ZERO FIVE WEST ADAMS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ADVISED INSTANT DATE, THAT HE WAS PRESENT AT A MEETING ON NOVEMBER TWENTY THREE LAST BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS CIRCLE CAMPUS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, SPONSORED BY THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, CHICAGO METROPOLITAN BRANCH, A PACIFIST GROUP WHEREIN FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON SPOKE CONCERNING THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) OF WHICH HE IS THE CHAIRMAN FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

MEETING ATTENDED BY APPROXIMATELY FORTY INDIVIDUALS, MOSTLY ELDERLY WHITE WOMEN AND HAMPTON SPOKE FROM APPROXIMATELY THREE PM TO THREE FIFTY PM ABOUT THE BPP AS A REVOLUNTIONARY PARTY.

DURING THIS SPEECH, HAMPTON STATED ON THREE OR FOUR OCCASIONS "NIXON MUST DIE." HAMPTON SPOKE CONCERNING THE POSSESSION OF THE BPP OF GUNS, BOTH AT THEIR HEADQUARTERS TWO THREE FIFTY WEST MADISON, CHICAGO, AS WELL AS AT THE HAMPTON RESIDENCE.

DFI

KUTNER ADVISED THAT THE STATEMENTS "NIXON MUST DIE," WHERE NOT MADE DIRECTLY PRECEDING OR FOLLOWING THE ABOVE STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE POSSESSION OF GUNS, BUT WERE MADE AT VARIOUS POINTS DURING THE SPEECH TO ACCENTUATE HAMPTON'S STATEMENTS THAT THE BPP WAS A REVOLUTIONARY PARTY.

ABOVE INFORMATION FURNISHED AT FIVE THIRTY PM INSTANT, TO SA JOSEPH E. NOONAN, JR., U.S. SECRET SERVICE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. U.S. SECRET SERVICE, CHICAGO KNOWLEDGEABLE OF IDENTITY AND ACTIVITIES OF HAMPTON.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

181

FBI

Date: 11/26/69

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

May 1969

Via TELETYPE DEFERRED
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

FRED HAMPTON, RM - BPP.

~~RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED~~ INSTANT, ILL. STATE SUPREME COURT UPHELD FRED HAMPTON'S, ~~DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ILL BPP,~~ CONVICTION FOR ARMED ROBBERY IN NINETEEN SIXTY NINE, HOWEVER, HAMPTON REMAINS FREE ON SAME APPEAL BOND UNTIL PETITION FOR REHEARING RULED UPON BY COURT IN APPROXIMATELY JANUARY, SEVENTY. HAMPTON IS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN ILLINOIS BPP. PERTINENT AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

RMM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES [illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

182

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 12/22/69

FROM : SAC, SPRINGFIELD

SUBJECT: FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON
RM - BPP

LHM being disseminated to 113th MI Group, Evanston, Ill. USA, EDI, East St. Louis, Ill.; OSI, Chanute Air Force Base, Ill.; Secret Service, St. Louis, Missouri; and, NISO, Chicago

CONFIDENTIAL

183

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Springfield, Illinois
December 22, 1969

SPEECHES OF FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON
AT ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY,
NORMAL, ILLINOIS, ON OCTOBER 29, 1969
AND SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY,
CARBONDALE, ILLINOIS, ON NOVEMBER 14, 1969

On October 27, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised Fred Hampton would appear at the Ballroom, Student Union Building, Illinois State University (ISU), Normal, Illinois, at 7:30 PM on October 29, 1969. Hampton was scheduled to appear as the guest speaker for the Students For A Democratic Society (SDS)*, Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM II) faction of SDS.

On October 27, 1969 who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that a facility request for the Ballroom of the Student Union at 7:30 PM on October 29, 1969, had been signed by Kenneth Klette of SDS and Carroll Byron Cox, Jr., Faculty Advisor for SDS at ISU. T-2 further advised that this meeting was advertised as a public meeting.

On October 29, 1969, representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation attended a program at the Student Union on the Illinois State University campus at Normal, Illinois, for the purpose of listening to a speech by Fred Hampton, Black Panther Party (BPP)*leader from Chicago, Illinois. At the entrance to the meeting, all persons attending were required to undergo a meticulous search by members of the SDS.

The program began at approximately 7:00 PM, with an introduction by Mark Clark, Captain, Peoria Black Panther Party. Clark introduced the next speaker as Eddie McChriston, Lieutenant, Peoria Black Panther Party, who described the ten-point program of the BPP. McChriston then introduced Leon Harps, Lieutenant, Peoria Black Panther Party, who spoke on systematic genocide,

* See Appendix

CONFIDENTIAL

Harps introduced the next speaker as a member of SDS. This speaker was later identified as Kenneth Klette. Klette called for students to stay away from class for a week and help in the strikes against huge corporations. The program then returned to Mark Clark, Master of Ceremonies.

At this point Clark turned the program over to a Negro male who identified himself as Fred Hampton, Deputy Minister, Chicago Chapter, BPP. Hampton spoke at length on the BPP leaders Newton, Seale and Cleaver. He urged the group to arm themselves and protect their homes. He called for those in attendance to support Bobby Seale, who had been bound, shackled and gagged by Judge Hoffman. Hampton said, "Kill the pigs", "arm yourselves", and then stated, "We have to shut Judge Hoffman up by ramming (inaudible) down his mouth". He then stated, "We follow the Marxist-Leninist line of thought and advocate revolution." The meeting then broke up and Hampton rejoined his bodyguards and BPP members from Peoria, Illinois, and left the ballroom.

There were approximately 350 persons in attendance, about 50 per cent of whom were Negro. There were no incidents or arrests at the time of the speech; however, after the speech as the contingent from Chicago was leaving, one was given a citation for improper turn signal, by the campus police.

On November 5, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that at a meeting of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) on November 4, 1969, it was announced that on November 14, 1969, in connection with the November 15th Moratorium Demonstrations in Washington, D.C., a "Brother Fred", head of the BPP in Illinois, would speak at Southern Illinois University. The SDS announced that its members would act as security guards, and that the speech would be made in the Ballroom of the University Center on the campus of Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois. T-3 advised he was of opinion "Brother Fred" was Fred Hampton, known to T-3 as BPP leader in Chicago, Illinois.

On November 15, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on October 27, 1969, the Southern Illinois University Student Government Activities Council reserved the University Center facilities, stating the event would be attended by 1,000 to 1,500 persons.

CONFIDENTIAL

SPEECHES OF FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON
AT ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, NORMAL,
ILLINOIS, 10/29/69 AND SOUTHERN
ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, CARBONDALE,
ILLINOIS, 11/14/69

CONFIDENTIAL

On November 14, 1969, representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation attended a speech given by Black Panther Party leader Fred Hampton at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois. All those attending the speech were searched at the entrance and pictures were taken of some of those persons entering.

At 8:40 PM, Joan Gray was introduced as Head of the Women's Division of the Illinois BPP. The master of ceremonies did not introduce himself. Joan Gray denounced white liberals who lend merely their intellectual support to the Panther movement, and attacked those/blacks who espouse black pride and African culture.

At 9:00 PM an individual was introduced as the Health Minister of the Illinois BPP. This individual described the health programs in the ghetto sponsored by the BPP, which programs are available to all who need them.

Fred Hampton began speaking at 9:10 PM. Hampton began his speech by indicating his strong disapproval of the propenents of black pride and culture, stating that African clothes will not stop a bullet and that the police, whom he referred to as "pigs", could still shoot blacks down in the street unless they defended themselves with guns. Hampton further denounced the police, stating that more "pigs" who were killed, the better for the people.

Hampton compared politics and war to ice and water, concluding that they are essentially the same substance and can be used for different purposes. Hampton cited a recent shooting incident in Chicago involving Black Panther Jake Winters, praising Winters as a true example of a Panther.

Hampton then proceeded to denounce Judge Hoffman of Chicago in profane and obscene terms, referring to Hoffman as a homosexual. In describing Hoffman, the adjectives fascist, racist and similar terms were used.

Hampton denounced the capitalist system as one where a minority rose to the top to exploit the majority, and concluded his speech with the assertion that the BPP was not directing its struggle against all whites but only against "fascist racist pigs". He stated that those whites who fit the latter description will be classified by their actions and not their words.

CONFIDENTIAL

SPEECHES OF FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON,
AT ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, NORMAL,
ILLINOIS, 10/29/69 and SOUTHERN
ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, CARBONDALE,
ILLINOIS, 11/14/69

CONFIDENTIAL

There were approximately 350 persons in attendance at this speech, most of whom were Negroes.

There were no incidents and no arrests in connection with Hampton's appearance.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as presently regarded, came into being at a founding convention held June, 1962, at Port Huron, Michigan. From an initial posture of "participatory democracy" the line of the national leadership has revealed a growing Marxist-Leninist adherence which currently calls for the building of a revolutionary youth movement. Concurrently, the program of SDS has evolved from civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war stance to an advocacy of a militant anti-imperialist position. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as the leaders of worldwide struggles against United States imperialism whereas the Soviet Union is held to be revisionist and also imperialist.

At the June, 1969, SDS National Convention, Progressive Labor Party (PLP) forces in the organization were expelled. As a result, the National Office (NO) group maintained its National Headquarters at 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, and the PLP faction set up headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts. This headquarters subsequently moved to Boston. Each group elected its own national officers, which include three national secretaries and a National Interim Committee of eight. Both the NO forces and the PLP forces claim to be the true SDS. Both groups also print their versions of "New Left Notes" which sets forth the line and the program of the particular faction. The NO version of "New Left Notes" was recently printed under the title "The Fire Next Time" to achieve a broader mass appeal.

Two major factions have developed internally within the NO group, namely, the Weatherman or Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) I faction, and the RYM II faction. Weatherman is action-oriented upholding Castro's position that the duty of revolutionaries is to make revolution. Weatherman is regarded by RYM II as an adventuristic elitist faction which denies the historical role of the working class as the base for revolution. RYM II maintains that revolution, although desired, is not possible under present conditions, hence emphasizes organizing and raising the political consciousness of the working class upon whom they feel successful revolution depends. Although disclaiming control and domination by the Communist Party, USA, leaders in these two factions have in the past proclaimed themselves to be communists and to follow the precepts of a Marxist-Leninist philosophy, along pro-Chinese communist lines.

A second source has advised that the PLP faction which is more commonly known as the Worker Student Alliance is dominated and controlled by members of the PLP, who are required to identify themselves with the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist philosophy of the PLP. They advocate that an alliance between workers and students is vital to the bringing about of a revolution in the United States.

SDS regions and university and college chapters, although operating under the outlines of the SDS National Constitution, are autonomous in nature and free to carry out independent policy reflective of local conditions. Because of this autonomy internal struggles reflecting the major factional interests of SDS have occurred at the chapter level since the beginning of the 1969-70 school year.

A characterization of PLP is attached.

APPENDIX

SPEECHES OF [illegible]DERICK ALLEN HAMPTON
AT ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY,
NORMAL, ILLINOIS ON OCTOBER 29, 1969
AND SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY,
CARBONDALE, ILLINOIS ON NOVEMBER 14,1969

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDI

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY (PLP)

"The New York Times" city edition, Tuesday, April 20, 1965, page 27, reported that a new party of "revolutionary socialism" was formally founded on April 18, 1965, under the name of the PLP which had been known as the Progressive Labor Movement.

According to the article, "The Progressive Labor Movement was founded in 1962, by Milton Rosen and Mortimer Scheer after they were expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for assertedly following the Chinese Communist line."

A source advised on June 3, 1968, that the PLP held its Second National Convention in New York City, May 31, to June 2, 1968, at which time the PLP reasserted its objective of the establishment of a militant working class movement based on Marxism-Leninism. This is to be accomplished through the Party's over-all revolutionary strategy of raising the consciousness of the people and helping to provide ideological leadership in the working class struggle for state power.

The source also advised that at the Second National Convention Milton Rosen was unanimously re-elected National Chairman of the PLP and Levi Laub, Fred Jerome, Jared Israel, William Epton, Jacob Rosen, Jeffrey Gordon, and Walter Linder were elected as the National Committee to lead the PLP until the next convention.

The PLP publishes "Progressive Labor," a bimonthly magazine; "World Revolution," a quarterly periodical; and "Challenge-Desafio," a monthly newspaper.

The April, 1969, issue of "Challenge-Desafio" sets forth that "Challenge is dedicated to the peoples fight for a new way of life--where the working men and women control their own homes and factories; where they themselves make up the entire government on every level and control the schools, courts, police and all institutions which are now used to control them."

Source advised on May 8, 1969, that the PLP utilizes an address of General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn, New York, and also utilizes an office in Room 617, 1 Union Square West, New York, New York.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Also Known As
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by Bobby Seale, BPP Chairman, and Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense. Newton was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968 contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, George Mason Murray, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "...we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it..."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

184

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
December 24, 1969

DAVID HILLIARD

On December 20, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Charles Garry, attorney in San Francisco, California, who represents Black Panther Party (BPP) members and David Hilliard, National BPP Chief of Staff, arrived O'Hare Airport, Chicago, early p.m. of December 20, 1969.

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

Source stated that the above persons were met at the airport by Bobby Rush, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois Chapter, BPP, Rufus "Chaka" Walls, Deputy Minister of Information, Illinois Chapter, BPP, Willie Calvin, Captain of Defense, Chicago Branch, Illinois Chapter, BPP, and others unknown.

Source stated that this group then came by Illinois BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison, then on to the Sheraton-Chicago Hotel, 505 North Michigan Avenue, where Garry and Hilliard registered.

Source stated that the entire group then proceeded to Malcolm X Junior College, Chicago, where numerous persons spoke before the remaining Black Congressmen who made up the "Black Caucus". The "Black Caucus" was publicly identified as consisting of six Black Congressmen, self-appointed, who held on December 20, 1969, in Chicago, Illinois, a public unofficial inquiry regarding the death of Fred Hampton, Deputy Chairman, Illinois BPP, who was killed on December 4, 1969, by Cook County, Illinois State's Attorney's Police when they attempted to serve a search warrant concerning the illegal possession of weapons.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DAVID HILLIARD

Source stated that Hilliard, Garry and Rush all appeared on the Marty Faye television show, Channel 26, WCIV, Chicago, on December 20, 1969, at 10:00 PM, wherein Hilliard talked about the BPP ten-point program and police harassment of the BPP. Garry indicated that he was responsible for bringing approximately $150,000 to his law firm before he began representing the BPP members and now brings in about $30,000. He also indicated that the police were harassing the Panthers as is evident by all the arrests throughout the nation.

Source stated that Rush stated the BPP has spent approximately $70,000 in legal costs for the defense of Huey Newton, National BPP Minister of Defense, and that the average Negro citizen has not advanced in society standing in over 100 years.

Source stated that the Illinois BPP Chapter gave Hilliard $2,000 cash as he indicated that the National BPP was in dire need of finances. Hilliard also indicated, according to this source, that Emory Douglas, National BPP Minister of Cultural Development, and D. C. Cox, National BPP Field Marshal, were both in Algiers with Eldridge Cleaver, National BPP Minister of Information, in self-imposed exile and that he (Hilliard) was contemplating a trip there next month.

On December 21, 1969, advised that Garry and Hilliard departed O'Hare Field, Chicago, between 3 and 4 PM on this date via unknown airlines. Source stated that no information was available as to their destination, however, both previously indicated they would visit Cleveland, Ohio, and New Haven, Connecticut, following Chicago.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished the United States Attorney, United States Secret Service, Office of Special Investigations, Naval Investigative Service Office, and 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement, ".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

185

1/21/70

AIRTEL AIRMAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS

FREDERICK ALLEN HAMPTON
RM - BPP

On 1/20/70, USA DONALD E. WALTER, Shreveport, La., telephonically contacted SA T. F. [illegible] of the Shreveport RA. Mr. WALTER said that he had been contacted by Mr. JERRIS LEONARD, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of Justice, with a request that WALTER contact the FBI to determine very discreetly some information relating to the burial of subject at Haynesville, La. He requested specifically that the FBI determine the city, cemetery and type of coffin in which HAMPTON was buried. There was no specific reason given for this request, although Mr. WALTER indicated confidentially that there apparently were discrepancies between two different doctors' reports relating to wounds received by HAMPTON when he was killed.

On 1/20/70, W. B. MARKS of Marks Funeral Home, Magnolia, Ark., and Haynesville, La., was discreetly contacted at which time he advised that HAMPTON was buried in the

Bethel Mission Baptist Cemetery, Haynesville, La. HAMPTON was placed in a metal half couch casket which in turn was placed inside a pine box. The body was buried with no other protection in sandy soil on the side of a hill with good drainage. It was MARKS' opinion that the body would be in good condition.

The above information was given orally to USA WALTER on the evening of 1/20/70 who stated he would relay the information to Mr. LEONARD.

186

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

Chicago, Illinois
January 23, 1970

FREDRICK ALLEN HAMPTON

Hampton, Deputy Chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP) was identified as one person being killed in the first floor apartment, 2337 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, on December 4, 1969, as the result of a gun battle between alleged BPP members occupying this apartment and the officers of the Illinois States Attorney's Police who were attempting to serve a search warrant for illegal possession of weapons on the occupants of this apartment.

See appendix for characterization of BPP.

The State of Illinois Coroner's Certificate of Death lists the cause of HAMPTON's death as a gunshot wound of the head; brain, and the date of death as December 4, 1969. The Coroner's physician signature is shown as Edward J. Shalgos, M.D.

HAMPTON was buried at Haynesville, Louisiana, in the Bethel Mission Baptist Cemetary.

One copy each of this memorandum is being furnished the following agencies:

United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois;
United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois;
Office of Special Investigations, Chicago, Illinois; an
Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston,
Illinois.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years on a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement,".....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature MAO's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

187

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 5/7/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

5

On April 27, 1969, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised receipt of the following information on the dates indicated:

April 18, 1969

FILM GROUP, INC.
BOBBY RUSH
BOB LEE
HOWARD ALK
CHICAGO CHAPTER

RUSH and LEE went to ALK's Film Group, Inc., 430 West Grant, during the afternoon where ALK was to put on some movies concerning the "Confrontation at the Demonstration" taken during the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago in August, 1968. This movie allegedly has some shots of the Chicago Chapter of the BPP in it. The Chicago Police officials were allegedly invited on April 17, 1969, to see this film.

MATTHEW ANGRUM

This person drives a black, 1965 Buick convertible.

RMM

5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

April 18, 1969

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, EVANSTON, ILLINOIS
WILLIAM O'NEAL
JERRY DUNNIGAN
CLEVE COOK
BILLY BROOKS
RUFUS WALLS
BOBBY RUSH
DANIEL CROSS
FRED HAMPTON

This group traveled to the above University on April 17, 1969, in vehicles belonging to CROSS and COOK. CROSS has a two door, 1969, Blue Camero, bearing 1969 Illinois license PW, numbers unknown.

LES COLEMAN, aka SLIM
SDS
MIKE KLONSKY

Upon arrival the above group met with KLONSKY and COLEMAN as well as the 21 black and 21 white students of the University who solicited all to come to the University and speak to them. The total 42 are on a hunger strike.

FRED HAMPTON

HAMPTON spoke to the group in his usual militant manner and then a collection was taken which netted about $250.

The Panthers left shortly afterwards inasmuch as it appeared the whites and blacks who requested their presence were beginning to disagree and it appeared they may not be in agreement on what they were trying to do.

SDS
JOHN ROSSEN
HOWARD ALK

The above gave the following monies to be used for the bond for those Panthers arrested on April 11, 1969:

SDS - $2,500 cash
JOHN ROSSEN - 1,500 cash
HOWARD ALK - 700 cash

This money was not actually seen, but BPP leaders stated this was what was received. The BPP allegedly had $1,300. already.

WRIGHT JUNIOR COLLEGE
LES COLEMAN
SDS
YOUNG PATRIOTS
YOUNG LORDS

Representatives of the above groups are scheduled to speak at the above college April 22, 1969.

Chicago Police Department advised.

According to stationery to be published the official name and offices will be shown as follows:

Illinois Black Panther Party
Central Headquarters
2350 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois 60612 (312)-243-8276

Central Staff

BOBBY RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense
FRED HAMPTON, Deputy Chairman
Communication Secretary - vacant; however acting is ANN CAMPBELL
RUFUS "CHAKA" WALLS, Deputy Minister of Information
BILLY "CHE" BROOKS, Deputy Minister of Education
RONALD SATCHEL, Deputy Minister of Health
CHRISTINA MAY, Deputy Minister of Culture
YVONNE KING, Deputy Minister of Labor
Deputy Minister of Finance, vacant; however, MAY is acting in this capacity

Field Secretaries:

NATHANIEL JUNIOR
JEWELL COOK
BOB LEE
TED BOSTON

April 19, 1969

ARGO, ILLINOIS, AREA BRANCH
MICHAEL WHITE
DENNIS HARVEY
DENNIS (LNU)
WILLIAM MC CLINTON
NATHANIEL JUNIOR

MC CLINTON

Inquiry among BPP members has determined that is a personal friend of JUNIOR's and a close associate of BPP members residing in the Argo, Illinois, area. A search of available BPP membership records failed to locate any membership application in MC CLINTON's name; however, rumor indicates he was aware and in on JUNIOR's plans to purchase the machine guns.

BOBBY RUSH
BOB LEE
JEWELL COOK

This group with women spent the night on April 18, 1969, at LEE's residence.

FRED HAMPTON
WILLIAM O'NEAL

These two with women spent the night at O'NEAL's residence on April 18, 1969.

THE TEACHER
WILLIAMS

WILLIAMS is also known as THE TEACHER. The flame thrower which THE TEACHER allegedly had to keep for the Chicago Panthers has been disassembled and the parts scattered among various unknown members. THE TEACHER is not a very active member any more. He resides at 820 Kimberty or Kimberly in De Kalb, Illinois, and is alleged to be a senior at the University in De Kalb.

FRED HAMPTON
WILLIAM O'NEAL
BOBBY RUSH

HAMPTON is allegedly considering approaching O'NEAL to see if he will take over as acting Minister of Defense if RUSH goes to jail.

April 20, 1969

WAUKEGAN, ILLINOIS
ROBERT BRUCE
FRED HAMPTON
JERRY DUNNIGAN

This group allegedly went to Waukegan, Illinois, on this date for an unknown reason.

April 22, 1969

WILLIAM O'NEAL
ROBERT BRUCE
CHRIS MAY
BILLY BROOKS
CASANDRA BYNUM
RON SATCHEL
BILLY AND DIANE DUNN
BOBBY RUSH
BOB LEE
DENNIS CUNNIGHAM

These persons went to Champaign, Illinois, on April 22, 1969, where RUSH, BILLY DUNN and BROOKS appeared for their court hearings regarding their arrest during a trip to Champaign, Illinois, during February 9, 1969.

RUSH was given six months sentence to prison which he is appealing and therefore was released on $3,000 bond with orders not to leave the state without the court's permission. The court advised him that it would deny any petition he submitted to leave the state.

DUNN and BROOKS were fined $50 each and costs for their disorderly conduct and resisting arrest charges.

April 23, 1969

JOSEPH KOLHEIM
JELDEAN ELDRIDGE

ELDRIDGE, a student at the University of Illinois, Champaign, and BPP member, telephonically contacted the Chicago BPP Headquarters from Champaign requesting money to bail out KOLHEIM who had been arrested at the University of Illinois, Champaign with two others unknown for unknown reasons.

ELDRIDGE was advised that KOLHEIM was on probation in the Chicago Chapter of the BPP for grant authority he did not have to give and for taking Party money he did not have a right to take. In addition on April 22, 1969, when observed by Chicago Panthers then at Champaign, Illinois, he failed to acknowledge them as friends. For these reasons, ELDRIDGE was advised that as far as the Chicago Chapter was concerned KOLHEIM could rot in jail.

HENRY ENGLISH
RUFUS WALLS
BILLY BROOKS
FRED HAMPTON
NATE JUNIOR
DENNIS HARVEY
CRANE JUNIOR COLLEGE
CALVIN COOK

These individuals are allegedly to meet at 10:30 AM, at Crane to straighten out some problem regarding WALLS. ENGLISH is a former BPP member.

COOK is allegedly going to testify at some school board which will allegedly attempt to expell WALLS.

COOK is to testify for the school against WALLS.

DENNIS HARVEY
NATHANIEL JUNIOR
DENNIS CUNNIGHAM
HOWARD ALK

These persons are meeting at ALK's to talk about their machine gun charge of April 11, 1969.

/188

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO : SA

DATE: JUN 9 1969

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
BPP

On May 23, 1969, , who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

RMM

ROBERT BRUCE, COUNT, DENNIS HARVEY, WILMER ANGRUM, DAVID VALENTINE, JAMES WHITE, WILLIAM O'NEAL, ROBERT SMILEY, MARGIE CURRY

On April 27, 1969, the above persons arrived at the Black Panther Party (BPP) headquarters, 2350 West Madison Street, and found O'NEAL and SMILEY already present. This happened about 12:00 noon or 1:00 p.m. and they arrived in BRUCE's Pontiac.

ROBERT BRUCE, FRED HAMPTON, BOB RUSH

BRUCE telephoned HAMPTON and told him that the Model 10 police shotgun was missing and they had brought the girl to the office. HAMPTON, according to BRUCE, said he would be right over. About this time, RUSH called the office and said that he would be right over. He was advised of the above.

DENNIS HARVEY, WILLIAM O'NEAL, WILMER ANGRUM, DAVID VALENTINE, JAMES WHITE, ALBERT MACKEY

HARVEY told the above group to go arrest MACKEY and bring him back to the office. ANGRUM took a .32 automatic; VALENTINE took a .25 or .32 automatic; O'NEAL took HARVEY's .38 Rohrn caliber and WHITE took a sawed off shotgun. This group left in VALENTINE's white 1959 Ford.

It is alleged that upon arrival at MACKEY's home, WHITE got out of the car with his shotgun in his pants and went to MACKEY's door. He returned to the car because no one answered the door.

This car proceeded around the corner, stopped and WHITE had ANGRUM get out to watch the house while the rest proceeded to the corner of 63rd and the main street of Argo where WHITE made a phone call to the BPP office, 2350 West Madison.

WHITE returned after a very short time because a police car went in the direction of MACKEY's home. VALENTINE suggested that the occupants' weapons be left at Brooker T's Tavern because the bartender there is a friend of Argo area Panthers. However, the suggestion was not heeded and the vehicle proceeded to a spot around the corner where ANGRUM had previously been let out.

A person identified as MACKEY by one of the occupants was walking toward a police squad car as VALENTINE's car passed MACKEY's residence.

When VALENTINE's vehicle stopped, ANGRUM ran and jumped into the vehicle.

En route to Argo, O'NEAL was allegedly filled in on what had already taken place and why they were to arrest MACKEY. It seems that a model ten shotgun, a police shotgun, had been left in the possession of MACKEY's friend, name not mentioned, but who was currently out of town, and when the Panthers went to this friend's family, they were told that MACKEY had the gun.

ROBERT BRUCE, COUNT, DENNIS HARVEY, MARGIE CURRY, JAMES WHITE, NATHANIEL JUNIOR, RICHARD POWELL

The above group, except possibly JUNIOR and POWELL, went into MACKEY's residence and beat him up because he would not produce the gun they were looking for. This group also took his shotgun.

MACKEY named MARGIE CURRY as the person having the gun. The group left MACKEY in Argo and brought CURRY back to the office at 2350 West Madison.

JAMES WHITE

Upon the arrest of WHITE, he called the BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison, and related that they had been arrested, you know what to do.

It was later learned that WHITE's mother had gone to the BPP office relating to them that WHITE was weakening and had told her that he was not taking this rap alone. The Panthers became afraid that he may talk and are concerned about this. His mother also told the Panthers that he is now a Muslim.

As a result, the Panthers are no longer providing his defense.

B. JONES

It was later learned that CURRY had been taken to the above person's residence, 6741 South Jeffery, either the third or fourth floor, where she was beaten. JONES is a yellow skinned Negro, 5'11", 230 pounds, about 29 or 30 years old. She is a former Panther; however, has subsequently been purged from the Party for an unknown reason. She drives a red 1965 Mustang.

Many of the Maywood and Argo area Panthers formerly had intercourse with her.

ALBERT MACKEY

It was determined that MACKEY returned the shotgun in question to the BPP.

The above information has been furnished to the Chicago Police Department.

189

F B I

Date: 7/14/69

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
NATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR A
UNITED FRONT AGAINST FASCISM
7/18-21/69
RM - BPP

Enclosed for ______________ is one (1) photograph of the following individuals which contains a description of each on the reverse:

JEWEL COOK	EUGENE CHARLES, JR.
WILLIE CALVIN	RUFUS CHARLES WALLS

RMM:

On 7/13/69 who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that to date the following Chicago Panthers either have departed or plan to depart for the above conference:

JEWEL COOK, Field Secretary, Acting Deputy Chairman, (State Offices), Illinois Black Panther Party (BPP);

WILLIE JAMES CLAVIN, aka JEW MAN, Captain of Defense, Chicago Chapter, Illinois BPP, who will temporarily occupy Deputy Minister of Defense (State Office) if BOBBY RUSH is incarcerated regarding pending local appeals;

EUGENE CHARLES, JR., Lieutenant of Information, Chicago Chapter, Illinois BPP;

MICHAEL MC CARTHY, Lieutenant of Education, Chicago Chapter, Illinois BPP, who is approximately 19 years old, 5'11", 155 pounds, dark complexion, black natural style hair, brown eyes;

JOAN GRAY, Field Lieutenant, Chicago Chapter, Illinois BPP, who is described as about 19 years old, 5'6", 135 pounds, hair black, eyes brown, disposition very arrogant.

RUFUS CHARLES WALLS, aka CHAKA, Deputy Minister of Information, (State Office), Illinois BPP;

HANK GADDIS, aka POISON, Field Lieutenant, Chicago Chapter, Illinois BPP, who is described as approximately 18 years old, 5'9", 160 pounds, natural style black hair, brown eyes which appears to have been pushed in, complexion light skin;

STEPHANNIE FISHER, Secretary on Information Staff, Chicago Chapter, Illinois BPP, who is described as approximately 20 years old, 5'11", 130 pounds (looks similar to a bear);

BEVERINA (LNU), member, Chicago Chapter, Illinois BPP, who is described as 19 years old, 5'5", 170 pounds, light skin and is the girlfriend of WILLIE CALVIN;

BARBARA ANN SANKEY, Lieutenant of Finance, Chicago Chapter, Illinois BPP, who is described as born on 2/7/49, 5'4", 188 pounds, black hair, brown eyes, Illinois Driver's License number S520-0614-9638, Social Security Number 330-42-2652.

Source stated that WALLS and GADDIS allegedly left Chicago area enroute California on 7/12/69, CALVIN and BEVERINA were scheduled to depart Chicago via unknown airlines on 7/13/69 enroute California. CHARLES and MC CARTHY are contemplating driving CHARLES's 1965 mint green Volkswagen Karmann Ghias bearing 1969 Illinois license PH 9662. COOK, FISHER, GRAY, and SANKEY allegedly will fly however, departure date unknown at this time as RUSH has advised no one else is to depart Chicago area until approved by himself.

Source stated that to date BOBBY RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense, (State Office) and WILLIAM MC KINLEY O'NEAL, Chief of Staff, (State Office) both Illinois BPP will not be able to attend above conference due to local court appearances; however, lawyers are currently working to gain permission for these individuals to attend.

On 7/14/69, this source advised that allegedly the following persons are now in the National BPP headquarters area:

CALVIN, WALLS, GADDIS, BEVERINA and MC CARTHY

The Chicago Police Department, the Chicago Illinois State's Attorney office, and 113th MI were orally apprised of the above information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

190

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: 7/11/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

reliable in past, will furnish only oral information, will not testify, but attests to accuracy of following information which should be paraphrased if used in any manner and on which all necessary action has been taken, advised on the indicated dates:

7/1/69 RODNEY HAYES BOBBY RUSH

HAYES is allegedly a contact of RUSH. HAYES employed by the Chicago Police Department, believed in the 18th District and went to school with RUSH.

This information was furnished upon receipt to Gang Intelligence Unit.

7/2/69 LYNN FRENCH - BILLY BROOKS BOB LEE

FRENCH was put in the Political Jail by BROOKS because she complained about the way the Panther leaders were abusing her apartment. She talked BROOKS into releasing her because she is pregnant.

7/2/69 JAMES STEWART EUGENE CHARLES

RMM:

STEWART was removed from the Security Staff because he was always unavailable and did not function properly.

7/3/69 **BOB LEE**

This person has listed the following telephone numbers as places where he can be located:

588-1160	264-3422
525-0937	642-4895

All of the above are Chicago numbers.

7/3/69 **JOHN WILLIAMS**

This person drives a 1963 grey Buick Riveria bearing 1969 Illinois plates LX7771.

ACE COLLINS **RON SATCHEL** **BPP Medical Center**

These people are involved in renting space for a Medical Clinic and one of the agencies they deal with is Cross Realty Corporation.

7/9/69 **ACE COLLINS** **ANN CAMPBELL** **STEPHANIE FISHER**

These three girls have taken an apartment in the 3800 block of West End Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

BOBBY TYLER

This person was purged from the party sometime during the latter part of April or first part of May, 1969. It seems that he took some items from the office and did not return them.

IRIS SHINN **ALVINO SHINN**

During the latter part of April or the first part of May, 1969, these people appeared before the Central Committee attempting to become active members of the BPP again. The Committee refused their request.

7/10/69 **BOB LEE** **BOBBY RUSH** **JEWEL COOK**

As it now stands these three people will attend the BPP Convention July 18-21, 1969, in California., with expenses paid by ; the BPP; however, others have been asked to attend but must pay their own way. In addition several members were told they could go if they wanted but were not encouraged to do so.

WILLIAM O'NEAL

This person is now the Chief of Staff, an Illinois State level office of the BPP created for him. Attempts were made to have this person take over his position of Chief of Security but he declined saying the Party if full of informants and he wants no part of this job.

191

UNITED STATES GOV[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: JUN 2 4 1969

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

On the indicated dates who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

RMM/

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

6/3/69

Black Panther Party

The party leaders have allegedly told the members that the Party will no longer bond anyone out of jail unless at least one shot is fired at the arresting officer.

6/8/69

JESSE WARD

WARD was placed in the political jail, 2350 West Madison, for some unknown reason.

BILLY BROOKS, YVONNE KING, CHRISTINA MAY

These persons are arguing over how and who should run the Party in the Chicago area. It is felt that the girl will be taken off the central committee staff if things do not get settled.

Black Panther Party

The suggestion had been made that the Panthers plan some action to show their protest for the FBI raid on BPP Headquarters, 2350 West Madison, on 6/4/69. Whatever is done should start at the same time as the raid took place.

6/6/69

ROBERT BRUCE, "CHICO"

CHICO is a white male and close friend of BRUCE's. He appears to be Jewish and drives a 1963 Blue Chevrolet, bearing 1969 Illinois license FS 8142. BRUCE has gotten large sums of money from him in the past.

6/9/69

ANN CAMPBELL, FRED HAMPTON

CAMPBELL is now 3 months pregnant by HAMPTON.

LYNN FRENCH, RUFUS WALLS

FRENCH is now 2 months pregnant by WALLS.

SANDRA RICH, BOB RUSH

RICH is 3 months pregnant by RUSH and she allegedly doesn't know that he is even married.

Chicago Area Panthers

The following individuals concerning an incident on 4/27/69 in Argo-Summit, Illinois, and based on current newspaper articles concerning Illinois grand jury indictments expect the following persons to be arrested:

FRED HAMPTON, Deputh Chairman of BPP of State of Illinois, already in jail.

NATHANIEL JUNIOR, Field Secretary, whereabouts unknown.

BILLY BROOKS, Deputy Minister of Education, 1320 South Kedvale, generally sleeps at office.

WILLIAM O'NEAL, Chief of Staff, former Chief of Security, who is expected to be released.

WILMUR ANGRUM, Sergeant, 305 South 11th Avenue, Maywood.

JERRY DUNNIGAN, Captain of Security, 1447 North Cleveland, and with BOB LEE.

CHRISTINA MAY, Deputy Minister of Culture, in charge of Chicago Circle Campus movement; acting Deputy Minister of Finance.

YVONNE KING, former Deputy Minister of Labor (position abolished) now serving as Field Secretary, resides with MAY generally.

KING and MAY are vicious women and MAY allegedly has an apartment where they stay part of the time, address unknown.

JAMES WHITE, 7500 West 64th Street, Summit, in jail. This person has allegedly turned to the Muslim beliefs since his incarceration. His mother told the BPP leaders that he related to her that he was not going to take the blame himself. The Panthers believe that he also turned in information which led to the arrests of MICHAEL WHITE, his brother, NATHANIEL JUNIOR, DENNIS HARVEY and another.

RICHARD POWELL, on the education staff, 17430 West 63rd Place, Summit, Illinois, in jail.

DAVID VALENTINE, Lieutenant of Information, 405 South 8th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois.

DENNIS HARVEY, Captain of Defense, whereabouts unknown.

ROBERT BRUCE, Chairman rank of Captain, 28 South 15th, Maywood, expected to be released.

WILLIAM IVORY, believed to reside in Maywood, Illinois, not known very well.

CHARLES MATIS, unknown to source but a panther.

HARLON WALTON, unknown to source but a panther.

BOB RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense, Illinois Black Panther Party.

WALTER ALLEN, Maywood, Illinois.

JAMES BYRES, Maywood, Illinois.

PETER HAMMACH, Maywood, Illinois.

JOHN WILLIAMS, aka "BEAVER", resides on Sawyer Street in LaGrange, Illinois.

The above information was furnished to the Chicago Police GIU Department.

6/13/69

FRED HAMPTON

HARLON WALTON, BROOKER T's TAVERN

WALTON, unknown to the membership at large, appeared at the Brooker T's Tavern on this date, was not visibly greeted by several unknown persons recognized as Panthers at the time and left shortly thereafter. Just after he left several police officers arrived requesting information concerning him. Later it was learned that he was arrested regarding the indictments returned by the Illinois Cook County Grand Jury.

WALTON is not really trsuted by the Chicago Chapter of the BPP and his membership though valid is not generally known. One Panther indicated that WALTON is related to HAMPTON.

The above information was furnished to the GIU of the Chicago PD upon receipt.

6/13/69

CHRISTINA MAY, DELBERT ORR, YVONNE KING

MAY and KING rented the third floor apartment at 1729 West Adams in the name of ORR. ORR is allegedly a non-party member who got MAY pregnant. MAY and KING stayed in this apartment the night on 6/9 and 10/69, when the Chicago Police were arresting various persons on indictment warrants.

This information was furnished to the Gang Intelligence Unit on receipt.

BOB RUSH, JEWEL COOK, RUFUS WALLS

RUSH related that COOK and WALLS had been out of town, probably to the west coast area though not stated for an unknown reason, however, are now back. RUSH also claims his name was added to the indictments to be returned by the Illinois Cook County Grand Jury on 6/9/69 but for some unknown reason scratched off. Indications are that RUSH is no longer respected as a leader among the "hard core" Panther members.

COOK more or less indicated that "the coast" authorized a purge of the Chicago area members for any reason the Chapter felt justified in doing. This would eliminate members aware of information and therefore make picking the informants out easier.

6/14/69

BOBBY RUSH, LYNN FRENCH, SANDRA RICH, RICHARD BLACK, ANN CAMPBELL

Above Panthers plus 5 or 6 who were unknown attended a gathering at FRENCH's apartment on Marylin and 55th or 56th. It is not known what was discussed, however, believed it was just a social party.

6/15/69

BOBBY RUSH

Most Chicago Chapter members are very defintely beginning to take issue with RUSH being the leader of the Panthers in Illinois. Most are now talking behind his back, however, more and more members are frequenting him less and less.

JEWEL COOK, BOB LEE

Most Panthers are beginning to look toward these persons as the current or future leaders of the BPP in Illinois.

FRED HAMPTON

Most Panthers believe now that HAMPTON actually kept the party alive and growing prior to his incarceration. Further, most are writing him letters to this effect or sending him this "cheer" through the lawyers.

6/16/69

Resist, BPP, DAN STERN

Black Panthers received their usual $250 from Resist today allegedly through DAN STERN.

BOBBY RUSH

RUSH indicated that the Party would be purged to about 50 hard core members, then the structure of the Party would be rebuilt. From now on if a member is late or makes an error and cannot take the punishment, that member will be purged from the Party.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

192

TO : SAC, CHICAGO (P) DATE: 8/15/69

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
RM

[redacted] who has furnished reliable information in the past, [redacted] and which where appropriate, has been disseminated as well as orally furnished to the Chicago Police Department and Cook County Illinois States Attorney's Office, advised as indicated:

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

August 1, 1969 CHERYL PETERSON

This person allegedly flew to Denver, Colorado, on July 30 or 31, 1969, where she will either attend some political school as a representative from the Chicago Chapter of the Illinois Black Panther Party (BPP) or where she will act as an instructor at this school. This school will last approximately two weeks. No other information is known concerning this matter.

August 1, 1969 JEWEL COOK

COOK was arrested on this date by the Chicago Police Department (CPD), other details unknown. COOK allegedly has some relatives in Des Moines, Iowa, who he visits frequently.

August 1, 1969 JAMES CORBETT

The Panthers are allegedly claiming that CORBETT only fired one or two shots from the roof of the Headquarters on July 31, 1969, and then ran. The Panthers are allegedly attempting to locate CORBETT now to question him concerning this matter.

August 2, 1969 MANNZ DOZIER

This person was arrested by the CPD and charged with aggravated battery. It is alleged that he pulled a gun on the arresting officer, however, did not fire.

West Suburban Branch, Illinois BPP

August 3, 1969 GREG (LNU), aka "CHICO"

This Panther resides on 14th Street in Maywood, Illinois, and is allegedly planning to set up a record store in Maywood. It is alleged that this store will probably be used by the Panthers for meetings.

August 3, 1969 **RUFUS WALLS**

WALLS allegedly purchased a 12 gauge shotgun and two .32 caliber pistols at Harnett's Gabby Sports Center, Incorporated, 6676 North Lincoln on May 23, 1969, for a total of $105 cash. The .32's have Serial Numbers 416552 on a Sour and Son .765 Automatic and 116102 on the Ortgie .765. WALLS Illinois State Gun Permit Number is 844 734.

WILLIAM O'NEAL

This person ordered three guns, paying a cash total of $152.25 on July 30, 1969, from Harnett's Gun Store, however, when he attempted to pick them up on August 1, 1969, the gun store refused to sell them and returned his money. O'NEAL has Illinois State Gun Permit Number 840 748, however, is allegedly going to return this registration as the state put his wrong birth date on it.

August 4, 1969 **BEVERLINA POWELL; ANN CANPBELL; CARLETTA FIELDS**

These persons will allegedly operate from an office at 48th and State Street. They will take orders from the Chicago Chapter. The only reason for the office is to "be closer to the people." The girls will not have any right to make policy.

August 4, 1969 **SAM LATSON**

LATSON will operate an office at 65th just off of Indiana. This will be under the same set up as the one at 48th and State.

August 4, 1969 **WILLIE CALVIN**

This Panther was arrested on this date by the CPD for disorderly conduct and incorrect car registration.

August 7, 1969 **BOB LEE**

This person allegedly traveled to Washington, D.C. on August 6, 1969, returning to Chicago on August 7, 1969. The purpose of this trip is unknown.

WFO was already aware of this information.

August 7, 1969 Chicago Chapter, Blackstone Rangers (BR)

The BPP is planning to open one or two room offices all along the perimeter of the BR Nation. These offices will be used to get closer to the community. They will allegedly be used to distribute such items as the BPP newspaper, pass out bulletins of coming events, etc. These offices will not have any authority to call the National BPP and will be directly responsible to the Chicago Chapter office and officers. They will not in other words, have any policy making powers or even have any officers as such.

August 8, 1969 LARRY WHITE

This Panther was born on December 6, 1943, and has the following two addresses:

340 South Western, telephone number 421-4694;
4814 South Calumet, both Chicago, Illinois.

August 9, 1969 JEWEL COOK; BOB LEE; Rockford, Illinois Branch

These persons traveled to Rockford, Illinois, on August 8, 1969, in LEE's vehicle. They were supposed to stay for several days to help Rockford get better organized, however, for some unknown reason, returned about 5:00 p.m., on August 9, 1969.

August 10, 1969 JOHN K. BRAKES

This person is better known as OBAR. He drives a 1969 blue Camero with a black top that has damage to the right rear fender. BRAKES also has the alias of OBA FIMING, resides at 559 East Browning, Apartment 101, telephone number 924-3598.

August 12, 1969 FRED HAMPTON

Allegedly, HAMPTON's total bond will be $5,500 for all charges currently outstanding. The Panthers allegedly have $4,500 now reserved for this purpose.

August 12, 1969 ALVINO SHINN; BOB RUSH; JEWEL COOK; RICHARD BLACK; JOHN "BEAVER" WILLIAMS; WILLIAM O'NEAL

These persons allegedly went to SHINN's new residence, address unknown, where they told him that he still owed the Illinois Panthers $1,000 cash for making his bond concerning his arrest of April 2 or 3, 1969. SHINN allegedly gave them $500 cash and promised to repay the remainder as soon as possible.

August 12, 1969 Chicago Chapter, Illinois BPP

Allegedly, the Panthers will have the Headquarters repaired by August 18, 1969, and will hold a press conference during the morning. It is alleged that eventually, this Headquarters will have sand bags stored for ready use should a police agency again decide to enter. The talk is that attempts will also be made to obtain gas masks to have available. It has also been suggested that as many as ten Panthers be assigned to be in Headquarters between midnight and 6:00 a.m.

193

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, CHICAGO

DATE: AUG 1 8 1969

FROM : SA ROY MARTIN MITCHELL

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

who has furnished reliable information in the past,

has been disseminated as well as orally furnished to the Chicago PD and Cook County, Ill., States Attorney's Office, advised as indicated:

RMM

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

7/13/69 MICHAEL MC CARTHY, EUGENE CHARLES
These two individuals allegedly attended an underground newspaper convention in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The exact dates of this attendance is unknown, however, they returned to Chicago on 7/12/69.

7/14/69 DENNIS CUNNINGHAM, SKIP ANDREW, HOWARD ALK, FRED HAMPTON, BOBBY RUSH
ALK allegedly has made some arrangements with a record company in California to have recordings of HAMPTON's speeches made and published. CUNNINGHAM and ANDREW allegedly have a contract now from this company which needs RUSH's signature. When signed the Ill. BPP will receive a $5,000 advance. Allegedly the above lawyers are contemplating forming a corporation to handle this matter. This allegedly will be the same company in the San Francisco area that published the ELDRIDGE CLEAVER records.

7/24/69 ANN CAMPBELL
CAMPBELL was purged from her position as Communication Secretary of the Ill. BPP due to her "incorrect political ideology," however, she is still a BPP active member.

7/24/69 HOWARD ALK, CARLETTA FIELDS, RUFUS WALLS, JOAN GRAY, STEPHANY FISHER, MICHAEL MC CARTHY, EUGENE CHARLES, WILLIE CALVEN, HANK GADDIS, BEVELINA POWELL, JEWEL COOK, CASANDRA BYNUM, BARBARA SANKEY, BOB LEE, BRENDA WILLIS.
These persons all allegedly attended the BPP conference in California during 7/18 - 21/69. All returned to Chicago on 7/22 - 24/69. WALLS', COOK's, and MC CARTHY's expences were paid by the party and the others paid their own expenses.

ALK went to take movies which allegedly will be incorporated into a new movie.

ALK has allegedly produced a movie called American Revolution II, which is a film about the Democratic Convention in Chicago, August, 1968, as well as about BPP activities.

7/25/69 DAN STERN
On 7/22/69, the BPP received another $250 check from STERN's alleged group.

7/25/69 Health Clinics, Dr. ERIC KAST (phonetic), Lawndale Association For Social Health (LASH), ACE COLLINS, Medical Committee on Human Rights
COLLINS is working with several doctors, including KAST (phonetic), in attempting to set up the BPP Health Clinic. It seems that LASH will actually form this first, but the BPP will then take it over. This is due to the fact that donations to the BPP are not tax deductible but are when given to LASH. First Health Clinic planned for 3850-52 W. 16th St. The Medical Committee on Human Rights is also playing an unknown part in this project.

7/29/69 WANDA ROSS, BARBARA SANKEY, Breakfast For Children Program
ROSS and SANKEY are the major persons to see concerning this program.

7/30/69 Chicago Chapter, FRED HAMPTON, HOWARD ALK
The BPP lawyers have allegedly received a $2,500 advance check from the Bluething Recording Company in California. This is half of a $5,000 promised advance payment for records to be produced by this company of HAMPTON's speech. Another $2,500 is allegedly to be received upon the return of the contract to the company. This deal was allegedly arranged through ALK.

Source advised three individuals, alleged Chicago BPP members attended a meeting in Milwaukee, Wisconson. When these individuals left the meeting they had in their possession, two M-1 Carbines allegedly purchased from an unidentified BPP member in Milwaukee. These three individuals stated they were returning to Chicago.

; 8/18/69)

Source advised that JOSEPH GRAY and DONALD SMILEY, BPP members were arrested with three other individuals earlier that date and charged with unlawful use of weapons and aggravated assault for shooting at ANDREW BLAIR, a Negro male, residing at 6943 South Justine Street, Chicago. BLAIR, at the time of shooting, was walking through the Chicago Housing Authority Project located at 5041 South Federal Street. BLAIR was not injured at the time of his arrest. SMILEY was in possession of a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol. GRAY possessed a .22 caliber revolver.

; 9/11/69)

Source advised they had learned that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had recently found plastic bombs, sawed off shotguns and smoke bombs as a result of a raid on an apartment in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. The source stated three men were believed to have been residing at the apartment and were identified by the RCMP as ROBERT BRUCE, NATHANIEL JUNIOR and DENNIS HARVEY, Chicago BPP members in exile. BRUCE is wanted in Chicago on kidnapping and assault with intent to commit murder charges according to the sources. These sources also advised JUNIOR and HARVEY are wanted on bond default charges after they failed to appear in court as a result of charges filed earlier, charging them with attempting to purchase machine guns.

;10/1/69
;10/1/69)

The Indianapolis Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) advised on October 1, 1969, JEWEL COOK, WILLIE CALVIN and CLEVELAND COOK were all arrested in Indianapolis, Indiana, where they had travelled to help the Indianapolis BPP Chapter get back on its feet. The three individuals are BPP Chicago members. These three, according to the Indianapolis Division were arrested for larceny and violation of a local firearms act. In the vehicle they were travelling in, a .38 Colt Snubnose revolver bearing Serial Number 223772 was found.

This gun was reported stolen in Chicago on March 24, 1969. Source advised the above individuals were incarcerated in Indianapolis, Indiana on charges of unlawful possession of a weapon and stealing a car battery. The three, according to the source, were in Indianapolis to assist in re-organizing that BPP chapter.

(10/2/69)

Officer FUNK, Chicago, Illinois Police Department (PD), advised on October 3, 1969, that seven Negro males were arrested at BPP Headquarters following a shooting incident that date during the early morning hours.

Officer WANER, Chicago PD, advised on October 4, 1969 that officer SHAMLEY was injured by a shotgun blast believed to have originated at BPP Headquarters.

Officer LARA, Chicago PD, subsequently advised on October 4, their investigation reflects that the PD responded to a call from an anonymous caller regarding gun shots at Panther Headquarters. When the police arrived, shooting occurred and upon entering Panther Headquarters, seven BPP members were arrested, one shotgun and one .30 caliber Carbin was confiscated.

Source advised the shooting had occurred at Panther Headquarters during the Headquarters during the early morning hours of October 4, 1969 because of trouble recently developing between Vice Lords and the BPP. Source stated the Vice Lords were a Negro youth gang operating on Chicago's West side and had approached the Panthers "wanting

to be cut in" on a medical center which the Panthers had announced would open soon. BPP refused to allow the Vice Lords any "part of the action". The Vice Lords told the BPP to either stop work and not attempt to operate the medical center or if the Panthers did open the center the Vice Lords would "burn it down". As a result of this earlier conflict between the Vice Lords and Panthers, a car loaded with Vice Lords drove by Panther Headquarters early that morning and fired shots at the headquarters. The Panthers returned the fire and the PD,arrived when the Vice Lords were making a second pass by headquarters. When the Vice Lords spotted the police they left the area and the police returned the fire of the Panthers, subsequently resulting in the arrest of seven members.

; 10/4/69)

IV. PUBLICATIONS

Source, on October 23, 1969, furnished a copy of a pamphlet captioned "Ministry of Information Bulletin, Illinois Chapter, Black Panther Party, Vol. 1, No.4". This "bulletin", which is contained in the appendix section of this memorandum,appears to be reprints of articles published earlier in the "BPP" newspaper. Source advised that while this issue was number four, it is the only bulletin to his knowledge prepared by the Illinois Chapter. Source also stated this is not to be a regular publication and no future issues have been discussed among party heirarchy.

(; 10/23/69)

Source also furnished on October 23, 1969, a leaflet which is attached to the appendix, captioned "Support Bobby Seale and the Conspiracy "8".

The Chicago Chapter of the BPP has no regularly scheduled publications, however, on occasion, leaflets have been distributed in connection with appearances by members at various functions.

V. ACTIVITIES

WILLIE JAMES CALVIN, also known as "Jew Man" Captain of Defense and JEWEL COOK, Field Secretary, Chicago BPP, travelled to Indianapolis, Indiana to ascertain why the Indianapolis Chapter had purged so many members, during August, 1969.

8/20/69).

Source advised the Chicago BPP continues to hold political orientation classes, Monday, Wednesday and Friday at 7:15 PM at the Church of the Epiphany, 201 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago. These classes consist of instruction on the ten point program of the BPP. Recently the classes have been poorly attended.

(8 28 69
9/4/69)

Source advised he had attended a closed meeting at a church on West Armitage Street, where the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican youth gang, maintains its headquarters. The meeting was held on September 10, 1969 and 125 to 150 people were present. Those in attendance represented members and sympathizers of the BPP, the Young Lords and the Young Patriots. According to source, the Young Patriots, is a youth gang whose membership is comprised of Appalachian poor on Chicago's near North side.

The meeting was held in Memory of LARRY ROBERSON, a BPP member who had died during the week of September 8-12, 1969, following a gun shot wound by police officers.

FRED HAMPTON spoke and referred to MAO Tse-tung, and ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, Minister of Defense, National BPP. HAMPTON stated the killing of one brother by the "Pigs" (police) doesn't stop the revolution.

9/11 69)

Sources advised a rally was held at the American University, Washington, D.C., on September 13, 1969, with approximately 700 to 800 people in attendance. The theme of all speakers was to the effect that a revolution was going on at that time and that all oppressed people should be armed. BOB LEE, Secretary of the BPP,Chicago spoke. LEE contained his remarks to the above and exhibited the film "American Revolution II" which is described as an anti-police and anti-establishment film.

9/13/69)

Source advised on September 14, 1969, the BPP sponsored a rally at the Intermediate School, 201, 125th Street, Madison Avenue, New York City, New York. Between 400 and 500 people attended and most were either black or Puerto Rican. BOB LEE spoke after showing the "American Revolution II" film and his remarkes were concerned with the "Facist Pig Tactics" used by police to suppress the desire of the people.

9/15/69)

The Chicago "Tribune" a daily Chicago newspaper in its Four Star Final edition on September 18, 1969, printed an article regarding the BPP Breakfast for Children Program. The article reflects the program as being almost non-existent in Chicago. The article also stated that FRED HAMPTON states the program feeds 3,000 to 3,500 children, but investigation determined that on some days the locations were not opened and on other days only handfuls of children showed up. The article concluded, saying the neighborhood merchants who had previously donated to the program had all but ceased donations.

Source advised the Breakfast for Children Program is run by BARBARA SANKEY, and JOAN GRAY.

The location of their Breakfast for Children Program is North Hoyne Street and West Washington Boulevard. While BPP is currently claiming to feed 100 children each day, in fact the program has almost ceased to operate.

;10/69)

Source advised BOB LEE was in Richmond, Virginia on September 18, 1969 on BPP business. He spoke at Chapel Hill, North Carolina on September 19, 1969. Speeches, according to source, followed the same text as set forth in the New York speech and also criticized the power structure as plotting to destroy the BPP.

9/19/69)

Source advised that the National Office of the BPP, Oakland, California has directed the Illinois BPP leaders to expect to more or less help the National Office in training, directing and in general be responsible for all BPP activities east of the Mississippi River.

;9/30/69)

This source advised that the above is not in effect at this time.

10/21/69)

Source advised that members of the"Chicago Daily Defender" a newspaper slanted to the Negro community, had contacted FRED HAMPTON to advise him that two jurors previously selected for the anti-riot conspiracy trial underway in Chicago wherein eight defendants, one of whom his BOBBY SEALE, National BPP Officer, was being tried for violations steming from the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago during August, 1968, had received threatening letters signed "The Panthers." HAMPTON, after contacting the National Office, denied any knowledge of these threatening

letters and issued a press release alleging that the letters were another means of the establishment in its plot to put the Panthers in a bad light.

9/30/69).

Source advised that FRED HAMPTON had announced to the news media in Chicago that the BPP would protest the arrest of seven of its members at Panther Headquarters early that day. HAMPTON stated that by these arrests the Chicago PD presented its continued harassment of the BPP. HAMPTON called for a massive rally to be held at the Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, 12:00 noon on October 7, 1969.

10/4/69)

Source advised that a rally on October 7, 1969 which had been called to emphasize the fact the Chicago BPP was backing BOBBY SEALE. The rally was also in an attempt to gain community support for the BPP. Source stated BPP leaders had instructed that any member becoming involved in any militant action would be purged from the party.

10/7/69)

Special Agents of the FBI on October 7, 1969. at 11:00 AM, observed a group of Negro males, identifying themselves as BPP members, arrived at the Federal Building. These Panthers commenced handing out literature "Government Conspiracy to Destroy BPP". The pamphlets criticized the Chicago PD and referred to them as "Pig Daley's Imperialistic Mad Dogs", and also stated "the continued raids, jailing and murdering of Panthers proves there is a government conspiracy to destroy revolutionary leaders in Babylon (America)."

At the height of the rally, about 75 BPP and New Left people, along with 200 to 225 individuals were observed in the plaza area of the Federal Building. BOB RUSH, Deputy Minister of Defense spoke along the theme that the government should be on trial for conspiracy against the BPP. RUSH offered the raids on Panther offices throughout the nation as evidence. The rally was dismissed without incident.

Agents of the FBI observed a demonstration at Cook County Hospital, 1835 West Harrison Street, Chicago. This demonstration was sponsored, according to leaflet, by the Young Lords, the BPP and the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM II) faction of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), on October 10, 1969. LYNN FRENCH, Chicago BPP member, spoke and stated that the BPP could perform a better service for the indigent people of the ghetto, instead of the Cook County Hospital, if the BPP was allowed to obtain a day care and health center. The group dispersed without incident.

Source advised that a discussion among BPP leaders was held regarding the formation of a committee against facism. During the discussion, it was mentioned the committee would most probably be comprised of one representative from the BPP and one from each of the organizations in which the BPP is currently in coalition. They are the Young Lords and the Young Patriots and the RYM-II faction, SDS. To date no committee has been formed.

; 10/10/68)

On October 22, 1969, Special Agents of the FBI observed approximately 30 BPP members demonstrating at the Federal Building in Chicago and shouting "free Bobby, free Bobby." Twelve of the BPP members began a series of close order drills and marched around the plaza area of the Federal Building. The demonstration lasted from 12:00 noon to 1:30 PM when United States Marshals (USM) allowed 15 members to enter the Federal Building to attend court session at the conspiracy trial underway as set forth above.

All the members were searched prior to being allowed to enter. No incident or arrests were reported.

Source advised the Illinois Chapter of the BPP had announced a rally for October 25, 1969 at the Federal Building, Chicago. Purpose of the rally was to protest "racist trial and miscarriage of justice perpetrated on BOBBY SEALE by the Federal Judge JULIUS HOFFMAN at the Federal Anti-riot Conspiracy trial currently being held at the Federal Building.

10/21/69)

On October 25, 1969, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed at 12:25 p.m. approximately 25 White persons, 35 Negroes had gathered in the Federal Building plaza. These individuals had apparently gathered for the previously announced rally to protest the above described trial.

Protestors were observed carrying signs reading "Get Out of Vietnam Now", "Free Huey", "Free Bobby", "Stop Facist Raids", "Free Panthers Now", "Youth Against Facism", "Racist Pig Daley".

At 1:00 p.m., FBI Agents observed a group of 15 Negroes carrying 10 BPP flags commence marching back and forth in the Federal Building plaza area. The group chanted "Your left, your right, now back up the gun. Free Bobby." At 1:05 p.m., this group commenced marching around the Federal Building and circled the building five times. About 1:20 p.m., speeches commenced on the southeast corner of the Federal Building plaza. Ronald Satchel, Minister of Health, Illinois BPP, spoke regarding the west side medical center project of the BPP. He said the project was to be "people controlled" and "community controlled". He demanded the political prisoners Huey Newton and Bobby Seale should be freed. He also blamed the problems of the poor Negro on the capitalistic system in this country. He concluded saying that members of the BPP were not opportunists but revolutionists.

violating Seale's Constitutional Rights by not permitting Seale to have an attorney of his choice or by permitting Seale to represent himself during the trial. He stated that people should be educated to the fact they have a right to bear arms as set forth in the United States Constitution. Walls held up a copy of Chairman Mao Tse Tung's "Redbook" stating ideology set forth in this book is the ideology of the BPP. He concluded saying the day will come when Panthers will be everywhere.

At 2:10 p.m., speeches concluded and the crowd dispersed. No incidents or arrests occurred.

ARS,
1

FRED HAMPTON, according to the source, advised the National Headquarters, Oakland, California, that Chicago was encountering problems in connection with the opening of its health clinic. HAMPTON stated the clinic was not opened as some work remained. HAMPTON stated the Vice Lords have good control over the area in the vicinity of the clinic, but the Panthers intend to open the clinic anyway.

10/6/69)

Source advised on October 25, 1969, that representatives of the National Office of the BPP were arriving that date from California. Source further advised that BOB RUSH, FRED HAMPTON and others met EMORY DOUGLAS, National BPP Minister of Culture; DAVID HILLIARD, National BPP Chief of Staff, and two Negro females at O'Hare International Airport. HAMPTON advised the group that arrangements had been made for HILLIARD to speak at the residence of Dr. HERBERT HAZELKORN, 2700 Wilmette, Wilmette, Illinois, on October 26, 1969, to a group of Jewish people who would probably donate a large sum of money to the Illinois BPP.

The following day, source advised that HILLIARD, accompanied by RUSH and HAMPTON and other BPP members, travelled to HAZELKORN's residence where HILLIARD spoke before a group of approximately 75 white people. HILLIARD gave a short history of the BPP, but his main speech concerned the right of the Arab people to rise against the country of Israel inasmuch as Israel has always attempted to suppress the Arabs. The BPP received no money from this group.

10/25 and 26/69)

Source advised HILLIARD spoke at Malcolm X Junior College, formerly Crane Junior College, on Chicago's west side to a group of about 125 to 150 people. HILLIARD spoke on capitalism and imperialism and restricted his speech to the BPP interpretation of these words. The speech was not militant and lasted approximately 30 minutes. He is alleged

2

to have received a fee of $1,000 from the Malcolm X Campus Bookstore which is run by students of the College. This speech occurred on October 27, 1969.

, 10/27/69)

Agents of the FBI, on October 29, 1969, observed eight members of the BPP in the plaza area of the Federal Building, Chicago. As of 7:30 a.m., the group numbered approximately 20. These individuals, by 8:30 a.m., totaled 51, 16 of whom were white. At 8:45 a.m., 35 Negroes and 10 whites were admitted to the Federal Building and after being searched by United States Marshals, were allowed to attend the antiriot law conspiracy trial as spectators.

On October 29, 1969, the Security Department of the Illinois State Union, Normal, Illinois, advised the Springfield Office of the FBI that a meeting sponsored by the RYM-II faction of SDS would be attended by FRED HAMPTON. Subsequently, the Security Office of the Illinois State Union advised that HAMPTON did speak that evening and denounced the trial of BOBBY SEALE in Chicago, giving a brief history and outline of the BPP and urged the audience to come to Chicago on November 1, 1969, to demonstrate at the Federal Building for BOBBY SEALE. No incidents occurred at this meeting.

VI. BPP CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER MILITANT GROUPS

Source advised on August 25, 1969, he had obtained a leaflet being distributed in Chicago captioned "In Memorium; 8/28/69" indicating "The Conspiracy" and the "Chicago Peace Council" would sponsor a demonstration that day from 5 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. at Grant Park, Chicago.

8/25/69)

"The Conspiracy" is an organization which has described itself as being comprised of eight individuals

3

indicted for criminal trespass in violation of Antiriot Laws statute as a result of activities that occurred during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

The "Chicago Peace Council" is a coalition organization comprised of peace activist groups in the Chicago area.

, 8/25/69)

The leaflet, according to the source, included the BPP, Young Lords, Young Patriots, Young Comancheros, all Chicago youth street gangs, and "The Conspiracy" as sponsoring this rally.

At the rally, FRED HAMPTON spoke concerning his recent imprisonment and local BPP activities. No incidents or arrests were reported during this demonstration.

, 8/25/69)

Sources advised on October 29, 1969, that a coalition does exist, in fact, between the BPP, Young Lords, Young Patriots and the RYM-II faction of SDS. RYM-II faction is led by MIKE KLONSKY, former National Secretary of SDS. Sources felt the coalition existed and would continue to exist only as long as the BPP felt it could receive some benefit from such a coalition. The sources did advise the coalition had deteriorated because of the refusal in the past of the BPP to engage in any activity with these groups unless the BPP received some benefit.

10/29/69)
10/29/69)

VII. FINANCES

Chicago BPP Chapter operates on funds received from the following sources:

4

(1) Speaker fees and honorariums received by BPP leaders for appearances at educational institutions and other public gatherings.

(2) Monthly assessments of BPP members, as well as fees charged for processing applications for membership in Chicago BPP Chapter.

(3) Donations and contributions given at BPP rallies or by individuals sympathetic to BPP objectives.

(4) No information developed indicating Chicago Chapter BPP has received any funds from National Chapter of BPP, from any foreign government or individual from a foreign country, or an organization operated in a foreign country.

National Headquarters of the BPP, Oakland, California, has allowed the Chicago Chapter to use proceeds from the sale of the Panther newspaper to defray expenses incurred for bonding members out of jail. The Chicago Chapter is in dire financial disorder.

10/69)
10/69)

Source advised FRED HAMPTON stated on October 25, 1969, that while at a fund raising party given by LUCY MONTGOMERY, 1754 North Wells Street, Chicago, he received $1,500.96 for the Illinois BPP. MONTGOMERY has been publicly identified as a supporter of the so-called "New Left" both philosophically and financially.

10/25/69)

VIII. CONTACTS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) OR OTHER GROUPS

Source advised on October 10, 1969, CHARLENE MITCHELL, Field Secretary, National Black Liberation Commission (NBLC),

5

CP, USA, met with FRED HAMPTON and other BPP leaders at BPP Headquarters. The meeting was for the purpose of exchanging ideas in the struggle for black liberation.

Both the BPP and CP agree they have a concurrent theory toward the antiriot law trial currently in progress in Chicago in that neither wants to become involved in any violence nor possible threat situation.

Both groups agreed that neither should nor would "stick their necks out for anybody," particularly in connection with the antiriot trial in Chicago.

10/10/69)

ALL MEMBERS OF THE BPP MUST BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS IN VIEW OF DESIRE OF ALL MEMBERS TO HAVE FIREARMS.

MIN[illegible]TRY [illegible]

BULLETIN
ILLINOIS CHAPTER
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

VOL. 1

NO. 4

STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN BOBBY SEALE TO JUDGE JULIUS J. HOFFMANN

I, Bobby G. Seale, submit the following in my handwriting to Judge Julius Hoffman of this Court in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division of the U.S.A., where presently the trial of so-called 'Conspiracy to Riot' is being held, 9-26-69, and I, Bobby G. Seale, being one of the defendants of eight have been, by denied motion, the right to speak out in my behalf where my constitutional right to have 'Legal Counsel of my choice who is effective,' namely Charles R. Garry, who is on record in this court as my defense counsel that I have made agreement with by my choice only that he will assist me in my defense during this trial.

I submit to Judge Julius Hoffman that the trial be postponed until a later date where I, Bobby G. Seale, can have the 'Legal Counsel of my choice who is effective,' Attorney Charles R. Garry, and if my constitutional rights are not respected by this court then other lawyers on record here representing me, except Charles R. Garry, do not speak for me or represent me as of this date, 9-26-69. I fire them now until Charles R. Garry can be made available as chief counsel in this trial of so-called 'Conspiracy to Riot' and in fact be my legal counsel of choice who is effective in assisting me in my defense. The only attorney I know of who can defend me and be effective is Charles R. Garry, who is presently my attorney on record in this court.

If I am continuously denied this constitutional right of legal defense counsel of my choice who is effective by the Judge of this court, then I can only see Judge Hoffman as a blatant racist of this U.S. Court with gross prejudicial error toward all defendants and myself in particular.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

CHICAG[illegible] FUTILITY

It is now crystal clear to the masses of the people at home and abroad that the United States is a downright fascist country. This has been exemplified with the commencement of the trial of the so-called 'Conspiracy 8' on September 24th in Chicago.

The fascist judge, 'Adolph' Julius J. Hoffman has promised that this will be the trial of the decade. It is obvious that this is the last stage and the turning point in American history when the iron hand of the dictatorship will be displayed.

This mock trial would not be possible without the inclusion of the Black Panther Party. The fascist Gestapo pigs have railroaded our Chairman on another trumped-up charge. Having kidnapped him from San Francisco these lunatics took him by car to Chicago 12 days prior to the trial. They had him sleeping in various county jails throughout the journey. Jails not fit for any form of habitation. The result is that Chairman Bobby Seale arrived in Chicago sick from the rot and mess of the jails to face the SS and the Gestapo army.

These fascist madmen have refused to to allow him to see a doctor and it is obvious that they intend murdering the Chairman by any means necessary.

It would be deviating [illegible] to keep to the pattern set. Charles R. Garry, Chairman Bobby Seale's attorney, [illegible] postponement of the trial [illegible] the hospital for an operation [illegible] to be present in Chicago. 'Adolph Hitler' Hoffman has of course refused the request and Chairman Bobby Seale faces the fascists without an attorney.

The judge hurried through the [illegible] of a dictatorial jury selection [illegible] questions like [illegible] what were the qualifications necessary to sit on the jury. Relevant facts like [illegible] these people true representatives of the peer group of the defendants were thrown out as being immaterial and irrelevant.

This is a warning for us to intensify the struggle to heighten our awareness to come together as it is clear that this mockery of a system will not deem any justice and that the time is imminent for us to move from all directions.

It is also the time for us to understand that the [illegible] of the masses must be intensified. The action on the part of the mother country radicals in antagonizing the [illegible] institution [illegible] their level of a[illegible] from [illegible] level [illegible]

[illegible] power structure [illegible] Panther Party has been [illegible] some time. The [illegible] of the Party and the murder of all its leaders [illegible] we should [illegible] that [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] freedom [illegible] Huey's freedom [illegible] political [illegible] repression.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Connie Matthews

GROUNDWORK FOR FASCISM

America has taken step one of Fascism relatively calmly. Amidst a few murmurs of "threats of freedom of the press", the fascist power structure, formerly condoned and supported by the mass media, has turned on its former [illegible]. Needless to say the mass media and the [illegible] power structure have never gotten along to well. The relationship was similar to that of a banker and a whore with the media doing all the [illegible]-backing and also the [illegible] have been kicked out of the bed, and with memories of the last "convention" [illegible] fresh in their memories, they have remained, in the main, dutifully silent.



Roy "Masai" Hewitt
Minister of Education

The mass media has not been able nor seen fit to defend the Constitution when it is applied to members of the Black Panther Party, S.D.S., The Young Lords, Los [illegible] de la Raza, Ahmed Evans, and a multitude of other "negative elements" (it is neither a secret nor a surprise that news coverage of the years of repression has been more concerned with profits than truth.) It is a strange paradox [illegible] the "Constitution" [illegible] or help to those who [illegible] fend it. With the arrest Friday of nine newsmen in Chicago for allegedly violating the [illegible] taking-or-educating [illegible], the Federal Government [illegible] that freedom of the press is at best a sometime thing depending on the whims of the ruling class. Strange how most papers, radio, and T.V. stations found this blatant act of fascism only of secondary importance, if any at all. The fact that "it could never happen in America" was not debated pr[illegible] or con[illegible] the fact that this "ban" was formerly confined to "Nazi Germany" or "racist South Africa" was also easily ignored.

This failure of the human senses in men, who have professional reputations for being sharp, can only be viewed as cowardice or complicity. While this same "profession" failed to give proper context to their own miserable plight, they were on their jobs when it came time to spread "approved" government-issue lies about the Black Panther Party, The Young Lords, and the Young Patriots allegedly "awaiting a load of machine guns", that ever one (F.B.I., C.I.A., State and City pigs) seemed to know about, except the so-called "suspects". They were also quite skillful in seeing to it that this news was broadcast everywhere but Chicago.

This was compounded by the fact that:

1. They failed to give any cry of alarm when our Chairman, Bobby Seale was kidnapped in an obvious frame-up attempt.

2. They failed to give scope or context to the [illegible] Department's admitted plan to raid the National Headquarters of the Black Panther Party, with no survivors intended.

3. In recent months there has been an escalation of terror, murder, raids, [illegible] lies on the Black Panther Party, and the news media has been relatively silent. There were no cries of [illegible] there [illegible] in Viet Nam. No cries of the Government stifling the news were to be heard.

THE CHICAGO SET-UP

The fact that there have been three raids on Panther homes in Chicago in the last three weeks and one Panther (Larry Roberson) murdered, has almost totally eluded the sharp-eyed, keen-nosed news beagles. Also the fact that in all these raids weapons were seized, has likewise escaped the stalwart defenders of "the American way". This is no easy task since some of those raids were daylight raids, and involved as many as 35 uniformed, oinking, Fascist Pigs, with helicopters flying close-air support while pigs ran amuck. As of press time, the last Panther home raided was [illegible] Rush's (Dep. Minister of Defense for the State of Illinois) at [illegible] o'clock Saturday morning (September 21st). The pigs allegedly had a warrant for Bob Rush's arrest, but [illegible] they ripped off his gun, and left. Since then [illegible] the community as usual, but [illegible] fascists [illegible] their "warrant."

These [illegible] should be viewed [illegible] light of the fact the "[illegible]" machinery [illegible] Illinois National Guard (as fine a bunch of fascists as ever lived) is on stand-by; unlike the Convention, this time the mass media has been effectively-muzzled, blinded, and silenced; the "[illegible]" have been effectively disarmed. The only ones who know about any shipment of arms, are the pigs and the pig-controlled-media; the [illegible] coalition has already hinted that the plan of the "[illegible]" may include seizing the Pentagon; and you have the ground-work and the alibi for a massive St. Valentine's Day Massacre by fascist pigs posing as "servants of the people."

If any of those "Clark Kent" types has the guts of a mustard seed, they will write of Pig Daley in terms reserved for Hess, Himler, Eichman, and Co., but they would still be lying. A plot as monsterous and massive as this should not be alluded to a brain as small as Daley's, not even the most chicken-hearted of [illegible] newsmen.

The plot to destroy the Black Panther Party, and thereby crush the whole movement of dissent is directed by Tricky-Dick Nixon, and his number one hatchet man, Attorney General John Mitchell. Under their direction a federal task force set-up "to keep an eye on the Panthers", has inflicted a reign of terror and lies upon the Black Panther Party from coast to coast.

It is no surprise to the Black Panther Party that "it (fascism) has happened here", [illegible] how long will the people [illegible]

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Masai Hewitt,
Minister of Education
Black Panther Party

FREE HUEY

FREE BOBBY

FREE LARRY WHITE

FREE ALVIN JEFFREYS

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

SEIZE THE TIME

Judge Adolph Julius Hoffman, 74 years old, has been named as the hanging judge for the trial of the Conspiracy Eight. The 8 defendants are charged with conspiracy to incite a riot in 1968,
cite a riot in 1968, before the democratic convention. Chairman Bobby Seale, National Chairman of the Black Panther Party, and the other 8 defendants face 10 years imprisonment and $20,000 fine if they are convicted.

Judge Adolph Hoffman stands on his record as a fascist. He has continually propagated this fascist moribund judicial system upon any and all advocates of socialism and or collectivism. This judge always finds any defendants guilty who have views which differ in the slightest degree from his and his other reactionary paper cartoon characters.

On Thursday, September 25, 1969, the trial and selection of the jury began. Judge Hoffman & Coo exerted all efforts to deny Chairman Bobby and all the other defendants any and all motions presented by their defense attorneys. Once again it is most important that we recognize fascism for what it actually is. The 'hangman' only allowed pigs, pig's and paramilitary right participants to remain on the jury. Any person remotely [illegible] a member of the defendants' peer groups was immediately disqualified from the jury.

The judge and state's attorney Foran have an expert plan. They are obviously aware that we the people, and we the members of the Black Panther Party no longer tolerate astronomical intimidation. We will go forth no matter what the sacrifice to propagandize and educate the masses of people. It is impossible to deceive the masses for any extended period of time, and their time has most assuredly run out. "The spirit of the people is greater than the man's technology" and the spirit of the Vanguard can never be crushed. An idea like freedom and liberation which has been born and started to grow cannot be stopped when its time has come to mature.

INTENSIFY THE STRUGGLE
SEIZE THE TIME
FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

Sister Cae, Ed. Cadre
Illinois Chapter, Black Panther Party

LETTER TO BOBBY FROM HIS WIFE

Bobby:

The fascist pigs have kidnapped you, and are trying to railroad you on trumped-up charges. The ransom for you Bobby, is the annihilation of all Panther members and headquarters. If the pig power structure had any knowledge of political economy, and the hardships of oppressed people, then they wouldn't act like racists, but like Judge Sherwin, who freed our Eldridge.

The Panther Party has, is, and will go forth into the community and educate the masses of the people about the injuries, the exploitations and the murders which the ruling class have subjected us to. The working class has a high infant mortality rate, death from starvation, and the suicide rate has been on a steady increase. All this is part and parcel of making sure that the coins still jingle in the pockets of the bourgeoisie jackasses. Therefore, it is only logical that the avaricious businessmen, the demagogic politicians, the murderous racist pig cops, can do nothing more than murder us, when we show the people the correct ideology.

The pigs have, and will go forth to hire, organizations (who are tools for the government) to kill members of the Black Panther Party. Remember when it was mentioned that there have been too many legalized judicial murders in the court room? Judge Hoffman is the true example of a legal hangman.

Bobby, I love you, and I'm going to try and tell the masses of people what you've been rapping to me in the past. Your spirit is strong. It's like that ever-pounding beat within the souls of Black people which says, their spirit will never die, because you, Bobby, and Huey P. Newton started a fire within the masses, that the pigs will never put out.

Your other half,
Artie

JUDGE JULIUS J. HOFFMAN

WHO ARE THE REAL CONSPIRATORS

"As a Black Man in America, I can't get a fair trial in a RACIST COURT"...Chairman Bobby Seale

This was the theme of the court proceedings of the Conspiracy Eight. From the hand picked jury (eight middle aged, white suburbanites, two house negroes, and two big businessmen—all registered voters) to the constant denial by Julius 'Adolph Eichman' Hoffman of all the defense motions.

Before the selection of the racist, Nazi-ridden jury was made, they were allowed to read newspapers in the ceremonial courtroom. Later, Hoffman, pig Nixon's chief fund raiser and right hand lackey in Illinois, told the prospective jurors not to read newspapers, listen to TV, or talk with each other.

The special category of jurors, all registered voters, were in contradiction to the political morales of the defendants. The defendants, demonstrators against the bourgeois political process, and a socialist revolutionary, an advocate of the people's dictatorship (proletarian democracy) are going to be tried by people who support and participate in that same bourgeois political process. This unrepresentative, illegal and unconstitutional jury is illustrative of the court proceedings here in fascist America. THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY demands that all defendants be tried in a court by a jury of their peer group and not lilly white suburbanites, right-wingers, black lackies, and capitalist businessmen. This overt misrepresentation of the community illustrates the 'conspiracy' against the defendants in general and the Chairman in particular. [illegible] the only conspiracy was spent in dismissing prospective black jurors and working class people. The conspiracy became evident as the government [illegible] people who because of their class [illegible]

hoy, and Julius Hoffman, pig Judge) conspired and removed the conspiracy staff from from the defense counsel table.

Kunstler acknowledged Hoffman's effort to intimidate all defense-then
fort to intimidate all defense counsel then the fascist tee-totaler warned him to watch the language that he uses (not to talk of objective reality).

It will be impossible for a true revolutionary, Chairman Bobby, to get a fair trial from a bourgeois reactionary. This fascist bourgeois state (Babylon) is using the courts to fall the revolutionary machine. But it won't work, the Vanguard Party, the motive force of the revolutionary movement, has already began to motivate, mobilize and energize the once sleeping masses. The trial of Chairman Bobby shows the people that unless they are in power to control all legislative and judicial processes (proletarian democracy), their leaders will be railroaded and the Vanguard will be slowed down.

William J. (Jobawaukee) Campbell, Chief pig circuit judge and 'Adolph' Hoffman have schemed together to stifle any and all communication and information on the trial. No press releases, press statements, photographs, pictures or tapes can be made by the defendants to express their view of the legal lynching. The Chairman isn't even allowed to speak to the press in the presence of the mechanical monsters (U.S. Marshalls). 'Adolph' has said that he isn't there to satisfy public interest but will 'run the court as I see fit.' (A bourgeois reactionary and fascist oppressor can only give a bourgeois reactionary verdict and run a trial in the manner of Nazi fascists.)

[illegible]

SEE NEXT PAGE

FREE BREAKFASTS FOR CHILDREN

Last week the demagogic bourgeoisie press carried an article which stated that the Black Panther Party in the City of Chicago was no longer feeding hungry school children. The article also stated that the Party was using the Breakfast money and food for their own personal use. This is totally incorrect, the Black Panther Party refuses to accept the ideology of the capitalist pig power structure which starve [illegible] of its population and uses food funds to send their astro-pigs to the moon for the purpose of heightening exploitation.

The people and the Black Panther Party say there's something terribly wrong when Daley's Stockyard pigs have nothing more to do than sit in front of our breakfast centers and spy on and intimidate the hungry school children, who attend our centers by the hundreds each morning.

Not only do the Breakfast Centers provide free breakfasts but they also serve as a place where children receive revolutionary culture, education and also immediate first aid treatment. We believe anything the people want and need can be gained through revolutionary struggle and until the people realize this we will continue to lighten the oppressive load that this pig power structure has placed on the people.

So the Black Panther Party's Breakfast for Children Program will continue in oppressed communities as long as the masses find it necessary. And we say to the pigs who wallow in the pig pen cars in front of the Breakfast Centers, our offices and cribs, Beware! The beat of the people is much too fast, so go back home where you belong. Watch out pigs, it's a people's thing!

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

Sister Beverline

BAIL MONEY IS NEEDED TO FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

SEND MONEY TO

BLACK PANTHER PARTY
ILL CHAPTER
2350 W MADISON
243-8276

FREE HEALTH CARE

The BLACK PANTHER PARTY is establishing a FREE PEOPLE'S MEDICAL CLINIC to satisfy the medical needs of our community. We understand that the capitalists in America will never provide adequate medical service to the BLACK PANTHER PARTY has moved to establish another community program in which all oppressed people can be involved.

Technical assistance, supplies, and donations can be brought to the office of the ILLINOIS CHAPTER of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, 2350 West Madison Street. For further information, call 243-8276

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

CONSPIRATORS cont.

One attorney, Gerald Lefcourt, is the chief counsel for the New York 21 and must return to New York to fight for their freedom. The only reason he can give for locking the attorneys up is Chairman Bobby's insistence upon having Charles Garry as his counsel. This is blackmail, piracy, genuine and unadorned.

One must understand the significance of the courts here in Babylon. There aren't too many more pigs they can hire, or too many more laws that they can pass, but the fascist power structure can call grand jury hearings and issue indictments forever. They are using the court system to frustrate the revolutionary struggle and imprison the man power needed to carry the revolution through to the end.

Pig Nixon, Hoffman, and Hoover, we have uncovered your 'conspiracy' against the people. The people of the whole world see through your fascist lies and your kangaroo court. You smell of pig manure and your true nature is evident to all who see you wallow in the mire. Keep your hands off Bobby mother-----. Keep your hands off the people. You are on the verge of extinction. The people are waiting for the opportune time to hang you for your astronomical crimes. You and all reactionaries are doomed. Give up 'Adolph' Hoffman, we are 'too revolutionary proletarian intoxicated to be astronomically intimidated.'

Justice To Those Who Deserve Justice
Death To Those Who Deserve Death
Free All Political Prisoners
Seize the Time; Off the Pig

Lt. Eugene Charles
Information [illegible] Illinois Chapter BPP

SUBSCRIPTION FORM

Support Your Newspaper--
Subscribe Today!

Enter my subscription for	National Subscriptions	Foreign Subscriptions
3 MONTHS: (13 ISSUES)	$2.50	$3.00
6 MONTHS: (26 ISSUES)	$3.00	$6.00
ONE YEAR: (52 ISSUES)	$7.50	$9.00

(Please print)

NAME

ADDRESS

CITY

STATE [illegible]

PLEASE MAIL CHECK OR MONEY ORDER TO: MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Box 2967 Custom House, San Francisco, CA 94126

THE CONSPIRACY "8"

BOBBY SEALE - Father of the

FREE BREAKFAST FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN

FATHER OF FREE MEDICAL CENTER

> " IF I AM CONTINUOUSLY DENIED THIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF LEGAL DEFENSE, COUNSEL OF MY CHOICE WHO IS EFFECTIVE, BY THE JUDGE OF THIS COURT, THEN I CAN ONLY SEE JUDGE HOFFMAN AS A BLATANT RACIST OF THIS U.S. COURT WITH GROSS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TOWARD ALL DEFENDANTS AND MYSELF IN PARTICULAR."
>
> BOBBY SEALE, CHAIRMAN
> BLACK PANTHER PARTY

FREE ALL POLITCAL PRISONERS

People's Rally SAT.

OCT. 25, 12:00 NOON

Jackson at Dearborn

COME SEE 'BOUT BOBBY

SEIZE THE TIME

1

APPENDIX

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, Also Known As Black Panther Party for Self-Defense

According to its official newspaper, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was started during December, 1966, in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY SEALE, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, BPP Minister of Defense. NEWTON was sentenced in 1968 to serve 2 to 15 years after being convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of an Oakland police officer.

The official newspaper, "The Black Panther," which further describes itself as the "Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to in the publication as "pigs" who should be killed.

"The Black Panther" issue of September 7, 1968, contains an editorial by BPP Minister of Education, GEORGE MASON MURRAY, which ends with the following:

"Black men. Black people, colored persons of America, revolt everywhere! Arm yourselves. The only culture worth keeping is a revolutionary culture. Change. Freedom everywhere. Dynamite! Black Power. Use the gun. Kill the pigs everywhere."

Included in the introduction to an article appearing in the October 5, 1968, edition of "The Black Panther" is the statement "....we will not dissent from American Government. We will overthrow it."

Issues of "The Black Panther" regularly contain quotations from the writings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic of China and feature Mao's statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The national headquarters of the BPP is located at 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branches have been established at various locations throughout the United States.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A source has advised that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. From an initial ideological posture of "participatory democracy," the current line of the national leadership reveals an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. MICHAEL KLONSKY, National Secretary, in March, 1969, called for the building of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement. The program of SDS has moved from involvement in civil rights struggles to an anti-Vietnam war position and finally to its present advocacy of an anti-imperialist line, linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. China, Vietnam and Cuba are regarded as countries which are leading the world-wide struggles against United States imperialism. On the other hand, SDS regards the Soviet Union as an imperialist power and does not support the polices of that country.

SDS maintains a National Office in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Its official paper "New Left Notes" reflects the line of the national leadership and program adopted at meetings of the National Council and National Interim Committee (NIC). Three national officers and a NIC of eleven members are elected each year during a June National Convention.

SDS Regional Offices and university and college chapters elect delegates to National Council meetings wherein program and ideology are debated, but each Region and chapter is autonomous in nature and is free to carry out independent policy and programs reflective of local conditions.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC), CHICAGO BRANCH

A source advised in May, 1968, that the Chicago Branch of SNCC was an affiliate of the national SNCC with headquarters located in Atlanta, Georgia. It was a non-membership type group headed in Chicago by ROBERT ALFONZO BROWN, a 19 year old male Negro, with the title of Midwest Region Director. BROWN maintained strict loyalty to STOKELY CARMICHAEL, Recruiter and Organizer and former National Director of SNCC. BROWN attempted to align Chicago's SNCC activities within the framework of CARMICHAEL's policies.

In a speech at Chicago on March 25, 1968, CARMICHAEL commented as follows: "The white people are preparing to commit genocide against the black race. What are we feeling so moral about? We know the honky got everything. He got it by stealing it. He's not going to give you anything. We got to take it. These brothers on the streets every day take it, but they're taking it for themselves. Let's organize them and let them take it for our people."

This source advised on August 27, 1968, that officials of the Chicago Branch of SNCC disbanded that branch on August 25, 1968, and as of that time it was no longer in existence. Its leaders became associated with the Black Panther Party at that time.

1

APPENDIX

STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), headquartered at 360-362 Nelson Street, S. W., Atlanta, Georgia, is a nonmembership organization, which was born out of the sit-in movement that erupted across the South beginning in 1960.

Today SNCC identifies itself as an organization in the revolutionary vanguard. It advocates that to be successful it is necessary to develop a revolutionary ideology and revolutionary program.

According to SNCC the year 1967 marked a historic milestone in the struggle for the liberation of black people in the United States and the year that revolutionaries throughout the world began to understand more fully the impact of the black movement. SNCC declared that "liberation will come only when there is final destruction of this mad octopus--the capitalistic system of the United States with all its life-sucking tentacles of exploitation and racism that choke the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The realities of black life, together with the recognition instilled in SNCC workers forced its members to further popularize the legitimacy of self-defense and rebellions when oppression became too great."

From May, 1966, until May, 1967, Stokely Carmichael was National Chairman of SNCC. As of July, 1968, Carmichael resided in Washington, D. C., where he was affiliated with SNCC and active as temporary chairman of a black coalition group. In May, 1967, Carmichael was replaced by Hubert Gerold Brown, commonly known as H. Rap Brown, who served until June, 1968.

In June, 1968, at the Staff and Central Committee meeting of SNCC held in Atlanta, Georgia, it was decided to restructure the organization by equalization of responsibility by creating ten deputy or vice chairmanships. The primary purpose for this change is to take law enforcement pressure off any single individual.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
November 7, 1969

Title BLACK PANTHER PARTY
CHICAGO DIVISION

Character RACIAL MATTERS - ORGANIZATION

Reference Report of Special Agent Alan R. Stephens dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

51 THRU 100

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88296 Date: 2025

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Organization of the

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

LHM refers to request of the SSC for a list of names and titles of certain FBI Intelligence Division (INTD) personnel at FBIHQ and numbers only of certain other INTD personnel; and relates agreement reached between FBI officials and Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the SSC, that the original request be modified as follows. The FBI will prepare the necessary list and make it available for review at FBIHQ by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75.

62-116395-100

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

REC- 106

16 MAY 7 197

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/8/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-53

11. NONE.

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/ZTG

SFP:ekw
(4)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 546

3-113a (Rev. 3-21-73)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-19-88 BY SP-5 ai/ah

intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 4/25/75

You were previously advised that Douglas Durham, former MP 4115-E, who has furnished high-level information regarding activities of the American Indian Movement (AIM), after being confronted by AIM leaders, admitted being a confidential informant for the FBI. This information has been made public.

Attached teletype from Omaha advises that Assistant U. S. Attorney Keith E. Uhl, Office of Special Prosecutor, stated he received a telephone call 4/24/75 from Durham and that Durham told him he had been contacted by representatives of the Office of Senator Frank Church, Washington, D. C., requesting Durham's presence in Washington during the week of April 28, 1975, for purpose of attending staff meetings to determine his potential as a witness before committee investigating operations of the FBI. Durham indicated he intended to comply and would have no further contact with the FBI. We are following this matter closely and you will be kept advised.

1 - General Investigative Division
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - External Affairs Division
1 - William O. Cregar

WRW

WDN:lfj wdn

JGD/WHA

DOJ/FBI

[illegible] OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 24 1975

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-19-88 BY SP5 cl/ahr

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR005 OM PLAIN

4:39PM NITEL 4/24/75 RRH

TO: DIRECTOR (137-33264)

MINNEAPOLIS (157-1458)

FROM: OMAHA (170-231) (P)

FORMER MP 4115-E. Comp.-Syst.

SENSTUDY-75

ON APRIL 24, 1975, AUSA KEITH E. UHL, ADVISED HE RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM SUBJECT RELATING SUBJECT HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICE OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, WASHINGTON, D.C., REQUESTING HIS PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON DURING WEEK OF APRIL 28, 1975, FOR PURPOSE OF STAFF MEETINGS TO DETERMINE SUBJECT'S POTENTIAL AS WITNESS BEFORE CHURCH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING OPERATIONS OF THE FBI. SUBJECT INDICATED HE INTENDED TO COMPLY WITH REQUEST AND HAD DECIDED THAT IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, HE WOULD DECLINE AND NOT SOLICIT ANY FURTHER CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FBI.

END.

RSP FBIHQ

5- Acting

Original Filed In 137-33264-6

REC-15 137-33264

18 MAY 2 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~5 0 MAY 30 1975~~

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED

JUN 11 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 22, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/JG

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

The purpose of this memorandum is to record that on 4/18/75 Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, Executive Office Building, stated he had reviewed a final copy of the Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction including Exhibit L, pages 36 and 37. Mr. Wilderotter advised Bureau Supervisor Alonzo L. Lacey that The White House interposed no objection to the Jurisdiction paper being furnished to the Senate Select Committee.

With reference to the study entitled Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction, Mr. Wilderotter requested that he be furnished a copy and this was done. In addition, Wilderotter had previously on 4/4/75 reviewed the paper for approval of the use of items concerning Presidential or National Security Council interest.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

ALL:ekw
(5)

62-116395

REC-106 62-116395-99

5-7 ~~[illegible]~~ 1975

84 MAY 7 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/7/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SENSTUDY 75

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER ON AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

~~Security~~ Jurisdiction

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize investigative efforts to authenticate Hoover memoranda dated 8/24-25/36.

Document Section, FBI Laboratory, determined the type appearing on Hoover memorandum dated 8/25/36 was prepared on a Remington typewriter with an elite type used since October, 1935. Hoover memorandum to Tamm dated 9/10/36, was prepared on an IBM typewriter with pica-style type used since 1930.

The letterhead used on both Hoover memoranda of 8/24-25/36 was authorized FBI stationery effective August 14, 1936.

On 3/10/75, Mr. Donald B. Schewe, Assistant Librarian, Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, advised that The White House Ushers Appointment Book contained entries showing that on Thursday, August 24, 1936, from 9:20 a.m. to 10:12 a.m., President Roosevelt met with Mr. Hoover in his residence at The White House prior to leaving for his office. Schewe pointed out that this meeting was significant since President Roosevelt met Mr. Hoover immediately after returning from an extended trip, a departure from his usual practice. There was no entry on 8/25/36, other than the President's departure for the Dakotas at 10:40 p.m.

On 4/2/75, review of Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress, reflected that a Desk Diary (container #68, folder #295, microfilm #38) of Secretary Hull contained an entry on 8/25/36 that the Secretary had luncheon with the President between 1:00 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.

Detailed memorandum attached.

ACTION:

For information.

5 ENCLOSURE
~~Enclosure~~

ALL:vb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-7-00 BY 39063 ~~ELW~~/BCE/AMW

Original Filed In 62-

REC-8 ~~62-116395-~~ 842

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
MAY 2 1975

~~5 0 APR 25 1975~~
MAY 2 1975

Mr. White February 27, 1975

J. H. Mortimer

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TAMM
FROM JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1936;
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DATED AUGUST 25, 1936.

On this date, SA Alonzo L. Lacey of the Intelligence Division delivered the above-captioned memoranda to the Laboratory with a request to determine the make of typewriter employed in the preparation of the memoranda and the date of introduction of the type styles employed. The purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether or not the type styles on the typewriters used to write the memoranda were in use on the dates appearing on the memoranda.

It was determined that the "Memorandum For Mr. Tamm from John Edgar Hoover dated September 10, 1936" was prepared on an IBM typewriter equipped with a pica style of type which has been in use since 1930. The typewriting comprising the "Confidential Memorandum by John Edgar Hoover dated August 25, 1936" was determined to have been prepared on a Remington typewriter equipped with an elite style of type that has been in use since October, 1935.

The memoranda were returned to SA Lacey.

RECOMMENDATION:

The result of this examination be forwarded to the Intelligence Division

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Lacey
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mortimer
1 - Mr. Oberg

WSO:mrg
(6)

ENCLOSURE

~~62-66121-1842~~

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

August 14,1936.

Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Tolson
Mr. Baughman
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Dawsey
Mr. Edwards
Mr. Egan
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Joseph
Mr. Lester
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Schilder
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

New letterheads.

st

AUG 20 1936

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

65-[illegible]-33

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AUG 18 1936 P.M.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FILE

ENCLOSURE 62-66727 / 1842

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Tolson
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Coffey
[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Egan
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Harbo
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Lester
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Schilder
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

OK

62-116395-
ENCLOSURE
~~ENCLOSURE~~

~~62-66727/~~

NOT DESTROYED

Mar 13, 1975

RESEARCH CONDUCTED AT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY, HYDE PARK, NY ON 3/10-12/75

On 3/10/74, Mr. DONALD B. SCHEWE, Assistant Librarian in the Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, was advised of our interest in locating any communications bearing upon a conversation between former President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT and former Secretary of State CORDELL HULL in the latter part of August, 1936. Mr. SCHEWE was advised that this conversation was concerned with the security of the US and that Mr. J. EDGAR HOOVER of the FBI may have participated in this conversation. Mr. SCHEWE was also advised that Mr. ROOSEVELT allegedly reduced the subject matter of above conversation to a memorandum and that we were interested in locating this memorandum or some information bearing upon above conversation. Arrangements were made to meet with Mr. SCHEWE at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY, on 3/12/75. Mr. SCHEWE indicated that in the meantime he would conduct some research in this matter.

On 3/12/75, Mr. SCHEWE advised that he had conducted some research relative to our telephone call on 3/10/75, and inquired if we could be more specific with regard to the dates of the information desired. SCHEWE was advised that to the best of our knowledge the conversation we were interested in involving FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (FDR), HULL and Mr. HOOVER, occurred on approximately 8/24-26/36 and that the conversation concerned the internal security of the US.

Mr. SCHEWE, at this point, furnished a Xerox copy of a "buck slip" dated 8/24/36, (copy of which is attached) on White House stationery, classified "Confidential and addressed to the Secretary of State from FDR". Mr. SCHEWE stated that "buck slips" are nothing more than a cover memorandum utilized to transmit communications which are attached thereto. It is to be noted that this "buck slip" indicates that attached to it was a memorandum for the Secretary of State, unsigned, undated and recommending coordination of activities of all agents of the Government in foreign countries. SCHEWE advised

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

that the synopsis of this memorandum which appears on the "buck slip" was the usual practice at that time to identify the documents attached to it. SCHEWE added that this was the only document he was able to locate which may have some bearing on the desired information. SCHEWE stated that the possibility exists that the referred to memorandum may be located among the collection of papers of CORDELL HULL which are now stored at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Mr. SCHEWE then exhibited to interviewing personnel the White House Ushers Appointment Book which was hand-written and kept on a daily basis. This appointment book contained the following pertinent information:

Thursday, August 13, 1936, at 9:50 AM FDR departed the White House for a visit to the flood areas in NY, Ohio and Pennsylvania.

Thursday, August 24, 1936, FDR returned to White House at 8:45 AM.
9:20 AM FDR met with Mr. HOOVER from 9:20 AM to 10:12 AM.

(Note * - There is no entry in this book for Aug. 24, 1936, indicating that Mr. HULL was there. Mr. SCHEWE advised that it is interesting to note that FDR met Mr. HOOVER in his residence in the White House on 8/24/36, prior to leaving for his office in the White House. SCHEWE also pointed out that this meeting was significant since FDR met with Mr. HOOVER on 8/24/36, immediately after returning from an extended trip. This, according to SCHEWE was a departure from FDR's usual practice.

There was no record in the White House Usher's Appointment Book for 8/25/36, which would indicate that FDR met with either Mr. HULL or Mr. HOOVER on that date. This book indicates that FDR departed the White House on Tuesday, 8/25/75, at 10:40 PM for a trip to the draught areas, in upper Maine, South Dakota and North

Dakota, as well as a visit to Mt. Rushmore. FDR did not return to the White House until Sunday, Sept. 6, 1936, at 10:02 AM.

The White House Usher's Appointment Book further reflects that FDR, during the period July 10, 1936, to Aug. 10, 1936, was away from the White House campaigning. FDR returned to the White House on 8/10/36, and remained there until 8/13/36, when he again departed on a trip and returned on 8/24/36. FDR also departed from the White House on 8/25/36, and returned on 9/6/36.

Mr. SCHEWE also produced to interviewing personnel the appointment book of FDR's private secretary, GRACE TULLY for the pertinent period. This appointment book reflects all of FDR's office appointments. A review of this appointment book fails to reflect that FDR met or had an appointment with Mr. HOOVER in his office during the period 8/13/36 to 9/6/36. However, this appointment book does reflect that during this period FDR did have a meeting with CORDELL HULL on 8/25/36, at 1:00 PM.

Mr. SCHEWE further advised that he personally reviewed the following and was unable to locate any documents or references which could possibly shed some light on the matter of interest to us:

1.) Papers kept in FDR's safe.

2.) Papers kept by his secretary in a separate White House safe.

3.) Papers kept in FDR's official presidential file.

4.) Papers kept in FDR's alphabetical file maintained by his secretary.

5.) Individual agencies files.

6.) J. EDGAR HOOVER's file.

7.) Attorney General's file.

8.) Assistant Attorney General's file.

9.) National Security file.

10.) Internal Security file.

11.) FBI file.

In conclusion, Mr. SCHEWE stated that after reviewing all of the above data, he concluded that the pertinent document of interest to us is not at the FDR Library at Hyde Park, NY. SCHEWE added that if any such document is at the Library, it is misfiled and as there are approximately 21 million pages of manuscripts and documents at the Library, it would be impossible to locate same.

It is to be noted that on the enclosed "buck slip" there are four penciled notations, i.e. 285-C, X20, X285 and X67. SCHEWE stated that these notations are part of the FDR Library cross-reference system. SCHEWE added that he checked these references and could locate nothing further regarding the matter of interest to us. SCHEWE stated that these references pertained to the enclosed "buck slip".

285-6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

August 24, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE x 20

I find this in my file, dating back two months. As I understand it everybody is agreed on it. What is the next step?

x 255

F. D. R.

x 67

Memo. from State, unsigned and undated, recommending coordination of activities of all agents of the govt. in foreign countries: each agency as it is related to the others, and all in their relation to the State Department; makes 9 recommendations of coordination.

6/4

#mod 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ATG

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

~~[illegible]~~ 542

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 003 AX CODE

11:43PM NITEL MAY 3, 1975 WMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-NEW) (P)

MAY 03 1975

TELETYPE

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/JTC
#MORI6

RE BUTEL MAY 2, 1975. Sec93

FORMER BUREAU AGENT WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 6302 GOLF COURSE SQUARE, ALEXANDRIA, VA., CONTACTED MAY 2, 1975 AND STATED THAT IN EVENT HE IS CONTACTED BY STAFF OF SENATE OR HOUSE COMMITTEES, HE MAY REFUSE TO BE INTERVIEWED, BUT IF HE CONSENTS TO BE INTERVIEWED HE WILL REQUEST PRESENCE OF FBI AGENT, IF QUESTIONS ARE ASKED RELATIVE TO SENSATIVE TO BUREAU OPERATIONS.

INQUIRY AT RESIDENCE OF HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1160 WIMBLEDON DRIVE, MC LEAN, VA., ON MAY 2, 1975, REVEALS THAT HE IS PRESENTLY AT CLUB MEDITERRANEAN, HOTEL CARAVELLE, ST. ANNE, GUADALUPE, FRENCH WEST INDIES. HE IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO HIS RESIDENCE ON MAY 18, 1975.

REC-106 62-116395-98

BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE IF ALEXANDRIA SHOULD CONTACT LEINBAUGH UPON HIS RETURN.

18 MAY 7 1975

TJT FBI WASH DC CLR

SAC [illegible] AX, [illegible] to contact Leinbaugh on return from 5/18/75

Records

cc 67-585330 (George)
67-476321 (Leinbaugh)

84 MAY 8 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 03 1975
TELETYPE

NR 002 BA PLAIN
1220PM URGENT MAY 3, 1975 BJD
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
FROM: BALTIMORE (62-NEW)
SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU TEL, MAY 2, 1975.

DONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND, CONTACTED INSTANT DATE BY SAC, BALTIMORE. INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED TELETYPE FOLLOWED. HANNING ADVISED HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO DATE. ADVISED WOULD CONTACT SAC, BALTIMORE SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED IN THE FUTURE.

ENDDSS FBIHQ CCLR

REC-106 62-116395-97

16 MAY 7 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2ALK/ME
#moe16

5-8
file 62-116395

cc: 62-41450 (Hanning)

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

84 MAY 8 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 02 1975

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/ffG
#MDR16

NR 09 OM PLAIN

7:00 PM CST URGENT MAY 2, 1975 SKH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: OMAHA (62-NEW) (P)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MAY 2, 1975.

FORMER SA JOHN J. QUINN WAS CONTACTED BY ME PERSONALLY AND ADVISED PER INSTRUCTIONS IN RETEL. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF ADVANCED NOTICE RE POSSIBLE INTERVIEW AND STATED THAT HE WOULD DESIRE AN AGENT BE PRESENT IF SUCH INTERVIEW OCCURS. STATED HE WOULD PERSONALLY CONTACT ME IF HE IS CONTACTED BY STAFF MEMBERS.

BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

END.

REC- 106

62-116395-96

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CRLR

16 MAY 7 1975

cc 67-436724 (Quinn)

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

84 MAY 2 1975

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with enclosures described below

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified except for one enclosure which is classified "Secret."

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Following excerpts from the FBI Manual of Instructions:

(a) Table of Contents.
(b) Preface. Guidelines for FBI Investigations.
(c) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret").
(d) Section 84. Registration Act.
(e) Section 86. Sabotage.
(f) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals.
(g) Section 88. Sedition.
(h) Section 95. Treason.
(i) Section 97. Voorhis Act.
(j) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

REC-106 62-116395-95

18 MAY 7 1975

Also, Table of Contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations.

SFP:ekw ekw
(4)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Material furnished includes policy, statutes, instructions and related matters covering FBI investigations in the security field generally. Limited, extremely sensitive material excluded but available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff at FBI Headquarters.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/7/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-75

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

No direct relation.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Routing Slip (Copies to [illegible]ces Checked)
0-7 (Rev. 12-17-73)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Beirut
☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☒ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Singapore
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

RE: **SENSTUDY 75**

Date 5/8/75

PERSONAL ATTN.

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☒ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ______

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ______ dated ______.

Remarks:

Attached should be brought to the attention of Assistant Legat Armand Cammarota. For his information, the SSC has exhibited an interest in Bureau's communications to Rome in 1964 and is aware Cammarota was then Legat there. He thus may be contacted by SSC personnel.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
#mel16

File
5/8

Enc.
Bufile **62-116395**
Urfile

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: 2/7/75.

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975

#mDL16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2-ALM/HG

Hotis

FARRINGTON

On 2/6/75 Mr. Kelley and I met with Senator Church and Bill Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee. Senator Church pointed out that he intended to run the Committee in a very responsible manner, had no intention of destroying or impairing the effectiveness of the intelligence community and, in fact, hoped that the efforts of the Committee would help to reestablish public confidence in the intelligence agencies.

Parameters have not been drawn but Senator Church feels that the Committee will confine its activities largely to inquiries into domestic activities. The inquiries will be designed to determine whether agencies have acted outside the law and the type of remedial legislation necessary to prevent such abuses in the future.

Study will be largely concerned with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency but will, of course, involve the FBI and other agencies involved in domestic intelligence.

The Committee hopes to have a nonpartisan staff of approximately 40 employees headed up by Mr. Miller and would appreciate having necessary background investigations expedited to permit an early clearance. Miller indicated he has already been in touch with Mr. Hotis and Mr. Bowers in this regard. It was explained that the contemplated procedure involved the FBI conducting the full-field investigation necessary with the results being furnished to the Chairman, after which he would, upon being personally satisfied as to their loyalty, furnish the results to CIA for final clearance. Senator Church appeared satisfied with this arrangement. He stated that he wanted to prevent leaks and be hopefully as successful as the Judiciary Committee was on the impeachment inquiry. Our experience in this regard was pointed out wherein the Judiciary Committee in connection with the 17 wiretaps had written us a letter indicating that if we made classified

ST-117

REC 68 62-116395-94

APR 29 1975

JBA:ams (8)
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis

LEGAL COUNSEL

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 7 1975

information available they would afford it appropriate security restricted to members only, excluding staff, and would not make the information public. Subsequent to the hearings, the Committee published its report which contained our classified documents right along with the Top Secret classifications. Senator Church was not aware of this, appeared surprised by it, and stated surely the information must have been declassified. I advised him that not by us and it was our information.

Senator Church was asked whether in his opinion the formation of the Select Committee would have any effect on the proliferation of committees seeking to obtain testimony from the FBI and it was his opinion that this would have a favorable effect. He said he had been in touch with other members of the Senate who felt that it was a waste of time to have repetitious testimony on the same subject matter before a variety of committees and he had the feeling that the other committees would hold off until after the Senate Select Committee completed its hearings. He indicated that he could not vouch for what would happen in the House, however, he intended to speak to the House leadership in order to try to effect some coordinated approach there also, because he was well aware of the large number of committees seeking to provide oversight or obtain information from the intelligence agencies.

A question arose as to the extent of cooperation with the Committee and Senator Church was assured that the FBI would be completely responsive subject to certain limitations which would have to be delineated by the President in order to protect sensitive sources and information. Senator Church indicated that he was going to talk to the President in this regard in order to secure his complete cooperation, and it was Senator Church's feeling that the Committee should be entitled to answers to any questions they might ask without restriction other than, of course, the identities of informants. He felt the progress of the Committee would be severely impaired if it were necessary to go to Court over such questions to obtain enforcement of their right to have access to whatever information they need.

ACTION:

Information.

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Mr. T.J.Jenkins 5/2/75
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

TO SACS ALL OFFICES

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

PERSONAL ATTENTION

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK TO INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ICS
#MORE16

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-16 62-116395-93

WOC:ekw ekw
(18)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAY 5 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 0~~2~~3 1975
TELETYPE

JB/PUM

NPS/PUM

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO 954-546

PROTECTED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL. YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

NOTE: Teletype prepared for all offices to alert SACs to the possibility former employees may contact their offices seeking guidance.

The Office of Legal Counsel in response to requests from former employees will utilize the briefing paper prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by Assistant Attorney General Antonino Scalia.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.

TO :MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 1, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM :MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum for record purposes reports discussion 4/25/75 between Bureau's Liaison Agent, L. F. Schwartz, and Mr. Jack E. Thomas, Chief, Coordination Staff, Intelligence Community Staff, relating to Abstracts we are to prepare for the Central Community Index (CCI) in connection with Senstudy 75.

Attached are (1) memorandum 4/11/75 re CCI and its attachments, memorandum 4/10/75 and Abstract format; and (2) letter 4/21/75 from Thomas to Schwartz and its attachment, Abstract format. On 4/25/75 Schwartz and Thomas discussed applicability of instructions in attachments and arrived at the following understandings.

The FBI will provide Abstracts only, not documents, to have on record in the CCI a summary of what we have furnished to the Select Committees. Abstracts should be dated when typed without regard to delivery date of Abstract or date of communications to which they pertain. Under item number nine of format, enter date of communication involved, not date it is delivered to a Select Committee. We may use an abbreviated version for the Select Committees' names, such as "Senate Select Committee." We will title Abstracts as near as possible in a manner keyed to the language of the request from the Select Committee. Inasmuch as we will honor only written requests from the Select Committees, the "Requester" will always be shown as the name of the requesting Committee and not the name of any Committee personnel.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2 WLM/

#MDR16

ACTION: None. For information and record purposes.

62-116395-92

62-116395

Enclosures

SFP:ekw
(6)

REC-88

16 MAY 6 1975

ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 6 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

11 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Reviews

Inspector General, CIA

SUBJECT : Central Community Index

[illegible]

[illegible] deliver our abstracts WOP

1. The central indexing capability detailed in the attached memorandum has been implemented. Format for preparation of abstracts has been accepted and the Community Index is ready to receive material. The address of the Community Index is

Room 6E25
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia 20505.

2. The timeliness of reporting to the Central Index is critical and you are requested to make this information available to the appropriate organizational components within your agencies.

Sincerely,

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment

from [illegible] 5/1/75

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JG #m0216

File 62-116395

5-8

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-92

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

10 April 1975

#moe16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-9-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TT6

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence

1. The Intelligence Community Staff, with John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy/IC, as my representative in these matters, will keep the Board and other appropriate officials advised as to progress of the investigations conducted by the Senate and House Select Committees investigating intelligence activities. In particular, it will ensure that we are kept informed as to materials which are formally being provided to the Select Committees by all elements of the Community. The USIB Ad Hoc Group will assist on this matter and provide the mechanism for regular and constant communications.

2. In response to this assignment, the Intelligence Community Staff is establishing a registry for documentation relating to the investigations. This registry will be a source of reference of all responses, testimony, et cetera, provided by USIB agencies and available to your designated representatives.

3. In order to make the registry useful to the Board, it is essential that it include:

a. File copies of documents or other materials which each Intelligence Community element provides to one of the Select Committees where the originating agency considers the materials to involve aspects of Community activities, and/or which may result in follow-on queries concerning the functioning of the Community. The availability of this documentation will be of particular importance if it is expected there will be subsequent inquiries relating to the materials provided and involving elements of the Community other than the originating element.

b. An abstract of each formal input to a Select Committee - unless the Intelligence Community registry is provided with an actual copy of the material itself. A proposed format for such abstracts is attached.

W. E. Colby

Attachment:
As stated

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT:

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)

7. DATE OF REQUEST:

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY:

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY:

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify)

MOR 16

1-19-01 SP-2 ALM/JTG

Ad Hoc Staff
75-358

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

21 April 1975

4/21/75

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ZTG

#MORI6

Mr. L. Frank Schwartz
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4637
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Frank:

Reference is your request for comments on the sample abstracts prepared in the FBI as a report on materials being provided to the Senate Select Committee.

As you know, we want to make the Community Registry as complete a record as possible of what is provided to the Committee, and for this reason hope that the actual copy of special reports and particularly important documents will be provided to the Registry. Where this is not done, an abstract or summary of each document or homogenous set of documents.

We have amended the abstract format slightly to include an entry for "Document Classification." A copy of the amended format is enclosed.

Your sample abstracts require a few alterations to make them more "indexable."

a. Item 1, "TITLE/SUBJECT" refers to the subject matter of the material which is being provided. The abstract on the FBI Manual of Instructions should have an entry here something like "Instructions covering FBI Investigations in the Security Field," rather than the title of the Senate Committee.

b. The date at the head of the page should be the date of preparation of the abstract. The date of submission to the Committee is listed at Item 9.

c. The entry "ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION" identified the organization with authority to release the document.

File 62-116395

5

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-92

d. The "SUMMARY OF CONTENTS" section should be brief, but also should clearly indicate what is being provided to the Committee. I wonder, for instance, whether your sample on the letterhead memoranda was issued in widely separated time periods. The summary as written gives no indication as to the particular subject of any of the memoranda and the single sentence now used to describe all of them covers the waterfront.

e. If the request for information comes officially from the Committee, the Committee title should be entered under "REQUESTOR," but if the requestor is an individual member of the Staff, his name should be indicated.

f. The last entry in the format, "PROBLEM AREAS," has particular significance since it is important to know if there are Third Agency, or sources and methods, or other sensitivity problems involved, and this is the place to identify them. We are beginning to use the abstracts prepared in our office as an aid to obtaining release clearance when we are dealing with the document for which another agency must concur in the release. The "PROBLEM AREAS" section gives such other agency an idea as to whether we see any important reason why they should be concerned about release of the document. The entry in this final section of the format is expected to prove useful for this purpose.

5. One copy of the document or its abstract is all that is needed by the registry.

6. The mailing address of the registry is:

Community Index
Room 6E25
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia 20505

Jack E Thomas
Jack E. Thomas
Chief
Coordination Staff, ICS

Enclosure: as stated

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT:

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)

7. DATE OF REQUEST:

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY:

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY:

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify)

#m DR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/TTG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 21, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On Thursday, 4/17/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President for Congressional Inquiries, was furnished the following four documents with a request that he advise whether copies of such documents could be made available to the Senate Select Committee: (1) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/16/72 captioned "FBI Jurisdiction, Criminal Intelligence Information"; (2) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/18/72 captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters"; (3) A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director L. Louis Patrick Gray III dated 5/19/72; (4) A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated 8/7/73 recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

On 4/18/75 Mr. Wilderotter advised Section Chief William O. Cregar that the above four documents were cleared for delivery to the Senate Select Committee.

ACTION: For information and record purposes.

WOC:ekw ekw

62-116395

REC-88

62-116395-91

16 MAY 6 1975

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/116

84 MAY 6 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General April 28, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Lish Whitson. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for your use in the event you desire to furnish it to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JDM/CA
6076

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)

SFP:ekw
(11)

REC-6

62-116395-90

EX-110

MAY 2 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NPC/mo

JBA/Pem

56 MAY 06 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JGmlu
6026

April 28, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information available to the FBI concerning captioned matter.

SSC Interview of Retired FBI SA Lish Whitson

On the afternoon of April 23, 1975, Mr. Lish Whitson personally appeared at the office of an FBI official, stated that he had just been interviewed by Mr. Michael Epstein, Staff Member of the SSC, and was desirous of reporting the results of that interview which Whitson related as follows:

Epstein first asked Whitson when he entered the FBI, when he first arrived for assignment at FBI Headquarters, to which Headquarters Division he had been assigned, and when he retired. (FBI records reveal that Whitson joined the FBI as an SA November 20, 1933, and retired June 19, 1972. He was assigned at Headquarters December 16, 1941, attached to the Domestic Intelligence Division and served in that Division until his retirement. The current name for that Division is Intelligence Division). Epstein then told Whitson that he knew that Whitson had at one time mailed a package to Mrs. Martin Luther King from Tampa, Florida, and asked Whitson to relate the details concerning this matter. Whitson thereupon

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

SFP:ekw (KW)
(11)

NPC/

JB/Pen

SEE NOTE PAGE FIVE

62-116395-90

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

told Epstein that in the late Summer of 1964, former FBI Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had telephoned Whitson at his home one Saturday and told him that late FBI Director Hoover wanted Whitson to deliver a package to Miami, Florida, by plane and on arrival at the Miami airport to telephone Sullivan for further instructions. Whitson did as directed and upon calling Sullivan, was instructed to address the package to Mr. Martin Luther King. Accordingly, Whitson had the package weighed, put postage stamps on it, and addressed it to Martin Luther King (not Mrs. Martin Luther King as Epstein had indicated). The following day, Sunday, Whitson flew back to Washington and on the next day, Monday, he informed Sullivan that his instructions had been carried out. Sullivan commented to Whitson "Someday I will tell you about that."

Epstein asked Whitson who had paid for the stamps to mail the package and Whitson said that he had probably done so utilizing per diem money. Epstein asked whether he had put a return address on the package and Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had gone to the Miami FBI Office, whether any Agent had met him at the Miami airport, and whether Whitson had discussed this matter with anyone. Whitson told Epstein that he had not gone to the Miami Office, that no Agent had met him, and that he had discussed the matter only with Sullivan. At this point, Whitson asked Epstein how he got the story. Epstein merely laughed and did not reply to the question.

Epstein also asked Whitson whether he had ever written a memorandum regarding this matter, to which Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had ever seen a memorandum on this matter and Whitson again replied in the negative.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On April 24, 1975, Whitson telephoned the FBI official referred to above on two occasions to report additional information which Epstein had secured from Whitson by telephone on April 24, 1975. This additional information was as follows:

Epstein asked how Whitson had made the trip to Miami; that is, how it was paid for. Whitson told him he had issued a Government Transportation Request (GTR). Epstein asked whether there was any prior written authorization for Whitson to make the trip and Whitson told him there was none. Epstein asked what kind of record would have been made covering the trip and Whitson explained that the only record he knew of would be the expense voucher he submitted covering the expenses involved and possibly the copy of the GTR which he had issued. Whitson explained to Epstein that the voucher would merely show that the GTR had been issued for a round-trip to and from Miami and how much per diem had been claimed in connection with the trip. Epstein inquired as to whether Whitson had registered at the Airport Hotel in Miami, and, if so, whether it was under his own name. Whitson told Epstein that he had registered under his name at this hotel.

Additional Information Furnished to FBI By Whitson

In addition to the foregoing, Whitson furnished to the FBI official the following information on April 23, 1975, which information he did not furnish to Epstein.

When Sullivan told Whitson he wanted him to fly the package to Miami, he stated that only he, Sullivan, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Tolson, (then FBI Associate Director) and Mr. Belmont (then FBI Assistant to the Director) knew of this situation. (At the time, 1964, Sullivan was an Assistant Director.) Sullivan never did explain to Whitson anything more regarding this incident.

Whitson said that when he arrived at the North Terminal at National Airport, following Sullivan's telephonic instructions, a young man who was unknown to Whitson but who addressed him as "Mr. Whitson," turned over to him a package which was wrapped in brown paper and sealed with sealing tape. It is Whitson's recollection the package measured approximately eight inches by eight inches by one inch.

It is Whitson's further recollection that at the time the foregoing occurred, King was either just about to go abroad to receive the Nobel Peace Prize or probably had already gone abroad. It was Whitson's recollection that sometime shortly after the mailing of the package, Sullivan commented to Whitson that the package had not yet been received by King. Because of this remark, Whitson is of the belief that the package was mailed to King at the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and not to King's residence. Further, it was Whitson's recollection that it was not long after he had mailed the package that King had a personal meeting with Mr. Hoover in the latter's office.

Whitson observed that in his opinion, the information which was in the possession of Epstein prior to interviewing Whitson must have originated with Sullivan. Whitson noted that Mr. Hoover and Mr. Tolson are both deceased and that he has heard nothing to indicate that Mr. Belmont has been contacted by members of the Staff of the SSC. One other factor that causes Whitson to feel that Sullivan was the source of the information was a question Epstein raised as to whether Whitson had put a return address on the package when he addressed it to King. Whitson said he recalls that when he was in Miami and received the telephonic instructions from Sullivan, Sullivan told him that he should put a return address on the package and Whitson then pointed out to Sullivan that if he did so, and the name of the addressee became smeared, the package would end up at someone's return address rather than in the

dead letter office. Sullivan concurred that no return address should be used. Thus, Sullivan would probably have reason to have commented regarding the use or nonuse of a return address.

On April 24, 1975, Whitson furnished by telephone to the aforementioned Bureau official the following additional information which he had not furnished to Epstein. Whitson stated it was now his recollection he had made the Miami trip either in the late Summer or early Fall of 1964 and that King was "away" at the time.

FBI Records Concerning Whitson's Travel

The following information is on record in the FBI concerning the travel of Whitson discussed above. On December 9, 1964, a Travel Voucher was processed for payment to Whitson the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period November 1-30, 1964. On record also is a memorandum copy of a Government Transportation Request issued November 21, 1964, to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air coach travel, Washington, D. C., to Miami, Florida, and return. November 21, 1964, has been determined to have been a Saturday. There is not available in the FBI any copy of the actual voucher submitted by Whitson.

NOTE: Original and one copy to the Attorney General (AG may forward the copy to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President). Information herein taken from two memoranda W.R. Wannall to J. B. Adams 4/23, 24/75, "Senstudy 75; Former Supervisor Lish Whitson, Assigned Intelligence Division." Voucher and GTR information from J. D. Cox, Voucher Unit, Computer Systems Division.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General April 18, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

#mac16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/MG

6

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and specifically Part IV, Policies and Procedures.

Since the enclosed memorandum captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, originated with the Office of the Attorney General and is covered under this request, we are deferring to your judgment in this matter. The FBI interposes no objection to furnishing this document to the Committee, it being noted that the document appeared in toto in the United States Government Printing Office publication captioned "Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillances, 1974."

Also enclosed for your approval is the original of a memorandum to the Senate Select Committee apprising the Committee of our referral of this matter to you. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

4/25 Approved by A.G. ([illegible])
4/24 Delivered to B[illegible] office by R[illegible]

REC-100

62-116395-89

TEB:vb
(8)

16 MAY 2 1975

NOTE:

The request referred to above is one of several contained in the referenced communication. We are referring this matter to the Department as a matter of protocol in line with our policy of furnishing the Committee only documents originating with the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

PLM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

April 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of the captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

This is to advise that with respect to the memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, we are deferring action on this request to the United States Department of Justice inasmuch as this communication originated with that Department.

62 - 116395

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:vb
(8)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW/TWL

[redacted]

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-89

GPO 954-546

S-89

#mol6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/JHG

62-116395-89

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation DATE: May 20, 1954.

FROM The Attorney General

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE

XI

155-26

declassified 4/26/74 TEB/am

[redacted]

The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of microphone surveillance in connection with matters relating to the internal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal security matters equally as important as the duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigations. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of installing a microphone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all cases, including internal security matters. Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion that under such circumstances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.

Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones, suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow rather than reflect the present state of the law. It is realized that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone. The question of whether a trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the circumstances in each case in the light of the practical necessities of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.

H.B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. WALSH

DATE: 4/3/75

FTMD 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/

FROM : L. C. GROOVER

LCG/

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church dated 3/19/75.

Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities, together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations and activities (page 3, item IIIC of relet).

The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached herewith, to the above request.

It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security, intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the data for both of the other categories as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-100

62-116395-88

That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

15 MAY 2 1975

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Jackson

JJC:jmb

SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE THREE

ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 21 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities

WOB

ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75

The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.

JWR/HHW

JVER

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-14-75

Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:

OK to classify confidential PVD

(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.

(2) Before making any determination as to whether we make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.

(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.

PVD

Tom Feeney acting for W.R. Wannall OK'd using Wannall as classification authority - 4/28/75 WOG

see memo Cregar to Wannall dated 4/1/75
woc f ekw

CONFIDENTIAL

4mo216
DECLASSIFIED BY 51-2 BLM/JHG
ON 1-18-07

62-116375-88

ENCLOSURE

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4-14-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 4-11-75 Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, was apprised of the fact we intended to affix a property stamp on certain nonclassified documents we were furnishing the Senate Select Committee (SSC). It was explained the stamp contained a caveat that the particular document may not be made available to unauthorized individuals without the Bureau's consent. He advised he felt this procedure was excellent.

On 4-14-75 Mr. Marvin requested that all future contacts with the Department concerning SENSTUDY be coordinated with Jack Fuller, extension 3892. Mr. Fuller is assigned to the Attorney General's office.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TTS

REC-106

62-116395-87

APR 23 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (7)

84 APR 30 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. J. B. Adams~~
1 - ~~Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 14, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. L. C. Groover to Mr. Walsh memorandum dated 3/4/75 entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities" forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review the titles and numbers of FBI field office Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities. This was in response to requirement IIIC of Senator Church's letter dated 3/19/75.

By addendum dated 4/4/75 the Intelligence Division recommended that the Legal Counsel Division discusses with the staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) our reluctance to provide these type figures to the SSC.

On 4/11/75 I discussed with Mr. John Clark, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the intelligence community, the request of Senator Church. Specifically, Mr. Clark was asked if Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had received such a request and how they responded. Mr. Clark advised that CIA had not received a specific request for the titles and numbers of CIA officers assigned to intelligence collection or counterintelligence matters. However, CIA had received a request to identify the names and numbers of CIA covert officers assigned overseas.

REC-106 62-116395-866

Mr. Clark advised that CIA intended to advise the Staff Director of the SSC that CIA was unwilling to provide such names and numbers to the SSC for retention in its files. However, CIA would be willing to allow a senior staff member or the Staff Director to review the names and numbers of CIA covert officers overseas at the CIA headquarters building.

APR 29 1975

WOC:ekw CKV
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/KG #MDR16

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL ADDENDUM
PAGE 3

84 APR 30 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

If approved, the Legal Counsel Division should advise the SCC that because of security considerations, the [redacted] titles and numbers of Special Agents of the FBI assigned to internal security and counterintelligence matters cannot be furnished to the SCC in documented form for the Committee files. However, the FBI would be willing to show the titles and figures to Mr. Miller or a senior staff member at FBIHQ in an effort to demonstrate a spirit of cooperation and credibility.

WRW/TJM

Addendum

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division interposes no objection to Intelligence Division's recommendation. If approved, Intelligence Division prepare necessary communication to notify the SSC.

JCF

JH

See memo to A.G. with encl. for AD & SSC 4/22/75 EWL/EKW. WJS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

DATE: 4/11/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
APRIL 11, 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TAG

W. O. Cregar

On 4/11/75, from 10:00 am until 12:20 pm, staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities were briefed by Assistant Director Wannall and members of his staff in the Conference Room at INTD. Briefed from the Committee were Mr. William Miller, Staff Director; Mr. Frederick A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel; and Messrs. Mark Gitenstein, Marvin Epstein, Patrick Shea, Britt Snider and Loch Johnson, all staff members.

The first hour of the briefing was occupied with the showing of the INTD slide presentation and commentary which provided highlights of the work of the INTD, both in the counterintelligence and internal security field. Following this presentation a question and answer period ensued for the rest of the briefing. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz posed most of the questions.

In the counterintelligence field the thrust of the questioning was directed toward the continuing growth of the hostile intelligence presence in the United States and its short-term and long-term effect on the FBI's operations. Mr. Wannall pointed out that the Director on previous occasions had indicated his intention to "beef up" the counterintelligence effort of the FBI by the addition of some 250 Special Agents, and that INTD had also effected certain programs designed to assign certain counterintelligence functions to non-Agent personnel, thereby freeing additional Special Agents to function as case officers. In response to a question as to whether the additional investigative effort necessary to counter the mounting hostile intelligence threat might not involve investigation of more and more American citizens, Mr. Wannall conceded

62-116395

REC-106 62-116395-83

APR 29 1975

EWL:jvl
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 APR 30 1975

that this was inevitable. He stressed, however, the investigative policies of the FBI which protected the constitutional rights and right of privacy of such individuals.

On the domestic internal security side the thrust of the questioning appeared to indicate an interest in the predication, duration and administrative controls of investigations of domestic organizations and individuals. Again, Mr. Wannall stressed the precautions inherent in FBI policy and instructions to the field in these matters, pointing out, in effect, that these investigations are founded on statutory authority and are closely supervised by experienced personnel at Headquarters level. The Committee staff appeared to accept these answers and no critical or hostile attitudes on their part were evident.

The briefing was terminated at 12:20 pm, due to commitments on the part of the staff. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz both expressed their appreciation for the briefing and indicated it had been most instructive. They indicated a desire to continue these discussions at some later date and Mr. Wannall assured them that he would be happy to continue the briefing at any future mutually agreeable time.

Perhaps most significant of all questions posed was the final question by Mr. Schwarz in which he inquired as to what advantages and disadvantages to the FBI could be anticipated as a result of the Committee fulfilling its mandate. Mr. Wannall replied that any statutory authority defining and affirming the FBI's role in the intelligence collection field would certainly be a positive achievement. He also stated that any result of the Committee's investigation which would tend to limit the investigative resources or the investigative effectiveness of the FBI would surely be an unfortunate negative factor.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: April 23, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
~~FORMER~~ SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

At 3:17 p.m., 4/22/75 former Special Agent Lish Whitson who for many years was a supervisor in the Intelligence Division telephoned me to advise that he had received a request to appear for an interview by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee. The interview was scheduled for 4/23/75.

In response to a question by Mr. Whitson, he was advised that to the writer's knowledge this was the first former Bureau employee who had been requested to appear for an interview by any member of the staff of the Select Committee. Whitson stated that he was proceeding on the basis that he would respond to questions propounded to him but he had some reservation in his mind concerning answering questions which would involve material which he knew to be classified at the time he retired. He commented he had noted in the news media that staff members of the Committee were reportedly to be granted clearances through TOP SECRET - Q (Atomic Energy Matters).

Whitson was advised by the writer that while it was true staff members were being granted clearances, the Bureau was endeavoring to establish procedures through the Attorney General whereby highly sensitive and classified material could be revealed on a restricted basis in response to Committee inquiries; for example, in some instances we would request that only the Majority and Minority leaders on the Committee be furnished certain types of material and in other instances only the Senators themselves as opposed to all staff members.

REC-100 62-116395-84

Mr. Whitson said in view of this, it was his intention to be as responsive and candid during the interview by Mr. Epstein as he could be but if any questions arose in his mind with respect to revelation as to what he, Whitson, considered to be sensitive material, he anticipated he would express his concern to Mr. Epstein and advise him he felt it would be appropriate to check with the Bureau since he is aware of regulations by the Attorney General which preclude revealing FBI information without the Attorney General's specific

8 APR 29 1975

WRW:lml
(5)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/

5-1508

84 APR 29 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

prior approval. Whitson stated that if the writer had no objection, he would telephone again after his interview with Epstein in the event any matters came up which he felt would be of interest to the Bureau. He was assured that the writer had no objection whatsoever and would appreciate any observations which he cared to pass along.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

JBA
PLM

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 22, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TTG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated March 19, 1975, the Senate Select Committee requested information from the FBI. Part I of the Committee's letter pertained to the legal authority for investigations.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and four documents on the subject of legal authority for investigations.

A copy of this memorandum, with enclosures, is being provided for your records.

4/28/75 [illegible] by [illegible] ([illegible])
4/28/75 Del[illegible] to Mike Epstein
of Committee (SSC)

Enclosures - 10

AFW:vb (6)

REC-100

62-11[illegible]-83

NOTE:

The Senate Select Committee's 3/19/75, letter was transmitted with an attachment, prepared by the Committee's staff, which set forth examples of the type of information concerning domestic intelligence jurisdiction of interest to it. Among those items cited in the attachment to the Committee's 3/19/75, letter was a study on jurisdiction prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III by the Office of Legal Counsel, dated 5/18/72. Representatives of the Legal Counsel Division do not believe the 5/18/72 study is, in itself, appropriate to furnish in response to the question of the Senate Select Committee on legal authority. However, Legal Counsel Division believes that two internal FBI memoranda, prepared in connection with the drafting of the 5/18/72, study, would be pertinent to the Senate Select Committee's inquiry. Accordingly, these two documents, items one and two of attached memorandum for the Committee, are being furnished.

APR 29 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

6 ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."

2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.

4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

1 - The Attorney General

AFW:vb
(6)

soc. Dir. ——
Dep. AD Adm. ——
Dep. AD Inv. ——
Asst Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
tell. ——
boratory ——
. & Evol. ——
Inv. ——
ing ——
oun ——
e Rm. ——
ec'y ——

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

mor16

JBA
PLM

62-116395-83
ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."

2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.

4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JK

62-116395-83

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

D : Mr. Dalbey DATE: 5/16/72

ROM : J. A. Mintz

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP2ALM/MG

#MOE16

UBJECT: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

You requested analysis of the legal authority for FBI criminal intelligence collection and its relationship to our statutory jurisdiction in criminal matters.

"The gathering of criminal intelligence information" describes activity not subject to precise definition. However, its general objective is well understood by those engaged in law enforcement. There exist individuals and groups whose daily occupations are directed toward profit without regard to the restraints of the law. Yet, by the very nature of their associations, little actual participation in criminal acts may be observed by the most astute law enforcement observer. Their existence and contribution to the sum of criminal behavior has been detected and to some degree measured by the collection of data concerning their personal life-styles, property holdings, associates, influence, and access to capital. Such information has been characterized as "criminal intelligence."

For years, the FBI has been aware of the need to identify these resources of the criminal element. Congress responded to this need through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The Congressional findings were that organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and by the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption. Legitimate business and labor unions are infiltrated and corrupted and our democratic processes are subverted. The problem was declared to be of of national concern both as to our economy and the domestic security.

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116510-83

ENCLOSURE

Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

The Act attempted to attack organized crime by making criminal the management of syndicated gambling and by prohibiting racketeering activity characteristic of organized crime including the use of illegal proceeds for investment in legitimate business enterprises.

The long-established suspicions of law enforcement officers were confirmed by the Congressional findings but statutory enactments did not eliminate the conduct described as evil therein. There remains the task of establishing the identities of those constituting the national menace and developing prosecutable evidence of their guilt. "Criminal intelligence" collection is one means by which this responsibility may be fulfilled. It may be the only practical means in view of the scarcity of witnesses willing to testify and of the high mortality potential of those who do appear. A classic example of such intimidation is reported in United States v. Addonizio, 451 F2d 49 (3rd Cir. 1972) where a prospective witness in a corruption case found an anonymous note on the seat of his car which read "This could have been a bomb. Keep your mouth shut."

Accepting the need for intelligence gathering as a practical necessity, the issue remains as to its propriety in the face of Constitutional protections. If the Supreme Court announces that individuals have a Constitutionally protected right of privacy that may be overcome only through established arrest, search, and subpoena procedures, the issue will be settled. But, thus far, the Court has only drawn upon the concept of Constitutional privacy to resolve cases involving special circumstances such as marital affairs (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)) and interception of communications (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))

More specific Constitutional limitations on the criminal intelligence function may be found in the First Amendment protections of speech and assembly; the Fourth Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

The theme consistently found in decisions having a bearing on th relationship between these rights and the collection of criminal intelligence is that, when in direct conflict, the collection efforts must yield. Such is

not to label criminal intelligence as necessarily the product of malpractice, but to recognize the paramount nature of the Constitutional interests being safeguarded. Other incidents of government regulatory authority have been required to yield as well when confronted with legitimate claims of Constitutional protection, e.g. the administrative search cases, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

Overt and obtrusive conduct susceptible of being characterized as harassment may well be enjoined as, for example, was the case of an obvious 24-hour-a-day physical surveillance of an individual, his home, relatives, friends, and associates (Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964) cert. den. 379 U.S. 1001. Similar results might be expected where an identified officer loiters in the subject's place of business (Bee See Books, Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (SD N.Y. 1968) or openly attends organizational meetings where his presence inhibits communication and the transaction of the business of the assembly (Local 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (ND Ind. 1948)). However, open photographic surveillance of public gatherings (Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (ED Va. 1971)) and secret monitoring of criminal activities through the use of undercover agents (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)) and informants (Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 295 (1966)) have met with judicial approval.

Obviously, criminal intelligence information gained by unreasonable search and seizure or through compelled self-incrimination is tainted and subject to judicial condemnation upon complaint of one having the requisite standing.

Perhaps, the decision coming nearest to discussing the legality of criminal intelligence collection was Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A2d 298 (1969), (reversed on the ground more complete record was needed to support the decision) 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970). New Jersey had responded to the threat of continuing civil disorders by collecting intelligence information on persons and events alleged to have some relationship to such activities. The trial court held the collection effort to be unconstitutional because it conflicted with the First Amendment.

However, the court order to destroy the intelligence files excepted instances "where such information will be used to charge persons with specifically defined criminal conduct." 256 A2d at 305. Thus, the decision may be interpreted as drawing a distinction between collection of intelligence information where political or social factors are involved and First Amendment freedoms therefore may be directly inhibited and collection of criminal intelligence information where the objective is the establishment of criminal conduct and the identities of the offenders. While the Fourth and Fifth Amendment may be enjoyed by the guilty and innocent alike, it is improbable that the First Amendment would be stretched so far as to protect freedom of speech and assembly when such speech and assembly constitute elements of a criminal offense. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey returned the case for further development of the record and observed ". . . the executive branch may gather whatever information it reasonably believes to be necessary to enable it to perform the police roles, detectional and preventive. A court should not interfere in the absence of proof of bad faith or arbitrariness." [illegible] A2d at [illegible].

A tentative conclusion may be stated, subject to further development of the case law. The gathering of criminal intelligence information for the purpose of developing evidence of specific offenses characteristic of organized crime is legally justified as well as practically necessary. Where there is diversion from the proper objective and such collection efforts are manipulated to cause harassment or where such activity conflicts with Constitutional rights, to that extent the criminal intelligence program must be reformed.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOV[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

) : Mr. Dalbey DATE: 5/18/72

ROM : J. B. Hotis

UBJECT: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM[illegible]

You requested an analysis of the Bureau's authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. The question of the jurisdictional basis for these investigations is being examined at length by the Domestic Intelligence Division and will not be discussed here.

It is fair to say that the domestic intelligence program is one of the more controversial areas of the Bureau's activities. For one thing, an intelligence investigation casts a broader net than inquiries that are directed toward the proof of a specific offense. A large amount of raw data is collected, much of which has no immediate bearing on potential offenses or offenders. But seemingly trivial information may later become important in the detection and prevention of violence or civil disorder. There are also fears that these investigations may eventually touch upon one's political beliefs, habits or associations; or that information collected for proper purposes may eventually be misused at the hands of Government. Each is a legitimate concern. The notion of Government prying into the personal lives of its citizens is repellent to all of us. And yet there is a strong sense that the Government must acquire necessary intelligence information if it is to meet its responsibilities in connection with the national security.

One of the major concerns about our domestic intelligence activities is that they are not supervised or monitored by any outside agency. The claim is made that the Executive Branch has been left wide discretion to define its own authority, and to choose the directions, methods, and focus of its investigations. For one thing, the law has never made clear what facts and circumstances must be present to authorize an intelligence investigation, nor how far such an investigation may lawfully proceed without being directed toward proof of a specific offense.

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

And unlike the practice in criminal cases, our electronic surveillances in security matters are not submitted for prior court approval. For another, the exclusionary rule which provides the usual method of judicial control over investigative procedures, is not often available in security cases. Since the goal is largely preventive, these cases seldom come before the courts. As a result, the public, the courts, and the Congress have very little information about how we operate in domestic intelligence matters and what we do with the information acquired.

In response to this situation, some members of the Congress have pressured for tighter controls over the Bureau, perhaps in the form of a watchdog committee to oversee our operations. Senator Ervin, who chairs the Senate Subsommittee on Constitutional Rights has expressed particular concern about the right of privacy and the authority of the Government to gather information. In an exchange of correspondence with the Department of Justice, the Senator has requested specific documentation of the Department's guidelines for the gathering and retention of domestic intelligence information. He has also suggested that legislation might be enacted, requiring a showing of probable cause before an investigation can be initiated by the Government. It is doubtful that any such measure would pass the Congress, but the proposal does show the mood of the times.

A parallel trend may be developing in the courts. In several recent cases, plaintiffs have made the claim that Government information gathering, which goes beyond the effort to apprehend criminal suspects, may have a "chilling effect" on the exercise of First Amendment rights. These challenges thus far have not been successful. Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970); Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Westmoreland, 323 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1971).

The courts have generally recognized that one of the principal functions of the Bureau is to gather information law violators, agitators of violence and possible subversives.. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1971) cert. granted, 404 U.S. 955 (1971); The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et. al., 70 Civ. 2646 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has observed that the identity of the agency gathering such information is determinative of the significance of any alleged chill to

to First Amendment rights. Thus, in Davis v. Ichord, 442 F2d 1207 (D. C. Cir. 1970) although appellants allegedly felt chilled by a Congressional Committee's investigation of them, the Court of Appeals found there was insufficient justiciability in their claims to create a viable case or controversy. This was because appellants had "failed to bring the fear of investigation by the present Committee home to themselves," their fears were wholly speculative; there were no criminal proceedings confronting them; nor was any action pending. Moreover, the Court in Davis found that the power of a Congressional Committee began and ended with the investigation; whenever a Committee of the Congress seeks punitive action, the Judiciary must become involved, and thus every investigation has a judicial check which operates to guarantee the protection of constitutional rights.

This latter aspect of the Davis decision was given perspective by the Court of Appeals in Tatum. In contrasting the potential impact on First Amendment rights occasioned by investigations conducted by the military with investigations conducted by a civilian investigative agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Court observed:

> The compilation of data by a civilian investigative agency is thus not the threat to civil liberties or the deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech that such action by the military is, because a civil investigative agency has no inherent power always being subject to the well-defined restrictions of law and the approval of the courts. * * *

There, the Court pointedly examined the "source of the chill" as it had in Davis, and in applying the "chilling effect doctrine", singled out the FBI as a source which does not generate a reasonable basis for inhibitions or apprehensions. In this connection the Court stated,

Referring to our holding in Davis that the "source of the chill" is important in determining whether there is any inhibiting effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights, we think that there is a significant difference between investigative actions taken by a military agency in reference to civilians and similar investigative actions taken by a regular investigative agency of a civilian branch of the Government.

One of the functions of a civilian investigative agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is to compile information on law violators, agitators of violence, and possible subversives. It has always been recognized that this is a delicate function, and it is exercised under the direction of the Attorney General. Investigation is performed by men a majority of whom are under the direction of lawyers in the Justice Department, and the information compiled is only usable and effective through court action. The FBI is powerless to imprison or to affect his liberty in any way except through the action of the courts.

As to the surveillance of public meetings through the use of informants, it has been held that such surveillance is not per se actionable. See Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971) (police surveillance of street demonstrations held not to offend First Amendment rights).

The Supreme Court in Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293 (1966), held that the use of secret informants is "not per se unconstitutional", and does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, nor the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court upheld, as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, admission at trial of evidence obtained by an undercover informant to whom a defendant spoke without knowledge that he was in the employ of the police. 385 U.S. at 300-303. See also Lewis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 206 (1966) and Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963).

Moreover, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), recently held that the use of secret informants does not violate any constitutionally justifiable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, even when an informant uses electronic equipment to transmit his conversations with defendants to other agents.

If the use of undercover government informants without a warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment and invade a defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, Hoffa v. U.S., supra, and such informants may write down their conversations with defendants and testify concerning them, or simultaneously record and transmit such conversations to others, who may testify against them, On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747 (1952); U.S. v. White, supra, then clearly mere visual "surveillance" of plaintiffs in plain view by informants at public meetings would not violate their constitutional rights.

It would seem that those who elect to present their views actively in the public arena deliberately expose themselves to the public. See Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Any recording of their activities by the defendants does not invade their privacy any more than does a newspaper, radio, or television story, and, indeed, much less since any information compiled is usable and effective only through court action. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

More difficult questions are presented where the investigation delves into the private affairs of the individuals or organizations. But even here, the courts have generally sustained our procedures so long as they comport with the restrictions of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et. al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et. al., 70 Civ. 2646 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. (examination of bank records) U.S. v. Gerhart, 275 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (examination of bank records); Minker v. U.S., 312 F2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962) (trash covers); Cohen v. U.S., 378 F2d 751 (9th Cir. 1967) (mail covers); U.S. v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detention and examination of packages in the mail); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (seizure of union records); Hoffa v. U.S., supra; U.S. v. White, supra; (use of informants).

In summary, it is premature to say that the First Amendment line of cases, dealing with the "chilling" concept offers any substantial impediment to our intelligence investigations. There is less reason for optimism, however, with regard to congressional intervention. We should be prepared, therefore, to meet arguments regarding the need for outside supervision. The sound answer, which should satisfy governmental needs and individual rights, is found in tight internal controls and carefully developed guidelines.

POSITION PAPER
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSION

May 19, 1972

OVERVIEW

This paper deals with the conduct by the FBI of intelligence-type investigations supervised by the Domestic Intelligence Division. Authority for these investigations is documented and outlined, including situations where there is no direct violation of law. Criteria and controls and dissemination policies implementing this authority are detailed.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/ATG

62-116395-83
ENCLOSURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 1

AUTHORITY 10
- Congressional Enactments 10
- Presidential Directives 11
- Policy Instructions of Attorney General 12
- National Security Council Directives 13
- Interagency Agreements 13

IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY 14
- Administrative Index 15
- Revolutionary Groups 17
- Extremist Groups 19
- Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals 19
- Unaffiliated Individuals 21
- Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations 21
- Restrictions on Investigations 23
- Information Storage and Retrieval 25
- Dissemination 27

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2-ALM/STG

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

The FBI's intelligence function is well established and documented. Yet, our work in gathering intelligence has been the subject of continuing criticism from segments of the press with charges being made that the FBI is conducting without authority security investigations of persons who are not in violation of the law. It has also been charged that our intelligence collection is uncontrolled, capricious and dwells on personal idiosyncrasies without there being any security interest involved. Fragments of information, distorted and twisted to convey the false impression that the FBI is wantonly disregarding the privacy of citizens, have been published.

The FBI does not conduct security investigations of individuals without clear-cut authority and tight controls. Critics have taken fragments of intelligence which have come to their attention and built them up into what is represented as the end product of security investigations with political overtones. In these instances, the items upon which such importance was placed have been fragmentary intelligence from substantive

investigations and could not be viewed in their real significance, except as they fit into the overall perspective of the case. This is indicative of the danger of using piecemeal intelligence taken out of context; properly used, however, intelligence is a legitimate and necessary part of all security investigations.

Intelligence is information and the collection of it is inseparable from efficient investigative operations. In fact the two--investigation and intelligence--are mutually dependent.

In the security field, it is vital that the Federal Government detect factors which have a direct bearing on possible violations of law related to the overthrow or destruction of the Government. Intelligence developed to identify individuals who have a propensity for revolutionary or racial violence or have affiliations with subversive or revolutionary groups is essential in the enforcement of the laws designed to protect the integrity of the Government. Intelligence is also essential to the detection of attempts or conspiracies to move against the Government, actions which may themselves be crimes.

No constitutional provisions, statutory enactments or judicial rulings have attempted to deprive law enforcement of its intelligence function, although various attempts have

been made to define or limit the areas encompassed by intelligence and particularly the techniques of collection. It is also recognized that some intelligence gathering activities may have an incidental "chilling" effect on individual citizens. The spectre of the Government's investigatory presence may cause a reaction in citizens, inhibiting the exercise of their full constitutional rights. Therefore, a balance between the requirements of the Government and the constitutional rights of citizens must be maintained.

The intelligence function of investigation, must be both reasonable and practical. It varies in scope and intensity with the seriousness of the provision it seeks to enforce. It is neither reasonable nor practical to launch an aggressive intelligence collection effort concerning the activities of those who might potentially violate a local antilittering ordinance. Detection of a conspiracy to bomb the White House, on the other hand, certainly justifies a continuous and intensive intelligence effort to identify the participants and gain knowledge of any specific plans.

It is mandatory that a Government protect its integrity and this has been recognized by judicial authorities. Ordinary crimes victimize an individual or groups; crimes against the existence of the government victimize society. Carrying these crimes to their ultimate produces the ultimate crime against society--the destruction of that society.

It is clear that the aspirations of most revolutionary groups far exceed their capability to achieve their ultimate objectives. They are, however, quite capable of eroding the integrity of the democratic system by lesser acts and, if not discouraged or thwarted, might well accumulate the will and power for more decisive action. The dramatic success of the Castro revolution is a sufficient example. Consequently, continuing intelligence collection relating to all revolutionary individuals and organizations, commensurate with the immediate threat posed, is imperative to proper vigilance.

The FBI serves as a prime producer of intelligence for the Executive Branch. Over the years it has provided information concerning hostile actions directed against the U. S.

by foreign governments, their intelligence services and others acting in their behalf. On the domestic scene the FBI has penetrated conspiracies ranging from the communist underground to the hooded night riders of the Klan who terrorized our black citizens. But, in the 1960's explosive changes occurred in the internal security problems faced by the country. These changes were reflected in both the scope and nature of the FBI's response and in the intelligence requirements levied upon the FBI by the Executive Branch.

In the decade of the '60's, social change and upheaval added to the critical areas of the FBI's intelligence responsibilities the problems of revolutionary and extremist ✓ activities. America was stunned by violent student disruptions, bombings and riots. Spanning the decade were civil rights protests, reactions against them, and tragically, the burning and looting of Watts in 1965 and the conflagrations in Detroit, Newark and Washington, D. C. And, what had been the youthful idealism of the emerging new left in the 1962 Port Huron Statement was drowned out by the obscene Weatherman war cries

as they took their revolution to the streets of Chicago in 1969 during their "Days of Rage."

As the tide of crime and disruption swelled, it brought with it new and pressing problems on the domestic security scene. FBI domestic security investigations increased accordingly. There was also an immediate increase in FBI intelligence collection concerning the lawlessness and violent tactics of these emerging revolutionary elements.

Intelligence collection was essential in contending with these new domestic security problems. This fact was recognized by the reports of two Presidential Commissions. The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission, 1968) stressed that the absence of accurate information before and during disorders created special control problems. It emphasized that law enforcement organizations must develop the means to obtain adequate intelligence for planning purposes and that law enforcement should "gather, evaluate, analyze and disseminate information on potential as well as actual civil disorders."

Similarly, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) took special note of the need for intelligence in effective law enforcement. The Commission stated in its report, "It is an undoubted fact that on some campuses there are men and women who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and sometimes to maim and kill." The report concluded that the best, AND sometimes the only, means law enforcement has to thwart or prevent such plots is through "clandestine intelligence work."

Prevention is the very essence of the proper use of intelligence. To be forewarned is to be placed in a position to carry out countermeasures to meet a threat. During the mass actions and violent confrontations of the 1960's, FBI intelligence collection was crystallized in dissemination of information to other government agencies. This intelligence provided them with an essential working tool to contend with public disorders and activities of a revolutionary nature.

In a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, 9/14/67, Attorney General Clark stressed the importance of intelligence. The Attorney General asserted, "It is most important that

you use the maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon (riot activity)." Elaborating on this point, he said, "In these circumstances we must be certain that every attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon these problems; to take every step possible to determine whether the rioting is pre-planned or organized; and, if so, to determine the identity of the people and interests involved; and to deter this activity by prompt and vigorous legal action." The Attorney General's evaluation of the importance of intelligence in this instance applies with equal force to other areas of the FBI's security work.

In December, 1967, the Department of Justice, aware of the high priority of intelligence in dealing with civil disorders, created the Inter-Division Information Unit. This is a repository for "reports which relate to individual or organizational activities which may play a part in instigating or spreading civil disorders" and includes intelligence "relating to black power and black nationalist organizations,

officers and members thereof, racial incidents throughout the country, and any specific demonstrations which are being planned and are of such nature as to render them subject to the possibility of violence." Quick retrieval of this intelligence was emphasized through the use of computers.

Attorney General Mitchell wrote to the FBI Director on May 17, 1971, concerning the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, created to analyze and evaluate intelligence for the guidance of the White House and other departments of the Executive Branch. In this memorandum, the Attorney General stated, "Intensified activities on the part of militant groups here in Washington, D. C., and elsewhere in the country clearly point up the need not only for the gathering of the highest quality intelligence available but also for an expert analysis and evaluation of the intelligence product itself."

AUTHORITY

All FBI investigations and intelligence collection functions in the internal security field are based on authorizations in Congressional enactments, Presidential directives, policy instructions of the Attorney General, National Security Council directives and interagency agreements as set forth below.

Congressional Enactments

Attorney General direction of FBI - 28 U. S. Code, Section 533

Treason - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2381 (U. S. Constitution, Article III, Section 3)

Rebellion and insurrection - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2383

Seditious Conspiracy - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2384

Advocating violent overthrow of Government - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2385 (Smith Act)

Sedition - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 2387, 2388, 2391

Recruiting for armed hostilities against U. S. - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2389

Designation of Organizations as "communist-action" and of Individuals as members of such groups after hearings by Subversive Activities Control Board - 50 U. S. Code, Sections 781-798 as amended or repealed (Internal Security Act of 1950, Subchapter I, called Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 and amendments by Communist Control Act of 1954) See also Executive Order 11605 below

Espionage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 792 et seq.

Sabotage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2151 et seq.

Private Correspondence with Foreign Governments - 18 U. S. Code, Section 953 (Logan Act)

Registration of Foreign Agents - 22 U. S. Code, Sections 611-621

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 - 42 U. S. Code, Section 2122

Deportation for Subversive Activities - 8 U. S. Code, Section 1481 (Immigration and Nationality Act 1952)

Possession, threatened use, or use of explosives for illicit purposes - 18 U. S. Code, Section 844

Travel in or use of facility of interstate commerce to promote or incite riot, to commit violence in furtherance of riot or to abet others in inciting or participating in a riot. - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 231-233, 245, 2101-2102

Neutrality Matters - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 956, 958-962; 22 U. S. Code, Sections 1934, 401 (Munitions Control Act)

Intelligence exchange with CIA - 50 U. S. Code, Section 403 (National Security Act)

Presidential Directives

Directive of the President - 6/26/39 directing that investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters are handled by FBI.

Directive of the President - 9/6/39 requesting the Attorney General to instruct FBI to take charge of investigative matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.

Presidential Directive - 1/8/43
reiterated instructions of previous directive of 9/6/39 and requested law enforcement officers, patriotic organizations and individuals turn over to FBI all information regarding espionage, sabotage and violations of neutrality regulations.

Presidential Directive - 7/24/50
reiterated substance of 9/6/39 and 1/8/43 directives, noting they provided for FBI to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.

Directive of President 12/15/53
referred to previous Presidential Directives and added investigation by FBI of violations of Atomic Energy Act.

Executive Order 10450 4/27/53
established programs to insure that the employment and retention of any Government employee is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. Requires check of FBI Fingerprint Files and, in cases where derogatory information develops, FBI conducts a full-field investigation.

Executive Order 11605 7/2/71
calls for Subversive Activities Control Board, when petitioned by the Attorney General, to determine after hearings if any organization is totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or whether it has adopted a policy of advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their Constitutional or statutory rights. By inference, the FBI, as investigative arm of the Attorney General, would develop evidence for hearings required. Also, FBI, by inference, would develop evidence of membership in such organizations, which may be basis for denial of Government employment.

Policy Instructions of Attorney General

September 14, 1967: instructions of then Attorney General Ramsey Clark for FBI to investigate possibility of conspiracy to plan, promote, or aggravate riot activity.

February 18, 1969: instructions from the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, for FBI to obtain information concerning possibility that underlying subversive groups were giving illegal directions or guidance to numerous campus disorders.

(Other policy instructions from Attorney General and Department have been received, amplifying points set forth above; many of these concerned specific cases.)

National Security Council Directives

Directive on Internal Security, March 23, 1949, establishing Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC) responsible to coordinate investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. FBI represented on IIC.

United States Intelligence Board (USIB) established September 15, 1958, to maintain coordination between CIA and other intelligence agencies. FBI a member of USIB to provide domestic intelligence for correlation with foreign intelligence.

Interagency Agreements

Delimitations Agreement signed by IIC members March 23, 1949, to establish jurisdiction in investigations by members of espionage, counterespionage, subversion, and sabotage and to provide for exchange of information on above matters.

FBI-Secret Service Agreement signed November 26, 1971, to provide for transmittal of information from FBI to Secret Service regarding individuals and organizations who, because of their propensities, represent or may represent a danger to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY

The criteria and guidelines for FBI investigations are furnished to the field in a "Manual of Instructions," the "F. B. I. Handbook," and in Letters to all Special Agents in Charge. In addition, instructions and guidance are given to the field in Headquarters communications on specific cases. Compliance with criteria and guidelines is obtained by supervision in both the field and at Bureau Headquarters. In addition, regular inspections of field and Headquarters Divisions assure that Bureau policies concerning investigations are being followed.

In the security field, the basic responsibility of the FBI is to investigate revolutionary organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow or destruction of the United States Government. These include old-line Marxist groups, for example, the Communist Party, USA, and the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party; and such new revolutionary groups as the Students for a Democratic Society, the Black Panther Party and the Weatherman. In the investigation of subversive individuals a determination is made of the dangerousness of the individual and efforts are made to obtain evidence of violations of any applicable

Federal laws. To assist in cataloguing the level of dangerousness of those individuals and to retrieve quickly information concerning them, the Domestic Intelligence Division maintains a card file known as the Administrative Index.

Administrative Index

Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Emergency Detention Act) before it was repealed on September 25, 1971, provided for emergency detention of subversive individuals in the event of a national emergency. To implement that provision of the act, the FBI and the Department of Justice maintained the Security Index. This Index was, of course, discontinued with the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act. By memorandum of October 22, 1971, however, the Attorney General noted that the repeal of Title II "does not alter or limit the FBI's authority and responsibility to record, file and index information secured" in this field and concurred in the establishment of an administrative index to assist in "making readily retrievable and available the results of its (the FBI's) investigations into subversive activities."

15

To this end, such an index (called Adex) was instituted for making quickly retrievable information on four categories of individuals in order of dangerousness:

I) National leaders of revolutionary or extremist groups, members who have exhibited a propensity for violence, members with training in sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla warfare,. unaffiliated revolutionaries with a propensity for violence, and revolutionaries with access to key facilities.

II) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and extremist groups, active members of these groups, and unaffiliated revolutionaries or extremists with a propensity for violence against property rather than persons.

III) Rank-and-file members of revolutionary groups within the previous five years, leaders of fronts for revolutionary groups, and individuals with revolutionary ideologies likely in a national emergency to commit acts of espionage, sabotage, or terrorism.

IV) Persons likely to assist, financially or otherwise, revolutionary groups, or persons in a position to influence others to commit acts inimical to the national defense.

Investigation of an individual is conducted to determine whether or not he should, consistent with the criteria of these categories, be listed on the Adex. If, as

16

the result of the investigation, it is determined he does not meet the criteria the case is closed. If, on the other hand, he does meet the criteria, he is listed in the Adex according to the determined degree of dangerousness. Category I cases continue under investigation for as long as the individual continues to warrant that Category listing. When an individual is listed in Categories II, III, and IV, however, the investigation is closed, subject to periodic reopening to verify his location, to determine his activities and to ascertain whether he still qualifies for inclusion in the Adex. Provision is made for upgrading, downgrading and purging an individual from the Adex as his activities and level of dangerousness fluctuate.

Revolutionary Groups

Investigations of individuals for a determination of whether or not they meet the criteria for Adex generally involve their degree of affiliation with revolutionary and extremist groups. The purpose of investigations of basic revolutionary and new-left type groups is to: (1) provide intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities;

(2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to prevent such conspiracies from being carried out; and (3) develop evidence necessary for the Attorney General to file petitions before the Subversive Activities Control Board in accordance with provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and Executive Order 11605.

The criteria, guidelines and restrictions on the investigations of revolutionary groups are outlined below:

> Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information indicating that organization advocates overthrow of Government or engages in activity to deny others their Constitutional or statutory rights.
>
> Investigation is conducted to establish aims and objectives, location and size, domination and control by hostile foreign power, identities of all leaders and members.

In regard to their front groups and organizations which they have infiltrated:

> Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information that organization is dominated, controlled or influenced to substantial degree by revolutionary organization.
>
> Investigation is conducted to determine degree of infiltration, aims and objectives, location and size and identities of all leaders.

Extremist Groups

The purpose of investigations of white hate and black extremist organizations is to: (1) provide intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities; and (2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to prevent such conspiracies from being carried out. Investigations of white hate groups are confined to those which have actually or allegedly committed or have conspired to commit acts of violence or have adopted a policy of advocating or inciting the use of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution. Investigations of black extremist organizations concern those groups which take extremist, anti-U. S. Government, anti-white positions and whose activities have involved them or may involve them in civil unrest and/or subversive activity.

Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals

Individuals referred to as subversives are generally affiliated with old-line basic revolutionary organizations; those termed revolutionaries are usually new left types; and those called extremists are fundamentally

19

involved in violent or revolutionary activities based on race. Procedures for the investigation of these types of individuals are similar and the criteria are outlined as follows:

Membership in a basic revolutionary organization

Espousing the LINE OF REVolutionary movements

Special trainING ABROAD, or leadership training, in a revolutionary group

Individuals having access to key facilities who have been members of a revolutionary group at any time

Persons with revolutionary, terrorist, anarchistic or extremist beliefs who are likely to seize upon a national emergency to endanger public safety

Individuals who have actually or allegedly committed, conspired to commit, or adopted policy to commit acts of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution

Extremists and revolutionaries who have demonstrated a propensity for violence, have involved or may involve themselves in civil unrest, or who advocate violent overthrow of the Government

Persons who influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense or who are likely to furnish financial or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements because of their sympathies, associations or ideologies

Unaffiliated Individuals

In the areas of revolutionary (new left) and extremist activities, some investigations are conducted of individuals who are not affiliated with organizations. Investigation of an individual is undertaken when information is received that the person:

Is a revolutionary and adheres to the Weatherman ideology of advocating a revolution now and uses terrorist tactics in furtherance of revolution

Is a revolutionary or extremist and demonstrates by acts or statements propensity for violence against property

Exhibits revolutionary or extremist ideology and is likely to seize opportunity in national emergency to commit espionage, sabotage, terrorism or otherwise interfere with Federal or local governments or defense efforts

Influences others to engage in acts inimical to national defense or likely to furnish financial or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements

Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations

The mission of the FBI in the foreign intelligence field is one of counterintelligence. The objectives and priorities of counterintelligence have been variously stated and evaluated. Generally, these objectives may be listed in declining priority as follows: (1) the detection and

identification of intelligence operations and agents; (2) the penetration of these operations for the purpose of control and the development of intelligence information; (3) neutralization of hostile intelligence operations through disruption and disinformation; and, (4) prosecution. Whatever the assigned priority, the overall objective is to deny access to information sought by whatever practical means are available.

Foreign intelligence investigations are grounded in the Espionage statute and related laws including the Registration and Atomic Energy Acts. Individual investigations are initiated usually on the basis of a known or suspected connection with a foreign intelligence service, foreign country or subversive organization with such connections. Since these investigations emanate from various sensitive sources and involve special considerations, extensive criteria and limitations are defined and enumerated in current instructions.

In general terms, the governing criteria are designed to preclude initiation and continuance of investigations which are not justified. The limitations are designed to control the scope of investigation in order to insure security of our interests through close supervisory scrutiny.

22

Restrictions on Investigations

FBI guidelines go beyond the rules for opening, investigating and closing cases; they also impose restrictions to make certain that we do not violate the constitutional rights of any individual and to preclude investigations from becoming "fishing expeditions." In the security field these are some of the restrictions WHICH are applied:

Security cases are evaluated continually to determine if we are fulfilling our responsibilities. Those cases not warranting further investigation are closed promptly.

There are no investigations of members of an organization which does not advocate use of force to bring about existing changes in the Government. Examples are the Socialist Party, the Independent Workers of the World and Independence Party of Puerto Rico.

Persons arrested during disruptive demonstrations are identified since circumstances of an arrest, in some cases, may indicate a propensity for violence. However, a mere arrest in connection with a demonstration is an insufficient basis in itself for security investigation. The arrest must be coupled with a demonstrated propensity for violence or with subversive or revolutionary activity on the part of the individual arrested.

When it is determined that a security subject is a member of the armed services, the investigation is discontinued immediately and the military advised.

Civil rights organizations are not investigated.

Ambassadors or heads of permanent missions to the United Nations are not investigated.

No surveillances are conducted at the White House, the Capitol, the Supreme Court, the House and Senate Office Buildings or the United Nations.

No telephone or microphone surveillances are operated without prior written approval of the Attorney General.

Bureau authority is REQUIRED for:

Investigations of officials and diplomatic representatives of foreign countries. (Department of State authority is also required.)

Investigation of communist infiltration of a political organization.

Developing sources connected with an institution of learning.

Interviews of subjects of active, current security investigations.

Investigations of faculty members. If approval is granted, only established sources functioning in an administrative capacity may be contacted on the campus. Other established sources and informants must be contacted away from the campus. Contacts with students, graduate students and faculty members must also have Bureau authority.

Interviews of labor leaders and persons in educational, mass media or publishing fields.

These examples demonstrate a consciousness of the need to impose limitations on investigations and the continuing imposition of them.

Information Storage and Retrieval

The storage and retrieval of information is a basic operational necessity of any investigative or intelligence-gathering agency. Procedures within the FBI for these functions provide for written records of information received from a variety of sources--confidential informants, confidential INVESTIGATIVE techniques, and open sources--and the storage of this information in different types of files. These include active investigative files on organizations and individuals and some general files. These "raw" files are maintained both at the Seat of Government and in the various field offices. Information in the files is thoroughly indexed so that data can be retrieved.

In the intelligence field, when an allegation within the jurisdiction of the FBI is received, a case on an individual or on an organization may be opened, depending on the quality of the allegation. Nonspecific information that is received on an individual or organization is placed in the pertinent file, if one exists, or is placed in a general file if the organization or individual is not the subject of a specific file.

These files are an integral part of the intelligence-gathering function. By the very nature of the FBI's assignment to coordinate internal security information, the maintenance of data over a period of time is required and it is necessary that a system for retrieving this information be used.

Because these files OFTEN contain derogatory information that may not SUBSTANTIATED [illegible] by further investigation (the derogatory information received may not be germane to a matter within the FBI's jurisdiction), the Attorneys General have long taken the position that these files should not be available for public scrutiny. Incalculable damage to individual reputations could result from the disclosure of single items of information without knowing the full background concerning the receipt of a particular item and the context within which it was recorded.

The late Justice Robert Jackson, in his capacity as Attorney General, wrote in 1941:

> Disclosure of information contained in the reports (FBI files) might also be the grossest kind of injustice to innocent individuals. Investigative reports include leads and suspicions, and sometimes even the statements of malicious or misinformed people. Even though later and more complete reports exonerate the individuals, the use of particular or selected reports might constitute the grossest injustice, and we all know a correction never catches up with an accusation.

Dissemination

The Bureau's general policy on dissemination is that information developed by or coming to the attention of the FBI is promptly referred to all agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government having a potential interest in it or responsibility for taking action concerning it, WHENEVER THAT INterest or responsibility is apparent or known. This policy is in accordance with numerous formal agreements entered into between the Bureau and other Government agencies. It is also in accordance with Presidential directives obligating the Bureau to act as clearing house for information affecting the internal security of the U. S.

Despite this general liberal policy of dissemination, we have recognized that with regard to highly sensitive information a determination must be made on an individual basis as to what information should be disseminated and how it should be transmitted. The degree of sensitivity and/or the security classification will determine level of dissemination to any interested agency and the method of transmittal. In certain instances, sensitive information may be furnished to a high-level official with a request that dissemination in his agency be restricted to his personnel on a need-to-know basis. Such information might be disseminated by secure teletype, courier, liaison, and where necessary, by secure telephone. Information furnished orally is confirmed in writing.

27

The Attorney General

August 7, 1973

Director, FBI

SCOPE OF FBI JURISDICTION
AND AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/LLG

During our meeting on July 26, 1973, you referred to a discussion you had with Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland during your confirmation hearings as to the statutory authority of the FBI and the Department of Justice in the field of domestic intelligence investigations. You then asked Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus to work with the FBI in weighing the pros and cons with regard to statutory authority in this area. I mentioned that research was being performed on this subject at the present time and that we would be in touch with Mr. Ruckelshaus with regard to this matter when we have completed the results of our consideration and findings within the FBI.

Actually, a study has been going on in the FBI for more than two years as to the scope of FBI jurisdiction and authority in domestic intelligence investigations. When Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III, was designated as Acting Director of the FBI, he instructed that a position paper be prepared concerning the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. A position paper was prepared which in essence stated that authority of the FBI in this field is based on legislative enactments, even though we may have publicly relied heavily on Presidential directives as the basis for such authority. Mr. Gray ordered an in-depth study made of the position and in August, 1972, a detailed report was furnished to him. The following is a summary of that report.

Over a period of several months there were a number of public statements questioning authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations, particularly where there is no clear-cut legislative authority apparent. One of the most searching inquiries was contained in a paper presented by Professor John T. Elliff at a two-day conference at Princeton University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public Justice.

62-116395-83

ENCLOSURE

A major thrust of Professor Elliff's paper concerned FBI authority derived from legislative enactments as opposed to that derived from Presidential directives, beginning with a directive issued by President Roosevelt in September, 1939. Professor Elliff is of the opinion that the 1939 directive, which was reiterated on three subsequent occasions, was magnified by the FBI from its original purpose to a definitive order to conduct intelligence-type investigations.

Senator Sam J. Ervin, as you know, had been probing into the nature and extent of FBI intelligence-type investigations. Senator Ervin had even announced that he intended to propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any person without that individual's consent, unless the Government has reason to believe that person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Other Congressmen indicated a similar interest in FBI investigative activities.

Our study revealed that the FBI had declared publicly over a long period of time that its responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field are authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential directives, and instructions of the Attorney General. The Presidential directives are obviously the 1) directive dated September 6, 1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953, and 2) Executive Order 10450 dated April 27, 1953 (and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order 11605 dated July 2, 1971).

In carefully analyzing the language of the first directive, dated September 6, 1939, and considering that the subsequent directives are all hinged on that one, we believe that there is a misconception as to the extent of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBI by these directives. It appears that while the 1939 directive fixed responsibility on the FBI to handle espionage, sabotage, and neutrality matters, it did not convey any authority or jurisdiction which the FBI did not already have from legislative enactments. It is difficult to read into this directive or in any of those which followed any authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations which would or could not be conducted under an umbrella of legislative enactments.

As a matter of historical fact, President Roosevelt in August, 1936, did request former Director J. Edgar Hoover to conduct investigations of subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism. This request, however, was a confidential oral request and there is doubt that any record of it was made outside the FBI. This request, or Presidential mandate, was based, incidentally, on the fact that the law provided that the FBI could conduct such investigations if the Secretary of State should so request.

The study revealed that while the 1939 et seq. directives did not grant any special intelligence-gathering authority to the FBI, we were responsible under these directives to collect all intelligence information furnished by local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies and patriotic citizens and to sift and coordinate all such information for indications of subversive activity covered by Federal statutes.

The study concluded that the FBI has the responsibility to conduct whatever investigations are necessary to determine if statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditious conspiracy, advocacy of overthrowing the Government, and other such crimes affecting the national security have been violated. In this connection we note that in a letter dated September 14, 1967, the Department of Justice advised that the FBI is continually alert to the problem of recurring riots and is submitting intelligence reports to the Department of Justice concerning such activity. This letter enumerated several Federal statutes and stated these could be applicable in using maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing on the question of schemes or conspiracies to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.

In other words, the Department was requesting all possible intelligence-type investigative activity based on the existence of certain statutes. We see this as being no different from our intelligence-type investigations relating to plans of groups or individuals to overthrow, destroy, interfere with or threaten the survival of effective operation of national, state, and local governments.

Based on this study, we believe that had there never been a single one of the Presidential directives in question the FBI would have conducted and will, through necessity, continue to conduct the same intelligence-type investigations as were conducted from 1939 to the present date. We also believe, however, that in order to counter the criticism and skepticism of such individuals as Professor Elliff and Senator Sam J. Ervin that an up-to-date Executive order should be issued clearly establishing a need for intelligence-type investigations and delineating a clear authority for the FBI to conduct such investigations based on guidelines established by the Attorney General and adhering to constitutional principles.

The study concluded with two basic recommendations. 1) That the Department of Justice be requested to sponsor comprehensive legislation spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of intelligence information relating to the national security and; 2) that the Department of Justice be requested to seek a comprehensive Executive order which would cover any possible gap between statutory authority and Executive necessity in protection of the national security.

At first glance these recommendations may appear to contradict our position that we already have statutory authority to conduct security-type investigations; that this being the case we do not need additional legislative enactments, nor do we need an Executive order. But being realistic we think that the basic statutes upon which we rely for our authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations need to be updated to fit 1973 needs. Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2383, 2384, and 2385 relate to the national security, but the legislative history of 2383 and 2384 indicates that they were designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth Century, and Section 2385 has been reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court. These statutes are unquestionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introduced as H.R. 6046 and S. 1400 in the 93rd Congress appear to contain language which should fill our statutory needs, except perhaps for those groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteed rights.

As to the need for an Executive order, we think that two issues are involved. We have statutory authority, but what we need is a definitive requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelligence data he requires in the pursuit of his responsibilities based on our statutory authority. In other words, there is a need, from our standpoint, for both authoritative and definitive guidelines. The statutes give us the authority. The Executive order would define our national security objectives.

Members of Congress, including such men as Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, have proposed legislation to spell out jurisdiction and authority of the FBI in this field. It would appear that the President would rather spell out his own requirements in an Executive order instead of having Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill his obligations and responsibilities as President.

The political climate of suspicion and distrust resulting from disclosures coming out of the Watergate hearings could present an obstacle to getting any such Executive order signed in the immediate future. However, the rationale is nevertheless valid and when scrutinized closely, the language in the Executive order we hereinafter propose establishes definitive guidelines which have heretofore been unclear. It is my belief that we should go forward with this.

We therefore propose and recommend that an Executive order along the following lines be submitted to the White House with a strong recommendation for approval. The language which follows is merely to illustrate the type of Executive order which we think would be appropriate and does not necessarily represent an ideal format or style which should be submitted to the White House.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Whereas the Constitution of the United States was established to insure, among other things, domestic tranquility; to provide for the common defense; and to promote the general welfare for the people of the United States; and

"Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally imposed responsibility of defending the Constitution and the existence of the Government thereunder; and

"Whereas there have been continuing unlawful acts of violence perpetrated against the Government of the United States or against citizens of the United States or against persons entitled to the protection of the United States thereby endangering the domestic tranquility, threatening the common defense, and jeopardizing the general welfare of the people of the United States; and

"Whereas the Congress has enacted laws prohibiting acts such as treason, sedition, sabotage, espionage, insurrection and rebellion, seditious conspiracy, civil disobedience, rioting, assassination, kidnaping, deprival of civil rights, and conspiracies to commit such acts; and

"Whereas the President of the United States as Chief Executive in the maintenance of the Government thereunder must have intelligence information for appropriate decisions in the discharge of his constitutionally imposed responsibilities;

"Now by authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States and in the interest of orderly operation of this Government and in furtherance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general welfare of the people of the United States it is ordered that;

"The Attorney General prepare and issue guidelines, conforming to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis intelligence information essential to the execution of laws pertaining to subversive activity and other such activity affecting the national security, domestic tranquility, and general welfare of the United States."

The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concept of urban guerrilla terrorism has been adopted by various extremist elements in the United States. Bombings of public buildings and national institutions;

killing of police officers who, by their uniform, are a symbol of the democratic establishment; hijacking of aircraft in furtherance of revolutionary movements; terrorist assaults on foreign diplomatic personnel and establishments; and open declaration of war on our form of government are only a few of the violent acts which have been perpetrated by domestic subversives who seek to destroy or seriously cripple our Government. Terrorist guerrilla attacks which were once confined to far away places and related to problems of no immediate concern of ours are now possible in this country. Foreign terrorist groups in collusion with domestic terrorists have laid plans for an airport massacre of the type which recently occurred in Israel. Other foreign terrorist elements have laid plans for terrorist attacks on American soil. Already one foreign official has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists.

It would be folly to adopt an investigative policy based on the concept of investigation only when there is reason to believe a crime involving the national security has been committed. The FBI must obviously anticipate the crimes described above. We believe that in order for the Government to be in position to defend itself against revolutionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it, the FBI must have sufficient investigative authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations not normally associated with enforcement of the statutes. In other words we think the President has the inherent Executive power to expand by further defining the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance information concerning the plans and aspirations of terrorists and revolutionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Government. However, we also believe that such expanded authority must be formally set forth in an Executive order and that this recommendation is responsive in the Attorney General's expressed interest in laying more formal guidelines to our work in areas where definition is not now clear.

We consider the issuance of a new Executive order delineating our jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility to gather and report intelligence information relating to the national security to be a very important and high priority matter. We believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney General under Title 28, Section 533, United States Code, to be equally important.

For your information, our own investigative guidelines as contained in our Manual of Instructions relating to domestic subversive investigations have been completely rewritten to conform with the concept that our domestic intelligence-type investigations are based on Federal statutes. These guidelines provide that in each instance, the domestic intelligence investigation must be predicated on information indicating that the organization or individual is engaged in activity which could involve a violation of specific statutes relating to the national security. A copy of the new guidelines was previously provided to the Department of Justice in connection with the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy to obtain a copy of the FBI's Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions. The effective date of the new guidelines was August 1, 1973.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
2 - Legal Counsel Division

The Attorney General

April 22, 1975
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.

Director, FBI

#MDR16.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to one of the requests set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

4/24 Approved by A.G. (Jack [illegible])
4/25 Delivered to Mike Epstein of SSC

EWL:ekw
(8)

REC-100

62-116395-82

NOTE: The Senate Select Committee has made a request for titles and number of FBI field office Agents in the internal security and counterintelligence field as well as the percentage of manpower assigned in these areas. The Administrative Division has compiled this information. However, it is not felt this data should be furnished formally in a written response to the Committee. This data can be classified "Confidential" under Executive Order 11652. Over and above this technical classification a great deal of sensitivity attaches to these figures since should they be made public or otherwise fall into the

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

APR 29 1975

2-ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

NOTE CONTINUED:

hands of hostile foreign intelligence services, they would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat.

It is noted that a precedent exists for making the information available for review only at FBIHQ. By letterhead memorandum 4/8/75 we advised the Committee that we would not furnish them a requested list of names and titles of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBIHQ down to and including Unit Chiefs together with a number of personnel below that level but that this list would be made available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee staff at FBIHQ.

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)

April 21, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1 - Mr. E. W.
Larson, Jr.)

RE: ORGANIZATION

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Under Item III entitled "Organization," paragraph C requested at the field level, the titles and number of FBI field office Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total Agent manhours devoted to such matters, operations, and activities.

You are advised that a current survey of all FBI field offices has been made to obtain the data requested. Since this information is considered to be highly sensitive, it is not being furnished directly to the Committee; however, the requested data is being maintained in the Intelligence Division at FBIHQ and is available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee staff upon request.

1 - The Attorney General
EWL:ek
(8)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. 62-116395
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/HG

JBN/PLM

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-22

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

MDR16 ON THIS ENVELOPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JG

62-116395-82

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Response

TO : MR. WALSH

DATE: 4/3/75

FROM : L. C. GROOVER
LCG/JJC

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church dated 3/19/75.

Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities, together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations and activities (page 3, item IIIC of relet).

The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached herewith, to the above request.

It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security, intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the data for both of the other categories as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Jackson

JJC:jmb

#MORI6

SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE THREE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/MAG

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities

wob

ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75

The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.

JWR/HHW

OVER

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-14-75

Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:

(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.

(2) Before making any determination as to whether we make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.

(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/LRG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/TAG #MORI6

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Adams DATE: 4-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In connection with our investigations of staff members for captioned Committee, we have developed derogatory information on two individuals which has been brought specifically to the attention of William Miller, Staff Director of the Committee. One of these involved Mrs. Diane Eloise LaVoy whose sister-in-law questioned her loyalty and declared she "does not love America." The sister-in-law said Mrs. LaVoy constantly criticized the U. S. Government and its policy and underlying weaknesses of our society. Another individual said she was highly critical of CIA activities. This information was pointed out to Miller on 3-25-75 when the results of the investigation were delivered to him, and he also was advised that the CIA would be furnished the same data in accordance with our agreement concerning these matters.

On 3-24-75 and 3-28-75 results of the investigation concerning Mrs. Betty Dale Ellison were delivered to Miller and he was advised that a prior supervisor with eight years of training and experience in psychiatric care stated he felt Mrs. Ellison needs psychological examination. He termed her a trouble maker and said he would have fired her if he had the authority. He described her definitely as a security risk due to her mental and emotional instability. It also was pointed out to Miller that other former supervisors described her as unstable when working under pressure and unable to get along with fellow employees. Miller was told that this information also would be furnished to CIA.

On 4-2-75 Miller advised Inspector Bowers he had considered the matter involving Mrs. LaVoy and had discussed it with the Committee Chairman, and they had decided to proceed with her as a staff member since they did not feel the derogatory remarks by her sister-in-law were sufficiently strong enough to disqualify her since the remainder of the investigation was favorable.

161-10822

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 161-11022

62-116375-81

REC-100

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers

3 APR 22 1975

DWB:kjs (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 APR 29 1975

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Miller also advised on 4-2-75 that their review of the Ellison investigation showed justifiable concern for her being cleared for the staff, and he asked for any guidance we might give him. It was pointed out that the only real solution to the situation seemed to be that she not be added to the staff. Miller said he would appreciate any comments from the CIA also in this regard. This request was conveyed to CIA by Section Chief William Cregar of the Intelligence Division who subsequently advised that Charles Kane, Director of Security, CIA, had reviewed the file on Ellison and agreed there was sufficient cause to question her suitability for assignment to the Select Committee staff. Kane stated CIA Director Colby concurred in this observation.

These views were conveyed to Miller on 4-9-75. Miller stated at that time that they had resolved the situation by assigning Mrs. Ellison to purely administrative tasks and that she would be fully isolated from any sensitive or classified information in connection with her responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

RLM

K

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/00 BY SP-2ALM/NE

On 3-19-75 Inspectors John B. Hotis, David W. Bowers, and Special Agent Paul V. Daly met with William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; and Michael T. Epstein of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) staff. During the meeting Mr. Schwarz requested a briefing be arranged for staff members of SSC concerning the operations of the Intelligence Division, that they be furnished copies of training documents pertaining to matters handled by the Intelligence Division, and that they be furnished a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field. He pointed out the aforementioned material would greatly assist in the SSC staff developing an understanding of the Intelligence Division operations and hopefully prevent misunderstandings or needless requests of the FBI.

Mr. Miller advised that Senators Frank Church and John Tower intended to contact the Director in the immediate future to discuss arrangements relating to the SSC's review of the FBI activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Intelligence Division review and ~~where possible~~ make available training documents relating to training concerning Intelligence Division matters and a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field, or recommend a counter offer.

(2) Legal Analysis Office in conjunction with the Intelligence Division arrange a briefing for Senate Select Committee staff members.

See memo Cregar to Wannall 4/11/75 prepared/[illegible]

REC 44 62-116395-8

17 APR 22 1975

5-E

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
PVD:kjs/dkg (8)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4/17/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/HG

At 11:00 a.m. on April 17, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis Special Agent Paul V. Daly and I met with Deputy Attorney General Tyler and Associate Deputy Attorney General James Hutchinson at the request of the Deputy Attorney General.

Deputy Attorney General Tyler advised that he had been requested by Burke Marshall and F.A.O. Schwarz, III, who are consultant and General Counsel, respectively, for the Senate Select Committee, to meet with him on Monday afternoon, April 21, 1975, to discuss matters relating to the Committee's activities. The Deputy Attorney General said that he has been personally acquainted with Mr. Marshall for a long time and also is acquainted with Mr. Schwarz. He considered the possibility of having a Bureau representative attend the meeting, but then decided it would be best if he would meet with Marshall and Schwarz privately to determine whether they desire to discuss details of the Committee's responsibilities and if it became necessary, he would request the Bureau to send a representative to the meeting.

REC 44 62-116395-79

EX-111

The Deputy Attorney General said that he would, of course, advise us orally or in writing of the results of his conference with Mr. Marshall and Mr. Schwarz.

APR 22 1975

The Deputy Attorney General inquired as to the procedure currently being employed in responding to the Committee's requests and Inspector Hotis explained the current procedures. I mentioned to the Deputy Attorney General the existence of the Ad Hoc Committee of Intelligence Agencies and suggested to him that he might desire to designate a representative to attend those meetings in order to be on notice as to the policies being developed by the White House and the intelligence community in responding to Committee requests. I explained to him that James Wilderotter, formerly Associate Deputy Attorney General, was the

62-116395

1 - Mr. Wannall	1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Cregar	1 - Mr. Hotis
	1 - Mr. Mintz

54 APR 29 1975

JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

Department's representative on the Committee, but he has now been reassigned to responsibilities at the White House. I told him that Assistant Attorney General Scalia had been scheduled to attend the last meeting of the Committee, although he was unable to attend. The Deputy Attorney General said that he would discuss with Mr. Scalia the possibility of having Mr. Scalia attend as the Department's representative.

I asked the Deputy Attorney General whether he was undertaking the principal responsibility in the Department for matters relating to the Senate Select Committee and other committees that may be inquiring into the FBI and he said that that was not clear as yet because the Attorney General has taken a personal interest in these matters and it appeared that the responsibilities are still fragmented within the Department. It was his opinion that the responsibilities should be centralized and he appeared to be willing to undertake that responsibility.

It was my impression that the Deputy Attorney General was interested in being of assistance to the FBI in these matters and expressed a willingness to cooperate by having the FBI participate as much as possible with the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Dir. was advised [illegible]
at mtg on 4/17.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/14/75

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. H. Weimar

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: WILLIAM G. MILLER
IS - R

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Senstudy-75

Mr. William G. Miller is the Staff Director for the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to intelligence activities. On 10/5/73, representatives of our Washington Field Office (WFO) interviewed Mr. Miller, with Bureau approval, [relative to contacts he had had with members of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.](S) At that time, Mr. Miller was the Director of the Special Senate Committee to Terminate the National Emergency. On that occasion he was most cooperative, and upon being advised that the FBI's interest in (S)[Soviet Embassy personnel focused more on their personalities rather than Soviet policies] per se, Mr. Miller agreed to be interviewed whenever the FBI felt such was necessary.

WFO has recently conducted an interview with Mr. Albert Ashton Lakeland, Jr., Executive Assistant to Senator Jacob Javits of New York, [relative to his past contacts with Grigoriy A. Rapota, a former Third Secretary assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Rapota was a known officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB), Political Branch (PB), who was extremely active on Capitol Hill.](S) In the course of the interview with Mr. Lakeland, he advised that among others Mr. William G. Miller was known to have had [numerous contacts with Soviet Embassy personnel,](S) although he was not able to state with certainty that Mr. Miller had been [in contact with Rapota.](S)

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
21 APR 25 1975

WFO has now requested the Bureau through the Legal Analysis Office obtain concurrence of the Chairman of the aforementioned committee for Agents of WFO to again interview Mr. Miller concerning his possible contact with

46 APR 25 1975

[105-213145](S)

CONTINUED - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

VHW:dan
(7)

Classified by 5683
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Enc. — Sent 4-17-75

RECORDS

Place cc in 62-116395
(SENSTUDY-75)

84 APR 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 4,6
MDR16 1-23-01

(S)
ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-213145-192

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: William G. Miller
[105-213145](S)

Rapota and possibly other Soviets. WFO has noted that Mr. Miller is also known to have been in contact with Aleksandr A. Kokorev, a First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., and a known officer of the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). (S)

While Mr. Miller was most cooperative on the last occasion he was interviewed by the FBI, it is noted he did not provide any particularly significant information concerning [the Soviets with whom he had contact.](S) While it is not known at this time whether he could presently provide meaningful information, an interview with him at this time, when he is now the Staff Director of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, could well be untimely and indiscreet.

ACTION:

(1) In view of impending contacts which will be had by FBIHQ with Mr. Miller, the purpose of this memorandum is to draw attention to the fact that Mr. Miller has had [past contact with representatives of Soviet intelligence services and may be continuing to have same.](S)

KAW WRS|KAW WRW|FSP

(2) If you agree, there is attached a communication to WFO captioned, "Grigoriy A. Rapota; IS - R (SOVEMB-KGB)" which denys authority for an interview with Mr. Miller at this time and instructs that office to promptly advise FBIHQ of any additional contacts between Mr. Miller and representatives of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., which may come to its attention. (S)

KAW WRS|KAW WRW|FSP

CONFIDENTIAL

PLM

SECRET

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 10, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/PLG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, setting forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority granted by Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and Attorney General instructions, as well as a list of statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation. Certain exhibits are extracted due to the "Third Agency Rule," however, approval for release is now being sought and the exhibits will be forwarded as soon as possible. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

Also enclosed with the jurisdiction paper is an original memorandum for the Committee and one copy for your records.

Enclosures - 3

ALL:vb
(6)

Approved by AG 4/ /75 [illegible]
delivered to SSC [illegible] 4/10/75 [illegible]

62-116395-118

REC- 106

APR 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TAG
#MDR16

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 10, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached is the FBI "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, which, though not specifically named, falls within the spirit of the documents requested in the letter of March 19, 1975.

The purpose of this paper is to set forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority granted by the Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and orders of the Attorney General, as well as to list statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation.

It is noted that certain exhibits are extracted. Extractions were made because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Approvals are being expeditiously sought and these exhibits will be made available as soon as approvals are obtained. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

We are attempting to identify Items 1, 2, 3, and 4, of the examples cited in the attachment to your March 19th letter. When identified, immediate consideration will be given to furnishing the Items to your Committee.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

ALL:vb
(6)

PLM

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

62-116395-98

GPO 934-546

8 per PVD 18

April 1~~6~~, 1975

This is to acknowledge receipt of classified material by letterhead memorandum dated April 10, 1975, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Ben Marshall

for Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence Activit

mDe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JG

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-78

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. T. Jenkins

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 15, 1975

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.: ____
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ds

#MD216

My memorandum to you 4/10/75, tickler copies as above, advised of the formal establishment of a task force called Project Senstudy 75 for the purpose of implementing responses to requests for information from Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities.

From time to time, requests will be made of various Divisions at FBIHQ for assistance in preparing responses. The Office of Legal Counsel has already contributed considerably in support of Senstudy 75 and is an integral part of the Project.

In order that we may keep an up-to-date record of the cost to the Bureau in handling this Project, each Assistant Director is requested to effect the necessary procedures to maintain such records and by the third of each month furnish by routing slip to W. O. Cregar, Room 4063, JEH Building, the following information: (1) Name of Division reporting; (2) Month for which reporting, which will be month just ended; (3) Man days devoted to Project assistance, broken down by (a) Agent and (b) clerical, including GS level for both Agent and clerical. An example submitted by 5/3/75 would be as follows: (1) GID; (2) Report for 4/75; (3)(a) one-half day @ GS-16; one day @ GS-15; three days @ GS-14; (3)(b) two days @ GS-7; two days @ GS-5.

This is effective commencing 4/1/75 and first routing slip report due 5/3/75 will be for the month of April, 1975.

If a Division has not participated during the preceding month, merely submit a routing slip to this effect.

The cooperation of all is urged so that the necessary cost data may be compiled each month. It is recognized that exact figures will not be feasible and that estimates will be most practical and will suffice.

ST-100 REC-43 62-116395-17

ACTION: For action as above by each Assistant Director.

62-116395
SFP:ekw (18)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116464

15 APR 22 1975

WBW

82 EKW

51 APR 28 1975

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Each Assistant Director

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/10/75

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM

This memorandum records the formal establishment of a task force entitled Project Senstudy 75.

The concept behind the establishment of this Project is to develop a capability of implementing requests received from Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible. We believe that by creating this facility we will be able to meet the requirements of these Select Committees with the exception of the research that will have to be done in the substantive Divisions.

While the Project will direct internal work and related liaison with the intelligence community and the White House staff, we envision the Legal Analysis Unit Office of Legal Counsel Division as continuing to be the primary point of direct contact with the Select Committees of the Congress. They will receive all requests and deliver all responses to these Committees. In addition, they will meet with the staffs of the Committees to insure the reasonableness of requests. If necessary, they will call upon the expertise of the substantive Division for determination as to whether a proposed request from the Committees can be responded to within a reasonable period of time and within the capabilities of the FBI's information retrieval system.

REC- 100 62-116395-

At the present time four Supervisors have been delegated to work exlusively on the Project. They are as follows:

12 APR 23 1975

The Project Manager will be Section Chief William O. Cregar, CI-2 Section, Intelligence Division. His duties will encompass the review of all incoming requests from the Select Committees in an effort to identify policy questions;

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

WOC:lmh lmh
(18)

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 APR 23 1975

ambiguities requiring recontact with Committee staffs; the assignment of research responsibilities to substantive Divisions; following such responsibilities to insure timely responses; as well as representing the FBI on the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. Assistant Director John A. Mintz is also a member of the Executive Committee. This latter responsibility will provide Cregar and Mintz with direct liaison not only with senior officials of the intelligence community but also with the President's counsel.

Mr. Elmer W. Larson, Unit Chief, Training Unit, IS-3 Section, Intelligence Division will act as Cregar's Number One Man; will administer the work of the Project; and act in the absence of Cregar.

Seymor F. Phillips, Unit Chief, Civil Disorders Reporting Unit, IS-1 Section, Intelligence Division will serve as the Review Coordinator for the Project. His responsibilities will be to review all research; coordinate all responses; be available to consult with substantive Divisions as to proper form of our responses; identify any conflicts in FBI positions where several Divisions are responding to a particular question; as well as to insure the quality, completeness and adequacy of responses to Select Committees requests. Additionally, Phillips will be responsible for the preparation of abstracts to be furnished to the Interagency Registry maintained at CIA Headquarters. This Registry established by the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Group at the suggestion of and with the concurrence of the White House will serve as the coordinating mechanism for the entire intelligence community.

Mr. Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Officer with CIA, CI-4 Section, Intelligence Division will function as the Liaison Officer with the intelligence community responsible for coordinating and clearing all information under the third agency rule where FBI responses are of interest to or are of a proprietary interest to other agencies of the intelligence community. Schwartz will serve as the Bureau's representative on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

CONTINUED - OVER

Because of the White House insistence that all requests and responses be completely coordinated and available for review by White House representatives, it is imperative that the Project have a self-sustained records facility to insure immediate access to requests received from and responses furnished to the Select Committees. In addition, in those instances where certain FBI documents furnished to the Select Committees must be sanitized (excised), it is imperative this records facility not only retain copies of the sanitized documents but also copies of the original text. For these reasons a senior clerical employee has been requested to function as a Records Manager for the Project.

In addition to the above, there will be stenographic and clerical personnel assigned to the Project to support the work of the Bureau Supervisors. We have not committed any more personnel to the Project than are absolutely necessary at the present time. Should the requests of the Select Committees require additional personnel, appropriate memoranda will be submitted with a complete justification for additional personnel assigned to the Project.

Although the physical space for the Project is limited, all personnel connected with Project Senstudy 75 will be located in Room 4063, J. Edgar Hoover Building. This space is physically located within the Intelligence Division.

As a matter of interest, Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has requested that should any member of the intelligence community get requests from other Committees of the Congress which impact on the intelligence community; could be of interest to the White House; or are of such sensitivity that coordination is required, copies of both the requests and an abstract of the responses should be made available to the Interagency Registry.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

PLM

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 9, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/TAG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which responds to the Committee's request for the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and those portions of these Manuals which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

REC-106

62-116395-75

Enclosures - 13

12 APR 23 1975

EWL:jvl
(7)

4/10/75 [illegible] to SSC [illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCL BEHIND FILE

3-ENCLOSURE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/LTG

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Under IV. A. (Policies and Procedures) the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and certain portions of this Manual were requested. In accordance with this request the following material is enclosed:

1) Table of contents; 2) Preface. Guidelines for FBI Investigations; 3) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret"); 4) Section 84. Registration Act; 5) Section 86. Sabotage; 6) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals; 7) Section 88. Sedition; 8) Section 95. Treason; 9) Section 97. Voorhis Act; 10) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

Not included as enclosures are Section 105, Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency (Foreign Intelligence), classified "Secret"; Section 107, Part I, Internal Security Informants and Confidential Sources; Section 107, Part II, Foreign Counterintelligence Assets; or Section 130, Extremist Informants and Sources. These Sections are deemed to contain extremely sensitive information and for that reason are not being transmitted; however, they are available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

Under IV. B. the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and pertinent portions of this Manual were requested. There is enclosed a copy of the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

EWL:jvl
(7)

PLM

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

75

GPO 954-546

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

From a review of the table of contents of this Manual it can be seen that the material contained in this Manual pertains to administrative rather than investigative operations of the FBI, and for that reason it has not been possible to select portions of this Manual which pertain directly to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities responsive to the Committee's request. The various other requests contained in the Committee letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and further response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures - 11

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Table of contents for Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations, as well as the several Sections of the Manual of Instructions which are being transmitted to the Select Committee, have already been made available to the General Accounting Office in the past, with the exception of Section 36, Section 105, and Section 107, Part II. Sections 105, 107, Part I and Part II, and Section 130 are not being furnished to the Committee, but the Committee will be allowed to examine these Sections at FBIHQ. Section 36, dealing with espionage, although classified, does not contain sensitive material involving sources and we feel in the spirit of the requirement we should furnish this Section to the Committee.

As a matter of interest, all of the material with respect to the Manual of Instructions which has been made available to GAO is actually maintained in FBI space.

April 1~~6~~, 1975 8-per PVD/18

This is to acknowledge receipt of classified material by letterhead memorandum dated April ~~10~~, 9 1975, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Ben Marshall
for Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence Activities.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/LAG

62-116395-75

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD-Adm. ____
Dep. AD-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/ATG

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-8-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
APRIL 11, 1975

As you were previously advised, William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, requested that we provide a briefing for certain staff members of the Committee on the functions of the Intelligence Division. He asked that the briefing cover both internal security and foreign counterintelligence operations and that it provide a broad overview of our investigative responsibilities.

The Intelligence Division is prepared to offer a two-hour briefing beginning at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, 4-11-75. It will include a slide show to be followed by a general discussion and an opportunity to afford questions and answers. After a luncheon break, the staff members will be given a brief tour of the Files and Communications Division.

Since the briefing will cover classified materials, no staff members will be invited unless they have appropriate security clearances. As a consequence Professor John Elliff, who has been tentatively named Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence, will not attend. It is hoped that we may provide him with a private meeting at some later date.

REC-106 62-116395-74

It is expected that those attending the briefing will include: Mr. Miller, F. A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel, Mark Gitenstein and Marvin Epstein, staff members. Since no Committee members will be present, we are not recommending that the staff meet with the Director.

12 APR 23 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That the above-named staff members of the Senate Select Committee be given a briefing by the Intelligence Division and the Files and Communications Division on 4-11-75.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis

PLM

JBH:dkg (10)

84 APR 23 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#m0216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/1116

"The Washington Post," Thursday, 4-10-75, edition on page A31 contains an article reporting an interview of Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Senator Church, according to this article, stated that the Committee is reserving the right to make public eventually any documents it gets and is accepting nothing with "strings attached."

Inasmuch as this Committee is also the Committee which the FBI is furnishing information to, it is believed a clarification of Senator Church's statement must be obtained and in the interim we should furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.

Section Chief William O. Cregar advised that he had contacted Dr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Committee concerning Senator Church's reported statement. Clarke stated that CIA Director William E. Colby was highly upset at Church's remark and that this statement would be a topic of a discussion of the Executive Committee meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review the morning of 4-11-75. We will be represented at that conference by Section Chief William O. Cregar and Assistant Director John A. Mintz. Clarke indicated the position that the CIA will apparently take regarding this problem is that the White House should obtain the clarification although CIA Director Colby initially was prepared to send a letter over his signature to Senator Church to obtain such clarification.

ENCLOSURE

EX-110 REC-4 62-116395-13

Inasmuch as the request by this Committee was forwarded through the Department, Senator Church's statement was brought to the attention of Douglas Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, who has been handling all FBI responses to Senate Select Committee requests. Marvin indicated he was concerned at Church's statement and stated it was the Attorney General's desire that he be advised of any Bureau response to the Committee concerning this matter.

APR 17 1975

Enc.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

11-90

PVD:dkg (9)

RECOMMENDATION
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

RECOMMENDATION:

No action be taken by the Bureau to obtain clarification of Senator Church's statement pending the results, 4-11-75, meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review, and that in the interim we furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.

pvD JBH/pvD

Senate CIA Committee Says White House Stalls on Data

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Committee on Intelligence Operations disclosed yesterday that the White House is still stalling on a month-old request for the directives involving covert activities by the Central Intelligence Agency and other arms of the Government.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), the committee chairman, told reporters after a closed, 2½-hour meeting that he had been authorized to write another letter to President Ford asking him to expedite the request.

The committee asked Mr. Ford on March 12 for all the executive orders and top-secret National Security Council directives concerning the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community, including the command structure at the White House.

The President was also asked to supply the committee with a copy of CIA Director William E. Colby's January report to Mr. Ford on allegations of illegal domestic spying by the agency.

But all the committee has gotten so far, Church said, has been what the White House evidently regards as the least sensitive documents on the list.

Church said he did not know "what the hang-up is" since White House aides have indicated they consider the committee's entire request as "perfectly proper."

Church did not spell out all of "the more sensitive data" that is still being withheld, but he said it includes both the Colby report and the top-secret White House and National Security Council directives dealing with covert operations, both foreign and domestic.

The Idaho senator said the committee is reserving the right to make public eventually any documents it gets and is accepting nothing with "strings attached." But he declined to speculate on whether this might be the reason for the administration's hesitance.

Church said all of the records were essential to the committee's mandate to investigate the CIA and the rest of the government's intelligence community. He said he still had no reason to think at this point that the White House would refuse to give them up, but he emphasized that he saw no reason for further delay.

Church said the committee also authorized its staff of about 35 lawyers and investigators to start gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses as the prelude to a projected round of public hearings this summer. The House has also ordered a similar inquiry but its committee, headed by Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), has yet to choose a staff director.

The Senate committee's chief counsel, Fritz Schwarz, said directors have now been named for all four of its task forces. They are William Bader, head of the foreign intelligence task force; John Elliff, head of the domestic intelligence task force; Alton H. Quanbeck, head of the Military intelligence task force, and David Aaron, head of the task force that will study the intelligence community's 'command and control structure."

Bader is a former Senate Foreign Relations Committee aide and has recently been working with the Ford Foundation. Elliff is a Brandeis University professor and expert in domestic law enforcement activities. Quanbeck has been director of the Brookings Institution's defense analysis project and Aaron has served on the National Security Council staff.

Schwarz said that each of the task forces will cut across the lines of various intelligence agencies and focus on general avenues of inquiry, such as the "legal authority and legal restraints" for intelligence work; the targets and techniques of intelligence-gathering, counterintelligence and covert operations, and the question of who orders and controls those activities.

#moe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/116

"The Washington Post"
April 10, 1975

62-116395-93
ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO :Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM :W. O. Cregar

DATE: 4/7/75

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the EXCOM), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/4/75.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were Mr. Roderick Hills, Assistant Counsel to the President; Associate Deputy AG Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke; as well as senior officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

The following items of interest were discussed:

Mr. Roderick Hills reported that he had a meeting with the Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to discuss having Legal Counsel present when members of a particular agency were being interviewed by SSC staff personnel. The essence of this meeting resulted in the SSC being receptive to such an arrangement but it would be incumbent upon each agency, department or bureau to negotiate the specific arrangements for such representation with the SSC. Hills also discussed the problem of the unknown employee or former employee who might request to be interviewed unbeknownst to the parent agency. It was suggested to the Counsel and Staff Director by Hills that such an employee be interviewed by only one staff member, that the staff member attempt to determine the scope of this individual's testimony and then discuss such testimony with the parent agency to insure the agency could provide advice as to the sensitivity of the unknown employee's testimony. No firm decisions were made but it would appear the Counsel and Staff Director will agree to allow Counsel to be present during the

REG 40

62-116395

21 APR 16 1975

ST-106

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

5 1 APR 21 1975

testimony of a secret employee and following such testimony the employee will be allowed to meet with staff members of the SSC in an Executive Session. It is anticipated more definitive information on the final decisions regarding this aspect will be forthcoming from the White House.

The question was raised by the Bureau representative as to whether the Ad Hoc Group and/or the interagency registry should be notified as to requests members of the Intelligence Community receive from other Congressional committees. Mr. Wilderotter advised that this would be a judgment question; however, if a request from a Congressional committee other than the Select Committees impacted on the Intelligence Community, involve sensitive issues or would be of interest to the White House, such requests should be provided to the interagency registry along with an abstract of the response.

Attached is a list of those members of the SSC staff who have been certified for access to compartmented information. Also attached is a paper identifying 10 issues likely to grow out of Select Committee deliberations. The pencil notation in the right-hand column identifies those agencies of the Intelligence Community responsible for preparing a paper which addresses these issues. It is noted that issue identified as number eight is entitled, "Intelligence Files and Privacy." Mr. Colby asked that the FBI prepare this paper. Assistant Director Mintz advised that the Bureau has a study underway on this very subject and agreed that the Bureau would prepare this study. The deadline for completion of the study is 4/25/75.

Also attached is a copy of the survey of the SSC facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, covering all aspects of physical and technical security. None of the participants of the EXCOM had any objection to the facility and we presume the SSC will abide by the procedures outlined in the attached survey report.

Attached also for information is a draft of an employee notice and agreement concerning treatment of confidential material being considered by the SSC. It is to be noted that to date neither the Committee nor its staff has signed any such Secrecy Agreement.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

TM

PCM WRW

JAM

AGREEMENT

I have read the foregoing employee notice concerning treatment of confidential material and have read the Resolution establishing the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, and the Committee Rules.

I understand that to qualify as an employee of the Select Committee, I am required to, and I hereby agree to, abide by those Rules. I further understand ~~that~~ and agree that the obligations hereby placed upon me continue after my employment with the Committee has terminated.

SIGNATURE

SWORN TO BEFORE NOTARY

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/LFG

those staff members with appropriate security clearances and a [redacted] need to know.

"7.5 Testimony taken in Executive session or papers and other materials received by the staff shall not be made public or disclosed to any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee, or upon termination of the Committee, as determined by a vote of the Senate.

"7.6 Before the Committee is called upon to make any disposition with respect to the testimony, papers, or other materials presented to it, the Committee members shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine all pertinent testimony, papers, and other materials that have been obtained by the inquiry staff. No member shall release any of that testimony or those papers or other materials to the public or any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote, a quorum being present at the time the vote is taken.

"9.3 The staff of the Committee shall not discuss either the substance or procedure of the work of the Committee with anyone other than a member of the Committee or other Committee personnel. Upon termination of employment by the Committee, each member of the staff, or consultant, shall surrender any classified material which came into his possession while in the employ of the Committee.

"9.4 The employment of any member of the staff who fails to conform to these Rules shall be immediately terminated."

In addition to the strict security precautions adopted by the Committee there are, as you no doubt know, sections of the United States Code and Executive Orders which relate to keeping certain material confidential--they are sections [TO BE INSERTED which are annexed hereto.

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Committee Rules include provisions relating to the confidential treatment of material received by the Committee. These provisions are contained in Rules 6.11; 7 (and each of its subsections), 9.3 and 9.4 which provide the following:

"6.11 Release of Testimony and Other Matters. No testimony taken or material presented at an Executive session shall be made public, in whole or in part or by way or summary, unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee. Unless authorized by the Chairman the name of any witness scheduled to be heard by the Committee shall not be released prior to his testimony.

"RULE 7. Procedures for Handling Select Committee Classified or Sensitive Material

"7.1 Staff offices on the first floor of the Dirksen Office Building shall operate under strict security precautions. One guard shall be on duty at all times by the entrance to control entry. All persons before entering the offices shall identify themselves. An additional guard shall be posted at night for surveillance of the secure area where sensitive documents are kept.

"7.2 Sensitive documents and other materials shall be segregated in a secure storage area. They may be examined only at secure reading facilities. Copying or duplicating of such documents and other materials is prohibited except as is necessary for use in Committee meetings or to prepare for the taking of testimony or for interviews.

"7.3 Each member of the Committee shall at all times have access to all papers and things received from any source by subpoena or otherwise. The staff director shall be responsible for the maintenance, under appropriate security procedures, of a record of all papers and things in the possession of the Committee, which log shall be available to any member of the Committee.

"7.4 Access to classified information supplied to the Committee shall be limited by the staff director, the chief counsel and the counsel to the minority, and to

DRAFT 3/28/75

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Employee Notice and Agreement Concerning Treatment of Confidential Material

NOTICE

Concern about security and the maintenance of confidentiality of information provided the Senate Select Committee has been stressed since the outset by the Senate and the Committee.

Section 7 of the resolution which established the Committee requires the Committee to:

> "institute and carry out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to prevent the disclosure, outside the Select Committee of any information relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the Federal Government engaged in intelligence activities, obtained by the Select Committee during the course of its study and investigation, not authorized by the Select Committee to be disclosed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the Select Committee, of any information which would adversely affect the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign countries or the intelligence activities in foreign countries of any department or agency of the Federal Government."

DD/A 75-1549

1 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration 2 APR 1975

SUBJECT : Security Survey, Senate Select Committee Facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, Capitol Hill

1. Attached to this memorandum is a letter to Mr. William G. Miller for your signature.

2. A security survey of the Senate Select Committee facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, as requested by Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director of that Committee, was completed on 24 March 1975.

3. With the security procedures now in effect and those planned for implementation, the facility will provide adequate protection for the handling and storage of CIA documents of all levels of classification. Also attached for your information is a copy of the survey report.

Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

Att

cc: DD/A
Chairman, SECOM

Refer
CFA

OS 5 1284

Regraded Unclassified when separated
from Classified Attachment(s)

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 063417

SURVEY REPORT

Senate Select Committee Facility
Dirksen Bldg. 1st & C Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C.

1. In response to a request from Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director, Senate Select Committee, (tele. 224-1700) Messrs. Nicholas R. Zubon and Robert E. Burgener conducted a comprehensive security survey of the Senate Select Committee's Facility on 24 March 1975.

2. Mr. Marshall provided both a comprehensive tour of the facility and a detailed explanation of the operation.

3. The following are pertinent facts concerning the security procedures as related to the Senate Select Committee Facility:

A. Type of Facility

The Committee is in the auditorium (Room G 308) of the Dirksen Building at 1st and C Streets, N. E., Washington, D. C. Access to the auditorium is gained easiest by entering the building from the 1st and C Streets entrance. A 24-hour guard post is located just inside this entrance. The Select Committee facility is 40' east of the building guard post. It is nearly in direct line of sight, however, a foyer surrounded by a 6' high temporary partition precludes the auditorium entrance door from being visible. The entrance to the auditorium is protected by a 24-hour guard post.

The auditorium (Room G 308) is approximately 100' long x 45' wide. The floor, ceiling and walls are made of 6" to 8" solid masonry. The ceiling has a false ceiling approximately 18" deep in which the air handling equipment and sundry other service components are housed. All major air handling equipment is on the roof above the auditorium. Access to the roof which is strictly controlled by the Director of Security, is gained by a stairway in the southeast corner of the auditorium. The sidewalls each have a 2' x 3' register approximately 12' above the floor through which

air is passed from the auditorium to the air handling equipment on the roof. These registers are solidly bolted into the walls.

The front of the auditorium (south wall) is covered by a large movie screen. To the right and left of the movie screen are two rooms 6' wide and approximately 15' long used by the research section clerical personnel. These rooms have countertop openings approximately 3' above the floor for access from within the auditorium. Countertop openings exist along both sidewalls for approximately three quarters of the length of the wall. The sidewalls have intercorridors on the opposite side of the countertops which have been converted into unpartitioned office space. The only reproduction machine, a xerox model 3100, is located in the west corridor. The east corridor has been converted into a compartmented information storage room and a compartmented document reading room. The Security Director indicated that he may move his office to the head of the compartmented reading room to provide a larger measure of access control to this sensitive area.

The auditorium has six wooden exterior doors, 7' high and 3" thick. The entrance door into the auditorium (west and north wall) will have an electrical push-button lock installed. A similar door in the east end of the north wall will be barred and bracketed on the inside to prevent unauthorized entry. The west wall has 2 exterior doors leading into the Capitol Police offices. The east wall has two exterior doors with one leading to the roof while the second door exits into the Capitol Police Garage. All exterior doors will be alarmed. The doors now have Yale 197 1/4 locks with the keys controlled by Mr. Marshall. The fire safety factor concerning these locked doors was discussed with him.

The auditorium has a small second floor area at the north end. Access is gained by two stairways on the east and west side of the auditorium. The second floor space consists of a large projection room, currently filled with projection equipment, and five small private film viewing rooms.

The five small rooms will be converted into witness interview rooms. The windows in each of these rooms will be covered during the stay of the Select Committee in the auditorium.

B. Access Controls

Access to the Dirksen Building is gained by either the main entrance on 1st and C Streets, ground level, or the Basement Tunnel Entrance at the rear of the building. Both entrances have a 24-hour guard post where persons entering are checked for identification. Brief cases and packages are processed through x-ray machines. Vendors entering the main entrance are checked for ID, however, all boxes are not checked.

Entry into the auditorium is controlled by a guard at the door. His instructions are that all persons entering must show an ID card. Visitors are permitted only by appointment. They are logged in and escorted at all times while in the auditorium. From 1800 hours Friday through 0800 hours Saturday, and from 1300 hours Saturday to 0700 hours Monday everyone must sign the log in and out and show an ID. In the event an access problem arises at the guard post, regardless of the hour, Mr. Marshall is alerted.

C. Guards

The Dirksen Building and the auditorium are protected by members of the U. S. Capitol Police Department. The Building has two 24-hour/7day-a-week guard posts at the entrances while the Senate Select Committee has one 24-hour/7 day-a-week guard post at the entrance and an after-hours roving patrol inside the auditorium. All police officers are well trained, wear the Capitol Police uniform and carry Smith and Wesson 38 caliber revolvers. After-hour patrols check all doors, the entire auditorium for classified material that may not have been secured, and the second floor hourly during the night. The guards on duty at the time of the survey were alert and responsive to their duties. During off-duty hours, guard supervisors make at least two unscheduled visits to the guard posts during each shift. In addition the guard at the stationary post has four telephones, two of which have a pickup and automatic ring feature with Capitol Police Headquarters. There will be no rotation of police officers during the occupancy of the Committee. The same officers will be assigned to these posts.

D. Alarms

All exterior doors to the auditorium will have contact (microswitch) alarms. The Remington Rand safes, being obsolete, will be protected by a proximity alarm. The compartmented storage room and an adjacent reading area will be protected by a volumetric alarm. For fire protection a smoke detector/rate of rise alarm will be installed in the compartmented area. All alarms will enunciate at the guard desk at the entrance to the auditorium. The ADT Company will install and maintain the alarms.

E. Safes

The facility has 22 safes. Sixteen 4-drawer Remington Rand Safes located below the movie screen. Three class six Mosler 5-drawer, two class 1 Diebold 2-drawer, and one class 2 Diebold four-drawer are located in the compartmented storage room. With the exception of the Remington Rand safes, all other safes are in good working order.

The safe combination and repairs are under contract with the Safemaster Company. The safe combinations were recently changed by that company. All safe combinations are under the control of Mr. Marshall. However, an assist on day-to-day operations is provided by Mr. Pat Shea, Assistant Staff Director, who acts as backup for safeguarding the combinations to the safes in the compartmented storage room. Messrs. Larry Kieves, John Petersen and Ms. Jan Orloff are backup for the combinations to the sixteen Remington Rand Safes. Mr. Marshall was given two change keys in the event he decides to change the combination himself should staff personnel rotate.

F. Document Control

Incoming CIA documents will be delivered by Agency courier to the guard at the entrance door to the auditorium. The registry officer will receipt for them and take them to the Registry Section where all documents will be logged. Compartmented and Top Secret material will be taken to the Compartmented Storage Room and placed in a safe after it has been logged in Registry. Individuals, on an access list promulgated by Mr. Marshall draw the compartmented documents from the safes but must read them in the adjacent area dedicated for this purpose. Documents classified below TS/Codeword will

be stored in the Remington Rand safes. The documents in the Remington Rand safes can be drawn by anyone on the staff, but must be receipted for with the Registry Officer. The documents are to be read on the tables placed there for that purpose in the Research Section.

Further control of classified documents is directed through the assigning of a staff employee given responsibility for the reproduction of documents on the xerox machine. He will control the number of copies made on typewriters.

All classified material is secured in safes at the end of the working day.

H. Classified Waste

It is estimated that one 50-pound bag of classified waste will be generated each week while the Committee is in session. Once the bag is filled with classified waste, it will be placed in the locked trunk of Mr. Marshall's automobile and taken to the Federal Reserve Building incinerator where he will witness destruction by burning. In the event this incinerator is booked to capacity, he will take the classified waste and burn it at the D. C. incinerator. Should either incinerator become unavailable to the Committee, Mr. Marshall was assured that CIA would consider assisting him in the secure disposition of Committee classified waste.

I. Compartmented/TS Storage

A room dedicated as the codeword/TS storage room is in the northeast corner of the auditorium. Its five walls are solid masonry ranging from 6" to 8" thick. A 1/8" stainless steel door frame is bolted to the masonry walls. A prefabricated 9 gage wire cross-patch metal frame door is attached to the steel frame serving as access control to the dedicated room. The door will be secured by lock and key once classified material arrives for storage. This room will be alarmed.

J. Telephone

The Facility has six standard telephones in the auditorium. Five of the telephones will be equipped with conversation

masking devices. A central switch installed ahead of the telephone instruments will disconnect all telephones simultaneously, should the need arise. The telephone system is maintained by the local telephone company.

K. Security Briefings

All new members of the committee receive a thorough briefing from Mr. Marshall on security procedures and security responsibilities. Briefings are periodically reinforced when conditions warrant.

L. Security Duty Check Procedures

Custodians secure the safe cabinets assigned to them, i.e. Mr. Shea, codeword room, Messrs. Kieves, Petersen, and Ms. Orloff, Research area. Mr. Marshall double checks behind them. The custodian, Security Director and the roving guard patrol check the entire auditorium to ensure all classified material has been secured at the end of the day.

M. Counteraudio Inspection

Mr. Marshall has taken action on this requirement and continues to monitor this area to provide the Committee with as much security protection against the Audio threat as possible.

N. Shredder

The facility has one Destroyit Model 51 Shredder used only for shredding the most sensitive documents. Other documents are not shredded in this machine because of its limited shredding capability.

O. General Observations

The security procedures implemented within the Senate Select Committee facility are sufficient to provide a proper environment for the protection of classified materials. The survey officers were pleased with the security director's dedication to the objective of providing the best security possible for the Committee.


Capitol PARK Police Garage
To GARAGE
Locked
Locked
To AIR COND And Furnace Room For Auditorium
SCREEN
SAFES
office Space
TABLE
Locked
Capitol PARK Garage
TS And compartmented Reading Room
OFFICES
Xerox Reproduction Area
Capitol PARK Police offices
Locked
TS and compartmented storage
Bolted
office Space unoccupied
Guard Reception Area
6' high Temp partition
6' high Temp partition
NORTH
MAIN HALL IN FRONT of AUDITORIUM in DIRKSEN BLDG
To GUARD Post

SECOND FLOOR


North
INTERVIEW ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM
Projection ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM
INTERVIEW ROOM

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/JRC

NOTES FOR SESSION

In previous sessions we discussed the importance of highlighting issues likely to grow out of Commission or Committee deliberations. We observed that we should identify some of those on which a legal brief or annex would be helpful to Executive Branch initiatives. The idea was to select a few where a solid research paper with options, pros and cons, etc., could help us develop a firm grip on the questions in the issue and identify options. For example, the question of Executive privacy presents itself, and I gather is being worked on.

There are others we feel it would be useful for the group to address and assign responsibility for further work. For example:

Suggested Action

1. Economic Intelligence and National Security--new discussion — Treasury

2. Covert action and the law — CIA

3. The Intelligence Budget--open, black, or closed--rational and procedures for handling past, present and future — OMB

4. Joint Congressional oversight committee for Intelligence — CIA.

5. GAO and the audit authorities of U.S. Intelligence Agencies — IC Staff help from legal counsel

6. Confidential funds authorities, contingency reserves, legal base, history and uses — CIA-DOD

7. Cover for Foreign Intelligence Actions legal and administrative issues — CIA-State

8. Intelligence files and privacy — FBI [illegible]

9. The "fact of" question--international, legal and political considerations — State

10. "Sources and methods" legislation — OMB & Justice

What human being responsible by next Friday
3 weeks at Executive Session

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 31, 1975

#MORI6

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

With respect to our letter to you of March 17, 1975 you will find attached the first list of members of the Committee staff designated to receive compartmented information.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller
Staff Director

Enclosure

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret and are designated to receive compartmented information. They also meet the requirements as set forth in DCID 1/14. WGM

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
William G. Miller	8-15-31	N.Y.	109-26-4349
Frederick A. O. Schwarz	4-20-35	N.Y.	084-30-2047
William Bader	9-8-31	N.J.	545-30-3377
Burton V. Wides	6-14-41	N.J.	139-30-1936
Elliot E. Maxwell	7-24-46	N.Y.	133-34-4225
Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495
Michael J. Madigan	4-18-43	D.C.	042-34-3797
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48	N.Y.	068-38-6464
Charity I. Benz	7-23-46	N.Y.	053-38-7410
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19	Neb.	485-28-4530
Maratha E. Mecham	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848
Audrey H. Hatry	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691

#MOR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-172

ENVELOPE

EMPTY

Official DocLab Instruction(s) – Revised 10-Apr-2014

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 4/10/75

REC-40

FROM : W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JG

W.O. Cregar

On 4/8/75 Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman of the Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, forwarded the attached copy of a letter dated 3/28/75 from Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, enclosing a list of staff members who have been certified for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Copies of the list are attached to tickler copies of this memorandum for retention by personnel who may be in contact with the Select Committee staff.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Enclosures (2) ENCLOSURE

62-116395

LFS:tdp (8)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Schwartz

PLM

ST-106

REC-40 62-116395- 71

15 APR 16 1975

51 APR 21 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
LTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
BERT MORGAN, N.C.
ARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., T[illegible]N.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 23, 1975

#MOP16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William Miller
Staff Director

62-116395-[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

ATTACHMENT

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
David Aaron	8-21-38	IL.	550-44-7971
Nancy Brooks	2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773
Barbara Chesnik	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235
Mary De Oreo	6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258
Daniel Dwyer	8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792
Peter Fenn	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123
Edward Greissing	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113
Mark Inderfurth	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617
Dorothy Johnson	6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413
Loch Johnson	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478
Howard Liebengood	12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707
Naldeen MacDonald	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503
William G. Miller	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349
Susan Pitts	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638
Alan Romberg	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583
Frederick A.O. Schwarz, III	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047
Patrick Shea	2-28-48	UT	528-64-1965
Stephanie Smith	3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476
Mary Towell	4-25-44	TN	566-64-7628

62-116395-71

ENCLOSURE

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1 - Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 14, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JYG #MDR16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to the Senate Select Committee letter dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents from the FBI and my letter to you dated April 10, 1975, enclosing a memorandum and a copy of the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, less certain exhibits, for the Committee's use.

The purpose of this letter is to make available for your information a copy of the aforementioned paper with all exhibits intact. The Committee's copy of the paper has missing exhibits because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Authority to release these exhibits is being expeditiously sought so they may be made available to the Committee.

The exhibits extracted from the Committee's copy included Exhibit I, J, K, M, and P.

REC-106 62-116395-70

Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has reviewed and approved all exhibits left in the paper and has requested to review the extracted exhibits after "Third Agency Rule" approval has been granted and before the exhibits are forwarded to the Committee. This will be done at the earliest possible time.

APR 21 1975

Enclosure

ALL:vb
(7)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Inv. ___
tion ___
ory ___
Eval. ___
m. ___

PM

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Director, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (3)

DRD:mjg
(6)

NOTE: This is the most current FBI Functional Organization Chart. A new chart would not be available if prepared in response to the Senate Select Committee's request for approximately 7 to 10 days.

REC-103 62-116395-69

6 APR 21 1975

5- WO

PLM

ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DRD

GPO 954-546

#MDR16

11/8/01 SP-2ALM/JTG

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975 to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

In response to the Committee's request for a detailed current organizational chart attached hereto is a document entitled "FBI Functional Organization Chart."

This chart was prepared January 14, 1975, and since that time the following changes concerning the position of Assistant Director have been made. The Assistant Director of the Files and Communications Division is John J. McDermott. The Assistant Director of External Affairs is Donald W. Moore, Jr. The Assistant Director of the Training Division is William M. Mooney.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

DRD/PVD:mjg/kjs
(6)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-69

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED [redacted] #NDE ON THIS ENVELOPE
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/STG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-69

FBI FUNCTIONAL ORG

FIELD OFFICES

ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
ALEXANDRIA
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
COLUMBIA
DALLAS
DENVER
DETROIT
EL PASO
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JACKSONVILLE
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LAS VEGAS
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE

DIRECTO
CLARENCE M. K

ASSOCIATE DIR
NICHOLAS P. CA

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
(ADMINISTRATION)
THOMAS J. JENKINS

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD H. ASH

RECORDING SECTION:

FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE
LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL MATTERS

POSTING SECTION:

FUGITIVE WANTED NOTICES
PROBATION AND PAROLE FLASHES

CARD INDEX SECTION:

CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND DECEASED NAME INDICES

TECHNICAL SECTION:

CLASSIFICATION AND SEARCHING
CRIMINAL FINGERPRINT FILE
CIVIL FINGERPRINT FILE (ALIEN, CIVIL SERVICE, MILITARY AND PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION)
WIRE ROOM SERVICES

ASSEMBLY SECTION:

FILING AND MAINTENANCE OF FINGERPRINT JACKETS
VERIFICATION OF IDENTIFICATIONS
MICROFILMING

FINGERPRINT CORRESPONDENCE SECTION:

UPDATING AND DISSEMINATION OF FINGERPRINT RECORDS
CERTIFIED RECORDS
MISSING PERSONS UNIT
MAIL ROOM

LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION:

DECEASED HAND AND FINGER EXAMINATIONS
DISASTER IDENTIFICATION SQUAD
FINGERPRINT PHOTO LAB
FINGERPRINT TESTIMONY
GENERAL APPEARANCE FILE ON CONFIDENCE MEN
LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATIONS
LATENT FINGERPRINT INSTRUCTION
NATIONAL UNIDENTIFIED LATENT FINGERPRINT FILE
SINGLE FINGERPRINT FILE
TECHNICAL FIELD ASSISTANCE

AUTOMATION AND RESEARCH SECTION:

AUTOMATED IDENTIFICATION DIVISION SYSTEM (AIDS)
CCH/CIRFO DESK
FINGERPRINT AUTOMATION RESEARCH

TRAINING DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOE DAVID JAMIESON

QUANTICO:

FBI ACADEMY – TRAINING CENTER
FIELD FIREARMS TRAINING
FIREARMS INSPECTION AND REPAIR
IN-SERVICE FIREARMS TRAINING
LAW ENFORCEMENT COMBAT ARTS RESEARCH PROGRAM (LECARP)
NATIONAL ACADEMY FIREARMS TRAINING
NEW AGENTS FIREARMS TRAINING
SPECIALIZED POLICE FIREARMS TRAINING
SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) TRAINING
RADIO STATIONS
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY
IN-SERVICE COURSES
DEFENSE PLANS FOR DIVISION
LEARNING RESOURCE CENTER
DEFENSIVE TACTICS COURSES
NEW AGENTS TRAINING
POLICE INSTRUCTOR COURSES
PHYSICAL TRAINING
SUPERVISORY AND MANAGEMENT TRAINING
EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT COURSES
ASSESSMENT CENTER – CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
TRAINING RESEARCH
POLICE INSTRUCTOR BULLETINS
LAW ENFORCEMENT SYMPOSIUMS
LAW ENFORCEMENT SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS
FACULTY DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH UNIT
INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
FIELD CLERICAL TRAINING ASSISTANCE
POLICE VISITORS
LIAISON – PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SOCIETIES
LIAISON – UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
LIAISON – NATIONAL ASSOCIATION STATE DIRECTORS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (NASDLET)
LIAISON – INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
LIAISON – INTERAGENCY POLICE GROUP

HEADQUARTERS:

BUREAU MANUALS
CHIEF CLERK MATTERS
CLERICAL RETRAINING COURSES
FIELD POLICE SCHOOLS
FORMS MANAGEMENT
LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES
SAC MEMORANDA
REPORTS MANAGEMENT
STENOGRAPHIC TRAINING
SUGGESTION PROGRAM
NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ADMISSIONS
INDOOR RANGE

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
EUGENE W. WALSH

BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION:

ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT
BUDGET AND FISCAL MATTERS
BUREAU ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS
PHYSICAL SECURITY MATTERS

EXHIBITS SECTION:

ARTIST'S-CONCEPTION DRAWINGS
GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF INVESTIGATIVE AND STATISTICAL DATA
PREPARATION OF CREDENTIALS AND SPECIAL FORMS
TRAINING AIDS (DIAGRAMS, ILLUSTRATIONS AND DISPLAYS)
TRIAL EXHIBITS (CHARTS AND MODELS)
J. EDGAR HOOVER FBI BUILDING

MECHANICAL SECTION:

AUTOMOTIVE POOL
EMPLOYEE PARKING
ENERGY CONSERVATION
PHOTOGRAPHY
PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION
SPACE MATTERS
SUPPLY AND STORAGE

PERSONNEL SECTION:

APPLICANT RECRUITING AND PLACEMENT
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
COMMENDATIONS AND AWARDS
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE
EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
HEALTH PROGRAMS
LEAVE
LIVING QUARTERS
PAY ADMINISTRATION
PERFORMANCE RATINGS
PERSONNEL MATTERS
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
POSITION CLASSIFICATION
RETIREMENT MATTERS
SAFETY PROGRAMS
VETERANS' COUNSELING
VOCATION AND AVOCATION RECORDS

PROCUREMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES SECTION:

PROCUREMENT (SUPPLIES-EQUIPMENT)
CONTRACTING
INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
TYPEWRITER REPAIR SHOP
MAINTENANCE

SPECIAL AGENT TRANSFERS AND MOVEMENT UNIT:

PERSONNEL LOCATION RECORDS
SPECIAL AGENT TRANSFERS
RESIDENT AGENCY MATTERS

FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
J. WALLACE LAPRADE

RECORDS SECTION:

AUTOMATION AND RESEARCH
CHIEF CLERK MATTERS
CLASSIFYING
CONSOLIDATION
CORRELATION
FILE REVIEW
FILING
GENERAL INDEX
MAIL ROOM
MESSENGERS
NAME SEARCHING
NUMBERING
PERSONNEL RECORDS
RECORDING
RECORDS MANAGEMENT
ROUTING
SERVICE
TRAINING

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION:

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS (INTRA-BUREAU)
TELEGRAPH, TELETYPE, AND MESSAGE ENCODING/DECODING SERVICES
TELEPHONE SERVICE

LABORATORY DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
BRIGGS J. WHITE

FRONT OFFICE:

FORENSIC SCIENCE TRAINING UNIT
PLANNING AND EVALUATION UNIT
TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE UNIT

CRYPTANALYSIS-GAMBLING-TRANSLATION SECTION:

CRYPTANALYSIS
GAMBLING EXAMINATIONS
POLYGRAPH
SECURITY OF FBI COMMUNICATIONS
TRANSLATIONS

DOCUMENT SECTION:

CHARRED PAPER EXAMINATIONS
HANDWRITING AND HANDPRINTING
INDENTED WRITING
INK AND PENCIL EXAMINATIONS
OBLITERATED WRITINGS
PAPER EXAMINATIONS
PHOTOGRAPHIC EXAMINATIONS
PORTRAIT PARLE EXAMINATIONS
PRINTING
RUBBER STAMP, CHECKWRITER, AND OTHER MECHANICAL DEVICES
SHOEPRINT EXAMINATIONS
TIRETREAD EXAMINATIONS
TYPEWRITING
MISCELLANEOUS

RADIO ENGINEERING SECTION:

CW RADIO NETWORK ENGINEERING
FM RADIO SYSTEMS
MAINTENANCE COORDINATION
MOBILE AND PORTABLE RADIO
RADIO FREQUENCY LIAISON COMMITTEES
EVIDENCE EXAMINATIONS

PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY SECTION:

BIOCHEMICAL
BIOLOGICAL
EXPLOSIVES
FIBERS AND HAIRS
GENERAL CHEMICAL
GLASS FRACTURES
GUNPOWDER TESTS
GUNS AND AMMUNITION
INSTRUMENTAL ANALYSIS
METALLURGICAL
MINERALOGICAL
NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS
NUMBER RESTORATION
PHARMACOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
TOOLMARKS
TOXICOLOGICAL
WOOD
X-RAY

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOHN J. McDERMOTT

PRESS SERVICES OFFICE

CORRESPONDENCE AND TOURS:

CORRESPONDENCE – CITIZEN INQUIRIES
CORRESPONDENCE REVIEW
MAILING LISTS
DISTRIBUTION OF REPRINTS
TOURS OF FBIHQ
SPEECH MATTERS

RESEARCH SECTION:

FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN
INVESTIGATOR
TOP TEN FUGITIVE PROGRAM
FUGITIVE PUBLICITY PROGRAMS
SPECIAL PROJECTS
LIBRARY
BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM
YOUTHFUL CRIMINALITY
RADIO-TV NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS
NEWS RELEASES

COMPUTER SYSTEMS DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ANDREW J. DECKER, JR.

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING SECTION:

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED OR ASSAULTED STATISTICS
NATIONAL BOMB DATA STATISTICS

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER SECTION:

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER/COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL HISTORIES SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
NCIC/CCH OPERATIONS
NCIC/CCH CRIMINAL HISTORY CONVERSION

DATA PROCESSING SECTION:

ACCOUNTING REPORTS
COMPUTER SYSTEMS:
  DATA PROCESSING
  TELEPROCESSING
  OPERATIONS RESEARCH
  SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
PAYROLL
RETIREMENT RECORDS
STATISTICAL TABULATIONS
VOUCHERS

JANUARY 14, 1975

ANIZATION CHART

#MD46

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-91 BY SP2ALM/716

FIELD OFFICES

MEMPHIS
MIAMI
MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
NORFOLK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH
PORTLAND
RICHMOND
SACRAMENTO
ST. LOUIS
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
TAMPA
WASHINGTON, D.C
TOTAL 59

R
ELLEY

ECTOR
.LAHAN

**ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
(INVESTIGATION)
JAMES B. ADAMS**

OFFICE OF PLANNING AND EVALUATION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD J. GALLAGHER

STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

OPERATIONS
PLANNING
POLICIES
PROGRAMS

INSPECTION DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
HAROLD N BASSETT

INSPECTIONS – FIELD AND HQs
SPECIAL PROJECTS
SURVEYS
INTERNAL AUDITS
SECURITY COORDINATOR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
W. RAYMOND WANNALL

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

CI-1 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY

CI-2 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY

CI-3 SECTION:

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT - VIOLATIONS
ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
FOREIGN ECONOMIC MATTERS
FOREIGN FUNDS
FOREIGN MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS
FOREIGN SOCIAL CONDITIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY
NEUTRALITY MATTERS
SECURITY MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY
BOMBING MATTERS
ANTI-RIOT
ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN GUESTS OF U. S.

CI-4 SECTION:

DOMESTIC AND MILITARY LIAISON
FOREIGN LIAISON MATTERS
FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH:

IS-1 SECTION:

EXTREMISTS AND
ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
EXTREMISTS
ACTIVITIES
CIVIL UNREST AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE
EXTREMIST INFORMANTS

IS-2 SECTION:

SEDITION
SABOTAGE
COMMUNIST
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS
OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS
SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (EXCEPT ESPIONAGE)

IS-3 SECTION:

CENTRAL RESEARCH
ANALYTICAL RESEARCH
TRAINING
SPECIAL RECORDS
DEFENSE PLANS

.LEGAL COUNSEL

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
LEGAL COUNSEL
JOHN A. MINTZ

LEGAL ANALYSIS
LEGAL INSTRUCTION
LEGAL LIAISON
LEGAL RESEARCH
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ROBERT E. GEBHARDT

CRIMINAL SECTION:

ASSAULTING OR KILLING A FEDERAL OFFICER
ASSAULTING FOREIGN PERSONNEL
CONGRESSIONAL ASSASSINATION STATUTE
ASSAULTING THE PRESIDENT (OR VICE-PRESIDENT) OF THE UNITED STATES
AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT
BANK ROBBERY
BILLS OF LADING ACT
CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT
CRIME ON INDIAN AND GOVERNMENT RESERVATIONS
CRIME ON THE HIGH SEAS
DESECRATION OF THE FLAG
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES
EXTORTION
FALSE ADVERTISING OR MISUSE OF NAMES TO INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY
FALSE ENTRIES IN RECORDS OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS
FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT
FEDERAL TRAIN WRECK STATUTE
FIREARMS ACT (A) NATIONAL (B) STATE FIREARMS CONTROL ASSISTANCE ACT (C) UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS
FRAUDULENT PRACTICES CONCERNING MILITARY AND NAVAL DOCUMENTS, AND SEALS AND SYMBOLS OF AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE, USE, POSSESSION OR SALE OF EMBLEMS AND INSIGNIA
ILLEGAL USE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS
ILLEGAL USE OF RAILROAD PASS
ILLEGAL WEARING OF UNIFORM
IMPERSONATION
INTERSTATE OBSCENE OR HARASSING TELEPHONE CALLS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISON-MADE GOODS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN CATTLE
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE OR AIRCRAFT
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS
IRREGULARITIES IN FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS
KIDNAPING
MAY ACT
POLICE KILLINGS
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - CRIMINAL
SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT
THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT, ROBBERY, AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT
WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT

CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION:

CIVIL RIGHTS
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
ELECTION LAWS
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY

NAME CHECK SECTION:

NAME CHECKS
SPECIAL MEMORANDA

ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD SECTION:

ACCOUNTING CONTROL
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRIES
ADMIRALTY MATTERS
ANTI-RACKETEERING
  HOBBS ACT
  LEA ACT
  INTERFERENCE WITH GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
ANTITRUST
ASCERTAINING FINANCIAL ABILITY
BANK FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT
BONDSMEN AND SURETIES
BRIBERY
CENSUS MATTERS
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
CONTEMPT OF COURT
COPYRIGHT MATTERS
COURT OF CLAIMS
DEPENDENTS ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950
DESTRUCTION OF INTERSTATE PROPERTY
EIGHT-HOUR DAY LAW
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
FALSE CLAIMS – CIVIL
FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
FEDERAL LENDING AND INSURANCE AGENCIES
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STRIKEBREAKERS
JURY PANEL INVESTIGATIONS
KICKBACK RACKET ACT
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 (INVESTIGATIVE MATTER)
LANDS DIVISION MATTERS
MAIL FRAUD
MIGRATORY BIRD ACT
MISCELLANEOUS – CIVIL SUITS
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
OBSTRUCTION OF COURT ORDERS
OBSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
PASSPORT AND VISA MATTERS
PATENT MATTERS
PERJURY
RAILWAY LABOR ACT
RED CROSS ACT
RENEGOTIATION ACT – CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT – 1940
TARIFF ACT OF 1930
UNREPORTED INTERSTATE SHIPMENT OF CIGARETTES
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
WAGE AND HOUR LAW
WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM V. CLEVELAND

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE-- ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION:

ANTI-RACKETEERING (INTELLIGENCE)
EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS -- OBSTRUCTION
INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF LOTTERY TICKETS
INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING INFORMATION
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF RACKETEERING
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF WAGERING PARAPHERNALIA
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
SPORTS BRIBERY
TOP-ECHELON CRIMINAL INFORMANTS

FUGITIVE SECTION:

BOND DEFAULT
CONDITIONAL RELEASE VIOLATORS
CRIMINAL INFORMANT MATTERS
DESERTERS AND DESERTER-HARBORING
ESCAPE AND RESCUE
ESCAPED FEDERAL PRISONERS
FUGITIVES
HARBORING
PAROLE VIOLATORS
PROBATION VIOLATORS
SELECTIVE SERVICE, INCLUDING FUGITIVE AND RE-EMPLOYMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID CUSTODY OR CONFINEMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID GIVING TESTIMONY
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION

EMPLOYEES SECURITY AND SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION:

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
APPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AND APPLICATIONS FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION OF SENTENCE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS)
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
PEACE CORPS
SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
U. S. COURTS APPLICANTS
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/7/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/2/75.

The study prepared for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) entitled, "Human Intelligence," has come to the attention of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The major contributors to this report were the FBI and CIA. It is an extremely sensitive document and for that reason any requests from any committees of the Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the White House. At the present time, the consensus of those persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release of information to the committees of Congress is that this report will not be provided Congressional committees at this time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TAK
#MDE16

The SSC does recognize a requirement to comply with the Third Agency Rule which states in effect that classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department. CIA's General Counsel has produced a paper entitled "The Third Agency Rule," copy attached, which they have requested be reviewed by the Legal Counsels of all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. A copy of CIA's paper referred to above has been made available to Assistant Director Mintz who has indicated he will be in direct contact with Mr. Warner, CIA's General Counsel.

REC-106 62-116395-68

Attached is a copy of sanitization guidelines for documents provided Congressional Select Committees. The Group asked that these guidelines be reviewed and concurrence or

APR 21 1975

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

objections be furnished to the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) for consideration. A copy of these guidelines has been furnished to the Freedom of Information Unit of the Legal Counsel Division for review. Their comments will be furnished to the Bureau's representative, Mr. Frank Schwartz, on the USIB Committee in compliance with the mandate from the Ad Hoc Group.

Also attached is a copy of the abstract which all agencies of the Intelligence Community are being required to use in abstracting information that agency has provided one of the Select Committees. These abstracts will be retained in an interagency registry to be available for review by any members of the Intelligence Community as well as the White House. The purpose of this interagency registry is to have available in one location all information in abstract form that members of the Intelligence Community have provided the SSC.

Attached is a memorandum for Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Group, advising the names and titles of individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that these persons will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated with the House Select Committee.

Also attached is a letter from Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee, addressed to the President enclosing a list of documents which the SSC is requesting from the White House.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a~~n~~ homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

> A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-68

contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community and then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(d) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-8-01 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

#MDe16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-68

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to interrelationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. agency receiving request
2. originating agency

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Sanitization Guidelines for Documents Provided Congressional Select Committees

1. Attached is a copy of a statement, "Guidelines for Sanitizing Certain Documents Provided Select Committees" prepared by the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, for consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. This step is a follow on to the understanding the DCI has with Senator Church that sanitization of selective documents will be undertaken before the documents are released to the Committee. Similar understandings have been discussed with House Staff as well.

2. It is important that, to the extent possible, all intelligence organizations follow generally the same sanitization guidelines. Accordingly, the USIB Ad Hoc Group should consider utilizing these or similar guidelines within their respective organizations.

3. If requested by the Chairman, the DCI will discuss orally with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate and House Select Committees the content of the sensitive USIB or CIA material excised from documents. Where appropriate, the DCI may discuss this sensitive material with the entire Select Committee. He considers it essential that the written record provided to the Committee staff not include such sensitive information for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

Attachment: As Stated

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY 5558 P-2 AUM/[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-68

DRAFT

28 MARCH '75

GUIDELINES FOR SANITIZING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has recently discussed with Senator Church the need for special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee of certain sensitive aspects of intelligence activities and the Senator has expressed his recognition of this need. Included in such matters are the identities of sensitive sources, the material provided to the United States by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain employees whose safety could be jeopardized if revealed, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with US intelligence and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems. Such material should be protected not only from exposure but indeed the risk of exposure. Further, recognition should be given to the need to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals.

#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JG

2. One form of this special consideration may include use of sanitization procedures to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of the community's activities.

3. What May Be Sanitized

While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which may be levied by the Committees for documenting material and not possible to determine specifically what material should be excised from these documents, the following illustrations are offered in certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet the test mentioned above.

4. Collection of Intelligence

(a) The Committee will probably address the matter of how intelligence activities or methods have or may impinge upon individual rights. Documents supporting responses may be sanitized by removal of identities of sensitive agents and informants, covert personnel, and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be substituted, i.e., a foreign journalist, a political official in the opposition party. No sanitization should be used in connection with

names of individuals whose employment or former employment by, or association with a department or agency, does not remain secret or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements remain secret.

(b) Some information may be required with respect to technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived by release of these codenames or nicknames in documents. Details of the technical systems involved, contractual arrangements, funding and/or names of companies or consultants whose participation was obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in the community's sanitization procedure. While documentary samples of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of verbal testimony, no raw product should be provided the Committees

for retention. If absolutely required by the Committees, sanitization of such raw product should be conducted to mask the degree of technical capabilities.

5. Intelligence Estimates

Finished intelligence reports of departments and agencies and estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not normally require sanitization. However, departments and agencies should review such publications to ensure deletion of source identities.

6. Administration

Information concerning the internal administration arrangements of intelligence agencies may be requested. This may include staffing charts with occupants identified. ~~Sanitization of individual,~~ Identities of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning in a cover assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future be considered for a covert assignment.

7. General

The following categories of information or specific examples may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should be given by the department or agency concerned to the necessity of

deletion or sanitization of this type of information, prior to providing the document.

(a) Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.

(b) Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) ~~employed overseas in human source~~ collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.

(c) The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targetted foreign organizations.

(d) The success or failure of recruitment attempts in any given targetted foreign organization.

(e) Names of particular employees whose physical safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.

(f) Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.

(g) Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries.

(h) Identifying collaborative operations between the United States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaborations or within a jointly targetted third country.

(i) Identifying collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved.

(j) Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.

(k) Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country.

(l) Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence operations.

(m) Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that collaborate in a special manner such as providing cover for foreign intelligence operations.

(n) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).

(o) Proprietary information relating to contractors or furnished in confidence.

8. What Should Not Be Sanitized

There are general categories of intelligence activities which have already been placed in the public domain by the mass news media or authors with background experience in intelligence departments or agencies of the community. Names, places, dates and events which have been so revealed should not be excised if contained in requested documents.

~~There is an increasing body of information which has been~~ released under the Freedom of Information Act. No further sanitization of this material should be conducted unless it relates to an individual's rights to privacy.

9. Techniques of Sanitization

Sanitization of intelligence material is usually considered the act of physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing from written communication with or without regard for the residual

content. Use of a substitution device, either pseudonym or ident is an example of sanitization which permits intelligent continuity of the material without revealing the true identity. Sanitization does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material in this context.

The integrity of official records must be maintained. The following sanitization techniques apply only to copies of records.

(a) Physical Sanitization - Names may be cut out and the residual material xeroxed and submitted to Committees. Names may be masked with correction tape and then xeroxed. The xerox copy may be submitted to the Committees.

(b) Names may be deleted and replaced with "IDEN." The deleted material is provided on a separate IDEN list which contains names or descriptive phrases substituted for deletions.

(c) The material can be retyped or reprinted with substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal the sensitive material.

(d) Entire pages can be removed from some documents and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information

as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing department or agency. This technique may be employed when physical sanitization or excision of material results in unintelligible gibberish as residue.

(e) Within a category of inquiry, it may be desirable to extract a complete document from requested material when the request is broad and all inclusive within its field. The existence of such a document should be made known to the Committees but retained by the agency or department for review under escort of a representative of the department or agency.

10. Management of Sanitization

The original record and a copy of the sanitized version provided should be readily available in all cases. Materials developed within an agency or department in response to requests should be reviewed at an appropriate level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. In the case of documents or materials of a community nature, the release should be done in coordination with the departments or agencies and/or the Program Manager concerned and any sanitization should be agreed upon during coordination.

This proposed use of sanitization as a special arrangement to protect selected issues contained in material provided to Select Committees by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies. It is essential to the proposal that departments and agencies attempt to employ the same criteria for sanitization and coordinate as required. This paper can serve only as general guidelines on sanitization.

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT OF MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT:
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)
4. TITLE:
5. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (A brief narrative statement which describes content of the material provided, problems addressed, and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should be of sufficient length clearly to convey the basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)
6. REQUESTOR:
7. DATE OF REQUEST:
8. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
9. LOCATION OF FILE COPY/COPIES
10. DOES MATERIAL RELATE TO AN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEM? IF SO, IDENTIFY:

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

62-116395-68

IC-75-1951
28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Clarke

SUBJECT : SECURITY - House Select Committee - Cleared Personnel

1. The following information has been obtained from the Office of Legislative Counsel and addresses those individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee, who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that they will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated in the near future with the House Select Committee.

Mr. Frank M. Slatinshek
Chief Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

Mr. William H. Hogan, Jr.
Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

Mr. John L. Boos
Chairman Nedzi's Assistant for Intelligence Matters
Room 2343 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

2. The following secretaries are approved for receipt of classified material at the levels indicated:

Berniece Kalinowski (Slatinshek)
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

62-116395-68

Rita D. Argenta (Hogan)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI

Oneta L. Stockstill (Boos)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

3. Safe storage facilities are available in Mr. William Hogan's office which have been approved by CIA. Mr. Slatinshek and Mr. Boos keep classified material meant for Congressman Nedzi in this area.

Don
Donald E. Moore

Dist: RTaylor:mm/28Mar75
O-Adse
1 - IC Reg
1 - SECOM

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, A[illegible]
CHARLES MCC. MAT[illegible]R., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible]A.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 12, 1975

MDE16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on March 5 to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for the direct and forthright manner in which you addressed some of the initial questions that lay before the Select Committee, and your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

We are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible and the Committee is gratified at the full and complete cooperation that we have received from the Executive agencies up to this point. In every respect thus far, the agencies have been fully cooperative with the Committee and the staff and I believe this augers well for a constructive and expeditious conclusion to our inquiry.

At our meeting on March 5th with you, we discussed the general areas in which the Committee would need initial documentation. As we discussed, our first requirements are to determine the legal basis for the activities for the intelligence agencies of the United States Government. In this regard, it will be helpful to the Committee to receive from whomever you may designate, the documents, files, and other papers that might be required to fully determine the legal basis for the activities of United States intelligence agencies. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents on the attached list directly relevant to the inquiry authorized by S. Res. 21, be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church

62-116395-68

ATTACHMENT

1. The report furnished to the President by Director Colby in January 19

2. All Executive Orders, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) or Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and other White House* directives pertaining to the charter, structure or guidelines for any overt or covert foreign or domestic intelligence agencies or activities.

3. All Executive Orders, National Security Council memoranda and directives, and other White House instructions pertaining to the structure, functions or organization of intelligence policy organizations within the Office of the President, including the Forty Committee and the Washington Special Action Group (and their predecessor organizations, e.g., the Operations Coordinating Board, Special Group, 54/12 Group, 303 Committee, etc.).

4. Organization charts and staffing patterns (for the present and, to the extent reasonably convenient, back to 1947) for all intelligence-related organizations within the White House (NSC, Forty Committee, OEP, WSAG, etc.) including names of key officials and staff personnel.

#mDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM

---

* "White House" as used in this listing is meant to include the President, the Office of the President, including the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JSS
#NW46

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. 1
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Sew 160

By memorandum dated 3-20-75, you were advised of a request received from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Intelligence Division requested that an attempt be made to modify portions of the Committee's request.

Regarding Part I titled Legal Authorities, the Intelligence Division pointed out that this particular request was wide-ranging and required a considerable file review as it requested any memorandum discussing the legal authority of the FBI to "(1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials asserted as sources of such authority." With regard to Part III concerning the FBI's administrative organization, they requested the identities by name of personnel in the Intelligence Division, Unit Chief and above. This caused concern in the Intelligence Division that there would be a needless proliferation of a list of Bureau personnel working in this field which list, of course, would be of interest to foreign intelligence sources.

On 4-1-75 Inspector John B. Hotis and SA Paul V. Daly discussed these matters with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee; John T. Elliff, who has been nominated to head the task force for the Committee looking into FBI activities; F. A. O. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee; and staff member Michael Epstein. They agreed to modify the request in Part III to the extent that personnel in the Intelligence Division need not be identified by name below the level of Assistant Director in the organization chart to be furnished them pursuant to their request of 3-19-75. They asked as an alternative the Bureau prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of Unit Chief with names included which they would have access to review in Bureau space.

REC 17 62-116395-61

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Farrington - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

ENCLOSURE

5 APR 15 1975

PVD:dkg (11)

APR 22 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

With regard to Part I relating to legal authorities, they stated they were amenable to the Bureau furnishing them whatever documents they have retrieved up to this time which have been recovered pursuant to their request of 3-19-75 and that no additional detailed review need be conducted until they review the aforementioned documents. At the end of their review they will make any additional specific requests concerning this part of their request. They also asked that in our response we furnish them copies of documents listed on a three-page paper prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee, a copy of which is attached.

Staff Director Miller requested that the Bureau expedite their response to the Senate Select Committee's request as the first meeting of that Committee is scheduled for Wednesday, 4-9-75, and he felt strongly that they must have material that showed progress in their study of the FBI prior to that time. Mr. Miller requested that, if necessary, the request be responded to in a piecemeal basis and that the complete response does not necessarily have to be made at one time.

It is suggested that we make available to this Committee as soon as possible those documents which we have furnished the General Accounting Office (GAO) which also fall within the 3-19-75 request of the Senate Select Committee. In this regard staff members have advised they are in contact with GAO auditors concerning the FBI.

By way of observations it is obvious that the staff members of the Committee are well versed in Bureau policy and procedures. To this point they have been cooperative and we should insure that we give a timely response to their various requests.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Intelligence Division advise whether modification of the Senate Select Committee's request concerning legal authorities for investigations and the modification of the table of organization of the Intelligence Division are acceptable and, if so, expeditiously prepare the necessary response to the Senate Select Committee.

4/8/75

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

(2) That we furnish all information which has previously been furnished GAO and is within the ambit of the Senate Select Committee's request.

Material furnished to GAO reviewed. All information within ambit of SSC has been furnished to SSC 4/8/75 WOB

(3) That as our response to any one of the five particular areas of inquiry as set forth in the 3-19-75 letter is completed, we furnish it to the Senate Select Committee.

Done 4/8/75 WOB

(4) This material should be sent to the Deputy Attorney General by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should specifically identify the request, for review and subsequent transmittal to the Senate Select Committee.

JBA PVD

RLM

WRW

AAG Dempsey informed; reviewing material. Per conversation with John Hotis letters should be directed to Attorney General 4/8/75 WOB

OK

Examples of the types of materials requested under Part I:

1. Studies on Subversion and FBI Jurisdiction which were prepared for Director Gray. See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session) on the Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973), pp. 7 and 14.

2. Paper prepared on jurisdiction which was discussed by Director Gray and others at a Quantico meeting on May 23 and 24, 1972. Id. at p. 151.

3. Memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an executive order concerning the authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence operations. See the Attorney General's reply to this memorandum which is published in the Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Surveillance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), on Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance (1974), pp. 31-32.

4. An Intelligence Division study which was furnished to the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, by Director Kelley. See Hearing before the Subcommittee on FBI Oversight of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session) on S. 2106, Ten-Year Term for FBI Director (1974), pp. 12-13.

5. Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Director Hoover, dated September 14, 1967. See Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, Part I (1974), pp. 3404-3406.

6. The two FBI memoranda which record instructions from President Roosevelt to Director Hoover concerning FBI investigations of subversive activities, and which indicate meetings between President Roosevelt and Director Hoover on August 24 and 25, 1936. Id. at pp. 3392-3393.

7. Memorandum from Director Hoover to Associate Director Tamm, dated September 10, 1936. Id. at p. 3377.

8. Presidential directives dated September 6, 1939; January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953. Id. at pp. 3404 et seq.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TAG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-67

Examples of the types of materials requested under Part II:

1. See Delimitation Agreement in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (First Session), on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights (1971), Part II, pp. 1172-1179.

2. See Agreement of Coordination in the Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes.(1974), Part I, pp. 3369-3383.

For references to items requested in Part IV, see:

1. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), on the Nomination of Richard G. Kleindienst, of Arisona, to be Attorney General (1972), pp. 63-64.

2. Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes.(1974), pp. 3569-3570.

3. Hearings before the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session), on the Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III. of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973), pp. 150-151.

An excised copy of the Report requested under Part V, Item A, is published in the record of the Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), pursuant to H. Res 803 (Impeachment), Book VII, Part 1, pp. 384-431.

The original COINTELPRO Report which is requested in Part V, Item B, is referred to in the Hearings before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session), FBI Counterintelligence Programs (1974), p. 21.

Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, dated May 20, 1954, captioned "Microphone Surveillance." See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), Warrantless Wiretapping (1972), p. 178.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/~~146~~
#MDR16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

Sen. Study - 75

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that all responses for the production of records, etc., received from Congressional committees be forwarded by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General to the requesting committee, and also that in selected instances a property stamp or statement be affixed to certain documents limiting access.

With the proliferation of committees in Congress looking into FBI operations, it is essential that a standard procedure for the forwarding of documents to the requesting committees be established. Inasmuch as requests such as the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities have been forwarded to this Bureau through the Department, it would appear logical that responses to such inquiries and all other inquiries of Congressional committees, whether they be directed to the Department and/or the Bureau, be responded to through the Department. Such a procedure not only will make all our responses consistent but will also give the Department an opportunity to review and approve documents being made available to Congress.

In connection with our preparation of responses to requests of Congressional committees, it is suggested that all responses should be by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should clearly describe the specific request which is being responded to in the letterhead memorandum.

REC-18 62-116395-66

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116395

In those instances where documents are of a nature that we are not desirous of unauthorized personnel, whether they be in Congress or otherwise, having access to, we should affix a property stamp. This property stamp should read as follows:

APR 11 1975

> "This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside of your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the contents may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI."

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

APR 18 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

PVD:kjs (21)

JUN 11 1975 RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all responses to Congressional inquiries concerning FBI operations be forwarded to the Congressional committees by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General. Upon approval, these letterhead memoranda will be hand-delivered to the Deputy Attorney General's office by Legal Counsel Division.

(2) That in instances where access to a particular document should be limited because of the contents of that document, a property stamp in line with the above be affixed thereto.

Div 5 is obtaining appropriate stamp. JCF 4/9

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/116

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached are copies of various documents which are jurisdictional agreements between the FBI and other Federal agencies or guidelines prepared by the Attorney General with reference to investigative responsibilities between the FBI and other Federal agencies insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

1. Delimitations of Investigative Duties of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force, dated February 23, 1949, with supplemental agreements 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Supplemental agreement number 2 is no longer in effect.

2. Agreement between the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency, dated February 7, 1966, classified "Secret."

3. Agreement between the FBI and the United States Secret Service, effective July 30, 1973.

RLM:mam
(6) mam

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

65

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-545

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General

April 8, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to the request entitled, "Jurisdictional Agreements." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of additional requests is continuing and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (2)

REC- 106

62-116395

RLM:mam
(6)mam

RLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

#MDR16

7 APR 17 1975

2 - ENCLOSURE

R.M

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APR 1 8 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

4. Investigative guidelines with reference to Title 11, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation of Explosives, prepared by the Attorney General of the United States, submitted by letter to the FBI on January 11, 1973.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures (4)

1 - The Attorney General

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JT6

62-116395-65

[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

February 23, 1949

VI

Subject: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force.

The Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, and the Presidential Directive of October 30, 1947. In addition, cognizance has been taken of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the specific application of that Act is set forth in Section II hereof. All other provisions of this Agreement are apart from and have no relation to the stated requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. In view of the above, it is now agreed that responsibility for the investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage (hereinafter referred to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated hereinafter. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with the other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest. When the organization with primary operating responsibility is unable for any reason to produce material in that field desired by the subscribing agencies, such special arrangements as may be legal or desirable will be worked out through negotiation at the national level prior to activity by one agency in another agency's field. It is recognized by the subscribers hereto that the Headquarters Department of the Army has decentralized such functions to its major subordinate commanders. When the major subordinate commanders of the Department of the Army cannot effect satisfactory special arrangements, the matter will be referred to the Director of Intelligence of the Army for further negotiations at the national level. Close cooperation and coordination between the four subscribing organizations is a mutually recognized necessity.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 [illegible]

II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigations of cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals of all classes in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the State of Hawaii**, and the State of Alaska* except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5.

2. All investigations of violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. There are no territorial or personnel limitations on this provision.

3. The coordination of the investigative activities of civilian agencies in the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the State of Alaska except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5, which provide information regarding subversive movements and activities in these categories.

4. Keeping the other subscribing organizations advised of important developments in these categories within its cognizance, particularly:

a. Activities of inactive reserves of the armed service, including the National Guard.

b. Developments affecting plants engaged in armed forces contracts.

c. Developments concerning the strength, composition, and intentions of civilian groups within its cognizance which are classed as subversive and whose activities are a potential danger to the security of the United States.

d. Developments affecting those vital facilities and vital utilities which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

e. Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

(For b, d, and e above no protective coverage is contemplated.)

*Editorial revision of this Agreement to reflect the statehood of Alaska was approved by the IIC on January 7, 1959.

**Revision to reflect the statehood of Hawaii was approved by the IIC on September 9, 1959.

III. ID, Army will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Army.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Army Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

6. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Army contracts.

IV. ONI will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired naval personnel of the Navy.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Navy Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and in the State of Alaska except as described in Section 5, below.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations and with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government on Kodiak and Afognak Islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula and Adak Island in the Aleutian Chain.*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Navy contracts.

V. The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Air Force.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Air Force Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The investigation of the same cases described above in that portion of Alaska described in Section 5, below, with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians, except as described hereinabove, (1) in that part of the Alaska Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay

---

*This paragraph added. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

northwest to the town of Old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to the Kvichak Bay; (2) in the islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula excluding Kodiak and Afognak Islands which are the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; (3) in the Aleutian Islands excluding Adak Island which is the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; and (4) in the Pribilof Islands.*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Air Force contracts.

VI. 1. Where Sections III, IV, and V involve general territorial coverage, responsibility for such coverage will pass from one element of the armed forces to another automatically when a change of command responsibility ensues. This provision is subject to modification by direct agreement between the interested elements of the armed forces.

2. While investigative jurisdiction over the civilian populace in former enemy territories occupied by the armed forces has been provided for in Sections III, IV, and V above, those provisions are subject to direct adjustment with the Department of State if and when that Department assumes governmental direction in such areas of occupation.

VII. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this Delimitations Agreement. Subject to the exceptions already provided for above, general amendments or modifications involving all of the four subscribing organizations shall be issued in the form of a revised Delimitations Agreement and not as separate instructions.

VIII. During periods of martial law, or periods of predominant armed forces interest not involving martial law, when agreed upon by the subscribing agencies, the provisions of Appendix A or B, hereto attached, will additionally apply.

IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to two or more of the subscribing agencies to the Delimitations Agreement which affect the basic jurisdiction thereof which are

---

*Original paragraph changed. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

now or hereafter mutually entered into by any of the subscribers thereto will be reduced to writing; will thereafter become supplements to the Delimitations Agreement, and distributed only to the extent agreed upon by the co-signers.

(Signed) S. Leroy Irwin
Director of Intelligence,
Department of the Army

(Signed) Thomas B. Inglis
Chief of Naval Intelligence

(Signed) J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

(Signed) Joseph F. Carroll
Director, Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force

APPROVED

APPENDIX A

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

I. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the armed forces commander will assume responsibilities for coverage in these categories. His authority to direct and control the subscribing agencies of the armed forces will be limited only by such instructions as he may receive from the Secretary of Defense. He will have authority to coordinate the intelligence activities of the subscribing agencies in his area of responsibility, within the limits of their available personnel and facilities, by the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibility, nor to issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

II. Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsibility of the armed forces commander will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. They will render such aid and assistance to the armed forces commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. They will furnish all pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to the armed forces commander by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. Each headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised by its agencies of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the armed forces commander.

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/MJ/16

APPENDIX B

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY INTERESTS, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

I. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theaters of operation. When an armed forces commander of such a potential theater is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the armed forces commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

1. Agents of the FBI; of ONI; ID, Army; and the OSI, IG, U.S. Air Force will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of Sections II, III, IV, and V.

2. In addition thereto, the armed forces commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other subscribing agencies will insure that the armed forces commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other agencies.

3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the other three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.

II. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When the commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that he is authorized to augment the coverage with such elements of the subscribing agencies as are under his jurisdiction. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies, the armed forces commander should obtain the necessary authority from the Secretary of Defense.

III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have placed the initiative in the hands of the armed forces commander, whenever any of the other services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/TS

Supplemental Agreement No. I to the Delimitations Agreement

Cooperation and Coordination Between
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Intelligence Division of the Army
The Office of Naval Intelligence and
The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, with a view to promoting the closest possible cooperation and coordination between the Field Services of these agencies agree that the following recommendations will be transmitted to their field installations:

(a) Special Agents in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Divisional Offices, Military Intelligence Officers of the pertinent Armies, District Officers of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, and Naval District Intelligence Officers will maintain close personal liaison between those offices and their representatives, including a meeting of representatives of the four agencies, preferably the officers in charge, at least twice per month, for the purpose of discussing pending and contemplated investigative activities, and any other subject necessary to insure that there is proper coordination of their investigative work.

(b) The close personal liaison to be maintained between representatives of the four agencies at all times should insure that there is not duplication of effort in any field, and that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is maintained. Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use of informers.

(c) A distinction should be recognized between the investigative interest of individual agencies and the coverage interest. It is believed that all four agencies should study, from time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in order to insure that all channels of interest and avenues of information are adequately covered by at least one of the participating agencies.

(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it should be transmitted to the other agency.

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain classes of information are of general interest to the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services in connection with background and knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations, even though the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.

(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature occur, the directors of the four intelligence agencies feel that with proper personal liaison, such differences can be satisfactorily adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various divisional organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. III to the Delimitations Agreement (As Amended June 8, 1950)

Investigative Jurisdiction on Vessels of Military Sea Transportation Service

1. The investigative jurisdiction of all activities under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage on vessels of the Military Sea Transportation Service is as follows:

a. Investigative jurisdiction on vessels purchased by the Navy will be the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

b. Vessels obtained by the Navy through a "bare boat charter" will be under the investigative jurisdiction of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

c. Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Transportation Service which are manned and supervised by their private owners are under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

2. When civilian personnel who are subjects of an investigation under a or b above reach a U.S. port or a port where the FBI has a field agency, or prior to reaching such port, if practicable, the Department of the Navy will promptly furnish the FBI all pertinent information concerning the investigation. If personnel who are subjects of an investigation as above remove themselves from the vessel upon arrival of the vessel in port and further surveillance is considered necessary, the Navy will continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local level that the FBI will make every effort to transfer responsibility upon arrival of the vessel at the port.

3. When the FBI opens an investigation under c above or when an FBI investigation in progress develops or is believed about to develop ramifications under a, b or c above, the FBI will promptly furnish all pertinent information to the Navy and will thereafter coordinate its actions with the Navy whenever and wherever deemed necessary to insure proper pursuit of the case.

#moe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2ALM/JG

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/ALG

Supplemental Agreement No. IV to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Private Contractors of the Armed Forces

It is agreed by the subscribers of the Delimitations Agreement (hereinafter referred to as subscribers) that with reference investigations of civilian employees, applicants for employment, directors and key personnel of privately owned plants and facilities, working or bidding on contracts important to the Army, Navy or Air Force (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces) procurement, the following will be followed insofar as practicable. Exceptions thereto will be adjusted by mutual agreement between the subscribers concerned.

a. The Armed Forces will conduct background investigations of such persons unless there is a particular reason for requesting that an investigation be conducted by the FBI or the FBI has a special interest in a particular case and has notified the Armed Forces of such interest.

b. The FBI will conduct complaint investigations of such personnel upon specific request in each case by one or more of the Armed Forces. If one of the Armed Forces has no further need for an investigation requested, but not completed, prompt notification will be made to the FBI.

c. Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces under a above will be terminated and all information passed to the FBI when credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature is uncovered. Upon receipt of such a case, the FBI will proceed as under b above if one of the Armed Forces so requests.

d. When one of the subscribers is aware that another is conducting an investigation on a person or firm identical or closely connected with a person or firm it contemplates investigating, no investigation will be undertaken without the consent of the subscriber which has an investigation in progress. The investigating agency will make available to the other interested agency copies of the reports of the investigation made.

e. Normally, identity of confidential informants will not be communicated from one subscriber to another; however, when such communication occurs, the receiving subscriber will employ the highest possible safeguards to insure that such informants are not compromised. No transmittal of information concerning confidential informants to a third subscriber or to another agency is authorized except by specific consent of the originator.

f. A subscriber who receives a report of investigation from another subscriber may freely transmit copies of such reports to a third subscriber except as provided in e above.

g. A report of complete investigation received by the Armed Forces from the FBI will not be reopened without the approval of the FBI except to obtain additional background information. In such case, the FBI will be furnished copies of all information obtained. Other information required by the Armed Forces will be requested of the FBI.

h. If one of the Armed Forces requests the FBI to conduct an investigation or to conduct additional investigation as provided under g above, and if for any reason the FBI declines or is unable to conduct such investigation or additional investigation, the Armed Force concerned may proceed with the investigation. The FBI will be furnished copies of the results thereof if the FBI so requests or if the Armed Force concerned considers the results to be of FBI interest.

i. Nothing above is to be construed as altering the basic Delimitations Agreement of 1949 or current agreements concerning subversive organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. V to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Reserve and Civilian Components of the Armed Services

It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force may conduct background investigations on members of the inactive reserve and National Guard who are anticipated being called back to active duty, or where an investigation is undertaken for the purpose of determining whether the individual should be disenrolled from his military status, or to determine whether the individual may be granted access to classified military information. The following procedures shall be pursued in each of the above circumstances:

(1) The Intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or Air Force before undertaking such background investigation will consult the FBI to determine: (a) if the FBI has an investigation in progress; if so, no investigation will be undertaken by the intelligence agencies except as may be mutually agreeable to the Armed Force concerned and the FBI; (b) if the FBI already has made an investigation; if so, the results will be made available to the other agencies; (c) if the FBI has information on the individual, even though it may not have conducted an investigation.

(2) If, after consulting the FBI, investigation is undertaken by the other agencies, it will be pursued no further than is necessary to make the determination required by the other agencies, and all information developed pertinent to the four categories will be furnished promptly to the FBI.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

#MD616
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JHS

Supplemental Agreement No. VI
to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation in Areas Not Specifically Assigned

It is agreed by the military subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the references therein in paragraphs III. 4., IV. 4., and V. 4. to "areas where the Army (Navy, Air Force) Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein" shall be interpreted as referring to areas where the Department of the Army (Navy, Air Force) is responsible for the administrative and logistic support of the Headquarters of Commands established by the Secretary of Defense.

(Approved by I.I.C. November 4, 1959)

#m Del6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ME

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 7, 1966

model 6 1-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (S)

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an (S)

SECRET

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (S)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. (S)

INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES
TITLE XI, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970
REGULATION OF EXPLOSIVES

1. General

Title XI of the captioned law amends Title 18, United States Code, by adding a new chapter 40 with section numbers 841 through 848 governing the importation, manufacture, distribution and storage of explosive materials and creating certain Federal offenses pertaining to the unlawful use of explosives. Administration of explosives regulation is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury as is investigative jurisdiction over the unlawful acts proscribed in section 842. Under authority contained in section 846 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) have concurrent investigative jurisdiction as to the remainder of chapter 40, i.e., the unlawful acts proscribed in subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of section 844. Although not specified in chapter 40, the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction to investigate all incidents involving explosive or incendiary devices sent through the mails or directed against U.S. Postal Service property.

Title XI greatly broadens Federal authority pertaining to explosives-connected offenses. At the same time, Congress has expressly disclaimed any intent to occupy the field to the exclusion of state law on the same subject matter. To effect both Congressional purposes and to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort it is essential that the limited Federal investigative resources be carefully allocated, particularly in cases in which both the ATF and the FBI have jurisdiction.

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Effect on prior jurisdiction - This agreement applies only to those incidents as to which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction prior to the enactment of the captioned law and to incidents previously subject to FBI investigation by reason of chapter 65, Title 18, United States Code (malicious mischief). Investigative procedures in other types of incidents (e.g., train wrecking, damaging aircraft and motor vehicles, racketeering) shall remain unchanged.

#MDM6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/MJE

(b) Primary jurisdiction - Subject to the provisions hereof, the FBI will exercise primary jurisdiction over all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities or at activities, such as transportation and tourist offices, operating under the aegis of a foreign government although not in a diplomatic status, over all alleged violations of subsections 844(d) through (i) which are perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals and all other violations of subsections 844(e) through (g) which are not directed at Treasury Department or Postal Service buildings or functions.

(c) Type of Investigation to be Conducted

(1) Offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which appear at the outset to have been perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals as defined in advance by the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice. If ATF or the Postal Inspection Service has properly initiated investigations and information is subsequently developed indicating apparent involvement of terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals, responsibility shall be relinquished to the FBI unless a determination is made by the Department of Justice that a transfer of responsibilities will unduly impair further investigative efforts.

(2) Alleged offenses against Colleges and Universities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of any alleged violation of section 844 which involves the use or attempted use of explosive (as distinguished from incendiary) materials against the facilities of a college or university. Investigation of alleged violations involving use or attempted use of incendiary materials will be limited initially to the development of background information as prescribed in paragraph 6 below.

(3) Alleged offenses directed against foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities as described in paragraph 2(b) above.

(4) All other alleged violations of subsection 844(f) -- offenses involving use of explosives against United States property or federally financed organizations, and (g) - offenses involving possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used, etc., by the United States - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all violations of subsection 844(g) over which it has primary jurisdiction hereunder, and those violations of 844(f) which are directed at federal property (e.g., a military facility) or a federal function (e.g., a Selective Service or ROTC facility). In other violations of 844(f) the FBI will develop and disseminate background information as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

3. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Violations ancillary to firearms laws violations or violation of section 842 - The Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) of the Department of the Treasury will exercise investigative jurisdiction over violations of section 844 which are ancillary to its primary jurisdiction over the Federal firearms laws or over section 842 of Title XI.

(b) Violations of subsection 844(d) - interstate transportation of explosives with unlawful intent and subsection 844(i) - offenses against property used in or affecting commerce - Subject to paragraph 2b, above, the ATF will exercise primary investigative jurisdiction over violations of subsection 844(d) and (i) and will conduct a full investigation thereof unless notified by the Criminal Division that pursuant to paragraph 2(c)(1), above, the Department of Justice has requested FBI investigation in a particular matter.

(c) Violations directed at Treasury Department property or functions - The ATF shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at Treasury Department property or functions and will conduct a full investigation of such violations.

4. Postal Inspection Service Jurisdiction

The Postal Inspection Service shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at U.S. Postal Service property or functions.

5. Special Considerations

(a) Bomb Threats, false information (section 844(e)) - The ATF and the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction over violations of section 844(e) against Treasury Department or Postal Service property or functions, respectively. The FBI shall have jurisdiction over all other violations of section 844(e). Upon receipt of information alleging or suggesting a violation of subsection 844(e), the investigative agency concerned will review available information to determine whether the identity of the offender is known or can be readily ascertained and, if not, whether the evidence suggests a pattern or plan of such offenses by a particular offender or against a particular victim. If such a pattern appears or if the offender is identified, all available information will be disseminated as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

(b) Use/carrying explosive in commission of a felony (section 844(h)) - Violations of 844(h) should be handled as an adjunct of the felony from which they arise and should be discussed with the appropriate United States Attorney or Division of the Department handling prosecution of the underlying felony offense. The agency having jurisdiction over the underlying felony will have investigative jurisdiction over the 844(h) violation (e.g., bank robbery is under FBI jurisdiction).

(c) Violations of 26 U.S.C. 5861 (destructive devices) - In incidents involving alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 844 (which may also involve a violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861), ATF shall not exercise its primary jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 5861 involving destructive devices, but the incident shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of these guidelines. This is in no way a relinquishment by ATF of its investigative jurisdiction under Title II of the Gun Control Act of 1968.

6. Development of Background Information

Some incidents such as those directed against Federal property or functions (paragraph 2(b) above) require immediate full federal investigation. Others require a more circumspect approach and will result in full Federal investigation only after consideration of factors pertinent to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, in those incidents which these guidelines do not prescribe immediate full investigation, the investigative agency having jurisdiction will develop background information which includes (a) facts bearing on motivation such as involvement of the suspected perpetrators in terrorist/revolutionary activities, organized crime, labor-management disputes, or racial-religious hate activities; (b) the applicability of state and local laws and likelihood of state or local investigative and prosecutive actions; and (c) any other available facts indicating whether or not the offense warrants Federal investigation and prosecution. Such background information will be submitted telephonically (202-739-2745) or by teletype (710-822-0008) to the General Crimes Section of the Criminal Division and to the appropriate United States Attorney. The Criminal Division will advise the investigative agency concerned whether the matter warrants submission to any other Division or Section of the Criminal Division, and when so warranted the Criminal Division will transmit the information to such other Division or Section.

7. Full Investigation

A full investigation will be initiated immediately in those instances wherein such investigation is specified herein. In other instances full investigation will be initiated only upon direction of the Department of Justice after consideration by the Division having cognizance over the matter of the background information developed under paragraph 6 above.

8. Reports

Copies of case reports prepared in matters investigated under these guidelines will be furnished directly to the Department of Justice and the appropriate United States Attorney. All investigative agencies

shall submit initial reports as soon as practicable to the Department of Justice and shall submit progress reports once each 30 days or as soon thereafter as possible. The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice will be informed as soon as possible in each instance wherein an investigative agency initiates an investigation under section 844. Such notification is of critical importance to the avoidance of duplication of investigative activities. Also each agency subscribing to these guidelines shall, upon instituting investigation regarding possible violations of section 844, immediately notify other subscribing agencies having a logical interest therein. Also, a sufficient level of follow-up liaison and dissemination shall be maintained to avoid duplication of investigative effort.

Additionally, each such agency will exchange information on a timely basis and in a manner which will not interfere with ongoing investigations relative to types, sources, movement, and storage of explosives which are the subject of its investigations. Information regarding significant developments in investigations being conducted under these guidelines and information of an intelligence nature developed incidental to investigations which is of logical interest to the Department of Justice shall be furnished promptly to the Criminal Division of that Department which will be responsible for any necessary further dissemination within that Department.

9. Review of Guidelines

These guidelines shall be reviewed on a continuing basis by the parties hereto to determine whether problems exist in their administration which should be alleviated or whether modification of any of the terms of the agreement are needed in the interests of better law enforcement.

10. Summary

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
842	Regulatory provision violations	ATF
844(d)	Interstate transportation (except by mail) of explosives with unlawful intent	ATF

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
844(e)	Bomb threats - false information - Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
844(f)	Offenses against property of the United States or federally financed organizations --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other (including colleges and universities)	FBI
844(g)	Possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used by the United States --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
844(h)	Use/carrying explosives in commission of a felony	Agency having jurisdiction over underlying felony

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
844(i)	Offenses against property used in or affecting commerce	ATF
All Sections	All offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals	FBI - Unless another agency has started investigation before receipt of information indicating terrorist/ revolutionary involvement. In this event see paragraph 2c(1) above.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

["I. Purpose of Agreement

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) originates, and receives from other sources, large numbers of reports on individuals and organizations. One purpose of this agreement is to define that portion of the information on file with, or received or originated by, the FBI, which the United States Secret Service (USSS) desires to receive in connection with its protective responsibilities.

"The USSS has statutory authority to protect, or to engage in certain activities to protect, the President and certain other persons. (Certain other persons, as used in this agreement, refers to those persons protected by the Secret Service under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056.) The authority of the USSS to protect the President or certain other persons is construed to authorize it to investigate organizations or individuals and to interview individuals who might constitute a threat to the President or certain other persons. The FBI has statutory authority to investigate assault, killing or kidnaping and attempts or conspiracies to kill or kidnap the President and other designated individuals.

"The FBI will make available to the USSS information it may request or information which by its nature reveals a definite or possible threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

"A second purpose of this agreement is to insure the most effective protection for the President and certain other persons by establishing a clear division of responsibility between the FBI and the USSS. Such division will also avoid compromising investigations or sources and needless duplication of effort.

"II. General Responsibilities

"The USSS is charged by Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056, with the responsibility of protecting the person of the President of the United States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer in the order of succession to the office of President, and the Vice President-elect; protecting the person of a former President and his wife during his lifetime and the person of a widow of a former President until her death or remarriage, and minor children of a former President until they reach 16 years of age, unless such protection is declined; protecting persons who are determined from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Advisory Committee, as being major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who should receive such protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection); protecting the person of a visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad (unless such persons decline protection).

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

"The Executive Protective Service, under the control of the Director, USSS, is charged by Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202, with protection of the Executive Mansion and grounds in the District of Columbia; any building in which Presidential offices are located; foreign diplomatic missions located in the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia; and foreign diplomatic missions located in such other areas in the United States, its territories and possessions, as the President, on a case-by-case basis, may direct.

"The FBI is charged under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, with investigative jurisdiction over the assault, killing or kidnaping, and attempts or conspiracies to assault, kill or kidnap the President of the United States and other designated individuals.

"The FBI has responsibility for Federal investigations of all violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117 and 1201, relating to the 'Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests in the United States.'

"The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of a wide range of the criminal statutes of the United States including primary jurisdiction over matters affecting the internal security of the United States.

"III. Exchange of Information and Coordination of Responsibilities

"The USSS undertakes to identify individuals or groups who because of their propensities or characteristics, may be dangerous to the President of the United States and certain other persons. To assist the USSS in identifying such individuals and groups the FBI agrees to furnish to the USSS, information (other than public source information or information originating with other U. S. agencies) from its files or which may come to its attention which by its nature reveals a danger or possible danger to the President or certain other persons, or which can be construed as falling within the categories of information desired by the USSS as set forth in Section IV of this agreement.

"The FBI will inform the USSS of the identity of individuals or organizations who come to the attention of the FBI as knowingly and willfully advocating, abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States, or the Government of any state, territory, or possession, or political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government. The FBI will furnish the USSS with reports on such individuals or organizations as requested. During investigation by the FBI of such individuals or organizations, the FBI will be alert and promptly notify the USSS of any information indicating a possible plot against the person of the President and certain other persons.

"The USSS agrees that it will conduct no investigation of individuals or groups identified or suspected of being threats to the internal security of the United States without notifying the FBI. However, when time for

consultation is not available, and an indication of immediate danger exists, the USSS may take such action as is necessary with respect to carrying out its protective responsibilities. Any information obtained by the USSS during such action will be furnished to the FBI as expeditiously as possible.

"The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction.

"It will be the responsibility of the FBI to advise the USSS when investigation is being initiated under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751 and thereafter to furnish the USSS with copies of the FBI investigative reports as they are prepared. It will be the responsibility of the USSS to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention which reasonably indicates that a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, has been or is being committed.

"The USSS also agrees to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention indicating a violation of any other statutes over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction.

"The FBI, under its responsibility for investigation of violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117, 1201 and 1751 will take cognizance of the protective responsibilities of the Treasury Department under Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202 and Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 and thus does not limit or interfere with the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury in the discharge of his statutory protective responsibilities. This is not to be construed as vesting concurrent investigative jurisdiction with the Treasury Department with respect to investigations of individuals or organizations engaged in activities affecting the national security including terrorism, treason, sabotage, espionage, counter-espionage, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, seditious conspiracy, neutrality matters, Foreign Agents Registration Act, or any other Statute or Executive Order relating to national security. Any investigations of such groups or individuals for any reasons other than in connection with protective responsibilities must be closely coordinated with and have the concurrence of the FBI in order to minimize interference with national security responsibilities of the FBI.

"IV. Information to be Furnished to the United States Secret Service by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

"A. When an individual or group is referred by the FBI to the USSS, the following information will be furnished to the extent available:

"Individual - Identification data including name or names, addresses, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment, and marital status.

"Organization - Name or names, address or addresses, officers, size, purpose or goals of organization, source of financial support, background data and such other relevant information as may be available.

"Reason for Referral - Statement of the class or classes of information described in Section IV B under which the individual or organization belongs.

"Information in FBI Files - A summary, as appropriate, of pertinent portions of any FBI file on an individual or organization referred.

"FBI Identification Records - The USSS will make specific requests in each instance where a check of the FBI identification records is desired.

"B. Types of information to be referred:

"1. Information concerning attempts, threats, or conspiracies to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by the USSS or other U. S. or foreign officials in the U. S. or abroad.

"2. Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means, or attempts personally to contact such officials for that purpose.

"3. Information concerning threatening, irrational, or abusive written or oral statements about U. S. Government or foreign officials.

"4. Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U. S. demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic establishments.

"5. Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-making; concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or other implements of war; or other terrorist activity.

"6. Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a desire to defect from the United States and who demonstrate one or more of the following characteristics:

a. Irrational or suicidal behavior or other emotional instability.

b. Strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment.

c. A propensity toward violence.

"7. Information concerning persons who may be considered potentially dangerous to individuals protected by the USSS because of their background or activities, including evidence of emotional instability or participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the United States.

"V. Provision of Federal Bureau of Investigation Personnel to Protect the President and Other Protected Persons

"The USSS may, in accordance with Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 request FBI Agents be detailed to the USSS in order to augment the capacity of the USSS to perform its protective duties. Such requests should be addressed to the Director of the FBI.

"FBI Agents detailed to the USSS are under the direction and exclusive operational control of the Director of the USSS for the period of their assignment. The FBI Agents so detailed may perform an armed or other protective function.

"VI. Implementation of Agreement

"In order to effect the best possible security of the President and certain other persons and places whose protection is the responsibility of the USSS, the FBI and the USSS will construe the terms of this agreement liberally and will take such steps as are necessary to insure the proper exchange and coordination of information.

"The agreement shall be reviewed annually by representatives of the FBI and the USSS, or at such other times as the FBI or the USSS may request, to insure that the agreement is both practical and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Director of the FBI and the Director of the USSS.

"This agreement supersedes all prior agreements between the FBI and the USSS.

July 16, 1973
Date

BY /s/ Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

July 30, 1973
Date

BY /s/ James J. Rowley
Director
United States Secret Service"

#NDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/MG

April 9, 1975

REC- 106

62-116395-64

BY LIAISON

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Flemister
1-Mr. Rachner

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Davis:

In connection with a request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, it is requested that the following documents, which were originated or received by representatives of the National Security Council, be cleared for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee:

Memorandum dated November 6, 1950, from J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and Mr. Raymond P. Whearty, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

DELIVERED BY LIAISON
ON 4/15/75 LES

Letter dated November 8, 1950, from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council, which encloses a report captioned "Report by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to the National Security Council Regarding the Recent Outbreak of Violence by Puerto Rican Nationalists"

Letter dated July 25, 1961, from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference,

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

BCR:hc
(7)

BCR

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

538/pm

84 APR 18 1975

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council

to Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which encloses a memorandum concerning United States internal security programs under the control of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee

Inasmuch as the Senate Select Committee requested the above documents by close of business April 7, 1975, your prompt attention to this matter would be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

NOTE:

In view of the urgency of the Senate Select Committee request, the above documents were hand carried to the NSC Staff on 4/4/75, by Liaison Agent B. C. Rachner. This letter constitutes a formal request which as in the past has been requested by the National Security Council Staff.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JMG

April 7, 1975

Sen Study - 75

Mr. Wannall

The statement in the attached of the Third Agency rule is accurate and does not present legal problems.

As an observation paragraph number 7 of the document titled "Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committee" dated March 28, 1975, (attached) appears to be subject to various interpretations. This paragraph and in particular the second sentence of the paragraph appears to allow the agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is indirectly involved and the material is sensitive without first contacting the Third Agency. Any notification of the Third Agency in this instance of the furnishing of such information to the Committee would be after the fact. The term indirectly is not defined. Additionally, this paragraph allows the Agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is directly involved and the material is nonsensitive without checking with the Third Agency involved. It would appear the language in paragraph number 7 should be tightened up and the appropriate terms defined.

REC-106 62-116395-64

Legal Counsel Division

6 APR 15 1975

3 ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

4/9/75
Above was brought to the attn of John Warner, General Counsel, CIA, who advised that he agreed with Bu's observation and would address this problem in new paper being prepared.
VFS

62-116395
5-VFS

PVD:dkg (4)

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAIN
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

ENCLOSURE

62-116395 - 64

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to inter-relationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency [illegible] [illegible]
2. [illegible] [illegible]

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U. S. C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

#mDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-64

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to inter-relationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency security request
2. Originating agency

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a~~n~~ homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

> A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/01 BY SP2ALM/ATS
#MDR16

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-64

contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community and then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(2) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Assoc. Dir. ____
- Dep. AD Adm. ____
- Dep. AD Inv. ____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. ____
- Comp. Syst. ____
- Ext. Affairs ____
- Files & Com. ____
- Gen. Inv. ____
- Ident. ____
- Inspection ____
- Intell. ____
- Laboratory ____
- Plan. & Eval. ____
- Spec. Inv. ____
- Training ____
- Legal Coun. ____
- Telephone Rm. ____
- Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : G. R. Steel GRS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/

#MDR-16

By agreement, the FBI is currently conducting full field investigations regarding SSC staff personnel. These have extremely short (2 week) deadlines which are identical to those afforded Presidential appointments and are, therefore, given preferential treatment in opening, assigning, and following field progress. The Special Inquiry Unit of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry Section, which has about twice its normal case load, is handling these requests. Senator Church, Chairman, SSC, originally estimated that between 35 and 40 staff members would be submitted for investigation. As of today, 4-3-75, we have received requests for 65 such investigations from the SSC and the end does not appear to be in sight. They are received in bunches as many as 6 at a time, which is not the even flow expected and presents an additional burden.

In addition it is expected that similar requests will be forthcoming in the near future from the HSC since we have a similar agreement with it. Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the HSC, has estimated "probably no more than about 25 staff members will be hired." It remains to be seen if this estimate also falls short of actual receipts.

Since there is no charge for these full field investigations they will have to be considered in the budget. It is noted the current charge for a full field investigation, where applicable, is $2028.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116464

EX 104

MCT

REC 44 62-116395-63

ACTION: For information. Since it appears the nucleus of the Committee has been formed, it is suggested Senator Church be contacted and queried regarding a more realistic (30 day) deadline on the remaining investigations concerning future staff members and their replacements.

APR 14 1975

[redacted]

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Walsh

1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Steel

GRS:dc
-6-

Discussed with Wm Miller 4-4-75. He agreed to 30-Day [illegible] on future [illegible] except a few which he will indicate still need in 2 weeks.

GRS

COUNSEL

APR 17 1975

XEROX

JUN 11 1975

84 APR 18 1975

4-528

62-116395- 62X
62X1 **CHANGED TO** 62-116464- 2
3

JUN 12 1975

Hmk/cz

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18-01 BY SP2 ALM/

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO :Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/3/75

FROM :W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum recommends that the attached draft of a paper prepared by CIA entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment and that a member of the Division be named to represent the FBI in future meetings with legal representatives from other U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies and departments. The purpose of such a group is to develop recommendations for changes in existing laws or the proposal of new legislation which Mr. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence can offer to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

At a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community 2/27/75, a draft paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," was distributed to all members. This paper was drafted by Mr. Marvin Smith of CIA. It is considered a starting point for the Intelligence Community to identify areas in existing statutes that should be changed, as well as to recommend new legislation deemed necessary to clarify for the Congress and the American people the authorities, the limitations and missions of various member agencies or departments of the Intelligence Community.

In furnishing copies of this paper to members, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Mr. John Clarke, acknowledged the paper presents a starting point and in no way should be considered a final draft. He suggested that Legal Counsel representatives of each agency or department of USIB review the document and submit their comments directly to Mr. Marvin Smith, on Agency code 143, extension 4055. Following the receipt of such comments from the legal offices of member agencies and departments, it was proposed that a meeting would be called in an effort to begin drafting a paper representative of the Intelligence Community which would reflect recommended changes in existing statutes or proposals for new legislation.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2ALM/dtc
#MDR16

REC-10 62-116395-62

APR 14 1975

Enclosure
62-116395

ENCLOSURE

SEE ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, PAGE 3

WOC:dln/ebc
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

R 21 1975

The Department of Justice is represented on the Ad Hoc Group by Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, and there will be Departmental participation in this matter.

ACTION:

(1) That the attached CIA paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment in concert with representatives of the Intelligence Division.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division designate a representative to participate in the drafting of a paper to be furnished by Mr. Colby to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

TWL

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Wannall dtd 3/3/75
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, 3/5/75, JH:msl

In view of the direct impact on operations of the Intelligence Division, we feel that representatives of that Division should participate in and coordinate these matters. Legal Counsel will review attached CIA paper and will furnish representative to assist the Intelligence Division regarding proposals and legislative language.

D R A F T

AMBIGUITIES AND THE LAW

CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI and, to some extent, several other Federal Agencies, collect information and produce intelligence, but of different kinds and for different purposes. This is recognized in practice but is not as clearly established in the law. Given some lack of clarity in the law and some uncertainty regarding limits placed on intelligence activities, misunderstanding and fear of abuse of power easily thrive~~s~~. In reality, however, in the implementation of mission and charters and in direction and control, there are not as many unresolved ambiguities as the uninformed may suppose.

The experience following the National Security Act of 1947 is such that it is now possible to eliminate some of the vagueness of the language of the Act. The certainty and public confidence that should result from clarifications in the law should far outweigh any disadvantages. A number of possible amendments or additions to current laws have already been mentioned, and proposed legislation has already been submitted for some. These ideas and others are suggested, below.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG
#MORI6

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-162

1) Clarify CIA's mission and charter by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect:

--that included in the proper functions of the Agency are (a) collection of foreign intelligence information; (b) conduct of activities to carry out CIA's counterintelligence responsibilities overseas; and (c) conduct of covert action operations overseas when authorized by the President;

--that CIA's responsibility to produce intelligence relates only to foreign intelligence;

--that it is a duty of the Agency to develop advanced technical equipment to improve the collection and processing of foreign intelligence information; and

--that the conduct of any counterintelligence operation or other activity overseas directed specifically at U.S. citizens (other than CIA employees) will be undertaken in coordination with the FBI or as requested by the FBI or by other USG agencies in coordination with the FBI.

2) Establish the authority for those agencies engaged in the collection and production of foreign intelligence to carry on certain specified activities within the United States, such as:

--protection of classified information and their own installations against penetration and compromise;

--investigation of employees, applicants, and those persons who could assist the U.S. foreign intelligence effort;

--investigation of employees and other individuals to be granted access to sensitive information;

--collection of foreign intelligence information from foreign nationals and from cooperating U.S. citizens;

--establishment of mechanisms in support of foreign intelligence activities; and

--cooperation with the FBI in investigations relating to the unauthorized disclosure of foreign intelligence.

3) Remove uncertainty regarding responsibility for internal security matters by modifying appropriate laws to establish clearly:

--that the collection of counterintelligence information in the United States and the collection of information related to internal security are functions of the FBI;

--that the responsibility for the production of intelligence related to internal security rests with the FBI; and

--that with due regard to assessed reliability of the information and responsibilities for protecting sources and methods, those agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities will make available to the FBI and other Federal agencies, as appropriate, the security and counterintelligence information relating to foreign nationals in the United States and to U.S. citizens which is derived as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities.

4) Recognize international terrorism and international illegal drug activities as threats to U.S. national security and proper targets for U.S. foreign intelligence efforts, as well as for internal security operations.

5) Provide protection against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods by:

--providing for the protection of intelligence sources and methods on a statutory basis independent of Executive Order 11652;

--clarifying that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods related to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence;

--assigning to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the duty of protecting intelligence sources and methods related to internal security and to counterintelligence within the United States;

--imposing specific burdens, upon officers and employees of all branches of the government and others granted official access, not to disclose such information without authorization,

and providing criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures;

--establishing effective injunctive recourse, through the Attorney General, for protection of all intelligence sources and methods;

--providing for in camera judicial review of material revealing intelligence sources and methods when relevant and necessary to criminal and civil proceedings;

--delineating authorities and responsibilities for investigating suspected or discovered unauthorized disclosures by (a) U.S. citizens overseas and (b) all persons within the United States.

6) Delineate areas of interagency assistance that facilitate performance of authorized missions, promote economy of resources, and as a matter of policy are desirable, for example:

--cooperation in research and development of technical collection and information processing equipment, methods and techniques;

--loan or supply of equipment, methods and techniques;

--provision of training in special skills and techniques;

--passage of information derived as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities to those agencies responsible for the matters involved.

A few changes in the procedures for reviewing intelligence activities might add considerable understanding and confidence. Of paramount importance is a form of congressional oversight that permits the provision to Congress of the necessary information in a timely, efficient and controlled manner. It is recognized that a number of Committees in both the Senate and House must be informed of substantive intelligence, operational matters and fiscal details in varying degrees. Just as in the executive branch, the test of access should be

"need-to-know." To apply this test and to control and protect sensitive information provided to Congress, a focal point within Congress would be extremely helpful. Whether a joint committee or not, such a focal point would also be valuable in facilitating changes in laws affecting intelligence activities. Congress might find that a more uniform approach to budget presentation and review would provide better insight and understanding.

The foregoing suggestions are by no means definitive. They do, however, present areas that in the experience of the intelligence community deserve careful attention.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Legal Counsel Division

DATE: 4/7/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall wrw

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MATERIAL; AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE EXHIBITS IN "INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER ON JURISDICTION" DATED 2/13/75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that on 4/7/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Executive Office Building, Washington, personally reviewed and approved each of the following exhibits from the captioned paper for release to the Select Committee:

1) Exhibit A - Historical Highlights.

2) Exhibit B - Confidential Memoranda: John Edgar Hoover, 8/24/36; 8/25/36; and, 9/10/36.

3) Exhibit C - Presidential Directives: 6/26/39; 9/6/39; 1/8/43; 7/24/50; 12/15/53; and, 10/30/47.

4) Exhibit D - The Delimitations Agreement of 2/23/49, as amended.

5) Exhibit E - National Security Council Charters of the IIC and the ICIS.

6) Exhibit F - National Security Action Memorandum 161, 6/9/62.

7) Exhibit G - Department of Justice Memorandum dated 3/5/64, setting forth new Charter for the IIC under supervision of the Attorney General.

8) Exhibit H - Preamble and Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947.

9) Exhibit L - Excerpt from former FBI Director Hoover's briefing of the National Security Council on 11/6/58.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/MF
#mol16

REC-23 62-116395-601

EX-110

5 APR 10 1975

ALL:vb
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Legal Counsel Division
Re: U. S. Senate Select Committee Material; Authorization to Release Exhibits in "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75

10) Exhibit N - Background information concerning the emergency detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950.

11) Exhibit O - Memorandum by former FBI Director Hoover, dated 5/11/61, concerning Cuban individuals and groups.

12) Exhibit Q - Memorandum of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark dated 9/14/67, concerning urban riot activities.

13) Exhibit R - Departmental Memorandum dated 2/18/69, concerning instructions on campus disorders.

14) Exhibit S - Excerpts from testimony of former Director Hoover.

15) Section of paper on "Statutes."

It was explained to Mr. Wilderotter that the extracted exhibits were letters and reports to and from The White House and/or National Security Council with which there are "Third Agency Rule" problems. As soon as cleared, it was planned to forward these to the Committee. He requested to review these exhibits prior to forwarding.

ACTION:

Upon "Third Agency Rule" approval regarding other exhibits, have same reviewed by Mr. Wilderotter. INTD will insure exhibits are made available for Mr. Wilderotter's review.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott
(Attention: Mr. J.W. Awe
Room 5644, JEH)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ✓
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

JJMcD

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/dle

#MDR16

Project Senstudy 75, established within the Intelligence Division, for the purpose of developing a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress. Bureau file 62-116395 has been opened for this Project.

WOG

Because of the unusual factors relating to this entire Project, such as the sensitive nature of much of the material involved, urgency for handling, necessity for having the file very readily available to the working staff at all times, and similar other reasons, it is essential that the file be maintained in the work area of the Project which, effective 4/14/75, will be in room 4063, JEH. The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to have Files and Communications Division take necessary steps to arrange for the maintenance of the file in the designated room rather than in the usual manner.

There has already been much publicity about the Select Committees and we anticipate much more. This involves many newspaper stories. It is, therefore, believed very desirable that a Sub A file to the main file be opened as the standardized repository for newspaper articles. As a first step, it will be necessary that a few articles already in the main file be extracted and placed in the new Sub A file in the usual chronological order.

Per agreement between Awe (Div. 4) & Phillips (Div 5) we will NOT open a Sub A for newsclips but keep them in T-folder w/ Project. 4/14/75

EX-104 REC-8 62-116395-60

66-17404-

The foregoing matters have been already discussed with Mr. J. W. Awe, Unit Chief, of the Files and Communications Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

6 APR 15 1975

COPY FILED IN

This memorandum to be referred to the Files and Communications Division for appropriate action as above.

WRWanall Phillips

FIVE

62-116395

SFP:jvl WOC
(6)

~~APR 23 1975~~

Handled By Special File Room 4-25-75

84 APR 25 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES VERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

DATE: 4/9/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. C. Flemister
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#n0216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2-ALM/JTG

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

This memorandum provides for the record the temporary reassignment of Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division.

Project Senstudy 75 has been established within the Intelligence Division, effective 4/4/75. Its purpose is to develop a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible.

Pursuant to the establishment of Project Senstudy 75, certain Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division have been relieved of substantive assignments. They are as follows:

Section Chief William O. Cregar, effective 4/4/75, has assumed the responsibilities of administering the Project.

Unit Chief Elmer W. Larson, effective the same date, will function as Cregar's Number One Man.

62-116395-59

REC-71

Liaison Supervisor Leon F. Schwartz has been relieved of his regular liaison duties and will function as the Liaison Officer in contact with the intelligence community for Project Senstudy 75.

APR 10 1975

Unit Chief Seymor F. Phillips, effective 4/8/75, was assigned to the Project and will function as the Review Coordinator.

1 - Personnel file of W. O. Cregar
1 - Personnel file of E. W. Larson
1 - Personnel file of L. F. Schwartz
1 - Personnel file of S. F. Phillips

WOC:lmh lmh
(12)

CONTINUED - OVER

54 APR 16 1975

At this time the length of the temporary assignment is indefinite. Upon the termination of Project Senstudy 75, the Bureau Supervisors mentioned above will revert back to their substantive assignments and an appropriate memorandum for the record will be prepared.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-12-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

In attached W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum of 3-6-75, captioned as above, it is recommended that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we can anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

In this regard, it is suggested that all Divisions receiving requests for information in connection with testimony before this Committee respond in the same commendable and expeditious manner that they responded in connection with the preparation of the Director's Brief on his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights. The format of this information should generally be as follows:

1 - Heading in all caps, centered, brief description of contents;

2 - White, watermarked bond paper, 8 x 10 1/2";

3 - At least a 2" left margin. This is essential since material will be inserted into a folder;

4 - Double spaced;

5 - Do not number pages;

6 - Each Division will be responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the information furnished in final form. This will also include up-dating any information previously furnished;

7 - Use "Mag" card typewriter (courier ~~ball~~); identifying caption on the card folder should be adequate to readily identify it with the corresponding paper. In addition to the ~~caption, card~~ folder should also have the name of the originating Division.

8 - Furnish all "Mag" cards to the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, along with the write-up.

EX 104
REC-23
62-116395-58
APR 10 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #10216
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALK/ats

Enc.
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.
JCF:law (13)

1 - Each Assistant Director - Enc.

CONTINUED - OVER

56 APR 18 1975

ENCLOSURE

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memo
Re: Senstudy 75

All mail should be routed through and coordinated with the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, and all contacts with the Senate and House committees will be handled by representatives of the Legal Analysis Office, Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division.

Each Division should advise the Legislative Matters Section the identity of individual who will be the contact and coordinator of that Division's responsibilities along with his phone extension.

The Intelligence Division will be responsible for representing the Bureau on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and the identity of such individual should be made known to the Legislative Matters Section. In addition, the Intelligence Division should accumulate the data identified in paragraphs 1 and 2, as they pertain to the FBI, in Mr. John M. Clarke's memorandum to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and submit this in the form suggested above.

The Administrative Division is requested to obtain the information set forth in paragraph 3 of Mr. Clarke's memorandum, also furnishing this data in narrative form as explained above.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall wrw/TeL

DATE: 3/6/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This memorandum recommends that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated 3/5/75, reported the results of a meeting between Senator Church and Mr. Colby wherein Senator Church advised he anticipated asking all agencies and departments of the Intelligence Community for (1) Organizational charts broken down to a branch level going back to 1947, (2) Copies of all budgets since 1947 and (3) Documents reflecting all cash flows since 1947.

Attached is a copy of a short letter from Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community to Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director, SSC. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Clarke to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. This memorandum sets out in more detail what information the SSC will be seeking from all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. It should be noted that on page two of Mr. Clarke's memorandum he notes a formal request from Senator Church to all agencies can be expected.

The Intelligence Division believes considerable time and effort will be required from several Divisions to pull this information together. It is believed we should begin now to assemble the data in anticipation of a request.

ENCLOSURE

EX 104 REC-23 62-116395-58

ACTION: If you agree, the Legal Counsel Division will coordinate this matter and assign responsibilities to appropriate Division for the collection and preparation of the material we anticipate the SSC will request from the FBI.

1 APR 10 1975

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(16) ebc

TeL

LEGAL COUNSEL TO
MR ADAMS MEMO
3/12/75 JCF:LAW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/lcs
#MORI6

2 - ENCLOSURE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

4 March 1975

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

#MORI6
1-18-01 SP-2 ALM|JMG

Dear ~~Mr. Miller~~ Bill:

Pursuant to your request, I have advised all members of the Ad Hoc Group of the United States Intelligence Board and Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, of Senator Church's request to provide legal authority and organization charts of USIB entities from their inception. I also have alerted them to the Committee's desire for comprehensive historical data on personnel, budgets, and cash flow for the same periods. They will expect to hear more directly from Senator Church on these matters.

By early next week, we will begin providing you the CIA data in response to the Chairman's request. The first set of annexes developed under the auspices of the USIB Ad Hoc Group is ready and I am having five copies of each run off for your use. Please advise if more copies are desired.

Sincerely,

John

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment:
Memo to Ad Hoc Group

62-116395-58

ENCLOSURE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

4 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review

SUBJECT: Information Requested by Senate Select Committee Staff Director

1. Senator Church has asked the Director to provide to the Senate Select Committee copies of CIA legal authorities and organization charts to branch levels, 1947-1975. He also indicated he wants similar authorities and charts for all USIB entities from their inceptions. In the case of CIA this will be from 1947; NSA from 1952; DIA from 1961; etc.

2. The Committee is seeking a comprehensive historical base line for each U.S. intelligence organization--its structure and the people involved over time. Therefore, Senator Church has asked that the names of all incumbents who have held supervisory responsibilities over the period, down through the branch level, also be provided. The Staff Director has been made aware of the difficulties involved in tracing personnel assignments too far back but asks that every effort be made to meet the request. CIA is proceeding accordingly.

3. Senator Church has also asked for budget and cash flow data on all U.S. intelligence organizations from their inceptions. The CIA finds that the source and uses tables, employed in annual financial reports, provides the historical profile desired. Supplemental data on specific programs can follow if requested. Senator Church wants data which will show specific patterns of expenditures

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-58

as distinct from budgets and appropriations. A formal request from the Chairman to all agencies on this matter can be expected.

4. The Senate Select Committee will be ready to receive classified material this week. It is suggested that Ad Hoc Group members begin assembling the legal, organizational, personnel, and budgetary data for early submission. I have provided Mr. Miller, Staff Director, with a list of Ad Hoc Principals, phone numbers, titles, etc. He understands that the central point for DOD is Mr. Thomas K. Latimer and for Treasury, Mr. Edward C. Schmults, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement.

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

1-Mr. Callahan
1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Jenkins

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/21/75

1-Each Assistant Director
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Farrington
1-Mr. Fulton

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

By memorandum Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams dated 3/12/75, the Legal Counsel Division indicated that its Legislative Matters Section would coordinate and assign responsibilities within the Bureau for the collection and preparation of material for the Senate Select Committee.

This memorandum instructed Intelligence Division to accumulate data which was identified in a memorandum from Mr. John M. Clarke from the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of the Intelligence Committee. Clarke's memorandum was attached to W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall memorandum dated 3/6/75. The identified data to be collected outlined in Clarke's memorandum was proposed-type data that the Senate Select Committee has indicated an interest in.

In view of 3/19/75 letter subsequently received from Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, to the Attorney General outlining a request for specific FBI documents they are interested in receiving, the Intelligence Division has begun accumulating this specific data. In view of this request for specific data, the Intelligence Division will not accumulate the data outlined in the Clarke memorandum since it was only in the nature of proposed data and differs from the specific data to be collected which is extensive in nature.

ACTION:

For information.

EX 104

REC-23

62-116395-5

APR 10 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/MG

#mo016

5-1006

ABF:enm
(19)

70 APR 15 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Groover

DATE: 4/8/75

FROM : J. J. Clynick JJC

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In order to respond to item III-C of Senator Church's letter dated 3/19/75, it was necessary to survey all field offices. This was done, the response summarized and forwarded to Legal Counsel Division by memo dated 4/3.

Attached hereto are the file copies of the teletypes from the field used to compile our response. It is believed these should be filed as one item as an EBF.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached be filed as an EBF.

Enclosure
Field Office [illegible] [illegible]

JJC:jmb

~~ENC. BEHIND FILE~~

63 ENCLOSURE

REC-11 62-116395-56

ST-112

APR 10 1975

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

3-JJC

70 APR 16 1975

MDR16 ON THIS ENVELOPE
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/JG

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

#MDR16.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/TTG

Budget + Acct.

NR004 AL CODE

4:09 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 CHP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALBANY

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPE, THE FOLLOWING IS ALBANY DIVISION'S RESPONSE:

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED ON PART-TIME BASIS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

8 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 20 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 30 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 35 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 45 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 50 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 60 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 75 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED ON A PART-TIME BASIS TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS ON

3/1

PAGE 2

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

6 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 5 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 4 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 30 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 35 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 45 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 60 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.

END.

2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
[illegible]
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR001 AQ CODE

10:55AM URGENT 3-36-75 PD

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: ALBUQUERQUE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

ALBUQUERQUE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 25 PER CENT OF HIS TIME IN THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THREE AGENTS WHO WORK THESE MATTERS ON A PART-TIME BASIS WITH 20 PER CENT, 40 PER CENT AND 40 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME DEVOTED TO THESE MATTERS.

ONE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THERE ARE 15 RESIDENT AGENTS EACH OF WHO WORK APPROXIMATELY FIVE PERSENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

END

JTG FBIHQ CLR

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/ZAB

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

3

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR006 AX CODE

6:20PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VAN

TO: BUREAU (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTIONS)

FROM: ALEXANDRIA (80-131)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

ALEXANDRIA, HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS. APPROXIMATELY SIXTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS.

ALEXANDRIA AGENTS PERFORMING IS WORK AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

3 SPECIAL AGENTS	NINETY PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	SIXTY-FIVE PERCENT
4 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIFTEEN PERCENT
5 SPECIAL AGENTS	TEN PERCENT

ALEXANDRIA HAS THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO CI WORK AS FOLLOWS:

1 SPECIAL AGENT	TEN PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIVE PERCENT

END.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/06 BY SP2ALM/JTG

4

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

Dw

NR001 AN CODE

5:45 PM 3-25-75 NITEL MAB

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SAC, ANCHORAGE

✓ R-[illegible]

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

ANCHORAGE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED BY THE SAC, WHO SPENDS 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE FORMER AND 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE LATTER CATEGORY.

THERE ARE 3 AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THEY SPEND 40 PERCENT, 5 PERCENT, AND 2 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME, RESPECTIVELY, ON THIS CATEGORY. ONE OF THE 3 AGENTS SPENDS 10 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC HOLD

#MDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM 1776

3/[illegible]

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Eval. ____
Coun. ____
Rm. ____
Sec'y ____

5

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975
Dew
TELETYPE

R-4028

NR008 AT CODED

5:44 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 LAP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF ATLANTA AGENT PERSONNEL PRESENTLY WORKING ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ALSO INCLUDING IN THIS AREA ALL OF CLASSIFICATIONS GENERALLY REGARDED AS SECURITY WORK AND EXTREMIST WORK, AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES:

	POSITION				PER CENT OF TIME
1	SAC		WORKING		5
1	ASAC		"		3
1	SUPERVISOR		"		75
1	SUPERVISOR		"		3
3	HEADQUARTERS	CITY	AGENTS	WORKING	100
4	"	"	"	"	90
2	"	"	"	"	80
1	"	"	"	"	50
1	"	"	"	"	40
2	"	"	"	"	20

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2ALM/SG

#m0e16

3/10

Note: Supervisor Charlie Haynes, Atlanta, telephonically contacted 3 pm, 3/27/75. He will send Nitel 3/27 breaking above out by IS & CI matters separately. DJ

PAGE TWO AT 100-0

POSITION		PER CENT OF TIME
3 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS	WORKING	10
3 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	10
4 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	6
1 " "	"	3
1 " "	"	2

THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE INCLUDED IN ARRIVING AT THE ABOVE COMPUTATION:

2, 3, 14, 61, 64, 65, 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 117, 134, 135, 157, 163, 170, 174, 176, AND 185.

E N D

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

5 Revised

R-6668

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR007 AT CODE

9:46 PM NITEL MARCH 27, 1975 SSP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE ATLANTA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, MARCH 26, 1975.

UNDER PER CENT OF TIME COLUMN, "IS" STANDS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND "CI" STANDS FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

POSITION		PER CENT OF TIME	
		IS	CI
1 SAC	WORKING	4	1
1 ASAC	"	2	1
1 SUPERVISOR	"	45	30
1 SUPERVISOR	"	3	0
1 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENT	"	100	0
1 " " "	"	85	15
1 " " "	"	80	20
1 " " "	"	90	0
1 " " "	"	0	90
1 " " "	"	85	5
1 " " "	"	75	15
1 " " "	"	60	20

#mpe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/TG

POSITION					PER CENT OF TIME	
					IS	CI
1	HEADQUARTERS	CITY	AGENT	WORKING	80	0
1	"	"	"	"	20	40
1	"	"	"	"	0	40
1	"	"	"	"	5	15
1	"	"	"	"	20	0
1	"	"	"	"	10	0
1	"	"	"	"	5	5
1	"	"	"	"	5	5
1	RESIDENT	AGENT		"	10	~~1~~0
1	"	"		"	10	0
1	"	"		"	10	~~3~~0
1	"	"		"	3	3
1	"	"		"	6	~~1~~0
1	"	"		"	0	6
1	"	"		"	6	~~1~~0
1	"	"		"	3	~~3~~0
1	"	"		"	0	~~1~~2

PAGE THREE AT 100-0

IN CONSIDERING ABOVE COMPUTATIONS, THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION UNDER INTERNAL SECURITY HEADING: 3, 14, 61, 98, 100, 117, 134 (INFORMANTS) 157, 163, 170, 176, 185. THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE CONSIDERED UNDER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HEADING: 2, 64, 65, 97, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 134 (ASSETS).

END

HOLD FOR 5 MORE

MAR 17 9 53 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

6

Admin.
G
I
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 014 BA CODE

10:14PM NITEL 3/25/75 JAN

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

Budget Acct

FROM BALTIMORE 66-NEW

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BALTIMORE HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 33 AGENTS DEVOTED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS). TWENTY AGENTS DEVOTE 100 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME TO IS MATTERS. THIRTEEN AGENTS DEVOTE 75 PER CENT TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PER CENT TO IS MATTERS. THE SAC'S OVERALL SUPERVISION INCLUDES 20 PER CENT OVER IS AND CI MATTERS.

END

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

MAR 23 10 45 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

7

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 002 BH CODE

241 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DGS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: BIRMINGHAM (66-2204)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

✓ Pm [illegible]

REBUTEL, 3/24/74, REGARDING PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS.

BIRMINGHAM HAS NO AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE MATTERS. FOLLOWING REPRESENT PERCENTAGES OF AGENT TIME:

AGENT	IS PERCENTAGE	CI PERCENTAGE
A	95	0
B	50	40
C	80	0
D	40	10
E	60	0
F	35	15
G	5	10
H	0	25
I	30	30
J	25	0
K (SUPERVISOR)	40	20

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2ALM/JT6

F0216

3/22

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
17 PM '75

REC'D
DIRECTOR
DIVISION
MAR 25 5 00 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

8

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

NR017 BS CODE

6:58 PM NITEL MARCH 25,1975 MCC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BOSTON (66-82)

ATTN/ BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ Budget [illegible] Unit
6058

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

BOSTON HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND TWENTY-ONE AGENTS, ALL ASSIGNED FULL TIME, TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IN ADDITION, TWELVE RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

BOSTON HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND TEN AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIME. IN ADDITION, ELEVEN RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

BUREAU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE SAME RESIDENT AGENTS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, WHO ARE ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, ARE ALSO ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/DS

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
PM '75

62-116395-56

9

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR001 BU CODE

4:04 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 TRR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUFFALO KYYXXX(66-NEW)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget & Acct.
603 H

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BUFFALO DIVISION HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 28 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT NOT NECESSARILY ON A FULL TIME BASIS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THESE AREAS ON FULL TIME BASIS:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SAC	0	0
ASAC	0	0
SUPERVISORS	0	0
SPECIAL AGENTS	6	0

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JG
#MDR16

3/10

PAGE TWO BU 66-NEW

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, COMPUTATION OF ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY OTHER AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED THESE MATTERS WOULD REPRESENT EQUIVALENT OF FOLLOWING NUMBER OF FULL TIME PERSONNEL:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	71/2	5
GRAND TOTALS:		
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	13 1/2	5

END

MAY 27 4 08 PM '75

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

10

QNR 006 BT PLAIN

9-13 QP PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 TDS

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUTTE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SECURITY MATTERS SUPERVISED BY ASAC FIVE PERCENT OF HIS TIME. ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT HANDLES FIFTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME AND ONE RA TEN PERCENT OF HIS TIME. NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORK BUTTE DIVISION.

END

V

FBIHQ FLC FR THREE TELS TKS AND CUL.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3/00

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 11 14 PM '75

62-116395-56

11

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

Budget Acct
6008

NR 009 CE CODED

5:33 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBULET MARCH 24, 1975.

CHARLOTTE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY MATTERS, NO OTHER SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLE SECURITY. THERE ARE 3 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE ADDITIONAL HEADQUARTERS AGENT ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ONE RESIDENT AGENT IS ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, 4 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, AND 9 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED FROM 5 TO 15 PER CENT OF THEIR WORK IN SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.

NO SUPERVISORY OR AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM WHICH WAS DISCONTINUED PER BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS IN 1971.

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JMC

Note: Charlotte Security Supervisor Telephonically contacted 2^{45} pm, 3/27/75 and the difference between counterintelligence program and C.I. matters explained to him. He will send corrected Nitel 3/27.
DH

3/DH

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 3 37 PM '75

62-116395-56

Revised
11

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR005 CE CODE

5:26 PMNITEL MARCH 27, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975, AND CHARLOTTE TEL MARCH 25, 1975.

CHARLOTTE OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO BOTH SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT IS ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND A SECOND HEADQUARTERS AGENT DEVOTES 25 PER CENT TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TWO RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 25 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND TWO ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED BETWEEN 5 TO 10 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. OTHER RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WHEN NEED ARISES, HOWEVER, NO EXACT PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE SINCE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS GREATLY FLUCTUATE.

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/STC

3/1.0

MAR [illegible] 31 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

12

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

Dcw

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR026 CG CODE

610PM NITEL 3-25-75 RWR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHICAGO

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

R-6988

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975, TO ALL SAC'S.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF AGENT TIME IN THE CHICAGO DIVISION SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

SAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, 20 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PERCENT.

ASAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 20 PERCENT.

SUPERVISORS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, FOUR, FULL TIME; INTERNAL SECURITY, ONE, FULL TIME, ONE, 50 PERCENT. (THE OTHER FIFTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IS SPENT ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.)

AGENTS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 76, FULL TIME (INCLUDES 10 AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE);

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/LRG

3/10

PAGE TWO

INTERNAL SECURITY, 28, FULL TIME.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, 10 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO EXTREMIST MATTERS.

THIS REPRESENTS A TOTLE OF 114 SA'S ASSIGNED SECURITY WORK EXCLUSIVE OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL.

END.

PLS ACK FOR TWELVE

~~NEED A RERUN OF UR NRTS HAVE AN OVERLINE~~

MAR 25 7 19 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

13

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

NR 004 CI CODE

748PM NITEL 3/25/75 KOD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CINCINNATI (105-7038)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ Rm. [illegible]

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL TIME BEING EXPENDED IN CINCINNATI DIVISION OM INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (CIM):

SAC AND ASAC - NONE

	IS	CIM
ONE SUPERVISOR	65 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE SUPERVISOR	53 PERCENT	36 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	100 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	80 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	60 PERCENT	40 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	27 PERCENT	73 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	45 PERCENT	55 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	50 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	50 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	73 PERCENT	27 PERCENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/00 BY SP-2 ALM/376
#Moe/6

3/19

	IS	CIM
ONE AGENT	30 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	40 PERCENT	20 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	25 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
THREE AGENTS	10 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	10 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	5 PERCENT	5 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	2 PERCENT	8 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	5 PERCENT	0 PERCENT.

END

REC 4 DBS FBIHQ CLR

RELAYED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 23 PM '75

62-116395-56

14

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 005 CV CODE

8:25PM NITEL 3/25/75 RJB

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: CLEVELAND (66-5641)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

CONF~~IDE~~NTIAL

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Budget & Accounting
Rm 6628 Bldg

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

CLEVELAND HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS TWO, AGENTS 20. THE FOLLOWING NUMBER ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-INTELLIGNECE WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS ONE, AGENTS 16. THE THREE SUPERVISORS HANDLE SECURITY-TYPE MATTERS EXCLUSIVELY.

CLEVELAND HAS UTILIZED PERCENTAGES OF AGENT'S TIME SPENT IN THESE CATEGORIES WHERE APPLICABLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE RESIDENT AGENCIES.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 6020, XGDS CATEGORY 2, INDEFINITE.~~

END

HOLD FOR ONE

TJT FBI WASH D

#MDE16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM [illegible]
ON 1-17-01

MAR 25 8 31 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

15

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

NR005 CO CODE

7:00PMEDT NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WCA

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM COLUMBIA (105-NEW)

✓Budget

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

COLUMBIA PRESENTLY HAS ZERO AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS COLUMBIA HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS AND SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED THE FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME:

AGENTS 1 - 75, 1 - 30, 3 - 20, 1 - 10,
3 - 5 OR LESS

SUPERVISORS 1 - 20

END.

DBS FBIHQ

CLR

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
'75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

16

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR008 DL CODE

5:44 PM NITEL 3/26/75 DRH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: DALLAS (105-NEW)

Budget Accounting
6028

ATTN: INTD SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN REPLY TO BUREAU REQUEST, THE DALLAS OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO WORK ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS), COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI), APPLICANT AND RELATED MATTERS. FIFTY-FOUR PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS. THERE ARE SIX HEADQUARTERS AGENTS HANDLING IS AND/OR CI MATTERS, THREE RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING THE MAJORITY OF THEIR TIME ON BOTH IS AND CI MATTERS AND EIGHT RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME IN THE IS AND CI FIELDS. DATA FOR SURVEY WAS OBTAINED FROM THE FEBRUARY, 1975, CASE LOAD. THE NUMBER OF DALLAS AGENTS WORKING IS, CI OR BOTH AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME SPENT IN THESE FIELDS IS SET OUT BELOW:

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

3/15

PAGE TWO DL 105-NEW

SAS	3X	1X	1X	1X	1X	1X	1X	2	2
IS PERCENT	100		34	63	62	24	30	16	5
CI PERCENT		100	66	11	38	76	16		

SAS	1	1	1	1
IS PERCENT	13	6		2
CI PERCENT			8	

X RA AND HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS AND CI SQUAD.

END.

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 6 48 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

17

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Ge[illegible] ____
Id[illegible] ____
Ir[illegible] ____
In[illegible] ____
L[illegible] ____
Pla[illegible] l. ____
S[illegible] ____
T[illegible] ____
Leg[illegible] ____
Tel[illegible] Rm. ____
Direct[illegible] Sec'y ____

NR007 DN PLAIN

535 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JSG

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

(ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: DENVER (66-DEAD)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL OFFICES, MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (CI):

SAC - 0

ASAC-0

SUPERVISOR - ONE FULL TIME, 3/4 OF TIME OF IS, 1/4 TO CI

AGENTS - 12 AND 1/2, 3/4 TIME TO IS, 1/4 TIME TO CI.

IN DENVER OFFICE, IS AND CI MATTERS ARE HANDLED BY FIELD SUPERVISOR ON FULL TIME BASIS. DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES ALSO HANDLED ON SQUAD BUT ONLY FRACTION OF SUPERVISOR'S AND SQUAD TIME IS USED ON THESE CASES. SAC AND ASAC ARE KEPT ABREAST OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND, OF COURSE, HAVE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY BUT HAVE NO0 IS OR CI MATTERS ASSIGNED TO THEM. BESIDES SUPERVISOR, THERE ARE 8 SPECIAL AGENTS (SA) IN HEADQUARTERS CITY ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS AND CI MATTERS WITH ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THIS TIME GIVEN TO DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES. ALL BOMBING MATTERS

#MD216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/lrG

3/[illegible]

PAGE TWO (DN 66-DEAD)

(174 CLASSIFICATION) ARE CONSIDERED A PART OF IS INVESTIGATIONS. TWO OF EIGHT SAS FULL TIME AND ONE SA HALF TI~~0~~ME HANDLE CI MATTERS, REMAINDER HANDLE IS.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES (RA) FOLLOWING SITUATION EXISTS:

ONE AGENT IN COLORADO SPRINGS SPENDS 50 0/0 AND ANOTHER AGENT SPENDS 25 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON IS AND CI MATTERS. IN BOULDER RA ONE FULL TIME AGENT AND ONE AGENT SPENDING 60 0/0 OF HIS TIME HANDLE IS AND CI MATTERS. IN FORT COLLINS RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 50 0/0 AND THE OTHER 40 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. IN CHEYENNE RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 25 0/0 OF HIS TIME ONE THESE MATTERS. IN THE OTHER RAS ONLY A MINOR FRACTION OF THE TIME OF EACH RA IS DEVOTED TO IS AND CI MATTERS. TOTAL TIME WOULD POSSIBLY EQUAL THAT OF ONE SA FULL TIME. IN ALL INSTANCES, ABOUT 3/4 OF TIME SPENT ON SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IS ON IS MATTERS WITH REMAINING 1/4 ON CI MATTERS.

END

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR FOUR

WA CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 7 59 PM '75

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

18

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
DCW

NR032 DE CODE

5:42 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WGM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DETROIT

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

R-Cable

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

DETROIT DIVISION CURRENTLY HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND FOURTEEN AGENTS ASSIGNED 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, ONE ASAC IS ASSIGNED FIVE PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT, THREE SAS FIFTEEN PERCENT, ONE SA TEN PERCENT, ONE SA FIVE PERCENT.

DETROIT DIVISION ALSO HAS ASSIGNED ONE SUPERVISOR AND ELEVEN SAS SPENDING 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN ADDITION, ONE ASAC FIVE PERCENT, THREE SAS 75 PERCENT, ONE SA 50 PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT AND ONE SA TEN PERCENT. ONE SAC HAS FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

HOLD PLS

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

MAR 27 7 21 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. A.D.-Adm.
Dep. A.D.-Inv.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

19

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 EP CODE

6:28 PM NITEL 3-25-75 MJT

TO: DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM: EL PASO (66-NEW) ///1P///

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC, EL PASO CURRENTLY SPENDS 3 PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY, 2 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ASAC HANDLES NO SECURITY MATTERS; SUPERVISOR NUMER THREE DESK DEVOTES 15 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 5 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

FOUR AGENTS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED SECURITY MATTERS, WITH ONE AGENT DEVOTING 60 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY, 0 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; SECOND AGENT SPENDS 10 PER CENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; THIRD AGENT 50 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; FOURTH AGENT, WHO IS RELIEF SUPERVISOR, DEVOTES 10 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 65 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/BJG

3/DR

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

20

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 001 HN CODE

5:08 PM HST NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JVS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HONOLULU (66-) 1P

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

✓Budget & Acct.

JEH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

HONOLULU CURRENTLY HAS FOUR SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED PRIMARILY SECURITY MATTERS BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY AS FOLLOWS: 2 AGENTS 90 PER CENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND AND 10 PER CENT EACH OTHER MATTERS; 1 AGENT 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY; 1 AGENT 30 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 40 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 30 PER CENT OTHER MATTERS. 3 ADDITIONAL AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 15 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

ASAC, SUPERVISES SECURITY MATTER, SPENDS 35 PER CENT OF TIME ON SECURITY BROKEN DOWN AS: 25 PER CENT COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND 10 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

END.

HOLD

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP8 ALM/ETG

3/DA

MAR 25 11 01 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

21

Assoc. Dir. —
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. —
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. —
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. —
Comp. Syst. —
Ext. Affairs —
Files & Com. —
Gen. Inv. —
Ident. —
Inspection —
Intell. —
Laboratory —
Plan. & Eval. —
Spec. Inv. —
Training —
Legal Coun. —
Telephone Rm. —
Director Sec'y —

✓ Budget & Acct.

NR008 HO CODE

5:55 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 BNG

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HOUSTON

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SET FORTH BELOW ARE SAC, SUPERVISOR AND AGENTS CURRENTLY WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AGENTS	2.05	2.70
SUPERVISOR	.30	.40
SAC	.02	.04

END

HOLD

#MOE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JF

3/F

MAR 25 6 PM '75
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

22

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budget & Accounting Room [illegible]

NR005 IP CODE

5:39 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RXH

TO DIRECTOR

FROM INDIANAPOLIS

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL, FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED CONCERNING INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

SAC	NONE
ASAC	NONE
SUPERVISORS	.30 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND .40 INTERNAL SECURITY
SPECIAL AGENTS	6.25 ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 9.50 ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD FOR FIVE MORE

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2ACM/JG

REC TELET

MAR 25 6 53 PM '75

62-116395-56

23

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR003 CODE JN

4:07PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JWD

TO DIRECTOR, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM JACKSON (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC AND ASAC, JACKSON OFFICE, HAVE NO CASES ASSIGNED IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. TWO SUPERVISORS HAVE CASES ASSIGNED AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO FORTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIFTEEN PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THERE ARE FIFTY FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO THREE POINT SIX TENTHS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE POINT ONE TENTH AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#m0216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/12/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

3/20

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

24

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

Rm-6[illegible]8
EH

NR003 JK CODE

7:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 GLB

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM JACKSONVILLE (100-NEW) (RUC)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED NITEL FOR JACKSONVILLE DIVISION:

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FIFTY PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY AND TEN PERCENT INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, NONE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, ACCUMULATED TO REPRESENT FOUR AGENTS ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE AGENT ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/PR

TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 21 PM '75

62-116395-56

25

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
[illegible]

NR 003 KC CODE

6:15 PM 3/25/75 NITEL JAW

TO: DIRECTOR

(ATTN:BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: KANSAS CITY (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

KANSAS CITY DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TIME SPENT IS 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 40 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

TWO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

KANSAS CITY HAS THIRTEEN ADDITIONAL AGENTS HANDLING BOTH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: FIVE AGENTS, 90 PERCENT, INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE AGENT, 90 PERCENT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: TWO AGENTS, 30 PERCENT ON EACH:; FOUR AGENTS, 10 PERCENT ON EACH, AND ONE AGENT 50 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/tsb

#mDe

7/NA

MAR 23 PM 75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

2-6

MAR 25 1975
DCW
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR004 KX CODE

8:10 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WEH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATN: BUDGET & ACCOUNTING SECTION)

VR-9028

FROM: SAC, KNOXVILLE (100-00)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ASAC'S DESK IN THE KNOXVILLE DIVISION. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE ASAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON SUCH MATTERS, DIVIDED 15 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/BTG #MDE16

IN ADDITION, THERE ARE FIVE AGENTS WITHIN THE DIVISION WORKING PRIMARILY ON SECURITY MATTERS. TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND 80 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY WORK AND 5 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 75 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 20 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 60 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 35 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; AND ONE AGENT SPENDS 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 75 PERCENT ON

3/19

PAGE TWO KX 100-00

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

SECURITY ITEMS REQUIRING THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF THE SAC UTILIZE ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON EACH CATEGORY.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE AND CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 47 PM '75

62-116395-56

27

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

Budget + Accounting

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

NR 011 LV CODE

838 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 MLP

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM LAS VEGAS (100-00)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

LAS VEGAS SAC AND ASAC DO NOT SUPERVISE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. LAS VEGAS HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ①

LAS VEGAS HAS ONE FIELD SUPERVISOR WHO SUPERVISES INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AMONG MANY OTHER CATEGORIES. IT IS ESTIMATED THIS SUPERVISOR SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON MATTERS OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY NATURE.

LAS VEGAS HAS FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO ARE NORMALLY ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 95 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. ONE OTHER SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 30 PER CENT, AND THE OTHER TWO, APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC CLR

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/DTG

① Supervisor Don Smith contacted and advises Counterintelligence matters should be as follows: No supervisory time.
2 agents involved, one about 3% of his time + one about 2%.

3/27/75
5^{45}pm

3/DA

MAR 30 1975
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

28

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Budget + Acct [illegible]

NR 004 LR PLAIN

3:09 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 GM

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LITTLE ROCK (66-1880)

ATTENTIONC BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING SET FORTH IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED TELETYPE:

TWO AGENTS IN LITTLE ROCK DIVISION ASSIGNED PART-TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH BREAKDOWN OF TIME SPENT AS FOLLOWS:

ONE AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 45 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. SECOND AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 65 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 8 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 2 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/GTG

3/04

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

MAR 26 13 PM 1975

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

29

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget & Acctg.

NR 009 LA CODE

12:09 PM URGENT 3-26-75 SMA

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOS ANGELES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUTEL, MARCH 24 LAST.

LOS ANGELES DIVISION HAS CAREFULLY BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGES THOSE AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE WORK USING THOSE CLASSIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY SUPERVISOR GROOVER. DIVISION HAS A TOTAL OF 91 AGENTS PLUS ONE SAC, FOUR SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, ASSIGNED TO SUCH CLASSIFICATIONS. THIRTY FIVE OF THESE WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 56 WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

ADMINISTRATIVE

LOS ANGELES IS SUBMITTING FOR BUREAU'S CONSIDERATION, IF PERTINENT. THREE OF THE ABOVE 56 CLASSIFIED AS SECURITY AGENTS WORK FULL TIME ON BOMBING MATTERS WHICH ARE ALMOST ALL MATTERS WHEREIN WE HAVE NO JURISDICTION EXCEPT FOR DATA KEEPING FOR NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER. TWELVE OF THE 56 SECURITY AGENTS

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TTS

3/

PAGE TWO

3
12
7
1
23

ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN OUR FALSE IDENTITY PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM ORIGINATED WITH OUR WEATHFUG ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER, THE FRAUDULENT USE OF DECEASED INFANT IDENTITY PAPERS HAS EXPANDED TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT THE VAST MAJORITY INVOLVE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN SECURITY WORK. SEVEN OF THE 56 AGENTS ON SECURITY ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS WHICH ORIGINATE WITH SOME DEMONSTRATION OR ACT OF TERROR, ETC, BUT AT THE PRESENT THEY ARE CLEAR CUT CRIMINAL FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS. ONE OF THE 56 IS INVOLVED FULL TIME IN THE HANDLING OF FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION MATTERS WHICH IS TECHNICALLY AN APPLICANT-TYPE INVESTIGATION, BUT THE 163 CLASSIFICATION WAS INCLUDED IN THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS. SUMMARIZING THESE EXCEPTIONS WE HAVE A TOTAL OF 23 AGENTS WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO SECURITY WORK BUT ARE, IN FACT, NOT INVOLVED IN ANY INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, LEAVING ONLY 33 AGENTS DEVOTING THEIR FULL TIME EFFORTS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS PLUS, THE ABOVE MENTIONED 35 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENTS.

END

JTG FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 3 14 PM '75

62-116395-56

30

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
[illegible] Com. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Pla[illegible] Eval. ____
[illegible] ____
Tr[illegible] ____
Legal [illegible] ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

DCW

TELETYPE

NR013 LS CODE

9:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 HSH

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOUISVILLE

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ 1B-6628

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, FOLLOWING DATA PERTAINS TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

SUPERVISOR (1) 40 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 85 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 30 IS, 40 CI; AGENT (1) 40 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 10 IS, 0 CI.

END.

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/dse

3/DA

MAR 26 9 51 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

31

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 005 ME PLAIN

9:12 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JLC

TO DIRECTOR ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM MEMPHIS

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

✓ Budget & Acct
JEH

MEMPHIS OFFICE USES APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IN THE SECURITY FIELD, 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IN ADDITION, SIX AGENTS ARE UTILIZED, THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS IN THIS FIELD:

AGENT	TIME ON SECURITY CASES	TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY	TIME ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
A	100	100	0
B	75	50	25
C	50	50	0
D	50	25	25
E	25	25	0
F	25	0	25

#MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 Alm/[illegible]

IN ADDITION TO THE ONE-FOURTH SUPERVISOR TIME, THIS OFFICE USES THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-FOURTH AGENTS IN THE SECURITY

3/D

PAGE TWO

FIELD; TWO AND ONE-HALF AGENTS ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE-FOURTHS OF ONE AGENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

PLS ACK FOR FOUR TES

ACK FOR 4 AND HOLD

TJT FBI WASH DC

Mar 25 10 14 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

32

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget + Accounting Section
Rm. 6028 JEH

NR002 MM CODE

925AM URGENT MARCH 27, 1975 JWB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MIAMI 1P

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING ARE MIAMI OFFICE STATISTICS SHOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS BY SPECIAL AGENT PERSONNEL:

SACS - 0; ASACS - 0.

SUPERVISORS - CI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 90 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. SI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT.

SPECIAL AGENTS- CI MATTERS: 15 ASSIGNED FULL TIME; TWO ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 40 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. IS MATTERS: TWO ASSIGNED FULL TIME; THREE ASSIGNED 75 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 60 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 30 PERCENT; FIVE ASSIGNED 10 PERCENT.

END.

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

#mde16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP2 ALM/JT6

3/D

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 9 29 AM '75

MAR 27 11 14 AM '75
REC'D [illegible] SECTION

62-116395-56

33

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budget + Account.
6/25

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR004 MI CODE

7:08PM NITEL 3 / 25 / 75 LSK

O: DIRECTOR

FROM: MILWAUKEE (66-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MILWAUKEE HAS 2 SECURITY SUPERVISORS, #5 AND #6, NEITHER OF WHOM IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY WORK. 23 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO THESE 2 SECURITY SQUADS, INCLUDING HEADQUARTERS AND RESIDENT AGENTS (RA'S). 4 OF LATTER squad ARE ENGAGED FULL TIME IN SECURITY WORK. 15 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS NOT ASSIGNED TO EITHER SECURITY SQUAD ALSO HANDLE SOME SECURITY WORK IN THEIR VARIOUS AREAS. PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN IS AS FOLLOWS:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COINTEL	OTHER
#5 SUPERVISOR	70	5	25
#6 SUPERVISOR	30	55	L5
#5 SQUAD 12 agents*	59	8	33
#6 SQUAD 11 agents*	44	44	L2
RA'S 15 agents *	2.5	4.5	93

END

ACJ FOR FOUR $$$

* Per phone call 4:55 pm, 3/27/75 with George Whople, supervisor of #6 squad in Milwaukee.

#MD016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]

3/DD

NR006 MI CODE

7:50PM NITEL 3/25/75 LEH

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MILWAUKEE (66-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MILWAUKEE HAS 2 SECURITY SUPERVISORS, #5 AND #6, NEITHER OF WHOM IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY WORK. 23 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO THESE 2 SECURITY SQUADS, INCLUDING HEADQUARTERS AND RESIDENT AGENTS (RA'S). 4 OF LATTER ARE ENGAGED FULL TIME IN SECURITY WORK. 12 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS NOT ASSIGNED TO EITHER SECURITY SQUAD ALSO HANDLE SOME SECURITY WORK IN THEIR VARIOUS AREAS. PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN IS AS FOLLOWS:

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 2
46 PM '75

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COINTEL	OTHER
#5 SUPERVISOR	76	5	19
#6 SUPERVISOR	31	55	14
#5 SQUAD	65	2	33
#6 SQUAD	44	44	12
RA'S	82.5	4.5	13

END

ACK FOR FOUR

62-116395-56

34

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

[illegible]
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

NR001 MP CODED

7:13 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DSC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (100-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget & Acct.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MINNEAPOLIS HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. A SECOND SUPERVISOR SPENDS 40 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY. THERE ARE FIVE AND ONE HALF AGENTS WORKING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 14 WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

H

O

L

[illegible]

MAR 25 8 15 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

35

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR005 MOBILE PLAIN

11-12 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VFP

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM MOBILE (66-1145)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE MOBILE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDING FIFTY PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS TWENTYFIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCY MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THERE ARE NINE AGENTS WHO SPEND AN AVERAGE OF FORTY FIVE PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

END

TMA ACK FOR TWO FBIHQ CLR

#M0216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DATE 1-17-01 BY SPJ ALM 1776

MAR 27 2 17 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 007 NK CODE

6:06PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 JCG

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget/Acct
JEH

FROM NEWARK

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL TO SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN RE NITEL NEWARK SUBMITS FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY PERSONNEL IN THE TWO SEPARATE CATEGORIES:

INTERNAL SECURITY:
1 ASAC - 15 PER CENT
1 SUPERVISOR - 50 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 100 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 70 PER CENT

#m 0216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 [illegible]

B/DA

NK

PAGE TWO

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

1 ASAC - 35 PER CENT

1 SUPERVICSOR - 50 PER CENT

1 SUPERVISOR - 100 PER CENT

23 SA 'S - 100 PER CENT

6 SA'S - 50 PER CENT

3 SA'S - 10 PER CENT

END

MAR 26 6 04 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

37

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

NR002 NH CODE

1038PM NITEL MARCH 25,1975 LM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: NEW HAVEN (105-13579) (RUC) 1P

ATTN; BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

REC-40 28

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24,1975.

ONE SUPERVISORY AGENT DEVOTES ONE-THIRD OF HIS TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND ONE THIRD TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

SEVENTEEN AGENTS ARE REGULARLY ASSIGNED EITHER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OR INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS IN ADDITION TO OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS. OF THESE 17 AGENTS THE EQUIVALENT OF FIVE AGENTS WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIMW AND FIVE AND ONE THIRD AGENTS WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

FBIHQ FLC FR TWO TELS CLR TKS

#m0216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ETG

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
3:13 PM '75

62-116395-56

38

Assoc Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

NR001 NO CODE

2:49PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DCB

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget & Acct.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE; PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE...

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-12-01 BY SP2 ALM/TTG
#mDR16

Note: Security supervisor contacted 5^{20}P, 3/27/75 re counterintelligence matters. He will check & get the obvious error corrected, either through call back or corrected Nitel.
DA

2/DA

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 3 47 PM '75

62-116395-56

38 Revised

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
[illegible] Com. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] Eval. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR015 NO CODE

7:15PM URGENT MARCH 27,1975 JMF

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget [illegible]
[illegible] JFH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24,1975; NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE MARCH 26,1975; BUTEL CALL MARCH 27,1975.

THE FOLLOWING ARE CORRECTIONS TO REFERENCED NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE. NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE, OF WHICH SEVEN ARE ALSO ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 25 PERCENT AND PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS 35 PERCENT. PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS 25 PERCENT, AND 35 PERCENT SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE.

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JG

44

3/1[illegible]

MAR 8 18 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

39

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 NY CODE

NITEL 3/25/75 SENT 9:25AM 3/26/75 GMD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

Budget & Accounting Sec

6028 JEH

NEW YORK HAS ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (DIVISION III) AND ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS (DIVISION IV). THERE ARE NO ASACS IN NEW YORK OFFICE.

SAC, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION (III) SPENDS FULL-TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SAC, INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION (IV) SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 60 PERCENT IS SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

SIX SUPERVISORS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 14 SUPERVISORS HANDLE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

114 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 331 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END.

JTG FBIHQ CLR

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JJS

3/10A

MAR 26 9 30 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

40

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 NF PLAIN

444PM NITEL 3-26-75 SNB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM NORFOLK (66-981)

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS INFORMATION REQUESTED IN RETEL:

POSITION	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ONE SUPERVISOR	50 PER CENT OF TIME	10 PER CENT OF TIME
THREE SAS	50 PER CENT OF TIME	20 PER CENT OF TIME
TWO SAS	75 PER CENT OF TIME	0
THREE SAS	50 PER CENT OF TIME	0

TOTAL AGENT PERSONNEL OF NORFOLK OFFICE ASSIGNED IS ONE SUPERVISOR AND EIGHT AGENTS FOR PERCENTAGES INDICATED ABOVE.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

R-6028

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3/

1

[illegible]

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 4 48 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

41

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR008 OC PLAIN

9:30PM MARCH 25, 1975 NITEL DSM MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

TO DIRECTOR

FROM OKLAHOMA CITY (105-2398)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THE SAC AND THE ASAC OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE ARE NOT ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE HAS NO SUPERVISOR OR SPECIAL AGENT ASIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND / OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN IN PERCENTAGES OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT'S TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

	NUMBER	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISOR	1	75	5
SA'S	31	615	65

OF THE THIRTY-ONE SPECIAL AGENT S, IT IS NOTED THAT 8 ARE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT OR MORE OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT ACCOUNT FOR 550 PERCENT OT THE 615 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY TIME AND 62 PERCENT OT THE 65 PERCENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TIME.

END PAGE 1

#MDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/1876

PAGE 2

OC 105-2398

IN SUMMARY, THERE IS .75 AND .05 SUPERVISORY EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIEGENCE, RESPECTIVELY. THERE ARE 6.15 AND .65 AGENT EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, RESPECTIVELY.

END

ACK FOR 1 TJT FBI WASH DC CL

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 10:37 PM '75

62-116395-56

42

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 004 OM CODE

4:38 PM NITEL 3/25/75 BJP

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: OMAHA

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ Budget + Acct. Unit
JEH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

OMAHA CURRENTLY HAS SEVEN AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, WITH TWO AGENTS SPENDING 60 PER CENT AND TWO AGENTS SPENDING 25 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON IS MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON IS MATTERS.

TWO AGENTS AND ONE SUPERVISOR SPEND APPROXIMATELY 10 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

MSE FBIHQ

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/ETB

3/[illegible]

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 5 43 PM '75

62-116395-56

43

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 PH CODE

245 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DMS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PHILADELPHIA (66-NEW) (P)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ Budget & Acctg

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

PHILA. DIVISION UTILIZES FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) INCLUDING EXTREMISTS, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

		IS	CI
1	SAC	5	5
1	ASAC	50	
1	SUPERVISOR	100	
1	SUPERVISOR		100
13	SAS AT HEADQUARTERS	100	
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS	50	
9	SAS AT HEADQUARTERS		100
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS		75
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS		85

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/00 BY SP-2 [illegible]

3/D

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SAS IN RAS:

	IS	CI
1 SA	5	
1 SA	45	45
1 SA	2	2
1 SA	50	25
1 SA	30	10
1 SA	75	20
1 SA	5	70
1 SA	2	5
1 SA	70	30
1 SA		10
1 SA	5	10
1 SA	55	15
1 SA	5	1
1 SA	1	5
1 SA	35	50
1 SA	5	3

IN SUMMARY, 16 RAS AVERAGED 24 IS, AND 19 CI.

END

KAC FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 2 58 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

44

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 003 PX PCODE

12:35 AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL JRL

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECT)

FROM PHOENIX (100-8529) (1P)

SENATE SELECT COMMITEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

PHOENIX DIVISION HAS FOLLOWING AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

A. INTERNAL SECURITY

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS -100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS - 75 PER CENT

THREE AGENTS - 50 PER CENT

B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. DOMESTIC - NONE

2. FOREIGN-

ONE SUPERVISOR - 30 PER CENT

ONE AGENT - 100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS- 25 PER CENT

END

MPM FBIHQ CLR

62-116

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM 1916
#MDR16

3/17

MAR 26 3 30 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

45

NR 09 PG PLAIN

7:35 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RGM

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: PITTSBURGH (62-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Budget & Accounting
602

REBUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THERE ARE 110 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE PITTSBURGH OFFICE (75 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS, 35 RESIDENTS AGENTS (RAS)).

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) FULL TIME. ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) FULL TIME.

11 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED CI FULL TIME AND 7 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED IS FULL TIME.

RESIDENT AGENT ASSIGNMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

6 RAS 2 PERCENT CI
3 RAS 3 PERCENT CI
3 RAS 5 PERCENT CI
2 RAS 6 PERCENT CI
3 RAS 7 PERCENT CI
2 RAS 8 PERCENT CI
1 RA 25 PERCENT CI

5 RAS 2 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 3 PERCENT IS
1 RA 4 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 5 PERCENT IS
1 RA 7 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 11 PERCENT IS
1 RA 12 PERCENT IS

END PAGE ONE

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3/DA

PAGE TWO, PG 62-NEW

1 RA 16 PERCENT IS
1 RA 24 PERCENT IS
1 RA 28 PERCENT IS

THE ABOVE PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES WERE ARRIVED AT BY COMPARING THE NUMBER OF CI AND IS CASES WITH THE TOTAL CASE LOAD OF EACH RA.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 12 PM '75

62-116395-56

46

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 007 PD CODE

8:57 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LLD

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PORTLAND

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

PORTLAND HAS TWO SUPERVISORY DESKS HANDLING SECURITY MATTERS. ONE DESK HANDLES ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) AND ACCOUNTING MATTERS. BOTH DESKS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND SOME CRIMINAL MATTERS. BECAUSE OF OFFICE SIZE, PERSONNEL OF BOTH DESKS NECESSARILY PARTICIAPTE IN BANK ROBBERY AND OTHER MAJOR CRIMINAL MATTERS.

ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS, SAC EXPENDS TIME IN DIRECTIONAL AND OVERSIGHT CAPACITY ON CI AND IS MATTERS.

ESTIMATED SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON SECURITY MATTERS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE:

SAC (ONE), 5 PERCENT CI, 5 PERCENT IS.

ASAC (ONE), NONE.

SUPERVISORS (TWO), 45 PERCENT CI, 85 PERCENT IS.

AGENTS AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON SECURITY MATTERS:

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2-ALM/KSG

3/DA

PAGE TWO

CI: 90 PERCENT - TWO
80 PERCENT - TWO
70 PERCENT - TWO
IS: 90 PERCENT - FOUR
80 PERCENT - SIX
50 PERCENT - TWO
40 PERCENT - TWO
20 PERCENT - ONE
10 PERCENT - FOUR.

LOWER PERCENTAGES ATTEMPT TO ACCOUNT FOR TIME SPENT BY RESIDENT AGENTS IN COVERING LEADS IN THESE FIELDS AND TO DISCOUNT TIME SPENT ON OTHER MATTERS BY HEADQUARTERS AGENTS.

END.

TJT FBI WASH DCC LR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 12 01 AM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

47

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budget & Accounting Room

NR004 RH PLAIN

3:50 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 EJM

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SEC.

FROM RICHMOND 1P

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS MAR 24, 1975.

RICHMOND HAS ONE AGENT ASSIGNED APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND NO AGENTS ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR DEVOTES LESS THAN 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO SUCH CASES.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/ELG

3/00

MAR 25 3 52 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

48

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/ATG

NR002 SC PLAIN

9:23 AM URGENT 3/27/75 VLS

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SACRAMENTO (66-511)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. ✓ Budget [illegible]

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN HEADQUARTERS, SACRAMENTO HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGEND FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. 7 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; 3 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS; 1 AGENT EXPENDS 75 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES, 1 AGENT WITH 90 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; 1 AGENT WITH 50 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. 7 RAS HANDLE VARIETY OF CLASSIFICATIONS AND ALSO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THESE 7 AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (20 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 5 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE).

END

FBIHQ CLR SMD

3/DA

MAR 27 12 28 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

PM '75
EIVED
TYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

49

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

ML

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget & Accounting Section
[illegible] JEH

NR001 SL PLAIN

8:30AM URGENT 3/27/75 TJO

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM ST. LOUIS (94-297) RUC

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JHB

MDR16

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE ST. LOUIS DIVISION AS REQUESTED BY RE COMMUNICATION.

NEITHER THE SAC OR THE ASAC ARE ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONLY ONE SUPERVISOR IS ASSIGNED TO SUCH MATTERS, HE SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 55 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THE REMAINING AGENTS SPEND NO TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT SPEND THE LISTED PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY: THREE AGENTS, 50 PERCENT; THREE AGENTS, 25 PERCENT; ONE AGENT, 10 PERCENT; TWO AGENTS, 5 PERCENT, TWO AGENTS, 2 PERCENT.

3/0

PAGE TWO SL 94-297

ABOVE FIGURES REFLECT BOTH HEADQUARTERS CITY AND RESIDENT AGENTS IN THIS DIVISION.

END

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 9 34 AM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

50

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/ALG

✓ Budget & Acctg

NR006 SU PLAIN

8:46 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI). ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS). TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.

END. M

3/27

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 10 51 AM '75

62-116395-56

50?

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR006 SU PLAIN

846 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

✓ Budget & Accts
4-28 JCH

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI). ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS). TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.

END.

JTG FBIHQ CLR

#mo016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

3/DN

MAR 26 10 57 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

51

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
LPP
DCW
TELETYPE

NR005 SA CODE

6:55PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN ANTONIO

R-6028

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN ANTONIO OFFICE. ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF THESE MATTERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF TIME ON SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME TO THESE MATTERS.

FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, THIS BEING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL.

E N D.......

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/TS

3/DA

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 17 PM '75

62-116395-56

52

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 02 SD CODED

12:11AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL GDF

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAN DIEGO (66-NEW)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ✓ [illegible] 6 [illegible] JEH

REBUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SUPERVISORY AND AGENT TIME DEVOTED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE SAN DIEGO DIVISION:

SAC - SIX PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST MATTERS; TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ASAC - SIX PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST MATTERS; TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; 40 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 20 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

SEVEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

FOUR AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

END

*MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TTG

3/[illegible]

THAT IS ALL

SSSSSSSS

MPM FBIHQ CLR

MAR 4 3 17 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

53

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budget & Accounting
6028

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

NR 004 SF CODE

12:28 PM URGENT 3/26/75 MCC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN FRANCISCO

ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUNITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN EXCLUDES ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS MAN DAYS SPENT ON CRIMINAL MATTERS BY AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES.

SAN FRANCISCO HAS 70 AGENTS AND 5 SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY. IT HAS 73 AGENTS AND 3 SUPERVISORS FULL TIME AND ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR 25 PER CENT TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. ONE SAC AND ONE ASAC 25 PER CENT EACH ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

IEWTZ

JTG FBIHQ

#MDC16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/DA

MAR 26 3 26 PM '75
UNIT

62-116395-56

54

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep. A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

NR003 SJ CODE

10:06 PM NITEL 3-25-75 JXC

Budget & Accounting
62

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM SAN JUAN

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT PERSONNEL IN THE SAN JUAN DIVISION ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR - FULL TIME; ONE SUPERVISOR - TWENTY PER CENT OF THE TIME; FOURTEEN SPECIAL AGENTS - FULL TIME; THREE SPECIAL AGENTS - FIFTY PER CENT OF THE TIME.

AT THIS TIME, THE SAN JUAN DIVISION HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN A PENDING STATUS; THEREFORE, NO AGENT PERSONNEL ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE GA

#MORI6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JHS

3/4

MAR 25 9 PM '75
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

55

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975

NR002 SV CODE

715 PM NITEL 3/25/75 PNR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAVANNAH

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

IN RESPONSE TO RENITEL, THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN IN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS BEING SET FORTH:

		INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
1	SAC	0	0
1	ASAC	0	0
1	SUPERVISOR	40 PERCENT	10 PERCENT
1	AGENT	90 "	0
1	AGENT	50 "	10 PERCENT
1	AGENT	10 "	0
1	AGENT	0	30 PERCENT

ALL OTHER AGENTS' ACCUMULATIVE TOTAL OF TIME WOULD EQUAL 10 PERCENT FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND 0 FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FOR ONE AGENT.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JF

MAR 27 24 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

56

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR002 SE CODED

3:59 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 CSC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SEATTLE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR- FULLTIME; FIVE AGENTS - FULLTIME; THREE AGENTS - 85PERCENT OF THEIR TIME.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR: 80 PER CENT OF TIME; SEVEN AGENTS - FULLTIME.

END

HOLD FOR ONE MORE

Budget
WGS EH

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/P.J.

MAR 25 7 09 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

57

MAR 26 1975

DU

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-AD-Adm. ____
Dep.-AD-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 013 SI CODE

10:22PM NITEL 3-26-75 DJK

TO DIRECTOR

(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

RK

FROM SPRINGFIELD (66)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE TIME SPENT BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

THIRTY-SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. ONE OF THE ABOVE SAS SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND ONE OTHER SA SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND APPROXIMATELY 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHILE ANOTHER SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SURITY MATTERS.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP2ALM/JFS

3F

THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE ANY SQUADS OF AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE MATTERS AND THE ABOVE ESTIMATE HAS BEEN DETERMINED FROM THE UTILIZATION OF TIMES SPENT DURING A TWO-WEEK PERIOD ON MATTERS BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 11 33 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

58

Assoc Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR010 TP CODE

6-10PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM TAMPA (105-0)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Budg. & Accnt.
6027 [illegible]

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975, REQUESTING THAT EACH SAC SUTEL THE NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TAMPA HAS ONE SQUAD WHICH HANDLES INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS WELL AS OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS, SUCH AS APPLICANT, SELECTIVE SERVICE, DESERTERS, AND EXTREMISTS.

NONE OF THE AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 1 AGENT WHO IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THE PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AN ACCUMULATION OF THE TIME SPENT BY EACH AGENT WORKING SUCH MATTERS.

INTERNAL SECURITY - SUPERVISOR, 20 PERCENT; AGENTS, 3.5

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - SUPERVISOR, 15 PERCENT; AGENTS, 1.5.

END

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/HB

3/10

59

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget [illegible]
6028 [illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR004 WF CODED

2:57PM URGENT 3-26-75 KLS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REGARDING BUREAU NITEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (WFO) HAS ONE ASAC DEVOTING 12 PERCENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND 78 PERCENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS, THE REMAINING 10 PERCENT BEING ADMINISTRATIVE, POLICE AND LIAISON DUTIES.

IN ADDITION, WFO HAS 162 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 6 SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO CI, AND 21 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 1 SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS MATTERS. ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR DEVOTES 75 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO IS MATTERS.

END.

JRM FBIHQ

CLR

#MOC16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3/DA

MAR 26 3 02 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

ROUTE I[illegible] ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP~~ SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4/4/75

Downgraded to SECRET
60324 UC BAW/SAB/ML
1/12/2011

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

#MOR16 1-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;
~~RODERICK HILLS~~, ASSOCIATE
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

Memorandum captioned as above, 3/27/75, from Legal Counsel to you, noted that you and Wannall were to meet with Mr. Hills and Mr. Phillip Buchen, Counsel to the President, on 3/28/75. Your addendum to the memorandum pointed out the results of this meeting and the various matters discussed.

As a follow-up to this meeting, you, Legal Counsel Mintz and Wannall met on 4/4/75 with Mr. James Wilderotter, who is presently working under Mr. Buchen in coordinating intelligence community matters relating to the inquiries underway by the Senate Select Committee. Mr. Wilderotter was given a briefing similar to that which had been afforded to Buchen and Hills. In addition, the discussion covered matters of a sensitive nature relating to the ORCHID and similar programs, electronic surveillances, specialized handling of informants, and Bureau Source 4 (access to social security records). Many of these matters discussed covered topics with which Mr. Wilderotter had become familiar when he was assigned to the Department as an Assistant to former Deputy Attorney General Silberman. (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Wilderotter said it was the feeling at The White House that while raw FBI files should not be made available to the Committee, it might be necessary to permit the Committee to review a few such files in order that the integrity of the FBI could be established with the Committee. It was pointed out to him that we did not agree to this, that we could furnish summaries of material from the files. Wilderotter said he did not feel that

REC-11 62-116395-55

WRW:dsh
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

8 APR 11 1975

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Classified ~~by 12~~
Exempt from GDS, ~~Categories~~ 2 and 3
Date of ~~Declassification Indefinite~~

54 APR 16 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

furnishing reports and letterhead memoranda which had been prepared for dissemination would satisfy the Committee's needs. He was advised by both you and Mr. Mintz that it was our feeling that we should not furnish the raw material but summaries could be prepared for the Committee's purposes and if necessary, Bureau officials could be placed under oath and attest to the correctness of the summaries. Wilderotter said that this was a matter which he would afford further consideration.

As during the conference with Buchen and Hills, it was obvious as the result of our meeting with Wilderotter that The White House was most anxious that it not be caught by surprise by revelations of activities which in any way might be considered questionable. The White House is making every effort possible to become cognizant of any such situation prior to the Committee hearings.

Classified "Top Secret" to protect highly sensitive investigative techniques and matters relating to foreign relations.

ACTION:

For information. Further contacts with Wilderotter or other White House Staff Members will be duly reported.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/4/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This will confirm that on 4/4/75 Mr. James Wilderotter of the White House orally approved the Bureau's dissemination to the Senate Select Committee the following two memoranda: confidential memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover dated 8/24/36, confidential memorandum from John Edgar Hoover dated 8/25/36, both dealing with conversations Mr. Hoover had with the President.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

WOC:aso (3)

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey

REC-55 62-116395-54

12 APR 8 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/MG

5-Wob

54 APR 22 1975

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 8, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures - 2

EWL:jvl
(7)

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2ALM/lfs

REC-38

62-116395-53

EX-110

5 APR 10 1975

MAILED 7
APR 9 1975
FBI

2-ENCLOSURES

Plm

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

57 APR 16 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr.Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

One of the requests contained in referenced letter was for a list of names and titles of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBI Headquarters down to and including unit chiefs, together with a number of personnel below the level of unit chief categorized by unit. At a meeting on April 1, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis and Special Agent Paul V. Daly discussed this request with Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee. It was agreed that the request as stated would be modified and that the FBI would prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of unit chief, with names included, which would be made available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

This is to advise that the list has been prepared and is available for review under the above conditions.

1 - The Attorney General

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP 2 ALM/TG

EWL:jvl
(7)

[illegible]

PVD

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PVM JAM WRW

ENCLOSURE

62.116395-53

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JRC

#M0016

access only

check 7/28

#mdr16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JG

62-111375-53

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

#mori6 1-1701
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ETG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

IV

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Branch

Hunter E. Helgeson
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Internal Security Branch

4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor
F. Anthony Tansey

Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor
Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan	Section Chief
Eugene C. Peterson	Number 1 Man
Special Cases Unit	
James P. Lee	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
New York Unit	
Alfred E. Smith	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Washington Unit Chief	
Wilfred R. Schlarman	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	

One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar	Section Chief
James W. Redfield	Number 1 Man

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Chinese (S) Unit	
Herbert J. Morgan	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Satellite Unit	
Howard H. Wallace	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Coordination Unit	
John P. Thomas	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr.	Section Chief
Sebastian S. Mignosa	Number 1 Man
Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit	
~~Richard J. Deily~~	~~Unit Chief~~
Four Special Agents	
Middle East (S) Unit	
Carl F. Freeman	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Far East (S) Unit	
William W. Hamilton	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Cuban (S) Unit	
Charles H. McCarthy	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Nationality Unit	
Vinicio Henry Nasca	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr.	Section Chief
H. C. Flemister, Jr.	Number 1 Man
Liaison Supervisors	
Six	

Foreign Liaison Unit	
Robert A. Bermingham	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan	Section Chief
William H. Atkinson	Number 1 Man
Black Nationalist and White Hate - Central Unit	
William D. Neumann	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - East Unit	
Paul E. Nugent	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - West Unit	
Garnett T. Tunstall	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Black Nationalist - South, Klan and Informant Unit	
Homer A. Newman, Jr.	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Civil Disorders Reporting Unit	
Seymor F. Phillips	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford	Section Chief
Conrad W. Thompson	Number 1 Man

Trotskyist Unit	
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Communist Party Unit	
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Security Informant Unit	
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Extremist-West Unit	
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Extremist-East Unit	
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	

Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man
Training Unit	
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Central Research Unit	
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Special Records and Related Research Unit	
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Analytical Research Unit	
David Ryan	Unit Chief
Seven Special Agents	

#MDR16 1-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/TG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Branch

Hunter E. Helgeson
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Internal Security Branch

4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor
F. Anthony Tansey

Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor
Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan	Section Chief
Eugene C. Peterson	Number 1 Man
Special Cases Unit	
James P. Lee	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
New York Unit	
Alfred E. Smith	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Washington Unit Chief	
Wilfred R. Schlarman	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	

One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar	Section Chief
James W. Redfield	Number 1 Man

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Chinese (S) Unit	
Herbert J. Morgan	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Satellite Unit	
Howard H. Wallace	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Coordination Unit	
John P. Thomas	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr.	Section Chief
Sebastian S. Mignosa	Number 1 Man
Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit	
~~Richard J. Daily~~	~~Unit Chief~~
Four Special Agents	
Middle East (S) Unit	
Carl F. Freeman	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Far East (S) Unit	
William W. Hamilton	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Cuban (S) Unit	
Charles H. McCarthy	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Nationality Unit	
Vinicio Henry Nasca	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr.	Section Chief
H. C. Flemister, Jr.	Number 1 Man
Liaison Supervisors	
Six	

Foreign Liaison Unit	
Robert A. Bermingham	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan	Section Chief
William H. Atkinson	Number 1 Man
Black Nationalist and White Hate - Central Unit	
William D. Neumann	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - East Unit	
Paul E. Nugent	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - West Unit	
Garnett T. Tunstall	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Black Nationalist - South, Klan and Informant Unit	
Homer A. Newman, Jr.	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Civil Disorders Reporting Unit	
Seymor F. Phillips	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford	Section Chief
Conrad W. Thompson	Number 1 Man

Trotskyist Unit	
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Communist Party Unit	
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Security Informant Unit	
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Extremist-West Unit	
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Extremist-East Unit	
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	

Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man
Training Unit	
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Central Research Unit	
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Special Records and Related Research Unit	
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Analytical Research Unit	
David Ryan	Unit Chief
Seven Special Agents	

(+)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ATG
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by 9~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MOR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by 9~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/BJG
ON 1-17-01

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

#MOR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JAG
ON 1-17-01

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED ST[illegible]ES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

#MOR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/23/01 BY SP-2 ALM

SUBJECT: JOHN T. ELLIFF
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICS
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

On 3-18-75 Professor John T. Elliff advised Inspector John B. Hotis that he had been contacted by William Miller, Staff Director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, and was asked to serve as Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence. This is one of four Task Forces being formed by the Select Committee and it will focus primarily on the activities of the FBI. The other Task Forces are on Foreign Intelligence, Military and Technological Intelligence, and Command and Control.

Elliff said he had not decided whether to accept the offer and believed that others were also being considered for the position. He said he was reluctant to do anything that would interfere with the excellent working arrangements he had developed with the Bureau. He feels that his initial obligation is to the Director, and the purpose of going to the Police Foundation was to get formal support for a project that would be of primary benefit to the Bureau and only secondarily to the Attorney General and Congress. He said he would be guided by our judgment in this matter and not want to break any commitments that he might have made with the Bureau.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-11[illegible]-26

If he accepts the appointment Elliff said he would, of course, suspend work on his research project until he had terminated his employment with the Committee. He said he would also agree not to use any classified material that he acquired in his capacity as Task Force Director. Elliff has discussed this matter with John Heaphy, Assistant Director of the Police Foundation. Heaphy said the Foundation had no objections whatsoever for his accepting the position with the Senate Select Committee, and he would be free to resume his project after the Committee work was done.

REC-10 62-116395-52

NOT RECORDED
202 APR 10 1975

MAR 28 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Reed
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
JBH:dkg (7)

54 APR 14 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

It should be noted that the Select Committee considered offering the position to Larry Baskir, Counsel to the President's Clemency Board. Mr. Baskir formerly served as Chief Counsel to Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, and we had numerous contacts with him in that capacity. Our purpose was to reach some common agreement on privacy legislation that Senator Ervin planned to introduce in the 93rd Session of Congress. There were numerous meetings with Baskir on the same subject in the Deputy Attorney General's office. These efforts proved unsuccessful and after several months we discontinued the discussions. In our opinion, Mr. Baskir was unwilling to work out any reasonable compromise and seemed unsympathetic to the ~~legislation~~ legitimate concerns of law enforcement.

B.C.

It is clear that this is a matter for Professor Elliff to determine and the Bureau should not express an official opinion. Although we have not always agreed with his views on intelligence matters, we have had no occasion to question his objectivity or his integrity as a scholar. Mr. Miller knows that Professor Elliff enjoys our confidence and it is our understanding that he offered Elliff the position in order to avoid an adversary relationship between the Bureau and the Committee.

Professor Elliff said he would make no commitments to the Senate Committee until he hears from us.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Professor Elliff be advised that it would be inappropriate for us to express an opinion on whether he should accept the appointment offered by the Senate Select Committee.

Handled 3/25/75
JBH

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/31/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the afternoon of 3/25/75.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; the then Deputy AG Laurence Silberman, Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke, as well as officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

The following items of interest were discussed:

Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), and the Committee's Counsel, Mr. F.A.O. Schwarz, III, visited CIA Headquarters to discuss SSC business. Mr. Miller suggested that a tactic the SSC was considering is the identification of several key issues that the Committee could look into in-depth. For example, the SSC might propose to identify two or three covert actions engaged in by CIA and examine them in-depth rather than try to cover each and every covert action CIA might identify. Colby advised that this appeared to be an encouraging development and possibly each agency of the Intelligence Community might be asked to provide a series of key issues from which the Select Committee could select one or two for an in-depth study.

EX 104 REC-10 62-116395-51

The question of the SSC staff signing a Secrecy Agreement is still not settled. The Staff Director raised some constitutional questions regarding the Secrecy Agreement. Mr. Schwarz admitted, however, that some type of arrangement would have to be made to insure that the Intelligence Community had some protection against unauthorized disclosures by staff members of the SSC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED #MDR16
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/TAM

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE
APR 14 1976

Both Miller and Schwarz accepted the Third Agency Rule and agreed to abide by it. For the record, the SSC's interpretation of the Third Agency Rule (which is consistent with the Intelligence Community) is as follows: Classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department.

The Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) will meet to develop some ground rules and standardization for sanitizing documents to be furnished to the Select Committees.

The question of Intelligence Community personnel being represented by counsel was discussed. The position of the White House on this issue has been fully reported in a memorandum from the Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, dated 3/27/75, entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Rodney Hills Associate Counsel to the President."

It was also agreed at the meeting of 3/25/75 that the President's Counsel would attempt to negotiate with the SSC to insure that all interviews of Intelligence Community personnel would be conducted on the premises of the bureau, agency or department employing the persons to be interviewed.

Attached also for the record are the following:

A letter dated 3/20/75 from Staff Director William G. Miller to Mr. John Clarke advising that Mr. Ben Marshall has been designated as the Security Officer of the SSC;

A letter dated 3/17/75 from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke listing employees of the SSC who have been cleared by the Committee for certification by CIA for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

A letter from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke dated 3/20/75 advising that Mr. Ben Marshall was cleared for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

CONTINUED - OVER

A memorandum from the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee advising that arrangements had been perfected for the delivery of classified documents to the SSC and describing how such documents should be delivered.

ACTION:

For informationand record purposes.

WRW/TWL

PLM

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATE[illegible].
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MA[illegible], JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible] PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Officer of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, has been designated Compartmentation Officer.

Sincerely,

William Green Miller

William G. Miller

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRM
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAI
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKE R., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATE ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 17, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter of March 13, outlining a procedure for clearance for the Select Committee staff. The procedure you have suggested has been adopted and attached to this letter is the Select Committee's first listing of staff who have been cleared by the Committee. This listing is the result of the investigation undertaken by the FBI and a consideration of the FBI reports on individuals by the Chairman. As further investigations by the FBI are received, we will send additional persons to be granted clearances.

As to access to compartmentalized information, those members of the staff who will be designated will be indicated to you in subsequent communications.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
Charity Benz	7-23-46	N.Y.	053-38-7410
Michael Taylor Epstein	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318
Mark Henry Gitenstein	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767
Audrey Helen Hatry	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48	N.Y.	068-38-6464
Michael James Madigan	4-18-43	D.C.	042-34-3797
Elliot Everett Maxwell	7-24-46	N.Y.	133-34-4225
Martha Evans Mecham	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848
James Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495
Jan Orloff	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394
John F. Peterson	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707
Lewis Brittle Snider	1-12-45	N.C.	246-72-0956
Burton Victor Wides	6-14-41	N.J.	139-30-1936

As the FBI completes its investigative work, other names will be sent to you.

Ad Hoc Staff

75-181

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. M[illegible]AS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHW[illegible], PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number has received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and is hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Benjamin Marshall, May 4, 1919, Walnut (now Verdigre)
Nebraska, soc sec no 485-28-4530

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-49
21 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of USIB on Congressional Review

SUBJECT : Security - Arrangements for Receipt of Classified Material by Senate Select Committee

1. On 19 March 1975 I telephonically inquired of Mr. Benjamin C. Marshall, Security Officer of the Senate Select Committee, whether he was in a position to begin receiving classified documents. He advised that arrangements had been perfected and that effective 20 March 1975 such documents could be delivered as follows:

> The courier should enter the 1st and C Street entrance of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, inquire of the guard as to the location of Room G308, go to the front door of G308, advise the guard there that material is being delivered and have him call Mr. Marshall or Charity Benz, both of whom are authorized to receive classified documents up to and including TOP SECRET*.

2. Mr. Marshall requested that prior to delivery he or someone in his office be telephonically advised (224-1700) of the impending delivery and the estimated time of arrival so that he or someone from his office can be available. He also stated that if delivery was desired to a specific staff member, Mr. Marshall would try and have such person available, but stated he was authorized to accept documents for members of the Committee and staff.

3. The Committee has not yet advised as to compartmented clearances but Mr. Marshall has been designated Compartmentation

---

*Mr. Patrick Shea is expected to be added as a person to receive documents but the certification for this access to classified material has not as yet been received by your office.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2ALM/LTG

#MDR16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

Officer and has advised that the same delivery arrangements will be in effect for compartmented material. When necessary clearance arrangements have been perfected so that delivery of compartmented material can begin, you will be advised.

Donald E. Moore

Donald E. Moore
Chairman

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

51 THRU 100

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Organization of [illegible]

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

LHM refers to request of the SSC for a list of names and titles of certain FBI Intelligence Division (INTD) personnel at FBIHQ and numbers only of certain other INTD personnel; and relates agreement reached between FBI officials and Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the SSC, that the original request be modified as follows. The FBI will prepare the necessary list and make it available for review at FBIHQ by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75.

62-116395-100

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI REC-106

16 MAY 7 1975

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/8/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-53

11. NONE.

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/ZTG

SFP:ekw
(4)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO

3-113a (Rev. 3-21-73)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-19-88 BY SP-5 ci/ahc

Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 4/25/75

You were previously advised that Douglas Durham, former MP 4115-E, who has furnished high-level information regarding activities of the American Indian Movement (AIM), after being confronted by AIM leaders, admitted being a confidential informant for the FBI. This information has been made public.

Attached teletype from Omaha advises that Assistant U. S. Attorney Keith E. Uhl, Office of Special Prosecutor, stated he received a telephone call 4/24/75 from Durham and that Durham told him he had been contacted by representatives of the Office of Senator Frank Church, Washington, D. C., requesting Durham's presence in Washington during the week of April 28, 1975, for purpose of attending staff meetings to determine his potential as a witness before committee investigating operations of the FBI. Durham indicated he intended to comply and would have no further contact with the FBI. We are following this matter closely and you will be kept advised.

1 - General Investigative Division
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - External Affairs Division
1 - William O. Cregar

WRW

WDN:lfj wdn

JGD/wllA

DOJ/FBI

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 24 1975

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-19-88 BY SP5 ct/ahi

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR005 OM PLAIN

4:39PM NITEL 4/24/75 RRH

TO: DIRECTOR (137-33264)

MINNEAPOLIS (157-1458)

SENSTUDY-75

FROM: OMAHA (170-231) (P)

FORMER MP 4115-E. Conf.-Inst.

ON APRIL 24, 1975, AUSA KEITH E. UHL, ADVISED HE RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM SUBJECT RELATING SUBJECT HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICE OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, WASHINGTON, D.C., REQUESTING HIS PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON DURING WEEK OF APRIL 28, 1975, FOR PURPOSE OF STAFF MEETINGS TO DETERMINE SUBJECT'S POTENTIAL AS WITNESS BEFORE CHURCH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING OPERATIONS OF THE FBI. SUBJECT INDICATED HE INTENDED TO COMPLY WITH REQUEST AND HAD DECIDED THAT IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, HE WOULD DECLINE AND NOT SOLICIT ANY FURTHER CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FBI.

END.

RSP FBIHQ

5- Action

Original Filed In 137-33264-6

137-33264

18 MAY 2 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~5 0 MAY 30 1975~~

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED

JUN 1 1 1975

JUN 1 1 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 22, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/JG

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to record that on 4/18/75 Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, Executive Office Building, stated he had reviewed a final copy of the Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction including Exhibit L, pages 36 and 37. Mr. Wilderotter advised Bureau Supervisor Alonzo L. Lacey that The White House interposed no objection to the Jurisdiction paper being furnished to the Senate Select Committee.

With reference to the study entitled Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction, Mr. Wilderotter requested that he be furnished a copy and this was done. In addition, Wilderotter had previously on 4/4/75 reviewed the paper for approval of the use of items concerning Presidential or National Security Council interest.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

ALL:ekw
(5)

62-116395

WOC

REC- 106
62-116395-99

5-2

8 4 MAY 7 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/7/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SENSTUDY 75

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER ON AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

~~Security~~ Jurisdiction

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize investigative efforts to authenticate Hoover memoranda dated 8/24-25/36.

Document Section, FBI Laboratory, determined the type appearing on Hoover memorandum dated 8/25/36 was prepared on a Remington typewriter with an elite type used since October, 1935. Hoover memorandum to Tamm dated 9/10/36, was prepared on an IBM typewriter with pica-style type used since 1930.

The letterhead used on both Hoover memoranda of 8/24-25/36 was authorized FBI stationery effective August 14, 1936.

On 3/10/75, Mr. Donald B. Schewe, Assistant Librarian, Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, advised that The White House Ushers Appointment Book contained entries showing that on Thursday, August 24, 1936, from 9:20 a.m. to 10:12 a.m., President Roosevelt met with Mr. Hoover in his residence at The White House prior to leaving for his office. Schewe pointed out that this meeting was significant since President Roosevelt met Mr. Hoover immediately after returning from an extended trip, a departure from his usual practice. There was no entry on 8/25/36, other than the President's departure for the Dakotas at 10:40 p.m.

On 4/2/75, review of Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress, reflected that a Desk Diary (container #68, folder #295, microfilm #38) of Secretary Hull contained an entry on 8/25/36 that the Secretary had luncheon with the President between 1:00 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.

~~REC-8~~ ~~62-116395-~~ 1842

Detailed memorandum attached.

ACTION:

~~EX-113~~

For information.

5 ENCLOSURE

~~Enclosure~~

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED

MAY 2 1975

ALL:vb

~~50 APR 25 1975~~

MAY 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-7-00 BY 39063 ~~ELW~~/BCE/AMW

Original Filed In 62-116395-1842

Mr. White February 27, 1975

J. H. Mortimer

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TAMM
FROM JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1936;
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DATED AUGUST 25, 1936.

On this date, SA Alonzo L. Lacey of the Intelligence Division delivered the above-captioned memoranda to the Laboratory with a request to determine the make of typewriter employed in the preparation of the memoranda and the date of introduction of the type styles employed. The purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether or not the type styles on the typewriters used to write the memoranda were in use on the dates appearing on the memoranda.

It was determined that the "Memorandum For Mr. Tamm from John Edgar Hoover dated September 10, 1936" was prepared on an IBM typewriter equipped with a pica style of type which has been in use since 1930. The typewriting comprising the "Confidential Memorandum by John Edgar Hoover dated August 25, 1936" was determined to have been prepared on a Remington typewriter equipped with an elite style of type that has been in use since October, 1935.

The memoranda were returned to SA Lacey.

RECOMMENDATION:

The result of this examination be forwarded to the Intelligence Division

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Lacey
1 - Mr. White
1 - Mr. Mortimer
1 - Mr. Oberg

WSO:mrg
(6)

ENCLOSURE

~~62-66121-1842~~

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

August 14,1936.

New letterheads.

st

Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Tolson
Mr. Baughman
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Dawsey
Mr. Edwards
Mr. Egan
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Joseph
Mr. Lester
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Schilder
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

AUG 20 1936

66-342-33

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AUG 18 1936 P.M.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FILE

ENCLOSURE 62-66727 1842

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Carson
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Egan
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Harbo
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Lester
Mr. Nichols
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Schilder
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

OK

62-116395-
ENCLOSURE

~~ENCLOSURE~~ ~~62-66727~~

[illegible] DESTROYED

Mar[illegible]13, 1975

RESEARCH CONDUCTED AT FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT LIBRARY, HYDE PARK, NY
ON 3/10-12/75

On 3/10/74, Mr. DONALD B. SCHEWE, Assistant Librarian in the Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, was advised of our interest in locating any communications bearing upon a conversation between former President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT and former Secretary of State CORDELL HULL in the latter part of August, 1936. Mr. SCHEWE was advised that this conversation was concerned with the security of the US and that Mr. J. EDGAR HOOVER of the FBI may have participated in this conversation. Mr. SCHEWE was also advised that Mr. ROOSEVELT allegedly reduced the subject matter of above conversation to a memorandum and that we were interested in locating this memorandum or some information bearing upon above conversation. Arrangements were made to meet with Mr. SCHEWE at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY, on 3/12/75. Mr. SCHEWE indicated that in the meantime he would conduct some research in this matter.

On 3/12/75, Mr. SCHEWE advised that he had conducted some research relative to our telephone call on 3/10/75, and inquired if we could be more specific with regard to the dates of the information desired. SCHEWE was advised that to the best of our knowledge the conversation we were interested in involving FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (FDR), HULL and Mr. HOOVER, occurred on approximately 8/24-26/36 and that the conversation concerned the internal security of the US.

Mr. SCHEWE, at this point, furnished a Xerox copy of a "buck slip" dated 8/24/36, (copy of which is attached) on White House stationery, classified "Confidential and addressed to the Secretary of State from FDR". Mr. SCHEWE stated that "buck slips" are nothing more than a cover memorandum utilized to transmit communications which are attached thereto. It is to be noted that this "buck slip" indicates that attached to it was a memorandum for the Secretary of State, unsigned, undated and recommending coordination of activities of all agents of the Government in foreign countries. SCHEWE advised

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

~~62-[illegible]~~

that the synopsis of this memorandum which appears on the "buck slip" was the usual practice at that time to identify the documents attached to it. SCHEWE added that this was the only document he was able to locate which may have some bearing on the desired information. SCHEWE stated that the possibility exists that the referred to memorandum may be located among the collection of papers of CORDELL HULL which are now stored at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Mr. SCHEWE then exhibited to interviewing personnel the White House Ushers Appointment Book which was hand-written and kept on a daily basis. This appointment book contained the following pertinent information:

> Thursday, August 13, 1936, at 9:50 AM FDR departed the White House for a visit to the flood areas in NY, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
>
> Thursday, August 24, 1936, FDR returned to White House at 8:45 AM.
> 9:20 AM FDR met with Mr. HOOVER from 9:20 AM to 10:12 AM.
>
> (Note * - There is no entry in this book for Aug. 24, 1936, indicating that Mr. HULL was there. Mr. SCHEWE advised that it is interesting to note that FDR met Mr. HOOVER in his residence in the White House on 8/24/36, prior to leaving for his office in the White House. SCHEWE also pointed out that this meeting was significant since FDR met with Mr. HOOVER on 8/24/36, immediately after returning from an extended trip. This, according to SCHEWE was a departure from FDR's usual practice.

There was no record in the White House Usher's Appointment Book for 8/25/36, which would indicate that FDR met with either Mr. HULL or Mr. HOOVER on that date. This book indicates that FDR departed the White House on Tuesday, 8/25/75, at 10:40 PM for a trip to the draught areas, in upper Maine, South Dakota and North

Dakota, as well as a visit to Mt. Rushmore. FDR did not return to the White House until Sunday, Sept. 6, 1936, at 10:02 AM.

The White House Usher's Appointment Book further reflects that FDR, during the period July 10, 1936, to Aug. 10, 1936, was away from the White House campaigning. FDR returned to the White House on 8/10/36, and remained there until 8/13/36, when he again departed on a trip and returned on 8/24/36. FDR also departed from the White House on 8/25/36, and returned on 9/6/36.

Mr. SCHEWE also produced to interviewing personnel the appointment book of FDR's private secretary, GRACE TULLY for the pertinent period. This appointment book reflects all of FDR's office appointments. A review of this appointment book fails to reflect that FDR met or had an appointment with Mr. HOOVER in his office during the period 8/13/36 to 9/6/36. However, this appointment book does reflect that during this period FDR did have a meeting with CORDELL HULL on 8/25/36, at 1:00 PM.

Mr. SCHEWE further advised that he personally reviewed the following and was unable to locate any documents or references which could possibly shed some light on the matter of interest to us:

1.) Papers kept in FDR's safe.

2.) Papers kept by his secretary in a separate White House safe.

3.) Papers kept in FDR's official presidential file.

4.) Papers kept in FDR's alphabetical file maintained by his secretary.

5.) Individual agencies files.

6.) J. EDGAR HOOVER's file.

7.) Attorney General's file.

8.) Assistant Attorney General's file.

9.) National Security file.

10.) Internal Security file.

11.) FBI file.

In conclusion, Mr. SCHEWE stated that after reviewing all of the above data, he concluded that the pertinent document of interest to us is not at the FDR Library at Hyde Park, NY. SCHEWE added that if any such document is at the Library, it is misfiled and as there are approximately 21 million pages of manuscripts and documents at the Library, it would be impossible to locate same.

It is to be noted that on the enclosed "buck slip" there are four penciled notations, i.e. 285-C, X20, X285 and X67. SCHEWE stated that these notations are part of the FDR Library cross-reference system. SCHEWE added that he checked these references and could locate nothing further regarding the matter of interest to us. SCHEWE stated that these references pertained to the enclosed "buck slip".

285-6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

August 24, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE x 20

I find this in my file, dating back two months. As I understand it everybody is agreed on it. What is the next step?

x 255

F. D. R.

x67

Memo. from State, unsigned and undated, recommending coordination of activities of all agents of the govt. in foreign countries: each agency as it is related to the others, and all in their relation to the State Department; makes 9 recommendations of coordination.

6/4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 SP2 ALM/JTG

#mac 1.6

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

NR 003 AX CODE

11:43PM NITEL MAY 3, 1975 WMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-NEW) (P)

MAY 03 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2ALM/STG
#MORI6

RE BUTEL MAY 2, 1975. Sec93

FORMER BUREAU AGENT WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 6302 GOLF COURSE SQUARE, ALEXANDRIA, VA., CONTACTED MAY 2, 1975 AND STATED THAT IN EVENT HE IS CONTACTED BY STAFF OF SENATE OR HOUSE COMMITTEES, HE MAY REFUSE TO BE INTERVIEWED, BUT IF HE CONSENTS TO BE INTERVIEWED HE WILL REQUEST PRESENCE OF FBI AGENT, IF QUESTIONS ARE ASKED RELATIVE TO SENSATIVE TO BUREAU OPERATIONS.

INQUIRY AT RESIDENCE OF HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1160 WIMBLEDON DRIVE, MC LEAN, VA., ON MAY 2, 1975, REVEALS THAT HE IS PRESENTLY AT CLUB MEDITERRANEAN, HOTEL CARAVELLE, ST. ANNE, GUADALUPE, FRENCH WEST INDIES. HE IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO HIS RESIDENCE ON MAY 18, 1975.

REC-106 62-116395-98

BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE IF ALEXANDRIA SHOULD CONTACT LEINBAUGH UPON HIS RETURN.

18 MAY 7 1975

TJT FBI WASH DC CLR

SAC [illegible] AX, [illegible] to contact Leinbaugh on return from 5/18/75

Records

cc 67-585330 (George)
67-476321 (Leinbaugh)

84 MAY 8 1975

NR 002 BA PLAIN

1220PM URGENT MAY 3, 1975 BJD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: BALTIMORE (62-NEW)

SENSTUDY 75

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 03 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

RE BUREAU TEL, MAY 2, 1975.

DONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND, CONTACTED INSTANT DATE BY SAC, BALTIMORE. INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED TELETYPE FOLLOWED. HANNING ADVISED HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO DATE. ADVISED WOULD CONTACT SAC, BALTIMORE SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED IN THE FUTURE.

ENDDSS FBIHQ CCLR

REC-106

62-116395-97

16 MAY 7 1975

5-B

file 62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2ALR/1/16
#M0016

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

cc: 62-41404 (Hanning)

84 MAY 8 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 0 2 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG
MDR16

NR 09 OM PLAIN

7:00 PM CST URGENT MAY 2, 1975 SKH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: OMAHA (62-NEW) (P)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MAY 2, 1975.

FORMER SA JOHN J. QUINN WAS CONTACTED BY ME PERSONALLY AND ADVISED PER INSTRUCTIONS IN RETEL. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF ADVANCED NOTICE RE POSSIBLE INTERVIEW AND STATED THAT HE WOULD DESIRE AN AGENT BE PRESENT IF SUCH INTERVIEW OCCURS. STATED HE WOULD PERSONALLY CONTACT ME IF HE IS CONTACTED BY STAFF MEMBERS.

BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

END.

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CRLR

REC- 106

62-116395-96

16 MAY 7 1975

cc 67-436724 (Quinn)

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

8 4 MAY 9 1975

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures of the FBI

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with enclosures described below

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified except for one enclosure which is classified "Secret."

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Following excerpts from the FBI Manual of Instructions:

(a) Table of Contents.
(b) Preface. Guidelines for FBI Investigations.
(c) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret").
(d) Section 84. Registration Act.
(e) Section 86. Sabotage.
(f) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals.
(g) Section 88. Sedition.
(h) Section 95. Treason.
(i) Section 97. Voorhis Act.
(j) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

REC-106

62-116395-95

16 MAY 7 1975

Also, Table of Contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations.

SFP:ekw
(4)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

Material furnished includes policy, statutes, instructions and related matters covering FBI investigations in the security field generally. Limited, extremely sensitive material excluded but available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff at FBI Headquarters.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/7/75

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-75

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

No direct relation.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 12-17-73)

(Copies to [illegible]ces Checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu
☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☐ New York City
☐ Norfolk
☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Beirut
☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Brasilia
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Hong Kong
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Manila
☒ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Singapore
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date 5/8/75

RE: **SENSTUDY 75**

PERSONAL ATTN.

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☒ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by ____________

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ____________ dated ____________.

Remarks:

Attached should be brought to the attention of Assistant Legat Armand Cammarota. For his information, the SSC has exhibited an interest in Bureau's communications to Rome in 1964 and is aware Cammarota was then Legat there. He thus may be contacted by SSC personnel.

#mol16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

File
5-8

Enc.
Bufile **62-116395**
Urfile

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: 2/7/75.

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2-ALM/MG

Hotis

FARRINGTON

On 2/6/75 Mr. Kelley and I met with Senator Church and Bill Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee. Senator Church pointed out that he intended to run the Committee in a very responsible manner, had no intention of destroying or impairing the effectiveness of the intelligence community and, in fact, hoped that the efforts of the Committee would help to reestablish public confidence in the intelligence agencies.

Parameters have not been drawn but Senator Church feels that the Committee will confine its activities largely to inquiries into domestic activities. The inquiries will be designed to determine whether agencies have acted outside the law and the type of remedial legislation necessary to prevent such abuses in the future.

Study will be largely concerned with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency but will, of course, involve the FBI and other agencies involved in domestic intelligence.

The Committee hopes to have a nonpartisan staff of approximately 40 employees headed up by Mr. Miller and would appreciate having necessary background investigations expedited to permit an early clearance. Miller indicated he has already been in touch with Mr. Hotis and Mr. Bowers in this regard. It was explained that the contemplated procedure involved the FBI conducting the full-field investigation necessary with the results being furnished to the Chairman, after which he would, upon being personally satisfied as to their loyalty, furnish the results to CIA for final clearance. Senator Church appeared satisfied with this arrangement. He stated that he wanted to prevent leaks and be hopefully as successful as the Judiciary Committee was on the impeachment inquiry. Our experience in this regard was pointed out wherein the Judiciary Committee in connection with the 17 wiretaps had written us a letter indicating that if we made classified

ST-117

REC 68 62-116395-94

5 APR 29 1975

JBA:ams (8)
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis

LEGAL COUNSEL

CONTINUED - OVER

84 MAY 7 1975

information available they would afford it appropriate security restricted to members only, excluding staff, and would not make the information public. Subsequent to the hearings, the Committee published its report which contained our classified documents right along with the Top Secret classifications. Senator Church was not aware of this, appeared surprised by it, and stated surely the information must have been declassified. I advised him that not by us and it was our information.

Senator Church was asked whether in his opinion the formation of the Select Committee would have any effect on the proliferation of committees seeking to obtain testimony from the FBI and it was his opinion that this would have a favorable effect. He said he had been in touch with other members of the Senate who felt that it was a waste of time to have repetitious testimony on the same subject matter before a variety of committees and he had the feeling that the other committees would hold off until after the Senate Select Committee completed its hearings. He indicated that he could not vouch for what would happen in the House, however, he intended to speak to the House leadership in order to try to effect some coordinated approach there also, because he was well aware of the large number of committees seeking to provide oversight or obtain information from the intelligence agencies.

A question arose as to the extent of cooperation with the Committee and Senator Church was assured that the FBI would be completely responsive subject to certain limitations which would have to be delineated by the President in order to protect sensitive sources and information. Senator Church indicated that he was going to talk to the President in this regard in order to secure his complete cooperation, and it was Senator Church's feeling that the Committee should be entitled to answers to any questions they might ask without restriction other than, of course, the identities of informants. He felt the progress of the Committee would be severely impaired if it were necessary to go to Court over such questions to obtain enforcement of their right to have access to whatever information they need.

ACTION:

Information.

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Mr. T.J.Jenkins 5/2/75
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

PERSONAL ATTENTION

TO SACS ALL OFFICES

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK TO INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ts6
#mde/6

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-16 62-11 [illegible] 93

WOC:ekw ekw
(18)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

JB/B
PvM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y ___

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 03 1975
TELETYPE

NPC/PvM

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

58 MAY 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO 954-546

PROTECTED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL. YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

NOTE: Teletype prepared for all offices to alert SACs to the possibility former employees may contact their offices seeking guidance.

The Office of Legal Counsel in response to requests from former employees will utilize the briefing paper prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by Assistant Attorney General Antonino Scalia.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. W. R. Wannall~~
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

DATE: May 1, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum for record purposes reports discussion 4/25/75 between Bureau's Liaison Agent, L. F. Schwartz, and Mr. Jack E. Thomas, Chief, Coordination Staff, Intelligence Community Staff, relating to Abstracts we are to prepare for the Central Community Index (CCI) in connection with Senstudy 75.

Attached are (1) memorandum 4/11/75 re CCI and its attachments, memorandum 4/10/75 and Abstract format; and (2) letter 4/21/75 from Thomas to Schwartz and its attachment, Abstract format. On 4/25/75 Schwartz and Thomas discussed applicability of instructions in attachments and arrived at the following understandings.

The FBI will provide Abstracts only, not documents, to have on record in the CCI a summary of what we have furnished to the Select Committees. Abstracts should be dated when typed without regard to delivery date of Abstract or date of communications to which they pertain. Under item number nine of format, enter date of communication involved, not date it is delivered to a Select Committee. We may use an abbreviated version for the Select Committees' names, such as "Senate Select Committee." We will title Abstracts as near as possible in a manner keyed to the language of the request from the Select Committee. Inasmuch as we will honor only written requests from the Select Committees, the "Requester" will always be shown as the name of the requesting Committee and not the name of any Committee personnel.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2

#MD216

ACTION: None. For information and record purposes.

62-116395-92

62-116395

REC-88

16 MAY 6 1975

Enclosures

SFP:ekw
(6)

2 ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 6 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

11 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Reviews

Inspector General, CIA

SUBJECT : Central Community Index

[illegible]

[illegible] deliver our abstracts WOP

1. The central indexing capability detailed in the attached memorandum has been implemented. Format for preparation of abstracts has been accepted and the Community Index is ready to receive material. The address of the Community Index is

Room 6E25
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia 20505.

2. The timeliness of reporting to the Central Index is critical and you are requested to make this information available to the appropriate organizational components within your agencies.

Sincerely,

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment

from [illegible] 5/1/75

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG
#m0216

File 62-116395

5-8

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-92

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

10 April 1975

#moe16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence

1. The Intelligence Community Staff, with John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy/IC, as my representative in these matters, will keep the Board and other appropriate officials advised as to progress of the investigations conducted by the Senate and House Select Committees investigating intelligence activities. In particular, it will ensure that we are kept informed as to materials which are formally being provided to the Select Committees by all elements of the Community. The USIB Ad Hoc Group will assist on this matter and provide the mechanism for regular and constant communications.

2. In response to this assignment, the Intelligence Community Staff is establishing a registry for documentation relating to the investigations. This registry will be a source of reference of all responses, testimony, et cetera, provided by USIB agencies and available to your designated representatives.

3. In order to make the registry useful to the Board, it is essential that it include:

a. File copies of documents or other materials which each Intelligence Community element provides to one of the Select Committees where the originating agency considers the materials to involve aspects of Community activities, and/or which may result in follow-on queries concerning the functioning of the Community. The availability of this documentation will be of particular importance if it is expected there will be subsequent inquiries relating to the materials provided and involving elements of the Community other than the originating element.

b. An abstract of each formal input to a Select Committee - unless the Intelligence Community registry is provided with an actual copy of the material itself. A proposed format for such abstracts is attached.

W. E. Colby

Attachment:
As stated

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT:

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)

7. DATE OF REQUEST:

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY:

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY:

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify)

MOR 16

1-19-01 SP-2 ALM/JTG

Ad Hoc Staff
75-358

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

21 April 1975

[illegible] 4/21/75 [illegible]

Mr. L. Frank Schwartz
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4637
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, D. C.

#MORI6
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TTG

Dear Frank:

Reference is your request for comments on the sample abstracts prepared in the FBI as a report on materials being provided to the Senate Select Committee.

As you know, we want to make the Community Registry as complete a record as possible of what is provided to the Committee, and for this reason hope that the actual copy of special reports and particularly important documents will be provided to the Registry. Where this is not done, an abstract or summary of each document or homogenous set of documents.

We have amended the abstract format slightly to include an entry for "Document Classification." A copy of the amended format is enclosed.

Your sample abstracts require a few alterations to make them more "indexable."

a. Item 1, "TITLE/SUBJECT" refers to the subject matter of the material which is being provided. The abstract on the FBI Manual of Instructions should have an entry here something like "Instructions covering FBI Investigations in the Security Field," rather than the title of the Senate Committee.

b. The date at the head of the page should be the date of preparation of the abstract. The date of submission to the Committee is listed at Item 9.

c. The entry "ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION" identified the organization with authority to release the document.

[illegible] W.O. [illegible] 0-11/75
SFP:eRW

File 62-116395

5

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-92

d. The "SUMMARY OF CONTENTS" section should be brief, but also should clearly indicate what is being provided to the Committee. I wonder, for instance, whether your sample on the letterhead memoranda was issued in widely separated time periods. The summary as written gives no indication as to the particular subject of any of the memoranda and the single sentence now used to describe all of them covers the waterfront.

e. If the request for information comes officially from the Committee, the Committee title should be entered under "REQUESTOR," but if the requestor is an individual member of the Staff, his name should be indicated.

f. The last entry in the format, "PROBLEM AREAS," has particular significance since it is important to know if there are Third Agency, or sources and methods, or other sensitivity problems involved, and this is the place to identify them. We are beginning to use the abstracts prepared in our office as an aid to obtaining release clearance when we are dealing with the document for which another agency must concur in the release. The "PROBLEM AREAS" section gives such other agency an idea as to whether we see any important reason why they should be concerned about release of the document. The entry in this final section of the format is expected to prove useful for this purpose.

5. One copy of the document or its abstract is all that is needed by the registry.

6. The mailing address of the registry is:

Community Index
Room 6E25
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia 20505

Jack E Thomas

Jack E. Thomas
Chief
Coordination Staff, ICS

Enclosure: as stated

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT:

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)

7. DATE OF REQUEST:

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY:

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY:

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify)

#m PR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: April 21, 1975

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

On Thursday, 4/17/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President for Congressional Inquiries, was furnished the following four documents with a request that he advise whether copies of such documents could be made available to the Senate Select Committee: (1) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/16/72 captioned "FBI Jurisdiction, Criminal Intelligence Information"; (2) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/18/72 captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters"; (3) A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director L. Louis Patrick Gray III dated 5/19/72; (4) A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated 8/7/73 recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

On 4/18/75 Mr. Wilderotter advised Section Chief William O. Cregar that the above four documents were cleared for delivery to the Senate Select Committee.

ACTION: For information and record purposes.

WOC:ekw ekw

62-116395

REC-88

62-116395-91

16 MAY 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/dfb

84 MAY 6 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General

April 28, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Lish Whitson. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for your use in the event you desire to furnish it to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SPLJOM/CA

6076

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

SFP:ekw
(11)

REC-6

62-116395-90

EX-110

MAY 2 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NPC/mo

JB+
Pln

56 MAY 06 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JOmlw
6026

62-116395

April 28, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information available to the FBI concerning captioned matter.

SSC Interview of Retired FBI SA Lish Whitson

On the afternoon of April 23, 1975, Mr. Lish Whitson personally appeared at the office of an FBI official, stated that he had just been interviewed by Mr. Michael Epstein, Staff Member of the SSC, and was desirous of reporting the results of that interview which Whitson related as follows:

Epstein first asked Whitson when he entered the FBI, when he first arrived for assignment at FBI Headquarters, to which Headquarters Division he had been assigned, and when he retired. (FBI records reveal that Whitson joined the FBI as an SA November 20, 1933, and retired June 19, 1972. He was assigned at Headquarters December 16, 1941, attached to the Domestic Intelligence Division and served in that Division until his retirement. The current name for that Division is Intelligence Division). Epstein then told Whitson that he knew that Whitson had at one time mailed a package to Mrs. Martin Luther King from Tampa, Florida, and asked Whitson to relate the details concerning this matter. Whitson thereupon

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)

SFP:ekw (KW)
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NPC/MB

JBS/Pen

SEE NOTE PAGE FIVE

62-116395-90

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

told Epstein that in the late Summer of 1964, former FBI Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had telephoned Whitson at his home one Saturday and told him that late FBI Director Hoover wanted Whitson to deliver a package to Miami, Florida, by plane and on arrival at the Miami airport to telephone Sullivan for further instructions. Whitson did as directed and upon calling Sullivan, was instructed to address the package to Mr. Martin Luther King. Accordingly, Whitson had the package weighed, put postage stamps on it, and addressed it to Martin Luther King (not Mrs. Martin Luther King as Epstein had indicated). The following day, Sunday, Whitson flew back to Washington and on the next day, Monday, he informed Sullivan that his instructions had been carried out. Sullivan commented to Whitson "Someday I will tell you about that."

Epstein asked Whitson who had paid for the stamps to mail the package and Whitson said that he had probably done so utilizing per diem money. Epstein asked whether he had put a return address on the package and Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had gone to the Miami FBI Office, whether any Agent had met him at the Miami airport, and whether Whitson had discussed this matter with anyone. Whitson told Epstein that he had not gone to the Miami Office, that no Agent had met him, and that he had discussed the matter only with Sullivan. At this point, Whitson asked Epstein how he got the story. Epstein merely laughed and did not reply to the question.

Epstein also asked Whitson whether he had ever written a memorandum regarding this matter, to which Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had ever seen a memorandum on this matter and Whitson again replied in the negative.

On April 24, 1975, Whitson telephoned the FBI official referred to above on two occasions to report additional information which Epstein had secured from Whitson by telephone on April 24, 1975. This additional information was as follows:

Epstein asked how Whitson had made the trip to Miami; that is, how it was paid for. Whitson told him he had issued a Government Transportation Request (GTR). Epstein asked whether there was any prior written authorization for Whitson to make the trip and Whitson told him there was none. Epstein asked what kind of record would have been made covering the trip and Whitson explained that the only record he knew of would be the expense voucher he submitted covering the expenses involved and possibly the copy of the GTR which he had issued. Whitson explained to Epstein that the voucher would merely show that the GTR had been issued for a round-trip to and from Miami and how much per diem had been claimed in connection with the trip. Epstein inquired as to whether Whitson had registered at the Airport Hotel in Miami, and, if so, whether it was under his own name. Whitson told Epstein that he had registered under his name at this hotel.

Additional Information Furnished to FBI By Whitson

In addition to the foregoing, Whitson furnished to the FBI official the following information on April 23, 1975, which information he did not furnish to Epstein.

When Sullivan told Whitson he wanted him to fly the package to Miami, he stated that only he, Sullivan, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Tolson, (then FBI Associate Director) and Mr. Belmont (then FBI Assistant to the Director) knew of this situation. (At the time, 1964, Sullivan was an Assistant Director.) Sullivan never did explain to Whitson anything more regarding this incident.

Whitson said that when he arrived at the North Terminal at National Airport, following Sullivan's telephonic instructions, a young man who was unknown to Whitson but who addressed him as "Mr. Whitson," turned over to him a package which was wrapped in brown paper and sealed with sealing tape. It is Whitson's recollection the package measured approximately eight inches by eight inches by one inch.

It is Whitson's further recollection that at the time the foregoing occurred, King was either just about to go abroad to receive the Nobel Peace Prize or probably had already gone abroad. It was Whitson's recollection that sometime shortly after the mailing of the package, Sullivan commented to Whitson that the package had not yet been received by King. Because of this remark, Whitson is of the belief that the package was mailed to King at the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and not to King's residence. Further, it was Whitson's recollection that it was not long after he had mailed the package that King had a personal meeting with Mr. Hoover in the latter's office.

Whitson observed that in his opinion, the information which was in the possession of Epstein prior to interviewing Whitson must have originated with Sullivan. Whitson noted that Mr. Hoover and Mr. Tolson are both deceased and that he has heard nothing to indicate that Mr. Belmont has been contacted by members of the Staff of the SSC. One other factor that causes Whitson to feel that Sullivan was the source of the information was a question Epstein raised as to whether Whitson had put a return address on the package when he addressed it to King. Whitson said he recalls that when he was in Miami and received the telephonic instructions from Sullivan, Sullivan told him that he should put a return address on the package and Whitson then pointed out to Sullivan that if he did so, and the name of the addressee became smeared, the package would end up at someone's return address rather than in the

dead letter office. Sullivan concurred that no return address should be used. Thus, Sullivan would probably have reason to have commented regarding the use or nonuse of a return address.

On April 24, 1975, Whitson furnished by telephone to the aforementioned Bureau official the following additional information which he had not furnished to Epstein. Whitson stated it was now his recollection he had made the Miami trip either in the late Summer or early Fall of 1964 and that King was "away" at the time.

FBI Records Concerning Whitson's Travel

The following information is on record in the FBI concerning the travel of Whitson discussed above. On December 9, 1964, a Travel Voucher was processed for payment to Whitson the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period November 1-30, 1964. On record also is a memorandum copy of a Government Transportation Request issued November 21, 1964, to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air coach travel, Washington, D. C., to Miami, Florida, and return. November 21, 1964, has been determined to have been a Saturday. There is not available in the FBI any copy of the actual voucher submitted by Whitson.

NOTE: Original and one copy to the Attorney General (AG may forward the copy to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President). Information herein taken from two memoranda W.R. Wannall to J. B. Adams 4/23, 24/75, "Senstudy 75; Former Supervisor Lish Whitson, Assigned Intelligence Division." Voucher and GTR information from J. D. Cox, Voucher Unit, Computer Systems Division.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 18, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/MG
#moe16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and specifically Part IV, Policies and Procedures.

Since the enclosed memorandum captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, originated with the Office of the Attorney General and is covered under this request, we are deferring to your judgment in this matter. The FBI interposes no objection to furnishing this document to the Committee, it being noted that the document appeared in toto in the United States Government Printing Office publication captioned "Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillances, 1974."

Also enclosed for your approval is the original of a memorandum to the Senate Select Committee apprising the Committee of our referral of this matter to you. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

4/25 Approved by A.G. ([illegible])
4/24 Delivered to [illegible] office by [illegible]

REC-100

62-116395-89

TEB:vb
(8)

16 MAY 2 1975

NOTE:

The request referred to above is one of several contained in the referenced communication. We are referring this matter to the Department as a matter of protocol in line with our policy of furnishing the Committee only documents originating with the FBI.

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

PLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

April 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of the captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

This is to advise that with respect to the memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, we are deferring action on this request to the United States Department of Justice inasmuch as this communication originated with that Department.

62 - 116395

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:vb
(8)

#MOE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW/TWL

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62 - 116395 - 89

GPO 954-546

S-89

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]G

62-116395-89

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation DATE: May 20, 1954.

XI

FROM The Attorney General

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE 155-26

declassified 4/28/7[illegible] TEB/[illegible]

~~[illegible]~~

The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of microphone surveillance in connection with matters relating to the internal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal security matters equally as important as the duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigations. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of installing a microphone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all cases, including internal security matters. Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion that under such circumstances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.

Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones, suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow rather than reflect the present state of the law. It is realized that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone. The question of whether a trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the circumstances in each case in the light of the practical necessities of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.

H.B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. WALSH

DATE: 4/3/75

FROM : L. C. GROOVER

LCG/

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM

Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church dated 3/19/75.

Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities, together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations and activities (page 3, item IIIC of relet).

The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached herewith, to the above request.

It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security, intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the data for both of the other categories as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-100

62-116395-88

That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

16 MAY 2 1975

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Jackson

JJC:jmb

SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE THREE

ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 21 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities

WOB

ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75

The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.

JWR/HHW

WAB

LC

FBD

WRW

OVER

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-14-75

Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:

OK to classify Confidential

(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.

(2) Before making any determination as to whether we make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.

(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.

PVD

Tom Feeney acting
for WOC OK'd using
Walsh as classification
authority - 4/28/75
WOC

see memo Cregar to Wannall dated 4/1/75
woc f eKw

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 5\1=2 BLM/JHG Amoe16
ON 1-18-07

62-116395-888

ENCLOSURE

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-14-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 4-11-75 Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, was apprised of the fact we intended to affix a property stamp on certain nonclassified documents we were furnishing the Senate Select Committee (SSC). It was explained the stamp contained a caveat that the particular document may not be made available to unauthorized individuals without the Bureau's consent. He advised he felt this procedure was excellent.

On 4-14-75 Mr. Marvin requested that all future contacts with the Department concerning SENSTUDY be coordinated with Jack Fuller, extension 3892. Mr. Fuller is assigned to the Attorney General's office.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

REC- 106

62-116395-87

APR 23 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (7)

84 APR 30 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - ~~Mr. J. B. Adams~~
1 - ~~Mr. J. A. Mintz~~
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 14, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Mr. L. C. Groover to Mr. Walsh memorandum dated 3/4/75 entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities" forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review the titles and numbers of FBI field office Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities. This was in response to requirement IIIC of Senator Church's letter dated 3/19/75.

By addendum dated 4/4/75 the Intelligence Division recommended that the Legal Counsel Division discuss with the staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) our reluctance to provide these type figures to the SSC.

On 4/11/75 I discussed with Mr. John Clark, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the intelligence community, the request of Senator Church. Specifically, Mr. Clark was asked if Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had received such a request and how they responded. Mr. Clark advised that CIA had not received a specific request for the titles and numbers of CIA officers assigned to intelligence collection or counterintelligence matters. However, CIA had received a request to identify the names and numbers of CIA covert officers assigned overseas.

REC-106 62-116395-86

Mr. Clark advised that CIA intended to advise the Staff Director of the SSC that CIA was unwilling to provide such names and numbers to the SSC for retention in its files. However, CIA would be willing to allow a senior staff member or the Staff Director to review the names and numbers of CIA covert officers overseas at the CIA headquarters building.

APR 29 1975

WOC:ekw
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL ADDENDUM
PAGE 3

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/KG

84 APR 30 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

If approved, the Legal Counsel Division should advise the SCC that because of security considerations, the [redacted] titles and numbers of Special Agents of the FBI assigned to internal security and counterintelligence matters cannot be furnished to the SCC in documented form for the Committee files. However, the FBI would be willing to show the titles and figures to Mr. Miller or a senior staff member at FBIHQ in an effort to demonstrate a spirit of cooperation and credibility.

WRW/TJL

Addendum

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division interposes no objection to Intelligence Division's recommendation. If approved, Intelligence Division prepare necessary communication to notify the SSC.

JCF

JH

See memo to A.G.
with encl. for AD & SSC
4/22/75 EWL/EKW.
WJB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
APRIL 11, 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM 1746

W. O. WOC

On 4/11/75, from 10:00 am until 12:20 pm, staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities were briefed by Assistant Director Wannall and members of his staff in the Conference Room at INTD. Briefed from the Committee were Mr. William Miller, Staff Director; Mr. Frederick A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel; and Messrs. Mark Gitenstein, Marvin Epstein, Patrick Shea, Britt Snider and Loch Johnson, all staff members.

The first hour of the briefing was occupied with the showing of the INTD slide presentation and commentary which provided highlights of the work of the INTD, both in the counterintelligence and internal security field. Following this presentation a question and answer period ensued for the rest of the briefing. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz posed most of the questions.

In the counterintelligence field the thrust of the questioning was directed toward the continuing growth of the hostile intelligence presence in the United States and its short-term and long-term effect on the FBI's operations. Mr. Wannall pointed out that the Director on previous occasions had indicated his intention to "beef up" the counterintelligence effort of the FBI by the addition of some 250 Special Agents, and that INTD had also effected certain programs designed to assign certain counterintelligence functions to non-Agent personnel, thereby freeing additional Special Agents to function as case officers. In response to a question as to whether the additional investigative effort necessary to counter the mounting hostile intelligence threat might not involve investigation of more and more American citizens, Mr. Wannall conceded

62-116395

REC-106 62-116395-83

APR 29 1975

EWL:jvl
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 APR 30 1975

that this was inevitable. He stressed, however, the investigative policies of the FBI which protected the constitutional rights and right of privacy of such individuals.

On the domestic internal security side the thrust of the questioning appeared to indicate an interest in the predication, duration and administrative controls of investigations of domestic organizations and individuals. Again, Mr. Wannall stressed the precautions inherent in FBI policy and instructions to the field in these matters, pointing out, in effect, that these investigations are founded on statutory authority and are closely supervised by experienced personnel at Headquarters level. The Committee staff appeared to accept these answers and no critical or hostile attitudes on their part were evident.

The briefing was terminated at 12:20 pm, due to commitments on the part of the staff. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz both expressed their appreciation for the briefing and indicated it had been most instructive. They indicated a desire to continue these discussions at some later date and Mr. Wannall assured them that he would be happy to continue the briefing at any future mutually agreeable time.

Perhaps most significant of all questions posed was the final question by Mr. Schwarz in which he inquired as to what advantages and disadvantages to the FBI could be anticipated as a result of the Committee fulfilling its mandate. Mr. Wannall replied that any statutory authority defining and affirming the FBI's role in the intelligence collection field would certainly be a positive achievement. He also stated that any result of the Committee's investigation which would tend to limit the investigative resources or the investigative effectiveness of the FBI would surely be an unfortunate negative factor.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

WRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: April 23, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
~~FORMER~~ SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

At 3:17 p.m., 4/22/75 former Special Agent Lish Whitson who for many years was a supervisor in the Intelligence Division telephoned me to advise that he had received a request to appear for an interview by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee. The interview was scheduled for 4/23/75.

In response to a question by Mr. Whitson, he was advised that to the writer's knowledge this was the first former Bureau employee who had been requested to appear for an interview by any member of the staff of the Select Committee. Whitson stated that he was proceeding on the basis that he would respond to questions propounded to him but he had some reservation in his mind concerning answering questions which would involve material which he knew to be classified at the time he retired. He commented he had noted in the news media that staff members of the Committee were reportedly to be granted clearances through TOP SECRET - Q (Atomic Energy Matters).

Whitson was advised by the writer that while it was true staff members were being granted clearances, the Bureau was endeavoring to establish procedures through the Attorney General whereby highly sensitive and classified material could be revealed on a restricted basis in response to Committee inquiries; for example, in some instances we would request that only the Majority and Minority leaders on the Committee be furnished certain types of material and in other instances only the Senators themselves as opposed to all staff members.

REC-100 62-116395-84

Mr. Whitson said in view of this, it was his intention to be as responsive and candid during the interview by Mr. Epstein as he could be but if any questions arose in his mind with respect to revelation as to what he, Whitson, considered to be sensitive material, he anticipated he would express his concern to Mr. Epstein and advise him he felt it would be appropriate to check with the Bureau since he is aware of regulations by the Attorney General which preclude revealing FBI information without the Attorney General's specific

6 APR 29 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

WRW:lml
(5)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JS

5-1506

84 APR 29 1975

prior approval. Whitson stated that if the writer had no objection, he would telephone again after his interview with Epstein in the event any matters came up which he felt would be of interest to the Bureau. He was assured that the writer had no objection whatsoever and would appreciate any observations which he cared to pass along.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

wrw

JBA
PLM

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 22, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated March 19, 1975, the Senate Select Committee requested information from the FBI. Part I of the Committee's letter pertained to the legal authority for investigations.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and four documents on the subject of legal authority for investigations.

A copy of this memorandum, with enclosures, is being provided for your records.

4/28/75 Appr[illegible] by [illegible] ([illegible])
4/28/75 Del[illegible]d to Mike Epstein
of Committee (SSC)

Enclosures - 10

AFW:vb (6)

REC-100

62-116395-83

NOTE:

The Senate Select Committee's 3/19/75, letter was transmitted with an attachment, prepared by the Committee's staff, which set forth examples of the type of information concerning domestic intelligence jurisdiction of interest to it. Among those items cited in the attachment to the Committee's 3/19/75, letter was a study on jurisdiction prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III by the Office of Legal Counsel, dated 5/18/72. Representatives of the Legal Counsel Division do not believe the 5/18/72 study is, in itself, appropriate to furnish in response to the question of the Senate Select Committee on legal authority. However, Legal Counsel Division believes that two internal FBI memoranda, prepared in connection with the drafting of the 5/18/72, study, would be pertinent to the Senate Select Committee's inquiry. Accordingly, these two documents, items one and two of attached memorandum for the Committee, are being furnished.

APR 29 1975

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."

2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.

4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

1 - The Attorney General

AFW:vb
(6)

soc. Dir. ——
Dep. AD Adm. —
Dep. AD Inv. —
Asst Dir.
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. —
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
tell. ——
boratory ——
. & Eval. —
Inv. ——
ing ——
oun ——
e Rm. —
Sec'y ——

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

JBA/PLM

62-116[illegible]-83
ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 934-546

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UN[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]USTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."

2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.

4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

62-116395-83

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

D : Mr. Dalbey DATE: 5/16/72

ROM : J. A. Mintz

UBJECT: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

#m0e16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/MG

You requested analysis of the legal authority for FBI criminal intelligence collection and its relationship to our statutory jurisdiction in criminal matters.

"The gathering of criminal intelligence information" describes activity not subject to precise definition. However, its general objective is well understood by those engaged in law enforcement. There exist individuals and groups whose daily occupations are directed toward profit without regard to the restraints of the law. Yet, by the very nature of their associations, little actual participation in criminal acts may be observed by the most astute law enforcement observer. Their existence and contribution to the sum of criminal behavior has been detected and to some degree measured by the collection of data concerning their personal life-styles, property holdings, associates, influence, and access to capital. Such information has been characterized as "criminal intelligence."

For years, the FBI has been aware of the need to identify these resources of the criminal element. Congress responded to this need through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The Congressional findings were that organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and by the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption. Legitimate business and labor unions are infiltrated and corrupted and our democratic processes are subverted. The problem was declared to be of of national concern both as to our economy and the domestic security.

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395-83

ENCLOSURE

The Act attempted to attack organized crime by making criminal the management of syndicated gambling and by prohibiting racketeering activity characteristic of organized crime including the use of illegal proceeds for investment in legitimate business enterprises.

The long-established suspicions of law enforcement officers were confirmed by the Congressional findings but statutory enactments did not eliminate the conduct described as evil therein. There remains the task of establishing the identities of those constituting the national menace and developing prosecutable evidence of their guilt. "Criminal intelligence" collection is one means by which this responsibility may be fulfilled. It may be the only practical means in view of the scarcity of witnesses willing to testify and of the high mortality potential of those who do appear. A classic example of such intimidation is reported in United States v. Addonizio, 451 F2d 49 (3rd Cir. 1972) where a prospective witness in a corruption case found an anonymous note on the seat of his car which read "This could have been a bomb. Keep your mouth shut."

Accepting the need for intelligence gathering as a practical necessity, the issue remains as to its propriety in the face of Constitutional protections. If the Supreme Court announces that individuals have a Constitutionally protected right of privacy that may be overcome only through established arrest, search, and subpoena procedures, the issue will be settled. But, thus far, the Court has only drawn upon the concept of Constitutional privacy to resolve cases involving special circumstances such as marital affairs (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)) and interception of communications (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))

More specific Constitutional limitations on the criminal intelligence function may be found in the First Amendment protections of speech and assembly; the Fourth Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

The theme consistently found in decisions having a bearing on th relationship between these rights and the collection of criminal intelligence is that, when in direct conflict, the collection efforts must yield. Such is

not to label criminal intelligence as necessarily the product of malpractice, but to recognize the paramount nature of the Constitutional interests being safeguarded. Other incidents of government regulatory authority have been required to yield as well when confronted with legitimate claims of Constitutional protection, e.g. the administrative search cases, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

Overt and obtrusive conduct susceptible of being characterized as harassment may well be enjoined as, for example, was the case of an obvious 24-hour-a-day physical surveillance of an individual, his home, relatives, friends, and associates (Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964) cert. den. 379 U.S. 1001. Similar results might be expected where an identified officer loiters in the subject's place of business (Bee See Books, Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (SD N.Y. 1968) or openly attends organizational meetings where his presence inhibits communication and the transaction of the business of the assembly (Local 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (ND Ind. 1948)). However, open photographic surveillance of public gatherings (Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (ED Va. 1971)) and secret monitoring of criminal activities through the use of undercover agents (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)) and informants (Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 295 (1966)) have met with judicial approval.

Obviously, criminal intelligence information gained by unreasonable search and seizure or through compelled self-incrimination is tainted and subject to judicial condemnation upon complaint of one having the requisite standing.

Perhaps, the decision coming nearest to discussing the legality of criminal intelligence collection was Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A2d 298 (1969), (reversed on the ground more complete record was needed to support the decision) 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970). New Jersey had responded to the threat of continuing civil disorders by collecting intelligence information on persons and events alleged to have some relationship to such activities. The trial court held the collection effort to be unconstitutional because it conflicted with the First Amendment.

However, the court order to destroy the intelligence files excepted instances "where such information will be used to charge persons with specifically defined criminal conduct." 256 A2d at 305. Thus, the decision may be interpreted as drawing a distinction between collection of intelligence information where political or social factors are involved and First Amendment freedoms therefore may be directly inhibited and collection of criminal intelligence information where the objective is the establishment of criminal conduct and the identities of the offenders. While the Fourth and Fifth Amendment may be enjoyed by the guilty and innocent alike, it is improbable that the First Amendment would be stretched so far as to protect freedom of speech and assembly when such speech and assembly constitute elements of a criminal offense. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey returned the case for further development of the record and observed ". . . the executive branch may gather whatever information it reasonably believes to be necessary to enable it to perform the police roles, detectional and preventive. A court should not interfere in the absence of proof of bad faith or arbitrariness." 265 A2d at 688.

A tentative conclusion may be stated, subject to further development of the case law. The gathering of criminal intelligence information for the purpose of developing evidence of specific offenses characteristic of organized crime is legally justified as well as practically necessary. Where there is diversion from the proper objective and such collection efforts are manipulated to cause harassment or where such activity conflicts with Constitutional rights, to that extent the criminal intelligence program must be reformed.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GO[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

: Mr. Dalbey DATE: 5/18/72

ROM : J. B. Hotis

UBJECT: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

You requested an analysis of the Bureau's authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. The question of the jurisdictional basis for these investigations is being examined at length by the Domestic Intelligence Division and will not be discussed here.

It is fair to say that the domestic intelligence program is one of the more controversial areas of the Bureau's activities. For one thing, an intelligence investigation casts a broader net than inquiries that are directed toward the proof of a specific offense. A large amount of raw data is collected, much of which has no immediate bearing on potential offenses or offenders. But seemingly trivial information may later become important in the detection and prevention of violence or civil disorder. There are also fears that these investigations may eventually touch upon one's political beliefs, habits or associations; or that information collected for proper purposes may eventually be misused at the hands of Government. Each is a legitimate concern. The notion of Government prying into the personal lives of its citizens is repellent to all of us. And yet there is a strong sense that the Government must acquire necessary intelligence information if it is to meet its responsibilities in connection with the national security.

One of the major concerns about our domestic intelligence activities is that they are not supervised or monitored by any outside agency. The claim is made that the Executive Branch has been left wide discretion to define its own authority, and to choose the directions, methods, and focus of its investigations. For one thing, the law has never made clear what facts and circumstances must be present to authorize an intelligence investigation, nor how far such an investigation may lawfully proceed without being directed toward proof of a specific offense.

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

And unlike the practice in criminal cases, our electronic surveillances in security matters are not submitted for prior court approval. For another, the exclusionary rule which provides the usual method of judicial control over investigative procedures, is not often available in security cases. Since the goal is largely preventive, these cases seldom come before the courts. As a result, the public, the courts, and the Congress have very little information about how we operate in domestic intelligence matters and what we do with the information acquired.

In response to this situation, some members of the Congress have pressured for tighter controls over the Bureau, perhaps in the form of a watchdog committee to oversee our operations. Senator Ervin, who chairs the Senate Subsommittee on Constitutional Rights has expressed particular concern about the right of privacy and the authority of the Government to gather information. In an exchange of correspondence with the Department of Justice, the Senator has requested specific documentation of the Department's guidelines for the gathering and retention of domestic intelligence information. He has also suggested that legislation might be enacted, requiring a showing of probable cause before an investigation can be initiated by the Government. It is doubtful that any such measure would pass the Congress, but the proposal does show the mood of the times.

A parallel trend may be developing in the courts. In several recent cases, plaintiffs have made the claim that Government information gathering, which goes beyond the effort to apprehend criminal suspects, may have a "chilling effect" on the exercise of First Amendment rights. These challenges thus far have not been successful. Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970); Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Westmoreland, 323 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1971).

The courts have generally recognized that one of the principal functions of the Bureau is to gather information law violators, agitators of violence and possible subversives.. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1971) cert. granted, 404 U.S. 955 (1971); The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et. al., 70 Civ. 2646 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has observed that the identity of the agency gathering such information is determinative of the significance of any alleged chill to

to First Amendment rights. Thus, in Davis v. Ichord, 442 F2d 1207 (D. C. Cir. 1970) although appellants allegedly felt chilled by a Congressional Committee's investigation of them, the Court of Appeals found there was insufficient justiciability in their claims to create a viable case or controversy. This was because appellants had "failed to bring the fear of investigation by the present Committee home to themselves," their fears were wholly speculative; there were no criminal proceedings confronting them; nor was any action pending. Moreover, the Court in Davis found that the power of a Congressional Committee began and ended with the investigation; whenever a Committee of the Congress seeks punitive action, the Judiciary must become involved, and thus every investigation has a judicial check which operates to guarantee the protection of constitutional rights.

This latter aspect of the Davis decision was given perspective by the Court of Appeals in Tatum. In contrasting the potential impact on First Amendment rights occasioned by investigations conducted by the military with investigations conducted by a civilian investigative agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Court observed:

> The compilation of data by a civilian investigative agency is thus not the threat to civil liberties or the deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech that such action by the military is, because a civil investigative agency has no inherent power always being subject to the well-defined restrictions of law and the approval of the courts. * * *

There, the Court pointedly examined the "source of the chill" as it had in Davis, and in applying the "chilling effect doctrine", singled out the FBI as a source which does not generate a reasonable basis for inhibitions or apprehensions. In this connection the Court stated,

> Referring to our holding in Davis that the "source of the chill" is important in determining whether there is any inhibiting effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights, we think that there is a significant difference between investigative actions taken by a military agency in reference to civilians and similar investigative actions taken by a regular investigative agency of a civilian branch of the Government.
>
> One of the functions of a civilian investigative agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is to compile information on law violators, agitators of violence, and possible subversives. It has always been recognized that this is a delicate function, and it is exercised under the direction of the Attorney General. Investigation is performed by men a majority of whom are under the direction of lawyers in the Justice Department, and the information compiled is only usable and effective through court action. The FBI is powerless to imprison or to affect his liberty in any way except through the action of the courts.

As to the surveillance of public meetings through the use of informants, it has been held that such surveillance is not per se actionable. See Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971) (police surveillance of street demonstrations held not to offend First Amendment rights).

The Supreme Court in Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293 (1966), held that the use of secret informants is "not per se unconstitutional", and does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, nor the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court upheld, as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, admission at trial of evidence obtained by an undercover informant to whom a defendant spoke without knowledge that he was in the employ of the police. 385 U.S. at 300-303. See also Lewis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 206 (1966) and Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963).

Moreover, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), recently held that the use of secret informants does not violate any constitutionally justifiable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, even when an informant uses electronic equipment to transmit his conversations with defendants to other agents.

If the use of undercover government informants without a warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment and invade a defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, Hoffa v. U.S., supra, and such informants may write down their conversations with defendants and testify concerning them, or simultaneously record and transmit such conversations to others, who may testify against them, On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747 (1952); U.S. v. White, supra, then clearly mere visual "surveillance" of plaintiffs in plain view by informants at public meetings would not violate their constitutional rights.

It would seem that those who elect to present their views actively in the public arena deliberately expose themselves to the public. See Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Any recording of their activities by the defendants does not invade their privacy any more than does a newspaper, radio, or television story, and, indeed, much less since any information compiled is usable and effective only through court action. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

More difficult questions are presented where the investigation delves into the private affairs of the individuals or organizations. But even here, the courts have generally sustained our procedures so long as they comport with the restrictions of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et. al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et. al., 70 Civ. 2646 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. (examination of bank records) U.S. v. Gerhart, 275 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (examination of bank records); Minker v. U.S., 312 F2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962) (trash covers); Cohen v. U.S., 378 F2d 751 (9th Cir. 1967) (mail covers); U.S. v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detention and examination of packages in the mail); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (seizure of union records); Hoffa v. U.S., supra; U.S. v. White, supra; (use of informants).

In summary, it is premature to say that the First Amendment line of cases, dealing with the "chilling" concept offers any substantial impediment to our intelligence investigations. There is less reason for optimism, however, with regard to congressional intervention. We should be prepared, therefore, to meet arguments regarding the need for outside supervision. The sound answer, which should satisfy governmental needs and individual rights, is found in tight internal controls and carefully developed guidelines.

POSITION PAPER

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSION

May 19, 1972

OVERVIEW

This paper deals with the conduct by the FBI of intelligence-type investigations supervised by the Domestic Intelligence Division. Authority for these investigations is documented and outlined, including situations where there is no direct violation of law. Criteria and controls and dissemination policies implementing this authority are detailed.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

62-116395-83
ENCLOSURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 1

AUTHORITY 10
  Congressional Enactments 10
  Presidential Directives 11
  Policy Instructions of Attorney General 12
  National Security Council Directives 13
  Interagency Agreements 13

IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY 14
  Administrative Index 15
  Revolutionary Groups 17
  Extremist Groups 19
  Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals 19
  Unaffiliated Individuals 21
  Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations 21
  Restrictions on Investigations 23
  Information Storage and Retrieval 25
  Dissemination 27

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2-ALM/TG

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

The FBI's intelligence function is well established and documented. Yet, our work in gathering intelligence has been the subject of continuing criticism from segments of the press with charges being made [illegible] the FBI is conducting without authority security investigations of persons who are not in violation of the law. It has also been charged that our intelligence collection is uncontrolled, capricious and dwells on personal idiosyncrasies without there being any security interest involved. Fragments of information, distorted and twisted to convey the false impression that the FBI is wantonly disregarding the privacy of citizens, have been published.

The FBI does not conduct security investigations of individuals without clear-cut authority and tight controls. Critics have taken fragments of intelligence which have come to their attention and built them up into what is represented as the end product of security investigations with political overtones. In these instances, the items upon which such importance was placed have been fragmentary intelligence from substantive

investigations and could not be viewed in their real significance, except as they fit into the overall perspective of the case. This is indicative of the danger of using piecemeal intelligence taken out of context; properly used, however, intelligence is a legitimate and necessary part of all security investigations.

Intelligence is information and the collection of it is inseparable from efficient investigative operations. In fact the two--investigation and intelligence--are mutually dependent.

In the security field, it is vital that the Federal Government detect factors which have a direct bearing on possible violations of law related to the overthrow or destruction of the Government. Intelligence developed to identify individuals who have a propensity for revolutionary or racial violence or have affiliations with subversive or revolutionary groups is essential in the enforcement of the laws designed to protect the integrity of the Government. Intelligence is also essential to the detection of attempts or conspiracies to move against the Government, actions which may themselves be crimes.

No constitutional provisions, statutory enactments or judicial rulings have attempted to deprive law enforcement of its intelligence function, although various attempts have

been made to define or limit the areas encompassed by intelligence and particularly the techniques of collection. It is also recognized that some intelligence gathering activities may have an incidental "chilling" effect on individual citizens. The spectre of the Government's investigatory presence may cause a reaction in citizens, inhibiting the exercise of their full constitutional rights. Therefore, a balance between the requirements of the Government and the constitutional rights of citizens must be maintained.

The intelligence function of investigation, must be both reasonable and practical. It varies in scope and intensity with the seriousness of the provision it seeks to enforce. It is neither reasonable nor practical to launch an aggressive intelligence collection effort concerning the activities of those who might potentially violate a local antilittering ordinance. Detection of a conspiracy to bomb the White House, on the other hand, certainly justifies a continuous and intensive intelligence effort to identify the participants and gain knowledge of any specific plans.

It is mandatory that a Government protect its integrity and this has been recognized by judicial authorities. Ordinary crimes victimize an individual or groups; crimes against the existence of the government victimize society. Carrying these crimes to their ultimate produces the ultimate crime against society--the destruction of that society.

It is clear that the aspirations of most revolutionary groups far exceed their capability to achieve their ultimate objectives. They are, however, quite capable of eroding the integrity of the democratic system by lesser acts and, if not discouraged or thwarted, might well accumulate the will and power for more decisive action. The dramatic success of the Castro revolution is a sufficient example. Consequently, continuing intelligence collection relating to all revolutionary individuals and organizations, commensurate with the immediate threat posed, is imperative to proper vigilance.

The FBI serves as a prime producer of intelligence for the Executive Branch. Over the years it has provided information concerning hostile actions directed against the U. S.

by foreign governments, their intelligence services and others acting in their behalf. On the domestic scene the FBI has penetrated conspiracies ranging from the communist underground to the hooded night riders of the Klan who terrorized our black citizens. But, in the 1960's explosive changes occurred in the internal security problems faced by the country. These changes were reflected in both the scope and nature of the FBI's response and in the intelligence requirements levied upon the FBI by the Executive Branch.

In the decade of the '60's, social change and upheaval added to the critical areas of the FBI's intelligence responsibilities the problems of revolutionary and extremist ✓ activities. America was stunned by violent student disruptions, bombings and riots. Spanning the decade were civil rights protests, reactions against them, and tragically, the burning and looting of Watts in 1965 and the conflagrations in Detroit, Newark and Washington, D. C. And, what had been the youthful idealism of the emerging new left in the 1962 Port Huron Statement was drowned out by the obscene Weatherman war cries

as they took their revolution to the streets of Chicago in 1969 during their "Days of Rage."

As the tide of crime and disruption swelled, it brought with it new and pressing problems on the domestic security scene. FBI domestic security investigations increased accordingly. There was also an immediate increase in FBI intelligence collection concerning the lawlessness and violent tactics of these emerging revolutionary elements.

Intelligence collection was essential in contending with these new domestic security problems. This fact was recognized by the reports of two Presidential Commissions. The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission, 1968) stressed that the absence of accurate information before and during disorders created special control problems. It emphasized that law enforcement organizations must develop the means to obtain adequate intelligence for planning purposes and that law enforcement should "gather, evaluate, analyze and disseminate information on potential as well as actual civil disorders."

Similarly, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) took special note of the need for intelligence in effective law enforcement. The Commission stated in its report, "It is an undoubted fact that on some campuses there are men and women who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and sometimes to maim and kill." The report concluded that the best, AND sometimes the only, means law enforcement has to thwart or prevent such plots is through "clandestine intelligence work."

Prevention is the very essence of the proper use of intelligence. To be forewarned is to be placed in a position to carry out countermeasures to meet a threat. During the mass actions and violent confrontations of the 1960's, FBI intelligence collection was crystallized in dissemination of information to other government agencies. This intelligence provided them with an essential working tool to contend with public disorders and activities of a revolutionary nature.

In a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, 9/14/67, Attorney General Clark stressed the importance of intelligence. The Attorney General asserted, "It is most important that

you use the maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon (riot activity)." Elaborating on this point, he said, "In these circumstances we must be certain that every attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon these problems; to take every step possible to determine whether the rioting is pre-planned or organized; and, if so, to determine the identity of the people and interests involved; and to deter this activity by prompt and vigorous legal action." The Attorney General's evaluation of the importance of intelligence in this instance applies with equal force to other areas of the FBI's security work.

In December, 1967, the Department of Justice, aware of the high priority of intelligence in dealing with civil disorders, created the Inter-Division Information Unit. This is a repository for "reports which relate to individual or organizational activities which may play a part in instigating or spreading civil disorders" and includes intelligence "relating to black power and black nationalist organizations,

officers and members thereof, racial incidents throughout the country, and any specific demonstrations which are being planned and are of such nature as to render them subject to the possibility of violence." Quick retrieval of this intelligence was emphasized through the use of computers.

Attorney General Mitchell wrote to the FBI Director on May 17, 1971, concerning the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, created to analyze and evaluate intelligence for the guidance of the White House and other departments of the Executive Branch. In this memorandum, the Attorney General stated, "Intensified activities on the part of militant groups here in Washington, D. C., and elsewhere in the country clearly point up the need not only for the gathering of the highest quality intelligence available but also for an expert analysis and evaluation of the intelligence product itself."

AUTHORITY

All FBI investigations and intelligence collection functions in the internal security field are based on authorizations in Congressional enactments, Presidential directives, policy instructions of the Attorney General, National Security Council directives and interagency agreements as set forth below.

Congressional Enactments

Attorney General direction of FBI - 28 U. S. Code, Section 533

Treason - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2381 (U. S. Constitution, Article III, Section 3)

Rebellion and insurrection - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2383

Seditious Conspiracy - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2384

Advocating violent overthrow of Government - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2385 (Smith Act)

Sedition - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 2387, 2388, 2391

Recruiting for armed hostilities against U. S. - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2389

Designation of Organizations as "communist-action" and of Individuals as members of such groups after hearings by Subversive Activities Control Board - 50 U. S. Code, Sections 781-798 as amended or repealed (Internal Security Act of 1950, Subchapter I, called Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 and amendments by Communist Control Act of 1954) See also Executive Order 11605 below

Espionage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 792 et seq.

Sabotage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2151 et seq.

Private Correspondence with Foreign Governments - 18 U. S. Code, Section 953 (Logan Act)

Registration of Foreign Agents - 22 U. S. Code, Sections 611-621

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 - 42 U. S. Code, Section 2122

Deportation for Subversive Activities - 8 U. S. Code, Section 1481 (Immigration and Nationality Act 1952)

Possession, threatened use, or use of explosives for illicit purposes - 18 U. S. Code, Section 844

Travel in or use of facility of interstate commerce to promote or incite riot, to commit violence in furtherance of riot or to abet others in inciting or participating in a riot. - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 231-233, 245, 2101-2102

Neutrality Matters - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 956, 958-962; 22 U. S. Code, Sections 1934, 401 (Munitions Control Act)

Intelligence exchange with CIA - 50 U. S. Code, Section 403 (National Security Act)

Presidential Directives

Directive of the President - 6/26/39 directing that investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters are handled by FBI.

Directive of the President - 9/6/39 requesting the Attorney General to instruct FBI to take charge of investigative matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.

Presidential Directive - 1/8/43

reiterated instructions of previous directive of 9/6/39 and requested law enforcement officers, patriotic organizations and individuals turn over to FBI all information regarding espionage, sabotage and violations of neutrality regulations.

Presidential Directive - 7/24/50

reiterated substance of 9/6/39 and 1/8/43 directives, noting they provided for FBI to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.

Directive of President 12/15/53

referred to previous Presidential Directives and added investigation by FBI of violations of Atomic Energy Act.

Executive Order 10450 4/27/53

established programs to insure that the employment and retention of any Government employee is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. Requires check of FBI Fingerprint Files and, in cases where derogatory information develops, FBI conducts a full-field investigation.

Executive Order 11605 7/2/71

calls for Subversive Activities Control Board, when petitioned by the Attorney General, to determine after hearings if any organization is totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or whether it has adopted a policy of advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their Constitutional or statutory rights. By inference, the FBI, as investigative arm of the Attorney General, would develop evidence for hearings required. Also, FBI, by inference, would develop evidence of membership in such organizations, which may be basis for denial of Government employment.

Policy Instructions of Attorney General

September 14, 1967: instructions of then Attorney General Ramsey Clark for FBI to investigate possibility of conspiracy to plan, promote, or aggravate riot activity.

February 18, 1969: instructions from the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, for FBI to obtain information concerning possibility that underlying subversive groups were giving illegal directions or guidance to numerous campus disorders.

(Other policy instructions from Attorney General and Department have been received, amplifying points set forth above; many of these concerned specific cases.)

National Security Council Directives

Directive on Internal Security, March 23, 1949, establishing Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC) responsible to coordinate investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. FBI represented on IIC.

United States Intelligence Board (USIB) established September 15, 1958, to maintain coordination between CIA and other intelligence agencies. FBI a member of USIB to provide domestic intelligence for correlation with foreign intelligence.

Interagency Agreements

Delimitations Agreement signed by IIC members March 23, 1949, to establish jurisdiction in investigations by members of espionage, counterespionage, subversion, and sabotage and to provide for exchange of information on above matters.

FBI-Secret Service Agreement signed November 26, 1971, to provide for transmittal of information from FBI to Secret Service regarding individuals and organizations who, because of their propensities, represent or may represent a danger to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY

The criteria and guidelines for FBI investigations are furnished to the field in a "Manual of Instructions," the "F. B. I. Handbook," and in Letters to all Special Agents in Charge. In addition, instructions and guidance are given to the field in Headquarters communications on specific cases. Compliance with criteria and guidelines is obtained by supervision in both the field and at Bureau Headquarters. In addition, regular inspections of field and Headquarters Divisions assure that Bureau policies concerning investigations are being followed.

In the security field, the basic responsibility of the FBI is to investigate revolutionary organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow or destruction of the United States Government. These include old-line Marxist groups, for example, the Communist Party, USA, and the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party; and such new revolutionary groups as the Students for a Democratic Society, the Black Panther Party and the Weatherman. In the investigation of subversive individuals a determination is made of the dangerousness of the individual and efforts are made to obtain evidence of violations of any applicable

Federal laws. To assist in cataloguing the level of dangerousness of those individuals and to retrieve quickly information concerning them, the Domestic Intelligence Division maintains a card file known as the Administrative Index.

Administrative Index

Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Emergency Detention Act) before it was repealed on September 25, 1971, provided for emergency detention of subversive individuals in the event of a national emergency. To implement that provision of the act, the FBI and the Department of Justice maintained the Security Index. This Index was, of course, discontinued with the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act. By memorandum of October 22, 1971, however, the Attorney General noted that the repeal of Title II "does not alter or limit the FBI's authority and responsibility to record, file and index information secured" in this field and concurred in the establishment of an administrative index to assist in "making readily retrievable and available the results of its (the FBI's) investigations into subversive activities."

15

To this end, such an index (called Adex) was instituted for making quickly retrievable information on four categories of individuals in order of dangerousness:

I) National leaders of revolutionary or extremist groups, members who have exhibited a propensity for violence, members with training in sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla warfare,. unaffiliated revolutionaries with a propensity for violence, and revolutionaries with access to key facilities.

II) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and extremist groups, active members of these groups, and unaffiliated revolutionaries or extremists with a propensity for violence against property rather than persons.

III) Rank-and-file members of revolutionary groups within the previous five years, leaders of fronts for revolutionary groups, and individuals with revolutionary ideologies likely in a national emergency to commit acts of espionage, sabotage, or terrorism.

IV) Persons likely to assist, financially or otherwise, revolutionary groups, or persons in a position to influence others to commit acts inimical to the national defense.

Investigation of an individual is conducted to determine whether or not he should, consistent with the criteria of these categories, be listed on the Adex. If, as

the result of the investigation, it is determined he does not meet the criteria the case is closed. If, on the other hand, he does meet the criteria, he is listed in the Adex according to the determined degree of dangerousness. Category I cases continue under investigation for as long as the individual continues to warrant that Category listing. When an individual is listed in Categories II, III, and IV, however, the investigation is closed, subject to periodic reopening to verify his location, to determine his activities and to ascertain whether he still qualifies for inclusion in the Adex. Provision is made for upgrading, downgrading and purging an individual from the Adex as his activities and level of dangerousness fluctuate.

Revolutionary Groups

Investigations of individuals for a determination of whether or not they meet the criteria for Adex generally involve their degree of affiliation with revolutionary and extremist groups. The purpose of investigations of basic revolutionary and new-left type groups is to: (1) provide intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities;

(2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to prevent such conspiracies from being carried out; and (3) develop evidence necessary for the Attorney General to file petitions before the Subversive Activities Control Board in accordance with provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and Executive Order 11605.

The criteria, guidelines and restrictions on the investigations of revolutionary groups are outlined below:

> Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information indicating that organization advocates overthrow of Government or engages in activity to deny others their Constitutional or statutory rights.
>
> Investigation is conducted to establish aims and objectives, location and size, domination and control by hostile foreign power, identities of all leaders and members.

In regard to their front groups and organizations which they have infiltrated:

> Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information that organization is dominated, controlled or influenced to substantial degree by revolutionary organization.
>
> Investigation is conducted to determine degree of infiltration, aims and objectives, location and size and identities of all leaders.

Extremist Groups

The purpose of investigations of white hate and black extremist organizations is to: (1) provide intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities; and (2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to prevent such conspiracies from being carried out. Investigations of white hate groups are confined to those which have actually or allegedly committed or have conspired to commit acts of violence or have adopted a policy of advocating or inciting the use of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution. Investigations of black extremist organizations concern those groups which take extremist, anti-U. S. Government, anti-white positions and whose activities have involved them or may involve them in civil unrest and/or subversive activity.

Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals

Individuals referred to as subversives are generally affiliated with old-line basic revolutionary organizations; those termed revolutionaries are usually new left types; and those called extremists are fundamentally

involved in violent or revolutionary activities based on race. Procedures for the investigation of these types of individuals are similar and the criteria are outlined as follows:

Membership in a basic revolutionary organization

Espousing the LINE OF REVOlutionary movements

Special trainING ABROAD, or leadership training, in a revolutionary group

Individuals having access to key facilities who have been members of a revolutionary group at any time

Persons with revolutionary, terrorist, anarchistic or extremist beliefs who are likely to seize upon a national emergency to endanger public safety

Individuals who have actually or allegedly committed, conspired to commit, or adopted policy to commit acts of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution

Extremists and revolutionaries who have demonstrated a propensity for violence, have involved or may involve themselves in civil unrest, or who advocate violent overthrow of the Government

Persons who influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense or who are likely to furnish financial or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements because of their sympathies, associations or ideologies

Unaffiliated Individuals

In the areas of revolutionary (new left) and extremist activities, some investigations are conducted of individuals who are not affiliated with organizations. Investigation of an individual is undertaken when information is received that the person:

Is a revolutionary and adheres to the Weatherman ideology of advocating a revolution now and uses terrorist tactics in furtherance of revolution

Is a revolutionary or extremist and demonstrates by acts or statements propensity for violence against property

Exhibits revolutionary or extremist ideology and is likely to seize opportunity in national emergency to commit espionage, sabotage, terrorism or otherwise interfere with Federal or local governments or defense efforts

Influences others to engage in acts inimical to national defense or likely to furnish financial or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements

Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations

The mission of the FBI in the foreign intelligence field is one of counterintelligence. The objectives and priorities of counterintelligence have been variously stated and evaluated. Generally, these objectives may be listed in declining priority as follows: (1) the detection and

identification of intelligence operations and agents; (2) the penetration of these operations for the purpose of control and the development of intelligence information; (3) neutralization of hostile intelligence operations through disruption and disinformation; and, (4) prosecution. Whatever the assigned priority, the overall objective is to deny access to information sought by whatever practical means are available.

Foreign intelligence investigations are grounded in the Espionage statute and related laws including the Registration and Atomic Energy Acts. Individual investigations are initiated usually on the basis of a known or suspected connection with a foreign intelligence service, foreign country or subversive organization with such connections. Since these investigations emanate from various sensitive sources and involve special considerations, extensive criteria and limitations are defined and enumerated in current instructions.

In general terms, the governing criteria are designed to preclude initiation and continuance of investigations which are not justified. The limitations are designed to control the scope of investigation in order to insure security of our interests through close supervisory scrutiny.

22

Restrictions on Investigations

FBI guidelines go beyond the rules for opening, investigating and closing cases; they also impose restrictions to make certain that we do not violate the constitutional rights of any individual and to preclude investigations from becoming "fishing expeditions." In the security field these are some of the restrictions WHICH are applied:

Security cases are evaluated continually to determine if we are fulfilling our responsibilities. Those cases not warranting further investigation are closed promptly.

There are no investigations of members of an organization which does not advocate use of force to bring about existing changes in the Government. Examples are the Socialist Party, the Independent Workers of the World and Independence Party of Puerto Rico.

Persons arrested during disruptive demonstrations are identified since circumstances of an arrest, in some cases, may indicate a propensity for violence. However, a mere arrest in connection with a demonstration is an insufficient basis in itself for security investigation. The arrest must be coupled with a demonstrated propensity for violence or with subversive or revolutionary activity on the part of the individual arrested.

When it is determined that a security subject is a member of the armed services, the investigation is discontinued immediately and the military advised.

Civil rights organizations are not investigated.

Ambassadors or heads of permanent missions to the United Nations are not investigated.

No surveillances are conducted at the White House, the Capitol, the Supreme Court, the House and Senate Office Buildings or the United Nations.

No telephone or microphone surveillances are operated without prior written approval of the Attorney General.

Bureau authority is REQUIRED for:

Investigations of officials and diplomatic representatives of foreign countries. (Department of State authority is also required.)

Investigation of communist infiltration of a political organization.

Developing sources connected with an institution of learning.

Interviews of subjects of active, current security investigations.

Investigations of faculty members. If approval is granted, only established sources functioning in an administrative capacity may be contacted on the campus. Other established sources and informants must be contacted away from the campus. Contacts with students, graduate students and faculty members must also have Bureau authority.

Interviews of labor leaders and persons in educational, mass media or publishing fields.

These examples demonstrate a consciousness of the need to impose limitations on investigations and the continuing imposition of them.

Information Storage and Retrieval

The storage and retrieval of information is a basic operational necessity of any investigative or intelligence-gathering agency. Procedures within the FBI for these functions provide for written records of information received from a variety of sources--confidential informants, confidential INVESTIGATIVE techniques, and open sources--and the storage of this information in different types of files. These include active investigative files on organizations and individuals and some general files. These "raw" files are maintained both at the Seat of Government and in the various field offices. Information in the files is thoroughly indexed so that data can be retrieved.

In the intelligence field, when an allegation within the jurisdiction of the FBI is received, a case on an individual or on an organization may be opened, depending on the quality of the allegation. Nonspecific information that is received on an individual or organization is placed in the pertinent file, if one exists, or is placed in a general file if the organization or individual is not the subject of a specific file.

These files are an integral part of the intelligence-gathering function. By the very nature of the FBI's assignment to coordinate internal security information, the maintenance of data over a period of time is required and it is necessary that a system for retrieving this information be used.

Because these files OFTEN contain derogatory information that may not SUBSTANTIATED by further investigation (the derogatory information received may not be germane to a matter within the FBI's jurisdiction), the Attorneys General have long taken the position that these files should not be available for public scrutiny. Incalculable damage to individual reputations could result from the disclosure of single items of information without knowing the full background concerning the receipt of a particular item and the context within which it was recorded.

The late Justice Robert Jackson, in his capacity as Attorney General, wrote in 1941:

> Disclosure of information contained in the reports (FBI files) might also be the grossest kind of injustice to innocent individuals. Investigative reports include leads and suspicions, and sometimes even the statements of malicious or misinformed people. Even though later and more complete reports exonerate the individuals, the use of particular or selected reports might constitute the grossest injustice, and we all know a correction never catches up with an accusation.

Dissemination

The Bureau's general policy on dissemination is that information developed by or coming to the attention of the FBI is promptly referred to all agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government having a potential interest in it or responsibility for taking action concerning it, whenever that interest or responsibility is apparent or known. This policy is in accordance with numerous formal agreements entered into between the Bureau and other Government agencies. It is also in accordance with Presidential directives obligating the Bureau to act as clearing house for information affecting the internal security of the U. S.

Despite this general liberal policy of dissemination, we have recognized that with regard to highly sensitive information a determination must be made on an individual basis as to what information should be disseminated and how it should be transmitted. The degree of sensitivity and/or the security classification will determine level of dissemination to any interested agency and the method of transmittal. In certain instances, sensitive information may be furnished to a high-level official with a request that dissemination in his agency be restricted to his personnel on a need-to-know basis. Such information might be disseminated by secure teletype, courier, liaison, and where necessary, by secure telephone. Information furnished orally is confirmed in writing.

The Attorney General

August 7, 1973

Director, FBI

SCOPE OF FBI JURISDICTION
AND AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP 2ALM/ 16

MDF16

During our meeting on July 26, 1973, you referred to a discussion you had with Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland during your confirmation hearings as to the statutory authority of the FBI and the Department of Justice in the field of domestic intelligence investigations. You then asked Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus to work with the FBI in weighing the pros and cons with regard to statutory authority in this area. I mentioned that research was being performed on this subject at the present time and that we would be in touch with Mr. Ruckelshaus with regard to this matter when we have completed the results of our consideration and findings within the FBI.

Actually, a study has been going on in the FBI for more than two years as to the scope of FBI jurisdiction and authority in domestic intelligence investigations. When Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III, was designated as Acting Director of the FBI, he instructed that a position paper be prepared concerning the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. A position paper was prepared which in essence stated that authority of the FBI in this field is based on legislative enactments, even though we may have publicly relied heavily on Presidential directives as the basis for such authority. Mr. Gray ordered an in-depth study made of the position and in August, 1972, a detailed report was furnished to him. The following is a summary of that report.

Over a period of several months there were a number of public statements questioning authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations, particularly where there is no clear-cut legislative authority apparent. One of the most searching inquiries was contained in a paper presented by Professor John T. Elliff at a two-day conference at Princeton University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public Justice.

62-116-15-83

ENCLOSURE

A major thrust of Professor Elliff's paper concerned FBI authority derived from legislative enactments as opposed to that derived from Presidential directives, beginning with a directive issued by President Roosevelt in September, 1939. Professor Elliff is of the opinion that the 1939 directive, which was reiterated on three subsequent occasions, was magnified by the FBI from its original purpose to a definitive order to conduct intelligence-type investigations.

Senator Sam J. Ervin, as you know, had been probing into the nature and extent of FBI intelligence-type investigations. Senator Ervin had even announced that he intended to propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any person without that individual's consent, unless the Government has reason to believe that person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Other Congressmen indicated a similar interest in FBI investigative activities.

Our study revealed that the FBI had declared publicly over a long period of time that its responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field are authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential directives, and instructions of the Attorney General. The Presidential directives are obviously the 1) directive dated September 6, 1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953, and 2) Executive Order 10450 dated April 27, 1953 (and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order 11605 dated July 2, 1971).

In carefully analyzing the language of the first directive, dated September 6, 1939, and considering that the subsequent directives are all hinged on that one, we believe that there is a misconception as to the extent of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBI by these directives. It appears that while the 1939 directive fixed responsibility on the FBI to handle espionage, sabotage, and neutrality matters, it did not convey any authority or jurisdiction which the FBI did not already have from legislative enactments. It is difficult to read into this directive or in any of those which followed any authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations which would or could not be conducted under an umbrella of legislative enactments.

As a matter of historical fact, President Roosevelt in August, 1936, did request former Director J. Edgar Hoover to conduct investigations of subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism. This request, however, was a confidential oral request and there is doubt that any record of it was made outside the FBI. This request, or Presidential mandate, was based, incidentally, on the fact that the law provided that the FBI could conduct such investigations if the Secretary of State should so request.

The study revealed that while the 1939 et seq. directives did not grant any special intelligence-gathering authority to the FBI, we were responsible under these directives to collect all intelligence information furnished by local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies and patriotic citizens and to sift and coordinate all such information for indications of subversive activity covered by Federal statutes.

The study concluded that the FBI has the responsibility to conduct whatever investigations are necessary to determine if statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditious conspiracy, advocacy of overthrowing the Government, and other such crimes affecting the national security have been violated. In this connection we note that in a letter dated September 14, 1967, the Department of Justice advised that the FBI is continually alert to the problem of recurring riots and is submitting intelligence reports to the Department of Justice concerning such activity. This letter enumerated several Federal statutes and stated these could be applicable in using maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing on the question of schemes or conspiracies to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.

In other words, the Department was requesting all possible intelligence-type investigative activity based on the existence of certain statutes. We see this as being no different from our intelligence-type investigations relating to plans of groups or individuals to overthrow, destroy, interfere with or threaten the survival of effective operation of national, state, and local governments.

Based on this study, we believe that had there never been a single one of the Presidential directives in question the FBI would have conducted and will, through necessity, continue to conduct the same intelligence-type investigations as were conducted from 1939 to the present date. We also believe, however, that in order to counter the criticism and skepticism of such individuals as Professor Elliff and Senator Sam J. Ervin that an up-to-date Executive order should be issued clearly establishing a need for intelligence-type investigations and delineating a clear authority for the FBI to conduct such investigations based on guidelines established by the Attorney General and adhering to constitutional principles.

The study concluded with two basic recommendations. 1) That the Department of Justice be requested to sponsor comprehensive legislation spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of intelligence information relating to the national security and; 2) that the Department of Justice be requested to seek a comprehensive Executive order which would cover any possible gap between statutory authority and Executive necessity in protection of the national security.

At first glance these recommendations may appear to contradict our position that we already have statutory authority to conduct security-type investigations; that this being the case we do not need additional legislative enactments, nor do we need an Executive order. But being realistic we think that the basic statutes upon which we rely for our authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations need to be updated to fit 1973 needs. Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2383, 2384, and 2385 relate to the national security, but the legislative history of 2383 and 2384 indicates that they were designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth Century, and Section 2385 has been reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court. These statutes are unquestionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introduced as H.R. 6046 and S. 1400 in the 93rd Congress appear to contain language which should fill our statutory needs, except perhaps for those groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteed rights.

As to the need for an Executive order, we think that two issues are involved. We have statutory authority, but what we need is a definitive requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelligence data he requires in the pursuit of his responsibilities based on our statutory authority. In other words, there is a need, from our standpoint, for both authoritative and definitive guidelines. The statutes give us the authority. The Executive order would define our national security objectives.

Members of Congress, including such men as Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, have proposed legislation to spell out jurisdiction and authority of the FBI in this field. It would appear that the President would rather spell out his own requirements in an Executive order instead of having Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill his obligations and responsibilities as President.

The political climate of suspicion and distrust resulting from disclosures coming out of the Watergate hearings could present an obstacle to getting any such Executive order signed in the immediate future. However, the rationale is nevertheless valid and when scrutinized closely, the language in the Executive order we hereinafter propose establishes definitive guidelines which have heretofore been unclear. It is my belief that we should go forward with this.

We therefore propose and recommend that an Executive order along the following lines be submitted to the White House with a strong recommendation for approval. The language which follows is merely to illustrate the type of Executive order which we think would be appropriate and does not necessarily represent an ideal format or style which should be submitted to the White House.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Whereas the Constitution of the United States was established to insure, among other things, domestic tranquility; to provide for the common defense; and to promote the general welfare for the people of the United States; and

"Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally imposed responsibility of defending the Constitution and the existence of the Government thereunder; and

"Whereas there have been continuing unlawful acts of violence perpetrated against the Government of the United States or against citizens of the United States or against persons entitled to the protection of the United States thereby endangering the domestic tranquility, threatening the common defense, and jeopardizing the general welfare of the people of the United States; and

"Whereas the Congress has enacted laws prohibiting acts such as treason, sedition, sabotage, espionage, insurrection and rebellion, seditious conspiracy, civil disobedience, rioting, assassination, kidnaping, deprival of civil rights, and conspiracies to commit such acts; and

"Whereas the President of the United States as Chief Executive in the maintenance of the Government thereunder must have intelligence information for appropriate decisions in the discharge of his constitutionally imposed responsibilities;

"Now by authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States and in the interest of orderly operation of this Government and in furtherance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general welfare of the people of the United States it is ordered that;

"The Attorney General prepare and issue guidelines, conforming to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis intelligence information essential to the execution of laws pertaining to subversive activity and other such activity affecting the national security, domestic tranquility, and general welfare of the United States."

The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concept of urban guerrilla terrorism has been adopted by various extremist elements in the United States. Bombings of public buildings and national institutions;

killing of police officers who, by their uniform, are a symbol of the democratic establishment; hijacking of aircraft in furtherance of revolutionary movements; terrorist assaults on foreign diplomatic personnel and establishments; and open declaration of war on our form of government are only a few of the violent acts which have been perpetrated by domestic subversives who seek to destroy or seriously cripple our Government. Terrorist guerrilla attacks which were once confined to far away places and related to problems of no immediate concern of ours are now possible in this country. Foreign terrorist groups in collusion with domestic terrorists have laid plans for an airport massacre of the type which recently occurred in Israel. Other foreign terrorist elements have laid plans for terrorist attacks on American soil. Already one foreign official has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists.

It would be folly to adopt an investigative policy based on the concept of investigation only when there is reason to believe a crime involving the national security has been committed. The FBI must obviously anticipate the crimes described above. We believe that in order for the Government to be in position to defend itself against revolutionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it, the FBI must have sufficient investigative authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations not normally associated with enforcement of the statutes. In other words we think the President has the inherent Executive power to expand by further defining the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance information concerning the plans and aspirations of terrorists and revolutionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Government. However, we also believe that such expanded authority must be formally set forth in an Executive order and that this recommendation is responsive in the Attorney General's expressed interest in laying more formal guidelines to our work in areas where definition is not now clear.

We consider the issuance of a new Executive order delineating our jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility to gather and report intelligence information relating to the national security to be a very important and high priority matter. We believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney General under Title 28, Section 533, United States Code, to be equally important.

The Attorney General

For your information, our own investigative guidelines as contained in our Manual of Instructions relating to domestic subversive investigations have been completely rewritten to conform with the concept that our domestic intelligence-type investigations are based on Federal statutes. These guidelines provide that in each instance, the domestic intelligence investigation must be predicated on information indicating that the organization or individual is engaged in activity which could involve a violation of specific statutes relating to the national security. A copy of the new guidelines was previously provided to the Department of Justice in connection with the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy to obtain a copy of the FBI's Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions. The effective date of the new guidelines was August 1, 1973.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
2 - Legal Counsel Division

The Attorney General

April 22, 1975
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.

Director, FBI

#MDR16.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JR

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to one of the requests set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures (2)

4/24 Approved by A.G. (Jack Miller)
4/25 Delivered to Mike Epstein
of SSC

62-116395

EWL:ekw
(8)

REC-100

62-116395-82

NOTE: The Senate Select Committee has made a request for titles and number of FBI field office Agents in the internal security and counterintelligence field as well as the percentage of manpower assigned in these areas. The Administrative Division has compiled this information. However, it is not felt this data should be furnished formally in a written response to the Committee. This data can be classified "Confidential" under Executive Order 11652. Over and above this technical classification a great deal of sensitivity attaches to these figures since should they be made public or otherwise fall ~~into the~~

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

APR 29 1975

2-ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

hands of hostile foreign intelligence services, they would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat.

It is noted that a precedent exists for making the information available for review only at FBIHQ. By letterhead memorandum 4/8/75 we advised the Committee that we would not furnish them a requested list of names and titles of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBIHQ down to and including Unit Chiefs together with a number of personnel below that level but that this list would be made available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee staff at FBIHQ.

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)

April 21, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.)

RE: ORGANIZATION

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Under Item III entitled "Organization," paragraph C requested at the field level, the titles and number of FBI field office Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total Agent manhours devoted to such matters, operations, and activities.

You are advised that a current survey of all FBI field offices has been made to obtain the data requested. Since this information is considered to be highly sensitive, it is not being furnished directly to the Committee; however, the requested data is being maintained in the Intelligence Division at FBIHQ and is available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee staff upon request.

1 - The Attorney General

EWL:ekw

(8)

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/HG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. 62-116395
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JBK/PLM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-22 Enc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED # MDR16 ON THIS ENVELOPE.
~~[illegible]~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JG

62-116395-82

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Response

EX

TO : MR. WALSH

DATE: 4/3/75

FROM : L. C. GROOVER
LCG/JJC

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church dated 3/19/75.

Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities, together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations and activities (page 3, item IIIC of relet).

The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached herewith, to the above request.

It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security, intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the data for both of the other categories as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Jackson

JJC:jmb

#MORE16

SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE THREE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/MAG

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities

wob

ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75

The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.

JWR/HHW

OVER

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-14-75

Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:

(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.

(2) Before making any determination as to whether we make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.

(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/ETG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTS
#MDR16

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 4-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In connection with our investigations of staff members for captioned Committee, we have developed derogatory information on two individuals which has been brought specifically to the attention of William Miller, Staff Director of the Committee. One of these involved Mrs. Diane Eloise LaVoy whose sister-in-law questioned her loyalty and declared she "does not love America." The sister-in-law said Mrs. LaVoy constantly criticized the U. S. Government and its policy and underlying weaknesses of our society. Another individual said she was highly critical of CIA activities. This information was pointed out to Miller on 3-25-75 when the results of the investigation were delivered to him, and he also was advised that the CIA would be furnished the same data in accordance with our agreement concerning these matters.

On 3-24-75 and 3-28-75 results of the investigation concerning Mrs. Betty Dale Ellison were delivered to Miller and he was advised that a prior supervisor with eight years of training and experience in psychiatric care states he felt Mrs. Ellison needs psychological examination. He termed her a trouble maker and said he would have fired her if he had the authority. He described her definitely as a security risk due to her mental and emotional instability. It also was pointed out to Miller that other former supervisors described her as unstable when working under pressure and unable to get along with fellow employees. Miller was told that this information also would be furnished to CIA.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

161-11022

On 4-2-75 Miller advised Inspector Bowers he had considered the matter involving Mrs. LaVoy and had discussed it with the Committee Chairman, and they had decided to proceed with her as a staff member since they did not feel the derogatory remarks by her sister-in-law were sufficiently strong enough to disqualify her since the remainder of the investigation was favorable.

62-116375-81

REC-100

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - ~~Mr. Farrington~~
1 - Mr. Bowers

3 APR 22 1975

DWB:kjs (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 APR 29 1975

Miller also advised on 4-2-75 that their review of the Ellison investigation showed justifiable concern for her being cleared for the staff, and he asked for any guidance we might give him. It was pointed out that the only real solution to the situation seemed to be that she not be added to the staff. Miller said he would appreciate any comments from the CIA also in this regard. This request was conveyed to CIA by Section Chief William Cregar of the Intelligence Division who subsequently advised that Charles Kane, Director of Security, CIA, had reviewed the file on Ellison and agreed there was sufficient cause to question her suitability for assignment to the Select Committee staff. Kane stated CIA Director Colby concurred in this observation.

These views were conveyed to Miller on 4-9-75. Miller stated at that time that they had resolved the situation by assigning Mrs. Ellison to purely administrative tasks and that she would be fully isolated from any sensitive or classified information in connection with her responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#mor16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/00 BY SP-2ALM/MG

On 3-19-75 Inspectors John B. Hotis, David W. Bowers, and Special Agent Paul V. Daly met with William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; and Michael T. Epstein of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) staff. During the meeting Mr. Schwarz requested a briefing be arranged for staff members of SSC concerning the operations of the Intelligence Division, that they be furnished copies of training documents pertaining to matters handled by the Intelligence Division, and that they be furnished a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field. He pointed out the aforementioned material would greatly assist in the SSC staff developing an understanding of the Intelligence Division operations and hopefully prevent misunderstandings or needless requests of the FBI.

Mr. Miller advised that Senators Frank Church and John Tower intended to contact the Director in the immediate future to discuss arrangements relating to the SSC's review of the FBI activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Intelligence Division review ~~and where possible make~~ available training documents relating to training concerning Intelligence Division matters and a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field, or recommend a counter offer.

(2) Legal Analysis Office in conjunction with the Intelligence Division arrange a briefing for Senate Select Committee staff members.

See memo Cregar to Wannall 4/11/75 prepared for [illegible]

REC 44 62-116395-8

17 APR 22 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
PVD:kjs/dkg (8)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4/17/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/HG

At 11:00 a.m. on April 17, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis Special Agent Paul V. Daly and I met with Deputy Attorney General Tyler and Associate Deputy Attorney General James Hutchinson at the request of the Deputy Attorney General.

Deputy Attorney General Tyler advised that he had been requested by Burke Marshall and F.A.O. Schwarz, III, who are consultant and General Counsel, respectively, for the Senate Select Committee, to meet with him on Monday afternoon, April 21, 1975, to discuss matters relating to the Committee's activities. The Deputy Attorney General said that he has been personally acquainted with Mr. Marshall for a long time and also is acquainted with Mr. Schwarz. He considered the possibility of having a Bureau representative attend the meeting, but then decided it would be best if he would meet with Marshall and Schwarz privately to determine whether they desire to discuss details of the Committee's responsibilities and if it became necessary, he would request the Bureau to send a representative to the meeting.

REC 44 62-116395-79

EX-111

The Deputy Attorney General said that he would, of course, advise us orally or in writing of the results of ~~his conference~~ with Mr. Marshall and Mr. Schwarz.

APR 22 1975

The Deputy Attorney General inquired as to the procedure currently being employed in responding to the Committee's requests and Inspector Hotis explained the current procedures. I mentioned to the Deputy Attorney General the existence of the Ad Hoc Committee of Intelligence Agencies and suggested to him that he might desire to designate a representative to attend those meetings in order to be on notice as to the policies being developed by the White House and the intelligence community in responding to Committee requests. I explained to him that James Wilderotter, formerly Associate Deputy Attorney General, was the

62-116395

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz

54 APR 29 1975

JAM:mfd (7)

LEGAL COUN.

CONTINUED - OVER

Department's representative on the Committee, but he has now been reassigned to responsibilities at the White House. I told him that Assistant Attorney General Scalia had been scheduled to attend the last meeting of the Committee, although he was unable to attend. The Deputy Attorney General said that he would discuss with Mr. Scalia the possibility of having Mr. Scalia attend as the Department's representative.

I asked the Deputy Attorney General whether he was undertaking the principal responsibility in the Department for matters relating to the Senate Select Committee and other committees that may be inquiring into the FBI and he said that that was not clear as yet because the Attorney General has taken a personal interest in these matters and it appeared that the responsibilities are still fragmented within the Department. It was his opinion that the responsibilities should be centralized and he appeared to be willing to undertake that responsibility.

It was my impression that the Deputy Attorney General was interested in being of assistance to the FBI in these matters and expressed a willingness to cooperate by having the FBI participate as much as possible with the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Dir. was advised [illegible]
and mtg on 4/17.
JMA

Pcn

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

1 - Mr. [illegible] B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/14/75

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. H. Weimar

SUBJECT: WILLIAM G. MILLER
IS - R

Senstudy - '75

Mr. William G. Miller is the Staff Director for the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to intelligence activities. On 10/5/73, representatives of our Washington Field Office (WFO) interviewed Mr. Miller, with Bureau approval, [relative to contacts he had had with members of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.] (S) At that time, Mr. Miller was the Director of the Special Senate Committee to Terminate the National Emergency. On that occasion he was most cooperative, and upon being advised that the FBI's interest in (S) [Soviet Embassy personnel focused more on their personalities rather than Soviet policies] per se, Mr. Miller agreed to be interviewed whenever the FBI felt such was necessary.

WFO has recently conducted an interview with Mr. Albert Ashton Lakeland, Jr., Executive Assistant to Senator Jacob Javits of New York, [relative to his past contacts with Grigoriy A. Rapota, a former Third Secretary assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Rapota was a known officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB), Political Branch (PB), who was extremely active on Capitol Hill.] (S) In the course of the interview with Mr. Lakeland, he advised that among others Mr. William G. Miller was known to have had [numerous contacts with Soviet Embassy personnel,] (S) although he was not able to state with certainty that Mr. Miller had been [in contact with Rapota.] (S)

62-116395

21 APR 25 1975

NOT RECORDED
46 APR 25 1975

WFO has now requested the Bureau through the Legal Analysis Office obtain concurrence of the chairman of the aforementioned committee for Agents of WFO to again interview Mr. Miller concerning his possible contact with

[105-213145] (S)

CONTINUED - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

VHW:dan
(7)

Classified by 5683
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MDR16 1-23-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 4,6

105-213145-193

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Enc. — Sent 4-17-75

RECORDS

Place cc in 62-116395
(SENSTUDY-75)

84 APR 25 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: William G. Miller
[105-213145](S)

Rapota and possibly other Soviets. WFO has noted that Mr. Miller is also known to have been in contact with Aleksandr A. Kokorev, a First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., and a known officer of the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). (S)

While Mr. Miller was most cooperative on the last occasion he was interviewed by the FBI, it is noted he did not provide any particularly significant information concerning [the Soviets with whom he had contact.](S) While it is not known at this time whether he could presently provide meaningful information, an interview with him at this time, when he is now the Staff Director of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, could well be untimely and indiscreet.

ACTION:

(1) In view of impending contacts which will be had by FBIHQ with Mr. Miller, the purpose of this memorandum is to draw attention to the fact that Mr. Miller has had [past contact with representatives of Soviet intelligence services and may be continuing to have same.](S)

KW WRS/KW WRW/FSP

(2) If you agree, there is attached a communication to WFO captioned, "Grigoriy A. Rapota; IS - R (SOVEMB-KGB)" which denys authority for an interview with Mr. Miller at this time and instructs that office to promptly advise FBIHQ of any additional contacts between Mr. Miller and representatives of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., which may come to its attention. (S)

KW WRS/KW WRW/FSP

CONFIDENTIAL

PLM

SECRET

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 10, 1975

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/PG
#MDE16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, setting forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority granted by Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and Attorney General instructions, as well as a list of statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation. Certain exhibits are extracted due to the "Third Agency Rule," however, approval for release is now being sought and the exhibits will be forwarded as soon as possible. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

Also enclosed with the jurisdiction paper is an original memorandum for the Committee and one copy for your records.

Enclosures - 3

ALL:vb
(6)

Approved by AG 4/ , '75 [illegible]
[illegible] to SSC [illegible] 4/10/75 [illegible]

62-116395-98

REC- 106

APR 25 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TAS
#MDE16

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 10, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached is the FBI "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, which, though not specifically named, falls within the spirit of the documents requested in the letter of March 19, 1975.

The purpose of this paper is to set forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority granted by the Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and orders of the Attorney General, as well as to list statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation.

It is noted that certain exhibits are extracted. Extractions were made because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Approvals are being expeditiously sought and these exhibits will be made available as soon as approvals are obtained. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

We are attempting to identify Items 1, 2, 3, and 4, of the examples cited in the attachment to your March 19th letter. When identified, immediate consideration will be given to furnishing the Items to your Committee.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

ALL:vb
(6)

PLM

WRW

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-78

GPO 934-846

8 per PVD 18
April 1~~6~~, 1975

This is to acknowledge receipt of classified material by letterhead memorandum dated April 10, 1975, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Ben Marshall
for Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence Activit

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/TG

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-78

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. T. Jenkins

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: April 15, 1975

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

My memorandum to you 4/10/75, tickler copies as above, advised of the formal establishment of a task force called Project Senstudy 75 for the purpose of implementing responses to requests for information from Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities.

From time to time, requests will be made of various Divisions at FBIHQ for assistance in preparing responses. The Office of Legal Counsel has already contributed considerably in support of Senstudy 75 and is an integral part of the Project.

In order that we may keep an up-to-date record of the cost to the Bureau in handling this Project, each Assistant Director is requested to effect the necessary procedures to maintain such records and by the third of each month furnish by routing slip to W. O. Cregar, Room 4063, JEH Building, the following information: (1) Name of Division reporting; (2) Month for which reporting, which will be month just ended; (3) Man days devoted to Project assistance, broken down by (a) Agent and (b) clerical, including GS level for both Agent and clerical. An example submitted by 5/3/75 would be as follows: (1) GID; (2) Report for 4/75; (3)(a) one-half day @ GS-16; one day @ GS-15; three days @ GS-14; (3)(b) two days @ GS-7; two days @ GS-5.

This is effective commencing 4/1/75 and first routing slip report due 5/3/75 will be for the month of April, 1975.

If a Division has not participated during the preceding month, merely submit a routing slip to this effect.

The cooperation of all is urged so that the necessary cost data may be compiled each month. It is recognized that exact figures will not be feasible and that estimates will be most practical and will suffice.

ST-100 REC-43 62-116395-17

ACTION: For action as above by each Assistant Director.

62-116395
SFP:ekw (18)

15 APR 22 1975

WRW

ekw

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

51 APR 28 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/dls
#MDR16

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Each Assistant Director

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/10/75

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

This memorandum records the formal establishment of a task force entitled Project Senstudy 75.

The concept behind the establishment of this Project is to develop a capability of implementing requests received from Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible. We believe that by creating this facility we will be able to meet the requirements of these Select Committees with the exception of the research that will have to be done in the substantive Divisions.

While the Project will direct internal work and related liaison with the intelligence community and the White House staff, we envision the Legal Analysis Unit Office of Legal Counsel Division as continuing to be the primary point of direct contact with the Select Committees of the Congress. They will receive all requests and deliver all responses to these Committees. In addition, they will meet with the staffs of the Committees to insure the reasonableness of requests. If necessary, they will call upon the expertise of the substantive Division for determination as to whether a proposed request from the Committees can be responded to within a reasonable period of time and within the capabilities of the FBI's information retrieval system.

REC- 100 62-116-395-

At the present time four Supervisors have been delegated to work exlusively on the Project. They are as follows:

12 APR 23 1975

The Project Manager will be Section Chief William O. Cregar, CI-2 Section, Intelligence Division. His duties will encompass the review of all incoming requests from the Select Committees in an effort to identify policy questions;

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

WOC:lmh lmh
(18)

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 APR 23 1975

ambiguities requiring recontact with Committee staffs; the assignment of research responsibilities to substantive Divisions; following such responsibilities to insure timely responses; as well as representing the FBI on the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. Assistant Director John A. Mintz is also a member of the Executive Committee. This latter responsibility will provide Cregar and Mintz with direct liaison not only with senior officials of the intelligence community but also with the President's counsel.

Mr. Elmer W. Larson, Unit Chief, Training Unit, IS-3 Section, Intelligence Division will act as Cregar's Number One Man; will administer the work of the Project; and act in the absence of Cregar.

Seymor F. Phillips, Unit Chief, Civil Disorders Reporting Unit, IS-1 Section, Intelligence Division will serve as the Review Coordinator for the Project. His responsibilities will be to review all research; coordinate all responses; be available to consult with substantive Divisions as to proper form of our responses; identify any conflicts in FBI positions where several Divisions are responding to a particular question; as well as to insure the quality, completeness and adequacy of responses to Select Committees requests. Additionally, Phillips will be responsible for the preparation of abstracts to be furnished to the Interagency Registry maintained at CIA Headquarters. This Registry established by the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Group at the suggestion of and with the concurrence of the White House will serve as the coordinating mechanism for the entire intelligence community.

Mr. Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Officer with CIA, CI-4 Section, Intelligence Division will function as the Liaison Officer with the intelligence community responsible for coordinating and clearing all information under the third agency rule where FBI responses are of interest to or are of a proprietary interest to other agencies of the intelligence community. Schwartz will serve as the Bureau's representative on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

CONTINUED - OVER

Because of the White House insistence that all requests and responses be completely coordinated and available for review by White House representatives, it is imperative that the Project have a self-sustained records facility to insure immediate access to requests received from and responses furnished to the Select Committees. In addition, in those instances where certain FBI documents furnished to the Select Committees must be sanitized (excised), it is imperative this records facility not only retain copies of the sanitized documents but also copies of the original text. For these reasons a senior clerical employee has been requested to function as a Records Manager for the Project.

In addition to the above, there will be stenographic and clerical personnel assigned to the Project to support the work of the Bureau Supervisors. We have not committed any more personnel to the Project than are absolutely necessary at the present time. Should the requests of the Select Committees require additional personnel, appropriate memoranda will be submitted with a complete justification for additional personnel assigned to the Project.

Although the physical space for the Project is limited, all personnel connected with Project Senstudy 75 will be located in Room 4063, J. Edgar Hoover Building. This space is physically located within the Intelligence Division.

As a matter of interest, Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has requested that should any member of the intelligence community get requests from other Committees of the Congress which impact on the intelligence community; could be of interest to the White House; or are of such sensitivity that coordination is required, copies of both the requests and an abstract of the responses should be made available to the Interagency Registry.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

PLM

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 9, 1975

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/THG

#MDH6

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which responds to the Committee's request for the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and those portions of these Manuals which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

REC-106

62-116395-75

Enclosures - 13

12 APR 23 1975

EWL:jvl
(7)

4/11/75 [illegible] to SSC [illegible]

ENCL BEHIND FILE

3 - ENCLOSURE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

#mOK16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/176

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Under IV. A. (Policies and Procedures) the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and certain portions of this Manual were requested. In accordance with this request the following material is enclosed:

1) Table of contents; 2) Preface. Guidelines for FBI Investigations; 3) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret"); 4) Section 84. Registration Act; 5) Section 86. Sabotage; 6) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals; 7) Section 88. Sedition; 8) Section 95. Treason; 9) Section 97. Voorhis Act; 10) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

Not included as enclosures are Section 105, Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency (Foreign Intelligence), classified "Secret"; Section 107, Part I, Internal Security Informants and Confidential Sources; Section 107, Part II, Foreign Counterintelligence Assets; or Section 130, Extremist Informants and Sources. These Sections are deemed to contain extremely sensitive information and for that reason are not being transmitted; however, they are available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

Under IV. B. the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and pertinent portions of this Manual were requested. There is enclosed a copy of the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PLM

EWL:jvl jvl
(7)

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

From a review of the table of contents of this Manual it can be seen that the material contained in this Manual pertains to administrative rather than investigative operations of the FBI, and for that reason it has not been possible to select portions of this Manual which pertain directly to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities responsive to the Committee's request. The various other requests contained in the Committee letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and further response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures - 11

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Table of contents for Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations, as well as the several Sections of the Manual of Instructions which are being transmitted to the Select Committee, have already been made available to the General Accounting Office in the past, with the exception of Section 36, Section 105, and Section 107, Part II. Sections 105, 107, Part I and Part II, and Section 130 are not being furnished to the Committee, but the Committee will be allowed to examine these Sections at FBIHQ. Section 36, dealing with espionage, although classified, does not contain sensitive material involving sources and we feel in the spirit of the requirement we should furnish this Section to the Committee.

As a matter of interest, all of the material with respect to the Manual of Instructions which has been made available to GAO is actually maintained in FBI space.

April 1~~6~~, 1975 8-per PVD/18

This is to acknowledge receipt of classified material by letterhead memorandum dated April ~~10~~, 9 1975, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Ben Marshall
for Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence Activities.

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/LAG

62-116395-75

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD-Adm.
Dep. AD-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-8-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/11G

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
APRIL 11, 1975

As you were previously advised, William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, requested that we provide a briefing for certain staff members of the Committee on the functions of the Intelligence Division. He asked that the briefing cover both internal security and foreign counterintelligence operations and that it provide a broad overview of our investigative responsibilities.

The Intelligence Division is prepared to offer a two-hour briefing beginning at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, 4-11-75. It will include a slide show to be followed by a general discussion and an opportunity to afford questions and answers. After a luncheon break, the staff members will be given a brief tour of the Files and Communications Division.

Since the briefing will cover classified materials, no staff members will be invited unless they have appropriate security clearances. As a consequence Professor John Elliff, who has been tentatively named Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence, will not attend. It is hoped that we may provide him with a private meeting at some later date.

REC-106 62-116395-74

It is expected that those attending the briefing will include: Mr. Miller, F. A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel, Mark Gitenstein and Marvin Epstein, staff members. Since no Committee members will be present, we are not recommending that the staff meet with the Director.

12 APR 23 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

That the above-named staff members of the Senate Select Committee be given a briefing by the Intelligence Division and the Files and Communications Division on 4-11-75.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis

PLM

JBH:dkg (10)

84 APR 23 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 4-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/116
#m0216

"The Washington Post," Thursday, 4-10-75, edition on page A31 contains an article reporting an interview of Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Senator Church, according to this article, stated that the Committee is reserving the right to make public eventually any documents it gets and is accepting nothing with "strings attached."

Inasmuch as this Committee is also the Committee which the FBI is furnishing information to, it is believed a clarification of Senator Church's statement must be obtained and in the interim we should furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.

Section Chief William O. Cregar advised that he had contacted Dr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Committee concerning Senator Church's reported statement. Clarke stated that CIA Director William E. Colby was highly upset at Church's remark and that this statement would be a topic of a discussion of the Executive Committee meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review the morning of 4-11-75. We will be represented at that conference by Section Chief William O. Cregar and Assistant Director John A. Mintz. Clarke indicated the position that the CIA will apparently take regarding this problem is that the White House should obtain the clarification although CIA Director Colby initially was prepared to send a letter over his signature to Senator Church to obtain such clarification.

ENCLOSURE
EX-110
REC-40 62-116395-13

Inasmuch as the request by this Committee was forwarded through the Department, Senator Church's statement was brought to the attention of Douglas Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, who has been handling all FBI responses to Senate Select Committee requests. Marvin ~~indicated he~~ was concerned at Church's statement and stated it was the Attorney General's desire that he be advised of any Bureau response to the Committee concerning this matter.

APR 17 1975

Enc.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

11-98

PVD:dkg (9)

RECOMMENDATION
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

RECOMMENDATION:

No action be taken by the Bureau to obtain clarification of Senator Church's statement pending the results, 4-11-75, meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review, and that in the interim we furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.

pvD JBH/pvD

K

Senate CIA Committee Says White House Stalls on Data

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Committee on Intelligence Operations disclosed yesterday that the White House is still stalling on a month-old request for the directives involving covert activities by the Central Intelligence Agency and other arms of the Government.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), the committee chairman, told reporters after a closed, 2½-hour meeting that he had been authorized to write another letter to President Ford asking him to expedite the request.

The committee asked Mr. Ford on March 12 for all the executive orders and top-secret National Security Council directives concerning the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community, including the command structure at the White House.

The President was also asked to supply the committee with a copy of CIA Director William E. Colby's January report to Mr. Ford on allegations of illegal domestic spying by the agency.

But all the committee has gotten so far, Church said, has been what the White House evidently regards as the least sensitive documents on the list.

Church said he did not know "what the hang-up is" since White House aides have indicated they consider the committee's entire request as "perfectly proper."

Church did not spell out all of "the more sensitive data" that is still being withheld, but he said it includes both the Colby report and the top-secret White House and National Security Council directives dealing with covert operations, both foreign and domestic.

The Idaho senator said the committee is reserving the right to make public eventually any documents it gets and is accepting nothing with "strings attached." But he declined to speculate on whether this might be the reason for the administration's hesitance.

Church said all of the records were essential to the committee's mandate to investigate the CIA and the rest of the government's intelligence community. He said he still had no reason to think at this point that the White House would refuse to give them up, but he emphasized that he saw no reason for further delay.

Church said the committee also authorized its staff of about 35 lawyers and investigators to start gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses as the prelude to a projected round of public hearings this summer. The House has also ordered a similar inquiry but its committee, headed by Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), has yet to choose a staff director.

The Senate committee's chief counsel, Fritz Schwarz, said directors have now been named for all four of its task forces. They are William Bader, head of the foreign intelligence task force; John Elliff, head of the domestic intelligence task force; Alton H. Quanbeck, head of the Military intelligence task force, and David Aaron, head of the task force that will study the intelligence community's "command and control structure."

Bader is a former Senate Foreign Relations Committee aide and has recently been working with the Ford Foundation. Elliff is a Brandeis University professor and expert in domestic law enforcement activities. Quanbeck has been director of the Brookings Institution's defense analysis project and Aaron has served on the National Security Council staff.

Schwarz said that each of the task forces will cut across the lines of various intelligence agencies and focus on general avenues of inquiry, such as the "legal authority and legal restraints" for intelligence work; the targets and techniques of intelligence-gathering, counterintelligence and covert operations, and the question of who orders and controls those activities.

#moe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JK6

"The Washington Post"
April 10, 1975

62-116395-93
ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO :Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/7/75

FROM :W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 [illegible]

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the EXCOM), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/4/75.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were Mr. Roderick Hills, Assistant Counsel to the President; Associate Deputy AG Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke; as well as senior officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

The following items of interest were discussed:

Mr. Roderick Hills reported that he had a meeting with the Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to discuss having Legal Counsel present when members of a particular agency were being interviewed by SSC staff personnel. The essence of this meeting resulted in the SSC being receptive to such an arrangement but it would be incumbent upon each agency, department or bureau to negotiate the specific arrangements for such representation with the SSC. Hills also discussed the problem of the unknown employee or former employee who might request to be interviewed unbeknownst to the parent agency. It was suggested to the Counsel and Staff Director by Hills that such an employee be interviewed by only one staff member, that the staff member attempt to determine the scope of this individual's testimony and then discuss such testimony with the parent agency to insure the agency could provide advice as to the sensitivity of the unknown employee's testimony. No firm decisions were made but it would appear the Counsel and Staff Director will agree to allow Counsel to be present during the

REC-40 62-116395-72

APR 16 1975

ST-106

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

5 APR 21 1975

testimony of a secret employee and following such testimony the employee will be allowed to meet with staff members of the SSC in an Executive Session. It is anticipated more definitive information on the final decisions regarding this aspect will be forthcoming from the White House.

The question was raised by the Bureau representative as to whether the Ad Hoc Group and/or the interagency registry should be notified as to requests members of the Intelligence Community receive from other Congressional committees. Mr. Wilderotter advised that this would be a judgment question; however, if a request from a Congressional committee other than the Select Committees impacted on the Intelligence Community, involve sensitive issues or would be of interest to the White House, such requests should be provided to the interagency registry along with an abstract of the response.

Attached is a list of those members of the SSC staff who have been certified for access to compartmented information. Also attached is a paper identifying 10 issues likely to grow out of Select Committee deliberations. The pencil notation in the right-hand column identifies those agencies of the Intelligence Community responsible for preparing a paper which addresses these issues. It is noted that issue identified as number eight is entitled, "Intelligence Files and Privacy." Mr. Colby asked that the FBI prepare this paper. Assistant Director Mintz advised that the Bureau has a study underway on this very subject and agreed that the Bureau would prepare this study. The deadline for completion of the study is 4/25/75.

Also attached is a copy of the survey of the SSC facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, covering all aspects of physical and technical security. None of the participants of the EXCOM had any objection to the facility and we presume the SSC will abide by the procedures outlined in the attached survey report.

Attached also for information is a draft of an employee notice and agreement concerning treatment of confidential material being considered by the SSC. It is to be noted that to date neither the Committee nor its staff has signed any such Secrecy Agreement.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Pcm wRW

AGREEMENT

I have read the foregoing employee notice concerning treatment of confidential material and have read the Resolution establishing the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, and the Committee Rules.

I understand that to qualify as an employee of the Select Committee, I am required to, and I hereby agree to, abide by those Rules. I further understand ~~that~~ and agree that the obligations hereby placed upon me continue after my employment with the Committee has terminated.

SIGNATURE

SWORN TO BEFORE NOTARY

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/TG

those staff members with appropriate security clearances and a [redacted] need to know.

"7.5 Testimony taken in Executive session or papers and other materials received by the staff shall not be made public or disclosed to any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee, or upon termination of the Committee, as determined by a vote of the Senate.

"7.6 Before the Committee is called upon to make any disposition with respect to the testimony, papers, or other materials presented to it, the Committee members shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine all pertinent testimony, papers, and other materials that have been obtained by the inquiry staff. No member shall release any of that testimony or those papers or other materials to the public or any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote, a quorum being present at the time the vote is taken.

"9.3 The staff of the Committee shall not discuss either the substance or procedure of the work of the Committee with anyone other than a member of the Committee or other Committee personnel. Upon termination of employment by the Committee, each member of the staff, or consultant, shall surrender any classified material which came into his possession while in the employ of the Committee.

"9.4 The employment of any member of the staff who fails to conform to these Rules shall be immediately terminated."

In addition to the strict security precautions adopted by the Committee there are, as you no doubt know, sections of the United States Code and Executive Orders which relate to keeping certain material confidential--they are sections [TO BE INSERTED] which are annexed hereto.

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Committee Rules include provisions relating to the confidential treatment of material received by the Committee. These provisions are contained in Rules 6.11; 7 (and each of its subsections), 9.3 and 9.4 which provide the following:

"6.11 Release of Testimony and Other Matters. No testimony taken or material presented at an Executive session shall be made public, in whole or in part or by way or summary, unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee. Unless authorized by the Chairman the name of any witness scheduled to be heard by the Committee shall not be released prior to his testimony.

"RULE 7. Procedures for Handling Select Committee Classified or Sensitive Material

"7.1 Staff offices on the first floor of the Dirksen Office Building shall operate under strict security precautions. One guard shall be on duty at all times by the entrance to control entry. All persons before entering the offices shall identify themselves. An additional guard shall be posted at night for surveillance of the secure area where sensitive documents are kept.

"7.2 Sensitive documents and other materials shall be segregated in a secure storage area. They may be examined only at secure reading facilities. Copying or duplicating of such documents and other materials is prohibited except as is necessary for use in Committee meetings or to prepare for the taking of testimony or for interviews.

"7.3 Each member of the Committee shall at all times have access to all papers and things received from any source by subpoena or otherwise. The staff director shall be responsible for the maintenance, under appropriate security procedures, of a record of all papers and things in the possession of the Committee, which log shall be available to any member of the Committee.

"7.4 Access to classified information supplied to the Committee shall be limited by the staff director, the chief counsel and the counsel to the minority, and to

DRAFT 3/28/75

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Employee Notice and Agreement Concerning Treatment of Confidential Material

NOTICE

Concern about security and the maintenance of confidentiality of information provided the Senate Select Committee has been stressed since the outset by the Senate and the Committee.

Section 7 of the resolution which established the Committee requires the Committee to:

> "institute and carry out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to prevent the disclosure, outside the Select Committee of any information relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the Federal Government engaged in intelligence activities, obtained by the Select Committee during the course of its study and investigation, not authorized by the Select Committee to be disclosed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the Select Committee, of any information which would adversely affect the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign countries or the intelligence activities in foreign countries of any department or agency of the Federal Government."

DD/A 75-1549

1 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration 2 APR 1975

SUBJECT : Security Survey, Senate Select Committee Facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, Capitol Hill

1. Attached to this memorandum is a letter to Mr. William G. Miller for your signature.

2. A security survey of the Senate Select Committee facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, as requested by Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director of that Committee, was completed on 24 March 1975.

3. With the security procedures now in effect and those planned for implementation, the facility will provide adequate protection for the handling and storage of CIA documents of all levels of classification. Also attached for your information is a copy of the survey report.

Charles W. Kane
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

Att

cc: DD/A
Chairman, SECOM

Refer
CFA

OS 5 1284

Regraded Unclassified when separated
from Classified Attachment(s)

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 063417

SURVEY REPORT

Senate Select Committee Facility
Dirksen Bldg. 1st & C Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C.

1. In response to a request from Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director, Senate Select Committee, (tele. 224-1700) Messrs. Nicholas R. Zubon and Robert E. Burgener conducted a comprehensive security survey of the Senate Select Committee's Facility on 24 March 1975.

2. Mr. Marshall provided both a comprehensive tour of the facility and a detailed explanation of the operation.

3. The following are pertinent facts concerning the security procedures as related to the Senate Select Committee Facility:

A. Type of Facility

The Committee is in the auditorium (Room G 308) of the Dirksen Building at 1st and C Streets, N. E., Washington, D. C. Access to the auditorium is gained easiest by entering the building from the 1st and C Streets entrance. A 24-hour guard post is located just inside this entrance. The Select Committee facility is 40' east of the building guard post. It is nearly in direct line of sight, however, a foyer surrounded by a 6' high temporary partition precludes the auditorium entrance door from being visible. The entrance to the auditorium is protected by a 24-hour guard post.

The auditorium (Room G 308) is approximately 100' long x 45' wide. The floor, ceiling and walls are made of 6" to 8" solid masonry. The ceiling has a false ceiling approximately 18" deep in which the air handling equipment and sundry other service components are housed. All major air handling equipment is on the roof above the auditorium. Access to the roof which is strictly controlled by the Director of Security, is gained by a stairway in the southeast corner of the auditorium. The sidewalls each have a 2' x 3' register approximately 12' above the floor through which

air is passed from the auditorium to the air handling equipment on the roof. These registers are solidly bolted into the walls.

The front of the auditorium (south wall) is covered by a large movie screen. To the right and left of the movie screen are two rooms 6' wide and approximately 15' long used by the research section clerical personnel. These rooms have countertop openings approximately 3' above the floor for access from within the auditorium. Countertop openings exist along both sidewalls for approximately three quarters of the length of the wall. The sidewalls have intercorridors on the opposite side of the countertops which have been converted into unpartitioned office space. The only reproduction machine, a xerox model 3100, is located in the west corridor. The east corridor has been converted into a compartmented information storage room and a compartmented document reading room. The Security Director indicated that he may move his office to the head of the compartmented reading room to provide a larger measure of access control to this sensitive area.

The auditorium has six wooden exterior doors, 7' high and 3" thick. The entrance door into the auditorium (west and north wall) will have an electrical push-button lock installed. A similar door in the east end of the north wall will be barred and bracketed on the inside to prevent unauthorized entry. The west wall has 2 exterior doors leading into the Capitol Police offices. The east wall has two exterior doors with one leading to the roof while the second door exits into the Capitol Police Garage. All exterior doors will be alarmed. The doors now have Yale 197 1/4 locks with the keys controlled by Mr. Marshall. The fire safety factor concerning these locked doors was discussed with him.

The auditorium has a small second floor area at the north end. Access is gained by two stairways on the east and west side of the auditorium. The second floor space consists of a large projection room, currently filled with projection equipment, and five small private film viewing rooms.

The five small rooms will be converted into witness interview rooms. The windows in each of these rooms will be covered during the stay of the Select Committee in the auditorium.

B. Access Controls

Access to the Dirksen Building is gained by either the main entrance on 1st and C Streets, ground level, or the Basement Tunnel Entrance at the rear of the building. Both entrances have a 24-hour guard post where persons entering are checked for identification. Brief cases and packages are processed through x-ray machines. Vendors entering the main entrance are checked for ID, however, all boxes are not checked.

Entry into the auditorium is controlled by a guard at the door. His instructions are that all persons entering must show an ID card. Visitors are permitted only by appointment. They are logged in and escorted at all times while in the auditorium. From 1800 hours Friday through 0800 hours Saturday, and from 1300 hours Saturday to 0700 hours Monday everyone must sign the log in and out and show an ID. In the event an access problem arises at the guard post, regardless of the hour, Mr. Marshall is alerted.

C. Guards

The Dirksen Building and the auditorium are protected by members of the U. S. Capitol Police Department. The Building has two 24-hour/7day-a-week guard posts at the entrances while the Senate Select Committee has one 24-hour/7 day-a-week guard post at the entrance and an after-hours roving patrol inside the auditorium. All police officers are well trained, wear the Capitol Police uniform and carry Smith and Wesson 38 caliber revolvers. After-hour patrols check all doors, the entire auditorium for classified material that may not have been secured, and the second floor hourly during the night. The guards on duty at the time of the survey were alert and responsive to their duties. During off-duty hours, guard supervisors make at least two unscheduled visits to the guard posts during each shift. In addition the guard at the stationary post has four telephones, two of which have a pickup and automatic ring feature with Capitol Police Headquarters. There will be no rotation of police officers during the occupancy of the Committee. The same officers will be assigned to these posts.

D. Alarms

All exterior doors to the auditorium will have contact (microswitch) alarms. The Remington Rand safes, being obsolete, will be protected by a proximity alarm. The compartmented storage room and an adjacent reading area will be protected by a volumetric alarm. For fire protection a smoke detector/rate of rise alarm will be installed in the compartmented area. All alarms will enunciate at the guard desk at the entrance to the auditorium. The ADT Company will install and maintain the alarms.

E. Safes

The facility has 22 safes. Sixteen 4-drawer Remington Rand Safes located below the movie screen. Three class six Mosler 5-drawer, two class 1 Diebold 2-drawer, and one class 2 Diebold four-drawer are located in the compartmented storage room. With the exception of the Remington Rand safes, all other safes are in good working order.

The safe combination and repairs are under contract with the Safemaster Company. The safe combinations were recently changed by that company. All safe combinations are under the control of Mr. Marshall. However, an assist on day-to-day operations is provided by Mr. Pat Shea, Assistant Staff Director, who acts as backup for safeguarding the combinations to the safes in the compartmented storage room. Messrs. Larry Kieves, John Petersen and Ms. Jan Orloff are backup for the combinations to the sixteen Remington Rand Safes. Mr. Marshall was given two change keys in the event he decides to change the combination himself should staff personnel rotate.

F. Document Control

Incoming CIA documents will be delivered by Agency courier to the guard at the entrance door to the auditorium. The registry officer will receipt for them and take them to the Registry Section where all documents will be logged. Compartmented and Top Secret material will be taken to the Compartmented Storage Room and placed in a safe after it has been logged in Registry. Individuals, on an access list promulgated by Mr. Marshall draw the compartmented documents from the safes but must read them in the adjacent area dedicated for this purpose. Documents classified below TS/Codeword will

be stored in the Remington Rand safes. The documents in the Remington Rand safes can be drawn by anyone on the staff, but must be receipted for with the Registry Officer. The documents are to be read on the tables placed there for that purpose in the Research Section.

Further control of classified documents is directed through the assigning of a staff employee given responsibility for the reproduction of documents on the xerox machine. He will control the number of copies made on typewriters.

All classified material is secured in safes at the end of the working day.

H. Classified Waste

It is estimated that one 50-pound bag of classified waste will be generated each week while the Committee is in session. Once the bag is filled with classified waste, it will be placed in the locked trunk of Mr. Marshall's automobile and taken to the Federal Reserve Building incinerator where he will witness destruction by burning. In the event this incinerator is booked to capacity, he will take the classified waste and burn it at the D. C. incinerator. Should either incinerator become unavailable to the Committee, Mr. Marshall was assured that CIA would consider assisting him in the secure disposition of Committee classified waste.

I. Compartmented/TS Storage

A room dedicated as the codeword/TS storage room is in the northeast corner of the auditorium. Its five walls are solid masonry ranging from 6" to 8" thick. A 1/8" stainless steel door frame is bolted to the masonry walls. A prefabricated 9 gage wire cross-patch metal frame door is attached to the steel frame serving as access control to the dedicated room. The door will be secured by lock and key once classified material arrives for storage. This room will be alarmed.

J. Telephone

The Facility has six standard telephones in the auditorium. Five of the telephones will be equipped with conversation

masking devices. A central switch installed ahead of the telephone instruments will disconnect all telephones simultaneously, should the need arise. The telephone system is maintained by the local telephone company.

K. Security Briefings

All new members of the committee receive a thorough briefing from Mr. Marshall on security procedures and security responsibilities. Briefings are periodically reinforced when conditions warrant.

L. Security Duty Check Procedures

Custodians secure the safe cabinets assigned to them, i.e. Mr. Shea, codeword room, Messrs. Kieves, Petersen, and Ms. Orloff, Research area. Mr. Marshall double checks behind them. The custodian, Security Director and the roving guard patrol check the entire auditorium to ensure all classified material has been secured at the end of the day.

M. Counteraudio Inspection

Mr. Marshall has taken action on this requirement and continues to monitor this area to provide the Committee with as much security protection against the Audio threat as possible.

N. Shredder

The facility has one Destroyit Model 51 Shredder used only for shredding the most sensitive documents. Other documents are not shredded in this machine because of its limited shredding capability.

O. General Observations

The security procedures implemented within the Senate Select Committee facility are sufficient to provide a proper environment for the protection of classified materials. The survey officers were pleased with the security director's dedication to the objective of providing the best security possible for the Committee.


Capitol PARK Police
Garage
To GARAge
Locked
Locked
SCREEN
Office
Space
To AIR COND
And FurNAce
Room for
Auditorium
SAFES
TABLE
Locked
Capitol PARK Police
Garage
TS And compartmented
Reading Room
OFFICES
Xerox
Reproduction
AREA
Capitol PARK Police
Offices
TS and
compartmented
storage
Locked
Bolted
Office Space
unoccupied
GUARD Reception AREA
6' high Temp partition
6' high Temp partition
NORTH
MAIN HALL IN FRONT of AUDITORIUM
in
DIRKSEN BLDG
To GUARD Post

SECOND FLOOR

North


Interview Room
Interview Room
Interview Room
Projection Room
Interview Room
Interview Room

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/JRK

NOTES FOR SESSION

In previous sessions we discussed the importance of highlighting issues likely to grow out of Commission or Committee deliberations. We observed that we should identify some of those on which a legal brief or annex would be helpful to Executive Branch initiatives. The idea was to select a few where a solid research paper with options, pros and cons, etc., could help us develop a firm grip on the questions in the issue and identify options. For example, the question of Executive privacy presents itself, and I gather is being worked on.

There are others we feel it would be useful for the group to address and assign responsibility for further work. For example:

	Suggested Action
1. Economic Intelligence and National Security--new discussion —	Treasury
2. Covert action and the law —	CIA
3. The Intelligence Budget--open, black, or closed--rational and procedures for handling past, present and future —	OMB
4. Joint Congressional oversight committee for Intelligence —	CIA.
5. GAO and the audit authorities of U.S. Intelligence Agencies —	IC Staff help from legal counsel
6. Confidential funds authorities, contingency reserves, legal base, history and uses —	CIA-DOD
7. Cover for Foreign Intelligence Actions legal and administrative issues —	CIA-State
8. Intelligence files and privacy —	FBI [illegible]
9. The "fact of" question--international, legal and political considerations —	State
10. "Sources and methods" legislation —	OMB & Justice

What human being responsible by next Friday
3 weeks at Executive Session

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 31, 1975

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
#MORI6

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

With respect to our letter to you of March 17, 1975 you will find attached the first list of members of the Committee staff designated to receive compartmented information.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller
Staff Director

Enclosure

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret and are designated to receive compartmented information. They also meet the requirements as set forth in DCID 1/14. WGM

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
William G. Miller	8-15-31	N.Y.	109-26-4349
Frederick A. O. Schwarz	4-20-35	N.Y.	084-30-2047
William Bader	9-8-31	N.J.	545-30-3377
Burton V. Wides	6-14-41	N.J.	139-30-1936
Elliot E. Maxwell	7-24-46	N.Y.	133-34-4225
Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495
Michael J. Madigan	4-18-43	D.C.	042-34-3797
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48	N.Y.	068-38-6464
Charity I. Benz	7-23-46	N.Y.	053-38-7410
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19	Neb.	485-28-4530
Maratha E. Mecham	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848
Audrey H. Hatry	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691

#MORI6

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED on THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-172

ENVELOPE

EMPTY

Official DocLab Instruction(s) – Revised 10-Apr-2014

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 4/10/75

REC-40

FROM : W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

On 4/8/75 Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman of the Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, forwarded the attached copy of a letter dated 3/28/75 from Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, enclosing a list of staff members who have been certified for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Copies of the list are attached to tickler copies of this memorandum for retention by personnel who may be in contact with the Select Committee staff.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Enclosures (2) ENCLOSURE

62-116395

LFS:tdp (8)
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Schwartz

PLM

ST-106

REC-40 62-116395-

15 APR 16 1975

51 APR 21 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., T[illegible]N.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
LTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
ARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 23, 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG
#MDR16

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William Miller
Staff Director

1 62-116395-[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

ATTACHMENT

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
David Aaron	8-21-38	IL.	550-44-7971
Nancy Brooks	2-14-40	KY	313-38-6773
Barbara Chesnik	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235
Mary De Oreo	6-13-47	OH	287-42-6258
Daniel Dwyer	8-24-52	MA	023-44-8792
Peter Fenn	12-12-47	MA	213-50-1123
Edward Greissing	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113
Mark Inderfurth	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617
Dorothy Johnson	6-8-25	OR	540-20-6413
Loch Johnson	2-21-42	New Zealand	566-62-0478
Howard Liebengood	12-29-42	IN	307-44-9707
Naldeen MacDonald	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503
William G. Miller	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349
Susan Pitts	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638
Alan Romberg	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583
Frederick A.O. Schwarz, III	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047
Patrick Shea	2-28-48	UT	528-64-1965
Stephanie Smith	3-23-54	OH	282-58-6476
Mary Towell	4-25-44	TN	566-64-7628

62-116395-71

ENCLOSURE

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1 - Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 14, 1975

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/TG #MDR16

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to the Senate Select Committee letter dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents from the FBI and my letter to you dated April 10, 1975, enclosing a memorandum and a copy of the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, less certain exhibits, for the Committee's use.

The purpose of this letter is to make available for your information a copy of the aforementioned paper with all exhibits intact. The Committee's copy of the paper has missing exhibits because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Authority to release these exhibits is being expeditiously sought so they may be made available to the Committee.

The exhibits extracted from the Committee's copy included Exhibit I, J, K, M, and P.

REC-106 62-116395-70

Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has reviewed and approved all exhibits left in the paper and has requested to review the extracted exhibits after "Third Agency Rule" approval has been granted and before the exhibits are forwarded to the Committee. This will be done at the earliest possible time.

Enclosure

APR 21 1975

ALL:vb
(7)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
sst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
iles & Com.
Inv.
tion
pry
Eval.

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Director, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY 5P-2ALM/MG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (3)

DRD:mjg
(6)

NOTE: This is the most current FBI Functional Organization Chart. A new chart would not be available if prepared in response to the Senate Select Committee's request for approximately 7 to 10 days.

REC-106 62-116395-69

5- WOG

DRD

6 APR 21 1975

PLM

ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DRD

GPO 954-546

#mDR16

1/18/01 SP-2 ALM/JTG

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975 to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

In response to the Committee's request for a detailed current organizational chart attached hereto is a document entitled "FBI Functional Organization Chart."

This chart was prepared January 14 1975, and since that time the following changes concerning the position of Assistant Director have been made. The Assistant Director of the Files and Communications Division is John J. McDermott. The Assistant Director of External Affairs is Donald W. Moore Jr. The Assistant Director of the Training Division is William M. Mooney.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

DRD/PVD:mjg/kjs
(6)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-69

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED #FDDE ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-69

FBI FUNCTIONAL ORG

FIELD OFFICES

ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
ALEXANDRIA
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
COLUMBIA
DALLAS
DENVER
DETROIT
EL PASO
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JACKSONVILLE
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LAS VEGAS
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE

DIRECTO
CLARENCE M. K

ASSOCIATE DIR
NICHOLAS P. CA

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
(ADMINISTRATION)
THOMAS J. JENKINS

IDENTIFICATION · DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD H. ASH

RECORDING SECTION:

FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE
LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL MATTERS

POSTING SECTION:

FUGITIVE WANTED NOTICES
PROBATION AND PAROLE FLASHES

CARD INDEX SECTION:

CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND DECEASED NAME INDICES

TECHNICAL SECTION:

CLASSIFICATION AND SEARCHING
CRIMINAL FINGERPRINT FILE
CIVIL FINGERPRINT FILE (ALIEN, CIVIL SERVICE, MILITARY AND PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION)
WIRE ROOM SERVICES

ASSEMBLY SECTION:

FILING AND MAINTENANCE OF FINGERPRINT JACKETS
VERIFICATION OF IDENTIFICATIONS
MICROFILMING

FINGERPRINT CORRESPONDENCE SECTION:

UPDATING AND DISSEMINATION OF FINGERPRINT RECORDS
CERTIFIED RECORDS
MISSING PERSONS UNIT
MAIL ROOM

LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION:

DECEASED HAND AND FINGER EXAMINATIONS
DISASTER IDENTIFICATION SQUAD
FINGERPRINT PHOTO LAB
FINGERPRINT TESTIMONY
GENERAL APPEARANCE FILE ON CONFIDENCE MEN
LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATIONS
LATENT FINGERPRINT INSTRUCTION
NATIONAL UNIDENTIFIED LATENT FINGERPRINT FILE
SINGLE FINGERPRINT FILE
TECHNICAL FIELD ASSISTANCE

AUTOMATION AND RESEARCH SECTION:

AUTOMATED IDENTIFICATION DIVISION SYSTEM (AIDS)
CCH/CIRFO DESK
FINGERPRINT AUTOMATION RESEARCH

TRAINING DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOE DAVID JAMIESON

QUANTICO:

FBI ACADEMY – TRAINING CENTER
FIELD FIREARMS TRAINING
FIREARMS INSPECTION AND REPAIR
IN-SERVICE FIREARMS TRAINING
LAW ENFORCEMENT COMBAT ARTS RESEARCH PROGRAM (LECARP)
NATIONAL ACADEMY FIREARMS TRAINING
NEW AGENTS FIREARMS TRAINING
SPECIALIZED POLICE FIREARMS TRAINING
SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) TRAINING
RADIO STATIONS
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY
IN-SERVICE COURSES
DEFENSE PLANS FOR DIVISION
LEARNING RESOURCE CENTER
DEFENSIVE TACTICS COURSES
NEW AGENTS TRAINING
POLICE INSTRUCTOR COURSES
PHYSICAL TRAINING
SUPERVISORY AND MANAGEMENT TRAINING
EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT COURSES
ASSESSMENT CENTER – CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
TRAINING RESEARCH
POLICE INSTRUCTOR BULLETINS
LAW ENFORCEMENT SYMPOSIUMS
LAW ENFORCEMENT SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS
FACULTY DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH UNIT
INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
FIELD CLERICAL TRAINING ASSISTANCE
POLICE VISITORS
LIAISON – PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SOCIETIES
LIAISON – UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
LIAISON – NATIONAL ASSOCIATION STATE DIRECTORS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (NASDLET)
LIAISON – INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
LIAISON – INTERAGENCY POLICE GROUP

HEADQUARTERS:

BUREAU MANUALS
CHIEF CLERK MATTERS
CLERICAL RETRAINING COURSES
FIELD POLICE SCHOOLS
FORMS MANAGEMENT
LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES
SAC MEMORANDA
REPORTS MANAGEMENT
STENOGRAPHIC TRAINING
SUGGESTION PROGRAM
NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ADMISSIONS
INDOOR RANGE

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
EUGENE W. WALSH

BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION:

ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT
BUDGET AND FISCAL MATTERS
BUREAU ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS
PHYSICAL SECURITY MATTERS

EXHIBITS SECTION:

ARTIST'S-CONCEPTION DRAWINGS
GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF INVESTIGATIVE AND STATISTICAL DATA
PREPARATION OF CREDENTIALS AND SPECIAL FORMS
TRAINING AIDS (DIAGRAMS, ILLUSTRATIONS AND DISPLAYS)
TRIAL EXHIBITS (CHARTS AND MODELS)
J. EDGAR HOOVER FBI BUILDING

MECHANICAL SECTION:

AUTOMOTIVE POOL
EMPLOYEE PARKING
ENERGY CONSERVATION
PHOTOGRAPHY
PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION
SPACE MATTERS
SUPPLY AND STORAGE

PERSONNEL SECTION:

APPLICANT RECRUITING AND PLACEMENT
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
COMMENDATIONS AND AWARDS
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE
EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
HEALTH PROGRAMS
LEAVE
LIVING QUARTERS
PAY ADMINISTRATION
PERFORMANCE RATINGS
PERSONNEL MATTERS
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
POSITION CLASSIFICATION
RETIREMENT MATTERS
SAFETY PROGRAMS
VETERANS' COUNSELING
VOCATION AND AVOCATION RECORDS

PROCUREMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES SECTION:

PROCUREMENT (SUPPLIES-EQUIPMENT)
CONTRACTING
INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
TYPEWRITER REPAIR SHOP
MAINTENANCE

SPECIAL AGENT TRANSFERS AND MOVEMENT UNIT:

PERSONNEL LOCATION RECORDS
SPECIAL AGENT TRANSFERS
RESIDENT AGENCY MATTERS

FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
J. WALLACE LAPRADE

RECORDS SECTION:

AUTOMATION AND RESEARCH
CHIEF CLERK MATTERS
CLASSIFYING
CONSOLIDATION
CORRELATION
FILE REVIEW
FILING
GENERAL INDEX
MAIL ROOM
MESSENGERS
NAME SEARCHING
NUMBERING
PERSONNEL RECORDS
RECORDING
RECORDS MANAGEMENT
ROUTING
SERVICE
TRAINING

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION:

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS (INTRA-BUREAU)
TELEGRAPH, TELETYPE, AND MESSAGE ENCODING/DECODING SERVICES
TELEPHONE SERVICE

LABORATORY DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
BRIGGS J. WHITE

FRONT OFFICE:

FORENSIC SCIENCE TRAINING UNIT
PLANNING AND EVALUATION UNIT
TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE UNIT

CRYPTANALYSIS-GAMBLING-TRANSLATION SECTION:

CRYPTANALYSIS
GAMBLING EXAMINATIONS
POLYGRAPH
SECURITY OF FBI COMMUNICATIONS
TRANSLATIONS

DOCUMENT SECTION:

CHARRED PAPER EXAMINATIONS
HANDWRITING AND HANDPRINTING
INDENTED WRITING
INK AND PENCIL EXAMINATIONS
OBLITERATED WRITINGS
PAPER EXAMINATIONS
PHOTOGRAPHIC EXAMINATIONS
PORTRAIT PARLE EXAMINATIONS
PRINTING
RUBBER STAMP, CHECKWRITER, AND OTHER MECHANICAL DEVICES
SHOEPRINT EXAMINATIONS
TIRETREAD EXAMINATIONS
TYPEWRITING
MISCELLANEOUS

RADIO ENGINEERING SECTION:

CW RADIO NETWORK ENGINEERING
FM RADIO SYSTEMS
MAINTENANCE COORDINATION
MOBILE AND PORTABLE RADIO
RADIO FREQUENCY LIAISON COMMITTEES
EVIDENCE EXAMINATIONS

PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY SECTION:

BIOCHEMICAL
BIOLOGICAL
EXPLOSIVES
FIBERS AND HAIRS
GENERAL CHEMICAL
GLASS FRACTURES
GUNPOWDER TESTS
GUNS AND AMMUNITION
INSTRUMENTAL ANALYSIS
METALLURGICAL
MINERALOGICAL
NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS
NUMBER RESTORATION
PHARMACOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
TOOLMARKS
TOXICOLOGICAL
WOOD
X-RAY

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOHN J. McDERMOTT

PRESS SERVICES OFFICE

CORRESPONDENCE AND TOURS:

CORRESPONDENCE – CITIZEN INQUIRIES
CORRESPONDENCE REVIEW
MAILING LISTS
DISTRIBUTION OF REPRINTS
TOURS OF FBIHQ
SPEECH MATTERS

RESEARCH SECTION:

FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN
INVESTIGATOR
TOP TEN FUGITIVE PROGRAM
FUGITIVE PUBLICITY PROGRAMS
SPECIAL PROJECTS
LIBRARY
BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM
YOUTHFUL CRIMINALITY
RADIO-TV NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS
NEWS RELEASES

COMPUTER SYSTEMS DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ANDREW J. DECKER, JR.

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING SECTION:

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED OR ASSAULTED STATISTICS
NATIONAL BOMB DATA STATISTICS

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER SECTION:

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER/COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL HISTORIES SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
NCIC/CCH OPERATIONS
NCIC/CCH CRIMINAL HISTORY CONVERSION

DATA PROCESSING SECTION:

ACCOUNTING REPORTS
COMPUTER SYSTEMS:
  DATA PROCESSING
  TELEPROCESSING
  OPERATIONS RESEARCH
  SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
PAYROLL
RETIREMENT RECORDS
STATISTICAL TABULATIONS
VOUCHERS

JANUARY 14, 1975

ANIZATION CHART

#MDK16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-91 BY SP2ALM/MG

R
ELLEY

ECTOR
.LAHAN

FIELD OFFICES

MEMPHIS
MIAMI
MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
NORFOLK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH
PORTLAND
RICHMOND
SACRAMENTO
ST. LOUIS
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
TAMPA
WASHINGTON, D.C
TOTAL 59

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION)

JAMES B. ADAMS

OFFICE OF PLANNING AND EVALUATION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD J. GALLAGHER

STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

OPERATIONS
PLANNING
POLICIES
PROGRAMS

INSPECTION DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
HAROLD N BASSETT

INSPECTIONS – FIELD AND HQs
SPECIAL PROJECTS
SURVEYS
INTERNAL AUDITS
SECURITY COORDINATOR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
W. RAYMOND WANNALL

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

CI-1 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY

CI-2 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY

CI-3 SECTION:

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT - VIOLATIONS
ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
FOREIGN ECONOMIC MATTERS
FOREIGN FUNDS
FOREIGN MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS
FOREIGN SOCIAL CONDITIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY
NEUTRALITY MATTERS
SECURITY MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY
BOMBING MATTERS
ANTI-RIOT
ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN GUESTS OF U. S.

CI-4 SECTION:

DOMESTIC AND MILITARY LIAISON
FOREIGN LIAISON MATTERS
FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH:

IS-1 SECTION:

EXTREMISTS AND
ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
EXTREMISTS
ACTIVITIES
CIVIL UNREST AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE
EXTREMIST INFORMANTS

IS-2 SECTION:

SEDITION
SABOTAGE
COMMUNIST
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS
OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS
SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (EXCEPT ESPIONAGE)

IS-3 SECTION:

CENTRAL RESEARCH
ANALYTICAL RESEARCH
TRAINING
SPECIAL RECORDS
DEFENSE PLANS

.LEGAL COUNSEL

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
LEGAL COUNSEL
JOHN A. MINTZ

LEGAL ANALYSIS
LEGAL INSTRUCTION
LEGAL LIAISON
LEGAL RESEARCH
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ROBERT E. GEBHARDT

CRIMINAL SECTION:

ASSAULTING OR KILLING A FEDERAL OFFICER
ASSAULTING FOREIGN PERSONNEL
CONGRESSIONAL ASSASSINATION STATUTE
ASSAULTING THE PRESIDENT (OR VICE-PRESIDENT) OF THE UNITED STATES
AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT
BANK ROBBERY
BILLS OF LADING ACT
CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT
CRIME ON INDIAN AND GOVERNMENT RESERVATIONS
CRIME ON THE HIGH SEAS
DESECRATION OF THE FLAG
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES
EXTORTION
FALSE ADVERTISING OR MISUSE OF NAMES TO INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY
FALSE ENTRIES IN RECORDS OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS
FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT
FEDERAL TRAIN WRECK STATUTE
FIREARMS ACT (A) NATIONAL (B) STATE FIREARMS CONTROL ASSISTANCE ACT (C) UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS
FRAUDULENT PRACTICES CONCERNING MILITARY AND NAVAL DOCUMENTS, AND SEALS AND SYMBOLS OF AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE, USE, POSSESSION OR SALE OF EMBLEMS AND INSIGNIA
ILLEGAL USE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS
ILLEGAL USE OF RAILROAD PASS
ILLEGAL WEARING OF UNIFORM
IMPERSONATION
INTERSTATE OBSCENE OR HARASSING TELEPHONE CALLS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISON-MADE GOODS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN CATTLE
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE OR AIRCRAFT
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS
IRREGULARITIES IN FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS
KIDNAPING
MAY ACT
POLICE KILLINGS
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - CRIMINAL
SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT
THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT, ROBBERY, AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT
WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT

CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION:

CIVIL RIGHTS
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
ELECTION LAWS
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY

NAME CHECK SECTION:

NAME CHECKS
SPECIAL MEMORANDA

ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD SECTION:

ACCOUNTING CONTROL
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRIES
ADMIRALTY MATTERS
ANTI-RACKETEERING
HOBBS ACT
LEA ACT
INTERFERENCE WITH GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
ANTITRUST
ASCERTAINING FINANCIAL ABILITY
BANK FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT
BONDSMEN AND SURETIES
BRIBERY
CENSUS MATTERS
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
CONTEMPT OF COURT
COPYRIGHT MATTERS
COURT OF CLAIMS
DEPENDENTS ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950
DESTRUCTION OF INTERSTATE PROPERTY
EIGHT-HOUR DAY LAW
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
FALSE CLAIMS – CIVIL
FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
FEDERAL LENDING AND INSURANCE AGENCIES
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STRIKEBREAKERS
JURY PANEL INVESTIGATIONS
KICKBACK RACKET ACT
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 (INVESTIGATIVE MATTER)
LANDS DIVISION MATTERS
MAIL FRAUD
MIGRATORY BIRD ACT
MISCELLANEOUS – CIVIL SUITS
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
OBSTRUCTION OF COURT ORDERS
OBSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
PASSPORT AND VISA MATTERS
PATENT MATTERS
PERJURY
RAILWAY LABOR ACT
RED CROSS ACT
RENEGOTIATION ACT – CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT – 1940
TARIFF ACT OF 1930
UNREPORTED INTERSTATE SHIPMENT OF CIGARETTES
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
WAGE AND HOUR LAW
WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM V. CLEVELAND

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE-- ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION:

ANTI-RACKETEERING (INTELLIGENCE)
EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS – OBSTRUCTION
INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF LOTTERY TICKETS
INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING INFORMATION
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF RACKETEERING
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF WAGERING PARAPHERNALIA
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
SPORTS BRIBERY
TOP-ECHELON CRIMINAL INFORMANTS

FUGITIVE SECTION:

BOND DEFAULT
CONDITIONAL RELEASE VIOLATORS
CRIMINAL INFORMANT MATTERS
DESERTERS AND DESERTER-HARBORING
ESCAPE AND RESCUE
ESCAPED FEDERAL PRISONERS
FUGITIVES
HARBORING
PAROLE VIOLATORS
PROBATION VIOLATORS
SELECTIVE SERVICE, INCLUDING FUGITIVE AND RE-EMPLOYMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID CUSTODY OR CONFINEMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID GIVING TESTIMONY
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION

EMPLOYEES SECURITY AND SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION:

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
APPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AND APPLICATIONS FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION OF SENTENCE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS)
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
PEACE CORPS
SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
U. S. COURTS APPLICANTS
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection ✓
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/7/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/2/75.

The study prepared for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) entitled, "Human Intelligence," has come to the attention of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The major contributors to this report were the FBI and CIA. It is an extremely sensitive document and for that reason any requests from any committees of the Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the White House. At the present time, the consensus of those persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release of information to the committees of Congress is that this report will not be provided Congressional committees at this time.

The SSC does recognize a requirement to comply with the Third Agency Rule which states in effect that classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department. CIA's General Counsel has produced a paper entitled "The Third Agency Rule," copy attached, which they have requested be reviewed by the Legal Counsels of all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. A copy of CIA's paper referred to above has been made available to Assistant Director Mintz who has indicated he will be in direct contact with Mr. Warner, CIA's General Counsel.

REC-106 62-116395-68

Attached is a copy of sanitization guidelines for documents provided Congressional Select Committees. The Group asked that these guidelines be reviewed and concurrence or

APR 21 1975

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

objections be furnished to the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) for consideration. A copy of these guidelines has been furnished to the Freedom of Information Unit of the Legal Counsel Division for review. Their comments will be furnished to the Bureau's representative, Mr. Frank Schwartz, on the USIB Committee in compliance with the mandate from the Ad Hoc Group.

Also attached is a copy of the abstract which all agencies of the Intelligence Community are being required to use in abstracting information that agency has provided one of the Select Committees. These abstracts will be retained in an interagency registry to be available for review by any members of the Intelligence Community as well as the White House. The purpose of this interagency registry is to have available in one location all information in abstract form that members of the Intelligence Community have provided the SSC.

Attached is a memorandum for Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Group, advising the names and titles of individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that these persons will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated with the House Select Committee.

Also attached is a letter from Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee, addressed to the President enclosing a list of documents which the SSC is requesting from the White House.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a~~n~~ homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

> A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-68

contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community and then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(d) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/LG

#MDR16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-68

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to interrelationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. agency receiving request
2. originating agency

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Sanitization Guidelines for Documents Provided Congressional Select Committees

1. Attached is a copy of a statement, "Guidelines for Sanitizing Certain Documents Provided Select Committees" prepared by the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, for consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. This step is a follow on to the understanding the DCI has with Senator Church that sanitization of selective documents will be undertaken before the documents are released to the Committee. Similar understandings have been discussed with House Staff as well.

2. It is important that, to the extent possible, all intelligence organizations follow generally the same sanitization guidelines. Accordingly, the USIB Ad Hoc Group should consider utilizing these or similar guidelines within their respective organizations.

3. If requested by the Chairman, the DCI will discuss orally with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate and House Select Committees the content of the sensitive USIB or CIA material excised from documents. Where appropriate, the DCI may discuss this sensitive material with the entire Select Committee. He considers it essential that the written record provided to the Committee staff not include such sensitive information for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

Attachment: As Stated

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY 5558 SP-2 RLM/[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-68

DRAFT

28 MARCH '75

GUIDELINES FOR SANITIZING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has recently discussed with Senator Church the need for special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee of certain sensitive aspects of intelligence activities and the Senator has expressed his recognition of this need. Included in such matters are the identities of sensitive sources, the material provided to the United States by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain employees whose safety could be jeopardized if revealed, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with US intelligence and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems. Such material should be protected not only from exposure but indeed the risk of exposure. Further, recognition should be given to the need to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals.

MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JG

2. One form of this special consideration may include use of sanitization procedures to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of the community's activities.

3. What May Be Sanitized

While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which may be levied by the Committees for document~~ing~~ary material and not possible to determine specifically what material should be excised from these documents, the following illustrations are offered in certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet the test mentioned above.

4. Collection of Intelligence

(a) The Committee will probably address the matter of how intelligence activities or methods have or may impinge upon individual rights. Documents supporting responses may be sanitized by removal of identities of sensitive agents and informants, covert personnel, and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be substituted, i.e., a foreign journalist, a political official in the opposition party. No sanitization should be used in connection with

names of individuals whose employment or former employment by, or association with a department or agency, does not remain secret or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements remain secret.

(b) Some information may be required with respect to technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived by release of these codenames or nicknames in documents. Details of the technical systems involved, contractual arrangements, funding and/or names of companies or consultants whose participation was obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in the community's sanitization procedure. While documentary samples of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of verbal testimony, no raw product should be provided the Committees

for retention. If absolutely required by the Committees, sanitization of such raw product should be conducted to mask the degree of technical capabilities.

5. Intelligence Estimates

Finished intelligence reports of departments and agencies and estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not normally require sanitization. However, departments and agencies should review such publications to ensure deletion of source identities.

6. Administration

Information concerning the internal administration arrangements of intelligence agencies may be requested. This may include staffing charts with occupants identified. ~~Sanitization of individual,~~ Identities of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning in a cover assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future be considered for a covert assignment.

7. General

The following categories of information or specific examples may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should be given by the department or agency concerned to the necessity of

deletion or sanitization of this type of information, prior to providing the document.

(a) Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.

(b) Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) ~~employed overseas in human source~~ collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.

(c) The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targetted foreign organizations.

(d) The success or failure of recruitment attempts in any given targetted foreign organization.

(e) Names of particular employees whose physical safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.

(f) Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.

(g) Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries.

(h) Identifying collaborative operations between the United States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaborations or within a jointly targetted third country.

(i) Identifying collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved.

(j) Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.

(k) Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country.

(l) Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence operations.

(m) Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that collaborate in a special manner such as providing cover for foreign intelligence operations.

(n) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).

(o) Proprietary information relating to contractors or furnished in confidence.

8. What Should Not Be Sanitized

There are general categories of intelligence activities which have already been placed in the public domain by the mass news media or authors with background experience in intelligence departments or agencies of the community. Names, places, dates and events which have been so revealed should not be excised if contained in requested documents.

There is an increasing body of information which has been released under the Freedom of Information Act. No further sanitization of this material should be conducted unless it relates to an individual's rights to privacy.

9. Techniques of Sanitization

Sanitization of intelligence material is usually considered the act of physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing from written communication with or without regard for the residual

content. Use of a substitution device, either pseudonym or ident is an example of sanitization which permits intelligent continuity of the material without revealing the true identity. Sanitization does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material in this context.

The integrity of official records must be maintained. The following sanitization techniques apply only to copies of records.

(a) Physical Sanitization - Names may be cut out and the residual material xeroxed and submitted to Committees. Names may be masked with correction tape and then xeroxed. The xerox copy may be submitted to the Committees.

(b) Names may be deleted and replaced with "IDEN." The deleted material is provided on a separate IDEN list which contains names or descriptive phrases substituted for deletions.

(c) The material can be retyped or reprinted with substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal the sensitive material.

(d) Entire pages can be removed from some documents and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information

as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing department or agency. This technique may be employed when physical sanitization or excision of material results in unintelligible gibberish as residue.

(e) Within a category of inquiry, it may be desirable to extract a complete document from requested material when the request is broad and all inclusive within its field. The existence of such a document should be made known to the Committees but retained by the agency or department for review under escort of a representative of the department or agency.

10. Management of Sanitization

The original record and a copy of the sanitized version provided should be readily available in all cases. Materials developed within an agency or department in response to requests should be reviewed at an appropriate level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. In the case of documents or materials of a community nature, the release should be done in coordination with the departments or agencies and/or the Program Manager concerned and any sanitization should be agreed upon during coordination.

This proposed use of sanitization as a special arrangement to protect selected issues contained in material provided to Select Committees by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies. It is essential to the proposal that departments and agencies attempt to employ the same criteria for sanitization and coordinate as required. This paper can serve only as general guidelines on sanitization.

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT OF MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT:
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)
4. TITLE:
5. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (A brief narrative statement which describes content of the material provided, problems addressed, and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should be of sufficient length clearly to convey the basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)
6. REQUESTOR:
7. DATE OF REQUEST:
8. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
9. LOCATION OF FILE COPY/COPIES
10. DOES MATERIAL RELATE TO AN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEM? IF SO, IDENTIFY:

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP'2 ALM/TG

62-116395-68

IC-75-1951
28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Clarke

SUBJECT : SECURITY - House Select Committee - Cleared Personnel

1. The following information has been obtained from the Office of Legislative Counsel and addresses those individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that they will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated in the near future with the House Select Committee.

Mr. Frank M. Slatinshek
Chief Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

Mr. William H. Hogan, Jr.
Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

Mr. John L. Boos
Chairman Nedzi's Assistant for Intelligence Matters
Room 2343 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

2. The following secretaries are approved for receipt of classified material at the levels indicated:

Berniece Kalinowski (Slatinshek)
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

62-116395-68

Rita D. Argenta (Hogan)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI

Oneta L. Stockstill (Boos)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

3. Safe storage facilities are available in Mr. William Hogan's office which have been approved by CIA. Mr. Slatinshek and Mr. Boos keep classified material meant for Congressman Nedzi in this area.

Don
Donald E. Moore

Dist: RTaylor:mm/28Mar75
O-Adse
1 - IC Reg
1 - SECOM

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, [illegible]
CHARLES MCC. MATH[illegible]R., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible]A.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 12, 1975

MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/JHG

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on March 5 to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for the direct and forthright manner in which you addressed some of the initial questions that lay before the Select Committee, and your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

We are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible and the Committee is gratified at the full and complete cooperation that we have received from the Executive agencies up to this point. In every respect thus far, the agencies have been fully cooperative with the Committee and the staff and I believe this augers well for a constructive and expeditious conclusion to our inquiry.

At our meeting on March 5th with you, we discussed the general areas in which the Committee would need initial documentation. As we discussed, our first requirements are to determine the legal basis for the activities for the intelligence agencies of the United States Government. In this regard, it will be helpful to the Committee to receive from whomever you may designate, the documents, files, and other papers that might be required to fully determine the legal basis for the activities of United States intelligence agencies. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents on the attached list directly relevant to the inquiry authorized by S. Res. 21, be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church

62-116395-68

ATTACHMENT

1. The report furnished to the President by Director Colby in January 19

2. All Executive Orders, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) or Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and other White House* directives pertaining to the charter, structure or guidelines for any overt or covert foreign or domestic intelligence agencies or activities.

3. All Executive Orders, National Security Council memoranda and directives, and other White House instructions pertaining to the structure, functions or organization of intelligence policy organizations within the Office of the President, including the Forty Committee and the Washington Special Action Group (and their predecessor organizations, e.g., the Operations Coordinating Board, Special Group, 54/12 Group, 303 Committee, etc.).

4. Organization charts and staffing patterns (for the present and, to the extent reasonably convenient, back to 1947) for all intelligence-related organizations within the White House (NSC, Forty Committee, OEP, WSAG, etc.) including names of key officials and staff personnel.

#MDe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/

---

* "White House" as used in this listing is meant to include the President, the Office of the President, including the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JBS
#NW46

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

By memorandum dated 3-20-75, you were advised of a request received from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Intelligence Division requested that an attempt be made to modify portions of the Committee's request.

Regarding Part I titled Legal Authorities, the Intelligence Division pointed out that this particular request was wide-ranging and required a considerable file review as it requested any memorandum discussing the legal authority of the FBI to "(1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials asserted as sources of such authority." With regard to Part III concerning the FBI's administrative organization, they requested the identities by name of personnel in the Intelligence Division, Unit Chief and above. This caused concern in the Intelligence Division that there would be a needless proliferation of a list of Bureau personnel working in this field which list, of course, would be of interest to foreign intelligence sources.

On 4-1-75 Inspector John B. Hotis and SA Paul V. Daly discussed these matters with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee; John T. Elliff, who has been nominated to head the task force for the Committee looking into FBI activities; F. A. O. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee; and staff member Michael Epstein. They agreed to modify the request in Part III to the extent that personnel in the Intelligence Division need not be identified by name below the level of Assistant Director in the organization chart to be furnished them pursuant to their request of 3-19-75. They asked as an alternative the Bureau prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of Unit Chief with names included which they would have access to review in Bureau space.

REC 17 62-116395-61

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Farrington - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

ENCLOSURE

APR 15 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:dkg

APR 22 1975

With regard to Part I relating to legal authorities, they stated they were amenable to the Bureau furnishing them whatever documents they have retrieved up to this time which have been recovered pursuant to their request of 3-19-75 and that no additional detailed review need be conducted until they review the aforementioned documents. At the end of their review they will make any additional specific requests concerning this part of their request. They also asked that in our response we furnish them copies of documents listed on a three-page paper prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee, a copy of which is attached.

Staff Director Miller requested that the Bureau expedite their response to the Senate Select Committee's request as the first meeting of that Committee is scheduled for Wednesday, 4-9-75, and he felt strongly that they must have material that showed progress in their study of the FBI prior to that time. Mr. Miller requested that, if necessary, the request be responded to in a piecemeal basis and that the complete response does not necessarily have to be made at one time.

It is suggested that we make available to this Committee as soon as possible those documents which we have furnished the General Accounting Office (GAO) which also fall within the 3-19-75 request of the Senate Select Committee. In this regard staff members have advised they are in contact with GAO auditors concerning the FBI.

By way of observations it is obvious that the staff members of the Committee are well versed in Bureau policy and procedures. To this point they have been cooperative and we should insure that we give a timely response to their various requests.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Intelligence Division advise whether modification of the Senate Select Committee's request concerning legal authorities for investigations and the modification of the table of organization of the Intelligence Division are acceptable and, if so, expeditiously prepare the necessary response to the Senate Select Committee.

4/8/75

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

(2) That we furnish all information which has previously been furnished GAO and is within the ambit of the Senate Select Committee's request.

Material furnished to GAO reviewed. All information within ambit of SSC has been furnished to SSC 4/8/75 WOB

(3) That as our response to any one of the five particular areas of inquiry as set forth in the 3-19-75 letter is completed, we furnish it to the Senate Select Committee.

Done 4/8/75 WOB

(4) This material should be sent to the Deputy Attorney General by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should specifically identify the request, for review and subsequent transmittal to the Senate Select Committee.

JBA

PVD

PLM

wRW

OK

All Senate information reviewing material. Per conversation with John Hotis letters should be directed to Attorney General 4/8/75 WOB

Examples of the types of materials requested under Part I:

1. Studies on Subversion and FBI Jurisdiction which were prepared for Director Gray. See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session) on the Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973), pp. 7 and 14.

2. Paper prepared on jurisdiction which was discussed by Director Gray and others at a Quantico meeting on May 23 and 24, 1972. Id. at p. 151.

3. Memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an executive order concerning the authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence operations. See the Attorney General's reply to this memorandum which is published in the Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Surveillance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), on Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance (1974), pp. 31-32.

4. An Intelligence Division study which was furnished to the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, by Director Kelley. See Hearing before the Subcommittee on FBI Oversight of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session) on S. 2106, Ten-Year Term for FBI Director (1974), pp. 12-13.

5. Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Director Hoover, dated September 14, 1967. See Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, Part I (1974), pp. 3404-3406.

6. The two FBI memoranda which record instructions from President Roosevelt to Director Hoover concerning FBI investigations of subversive activities, and which indicate meetings between President Roosevelt and Director Hoover on August 24 and 25, 1936. Id. at pp. 3392-3393.

7. Memorandum from Director Hoover to Associate Director Tamm, dated September 10, 1936. Id. at p. 3377.

8. Presidential directives dated September 6, 1939; January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953. Id. at pp. 3405 et seq.

#MDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-67

Examples of the types of materials requested under Part II:

1. See Delimitations Agreement in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (First Session), on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights (1971), Part II, pp. 1172-1179.

2. See Agreement of Coordination in the Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes. (1974), Part I, pp. 3369-3383.

For references to items requested in Part IV, see:

1. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), on the Nomination of Richard G. Kleindienst, of Arisona, to be Attorney General (1972), pp. 63-64.

2. Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes. (1974), pp. 3569-3570.

3. Hearings before the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session), on the Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973), pp. 150-151.

An excised copy of the Report requested under Part V, Item A, is published in the record of the Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), pursuant to H. Res 803 (Impeachment), Book VII, Part 1, pp. 384-431.

The original COINTELPRO Report which is requested in Part IV, Item B, is referred to in the Hearings before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session), FBI Counterintelligence Programs (1974), p. 21.

Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, dated May 20, 1954, captioned "Microphone Surveillance." See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), Warrantless Wiretapping (1972), p. 178.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/
#MDR16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

Sen. Study-75

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that all responses for the production of records, etc., received from Congressional committees be forwarded by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General to the requesting committee, and also that in selected instances a property stamp or statement be affixed to certain documents limiting access.

With the proliferation of committees in Congress looking into FBI operations, it is essential that a standard procedure for the forwarding of documents to the requesting committees be established. Inasmuch as requests such as the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities have been forwarded to this Bureau through the Department, it would appear logical that responses to such inquiries and all other inquiries of Congressional committees, whether they be directed to the Department and/or the Bureau, be responded to through the Department. Such a procedure not only will make all our responses consistent but will also give the Department an opportunity to review and approve documents being made available to Congress.

In connection with our preparation of responses to requests of Congressional committees, it is suggested that all responses should be by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should clearly describe the specific request which is being responded to in the letterhead memorandum.

REC-18 62-116395-66

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116464

In those instances where documents are of a nature that we are not desirous of unauthorized personnel, whether they be in Congress or otherwise, having access to, we should affix a property stamp. This property stamp should read as follows:

APR 11 1975

> "This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside of your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the contents may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI."

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

APR 18 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

PVD:kjs (21)

JUN 11 1975

RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all responses to Congressional inquiries concerning FBI operations be forwarded to the Congressional committees by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General. Upon approval, these letterhead memoranda will be hand-delivered to the Deputy Attorney General's office by Legal Counsel Division.

(2) That in instances where access to a particular document should be limited because of the contents of that document, a property stamp in line with the above be affixed thereto.

Div 5 is obtaining appropriate stamp. JCF 4/9

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached are copies of various documents which are jurisdictional agreements between the FBI and other Federal agencies or guidelines prepared by the Attorney General with reference to investigative responsibilities between the FBI and other Federal agencies insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

1. Delimitations of Investigative Duties of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force, dated February 23, 1949, with supplemental agreements 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Supplemental agreement number 2 is no longer in effect.

2. Agreement between the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency, dated February 7, 1966, classified "Secret."

3. Agreement between the FBI and the United States Secret Service, effective July 30, 1973.

RLM:mam
(6) mam

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

wrw

65

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-545

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General

April 8, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to the request entitled, "Jurisdictional Agreements." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of additional requests is continuing and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (2)

REC-106

62-116395-65

RLM:mam
(6) mam

RLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

7 APR 17 1975

2 - ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

APR 1 ? 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

4. Investigative guidelines with reference to Title 11, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation of Explosives, prepared by the Attorney General of the United States, submitted by letter to the FBI on January 11, 1973.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures (4)

1 - The Attorney General

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JT6

[illegible]

62-116395-65
[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

February 23, 1949

VI

Subject: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Office of Naval Intelligence, the
Intelligence Division of the Army, and
the Office of Special Investigations,
Inspector General, U. S. Air Force.

The Agreement for Coordination of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office
of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence
Division of the Army, and the Office of
Special Investigations, Inspector General,
U. S. Air Force.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, and the Presidential Directive of October 30, 1947. In addition, cognizance has been taken of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the specific application of that Act is set forth in Section II hereof. All other provisions of this Agreement are apart from and have no relation to the stated requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. In view of the above, it is now agreed that responsibility for the investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage (hereinafter referred to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated hereinafter. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with the other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest. When the organization with primary operating responsibility is unable for any reason to produce material in that field desired by the subscribing agencies, such special arrangements as may be legal or desirable will be worked out through negotiation at the national level prior to activity by one agency in another agency's field. It is recognized by the subscribers hereto that the Headquarters Department of the Army has decentralized such functions to its major subordinate commanders. When the major subordinate commanders of the Department of the Army cannot effect satisfactory special arrangements, the matter will be referred to the Director of Intelligence of the Army for further negotiations at the national level. Close cooperation and coordination between the four subscribing organizations is a mutually recognized necessity.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TIG

II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigations of cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals of all classes in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the State of Hawaii**, and the State of Alaska* except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5.

2. All investigations of violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. There are no territorial or personnel limitations on this provision.

3. The coordination of the investigative activities of civilian agencies in the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the State of Alaska except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5, which provide information regarding subversive movements and activities in these categories.

4. Keeping the other subscribing organizations advised of important developments in these categories within its cognizance, particularly:

a. Activities of inactive reserves of the armed service, including the National Guard.

b. Developments affecting plants engaged in armed forces contracts.

c. Developments concerning the strength, composition, and intentions of civilian groups within its cognizance which are classed as subversive and whose activities are a potential danger to the security of the United States.

d. Developments affecting those vital facilities and vital utilities which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

e. Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

(For b, d, and e above no protective coverage is contemplated.)

---

*Editorial revision of this Agreement to reflect the statehood of Alaska was approved by the IIC on January 7, 1959.

**Revision to reflect the statehood of Hawaii was approved by the IIC on September 9, 1959.

III. ID, Army will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Army.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Army Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

6. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Army contracts.

IV. ONI will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired naval personnel of the Navy.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Navy Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and in the State of Alaska except as described in Section 5, below.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations and with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government on Kodiak and Afognak Islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula and Adak Island in the Aleutian Chain.*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Navy contracts.

V. The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Air Force.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Air Force Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The investigation of the same cases described above in that portion of Alaska described in Section 5, below, with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians, except as described hereinabove, (1) in that part of the Alaska Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay

---

*This paragraph added. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

northwest to the town of Old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to the Kvichak Bay; (2) in the islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula excluding Kodiak and Afognak Islands which are the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; (3) in the Aleutian Islands excluding Adak Island which is the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; and (4) in the Pribilof Islands.*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Air Force contracts.

VI. 1. Where Sections III, IV, and V involve general territorial coverage, responsibility for such coverage will pass from one element of the armed forces to another automatically when a change of command responsibility ensues. This provision is subject to modification by direct agreement between the interested elements of the armed forces.

2. While investigative jurisdiction over the civilian populace in former enemy territories occupied by the armed forces has been provided for in Sections III, IV, and V above, those provisions are subject to direct adjustment with the Department of State if and when that Department assumes governmental direction in such areas of occupation.

VII. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this Delimitations Agreement. Subject to the exceptions already provided for above, general amendments or modifications involving all of the four subscribing organizations shall be issued in the form of a revised Delimitations Agreement and not as separate instructions.

VIII. During periods of martial law, or periods of predominant armed forces interest not involving martial law, when agreed upon by the subscribing agencies, the provisions of Appendix A or B, hereto attached, will additionally apply.

IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to two or more of the subscribing agencies to the Delimitations Agreement which affect the basic jurisdiction thereof which are

---

*Original paragraph changed. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

now or hereafter mutually entered into by any of the subscribers thereto will be reduced to writing; will thereafter become supplements to the Delimitations Agreement, and distributed only to the extent agreed upon by the co-signers.

(Signed) S. Leroy Irwin
Director of Intelligence,
Department of the Army

(Signed) Thomas B. Inglis
Chief of Naval Intelligence

(Signed) J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

(Signed) Joseph F. Carroll
Director, Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force

APPROVED

APPENDIX A

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

I. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the armed forces commander will assume responsibilities for coverage in these categories. His authority to direct and control the subscribing agencies of the armed forces will be limited only by such instructions as he may receive from the Secretary of Defense. He will have authority to coordinate the intelligence activities of the subscribing agencies in his area of responsibility, within the limits of their available personnel and facilities, by the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibility, nor to issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

II. Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsibility of the armed forces commander will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. They will render such aid and assistance to the armed forces commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. They will furnish all pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to the armed forces commander by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. Each headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised by its agencies of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the armed forces commander.

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2-ALM/[illegible]

APPENDIX B

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY INTERESTS, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

I. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theaters of operation. When an armed forces commander of such a potential theater is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the armed forces commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

1. Agents of the FBI; of ONI; ID, Army; and the OSI, IG, U.S. Air Force will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of Sections II, III, IV, and V.

2. In addition thereto, the armed forces commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other subscribing agencies will insure that the armed forces commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other agencies.

3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the other three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.

II. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When the commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that he is authorized to augment the coverage with such elements of the subscribing agencies as are under his jurisdiction. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies, the armed forces commander should obtain the necessary authority from the Secretary of Defense.

III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have placed the initiative in the hands of the armed forces commander, whenever any of the other services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended.

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/TT6

Supplemental Agreement No. I
to the Delimitations Agreement

Cooperation and Coordination Between
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Intelligence Division of the Army
The Office of Naval Intelligence and
The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, with a view to promoting the closest possible cooperation and coordination between the Field Services of these agencies agree that the following recommendations will be transmitted to their field installations:

(a) Special Agents in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Divisional Offices, Military Intelligence Officers of the pertinent Armies, District Officers of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, and Naval District Intelligence Officers will maintain close personal liaison between those offices and their representatives, including a meeting of representatives of the four agencies, preferably the officers in charge, at least twice per month, for the purpose of discussing pending and contemplated investigative activities, and any other subject necessary to insure that there is proper coordination of their investigative work.

(b) The close personal liaison to be maintained between representatives of the four agencies at all times should insure that there is not duplication of effort in any field, and that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is maintained. Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use of informers.

(c) A distinction should be recognized between the investigative interest of individual agencies and the coverage interest. It is believed that all four agencies should study, from time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in order to insure that all channels of interest and avenues of information are adequately covered by at least one of the participating agencies.

(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it should be transmitted to the other agency.

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain classes of information are of general interest to the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services in connection with background and knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations, even though the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.

(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature occur, the directors of the four intelligence agencies feel that with proper personal liaison, such differences can be satisfactorily adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various divisional organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. III
to the Delimitations Agreement
(As Amended June 8, 1950)

Investigative Jurisdiction on Vessels of Military Sea Transportation Service

1. The investigative jurisdiction of all activities under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage on vessels of the Military Sea Transportation Service is as follows:

a. Investigative jurisdiction on vessels purchased by the Navy will be the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

b. Vessels obtained by the Navy through a "bare boat charter" will be under the investigative jurisdiction of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

c. Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Transportation Service which are manned and supervised by their private owners are under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

2. When civilian personnel who are subjects of an investigation under a or b above reach a U.S. port or a port where the FBI has a field agency, or prior to reaching such port, if practicable, the Department of the Navy will promptly furnish the FBI all pertinent information concerning the investigation. If personnel who are subjects of an investigation as above remove themselves from the vessel upon arrival of the vessel in port and further surveillance is considered necessary, the Navy will continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local level that the FBI will make every effort to transfer responsibility upon arrival of the vessel at the port.

3. When the FBI opens an investigation under c above or when an FBI investigation in progress develops or is believed about to develop ramifications under a, b or c above, the FBI will promptly furnish all pertinent information to the Navy and will thereafter coordinate its actions with the Navy whenever and wherever deemed necessary to insure proper pursuit of the case.

#moel6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/jjs

#mdr16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALN

Supplemental Agreement No. IV to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Private Contractors of the Armed Forces

It is agreed by the subscribers of the Delimitations Agreement (hereinafter referred to as subscribers) that with reference investigations of civilian employees, applicants for employment, directors and key personnel of privately owned plants and facilities, working or bidding on contracts important to the Army, Navy or Air Force (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces) procurement, the following will be followed insofar as practicable. Exceptions thereto will be adjusted by mutual agreement between the subscribers concerned.

a. The Armed Forces will conduct background investigations of such persons unless there is a particular reason for requesting that an investigation be conducted by the FBI or the FBI has a special interest in a particular case and has notified the Armed Forces of such interest.

b. The FBI will conduct complaint investigations of such personnel upon specific request in each case by one or more of the Armed Forces. If one of the Armed Forces has no further need for an investigation requested, but not completed, prompt notification will be made to the FBI.

c. Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces under a above will be terminated and all information passed to the FBI when credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature is uncovered. Upon receipt of such a case, the FBI will proceed as under b above if one of the Armed Forces so requests.

d. When one of the subscribers is aware that another is conducting an investigation on a person or firm identical or closely connected with a person or firm it contemplates investigating, no investigation will be undertaken without the consent of the subscriber which has an investigation in progress. The investigating agency will make available to the other interested agency copies of the reports of the investigation made.

e. Normally, identity of confidential informants will not be communicated from one subscriber to another; however, when such communication occurs, the receiving subscriber will employ the highest possible safeguards to insure that such informants are not compromised. No transmittal of information concerning confidential informants to a third subscriber or to another agency is authorized except by specific consent of the originator.

f. A subscriber who receives a report of investigation from another subscriber may freely transmit copies of such reports to a third subscriber except as provided in e above.

g. A report of complete investigation received by the Armed Forces from the FBI will not be reopened without the approval of the FBI except to obtain additional background information. In such case, the FBI will be furnished copies of all information obtained. Other information required by the Armed Forces will be requested of the FBI.

h. If one of the Armed Forces requests the FBI to conduct an investigation or to conduct additional investigation as provided under g above, and if for any reason the FBI declines or is unable to conduct such investigation or additional investigation, the Armed Force concerned may proceed with the investigation. The FBI will be furnished copies of the results thereof if the FBI so requests or if the Armed Force concerned considers the results to be of FBI interest.

i. Nothing above is to be construed as altering the basic Delimitations Agreement of 1949 or current agreements concerning subversive organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. V to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Reserve and Civilian Components of the Armed Services

It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force may conduct background investigations on members of the inactive reserve and National Guard who are anticipated being called back to active duty, or where an investigation is undertaken for the purpose of determining whether the individual should be disenrolled from his military status, or to determine whether the individual may be granted access to classified military information. The following procedures shall be pursued in each of the above circumstances:

(1) The Intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or Air Force before undertaking such background investigation will consult the FBI to determine: (a) if the FBI has an investigation in progress; if so, no investigation will be undertaken by the intelligence agencies except as may be mutually agreeable to the Armed Force concerned and the FBI; (b) if the FBI already has made an investigation; if so, the results will be made available to the other agencies; (c) if the FBI has information on the individual, even though it may not have conducted an investigation.

(2) If, after consulting the FBI, investigation is undertaken by the other agencies, it will be pursued no further than is necessary to make the determination required by the other agencies, and all information developed pertinent to the four categories will be furnished promptly to the FBI.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JRS

Supplemental Agreement No. VI to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation in Areas Not Specifically Assigned

It is agreed by the military subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the references therein in paragraphs III. 4., IV. 4., and V. 4. to "areas where the Army (Navy, Air Force) Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein" shall be interpreted as referring to areas where the Department of the Army (Navy, Air Force) is responsible for the administrative and logistic support of the Headquarters of Commands established by the Secretary of Defense.

(Approved by I.I.C. November 4, 1959)

#m Del6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

SECRET

February 7, 1966

[illegible]

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JAC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X/
model6 1-17-01

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (S)

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an (S)

SECRET

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (S)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. (S)

INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES
TITLE XI, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970
REGULATION OF EXPLOSIVES

1. General

Title XI of the captioned law amends Title 18, United States Code, by adding a new chapter 40 with section numbers 841 through 848 governing the importation, manufacture, distribution and storage of explosive materials and creating certain Federal offenses pertaining to the unlawful use of explosives. Administration of explosives regulation is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury as is investigative jurisdiction over the unlawful acts proscribed in section 842. Under authority contained in section 846 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) have concurrent investigative jurisdiction as to the remainder of chapter 40, i.e., the unlawful acts proscribed in subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of section 844. Although not specified in chapter 40, the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction to investigate all incidents involving explosive or incendiary devices sent through the mails or directed against U.S. Postal Service property.

Title XI greatly broadens Federal authority pertaining to explosives-connected offenses. At the same time, Congress has expressly disclaimed any intent to occupy the field to the exclusion of state law on the same subject matter. To effect both Congressional purposes and to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort it is essential that the limited Federal investigative resources be carefully allocated, particularly in cases in which both the ATF and the FBI have jurisdiction.

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Effect on prior jurisdiction - This agreement applies only to those incidents as to which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction prior to the enactment of the captioned law and to incidents previously subject to FBI investigation by reason of chapter 65, Title 18, United States Code (malicious mischief). Investigative procedures in other types of incidents (e.g., train wrecking, damaging aircraft and motor vehicles, racketeering) shall remain unchanged.

#MOM6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/

(b) Primary jurisdiction - Subject to the provisions hereof, the FBI will exercise primary jurisdiction over all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities or at activities, such as transportation and tourist offices, operating under the aegis of a foreign government although not in a diplomatic status, over all alleged violations of subsections 844(d) through (i) which are perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals and all other violations of subsections 844(e) through (g) which are not directed at Treasury Department or Postal Service buildings or functions.

(c) Type of Investigation to be Conducted

(1) Offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which appear at the outset to have been perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals as defined in advance by the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice. If ATF or the Postal Inspection Service has properly initiated investigations and information is subsequently developed indicating apparent involvement of terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals, responsibility shall be relinquished to the FBI unless a determination is made by the Department of Justice that a transfer of responsibilities will unduly impair further investigative efforts.

(2) Alleged offenses against Colleges and Universities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of any alleged violation of section 844 which involves the use or attempted use of explosive (as distinguished from incendiary) materials against the facilities of a college or university. Investigation of alleged violations involving use or attempted use of incendiary materials will be limited initially to the development of background information as prescribed in paragraph 6 below.

(3) Alleged offenses directed against foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities as described in paragraph 2(b) above.

(4) All other alleged violations of subsection 844(f) -- offenses involving use of explosives against United States property or federally financed organizations, and (g) - offenses involving possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used, etc., by the United States - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all violations of subsection 844(g) over which it has primary jurisdiction hereunder, and those violations of 844(f) which are directed at federal property (e.g., a military facility) or a federal function (e.g., a Selective Service or ROTC facility). In other violations of 844(f) the FBI will develop and disseminate background information as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

3. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Violations ancillary to firearms laws violations or violation of section 842 - The Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) of the Department of the Treasury will exercise investigative jurisdiction over violations of section 844 which are ancillary to its primary jurisdiction over the Federal firearms laws or over section 842 of Title XI.

(b) Violations of subsection 844(d) - interstate transportation of explosives with unlawful intent and subsection 844(i) - offenses against property used in or affecting commerce - Subject to paragraph 2b, above, the ATF will exercise primary investigative jurisdiction over violations of subsection 844(d) and (i) and will conduct a full investigation thereof unless notified by the Criminal Division that pursuant to paragraph 2(c)(1), above, the Department of Justice has requested FBI investigation in a particular matter.

(c) Violations directed at Treasury Department property or functions - The ATF shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at Treasury Department property or functions and will conduct a full investigation of such violations.

4. Postal Inspection Service Jurisdiction

The Postal Inspection Service shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at U.S. Postal Service property or functions.

5. Special Considerations

(a) Bomb Threats, false information (section 844(e)) - The ATF and the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction over violations of section 844(e) against Treasury Department or Postal Service property or functions, respectively. The FBI shall have jurisdiction over all other violations of section 844(e). Upon receipt of information alleging or suggesting a violation of subsection 844(e), the investigative agency concerned will review available information to determine whether the identity of the offender is known or can be readily ascertained and, if not, whether the evidence suggests a pattern or plan of such offenses by a particular offender or against a particular victim. If such a pattern appears or if the offender is identified, all available information will be disseminated as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

(b) Use/carrying explosive in commission of a felony (section 844(h)) - Violations of 844(h) should be handled as an adjunct of the felony from which they arise and should be discussed with the appropriate United States Attorney or Division of the Department handling prosecution of the underlying felony offense. The agency having jurisdiction over the underlying felony will have investigative jurisdiction over the 844(h) violation (e.g., bank robbery is under FBI jurisdiction).

(c) Violations of 26 U.S.C. 5861 (destructive devices) - In incidents involving alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 844 (which may also involve a violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861), ATF shall not exercise its primary jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 5861 involving destructive devices, but the incident shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of these guidelines. This is in no way a relinquishment by ATF of its investigative jurisdiction under Title II of the Gun Control Act of 1968.

6. Development of Background Information

Some incidents such as those directed against Federal property or functions (paragraph 2(b) above) require immediate full federal investigation. Others require a more circumspect approach and will result in full Federal investigation only after consideration of factors pertinent to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, in those incidents which these guidelines do not prescribe immediate full investigation, the investigative agency having jurisdiction will develop background information which includes (a) facts bearing on motivation such as involvement of the suspected perpetrators in terrorist/revolutionary activities, organized crime, labor-management disputes, or racial-religious hate activities; (b) the applicability of state and local laws and likelihood of state or local investigative and prosecutive actions; and (c) any other available facts indicating whether or not the offense warrants Federal investigation and prosecution. Such background information will be submitted telephonically (202-739-2745) or by teletype (710-822-0008) to the General Crimes Section of the Criminal Division and to the appropriate United States Attorney. The Criminal Division will advise the investigative agency concerned whether the matter warrants submission to any other Division or Section of the Criminal Division, and when so warranted the Criminal Division will transmit the information to such other Division or Section.

7. Full Investigation

A full investigation will be initiated immediately in those instances wherein such investigation is specified herein. In other instances full investigation will be initiated only upon direction of the Department of Justice after consideration by the Division having cognizance over the matter of the background information developed under paragraph 6 above.

8. Reports

Copies of case reports prepared in matters investigated under these guidelines will be furnished directly to the Department of Justice and the appropriate United States Attorney. All investigative agencies

shall submit initial reports as soon as practicable to the Department of Justice and shall submit progress reports once each 30 days or as soon thereafter as possible. The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice will be informed as soon as possible in each instance wherein an investigative agency initiates an investigation under section 844. Such notification is of critical importance to the avoidance of duplication of investigative activities. Also each agency subscribing to these guidelines shall, upon instituting investigation regarding possible violations of section 844, immediately notify other subscribing agencies having a logical interest therein. Also, a sufficient level of follow-up liaison and dissemination shall be maintained to avoid duplication of investigative effort.

Additionally, each such agency will exchange information on a timely basis and in a manner which will not interfere with ongoing investigations relative to types, sources, movement, and storage of explosives which are the subject of its investigations. Information regarding significant developments in investigations being conducted under these guidelines and information of an intelligence nature developed incidental to investigations which is of logical interest to the Department of Justice shall be furnished promptly to the Criminal Division of that Department which will be responsible for any necessary further dissemination within that Department.

9. Review of Guidelines

These guidelines shall be reviewed on a continuing basis by the parties hereto to determine whether problems exist in their administration which should be alleviated or whether modification of any of the terms of the agreement are needed in the interests of better law enforcement.

10. Summary

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
842	Regulatory provision violations	ATF
844(d)	Interstate transportation (except by mail) of explosives with unlawful intent	ATF

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
844(e)	Bomb threats - false information - Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
844(f)	Offenses against property of the United States or federally financed organizations --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other (including colleges and universities)	FBI
844(g)	Possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used by the United States --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
844(h)	Use/carrying explosives in commission of a felony	Agency having jurisdiction over underlying felony

Section	Type Violation	Primary Jurisdiction
844(i)	Offenses against property used in or affecting commerce	ATF
All Sections	All offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals	FBI - Unless another agency has started investigation before receipt of information indicating terrorist/revolutionary involvement. In this event see paragraph 2c(1) above.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

["I. Purpose of Agreement

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) originates, and receives from other sources, large numbers of reports on individuals and organizations. One purpose of this agreement is to define that portion of the information on file with, or received or originated by, the FBI, which the United States Secret Service (USSS) desires to receive in connection with its protective responsibilities.

"The USSS has statutory authority to protect, or to engage in certain activities to protect, the President and certain other persons. (Certain other persons, as used in this agreement, refers to those persons protected by the Secret Service under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056.) The authority of the USSS to protect the President or certain other persons is construed to authorize it to investigate organizations or individuals and to interview individuals who might constitute a threat to the President or certain other persons. The FBI has statutory authority to investigate assault, killing or kidnaping and attempts or conspiracies to kill or kidnap the President and other designated individuals.

"The FBI will make available to the USSS information it may request or information which by its nature reveals a definite or possible threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

"A second purpose of this agreement is to insure the most effective protection for the President and certain other persons by establishing a clear division of responsibility between the FBI and the USSS. Such division will also avoid compromising investigations or sources and needless duplication of effort.

"II. General Responsibilities

"The USSS is charged by Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056, with the responsibility of protecting the person of the President of the United States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer in the order of succession to the office of President, and the Vice President-elect; protecting the person of a former President and his wife during his lifetime and the person of a widow of a former President until her death or remarriage, and minor children of a former President until they reach 16 years of age, unless such protection is declined; protecting persons who are determined from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Advisory Committee, as being major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who should receive such protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection); protecting the person of a visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad (unless such persons decline protection).

#mor16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP 2 ALM/

"The Executive Protective Service, under the control of the Director, USSS, is charged by Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202, with protection of the Executive Mansion and grounds in the District of Columbia; any building in which Presidential offices are located; foreign diplomatic missions located in the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia; and foreign diplomatic missions located in such other areas in the United States, its territories and possessions, as the President, on a case-by-case basis, may direct.

"The FBI is charged under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, with investigative jurisdiction over the assault, killing or kidnaping, and attempts or conspiracies to assault, kill or kidnap the President of the United States and other designated individuals.

"The FBI has responsibility for Federal investigations of all violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117 and 1201, relating to the 'Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests in the United States.'

"The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of a wide range of the criminal statutes of the United States including primary jurisdiction over matters affecting the internal security of the United States.

"III. Exchange of Information and Coordination of Responsibilities

"The USSS undertakes to identify individuals or groups who because of their propensities or characteristics, may be dangerous to the President of the United States and certain other persons. To assist the USSS in identifying such individuals and groups the FBI agrees to furnish to the USSS, information (other than public source information or information originating with other U. S. agencies) from its files or which may come to its attention which by its nature reveals a danger or possible danger to the President or certain other persons, or which can be construed as falling within the categories of information desired by the USSS as set forth in Section IV of this agreement.

"The FBI will inform the USSS of the identity of individuals or organizations who come to the attention of the FBI as knowingly and willfully advocating, abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States, or the Government of any state, territory, or possession, or political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government. The FBI will furnish the USSS with reports on such individuals or organizations as requested. During investigation by the FBI of such individuals or organizations, the FBI will be alert and promptly notify the USSS of any information indicating a possible plot against the person of the President and certain other persons.

"The USSS agrees that it will conduct no investigation of individuals or groups identified or suspected of being threats to the internal security of the United States without notifying the FBI. However, when time for

consultation is not available, and an indication of immediate danger exists, the USSS may take such action as is necessary with respect to carrying out its protective responsibilities. Any information obtained by the USSS during such action will be furnished to the FBI as expeditiously as possible.

"The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction.

"It will be the responsibility of the FBI to advise the USSS when investigation is being initiated under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751 and thereafter to furnish the USSS with copies of the FBI investigative reports as they are prepared. It will be the responsibility of the USSS to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention which reasonably indicates that a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, has been or is being committed.

"The USSS also agrees to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention indicating a violation of any other statutes over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction.

"The FBI, under its responsibility for investigation of violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117, 1201 and 1751 will take cognizance of the protective responsibilities of the Treasury Department under Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202 and Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 and thus does not limit or interfere with the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury in the discharge of his statutory protective responsibilities. This is not to be construed as vesting concurrent investigative jurisdiction with the Treasury Department with respect to investigations of individuals or organizations engaged in activities affecting the national security including terrorism, treason, sabotage, espionage, counter-espionage, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, seditious conspiracy, neutrality matters, Foreign Agents Registration Act, or any other Statute or Executive Order relating to national security. Any investigations of such groups or individuals for any reasons other than in connection with protective responsibilities must be closely coordinated with and have the concurrence of the FBI in order to minimize interference with national security responsibilities of the FBI.

"IV. Information to be Furnished to the United States Secret Service by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

"A. When an individual or group is referred by the FBI to the USSS, the following information will be furnished to the extent available:

"Individual - Identification data including name or names, addresses, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment, and marital status.

"Organization - Name or names, address or addresses, officers, size, purpose or goals of organization, source of financial support, background data and such other relevant information as may be available.

"Reason for Referral - Statement of the class or classes of information described in Section IV B under which the individual or organization belongs.

"Information in FBI Files - A summary, as appropriate, of pertinent portions of any FBI file on an individual or organization referred.

"FBI Identification Records - The USSS will make specific requests in each instance where a check of the FBI identification records is desired.

"B. Types of information to be referred:

"1. Information concerning attempts, threats, or conspiracies to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by the USSS or other U. S. or foreign officials in the U. S. or abroad.

"2. Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means, or attempts personally to contact such officials for that purpose.

"3. Information concerning threatening, irrational, or abusive written or oral statements about U. S. Government or foreign officials.

"4. Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U. S. demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic establishments.

"5. Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-making; concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or other implements of war; or other terrorist activity.

"6. Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a desire to defect from the United States and who demonstrate one or more of the following characteristics:

a. Irrational or suicidal behavior or other emotional instability.

b. Strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment.

c. A propensity toward violence.

"7. Information concerning persons who may be considered potentially dangerous to individuals protected by the USSS because of their background or activities, including evidence of emotional instability or participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the United States.

"V. Provision of Federal Bureau of Investigation Personnel to Protect the President and Other Protected Persons

"The USSS may, in accordance with Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 request FBI Agents be detailed to the USSS in order to augment the capacity of the USSS to perform its protective duties. Such requests should be addressed to the Director of the FBI.

"FBI Agents detailed to the USSS are under the direction and exclusive operational control of the Director of the USSS for the period of their assignment. The FBI Agents so detailed may perform an armed or other protective function.

"VI. Implementation of Agreement

"In order to effect the best possible security of the President and certain other persons and places whose protection is the responsibility of the USSS, the FBI and the USSS will construe the terms of this agreement liberally and will take such steps as are necessary to insure the proper exchange and coordination of information.

"The agreement shall be reviewed annually by representatives of the FBI and the USSS, or at such other times as the FBI or the USSS may request, to insure that the agreement is both practical and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Director of the FBI and the Director of the USSS.

"This agreement supersedes all prior agreements between the FBI and the USSS.

July 16, 1973
Date

BY /s/ Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

July 30, 1973
Date

BY /s/ James J. Rowley
Director
United States Secret Service"

#NDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/HG

April 9, 1975

REC- 106
62-116395-64

BY LIAISON

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Flemister
1-Mr. Rachner

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Davis:

In connection with a request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, it is requested that the following documents, which were originated or received by representatives of the National Security Council, be cleared for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee:

Memorandum dated November 6, 1950, from J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and Mr. Raymond P. Whearty, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

DELIVERED BY LIAISON
ON 4/15/75 LES

Letter dated November 8, 1950, from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council, which encloses a report captioned "Report by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to the National Security Council Regarding the Recent Outbreak of Violence by Puerto Rican Nationalists"

Letter dated July 25, 1961, from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference,

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

BCR:hc
(7)

BCR

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

8 APR 1 1975

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council

to Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which encloses a memorandum concerning United States internal security programs under the control of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee

Inasmuch as the Senate Select Committee requested the above documents by close of business April 7, 1975, your prompt attention to this matter would be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

NOTE:

In view of the urgency of the Senate Select Committee request, the above documents were hand carried to the NSC Staff on 4/4/75, by Liaison Agent B. C. Rachner. This letter constitutes a formal request which as in the past has been requested by the National Security Council Staff.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2ALM/JHG

April 7, 1975

Sen Study - '75

Mr. Wannall: WRW

The statement in the attached of the Third Agency rule is accurate and does not present legal problems.

As an observation paragraph number 7 of the document titled "Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committee," dated March 28, 1975, (attached) appears to be subject to various interpretations. This paragraph and in particular the second sentence of the paragraph appears to allow the agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is indirectly involved and the material is sensitive without first contacting the Third Agency. Any notification of the Third Agency in this instance of the furnishing of such information to the Committee would be after the fact. The term indirectly is not defined. Additionally, this paragraph allows the Agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is directly involved and the material is nonsensitive without checking with the Third Agency involved. It would appear the language in paragraph number 7 should be tightened up and the appropriate terms defined.

REC-106 62-116395-64

Legal Counsel Division

6 APR 15 1975

3 ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

4/9/75
Above was brought to the attn of John Warner, General Counsel, CIA, who advised that he agreed with Bu's observation and would address this problem in new paper being prepared.
HPS

62-116395

5-HFS

PVD:dkg (4)

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

#MORI6

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAIN
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/ATG

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

ENCLOSURE

62-116[illegible]-64

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to interrelationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency security request
2. Originating agency

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

> "D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

> "(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/MG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-64

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.

6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to inter-relationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency security request

2. Originating agency

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.

John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a~~n~~ homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

> A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/01 BY SP2ALM/STS

#MDR16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-64

[illegible]tractual obligations. The dete[illegible]nation of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community and then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(2) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : G. R. Steel GRS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

By agreement, the FBI is currently conducting full field investigations regarding SSC staff personnel. These have extremely short (2 week) deadlines which are identical to those afforded Presidential appointments and are, therefore, given preferential treatment in opening, assigning, and following field progress. The Special Inquiry Unit of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry Section, which has about twice its normal case load, is handling these requests. Senator Church, Chairman, SSC, originally estimated that between 35 and 40 staff members would be submitted for investigation. As of today, 4-3-75, we have received requests for 65 such investigations from the SSC and the end does not appear to be in sight. They are received in bunches as many as 6 at a time, which is not the even flow expected and presents an additional burden.

In addition it is expected that similar requests will be forthcoming in the near future from the HSC since we have a similar agreement with it. Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the HSC, has estimated "probably no more than about 25 staff members will be hired." It remains to be seen if this estimate also falls short of actual receipts.

Since there is no charge for these full field investigations they will have to be considered in the budget. It is noted the current charge for a full field investigation, where applicable, is $2028.

EX 104 MCT REC 44 62-116395-63

ACTION: For information. Since it appears the nucleus of the Committee has been formed, it is suggested Senator Church be contacted and queried regarding a more realistic (30 day) deadline on the remaining investigations concerning future staff members and their replacements.

APR 14 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Steel

GRS:dc
-6-

Discussed with Wm Miller 4-4-75. He agreed to 30-day deadline on future members except a few which he will indicate still need in 2 weeks. GRS

COUNSEL

APR 17 1975

XEROX

JUN 11 1975

84 APR 18 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2ALM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116116

4-528

62-116395- 62X
62X1 **CHANGED TO** 62-116464 - 2
3

JUN 12 1975

Hmk/cz

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/3/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum recommends that the attached draft of a paper prepared by CIA entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment and that a member of the Division be named to represent the FBI in future meetings with legal representatives from other U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies and departments. The purpose of such a group is to develop recommendations for changes in existing laws or the proposal of new legislation which Mr. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence can offer to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

At a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community 2/27/75, a draft paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," was distributed to all members. This paper was drafted by Mr. Marvin Smith of CIA. It is considered a starting point for the Intelligence Community to identify areas in existing statutes that should be changed, as well as to recommend new legislation deemed necessary to clarify for the Congress and the American people the authorities, the limitations and missions of various member agencies or departments of the Intelligence Community.

In furnishing copies of this paper to members, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Mr. John Clarke, acknowledged the paper presents a starting point and in no way should be considered a final draft. He suggested that Legal Counsel representatives of each agency or department of USIB review the document and submit their comments directly to Mr. Marvin Smith, on Agency code 143, extension 4055. Following the receipt of such comments from the legal offices of member agencies and departments, it was proposed that a meeting would be called in an effort to begin drafting a paper representative of the Intelligence Community which would reflect recommended changes in existing statutes or proposals for new legislation.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2ALM/dfb
#mdel6

Enclosure
62-116395

WOC:dln/ebc
(5)

ENCLOSURE

REC-10 62-116395-62

APR 14 1975

SEE ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, PAGE 3

CONTINUED - OVER

MAR 21 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

The Department of Justice is represented on the Ad Hoc Group by Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, and there will be Departmental participation in this matter.

ACTION:

(1) That the attached CIA paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment in concert with representatives of the Intelligence Division.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division designate a representative to participate in the drafting of a paper to be furnished by Mr. Colby to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

Twl

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Wannall dtd 3/3/75
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, 3/5/75, JH:msl

In view of the direct impact on operations of the Intelligence Division, we feel that representatives of that Division should participate in and coordinate these matters. Legal Counsel will review attached CIA paper and will furnish representative to assist the Intelligence Division regarding proposals and legislative language.

JCF

DRAFT

AMBIGUITIES AND THE LAW

CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI and, to some extent, several other Federal Agencies, collect information and produce intelligence, but of different kinds and for different purposes. This is recognized in practice but is not as clearly established in the law. Given some lack of clarity in the law and some uncertainty regarding limits placed on intelligence activities, misunderstanding and fear of abuse of power easily thrive~~s~~. In reality, however, in the implementation of mission and charters and in direction and control, there are not as many unresolved ambiguities as the uninformed may suppose.

The experience following the National Security Act of 1947 is such that it is now possible to eliminate some of the vagueness of the language of the Act. The certainty and public confidence that should result from clarifications in the law should far outweigh any disadvantages. A number of possible amendments or additions to current laws have already been mentioned, and proposed legislation has already been submitted for some. These ideas and others are suggested, below.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/TG
fm OR16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-162

1) Clarify CIA's mission and charter by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect:

--that included in the proper functions of the Agency are (a) collection of foreign intelligence information; (b) conduct of activities to carry out CIA's counter-intelligence responsibilities overseas; and (c) conduct of covert action operations overseas when authorized by the President;

--that CIA's responsibility to produce intelligence relates only to foreign intelligence;

--that it is a duty of the Agency to develop advanced technical equipment to improve the collection and processing of foreign intelligence information; and

--that the conduct of any counterintelligence operation or other activity overseas directed specifically at U.S. citizens (other than CIA employees) will be undertaken in coordination with the FBI or as requested by the FBI or by other USG agencies in coordination with the FBI.

2) Establish the authority for those agencies engaged in the collection and production of foreign intelligence to carry on certain specified activities within the United States, such as:

--protection of classified information and their own installations against penetration and compromise;

--investigation of employees, applicants, and those persons who could assist the U.S. foreign intelligence effort;

--investigation of employees and other individuals to be granted access to sensitive information;

✓ --collection of foreign intelligence information from foreign nationals and from cooperating U.S. citizens;

--establishment of mechanisms in support of foreign intelligence activities; and

--cooperation with the FBI in investigations relating to the unauthorized disclosure of foreign intelligence.

3) Remove uncertainty regarding responsibility for internal security matters by modifying appropriate laws to establish clearly:

--that the collection of counterintelligence information in the United States and the collection of information related to internal security are functions of the FBI;

--that the responsibility for the production of intelligence related to internal security rests with the FBI; and

--that with due regard to assessed reliability of the information and responsibilities for protecting sources and methods, those agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities will make available to the FBI and other Federal agencies, as appropriate, the security and counterintelligence information relating to foreign nationals in the United States and to U.S. citizens which is derived as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities.

4) Recognize international terrorism and international illegal drug activities as threats to U.S. national security and proper targets for U.S. foreign intelligence efforts, as well as for internal security operations.

5) Provide protection against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods by:

--providing for the protection of intelligence sources and methods on a statutory basis independent of Executive Order 11652;

--clarifying that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods related to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence;

--assigning to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the duty of protecting intelligence sources and methods related to internal security and to counterintelligence within the United States;

--imposing specific burdens, upon officers and employees of all branches of the government and others granted official access, not to disclose such information without authorization,

and providing criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures;

--establishing effective injunctive recourse, through the Attorney General, for protection of all intelligence sources and methods;

--providing for in camera judicial review of material revealing intelligence sources and methods when relevant and necessary to criminal and civil proceedings;

--delineating authorities and responsibilities for investigating suspected or discovered unauthorized disclosures by (a) U.S. citizens overseas and (b) all persons within the United States.

6) Delineate areas of interagency assistance that facilitate performance of authorized missions, promote economy of resources, and as a matter of policy are desirable, for example:

--cooperation in research and development of technical collection and information processing equipment, methods and techniques;

--loan or supply of equipment, methods and techniques;

--provision of training in special skills and techniques;

--passage of information derived as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities to those agencies responsible for the matters involved.

A few changes in the procedures for reviewing intelligence activities might add considerable understanding and confidence. Of paramount importance is a form of congressional oversight that permits the provision to Congress of the necessary information in a timely, efficient and controlled manner. It is recognized that a number of Committees in both the Senate and House must be informed of substantive intelligence, operational matters and fiscal details in varying degrees. Just as in the executive branch, the test of access should be

"need-to-know." To apply this test and to control and protect sensitive information provided to Congress, a focal point within Congress would be extremely helpful. Whether a joint committee or not, such a focal point would also be valuable in facilitating changes in laws affecting intelligence activities. Congress might find that a more uniform approach to budget presentation and review would provide better insight and understanding.

The foregoing suggestions are by no means definitive. They do, however, present areas that in the experience of the intelligence community deserve careful attention.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Legal Counsel Division

DATE: 4/7/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MATERIAL; AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE EXHIBITS IN "INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER ON JURISDICTION" DATED 2/13/75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that on 4/7/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Executive Office Building, Washington, personally reviewed and approved each of the following exhibits from the captioned paper for release to the Select Committee:

1) Exhibit A - Historical Highlights.

2) Exhibit B - Confidential Memoranda: John Edgar Hoover, 8/24/36; 8/25/36; and, 9/10/36.

3) Exhibit C - Presidential Directives: 6/26/39; 9/6/39; 1/8/43; 7/24/50; 12/15/53; and, 10/30/47.

4) Exhibit D - The Delimitations Agreement of 2/23/49, as amended.

5) Exhibit E - National Security Council Charters of the IIC and the ICIS.

6) Exhibit F - National Security Action Memorandum 161, 6/9/62.

7) Exhibit G - Department of Justice Memorandum dated 3/5/64, setting forth new Charter for the IIC under supervision of the Attorney General.

8) Exhibit H - Preamble and Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947.

9) Exhibit L - Excerpt from former FBI Director Hoover's briefing of the National Security Council on 11/6/58.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/dfs
#40016

REC-23 62-116395-61

EX-110

5 APR 10 1975

ALL:vb
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

10) Exhibit N - Background information concerning the emergency detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950.

11) Exhibit O - Memorandum by former FBI Director Hoover, dated 5/11/61, concerning Cuban individuals and groups.

12) Exhibit Q - Memorandum of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark dated 9/14/67, concerning urban riot activities.

13) Exhibit R - Departmental Memorandum dated 2/18/69, concerning instructions on campus disorders.

14) Exhibit S - Excerpts from testimony of former Director Hoover.

15) Section of paper on "Statutes."

It was explained to Mr. Wilderotter that the extracted exhibits were letters and reports to and from The White House and/or National Security Council with which there are "Third Agency Rule" problems. As soon as cleared, it was planned to forward these to the Committee. He requested to review these exhibits prior to forwarding.

ACTION:

Upon "Third Agency Rule" approval regarding other exhibits, have same reviewed by Mr. Wilderotter. INTD will insure exhibits are made available for Mr. Wilderotter's review.

wRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott
(Attention: Mr. J. W. Awe
Room 5644, JEH)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JJM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM

MDR16

Project Senstudy 75, established within the Intelligence Division, for the purpose of developing a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress. Bureau file 62-116395 has been opened for this Project.

WOC

Because of the unusual factors relating to this entire Project, such as the sensitive nature of much of the material involved, urgency for handling, necessity for having the file very readily available to the working staff at all times, and similar other reasons, it is essential that the file be maintained in the work area of the Project which, effective 4/14/75, will be in room 4063, JEH. The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to have Files and Communications Division take necessary steps to arrange for the maintenance of the file in the designated room rather than in the usual manner.

Per agreement between Awe (Div. 4) & Phillys (Div 5) we will NOT open a Sub A for newsclippings but keep them in T-folder w/ Project. 4/14/75

There has already been much publicity about the Select Committees and we anticipate much more. This involves many newspaper stories. It is, therefore, believed very desirable that a Sub A file to the main file be opened as the standardized repository for newspaper articles. As a first step, it will be necessary that a few articles already in the main file be extracted and placed in the new Sub A file in the usual chronological order.

EX-104

REC-6 62-116395-60

66-1740

The foregoing matters have been already discussed with Mr. J. W. Awe, Unit Chief, of the Files and Communications Division.

6 APR 15 1975

COPY FILED IN

RECOMMENDATION:

This memorandum to be referred to the Files and Communications Division for appropriate action as above.

62-116395

SFP:jvl
(6)

WOC

WRW

Phillips

FIVE

~~APR 23 1975~~

Handled by Special File Room 4-25-75

84 APR 25 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 4/9/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. C. Flemister
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

#mo216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2-ALM/AJG

This memorandum provides for the record the temporary reassignment of Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division.

Project Senstudy 75 has been established within the Intelligence Division, effective 4/4/75. Its purpose is to develop a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible.

Pursuant to the establishment of Project Senstudy 75, certain Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division have been relieved of substantive assignments. They are as follows:

Section Chief William O. Cregar, effective 4/4/75, has assumed the responsibilities of administering the Project.

Unit Chief Elmer W. Larson, effective the same date, will function as Cregar's Number One Man.

62-116395-59

REC-71

Liaison Supervisor Leon F. Schwartz has been relieved of his regular liaison duties and will function as the Liaison Officer in contact with the intelligence community for Project Senstudy 75.

APR 10 1975

Unit Chief Seymor F. Phillips, effective 4/8/75, was assigned to the Project and will function as the Review Coordinator.

1 - Personnel file of W. O. Cregar
1 - Personnel file of E. W. Larson
1 - Personnel file of L. F. Schwartz
1 - Personnel file of S. F. Phillips

WOC:lmh lmh
(12)

CONTINUED - OVER

54 APR 16 1975

At this time the length of the temporary assignment is indefinite. Upon the termination of Project Senstudy 75, the Bureau Supervisors mentioned above will revert back to their substantive assignments and an appropriate memorandum for the record will be prepared.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

wRW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-12-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

In attached W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum of 3-6-75, captioned as above, it is recommended that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we can anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

In this regard, it is suggested that all Divisions receiving requests for information in connection with testimony before this Committee respond in the same commendable and expeditious manner that they responded in connection with the preparation of the Director's Brief on his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights. The format of this information should generally be as follows:

1 - Heading in all caps, centered, brief description of contents;

2 - White, watermarked bond paper, 8 x 10 1/2";

3 - At least a 2" left margin. This is essential since material will be inserted into a folder;

4 - Double spaced;

5 - Do not number pages;

6 - Each Division will be responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the information furnished in final form. This will also include up-dating any information previously furnished;

EX 104
REC-23
62-116395-58

7 - Use "Mag" card typewriter (courier ball); identifying caption on the card folder should be adequate to readily identify it with the corresponding paper. In addition to the ~~caption, card~~ folder should also have the name of the originating Division.

APR 10 1975

8 - Furnish all "Mag" cards to the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, along with the write-up.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.
JCF:law (11)

1 - Each Assistant Director - Enc.

CONTINUED - OVER

56 APR 18 1975

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2ALM/sts

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memo
Re: Senstudy 75

All mail should be routed through and coordinated with the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, and all contacts with the Senate and House committees will be handled by representatives of the Legal Analysis Office, Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division.

Each Division should advise the Legislative Matters Section the identity of individual who will be the contact and coordinator of that Division's responsibilities along with his phone extension.

The Intelligence Division will be responsible for representing the Bureau on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and the identity of such individual should be made known to the Legislative Matters Section. In addition, the Intelligence Division should accumulate the data identified in paragraphs 1 and 2, as they pertain to the FBI, in Mr. John M. Clarke's memorandum to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and submit this in the form suggested above.

The Administrative Division is requested to obtain the information set forth in paragraph 3 of Mr. Clarke's memorandum, also furnishing this data in narrative form as explained above.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G[redacted]RNMENT

[redacted]

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TWL

DATE: 3/6/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum recommends that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated 3/5/75, reported the results of a meeting between Senator Church and Mr. Colby wherein Senator Church advised he anticipated asking all agencies and departments of the Intelligence Community for (1) Organizational charts broken down to a branch level going back to 1947, (2) Copies of all budgets since 1947 and (3) Documents reflecting all cash flows since 1947.

Attached is a copy of a short letter from Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community to Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director, SSC. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Clarke to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. This memorandum sets out in more detail what information the SSC will be seeking from all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. It should be noted that on page two of Mr. Clarke's memorandum he notes a formal request from Senator Church to all agencies can be expected.

The Intelligence Division believes considerable time and effort will be required from several Divisions to pull this information together. It is believed we should begin now to assemble the data in anticipation of a request.

ENCLOSURE

EX 104

REC-23 62-116395-58

ACTION: If you agree, the Legal Counsel Division will coordinate this matter and assign responsibilities to appropriate Division for the collection and preparation of the material we anticipate the SSC will request from the FBI.

1 APR 10 1975

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(16) ebc

TWL

LEGAL Counsel TO
MR Adams MEMO
3/12/75 JCF:LAW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2

#MORI 6

2 — ENCLOSURE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

4 March 1975

#mor16
CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
UNCLASSIFIED
1-18-01 SP-2 ALM/JMG

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Bill ~~Mr. Miller~~:

Pursuant to your request, I have advised all members of the Ad Hoc Group of the United States Intelligence Board and Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, of Senator Church's request to provide legal authority and organization charts of USIB entities from their inception. I also have alerted them to the Committee's desire for comprehensive historical data on personnel, budgets, and cash flow for the same periods. They will expect to hear more directly from Senator Church on these matters.

By early next week, we will begin providing you the CIA data in response to the Chairman's request. The first set of annexes developed under the auspices of the USIB Ad Hoc Group is ready and I am having five copies of each run off for your use. Please advise if more copies are desired.

Sincerely,

John

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment:
Memo to Ad Hoc Group

62-116395-58

ENCLOSURE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

#MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

4 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review

SUBJECT: Information Requested by Senate Select Committee Staff Director

1. Senator Church has asked the Director to provide to the Senate Select Committee copies of CIA legal authorities and organization charts to branch levels, 1947-1975. He also indicated he wants similar authorities and charts for all USIB entities from their inceptions. In the case of CIA this will be from 1947; NSA from 1952; DIA from 1961; etc.

2. The Committee is seeking a comprehensive historical base line for each U.S. intelligence organization--its structure and the people involved over time. Therefore, Senator Church has asked that the names of all incumbents who have held supervisory responsibilities over the period, down through the branch level, also be provided. The Staff Director has been made aware of the difficulties involved in tracing personnel assignments too far back but asks that every effort be made to meet the request. CIA is proceeding accordingly.

3. Senator Church has also asked for budget and cash flow data on all U.S. intelligence organizations from their inceptions. The CIA finds that the source and uses tables, employed in annual financial reports, provides the historical profile desired. Supplemental data on specific programs can follow if requested. Senator Church wants data which will show specific patterns of expenditures

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-58

as distinct from budgets and appropriations. A formal request from the Chairman to all agencies on this matter can be expected.

4. The Senate Select Committee will be ready to receive classified material this week. It is suggested that Ad Hoc Group members begin assembling the legal, organizational, personnel, and budgetary data for early submission. I have provided Mr. Miller, Staff Director, with a list of Ad Hoc Principals, phone numbers, titles, etc. He understands that the central point for DOD is Mr. Thomas K. Latimer and for Treasury, Mr. Edward C. Schmults, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement.

John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

1-Mr. Callahan
1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Jenkins
1-Each Assistant Director
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Farrington
1-Mr. Fulton

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/21/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

By memorandum Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams dated 3/12/75, the Legal Counsel Division indicated that its Legislative Matters Section would coordinate and assign responsibilities within the Bureau for the collection and preparation of material for the Senate Select Committee.

This memorandum instructed Intelligence Division to accumulate data which was identified in a memorandum from Mr. John M. Clarke from the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of the Intelligence Committee. Clarke's memorandum was attached to W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall memorandum dated 3/6/75. The identified data to be collected outlined in Clarke's memorandum was proposed-type data that the Senate Select Committee has indicated an interest in.

In view of 3/19/75 letter subsequently received from Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, to the Attorney General outlining a request for specific FBI documents they are interested in receiving, the Intelligence Division has begun accumulating this specific data. In view of this request for specific data, the Intelligence Division will not accumulate the data outlined in the Clarke memorandum since it was only in the nature of proposed data and differs from the specific data to be collected ~~which~~ is extensive in nature.

ACTION:

For information.

EX 104
REC-23
2-116395-57

APR 10 1975

#mo616
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/MG

ABF:enm
(19)

5-1006

70 APR 15 1975

OPTIONAL FO[illegible]NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Groover DATE: 4/8/75

FROM : J. J. Clynick JJC

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In order to respond to item III-C of Senator Church's letter dated 3/19/75, it was necessary to survey all field offices. This was done, the response summarized and forwarded to Legal Counsel Division by memo dated 4/3.

Attached hereto are the file copies of the teletypes from the field used to compile our response. It is believed these should be filed as one item as an EBF.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached be filed as an EBF.

Enclosure
Field Office [illegible]

JJC:jmb

ENCLOSURE

63

REC-11 62-116395-56

ST-112

APR 10 1975

#mDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM

3-JJC

70 APR 16 1975

MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

62-116395-56

1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

Budget + Acct.
[illegible]

NR004 AL CODE

4:09 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 CHP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALBANY

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPE, THE FOLLOWING IS ALBANY DIVISION'S RESPONSE:

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED ON PART-TIME BASIS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

8 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 20 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 30 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 35 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 45 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 50 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 60 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 75 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED ON A PART-TIME BASIS TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS ON

3/1

PAGE 2

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

6 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 5 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 4 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 30 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 35 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 45 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 60 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.

END.

2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
[illegible]
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR001 AQ CODE

10:55AM URGENT 3-36-75 PD

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: ALBUQUERQUE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

ALBUQUERQUE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 25 PER CENT OF HIS TIME IN THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THREE AGENTS WHO WORK THESE MATTERS ON A PART-TIME BASIS WITH 20 PER CENT, 40 PER CENT AND 40 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME DEVOTED TO THESE MATTERS.

ONE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THERE ARE 15 RESIDENT AGENTS EACH OF WHO WORK APPROXIMATELY FIVE PERSENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

END

JTG FBIHQ CLR

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ~~ALM/TAB~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

3

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR006 AX CODE

6:20PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VAN

TO: BUREAU (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTIONS)

FROM: ALEXANDRIA (80-131)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

ALEXANDRIA, HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS. APPROXIMATELY SIXTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS.

ALEXANDRIA AGENTS PERFORMING IS WORK AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

3 SPECIAL AGENTS	NINETY PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	SIXTY-FIVE PERCENT
4 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIFTEEN PERCENT
5 SPECIAL AGENTS	TEN PERCENT

ALEXANDRIA HAS THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO CI WORK AS FOLLOWS:

1 SPECIAL AGENT	TEN PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIVE PERCENT

END.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/06 BY SP2ALM/JTG

4

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR001 AN CODE

5:45 PM 3-25-75 NITEL MAB

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SAC, ANCHORAGE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

ANCHORAGE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED BY THE SAC, WHO SPENDS 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE FORMER AND 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE LATTER CATEGORY.

THERE ARE 3 AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THEY SPEND 40 PERCENT, 5 PERCENT, AND 2 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME, RESPECTIVELY, ON THIS CATEGORY. ONE OF THE 3 AGENTS SPENDS 10 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/TTG
#MDE16

5

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] Eval. ____
[illegible] Coun. ____
[illegible] Rm. ____
[illegible] Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

R-[illegible]

NR008 AT CODED

5:44 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 LAP

TO: ~~DIRECTOR~~, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF ATLANTA AGENT PERSONNEL PRESENTLY WORKING ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ALSO INCLUDING IN THIS AREA ALL OF CLASSIFICATIONS GENERALLY REGARDED AS SECURITY WORK AND EXTREMIST WORK, AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES:

	POSITION				PER CENT OF TIME
1	SAC		WORKING		5
1	ASAC		"		3
1	SUPERVISOR		"		75
1	SUPERVISOR		"		3
3	HEADQUARTERS	CITY	AGENTS	WORKING	100
4	"	"	"	"	90
2	"	"	"	"	80
1	"	"	"	"	50
1	"	"	"	"	40
2	"	"	"	"	20

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP 2ALM/BG
#m0e16

3/10

Note: Supervisor Charlie Haynes, Atlanta, telephonically contacted 3PM, 3/27/75. He will send Nitel 3/27 breaking above out by IS & CI matters separately.

PAGE TWO AT 100-0

POSITION		PER CENT OF TIME
3 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS	WORKING	10
3 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	10
4 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	6
1 " "	"	3
1 " "	"	2

THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE INCLUDED IN ARRIVING AT THE ABOVE COMPUTATION:

2, 3, 14, 61, 64, 65, 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 117, 134, 135, 157, 163, 170, 174, 176, AND 185.

END

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975
TELETYPE

5 Revised

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR007 AT CODE

9:46 PM NITEL MARCH 27, 1975 SSP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

R-6066

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE ATLANTA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, MARCH 26, 1975.

UNDER PER CENT OF TIME COLUMN, "IS" STANDS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND "CI" STANDS FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

POSITION		PER CENT OF TIME	
		IS	CI
1 SAC	WORKING	4	1
1 ASAC	"	2	1
1 SUPERVISOR	"	45	30
1 SUPERVISOR	"	3	0
1 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENT	"	100	0
1 " " "	"	85	15
1 " " "	"	80	20
1 " " "	"	90	0
1 " " "	"	0	90
1 " " "	"	85	5
1 " " "	"	75	15
1 " " "	"	60	20

#mpe16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/TG

PAGE TWO AT 100-0

POSITION					PER CENT OF TIME	
					IS	CI
1	HEADQUARTERS	CITY	AGENT	WORKING	80	0
1	"	"	"	"	20	40
1	"	"	"	"	0	40
1	"	"	"	"	5	15
1	"	"	"	"	20	0
1	"	"	"	"	10	0
1	"	"	"	"	5	5
1	"	"	"	"	5	5
1	RESIDENT	AGENT		"	10	0
1	"	"		"	10	0
1	"	"		"	10	0
1	"	"		"	3	3
1	"	"		"	6	0
1	"	"		"	0	6
1	"	"		"	6	0
1	"	"		"	3	0
1	"	"		"	0	2

IN CONSIDERING ABOVE COMPUTATIONS, THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION UNDER INTERNAL SECURITY HEADING: 3, 14, 61, 98, 100, 117, 134 (INFORMANTS) 157, 163, 170, 176, 185. THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE CONSIDERED UNDER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HEADING: 2, 64, 65, 97, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 134 (ASSETS).

END

HOLD FOR 5 MORE

MAR 17 9 53 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

6

Dep-A.D.-Adm.
Dep. [illegible]
Admin.
[illegible]
G
I
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 014 BA CODE

10:14PM NITEL 3/25/75 JAN

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

Budget & Acct
66-[illegible]

FROM BALTIMORE 66-NEW

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BALTIMORE HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 33 AGENTS DEVOTED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS). TWENTY AGENTS DEVOTE 100 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME TO IS MATTERS. THIRTEEN AGENTS DEVOTE 75 PER CENT TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PER CENT TO IS MATTERS. THE SAC'S OVERALL SUPERVISION INCLUDES 20 PER CENT OVER IS AND CI MATTERS.

END

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/1A

MAR 23 10 45 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

7

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 002 BH CODE

241 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DGS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: BIRMINGHAM (66-2204)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Budget & Accounting Sect
✓ Rm 6073

REBUTEL, 3/24/74, REGARDING PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS.

BIRMINGHAM HAS NO AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE MATTERS. FOLLOWING REPRESENT PERCENTAGES OF AGENT TIME:

AGENT	IS PERCENTAGE	CI PERCENTAGE
A	95	0
B	50	40
C	80	0
D	40	10
E	60	0
F	35	15
G	5	10
H	0	25
I	30	30
J	25	0
K (SUPERVISOR)	40	20

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JT6
FM 0816

3/DB

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

8

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR017 BS CODE

6:58 PM NITEL MARCH 25,1975 MCC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BOSTON (66-82)

ATTN/ BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓Budget [illegible] Unit
6057

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

BOSTON HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND TWENTY-ONE AGENTS, ALL ASSIGNED FULL TIME, TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IN ADDITION, TWELVE RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

BOSTON HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND TEN AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIME. IN ADDITION, ELEVEN RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

BUREAU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE SAME RESIDENT AGENTS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, WHO ARE ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, ARE ALSO ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/MG

3/28

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
PM 75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

9

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budget & Acct.
605 JIH

NR001 BU CODE

4:04 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 TRR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUFFALO KYYXXX(66-NEW)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BUFFALO DIVISION HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 28 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT NOT NECESSARILY ON A FULL TIME BASIS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THESE AREAS ON FULL TIME BASIS:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SAC	0	0
ASAC	0	0
SUPERVISORS	0	0
SPECIAL AGENTS	6	0

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTS
#MDR16

1

3/10

PAGE TWO BU 66-NEW

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, COMPUTATION OF ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY OTHER AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED THESE MATTERS WOULD REPRESENT EQUIVALENT OF FOLLOWING NUMBER OF FULL TIME PERSONNEL:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	71/2	5
GRAND TOTALS:		
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	13 1/2	5

END

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAY 27 4 08 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

10

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

QNR 006 BT PLAIN

9-13 QP PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 TDS

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUTTE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SECURITY MATTERS SUPERVISED BY ASAC FIVE PERCENT OF HIS TIME. ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT HANDLES FIFTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME AND ONE RA TEN PERCENT OF HIS TIME. NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORK BUTTE DIVISION.

END1

V

FBIHQ FLC FR THREE TELS TKS AND CUL.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3/00

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 11 14 PM '75

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

11

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

Budget Acct
6008

NR 009 CE CODED

5:33 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBULET MARCH 24, 1975.

CHARLOTTE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY MATTERS, NO OTHER SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLE SECURITY. THERE ARE 3 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE ADDITIONAL HEADQUARTERS AGENT ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ONE RESIDENT AGENT IS ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, 4 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, AND 9 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED FROM 5 TO 15 PER CENT OF THEIR WORK IN SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.

NO SUPERVISORY OR AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM WHICH WAS DISCONTINUED PER BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS IN 1971.

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Note: Charlotte security supervisor telephonically contacted 2^{45} PM, 3/27/75 and the difference between counterintelligence program and C.I. matters explained to him. He will send corrected Nitel 3/27.

RECEIVED TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 23 5 37 PM '75

62-116395-56

Revised
II

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

Budg[illegible] Acct

NR005 CE CODE

5:26 PMNITEL MARCH 27, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975, AND CHARLOTTE TEL MARCH 25, 1975.

CHARLOTTE OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO BOTH SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT IS ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND A SECOND HEADQUARTERS AGENT DEVOTES 25 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TWO RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 25 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND TWO ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED BETWEEN 5 TO 10 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. OTHER RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WHEN NEED ARISES, HOWEVER, NO EXACT PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE SINCE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS GREATLY FLUCTUATE.

END

#MDE16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]

3/[illegible]

MAR 27 2 31 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

12

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

Dcw

NR026 CG CODE

610PM NITEL 3-25-75 RWR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHICAGO

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

R-698

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975, TO ALL SAC'S.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF AGENT TIME IN THE CHICAGO DIVISION SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

SAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, 20 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PERCENT.

ASAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 20 PERCENT.

SUPERVISORS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, FOUR, FULL TIME; INTERNAL SECURITY, ONE, FULL TIME, ONE, 50 PERCENT. (THE OTHER FIFTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IS SPENT ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.)

AGENTS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 76, FULL TIME (INCLUDES 10 AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE);

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/lmtg

3/140

PAGE TWO

INTERNAL SECURITY, 28, FULL TIME.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, 10 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO EXTREMIST MATTERS.

THIS REPRESENTS A TOTLE OF 114 SA'S ASSIGNED SECURITY WORK EXCLUSIVE OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL.

END.

PLS ACK FOR TWELVE

~~NEED A RERUN OF UR NRTS HAVE AN OVERLINE~~

MAR 25 7 19 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

13

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

NR 004 CI CODE

748PM NITEL 3/25/75 KOD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CINCINNATI (105-7038)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Rm. 4988

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL TIME BEING EXPENDED IN CINCINNATI DIVISION OM INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (CIM):

SAC AND ASAC - NONE

	IS	CIM
ONE SUPERVISOR	65 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE SUPERVISOR	53 PERCENT	36 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	100 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	80 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	60 PERCENT	40 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	27 PERCENT	73 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	45 PERCENT	55 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	50 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	50 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	73 PERCENT	27 PERCENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/00 BY SP-2ALM/STG
#Moe16

3/19

PAGE TWO CI 105-7038

	IS	CIM
ONE AGENT	30 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	40 PERCENT	20 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	25 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
THREE AGENTS	10 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	10 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	5 PERCENT	5 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	2 PERCENT	8 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	5 PERCENT	0 PERCENT.

END

REC 4 DBS FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 23 PM '75

62-116395-56

14

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Budget & Accounting

NR 005 CV CODE

8:25PM NITEL 3/25/75 RJB

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: CLEVELAND (66-5641)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

CONF~~IDE~~NTIAL

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

CLEVELAND HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS TWO, AGENTS 20. THE FOLLOWING NUMBER ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-INTELLIGNECE WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS ONE, AGENTS 16. THE THREE SUPERVISORS HANDLE SECURITY-TYPE MATTERS EXCLUSIVELY.

CLEVELAND HAS UTILIZED PERCENTAGES OF AGENT'S TIME SPENT IN THESE CATEGORIES WHERE APPLICABLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE RESIDENT AGENCIES.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 6020, XGDS CATEGORY 2, INDEFINITE.~~

END

HOLD FOR ONE

TJT FBI WASH D

#mDe16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JG
ON 1-17-01

3/11

MAR 25 8 33 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

15

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR005 CO CODE

7:00PMEDT NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WCA

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM COLUMBIA (105-NEW)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

COLUMBIA PRESENTLY HAS ZERO AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS COLUMBIA HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS AND SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED THE FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME:

AGENTS 1 - 75, 1 - 30, 3 - 20, 1 - 10,
3 - 5 OR LESS

SUPERVISORS 1 - 20

END.

DBS FBIHQ

CLR

Budget [illegible] JEH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG #MDL16

3/0.J

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

16

MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR008 DL CODE

5:44 PM NITEL 3/26/75 DRH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: DALLAS (105-NEW)

Budget + Accounting
6628

ATTN: INTD SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN REPLY TO BUREAU REQUEST, THE DALLAS OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO WORK ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS), COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI), APPLICANT AND RELATED MATTERS. FIFTY-FOUR PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS. THERE ARE SIX HEADQUARTERS AGENTS HANDLING IS AND/OR CI MATTERS, THREE RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING THE MAJORITY OF THEIR TIME ON BOTH IS AND CI MATTERS AND EIGHT RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME IN THE IS AND CI FIELDS. DATA FOR SURVEY WAS OBTAINED FROM THE FEBRUARY, 1975, CASE LOAD. THE NUMBER OF DALLAS AGENTS WORKING IS, CI OR BOTH AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME SPENT IN THESE FIELDS IS SET OUT BELOW:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP 2

SAS	3X	1X	1X	1X	1X	1X	1X	2	2
IS PERCENT	100		34	63	62	24	30	16	5
CI PERCENT		100	66	11	38	76	16		

SAS	1	1	1	1
IS PERCENT	13	6		2
CI PERCENT			8	

X RA AND HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS AND CI SQUAD.

END.

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 6 48 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

17

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. ____
Id. ____
Ir ____
In ____
L ____
Pl ____
S ____
T ____
Leg ____
Tel ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 007 DN PLAIN

535 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JSG

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

(ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: DENVER (66-DEAD)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL OFFICES, MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (CI):

SAC - 0

ASAC-0

SUPERVISOR - ONE FULL TIME, 3/4 OF TIME OF IS, 1/4 TO CI

AGENTS - 12 AND 1/2, 3/4 TIME TO IS, 1/4 TIME TO CI.

IN DENVER OFFICE, IS AND CI MATTERS ARE HANDLED BY FIELD SUPERVISOR ON FULL TIME BASIS. DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES ALSO HANDLED ON SQUAD BUT ONLY FRACTION OF SUPERVISOR'S AND SQUAD TIME IS USED ON THESE CASES. SAC AND ASAC ARE KEPT ABREAST OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND, OF COURSE, HAVE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY BUT HAVE NO IS OR CI MATTERS ASSIGNED TO THEM. BESIDES SUPERVISOR, THERE ARE 8 SPECIAL AGENTS (SA) IN HEADQUARTERS CITY ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS AND CI MATTERS WITH ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THIS TIME GIVEN TO DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES. ALL BOMBING MATTERS

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

(174 CLASSIFICATION) ARE CONSIDERED A PART OF IS INVESTIGATIONS. TWO OF EIGHT SAS FULL TIME AND ONE SA HALF TI~~0~~ME HANDLE CI MATTERS, REMAINDER HANDLE IS.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES (RA) FOLLOWING SITUATION EXISTS:

ONE AGENT IN COLORADO SPRINGS SPENDS 50 0/0 AND ANOTHER AGENT SPENDS 25 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON IS AND CI MATTERS. IN BOULDER RA ONE FULL TIME AGENT AND ONE AGENT SPENDING 60 0/0 OF HIS TIME HANDLE IS AND CI MATTERS. IN FORT COLLINS RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 50 0/0 AND THE OTHER 40 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. IN CHEYENNE RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 25 0/0 OF HIS TIME ONE THESE MATTERS. IN THE OTHER RAS ONLY A MINOR FRACTION OF THE TIME OF EACH RA IS DEVOTED TO IS AND CI MATTERS. TOTAL TIME WOULD POSSIBLY EQUAL THAT OF ONE SA FULL TIME. IN ALL INSTANCES, ABOUT 3/4 OF TIME SPENT ON SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IS ON IS MATTERS WITH REMAINING 1/4 ON CI MATTERS.

END

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR FOUR

WA CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 7 59 PM '75

62-116395-56

18

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
Dcw

NR032 DE CODE

5:42 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WGM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DETROIT

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

DETROIT DIVISION CURRENTLY HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND FOURTEEN AGENTS ASSIGNED 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, ONE ASAC IS ASSIGNED FIVE PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT, THREE SAS FIFTEEN PERCENT, ONE SA TEN PERCENT, ONE SA FIVE PERCENT.

DETROIT DIVISION ALSO HAS ASSIGNED ONE SUPERVISOR AND ELEVEN SAS SPENDING 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN ADDITION, ONE ASAC FIVE PERCENT, THREE SAS 75 PERCENT, ONE SA 50 PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT AND ONE SA TEN PERCENT. ONE SAC HAS FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

HOLD PLS

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3/DR

MAR 27 2 21 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. A.D.-Adm.
Dep. A.D.-Inv.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

19

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 EP CODE

6:28 PM NITEL 3-25-75 MJT

TO: DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM: EL PASO (66-NEW) ///1P///

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC, EL PASO CURRENTLY SPENDS 3 PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY, 2 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ASAC HANDLES NO SECURITY MATTERS; SUPERVISOR NUMER THREE DESK DEVOTES 15 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 5 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

FOUR AGENTS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED SECURITY MATTERS, WITH ONE AGENT DEVOTING 60 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY, 0 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; SECOND AGENT SPENDS 10 PER CENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; THIRD AGENT 50 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; FOURTH AGENT, WHO IS RELIEF SUPERVISOR, DEVOTES 10 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 65 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JJG

3/DR

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

20

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 001 HN CODE

5:08 PM HST NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JVS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HONOLULU (66-) 1P

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

✓Budget & Acct JEH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

HONOLULU CURRENTLY HAS FOUR SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED PRIMARILY SECURITY MATTERS BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY AS FOLLOWS: 2 AGENTS 90 PER CENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND AND 10 PER CENT EACH OTHER MATTERS; 1 AGENT 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY; 1 AGENT 30 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 40 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 30 PER CENT OTHER MATTERS. 3 ADDITIONAL AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 15 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

ASAC, SUPERVISES SECURITY MATTER, SPENDS 35 PER CENT OF TIME ON SECURITY BROKEN DOWN AS: 25 PER CENT COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND 10 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

END.

HOLD

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP8 ALM/ETG

3/DA

MAY 25 11 51 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

21

Assoc. Dir. —
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. —
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. —
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. —
Comp. Syst. —
Ext. Affairs —
Files & Com. —
Gen. Inv. —
Ident. —
Inspection —
Intell. —
Laboratory —
Plan. & Eval. —
Spec. Inv. —
Training —
Legal Coun. —
Telephone Rm. —
Director Sec'y —

NR008 HO CODE

5:55 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 BNG

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HOUSTON

✓ Budget & Acct.
66-

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SET FORTH BELOW ARE SAC, SUPERVISOR AND AGENTS CURRENTLY WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AGENTS	2.05	2.70
SUPERVISOR	.30	.40
SAC	.02	.04

END

HOLD

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/116

3/EX

MAR 25 6 PM '75
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

22

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR005 IP CODE

5:39 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RXH

TO DIRECTOR

FROM INDIANAPOLIS

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget & Accounting Room

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL, FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED CONCERNING INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

SAC	NONE
ASAC	NONE
SUPERVISORS	.30 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND .40 INTERNAL SECURITY
SPECIAL AGENTS	6.25 ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 9.50 ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD FOR FIVE MORE

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2ACM/JG

REC TELET
MAR 25 6 53 PM '75

62-116395-56

23

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975
Dw
TELETYPE

NR003 CODE JN

4:07PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JWD

TO DIRECTOR, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM JACKSON (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC AND ASAC, JACKSON OFFICE, HAVE NO CASES ASSIGNED IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. TWO SUPERVISORS HAVE CASES ASSIGNED AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO FORTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIFTEEN PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THERE ARE FIFTY FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO THREE POINT SIX TENTHS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE POINT ONE TENTH AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#m0216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

3/20

62-116395-56

24

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 JK CODE

7:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 GLB

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ Rm-6[illegible]8 EH

FROM JACKSONVILLE (100-NEW) (RUC)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED NITEL FOR JACKSONVILLE DIVISION:

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FIFTY PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY AND TEN PERCENT INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, NONE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, ACCUMULATED TO REPRESENT FOUR AGENTS ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE AGENT ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

3/PR

TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 21 PM '75

62-116395-56

25

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DCW

NR 003 KC CODE

6:15 PM 3/25/75 NITEL JAW

TO: DIRECTOR

(ATTN:BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: KANSAS CITY (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

KANSAS CITY DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TIME SPENT IS 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 40 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

TWO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

KANSAS CITY HAS THIRTEEN ADDITIONAL AGENTS HANDLING BOTH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: FIVE AGENTS, 90 PERCENT, INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE AGENT, 90 PERCENT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: TWO AGENTS, 30 PERCENT ON EACH:; FOUR AGENTS, 10 PERCENT ON EACH, AND ONE AGENT 50 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD

#moe

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JW

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 23 PM 75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

DCW

TELETYPE

2-6

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR004 KX CODE

8:10 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WEH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATN: BUDGET & ACCOUNTING SECTION)

VR-9028

FROM: SAC, KNOXVILLE (100-00)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/17/01 BY SP2ALM/ATG
#MDE16

INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ASAC'S DESK IN THE KNOXVILLE DIVISION. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE ASAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON SUCH MATTERS, DIVIDED 15 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IN ADDITION, THERE ARE FIVE AGENTS WITHIN THE DIVISION WORKING PRIMARILY ON SECURITY MATTERS. TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND 80 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY WORK AND 5 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 75 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 20 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 60 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 35 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; AND ONE AGENT SPENDS 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 75 PERCENT ON

3/19

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

SECURITY ITEMS REQUIRING THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF THE SAC UTILIZE ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON EACH CATEGORY.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE AND CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 47 PM '75

62-116395-56

27

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budget & Accounting

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

NR 011 LV CODE

838 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 MLP

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM LAS VEGAS (100-00)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

LAS VEGAS SAC AND ASAC DO NOT SUPERVISE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. LAS VEGAS HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ①

LAS VEGAS HAS ONE FIELD SUPERVISOR WHO SUPERVISES INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AMONG MANY OTHER CATEGORIES. IT IS ESTIMATED THIS SUPERVISOR SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON MATTERS OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY NATURE.

LAS VEGAS HAS FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO ARE NORMALLY ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 95 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. ONE OTHER SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 30 PER CENT, AND THE OTHER TWO, APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC CLR

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/DTG

① Supervisor Don Smith contacted and advises Counterintelligence matters should be as follows: No supervisory time.

2 agents involved, one about 3% of his time & one about 2%.

3/27/75
5:45 pm

3/DA

MAR 30 1975
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

28

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Budget & Acct

NR 004 LR PLAIN

3:09 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 GM

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LITTLE ROCK (66-1880)

ATTENTIONC BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING SET FORTH IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED TELETYPE:

TWO AGENTS IN LITTLE ROCK DIVISION ASSIGNED PART-TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH BREAKDOWN OF TIME SPENT AS FOLLOWS:

ONE AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 45 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. SECOND AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 65 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 8 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 2 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

#MORI6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/TG

3/07

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 1 33 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

29

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget & Acctg Sch

NR 009 LA CODE

12:09 PM URGENT 3-26-75 SMA

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOS ANGELES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUTEL, MARCH 24 LAST.

LOS ANGELES DIVISION HAS CAREFULLY BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGES THOSE AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE WORK USING THOSE CLASSIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY SUPERVISOR GROOVER. DIVISION HAS A TOTAL OF 91 AGENTS PLUS ONE SAC, FOUR SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, ASSIGNED TO SUCH CLASSIFICATIONS. THIRTY FIVE OF THESE WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 56 WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

ADMINISTRATIVE

LOS ANGELES IS SUBMITTING FOR BUREAU'S CONSIDERATION, IF PERTINENT. THREE OF THE ABOVE 56 CLASSIFIED AS SECURITY AGENTS WORK FULL TIME ON BOMBING MATTERS WHICH ARE ALMOST ALL MATTERS WHEREIN WE HAVE NO JURISDICTION EXCEPT FOR DATA KEEPING FOR NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER. TWELVE OF THE 56 SECURITY AGENTS

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JT/6

3/

3
12
7
1
23

ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN OUR FALSE IDENTITY PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM ORIGINATED WITH OUR WEATHFUG ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER, THE FRAUDULENT USE OF DECEASED INFANT IDENTITY PAPERS HAS EXPANDED TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT THE VAST MAJORITY INVOLVE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN SECURITY WORK. SEVEN OF THE 56 AGENTS ON SECURITY ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS WHICH ORIGINATE WITH SOME DEMONSTRATION OR ACT OF TERROR, ETC, BUT AT THE PRESENT THEY ARE CLEAR CUT CRIMINAL FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS. ONE OF THE 56 IS INVOLVED FULL TIME IN THE HANDLING OF FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION MATTERS WHICH IS TECHNICALLY AN APPLICANT-TYPE INVESTIGATION, BUT THE 163 CLASSIFICATION WAS INCLUDED IN THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS. SUMMARIZING THESE EXCEPTIONS WE HAVE A TOTAL OF 23 AGENTS WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO SECURITY WORK BUT ARE, IN FACT, NOT INVOLVED IN ANY INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, LEAVING ONLY 33 AGENTS DEVOTING THEIR FULL TIME EFFORTS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS PLUS, THE ABOVE MENTIONED 35 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENTS.

END

JTG FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 3 14 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

30

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
[illegible] Com. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
[illegible] ____
Tr[illegible] ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

DCW

TELETYPE

[illegible]

NR013 LS CODE

9:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 HSH

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOUISVILLE

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, FOLLOWING DATA PERTAINS TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

SUPERVISOR (1) 40 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 85 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 30 IS, 40 CI; AGENT (1) 40 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 10 IS, 0 CI.

END.

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/lg

3/DH

NR013 LE CODE

8:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 HSH

TO DI

RECTOR

FROM LOUISVILLE

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, FOLLOWING DATA

PERTAINS TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED

INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

SUPERVISOR (1) 90 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 85 IS, 15 CI;

AGENT (1) 25 IS, 75 CI; AGENT (1) 75 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1)

95 IS, 5 CI; AGENT (1) 30 IS, 40 CI; AGENT (1) 40 IS,

10 CI; AGENT (1) 75 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 10 IS, 9 CI.

END.

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 9 51 PM '75

62-116395-56

31

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 2 5 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget + Acct JEH

NR 005 ME PLAIN

9:12 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JLC

TO DIRECTOR ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM MEMPHIS

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

MEMPHIS OFFICE USES APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IN THE SECURITY FIELD, 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IN ADDITION, SIX AGENTS ARE UTILIZED, THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS IN THIS FIELD:

AGENT	TIME ON SECURITY CASES	TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY	TIME ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
A	100	100	0
B	75	50	25
C	50	50	0
D	50	25	25
E	25	25	0
F	25	0	25

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 Alm/[illegible]
#MDR16

IN ADDITION TO THE ONE-FOURTH SUPERVISOR TIME, THIS OFFICE USES THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-FOURTH AGENTS IN THE SECURITY

3/D0

PAGE TWO

FIELD; TWO AND ONE-HALF AGENTS ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE-FOURTHS OF ONE AGENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

PLS ACK FOR FOUR TES

ACK FOR 4 AND HOLD

TJT FBI WASH DC

MAR 25 10 14 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

32

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget + Accounting Section
Rm. 6028 JEM

NR002 MM CODE

925AM URGENT MARCH 27, 1975 JWB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MIAMI 1P

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING ARE MIAMI OFFICE STATISTICS SHOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS BY SPECIAL AGENT PERSONNEL:

SACS - 0; ASACS - 0.

SUPERVISORS - CI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 90 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. SI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT.

SPECIAL AGENTS- CI MATTERS: 15 ASSIGNED FULL TIME; TWO ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 40 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. IS MATTERS: TWO ASSIGNED FULL TIME; THREE ASSIGNED 75 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 60 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 30 PERCENT; FIVE ASSIGNED 10 PERCENT.

END.

#mde16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

3/DJ

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 9 29 AM '75

MAR 27 11 14 AM '75
REC'D [illegible]
SECTION

62-116395-56

33

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budg + Accnt.
6/25

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR004 MI CODE

7:08PM NITEL 3 / 25 / 75 LSK

O: DIRECTOR

FROM: MILWAUKEE (66-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MILWAUKEE HAS 2 SECURITY SUPERVISORS, #5 AND #6, NEITHER OF WHOM IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY WORK. 23 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO THESE 2 SECURITY SQUADS, INCLUDING HEADQUARTERS AND RESIDENT AGENTS (RA'S). 4 OF LATTER squad ARE ENGAGED FULL TIME IN SECURITY WORK. 15 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS NOT ASSIGNED TO EITHER SECURITY SQUAD ALSO HANDLE SOME SECURITY WORK IN THEIR VARIOUS AREAS. PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN IS AS FOLLOWS:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COINTEL	OTHER
#5 SUPERVISOR	70	5	25
#6 SUPERVISOR	30	55	L5
#5 SQUAD 12 agents*	59	8	33
#6 SQUAD 11 agents*	44	44	L2
RA'S 15 agents *	2.5	4.5	93

END

ACJ FOR FOUR $$$

* Per phone call 4:55 pm, 3/27/75 with George Whopte, supervisor of #6 squad in Milwaukee.

#MD016
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/dtb

3/DD

IVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 2[illegible] 46 PM '75

62-116395-56

34

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

[illegible]
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
[illegible]

NR001 MP CODED

7:13 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DSC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (100-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget [illegible] Acct.
68 [illegible]

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MINNEAPOLIS HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. A SECOND SUPERVISOR SPENDS 40 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY. THERE ARE FIVE AND ONE HALF AGENTS WORKING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 14 WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

#mOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM [illegible]

H

O

L

3/[illegible]

MAR 25 8 15 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975 8

TELETYPE

35

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR005 MOBILE PLAIN

11-12 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VFP

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM MOBILE (66-1145)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE MOBILE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDING FIFTY PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS TWENTYFIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCY MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THERE ARE NINE AGENTS WHO SPEND AN AVERAGE OF FORTY FIVE PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

END

TMA ACK FOR TWO FBIHQ CLR

#m0216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-17-01 BY SPJ ALM 1776

MAR 27 2 17 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 007 NK CODE

6:06PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 JCG

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget/Acct

FROM NEWARK

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL TO SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN RE NITEL NEWARK SUBMITS FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY PERSONNEL IN THE TWO SEPARATE CATEGORIES:

INTERNAL SECURITY:
1 ASAC - 15 PER CENT
1 SUPERVISOR - 50 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 100 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 70 PER CENT

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 BLM/JG

B/D/A

NK

PAGE TWO

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

1 ASAC - 35 PER CENT

1 SUPERVICSOR - 50 PER CENT

1 SUPERVISOR - 100 PER CENT

23 SA 'S - 100 PER CENT

6 SA'S - 50 PER CENT

3 SA'S - 10 PER CENT

END

MAR 26 6 04 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

37

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
Dal
TELETYPE

NR002 NH CODE

1038PM NITEL MARCH 25,1975 LM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: NEW HAVEN (105-13579) (RUC) 1P

ATTN; BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

√ R 4028

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24,1975.

ONE SUPERVISORY AGENT DEVOTES ONE-THIRD OF HIS TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND ONE THIRD TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

SEVENTEEN AGENTS ARE REGULARLY ASSIGNED EITHER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OR INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS IN ADDITION TO OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS. OF THESE 17 AGENTS THE EQUIVALENT OF FIVE AGENTS WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIMW AND FIVE AND ONE THIRD AGENTS WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

FBIHQ FLC FR TWO TELS CLR TKS

#m0216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ATG

3/0

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

38

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR001 NO CODE

2:49PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DCB

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Budget & Acct.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE; PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE...

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CLR

#mde16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-12-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Note: Security supervisor contacted 5^{20}P, 3/27/75 re counterintelligence matters. He will check & get the obvious error corrected, either through call back or corrected Nitel.

2/DA

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 3 47 PM '75

62-116395-56

38 Revised

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
F[illegible] Com. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
L[illegible] ____
P[illegible] Eval. ____
Sp[illegible] ____
Tr[illegible] ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR015 NO CODE

7:15PM URGENT MARCH 27,1975 JMF

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Budget & Acct
JFH

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24,1975; NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE MARCH 26,1975; BUTEL CALL MARCH 27,1975.

THE FOLLOWING ARE CORRECTIONS TO REFERENCED NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE. NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE, OF WHICH SEVEN ARE ALSO ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 25 PERCENT AND PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS 35 PERCENT. PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS 25 PERCENT, AND 35 PERCENT SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE.

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JDG

44

MAR 8 18 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

39

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 NY CODE

NITEL 3/25/75 SENT 9:25AM 3/26/75 GMD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

Budget & Accounting Sec

6028 JEH

NEW YORK HAS ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (DIVISION III) AND ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS (DIVISION IV). THERE ARE NO ASACS IN NEW YORK OFFICE.

SAC, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION (III) SPENDS FULL-TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SAC, INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION (IV) SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 60 PERCENT IS SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

SIX SUPERVISORS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 14 SUPERVISORS HANDLE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

114 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 331 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END.

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JJS

JTG FBIHQ CLR

3/10A

[illegible]

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 9 30 AM '75

62-116395-56

40

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975
DC
TELETYPE

NR 002 NF PLAIN

444PM NITEL 3-26-75 SNB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM NORFOLK (66-981)

R-6028

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS INFORMATION REQUESTED IN RETEL:

POSITION	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ONE SUPERVISOR	50 PER CENT OF TIME	10 PER CENT OF TIME
THREE SAS	50 PER CENT OF TIME	20 PER CENT OF TIME
TWO SAS	75 PER CENT OF TIME	0
THREE SAS	50 PER CENT OF TIME	0

TOTAL AGENT PERSONNEL OF NORFOLK OFFICE ASSIGNED IS ONE SUPERVISOR AND EIGHT AGENTS FOR PERCENTAGES INDICATED ABOVE.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#MD016
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

3/8

[illegible]

MAR 26 4 48 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

41

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
[illegible] ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR008 OC PLAIN

9:30PM MARCH 25, 1975 NITEL DSM

MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

TO DIRECTOR

FROM OKLAHOMA CITY (105-2398)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THE SAC AND THE ASAC OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE ARE NOT ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE HAS NO SUPERVISOR OR SPECIAL AGENT ASIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND / OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN IN PERCENTAGES OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT'S TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

	NUMBER	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISOR	1	75	5
SA'S	31	615	65

OF THE THIRTY-ONE SPECIAL AGENT S, IT IS NOTED THAT 8 ARE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT OR MORE OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT ACCOUNT FOR 550 PERCENT OT THE 615 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY TIME AND 62 PERCENT OT THE 65 PERCENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TIME.

END PAGE 1

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/1876

IN SUMMARY, THERE IS .75 AND .05 SUPERVISORY EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIEGENCE, RESPECTIVELY. THERE ARE 6.15 AND .65 AGENT EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, RESPECTIVELY.

END

ACK FOR 1 TJT FBI WASH DC CL

MAR 25 10:37 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

42

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 004 OM CODE

4:38 PM NITEL 3/25/75 BJP

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: OMAHA

✓ Budget & Acct. Unit
JEH

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

OMAHA CURRENTLY HAS SEVEN AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, WITH TWO AGENTS SPENDING 60 PER CENT AND TWO AGENTS SPENDING 25 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON IS MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON IS MATTERS.

TWO AGENTS AND ONE SUPERVISOR SPEND APPROXIMATELY 10 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

MSE FBIHQ

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/ETS

3/27

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 5 43 PM '75

62-116395-56

43

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 PH CODE

245 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DMS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PHILADELPHIA (66-NEW) (P)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

✓ Budget & Acctg

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

PHILA. DIVISION UTILIZES FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) INCLUDING EXTREMISTS, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

		IS	CI
1	SAC	5	5
1	ASAC	50	
1	SUPERVISOR	100	
1	SUPERVISOR		100
13	SAS AT HEADQUARTERS	100	
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS	50	
9	SAS AT HEADQUARTERS		100
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS		75
1	SA AT HEADQUARTERS		85

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/00 BY SP-2 ALM/MG
#MORI 6

3/27

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SAS IN RAS:

	IS	CI
1 SA	5	
1 SA	45	45
1 SA	2	2
1 SA	50	25
1 SA	30	10
1 SA	75	20
1 SA	5	70
1 SA	2	5
1 SA	70	30
1 SA		10
1 SA	5	10
1 SA	55	15
1 SA	5	1
1 SA	1	5
1 SA	35	50
1 SA	5	3

IN SUMMARY, 16 RAS AVERAGED 24 IS, AND 19 CI.

END

KAC FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 26 2 58 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

44

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 003 PX PCODE

12:35 AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL JRL

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECT)

FROM PHOENIX (100-8529) (1P)

SENATE SELECT COMMITEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

PHOENIX DIVISION HAS FOLLOWING AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

A. INTERNAL SECURITY

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS -100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS - 75 PER CENT

THREE AGENTS - 50 PER CENT

B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. DOMESTIC - NONE

2. FOREIGN-

ONE SUPERVISOR - 30 PER CENT

ONE AGENT - 100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS- 25 PER CENT

END

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

MPM FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 3 30 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE

45

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

Budget & Accounting
602

NR 09 PG PLAIN

7:35 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RGM

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: PITTSBURGH (62-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THERE ARE 110 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE PITTSBURGH OFFICE (75 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS, 35 RESIDENTS AGENTS (RAS)).

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) FULL TIME. ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) FULL TIME.

11 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED CI FULL TIME AND 7 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED IS FULL TIME.

RESIDENT AGENT ASSIGNMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

6 RAS 2 PERCENT CI	5 RAS 2 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 3 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 3 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 5 PERCENT CI	1 RA 4 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 6 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 5 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 7 PERCENT CI	1 RA 7 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 8 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 11 PERCENT IS
1 RA 25 PERCENT CI	1 RA 12 PERCENT IS

END PAGE ONE

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/FTG

3/DA

PAGE TWO, PG 62-NEW

1 RA 16 PERCENT IS

1 RA 24 PERCENT IS

1 RA 28 PERCENT IS

THE ABOVE PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES WERE ARRIVED AT BY COMPARING THE NUMBER OF CI AND IS CASES WITH THE TOTAL CASE LOAD OF EACH RA.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 12 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

46

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 007 PD CODE

8:57 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LLD

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PORTLAND

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

PORTLAND HAS TWO SUPERVISORY DESKS HANDLING SECURITY MATTERS. ONE DESK HANDLES ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) AND ACCOUNTING MATTERS. BOTH DESKS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND SOME CRIMINAL MATTERS. BECAUSE OF OFFICE SIZE, PERSONNEL OF BOTH DESKS NECESSARILY PARTICIAPTE IN BANK ROBBERY AND OTHER MAJOR CRIMINAL MATTERS.

ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS, SAC EXPENDS TIME IN DIRECTIONAL AND OVERSIGHT CAPACITY ON CI AND IS MATTERS.

ESTIMATED SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON SECURITY MATTERS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE:

SAC (ONE), 5 PERCENT CI, 5 PERCENT IS.

ASAC (ONE), NONE.

SUPERVISORS (TWO), 45 PERCENT CI, 85 PERCENT IS.

AGENTS AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON SECURITY MATTERS:

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2-ALM/KSTG

3/DA

PAGE TWO

CI: 90 PERCENT - TWO
80 PERCENT - TWO
70 PERCENT - TWO
IS: 90 PERCENT - FOUR
80 PERCENT - SIX
50 PERCENT - TWO
40 PERCENT - TWO
20 PERCENT - ONE
10 PERCENT - FOUR.

LOWER PERCENTAGES ATTEMPT TO ACCOUNT FOR TIME SPENT BY RESIDENT AGENTS IN COVERING LEADS IN THESE FIELDS AND TO DISCOUNT TIME SPENT ON OTHER MATTERS BY HEADQUARTERS AGENTS.

END.

TJT FBI WASH DCC LR

MAR 27 12 01 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

47

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

✓ Budget Accounting
Room

NR004 RH PLAIN

3:50 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 EJM

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SEC.

FROM RICHMOND 1P

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS MAR 24, 1975.

RICHMOND HAS ONE AGENT ASSIGNED APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND NO AGENTS ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR DEVOTES LESS THAN 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO SUCH CASES.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/

300

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 3 52 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

48

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAR 27 1975
TELETYPE

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/ETG

NR002 SC PLAIN

9:23 AM URGENT 3/27/75 VLS

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SACRAMENTO (66-511)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. ✓ Budget [illegible]

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN HEADQUARTERS, SACRAMENTO HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGEND FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. 7 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; 3 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS; 1 AGENT EXPENDS 75 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES, 1 AGENT WITH 90 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; 1 AGENT WITH 50 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. 7 RAS HANDLE VARIETY OF CLASSIFICATIONS AND ALSO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THESE 7 AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (20 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 5 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE).

END

FBIHQ CLR SMD

3/DA

MAR 27 12 28 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

PM '75
IVED
YPE UNIT

62-116395-56

49

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

ML

TELETYPE

✓ Budget & Accounting Section
[illegible] JEH

NR001 SL PLAIN

8:30AM URGENT 3/27/75 TJO

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM ST. LOUIS (94-297) RUC

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

MDL16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/TOB

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE ST. LOUIS DIVISION AS REQUESTED BY RE COMMUNICATION.

NEITHER THE SAC OR THE ASAC ARE ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONLY ONE SUPERVISOR IS ASSIGNED TO SUCH MATTERS, HE SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 55 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THE REMAINING AGENTS SPEND NO TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT SPEND THE LISTED PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY: THREE AGENTS, 50 PERCENT; THREE AGENTS, 25 PERCENT; ONE AGENT, 10 PERCENT; TWO AGENTS, 5 PERCENT, TWO AGENTS, 2 PERCENT.

PAGE TWO SL 94-297

ABOVE FIGURES REFLECT BOTH HEADQUARTERS CITY AND RESIDENT AGENTS IN THIS DIVISION.

END

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 9 34 AM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

50

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/HG

NR006 SU PLAIN

8:46 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

✓ Budget & Acctg

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI). ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS). TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.

END. M

3/27

[illegible]

MAR 26 10 51 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

50 ?

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR006 SU PLAIN

846 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

✓ Budget & Accts
4028 Sect

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI). ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS). TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.

END.

JTG FBIHQ CLR

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/EE

3/Drt

MAR 26 10 57 AM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
LPP
TELETYPE

51

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR005 SA CODE

6:55PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN ANTONIO

✓ R-6028

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN ANTONIO OFFICE. ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF THESE MATTERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF TIME ON SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME TO THESE MATTERS.

FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, THIS BEING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL.

E N D.......

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/JTS
#MOR16

3/DA

NR005 SA CODE

2:55PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LFP

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN ANTONIO

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN ANTONIO OFFICE. ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF THESE MATTERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 10 PER CENT OF TIME ON SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME TO THESE MATTERS.

FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THIS TIME A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL.

END........

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 7 17 PM '75

62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

52

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

NR 02SD CODED

12:11AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL GDF

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAN DIEGO (66-NEW)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ✓ R

6 [illegible] JEH

REBUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SUPERVISORY AND AGENT TIME DEVOTED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE SAN DIEGO DIVISION:

SAC - SIX PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST MATTERS; TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ASAC - SIX PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST MATTERS; TWO PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; 40 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 20 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

SEVEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

FOUR AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

END

*MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TJG

3/D

THAT IS ALL

SSSSSSSS

MPM FBIHQ CLR

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 4 3 17 AM '75

62-116395-56

53

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE

Budget & Accounting
6028

NR 004 SF CODE

12:28 PM URGENT 3/26/75 MCC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN FRANCISCO

ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUNITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN EXCLUDES ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS MAN DAYS SPENT ON CRIMINAL MATTERS BY AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES.

SAN FRANCISCO HAS 70 AGENTS AND 5 SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY. IT HAS 73 AGENTS AND 3 SUPERVISORS FULL TIME AND ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR 25 PER CENT TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. ONE SAC AND ONE ASAC 25 PER CENT EACH ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

IEWTZ

JTG FBIHQ

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/DA

[illegible] UNIT
MAR 26 3 26 PM '75

62-116395-56

54

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

Budget + Accounting

NR003 SJ CODE

10:06 PM NITEL 3-25-75 JXC

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM SAN JUAN

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT PERSONNEL IN THE SAN JUAN DIVISION ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR - FULL TIME; ONE SUPERVISOR - TWENTY PER CENT OF THE TIME; FOURTEEN SPECIAL AGENTS - FULL TIME; THREE SPECIAL AGENTS - FIFTY PER CENT OF THE TIME.

AT THIS TIME, THE SAN JUAN DIVISION HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN A PENDING STATUS; THEREFORE, NO AGENT PERSONNEL ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE GA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JHS
#MORI6

3/

NR 003 SJ CODE

11:26 PM NITEL 3-25-75 JKC

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM SAN JUAN

TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 25 9 PM '75

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE DATED [illegible], 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT PERSONNEL IN THE SAN JUAN DIVISION ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR - FULL TIME; ONE SUPERVISOR - TWENTY PER CENT OF THE TIME; FOURTEEN SPECIAL AGENTS - FULL TIME; THREE SPECIAL AGENTS - FIFTY PER CENT OF THE TIME.

AT THIS TIME, THE SAN JUAN DIVISION HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN A PENDING STATUS; THEREFORE, NO AGENT PERSONNEL ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END.

DSS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE GA

62-116395-56

55

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975

NR002 SV CODE

715 PM NITEL 3/25/75 PNR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAVANNAH

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

IN RESPONSE TO RENITEL, THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN IN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS BEING SET FORTH:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
1 SAC	0	0
1 ASAC	0	0
1 SUPERVISOR	40 PERCENT	10 PERCENT
1 AGENT	90 "	0
1 AGENT	50 "	10 PERCENT
1 AGENT	10 "	0
1 AGENT	0	30 PERCENT

ALL OTHER AGENTS' ACCUMULATIVE TOTAL OF TIME WOULD EQUAL 10 PERCENT FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND 0 FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FOR ONE AGENT.

END

#NDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2ALM/LHG

MAR 3 7 24 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

56

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR002 SE CODED

3:59 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 CSC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SEATTLE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR- FULLTIME; FIVE AGENTS - FULLTIME; THREE AGENTS - 85PERCENT OF THEIR TIME.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR: 80 PER CENT OF TIME; SEVEN AGENTS - FULLTIME.

END

HOLD FOR ONE MORE

#MORI6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

MAR 25 7 09 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

57

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
& Com. ____
Inv. ____
ry ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 013 SI CODE

10:22PM NITEL 3-26-75 DJK

TO DIRECTOR

(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM SPRINGFIELD (66)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE TIME SPENT BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

THIRTY-SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. ONE OF THE ABOVE SAS SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND ONE OTHER SA SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND APPROXIMATELY 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHILE ANOTHER SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SURITY MATTERS.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP2ALM/JFS

THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE ANY SQUADS OF AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE MATTERS AND THE ABOVE ESTIMATE HAS BEEN DETERMINED FROM THE UTILIZATION OF TIMES SPENT DURING A TWO-WEEK PERIOD ON MATTERS BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 11 33 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

58

Assoc Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Budg & Accnt.
602 [illegible]

NR010 TP CODE

6-10PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM TAMPA (105-0)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975, REQUESTING THAT EACH SAC SUTEL THE NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TAMPA HAS ONE SQUAD WHICH HANDLES INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS WELL AS OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS, SUCH AS APPLICANT, SELECTIVE SERVICE, DESERTERS, AND EXTREMISTS.

NONE OF THE AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 1 AGENT WHO IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THE PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AN ACCUMULATION OF THE TIME SPENT BY EACH AGENT WORKING SUCH MATTERS.

INTERNAL SECURITY - SUPERVISOR, 20 PERCENT; AGENTS, 3.5

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - SUPERVISOR, 15 PERCENT; AGENTS, 1.5.

END

#mor16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JHB

3/06

59

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

✓ Budget [illegible]
60[illegible]8 [illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR004 WF CODED

2:57PM URGENT 3-26-75 KLS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REGARDING BUREAU NITEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (WFO) HAS ONE ASAC DEVOTING 12 PERCENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND 78 PERCENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS, THE REMAINING 10 PERCENT BEING ADMINISTRATIVE, POLICE AND LIAISON DUTIES.

IN ADDITION, WFO HAS 162 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 6 SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO CI, AND 21 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 1 SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS MATTERS. ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR DEVOTES 75 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO IS MATTERS.

END.

JRM FBIHQ

CLR

#mdl6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/JTG

MAR 26 3 02 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

ROUTE I[illegible] ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP~~ SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 4/4/75

Downgraded to SECRET
60324 UC BAW/SAB/ML
1/12/2011

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;
~~RODERICK HILLS~~, ASSOCIATE
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

#MO 16 1-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

Memorandum captioned as above, 3/27/75, from Legal Counsel to you, noted that you and Wannall were to meet with Mr. Hills and Mr. Phillip Buchen, Counsel to the President, on 3/28/75. Your addendum to the memorandum pointed out the results of this meeting and the various matters discussed.

As a follow-up to this meeting, you, Legal Counsel Mintz and Wannall met on 4/4/75 with Mr. James Wilderotter, who is presently working under Mr. Buchen in coordinating intelligence community matters relating to the inquiries underway by the Senate Select Committee. Mr. Wilderotter was given a briefing similar to that which had been afforded to Buchen and Hills. In addition, the discussion covered matters of a sensitive nature relating to the ORCHID and similar programs, electronic surveillances, specialized handling of informants, and Bureau Source 4 (access to social security records). Many of these matters discussed covered topics with which Mr. Wilderotter had become familiar when he was assigned to the Department as an Assistant to former Deputy Attorney General Silberman. (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Wilderotter said it was the feeling at The White House that while raw FBI files should not be made available to the Committee, it might be necessary to permit the Committee to review a few such files in order that the integrity of the FBI could be established with the Committee. It was pointed out to him that we did not agree to this, that we could furnish summaries of material from the files. Wilderotter said he did not feel that

REC-11 62-116395-55

WRW:dsh dsh
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

APR 11 1975

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Classified ~~by~~ 12 WRW
Exempt from GDS, ~~Categories~~ 2 and 3
Date of ~~Declassification~~ Indefinite

5-WRW

54APR 16 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

furnishing reports and letterhead memoranda which had been prepared for dissemination would satisfy the Committee's needs. He was advised by both you and Mr. Mintz that it was our feeling that we should not furnish the raw material but summaries could be prepared for the Committee's purposes and if necessary, Bureau officials could be placed under oath and attest to the correctness of the summaries. Wilderotter said that this was a matter which he would afford further consideration.

As during the conference with Buchen and Hills, it was obvious as the result of our meeting with Wilderotter that The White House was most anxious that it not be caught by surprise by revelations of activities which in any way might be considered questionable. The White House is making every effort possible to become cognizant of any such situation prior to the Committee hearings.

Classified "Top Secret" to protect highly sensitive investigative techniques and matters relating to foreign relations.

ACTION:

For information. Further contacts with Wilderotter or other White House Staff Members will be duly reported.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall
DATE: 4/4/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This will confirm that on 4/4/75 Mr. James Wilderotter of the White House orally approved the Bureau's dissemination to the Senate Select Committee the following two memoranda: confidential memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover dated 8/24/36, confidential memorandum from John Edgar Hoover dated 8/25/36, both dealing with conversations Mr. Hoover had with the President.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

WOC:aso (3)

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey

REC-5 62-116395-54

APR 8 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2ALM/ING

5-W06

54 APR 22 1975

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 8, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures - 2

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2ALM/TTG

EWL:jvl
(7)

REC-38

62-116395-53

EX-110

5 APR 10 1975

MAILED 7
APR 9 1975
FBI

2-ENCLOSURES

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

57 APR 16 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

One of the requests contained in referenced letter was for a list of names and titles of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBI Headquarters down to and including unit chiefs, together with a number of personnel below the level of unit chief categorized by unit. At a meeting on April 1, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis and Special Agent Paul V. Daly discussed this request with Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee. It was agreed that the request as stated would be modified and that the FBI would prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of unit chief, with names included, which would be made available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

This is to advise that the list has been prepared and is available for review under the above conditions.

1 - The Attorney General

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP 2 ALM/TG

EWL:jvl
(7)

PVD

wrw

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-53

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/ZTC

#moe16

access only

check 7/28

#mdr16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

62-111375-53

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

#mori6 1-1701
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ZTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

IV

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director Counterintelligence Branch	Hunter E. Helgeson Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director Internal Security Branch
4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor F. Anthony Tansey	Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan	Section Chief
Eugene C. Peterson	Number 1 Man
Special Cases Unit	
James P. Lee	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
New York Unit	
Alfred E. Smith	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Washington Unit Chief	
Wilfred R. Schlarman	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	

One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar	Section Chief
James W. Redfield	Number 1 Man

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

[Chinese] (S) Unit	
Herbert J. Morgan	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Satellite Unit	
Howard H. Wallace	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Coordination Unit	
John P. Thomas	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr.	Section Chief
Sebastian S. Mignosa	Number 1 Man
Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit	
~~Richard J. Deily~~	~~Unit Chief~~
Four Special Agents	
[Middle East] (S) Unit	
Carl F. Freeman	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
[Far East] (S) Unit	
William W. Hamilton	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
[Cuban] (S) Unit	
Charles H. McCarthy	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Nationality Unit	
Vinicio Henry Nasca	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr.	Section Chief
H. C. Flemister, Jr.	Number 1 Man
Liaison Supervisors	
Six	

Foreign Liaison Unit	
Robert A. Bermingham	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan	Section Chief
William H. Atkinson	Number 1 Man
Black Nationalist and White Hate - Central Unit	
William D. Neumann	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - East Unit	
Paul E. Nugent	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - West Unit	
Garnett T. Tunstall	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Black Nationalist - South, Klan and Informant Unit	
Homer A. Newman, Jr.	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Civil Disorders Reporting Unit	
Seymor F. Phillips	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford	Section Chief
Conrad W. Thompson	Number 1 Man

Trotskyist Unit	
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Communist Party Unit	
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Security Informant Unit	
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Extremist-West Unit	
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Extremist-East Unit	
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	

Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man
Training Unit	
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Central Research Unit	
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Special Records and Related Research Unit	
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Analytical Research Unit	
David Ryan	Unit Chief
Seven Special Agents	

SECRET

#MDR16 1-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director Counterintelligence Branch	Hunter E. Helgeson Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director Internal Security Branch
4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor F. Anthony Tansey	Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan	Section Chief
Eugene C. Peterson	Number 1 Man
Special Cases Unit	
James P. Lee	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
New York Unit	
Alfred E. Smith	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Washington Unit Chief	
Wilfred R. Schlarman	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	

One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar	Section Chief
James W. Redfield	Number 1 Man

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Chinese (S) Unit	
Herbert J. Morgan	Unit Chief
Five Special Agents	
Satellite Unit	
Howard H. Wallace	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Coordination Unit	
John P. Thomas	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr.	Section Chief
Sebastian S. Mignosa	Number 1 Man
Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit	
~~Richard J. Daily~~	~~Unit Chief~~
Four Special Agents	
Middle East (S) Unit	
Carl F. Freeman	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Far East (S) Unit	
William W. Hamilton	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Cuban (S) Unit	
Charles H. McCarthy	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Nationality Unit	
Vinicio Henry Nasca	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr.	Section Chief
H. C. Flemister, Jr.	Number 1 Man
Liaison Supervisors	
Six	

Foreign Liaison Unit	
Robert A. Bermingham	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan	Section Chief
William H. Atkinson	Number 1 Man
Black Nationalist and White Hate - Central Unit	
William D. Neumann	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - East Unit	
Paul E. Nugent	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Black Nationalist and White Hate - West Unit	
Garnett T. Tunstall	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Black Nationalist - South, Klan and Informant Unit	
Homer A. Newman, Jr.	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Civil Disorders Reporting Unit	
Seymor F. Phillips	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford	Section Chief
Conrad W. Thompson	Number 1 Man

SECRET

Trotskyist Unit	
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Communist Party Unit	
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Security Informant Unit	
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Extremist-West Unit	
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Extremist-East Unit	
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	

Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man
Training Unit	
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Central Research Unit	
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Special Records and Related Research Unit	
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Analytical Research Unit	
David Ryan	Unit Chief
Seven Special Agents	

(+)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/TTG
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MOR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/[illegible]
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by 9~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/BJE
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full-Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MOR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JJ6
ON 1-17-01

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 9
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. __
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. __
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. __
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

#MOR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/23/01 BY SP-2 ALM

SUBJECT: JOHN T. ELLIFF
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICS
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

On 3-18-75 Professor John T. Elliff advised Inspector John B. Hotis that he had been contacted by William Miller, Staff Director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, and was asked to serve as Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence. This is one of four Task Forces being formed by the Select Committee and it will focus primarily on the activities of the FBI. The other Task Forces are on Foreign Intelligence, Military and Technological Intelligence, and Command and Control.

Elliff said he had not decided whether to accept the offer and believed that others were also being considered for the position. He said he was reluctant to do anything that would interfere with the excellent working arrangements he had developed with the Bureau. He feels that his initial obligation is to the Director, and the purpose of going to the Police Foundation was to get formal support for a project that would be of primary benefit to the Bureau and only secondarily to the Attorney General and Congress. He said he would be guided by our judgment in this matter and not want to break any commitments that he might have made with the Bureau.

If he accepts the appointment Elliff said he would, of course, suspend work on his research project until he had terminated his employment with the Committee. He said he would also agree not to use any classified material that he acquired in his capacity as Task Force Director. Elliff has discussed this matter with John Heaphy, Assistant Director of the Police Foundation. Heaphy said the Foundation had no objections whatsoever for his accepting the position with the Senate Select Committee, and he would be free to resume his project after the Committee work was done.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116395-

REC-10 62-116395-52

NOT RECORDED
102 APR 10 1975

MAR 28 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Reed
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
JBH:dkg (7)

54 APR 14 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: JOHN T. ELLIFF

It should be noted that the Select Committee considered offering the position to Larry Baskir, Counsel to the President's Clemency Board. Mr. Baskir formerly served as Chief Counsel to Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, and we had numerous contacts with him in that capacity. Our purpose was to reach some common agreement on privacy legislation that Senator Ervin planned to introduce in the 93rd Session of Congress. There were numerous meetings with Baskir on the same subject in the Deputy Attorney General's office. These efforts proved unsuccessful and after several months we discontinued the discussions. In our opinion, Mr. Baskir was unwilling to work out any reasonable compromise and seemed unsympathetic to the ~~legislation~~ Committee concerns of law enforcement.

B.C.

It is clear that this is a matter for Professor Elliff to determine and the Bureau should not express an official opinion. Although we have not always agreed with his views on intelligence matters, we have had no occasion to question his objectivity or his integrity as a scholar. Mr. Miller knows that Professor Elliff enjoys our confidence and it is our understanding that he offered Elliff the position in order to avoid an adversary relationship between the Bureau and the Committee.

Professor Elliff said he would make no commitments to the Senate Committee until he hears from us.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Professor Elliff be advised that it would be inappropriate for us to express an opinion on whether he should accept the appointment offered by the Senate Select Committee.

JAF/JBH

Handled 3/25/75 JBH

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/31/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the afternoon of 3/25/75.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; the then Deputy AG Laurence Silberman, Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke, as well as officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

The following items of interest were discussed:

Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), and the Committee's Counsel, Mr. F.A.O. Schwarz, III, visited CIA Headquarters to discuss SSC business. Mr. Miller suggested that a tactic the SSC was considering is the identification of several key issues that the Committee could look into in-depth. For example, the SSC might propose to identify two or three covert actions engaged in by CIA and examine them in-depth rather than try to cover each and every covert action CIA might identify. Colby advised that this appeared to be an encouraging development and possibly each agency of the Intelligence Community might be asked to provide a series of key issues from which the Select Committee could select one or two for an in-depth study.

EX 104 REC-10 62-116395-51

The question of the SSC staff signing a Secrecy Agreement is still not settled. The Staff Director raised some constitutional questions regarding the Secrecy Agreement. Mr. Schwarz admitted, however, that some type of arrangement would have to be made to insure that the Intelligence Community had some protection against unauthorized disclosures by staff members of the SSC.

APR 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/BS #MDR16

Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(7)

ENCLOSURE
54 APR 14 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Both Miller and Schwarz accepted the Third Agency Rule and agreed to abide by it. For the record, the SSC's interpretation of the Third Agency Rule (which is consistent with the Intelligence Community) is as follows: Classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department.

The Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) will meet to develop some ground rules and standardization for sanitizing documents to be furnished to the Select Committees.

The question of Intelligence Community personnel being represented by counsel was discussed. The position of the White House on this issue has been fully reported in a memorandum from the Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, dated 3/27/75, entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Rodney Hills Associate Counsel to the President."

It was also agreed at the meeting of 3/25/75 that the President's Counsel would attempt to negotiate with the SSC to insure that all interviews of Intelligence Community personnel would be conducted on the premises of the bureau, agency or department employing the persons to be interviewed.

Attached also for the record are the following:

A letter dated 3/20/75 from Staff Director William G. Miller to Mr. John Clarke advising that Mr. Ben Marshall has been designated as the Security Officer of the SSC;

A letter dated 3/17/75 from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke listing employees of the SSC who have been cleared by the Committee for certification by CIA for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

A letter from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke dated 3/20/75 advising that Mr. Ben Marshall was cleared for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

A memorandum from the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee advising that arrangements had been perfected for the delivery of classified documents to the SSC and describing how such documents should be delivered.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WRW/TWL

PLM

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATE[illegible]
CHARLES MCC. MA[illegible], JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK[illegible] PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Officer of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, has been designated Compartmentation Officer.

Sincerely,

William Green Miller

William G. Miller

#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2ALM/[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRM
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAI

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKE R., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATE ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 17, 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2ALM/

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter of March 13, outlining a procedure for clearance for the Select Committee staff. The procedure you have suggested has been adopted and attached to this letter is the Select Committee's first listing of staff who have been cleared by the Committee. This listing is the result of the investigation undertaken by the FBI and a consideration of the FBI reports on individuals by the Chairman. As further investigations by the FBI are received, we will send additional persons to be granted clearances.

As to access to compartmentalized information, those members of the staff who will be designated will be indicated to you in subsequent communications.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

NAME	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
Charity Benz	7-23-46	N.Y.	053-38-7410
Michael Taylor Epstein	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318
Mark Henry Gitenstein	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767
Audrey Helen Hatry	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48	N.Y.	068-38-6464
Michael James Madigan	4-18-43	D.C.	042-34-3797
Elliot Everett Maxwell	7-24-46	N.Y.	133-34-4225
Martha Evans Mecham	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848
James Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495
Jan Orloff	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394
John F. Peterson	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707
Lewis Brittle Snider	1-12-45	N.C.	246-72-0956
Burton Victor Wides	6-14-41	N.J.	139-30-1936

As the FBI completes its investigative work, other names will be sent to you.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. M[illegible]AS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHW[illegible], PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

Ad Hoc Staff
75-181

United State[illegible] Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number has received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and is hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Benjamin Marshall, May 4, 1919, Walnut (now Verdigre)
Nebraska, soc sec no 485-28-4530

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller

#MOR16
[illegible] INFORMATION CONTAINED
[illegible] UNCLASSIFIED
[illegible] 1-17-01 [illegible] SP2ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-49
21 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of USIB on Congressional Review

SUBJECT : Security - Arrangements for Receipt of Classified Material by Senate Select Committee

1. On 19 March 1975 I telephonically inquired of Mr. Benjamin C. Marshall, Security Officer of the Senate Select Committee, whether he was in a position to begin receiving classified documents. He advised that arrangements had been perfected and that effective 20 March 1975 such documents could be delivered as follows:

> The courier should enter the 1st and C Street entrance of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, inquire of the guard as to the location of Room G308, go to the front door of G308, advise the guard there that material is being delivered and have him call Mr. Marshall or Charity Benz, both of whom are authorized to receive classified documents up to and including TOP SECRET*.

2. Mr. Marshall requested that prior to delivery he or someone in his office be telephonically advised (224-1700) of the impending delivery and the estimated time of arrival so that he or someone from his office can be available. He also stated that if delivery was desired to a specific staff member, Mr. Marshall would try and have such person available, but stated he was authorized to accept documents for members of the Committee and staff.

3. The Committee has not yet advised as to compartmented clearances but Mr. Marshall has been designated Compartmentation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2ALM/ZTG

#MDR16

---

*Mr. Patrick Shea is expected to be added as a person to receive documents but the certification for this access to classified material has not as yet been received by your office.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

Officer and has advised that the same delivery arrangements will be in effect for compartmented material. When necessary clearance arrangements have been perfected so that delivery of compartmented material can begin, you will be advised.

Donald E. Moore

Donald E. Moore
Chairman

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

June 23, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND JURISDICTION

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Pursuant to your request in Appendix B, Items 13 and 14, for all memoranda and other materials reflecting meetings and contacts during 1971 between the President and the Director of the FBI and between officials of the FBI and officials of the Department of State on the subject of "legal attaches," enclosed are copies of 23 documents.

Enclosures (23)

1 - The Attorney General

RLM:mam ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG
(8)

NOTE:

The Senate Committee request is understood to be a request for contacts with reference to the legal attaches as a group and therefore contacts between officials of the FBI and officials of the State Department pertaining to any one particular legal attache, such as Tel Aviv, have not been included. In the enclosures there is reference to State "dragging its feet," and information that during negotiations with the State Department the fact that collection of political intelligence was the primary purpose for the expansion of legal attaches was concealed from the State Department. The enclosures also contain information that there are a large number of [CIA employees assigned to the U. S. Embassy at Kuala Lumpur]

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

JFK (1)(B)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___ RLM
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

62-116395-385 PLN

CONFIDENTIAL

I pointed out that there would be no possibility of our "doubling up" with Narcotics investigators, explaining that our functions and methods of operation are totally different and would actually be incompatible in some areas. I noted that our modest request had actually been scaled down before it was forwarded to State and that we had limited each office to a single Agent with only one Clerk-Stenographer. I referred to the detailed explanation for our request which had been furnished in our letter of 10/14/71 to Mr. Irwin and stated that we would not have made the request if we had not felt it fully justified and responsive to the President's instruction. I said that we would, however, carefully consider each part of the request once more to see if there was any way in which the total number of personnel involved might be reduced. It was agreed that following this review, we would meet again for further discussion during the week of November 29, 1971. Comments and recommendations concerning the specific areas follow:

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

The Agency for International Development Mission here has been withdrawn in the face of local criticism of U. S. efforts to influence the Brazilian Police. We have been covering this enormous country from our office in Argentina on a 2,500 mile round trip basis. No criticism has been made of our liaison contacts with the Brazilian Police or other agencies, and we feel we should insist on reopening our office here. By reducing our staff in Buenos Aires by one Agent and one clerk (which we intended to do anyway), reopening this office will result in no increase in personnel.

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

JFK(1)(B) [There is an abnormally large percentage of Central Intelligence Agency personnel here on both an overt and covert basis,] and the addition of another investigative agency is feared by the Ambassador as objectionable to the Malaysian Government which is endeavoring to maintain a neutral position. State asks that we let them explore the possibility of opening in Singapore instead of Kuala Lumpur. Singapore is extremely close and is actually a better location from the standpoint of travelers both east and west as Singapore is a normal international aviation stop. We believe Singapore would be just as good a location as Kuala Lumpur and recommend that State be asked to make the necessary arrangements without further delay.

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

769
726-768,^770-793X, 795-2nd NR 797, 798
799-806, 807X-810

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date: 03-18-2025

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2622
29 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/eg
MDR-16

Jack E. Thomas
Jack E. Thomas
Major General, USAF (Ret.)
Chief, Coordination Staff/ICS

Attachment

REC-20 62-116395-810

RECORDED
21 OCT 2 1975

ST. 114

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

84 OCT 6 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

29 SEP 1975

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Aaron, David [1]	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
[redacted]er, William [1]	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara	*	B 6/26	12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Betts, Richard K.	*	B 7/1	8-15-47	Pa.	016-38-2619	
Binkin, Martin	*	B 8/5	5-6-28	Mo.	498-20-5633	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
[redacted]oomfield, Beth Susan	*	B 7/14(H, G, K)	12-23-51	Ohio	256-92-0341	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Brown, Maxine	*	B 6/26	8-8-28	Ida.	568-40-3123	

62-116395-1

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/18/90 BY SP2ALM/eb
MDR-16

All Footnotes at the end.

29 SEP 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Bushong, David	*	B 71/4	8-10-47	Ohio	289-40-1203	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
[redacted]esnick, Barbara	*	B 7/14	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
Culbreth, Elizabeth	*	B 7/2	6-23-42	NC	240-64-9040	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17(Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Dawson, Thomas	*	B 6/26	9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeMarco, James	*	B 6/26	3-12-43	W. Va.	286-36-9097	
Dennin, Joseph Francis	*	B 6/23	6-9-43	NY	567-62-5353	
DeOreo, Mary	*	B 6/26	6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
DeTemple, Mary	*	B 7/29	6-16-25	Wisc.	394-20-5968	
[redacted]Genova, Joseph E.	*	B 6/26	2-22-45	Del.	222-28-5430	
Dick, James	*	B 6/26	7-25-47	Mass.	029-36-6745	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Donock, Mary Jane[2]			9-12-23	W. Va.	235-22-9235	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel	*	B 7/14	8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor	*	B 6/26	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
Er[illegible], Jean			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	

29 SEP 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Ford, Harold	*	B 6/26	3-23-21	Cal.	550-16-4630	
Fortman, Bernard Louis[3]			12-5-25	Md.	216-20-2565	
Fortman, Donald Thomas[3]			8-31-33	Md.	213-30-8943	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
G[redacted]nt, Bruce	*	B 7/2	6-16-16	Neb.	507-20-1311	
Greissing, Edward	*	B 7/14	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Hanback, Sara Susan			2-4-46	W. Va.	215-46-3141	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Harris, William R.[4]	already	Briefed	7-30-41		128-32-2350	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691	
Herrington, Arthur[5]	*	B 9/15	3-24-31	D. C.	304-28-8364	
Hodges, Paulette	*	B 7/29	4-17-43	Okla.	224-60-2495	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	
Iverson, Portia	*	B 7/14	10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	
Jefferson, Arthur M.	*	B 6/26	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
[redacted]son, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
Johnston, James	*	B 7/29	1-6-44	Kan.	495-46-9594	
Karalekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kayden, Jeffrey	*	B 7/14	3-22-51	NY	065-40-7277	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles[1]	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge
Kirchheimer, Joseph			6-3-17	Ill.	359-03-7843	
Koppal, Diane	*	B 6/26	6-24-48	NC	219-48-0018	

29 SEP 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Compartmented Clearance Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Koscis, Susan	*	B 9/17	11-5-49	NY	051-42-2418	
Krauss, George Henry Jr.[3]			9-9-16	Colo.	385-01-1876	
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles[1]	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen	*	B 8/20	10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James[1]	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mascioli, Cynthia	*	B 6/26	1-4-51	NY	112-44-7636	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mayo, Betty	*	B 6/26	2-13-22	Ohio	277-14-4062	
McCorkle, Daniel	*	B 8/20	6-25-55	Ohio	297-56-6722	
McIntyre, Dorothy			5-16-16	Canada	220-48-9104	
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	
Michel, Paul	*	B 8/14	2-3-41	Pa.	172-34-8584	
Miller, William G.[1]	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	

29 SEP 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
Murphy, Michael	*	B 7/1	10-13-54	Tex.	231-86-8829	
Nash, Dorothy			7-24-12	Wisc.	399-14-4589	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan	*	B 6/26	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Oster, Lynsey Lee			9-14-53	SD	501-68-8908	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.	*	B 6/26	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Postal, Andrew	*	B 7/23	5-11-48	NY	128-40-4695	
Pyle, Christopher	*	B 6/26	11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Ralston, Theodore	*	B 7/23	8-25-48	Wash.	538-48-4673	
Rhea, Gordon	*	B 6/26	3-10-45	Va.	412-74-7901	
[illegible]hard, Eric	*	B 7/10	12-27-49	NY	128-40-7430	
R[illegible]cks, Walter	*	B 6/26	12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III[1]	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester	*	B 6/26	7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	

29 SEP 1975

	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Name	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
[redacted] Smith, John L.	*	B 6/26	3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha	*	B 6/26	9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Tascione, Rosemary			6-23-45	NY	085-34-6648	
Theoharis, Athan George			8-3-36	Wisc.	395-32-1273	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
[redacted]malonis, Alexandra			6-1-48	Md.	200-38-8408	
owell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Turner, James	*	B 7/14	6-29-53	Cal.	215-64-7255	
Tschirgi, James 6	*	B 6/26	2-23-25	Wyo.	520-16-7290	
Vance, James	*	B 7/23	4-6-36	Ohio	078-28-3950	
Wallach, Paul	*	B 6/26	5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

29 SEP 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
White, William	*	B 7/10	8-8-39	Pa.	168-30-9147	
Wides, Burton Victor[1]	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe	*	B 8/5	12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

Footnotes:

1 Also briefed on Hx, Mat, Rh & Ke

2 Detailed from Ward and Paul Reporters

3 Detailed from General Printing Office

4 Consultant to SSC, also associated with RAND Corp (has SI, TK BYC)

5 Has SI, TK, B, G, C, H, R, A, E

6 Also has A, G, E, K, H, C & R

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
September 24, 1975
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

LEGAL ADVICE FOR PRESENT OR FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/ely

Reference is made to my memorandum of September 23, 1975, which advised you of a request I received concerning legal representation for W. Donald Stewart a former Special Agent of this Bureau who has been requested to submit to interview by the Senate Select Committee.

Mr. Stewart telephonically advised on September 24, 1975, that he had been contacted by James Dick of the Senate Select Committee and again asked to appear for interview concerning mail openings. Mr. Stewart explained to Mr. Dick that he was arranging with the Department of Justice for legal representation and until these arrangements were completed, he did not feel it was appropriate for him to be interviewed. According to Mr. Stewart, Mr. Dick informed him that the Committee could not wait for such arrangements to be completed and that arrangements should be made at this time for the interview. Mr. Stewart stated, Mr. Dick implied that, if he did not agree to an interview in the immediate future, a subpoena would be issued. As a result, Mr. Stewart agreed to appear September 26, 1975, for interview by the Senate Select Committee concerning mail openings. He, however, did not indicate whether he intends to furnish information at that time.

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
NOV 6 1975

Mr. Stewart inquired as to the status of his request for legal representation which he requested by letter dated September 18, 1975 (a copy was enclosed with referenced memorandum). He was advised that this matter had not as yet been resolved and that he would be expeditiously advised of the resolution of his request.

REC 17
62-116395-1182
ST-103

In view of the immediacy of the problem concerning legal representation for Mr. Stewart, it is respectfully requested that this Bureau be expeditiously advised of your decision in this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
(Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination)

1 - Personnel File - W. Donald Stewart

SEP 29 1975
Approved
For delivery
JB 9/25/75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PVD:lad (11)

(SEE NOTE CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

84 OCT 6 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General
RE: LEGAL ADVICE FOR PRESENT OR FORMER
BUREAU EMPLOYEES

NOTE: The referenced memorandum was hand delivered to the office of Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, on 9/24/75. This letter advised the Department of additional information pointing out the need for an expeditious resolution of Stewart's request.

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

The Attorney General

September 24, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

CLASSIFIED BY 885 JC/SW 6-7-99
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
060-98-0000

Reference is made to the memorandum dated August 13, 1975, from Mr. Douglas R. Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General, to Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, of this Bureau, captioned, "Senate Select Committee Request for Information on Warrantless Electronic Surveillances," which enclosed an SSC request dated July 7, 1975, and to my memoranda, captioned as above, dated August 25, 1975, September 16, 1975, and September 19, 1975.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum containing responses to questions 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, as they pertain to FBI warrantless microphone and telephone surveillances. My memorandum to you dated September 16, 1975, indicated these responses were being prepared separately.

ST. 114

REC-61 62-116395-809

In conformity with our prior responses to these SSC requests, the identity of the requesting Presidential appointee is omitted. This criteria did not become applicable until the recent Presidential Directive which is the subject of the SSC request question #23b, the response to which the Department has reserved for itself. Our response therefore states all electronic surveillance requests are signed by the Director or Acting Director of the FBI.

21 OCT 2 1975

62-116395

RHR:jmn
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~Classified by 5736~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 OCT 6 1975

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

A briefing for Senators Church and Tower has been provided covering warrantless electronic surveillances, surreptitious entry for recovery of cryptographic material, teletype coverage requested by the National Security Agency and electronic penetration of communications equipment requested by the National Security Agency. The White House asked that agencies of the intelligence community not respond to any requests from the SSC covering these matters until the briefing had been given. The goal of the briefing was to confine knowledge of these matters to Senators Church and Tower and avoid proliferation of this information throughout the SSC staff. In view of this, it is recommended that the enclosed material not be made available to the SSC staff until it is discussed with the White House. I further urge that it be made clear to the White House that if this material is to be made available to the SSC that access to the enclosed material be limited to Senators Church, Tower, and SSC Staff Director William Miller only.

A copy of the memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Memorandum 8/25/75 to the Attorney General, enclosed responses to questions 2, 3, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 21. Memorandum 9/19/75 to the Attorney General enclosed the response to question 24. Memorandum 9/16/75 to the Attorney General enclosed responses to questions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 17. The latter memorandum excluded FBI warrantless electronic surveillance statistics relative to questions 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 since this data required more time for compilation. This data has now been compiled and is contained in the memorandum enclosed with this letter. Responses have now been provided to all questions in the SSC request dated 7/7/75 which were assigned to the Bureau by the Attorney General's office.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

62-116395

September 24, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO WARRANTLESS
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES

6-7-99
CLASSIFIED BY SPS JCP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

060-98-008

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 7, 1975, with attached questionnaire. By memorandum dated September 16, 1975, replies were given to questions 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 as they pertained to agencies other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This response pertains to FBI requests for both telephone and microphone warrantless electronic surveillances utilized in FBI investigations. The response excludes from consideration the electronic surveillances utilized regarding the "Kissinger 17," Joseph Kraft, and Yeoman Charles Edward Radford. These matters have been the subject of individual SSC inquiries. The material furnished to the Committee or to which it has been given access in regard to these specific matters provides the data which would respond to questions 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.

Question #4 asked: "What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from 1966 to the present?"

With respect to this question, the FBI has initiated requests to the Attorney General for warrantless electronic surveillances. All FBI requests, either initial or continuances, are signed by the Director or Acting Director of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

RHR:jmn
(8)

~~TOP SECRET~~ NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~Classified by 5730~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2~~
Date of ~~Declassification Indefinite~~

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Warrantless
Electronic Surveillances for
National Security Purposes

The chart which follows pertains to questions 5, 6, 7, and 8, listed below.

Question #5 asked: "How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee?"

Question #6 asked: "How many of the requests initiated by each agency and Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?"

Question #7 asked: "How many requests have been made by each agency and each Presidential appointee for the continuation of previously approved surveillance?"

Question #8 asked: "How many of the requests for the continuation of previously approved surveillance made by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?"

~~(S)~~

	Question 5 Initial Requests	Question 6 Initial Requests Approved	Question 7 Continuation Requests	Question 8 Continuation Approved
1966 (FBI)	45	41	155	155
1967 (FBI)	18	9	142	142
1968 (FBI)	99	32	173	173
1969 (FBI)	44	47*	175	175
1970 (FBI)	72	71	144	144
1971 (FBI)	44	43	142	142
1972 (FBI)	107	99	146	146
1973 (FBI)	78	71	285	285
1974 (FBI)	96	94	385	385
1975 (through August 29, 1975) (FBI)	48	39	276	254

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Warrantless
Electronic Surveillances for
National Security Purposes

The asterisk indicates approval of requests initiated in preceding year.

Regarding the statistics in columns 7 and 8, one surveillance operation could generate more than one continuance request in one year.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top~~ Secret" since unauthorized disclosure could jeopardize sensitive methods.

The responses to questions 5, 6, 7, and 8 were obtained by review of records maintained in Special Records and Related Research Unit. Statistics were compiled from available data regarding microphone and telephone surveillances which were approved and installed; approved but not installed; not approved; or on which no Attorney General response was received.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 9/24/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee 7/7/75 request
Items 4,5,6,7 and 8

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: SA J W Daley Date: 9/25/75

Received by: Douglas R. Marvin

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/02 BY SP2ALM/rlj

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-869

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
9/24/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General, not made available to SSC Staff until discussed with White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

8/13/75 letter from Douglas R. Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; SSC letter 7/7/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

TS

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Information furnished on Warrantless Electronic Surveillance for National Security Purposes

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cdj

62-116395

FMK:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

5, NOC/B

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY 6P2ALM/ely

62-116395-808

CHANGED TO

61-3499-1444X

NOV 10 1975

---

ft/JE

C✓

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 9/18/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/elj

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: LEGAL ADVICE FOR PRESENT OR FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES

SEN STUDY 75

On September 17, 1975, Mary Wagner, an attorney in the office of the Deputy Attorney General, accompanied by Bruce Baird, an attorney recently appointed to the Deputy's office, met with me in my office and advised that they have been assigned the responsibility of drafting guidelines for the Attorney General's approval concerning legal representation of Department employees. She explained that they view the problem of legal advice to employees as larger than the request made by the FBI concerning Bureau employees, and that the guidelines would address the larger problem. She asked for my suggestions concerning the proposed guidelines.

I told Miss Wagner that in the beginning of the inquiries received from the Senate and House Select Committees, we had been advised by the Department that a conflict of interest would prohibit Department attorneys, including lawyers in the FBI, from providing legal representation individually to the employees of the FBI in matters relating to the Senate and House inquiries. As a consequence we have been advising our employees of the procedures involved in Congressional committee interviews and appearances for testimony; the limitations imposed on the employees in regard to sensitive areas of testimony which might require special approval; their right to counsel and of the limitation imposed on us that personal counsel would have to be privately employed. I told Miss Wagner that my reading of the Attorney General's memorandum for the Director dated September 12, 1975, was that the Attorney General intended to make personal legal advice available to employees requesting it and that we would like for the guidelines to be written broadly enough for employees to receive effective assistance of legal counsel.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-19166-2

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
SEP 24 1975
NOV 6 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUN.
PERS. REC. UNIT

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

I suggested to her that the Attorney General might approve the appointment of a special counsel within the Department whose responsibilities would be somewhat similar to those imposed on the Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in that he would be relieved of other Department responsibilities and his allegiance would be only to discharging the obligations of personal counsel when requested by an employee. I suggested that such special designation would permit the Department lawyer so assigned to avoid the conflict of interest problem and at the same time it would impose on him the obligations of the attorney-client privilege.

Miss Wagner commented that she understood that in some cases handled by the Civil Division of the Department, Government attorneys represent employees in civil suits, but require that the employee waive the attorney-client privilege to the extent that should the Government employee become aware of information that should be communicated to another division of the Department, the attorney would furnish such information to the other division. If the attorney learned of criminal conduct on the part of the employee, he would not be prohibited by the attorney-client privilege from making such conduct known to the Department.

I told Miss Wagner that an essential element of the relationship between the special counsel for furnishing advice to employees would be that the attorney-client privilege would apply and it would not be possible for such a waiver to be required in exchange for providing legal advice. She agreed.

I suggested to Miss Wagner that the Department special counsel could be available for consultation concerning such matters as appearances before Congressional committees and for such preliminary advice as would be useful to employees called to testify. At the point where the special counsel determined that the employee required more in-depth legal assistance in order to protect his legal rights, the special counsel could recommend to the Deputy Attorney General that the employee should be afforded an opportunity to have private counsel whose fees would be paid by the Department of Justice.

CONTINUED - OVER

In regard to the question of security clearance for such outside counsel and the possibility that an employee might seek to employ an attorney whose background would suggest that he would not be approved for security clearance, I told Miss Wagner that the provision of private counsel to an employee would be done in the discretion of the Department and that a reasonable limitation could well be imposed by the Department as to those attorneys in private practice who would be eligible for appointment to represent individual employees. Such limitation would permit the Department and the employee to agree upon an attorney who would be qualified for security clearance.

Miss Wagner inquired as to when the Department's responsibility for furnishing legal counsel to an employee should terminate. I told her that an appropriate time would be when the Department advised the employee that a decision had been made to prosecute the employee. Up to that point the inquiries would have been directed toward the determination of the circumstances and that the employer-employee relationship would justify protecting the legal rights of the employee, but at the point at which the Government determines and so advises the employee that the employee would be prosecuted, the Government and the employee would become adversaries.

We discussed the provision in Federal law for the appointment of counsel for Federal defendants in cases where the defendant is indigent. I suggested that they consider the possibility that even in those cases where an employee is to be prosecuted, the Department consider the possibility of employing existing law to provide counsel to employees who may become defendants in criminal cases.

As to the scope of the representation of the employee, I told Miss Wagner that the initial need is for legal advice in situations where an employee is called for an interview or testimony by Members, committees, subcommittees, or other units of the Congress. However, I explained that due to the publicity of the Congressional inquiries, others may well be interested in pursuing independent inquiries concerning the same matters or other matters and that employees may well request legal advice when they are called for interview or testimony by the Criminal

CONTINUED - OVER

Division of the Department, the Civil Rights Division of the Department, or other Federal Government entities including Federal Grand Juries. Further, state and local prosecutors and grand juries may seek to inquire concerning matters within their jurisdiction arising out of the employee's Federal activities and the employee would require the assistance of counsel. Therefore, I asked Miss Wagner to include in the guidelines a provision that legal counsel would be available through the Department for employees in all circumstances where the employee is being questioned concerning matters arising out of his employment in the FBI.

I told Miss Wagner that the concluding paragraph in the Attorney General's memorandum for the Director indicated the possibility that a determination would be made in some cases that the employee's activities were beyond the scope of his duties and in such cases legal counsel would not be provided. I told her that such a determination would be critical and the policy followed in making such decisions would color the entire program of providing legal assistance to employees. Therefore, I requested Miss Wagner to address the question of scope of duties in the guidelines by expressing a presumption that the employee's activities were within the scope of his duties and that such presumption would be overcome only by a showing of facts clearly indicating to the contrary, and that such determination would be made at least by the Deputy Attorney General himself.

I told Miss Wagner that this matter was most urgent and that the Special Agents of the FBI throughout the field are anxiously awaiting the announcement of the Attorney General's policy in regard to availability of legal advice to employees concerning matters arising out of their employment. She advised me that work would begin immediately and that she would be in touch with me concerning its progress, and to discuss the guidelines as they are developed.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information of the Director in response to his request.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General September 23, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a request by Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC on September 22, 1975, for delivery of documents concerning a White House request for a detailed breakdown of the income source for various revolutionary groups.

Enclosed for forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum enclosing material responsive to this request. Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum as well as copies of the enclosures.

You will note that the enclosed material is of interest to the White House and it is requested that appropriate clearance be obtained before passage.

Enclosures (32)

62-116395

REC-65

ST 112

807X

20 FEB 20 1976

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

LED:pal pal
(7)

32 per ENCLOSURE - sent w/ original

ENCL BEHIND FILE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 561

FEB 27 1976

2 [illegible]r. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

(IS-2) 62-116395

September 23, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a request by Mr. John T. Elliff of the SCC on September 22, 1975, for delivery of documents concerning a White House request for a detailed breakdown of the income source for various revolutionary groups.

Enclosed with this memorandum are documents relating to this request, including the White House request dated February 23, 1970, and the FBI response dated February 26, 1970, with 13 memoranda concerning sources of funds utilized by revolutionary groups.

Enclosures (15)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY

LED:cap cap
(7)

ORIGINAL AND 1 COPY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-807X

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 9-22-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

On 9-18-75 Michael Epstein, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee, requested James F. Bland and Lawrence T. Gurley, former Special Agents, be released from existing employment agreements for a staff interview by the Senate Select Committee. Epstein stated the topic of the interview would be the Bureau's investigation concerning Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Communist influence in the racial movement and civil rights movement.

Bland and Gurley both advised on 9-18-75 that they had been contacted by the Committee and requested to consent to be interviewed by that Committee. Bland, by memorandum dated 9-3-75, was released from existing employment agreement for purposes of an interview concerning the security index by the Senate Select Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That former Special Agents Bland and Gurley be released from existing employment agreements for purposes of the aforementioned interview.

WOC
Ext

ST. 114

REC-61 62-116395-18

21 OCT 1 1975

1 - Personnel File James F. Bland
1 - Personnel File Lawrence T. Gurley

PVD:dkg (9)

84 OCT 6 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO :Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 9/22/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM :Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cdj

Former Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of the Legal Counsel Division on 9/22/75 to advise that he had been requested by the Senate Select Committee to appear before that Committee at 5 p.m. on 9/23/75 to testify under oath concerning his knowledge of the "Huston Plan." Brennan was further informed that he was being requested to testify during open session of the Committee on Thursday, 9/25/75, regarding the same topic. He was advised generally of his legal rights and of the appropriate provisions of the rules of procedure concerning the Senate Select Committee. He was informed that the Bureau was cooperating with the Committee and had furnished considerable information in the form of briefings and documents some of which directly relate to the Bureau's knowledge and participation in the "Huston Plan."

Brennan expressed concern as to exactly what topics he might discuss during an open session of the Senate Select Committee and it was explained to him that he should contact Section Chief William O. Cregar of the Intelligence Division who would appropriately advise him concerning this area. Brennan asked if SA Daly would have Cregar contact him concerning this matter and stated he could be reached at telephone number 790-6132. Cregar was appropriately advised of the aforementioned and indicated he would contact Brennan.

RECOMMENDATION:

ST. 114 REC-20 62 116395-805

OCT 1 1975

That former Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan be released from his employment agreement and the applicable sections of the Code of Federal Regulations for purposes of giving testimony before the Senate Select Committee.

OK JBA

1 - Personnel File - Charles D. Brennan

PVD:lad
(8)

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 OCT 6 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.,
BARRY GOLDWATER, AR
CHARLES MC C. MATHIA , MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER,
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 22, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Senstudy - 75

Dear Mike:

I have previously requested a list of all domestic targets (American citizens and groups) of surreptitious entries conducted by the FBI. In view of the Committee's decision to hold hearings this week on the "Huston Plan," I wish to make the following request in this area:

1. Statistics on the volume of such surreptitious entries in inclusive categories such as "subversives," "white hate," "organized crime," or "miscellaneous." These statistics should be cleared for public disclosure.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cjk

2. Committee access at FBI headquarters to a complete list of specific targets, represented by the statistics in Item 1. above.

3. Delivery to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the list of specific targets requested for access in Item 2. above.

I hope that the above materials can be prepared by tomorrow, Tuesday, September 23, 1975. The Committee needs them in order to be prepared for the hearings on Thursday, September 25, 1975. Thank you for your assistance on this matter.

ST. 114 REC-61 62-116395-804

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

OCT 2 1975

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

1-Ad Hoc
9-30-75

Treat as original

5 - Phillips

"Do not fit" imprecise
Are records imprecise
recollections
Stats - targets are
approximations

SE solely for install. of elect. surv.
(if only bug) not covered
if bug and search, explain
Separate document.

SWP – 12
KKK – 1

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRM[illegible]

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. — HOWARD H. BAKE[illegible]
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. — BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. — CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. — RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDRICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

#13

September 22, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

I have previously requested a list of all domestic targets (American citizens and groups) of surreptitious entries conducted by the FBI. In view of the Committee's decision to hold hearings this week on the "Huston Plan," I wish to make the following request in this area:

1. Statistics on the volume of such surreptitious entries in inclusive categories such as "subversives," "white hate," "organized crime," or "miscellaneous." These statistics should be cleared for public disclosure.

Committee access at FBI headquarters to a complete list of specific targets, represented by the statistics in Item 1. above.

3. Delivery to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the list of specific targets requested for access in Item 2. above.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

I hope that the above materials can be prepared by tomorrow, Tuesday, September 23, 1975. The Committee needs them in order to be prepared for the hearings on Thursday, September 25, 1975. Thank you for your assistance on this matter.

ST. 114 REC-61 62-116395-

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

OCT 2 1975

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

LAH 9-30-75

Treat as original

1 - Mr. J. [illegible]. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Attorney General

September 18, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cljk

Enclosed for your information is a memorandum with its enclosure concerning an interview by an SSC Staff Member of retired FBI Assistant Director Joseph K. Ponder. A copy of the memorandum with its enclosure is also being furnished for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
        Special Counsel for
        Intelligence Coordination

ST 114 REC-7 62-11[illegible]-803

1 - 67- (Personnel file Former AD Joseph K. Ponder)

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

OCT 2 1975

SFP:eks
(11)

UNREC COPY FILED IN

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

S.F. Phillips 4063

84 OCT 6 1975

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

September 18, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOSEPH K. PONDER BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/18/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

Set out below is information concerning an interview of former FBI Assistant Director Joseph K. Ponder by an SSC Staff Member.

On August 28, 1975, Ponder telephonically contacted FBI Headquarters from California and advised that he had been contacted by one Mike Epstein who identified himself as a Staff Member of the SSC. Epstein indicated he wanted to interview Ponder regarding the Martin Luther King, Jr., case. Ponder advised that he was Special Agent in Charge in the Atlanta, Georgia, Field Office during the King investigation and indicated that Epstein was to recontact him in Los Angeles on August 30, 1975. Ponder's call to the FBI was at 10:30 p.m. and he requested any advice the Bureau might have regarding such an interview.

On the following day, August 29, 1975, Ponder telephonically contacted the Legal Counsel Division of the FBI concerning a contemplated interview of Ponder by Epstein

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___
MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1 - 67- (Personnal file Former AD Joseph K. Ponder)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

SFP:eks
(10)

WRW/TAL

WOC/18

SEE NOTE PAGES 2 & 3

ENCLOSURE 62-116395

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

on Sunday, August 31, 1975. Ponder was advised that the FBI was waiving his secrecy agreement for purpose of the interview, but only as it concerned a discussion of matters relating to the King investigation. Ponder was additionally advised that he should not furnish information which would identify confidential sources, disclose sensitive methods or investigative techniques, jeopardize ongoing investigations, or violate third agency commitments. Ponder was told that if he had any questions regarding the proper scope of the interview, he could further consult with FBI Headquarters by collect call.

Attached herewith is a memorandum prepared by Ponder and voluntarily furnished by him to the Los Angeles Field Office of the FBI. His memorandum reports the interview of him by Epstein.

Enclosure

NOTE:

Telephonic contacts between Ponder and FBIHQ are set forth in memorandum 8/28/75 from T. W. Leavitt to Mr. W. R. Wannall and memorandum 8/29/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, both memoranda concerning SENSTUDY 75. The Legal Counsel Division advice to Ponder was given by Inspector J. B. Hotis.

The LHM we are furnishing the Department was received by Los Angeles airtel 9/5/75 which contained the following additional significant information. Ponder dictated to the Los Angeles Office the following impressions for the Bureau's information:

"Following this interview and upon further reflection I believe Atlanta did have some coverage on King at the time I arrived in Atlanta. I believe that

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3

NOTE CONTINUED:
coverage was on his home as opposed to the coverage on his offices at Southern Christian Leadership Conference which we obtained while I was there.

"Based on my brief discussion with Epstein and his manner in making the appointment, I had the feeling that his interview of me was arranged over the Labor Day weekend to suit his personal convenience or to fit his personal travel plans. He was pleasant, low-keyed, and not at all aggressive or probing and I had the impression that he learned nothing during the interview that he had not known before. I told him on several occasions during the interview that my memory of this ten year old matter is very poor, that he should rely on the records made at the time for a more accurate account.

"I also had the impression that he is pursuing leads based on material furnished to him by Sullivan."

The foregoing impressions of Ponder are not being included in the material being furnished to the Department as it appears obvious Ponder intended this information for the exclusive information of the Bureau.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California

September 5, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR JOSEPH K. PONDER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 28, 1975, I received a call from Mike Epstein of the Staff of the Senate Select Committee. He said he planned to be in Southern California on Labor Day weekend and asked whether I would be available for interview on Sunday, August 31, 1975. I told him I would. Epstein subsequently called me on August 30 and agreed to meet me at my home at San Clemente on Sunday afternoon, August 31, 1975.

The interview with Epstein took place between 3:40 pm and 4:05 pm. This included the time spent in amenities and general conversation.

Regarding my Bureau background Epstein asked during what period of time I was Special Agent in Charge in Atlanta. I told him from April or May 1964 to December 1966. He asked where I had been assigned before that (Buffalo) and where I went after leaving Atlanta (New York). He asked no other questions about my Bureau career. He asked if I were aware of telephone taps maintained by the Atlanta Office on Martin Luther King. I replied that I was aware of certain taps placed and removed during my tenure in Atlanta. He asked if there were such coverage before I arrived in Atlanta and I told him I was not aware of any. In response to these and other subsequent questions I pointed out to Epstein that I had not been personally involved in the King matter, that I had various other responsibilities in Atlanta and that after ten years I cannot now clearly recall information which might answer his questions. I told him that everything that was done was properly recorded, that the records were accurate, and wherever my recollection differs from the record, he should rely on the record to determine what happened.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-863

He asked whether the request for the King coverage originated at the Bureau or in Atlanta. I told him I did not recall, but that in any case it was approved by the Bureau. He asked where it was monitored and I told him the monitoring was done in an apartment rented for that purpose. He asked if I knew the name in which the apartment was rented and I said I did not. He asked why the taps were discontinued and I told him I do not now recall whether I was told why they were discontinued, but if I were I cannot now recall the reason. He asked whether we had a bug on King as opposed to a tap and I told him, "no." He asked whether it were possible there were taps and bugs placed and maintained without my knowledge. I told him that was not possible because of the size of the office and the relationship I had with the supervisors and Agents that nothing was done without my knowledge or without Bureau approval.

Epstein asked whether we had conducted any Counterintelligence Program against King or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and I told him I recalled none. He asked whether we had made efforts to prevent King from receiving the Nobel Prize or efforts to interfere with or make more difficult the raising of funds for a banquet to honor King for his receipt of the Nobel Prize. I told him I knew of no such efforts.

He asked whether Sullivan (Assistant Director William C. Sullivan) had visited Atlanta. I told him Sullivan had been to Atlanta in connection with a regional conference dealing with the Bureau's investigation of the Klan. He wanted to know if Baumgartner had been with Sullivan and I told him I thought so. He asked who else had accompanied Sullivan and I told him Arbor Gray had accompanied Sullivan and perhaps someone else whose name I cannot now recall. He asked whether Sullivan had met with Ralph Magill (then publisher of the Atlanta Constitution). I told him Sullivan may have met with Magill, that I may have accompanied Sullivan to Magill's office, but I cannot specifically recall such a meeting and if it were held I cannot recall anything discussed. He asked the purpose of such a meeting and I told him if such a meeting took place it was in the nature of a social call with Sullivan paying his respects to Magill and a public relations-type of meeting. He asked whether there was any discussion between Sullivan and Magill regarding any anti-King activities and I told him, "no." He asked whether Sullivan had made any other visits to Atlanta and I told him I knew of none.

He asked whether I was aware of any inquiry made by the Bureau into the handling of the King investigation either through the Inspection Staff or otherwise. I told him I was not aware of any. He asked whether Nichols, the Agent assigned to the King investigation had been in Atlanta while I was there. I told him I had hazy recall of Nichols, but did not recall him. He asked the same thing about Al Sentinella. I told him Sentinella was there when I arrived and was still there when I left Atlanta. He asked who had supervised the Security Squad. I told him Supervisor Charles Harding.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

9/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

The Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Member of former Assistant Director Joseph K. Ponder

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Surveillance, electronic

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/18/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395

FMK:lhb
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5-WOC 18

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 9/17/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 9/16/75, Paul Wallach, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, advised that he desired to interview SA Homer W. Schweppe of the Washington Field Office concerning his knowledge on mail openings. Wallach requested that SA Schweppe be made available Tuesday, 9/23/75, at 10 a.m.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That any existing employment agreement be waived for purposes of an interview with SA Schweppe by the Senate Select Committee.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division advise SA Schweppe of the request for interview.

ST 114 REC-20 62-116395-802

(3) That the Legal Counsel Division will orally advise the Committee of the whereabouts of SA Schweppe and arrange for the interview.

21 OCT 1 1975

1 - Personnel File - Homer W. Schweppe

lad
(9)

84 6 1975

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 9/17/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On 9/16/75, James Dick of the Senate Select Committee requested that former Liaison Officer William McDonnell be made available for Staff interview concerning his knowledge on the FBI's use of the NSA Watch List for monitoring of international communications and mail openings. McDonnell has subsequently advised that he was contacted by Dick and asked to make himself available for interview concerning the aforementioned matters. McDonnell requested that the Bureau advised him whether he was released to testify concerning these particular matters. He was advised that appropriate clearance would be sought and he would be notified when this clearance is obtained. It was also pointed out to former SA McDonnell that mail openings is currently under inquiry by the Department for possible criminal culpability and that since his appearance was a voluntary one, he should give some consideration to this particular aspect of the interview. He was informed that the Legal Counsel Division would afford him a briefing concerning his rights before hand. He indicated that he would like a briefing.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

ST. 114 REC-61 62-116395-801

(1) That McDonnell be released from any existing employment agreement for purposes of this interview by the Senate Select Committee.

OCT 1 1975

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division will contact McDonnell and advise him when appropriate clearance has been received.

1 - Personnel File - William McDonnell

PVD:lad LAD
(8)

84 6 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 9/17/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/rlj

On 9/16/75, a meeting was held in the office of Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department. Present at the meeting were Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.; his Deputy, Steven Blackhurst; John T. Elliff, Director of the Domestic Task Force of the Senate Select Committee; Mark Gitenstein, Senate Select Committee Staff Member; Section Chief William O. Cregar; Unit Chief Elmer Larson, and SA Paul V. Daly. During the meeting, Elliff announced that the Committee had set forth a schedule of hearings in which the Bureau will be involved peripherally and/or as the principal topic. The following is a list of the hearing topics in the order in which they will be held.

(1) Hearings concerning NSA. (Bureau's involvement in the NSA Watch List will be covered in this hearing.)

(2) Review of IRS intelligence operations. (Bureau's dissemination and receipt of information from IRS will be reviewed during this hearing and there is a possibility that one Bureau witness may be called, the identity of which is not known.)

(3) Mail Surveillance. (This will be covered in public and executive hearings.)

(4) Huston Plan. (While this will deal basically with the White House, Bureau documents will be used during this hearing and a Bureau witness could be called.)

(5) Overview Day. (One day of hearings is going to be devoted to giving an overview on the Senate's inquiry into domestic intelligence matters principally involving in the FBI.)

ST 114 REC-7 62-116395-800

OCT 1 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

↓ ↓

PVD:lad
(8)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

84 OCT 6 1975

(6) Scope of investigations and emergency detention plans. (The Bureau will be the principal topic of this hearing.)

(7) Informant matters. (The Bureau will be the principal topic of this hearing.)

(8) Martin Luther King, Jr., Investigation. (The Bureau will be the principal topic of this hearing.)

(9) COINTELPRO. (The Bureau will be the principal topic of this hearing.)

(10) A review of the Bureau filing system and the official and confidential files. (Elliff stated this hearing would be similar to the Bureau's appearance and testimony before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, on February 27, 1975.)

(11) Bureau's involvement in the Fred Hampton Black Panther Party in Chicago, Illinois. (The Bureau will be the principal topic of this hearing.)

Elliff indicated that the Bureau will ordinarily be given transcripts of what witnesses have furnished the Committee concerning the topic of the hearing prior to the hearing and will be given a list of documents which will be used during the particular hearing prior to that hearing. Gitenstein stated that this was intended so that the Bureau could be responsive to questions asked during the particular hearing. Additionally, Gitenstein indicated that the Bureau will be requested from time to time to declassify documents and that this will be done by making the request ten days, if possible, prior to the Committee's intended use.

Elliff in a subsequent conversation indicated that this procedure had not been worked out by the Committee and that there were many options being considered concerning the declassification matter. One of the means being discussed by the Committee is to have a suitably paraphrased substitute for the document to be used in hearings.

CONTINUED - OVER

↓ ↓

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

We have previously been advised that the main Bureau hearings will not commence until after the Columbus Day recess for the Congress which would be approximately October 16th.

RECOMMENDATION:

You will be advised of future developments concerning Bureau testimony before this Committee.

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/ely

9/12/75

~~Attached teletype a~~dvises former Special Agent Sam J. Papich has been requested to make himself available for interview by Departmental attorneys 9/18/75 and is to be subpoenaed to testify before the Senate Select Committee on 9/22/75. The topic of both interviews will be mail openings involving CIA and the FBI.

Legal Counsel Division recommends that former SA Papich be released from existing employment agreement and the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations for purposes of this interview.

Legal Counsel Division will telephonically contact Papich and insure he is aware of his rights, of the Departmental inquiry concerning mail openings, and of the legal ramifications any statement he may make concerning mail openings. He will be advised at this time he is not under legal complusion to submit to interview. Thus, whether he chooses to be interviewed is a decision he will have to make.

Enclosure

Find out if Dept [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] OK.

2 - Intelligence Division
(1 - S. F. Phillips)
1 - Personnel File - Sam J. Papich

PVD:lad
(8)

Duly advised Pap

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 11

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

NR001 AQ CODE

10:00AM URGENT 9/11/75 MC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/ely

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM ALBUQUERQUE

ATTENTION SECTION CHIEF W. O. CREGAR, INTD

SENSTUDY - 75

ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1975, SAM J. PAPICH, FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, NOW RESIDING ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO, ADVISED HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY A MR. WALLACH, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND WAS ADVISED BY WALLACH THAT HE HAS BEEN SUBPOENAED TO TESTIFY BEFORE ABOVE COMMITTEE AT WASHINGTON, D.C., ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975. PAPICH ADVISED HE WAS TOLD TO BE PREPARED TO TESTIFY FOR APPROXIMATELY EIGHT HOURS UNDER OATH CONCERNING "THE MAIL PROBLEM". PAPICH EXPECTS TO ARRIVE WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 21, 1975, AND WILL PROBABLY STAY AT STATLER.

PAPICH ALSO ADVISED THAT HE WAS CONTACTED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT AND ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR PAPICH TO BE INTERVIEWED ALBUQUERQUE ON SEPTEMR 18, 1975, BY DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEYS PAUL BOUSCHER AND (FNU) MALONE. ACCORDING TO PAPICH THIS INTERVIEW CONCERNS HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ROCKEFELLER COMMITTEE.

ST. 114 REC-7 62-116395-799

17 SEP 30 1975

END.

AJN FBIHQ CLR TU

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 OCT 6 1975

[redacted]

[redacted]

1 - [redacted]nall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

Mr. W. R. Wannall

9/12/75

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

F. J. Cassidy

COINTELPROS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

This is to identify a total of 76 serials which were delivered on 9/9/75 and 9/11/75 to staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) for retention in SSC offices.

Arthur Harrigan, SSC staff member, requested on 9/5/75 that the serials be re-excised for delivery after having been reviewed by SSC staff members in Room 4171, JEH. Harrigan's request, which consists of 76 serials, relates to an IRS survey which is being conducted by the Committee. Subsequent to the request for delivery, the serials were re-excised by personnel of the respective Sections in accordance with current guidelines relating to excisions for delivery. Excisions in each serial, prior to being made available for delivery, were approved for passage by the appropriate Section Chief.

A total of 31 serials were delivered on 9/9/75 by Supervisor William Fallin to staff member Walter Ricks. The 31 serials consisted of 23 relating to White Hate matters, three relating to SWP, and five regarding the Black Extremists Staff member James Dick, on 9/11/75, accepted delivery of a total of 45 serials from SA Don Pettus. Forty-one of the serials related to CPUSA and the other four concerned New Left matters. The list indicating receipt by Ricks on 9/9/75 and Dick on 9/11/75 is attached.

A duplicate set of the 76 excised serials as delivered to SSC staff members is being maintained in one volume in Room 4426, JEH.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosure
62-116009
1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
1 - 100-448006 (Black Extremist)
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)
1 - 100-449698 (New Left)
1 - 100-436291 (SWP)
1 - 157-9 (White Hate)

DKP:lfj
(13)

NOT RECORDED
SEP 16 197

With regard to Item 24 of request #1, our indices contain no references to a Zelma Coolidge. One reference concerning a Tony Consiglio and one reference to a Sam Cravatta were located. A Xerox copy of each of these indices cards is being furnished.

With regard to Item 25 of request #1 which requested advice as to whether there is any information contained in the John Rosselli electronic surveillance logs concerning 18 individuals or situations, a check of our electronic surveillance indices revealed references to three of the individuals; namely, Sam Giancana, Frank Sinatra, and Robert Maheu, as having been overheard through electronic surveillance coverage on John Rosselli. Without further advice as to the identity of "any White House person" or "any DOJ person" no logical search of electronic surveillance indices can be made.

With regard to Item 26 of request #1 in which you requested to be advised if six individuals had been the subject of electronic surveillance, our files reveal that two of the six named were the subjects of such coverage; namely, Sam Giancana and Santos Trafficante.

In view of the fact that some of the information contained in the material being furnished originates from sensitive FBI sources in the criminal field and because of privacy considerations of individuals referred to in this material, it is requested that access be restricted to those persons having an absolute need to know.

1 - The Attorney General

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
9/9/75

1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

Mr. W. R. Wannall

F. J. Cassidy

COINTELPROS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY 3P2ALM/clg

This is to identify additional copies of excised serials which are being made available in Room 4171, JEH Building, for review by staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The copies have been excised to protect sensitive sources and delete information from other agencies where there were sensitivities.

Each serial is approved for passage by the Section Chief prior to its being made available for review to members of the SSC staff in Room 4171.

A total of 258 copies of excised serials regarding CPUSA were made available to SSC on 8/19/75; 114 copies of serials relating to CPUSA were made available on 9/2/75. The initial 258, which consist of four volumes, and the latter 114 copies, which consist of two volumes, are being maintained in Room 4426, JEH.

ACTION:

None. For information.

62-116009

1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)
1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)

DKP:lfj
(8)

62-116395-

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. F. Cassidy
9/15/75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by an SSC Staff Member of FBI Special Agent Fred J. Cassidy. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-20 62-116395-797

1 - 67- (Personnel file SA Fred J. Cassidy)

OCT 2 1975

SFP:bkb
(11)

ST 114

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/02 BY SP2ALM/[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

WOC/8

JBA/pcm

84 OCT 6 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. F. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/blj

September 15, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
FRED J. CASSIDY BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information concerning an interview of FBI SA Fred J. Cassidy by a Staff Member of the SSC. Cassidy is currently assigned to FBI Headquarters. The details of the interview are as furnished by Cassidy.

On advance notice from Mr. Loch Johnson, SSC Staff Member, Cassidy was advised that he was to be interviewed on August 20, 1975. Cassidy was informed by the Legal Counsel Division of the FBI that he was being released from any applicable employment agreement for purposes of the SSC interview concerning the Huston Plan. It was explained to Cassidy that he had a right to counsel; however, the FBI was unable to provide private counsel. Cassidy was also told that there were certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions. These areas concern information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and information which had originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Cassidy was informed that if a question arose during the interview in one of these areas, he had the privilege, before replying, of consulting with an FBI representative.

The following is a first-person statement prepared by Cassidy reporting the interview of him.

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

1 - 67- (Personnel file SA Fred J. Cassidy)

SFP:bkbbkb
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 6

WRW/TAL

WOC

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
FRED J. CASSIDY BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 20, 1975, Mr. Loch Johnson of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC) staff interviewed me in my office, Room 4821, JEH Building, concerning my knowledge of, and participation in, the so-called "Huston Plan."

Mr. Johnson did not place me under oath or advise me of my rights.

He asked about my background which I provided, including the fact that I have been a Special Agent of the FBI since August 7, 1950.

With regard to the extent of my participation in the Huston Plan, I advised Mr. Johnson that I was selected by former Assistant Director William C. Sullivan to act as the liaison officer for the plan, probably because of my experience in the FBI Domestic Liaison Section and my extensive liaison contacts through my participation in the various United States Intelligence Board (USIB) Committees. My duties with regard to the Huston Plan were to insure that appropriate notification of meetings was made and that the various papers prepared as the result of meetings held were delivered to the proper individuals in the other agencies participating in the plan. Some of the papers were delivered personally by me, others were sent by courier.

I advised Mr. Johnson that I was generally aware of the contents of the papers prepared through my attendance at the meetings of the working group and discussions with participating personnel; however, I personally made no input nor did I participate in the preparation of the workpapers or the finished product.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
FRED J. CASSIDY BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Johnson asked if I had met Tom Charles Huston prior to the initial meeting of the Huston Plan working group. I advised him that I had never heard of Huston prior to the mentioning of his name by W. C. Sullivan at the initial meeting of FBI personnel involved in the Huston Plan, which meeting occurred early in June, 1970, and had never seen him until the first meeting of the working group held at CIA Headquarters, Langley, Virginia, shortly thereafter.

Mr. Johnson asked about the initial meeting of FBI personnel concerning the Huston Plan. I told him it was held in Mr. Sullivan's conference room in the Federal Triangle Building and that as best as I could recall it was attended by Mr. Sullivan and the branch Inspectors of the Intelligence Division as well as the Section Chiefs. Sullivan told us of the plan and as I recall indicated this was a golden opportunity to regain the coverage afforded by techniques, which had been denied us for the most part, since 1967. I told him that in my view Sullivan was going to make this one last effort to regain the coverage and if this effort failed was prepared to retire.

Mr. Johnson asked if former Inspector T. J. Smith was at this meeting. I told him I could not recall.

The initial meeting of the Ad Hoc group at CIA was discussed and I advised him that, as I recalled, at that meeting it was decided that each participating agency would submit a paper listing the restraints on their particular agency which were hampering them in doing their job. I pointed out that the FBI submitted an extensive list of restraints and that this paper was circulated to the other participating agencies without being cleared through Mr. Hoover.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
FRED J. CASSIDY BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Mr. Johnson asked if I was aware of who was the instigator of the Huston Plan. I told him I had no direct knowledge but would suspect it was W. C. Sullivan, Huston, or possibly former Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian; however, the answer to his question would have to be obtained from those individuals or such records as he may be able to locate.

He asked my impression of Tom Charles Huston. I told him I felt Huston was a very bright young man who saw this plan as an opportunity to become the Henry Kissinger of domestic security and thereby enhance himself and his political career.

Mr. Johnson stated that his investigation had developed that Sullivan at the outset of the plan appeared to want to push through the plan; however, he seemed to take a direct turnabout and began to advise Mr. Hoover against adopting some of the proposals being made by the various participating agencies. He said it was his impression that this turnabout occurred at the time Sullivan was promoted to Number Three Man in the Bureau. He asked if I could shed any light on this turn of events.

I told Mr. Johnson that I could not speak for Sullivan and could only give him my impression of what occurred, that being at the outset of the plan Sullivan truly felt this was a golden opportunity to get the coverage back, and decided to lay his job on the line to accomplish this. When he was moved up to the Number Three job, I felt he saw the opportunity to someday become the Director of the FBI. Further, as the drafts of the plan were being written, Sullivan realized that sooner or later Mr. Hoover would see them and at that time realize that Sullivan had disseminated to the intelligence community all of the restraints Mr. Hoover had imposed on the FBI.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
FRED J. CASSIDY BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Sullivan then tried to have the other agencies listed as the agencies which submitted the restraints. Having accomplished this, he was then in a position to advise Mr. Hoover that this or that was not wise or necessary. When the final report was prepared, the FBI then footnoted most of the recommendations as opposing them.

Mr. Johnson said he had been advised by Mr. Helms and Admiral Gaylor that the final draft which they reviewed prior to going to Mr. Hoover's office to sign it did not contain the footnotes and that they were not aware that the FBI was objecting to the recommendations until they saw the final version of the report in Mr. Hoover's office.

I told him that I cannot specifically recall what was in the final draft; however, I was aware that all of the working group was aware of the FBI position as it was so stated at the meeting in which the draft was hammered out. I told him I specifically recalled this as it had put Mr. Sullivan in a most embarrassing position. At one point when asked why a change was to be made or why the FBI was going to object, Sullivan responded with words to the effect that because Mr. Hoover said so.

Mr. Johnson asked why covert mail coverage was listed as a restraint as CIA was engaged in such coverage in 1970. I told him I was not in a position to discuss CIA operations with him. He also asked about the removal of restrictions or use of surreptitious entries to obtain cryptographic materials. I told him I was not free to discuss such activity with him.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
FRED J. CASSIDY BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

NOTE:

Legal Counsel Division advice to Cassidy was given by Supervisor P. V. Daly.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

September 11, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

Reference is made to prior FBI communications which have, on a continuing basis, effected delivery to the SSC of materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and responsive to SSC requests dated July 8 and 14, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum in further response to the aforementioned July 14, 1975, SSC request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

REC-7 62-116395-196

ST 114

62-116395

OCT 2 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

10-ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

SFP:eks
(9)

NOTE: A copy of the 7/14/75 SSC request is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

~~ROUTE IN ENVELOPE~~

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 OCT 6 1975

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. [illegible]intz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

September 11, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Reference is made to the letter from the Chairman of the SSC to the Attorney General dated August 28, 1975, requesting delivery of previously requested FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. Reference is also made to prior FBI communications which have, on a continuing basis, effected delivery to the SSC of materials concerning King and responsive to SSC requests dated July 8 and 14, 1975.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the SSC request dated July 14, 1975, and specifically, to the following Items in this request: 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, and 22.

Materials relating to Items 16, 18 and 22 are being delivered with this memorandum.

In respect to Items 3, 4 and 6, we are delivering two documents dated October 15 and 18, 1963. We have been, however, unable to locate from a review of logical FBI files, any further documentation which would be responsive to the SSC inquiries in Items 3, 4 and 6.

In respect to Item 11, we are delivering two documents dated November 22 and 27, 1964, concerning the 1964 revision of a 1963 FBI monograph. The November 27, 1964, document is also responsive to Item 12.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

SFP:eks
(8)

[redacted]

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

In respect to Items 14 and 15, we are delivering a document dated December 17, 1964. As indicated on page 2 of this document, it was approved for Mr. Sullivan by someone whose initials appear to the right of "WCS/." Although we cannot say with absolute certainty who that person might have been, the initials appear to be those of former FBI Special Agent (SA) Daniel J. Brennan. Former SA E. R. Clayton approved the communication for Mr. Tolson. Notations on page 2 indicate that Mr. Belmont approved it and also advised FBI Director Hoover of its contents on December 18, presumably 1964. No written approval by Mr. Hoover is noted.

In respect to Item 21, we are delivering a document dated August 24, 1967. We have previously furnished the SSC, by memorandum dated June 24, 1975, and subtitled "Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance," an excised copy of the August 24, 1967, document. The copy which is now being delivered contains certain administrative data which had been excised on previous delivery. However, those excisions remaining relate to the substance of the memorandum and were made to protect the identity of a representative of a friendly foreign intelligence service, the name of that service and the name of the country involved.

With respect to the excisions in materials being delivered herewith, where no notation appears as to reason for excision, the excision was made for the reason that the information actually summarizes or quotes from conversations monitored during electronic surveillances of King. In some cases, it can be ascertained precisely what information in FBI files came from electronic surveillances of Dr. King; however, there exist areas where documentation of the information is not precise and no accurate determination can be made. Therefore, no assurances can be given that portions of the material being furnished do not contain information developed as a result of electronic surveillances of King.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

The remaining materials in the SSC requests relating to King are receiving continuous attention and the results will be forwarded on a periodic basis as soon as possible.

1 - The Attorney General

Appeal

CASE STATUS COVER SHEET

FOIA NUMBER: 1013889-001

SUBJECT(s) Sullivan, William C
(1963 Speech)

HQ ____ OR FO ____ If applicable FO INITIALS ____

EMAILED FIELD OFFICE TO REQUEST SEARCH Date: ________

Manual Search Needed? YES/NO

Files Ordered: Date: ________ Total Ordered: ________

Miscellaneous Notes RE: CASE

Order Files -

8/3/07 File HQ 62-116395 -

[illegible] file

King

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

[illegible] A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 14, 1975

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/ely

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Reference is made to your letter of July 8, 1975, transmitting certain materials relating to the Martin Luther King, Jr. monographs.

We would appreciate being supplied the following additional items in response to Appendix D, Item 9, of the Committee's letter of May 14, 1975:

1. All materials refelcting the earlier recommendation and approval which are indicated in the first sentence of Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.

2. The identity of the author of the monograph which was attached to Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.

3. All materials which reflect or relate to Mr. Sullivan's instructions to subordinates concerning the preparation of the 1963 monograph.

4. All materials which reflect or relate to the transmission of the monograph to Mr. Sullivan from subordinates prior to Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.

5. All materials which reflect Mr. Tolson's transmission to the Director of Mr. Belmont's memorandum of October 17, 1963.

Encl-2
9/11/75

Ltr to AG
cc DAG
SFO/eke

RECEIVED
JUL 14 1975
KWIC

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-796

6. All materials which reflect what transpired between the Director's approval of Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum, and the transmission of Mr. Sullivan's October 18, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.

7. A xerox of the original of the Director's November 17, 1963 memorandum to Mssrs. Tolson, Belmont, De Loach, Rosen, and Sullivan.

8. A xerox of the original of the director's February 5, 1964 memorandum to Mssrs. Tolson, Belmont, Rosen, Sullivan, De Loach, and Evans.

9. Access to the original memoranda from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont, dated:

    a. November 22, 1964;

    b. November 27, 1964.

10. The identity of the author of the 1964 "up-to-date revision" of the 1963 monograph.

11. All materials which reflect or relate to Mr. Sullivan's instructions to subordinates in 1964 to revise the 1963 monograph.

12. All materials which transmitted for approval and/or signature the December 1, 1964 letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers.

13. All materials which reflect the approval of Mr. Belmont, Mr. Tolson, and/or the Director of:

    a. Recommendations contained in Mr. Sullivan's November 22, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont;

    b. Recommendations contained in Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont;

    c. The December 1, 1964 letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers.

14. Access to the second page (unexcised) of the December 17, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan.

15. All materials reflecting the approval of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Belmont, Mr. Tolson, and/or the Director of the recommendation contained in Mr. Baumgardner's December 17, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan.

16. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to the preparation of a memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which is referred to and was apparently enclosed with, the Director's December 21, 1964 letter to Senator Humphrey. (Please do not supply the memorandum.)

17. The identity of the author of the memorandum described in item #16 above and of any other similar memoranda.

18. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to the dissemination to Senator Humphrey of the memorandum described in item #16 and which relate to any other dissemination of the said memorandum or any other similar memorandum.

19. The identity of the author of the 1967 revision of the Martin Luther King, Jr. monograph.

20. All material which reflect or relate to Mr. Sullivan's and/or Mr. C. D. Brennan's instructions to subordinates in 1967 to revise any earlier Martin Luther King, Jr. monograph.

21. Access to an unexcised copy of the August 24, 1967 memorandum from Mr. C. D. Brennan to Mr. Sullivan.

22. All materials reflecting Mr. Tolson's suggestion, and the Director's agreement, that the King monograph be brought up to date in 1968, as indicated in the February 29, 1968 memorandum from Mr. G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 9/11/75

Caption of Document: Re let from Chairman 8/28/75 requesting delivery of previously requested FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. Items 3,4,6,11,12,14,15,16,18,21, and 22.

Originating Office: FBI 5 25 P

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Jr. Date: 9/12/75

Received by: WMeecham

Title: Exec. Sec.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/ch

62-116395-1196

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

9/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum and enclosures

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letters 8/28/75, 7/14/75, Items 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21 and 22

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

S

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr: monographs and interoffice memoranda

62-116395

FMK:lhb
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5-WOC

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

SSC LETTER 7/14/75
ITEMS 3, 4, and 6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

RETAIN

62-116395-776

ENCLOSURE

FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont DATE: 10-15-63

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: COMMUNISM AND THE NEGRO MOVEMENT--
A CURRENT ANALYSIS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY [illegible]

The enclosed article, captioned as above, is the one we have been preparing in line with approval of our recommendation to disseminate it on a select basis at a very high level to show current communist activities in relation to the Negro movement. It incorporates up-to-date material just received from our New York Office relating to the recent meeting of the Communist Party's National Executive Committee. Discussion of racial matters was a primary topic at the week-long meeting.

The enclosed article is a factual, documented analysis of the over-all current situation. We believe that it would be of interest not only to the Attorney General but also to Mr. O'Donnell, at the White House; Mr. McCone, at the Central Intelligence Agency; Mr. Rusk, at the Department of State; as well as to Mr. McNamara and the three Armed Forces intelligence agencies of the Defense Department. Accordingly, if the article as prepared is approved, we propose to disseminate it to the afore-mentioned individuals and agencies.

RECOMMENDATION:

ENC

That the enclosed article be approved. If approved, it should be returned to the Domestic Intelligence Division for preparation of appropriate letters of transmittal.

Enc.

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Research - Satellite Section

CDB:dww
(6)

REC 7

O.K.

OCT 23 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

TO : A. H. Belmont DATE: 10-18-63

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: COMMUNISM AND THE NEGRO MOVEMENT-- A CURRENT ANALYSIS

5 -

Re my memo in captioned matter 10-15-63, attached, in which it was recommended and approved that we disseminate the prepared analysis regarding communist activities and the Negro movement on a select basis to individuals and agencies set forth in referenced memo.

Attached are appropriate letters of transmittal for dissemination. Through them, we are sending a copy of the analysis to the Attorney General, with a copy each for the Deputy Attorney General, and the Assistant Attorneys General Burke Marshall and J. Walter Yeagley. In addition, a copy is being sent as an enclosure to attached letters for P. Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President; the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; the Honorable John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence Agency; the Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, Director of Naval Intelligence; Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence; and Brigadier General John S. Samuel, Director of Special Investigations for the Air Force.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letters be approved and sent.

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures Sent 10-18-63

CDB:jej
(10)

WCS

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Bland
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. W. Smith
- 1 - Section tickler
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

REC 7 100-3-116-416

6 OCT 23 1963

78 NOV 6 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SSC LETTER 7/14/75
ITEMS 11 AND 12

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY

RETAIN
62-116395-796

ENCLOSURE

FORM NO. 10
EDITION
REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. [illegible]ont
1 - Mr. Mo.
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: November 22, 1964

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips

SUBJECT: COMMUNISM AND THE NEGRO MOVEMENT--A CURRENT ANALYSIS

Enclosed is a paper, captioned as above, which depicts the communist influence in the Negro movement with emphasis on Martin Luther King, Jr. This paper is an up-to-date revision of the one by the same title prepared under the date of October 16, 1963. In updating it we emphasized three main areas: (1) the continued dependence of King upon former Communist Party, USA members, current and former Party sympathizers and his continued reliance on the long-time communist [Stanley David Levison;] (2) facts relating to the moral degeneracy of King; and (3) the recent and current Party aims and activities relative to the racial movement.

RECOMMENDATION:

Upon approval, consideration will be given to appropriate dissemination.* When approved, the paper should be returned to the Domestic Intelligence Division for printing and the preparation of appropriate letters if disseminated.

Enclosure
SFP:kao
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/02 BY SP2ALM/ely

W.C.S.

* White House
Dept
State
CIA
Army, Navy, Air Force
USIA

REC-23 100-442529-504

Revised to Nov 27 in view of changes on [illegible]

12/2 Revised draft

11 DEC 10 1964

INT. SEC.

66DEC 15 1964

EX-1

ENCLOSURE

SENT DIRECTOR
FOR APPROVAL

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

R JTE IN ENVEL PE

ONAL FORM NO. 10
AY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Evans

Tolson	
Belmont	
Mohr	
DeLoach	
Casper	
Callahan	
Conrad	
Evans	
Gale	
Rosen	
Sullivan	
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Holmes	
Gandy	

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/27/64 REC 23

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. J. F. Bland
1 - Mr. F. J. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT: "COMMUNISM AND THE NEGRO MOVEMENT—A CURRENT ANALYSIS"

5 - Phillips

My memorandum to you 11/22/64 submitted for approval a paper, captioned as above which depicts the communist influence in the Negro movement with emphasis on Martin Luther King, Jr. We have added information on the last four lines, page four, top paragraph, to show that on 11/24/64 King contacted Clarence Jones and asked that Jones and Stanley Levison among others submit five-minute speeches which King could use in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize. King would select the best material from these speeches. Jones and Levison are key advisors to King.

I have checked with Mr. Mohr and Mr. DeLoach who have advised that they have read this paper.

It is contemplated that dissemination will be made under Monday's date (11/30/64), if approved, to the following individuals:

The Honorable Bill D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, The White House
The Acting Attorney General with copies to the Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General, and Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General
The Honorable Dean Rusk, The Secretary of State
The Honorable John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence Agency
The Honorable Carl T. Rowan, Director of United States Information Agency
The Honorable Robert S. McNamara, The Secretary of Defense
Major General Edgar C. Doleman, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Colonel Joseph J. Cappucci, Director of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force
Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY [illegible]

REC 23 100-442529-505

10 DEC 8 1964

100-442529
Enclosures - 10
SFP:jad:fhd (11)

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: "COMMUNISM AND THE NEGRO
MOVEMENT--A CURRENT ANALYSIS"
100-442529

Moyers letter revised
+ sent 12/1 –
others redacted +
sent out 12/7/64

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached transmittal letters be approved and sent.

see revised
letter to
Moyers 12-1

SSC LETTER 7/14/75
ITEMS 14 and 15

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

62-116395-716

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 12/17/64

1 - Liaison
1 - F. J. Baumgardner
1 - S. F. Phillips
1 - T. P. Rosack

FROM : F. J. Baumgardner FJB

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

This memorandum recommends that the National Science Foundation (NSF) be furnished information concerning the communist influence exerted on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and its President, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. This appears necessary since the SCLC has been contacted by the NSF for the purpose of obtaining applicants for southern schools.

AT 1382-S* has furnished information that Cordy T. Vivian, SCLC Director of Affiliates, was advised that the NSF desired qualified applicants to enter the University of Mississipp and other schools in southern states where the NSF has its program in progress. Vivian was advised that the NSF was contacting organizations such as the SCLC and other civil rights groups to handle the recruitment program for Negro students since they did not want it to appear that the NSF was attempting to put Negro applicants in southern schools.

Vivian was advised that each qualified applicant would receive a $3,000 scholarship from the NSF. Since this is a Government project any expenses incurred in this matter "would not come out of anyone's pocket." This would indicate that any expenses incurred by the SCLC in their recruitment effort would be paid for with Government funds.

The communist influences exerted on King are well known to the Bureau. Vivian has in the past been a member of the Communist Party.

OBSERVATIONS:

It is incredible that an outfit such as the SCLC should be utilized for the purpose of recruiting Negroes to take part in the NSF program, particularly where funds of the

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cbj

100-438794

REC- 16

Enclosure sent 12-23-64

11 DEC 23 1964

TPR:jad
(8)

CONTINUED OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

U. S. Government are involved. The Atlanta Office has recommended that Senator Richard Russell (D. Georgia) be advised concerning this matter. This appears inadvisable since such action could conceivably cause repercussions which would only aggravate the racial situation that exists in the South.

It is felt that Dr. Leland J. Haworth, Director, NSF, should be furnished information regarding communist influences exerted on the SCLC and King. In this regard we recently disseminated to the White House and the heads of the intelligence community copies of a "Top Secret" summary entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" which contains information regarding the SCLC and King. This summary deals with King's communist connections and his personal immoral activities. With the receipt of this summary by Dr. Haworth, the SCLC would undoubtedly be removed from the NSF program to obtain qualified Negro students for southern schools.

The information concerning the SCLC participation in the NSF program is being separately disseminated to the Department and interested intelligence agencies.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached for approval a letter to Dr. Leland J. Haworth, Director, NSF, transmitting a copy of the recently prepared summary entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis."

12/18

WCS

SSC LETTER 7/14/75
ITEM # 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

RETAIN

62-116395-736

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: 12/21/64

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

OC/RM

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

SUBJECT: "COMMUNISM AND THE NEGRO MOVEMENT--A CURRENT ANALYSIS"

By memorandum dated 11/27/64, which was approved, a paper captioned as above depicting the communist influence in the Negro movement, with emphasis on Martin Luther King, Jr., was disseminated to the heads of the intelligence community. We have received additional information concerning King's immoral conduct at Memphis, Tennessee, and at Oslo, Norway.

It is contemplated that dissemination of this additional information will be made, if approved, to the following individuals:

The Honorable Dean Rusk, The Secretary of State
The Honorable John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence Agency
The Honorable Carl T. Rowan, Director of United States Information Agency
The Honorable Robert S. McNamara, The Secretary of Defense
Major General Edgar C. Doleman, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Colonel Joseph J. Cappucci, Director of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force
Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Dr. Leland J. Haworth, Director, National Science Foundation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/02 BY SP2

100-442529

REC-21 100-442529-555

Enc. sent 12-21-64

DEC ~~26~~ 28 1964

TPR:rbm
(11)

CONTINUED - OVER

SENT DIRECTOR
12-21-64

ENCLOSURE

70 DEC 31 1964

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: "COMMUNISM AND THE NEGRO
MOVEMENT--A CURRENT ANALYSIS"
100-442529

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the attached transmittal letters directed to those listed above be approved and sent, enclosing a copy of a memorandum entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct."

2. Also attached is a letter to the Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice President Elect, to be delivered by a representative of Mr. DeLoach's office, furnishing a copy of captioned paper and the additional information regarding the Memphis and Oslo incidents.

MOYERS delivered 12/2/64 D.

3. In addition, attached are letters to Mr. Moyers at the White House and the Acting Attorney General (copies to Deputy Attorney General and AAG's Civil Rights and Internal Security Divisions) advising of the Memphis incident. Both the White House and Acting Attorney General have already been furnished the captioned paper and information concerning the Oslo incident.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen

December 21, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/cjj
ON 10/18/00

Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator: Cirm

I thought you would be interested in the enclosed study entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" as well as a memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which is an adjunct of the study. Copies of these documents have been furnished to interested officials of the Government.

The sources used in the enclosures have furnished reliable information in the past, and because of their sensitive nature, the documents have been classified "~~Top Secret.~~" Upon removal of the classified enclosures, this transmittal letter becomes unclassified.

100-442529-562

REC 4

Sincerely yours,

EX-112

DEC 30 1964

Enclosures (2)

100-442529
TPR:lat;jed
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~

JAN 5 1965

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey

NOTE:

See memorandum Sullivan to Belmont, 12/21/64, re "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis," TPR:rbm.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secre~~t" since the enclosures are so classified in order to fully protect the extremely sensitive sources involved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen

December 21, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/cj
ON 10/18/00

Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator:

I thought you would be interested in the enclosed study entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" as well as a memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which is an adjunct of the study. Copies of these documents have been furnished to interested officials of the Government.

The sources used in the enclosures have furnished reliable information in the past, and because of their sensitive nature, the documents have been classified "~~Top Secret.~~" Upon removal of the classified enclosures, this transmittal letter becomes unclassified.

100-442529-56

562

REC 4 Sincerely yours,

EX-112

DEC 30 1964

Enclosures (2)
100-442529
TPR:lat;jed
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~

JAN 5 1965

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey

NOTE:

See memorandum Sullivan to Belmont, 12/21/64, re "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis," TPR:rbm.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the enclosures are so classified in order to fully protect the extremely sensitive sources involved.

SSC LETTER 7/14/75
ITEM # 18

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/18/00 BY

RETAIN

62-1 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/cjs
ON 10/18/00

December 21, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

C IRM

Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

12/22/64 delivered OSH

Dear Mr. Rusk:

By letter dated November 30, 1964, you were furnished a copy of a study entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." There is enclosed a memorandum containing additional information relating to the personal conduct of Martin Luther King, Jr. Copies of this document are being furnished to interested officials of the Government.

The sources utilized in the enclosure have furnished reliable information in the past and because of their sensitive nature the memorandum has been classified "~~Top Secret~~." Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this transmittal letter becomes unclassified.

REC-111

Sincerely yours,

100-442529-540

21 DEC 22 1964

Enclosure

100-442529
TPR:jed (12)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

67 DEC 28 1964

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Honorable Dean Rusk

NOTE:

See memo W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont, dated 12/21/64, re "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis," TPR:rbm.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the enclosure is so classified in order to fully protect the extremely sensitive sources involved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

December 21, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/elj
ON 10/18/00

Honorable John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

By letter dated November 30, 1964, you were furnished a copy of a study entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." There is enclosed a memorandum containing additional information relating to the personal conduct of Martin Luther King, Jr. Copies of this document are being furnished to interested officials of the Government.

The sources utilized in the enclosure have furnished reliable information in the past and because of their sensitive nature the memorandum has been classified "~~Top Secret.~~" Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this transmittal letter becomes unclassified.

REC-11

Sincerely yours,

100-442529-554

6 DEC 23 1964

Enclosure

100-442529
TPR:jed (12)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

60 DEC 29 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Honorable John A. McCone

NOTE:

See memo W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont, dated 12/21/64, re "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis," TPR:rbm.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the enclosure is so classified in order to fully protect the extremely sensitive sources involved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

December 21, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

CIRM

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/clj
ON 10/18/00

Honorable Carl T. Rowan
Director
United States Information Agency
Room 432
1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Del Mr. Rowan's Sec 12/22/64

Dear Mr. Rowan:

By letter dated November 30, 1964, you were furnished a copy of a study entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." There is enclosed a memorandum containing additional information relating to the personal conduct of Martin Luther King, Jr. Copies of this document are being furnished to interested officials of the Government.

539

REC-47 100-442529-53

The sources utilized in the enclosure have furnished reliable information in the past and because of their sensitive nature the memorandum has been classified "~~Top Secret~~." Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this transmittal letter becomes unclassified.

21 DEC 22 1964

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

100-442529
TPR:jed (12)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
DeLoach ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

69 DEC 24 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-nel without the express approval of the FBI.

Honorable Carl T. Rowan

NOTE:

See memorandum Sullivan to Belmont dated 12/21/64 re "Communism and the Negro Movement-A Current Analysis," TPR:rbm.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the enclosure is so classified in order to fully protect the extremely sensitive sources involved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/eij
ON 10/18/00

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

December 21, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

C
CIRM

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McNamara:

By letter dated November 30, 1964, you were furnished a copy of a study entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." There is enclosed a memorandum containing additional information relating to the personal conduct of Martin Luther King, Jr. Copies of this document are being furnished to interested officials of the Government.

The sources utilized in the enclosure have furnished reliable information in the past and because of their sensitive nature the memorandum has been classified "~~Top Secret.~~" Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this transmittal letter becomes unclassified.

Sincerely yours,

REC-16 100-442529-541

21 DEC 22 1964

Enclosure

100-442529
TPR:jed (12)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

jed

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

~~TOP SECRET~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Delivered via Liaison 12/22/64

F B I
RECEIVED-DIRECTOR

67 DEC 28 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Honorable Robert S. McNamara

NOTE:

See memorandum Sullivan to Belmont dated 12/21/64 captioned "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis," TPR:rbm.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the enclosure is so classified in order to fully protect the extremely sensitive sources involved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

December 21, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/clj
ON 10/18/00

Major General Edgar C. Doleman
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Delivered to Mr. McDaley T.S. [illegible] 12/22/64

Dear General Doleman:

By letter dated November 30, 1964, you were furnished a copy of a study entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." There is enclosed a memorandum containing additional information relating to the personal conduct of Martin Luther King, Jr. Copies of this document are being furnished to interested officials of the Government.

The sources utilized in the enclosure have furnished reliable information in the past and because of their sensitive nature the memorandum has been classified "~~Top Secret~~." Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this transmittal letter becomes unclassified.

Sincerely yours,

REC-21 100-442529-549

DEC 23 1964

Enclosure
100-442529
TPR:jed (12)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
DeLoach ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Evans ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

67 DEC 29 1964

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Major General Edgar C. Doleman

NOTE:

See memo Sullivan to Belmont dated 12/21/64 captioned "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis," TPR:rbm.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the enclosure is so classified in order to fully protect the extremely sensitive sources involved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen

December 21, 1964

BY LIAISON

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/cbj
ON 10/18/00

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

CIRM

Dear Admiral Taylor:

By letter dated November 30, 1964, you were furnished a copy of a study entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." There is enclosed a memorandum containing additional information relating to the personal conduct of Martin Luther King, Jr. Copies of this document are being furnished to interested officials of the Government.

The sources utilized in the enclosure have furnished reliable information in the past and because of their sensitive nature, the memorandum has been classified "~~Top Secret~~." Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this transmittal letter becomes unclassified.

Sincerely yours,

100-442529-550

REC- 11

DEC 23 1964

Enclosure
100-442529
TPR:jed (12)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

6 DEC 29 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DEC 21 12 PM '64
F B I
RECEIVED-DIRECTOR

Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor

NOTE:

See memo W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont, dated 12/21/64, re "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis," TPR:rbm.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the enclosure is so classified in order to fully protect the extremely sensitive sources involved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/cb
ON 10/18/00

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen

December 21, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

BP

CIRM

Colonel Joseph J. Cappucci
Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Building Tempo E
Fourth and Adams Drive, Southwest
Washington, D.C.

To Col. Cappucci
12/22/64

Dear Colonel Cappucci:

By letter dated November 30, 1964, you were furnished a copy of a study entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." There is enclosed a memorandum containing additional information relating to the personal conduct of Martin Luther King, Jr. Copies of this document are being furnished to interested officials of the Government.

The sources utilized in the enclosure have furnished reliable information in the past and because of their sensitive nature, the memorandum has been classified "~~Top Secret.~~" Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this transmittal letter becomes unclassified.

Sincerely yours,

REC- 11 100-442529-551

DEC 23 1964

Enclosure

100-442529
TPR:jed (12)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

jed

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

60 DEC 29 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DEC 21 12 13 PM '64

RECEIVED DIRECTOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Colonel Joseph J. Cappucci

NOTE:

See memo Sullivan to Belmont Dated 12/21/64 re "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis," TPR:rbm.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the enclosure is so classified in order to fully protect the extremely sensitive sources involved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach

December 21, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

CC/RM

Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ej
ON 10/18/00

Dear General Carroll:

By letter dated November 30, 1964, you were furnished a copy of a study entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." There is enclosed a memorandum containing additional information relating to the personal conduct of Martin Luther King, Jr. Copies of this document are being furnished to interested officials of the Government.

The sources utilized in the enclosure have furnished reliable information in the past and because of their sensitive nature the memorandum has been classified "~~Top Secret~~." Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this transmittal letter becomes unclassified.

Sincerely yours,

REC-16 100-442529-542

21 DEC 22 1964

Enclosure

100-442529
TPR:jed (12)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

6 9 DEC 1964

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll

NOTE:

See memo Sullivan to Belmont dated 12/21/64, re "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis," TPR:rbm.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the enclosure is so classified in order to fully protect the extremely sensitive sources involved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

r. Belmont
r. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - F. J. Baumgardner
1 - S. F. Phillips

December 18, 1964

BY LIAISON

1 - T. P. Rosack

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/elj ON 10/18/00

Dr. Leland J. Haworth
Director
National Science Foundation
1951 Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

delivered to Dr Haworth personally 12/21/64 gmt

Dear Dr. Haworth: C.I.K.M

A confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past has advised that the National Science Foundation contemplated utilizing the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to locate qualified applicants to enter the University of Mississippi and other southern schools where the National Science Foundation has a program in progress.

There is enclosed for your information a summary entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis" which sets forth information regarding the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and its President, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this transmittal letter may be downgraded to "~~Secret.~~" 100-442529-538

Sincerely yours, REC 66 21 DEC 22 1964

By ~~OAG~~ Letter dated 6/24/75 National Science Foundation Director H. Guyford Stever advised of declassification. PEH

Enclosure

TPR:jad jad
(9)

12/18

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
G
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

69DEC 28 1964

DEC 18 6 20 PM '64

~~TOP SECRET~~
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dr. Leland J. Haworth

NOTE:

See cover memorandum F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, dated 12/17/64, captioned "Communist Infiltration of Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by TPR:jad.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because the enclosure is so classified. It may be downgraded to the classification of "~~Secret~~" upon removal of the enclosure since the information contained therein was obtained from a highly sensitive source with respect to the racial situation in the Atlanta area, the unauthorized disclosure of which could seriously hamper the defense interest of the Nation.

12-18-64

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen

December 21, 1964

To Mrs. Esther Hall 12/22/64

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Phillips
1 - Mr. Rosack

CIRM

DEC 21 6 03 PM '64

Dr. Leland J. Haworth
Director
National Science Foundation
1951 Constitution Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/elj
ON 10/18/00

Dear Dr. Haworth:

By letter dated December 18, 1964, you were furnished a copy of a study entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis." There is enclosed a memorandum containing additional information relating to the personal conduct of Martin Luther King, Jr. Copies of this document are being furnished to interested officials of the Government.

The sources utilized in the enclosure have furnished reliable information in the past and because of their sensitive nature the memorandum has been classified "~~Top Secret.~~" Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this transmittal letter becomes unclassified.

Sincerely yours,

REC- 11 100-442529-552

8 DEC 23 1964

Enclosure

100-442529

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~

TPR:jed
(12)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

60 DEC 29 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

FBI
RECEIVED-DIRECTOR

Dr. Leland J. Haworth

NOTE:

See memo W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont, dated 12/21/64, re "Communismand the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis," TPR:rbm.

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the enclosure is so classified in order to fully protect the extremely sensitive sources involved.

SSC LETTER 7/14/75

ITEM # 21

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/12 BY

RETAIN

62-116395-796

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-1 ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: August 24, 1967

FROM : C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
1 - Mr. D. M. Wells

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST

ALL EXCISIONS EXCEPT ONE NOTED IN PARAGRAPH UNDER "OBSERVATION" BELOW, ARE TO PROTECT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, NAME OF SERVICE AND COUNTRY INVOLVED.

PURPOSE:

To obtain approval to disseminate to S. C. Hocking, [covert Australian Security Intelligence Officer,] Australian ~~(S)~~ Embassy, Washington, D. C., a copy of the monograph entitled, "Communist Influence in Racial Matters--A Current Analysis."

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/cleg
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6
10/18/00

BACKGROUND:

S. C. Hocking, who has the formal title of First Secretary-Migrant Matters, Australian Embassy, Washington, D. C., has advised that the Vietnam Protest Movement in Australia is considering inviting prominent Americans to lecture in Australia on Vietnam. Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, has been mentioned by this group as one they might invite for this purpose. Mr. Hocking has requested that he be furnished any information of a political or subversive nature concerning King so that his Director-General can brief the Prime Minister of Australia.

OBSERVATION:

Since there is a good possibility King might be invited to Australia in the near future, it is deemed desirable to advise appropriate government officials of his heavy alliance to Communist advisors and his immoral conduct.

INFO FROM - TESUR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

RECOMMENDATION:

TO Hocking 9/5/67

The attached document be disseminated by routing slip to Mr. Hocking through Liaison Section.

Enclosure

DMW:llc (6)

LIAISON

~~SECRET~~ REC 30

EX 101

AUG 25 19

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

67 AUG 28 1967

SSC LETTER 7/14/75
ITEM # 22

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cdj

RETAIN

62-116395-776

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 2/29/68

FROM : G. C. Moore GCM/TM

1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. M. Wells

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cl

G Moore

Mr. Tolson has suggested, and the Director agreed, that the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr., be brought up to date.

This is an excellent suggestion and we have already started the necessary research. Bringing this monograph up to date and disseminating it at high level prior to King's "Washington Spring Project" should serve again to remind top-level officials in Government of the wholly disreputable character of King.

As you know, King's "Washington Spring Project" was originally scheduled for early April, 1968. However, our Washington Field Office has developed information that King's group is experiencing difficulty in recruiting individuals to participate in the demonstration and the date for the project has now tentatively been set for April 27, 1968.

Because of the importance of doing a thorough job on this, we will conduct an exhaustive file review to bring together the most complete and up-to-date information and to present it in a hard-hitting manner. To make the brief timely, we will have it completed and ready for dissemination by March 14, 1968.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

REC-111

TDR:lmr
(6)

OK

100-106670-3231

1 MAR 5 1968

54 MAR 19 1968

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

4-528

62-116395-795

CHANGED TO

66-19166-1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2 ALM/elj

NOV 6 1975

ft / cz

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

The Attorney General   September 15, 1975

Director, FBI

REC- 35 62-116395-793X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

9/15/75 AD

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Michael E. Shaheen of the Department of Justice to Mr. John A. Mintz of this Bureau, captioned "Senate Select Committee Request," dated September 9, 1975. Reference is also made to letter dated September 5, 1975, to Mr. Shaheen from Mr. Mark Gitenstein of the SSC staff.

The issue raised in referenced communications is whether employees of the Internal Revenue Service who supplied tax returns or tax return information to Special Agents of the FBI in response to formal or informal requests are to be characterized as "confidential sources" and, as such, to be spared being interviewed by the SSC.

It is the position of this Bureau that regardless of the formality or informality of requests made in the above context they cannot be characterized as "confidential" since they represent official responses to official requests. Therefore, we cannot consider them in the same light as the "confidential sources" issue raised earlier in Cointelpro matters.

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

EWL:jvl
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

84 FEB 12 1976

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Issue raised by the SSC here is that they have detected in their investigation of the Internal Revenue Service and through review of Cointelpro documents furnished to them by the FBI instances relating to FBI use of tax return information. Included in this material were a number of cases in which the FBI locally requested and, according to the documents, received tax returns or tax return information from Internal Revenue Service employees. Earlier the SSC had sought to interview individuals who assisted us in several of our Cointelpro operations. We successfully resisted these attempts to obtain the identities of such individuals and our assent to such interview by the SSC. We were sustained in our position by the Attorney General. Our position was based on the fact that we considered that we had an obligation, expressed or implied, of confidentiality toward such sources who had acted on our behalf.

The SSC now raises a question as to whether our position concerning contacts with and identities of employees of the Internal Revenue Service is the same as with the "confidential sources." For the reasons cited in our letter we do not believe it would be possible to sustain such an argument.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 9 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

9/9

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cdj

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

The attached letter is self-explanatory and, put in distilled form, asks the following question:

Are employees of the IRS who supplied tax returns or tax return information to agents of the FBI in response to formal or informal requests made by Bureau agents to be characterized as "confidential sources" and, as such, to be spared being interviewed by the Select Committee?

Because the Attorney General and the Bureau have previously addressed the Bureau's position on the nondisclosure of its sources for interview purposes by the SSC staff, and because the issue raised in the attached letter may represent a clear exception to the earlier resolution of the Bureau's COINTELPRO-sources problem, I am forwarding this to you for your prompt attention and views for early transmittal to the Attorney General. I shall appreciate the receipt of your views on or before COB Thursday, September 11, 1975.

cc: Paul Daly

EX-

REC-45 62-116395-793X

5 FEB 6 1976

ENCLOSURE

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 5, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

Dear Mike:

In connection with our investigation of the Internal Revenue Service, we have received a number of FBI COINTELPRO documents relating to FBI use of tax return information. Included in this material are a number of cases in which the FBI locally requested and, according to the documents, received tax returns or tax return information from IRS employees, such as the local Chief of Audit or Chief of Intelligence.

We wish to determine whether these requests were treated by the IRS as official requests and prescribed procedures thus followed for disclosure of the information, or whether the requests were treated as informal requests and prescribed procedures ignored. We cannot make this determination solely on the basis of the FBI documents we have reviewed. In many cases, the only way to determine how the requests were treated will be to interview the IRS employees who handled the requests.

Since these requests were directed to a federal agency, we are proceeding on the basis of a presumption that the responses were properly cleared. If so, we do not believe there is any basis for characterizing the IRS employees in question as "confidential sources". They would then be in essentially the same position as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is where the request is directed through normal channels to the National Office

RECEIVED
SEP 5 1975

Enclosures

62-116395-793X

and responded to officially. In the event it should turn out that the responses were not officially approved, they were nonetheless made by federal employees who should have been acting within the scope of their official duties and who, if they were not so acting, should certainly be subject to interrogation regarding the circumstances of their acting outside their authority.

In what is perhaps an excess of caution in view of the pending discussions regarding the questioning of "confidential sources", we are submitting this situation for your review lest you should disagree with our analysis that these individuals cannot properly be so characterized. Because IRS hearings are scheduled for the last week in September, our need to question the people who released the returns is very urgent, and we would appreciate your advising us of your view on the subject at the earliest possible moment -- hopefully no later than Monday, September 8th.

Sincerely,

Mark Gitenstein
Acting Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

2

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 9/9/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/lj

On 9/9/75, John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Head of the Senate Select Committee, telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly and requested that SA Douglas MacDougall be released for purposes of submitting to a Staff interview concerning mail openings.

Elliff stated that he was currently being interviewed by Senate Select Committee Staff Members on mail covers; however, he indicated there is an apparent misunderstanding as the Senate Select Committee also requested that he be made available for Staff interview on mail openings at the same time. Elliff was advised that this was not true and that James Dick of the Senate Select Committee had requested only a release insofar as mail covers was concerned for purposes of an interview with MacDougall and that this particular topic had been confirmed with Dick on a separate occasion to insure that their intent insofar as MacDougall was concerned was to interview him on mail covers. Elliff then requested that MacDougall be released for mail openings and inquired as to how long this particular procedure might take. He was informed that prior to MacDougall's being made available for such an interview the Bureau would brief MacDougall concerning his Fifth Amendment rights and would want MacDougall to have sufficient time to consider whether he might want to retain private counsel or whatever other steps he feels necessary to protect his rights.

Elliff subsequently recontacted SA Paul V. Daly telephonically and stated he had checked with James Dick, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, and determined that Dick had only asked that MacDougall be made available for interview concerning mail covers. Elliff stated that since

REC-7 62-116395-793

1 - Personnel File - Douglas MacDougall

ST 114

SEP 19 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:lad
(8)

84 [illegible] 6 1975

5010-108
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

MacDougall had traveled from New York for purposes of this particular interview, they felt that it would be in their interest to also interview MacDougall concerning mail openings. He requested that MacDougall be released for purposes of the mail openings interview. He also informed SA Daly that after the mail covers interview, MacDougall will return to the Bureau so that he can be appropriately briefed by the Legal Counsel Division concerning his Fifth Amendment rights.

RECOMMENDATION:

That SA MacDougall be released from existing employment agreement for purposes of interview by the Senate Select Committee concerning mail openings.

ADDENDUM: Legal Counsel Division PVD:lad 9/9/75

MacDougall was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights by SA Paul V. Daly of this Division, upon returning from the Senate Select Committee. MacDougall advised that he would prefer contacting private counsel before submitting to an interview concerning mail openings. He indicated that he was attempting to make arrangements to consult with the attorney in person. SA MacDougall advised that he would telephonically contact the Legal Counsel Division subsequent to his conference with the attorney and advise whether he desires to submit to an interview concerning mail openings. His decision in this matter will be brought to the attention of the Senate Select Committee.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 9/5/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
~~Spec. Inv.~~ ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: ACTING ADIC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243)

RE: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR JOSEPH K. PONDER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/ctg

Re telephone conversation between Former Assistant Director JOSEPH K. PONDER and Inspector JOHN B. HOTIS, Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Office, 9/3/75.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau is the original and seven copies of letterhead memorandum dictated by Mr. PONDER with respect to the interview conducted on 8/31/75, by SSC Staff Member MIKE EPSTEIN. This interview took place at Mr. PONDER's home at San Clemente.

Mr. PONDER dictated the following impressions for the Bureau's information:

"Following this interview and upon further reflection I believe Atlanta did have some coverage on KING at the time I arrived in Atlanta. I believe that coverage was on his home as opposed to the coverage on his offices at Southern Christian Leadership Conference which we obtained while I was there.

ST 114 REC-61 62-116395-792

"Based on my brief discussion with Epstein and his manner in making the appointment, I had the feeling that his interview of me was arranged over the

ENCLOSURE

② - Bureau (Enc. 8)
2-Los Angeles

RJR:sas
(4)

10-2
15 ~~SEP 9~~ 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

PERS. REC. UNIT

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

[illegible], 9/16/75
SFP:eks 1cc - [illegible]
enc with [illegible] LHM, 9/15/75

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge   Sent ______ M   Per ______

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

Labor Day weekend to suit his personal convenience or to fit his personal travel plans. He was pleasant, low-keyed, and not at all aggressive or probing and I had the impression that he learned nothing during the interview that he had not known before. I told him on several occasions during the interview that my memory of this ten year old matter is very poor, that he should rely on the records made at the time for a more accurate account.

"I also had the impression that he is pursuing leads based on material furnished to him by Sullivan."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
September 5, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/lcj

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR JOSEPH K. PONDER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 28, 1975, I received a call from Mike Epstein of the Staff of the Senate Select Committee. He said he planned to be in Southern California on Labor Day weekend and asked whether I would be available for interview on Sunday, August 31, 1975. I told him I would. Epstein subsequently called me on August 30 and agreed to meet me at my home at San Clemente on Sunday afternoon, August 31, 1975.

The interview with Epstein took place between 3:40 pm and 4:05 pm. This included the time spent in amenities and general conversation.

Regarding my Bureau background Epstein asked during what period of time I was Special Agent in Charge in Atlanta. I told him from April or May 1964 to December 1966. He asked where I had been assigned before that (Buffalo) and where I went after leaving Atlanta (New York). He asked no other questions about my Bureau career. He asked if I were aware of telephone taps maintained by the Atlanta Office on Martin Luther King. I replied that I was aware of certain taps placed and removed during my tenure in Atlanta. He asked if there were such coverage before I arrived in Atlanta and I told him I was not aware of any. In response to these and other subsequent questions I pointed out to Epstein that I had not been personally involved in the King matter, that I had various other responsibilities in Atlanta and that after ten years I cannot now clearly recall information which might answer his questions. I told him that everything that was done was properly recorded, that the records were accurate, and wherever my recollection differs from the record, he should rely on the record to determine what happened.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

He asked whether the request for the King coverage originated at the Bureau or in Atlanta. I told him I did not recall, but that in any case it was approved by the Bureau. He asked where it was monitored and I told him the monitoring was done in an apartment rented for that purpose. He asked if I knew the name in which the apartment was rented and I said I did not. He asked why the taps were discontinued and I told him I do not now recall whether I was told why they were discontinued, but if I were I cannot now recall the reason. He asked whether we had a bug on King as opposed to a tap and I told him, "no." He asked whether it were possible there were taps and bugs placed and maintained without my knowledge. I told him that was not possible because of the size of the office and the relationship I had with the supervisors and Agents that nothing was done without my knowledge or without Bureau approval.

Epstein asked whether we had conducted any Counterintelligence Program against King or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and I told him I recalled none. He asked whether we had made efforts to prevent King from receiving the Nobel Prize or efforts to interfere with or make more difficult the raising of funds for a banquet to honor King for his receipt of the Nobel Prize. I told him I knew of no such efforts.

He asked whether Sullivan (Assistant Director William C. Sullivan) had visited Atlanta. I told him Sullivan had been to Atlanta in connection with a regional conference dealing with the Bureau's investigation of the Klan. He wanted to know if Baumgartner had been with Sullivan and I told him I thought so. He asked who else had accompanied Sullivan and I told him Arbor Gray had accompanied Sullivan and perhaps someone else whose name I cannot now recall. He asked whether Sullivan had met with Ralph Magill (then publisher of the Atlanta Constitution). I told him Sullivan may have met with Magill, that I may have accompanied Sullivan to Magill's office, but I cannot specifically recall such a meeting and if it were held I cannot recall anything discussed. He asked the purpose of such a meeting and I told him if such a meeting took place it was in the nature of a social call with Sullivan paying his respects to Magill and a public relations-type of meeting. He asked whether there was any discussion between Sullivan and Magill regarding any anti-King activities and I told him, "no." He asked whether Sullivan had made any other visits to Atlanta and I told him I knew of none.

He asked whether I was aware of any inquiry made by the Bureau into the handling of the King investigation either through the Inspection Staff or otherwise. I told him I was not aware of any. He asked whether Nichols, the Agent assigned to the King investigation had been in Atlanta while I was there. I told him I had hazy recall of Nichols, but did not recall him. He asked the same thing about Al Sentinella. I told him Sentinella was there when I arrived and was still there when I left Atlanta. He asked who had supervised the Security Squad. I told him Supervisor Charles Harding.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.: ✓
~~Admin.~~
~~Comp. Syst.~~
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ✓
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 9-5-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

On 9-4-75, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Noah Smith, Attorney, Office of General Counsel, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), telephoned Special Agent Richard T. Taylor, Jr., advising he recently received a written request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC) for access to the Federal income tax returns of one "William Simon, a former FBI Agent residing in the Los Angeles, California, area." Mr. Smith explained IRS receives approximately three million returns from their Los Angeles district and that upon review of IRS indices he is unable to identify "William Simon," the object of the Committee's interest. He noted SSC provided no additional identifying data concerning Simon and did not furnish any indication as to the reason for their interest in him.

Mr. Smith requested the address and Social Security Numbers of retired SAs of the FBI with the surname "Simon" who have resided in the Los Angeles area during the past three years. SA Taylor informed Mr. Smith his request will be forwarded to our Administrative Division for consideration as to its appropriateness and feasibility.

At 1:15 p.m. on 9-4-75, Mr. Smith telephoned SA Taylor and advised he had located the income tax return of one "William Simon," a former FBI Agent, who resides in Los Angeles and is presently engaged in the practice of law there." Mr. Smith rescinded his earlier request.

62-116395-791

REC-20

12 SEP 19 1975

ST 114

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Walsh
  (Att: Mr. Hunsinger)
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-Personnel File of former SAC William Simon
1-Mr. Taylor

RTT:lgp
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 OCT 16 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SENSTUDY 75

The possibility exists that SSC interest may relate to former SAC William Simon of Los Angeles, California, therefore a copy of this memorandum is designated for his personnel file.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

New York, New York
September 3, 1975

Honorable Clarence E. Kelley
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/ELG

Dear Mr. Kelley:

In accordance with instructions received from the Bureau, I am enclosing a bill in the amount of $750.00 from the law firm of Kantor, Shaw & Davidoff. Mr. Herbert Kantor is an attorney who acted as my counsel during an appearance by me before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations in Washington, D. C. on August 12, 1975.

After notification by the Committee and the Bureau that my appearance had been requested, I was advised by the Legal Department of the Bureau that I had the right to have an attorney accompany me during my appearance. I was also advised by the Bureau that neither they nor the Department of Justice could provide me with counsel due to a possible conflict of interest on their part.

The matters to be discussed before the Committee involved only my prior official duties in the counter-intelligence field. At this point, I strongly believed that to best protect both my constitutional privileges and the Bureau's overriding interest, the most prudent course of action would indicate the retention of an attorney. I would like to advise you that much thought was paid to the selection of an attorney since confidential Bureau activities would have to be discussed with him and it was felt that the person selected would, in effect, be representing the Bureau in addition to myself.

The specific legal fees incurred, as itemized in the enclosed bill, are only in connection with the preparation for and attendance at my appearance before the Committee.

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-19166-1

REC-20

62-116395
NOT RECORDED

SEP 19 1975

NOV 6 1975

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

9/10/75

12

LEGAL COUNSEL

DATA PROCESSING

THREE

In view of the fact that my appearance was solely connected with my official duties, I respectfully request that you ascertain what avenues are available to me for the reimbursement of these legal fees.

Thank you for your kindness and consideration in this matter.

Yours truly,

James P. Kehoe

(212) MU2-8383

KANTOR, SHAW & DAVIDOFF, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
200 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

August 26, 197

Mr. James Kehoe
c/o Federal Bureau of Investigation
201 East 69th Street
New York, New York

FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED:

Appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations in Washington, D.C. on August 12, 1975; Office conference on August 6, 1975; Telephone conversations with Senate Committee Staff; Telephone conversations with F.B.I. legal staff; Preparation of Memorandum of Testimony. $750.00

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY 5Y2ALM/cdj

62-116395

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

September 5, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

ST. 114 REC-61

790

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated August 19, 1975, requesting certain information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to its requests. A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Division

JWJ:sjm
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

ENCLOSURE

WRW/tal

JBA
pim

WOC

8

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 OCT 14 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

✓ 5.7 Phillips - 4063 pst

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. W. Johnson

62-116395

September 5, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR IDENTITIES AND CURRENT ADDRESSES
OF FORMER AND PRESENT SPECIAL AGENTS (SA) OF
THE FBI TO BE INTERVIEWED REGARDING FBI'S
RELATIONSHIP TO MAIL OPENING ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated August 19, 1975, to Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, from John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force of captioned Committee.

The SSC made the following requests:

1. The SSC desired to interview all present and former Special Agents of the FBI responsible for supervising the communications between the FBI and CIA regarding the FBI's relationship to mail opening activities. The names, present assignment, and/or whereabouts were requested.

The following listed Special Agents (SA) were responsible for supervision of communications between FBI and CIA regarding CIA Project Hunter:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY

SA Anthony P. Litrento
2810 Stonybrook Drive
Bowie, Maryland 20715

SA Homer W. Schweppe — Assigned Washington Field Office

SA W. Donald Stewart
Crystal House I, Apartment 202
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

8

JWJ

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

JWJ:sjm sjm
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE 9

2-116395-

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

SA William A. Branigan	Assigned FBI Headquarters

2. The SSC requested current addresses and office assignments of all Special Agents with the surname "Mc Dougal" who were assigned to the New York City area in 1971.

A review of personnel records at FBI Headquarters indicates the only Special Agent who meets the above criteria is Special Agent Douglas Mac Dougall, who is currently assigned to the New York Office of the FBI.

3. The SSC requested the names and current addresses of all Special Agents in Charge (SAC) and Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASAC) for the years 1959 to 1966 in the following field offices: Boston, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Washington.

A review of personnel records at FBI Headquarters indicates the following information:

BOSTON

SAC Leo L. Laughlin
9 Everett Avenue
Winchester, Massachusetts 01890

SAC Edward J. Powers
10 Colonial Drive
Bedford, New Hampshire 03102

SAC Thomas J. Jenkins	Deputy Associate Director FBI Headquarters
SAC James Handley	Deceased

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

ASAC Marlin W. Johnson
Canteen Corporation
The Merchandise Mart
Chicago, Illinois 60654

ASAC Paul H. Stoddard
3014 Chatterton Drive
San Angelo, Texas 76901

ASAC Paul Fields
2677 Cyclorama Drive
Cincinnati, Ohio 45211

ASAC Kenneth W. Whittaker — SAC, assigned
Oklahoma City

ASAC Troy Coleman
36 Cromwell Road
Wilmington Park
Savannah, Georgia 31404

DETROIT

SAC Thomas J. Gearty
6630 Clayton Road #105
Richmond Heights, Missouri 63117

SAC Bernard C. Brown
2301 Newmarket Drive, N. E.
Louisville, Kentucky 40222

SAC Paul H. Stoddard
(Previously Listed)

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

ASAC Kenneth E. Commons
2458 Douglas Drive
San Angelo, Texas 76901

ASAC Karl W. Dissly
Post Office Box 9762
El Paso, Texas 79987

ASAC Palmer M. Baken, Jr.
3832 East Yucca Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85028

ASAC John F. Callaghan
Iowa Law Enforcement Academy
Camp Dodge
Post Office Box 130
Johnston, Iowa 50131

ASAC Thomas J. Nally — Assigned to Detroit Office

LOS ANGELES

SAC Donald K. Brown
826 Brookmont Avenue, East
Jacksonville, Florida 32211

SAC William G. Simon
2075 Lombardy Road
San Marino, California 91108

SAC Wesley G. Grapp
4240 Don Hommo Road
Woodland Hills, California 91364

ASAC William M. Alexander
4857 Water Oak Lane
Jacksonville, Florida 32210

ASAC Henry A. Onsgard — Deceased

ASAC Arnold C. Larson
4232 Abbington Court
Westlake Village, California 91361

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

MIAMI

SAC Lee O. Teague
2501 N. W. 121st Street
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73120

SAC Wesley G. Grapp
(Previously Listed)

SAC F. A. Frohbose Deceased

ASAC Allan Gillies
8228 Hoover Lane
Indianapolis, Indiana 46260

ASAC Richard J. Baker
219 Jeffrey Lane
Newton Square, Pennsylvania 19073

ASAC Harry J. Morgan
5314 Elmcrest Lane
Cincinnati, Ohio 45242

ASAC Donald W. Morley
Box 222
New Market, Maryland 21774

ASAC Frederick F. Fox
11450 W. Biscayne Canal Road
Miami, Florida 33161

NEW YORK

SAC Harvey G. Foster
1012 South Hamlin
Park Ridge, Illinois 60068

SAC (Assistant Director)
John F. Malone
25 Garfield Avenue
Carbondale, Pennsylvania 18407

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

SAC E. Hugo Winterrowd
1550 North Parkway
Memphis, Tennessee 38112

SAC Joseph L. Schmit
656 Hunt Lane
Manhasset, New York 11030

SAC Donald E. Roney
131 Cambridge Drive
Windsor Hills
Wilmington, Delaware 19803

SAC Henry A. Fitzgibbon
76 Easton Road
Bronxville, New York 10708

SAC Joseph K. Ponder
3719 Carriage House Court
Alexandria, Virginia 22309
business address:
2030 South Red Hill Avenue
Santa Ana, California 92705

SAC Victor Turyn
2645 Turf Valley Road
Ellicott City, Maryland 21043

SAN FRANCISCO

SAC Williams W. Burke, Jr.
1847 Aztec Drive
Jackson, Mississippi 39211

SAC Richard D. Auerbach
P. O. Box 1768
Seattle, Washington 98111

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

SAC Frank L. Price
2705 Tokalon Street
San Diego, California 92110

SAC Curtis O. Lynum
644 East Hillsdale Boulevard
San Mateo, California 94403

ASAC Thomas E. Bishop
8820 Stark Road
Annandale, Virginia 22003

ASAC George M. Peet — Assigned to Tampa Office

ASAC Robert E. Gebhardt — Assistant Director,
Los Angeles Office

ASAC Paul O'Connell, Jr.
2417 Stratton Drive
Potomac, Maryland 20854

ASAC Harold E. Welborn
13067 La Vista Court
Saratoga, California 95070

ASAC James T. Moreland
108 Fern Drive
Poteau, Oklahoma 74953

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

SEATTLE

SAC Donald S. Hostetter Deceased

SAC James L. Milnes
4317 50th Avenue, N. E.
Seattle, Washington 93105

ASAC J. F. Desmond
185 Franklin Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02107

ASAC John David Pope, Jr.
221 Remington Road
Birmingham, Alabama 35215

ASAC Wesley T. Whaley
286 Green Trails Drive
Chesterfield, Missouri 63017

ASAC Paul R. Bibler
15134 38th Avenue, N. E.
Seattle, Washington 98155

WASHINGTON FIELD

SAC Leland V. Boardman
Route 3, Box 268
Sequim, Washington 98382

SAC James H. Gale
3307 Rocky Mount Road
Fairfax, Virginia 22030

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

SAC Marlin W. Johnson
(Previously listed)

SAC Thomas J. Jenkins	Deputy Associate Director, FBI Headquarters

SAC Joseph D. Purvis
721 Dancy Avenue
Savannah, Georgia 31406

ASAC Thomas Mc Andrews
324 Neapolitan Way
Naples, Florida 33940

ASAC Dillard W. Howell
6413 Cardinal Lane
Indianapolis, Indiana 46220

ASAC John J. Mc Dermott	Assistant Director, FBI Headquarters

The above information is the most current listing in the FBI personnel files.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

SSC Letter of 8/19/75, to Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General requested Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq. to advise Mr. John T. Elliff, SSC whether SSC staff interviews of the Special Agents, as set forth in attached letterhead memorandum, would interfere with the current criminal investigation into these matters by the Justice Department. By letter dated 8/21/75, to Assistant Director John Mintz, Legal Counsel Division captioned "Senate Select Committee Request," Mr. Shaheen

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 10

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

NOTE CONTINUED:

requested FBI to furnish the names and addresses of various former and present Special Agents, requested by the SSC, and advised the Department had determined that SSC staff interviews with present and former Special Agents would not interfere with any current criminal investigation by the Department. Shaheen advised he will so advise the SSC when the requested information is transmitted.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

AUG 21 1975

TO: John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 8/20

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter dated August 19, 1975, from the Senate Select Committee requesting the names and addresses of various former and present Agents of the Bureau. Please arrange for compliance with this request as soon as possible.

The Department has determined that SSC staff interviews with these present and former agents would not interfere with any current criminal investigation by the Department and will so advise the Select Committee when the requested information is transmitted.

ST. 114 REC-61

62-116395-19

OCT 2 1975

Letter to AG, CCDAG, enclosures - 2
9/5/75 JWS sjh

2 ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/elg

5' Phillips

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 19, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/elg

Dear Mike:

The Select Committee, as you know, is investigating the FBI's relationship to mail opening activities. The Committee staff desires to interview all present or former Special Agents of the FBI who were responsible for supervising the communications between the FBI and the CIA with regard to this activity. Therefore, I am hereby requesting the names and present assignment and/or whereabouts of these Special Agents. Furthermore, please provide the current addresses and office assignments of all Special Agents with the surname "McDougal" who were assigned to the New York City area in 1971, and the names and current addresses of all SACs and ASACs for years 1959 to 1966 in the following field offices: New York, Boston, Washington, Detroit, Seattle, Los Angeles, Miami, and San Francisco.

In addition, please advise me as to whether Committee staff interviews of these Special Agents would interfere with the current criminal investigation into those matters by the Justice Department. This request is pursuant to the special procedure to which we have agreed.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
AUG 19 1975

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-990

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 9/9/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. 8/20/75 request Part V

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Date: 9-9-75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-196

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
9/5/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/02 BY SP2ALM/ekj

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 8/19/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence handling
Organization and Staffing

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Identities and current addresses of former and present Special Agents of the FBI to be interviewed regarding FBI's relationship to mail opening activities

62-116395

FMK:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5. woc 18

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. [illegible]. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

September 18, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY

Reference is made to prior FBI communications which have, on a continuing basis, effected delivery to the SSC of materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and responsive to SSC requests dated July 8 and 14, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum in further response to the aforementioned July 8 and 14, 1975, requests.

REC-20 62-116395-189

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

ST. 114

21 OCT 2 1975

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

6-ENCLOSURE

K

WRW/TH

SFP:eks
(9)

woc/B

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NOTE: Single copies of the 7/8 and 14/75 requests are attached to the file copy of enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

OCT 6 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/18/00 BY

September 18, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter from the Chairman of the SSC to the Attorney General dated August 28, 1975, requesting delivery of previously-requested FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr. Reference is also made to prior FBI communications which have, on a continuing basis, effected delivery to the SSC of materials concerning King and responsive to SSC requests dated July 8 and 14, 1975.

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery to the SSC of information and materials relating to the July 8 and 14, 1975, SSC requests, and specifically to the following items in those requests:

July 8, 1975: Items 2, 6, 8, 15, and 20

July 14, 1975: Items 19 and 20

In respect to Item 2, a through f, of the July 8, 1975, request, effort has been made to divide the material being delivered into specific categories a through f. However, in some instances material overlaps and information in one communication may actually apply to more than one category.

In respect to Items 19 and 20 of the July 14, 1975, request, we are delivering to the SSC a communication dated April 10, 1967, which relates to the 1967 revision of an FBI monograph concerning Martin Luther King, Jr. FBI records indicate this revision was authored by Special Agents Robert L. Shackelford and Dwight M. Wells. No information can

Wannall
WOC

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

SFP:eks
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

be located concerning any instructions by Mr. Sullivan and/or Mr. C. D. Brennan to subordinates in 1967 to revise any earlier monograph pertaining to King.

With respect to the excisions in materials being delivered herewith, where no notation appears as to reason for excision, the excision was made for the reason that the information actually summarizes or quotes from conversations monitored during electronic surveillances of King. In some cases, it can be ascertained precisely what information in FBI files came from electronic surveillances of King; however, there exist areas where documentation of the information is not precise and no accurate determination can be made. Therefore, no assurances can be given that portions of the material being furnished do not contain information developed as a result of electronic surveillances of King.

In connection with any response where we have included Xeroxes of newspaper articles or news releases, we have not necessarily furnished all relating to a particular matter which may be scattered through FBI files, but have included those readily available and generally representative of the media accounts of the particular matter. An example would be those included in the response to Item 6 of the July 8, 1975, SSC request.

With the delivery of the materials with this memorandum we have fulfilled all requests contained in the July 14, 1975, request.

The remaining materials in SSC requests relating to King are receiving continuous attention and the results will be forwarded on a periodic basis as soon as possible.

1 - The Attorney General

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 8, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/klj

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Pursuant to Section III. A. of the notification attached to the Committee's letter of June 27, 1975, I am forwarding herewith an additional request for materials which relate to this matter.

The specificity of this request is not, of course, intended to limit in any way the agreement to come forward with all relevant information and materials, including documents, whether or not they have been brought to the Committee's attention or have been specifically requested by the Committee.

As Mr. Schwarz and I indicated in our meeting with you a few days ago, there are still outstanding several items relating to this matter which the Committee requested some time ago. This request should in no way delay further the availability of the previously requested items, and we would expect that individual items will be supplied whenever they become separately ready for submission.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

S. Phillips

Ltr to AG Encl 2
cc DAG 5FRetc
7/16/75
JA

RECEIVED
JUL 8 1975
KWO'C

62-116395-789

ENCLOSURE

1. Access to all memoranda, airtels, teletypes, and any other materials which relate in any way to:

    a. The dissemination to any person or organization outside the executive branch of the federal government of information relating to Martin Luther King, Jr.

    b. Contacts between FBI personnel and persons outside the executive branch of the federal government concerning Dr. King.

2. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to meetings or proposed meetings between FBI headquarters and Dr. King, including, but not limited to:

    a. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting such proposals.

    b. All correspondence and any other materials reflecting invitations extended for such meetings.

    c. All correspondence and any other materials reflecting replies to any such invitations.

    d. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting briefings or preparations for such meetings.

    e. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting what occurred at such meetings.

    f. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting actions recommended or taken following such meetings.

3. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a meeting between the FBI Director and reporters on November 18, 1964, including, but not limited to:

    a. Proposals, invitations, and replies for such meeting.

    b. Arrangements, briefings, and preparations for such meeting.

    c. Summaries or other evidence of what occurred at such meeting.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

62-116395-189

ENCLOSURE

4. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a meeting between the President and Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph, Whitney Young, Mrs. Dorothy Haight, James Farmer, and Jack Greenberg on November 19, 1964.

5. A copy of a November 19, 1964, telegram from Dr. King to Director Hoover, and all notes, memoranda, and any other materials reflecting the disposition of, or actions taken as a result of the receipt of, said telegram.

6. All memoranda and any other materials relating to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Dr. King on or about December 10, 1964.

7. All memoranda and any other materials relating to a banquet held in honor of Dr. King in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 25, 1965.

8. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a meeting between the President and Dr. King on February 9, 1965.

9. All materials which formed the basis for the FBI's response dated June 12, 1975, captioned "Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance", which pertained to the travel of certain former agents of the FBI.

10. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to mail openings, and mail covers, with respect to Dr. King.

11. Access to all memoranda and any other materials which relate to electronic surveillance of Dr. King by state or local agencies or governments.

12. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to the transfer of former Special Agent Robert R. Nichols to the Oklahoma City office of the FBI in June 1969.

13. All Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") from 1959 until retirement for:

a. Former Special Agent Robert R. Nichols.

b. Former Special Agent Alan Sentinella.

14. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a letter from former Associate Director Clyde A. Tolson to newspaper columnist Carl T. Rowan concerning Dr. King, as reported in the Washington Evening Star on June 18, 1969.

15. All memoranda and any other materials relating to arrangements, briefings, and preparations for an interview of the FBI Director by any reporters for the Washington Evening Star on June 19, 1969; all memoranda and any other materials referred to, quoted from, or displayed during such interview; and all memoranda and any other materials reflecting what occurred at such interview.

16. Access to all materials upon which "Black Extremist" COINTELPRO summaries 16, 23, 63, and 156 were based.

17. An August 17, 1964, memorandum from former Assistant Attorney General John Doar to the FBI Director requesting a name check on certain individuals connected with the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

18. All memoranda and any other materials indicating or reflecting the inception of (a) all headquarters files and (b) all Atlanta, Georgia, field office files concerning Dr. King and concerning the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, together with the basis and authority for opening such files.

19. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting or relating to a 1963 meeting at FBI headquarters which was attended by former Special Agents Robert R. Nichols, Henry Rouse, William Sullivan, and other FBI personnel, and which related to Dr. King.

20. All memoranda prepared by the Internal Security Section and by former Assistant Director William Sullivan concerning the August 1963 March on Washington.

21. All memoranda and any other materials which reflect or relate to communications between the FBI Director or FBI headquarters personnel and the President or the President's staff in June 1969 concerning electronic surveillance of Dr. King.

N.B.: The Bureau's search for the above-requested materials should include a check of pertinent field office files as well as headquarters files.

KING

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 14, 1975

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/00 BY SP2ALM/clg

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Reference is made to your letter of July 8, 1975, transmitting certain materials relating to the Martin Luther King, Jr. monographs.

We would appreciate being supplied the following additional items in response to Appendix D, Item 9, of the Committee's letter of May 14, 1975:

1. All materials refelcting the earlier recommendation and approval which are indicated in the first sentence of Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.
2. The identity of the author of the monograph which was attached to Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.
3. All materials which reflect or relate to Mr. Sullivan's instructions to subordinates concerning the preparation of the 1963 monograph.
4. All materials which reflect or relate to the transmission of the monograph to Mr. Sullivan from subordinates prior to Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.
5. All materials which reflect Mr. Tolson's transmission to the Director of Mr. Belmont's memorandum of October 17, 1963.

RECEIVED
JUL 24 1975
KWOC

62-116395-789

6. All materials which reflect what transpired between the Director's approval of Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum, and the transmission of Mr. Sullivan's October 18, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.

7. A xerox of the original of the Director's November 17, 1963 memorandum to Mssrs. Tolson, Belmont, De Loach, Rosen, and Sullivan.

8. A xerox of the original of the director's February 5, 1964 memorandum to Mssrs. Tolson, Belmont, Rosen, Sullivan, De Loach, and Evans.

9. Access to the original memoranda from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont, dated:

   a. November 22, 1964;

   b. November 27, 1964.

10. The identity of the author of the 1964 "up-to-date revision" of the 1963 monograph.

11. All materials which reflect or relate to Mr. Sullivan's instructions to subordinates in 1964 to revise the 1963 monograph.

12. All materials which transmitted for approval and/or signature the December 1, 1964 letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers.

13. All materials which reflect the approval of Mr. Belmont, Mr. Tolson, and/or the Director of:

   a. Recommendations contained in Mr. Sullivan's November 22, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont;

   b. Recommendations contained in Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont;

   c. The December 1, 1964 letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers.

14. Access to the second page (unexcised) of the December 17, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan.

15. All materials reflecting the approval of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Belmont, Mr. Tolson, and/or the Director of the recommendation contained in Mr. Baumgardner's December 17, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan.

16. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to the preparation of a memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which is referred to and was apparently enclosed with, the Director's December 21, 1964 letter to Senator Humphrey. (Please do not supply the memorandum.)

17. The identity of the author of the memorandum described in item #16 above and of any other similar memoranda.

18. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to the dissemination to Senator Humphrey of the memorandum described in item #16 and which relate to any other dissemination of the said memorandum or any other similar memorandum.

19. The identity of the author of the 1967 revision of the Martin Luther King, Jr. monograph.

20. All material which reflect or relate to Mr. Sullivan's and/or Mr. C. D. Brennan's instructions to subordinates in 1967 to revise any earlier Martin Luther King, Jr. monograph.

21. Access to an unexcised copy of the August 24, 1967 memorandum from Mr. C. D. Brennan to Mr. Sullivan.

22. All materials reflecting Mr. Tolson's suggestion, and the Director's agreement, that the King monograph be brought up to date in 1968, as indicated in the February 29, 1968 memorandum from Mr. G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 9/18/75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

Caption of Document: 7/8/75 request, items 2,6,8,15 and 20

7/15/75 request items 19 and 20

Originating Office: FBI 3:30 pm

Delivered by: Richard I. Taylor J. Date: 9/19/75

Received by: Sherry Brown

Title: Asst. Off Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

ENCLO

62-116395-757

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
9/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letters 8/28/75; 7/8/75, Items 2, 6, 8, 15 and 20; 7/14/75, Items 19 and 20

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Surveillance, electronic
Intelligence collection

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Materials on Martin Luther King, Jr., relating to meetings between FBI and Dr. King; Nobel Prize awarded to Dr. King; meeting between President and King on 2/9/65; materials for an interview of Director by reporters for Washington Evening Star 6/19/69; memoranda by Internal Security Section and by former Assistant Director William Sullivan concerning the August, 1963, March on Washington; monographs of 1967.

62-116395

5 - WOC

FMK:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

September 16, 1975

Director, FBI

REC-7 62-116395-188

ST 114

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed for your information is a memorandum with its attachment concerning an interview by a Staff Member of the SSC of former FBI Special Agent Edward F. Gamber. A copy of the memorandum with its enclosure is being furnished for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former SA Edward F. Gamber)

SFP:dmt
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/elj

WRW/
JBN
woc

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 OCT 6 1975

S. F. Phillips

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

September 16, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) EDWARD F.
GAMBER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information concerning an interview of former FBI SA Edward F. Gamber by an SSC Staff Member.

On receipt of information by the FBI that the SSC might interview Gamber, he was contacted by the Atlanta, Georgia, Field Office of the FBI on August 15, 1975, and advised of the necessity, should he be interviewed by the SSC, to protect matters relating to sensitive Bureau operations. Such matters would relate to sources, methods, techniques, third agency consideration and ongoing investigations. He was told that if he desired, after being contacted by the SSC Staff, he could contact the FBI's Legal Counsel Division by collect call for information to assist him, including his obligations as to confidentiality of the information acquired as an FBI employee. It was emphasized to him that the FBI's offer of assistance was not intended to impede the SSC work but was done as a cooperative gesture and to safeguard sensitive Bureau information.

On August 21, 1975, Gamber advised the Atlanta Field Office that he had been contacted by Paul Wallach, SSC Staff Member, who had arranged to interview Gamber in the Atlanta area on September 2, 1975. Gamber also advised that he intended to contact the Legal Counsel Division of the FBI by collect call on August 22, 1975.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former SA Edward F. Gamber)

SFP:dmt dmt
(10)

WEW/TWL SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

JBA CM WOC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) EDWARD F.
GAMBER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Gamber was subsequently interviewed by Wallach on September 2, 1975, and voluntarily furnished to the Atlanta Field Office a statement concerning the interview which is incorporated into a memorandum, a copy of which is attached hereto.

Gamber additionally advised that he had no objection to his statement being disseminated to the White House and the Department; however, he specifically requested it not be disseminated to the SSC. Gamber further advised that when arrangements were made between himself and Wallach for the interview, he, Gamber, intended to contact the Legal Counsel Division of the FBI by collect call on August 22, 1975. Gamber stated, however, that he inadvertently failed to make the call due to the pressure of business.

Enclosure

NOTE:

The LHM incorporating Gamber's statement was received by cover of Atlanta airtel 9/5/75 "Senstudy 75." The information reported herein concerning contacts with Gamber are from Bureau teletype 8/14/75 and Atlanta teletypes 8/15, 21/75.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 9/5/75

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
(ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR)

WOC
EWS

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

Re Bureau teletype 8/14/75 and Atlanta teletypes 8/15/75 and 8/21/75.

Enclosed are the original and six copies of an LHM prepared at Atlanta, Georgia, concerning an interview with former SA EDWARD F. GAMBER by SSC Staff Member PAUL G. WALLACH, which took place at Atlanta on 9/2/75.

ST. 114 REC-71

Mr. GAMBER has no objection to this material being disseminated to the White House and the Department; however, he specifically requested that it not be disseminated to the SSC Staff. Former SA GAMBER was contacted in connection with this matter in accordance with instructions set forth in referenced Bureau teletype. He subsequently advised on 8/21/75 that he was contacted on that date by SSC Staff Member WALLACH and at that time arrangements were made for an interview to take place in Atlanta on 9/2/75. At this time SA GAMBER stated he intended to contact the Office of Legal Counsel by collect call 8/22/75. SA GAMBER has advised that he inadvertently failed to make this call due to the pressure of business. He has advised that he certainly intends to keep the Bureau advised of any further developments in connection with this matter.

21 OCT 1975

62-116395-[illegible]

2-Bureau (Enc. 7) ENCLOSURE
1-Atlanta
JO'K:rrl
(3)

Ltr to AG w/encs, 9-16-75, SFP:dnt
cc DAG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/kg

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Atlanta, Georgia
September 5, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
EDWARD F. GAMBER BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

The following information was furnished voluntarily to the Atlanta Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by former Special Agent Edward F. Gamber, Atlanta, Georgia, concerning interview of him conducted by SSC Staff Member Paul G. Wallach on September 2, 1975:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

62-116395-788

ENCLOSURE

September 3, 1975
Atlanta, Georgia

On September 2, 1975, Mr. Paul G. Wallach, Counsel to the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate arrived at my office located at 6165 Barfield Road, Atlanta, Georgia 30302, at approximately 10:10 a.m. His interview with me commenced at approximately 10:15 a.m. and lasted until approximately 10:50 a.m. This interview was not conducted under oath. Mr. Wallach did not advise me of my rights. I drove Mr. Wallach to Perimeter Mall where he caught the 11:00 a.m. bus to the Airport.

During the interview Mr. Wallach asked how long I had served in the Federal Bureau of Investigation and what areas I worked in during my FBI career. He was told that my FBI career started on March 19, 1951, and ended with my retirement on January 27, 1973. During this time I was assigned to criminal work for two years, worked in the Soviet Intelligence field for approximately 17 years, and again handled criminal work for the last three years of my Bureau career.

Wallach wanted to know if I worked with James Kehoe. I told him that for the most part Kehoe and I were on different squads, although we both worked in the Soviet Intelligence field. We did work on the same squad during the first years of our assignment to this type of work.

Wallach wanted to know if I was aware of the operation involving the mail at Kennedy Airport and at other post offices in the New York area. I told him that officially I was not aware of these operations but that in fact I knew of the operations. Wallach wanted to know if I had ever been assigned to work in a post office and my answer was "no".

Wallach then wanted to know if I was acquainted with Sam Jaffee. After my affirmative answer he wanted to know how I met him, why I interviewed him, whether I had to have permission to interview him, what kind of information he furnished, whether I had ever asked him to do anything, and whether Jaffee was an informant. He also wanted to know when I first met Jaffee, how frequently I saw him, over what period of time I was seeing him, and when I last saw him.

I told Wallach that I could not remember dates and other details of my relationship with Jaffee, but that information responsive to his questions could be found recorded in FBI files as I had prepared detailed memos reflecting all of my contacts with Jaffee. I told Wallach that if he were entitled to the information he was seeking, I'd suggest that he get hold of the file on Jaffee. Wallach said he understood my position, but that before going through the process of getting a file "they" liked to talk to a few individuals to see if information the Committee had was worth pursuing.

Wallach acknowledged that it would not be possible for me to furnish specific information, such as dates, after the passage of such a long period of time. Thereafter, in response to inquiry, he was told that Jaffee was in contact with many diplomatic officials, including Soviets, in his capacity as a CBS newsman. I could not specifically remember how this information came to the Bureau's attention. I did have some background information on Jaffee and it was necessary for me to get permission before I could interview him. He was told that I did not know specifically who authorized the interview.

Wallach wanted to know what approach was used during the initial interview with Jaffee. He was told that I could not specifically recall this information, but that John Willis and I conducted the interview. Both of us were keenly aware of the FBI's policy of not interfering with the Freedom of the Press and we wanted to make sure that Jaffee understood this. We also wanted to make sure that Jaffee understood that we did not want to place him in a difficult or embarrassing position by talking to him and that if he found our presence to be a problem we would leave immediately. He was told that Jaffee proved to be most cooperative and that thereafter we were in contact with Jaffee frequently. Wallach wanted to know how often and he was told that sometimes we were in contact with him two or three times a week, once every two weeks, or perhaps once a month. He was told that all contacts were recorded in writing in the file, along with the results of the contact.

Concerning information which Jaffee furnished, Wallach was told that Jaffee furnished information concerning current events of major and minor importance on the international scene, which came to his attention as a result of his contacts with numerous individuals in diplomatic circles. He was again told that all of this information was reduced to writing and I understood that it was disseminated to other government agencies, including the U. S. Mission to the UN and the State Department. Wallach wanted to know how I knew this to be the case. I explained that FBI policy required dissemination of information to other government agencies and I felt certain that this policy was followed in the case of memoranda prepared as a result of my contacts with Jaffee.

Wallach asked if Jaffee was an informant and I told him that Jaffee might more properly be called a Source of Information.

Wallach then wanted to know if I requested Jaffee to do anything in the course of contacts with him. Wallach was told that Jaffee may have been asked to follow up on information which he furnished or make contact with a specific individual but that this did not occur very often, if at all, since Jaffee was a free spirit, who usually did as he pleased. I then explained that during my contacts with Jaffee I received frequent calls from other FBI Agents who said that Jaffee was using my name in order to cross police lines or get information while covering a story of major importance,such as airplane hijacking. This in spite of repeated requests on my part that he cease doing this.

Wallach asked if I knew whether Jaffee had ever been followed by FBI Agents. I pointed out that Jaffee had been followed by FBI Agents and, in fact, talked to Agents who were following him, as well as Agents going about their business. He often mentioned my name to these Agents.

Wallach asked if I was aware that Jaffee did a television program on the FBI. I said that I was aware of this and in fact, at his request, arranged to have him visit Camp Smith with a camera crew to cover our firearms training program.

Wallach was told that I could not remember when I last saw Jaffee, but that I last talked to him when he returned from Hong Kong. At this time Jaffee called my home from Washington, D. C. and told my daughter that he had to talk to me immediately about an urgent problem. When I returned Jaffee's call I listened to him for about five to ten minutes repeatedly telling me how the FBI or CIA or some individual had furnished information to ABC-TV which cost him his job. Jaffee would not listen to me as I tried to explain that he had to be mistaken. I then got sick of listening to him and hung up on him.

Wallach was told that this was typical of Jaffee who often thought that there was something personal involved when he failed to get an assignment or a news item, which he covered,was not shown on the evening news program. Wallach was told that Jaffee was an intelligent and personable guy with a burning ambition, who wanted to become a Walter Cronkite or a Marvin Kalb overnight. Wallach was told that I did not believe that Jaffee completed college and he was probably not otherwise qualified for some of these positions, which he would like to have had immediately. I then told Wallach that in my opinion Jaffee had the same problem at ABC that he had at CBS and at both places he was probably overly aggressive and not amenable to direction.

Wallach was also told that Willis and I found Jaffee to be an interesting guy who we enjoyed talking to but that he positively would not accept advice or direction.

Wallach wanted to know if I was acquainted with Special Agents Reeves, Winton or Graves and I gave a negative reply. It should be noted that Wallach had a first name for each of these individuals but I do not recall these names. He then wanted to know if I knew Bert Turner. I did know Bert Turner as a Supervisor in WFO and possibly at the Bureau.

Wallach wanted to know if I would be surprised to learn that Jaffee had been interviewed by Bureau Agents for four days upon his return from Hong Kong. I said that I would be surprised.

He also wanted to know if I would be surprised to learn that the FBI or CIA had furnished information to ABC-TV which cost Jaffee his job. I said that I would be most surprised and that I did not believe there was any possibility that this could happen. I told Wallach that in my opinion Jaffee was perfectly capable of losing his job on his own.

Wallach then asked if I had ever talked to any other newspaper people. I told him that I once talked to Irving R. Levine many years ago. He wanted to know if I knew of any other Agents of the FBI who were talking to people in the news media. I said that I did not.

Wallach then made reference to newspaper articles of recent date concerning the FBI's relationship with newspaper people friendly to the FBI. In response to inquiry I told him that I knew absolutely nothing about this.

At the outset of the interview Wallach asked if I told the FBI about his visit and I said that I had called the Atlanta FBI Office and that as soon as he left I would again call the Atlanta FBI Office and give an Agent a rundown on the interview. He said that the FBI had notified the Select Committee about my call.

He wanted to know if I had called the FBI in Washington and I gave a negative reply. He also wanted to know if I had talked to John Willis. I had not.

Before leaving Wallach commented that he did not know who cost Jaffee his job, but that he, Wallach, was certain someone caused Jaffee to lose his job.

I believe I have covered the interview in its entirety, however, I did not make any notes and the possibility of some minor omission does exist.

Edward F Gamber
Signed Edward F. Gamber
9/3/75

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

9/16/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Member of former Special Agent Edward F. Gamber

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interviewed regarding mail openings and Gamber's connection with Sam Jaffee

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/02 BY

FMK:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5-WOC

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 8-29-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY -75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

On 8-29-75 former Assistant Director Joseph Ponder called Inspector John B. Hotis to advise that he had been contacted by Michael Epstein, staff member, Senate Select Committee. Mr. Epstein said he was going to be in the Los Angeles area this coming weekend and would like to interview Mr. Ponder on Sunday 8-31-75 concerning his involvement in the Martin Luther King investigation.

Ponder was told that we are waiving his secrecy agreement for purposes of this interview, but he was not to discuss matters other than the Martin Luther King investigation. In addition he was advised that he should not furnish information which would identify confidential sources, disclose sensitive methods or investigative techniques, jeopardize ongoing investigations, or violate the Third Agency rules. Ponder was told that if he had any questions regarding the proper scope of the interview, he should call Bureau Headquarters collect and discuss the matter with SA Elmer Larson.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. Ponder be released from existing employment agreement for purposes of the forthcoming interview by Mr. Epstein concerning the Martin Luther King investigation.

ST. 114 REC-61

62-116395-787

OCT 2 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Personnel File Joseph K. Ponder

JBH:dkg (8)

8 4 O[illegible] 1 4 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Airtel

To: SAC, New York (105-140691)

8/27/75

From: Director, FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 1975
13 - R

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz

-110

Reurairtel 8/22/75.

SA James P. Kehoe inquired as to what avenues are available to him to be reimbursed for his legal fees in connection with his appearance before representatives of the Senate Select Committee on August 12, 1975, in Washington, D. C.

SA Kehoe should be advised that he may address a personal letter to the Director describing the circumstances under which he engaged private counsel, the specific legal fees incurred, his justification for those expenses, and his specific request that he be reimbursed for such costs.

Upon receipt of SA Kehoe's letter, the matter will be presented to the Department for a determination of the appropriate disposition of SA Kehoe's request for reimbursement.

REC-20

ST 114

62-116395-186

NOTE: Based on incoming airtel from NY 8/22/75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

JAM:mfd
(7)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAILED 10
AUG 27 1975
FBI

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 OCT 6 1975

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Attention: Edward Fenig

August 20, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAMS

Reference is made to your letter dated July 22, 1975, captioned "Criminal Division Investigation of CIA Mail Intercept Programs," and to your letter received August 1, 1975, captioned as above.

A compilation of documents in the possession of Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters pertaining to the mail interception program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency known by that Agency as Project Hunter has been made. In accordance with your request these documents are available for your review. It is requested that you contact Special Agent James P. Lee, on extension 4562, at FBI Headquarters to arrange for this review.

105-288406

① 62-116395 (Senstudy '75)

JPL:eml/emg
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/eky

62 116395-

DUPLICATE YELLOW

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Re: Mail Intercept Programs

NOTE:

The incoming letter delivered on 8/1/75 is undated and it requested that the FBI make available for review by the Criminal Division attorneys, all memoranda, records, letters or other correspondence from 1951 to date which the FBI had received or generated with respect to its contacts or involvement with the White House, the Attorney General, Post Office Department or Postal Service and CIA in connection with the inception, implementation or declination of participation by the FBI in mail interception programs. This relates solely to the information in Bureau files concerning Bureau Informant 200 also known as Project Hunter which was the CIA code name for its interception program. In accordance with discussions held with members of the Staff of the Senate Special Committee on 8/15/last, it was requested that this program be cleared with the Criminal Division first. The Hunter policy file has been reviewed and documents considered to be pertinent have been Xeroxed and will be held for review by Departmental attorneys.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

July 24, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the SSC letter, and appendices thereto, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed is an original and one copy of a memorandum and enclosures (Exhibits A through X) responsive to some of the requests which concern electronic coverage of Martin Luther King, Jr. by the FBI. This material was compiled prior to the receipt of the July 15, 1975, letter from Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department to Mr. John T. Elliff of the Committee. In view of the information in paragraph four, page two of the July 15, 1975, letter concerning special considerations in the King case, we are making no recommendations concerning the furnishing of the enclosed memorandum to the Committee as this appears to be a decision for the Department to make.

Enclosures (50) ENCLOSURE

REC-7 785

ST 113 OCT 2 1975

62-116395
~~ENCL BEHIND FILE~~

UNREC COPY AND ENCL FILED IN

Delivered to Michael Shaheen 7/24/75 by [illegible]

Returned from Shaheen by hand 8/7/75

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

RDS:mjg
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-20-81 BY SPJ JRM/dk 6076

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 OCT 6 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

July 21, 1975
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to the SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, Item 5, the SSC requested a list of all electronic surveillances (elsurs) identified by subject and target, which were instituted or operated by, for, or on behalf of, or at the request of, the FBI, and which intercepted and/or monitored any conversations of Martin Luther King, Jr., at any time between January 1, 1960, and April 5, 1968.

In Item 6, with respect to each surveillance listed in response to Item 5, the SSC requested the FBI to provide responses to the following:

(a) the address of the premises surveilled and the number of the telephone surveilled;

(b) a generic description of the surveillance technique employed;

(c) all memoranda and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization and reauthorization by the President, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, White House officials, or National Security officials.

ALL INF[illegible] CONTAINED
HEREIN [illegible]
DATE 3/6/89 BY 3694 RW/LC/BG
Garrow/King

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

RDS:mjg
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE EIGHT
SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic
Surveillance

In regard to the term "subject and target" listed in Item 5, in this instance, it is synonymous with Martin Luther King, Jr.

Set forth hereinafter are the responses to Item 5, 6 (a), 6 (b), and 6 (c):

Date of Installation	Date of Discontinuance	Type of Electronic Surveillance	Place of Coverage	Telephone Number, if available	Authorization

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic
Surveillance

Date of Installation	Date of Discontinuance	Type of Electronic Surveillance	Place of Coverage	Telephone Number, if available	Authorization

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Date of Installation	Date of Discontinuance	Type of Electronic Surveillance	Place of Coverage	Telephone Number, if available	Authorization

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Date of Installation	Date of Discontinuance	Type of Electronic Surveillance	Place of Coverage	Telephone Number, if available	Authorization

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic
Surveillance

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

In respect to Item 6 (c), there are enclosed, communications (see Exhibits A through X) disclosing the authorization of the above-described elsurs.

As previously set forth, a misur was installed on [redacted] at [redacted] [redacted] A thorough, exhaustive search was conducted of numerous FBI files in an effort to locate an FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) communication disclosing an authorization to place this misur. However, the search was unsuccessful. There was located, however, a Radiogram dated [redacted] from the [redacted] (see Exhibit F) revealing that a misur was installed which in effect acknowledged that Bureau instructions were carried out regarding this misur coverage and indicates that Bureau authority was obtained.

In regard to the matter involving the authorization of misurs, the procedures in effect at the time most of these misurs were in operation did not require specific written authority from the Attorney General. At that time, authority for FBI misurs was maintained at FBIHQ and authorization for utilizing a misur was made by the FBI Director or his designees based on a memorandum from Attorney General Herbert Brownell dated May 20, 1954, which recognized FBI authority to institute such surveillances. (see Exhibit W). Subsequent to March 30, 1965, the aforementioned procedure was changed wherein the FBI, in requesting authority for the installation of a misur, in each instance forwarded such request to the Attorney General for his approval or disapproval. (see Exhibit X). Other exhibits enclosed with this memorandum and pertaining to the approval of misurs by FBI officials contain the initials of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover or his designees to make such approvals.

In respect to tesurs, on facilities under the control of the SCLC and approved by the Attorney General, the reason for the placing of such tesurs lies in the fact that the SCLC and Martin Luther King, Jr. as its president, were subjects of intensified FBI investigations at that time. (see Exhibits A and B). Thus, an integral phase of the FBI's coverage of King was also its coverage of the SCLC.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

In respect to that part of Item 5, wherein the SSC requested a list of all elsurs which "intercepted and/or monitored" any conversations of Martin Luther King, Jr. at any time between January 1, 1960 and April 5, 1968, an extensive, exhaustive review has been made of Bureau files, including a review of the elsur indices, Martin Luther King's main file and other files directly and indirectly related to the investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., to satisfy this part of the request. As a result of this review, it was determined that Martin Luther King, Jr. [redacted] In addition, to further satisfy this part of the request, inquiries have been made of some field offices concerning this particular aspect. However, their extensive review has been unsuccessful. One reason for the unsuccessful attempts to retrieve this particular information both at FBIHQ and in the field can be attributed to the fact that FBI elsur indices did not come into existence until October 5, 1966, and did not become operational for a period of time following October 5, 1966.

In respect to Item 6 (d) which requested data concerning FBI dissemination of information concerning King, we are not supplying this data pursuant to an agreement between Mr. Mark Gitenstein of the SSC Staff and Special Agent Elmer Larson of the FBI.

Enclosures (24)

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic
Surveillance

NOTE:

Technical coverage information set forth in this memorandum was extracted and retrieved following an exhaustive, extensive research of Martin Luther King's "June" file, his main file and the "June" files of the Communist Influence in Racial Matters (CIRM), the Communist Party, United States of America (CP, USA) and SCLC. In addition, sundry other files were reviewed that were directly or indirectly related to the investigation of Martin Luther King. The enclosures (see Exhibits A through X) to the memorandum were also the result of the review of aforementioned files. These files and the elsur indices were reviewed by Special Agents George R. Ross and Robert D. Shea. In regard to Item 6 (d) set forth in Appendix D of the 3/14/75 letter, an agreement was reached between SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein and Supervisor Elmer Larson of the Senstudy 75 Project that a response to Item 6 (d) is not necessary. Item 6 (d) is as follows: "A list of all memoranda and other material reflecting dissemination outside the FBI of information from each surveillance, stating author, address (s) and dates together with the purpose of such dissemination." From a review of the elsur indices,

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

The description of Martin Luther King was excised from the middle of Exhibits A and B as it could possibly pinpoint NY 694-S, an extremely sensitive source, who furnished same (see unexcised copies of Exhibits A and B).

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

August 7, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 8/7

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Materials Compiled by the Bureau in Response to the Senate Select Committee's Request Concerning Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Attached is an original and one copy of a memorandum and enclosures (Exhibits A through X) which the Bureau prepared in partial response to Senate Select Committee requests for materials pertaining to electronic surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Although no formal agreement has been reached concerning the procedures to be followed for handling requests for materials relating to Dr. King, we think that there is no reason not to send the attached memorandum and enclosures to the SSC at this time as long as two additional excisions are made in the enclosures.

With regard to lines 7 and 8 of paragraph one, Exhibit D, please excise the words [redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

With regard to lines 2 and 3, page 2 of Exhibit V, please excise the words [redacted]

done 8/11/75

After these additional excisions have been made, please return the memorandum and enclosures to this office.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2

Sent to Cregar 8-7-75

5 - Phillips

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7/24/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance. Appendix D, #5 (5/14/75 request)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6:15pm 8/8/75

Received by:

Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/eg

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
7/24/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒	SSC
☐	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/18/17 BY SP2ALM/elj

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Items 5, 6a, 6b and 6c

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Furnished a list of all electronic surveillances identified by subject and target, whichwere instituted and operated by, for, and on behalf of the FBI and which intercepted and/or monitored conversations of Martin Luther King, Jr., between 1/1/60 and 4/5/68

62-116395

FMK:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-100 CB

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNEXCISED EXHIBITS A THROUGH X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-106670
100-3-116

October 7, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN
RACIAL MATTERS

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/clg
ON 10/18/00

Martin Luther King, Jr., resides at 563 Johnson Avenue, Northeast, Atlanta, Georgia, and is president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The New York office of the SCLC is located at 312 West 125th Street, New York City. He is closely associated with Stanley Levison, a concealed member of the Communist Party, USA. Levison has described King as a wholehearted Marxist who has studied Marxism, believes in it, agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion does not dare to espouse it publicly. In view of the possible communist influence in the racial situation, it is requested that authority be granted to place a technical surveillance on King at his current address or at any future address to which he may move.

It is further requested that authority be granted to place a technical surveillance on the SCLC office at the current New York address or to any other address to which it may be moved.

Respectfully,

ENCLOSURE

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED ____________

DATE 10/10/63

NOV [illegible] 1963

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

B

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-106670
100-3-116

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
October 18, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN
RACIAL MATTERS

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/cdj
ON 10/18/00

The office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference is located at 330 Auburn Avenue Northeast, Atlanta, Georgia. Martin Luther King, Jr., is President of this organization. He is closely associated with Stanley Levison, a concealed member of the Communist Party, USA. Levison has described King as a wholehearted Marxist who has studied Marxism, believes in it, agrees with it, but because of his being a minister of religion, does not dare to espouse it publicly. In view of the possible communist influence in the racial situation, it is requested that authority be granted to place a technical surveillance on the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference at its current address or at any future address to which it may be moved.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED RFKennedy

DATE 10/21/63

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NOV 13 19[illegible]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

F

G

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

H

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

2 APR 15 1964

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

J

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

L

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

M

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 100-106670

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This Bureau's investigation of the communist influence in racial matters has developed considerable information indicating the influence upon Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, by individuals with subversive backgrounds such as [Stanley David Levison,

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/elj
ON 10/18/00

EX-116

REC- 37

~~SECRET~~ 18 MAY 21 1965

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

MAY 25 1965

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 100-106670

October 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This Bureau's investigation of the communist influence in racial matters has developed considerable information indicating the influence upon Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, by individuals with subversive backgrounds such as Stanley David Levison, Harry Wachtel, Bayard Rustin and others. From time to time,

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/cbj
ON 10/18/00

REC-21

100-106670-1990

~~SECRET~~

6 OCT 28 1965

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

3 Xerox Copy 6/30/88 JR

6 NOV 3 1965

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

T

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

12/10/65

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 100-106670

December 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

"JUNE"

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This Bureau's investigation of the communist influence in racial matters has developed considerable information indicating the influence upon Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, by individuals with subversive backgrounds such as (Stanley David Levison, Harry Wachtel, Bayard Rustin) and others. From time to time,

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
ON 10/5/00

REC-4
100-106670-2183

~~SECRET~~
~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

6 JAN 10 1968

JAN 19 1966

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

COPY

To: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation May 20, 1954

From: The Attorney General

MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE 155-26

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of microphone surveillance in connection with matters relating to the internal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal security matters equally as important as the duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigations. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of installing a microphone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all cases, including internal security matters. Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion that under such circumstances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.

Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones, suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow rather than reflect the present state of the law. It is realized that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone. The question of whether a trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the circumstances in each case in the light of the practical necessities of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Nichols
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation DATE: May 2 195

FROM : The Attorney General

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE

155-26

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/18/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of microphone surveillance in connection with matters relating to the internal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal security matters equally as important as the duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigations. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of installing a microphone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all cases, including internal security matters. Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion, that under such circumstances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.

MAY 20 1954

71

COPY ... ED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13 JUL 2 1954

cc 372 [illegible] Nichols, [illegible]

INT

Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones, suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow rather than reflect the present state of the law. It is realized that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone. The question of whether a trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the circumstances in each case in the light of the practical necessities of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone coverage by ~~the FBI~~ in a manner most conducive to our national interest. ~~I~~ recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
[illegible]
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
[illegible]
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation DATE: May 20, 1954

FROM : The Attorney General

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY [illegible]

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE

155-26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of microphone surveillance in connection with matters relating to the internal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal security matters equally as important as the duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigations. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of installing a microphone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all cases, including internal security matters. Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion that under such circumstances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.

MAY 20 1954

71

COP[illegible]D
372 [illegible]

cc to Boardman, Nichols, Belmont

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13 JUL 2 1954

INT

Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones, suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow rather than reflect the present state of the law. It is realized that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone. The question of whether a trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the circumstances in each case in the light of the practical necessities of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.

HB.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

March 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

With reference to the proper controls over wiretapping and the installation of microphones, you will recall that I advised you that back under the administration of Attorney General Clark I recommended that all Government agencies refrain from wiretapping unless there was specific approval in each instance by the Attorney General who is the chief law officer of the Government. I repeated the same recommendation to each successive Attorney General following the administration of Attorney General Clark.

I have always felt that there was a very lax control in the handling of wiretapping by Government agencies. I am the only head of a Government investigative agency who does not have the authority to authorize a wiretap, but under the system which I personally set up. Therefore, requests for wiretaps are sent by me to the Attorney General for his approval or disapproval. I know that no such system is followed in other branches of the Government and, in fact, in many instances subordinates quite far down the line of authority tap telephones without the specific approval of the head of the agency and certainly without specific approval of the cabinet officer in charge of the department.

I still feel quite strongly that no Government agency should tap a telephone unless it is specifically approved in each instance by the Attorney General. This would certainly circumscribe promiscuous wiretapping on the part of Government agencies and would centralize in one place, the Attorney General's office, a record of any phone taps which have been placed by a Government agency.

As you are aware, in the case of the FBI we do not request phone taps except in cases involving kidnaping and espionage. This has been predicated upon my theory that when the life of an individual or the life of the Nation is in peril a phone tap is justified for intelligence purposes as any information obtained over a phone tap cannot be used in the trial of a criminal case.

JEH:RM (6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/02 BY SP2ALM/elg

Memorandum for the Attorney General

In line with your suggestion this morning, I have already set up the procedure similar to requesting of authority for phone taps to be utilized in requesting authority for the placement of microphones. In other words, I shall forward to you from time to time request for authority to install microphones where deemed imperative for your consideration and approval or disapproval. Furthermore, I have instructed that, where you have approved either a phone tap or the installation of a microphone, you be advised when such is discontinued if in less than six months and, if not discontinued in less than six months, that a new request be submitted by me to you for extension of the telephone tap or microphone installation.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY

March 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

With reference to the proper controls over wiretapping and the installation of microphones, you will recall that I advised you that back under the administration of Attorney General Clark I recommended that all Government agencies refrain from wiretapping unless there was specific approval in each instance by the Attorney General who is the chief law officer of the Government. I repeated the same recommendation to each successive Attorney General following the administration of Attorney General Clark.

I have always felt that there was a very lax control in the handling of wiretapping by Government agencies. I am the only head of a Government investigative agency who does not have the authority to authorize a wiretap, but under the system which I personally set up. Therefore, requests for wiretaps are sent by me to the Attorney General for his approval or disapproval. I know that no such system is followed in other branches of the Government and, in fact, in many instances subordinates quite far down the line of authority tap telephones without the specific approval of the head of the agency and certainly without specific approval of the cabinet officer in charge of the department.

I still feel quite strongly that no Government agency should tap a telephone unless it is specifically approved in each instance by the Attorney General. This would certainly circumscribe promiscuous wiretapping on the part of Government agencies and would centralize in one place, the Attorney General's office, a record of any phone taps which have been placed by a Government agency.

As you are aware, in the case of the FBI we do not request phone taps except in cases involving kidnaping and espionage. This has been predicated upon my theory that when the life of an individual or the life of the Nation is in peril a phone tap is justified for intelligence purposes as any information obtained over a phone tap cannot be used in the trial of a criminal case.

JEH:RM (6)

Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11:10 am
DATE 3-30-65
BY

Memorandum for the Attorney General

In line with your suggestion this morning, I have already set up the procedure similar to requesting of authority for phone taps to be utilized in requesting authority for the placement of microphones. In other words, I shall forward to you from time to time request for authority to install microphones where deemed imperative for your consideration and approval or disapproval. Furthermore, I have instructed that, where you have approved either a phone tap or the installation of a microphone, you be advised when such is discontinued if in less than six months and, if not discontinued in less than six months, that a new request be submitted by me to you for extension of the telephone tap or microphone installation.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

March 30, 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/ldj

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

With reference to the proper controls over wiretapping and the installation of microphones, you will recall that I advised you that back under the administration of Attorney General Clark I recommended that all Government agencies refrain from wiretapping unless there was specific approval in each instance by the Attorney General who is the chief law officer of the Government. I repeated the same recommendation to each successive Attorney General following the administration of Attorney General Clark.

I have always felt that there was a very lax control in the handling of wiretapping by Government agencies. I am the only head of a Government investigative agency who does not have the authority to authorize a wiretap, but under the system which I personally set up. Therefore, requests for wiretaps are sent by me to the Attorney General for his approval or disapproval. I know that no such system is followed in other branches of the Government and, in fact, in many instances subordinates quite far down the line of authority tap telephones without the specific approval of the head of the agency and certainly without specific approval of the cabinet officer in charge of the department.

I still feel quite strongly that no Government agency should tap a telephone unless it is specifically approved in each instance by the Attorney General. This would certainly circumscribe promiscuous wiretapping on the part of Government agencies and would centralize in one place, the Attorney General's office, a record of any phone taps which have been placed by a Government agency.

As you are aware, in the case of the FBI we do not request phone taps except in cases involving kidnapping and espionage. This has been predicated upon my theory that when the life of an individual or the life of the Nation is in peril a phone tap is justified for intelligence purposes as any information obtained over a phone tap cannot be used in the trial of a criminal case.

JEH:RM (6)

rotter
ele. Room
lolmes
dy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11:10 am
DATE 3-30-65
BY

In line with your suggestion this morning, I have already set up the procedure similar to requesting of authority for phone taps to be utilized in requesting authority for the placement of microphones. In other words, I shall forward to you from time to time request for authority to install microphones where deemed imperative for your consideration and approval or disapproval. Furthermore, I have instructed that, where you have approved either a phone tap or the installation of a microphone, you be advised when such is discontinued if in less than six months and, if not discontinued in less than six months, that a new request be submitted by me to you for extension of the telephone tap or microphone installation.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

EXCISED EXHIBITS A THROUGH X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

October 7, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN
RACIAL MATTERS

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/cly
ON 10/18/00

Martin Luther King, Jr., resides at 563 Johnson Avenue, Northeast, Atlanta, Georgia, and is president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The New York office of the SCLC is located at 312 West 125th Street, New York City. He is closely associated with [redacted] member of the Communist Party, USA. [redacted]

[redacted] In view of the possible communist influence in the racial situation, it is requested that authority be granted to place a technical surveillance on King at his current address or at any future address to which he may move.

It is further requested that authority be granted to place a technical surveillance on the SCLC office at the current New York address or to any other address to which it may be moved.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED
DATE 10/10/63

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
October 18, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN
RACIAL MATTERS

The office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference is located at 330 Auburn Avenue Northeast, Atlanta, Georgia. Martin Luther King, Jr., is President of this organization. He is closely associated with [redacted] member of the Communist Party, USA. [redacted]

[redacted] In view of the possible communist influence in the racial situation, it is requested that authority be granted to place a technical surveillance on the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference at its current address or at any future address to which it may be moved.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/eh
ON 10/18/00

APPROVED

DATE 10/21/63

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/cdj

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

D

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

E

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/02 BY SP2ALM/eg

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

WCS

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

GH

H

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

N

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

~~SECRET~~

UN[illegible]ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]STICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This Bureau's investigation of the communist influence in racial matters has developed considerable information indicating the influence upon Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, by individuals with subversive backgrounds such as [redacted] [redacted] and others. From time to time,

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFIED BY 9803 RLH/clj
ON 10/18/00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

Q

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

R

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

October 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This Bureau's investigation of the communist influence in racial matters has developed considerable information indicating the influence upon Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, by individuals with subversive backgrounds such as and others. From time to time,

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFIED BY
ON 10/18/00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

12/10/65

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

This Bureau's investigation of the communist influence in racial matters has developed considerable information indicating the influence upon Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, by individuals with subversive backgrounds such as [redacted] and others. From time to time, [redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DECLASSIFIED BY 5P2ALM/clj
ON 10/18/00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

COPY

To: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation May 20, 1954

From: The Attorney General

MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE 155-26

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/17/00 BY SP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of microphone surveillance in connection with matters relating to the internal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal security matters equally as important as the duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigations. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of installing a microphone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all cases, including internal security matters. Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion that under such circumstances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones, suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow rather than reflect the present state of the law. It is realized that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone. The question of whether a trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the circumstances in each case in the light of the practical necessities of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Karbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO :Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation DATE: May 2[illegible] 195[illegible]

FROM The Attorney General

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE 155-26

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE [illegible] BY [illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v. California 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of microphone surveillance in connection with matters relating to the internal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal security matters equally as important as the duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigations. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of installing a microphone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all cases, including internal security matters. Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion that under such circumstances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.

MAY 20 1954

COPY [illegible] D

CC to [illegible], Nichols, Belmont

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 13 JUL 2 1954

INT

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones, suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow rather than reflect the present state of the law. It is realized that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone. The question of whether a trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the circumstances in each case in the light of the practical necessities of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.

HB.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

March 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

With reference to the proper controls over wiretapping and the installation of microphones, you will recall that I advised you that back under the administration of Attorney General Clark I recommended that all Government agencies refrain from wiretapping unless there was specific approval in each instance by the Attorney General who is the chief law officer of the Government. I repeated the same recommendation to each successive Attorney General following the administration of Attorney General Clark.

I have always felt that there was a very lax control in the handling of wiretapping by Government agencies. I am the only head of a Government investigative agency who does not have the authority to authorize a wiretap, but under the system which I personally set up. Therefore, requests for wiretaps are sent by me to the Attorney General for his approval or disapproval. I know that no such system is followed in other branches of the Government and, in fact, in many instances subordinates quite far down the line of authority tap telephones without the specific approval of the head of the agency and certainly without specific approval of the cabinet officer in charge of the department.

I still feel quite strongly that no Government agency should tap a telephone unless it is specifically approved in each instance by the Attorney General. This would certainly circumscribe promiscuous wiretapping on the part of Government agencies and would centralize in one place, the Attorney General's office, a record of any phone taps which have been placed by a Government agency.

As you are aware, in the case of the FBI we do not request phone taps except in cases involving kidnaping and espionage. This has been predicated upon my theory that when the life of an individual or the life of the Nation is in peril a phone tap is justified for intelligence purposes as any information obtained over a phone tap cannot be used in the trial of a criminal case.

JEH:RM (6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

Memorandum for the Attorney General

In line with your suggestion this morning, I have already set up the procedure similar to requesting of authority for phone taps to be utilized in requesting authority for the placement of microphones. In other words, I shall forward to you from time to time request for authority to install microphones where deemed imperative for your consideration and approval or disapproval. Furthermore, I have instructed that, where you have approved either a phone tap or the installation of a microphone, you be advised when such is discontinued if in less than six months and, if not discontinued in less than six months, that a new request be submitted by me to you for extension of the telephone tap or microphone installation.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

March 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

With reference to the proper controls over wiretapping and the installation of microphones, you will recall that I advised you that back under the administration of Attorney General Clark I recommended that all Government agencies refrain from wiretapping unless there was specific approval in each instance by the Attorney General who is the chief law officer of the Government. I repeated the same recommendation to each successive Attorney General following the administration of Attorney General Clark.

I have always felt that there was a very lax control in the handling of wiretapping by Government agencies. I am the only head of a Government investigative agency who does not have the authority to authorize a wiretap, but under the system which I personally set up. Therefore, requests for wiretaps are sent by me to the Attorney General for his approval or disapproval. I know that no such system is followed in other branches of the Government and, in fact, in many instances subordinates quite far down the line of authority tap telephones without the specific approval of the head of the agency and certainly without specific approval of the cabinet officer in charge of the department.

I still feel quite strongly that no Government agency should tap a telephone unless it is specifically approved in each instance by the Attorney General. This would certainly circumscribe promiscuous wiretapping on the part of Government agencies and would centralize in one place, the Attorney General's office, a record of any phone taps which have been placed by a Government agency.

As you are aware, in the case of the FBI we do not request phone taps except in cases involving kidnaping and espionage. This has been predicated upon my theory that when the life of an individual or the life of the Nation is in peril a phone tap is justified for intelligence purposes as any information obtained over a phone tap cannot be used in the trial of a criminal case.

JEH:RM (6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/elj

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11:10 am
DATE 3-30-65
BY

rotter
ele. Room
olmes
dy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for the Attorney General-

In line with your suggestion this morning, I have already set up the procedure similar to requesting of authority for phone taps to be utilized in requesting authority for the placement of microphones. In other words, I shall forward to you from time to time request for authority to install microphones where deemed imperative for your consideration and approval or disapproval. Furthermore, I have instructed that, where you have approved either a phone tap or the installation of a microphone, you be advised when such is discontinued if in less than six months and, if not discontinued in less than six months, that a new request be submitted by me to you for extension of the telephone tap or microphone installation.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Assoc. Dir. ✓
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ✓
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

August 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

RE: Senate Select Committee

(Senstudy) 1975

① Hotis
② John [illegible]

On the afternoon of August 19, 1975, John Ellif of the SSC staff, telephoned me to report that the Committee has decided to defer on its pending request for the identity of various so-called "recipient-source" witnesses in the COINTEL program.

Mr. Ellif also emphasized that he wished to apologize to the Attorney General for possibly misstating the grounds as to why the Committee and the staff had decided to reject the proposals apparently agreed upon by Senator Church and the Attorney General.

Finally, I noted to John Ellif that I continue to have difficulty in understanding why the staff insists that they need further witnesses to establish any possible "damage" to the targets of the COINTEL program. Ellif finally agreed that since they do know the names and identities of the targets, the latter probably would be the best witnesses on this issue in any event. Nonetheless, Ellif did stress that it is possible that later on in the fall, the Committee and its staff may choose to come back and press its demands for the right to interview the recipient-source witnesses.

AUG 22 1975

HRT, Jr.
(Harold R. Tyler, Jr.)
(DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL)

EX-108

cc: The Attorney General
Director, FBI
M. Shaheen

REC-1 62-116395-784

5 SEP 12 1975

5-6

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/elg

58 OCT

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 23 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

9/23

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/eg

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached for your attention and priority response is a letter dated September 22, 1975, from the Senate Select Committee requesting certain materials for the Committee's hearing this week on the Huston Plan.

cc: Paul Daly

REC-7 62-116395-783

ST 114

21 SEP 25 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

LEGAL COUNSEL

1-Ad Hoc

5-Ed

~~SPEC. MAT'L RM~~

84 MAY 13 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 22, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Office of Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/klj

Dear Mike:

In connection with the Committee's hearings on the Huston Plan, I am requesting the following materials from the FBI:

(1) Hoover memo to Angleton, "Hunter Project," March 10, 1972.

(2) Krogh memo to Haynes, "Detailed information regarding income sources for revolutionary groups," February 23, 1970.

(3) Brennan memo to Sullivan, "Income sources for revolutionary groups," February 26, 1970.

(4) Hoover letter to Krogh with 13 enclosures, February 26, 1970.

In addition, I have requested that the FBI certify as official FBI documents, the following:

(5) "New Left Notes - Philadelphia," Sept. 16, 1970.

(6) SAC, Philadelphia, Airtel to Director FBI, "Black Student Groups on College Campuses," December 2, 1970.

(7) LHM "Black Student Union; Philadelphia Military College, Chester, Pa.," February 26, 1971.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff,
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
SEP 22 1975

62-116395-
ENCLOSURE

4-528

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

62-116395-782

CHANGED TO

66-19166-3

NOV 6 1975

ft/cz

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
1 - Movement Section

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC
DATE: 9/26/75
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/02 BY SP2ALM/ely

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ✓
Ident. ____
Inspection ✓
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

On 9/10/75, SA Daniel A. Flynn of the New York Office (NYO) was interviewed by a Staff Member of the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC) in its offices in Washington, D. C., on the subject of mail openings. The interview was recorded by an SSC stenographer.

On the morning of 9/26/75, SAC Robert Denz, NYO, telephonically contacted Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project and advised that Flynn had been contacted by James Dick, the SSC Staff Member who had interviewed him. Dick informed Flynn that the transcript of the interview is available for review by Flynn but that the review must be done in SSC offices, pursuant to SSC rules. The deadline for Flynn's review is 9/30/75. Also according to SSC rules, Flynn's review will not permit any substantive changes but only changes as to grammar, and the like. Flynn desires the opportunity to review the transcript and authority was sought for his coming to Washington, D. C., the morning of 9/30/75.

EX-106 REC-7 62-116395-781
OCT 1 1975

In addition to seeking authority for the trip SAC Denz inquired as to the position Flynn should take in the event he reviews the transcript and finds the recording as inaccurate from a substantive standpoint. Phillips told Denz that, before coming to Washington, D. C., Flynn ought to review any notes he has, as well as the LHM which Flynn prepared and submitted to the Bureau after the interview. If Flynn finds that in his opinion the transcript is inaccurate from a substantive standpoint, and he is unable to persuade Dick to make any changes, Flynn should submit another LHM

Jon Hengemuhle, NYO, teleph. adv of approval for Flynn's trip. 3:30 pm 9/26/75

62-116395
1 - 67- (Personnel File SA Daniel A. Flynn)
SFP:lhb lhb
(8)

84 OCT 2 1975

5 B

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

recording the review of the transcript and the exceptions he is taking to it. This will enable the Bureau to then take appropriate action.

We have checked with Deputy Assistant Director Jack E. Herington of the Legal Counsel Division who agrees that Flynn should be permitted to come to Washington, D. C., and review the transcript involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

SA Flynn be permitted to come to Washington, D. C., to review the transcript. Upon approval, INTD will telephonically advise SAC Denz.

JAM/pvD

wrw|ssm

JBA/RVM

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 26 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 9/26

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached for your attention and prompt response is another letter of request from the Senate Select Committee.

You will note that the Committee asks that response to the attached request be readied for Monday, September 29, 1975.

EX-106

REC-7 62-116395-780

21 OCT 1 1975

cc: Paul Daly

LEGAL COUNSEL

ENCLOSURE

1-[illegible]
9-29-75

62-116395

5-Woc

84 OCT 6 1975

SEP 26 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached for your attention and prompt response is another letter of request from the Senate Select Committee.

You will note that the Committee asks that response to the attached request be readied for Monday, September 29, 1975.

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 26, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Committee requests delivery by Monday morning, September 29, of section 48 of the FBI's Manual for Bureau Supervisors, page 60, entitled "Income Tax Returns".

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/02 BY SP2ALM/dj

RECEIVED
SEP 26 1975

62-116395-780

ENCLOSURE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 26 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 9/26

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached for your attention and prompt response is another letter of request from the Senate Select Committee.

You will note that the Committee asks that all requested documents be declassified and readied for delivery by Monday, September 29, 1975.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY [illegible]

EX-106

REC-7 62-116395-179

21 OCT 1 1975

cc: Paul Daly

ENCLOSURE

LEGAL COUNSEL

62-116395

5-WBC

1-M Hore
9-29-75

84 OCT 6 1975

SEP 26 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached for your attention and prompt response is another letter of request from the Senate Select Committee.

You will note that the Committee asks that all requested documents be declassified and readied for delivery by Monday, September 29, 1975.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cj

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 26, 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/ldj

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

We request that the Sidney Morris Peck case file be reviewed for all documents which reflect the following:

1. that Dr. Peck attended the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago;
2. that while in Chicago he was arrested;
3. that he was designated as a key activist;
4. that he was placed on the Bureau's Security Index.

Copies of all documents pertinent to the above request should be declassified and delivered to the Committee by Monday, September 29, 1975.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
SEP 26 1975

cc: Mr. William O. Cregar

62-116395-779

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 26 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 9/26

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/12/02 BY SP2ALM/lij

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter of request from the Senate Select Committee which is self-explanatory. Please prepare an appropriate response.

EX-106

REC-7 62-116395-978

21 OCT 1 1975

ENCLOSURE

cc: Paul Daly

LEGAL COUNSEL

62-116395

5-Wrc

1-Ad Hoc
9-29-75

84 OCT 6 1975

SEP 26 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter of request from the Senate Select Committee which is self-explanatory. Please prepare an appropriate response.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/80 BY 597 ALM/clg

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 24, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP1 ALM/clj

Dear Mike:

Contained in an FBI internal memorandum dated 8/28/56 from Belmont to Boardman, captioned CP,USA - Counterintelligence Program Internal Security-C, supplied to this committee by the Bureau 7/25/75, is a reference on page 4 to a memorandum "covering the first phase of the IRS angle." We request copies of this memorandum and any others relating to the use of the IRS in the disruptive program described in the memo cited above.

Delivery of the declassified version of these memoranda and the 8/28/56 memo cited above is requested. ~~by Thursday 9/25/75~~.

JTE

We also request that the attached transcript of J. Edgar Hoover testimony be excised for public disclosure along the agreed upon declassification procedure.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
SEP 25 1975

62-116395-778

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 9/12/75

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cdj

On 9/11/75, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., was advised that Senator Howard Baker had reviewed the information contained in Bureau files pertaining to him per instructions of the Attorney General and in response to the letter from Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, dated May 27, 1975. Baker requested that one particular file be made available for review by his designee on the Senate Select Committee, James Madigan. This file is titled ALLEGED TAPPING OF TELEPHONE OF UNITED STATES SENATOR HOWARD BAKER, WASHINGTON, D. C. (Bufile 139-4744). Shaheen was asked what the Department position was concerning this particular request inasmuch as the file had been made available to the Senator pursuant to the instructions of the Attorney General.

REC-7

Shaheen advised that inasmuch as the initial request was from the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee for access to files for Senators that any modification of that request giving access to Senate Select Committee Staff Members should also be pursuant to a communication from the Chairman of that Committee. Shaheen indicated that making the file available to Senator Baker's designee may set a precedent which could be used by other interested Senators on the Committee to gain access for their designees. Shaheen offered to telephonically advise John Elliff, Task Force Director for the Senate Select Committee, that the Department would not grant access to this particular file for Madigan. He was advised that the Bureau should perhaps respond to Senator Baker's request ~~inasmuch as~~ it was made to the Bureau and that unless he was advised to the contrary the Bureau would advise Senator Baker of this decision. Shaheen interposed no objection to this decision.

EX-106

62-116395-777

OCT 1 1975

Madigan advised by P. Daly 9/18/75

RECOMMENDATION:

That Senator Baker be advised that it was not possible to grant access to his designee, Madigan, to the above-described file.

WRW/TAL

JBA PLM

JBA

PVD:lad
(8)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

84 OCT 6 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 9/9/75

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

By a prior oral arrangement between Mr. Mark Gitenstein, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee (SSC), and Mr. W. R. Wannall, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division (INTD), a briefing was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. on 8/28/75. This briefing was to consist of a discussion of the various indices maintained and operated by the FBI. Information pertaining to these indices had previously been submitted the SSC by letterhead memorandum dated July 17, 1975, and documents pertaining to the indices were made available for review by appropriately cleared SSC Staff Members at FBI Headquarters.

This briefing was held in the conference room of the INTD, JEH Building, on 8/28/75 during the approximate period 2:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Present at this meeting were Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Section Chief J. G. Deegan Unit Chief E. P. Grigalus, SA K. A. Mendenhall, all of the INTD, Mark Gitenstein, Michael Epstein, and Martha Talley, Staff Members of the SSC.

Main items of discussion during this briefing centered around the Rabble Rouser Index (RRI), later known as the Agitator Index (AI), the Key Activist Program (KAP), the Security Index (SI), and the Administrative Index (ADEX). The origin and implementation of the above-mentioned indices and the KAP were discussed and Mr. Wannall offered background information and historical reasoning as to the necessity for implementing these indices and the KAP. Mr. Deegan answered questions pertaining to the AI and Messrs Grigalus and Mendenhall answered questions pertaining to the AI and Messrs Grigalus and Mendenhall answered questions pertaining to the KAP, the SI, and ADEX, which were raised by the SSC Staff Members.

REC-7 62-116395-776

EX-106

OCT 1 1975

SSC Staff Members desired to know what plan of action was currently available for the FBI to apprehend individuals whose names are currently on the ADEX and they

62-116395

KAM:lm
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

5-KAM

84 OCT 2 1975

were advised there is no plan of action in the FBI for the apprehension of the individuals so listed. The SSC Staff Members were advised individuals currently listed on the ADEX would merely be afforded priority investigative attention during any national emergency which should occur; however, they would not be apprehended. SSC Staff Members also indicated they felt criteria for inclusion on the ADEX when first established were the same as the criteria for inclusion on the old SI. They were advised when the ADEX Program was initiated the criteria were basically the same; however, after closely following the matter for a period of approximately 8 months, the criteria were reevaluated and revised so only individuals who were considered currently dangerous were to be included on the ADEX. SSC Staff Members were also advised that the SI was stored "off-line" in the Bureau's computers and as such was utilized in a strictly in-house operation. Information was therefore not available to outside agencies or terminals tied in with the Bureau's computer system. Staff Members also indicated from a review of material made available to them it appeared as though there was friction between the Bureau and the Department during the late 1940s and early 1950s with respect to establishing guidelines and policy in connection with the SI and they desired to know what the cause of this friction was. INTD representatives present advised they were unaware of the cause of any such friction.

Other questions similar to those above were asked by the SSC Staff Members and were answered by INTD personnel present. In addition the following nine questions were asked by the SSC Staff Members and Mr. Wannall indicated answers would be obtained and orally furnished:

1. Was there a memorandum which established the RRI and does it indicate Mr. Hoover appeared before the Civil Unrest Commission? (A memorandum dated 8/3/67 from C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan indicates Mr. Hoover instructed an index be compiled of racial agitators; however, the memorandum does not indicate Mr. Hoover appeared before the Civil Unrest Commission.)

CONTINUED - OVER

2. Was there a memorandum concerning the expansion of the AI to include individuals of local prominence? (Memorandum of G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 11/22/67 requested approval of an SAC letter for expanding the AI to include local leaders as well as national leaders involved in racial disorders.)

3. Were individuals included on both the AI and the SI and, if so, wasn't this a duplication of effort? (Individuals were included on both the AI and the SI; however, this was not necessarily a duplication of effort inasmuch as the SI was to be utilized in the apprehension and detention of individuals considered dangerous and the AI was an administrative aid to follow the activities and movement of individuals attempting to cause racial disorders.)

4. When did the SI become automated and was the Reserve Index (RI) ever automated? (The SI became automated during the early 1950s and was updated throughout the years with the advancement of computer technology and purchase by the Bureau of more advanced computers. Following discontinuance of the SI the ADEX was continued in the computer systems in an "off-line" manner. The RI-A was placed on automatic data processing (ADP) equipment the same as the SI. RI-B was maintained at the field level only and was never placed in the ADP equipment.)

5. Has the Bureau's copy of the Attorney General's portfolio concerning the Emergency Detention Program (EDP) been returned? (One copy of the Attorney General's portfolio concerning the EDP has been located and is currently maintained in the Security Informant Unit of the IS-2 Section, INTD.)

6. Who were the Bureau individuals who (a) maintained the Attorney General's portfolio during 1968 and (b) involved with the EDP during the 1940s? (The following individuals were identified through review of pertinent communications during time period in question: (a) 1968 - C. D. Brennan, P. F. Enlow, T. P. Rosack; (b) 1946-D. M. Ladd, J. C. Strickland; 1948-Lish Whitson, W. H. Winterrowd, J. W. Yeagley.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

7. When did the Department start reviewing and approving the SI list? (Matters pertaining to the old Custodial Detention List were first referred to the Department during March, 1941. Copies of the SI were submitted to the Department during 1951 and the Department, on a continuing basis, reviewed matters pertaining to the SI except for brief periods of time when funds and manpower were not available until the SI was discontinued in 1971.)

8. Was there a form used by the Department concerning the continuance or cancellation of individuals on the SI and, if so, what does the form look like? (Forms were utilized and copies have been obtained to exhibit to SSC Staff Members.)

9. Do we have a copy of the form for including or deleting an individual from the AI? (FD-397 was utilized with the AI. A copy of this form will be exhibited to SSC Staff Members.)

At the closure of this briefing SSC Staff Members expressed their appreciation to the Bureau personnel present and indicated the briefing had furnished them a better understanding of the Bureau's utilization of the above indices and the KAP.

ACTION:

With your approval and in accordance with your previous instructions the Senstudy Unit will initiate contact with Mr. Gitenstein so answers relating to the above nine questions may be orally provided to the above-named SSC Staff Members.

KAM TJM WRW PLM

JMA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 8/22/75

FROM : Legal Counsel ~~Mr. J. A. Mintz~~

1 - Personnel File - Jay Robert Newton
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY -75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY 5D2 ALM/eh

On 8/21/75, Michael Epstein, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee, requested that SA Jay Robert Newton of the New York Office be made available for interview concerning the FBI's investigations of the Women's Liberation Movement and other women's groups and organizations. Epstein stated that this would be a Staff interview. According to Epstein, SA Newton is assigned to the New York Office and he requested that he be advised when Newton would be available for interview.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That SA Newton be released from existing employment agreement for the purpose of an interview by the Senate Select Committee in compliance with their request.

(2) That the Intelligence Division arrange for an Agent to be available for consultation but not present during the interview of SA Newton. (See addendum)

(3) Verify that SA Newton is assigned to the New York Office and if not, determine his current office of assignment so that final arrangements concerning interview may be made with the Senate Select Committee.

Daly
Adv. Newton
assign.
Intell. Div. 8-27-75

REC-24 62-116395-775

9

PVD
PVD:lad
(8)

(SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 2)

OCT 2 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 9/2/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/ehj

On 8/22/75, John T. Elliff, Task Force Director for the Domestic Intelligence Task Force of the Senate Select Committee, advised that regarding proposed plans for testimony by Bureau officials before the Senate Select Committee that the Committee tentatively scheduled hearings for mid-October. He cited October 16th as being the approximate date. Initially, according to Elliff, hearings concerning the Bureau were to have been initiated in the first week of October but the Staff Members did not have the necessary background information to conduct the hearings at that time and instead scheduled hearings concerning IRS for early October.

Elliff indicated that the tentative format for these hearings would be to furnish the Bureau an outline of or a series of questions pertaining to the area to be covered in testimony prior to our appearance. He indicated that the hearings would cover a narrow topic on any given day so that a Bureau official could be briefed and respond to questions raised concerning the particular subject matter.

Elliff indicated that typical subjects of hearings concerning the FBI would be a one-day hearing on political abuse or a series of hearings on COINTELPRO.

REC-11 62-116395-774

Elliff indicated that it was the Committee's intent to continue hearings regarding the FBI into mid-December once they are initiated with the Bureau testifying at least once a week during that period. He advised they also envisioned the initial hearing as setting forth what the scope of the Senate Select Committee inquiry had been into the FBI and of topics to be covered by hearings. Elliff felt this would inform the House Select Committee of what areas the Senate Select Committee had delved into.

12 SEP 11 1975

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

WRW/TAL K

PLM

PVD:lad LAD

LEGAL COUNSEL

8 OCT 2 (8) 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:lad 8/26/75

On 8/25/75, SA Daly determined from Michael Epstein of the Senate Select Committee that this particular interview was not considered an "abuse" interview and if the Bureau so desired, they could have a representative present during the interview. Accordingly, Recommendation #2 in this memorandum should be changed to show that an Agent may, in fact, be present.

pvd

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMA[illegible]
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible]TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, [illegible]Z.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

FBI

September 26, 1975

Senstudy-'75

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cbj

Dear Mike:

We request that the Sidney Morris Peck case file be reviewed for all documents which reflect the following:

1. that Dr. Peck attended the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago;
2. that while in Chicago he was arrested;
3. that he was designated as a key activist;
4. that he was placed on the Bureau's Security Index.

Copies of all documents pertinent to the above request should be declassified and delivered to the Committee by Monday, September 29, 1975.

Sincerely yours,

JTE

John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

EX-108

REC-1 62-116395-173

12 SEP 29 1975

cc: Mr. William O. Cregar

1-Ad Rec
9-26-75

62-116395

5-8

84 OCT 2 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMA[illegible]
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible]ENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, [illegible]IZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

FBI

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

8

September 26, 1975

C [illegible] -15

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Committee requests delivery by Monday morning, September 29, of section 48 of the FBI's Manual for Bureau Supervisors, page 60, entitled "Income Tax Returns".

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/02 BY SP2ALM/clj

EX-108
REC-118 62-116395-772

SEP 29 1975

1-AG the
9-26-75

62-116395

5-8

84 OCT 2 1975

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 25 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

9/24

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Letter dated September 23, Revising SSC Letter dated September 4, Requesting Information Relating to FBI Use of IRS Information

Attached is a letter dated September 23, from the Senate Select Committee which revises a September 4, letter from the SSC requesting certain materials pertaining to FBI use of IRS information. Please prepare an appropriate response to the September 23, letter.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/klj

EX-108

cc: Paul Daly

REC-11 62-116395-771

SEP 29 1975

3

1 - Ad Hoc
9-25-75

62-116395

84 OCT 2 1975

SEP 25 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Letter dated September 23, Revising SSC Letter dated September 4, Requesting Information Relating to FBI Use of IRS Information

Attached is a letter dated September 23, from the Senate Select Committee which revises a September 4, letter from the SSC requesting certain materials pertaining to FBI use of IRS information. Please prepare an appropriate response to the September 23, letter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/eLj

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESYON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 23, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/ldj

Dear Mike:

In response to discussion with James Johnson and John Thomas of the Bureau by Select Committee staff members Thomas Dawson and James De Marco, we have agreed to a revision of the list of names that appear in the September 4, 1975, letter of request signed by F.A.O. Schwarz.

As discussed with James Johnson on Monday, September 22, Bureau personnel are conducting a review of the entire case files and all documents relevant to the SSCI request of September 4, 1975, as revised in Attachment 1, with specific attention to the areas outlined in Attachment 2 of this letter. We would like delivery of these documents to the Committee, if possible, by Friday, September 26, 1975.

For the sake of expediency, all excision necessary for declassification should be completed by that same date.

Sincerely,

John Elliff

John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
SEP 24 75

William Cregar

62-116395-771

ENCLOSURE

Attachment 2

1. Use of tax related information to harass or disrupt groups or individuals.

2. Influence exerted or requests by the FBI that the IRS conduct audits or begin Intelligence Division cases on individuals or groups of interest to the Bureau.

3. Disclosure of IRS information to:

   a. local law enforcement agencies;

   b. employers, creditors, family, or anyone outside of the Bureau, including other agencies and branches of government.

4. Disclosure of (a) tax related information, or (b) intelligence data to the Bureau by IRS that was not pursuant to a written request approved by proper Bureau and DOJ officials.

5. Memoranda reflecting Bureau policy concerning requests for and use of information provided by the IRS.

6. Disclosure of information collected by the Bureau to the IRS which effected either IRS Intelligence Division or audit action against individuals or groups.

7. Any record of verbal requests of the IRS for tax information or request by the IRS for clarification or justification of Bureau requests for tax related information.

8. All memoranda reflecting the origin and approvals for requests of IRS for tax information.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

62-116395-771

Attachment I.

1. Charles C. Kissinger
2. Tom Hayden
3. Sidney Morris Peck
4. David Dellinger
5. Robert M. Pardun
6. Absolam Jordan
7. Raymond Hewitt
8. Huey P. Newton
9. Robert M. Shelton 157-552

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2-ALM/cly

62-116395-711

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 25 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 9/24

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request:
COINTELPRO Documents

The attached letter from the Senate Select Committee is self-explanatory and requests that the documents in the two attached packages be cleared for the Committee's use at public hearings. Because the hearings are scheduled to begin September 30, your prompt attention to this request is invited.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY 592 ALM/clj

cc: Paul Daly

EX-108

REC-1 62-116395-770

SEP 29 1975

ENCLOSURE

1-Ad Hoc
9-25-75

62-116395

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 MAY 13 1976

SEP 25 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request;
COINTELPRO Documents

The attached letter from the Senate Select Committee is self-explanatory and requests that the documents in the two attached packages be cleared for the Committee's use at public hearings. Because the hearings are scheduled to begin September 30, your prompt attention to this request is invited.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clg

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 22, 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2 ALM/eg

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Enclosed are two packets of COINTELPRO documents labeled Packet #1 and Packet #2. We request that all these documents be cleared for use at public hearings. As the hearings in which these documents will be used are scheduled to begin September 30, we would appreciate your acting on this request by Wednesday. Should there be any difficulty in your approving all the documents for public hearings by Wednesday, please concentrate your early attention on the serials contained in Packet #1, and in particular on the following serials:

1. 157-9-33-28
2. 100-449698-11-9
3. 100-449698-11-31
4. 100-3-104-34-1095
5. 100-104-34-1088
6. 100-104-34-1113
7. 157-9-8-167
8. 157-9-8-168
9. 100-448006-3
10. 100-3-104-34-230
11. 100-3-104-43-163
12. 100-3-104-888
13. 100-449698-2

Schedule A, attached hereto, contains a list, by serial, of all of the enclosed documents.

RECEIVED
SEP 24 1975

2

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

It is the Committee's intention to insert in some of the blanks in the documents an identifying description of IRS personnel who assisted the FBI in certain instances, such as "an IRS Special Agent" or "an IRS Inspector". We will make these identifications based upon our notes from the documents, and will supply you with copies of the documents in which such descriptions have been typed in order that you may check the accuracy of the descriptions. In this way, we will avoid public identification of the IRS personnel even though Bureau agreement has previously been obtained that these individuals are not "sources".

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc: William Cregar

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 17, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2 ALM/cdj

Dear Mike:

With reference to my letter of September 15, 1975, requesting materials contained in FBI and Justice Department files, please add the following items:

1) Access to FBI and Justice Department materials pertaining to Tony Consiglio A/K/A Anthony Consiglio which may be contained in file number 63-6706 as indicated on FBI index card 4 27-607.

2) Access to FBI and Justice Department materials pertaining to Sam Cravatta which may be contained in FBI file number 100-36491.

3) Access to Department of Justice Organized Crime and Racketeer materials pertaining to Carlo Marcella, New Orleans.

Please advise Mr. David Bushong of the Committee staff as soon as access for review is possible. You may contact Mr. Bushong at 224-1769 or 224-1747. This request should be treated with the highest priority.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
SEP 17 1975

P.S. Please supply copies of following documents contained in DOJ file 71-4-16-27, Section 4, 5-1-61 - 3-15-62:

(1) Note dated 12/5/61 from Department of State, Signed "Dick";

cc: Uhlmann
Blackhurst

62-116395-769

ENCLOSURE

(See Reverse Side)

Asso Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 24 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 BS CODE

10:40AM NITEL 9/24/75 MMA

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395) ATT: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, BOSTON (66-4117)

SENSTUDY 75

Mr. W.O. CREGAR
Rm. 4123 JEH

-768

RENYTEL TO DIRECTOR AND BOSTON, SEPTEMBER 23, 1975, REGARDING CONTACT OF FORMER SUPERVISOR JOHN KEARNEY.

KEARNEY TODAY CONTACTED SAC, BOSTON, WHO ALERTED KEARNEY TO SENSTUDY IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTRUCTIONS IN BUTEL SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

END

MLN FBIHQ ACK FORONE TEL CLR TU

EX-108

File 67- Kearney

REC-24 62-116395-768

12 SEP 29 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

GC

84 OCT 20 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

FBI

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 24, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

(Senstudy-75)

Dear Mike:

Contained in an FBI internal memorandum dated 8/28/56 from Belmont to Boardman, captioned CP,USA - Counterintelligence Program Internal Security-C, supplied to this committee by the Bureau 7/25/75, is a reference on page 4 to a memorandum "covering the first phase of the IRS angle." We request copies of this memorandum and any others relating to the use of the IRS in the disruptive program described in the memo cited above.

Delivery of the declassified version of these memoranda and the 8/28/56 memo cited above is requested ~~by Thursday 9/25/75~~.

DTE

We also request that the attached transcript of J. Edgar Hoover testimony be excised for public disclosure along the agreed upon declassification procedure.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director,
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

EX-198

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/elg

REC-20 62-116395-767

SEP 29 1975

1. Ad Hoc
9-26-75

62-116395

5-Doc

84 OCT 2 1975

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 23 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 9/23

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter dated September 19, 1975, from John Elliff of the SSC staff which requests "delivery on a priority basis" of certain documents in the possession or control of the Bureau. Please arrange for prompt compliance with this request.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/00 BY SP2 [illegible]

cc: Paul Daly

EX-108

REC-41

62-116395-766

21 SEP 25 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

LEGAL [illegible]

5-Ed

1-ad hoc

84 MAY 13 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 19, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clg

Dear Mike:

The Committee requests delivery on a priority basis of all documents in the possession or control of the Federal Bureau of Investigation pertaining to either isolated instances, or programs or surveys where mail to or from any person in the United States was intercepted and/or opened--either domestically or abroad--by any third party at any time subsequent to January 1, 1967.*

The Committee also requests all materials pertaining to the decisional process--(i.e., consideration, recommendation and proposal--and the names of all persons involved therein)--which preceded and resulted in the Bureau's request to the Central Intelligence Agency to place each of the following names on the HUNTER Mail watch list:

(1) Cambridge Institute, Center for Study of Public Policy (Hunter Request #288);

(2) Clergy and Layman Concerned About Vietnam (Hunter Request #217);

(3) Institute for Policy Studies;

(4) Linus Pauling (Hunter Request #118);

RECEIVED
SEP 22 1975

*To the exclusion of all documents provided to the SSC on the Hunter program.

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

(5) Jeremy Stone (Hunter Request #223);

(6) Women's International Strike for Peace;

(7) Women's International League for Peace & Freedom.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

X

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATE[illegible]
CHARLES MC C. MA[illegible]AS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

September 23, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Senstudy-75

Dear Mike:

In response to discussion with James Johnson and John Thomas of the Bureau by Select Committee staff members Thomas Dawson and James De Marco, we have agreed to a revision of the list of names that appear in the September 4, 1975, letter of request signed by F.A.O. Schwarz.

As discussed with James Johnson on Monday, September 22, Bureau personnel are conducting a review of the entire case files and all documents relevant to the SSCI request of September 4, 1975, as revised in Attachment 1, with specific attention to the areas outlined in Attachment 2 of this letter. We would like delivery of these documents to the Committee, if possible, by Friday, September 26, 1975.

For the sake of expediency, all excision necessary for declassification should be completed by that same date.

2 ENCLOSURE

EX-108

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

REC-1 62-116395-765

John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc: William Cregar

RECEIVED
SEP 24 1975

SEP 29 1975

62-116395

5-P

84 OCT 2 1975

Attachment I.

1. Charles C. Kissinger
2. Tom Hayden
3. Sidney Morris Peck
4. David Dellinger
5. Robert M. Pardum
6. Absolam Jordan
7. Raymond Hewitt
8. Huey P. Newton
9. Robert M. Shelton 157-552

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/02 BY SP2ALM/ely

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-765

Attachment 2

1. Use of tax related information to harass or disrupt groups or individuals.

2. Influence exerted or requests by the FBI that the IRS conduct audits or begin Intelligence Division cases on individuals or groups of interest to the Bureau.

3. Disclosure of IRS information to:

    a. local law enforcement agencies;

    b. employers, creditors, family, or anyone outside of the Bureau, including other agencies and branches of government.

4. Disclosure of (a) tax related information, or (b) intelligence data to the Bureau by IRS that was not pursuant to a written request approved by proper Bureau and DOJ officials.

5. Memoranda reflecting Bureau policy concerning requests for and use of information provided by the IRS.

6. Disclosure of information collected by the Bureau to the IRS which effected either IRS Intelligence Division or audit action against individuals or groups.

7. Any record of verbal requests of the IRS for tax information or request by the IRS for clarification or justification of Bureau requests for tax related information.

8. All memoranda reflecting the origin and approvals for requests of IRS for tax information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-765

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 23 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR002 NY CODE

2:20 PM URGENT 9/23/75 PJS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

AND SAC, BOSTON

ATTN: SECTION CHIEF W. O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (62-15065)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/17/02 BY SP2ALM/clj

Cregar

SENSTUDY-75.

RE BUREAU TEL, SEPTEMBER 19, 1975, TO LA AND NY, WHICH DIRECTED NY TO CONTACT FORMER SUPERVISOR JOHN KEARNEY WHO SUPERVISED COINTELPRO-BLACK EXTREMIST CASES FROM 1968-70, AND ALERT HIM TO SENSTUDY IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN BUREAU TELETYPE, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

KEARNEY CAN BE CONTACTED AT WELLS FARGO COMPANY, SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS, TELEPHONE NUMBER 413-732-1122.

BOSTON HAS COPY OF BUREAU TELETYPE, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975. BOSTON REQUESTED TO CONTACT KEARNEY.

END.

REC-4 62-116395-764X OCT 7 1975

EX-111

AJN FBIHQ CLR TU

File cc - 67-Kearney

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 OCT 22 1975

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 23 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

9/23

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: 6 Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter dated September 18, 1975, from John Elliff of the SSC staff which requests "access or delivery" of certain materials, "many of which are supplementary to [their] prior request of July 28." Please arrange for prompt compliance with this request and advise me when access can be available, if delivery is not the elected method of response.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

cc: Paul Daly

EX-108

REC-24 62-116395-764

21 SEP 25 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

1-Ad Hoc

LEGAL COUNSEL

5/Encl

84 MAY 13 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 18, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Committee requests access or delivery of the following materials, many of which are supplementary to our prior request of July 28, Part 3. D., and August 20, Part 3. 1. A. The staff member responsible for the studies to which these materials pertain is Lester Seidel, who should be contacted with any questions regarding these documents. The Committee requests delivery/access of the following materials by September 23, 1975.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

Attachment

RECEIVED
SEP 18 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/00 BY SP2ALM/cdj

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1104

September 18, 1975

I. Democratic National Convention 1968

The Committee requests delivery of all underlying documents used to prepare the memorandum of July 31, 1975, entitled "Sullivan Memorandum to John Dean (Democratic Convention 1968)". The underlying documents should include, but not be limited to, all materials as they relate to the subject matter of the July 31, 1975, memorandum:

A. pertaining to contacts with FBI personnel and anyone at the Democratic National Committee including, but not limited to, John Criswell.

B. pertaining to contacts between FBI personnel and anyone on the White House staff or the staff of the Vice President of the United States at that time, including, but not limited to, William Connell.

C. prepared by or for J. Edgar Hoover, Cartha DeLoach, William C. Sullivan, and other Bureau personnel.

D. prepared by or for Marlin Johnson, Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Field Office of the FBI at the time of the Democratic National Convention.

E. pertaining to requests by the FBI to the Attorney General of the United States for authority for electronic surveillance and any response by the Attorney General pertaining to the aforementioned requests.

II. Files on Warren Commission Critics

The Committee requests delivery of all underlying documents used to prepare the February 3, 1975, memorandum entitled "Information concerning Washington Star-News article January 31, 1975, regarding Hale Boggs' son claiming possession of files of Warren Commission critics". The Committee requests a serial-by-serial description of the contents of any such

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-964

files and delivery of all materials pertaining to the original authority or order to ~~grant~~ create such a file and materials reflecting dissemination of information from such files.

III. Bobby Baker Investigation

The Committee requests delivery of all underlying materials used to prepare the February 3, 1975, memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General captioned "Background Information Concerning the Department's Request for Body Recorder in Bobby Baker Investigation in 1965". The underlying materials should include, but not be limited to, all materials pertaining to:

A. the original request from the Department to the Bureau to place the body recorder.

B. the Bureau's responses thereto.

C. any investigation conducted at the request of the White House on individuals in the Treasury Department, Narcotics Bureau, and Department of Justice pertaining to the placement of this recorder.

D. communications between White House personnel or the President and Bureau personnel.

E. the dissemination of the results of such information.

IV. The Committee requests staff access to abstracts of all communications to or from or contacts between FBI personnel and W. Marvin Watson, former Special Assistant to former President Lyndon B. Johnson for the years 1965-1968. The Committee also requests staff access to the results of a general name index search of Mr. Watson for the same years.

V. The Committee requests delivery of an unexcised copy of a May 18, 1970, 9:49 a.m. memorandum from Mr. Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, DeLoach, Rosen, Sullivan, and Bishop pertaining to a call from Vice President Spiro Agnew.

The Committee requests delivery of all materials reflecting dissemination of information to the Vice President or any member of his staff as the result of Mr. Agnew's telephone conversation on May 18, 1970, with Mr. Hoover.

VI. The Committee requests access to abstracts of all communications to or from or contacts between FBI personnel and Kent B. Crane, former assistant to former Vice President Spiro Agnew. The Committee also requests staff access to the results of a general name index of Mr. Crane for the ~~same~~ years – 1969 – 1971.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] val.
[illegible]
[illegible]
Legal [illegible]
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 22 1975

TELETYPE

NR003 NY CODE

4:38PM URGENT SEPTEMBER 22, 1975 GBM

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

ATTN: SUPERVISOR W. O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (62-15065)

SENSTUDY-75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

RE BUREAU TEL, SEPTEMBER 19, 1975, TO LA AND NY, WHICH DIRECTED NY TO CONTACT FORMER SUPERVISOR JOHN KEARNEY WHO SUPERVISED COINTELPRO-BLACK EXTREMIST CASES FROM 1968-70, AND ALERT HIM TO SENSTUDY IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN BUREAU TELETYPE, SEPTEMBER 17,, 1975.

KEARNEY CAN BE CONTACTED AT WELLS FARGO COMPANY, SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS, TELEPHONE NUMBER 413-732-1122.

BOSTON HAS COPY OF BUREAU TELETYPE, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975. BOSTON REQUESTED TO CONTACT KEARNEY.

END.

MEB FBIHQ CLR AND TKS

DISREGARD —
Supv. Karl Buckman, NYO
called 9/23/75 to advise
that NY would re-transmit
with copy to
9/23/75

EX-108

REC-41 62-116395-763

SEP 25 1975

84 OCT 2 1975

~~SECRET~~ SEP 22 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

11:30 AM IMMEDIATE 9-22-75 JN

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395) NR. 154-22

LEGAT BRASILIA NR. 048-22

FROM LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (62-37)

SECRET

SENSTUDY - 75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

RE BU CAB SEPTEMBER 19, 1975.

FOR INFORMATION BUENOS AIRES EMBASSY RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VIA THE SECRET ROGER CHANNEL WITH REGARD TO THE VISIT OF DAVID AARON, A FORMER U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, AND WILLIAM TRUEHART, A FORMER U. S. AMBASSADOR, WHO ARE STAFF MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE. ~~(S)~~

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
10/17/00

THESE STATE DEPARTMENT ROGER CHANNEL MESSAGES WERE DIRECTED TO U. S. EMBASSIES AT BRASILIA, BUENOS AIRES AND MONTEVIDEO, AND THE U. S. CONSUL GENERAL IN RIO DE JANEIRO AND WERE CLASSIFIED SECRET. ~~(S)~~

THE STATE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTED EACH RECIPIENT IN A SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, MESSAGE THAT "PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO DISCUSS WITH AMBASSADOR, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, CHIEF OF STATION (CIA) AND DEFENSE ATTACHE, THE RELATIONSHIPS AND EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY BY THE AMBASSADOR OVER INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD. ~~(S)~~

EX-108

REC-20 62-116395-762

21 SEP 25 1975

END PAGE ONE

cc

5 - Bem

~~SECRET~~

84 OCT 2 1975

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

BUE 62-37

THEY ARE NOT CONDUCTING A SPECIFIC INVESTIGATION OF ANY NATURE AND DO NOT DESIRE TO MEET WITH HOST COUNTRY PERSONNEL AND WISH TO AVOID ALL PUBLICITY." ~~(S)~~

IN THE SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, MESSAGE, THE STATE DEPARTMENT INDICATED THAT "AARON AND TRUEHART ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE STAFF MEMBERS AND THAT IT IS BELIEVED THAT RECIPIENTS COULD BE FORTHCOMING IN RESPONDING TO THEIR INQUIRIES." THE SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, MESSAGE INSTRUCTED, HOWEVER, THAT OPERATIONAL DETAILS, SOURCES AND METHODS WERE NOT CONSTRUED TO BE LEGITIMATE AVENUES OF INQUIRY. THE SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, MESSAGE NOTED THAT BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY STATE DEPARTMENT AND CIA OFFICIALS FOR THEIR VISIT. ~~(S)~~

AARON'S AND TRUEHART'S SCHEDULE CALLED FOR THEM TO BE IN BRASILIA FROM SEPTEMBER 21, 1975, UNTIL SEPTEMBER 23, 1975, WHEN THEY WILL LEAVE FOR MONTEVIDEO. THEY WILL ARRIVE IN BUENOS AIRES ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1975, WITH AARON DEPARTING ON SEPTEMBER 26 AND TRUEHART ON SEPTEMBER 27. IT IS NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR HILL IS PRESENTLY IN THE U. S. AND HAS SENT ~~(S)~~

END PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE

~~SECRET~~

BUE 62-37

INSTRUCTIONS THAT HE DESIRES TO PERSONALLY CONFER WITH TRUEHART PRIOR TO THE LATTER'S DEPARTURE ON SEPTEMBER 27, 1975. AMBASSADOR HILL IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO ARGENTINA DURING THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 26, 1975. (S)

ANOTHER COMMUNICATION DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 WAS DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE LISTED POSTS VIA THE STATE DEPARTMENT ROGER CHANNEL. THIS MESSAGE STATES VERBATIM "AARON AND TRUEHART HAVE TOLD US THEY ARE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN KINDS OF REPORTING DONE BY THE EMBASSY OFFICERS, ATTACHES, SRF (CIA) AND FBI, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE DIVISION OF EFFORT AMONG THEM. IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TALK TO THE FBI OFFICER AT YOUR POST AND HAVE SO INFORMED FBI HERE." (S)

FROM THE FOREGOING, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF AARON AND TRUEHART'S VISIT IS TO ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP INFORMATION INDICATING THAT DUPLICATION EXISTS IN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OVERSEAS AMONG THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THERE APPEARS TO BE A BASIC MISCONCEPTION BY AARON AND TRUEHART

END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

SECRET

BUE 62-37

THAT THE FBI IS ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING OPERATIONS OVERSEAS. THE PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED BUREAU POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE FUNCTION OF LEGAL ATTACHES WILL BE STRICTLY ADHERED TO IN CONTACT WITH AARON AND TRUEHART, I. E. THE PURPOSE OF A LEGAL ATTACHE IS TO SERVE THE FBI'S INTERESTS OVERSEAS IN CONDUCTING DIRECT LIAISON WITH VARIOUS POLICE DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER COMPETENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FROM THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES COVERED. SHOULD INTELLIGENCE BE DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THESE LIAISON CONTACTS, THE LEGAL ATTACHE HAS AN OBLIGATION TO REPORT THIS INFORMATION TO THE AMBASSADOR AND OTHER INTERESTED EMBASSY OFFICERS, AS WELL AS TO FBI HEADQUARTERS; HOWEVER, INTELLIGENCE REPORTING BY LEGAL ATTACHES IS NOT THEIR PRIME FUNCTION.

THE FOREGOING IS SUBMITTED FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND LEGAT, BRASILIA.

~~CLASSIFIED SECRET XGDS-2 BY 5931,~~ INASMUCH AS THE ABOVE DESCRIBED U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROGER CHANNEL MESSAGES WERE SO CLASSIFIED. ~~(S)~~

END.

PLD AL

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 22 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR002 AT CODE

10:20 PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 22, 1975 LMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

Cregar

RE ATLANTA NITEL TO DIRECTOR, SEPTEMBER 18, 1975, AND BUREAU NITEL TO ALEXANDRIA AND OTHER OFFICES, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

FORMER SA CHARLES S. HARDING WAS NOTIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN BUREAU NITEL SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, AND HIS REACTION WAS COOPERATIVE.

END

PLS HOLD FOR SIX MORE TELS

Y RETAINED IN
ERSONNEL RECORDS UNI

EX-108

REC-24 62-116395-761

SEP 25 1975

Rek bx'ds
File cc 67-Harding

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/ky

GC XEROX
OCT 2 1975

84 OCT 6 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. [illegible]ntz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

The Attorney General September 22, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

Reference is made to the request of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated August 26, 1975, for FBI materials. Included in this request, Part I, Number 6a through r, was a request for extensive material relating to the discontinued Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros) of this Bureau.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum which responds to the request of the SSC.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

REC- 112

62-116395-760X

FEB 17 1976

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

DR:lfj
(11)

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 FEB 23 1976

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

62-116395 September 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/ldj

Reference is made to the request of the SSC dated August 26, 1975, for FBI materials. Included in this request, Part I, Number 6a through r, was a request for extensive material relating to the discontinued Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros) of this Bureau. Except as noted below, this material is being delivered with this memorandum.

Items 6b, c and d, of the above request relate to documents included in the FBI Cointelpro which targeted Soviet-Satellite intelligence. Because of the sensitivity of these documents and their foreign intelligence ramifications, they are not being delivered at this time; however, they are available for review by members of your staff in Room 4171, JEH Building.

Item 6f refers to an August 25, 1967, letter "described in Item e above," which sets up requirements for status letters to be periodically submitted and requests all such status letters. No letter of this date is described in Item e. A review of FBI files indicates the August 25, 1967, letter is captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Internal Security." Copies of a memorandum dated February 29, 1968, and an airtel dated March 4, 1968, which set up the requirements for status letters in this Program, are included in material forwarded under Item 6a. Under this item it is also requested all status letters submitted in accordance with instructions in the August 25, 1967, letter be submitted. The status letters submitted under the "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups" Program are being furnished under Item 6j which requests all progress letters under that Program.

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpros)

DR:lfj
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-760X

GPO 954-546

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Item 6g requests memoranda and materials which reflect recommendations and decisions at FBIHQ regarding the transmittal of the letter dated August 25, 1967. As indicated above, memorandum dated February 29, 1968, responds to this request and it is being submitted under Item 6a with other material.

Item 6h requests an unexcised copy of the March 4, 1968, airtel captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups." This is being furnished with other material under Item 6a.

Item 6k requests all status letters received by FBIHQ pursuant to instructions contained in the May 10, 1968, letter captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security, Disruption of New Left." These status letters are being submitted with other material under Item 6o.

Item 6o requests all 90-day status reports from all Cointelpros. In this regard, it should be noted that 90-day status reports were not submitted in all the Programs. Also some 30- and 60-day status reports which were submitted under Cointelpros have been included with the material being furnished in response to Item 6o.

Item 6p requests yearly evaluations of the various Cointelpros. Such evaluations were prepared only in the instances of the Black Nationalist, Socialist Workers Party, and Communist Party, USA, Programs. Under this item it is also requested the two documents relating to the termination of all Cointelpros, a memorandum dated April 27, 1971, and an airtel dated April 28, 1971, be provided. These two documents have previously been furnished to the SSC.

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Item 6q requests certain documents submitted under the title "Communist Party, USA - Negro Question - Communist Influence in Racial Matters." These documents are included in Item 6q, except for a letter submitted by the FBI Philadelphia Office in connection with the requirement noted in Item 6q which is included with the status letters requested under Item 6o. Also, the responses from the 16 offices participating in the Cointelpro, as requested under Item 6q, have been included with the material being submitted under Item 6o.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

See letter to the Attorney General dated 9/22/75, captioned "United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)," prepared by DR:lfj.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 22 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 003 RH CODE

10:36 PM NITEL SEPT 22, 1975 PRH

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: RICHMOND (66-2757)

ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

RERHNITEL TO DIRECTOR, SEPT. 17, 1975.

ON SEPT. 19, 1975, CHARLES F. HEINER CONTACTED AND ADVISED IN EVENT HE IS CONTACTED RE CAPTIONED MATTER, HE WILL IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY RICHMOND DIVISION AND BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION.

END.

Cregar

EX-108

REC-11 62-116395-760

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY

SEP 25 1975

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

File cc 67-Heiner

OCT 2 1975

84 OCT 6 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 19, 1975

Mr. Paul V. Daly
Office of Legal Counsel
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20535

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/17/00 BY SP2GLM/cly

Dear Mr. Daly:

Enclosed is a list of documents which the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities may decide to declassify for its public hearings on the Huston Plan. We invite your opinion on any sections which you think ought to be sanitized before declassification. Of course, the great majority of key documents on the Huston Plan are already a matter of public record.

Since these hearings may be held as early as September 23rd and certainly by early October, your quick response would be most helpful.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

Enclosure

REC-100

62-116395-759X

12 FEB ~~5~~ 6 1976

2 ENCLOSURE

let to AG 1-DAG
EWL:lhc 9/22/75

LEGAL COUNSEL

HUSTON PLAN:

FBI DOCUMENTS TO BE DECLASSIFIED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY

FBI

Sullivan memo to DeLoach, "Mr. Tom Charles Huston," 20 June 1969

Brennan memo to Sullivan, "Foreign Support for Revolutionary Protest Movements in the United States," 30 June 1969

Sullivan memo to DeLoach, "Interagency Committee on Intelligence," 5 June 1970

Sullivan memo to DeLoach on plans for 8 June meeting in Hoover's office, 5 June 1970

Sullivan memo to DeLoach, "ICI Meeting in Hoover's Office," 8 June 1970

Sullivan memo to DeLoach, summary of first Langley meeting, 10 June 1970, with minutes attached

Sullivan memo to DeLoach, summary of record Langley meeting, 15 June 1970, with minutes attached

Minutes of third Langley meeting, 17 June 1970

Sullivan memo to DeLoach, summary of third Langley meeting, 18 June 1970

Sullivan memo to Tolson, advice on the Special Report draft, 20 June 1970

Minutes of fourth Langley meeting with attached Sullivan memo to Tolson on fourth meeting outcome

Sullivan memo to Tolson on Special Report signing ceremony, 26 June 1970

Hoover memo to Mardian, "Intelligence Evaluation Committee," 3 February 1971

Wannall memo to Brennan on Hoover's meeting with Helms, Gayler, and Mitchell, 25 March 1971

Hoover memo for the record on meeting with Helms, Gayler and Mitchell, 12 April 1971

Special Report ICI (ad hoc) June 1970

62-116395-759X

ENCLOSURE

Sullivan memo to Belmont, "Confidential Informant and Similar Types of Coverage," 30 September 1964

Baumgardner memo to Sullivan, "Mail Covers," 2 October 1964

Sullivan memo to DeLoach, "Black Bag Jobs," 19 July 1966

Hoover memo to Tolson and DeLoach, note on "black bag" techniques, 6 January 1967

Sullivan memo to DeLoach, "Relationships with CIA, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and John McCone," 7 March 1970 (Revised excision prepared)

Sullivan memo to DeLoach, "Relationships with CIA," 11 March 1970

Hoover letter to Helms on FBI-CIA relations, 11 March 1970

Hoover letter to Helms replying to CIA proposals, 31 March 1970

Sullivan memo to DeLoach, "Relations with Central Intelligence Agency," on meeting with CIA officials, 14 April 1970 (Original requested with names of officials included)

Felt memo to Tolson, "Security Informants, Racial Informants," on 18-21 year old informants, 2 September 1970

SAC letter 70-48, "(B) New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism--Informant Coverage, (C) Security and Racial Informants" (18-21 years old)

Executives Conference to Tolson, "Proposed Intensifications of Certain Investigations in the Security Field," 29 October 1970

Moore memo to Brennan, "Black Student Groups on College Campuses, Racial Matters," 3 November 1970

Director, FBI, airtel to SAC, Albany, "Black Student Groups on College Campuses, Racial Matters," 4 November 1970

Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, "Mail Covers, Trash Covers," 27 July 1971

Wilson to Director, FBI, "Mail and Trash Covers," 6 September 1971

Brannigan memo to Miller, "Bureau Informant 200-Policy," discussing CIA mail intercept program, 15 February 1973

FBI memo to Senate Select Committee on surreptitious entries, mail covers, and electronic surveillance, 16 July 1975

Brennan memo to Sullivan, "New Left Movement - Finances," 12 March 1970 (Cited letter to White House dated 2/26/70, requested)

Director, FBI, airtel to SAC Albany, New Left Movement - Finances," 16 March 1970

Shackelford memo to Brennan, "Security Investigations of Individuals Who Are Members of the Students for a Democratic Society and Militant New Left Campus Organizations," 3 November 1970

Director, FBI, airtel to SAC, Albany, Security Investigations of Individuals Who Are Members of the Students for a Democratic Society and Militant New Left Campus Organizations," 4 November 1970

Moore memo to Brennan, "Recommendation to Modify Instructions Concerning Recordings of Black and New Left Public Appearances," 2 November 1970

Director, FBI, airtel to SAC, Albany, "Use of Concealed Recording Devices in Covering Public Appearances by Black and New Left Extremists," 5 November 1970

Director, FBI, airtel to SAC, Albany, "Key Black Extremist Program," 23 December 1970

Information Concerning Contacts Between Representatives of the Soviet Union and Members or Staff Personnel of the United States Congress Furnished to the White House at the Request of the President," 3 February 1975 (New request, not discussed with Mr. Cregar)

Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, "Interagency Committee on Intelligence," 27 June 1970

Sullivan memo to DeLoach, "Relationships with Central Intelligence Agency (Positive Intelligence)," 6 March 1970

HUSTON PLAN:

JUSTICE DOCUMENTS TO BE DECLASSIFIED

Mardian memo to Mitchell, "Intelligence Evaluations Committee Status Report," 4 December 1970

Mardian memo to Mitchell, "Intelligence Evaluation Committee," 12 February 1971

Petersen memo to Col. Michel, "IEC," 11 June 1973 (Original needed)

Unsigned memo to Mitchell, Ehrlichman, and Haldeman on the IEC and implementation of the Huston Plan (Original needed)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY

62-116395-759X

ENCLOSURE

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

The Attorney General

September 22, 1975

Director, FBI

REC-100 62-116395-759X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY

Reference is made to letter dated September 19, 1975, from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, SSC, to Mr. Paul V. Daly, Office of Legal Counsel, FBI. This communication enclosed a list of documents which the SSC may decide to declassify for public hearings on the Huston Plan. The FBI was requested to advise whether any of the documents required appropriate excisions prior to the declassification.

On September 21, 1975, Messrs. William O. Cregar and Elmer W. Larson of the FBI met with Mr. John Elliff of the SSC Staff. During this meeting, the documents, which were enclosed with the September 19, 1975, letter, were carefully reviewed and excisions were made and mutually agreed to.

This is to advise that the FBI has no objection to the declassification and use of the documents for public hearings providing the excisions mutually agreed to on September 21, 1975, are in effect.

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
    Special Counsel for
    Intelligence Coordination

EWL:lhb lhb
(9)

EWL

NOTE:

The documents were reviewed by SAs Cregar and Larson on Sunday, September 21, 1975, and the excisions agreed upon by Mr. Elliff. On September 22, 1975, Mr. Elliff again contacted us and advised that the excisions were agreeable to the Committee. He also requested that we acknowledge the letter of September 19, 1975, through Mr. Shaheen of the Department who would then [illegible] final reply to the Committee.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

FBI

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 19 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

M 9/19

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/edj

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

John:

The attached letter is self-explanatory and seeks information which you, better than I, know to be of the most inordinate sensitivity.

The letter's penultimate paragraph requests my "personal attention to this matter, including [my] own examination of the three documents in question, and hopefully, a determination by [me] that these documents should be provided to the Committee in unexcised form (except for the names of so-called "live" informants)."

I would appreciate an early meeting with you and other appropriate Bureau representatives to discuss a proposed resolution of the matters raised by the attached requests.

EX-108 Mike

ENCLOSURE

REC-41 62-116395-759

cc: Paul Daly

21 SEP 25 1975

1-Ad Hoc 9-22-75

62-116395

84 MAY 13 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 16, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cdj

Dear Mike:

The following two documents, which relate to the Martin Luther King, Jr. matter, are the subject of a pending Committee request for documents:

A. Airtel dated 2/12/62 from SAC, New York, to Director, FBI, subject "Dr. Martin Luther KIng, Jr., SM-C (00:Atlanta);"and

B. Airtel dated 8/15/66 from SAC, New York, to Director, FBI, subject "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C (Stanley David Levison)."

These two documents had been previously provided to the Committee in heavily or almost completely excised form. Virtually the entire contents of Item A. (a 3-page airtel) were excised because "it could result in identification of an FBI informant," and more than 12 pages of Item B. (a 29-page airtel) were excised because such portions contained information which "tends to identify highly sensitive sources of continuing value." A third document which is needed by the Committee, and which would presumably also be provided by the Bureau only in excised form is a New York field office letter to the Bureau dated 6/21/62 as cited in the last paragraph of page 9 of the 10/11/62 memorandum from the SAC, Atlanta, to the Director, FBI, subject "Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, IS-C (00: Atlanta)."

RECEIVED
SEP 16 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-789

The Bureau's position with respect to the excised portions of Items A. and B. above was reiterated by FBI representatives at our September 9 meeting, notwithstanding our position that these materials were deemed to be absolutely essential to our complete understanding of the King investigation. As you are aware, several other documents previously provided to the Committee contain conclusionary statements about Stanley Levison as predicates for many of the actions taken with respect to King, and it would appear that the withheld portions of Items A. and B. above, as well as the 6/21/62 New York letter described above, would contain the detailed bases for such conclusions.

I am sure you would agree that the underlying facts concerning Levison are vital in order that we can meet our responsibilities to fully assess the propriety of the FBI's activities with respect to this case. Accordingly, I would appreciate your personal attention to this matter, including your own examination of the three documents in question, and hopefully, a determination by you that these documents should be provided to the Committee in unexcised form (except for the names of so-called "live" informants).

An early resolution of this matter is essential, and I would hope you can respond by the end of the week.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 19 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

NR014 SL CODE

6:44PM NITEL 9/19/75 MSM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ST. LOUIS (62-5038)

ATTENTION: INTD, W.O. CREAGER

SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Creager

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALEXANDRIA, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975 AND ST. LOUIS NITEL TO BUREAU, SEPTEMBER 18, 1975.

ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1975, EDMUND C. WELTON, 825 DEANDELL COURT, FERGUSON, MISSOURI, WAS CONTACTED BY SAC, ST. LOUIS, THIS DATE. HE WAS FURNISHED INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE AND ADVISED IF CONTACTED HE WOULD PROMPTLY CONTACT THE BUREAU'S LEGAL STAFF. HE ADVISED HE DOES NOT BELIEVE HE POSSESSES ANY PERTINENT INFORMATION AND STATED HE WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE THE BUREAU'S REPUTATION.

END

REC-1 62-116395-758

SEP 25 1975

file cc - 67-WELTON

84 OCT 6 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 19 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR005 NY CODE

7:38PMNITEL SEPTEMBER 19, 1975 DXM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM NEW YORK (62-15065)

ATTN: INID - W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/elg

RE BUREAU TELETYPE SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, AND NEW YORK TELEPHONE CALL TO NEWARK SEPTEMBER 18, 1975.

Mr Cregar

PER COORDINATION BY NEW YORK AND NEWARK, ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR NEW YORK TO HANDLE CONTACTS WITH FORMER SAC JOSEPH H. GAMBLE AND FORMER SA BENJAMIN P. MC MANUS IN NEW JERSEY.

FORMER SAC GAMBLE CONTACTED BY SAC INGRAM AND GAMBLE STATED HE DID NOT THINK HE WOULD BE ABLE TO FURNISH ANY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION TO COMMITTEE. GAMBLE IS PRESENTLY PRESIDENT, WELLS FARGO SECURITY GUARDS SERVICE, ROUTE TEN, RANDOLPH PARK WEST, RANDOLPH, NEW JERSEY, AND RESIDES FOUR CANFIELD TERRACE, CONVENT STATION, NEW JERSEY.

EX-108

REC-40 62-[illegible]-757

FORMER SEPERVISOR THOMAS J. CROKE, JR. AND FORMER SA BENJAMIN P. MC MANUS, ADDRESSES SAME AS LISTED IN RETEL, BOTH ALERTED AND BOTH INDICATED STILL IN POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION AND UNDER DOCTOR'S CARE.

21 SEP 25 1975

FORMER SA JOHN J. DUNLEAVY, SAME ADDRESS AS LISTED IN RETEL, ALSO ALERTED AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT HE COULD POSSIBLY BE CALLED UPON TO APPEAR BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT

file cc-67- { GAMBLE
CROKE
McMANUS
DUNLEAVY

5 GC4

84 OCT 6 1975

COMMITTEE. HE STATED IF CONTACTED BY A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONTACT THE LEGAL DIVISION.

END

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 19 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR06 SD CODE

1:37 AM SEPTEMBER 19, 1975 NITEL CWF

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714)

ATTENTION: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY [illegible]

RE BUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA, ET AL, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

FORMER EMPLOYEE ROBERT S. BAKER, 4268 HORTENSIA, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, TELEPHONE 714--296-4671, WAS TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED SEPTEMBER 18, 1975.

MR. BAKER WAS ADVISED THAT HE MAY BE CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND THAT HE, AS A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE FBI, MAY AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY THE SSC STAFF CONTACT THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING OBLIGATION AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY AS TO INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS AN FBI EMPLOYEE.

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

EX-108
REC-20
62-116395-756

MR. BAKER ACTED FAVORABLY TOWARDS ANY FUTURE INTERVIEW BY THE SSC AND SAID HE WOULD BE AS HELPFUL AS HE COULD.

21 SEP 25 1975

HE SAID THAT MR. LESTER SEIDEL OF THE SSC WHO PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED HIM HAD TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED HIM ON ABOUT

[illegible]
file cc-67 - R.S. Baker

5

GC

OCT 2 1975

84 OCT 6 1975

SEPTEMBER 12, 1975, AND WANTED TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION THAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN HELD IN SAN DIEGO PRIOR TO THE LAST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. SPECIFICALLY HE ASKED WAS THERE ANY WHITE HOUSE PRESSURE ON THE FBI REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF NEW LEFT AND BLACK EXTREMIST GROUPS AND MR. BAKER SAID IN REPLY THAT HE RECALLED NO PRESSURE AND HE REALLY DID NOT KNOW WHAT SEIDEL WAS REFERRING TO.

SEIDEL INDICATED HE MIGHT MAKE ANOTHER TRIP IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO OTHER WEST COAST OFFICES AND WOULD PROBABLY BE IN CONTACT AGAIN WITH BAKER IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

END

TMA ACK FOR SIX FBIHQ CLR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 19 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 008 DE CODE

956 PM SEPTEMBER 19, 1975 NITEL BLM

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: DETROIT (62-5146)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA, ET AL, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, AND MEMPHIS TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, SEPTEMBER 18, 1975. -739

NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS MADE TO CONTACT FORMER SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT F. O'NIELL, 2551 IROQUOIS, DETROIT, MICHIGAN, TELEPHONE NUMBER 571-2296, ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975, WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1975, MR. O'NIELL WAS CONTACTED BY ASAC JAY E. BAILEY, AT WHICH TIME HE WAS ADVISED OF THE PERTINENT CONTENTS OF REBUTEL. HE ADVISED THAT HE ONLY SERVED ABOUT ONE YEAR AS A SECURITY SUPERVISOR IN THE DETROIT OFFICE AND THAT HE HAD DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER HE HAD ANY INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC). HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF SSC, HE WILL PROMPTLY CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION FOR APPROPRIATE GUIDELINES AND WOULD CLOSELY ADHERE THERETO.

REC-24 62-116395-755

EX- SEP 25 1975

Records

file cc-C7-{O'NEILL
ENDRES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

OCT 2 1975

84 OCT 6 1975

ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1975, FORMER SPECIAL AGENT PHILIP S. ENDRES, 1527 PINE RIDGE DRIVE, GRAND HAVEN, MICHIGAN, BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER 798-536L, WAS CONTACTED BY ASAC BAILEY, AT WHICH TIME HE TOO WAS FURNISHED PERTINENT INSTRUCTIONS AS OUTLINED IN REBUTEL. HE INDICATED THAT WHILE ASSIGNED TO THE JACKSON OFFICE HE HAD HANDLED PRIMARILY COINTEL ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE KLAN, IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD PROMPTLY CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION IN THE EVENT HE IS CONTACTED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF SSC.

END.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 19 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR019 SL PLAIN

1207AM 9-19-75 ,853) 9/18/75 KCM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ST. LOUIS (62-5038)

ATTENTION: INTD, W. O. CREAGER

SEN STUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALEXANDRIA, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975, JOHN J. BUCKLEY, 9469 HAROLD DRIVE, WOODSON TERRACE, MO., WAS CONTACTED BY ASAC, ST. LOUIS, THIS DATE. HE WAS FURNISHED INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE AND ADVISED IF CONTACTED HE WOULD PROMPTLY CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL DIVISION. HE ADVISED HE DOES NOT BELIEVE HE POSSESSES ANY PERTINENT INFORMATION BUT STATED HE WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE THE BUREAU'S REPUTATION.

ST. LOUIS ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT EDMUND C. WE[illegible]ON.

EX-108

END

REC-11 62-116395-754

~~TMA ACK FOR ONE FBIHQ CLR~~

SEP 25 1975

File cc-67-BUCKLEY

84 OCT 6 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
SEP 19 1975
TELETYPE

NR 003LA PLAIN

419PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 19, 1975 RJM

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-6243)

ATTN - INTD

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL SEPTEMBER 18, 1975.

SAC RALPH J. RAMPTON WILL DEPART LOS ANGELES AT 9 AM, SEPTEMBER 22, 1975, VIA AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 76, ARRIVING DULLES AIRPORT, WASHINGTON, D.C., AT 4:50 PM.

END

RETAINED IN
ERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY

(Rampton)

EX-108

Phillips (last)

REC-15 62-116395-153

SEP 25 1975

OCT 2 1975

84 OCT 7 1975

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 9/19/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clg

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY

Removed By 79 FEB 23 1976

File Number 62-116395-752X

Permanent Serial Charge Out

... BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 19 1975

TELETYPE

mcw

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 018 LA CODE

537PM NITEL 9-19-75 RLD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOS ANGELES (157-5089)

ATTN: SUPERVISOR KEITH MENDENHALL, ROOM 4427, JEH BUILDING

ATTN: INTD

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/elj ON 10/17/00

SENSTUDY -75

RE BUTEL CALL SEPTEMBER 19, 1975, AND LOS ANGELES TEL APRIL 23, 1975.

AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED LOS ANGELES TEL, CAPTAIN MERVIN KING, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, ADVISED THAT HIS DEPARTMENT HAD NO OBJECTION TO DIVULGING THAT THE LETTER FROM JANE FONDA TO LEO M. ATARASSO, DATED MARCH 25, 1970, HAD BEEN OBTAINED BY THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH A LEGAL SEARCH, IN CONNECTION WITH A HOMICIDE INVESTIGATION INVOLVING SAUNDRA PRATT, WIFE OF ELMER PRATT, AN ACKNOWLEDGED LEADER OF THE CLEAVER FACTION, BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP).

EX-108

REC-20 62-116395-752

21 SEP 25 1975

CLASSIFIED BY 5411, XGDS TWO, INDEFINITE.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

END

~~HOLD PLS~~

Recmd:
PKS place cc in
100-459279 (Fonda)
ES

5-TAM

84 OCT 7 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

Mr. W. R. Wannall

9/18/75

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

F. J. Cassidy

COINTELPROS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/rlg

This is to identify additional serials which are being made available for access in Room 4171, JEH, or delivered to staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) for retention in SSC office.

Attached are nine serials relating to CPUSA matters which were made available for access for SSC staff members in Room 4171, JEH, on 9/10/75.

Each serial, prior to being made available for access, was excised in accordance with current guidelines relating to excision for access and were approved for passage by the appropriate Section Chief.

Barbara Banoff, SSC staff member, on 9/10/75, requested that eight serials relating to CPUSA matters be re-excised for delivery after having been reviewed by SSC staff members in Room 4171, JEH. Subsequent to the request for delivery, the serials were re-excised by personnel of the respective Sections in accordance with current guidelines relating to excision for delivery. Each serial, prior to being made available for delivery, was approved for passage by the appropriate Section Chief. The list indicating receipt by Banoff of the eight serials on 9/12/75 is attached.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116009-[illegible]

Enclosures
62-116009

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy) — 73
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)
1 - 100-449698 (New Left)
1 - 100-448006 (Black Extremist)

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 OCT 1 1975

DKP:lfj
(11)

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

OCT 7 1975

Arthur Jefferson, SSC staff member, on 9/16/75 accepted delivery of 11 Black Extremist serials and 19 CPUSA serials which had been appropriately excised for delivery. Each serial, prior to delivery, was approved for passage by the appropriate Section Chief. The two lists indicating receipt of the 11 Black Extremist and 19 CPUSA serials by Jefferson on 9/16/75 are attached.

A duplicate set of the eight CPUSA serials delivered on 9/10/75 and the 11 Black Extremist and 19 CPUSA serials delivered on 9/16/75 is being maintained in one volume in Room 4426, JEH.

ACTION:

None. For information.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 19 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR011 MP CODED

11:18PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 DCW

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (66-3610)

ATTENTION: INTD, W. O. CREGAR.

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

-750

RE SEATTLE TELETYPE TO BUREAU DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1975.

MR. LEROY W. SHEETS, WAS PERSONALLY CONTACTED THIS DATE, BY ASAC WILLIAM D. NEUMANN. MR. SHEETS REACTED AFFIRMATIVELY AND EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR BEING CONTACTED BY THE FBI IN A SUPPORTIVE ROLE. MR. SHEETS STATED HIS INTENTION TO CALL THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION IN THE EVENT HE IS CONTACTED BY THE SSC.

END

EX-108

REC-41 62-116395-751

SEP 25 1975

Records

File cc-67-SHEETS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

84 OCT 6 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 19 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

NR011 MP CODED

11:30PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 DCW

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (66-3610)

ATTENTION: INTD, W. O. CREGAR.

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY/75

Cregar
-75

RE SEATTLE TELETYPE TO BUREAU DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1975.

MR. LEROY W. SHEETS, WAS PERSONALLY CONTACTED THIS DATE, AT ISLAND CAMP GROUNDS, RED WING, MINNESOTA, BY ASAC WILLIAM D. NEUMANN. MR. SHEETS REACTED AFFIRMATIVELY AND EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR BEING CONTACTED BY THE FBI IN A SUPPORTIVE ROLE. MR. SHEETS STATED HIS INTENTION TO CALL THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION IN THE EVENT HE IS CONTACTED BY THE SSC.

EX-108

REC-24 62-116395-150

GC

EX SEP 25 1975

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

LER ACK FOR ONE FBIHQ CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

Rpbd
File cc-67-Sheets

OCT 2 1975

84 OCT 6 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

NR001 AX PLAIN

3:03 PM U R G E N T SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 DKL

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

(ATTENTION: INTD W. O. CREGAR)

BOSTON

FROM: ALEXANDRIA (62-217) (RUC)

SENSTUDY, 1975.

REFERENCE BUREAU NITEL, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

REFERENCED NITEL INSTRUCTED ALEXANDRIA CONTACT JESSE C. HALL, JR. HALL CURRENTLY RESIDES POST OFFICE BOX 142, NORTH NO., TRURO, MASSACHUSETTS.

BOSTON HANDLE PER REFERENCED NITEL.

END.

Mr Cregar

4/23

EX-108

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

REC-11 62-116395-749

21 SEP 25 1975

File CC-67-HALL

√-THOMAS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

84 OCT 6 1975

OCT 2 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

NR002 AX PLAIN

3:05 PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 DKL

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

(ATTENTION: INTD W. O. CREGAR)

FROM: ALEXANDRIA (62-217) (RUC)

SENSTUDY, 1975.

Mr Cregar
4123

REFERENCE BUREAU NITEL, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975; AND ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO BOSTON, SEPTEMBER 18, 1975.

ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975, FORMER EMPLOYEE, SETH F. EIKENBERRY, WAS CONTACTED BY ASAC MICHAEL A. MORROW IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS AND FURNISHED INFORMATION SET OUT IN REFERENCED BUREAU NITEL. EIKENBERRY INDICATED HE WOULD CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL IF HE IS CONTACTED.

END.

RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

EX-108

REC-1 62-116395-148

SEP 25 1975

#

VLN FBIHQ ACK FOR TWO TELS CLR TU

Records
File cc- 67- EIKENBERRY

OGC
OCT 2 1975

84 OCT 6 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SPJALM/clj

NR008 AT CODE

7:24 PM NITELSEPTEMBER 18, 1975 LMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALEXANDRIA, ATLANTA, AND OTHER OFFICES SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, AND ATLANTA URGENT TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR AND KNOXVILLE, SEPTEMBER 18, 1975. -736

FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, RICHARD H. DAVIS, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, WAS NOTIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPE AND HIS REACTION IS COOPERATIVE.

FORMER SA, CARL E. CLAIRBORNE, NOW LOCATED IN KNOXVILLE DIVISION, AND KNOXVILLE SO NOTIFIED IN REFERENCED ATLANTA TELETYPE.

FORMER SA CHARLES S. HARDING PRESENTLY TRAVELING AND UNAVAILABLE BUT WILL RETURN TO ATLANTA ON LATE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 19, 1975. HARDING WILL BE NOTIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS RETURN TO ATLANTA AND THE BUREAU WILL BE NOTIFIED WHEN CONTACT COMPLETED.

END

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

EX-108

REC-41 62-116395-747

SEP 25 1975

Richards
File cc 67 - Claiborne
- Davis

84 OCT 6 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR009 SE CODE

7:10 PM IMMEDIATE SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 GJW

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

MINNEAPOLIS

FROM SEATTLE (66-2894)

ATTENTION: INTD, W. O. CREGAR.

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cbj

Mr. Cregar
9/23 JEN

RE BUTELS MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975 TO ALL OFFICES AND BUTELS SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, TO SELECTED OFFICES INFORMING LATTER THAT SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAD REQUESTED IDENTITIES OF ALL SUPERVISORS AND COORDINATORS FOR COINTELPROS IN SELECTED OFFICES FOR (1) NEW LEFT AND BLACK EXTREMIST, 1967 THROUGH 1971, AND (2) FOR WHITE HATE, 1964 THROUGH 1971.

SSC ALSO REQUESTED LOCATIONS OF PERSONS NAMED IN FIELD RESPONSES IN REFERENCED SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, TELETYPES AND LATEST INFORMATION IN FBIHQ FILES HAS BEEN FURNISHED TO SSC. SSC STAFF MAY CONTACT CURRENT AND/OR FORMER EMPLOYEES NAMED, TO INTERVIEW THEM CONCERNING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF COINTELPROS IN WHICH THEY HAD SUPERVISORY OR COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITIES.

EX-108
REC-20 62-11[illegible] 146

SEP 25 1975

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

LEROY W. SHEETS, FORMER EMPLOYEE, IS TO BE CONTACTED IMMEDIATELY AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. MR SHEETS MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF CONTACT BUREAU'S

END PAGE ONE

Refiled
Files - SHEETS

GC1

84 OCT 6 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS A COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.

CONTACT WITH MR. SHEETS TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, ATTENTION INTD, W. O. CREGAR, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACTED/ IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

INVESTIGATION SEATTLE DIVISION DETERMINED LEROY W. SHEETS CURRENTLY IN TRAVEL STATUS THROUGHOUT THE US. HIS STEPDAUGHTER PAMELA WEIHEMULLER, MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON, ADVISED ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975, THAT SHE DETERMINED ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, FROM MR. SHEETS THAT HE WOULD BE IN RED WING, MINNESOTA FROM EVENING HOURS SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 THROUGHT SEPTEMBER 23, 1975. MR. SHEETS CAN BE CONTACTED AT ONLY

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

SE 66-2894

TRAILER COURT IN RED WING WHICH IS LOCATED ON BANK OF RIVER OR

THROUGH GAY REITAN, 753 EAST 7TH, RED WING, MINNESOTA.

E N D

SJP FBIHQ

PLS HOLD

cc-11

PLAINTEXT TELETYPE URGENT

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

9/18/75

TO: SAC, DENVER
ADIC, LOS ANGELES

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/elj

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE THEODORE P. ROSACK AND RALPH J. RAMPTON BE MADE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., FOR INTERVIEW BY THAT COMMITTEE ON 9/23/75. THE INTERVIEW WILL INVOLVE SACS RAMPTON'S AND ROSACK'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE BUREAU'S INVESTIGATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, STANLEY DAVID LEVISON, AND COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE RACIAL MOVEMENT. SACS RAMPTON AND ROSACK SHOULD ARRANGE TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., IN TIME TO BE BRIEFED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONS AT 9 A.M., 9/23/75, IN ROOM 4509 OF THE JUSTICE BUILDING.

EX-108

REC-24 62-116395-745

21 SEP 25 1975

1 - Personnel File - Theodore P. Rosack
1 - Personnel File - Ralph J. Rampton

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
SEP 18 1975
TELETYPE

NOTE: Michael Epstein, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, made the request for the interviews of SACs Rampton and Rosack concerning their knowledge of the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Stanley David Levison, and Communist Influence in the Racial Movement. This communication will serve as approval for the waiver of the existing employment agreements signed by SACs Rampton and Rosack for purposes of this interview.

PVD:lad
(13)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
al Coun.
phone Rm.
or Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

Daly

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR 004 RH CODE

3:29 PM NITEL 9-18-75 MLW

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: ACTING SAC, RICHMOND (66-2757)

ATTENTION: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

REBUNITEL SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

RANDOLPH E. TROW AND JOHN H. WAGNER CONTACTED BY SENIOR SUPERVISOR SHERRILL W. LAW, WHO IS PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH BOTH INDIVIDUALS, ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975. BOTH TROW AND WAGNER DID NOT APPEAR UNDULY ALARMED AND ADVISED IN EVENT THEY ARE CONTACTED BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE THEY WILL IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY RICHMOND DIVISON AND BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION.

CHARLES F. HEINER IS CURRENTLY IN EUROPE. WILL RETURN TO RICHMOND WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1975, AND WILL BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED UPON HIS RETURN BY RICHMOND. BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED OF THIS CONTACT.

END

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

EX-108

REC-11 62-116395-744

21 SEP 25 1975

LNG FBI HQ CLR

File cc-67- { TROW
WAGNER
HEINER

GC3

OCT 2 1975

84 OCT 6 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
✓ Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR 004 JN CODE

4:15 PM NITEL 9/18/75 SRG

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: JACKSON (80-662)

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cls

REBUNITEL SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975, FORMER SAC, JACKSON, ROY K. MOORE WAS CONTACTED BY SAC SULLIVAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS IN RE NITEL. MR. MOORE APPRECIATED THE CONTACT. HE ADVISED THAT DUE TO THE MANY SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS HE SERVED ON DURING THE PERTINENT PERIOD AND HIS MANY TRANSFERS HE HAS AT THE PRESENT TIME NO RECOLLECTION WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE FILE AND WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WISH TO REFRESH HIS RECOLLECTION THROUGH REVIEW OF PERTINENT FILES FOR PURPOSE OF ANSWERING THE INQUIRY. IF, HOWEVER, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVE HAD PERTINENT DOCUMENTS AUTHORED AND SIGNED OR INITIALED BY MOORE AND UTILIZED THIS MATERIAL TO REFRESH MOORE'S RECOLLECTION, HE WOULD, OF COURSE, COOPERATE FULLY. HE POINTED OUT HE WOULD IN NO WAY BE UNCOOPERATIVE BUT SIMPLY HAS NO INDEPENDENT RECOLLECTION AT THE PRESENT TIME.

EX-108
REC-1 62-116395-743

END

SJP FBIHQ CLR

File 67- R.K.Moore

84 OCT 6 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

Dep. [illegible]-Adm. ___
Dep.-A D-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR009 KX PLAIN

5:43 PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 WEH

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

ATLANTA (62-2854)

(ATTN: INTD, W. O. GREGAR)

FROM: KNOXVILLE (62-1109)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY [illegible]

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL SEPT. 17, 1975, AND ATLANTA TEL SEPT. 18, 1975

FORMER SA CARL E. CLAIRBORNE WAS CONTACTED THIS AFTERNOON AND ADVISED OF INFORMATION SET FORTH IN REFERENCED TEL. MR. CLAIRBORNE'S INITIAL REACTION WAS QUITE STRONG AND HE INDICATED THAT IF CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF FOR INTERVIEW HE WOULD HESITATE TO TELL THEM ANYTHING. HE STATED THAT HIS POSTURE IN THIS REGARD WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO TELL THEM ANYTHING THAT WOULD HURT THE BUREAU. HE INDICATED THAT HIS FEELING AT THIS TIME WAS THAT HE WOULD NOT SUBMIT TO INTERVIEW UNLESS SUBPOENAED; HOWEVER, MR. CLAIRBORNE STATED THAT IF HE WAS CONTACTED BY THE COMMITTEE STAFF HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY ADVISE ME AND THEREAFTER CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION OF THE BUREAU FOR FURTHER ADVICE.

END.

EX-108

REC-11 62-116395-742

SEP 25 1975

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

File cc-67-Claiborne

OCT 8 1975

OC1

84 OCT 6 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR008 NK PLAIN

5:10PM NITEL 9/18/75 KXM

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

FROM NEWARK (66-3963)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/02 BY SP2ALM/cbj

REBUNITEL 9/17/75.

LEAD FOR NEWARK TO CONTACT BENJAMIN P. MC MANUS HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH SAC JAMES O. INGRAM, NYO, AND IT WAS DECIDED THAT DUE TO MC MANUS' PHYSICAL CONDITION AND THE FACT HE IS WELL KNOWN TO THE NYO SUPVERVISORY STAFF, NEW YORK WOULD MAKE NECESSARY CONTACT REQUESTED IN REBUNITEL.

COPY NYO VIA MAIL.

END

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

EX-108

REC-20

62-116395-741

SEP 25 1975

SJP FBIHQ ACK FOR THREE CLR AND TKS

Records

File CC-67-McManus

84 OCT 6 1975

OCT 2 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ——
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ——
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ——
Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs ——
Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. ——
Ident. ——
Inspection ——
Intell. ——
Laboratory ——
Plan. & Eval. ——
Spec. Inv. ——
Training ——
✓ Legal Coun. ——
Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec'y ——

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

NR005 JK CODED

6:20 PM NITEL 9/18/75 HER

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395) ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM JACKSONVILLE (66-408)

SENSTUDY/75.

W.O. Cregar

RE BUREAU NITEL TO JACKSONVILLE AND OTHER OFFICES SEPT. 17, 1975.

W. HERSHEL CAVER, 3714 NORTHWEST 40TH ST., GAINESVILLE, FLA., TELEPHONE 904-373-3784, CONTACTED BY ASAC, JACKSONVILLE, AND ADVISED OF PERTINENT CONTENTS OF RE NITEL. CAVER STATED HE HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY SSC AND FEELS HE HAS NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF COINTELPROS. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OPPORTUNITY TO CONTACT OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL IF NECESSARY.

RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

EX-108

END

REC-24 62-116395-740

SEP 25 1975

File cc-67- CAVER

OCT 1975

84 OCT 6 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 013 ME CODE

6:14 PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 JLC

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

DETROIT

FROM MEMPHIS (66-2150)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/elj

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

RE BUNITEL OF SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

REFERENCED NITEL LISTED ADDRESS OF PHILIP S. ENDRES AS 22 SOUTH SECOND STREET, MEMPHIS, TENN. INQUIRIES AT THAT LOCATION DETERMINED HE IS NOT KNOWN THERE. BUREAU SUBSEQUENTLY ADVISED REVIEW OF ADDITIONAL DATA LISTED 1975 ADDRESS AS 1527 PINE RIDGE DRIVE, GRAND HAVEN, MICHIGAN, AND PRESENTLY EMPLOYED AS DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY, MUSKEGON, MICHIGAN.

REC-11 67- -139

27 SEP 25 1975

DETROIT HANDLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED NITEL.

END

~~HOLD~~

file C-67- ENDRES

84 OCT 6 1975

OC

OCT 2 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975
TELETYPE

Assoc Dir.	
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

NR 017 LA PLAIN

05:38 PM NITEL 9-18-75 BDW

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-6243)

ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

Mr Cregar

REBUTEL 9/17/75.

THE FOLLOWING FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE FBI LISTED IN LOS ANGELES WERE CONTACTED 9/18/75 BY SAC RALPH J. RAMPTON, CURRENT ADDRESS INFO IS LISTED BELOW:

RICHARD J. STILLING, 11648 AMESTOY STREET, GRANADA HILLS, CALIF., 91344, EMPLOYED AT SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO., P.O. BOX 800, 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE, ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770.

JOHN S. TEMPLE, 2145 WEST GRENADIER, SAN PEDRO, CALIF. 91732, EMPLOYED AT MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 1420 SOUTH CENTRAL, GLENDALE, CALIF. 91204.

JOHN KEANE (NOT KEARNEY), WHOSE ADDRESS REMAINS 4140 MAYFIELD STREET, NEWBURY PARK, CALIF. IS CURRENTLY TRAVELING WITH HIS WIFE IN A MOBILE HOME WITH AN UNCERTAIN ITINERARY. HE HAS BEEN IN THIS STATUS SINCE APRIL 1975 AND WILL NOT RETURN HOME IN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE. HE MAINTAINS IRREGULAR CONTACT WITH HIS SON, JOHN JR., WHO IS AN ORTHODONIST IN LOS ANGELES. HE LAST CONTACTED HIS SON

Keane Not located LA + SSC advised 9/19/75.

Nitel to LA NY, 9/19/75

REC-1 62-116395-738

SEP 25 1975

File Richard Stilling, Temple, Keane
cc-67-

OC3

OCT 6 1975

84 OCT 6 1975

9-16-75, FROM MAINE AND DISCLOSED HE IS EN ROUTE TO VIRGINIA AND HE IS EXPECTED TO ATTEND THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE SOCIETY OF FORMER FBI AGENTS 11/5-8/75 IN HOUSTON, TEXAS. IT IS PROBABLE HE WILL CONTACT HIS SON IN LOS ANGELES BY TELEPHONE NEAR THE END OF SEPTEMBER, AND A STOP HAS BEEN PLACED WITH THE SON TO CONTACT THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE CONCERNING THIS MATTER.

MSSRS STILLING AND TEMPLE WERE NOT SURPRISED BY THE INFO CONTAINED IN RETEL AND EXPRESSED COMPLETE COOPERATION IN THE MATTER.

END

SJP FBIHQ ACK FOR SEVEN TELS

PLS HOLD

[illegible]

W. Donald Stewart
1900 South Eads Street, Apt. 202
Crystal House I
Arlington, Virginia   22202

September 18, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

Mr. Clarence M. Kelley
Director, FBI
10th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.   20535

Dear Mr. Kelley:

I have been contacted by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee and instructed by Mr. Paul Wallach to report for an interview on September 23, 1975 at 2:00 P.M.

I have learned that the "Hunter" matter, on which I'm to be interviewed, is presently under review for possible criminal prosecution by the Department of Justice. Accordingly, since, while being associated with "Hunter", I was under Bureau direction, I am requesting that an attorney be appointed for me by the Department of Justice or arrangements be effected that I can be reimbursed if I secure my own attorney.

EX-108

Sincerely yours,

REC-41

W. Donald Stewart

-137

SEP 25 1975

Bill [illegible]
Please advise Paul Daly of above. Don

Telephonically advised Wallach at 12:10 pm 9/18/75

84 OCT 2 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Mr Cregar
4/23

NR007 AT CODE

3:10 PM URGENT SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 LMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

KNOXVILLE

FROM ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/klg

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ATLANTA, KNOXVILLE, AND OTHER OFFICES, SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, CARL E. CLAIRBORNE, MOVED FROM ATLANTA, GEORGIA, TO KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE, APRIL, 1975, AND CAN BE LOCATED THROUGH HIS PARENTS AT 7840 CEDAR CREST ROAD, KNOXVILLE TENNESSEE 37918.

KNOXVILLE CONTACT CLAIRBORNE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPE.

RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

END

MKA FBIHQ CLR

EX-108

62-116395-736

REC-24

21 SEP 25 1975

Rizzardi
File cc- 67-Claiborne

84 OCT 6 1975

OCT 2 1975

EDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
~~Training~~ ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR002 KX PLAIN

11-40 AM NITEL SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 IHC

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM KNOXVILLE (62-1109)

ATTENTION: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cl

ATTN: MR CREGAR
RM. 4123

REBUNITEL SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

FORMER SA IRVING R. ANDERSON WAS CONTACTED THIS A.M. AND ADVISED OF INFORMATION SET FORTH IN RETEL. SA ANDERSON'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT IF CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF FOR INTERVIEW HE WOULD LIKE TO "TELL THEM TO GO TO H ". HOWEVER, HE FELT THAT IF HE TOOK THIS STANCE, HE WOULD HURT THE BUREAU INASMUCH AS THE BUREAU HAS PLEDGED COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT WANT TO TAKE ANY ACTION, EVEN THOUGH NOW A FORMER EMPLOYEE, TO HURT THE BUREAU IN THE FUTURE. HE STATED THAT HE SERVED THE BUREAU FOR MANY YEARS, STILL FEELS HE IS PART OF THE BUREAU, AND IS DEDICATED TO BEING USEFUL TO THE BUREAU IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER.

Y RETAINED IN
ERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

EX-108

REC-11 62-116395-735

21 SEP 25 1975

ANDERSON STATED IF HE WAS CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF, HE WOULD DEFER THE INTERVIEW

File cc 67-Anderson

5-Evd

OCT 2 1975

cc- Cregar

84 OCT 6 1975

KX 62-1109 PAGE TWO

AND IMMEDIATELY ADVISE ME. HE ALSO STATED THAT PRIOR TO SUBMITTING TO ANY INTERVIEW WITH THEM, HE WOULD CONTACT THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL TELEPHONICALLY FOR FURTHER ADVICE.

END.

AJN FBIHQ CLR TU

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A D-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Mr. Cregar

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

NR011 BS CODE

7:00PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 18, 1975

TO: DIRECTOR 62-116395

FROM: BOSTON 66-4117

ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/11/00 BY SP2ALM/clg

REBUNITEL DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, AND ALEXANDRIA URGENT TELETYPE DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 BOTH CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

RICHARD H. BLASSER, FREDERICK M. CONNORS, MICHAEL J. MC DONAGH, AND JOHN F. NOONAN, ALL RESIDING GREATER BOSTON AREA, AND JESSE C. HALL, JR., PO BOX 142, NORTH TRURO, MASSACHUSETTS, TELEPHONE 487-1633, CONTACTED SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 BY ASAC, BOSTON.

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

EX-108

ALL FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES ADVISED OF PERTINENT PORTIONS OF REFERENCED BUREAU NITEL. EACH EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR BUREAU STATING THEY WOULD COOPERATE WITH ANY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBER IN THE EVENT THEY ARE CONTACTED IN FUTURE; HOWEVER, STATED THEY HAD BEEN AWAY FROM BUREAU SO LONG THEY COULD NOT RECALL ANYTHING THEY BELIEVED TO BE OF VALUE TO THE COMMITTEE.

REC-1 62-116395-734

SEP 25 1975

END

[illegible]

File CC - 67 - { Blasser
Connors
McDonagh
Hall

OC4

OCT 2 1975

84 OCT 6 1975

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 17 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

9/16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cdj

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter dated September 15, from the Senate Select Committee which requests various materials from the Bureau. Please arrange for an appropriate response to this request.

9/17/75 Elliff advised [illegible] we should [illegible] request as there is not sufficient data identifying the subject of the request to identify in identification records PVD

5-Ext

cc: Paul Daly

EX-108 Daly

REC-24 62-116395-733

21 SEP 25 1975

ENCLOSURE

LEGAL COUNSEL

150

58 OCT 6 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 15, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

With reference to my letter of September 11, 1975, requesting materials contained in FBI and Justice Department files, please add the following item: the FBI "rap sheet" on Alfredo Perez (wife's name Florenz) residing in Reston, Virginia.

Please advise Mr. David Bushong of the Committee staff as soon as this information is available. It should be treated with the highest priority.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

Delivered by Hand

RECEIVED
SEP 15 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-733

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 9-17-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/cly

Senate Select Committee (SSC) convened public hearings 9-16-75, at which Chairman Frank Church announced the chief purpose of the inquiry was to examine the role of CIA disobeying direct orders of President Nixon who had ordered the destruction of biological/bacteriological agents and weapons of war by Presidential Order, 11-25-69. Chairman Church referred to previous executive testimony of Director Colby which established that CIA had maintained a supply of approximately 6 grams of shellfish toxin, a lethal agent, until June, 1975, in apparent contravention of the Presidential Order of 1969. The retention of the toxin had been ordered by a midlevel employee without the knowledge of former Director Richard Helms.

While Chairman Church stressed it is not the purpose of SSC to denigrate the importance of the FBI and the CIA of their contribution to the welfare of the United States, he stated subsequent SSC hearings would highlight the necessity that Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies operate in a manner which will not infringe upon the rights of American citizens.

EX-109

REC-11 62-116395-132

Church added that SSC will eliminate the possibility of domestic abuse by these agencies and will draft legislation for the establishment of joint Congressional oversight.

SEP 25 1975

Dr. Nathan Gordon, project NAOMI chemist who retired from CIA on 9-30-72, testified he had received no

1-Mr. Wannall
  (Att: Mr. Cregar)
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-Mr. Taylor

RTT:lgp
(6)

1 - ~~Taylor~~ RTT

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

CIA directive to destroy or impinge on his decision to maintain the toxins and, further, the Presidential Order was directed toward offensive biological weapons of war in possession of the Department of Defense. Additionally, Dr. Gordon pointed out that the shellfish toxin over which he had custody was a chemical substance and could not be classified as a biological weapon.

Former Director Helms will appear before SSC in public session, 9-17-75.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 17 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2 ALM/elg

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request for IRS Information

Reference is made to my memoranda of September 9, and September 11, 1975 (copies of which are attached), by which I forwarded to you copies of the September 4, 1975, letter from SSC Chief Counsel Schwarz to the Attorney General and the letter of "modification" dated September 10, 1975, from John Elliff to me.

I have been orally advised (and will be in receipt of a confirming letter today) that the very long list of names and organizations about whom tax information was and is sought by Schwarz's September 4, letter was intended to apply as well to the Bureau for its response.

The Bureau is, therefore, requested to provide relevant materials and documents pertaining to Bureau requests for tax returns and tax return information, on the individuals and organizations listed in Mr. Schwarz's letter of September 4. In other words, the request made in the September 4, letter is for Bureau response except as Elliff's letter of modification exempts the raw files of the Bureau from inclusion in this request.

The SSC staff requests that materials be assembled on the named individuals and organizations in the same order as they are listed in the letter and that when a response for a given name or organization involves a great volume of materials or documents, an appropriate Bureau official should advise either

EX-118

REC-20 62-116395-131

3 ENCLOSURE

SEP 29 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 MAY 13 1976

Mark Gitenstein or Art Harrigan of the SSC staff that response, in such an instance, will be voluminous and should be refined by consultation.

I am advised, as usual, that because the SSC anticipates early hearings on the materials specifically sought by this request, this request enjoys urgent priority. Please prepare as prompt a response as possible.

(I am attaching the letter confirming the oral advise that the September 4, letter applies to the Bureau; that letter was received while this memo was in typing.)

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/ky

September 17, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

As Mark and you discussed today on the phone, it was the Committee's intent in Fritz Schwarz' letter to you of September 4, 1975, that the FBI, as well as the Internal Security Division, provide information pertaining to the individuals and organizations listed in that letter. Of course this letter and the August 29 letter are modified by my letter of September 10. Furthermore, this request is of the highest priority and therefore we want to be kept informed of its progress on a daily basis. Perhaps the best approach would be to have Bureau representatives contact either Mark Gitenstein or Art Harrigan immediately so that we might prioritize the names listed in the September 4 letter.

Tom Dawson,
SSC adv. WOC
9/17/75 that
priority is
listed.
P. in order

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
SEP 17 1975

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-721

SEP 11 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/11/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

SUBJECT: Modification of SSC Request

Attached is a letter from John Elliff of the SSC staff which modifies the language of the August 29, letter from the SSC's Chief Counsel Schwarz to the Attorney General. The last sentence of the first paragraph of the August 29, letter read as follows:

> "Where an Internal Security Division request was made with respect to a person or organization on whom the Internal Security Division or the FBI maintained or maintains a file, we would appreciate the opportunity to review the entire file". (emphasis mine)

The modification of the first paragraph effected by the attached letter deletes the words "or the FBI" as underlined above. Such a modification exempts the raw files of the Bureau from inclusion in this request. The request still requires response by the Bureau for "all documents" in its possession as requested of the entire Department generally by the modified first paragraph.

cc: Paul Daly

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-731

SEP 9 1975

TO: Richard L. Thornburgh
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2ALM/clg

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Reference is made to my memorandum of September 5, 1975, by which I forwarded to you for your attention and appropriate response a letter dated August 29, 1975, from the Senate Select Committee which contained a "partial list" of selected cases in which IRS files indicated that the Department had received tax returns and other tax information. You will recall that that letter requested that the Department expedite the production of its files showing the origin of each request, the use made of the information, and the names of Departmental personnel with firsthand knowledge of the request for and use of the tax information in each instance of such request.

Attached for your further attention and additional response is what is hoped to be the Committee's completed list of selected cases for which the SSC seeks the same information as requested in their letter of August 29.

Please advise me as soon as possible of any delays that may make prompt compliance with this request impossible.

cc: Michael Uhlmann, AAG, OLA
John Mintz, FBI

62-116395- 931

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 9/11/75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/dj

David Bushong, who identified himself as a Senate Select Committee Staff Member, telephonically requested on 9/10/75 that the Bureau determine the listing for telephone number 714-756-3388 in Rancho, Santa Fe, California, and the listing for Post Office Box 515 in Rancho, Santa Fe, California. Bushong indicated that the fact he was attached to the Senate Select Committee could be verified by inquiry with Staff Director Bill Miller or Security Officer Ben Marshall of that Committee.

Mark Gitenstein of the Senate Select Committee was telephonically contacted by SA Paul V. Daly and advised of the request received from David Bushong. He was informed that the Bureau did not have authority to conduct an investigation for the Senate Select Committee in the absence of instructions from the Attorney General and that the Bureau would not conduct such an investigation in the absence of same. Gitenstein agreed that the Bureau should not conduct the investigation and indicated he would bring this to the attention of Bushong.

Subsequently, ASAC Arthur Barger of the San Diego Office telephonically advised he had been contacted by David Bushong and asked to make available to him information he had requested the Bureau to furnish. Barger was informed that the Committee had been notified that this was an improper request and that the Bureau was not going to comply. He was told to tell Bushong that Mark Gitenstein of the Committee had been apprised of this matter and he should contact Gitenstein.

REC-20 62-116395-730

Gitenstein was telephonically recontacted and advised that Bushong had contacted the San Diego Office requesting an investigation and Gitenstein was reminded that he had stated previously he would insure that Bushong was advised that his was an improper request. Gitenstein explained that he did not realize Bushong had left for San Diego and that he would straighten the situation out.

SEP 25 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:lad
(7)

84 OCT 2 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Subsequently, Gitenstein telephonically recontacted SA Paul V. Daly and advised that the request for investigation had been done "behind his and Elliff's back" apparently referring to John Elliff, Task Force Director for the Senate Select Committee. He indicated that this request had been discussed with the Deputy Attorney General's Office and was an investigation being conducted by Senate Tower and Kurt Smothers, Minority Counsel. He requested that SA Daly contact Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, to verify that arrangements have been made for the Bureau to conduct this investigation.

SA Daly contacted Shaheen and Shaheen advised that he knew nothing of this request. Shaheen was informed that absent specific instructions from the Attorney General the Bureau would not conduct the requested investigation and Shaheen agreed that this was the proper position for the Bureau. Shaheen was informed that the Senate Select Committee Staff Member conducting the investigation was David Bushong and Shaheen stated that he knew Bushong and Bushong had formerly been the Administrative Assistant to former Attorney General William Saxbe.

Subsequently, John Bayley, Assistant Minority Counsel for the Senate Select Committee, telephonically contacted SA Daly and apologized for the request that the Bureau conduct an investigation for the Senate Select Committee and he indicated that he thought arrangements had been made for this investigation through the Deputy Attorney General's Office. Bushong advised that Senator Tower was currently attempting to locate the Attorney General to straighten out this particular problem and apparently arrange for the Bureau to conduct such an investigation.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

JBH|pvd
PVD

JBA

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 9 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/elg

TO: Richard L. Thornburgh
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Reference is made to my memorandum of September 5, 1975, by which I forwarded to you for your attention and appropriate response a letter dated August 29, 1975, from the Senate Select Committee which contained a "partial list" of selected cases in which IRS files indicated that the Department had received tax returns and other tax information. You will recall that that letter requested that the Department expedite the production of its files showing the origin of each request, the use made of the information, and the names of Departmental personnel with firsthand knowledge of the request for and use of the tax information in each instance of such request.

Attached for your further attention and additional response is what is hoped to be the Committee's completed list of selected cases for which the SSC seeks the same information as requested in their letter of August 29.

Please advise me as soon as possible of any delays that may make prompt compliance with this request impossible.

EX-108

REC-20 62-116395-729

12 SEP 29 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

cc: Michael Uhlmann, AAG, OLA
John Mintz, FBI

ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 17 1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 4, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/17/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As we indicated in our letter of August 29, the request for Internal Security Division file information regarding the individuals and organizations listed in that letter was a partial request on which early action was needed because of hearings tentatively scheduled for the last week in September. We would appreciate your providing with respect to the individuals and organizations listed below the same information which we requested in our letter of August 29:

Name	Date of Request
Hubert Geroid Brown, et al.	4/25/68
Bobby George Seale	5/7/68
David E. Murphy	5/8/68
Earl Leon Anthony	5/15/68
James Leroy Doss	5/15/68
David Hilliard	5/15/68
Huey Percy Newton	5/16/68
Richard Bullock Henry	5/20/68
Leroy Eldridge Cleaver	5/21/68
Gregory Allan Calvert, et al.	5/31/68
Robert Milton Pardun, et al.	5/31/68
Linda Morse Dannenberg	5/31/68
Carl Alfred Davidson	5/31/68
Rennard Cordon Davis	5/31/68
David Tyre Dellinger	5/31/68
Nicholas Michael Egelson	5/31/68
Steven Edward Halliwell	5/31/68
Thomas Emmett Hayden	5/31/68

RECEIVED
SEP 9 1975

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-429

Name	Date of Request
Charles Clark Kissinger, Jr.	5/31/68
Carl Preston Oglesby, Jr.	5/31/68
Sidney Morris Peck	5/31/68
Jerry Clyde Rubin	5/31/68
Mario Robert Savio	5/31/68
Robert Scheer	5/31/68
Michael Louis Spiegel	5/31/68
Isaiah Rowley	12/18/68
Shermont Le Grant Banks	2/4/69
William Edward Martin	2/4/69
Albert Jason Lima	3/5/69
Roscoe Quincy Proctor	3/5/69
Mohammed T. Mehdi	3/25/69
Frederick Harris Gardner	4/15/69
Simon Groenteman	4/18/69
Levi Lee and Mary Miller Laub	5/5/69
James Earl Ray, alias Eric Starvo Galt	5/19/69
Ignacio Gonzalez	5/22/69
Conservative Vice Lords, Inc.	5/16/69
City-Wide Citizens Action Committee (CCAC)	5/16/69
Black Panther Party	6/26/69
Hector & Paulina Fernandez	7/14/69
Raymond Hewitt	7/29/69
Sinan A. & Sara C. Korle	9/11/69
Lonnie O'Neil Counts	9/17/69
The Africa Fund; American Comm. on Africa (ACOA) may have evolved from African Aid & Legal Defense Fund	9/26/69
Roland Otto Fehrmann	10/27/69
Michael Britt & Tatiana	1/13/70
Paul Yu (Greta Yee-Tak-Yu)	1/16/70
Gerhard E. G. Bauch	1/29/70
Joseph Albert Yablonski	2/6/70
Vincent A. Massock	2/6/70
Silous Huddleston	2/6/70
Paul Eugene Gilly	2/12/70
Robert Marvin Shelton United Klans of America, Inc. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and/or the Alabama Rescue Service	6/19/70
June Hunzinger	12/1/70

Name	Date of Request
National Bank Robery	1/27/71
Melvin Smith	2/16/71
Charles Leonard aka Charles Vincent	2/25/71
Stokley Carmichael	2/25/71
Willie Lee Warford	2/25/71
Lance Watson	3/1/71
Absalom Frederick Jordon	3/4/71
James Paul Garrett	3/4/71
Bobby Lee Rush	3/11/71
Juette Kathleen Cleaver	3/12/71
Jewish Defense League Jewish Organization Youth, Inc. Estelle Donna Evans Foundation	3/15/71
Larry E. Canada, Jr.	3/16/71
Donald Lee Cox	3/17/71
Andrew Eugene Austin	3/17/71
Leroy Eldridge Cleaver	3/19/71
Patricia Sue Hilliard	3/18/71
Emory Douglas, Jr.	3/19/71
David Hilliard	3/19/71
Roosevelt Hilliard	3/24/71
Aaron Lloyd Dixon	3/25/71
Elmer James Dixon III	3/25/71
Elbert Emcy Howard	3/25/71
Byron James Rice a/k/a George A. Burton	3/31/71
Donald Howard Campbell	4/1/71
Charles Enlow Koen	4/1/71
Irving H. Mayer Dorothy Florence Mayer Mark Ivan Mayer	5/24/71
Bobby George Seale	6/8/71
David and Patricia Hilliard	6/7/71
Eve Williams Kennelly	6/1/71
Human Organizational Political Economic Development, Inc.	6/14/71
Center for Community Change	6/14/71
Daniel Ellsberg	7/13/71
Klaus Herbert Becker	7/22/71
Everett LeRoy Jones	8/5/71
John A. Czechel	8/6/71
Institute for Policy Studies	8/26/71
Bay Area Institute	10/15/71
Anatolity Kapralofff	11/11/71
Robert Alexander Harvey	11/29/72
Judith Schneider	1/18/72

Name	Date of Request
Baltimore Neighborhood Commons Corp.	1/21/72
Irwin Management Co., Inc.	1/21/72
Cummins Engine Foundation	1/21/72
Sonia Kaufman	1/26/72
Ronald Kaufman	1/26/72
Walter H. Lively	2/8/72
Austin Lulin Sydnor	2/8/72
Robert Harper	2/8/72
Burnett Pointdexter	2/8/72
Ivanhoe Gaylord Donaldson	2/8/72
James Paul Garrett	2/8/72
Marvin Holloway	2/8/72
Walter Bremond	2/8/72
Richard Arnold Lawrence	2/8/72
Stanley Leroy Wise	2/8/72
Jewish Operation Youth, Inc.	2/22/72
Peter and Cora Weiss	2/29/72
Samuel Rubin Foundation	2/29/72
Black Panther Party (David T. Hilliard)	2/18/72
Huey Percy Newton	2/25/72
Black World Foundation	3/30/72
James Boggs	4/28/72
The Pentagon Papers Fund for Human and Civil Rights	9/28/72
Kenneth Ralph Tolliver	10/10/72
Claudia M. Strain	8/31/72
James and Grace Lillian Boggs	10/30/72
Philip Leroy Hutchings	3/20/73
Leibel Bergman	5/25/73
Michael Vernon Jarvis	5/25/73
Michael Francis McDermott	5/25/73
Dr. Curtis Nelson Powell	7/3/73
Nelson Napoleon Johnson	9/27/73
Howard Lamar Fuller	9/27/73
Robert Franklin Williams	9/28/73
Marilan Shih Hsieh	10/17/73
Courtland Vernon Cox	11/28/73
Richard Arnold Lincoln	12/14/73
David Chandler Prince	12/14/73
Frederick McFarlin, Sr.	12/14/73
Stokely Carmichael	2/20/74
Arthur Hayden Bronson, Jr.	3/5/74
John Henle	3/14/74

Name	Date of Request
Stokely Carmichael	2/20/74
Arthur Hayden Bronson, Jr.	3/5/74
John Henle	3/14/74
Chan Soo OH	6/18/74
Sarkis O. Paskalian & Sahag K. Dedeyan	7/16/75

We would appreciate your making the files available in the order in which they are listed above. In order to permit the Committee staff to review as many files as possible before the end of September, we would appreciate your endeavoring to provide the first half of the requested files by September 15, and the remainder by September 19.

If you anticipate that there will be any difficulty in supplying the information requested by the dates indicated, we would appreciate your advising the Committee as early as possible as any delay could affect the hearing schedule.

Very truly yours,

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.

AL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
IMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR002 AQ CODE

7:38 PM NITEL 9-18-75 FXH

REC-29

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/elj
ON 10/17/00

FROM ALBUQUERQUE

ATTENTION: SECTION CHIEF W.O. CREGAR, INTD.

SENSTUDY SSC - FIVE

FORMER SPECIAL AGENT SAM J. PAPICH, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO, TODAY ADVISED THAT HE WAS INTERVIEWED SEPTEMBER 18, 1975, BY DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEYS REGARDING HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION.

PAPICH STATED THAT INTERVIEW COVERED "Z" COVERAGE, [SAM SURVEY,] AND DEALT LIGHTLY REGARDING CONTACTS WITH (~~S~~)(u) ANONYMOUS SOURCES. DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEYS PLACED EMPHASIS ON PAPICH'S KNOWLEDGE ABOUT AUTHORITY FOR ABOVE ACTIVITY. PAPICH STATED HE REPLIED TO BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE HE AND ANYONE INVOLVED IN SUCH ACTIVITY ASSUMED AUTHORITY CAME FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL MEANING ATTORNEY GENERAL AND/OR PRESIDENT. PAPICH EXPLAINED TO ATTORNEYS THAT IN [SAM SURVEY] (~~S~~)(u) EFFORT WAS MADE TO DETECT CYRLLIC WRITING ON MAIL LEAVING UNITED STATES DESTINED ABROAD AND THIS PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO DETECT ILLEGAL AGENTS OPERATING IN UNITED STATES.

EX-106 REC-29 62-116395-728

SEP 24 1975

PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Records

(Papich) 2/18/94 05 RMB/GAT (JFK)

5-WOB

84 OCT 10 1975

X

PAGE TWO

PAPICH DENIED DIRECT KNOWLEDGE THAT MAIL WAS ACTUALLY OPENED UNDER [SAM SURVEY OPERATION.] ALSO DISCUSSED WAS (~~S~~)(u) [ELECTRONIC COVERAGE INVOLVING COLLECTIVE EFFORT OF NSA, CIA, AND FBI. PAPICH STATED HE RESPONDED THAT HE HAD KNOWLEDGE OF A COOPERATIVE EFFORT REGARDING ABOVE THREE AGENCIES AS REGARDS CABLE TRAFFIC.] (~~S~~)(u)

DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEYS INDICATED TO PAPICH THAT THEY PLAN TO INTERVIEW FORMER BUREAU OFFICIALS WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN, CARTHA DE LOACH, AND DONALD E. MOORE.

PAPICH ADVISED HE DETECTED NO HOSTILITY ON PART OF INTERVIEWING ATTORNEYS.

END.

X

PLAINTEXT **TELETYPE** **URGENT**

TO SAC NEW YORK

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Walsh

9/19/75

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT SAC ROBERT CHARLES DENZ AND SA JOHN C. SULLIVAN BE MADE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON, D.C., FOR INTERVIEW BY THAT COMMITTEE ON 9/24/75. THE INTERVIEW WILL INVOLVE THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE BUREAU'S INVESTIGATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, STANLEY DAVID LEVISON, AND COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE RACIAL MOVEMENT. SAC DENZ AND SA SULLIVAN SHOULD ARRANGE TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON IN TIME TO BE BRIEFED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISION AT 9 A.M., 9/24/75, IN ROOM 4509 OF THE JUSTICE BUILDING.

EX-106

REC-29

62-116395-727

1 - Personnel file - Robert Charles Denz
1 - Personnel file - John C. Sullivan (NY)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

PVD:mfd
(13)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
SEP 19 1975
4:39 VLA
TELETYPE

18 SEP 22 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/02 BY SP2ALM/ely

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

84 SEP 30 1975

NOTE: Michael Epstein, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, made the request for the interviews of SAC Denz and SA Sullivan concerning their knowledge of the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Stanley David Levison, and Communist Influence in the Racial Movement. This communication will serve as approval for the waiver of the existing employment agreements signed by SAC Denz and SA Sullivan for purposes of this interview.

1 - M[illegible]. A. Mintz
1 - Mr[illegible]W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

SEPTEMBER 19, 1975

TO LOS ANGELES
NEW YORK

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395

SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2ALM/elj
MDR-16

REBUTEL SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, AND LATEL SEPTEMBER 18, 1975.

LOS ANGELES DISCONTINUE EFFORTS TO CONTACT FORMER SA JOHN KEANE. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS NOT BEEN FURNISHED NAME OF MR. KEANE IN CONNECTION WITH SSC INTEREST IN COINTELPRO.

NEW YORK CONTACT FORMER SA JOHN KEARNEY, WHO SUPERVISED COINTELPRO-BLACK EXTREMIST, 1968-1970, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPE. BUREAU FILES SHOW LATEST ADDRESS FOR KEARNEY AS 2512 MARTIN AVENUE, BELLMORE, NEW YORK.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
SEP 19 1975

EX-106

REC-10 62-116395-726

TELETYPE
19 SEP 22 1975

JPT:lhb
(6)

NOTE:

SSC requested identities of former supervisors and coordinators of COINTEL Programs in several offices. We furnished same. Referenced Bureau teletype instructed offices covering residences (latest in FBI Headquarters files) of former employees to alert those individuals that SSC might contact them for interview and that in such event they could contact Legal Counsel Division. Address furnished for Kearney proved to be address of former SA John Keane, according to Los Angeles Office. This has been verified

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

OCT 3 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

NOTE CONTINUED:

and SSC informed separately of correct address. This is to inform Los Angeles that Keane is not involved and Kearney may be.

5-113a (Rev. 3-21-73)

10/10/00 #MDR16
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/16
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SECRET
Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 8/4/75

In connection with our responses to the Senate Select Committee (SSC), the White House has instructed that the Intelligence Community prepare a briefing for Senators Church and Tower of the SSC regarding warrantless electronic surveillances and surreptitious entries. During meetings of the Intelligence Community, it was agreed that NSA, FBI and CIA would give the briefings. No date has been scheduled for the briefings, although it is anticipated representatives of the White House will monitor a preview of the actual briefing to be given Senators Church and Tower.

During meetings of the Intelligence Community representatives, to discuss the contents of such a briefing, it was agreed among representatives of NSA, CIA and FBI that efforts would be made to avoid identifying specific foreign targets of surreptitious entries or warrantless electronic surveillances.

Attached is a memorandum from CIA advising that CIA has already disseminated to the SSC information concerning sensitive technical operations against certain Embassies and diplomatic establishments in the U.S.(S)

ACTION: For information and record purposes.

WOC:bcw bcw

~~SECRET~~
~~Classified by 6268~~ WB
~~Exempt from GDS, Category~~ 2
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

wpw
BA
PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 8/6/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MDR16

10-10-00 SP-2ALM/JK

On 8/6/75, Daniel M. (Mac) Armstrong, III, who was on the personal staff of former Acting Director Gray, called to advise that he had been contacted by John Elliff. He had known Elliff casually during the confirmation hearings regarding Mr. Gray. Elliff told him that he was personally interested in determining background on two matters which were: (1) the decision to abolish the Crime Records Division; and (2) the Legal Attache program.

Armstrong told him that he had no knowledge concerning the Crime Records Division and had not even learned of its abolishment until after the fact. Armstrong referred Elliff to Dave Kinley regarding that topic. Armstrong said that Elliff did not want to talk to him concerning the Legal Attache program over the phone and said he would contact him in the near future for an appointment to see him personally.

Armstrong said he was passing this information along to us in order to keep us advised of his contacts with the Senate Select Committee concerning his Bureau information which came to him as a result of his Bureau employment.

REC-26 62-116395-524

RECOMMENDATION:

EX-101

For information.

AUG 15 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Herington

JH:mfd
(6)

(Armstrong)

84 G 26 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

SECRET

SENSITIVE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓ wrw
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-16-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTC

DivD-75/327
4 August 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Staff Knowledge of CIA Domestic Electronic Surveillance Against Foreign Targets

1. In our discussions preparatory to the briefing to be given to Senators Church and Tower, we have agreed to try to avoid identifying specific foreign targets of the various types of operations which will be discussed, although it was generally recognized that it would be impossible to avoid discussing the Soviet target specifically. I have recently learned that the SSC Staff is aware of the fact (from material turned over to them by CIA) that CIA "participated in a series of electronic surveillance operations in the U.S." The information is contained in a single paragraph, which goes on to say:

> "Included among them are operations against the Czech Embassy, the UAR Embassy, the Chilean Embassy, the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, the present Soviet Embassy, the planned Soviet Embassy, and the quarters occupied by the Chinese Communists in New York City."

JFK(1)(c)

2. This being so, it can be expected that the Staff will have brought this information to the senators' attention, and I will be prepared to respond factually to questions with respect to these operations, which of course were carried out in pursuit of NSA requirements, and with FBI coordination and/or support.

EX-101 REC-26 62-116395-523

AUG 15 1975

3. Notwithstanding this regrettable breach in the principle we have agreed to try to maintain, I believe we should resist pressures to expand on the number of identified targets.

Edward Ryan
Edward Ryan
Chief, Division D

1 c/c made for temporary use & destruction 8/4/75 wrw

cc: NSA (Mr. Richard Kern)
FBI (Mr. William Cregar)
IC Staff (Adm. Showers)

84 AUG 18 1975

SECRET

SENSITIVE

62-116395

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

500 THRU 535

537 THRU 541

543 THRU 546

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 03-18-2025

1 - [illegible] Adams
2 - Mr. [illegible] Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. J. Cochran

August 18, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Reference is made to the August 5, 1975, request of the SSC for FBI materials.

Enclosed is a memorandum for your approval and forwarding to the Committee in response to Item V in referenced request, relating to access to screen material by August 18, 1975.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JPT:lhb lhb
(11)

REC 27 62-116395-546

EX 104

AUG 21 1975

4 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

c. Dir. ___
p. AD Adm. ___
p. AD Inv. ___
. Dir.: ___
nin. ___
np. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
v ___
val. ___
m. ___

WO

JPT

AUG 5 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. J. Cochran
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

August 18, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

#MDR16

SP-2 ALM[illegible]16

10-11-00

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to Item V of the August 5, 1975, request by the SSC for access to screen FBI materials.

Materials considered responsive to the SSC request have been assembled and are available for review by SSC Staff Members in Room 4171, JEH Building, regarding the following parts of Item V:

Part A. Materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew. Regarding Item V., A., 6., information pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary letters described in Item V., A., 4., is not contained in FBI files. Regarding Item V., A., 7., the FBI has no record of any former or current Special Agent (SA) named William Jackson who could have performed the tasks enumerated in the SSC request. However, at the time that SA Phil Claridge was assigned to the Albuquerque Field Office, there was also assigned there a Special Agent named Gordon Jackson, now retired. The last known residence for SA Claridge, who retired June 29, 1973, is 619 16th Street N.W., Albuquerque, New Mexico. The last known residence for SA Jackson is 1537 Wellesley Drive N.E., Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Part B. Materials pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Radford.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
pec. Inv. ____
aining ____
Coun. ____
one Rm. ____
Sec'y ____

JPT:lhb lhb
(10)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

JPT

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ **ENCLOSURE**

GPO 951-546

Part E. Materials relating to the National Security Agency (NSA) "watch list." Regarding this request, it should be noted that no central file or individual case regarding the "watch list" has been maintained by the FBI. Accordingly, a diligent search of logical files and inquiries of personnel possibly knowledgeable of information pertinent to the SSC request have been conducted. Materials secured by this effort have been assembled in chronological order, in order to facilitate Staff review.

Part F. Materials pertaining to authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service.

Part G. The "Handbook of Technical Equipment." Pursuant to agreement between Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC and Mr. William O. Cregar of the FBI, the aforementioned handbook, which deals entirely with technical information, is available for review by Mr. Elliff to determine its relevance to SSC interests. Should Mr. Elliff determine that the handbook or specific portions thereof are relevant, and request delivery of same, prior review by FBI Laboratory personnel, to determine the necessity for security classification of requested materials, will be required before delivery.

Part H. Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-in (also known as "Earth Day"), April 22, 1970.

Part I. Materials pertaining to the origin and implication of any decision to gather intelligence on "Women's Liberation" in the FBI Philadelphia Field Office from 1969 to the present.

Part J. Additional SAC letters and memoranda identified on a list attached to the referenced request.

Part K. Performance ratings (form FD-185) of several named current or former FBI employees. Regarding this request, pursuant to agreement between Mr. Elliff, supra, and Mr. Cregar, supra, the personnel file of former SA George Berley, containing forms FD-185 regarding Mr. Berley, will be available in the possession of a representative of the FBI for discussion and responses to specific questions Mr. Elliff may desire to ask regarding the performance ratings contained therein.

Part L. The current office assignment or last known address of individuals listed in Part K. of the request.

As previously indicated, the aforementioned materials will be available in Room 4171, JEH Building.

Part C. of the referenced request concerned surreptitious entries carried out by the FBI from January 1, 1960, to the present. Part D. of the referenced request concerned materials pertaining to any jurisdictional agreements, agreements of coordination, or other agreements between the FBI and any other Federal, state or local agency with regard to the conduct of and dissemination of information from surreptitious entries. The Department of Justice has previously informed the SSC that it has the matter of surreptitious entries under study and the FBI has been instructed by the Department of Justice to withhold responses to inquiries concerning surreptitious entries until Departmental study of the matter has been completed.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 8/18/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. (Item V of 8/5/75 SSC request.)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V. Daly Date: 8/18/75

Received by: Janet Moore

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP2 ALM/JG

62-116395-546

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 8/5/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Operating Procedures
Intelligence collection

#MDR16
10-11-00 SPJ mm 1776

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Made available to appropriate personnel of the SSC Staff, for review at FBIHQ, materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew. Addresses furnished of two former Special Agents of the Albuquerque, New Mexico office. Material pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Radford. Materials relating to the National Security Agency "watch list". Materials pertaining to authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. The "Handbook of Technical Equipment." Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-in, April 22, 1970. Materials pertaining to the origin and implication of any decision to gather intelligence on "Women's Liberation" in the FBI Philadelphia Field Office from 1969 to the present. Additional S/C letters and memoranda. Performance ratings (form FD-185) of several named current or former FBI employees.

62-116395 FMK:fmk (4)

TREAT AS YELLOW

/ / WOO

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-546

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

1 - Mr. J. [illegible] Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

The Attorney General

August 7, 1975

Director, FBI

#MDR16

10-11-00 SP2ALM/JJG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is a memorandum with enclosure concerning an interview by a representative of the captioned Committee of former FBI Inspector Donald E. Moore. Single copies of the memorandum and its enclosure are also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 4

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former FBI Inspector Donald E. Moore)

LFS:lhb/hb
(10)

EX 104

REC 27 62-116395-543

9 AUG 21 1975

3 ENCLOSURE

WOC

JBA

W.O. CREGAR

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 AUG 25 1975

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

62-116395

August 7, 1975

#MDR 16

SP2 ALM/JTB

AL 10-11-00

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
INSPECTOR DONALD E. MOORE
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

This memorandum and its enclosure contain information concerning an interview on July 28, 1975, of former FBI Inspector Donald E. Moore by Mr. Loch Johnson, SSC Staff Member. Mr. Moore entered on duty with the FBI on March 10, 1941, and served continuously in a variety of assignments until his retirement on June 29, 1973.

On advance notice from Mr. Johnson, Mr. Moore was advised that Mr. Johnson desired to interview him at Mr. Moore's convenience relative to his knowledge of the Huston Report. Mr. Moore was advised that he was being released from any applicable employment agreement for purposes of the SSC interview concerning the Huston Report. It was explained to him that he had the right to counsel; however, the FBI would be unable to provide private counsel. He was also advised that there were certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions. These areas concerned information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and information originating with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Mr. Moore was advised that if he desired an FBI representative to be available for consultation at the time and place of the interview, one would be supplied. Mr. Moore commented that

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former FBI Inspector Donald E. Moore)

LFS:lhb/hb
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-wdc 854

LFS

GPO 954-546

this would not be necessary but indicated that if necessary he might contact a Bureau representative telephonically if a matter requiring consultation should come up during the interview. Mr. Moore subsequently contacted Mr. Johnson and made arrangements to be interviewed in Mr. Moore's office on July 28, 1975.

On July 31, 1975, Mr. Moore voluntarily furnished the attached memorandum which he prepared subsequent to his interview with Mr. Johnson.

Enclosure

NOTE:

Mr. Moore's memorandum concerning the interview was voluntarily furnished to SA L. F. Schwartz.

Interview of Donald E. Moore by
Mr. Loch Johnson, Senate Select Committee
July 28, 1975

Mr. Johnson stated at the outset that this was an informal interview and he did not place me under oath. He asked about my background which was provided him and included the fact that I served in the FBI from March 10, 1941, until my retirement at the end of June 1973.

The interview concerned the so-called Huston Committee and he asked if I knew Tom Charles Huston before the Committee was established. I said I recalled meeting Huston once, in Bill Sullivan's office, but I didn't recall when this was, but it was before the Committee was formed. In response to questions, Mr. Johnson was informed as follows:

I was aware of the meeting at the White House attended by Director Hoover, Mr. Helms, Admiral Gayler and Gen. Bennett. I was probably aware the meeting was to take place before the meeting date but I can't recall this. (He said the meeting was held June 5, 1970.) I was not at a meeting held in Mr. Hoover's office June 8 but I recall hearing about the meeting, probably from Bill Sullivan. I don't recall a meeting held in the Domestic Intelligence Division after this at which Sullivan, Bill Cregar, George Moore, Fred Cassidy and I were present. I did attend the initial meeting of the Working Group headed by Sullivan and was present because Sullivan asked me to be there. I remember Sullivan and Cregar were at the meeting and I thought one or more other FBI representatives were present. He mentioned George Moore and Fred Cassidy were at the meeting.

I recall Mr. Helms and Mr. Angleton from CIA were present but did not recall the names of others including the representatives from NSA, DIA and the military services. I recall Sullivan chaired the meeting and that Huston sat at the opposite end of the table. Either Helms or Sullivan announced that Helms probably couldn't stay for the entire meeting but I don't recall Helms leaving, although he did not sit directly at the conference table.

#MDR16

[illegible] CONTAINED
[illegible] UNCLASSIFIED
10/11/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE · 62-116395-543

I can't recall the conversation at the meeting but think that Sullivan outlined the request of the President to study means of getting better intelligence information on new left activities and violent protest movements in the US, especially with regard to possible foreign support. I think Sullivan probably outlined areas of concern and asked representatives present to document where they felt intelligence was lacking, how it could be obtained, who should obtain it and what was needed to obtain it. I said I couldn't at this date recall specific observations or proposals and rather believed the purpose of the meeting was to outline the general problem and ask the representatives to document these and come in with specific recommendations at a subsequent meeting. I am certain Mr. Huston spoke about the purpose of the meeting but I can't recall his comments.

This was the only meeting of the Working Group I attended. I told Mr. Sullivan that if agreeable with him I would not attend subsequent meetings and I thought the FBI had several representatives present and that the thrust was on new left and related activities. As I recall he said "suit yourself." Johnson pressed me on this and I told him this was what I expressed to Sullivan but I also was somewhat uneasy after the first meeting as I did not believe Mr. Hoover was aware of collection efforts that were likely to be recommended. I could not state what FBI members attended subsequent meetings but I believe Charles Brennan and Bill Cregar, and of course, Bill Sullivan, attended as well as some other representatives.

I can't say who drafted the report but was sure it was under Sullivan's direction. During the period of the meetings Deke DeLoach had retired and Sullivan had been appointed Assistant to the Director and moved from the 9th & D Building to the Justice Building. I don't recall when Mr. Hoover's objections to certain of the recommendations were added. I can't say whether I saw the report prior to the objections being in it but may have; I do recall seeing the report after the objections were in it. I don't know whether Mr. Hoover told Sullivan to put the objections in it but presume Sullivan knew Mr. Hoover's views and put the objections in on this basis. I could not answer the question as to whether Mr. Tolson was the person responsible for having the objections made but felt he would have objected to the initial recommendations.

I did see the letter from the White House saying the report had been approved. I believe it was signed by Huston and stated the President had approved the recommendations. I was aware Mr. Hoover had either written or seen Attorney General Mitchell expressing his reluctance and was aware the White House letter was withdrawn. I din't know why it was withdrawn other than this occurred after Mr. Hoover went to the Attorney General.

Mr. Johnson asked certain specific questions during or after the above discussion. He asked what covert mail coverage was involved since CIA in 1970 was engaged in covert mail interception. After checking with Mr. Leon F. Schwartz of the FBI, Mr. Johnson was advised that while I had been released from my pledge of confidentiality by the FBI in general with regard to the Huston Committee this matter was under review by the Department of Justice and I had not been released from my pledge on this aspect. A similar answer was given to the question about what was meant by the removal of restrictions on the use of surreptitious entry of embassies to obtain cryptographic materials.

Mr. Johnson asked if I thought the Huston Committee had been instigated by Bill Sullivan to more or less force Mr. Hoover to take a more aggressive stance in intelligence collection. I answered that I would not like to speculate on this and I could not make a definite statement yes or no.

He asked why the Working Group met at CIA as opposed to the FBI and whether this had special meaning. I answered that I did not think so, that the US Intelligence Board was headed by the Director of CIA, was concerned with intelligence collection and met at CIA and also meeting arrangements could probably be better arranged at CIA in view of parking, conference rooms, etc.

He said Admiral Gayler had stated that he and his predecessor, Gen. Carter, had tried to get Mr. Hoover to provide more support to NSA with regard to Communications Intelligence and asked if I was aware of any such efforts, and if they were in person or in writing. I said I was aware that Gen. Carter and Adm. Gayler had asked for support and I believe they might have seen Mr. Hoover personally and perhaps had written him.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/7/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former FBI Inspector Donald E. Moore

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence Collection

#MDR16

10/11/00 SPJ ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Concerning the FBI and the so-called Huston Report

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5/10

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-543

274-10033

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 14 1975

TELETYPE

REC 22

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ___
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. WRW
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

NR 012 NY CODE

5:08PM URGENT 8-14-75 PLQ

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-146601)

~~TOP SECRET~~

#MDR16 DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG ON 11-28-00

ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

W. O. Cregar

SENSTUDY 75; IS-R

THERE FOLLOWS A PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SPECIAL AGENT (SA) JAMES P. KEHOE TO STAFF MEMBERS OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON AUGUST 12, 1975. COMPLETE DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE BUREAU WHEN THEY ARE RECEIVED FROM SA KEHOE'S ATTORNEY.

THREE SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED BY SA KEHOE AND THEY WERE SAM SURVEY, SUN SURVEY, AND Z COVERAGE. WITH REGARD TO SAM SURVEY, IT WAS STATED THAT TO THE BEST OF HIS RECOLLECTION THIS BEGAN ABOUT 1959 AND WAS BELIEVED TERMINATED IN 1963. IT BEGAN AS A SURVEY TO OBSERVE THE OUTSIDE OF THE ENVELOPS DESTINED TO VARIOUS CITIES IN EUROPE, LOOKING FOR INDICATORS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO LOCATION OF SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS. AT A LATER POINT IN TIME COVERAGE WAS ALSO MAINTAINED ON CERTAIN ADDRESSES IN EUROPE KNOWN TO BE MAIL DROPS UTILIZED BY THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS). THE ACTUAL SCRUTINY OF THE MAIL WAS CONDUCTED AT

EX 104 REC 27 62-116395

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS

James P. Kehoe

9 AUG 21 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 AUG 26 1975

KENNEDY AIRPORT IN A ROOM AT THE POSTAL AIR MAIL FACILITY. CERTAIN CONSTANT CITIES WERE EXAMINED AND OTHER CITIES WERE SELECTED ON A VARIABLE BASIS. WHEN LETTERS WERE OBSERVED THAT WERE BELIEVED TO MEET THE CRITERIA THEY WERE BROUGHT BACK TO THE NEW YORK OFFICE (NYO) WHERE THEY WERE OPENED AND PHOTOGRAPHED BY THE AGENT CONDUCTING THE Z COVERAGE. THE VOLUME WAS VERY SMALL, PROBABLY CONSISTING OF ABOUT TEN LETTERS IN A SIX MONTH PERIOD. A DESCRIPTION OF THE MACHINE UTILIZED IN THE OPENING WAS PROVIDED AND IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WHEN A LETTER, BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SENT BY A SOVIET AGENT WAS OBSERVED, PHOTO COPIES WERE PROVIDED TO HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON, AS WELL AS, AN INVESTIGATIVE FILE BEING OPENED IN NEW YORK CITY (NYC). THE SIZE OF THE SQUAD HANDLING THIS TOTAL OPERATION WAS ESTIMATED TO BE ABOUT TWENTY MEN. IT WAS INDICATED THAT THE POSTAL EMPLOYEES WHOSE NAMES WERE NOT RECALLED MERELY PROVIDED THE MAIL POUCHES AND WERE NOT PRESENT IN THE ROOM DURING THE SCREENING PROCESS. IT WAS ALSO STATED THAT ANY MAIL REMOVED AND BROUGHT TO THE NYO WAS RETURNED TO THE AIRPORT FOR DISPATCH ON THE NEXT OUTGOING FLIGHT, TO THE CITY OF DESTINATION.

WITH REGARD TO SUN SURVEY IT WAS STATED THAT THIS OPERATION WAS RUN BY THE SAME SQUAD BUT THAT IN THIS OPERATION THE ONLY MAIL SCREENED WAS MAIL ADDRESSED TO THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) AT A POST OFFICE BOX IN GRAND CENTRAL STATION. THE SCREENING TOOK PLACE IN A ROOM PROVIDED BY THE POST OFFICE AT GRAND CENTRAL STATION AND THE PURPOSE WAS TO OBTAIN MAIL WHICH MIGHT BE ADDRESSED TO SOVIET MEMBERS OF THE UN AT THIS BOX NUMBER. THESE LETTERS WERE ALSO RETURNED TO THE NYO AND OPENED AND PHOTOGRAPHED IN A SIMILAR MANNER. IN THIS INSTANCE, PHOTOGRAPHS WERE NOT FORWARDED TO HEADQUARTERS BUT WERE FORWARDED TO THE INDIVIDUAL CASE FILE OF THE SOVIET NATIONAL AND THE RESULTS OF THE MAIL INTERCEPT WOULD BE REPORTED TO THE BUREAU AT THE NEXT REPORTING SCHEDULE FOR THAT PARTICULAR CASE. IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT SUCH COVERAGE RESULTED IN THE OPENING OF ABOUT FIVE OR SIX LETTERS A DAY.

WITH REGARD TO Z COVERAGE IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT SA KEHOE HAD NO DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THIS OPERATION BUT HAD BEEN PRESENT IN THE ROOM, IN THE NYO, WHEN MAIL WAS OPENED. NO ESTIMATE COULD BE GIVEN OF THE INCLUSIVE DATES OF COVERAGE OR THE VOLUME OF MAIL.

BUT IT WAS STATED THAT ALL MAIL TO THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UN (SMUN) WAS OPENED AND PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE NYO AND THAT THIS MAIL WAS PROVIDED BY POSTAL OFFICIALS AND THAT AFTER PHOTOGRAPHING, THE INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE INVESTIGATIVE CASE FILES.

THE NAMES OF SOME INDIVIDUALS EMPLOYED IN THESE THREE OPERATIONS WERE PROVIDED AND THE THOUGHT EXPRESSED THAT ALL THREE OPERATIONS MAY HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED AT THE SAME TIME AND THAT THE DECISION TO CONCLUDE THE OPERATIONS CAME FROM WASHINGTON.

IT WAS STATED THAT SA KEHOE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE AS TO WHICH OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON APPROVED THE ORIGINAL PROGRAMS OR TERMINATED THEM, BUT IT WAS FELT THAT THE ONLY PERSON WHO COULD GIVE APPROVAL TO COMMENCE AND TERMINATE WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE BEEN FORMER DIRECTOR HOOVER. OTHER QUESTIONS, SUCH AS DID THE AGENT KNOW SPECIFIC NAMES, WERE ANSWERED EITHER AFFIRMATIVELY OR NEGATIVELY, DEPENDING UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE NAMES RECOGNIZED WERE POSTAL INSPECTORS, AND QUESTIONS SUCH AS WAS THERE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) IN THESE OPERATIONS

WERE ANSWERED NEGATIVELY. QUESTIONS AS TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CIA'S MAIL SCREENING OPERATION WERE ANSWERED IN EFFECT THAT SA KEHOE GENERALLY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THESE OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WHAT HE READ IN THE PAPERS.

A DIRECT QUESTION WAS ASKED IF SA KEHOE WAS AWARE THAT A PIECE OF CORRESPONDENCE HAD BEEN FOUND IN THE MEDIA BREAK-IN INDICATING THAT MAIL OPENINGS WENT ON AS LATE AS 1970. THE ANSWER WAS GIVEN THAT HE HAD READ THIS STATEMENT IN THE PAPERS, AND IT WAS THEN ASKED HOW HE WOULD EXPLAIN THIS. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THIS WHATSOEVER., BUT THAT IF THE BUREAU ISSUED A STATMENT ADVISING THAT ALL MAIL OPENINGS CEASED IN 1966, THEN THERE WAS AN EXPLANATION, BUT SA KEHOE WAS UNAWARE OF IT.

A QUESTION AS TO WHAT SPECIFIC INDICATORS WERE LOOKED FOR IN SAM SURVEY WAS NOT ANSWERED ON THE GROUNDS THAT SUCH INFORMATION REPRESENTED A SENSITIVE TECHNIQUE THAT WAS STILL VIABLE.

AT NO POINT IN THE PROCEEDINGS DID SA KEHOE EXCERCISE HIS RIGHT TO CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE UNDER TE FIFTH AMENDMENT.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 6444, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

END.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ✓
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ✓
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. __
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7/8/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MORI6

10/11/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

Mr. Callahan requested that a research be conducted to determine whether the FBI or the Department of Justice would be authorized to pay for private counsel for employees called to testify before the Senate Select Committee and who desired private counsel.

I advised Mr. Callahan that the position of the FBI and the Department is that we could not provide counsel directly to the individuals because of the potential conflict of interest between the rights of the individual and the duties of our officers. However, I told him that to my knowledge the question concerning whether the Government could pay for private counsel selected by the employee has not been researched. Mr. Callahan therefore requested that the research be conducted.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Administrative Division and Legal Counsel confer and prepare an appropriate response to Mr. Callahan's request.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Donahue
1 - Mr. Mintz

memo Legal Coun to Adams 7/23/75 PGD/[illegible]

-108

REC-42 62-116395-540

EX. AUG 1 1975

PLM

JAM:mfd
(6)

84 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7/23/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

#MDR16

10/11/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

SUBJECT: AUTHORITY OF FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO RETAIN PRIVATE COUNSEL TO REPRESENT EMPLOYEES

Legal Counsel memorandum to you dated 7-8-75 captioned "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," recommended that the Administrative Division and Legal Counsel Division confer and prepare an appropriate response to Mr. Callahan's request that research be conducted to determine whether the FBI or the Department of Justice would be authorized to pay for private counsel for employees who are called to testify before the Senate Select Committee and who desire private counsel. We have also undertaken to present the statutory considerations governing the provision of such representation in a legal proceeding as distinguished from a legislative hearing.

Title 5, United States Code, Section 3106, states:

> "Except as otherwise authorized by law, the head of an Executive department or military department may not employ an attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or an employee thereof is a party, or is interested, or for the securing of evidence therefor, but shall refer the matter to the Department of Justice. . . ."

ST-108

62-116395-539

AUG 1 1975

This statutory prohibition makes it clear that only the Attorney General has the authority to make a contract for special employment of an attorney. This Bureau, as an agency of the Department of Justice, obviously does not have authority to do that which is denied to Executive departments which are otherwise of coequal stature to the Department of Justice.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Donahue
1 - Mr. Adams
2 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh

PGD:mbk

84 AUG 25 1975

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

An examination of our budgetary language by representatives of the Administrative Division and this Division does not disclose any explicit or implicit authority which would qualify as "otherwise authorized by law, . . ." under the above statute. The statutory authority for provision of private counsel is contained in Title28, United States Code, Section 515, which gives the Attorney General the authority to appoint and pay special attorneys. However, this authority is circumscribed by the statement that these attorneys "may, when specifically directed by the Attorney General, conduct any kind of legal proceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings and proceedings before committing magistrates, which United States Attorneys are authorized by law to conduct. . . ." It is evident then that this authority pertains only to proceedings held within the judicial system, not to hearings held before a legislative body. Such a hearing is not a "legal proceeding" and is not one "which United States Attorneys are authorized by law to conduct. . . ."

In the event that employees need representation in a legal proceeding and the Department believes that a potential conflict of interest would prevent it from providing counsel, outside counsel could be appointed and paid under the statute up to the monetary limits fixed. Whether the Department would allow the individual employee to designate or select the outside counsel would be a matter of Departmental policy but we see no reason why such an individual selection would not ordinarily be approved.

We are aware that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has recently engaged the law firm of Arnold and Porter and that Mr. Mitchell Rogovin of that firm has been designated as the individual attorney to represent that agency. Inquiry with CIA has determined that the authority relied on for this action is Title 50, United States Code, Section 403j, which states:

(CONTINUED - OVER)

> "(a) Notwithstanding any other other provisions of law, sums made available to the Agency by appropriation or otherwise may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions, including --
>
> "(1) personal services, including personal services without regard to limitations on types of persons to be employed. . . ."

We would emphasize, however, that the counsel hired apparently represents the CIA, not individual employees, and that private counsel has the same problems as does their "in-house" counsel. Therefore, no firm or individual hired by that agency can provide counsel to the individual employee in any situation which presents a potential conflict between the interests of the individual and the interests of the agency.

CONCLUSION:

We conclude that there is no authority for either the FBI or the Department to pay for private counsel selected by employees called to testify before the Senate Select Committee or any other legislative body. If an employee called to testify in such a forum desires private counsel, or where a potential conflict of interest makes representation by "in-house" counsel or the Department impossible, the employee must decide if the possible consequences warrant the personal expense of such counsel and, if so, responsibility for payment rests with him.

Furthermore, private counsel retained by an agency having authority to do so would be under the same disabilities as "in-house" or Departmental counsel in situations presenting a potential conflict of interest.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: Authority of FBI and Department of Justice
to Retain Private Counsel to Represent Employees

The only authority for payment by the Department of private counsel would be in a legal proceeding in the judicial system under Title 28, United States Code, Section 515.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TJM

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 7/24/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

This memorandum records Bureau waiver from secrecy agreement for interview of Atlanta Field Office (FO) SA Edward A. Shea by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Members at Atlanta, 7/22-23/75.

Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project was in Atlanta 7/22/75 in connection with the interviews there of six SAs (five from Atlanta FO; one who traveled to Atlanta from Knoxville FO) by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo. Interviews concerned the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. At approximately 5:00 p.m., 7/22/75, Epstein telephonically contacted Phillips and advised that one of the interviews developed information resulting in his desire to interview a seventh SA, Edward A. Shea of the Atlanta FO. In order to avoid another trip to Atlanta, Epstein asked if Phillips could obtain FBI clearance for the interview which would concern: (1) any possible COINTELPRO operations in Atlanta with respect to King or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); (2) Shea's assignment to a "file review or file retrieval" project during past year concerning COINTELPRO; and (3) concerning COINTELPRO "generally." (It should be noted that earlier this year, Shea handled a project relating to classifying documents in Atlanta files regarding COINTELPRO. Shea advised Phillips of this and also said that he does not recall seeing any documents regarding COINTELPRO/SCLC - KING.) Epstein desired to interview Shea the morning of 7/23/75.

#MDE16 10/11/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

62-116395 EX 104 REC 17 62-116395-538

1 - 67- (Personnel File SA Edward A. Shea)

5 JUL 31 1975

SFP:lhb lhb
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84AUG 2 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

On basis of foregoing request, Phillips telephonically contacted Assistant Director (AD) Mintz who granted clearance for (1) and (2) above and suggested withholding clearance on (3) pending further request from Epstein after interview on items (1) and (2). Mintz asked that Phillips touch base with AD Wannall for his concurrence. In the absence of Wannall who was out of the building, Deputy AD T. Leavitt concurred with Mintz. At about 5:30 p.m., 7/22/75, Epstein was telephonically advised by Phillips as indicated above--clearance for (1) and (2); not for (3) at this time. Arrangements were then made for interview of Shea morning of 7/23/75.

Subsequent interview of Shea (being reported separately) apparently satisfied Epstein and it does not appear there will be any further request as to item (3).

ACTION:

None. For information.

wRW

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/16/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/10/00 BY SP2ALM/JG

This memorandum records that no effort is being made to respond to a request of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated 6/27/75, pursuant to instructions of the Deputy Attorney General, until such time as the Department can obtain clarification from the SSC regarding the meaning of paragraph 2 in the SSC's letter of 6/27/75.

Memorandum Wannall to Adams, dated 6/30/75, reviewed a draft copy of the SSC's letter to the Department. This draft copy is dated 6/25/75. It is identical in content with the final version dated 6/27/75.

Memorandum Cregar to Wannall, dated 7/2/75, reported the results of a meeting in the office of the Deputy Attorney General on the morning of 7/2/75. In this memorandum it was pointed out that the Deputy Attorney General found considerable difficulty in understanding paragraph 2 of the SSC's draft of a letter dated 6/25/75. He noted that in view of the ambiguities found in the letter, as well as the lack of any specific agreement entered into with the SSC by the Department and/or the FBI, the Department should prepare a letter over the Attorney General's signature asking for clarification. In the meantime, the Deputy Attorney General advised that we should take no action responsive to the requests levied on the FBI in this letter. To date, we have received no information from the Department that a letter asking for clarification of the SSC has been sent.

REC-10 62-116395-537

Enclosure

EX 104

62-116395

5 JUL 31 1975

WOC:lhb
(6)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

The purpose of this memorandum is to note for the record that no effort is being made to develop responses to the SSC request of 6/27/75 until such time as the Department obtains the clarification described above. This position was noted during a conference that the Director and other Bureau officials had with the Attorney General on the morning of 7/15/75.

Enclosed herewith is a copy of the 6/27/75 request mentioned above.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

wRW

Per

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 27, 1975

RECEIVED
JUL 31 1975
O.L.A.

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Enclosed with this letter are notifications concerning certain matters currently under investigation by the Select Committee which relate to government entities under your jurisdiction.

These notifications are submitted pursuant to an agreement between the Committee, the various intelligence entities, and the White House. Pursuant to that agreement, the various entities in the Executive Branch have agreed not only to make available the pertinent witnesses, but also to submit in response all information and material which they possess that is relevant to the areas and cases which the Committee wishes to investigate. The response should include all relevant underlying documentation and other information, including documents which may not have come to the Committee's attention and which the Committee has not specifically requested, and all material relating to any prior Executive Branch inquiry into the matter. In addition, we would welcome a current analysis of the particular questions raised by the Committee and any other observations on the subject that you believe would be helpful.

We welcome the promise of cooperation and full disclosure that underlies that agreement. Success in fulfilling the full disclosure policy contained in the agreement is indispensible to the Committee's analysis and to the formulation of our ultimate findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
RECD
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

10/10/00 SP2ALM/dTG
#mDR16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-537
FEDERAL BU. OF INV.

Within the Committee mandate, contained in S. Res. 21, there are four broad subjects relating to the intelligence community which we are required to investigate and study in order to determine the facts and ultimately to decide whether to make recommendations for legislative or other changes. They are:

1. The structure, performance, and utility of government operations with respect to intelligence activities.

2. Whether certain policies or practices are or are not illegal, unethical, or otherwise improper.

3. Whether there has or has not been excessive duplication or inadequate coordination between and among intelligence agencies and, more generally, the efficiency of intelligence activities.

4. Whether there has or has not been adequate internal and external control and oversight over the policies and practices of intelligence agencies.

In attempting to find the answers to these fundamental questions, the Committee is proceeding in two ways. First, we are examining intelligence functions broadly as instruments of government policy, giving attention to the authority for particular functions, the problems which intelligence activities are designed to solve, the procedures by which intelligence activities are and have been proposed, approved, executed, evaluated, and terminated, the range and scope of the activities utilized to achieve intelligence objectives, and the propriety and utility of the activities undertaken. Second, we will examine in depth certain subjects within the broad topics of investigation. (We would, of course, welcome your suggestion of other cases that would give added insight into intelligence matters under your jurisdiction.) These specific subjects for investigation are not intended to limit the scope contained in the more general questions.

The annexed notifications spell these matters out in greater detail. In addition, they ask certain specific questions, set forth certain previously requested documents not yet received, request additional documents,* and, in some cases, ask for the names and present addresses of persons who have held certain positions. Where appropriate, the subject's description indicates that, pursuant to the agreed Outline for Inquiry Procedures, the matter primarily concerns allegations of abuse or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. Finally, the notifications indicate the name(s) of the staff member(s) who, in addition to the Committee's senior staff, will be responsible for the particular matters.

The Committee, in the course of the next few months, will undertake other subjects for investigation as its work proceeds and will notify you as appropriate.

We look forward to your cooperation in these matters.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
John Tower
Vice Chairman

evel ✓

---

* These specific requests are not, of course, intended to limit the agreement to come forward with all relevant information and material, including documents, whether or not they have been brought to the Committee's attention or have been specifically requested by the Committee.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(Including DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)

Table of Contents

Page

I. Issues 1

II. Areas of General Inquiry 3

A. Legal Authority for FBI Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities 3

B. Organization and Operation of the FBI Intelligence Division 3

1. FBI Internal Security Intelligence Operations 4

2. The FBI and the U. S. Intelligence Community 4

3. FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Operations 5

4. Inspection Division Investigations 5

5. FBI Intelligence Activities and State or Local Law Enforcement Agencies 6

III. Case Studies 7

General Questions 7

A. Electronic Surveillance 9

1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance 9

2. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and "Leaks" 11

Page

3. Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King 13

4. Electronic Surveillance and the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964 15

B. Surreptitious Entry 17

C. Mail Covers and Mail Openings 18

D. Other Specific Techniques 20

E. COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities 21

F. Clandestine Informant Activities 24

G. "Notional" Organizations 27

H. Joint FBI-Police Operations 28

1. White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi 28

2. Black Panther Party, Chicago 30

I. The "Huston Plan" 32

J. Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI 34

IV. Department of Justice 36

A. The Attorney General 36

B. The Internal Security Section (formerly Division) 38

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(INCLUDING DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)

I. Issues

The Committee's inquiry into the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is examining fundamental issues which bear directly on the adequacy of current legislation and administrative organization and procedure. The Committee seeks to determine whether FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities achieve legitimate objectives in conformity with the rule of law. Among the basic issues to be addressed are the following:

A. What is the legal authority for FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities? Should the FBI's authority be clarified or revised or incorporated in a comprehensive statutory charter?

B. What limitations are placed on FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities by the Constitution and laws of the United States? Should these limitations be clarified or revised?

C. What have been the purposes and aims of FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities? Should these objectives be modified?

D. How have the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the FBI been organized and coordinated with other agencies of government? Should these procedures and practices be revised?

E. What have been the procedures for and techniques of intelligence gathering and dissemination and counterintelligence operations used by the FBI? Under what conditions and through what procedures should these methods and techniques be used in the future?

F. What have been and should be the mechanisms for internal and external policy-making, control, and supervision of FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities?

As a means of examining the above issues in the context of actual FBI intelligence operations, the Committee intends to study certain specific topics, some of which are general in nature, and others of which involve specific cases, programs or techniques. Part II, below, contains descriptions of the general areas into which the Committee intends to inquire. Part III contains descriptions of the specific cases mentioned above. The descriptions specifically indicate whether the investigation may concentrate on specific allegations of possible abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. In addition to the topics described below, additional areas of inquiry may develop during the course of the Committee's work.

II. Areas of General Inquiry

A. Legal Authority for FBI Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities

The Committee is examining the legal basis for FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities. There may be serious question as to the adequacy of the present legislative framework for the FBI's functions in these fields. Current statutes authorize the FBI to perform investigative and law enforcement functions, but they do not specifically authorize intelligence or counterintelligence activities. Therefore, the Committee seeks to determine whether the FBI's authority should be clarified, revised, or incorporated in a comprehensive statutory charter.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein

B. Organization and Operation of the FBI Intelligence Division

The Committee is investigating the structure and operating practices of the FBI Intelligence Division. Proposals have been made that the national security intelligence and counterintelligence functions of the FBI should be lodged in a separate agency or otherwise separated from the FBI's criminal investigative activities. Further recommendations have been advanced for improved coordination between the FBI and other intelligence agencies, for strengthened supervision of FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities by the Attorney General or an independent board, and for clearer standards and procedures for FBI activities in this area. Therefore, the Committee desires complete information on the operating practices and procedures of the FBI Intelligence Division and of the field office activities supervised by the Intelligence Division.

The Committee's inquiry focuses on the following specific areas:

1. FBI Internal Security Intelligence Operations

The Committee seeks to determine the nature and purpose of FBI intelligence operations directed at foreign intelligence activities and subversive or extremist activities within the United States. It has been alleged that the scope of FBI intelligence investigations is too broad and has extended to legitimate political activities. Consequently, the Committee must examine how the FBI's responsibilities have been defined.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein

2. The FBI and the U. S. Intelligence Community

The Committee seeks to determine what have been the policies and procedures for coordination between the FBI and other agencies in the U. S. intelligence community. There have been occasions in the past where friction between the FBI and other agencies has produced serious dissatisfaction within the U. S. intelligence community. The purpose of this inquiry is to evaluate the adequacy of past and present coordinating mechanisms.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein

3. FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Operations

The Committee seeks to determine the nature of FBI counterintelligence operations directed at foreign intelligence activities within the United States or at any other hostile foreign-related activities within the United States. Since FBI operations to "counter" these activities go beyond intelligence collection, the Committee must consider whether such practices require statutory authorization. The impact of counterintelligence operations on United States foreign relations will also be considered.

Responsible staff:	Senior staff Task Force leader Loch Johnson Barbara Banoff

4. Inspection Division Investigations

The Committee is examining the relationship of the FBI Inspection Division to FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities. This includes both regular Inspection Division reviews of Intelligence Division and field office functions and specific investigations of allegations of improper conduct in connection with FBI intelligence activities.

Responsible staff:	Senior staff Task Force leader Mark Gitenstein

5. FBI Intelligence Activities and State or Local Law Enforcement Agencies

The Committee seeks to determine the nature of the relationships between FBI intelligence activities and state and local law enforcement agencies. This subject involves the delicate balance between the necessary centralization of certain law enforcement activities and the Constitutionally-mandated decentralization of general law enforcement responsibility. It is necessary for the Committee to evaluate the centralizing influence of the FBI, as well as the FBI's role as a check on local law enforcement abuses.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein
Walter Ricks

III. Case Studies

General Questions

The descriptions which follow of the specific cases the Committee intends to study are intended to serve the dual purpose of notifying the FBI of the issues the Committee will explore in connection with each case and eliciting from the FBI all information and material in its possession relating to the questions the Committee wishes to explore in each case. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition of certain questions which will be basic to the Committee's investigations of each case, certain fundamental questions are set forth below. As to each case described, the Committee intends to explore these fundamental questions, and expects that the FBI will, as to each case, provide all information and material it has relating to these basic questions even though they are not repeated in the discussion of each particular area.

1. What is or has been the legal authority for the activity?
2. What have been the purposes of the activity?
3. What techniques have been employed in the activity?
4. What kinds of information have been gathered in the activity?
5. How have specific uses of the activity been initiated and approved?
6. How have the targets for the activity been selected?
7. What have been the criteria for target selection?
8. How has the intelligence which is collected been used?
9. To whom has the intelligence collected been disseminated?
10. What has been the basis for any dissemination with respect to each recipient?
11. How has the activity been coordinated with other intelligence agencies?

12. What have been the effects of this coordination?

13. To what extent has each of the foregoing been compatible with the legal authority for and the purposes of the activity?

14. By what means has the activity been monitored, controlled and administered?

15. What are the potential abuses to which the activity may lead?

16. To what abuses has the activity led?

17. What steps have been taken to investigate such abuses?

18. What steps have been taken to avoid such abuses?

19. What have been the costs and utility of the activity?

In some instances, the specific questions set forth below may appear to repeat some of the general questions. The purpose in such cases is simply to clarify the application of the general question to the specific case. Except where inapplicable by their terms, all general questions relate to each specific case.

A. Electronic Surveillance

The Committee is examining all forms of electronic interception of communications including wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, consensual electronic surveillance interception of video and data communications, local monitoring devices, and all other forms of electronic or technical monitoring. The Committee's general questions apply to each of the techniques listed above, as well as to the matters set forth in the following specific cases.

1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance

The Committee seeks to determine whether the Attorney General should have the authority to authorize electronic surveillance for certain purposes without a prior judicial warrant. This power has been exercised by succeeding Attorneys General since 1940, upon the explicit directive of the President. The Supreme Court has ruled that this power does not extend to purely domestic matters, but the remaining scope of the Attorney General's authority remains undefined by the Supreme Court.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. What is the scope and basis of the claim of Executive authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance?

b. What have been the procedures for consideration and approval of requests for warrantless electronic surveillance authorized by the Attorney General?

c. What are the specific disadvantages of the judicial warrant requirement for those electronic surveillances which have been authorized by the Attorney General?

d. Does the Fourth Amendment permit the issuance of judicial warrants for electronic surveillance on grounds other than ordinary probable cause where national security intelligence purposes are advanced to justify the surveillance?

e. To what extent are the specific procedures of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 inappropriate for electronic surveillance conducted for national security intelligence purposes?

Documents

The Committee requests the following additional documents bearing on the questions stated above:

a. All written justifications for the specific authorizations by the Attorney General for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present.

b. All documents reflecting the denial by the Attorney General of specific requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present.

c. Committee staff access to information contained in the impounded documents, depositions, and other materials in all pending civil suits which involve warrantless electronic surveillance and in which the Committee has received the consent of the plaintiffs for such access.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mike Epstein

2. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and "Leaks"

The Committee is examining several instances of the use of warrantless electronic surveillance and other investigative techniques in connection with "leaks" of classified information. These cases may involve specific allegations of abuse or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. These instances include:

a. The investigation of alleged "leaks" by or to 17 Executive officials and newsmen between May 1969 and February 1971.

b. The investigation of alleged "leaks" from a military staff member assigned to the National Security Council in 1971-72.

c. The reported investigation of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969.

d. The reported investigation of the activities of Mrs. Anna Chennault and Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew in 1968.

e. Any other instances of warrantless electronic surveillance in connection with the investigation of "leaks" to the press.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. Through what procedures and by whom were each of these electronic surveillances authorized and approved, continued, and terminated?

b. As to each person to whom information was disseminated, please state:

   (1) The nature of the information.

   (2) The basis for the dissemination.

(3) The date of each dissemination.

(4) The use which was in fact made of the information by the recipient.

c. What evaluations were made of the original grounds for the surveillance as it progressed?

d. What were the results of the evaluations?

e. Who made them?

f. What are the reasons for use of electronic surveillance without judicial warrant to investigate "leaks" of classified information to the press?

g. How does each of the above instances relate to these reasons?

h. To what extent would requirement of a warrant interfere with the ability to detect such leaks?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein

3. Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King

This investigation examines the authorization for, conduct and termination of, and deliberations regarding the surveillance of Dr. King. This case may involve specific allegations of abuses and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. Through what procedures and by whom were wiretaps and electronic bugs of Dr. King initiated, approved, continued, and terminated?

b. What were the locations, extent, and duration of the electonic surveillances of Dr. King?

c. What were the grounds of national security, if any, for the introduction of the electronic surveillances of Dr. King?

d. What was the relationship between the information collected and each of the purposes of the surveillance?

e. What evaluations were made of the original grounds for the surveillance as it progressed?

f. What were the results of those evaluations?

g. Who made them?

h. What periodic evaluations were made of the relationship between the information being collected and the original objectives of the surveillance?

i. What were the results of the evaluations?

j. Who made them?

k. To whom were any results of the surveillance disseminated?

l. As to each person to whom information was disseminated, please state

(1) The nature of the information.

(2) The basis for the dissemination.

(3) The date of each dissemination.

(4) The use which was in fact made of the information.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force Leader
Mike Epstein

4. Surveillance at the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964

The Committee is examining the use of surveillance and other intelligence operations in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on or about the time of the Democratic National Convention in 1964. This case may involve specific allegations of abuses and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. Did the FBI conduct electronic surveillance and other intelligence operations at this time and place?

b. Who were the targets?

c. Through what procedures and by whom were the decisions made to engage in electronic surveillance and intelligence operations at this time and place?

d. What were the nature, extent, and duration of the electronic surveillance and other intelligence operations at this time and place?

e. What was the relationship between each target selected and the purpose of the surveillance?

f. Was the FBI requested to conduct such surveillance by any person or organization outside the FBI?

g. If so, by whom, when, and for what stated reason?

h. To whom were the results of the surveillance disseminated?

i. As to each person whom information was disseminated, please state

(1) The nature of the information.

(2) The basis for the dissemination.

(3) The date of each dissemination.

(4) The use which was in fact made of the information.

Responsible staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Mike Epstein

B. Surreptitious Entry

The purpose of this inquiry is to determine the extent to which the FBI has used surreptitious entry as an intelligence technique, either through its own operations or through operations by other agencies and individuals. This case may involve allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What are the scope and basis of the claim of Executive authority to conduct warrantless surreptitious entry as asserted by the Department of Justice in United States v. Ehrlichman?

2. What surreptitious entries have been carried out by the FBI or by another government agency with the knowledge of the FBI from January 1, 1960, to the present? Please list by date, place,and target.

3. As to any instance in which the FBI has refused to comply with another agency's request for surreptitious entry, what was

   a. The basis for the refusal?

   b. The reason given for the request?

4. What procedures were employed to authorize any surreptitious entry identified under 2, and who authorized each such entry?

5. To the extent applicable by their terms, each of the above questions and the General Questions will be explored specifically with reference to any entry or proposed entry at an embassy in May 1972.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Mike Epstein
Paul Wallach

C. Mail Covers and Mail Openings

The Committee is examining the conduct of mail covers and mail openings by or on behalf of the FBI and any instances of mail openings or intercepts which may have been conducted by or on behalf of the FBI. This inquiry may involve allegations of abuse or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. The specific purposes of all mail covers conducted in connection with FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities. This includes all documents pertaining to FBI decisions to request Postal Service mail covers and lists of all subjects upon whom mail covers have been placed as a result of FBI requests since January 1, 1960.

2. The procedures and practices for the dissemination of information from mail covers requested by the FBI. This includes a list of all entities to whom mail cover information has been disseminated since January 1, 1960.

3. Whether or not FBI personnel may have conducted mail covers in violation of existing Postal Service regulations. For any mail covers which may have been conducted by FBI personnel or for the FBI by persons other than Postal Service employees, from January 1, 1960, to the present: identify the physical location where the mail cover was conducted, the names of all persons who participated in and authorized the mail cover, and a brief explanation of the purpose of the mail cover and why it was initiated.

4. Whether or not the FBI has opened mail or caused mail to be opened, either with or without the permission of the Postal Service. For all incidents of mail opening which may have been conducted by FBI employees or by other persons in cooperation with the FBI, from January 1, 1960, until the present: identify the physical location where the mail was opened or intercepted, the names of the individuals who participated in the opening or intercept, and the purpose of the opening or intercept.

Documents

The Committee requests the following additional documents bearing on the questions stated above:

1. All documents which discuss, refer to, or relate to the origins, authorizations, conduct, and termination of and procedures for the mail covers, intercepts, and openings identified in 3 and 4 above.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Paul Wallach

D. Other Specific Techniques

As to the following techniques, the Committee's inquiry will initially be confined to the General Questions. As the inquiry proceeds, areas of potential abuse and thus of specific inquiry beyond the General Questions may develop:

1. Incommunicado detention and interrogation.
2. Photographic and television surveillance.
3. Polygraphs.
4. The obtaining of bank, credit, school, and other personal records and information, including the obtaining of information under false pretext.

E. COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities

The Committee is investigating the circumstances surrounding the origins of, authorization for, and implementation of the FBI program known as COINTELPRO and any similar programs. This inquiry may involve allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. The scope of this investigation covers:

1. COINTELPRO -- Communist Party USA;
2. COINTELPRO -- Socialist Workers Party;
3. COINTELPRO -- White Hate Groups;
4. COINTELPRO -- Black Extremists;
5. COINTELPRO -- New Left;
6. COINTELPRO -- Special Operations (except as targeted against hostile foreign intelligence services);
7. COINTELPRO -- Puerto Rican Independence Groups;
8. COINTELPRO -- Operation Hoodwink
9. Any other activities of the FBI which have or have had the purpose and effect of disrupting domestic groups or discrediting U.S. citizens, whether or not carried out under a COINTELPRO program.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Under what circumstances, through what procedures, and by whom were these programs initiated, authorized, and terminated?
2. Under what circumstances and through what procedures did the FBI discover and report to the Attorney General the existence of items 7 and 8 identified above and similar disruptive activities not included in the original review of COINTELPRO activities conducted by the Department of Justice in 1974?

3. What were the purposes of each program?

4. In each case, by what means was it intended the purpose would be accomplished?

5. What internal FBI procedures were adopted for the consideration and approval of specific disruptive activities and for determining the results of such activities?

6. As to each operation listed above, and any others of a fundamentally similar kind, identify by type the sources of the information used against individuals and groups for disruptive purposes.

7. As to each instance in which such information was obtained through electronic surveillance

    (a) What or who was the target of the surveillance?

    (b) Was the surveillance legal?

    (c) Was the surveillance conducted pursuant to warrant?

    (d) What were the dates of the surveillance?

    (e) What were the precise means of surveillance?

    (f) Who authorized the surveillance (both within and without the FBI)?

    (g) What was the purpose of the surveillance?

8. As to each case listed above and all fundamentally similar cases, what was the legality and propriety of the distruptive activities? Should any of the activities referred to in the above sentence be forbidden by statute, considered for future use, or otherwise subject to statutory or administrative regulation?

9. In what activities has the FBI engaged since April 28, 1971, the purpose or effect of which has been to disrupt domestic groups or discredit U.S. citizens or which bear any other similarity to the purposes or effects of COINTELPRO activities?

10. What restrictions, directives, or other measures have been adopted by the FBI and the Justice Department to limit or regulate the use of such disruptive techniques?

The Committee will investigate all COINTELPRO and disruptive activities identified above. On the basis of a review of the summaries of COINTELPRO cases prepared for the so-called Petersen Committee, as well as other sources of information, the Committee will develop further requests for information and documents.

Responsible Staff:	Senior Staff
	Task Force Leader
	Les Seidel
	Mike Epstein
	Walter Ricks

F. Clandestine Informant Activities

The Committee is examining all aspects of the FBI's use of informants, sources, and undercover personnel and the techniques employed by such persons. Although informants are the single most productive source of intelligence information, the difficulties of controlling their activities may increase the possibility of improper conduct. The use of informants to infiltrate organizations also may pose dangers to the right of associational privacy. Consequently, proposals have been made for the imposition of a judicial warrant requirement or other safeguards for the use of informants. The Committee seeks to evaluate such proposals as well as the contributions of informants to the accomplishment of legitimate objectives.

In addition, the Committee is examining informant activities with respect to several particular situations and cases. This investigation may involve specific allegations of abuse or controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. The Committee's inquiry covers the general circumstances surrounding the following incidents or cases:

a. Wounded Knee;

b. Kent State;

c. New York v. Stroble (Attica);

d. United States v. Buckalew (Gainesville);

e. United States v. Briggs (Camden);

f. New York v. Dillon (Hobart College);

g. United States v. Marshall (Seattle).

Additional cases may also be examined.

In addition to the above cases, the Committee is examining the role of FBI informants in providing information to the FBI concerning members of the following organizations:

a. Ku Klux Klan;

b. Students for a Democratic Society;

c. Weathermen;

d. Black Panther Party;

e. Communist Party USA;

f. W.E.B. DuBois Clubs.

Additional studies of informant activities with respect to members of other organizations may be formulated.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. With respect to both categories of cases listed above, what allegations, whether unfounded or not, of improper, illegal, unethical, or provocative conduct by FBI informants have been made in connection with these situations or groups?

2. What measures has the FBI taken to investigate such allegations of misconduct and to prevent such alleged misconduct from taking place in the future?

3. What instructions has the FBI given to its informants with respect to possible improper, illegal, unethical, or provocative conduct?

4. What has been the largest number of informants, sources, and undercover personnel in use at any one time during each year from 1960 until the present in connection with security, intelligence, and counterintelligence matters, cases, and programs?

5. What has been the annual total amount of funds (including reimbursement for expenses) paid to informants and sources for each year from 1960 until the present?

6. What limits, if any, have been placed on the type of information which informants have been intrusted to report back to the FBI?

7. What have been the annual percentage of potential informants who became paid informants in connection with security, intelligence, and counterintelligence matters, cases, and programs from 1960 until the present?

Documents

Please provide a summary of ten cases (for each of the following categories) where the FBI's use of informants, sources, or undercover personnel resulted in:

1. the conviction of an espionage agent of a foreign government.

2. the prevention of the theft of national security information.

3. the prevention of sabotage.

4. the prevention of an act of violence.

5. the prevention of the carrying out of a conspiracy to overthrow the government.

6. any other successful preventive actions in furtherance of the FBI's national security responsibilities.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mike Epstein
Jack Smith
Walter Ricks
Pat Shea

G. "Notional" Organizations

The Committee is examining the FBI's alleged creation of the support for "notional" organizations for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. Although it may rely upon informants and other clandestine operatives, this alleged practice is sufficiently novel to require separate attention.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What groups, organizations, movements, or other associations has the FBI caused directly or indirectly to be formed or created for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes? Please provide a complete list from January 1, 1960, to the present.

2. What groups, organizations, movements, or other associations has the FBI supported financially or materially? Please provide a complete list from January 1, 1960, to the present.

3. In which cases has the FBI supported or created such organizations in coordination or cooperation with other agencies?

4. How have the presence of such "notional" organizations affected the public's perception of the movements of which they form a part?

5. How have any FBI programs for the creation and support of such groups been coordinated with any similar programs undertaken by the CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mike Epstein

H. Joint FBI-Police Operations

The purpose of this inquiry is to examine certain allegations that joint FBI-police operations resulted in misconduct or abuse. These cases are complex and involve a variety of techniques. Nevertheless, they may indicate some of the most serious problems which may arise in attempting to deal with potentially violent situations.

1. The White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi

The Committee is inquiring into the relationships between the FBI and other law enforcement agencies and private organizations in Mississippi in connection with the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine what effect, if any, FBI activities had on the actions of other law enforcement agencies and private individuals with respect to the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi. This investigation may involve allegations of abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. Was this organization a target of FBI COINTELPRO operations?

b. If so, how and by whom was it selected as a target?

c. What were the purposes of any disruptive operations directed at it?

d. To what extent were the purposes achieved?

e. What disruptive techniques, if any, were employed?

f. Over what period of time did the disruptive activities occur?

g. What evaluations were made of their effects?

h. By whom were they made?

i. What were the results of the evaluations?

j. Were FBI informants used to infiltrate the organization?

k. If so, what kinds of information did the informants gather?

l. What activities did the informants engage in other than information gathering?

m. Identify by date and names the persons involved in all contacts the FBI had with other law enforcement agencies and private groups and individuals with respect to alleged Klan bombings of Jewish synagogues and the homes of Jewish leaders in Meridian, Mississippi, during May - August 1968.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Jack Smith
Les Seidel

2. The Black Panther Party, Chicago

The Committee is inquiring into the relationships between the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in the Chicago area in connection with the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine what effect, if any, FBI activities had on the actions of other law enforcement and intelligence agencies with respect to the Black Panther Party in the Chicago area. This investigation may involve allegations of abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

a. Was the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party a target of FBI COINTELPRO operations?

b. If so, how and by whom was it selected as a target?

c. What were the purposes of any disruptive operations directed at it?

d. To what extent were the purposes achieved?

e. What disruptive techniques, if any, were employed?

f. Over what period of time did the disruptive activities occur?

g. What evaluations were made of their effects?

h. By whom were they made?

i. If FBI informants were used to infiltrate the organization, what kinds of information did the informants gather?

j. What techniques did the informants employ to gather the information?

k. Were the techniques used by the informants all approved and monitored by the FBI? If not, which were not so approved?

l. What activities did the informants engage in other than information gathering?

m. What other methods and sources did the FBI use to gather intelligence on the organization?

n. If electronic surveillance was used, how did the use of such surveillance relate to each of the general questions?

o. To what extent was information on persons and groups not members of or affiliated with the Black Panther Party gathered, stored, or disseminated by the FBI as a result of its investigations of the organization?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Walter Ricks
Chris Pyle

I. The "Huston Plan"

The Committee is examining the FBI's role in the disposition of the report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) in 1970. This report as submitted to the President included certain options which were specifically identified as "illegal". It purported to represent the joint recommendations of all members of the U. S. intelligence community, but FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover disagreed in a series of footnotes. The serious consideration given to such allegedly illegal proposals gives this case the utmost significance for the Committee's understanding of the risks of uncontrolled intelligence activity. This case may involve specific allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What contacts occurred between Tom Charles Huston and personnel of the FBI and the Department of Justice during 1969 and 1970? Identify by date and names of persons involved.
2. What was the purpose of each such contact?
3. With respect to any assistance provided to the Interdepartmental Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) by personnel of the FBI:
    a. Who were the FBI participants?
    b. What kind of assistance was provided?
    c. What was the role of the FBI in preparing the various drafts of the special report of the Committee?

4. What were the specific arguments advanced for the inclusion of the allegedly illegal options in the special report submitted for the President's consideration? Were other allegedly illegal options considered and rejected?

5. Were any measures taken by the FBI to implement specific elements of the Huston Plan? This includes both the allegedly "illegal" aspects and other provisions such as the expanded recruitment of 18-21 year old informants.

6. What are the present views of the FBI and the Department of Justice as to the legality and propriety of the various options included in the special report?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Barbara Banoff
Loch Johnson

J. Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI

The Committee is investigating allegations that the intelligence and investigative resources of the FBI have been misused by various Presidents, Attorneys General, Members of Congress, and FBI executives themselves. This subject may involve specific allegations of abuse and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Have persons outside the FBI sought the FBI's assistance for partisan political purposes or personal advantage? Please identify each instance by the name of the person seeking to so use the FBI, the date, and the nature of the assistance sought.

2. In each such case, what has been the response of the FBI?

3. Have persons inside or outside the FBI sought to employ the resources of the FBI for purposes outside the FBI's authority? Please identify each instance by the name of the person seeking to so use the FBI, the date, and the purpose for which the person sought to use the FBI.

4. In each such case, what has been the response of the FBI?

5. What measures has the FBI employed to

   a. Respond to critics.

   b. Affect the reputation or credibility of or otherwise discredit critics.

6. What were the nature, purpose, duration, and results of Project INLET involving preparation of an intelligence letter for the President and other Executive officials?

7. With respect to any so-called "secret files" maintained within the FBI, including the "official and confidential" and"personal and confidential" files maintained by the executive assistant to the FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on his behalf until the time of his death, the Committee seeks to establish the contents of such files, the circumstances surrounding the transfer of a portion of such files within the Bureau at the time of Director Hoover's death, the transfer of a portion of such files to Mr. Hoover's residence, the destruction of any such files, the transfer of any such files from Mr. Hoover's residence, the use of information within such files, and their relationship to the official investigative files of the FBI. The Committee desires all information bearing on these matters, including the results of any inquiries conducted within the FBI and the Department of Justice.

8. What measures have been taken to ensure that the intelligence and investigative resources of the FBI are not misused for political purposes or personal advantage.

9. What additional measures should be taken?

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Mark Gitenstein

IV. Department of Justice

The Committee is examining activities of divisions of the Justice Department other than the FBI which perform internal security and intelligence functions. The purpose of these inquiries is to determine whether these functions have been carried out in conformity with the rule of law.

A. The Attorney General

The Committee is studying the functions of the Attorney General with respect to the supervision of and policy-making for internal security and intelligence activities. The Committee seeks to determine whether his duties are properly defined and his office properly organized to perform these functions effectively.

Questions

The Committee requests that the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. To what extent has the Attorney General been involved in the consideration or approval of the policies and activities of U. S. foreign and military intelligence agencies?

2. Has the Justice Department made any agreements with the CIA or any other U. S. intelligence agency with regard to the investigation or prosecution of agency personnel?

3. Under what circumstances and for what purposes has the Office of Legal Counsel provided legal advice to the Attorney General on matters pertaining to foreign and domestic intelligence activities?

4. To what extent has the Attorney General authorized cooperation, including the exchange of information and the conduct of joint operations, between the Drug Enforcement Administration or its predecessors and the CIA or other

intelligence agencies with respect to narcotics intelligence?

5. What standards and procedures has the Attorney General adopted for:

   a. The collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of narcotics intelligence.

   b. The collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of organized crime intelligence.

   c. The use of intelligence information by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

   d. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grants for the support of state or local police intelligence activities and intelligence data systems.

6. To what extent have communications between the White House and the FBI or other agencies under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General bypassed the Attorney General? To what extent should such communications be channeled through the Attorney General?

7. What have been the policies and procedures of the Justice Department for evaluating the budget requests of the FBI for intelligence and counterintelligence activities?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein
Barbara Banoff

B. The Internal Security Section (formerly Division)

The Committee is examining the activities of the Internal Security Section of the Justice Department and its predecessor, the Internal Security Division. These entities have supervised the Department's internal security law enforcement activities, coordinated certain interdepartmental internal security policies, and engaged in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence.

Questions

The Committee requests that the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Under what circumstances, if any, has the Justice Department seriously considered prosecutions under the Smith Act and laws pertaining to seditious conspiracy, rebellion, or insurrection, or "subversive activities", since January 1, 1960?

2. To what extent has FBI intelligence activity provided valuable evidence for use in the prosecution of specific federal crimes?

3. What have been the practices and procedures for coordination of policy through the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security?

4. What have been the practices and procedures for the interdepartmental and interagency evaluation of domestic intelligence and domestic collection of foreign intelligence through the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and its predecessors?

5. With respect to the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit and the Analysis and Evaluation Section of the Internal Security Division,

   a. What have been the practices and procedures of the Unit and Section for the gathering of intelligence?

b. What type of information has been stored in readily retrievable form by the Unit and Section?

c. To whom and for what reasons has intelligence information been disseminated by the Unit and Section?

d. What were the reasons for the submission of IDIU computer printouts to the CIA, as reportedly occurred in 1969?

e. To what extent did the Unit and Section make specific requests to other agencies within and outside the Justice Department for intelligence information?

6. With respect to the use of grand juries by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division,

a. Have any allegations of misuse of the grand jury process in cases handled by Special Litigation Section attorneys come to the attention of the Department? If so, briefly describe each such allegation and what, if any, action was taken by the Department in response to such allegation.

b. To what extent, if any, did the use of grand juries in cases handled by the Special Litigation Section attorneys differ from the use of grand juries in cases handled by other sections of the Justice Department?

c. To what extent, if any, was information obtained through the use of grand juries included in the intelligence files of the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit or the Analysis and Evaluation Section?

7. What have been the practices and procedures of the Internal Security Division and the Departmental Security Office for advising the Attorney General and other executive agencies with regard to the Federal Employee Security Program?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Barbara Banoff

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 15 1975

TELETYPE

#mpR16

10/10/00 SP-2 ALM/776

NR008 AT CODE

4:15 PM URGENT AUGUST 15, 1975 WCG

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: ATLANTA (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA, AUGUST 14, 1975.

FORMER SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, HOME ADDRESS 2861 GANT QUARTERS DRIVE, MARIETTA, GEORGIA, 30062, WAS CONTACTED BY ASAC THIS DATE AND ADVISED CONCERNING CAPTIONED MATTER IN ACCORDANCE WITH REBUTEL.

END

AJN FBIHQ CLR TU

62-116395-535

cc 67

REC- 102

AUG 19 1975

5-5.1

84 AUG 20 1975

FBI

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

August 14, 1975

Rec'd from SSC 8/14/75

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request for Documents

#MDR16
10/10/00 SP-2 ALM/TG

Attached is a request from the Senate Select Committee dated August 13, 1975, for underlying materials logically related to Department of Justice file #82-46-5. Please arrange for compliance with this request as soon as possible.

treat as original 62-116395-534

9 AUG 19 1975

REC- 102

1 ENCLOSURE

62-116395

5-8

84 AUG 21 1975

[redacted]

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN [illegible]WER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 13, 1975

#MDR 16
10-10-00 SP-2 ALM 1876

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

On July 17, 1975, the Committee received from the Department of Justice a summary of the material in departmental file No. 97 82-46-5. This was in addition to materials received by the Committee on June 25. 1975.

The Committee now wishes staff access to all underlying materials logically related to the above and maintained in the files of the Justice Department and the FBI. Please expedite this request since it is of immediate importance to the Committee.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

RECEIVED
AUG 13 1975

62-116395-531

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 13 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 024 NY CODE

7:35 P.M. NITEL 8-13-75 PLQ

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-14660)

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTN: INTD

SENSTUDY, 1975.

(S) [NEW YORK 6811-IA] TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED SPECIAL AGENT JOSEPH J. PALGUTA ON AUGUST 13, 1975, AND FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ON AUGUST 11, 1975, MR. PATRICK A. SHEY, A MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (SSCIO), TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED [NEW YORK 6811-IA] (S) AND THEY MADE AN APPOINTMENT TO MEET IN NYC AT 2:00 PM ON AUGUST 13, 1975. SOURCE MET WITH SHEY AS ARRANGED ON AUGUST 13, 1975. SHEY TOLD SOURCE THAT SAM JAFFE (FORMER NEW YORK 2524-S) VISITED A FRIEND OF HIS, A MR. MILLER, WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE SSCIO. WHILE IN MILLER'S OFFICE, JAFFE WAS RELATING TO MILLER THAT HE HAD A

REC-102 62-116395-533

9 AUG 19 1975

#MDR 16 10/25/00
SP2 ALM/JTG

tel to AT
LFS:1/5L 8/19/75

84 AUG 19 1975

PLEASANT RELATIONSHIP WITH FORMER SPECIAL AGENTS (SAS) JOHN G. WILLIS AND EDWARD F. GAMBER WITH REGARD TO [SOVIET INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.] (S)

DURING THE TIME THAT JAFFE WAS RELATING ABOVE DATA TO MILLER, SENATOR CHURCH, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SSCI, ENTERED MILLER'S OFFICE AND BECAME VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN JAFFE'S STATEMENTS. JAFFE RELATED TO MILLER THAT AS A REPORTER FOR THE COLUMBIA BROADCASTING COMPANY, HE COVERED THE STORY INVOLVING THE RELEASE OF FRANCIS G. POWERS BY THE SOVIETS (POWERS WAS THE FORMER U-2 PILOT WHO WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE USSR IN 1960). JAFFE RELATED TO MILLER THAT THEREAFTER HE WENT TO HONG KONG. JAFFE ALSO TOLD MILLER THAT WHEN HE RETURNED FROM HONG KONG [(SOURCE BELIEVES THIS TO BE IN 1966-1968)] (S), HE LEARNED THAT HE WAS "FINGERED" BY [A SOVIET DEFECTOR BY THE NAME OF PENKOVSKIY. THIS DEFECTOR ALLEGEDLY REPORTED THAT HE SAW JAFFE'S NAME ON A PIECE OF PAPER ON THE DESK OF A SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.] (S) JAFFE TOLD MILLER THAT THE FBI, UPON LEARNING THAT INFORMATION FELT THAT JAFFE WAS A "DOUBLE AGENT" BECAUSE OF THE COOLNESS OF BUREAU PERSONNEL TOWARD HIM WHEN HE RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES FROM HONG KONG. JAFFE

TOLD MILLER THAT EVER SINCE HIS RETURN FROM HONG KONG, HE CANNOT HOLD A JOB, AND BELIEVES THE FBI IS THE CAUSE OF HIS PREDICAMENT. JAFFE IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE FBI IS BEING VINDICTIVE TOWARD HIM IN PURSUING THIS MATTER AND DEPRIVING HIM OF MAKING A LIVELIHOOD.

MR. SHEY TOLD THE SOURCE THAT THE SSCIO IS LOOKING INTO THE ABOVE MATTER TO DETERMINE IF JAFFE'S STATEMENTS ARE TRUE, AND TO DETERMINE IF SOME CONTROLS COULD BE CREATED SO THAT THE FBI COULD NOT BE VINDICTIVE IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS.

SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE TOLD SHEY THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE FBI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JAFFE AFTER 1964, SINCE HE RETIRED FROM THE BUREAU THAT YEAR. (S) SOURCE ADVISED THAT SHEY TOLD HIM THAT AS YET HE HAS NOT TALKED TO FORMER SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, BUT MAY INTERVIEW HIM IN THE FUTURE.

SOURCE ADVISED THAT SHEY TOLD HIM THAT JAFFE IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS A FREE-LANCE REPORTER WORKING IN WASHINGTON, DC. SOURCE STATED THE HE INFORMED SHEY OF FORMER SA GAMBER'S CURRENT EMPLOYMENT.

SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE MET WITH SHEY ON AUGUST 13, 1975 FROM 2:00 PM UNTIL 3:30 PM.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM THE SOURCE IN A GUARDED MANNER, AND ONLY THE PERTINENT FACTS WERE OBTAINED.

THE NYO WILL PERSONALLY REINTERVIEW THE SOURCE REGARDING THE ABOVE AND OBTAIN COMPLETE DETAILS CONCERNING THE MATTER.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 2609, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

END.

LRF FBIHQ CLR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: August 13, 1975

#mDR16
10/10/00 SP-2ALM/JMG

FROM : Douglas R. Marvin
DRM Counselor to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request for Information on Warrantless Electronic Surveillances

Rec'd from SSC 8/13/75

In accord with our telephone conversation of August 12th, I am forwarding to you a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting answers to questions relating to electronic surveillance conducted by the Federal government in the interests of national security. The Committee has been told that we would try to respond to their request by August 20th. That date is fast approaching and may not be a reasonable period of time in which to compile the information requested and respond to their questions. That date is a useful target, however, since any issues to be presented to the Attorney General with respect to complying to this request must be considered prior to August 19th, the date the Attorney General is scheduled to leave Washington.

13

Would your office please prepare responses to the following questions that involve areas with which, I believe, you are familiar: questions 2-10, 11(b)-(d), 12, 14, 15, 17, 21 and 24.

Thank you.

Treat as original 62-116395-532

REC-102

9 AUG 19 1975

13

ENCLOSURE

5-P

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

84 AU[illegible]9 1975

Julia ~~SECRET~~ R43

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

T, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
NDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
UDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
GAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
REDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COPY 6 OF 8

July 7, 1975

#mDe16

10/10/00 5P2 ALM/JK

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Thank you for your letters of June 24 and June 25, 1975, relating to electronic surveillance conducted by the federal government in the interests of national security and foreign intelligence. The Select Committee also appreciates your providing the information of a sensitive nature in your separate letter of June 24, 1975.

Your letters, and the recent testimony of Kevin T. Maroney and Clarence M. Kelley before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, have raised several additional questions which the Committee wishes to pursue. Further questions are raised by the July 1, 1975, White House news briefing by the Press Secretary relating to the effect of the recent Zweibon decision. Some of these questions relate to general policy considerations in the electronic surveillance area; others address our need for a more complete factual base from which we can draw our conclusions. A list of these questions is attached to this letter. These questions, of course, do not supersede prior requests for material relating to electronic surveillance, which are itemized in the document requests of May 14, June 16, and June 27. Rather, they should be considered as supplementary to the prior requests.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-538

~~SECRET~~

I believe that the answers to these questions are essential to a complete understanding of the policies and procedures followed by the Justice Department in electronic surveillance cases. Full information on these matters is necessary for the Committee to fulfill its mandate "to recommend the enactment of any new legislation . . . necessary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the national security, intelligence, or surveillance activities of the United States and to protect the rights of United States citizens with regard to these activities." With the continued cooperation of the Justice Department, I am convinced that the Committee will be able to discharge this responsibility in the critical area of national security electronic surveillance.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman

[illegible] #mpc/6
[illegible] 11/10/00 SP2ALM/JTB

SECRET

Warrantless Electronic Surveillance for National Security Purposes

60 1. With respect to the "Special Review Group" which you have established within the office of the Attorney General for the purpose of examining requests for nonconsensual electronic surveillance without a judicial warrant, the following questions are asked:

a. What have been the names and titles of the persons serving on the Special Review Group?

b. If the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division is not a member of the Special Review Group, does he normally have the opportunity to review requests for warrantless electronic surveillance?

c. Have any individuals other than those serving on the Special Review Group or the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division had the opportunity to review requests for warrantless electronic surveillance? If so, whom?

d. Does the Special Review Group have the authority to deny requests for warrantless electronic surveillance?

e. Does the Special Review Group review requests for reauthorizations of warrantless electronic surveillance?

AG0 2. Do Justice Department standards and procedures for the authorization and reauthorization of warrantless electronic surveillance require the concurrence of the State Department in the request for such surveillance? If so, in what types of cases is such concurrence required?

FBI 3. What procedures, if any, have been followed to obtain the concurrence of the State Department in the request for warrantless electronic surveillance?

4. What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from 1966 to the present?

5. How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee?

6. How many of the requests initiated by each agency and Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?

7. How many requests have been made by each agency and each Presidential appointee for the continuation of previously approved surveillance?

8. How many of the requests for the continuation of previously approved surveillance made by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?

9. What procedures have been followed for the review of all such surveillance on a regular basis to ensure that the criteria for the surveillance are satisfied?

10. With respect to non-consensual electronic surveillance instituted outside the United States by agencies of the United States government, the following questions are asked:

    a. What have been the standards and procedures, if any, established for the authorization and review of such surveillance?

    b. What has been the total number of such surveillances by year and by month for each year from 1966 to the present?

    c. What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated such requests from 1966 to the present?

    d. How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee?

    e. How many of the requests initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?

f. How many requests have been made by each agency and each Presidential appointee for the continuation of such previously approved surveillance?

g. How many of the requests for the continuation of such previously approved surveillance have been approved by the Attorney General?

h. For each year from 1966 to the present, how many such surveillances have been instituted in (1) North America, other than the United States; (2) South America; (3) Western Europe; (4) Eastern Europe; (5) Africa; (6) the Middle East; (7) Southeast Asia; (8) the rest of Asia?

i. For each year from 1966 to the present, how many such surveillances have been directed at subjects who are United States citizens?

ii. With respect to the requirement that the Attorney General must be satisfied that the subject of the surveillance "plans unlawful activity directed against a foreign power or a foreign-based political group", the following questions are asked:

a. To what extent does the recent decision in Zweibon v. Mitchell by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia limit or otherwise affect this standard?

b. What has been the total number of subjects under surveillance and installations for telephone and microphone surveillance requested and approved under the standard "plans unlawful activity directed against a foreign power" and under the standard "plans unlawful activity directed against a foreign-based political group" for each year from 1966 to the present?

c. How many of the subjects in each category and for each year identified in "b" above have been United States citizens?

d. What have been the identities of all "foreign-based political groups" related to the surveillances identified in "b" above?

~~SECRET~~

With respect to the requirement that the Attorney General must be satisfied that the subject of the surveillance is "assisting a foreign power or foreign-based political group", the following questions are asked:

a. What has been the total number of subjects under surveillance and installations for telephone and microphone surveillance requested and approved under the standard "assisting a foreign power" and under the standard "assisting a foreign-based political group" for each year from 1966 until the present?

b. How many of the subjects in each category and for each year identified in "a" above have been United States citizens?

c. What have been the identities of all "foreign-based political groups" related to the surveillances identified in "a" above?

13. With respect to the requirement that the Attorney General must be satisfied that the requested surveillance is "necessary for national security or foreign intelligence purposes important to national security", the following questions are asked:

a. Is this standard intended to supplant the standard for national security electronic surveillance under former Attorney General Elliot Richardson (i.e., that the proposed surveillance must be necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or any other hostile action of a foreign power, that it be necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or that it be necessary to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities)?

b. Is this standard intended to modify the standard for national security electronic surveillance under former Attorney General Elliot Richardson?

c. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, what is the reason(s) for such change?

d. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, what is the precise legal authority supporting such change in the formulation of the standard?

e. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, what is the reason(s) for the deletion of the word "essential" from the formulation of the standard under former Attorney General Elliot Richardson?

f. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, please give examples of hypothetical situations where national security electronic surveillance would be permitted: (1) under the current standard but not under the former standard, and (2) under the former standard but not under the current standard.

14. What have been the standards and procedures, if any, that have been established for determining that "the minimum physical intrusion necessary to obtain the information will be used"?

15. With respect to warrantless electronic surveillance in cases of "leaks" of information deemed either "essential" or "important" to the security of the United States, the following questions are asked:

a. Has there been a Justice Department policy specifically addressed to such cases?

b. Have there been Justice Department standards or procedures specifically addressed to such cases?

c. Have surveillances in such cases been approved by the Attorney General under the standard "assisting a foreign power or a foreign-based political group"?

d. If the answer to "c" above is no, under what standard have surveillances in such cases been approved?

e. What has been the total number of subjects under surveillance and installations for telephone and microphone surveillance requested and approved for such cases for each year from 1966 to the present?

f. What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated requests for warrantless electronic surveillance in such cases from 1965 to the present?

g. How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee?

h. How many of such requests initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?

i. Of the total number of subjects under surveillance in such cases for each year from 1966 to the present, how many were (1) employees of news media organizations; (2) current employees of the federal government; (3) former employees of the federal government; (4) other?

16. With respect to the dissemination of information obtained from national security electronic surveillance, the following questions are asked:

a. What have been the standards and procedures for the dissemination of such information?

b. What have been the identities of the agencies and Presidential appointees who have received information obtained from national security electronic surveillance for each year from 1966 to the present?

c. What have been the standards and procedures for the dissemination of such information to agencies and Presidential appointees who did not initiate the request for the surveillance?

17. Can additional monthly data on warrantless electronic surveillances prior to November 1972 be made available in view of the fact that the FBI was able to precisely state the number of warrantless electronic surveillances in operation on nineteen separate days, ranging from March 4, 1965, to March 31, 1972, in response to a request by the Select Committee? (By letter of June 9, 1975, the FBI's Office of the Director informed the Committee of the number of warrantless electronic

surveillances in operation on, thirty days before, and thirty days after testimony by the Director before the House Appropriations Committee from 1965 to the present.)

18. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, Kevin T. Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, stated in reference to a three-man Executive Branch commission used in Great Britain to review applications for national security electronic surveillance, "Whether such a commission would be feasible under our system . . . I think it might well be." Is it the official position of the Justice Department that a similar commission composed of Executive Branch officials would be an acceptable alternative to the present system for authorizing national security electronic surveillance?

19. In the testimony referred to above, Mr. Maroney also stated, "I think the Department has previously committed itself . . . to complete disclosure to an oversight committee." With respect to this statement, the following questions are asked:

   a. When and in what context has the Justice Department committed itself to complete disclosure to an oversight committee?

   b. What material or information, if any, that relates to the authorization for, identities of the subjects of, conduct of, and dissemination of information from particular electronic surveillances would the Justice Department be unwilling to disclose to an oversight committee?

20. What is the basis for Justice Department opposition to the concept of a specially-designated court, composed of one or three federal judges, which would review applications for warrants in cases of national security electronic surveillance?

21. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, Clarence M. Kelley stated that he would accept a requirement of judicial warrants for national security

electronic surveillance if the standard for issuance of the warrant was "less than probable cause". When asked by Mr. Badillo what the appropriate standard should be, he answered, "I think reasonable grounds, that as a result of the pursuit of an investigation (it is), possible to believe that there has been, or will be, or there is a need for the gathering of intelligence." Does this statement reflect the official position of the FBI in regard to (1) a warrant requirement for national security electronic surveillance, and (2) the appropriate standard for the issuance of a warrant?

22. What have been the standards and procedures followed by the Justice Department for the authorization and conduct of national security electronic surveillance where one (but not all) of the parties to the conversation consents to the monitoring?

23. With respect to the July 1 White House news briefing by Ron Nessen relating to the effect of the Zweibon decision, the following questions are asked:

a. What is the nature of the directive from the President to the Attorney General, referred to by Mr. Nessen, relating to Justice Department policy and procedures for electronic surveillance of United States citizens?

b. How does this directive affect Justice Department policy and procedures for electronic surveillance of United States citizens?

c. Will the Justice Department support legislative proposals that would require a court order for any electronic surveillance, as was indicated by Mr. Nessen's statement?

d. If the answer to "c" above is yes, which of the pending bills in Congress, if any, would the Justice Department be willing to support?

e. If the answer to "c" above is yes, what would the Justice Department consider to be the appropriate judicial standard for the issuance of a warrant?

f. If the answer to "c" above is yes, what would the Justice Department consider to be the appropriate court or courts to issue such warrant?

24. With respect to electronic surveillance directed at encoded, non-conversational communications conducted in the interests of national security and foreign intelligence, the following questions are asked:

a. What were the total number of such surveillances for each year from 1966 to 1968?

b. What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated requests for such surveillance for each year from 1966 to the present?

c. How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee for each year from 1966 to the present?

d. How many of such requests initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General for each year from 1966 to the present?

e. How many requests have been made by each agency and each Presidential appointee for the continuation of such previously approved surveillance for each year from 1966 to the present?

f. How many of the requests made by each agency and each Presidential appointee for the continuation of such previously approved surveillance have been approved by the Attorney General for each year from 1966 to the present?

g. For each year from 1966 to the present, how many such surveillances have been instituted in (1) the United States; (2) North America, other than the United States; (3) South America; (4) Western Europe; (5) Eastern Europe; (6) Africa; (7) the Middle East; (8) Southeast Asia; (9) the rest of Asia?

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

August 8, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic
(Attn: Mr. L. A. Crescioli
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by Staff Members of captioned Committee of FBI Special Agent Louis A. Crescioli. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-23533
1 - 67- (Louis A. Crescioli)

TJM:dmt
(13)

REC- 102

62-116395-531

UNREC COPY [illegible] OF ENCL FILED IN 62-23533

ALL INF[illegible] CONTAINED
[illegible]
DATE 2/10/82 BY SP4[illegible]

19 AUG 13 1975

ENCLOSURE

MAILED 7
AUG 11 1975
FBI

TJM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 AUG 1 9 1975 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/12/82 BY SP4Qm/rpn
wmp209635

62-116395

August 8, 1975

(Attn: Mr. L. A. Crescioli)
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF SPECIAL AGENT LOUIS A. CRESCIOLI
BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBERS

Set out below is information concerning an interview of Special Agent Louis A. Crescioli by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Members. Mr. Crescioli, who has been a Bureau Agent since September, 1954, is currently assigned to FBI Headquarters, Domestic Liaison, handling liaison responsibilities with the military and the U. S. Postal Service.

On advance notice from Mr. James Dick, SSC Staff Member, Mr. Crescioli was advised that he was to be interviewed at 2:00 p.m., August 1, 1975, in the Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. Mr. Crescioli was informed by this Bureau's Legal Counsel Division that he was being released from any applicable employment agreement for purpose of this interview as it relates to Bureau liaison operations with regard to the U. S. Postal Service. Mr. Crescioli was advised there were certain areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions, namely: information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect on-going FBI investigations and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

After meeting at the Senate Office Building with Staff Members at the scheduled time, it was learned the interview of Mr. Crescioli would occur in Room 610 of the Carrol Arms Hotel which is located across the street from the Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. The interview commenced at approximately 2:05 p.m., and was conducted by Mr. Dick and his SSC Staff Associate Mr. Paul Wallach. Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff, FBI Headquarters, accompanied Mr. Crescioli and was present during the interview.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1 - 62-23533
1 - 67- (Louis A. Crescioli)

TJM:dmt
(12)

wrw

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

62-116395-

TJM

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM [V] TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

At the outset Mr. Crescioli was informed of his rights; namely, that he did have a right to an attorney, that the interview was entirely voluntary and that he could refuse to answer any questions asked of him. The interview included the following questions asked by Messrs. Dick and Wallach which are deemed pertinent:

In order to assess the experience of Special Agent Crescioli, his prior Bureau background was requested. Mr. Crescioli responded that he entered on duty as a Special Agent in September, 1954, and served in five field offices handling both criminal and security matters prior to his assignment to FBI Headquarters. During the period 1962-73, Mr. Crescioli was assigned as an FBI Headquarters Supervisor handling substantive cases in the internal security area. From 1973 to November, 1974, he was assigned to the Foreign Liaison Unit of the Liaison Section, and from November, 1974, to the present, he has been assigned to the Domestic Liaison Unit handling liaison specifically with the military and U. S. Postal Service.

Messrs. Wallach and Dick were most interested in ascertaining the procedure followed by Mr. Crescioli to secure authority to be present at this interview. He was specifically queried as to the names of the individuals who authorized his attendance and what comments or instructions, if any, those Bureau officials gave him. Mr. Crescioli responded by stating that upon receiving a telephone call from Mr. Dick requesting his appearance, a memorandum setting forth this request was prepared by Mr. Crescioli and "walked through" various Bureau levels for approval. The identities of Bureau officials approving the memorandum were made known to these Staff Members, however, it was pointed out to them that no particular comment of pertinence to instant matter was recalled by Mr. Crescioli as having been made by any of these officials.

To the question as to what problems have been experienced by Mr. Crescioli with the Postal Service since assuming his role of Liaison Officer, Mr. Crescioli responded that cooperation with the Postal Service has been excellent and no real problems have been encountered. Mr. Crescioli explained that he has visited the Postal Inspection Service on the average of once every two weeks since November, 1974. He added that on occasion he will be telephoned by an official of the Inspection Service with a question regarding a national security mail cover requested by the FBI, a question regarding training procedures or a question regarding handling of Freedom of Information Act requests. In his liaison capacity, Mr. Crescioli would initiate the necessary arrangements to have these questions resolved and the answer returned to the Postal Inspection Service. In this same area of conversation, Mr. Wallach asked Mr. Crescioli if he ever visited the Postal Inspection Service to merely "chat" with the Postal Inspectors. Mr. Crescioli responded that because of his heavy liaison responsibilities with agencies other than the Postal Service he did not have time to visit the Postal Service for other than official reasons.

When asked if the various FBI field offices have liaison representatives with the various Regional Postal Inspectors in Charge, Mr. Crescioli responded that with regard to national security mail covers, the Special Agent in Charge of the local FBI office is the designated Bureau liaison contact with the Regional Postal Inspector in Charge.

The above Staff Members were interested in ascertaining whether or not national security mail cover checks were routed through Mr. Crescioli prior to delivery to the Chief Postal Inspector. Mr. Crescioli responded that these mail cover requests are not routed through him for review but rather are routed through normal Bureau channels prior to delivery by Courier Service to the Chief Postal Inspector.

When asked if he knew of Bureau Agents actually being engaged in physically handling the mail in any Post Office, particularly relating to mail covers, Mr. Crescioli responded that he had no knowledge of such activities. Mr. Crescioli pointed out that to his knowledge all mail cover requests were forwarded to proper Postal authorities for handling by Postal employees only.

In conclusion, Mr. Wallach inquired if Mr. Crescioli had knowledge of the reason for the discontinuance of mail covers by the FBI as an investigative technique for a period of time in the past. Mr. Crescioli responded that he had no knowledge of this matter.

At this point, the interview was terminated at approximately 2:50 p.m., with both Messrs. Wallach and Dick expressing their appreciation of Mr. Crescioli's appearance and responses on this occasion.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Results of above interview from notations made by Special Agent Crescioli at the conclusion of the interview. Special Agent McNiff, the dictator, has reviewed the above and has noted no discrepancies between reported results of the interview and that which transpired on the above occasion.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - J. A. Mintz
(Attn: J.B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 8/6/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - J. G. Deegan
1 - H. A. Newman

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

#mDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

Through arrangements made by Mr. John Hotis, Legal Counsel Division, Unit Chief Homer A. Newman, IS-1 Section, Intelligence Division, was interviewed for the purpose of developing general information regarding the handling of informant files within the FBI by Mr. John T. Elliff and Mr. Mark Gitenstein of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force, U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The interview was conducted on 8/4/75 in FBI space and lasted from approximately 2:00 p.m. until 2:30 p.m.

The interview was extremely general in nature and dealt exclusively with general information regarding the handling of informant files both in the field and at FBIHQ. The questions asked dealt with such matters as what type of files were maintained in the field and at FBIHQ regarding informants and generally the types of information contained therein. They were particularly interested as to whether or not an individual informant file either at FBIHQ or in the field would contain information which would specifically identify informants other than the informant on which the file was maintained. They also inquired whether or not there was a sub A section of each informant file maintained at FBIHQ as was the case in the field. Questions were also asked as to whether or not the individual file maintained at FBIHQ on informants would run into several volumes. This inquiry was answered to the effect that the size of the file would depend on the activity of the informant, how long he had been operated, etc.

62-116395-530

HAN:cah (6)

cah

REC- 102

9 AUG 19 1975

CONTINUED OVER

62-116395

5-606

84 AUG 19 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy

It was readily apparent that they were asking these questions with the thought in mind of requesting access to certain informant files, the identity of which they already had but did not divulge. They did state specifically that the informant files in which they would have an interest amounted to approximately ten and were all on informants that had publicly been exposed for one reason or another and were no longer being operated as current informants. The indication was that the request would be for access only to such files for review in FBI space.

ACTION:

For information.

HN HEB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 7/30/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/30/00 BY sp2tap/cp

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

The purpose of the memorandum is to set forth in summary form the requests we have received from various Committees in Congress and the status of our replies.

Senate Select Committee
On Intelligence Activities (Church's Committee)

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
Letter, 5/14/75	Includes among other things information concerning wiretaps, including the reconstruction of Bureau files, as well as Inspection surveys for ten offices.	Responses to most questions prepared, approved, and delivered. Some responses are awaiting White House and/or Departmental approval.
Letter, 6/27/75	Request for information concerning alleged abuses.	Department seeking clarification.
Letter, 6/30/75, received by Bureau, 7/8/75	Request pertaining to COINTELPRO.	Partial response delivered.
Letter, 7/3/75	Requests documents pertaining to COINTELPRO be furnished to the Committee in Committee space	Response being prepared
Letter, 7/8/75	Communication to all employees concerning Senate Select Committee inquiries.	Response being prepared.

REC- 102 62-116395-529

62-116464 62-116009 62-116

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116

9 AUG 19 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Cregar)
1 - Mrs. Metcalf

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

4 XEROX

AUG 19 1975
JFH

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

LAD:lad
(8)

8 AUG 26 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
Letter, 7/14/75	Request concerning two highly sensitive Bureau programs in the foreign intelligence field.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7/14/75	Request concerning COINTELPRO documents.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7/14/75	Material pertaining to Martin Luther King.	Awaiting Departmental decision.
Letter, 7/14/75	Material pertaining to Ku Klux Klan.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7/16/75	Information regarding functions of Attorney General with respect to supervision of and policy-making for internal security and intelligence activities.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7/23/75	List of people interviewed in O&C Inspection Review.	Response prepared and delivered to Department.
Letter, 7/24/75	List of Agents in New York City area who had surname "Kehoe."	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7/28/75	Superseding request for FBI materials for delivery and/or access of Committee.	Response being prepared.

Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Tunney's Committee)

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
Letter, 7/18/75	Material concerning Flagging procedures in Identification and NCIC Systems.	Response being prepared.

CONTINUED - OVER

↓ ↓

Subcommittee on Oversight Committee on Ways and Means (Vanik's Committee)

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
Letter, 7/14/75	Description of FBI's informant programs.	Response awaiting Bureau's approval.

House Select Committee (Pike's Committee)

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
Letter, 7/22/75	All documents and materials provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations and request for all materials related to budgetary authority.	Being discussed with Department.
Letter, 7/24/75	Review documents and materials related to budgetary matters.	Briefing concerning Budget Matters being arranged.

Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights House Judiciary Committee (Edwards Committee)

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
Letter, 7/9/75	Requested information concerning surreptitous entry.	Response prepared and delivered to Department.
Letter, 7/15/75	Requested information pertaining to our assignment of Bureau personnel to Congressional Committees.	Response prepared and delivered to Department.

Hearings

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
	Request to arrange testimony before Subcommittes on Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee concerning mail covers and mail openings.	Date of testimony has not been established.

CONTINUED - OVER
↓ ↓

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE REQUESTS

Hearings (continued)

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
7/29/75	Orally advised by Committee staff members letter sent requesting Bureau testimony relating to Budget matters.	Testimony to be 8/7 or 8/8/75.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

wRW JBA

Pcm

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7/24/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
Attn: Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS TO FBI MATERIALS BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On the afternoon of July 24, 1975, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel in the Department, met with Deputy Associate Director Adams and me to present us with a copy of the proposed procedures and to discuss any amendments the Bureau might request. I asked Mr. O'Connor who had approved this latest draft of the proposed procedures and he said that they had been tentatively approved by the Attorney General and the White House. I specifically asked him who in the White House had approved them and he said that they had been approved by Mr. Buchen (Counsel to the President).

Mr. Adams and I discussed the procedures with Mr. O'Connor and suggested to him as indicated by my inked notation on the bottom of page 2A that the word "use" used in subparagraph (d) should be further defined by a footnote that would specify the limitations on information to be provided the Committee and its staff concerning the identities of persons to whom the FBI has undertaken an obligation of confidentiality. Mr. O'Connor agreed to the proposed change and in our presence telephonically communicated with John Elliff and obtained his concurrence in the amendment to subparagraph (d).

REC-102 62-116395-528

Mr. Adams told Mr. O'Connor that the FBI was not agreeing to the procedures in substance but that we recognized the authority of the Attorney General in these matters and would abide by his decision that the proposed procedures would be implemented on agreement by the Committee. Mr. O'Connor said he understood that and he advised John Elliff that the Bureau had acquiesced in the proposed procedures with the one amendment described above. Mr. O'Connor departed indicating that he was going to proceed to meet with the Committee and obtain final agreement as to the text of the proposed procedures. The draft of the procedures is attached for the Director's information.

ENCLOSURE

9 JUL 30 1975

Enc.
JAM:mfd

8 AUG(5)9 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

#moR16 10-10-00 SP2ALM/TC

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Proposed Procedures for Access to
FBI Materials by SSC

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum and the proposed draft of the proposed procedures be forwarded for the information of the Director.

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader* will submit periodically a list of ~~specific~~ materials, ~~relevant~~ pertaining to the inquiry being conducted under S.R. 21, to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. Any questions as to the scope, specificity, or meaning of any portion of such list shall be identified by the Special Counsel and discussed at the time of acceptance of the list, between the DTFL and the Special Counsel.

The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within ~~48~~ 96 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of ~~the~~ each request, of any delay beyond ~~48~~ 96 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

#MDR16

10/10/00 SPR 2 ALM/JTB

---

* Wherever used herein, the term Domestic Task Force Leader (DTFL) is understood to include the Staff Director, Chief Counsel and the Minority Counsel of the Senate Select Committee.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-50

These procedures shall apply to all matters covered by paragraph 1. In the event of a specific problem arising with the applicability of these procedures to any matters in current litigation or any matters in which criminal prosecution is pending, or any matter which the Attorney General shall specifically designate as extraordinarily sensitive, a special procedure shall be undertaken.* Such specific problem areas shall be identified by the Attorney General to the Chairman and Vice Chairman by letter upon consideration of the lists submitted pursuant to this provision. The special procedure to be followed shall be proposed, defined, adopted, and followed after consideration by the SSC of the specific problem area and pertinent inquiry and discussion at the staff level.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader requests access to materials, rather than delivery to the SSC.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources or peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operations.

---

* No restriction of currently operational arrangements is intended under this provision.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the identities of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identities to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(d) As to other information which would identify persons, as sources, who have provided or continue to provide information to the FBI, and as to whose identity the FBI has undertaken an obligation of confidentiality, the Committee and its staff shall preserve the confidentiality and shall make no use Ⓐ which would impair the confidentiality of this class of information to which access has been given, unless the identity of the individual as a source has already been made known to the Committee, or unless such information appears in materials which have been screened by the FBI as provided in paragraph 6 below.

Ⓐ Examples of prohibited uses are: ① interviews of the source's source; ② interviews or other inquiries that would disclose the fact the identity of a confidential source was made known to the staff; ③ public disclosure

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the Committee's offices

(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources ~~and~~/ or sensitive ongoing operations.

(b) If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions or paraphrases, the materials in issue will be forthwith conveyed by the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position, to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation within 24 hours.

(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an appropriate disposition.

(7) The Committee staff may remove to the office of SSC for appropriate use, any notes which they may make upon review of material screened by the FBI, as provided in (6) above, without such notes being reviewed by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only if such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above.

(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the original materials to which the staff has been given access as extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171, during normal FBI business hours; upon reasonable notice, special arrangements may be made for access at other times.

(9) These procedures are adopted subject to satisfactory experience in implementation. If after a fair trial the procedures herein do not operate suitably in the view of either the SSC or the Attorney General, the procedures may be unilaterally set aside by either the SSC or the Attorney General and other appropriate and suitable methods of procedure undertaken.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

#MDR-16
SP2ALM/TTS
10/10/00

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 7-24-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth in summary form the requests we have received from various Committees in Congress and the status of our replies.

Senate Select Committee
On Intelligence Activities (Church's Committee)

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
Letter, 5-14-75	Includes among other things information concerning wiretaps, including their reconstruction of Bureau files, as well as Inspection surveys for ten offices.	Responses to most questions prepared, approved, and delivered.
Letter, 6-27-75	Request for information concerning alleged abuses.	Department seeking clarification.
Letter, 6-30-75, received by Bureau 7-8-75.	Request pertaining to COINTELPRO.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7-3-75	Requests documents pertaining to COINTELPRO be furnished to the Committee in Committee space.	Response being prepared.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-116395-527

REC-102

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Cregar)
1 - Mrs. Metcalf

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

5 JUL 30 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:bjc (7)

84 AUG 19 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE REQUESTS

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
Letter, 7-8-75	Communication to all employees concerning Senate Select Committee inquiries.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7-14-75	Request concerning two highly sensitive Bureau programs in the foreign intelligence field.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7-14-75	Request concerning COINTELPRO documents.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7-14-75	Material pertaining to Martin Luther King.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7-14-75	Material pertaining to Ku Klux Klan.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7-23-75	List of people interviewed in O&C Inspection Review.	Response being prepared.

Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights House Judiciary Committee (Edwards Committee)

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
Letter, 7-9-75	Requested information concerning surreptitious entry.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7-15-75	Requested information pertaining to our assignment of Bureau personnel to Congressional Committees.	Response being prepared.

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE REQUESTS

Hearings

Nature of Request	Status
Request to arrange testimony before Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee concerning mail covers and mail openings.	Date of testimony has not been established.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 7-16-75

#MDR16

FROM : Legal Counsel

10/10/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

SUBJECT: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth in summary form the requests we have received from various Committees in Congress and the status of our replies.

Senate Select Committee
On Intelligence Activities (Church's Committee)

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
Letter, 5-14-75	Includes among other things information concerning wiretaps, including their reconstruction of Bureau files, as well as Inspection surveys for ten offices.	Responses to most questions prepared, approved, and delivered.
Letter, 5-28-75	Requests certain Senators on Committee be given access to any information concerning them in FBI files.	Being handled under same guidelines as Freedom of Information Act requests. Letter to Committee from Department requesting discussion be held.
Letter, 6-13-75	Requests complete information concerning mail openings and mail covers.	Material being gathered for response.
Letter, 6-27-75	Request for information concerning alleged abuses.	

62-99229

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-116395-526

REC-102

JUL 30 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Cregar)
1 - Mrs. Metcalf

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 1 9 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
Letter, 6-30-75, received by Bureau 7-8-75.	Request pertaining to COINTELPRO.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7-9-75	Request briefing for Committee Members concerning documents in possession of Committee which may be highly sensitive. Documents were furnished by White House and were material studied by Rockefeller Commission.	
Letter, 7-3-75	Requests documents pertaining to COINTELPRO be furnished to the Committee in Committee space.	Response being prepared.
Letter,7-8-75	Communication to all employees concerning Senate Select Committee inquiries.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7-14-75	Request concerning two highly sensitive Bureau programs in the foreign intelligence field.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7-14-75	Request concerning COINTELPRO documents.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7-14-75	Material pertaining to Martin Luther King.	Response being prepared.
Letter 7-14-75	Material pertaining to Ku Klux Klan.	Response being prepared.

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE REQUESTS

Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights
(Abzug's Committee)

Date of Request	Nature of Request	Status
	Request asking for identity of FBI personnel who served on Interagency Evaluation Committee between 1970 and 1973.	We have responded.
Hearings		
	Request to arrange testimony before Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee concerning mail covers and mail openings.	Date of testimony has not been established. It has been postponed from 7-15-75 to around 7-24-75.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

[redacted]

2 - Mr. [redacted]A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO SAC ATLANTA

AUGUST 14, 1975

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

SENSTUDY 75

NEW YORK OFFICE HAS ADVISED THAT FORMER SA JOHN G. WILLIS WAS RECENTLY CONTACTED BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF MEMBER PATRICK SHEA WHO INTERVIEWED HIM RELATIVE TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF FORMER BUREAU SOURCE SAM JAFFE WHO ALLEGEDLY HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SSC. JAFFE ALLEGEDLY ADVISED SSC THAT HE FORMERLY ENJOYED A PLEASANT RELATIONSHIP WITH FORMER SA WILLIS AND FORMER SA EDWARD F. GAMBER WITH REGARD TO SOVIET INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. JAFFE ALLEGEDLY STATED TO SSC THAT BUREAU PERSONNEL BECAME COOL TOWARD HIM IN APPROXIMATELY 1966-1968 AFTER JAFFE RETURNED FROM HONG KONG AND THAT SINCE THAT TIME JAFFE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO HOLD A JOB AND BELIEVES THAT THE FBI IS BEING VINDICTIVE TOWARD HIM AND IS DEPRIVING HIM OF A MEANS OF MAKING A LIVELIHOOD.

EX-105 REC-36 62-116395-525

10 AUG 15 1975

#MDR16

10/25/00 SP2ALM/LTB

LFS:lhb
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

1 - 67-456921 (Personnel File Former SA Edward F. Gamber)
1 - 67-66250 (Personnel File Former SA John G. Willis)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 14 1975
TELETYPE

WRW/TUL

JBH/PLN

LFS

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

84 AUG 18 1975

GPO 954-546

FORMER SA WILLIS ADVISED THAT HE TOLD SHEA THAT HE KNEW NOTHING OF THE FBI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JAFFE AFTER 1964, SINCE HE RETIRED FROM THE BUREAU THAT YEAR. SHEA INDICATED TO WILLIS THAT HE HAD NOT YET TALKED TO FORMER SA GAMBER BUT MAY INTERVIEW HIM IN THE FUTURE.

FORMER SA GAMBER IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY THE WELLS FARGO ARMOREDCAR DIVISION AND RESIDES IN THE ATLANTA AREA. YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY ATTEMPT TO CONTACT GAMBER AND ALERT HIM THAT HE MAY BE APPROACHED FOR INTERVIEW BY SSC STAFF. HE SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT IN THE EVENT HE IS INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE INTERVIEW, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), HE MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT TO BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT IF REQUESTED. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING HIS OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS

FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACT WITH FORMER SA GAMBER SHOULD BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC, OR IF THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE BY A SENIOR SPECIAL AGENT OF YOUR OFFICE.

SUTEL RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH GAMBER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF HE IS NO LONGER LOCATED IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO RESPONSIBLE OFFICE WITH COPY TO BUREAU.

NOTE:

Jaffe is a former Bureau source who is currently engaged in a Freedom of Information Act request appeal. Appropriate files are being reviewed to determine what, if any, significance there may be in the allegations attributed to Jaffe by the SSC Staff Member. Procedure for alerting former SA Gamber is in accordance with what we have been doing concerning many other former employees.

5-113a (Rev. 3-21-73)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

10/10/00 #MDR16
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 8/4/75

In connection with our responses to the Senate Select Committee (SSC), the White House has instructed that the Intelligence Community prepare a briefing for Senators Church and Tower of the SSC regarding warrantless electronic surveillances and surreptitious entries. During meetings of the Intelligence Community, it was agreed that NSA, FBI and CIA would give the briefings. No date has been scheduled for the briefings, although it is anticipated representatives of the White House will monitor a preview of the actual briefing to be given Senators Church and Tower.

During meetings of the Intelligence Community representatives, to discuss the contents of such a briefing, it was agreed among representatives of NSA, CIA and FBI that efforts would be made to avoid identifying specific foreign targets of surreptitious entries or warrantless electronic surveillances.

Attached is a memorandum from CIA advising that CIA has already disseminated to the SSC information concerning sensitive technical operations against certain Embassies and diplomatic establishments in the U.S. ~~(S)~~

ACTION: For information and record purposes.

WOC:bcw bcw WJB

~~SECRET~~
Classified by ~~6203~~ WJB
Exempt from GDS, Category ~~1~~
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 8/6/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

*MDR16

10-10-00 SP-2 ALM/TK

On 8/6/75, Daniel M. (Mac) Armstrong, III, who was on the personal staff of former Acting Director Gray, called to advise that he had been contacted by John Elliff. He had known Elliff casually during the confirmation hearings regarding Mr. Gray. Elliff told him that he was personally interested in determining background on two matters which were: (1) the decision to abolish the Crime Records Division; and (2) the Legal Attache program.

Armstrong told him that he had no knowledge concerning the Crime Records Division and had not even learned of its abolishment until after the fact. Armstrong referred Elliff to Dave Kinley regarding that topic. Armstrong said that Elliff did not want to talk to him concerning the Legal Attache program over the phone and said he would contact him in the near future for an appointment to see him personally.

Armstrong said he was passing this information along to us in order to keep us advised of his contacts with the Senate Select Committee concerning his Bureau information which came to him as a result of his Bureau employment.

REC-26 62-116395-524

RECOMMENDATION:

EX-101

AUG 15 1975

For information.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Herington

JH:mfd
(6)

(Armstrong)

84 AUG 26 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

S E N S I T I V E

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-16-00 BY SP-2 ALM/bjs

DivD-75/327
4 August 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓ wrw
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Staff Knowledge of CIA Domestic Electronic Surveillance Against Foreign Targets

1. In our discussions preparatory to the briefing to be given to Senators Church and Tower, we have agreed to try to avoid identifying specific foreign targets of the various types of operations which will be discussed, although it was generally recognized that it would be impossible to avoid discussing the Soviet target specifically. I have recently learned that the SSC Staff is aware of the fact (from material turned over to them by CIA) that CIA "participated in a series of electronic surveillance operations in the U.S." The information is contained in a single paragraph, which goes on to say:

> "Included among them are operations against the Czech Embassy, the UAR Embassy, the Chilean Embassy, the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, the present Soviet Embassy, the planned Soviet Embassy, and the quarters occupied by the Chinese Communists in New York City."

2. This being so, it can be expected that the Staff will have brought this information to the senators' attention, and I will be prepared to respond factually to questions with respect to these operations, which of course were carried out in pursuit of NSA requirements, and with FBI coordination and/or support.

EX-101 REC-26 62-116395-523

AUG 15 1975

3. Notwithstanding this regrettable breach in the principle we have agreed to try to maintain, I believe we should resist pressures to expand on the number of identified targets.

Edward Ryan
Edward Ryan
Chief, Division D

1 c/c made for temporary use & destruction
8/4/75
wrw

cc: NSA (Mr. Richard Kern)
FBI (Mr. William Cregar)
IC Staff (Adm. Showers)

~~SECRET~~

S E N S I T I V E

62-116395

84 AUG 18 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. McDermott

DATE: 7831-75

FROM : W. L. Bailey

10/10/00 #MDR16
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 1

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

On July 31, 1975, Mr. Dan Dwyer, Research Assistant, Senate Select Committee, advised SA Seymor F. Phillips that he had some specific questions to ask concerning his review of the Classifying Guide, Files and Communications Division. Thereafter, ~~Supervisor Paul F. Shea and Classifying Unit~~ Supervisor Odell Wheeler answered the following questions raised by Mr. Dwyer: (1) Explain the difference in applicant mail categories, i.e. 67, 77, 116, 151 and 161? The various applicant type categories were discussed with him. (2) What is the difference between main files, general files and setup files? These definitions were given to him in accordance with the manual; in addition, our procedures for handling "0" files, "00" files and subfiles were also explained. (3) When is a 62 file interchangeable? It was explained to him that the 62 classification is interchangeable with other designated classifications, for example, that incoming 62 material could be placed in an existing file on the subject rather than opening a separate 62 file. (4) Describe what you mean by the standard sublist. It was explained that a subnumber is assigned to each one of our field offices and to each foreign country; that subfiles are used when it is anticipated that the volume of mail will be sufficient to place the file in separate subs for future ready reference to a particular area or locality. (5) What is the meaning of the character of a case? It was explained that we have utilized 185 classification numbers to date and that each of these classifications has a corresponding character. The example given was the 26 classification and corresponding ITSMV character. (S) (6) What is meant by the [134] classification being interchangeable with the subversive list? It was explained to him that from the 185 classifications approximately 60 of these are termed subversive from an administrative standpoint. The [134] classification which (S) designates a [security informant] is interchangeable with certain (S) subversive classifications on the subversive list.

Bureau file 62-116395

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - S. F. Phillips

EX-110
REC-26 62-116395-522

AUG 15 1975

PFS:mks
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 AUG 18 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

August 7, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Director, FBI

#MOR 16

10-10-00 SP2 ALM/TG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

This is in response to an oral request from Mr. Loch Johnson, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, that two former FBI Special Agent employees be made available for interview and/or their current addresses be made available to the Senate Select Committee so that the Committee may arrange for the interviews.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum responsive to the above request. A copy of this memorandum is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

REC-26

62-116395-521

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

AUG 15 1975

1 - 67-449472
1 - 67-431020

TJM:dmt
(12)

3 ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____

WOC
406

WOC

JBA p.m

84 AUG 1 9 ~~~~ MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

62-116395

August 7, 1975

#MDR16

10/10/00 SP2 ALM/SRS

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: ADDRESSES OF FORMER
BUREAU EMPLOYEES

On July 28, 1975, Mr. Loch Johnson, Senate Select Committee Staff Member, orally requested of Special Agent Paul V. Daly, FBI Headquarters, that former FBI Special Agents Thomas J. Smith and Richard D. Cotter be made available for interview and/or their current addresses be made available to the Senate Select Committee so that interviews may be arranged. The subject matter of the interview is to be limited to the above former employees' knowledge concerning the "Huston Plan."

This is to advise that both Messrs. Smith and Cotter have been released from their employment agreement with this Bureau for the purpose of an interview by the Senate Select Committee concerning their knowledge of the "Huston Plan." In response to Mr. Johnson's request, there is set forth below the last known address for each of the above-named former employees:

Thomas J. Smith, 3410 Memphis Lane, Bowie, Maryland 20715.

Richard D. Cotter, 5337 Ravensworth Road, Springfield, Virginia 22151.

1 - The Attorney General

1 - 67-449472
1 - 67-431020

TJM:dmt
(11)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL

wRW

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

WOC
Eurg
TJM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-1[illegible]

GPO 954-546

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE:

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to J. B. Adams, dated 7/29/75, captioned "Senstudy 75," wherein the request of Mr. Johnson is set forth as well as the approved release of Messrs. Smith and Cotter from their employment agreement as it relates to the "Huston Plan." On 8/4/75 Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff attempted to contact Mr. Smith at his home phone 301-262-1921. An adult female answered and advised that she was baby-sitting for Mr. and Mrs. Smith who are currently in New Mexico and are not expected to return for an additional two weeks. Special Agent McNiff left his name and office phone number with the request that Mr. Smith call him upon his return to his residence.

Mr. Richard Cotter on 8/4/75 was contacted at his home residence phone 256-7227 and advised of the SSC desire to interview him within the parameter outlined above. Mr. Cotter was advised that he has been released from his employment agreement withinthe above parameter and that should he so request a Bureau Agent will be made available to him for consultation at the time of the interview. It was pointed out to Mr. Cotter that during the interview there are certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions, namely: information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect on-going FBI investigations and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Mr. Cotter concluded by saying that upon being contacted by the SSC he would advise this Bureau of the date of the anticipated interview and his decision as to whether or not he would request that a Bureau Agent be made available for consultation.

F-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 8/7/75

Caption of Document: United States Senate Select Committee. Re: Addresses of Former Bureau Employees. (7/28/75 request)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V. Daly Date: 6:15pm 8/8/75

Received by:

Title: Counsel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395- 5[illegible]1

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
8/7/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

7/28/75 oral request

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 16-10-00 SP2ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Furnishing SSC addresses of former Special Agents to be interviewed concerning their knowledge of the "Huston Plan."

62-116395

(FMK;FMK)
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

51WO(/8

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-521

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

The Attorney General July 22, 1975

Director, FBI REC-26 62-116395-520

~~PROPOSED~~ PROCEDURES -
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

I have reviewed the proposed procedures as set forth in memorandum to you from Mr. K. William O'Connor dated July 21, 1975, and I will abide by your judgment in this matter. To clarify our position relative to raw files, I strongly recommend you incorporate in your transmittal letter a reference to this.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Mintz (detached)

JBA:ams
(6)

Hand [illegible]
[illegible]
7/22/75 3 Pm

#MDR 16

10-10-00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

AUG 1 8 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

J. B. AD
DEPUTY ASSOCIAT RECTOR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP 2 ALM/17

7/22/75

TO MR. KELLEY:

The attached constitutes the revised draft of proposed procedures which we met on yesterday with the Attorney General and staff. Mr. Mintz and I feel it incorporates the matters agreed upon at the meeting.

Please note the memo to Mr. Levi from O'Connor indicates these procedures are designed "to permit broad access for SSC staff to FBI materials," and the proposed procedures do not rule out the possibility that the Committee can request complete files for review. Accordingly, if you have no objection, we will advise the Attorney General that you have reviewed the proposed procedures and will abide by his judgment, however, we continue to object to granting of access to raw files of the FBI to representatives of the SSC. Attached is a letter to the AG so stating.

EX-101 REC-26 62-116395-520

J. B. ADAMS

1 ENCLOSURE

17 AUG ~~JUL 24~~ 1975

Enclosures

To replace last sentence -

"To clarify our position relative to raw files I strongly recommend you incorporate in your transmittal letter a reference to this";

LEGAL COUNSEL

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

July 21, 1975

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO: Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Proposed Procedures - SSC

This draft of "Proposed Procedures" has not been discussed with SSC staff. It is intended to reflect the substance of the discussion had on 7/21, in your office; and incorporates (as underscored) additional language for the purposes suggested by that discussion. Also reflected are the slight editorial changes requested by the SSC in the draft attached to Senator Church's letter of July 18, 1975.

These procedures are designed to permit broad access for SSC staff to FBI materials at the FBI, or delivery of such materials, if appropriate, to the SSC. The present scope of the access is defined by the requests as received; those extant are the subject of superseding redraft under paragraph 1. The prospective scope of requested information is not restricted, but is subject to negotiation as indicated in the amendment to paragraph 1.

The proposed modification of paragraph 3 will be the focus of most controversy. The SSC will probably object to the withholding of sources under paragraph 3(d) (proposed) saying that access to information at the FBI offices is all that is required; that no note on such documents can be removed from the premises of the FBI under procedure 6; and that if they wish to pursue any sources, the appeal provision of existing paragraph 6 should cover it. Since that was the purpose of paragraph 6, and since paragraph 6(a) was designed to focus on any real problem which might arise, the scope of the stated problem under paragraph 3(d) may be seen by the SSC as an attempt to withhold information from the SSC staff, and delay the inquiry (since the Bureau would have to do considerable pre

#MDE16 SP-2 ALM/dt6 10/10/60

ENCLOSURE

cc: Deputy Attorney General
✓Director, FBI
Mr. Scalia
Doug Marvin

REC-26 62-116395-556

EX-101

ENCLOSURE

17 JUL 24 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

delivery work under 3(d) to make properly defined and reviewed deletions). Accordingly, I would expect SSC to assert (a) DOJ does not trust SSC probity or security, and (b) DOJ is following a dilatory and unnecessary tactic.

In anticipation of these problems, I have re-written paragraph 9 to permit unilateral abrogation if the procedures do not work. If actual information withheld is capriciously defined, or if any lapse of good judgment occurs, I would expect prompt abrogation by SSC and a very severe criticism of the Director, the Attorney General, and the Department.

I think that is a high risk, and assumption of it places a very heavy burden upon the Bureau, initially, and upon the Department, ultimately.

My recommendation is that the proposed procedures be attempted as redrafted, subject to Attorney General and White House approval; but a vigorous caveat is indicated as to the need for real restraint in the exercise of initial FBI discretion under paragraph 3(d).

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader* will submit periodically a list of specific materials, relevant to the inquiry being conducted under S.R. 21, to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the Committee desires delivery. Any questions as to the scope or meaning of any portion of such list shall be identified by the Special Counsel and discussed at the time of acceptance of the list, between the DTFL and the Special Counsel.

The first such list will be delivered to the Department of Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this list will be in priority order, as fixed by the Committee, with fixed delivery/access dates specified. Those materials for which the Committee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than within ~~48~~ 96 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours of receipt of the request, of any delay beyond ~~48~~ 96 hours, the expected length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Partial access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth herein.

#MORI6

10/16/00 SP-2 ALM/376

---

* Wherever used herein, the term Domestic Task Force Leader (DTFL) is understood to include the Chief Counsel and the Minority Counsel of the Senate Select Committee.

62-116395 - 580

ENCLOSURE

The Attorney General may exempt specific topical areas of inquiry from the scope of these procedures. Such topical areas shall be identified by the Attorney General to the Chairman and Vice Chairman by letter upon consideration of the lists submitted pursuant to this provision. As to any such exemption, the procedure to be followed shall be proposed, defined, adopted, and followed after consideration by the SSC of the specific exemption, and pertinent inquiry and discussion at the staff level.

(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations, or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader requests access to materials, rather than delivery to the SSC.

(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials requested:

(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources or sensitive ongoing operations.

(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who will have access to all of the materials.

(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the identities of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential informant has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identities to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(d) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for information which would identify persons, as sources, who have provided or continue to provide information to the FBI, and as to whose identity the FBI has undertaken an obligation of confidentiality. In order to preserve that obligation of confidentiality, the FBI will withhold access to this class of information, unless the identity of the individual as a source has already been made known to the Committee, or unless the Attorney General, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, jointly agree on the limited disclosure of such identities to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.

(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the Committee's offices.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-23-81 BY SP4/JBM/LA 6076

August 7, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) JOHN M.
MATTER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

Set out below is information concerning an interview of former FBI SA John M. Matter by SSC Staff Members. Matter served in the FBI from October 21, 1940, until his retirement May 28, 1971. He is a current resident of Ft. Myers, Florida.

On advance notice from Mr. Michael Epstein, SSC Staff Member, Matter traveled to Washington, D. C., from his residence in Florida to be interviewed at 11:30 a.m. July 25, 1975, in the SSC offices.

Prior to appearing for the interview, Matter was informed by the FBI that he was being released from any applicable employment agreement for the purpose of the SSC interview which Epstein had indicated would concern the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. It was explained to Matter by the FBI that he had the right to counsel; however, the FBI was unable to provide private counsel. Matter was also told that there were certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions. These areas concerned sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and information which originated

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-72607 (Personnel file of former SA John M. Matter)

SFP:eks (10)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG   SEE NOTE PAGE 13

62-116395-[illegible]

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Matter was informed that if he desired the presence of an FBI representative for consultation purposes, one would be supplied on his request. It was explained that this representative would not be present at the interview itself, but would be located nearby and available for consultation purposes. Matter requested such assistance.

It was further explained to Matter by the FBI that if a question arose during the interview in one of the areas set out above, he had the privilege, before replying, of consulting with the FBI representative. The FBI representative accompanied Matter to the SSC offices and made himself available as indicated above.

Set forth below is a statement which Matter prepared and voluntarily furnished to the FBI which reports the results of the interview of him. Items underscored for emphasis or otherwise, and items placed in quotation marks are as indicated by Matter in his preparation of this statement. Only a minimal number of typographical and grammatical corrections were made by the FBI in the reproduction of Matter's statement.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC
Statement of John M. Matter

STATEMENT OF JOHN M. MATTER

The following information is supplied as a result of an interview of former SA John M. Matter by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein (asked about 95% of the questions) and Ms. Mary DeOreo (asked about 5% of the questions). The information is presented according to subject matter and not in the chronological order in which it was asked because Epstein kept going back and picking up points that had been discussed previously.

The interview began at 11:35 a.m. on Friday July 25, 1975, and lasted until 5:40 p.m. with an hour out for lunch and three 10 minute breaks. It was held in a small, acoustically-treated room (former projection booth), up one flight of stairs above room G-308, Dirksen Senate Office Building. Epstein advised that this was an interview concerning the part I had in the Bureau investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. (hereinafter MLK). He did not advise me of my rights until I called his attention to the lack of this about 5:00 p.m., at which time he told me all information I gave was to be supplied voluntarily, that anything I said could be the subject of further investigation by his Staff and that I could decline to answer any questions which I did not feel were within the scope of the inquiry.

Epstein asked if I had discussed the MLK matter with any Bureau personnel this morning (July 25, 1975 - he saw me come to G-308 with the FBI representative who was available for consultation), and I stated I had discussed procedural matters with SAs Paul Daly and Seymor Phillips, both of whom had leaned over backwards to limit my discussion to procedural matters and nothing else.

Epstein asked for and I supplied background information as to my present address, when I entered on duty in the Bureau, the field offices (FOs) where I had worked, when I was first assigned to the Radio Engineering Section (hereinafter Re SEC), and how long I was in that Section. He asked how I would describe my particular kind of work and I told him "security work" in the Security Unit in which I ultimately became Unit Chief. He inquired if I was assigned to other than the Re SEC and I advised that when I first reported on duty in the Laboratory in 1944, it was the Electrical Section, but that about two or three years later that Section was merged with the Re SEC. He asked and was told that the Chief of the Re SEC at the time was I. W. Conrad, who later became Assistant Director of the Laboratory.

After about 10 minutes, Epstein started to question me as to what Units existed in the Re SEC, what type of work was done in the Units and who was working with me in my Unit, explaining that he was trying to get an idea of how the Re SEC was set up and where an investigation of MLK-type would fit into that Section. I asked for and was granted permission to see the FBI consultation representative who accompanied me. When advised by me of this line of questioning, the representative told me to supply such information as to the Re SEC's set-up and the name of any Agents in my Unit. On returning to the interview, Epstein then produced an FBI organizational chart from the position of Director on down through the individual units in the sections under each division (this chart appeared to be one issued after my retirement in May, 1971). He called my attention to the Re SEC and the Units listed thereunder, all of which dealt with radio matters except one which was listed as "Evidence Examinations." I advised him that my work fell into the latter and that all other units listed had to do with some phase of radio communications used throughout the Bureau. I furnished him at his request the following names of persons who had worked with me in "security matters" during 1960 to 1968, which he named as the period in which he was interested:

Wilbur G. Stevens, Robert A. Miller, William E. Harward, and William D. Campbell. I stated that there may have been others whose names I could not recall or who did not fit into the time period he mentioned. He asked and I advised that during that period, Richard L. Millen was Section Chief and Arthur J. Baker was his Number One Man.

Epstein and DeOreo specifically named the following persons and asked if they were connected in any way with the MLK investigation: Pfafman, Mayo, Swartz, Bradley, Stevens, and Berley. I advised that Robert F. Pfafman and George W. Mayo had retired from the Re SEC about 1956 and 1958 respectively, Richard Swartz about 1968, Wayne Bradley about 1974, Wilbur G. Stevens was still in the Section, and succeeded me as Unit Chief, that George Berley was in another Section of the FBI Laboratory, and that to my personal knowledge none of the above had been connected with the MLK investigation. Epstein specifically asked whether "Don Parsons" would have been involved and I told him I had no knowledge of such. He asked if I knew Parsons and I said yes, he had been a former Assistant Director of the FBI Laboratory.

Epstein and DeOreo questioned me at great length as to how I got my assignment in the MLK investigation, who authorized the investigation, how long my work took, how "the tapes" came into my possession, how I used "the tapes" during my work, what I did with "the tapes" after I was finished with my assignment, and whether anyone else worked with me on the assignment (specifically asking me if I knew "a William Campbell"). They also inquired what case supervisor I dealt with in the Domestic Intelligence Division (hereinafter DID). Some of these points were gone over by the interrogators two or three times. I advised largely as follows and qualified many of my answers as being "to the best of my memory," and in some instances I could not recall specific details or names:

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC
Statement of John M. Matter

My assignment came orally from Section Chief Millen and quite possibly Assistant Director Conrad in a conference of the three of us in which I was advised that a Top Secret investigation of MLK had been authorized by the then Attorney General (AG) Robert F. Kennedy to determine if any attempt was being made by the Communist Party (CP) to infiltrate MLK's organization and use it to serve the Party's purposes. This particularly related to at least one highly-placed MLK staff member (whose name I do not recollect) who had been associated with CP activities in the past. I was told that I was to render all technical assistance that was required in keeping with any requests made by then DID Assistant Director, William C. Sullivan, or DID case supervisor handling the investigation. Some tapes from the AG-authorized MLK installations would be received by me, and I was to prepare a composite tape of any derogatory information in those tapes. William Campbell of the Washington Field Office (WFO) was to work with me and was to be primarily responsible for preparing a transcript of the WFO tapes, while pinpointing for me any information that might be of value for the composite.

Campbell came to the Re SEC with the WFO tapes and he and I set up the necessary transcription and filtering equipment for him in the studio and control room parts of Room 7318 in the Justice Building (JB). At some point additional tapes were received from authorized MLK installations in Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]
I would have determined these locations either from "identification on the tape reels" or from "letters of transmittal," as such actually received with the tapes. I could not specifically recall whether any of the tapes were received directly by the Re SEC, from the last three FOs, but was of the opinion that they were most likely received from the DID case supervisor whose name I could not specifically recall. I was asked specifically if that case supervisor's name

was "Ryan," "Seymor Phillips," "Frank Baumgardner," or "Lish Whitson." I replied that I did not know a Ryan, and that Phillips, Fred (not Frank) Baumgardner and Lish Whitson were possibilities but I could not specifically recall whether it was any one of them. Epstein hammered on "who was the case supervisor," but I could give him nothing more definite than I had indicated.

It took me somewhere between one and two weeks to complete my part of the assignment. There were inquiries from both my Section Chief and the DID as to progress. There were long hours put in by both Campbell and myself to do an accurate and reliable job as well as possible. No one else was assigned except us two because of the highly sensitive nature of the material and its classification. I did not specifically recall if "working copies" were made immediately from the FO tapes, but most likely such was done since this would eliminate the possibility of damaging the FO tapes during transcription. At the same time I would have been able to monitor the FO tapes to gain familiarity with the subject matter and any sections which I might use for the composite or were unintelligible. It is possible that Campbell may have monitored the tapes with me at the same time with a second set of earphones, but I could not specifically recall such. I made the composite by copying the pertinent sections from the FO tapes onto a single reel. The first part of the composite would contain all the excerpts from one FO; the second part of the composite, the excerpts from another FO; and so on through the third and fourth parts. There possibly were gaps within the excerpts to indicate discontinuity and possibly longer gaps between the end of all excerpts from one FO and the start of excerpts from another FO.

To the best of my recollection, the final composite did not contain splices between excerpts or between the FO groups or excerpts. The composite was sterile (not traceable to any source) as to the ¼ inch recording tape itself, the 7 inch plastic reel containing the tape, and the 7 inch box containing the reel. I do not recall whether it was a commercial or a plain box. I estimate the total elapsed playing time of the composite as being somewhere between 45 and 90 minutes, but I could not recall the specific time nor the tape speed.

Epstein made quite a point of asking if the composite had actually been put together as explained above, or whether it was put together in the following manner: one or more excerpts from one FO tape immediately followed by one or more excerpts from another FO tape, and followed again by one or more excerpts from a third or fourth FO tape. It appeared that he was trying to indicate that the composite had deliberately been put together in such a manner as to create a false impression as to where the excerpts had come from. I stated that to the best of my memory the composite had not been the target in that manner and I categorically denied that any effort had been made on my part to have the composite convey an idea other than that which was actually on the tape. When the composite was finished I made two or three copies of it which I identified as "third generation tapes," while I considered the composite a "second generation tape." I delivered the composite, most likely in the government routing envelope, to William C. Sullivan in the JB, fifth floor office of then Assistant to the Director Alan Belmont. I recalled that this was on a Saturday and Belmont was in his office with Sullivan. Delivery was made to Sullivan as a result of instructions I had most likely obtained from Millen or Conrad who also told me to inquire of Sullivan if there was anything else he wanted me to do. I so inquired and Sullivan replied that there was nothing further and that he would take it from there. I could not recall if I delivered two or three copies of the composite to Sullivan at the same time or whether they were sent to him or the DID case supervisor by special messenger the following Monday. Nor could I specifically recall if I gave a composite copy to Campbell so that he could make a transcription of it. However, that was a possibility because Campbell had the job of transcribing the WFO tapes and worked at it up to 6 weeks or two months.

To the best of my recollection, Campbell retained the WFO tapes and I have no way of knowing whether I used all WFO tapes or only those Campbell selected as being pertinent.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law

I do not recall the specifics, but the tapes from [redacted] were returned to the DID case supervisor either when I had furnished my part of the investigation or after Campbell completed his work. About two years after that, I got a telephone call from the DID case supervisor inquiring as to whether the Re SEC still had the tapes. I verified that he was the case supervisor and assured him the [redacted] tapes had been sent to the DID after the Laboratory's work had been completed.

I have no specific knowledge as to what was to be done with the composite or the copies thereof. The preparation in the sterile form of tape, reel and box was apparently done as a result of a specific request made by William C. Sullivan.

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

[redacted] I supposed that Bureau officials had their own reason for requesting such a composite, but I was never told.

Epstein kept pressing me with "didn't you think this was strange?" and finally "what was your opinion?" To the former I replied "not necessarily," and to the latter I said a possible reason could have been that Bureau officials wanted to give the composite to AG Robert F. Kennedy to show him the type of information being obtained so that he could decide whether the surveillances he had authorized were to be continued. I never discussed the "MLK tapes" with anyone in the Crime Records Division. I don't rule out the possibility that some member of that Division may have asked whether I had worked on the tapes, but I certainly had no discussion on the subject matter. I did not discuss the tapes with "Deke" DeLoach (specifically named by Epstein after he had asked me whether I had discussed the tapes with anyone in the Crime Records Division). Epstein asked if I had any knowledge of Ernie Belter having anything to do with the MLK installation - WFO, and I told him, "none."

He appeared to be trying to find some sort of record within the Bureau so that he could get names, dates and assignments. In answer to his inquiry, I stated that it was quite likely I had received an "assignment slip" to account for my time in the case. I seriously doubted that such a slip would bear the name of MLK but would most likely have identified it as a "special case" or the "MLK case." I had no knowledge of how Campbell's assignment was handled. A register is kept in the Re SEC for personnel signing in and out, but this would only show dates and times worked by me and other personnel, and would not indicate what I was doing during a particular day or 'period of time period.' Campbell, being assigned to WFO, would have signed in and out on the WFO register, even though he was working for a longer period of time in the Re SEC space.

I have no knowledge that a physical and/or photographic surveillance of MLK was conducted by the Bureau.

I received no "letter of commendation" or "meritorious raise" as a result of my work on the MLK case. Nor was the latter specifically or otherwise mentioned in my last efficiency report. Epstein was very specific in asking about the letter of commendation, the meritorious raise and the efficiency report.

He asked if I was aware in any way that the tape had been furnished newsmen. I told him that I had a recollection of reading an article in a newspaper or weekly news magazine a few months or a year or more after my assignment that MLK tape information had been obtained by or furnished to newsmen. I wondered at the time how they had been able to get the information. I also pointed out that within the last year or two there have been a number of references by several featured news columnists that MLK tape information had been leaked to selected columnists. I again denied that at the time I delivered the composite to Sullivan that I had any specific knowledge of the use to which it was to be put.

Epstein and DeOreo did not ask if I had any further information to furnish to them which had not been brought out by questioning. It was very apparent that they did not wish to pursue the subject matter in a composite tape any further after I stated that [redacted] Nor did they pursue the interest of former AG Robert F. Kennedy in the case after his name was mentioned. Epstein wanted to know if it was apparent from the tapes that each [redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 1

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Epstein gave me no explanation as to where he obtained the names that he specifically mentioned to me. It appeared to be his desire to conduct a thorough interview and to clear up confusion in his mind, possibly caused by conflicting reports about the tapes. He and DeOreo were courteous and stayed well within the legitimate bounds of the MLK investigation except as possibly indicated by his questions concerning the makeup of the Re SEC and its Units. While he did not state it specifically, as such, it appeared to me that he was trying to determine how tape recordings resulting from microphone surveillances were handled in a Section which dealt with radio matters. He seemed satisfied when I told him that the work of my Unit came under the "Evidence Examinations" Unit. He also accepted my explanation of "security work" with the comment that such sensitive work certainly was of a security nature. He made no effort whatsoever to inquire as to what further work I may have done in the Section. He specifically asked whether I had given any MLK information to Stevens, and I replied that while I could not recall specifically, this was possible because Stevens and I worked closely together and he would have had to take over the case in my absence.

At a point near the end of the interview, Epstein asked me if I am a personal friend of William Sullivan, Seymor Phillips, Fred Baumgardner and Lish Whitson. I replied, "No." Epstein indicated doubt, to which I added that my relations with all were purely official. Epstein then asked if I held any animosity toward Sullivan. I answered, "No." He then inquired, "You don't have any?" Again I replied "No."

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC
Statement of John M. Matter

NOTE:

Briefing of Matter prior to interview was by Supervisor P. V. Daly and by Supervisor S. F. Phillips of INTD. The latter accompanied Matter to the interview and prepared this letterhead memorandum based upon a statement which Matter dictated and had typed at FBIHQ on the day following the interview.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/7/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

The Attorney General with acopy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former Special Agent of the FBI John M. Matter.

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Surveillance, electronic
Organization and staffing

#MDR16
[illegible] CO[illegible]
[illegible] 10/10/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LISISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5. WOC

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~SECRET~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
July 28, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Hampton

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

10/13/00 #mpL18 SP-2 ALM/766

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated July 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is a memorandum containing a partial response to requests contained in referenced letter, but which represents, in its entirety, our reply to the Committee's inquiry concerning the nature of "SCOPE." A copy of this memorandum is being provided for your records. ~~(S)~~ (S)

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

REC-26 62-116395-518

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ENCLOSURE

21 AUG 14 1975

RDH:mjg mjg
(9)

NOTE:

(S) Referenced SSC letter requested information concerning SCOPE and ORKID. Information concerning ORKID will be handled by CI-1 and will be disseminated orally to the proper representatives of SSC. (S)

Classified "Secret" to protect a sensitive investigative technique.

~~SECRET~~
~~Classified by 7005~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 AUG 18 1975

~~SECRET~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1- Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

July 28, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Hampton

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16 10/18/00 SP2ALM/JTG
1

RE: [SCOPE] (S)

Reference is made to the letter from the captioned Committee dated July 14, 1975, which requested, in part, that the Committee be advised concerning the nature of [SCOPE.] (S)

SCOPE was the code word for a special channelizing procedure whereby information received from an electronic surveillance conducted by the FBI in the United States on a certain foreign diplomatic establishment as well as selected foreign officials from that government was disseminated to interested United States Government agencies. The code name SCOPE indicated such information was to be handled in a most secure manner and access to it was to be restricted within these agencies to only specifically designated people. This channel is no longer being utilized. (S)

1 - The Attorney General

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

RDH:mjg mjg
(8)

rw

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

PLM

WJB RDH

~~SECRET~~
~~Classified by 7305~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-518

GPO 954-546

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

SECRET

July 14, 1975

10/13/00 #MDR16
BYSP2 ALM 1776
ON:25X1

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

As indicated in the enclosure to the Committee's July 9, 1975 letter to the Attorney General, we are still awaiting several requested items which relate to the relationship between the FBI and the CIA.

Although an FBI file search is presumably underway to locate all items which would be responsive to that section of the Committee's request, we would appreciate receiving as soon as possible, as a partial response, all of the items bearing on this subject which were specifically identified in the attachment to the Committee's May 14, 1975 request, as well as the exchange of correspondence between the FBI and the CIA which occurred on March 11 and 20, 1970, and which related to domestic intelligence collection. *

Finally, we would appreciate your advice concerning the nature of ["SCOPE" and Operation ORKID] which are identified in the above-referenced March 20, 1970 letter from Director Helms to Director Hoover. (S)

Your cooperation would be appreciated.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

Req. in 2nd info re:
[Scope] program
(S)

RECEIVED
JUL 14 1975
KWO'C

[illegible]
Secret!

ENCLOSURE

1-2 [illegible] 5/18 RDH 5

* These letters referred to domestic collection of foreign intelligence
wrw

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 28

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7/25/75

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Re: SCOPE. (Relet from captioned Committee 7/14/75 concerning nature of SCOPE.)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard Taylor Date: 8-8-75

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP2 ALM/STG

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/28/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

X	SSC
	HSC

#MDR 16 10-13-00
SP-2ALM/JTG

[illegible]

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

SSC letter 7/14/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

S

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Surveillance, electronic
Intelligence collection, domestic

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

SCOPE was the code word for a special channelizing procedure whereby information received from an electonic surveillance conducted by the FBI in the United States on a certain foreign diplomatic establishment as well as selected foreign officials from the government was disseminated to interested United States Government agencies. The code name SCOPE indicated such information was to be handled in a most secure manner and access to it was to be restricted within these agencies to only specifically designated people. This channel is no longer being utilized. (S)

62-116395

TREAT AS YELLOW

(FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO THE CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

[illegible]ly 21, 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

Attached teletype advises former SA John Matter was requested by the Senate Select Committee to make himself available for interview at 11:30 a.m., 7-25-75. Mr. Matter telephonically advised this will be a staff interview concerning the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King. He requested a Bureau representative be available for consultation during the interview.

Matter will be briefed by representatives of the Intelligence and Legal Counsel Divisions prior to his interview.

Legal Counsel Division recommends that any applicable employment agreement be waived for purpose of this interview and that an Intelligence Division representative accompany Matter to be available for consultation during interview.

1 - Intelligence Division

Enclosure
PVD:ech
(3)

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-00 BY SP2ALM/JTG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-00 BY SP-2 ALM/116

NR001 TP CODE

8:58AM URGENT JULY 21, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM TAMPA (105-5390)

SENSTUDY 75

RE TAMPA NITEL JULY 11, 1975.

ON EVENING JULY 20, 1975, FORMER SA JOHN MATTER, TELEPHONE 813-936-1691, WAS TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED AT FT. MYERS BY MIKE EPSTEIN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF. EPSTEIN REQUESTED MEETING AT FT. MYERS THE NIGHT OF JULY 22 OR THE MORNING OF JULY 23.

ABOUT ONE HOUR AFTER INITIAL CALL, EPSTEIN CALLED MATTER AGAIN AND FINALLY SET APPOINTMENT FOR FRIDAY, JULY 25, 1975, AT 11:30 A.M., ROOM G308, NEW SENATE OFFICE BUILDING.

MATTER WILL TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON FOR THIS MEETING AND REQUESTS SUPERVISOR PAUL DALY, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, TO TELEPHONICALLY CONTACT HIM IN FT. MYERS. MATTER DESIRES BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE AT MEETING JULY 25, 1975.

END

SMD FBIHQ CLR

REC-26

517

AUG 14 1975

Records

cc 67

(John Matter)

"Daly

PERSONNEL RECORDS

Mr. Paul Daly

84 AUG 20 1975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

FMOR16
10-10-00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

July 16, 1975

Sensitively '75

RECEIV
17 1975
O.L.A.

Being handled by
Mr. Adams with Mr. O'Connor
in the DAG's office 7/21/75

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Thank you for your letter replying to our letter concerning access by certain members of the Select Committee to files and documents concerning them held by the Department, including the FBI.

The Committee has resolved to adopt a slightly different procedure than that proposed in your letter. As you know, the purpose of this particular request is to enable the members, through analysis of materials relating to them, to obtain general insights into how the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, collects, maintains and retrieves for itself material on Americans generally. Accordingly, we suggest that at a mutually convenient time, the designated members come to the Department or the Bureau and physically go through the retrieval process with the persons who would be responsible for performing that function in a real life situation. The Committee members do not wish to have their individual files either removed from the filing system or "sanitized" prior to their reviewing them.

EXP. PROC.
JUL 18 1975

EX-101 REC-26 62-116395-516

This proposed method of on-site review may help, moreover, to alleviate the possible problems of disclosure to the particular members which your letter adverted to. We are sure that you could discuss any remaining actual problems with the members themselves at your premises, including whatever retrieval problems may exist with respect to the letters from the members themselves which you referred to.

9 JUL 25 197

In the first instance, what the members seek is insight

The attached letter was forwarded
to the Bureau by the Department.

LEGAL

84 AUG 1 1975

and understanding. After the initial review, further steps to record facts and reach conclusions can be agreed upon as appropriate.

Senator Baker and Senator Philip Hart wish to be added to the list of Senators who wish to examine their own files.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church (D-IDAHO)
Chairman

John Tower

John Tower
Vice Chairman
(R-TEXAS)

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FBI

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2614
11 August 1975

Senstudy - 75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

REC-26 62-116395-515

EX-101

Jack E. Thomas
Jack E. Thomas
Major General, USAF (Ret.)
Chief, Coordination Staff/ICS

Attachment

AUG 14 1975

Treat as original

ENCLOSURE

Rec'd from cia 8/12/75

5-P

#MDR16

10-10-00 SP 2 Alm/ftG

84 AUG 18 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

11 AUG 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-513

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Aaron, David	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
Bader, William	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badge
Bayly, John	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
Banoff, Barbara	*	B 6/26	12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
Barkey, Howard	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
Baron, Frederick	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
Benz, Charity I.	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
Betts, Richard K.	*	B 7/1	8-15-47	Pa.	016-38-2619	
Binkin, Martin	*	B 8/5	5-6-28	Mo.	498-20-5633	
Birdsell, Wayne			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
Bloomfield, Beth Susan	*	B 7/14(H, G, K)	12-23-51	Ohio	256-92-0341	
Bouschard, Samuel	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
Brissett, Belva	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
Brooks, Nancy	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky	313-38-6773	
Brown, C. Harold			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
Brown, Maxine	*	B 6/26	8-8-28	Ida.	568-40-3123	

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/15/00 BY ~~[illegible]~~ SP-2 ALM/STG

#MDR16

11 AUG 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Bushong, David	*	B 71/4	8-10-47	Ohio	289-40-1203	
Carpenter, Margaret	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	
Carter, Barry	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
Chesnick, Barbara	*	B 7/14	4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
Culbreth, Elizabeth	*	B 7/2	6-23-42	NC	240-64-9040	
Davis, Lynn	*	B 4/17(Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
Dawson, Thomas	*	B 6/26	9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
Dawson, Rhett	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
DeMarco, James	*	B 6/26	3-12-43	W. Va.	286-36-9097	
Dennin, Joseph Francis	*	B 6/23	6-9-43	NY	567-62-5353	
DeOreo, Mary	*	B 6/26	6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
DeTemple, Mary	*	B 7/29	6-16-25	Wisc.	394-20-5968	
DiGenova, Joseph E.	*	B 6/26	2-22-45	Del.	222-28-5430	
Dick, James	*	B 6/26	7-25-47	Mass.	029-36-6745	
Dillon, Molly	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
Doolittle, Patricia			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
Dwyer, Daniel	*	B 7/14	8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
Elliff, John	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
Epstein, Michael Taylor	*	B 6/26	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
Erno, Joan			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	

11 AUG 1975

	Compartmented Clearance					
Name	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)	Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
Fenn, Peter	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
Ford, Harold	*	B 6/26	3-23-21	Cal.	550-16-4630	
Gitenstein, Mark Henry	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
Grant, Bruce	*	B 7/2	6-16-16	Neb.	507-20-1311	
Greissing, Edward	*	B 7/14	11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
Hanback, Sara Susan			2-4-46	W. Va.	215-46-3141	
Harrigan, Arthur	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Hatry, Audrey Helen	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md.	216-14-8691	
Hodges, Paulette	*	B 7/29	4-17-43	Okla.	224-60-2495	
Inderfurth, Mark K.	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF Badge
Iverson, Portia	*	B 7/14	10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	
Jefferson, Arthur M.	*	B 6/26	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
Johnson, Dorothy			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
Johnson, Loch	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
Johnston, James	*	B 7/29	1-6-44	Kan.	495-46-9594	
Karalekas, Anne	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
Kayden, Jeffrey	*	B 7/14	3-22-51	NY	065-40-7277	
Kelley, Robert	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
Kieves, Lawrence	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
Kirbow, Charles	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge.
Kirchheimer, Joseph			6-3-17	Ill.	359-03-7843	

11 AUG 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Koppal, Diane	*	B 6/26	6-24-48	NC	219-48-0018	
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	165-40-3119	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mascioli, Cynthia	*	B 6/26	1-4-51	NY	112-44-7636	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mayo, Betty	*	B 6/26	2-13-22	Ohio	277-14-4062	
McCorkle, Daniel			6-25-55	Ohio	297-56-6722	
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	

11 AUG 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820	
Murphy, Michael	*		10-13-54	Tex.	231-86-8829	
Nash, Dorothy			7-24-12	Wisc.	399-14-4589	
O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495	Badge
Orloff, Jan	*	B 6/26	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394	
Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271	
Peterson, John F.	*	B 6/26	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707	
Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638	
Postal, Andrew	*	B 7/23	5-11-48	NY	128-40-4695	
Pyle, Christopher	*	B 6/26	11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898	
Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534	
Ralston, Theodore	*	B 7/23	8-25-48	Wash.	538-48-4673	
Rhea, Gordon	*	B 6/26	3-10-45	Va.	412-74-7901	
Richard, Eric	*	B 7/10	12-27-49	NY	128-40-7430	
Ricks, Walter	*	B 6/26	12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304	
Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583	
Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719	
Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180	
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047	
Seidel, Lester	*	B 6/26	7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204	

11 AUG 1975

	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social	
Name	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)			Security No.	
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965	
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934	
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199	
Smith, John L.	*	B 6/26	3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800	
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476	
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869	Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956	
Talley, Martha	*	B 6/26	9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368	
Tascione, Rosemary			6-23-45	NY	085-34-6648	
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857	
Thomas, Robert.			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186	
Tomalonis, Alexandra			6-1-48	Md.	200-38-8408	
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628	
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459	
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411	
Turner, James	*	B 7/14	6-29-53	Cal.	215-64-7255	
Tschirgi, James	*	B 6/26	2-23-25	Wyo.	520-16-7290	
Vance, James	*	B 7/23	4-6-36	Ohio	078-28-3950	
Wallach, Paul	*	B 6/26	5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999	
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983	

11 AUG 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
White, William	*	B 7/10	8-8-39	Pa.	168-30-9147	
Wides, Burton Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
Zimmerman, Peter Brown	already briefed		3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
Zimmerman, Phebe	*	B 8/5	12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General

July 16, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16
10-10-00 SP2 ALM/JTG

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which is in response to two of the Committee's requests.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (6)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

TEB:jmm/1hb lhb
(9)

REC-26

EX-101

62-116395-514

AUG 14 1975

Return [illegible] to [illegible]
8/5/75 [illegible]

WRW

WBB

TEB
TJM

PLM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

W.O.C

4063

84 AUG 1 8 1975

GPO : 1975 O -

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

62-116395 #mDR16 10/10/00 SP-2 ALM/ZTG

July 16, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
COMMITTEE'S PRIOR REQUESTS

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number 5.e., Appendix A, of referenced communication requests all memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer - client relationship, or other problems, to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence activity.

Items number 4.a. and 4.b. of Appendix B of referenced communication requests, inter alia, with regard to 5.e. above, all memoranda and other materials relating to the original decision to use the technique as well as the policies and procedures of the FBI for the utilization of the technique.

Enclosed with this memorandum is one memorandum responsive to the request in 5.e. above, regarding the legal authority of the FBI to use informants. This memorandum is captioned "Legal Authority of the FBI to Use Confidential Informants as an Investigative Technique," and dated July 24, 1973.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TEB:eks (8)

Original and one copy to Attorney General

62-116395

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

TJM

PLM

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)
Re: Documents Pertaining To The
Committee's Prior Requests
Re: Further Documents Pertaining To
The FBI and Department of Justice

Also enclosed is a copy of SAC memorandum 23-75 dated May 27, 1975, which is believed responsive to 5.e. This particular SAC memorandum is being provided herewith, since, in view of its recent date, it was not included in the index of SAC Letters and Memoranda previously made available to the SSC Staff.

With regard to that portion of 5.e., above, concerning "possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer - client relationship or other problems," as it relates to informant operation, there are no Bureau memoranda or other material addressing these areas, as the same policy and procedures applicable to Special Agent conduct regarding these problems similarly apply to informants. In response to your general request under 4.b., above, FBI policy and procedures concerning such matters are set forth in the Manual of Instructions (MOI) and the Manual of Rules and Regulations (MRR), which have already been made available to SSC Staff Members pursuant to an earlier request and to the SAC Letters and Memoranda which are being made available to SSC Staff personnel for review pursuant to another request.

With respect to your request under Item 4.a., above, no memoranda or other materials were located relating to the original decision to utilize informants in our investigations.

It is noted your requests under Item 5., Appendix A, of referenced communication were directed by you to both the FBI and the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Our response in this matter with respect to legal authority should therefore be viewed in conjunction with any material you may have received or will receive from the U. S. DOJ.

Enclosures (2)

1 - The Attorney General

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect To Intelligence Activities (SSC)
Re: Documents Pertaining To The
Committee's Prior Requests
Re: Further Documents Pertaining To
The FBI And Department Of Justice

NOTE:

The above response covers two separate requests in Appendices A and B since such requests are cross referenced in the referenced SSC communication. The following sections of the double zero files for the classifications shown were reviewed by the writer, Special Agent Thomas E. Burns, Jr., to locate memoranda discussing legal authority for utilization of informants.

[134-00-7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 (Security Informants)] ~~(S)~~
137-00-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (Criminal Informants)
170-00-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (Extremist Informants)

The enclosed memoranda dated July 24, 1973, were culled from the 137-00 file. This matter was coordinated with Paul G. Donahue and Paul V. Daly of the Office of Legal Counsel.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mintz

DATE: 7/24/73

FROM : P. G. Donahue

SUBJECT: LEGAL AUTHORITY OF THE FBI TO USE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AS AN INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUE

#MDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

The legal authority of the FBI to use confidential informants as an investigative technique rests upon three factors:

1) Legislative authority embodied in the approval of the annual appropriation.

2) Case law that the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not protect a wrongdoer from the use of informants.

3) Case law reflecting that courts recognize the necessity and utility of informants in providing probable cause for making arrests without a warrant, and for obtaining warrants, provided that certain conditions are met.

Regarding the first of the above-cited factors, reference is made to the "Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Departments of State, Justice and Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1974."

Part I, page 783 of those hearings, sets forth ~~the~~ justification language for the 1974 budget estimate for FBI salaries and expenses. It is noted that this language is the same as used in previous years except for underlined and bracketed changes which do not affect this subject. There is specific provision under the

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

PGD:llr

62-116395-514

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

heading of "Salaries and Expenses" for "expenses necessary for the detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States" and more specifically for the "payment of rewards."

At page 879 of these hearings, there is set forth as part of the testimony on "Investigative Accomplishments," a paragraph detailing the statistics achieved by the use of confidential informants. Since Congress has approved FBI appropriations without objection to the use of money for "payment of rewards" or for the informant achievements listed in the testimony, the approval of the appropriations serves as one form of legislative approval for the use of informants.

The use of informants does not violate the defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).

> "Neither this Court, nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it. Indeed, the Court unanimously rejected that very contention ---in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427---"
>
> Id. at 302

The Court also held that the use of an informer did not violate Hoffa's rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, citing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224, (1950), which said,

> "Courts have countenanced the use of informers from time immemorial; in cases of conspiracy, or in other cases when the crime consists of preparing for another crime it is usually necessary to rely upon them or upon accomplices because the criminals will almost certainly proceed covertly."

Besides the explicit recognition reflected above of the right of investigative bodies to avail themselves of informants, there are other Supreme Court cases which implicitly recognize this right by regulating the conditions under which an informant's identity need be revealed at trial. (Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)), or the conditions to be met in using an informant's information as the basis of probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. (Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); McCray v. Illinois. 386 U.S. 300 (1967)). Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that informant information may form the basis for a warrant application, provided the affidavit shows the underlying circumstances which would give reason to believe the informant is credible, and circumstances showing the basis for conclusions reached by the informant. (Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)).

The above-cited cases show that while courts have circumscribed in several ways the uses to be made of informant information, there has always been a recognition of the fact that the informant is a basic and necessary weapon in law enforcement's defense of society against crime.

RECOMMENDATION:

None; for information.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

PER[illegible]NAL ATTENTION
MEM[illegible]ANDUM 23-75

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 27, 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFO. CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-00 BY SP2 ALM/TTE

MEMORANDUM TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

(A) INFORMANT MATTERS - DEFENSE PLANS AND STRATEGY -- Recently there have been several instances where attorneys in connection with law suits have publicly and erroneously alleged that the FBI utilized informants to uncover defense plans and strategy. Also, recently a former informant falsely alleged that informant's services were utilized by the Bureau to infiltrate a defense camp. These accusations reemphasize the need for the careful and professional handling of informants at all times.

As you are aware under current policy, informants are advised to avoid becoming involved in defense plans or strategy in subversive-type cases or with anyone under criminal indictment. It is the responsibility of all Special Agents handling informants to insure that their informants are continually alert so that they will avoid becoming involved in defense matters and in the event an informant is requested to assist or partake in such matters, that the contacting Agent is immediately advised so that the matter will be recorded. If the informant cannot avoid being involved, informant is not to report any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy and such incident must be promptly reported to the Bureau under the substantive case caption.

In view of the above, the statement of cooperation normally signed by security and extremist informants is being amended to incorporate current policy regarding defense plans and strategy. Where it is not required as in criminal informant cases or it has not been practical to obtain a statement of cooperation, each handling Agent must orally advise the informant of the above, reduce it to writing, and record it in the informant's file. Insure that all pending informant files reflect the above as a matter of record.

Manual changes follow.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

5-27-75
MEMORANDUM 23-75

62-116395-511

ENCLOSURE

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7/16/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee Re: Documents Pertaining to the Committee's Prior Request. Re: Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice. Appendix A, Item 5.e., Appendix B Items 4.a., and 4.b.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard Taylor Date: 8/8/75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP2 ALM/jtf16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/16/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75. Appendix A,5e; Appendix B,4a&b

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection
Operating procedures
COINTELPRO

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 SP-2 ALM/JTS

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Furnishing SSC memorandum captioned "Legal Authority of the FBI to Use Confidential Informants as an Investigative Technique." Concerning "possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship or other problems" as it relates to informant operation, there are no Bureau memoranda or other materials. FBI policy and procedures concerning such matters are set forth in the Manual of Instructions and the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

62-116395

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-W06/18

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO THE CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. D. R. Dickson

Director, FBI

[illegible] #MDR16
10/10/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is in response to SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and enclosures which constitutes our response to one of the requests. A copy of the memorandum and enclosures is being provided for your records.

Several of the enclosures pertain to telephone conversations between former President Johnson and former FBI Director Hoover. In accordance with the request of Mr. K. William O'Connor, we are deferring to him any action necessary to obtain appropriate clearance from the White House to furnish these documents to the Committee.

Enclosures (16)

62-116395

REC-26 62-116395 5/13

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ENCLOSURE

21 AUG 14 1975

DRD:mjg
(9)

DRD

NOTE:

It is noted that the original request from the Committee, specifically to furnish all memoranda pertaining to the "conduct" of the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is rather ambiguous and nonspecific and efforts to clarify this request have not met with much success to date. It is believed the memorandum prepared is responsive to their request; however, if they desire additional information at some future date, same will be considered.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____
AUG 1 9 1975
MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. J.B. Hotis)
1 - Mr.W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. D. R. Dickson

62-116395

June 11, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON PLAN", COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

OTHER SPECIFIC FBI PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

#MDR16
10-10-00 SP-2 ALM/JJG

Reference is made to the letter from the captioned Committee dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part III, Item #28 requested all memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins and conduct of the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic (DR) in 1965.

Pursuant to your request, attached hereto are the following communications:

1. Director Hoover memorandum dated May 17, 1965.

2. A. H. Belmont memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated May 17, 1965, captioned, "Legal Attache's Office, Dominican Republic."

3. SAC letter no. 65-31 dated June 2, 1965.

4. Director Hoover memorandum dated August 24, 1965.

5. Director Hoover memorandum dated September 10, 1965.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

DRD:mjgn
(9)

DRD

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities

Re: Documents Pertaining to the "Huston
Plan", Cointelpro, and Other Practices
and Programs

Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs

6. Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated August 22, 1966, captioned, "Operations Legal Attache, Santo Domingo Office.

7. FBI letter to Department of State dated June 20, 1968.

It is noted two of these documents do not pertain to the year 1965 as indicated by your request; however, they have been included to show the reduction in our staff at our Legal Attache's Office in Santo Domingo in August, 1966, and June, 1968, as well as to show the change in our mission in the Dominican Republic effective August, 1966. For your additional information, the Legal Attache's Office in the Dominican Republic was closed in April, 1969.

Reference is also made to a conference held on May 30, 1975, between Messrs. John T. Elliff and Mark Gitenstein of the Senate Select Committee; Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of Justice; and Messrs. William O. Cregar and Elmer W. Larson of the FBI. The question was asked by Mr. Elliff whether there is a summary or "post-mortem" in the FBI files which could be made available to the Committee covering the FBI's activities in the Dominican Republic. It was indicated that if no such summary or "post-mortem" was in our files, to so advise the Committee. This is to advise that we have been unable to locate same in our files.

Enclosures (7)

1 - The Attorney General

~~SECRET~~

2:44 PM

#MDE16 DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/lrc ON 11-15-00

May 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. DE LOACH
MR. SULLIVAN

President Lyndon B. Johnson called and asked if I would check one as they want him to be the Chief of the Army in the Dominican Republic, which would, in effect, control the city. The President stated he did not know his first name. I asked if he was in the Dominican Republic at the present time. The President stated he was; that they were getting pretty close to a settlement with and he thought we had checked him out, but anyway I had the whole list and he wants to be sure they are checked and that there are none who are known communists because that is one thing both the right and left wings would attack him one, so the on way to protect him, the President, is to be sure they are not communists. The President stated another thing is how are they going to get rid of the communists when we do get a government. I stated that is going to depend on the strength of the one in power.

I told the President that in connection with who is going down to Puerto Rico with on the 5:00 PM plane, we have an Agent who is going on the same plane, but as to whether we can get a microphone in, we do not know because is living in a house rather than a hotel. I stated one of our Agents is driving to the airport in his car so he will have an opportunity to talk to The President asked if knew he was an Agent and I stated he does as he had interviewed but the Agent on the plane will not be known to I stated when arrives in Puerto Rico, a surveillance will be put on him but if he stays with as we anticipate, it will be difficult to cover except the telephones. I stated there are five lines operating between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic and we have all five lines covered.

The President inquired as to whether they had asked me to assemble a staff to help on the anti-communist thin_ after the takeover and I stated the only names I have are of the Cabinet. The President stated that after they get the

~~Classified by 414~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2 3 4~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~ XGDX
Holmes

1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

government in the alternatives are: Let them fight it out and kill thousands and probably the communists would end up in charge; we can go in there and try to get them to agree and go on the constitution and let them vote on it in 60 or 90 days, supervise the election and have a cabinet we mutually agreed upon which I can check upon; then once we get it, help the President with some intelligence people to point up who are communists. He said they ought to be Latins or ones who speak the language and he wanted me to take charge of that and to start right now saying if I were President, what I would do down there to get rid of the communists. The President stated it can't be done in one day, but that is what he wants for the Dominican Republic.

I told the President I had quite a number of Agents, a hundred or so, who are expert in the Spanish language so we have the facilities that we can do that. The President asked that I look at the best ones and see who it is; that it has to be a fellow who can get along with the new President whom he can trust, to figure out what I need, how I would set it up, and what I would do to get set up to go to work on the communists. I stated I thought it can be covered as we do in the South American countries as we have in some foreign countries a Legal Attache attached to the Embassy and if we have a man from the Bureau attached to the Embassy as Legal Attache, he can be the medium through which to advise the President and select the individuals who ought to be listed, deported, or put under control. The President asked I get the results of the check to him as soon as possible on

2:56 PM

While talking to the Attorney General on another matter, I advised him the President had just called and wanted a name checked, but also wanted me to pick a squad of FBI Agents to go to the Dominican Republic when the new government is formed to advise the President on the removal of communists and getting them out of government offices. I briefed the Attorney General on my conversation with the President. I told him I was not enthusiastic about it, but since he wants it done, I was starting to look into it and trying to line up fifteen or twenty men able to do it. I told the Attorney General I had wanted him to know in the event the President speaks to him about it.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

May 17, 1965

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, Sullivan

I also briefed the Attorney General in regard to and the coverage on that.

3:05 PM

The President called and stated the name of the individual he had asked me to check is a graduate of the Canal Zone School and his complete name was I stated we can check that quickly.

The President asked I be sure that I and Admiral Raborn, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, check out because he, the President, did not want to agree on a government and find a Khrushchev as the head of it. I stated I would check on the names he had given me Friday. I asked the President if Admiral Raborn had been furnished the list and he stated he was not sure but he wanted the two of us to check them out carefully.

Very truly yours,

J.E.H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. SULLIVAN

DATE: 5/17/65

FROM : A. H. Belmont

DR/6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTF

SUBJECT: LEGAL ATTACHE'S OFFICE,
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Director advised that the President will want the FBI to set up a group in the Dominican Republic to advise the President of the Dominican Republic concerning Communists, how to deal with them, and how to get rid of them. It is contemplated that we will set up a Legal Attache's Office, with a group of 20 to 25 men, for the purpose of taking charge of cleaning out communists in the Dominican Government and advising the government of those who may try to infiltrate into the government. This activity would take place first in the city of Santo Domingo, and then extend throughout the country until all communists have been spotted and the Dominican Government has been advised.

All of the agents to be sent down should be fluent in Spanish and we should select any who have Dominican or Spanish blood, which will assist them in working inconspicuously with the populace.

Relative to the Legal Attache, he should be a top man, fully experienced, as he will be dealing with the President of the Dominican Republic and with our Ambassador there.

ACTION:

In anticipation of the above, the Director desires that we draw up suggestions for a Legal Attache and for a group of twenty to twenty-five men who can proceed, when so ordered, to the Dominican Republic for this purpose.

A copy of this memorandum is being designated for the Administrative Division so that the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Administrative Division can work together on this. Time is of the essence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

P[illegible]SONAL ATTENTION
[illegible] LETTER NO. 65-31

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 2, 1965

(A) DOMINICAN SITUATION (NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - LATIN AMERICA)-- For your information, Bureau has established a Legal Attache in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, who has already begun to make a valuable contribution to the over-all efforts of the United States in making certain that the Dominican Republic does not become another Cuba. If the United States succeeds in its efforts to keep communists out of the new Dominican coalition government which is in the process of being formed, current United States policy in the Dominican Republic could very well become the established course of action for all other countries in Latin America threatened with communism.

The responsibilities which have been placed upon the Bureau in developing intelligence data in the Dominican Republic, as well as in other Latin-American countries, are not only tremendous but may be the heaviest and most far-reaching burden the FBI has ever been asked to assume in the intelligence field. To guarantee our complete success, teamwork is a must.

Accordingly, first we must do everything possible to assist Legal Attache, Santo Domingo, in his immediate task of developing quality sources of sufficient quantity to effect maximum coverage in the Dominican Republic.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/29/00 BY SP-2
#mDR16

In this regard, each office and Legal Attache must furnish to the Bureau within five days of the receipt of this letter under the caption of "DOMSIT" (code word for "Dominican Situation") the following:

(1) Identities of any established sources (former or current) who are now in the Dominican Republic.

(2) Persons in Dominican Republic known to personnel of your office who appear to have good source potential.

(3) Identities of any current security sources (regardless of nationality) who may be available for assignment (temporary or permanent) in the Dominican Republic if such is considered feasible by Legal Attache, Santo Domingo.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Any leads for purpose of checking background of potential sources for Santo Domingo must receive priority attention and results submitted by teletype.

In addition to the Dominican requirements placed upon the Bureau, your attention is directed to over-all need for additional informants and sources in the Latin-American field. The reputation the Bureau has gained during recent Dominican crisis is due in large part to the results achieved in developing Dominican sources through a concentrated informant development program over the past several years.

In view of critical state of unrest in Latin America today, each office should survey its informant coverage in this field. If substantial numbers of nationals of any Latin-American country reside within the territory covered by your office, Bureau expects that you will have coverage sufficient to alert you to exile organizational activities of political nature, plots to overthrow existing governments, and general intelligence data concerning the countries of interest. Informant development in this field is considered most important and any weaknesses which now exist must be overcome promptly by instituting an aggressive informant development program.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

2:04 p.m.

August 24, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. DE LOACH
MR. SULLIVAN

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-00 BY SP-2 ALM/2.46

I called Admiral William F. Raborn, Director of CIA, and told him I wanted to pass on to him a development he may be asked about. I stated, about ten days ago, the President asked my view of the removal of my men from the Dominican Republic and whether the work we have been doing down there could be carried on by CIA as effectively as both agencies have handled it in the past.

I stated I checked with [redacted] who is in charge of the FBI's office in the Dominican Republic, and he felt very strongly the FBI men could be withdrawn and the CIA personnel carry on. I advised Admiral Raborn that I sent this message to the White House and got word from Marvin Watson that the President indicated no move should be made at this time and that our men are still down there.

I advised Admiral Raborn that I expect to see the President this week and I am going to bring this up to see whether he will make a decision; that we could use those men back here; and that I think the situation is well in hand by CIA personnel. I said I thought the President might make some inquiry of Admiral Raborn.

Admiral Raborn said he certainly appreciated my calling and he is delighted with the fine way our folks have gotten along; that there is a lot of mutual respect. I stated that I instructed [redacted] to let me know what his views were and did not tell him mine; that he was very high in praise of the man in charge of the CIA office, as well as the staff of this office. Admiral Raborn stated they welcome cooperation with the FBI in any and every place.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, and Sullivan

August 24, 1965

I stated that I think we are going to have trouble down there but I think CIA can handle it with their force. He replied that they will be delighted to have us stay but they certainly appreciate the fact we may need our people elsewhere. I said we need them in this country where the riots are occurring; that this is not really our field; that it is CIA's field; and that the sooner we get back to our own field, the better.

I again stated it is very likely the President may speak to Admiral Raborn about this and he thanked me for calling.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

3:52 PM September 10, 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/15/00 BY SP-2 ALM/

Fm DE 16

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. DE LOACH
MR. SULLIVAN

President Lyndon B. Johnson called. He stated he was worried about the situation in the Dominican Republic and asked me how I felt about it. I told him it was my feeling that it is in an awful mess; that there have been several people who have been selected to be in the Cabinet who are far from being free of communist association or domination and why they were selected, I did not know, but I thought the situation down there is very critical. I stated I met with McGeorge Bundy and Admiral William Raborn of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the other day as to whether the FBI could withdraw from the Dominican Republic and my view was that we could as CIA is thoroughly qualified and has a good man down there to carry on the responsibilities and there is no need for the FBI to remain. I stated it was the view of Admiral Raborn and myself that it was going to be a mess and that we would have trouble for some time to come because various people are going back to the Dominican Republic now, such as and his followers, and the former Presidents who were deposed and I thought in the political campaign which is going to be held down there this year, there are going to be violent outbursts which are characteristic of the Latins. I stated the populace is very anti-American and now that has been sent out and made the rebel element, which is always strongly anti-American, will be in the ascendancy. I stated is not what one would call a strong man; that I think he means well and will try to do right but he is not the kind of a man who will stand up to his opposition.

The President stated he was not too happy with CIA and the reports he gets from them and he would hate to see the Bureau people pull out until a government is formed. I stated we wouldn't until he, the President, says so; that as I said the other day, we would not leave until the decision has been made by the President.

September 10, 1965

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, Sullivan

The President stated that while he thinks Admiral Raborn is a wonderful man, this is playing for keeps and we can't have a Communist Government and we have to have somebody alert enough to stand up and say "this is suspicious," et cetera. The President stated they tell him they have an Attorney General who is quite suspicious. I stated he is very dangerous to have in the Attorney General position. I stated in the discussion we had the other day in Mr. Bundy's office, one matter was how the investigative set-up would be under the new government and they were going to have a flying squadron of men working directly for the President of the Dominican Republic and then an intelligence unit which would gather information and a Dominican national police. I stated I expressed my opinion that I thought it was wrong for the President to have a flying squadron which would be nothing more or less than a secret police like Trujillo had who would make just reports the President would want against certain individuals who might not be as bad as the President felt they were. I stated I felt there should be an intelligence unit and that the national police should be increased. I stated we, of course, would assist in any training program they might want to set up either down there or up here. I stated at the present time in the national police is one man who was trained in our National Academy and was very valuable in furnishing us with information that we could not have gotten from other sources.

The President asked if we were having any trouble working together and I told him no trouble at all. The President stated he had asked me to be on the job to keep the communists from taking over this hemisphere and to serve him and he thought we ought to wait and not pull out of the Dominican Republic until the government has been selected and we get along further in this; for me to tell my man down there to root out everything he can and to be hard and tough as he can and be sure we get rid of every spy; that he did not know what the diplomatic people are doing to see that President Godoy takes our reports and respects them. I stated I understand the Attorney General was recommended by

I stated a large number of people are drifting back into the Dominican Republic from New York and Miami who have been exiled in the past and those who have been in political life in the past are going to run again.

September 10, 1965

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, Sullivan

The President stated we have to have an Ambassador who is a practical fellow and one who understandshis job. I stated he needed a good, tough individual who will be able to stand up and dominate the President. The President asked, "who is he?" and told me to think about that and also about what we are doing and not doing that should be done, as we can't lose and he would be talking with me next week. I told him I would.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GC RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan　　　DATE: August 22, 1966

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: OPERATIONS
LEGAL ATTACHE,
SANTO DOMINGO OFFICE

This is to recommend that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) be advised that we have set up a regular Legal Attache Office in Santo Domingo in view of the President's desire that the FBI remain in the Dominican Republic and that Legal Attache, Santo Domingo, be authorized to turn [redacted] informants over to the Agency.

In accordance with the desire of the President and recommendation of the Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President, that the FBI remain in the Dominican Republic, the Director, on 8/2/66, advised the White House that our staff in Santo Domingo would be reduced to three men and that henceforth this office will be manned in a manner similar to that of our other Legal Attache Offices. It will not be an operational office but rather will serve as a strategic listening post for intelligence data and as liaison with agencies of the Dominican Republic, as well as other agencies of foreign governments in that country.

In light of this redirection of effort, we instructed Legal Attache, Santo Domingo, to review his informant coverage to determine if any of our informants should be made available to the Agency for operation. Legal Attache has recommended that [redacted] informants, [redacted], be turned over to CIA. [redacted] has been used principally to develop subversive data on individuals in Santiago, Dominican Republic. [redacted] is a penetrative-type informant who has gained membership in Dominican subversive groups. Both of these sources are operational and are not the type we would contact in a normal liaison capacity. Continuation of their services under our current criteria would be a questionable procedure.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

In the case of this informant was originally developed by the New York Office. Legal Attache suggested the New York Office might have use of informant's services. This information furnished to New York Office which replied that in the absense of organized activity informant would be of no use unless he came to New York with instructions from Dominican communist groups to reorganize activity. This, of course, is not a desirable situation.

OBSERVATIONS:

We believe Legal Attache, Santo Domingo's recommendation to turn over to CIA is sound, even though both of these sources are in a position to furnish valuable intelligence information to us. By making these informants available to the Agency we will avoid any possible duplication or conflict. This matter should be discussed with appropriate officials by our Liaison Agent in order to insure the Agency is fully aware of our current status in the Dominican Republic.

ACTION:

If you approve:

(1) Liaison Agent will advise appropriate CIA officials as follows:

In accordance with the desire of the President that the FBI remain in the Dominican Republic, we are setting up a regular Legal Attache Office in Santo Domingo consisting of three men. This will not be an operational office but rather will serve as a strategic listening post for intelligence data and as liaison with agencies of the Dominican Republic, as well as other agencies of foreign governments in that country. In connection with this reorganization, we have instructed our representative in Santo Domingo to make [redacted] informants available to the Agency in the event it may wish to operate them.

(2) The attached teletype, with instructions to make [redacted] available to CIA, will be sent to the Legal Attache, Santo Domingo.

June 20, 1968

BY LIAISON

FM0816

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-00 BY SP-2ALM/JTF

Honorable Idar Rimestad
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rimestad:

You have previously been advised of reductions in FBI personnel overseas which were made in response to the wishes of the President. In a further effort to comply with the desire of the President, I have decided to reduce our staff in Santo Domingo by one Special Agent and one clerk. This will eliminate one position in GS-14 and one position in GS-8.

You may be sure that I will continue to give this matter close scrutiny with a view to effecting further economies whenever such action can be taken without impairing the discharge of our responsibilities.

Sincerely yours,

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

#MOR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ldk
ON 11-15-00

~~SECRET~~

2:44 PM

May 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. DE LOACH
MR. SULLIVAN

President Lyndon B. Johnson called and asked if I would check one [redacted] as they want him to be the Chief of the Army in [redacted], which would, in effect, control the city. The President stated he did not know his first name. I asked if he was in the Dominican Republic at the present time. The President stated he was; that they were getting pretty close to a settlement with [redacted] and he thought we had checked him out, but anyway I had the whole list and he wants to be sure they are checked and that there are none who are known communists because that is one thing both the right and left wings would attack him on, so the only way to protect one, the President, is to be sure they are not communists. The President stated another thing is how are they going to get rid of the communists when we do get a government. I stated that is going to depend on the strength of the one in power.

I told the President that in connection with [redacted] who is going down to Puerto Rico with [redacted] on the 5:00 PM plane, we have an Agent who is going on the same plane, but as to whether we can get a microphone in, we do not know because [redacted] is living in a house rather than a hotel. I stated one of our Agents is driving [redacted] to the airport in his car so he will have an opportunity to talk to [redacted]. The President asked if [redacted] knew he was an Agent and I stated he does as he had interviewed [redacted] but the Agent on the plane will not be known to [redacted]. I stated when [redacted] arrives in Puerto Rico, a surveillance will be put on him but if he stays with [redacted] as we anticipate, it will be difficult to cover except the telephones. I stated there are five lines operating between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic and we have all five lines covered.

The President inquired as to whether they had asked me to assemble staff to help on the anti-communist thing after the takeover and I stated the only files I have are of the Cabinet. The President stated that after they get the

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category [illegible]
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC- 18

109-12-211-3064

1 - Miss Holmes

MAY 20 1965

18 MAY 21 1965

JEH:edm (3)

MAY 26 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

government in the alternatives are: Let them fight it out and kill thousands and probably the communists would end up in charge; we can go in there and try to get them to agree and go on the constitution and let them vote on it in 60 or 90 days, supervise the election and have a cabinet we mutually agreed upon which I can check upon; then once we get it, help the President with some intelligence people to point up who are communists. He said they ought to be Latins or ones who speak the language and he wanted me to take charge of that and to start right now saying if I were President, what I would do down there to get rid of the communists. The President stated it can't be done in one day, but that is what he wants for the Dominican Republic.

I told the President I had quite a number of Agents, a hundred or so, who are expert in the Spanish language so we have the facilities that we can do that. The President asked that I look at the best ones and see who it is; that it has to be a fellow who can get along with the new President whom he can trust, to figure out what I need, how I would set it up, and what I would do to get set up to go to work on the communists. I stated I thought it can be covered as we do in the South American countries as we have in some foreign countries a Legal Attache attached to the Embassy and if we have a man from the Bureau attached to the Embassy as Legal Attache, he can be the medium through which to advise the President and select the individuals who ought to be listed, deported, or put under control. The President asked I get the results of the check to him as soon as possible on ~~Colonel Lora Fernandez~~.

2:56 PM

While talking to the Attorney General on another matter, I advised him the President had just called and wanted a name checked, but also wanted me to pick a squad of FBI Agents to go to the Dominican Republic when the new government is formed to advise the President on the removal of communists and getting them out of government offices. I briefed the Attorney General on my conversation with the President. I told him I was not enthusiastic about it, but since he wants it done, I was starting to look into it and trying to line up fifteen or twenty men able to do it. I told the Attorney General I had wanted him to know in the event the President speaks to him about it.

May 17, 1965

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, Sullivan

I also briefed the Attorney General in regard to ~~Juan Balaguer~~ and the coverage on that.

3:05 PM

The President called and stated the name of the individual he had asked me to check is a graduate of the Canal Zone School and his complete name was ~~Juan Lora Fernandez~~. I stated we can check that quickly.

The President asked I be sure that I and Admiral Raborn, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, check out because he, the President, did not want to agree on a government and find a Khrushchev as the head of it. I stated I would check on the names he had given me Friday. I asked the President if Admiral Raborn had been furnished the list and he stated he was not sure but he wanted the two of us to check them out carefully.

Very truly yours,

J.E.H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 5:35 PM
DATE [illegible]
BY [illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont ✓
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. SULLIVAN S

DATE: 5/17/65

FROM : A. H. Belmont Mohr

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Wannall
Mr. D.J.Brennan

SUBJECT: LEGAL ATTACHE'S OFFICE,
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Santo Domingo

The Director advised that the President will want the FBI to set up a group in the Dominican Republic to advise the President of the Dominican Republic concerning Communists, how to deal with them, and how to get rid of them. It is contemplated that we will set up a Legal Attache's Office, with a group of 20 to 25 men, for the purpose of taking charge of cleaning out communists in the Dominican Government and advising the government of those who may try to infiltrate into the government. This activity would take place first in the city of Santo Domingo, and then extend throughout the country until all communists have been spotted and the Dominican Government has been advised.

All of the agents to be sent down should be fluent in Spanish and we should select any who have Dominican or Spanish blood, which will assist them in working inconspicuously with the populace.

Relative to the Legal Attache, he should be a top man, fully experienced, as he will be dealing with the President of the Dominican Republic and with our Ambassador there.

ACTION:

In anticipation of the above, the Director desires that we draw up suggestions for a Legal Attache and for a group of twenty to twenty-five men who can proceed, when so ordered, to the Dominican Republic for this purpose.

A copy of this memorandum is being designated for the Administrative Division so that the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Administrative Division can work together on this. Time is of the essence.

AHB:CSH (6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-00 BY SP2 ALM/116 amdr16

REC 20 64-4503-222

4 JUN 4 1965

NAT. INT. SEC.

58 JUN 9 1965

PERSONAL ATTENTION
LETTER NO. 65-31

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 2, 1965

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(A) DOMINICAN SITUATION (NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - LATIN AMERICA)-- For your information, Bureau has established a Legal Attache in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, who has already begun to make a valuable contribution to the over-all efforts of the United States in making certain that the Dominican Republic does not become another Cuba. If the United States succeeds in its efforts to keep communists out of the new Dominican coalition government which is in the process of being formed, current United States policy in the Dominican Republic could very well become the established course of action for all other countries in Latin America threatened with communism.

The responsibilities which have been placed upon the Bureau in developing intelligence data in the Dominican Republic, as well as in other Latin-American countries, are not only tremendous but may be the heaviest and most far-reaching burden the FBI has ever been asked to assume in the intelligence field. To guarantee our complete success, teamwork is a must.

Accordingly, first we must do everything possible to assist Legal Attache, Santo Domingo, in his immediate task of developing quality sources of sufficient quantity to effect maximum coverage in the Dominican Republic.

In this regard, each office and Legal Attache must furnish to the Bureau within five days of the receipt of this letter under the caption of "DOMSIT" (code word for "Dominican Situation") the following:

(1) Identities of any established sources (former or current) who are now in the Dominican Republic.

(2) Persons in Dominican Republic known to personnel of your office who appear to have good source potential.

(3) Identities of any current security sources (regardless of nationality) who may be available for assignment (temporary or permanent) in the Dominican Republic if such is considered feasible by Legal Attache, Santo Domingo.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-3343

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/28/00 BY SP-2

#MDR16

64-4503
NOT RECORDED
3D JUN 4 1965

58 JUN 15 1965

Any leads for purpose of checking background of potential sources for Santo Domingo must receive priority attention and results submitted by teletype.

In addition to the Dominican requirements placed upon the Bureau, your attention is directed to over-all need for additional informants and sources in the Latin-American field. The reputation the Bureau has gained during recent Dominican crisis is due in large part to the results achieved in developing Dominican sources through a concentrated informant development program over the past several years.

In view of critical state of unrest in Latin America today, each office should survey its informant coverage in this field. If substantial numbers of nationals of any Latin-American country reside within the territory covered by your office, Bureau expects that you will have coverage sufficient to alert you to exile organizational activities of political nature, plots to overthrow existing governments, and general intelligence data concerning the countries of interest. Informant development in this field is considered most important and any weaknesses which now exist must be overcome promptly by instituting an aggressive informant development program.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

2:04 p.m. August 24, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. DE LOACH
MR. SULLIVAN

#MD216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-00 BY SP2 ALM/PLG

I called Admiral William F. Raborn, Director of CIA, and told him I wanted to pass on to him a development he may be asked about. I stated, about ten days ago, the President asked my view of the removal of my men from the Dominican Republic and whether the work we have been doing down there could be carried on by CIA as effectively as both agencies have handled it in the past.

I stated I checked with Anderson who is in charge of the FBI's office in the Dominican Republic, and he felt very strongly the FBI men could be withdrawn and the CIA personnel carry on. I advised Admiral Raborn that I sent this message to the White House and got word from Marvin Watson that the President indicated no move should be made at this time and that our men are still down there.

I advised Admiral Raborn that I expect to see the President this week and I am going to bring this up to see whether he will make a decision; that we could use those men back here; and that I think the situation is well in hand by CIA personnel. I said I thought the President might make some inquiry of Admiral Raborn.

Admiral Raborn said he certainly appreciated my calling and he is delighted with the fine way our folks have gotten along; that there is a lot of mutual respect. I stated that I instructed Anderson to let me know what his views were and did not tell him mine; that he was very high in praise of the man in charge of the CIA office, as well as the staff of this office. Admiral Raborn stated they welcome cooperation with the FBI in any and every place.

109-12-11-6992

64-44502
NOT RECORDED
170 AUG 26 1965

6 AUG 25 1965

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JEH:rm (8)

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 6:45 PM
DATE 8/24/65
BY JDA

70 SEP 1 - 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

I stated that I think we are going to have trouble down there but I think CIA can handle it with their force. He replied that they will be delighted to have us stay but they certainly appreciate the fact we may need our people elsewhere. I said we need them in this country where the riots are occurring; that this is not really our field; that it is CIA's field; and that the sooner we get back to our own field, the better.

I again stated it is very likely the President may speak to Admiral Rabora about this and he thanked me for calling.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP2 ALM

3:52 PM

September 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. DE LOACH
MR. SULLIVAN

Santo Domingo

President Lyndon B. Johnson called. He stated he was worried about the situation in the Dominican Republic and asked me how I felt about it. I told him it was my feeling that it is in an awful mess; that there have been several people who have been selected to be in the Cabinet who are far from being free of communist association or domination and why they were selected, I did not know, but I thought the situation down there is very critical. I stated I met with McGeorge Bundy and Admiral William Raborn of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the other day as to whether the FBI could withdraw from the Dominican Republic and my view was that we could as CIA is thoroughly qualified and has a good man down there to carry on the responsibilities and there is no need for the FBI to remain. I stated it was the view of Admiral Raborn and myself that it was going to be a mess and that we would have trouble for some time to come because various people are going back to the Dominican Republic now, such as Juan Bosch and his followers, and the former Presidents who were deposed and I thought in the political campaign which is going to be held down there this year, there are going to be violent outbursts which are characteristic of the Latins. I stated the populace is very anti-American and now that ~~General Wessin~~ has been sent out and made Consul General at Miami, the rebel element, which is always strongly anti-American, will be in the ascendancy. I stated President Godoy is not what one would call a strong man; that I think he means well and will try to do right but he is not the kind of a man who will stand up to his opposition.

The President stated he was not too happy with CIA and the reports he gets from them and he would hate to see the Bureau people pull out until a government is formed. I stated we wouldn't until he, the President, says so; that as I said the other day, we would not leave until the decision has been made by the President.

1 - Miss Holmes

JEH:edm (3)

Loach

64-4503

NOT RECORDED
170 SEP 14 1965

6 SEP 14 1965

109-12-211-7233

FILED IN

September 10, 1965

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, Sullivan

The President stated that while he thinks Admiral Raborn is a wonderful man, this is playing for keeps and we can't have a Communist Government and we have to have somebody alert enough to stand up and say "this is suspicious," et cetera. The President stated they tell him they have an Attorney General who is quite suspicious. I stated he is very dangerous to have in the Attorney General position. I stated in the discussion we had the other day in Mr. Bundy's office, one matter was how the investigative set-up would be under the new government and they were going to have a flying squadron of men working directly for the President of the Dominican Republic and then an intelligence unit which would gather information and a Dominican national police. I stated I expressed my opinion that I thought it was wrong for the President to have a flying squadron which would be nothing more or less than a secret police like Trujillo had who would make just reports the President would want against certain individuals who might not be as bad as the President felt they were. I stated I felt there should be an intelligence unit and that the national police should be increased. I stated we, of course, would assist in any training program they might want to set up either down there or up here. I stated at the present time in the national police is one man who was trained in our National Academy and was very valuable in furnishing us with information that we could not have gotten from other sources.

The President asked if we were having any trouble working together and I told him no trouble at all. The President stated he had asked me to be on the job to keep the communists from taking over this hemisphere and to serve him and he thought we ought to wait and not pull out of the Dominican Republic until the government has been selected and we get along further in this; for me to tell my man down there to root out everything he can and to be hard and tough as he can and be sure we get rid of every spy; that he did not know what the diplomatic people are doing to see that President Godoy takes our reports and respects them. I stated I understand the Attorney General was recommended by Bunker and Bennett.

I stated a large number of people are drifting back into the Dominican Republic from New York and Miami who have been exiled in the past and those who have been in political life in the past are going to run again.

September 10, 1965

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, Sullivan

The President stated we have to have an Ambassador who is a practical fellow and one who understands his job. I stated he needed a good, tough individual who will be able to stand up and dominate the President. The President asked, "Who is he?" and told me to think about that and also about what we are doing and not doing that should be done, as we can't lose and he would be talking with me next week. I told him I would.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. C.
TIME 516 PM
DATE 9/10/65

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: August 22, 1966

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Liaison
(Mr. Papich)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Mr. Potocki)
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Griffith

SUBJECT: OPERATIONS
LEGAL ATTACHE,
SANTO DOMINGO OFFICE

This is to recommend that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) be advised that we have set up a regular Legal Attache Office in Santo Domingo in view of the President's desire that the FBI remain in the Dominican Republic and that Legal Attache, Santo Domingo, be authorized to turn two informants over to the Agency.

In accordance with the desire of the President and recommendation of the Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President, that the FBI remain in the Dominican Republic, the Director, on 8/2/66, advised the White House that our staff in Santo Domingo would be reduced to three men and that henceforth this office will be manned in a manner similar to that of our other Legal Attache Offices. It will not be an operational office but rather will serve as a strategic listening post for intelligence data and as liaison with agencies of the Dominican Republic, as well as other agencies of foreign governments in that country.

In light of this redirection of effort, we instructed Legal Attache, Santo Domingo, to review his informant coverage to determine if any of our informants should be made available to the Agency for operation. Legal Attache has recommended that two informants, DOM-10 and DOM-12, be turned over to CIA. DOM-10 has been used principally to develop subversive data on individuals in Santiago, Dominican Republic. DOM-12 is a penetrative-type informant who has gained membership in Dominican subversive groups. Both of these sources are operational and are not the type we would contact in a normal liaison capacity. Continuation of their services under our current criteria would be a questionable procedure.

REC- 71 64-4503-363

14 SEP 22 1966

Enclosure ~~sent~~ 8-25-66

1 - 64-4123-211 (Legal Attache Informants - Santo Domingo Office)
1 - 134-13781 (DOM-12)

FBG:pem/js
(9)

ST-100

(CONTINUED - OVER)

62 SEP 28 1966

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan
Re: OPERATIONS
LEGAL ATTACHE, SANTO DOMINGO OFFICE

In the case of ~~DOM-12~~, this informant was originally developed by the New York Office. Legal Attache suggested the New York Office might have use of informant's services. This information furnished to New York Office which replied that in the absense of organized activity informant would be of no use unless he came to New York with instructions from Dominican communist groups to reorganize activity. This, of course, is not a desirable situation.

OBSERVATIONS:

We believe Legal Attache, Santo Domingo's recommendation to turn ~~DOM-10~~ and ~~DOM-12~~ over to CIA is sound, even though both of these sources are in a position to furnish valuable intelligence information to us. By making these informants available to the Agency we will avoid any possible duplication or conflict. This matter should be discussed with appropriate officials by our Liaison Agent in order to insure the Agency is fully aware of our current status in the Dominican Republic.

ACTION:

CAL TENNEY, CIA & DESMOND FITZGERALD, CIA BRIEFED PER BELOW, 9/1/66 & 9/2/66

If you approve:

(1) Liaison Agent will advise appropriate CIA officials as follows:

In accordance with the desire of the President that the FBI remain in the Dominican Republic, we are setting up a regular Legal Attache Office in Santo Domingo consisting of three men. This will not be an operational office but rather will serve as a strategic listening post for intelligence data and as liaison with agencies of the Dominican Republic, as well as other agencies of foreign governments in that country. In connection with this reorganization, we have instructed our representative in Santo Domingo to make ~~two~~ informants available to the Agency in the event it may wish to operate them.

(2) The attached teletype, with instructions to make DOM-10 and DOM-12 available to CIA, will be sent to the Legal Attache, Santo Domingo.

June 20, 1968

BY LIAISON

FmDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-00 BY SP2ALM/J16

1 - Mr. Jackson
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Rachner
1 - Mr. Potocki

Honorable Idar Rimestad
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

delivered 6/24/68 BCP

Dear Mr. Rimestad:

You have previously been advised of reductions in FBI personnel overseas which were made in response to the wishes of the President. In a further effort to comply with the desire of the President, I have decided to reduce our staff in Santo Domingo by one Special Agent and one clerk. This will eliminate one position in GS-14 and one position in GS-8.

You may be sure that I will continue to give this matter close scrutiny with a view to effecting further economies whenever such action can be taken without impairing the discharge of our responsibilities.

Sincerely yours,

64-4503-422

REP:bsc
(6)

REC 11

EX 106

4 JUN 26 1968

NOTE:

Above personnel cuts approved by Dir~~ector in~~ memorandum Wannall to Sullivan, 5/17/68, captioned "Operations - Santo Domingo," whereby Legat, Santo Domingo, was instructed to recommend by 6/22/68 personnel to be transferred. Transfers now under way.

Tolson
eLoach
ohr
ishop
asper
allahan
onrad
elt
ale
osen
van
avel
rotter
Room
olmes
andy

57 JUL 2 1968

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

PERS. REC. UNIT

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt. Operations with Respect to Intelligence activities: Re: Documents pertaining to the "Huston Plan", Cointelpro, and other Practice and Programs; Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard Taylor Date: 8-8-75

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
#MDR16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75. Appendix C, Part III, Item 28

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

S

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

COINTELPRO
Intelligence collection, foreign

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED [illegible]
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP-2ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Various communications pertaining to the origins and conduct of the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Other documents also submitted to show reduction in staff in August, 1966 and to show the change in our mission in the Dominican Republic in August, 1966. Legal Attache's Office in the Dominican Republic was closed in April, 1969.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO THE CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

S. WOC

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 0 4 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

4:30 PM URGENT 8/04/75 ACM:EJG

TO DIRECTOR NR 323-04

FROM LEGAT LONDON (94-417)

ATTENTION: HELGESON, INTD

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

REBUTEL 7/29/75.

✓ MR. HELGESON
4026 JEH

REBUTEL INDICATING MARK GITENSTEIN, SENIOR STAFF MEMBER, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, DESIRED TO VISIT WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS REGARDING DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. [THIS MATTER HAS BEEN TAKEN UP WITH BRITISH SECURITY SERVICE (MI-5) WHO HAVE ALSO HEARD FROM THEIR REPRESENTATIVE, JOHN PARKER.] (S)

[THIS REQUEST PLACES MI-5 IN A DIFFICULT POSITION BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK), AND BEFORE ANY DECISION CAN BE MADE, MI-5 NEEDS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION] (S) WHICH SHOULD REACH LEGAT MORNING OF AUGUST 6, 1975. SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIRED AS FOLLOWS:

THE EXACT STATUS OF GITENSTEIN, I.E., IS HE CONSIDERED A U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OR A TEMPORARY POLITICAL APPOINTEE BY THE COMMITTEE. ALSO, WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE VISIT; IS THIS VISIT AN OFFICIAL REQUEST OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT; HAS GITENSTEIN BEEN

10/10/00 #MDR16
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JFK
6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Let to London
8/5/75 HEH:la

REC-1 62-116395-
5-868

EX-101

17 AUG 8 1975

PAGE TWO

INSTRUCTED BY THE COMMITTEE TO VISIT THE UK OR IS HE ACTING ON HIS OWN. ALSO, WHAT EXACTLY IS GITENSTEIN WANTING TO KNOW, I.E., WHAT TYPE OF ACTIVITY IS INVESTIGATED IN THE UK, OR HOW IT IS INVESTIGATED.

ANSWERS TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS WITH PRECISE DETAILS AS POSSIBLE WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED BY MI-5. IN VIEW OF THE ANSWERS, MI-5 MAY DESIRE TO HAVE AN OFFICIAL OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE SPEAK TO HIM RATHER THAN ONE OF THEIR OWN EMPLOYEES. NO CONTACT HAS YET BEEN MADE WITH THE POLICE AS IT WAS FELT PROPER TO DEFER TO MI-5 FIRST. (5)

END

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-105

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. McDermott

DATE: August 1, 1975

#MDR16 10/25/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6

FROM : J. C. Farrington

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY U. S. SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MEMBER TO REVIEW HIS FBI FILES

On July 21, 1975, the Attorney General determined there should be a disclosure of material in the files, with certain exceptions (for details see J. B. Adams to Callahan memorandum dated July 24, 1975, captioned "Request by various Senators on Senate Select Committee to Review their FBI files").

On July 29, 1975, Senator Mondale; his Legislative Assistant, David Aaron and William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, were with James B. Adams, Assistant to the Director, Deputy Associate Director in his office from 8:05 a.m. to 10:50 a.m. During this time Senator Mondale reviewed the following FBI material pertaining to himself.

94-6048-3

ORIGINAL FILED IN

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. McDermott

1 - Mr. Farrington

1 - Mr. Wannall
Attention: Mr. W. Cregar

9 AUG 6 1975

Enclosures (7) ENCLOSURE

DRW:evp (7)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 AUG 6 1975

SEE ADDENDUM, PAGES 4 & 5

84 AUG 15 1975

July 23, 1975

I, _________________________, have received the following files from the Federal Bureau of Investigation today, 7/23/75, on the following subject:

Senator Walter F. Mondale

✓ 94 - 60489

✓ 9 - 54750

✓ 9 - 52508

✓ 9 - 44386 (7 volumes)

✓ 1 - 11800 - ✓3, 5

✓ 61 - 3176 - 4490

✓ 62 - 89475 - 592

✓ 61 - 108230 - 1p2

✓ 105 - 10828 - ✓2192, ✓2032, ✓2013 (S)

✓ 67 - 99890 - 307

✓ 105 - 14537 - 135

✓ 105 ✓- 25263 - ✓1420, ✓1309, ✓1246X

✓ 105 ✓- 43813 - ✓388, ✓394, ✓435

✓ 105 - 84402 - 65

✓ 105 - 185624 - 5

✓ 105 - [illegible] - 81, 114, 133, 135, 140, 117, 145 (S)

Received from Mr. O'Connor, Department of Justice 7/24/75 SA Donald R Williams

✓134-1676-12
✓157-4-33-A
✓100-435179-42
✓100-366174-154 (S)
✓105-25263-1418 (S)
✓105-40461-319 (S)
✓62-110783-68
✓92-15336-1
✓94-1-28836-43
✓100-454565-✓376, ✓463
✓105-138938-7 (S)
✓105-141346-3 (S)
✓105-202547-18
✓157-6-43-✓24, ✓25
✓100-431357-92 (S)
✓105-20276-160 (S)
✓105-25263-✓1046, ✓1047, ✓1111, ✓1124, ✓1126, ✓1395, ✓1410, ✓1512, ✓1514 (S)
✓105-40461-463 (S)
✓105-43813-✓375, ✓377, ✓380, ✓384, ✓386, ✓391, (S)
✓105-74565-275
✓105-138941-✓42, ✓50
✓105-198867-84
✓105-213145-59 (S)

J. C. Farrington to Mr. McDermott Memo
REQUEST BY U.S. SENATOR WALTER F.
MONDALE, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MEMBER
TO REVIEW HIS FBI FILES

In above file references, we had seven documents containing masked out portions. As these masks will be removed prior to replacing in our files, a Xerox of the pertinent portion of the respective documents have been made for record purposes and attached to this memorandum.

Concerning [105-188989-8] (S) Department of State letter to FBI dated April 10, 1969, Senator Mondale advised he had recevied a copy of this letter from the State Department.

Concerning 62-110783-68 report of SAA Dale E. Berglund dated March 10, 1966, at Minneapolis captioned "MILES WELTON LORD; United States Attorney District of Minnesota, Administrative Inquiry - Bribery," Mr. Adams mentioned to Senator Mondale there were privacy considerations concerning this report and Senator Mondale limited his review of this document to information pertaining to himself set forth on pages 35b and 36.

ACTION: For Information.

ADDENDUM: J. B. ADAMS:ams 7/31/75

Subsequent to the meeting, David Aaron advised that the Senator requested to be advised as to why certain serials [of sensitive coverage (technical coverage on foreign embassies)] seemed to end in (S) 1970 and I advised him that in recent years our indexing procedures in such matters have not called for indexing the name of a Congressman or [[redacted]] (S) it has not been indexed for retrievability.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. McDermott
Re: REQUEST BY U. S. SENATOR WALTER F.
MONDALE, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
MEMBER, TO REVIEW HIS FBI FILES

The Senator raised a question concerning a folder on the Consumers Advisory Council, of which he was a member (62-108230-1) and inquired how we came into possession of this particular report. I determined that this report had been sent to Mr. Hoover in September, 1962, by Richard Berlin, President of the Hearst Corporation, as he felt Mr. Hoover would be interested in reading the report. I advised Mr. Aaron that the report had been sent to Mr. Hoover by a friend of his in the newspaper field.

FD-36 (Rev. [illegible]-64)

FBI

SECRET Date: 3/6/68

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [(105-40461)] (S)

FROM: SAC, WFO [(105-13225)] (C) (S)

[ZYGMUNT BRONIAREK IS-PO] (S)
(OO:WFO)

10/25/00 #MD016
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 1.6 X

Enclosed for Bureau are five copies of LHM dated and captioned as above.

[redacted] who voluntarily furnished the information to SA GILBERT L. LEE, WFO. She advised the Senator told her the information which appears in the LHM. She also stated BRONIAREK may have been introduced to the Senator when he visited her office on one occasion but BRONIAREK hardly knew the Senator. (By request) (S)

Second informant is [WF 456-S*.]
Third informant is [CG 6417-S.] (S)

LHM has been classified "Secret-No Foreign Dissemination" in order to protect [WF 456-S*,] (S) a sensitive source of continuing value. In addition it is so classified to comply with the "Secret" classification accorded [CG 6417-S.] (S)

The informant Memo has been classified "~~Confidential~~" since it reveals Bureau's interest in a representative of an official foreign agency. (S)

3 - Bureau (Enc. 5) ENCLOSURE
2 - WFO
[(1-105-[illegible]) ([illegible])] (S)

ORIGINAL FILED IN

MAR 14 1968

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge   Sent ______ M   Per ______

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. C[illegible]
Mr. Ca[illegible]
Mr. Con[illegible]
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 10/13/70

Transmit the following in ____________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL 10/25/00 #m DR16 CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM 1HG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6 (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [(105-10828)] (S)

FROM: SAC, WFO [(105-524)] (P) (S)

REC-77

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - ISRAEL (S)
(OO:WFO)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM, dated and captioned as above. Informant mentioned in LHM is (WF 568-S*;) LHM has been classified "Secret - No Foreign Dissemination" and has been marked (S)

[redacted]

10/15/70
1cc LHM to CIA / Angleton / By Courier
State } By Courier
DIA } ARG (ISD) Attn [illegible]
v/info GEN:cfh 1cc [illegible] LHM 10/8/70

WFO adv by 0-7
6/24/75

REC-77

[105-10828 - 2197] (S)

8 ENCLOSURE

OCT 20 1970

2 - Bureau (Enc. 8)
1 - WFO

CAM:nsr
(3)

ORIGINAL
105-10828
2197
MARKED

NAT. INT. SEC.

Approved: ____________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FBI

Date: 6/9/70

ORIGINAL MARKED 105-10828-2032

Transmit the following in ______________ (Type in plaintext or code)

10/25/00 #mdr16

Via AIRTEL CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ATG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6 (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [105-10828] (S)

REC-25

FROM: SAC, WFO [(105-524)] (S) (P)

airtel & LHM

CONFIDENTIAL

[EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - ISRAEL] (S)
(OO:WFO)

(S) Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM, dated and captioned as above. Informant mentioned in LHM is [WF 568-S*;] LHM has been classified "Secret - No Foreign Dissemination" and has been marked

[redacted]

Concerning SAUL KOHLER (ph), mentioned in LHM, informant learned that he gave his telephone number as 225-3135. A call to this number elicited the reply, "Office of the Republican leader" which may indicate that KOHLER is in the office of Senator HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania. (S)

~~Classified confidential~~ D.C. 2003

② - Bureau (Enc. 8)
1 - WFO

CAM:nsr
(3)

6/10/70 1cc LHM to CIA/liaison
State - By liaison By Courier
AAG (ISD) attn: [illegible]

REC 25 [105-10828-] (S)

JUN 11 1970

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

FBI

Date: 5/27/70

Transmit the following in ________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

#mDe16 10/25/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/116
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6

Via AIRTEL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [(105-10828)] (S) REC 112

FROM: SAC, WFO [(105-524)] (P) (S)

[EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - ISRAEL] (S)
(OO:WFO)

WFO advised [illegible] 6/[illegible]

(S) Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM, dated and captioned as above. Informant mentioned in LHM is [WF 568-S*; LHM has been classified "Secret-No Foreign Dissemination" and has been marked "

[redacted]

A call to telephone 225-4551 received the reply, "Senate press" which could possibly indicate that the KRAFT mentioned in LHM is in fact JOSEPH KRAFT, the columnist. (S)

Informant has previously furnished information indicating that AMNON SPIEWAK is employed in the Economic Office, Embassy of Israel. (S)

③ - Bureau (Enc. 8) ENCLOSURE
1 - WFO

~~Classified by 4005, XGDS, 3, [illegible]~~

CAM:vm
(3)

[Information on foreign diplomatic [illegible] columnist] (S)

REC-112 [105-10828-2012] (S)

17 MAY 28 1970

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NAT. [illegible] SEC.

6/1/70 1cc Ltr to CIA [illegible]
AAG (ISD) attn [illegible]
[illegible] State - By liaison [illegible]

1cc airtel + LHM [illegible] 6/10 [illegible]

Approved: ________________________ Sent ________________ M Per ________________
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GO RNMENT

Memorandum

10/25/00 #-DR16
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/ITG
DECLASSIFY ON: 1,6

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 7/22/65

FROM : SAC, WFO [(105-65677)] (S) (RUC)

01-MP-9-3

SUBJECT: VALERIA (NMN) BATOREWICZ
[IS - R (VISITOR TO THE USSR)] (S)
(OO: MP)

USIA info. is unclass. per ltr dtd 8/7/89 SP1AG/JAC 2/28/90 (28 P) 967

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

ReWFOlet dated 7/22/65, in captioned matter.

Dept , advised SA DONALD A. BRUMMITT of the following developments in connection with subject's status since EMOND was interviewed on 7/19/65. (S-1) ~~(S)~~ (U)

Prior to departing for the USSR, BATOREWICZ was advanced $1,000 for travel and living expenses. Upon her return she was asked to repay this money. She was unable to do so since she had spent the money during her travel in Europe. Upon being advised that the funds must be repaid, she became quite upset and pointed out that she has been put to considerable inconvenience. (S-1) ~~(S)~~ (U)

On 7/21/65, Mr. EMOND learned that BATOREWICZ had contacted Congressman JOSEPH KARTH and Senator WALTER MONDALE, both of Minnesota and related the full facts of her employment with USIA and subsequent abrupt recall from the Soviet Union along with comments on her being expected to repay the $1,000 advance in funds. (S-1) ~~(S)~~ (U)

As related by Mr. EMOND, Congressman KARTH and Senator MONDALE have both contacted USIA and requested all details. He said it looks as if there will be a "considerable stink" about the matter. (S-1) ~~(S)~~ (U) (USIA + State problem)

Mr. EMOND said there has been no mention made of any FBI interest in BATOREWICZ. (S-1) ~~(S)~~ (U)

Above furnished for information of Bureau and Minneapolis.

REC 55

2-Bureau
2-Minneapolis (RM)
1-WFO

EX-107

JUL 23 1965

(S)

DAB:MJB

](S)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 3/6/68

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL (Priority)

#m DR16 10/25/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/TTC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [(105-40461)] (S)

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-13225) (C)

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFIED BY 4221
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2 & 3
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON ______

(S) [ZYGMUNT BRONIAREK
IS-PO]
(OO:WFO)

Enclosed for Bureau are five copies of LHM dated and captioned as above.

[redacted] who voluntarily furnished the information to SA DELBERT E. LEE, WFO. She advised the Senator told her the information which appears in the LHM. She also stated BRONIAREK may have been introduced to the Senator when he visited her office on one occasion but BRONIAREK hardly knew the Senator. (S) (By request)

AGENCY State, CIA, RAO
REQ. REC'D 3-8-68
HOW FORW.
BY

Second informant is [WF 456-S*.]
Third informant is [CG 6417-S.] (S)

LHM has been classified "Secret-No Foreign Dissemination" in order to protect [WF 456-S*] (S) a sensitive source of continuing value. In addition it is so classified to comply with the "Secret" classification accorded [CG 6417-S.] (S)

The informant Memo has been classified "Confidential" since it reveals Bureau's interest in a representative of an official foreign agency. (S)

3 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
2 - WFO
[(1-105-28475)] (S)

EX 100

REC 18

Approved: ______ Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

FBI

Date: 2/13/70

Transmit the following in ______
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL #mdR16 10/25/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/ZRS
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-74565)

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-28204)(P*)

BORIS N. DAVYDOV
IS - R (SOVEMB) (S)
(OO:WFO)

- WFO [illegible]

REC 14

ST
GR

Enclosed for the Bureau are 5 copies of an LHM, captioned and dated as above, and classified "Confidential" as it reveals the Bureau's investigative interest in an official of a foreign diplomatic establishment. (S)

The individual who furnished information contained in enclosed LHM is ANDREW GYORGY, who was interviewed by SA ALBERT F. WATTERS, JR. on 2/11/70. (S)

[redacted]

However, he is characterized therein as "an individual who volunteered information to the FBI but requested that his identity be concealed" in order to avoid the impression that he is operating under the guidance and direction of the FBI.

REC 14 105-74565-[illegible] (S)

As set forth in enclosed LHM, GYORGY furnished information indicating DAVYDOV was aware of specific questions asked Ambassador BEAM in a closed-door briefing (S)

SECRET

2- Bureau (Enc. 5)
2- WFO
(S) (1- 105-89252)(GYORGY)
AFW:kyu
(4)

CLASSIFIED BY 2721
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
[illegible]

AGENCY [illegible]

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

SECRET

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

REC-1 62-116395-512 8/5/75

1-Legal Counsel Office
(Attn: Mr. Daly)
1-Foreign Liaison Section Delivered wmm
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1-Mr. H. E. Helgeson

TO LEGAT LONDON EX-101

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

REURTEL AUGUST FOUR LAST.

GITENSTEIN IS NOT A U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL. HE IS A FULL TIME STAFF MEMBER EMPLOYED BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THIS COMMITTEE TO CONTACT APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS IN UK TO SEEK DESIRED INFORMATION. HE WILL HAVE WITH HIM LETTER OF INTRODUCTION FROM CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. HE IS ONLY INTERESTED IN WHAT BRITISH DO IN "VERY GENERAL" FASHION AS TO THEIR HANDLING OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES INVESTIGATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPARING WITH FBI INVESTIGATIONS OF SIMILAR MATTERS. GITENSTEIN DESCRIBED IT AS AN "ACADEMIC INQUIRY" AND IS NOT SEEKING SPECIFIC FACTS ON ANY INVESTIGATIONS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

#MDR16 10-10-00 SP2 ALM/JTG
6

FOR INFO LEGAT, GITENSTEIN IS CLEARED FOR ACCESS TO

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

HEH:enm
(6)

NOTE: By teletype 7/28/75 Legat, London, was advised Mark Gitenstein, Senior Staff Member, Senate Select Committee, desired to contact appropriate British officials for general briefing concerning their handling of domestic security investigations. Legat in referenced teletype posed certain questions raised by MI-5 concerning Gitenstein and the purpose of his visit. (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 05 1975
TELETYPE

79 AUG 14 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

TOP SECRET INFORMATION.

IF AT ALL POSSIBLE YOU SHOULD SUTEL BEFORE TWELVE NOON AUGUST SIX ANY ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FINALIZE. IN ABSENCE OF COMMUNICATION FROM YOU GITENSTEIN WILL BE ADVISED TO CONTACT YOU UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN LONDON.

The Attorney General July 30, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is in response to SSC letter dated July 24, 1975, requesting a list of all Special Agents assigned to the New York City area in the mid-1960's who had the surname Kehoe and requesting the unit to which they were assigned as well as their current addresses.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes our response to this request. A copy of the memorandum is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Mr. K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-1 62-116395-511

EX-101

21 AUG 13 1975

DCT:pms
(10)
2 - Mr. Mintz (Sent Direct)
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
1 - Mr. Wannall (Sent Direct)
1 - Mr. Walsh (Sent Direct)
1 - Mr. Midkiff (Sent Direct)

#MDR16

16-10-00 SP-2 ALM/JTG [illegible]/RCH

Based on memo Burns to Walsh dated 7-29-75; DCT:pms

NOTE: The response has been coordinated with Intelligence Division and if approved will be hand carried by Mr. P. V. Daly to Mr. Michael Shaheen, Jr., of the Deputy Attorney General's Office.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ENCLOSURE

TJD/JDF PLM TJM

79 AUG 14 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

62-116395

July 30, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR IDENTITIES AND
ADDRESSES OF SPECIAL AGENTS
WITH SURNAME KEHOE ASSIGNED
NEW YORK CITY AREA MID-1960's

Reference is made to the letter from captioned committee dated July 24, 1975, which requested a list of all Special Agents assigned to the New York City area in the mid-1960's who had the surname Kehoe and requested the unit to which they were assigned as well as their current address.

Pursuant to your request, set forth below are the names and business addresses of the two Special Agents of the FBI with surname Kehoe who were employed in the New York City area in the mid-1960's. Both were assigned to the investigation of Soviet espionage matters and both are currently Special Agents of the FBI.

Francis Joseph Kehoe
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Gateway I, Market Street
Newark, New Jersey 07101

#MDR16

SP-2ALM/ITG

10/10/00

James Patrick Kehoe
Federal Bureau of Investigation
201 East 69th Street
New York, New York 10021

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Kmn
DCT:pms (9)   ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

EW/KGH

2 - Mr. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Midkiff

SRB
TJ
TJM

MAIL ROOM ☑   TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-511

GPO 954-546

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7/30/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re Request for Identities and Address of SAs with surname "Kehoe" assigned NYC area mid-1960s

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Date: 8/7/75 150 P

Received by:

Title: Office Mgr

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/30/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 7/24/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence collection - domestic

#MDR16

10/10/00 SP2 AEM/JT6

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Setting forth names and business address of two Special Agents of the FBI with surname "Kehoe" who were employed in the New York City area in the mid-1960's

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO THE CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-WOC/18

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 29 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

10/10/00 #MDR16
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: ____

NR 006 PH PLAIN

633 PM 7-29-75 NITEL MCA

TO: BUREAU

FROM: PHILADELPHIA (62-0-23222)

SENSTUDY -75

SA JOHN MAICHER, OPERATIONS OFFICER, DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, TELEPHONE 755-4012, TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED THAT ROBERT THWEAT, U.S. NAVY COMMANDER (RETIRED) NOW MANAGER, AT FIDELITY BANK, WYNNEWOOD, PA., TELEPHONE MI-2-2990, HOME NUMBER LO-7-1739, RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM RELIABLE SOURCE THAT A DOCUMENT WAS STOLEN FROM SENATOR CHURCH'S COMMITTEE. [THIS DOCUMENT ALLEGEDLY CONTAINS INFORMATION OF A DEROGATORY NATURE CONCERNING SENATOR HENRY JACKSON.] (S1)(S) SOURCE STATED THIS DOCUMENT COPIED AND PASSED TO THOSE OPPOSING JACKSON.

NO ACTION IS BEING TAKEN ON THE ABOVE, UACB.

END

12-19-88
~~Classified by SP1 AG/GM~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-75

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
AUG 14 1975

7/30/75
Will Ramsey, PH supv, telephonically advised to obtain additional details & availability of Thweat's source.
TJM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

84 AUG 18 1975

~~SECRET~~

FOI/PA # 293 030
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
E.O. #12356
DATE 12-19-88 INITIALS G.M

(81) (S) [CIA] (S)

~~SECRET~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

July 25, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

#FMDR16
10/10/00 SP2ALM/ttG

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to your memorandum July 16, 1975, captioned as above, requesting information relating to the collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of organized crime intelligence and a second request related to what extent have communications between the White House and the FBI or other agencies under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General bypassed the Attorney General and to what extent should such communications be channeled through the Attorney General.

In response to the first matter, on June 25, 1974, I testified before the FBI Oversight Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee that the Bureau has "no statutory authority to collect intelligence per se" but that it operates under the general umbrella of 28 U.S.C. 533 (3), which authorizes the Attorney General to appoint officials "to conduct...investigations regarding official matters...as may be directed by the Attorney General." A listing of any directives issued by the Department or the Attorney General with respect to organized crime should be available in the office of the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

EX-101 REC-1 62-116395-510

With respect to the FBI, all our investigations in the organized crime field are aimed at one ultimate objective: prosecution.

AUG 13 1975

During the course of our investigation ~~of individual~~ hoodlums and the various criminal syndicates operating throughout the United States, we naturally acquire considerable data regarding the structure of the organized underworld, the identities of its principal leaders, the extent of its influence, its primary sources of income, its payoffs to corrupt officials, and the operations of its vast communications networks.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

RLM:mam mam
(10)

~~ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL~~

RLM

79 AUG 14 1975

RLM

WVC

W.O.C.

4063

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Most of this information is obtained from paid informants, from other law enforcement officers, from alert citizens, and from court-approved electronic surveillances installed under the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

None of it, however, is intelligence for intelligence's sake. The experience of the FBI over the years has shown that criminal syndicates exist for the sole purpose of conducting illegal operations and that anyone belonging to them may reasonably be presumed to be engaged in one or more of these activities. Therefore, our investigations of the organized underworld are not aimed at developing general nonspecific data but at establishing which criminal violations its members are engaged in and then proving these violations in a court of law.

Obviously, not every case opened, every lead followed, or every bit of information received is going to wind up in Federal court. On the contrary, much of this material relates to offenses outside the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI. When such is the case, we immediately disseminate the information to the appropriate Federal, state, or local agency. As a result, information uncovered by the FBI during the past five years alone has enabled the recipient agencies to make more than 17,000 organized crime arrests; confiscate over $151,000,000 worth of illicit drugs and narcotics, $9,000,000 worth of cash, property, weapons, and wagering paraphernalia, and $6,000,000 worth of counterfeit bills; and assess tax liens against $19,000,000 worth of property arising out of Federal gambling cases.

In addition, a considerable portion of the organized crime intelligence information developed by the FBI is forwarded to the various Federal Strike Forces coordinating racket investigations throughout the country and to the Criminal Division of the Department, which has entered this information in its computerized data bank called "Racketeer Profile."

The Attorney General

In response to the second request in your letter, my answer is restricted to communications between the White House and the FBI as it would not be appropriate for me to attempt to respond for other agencies under your jurisdiction.

There are two major areas in which the Attorney General does not see communications between the White House and the FBI. They are the results of name checks and the results of full field investigationswe do for the White House. The White House requests approximately 13,000 name checks per year concerning persons who visit the White House complex who could pose a physical threat or possible embarrassment to the President directly or indirectly. Approximately 1,000 full field background investigations on Presidential appointees, members of the White House staff, and other persons having regular access to the White House are requested annually.

I direct your attention to Section 0.15 (b) (7), Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, which states that the Deputy Attorney General shall "Coordinate Departmental liaison with the White House staff and the Executive Office of the President." When this order was promulgated there were discussions between the Department and Bureau officials as to its implementation and its impact on existing direct liaison between the FBI and the White House. My letter to the Attorney General, May 2, 1974, captioned "Revision of the Department of Justice Organization Regulations (28 CFR Part 0)," set forth the FBI's need for a Special Agent-Liaison officer to handle day to day operational liaison with the White House. His activities were outlined and it was requested that he continue to handle operational problems on a daily basis with specific individuals because of the sensitivity of the matters involved, both of a personal security and intelligence nature.

By memorandum dated May 16, 1974, captioned "Direct Operational Liaison with the White House," the Attorney General authorized the continuance of FBI direct operational liaison with the White House.

With the exceptions as noted above, the FBI has adhered to a policy that when information is given to the White House the Attorney General is given the same information contemporaneously. Most of this information relates to current matters pertaining to the national security. This dissemination to the White House is sometimes based on requests from the White House but more frequently on the initiative of the FBI.

With regard to any correspondence directed to this Bureau from the White House, short of a file by file review, there is no means of determining whether or not such communications bypassed the Attorney General.

The established rule of furnishing the Attorney General copies of correspondence to the White House should be followed strictly so that the Attorney General is kept fully informed on matters of interest to him.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

REC-1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. J. Cochran

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. 1
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7/25/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar WRW

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY '75

By memorandum dated 4/23/75, you were advised that former Intelligence Division Supervisor Lish Whitson reported to the writer that he had been interviewed by Mike Epstein of the Senate Select Committee Staff regarding the Martin Luther King case. Whitson had participated in activity at the direction of former Assistant to the Director, William C. Sullivan, relating to the mailing of a package from Florida to King's office. The package had been delivered to Whitson at National Airport on a Saturday by someone unknown to Whitson.

At 5:30 p.m., today, Whitson telephoned the writer to state that he had been contacted by phone just a few minutes before by Mike Epstein. He said that the latter asked him, Whitson, if the person who had met him at National Airport and turned the package over to him was either "Doc" Miller (Fred M. Miller) or John Matter. Whitson said he told Epstein that it was neither of these two former FBI Laboratory employees.

ACTION:

EX-101 REC-1 62-116395-509

To record information furnished voluntarily by former Supervisor Whitson.

AUG 13 1975

TK

(Personnel file Lish Whitson)

WRW

WRW:dsh
(6)

Records

Jm

cc-67

APR 24 1975

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

79 AUG 14 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Mintz

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

DATE: 7-21-75

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

#MDR16

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

10/10/00 SP-2 ALM/TG

On 7-18-75 Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee, advised that he desires to interview the following Agents: Donald P. Burgess, Robert W. Thomson, O. Richard Hamilton, Charles T. Haynes and Alden F. Miller, all of the Atlanta Office. Additionally, he requested that SA W. John Benton of the Knoxville Office be made available in Atlanta. All interviews will be conducted on Tuesday, 7-22-75. The scope of the interviews will be the Bureau investigation of Martin Luther King. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, advised Assistant Director John A. Mintz on 7-18-75 that staff interviews would no longer be considered a demand and thus no longer necessitate a waiver of the Code of Federal Regulations provisions concerning interviews.

After securing the approval of Robert H. Cahill of the Administrative Division for the travel of Benton to Atlanta, SAC Harold C. Swanson, Knoxville Office, was telephonically advised on 7-18-75 to arrange that Benton be available in Atlanta, 7-22-75.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That existing employment agreements of the aforementioned Special Agents be waived for purposes of this interview.

REC-1 62-116395-508

7 JUL 22 1975

(2) That a representative of the ~~Intelligence Division~~ travel to Atlanta to be available for consultation for the interview.

79 AUG 14 1975

1 - Personnel File of Donald P. Burgess
1 - Personnel File of O. Richard Hamilton
1 - Personnel File of Charles T. Haynes
1 - Personnel File of Alden F. Miller
1 - Personnel File of Robert W. Thomson
1 - Personnel File of W. John Benton

LEGAL COUNSEL

PVD:dkg (13)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - [illegible]r. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

The Attorney General July 16, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from Senate Select Committee dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which is responsive to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of the memorandum is being provided for your records.

#mDR16

Enclosures (2)

10-10-00 SP-2 ALM/HTG

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

REC-1 62-116395-507

1 - 62-116009

DR:lfj
(10)

21 AUG 13 1975

UNREC COPY [illegible] FILED IN

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

79 AUG 14 1975

PCM

WRW

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

4063 KKS

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

62-116395

July 16, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
COMMITTEE'S PRIOR REQUEST

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated May 14, 1975, and the appendices thereto, which contained requests for information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Item 5 J, Appendix A, requested all memoranda of the FBI and the Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use so-called "Cointelpro" techniques and methods, including all forms of organizational "disruption."

A review of all logical files of the FBI and a canvass of appropriate personnel knowledgeable of the counterintelligence programs has failed to locate any documents discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use Cointelpro techniques and methods.

1 - The Attorney General

1 - 62-116009

DR:lfj
(9)

#MDR 16

10-10-00 S.P.2 ALM/JTG

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

PLM

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-

GPO 954-546

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7/16/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re; Documents Pertaining to the Committee's Prior Request. Item 5J, Appendix A (May 14, 1975 request)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller Date: Aug 1, 1975

Received by:

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR 16

10/10/00 SP2 ALN/SS

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
7/16/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix A, Item 5J

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

COINTELPRO

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC requested all memoranda of FBI and Justice Department discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use so-called "COINTELPRO" techniques and methods including all forms of organizational "disruption". A review of all logical files of the FBI and a canvass of appropriate personnel knowledgeable of the counterintelligence programs has failed to locate any documents discussing the legal authority of the FBI to use COINTELPRO techniques and methods.

62-116395

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 - woc/

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO THE CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ✓
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Hotis

Attached is a copy of a Departmental memorandum which interprets "demand" under 28 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 16.21 et seq. for the purpose of dealing with the Senate Select Committee. The provisions of 16 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 16.21 et seq. requires Departmental approval in those instances where a current or former employee in response to a demand of a court or authority is required to furnish material contained in Departmental files or disclose information contained therein.

The Department decision as set forth in the attachment characterizes all requests by Senate Select Committee staff members as a demand which requires a waiver from the Department prior to the employee's submission to the Committee request.

REC-1 62-116395-506

According to the Departmental position concerning demand, the Director or "the FBI General Counsel" in coordination with the Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination of the Department may waive the provision of 28 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 16.21 et seq. This is in accordance with the provision of Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 16.23.

14 AUG ~~11~~ 13 1975

Upon receipt of the attached documents, SA Paul V. Daly and Inspector John B. Hotis of this Division sought clarification concerning the Departmental interpretation of "demand" as set forth in attachment, including whether this interpretation applied to the General Accounting Office (GAO) inquiry into the Bureau. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, stated he believed this might also apply to GAO, however, he had not really thought out this point. He was also asked what was meant by the phrase, "in coordination with this office." Mr. O'Connor indicated that he wanted to be notified of requests for interviews and that was what he meant by the phrase, "in coordination with this office."

#mok/6
10/10/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

1 - Mr. Wannall - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Cregar - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Finzel - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Daly - Enclosure

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 [illegible] 15 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

He was advised by SA Daly that we had previously received requests for the interview of a number of employees in Atlanta, Georgia, by the Committee and that upon receipt of the attached communication, after consultation with Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination Michael Shaheen, SA Daly had telephonically informed John Elliff, head of the domestic intelligence task force for the Committee, of the Department's interpretation as set forth in the attached document and the fact that Mr. Elliff should contact Mr. O'Connor concerning these proposed interviews. Mr. O'Connor said that he had been contacted by Mr. Elliff and had, in fact, told Mr. Elliff there would be no interviews. In this regard, O'Connor stated the Department had prepared a proposed draft letter to the Committee expressing concern for the Fifth Amendment rights for Bureau employees and raising other legal issues. Mr. O'Connor indicated that the finalized form of this letter should be sent to the Committee in the near future.

The results of the conversation with John Elliff by O'Connor have caused the Office of Legal Analysis to receive complaints concerning this decision from various Committee staff members, including Mark Gitenstein and Michael Epstein. We can anticipate, unless this particular problem is resolved, receiving protests from their superiors on the Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

You will be kept advised of developments concerning this matter. Legal Analysis Office will continue efforts to determine what effect this will have on the GAO inquiry.

JBH/pvD pvD

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUL 8 1975

TO: John A. Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: KWO'C K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

The attached self-explanatory memo, which the Deputy Attorney General has approved, interprets the word "demand" for the purpose of dealing with Senate Select Committee, under 28 C.F.R., 16.21. It is furnished for your information.

#MDR16
10-10-00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

REC-1 62-116395-506

14 AUG ~~21~~ 13 1975

EAVE

LEGAL COUNSEL

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 23 1975

To Bill O'C.
HRT

TO: Harold R. Tyler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Interpretation of "Demand",
28 C.F.R., § 16.21, et. seq. - Action Memorandum

The meaning of "demand" is not indicated, beyond subpoena, in the C.F.R. sections indicated. This omission creates a need for an interpretation, for purposes of uniform Department of Justice reaction.

Outlines for inquiry proceedings were agreed upon between the White House and the Senate Select Committee on June 13, 1975, and a copy of those procedures was furnished to the Department on June 16, 1975. Under those guidelines, there is a general undertaking by the Committee to identify witnesses to the Agency a reasonable time before the interviews occur. This general rule includes current and former employees; certain exceptions (not clearly defined) are indicated in the guidelines. The Committee is required to provide the witness with a copy of the procedures, and "relevant waivers of secrecy oaths or agreements for the purpose of this inquiry". The Committee is required to give prior notice of an interview, generally, specifying: (a) subject area; (b) periods of employment; (c) the date set for the interview.

Since these structured procedures, taken with the rules of the Subcommittee, may create a requirement of testimony upon witnesses, it seems to me clear that the paragraphs of 28 C.F.R., § 16.21, et. seq., which refer to "demand" should be interpreted to include any request by any Committee staff member to interview any employee, former employee or other person connected with the Department of Justice.

This interpretation requires certain action: (1) that the witness be authorized to speak under § 16.23 by an appropriate Department Official; and, (2) that an appropriate Department Official be designated. I would think that the appropriate Department Official for the FBI should be the Director of the FBI or the FBI General Counsel, in coordination with this office.

#MDR 16
10-10-00 SP2ALM/JTG

258-3

62-116395 - 566

6-24-5

As a matter of current practice, the FBI and other components of the Department are presently coordinating with me on agreements for disclosure under § 16.23, as a system for ensuring that they are receiving treatment consistent with the outlines of inquiry procedure and the agreements between the Committee and the Department.

If you approve, I will advise the involved components of the Department of Justice that the word "demand" will be interpreted as indicated for each witness.

_____X_____ Approve

______________ Disapprove

______________ Let's Discuss

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7-23-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

On July 23, 1975, Mike Gitenstein, staff member Senate Select Committee, requested that he be given a briefing concerning "Official and Confidential" files. By way of background, we furnished a summary of the inspection inquiry to the Committee by letterhead memorandum dated 7-16-75, and also made available for review in Bureau space a list of people contacted during the course of this inquiry.

With regard to Gitenstein's request it would appear beneficial for us to brief the Senate Select Committee representative concerning the scope and details of this inquiry. In this regard it appears Gitenstein is interested in those individuals who were contacted by the Inspection Division during their inspection into the "Official and Confidential" files.

If approved the briefing will be tentatively scheduled for Friday, July 25, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a briefing be arranged for Gitenstein concerning the "Official and Confidential" files inspection inquiry by Inspection Division.

ALL INFO CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-16-00 BY SP2 ALM/TLG

MOE 16

REC-47 62-116395-505

1-Mr. Bassett
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly

5 JUL 29 1975

PVD:lgp
(8)

Briefing held 7/25/75 with Gitenstein, H Helgeson and [illegible]. Generally briefed him concerning the inspection inquiry and [illegible] [illegible] usage of O.C. files
PVD

84 AUG 15 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7-23-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

By memorandum dated June 24, 1975, you were advised of the Department's intention to make a closed Departmental file available to captioned Committee. The file contained the results of a criminal investigation conducted by the Bureau. The Intelligence, General Investigative and Special Investigative Divisions were requested to furnish their views concerning this matter and the Legal Counsel Division was to prepare a letter to the Department setting forth the Bureau's position with regard to this matter.

We have since had discussions with the Attorney General and other representatives of the Department concerning Senate Select Committee access to Bureau files and submitted correspondence to the Department concerning this matter. It would appear additional communications to the Department are unnecessary. The Department is well aware of our position in this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

We do not prepare a communication to the Department concerning this matter.

Enclosure

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Gallagher
1-Mr. Cleveland
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly

PVD:lgp
(9)

EX-108

REC-47 62-116395-50

#MDR16

10-10-00 SP2 ALM 1776

JUL 28 1975

84 15 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

2

FBI

Date: 8/7/75

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ADIC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243)

RE: SENSTUDY 75

#MDR16

10/10/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

ReButel 7/30/75.

Enclosed are 8 copies of LHM reflecting interview of ADIC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT by LESTER SEIDEL, Staff Member of the Senate Select Committee, United States Senate.

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

[illegible] cc Personnel file

1-4063

Extra cc's destroyed

EX 104

REC-36

62-116395-503

ENCLOSURE

14 AUG 11 1975

FIVE

2 - Bureau (8 Encls)
1 - Los Angeles
/mmb
(3)

Let to AG 1-Dup Enc. 2
Sep. 11/75 8/18/75

79 SEP 17 1975

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1975

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC); INTERVIEW OF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE ROBERT E. GEBHARDT BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 7, 1975, Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt, Los Angeles Division, was interviewed in the Los Angeles FBI Office by Mr. Lester Seidel, Staff Member of the Senate Select Committee, United States Senate.

Gebhardt's rights were not explained to him by Seidel although Seidel did explain the purpose of the interview, that is, the Cointel Program of the FBI as it related to the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party when Gebhardt was the Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco Division from 1970 to 1972.

The interview lasted from 9:05 AM until 10:30 AM, and it was not necessary for Gebhardt to consult with any Bureau representative.

Gebhardt had previously been advised by a Bureau representative of his right to counsel, the privileged areas of information, consultation privileges, and the parameters of interview.

Seidel inquired at the outset as to whether Gebhardt was aware of the Cointel Program relative to the Black Panther Party investigation on a day-to-day basis being specifically advised details of the investigation as it relates to the Cointel Program. It was explained to Seidel that as Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco FBI Office wherein over 500 employees were located at the time, Gebhardt had many responsibilities in the operation of that division and

PROPERTY OF THE FBI
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

42-116395-505

ENCLOSURE

therefore, relied upon the experience, expertise, and judgment of the various supervisors assigned to the office for the day-to-day direction of the various matters under investigation, including the investigation of the Black Panther Party.

It was further explained that if a problem was encountered or a particularly unusual situation developed, Gebhardt was, of course, consulted and was available for such consultation to resolve any particular problem areas.

Gebhardt was next asked if he recalled being SAC when the electronic coverage of the Black Panther Party and the various officials at BBP was instituted and eventually terminated. Seidel was advised that the electronic coverage was already in effect upon Gebhardt's arrival, however, he does recall receiving a phone call after the "Keith Decision" was handed down instructing that all electronic coverage of the BPP and the various members of the BPP be discontinued. The call was received from Bureau Headquarters and the discontinuance was effected immediately.

Seidel inquired as to whether Gebhardt felt the intelligence type investigations should be completely removed from the criminal investigations which investigations would be looking toward eventual prosecution.

Seidel was informed by Gebhardt that even in criminal investigations looking toward prosecutions, much intelligence information is obtained from time to time which really has no value from a prosecutive standpoint, but does have possible value with respect to the direction of the investigation. In some criminal investigations a great deal of intelligence information may be obtained and in other types, very little. Insofar as the FBI is concerned, however, every effort is made to make certain there is some Federal law which would be a basis for an investigation which procedures would include matters commonly referred to as security investigations.

In some instances, in such security investigations a great deal of intelligence information would be obtained therefore, it was Gebhardt's opinion that so-called intelligence type investigations should not be removed from or differentiated from criminal type investigations looking toward prosecutions since intelligence information is an outgrowth of the basic investigation.

Gebhardt was asked if he felt the Cointelpro was a separate entity distinguished from the basic investigation and it was explained that the Cointelpro was a phase of the overall investigation in any particular organization or individual.

Gebhardt was asked if he felt Congress should enact legislation which would set forth specific investigative techniques that could or could not be utilized by the FBI or other Federal investigative agencies. He was advised in Gebhardt's opinion, such legislation should not be enacted, and in reply to the question as to why such legislation should not be enacted, it was pointed out that as an investigative agency, there must of necessity be allowed a certain flexibility because no two investigations are exactly alike and the circumstances of such investigations could possibly not be related to such Federal law.

In answer to the question as to how Congress should assure the American public that questionable activity such as the Cointelpro, was not being engaged in by an investigative agency such as the FBI, Seidel was informed that the Congress and the American people must rely upon the integrity and honesty of the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General.

It was pointed out that both the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General are nominated by the President, hearings are held before the various Congressional Committees and finally approved by the Senate. It was further pointed out that Director Kelley has recently stated in connection with the publicity relative to Cointelpro, that he has no intention of permitting this program to be reinstituted in the FBI and if circumstances ever arose which circumstances he could not contemplated at this time, wherein it was thought such activities should be embarked upon, he would obtain the personal approval of the Attorney General prior to such instituting. Seidel was informed that Gebhardt was in total agreement with this statement of Mr. Kelley.

Gebhardt was asked as to what his feelings were relative to what the relationship should be between the FBI and Congress. He was informed that a Senate Oversight Committee was recently established and it was felt that this was a good start and that this Committee should formalize and

standardize their oversight responsibilities and make regular inquiries of the Director and other officials of the FBI as to our activities. He was informed that there should be either a joint oversight committee between the House and Senate or if the Congress decided on two oversight Committees in both the House and Senate, these committees should be the entities through which all information relative to the activities of the FBI should flow.

It was emphasized however, that there should be regular consultation between these representatives and the FBI.

Inquiry was made as to Gebhardt's opinion relative to the relationship between the Department of Justice and the FBI and Seidel was informed the relationship, in Gebhardt's opinion, is excellent, should continue, and there should be a free flow of information between the FBI and the Department of Justice.

At the conclusion of the interview, Gebhardt summed up his comments by stating that Congress should definitely set up a structured oversight procedure of the activities of the FBI with due regard to the confidentiality of many of the FBI operations and investigations and must assure itself that the members of the Committee and its staff will maintain the confidentiality where necessary.

Secondly, in the areas of investigative matters usually referred to as national defense, national security or intelligence operations, all of the FBI investigations must be based on the application of the facts toward a particular Federal statute and if the facts are so oblique that they cannot be clearly applied to a particular Federal statute, consultation with the Department of Justice should be had in all instances.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-18-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

#MDR16

10/10/00 SP-2ALM/JTG

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At 10 a.m., on 6-18-75, Mr. William Miller, Staff Director Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities called Inspector John B. Hotis to advise that he heard a report on the radio earlier that morning concerning the alleged penetration of Congressional and Senatorial offices by the KGB or agents of Soviet bloc Nations. Miller said he did not have any further details and stated he was uncertain whether the report alleged actual penetration of the offices or simply increased contacts by the Soviets with Members of Congress. Miller said he believed the source of the report was a television interview of Senator Goldwater (R-Arizona) on Sunday, 6-15-75.

Mr. Miller said the members of the Senate Committee were concerned about these allegations and asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation to inquire into the matter. Assistant Director Wannall has been advised of this request.

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the sensitivity of this matter, it is recommended that the Intelligence Division prepare an oral briefing for Mr. Miller concerning increased Soviet contacts with Members of Congress.

REC-36 62-116395-502

Oral briefing given on 8/7/75 to Messrs. Miller, Elliff and Shea by W.R. Wannall and W.O. Branigan
WOB 8/7/75

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Daly
1-Mr. Hotis

JBH:lgp
(7)

5-WOB

84 AUG 13 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 0 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR002 PH PLAIN

417 PM URGENT AUG. 6, 1975 DCC

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM PHILADELPHIA (62-0-23222)

SENSTUDY -75

RE PHILADELPHIA NITEL TO THE BUREAU, JULY 30, 1975, AND PHILADELPHIA TELCALL TO THE BUREAU, AUGUST 6, 1975.

ON AUGUST 6, 1975, MRS. ROBERT THWEAT ADVISED THAT HER SOURCE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED IN RE NITEL IS AMY MITCHELL, AGE 24, EMPLOYED BY THE CITIZENS' ACTION COMMITTEE AT THE WHITE HOUSE. SHE CAN BE REACHED AT TELEPHONE NUMBER 456-6466 AFTER 2:00 PM THIS DATE. SHE PREFERS INTERVIEW IN WASHINGTON, D. C., THIS EVENING. SHE DOES NOT DESIRE HER NAME DIVULGED OR CREDITED AS THE ORIGINAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

PHILADELPHIA WILL REPORT ANY FURTHER INFORMATION THAT IS PROVIDED BY MR. OR MRS. THWEAT.

END

REC-102 62-116395-501

PLS ACK FOR TWO

VLJ ACK FOR TWO

FBIHQ CLR

14 AUG 11 1975

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP-2 ALM/ZTG

84 AUG 13 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

[illegible]

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

NR002 PH PLAIN

417 PM URGENT AUG. 6, 1975 DCC

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM PHILADELPHIA (62-0-23222)

SENSTUDY 75

RE PHILADELPHIA NITEL TO THE BUREAU, JULY 30, 1975, AND PHILADELPHIA TELCALL TO THE BUREAU, AUGUST 6, 1975.

ON AUGUST 6, 1975, MRS. ROBERT THWEAT ADVISED THAT HER SOURCE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED IN RE NITEL IS AMY MITCHELL, AGE 24, EMPLOYED BY THE CITIZENS' ACTION COMMITTEE AT THE WHITE HOUSE. SHE CAN BE REACHED AT TELEPHONE NUMBER 456-6466 AFTER 2:00 PM THIS DATE. SHE PREFERS INTERVIEW IN WASHINGTON, D. C., THIS EVENING. SHE DOES NOT DESIRE HER NAME DIVULGED OR CREDITED AS THE ORIGINAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

PHILADELPHIA WILL REPORT ANY FURTHER INFORMATION THAT IS PROVIDED BY MR. OR MRS. THWEAT.

END

REC-102

PLS ACK FOR TWO

VLJ ACK FOR TWO

FBIHQ CLR

14 AUG 11 1975

#NDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 8/6/75

1 - Mr. S. S. Mignosa
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-19-88 BY SP-1 A66 [illegible]

PURPOSE:

To advise of recent developments in matter involving possible leak of intelligence community information in possession of Senate Select Committee (SSC).

DETAILS:

My memorandum to you dated 8/1/75, captioned as above (copy attached), advised that our Philadelphia Office recently received information that a member of the SSC had reportedly, without authorization, Xeroxed a CIA document in possession of the Committee for subsequent transmittal to Congressman Morris Udall. Since receipt of this original information, our Philadelphia Office has been attempting to arrange for an interview of the original source of this information.

62-116395-

The following information is set forth to advise you of pertinent developments subsequent to my memorandum of 8/1/75.

NOT RECORDED
17 AUG 1975

At approximately 3:00 p.m., 8/5/75, Mr. Paul Mack, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Associate Director, advised Special Agent (SA) Thomas J. McNiff that the contemplated interview of the source should not be conducted prior to a discussion that Mr. Nicholas P. Callahan, Associate Director, was scheduled to have with appropriate representatives of the Department concerning this matter. At approximately 5:00 p.m., 8/5/75, Mr. Mack advised SA McNiff that Department representatives had been appropriately advised and that the interview of source should be conducted at the earliest time.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Enclosure
62-116395

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 AUG 13 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

At 10:35 a.m., 8/6/75, SA John Kutz, Philadelphia Office, called and advised that he had been in touch this date with Mrs. Robert Thweat who advised that the identity of her niece, the original source of information, is Amy Mitchell who is 24 years of age and is currently employed as a summer intern for the Citizens Action Committee at the White House. Miss Mitchell can be contacted at phone number 456-6466 between the hours of 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., 8/6/75. Mrs. Thweat advised if not contacted prior to 4:00 p.m., Mitchell would be unavailable (for unexplained reasons) until after 8/11/75. Mrs. Thweat also advised that her niece, Amy Mitchell, desired that her name remain confidential with regard to any information she would furnish this Bureau and that under no circumstances would she be agreeable to testimony.

At 10:55 a.m., 8/6/75, Mr. Mack was contacted and advised of the above recent information received from Philadelphia and that arrangements were being effected for Agents of the Washington Field Office (WFO) to contact Mitchell for purpose of interview.

At 11:20 a.m., 8/6/75, SA McNiff personally contacted ASAC Cornelius G. Sullivan, WFO, and furnished him with copies of Philadelphia teletypes 7/29/75 and 7/30/75 concerning this matter, as well as briefing him of developments subsequent to information contained in these teletypes. ASAC Sullivan was instructed to have two experienced Agents contact Mitchell in the above-mentioned time frame for the purpose of arranging an interview of Mitchell.

At approximately 1:30 p.m., 8/6/75, SAs Donald E. Stukey II and Daniel J. Kiernan contacted SA McNiff at FBIHQ for the purpose of briefing prior to initiating contact with Mitchell. These Agents were brought up to date regarding available information relating to this matter and were instructed to insure that the interview of Mitchell was conducted in a most discreet and thorough manner. They were instructed to submit this evening a nitel summarizing results of the interview followed immediately by an LHM suitable for dissemination setting forth in detail results of the interview.

At 2:15 p.m., 8/6/75, SA Stukey called advising that he had telephonically contacted Mitchell and arranged for an interview of her at her residence at 6:00 p.m., 8/6/75.

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information. You will be advised of results of interview along with recommendation for additional action to be taken in this matter.

TJm

JBA

WRW

FBI

~~SECRET~~

15

August 5, 1975 (c Sen Study 1975

Rec'd from SSC 8/6/75

REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

I. Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access; delivery requested by Monday, August 11, 1975:

A. The notebook or binder containing materials on the FBI legal authority and maintained in the Office of the Special Counsel.

B. Materials pertaining to FBI-CIA relations in 1970 previously made accessible at FBIHQ in excised form; unexcised versions of the memoranda bearing the item-number designations 8, 9, 30, 32, and 37.

C. "Foreign Operations Policy Manual," previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

D. Inspection Reports on the Intelligence Division and the San Francisco Field Office, as currently sanitized.

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
14 AUG 12 1975

5-Phillips

84 AUG 13 1975

II. Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 15, 1975:

A. The following materials maintained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files and designated "non-derogatory," previously examined by SSC staff:

1. Agreement between FBI and Secret Service;
2. Attorney General - Submission of Memoranda by FBI;
3. "Black Bag" Jobs;
4. Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence Coverage;
5. Intelligence Coverage - Domestic and Foreign;
6. Directives (60);
7. Cook, Fred (52).

B. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the individuals whose names are underscored on the attached list (slightly expanded from previous access requests).

III. Newly requested materials; delivery requested by Monday, August 11, 1975:

A. All of Section 8 of the Manual of Instructions.

B. Sections 1, 6, 7H, 7J, 8L, and 14F of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

C. Superseding versions of Section 6 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, since January 1, 1960.

D. The following materials referred to in memoranda previously delivered to SSC regarding FBI legal attaches:

1. Memoranda of W. C. Sullivan of June 7, 1971, and June 16, 1971;
2. Memoranda of Mr. Wannall of May 27, 1971, and May 28, 1971;
3. Letter of Hoover to the President dated September 21, 1970;
4. Memorandum of W. C. Sullivan dated September 22, 1970
5. Memorandum of Mr. Brennan dated September 21 1970;
6. Memorandum of Mr. Child of May 23, 1969;
7. Recommendations of Dalby, Felt, and Beaver upon the recommendation made in memorandum of Sullivan of June 7, 1971:
8. Material pertaining to an inspection of all FBI foreign liaison posts conducted in 1971 pursuant to instructions from Hoover to Assistant Director Ponder in charge of inspections.

E. Materials pertaining to the origin, operation, and termination of the Mass Media Program implemented by the former FBI Crime Records Division.

F. Materials pertaining to the establishment and functions of the FBI External Affairs Division.

G. "Guide to Indexing" and "Rules Pertaining to the General Index", cited at p. 14, Volume 1, of the Classifying Instructor's Guide.

H. "The Standard Sub List"

I. The following materials pertaining to Project INLET:

   1. Materials reflecting approval of the Project on or about November 20, 1969.

   2. Inspection Report referred to in SAC letter of December 26, 1972.

   3. Letter from FBI to Congressman Les Aspin in 1973 regarding the Project.

J. Materials pertaining to the policies and procedures of the FBI for the use of FBI agents for so-called "undercover" activity.

K. The current address and assignment of Special Agent (or former Special Agent) John Kunkle, who was assigned to the Bureau's Hawaii office in 1955.

IV. Newly requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 18, 1975:

A. The following materials referred to in memoranda previously delivered to SSC regarding FBI Legal Attaches:

1. Materials pertaining to conversations between the President and Hoover regarding foreign liaison operations in September 1970;
2. Materials pertaining to conversations between Dr. Kissinger and Hoover in December 1970;
3. Materials pertaining to communications between the FBI and the State Department regarding foreign liaison operations in 1970;
4. Materials pertaining to a conference with the President regarding foreign liaison operations in June 1971.

V. Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by August 18, 1975:

A. The following materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew:

1. All materials pertaining to the authorization or re-authorization by the President or the Attorney General of technical surveillance of the South Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C. in 1968.

2. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault in November 1968.

3. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.

4. All materials summarizing the results of technical or physical surveillance, including incidental overhearings, and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968, but not including "logs".

5. All materials pertaining to White House instructions to the FBI for the handling of the summary letters described in item 4 above.

6. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary letters described in item 4 above.

7. The current addresses of the following former Special Agents, who may have participated in the technical or physical surveillance or "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault or Spiro T. Agnew:

   a. Phil Claridge

   b. William Jackson

B. The following materials pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Radford:

1. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillances of Yeoman Charles E. Radford from December 1971 to June 1972.

2. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of two close personal friends of Yeoman Radford, one retired from the Navy, the other a State Department employee, from January to April 1972.

3. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of Yeoman Radford's step-father in Oregon from February to April 1972.

4. All materials summarizing the results of the technical surveillances described in items 1 through 3 above.

5. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary described in item 4 above.

C. With respect to surreptitious entries carried out by the FBI from January 1, 1960 to the present, all materials pertaining to the following:

1. The date, place, target, and purpose of each entry;

2. The request and authorization for each entry including the identities of the agencies and/or individuals who requested and/or authorized the entry;

3. The procedures and methods used for the conduct of each entry;

4. The results of each entry, including the information obtained and the identities of the agencies and/or individuals to whom the information was disseminated.

5. The materials in 1 through 4 above which may pertain to any surreptitious entry directed at the following targets:

   a. French Embassy in Washington D.C. (1960)

   b. Japanese Consulate in Seattle, Washington(1957?,196

   c. Daniel Ellsberg, Mill Valley, California (1973,1974)

   d. Gerald Lefcourt, New York City (1970, 1971)

   e. Charles Garry, Oakland, California (1970, 1971)

   f. Eqbal Ahmed, Chicago (1970)

   g. United States Servicemen's Fund, Boston (1971)

   h. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, New York City (1971)

   i. Marvin Kalb, CBS News (1972, 1973)

   j. Dan Rather, CBS News (1972, 1973)

   k. Sol Linowitz (1972)

   l. Institute of Policy Studies, Washington,D.C. (1971)

   m. Michael Kennedy, San Franciso (1969, 1970)

   n. Radical Education Project and SDS,Ann Arbor, Michig
   (1969)

   o. Carol Wild Scott, Gainsville, Florida (1972)

   p. Henry di Suvero, New York City (1972)

   q. The Washington Free Press, Washington,D.C. (1969)

   r. The home of a "known bigot...(who) might (have been) plotting violence against Jewish leaders," referred to in Jack Anderson's column in the Washington Post of June 21, 1975.

D. Materials pertaining to any jurisdictional agreements, agreements of coordination, or other agreements between the FBI and any other federal, state or local agency with regard to the conduct of and dissemination of information from surreptitious entries.

E. The following materials pertaining to NSA watch list activity, reportedly in operation from late 1967 through 1973, which involved the monitoring of international communications that were addressed to, or from, or included the names of persons on a changing "watch list":

1. All materials pertaining to the proposing, approving, putting names on, executing, evaluating, or terminating the watch list activity;

2. All materials (including correspondence) sent by the FBI to the National Security Agency or any other entity in the Department of Defense listing names for the watch list or otherwise commenting on the activity;

3. Any internal FBI materials produced as part of the activity;

4. Any NSA or Department of Defense materials (including correspondence and reports) regarding the watch list activity sent to the FBI.

F. Materials pertaining to the authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service.

G. "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".

H. Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-In (also known as "Earth Day"), April 22, 1970.

I. Materials pertaining to the origin and implication of any decision to gather intelligence on "Women's Liberation" in the Philadelphia FBI field office 1969 to the present.

J. The additional SAC letters and memoranda identified on the attached list.

K. The performance ratings (Form FD 185) of the following current or former FBI employees:

1. George Berley
2. Wilfred Bergeron
3. William D. Campbell
4. Richard Suter
5. William Tucker
6. Terry O'Connor
7. Joseph English

L. The current office assignment or last known address of the individuals listed in K. above.

7B9

~~SECRET~~

August 5, 1975 [illegible]

REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

I. Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access; delivery requested by Monday, August 11, 1975:

A. The notebook or binder containing materials on the FBI legal authority and maintained in the Office of the Special Counsel.

B. Materials pertaining to FBI-CIA relations in 1970 previously made accessible at FBIHQ in excised form; unexcised versions of the memoranda bearing the item-number designations 8, 9, 30, 32, and 37.

C. "Foreign Operations Policy Manual," previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

D. Inspection Reports on the Intelligence Division and the San Francisco Field Office, as currently sanitized.

Recd from SSC 8/6/75

NOT RECORDED
14 AUG 12 197

5-Phillips

II. Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 15, 1975:

A. The following materials maintained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files and designated "non-derogatory," previously examined by SSC staff:

1. Agreement between FBI and Secret Service;
2. Attorney General - Submission of Memoranda by FBI;
3. "Black Bag" Jobs;
4. Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence Coverage;
5. Intelligence Coverage - Domestic and Foreign;
6. Directives (60);
7. Cook, Fred (52).

B. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the individuals whose names are underscored on the attached list (slightly expanded from previous access requests).

III. Newly requested materials; delivery requested by Monday, August 11, 1975:

A. All of Section 8 of the Manual of Instructions.

B. Sections 1, 6, 7H, 7J, 8L, and 14F of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

C. Superseding versions of Section 6 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, since January 1, 1960.

D. The following materials referred to in memoranda previously delivered to SSC regarding FBI legal attaches:

1. Memoranda of W. C. Sullivan of June 7, 1971, and June 16, 1971;

2. Memoranda of Mr. Wannall of May 27, 1971, and May 28, 1971;

3. Letter of Hoover to the President dated September 21, 1970;

4. Memorandum of W. C. Sullivan dated September 22, 1970

5. Memorandum of Mr. Brennan dated September 21 1970;

6. Memorandum of Mr. Child of May 23, 1969;

7. Recommendations of Dalby, Felt, and Beaver upon the recommendation made in memorandum of Sullivan of June 7, 1971:

8. Material pertaining to an inspection of all FBI foreign liaison posts conducted in 1971 pursuant to instructions from Hoover to Assistant Director Ponder in charge of inspections.

E. Materials pertaining to the origin, operation, and termination of the Mass Media Program implemented by the former FBI Crime Records Division.

F. Materials pertaining to the establishment and functions of the FBI External Affairs Division.

G. "Guide to Indexing" and "Rules Pertaining to the General Index", cited at p. 14, Volume 1, of the Classifying Instructor's Guide.

H. "The Standard Sub List"

I. The following materials pertaining to Project INLET:

1. Materials reflecting approval of the Project on or about November 20, 1969.

2. Inspection Report referred to in SAC letter of December 26, 1972.

3. Letter from FBI to Congressman Les Aspin in 1973 regarding the Project.

J. Materials pertaining to the policies and procedures of the FBI for the use of FBI agents for so-called "undercover" activity.

K. The current address and assignment of Special Agent (or former Special Agent) John Kunkle, who was assigned to the Bureau's Hawaii office in 1955.

IV. Newly requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 18, 1975:

A. The following materials referred to in memoranda previously delivered to SSC regarding FBI Legal Attaches:

1. Materials pertaining to conversations between the President and Hoover regarding foreign liaison operations in September 1970;

2. Materials pertaining to conversations between Dr. Kissinger and Hoover in December 1970;

3. Materials pertaining to communications between the FBI and the State Department regarding foreign liaison operations in 1970;

4. Materials pertaining to a conference with the President regarding foreign liaison operations in June 1971.

V. Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by August 18, 1975:

A. The following materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew:

1. All materials pertaining to the authorization or re-authorization by the President or the Attorney General of technical surveillance of the South Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C. in 1968.

2. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault in November 1968.

3. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.

4. All materials summarizing the results of technical or physical surveillance, including incidental overhearings, and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968, but not including "logs".

5. All materials pertaining to White House instructions to the FBI for the handling of the summary letters described in item 4 above.

6. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary letters described in item 4 above.

7. The current addresses of the following former Special Agents, who may have participated in the technical or physical surveillance or "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault or Spiro T. Agnew:

   a. Phil Claridge

   b. William Jackson

B. The following materials pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Radford:

1. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillances of Yeoman Charles E. Radford from December 1971 to June 1972.

2. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of two close personal friends of Yeoman Radford, one retired from the Navy, the other a State Department employee, from January to April 1972.

3. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of Yeoman Radford's step-father in Oregon from February to April 1972.

4. All materials summarizing the results of the technical surveillances described in items 1 through 3 above.

5. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary described in item 4 above.

C. With respect to surreptitious entries carried out by the FBI from January 1, 1960 to the present, all materials pertaining to the following:

1. The date, place, target, and purpose of each entry;

2. The request and authorization for each entry including the identities of the agencies and/or individuals who requested and/or authorized the entry;

3. The procedures and methods used for the conduct of each entry;

4. The results of each entry, including the information obtained and the identities of the agencies and/or individuals to whom the information was disseminated.

5. The materials in 1 through 4 above which may pertain to any surreptitious entry directed at the following targets:

   a. French Embassy in Washington D.C. (1960)

   b. Japanese Consulate in Seattle, Washington(1957?,196

   c. Daniel Ellsberg, Mill Valley, California (1973,1974)

   d. Gerald Lefcourt, New York City (1970, 1971)

   e. Charles Garry, Oakland, California (1970, 1971)

   f. Eqbal Ahmed, Chicago (1970)

   g. United States Servicemen's Fund, Boston (1971)

   h. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, New York City (1971)

   i. Marvin Kalb, CBS News (1972, 1973)

   j. Dan Rather, CBS News (1972, 1973)

   k. Sol Linowitz (1972)

   l. Institute of Policy Studies, Washington,D.C. (1971)

   m. Michael Kennedy, San Franciso (1969, 1970)

   n. Radical Education Project and SDS,Ann Arbor, Michig
   (1969)

   o. Carol Wild Scott, Gainsville, Florida (1972)

   p. Henry di Suvero, New York City (1972)

   q. The Washington Free Press, Washington,D.C. (1969)

   r. The home of a "known bigot...(who) might (have been) plotting violence against Jewish leaders," referred to in Jack Anderson's column in the Washington Post of June 21, 1975.

D. Materials pertaining to any jurisdictional agreements, agreements of coordination, or other agreements between the FBI and any other federal, state or local agency with regard to the conduct of and dissemination of information from surreptitious entries.

E. The following materials pertaining to NSA watch list activity, reportedly in operation from late 1967 through 1973, which involved the monitoring of international communications that were addressed to, or from, or included the names of persons on a changing "watch list":

1. All materials pertaining to the proposing, approving, putting names on, executing, evaluating, or terminating the watch list activity;

2. All materials (including correspondence) sent by the FBI to the National Security Agency or any other entity in the Department of Defense listing names for the watch list or otherwise commenting on the activity;

3. Any internal FBI materials produced as part of the activity;

4. Any NSA or Department of Defense materials (including correspondence and reports) regarding the watch list activity sent to the FBI.

F. Materials pertaining to the authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service.

G. "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".

H. Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-In (also known as "Earth Day"), April 22, 1970.

I. Materials pertaining to the origin and implication of any decision to gather intelligence on "Women's Liberation" in the Philadelphia FBI field office from 1969 to the present.

J. The additional SAC letters and memoranda identified on the attached list.

K. The performance ratings (Form FD 185) of the following current or former FBI employees:

1. George Berley
2. Wilfred Bergeron
3. William D. Campbell
4. Richard Suter
5. William Tucker
6. Terry O'Connor
7. Joseph English

L. The current office assignment or last known address of the individuals listed in K. above.

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. [illegible] Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 8/ 1/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

WO

1 - Mr. S. S. Mignosa
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

FOI/PA # 293030
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
E.O. # 12356
DATE 12-19-88 INITIALS GM
S/ IS (CIA) JS

PURPOSE:

To advise of receipt of uncorroborated information from Philadelphia Office to the effect that a Staff Member of the Church Committee reportedly, without authorization, Xeroxed a CIA document in possession of the Committee for subsequent transmittal to Congressman Morris Udall.

DETAILS:

Senstudy is acronym for Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC), also known as Church Committee, which Committee is looking into operations of members of the intelligence community.

By teletype 7/30/75, our Philadelphia Office advised that one Robert Thweat, a retired United States Navy Commander, had made available information he received from an unnamed relative. This relative told him that one Daniel O'Flaherty, who is employed with the Church Committee, had on an unknown date removed from his work area, by hiding underneath his shirt, a CIA memorandum containing derogatory information on Senator Henry Jackson. (S) O'Flaherty then Xeroxed the memorandum and provided the Xeroxed copy to an unknown person for subsequent transmittal to Congressman Morris Udall. According to Thweat O'Flaherty had personally related the above information to his relative and reportedly had also related the incident to a Mr. Katz, a former associate who is currently a professor at the University of Vanderbilt, Nashville, Tennessee. Katz

#MDR16 10-10-00 SP-2ALM/JTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

253363

62-116305

62-116395-

TJM:lhb lhb
(7)

12-19-88
Classified by SP1AG/GM
Declassify on: OADR
11293030

NOT RECORDED
20 AUG 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE ADDENDUM, PG. 5

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

reportedly voiced his displeasure to O'Flaherty stating he did not approve of the latter's action. The memorandum in question dealt with CIA's possible use of derogatory information to determine the direction Senator Jackson would take in future actions he might encounter which might involve CIA activity. ~~(S)~~ Thweat advised he would recontact his relative to determine if this individual would come forward, reveal his identity and be cooperative in any investigation.

A memorandum from CIA dated 7/29/75 indicates that James Daniel O'Flaherty, born 11/4/42, is a member of the Staff ~~(S)~~ of SSC and has been granted a security clearance up to "Top Secret." ~~(S)~~

On the morning of 7/31/75, Philadelphia Office was telephonically contacted and instructed to expedite a contact with Thweat to determine the availability of his relative. At approximately 2:30 p.m., 7/31/75, Philadelphia Office advised that Thweat, upon recontact, had stated that it would be impossible to contact his relative before this coming weekend. In conversation, he identified his relative as a niece who is currently attending school in Washington, D. C. He further advised that O'Flaherty reportedly is no longer residing with his wife and is engaged in an emotional relationship with his niece. Thweat added he believed his niece would be cooperative as she has expressed her disapproval of O'Flaherty's action. He concluded by saying that upon determination of his niece's decision in this regard he would immediately advise the Philadelphia Office.

OBSERVATIONS:

The above information, if accurate, represents a serious violation of the agreement regarding confidentiality existing between the SSC and members of the intelligence community as it relates to material being turned over or made available to Staff Members of the Committee. It is incumbent

~~SECRET~~ CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

upon this Bureau to make the above information available at the earliest logical time and in the most complete form possible to the Department, CIA, and Senators Frank Church and John G. Tower of the SSC. Accordingly, an interview by Bureau Agents of Thweat's niece, if she agrees to cooperate, would appear desirable before initiating any action on the basis of information received to date.

Additionally, it is not known at this time whether or not the document reportedly Xeroxed by O'Flaherty is classified. In our continuing inquiry into this matter, attempts will be made to identify document, determine whether it contains classified information and ascertain whether or not a violation of Federal statutes exists.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That contact be maintained with the Philadelphia Office to insure that the desired information concerning Thweat's niece be expeditiously obtained. If she agrees to cooperate, she will be immediately interviewed and pertinent information obtained furnished, via established liaison channels, to the Department, CIA, and Senators Church and Tower. Appropriate field offices will be instructed to conduct necessary investigation to corroborate the information and to determine if a possible violation of Federal statutes has been committed.

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75'
62-116395

2. If Thweat's niece declines cooperativeness, pertinent information obtained thus far will, in memorandum form concealing identity of source, be furnished via established liaison channels to the Department, CIA, and Senators Church and Tower. Additionally, a lead will be sent to the Memphis Office to interview Professor Katz at the University of Vanderbilt in an attempt to corroborate the allegation.

TJM

This should be discussed with department first
Jma

WRW

JAM

contact Dept.

I agree - First contact Dept.
KH

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ADDENDUM PAUL L. MACK/mah 8/5/75

The Intelligence Division advised Philadelphia Office telephonically informed FBIHQ on 8/5/75 that Thweat had returned to Philadelphia from seeing his niece and indicated she would talk to the FBI on the condition that she would go to Philadelphia about 8/22/75 to talk to the Agent who is a personal friend of Thweat and to whom he initially confided the information regarding this matter. Philadelphia was advised in view of the time lag a more preferable alternative would be for WFO Agents to contact the niece or as another alternative the Philadelphia Agent would travel to Washington, D. C., to conduct the interview. Philadelphia was requested to expeditiously recontact Thweat concerning the above possibilities.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]NMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. E. Walsh
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO :Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/TJL

DATE: 7/31/75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

FROM :W. O. Cregar WOC TJM

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is to recommend that the Administrative Division provide a copy of the Foreign Operations Policy Manual, to be reviewed by the Intelligence Division before presentation to the SSC for its review.

The 7/28/75 communication from the SSC contains on page 4, request IV C, which asks for "The Manual for the Legal Attaches." The SSC requested access to this Manual for the purpose of "access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975."

This Manual will not be delivered to the SSC for its permanent retention at this time, however, the SSC may later request the copy for its permanent retention. This Manual should be reviewed by the Liaison Section, Intelligence Division, prior to being made available to the SSC and if necessary, deletions from the Manual will be made and the SSC will be advised of the general nature of the deletions.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Administrative Division make available to the Intelligence Division one copy of the Foreign Operations Policy Manual for review prior to its being made available to the SSC.

WRW/TJL REC-102 62-116395 500

RLM:mam
(6)
RLM

AUG 11 1975

Manual #10 issued to Robert R. Moore 7-31-75

5-Phillips

#MOR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP-2 ALM/TTG

84 AUG 13 1975

File #:

62-116464

Serial Scope:

212 - Bulky

ORIGINAL WORK

COPY

Volume I

10/22/75

HSC

request

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT: SAM JAFFE
CBS NEWS

DATE: September 28, 1959

CONFIDENTIAL

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

105-28333

On September 25, 1959, Jaffe, who is a good friend of the Bureau and who did two radio shows on the New York Office, came by and talked with Kemper. (u)

Jaffe has been on the Khrushchev trip, and he said it was the most hectic thing he has ever had to do in his life. He said there was no question about Khrushchev's anger in Los Angeles and that one of the aides told him, "Don't be surprised if the old man doesn't suddenly get up and go home." He said the security of Khrushchev was badly handled and that Roswell Garst, Coon Rapids, Iowa, the millionaire farmer, is no more than a publicity seeker and is a real "corn ball." (c)

He said one amusing thing happened in San Francisco. At about 7:15 in the morning Khrushchev decided to take a walk and, apparently, caught his bodyguards flatfooted. He headed down the street with the guards streaming out the doors behind him, some of them buttoning their clothes as they ran.

Jaffe is trying to get back to Russia (CBS lost their correspondents after the television show that was critical of Stalin, et al.) and he has been working with people at the embassy to try and get back. He said that he wanted to go back and have a television interview with Khrushchev on his reaction to his trip and that he had been in touch with Viktor Osipov, who is a second secretary in the embassy and attached to the Cultural Section. He said that at the reception at the embassy on Thursday night, Osipov told him to submit his list of questions and he would see what they could do about getting him to Moscow to interview Khrushchev.

Jaffe said that he felt that the over-all trip by Khrushchev would be beneficial, particularly in case of a hot war because Khrushchev, having seen the country and the people, may hesitate before "pushing the button."

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

REC- 62

EX 105

3 - 43

12 OCT 2 1959

1 - Mr. Belmont

ECK:cag (3)

auto Copy 10-5-59

DIRECTOR, FBI (134-7963) 9/10/59

SAC, NEW YORK (134-3772) CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

(C) CONF. INFT.

[illegible]

Remylet, 6/23/59.

Subject continues to reside at [redacted], [redacted]) NYC, and is employed as a [redacted] by [redacted]. (C)

Subject has not begun to take Russian language instructions as yet since she cannot take a regularly scheduled course because of her work schedule and she has not, as yet, been able to make definite plans for private instruction, although she has arranged for same. The private instruction would be given by a Columbia University instructor, Miss [redacted], on whom there is a closed SM-C case in NY. The private instruction would not preclude subject's associating with other Russian language students since it would be given at Columbia University and Miss [redacted] would have various contacts among such students. (C)

On 9/2/59, subject stated she was entirely willing to accompany [redacted] to parties he will be invited to, given by the Diplomatic establishments in NYC; [redacted] had expressed a willingness to take a female who is cooperating with the NYO to such parties. A meeting of subject and this informant cannot be arranged until 9/21/59, when both are scheduled to be available, and it is anticipated that subject will be in contact with the Soviets at some of the parties which will be given during the forthcoming 14th Session of the UNGA. [redacted] has a pleasing personality and makes a good appearance; she should be well received at such gatherings. (C)

(2) - Bureau (134-7963)
1 - New York (134-3772) (ADM)

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

RWH:pfm
(3)

[illegible]

NOT RECORDED
159 SEP 1959

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

[redacted] is an intelligent stable person and there is no reason to question her reliability. It is felt that she will be of value to the [redacted] Program. (C)

The Bureau will be kept advised of developments.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Mem...dum • UNITED ·OVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: September 3, 1959

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT: [illegible] [redacted]

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

This morning Kemper took a call from Mr. Sam Jaffe, CBS News--Television, New York, Plaza 1-2345, Extension 7801. He wanted to know if it would be possible to interview the Director in connection with the current juvenile delinquency problem in New York City. Kemper told Jaffe that the Director had a firm policy in not injecting himself into local matters; and accordingly, the Director could not comply with this request. (u)

Jaffe then wanted to know if it would be possible to interview SAC Foster on the problem of juvenile delinquency, but that this interview would be general in nature and would not refer to the specific New York problem, but would cover the broad national picture. (u)

Kemper advised Jaffe that again it would be injecting the FBI into the local situation, and we did not deem this advisable. Jaffe agreed. Kemper called SAC Foster and alerted him to Jaffe's call and explained to him the reasons. Foster said that he would be alert to keeping out of the situation as it developed in New York. (u)

RECOMMENDATION:

REC- 13

105-22333-42

For information.

20 SEP 4 1959

1 - Mr. Jones

ECK:jrf
(3)

SEP 10 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office M dum • UNITE GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W.C.Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 8/19/59

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

SUBJECT: CONF. INFT. [redacted] [redacted]

During interview with informant on 8/11/59, informant showed interviewing agents a letter which he received from the Director, dated 7/13/59, expressing appreciation for the fine presentation made by informant of fire arms in the NYO in a five minute filmed sequence on CBS's Saturday News Special. Informant said that he was very proud of the letter he received from the Director and that he showed it to his Managing Editor, JOHN P. DAY. DAY, in turn, complimented informant on a job well done and told him he should be proud of this letter.

EX-PROC

33

② - Bureau (105-28333)(RM)
1 - New York (134-3315)(ADM)

REC-43 105-28333-4

EFG:vad
(3)

~~Classified by~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category~~
~~Date of Declassification~~

12 SEP 1 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Me dum • UNITED OVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 8/19/59

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

CONF. INFT.

SUBJECT: [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

Re NY let 4/27/59.

a. Residence and Employment

No change.

b. Current Membership in Subversive Organizations

Not applicable.

c. Summary of Information Furnished During Pertinent Period

Informant has continued to associate with numerous Soviet and Satellite Nationals in NYC in connection with his employment as a news reporter with the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). He has had lunch with them, has attended social affairs at their UN Delegations and at the UN and in connection with his employment as a news reporter he has been in touch with members of the Soviet Bolshoi Ballet while it was in NY. He was also in contact with members of the Soviet Fair Committee while they were in NY in connection with the Soviet Exhibition of Science, Culture and Technology, which was exhibited at the NY Coliseum. (C)

During his contacts with Soviet and Satellite Nationals informant has learned information about individuals, Soviet and Satellite personalities, which he has passed on to the Bureau. He has been able to ascertain some information with respect to the travel of these individuals and in some cases has been able to ascertain the reason for the return to Russia of some Soviet Nationals. (C)

② - Bureau (105-28333)(RM)
1 - New York (134-3315)(ADM) REC-57 105-28333-40

EFG:vad
(3)

4 AUG 21 1959

Classified by 61306
Exempt from GDS, Category 2(3)
Date of Declassification Indefinite

58 AUG 31 1959

Informant is occasionally able to furnish the identity of an individual in contact with a Soviet or Satellite National and can sometimes furnish the identity of individuals in attendance at social functions given by Soviet or Satellite UN representatives. (C)

Much of the information furnished by informant would not come to the attention of the Bureau were it not for informant. (U)

d. Amount Paid for Services and Expenses by Month

Not applicable. U

e. Type and Number of Meetings Attended and Other Activity

Not applicable. U

f. Number of Written and Oral Reports Submitted

Nine oral reports on the following dates:

4/28/59
5/12/59
5/28/59
6/3/59
6/18/59
6/23/59
7/7/59
7/13/59
8/11/59

U

g. Information Furnished of Unusual Value

On 5/28/59, informant advised that an employee of the CBS received a letter from PETR BORISSOV in which BORISSOV (C offered to pay all of this employee's expenses while he visited Russia, if this employee would pay his expenses to Russia. Informant advised that this individual met BORISSOV at the UN while BORISSOV was employed there in the Department of Public Information. Since BORISSOV's return to Russia this employee was apparently in contact with him according to informant. Informant got this information secondhand and was not able to furnish this individual's name until 7/7/59. On 7/21/59 [redacted], a Research Analyst on the staff of the CBS, appeared at the NYO and furnished information concerning his association with PETR BORISSOV, known Soviet Agent. [redacted] is identical with the individual about whom informant furnished information and he is now being considered for development as an informant or double agent. He is going to Russia. (C)

On 6/3/59, as a result of his contacts with Soviet Nationals, informant was able to shed some light on the rather sudden departure of VADIM BOGOSLOVSKI, Protocol Officer at the Soviet UN Delegation. Through his contacts among Soviet Nationals he learned that BOGOSLOVSKI was having family troubles and on 8/11/59, he learned that BOGOSLOVSKI did not expect to return to the US because of these family troubles. (C)

On 7/7/59, informant advised that IMRE HOLLAI, Counselor of the Hungarian Delegation to the UN, was spending a vacation at Cape Cod in Massachusetts. HOLLAI is a known Hungarian Agent and this was the first information to come to the attention of this office concerning his travel to Cape Cod. This information resulted in appropriate investigation of HOLLAI in Cape Cod. (C)

h. Approximate Number of Persons on Whom Informant Furnished Coverage and Their Importance

Approximately 28 individuals connected with the UN or Delegations to the UN. Many of these are known agents of the Soviets or the Satellites. (C)

i. Informant's Potential for Advancement

Informant possesses good potential for advancement in the Soviet and Satellite field. He is aggressive and very capable of injecting himself into circles in which he has not been acquainted in the past on the basis of his occupation as a news reporter. To date, his aaquaintance among Soviet and Satellite Nationals has been widening continuously. (C)

j. Stability and Reliability

Informant's association with Soviet Nationals has been verified by sources of all types. The information he has furnished concerning Soviet Nationals has on many occasions been substantiated by information obtained from other sources. To date, information furnished by informant has been accurate and he has proved reliable in his dealings with this office. (C)

Informant has not shown any sign of instability. He has, however, experienced marital difficulties during the past 8 months, which have caused him great concern. On 8/11/59, informant advised that his marital difficulties have about been resolved and his wife will obtain a divorce in the immediate future. Informant and his wife have reached an agreement in connection with their divorce. (U)

k. Indoctrination Against Disclosure

Informant is most security conscious and has repeatedly stated that if it became known that he was furnishing information to the Bureau on a confidential basis his career as a news reporter would be jeopardized. Informant has been repeatedly advised of the necessity for maintaining the fact that he is furnishing information to the Bureau on a confidential basis in strictest confidence in the interest of the Bureau as well as himself. (U)

NY 134-3315

1. All Necessary Action Taken on Information Furnished

(U)

Information furnished by informant has been properly disseminated.

It is recommended that informant be continued.

ok

Subject - Samuel Adas is CBS news reporter. He has ha ve official news-gathering contacts w ts since 1951. He has been furnishing on concerning Soviets at UN since separated from his wife 1-30-59. On 7-7-59 he advised his wife threatened to tell Soviets of his relationship with Bureau. In view of his official contacts with Bureau, we recommended NY be allowed to maintain contact with subject. On 7-17-59 subject's wife advised NYO she will never tell Soviets or any one else of her husband's relationship to FBI.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

(of Mailing)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)(ADM)

RE : [redacted]
CONF. INFT.

ReNYairtel, 7/8/59.

Informant's wife voluntarily stopped at the NYO on 7/17/59. She said that in the course of a discussion with informant she said something to cause informant to think that she was going to tell the Russians that he was talking to the FBI. She said that informant was quite concerned about this and she presumed that the Bureau would also be concerned. (C)

Informant's wife said that it was at her insistence that informant first called this office to advise that they were seeing the Russians. Therefore, she was aware that informant did furnish information to the FBI about the Russians. (C)

Informant's wife went on to say that she wanted to assure the Bureau that she will never tell the Russians or anyone else that informant has furnished information about the Russians to the FBI. Furthermore, she said that she has not mentioned this to anyone including her attorney. (C)

EX. - 124

③ Bureau (105-28333)(RM)
1- NY 134-3315 (ADM)

REC- 77

EFG:ras
(5)

Classified by 6136
Category 2-3

JUL 20 1959

INT. SEC.

Approved: ______ Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 7/17/59

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

NY 134-3315

Informant's wife was briefly acquainted with the Bureau's interest in the Soviets as this interest stems from the Bureau's jurisdiction in matters involving the internal security of the US. At the same time her attention was called to recent publicity appearing in the "NY Herald Tribune" about the Bureau's interest in the Soviets. She was also told that the Bureau wanted to be sure that its interest in the Soviets in no way interfered with the United Nations in its efforts to achieve the very worthy aims and purposes for which it was formed. (C)

Informant's wife was most pleasant while at the New York Office and this office does not anticipate that any problems will arise in the handling of informant in the future as a result of his marital problems. (U)

Developments in this matter will be called to the Bureau's attention. (U)

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

69747

July 13, 1959

Mr. Sam Jaffe
CBS-TV News
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Jaffe:

Please accept my sincere congratulations regarding your fine presentation of FBI firearms training at Peekskill, New York, which was televised on "The Saturday News With Harry Reasoner." Your confidence and support are deeply appreciated, and you may be sure my associates in our New York Office considered it a pleasure to be of assistance.

(u)

MAILED 25
JUL 14 1959
COMM-FBI

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

1 - New York [redacted]

REC- 79 / -28333-38

NOTE: Bufiles reflect that Jaffe has been most cooperative in the past. He is separated from his wife. Bufiles contain no information to preclude this letter. Also see letter of same date to SAC, Foster of the New York Office. Jaffe is a security informant of the New York Office ([redacted]). In view of his nationwide broadcast regarding his contact with the FBI in connection with the program, it is not believed that the above letter will compromise his position.

GEM:td
(5)

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
DeLoach ____
McGuire ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

[redacted]

JUL 16 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Men um • UNITED OVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Linton

TO : A. H. Belmont
FROM : W. A. Branigan
DATE: July 13, 1959

CONFIDENTIAL

Malmfeldt
10:30-7-13-59

DeLoach
McGuire
W.C. Sullivan

Tolson ___
Boardman ___
Belmont ___
Mohr ___
Nease ___
Parsons ___
Rosen ___
Tamm ___
Trotter ___
W.C. Sullivan ___
Tele. Room ___
Holloman ___
Gandy ___

CONF. INFT.
SUBJECT: [redacted]

Subject, Samuel Adason Jaffe, is Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) newsreporter. He has had extensive contact with Soviets in official news-gathering capacity since 1951. He has written articles for "The Nation." He was interviewed 9/12/58 and since that date has been furnishing information concerning his contact with four known Soviet-Satellite intelligence agents as well as other Soviet officials. Subject has been cooperative and participated in making a film for CBS in the New York Office in 1957. On 7/11/59 CBS TV carried a program during which subject narrated FBI firearms and defensive tactics. (C)

BRAN

Subject has been having marital difficulties and has been living apart from his wife since 1/30/59. On 7/7/59 subject advised that his wife had retained an attorney and desired to obtain a divorce as soon as possible. Subject has also retained an attorney. Subject's wife refused to agree to a property settlement and on 6/30/59 threatened to tell the Soviets that subject is working with the FBI. Subject has indicated that he is concerned about this in view of the adverse effect it might have on his news career. Subject has been security conscious and in his news gathering capacity has had numerous official contacts with the FBI. Subject stated that his wife has knowledge of his contacts with the Bureau and with the Soviets. She does not know that subject has been furnishing information to the Bureau. Subject believes his wife may be making idle threats or may be making this statement in order to harm subject. (C)

Subject is not involved in any intelligence operation. He does furnish good information concerning plans and thinking of top Soviet personnel at the United Nations. The New York Office has recommended that we continue contact with subject and not take steps to contact subject's wife, subject having indicated that he does not feel that his wife will carry out her threats. It is pointed out that subject has good official reasons to contact both the Soviets and the Bureau, and in view of his desire for security in connection with his reporting career, it appears we can safely continue contact with him. (C)

- 28333 - 37

RECOMMENDATION:

EX - 12A REC- 60

8 JUL 15 1959

No further action at this time. New York will be allowed to maintain contact with the subject.

LML:bwd. (5)
105-28333

57 JUL 21 1959

6/30

5 Branigan

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 7/8/59

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W.C.Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

CONF. INF.

[redacted]

As of 1/30/59, informant and his wife separated and have been living apart since that date. (U)

Informant was interviewed on 7/7/59, at which time he advised that his wife has shown no inclination to obtain a divorce in a hurry until recently. He said that she has recently engaged the services of GEORGE KENNAN HOURWICH, Attorney, 14 Wall St., NYC. Informant has engaged the legal services of CHARLES H. LIEB, 19 Rector St., NYC. (U)

Indices of this office do not contain any references which can be identified with LIEB. They do contain several references concerning HOURWICH. (U)

"Who's Who of Russian Travellers for 1936," published by the OPEN ROAD, INC., 8 West 40th St., NYC, lists Mr. and Mrs. GEORGE HOURWICH, 55 East 86th St., NYC, as "independent travellers" in the Soviet Union for the year 1936. (U)

REC- 60

3-Bureau (105-28333) (RM)
1-New York (134-3315)

EFG:rmv
(5)

EX. - 124

23 JUL ~~10~~ 15 1959

INT. SEC.

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 7/8/59

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ______ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

NY 134-3315

LOUIS F. BUDENZ has described OPEN ROAD, INC., as a Communist created travel organization used in connection with securing transportation for Comrades between the U.S. and Russia. (u)

"Who's Who in American Jewry" for the year 1938 to 1939, indicates that GEORGE KEENAN HOURWICH was born in Washington, D.C., on 11/19/04, attended Harvard University, Auslander Institute (Berlin), Sorbonne University (Paris) and Fordham University. (u)

HOURWICH was the Secretary of READEX MICROPRINT CORP., [redacted]. This firm was in contact with Soviet and satellite officials and when officers of this firm were interviewed, they were cooperative. However, HOURWICH was not interviewed. (c)

Report of SA FRANCIS X. PLANT, dated 1/10/45, in the case entitled, [redacted]" reflects that the subject of this case walked into the office of the law firm in which HOURWICH was a partner on 11/1/44. [redacted], an Attorney, was an associate of ARTHUR ADAMS, prominent Soviet Espionage figure in the 1940s. (c)

HOURWICH was also attorney for JOSEPH ISRAELS and had power of Attorney over ISRAELS' bank account, according to information set forth in the report of SA T. SCOTT MILLER, dated 3/7/47, at N.Y., captioned, [redacted] (c)

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge   Sent ______ M   Per ______

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 7/8/59

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

NY 134-3315

HOURWICH was also a contact of the League of American Artists and Writers. (u)

Informant advised that through her attorney, his wife has expressed a desire to obtain a divorce immediately. Informant has agreed to give his wife a divorce providing she will give him $11,000 in bearer bonds, $5,000 for furniture in their apartment and pay attorney fees as well as agree to let informant see his children frequently. To this his wife has refused to agree. (u)

On June 30, 1959, informant met his wife to discuss the matter of a settlement. During this discussion, informant's wife threatened to ruin informant at CBS (his employer), tell his children that he married her for her money when they grow up and to tell the Russians that he is working with the FBI. Informant said that he considered these to be idle threats on the part of his wife; however, he was very concerned about the effect his wife's threats would have on his career as a news reporter if she carried them out. Informant pointed out that he is very anxious to travel to Russia and China and possibly represent CBS in one of these countries at some future time. He said that he would never be permitted to travel to these countries if his wife ever said anything to the Russians about his talking to the FBI. (C)

Informant has always been most security conscious about the possibility of it becoming known that he was furnishing information to the Bureau. However, as a news reporter with CBS, he has had open contact with this office (C)

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 7/8/59

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

---

since at least 10/30/57, when he and a CBS camera crew made a feature film in the NYO. Informant said that his wife has been aware of the fact that he has been in contact with the Bureau and that he has been in contact with the Russians. However, she does not know that he has been furnishing information to the Bureau about the Russians on a continuing basis. Informant agreed that she may have assumed that he is doing this or that her threat to tell the Soviets that he is talking to the FBI indicated she would do this even if it were not true, in order to harm informant. (C)

The voluntary aspect of informant's cooperation was called to informant's attention, as well as the fact that his cooperation must be on a strictly confidential basis at all times. Informant acknowledges that this had been repeatedly called to his attention. He was then asked if he wanted to continue to furnish information to the Bureau. Informant said that he has great respect for the Bureau and he feels duty bound to continue to furnish information to the Bureau about the Soviets. However, he reiterated a statement he has made in the past to the effect that he could not do anything other than furnish information. (C)

Informant was told to bear in mind that he has had open contacts with this office and if he ever has occasion to explain his contacts with the Bureau, to do so on the basis of his news reporting activities. It was also suggested to informant that he refrain from bringing up the threats made by his wife in conversation with her, particularly the threat about telling the Russians he is talking to the FBI. (C)

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 7/8/59

Transmit the following in ________________________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

NY 134-3315

OK

This office recommends that contact be continued with informant as he has furnished valuable information and is himself very security conscious and desirous of furnishing information to the Bureau. Consideration has been given to contacting informant's wife, however, this would only serve to confirm what she appears to have assumed and might possibly add impetus to the situation existing between informant and his wife. Should informant's wife carry out any or all of her threats, informant understands that his cooperation has been voluntary and will continue to be voluntary. Informant is of the opinion that his wife will not carry out her threats. (U)

This office will follow this matter closely and keep the Bureau advised. U

Approved: ________________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 5/21/59

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

CONF. INFT.

SUBJECT: [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

Informant was interviewed on 5/12/59 at which time he advised that it is fairly certain that he and his wife will be divorced and all possibilities of a reconciliation have been exhausted. Informant presumes that his wife will obtain the divorce in Reno, Nevada on a date as yet undetermined. Informant does not anticipate any scandal in connection with the divorce nor does he anticipate any publicity unless it results from the inability of he and his wife to resolve the problem of custody of their children. (U)

During this interview, the informant advised that he is still desirous of travelling to Red China as a news reporter and toward this end he has written to the Chinese Legation in London and forwarded three copies of "Face of Red China", a pamphlet prepared by CBS concerning a television presentation of the same name. In reply, he received a letter from the Third Secretary of the Chinese Legation, who advised him that he was forwarding two copies of "Face of Red China" to Peking and he was reapplying for a visa for the informant. (C)

The Bureau will be kept advised of developments in these matters. (U)

2 - Bureau (105-28333) (RM)
1 - New York (134-3315) (ADM)

EFG:jjs
(3)

Classified by 6136 Ad
Exempt from GDS Category 2
Date of Declassification indefinite

105-28333-34

14 MAY 25 1959

REC 18

60 JUN 2 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Men ....*um* • UNITED ....VERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 5/6/59

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

SUBJECT: CONF. INFT. [redacted]

The informant was interviewed on April 28, 1959, at which time he advised that he completed reading the article concerning the FBI in the October 18, 1958 issue of "The Nation". The informant said that he was very unimpressed with the content of the article and was, of course, well aware of the fact that it contained a mass of untrue information. (U)

However, the informant said that he was not personally acquainted with FRED J. COOK, the author, and could not possibly be aware of the motive COOK might have had for writing the article. The informant did express the opinion that COOK must have thought that an article such as this would benefit him financially although he does not know this to be true. (U)

However, the informant said that the article is indicative of the thinking of CAREY MC WILLIAMS, Editor of "The Nation", and "The Nation's" Publisher, GEORGE G. KERSTEIN. The informant expressed the belief that MC WILLIAMS and KERSTEIN would publish any article which attacked the Bureau, the House on Un-American Activities Committee, and almost any other government organization. (U)

This office has considered obtaining a signed statement of cooperation from the informant. It is not believed that it would be advisable to obtain such a signed statement from the informant, inasmuch as the informant is a news reporter employed by the Columbia Broadcasting System. OK

Copy detached Crime Records DGH/mlw

2- Bureau (105-28333) (CRM)
1- New York (134-3315) (ACM)

EFG:mav
(3)

REC-82

105-28333-33

21 MAY 8 1959

55 MAY 15 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memo m • UNITED S OVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 4/27/59

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: [redacted]

~~CONF. INFT.~~

a. Residence and Employment

Informant resides in Apartment 1F, 345 E. 62nd Street, NYC, telephone number TE 8-0881. He is employed as a news reporter by the Columbia Broadcasting Systemy (CBS), in NYC. (U)

b. Current Membership in Subversive Organizations

Not applicable. U

c. Summary of Information Furnished During Pertinent Period

Since informant was initially interviewed on 9/12/58, he has furnished information about Soviet nationals in the NYC area, and information concerning several representatives of other Eastern Bloc countries, and representatives of Arabian and Indian Delegations to the UN. (C)

The informant has been particularly friendly with NIKOLAI S. KALININ, translator assigned tot the UN Secretariat. He has been able to furnish information with respect to some of KALININ's acquaintances and some of KALININ's activities, as well as information with respect to conversations he has had with KALININ occasionally concerning other Soviet nationals. As a result of informant's numerous contacts among individuals at the UN, in NYC, he has been able to furnish information concerning comments made by these individuals ~~at~~ concerning current affairs, as well as some information with respect to their contacts, travels, and activities. (C)

2-Bureau (105-28333)(RM)
1-New York (134-3315)(ADM)

EFG:vmk
(3)

REC- 75

105-28333-32

24 APR 30 1959

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification

TWO

67 MAY 13 1959

d. Amount Paid for Services and Expenses by Mont

Not applicable. (U)

e. Type and Number of Meetings Attended, and Oth Activity

Not applicable. (U)

f. Number of Written and Oral Reports Submitted

Sixteen oral reports on the following dates:

9/12/58 (Initial interview)
11/6/58
11/12/58
12/4/58
12/10/58
12/31/58
1/9/59
1/12/59
1/22/59
1/26/59
2/12/59
2/24/59
2/25/59
3/12/59
3/25/59
4/8/59

(C)

g. Information Furnished of Unusual Value

On 11/6/58, the informant furnished information with respect to the conduct of VLADIMIR P. SUSLOV at a reception at the Czechoslovak UN Delegation, on 10/10/58. The informant advised that SUSLOV became quite intoxicated during this reception, and while intoxicated became amorous with two females present, one of whom is Secretary to the Pakhistan Ambassador to the UN. Subsequent to this interview, informant was able to ascertain this female's name as BERTHA SAUNDERS. (C)

DENTIAL

NY 134-3315

On 11/6/58, informant advised that during lunch which he had with VLADIMIR B. BARKOVSKY, BARKOVSKY asked informant to consider writing his analysis of the American political situation for BARKOVSKY, and BARKOVSKY told him that he would be paid for doing this. (C)

On 12/10/58, informant advised that BARKOVSKY, with whom he was in contact on 12/5/58, showed an interest on that date in having informant ascertain through his father, the identity of business concerns on the West Coast of the US that feel trade with China would be advantageous. (C)

Informant has furnished voluminous information concerning Soviet and satellite personel with whom he is acquainted, which would not have come to the Bureau's attention were it not for informant. (C)

On 9/12/58, informant mentioned that the CBS monitors police and Fire Department radio transmissions, and has occasionally monitored FBI radio transmissions for the purpose of obtaining possible leads for news stories. He said that FBI transmissions have never been monitored successfully as far as such leads are concerned, and in view of the unproductiveness of this, FBI transmissions are monitored very infrequently. U

h. Approximate Number of Persons on Whom Informant Furnished Coverage and Their Importance

Approximately 28 individuals connected with the UN or Delegates to the UN. Included among these individuals are the following known intelligence agents: (C)

VADIMIR B. BARKOVSKY - Soviet
BORIS N. IVANOV - Soviet
VALDIMIR N. KRESTYANOV - Soviet
NIKOLAI S. KALININ - Soviet

See NY let to Bu
4-15-59 - (Bu file)
100-418-34-295
which indicates
informant still
being handled
as necessary
information.
jmv 5-8-59

VLADIMIR G. KRASOVSKI - Soviet
V VLADIMIR P. SUSLOV - Soviet
RAYMOND VIANU - Hungarian
IMRE HOLLAI - Hungarian

(C)

i. Informant's Potential for Advancement

Informant is in a good position to continually meet additional Soviet and satellite personnel, thereby increasing his value to the Bureau. (C)

j. Stability and Reliability

Information furnished by informant has been found to be reliable. Much of this information has been substantiated by other live sources who have, on occasion, furnished the same information as informant, or who have furnished information with respect to informant's contacts with individuals about whome he has subsequently furnished information. Information furnished by the informant with respect to movement of certain individuals have proved reliable, based upon known activities of these individuals. (U)

Informant has shown no signs of instability, however, informant does have personal problems involving marital difficulties which have caused him great concern of late. He has been separated from his wife since 1/30/59, and in spite of his desire to effect a reconciliation, his wife is not interested in this. No legal action has been started by informant or his wife, at this time, however, a divorce will probably be sought by informant's wife in the not too distant future. (U)

k. Indoctrination Against Disclosure

The informant has been repeatedly reminded of the necessity for keeping his relationship with the Bureau in strictest confidence. Informant in turn has repeatedly expressed utmost concern about the possibility that it might become known that he was furnishing information to the Bureau. Informant has said that if this became known, it would jeopardize his career as a news reporter. (U)

l. All Necessary Action Taken All Information Furnished

All information furnished by informant has been appropriately disseminated. (U)

m. Miscellaneous

Informant is desirous of travelling to Red China as a news reporter. In pursuit of this desire, he has directed communications to the Red Chinese Ambassador in London and made contacts with individuals who might assist him in obtaining a visa to visit China. He has mentioned this desire to Soviet nationals, and satellite nationals, and is pursuing his efforts to obtain a visa through all possible channels. (C)

In recent conversations with VADIMIR B. BARKOVSKY informant has discussed the matter of CBS representation in Russia. It is noted that in the not too distant past, a CBS representative in Moscow was expelled, and CBS has not had any representative there since. In conversations with BARKOVSKY, BARKOVSKY has suggested to informant that informant could travel to Russia as a tourist, and upon his return to the US, use material obtained for CBS broadcasts. The informant is pursuing the possibility of such a trip with his superiors at CBS. (C

Informant is still reading the article concerning the Bureau which appeared in the 10/18/58 issue of "The Nation". This article was given to informant on 2/12/59. When he completes this article, it is contemplated that informant's comments will be obtained. (U

(S)
CONF. INF.

This Office will, in the future, consider the informant to be a Security Informant, and he will be carried as [redacted]. Future communications in this matter will be appropriately captioned. (C

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-54487) 4/23/59

SAC, NEW YORK (134-2112)

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

CONF. INFT. NY 2524

ReNYlets to the Bureau, dated 4/10 and 4/13, respectively, and both captioned as above.

[redacted] is a Clerk in the Documents Section of the [redacted] Delegation to the UN, and has in the past been involved in a double agent operation with NIKOLAI S. KALININ, a Soviet national assigned to the UN Secretariate, NYC. (C)

On 4/20/59, [redacted] advised that he had seen KALININ at the Bar of the Delegates Lounge, at the UN, on 4/14/59. According to the informant, KALININ was seen with SAM JAFFE, a CBS News Reporter. [redacted] advised that JAFFE and KALININ are very friendly and the informant indicated he has seen these individuals together on a number of occasions for long periods of time. (C)

Informant advised he is not aware of the relationship which exists between JAFFE and KALININ. (C)

As the Bureau is aware, SAM JAFFE is [redacted] of the NYO and his identity must be protected. (C)

Informant indicated that KALININ noticed him at the bar in the Delegates Lounge and nodded in a friendly manner but did not suggest that [redacted] join him and JAFFE. (C)

In the opinion of the informant, KALININ has been a great deal more cordial and friendly with [redacted] since the informant approached the Soviet regarding the lack of intelligence activities between them. The results of this approach are set forth in referenced communication, dated 4/13/59. (C)

3 - Bureau (105-54487) (RM)
    1 - (105-32278) ([redacted])
1 - New York (105-9768) ([redacted])
1 - New York (134-3315) (JAFFE)
1 - New York (134-2112)

EJA:ecb
(6)

105-

NOT RECORDED
172 MAY 4 1959

6/31/75

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62 MAY 4 1959

The NYO will advise the Bureau of further activities (u) in this matter.

b 2

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office M ndum • UNITE GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 3/30/59

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

CONF. INFT.

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Heretofore info last par

ReNYlet, 3/3/59.

Informant was interviewed on 3/25/59, at which time he advised that his marital difficulties have not been resolved and in recent conversations with his wife she told him that she had been seeing another man while married to him. Informant does not know the identity of this other man and inspite of this he is still willing to reconcile his differences with his wife in the interests of his children. No legal action has been started by either informant or his wife, Although informant has considered seeking the advice of an attorney, he has not been able to effect a reconciliation in a reasonable time. (U)

Informant does not show any signs of instability and to date he has proven to be reliable. However, he does show some concern for his children and is obviously upset over his marital difficulties. This office will keep abreast of matters pertaining to difficulties between informant and his wife and the Bureau will be kept advised. (U)

NYlet to Bureau dated 2/16/59, reflects that the informant was given a copy of the 10/18/58 issue of "The Nation" on 2/12/59. This issue of this magazine contained an article concerning the FBI, written by FRED J. COOK, in an apparent effort to "smear" the Bureau. Informant has been contacted on several occasions since he was given this article to read and on both occasions he advised that he has not been able to complete this article. He has always requested permission to keep the article so that he might finish reading it. Comments concerning the article will be solicited from informant when he completes reading it and the Bureau will be advised. (U)

2 - Bureau (105-28333) (RM)
1 - New York (134-3315) (Admin.

REC- 44

EFG:gmg
(3)

EX-136

6136

18 APR 1 1959

INT. SEC.

APR 7 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 3/3/59

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, aka. (U)

ReNYlet, dated 2/16/59.

On 2/24/59, JAFFE was interviewed by SAS JOHN G. WILLIS and EDWARD F. GAMBER. On the occasion of this interview, JAFFE was furnished with a copy of the 10/18/58 issue of "The Nation", which contained an article about the FBI. When JAFFE is next interviewed, his reactions to this article will be obtained as well as any comments he might make concerning the author or staff of "The Nation". (U)

On 2/24/59, JAFFE advised that his marital difficulties have not been resolved and his wife has not instituted divorce proceedings as yet. He is still desirous of affecting a reconciliation and is making every effort to do this. He does not intend to make any effort to dissolve his marriage. JAFFE said that his wife is emotionally disturbed and in need of the services of a marriage counselor. He said that her difficulties stem from a childhood in which parental love and affection were lacking. He is interested in seeking professional treatment for her but could not obtain her cooperation. (U)

This matter will be followed closely by this office and the Bureau will be kept advised. (U)

CONF. INFT.

JAFFE has been assigned [redacted] to facilitate the handling of information furnished by him. Future communications in this matter will be captioned accordingly. (U)

2 - Bureau (105-28333) (RM)

1 - New York (134-3315) (ADMIN.)

EFG:mlm
(3)

REC- 75

105-28333-30

EX-130 MCT-42

50

12 MAR 5 1959

ESP. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 2/16/59

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, aka
PSI
IS - R

JAFFE was interviewed on 2/12/59, by SAS JOHN F. MABEY and EDWARD F. GAMBER. During this interview, JAFFE advised that as of 1/30/59, he moved out of the apartment which he and his family shared. He said that this move was made at the request of his wife, who told him that she no longer feels any affection for him. JAFFE stated that his wife is emotionally immature and that his marital difficulties do not stem from any other romantic interest on the part of his wife or himself. JAFFE sincerely hopes that he can effect a reconciliation and he exhibits very sincere concern for the welfare of his children. (U)

According to JAFFE, his wife intends to obtain a divorce, the grounds for which will probably be incompatibility. He has not as yet sought legal counsel and will not do so until such time as his wife makes some overt move. He is still very hopeful of effecting a reconciliation. (U)

This matter will be closely followed and the Bureau will be kept advised. (U)

~~Classified by~~ G136
~~Exempt from GDS, Category~~ 2
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

31

REC- 44 /[illegible]-29

1 FEB 1[illegible] 1959
20

2 - Bureau (105-28333) (RM)
2 - New York (134-3315)

EFG:gmg
(5)

68 FEB 20 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Me lum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 2/16/59

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, aka

DeLoach

ReBulet, 1/28/59.

JAFFE was interviewed by SAS JOHN F. MABEY and EDWARD F. GAMBER on 2/12/59. (JAFFE's identity should be protected.) As usual, JAFFE was most pleasant and cooperative. (U)

During the interview, JAFFE was casually asked if he had read the article about the FBI in the 10/18/58 issue of "The Nation." The introduction of this topic into the interview was very casual and the exact date of the issue in which the article appeared was not actually mentioned. JAFFE said that he did not read this article nor had he heard about the article. Interviewing Agents then told JAFFE that the article was written in an apparent effort to "smear" the Bureau. The Agents commented that the Bureau always welcomes constructive criticism and upon receipt of same, has always taken expeditious steps to make any warranted changes in its operations. However, the article appearing in "The Nation" contained no constructive criticism and in fact, the criticism contained therein was based on untruths, erroneous conclusions, and biased innuendoes. (U)

JAFFE said that he would like very much to read this article and asked who the author was. When the name of FRED J. COOK was mentioned, it meant nothing to JAFFE, but when JAFFE was told that COOK wrote for the "New York World Telegram and Sun," he expressed amazement. Interviewing Agents expressed idle interest in knowing whatever provoked the writing and publication of such an article and this evoked from JAFFE the comment that CAREY MC WILLIAMS, editor of "The Nation," was undoubtedly the moving factor behind such an article appearing in "The Nation." He said that CAREY MC WILLIAMS is violently anti-Bureau, was anti-"McCarthy", is anti-House Un-American Activities (U)

cc detached [illegible]
2 - Bureau (105-28333) (RM)
2 - New York (134-3315)

REC- 91

28

EFG:gmg
(2)
3

EX-100

FEB 19 1959

ESP. SECD

Committee, anti-Secretary of State JOHN FOSTER DULLES, and anti just about everything. He said that MC WILLIAMS is a fanatical and extreme liberal. (C)

JAFFE hastened to explain during this conversation that he was never a staff employee of "The Nation" but that he was employed by "The Nation" on a temporary basis. He said that he has not had any contact with "The Nation" or its employees or officials since he left his temporary employment with this publication. However, when JAFFE went to work at the Columbia Broadcasting System, where he is now employed as a news reporter, he gave CAREY MC WILLIAMS as a reference. (C)

In a further discussion of "The Nation", JAFFE said that "The Nation" was at one time published by FREIDA KIRSHWAY, but that she now acts in an advisory capacity to this publication. She sold the publication to an individual named KERSTEIN, according to JAFFE, and JAFFE believes that this individual is associated with the Federated Department Stores in Boston, Mass. It is JAFFE's belief that this man's resources provide the sole source of financial backing for "The Nation." (C)

"The Nation" lists as its publisher GEORGE G. KERSTEIN.

[redacted] is the subject of Bureau file 100-998. [redacted]. (C)

In connection with our interest in learning who is behind the "smear campaign," highlighted by the article appearing in the 10/18/58 issue of "The Nation," this office is going to make a copy of this issue available to JAFFE so that he can read it. In this way, it is felt that further comments from JAFFE concerning the article and the people behind "The Nation" will be spontaneously brought forth in subsequent interviews with him. (C)

Inquiry concerning "The Nation" was made during an interview with JAFFE which encompassed some casual conversation, as well as inquiry concerning his association with Soviet nationals. JAFFE's reaction to the casual inquiry about "The Nation" was such that no possible embarrassment to the Bureau can result. He is most cooperative and anxious to assist the Bureau. (C)

The Bureau will be kept advised.

[redacted]

1 - Mr. Ne
1 - Mr. Be
1 - Mr. Br
1 - Mr. Ha
1 - Mr. Li

[redacted]

EX-101

SAC, New York (134-3315)

January 28, 1959

REC-27

Director, FBI (105-28333) - 25

CONFIDENTIAL

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, aka.

[redacted]

Reurlet dated January 15, 1959.

Authority granted to continue contacts with Jaffe for development as a potential security informant. This should be handled in accordance with Section 107, Manual of Instructions.

The Bureau considers subject to be of interest to the Soviets and has authorized continued contact with him in view of his apparent potential as a source against the Soviets. The Bureau has followed closely information furnished by Jaffe and it appears he is progressing satisfactorily and is in a logical position to furnish us information of interest concerning our coverage of the Soviets. It is desired that this phase of his development be carefully followed on a continuing basis.

The Bureau has been alert to the potential value that subject might have since the publication of the article "The FBI" in the October 18, 1958, issue of "The Nation." In view of subject's cooperation with the Bureau and his respect for, interest in and appreciation of the confidential nature of the Bureau's work, you are authorized to discreetly and tactfully bring up the subject of "The Nation" in an early contact with subject for the purpose of determining his reaction to the above article. If Jaffe appears inclined to discuss this article, you should guide the discussion in the initial interview or subsequent contacts to ascertain who on "The Nation" staff is behind the "smear campaign" highlighted by above article. Two experienced agents familiar with press relations matters should handle interview when "The Nation" is first brought up. Obviously, at least one Agent must be one who has handled the development of Jaffe but in view of possible ramifications Bureau desires both be conversant with over-all need for good press relations.

MAILED 4
JAN 28 1959
COMM-FBI

1 - 61-901
1 - 100-376393

Classified by
Exempt from GDS Category 2-3
Date of Declassification

NOTE: See memo Branigan to Belmont 1/27/59, same caption, LWL:s

LWL:hrt:clb
(11)

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

DeLoach
McGuire
W.C. Sullivan

66 FEB 17 1959

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Mem um • UNITED OVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, aka.

DATE: January 27, 1959

1 - Mr. Nease
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Hanning
1 - Mr. Linton

CONFIDENTIAL

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Nease ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

DeLoach
McGuire
W.C. Sullivan

Subject is Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) news reporter. He has had extensive contact with Soviets in official capacity since 1951. He traveled in Asia, including Red China, interviewed Red China's Premier Chou-En-lai in 1955. He wrote five articles in "The Nation" from 1951-55. He was interviewed by Bureau Agents 1-3-56 at his request. He participated in making a film for CBS in the New York Office in 1957. He was cooperative. He was interviewed 9-12-58 after Bureau approval to determine his attitude toward cooperation with Bureau concerning his knowledge and contact of Soviets in New York. He has been contacted and furnished significant information on seven occasions since that time. (C)

In response to Bulets 11-21-58 and 12-2-58 authorizing continued contact with Jaffe to further his development and alerting New York to possibility of obtaining information from Jaffe concerning "The Nation," New York, by letter 1-15-59, has indicated that they believe that in view of subject's cooperation and reaction to our contact with him, they can discreetly and tactfully bring up the subject of "The Nation" in the course of a conversation with Jaffe. (C)

Subject is acquainted with four known Soviet-satellite intelligence agents. He has furnished information concerning an additional two Soviet officials. He is still interested in traveling to Red China and in his contacts with the New York Office, he has indicated that he will keep confidential his relationship with the Bureau and does not expect favors as a result of cooperation furnished. His uncle was formerly on the Security Index of the New York Office but was cooperative when interviewed by Bureau Agents. (C)

The New York Office requests Bureau permission to develop subject as a potential security informant and stated they will make no mention of "The Nation" without Bureau authority. (C)

94-4925 61-901 100-376393

UNRECORDED FILED IN

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, there is attached a letter to New York authorizing development of subject as a potential security informant and

Enclosure sent 1-28-59
105-28333
1 - Bufile (94-4925)
1 - Bufile (61-901)
1 - Bufile (100-376393)
LML:hrt
(8)

REC-13 105-28333-27

Classified by 6136 SR
Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

JAN 30 1959

5-Linton

26 FEB 4 1959

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
105-28333

further authorizing the New York Office to discreetly and tactfully bring up the subject of "The Nation" with Jaffe with the ultimate purpose being to determine the extent of his present or past knowledge of the staff of "The Nation" with the aim of identifying the individuals who may be responsible for the unfavorable publicity concerning the Bureau set forth in the 10-18-58 issue of "The Nation." (U).

O.K.

OK

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 1/15/59

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, aka.

ReNYlet, 11/4/58.

JAFFE was initially interviewed on 9/12/58, and subsequent to that time he was interviewed on 11/6, 12/12,4, 10,31/58 and 1/9/59. During these interviews he has been most cooperative, and has furnished information concerning numerous Soviet and Satellite Nationals with whom he is acquainted. His acquaintance with these people stems from his employment as a news reporter with the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), in which capacity he feels that he needs news sources in Soviet and Satellite circles. Included among his acquaintances are the following Soviet nationals: (C)

NIKOLAI S. KALININ, known Soviet intelligence agent.

VLADIMIR P. SUSLOV, known Soviet intelligence agent.

VLADIMIR B. BARKOVSKY, known Soviet intelligence agent.

VADIM A. BOGOSLOVSKI, potential Soviet defector.

(C)

cc 105-63845

BORIS N. IVANOV, press officer, Soviet UN Delegation.

In addition JAFFE is acquainted with RAYMOND VIANU, known Rumanian intelligence agent. (C)

copy detached

Classified by 613
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification

Bureau copy 2-13-59

REC-53

25

② - Bureau (105-28333) (RM)
1 - New York (134-3315)

4 JAN 16 1959

EFG:dmb
(3)

JAFFE is the recipient of invitations to social functions at the homes of Soviet nationals and at the Soviet UN Delegation. He in turn entertains Soviet nationals at his home. (C)

JAFFE's acquaintance with VLADIMIR B. BARKOVSKY is of such a nature that it might possibly result in a double agent operation. BARKOVSKY has made inquiry of JAFFE concerning individuals, groups and business firms on the West Coast of the United States who were interested in seeing trade restrictions placed on trade with Red China eased. JAFFE furnished some information concerning this to BARKOVSKY, and the extent to which BARKOVSKY's inquiries along this line will go are not as yet known. BARKOVSKY also asked JAFFE to put in writing his impressions and an analysis of the political scene in the US, and told JAFFE that he would pay him for doing this. JAFFE refused the offer. (C)

On 11/14/58, [redacted] advised that during the week prior to 11/14/58, JAFFE was sitting at a table in the North Delegate's lounge at the UN Secretariat in the company of ERNESTO DE LOSSA of the Panama Delegation to the UN and FRANK R. BEGLEY, a US staff member at the UN Secretariat. After leaving JAFFE and BEGLEY, DE LOSSA told source that BEGLEY warned him to be careful of JAFFE, because he was suspected of being a Communist. This is the only source from which any information was obtained indicating that JAFFE was suspected of being a Communist. Investigation did reveal that JAFFE was at one time a correspondent for "The Nation". (C)

Bulet 11/21/58, in instant matter, states that in any contacts which this office has with JAFFE, agents should be alert to any information indicating that he has contacts presently on the staff of "The Nation", or knowledge of any individuals employed therewith. This letter further states that prior to bringing (U) this subject up with JAFFE, recommendations regarding contact with JAFFE on this subject should be submitted to the Bureau upon completion of the remaining lead in the background investigation of subject. Bulet 12/2/58, sets forth information with respect to JAFFE's former association with "The Nation", and states that the letter is not intended to create the impression that this office should bring up the question of "The Nation" in its discussion with him. (U)

done by WFO let 1-15-59

The WFO has not as yet advised this office of the results of its check of CIA files for information concerning JAFFE. Accordingly, this office has not submitted any recommendation regarding contact with JAFFE concerning "The Nation". However, in the course of contacts with JAFFE, he has stated that in his employment with the CBS, he is prohibited from writing articles for any newspaper or magazine, or doing work for any other organization without the express permission of CBS. Therefore, it does not appear that JAFFE is presently affiliated with "The Nation" in any respect. (U)

It is obvious through conversations which interviewing agents have had with JAFFE that he has the utmost respect for the Bureau, and is extremely interested in the Bureau's work. He has had contacts with Bureau personnel on matters related to his position as a news reporter with CBS, and he has spoken of these contacts in a manner reflecting the utmost respect for the personnel with whom he has had contact. He shows a sincere appreciation for the confidential nature of the Bureau's work, and speaks of the very professional manner in which he has found Bureau agents conducting themselves as compared to representatives of other law enforcement agencies with whom he is in contact. (U)

If the Bureau so desires, this office believes that the subject of "The Nation" could be discreetly and tactfully brought up in the course of a conversation with JAFFE. This may then be discussed in a conversational vein serving the purpose of exploring JAFFE's present knowledge of the staff of "The Nation". This subject will not be brought up with JAFFE in the absence of Bureau permission. (U)

Every opportunity has been taken to acquaint JAFFE with the fact that his relationship with the Bureau must be held in strictest confidence at all times. JAFFE has made known the fact on repeated occasions that information which he furnishes to the Bureau must be handled in strictest confidence, since if it became known that he were furnishing information to the Bureau, his position as a news reporter would be jeopardized. JAFFE has been told to use the facilities of a public pay station when telephonically contacting this office, and that he should not have any personal contact at the NYO. However, these latter instructions were qualified to the extent that if in his position as a news reporter it is necessary for him to contact this office concerning matters other than those on which he is furnishing information to this office, he must of course feel free to do so. JAFFE has been told he is not to consider himself to be an employee of the Bureau and that his cooperation with the Bureau is to be on a voluntary basis at all times. The Bureau's labor policy was explained to JAFFE inasmuch as he is a member of a labor union. (U)

JAFFE has been told that under no circumstances would the fact that he is cooperating with the Bureau in furnishing information to the Bureau, place him in the position of receiving preferential treatment (U) when news releases were made by the Bureau. He was advised that an inquiry which he might make through this office in connection with his employment should be made through normal channels, and not through agents to whom he is furnishing information. JAFFE fully understands that he is not to be the recipient of any personal consideration in matters of public interest being investigated by the Bureau. Furthermore, he fully understands the necessity for this, and at no time has indicated that he expected to be the recipient of any personal favors. (C)

Inasmuch as JAFFE is being contacted on a rather regular basis, and has been found to be most cooperative, this office desires to take steps to develop him as a PSI. It is noted that some steps along this line have already been taken in order to capitalize on existing situations, as well as JAFFE's very favorable attitude concerning these situations. (U)

Bureau permission is requested for this office to develop JAFFE as a PSI. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Dinton

SAC, New York (134-3685) January 14, 1959

Director, FBI (134-New)

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

Reurlet dated January 7, 1959, requesting authority to conduct an initial interview with [redacted] for purpose of soliciting his cooperation and to determine his attitude toward the Bureau in connection with our [redacted] Program. Authority granted. (U)

Based on information available, Bufiles contain no identifiable information concerning subject. Your handling of this interview should be in accordance with pages 33-34, Section 105K, Manual of Instructions. (U)

1 - Bufile (105-28333) (Samuel Adason Jaffe) (U)

NOTE: Samuel Adason Jaffe, CBS reporter, [redacted], advised subject vice president [redacted] Corporation, has met three Soviets through Jaffe and subject plans to invite these Soviets to his home. Jaffe has indicated subject would cooperate with Bureau and respect our confidence in him. NY indices negative. Believed he should be interviewed to possibly increase our coverage of Soviets. (C)

LML:hrt
(5)

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification [illegible]

105-28333-
NOT RECORDED
71 JAN 2 1959

ORIGINAL FILED IN 134-7771-1

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
JAN 1959
MAILED

MB
JAN 23 1959

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1/12/59

AIRTEL

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-361863)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (65-15026)

[redacted]

Enclosed herewith are the original and four copies of a letterhead memorandum for the Bureau and one copy for San Francisco and Washington Field. (u)

This letterhead memorandum reflects information furnished by SAMUEL ABRAHAM JAFFE, News Reporter, CBS, NY (protect identity) to SA EDWARD F. GAMBER on 1/[illegible]/59. (C)

It has been classified confidential inasmuch as it reflects investigation of a Soviet national, which, because of its sensitive nature requires State Department approval. (C)

5-Bureau (100-361863) (Encs. 5) (RM)
(1 - Dfile 105-75023)([redacted]
(1 - Dfile 105-23333)(SAMUEL ABRAHAM JAFFE)
1-San Francisco (Info) (Encs. 1) (RM)
1-Washington Field (Info) (Encs. 1) (RM)
1-New York (105-33634) ([redacted])

1-New York (134-3315)
1-New York (65-15026)

LFJ:FMJ (#341)
(11)

61366-AS 263 1-2-6333

NOT RECORDED
151 JAN [illegible] 1959

ENCLOSURE

58 JAN 23 1959

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 1/0

NY 65-15026

In addition to information set forth in enclosed letterhead memorandum, JAFFE advised that CBS is making a motion picture film of MIKOYAN's visit to the US which will be given to MIKOYAN. This is an effort on the part of CBS to restore itself to the good graces of the Soviets. It is noted that CBS no longer has any representation in Moscow since their correspondent was forced to leave Moscow at the request of the Soviets. (C)

JAFFE told this to BARKOVSKY and asked BARKOVSKY if he could arrange an interview for him with MIKOYAN. BARKOVSKY told JAFFE that it would be impossible for him to arrange an interview for JAFFE with MIKOYAN, inasmuch as he represents CBS. (C)

BARKOVSKY said that he would, however, endeavor to obtain an invitation for JAFFE to a reception which may be given for MIKOYAN. BARKOVSKY also asked JAFFE when CBS was going to do something to restore themselves in the good graces of the Soviets. JAFFE, other than telling BARKOVSKY about the film being made of MIKOYAN's visit to the US, knew of no other effort being made by CBS along these lines. (C)

Concerning JAFFE's desire to interview MIKOYAN, and the invitation which he would try to get for JAFFE to a reception which might be given for MIKOYAN, BARKOVSKY said that the decision would be made by a press (C) officer at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. When JAFFE asked BARKOVSKY for the name of the press officer, he told JAFFE that he did not know. JAFFE asked BARKOVSKY who he was kidding when he said he did not know the name of the press officer, but BARKOVSKY insisted that he did not know the name of the press officer. (C)

This information has not been included in the enclosed memorandum as it would tend to disclose JAFFE as the source of this information. (C)

The Bureau will be immediately advised of any information which JAFFE furnishes concerning MIKOYAN. (C)

FOSTER

d States Department of Just
Federal Bureau of Investigation
New York, New York
January 12, 1959

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: [redacted]

An informant, who is in a position to furnish reliable information, advised that subject and his wife visited his home on the evening of December 31, 1958, arriving at approximately 8:30 p.m., and departing at approximately 11:45 p.m. In addition to the subject and his wife, Nikolai S. Kalinin was also present. Subject brought informant and his wife a pictorial book on Russia. C

During the evening, Barkovsky told informant that Deputy Soviet Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan may visit San Francisco, California, and he wanted the informant to suggest several groups before whom Mikoyan might speak in California. Informant told subject that the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco had among its members all of the foremost citizens in the San Francisco community, and he would suggest, if possible, Mikoyan speak before this club, as well as the San Francisco Press Club. C

Informant also took the opportunity to tell subject that in a recent conversation with his father on the telephone, he asked his father about the identity of business concerns on the West Coast of the United States desirous of doing business with Red China. C

It is noted that while informant was in subject's company on December 5, 1958, he asked informant for information concerning business concerns on the West Coast of the United States desirous of doing business with Red China. C

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENCY State, CIA, RAB (0-6-8)
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. 1-15-59
HOW FORW. rs
BY

ENCLOSURE

The informant told subject that his father furnished him the names of several individuals who have spoken in favor of trade with Red China. C

Most of the conversation at informant's home on the evening of December 31, 1958, was of a social nature, however, subject showed a definite interest in the information which informant gave to him about business concerns interested in trade with Red China, and accordingly, informant arranged to have lunch with subject on January 5, 1959. C

On January 5, 1959, informant did have lunch with subject, and subject again brought up the matter of Mikoyan's visit to San Frandsco, and asked informant for some background information on the clubs which he mentioned. Informant told subject that he conversed with his father on the telephone, over the weekend, and his father agreed that Mikoyan would do well to speak before the Commonwealth Club and the San Francisco Press Club. C

Subject asked informant about the Union League Club in San Francisco, and informant told him that this club merged with the San Francisco Press Club, although not all members of this club are members of the Press. C

He told subject that the Union League Club was one of the best clubs in San Francisco, and that it and the Commonwealth Club have as members all of the influential people in San Francisco. Subject told informant that he would pass this information to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., but that for the most part, the Soviets were relying on Eric Johnston, President of the Motion Picture Association of America, when arranging Mikoyan's activities. C

Subject told informant that the Soviets still owned property in San Francisco, which he believed C to include a building. It was the subject's opinion that somebody from Washington, D.C. would accompany Mikoyan for the purpose of inspecting this property, inasmuch as the Soviets did not get an opportunity to visit San Francisco too often. Subject mentioned to informant that he traveled through San Francisco on his way from Japan to Russia during World War II.

During lunch, subject asked informant about the information he had obtained concerning business concerns on the WestCoast of the United States desirous of doing business with Red China. C

Informant verbally repeated what he had told the subject on the evening of December 31, 1958, mentioning that there were over 700 organizations in the San Francisco area who favored trade with China. At subject's request, informant wrote on a piece of paper, the names of individuals who have spoken in favor of trade with Red China. C

The names which he wrote on the paper were those of James P. Wilson, Manager of the World Trade Department of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce; George E. Talmage, Vice President of Pacific Transport Line and States Lines; John S. Bolles, Head of the Chamber of Commerce's Industry Committee and Malcolm W. Boyd, Assistant Publisher of the "Pacific Shipper". U

In addition, informant told subject that "The Dispatcher", official organ of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union endorsed a policy favorable to trade with Red China. C

Subject told informant that trade with Red China would help the United States by increasing trade between the United States and Russia, as the Russians would much rather pick up goods on the West Coast of the C

United States than to pick these goods up elsewhere. He made no further request of informant for information concerning business concerns desirous of doing business with Red China.

During lunch, subject also asked informant what the reaction in the United States has been to the visit of Mikoyan. Informant told subject that it is too early to tell, as we do not even know why Mikoyan is here. He told subject that there was too much of a mystery surrounding Mikoyan's visit and subject then asked informant if there was not any reaction at all. Informant told Barkovsky that there was none of which he was aware. C

The records of the United States Department of State reflect that Vladimir Borisovich Barkovsky, a Soviet National, is Counselor to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. U

The records of the United States Department of State reflect that Nikolai Sergeevich Kalinin, a Soviet National, is a translator assigned to the United Nations Secretariat. U

This memorandum is loaned to you by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned. U

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-361863) 1/2/59

SAC, NEW YORK (65-15026)

[redacted]

Re NY letter dated 12/15/58, and San Francisco letter dated 12/23/58.

On 12/31/58, SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, news reporter, Columbia Broadcasting System, NYC, (PSI protect identity), was interviewed by SAs LAWRENCE J. DOYLE and EDWARD F. GAMBER. On this occasion subject's interest in ascertaining information with respect to business concerns on the West Coast of the United States desirous of doing business with Red China was discussed with JAFFE. It should be noted that in conversation with subject on 12/5/58, subject suggested to JAFFE that his father, whom he met, would be able to ascertain information with respect to business concerns desirous of doing business with Red China. JAFFE told subject that his father was in the Hawaiian Islands and would not return until the middle of next year. (U)

JAFFE advised that his father has returned to San Francisco and he has talked with him on the phone. He suggested that he could tell the subject that he asked his father about business concerns on the West Coast desirous of doing business with Red China while conversing with him on the phone. (U)

It was agreed that JAFFE in his next conversation of any length with the subject, will recall subject's interest in business concerns desirous of doing business (U)

(5)- Bureau (100-361863) (RM)
1-Bureau (105-28333) (RM) (SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE)
1-Bureau (105-32278) (RM) ([redacted])
1- New York (134-3315) (SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE)
1- New York (105-97[illegible]) ([redacted])
1- New York (65-15026)

EFG:dam
(8)

61 36[illegible] 343

NOT RECORDED
[illegible] JAN 3 1959

[illegible] JAN 9 [illegible]

with Red China and then tell the subject that he spoke with his father on the phone and learned that most of the foreign traders in San Francisco desired to have the embargo against trade with Red China lifted or at least relaxed. (C)

JAMES P. WILSON, Manager of the World Trade Department of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce; GEORGE E. TALMAGE, JR., Vice-President of Pacific Transport Line and States Lines; JOHN S. BOLLES, Head of the Chamber of Comerce's Industries Committee, and MALCOLM W. BOYD, Assistant Publisher of the "Pacific Shipper", have all spoken in favor of Red China. In addition, "The Dispatcher", official organ of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union endorses a policy favorable to trade with Red China. (u)

The above information was furnished to the Bureau and this office in San Francisco letter, 12/23/58, and is all available from public sources. It will be furnished to subject verbally by JAFFE for the purpose of exploring subject's interest in the matter and possibly provoking a further request for information from subject. (C)

It should be noted that JAFFE has been reminded that his cooperation with the Bureau is on a strictly voluntary basis and that he has been constantly reminded of the necessity for maintaining his relationship with the Bureau in strict confidence. (C)

On 12/31/58, JAFFE advised that NIKOLAI S. KALININ, was at his home on Christmas Eve along with members of JAFFE's family. One of these members of JAFFE's family was IRVING KAHN, who is a member of the brokerage firm of J. R. Williston and Company and also on the (C)

Board of Directors of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (A & P). During the evening in conversation with KAHN, KALININ told KAHN that ANASTAS MIKOYAN, Deputy Soviet Premier, would like to observe the operation of a large food store chain during his forthcoming visit to the United States, and he, KALININ, was wondering if KAHN could arrange to have MIKOYAN meet the president of the A & P as well as observe the operations of this firm. KAHN told KALININ that he thought this could be arranged. Subsequent to his conversation with KALININ, KAHN told JAFFE about it and expressed his intention to see if he could arrange to fulfill MIKOYAN's desire as expressed by KALININ. KAHN will keep JAFFE advised of any arrangements which he makes and JAFFE will in turn immediately advise this office. (C)

This office does not believe that KALININ, as a translator assigned to the United Nations Secretariat, holds a position in which he would be permitted to make arrangements for any activities of MIKOYAN while MIKOYAN is in the United States. KALININ is not known to be an exceptionally intelligent or polished individual and it is unlikely that he will be one of the Soviet Nationals closely associated with MIKOYAN while MIKOYAN is in the United States. Accordingly, the above information has not been included in a memorandum suitable for dissemination; however, if in the future more concrete information with respect to KALININ's efforts to arrange a visit for MIKOYAN to the A & P comes to the attention of this office, it will be included in a memorandum suitable for dissemination. (C)

The Bureau will be kept advised.

DIRECTOR, FBI 12/30/58

SAC, NEW YORK (134-new)

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

On 11/24/58, [redacted] was interviewed by SAS ROBERT F. LAUDWEIN and JOHN G. WILLIS at his residence, Apartment [redacted] St., NYC.

The interview with [redacted] was conducted pursuant to Bureau telephone call to NYO on 11/20/58, in which the Bureau advised this office that arrangements had been made with [redacted] to have [redacted] contact this office for interview. [redacted] was interviewed for information he possessed regarding [redacted] (Bufile 105-24351) and any other individuals of interest to this Bureau. It may be noted that information obtained from [redacted] on 11/24/58, has been made the subject of a separate communication to the Bureau in the [redacted] file, which is NY letter 12/16/58. (C)

A review of NYO indices reflects that [redacted] was investigated under the European Recovery Program in 1948 (Bufile 124-1710; NYfile 124-905). His PSQ reflects that he was born on [redacted], in NYC. He graduated from Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, in June, 1948, and received a BA degree. He is a member of Dartmouth and Yale alumni associations and entered the Armed Services on 6/1/44, separated from the US Navy on 7/8/48. His Military Serial number is [redacted]. (U)

It is noted in the report of DANIEL F. FLEMING, 10/26/48, at NY, that no birth record for [redacted] was found in the NYC Bureau of Vital Statistics. It is also noted in Bureau teletype, 11/10/48, that WFO advised the Bureau that no record was located for [redacted] at the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Bureau instructed that this office make a further attempt to verify [redacted] Navy service. NY report, 11/16/48, by SA MEFFERT W. KUHRTZ, reported that no record for [redacted] was located at the Naval Records Center, Garden City, NY. (U)

NOT RECORDED
15 1959

Classified by 6130
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification [illegible]

2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (105-13781-E)(DESECO)
1-New York (134-new)

JGW:jmb
(4)

Place this in 105-78333 - SAMUEL ADASON
5/bnh

60 JAN 15 1959

NY 134-new

During the interview of 11/24/58, [redacted] stated that he is employed by the Department of State and assigned to the US Mission to the UN in NYC as [redacted] In his UN job he works with [redacted], [redacted] US [redacted] the UN, on disarmament affairs. (U)

[redacted] stated that in 1952, 1953 and 1954, he worked in Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia [redacted]. (U)

[redacted] (C)

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] (C)

[redacted] advised that he has for the past two years written memoranda to the Department of State through the US Mission to the UN on persons with whom he comes in contact in connection with his US UN duties. [redacted] (U)

[redacted] impressed interviewing agents as being intelligent, well-versed in current political matters and one who would make an excellent host. He was extremely cooperative during the interview. b7C (U)

[redacted] pointed out that he and his wife gave numerous cocktail parties in his apartment, with guest lists ranging from one to 30 persons, and consisting predominantly of UN (C) personnel. His sphere of operations is in the Asian group. However, in his work with the US UN, he is involved on disarmament matters. In such employment he has come in contact with [redacted], mentioned above, who has a similar position with the Soviet UN Delegation. [redacted] has been helpful and friendly to [redacted] and [redacted] looks on him as a friend, in [redacted] opinion. (C)

It was the original intention of this office to request Bureau authority to contact [redacted] for the purpose of developing him as an informant in the [redacted] field. However, this intention was changed because of an interview on 12/10/58, which SAS EDWARD F. GAMBER and JOHN G. WILLIS had with SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, [redacted], who is employed as a news reporter by the Columbia Broadcasting System, NYC, and is assigned to cover the UN. JAFFE's identity is concealed at his request whenever information attributed to him is reported and he is characterized as one with whom contacts have been insufficient in number to determine his reliability. (C)

[redacted] JAFFE stated that [redacted] is entirely too open in the manner in which he mingles with and associates with representatives of foreign governments at the UN. He stated that [redacted] resides at [redacted] Street, New York City, telephone number [redacted]. (C)

It is realized of course, that JAFFE was giving only his opinion regarding [redacted] and that as a trained observer he would probably be more responsive to any of [redacted] associations which would lead him to a conclusion concerning [redacted] activities. It is (C) also true, however, that Soviet nationals engaged in intelligence operations are trained to be as observant as JAFFE obviously is. In view of this, it is logical to assume that there must be other persons, including Soviet nationals, who believe that [redacted]. If this is true, his value in the [redacted] field is considerably lessened. (C)

It is the intention of this office to consider [redacted] as a potential confidential source in view of his many and varied contacts among UN personnel. [redacted]. Notwithstanding this fact, it is believed that [redacted] will be of value to us in our continuing efforts to obtain information of value relating to the activities of Soviet and Soviet-bloc officials as such activities relate to intelligence operations. (C)

No attempt will be made to direct or control [redacted] activities, but contact will be maintained with him on a regular basis of at least monthly, in order to create as many good sources of information as possible in order to properly discharge our responsibilities in the internal security field. (C)

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-361868) 12/23/58

SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4257)

[redacted]

OO: NEW YORK

Re New York letter 12/5/58, captioned as above, and San Francisco letter to Director 10/22/58, entitled "SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, PSI."

[redacted], RCA Communications, West Coast Operations ([redacted]) on 12/22/58 advised that he is in regular contact with officials of San Francisco Communication, shipping, oil, import and export companies, and International banks. MR. [redacted] stated that as a result of his current association with these officials, he believes that almot all favor some trade with Red China. MR. [redacted] explained that it is not difficult to understand why these San Francisco shipping and trade interests desire trade with Red China. He said they reason that Red China with its 600,000,000 people, 1/4 the world's population, would be a lucrative market. MR. [redacted] added that it was his recollection that the "Daily Commercial News," a trade journal published in San Francisco, from time to time, contains articles and editorials advocating trade with Red China.

The files of [redacted], Western Research Foundation, San Francisco, contained an editorial from the June 4, 1957 issue of the "San Francisco Chronicle" captioned "Time to Review China Trade Ban." An article in the March 5, 1957 issue of the "San Francisco Examiner" entitled "Red China's Trade Gain Told by Shipping Journal." This article went on to state that according to the weekly "Pacific Shipper," every maritime country in the world except the United States, Panama and Liberia is providing the Chinese with a flourishing market." An editorial in the 3/17/58 "San Francisco Chronicle" was captioned "Should the U.S. trade with Red China?" This article pointed out that only the U.S. endorses the China embargo. MR. [redacted] advised that "The Dispatcher," official organ of the International Longshoremens and Warehousemens' Union(HARRY BRIDGE's ILWU), San Francisco, endorses a policy favorable to trade with Red China.

3 - Bureau (1 - 105-28333)(SAMUEL A. JAFFE)(AM REG.)
3 - New York (2 - 65-15026)(1 - 134-3315)(Encls.4)(AM REG.)
2 - SF (1 - 65-4257)(1 - 105-3646)
JTK/lp
(8)

61366-146

NOT RECORDED
242 19 DEC 1958

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

The World Trade Division, San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, maintains a file containing news releases concerning trade with Red China. An article appearing in the "San Francisco Chronicle," Sunday, June 9, 1957, by JACK FOISIE, entitled "Local Traders Want to End Red China Ban." The fist paragraph of this article is as follows: "This City's 730 foreign traders are mounting pressure on the EISENHOWER Administration to end, or at least relax, the embargo against trade with Communist China, import-export leaders said yesterday." Paragraph nine of this article states GEORGE E. TALMAGE, JR., Vice President of Pacific Transport Line -- States Lines, speaking as President of the San Francisco Area World Trade Association, favors trade with Red China. (U)

Another release dated Thursday, 4/11/57, stated "Relaxation of the U.S. Government's Embargo policy regardingtrade with Red China was urged today by MALCOLM W. BOYD, Assistant Publisher of the Pacific Shipper, at a luncheon held at the Fairmont Hotel by the San Francisco Area World Trade Association, San Francisco Chamber of Commerce affiliate. (U)

"BOYD charged 'there is too much emotion involved in the Government's policy in Eastern Asia. It's a question which should be decided on fact, not emotion.

"'The present policy may or may not be a correct one,' he added, 'but the decision about it should not be based on likes and dislikes.' (U)

"BOYD said 'the electorate of the country' is entitled to more accurate information from U.S. Government sources. 'We are too dependent on Chinese propaganda and reports of foreign businessmen touring China because the State Department won't allow American newsmen to enter the country. (U)

"'We should put the heat on our own Government to get non-military facts about what is going on in China. (U)

"'The State and Defense Departments won't tell us the extent of shipping calling at Chinese ports,' he continued, 'consequently, we're fumbling in the dark for the facts.' (U)

"BOYD said that the list of European and Japanese shipping companies doing business in Chinese Mainland ports 'Reads like a maritime blue book.' He warned that a continued U.S. embargo means 'forfeiture of trade to the British and Scandinavians if and when the time comes that the embargo is lifted, at least for non-strategic materials.' (U)

"U.S. Naval Intelligence figures were cited for March, 1956. Out of 183 'non-communist registered vessels' grossing 1,130,560 tons in trade to and from the Chinese Mainland, 59 were British vessels, 15 Japanese and the rest European, BOYD pointed out. By October, 1956 the number of ships had grown to 214 a month, he said. Of these, 43 vessels were British, 24 Japanese and the rest European. (u)

"'We trade with Russia and the satellites, why not China?', BOYD asked. (u)

"'You cannot ignore the world's most populated country forever. Forever is a very, very long time."

Another release dated Tuesday, January 7, 1958, stated "Unless the United States lifts its embargo and recognizes Red China it will forfeit control of Asia to the Soviets, JIM ROBINSON, NBC news correspondent in Tokyo, warned a meeting of the San Francisco Area World Trade Association of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce today during a luncheon at the Fairmont Hotel.

"'While the Chinese have had little love for the West there is still time to woo them away from the Russians,' he continued.

"'To do this the U.S. State Department must be realistic and face up to the fact that the Government of Communist China is a going concern and that China, with 640 million mouths to feed, has had only Russia to turn to because of the trade embargo.

"'It is an illusion to believe that China is seething with revolt and that an invasion by the Chinese Nationalists would bring the Communist regime to its knees.

"'Red China's so-called allegiance to Moscow is sealed to her dependency on the Russians for food and machinery.

"'Breaking the U.S. embargo would counterbalance Russia's influence greatly.'"

U.S. Bureau of Customs, San Francisco, advise the present embargo prohibits any American vessel to visit Red China ports. Exporters to Red China must apply for an export license through the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Washington, D.C., and any imports must be approved by Foreign Funds Control Section, Federal Reserve Bank, New York City. Customs officials have advised that there is no U.S. trade with Red China at the present time.

There are being enclosed for the NYO four photostats of news releases and excerpts from San Francisco newspapers obtained from World Trade Division, setting forth names of local individuals desirous of trade with Red China.

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-361868) 12/15/58

SAC, NEW YORK (65-15026)

[redacted]

Enclosed herewith are an original and four copies of a letterhead memorandum for the Bureau, and two copies of which are enclosed for the San Francisco Division. (u)

On 12/10/58, SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, News Reporter, Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), was interviewed by SAS JOHN G. WILLIS and EDWARD F. GAMBER. JAFFE furnished information with respect to his contacts with Soviet nationals. Information which he furnished with respect to his contact with subject is set forth in enclosed letterhead memorandum, while other information which he furnished is being appropriately disseminated in this office. (C)

JAFFE is a PSI ;this office and he has been most adamant in expressing his desire to have information which he furnished to the Bureau handled on a strictly confidential basis, because ~~if~~ it became known that he is furnishing information to the Bureau, it would jeopardize his career as a news reporter. (U)

The enclosed letterhead memorandum reflects subject's interest in ascertaining information with respect to business concerns on the West Coast of the United States desirous of doing business with Red China. (U)

4 - Bureau (100-361868) (Encls. 5) (RM)
 (1 - 105-28333) (SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE)
2 - San Francisco (Encls. 2) (RM)
1 - New York (134-3315) (SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE)
1 - New York (65-15026)

EFG:cxm
(8)

61

NOT RECORDED
2D DEC 18 1958

53 DEC 22 1958

On 11/6/58, subject asked JAFFE if he could ascertain the feeling of American business and American industry toward Red China and apprise him of this feeling. (C)

The San Francisco Division is requested to furnish this office and the Bureau with information concerning business firms or groups on the West Coast who, through organizations or political activities, have made known their desire to have trade with Red China authorized by appropriate government agencies. It is further requested that the San Francisco Division furnish this office and the Bureau with any information contained in its files concerning business organizations on the West Coast doing business with Red China. (u)

It would be most desirable to have the information requested available from public sources and accordingly, the San Francisco Division should furnish the sources of all of the information which it forwards to this office and the Bureau. (U)

Upon receipt of the requested information from the San Francisco Division, this office will evaluate it for the purpose of passing this information to the subject through JAFFE, thus enhancing ~~the activities of~~ JAFFE as a source of information in the eyes of the subject. (U)

The enclosed letterhead memorandum has been classified "Confidential", inasmuch as it reflects the Bureau's interest in a Soviet national investigation of which requires State Department approval because of its sensitive nature. (C

M. Linton
A. Nease
G. Hanning

SAC, New York (134-3315) 12/2/58

REC- 91

Director, FBI (105-28333)-23

-102

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, aka.
PSI - ESPIONAGE

ReBulet 11/21/58 which authorized your continued contacts with subject pending completion of background investigation. As indicated in relet the Bureau does not desire that you initiate conversation with Jaffe concerning the "Nation" and this letter contains additional information of significance in the event a discussion concerning the "Nation" should rise during contact of subject by agents of your office. (U)

A review of "Readers' Guide To Periodical Literature" shows that subject wrote five articles which were published in the "Nation" between 12/29/51 and 8/6/55. He has apparently had nothing published in the "Nation" since 8/6/55. It is noted that in WFO letter 11/20/58 subject indicated by letter dated 2/22/57 that he desired to travel to foreign countries to gather information for "news gathering organizations like CBS News, Worldwide Press Service and the Nation." In view of this statement by subject it appears that he may still have some contacts with the staff of the "Nation." U

For your information subject's articles in the "Nation" are as follows: (U)

(1) 12/29/51 "Uncle Sam's Bitter Nephews." Article discusses marine reservists being called to active duty and serving in the Korean Conflict. A footnote indicates subject was New York newspaperman who spent eight months in Korea as combat correspondent with the First Marine Division. (U)

(2) 5/7/55 "Chou En-lai Talks To The West." This article reports subject's interview with Red China's premier on 4/25/55. Subject is described in a footnote as the "Nation's" special correspondent-assigned to cover the

MAILED 31
DEC - 3 1958
COMM-FBI

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category [illegible]
Date of Declassification [illegible]

SECRET

IML:gds
(6)

(SEE NOTE PAGE 3)

DEC 4 1958

55

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

Letter to New York
Re: Samuel Adason Jaffe
(105-28333)

Bandung Conference. The footnote indicated subject had spent several years in the Far East. This article contains a statement that Chou Chang-pu, personal secretary and interpreter to Chou En-lai, a graduate of Harvard University, asked subject whether Freda Kirchwey was still editor of the "Nation." (U)

(3) 6/25/55 "Dilemma In Saigon, Which Way Democracy?" Article discusses American relations with Vietnam and subject concludes that if we lose Vietnam, we shall have lost all Asia. A footnote describes subject as the "Nation's" roving correspondent in Southeast Asia. (U)

(4) 7/9/55 "Buddhist Reformer: The Philosophy Of U Nu." Article discusses U Nu, Prime Minister of Burma and in footnote subject is again described as roving correspondent in the Far East. (U)

(5) 8/6/55 "Restive Malaya, Driving For Independence." Article discusses British activities and Communist terrorists and in footnote subject is again referred to as the "Nation's" roving correspondent. (U)

By letter dated 11/17/58 [redacted] furnished the following information which must not be disseminated outside the Bureau: S

On 10/7/58 subject wrote to the Red Chinese Ambassador in Moscow referring to subject's interview with Chou En-lai and generally requested assistance in arranging travel to Red China. Subject indicated he had learned that another reporter had traveled to Red China via the Soviet Union. This information indicates subject is making considerable effort to travel to Red China and the Bureau is aware that subject has indicated this in his conversation to agents of your office. ; 105-67845-437 C

A further review of Bufiles reveals that by letter dated 2/26/48 subject inquired concerning a position in the Bureau. He stated that he was only nineteen years old but had been doing newspaper work as a reporter on

SECRET

Letter to New York
Re: Samuel Adason Jaffe
(105-28333)

SECRET

crime for two years. He stated that he had been in the United States Merchant Marines for two years before that. He indicated that he was attending night school at the University of California and planned to take law later. He indicated he would like to become an agent of the FBI. He inquired concerning a clerical position working with agents to develop a better understanding of investigative work. Subject's letter was answered 5/6/48. There is no indication that he made further inquiry or ever filed application. This is furnished to you for additional background information as it is believed to be an indication of possible interest and significance in your contacts with him. 67-432170 (U)

The purpose of this letter is to furnish you additional background concerning subject's contact with the "Nation" and it is not intended to create the impression that you should bring up this question with him in your discussions. This is being furnished to you for your guidance in dealing with subject as the Bureau feels that subject does have good potential and has a background that would appear to be of sufficient interest to the Soviets that their contacts with him might be an excellent source of information for us. (U)

NOTE: Subject is being considered as potential security informant and Bureau has previously approved additional contacts with informant pending completion of one additional lead to check CIA records. Subject is presently CBS News reporter and has been in frequent contact with numerous Soviets and has furnished information of significance. He has excellent potential and above is being furnished to NY for their guidance in view of subject's past contact with the "Nation." (C)

SECRET

1 -
1 - nt
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Hanning
1 - Mr. Bly
1 - Mr. Linton

November 21, 1958

SAC, New York (134-3315)

REC- 28

Director, FBI (105-28333)-22

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, aka.
POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANT -
ESPIONAGE

EX-101

Reurlet dated November 4, 1958.

Authority granted to maintain contact with Jaffe to secure any information he may have concerning Soviets of interest to us and to further his development, pending completion of background investigation. (U)

In these contacts you should additionally be alert to any information you may receive indicating subject may have contacts presently on the staff of "The Nation" or knowledge of any individuals employed therewith. This phase of your contact must be discreet and prior to bringing this subject up with Jaffe, you should submit your recommendations concerning contacting him on this subject upon completion of the remaining lead in the background investigation of subject. (U)

NOTE: See memo Branigan to Belmont 11-20-58, same caption, LML:hrt.

MAILED 5
NOV 21 1958
COMM-FBI

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman

LML:hrt
(9)

67 NOV 28 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Me um • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: November 20, 1958

FROM : MR. W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, aka

1 - Mr. Nease
1 - Mr. Belmont
~~1 - Mr. Branigan~~
1 - Mr. Hanning
1 - Mr. Bly
1 - Mr. Linton

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W.C.Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Jaffe is Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) news reporter in New York who has had extensive contact with Soviets as representative of news-gathering media since 1951. He desired to travel to Red China and Soviet Russia as representative of "Life" and "Time" magazines in 1954. He contacted representatives of the Soviet Embassy on this occasion and a representative of "Time" and "Life" indicated Jaffe had thought that he had been surveilled by the FBI. On 2-23-55, Jaffe corresponded with the State Department on the letterhead of "The Nation" concerning proposed travel. On 9-5-55 Jaffe indicated to a confidential source that he was permanent correspondent of "The Nation" on the West Coast. On 1-3-56 Jaffe was interviewed by Bureau Agents at his request and furnished information concerning his efforts to travel to China and Russia. There is no indication that Jaffe made this trip as the result of his contacts with the Soviets at that time. (C)

On 10-30-57 Jaffe and a CBS camera crew made a feature film in our New York Office which was telecast in two parts over certain CBS affiliate stations on 11-13 and 14-57. Jaffe was in charge of making this film. He reciprocated [redacted] the cooperation shown him by the Bureau in making this film. (U)

On 7-23-58 Jaffe contacted our New York Office and advised that he was inviting two Soviets to dinner that date. Informant advised at that time that Jaffe was in frequent contact with the Protocol Officer of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations (UN). By letter 8-28-58 Bureau approved preliminary interview of Jaffe to determine his attitude toward the Bureau for cooperation in connection with his knowledge and contact of Soviets in New York. (C)

Jaffe was interviewed 9-12-58 and was extremely cooperative. He talked at length concerning his association and knowledge of five Soviets, two of whom are known intelligence agents and one considered a potential defector. Jaffe advised that his uncle, an actor, Samuel Charles Jaffe, was active on behalf of Russian war relief and sympathized with what proved to be communist inspired organizations. [redacted] He has been interviewed by Bureau Agents. He was cooperative, denying membership in the Communist Party, but admitted membership in 14 communist front organizations. (C)

Enclosure sent 11-21-58
105-28333
LML:hrt

REC- 35

66 DEC 5

11 DEC 1 1958

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, aka.
105-28333

Background investigation of Jaffe was instituted as a result of his interview on 9-12-58. No derogatory information has been developed and it appears that all of his contacts with the Soviets have been as the result of his news-gathering assignments. The New York Office, aware of the additional significance of Jaffe's former association with "The Nation," since publishing the article entitled "The FBI," in the 10-18-58 issue of this publication, has requested Bureau authority to maintain contact with Jaffe pending coverage of one remaining lead involving review of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) records in order to receive information concerning the Soviets with whom he is in contact and as a follow up of our 9-12-58 interview. (C)

OBSERVATIONS:

It is believed that we should allow New York to continue contacts with Jaffe and and it is possible that this contact, if properly handled, may develop a source of information of significance concerning Soviet officials in New York as well as providing a possible source of information concerning the article and general policy of "The Nation" through such contacts as Jaffe may still have on the staff of that publication. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, there is attached a letter to New York authorizing continued contacts with Jaffe concerning information of interest to us concerning Soviet officials and instructing New York to be alert in their contacts with Jaffe to develop any opportunity that might arise toward obtaining information concerning the general policy and personalities that Jaffe may have knowledge of who are presently connected with "The Nation." (C)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 11/20/58

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
PSI
(00:NY)

[redacted]

ReWFOlet to Director dated 8/25/55, copy to NY, setting forth info from the Passport Office, U. S. Department of State, concerning SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE and JOSEPHINE CLARK WINTER JAFFE. MRS. (u).

B. 10-23-32, [illegible]

NY letter to Director, copy to WFO, dated 9/22/58, requesting WFO to check for current passport record for JAFFE and his wife. NY also requested that records of U. S. Maritime Service and CIA should be checked. (u)

do

PASSPORT DATA:

Mrs. [redacted], Agency Liaison Officer, Passport Office, U. S. Department of State, advised SA GENE P. COLE on 10/27/58, of the following regarding JAFFE and his wife: (u)

By letter dated 2/22/57, from JAFFE, written on stationery of CBS News, 485 Madison Ave., New York 22, N. Y., addressed to the Passport Office, JAFFE sets forth intention to visit the Middle East. For 4 weeks, during latter May and June, 1957, he planned to visit Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan as an American journalist. His purpose, he said, was "to gather information on the internal affairs of these countries for American news gathering organizations like CBS News, Worldwide Press Service and the Nation." As of 1957, JAFFE was employed as a reported, he indicated. (u)

On 3/22/57, Passport No. 36093, issued 2/25/55, at San Francisco, Calif., was revalidated at WDC for JAFFE. JAFFE's address in 1957 was 200 East End Ave., New York 28, N. Y., The passport application indicated, his intention to travel 3 months, (u)

EX. - 132 REG-61

2-Bureau
2-New York (134-3315) (RM) (Encls.-10)
1-WFO

105-28333-23

16 NOV [illegible]

GPC:stb
(5)

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from GDS Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

[redacted]

[redacted]

visiting Hong Kong, Burma, India, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. Purpose of the trip was "business-journalistic writing." (u)

JOSEPHINE WINTER JAFFE filed application for passport on 4/9/57, at New York, N. Y. On 4/16/57, Passport No. 458396 was issued to her. Her address was then given as 200 East End Ave., New York, N. Y. (u)

Mrs. JAFFE sets forth her birth date as 10/23/32, at New York, N. Y. Her father was LESTER CLARK WINTER, born Cambridge, Mass., 4/4/07. In 1957, he resided at 119 Carnegie Place, Pittsburgh, Penna. Mrs. JAFFE's mother, JOSEPHINE AUGUSTE POPE, was born Cleveland, Ohio, 11/22/10. In 1957, her mother resided at 19 E. 72nd St., New York, N. Y. (u)

Winter

Mrs. JAFFE advised her previous passport had been obtained 8/1/52, under No. 50854 at New York, N. Y. On the application, she stated she was not now, nor had she been in the past, a member of the Communist Party. In this record, Mrs. JAFFE sets forth she had one child, DAVID TOBY JAFFE, born 12/14/53, at New York, N. Y. (u)

U. S. MARITIME SERVICE DATA:

Records of the U. S. Maritime Service were reviewed by SA COLE on 11/3/58. A review of JAFFE's Merchant Marine file reflected the following: (u)

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE was born 6/19/29, at San Francisco, Calif. JAFFE was issued No. Z Number 459287 on 8/4/55, at San Francisco, and there were 3 recorded voyages between 8/10/44, and 1/13/46. Certificate of Service as Ordinary seaman was issued to him 8/4/44, at San Francisco. On the latter date, his residence was 6000 Rockridge Blvd., Oakland, Calif. His father, ABRAM S. JAFFE, resided then at that address. (u)

The records reflected the following voyages:

Rating	Date Shipped	Place Shipped	Date Discharged	Place Discharged	Vessel	Voyage
Ordinary Seaman	8/10/44	Alameda, Calif.	12/11/44	San Francisco, Calif.	"Wm. H. Dall"	Foreig

23

[redacted]

[redacted]

Rating	Date Shipped	Place Shipped	Date Discharged	Place Discharged	Vessel	Voyage
Ordinary Seaman	12/20/44	San Francisco, Calif.	3/20/45	San Francisco, Calif.	"Wm. H. Dall"	Foreign
Ordinary Seaman	7/19/45	San Francisco, Calif.	1/13/46	Nagoya, Japan.	"W.W. McCrakin"	Foreign

Records of the U. S. Coast Guard, Intelligence Division, WDC, as they were furnished to IC ARTHUR E. WARNER on 10/8/58, were negative regarding JAFFE. (u)

LEAD

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Will furnish the NY Division the CIA information when it becomes available to WFO. (X)

Enclosed to the NY Division are 5 photos of SAMUEL JAFFE and 5 photos of JOSEPHINE JAFFE. (u)

[redacted]

23

11/7/58

PLAIN TEXT

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-361868)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (65-15026)

SUBJECT: [redacted]

On 11/5/58, SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, news reporter, CBS, telephonically contacted SA EDWARD F. GAMBER and said that he possessed some information which he would like to furnish to the Bureau. (U)

On 11/6/58, JAFFE was interviewed by SAS LAWRENCE J. DOYLE and EDWARD F. GAMBER. He furnished information [redacted], which is set forth in letterhead memorandum, five copies of which are enclosed. (C)

JAFFE advised that he has been endeavoring to obtain permission to visit Red China as a journalist, but he has not received any encouragement from the Red Chinese authorities. He talked to subject about getting some assistance from the Soviets. Subject told him that there was nothing which he could do, nor was there anyone at the (U)

ENCLOSURE

4- Bureau (100-361868) (Encls.5) (RM)
(1- 105-20[illegible]) (SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE)
1- New York (1[illegible]) (SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE)
1- New York (65-15026)

Classified by 6138
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification [illegible]

[illegible]/dmb
(7)

105-28333-

NOT RECORDED
175 NOV 14 1958

52 NOV 17 1958

FILED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

NY 65-15026

Soviet UN Delegation who could do anything for him. Subject said that if the Soviets were to try to help him, the Red Chinese would think that the Soviets were trying to push someone off on them. However, subject told JAFFE that he could use the names of the Soviets with whom he is acquainted as references in his dealings with Red Chinese authorities. (C)

This information was not included in enclosed letterhead memorandum, as it would tend to disclose JAFFE as the source of this information. JAFFE has been emphatic in expressing his desire to have his idenbity protected. (C)

In addition to information concerning subject, JAFFE also furnished information with respect to Soviet and satellite personnel with whom he is acquainted. This information will be properly disseminated to respective case files. JAFFE was most cooperative during this interview and evidenced a sincere desire to be of assistance by furnishing information concerning his association with Soviet and Satellete personnel to the Bureau in the future. JAFFE evidenced a great deal of respect for the Bureau during interview. (C)

Enclosed letterhead memorandum has been classified "Confidential" inasmuch as it reflects the Bureau's in a Soviet National investigation, which requires State Department approval because of its sensitive nature. (C)

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

New York, New York
November 7, 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: [redacted]
Also Known As

On November 6, 1958, an informant, who is in a position to furnish reliable information, advised that he has known subject for quite some time. He originally met subject at a party at subject's home. He was invited to this party by Nikolai S. Kalinin, another Soviet, with whom he is acquainted.

Informant said that he has seen subject quite often at the United Nations Secretariat in New York City. Some time ago, subject asked informant if he could ascertain the feeling of American business and American industry toward Red China and apprise subject of this feeling. Informant told subject, at that time, that subject should be able to ascertain this for himself by reading American newspapers and magazines. Informant said that subject is interested in economics and is quite well versed in this field.

Informant advised that he had not seen subject for several months, but on November 5, 1958, he had lunch with him. During lunch, subject asked informant what he thought of the recent elections in the United States. Informant told subject that it was his opinion that the Republican Party was beaten on their national and foreign policy. Subject told informant that he likes the way informant analyzes situations, and he would like informant to write his analysis of the American political situation and make this analysis available to him, so that he in turn can make this analysis available to Soviet

CONFIDENTIAL

105-28523-

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

correspondents in the United States. Informant suggested that subject could remember what informant said during their conversations, and pass this information on to Soviet correspondents. Subject said that it was difficult for him to remember everything.

Informant advised subject that it is one thing to talk and another thing to write it down. He told subject that he is not an expert, and that subject's opinion is as good as his. Informant bluntly told subject that he did not like the idea proposed by subject, and that he can not write for him. Subject asked informant to consider writing this analysis of the American political situation, and said that he would be paid for this. Informant was quite shaken at this, and told subject that it was not a question of money, but that he just does not want to write for him.

Informant and subject also discussed Boris Pasternak, 1958 Nobel Prize Winner in Literature. Informant told subject that the Soviet treatment of Pasternak was an example of the lack of freedom in the Soviet Union. The subject replied by saying that the Soviets are trying to build a Socialist State, and can not tolerate criticism. Informant told subject that this was the reason that he was unable to understand or appreciate the Soviet political system, and that this was also the reason why he could never subscribe to a totalitarian form of government. Informant pointed out to subject that in the United States people were free to criticize as they saw fit, even if their criticism is directed toward the President of the United States. While people may take issue with this criticism, or even criticize the individual in return, the individual making the criticism had no reason to fear that he would be punished.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject's only reply to informant was that Pasternak's book, "Doctor Zhivago," was "political treason." Subject also said that this was "their system," with an air of finality.

The records of the United States Department of State reflect that Vladimir Borisovich Barkovsky, a Soviet national, is Counselor of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. These same records reflect that Nikolai Sergeevich Kalinin, a Soviet national, is a translator assigned to the United Nations Secretariat.

This is loaned to you by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 11/4/58

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, aka.
PSI

ReNYlet, 9/22/58.

I. Indices of this office reflect a case entitled, "SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE; IS - R", subject of which is identical with subject of instant matter. Bureau file 105-28333 concerns the subject of instant matter and the subject of the aforementioned case. All information contained in this file has been previously furnished to the Bureau. A review of this file reflects that JAFFE has been in contact with Soviet nationals on numerous occasions, dating back to 1951. Information concerning these contacts reflects that they were all for journalistic purposes and that JAFFE in 1954, was trying to obtain permission to travel to Red China and in 1955, he was trying to obtain permission to travel to Russia in connection with his journalistic endeavors.

[redacted] (U)

"The Nation" is considered to be a liberal magazine and it has been extremely critical of the Bureau, this criticism reaching its peak with an article entitled, "The FBI", in the 10/18/58 issue of this publication. (U)

JAFFE's uncle is SAMUEL CHARLES JAFFE, a former [redacted]). JAFFE, during interview on 9/12/58, advised (X)

2-Bureau (105-28333) (RM)
1-New York (134-3315)

105-28333-22

REC- 27

24 NOV 5 1958

EFG:hel
(3)

that he is a close associate of this uncle and said that this uncle was active on behalf of Russian war relief and sympathized with what proved to be Communist inspired organizations. He said that he does not believe that his uncle was a member of the CP and JAFFE said that he himself had never been a member of the CP or any Communist inspired organization, nor has he ever sympathized with the CP. (X)

II. The following informants, when contacted on the dates indicated by the Agents indicated, were unable to furnish any information with respect to the subject: (U)

Source	Date Contacted	Contacted By
[redacted]	7/12/54	SA JOHN W. DOOLEY
[redacted]	7/12/54	SA JOHN W. DOOLEY
[redacted]	7/2/54	SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON
[redacted]	7/2/54	SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON
[redacted]	6/24/54	SA RICHARD H. BLASSER
[redacted]	6/29/54	SA RICHARD H. BLASSER
[redacted]	6/23/54	SA BERT S. TAYLOR
[redacted]	10/3/58	SA JOHN A. HAAG
[redacted]	10/3/58	SA JOHN A. HAAG
[redacted]	9/29/58	SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON
[redacted]	9/29/58	SA JAMES P. HALLERON
[redacted]	9/29/58	SA JAMES P. HALLERON
[redacted]	9/30/58	SA JAMES P. HALLERON
[redacted]	9/29/58	SA LEROY W. SHEETS
[redacted]	9/29/58	SA LEROY W. SHEETS

(U)

It should be noted that contacts made in 1954, were in connection with an investigation of JAFFE being conducted at that time, the basis for which was his contact with Soviet nationals. (U)

III. JAFFE is employed as a news reporter by the Columbia Broadcasting System in NYC and resides at 200 East End Ave., NYC, with his wife and 2 children. He was born on 6/19/29, in San Francisco, California. (u)

[redacted] NYC, advised SA THOMAS J. MC SHANE on 9/24/58, that JAFFE holds a UN pass, which reflects that he is with the Columbia Broadcasting System's Newsreel TV Dept. (U)

The records of the Board of Elections for the Borough of Manhattan, NYC, when checked by IC THOMAS A. MC CARTHY on 10/7/58, reflect that in 1952 SAMUEL A. JAFFE, Apt.C-17, 29 W.8th St., NYC, registered for his first vote. He stated that he was 23 years of age, single and resided in the City of NY for 15 months and the State of NY for 15 months. He resided in care of a family named DEMMING and was employed by "Life" Magazine. He graduated from Claremont High School in Oakland, California, in June, 1944.

In 1953, SAMUEL A. JAFFE registered from Apt.1A, 63 W.90th St., NYC, and stated that he was 24 years of age, married and resided in the City of NY and the State of NY for 3 years, and in the election district for 10 months. He said that he was a reporter for "Life" Magazine and registered in 1952, from 29 W.8th St., NYC.

His wife, JOSEPHINE JAFFE, also registered from this address for her first vote in 1953. She stated that she was 21 years of age, married and resided in the City of NY and the State of NY for 21 years, and in the election district for 10 months. She was born in the US, and a notation beside her registration lists the name ROSEMARY ~~HALL~~, Greenwich, Conn. The significance of this is not known. (u)

In 1954, SAMUEL A. JAFFE registered from Apt.1B, 25 Indian Road, NYC, at which time he listed his age as 25, said he was married, and had resided in the City of NY and the State of NY for 4 years and in the election district for 9 months. He was still employed by Life Magazine and said that he registered in 1953, from 63 W.90th St., NYC. (U)

When registering in 1952, 1953, and 1954, JAFFE and his wife both expressed a preference for one of the major political parties. For the years 1955 through 1957, no registration could be located at the 25 Indian Road address, 200 E.66th St., or his present address, 200 East End Ave., NYC. (U)

The records of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, as furnished to IC JOHN T. LYNCH by LAWRENCE MEIGHAN on 10/10/58, reflected that JAFFE possesses current NY State Operator's License Number 3001647, which confirms his present address and employment. His description on this license is as follows: (U)

Date of Birth	6/19/28
Place of Birth	San Francisco, California
Age	30
Height	5' 10"
Weight	157 pounds
Hair	Blond
Eyes	Brown
Race	White

IV. Records of the Credit Bureau of Greater NY were checked by SA WALTER C. ZINK on 9/25/58. These records contain a report dated 10/23/57, which reflects that SAMUEL A. JAFFE, and wife, JOSEPHINE, reside at 200 East End Ave., NYC. They formerly resided at 301 Fletcher Drive, Atherton, California; 200 E.66th St., NYC, and 25 Indian Road, NYC. He is employed as a reporter by the (U)

Columbia Broadcasting System, 485 Madison Ave., NYC, and from 1952 to 1954, he was employed by Time Inc., NYC. This report reflects that he has been a good tenant, has a good credit record and is well regarded by his employer.

The records of the Bureau of Criminal Identification and the Bureau of Special Services, both of the NYCPD, when checked on 9/26/58, did not contain any information with respect to JAFFE. (U)

Form FD9, when returned from the Bureau, was not accompanied by any derogatory information with respect to JAFFE or his wife. (U)

V. The records of the Naval Records Management Center, Garden City, NY, when checked by SE JOSEPH P. MAYER on 6/24/54, reflected that SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, serial number 1056314, entered the US Marine Corps at San Francisco, California on 2/10/49, with the rank of Private. These records reflect that he was born on 6/19/29, at San Francisco, California. On 7/23/50, he was called to active duty at San Francisco, California, and on 7/27/51, he was honorably discharged at San Francisco, California, as a Private First-Class by reason of physical disability, in that he was suffering from asthma. (U)

MRS. SAMUEL [illegible]

VI. JAFFE is not known to be a member of any Armed Forces reserve organization. (U)

VII. On 11/27/57, ~~JAFFE~~ was married to JOSEPHINE CLARK WINTER, who was born on 10/10/32, in NYC. During interview on 9/12/58, JAFFE advised that his wife is a volunteer worker at the UN International Children's Emergency Fund. (U)

[illegible]

- 5 -

Indices of this office do not contain any references reflecting derogatory information with respect to JAFFE's wife. (u)

JAFFE's wife's mother's name is JOSEPHINE A. CAVE, who resides at 19 E. 72nd St., NYC. (u)

In the case entitled, "[redacted]; [redacted], Bureau file 65-58632, there is a reference which reflects that on 10/17/50, [redacted], 19 E. 72nd St., NYC, was in touch with [redacted]. [redacted] is a former Rumanian [redacted] the US, who has been in exile, having resigned his position in [redacted]. [redacted] furnished information alleging [redacted] recruitment into the MGB on [redacted]. However, he was exhaustively interviewed on numerous occasions and steadfastly and vehemently denied this allegation. [redacted] apparently circulated in social circles in NYC and [redacted] contact with him is not believed to be significant in and of itself. (C)

Information in the files of this office reflect that Mrs. JOSEPHINE AUGUSTE CAVE, born 11/22/10, in Cleveland, Ohio, subject's mother-in-law, entered the US on 6/12/43, to visit her daughter, JOSEPHINE CLARK WINTER at 912 5th Ave., NYC. She intended to return to England and said she was presently married to Lt. Col. GERALD E. CAVE, British Army, Royal Artillery 83, Light Anti-Aircraft Division. (C)

The records of the Credit Bureau of Greater NY, when checked by IC ALFRED G. ENNULAT on 10/8/58, did not contain any information with respect to CAVE. (u)

JAFFE is not known to have any marital difficulties or domestic problems. (u)

There are leads outstanding in other divisions concerning background investigation of subject. For this reason, no request is being made by this office to contact (u)

JAFFE to develop him as a PSI. However, the Bureau is requested to furnish this office with permission to recontact JAFFE on an informative basis on one occasion as a follow-up to the initial interview conducted on 9/12/58. During this interview, JAFFE would not be pressed for information, but information which he will most certainly volunteer, would be accepted. This interview would serve the purpose of letting JAFFE know of the Bureau's continued interest and place us in a better position to eventually contact JAFFE for the purpose of developing him as a PSI, upon completion of background investigation. (u)

ARD FORM NO. 64

ice Men [illegible] um • UNITED [illegible] OVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 10/23/58

FROM : SAC, Kansas City (134-201)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
PSI

CONFIDENTIAL

Re New York letter dated 9/22/58.

On 10/2/58, [redacted], Clerk, Greater Kansas City Credit Bureau, Kansas City, Mo., and Mrs. [redacted], Clerk, Sheriff's Office, Olathe, Ks., whose office covers Mission, Ks., advised they have no record of JAFFE's wife's mother, JOSEPHINE A. CAVE. (U)

On 10/2/58, [redacted], Clerk, Greater Kansas City Credit Bureau, advised that the records of this Bureau has on file a report dated 11/10/52 concerning L. CLARK WINTER, 7108 Mission Road, Mission, Ks. His wife is listed as LOIS JAMESON WINTER and there were reported two children, not otherwise identified, living at the home. His prior residences were listed as Hoosier Court, Bloomington, Ind., and 316 Frontenac Place, Worthington, Ohio. According to [redacted] at the time of this report, WINTER was employed at the Kansas City Art Institute as a sculptural instructor and had reportedly been there since Sept. 1949. He previously was reported as employed by the Ohio State University as a professor of Sculpture. According to [redacted], credit record for WINTER was good. (U)

Mrs. [redacted], Clerk, Sheriff's Office, Olathe, whose office covers Mission, Ks., advised on 10/2/58 that the records of that Department reflect that LESTER CLARK WINTER was fined $2.00 and costs 10/3/50 for running a stop sign. No further information was noted. (U)

The 1953 Northeast Johnson County Directory lists LESTER CLARK WINTER and LOIS J, as residents at 7108 Mission Road, Mission, Ks.; his occupation is listed as instuctor Kansas City Art Institute. Succeeding directories do not list him. (U)

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - New York (134-3315) (RM)
1 - Kansas City
LKW/hmg
(5)

REC- 99

16 OCT 24 1958

52 OCT 29 1958

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification [illegible]

KC 134-201

On 10/21/58, [redacted] and [redacted] were contacted by SA RICHARD H. ASH and they advised that LESTER CLARK WINTER and JOSEPHINE CAVE were unknown to them. On 10/21/58 [redacted] advised SA L. KEITH WILLIAMS likewise. (2)

RUC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 10/22/58

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (105-3646)

Please handle as AiRTel [redacted]

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
PSI

Re New York letter, 9/22/58, and Bulet, 10/3/58.

The files of the Palo Alto, California, Credit Bureau, as examined by SA FRED R. ELLEDGE on 10/8/58, reflected that SAM A. JAFFE, wife JOSEPHINE, resided at 301 Fletcher Drive, Atherton, and that he was employed by the North American Newspaper Alliance, Chronicle Building, San Francisco, California. These files contained a notice dated 6/27/56 from the Allsberry Plumbing, Heating and Sheet Metal Company, Palo Alto, California, that a balance of $6 was owing to them from JAFFE and that this amount had been past due for 60 days. (U)

The files of the Redwood City, California, Credit Bureau, as examined by SA ELLEDGE on 10/8/58, were found to contain a report dated 11/23/54 which set forth the following information concerning JAFFE. (U)

His age as of the date of this report was listed as 25; his wife's name was JOSEPHINE A. and there was one child. His residence was listed as 301 Fletcher Drive, Atherton, California, which residence they were buying. A former residence was indicated as 25 Indian Road, New York City, with a notation that the JAFFEs still maintain a four room apartment at this address. JAFFE'S occupation was listed as self-employed as a journalist for the North American Newspaper Alliance, Inc., New York City. The file contained a notation that this employment had been verified as of 11/22/54. The file also indicated that JAFFE had been employed as a reporter free-lance for the above firm which is a moderate (U)

2 - Bureau (REG) AM
2 - New York (134-3315)(REG)
1 - San Francisco

REC- 17

105-28333-21

FRE:fra #12
(5)

See pg 6 when NY letter is pink.

EX. - 132

OCT 25 1958

[redacted]

INT. SEC.

63

6136

2

sized news agency with reporters stationed over the world. JAFFE was formerly employed with Time-Life International, New York City, for a few years. He reportedly left this firm in good standing in October, 1954. He had been employed as a researcher for this firm. An additional notation in the file as of 11/30/54 indicated that JAFFE was the son of A.S. JAFFE, owner of the A.S. Jaffe Company (candy manufacturers' agents), Hearst Building, San Francisco, California. (U)

Also contained in the files of the Redwood City Credit Bureau was a copy of a report in the San Francisco Retail Credit Association dated 11/23/54. This report indicated that JAFFE had been on record in their files since 6/17/49, and that he formerly resided at 891-28th Avenue, San Francisco, California (the home of his father), since 1949. His occupation was listed as correspondent with the North American Newspaper Alliance, Chronicle Building, San Francisco, California, for two weeks. (U)

Also contained in the Redwood City Credit Bureau files was a copy of a report from the New York City Credit Bureau dated 11/12/54. This report stated that JAFFE still maintains a four room apartment at 25 Indian Road, New York City, where he had been renting since September, 1954. The report stated that JAFFE occupied Apartment 1B at a rental of approximately $100 per month. The apartment was located in good living conditions and JAFFE enjoyed a good reputation in the area. The report stated that JAFFE had been employed by the North American Newspaper Alliance for a short while. Mr. SHELL, of the Personnel Department of North American, stated that JAFFE came well recommended. (U)

[redacted]

2

SF 105-3646
FRE:fra

On October 8, 1958, [redacted], [redacted], Atherton, California, Police Department, advised SA ELLEDGE that JAFFE had resided at 301 Fletcher Drive from approximately November, 1954, to November, 1956. [redacted] stated that there were no arrests regarding JAFFE and no derogatory information concerning him. [redacted] stated that the JAFFE residence had been on the "home call list" much of the time between November, 1954, and November, 1956, due to the absences of JAFFE and his family during this period. [redacted] commented that the address, 301 Fletcher Drive, was in a comparatively new sparsely settled area in Atherton, and that there were no homes in the immediate vicinity of this address. [redacted] stated that he knew of no one who was a close associate of JAFFE or who could possibly furnish information concerning him. It is noted that Atherton, California, is a small community and that the residents thereof are wealthy and occupy estate-size dwellings. (U)

[redacted] and [redacted], both of whom are familiar with CP and related activities in the Menlo Park, Palo Alto and Atherton, California, areas, advised SA RICHARD H. NELSON that JAFFE was unknown to them. (U)

Mrs. [redacted], Registrar's Office, University of California, Berkeley, California, advised SA PERRY W. MOOTHART on 10/10/58 that she had no record of JAFFE attending the University of California. The applications for admission to the University of California from 1946 through 1949 were reviewed on 10/10/58 by SA PERRY W. MOOTHART with negative results. (U)

[redacted]

SF 105-3646
FRE:fra

[redacted], Clerk, Alumnae Records, 2000 Carleton Street, Berkeley, California, advised SA PERRY W. MOOTHART on 10/10/58 that she had no record of JAFFE having attended the University of California. (U)

Mrs. [redacted], Clerk in the Records Department, Extension Division, University of California, Berkeley, California, advised SA PERRY W. MOOTHART on 10/13/58 that in 1948 and 1949 JAFFE took eight courses through the Extension Division, and most of the courses were non-credit courses. She mentioned that no one could graduate by taking courses at the Extension Division. She further stated that the records were in the basement, but that her card reflects that JAFFE'S address was listed as 891-28th Avenue, San Francisco, California. (U)

[redacted], Security Department, University of California; [redacted], University Police Department, University of California, related to SA PERRY W. MOOTHART on 10/10/58 that they had no information identifiable with JAFFE. (U)

On 10/14/58, [redacted] Local Draft Board #42, located at 551 Taraval Street, San Francisco, advised SA PERRY W. MOOTHART that JAFFE was a registrant of that board under SSN 442-29-211. He had served in the U.S. Marine Reserve from 5/30/47 to 7/23/50, at which time he entered the regular U.S. Marines and served to 6/27/51 when he received an honorable discharge. He was listed as working for the International News Service as a rewrite man in 1948 and having taken courses at the Extension Division, University of California, Berkeley (date not given). (U)

The Berkeley and Oakland Police Departments and the records of the Greater East Bay Credit Bureau were reviewed on 10/9/58 by IC ROBERT L. GIBSON and contained no information identifiable with JAFFE. (U)

[redacted]

21

[redacted]

SF 105-3646
FRE:fra

On 10/14/58, SA ELLEDGE telephonically contacted the Registrar's Office of the Drew School, San Francisco, California, without disclosing his identity. He was advised that JAFFE entered the Drew School on 6/24/46 and left on 5/5/47. His address at this time was listed as 891-28th Avenue, San Francisco, California, and he indicated prior attendance at the Claremont Junior High School, Oakland, California, from 1941 to 1944. JAFFE did not graduate from Drew School. (U)

On 10/14/58, Miss [redacted], Radio Station KGO, San Francisco, California, advised SA ELLEDGE that the records of her department failed to list any employment for JAFFE at that station. Miss [redacted] commented further that she had been continuously employed at KGO since [redacted], and that she had no personal recollection of his association with this studio. She stated that JAFFE was not regularly employed by the station otherwise his name would have been included on the payroll records. She stated that this did not rule out the possibility that JAFFE may have been employed as an independent contractor, a free-lance writer or in the employ of a concern doing work for the station under contract. She advised that in order to verify such a contractural relationship, it would be necessary to review all vouchers submitted to the station for the period from 31/48 to 10/31/48, and she indicated that these vouchers were in existence at the present time. (U)

It is noted that JAFFE furnished his mailing address in 1955 as 68 Post Street, San Francisco, California. (U)

[redacted]

21

[redacted]

SF 105-3646
FRE:fra/lp

A review of the Cross-Index Street Directory for 1955 shows that the name of SAM A. JAFFE was listed for the months of March and April, 1955, as a tenant in Room 224 of the Foxcroft Building, 68 Post Street. It is also noted that these same quarters were listed to "The Nation" (magazine), and that the same telephone number, YU 2-6030, was listed to each of the above tenants. No listing was located prior to March or subsequent to April. (U)

On 10/16/58, MR. [redacted], Foxcroft Building, advised that the records of his office show that Room 224, 68 Post Street, was listed to O.D. Keep and Associates, publishers of the magazine "Fortnight" during a brief period in 1955. He stated that O.D. Keep and Associates went bankrupt and that the firm is dissolved. His records did not show JAFFE as a tenant and he stated that he assumed that any tenants listed to Room 224 had some sort of rental arrangement with O.D. Keep and Associates. (U)

In connection with JAFFE's association with "The Nation," WFO letter 9/12/55 sets forth information that JAFFE on 9/7/55 claimed he was a permanent correspondent of "The Nation" on the West Coast. New York may wish to further consider this connection with "The Nation" on the part of JAFFE in evaluating him as a PSI. (U)

The records of the San Francisco Police Department, as made available to IC RAYMOND A. LANGLOIS by [redacted] on 10/10/58, show that JAFFE was fingerprinted on 7/26/48 as an applicant for a commercial license private vehicle and was again fingerprinted on 11/30/54 as an applicant for a press pass, Northern California Correspondent, North American Newspaper Alliance. There was no additional record of JAFFE in these files. (U)

There was no record of ABRAM S. JAFFE, JOSEPHINE CLARK WINTER or JOSEPHINE CLARK JAFFE in the indices of the San Francisco Office. There was no additional information regarding SAMUEL A. JAFFE that has not previously been made available to the Bureau and the New York Office. RUC. (U)

[redacted]

21

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office M dum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 10/6/58

FROM : SAC,PHILADELPHIA (134-756)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
PSI

[redacted]

Re NY let to BU 9/22/58.

On 9/29/58, Miss [redacted], Mail and Files Clerk, Philadelphia District Office, INS, advised SE E. DAVIS PORTER that there was no record in the files of that office of any ABRAM S. JAFFE, born in Russia about 1893, having received derivitive citizenship through the naturalization of his father who entered the United States about 1894 and was naturalized at Philadelphia. (u)

On 9/29/58, SE. E. PORTER [redacted] checked the naturalization records of the USDC, EDPa., Philadelphia, for all persons names JAFFE who were naturalized during the period from 1890 through 1920. 29 petitions for naturalization by persons named JAFFE were reviewed and none was found in which the petitioner listed any child named ABRAM born about 1893. (u)

There is no information in the files of the Philadelphia Office which is identifiable with SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE or ABRAM S. JAFFE. (u)

RUC.

2 - Bureau (105-28333)(REGISTERED)
2 - New York (134-3315)(REGISTERED)
1 - Philadelphia (134-756)

EDP:MCB
(5)

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS Category 2
Date of Declassification Indef

REC- 65

—19

OCT 7 1958

[redacted]

50 OCT 10 1958

ESP/SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office M dum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 10/6/58

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (134-756)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
PSI

[redacted]

Re NY let to BU 9/22/58.

On 9/29/58, Miss MARIE DE VLIEGER, Mail and Files Clerk, Philadelphia District Office, INS, advised SE E. DAVIS PORTER that there was no record in the files of that office of any ABRAM S. JAFFE, born in Russia about 1893, having received derivitive citizenship through the naturalization of his father who entered the United States about 1894 and was naturalized at Philadelphia. (u)

On 9/29/58, SE PORTER checked the naturalization records of the USDC, EDPa., Philadelphia, for all persons names JAFFE who were naturalized during the period from 1890 through 1920. 29 petitions for naturalization by persons named JAFFE were reviewed and none was found in which the petitioner listed any child named ABRAM born about 1893. (u)

There is no information in the files of the Philadelphia Office which is identifiable with SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE or ABRAM S. JAFFE. (u)

RUC.

2 - Bureau (105-28333)(REGISTERED)
2 - New York (134-3315)(REGISTERED)
1 - Philadelphia (134-756)

EDP:MCB
(5)

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC- 65

-19

14 OCT 7 1958

[redacted]

50 OCT 10 1958

ESP/SHC

Tic: 1

SAC, San Francisco (105-3646)
REC- 6

Director, FBI (105-28333) — 18

October 3, 1958

[illegible]

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
PSI - ESPIONAGE

EX-128

Bureau authority granted to check records at the University of California through your established contacts. This background investigation concerning subject should be completed within 30 days. (C)

1 - New York (134-3315)

LML:kg
(5)

NOTE:

Bu previously approved interview with subject under Deseco. He was interviewed 9-12-58. He was extremely cooperative during interview. New York has set out leads for background information and San Francisco was instructed not to cover lead without Bureau authority. Inasmuch as subject has been interviewed and is apparently cooperative, there is no reason why background investigation at University of California should not be conducted. (C)

~~Classified by~~ 6136 ACS
~~Exempt from GDS, Category~~ 2
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

MAILED 31
OCT 3 - 1958
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

62 OCT 8 1958
MAIL ROOM ☑

OFFICE MEMORANDUM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 9/22/58

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

[redacted]

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
PSI

ReNY airtel, 9/15/58.

JAFFE was interviewed by agents of this office on 9/12/58, at which time he was cooperative and furnished information with respect to his association with Soviet nationals in the New York City area. It is the intention of this office to give consideration to the development of JAFFE as a potential security informant. Accordingly, background investigation is being instituted on JAFFE. (U)

JAFFE is employed as a news reporter by the Columbia Broadcasting System in NYC, and resides at 200 East End Ave., NYC, with his wife and two children. (u)

A review of NY file captioned, "SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE; IS-R", reflects that JAFFE was born on 6/19/29, in San Francisco, California. He formerly resided at 301 Fletcher Drive, Atherton, California, and his mailing address in 1955, was 68 Post St., San Francisco, California. His mother was DOROTHY I. JAFFE, who was born in Ohio, and is deceased. His father is ABRAM S. JAFFE, who was born in Russia, about 1893, and in 1955, resided at 891 28th Ave., San Francisco, California. JAFFE'S fathersimmigrated to the US about 1894, and was naturalized at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, through his father, on an unknown date. JAFFE was issued passport # 36093, San Francisco series, on 2/25/55. (u)

REC-1 18

2 - Bureau (105-28333) (RM)
2 - Kansas City (RM)
2 - San Francisco (105-3646) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (105-8906) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (RM)
1 - New York (134-3315)

4 SEP 25 1958

Classified by 6131
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification

EFG:1jl
(11)

57

On 11/27/52, JAFFE was married to JOSEPHINE CLARK WINTER, who was born on 10/10/32, at NYC. During interview, JAFFE advised that his wife is a volunteer worker at the United Nations International Childrens Emergency Fund. (u)

On an application for a passport, dated 7/21/52, which JAFFE'S wife filled out, she listed her permanent residence as 215 East 73rd St., NYC, and stated that her last American passport #448639 was issued in June, 1951, in Washington, D. C. Her father, LESTER CLARK WINTER, was born in Baltimore, Maryland, about 1907, and resided at Mission Road, Mission, Kansas. Her mother, JOSEPHINE A. CAVE, was born in Cleveland, Ohio, on or about 11/22/10, and resided at 19 East 72nd St., NYC. She was issued passport #50858, NY series, on 8/1/52, at NYC. In connection with an application for a passport, dated 5/25/51, at NYC, LOUIS PAVELEK, a friend, completed an affidavit supporting statements in her application. He resided at 1448 121st St., South Ozone Park, NY. (u)

On 5/14/54, the records of Time, Inc., 9 Rockefeller Plaza, NYC, were checked concerning JAFFE. These records reflected the following information: (u)

Education

1. Graduated Claremont High School, Oakland, California, 1946.

2. Graduated University of California, Berkeley, California, 1949.

(?

[redacted]

3. Attended Drew School, San Francisco, California, 2 years.

Military Service

1. United States Marine Corp, 5/30/47, to 6/27/51, rank PFC, honorably discharged, combat correspondent.

2. United States Maritime Service, no specific dates, traveled in Japan and Korea, in 1950, and 1951, and Hawaii, India and Japan, around 1945. (u)

Employment

1. Radio station KGO, San Francisco, California, edited and rewrote stories, 3/1/48, to 10/31/48.

2. International News Service, San Francisco, California, wrote and edited stores of international interest, no dates listed for this employment.

3. UN Secretariat, NYC, worked on NY radio news desk as assistant news editor from 7/31/51, to 11/30/51, and from 5/15/52, to 6/10/52.

4. BENJAMIN SONNENBERG, NYC, in public relations as a reporter and writer of feature material on the Empire State Building, NYC, dates not listed. (u)

[redacted]

[redacted]

NY 134-3315

5. Time, Inc., 9 Rockefeller Plaza, NYC; started on 6/16/52, as an editorial traninee for "Life" magazine and on 10/14/52, became a researcher for "Life" magazine. (u)

Residence

1. 25 Indian Road, Apartment 1B, NYC.

During interview on 9/12/58, JAFFE advised that his uncle with whom he is close is SAMUEL CHARLES JAFFE, the actor. SAMUEL CHARLES JAFFE is a former security index subject of this office. He was interviewed on three occasions and proved cooperative. He admitted membership in some fourteen Communist front organizations, although he never admitted membership in the Communist Party. (X)

In conducting investigation in this matter, offices should remain alert to this family relationship between JAFFE and his uncle. (X)

The Kansas City Division will conduct a credit and criminal check and contact informants concering JAFFE'S wife's mother in Mission, Kansas. Rule 18.2.3(a)

The Philadelphia Division will check the records of INS for information with respect to the naturalization of JAFFE'S father, ABRAM S. JAFFE, and if it is found that JAFFE or JAFFE'S father resided in the Philadelphia area for any length of time or during a fairly recent period, it will conduct appropriate background investigation. Rule 10.6 (u)

15

[redacted]

JAFFE'S Marine Corp record has been checked and no derogatory information has been developed. (u)

The San Francisco Division will conduct a thorough background investigation concering JAFFE including contacts with security informants, credit and criminal checks, and a check of JAFFE'S records at the University of California upon receipt of Bureau permission to make this check. Rec 10-22 (U)

The Washington Field Office will check the records of the Passport Office, US Department of State, for current information with respect to passports issued to JAFFE and his wife. Detailed information should be abstracted from these records and current photographs of JAFFE and his wife should be obtained. In addition, the records of CIA should be checked for information with respect to JAFFE, as well as records of the US Maritime Service. WFO let 11-20 C & R still out (u)

This office will conduct background investigation concerning JAFFE in the NYC area. (u) b-

The Bureau is requested to furnish San Francisco with permission to check JAFFE'S records at the University of California.. b2 Rec'd 10-3

Investigation in this matter should receive immediate attention. b5 (u)

JAFFE is described as follows:

Date of Birth:	6/19/29, at San Francisco, California
Height:	5'10"
Weight:	165 lbs.
Hair:	Reddish brown
Eyes:	Brown
Occupation:	Journalist

(u)

[redacted]

[redacted]

NY 134-3315

JAFFE'S wife is described as follows:

Hair:	Brown
Eyes:	Brown
Height:	5'7"
Occupation:	Housewife

(u)
b7c

18

[redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE 8/19/58

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-new)

SUBJECT: SAM A. JAFFE

CONFIDENTIAL

65-63478-13

ReBulet, dated 12/17/57, entitled [redacted], which directs this office to develop persons who can be placed in contact with the Soviets. (C)

On 7/23/58, SAM A. JAFFE of the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) News Department contacted this office and advised that he and SAM SCOLOW, also of CBS, were going to take VADIM A. BOGOSLOVSKI, Protocol Officer, and BORIS IVANOFF, Press Attache, both with the Soviet Delegation to the UN, to dinner that evening. JAFFE advised that they were going to pick these Soviets up at the Delegation at 7:00 p.m. He did not know exactly where they were going to have dinner, but said he would be driving his Jaguar, which bears NYS license plate 329 NYP. (C)

On 8/5/58, [redacted] advised SA RAYMOND E. BOYLE that since BOGOSLOVSKI returned to the US, he has seen him in frequent contact with SAM JAFFE, a contact man for CBS. This source said that he recalls first seeing JAFFE about a year ago talking with various newsmen. He did not see JAFFE at the UN for quite some time, but of recent dates, JAFFE has again been around the UN. This source said that JAFFE claims to be a former staff member and source believes that JAFFE claimed to have worked in the Library at the UN. (C)

cob 6/19/78

REC-12 105-28533-16

EX-140

1958

4 - Bureau (RM)
(1 - 105-48607) ([redacted])
(1 - 65-63478) ([redacted])
1 - New York (105-18989) ([redacted])
1 - New York (105-13781) ([redacted])
1 - New York (134-new)

EFG:mtj
(7)

Ltr to NY
8-28-58

Classified by 6135
Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

On 10/30/57, SAM JAFFE and a CBS camera crew made a feature film in the NYO, which was telecast in two parts over certain CBS affiliate stations on 11/13 and 14/57. JAFFE was in charge of making this film, and subsequently informed this office that CBS was highly pleased with the results obtained in this office. A review of correspondence dealing with JAFFE's participation in the taking of pictures in the NYO reveals that while doing same, he reciprocated in kind for the cooperation which the Bureau was giving him. (U)

There are numerous references to the name SAM JAFFE in NYO indices, which are presently being reviewed. (u)

This office desires to contact JAFFE on the basis of his call to this office on 7/23/58, and arrange for an interview. During this interview the Bureau's jurisdiction in matters involving the internal security of the US will be explained to him, and he will be told that the Bureau desires to have the fact that he has been contacted by the Bureau kept in strictest confidence. He will not be pressed during this initial interview for details of his association with the Soviets, although efforts will be made to determine the extent of his association with the Soviets, as well as the degree of cooperation which might be expected from JAFFE in furnishing information to the Bureau. JAFFE's attitude will govern the extent to which the interview will be pursued, and during the interview appropriate precautions will be taken in view of the fact that JAFFE is employed by a news media. (C)

Bureau permission is requested for this office to conduct a "sounding out" interview with JAFFE, in line with the above observations. Should JAFFE prove to be cooperative, background investigation will be conducted, and recommendations made to the Bureau for developing him as a PSI. (C)

9/18/58

PLAIN

AM AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-48607)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-18989)

SUBJECT: [redacted],
[redacted]

Re NY airtel dated 9/10/58, which reflects that [redacted] Guide, UN, was in contact with subject. (C)

INS records reflect that [redacted] entered the US at NY on [redacted], with a B 2 type visa, issued 10/21/57. This would appear to rule her out as being identical with the blonde American stenographer with whom subject danced on 10/1[illegible]/57, and to whom he expressed his intention of seeking asylum in the US. However, this office believes that it will still be profitable to exhibit a photograph of [redacted] to the source abroad through CIA as he may recognize some similarities between the appearance of [redacted] and the American stenographer of interest in this matter. (U)

4 - Bureau (105-48607)(RM)
(1 - 105-28333 (SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE)

1 - New York (134-3315)
1 - New York (105-18989)

EFG:mlm
(7)

6136 3

NOT RECORDED
SEP 23 1958

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN

9/18/58

PLAIN

AM AIRTEL

NY 105-18989

[redacted] advised on 9/17/58, that a female, who is apparently from the UN, mentioned to subject, that a girlfriend of hers was giving a party on Saturday and asked her if she had any friends to bring along. She thought that prehaps subject could come and also bring a friend as her girlfriend is short of men. This woman expressed the thought that it would be nice to have subject there as they would enjoy his company. Subject gave a C preliminary affirmative answer to the invitation and arranged to discuss it further with this woman at the UN on 9/18/58. He mentioned that he has had a very difficult week and that anything could happen. This woman mentioned that as far as subject's book is concerned, she has checked everyday but it has not been received as yet. She believes that these books come in from Europe. Subject mentioned that they were having a lesson tomorrow, Thursday, and ~~that~~ they arranged to see one another before their class. This woman would like to know at that time whether subject could bring a friend as she would like to advise her girlfriend so that she could plan on a certain number of people.

Informants at the UN Secretariat were alerted to the possible presence of subject there on 9/18/58, and it is C the intention of this office to afford fisur coverage of subject on Saturday, 9/20/58.

[redacted] also advised on 9/17/58, that subject and an individual believed to be SAM JAFFE were in contact with one another and that this individual invited subject to his home for dinner on Friday, 9/19/58. He gave his address as 200 West [illegible]nd Ave., NYC, (JAFFE's address). This individual C said that he wanted to see subject on the day of the opening session but that he was called to NJ about the crash which occurred there. He chided subject about the fact that subject never watches television and would not be aware of this. Subject mentioned that he had seen this individual on television interviewing a young hero, who saved a woman.

9/18/58

PLAIN

AM AIRTEL

NY 105-18989

This individual (JAFFE) mentioned to subject that EW went back to China, and that he obtained this information from his source in the Indian Delegation. He mentioned that he and LEFIE (PH) (JAFFE's wife's nickname is FIFI) were over to his source's home about a week ago. Subject accepted the invitation for dinner on Friday night but will not be able to arrive until 8:00 or 8:30 PM, because he has an English examination at 7:00 PM.

NY airtel 9/15/58, captioned, "SAMUEL ARMSON JAFFE; PSI, (TSP)" reflects the results of interview with JAFFE on 9/12/58. During this interview, JAFFE mentioned that [redacted] Afro-Asian Correspondent, was planning a return trip to Communist China. [redacted] is undoubtedly the individual to whom he referred to as EW during his contact with subject. Concerning EW subject commented that he is really a courageous man.

The Bureau will be kept advised of developments in instant matter.

FOSTER

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 9/15/58

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Re Bulet, 8/28/58.

JAFFE was interviewed on 9/12/58 by SAS JOHN G. WILLIS and EDWARD F. GAMBER. JAFFE was extremely cooperative during interview. Interview was based on a telephone call which JAFFE made to this Office advising that he was taking VADIM A. BOGOSLOVSKI and BORIS N. IVANOV to dinner. Initially and throughout the interview JAFFE was told of the necessity for respecting the Bureau's confidence at all times. He agreed to do this. (C)

Place cc. 105-48607

The Bureau's jurisdiction in matters involving the internal security of the United States was explained to JAFFE as well as the Bureau's interest in Soviet Nationals which stems from this jurisdiction. Mention was made of the fact that a large number of Soviet Nationals have been declared personna non grata in recent years because of activities in which they have engaged while in this country in a diplomatic status. JAFFE said that he was aware of this. (C)

3 - Bureau (105-28333)(RM)
1 - New York (134-3315)

REC- 4

17

EFG:rag
(5)

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

13 SEP 16 1958

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ______ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

NY 134-3315

JAFFE talked quite freely and at length about his association with Soviet Nationals. He said that in his capacity as a news reporter for the Columbia Broadcasting System, it was necessary for him to have as many contacts as possible in order to keep abreast of newsworthy incidents and information. He said that he has been very successful in cultivating the Soviets and other foreigners at the UN as news sources. He first met VADIM A. BOGOSLOVSKI and NIKOLAI KALININ at a press party at the Soviet Mission to the UN. He has ~~gotten~~ [illegible] to know these Soviets very well, and in fact he has visited their homes and they have visited his home. He said that he sees these two Soviets very frequently and is particularly close to BOGOSLOVSKI, whom he describes as being very much unlike other Soviets. JAFFE said that BOGOSLOVSKI is very outspoken and in fact gave him a 24 hour "~~N~~eat" on the decision of NIKITA KHRUSCHEV to accept an invitation to a Soviet conference under UN auspices. He said that the Soviets are useful~~l~~ in giving him the ~~decision~~ [illegible] on what is going to happen. When the Mideast problem was before the UN, KALININ told JAFFE that it would resolve itself but that he should keep his eye on China. (c)

In addition to BOGOSLOVSKI and KALININ, JAFFE is acquainted with the following Soviets:

Place [redacted]

VLADIMIR B. BARKOVSKY, Counsellor at the Sovdel

BORIS N. IVANOV, Press Officer, Sovdel

VLADIMIR N. KRESTYANOV, UN Secretar~~y~~AT, (c)

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge   Sent ______ M   Per ______

FD-36 (Rev 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in (Type in plain text or code)

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRTEL

Via (Priority or Method of Mailing)

JAFFE met KRESTYANOV on one occasion at a party at KALININ's home. (c)

During interview JAFFE said that he would be willing to furnish information to the Bureau concerning his contacts with the Soviets. However, he said that he would have to be sure that his identity would be protected at all times. He said he did not want to become another BORIS MORROS or HERBERT PHILBRICK as it would ruin his career as a news reporter if he did so. He was told that the Bureau would respect his confidence, but that he in turn would have to respect the Bureau's confidence at all times. (u)

JAFFE mentioned that at one time [redacted], Afro-American News Reporter, mentioned that the State Department had asked him if he possessed any information indicating that JAFFE was a Communist. JAFFE mentioned this by way of inquiry of interviewing agents to ascertain if they knew of any such allegation. Interviewing agents then asked JAFFE if he had ever been a member of the CP, and he said that he had not been a member of the CP or any Communist inspired organization nor has he ever sympathized with the CP. He said that his uncle, with whom he has a close association, is the actor SAMUEL CHARLES JAFFE who was active on behalf of Russian War Relief and sympathized with what proved to be Communist inspired organizations. JAFFE said that he does not believe that his uncle was a member of the CP however, and that his uncle did testify before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. (c)

SAMUEL CHARLES JAFFE is a [redacted]. He was interviewed (u)

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent M Per

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ________________________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

on January 2, 22 and February 2, 1954 by Bureau Agents and was cooperative. He denied membership in the CP but admitted membership in 14 Communist front organizations. His file contains information reflecting alledged CP membership. (U)

SAM JAFFE, subject of instant airtel, is acquainted with two known Soviet agents in the person of BARKOVSKY and KRESTYANOV, one potential Soviet defector in the person of BOGOSLOVSKI, and two other Soviets who are among the more active Soviets in the NYC area. All possible coverage of these Soviets is desirable. (C)

Should JAFFE fail to respect the Bureau's confidence, he would jeopardize his own career and certainly his contacts at the UN. This is pointed out as it is believed that this puts the Bureau in a better position to control JAFFE than would be true in the case of the average individual. (U)

It is not believed that JAFFE can be used in connection with the [redacted] at this time because of his reluctance to do anything other than furnish information to the Bureau. However, it is believed that JAFFE can be used as an informant or source of information furnishing information with respect to his contacts with the Soviets. (C)

This Office realizes that JAFFE's uncle presents one very serious drawback to his use as an informant. (U)

Approved: ________________ Sent ________ M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ____________________ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

NY 134-3315

-5-

However, it is the intention of this Office to develop background on JAFFE and in the absence of any derogatory information relating specifically to him, give consideration to further contact. Appropriate recommendation will be submitted to the Bureau. (U)

Information furnished by JAFFE regarding Soviets mentioned herein will be disseminated to appropriate case files and leads for development of background will be set forth in a separate communication. (U)

FOSTER

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________

Special Agent in Charge

1 - Le [redacted]
1 - Sh

SAC, New York

8-28-58

REC- 12 Director, FBI (105-28333) -16

EX. - 140

SAM A. JAFFE
PSI - DESECO
IS - R

Reurlet 8-19-58.

Authority granted to conduct preliminary interview with Jaffe to determine his attitude towards the Bureau and his availability for possible use in this program. This preliminary interview should be conducted immediately and, if favorable, you should immediately initiate appropriate investigation to determine his personal history, reliability, stability, and integrity. All leads set out by your office in this matter should be given a three-week deadline. Your investigation should clearly establish whether Jaffe is the type of person who can be successfully operated by the Bureau. If your investigation is favorable, the results thereof and of your preliminary interview with Jaffe should be furnished to the Bureau with a request for Bureau authority to interview Jaffe and develop him as an informant or double agent. (U)

REL:mtb
(5) mtb

MAILED 27
AUG 28 1958
COMM-FBI

NOTE: Jaffe is an employee of the Columbia Broadcasting System News Department, NYC. During the past several years he has had frequent contact with Soviet officials in the U. S., apparently in a legitimate capacity as a reporter and writer. We have interviewed him in the past concerning some of these contacts, and he has been completely cooperative. On 7-23-58, he contacted NYO and indicated he was taking two Soviets attached to the UN Delegation to dinner. By letter 8-19-58, NYO requested Bureau authority to conduct "sounding out" interview with Jaffe to determine whether he might have potential for development as a selected contact whom we can place in touch with the Soviets for intelligence purposes. NYO indicated that appropriate precautions would be observed during this interview, inasmuch as Jaffe is employed by a news media. (U)

Watkins

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room

Classified by 613 [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, [illegible]
Date of Declassification [illegible]

52 SEP 8 1958

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/28/58

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

SUBJECT: CHANGED
SAMUEL EDASON JAFFE, aka.,
Sam A. Jaffe
PSI (DESECO)

200

U 5-1

CONFIDENTIAL

ReNYlet, 8/19/58, 16 captioned "SAM A. JAFFE; PSI (DESECO)." (U)

The title of this case has been changed to reflect subject's full name as obtained in a review of case entitled "SAMUEL EDASON JAFFE; IS-R," Bufile 105-28333, subject of which is identical with subject in instant matter. File review reflects that JAFFE has been known to the Bureau as a journalist in contact with Soviets since 1954, both in Washington, D.C. and NY, NY. Contacts appeared to be legitimate. JAFFE travelsd extensively and has traveled to Russia. (C)

JAFFE voluntarily contacted SF on 12/29/55, and was interviewed there re his association with Soviets, and proved cooperative. (U)

This office still desires to conduct a "sounding out" interview with JAFFE based on his telephone call to this office on 7/23/58, re his dinner engagement with two Soviet nationals. Permission for this interview requested in relet 8/19/58. (U)

Bulet 8/28/58 [illegible] 9/5

FOSTER

3-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (134-3315)

REC- 54

EX-135

105-28333-15

Classified by 6135

Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

EFG:ume
(5)

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Me... ...um • UNITED ... ...OVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 5/3/57

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-8180) SECRET

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS-R

Re New York Airtel 4/1/57, captioned [redacted] in which information is set forth reflecting that on 3/29/57 [redacted] Street, Brooklyn, New York (protect identity) furnished information that he had ascertained through a discussion with associates of his, that SAM JAFFE (ph), a free lance reporter, had left a gathering of the Asian-African Student Group some months ago in the company of VLADIMIR A. GRUSHA.

NY
INDONESIA
(C)

On 4/1/57 [redacted] advised that the only information he could furnish regarding JAFFE was that he knew he had attended the Bandung Conferences; was in his mid 30's, and was an American newsman. [redacted] did not have any additional information regarding JAFFE, and stated that he did not know him personally, although he had met him on one or two occasions. (C)

As the Bureau is aware, GRUSHA, a Soviet National, is a known intelligence agent. He had been in the United States since 1953, and departed the United States on 4/10/57. In addition to being the Soviet principal in a double agent operation involving [redacted], in which he had attempted to secure information relating to Russian emigre, GRUSHA was recently identified through information from an informant as having actively cultivated a Ceylon National for the purpose of stealing the Ceylon code from the Delegation of the Ceylon Government in New York City. (C)

3-Bureau (2-105-28333) (RM)
(1-105-21920) (INFO) (RM)
1-WFO (105-8906) (INFO) (RM)
1-San Francisco (105-3646) (INFO) (RM)
3-New York (1-105-8180)
(1-105-5857) ([redacted])
(1-105-20452) ([redacted])

105-28333-14

JFM:PWB
(8)

Classified by 6(3/...
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

RECORDED - 75
INDEXED - 75

MAY 7 1957

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ESP SEC

60 MAY 15 1957

On 3/5/57, Special Agents of the FBI observed the activities of a certain individual in the offices of the Ceylon Delegation where the afore-mentioned code was known to be kept, and subsequently observed this individual with GRUSHA. Approximately one hour later, after this individual had again been observed with GRUSHA, he was observed returning a red covered book to the offices of the Ceylon Delegation. (c)

A review of the New York Office Indices reflects numerous references to the name SAMUEL JAFFE; however, based on the information from [redacted], it would appear that the subject is identical with the JAFFE named by [redacted]. This identification is based upon the following facts obtained from the previous investigation of the subject. (c)

According to [redacted], JAFFE, on numerous occasions during 1955 and 1956, had been in contact with individuals at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. in regard to visa matters pertaining to his contemplated travel to the USSR. (S)

In April, 1954, according to [redacted] JAFFE was in contact with the Soviet United Nations Delegation in New York City. At this time, it was determined that he was employed as a culture researcher for "Life" Magazine in New York City, and had contacted the Soviet United Nations Delegation in connection with some work he was doing on a story for this magazine. Subsequently, it was determined from inquiry at the offices of "Life" Magazine, that JAFFE was born on 6/19/28. (S)

Passport records of the Department of State, reviewed on 7/27/55, (as set forth in WFO letter of 8/25/55), reflect that JAFFE, in a supplemental statement dated 6/22/55 in connection with his passport, indicated that he wished to have his passport amended to allow him to travel in Communist China as a professional American journalist. It was indicated further, that he had excellent reason to believe that the Red Chinese Government would allow him to enter their country as a journalist in view of the fact that during the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, he obtained an interview with Red Chinese Premier CHOU-EN-LAI. (C)

On 4/30/57, Mr. [redacted], 200 East End Avenue, New York City, advised SA JOHN F. MABEY that the subject, who is presently an employee of the Columbia Broadcasting System in New York City, presently resides in an apartment at this address with his wife and small child. (c)

In view of the information which is set forth in the subject's investigative file reflecting numerous past contacts on his part with various Soviets attached to both the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and the Soviet United Nations Delegation, New York City, and the fact that the subject has a history of employment in the capacity of a news correspondent, the New York Office feels that no contact should be initiated at this time with the subject concerning his association with GRUSHA. In addition, it is to be noted that following a contact by the subject with KONSTANTIN G. FEDOSEEV, Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., on 7/9/54, a representative of "Time" and "Life" Magazines contacted the Bureau, alleging that he believed JAFFE had been under surveillance by the FBI. (C) RUSSIA

The New York Office feels that subject's contact of GRUSHA possibly can be logically explained as a normal contact in view of the subject's employment, and it is felt that an interview with JAFFE would possibly result in embarrassment to the Bureau should the subject take exception to the Bureau's interest in his activities. (C)

Copies of this letter are being disseminated to the Washington Field Office and San Francisco Office for information in view of their past interest in the subject. (u)

CONFIDENTIAL

MAILED

DEC 13 1956

NAME CHECK

December 11, 1956

SAMUEL ADASEN JAFFE
Born: June 19, 1919
San Francisco, California

No investigation pertinent to your inquiry has been conducted by the FBI concerning the captioned individual. However, the files of this Bureau reflect the following information concerning Samuel Adason Jaffe, who was born June 19, 1929, at San Francisco, California. (c)

The Passport files, Department of State, disclosed that his mother, Dorothy I. Jaffe, was born in Ohio and is deceased. His father, Abram S. Jaffe, was born in Russia about 1893 and resided at 891 28th Avenue, San Francisco, California. (c)

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, learned on August 29, 1951, that a Sam A. Jaffe contacted the Soviet United Nations Delegation, New York City, and stated he was contacting the Delegation on behalf of the San Francisco Press Club. He indicated the club wanted to invite Andrei Gromyko to speak informally before the club.

(Source: [redacted])

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Jaffe was in contact with various members of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., in 1953, 1954 and 1955. Our source advised that Jaffe contacted the Embassy regarding a visa to enter the Soviet Union.

(Source: [redacted])

Passport records, Department of State, disclosed that subject had requested, on June 6, 1955, that his passport be validated for travel to the Soviet Union.

/3

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following background information regarding Jaffe on May 14, 1954:

RECORDED

DEC 14 1956

INDEXED - 10

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
osen
amm
ease
interrowd
ele. Room
olloman
Gandy

Orig. and one to [redacted]
Req. Rec'd: 11/20/56
M. L. Armstrong:cgm
(4)

Info in above memo furnished [redacted] 1/23/56.

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR
ADD. [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

Samuel Adasen Jaffe

Education:

1. Graduated Claremont High School, Oakland, California, 1946.
2. Graduated University of California at Berkeley, California, 1949. (C)
3. Attended the Drew School, San Francisco, California, two years.

Mititary Service:

1. United States Marine Corps, May 30, 1947, to June 27, 1951; rank, Private First Class; honorable discharged; combat correspondent.
2. United States Maritime Service, no specific date, but traveled in Japan and Korea in 1950 and 1951, and Hawaii, India and Japan around 1945. (C)

Employment:

1. Radio Station KGO, San Francisco, California, edited and rewrote stories, March 1, 1948, to August 31, 1948.
2. International News Service, San Francisco, California. No dates listed for this employment.
3. United Nations Secretariat, New York City, worked on New York radio news desk as assistant news editor from July 31, 1951, to November 30, 1951, and from May 15, 1952, to June 10, 1952.
4. Benjamin Sonnenberg, New York City; he worked here in public relations as a recorder and writer of feature material regarding the Empire State Building, New York City. Dates of employment not listed.
5. Time, Incorporated, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City; he began there June 16, 1952, as an editorial trainee for "Life" magazine; on October 14, 1952, he became a researcher for "Life" magazine where he was still employed as of May 14, 1954.

Samuel Adasen Jaffe

Residence, 1954:

25 Indian Road, Apartment 1B, New York City. (C)
(105-28333 page 12)

Jaffe was interviewed at his request by agents of this Bureau on January 3, 1956, at his home 301 Fletcher Drive, Atherton, California. He identified himself as a correspondent currently representing the North American Newspaper Alliance. He stated he was formerly employed by "Time" and "Life" and in connection with this latter employment, had been assigned to writing and research on the articles published in "Life" magazine dealing with the various religions of the world. Jaffe stated that in connection with this assignment he made the acquaintance of Fedoseev (Konstantin G. Fedoseev), Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Jaffe said he had contacted Fedoseev initially in his efforts to obtain a visa to enable him to enter China. He commented this had been a mistake to approach the Soviets in this regard inasmuch as they could not or at least did not, do anything to aid in the issuance of the visa. (C)

Jaffe advised he had been attempting to obtain a visa to enter the Soviet Union to write a series of articles on conditions existing there and in his efforts to obtain this visa he had again contacted Fedoseev. After considerable delay, he was advised that a visa would be issued for a period not to exceed two weeks. Jaffe said he contacted Fedoseev in the hope that he could obtain a visa for a longer period of time, but Fedoseev advised Jaffe the issuance of such a visa would not follow, but that he could possibly obtain an extension on the two weeks' visa. Jaffe stated he challenged the statement of Fedoseev that his visa would be extended and since he could receive assurance of a visa for a period not to exceed two weeks, he had decided against making the trip to the Soviet Union and he returned to his home in Atherton from Washington, D. C., and New York. (C)

Jaffe commented that in discussing his desire for a visa with Fedoseev, the latter had indicated that should Jaffe write objectively concerning the Soviet Union he, Fedoseev, felt certain Jaffe's visa would be extended. Jaffe said he challenged this remark by Fedoseev and indicated to the latter he felt Fedoseev's remarks were equivalent to blackmail and that in order for him to get an extension on his visa it would be necessary for him to slant his articles in favor of the Soviet Union. Fedoseev denied this intent and stated only that they desired the articles to be written objectively. (C)

Samuel Adasen Jaffe

Jaffe stated that during his conversation with Fedoseev, he had remarked that his, Jaffe's, father was born in the Soviet Union. Fedoseev seemed to be impressed by the above statement and inquired as to whether Jaffe's father was still a citizen of the Soviet Union. Jaffe informed Fedoseev his father was an American citizen and Fedoseev was apparently very disturbed concerning this and on several occasions inquired as to whether Jaffe had any relatives currently residing in the Soviet Union. Jaffe stated Fedoseev was visibly disturbed when advised Jaffe had no relatives in the Soviet Union. (C)

The files of this Bureau contain no information in addition to the above pertinent to your inquiry. However, you may desire to consult the Passport Division of the Department of State for additional information regarding Jaffe's background. (105-28333 - 11) C

The foregoing information is furnished to you as a result of your request for an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or a nonclearance of the individual involved. This information is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated outside of your agency. (u)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: August 21, 1956

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS - R

SECRET

[redacted] advised 8-17-56, that SAM JAFFE (PH), NYC, contacted employee IVAN F. BUKANOV at Soviet Embassy and asked for his passport. BUKANOV stated he had it but he understood that they (possibly U. S. State Department) would not allow him to travel in China. JAFFE laughed and stated "I think it will work out." He said he would apply for a Soviet visa when he reaches Peking. JAFFE then asked that BUKANOV forward his passport right away to CBS News, but then said it would be best to send it to his home, 200 East 66th Street, Apartment C-1101, New York. BUKANOV said he would send it Special Delivery.

Submitted for information.

2-Bureau
1-New York (105-8180) (Info) — REGISTERED MAIL
1-WFO
LEW/mdb
(4)

5-1

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

EX 104

RECORDED - 91 28333-12

29 AUG 22 1956

ESP. SEC.

1-D

60 AUG 23 1956

CONFIDENTIAL   Ticklers: Mr. Turyn
Liaison Section

69748

105-28333

BY COURIER SERVICE

CS-1

Date: January 23, 1956

To: Director (orig & 1)
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Regional CIA 2-27-56

Reference is made to your request for a check of FBI files regarding Sam A. Jaffe dated January 11, 1956.

A review of files of this Bureau ~~disclosed that~~ subject's full name is Samuel Adason Jaffe who was born June 19, 1929, at San Francisco, California. His permanent residence address is listed as 301 Fletcher Drive, Atherton, California, and his mailing address is 68 Post Street, San Francisco, California. Passport files, Department of State disclose that his mother, Dorothy I. Jaffe, was born in Ohio and is deceased. His father, Abram S. Jaffe, was born in Russia about 1893 and currently resides at 891 28th Avenue, San Francisco, California. His father, Abram S. Jaffe, immigrated to the United States about 1894 and has resided continuously in the United States from 1894 to 1955. Abram S. Jaffe was naturalized at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, date unknown, through his father. (C)

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

83 JAN 2

VT:mpp
(5)

1 ENCL.

NOTE: Background info set out on page 2 and 3 furnished by Miss [redacted], Time, Inc., NYC. There may appear to be conflicts as regards various dates of subject's activities; however, it is set out herein exactly as reported to us by [redacted]. (C)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

138

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAN 26 1956

RECORDED-27

EX-107

JAN 24 1956

Letter to Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Subject was last married on December 27, 1952, to Josephine Clark Winter who was born in New York City and who resides at the above Fletcher Drive address. (u)

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, learned on August 29, 1951, that a Sam A. Jaffe contacted the Soviet United Nations Delegation, New York City, and stated he was contacting the Delegation on behalf of the San Francisco Press Club. He indicated the club wanted to invite Andrei Gromyko to speak informally before the club. (Source: [redacted]) (S)

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Jaffe was in contact with various members of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., in 1953, 1954 and 1955. Our source advised that Jaffe contacted the Embassy regarding a visa to enter the Soviet Union. (Source: [redacted]) (S)

Passport records, Department of State, disclosed that subject had requested, on June 6, 1955, that his passport be validated for travel to the Soviet Union. (c)

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following background information regarding subject on May 14, 1954: (C)

Education:

1. Graduated Claremont High School, Oakland, California, 1946.
2. Graduated University of California at Berkeley, California, 1949.
3. Attended the Drew School, San Francisco, California, two years.

(U)

Military Service:

1. United States Marine Corps, May 30, 1947, to June 27, 1951; rank, Private First Class; honorably discharged; combat correspondent. (U)

2. United States Maritime Service, no specific date, but traveled in Japan and Korea in 1950 and 1951, and Hawaii, India and Japan around 1945. (U)

Employment:

1. Radio Station KGO, San Francisco, California, edited and rewrote stories, March 1, 1948, to August 31, 1948.
2. International News Service, San Francisco, California. No dates listed for this employment.
3. United Nations Secretariat, New York City, worked on New York radio news desk as assistant news editor from July 31, 1951, to November 30, 1951, and from May 15, 1952, to June 10, 1952.
4. Benjamin Sonnenberg, New York City; he worked here in public relations as a recorder and writer of feature material regarding the Empire State Building, New York City. Dates of employment not listed.
5. Time, Incorporated, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City; he began there June 16, 1952, as an editorial trainee for "Life" magazine; on October 14, 1952, he became a researcher for "Life" magazine where he was still employed as of May 14, 1954. (U)

Residence, 1954:

25 Indian Road, Apartment 1B, New York City.

(105-28333 page 12)

Jaffe was interviewed at his request by agents of this Bureau on January 3, 1956, at his home 301 Fletcher Drive, Atherton, California. He identified himself as a correspondent currently representing the North American Newspaper Alliance.

Letter to Director
Central Intelligence Agency

He stated he was formerly employed by "Time" and "Life" and in connection with this latter employment, had been assigned to writing and research on the articles published in "Life" magazine dealing with the various religions of the world. Jaffe stated that in connection with this assignment he made the acquaintance of Fedoseev (Konstantin G. Fedoseev), Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Jaffe said he had contacted Fedoseev initially in his efforts to obtain a visa to enable him to enter China. He commented this had been a mistake to approach the Soviets in this regard inasmuch as they could not, or at least did not, do anything to aid in the issuance of the visa. (C)

Jaffe advised he had been attempting to obtain a visa to enter the Soviet Union to write a series of articles on conditions existing there and in his efforts to obtain this visa he had again contacted Fedoseev. After considerable delay, he was advised that a visa would be issued for a period not to exceed two weeks. Jaffe said he contacted Fedoseev in the hope that he could obtain a visa for a longer period of time, but Fedoseev advised Jaffe the issuance of such a visa would not follow, but that he could possibly obtain an extension on the two-weeks' visa. Jaffe stated he challenged the statement of Fedoseev that his visa would be extended and since he could receive assurance of a visa for a period not to exceed two weeks, he had decided against making the trip to the Soviet Union and he returned to his home in Atherton from Washington, D. C., and New York. (C)

Jaffe commented that in discussing his desire for a visa with Fedoseev, the latter had indicated that should Jaffe write objectively concerning the Soviet Union he, Fedoseev, felt certain Jaffe's visa would be extended. Jaffe said he challenged this remark by Fedoseev and indicated to the latter he felt Fedoseev's remarks were equivalent to blackmail and that in order for him to get an extension on his visa it would be necessary for him to slant his articles in favor of the Soviet Union. Fedoseev denied this intent and stated only that they desired the articles to be written objectively.

Letter to Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Jaffe stated that during his conversation with Fedoseev, he had remarked that his, Jaffe's, father was born in the Soviet Union. Fedoseev seemed to be impressed by the above statement and inquired as to whether Jaffe's father was still a citizen of the Soviet Union. Jaffe informed Fedoseev his father was an American citizen and Fedoseev was apparently very disturbed concerning this and on several occasions inquired as to whether Jaffe had any relatives currently residing in the Soviet Union. Jaffe stated Fedoseev was visibly disturbed when advised Jaffe had no relatives in the Soviet Union. (C)

Files of this Bureau contain no information in addition to the above pertinent to your inquiry. It is noted that Jaffe has traveled extensively abroad and the Passport Division of the Department of State would probably have additional information regarding subject's background. (U)

b5

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

INDEXED

Office Memo   *n* • UNITED STA   ERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 1/6/56

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (105-3646)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

On 12/29/55 JAFFE telephonically contacted SA LEWIS H. JOHNSON of the San Francisco Office and advised that he had received a letter addressed to him from a JERRY RUBIN, which letter indicated that RUBIN desired to contact JAFFE regarding the latter's trip to Russia. JAFFE advised that the letter from RUBIN was written on plain stationery and set forth RUBIN's telephone number. JAFFE advised that he had telephonically contacted RUBIN and the latter had indicated that he was employed by a Government agency and desired to make an appointment to discuss with JAFFE the latter's trip to Russia. JAFFE advised SA JOHNSON that he was suspicious of RUBIN inasmuch as the latter had written his letter on plain stationery and had declined to identify the Government agency with which he was connected. JAFFE advised that an appointment had been made for him to meet with RUBIN on January 4, 1956. JAFFE requested an agent of this office contact him prior to the above-arranged meeting. (U)

SA FRED R. ELLEDGE contacted JAFFE at the latter's home, 301 Fletcher Drive, Atherton, California, on January 3, 1956. JAFFE at this time repeated the information furnished by him to SA JOHNSON regarding RUBIN. [redacted] advised that at the time of the Wednesday appointment RUBIN should exhibit proper credentials, and in the event he did not do so JAFFE advised that he would contact the San Francisco Office of the FBI. (U)

JAFFE identified himself as a correspondent presently representing the North American Newspaper Alliance. He stated that he was formerly employed by "Time" and "Life" and in connection with this employment had been assigned to writing and research on the article published in "Life" magazine dealing with the various religions of the world. JAFFE stated that in connection with this assignment he had made the acquaintance of FEDOSEEV (KONSTANTIN G. FEDOSEEV), Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. JAFFE stated that he had contacted FEDOSEEV initially in his efforts to obtain a visa to enable him to enter China. He commented that it had been a mistake to approach the Soviets in this regard inasmuch as they could not or at least did not do anything to aid the issuance of this visa. (U) C

Classified by 6/26
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

JAFFE stated that he had been attempting to obtain a visa to enter the Soviet Union to write a series of articles on conditions existing there and in his efforts to obtain this visa he had again contacted FEDOSEEV. After considerable delay he was advised that a visa would be issued for a period not (C)

RECORDED-39

2 - Bureau (105-28333)(Registered)
1 - Washington Field (105-3906)(Information)(Registered)
1 - New York (105-8180)(Information)(Registered)
1 - San Francisco (105-3646)

13 JAN 10 1956

INDEXED-69

to exceed two weeks. JAFFE stated that he had contacted FEDOSEEV in hopes to obtain a visa for a longer period of time but FEDOSEEV had advised him that the issuance of such a visa would not follow but that he could possibly obtain an extension on the two weeks' visa. JAFFE stated that he challenged the statement of FEDOSEEV that his visa would be extended and since he could receive assurance of a visa for a period not to exceed two weeks he had decided against making the trip to the Soviet Union and had returned to his home in Atherton from Washington, D.C., and New York. (C)

JAFFE commented that in discussing his desire for a visa with FEDOSEEV, the latter had indicated that should JAFFE write objectively concerning the Soviet Union he, FEDOSEEV, felt certain that JAFFE's visa would be extended. JAFFE stated that he challenged this remark of FEDOSEEV and indicated to the latter that he felt FEDOSEEV's remarks were equivalent to blackmail and that in order for him to get an extension on his visa he would have to slant his articles in favor of the Soviet Union. FEDOSEEV immediately denied this intent and stated only they desired the articles to be written objectively. JAFFE stated that during his conversation with FEDOSEEV he had remarked that his, JAFFE's, father had been born in the Soviet Union. FEDOSEEV seemed very impressed by this statement on the part of JAFFE and inquired if JAFFE's father was still a citizen of the Soviet Union. JAFFE stated that when he advised FEDOSEEV that his, JAFFE's, father was an American citizen that FEDOSEEV was apparently very disturbed concerning this and on several occasions inquired of JAFFE if the latter had any relatives still residing in the Soviet Union. JAFFE stated that FEDOSEEV was visibly disappointed when advised that JAFFE had no relatives presently residing in the Soviet Union. (C)

The above is furnished for the information of the Bureau, Washington Field, and New York by virtue of their interest in activities of JAFFE to obtain a Soviet visa to visit Russia. (U)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: December 6, 1955

111 WHA

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INTERNAL SECURITY - R & CH

Reference is made to WFO airtel to Bureau dated 11/22/55.8 (u)

[redacted] advised that on December 1, 1955, the subject, [redacted], talked with KONSTANTIN G. FEDOSEEV (Counselor, Embassy of USSR) regarding his request for an extension on his visa permitting him to travel to to the Soviet Union. FEDOSEEV said that he was working to extend the visa from two weeks to three weeks and asked that JAFFE notify him when he leaves the US on this trip. JAFFE said that he received a nice letter from the Chinese about his entry into China and was informed that his request is still pending. JAFFE checked his entry date into Russia as December 14, 1955, and said that he saw ALETHIA (ph) LARSON, the photographer, and she told him she was granted a three week visa good for this spring. Some discussion followed regarding JAFFE'S purchase of travel coupons from the Cosmos Travel Bureau. (S)

This data is being furnished the Bureau, San Francisco, and New York for information. (u)

1-New York (105-8180)(Info.)(RM)
1-San Francisco (Info)(RM)
HLL:akl
(5)

RECORDED-48

INDEXED-48

105-28333-9

16 DEC 6 1955

EX. - 124

Classified By 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

85 DEC 15 1955

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

AIRTEL

FBI WASH FIELD 11/22/55

DIRECTOR (105-28333) AND SACS SAN FRANCISCO (INFO)
NEW YORK (105-8180)(INFO)

SAMUEL ADAM JAFFE
IS-R

Reference is made to WFO ~~airtel~~ Memo to Bureau dated 10/26/55.

[redacted] advised 11/17/55 that subject informed KONSTANTIN G. FEDOSEEV, Counselor, Embassy of USSR, that he, JAFFE, would visit Embassy 11/18/55 and wanted to take FEDOSEEV to lunch. Informant advised 11/18/55 that JAFFE was in the Embassy at 10:36 AM on that date. On same day, Special Agents ROBERT L. [illegible] and [illegible] D. WILSON from stationary lookout observed an individual answering subject's description enter the Embassy at 10:36 AM and leave at 11:31 AM. This individual returned to the Embassy at 12:47 PM and left in the company of FEDOSEEV at 12:52 PM.

This is being furnished the Bureau, SF and NY for info.

LAUGHLIN

HLL:BH
(6)
105-6906

AIRTEL

NOV 28 1955

8

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Mem m • UNITED ST VERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: October 28, 1955

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906)

SECRET

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS - R

Reference is made to WFO letter dated September 12, 1955, to the Bureau, San Francisco, and New York under the above caption. (u)

On October 25, 1955, [redacted] advised that on that date the subject, [redacted], informed KONSTANTIN G. FEDOSEEV that he had received the good news that he was granted a visa to Russia. The subject said that he planned to go to New York in about one and one-half weeks and would see FEDOSEEV sometime between November 7 and 9, 1955. FEDOSEEV asked if JAFFE was going to take his two and one-half year old son with him since he was planning to stay in Moscow some time. JAFFE said he was. FEDOSEEV cautioned him that it was a cold climate there and did not advise it. FEDOSEEV suggested that the subject get in touch with Union Tours, 15 West 36th Street, New York, where he can buy coupons toward travel expense in Russia. JAFFE asked if FEDOSEEV would write him a letter regarding the possibility of contacting and interviewing Soviet leaders, stating that he would like to do the same type of thing he did when he interviewed the Chinese Premier. FEDOSEEV said they would discuss it when they got together. (S)

The above information is being forwarded to the Bureau, San Francisco, and New York for information. (u)

HLL/mmd
1-CC-SAN FRANCISCO (Info) -- REGISTERED -- AIRMAIL
1-CC-NEW YORK (Info) -- REGISTERED
(5)

105-1597

RECORDED - 25 105-28333-7

INDEXED - 25 23 NOV 1 1955

ESP. SEC.

Classified by 6135
Exempt from GDS Category 2,3
Date of Declassification indefinite

1-D

NOV 7 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Men......ım • UNITED ST ERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: September 12, 1955

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS - R

Reference is made to WFO letter dated August 25, 1955, to the Bureau, San Francisco, and New York, captioned as above, and setting forth a review of the passport files regarding JAFFE and his wife, as well as information contained in WFO indices regarding JAFFE's contacts with Soviet Embassy personnel. (c)

Russia

[redacted] advised on September 7, 1955, that on that date SAMUEL JAFFE, [redacted], asked KONSTANTIN G. FEDOSEEV if he had heard anything about his visa request yet. FEDOSEEV said he had not, but hoped he would be able to help JAFFE soon. JAFFE said he is leaving for California tomorrow, and will be unable to come to see FEDOSEEV. He will, however, write FEDOSEEV tonight, giving him the address where he will be in California. FEDOSEEV asked if JAFFE would be permanently in California. JAFFE said he was permanent correspondent of the "Nation" on the West Coast. If he got the visa, however, he would go immediately via Scandinavian "Polar" route. JAFFE's wife, FIFI, would like to go, and has applied for a visa too, but primarily JAFFE's visa request is of most importance. (S)

Mrs Samuel Adason Jaffe

WFO indices are negative on the name of FIFI JAFFE.

The above has been sent to the Bureau, San Francisco, and New York for information.

ABM:agb

1 - San Francisco (Info)(RM)
1 - New York (105-8180)(Info)(RM)

(5)

RECORDED - 77
INDEXED - 77
105-28333-6
SE 48

14 SEP 16 1955

EX-108

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

52 SEP 21 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Me dum • UNITED OVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 8/25/55

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906)

SUBJECT: CHANGED
SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS - R

SECRET J 5-1,7

2
5
6
8
10
11
12

The title of this matter has been marked changed to show the full name of JAFFE as shown in his passport file. (c)

Reference is made to Bulet dated 7/19/54 to New York and WFO captioned "SAM A. JAFFE; IS - R," no copy being sent to San Francisco. Information contained in Bulet dated 7/19/54 will be set forth hereinafter. (u)

Inasmuch as the Passport Office, Department of State, Washington, D. C., has authorized the American Embassy at New Delhi, India, that when Soviet visas are assured, the passport of JAFFE and the passport of JAFFE's wife, JOSEPHINE WINTER JAFFE, nee JOSEPHINE CALRK WINTER, aka Mrs. SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, should be endorsed that when appropriately visaed each is valid for one round trip to the USSR, the Passport Office made their passport files available for review. Born - 10-23-32 [illegible] (c)

These files were reviewed on 7/27/55 by SA ALBERT B. MILLER and reflect the following:

By communication dated 6/6/55, the American Embassy at New Delhi, India, advised the Department of State, Washington, D. C., that in consequence of the recent KHRUSHCHEV (a high official in the Soviet government) statement welcoming visits from American journalists, SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, Special Correspondent of "The Nation" and his wife, JOSEPHINE WINTER JAFFE, have inquired of the Soviet Embassy, New Delhi, regarding the possibility of a three-week visit to the Soviet Union and they say a tentative reply is affirmative. They related their purpose in wanting to go to the Soviet Union is to study and write about advancement made in the USSR, freedom prevailing there, and chances of preventing war. The communication concluded by relating that JAFFE and his wife request the Department of State to remove the travel to the Soviet Union restriction. B (c)

By communication dated 6/28/55, the Department of State, Washington, D. C., advised the American Embassy, New Delhi, that when

ABM:sap
(6)

SE 47 105-[illegible]-5

2 - San Francisco (Encl. - 8) (RM)
1 - New York (105-8180) (Encl. - 4) (Info) (RM)

RECORDED - 30
INDEXED - 30
14 AUG 26 1955

ESP. SEC.

71 SEP 7 1955 1429

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Soviet visas are assured their passports should be endorsed that when appropriately visaed each is valid for one round trip to the USSR for a period not to exceed three weeks. (C)

An application dated 2/23/55 at San Francisco, California, for a passport by JAFFE reflects the following:

His full name is SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE and he was born 6/19/29 at San Francisco, California. His permanent residence is 301 Fletcher Drive, Atherton, California, and his mailing address is 68 Post Street, San Francisco, California. He has never resided outside the U. S. His last American passport was obtained from Washington, D. C., on 5/25/51, number 444214. (C)

(It is noted that the application in regard to Passport Number 444214 was unavailable for review. Information regarding possible previous passports was also unavailable. All passport information which was available is set forth herein.) (C)

His mother, DOROTHY I. JAFFE, born in Ohio, is deceased. His father, ABRAM S. JAFFE, born in Russia about 1893, resides at 891 28th Avenue, San Francisco, California. ABRAM S. JAFFE immigrated to the U. S. about 1894, has resided continuously in the U. S. from 1894 to 1955, and was naturalized at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, date unknown, through his father. (C)

He was last married on 12/27/52 to JOSEPHINE CLARK WINTER, who was born in New York City in 1932 and who resides at the above Fletcher Drive address. (C)

JAFFE applied for the passport to visit on "business - 'Nation' magazine, Djakarta, Indonesia, approximately three weeks." Under countries to be visited he listed India, Thailand, Burma, Japan, Indonesia, and Pakistan. He intended to depart San Francisco about 3/15/55 via Pan American Airways and intended to stay abroad three or four months. (C)

The application described him as 5' 10", brown hair, brown eyes, occupation, journalist. A photograph of him affixed to the application shows his hair is cut short and that he wears a mustache. (C)

He was issued Passport Number 36093, San Francisco series, on 2/25/55. This passport is not valid for travel to Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, or the USSR unless specifically endorsed by the Department of State as being valid for such travel. (c)

A letter dated 2/23/55 on the letterhead of the "Nation," 68 Post Street, San Francisco, California, signed by JAFFE as West Coast Correspondent addressed to the Passport Agency, Department of State, San Francisco, California, relates that his Far Eastern trip will be made as a working journalist; that the trip will last approximately three months and he will visit such countries as Japan, Burma, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Thailand. (c)

A letter dated 2/25/55 on the above letterhead, signed by JAFFE, as West Coast Bureau Chief, addressed to Mr. HARRY H. BOLDS, Passport Agency, San Francisco, California, relates that as the "Nation" magazine's West Coast Bureau Chief he is classed as a member of the Publications Board of Editors. Thus, he is in the position of an editorial executive. He wrote further that as he explained to BOLDS those in authority at their home office in New York are on vacation. While in the employ of Time, Incorporated, "Life" magazine, he made a trip to Asia in an editorial capacity; that BOLDS' New York office asked him to write a letter on "Life"stationery stating the purpose of his trip abroad though at the time he was making the journey for some other publications. He explained this and the fact that he was only a reporter. This, JAFFE wrote, seemed to make no difference as long as the New York agency had a letter on file. (c)

An application for amendment of Passport Number 36093, San Francisco series, as above, dated June 22, 1955, and signed by JAFFE, Imperial Hotel, New Delhi, India, was forwarded by the American Consular Service at New Delhi to the Department of State, Washington, D. C., for consideration and decision. The application reflects that JAFFE desired his passport be made valid for travel in Communist China. In the application he referred to an attached supplemental statement. (c)

The supplemental statement is dated 6/22/55 and is on the letterhead of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi. It shows the following: (c)

SECRET

JAFFE asks that his passport be amended allowing him to travel in Communist China as a professional American journalist and he understands that he will personally assume all the risks in such an undertaking. If this request is not within the power of the Department of State to approve, he desires to know if the Department of State would have any objection if he deposited his passport with the nearest Embassy and entered Communist China, assuming all risks, as a private citizen. (C)

His purpose in visiting Communist China would be in the capacity of a professional journalist for the "Nation" magazine of America and other American publications to write on what is taking place in Red China today. He would also seek an interview with Red China's leader MAO TSE-TUNG and other Communist officials. He would try to interview the eleven American fliers held by the Reds and the Americans who have deflected to the side of the Reds. He would deport himself in the best interests of the U. S. and would provide information to his Government upon his return. (C)

He has excellent reasons to believe that the Red Chinese government would allow him to enter their country as a journalist. During the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, he obtained an interview with Red Chinese Premier CHOU-EN-LAI through the good offices of Prime Minister U NU of Burma. He filed a full report of this interview with the American Embassy at Rangoon, Burma on 5/20/55 and previously he had informed the American Consul at Singapore of certain statements CHOU-EN-LAI made to him during the interview. The Red Chinese know that Prime Minister U NU thinks well of him. (C)

He was also told by one KANG MAO-CHAO, Counselor for Cultural Affairs at the Red Chinese Embassy in New Delhi that he stood an excellent chance of being admitted to his country, as "My Premier was impressed by the way your story was handled." KANG MAO-CHAO added that also in his favor was the fact that CHOU-EN-LAI knew him as well as do others in his government. His request for admittance to Red China is presently being considered by the authorities at Peking. (C)

JAFFE concluded his statement by relating that he hopes that in making a decision the Department will realize that it would be in the best interests of our Government and our people that an American journalist be permitted to visit Red China to report firsthand on the state of affairs there. (C)

An Application dated 7/31/52 at New York City for a passport by Mrs. JAFFE, then JOSEPHINE CLARK WINTER, reflects the following: (C)

Her full name is JOSEPHINE CLARK WINTER and she was born 10/10/23 at New York City. Her permanent residence and mailing address is 215 East 73rd Street, New York City. She resided outside the U. S. in France and Italy from 6/20/51 to 7/51. Her last American passport, number 448639, was obtained from Washington, D. C., in June, 1951, and is lost. She has never married. (C)

MELVILLE N.Y.

Her father, LESTER CLARK WINTER, was born in Baltimore, Maryland, about 1907 and resides at Mission Road, Mission, Kansas. Her mother, JOSEPHINE A. CAVE, was born at Cleveland, Ohio, on or about 11/22/10 and resides at 19 East 72nd Street, New York City. (C)

WINTER

She applied for the passport to visit France, Italy, Switzerland, and England for pleasure. She planned to depart New York via TWA about 8/6/52 and intended to stay abroad one month. (C)

PAUL (last two names illegible), no relation, 4324 Colden Street, Flushing 52, New York, completed an affidavit that he has known JOSEPHINE CLARK WINTER for four years and that the statements made by her in the application are true to the best of his knowledge and belief. (C)

The application described her as 5' 7", brown hair, brown eyes, occupation - "none."

She completed an affidavit on 7/31/52 that she lost the American passport which was issued her about June, 1951; that she made an exhaustive search for it and it is not in her possession. She does not know where or when she lost it; did not give it to anybody, or let anybody take it. She reported the loss to the 19th Precinct, Police Department of New York City, East 67th Street. (C)

By letter dated 7/31/52, return address New York City, to the Department of State, Washington, D. C., she asked that her passport be issued in time for her flight on TWA, 8/6/52, because the trip is necessary immediately as her grandmother, sojourning in Paris, urgently desires her presence on the 7th. (C)

She was issued Passport Number 50858, New York series, on 8/1/52 at New York City. This passport was not valid for travel to (C)

Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, or the USSR unless specifically endorsed by the Department of State as being valid for such travel. It was also valid for only two months, to expire 10/1/52. (C)

She applied to have her passport, number 50858, New York series, amended to show her date of birth as 10/23/32 instead of 10/10/23 as shown in her passport. Her passport was so amended on 8/6/52. A notation by the amending official on this undated application, reflects that a previous passport, number 631887, issued on 6/9/39 at Washington, D. C., shows her date of birth as 10/23/32. (C)

A Photostat of a City of New York Certificate of Birth reflects that a female WINTER was born in New York to LESTER C. and JOSEPHINE on 10/23/32. N.Y. [illegible] Winter [illegible]

N.Y.
Chi.
K[illegible]

She applied to have the above passport amended to show her married name, JOSEPHINE WINTER JAFFE. She set forth that she married SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE on 12/27/52 at New York City. A handwritten notation dated 5/3/54 by a passport office employee on the undated application, reflects that the passport should be amended to show her married name JOSEPHINE WINTER JAFFE. (C)

An undated memo signed by her relates that she intends to accompany her husband for approximately six weeks, leaving the first part of August, to Japan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines. "My husband, as a journalist is going to seek information for stories, on personal business." (S)

On an undated application for a renewal of her passport number 50858, New York series, she related that since passport number 50858 was issued her on 8/1/52, she resided in Italy in August, 1952, on a vacation trip. She gave her mailing address as 25 Indian Road, New York 34, New York. She stated she intended to depart San Francisco, California, about 8/2/54 via PAA, proposed to stay abroad approximately six weeks, and intended to visit Japan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines on a vacation. (C)

Her passport was renewed on 5/3/54, making it valid until 7/31/56. This passport is not valid for travel to or in Korea. (C)

On the application, dated 5/25/51, at New York City, for passport number 448639, which was issued her on 6/1/51 at Washington, D. C., she gave her birth data as 10/23/32, New York City and her permanent residence as 19 East 72nd Street, New York City. She listed her occupation as student and related she intended to depart New York City about 6/1/51 for France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, for pleasure and intended to stay abroad 55 days. According to the application, she was previously issued passport number 631887 at Washington, D. C., on 6/9/39 and resided outside the U. S. in England from June, 1939, to 7/3/40. LOUIS PAVELEK, friend, 1448 121st Street, South Ozone Park, New York, completed an affidavit that he has known her ten years and to the best of his knowledge and belief the statements made by her in the above application are true. (c)

In connection with passport number 631887, as above, it is noted that she was six years old when it was issued. WFO did not ask the Passport Office to make the application for it available. (c)

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE was searched through WFO indices with the following results:

A report of SA MARTIN CAREY dated 11/2/51 at New York entitled [redacted], New York origin, Bufile 62-77787-240, New York file 100-92701, WFO file 105-1105-30, lists chronologically the daily activities of the Soviet delegation, Byelorussian delegation, Ukrainian delegation, and also those Soviet nationalists attached to the U. N. Secretariat, all of which are in New York City. Pages 1, 8, 9, and 11 of the above report reflect that T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past (Security Informant [redacted]), learned that on 8/29/51 a Mr. SAM A. JAFFE, stated he was contacting the delegation on behalf of the San Francisco Press Club, indicated that the club wanted to invite GROMYKO to speak informally before them. On the same date, 8/29/51, SAM JAFFE recontacted the delegation and since he was unable to contact GROMYKO in New York, indicated that he would have a friend contact GROMYKO in San Francisco. The above New York report then sets out parenthetically that it should be noted that this JAFFE is not identical with a person of the same name connected with the New York State Communist Party. (c)

WFO indices reflect the following information from [redacted] (S)

(FEDOSEEV and SMIRNOVSKY, referred to below, are characterized as follows):

SECRET

(The "Diplomatic List" of August, 1954, issued by the Department of State, reflects KONSTANTIN G. FEDOSEEV as a counselor, Embassy of the USSR, and MIKHAIL N. SMIRNOVSKY as a First Secretary, Embassy of the USSR.) (C)

On 7/13/53, one SAM JAFFY (phonetic), [redacted], asked E. P. PODGORNAYA for N. P. SAVCHENKO or anyone else with whom he could talk about a visa. PODGORNAYA advised JAFFY that no one was in the office as it was lunch time. JAFFY related he would call again after the lunch hour. U.S.S.R., D.C. (S)

The "Diplomatic List," July, 1953, issued by the Department of State, lists NIKOLAI P. SAVCHENKO as a Second Secretary, Embassy of the USSR, D.C., and ELENA P. PODGORNAYA as an Attache, Embassy of the USSR, D.C. (C)

On 12/30/53, FEDOSEEV contacted SAM JAFFE in New York regarding the letter he had sent to Ambassador ZARUBIN on November 24th. FEDOSEEV said per JAFFE's request ZARUBIN had sent this letter on to Moscow but to date no reply had been received, and further in line with JAFFE's letter of December 28th, FEDOSEEV would advise him when anything is received. JAFFE went on to indicate that he is coming to Washington tomorrow and that he is going to visit at the Legation of Yemen since the King of Yemen has granted him permission to visit Yemen to do the Islamic phase of the religious story. JAFFE mentioned that he is doing a series of articles and stories on the various religions. FEDOSEEV will contact JAFFE when anything is received from Moscow. (S)

On 1/20/54 SAM JAFFE, "Life" magazine, asked SMIRNOVSKY whether the Embassy had heard anything from Moscow about the thing he had spoken to him and Ambassador ZARUBIN about. SMIRNOVSKY said they had not. JAFFE pointed out that they wanted to do a completely fair job on all five religions, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism, and they could not do justice to the last three without actually going to China. SMIRNOVSKY was very friendly and said he would try to see that the people in Moscow were reminded again. (S)

On 2/5/54, SAM JAFFEY (phonetic), asked SMIRNOVSKY if he received the letters and was told he had. JAFFEY asked if any action would be taken. SMIRNOVSKY replied that the Ambassador was not here to act upon it and as a result the matter will be decided upon in Moscow. JAFFE said he heard reports and has read in the newspapers that there are Chinese advisors in Berlin at the present time. SMIRNOVSKY replied (S) that he had read this also. JAFFE expressed considerable concern about receiving action on his proposal and then asked if SMIRNOVSKY knew of any place in the U. S. where one could buy Russian vodka and SMIRNOVSKY said he did not. (S)

On 2/18/54 SAM JAFFEY (phonetic), told SMIRNOVSKY that he planned to be in Washington next Thursday and wondered if SMIRNOVSKY would have lunch with him. SMIRNOVSKY said he would and suggested that he call him when he gets in town. JAFFEY said he is working on a story regarding the Indian caste system; that he already has the Hindu story laid out covering about 40 pages; that at a conference yesterday it was decided that photos would have to be taken in China, i.e, pictures of temples but still they have not received an answer from the Peking government. JAFFEY wondered if Ambassador ZARUBIN could be of further help in this matter if a wire were sent to him in Germany. SMIRNOVSKY said it would be all right to send the wire. They agreed to discuss this further Thursday. (S)

On 2/26/54 SAM JAFFE, "Life," tried to reach Ambassador ZARUBIN finally spoke instead with FEDOSEEV, with whom he went over again "Life's" project for photographic essays of religions of the world and their desire to get into China. FEDOSEEV promised that he and the Ambassador would do all they could, but that they just had not heard as yet. JAFFE emphasized that all he wants is a definite answer even if it is no. (S)

On 3/22/54, SAM JAFFE [redacted], asked whether FEDOSEEV had heard any word from the Peoples Republic of China regarding his request. JAFFE pointed out that the Chinese will be holding a big Confucius ceremony in April and he would like to cover it to get material for his story. JAFFE went into great detail explaining the importance for covering the ceremony in China proper since it is the birth place of Confucius. He said they would probably cover it in Korea and on Formosa. FEDOSEEV agreed to talk the request over again with the Ambassador and call JAFFE when something comes in. (S)

On 4/9/54, SAM JAFFE [redacted] tried to reach FEDOSEEV, was told that he was out to lunch now and to call back at 2 o'clock. JAFFE said that he wanted to know something about the "Red Star" magazine (Red Army magazine), and was told FEDOSEEV would help on this matter. (S)

On 4/9/54 SAM JAFFE again attempted to reach FEDOSEEV and was told by SMIRNOVSKY that he was not in the Embassy. JAFFE said this call did not pertain to the Chinese proposal but to a drawing published in the end of the March issue of the "Red Star" of the "H Bomb." (S)

SECRET

SMIRNOVSKY said he had not received that issue as yet but to contact Mr. TARASOV in the New York office and see if he has that issue. JAFFE said he had contacted TARASOV regarding this matter and that TARASOV was checking on it. JAFFE said he would then recontact TARASOV. (S)

On 6/28/54 SAM JAFFE (phonetic), told FEDOSEEV that he was calling to say hello. He was in Washington up at the "Life" office for two weeks and he wondered if FEDOSEEV would like to have dinner with him and his wife one day during his stay here. FEDOSEEV asked JAFFE for his telephone number - REpublic 7-6050 - and said he would call JAFFE in a couple of days. FEDOSEEV asked JAFFE when it would be convenient for him. JAFFE said he would be free any time. (S)

On 7/2/54 SAM JAFFE asked FEDOSEEV if it would be all right if they postponed their dinner because he was just notified that EISENHOWER was making a trip this week and that he, JAFFE, was selected to make the trip too. He will probably be back on Monday. FEDOSEEV said he would be working on Monday and will call JAFFE about noon. JAFFE is living at the Mayflower Hotel, Room 877. He will be glad to have dinner with FEDOSEEV Monday night if the latter can arrange it. (S)

On 7/5/54 FEDOSEEV tried to reach Room 877 at the Mayflower but no one answered at the room. (S)

On 7/6/54 SAM JAFFE informed FEDOSEEV that he had expected to call him yesterday but that the President had decided to stay another day. JAFFE asked FEDOSEEV when they could meet and gave him a choice of Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday. JAFFE suggested that they meet (did not say where) at 7 o'clock and FEDOSEEV said he would call him back at his office either today or tomorrow to make it definite. FEDOSEEV asked JAFFE when he would be leaving Washington and JAFFE said he thought it would be on Saturday. (S)

On 7/12/54 SAM JAFFE told FEDOSEEV that he had just talked to Mr. HUNT about getting a picture of the ZARUBINs either today or tomorrow in the big room of the Embassy. FEDOSEEV promised to check with the Ambassador and call JAFFE back either today or tomorrow. (S)

On 8/19/55 SAM JAFFE, Nation magazine, calling from New York, told K. G. FEDOSEEV that he applied for a visa to enter Russia on June 6th, in New Delhi, India, where he was during an Asian tour for the magazine. He checked on the visa in Rome and in Paris, but got no word. He checked in London, where they had no information, but Mr. MOLCHANOV there promised to check with Moscow on it. Also, while in London, JAFFE said he contacted KINGSLEY MARTIN, of the "New Statesman," who had just (S) returned from Russia. MARTIN said he had a friend in the Soviet Embassy in London, a First Secretary, Mr. DENCHINSKY (ph), who also talked to JAFFE about the visa and promised to help. Just before JAFFE left London for the U. S., he received word from DENCHINSKY that the matter was being considered at the highest level, and word of the results would be given to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, or directly to the magazine in New York. JAFFE asked FEDOSEEV to help him. FEDOSEEV asked if JAFFE planned on being in Washington, D. C., soon. JAFFE said he hoped to be here next week. It was arranged that he will call FEDOSEEV the day before coming down to arrange to get together and FEDOSEEV will try to find out about the visa in the meantime. JAFFE and FEDOSEEV recalled that they had had dinner together some time ago. (S)

WFO indices also reflect the following:

WFO agents on physical surveillance observed the following:

On 7/9/54 at 8:37 pm FEDOSEEV and his wife, NONNA ~~N.~~ FEDOSEEVA, in the company of JAFFE and his wife departed the FEDOSEEV residence, Chastleton Hotel, 1701 16th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., and walked to the Colony Restaurant, 1737 DeSales Street, N. W., which they entered at 8:58 pm. They departed the restaurant at 11:18 pm and walked to the vicinity of the FEDOSEEV residence where the couples separated. JAFFE and his wife then entered a taxicab and thereafter engaged in strenuous efforts to detect or lose the physical surveillance. (C)

The Bureau advised NY and WFO by letter dated 7/19/54 that on the following day, 7/10/54, a representative of "Time" and "Life" magazines contacted the Bureau alleging that he believed JAFFE had been under surveillance by the FBI on the previous night. A representative of "Time" and "Life" magazines stated that JAFFE has an assignment to write a story on contemporary religions and plans to go to Red China for the purpose of studying Buddhism. JAFFE was in contact with FEDOSEEV and other Soviets to obtain their co-operation in travel clearance. (C)

With the above letter, the Bureau sent to WFO for its information a copy of a letter dated 6/11/54 from New York to the Bureau captioned "SAM A. JAFFE, IS - R, and [redacted], [redacted]." For the information of San Francisco, this letter reads as follows: (C)

On 4/9/54 [redacted] advised that SAM JAFFE, JUdson 6-1212, Ext. 120, spoke to TARASOV and called him by his first name, IVAN. JAFFE stated it has been a long time since he spoke to TARASOV. According to the informant, JAFFE told TARASOV, "We are still working on that China thing and we are dealing with KONSTANTIN FEDOSEEV in Washington." JAFFE mentioned to TARASOV he wanted to get hold of "Red Star" magazine, March issue, which contains a story JAFFE wanted to see. TARASOV said he would look it up and call JAFFE: (S)

It is noted that IVAN V. TARASOV is the Second Secretary of the Soviet Mission ~~to the UN~~. N.Y. [illegible] (c)

It is to be noted that JUdson 6-1212 is listed to Time, Incorporated, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, NYC.

On 5/14/54 Miss [redacted] (identity to be protected), [redacted] at Time, Incorporated, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, NYC, furnished the following information regarding SAM A. JAFFE, the only individual with that name presently employed. JAFFE is presently employed as a Culture Researcher for "Life" magazine and has previously been in most sections of research for that magazine. (c) (c)

The following information was also furnished:

Education

1. Graduated Claremont High School, Oakland, California, 1946
2. Graduated University of California at Berkeley, California, 1949
3. Attended the Drew School, San Francisco, two years

(c)

Service

1. United States Marine Corps, 5/30/47 to 6/27/51, rank PFC, honorably discharged, combat correspondent
2. United States' Maritime Service, no specific dates, but travelled in Japan and Korea in 1950 and 1951 and Hawaii, India, and Japan around 1945

Employment

1. Radio Station KGO, San Francisco, California, edited and rewrote stories, 3/1/48 to 10/31/48 (c)
2. International News Service, San Francisco, California, wrote and edited stories of international interest, no dates listed for this employment (c)
3. United Nations Secretariat, New York City, worked on New York Radio News Desk as assistant news editor from 7/31/51 to 11/30/51 and 5/15/52 to 6/10/52 (c)
4. Benjamin Sonnenberg, New York City, worked here in public relations as a reporter and writer of feature material on the Empire State Building, New York City, dates not listed (c)

5. Time, Incorporated, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City, started here 6/16/52 as an editorial trainee for "Life" magazine; on 10/14/52 became a researcher for "Life" magazine where he is still employed in that capacity. (C)

Residence

25 Indian Road, Apartment 1-B, New York City (C).

Description

Name	SAM A. JAFFE
Date of Birth	6/19/28
Height	5' 11"
Weight	165 lbs.
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Sandy
Marital Status	Single
Social Security No.	522-30-09-39

(C)

The above New York letter concluded by setting forth that a case has been opened under the caption "SAM A. JAFFE; IS - R" in the NYO and will be investigated as directed in no number SAC letter AF Series, 1952 dated 10/22/52 captioned "Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations - Double Agent Program"; that subsequent correspondence in this case will be carried under the single caption of the subject. (C)

In addition to the information set forth above, the Bureau's letter of 7/19/54 set forth that inasmuch as the reason for JAFFE's contacts with the Soviets has been determined and in view of his allegations in regard to a physical surveillance conducted on him on 7/9/54, it is not believed desirable to continue inquiries in regard to him for the purpose of considering his development as a source of information in regard to Soviet activities. The Bureau concluded that no further investigation should be conducted regarding JAFFE unless additional information comes to WFO or NY's attention that JAFFE may be engaged in activities inimical to the security of the U. S., at which time the Bureau should be appropriately advised. (C)

WFO indices are negative regarding Mrs. JAFFE, JOSEPHINE WINTER JAFFE, nee JOSEPHINE CLARK WINTER, aka Mrs. SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE. (u)

Enclosed herewith to San Francisco are the negative and three copies of the photograph of JAFFE, which is affixed to his passport application dated 2/23/55. (c)

Enclosed herewith to New York are two copies of the above photograph. (c)

Enclosed herewith to San Francisco are the negative and three copies of the photograph of Mrs. JAFFE, which is affixed to her passport application dated 7/31/52. (c)

Enclosed herewith to New York are two copies of the above photograph of Mrs. JAFFE. (c)

The foregoing has been sent the Bureau, San Francisco, and New York in accordance of SAC Letter 54-38, 7/27/54, pages 16 and 17, "Persons Who Travel in the Soviet Union." (u)

UACB, WFO contemplates no further action.

SAC, New York (105-8180) July 27, 1954

Director, FBI (105-28933)

SAM A. JAFFE
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

ReBulet 7-19-54.

Enclosed is a copy of Bulet to WFO, dated 7-22-54, captioned "[redacted]" For information of NYO, WFOlet dated 7-15-54, pointed out that it has been the experience of WFO, from persons interviewed, that the latter have been told by the Soviets they probably would be surveilled as a result of being in contact with the Soviets. (C)

Inasmuch as it is possible a similar situation may arise in the course of investigations being conducted by the NYO, it is suggested the possibility the Soviets may be advising persons contacting them to be alert for surveillances be brought to the attention of agents conducting such surveillances in the NYO. (C)

Enclosure

JJT:rmc

RECORDED - 90
EX-108

1 - 28933-4

AUG 4 1954
132

MAILED 10
JUL 27 1954
COMM-FBI

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Nichols ____
Belmont ____
Harbo ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Sizoo ____
Winterrowd ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

Classified by 613
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

51 AUG 12 1954

SAC, Washington Field Office

7/22/54

Director, FBI

105-29333-

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

Reurlet dated 7/15/54 in the captioned case and Bulet dated 7/19/54 in the case captioned Sam A. Jaffe, Internal Security - R. (u)

It was pointed out in referenced Bureau letter that a study of the material relating to the surveillance submitted by you failed to indicate that Jaffe had any facts to support his belief that he was under physical surveillance and it appears merely to have been a suspicion on his part. (c)

Your observation that the Soviets very possibly are advising persons contacting them to be alert for surveillances may very well be true. It is desired, therefore, that at your next Surveillance Squad Conference that the surveillance of Fedoseev on 7/9/54 be thoroughly discussed so that all Special Agents employed on surveillances can again be alerted to the possible attempts by the Soviets to endeavor to cause embarrassment to the Bureau through any means. (c)

GCG:DB db

Tolson ____
Boardman ____
Nichols ____
Belmont ____
Harbo ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Sizoo ____
Winterrowd ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
JUL 22 1954
MAILED

53 AUG 12 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

SAC, Washington Field July 19, 1954

Director, FBI (105-28333)-3

RECORDED - 3

CONFIDENTIAL

SAM A. JAFFE
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Re New York let 6/11/54, captioned as above and WFO airtel, 7/10/54, captioned, [redacted] [redacted] Internal Security - R," and WFO let 7/15/54, entitled, "[redacted] Internal Security - R." A copy of referenced New York let is enclosed herewith for WFO. (C)

For the information of New York, Jaffe and his wife were observed in contact with the Fedoseevs on 7/9/54. Following the contact they engaged in strenuous efforts to detect or lose the physical surveillance and on the following day a representative of "Time" and "Life" magazines contacted the Bureau alleging that he believed Jaffe had been under surveillance by the FBI on the previous night. The representative of "Time" and "Life" magazines stated that Jaffe has an assignment to write a story on contemporary religions and plans to go to Red China for the purpose of studying Buddhism. Jaffe was in contact with Fedoseev and other Soviets to obtain their cooperation in travel clearance. A study of this material by the Bureau has failed to indicate that Jaffe had any facts to support his belief that he was under physical surveillance and it appears merely to have been suspicion on his part. (C)

MAILED 11
JUL 19 1954
COMM-FBI

Bufiles contain no pertinent derogatory data identifiable with Jaffe other than that already in your possession. In this connection, your attention is directed to the report of SA John J. Morris, dated 3/1/54, at Washington, D. C., entitled, "[redacted]h [redacted], Internal Security - R," New York (C)

Classified by G136 [illegible]
Exempt [illegible] Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

cc - 2 - Washington Field

cc - 4 - New York

CC - 105-15978
105-26141
105-353190

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

7

CONFIDENTIAL

file 105-3728, WFO file 105-2264. This report indicates previous contacts by the Jaffes and the Soviets apparently for the same purpose as their recent meeting. (c)

As we have now determined the reason for Jaffe's contacts with the Soviets and in view of his allegations in regard to a physical surveillance conducted on him on July 9, 1954, it is not believed desirable to continue inquiries in regard to him for the purpose of considering his development as a source of information in regard to Soviet activities. Therefore no further investigation should be conducted in this matter unless additional information comes to your attention indicating that Jaffe may be engaged in activities inimical to the security of the United States, at which time, the Bureau should be appropriately advised. (c)

Extra copies of this letter are being furnished WFO for its file 105-2264 on [redacted] and its file 105-5848 on [redacted] (c)

Extra copies of this letter are being furnished NYO for its file on Fedoseev and 105-4145 on [redacted]. [redacted] (c)

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Boardman July 16, 1954

A. H. Belmont

[redacted]

INTERNAL SECURITY - R

In Mr. Nichols' memo to Mr. Tolson dated July 13, 1954, it is reported that James R. Shepley of "Time" and "Life" magazines in Washington, called on July 10, 1954, stating that he believed the FBI had a surveillance on Sam Jaffe, a writer for "Time" and "Life" who has the assignment of writing a story on contemporary religions. Shepley stated that Jaffe plans to visit Red China to study Buddhism. (U)

Jaffe and his wife on July 9, 1954, had dinner with Konstantin Fedoseev of the Soviet Embassy and the latter's wife. Shepley stated the purpose of this meeting was to get Fedoseev's cooperation in travel clearance. The Director commented, "I want facts re this situation." (C)

WFO has submitted a memorandum of explanation from the Agents engaged in the surveillance referred to above. This memo states that at 8:37 p.m. on the night of July 9, 1954, surveilling agents observed Fedoseevs, accompanied by an unidentified couple leave the Fedoseev's residence and walk to a nearby restaurant. During this period the four persons under surveillance did not appear to be surveillance conscious. Agents did not enter the restaurant as they thought this would be indiscreet. The Fedoseevs and the unidentified couple left the restaurant at 11:18 p.m. and were immediately observed to scrutinize passing traffic and other pedestrians in the area. In view thereof, the surveillance was maintained from a discreet distance. After walking in a roundabout way to the residence of the Fedoseevs at 16th and R Sts., N.W., the unidentified couple took a taxi. The taxi followed a circuitous route to the Mayflower Hotel, during which time the unidentified couple constantly peered through the rear and side windows at passing automobiles and pedestrians. After leaving the taxi at the Mayflower Hotel at 12:26 a.m., the unidentified couple subsequently identified as Sam Jaffe and his wife, of "Time" and "Life" magazines, engaged in a series of maneuvers designed to determine if they were under surveillance. This included several entrances and exits ~~in~~to the Mayflower Hotel and excursions to side streets in the vicinity during which period they appeared to be looking for surveillance by hiding in store fronts and doorways and unexplainably reversing the direction of their travel. Six different agents participated (C)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

105-20151
cc -105-15273
10[illegible]-5333
Attachment
C.P:fjm

Classified by 636[illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2/3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NOT RECORDED
AUG 5 1954

COPY FILED IN

at one time or another in the surveillance on foot and three different automobiles were used at various times. Surveillance agents and automobiles were interchanged frequently and according to the agents, no situation arose indicating that their surveillance had been in fact detected. SAC Laughlin of the WFO talked to the agents who conducted it and states that during the period after the surveillance was initiated at 8:37 p.m. when the four individuals went from the Chastelton Hotel to the Colony Restaurant none of them indicated any awareness of surveillance or any consciousness of being surveilled; however, when the party left the restaurant at 11:18 p.m. they were noted to be on the lookout for surveillance and the agents proceeded with appropriate discretion. SAC Laughlin states that it would appear that something may have been said while the party was in the restaurant about being followed by the FBI which could account for the sudden awareness of the possible surveillance. It has been the experience of WFO from persons interviewed that they have been told by the Russians they probably would be surveilled as a result of being in contact with the Russians. (C)

SAC Laughlin further points out the taxi driver who was interviewed some twenty minutes after he left the Jaffes at the Mayflower Hotel stated that after picking up the couple at 16th and R Sts., N. W., they told him they were "newspaper people," had spent the evening with a "couple of Russians" and they probably would be followed. The cab driver was instructed to try to "lose them." The cab driver stated that the Jaffes were attempting to obtain license numbers but he did not think they were successful. He stated that he, himself, had not been able to detect any surveillance. SAC Laughlin further points out that on one occasion when Jaffe and his wife entered the Mayflower Hotel they looked back out of the entrance on to the street and were not aware of the fact that the surveilling agents had preceded them into the hotel lobby by a side entrance and were in the lobby at the time the Jaffes were looking outside for the surveillance. WFO subsequently identified the Jaffes through inquiries at the hotel and by reference to material in WFO files which was located the following day. (C)

In this connection, it is to be noted that Jaffe was already the subject of an investigation by reason of his previous contacts with the Soviets with a view to possible future interview with him for consideration as a source of information in regard to the Soviets. (U)

SAC Laughlin states that in view of the difficult circumstances under which this surveillance was conducted, it does not appear that *it was handled indiscreetly and therefore, does not recommend any administrative action.* (U)

OBSERVATIONS:

Fedoseev is a Counselor at the Soviet Embassy and his wife is in charge of the Press Department which has replaced the defunct Soviet Information Bulletin. Both are important figures at the Soviet Embassy and are suspected of Soviet intelligence activities. The importance of identifying unknown individuals who have personal contact with officials of Soviet establishments and in particular with persons like Fedoseev and his wife is an important and necessary part of our coverage of Soviet activities. It becomes even more important to identify such persons when they act in a suspicious manner or attempt to detect a possible surveillance. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

1. As it appears that the surveillance was conducted discreetly under difficult circumstances and no specific fact has been developed indicating that the surveillance was in fact compromised, the statement of the "Time" and "Life" magazines representative would appear to reflect only Jaffe's suspicions that he was under surveillance. No administrative action is recommended. (U)

2. In view of the actions of Jaffe in the matter and as we now know the reason for his contacts with the Soviets, no further consideration should be given to an interview with him for possible development as a source of information regarding Soviet activities. A letter to the New York and Washington Field offices containing appropriate instructions is attached hereto. (U)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Me[illegible]um • UNITED [illegible]OVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI DATE: July 15, 1954

FROM : SAC, WFO

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Re telephone call from Mr. C. E. HENNRICH of the Bureau today regarding this matter.

Attached is a memorandum submitted by Special Agents ARTHUR J. ACHENBACH, KEVIN F. FLANAGAN, DONALD A. GRUENTZEL, JOHN H. KENOYER, ROBERT G. McGEARY and JOSEPH E. SCULLY describing the surveillance maintained by them on FEDOSEEVA, her husband, SAM JAFFEE and his wife on the evening of July 9, 1954. (C)

I have talked to the Agents who handled this surveillance which was being conducted in accordance with instructions issued under the Soviet Intensification Program. The purpose of these surveillances is to determine whether the subjects under surveillance are engaged in intelligence or espionage activities and to identify any contacts which may be observed in the course of the surveillance. (C)

As explained by the Agents, and as will be noted from the attachment, the surveillance was initiated at 8:37 P.M., at which time this party were observed walking from the Chastleton Hotel to the Colony Restaurant. During this period, which constituted approximately twenty minutes, no activities whatever on the part of the subjects under surveillance indicated any awareness or any consciousness of being surveilled. As the party left the restaurant at 11:18 P.M., they were noted to be on the lookout for a surveillance, even going to the extent of scrutinizing passing persons and traffic. The Agents noticed this awareness immediately and proceeded with appropriate discretion. It would appear that something may have been said during the time the party were in the restaurant about being followed by the FBI, which may account for the sudden awareness of a surveillance on the part of this group. It has been the (C) experience of this office from persons we have interviewed that

ENCL.

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

RECORDED

LLL:MCP

Attachment

65-

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: Nonna Nikolaevna Fedoseeva

they have been told by the Russians they probably would be surveilled as a result of their contact with the Russians. (C)

The remarks made to the taxi driver, as reported by him, plus the activities of this group, reflect a definite effort on their part to determine whether they were actually under surveillance. The admission by the taxi driver that he did not detect any surveillance seemed to indicate that it was handled properly and with discretion. This would appear to be borne out further by the fact that when Mr. JAFFEE and his wife entered the Mayflower Hotel they looked out of the Mayflower Hotel onto the street and were obviously not aware of the fact that Bureau Agents had them under surveillance in the lobby of the hotel. (U)

The surveillance of Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE was discontinued at 12:42 A.M., when it was learned from the cab driver that they possibly were "newspaper people", but thereafter inquiries were made in the hotel to determine the identity of the JAFFEEs. (U)

In view of the difficult circumstances under which this surveillance was conducted, it does not appear that it was handled indiscreetly and, therefore, no administrative action is recommended. (U)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, WFO

DATE: 7/15/54

FROM : SAs ARTHUR J. ACHENBACH, KEVIN F. FLANAGAN, DONALD A GRUENTZEL, JOHN H. KENOYER, ROBERT G. McGEARY, JOSEPH E. SCULLY

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R
(Physical Surveillance of July 9, 1954)

The following summarizes the physical surveillance conducted on July 9, 1954, concerning the [redacted], KONSTANTIN G. FEDOSEEV, MRS. FEDOSEEV, SAM JAFFEE, and Mrs. JAFFEE. (C)

At 8:37 P.M., SAs DONALD A. GRUENTZEL and ROBERT G. McGEARY observed Mr. and Mrs. FEDOSEEV and an unknown young couple, subsequently identified as SAM JAFFEE and wife, leave the Chastleton Hotel, 16th and R Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. They walked directly to the Colony Restaurant, 1737 DeSales Place, N. W., by way of 16th Street, N Street and 17th Street, N. W. They were observed to enter this restaurant at 8:58 P.M. No attempt was made to keep the party under observation within the restaurant, because it was felt that this could not be done discreetly. (C)

At 11:18 P.M., SAs JOSEPH E. SCULLY, DONALD A. GRUENTZEL and ROBERT G. McGEARY observed the party leaving the Colony Restaurant. These Agents, who were on foot, observed the group walk west on DeSales Place, N. W., north on Connecticut Avenue to N Street, N. W. They observed that FEDOSEEV and JAFFEE walked together very slowly and appeared to be in deep conversation. It was also noted that FEDOSEEVA and Mrs. JAFFEE were walking together about 10 feet behind their husbands and were also conversing. The Agents noticed that the party on departing the Colony Restaurant appeared to be scrutinizing passing traffic and other pedestrians in the area. Consequently, the Agents maintained a discreet distance from the group. (C)

On reaching Connecticut Avenue, SA JOHN H. KENOYER took over the surveillance on foot and observed the party continuing to walk north on Connecticut Avenue, around Dupont Circle, N. W., at which time SA DONALD A. GRUENTZEL rejoined the surveillance on foot. The two Agents observed the party walk northeast on New Hampshire Avenue, N. W., to 16th Street, N. W., and then south on the west side of 16th Street, N. W., to R Street, N. W. While walking from Dupont Circle to this point, the Agents noticed that the party carefully observed other pedestrians and passing automobiles. At no time did a Bureau automobile pass the party or come within its sight. The cars were utilized solely (C)

AJA/KFF/DAG/JHK/RGM/JES:af

105-28333-3

for maintaining contact with the Agents who were on foot. CONFIDENTIAL

Agents GRUENTZEL and KENOYER observed the party standing on the corner of 16th and R Streets, N. W., conversing for about three minutes. At 12:04 A.M., Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE were observed entering Skyking Taxi Cab #60. At this time, the Agents on foot brought up a surveillance car occupied by SAs SCULLY and ACHENBACH. These Agents observed the taxi proceeding south on 16th Street to M Street, N. W. At this point, SA McGEARY, in another Bureau car, took over the surveillance and observed the cab proceeding west on M Street to 17th Street, N. W., then south on 17th Street, N. W., to I Street, N. W., at which point SA KEVIN F. FLANAGAN, in another Bureau car, took over the surveillance. SA FLANAGAN observed the taxi proceeding west on I Street and south on 17th Street to E Street, N. W. At this point, the first surveillance car took over the surveillance and observed the taxi proceeding east on E Street, N. W., then circle through the Ellipse back to 17th Street, N. W. At this point, SA McGEARY, in a Bureau car, rejoined the surveillance, and the Agents in both cars observed the taxi cab proceeding north on 17th Street, N. W., and Connecticut Avenue to the Mayflower Hotel. The Agents noticed that from the time Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE entered the taxi cab until they alighted at the Mayflower Hotel, they frequently looked through the rear window of the taxi cab. The cab varied its speed noticeably throughout the ride. (c)

Scully At 12:26 A.M., Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE were observed by SAs ACHENBACH, FLANAGAN and KENOYER leaving the taxi in front of the hotel. They looked up and down the street and then walked south on Connecticut Avenue, almost to L Street, N. W., whereupon they turned around and started back toward the hotel. At this time, SAs ACHENBACH and KENOYER entered the hotel through the DeSales Street entrance and seated themselves in the lobby. Agent FLANAGAN entered the hotel through the Connecticut Street entrance and proceeded to the desk. About three minutes later, Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE were observed by these Agents entering the hotel through the Connecticut Avenue entrance. Immediately after entering the hotel, Mr. JAFFEE and his wife were observed standing in the entrance-way and looking up and down Connecticut Avenue. They then proceeded to the center of the lobby where they separated. Agents KENOYER and ACHENBACH observed Mr. JAFFEE walk toward the 17th Street end of the lobby and out of sight. All three Agents observed Mrs. JAFFEE walk to the hotel desk, at which SA FLANAGAN was filling out a reservation form under an alias. After completing the form, SA FLANAGAN walked out of the hotel. At this time, SAs ACHENBACH and KENOYER observed Mrs. JAFFEE purchase a package of cigaretts at the desk. She was then rejoined by her husband, and both Agents observed the couple (U) leave the hotel. During the time that Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE were in the

CONFIDENTIAL

lobby, the Agents noticed that the JAFFEES were very observant of persons in the lobby. In view of the late hour, few people were in the lobby.

At 12:32 A.M., SA GRUENTZEL observed Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE come out of the Connecticut Avenue exit of the hotel and, after looking up and down Connecticut Avenue, walk south on Connecticut Avenue to L Street, N. W. At this time, SA ACHENBACH joined the foot surveillance of Agent GRUENTZEL. They observed the JAFFEES crossing Connecticut Avenue at L Street and disappear from view going west on L Street. Approximately two minutes later, SA ACHENBACH observed Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE in a doorway located on the L Street side of a business establishment at the intersection of L Street and Connecticut Avenue, N. W. He observed that they were looking intently through the plate glass windows of the store in the direction of the Mayflower Hotel. At this point, Agent ACHENBACH, who was standing on a streetcar platform at the corner of L Street and Connecticut Avenue, N. W., boarded a southbound streetcar. Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE were next observed by SA~~s~~ ~~SCULLY~~ ~~and~~ GRUENTZEL running across L Street to the south side and walking west on L Street to 18th Street. After reaching 18th Street, they recrossed to the north side of L Street and returned to the Mayflower Hotel via L Street and Connecticut Avenue, N. W. They entered the Mayflower Hotel at 12:42 A.M. Surveillance was discontinued at this time upon receipt of information from SA McGEARY to the effect that Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE were possibly "newspaper people." (U)

After Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE alighted from the taxi cab in front of the Mayflower Hotel, SA McGEARY located and interviewed the cab driver, ROBERT S. DAVIS, at 17th and M Streets, N. W. DAVIS informed SA McGEARY that immediately after picking up the couple at 16th & R Streets, N. W., they informed him that they were "newspaper people" and that they had spent the evening with a "couple of Russians" and that they probably would be followed. The cab driver stated further that he asked the couple if he should try to "lose them." Mrs. JAFFEE replied, "Yes, if you can." DAVIS also advised SA McGEARY that Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE were attempting to obtain license numbers, but that he did not think they were successful. He stated that he himself had not been able to detect any surveillance. (U)

After Mrs. JAFFEE had purchased the cigaretts in the hotel and had departed with her husband, SA KENOYER asked the night manager at the hotel desk whether he was acquainted with the couple and whether they were registered at the hotel. The night manager replied that he did not know. (U)

Approximately 20 minutes after the couple had entered the hotel for the second time, SA FLANAGAN, under suitable pretext, interviewed the elevator operator, who advised that a couple answering the description of Mr. and Mrs. JAFFEE had gotten off the elevator at the eighth floor. (U)

Upon receipt of the information from SA McGEARY, as obtained from the cab driver, that the couple were possibly associated with the Press, SA KENOYER contacted the appropriate supervisor and was instructed to discontinue the surveillance in view of the possibility that the unknown couple were associated with the Press. (U)

It was noted in the early stages of the surveillance that the individuals involved were extremely surveillance conscious and the Agents made every attempt to be very discreet. As set forth in detail above, the automobiles and Agents involved were rotated as much as possible to avoid detection by the persons under surveillance. Even though it was apparent to the Agents that the parties under surveillance were apparently looking for a tail, it was not felt desirable to discontinue the surveillance until the couple were identified. The importance of identifying unknown individuals who have personal contact with officials of the Soviet establishments has been impressed on the Field by the Bureau as a necessary part of the Soviet Intensification Program. (C)

On July 10, 1954, SA KENOYER ascertained that the files of this office reflect that SAM JAFFEE of Life magazine on July 6, 1954, discussed with KONSTANTIN G. FEDOSEEV the prospect of having dinner together. No definite plans were made for this dinner. The files also reflected that JAFFEE was residing in Room 877 of the Mayflower Hotel, which is the same floor to which the unknown couple proceeded on the night of July 9, 1954. This information was not available to the Agents conducting the surveillance on July 9, 1954. (C)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : L. B. Nichols

DATE: July 13, 1954

SUBJECT: SAM JAAFE
KONSTANTINE FEDOSEEV
TIME-LIFE MAGAZINE

SAM A. JAFFE (Jr)
DPOB 6-17-[illegible] San Francisco, Cal
[illegible] Bradley Blvd
Bethesda, Md.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

For record purposes, at 12:05 p.m., 7-10-54, James R. Shepley of the TIME and LIFE organization in Washington called Wick in my office. He said he could save us some work by reporting the following to us. (u)

A TIME and LIFE writer from New York named Sam Jaafe has been assigned the writing of a story on contemporary religions. Jaafe and a photographer are going into Red China for the purpose of studying Buddhism. (u)

Shepley said that on 7-9-54 Jaafe and his wife checked into Room 876 of the Mayflower Hotel (a suite maintained by TIME and LIFE) and that evening met with Konstantine Fedoseev of the Soviet Embassy at the Colonial Restaurant near the Mayflower where they had dinner. The purpose of this meeting was to obtain Fedoseev's cooperation in travel clearance. Jaafe has had several prior conversations with him. (c)

Shepley said he believed the FBI had a surveillance on Jaafe the evening of 7-9-54 and he just wanted us to know, in case any inquiries arose, the purpose of Jaafe's contact with Fedoseev. (c)

We must have been pretty obvious. H

Wick thanked Shepley for bringing this to our attention and said it would be made a matter of record.

This should be looked into.

ACTION TAKEN:

Supervisor Tom Jenkins of the Washington Field Office was advised of the above at 12:15 p.m., 7-10-54. Jenkins advised that the Washington Field Office was aware of this situation the evening of 7-9-54, had identified Jaafe as a TIME and LIFE employee and was fully cognizant of all the information passed on to the Bureau by Shepley.

Classified by 6136A
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ACTION TO BE TAKEN:

None. For information.

RECORDED - 5

EX - 104

cc - Mr. Boardman
cc - Mr. Belmont

REW:rcw

I want [illegible] this situation.
H.

Memo to Belmont 7/16/54

JUL 26 1954

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

SAC, New York (105-8180) June 29, 1954

RECORDED - 90 Director, FBI (105-28333) -1

EX-103

SAM A. JAFFE
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Reurlet 6-11-54.

Bufiles contain numerous references to name of Sam Jaffe. These references are being reviewed and any pertinent information identifiable with him will be furnished to you. New York should also thoroughly review its files and include any pertinent information in report form suitable for dissemination.

JJT:rmc

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman

59 JUL 29 1954

MAILED 3
JUN 29 1954
COMM - FBI

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI DATE: JUN 1 1954

FROM : SAC, New York (105-8180)

SUBJECT: SAM A. JAFFE
IS-R

[redacted]
IS-R

On 4/9/54 [redacted] advised that SAM JAFFE, Judson 6-1212, Ext. 120 spoke to TARASOV and called him by his first name, IVAN. JAFFE stated it has been a long time since he spoke to TARASOV. According to informant, JAFFE told TARASOV, "We are still working on that China thing and we are dealing with Konstantin Fedoseev in Washington". JAFFE mentioned to TARASOV he wanted to get hold of "Red Star" magazine, March issue, which contains a story JAFFE wanted to see. TARASOV said he would look it up and call JAFFE. (S)

It is noted that IVAN V. TARASOV is the Second Secretary of the Soviet Mission to the UN. (U)

It is to be noted that Judson 6-1212 is listed to Time, Incorporated, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, NYC. (U)

On 5/14/54 Miss [redacted] (identity to be protected), [redacted] at Time, Incorporated, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, NYC furnished the following information regarding SAM A. JAFFE, the only individual with that name presently employed. JAFFE is presently employed as a Culture Researcher for "Life" magazine and has previously been in most sections of research for that magazine. U

The following information was also furnished:

8

Education

1. Graduated Claremont High School, Oakland, California, 1946
2. Graduated University of California at Berkeley, California, 1949 U
3. Attended the Drew School, San Francisco, two years (U)

Service

1. United States Marine Corps, 5/30/47 to 6/27/51, fank PFC, honorably discharged, combat correspondent (U) U

RM

1-Bufile 100-353190 ([redacted])
1-NY 105-4145) ([redacted])

SE-22

RECORDED-52
EX-112

PJB:AMF

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

2. United States Maritime Service, no specific dates, but travelled in Japan and Korea in 1950 and 1951 and Hawaii, India, and Japan around 1945 (C) U

Employment

1. Radio Station KGO, San Francisco, California, edited and rewrote stories, 3/1/48 to 10/31/48

2. International News Service, San Francisco, California, wrote and edited stories of international interest, no dates listed for this employment

3. United Nations Secretariat, New York City, worked on New York Radio News Desk as assistant news editor from 7/31/51 to 11/30/51 and 5/15/52 to 6/10/52 (U)

4. Benjamin Sonnenberg, New York City, worked here in public relations as a reporter and writer of feature material on the Empire State Building, New York City, dates not listed

5. Time, Incorporated, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City, started here 6/16/52 as an editorial trainee for "Life" magazine; on 10/14/52 became a researcher for "Life" magazine where he is still employed in that capacity

Residence

25 Indian Road, Apartment 1-B, New York City (U)

Description

Name	SAM A. JAFFE
Date of Birth	6/19/28
Height	5' 11"
Weight	165 lbs.
Eyes	Brown
Hair	Sandy
Marital Status	Single
Social Security No.	552-30-09-39

U

A case has been opened under the caption "SAM A. JAFFE; IS-R" in the NYO and will be investigated as directed in no number SAC letter AF Series, 1952 dated 10/22/52 captioned "Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations-Double Agent Program". Subsequent correspondence in this case will be carried under the single caption of the subject. (U)

ORIGINAL WORK

COPY

Volume 2

62-116464-212	3 enc. 12	RGK:dmt 11/10/75

The Attorney General

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (HSC)

ReHSC let 10/22/75 requesting all files, records and documents concerning Sam Jaffe. Enclosed is a memo responding to the request. Also enclosed are 2 volumes of material which constitute the FBI files on Jaffe.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 9/13/73

29 mc/Jm)

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906) (C) [redacted]

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS - CH
(OO:WFO)

per 134

ReWFOlet 11/2/72 under the above caption, and Legat, Ottawa letter 8/25/73 captioned SAMUEL JAFFE forwarded by Bureau 0-7 dated 9/5/73 and marked "For appropriate action." (u)

In view of past information concerning subject furnished by Legat, Ottawa, subject's past relationship with the FBI and his possible present relationship with other U.S. intelligence agencies, WFO does not feel that any action is warranted under Section 105N, Manual of Instructions. (u)

UACB, no investigation being conducted. (u)

2 - Bureau
1 - WFO
JLT:cbi
(3)

EX-105

REC-26 105-28333-136

[redacted]

SEP 14 1973

Classified by 6136 w
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of [illegible]

OCT 1973

99 *Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan*

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES C ERNMENT

Memorandum

Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ✓
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. Jenkins DATE: 9-13-74

FROM : J. J. McDermott

[redacted]

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
DALLAS, TEXAS
11-22-63

Reference my memorandum of 9-12-74 concerning contacts between Inspector Bowers and Don Donahue, Special Assistant to Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), regarding the information and photographs Donahue had obtained from Michael Canfield which Canfield believes are pertinent to captioned matter. (u)

Late on 9-12-74 Donahue advised Bowers he had learned from Sam A. Jaffe, free-lance writer in Washington who has been involved with Canfield concerning this matter, that Canfield apparently has made a deal with Stern Magazine, a German publication described as the Life Magazine of Germany, for its use of the photographs Canfield has collected and the information concerning them. This magazine allegedly has arranged for a Swiss photographic expert to examine the pictures in an effort to determine if the three "bums" shown in the photographs might be identical to E. Howard Hunt, Frank Sturgis, and Thomas Arthur Vallee. (u)

Supervisor John Ruhl of Washington Field Office advised Bowers on the night of 9-12-74 that he had received a call from Jaffe who was seeking an FBI evaluation of Canfield's reliability and the information Canfield had regarding the Kennedy assassination. Jaffe told Ruhl he had given Canfield $300 as an advance toward a possible story which he might write regarding the photographs and information Canfield has developed. Ruhl furnished Jaffe no information. He is submitting a communication to the Bureau on 9-13-74 furnishing full details of his conversation with Jaffe. Ruhl also advised that Canfield had contacted him on 9-12-74 and promised to furnish him a set of the photographs he has obtained in accordance with a promise he had made to Ruhl some time ago.

NOT RECORDED
28 SEP 23 1974

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Memorandum of 9-12-74 from Mr. Downing to Mr. White reported that Laboratory examination of the photographs which were furnished to the Bureau by Donahue has led to the conclusion that Hunt and Sturgis are not identical with the

[redacted]

SEP 17 1974

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. White

1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Bates
1 - Mr. Bowers

Classified by 6D6
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

57 SEP 26 1974

7/30

"bums" in the photograph with the police officer. No photograph of Vallee was available for comparison in this regard. The Laboratory made copies of all the information furnished by Donahue, and the originals of the photographs and notes were returned to him on 9-13-74 by Bowers. Donahue had told Canfield he was going to have a contact examine the pictures but did not identify his contact. Donahue intends to tell Canfield that his contact does not believe the "bums" are identical with Hunt and Sturgis and that he does not want to become involved in this matter since he feels it is a situation which should be handled by the FBI.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES [illegible]VERNMENT

Memorandum

B

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)   DATE: 11/2/72

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906) (C)

SECRET

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS - CH
(OO:WFO)

sev 132

Re Legat, Ottawa letter to the Bureau, 10/11/72, captioned SAM JAFFE. Re NYlet and LHM under same caption 8/7/72.

sev 130

For the information of New York, referenced communication quoted information r[redacted]

[redacted]

In view of past activities and current employment of subject, both of which are included in Bureau files, WFO feels this case does not warrant investigative attention.

Copies for New York since subject has been of interest to that office in the past.

REC-14 105-28333-134

EX-117

SECRET

22 NOV 3 1972

NAT. INT. SEC.

2-d

③-Bureau
2-New York
(1- 134-3315)
(1- 134-6730) (INV)
1-WFO

Classified by 6134
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

JLT:mas
(6)

NOV 20 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

He was referred to the Consular Section of the American Consulate General, Hong Kong. As of this date JAFFE has received the necessary funds from the US to pay his tax bill and presumably will be leaving Hong Kong for the US on 10/25 or 26/72. At this point no specific data pertinent to subject's itinerary is available.

HON-4 (8-3-71)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATE OVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 10/25/72

FROM : LEGAT, HONG KONG (105-6699) RUC)

SUBJECT: SAM JAFFE
IS-CH

Reference: NYlet & LHM 8/7/72. ~~rec~~ 130

[redacted] C

[redacted] C

☐ Files of the Legat, Hong Kong Office, contain no information identifiable with the subject.

☒ Further information relating to the subject is set forth below. U

Office of origin should review indices to determine whether further investigation warranted under guidelines set forth in Section 105-G, Manual of Instructions.

Remarks: Subject born 6/19/29. Listed as traveling on US passport Z752999, issued 4/8/68, Hong Kong. -U-

For the information of the Bureau and recipient offices, the above captioned subject contacted Legat telephonically to enlist his assistance as he had been prevented from departing Hong Kong with his family on 10/22/72 by the Hong Kong authorities for non-payment of resident taxes. His US passport was in fact picked up by the Hong Kong authorities. Subject was advised that this was apparently a matter between himself and the Hong Kong Government and that there was absolutely nothing Legat could do to assist. -U-

Classified by 6364L
GDS Category 2-3

ST-113

REC 25

-133

6 ~~5~~ - Bureau (~~Encl~~)
(1 - Foreign Liaison Desk)
(2 - New York) (1-WFO)
1 - Hong Kong
RVP:cjb

~~10~~ (7)

17 OCT 31 1972

5 0 NOV

Copy to NY (2-INFO) WFO (1-INFO)
by routing slip for
☒ info ☒ action
date 11/8/72
by LER/VOE/72

NAT. INT. SEC.

SECRET

1 - Mr. Devitz

August 9, 1972

SAM A. JAFFE
Born: June 19, 1929
San Francisco, California

In response to your name check inquiry, there are enclosed two reports which may relate to the subject of your inquiry.

In addition, a review of the files of this Bureau reveals that on October 16, 1970, a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that on the evening of October 15, 1970, he had met Sam Jaffe who advised him that he had just come from the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, 136 East 67th Street, New York, New York, where he had taped an exclusive interview with a Soviet national. Jaffe did not identify the Soviet to the source. The source described Jaffe as a former Moscow correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System who has, or has had, numerous close contacts with Soviet nationals. The source stated that Jaffe later worked as a correspondent for the American Broadcasting Company in Southeast Asia and is presently employed by United Press International in New York. (c)

Summary REC-5 105-28333-131

Your attention is called to previous reports on Samuel Addison Jaffe, which were sent to your agency on numerous dates in the past, the latest being February 16, 1971, and March 23, 1971. (u)

20 AUG 11 1972

Your attention is also directed to one attached report on Barry Sanford Jaffe who may or may not be the son or relative of the subject of your inquiry. (u)

You may desire to consult the files of the Central Intelligence Agency for further information concerning the subject of your inquiry. (u)

(105-28333)

Enclosures (3)

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Original and 1 - State (SY/DO)
Request received - 7-28-72

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This reply is result of check of FBI investigative files. To check arrest records, request must be submitted to FBI Identification Division. Fingerprints are necessary for positive check.

elt
ates
ishop
allahan
ampbell
leveland
onrad
albey
enkins
arshall
iller, E.S.
onder
oyars
alters
ele. Room
r. Kinley
r.

ABD:jml (4)
NOTE: ~~Memorandum is being~~ SECRET ~~classified "Secret" inasmuch~~ ~~and material in memorandum are so classified.~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATE. , OVERNMENT

Memorandum

C/F

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 8/7/72

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315) (C)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SAM JAFFE
IS - R

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosed herewith are five copies of an LHM concerning the above subject. Two copies are enclosed for the Washington Field Office.

The confidential source in the LHM is [redacted] who furnished the information to SA JAMES B. DAVIDSON on 7/26/72.

The LHM is not classified, inasmuch as the material contained therein does not merit classification.

The informant advised that he ~~has~~ not seen JAFFE lately, but he is sure he will be in the NY offices of the UPI prior to making his trip in which case, he will surely stop by to talk to the source.

CIA (ANGELTON) (LHM)
STATE (LHM)
USIA (LHM)
8/21/72
R/S
HJM/TL

LEGATS
HON (1 let - 1 LHM)
Copy to OTT (XEROX LET & LHM)
by routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 8/21/72
by HJM/TL

EX 104

REC-5

130

ENCLOSURE

AUG 10 1972

2 - Bureau (Encl. 5) (RM)
2 - WFO (105-8900) (Encl. 2) (RM)
1 - New York (134-6730) (INV)
1 - New York

JBD:mat
(6)

CONFIDENTIAL

Not Esp
~~ESPIONAGE~~

Classified by 634
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

5 AUG 23 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

August 7, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

Sam Jaffe

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised a Special Agent (SA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), that the July 15, 1972 issue of "UPI Log", the house organ of United Press International, reflected that "Sam Jaffe Special UPI correspondent has been granted a visa to visit China. He will arrive in early August and will file for the news wires, news pictures, and audio".

The source advised that Jaffe is not on the regular UPI staff, but has done free-lance work for the UPI, such as covering the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) with a tape recorder. It was the source's opinion that the visa from Mainland China was not arranged for Jaffe by the UPI as they would have sent somebody of more consequence, if they had been able to get a visa. The source also noted that during the UNGA, Jaffe leaned to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations for "behind the scene" type news rather than trying to be friendly with the new Chinese delegatinn.

The source described Jaffe as a former Moscow correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System , who is, or has had, numerous close contacts with Soviet nationals. Source statedthat Jaffe later worked as a correspondent for the American Broadcasting Company in Southeast Asia and also did free-lance work for UPI in New York.

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 6134
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

105-

130

ENCLOSURE

REC 43

ST-105

REC 43 105-28333-129

NOT RECORDED
5 JUL 26 1972

105-28333

File-5-

UPI-42

(CHINA VISIT)

NEW YORK--TWO UPI CORRESPONDENTS HAVE RECEIVED PERMISSION TO VISIT CHINA AND WILL BE DEPARTING SOON ON THEIR ASSIGNMENTS.

SAM JAFFE, A VETERAN FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT, LEAVES LATER THIS MONTH ON SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT FOR THE UPI AUDIO NETWORK. HE WILL ALSO FILE DISPATCHES FOR THE UPI NEWSWIRES AND PROVIDE PICTURE COVERAGE AS WELL.

DONALD MACKAY, UPI GENERAL MANAGER FOR CANADA, WILL ACCOMPANY A CANADIAN TRADE DELEGATION TO CHINA IN AUGUST. HIS NEWS AND PHOTO COVERAGE ALSO WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED BY VOICE REPORTS FOR THE UPI AUDIO NETWORK.

7-24--EH1031AED

54 AUG 14 1972

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 10/6/71

RGK/ FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906)(C) [redacted]

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS - CH
(OO:WFO)

ReLegat Hong Kong lets, 8-20-71 124 and 9-14-71 125, and WFOlet 3-22-71. 121

Any information coming to the attention of this office concerning possible travel by the subject will immediately be furnished to the Bureau and interested offices. (u)

WFO does not feel that further investigation is warranted in this matter at this time and UACB will handle this matter as set forth in reWFOlet. (u)

ST-106

REC 25

EX. PROC

105-28333-127

3,0

14
~~12~~ OCT 12 1971

Copy to Legat, Hong Kong
by routing slip for
☐ info ☐ action
date 10-13-71, cc - letter
by J.E.M./lo. c.

NAT. INT. SEC.

[redacted]

③- Bureau
(1 - Legat, Hong Kong)(105-6659)
1 - WFO
LJT/1t
(4)

Classified by 6126W
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification

60 OCT 19 1971 145

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

M

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 9/14/71

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906) (C)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS - CH
(OO:WFO)

ReBureau 0-7, 8/3/71 with attached Legat, Ottawa letter dated 7/22/71, captioned "SAM JAFFE, IS-CH".

Information contained in the above Legat, Ottawa, [redacted]. WFO has previously furnished information concerning JAFFE's contacts with PAUL LIN and his desire to visit the China Mainland.

In view of the subject's continued affiliation with the news media, UACB, WFO will follow the policy outlined in WFO letter 5/1/69, [redacted] aka IS-CH" wherein it was noted that WFO would continue to accept information proffered by JAFFE; however, no efforts would be made by WFO to direct his activities.

It is not felt that further investigation is warranted in this matter at this time and accordingly this case is being placed in closed status.

EX-102

REC- 66 105-28333-126

15 SEP 15 1971

③- Bureau
(1 - Legat, Ottawa)(105-1591)
1- WFO

LJT:jgv
(4)

Copy to Legat, Ottawa
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
1 cc - letter
date 9-21-71
by J.E.M./b.c.

SEP 29 1971

Classified by 1174
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NAT. INT. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) -C- DATE: 3/22/71

RGK/SBn

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906) ( )

SECRET

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS-CH

ReBulet to Legat Hong Kong 2/17/71 and WFOlet to the Bureau [redacted], aka IS-CH".

It is noted that captioned subjects relationship with SZETO Kung, a new Chinese news agency representative in Hong Kong, is set forth in ReWFOlet. Additionally, upon interview on 2/25/71, JAFFE readily volunteered information re his correspondence with SZETO as set forth Hong Kong letter dated 1/22/71. JAFFE added that he had continued to correspond with SZETO, hoping that this will in some way facilitate his possible travel to the China Mainland in the near future. (C)

[redacted] (S)

In regards to further contact with JAFFE, WFO will, (UACB), continue the policy as outlined in ReWFOlet.

③ Bureau
(1- Legat Hong Kong) (105-6699)
1- WFO

EX-113

REC 12

105-28333-121

LJT:cf
(4)

26
MAR ~~24~~ 1971

Copy to Legat, Hong Kong
by routing slip for
☑ Info ☐ action
date

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification

NAT. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 3/16/71

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906) (C) CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

CONF. INFT.

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R
(OO: WFO)

3
5

Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau and one for NYO of an LHM dated as above and captioned, "SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE". (U)

JAFFE voluntarily came to WFO on 2/25/71, and was interviewed by SAS LYLE J. THEISEN and DANIEL J. KIERNAN. The enclosed LHM includes only that information furnished by JAFFE relating to the Soviets. (U)

WFO letter to Bureau dated 5/2/69 107 instant caption, with LHM same date and under the JAFFE caption sets out on pages 5 and 6 information furnished by JAFFE on 4/29/69, of his meeting BORIS V. YAROCHEVSKIY and INNA G. YAROCHEVSKAYA at the Hungarian Embassy reception on 4/17/69. This is referred to in enclosed LHM, instant letter. (C)

WFO letter to Bureau dated 5/26/69 107, instant caption, set out information furnished by JAFFE on 5/14/69, of his having the YAROCHEVSKIYs to his home for lunch. This is also referred to in enclosed LHM, instant letter. As noted in WFO's letter of 5/16/69, [redacted], a WFO PSI and his wife were also present at the luncheon. (C)

ENCLOSURE ST 104 REC 9 105-28333-120

3- Bureau (Enc. 6)
  (1- 105-167691) ([redacted])
1- New York (134-3315) (Enc. 1) (INFO) (RM)
5- WFO
  (1- 105-93362) [redacted]
  (1- 105-93435) [redacted]
  (1- 105-31850) ([redacted]
  (1- 105-11530) ([redacted]
  (1-134-8569 ([redacted]
DJK:th
(10)

MAR 17 1971

1-State, 1-USIA
2-CIA by courier
3-23-71
E-5

ESPIONAGE SECTION

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

F198
58 MAR 26 1971

COPY AND COPY CC EXCL FILED IN

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
5010-108

CONFIDENTIAL

On 2/25/71, JAFFE advised that NICHOLAS DANILOFF, a United Press International correspondent is acquainted with YAROCHEVSKIY and other Soviet correspondents in Washington, D. C. JAFFE stated that DANILOFF speaks Russian fluently and has dedicated himself to becoming an authority on Soviet Union affairs. JAFFE recalled that some time ago DANILOFF attempted to interest JAFFE in their pooling expenses and arranging social affairs for Soviet nationals here. Purpose of this was to give them an entre to the Soviets for background information which might serve their correspondent careers. JAFFE was not interested. (C)

JAFFE stated that on the night of 2/25/71, DANILOFF telephoned him and stated that he had turned down an offer to become the head of the UPI office in Moscow. DANILOFF stated the conditions were not right. JAFFE took this to mean that the salary offered for the position was not enough. (C)

Enclosed LHM has been classified "Confidential" as it discloses investigative interest in a representative of a foreign power. (C)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

March 16, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

On February 25, 1971, Samuel Adason Jaffe, a free lance correspondent was shown photographs of Boris V. Yarochevskiy, a correspondent for the Tass News Agency, an official Soviet news agency, and the latter's wife, Inna G. Yarochevskaya. Jaffe recognized the Yarochevskiys and recalled he had previously volunteered information concerning them.

(On April 29, 1969, Jaffe advised he met the Yarochevskiys at a Hungarian Embassy reception in Washington, D. C. (WDC) on April 17, 1969. Yarochevskaya had looked familiar to Jaffe. Yarochevskaya recognized Jaffe as having formerly been a correspondent in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and indicated that she had been one of the translators for the Reuters News Agency in Moscow working for John Miller, and that later she had been a translator for Lares Bruger (phonetic), a Swedish newspaper correspondent and a friend of Jaffe.)

(On April 29, 1969, Jaffe indicated that Yarochevskiy was attending the Foreign Language Institute in Moscow while Yarochevskaya was working for Reuters. Later, YAROCHEVSKIY attended Mc Gill University in Canada, and his wife had flown from Moscow to meet her husband in Canada and they then traveled to the United States. On April 17, 1969, Yarochevskaya indicated that she and her husband had been in WDC for approximately a month and a half.)

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

105-28333-120

ENCLOSURE

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

(On May 14, 1969, Jaffe advised that recently he had had the Yarochevskiys to his residence for lunch. Present also were an American correspondent and the latter's wife.)

On February 25, 1971, Jaffe stated he has had no further contacts with Yarochevskaya, and has seen Yarochevskiy only once since he had them to his residence for lunch in May of 1969. Jaffe said he had seen Yarochevskiy in attendance at an anti-Vietnam war demonstration in Washington, D. C., in 1969, date unrecalled. Yarochevskiy was walking alone and carrying a camera, and it was not until he was right on top of the Soviet did Jaffe realize his identity. They exchanged only greetings. Yarochevskiy told Jaffe that they must get together sometime.

Jaffe stated he had never known Yarochevskiy prior to their meeting at the Hungarian Embassy reception on April 17, 1969. He had known Yarochevskaya previously, but only as one of a number of individuals whose services as translators, chauffeurs or house maids were made available to foreign correspondents assigned to Moscow by a Soviet government agency which Jaffe knew as "UPDK". It is Jaffe's impression now, that Yarochevskaya had been assigned by 'UPDK', as a translator, to Lares Bruger (phonetic), a Swedish national and a correspondent for a Swedish newspaper, probably in 1965.

Jaffe recalled that both he and Bruger (phonetic) left Moscow in 1965. Jaffe now has the impression that Yarochevskaya was not married when he knew her in 1965. Jaffe did not know her socially. He did not know her by her maiden name. He recognized her at the Hungarian Embassy reception in 1969 but only after Yarochevskaya had refreshed his memory by recalling Moscow.

Jaffe said he believes that the "UPDK" was controlled by the KGB (Ministry of State Security); however, all of the persons employed by "UPDK" were not necessarily connected with Soviet intelligence. Jaffe stated he has no information that Yarochevskaya is, or was, connected with Soviet intelligence.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe offered his opinion that Yarochevskaya may be connected with Soviet intelligence. He stated his opinion is influenced by the fact that in her 1965 employment as a translator in Moscow, Yarochevskaya had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with foreign correspondents assigned to Moscow. His opinion is influenced also by Yarochevskaya's subsequent marriage to a personable and younger Soviet who received an assignment to the United States as a Tass correspondent. Jaffe stated Yarochevskaya is the only Soviet national whom he knows who was employed by "UPDK" as a translator for foreign correspondents, who later came to the United States.

Jaffe stated that when he served in Moscow he and other foreign correspondents often heard references to a "Black Tass". The rumors were that the Tass News Agency abroad performed two functions. One was to gather news for dissemination to the Soviet people through Soviet newspapers and periodicals. The other, "Black Tass", was a form of intelligence gathering, the results of which were never made known to the Soviet people but were furnished directly to the KGB in Moscow for transmittal to Kremlin officials. Jaffe stated that an example of the "Black Tass" operation would be a Tass correspondent in Washington, D.C. feeling out his contacts to ascertain what the thinking of government officials might be in regard to some phase of the United States' foreign policy. Jaffe said that "Black Tass" would not necessarily relate to espionage.

Jaffe stated the only contact he has had in recent months with Soviet nationals occurred approximately in the end of January, 1971, exact date unrecalled. Jaffe had just stepped away from making a telephone call in the lobby of the Statler Hilton Hotel, 16th and K Streets, N. W., Washington, D. C., when Oleg M. Sokolov, a First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, walked into view. Sokolov greeted him warmly and asked Jaffe where he had been keeping himself and why no one had seen him. Jaffe replied that he has been in the Washington, D. C. area but that

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

he receives no invitations to Soviet Embassy receptions. Sokolov stated that that was not his (Sokolov's) fault and added that there "are two people who like you, Bubnov and I". Sokolov gave Jaffe his business card and said that they must get together.

Jaffe stated Sokolov was referring to Igor D. Bubnov, a Counselor, Soviet Embassy.

Jaffe stated that he does not intend to initiate any contacts with the Soviets.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 2/3/71

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906) (C)

SUBJECT: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS - NORTH VIETNAM

RGK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosed herewith to the Bureau are six copies, one copy for the information of Legat, Paris, of an LHM dated and captioned as above. -S-

WF T-1 is SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, [redacted], whose identity is protected per request. -S-

The enclosed LHM is classified, "SECRET", to protect the identity of JAFFE who continues to furnish valuable information to WFO. -S-

On 1/26/71, JOHN M. STENT, DOD, CIA (Covert), telephonically contacted WFO advising that JAFFE wished to pass on the enclosed information to the FBI. -S-

Upon interview by SAs LYLE J. THEISEN and CHARLES B. FINDLEY, JR., JAFFE indicated his desire not to divulge the names of other individuals with whom he hoped to visit U.S. prisoners of war in North Vietnam. Additionally, JAFFE indicated that no contact has been made with any U.S. Government agency concerning this proposed visit, and it was his desire that dissemination of this information be on a strictly need to know basis. -S-

Subsequent to interview STENT advised that very possibly former Attorney General, RAMSEY CLARK, and former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, may be working with JAFFE in the matter of this proposed visit. -S-

2/16/71
1cc LHM to
CIA - by Courier
State 1/cc
USIA

copy to Legat, Paris
by routing slip for
info ✓ action
date 2/18/71
by

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

EX-105

REC-33

16 FEB 22 1971

3 - Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1 - Legat, Paris)
2 - WFO
(1-105-56161) (TRAN VAN DINH)
LJT:jeb
(5)

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

FEB 24 1971

ENCLOSURE

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR
ADD. DISSEMINATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

WFO 105-8906

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

JAFFE advised that should his proposed visit be accepted by the North Vietnamese Government, he would notify WFO as to the exact plan of action he would then intend to take. Results will immediately be made known to the Bureau. -S-

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535
February 3, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INTERNAL SECURITY - NORTH VIETNAM

On January 27, 1971, WF T-1, whose reliability is unknown, however, who is in a position to furnish reliable information, advised that he had received the following information concerning Samuel Adason Jaffe, a free-lance journalist and lecturer in the Washington, D. C. (WDC) area.

Viet Nam C.O.

Samuel Adason Jaffe an acquaintance of one TRAN VAN DINH, former Acting Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of Vietnam, WDC, and currently employed as a free-lance researcher and lecturer, suggested to TRAN VAN DINH the possibility of arranging for a visit by an unidentified group of United States (U.S.) citizens to various camps in North Vietnam holding U.S. prisoners of war.

Vietnam France

TRAN VAN DINH advised Jaffe that he would correspond with an acquaintance of his one LE CHAN, Director of Press Relations for the Embassy of North Vietnam in Paris, France, and set forth Jaffe's proposal. In addition, TRAN VAN DINH advised he would prepare a letter of introduction to LE CHAN which Jaffe could hand carry. This letter would also set forth the proposal of visiting the U.S. prisoners of war.

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL
~~GROUP 1~~
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

105-28333-118

ENCL

France

On January 12, 1971, Jaffe arrived in Paris, France, and contacted LE CHAN at which time it was suggested to Jaffe that the proposal first be discussed with THICK THIEN CHAU, President of the Association of Vietnamese Buddhists in France.

France

Jaffe met with THICK THIEN CHAU for a two hour luncheon engagement on January 12, 1971. THICK THIEN CHAU was generally receptive to the proposal, however, he suggested that the proposal be handled through the National Liberation Front (NLF) representative in Paris, HA THANH LAM. Jaffe was not immediately receptive to this; however, THICK THIEN CHAU indicated that the possibility of any success with his proposal would depend on this course of action.

On January 14, 1971, at 10:30 a.m. Jaffe met with HA THANH LAM, Director of Information, NLF, Paris, France; however, due to a language barrier further discussions were arranged for 4:30 p.m. that day when each could obtain the services of a translator.

At 4:30 p.m. Jaffe returned to the offices of HA THANH LAM with Ann David an acquaintance of his from Sorbonne University, Paris, France. HA THANH LAM had at his office a Buddhist nun, THICK MAN DA LA, who spoke excellent English and who appeared to be very influential during the course of discussion. France

Jaffe emphasized to HA THANH LAM the great concern of the people of the United States for the U.S. prisoners of war in North Vietnamese prison camps and the necessity of allowing an unbiased group, including himself, of U.S. citizens to visit all the prisoners in all the camps and not just a so-called "representative number who may have been brainwashed."

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

After further discussion, the proposal was accepted by HA THANH LAM who advised that he would forward it to the proper North Vietnamese authorities, and Jaffe should again contact him.

On the following day Jaffe was advised that the proposal was accepted for consideration by the North Vietnamese representative in Paris and forwarded to Hanoi for their consideration. Additionally, Jaffe was advised not to expect an answer for at least four weeks.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
1 - Mr. M.A. Jones

Legat, Hong Kong (105-6699) 2/17/71

1 - Mr. J.E. Manning

Director, FBI (105-28333) -11?

REC-52

SECRET

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
IS - CH

ReHONlet 1/22/71, ab two copies of which are enclosed for New York and two copies for WFO. In addition, there is enclosed for New York and WFO one copy each of the three enclosures furnished by Legat, Hong Kong.

Legat should not furnish Special Branch any information set out in Bulet to Hong Kong 9/14/66, since that information is not pertinent to the inquiry by Special Branch (SB). Advise SB Bureau has no pertinent information concerning Jaffe. Jaffe should be well-known to SB because of his recent assignment in Hong Kong.

According to the enclosures, Jaffe currently resides at 6510 Bradley Boulevard, Bethesda, Maryland, and currently is unemployed. New York and WFO should be most circumspect in any contact with Jaffe in view of information in the enclosures which were furnished by SB, Royal Hong Kong Police.

2 - New York (134-3315) (Enclosures - 5)
2 - WFO (105-8906) (Enclosures - 5)

1 - Foreign Liaison Desk (Route through for review)

SECRET

JEM:dgo
(11)

MAILED 5
FEB 17 1971
COMM-FBI

Classified by 6-34
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NOTE:

Jaffe is a prominent newsman formerly stationed in Hong Kong, He is former source of NYO and has volunteered information to WFO. Jaffe, on 9/10/70, sent letter to New China News Agency (NCNA), Hong Kong, representative who appears to be a friend. He sought information regarding permit to enter Communist China. He also mentioned contact with Paul Lin who we know is Chicom supporter in Canada. Letter to NCNA also critical of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. Legat desires to furnish SB information in Bulet 9/14/66, which was in answer to Legat's request for contact with Jaffe in Hong Kong. Letter cautioned Legat to be discreet and circumspect in contacts with Jaffe and also noted Jaffe was operated as a source by the FBI. The information in the 9/14/66 letter does not appear pertinent to SB inquiry and it is not felt we should disclose our past relationship with Jaffe.

JEM

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Conf
~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 11/23/70

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315) (C)

SUBJECT: SAM JAFFE
IS - R

Enclosed herewith are 9 copies of an LHM submitted in accordance with instructions in Bulet dated [redacted] (RADIO MOSCOW - KGB). One copy is enclosed for Bufile on NY 3507-S.

The confidential source mentioned in the LHM is [redacted], contacted by SA JAMES B. DAVIDSON. During the contact, it was emphasized to informant that his cooperation is strictly voluntary and must remain confidential at all times. It was impressed upon him that he is not a Bureau employee. Care will be taken in the handling of this informant to make certain that he is not a plant.

The LHM is classified "Confidential" as it reflects investigation of a Soviet national, the delicate nature of which requires State Department approval.

Concerning JAFFE, informant stated that he believes JAFFE has a drinking problem and that his current employment with UPI represents a "comedown" from his former positions with CBS and ABC. Informant said that he was at one time very friendly with JAFFE and also well-acquainted with SUKHODREV. He advised that he hopes to get together with both of them for a night "on the town". He will advise this office of future developments if any.

[illegible] COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

ENCLOSURE
EX-115
REC-43

-2 [illegible] -116

③ - Bureau (Encls. 9)
(1 - 134-10554) [redacted])
1 - New York (134-6730) [redacted]

NOV 27 1970

JBD:mat
(4)

AGENCY State, 2-ACSI, Air
~~REQ.~~ REC'D USIA, AEC
DATE FORW. 12-1-70
HOW FORW. R-S
BY ECD:kw

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SOVIET SECTION

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR
ADD. [illegible]

Conf
~~SECRET~~

DEC 3 1970

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
November 23, 1970

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. Bureau file 105-28333
New York file 134-3315

CONFIDENTIAL

Sam Jaffe

On October 16, 1970, a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that on the preceding date he had met Sam Jaffe. Source described Sam Jaffe as a former Moscow correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System, who has or has had numerous close contacts with Soviet nationals. Source said that Jaffe, whom he met on the evening of October 15, 1970, advised him that he had just came from the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (SMUN), 136 East 67th Street, New York, New York, Jaffe told the source that he had just taped an exclusive interview with a Soviet national at the SMUN.

Source stated that Jaffe is presently employed by United Press International in New York, and had previously worked as a correspondent for the American Broadcasting Company in South East Asia.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY; IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY.

105-28333-116

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
(NY Folder)
1 - Mr. E.C. Paterson

SAC, New York (105-73111)

10/30/70

Director, FBI (105-143202)

1 - Mr. G.M. Quinn
1 - Mr. A. E. Smith
1 - Mr. J. E. Nolan

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

Reurlet 10/19/70 with accompanying LHM.

Referenced LHM cannot be disseminated in its present form, as the only connection between the information reported concerning [redacted] and Sam Jaffe is that each was in contact with the same source of your office within a relatively short period of time.

Information pertaining to different subjects which is unrelated should be reported in separate LHMs, so that selective dissemination is possible at the Bureau and in order to insure protection of your source.

In this regard it would also seem unnecessary to set forth in the LHM where specifically your source met Sukhodrev, unless there is some significance in his being on the second floor of the UN which is not readily discernible at the Bureau.

Promptly submit separate LHMs and score responsible personnel with errors of form.

3 - New York
(1 - 105-31753 - [redacted])
(1 - 134-3315 - Jaffe)
(1 - 134-6730 - [redacted])
1 - 105-72303 ([redacted])
1 - 105-28333 (Jaffe)
1 - 134-10554 [redacted]

JEN:cal/pca
(14)

DUPLICATE YELLOW

Classified by 6136 w
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NOTE:

NY's method of reporting information derived from NY 3307-S concerning three unrelated subjects is unacceptable and they are being directed to submit separate LHMs.

61 NOV 9 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-143202)

DATE: 10/19/70

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-75111) (P)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R (RADIO MOSCOW-KGB)

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are copies of an LHM concerning captioned subject. Copies are included for Bufiles [redacted], SAM JAFFE and [redacted]

The confidential source mentioned in the LHM is [redacted] contacted by SA JAMES B. DAVIDSON. During the contact, it was emphasized to informant that his cooperation is strictly voluntary and must remain confidential at all times. It was impressed upon him that he is not a Bureau employee. Care will be taken in the handling of this informant to make certain that he is not a plant.

The LHM is classified "Confidential" as it reflects investigation of a Soviet national, the delicate nature of which requires State Department approval.

Concerning JAFFE, informant stated that he believes JAFFE has a drinking problem and that his current employment with UPI represents a "comedown" from his former positions with CBS and ABC. Informant said that

ORIGINAL FILED IN 164

(5) - Bureau (Encls. 11) (RM)
  (1 - 105-72303) ([redacted])
  (① - 105-28333) (JAFFE)
  (1 - 134-10554) ([redacted])
1 - New York (105-31753) ([redacted])
1 - New York (134-3315) (JAFFE)
1 - New York (134-6730) ([redacted])
1 - New York

JBD:amd
(9)

ENCLOSURE

105-28[illegible]

NOT RECORDED
150 OCT 26 1970

he was at one time very friendly with JAFFE and also well-acquainted with SUKHODREV. He advised that he hopes to get together with both of them for a night "on the town". He will advise this office of future developments if any.

NYO will attempt to identify the two Soviets with BELOBORODKO, however, with the large influx of people at the UN General Assembly, this may be difficult. Informant advised that BELOBORODKO greeted him when he saw him but did not introduce the other Soviets.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
October 19, 1970

[redacted]

On October 16, 1970, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on the preceding date, he had met Vitaliy L. Beloborodko, at the main gate to the United Nations (UN) Building, 43rd Street and First Avenue, New York, New York.

> Vitaliy L. Beloborodko is a Soviet national assigned to the United States as a correspondent for Moscow Television and Radio. Based on information and/or his activities, he is suspected of being affiliated with the Soviet Intelligence Services (SIS).

The source stated that Beloborodko was with two other Soviets, neither of whom appeared to speak or understand English, and was attempting to have them admitted to the UN grounds based on his own UN accreditation as a correspondent. He was unable to do this and had to go across the street and obtain passes. Source stated that he received the impression that the two unidentified Soviets were probably Beloborodko's superiors as he treated them with considerable deference and appeared to be uncomfortable in their presence.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

In addition to the above, source stated that he had met Viktor M. Sukhodrev on the second floor of the UN on October 15, 1970. Source said that he had met Sukhodrev on one of the Soviet's previous trips to the United States, and that Sukhodrev went out of his way to greet the source when he saw him at the UN on October 15, 1970. Source described Sukhodrev as the most intelligent Soviet he has ever met and as the best Russian-English translator at the United Nations.

> Viktor M. Sukhodrev is a Soviet national who last arrived in the United States on October 13, 1970, as a member of the Soviet Delegation to the 25th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

Source further advised that on the evening of October 15, 1970, he met Sam Jaffe who advised him that he had just come from the Soviet Mission to the UN, 136 East 67th Street, New York, New York, where he had taped an exclusive interview with a Soviet national. Jaffe did not identify the Soviet to the source. Source described Jaffe as a former Moscow correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System who has, or has had, numerous close contacts with Soviet nationals. Source stated that Jaffe later worked as a correspondent for the American Broadcasting Company in Southeast Asia, and is presently employed by United Press International in New York.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: OCT 19 1970

FROM : SAC, WFO

SECRET

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R (GROUP)
(WFOfile 105-100799) (P)

[redacted]
IS - R (GROUP)
(WFOfile 105-96243) (P)

ReWFOlets & LHMs, 9/16, 30/70 captioned [redacted] reporting information from "SAMMY" and from SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE. - 5 -

Enclosed are 7 copies for Bureau, 2 each for New York, and Milwaukee and 1 for information of Boston of LHM captioned "[redacted])" reporting information from "[redacted]". - 5 -

The LHM is classified "Secret" since it contains information from CIA so classified. The sources are "[redacted]. "[redacted]" was interviewed by SAs ROBERT P. FINZEL and JAMES P. WOOTEN. - 5 -

ORIGINAL FILED IN

④ - Bureau (Enc.7)
    (1-105-28333) (JAFFE)
1 - Boston (Info) (Enc.1) (RM)
2 - Milwaukee (Enc.2) (RM)
2 - New York (Enc.2) (RM)
4 - WFO
    (1-105-8906) (JAFFE)
    (1-134-5437) (SAMMY)

SECRET

NOT RECORDED
47 OCT 21 1970

JPW:act
(13)

ENCLOSURE

309

Classified by 6196 W
Exempt from GDS Category [illegible]
Date of Declassification [illegible]

OCT 22 1970

Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UN[illegible] STATES DEPARTMENT O[illegible]STICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C. 20535

SECRET

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

OCT 19 1970

[redacted]

Reference is made to memoranda dated September 16, 1970 and September 30, 1970 captioned [redacted] which contains information concerning members of this group, including Aleksandr Davidovich Shveytser (Shveitser).

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

During interview [redacted] on September 30, 1970 by Special Agents of the FBI, source was shown several photographs and limited biographic data of Shveitser, including information that he was born December 8, 1923 at Moscow, and that he was in the United States January 29, 1960-February 20, 1960 with a group of Soviet Republic Officials at which time he was described as a

SECRET

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

ENCLOSURE

105-

teacher at Foreign Languages Institute; June 10, 1961-September 1, 1961 with the Soviet Children's Book Exhibit at which time he was described as Senior Teacher, Moscow State Institute for Teaching Foreign Languages; October 18, 1962-November 2, 1962 with a group of Soviets to participate in a meeting of prominent Soviets and Americans at Andover, Massachusetts, at which time he was listed as interpreter; and January 13-28, 1969 with a group of Soviets to participate in the Dartmouth Conference, at which time he was described as "Translator, Docent of 1st Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages." (Shveitser also was in the United States in 1970 with a Soviet group to attend the 20th International Pugwash Conference, at which time he was described as Professor, Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages.)

Source commented that he did not recognize the individual depicted in the photographs of Shveitser and he never heard of this individual; however, he expressed the opinion that the large number of visits Shveitser has made to the United States with a variety of Soviet groups suggests he may be a KGB agent.

Source was asked if he knew of any connection of Soviet poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko with KGB. (Referenced memorandum dated September 30, 1970 indicates that during interview of Samuel Adason Jaffe on September 24, 1970 concerning his contacts with members of the Soviet group attending the Pugwash Conference in 1970, Jaffe indicated he first met Shveitser a number of years ago when Jaffe interviewed Soviet poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko with the assistance of Shveitser during the Youth Festival in Helsinki, Finland.) Source replied that he heard that Filip Denisovich Bobkov, identified by source as former Chief of Department in the 4th Directorate, KGB who since 1961 was Deputy Chief of the Second

Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB "was contacting Yevtushenko, trying to influence him - to use" him; however, source indicated Bobkov was unsuccessful, and source described Yevtushenko as a "tough nut" to crack.

[redacted]

"[redacted]"

Source was advised that during a recent visit of Shveitser to the United States with the Soviet group to attend the 20th International Pugwash Conference, Shveitser reportedly roomed at a hotel in New York City with Mikhail Ilich Bruk, another member of this group. (Source previously identified Bruk as a KGB agent.) Source stated the fact that Bruk and Shveitser roomed together while traveling abroad does not necessarily indicate that Shveitser also is a KGB agent. He said it would appear more logical for a KGB agent to avoid associating too closely with another KGB agent. Source stated Bruk is of Jewish background and he described him as a "very sharp agent - clever agent - he wasn't ordinary informer."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DIRECTOR, FBI

9/30/70

SAC, WFO

SECRET

[redacted]
IS - R (GROUP)
(WFOfile 105-100799) (P)

[redacted]
IS - R (GROUP)
(OO:MI)
(WFOfile 105-96243) (P)

Re WFO let, captioned as above, enclosing LHM captioned "[redacted]."

Enclosed are seven copies for Bureau, three for New York, two for Boston and three for Milwaukee of LHM reporting information from SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE and [redacted] concerning [redacted] and captioned group.

The LHM is classified "Secret" since CIA has requested that information from [redacted] be so classified. The source, WF T-1 is [redacted] who was interviewed by SAs ROBERT P. FINZEL and JAMES P. WOOTEN. JAFFE voluntarily contacted SA WOOTEN on 9/24/70, by phone.

2 ~~4~~ - Bureau (Enc.7)
(~~1~~ 0 - 105-28333) (JAFFE)
2 - Boston (Info) (Enc.2) (RM)
3 - Milwaukee (Enc.3) (RM)
3 - New York (Info) (Enc.3) (RM)
(1 - 134-3315) (JAFFE)
4 - WFO
(1 - 105-8906) (JAFFE)
(1 - 105-81653) [redacted]
~~(1 - 134-5437)~~ ([redacted]
JPW:can

105-28333-

NOT RECORDED
200 SEP [illegible] 1970

SECRET

8 OCT 15 1970

ENCLOSURE

Classified by 6136 W
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ORIGINAL FILED IN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

Washington, D. C. 20535

SECRET

September 30, 1970

[redacted]

Reference is made to memorandum dated September 16, 1970, reporting interview of Samuel Adason Jaffe concerning members of captioned group, and memorandum dated June 30, 1970, [redacted] [redacted]" husband of Lyudmila Alekseyevna Gvishiani nee Kosygina, a member of captioned group.

On September 24, 1970, Jaffe telephonically advised he attended the party given on September 18, 1970, at the Harmony Club in New York City by members of the "Young Presidents of America" in honor of some members of captioned group. Jaffe indicated about ten couples attended the party and the only Soviets who attended were Mikhail Ilich Bruk, Aleksandr Davidovich Shveytser, and a young Soviet, about 27-28 years of age, whose name he could not recall, but who is the Novosti Press Agency (APN) representative in New York.

Jaffe indicated that almost immediately he "got off on the wrong foot" with Bruk when he asked Bruk about his old friend, Yuriy Nikolaevich Vinogradov. Jaffe described Vinogradov as his closest Soviet friend and said that while employed at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, Vinogradov "was running around with girls and Russia pulled him back;" however, he is still connected with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bruk replied "he and I don't see each other any more - we are not friends." When asked why, Bruk responded: "He called my cousin a dirty Jew."

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

105-28333-

ENCLOSURE

[redacted]

Jaffe told Bruk he could not believe Vinogradov could possibly say anything like that. According to Jaffe, Bruk, who claims he is Jewish, is "always trying to convince American Jews there is no anti-Semitism in Russia." During the party, Bruk gave a long-winded speech and later Jaffe "sounded off" in a speech "and implied that he (Bruk) was the Soviet Union's House Jew." Jaffe indicated this incensed Bruk.

Jaffe noted that the Soviets are quite obvious in their efforts to convince foreigners they are not anti-Semitic. He was told by some of the "Young Presidents of America" who recently toured the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that the Soviets saw to it that Bruk escorted them and that their driver and their guides were Jewish. The Soviets did not encourage the group, all of whom were of Jewish origin, to visit any synagogues in the Soviet Union.

In an effort to convince Jaffe that the Soviets are not anti -Semitic, Bruk asked Jaffe if he was aware that the wife of Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev was Jewish. When Jaffe answered in the negative, Bruk insisted that not only is she Jewish but that "she has a heavy Jewish accent."

Bruk indicated he is now head of the English Section of APN and obtained this position through his friend, Boris (Sergeyevich) Burkov, former head of APN. Bruk added that Burkov subsequently was demoted; however, this has not affected his own career in APN and he conveyed the impression his job is very secure. Bruk stated he has thirteen people working under him, all of whom he had "handpicked." Bruk commented that Georgiy Bolshakov is no longer working for APN, having been discharged because of heavy drinking.

(WF T-1, a former officer of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) whose bona fides has not been

[redacted]

established but who has furnished reliable information in the past, identified Georgiy Nikitovich Bolshakov as a Colonel in GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) who in 1962-63 worked under cover as a department chief in APN.)

In Jaffe's opinion, Bruk has always been a "name-dropper" and during his conversation with Jaffe, Bruk mentioned seeing or hearing from several American millionaire friends of his. Bruk indicated he had contacted, apparently telephonically, Armand Hammer, head of Occidental Petroleum Corporation, in Los Angeles. He claimed to be in touch with Charles Stewart Mott, philanthropist and former General Motors Corporation executive; with industralist Cyrus Eaton, and with a Vice President of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, name not recalled, who lives in a plush apartment on 5th Avenue in New York City.

Following the party, Jaffe invited Bruk and Shveytser to dinner and visited Bruk and Shveytser in the hotel room they shared at the Warwick Hotel on 6th Avenue in New York City. While there, Shveytser said the girl from whom Bruk expected a telephone call had not phoned. Bruk replied he was very anxious to hear from the girl, mentioning to Jaffe that he would like to have intimate relations with her, but he did not mention her name.

Jaffe recalled that in Moscow Bruk had the reputation of being a "girl chaser." During his current trip to the United States, Bruk showed Jaffe a photograph of his wife, Helen, and their daughter; and did not mention he had divorced Helen and remarried. Jaffe indicated he previously heard from members of the "Young Presidents of America" who visited the Soviet Union that Bruk had divorced his first wife and remarried, and had introduced members of the American group to his new wife.

[redacted]

Bruk asked Jaffe about his current activities and Jaffe indicated he was doing some free-lance writing and giving lectures. In response to Bruk's questions, Jaffe said his lectures are arranged by American Program Bureau, whose main office is located in Boston, Massachusetts, and he normally receives a lecture fee of $750 less expenses but sometimes get $750 plus expenses per lecture. When asked if he lectures on the USSR, Jaffe told Bruk very few people are now interested in this topic and he generally lectures about Southeast Asia, Vietnam and Cambodia. Bruk appeared to be greatly impressed by the amount of Jaffe's lecture fees and he asked Jaffe: "Could you arrange (speaking) tours for me?" When the latter hesitated, Bruk indicated he felt sure that even though he is a Communist, United States authorities would permit him to visit the United States for a lecture tour. Jaffe suggested that Bruk contact the American Program Bureau of Boston and Colsen Lee of New York City, pointing out that they are managers in this field. Bruk appeared genuinely interested in lecturing in the United States and Jaffe commented he would not be at all surprised to see him appearing as a guest lecturer at United States universities. Bruk indicated he had visited the United States last year, and expected to come again, possibly next year, when he expects to make an inspection tour of all Novosti bureaus abroad.

In discussing Aleksandr Shveytser, Jaffe indicated he first met Shveytser a number of years ago in Helsinki when Jaffe interviewed the Soviet poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko with the assistance of Shveytser during the Youth Festival in Helsinki. Source described Shveytser as head of the English Department at the Foreign Language Institute; a "very nice guy," very humble and reserved in his conduct. Bruk, by contrast, he considers a vain, boastful, "name-dropping" individual whom he finds quite distasteful. While the three were eating dinner, Bruk commented that Shveytser was connected

[redacted]

with KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security). It was obvious to Jaffe that Shveytser was very much upset by Bruk's statement. Jaffe told Bruk his statement was ridiculous per se adding that Shveytser was a very scholarly individual who rarely had contacts with foreigners. Bruk replied facetiously that this was the type of person KGB used; however, Jaffe got the impression Bruk was not sincere in his comments about Shveytser.

Jaffe said he inquired of Bruk concerning several of his Soviet contacts and the latter replied: "I don't see them any more." Shveytser asked Bruk why he still was friendly with him (Shveytser) when he had failed to retain many of his other friends. Bruk replied: "Well, you don't goad me and don't ride all over me." Shveytser replied: "I have let you have it on occasion when you are wrong." Jaffe added that although Bruk is a sharp individual, Shveytser is on a much higher intellectual plane, and expressed the opinion that Bruk probably did not fully comprehend many of Shveytser's comments.

Jaffe stated he has always been convinced that Bruk was a member of or "very close" to KGB and claims to have frequently warned his American associates to be careful of their contacts with Bruk since he was "always probing and picking your brains and reporting back" to KGB.

Jaffe learned from Bruk that Lyudmila Alekseyevna Gvishiani, daughter of Soviet leader Alexey Kosygin, would not depart the United States with the captioned group but would remain in the United States to do research. Jaffe understood she was a historian. He added that unlike some members of captioned group, who reside in hotels during their tour, Lyudmila Gvishiani lives at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (SMUN) in New York City. Jaffe learned

[redacted]

that Gvishiani was interviewed by a reporter of a Milwaukee, Wisconsin newspaper possibly the "Milwaukee Journal." She was willing to talk about the United States and her reaction to the United States, but she would not discuss her father. Jaffe indicated he informed a newspaper friend in New York that Gvishiani was staying at the SMUN; however, he does not know whether or not his friend succeeded in interviewing Gvishiani.

By communication of August 17, 1970, the United States Department of State (USDS) advised that among the Soviets who were issued visas to enter the United States to attend the 20th International Pugwash Conference, Chicago, Illinois, September 9-15, 1970 are:

Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, born May 19, 1923, Kherson, described as Director, Institute of USA (United States of America), USSR Academy of Sciences;

Mikhail Ilich Bruk, born September 22, 1929, Leningrad, described as "Chief Editor of News Agency;"

Lyudmila Alekseyevna Gvishiani, born November 4, 1928, Kirensk, described as Senior Researcher, Institute of USA, USSR Academy of Sciences;

Aleksandr Davidovich Shveytser, born December 8, 1923, Moscow, described as Professor, Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages.

During interview of WF T-1 by Special Agents of the FBI, source was shown the photographs and limited biographic data of Soviets who applied for visas to enter the United States with captioned group. Source indicated he knew only Arbatov, Bruk and Lyudmila Gvishiani. Source

[redacted]

stated he was aware that Arbatov attended the Institute of International Relations, finishing in 1948. (Source attended this Institution 1945-1950). Source indicated he was personally acquainted with Lyudmila Gvishiani nee Kosygina, since her family and source's family were friendly. Source's mother and Gvishiani's mother were quite close and Lyudmila Gvishiani also attended the Institute of International Relations. Source commented that the photograph of Gvishiani indicates she has aged somewhat; however, the photograph is a good likeness of her. In commenting on Bruk, source identified him as a KGB agent, and noted that he is now listed as a Chief Editor of APN. Source remarked he formerly was an employee of the International Department of the Soviet Ministry of Health and a very capable agent, "and he was writing his information (reports for KGB).good." Source indicated that although Bruk had some type of medical education, his work in the Ministry of Health dealt "with international relations" and source indicated that his present work probably is not very much different than his former work with the Ministry of Health.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 9/16/70

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO

SECRET

[redacted]

IS - R (GROUP)
(WFOfile 105-100799) (P)

[redacted]

IS - R (GROUP)
(OO: MI)
(WFOfile 105-96243) (P)

CARBON COPY

ReWFOlets 4/29/69 and 5/2/69, captioned "[redacted]" enclosing LHMs captioned "SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE" reporting interviews in March and April 1969 of JAFFE. ReBuairtel 9/14/70, entitled [redacted] - S -

Enclosed are seven copies for the Bureau, three for New York, two for Boston and three for Milwaukee of LHM reporting info from JAFFE concerning MIKHAIL ILICH BRUK, a member of the Pugwash group, as well as a summary of info from [redacted] concerning BRUK and JAFFE. - S -

LHM classified "Secret" since it contains info from CIA so classified. Sources are "[redacted] (WF T-1) and CIA (WF T-2). - S -

Info concerning JAFFE was volunteered by him. He indicated he was not certain whether or not he would attend the party for BRUK, but would advise the FBI of any contact he might have with BRUK or any other member of captioned group. - S -

④-Bureau (Enc-7)
(1-105-28333) (JAFFE)
2-Boston (Info) (Enc-2) (RM)
3-Milwaukee (Enc-3) (RM)
3-New York (Info) (Enc-3) (RM)
(1-134-3315) (JAFFE)
3-WFO
(1-105-8906) (JAFFE)
JPW:MJB

105-2[illegible]

NOT RECORDED
168 SEP 18 1970

ENCLOSURE

105-207487-7

ORIGINAL FILED IN

7-1918

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

06 SEP 2 1970

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D.C. 20535

September 16, 1970

[redacted]

By communication of August 17, 1970, the U.S. Department of State advised that among the Soviets invited to attend captioned conference were Mikhail Ilich Bruk, born September 22, 1929, Leningrad, described as "Chief Editor of News Agency," and Lyudmila Alekseyevna Gvishiani, born November 4, 1928, Kirensk, described as "Senior Researcher, Institute of U.S.A., USSR Academy of Sciences" and daughter of Soviet Premier Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin.

On September 15, 1970, Samuel Adason Jaffe (hereinafter referred to as source), former American Broadcasting Company (ABC) correspondent in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), who now resides in Bethesda, Maryland, telephonically advised a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that he had been invited to a party to be given on Friday, September 18, 1970, at about 8 p.m., at the Harmony Club in New York City, for Mikhail Bruk, a Soviet national currently visiting the United States with a Soviet group which includes the daughter of Soviet Premier Kosygin.

Source stated he received a call the night of September 14, 1970, from a very close friend, Jeff Jaffe, President of Ward Candy Company, extending an invitation for source and wife to attend the party. Source said Jeff Jaffe is not a relative of source, however, source's father at one time represented the Ward Candy Company. Jeff Jaffe is one of a group of American millionaires referred to as "Young Presidents of America," which recently visited the USSR. Before making the trip, source told Jeff Jaffe he might be contacted in the USSR by some of source's former Soviet acquaintances, including Mikhail Bruk. Source informed Jeff Jaffe that Bruk has acted as an interpreter for Americans in Moscow and has attended a number of Pugwash Conferences as an interpreter, and source indicated he suspected Bruk was connected with the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).

ENCLOSURE

[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

RE: [redacted]

SECRET

After his return from the USSR, Jeff Jaffe told source that during a portion of the tour of the "Young Presidents of America" in the USSR, they were escorted by Mikhail Bruk. Source was told that "at one point in an elevator in the Ukraine," Bruk mentioned source's name to Jeff Jaffe and asked if source was a relative or friend of his. When Jeff Jaffe informed Bruk that they were close friends, but not related, Bruk asked Jeff Jaffe if he would mind taking a letter or note to source. Jeff Jaffe indicated he would be glad to do so, however, they parted that day and he did not see Bruk again for a couple of weeks. Just prior to his departure from the USSR, Jeff Jaffe met Bruk again and reminded Bruk of the letter to source, pointing out that he would be leaving the USSR very shortly, however, Jeff Jaffe got the impression he "was talking to a dummy." Bruk gave absolutely no indication that he recalled ever requesting him to deliver a letter or note to source.

Source stated that when Jeff Jaffe called him September 14,1970, and extended him the invitation to attend the party for Bruk at the Harmony Club, which source referred to as a very exclusive Jewish club, source inquired if Bruk was aware that source might attend the party. Source was told Bruk should not be aware of this. Source indicated he would be in New York City on business Wednesday, September 16, 1970, and might stay over to attend the party that Friday. He indicated his wife would not be able to attend because she has to remain home with their children.

Source indicated he has observed no indication that Bruk has attempted to contact him during Bruk's current visit to the United States; however, source noted that he and his wife were out of town the previous weekend and would not be aware if Bruk attempted to call him during that period.

In answer to a specific question, source indicated he does not know whether or not KGB would have been aware that he was a close friend of Jeff Jaffe prior to the latter's trip to the USSR. Source stated it is possible during his assignment in Moscow as ABC correspondent that he could have mentioned Jeff Jaffe to Mikhail Bruk. He said it also is possible that Bruk asked Jeff Jaffe about him merely because both have the same surname.

SECRET

During an interview on July 25, 1969, by Special Agents of the FBI, WF T-1, a former officer of the KGB whose bona fides has not been established, but who has furnished reliable information in the past, identified Mikhail Ilich Bruk as an employee of the International Department of the Soviet Ministry of Health and a KGB agent "of one of apparatus of one of regions of Moscow." Although not an agent of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, Bruk knew several doctors stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and Bruk was used by officers of the First (American Embassy) Section, First Department, SCD, in their operations against American doctors stationed at the U.S Embassy in Moscow.

WF T-2, another government agency which conducts intelligence investigations, advised that WF T-1 furnished the following handwritten comments concerning his knowledge of the KGB operation against Samuel Adason Jaffe:

"Sam Jaffee, an American correspondent, arrived in Moscow in 1961. The Chief of the 1st Section, 1st Department (Vladislav Mikhaylovich Kovshuk, settled a question with 10th (Correspondents) Department, 2nd Chief Directory (Directorate), that the 1st Department would be working against Jaffee. I remember that he acquainted with a ballet dancer from Finland who was finishing her studies in Moscow and he was even thinking about his marriage with her. At that time we were thinking about a recruitment of this girl and I through (Johann) Preisfreund (identified by WF T-1 as a Finnish businessman and a KGB agent) became acquainted with her. As I found out there was not a sense (useless) as she was going to return to Finland or to Sweden.

"In 1962-1963 I found out from Kovshuk (and Gennadiy Ivanovich) Gryaznov (identified by WF T-1 as an officer of the 1st Section, 1st Department, SCD, KGB) that a senior case officer of the 1st Section, 1st Department, Kus_kov, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich was working with Sam Jaffee. I don't know (if) he was an agent or an operative contact. I am not sure but it seems to me that he was approached on the basis (of being) connected with women.

RE: [redacted]

SECRET

"In March 1962 I have seen Sam Jaffee in Geneva. He with other correspondents visited a pair of times the Soviet representative there. He knew several Russian diplomats and among them Suslov, Vladimir (Vladimir Pavlovich Suslov; identified by WF T-1 as a Soviet diplomat and KGB operative contact)."

During interviews of Samuel Adason Jaffe by Special Agents of the FBI during March and April 1969, he identified from photographs of numerous Soviets who had been mentioned by WF T-1 as KGB agents, operative contacts or officers, the following as his Soviet contacts - Mikhail Bruk, Vladimir Pavlovich Suslov, Vladislav Mikhaylovich Kovshuk and Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Kuskov (known to Jaffe as "Slava"). Jaffe denied ever knowingly being a KGB agent although he stated "Slava" might have thought that he (Jaffe) was "Slava's" agent. Jaffe stated he never told "Slava" or any other Soviet connected with Soviet Intelligence anything other than his own observations and opinions and denied furnishing any information from any government documents. Jaffe indicated that after the defection of WF T-1 was reported in newspapers, "Slava" told Jaffe he had worked with him ("Slava") and knew several of his contacts, including Jaffe. "Slava" then told Jaffe "If you are ever asked anything about me, deny any knowledge of me." Jaffe emphatically denied "Slava" ever made any arrangements to get in touch with Jaffe after Jaffe left the USSR and Jaffe denied ever having contact with "Slava" after his departure from the USSR.

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

SECRET

(S) 105-28233 115
REC-52

BY COURIER Delivered to CIA by CIA courier 9-9-70 GPD/kam

Date: EX 105 September 4, 1970

1 - Mr. Peterson

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director for Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

Reference is made to your letter dated August 26, 1970, captioned "Request for Letters Exchanged with ChiCom Newsman by Samuel Adason Jaffe," your reference CSCI-316/02601-70.

This Bureau also no longer maintains contact with subject; therefore, it will not be possible for us to respond to the request in your letter of reference.

ECP:eco
(4)

NOTE: Classified "Secret" since it repeats information so classified by CIA.

Subject is former correspondent for ABC who was stationed in Moscow and while there was considered as recruited agent by Soviets, according to defector source. We conducted several interviews of him during March and April, 1969, during which he did not adequately resolve allegations to our satisfaction and we have had no further contacts with him since September, 1969, when he volunteered information concerning encounter with a Soviet at UN in New York. In relet CIA requested Bureau to ask subject for copies of letters exchanged with New China News Agency official since 1/70 since it no longer maintains contact with him.

Tolson ____
Sullivan ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Brennan, C.D. ____
Callahan ____
Casper ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Tavel ____
Walters ____
Soyars ____
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

66 SEP

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Walters
Mr. Mohr
Mr. T
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

F B I

Date: 2/27/70

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-8906)

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, former [redacted], has been voluntarily furnishing information on an irregular basis concerning Soviet and Chinese matters. On 2/26/70, JAFFE, at his request, was contacted by SA LYLE J. THEISEN concerning a pending investigation in the Chinese field. (U)

On 2/27/70, JAFFE telephonically advised SA THEISEN that he was interested in doing a 26 minute interview of the Director of the FBI for a weekly program of Metro-Media, Inc., entitled "Profile." (U)

JAFFE advised that the interview, if granted would be presonally conducted by him and would generally cover such subjects as crime in America, civil rights and the future of the FBI. The date and place of the interview would be at the discretion of the Director. (U)

JAFFE was advised by SA THEISEN that these requests are handled directly by the Bureau and any correspondence should be so directed. (U)

As indicated in Bureau files, JAFFE was considered by the KGB to be one of their agents and his recent contacts with the Soviets remain suspicious. (C)

REC 14 105-28333-113

2 - Bureau
1 - WFO

10 MAR 5 1970

LJT:nsr (3)

Classified by 6134
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Approved: ______ 1970
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

The above is being brought to the Bureau's attention in the event JAFFE does in fact correspond with the Bureau concerning a possible interview of the Director. (u)

JAFFE is currently news editor for Metro-Media, Inc., WDC. (u)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GC [illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 9/29/69

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906) (C)
CONF. INFT.

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

SECRET

On September 18, 1969, subject contacted SA ELBERT T. TURNER by telephone and advised that he had been in New York the previous week where he had accidently met VLADIMIR ALEKSANDROVICH CHUCHUKIN, First Secretary of the Soviet United Nations Delegation at the delegates lounge. Subject said that he had known CHUCHUKIN for about ten years and mentioned to CHUCHUKIN that he was currently looking for a job. They made a luncheon date for the following day (9/11/69) for which CHUCHUKIN was late. They met at the lounge but went to another restaurant to eat at CHUCHUKIN's suggestion. During the luncheon, there was no conversation which would suggest that CHUCHUKIN was making any kind of intelligence follow up. -S-

Subject stated that he had not had any further contact with BORIS SEDOV and occasionally sees BORIS STRELNIKOV, who resides in his apartmenthouse, but merely exchanges greetings with him. Subject indicated that there has been no further indication of Soviet intelligence follow up with him. -S-

Subject stated that he was going back to New York the following week and is still looking for a job. -C-

An extra copy of this letter is submitted for the Bureau (105-94406) and New York (105-45740) files on CHUCHUKIN. -C-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-91140

3-Bureau
2-New York (134-3315) (Info) (RM)
2-WFO
(1-105-39752)

EX. - 117
REC-23
105-28333-112
SECRET

ETT:yh 363
(7)

Classified by 0342
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

3 SEP 30 1969

58 OCT 3 1969

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 8/14/69

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906) (C)

CONF. INFT. CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

ReWFOlet dated 6/17/69. 11°

Since relet the subject has contacted WFO on only one occasion, 8/8/69. At that time he stated that there had been no follow-up by BORIS SEDOV and in fact, he had not had any contact with Soviet officials except casual contact with BORIS STRELNIKOV at the swimming pool at their place of residence. -C-

In view of the above, there appears to be no basis for keeping this case in a pending status, and it is therefore being closed subject to being reopened in the event of additional developments. - C -

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC-40 105-28333-111
ST-106

1 AUG 15 1969

② - Bureau
1 - New York (134-3315) (RM) (INFO)
1 - WFO

ETT:sls
(4)

F54

AUG 21 1969

SOVIET SECTION

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

9/15/69

AIRTEL CONFIDENTIAL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-129821)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-11361)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS-CH

ReNYairtel to Bureau, 9/12/69.

On 9/15/69, [redacted] advised that [redacted] had left a message for her on the afternoon of 9/12/69, that he would be unable to keep their appointment for dinner on that evening, because he had to go to Washington. He stated that he would recontact [redacted] "in a few weeks". C

NYO will follow through [redacted]

On 9/15/69, [redacted] advised that SIMON MALLEY had been present at the UN on 9/12/69. C

ORIGINAL FILED IN

5-Bureau (105-129821) (RM)
(1-105-44898) ([redacted])
(1-105-14704) ([redacted]) C CONF. INFT.
(1-105-28333) ([redacted])
1-Washington Field (105-1871) ([redacted]) (Info) (RM)
1-New York (134-3315) ([redacted])
1-New York (105-16742) ([redacted])
1-New York (105-2305) ([redacted])
1-New York (134-11361) (INV) ([redacted])

105-28333-

NOT RECORDED
98 SEP 22 1969

MVD:eac
(10)

Classified by
Exempt from GDS Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

96

70 SEP 29 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 9/12/69

Transmit the following in ______________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________ SECRET (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-129821)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-11361)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS-CH

ReNYlet to Bureau dated 4/23/69, captioned "[redacted], IS-CH" and WFO airtel to Bureau dated 5/1/69, captioned "[redacted], aka, IS-CH" (Bufile 105-14704). - u

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies and for WFO, one copy, of an LHM captioned "SAM JAFFE". The LHM is classified "Secret" since disclosure of the information contained therein would tend to identify a highly placed source, whose identity, if revealed, would seriously effect the national security.

NY T-1 in the LHM is NY 5115-S. (S

Sources used to characterize SIMON MALLEY are:

NY T-2	CIA (NY 105-16742)
NY T-3	WF 1373-S (NY 105-16742)

ENCLOSURE

5-Bureau (105-129821) (Encls. 8) (RM)
(1-105-44898) ([redacted])
(1-105-14704) ([redacted]) - CONF. INFT.
(1-105-28333) ([redacted])
1-Washington Field (105-1871) ([redacted]) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-New York (134-3315) ([redacted])
1-New York (105-16742) ([redacted])
1-New York (105-2305) ([redacted])
1-New York (134-11361) (INV) ([redacted])

MVD:eac
(10)

SECRET

Classified By 6736
Exempt from GDS Category 1/3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NOT RECORDED
172 SEP 30 1969

CARBON COPY

58 OCT 3 1969

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________M Per ______________

SECRET

Re WFO airtel advised that [redacted], who is identical with the subject of the enclosed LHM, is presently operational for CIA. This individual has also furnished information to WFO concerning his contact with Professor PAUL LIN (Bufile [redacted]), and his attempts to gain entry to Communist China. WFO at the present time has recommended against efforts to direct the activities of [redacted], since the possibility exists that this individual would attempt to use any such relationship to support advancements in his career as a journalist. - S -

On 4/23/69, [redacted] contacted [redacted], code name [redacted], in connection with his attempts to arrange for a meeting with Professor PAUL LIN. It will be recalled that [redacted] contacted [redacted] at the suggestion of Dr. CHANG Hsin-hai (NY file [redacted]). A report was submitted by [redacted] on this meeting to his handling agent at CIA, which indicated that in his opinion [redacted] was not active in any clandestine capacity, nor was she the witting agent of anyone. - S -

On 9/10/69, [redacted] reported on her most recent meeting with [redacted], which had occurred on 9/9/69. During the course of this meeting he invited [redacted] to dinner on 9/12/69. He gave no reason to source for this invitation, however, it is expected that he will try to elicit whatever information source might have concerning Professor LIN, travel to China, and perhaps SIMON MALLEY. Source accepted the invitation in order to determine further what the nature of the current activities of [redacted] are. [redacted] is, of course, unaware of the past and present intelligence activities of [redacted]. [redacted] has been instructed to discuss in a normal fashion her contact with LIN and her attempts to gain entry to mainland China. - S -

The enclosed LHM is being submitted for the information of the Bureau and WFO, since it is expected that [redacted] will contact either WFO or CIA or both concerning his meeting with [redacted]. - S -

NYO will report any significant information developed by [redacted] during her meeting on 9/12/69, with [redacted].

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
September 12, 1969

SECRET

Sam Jaffe

NY T-1 advised that Sam Jaffe, former American Broadcasting Company (ABC) news correspondent in Hong Kong, was present at the United Nations on September 9, 1969. Source learned that Jaffe is no longer employed by ABC and is presently seeking a new journalistic affiliation.

Source indicated that Jaffe is interested in some type of news agency being established in Europe by Simon Malley.

> Simon Malley, who has also been known as Simon Menache (true name), Selim Malek and Selim Menache, was born May 25, 1923, at Cairo, Egypt. He is a United States citizen. During November, 1962, NY T-2, another government agency which conducts security and personnel type investigations, advised [redacted]. NY T-3 advised during January, 1963, that Malley was possibly identical with a paid source of a known Yugoslav intelligence agent. Malley has been an accredited news correspondent at United Nations Headquarters, New York, representing a number of African and Arab news media. In 1967 Malley published a series of articles in the United States concerning travel to China, and in particular about the results of an interview with Chinese Communist Premier CHOU En-lai.

Jaffe was heard to comment that he has been interested in traveling to the Chinese mainland. He noted that he had recently received notice from the "Deputy Representative" of the China News Agency in Hong Kong to the effect that no visas

SECRET

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

New York
9-12-69

for travel to mainland China would be granted this year. Source could not determine whether this notice was confined to Jaffe or was meant to include all individuals who might apply for permission to travel to China.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
September 12, 1969

Title	Sam Jaffe
Character	
Reference	is made to memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOV. MENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 6/17/69

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906)(P)

SUBJECT: CONF. INFT. [redacted] CONFIDENTIAL
IS - R

ReWFOlet 5/26/69 106 reporting contact of subject with WFO 5/14/69.

On 6/2/69 subject telephonically contacted SA ELBERT T. TURNER to "check in", stating he had been in New York last week after resigning his position with ABC. He has not yet obtained another position but desires to stay in newspaper or journalistic work and made a number of contacts while in New York.

He has not had any recent contacts with Soviet officials except at a recent Bulgarian reception when a number of correspondents, including Soviets, made inquiries concerning the reasons for his leaving ABC. Subject stated he visited CSABA KIS, a representative of the Hungarian Central News Agency, on 6/1/69 at the Hungarian's house, and engaged in casual conversation.

On 6/16/69 subject telephonically contacted SA JAMES P. WOOTEN and advised he and his wife recently had lunch at the residence of the Hungarian Press Attache, who expressed a strong displeasure with Communist China. He stated he has had no contacts with Soviets recently; however, his wife belongs

CONFIDENTIAL

② - Bureau
2 - New York (134-3315)(RM)
1 - WFO

105-28333-110

5 JUN 18 1969

JPW:jw
(5)

Classified by
Exempt from GDS Category 2 3
Date of Declassification

REC 46

SOVIET SECTION

JUN 26 1969

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
5010-108

to the same apartment swimming pool to which the wife of Mrs. BORIS STRELNIKOV belongs and they see each other almost daily. He said Mrs. STRELNIKOV is very unhappy over recent travel restrictions placed on her husband and is afraid this might interfere with vacation plans, such as trips to beaches this Summer. – C –

Subject stated he is still looking for a new job and has made several contacts and some interest has been expressed but no tangible offer has been received. Subject stated he is primarily interested in going overseas in the journalistic field or in some type of roving assignment in the United States. – C –

Subject stated he read a very interesting article out of Peking on page 4 of last Sunday's "New York Times" which speculates that Americans will be permitted to visit China before October, 1969 and states a tourist group is being organized in Toronto, Canada to visit China. He said the article also indicates that an Italian TV cameraman visited China in April, 1969. Subject stated that although his name was not mentioned, subject feels sure this is a friend of his. – C –

Subject stated he wrote a letter to Chou En Lai June 1, 1969, as suggested by Paul Lin, and sent it to Lin in Canada, requesting that Lin deliver it to Chou En Lai, in connection with subject's request to be permitted to visit China. – C –

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 5/27/69

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315) (C)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

SECRET

ReWFO let and LHM 4/29/69; -106 WFO airtel and enclosure dated 5/1/69 under caption "[redacted] IS - CH"; and WFO let and LHM dated 5/2/69. -107 — c —

The NYO agrees with WFO's conclusion that former [redacted] was an agent of the KGB during his service as an ABC Television correspondent in Moscow from 1961 - 1965. While he may not have considered himself as such, there is no doubt the KGB regarded him as their agent. His contacts with Soviet nationals since leaving Moscow in October, 1965, are of such nature that it is not possible to conclude whether or not he continues to serve KGB interests. As noted by WFO, the call he received recently from BORIS SEDOV of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., indicating SEDOV's desire to show him a photograph is suspicious and could well represent a KGB attempt to re-establish the former agent relationship with him. -S-

WFO's impression of former [redacted] as an aggressive type, a fast talker and a smooth operator is an accurate description and constitutes his basic qualifications for his professional capacity, that of a television reporter-correspondent. His former affinity for Russian matters led him into numerous contacts with Soviet nationals here in the United States and resulted in his being posted to Moscow in 1961. Following his expulsion from the Soviet Union and his subsequent posting to Hong Kong, former [redacted] turned his attention toward the Red Chinese. He undoubtedly views relations with Red China as the future primary concern of the United States and wants to be "in on the ground floor", so to speak. While this desire, in and of itself, does not reflect -S-

REC 18

105-28333-109

8 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Washington Field (105-8906)(RM)
1 - New York

MAY 28 1969

JRN:glb
(5)

SECRET

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2/3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SOVIET SECTION

70 JUN 20 1969

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

unfavorably upon former [redacted] and is understandable for one in his position, the possibility that he could be used by the Red Chinese, as he was by the Soviets, should always be borne in mind. [redacted] had an exaggerated faith in his ability to "handle" the Soviets and probably feels the same way now towards the Red Chinese, but his personal conduct, especially in the past, has placed him in a position to be rather easily compromised. The NYO suspects there are still areas of his conduct and activities while in Moscow which he has not revealed. -S-

CIA's interest in [redacted] is undoubtedly based on the possibility of his getting into Red China at some future date. CIA is aware of [redacted] background and the Bureau's dealings with him and is therefore forewarned. - S -

In view of the above, the NYO agrees with WFO that no effort should be made by the Bureau at this time to direct the activities of [redacted] or to give him any assignments. Any information he might volunteer concerning his contacts with Soviet, Soviet-bloc or Red Chinese nationals (or their agents) should, however, be accepted and evaluated. He has furnished information of value in the past and could well do the same in the future. -S-

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-14704) 5/28/69

SAC, WFO (105-1871) (P)

[redacted] aka
IS - CH
(OO:Bu)

SECRET

ReWFOairtel to the Bureau, 5/1/69.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are six copies, for New York, two copies, for information, and for Seattle, one copy for information, of an LHM pertaining to captioned subject. - (U)

The confidential source referred to in enclosed LHM is SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE, former [redacted] (U)

The enclosed LHM is classified "Secret" in view of the possible double agent potential in this matter. - S -

As noted in referenced WFO airtel, the subject's name was furnished to JOHN STENT, Domestic Operations Division, CIA (covert) who in turn furnished it to former [redacted], with whom STENT had close business and personal contact while both were recently assigned to Hong Kong. STENT continues to maintain frequest contact with former [redacted] - S -

On 5/20/69, STENT advised WFO that JAFFE is no longer affiliated with the American Broadcasting Company and is currently seeking new employment. He further advised that JAFFE had sent LIN a copy of a newspaper article in which LIN had expressed interest and received a "thank you" reply from LIN. According to STENT, JAFFE has not prepared the letter requesting permission to enter the China Mainland; however, expects to do so very shortly. - S -

ENCLOSURE
CONF. INFT.

4 - Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1-Legat, Ottawa - 105-1591)
(1-105-28333 - Former NY 2524-S)
2 - New York (105-2405) (Enc. 2)
(1-134-3315) (Former NY 2524-S)
1 - Seattle (105-3690) (RM) (Enc. 1)

126

NOT RECORDED
178 JUN 4 1969

55 JUN 1 4

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

EBT:jjs
(8)

ORIGINAL FILED IN

WFO will continue to follow this matter and report pertinent developments.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

May 28, 1969

SECRET

[redacted]

INTERNAL SECURITY - CH

On April 29, 1969, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised he had been informed of the following information by Samuel Jaffe, identified below: -S-

Samuel Adason Jaffe, American Broadcasting Company correspondent, recently learned of Dr. Paul Lin, a professor at McGill University, Montreal, Canada. Subsequently, Jaffe obtained additional information concerning LIN from a long-time friend, Mr. H. H. CHANG, a professor at Fairleigh Dickinson University, New Jersey, and from VAN LUNG, one of the owners of the Yenching Palace Restaurant, 3524 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C., with whom Jaffe dined in April, 1969. -S-

On April 8, 1969, Jaffe telephonically contacted LIN advising Lin that he had recently seen a New York Times article dealing with the restoration of Canada-China diplomatic relations and in which LIN's name appeared. Jaffe informed LIN that he had been in Hong Kong for about four years and was desirous of interviewing LIN. Additionally, Jaffe informed LIN that he had interviewed CHOU En-lai in 1955 and was one of about 18 journalists invited to visit the China Mainland in 1956. Jaffe also advised LIN that he knew one SZETO KUNG of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong. -S- -S-

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 1
Date of Declassification Indefinite

105-96535-

ENCLOSURE

04-28-69

LIN advised Jaffe to contact him later at which time he would have a definite answer as to a possible interview. -S-

On April 18, 1969, Jaffe recontacted LIN telephonically at which time LIN indicated a reluctance to grant an interview with Jaffe, feeling that granting such an interview would leave the door open to interviews by many other journalists. LIN, however, indicated a desire to talk with Jaffe and after exchanging telephone numbers and addresses a luncheon engagement was set for April 28, 1969, at the faculty lounge at McGill University, Montreal, Canada. -S-

On April 28, 1969, Jaffe flew to Montreal and met LIN for lunch as previously arranged. Jaffe expressed to LIN his strong desire to visit the China Mainland as a correspondent and suggested that it might be possible that the Chinese Government would permit foreign journalists to enter the China Mainland in connection with the October celebrations. LIN expressed the opinion that the October celebrations would make no difference in the Government's policy concerning the admittance of journalists. LIN suggested that Jaffe write a letter by the first of June, 1969, to the Chinese Government indicating that he desired to enter the China Mainland as a private citizen, stating that he had interviewed CHOU En-lai in 1955 as an American journalist and that if he is permitted to enter China, he would like to continue to pursue his career as a journalist. -S-

LIN indicated that the best way to establish contact would be through the Chinese Embassy in Paris; however, when Jaffe indicated that he knew no one there and the possibility existed that the letter would not be forwarded to the proper channels LIN stated he would "Be going East in early summer" and he would be willing to see to it that the letter would be properly dispatched. LIN also suggested that Jaffe's letter be sent to him for perusal prior to its dispatch as he possibly could be of assistance in wording the letter correctly. LIN emphasized that Jaffe should indicate in his letter that he was writing as a private citizen; however, he should not try to hide that fact that he is a journalist and state in the letter that he had previously been a journalist for "The Nation" and that he would like to write and produce films about China. -S-

LIN also stated that Jaffe should include in his letter the fact that he would be willing to leave his United States Passport in Hong Kong and when Jaffe indicated to LIN that he did not think that would be necessary, LIN stated that maybe "they would not want you to come into China with a U.S. Passport." -S-

According to Jaffe, LIN is a very brilliant individual well-versed in Soviet-Chinese relations and in United States relations with China and the Soviet Union. LIN appeared to be more concerned with Sino-Soviet relations than with the United States. LIN commented that Cyrus Eaton is very much interested in bringing China and the United States together and stated that Eaton had sent him an article from a Cleveland newspaper on anti-China hysteria whipping up in the United States. -S-

In commenting on the recent newspaper accounts of the speech of LIN Piao, Vice Primier, Communist China, LIN stated that he thought it was premature to make any judgment on the speech in its entirety; however, LIN ranked MAO Tse-tung, CHOU En-lai, and LIN Piao almost equally. LIN stated that he did not for a minute think that they believe the United States or the Soviet Union would launch an atomic attack. They do believe the Soviet Union is a serious threat but they do not think either the United States or the Soviet Union plan to launch a premature attack on them. In talking about moderates, LIN stated that CHOU En-lai is not a moderate; he is a tactician. LIN stated that MAO probably is the only man who really understands the Chinese people and believed MAO felt he had to start the Cultural Revolution because there were people in China who were doing things for their own self interest and MAO had to take action, including the unleashing of the Red Guard to prevent this. LIN indicated that he felt MAO has been successful. LIN stated that the Soviet Union is much like the United States but MAO knew -S-that if these people were allowed to gain a foothold that China would revert to the days of CHIANG Kai-shek when there was unlimited corruption and he felt this had to be settled once and for all. LIN stated that MAO, CHOU, and LIN Piao were unanimous and there was no disagreement among them. - S -

LIN stated to Jaffe that he would not set foot in the United States until the Vietnam war was ended; however, later when LIN asked Jaffe if he was aware of the fact that he (LIN) had been in Hong Kong in January, 1969, and Jaffe replied in the affirmative, LIN stated "I am sorry, I am not being completely honest. You know that I was in Seattle." LIN then explained that en route from Hong Kong to Canada he decided to return through Seattle to Canada against the advice of his friends in Hong Kong who indicated that there might be trouble. LIN stated that he was detained at the airport (Seattle) for two hours, was interrogated, and all personal effects were gone through. LIN stated he was sure everything was photographed and he was furious. LIN stated that he subsequently contacted an attorney, "the number one professor of law at Harvard University," who was also incensed over the incident. - S -

LIN inquired of Jaffe if he knew other news correspondents, such as Harrison Salisbury, Doak Barnett, or Frank Trader. LIN indicated that he knew Salisbury well and stated that he was sure Salisbury would speak well of him (LIN). LIN also discussed Mortin Schafer, Canadian correspondent, who entered China as a tourist and who apparently concealed a camera in a cigarette lighter to take photographs in China. Jaffe indicated that that was unfortunate as it has made it more difficult for foreign journalists to obtain permission to enter China. In commenting on correspondent Milton Nash, LIN stated that he thought Nash was "bright and understanding." - S -

LIN was shown a United States newspaper article concerning China and LIN expressed a desire to have a copy of that article. Jaffe promised to send him a copy of the article. - S -

Jaffe indicated to LIN that he intended to remain in contact with him and would forward to LIN his request of the Chinese Government for permission to enter the China Mainland. -S-

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
September 12, 1969

Title	Sam Jaffe
Character	
Reference	is made to memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 5/26/69

REC-6

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906)(P)

CONF. INFT. **CONFIDENTIAL**

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

On 5/14/69 subject telephonically contacted SA ELBERT T. TURNER. He said he had a rather interesting lunch with the Press Attache of the Hungarian Embassy, JOZSEF HAJDU (3rd Secretary, Press Department). HAJDU, who arranged for the luncheon, indicated he was interested in what President NIXON would speak about in his national TV broadcast. He asked subject when he would get an "advance" of the speach, and subject said he did not think ABC (American Broadcast Company) would get one until a half hour prior to the start of the broadcast. - C -

HAJDU also asked subject if he was aware of a report put out by the Institute for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. about the situation in Europe and if subject could obtain a copy of it. HAJDU said he thought subject would find the report interesting to read. HAJDU also inquired about a report just issued by Senator KENNEDY's Office containing comments of scientists against the ABM project. Subject told HAJDU he was not aware of it. - C -

Subject also advised he had lunch with BORIS (VALENTINOVICH) YAROCHEVSKIY, new "Tass" correspondent, and his wife, INNA YAROCHEVSKAYA. DON WINSTON and his wife also attended the lunch, held at subject's residence. Also invited but not attending was ANATOLI KARTOOF (phonetic)(undoubtedly ANATOLIY PAVLOVICH KOTOV, Attache, Press Department, Soviet Embassy). Subject complained C

② - Bureau
2 - New York (134-3315)(Info)(RM)
1 - WFO

JPW/ETT:jw
(5)

REC-15 - 28333 - 108

REC-6 MAY 27 1969

ST 102

SOVIET SECTION

JUN 10 1969

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3 **CONFIDENTIAL**
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

/ to YAROCHEVSKIY about his failure to attend and the next day KARTOOF (KOTOV) apologized telephonically, indicating he had mixed up his dates. -C-

In answer to a specific question, subject stated he had not been in contact with BORIS SEDOV, stating "I never heard another word from him." Subject stated he received an invitation to attend a reception at the Hungarian Embassy on 5/23/69 and suggested that SEDOV "may show up there." Subject said he did not receive an invitation to the "May Day" reception at the Soviet Embassy. He called and mentioned this to ANATOLI KARTOOF (KOTOV), who stated invitations were limited to one press representative for each press service, but told subject that if he wanted to attend, "please feel free to do so." Subject stated he refused to accept the invitation under such circumstances. -C-

Subject indicated he was "leaving here on Friday" (5/16/69) for New York and will be "looking around to see what is in the hopper"; however, he will return to Washington, D.C. by 5/23/69 since his daughter has a birthday then. -C-

On 5/20/69 JACK STENT, CIA, advised SA LYLE J. THEISEN that subject had resigned from ABC effective 5/16/69. -C-

DIRECTOR, FBI 10/3/74

SAC, WFO (105-127201) (C)

[redacted]
IS-CH
(OO:WFO)

Re WFO airtel, 8/22/74.

The Haines Directory for the Washington, D. C. (WDC) area discloses that captioned address is the residence of SAM A. JAFFE, subject of Bufile 105-28333 and WFO file 105-8906. JAFFE is a former news correspondent and currently a free lance writer. The Bureau is well aware of JAFFE and his background in the PRC.

In view of the above, WFO will conduct no further investigation in this matter.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-269159-[illegible]

105-28333 -
NOT RECORDED
NOV 1 - 1974

2 - Bureau
(1-105-28333)
2 - WFO
(1-105-8906)
LGA:dah
(4)

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 [illegible]
Date of Declassification Indefinite

245
NOV 0 [illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 5/2/69

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906)(P) SECRET

3 -

5 -

SUBJECT: CONF. INFT.
[redacted]
IS - R
(OO:WFO)

5 9 11

ReWFOlet & LHM, 4/29/69, reporting interviews of SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE on 3/20,21,27/69.

Enclosed are 5 copies for Bureau and one for information of NYO of LHM captioned "SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE" reporting interviews of JAFFE on 4/16,22,29/69. JAFFE was interviewed by SA ELBERT T. TURNER on 4/16/69 and 4/22/69 and by SAs ELBERT T. TURNER, JAMES P. WOOTEN and LYLE J. THEISEN, on 4/29/69.

The enclosed LHM is classified "Secret" [redacted] The sources mentioned in the LHM are:

S

[redacted]: [redacted]
WF T-2: [redacted]

The details of the interview of JAFFE on 4/29/69 concerning his contacts with Chinese nationals recently is being set forth by separate communication.

C

2 - Bureau (Enc. 5) ENCLOSURE
1 - New York (134-3315)(Info)(Enc. 1)(RM)
1 - WFO

Classified by 6136 TOM
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

JPW:jw
(4)

T/4/-104-403

107

AGENCY State, CIA/Liaison
~~REQ.~~ REC'D
DATE FORW. 5/14/69
HOW FORW. R/S
BY EC Plas

REC 81

22 MAY 6 1969

SOVIET-CHINESE

SECRET

5 MAY 29 1969

Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

May 2, 1969

SECRET

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

CONTENTS   Page

I. Interview, April 16, 1969:

C

Party Given by Jaffe, Attended by Hungarian and Polish Nationals.................................... 2
Attempts to Contact Boris Nikolayevich Sedov........ 2
Farewell Party for Vladimir Ivanovich Bogachev..... 2
Contact with Vladimir Nikiforovich Vashchenko...... 3

II. Interview, April 22, 1969:

C

Contact with Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy........ 3
Attempt to Contact Boris Nikolayevich Sedov........ 3
Contact with New Tass News Agency Correspondent.... 4

III. Interview, April 29, 1969:

C

Farewell Party for Vladimir Ivanovich Bogachev..... 4
Attempt to Contact Boris Nikolayevich Sedov........ 4
Boris Valentinovich Yarochevskiy, "Tass" Correspondent, and his wife, Inna Grigoryevna Yarochevskaya.................................... 5
Contact with Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy and (first name unknown) Loginov (Possibly Vadim Petrovich Loginov).............................. 6
Identification of Soviet Nationals Employed in the Press Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, Moscow 9
Identification of Soviet Nationals in Contact with Jaffe..10
United States Correspondents Currently in Moscow...16
Moscow Journalists Suspected by Jaffe of Being Connected with KGB..................................17
Jaffe's Future Plans...............................18

Classified by 6136 [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

107

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Reference is made to memorandum dated April 29, 1969 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington, D.C. concerning captioned individual. U

Interview, April 16, 1969

On April 16, 1969, Samuel Adason Jaffe telephonically furnished the following information to an Agent of the Washington Field Office (FBI). U

Party Given by Jaffe, Attended by Hungarian and Polish nationals

Jaffe stated he recently held a party at his residence which was attended by a representative of the Hungarian News Agency, the Hungarian Press Attache, and the Polish Press Attache, whom he identified as Andrej Konopacki and described as a "hard-nosed" individual in his political outlook. C

Attempts to Contact Boris Nikolayevich Sedov

Jaffe said he had attempted on three or four occasions to telephonically contact Boris Nikolayevich Sedov at the Soviet Embassy, but was unable "to catch him in." He left word with the Soviet Embassy on one or two occasions for Sedov to contact him. C

(Sedov has been reported to be a KGB officer. Jaffe previously advised that Sedov told him that while thumbing through "our photograph files" he found a photograph of Jaffe taken in Moscow interviewing a Russian. Sedov indicated he thought Jaffe might want the photograph and suggested that they get together for lunch soon.) C

Farewell Party for Vladimir Ivanovich Bogachev

Jaffe advised that next week he will attend the going-away party for Vladimir Ivanovich Bogachev, Novosti Press Agency (APN) correspondent. C

(Bogachev has been reported as connected with Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). The Novosti C

Press Agency was newly established in Russia in February, 1961.) U

Contact with Vladimir Nikiforovich Vashchenko

Jaffe stated he attended the Hungarian Independence Day reception. He arrived late and spent considerable time talking to Captain Vladimir Nikiforovich Vashchenko, Naval Attache assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. Vashchenko indicated he did not think the dispute between Russia and China will mean anything. He does not see any real trouble now between the two countries. According to Jaffe, Vashchenko did not "spout" the "Soviet line." Jaffe said this was the first time he was able to get a Soviet military man to talk to him for any length of time. C

(Vashchenko has been reported as connected with GRU.) C

Interview, April 22, 1969

On April 22, 1969, Jaffe telephonically furnished the following information to an Agent of the WFO, FBI. C

Contact with Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy

Jaffe said he recently visited New York City in connection with his interest in interviewing a Chinese professor at McGill University in Canada and had a long conversation with Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy and his wife, Mira Mikhailovna Petrovskaya. He also had contact with a Soviet named Loginov who used to be with the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow. C

(Petrovskiy has been identified as connected with KGB.) C

Attempt to Contact Boris Nikolayevich Sedov

Jaffe also stated he "was invited up to the Hungarian Embassy" and while there he asked a Soviet Press Officer, "Where C is Sedov? He said, 'He doesn't work for me. He is in the Information Department.'" Jaffe continued: "They (Soviets) just say he isn't in. He has been in New York." C

Contact with new Tass News Agency Correspondent

Jaffe also indicated he recently met a newly arrived "Tass" correspondent whom he described as "sort of Ivy League," and his wife, whom he described as a "very attractive blond girl who remembered me from Moscow." Jaffe initially did not remember her but later recalled she was a translator for Reuters News Agency in Moscow and later worked for a Swedish correspondent in Moscow who is a friend of Jaffe. Jaffe remarked this couple have only been in the United States about a month. C

Interview, April 29, 1969

On April 29, 1969, Jaffe telephoned an agent of the WFO, FBI and on the same date voluntarily appeared at the WFO for interview. C

Farewell Party for Vladimir Ivanovich Bogachev

Jaffe advised he attended a farewell party for Bogachev at the Aviation Club. According to Jaffe, Bogachev appeared to be "very cold" and "a little stiff" in his contact with Jaffe. Jaffe asked him what he intended to do and he replied: "I might go back to 'Tass.'" Jaffe indicated the Soviets gave Bogachev an "atmosphere weather gauge" as a farewell gift. C

Attempt to Contact Boris Nikolayevich Sedov

Jaffe said Sedov has not yet returned his calls. Jaffe again indicated he met a Soviet Press Officer at a Hungarian reception (later he said he met him at the Aviation Club party) who told him Sedov was not in his department but was connected with the Soviet Information Department at the Soviet Embassy. The C

Press Officer indicated Sedov had been in New York but was now back in Washington, D.C. The Press Officer told Jaffe he would tell Sedov to get in touch with Jaffe. According to Jaffe, the Press Officer, whose name he cannot recall, displayed great interest in Jaffe and "practically begged" Jaffe to invite him to his home. The Soviet stated: "You haven't forgotten? You said you would have me over. You are a great fellow. You will have me over?" Jaffe said he replied in the affirmative. According to Jaffe, the Soviet "made very sure I knew he was Jewish, which was very obvious." Jaffe associates the Soviet's name with the Russian word for "potato." C

Boris Valentinovich Yarochevskiy, "Tass" Correspondent, and his wife, Inna Grigoryevna Yarochevskaya

Jaffe said he attended a Hungarian reception April 17, 1969 which also was attended by several Soviet journalists. The Soviets spent considerable time during the reception, which was held just after the United States "spy" plane was shot down by the North Koreans, in conversation with Bob McCloskey of the United States Department of State. C

Jaffe continued: "I met this young guy - the newest arrival from 'Tass' - Boris (last name unknown)(LNU) and Inna (his wife)." Jaffe described Boris as "very, very Ivy League" and "quite bright." Inna, who looked familiar to Jaffe, came over to Jaffe and stated: "Sam, how are you? You don't remember me? No? You are still a legend in Moscow. There is still talk about you." Inna then indicated that she was one of the translators for Reuters News Agency in Moscow, working for John Miller. Her last job was translator for Lares Bruger (phonetic), a Swedish newspaper correspondent in Moscow and a friend of Jaffe. C

Jaffe stated Boris apparently studied at McGill University in Canada and Inna apparently joined her husband in Canada just prior to his assignment in Washington, D.C. Inna indicated she and Boris have only been in Washington, D.C. about one or one and one-half months. C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe said Inna "is more outgoing than the others (Soviets)." Both Boris and Inna speak good English. Jaffe indicated that Boris was going to the Foreign Language Institute in Moscow while Inna was working for Reuters News Agency. He said John Miller, Inna's boss, knew Boris. Jaffe stated Boris followed up his studies at the Foreign Language Institute by attending McGill University. He said Inna flew from Moscow to meet Boris in Canada and they then flew to the United States. C

Jaffe said Boris, while studying at McGill University, met a Chinese professor at McGill University whom Jaffe interviewed at McGill University on April 28, 1969. According to Jaffe, this Chinese professor is closely connected with, if not a part of, the Chinese Communist Government. C

Jaffe said he learned from Inna that Yuri Nikolaevich Vinogradov, a contact of Jaffe in Moscow and in the United States, is now divorced. C

[redacted] C

Contact with Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy and (first name unknown)(FNU) Loginov (Possibly Vadim Petrovich Loginov)

Jaffe stated: "I went to New York and called Vladimir Petrovskiy and his wife, Mira, whom I have known for years. We had lunch at 'The Plaza' and had a long relaxing conversation." C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe said he mentioned to Petrovskiy that Inna had told him Yuri Vinogradov is now divorced. Although Petrovskiy did not acknowledge that he was aware of this, he stated he was not surprised since he knew he had separated from his wife. Yuri Vinogradov is now in the "World Organization Department" of the Soviet Foreign Ministry as "an assistant to an assistant." Jaffe got the impression that Vinogradov's job is not important. C

Petrovskiy mentioned that Viktor Mikhailovich Sukhodrev and his wife also are now divorced. Jaffe said she had been in "show business." Jaffe continued: "Viktor decided he wanted a diplomatic career. He is working in the Foreign Ministry, but whenever they need a translator, they grab him." Petrovskiy indicated Sukhodrev is not happy with his new job because he likes to travel and "be a big shot." While working at the Foreign Ministry, Sukhodrev occasionally is used as an interpreter in important cases. C

Petrovskiy indicated that Vladimir Pavlovich Suslov is now "what you would call policy planner for United States affairs at the Foreign Ministry. He has the title of Ambassador. He has a very important job now." C

> (Suslov has been identified by WF T-2, a former KGB officer whose bona fides has not been established but who has furnished reliable information in the past, as a Soviet diplomat who is an operative contact of KGB.) S

Jaffe said he learned from Petrovskiy that Yuri Nikolaevich Chernyakov, Press Officer, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., might be recalled. He also learned that Mikhail Nikolaevich Smirnovskiy, who used to be Chief of the American Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry "is ill" and has been replaced as Ambassador to England. Jaffe got the impression it was a "political illness." C

Jaffe said Mira Petrovskaya is now working for the Aeroflot Section of Intourist in New York because "she decided she would keep herself busy." C

Jaffe continued: "Petrovskiy was concerned because 'The Washington Post' is on a deliberate kick to defame him." Jaffe indicated Petrovskiy has been accused of being responsible for the Soviet Union using the United Nations (UN) for its own advantage. Jaffe stated: "He (Petrovskiy) admits he made a mistake. He thought because it was made public and was given to a group, he was able to publish it, and this has caused embarrassment for the UN." Petrovskiy told Jaffe that "Robert Esterbrook has had two articles sort of attacking me. I admit I made a mistake. I was wrong. I told the Secretary General (of the UN) this. I didn't know you had a group through which this should be cleared. Why should this man continue to attack me? Two articles in 'The Washington Post' and one in the 'Los Angeles Times.'" Jaffe said Petrovskiy indicated the Secretary General of the UN was upset over the incident and Petrovskiy wonders if he should try to "pull the book back" (from publication), if it is still possible to do so.

Jaffe advised that the next day he visited the UN and talked to Petrovskiy and (FNU) "Loginov," who is (Soviet) Press Officer here (Washington, D.C.) and used to be Press Officer in Moscow. We had a conversation. He said he would be in Washington this week and would look me up. Loginov started to discuss the Chinese. I said I would like to go there. He said he had been in China and speaks Mandarin. He said he was very skeptical about one point in (United States President) Nixon's press conference, why he brought up Czechoslovakia in the press conference. 'Do you (Jaffe) think it was a slam at us (Soviets)?' He seemed to read a lot of stuff into it."

(Vadim Petrovich Loginov was in the United States October 27,1959-November 25,1959 as a group leader and member of a Soviet delegation of students. He was again in the United States September 4,1967-November 29,1967 as a temporary trainee at the Soviet Embassy. He returned to the United States February 12,1968 as First Secretary, Political Division, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C.)

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Identification of Soviet Nationals Employed in the Press Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, Moscow

Jaffe was shown photographs of several Soviet nationals and he identified Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin, Boris Dmitrievich Pyadyshev, and Fedor Stepanovich Fedorenko as employees of the Press Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, with whom he had contact while in Moscow. He was shown a photograph of Fedor Yakovlevich Semenov, but he did not recognize this individual and stated he was not identical with the Fedor Semenov he knew in Moscow as the Number Three Man in the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Jaffe was asked if he observed any indication that any of these individuals were connected with Soviet Intelligence. Jaffe replied in the negative; however, he stated Boris Pyadyshev "is a very strange guy. A young man. Vladimir (Petrovskiy) told me he had risen to Number Two man (in the Press Department)." Jaffe recalled that on one occasion when he was accompanying N. K. Khrushchev on a trip, he invited Zamyatin to have a drink. Although Zamyatin ordinarily did not drink with Jaffe, he accepted his invitation on this occasion. Zamyatin indicated he was very tired of his position in the Press Department and planned to retire and write under a pseudonym. According to Jaffe, Mira Petrovskaya said she went to school with Pyadyshev. Jaffe said he found Pyadyshev to be a very bright, but very cold individual. Jaffe stated: "I have always felt that Mira Petrovskaya was connected with KGB;" however, she has never made any intelligence approach to Jaffe.

Jaffe then mentioned a Soviet national named Yuri Bekov (phonetic) and stated: "There is no question that he was KGB. (He was connected with) Press Department. He could do more things than the Press Department, but he was supposed to be an arm of the Press Department on trips. He knew all the overt KGB men."

(Fedor Stepanovich Fedorenko has been reported as connected with the Soviet Committee of Information.)

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

(Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin has been reported as connected with the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs.)(MVD) C

Identification of Soviet Nationals in Contact with Jaffe

Jaffe was then shown photographs of individuals, all but one identified by [redacted] as [redacted], KGB, and whom Jaffe identified on March 21, 1969 as Soviets with whom he had had contact either in the United States or in Russia. When making these identifications on March 21, 1969, Jaffe was not furnished the names of these individuals, and he indicated at that time that although he has a very good recollection of faces of individuals he has met, he has a very poor recollection of names. On April 29, 1969, Jaffe was shown the names as well as the photographs of these individuals, the names of whom are set forth hereinafter: C

Aleshin, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich
Artemov, Vladimir Lvovich
Bagrichev, Nikolay Grigoryevich
Biryukov, Vadim Osipovich
Chernetsov, Yuri Evgenvich
Chernyshev, Georgiy Pavlovich
Fedorov, Yuriy Vladimirovich
Fedotkin, Ivan Kuzmich
Gavrilenko, Nikolay Aleksandrovich
Glazunov, Vyacheslav Viktorovich (agent of KGB)
Gromakovskiy, Evgeniy Petrovich also known as (aka)
  Granovskiy
Ivanov, Boris Semenovich
Kalinkin, Mikhail Vasilevich
Karpekin, Vyacheslav Vasilevich aka Efremov
Kevorkov, Vyacheslav Ivanovich aka Chitashvili
Khodorkov, Leonid Filippovich

C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Kirilyuk, Vadim Aleksandrovich
Kislov, Aleksandr Konstantinovich
Komarov, Sergey Vasilevich
Kostyra, Vladimir Viktorovich aka Vladimirov
Kovshuk, Vladislav Mikhaylovich aka Vladimir Komarov
Krivoshey, Vladimir Vasilyevich aka Krivitskiy
Kuskov, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich
Massaya, Petr Ivanovich
Medvedev, Sergey Vasilyevich
Mikhaylov, Valentin Matveyevich aka Sadovnikov
Nikiforov, Yuriy Aleksandrovich
Panasenko, Ivan Abramovich
Ratnikov, Nikolay Timofeyevich
Sagatelyan, Mikhail R.
Sergeyev, Gleb Sergeyevich
Sumskoy, Mikhail Mikhailovich
Timofeyev, Viktor Dmitriyevich
Titov, Viktor Nikolaevich

Jaffe indicated he did not recognize the names of any of these individuals except Vadim Biryukov, Yuriy Fedorov, and Mikhail Sagatelyan. He remarked that many of these individuals have rather common Russian names. He made the following additional remarks concerning individuals depicted in these photographs.

He said he is sure he met Evgeniy Gromakovskiy; however, this name is not familiar to him and he may have known him as Granovskiy. He continued: "I think I knew him, possibly at 'Tass.' I don't think (I knew him) in Moscow." Jaffe stated he did not have close contact with this individual.

In regard to Vadim Biryukov, Jaffe stated: "I always thought that Vadim might have been with KGB. He got 'Life' into fantastic places. Then he worked for 'APN Novosti.' Now I understand he is no longer with 'APN.' He was really close to Ed Stevens."

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

([redacted]) C

When shown a photograph of Vladimir Krivoshey aka Krivitskiy, Jaffe stated: "He looks like a Russian. He looks familiar." Jaffe indicated he was not sure whether or not he had contact with this individual and he does not recognize him by name. C

In regard to Vyacheslav Kevorkov aka Chitashvili, Jaffe indicated he definitely knew this individual, but not under the name Kevorkov. He may have known him as Chitashvili, and recalled he was using the "cover of the secretary of the Union of Journalists." C

In commenting on Yuriy Fedorov, Jaffe described him as "an evil S.O.B. Apparently an expert on China. 'Slava' (Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Kuskov aka Mislyuk, Kiselov, Kislov) said 'Fedorov is very upset with you (Jaffe), feels you don't like him. You never have him up to your home. You have other journalists (there).' I said I didn't like him. He said 'you should see him.' I just didn't. He just dropped out of sight." C

Jaffe indicated he recognized the individual depicted in the photograph of Viktor Dmitriyevich Timofeyev as an individual with whom he had contact; however, this name is not familiar to him. He then stated he recalled an individual named Timofeyev (phonetic) who accompanied Khrushchev on a trip to the United States. Jaffe referred to this individual as a "mystery man" who was very close to Khrushchev. Jaffe indicated that this Timofeyev was not the individual depicted in the photograph of Viktor Dmitriyevich Timofeyev. C

> (On March 21, 1969 Jaffe identified a photograph of Timur Timofeevich Timofeev as a correspondent who "at one time stood very high in Soviet hierarchy" and "came here on Khrushchev trip." Jaffe was told "he stood very high with Khrushchev and then something happened.") C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe was questioned specifically about Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Aleshin. He stated the name is not familiar to him but he recognizes the face and possibly he met him in the United States rather than in Moscow. He said he cannot recall that Aleshin gave any indication he was connected with KGB. C

Jaffe again identified Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Kuskov as the Soviet national connected with KGB known to him first as "Slava" and later as Vyacheslav Kiselov. He did not associate the name Kuskov with "Slava". 6

[redacted] 5

Jaffe was questioned concerning previous comments he made that photographs of Nikolay Aleksandrovich Gavrilenko resemble "Slava's" KGB superior. Jaffe stated: "I can't say it (photographs of Gavrilenko) was 'Slava's' boss. He was less Russian looking. I definitely have seen this guy (Gavrilenko) but the name doesn't ring a bell." 6

When shown a photograph of Viktor Nikolaevich Titov, Jaffe commented: "This could be 'Slava's' boss." Jaffe said "Slava's" boss was a "fellow like this (Titov), younger than 'Slava.' (I was) never introduced by name. All he ('Slava') said was, 'this is my boss.' He ('Slava's' boss) said he can speak a little English. 'Slava' said, 'Better let me translate.' All we did was go over the accident report. At the end he said, 'I am aware of the case.' Then they spoke in Russian. ('Slava' asked) 'What do you think now that you have met Sam?' (The other Soviet replied) 'I would think there isn't anything to worry about.'" "Slava" then indicated to Jaffe that if his boss said there was nothing to worry about, Jaffe could forget about the incident. Later "Slava" tore the accident report up in Jaffe's presence. 6

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

✓ ([redacted].)

5

(Titov arrived in the United States at New York City January 24, 1963, destined to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations with the rank of First Secretary. He departed October 1,1963 and returned to New York City November 19, 1963. He again departed the United States July 24, 1964.)

C

Jaffe again indicated he recognized photographs of Vladislav Mikhaylovich Kovshuk aka Vladimir Komarov, particularly the younger photograph; however, he does not recognize these names. He said he believes he had contact with this individual in the United States and not in Russia.

C

([redacted])

5

Jaffe stated his closest contacts among Soviet nationals in Moscow were:

Mikhail ("Mike") I. Bruk;
Yuriy Vladimirovich Fedorov;
Aleksandr "Sasha" Nezmanov, his translator;
Nikolai Sergeevich Kalinin;

C

Yuri Nikolaevich Vinogradov;
Lyudmila Borisovna (LNU), an artist who worked in the television section of APN. C

Jaffe stated he also had several contacts with Oleg Danilovich Kalugin in Moscow; however, he did not associate as closely with Kalugin as he did with the aforementioned Soviets. C

[redacted].) S

(Nikolai Sergeevich Kalinin has been reported as connected with KGB and with MVD.) C

(Oleg Danilovich Kalugin has been reported as connected with KGB.) C

Jaffe stated that another of his Soviet contacts, Vladimir Borisovich Barkovski, was definitely connected with KGB. Barkovski asked Jaffe to "write for their (Soviet) journalists because they don't know about the U.S." Jaffe said he mentioned Barkovski to "Slava," but "Slava" said he never heard of him. He also mentioned Kalinin to "Slava" and "Slava" denied knowing him. Jaffe said he believes Kalinin definitely was connected with KGB. He continued: "When I came to Moscow, who popped up of all people, but Nikolai Kalinin." Jaffe advised he once had his translator call Kalinin at a telephone number furnished by Kalinin; however, Kalinin was not known to the party answering the telephone. S

In answer to a specific question, Jaffe said it was Lyudmila Borisovna (LNU) who confirmed the "Khrushchev ouster exclusive" given him by "Slava." Jaffe said he accomplished this through a telephone call to Lyudmila at APN. Prior to contacting Lyudmila, Jaffe had not been able to confirm the story. C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

United States Correspondents Currently in Moscow

Jaffe stated he recently received a letter requesting his advice from Irving Chapman who has been the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) correspondent in Moscow for only about three months. Jaffe said Ken Bernstein, who has been the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) correspondent in Moscow for three years, got an exclusive concerning the Chinese-Soviet border clash. Jaffe stated: "The pressure is on 'Irv' (Irving Chapman)," who has been told, "if you can't do the job, you might as well get out." U

In his letter, Chapman said, "I don't know how he got the film. I guess he got it through APN Novosti." Chapman reached the conclusion NBC apparently obtained the exclusive through Viktor Louis. Chapman stated: "I don't know how much NBC gives him, but he is riding around in a Porsche (automobile)." Jaffe then stated: "'Slava' was interesting, a Stalinist. Louis is a capitalist. I had very little to do with him. I was at his apartment once and I heard about his house." Jaffe indicated that because of his wife's curiosity, he and his wife visited the house of Viktor Louis, which he described as very "plush." S

Jaffe said Chapman "asked me for my contacts and how he can defeat NBC." Chapman's letter stated: "I met many of your friends. They send best regards and inquire about you." Chapman mentioned three individuals, Vetler Prog (phonetic), who is connected with the State Committee on Radio and Television of the Soviet Foreign Ministry; Mikhail Bruk, and Viktor Louis. The letter stated: "They all indicate there has been no correspondent with ABC (in Russia) since Sam Jaffe left. They don't think much of Watkins (Jaffe's successor as ABC correspondent in Russia)." According to Jaffe, Chapman's letter indicated that Jaffe's Soviet contacts suggested that "if Jaffe was there he would have such an exclusive." Chapman asked: "Can you help me out and tell me what you can do with Louis?" Chapman's letter concluded: "If a KGB agent like Viktor Louis is good enough for S. Jaffe, he certainly is good enough for I. Chapman." S

Jaffe said his advice to Chapman was: "Play one against the other, as well as with Viktor Louis, through the Embassy." S

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe explained that he advised Chapman to clear all his contacts through the American Embassy, Moscow.

Jaffe indicated he was surprised when he learned recently that Viktor Louis had travelled to Taiwan and had written an article praising the Taiwan government. Q

Jaffe concluded: "Ken Bernstein should get out of there (Russia). He is a bachelor. I know he is shacking with Russian girls. I saw him in Hong Kong and asked, 'Are you going back.' He said he doesn't know exactly what he will do. (He said) 'I am going back for a while.'" U

[redacted] 5

Moscow Journalists Suspected by Jaffe of Being Connected With KGB

Jaffe was asked if he considered Edmund Stevens to be connected with KGB. He replied: "How can you stay in that country that long and get the things that he got without having some connection with KGB? How can he have this beautiful house? Then, when it is torn down (because of a roadbuilding project), he winds up in an ex-embassy!" In commenting on the Soviet wife of Stevens, Jaffe stated, "She is weird. How does she get Soviet art out of the country?" Jaffe stated Stevens appears to have dropped out of the newspaper field. Jaffe said he was once a syndicated writer, but "not any more. He had a deal in caviar and vodka, selling vodka and caviar to the Kremlin." Jaffe described his daughter, Anastasia, as a "nut" and said he understands she is now married. G

Jaffe emphatically expressed the opinion that Stevens, Viktor Louis and Henry Shapiro are connected with KGB. He described Shapiro as "an evil little man," "more Russian than the Russians." Jaffe stated: "He should get out and teach. He is no writer." C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

[redacted]) S

In discussing Viktor Louis, Jaffe stated he "never had any doubts that he (Louis) was with KGB." In discussing Louis, Jaffe indicated that all important "exclusives" in Moscow pertained to security matters and not to "leaks" from the Soviet Foreign Ministry concerning political matters; therefore, KGB must have been responsible for the "exclusives." Jaffe indicated that Louis was the recipient of many such "exclusives." Jaffe also indicated that Louis appears to live far better than other correspondents from foreign countries and is permitted to travel extensively abroad, including countries such as the United States and Taiwan. Jaffe indicated that these factors convince him that Louis is connected with KGB. C

Jaffe concluded: "That is what they (KGB) do. They set this man up. If you want information," then contact a man such as Viktor Louis. C

Jaffe's Future Plans

Jaffe stated: "I like to keep contact with these people (Soviet and Chinese nationals) because it will pay off in the long run." Jaffe indicated he expects to attend the May Day celebration at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. He also indicated he was still actively trying to obtain an assignment as a newspaper correspondent in Mainland China but has done nothing more concerning his desire to obtain a similar assignment in Cuba. U

In discussing his desire to go to Mainland China, Jaffe indicated that he had interviewed Chou En Lai in 1955 and was one of 18 foreign correspondents selected to visit China in 1956. In the Fall of 1965 he went from Moscow to Belgrade, Yugoslavia, following his ouster from the Soviet Union, and conveyed to Chinese newsmen in Belgrade his desire to obtain a newspaper assignment in Mainland China. While in Hong Kong he made the same desire known to Szeto Kung of the Chinese News Agency. Finally, on April 28, 1969 he indicated to a Chinese professor at McGill University in Canada his desire to obtain a newspaper assignment in China and the professor agreed to forward a letter from Jaffe indicating U his desire to visit Mainland China. The Chinese professor has suggested that Jaffe mention in the letter that he desires to visit China as a private citizen rather than as a newspaper correspondent; however, Jaffe should be completely honest in the letter, mentioning the facts that he has been a journalist, that he interviewed Chou En Lai in 1955, and that when visiting China as a private citizen, he would like to continue his writing career.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Document downgrade to Secret 5/24/13 [illegible] 60324

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 4/29/69

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906)(P)

SUBJECT: [redacted]

SECRET

ReWFOlet 2/28/69 requesting Bureau authority to interview SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE and Bulet 3/12/69 authorizing interview.

Enclosed are original and four copies for Bureau and one copy for information of NYO of LHM captioned "SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE". [redacted] S

JAFFE was interviewed by SAs TURNER and JAMES P. WOOTEN on 3/20,21 & 27/69. The sources mentioned in the LHM are:

✓ WF T-1 [redacted]
✓ WF T-2 [redacted]
✓ WF T-3 [redacted]
✓ WF T-4 [redacted]
S

1 REC
3/5/7?
R/S

As is indicated in the enclosed LHM, JAFFE identified through photographs a large number of Soviet nationals with whom he has been connected in the United States and in Russia, many S

② - Bureau (Enc.7)
1 - New York (134-3315)(Info)(Enc.3)(RM)
1 - WFO

ETT/JPW:jw
(4)

5/9/69 [illegible] CIA, [illegible]

REC 22

Classified by 6756 [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

EX-103

REC 8

2 MAY 1 1969

AGENCY 2CIA, Liaison
~~REQ.~~ REC'D. State/Liaison 5-14-69
DATE FORW. 5/7/69
HOW FORW. R/S
BY ESClas

SECRET

SOVIET SECTION

JUN 3 1969

Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

of whom have been identified by informants as being connected with KGB or GRU. Characterizations of these Soviets have been included in the LHM; however, no attribution to sources was included in order to protect those sources who have not been surfaced. Although sources such as [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted], who furnished information regarding Soviet Intelligence Service connections of some of JAFFE's contacts, have been surfaced, other sources, such as [redacted] and [redacted], have furnished information regarding many of JAFFE's contacts. To attribute characterizations by [redacted] of being connected with KGB of numerous Soviets and characterizations by [redacted] of being connected with GRU of many other Soviet contacts of JAFFE, would clearly suggest that the FBI [redacted] those establishments in the United States. (S)

As indicated in reWFOlet 2/28/69 requesting Bureau authority for interview of subject, approved by Bulet 3/12/69, JAFFE was invited to WFO and showed no reluctance to do so. Since he was on general assignment, he called his office at the beginning of each of the first two interviews to give the telephone number at which he could be located. He was contacted by his office during the first interview. On the third interview, he had what he called a "Bellboy" signalling device which he said would receive a signal from his office after which he would call. He indicated he used this device to avoid the office giving out the FBI telephone number to anyone, including Russians, who might call him. C

JAFFE gave the appearance of being a very aggressive, fast-talking, smooth operator. Prior to each interview, he had been drinking, but was not intoxicated. U

The first two interviews were handled as planned, by asking him to recount his experiences and contacts with Russians in the USSR and Hong Kong, including his experiences with "Slava". He expressed no hesitancy in talking about his contacts but constantly spoke in generalities, tending to "playdown" his relations with "Slava". He furnished more detail after specific S

~~TOP~~ SECRET

or leading questions were put to him. For example, the disclosures he made to [redacted] were confirmed in interview only after leading questions.

During the interview on 3/27/69, JAFFE was advised that interviewing agents were concerned regarding a number of aspects of his relationship with the Soviets and the FBI. For example, it was noted he had now disclosed considerable additional information about his relationship with "Slava", more than previously; that because of his past relationship with Agents of the NYO, the FBI had a right to expect that he would make immediate full disclosures of such relationship and his failure to do so raised questions about the relationship, whether he has been recontacted by KGB since he left Russia, etc. It also was pointed out that his expulsion from Russia after he had been ordered to Hong Kong and his replacement named, seemed somewhat suspicious, particularly since he had been warned that a defector knew of his relationship with "Slava"; that this defector had in fact reported this relationship and alleged that he had been an agent of and furnished information to "Slava". He was urged to now furnish complete information regarding his relationship with the KGB and to "square the record" with the FBI. C

JAFFE did not lose his composure at any time during the interviews, but, as indicated in the LHM, when pressed on 3/27/69 on his relationship with KGB and his failure to make complete disclosure to FBI, he offered the lame excuse, his fear of "Slava", but conceded this was a poor excuse for not reporting the relationship after his return to the United States. C

JAFFE was emphatically told that the FBI had not had any contact with the American Broadcast Company (ABC) with regard to him and had not in any way labelled him as a security risk to any other person or agency. He replied that someone had done so and indicated he was aware that some ABC officials are very close to CIA. C

JAFFE seemed very concerned that ABC did not give him the diplomatic "beat" or the State Department "beat" which he seemed to consider his right. It appears he will continue contacts with the Soviet Bloc people as a means of trying to get such assignments. To preclude his use of cooperation with the FBI as a means to this end, he was very emphatically told that the decision for such continued contacts was strictly his decision and the FBI would not ask him to do so. C

It also is apparent that JAFFE is intensely interested in getting an assignment to China or Cuba. He denied that he had any KGB instructions to do so, but this, of course, is a definite possibility. It is not possible to accurately assess this possibility at this time, and it also is not possible to conclude whether he is or is not still in contact with KGB and acting as an agent. He emphatically denied any intelligence contact since he left Moscow; however, the call which he said he received from BORIS SEDOV desiring to show him a photograph seems unusual and is possibly contrived. 6

JAFFE is in current contact with Chinese nationals, which he is reporting to [redacted], who appears to be very friendly with JAFFE and, of course, is interested in getting him into China. [redacted] 5

Since the interview of 3/27/69, JAFFE has telephonically furnished some general information regarding his current contacts with Soviet and Satellite nationals and his unsuccessful efforts to recontact SEDOV. C

Based on the interviews, WFO believes that we should continue to accept information volunteered by JAFFE regarding his contacts with Soviets, Satellites, and Chinese; however, it is believed no effort should be made at this time to direct his activities or to give him assignments, particularly since the possibility exists he would attempt to use any such relationship to support his attempts to get certain assignments from ABC, or otherwise advance his career. WFO will follow this policy, UACB. C

In the event JAFFE later reports that he has been recontacted by KGB to work in the United States, this matter will be re-evaluated and appropriate recommendations made. S

WFO will keep this file in a Pending status for a limited time to follow JAFFE's relationship with SEDOV and to see if this develops into a KGB follow-up. If it does not, the case will be closed. S

5/1/69

AIRTEL

~~TOP~~ SECRET

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-14704)

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-1871) (P)

[redacted]
(OO:BU)

Re NY airtel to Bureau, 4/23/69, and WFO let to the Bureau, 4/29/69, captioned "[redacted]. G

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies, and for New York, two copies of a memorandum of contact concerning former NY 2524-S's contact with NELLIE MARANS, NYC. This memorandum was obtained on a confidential basis from JOHN N. STENT, Domestic Operations Div., CIA. S

JOHN STENT, Domestic Operations Division, CIA (covert), in explaining the agency's urgency in attempting to place an individual on the China Mainland, recently requested of WFO the names of individuals outside the United States who might possibly be receptive to an approach by former NY 2524-S, with whom STENT maintained official and social contact whileboth were recently assigned to Hong Kong. X5

5 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
    (1 - Legat, Ottawa) (105-1591) CONF. INFT.
    (1 - 105-20930)3 ([redacted]
2 - New York (105-2/05) (Enc. 2) (RM)
    (1 - 134-3315) [redacted]
2 - WFO
    (1 - 105-8906)

LJT:mer
(9)

Classified by 6136 KSD
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

105 - 21

NOT RECORDED
191 MAY 13 1969

~~TOP~~ SECRET

ENCLOSURE

Downgraded to Secret on 4/13/16 per Cent. Mulan Guide 73741-VC

(It is noted that both of the above are now on their respective assignments in the WDC area and STENT continues to contact former NY 2524-S.) The name of captioned subject was furnished to STENT.

On 4/24/69, STENT advised that on 4/8/69 former NY 2524-S telephonically contacted LIN, advising LIN that he had recently seen a New York Times article dealing with possible restoration of China-Canada Relations and in which LIN's name appeared and he wished to interview LIN. By way of documentation, former NY 2524-S advised LIN that he had interviewed CHOU En-lai in New Delhi in 1955 and he was personally acquainted with SZETO KUNG, a New China News Agency representative in Hong Kong. Former NY 2524-S was advised by LIN to contact him later at which time he would have a definite answer. On 4/10/69, former NY 2524-S recontacted LIN, telephonically, at which time LIN stated that he would not submit to an interview however, he would be very much interested in talking to former NY 2524-S. A luncheon date with former NY 2524-S was set for April 29, 1969, at the faculty lounge at McGill University, Montreal, Canada. S

On 4/29/69, [redacted] contacted WFO and advised as follows: C

On 4/28/69, he met with PAUL LIN at the faculty lounge at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, as previously arranged through telephonic contact with LIN. (He had been furnished LIN's name by [redacted] and prior to that had never heard of LIN.) He spent approximately two hours with LIN and LIN was very receptive and friendly towards [redacted] indicated his desire of visiting the China Mainland, possibly during the October celebrations; however, LIN suggested that [redacted] may not have to wait that long. LIN suggested that a letter be directed to CHOU En-lai indicating his desires. When [redacted] suggested that the letter may never reach CHOU if sent directly, LIN suggested the possibility of sending it through the Chinese Embassy, Paris. [redacted] suggested that it S still may not reach the proper channels at which time LIN stated that he would be going "East" sometime soon and possibly he could insure its proper dispatch.

[redacted] intends to draft a letter in the near future and send it to LIN for perusal and necessary corrections, and when in acceptable form (according to LIN) submit the letter in final form to LIN for dispatch to CHOU.

C

Additionally, [redacted] advised that on 4/21/59 at the suggestion of one H. H. CHANG, with whom he recently lunched in WDC, he met with NELLIE MARANS, a French woman free-lance correspondent at the UN, NYC. CHANG had advised [redacted] that MARANS had previously interviewed LIN and therefore might possibly be of interest to him prior to his contacting LIN. [redacted] stated that he had given a report of this contact to [redacted]. [redacted]

S

As set out in referenced WFO letter, 4/29/59, WFO believes that we should continue to accept information volunteered by [redacted] regarding his contacts with the Soviets, Satellites, and Chinese; however, it is believed no effort should be made at this time to direct his activities or give him assignments, particularly since the possibility exists he would attempt to use any such relationship to support his attempts to get certain assignments from AEC, or otherwise advance his career. UACB, WFO will follow this policy.

C

[redacted]

S

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

April 29, 1969

SECRET

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

CONTENTS — Page

C I. Jaffe's Contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 1958 - 1961 3

II. Jaffe's Contacts with FBI While Assigned to Moscow . . . .

C Information Regarding Intelligence Approach 4
Information Regarding Other Soviet Contacts 9

S III. Allegations of WF T-2 concerning Jaffe 14

S IV. Allegations of WF T-3 concerning Jaffe 18

S V. Jaffe's Contacts with FBI Subsequent to Expulsion From Moscow, October, 1965 19

S VI. Jaffe's Contacts with Soviets Since His Expulsion From the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 24

VII. FBI Interviews of Jaffe in March, 1969:

March 20, 1969:
Association with KGB Contact "Slava" . . 26
Jaffe's "Exclusive" Regarding Khrushchev Ouster 28
S Expulsion of Jaffe from Soviet Union . . 29
Possible Current KGB Approach to Jaffe by Boris Sedov 31
Possible KGB Approach to Jaffe in New York 32
Jaffe's Dating of Foreign Nationals in Russia 33
Information Requested by Slava 34

Classified by 6136 [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category [illegible]
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

[illegible]-106

ENCLOSURE

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Page

March 21, 1969:

5

Jaffe's Identifications of Soviet Contacts . . . 35
Jaffe's "Exclusive" Regarding Professor Frederick Barghoorn 51
Attitude of "Slava" 52

March 27, 1969:

5

Contacts with Boris Sedov 53
Activities in Hong Kong 54
Recent Contacts with Soviets 57
Jaffe's Employees in Moscow 59
Activities with "Slava" 60
Activities on Behalf of Naval Intelligence . . 63
Jaffe's Difficulties with ABC and CIA 64
Jaffe's Attitude Concerning Subsequent Contacts with Boris Sedov 68

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

SAM JAFFE

ITALY
FINLAND
RUSSIA
Rumania
DENMARK
GER
Hong Kong
CALIF

I. Jaffe's Contacts with FBI, 1958 - 1961

Samuel Adason Jaffe, born June 19, 1929, San Francisco, California, advised agents of the New York Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in July, 1958, that he was taking two Soviet employees of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (SMUN) to dinner. At that time Jaffe was a Columbia Broadcast System (CBS) News Correspondent at the United Nations (UN). Jaffe subsequently furnished voluminous information concerning his contacts with Soviet nationals to the FBI from 1958 until November, 1961 when he assumed the position of American Broadcast Company (ABC) Television Correspondent in Moscow.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

II. Jaffe's Contacts with FBI While Assigned to Moscow

U Jaffe furnished the following information to agents of the New York Office of the FBI on January 7, 1963.

U.S. Russia

C Jaffe stated he was acquainted with Yuri Vladimirovich Fedorov while in Moscow. Jaffe said Fedorov was with the Novosti Press Agency in Moscow.

C While Jaffe was in Moscow, in 1962, he became acquainted with a number of Soviet citizens both male and female. He said that he was dating one Soviet female by the name of Galina in the Fall of 1962. He became acquainted with her through other Soviet females with whom he was acquainted; however, he was unable to furnish her last name. Galina told Jaffe that she had been dating foreigners in the past and, because of this, had been called into KGB Headquarters and warned against continuing her association with foreigners.

C During the Cuban crisis, in the Fall of 1962, Fedorov told Jaffe confidentially that there was a bitter dispute among the Soviet hierarchy in the Kremlin concerning the manner in which the Soviets should deal with the Cuban crisis. Fedorov told Jaffe that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was able to muster enough support for his position and eventually won out over those in the Soviet hierarchy who proposed a tough uncompromising attitude.

Russia

C Jaffe advised that he used the information furnished to him by Yuri V. Fedorov concerning the dispute in the Kremlin over the Cuban crisis in a broadcast over the ABC network.

Russia U.S

C Jaffe recalled that the aforementioned information came to him from Fedorov on a Friday late in October, 1962. On the following day, a Saturday, Jaffe attended a social function at the home of Stanley Weyman, Life Magazine correspondent in Moscow. He brought his friend, Galina, with him and remained at Weyman's house until some time after midnight. When he departed from Weyman's house, he took Galina and a Soviet male with him. The Soviet male, whose name he could not remember, was also a guest at Weyman's house and Jaffe offered to drive him home. This Soviet male was associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to Jaffe.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

After Jaffe dropped the Soviet male at his home, he proceeded to drive toward Galina's home. At Galina's instruction, he made a turn in an area of Moscow which was unfamiliar to him. After making this turn he hit a deep hole and blew out several tires on the Chevrolet automobile which he was driving. Jaffe said that he sent Galina to obtain police assistance and, after she left, he noticed four male individuals driving by in an old Pobeda automobile. Shortly thereafter several truck drivers came by and assisted Jaffe. Fortunately, he had several spare tires in his automobile. At about 3:15 a.m., the police came by but showed no interest in Jaffe and apparently made no report of his situation. Jaffe then returned to his apartment.

Some time after Jaffe returned to his apartment, he received a telephone call from Galina. Galina told Jaffe that she had to see him immediately. She said that she was near the American Embassy in Moscow and Jaffe arranged to meet her in the vicinity of the Ukraine Hotel in Moscow.

When Jaffe met Galina he found that she had apparently been physically abused as she bore scars and marks on her arms and face. Galina told Jaffe that after she left him she went to telephone for assistance. As she was leaving the telephone from which she made the call to the police, she was accosted by two men. She immediately resisted efforts of these men to detain her and as she ran from them she was accosted by another man who knocked her to the ground. She told Jaffe that she was then taken to a police station where she was questioned at length about her association with Jaffe. The individuals questioning her wanted to know how long she had been seeing Jaffe, where she had been with Jaffe and they were particularly interested in her travels with Jaffe during the last several days. They wanted to know if Jaffe was in love with her.

Galina told Jaffe that they wanted her to sign a statement to the effect that she would not see Jaffe again. These individuals also wanted to know what, if anything, Jaffe had given her by way of gifts.

Galina told Jaffe that at approximately 6:00 a.m. another individual came in and questioned her about the same matters but did so in a very polite and refined manner. This was in contrast to the manner in which she had been questioned immediately subsequent to her arrival at the police station. Galina told Jaffe that she was quite upset and a doctor was also called to administer a sedative to her.

Before being released by the police, Galina was told by the police not to see Jaffe again. She said that they told her that Jaffe's name and her name would appear in "Izvestia". C

After hearing Galina's story, Jaffe called Fedorov and relayed the story of Galina's experiences to Fedorov. Fedorov told Jaffe that he would be right over to see him. 6

According to Jaffe, Fedorov immediately came to see him at his apartment. Upon his arrival Fedorov acted as though he were shocked by the whole story which Jaffe told to him. Fedorov told Jaffe that this was a very serious matter and that an article was then being written concerning Jaffe's association with Galina. He said that Jaffe would be depicted as an American who had led a Soviet female astray. This would serve as a lesson to Soviet citizens, particularly females, to refrain from associating with American citizens. Fedorov also told Jaffe that this article would appear in "Komsomolskaya Pravda". Fedorov said that he did not know what he could possibly do for Jaffe but suggested that a friend of his, who is a Deputy Editor with "Komsomolskaya Pravda", might be able to help. Fedorov suggested that there might still be time to stop the story. In Jaffe's presence Fedorov made a telephone call allegedly to his friend the Deputy Editor. After the call was made Fedorov told Jaffe that it would be okay for them to see his friend at 6:00 p.m. that night. 6

Jaffe met Fedorov at a restaurant in Moscow at 6:00 p.m. that evening in accordance with arrangements previously made. Fedorov's friend, the Deputy Editor, was to meet them there but prior to Fedorov's friend's arrival, Fedorov told Jaffe that his friend was not actually Deputy Editor of "Komsomolskaya Pravda". He told Jaffe that his friend was an old war buddy who just happened to be in the KGB. 6

When Fedorov's Kissla friend arrived he was introduced to Jaffe as Vyacheslav Kislov. Jaffe came to know this individual as "Slava". Kislov said to Jaffe "I guess you know who I am". He then went on to tell Jaffe that he was with the KGB. He said that he and his colleagues were not too pleased with Jaffe's conduct. He asked Jaffe who his source in the Kremlin was and then 6 suggested that information which Jaffe obtained concerning a dispute in the Kremlin came from someone in the American Embassy in Moscow. Jaffe denied that his source was in the American Embassy in Moscow but refused to tell Kislov the identity of his source. 6

Kislov then proceeded to give Jaffe a complete run down of everything he had done in Russia. He named females Jaffe had dated and told Jaffe all about his association with Galina. He went on to tell Jaffe that Galina was formerly a designer in a factory in Moscow but that she would be given a trial and be banned from Moscow. 6

When Jaffe asked Kislov about the story being prepared for "Komsomolskaya Pravda", Kislov told Jaffe that he liked him. He said that he might be able to kill the story while at the same time he looked at his watch. He then said that he would see what he could do, expressing the opinion that he could probably kill the story. Before Jaffe left Kislov's company, Kislov said that he would like to see Jaffe again and Jaffe agreed to see him although no definite arrangements were made. 6

On the following morning Kislov called Jaffe and told Jaffe that he had succeeded in killing the story. He asked Jaffe to have lunch with him and a date was made. At lunch Kislov told Jaffe that he had been in the United States. He then told Jaffe that it was necessary to watch Western correspondents in Moscow as the Soviets know that American citizens pay a great deal of attention to material written in newspapers. He said it was necessary for the Soviets to be careful what they permit Western correspondents to write and say. He said the Soviets would like to know Western reaction to Soviet moves particularly Soviet moves in situations like the Cuban crisis. 6

Kislov then went on to tell Jaffe that he was lucky to be in Moscow and itwas only because of his superiors that he was granted a visa. He told Jaffe that Jaffe killed his chances for obtaining a Soviet visa of his own accord because ~~of his~~ conduct during the trial of Francis Gary Powers on espionage charges in Moscow in 1960. At this time Kislov said that the Soviets concluded that Jaffe was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and had been assigned to keep track of Powers' wife, Barbara, since he spent so much time in her company. C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe was aware that upon his arrival in Moscow late in 1961, he was kept under surveillance for four solid weeks. Kislov called this to Jaffe's attention and told Jaffe that he had aggravated some Soviets who were surveilling him because of his activities. Kislov then went on to discuss the fact that the Soviets had exposed several United States Embassy officials as intelligence agents recently. Kislov told Jaffe that these were strictly retaliatory measures taken by the Soviets because of Soviet nationals associated with the United Nations who had been exposed in the United States. S

Kislov also asked Jaffe to bring him a miniphone recording machine from the United States. S

Jaffe said that during his stay in Moscow he has never experienced anything which would indicate that the Soviets were attempting to compromise him with the exception of the one incident related herein. C

Jaffe made one observation stemming from his visit in Moscow to the effect that the younger generation Soviet is more free thinking and independent than his elders. The younger generation Soviets, in Jaffe's opinion, do not have the unbending fear of the Soviet regime which has been characteristic of the Soviet people in the past. U

Yuri Vladimirovich Fedorov was in the United States from January 20, 1962 until May 1, 1962, with the visit of the Soviet Children's Art Exhibit to the United States. He is a Senior Editor of the periodical "East and Latin America" of the Novosti Press Agency. C

Jaffe was able to identify a photograph of Fedorov as the individual known to him in Russia. C

The Novosti Press Agency was newly established in Russia in February, 1961. C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

"Komsomolskaya Pravda"
is the Communist Party (CP)
youth edition of "Pravda". C

"Pravda" is the organ of the
Central and Moscow Committees
of the CP of the Soviet Union.
It is a central newspaper
published in Moscow. C

"Izvestia" is the news organ
of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR. C

Jaffe stated he was very displeased with his assignment in Moscow because of living conditions. He intended to fulfill his contract which called for his return to the U.S. in November, 1963. Jaffe did not intend to renew his contract as far as an assignment in Moscow is concerned. U

Jaffe made his home in Moscow at 19 Kutuzovsky Prospect, Apartment 133-134, Entrance 4, Floor 6, Moscow. U

During the year he had been assigned to Moscow, Jaffe traveled to Copenhagen, Italy, Finland, and Rumania. All of these trips were on business with the exception of his trip to Italy where he spent his vacation. Jaffe advised on January 7, 1963, that while in Moscow he had occasion to see the following Soviet nationals with whom he was acquainted in the United States: U

Evgeni V. Litoshko
Danil Kraminov
Aleksei I. Adzhubei
Nikolai S. Kalinin

NY Russia C

Russian N.Y

Jaffe noted that Kalinin is now (1963) assigned in the U.S. C

Jaffe, during his ten day visit in the U.S., had occasion to have a drink with Vladimir I. Bogachev and Nikolai D. Turkatenko of Tass News Agency at the Overseas Press Club C

Russia

NY

Russia

during the week of December 30, 1962. Jaffe was with Dave Miller, "New York Herald Tribune" Moscow correspondent, at that time. Jaffe said that he and Miller spent about an hour with Bogachev and Turkatenko discussing life in Moscow.

Jaffe left the U.S. on January 13, 1963 for East Berlin, where he was to cover the visit of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to that city. He then would return to Moscow with Khrushchev and complete his assignment there. U

During interview of January 7, 1963, Jaffe asked if there was any way that he could possibly communicate information to interviewing agents. He explained that he does not expect to come into possession of any earth shattering or startling information, but he does believe that it would be possible for him to learn of information which would be of interest to the FBI from time to time. He had specific reference to advance notice which he might receive of information which might later become public knowledge through news media. Jaffe was discouraged from attempting to communicate with FBI agents in any manner whatsoever from Moscow. C

Jaffe said that he is not favorably impressed with State Department representatives in Moscow, at least the ones with whom he deals. He said that the people with whom he deals give him the impression of being naive in the field of security and intelligence work, and therefore, he has no desire whatsoever to furnish information to them. Jaffe had particular reference to the security officers in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow with whom he has dealt. U

Jaffe said that he does know one individual by the name of Sam Wise at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in whom he has the utmost confidence. U

Jaffe advised agents of the New York Office of the FBI on January 18, 1965, that since he had been assigned to Moscow he has become very friendly with Yuri M. Vinogradov, who is presently assigned to the United Nations Secretariat. He advised that Vinogradov's wife is a top rated television star in Moscow on children's programs. On Monday, January 18, 1965, Jaffe had lunch with Vinogradov and his wife and James Hagerty, an official of the ABC. Conversation during this lunch C

N.Y.

D.C.

concerned itself with Vinogradov's wife's interest in making television shows in the U.S. for presentation in Russia. Jaffe said that Vinogradov's wife has been here for a very short time with her child and she is very upset about being in the U.S. and does not like it one bit. This in turn has upset Vinogradov and Vinogradov's wife's mother, who still resides in their two room apartment in Russia, is also very upset over the presence of her daughter and grandchild in the U.S. Jaffe said that Vinogradov's wife's mother lives with the family in this two room apartment in Moscow and by Soviet standards they live rather well.

Jaffe said that Vinogradov has good taste and is interested in the finer things in life and seldom fails to ask Jaffe to obtain a bottle of Scotch for him when he sees him. C

Jaffe said that Vinogradov does like the good things C in life.

All Russia N.Y.

He said that on Saturday evening, January 16, 1965, he visited Aleksandr N. Druzhinin in his apartment in the Schwab House for dinner. Druzhinin's son and wife were present as well as Stanislav N. Kondrashov and Georgi A. Kuznetsov. Jaffe said this was strictly a social visit related to his assignment in Moscow and acquaintance with many Soviet nationals. C

Russ

Jaffe said that he has seen Vadim A. Bogoslovski in the Soviet Union, however, of recent date Bogoslovski no longer acknowledges his acquaintance with Jaffe. Jaffe spoke to Vinogradov about this and Vinogradov told Jaffe that Bogoslovski is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and as such is forced to give up many of his former friends and acquaintances. Vinogradov said that as much as he likes Jaffe, he would give up his acquaintance with Jaffe were he to be elevated to a sensitive position on the Central Committee. C

[illegible] in N.Y.

Jaffe advised that Nikolai Kalinin, with whom he has been acquainted in the past, is now assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Vienna, Austria. C

N.Y.

Jaffe said that he is acquainted with a Frank Dandridge, a Negro photographer. He met this individual through Mari Yanopsky, who is employed in the Publicity Department of ABC. Yanopsky introduced Dandridge to Jaffe for the purpose of soliciting Jaffe's cooperation in arranging a trip to the Soviet Union for Dandridge. Jaffe said he was never able to do anything for Dandridge. U

N.Y.

SECRET

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

WF T-1, advised that on January 16, 1964, Frank Dandridge, a Negro photographer, told Oleg M. Sokolov he was referred to Sokolov by Sam Jaffe. He said he is planning a trip to Russia in March, 1964, with a Negro writer. They plan to do an article on Negros who have resided in Russia for 20 to 30 years. They are interested in facilities for Negros in the Caucases. Dandridge indicated he obtained information on this matter from the offices of "The Worker." Dandridge also indicated he would like to interview N. K. Khrushchev. Sokolov advised Dandridge to write a letter, with full details of his proposed trip, to Aleksandr I. Zinchuk. S

"The Worker" is an east-coast Communist newspaper. U

Jaffe advised that since former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was deposed there has been a very noticeable effort to change the image of the KGB in the Soviet Union through television programs, newspaper and magazine stories and the like. These television programs and newspaper and magazine stories resemble television programs, newspaper and magazine stories which might be read or seen in the U.S. and be classed as detective stories. They are designed to create a favorable impression upon the Soviet populace concerning the KGB as well as solicit the cooperation of the Soviet populace in combatting subversion on the part of foreign visitors as well as combatting crime. The Soviet populace is urged to report suspicious activity in both of these fields to the KGB. KGB personnel are depicted as competent, efficient, and friendly officials with whom the Soviet populace can readily do business. C

[illegible]

Jaffe has also noticed that Vladimir Semichastnyy, KGB Chief and member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, has taken a more prominent place among Soviet officials at public functions than he formerly did and he can also be seen at diplomatic affairs circulating more freely than he would formerly circulate under the Khrushchev regime. C

SECRET

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe advised telephonically on January 19, 1965, that Yuri Vinogradov contacted him and asked him to take a package back to Moscow with him. Jaffe was to deliver this package to Vinogradov's wife's mother in Moscow. This package contained two "Bic" special ballpoint pens, six pacifiers produced by Baby Products, New York City, and all of these items were purchased at the Feldhammer Pharmacy, 1691 York Avenue, New York City. C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

III. Allegations of WF T-2 Concerning Jaffe

Russia

WF T-2, a former officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB), advised in [redacted], that Sam Jaffe, ABC correspondent in Moscow, is a recruited agent of KGB. He was cultivated and recruited by Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Kuskov, a case officer of the 1st (American) Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB. WF T-2 indicated KGB probably would use Jaffe to introduce individuals connected with KGB to interesting targets and to obtain political information. S

On [redacted], WF T-2 prepared a handwritten report concerning Jaffe, stating that Sam Jaffe, an American correspondent, arrived in Moscow in 1961. Vladislav Mikhailovich Kovshuk also known as (aka) Vladimir Mikhailovich Komarov, Chief of the 1st (American Embassy) Section, 1st Department, SCD, KGB, settled a question with the 10th Department (operations against foreign correspondents), SCD, that the 1st Department would be working against Jaffe. WF T-2 recalled that Jaffe was acquainted with a ballet dancer from Finland who was finishing her studies in Moscow. Jaffe was actually thinking about marrying this girl. [redacted]. According to WF T-2, the Finnish ballet dancer could speak English and visited the American House Club. S

Russia

In [redacted] WF T-2 [redacted] Kovshuk and Gennadiy Ivanovich Gryaznov aka Grigoriy Ivanovich Lapin, Deputy Chief of the 1st Section, 1st Department, SCD, KGB, that Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Kuskov, a senior case officer of the 1st Section, was working against Jaffe. WF T-2 wrote: "I don't know (whether) he was anagent or an operative contact. I am not sured but it seems to me that he was approached on the basis (of being) connected with women. In [redacted] I have seen Sam Jaffee in [redacted]. He with other correspondents visited a pair of times the Soviet representation there. He knew several Russian diplomats and among them (that he knew was) Suslov, Vladimir." S

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

During interview on [redacted] concerning his handwritten report, WF T-2 furnished substantially the same information. He stated he did not know whether Jaffe was a KGB agent or operative contact; however, he knew Kuskov was meeting with Jaffe and had obtained some information from him. WF T-2 indicated that Kuskov obtained an agreement with the 10th Department that the 1st Department would work against Jaffe in order to have an agent who could move in American Embassy circles in Moscow. WF T-2 said he thought Kovshuk had contact with Jaffe, probably posing as a diplomat and using the name Komarov. The informant does not know whether or not Gryaznov knew Jaffe.

S

WF T-2 was asked why he was sure Jaffe was actually a KGB agent or operative contact. He replied: "In [redacted] when we (KGB) were planning to work against a group of businessmen - very big businessmen - there was plan of work and there were different, different, one, two, three questions (of) which agents to use - not only 7th Department, but 10th Department, 1st Department - and there were put agents - to use the agents against this group - and 1st Department - Jaffe's name was there, and Kuskov was coming and giving information which he had received" from Jaffe.

S

WF T-2 recalled there was another case involving a visiting group in which KGB plans called for the use of Jaffe. WF T-2, who in [redacted], but who formerly had worked with [redacted] in the [redacted], telephoned [redacted] and asked: "How about [redacted]) receiving information from your agents on whom you can rely - you must help us." WF T-2 said [redacted] ordered Kuskov to use Jaffe against this group. WF T-2 stated: "I know they were received by Khrushchev and (it is) highly demanded in KGB everytime when Khrushchev was receiving anybody to know after that - what was said (by the individuals visiting Khrushchev)."

S

WF T-2 advised that probably in 1963 Kuskov was appointed Chief of the 2nd Section (operations against individuals suspected of being with American Intelligence and use of double agents against American Intelligence), 1st Department, SCD; however, "Kuskov still kept Jaffe as an agent or contact."

S

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

On [redacted], WF T-2 advised that the visits to Russia of the two American groups about which Jaffe reported information to Kuskov occurred in [redacted] and one involved a group of Congressmen who signed a treaty connected with limitations of nuclear explosions in the air and the other involved a "group of big businessmen" sponsored by "Time" magazine. WF T-2 said he recalls the businessmen group was sponsored by "Time" "because one of the managers of this 'Time' was coming, and a group of correspondents was accompanying them from - I think London, from Paris, maybe from Bonn." WF T-2 indicated that both groups met with Khrushchev and Jaffe reported to Kuskov "their opinions, their attitude." WF T-2 is of the opinion that Jaffe furnished his information orally to Kuskov who then prepared written reports. When questioned concerning the type of information Jaffe furnished, WF T-2 stated: "Oh, it's general - their opinion on something. Nothing important. Nothing from the point of intelligence - counterintelligence, in the meaning that he had given something only about special person, no, no, nothing. In general - their opinion and their attitude." S

WF T-2 was advised that Jaffe was expelled from Russia in the Fall of 1965 because of a critical story prepared by ABC but not by Jaffe. WF T-2 then commented: "I think - my personal opinion - that he couldn't be expelled. It could be a cover for Jaffe. They wanted to cover him, knowing the fact that I knew about his connection. I think it's possible for the sake of cover." S

WF T-2 was not aware of Jaffe covering the Francis Gary Powers trial and he was not aware of any "exclusives" furnished to Jaffe by the KGB. WF T-2 was not aware of any KGB officers from the 1st Department, with the exception of Kuskov and possibly Kovshuk who met Jaffe. WF T-2 stated: "I think maybe Kovshuk in 1962, beginning in 1963, could visit - meet him, but at the same time I doubt, because Kovshuk was playing the part of diplomat of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He knew him in face, and I think Jaffe knew him (Kovshuk) in face - as Komarov." S

WF T-2 was asked if he had ever heard that Jaffe was in contact with KGB officers in the United States prior to Jaffe's Moscow assignment. WF T-2 answered in the negative and S stated: "But he was known to many diplomats - maybe some officers of KGB even - I don't know - on official base"(in connection with his activities as a foreign correspondent). WF T-2 continued: "Of course officers from 10th Department, from this section which was working against correspondents, knew him - Krivoshei (Vladimir Vasilyevich Krivoshei aka Krivitsky) and others could know him. He probably knew Krivoshei as Krivitsky - correspondent Krivitsky - because they were appearing" as offical contacts. S

WF T-2 stated Jaffe was approached by KGB in the second half of 1962, possibly at the end of 1962. S

On [redacted], WF T-2 was shown a newspaper clipping concerning the "Time" magazine businessmen group which visited Russia in [redacted]. He stated this was one of the visiting American groups about which Jaffe furnished information to KGB. S

IV. Allegations of WF T-3 Concerning Jaffe

WF T-3 advised that the American correspondent, Sam Jaffe, was approached by the KGB in Moscow but does not know the details concerning this approach. WF T-3 stated he did not know if the KGB had been successful in recruiting Jaffe but believed the attempt failed. He reported that Yevgeniy N. Aleshin commented that when Jaffe was in Moscow he personally controlled all of Jaffe's actions and knew all the details concerning Jaffe's activities. Aleshin also commented that he regarded Sam Jaffe as a hoax.

Russia

S

WF T-2 identified Aleshin by name and photograph and advised that until 1952 he was involved in Communist Party - Komsomol work; from 1952 - 1960 served in the 1st Department, SCD, KGB; and since 1960 or 1961 was Chief of 10th Department, SCD, KGB. While in the 1st Department he served in the 2nd and 3rd Sections; at one time was chief of the section dealing with Russians suspected of having connections with United States Intelligence, and from about 1959 - 1960 was Deputy Chief of the 1st Department.

S

V. Jaffe's Contacts with FBI Subsequent to Expulsion From Moscow, October, 1965

ALL

RUSSIA

On December 2, 1965, Jaffe advised agents of the New York Office of the FBI that he was notified of his expulsion from Russia in October, 1965, by Leonid Zamyatin, number one man in the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. During his stay in Moscow he had contact with Zamyatin and Boris Pyadyshev, number two man in the Press Department; Fedor Semenov, number three man in the Press Department; Fedor Fedorenko, number four man in the Press Department; and Anatoli Kachev, number five man in the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. All of these people were friendly to Jaffe and somewhat apologetic concerning the fact that he was being expelled from the Soviet Union. This was particularly true of Kachev, who told Jaffe that he hoped to be able to see him in New York City sometime in the future.

> Fedor Stepanovich Fedorenko has been reported as connected with the Soviet Committee of Information (KI).
>
> Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin has been reported as connected with the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

According to Jaffe, Kachev also told him not to be concerned about his expulsion and that, if there were anything the Soviets could do for Jaffe, Oleg Kalugin was in Russia Washington, D.C. Jaffe said he is acquainted with Kalugin and knew Kalugin when he was the number three man in the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, after Kalugin's return to Russia from his previous assignment in New York City and prior to his present assignment at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. Prior to his present assignment in Washington, D.C., Kalugin transferred from the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to Radio Moscow in the American Department. Jaffe said Kalugin is very Americanized in his outlook and Jaffe knows Kalugin to be a very talkative individual.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Russia

Jaffe also advised on December 2, 1965, that he knows Vadim Evgenievich Golovanov, an exchange student studying at Stanford University, Palo Alto, California. Kalugin and Golovanov are acquainted with each other because of their journalistic backgrounds and assignments in the journalism field in Russia. Jaffe said Golovanov formerly was a Radio Moscow correspondent usually assigned to interview prominent American citizens visiting Russia.

Russia

During interview of December 2, 1965, Jaffe also furnished information on several other Soviet nationals. He said he had seen Vladimir P. Suslov briefly in Moscow since Suslov returned to Russia, and Jaffe indicated Suslov is now Andrei Gromyko's chief advisor. Jaffe stated Vladimir F. Petrovskiy and his wife, Mira, also were employed in Gromyko's office when they were in Russia. According to Jaffe, Petrovskiy and his wife attended Jaffe's reception at the American Embassy, Moscow following his marriage two and a half years ago.

Russia

Jaffe said Yuri Vinogradov, who was formerly employed on the Staff of the United Nations Secretariat, was a good friend of his and was one of three individuals who stood up for him at the time of his marriage in Russia. The other two were Stewart Ramsey of McGraw-Hill, Incorporated, and Martin Paige, of the "London Daily Express." Since Vinogradov returned to Russia in February, 1965, he has been inaccessible to Jaffe. Vinogradov is assigned to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow and Jaffe has heard that while in the United States, Vinogradov was running around with an Indian girl who was the wife of U-Thant's Military Advisor. Jaffe said this allegedly is the reason Vinogradov was recalled to Russia.

ENG
Russia

Russia

Jaffe said Igor Chechetkin is now in charge of the United Nations Information Bureau in Moscow. Jaffe said he has not seen Vladimir I. Bogachev since his return to the United States, although he is well acquainted with Bogachev. Jaffe said Vadim Bogoslovski is employed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in a position in which he is supposed to have no contact with foreigners.

Russia

D.C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

F-510

Jaffe also advised he became acquainted with Andrei N. Itskov when Itskov was the number three man in the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow. Jaffe recalled Itskov did not like his assignment and was eventually transfered to "Izvestia" prior to his assignment in Washington, D.C. C

Jaffe said he became acquainted with Oleg M. Sokolov in Washington, D.C., in connection with his occupation as a television news correspondent. Jaffe said he was in contact with Sokolov and Itskov in January, 1964, in connection with his assignment as ABC correspondent in Moscow and the contact was a matter of maintaining his contacts among Soviet nationals for professional reasons. He was unable to recall specific matters of conversation during his 1964 contact. C

> (WF T-1 advised on January 22, 1964, that he learned from Oleg M. Sokolov, Attache, Press Department, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., that Sokolov had been contacted on that date by Sam Jaffe, who had just arrived in Washington, D.C., and planned to stay there until January 24, 1964. Jaffe wanted to get together for a drink with Sokolov and agreed to meet him that evening. Jaffe suggested that Sokolov invite Andrei Nikolaevich Itskov, "Izvestia" correspondent at Washington, D.C., to join them and Jaffe would bring another person. According to WF T-1, Jaffe seemed to know Itskov very well and said he had given Itskov the names of a couple of persons to look up when Itskov came to Washington, D.C.)

S

[redacted]

On September 13, 1968, Jaffe advised agents of the New York Office of the FBI that he was recalled from his assignment as correspondent for ABC in Hong Kong and would be reassigned as a general correspondent in either New York or Washington, D.C. He advised that while in Hong Kong he associated with both Russian and Chinese individuals. He said he also was acquainted with the FBI and CIA representative in Hong Kong. C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

(1)a

He stated he and his wife visited the Soviet ship "Bikal" on four or five occasions while it was in Hong Kong and they entertained two Russian engineers, E. Gouriev and Pavel Dmitriev on one occasion in their home after having met them aboard the Russian ship.

Jaffe also advised that he and Brian Slevin, Chief of the Special Branch, Hong Kong Police, never saw eye-to-eye. He said Ted Cavan of British Intelligence, Special Branch, Hong Kong mentioned to Jaffe that Jaffe was being recalled by ABC for security reasons. Jaffe indicated he was unable to understand why ABC had recalled him from Hong Kong.

6

On September 17, 1968, Jaffe advised he probably would be assigned to Washington, D.C., and would depart for Washington the latter part of the week. He said that while in Washington, D.C., during the week of September 9, 1968, he contacted Oleg Kalugin and Vladimir Bogachev. Russia D.C

On November 14, 1968, Jaffe approached some agents of the Washington Field Office who were conducting a surveillance in the area of his residence (but not on Jaffe) and indicated he would like to have contact with the FBI in Washington, D.C., in the same manner as he had previously had contact in New York. He indicated he was in contact with Soviets in Washington, D.C., and would report on them.

On February 5, 1969, Jaffe telephonically contacted an agent of the New York Office and advised that ABC was in receipt of two copies of a book entitled "America's Unelected Rulers of the Council of Foreign Relations", written by Phoebe Greene Courtney of New Orleans, Lousiana. According to Jaffe, this book lists a number of people who are members of the Council on Foreign Relations who have subversive backgrounds. Jaffe is one of the individuals listed in this book. According to Jaffe, another section accuses Jaffe of being a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy. Jaffe indicated he is quite incensed over the information contained in this book concerning him and he connected the information in the book with his recent recall from Hong Kong by ABC. Jaffe said he has never been a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy; however, he has been a member for many years of the Council on Foreign Relations. Jaffe said he understands that Courtney and her husband reside in New Orleans and are considered to be erratic individuals in the area of anti-Communist activity.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe also advised that he has been in contact with Boris G. Strelnikov, Pravda correspondent in Washington, D.C.

Russia

VI. Jaffe's Contacts with Soviets Since His Expulsion From the USSR

WF T-4, advised that on January 16, 1966, Sam Jaffe contacted Oleg D. Kalugin and indicated he had been trying to get in touch with Kalugin for two days. He said he was in Washington, D.C., in connection with a breakfast with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, but that Rusk's assistant, George Ball, was substituting for him. Jaffe indicated he would return to New York and then to California. Jaffe suggested that he and Kalugin have lunch together, and asked Kalugin how the prospects looked for ABC to again get representation in Russia. Kalugin suggested that they discuss the matter at lunch.

WF T-1 advised that on October 7, 1968, Kalugin contacted Jaffe in response to a prior request by Jaffe. Jaffe told Kalugin he returned from Moscow and is now assigned to Washington, D.C. They agreed to get together for lunch on October 8, 1968.

Russia D.C.

WF T-1 advised that on November 29, 1968, Sam Jaffe invited Valentin M. Kamenev to have a drink after work. Kamenev declined, but it was agreed that they get together for lunch the following week.

WF T-1 advised that on December 9, 1968, Jaffe attempted unsuccessfully to contact Mikhail K. Polonik, but indicated he would attempt to contact him again.

Russia

D.C.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

VII. FBI Interviews of Jaffe in March, 1969

At the request of a Special Agent, Jaffe voluntarily appeared for interviews at the Washington Field Office of the FBI on March 20, 21, and 27, 1969. U

March 20, 1969

At the inception of the interview on March 20, 1969, Jaffe was advised that it was realized he had been in contact with FBI Agents in New York since 1958, and had furnished information concerning his contacts with Soviet nationals. He was advised that interviewing agents were interested in his contacts with Soviet nationals in Russia and in the United States, and since he had not been fully debriefed concerning his tours of duty in Moscow and Hong Kong, interviewing agents desired to obtain his comments concerning these assignments including his comments concerning his relationship with "Slava" in Moscow, which he previously reported to the FBI in 1963. His comments concerning contacts with Soviets since his return from Hong Kong were also solicited. S

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Association with KGB Contact "Slava" (Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Kuskov, aka Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Mislyuk, Vyacheslav Kiselov, Vyacheslav Kislov)

Russia

Russia

Jaffe was requested to recount the circumstances under which he met "Slava." He stated he met "Slava" through Yuri Fedorov, an employee of Novosti Press Agency (APN). ~~Initially~~ Jaffe was led to believe "Slava" also was connected with APN, but later he learned "Slava" was connected with KGB. 6

Jaffe continued: "What specifically he ('Slava') did, I don't know, but he was contacting foreigners. He was interested in what went on at American Embassy briefings. I would string him along. I would meet him usually at a restaurant. He was a real hawk, a real Stalinist - Khrushchev was wrong, China was right - real old-guard Stalinist. Whenever there was anything of any importance regarding Soviet-American relations he would ask, 'what did they say at the briefings?'" 6

Jaffe indicated he told "Slava" he did not learn anything important at the briefings. Jaffe continued: "This was basically the relationship. The only thing he asked me for was 'What is the thinking at the Embassy? What did the Ambassador have to say at the briefing?' I got the impression he had other sources because he would say, 'This isn't what I understand.'" 6

In answer to a specific question, Jaffe said he would see "Slava" on the average of once every two or two and one half weeks. He continued: "I have met his wife. She was formerly KGB." Jaffe indicated he learned from "Slava" that his wife had been with KGB and was retired. 6

Jaffe indicated he subsequently met "Slava's" boss following an automobile accident in which he hit a pedestrian in Moscow. He had had a couple of drinks, and was driving an employee to the airport when a Russian male suddenly appeared "weaving in front of my car. I hit the guy. I thought he was dead. I got out of the car. He was unconscious." Jaffe indicated the police appeared as did a "Mobile Lab" and a crowd of people. Jaffe gave a statement and was told everything was all right; however, it was necessary for him to go to the 6 police station. At the station, Jaffe initially was led to believe there was no problem, until an assistant traffic chief of police appeared. "This man spotted me" and he was required to take a sobriety test. Jaffe stated he passed the test although there was a trace of alcohol in his system. Jaffe was permitted to leave, but later was required to return to the police station and "they said it was decided to press charges." 8

Jaffe said he reported the matter to the American Embassy and received conflicting advice. "Some said shut up because if you push them" it might lead to serious trouble. "Others said scream like hell because they have never convicted an American correspondent." Jaffe decided "to take the dovish" position. 6

Jaffe continued: "At this point 'Slava' found out about it. He came to see me and said it was very, very serious." A little later, Jaffe and his wife had prepared to leave on vacation but at the last minute he was told he could not obtain an exit visa until the automobile accident had been cleared up. Jaffe then got a call from "Slava" who "Said he would like me to meet a guy. This man - I think I could identify - very young, very tough, aggressive guy, good looking, in 30's. 'Slava' said it was his chief and he just wanted to meet me." Initially the conversation was quite general, with "Slava's" boss, who spoke very good English, asking Jaffe his thoughts about the Soviet Union. Toward the end of the meeting, "Slava" mentioned Jaffe's automobile accident problem, and asked "what do you think we can do about it?" Then the two Soviets conversed in Russian, after which Jaffe was told "don't worry." 6

Later, at the advice of Kamenev, Jaffe's translator, Jaffe visited the injured Soviet at a hospital, and "brought him some booze." Jaffe continued: "They found out about this and the police were furious," insinuating that Jaffe was trying to influence the victim. A month passed, and still Jaffe did not receive an exit visa. Then "Slava" called and requested a meeting. They met in a park in Moscow. "Slava" showed Jaffe a piece of paper concerning the police charges, and tore it up in Jaffe's presence. Jaffe asked "Slava" what "Slava" wanted from him and "Slava" replied: "Forget about it. The case is closed. You have to make a financial settlement." Thereafter, Jaffe met the victim's wife, paid her 100 or 200 rubles, and she signed a statement releasing Jaffe from all other claims. 6

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe's "Exclusive" Regarding Khrushchev Ouster

Jaffe continued: "Khrushchev was ousted after this. 'Slava' called me and said: 'A friend of yours is out - somebody that likes you and you like.'" Jaffe continued: "I said, why are you telling me this. He said I thought you should be the first one to know." 6

Jaffe said he was afraid to release this story without verification, fearing it might be some sort of provocation. He attempted to verify the story thought American Embassy personnel. "They said we know something is going on;" however, Jaffe got the impression they were notaware of the actual story. Jaffe then contacted a girl who worked for APN named Lyudmila (last name unknown) and asked if she was aware that an important story was breaking. She asked "Does it have anything to do with Khrushchev?" Jaffe stated only then did she confirm the story. Jaffe also stated that Victor Louis, a correspondent for the "London Evening News", also had the "exclusive" on the Khrushchev ouster. (WF T-2 has identified Vitaliy Yevgenievich Luy, aka Vitaliy Yevgeniyevich, Louis, Victor E. Louis, a correspondent, married to an English girl, as an agent of the Directorate of Moscow, KGB).

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Expulsion of Jaffe from Soviet Union

Jaffe advised that after receiving the "exclusive" from "Slava" concerning the Khrushchev ouster, he continued to meet with "Slava" "on and off" until Jaffe was expelled from the Soviet Union in October, 1965. In explaining the expulsion, Jaffe said that without advising him, John Scali of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) wrote a story which Jaffe thinks was a "trial baloon" intimating that Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin were about to be ousted. Jaffe got a call from ABC in New York asking what he thought about Scali's story. Jaffe stated he did not believe the story was true and he asked "Slava" for his opinion. "Slava" indicated that although he would like to see it happen, he did not believe it would occur "because they were too new" as Soviet Heads of State. Jaffe continued: "The next morning, Henry Shapiro called me, asking why I had written such a story." Jaffe denied knowing anything about it. He explained that it was later that he learned that the story had been written by John Scali. (WF T-2 has identified Shapiro and his wife, Lyudmila Nikolayevna Shapiro, as KGB agents.) S

At the time Scali's story broke, Jaffe and his wife were in the process of packing in preparation for their departure from Russia for Hong Kong and Jaffe's ABC successor in Moscow already had been named. The first indication Jaffe received of his expulsion was a call from ABC in New York asking what Jaffe had done to cause the Soviets to recall the visa for Jaffe's sucessor. Jaffe said he replied: "Did you ever think it could be John Scali's story?" C

Later Jaffe was called into the Soviet Foreign Office and told he had to leave the Soviet Union in ten days and that the ABC office in Moscow was being closed. Jaffe said he inquired: "Are you holding this (story) against me?" Jaffe was told that the Soviets were not, and that "we know exactly what you said about us for four years." Jaffe indicated this was the first indication he had that the Soviets had technical coverage on him. Jaffe said he did not want to leave the Soviet Union under these conditions. He said the Soviets told him, "We are not holding this against you but it has to be." Jaffe was told not to worry about the deadline for his departure and that he could get additional time. Jaffe also was told he would be able to return to Russia. He continued: "After that, everything went smoothly. They only opened one box at the Customs Office. No problems at all. I don't recall that I saw Slava again" (after his expulsion was announced). C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe was asked how he was placed in contact with "Slava". He replied he was introduced to "Slava" by Yuri Fedorov. He continued: "I was dating a Russian girl and this girl got herself in trouble." Jaffe then stated: "She came to me and said that they had found out she was seeing an American and they were going to put this in the Soviet press. Fedorov said they will print your name and it will be very embarrassing." Jaffe said Fedorov then said, "I think I know someone who can help you." Jaffe indicated that Fedorov placed him in contact with "Slava", and "there was no article. It was his way of meeting me." Jaffe said he never saw the girl after that, and understood she was sent to Siberia.

6

In discussing his association with "Slava", Jaffe stated: "At one point when he was at my house he told me that he thought I was in CIA. Apparently he knew everything. When I first got to Russia I was tailed day and night for two months - two guys and a girl. 'Slava' said when I came over with Barbara Powers (wife of U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers) and was so close to her, they thought I was with CIA and was her advisor."

6

Jaffe stated he first met "Slava" at a restaurant in Moscow and it was not for six or seven months from then that "Slava" first visited Jaffe's residence.

6

Possible Current KGB Approach to Jaffe by Boris Sedov

Russian

On March 20, 1969, Jaffe advised that yesterday (March 19, 1969) he received a call from Boris N. Sedov, Soviet Embassy Press Department, whom Jaffe has seen a few times recently. Jaffe stated: "Sedov said 'I was thumbing through our photograph files and found a picture of you taken in Red Square. You were interviewing a Russian.'" Jaffe said Sedov indicated he thought Jaffe might want the photograph and an offer was made that they get together for lunch soon. In response to inquiry, Jaffe stated Sedov's comments "sounded funny to me."

6

(Sedov has been reported to have been a KGB officer.)

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

p. 3

Russia

Possible KGB Approach to Jaffe in New York

Jaffe stated that one man whom he met in New York prior to his Moscow assignment whom he never saw again was Vladimir Barkovski, a Soviet Consular Officer. Jaffe continued: "He asked me to do some work. I had lunch with him in Sardi's Restaurant. Barkovski said, 'When Soviet journalists come over to this country they don't know the American political system. Would you (Jaffe) write out a long brief which would help them?'" Jaffe stated he told Barkovski: "I don't think I could to that. I would have to register as an agent." Jaffe continued: "He got panicky and said, 'we will pay you well.'"

6

Russia · Austria

In discussing his Soviet contacts, Jaffe also stated: "Another man who squired me around in Moscow was Nikolay Kalinin. I knew him very well. He was assigned to me. The last I heard, he was in Vienna as Press Officer."

C

Jaffe's Dating of Foreign Nationals in Russia

Jaffe was asked if he dated any other Soviet girls. He replied he dated about three Russian girls. He continued: "The first two or three months that I moved into an apartment at about 2:00 a.m., there was a knock on the door and I opened it and here was a very attractive blond, looking for some Arab. She was loaded. She said, 'please let me use your John.' The next thing I knew she had the bathroom door locked. When I got the door open, she was undressed. I got her dressed and sat up with her all night." C

Jaffe then stated that he realized the girl through whom KGB arranged for him to meet "Slava" was "a set-up." He continued: "I knew Fedorov before. There is no question he is with KGB and an APN representative." C

Jaffe said he was "never intimate in a place where they (KGB) could photograph. I had a small apartment and looked everywhere for cameras." C

Jaffe advised that another Soviet girl whom he dated was Tania (last name unknown), who spoke excellent English. He continued: "After I was married, she met my wife and said, 'you will never keep him. He is mine.'" Jaffe said he thinks this girl was connected with KGB. He said she was allegedly a student at Moscow University and went out with foreigners. Jaffe concluded: "After I met 'Slava', he told me to stay away from her and I did." C

Jaffe was asked if he dated any other foreign nationals. He stated: "I dated a Finnish girl who was studying ballet at the Bolshoi Theater - the prima ballerina of the Helsinki Ballet Company," who was of Russian origin. Jaffe continued: "I took out the Second Secretary of the Danish Embassy for a long time. She later transferred. She wanted to get married." C

Jaffe stated he did not suspect that any of the non-Russian girls whom he dated were connected with KGB. He indicated that he met these girls at the American House Club by chance and he does not believe the associations were KGB inspired. Jaffe also stated: "Another girl I dated for quite a while was a beatnik type." He continued: "My wife, before we were married, dated a Russian, allegedly a student. He tried to set her up but she pulled out because she was working for the American Embassy." C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Information Requested by "Slava"

In response to inquiries, Jaffe stated "Slava" was especially interested in important current events such as "the Cuban crisis - things like that - what our (U.S.) reactions would be." Jaffe also stated: "He would ask me about some guy" at the American Embassy, such as Dick Gabey and Manuel Oliver." Jaffe indicated that his responses would be that he did not get close to these people or he only had a drink with them but did not learn anything significant. Jaffe continued: "He ('Slava') would say 'They talk to some of the correspondents.' I would say 'I never have any occasion, because with radio (ABC) you don't go into depth.'" 6

Jaffe also stated: "He was also very much interested in the Time, Incorporated group that came over there (Russia). What do they say. What do they talk about." Jaffe stated: "I said they are looking into expanding trade." Jaffe was asked to list any business or political groups visitng Russia in which "Slava" expressed an interest. Jaffe mentioned the Time, Incorporated businessmen group, the Rockefeller visit and a Business International Group. 6

Jaffe was asked why KGB would have considered him a good contact or recruited agent. He replied "I don't know why they would consider me a good contact or recruited agent, because there was nothing I could furnish them." He continued: "I could see why they thought I was so interesting. I figure they wanted something in the future." 6

Jaffe said "Slava" would ask him if he was aware of or expected to be with a particular group and Jaffe would answer in the affirmative or would indicate he might cover such a group; however, he would tell "Slava", "I have no entree to these people." Jaffe continued: "He consulted me about several people over there. My answer always was, 'I know the guy. I had a drink with him but I didn't get close.' I said, 'I have no real reason.'" Jaffe indicated that he merely furnished "Slava" his opinions concerning matters of interest to "Slava." Jaffe concluded that "Slava" made no arrangements to recontact him after his expulsion from the Soviet Union. He stated: "I never saw this man since." Jaffe stated he saw two Soviet engineers aboard a Soviet ship in Hong Kong and had them to lunch at his residence; however, he initiated these contacts himself. 6

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

March 21, 1969

Identifications of Soviet Contacts

On March 21, 1969, when requested to review numerous photographs of Soviet nationals and comment concerning his recollections of them, Jaffe stated he has a very poor recollection of names of individuals; however, he has a very good recollection of faces of individuals he has met. Jaffe made the following comments concerning the first group of photographs displayed to him: C

Russia

1. Vladimir Ivanovich Bogachev: APN correspondent. C

Bogachev has been reported as connected with Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). C

2. Vladimir Borisovich Barkovski: The Soviet national who approached Jaffe with a request of Jaffe to write an analysis of the American political scene. Subsequently, when shown a group of photographs of Soviet nationals identified by WF T-2 as officers of the KGB, including photographs of Barkovski and his wife, Jaffe again identified Barkovski and also indicated he recognized his wife. C

WF T-2 identified Barkovski as a KGB officer who was KGB Resident in the United States in the late 1950's; in 1962 was Chief of the First (American) Department of the First Chief Directorate (FCD), KGB; and in 1963 was appointed Deputy Chief of the newly created Scientific - Technical Directorate, FCD, KGB. S

Russi

3. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh: Face looks familiar. C

When shown a photograph of this individual, WF T-2 thought he had seen this individual, and he may have been an officer of the FCD, KGB. He was aware there was a Colonel Bessmertnykh who until 1962, worked in the FCD, KGB. S

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Russia N.Y.

4. Vadim Aleksandrovich Bogoslovski: Soviet who was with United Nations (UN) Secretary U-Thant when U-Thant visited Moscow the first time. This Soviet studied at the Communist Party (CP) Central Committee school. Jaffe stated he did not know whether or not this individual was connected with the KGB.

Russia

5. Igor Dmitrievich Bubnov: Jaffe thinks this Soviet is now in Washington, D.C. Jaffe thinks he may be connected with KGB.

Russia

6. Ivan F. Bukanov: Jaffe stated he has seen this individual, probably either in Washington, D.C., or in New York; however, he has not had close contact with him.

Bukanov has been reported as connected with KGB.

Russia

7. Nikolai Ivanovich Burov: Jaffe saw him in Moscow, and he thinks he is connected with KGB.

Russia

8. Igor Vasilevich Chechetkin: Jaffe knew him at the Soviet Delegation to the UN in New York City and also saw him in Moscow at a Kremlin reception; however, he never had social contact with him and did not associate closely with him. This individual never "approached" Jaffe.

Chechetkin has been reported as connected with KGB and with MVD.

Russia

9. Yuri Nikolaevich Chernyakov: Consular Officer in Washington, D.C. (Jaffe did not recognize photographs of several other Soviet nationals with surname of Chernikov or Chernyakov.)

Russia

10. Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Druzhinin: Radio Moscow employee very much concerned with Soviet-American relations in the radio-television fields. He appears to be sincerely concerned with radio and television exchanges. He currently is back in Moscow.

Druzhinin has been reported as connected with KGB.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Russian

11. Konstantin Grigorevich Fedoseev: Employed as counselor at Soviet Delegation to UN, New York City. Jaffe described him as a nice little man who did not speak good English. His wife, who spoke excellent English, is very close to the wife of Vladimir Barkovski. On one occasion, Jaffe took Fedoseev to the Press Club. C

Russia CALIF

12. Vadim Yevgenyevich Golovanov: Jaffe stated he and his wife were very fond of Golovanov, an employee of Radio Moscow who formerly attended Stanford University. His wife previously was at "M.K.U." Jaffe stated Golovanov and his wife were "one of the few Russians who had us to his apartment. Very decent. A young man who I think could be swayed. Wants to understand Americans. Gave me tape of Russian music and I gave him tapes of American music. I do not think he was KGB." (Jaffe indicated he feels he can spot CIA officers, FBI agents, and KGB employees.) C

Jaffe stated Golovanov worked in the American Department of Radio Moscow, interviewing American personalities coming to Russia for Radio Moscow radio programs. He tried to obtain an assignment in the U.S. According to Jaffe, he and his wife resided in a "room and a half apartment" with his grandmother. C

Russian

13. Nikolay Golub; Pavel Iosifovich Golub; Filipp Andreevich Gontar: Their faces are familiar; however, Jaffe cannot recall where he might have seen them. C C

Gontar has been reported as connected with KGB. C GRU

Russian

14. Andrey Nikolayevich Itskov: Jaffe thinks this Soviet was connected with the Soviet Mission to the UN (SMUN) in New York City. Jaffe met and talked to him, and possibly saw him at a party; however, Jaffe was not a close contact. C

WF T-2 reported he has seen this individual in the 1960's at KGB Headquarters, Moscow. [redacted] S

Russian

15. Oleg Danilovich Kalugin: Jaffe described this Soviet as a "very sharp, bright young man" who is "very resentful of me." Jaffe stated: "I don't think he likes me and I don't like him. I am told he is going back (to Russia)." Jaffe also stated: "He is the man who had my case when I had the automobile accident. If KGB was going to employ a young man, this is the type I think they would hire." Jaffe said he thinks Kalugin once attended Columbia University in New York City. C

Kalugin has been reported as connected with KGB.

Russia

16. Nikolay Nikolayevich Karev: Jaffe indicated he was connected with "Pravda" or "Izvestia." Jaffe stated he is "very much like 'Slava' (Kuskov)", in that he is a "very, very hard liner" in his political discussions; however, Jaffe does not think Karev is connected with KGB. He thinks he is connected with radio and television in Moscow.

Russia

17. Boris Semenovich Ivanov: Jaffe "only saw" him in New York, but had no close contact with him.

Ivanov has been reported as connected with KGB.

Russian

18. Nikolai Sergeevich Kalinin: Jaffe thinks this individual is definitely connected with KGB.

Kalinin has been reported to have been connected with KGB and with MVD.

Russian

19. Mikhail Averkievich Kharlamov: Jaffe said he heard from Jim Hagerty, former White House Press Officer, that this individual was head of the Central Committee of Radio and Television until the Khrushchev ouster and now has only some type of menial job. Jaffe heard he was very close to Khrushchev, but was never seen after Khrushchev's ouster. Jaffe also stated: "I got a lot of cooperation with this man. I don't think he is KGB, but a member of Central Committee. I don't think KGB would have a man in that kind of job. He knew Hagerty very well when Hagerty was Press Secretary." Jaffe stated he "got more things because of this man" than through any other Soviet national.

Kharlamov has been reported as connected with MVD.

Russia

20. Vladilev Vasilevich Klokov: Jaffe saw this man at the SMUN, New York City.

Klokov has been reported as connected with KGB.

Russia

21. Stanislav Nikolayevich Kondrashov: Jaffe stated he has seen this Soviet "someplace", but not in Moscow.

Kondrashov has been reported as connected with KGB.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Russia

22. Daniil Fedorovich Kraminov: Jaffe said he knew this individual but "I can't tell you where or when." When told the Soviet's name, Jaffe identified him as editor of a Soviet publication and said he travelled to the United States with Khrushchev. Jaffe said he "is extremely bright and very well versed in America and in international affairs in general." Jaffe also stated he "followed the Communist line, but didn't push it."

Russia

23. Georgi Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov: Jaffe indicated this is a "friendly" Soviet who he thinks was stationed in Washington, D.C.

Kuznetsov has been reported as connected with KGB.

Russia Deceased

24. Evgeni Vladimirovich Litoshko: Jaffe stated this individual formerly was a correspondent in the United States, and a friend of Kraminov. Jaffe described him as a "real hard liner" and an American editor of "Pravda" who died of cancer.

Litoshko has been reported as connected with MVD.

Russia

25. Pavel Pavlovich Lukyanov: "With KGB. I met him once in Moscow and he said he was going back to States. Met him previously in New York. I think he was KGB. Met him at some party. Invited over to house for drink." Jaffe described this Soviet as very sharp and deceptive.

Lukyanov has been reported as connected with KGB.

Russia

26. Aleksei Efremovich Nesterenko: Jaffe said this individual was with the Soviet Foreign Ministry in New York. Jaffe met him in New York, and he thinks he met him a couple of times in Moscow.

Nesterenko has been reported as connected with KGB.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Russia

27. Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy: "Vladimir Petrovskiy. They came to our wedding. His wife is a red head, very attractive, very sharp. Both speak excellent English. He is with Foreign Ministry; one of advisors and aides to Gromyko. They were to come to this country when we went to Moscow. I liked him personally. He never inquired about anything. Socially quite nice. I thought his wife was a lot sharper than he."

Petrovskiy has been reported as connected with KGB.

Russia

28. Aleksei Yakovlevich Popov: "With Press Department in Moscow. A first class S.O.B. The last I heard he is or was in Canada. Very sickly man which might have accounted for his disposition."

Popov has been reported as connected with MVD.

Russia

29. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Popov: Jaffe said this individual looks familiar. Jaffe thinks he met him in Washington, D.C., rather than in Moscow.

Russia

30. Aleksandr Iosifovich Popov: "I have seen him. Met him some place."

Russia Japan

31. Gennadi Arkadevich Shishkin: "American editor of 'Tass.' Hard nose, possibly could be KGB. In New York for long time. Gennadi Shishkin. Lovely wife. Went out to Press Club together in New York; saw couple of times at Press Club. He was over to my house when Jim Hagerty was there. Last I heard he flew over to Tokyo to open new 'Tass' office. Quite possibly, KGB. Met him first in New York."

Russia

32. Mikhail Nikolaevich Smirnovskiy: "Soviet Ambassador to England. Mikhail Smirnovskiy. Chief of American Department. Would never come to my apartment. A guy (who) I think could be quite a moderate. Like him very much."

Russia

33. Oleg Mikhaylovich Sokolov: "He is here (Washington, D.C.). Was here originally when I was in Moscow. Sokolov is very sharp young man. I think he had a couple of trips (tours) in Washington, D.C. Wants to meet other Americans." Jaffe indicated he thought he was connected with KGB.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Russia

34. Vadim Vladimirovich Sorokin: "Have seen him, but where, I don't know." C

Sorokin has been reported as connected with GRU. C

Russia

34A. Valentin M. Sorokin: Jaffe indicated this individual is associated with APN, Moscow and Jaffe has seen him in Moscow, but not in the United States. C

35. Viktor Mikhailovich Sukhodrev: Jaffe immediately recognized him by name and photograph and indicated he has seen him on several occasions, and described him as a professional translator. Jaffe does not think he is connected with KGB. C

Russia

36. Vladimir Pavlovich Suslov: "Gromyko's advisor. Very bright, very sharp. Don't know whether he is flexible or not. Very guarded. Would never visit (my) house." C

Suslov has been identified by WF T-2 as a Soviet diplomat who is an operative contact of KGB. S

Russia U.S.

37. Timur Timofeevich Timofeev: "Correspondent. I know him. I think we met in the United States. This was the man I first met. Very taken by him. Very bright. At one time stood very high in Soviet hierarchy. Came here (United States) on Khrushchev trip. No one quite knew what he did, but I was told he stood very high with Khrushchev and then something happened. Couldn't find what happened to him." C

Russia

38. Nikolai Demyanovich Turkatenko: "'Tass' correspondent. Saw him in Moscow once or twice. Very Ivy League. Very sharp boy. Probably KGB plant of some type in Moscow." Jaffe indicated he may have had this individual to his residence on one occasion. C

Russia

39. Gennadiy Vasilievich Vasilev: Jaffe indicated he was associated with "Tass" in New York and was once involved in an automobile accident. Jaffe visited his house in the country outside New York City. Vasilev got drunk, and while escorting Jaffe from his residence, someone hit his car. Jaffe continued: "Nice enough, quite meek. I don't think he was KGB." C

It has been reported that Vasilev may have been of assistance to KGB. C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Russia

40. Yuri Nikolaevich Vinogradov: Jaffe recognized this individual and expressed the opinion he was not associated with KGB.

Russia

41. Sergei N. Vishnevski: "I think I have seen him some place." When told the name of this Soviet national, Jaffe stated: "I knew a Vishnevski, a 'Pravda' correspondent in New York. Took me aside one day. Quite liberal. I knew him in New York and I think I saw him in Moscow."

Vishnevski has been reported as connected with GRU.

Russia

42. Mikhail I. Bruk: "KGB. Very, very clever person. Jewish, he claims. Lovely wife who doesn't speak good English. He is in touch with intellectuals. He thought he was coming to the States once."

Bruk has been reported as connected with KGB.

Russia

43. Yuri Vladimirovich Fedorov: Jaffe indicated he knew this individual.

Russia

44. Valentin Mikhailovich Kamenev: Jaffe indicated he did not recognize this individual, and then commented that "he looks somewhat like the guy that 'Slava' introduced to me as his boss;" however, the individual depicted in the photograph appears to be somewhat older than "Slava's" boss.

Russia

45. Abram Nepomnyashchi: "APN Novosti editor. Met him first in New York. Told me he would be of great help to me in Moscow - with one of top publications. I would say (he was) KGB. Foreign editor. I thought he was evil, nasty."

Nepomnyashchi has been reported as connected with MVD.

Russia

46. Lyudmila Y. Panova: "This is one that I didn't meet. Hung out at Metropole (Hotel) bar. She knew my girl friend. Shacked up with a lot of American businessmen. I thought (she was) KGB. Several of my colleagues knew her." When told her name, Jaffe said he knew her only as Lyudmila.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Russia

47. Mikhail Korneyevich Polonik: Jaffe immediately recognized this individual by name and photograph and stated Polonik started out as a political officer at the SMUN, New York City, and is now stationed in Washington, D.C. Jaffe saw him at two receptions held at the Soviet Embassy, the "November Revolution" and the "Armed Forces Day" reception. Jaffe indicated he disliked Polonik.

> Polonik has been reported as connected with KGB.

Russia

48. Boris Georgievich Strelnikov: Jaffe recognized this individual as a neighbor who lives on the floor below Jaffe in a Washington, D.C. apartment building. Jaffe described him as "very hard nosed" and stated he worked "for 'Pravda' for his first year here. I had Boris up for a party, but he never reciprocated." Jaffe indicated he had contact with Strelnikov to initiate an inquiry of the Soviets at the request of former President Lyndon B. Johnson to ascertain why the Soviets had not invited Johnson to visit the Soviet Union.

> Strelnikov has been reported as connected with MGB (Soviet Ministry for State Security).

49. Georgi Aleksandrovich Zhukov: Jaffe commented: "I would call him an opportunist. He is a leading (Soviet) writer, the Walter Lippmann or Walter Winchell of Russia. A journalist of 'Pravda'; chief hatchetman. I met him on several occasions, talked to him. Tough man to get anything out of. Invited to Hagerty's party, but didn't follow up."

Russia

50. Georgi Leonidovich Zhukov and Yuri Petrovich Zhukov: Jaffe commented that both photographs appeared to be familiar; however, he has no recollection of where he might have seen these individuals.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe made the following comments when shown photographs of Soviet nationals identified by WF T-2 as officers of the Special Section of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, working against foreign correspondents and its successor, Department 10, SCD, KGB.

RUSSIA

1. Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Aleshin: Jaffe stated he thinks he knew this individual when he served with the SMUN, New York City.

RUSSIA

2. Vadim Osipovich Biryukov: Jaffe indicated he thought this individual was associated with KGB. Jaffe said he spoke excellent English and formerly worked for Time-Life in Moscow and now works for Novosti. He stated "Time-Life got a lot of things through him and his contacts." Jaffe described him as a very sharp, "hard-nosed" individual who wore western-style clothes, including button-down sport shirts. Jaffe stated he met this individual at Soviet receptions.

3. Evgeniy Petrovich Gromakovskiy: Jaffe stated he is sure he has met this man, probably in the United States, possibly New York, rather than in Russia. Jaffe stated he "Never had any dealings" with him, and possibly met him at some luncheon or reception.

RUSSIA

4. Mikhail Vasilevich Kalinkin: Jaffe stated he definitely has met this individual. He thinks he first met him during Khrushchev's visit to the United States, and he also has seen him in Moscow.

RUSSIA

5. Vyacheslav Ivanovich Kevorkov: Jaffe stated this individual is connected with KGB and commented: "Evil S.O.B. This is the man who said he was Secretary of the Union of Journalists."

RUSSIA FINLAND

RUSSIA FINLAND

Jaffe indicated he first met Kevorkov in the company of the young Soviet poet, Stasa Yeftisev (phonetic) in Helsinki during the Youth Festival. According to Jaffe, Jena (Anastasia) Stevens, daughter of American correspondent Edmund Stevens, and this poet secretly used Jaffe's Moscow office to engage in sexual intercourse until Jaffe learned about it and ordered them to stop using his place.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe covered the Youth Festival with Don Larrimore, United Press International (UPI) correspondent, with whom Jaffe got along well. He and Larrimore were having dinner with Miss Stevens in a Helsinki hotel when Kevorkov and the young poet appeared. Later they ended up on the Soviet ship "Drugba" (phonetic) where a conversation ensued. Jaffe did not see Kevorkov again until a year or two later in Moscow. According to Jaffe, when Larrimore was ultimately expelled from Poland "there was a KGB fake story which recalled the conversation (on the Soviet ship) and meeting at Helsinki." Jaffe stated he (Jaffe) was not mentioned in the story and he indicated that the only party who could have furnished the information in the story was Kevorkov, which convinced Jaffe that Kevorkov is connected with KGB. C

WF T-2 has identified Edmund Stevens, American correspondent in Moscow, husband of a Soviet female and father of Anastasia Stevens, as a KGB agent. Russia U.S. S

6. Vladimir Viktorovich Vladimirov Russia (true name Kostyra): Jaffe indicated he thought he recognized this individual; however, "it must have been a fleeting" association. C

7. Vladimir Vasilyevich Krivoshey Russia: Jaffe said "his face is familiar." C

8. Ivan Abramovich Panasenko Russia: Jaffe also indicated the face of this individual is familiar. He expressed the opinion he might have seen him in New York City. C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

S [redacted]

Jaffe was then shown photographs of individuals identified by WF T-2 as officers of the First Department, SCD, KGB, and he indicated he recognized the following individuals. He furnished no additional information other then that set forth below:

Russia

1. Vladimir Lvovich Artemov: Jaffe commented: "I know this man. Have met someplace." C

Russia

2. Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Aleshin: Jaffe indicated he definitely has met this individual. He indicated he might have seen him in Moscow; however, he recalls specifically meeting him in New York at some party. According to Jaffe, the Soviet got drunk and "I took care of the guy." Subsequently, the Soviets called him at 3:00 or 4:00 a.m., inquiring about the Soviet's whereabouts. Jaffe indicated that in spite of the favor he rendered this Soviet, the Soviet never looked him up in Moscow. Jaffe stated he ran into this Soviet again in Moscow when he was covering an American businessmen group sponsored by Time-Life and Jaffe asked the Soviet why "he didn't look me up." The Soviet indicated he had been too busy. C

Russia

3. Nikolay Grigoryevich Bagrichev: Jaffe indicated this individual looked familiar; however, he has no recollection of where he might have seen him. C

Russia

4. Yuri Evgenvich Chernetsov: Jaffe indicated he has seen this Soviet some place. He commented the man was somewhat similar in appearance to "Slava's" boss, but shorter and more handsome. C

5. Yuriy Vladimirovich Fedorov: Jaffe commented that this individual is connected with APN and also is connected with KGB. He continued: "This is the guy that set me up with 'Slava' - Fedorov - who traveled here (United States) with Book Exhibit - vicious, condescending greasy type of fellow." C

WF T-2 has stated Yuriy Vladimirovich Fedorov might be identical with a correspondent and a former agent of the First Department, SCD, KGB, who previously was a Major in GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence). Later, in 1962 or 1963, this individual became an officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, KGB.

[redacted] S

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Russian

6. Ivan Kuzmich Fedotkin: Jaffe stated he has met this man someplace, possibly at a reception or party; however, he has had no close contact with him. C

Russian

7. Nikolay Aleksandrovich Gavrilenko: Jaffe initially was shown a sheet of paper containing two photographs of Gavrilenko and one of his wife. He indicated the face of Gavrilenko is familiar. Later, when shown another group of Soviet nationals identified by WF T-2 as officers of the SCD, KGB, including a sheet with three photographs of Gavrilenko, two of which appeared on the previous sheet depicting Gavrilenko and his wife, Jaffe commented that although the hair appears to have changed, there is a striking similarity in the eyes of this individual with "Slava's" boss. Jaffe commented: "I would say this might have been 'Slava's' boss." S

> WF T-2 has identified Gavrilenko as a former officer of the First Chief Directorate, KGB, who worked in the Geneva KGB Residentura. From 1959 - 1962, he was a senior case officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, KGB, working against Air Force Attaches assigned to the American Embassy, Moscow, and in 1963, he was made Chief of the Special Section - Technical of the SCD. S

Russian

8. Ilya Sergeyevich Glazunov: Jaffe mentioned this individual by name and stated he "has to be a KGB plant - a great political artist." Jaffe stated his (Jaffe's) wife knew him better than he did because Glazunov made portraits of the wives of American Embassy personnel. According to Jaffe, Glazunov "wanted to join the Union of Soviet Artists, but they didn't want him." Jaffe described him as a "greasy S.O.B." who had a "lovely wife." C

> WF T-2 identified Glazunov as a painter and agent of Section 1, Department 1, SCD, who gave lessons to diplomats and wives, and spotted, assessed, and furnished information to KGB on diplomats. S

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Russia C

9. Evgeniy Petrovich Gromakovskiy, aka Evgeniy Petrovich Granovskiy: Jaffe indicated he has seen this man some place.

Russia N.Y. C

10. Boris Semenovich Ivanov: Jaffe stated he has met this individual at the United Nations, "just at a reception or something." and he said this man was "not someone I went to for something." Jaffe described this man as "one of the V.I.P.'s" at the SMUN.

Russia C

11. Vyacheslav Vasilevich Karpekin, aka Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Efremov: Jaffe stated: "Yes, I have seen this man."

Russia C

12. Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilyuk: Jaffe also stated he has seen this man, but not in Moscow.

Russia C

13. Sergey Vasilevich Komarov: Jaffe said this man looks familiar.

S

14. Vladislav Mikhaylovich Kovshuk, aka Vladimir Mikhaylovich Komarov: When shown two photographs of this individual, Jaffe indicated that the photograph depicting this individual as a younger man was familiar. Subsequently, when viewing another group of photographs of individuals identified by WF T-2 as officers of the Directorate of SCD, KGB, Jaffe, upon seeing only the older of two photographs of this individual, commented: "I saw him before. I met him."

C

15. Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Kuskov, aka Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Mislyuk (two photographs of this individual and one photograph of his first wife): Jaffe immediately identified this individual as "Slava". He stated he did not recognize the female depicted therein. He stated he initially knew him only as "Slava"; however, after their association became "established", he knew him as Vyacheslav Kiselov. "Slava" told Jaffe, "I know about your country; I have been to your country." Jaffe described "Slava" as a very dedicated individual.

Russia C

16. Petr Ivanovich Massaya: Jaffe said his face is familiar. Later when shown this individual's photograph with another group of Soviets, Jaffe stated he has met this man in New York, but he has no recollection of seeing him in Moscow.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Russia

17. Sergey Vasilyevich Medvedev: Jaffe indicated his face is "very familiar."

Russia

18. Valentin Matveyevich Mikhaylov, aka Valentin M. Sadovnikov: Jaffe stated: "I have seen him some place."

Russia

19. Yuriy Aleksandrovich Nikiforov (with his wife, Yelizaveta Timofeyevna Mikhaylova): Jaffe indicated that this man and woman look familiar. He voiced the opinion he probably had contact with these individuals in the United States rather than in Moscow. Later, when shown the same photographs with another group of Soviets, Jaffe commented that the photographs appeared to be familiar.

Russia N.Y.

20. Mikhail R. Sagatelyan: Jaffe initially commented that he knew this individual in the United States and may have seen him in Moscow. When told his name, Jaffe described him as the "chief American writer for 'Tass'; nice enough; certainly understands the country; probably not KGB, very sharp; good English; tries to act like an American." Jaffe said he last saw Sagatelyan in Moscow.

Russia

21. Gleb Sergeyevich Sergeyev: Jaffe said the individual looks familiar; however, he cannot recall having had contact with him.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe also was shown photographs of other Soviet nationals identified by WF T-2 as officers of the SCD, KGB. He commented on the following individuals: S

1. Aleksandr Konstantinovich Kislov: Russia Jaffe states his face looks familiar. C

2. Viktor Nikolaevich Titov: Russia Jaffe commented that this individual resembles the man with whom he had contact during his automobile accident in Moscow. C

3. Leonid Filippovich Khodorkov: Russia His face is familiar. C

4. Mikhail Mikhailovich Sumskoy: Russia Jaffe stated he has seen this individual in the United States or Moscow; however, he had no sustantial contact with him. C

5. Georgiy Pavlovich Chernyshev: Russia His face is very familiar to Jaffe. C

6. Nikolay Timofeyevich Ratnikov: Russia Jaffe stated: "Yes, I have seen him in New York." C

7. Viktor Dmitriyevich Timofeyev: Russia Jaffe said this individual looks familiar. C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe's "Exclusive" Regarding Professor Frederick Barghoorn

Jaffe advised that another "exclusive" he obtained while in Moscow was information about the release of Professor Frederick Barghoorn. Jaffe obtained this "exclusive" from Mikhail "Mike" Bruk, "a guy who never pumped me." He said Bruk was an employee of APN, an "extremely interesting man, a fine linguist" who normally covers scientific matters. Jaffe stated it is his opinion that the release of Barghoorn was the culmination of a fight between Khrushchev and the KGB and his opinion was confirmed by statements made to him by Yuri Vinogradov that Khrushchev initially was not aware that Barghoorn was being detained and after he learned of it he insisted, over the objections of KGB, that he be released.

Jaffe said he learned beforehand of the expected release of Barghoorn while attending a Soviet-American Friendship meeting with Bruk and Vinogradov. He continued: "Mike (Bruk) took me out in the hall. He said he (Barghoorn) will be released. He will leave here tomorrow for London." Jaffe said the release occurred on a Saturday and no British European Airways (BEA) flight is scheduled from Moscow on Saturday; however, the BEA plane was detained and did not depart until Saturday, with Barghoorn. Jaffe said that before releasing the story, he tried to verify it with the American Embassy, but was unable to do so.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Attitude of Vyacheslav Kiselov, aka "Slava" (Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Kuskov)

Jaffe said he and "Slava" discussed the way the Soviet Union was changing and "Slava" admitted changes were occuring and that "this was bad." Jaffe tried to convince "Slava" that many of these changes were desirable; however, "Kiselov couldn't see this at all (saying) 'We have to bring it about through Marxism - Leninism.' I disagreed. Even China will come around. Even you (Russia) are coming around. He ("Slava") refused to accept this."

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

March 27, 1969

Contacts with Boris Nikolayevich Sedov Russia

At the inception of the interview on March 27, 1969, Jaffe indicated he had attempted to contact Sedov to arrange for a luncheon appointment but was unable to reach him.

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Activities in Hong Kong

Jaffe indicated that "in order to keep up on my Russian and to buy caviar and vodka," he and New York correspondent Ian Stewart visited the "S.S. Bikal", a Soviet cruise ship plying between Hong Kong and Siberia. Jaffe indicated that one unusual incident occurred on the ship. Jaffe asked if the ship had any delux cabins and was escorted by a Soviet female guide to the cabin. The door was locked. She knocked and upon receiving no answer, unlocked the door. They saw two Russian caucasians talking to a Chinese national. The Chinese national immediately turned his head away from the Americans and kept it turned away thoughout their stay in the cabin. The Russians appeared upset and one asked "What are you doing here?" The girl explained that the Americans were touring the ship and tried to show them the cabin hurriedly. It was obvious to Jaffe that she wanted to get out of the cabin as soon as possible; however, Jaffe inquired about and insisted upon being shown the cabin's toilet. Jaffe concluded: "As we were leaving, I turned around and said in Russian, 'Thank you very much.'" Jaffe indicated the fact that he could speak Russian obviously shocked the Russian nationals. C

Jaffe stated he developed an association with two Russians on the ship who "had been trying to get into Hong Kong for some time. I think they were engineers." Jaffe said he invited them to his residence where they had lunch with Ken Bernstein, of National Broadcasting Company and another individual whose name Jaffe cannot recall. One of the Soviet engineers was quite open in his concern about the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. Jaffe also learned that Hong Kong was doing 100 million dollars of business repairing Soviet tankers, freighters and cruise ships. Jaffe said the Soviet engineers were very anxious to obtain visas for their wives and children to enter Hong Kong. C

Jaffe also advised China he had contacts with CIA and British Intelligence in Hong Kong, as a result of his contacts with a Red Chinese national, Szeto/Kung, the news editor of the Chinese News Agency. After being introduced to Szeto by an individual who works for Reuters, Jaffe told Szeto about his assignment in Russia. An association between Jaffe and Szeto ensued. Jaffe indicated to Szeto that he was very anxious to go to Red China. Jaffe indicated that in 1955, he was granted an interview by Chou En Lai. C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

After his initial contacts with Szeto, Jaffe observed him several times, "but he never recognized me or my camera man." Subsequently Jaffe called Szeto and asked him if he could get Jaffe some Mao banners. Szeto indicated 6
they were difficult to obtain, but he would try. They later met at a restaurant and Szeto gave him some Mao banners. Szeto asked Jaffe his attitude toward the Hong Kong crisis and how the British had reacted and whether or not their hostility had tapered off. Jaffe stated: "I said I was pretty sore about the British newspaper man being held in China." Szeto replied that the British were holding one of their (China's) men.

Jaffe stated Szeto invited him to lunch several days later and indicated that things were getting better in China; however, "we still have trouble in Canton, but we think everything is toning down. The Red Guards are going 6
back to school." They also talked about developing better relations with the United States in the future and Szeto indicated that a Communist Party Congress would be held this year in China.

When Jaffe was packing to return to the United States, he contacted Szeto and Szeto suggested that they get together. Jaffe indicated he would like to introduce his wife to Szeto. This was agreeable and Szeto took them to dinner on the eve of the Chinese Anniversary. Szeto brought up the subject of keeping in touch with Jaffe, indicating that he did not desire to contact him through ABC. It was decided that after Jaffe got settled in the United States, he would write Szeto at the Chinese News Agency office in Hong Kong and furnish 6
his mailing address. Jaffe again indicated to Szeto his strong desire to get assigned to China. Jaffe said he had cleared this "with the Agency (CIA)" prior to his conversation with Szeto. Jaffe stated his CIA contact in Hong Kong "at one point showed me a report on him (Szeto). He told about taking groups of people to China. He had been abroad but never to this country (United States). He obviously was a liaison man with the Foreign press. I think it was a surprise to CIA and the State Department that he (Szeto) would see us (the Jaffes)."

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

In answer to specific questions, Jaffe stated that although "Slava" was aware that Jaffe would be assigned to Hong Kong, "'Slava' never expressed any interest in China" and made "no arrangements to contact me in Hong Kong."

6

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Recent Contacts with Soviets

In response to questions, Jaffe stated that with the exception of the contact initiated by Boris Sedov concerning a photograph of Jaffe taken in Red Square, all recent contacts with Soviet nationals, have resulted from Jaffe's initiative. He stated he has invited the following Soviets to his residence for social functions: 6

Russia D.C

Boris Georgievich Strelnikov, "Pravda" correspondent, who lives in the same apartment building as Jaffe; 6

Mikhail Korneyevich Polonik, Counselor, Political Division, Soviet Embassy; D.C. Russia 6

Valentin Mikhailovich Kamenev, Counselor, Cultural Division, Soviet Embassy; D.C. Russia 6

Oleg Danilovich Kalugin, First Secretary, Press Division, Soviet Embassy; D.C Russia 6

D.C Russia

Viktor Vasilyevich Kopytin, Tass correspondent; 6 6

Kopytin has been reported as connected with KGB. 6

Russia

Leonid Yefimovich Lipovetskiy, Radio Moscow correspondent;

Russia D.C

Yuriy Vladimirovich Barsukov, "Izvestia" correspondent. 6

Barsukov has been reported as connected with KGB. 6

Jaffe said he and his wife were invited out for a drink with Kopytin and his wife, whom Jaffe described as very attractive. Jaffe stated: "I had a couple of drinks. They picked up the check." 6

Jaffe said he also had contact with a Radio Prague correspondent. Jaffe described him as a very young, capable individual for whom Jaffe has a high regard. 6

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe stated all his contacts with the Soviets have been cordial. The only time he felt out of place and embarrassed in connection with his Soviet contacts was when he attended the Soviet Air Forces Day celebration at the Soviet Embassy. He explained that John Lynch of ABC had been invited but said he could not make it and gave Jaffe his ticket. Jaffe continued: "When they (the Soviets) saw me there they seemed surprised and asked: 'What are you doing here?' One of the guys said he had seen my piece on Russian trawlers. Kalugin did most of the talking. Asked what I was doing. I said I was John Lynch's replacement. Later Lynch and his wife showed up with a sister-in-law." C

Jaffe said the Soviets asked what he was doing with ABC. He replied he had expected to cover the State Department but he is on general assignment to get the feel of the country since he has been away for so long. C

Jaffe said on the night of the Soviet Air Forces Day celebration, he also met a member of the Soviet Press Department who expressed great interest in Jaffe and indicated a desire to get together again. However, he has had no additional contact with this individual. C

Jaffe also had contact with the new Counselor of Press Affairs at the Soviet Embassy. Jaffe inquired about the possibility of touring one of the Soviet "mother ships." This Soviet merely suggested that Jaffe "write a letter." C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe's Employees in Moscow

Jaffe advised that in 1965 prior to his expulsion he had a Soviet cameraman and a translator. The cameraman had left several months before the ABC office was ordered closed, and he was replaced by Yuri Boridorov (phonetic), who stayed until Jaffe's expulsion and actually closed the ABC office. The translator, Aleksandr "Sasha" Nezmanov (phonetic), "was good and would stick his neck out, but he was mixed up with some girl. This was the excuse he gave." "Sasha" told Jaffe he had "gotten himself in trouble with a circus girl and this was about to cause a scene." "Sasha," who broke down and cried when he related the story to Jaffe, said he made the girl pregnant and she had threatened to come down to his office and complain. Jaffe said he asked "Slava" about this, and his only comment was "they weren't very good" employees. Jaffe said the translator's replacement was a "great big goon type who knew nothing," and Jaffe fired him.

Jaffe stated he left Russia about a month after the Scali story broke. He continued: "I had already reported the denial based on what I saw and believed, but ABC didn't use them - radio did but TV didn't." Jaffe stated the Soviets were aware of the ABC radio denial but they asked Jaffe why the denial did not appear on television, stating "the impact was created on TV." According to Jaffe, this is why Henry Shapiro, UPI correspondent, called and complained. Then Reuter's called. Jaffe said he replied: "No, gentlemen, I have knocked the story down." Jaffe again commented that it was only when the Soviets indicated they were aware of his criticism of the story "that I knew I had been bugged. They knew everything I said."

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Activities with "Slava"

Jaffe was asked if he could recall any United States groups visiting Russia in which "Slava" expressed an interest. Jaffe mentioned the Time-Life Group and the Business International Group. He was asked if "Slava" expressed an interest in any group connected with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. He answered in the affirmative and stated, "They expressed interest in what people were saying. I said, 'everybody was happy to see it.'" Jaffe continued: "I went up with Vice President (Hubert) Humphrey and we went to Gorki Park and interviewed Russians." As Humphrey talked to the Russians, Jaffe recorded the interviews on his tape recorder. A translator from the American Embassy accompanied Humphrey and Jaffe. 6

Jaffe then stated: "I was never asked in advance to get anything; always after the fact." Jaffe was asked if "Slava" ever made inquiries concerning American groups prior to their arrival in Russia. He replied: "A couple of times he would say, 'a group is coming in. Do you think you will be covering it?' I was never asked specifically to do anything." 6

Jaffe was asked if "Slava" ever asked anything about being contacted by the FBI. He answered in the affirmative and indicated that this occurred two or three months after he met "Slava". Jaffe said he told "Slava" that FBI agents indicated they were aware that he "bumped into these guys" and "sees a lot of Russians" and they requested him to furnish information about his Russian contacts. Jaffe said he deliberately lied to "Slava", telling him "I told these people (FBI), 'Sorry, I am a news man. These are my sources.'" Jaffe said he did not know whether or not "Slava" believed him; however, he never questioned Jaffe's comments. 6

Jaffe was asked if he was ever warned that United States authorities might be aware of his association with "Slava." He replied in the affirmative, stating, "He called me for lunch and told me that a guy defected from Geneva who worked with him ('Slava') and knew of several of his contacts and I was one of them." "Slava" then told Jaffe, "If you are ever asked anything about me, deny any knowledge of me." 6

Jaffe later indicated that "Slava" warned him of the defector shortly after Jaffe read the story in the press that a Soviet national disappeared in Switzerland. Jaffe continued: "He ('Slava') was actually concerned because the man had a lot of valuable information. He said he worked with 'Slava' for a while and then he was in another department - higher position. He knew him ('Slava') personally. And he said he couldn't understand why the man would do anything like defecting. He said, 'Don't say anything about knowing me to anyone.' He was very, very worried." Jaffe said he learned at about the time he was leaving Russia that "Slava" was "being demoted and was going into another area. He wasn't happy. I think he felt he had more to offer."

6

When again requested to relate the circumstances of his introduction to "Slava", Jaffe stated he was dating a Soviet girl. He said he did not believe the Soviets have any compromising photographs of their activities; however, the girl told him she had been called up before the review board of the factory where she worked and embarrassed because of her association with an American. She told Jaffe that the whole story would appear in "Izvestia" or some other Soviet newspaper. Jaffe continued: "At this point Fedorov befriended me. He said, 'I hear by the grapevine you are in a little hot water.' I acknowledged this but said I didn't think there was anything wrong with seeing a Soviet girl. He said it could be very serious, your name could be written in 'Izvestia'". Jaffe indicated Fedorov got "very melodramatic." He continued: "I was scared of the automobile accident (in which he hit a pedestrian). But I wasn't scared about this." Jaffe then related again that Fedorov introduced "Slava" to him as an individual who could keep his name out of the newspapers.

6

It was pointed out to Jaffe that he first mentioned "Slava" to the FBI in January, 1963, and he was asked if he could recall the information he furnished at that time regarding attendance at a party and flat tires. He then related that he had attended a party with a girl friend and had a few drinks. At about 1:00 a.m., he wasdriving in an area not familiar to him and noticed he was being "tailed." Then he observed a "detour left" sign. He turned left as directed, subsequently he noticed the surveilling car continue on the road he had left. He then abruptly fell into a big hole and all four tires were flattened by the severe fall. The girl

6

volunteered to go for help, stating: "let me make a telephone call. I think I can find one. I can speak the language better than you." After about 30 minutes had passed and the girl had not returned Jaffe got a cab and returned home at about 3:00 a.m. He continued: I got a call about five or six (am) from the girl. She had been picked up and taken to the police station near the American Embassy, which was not in this district (where the automobile was disabled). She said, 'I must see you right away.' She came to my apartment. She had bruises on her and had been crying. Her eyes were swollen. She told me she had been interrogated by the KGB." Jaffe said the girl said she was in very serious trouble and was accused of seeing other foreigners. She had insisted to Jaffe that the only other foreigner with whom she associated was a Negro, the Senegalese Ambassador to Russia. Jaffe said he gave her breakfast and then she went home. He continued: "The next time I saw her, she said she would be called up by her factory" and reprimanded. 6

In answer to a specific question, Jaffe stated: "I think my expulsion (from Russia) came as much as a surprise to him ('Slava') as to me. I didn't see him after the expulsion order came in." Jaffe again stated: "'Slava' knew I was leaving. He knew I was going to Hong Kong." 6

Jaffe again indicated he was already preparing to leave Moscow for Hong Kong when the expulsion order came in. He stated he and his wife were tired of being in Moscow. He said ABC wanted him to remain in Russia but Jaffe did not. While in Paris on a trip, he threatened to quit if he could not leave Moscow. Jaffe stated: "My business wanted me to stay but I didn't. I didn't want to be another Henry Shapiro. I didn't want to let my kid get educated there." In explaining why he wanted to leave Russia, Jaffe stated: "There were goons around all the time - a lot of pressure - and guys string you along." 6

In answer to a specific question, Jaffe stated: "'Slava' in no way, shape or form said 'I would be in touch with you again.'" Jaffe insisted that since his departure from the Soviet Union he has had no contacts with Soviets except at his own initiative with the exception of the recent contact by Boris Sedov. 6

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Activities on Behalf of Naval Intelligence

Jaffe stated that on one occasion he attempted to perform a task for Naval Intelligence. He received permission to travel in the North Sea aboard a Soviet Ice Breaker "Lenin" and prior to starting this assignment, he was briefed by Naval Attaches at the American Embassy, Moscow, on their interests including any observations he might make of Soviet atomic submarines. Accompanying Jaffe on the trip was Dieter Steiner, another foreign correspondent in Moscow. Jaffe did not observe any atomic submarines and every time the ship neared a Soviet naval base, the guests were told the Captain desired to brief them below deck in his cabin. By the time the briefings were over, the ship had passed the naval bases. On one occasion, Jaffe, while en route to the Captain's cabin, realized he had left his photographic equipment on deck. He returned to get it and was approached by Soviet Naval Officers who reminded him he was expected to be receiving a briefing in the Captain's cabin; however, he was not reprimanded and was treated well throughout the cruise. 6

While in Riga, Jaffe and Steiner observed a group of buoys in a large channel which were spaced uniform distances apart. Jaffe and Dieter finally realized that by photographing these buoys, the size of various Soviet ships passing through the channel could be ascertained, and they attempted to take photographs, but wee told this was not permitted. They protested and the next morning the Cultural Committee agreed to let them photograph the area. When they arrived at the channel they discovered that all the buoys had been removed. Jaffe said he is convinced the Soviets worked throughout the night removing the buoys. 6

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe's Difficulties with ABC and CIA

Jaffe indicated he believed his recall by ABC from Hong Kong was caused by or influenced by an agency or agencies of the United States Government. He indicated he was told by a British Intelligence contact in Hong Kong that he was recalled because he refused to cooperate with CIA in Hong Kong. Jaffe said he recently mentioned this to a CIA contact in Washington, D.C., and was told the British Intelligence representative " had no right to tell you this." Jaffe stated he also was told by other contacts that British Intelligence was investigating him and desired to know as much as possible about him; however, British Intelligence had not initiated the inquiry, but was obtaining the information for another organization. 6

Jaffe also indicated he was concerned that a recent publication had falsely reported that he was a member of a left wing organization. Jaffe then stated: "I would like to get this thing cleaned up. I feel that I have been pulled back here." 6

Jaffe was advised that the FBI had absolutely nothing to do with his return to the United States from Hong Kong and did not have any contact with ABC with regard to him. He was also told that it is difficult to understand why he had not previously advised the FBI of some of the information concerning his activities in Russia which he has now related. Jaffe said he felt that he had told the FBI enough but admitted he had not furnished complete information concerning his activities in Russia, including the warning by "Slava" concerning the KGB defector. He admitted the FBI had a right to expect him to do so. He continued: "I was afraid of this guy. I was damn interested and curious - he was an intense man - someone who gave me more information than I gave him. I was afraid I might meet with an automobile accident." Jaffe said he did not tell the FBI "everything because with that guy - I was scared. I am not on their side in any way. There are a lot of things wrong with it, but I love it (the United States) - I try to be middle of the road - I have been in Vietnam - I am not a Soviet spy and not a Communist. I was frightened. This man was a very threatening man. This man could have killed. He felt that strong about the old country - Stalin - I think he was as vicious as Semichastnyy and Shelepin (former Chairmen of the KGB) - I went up (and talked) to them. Semichastnyy said, 'Yes, I know you. What do you want?'" Jaffe explained this occured at a reception. 6

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Jaffe stated that "Slava" might have thought that he (Jaffe) was "Slava's" agent. He continued: "Little things came out of 'Slava', but I never knew exactly what he did. I do know I would tell him what I would think, which is not a secret." Jaffe indicated he never told "Slava" or any other Soviet connected with Soviet Intelligence anything other than his own observations and opinions and denied furnishing any information from any Government documents. He also emphatically denied that KGB had made any arrangements for meeting him after he left Moscow or that there had been any such meetings since he left Moscow. He said nobody had followed up "Slava's" contacts with him. C

In response to a specific question, Jaffe stated he did not think "Slava" had anything to do with his expulsion from Russia. He continued: "My guess is John Scali, who is very close to CIA" was responsible for the expulsion. Jaffe continued: "John wanted to set me up with CIA. They (CIA) would do things in indirect ways." Jaffe then related an incident in which Scali invited several ABC employees to a party, including an individual introduced to Jaffe as an employee of the Department of Commerce, who expressed very much interest in Jaffe's assignment to Russia. Jaffe later verified that this individual was connected with CIA and he feels it would have been better if the individual had been completely open with him. C

Jaffe then stated: "I still believe CIA sent me to Moscow on the (Francis Gary) Powers trial. Prior to the trial, he was approached by a CIA representative in California who indicated he was aware Jaffe would be sent to Moscow by Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). Jaffe stated he (Jaffe) was not aware of it at that time. Jaffe said he subsequently was told by another CIA representative whom he met while attending meetings of the Council on Foreign Relations that he had been picked to go to Moscow with Barbara Powers and help Marvin Kalb, CBS correspondent, cover the trial. On the eve of his departure, a CIA representative who claimed he was a psychiatrist gave Jaffe background material on spy trials and said "they were very much interested in determining if Powers is brainwashed." Jaffe related that Barbara Powers developed a friendship with him and constantly sought his company and advice and expressed a strong dislike for CIA personnel accompanying them. Jaffe, at the insistance of Mrs. Powers, wrote a letter to the President of the Soviet Union appealing for clemency for Powers. Jaffe continued: "There was nothing physical between us. We went down town (in Moscow) and went to the KGB building (at the request of Mrs. Powers, who insisted on seeing the building). This was the first time she cried. Then we went back. The next morning was the trial. The next thing I know I am sitting down in the VIP section. They wrote that I was a member of the family. The game (with CIA) has been going on for a long time." C

SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

In response to a specific question, Jaffe stated: "'Slava' never said anything about the trial except to say they (KGB) thought I was with CIA. Later he said they knew I was not." 6

Jaffe again indicated that he felt some United States Government agency was responsible for his recall from Hong Kong and that it had some connection with an "intelligence" allegation. He also indicated dislike for his present assignment with ABC in Washington, D.C., stating that although he had hoped to cover the "diplomatic beat" or the State Department, he is merely on general assignment, sitting around waiting for miscellaneous stories to break.

Jaffe also stated: "I was a bit afraid of 'Slava'. I was waiting for them (KGB) to contact me in Hong Kong. I thought it would have come there." Jaffe also stated: "You (FBI) have a right, after our relationship" to inquire about Jaffe's activities and "I have a right to an answer in all honesty" concerning the reason for the recall from Hong Kong. 6

Jaffe stated that when he returned from Hong Kong he asked the head of ABC for an explanation of his recall and was told he had not produced and had refused to return to Vietnam. Jaffe denied both accusations. Jaffe then went to his immediate superior and was told he was recalled because of a cable he sent from Saigon. Jaffe asked to be shown the cable, but his request was refused. The discussion between Jaffe and his immediate superior became very heated, with the superior loudly accusing Jaffe of being a liar and Jaffe suggesting that the superior was mentally ill for shouting at him and refusing to show him the cable. Jaffe stated he had seriously considered leaving ABC; however, during the last week of March, 1969, he signed another contract with ABC. Jaffe said he is quite satisfied with the salary involved, but dislikes very much being on general assignment. He again indicated he is trying to obtain an assignment to Red China and also is attempting to obtain an assignment to Cuba.

In explaining his difficulties with ABC in Vietnam, Jaffe stated that ABC correspondents in Hong Kong are rotated on assignments to Vietnam and Korea and it was understood that the assignments in Vietnam would never exceed one month's duration. While Jaffe was in Vietnam on an assignment, his sound man, a Chinese boy, was wounded, and the cameraman, a brother-in-law of the sound man, "said we had to get out (of Vietnam). I telephoned the Bureau Chief in Saigon and said my month is up and we want to go back (to Hong Kong)." Jaffe received a cable from headquarters stating "Tell Jaffe to hold fast." Jaffe then sent cables reminding ABC of the oral agreement or understanding concerning the duration of assignments in Vietnam, and he ultimately received a cable stating: "Tell Jaffe if he can't do job, quit." Jaffe said he later learned that the agreement that correspondents would serve only a month at a time in Vietnam had been cancelled.

Jaffe's Attitude Concerning Subsequent Contacts with Boris Sedov

Jaffe indicated he was concerned about what effect subsequent contacts with Boris Sedov might have on his career with ABC, particularly if Sedov's contacts might lead to another KGB approach. Jaffe was told that he alone could made a decision concerning his future contacts with Soviet nationals; that the FBI would not request that he continue these contacts; but the FBI would be interested in any information concerning contacts with anyone which Jaffe feels represents an attempt by foreign intelligence to cultivate him.

C

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535
April 29, 1969

Title	SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE
Character	
Reference	Memorandum dated April 29, 1969.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535

April 29, 1969

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

Title SAMUEL ADASON JAFFE

Character

Reference Memorandum dated April 29, 1969.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 4/23/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-14704)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-2305)

SUBJECT: [redacted]

ReNYairtel to Bureau, 3/3/69.

Enclosed for the Bureau are seven copies, for Legat, Ottawa, two copies, and for Washington Field Office, one copy, of an LHM dated and captioned as above.

The LHM is classified "Top Secret" in order to protect the identity of a highly placed source, disclosure of whose identity would seriously affect the national security, and US international relations. It is pointed out that the information contained in the LHM could, if revealed, lead directly to disclosure of source's identity. In accordance with previous Bureau instructions, the LHM is datelined Washington, D.C., in order to further conceal source's identity.

The source in the LHM is [redacted].

Classified by 4316/[illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

6-Bureau (Encls. 9) (RM)
  (2-Legat, Ottawa) (105-1591) (Encls. 2) (Info)
  (1-105-129821) ([redacted])
  (1-105-28333) ([redacted])
1-Washington Field (105-8906) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-New York (105-69999) ([redacted])
1-New York (105-15946) ([redacted])
1-New York (134-3315) ([redacted])
1-New York (134-11361) (INV) ([redacted])
1-New York

MVD:cac
(13)

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED COPY

NOT RECORDED
165 APR 29 1969

Downgraded to Secret on 6/13/96 per auto declass guide 5/3545780

MAY 2 - 1969

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

ORIGINAL FILED IN

SAM JAFFE was directed to source by Dr. CHANG Hsin-hai, with whom source is acquainted. Dr. CHANG knows of source's previous contacts with Professor LIN and, therefore, recommended that JAFFE contact source in order to gain further knowledge of LIN. S

Source met with JAFFE on 4/21/69, at [redacted], NYC. S

Source advised that she spoke in very laudatory terms concerning LIN and his knowledge of the problems of Communist China and its relations with the non-communist world. JAFFE advised source that he is acquainted with A. DOAK BARNETT, a Columbia University Professor who is regarded as an expert on Chinese matters. JAFFE indicated that he might utilize BARNETT's name in his contacts with LIN in an attempt to gain LIN's cooperation. Source stated that she did not advise JAFFE of the fact that LIN holds BARNETT in rather low esteem. S

JAFFE advised source that he would contact her regarding the outcome of his attempts to solicit LIN's cooperation. S

Copies of the LHM are being furnished to Legat, Ottawa, for information purposes in the event that JAFFE's presence in Canada and his attempts to contact Professor LIN come to the attention of RCMP. S

An information copy of the LHM is being furnished to WFO since JAFFE is the subject of WFO file 105-8906. For the further information of WFO, subject, a Canadian citizen by birth, returned to Canada from mainland China in [redacted]. He is presently active in attempting to establish diplomatic relations between Canada and Communist China. S

NY has advised source to report any further contacts with JAFFE. S

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D.C.
April 23, 1969

~~TOP~~ SECRET

[redacted]

On April 22, 1969, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information:

Sam Jaffe, a correspondent employed by the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) in their Washington, D.C. office, met Dr. and Mrs. CHANG Hsin-hai in Washington about two weeks ago. S

Dr. CHANG Hsin-hai is a former Chinese Nationalist official who is currently an advocate of relations between the United States and Communist China. He is a faculty member at Fairleigh Dickinson University, Teaneck, New Jersey. Mrs. CHANG is retired from employment in the United Nations Secretariat, where she worked in the Radio Section. S

Jaffe told the CHANGs that he was very interested in meeting with Paul Lin, faculty member at Mc Gill University, Montreal, for the purpose of interviewing him. S

Jaffe, since his contact with the CHANGs, has contacted Lin by phone. Jaffe has stated that Lin's reception of his proposition was rather cool. Lin told Jaffe he would be willing to talk with him, but would not give him an interview for publication.

Source advised that although Jaffe has told Lin that he wishes to interview him, his real purpose in contacting Lin is to gain Lin's assistance in obtaining permission for him, Jaffe, to travel to Communist China. Jaffe has said that he first heard of Lin in 1954, at the Bandung Conference. Jaffe, at that time, was employed by the "Nation", a magazine on national and international affairs published in the United States. Jaffe said at that time he asked U. Nu of Burma, ~~X~~ S

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Classified by 6136/5
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

ENCLOSURE

with whom he was acquainted, to assist him in obtaining an interview with Chinese Permier CHOU En-lai. Jaffe stated that at that time CHOU had an interpreter named P'u (phonetic), who has recently acted as an interpreter for MAO Tse-tung. Jaffe stated that P'u is a friend of Paul Lin. Jaffe stated that he is acquainted with another friend of Lin, an individual whose name is Kong (phonetic), who was also at the Bandung Conference on behalf of Communist China. Jaffe stated that Kong later served as Chinese Communist Press Attache at New Delhi, India, and Belgrade, Yugoslavia. A third friend of Lin's with whom Jaffe is acquainted is the head of the Chinese Communist press agency in Hong Kong. Jaffe has been in contact with this individual within the last six months and again heard of Lin from him. Jaffe stated that he was in Hong Kong in connection with his duties as an ABC correspondent. X5

Jaffe stated that it is presently his intention to go to Montreal for the purpose of contacting Lin within the next two weeks. He stated that he hopes he can solicit Lin's cooperation in person, since he achieved no success in trying to do so on the telephone. 5

Jaffe furnished the name of a friend of his who is presently in Paris and who spent an unspecified period of time in mainland China. He stated that this individual, K. S. Karol, is the author of a book which is favorable to the Chinese Communist Government. Jaffe said that Karol was formerly with the French newspaper "L'Expresse" and is now a free lance writer. 5

Jaffe stated that he has met Mr. Kong, previously mentioned, both in Belgrade and New Delhi, during overseas assignments as a correspondent in the past few years. Jaffe furnished his office phone number in Washington, D.C. as 393-7700, and advised that this is the number of ABC in Washington. His home telephone number in Washington, D.C. is 657-9774. 5

TOP SECRET

ORIGINAL WORK COPY

Volume 3

10/22/75
HSC
Request

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3/11/69

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson

SUBJECT: SAM JAFFE

SECRET

Recommends interview of subject to clarify details of his contacts with Soviet Intelligence Service (SIS) in the USSR and so that determination can be made as to his suitability for further reporting on contacts with SIS personnel in this country. (C)

Subject has been assigned as Washington correspondent for the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) since the Fall of 1968. From 1958 until 1961, he voluntarily furnished information to the New York Office concerning his contacts with Soviet officials in that city. In November, 1961, he was transferred to Moscow by ABC and while on vacation trip to the United States during January, 1963, he reported to the New York Office what appeared to be recruitment effort of him by SIS. Insufficient time was available for complete debriefing of him and in 1965 he was expelled by Soviets with subsequent transfer to Hong Kong by ABC. (C)

The Soviet defector, [redacted], has advised that subject was recruited by SIS about 1962 but he did not know if Jaffe was considered an agent or just an operative contact. During November, 1968, subject indicated he would like to have contacts with Bureau in Washington, D. C., in same manner as he had previously been in New York; however, contacts were not initiated since it was desired to reinterview [redacted] in order to clarify his previous comments which has been completed but no additional information elicited. During February, 1969, he telephonically informed the New York Office of contacts with Soviets in Washington, D. C., and again evinced desire to be interviewed by Bureau personnel. (S)

105-28333-104

Our files contain no derogatory information concerning Jaffe. Although he is not regular contact of Crime Records Division, there is nothing in our relations with ABC which would preclude an interview of him. His request to be contacted would serve as basis for approach to him after which details of his association with SIS personnel in USSR could be fully explored and a determination made as to whether or not we should continue to utilize him as a source or informant against Soviet personnel in Washington, D. C. (C)

105-28333
Enclosure
ECP:eco
(6)

Classified by 6
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SAM JAFFE
/ 105-28333

SECRET

ACTION:

If you agree, attached is communication authorizing WFO to interview subject as indicated above.

WCS

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 2/28/69

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906) (P)

CONF. INFT.

SECRET

SUBJECT: [redacted]

ReBulet, 2/20/69, instructing that no contact should be made with captioned individual without prior Bureau authority. -U-

WFO has reviewed the detailed material furnished by NYlets dated 1/22/69 and 2/12/69, in response to WFOlets dated 11/6/68 and 12/19/68. In addition, the contents of NYairtel 2/6/69 and Bulet 2/20/69 have been considered. WFO believes that a thorough, detailed, and comprehensive interview of this individual should be conducted in the near future for the following reasons: -U-

1) This source was operated by the New York Office since 1958, when he voluntarily informed the New York Office of his contacts with Soviet officials connected with the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. During the period 1958 - 1961, he furnished New York with information regarding Soviet personalities and activities considered important by the New York Office. In November, 1961, he assumed the position of ABC television correspondent in Moscow. On 1/7/63, while on a short return trip to the United States, he reported to the New York Office that in October, 1962, he had been interviewed by a representative of the KGB as a result of an association with a Soviet female. The KGB officer had met with him on several occasions and indicated the Soviets would like to know Western reaction to Soviet moves, particularly moves in

SECRET

103

② Bureau
1-New York (134-3315) (Info) (RM)
1-WFO

ETT:dan
(4)

1-Memo Brangan to Sullivan
3-11-69 Enc ECP/eco

Ret to SAC, WFO
1-NY 3-12-69 ECP/eco

Classified by 6136/ken
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

situations like the Cuban crisis. He also requested the source to bring him a miniphone recording machine from the United States. Source stated that he had never experienced anything else which would indicate the Soviets were attempting to compromise him. -

SECRET

Source was expelled by the Soviets in 1965, only after it was known to KGB that he was to be replaced by ABC. Shortly after his return to the United States, he was assigned to Hong Kong by ABC and has not been thoroughly debriefed concerning his activities in Moscow. -4-

2) Soviet defector [redacted] advised that this individual (SAM JAFFE) was recruited by the KGB about 1962. He said when JAFFE arrived in 1961, the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD), which operated against the American Embassy, and the Tenth Department of SCD, which operated against foreign correspondents, consulted and it was decided that the First Department would operate against JAFFE for the purpose of recruiting an American agent moving in American Embassy circles. [redacted] said that in 1962 or 1963, VYACHESLAV ALEKSANDROVICH KUSKOV was working with JAFFE, but [redacted] did not know if JAFFE was considered as an agent or just an operative contact. He did know that KUSKOV was meeting JAFFE and obtained information from him. [redacted] recalled also that JAFFE was used by KGB in connection with trips of two groups of Americans to the USSR, where they met with Premier KHRUSHCHEV. The Seventh Department of SCD, which was working against tourists (of which [redacted]), the Tenth Department, and the First Department were all planning work against these groups. KGB desired to operate agents against them to find out what was said by them after meeting with KHRUSHCHEV. He recalled that KUSKOV had been requested to utilize JAFFE in this connection and furnished information which he had received from JAFFE. [redacted] said one group was a group of businessmen which met with KHRUSHCHEV on 11/6/62 or possibly 1963, and another group contained some Congressmen who came to the USSR in connection with the signing of some treaty pertaining to atomic energy. -5-

SECRET

103

From [redacted] comments, it is clear that KGB considered JAFFE as at least a cooperative source and it is clear that JAFFE was furnishing some type of information to KGB officer KUSKOV. -S-

9?

3) Since JAFFE's arrival in Washington, D.C. in the Fall of 1965, he has been observed in contact with Soviet officials assigned to Washington, D.C. In addition, on 11/14/68, he approached some WFO Agents who were conducting a surveillance on satellite personnel and indicated that he would like to have contact with the FBI in Washington, D.C. in the same manner as he had previously had contact in New York. He indicated that he was in contact with Soviets in Washington, D.C. and would report on them. WFO did not initiate contact with him at that time because it was desired to obtain from New York the complete details of New York's relations with him, and it was also desired to interview [redacted] concerning him. As indicated above, the New York material has now been reviewed and [redacted] was interviewed concerning JAFFE by WFO Agents on 2/11/69. -S-

It is considered entirely possible that JAFFE, while in Moscow, furnished only innocuous information to his KGB contact and did not consider that he was a recruited agent or source of KGB. He should be given an opportunity to describe his activities in Moscow. Based upon review of information pertaining to him, it appears that he could be a good source against Soviets in Washington, D.C., provided he is candid concerning his activities in Moscow and is not, in fact, a recruited agent continuing to report to KGB. It is believed that an interview with him is necessary to assess this potential. -C-

4) As indicated in NYairtel, JAFFE appears to be concerned regarding derogatory information which has appeared in a book written by PHOEBE GREENE COURTNEY. He has related these allegations to his recall from Hong Kong by his employer and is concerned regarding the allegation

of disloyalty. It would appear that this may be a propitious time to interview JAFFE in an effort to completely debrief him concerning his contacts with Soviets during his tour in Moscow and in Hong Kong, as well as concerning his recent contacts with Soviets in Washington, D.C. -C-

If the Bureau approves interview with JAFFE, it is contemplated that he will be advised that WFO Agents desire to renew contacts with him previously initiated by New York Agents. He will be invited to the Washington Field Office to discuss in some detail his tour of duty in Moscow and his contacts with Soviets since his return to this country. It will be pointed out that WFO desires to display to him a large number of photographs of Soviets in this country and in Russia to obtain his comments. If JAFFE agrees, he will first be requested to describe in detail his activities in Moscow and in particular, his contacts with the KGB subsequent to those reported in January, 1963. He will also be asked if he had any contacts with Soviets while in Hong Kong and if so, to describe them. Thereafter, he will be requested to describe in detail his contacts with Soviets since his return to this country. During the course of the interview, he will be shown photographs of KGB officers assigned to the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow, as well as photographs of Soviets currently assigned to Washington, D.C. Also during the course of the interview, it is contemplated that he will be informed that a Soviet defector has advised that he furnished information to KGB officer KUSKOV, and he will be requested to specify what information he furnished. In particular, he will be questioned concerning the two groups of Americans who visited with KHRUSHCHEV, concerning which he made reports to KGB. Every effort will be made to obtain accurate information from JAFFE as a means of assessing his potential. If it appears that he is not candid, it is believed that no further consideration should be given to utilizing him as an active source, but information volunteered by him should be accepted. Also if he

123

SECRET

is not candid, consideration will be given as to whether additional investigation is necessary to determine if, in fact, he is continuing to report to KGB. -C-

In the event JAFFE does not agree to come to the Washington Field Office, Bureau permission is requested to interview him at his residence. -C-

SECRET

103

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop

SAC, WFO (105-8906)

3/12/69

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson

Director, FBI (105-28333)-103

[redacted]

[redacted]

Reurlet 2/28/69.

Pursuant to your request therein, you are authorized to conduct an interview of subject utilizing the approach suggested by you. If he does not agree to appear at your office, the interview mayl be conducted at his residence. ( )

Handle in accordance with instructions pertaining to interviews of security subjects. ( )

Promptly furnish results, if pertinent, to Bureau in form suitable for dissemination appropriately captioned together with your recommendations for additional action you believe necessary. Do not consider subject a source or informant without additional Bureau authority. ( )

1 - New York (134-3315)

ECP:eco
(9)

NOTE:

See memorandum W. A. Branigan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 3/11/69, captioned "Sam Jaffe, [redacted]," prepared by ECP:eco.

B [redacted]

WCS/

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____

MAILED 19
MAR 12 1969
COMM-FBI

MAR 24 1969

Classified by
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 2/6/69

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)(ADM)(C)
CONF. INFT.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: [redacted]
(OO: WF)

On the evening of 2/5/69, [redacted] telephonically contacted the NYO and wanted to speak with SA EDWARD F. GAMBER immediately. In SA GAMBER's absence, he asked that SA GAMBER telephonically contact him as soon as possible at telephone #657-9774 in Chevy Chase, Md. -U-

[redacted] telephone call was returned. His purpose in calling was to advise the Bureau that his employer, the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), was in receipt of 2 copies of a new book entitled "America's Unelected Rulers of the Council on Foreign Relations", which was written by PHOEBE GREENE COURTNEY of New Orleans, La. According to informant, this book lists a number of people who are members of the Council on Foreign Relations who have subversive backgrounds. The informant is one of the individuals listed in this book. According to informant, another section of this book accuses him of being a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy. The informant is quite incensed over the information contained in this book concerning himself and connected the information contained in this book with his recent recall from Hong Kong by ABC. He further advised that he has consulted an attorney about this matter and intends to seek the advice of US Government officials with whom he is acquainted in WDC. -U-

Ref to SAC, WFO 2-14-69
1-NY [illegible]

3 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (105-8906)(RM)
1 - New York

REC-114

105-28333-102

CONFIDENTIAL

EFG:htc
(8) C. C. - Bishop

6/30/[illegible]

FEB 7 1969

Classified by
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SOVIET SECTION

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (-2-64)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

NY 134-3315

CONFIDENTIAL

Informant advised that he has never been a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy although he has been a member for many years of the Council on Foreign Relations. Informant went on to state that he wanted to be certain that this would be a matter of record in Bureau Headquarters as well as the fact that there is not one word of truth concerning him in the book. Informant stated that he understands that COURTNEY and her husband reside in New Orleans, La, and are considered to be erratic individuals in the area of anti-Communist activity. -U-

NYO indices contain no information concerning COURTNEY. -U-

Informant was told to handle any matters of interest which he wished to call to the attention of the Bureau through the WFO and to refrain from calling the NYO in the future unless he was present in NYC. Informant then said that he has been in contact with BORIS G. STRELNIKOV, Pravda correspondent, in WDC, and he could not understand why he has not been contacted by Bureau agents as he would like to be of assistance to the Bureau at the present time as he has been in the past. -C-

It is the opinion of the NYO that the American Broadcasting Company has not been entirely satisfied with informant's work and he was probably recalled from Hong Kong for this reason. The informant, in turn, has concluded that his recall was due to some allegation of disloyalty in view of a comment made to him in Hong Kong by a British official. The aforementioned book and its contents have served to confirm in informant's mind that the reason for his recall from Hong Kong, in fact, stemmed from an allegation of disloyalty. -U-

The above information is being furnished to the Bureau and WFO for information and the NYO does not contemplate taking any further action in this matter. -U-

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Peterson

SAC, WFO (105-8906)

2/20/69

Director, FBI (105-28333) -102-

SECRET

[redacted] REC-114

ReNYairtel 2/6/69 wherein information telephonically furnished by subject to the New York Office 2/5/69 is set forth. -U-

Subject indicated displeasure over the fact that his name was listed in a book titled "America's Unelected Rulers of the Council on Foreign Relations," which was written by Phoebe Greene Courtney of New Orleans, Louisiana. The book had apparently been sent to subject's employer, American Broadcasting Company (ABC) in New York and he believed that the information concerning him had some connection with his recent recall from Hong Kong by ABC. -U-

Bufiles show that Phoebe Greene Courtney and her husband, Kent, are mentioned numerous times as right wing authors and publishers who have been known for their extreme views concerning Chief Justice Earl Warren. For a number of years they have published "The CSA Newsletter" which is indicated to be for members of the Conservative Society of America, P.O. Box 4254, New Orleans, Louisiana, 70118. Kent Courtney was reportedly to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with hearings concerning the appointment of Abe Fortas as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. They have also published numerous other right wing periodicals and pamphlets; however, Bureau has not conducted any investigation of them. The information furnished by subject indicates the book he mentioned was only recently published; however, Bufiles indicate that book with same name was published by the Courtneys during 1962. (62-5-11087; 62-107722) -U-

MAILED 7
FEB 20 1969
COMM-FBI

The above is for your information and completion of your files. -U-

TSB

Since subject indicated to the New York Office that he has been in contact with a Soviet correspondent in Washington, D. C., and that he would like to again be of assistance to Bureau, it would appear that his offer in this regard would

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room

1 - New York (134-3315)

ECP:gco
(6)

FEB 27 1969

Classified by 213 GAS
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NOTE PAGE TWO

20

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

serve as logical basis for an approach to him in the event you believe an interview necessary or desirable; however, no contact should be made with him without prior Bureau authority. -C-

NOTE:

Subject (Sam Jaffe) is former informant of NYO who was directed against Soviets in that city. He recently returned from Hong Kong where he was correspondent for ABC. [redacted] the Soviet defector known by code word [redacted] furnished information indicating Jaffe had been approached for recruitment by KGB during prior assignment in Moscow, USSR. WFO currently reviewing all available material concerning him and in connection with its reinterviews of [redacted] attempting to clarify some information he previously furnished so that consideration can be made to securing Bureau authority for a comprehensive interview of subject after which a determination can be made as to the advisability of our continuing utilization of him. -S-

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 2/12/69

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)(ADM)(RUC)

SUBJECT: O CONF. INF.
[redacted]
(00: WFO)

[redacted]

Re NY let, 1/22/69, and airtel, 2/6/69.

Enclosed for WFO is one Xerox copy each of NY lets to the Director, dated 1/14/63 and 1/21/63, both captioned "[redacted] (u)

The NYO in furnishing contacts between informant and the NYO inadvertently omitted the above enclosures. These enclosures, it is believed, will aid WFO in evaluating informant. (u)

[redacted]

ST-105

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (105-8906)(Encls.2)(RM) REC 17 105-28333-101
1 - New York

BJF:htc
(5)

3 FEB 13 1969

7 49

Classified by 6136 lker
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SOVIET SECTION

6 FEB 18 1969

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 1/22/69

OM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315) (ADM) (RUC)

CONFIDENTIAL

BJECT: CONF. INFT.
[redacted]
(OO: WASHINGTON FIELD)

REFERENCES:

NY letter, 12/10/68, and WFOlet, 12/19/68, both captioned as above.

ENCLOSURES TO WASHINGTON FIELD (75):

Enclosed is one Xerox copy of the following:

1. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 2/29/60, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

2. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 3/25/60, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

3. NYlet to Bureau, dated 4/19/60, captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

4. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 8/12/60, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

5. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 9/16/60, captioned "[redacted], [redacted], [redacted] MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING".

6. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 9/22/60, captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

7. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 9/29/60, captioned "[redacted] IS - R".

8. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 9/29/60, at NY captioned "[redacted]SM - C".

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

CONFIDENTIAL

105- [illegible] - 100

REC-9

12 JAN 24 1969

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Washington Field (105-8906) (Encls. 75) (RM)
1 - New York
BJF:dje

SOVIET SECTION

9. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 9/29/60, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

10. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 9/30/60, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

11. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 10/5/60, captioned "[redacted]; MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING".

12. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 10/12/60, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

13. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 10/17/60, captioned "[redacted]; MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING (ESPIONAGE)".

14. NYlet and LHM to Bureau, dated 10/24/60, captioned "[redacted], IS - R".

15. NY airtel to Bureau, dated 10/31/60, captioned "[redacted] MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING (ESP)."

16. NYlet to Bureau, dated 11/2/60, captioned [redacted] IS - R (OO: SEATTLE)".

17. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 11/2/60, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

18. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 11/7/60, at NY captioned [redacted]; IS - R".

19. NYlet to Bureau, dated 11/21/60, captioned [redacted] IS - R".

20. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 11/21/60, at NY captioned [redacted]; IS - R".

CONFIDENTIAL

21. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 9/28/60, at NY captioned "[redacted] IS - CZ".

22. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 12/8/60, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - R".

23. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 12/16/60, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - R".

24. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 1/24/61, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - R".

25. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 2/2/61, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

26. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 2/23/61, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - R".

27. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 3/14/61, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

28. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 4/6/61, captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

29. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 4/10/61, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - R".

30. Memo of SA THOMAS NOLAN, JR., dated 4/11/61, at NY captioned [redacted], IS - R".

31. Memo of ASAC J. L. SCHMIT, dated 4/18/61, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - CUBA".

32. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 4/19/61, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - AFRICA".

33. Memo of SA RAYMOND E. BOYLE, dated 4/20/61, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - R".

34. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 3/15/61, at NY captioned [redacted]; IS - R".

35. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 4/3/61, at NY captioned [redacted]; IS - R".

36. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 3/23/61, captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

37. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 4/20/61, at NY captioned "[redacted]".

38. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 4/26/61, at NY captioned "[redacted]."

39. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 5/4/61, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - R".

40. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 5/11/61, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

41. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 6/12/61, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

42. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 6/27/61, at NY captioned [redacted]; IS - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC".

43. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 6/30/61, at NY captioned [redacted]; IS - R".

44. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 7/10/61, at NY captioned [redacted]; IS - R".

45. Memo of SA JOHN G. WILLIS, dated 7/13/61, at NY captioned [redacted] IS - R".

46. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 7/13/61, at NY captioned [redacted]; IS - HU".

47. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 8/4/61, at NY captioned "[redacted] IS - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC".

48. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 8/7/61, at NY captioned [redacted], IS - CUBA".

49. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 8/16/61, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - R".

50. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 8/29/61, at NY captioned [redacted], IS - R".

51. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 9/26/61, captioned "[redacted], IS - R".

52. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 9/27/61, captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

53. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 9/26/61, at NY captioned "[redacted] IS - R".

54. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 10/4/61, captioned "[redacted] IS - R".

55. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 10/4/61, captioned [redacted], IS - R".

56. NY airtel and LHM to Bureau, dated 11/1/61, captioned "[redacted] IS - R".

57. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 11/1/61, at NY captioned [redacted], IS - R".

58. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 11/7/61, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

59. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 11/30/61, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - C".

60. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 1/10/63, at NY captioned "[redacted], IS - R".

CONFIDENTIAL

61. Memo of SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 1/28/63, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - CUBA".

62. WFOlet to Bureau, dated 1/27/64, captioned "CHANGED [redacted]; IS - R (IZVESTIA) (OO: WFO)".

63. WFO airtel to Bureau, dated 2/18/64, captioned "[redacted], aka; IS - R (IZVESTIA) (OO: WFO)".

64. Buairtel to NY, dated 2/20/64, captioned "[redacted] aka; IS - R".

65. NYlet to Bureau, dated 3/2/64, captioned "[redacted]aka; IS - R (IZVESTIA) (OO: WASHINGTON FIELD)".

66. WFOlet to Bureau, dated 3/4/64, captioned "[redacted] IS - R (OO: WFO)".

67. Memo of SUPV. EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 1/22/65, at NY captioned "[redacted]IS - R".

68. NYlet to Bureau, dated 1/22/65, captioned "[redacted] IS - R".

69. Memo of SA ROGER PAUL ROUVELL, dated 3/3/65, at NY captioned [redacted] aka; IS - R (IZVESTIA - KGB).

70. NY airtel to Bureau, dated 12/2/65, captioned [redacted] IS - R (STUDENT)".

71. Memo of SUPV. EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 12/8/65, captioned "[redacted]IS - R (SOVEMB - KGB)".

72. NYlet to Bureau, dated 12/9/65, captioned [redacted] IS - R (SOVEMB - KGB)".

73. NYlet to Bureau, dated 12/9/65, captioned [redacted]; IS - R".

CONFIDENTIAL

(C

74. Memo of SUPV. EDWARD F. GAMBER, dated 12/9/65, at NY captioned "[redacted]; IS - R".

75. NYlet to Bureau, dated 12/27/65, captioned "[redacted]; IS - R (SOVPRESS - GRU) (OO: WFO)".

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Referenced WFO letter requested that NY forward to WFO the complete results of contacts between subject and the NYO since the subject's initial travel to the USSR. WFO requested this information for the purpose of evaluating source who is currently residing and working within their territory. —(C—

The above enclosures contain all contacts between [redacted] and the NYO subsequent to his return from the USSR. In addition, the NYO is furnishing contacts between informant and the NYO prior to his travel to the USSR, but which included information pertaining to his assignment in Moscow. —(C—

The NYO has no additional information which will assist WFO in evaluating informant. —(C—

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 12/19/68

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906) (P)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~EXP. PROC.~~

SUBJECT: CONF. INFT.
[redacted]
(OO:WFO)

ReWFOlet 11/6/68 requesting NY to forward copies of all pertinent serials which will assist in evaluating the captioned subject's relationship with the Soviets. ReNYlet 12/10/68 which furnished serials pertaining to the initial development of the source and copies of evaluation letters and memoranda since that time. -C-

WFO does not consider the material furnished by NY adequate ~~to~~ evaluation of this source. The attention of NY is directed to information furnished by [redacted] which indicated that the subject was recruited by the KGB and subsequently was considered to be a valuable agent who was used to acquire information on individuals in whom KGB was interested. It is also noted that the subject was expelled from Moscow after it was known to the KGB that he was to be replaced and a visa had been issued to his replacement. Subject's expulsion could well have been arranged to make it appear that subject had not cooperated with the KGB. -C-

The material submitted by NY indicated that subject reported to NY concerning the recruitment approach made to him but apparently did not admit furnishing information or assisting KGB. It is requested, therefore, that NY forward to WFO the complete results of contacts between subject and the NY office since the subject's initial travel to the USSR. WFO desires to review this material in detail before making contact with the subject and decide whether or not to use him as a source against Soviets assigned to the Embassy in Washington, D. C. -C-

Please expedite. 105-28333-99

REC-10

ID ② - Bureau
2 - New York (134-3315) (RM)
1 - WFO #149

EX-103

19 DEC 19 1968

Classified by 0136/...
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

54 DEC 27 1968

ETT:pab (5)

CONFIDENTIAL

SOVIET SECTION

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1952 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 12/9/68

FROM : LEGAT, HONG KONG (134-59)(RUC)

CONF. INFT.

SUBJECT: [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

Re NY let 9/19/68.

In order to better assess information provided by the subject to interviewing agents in New York on 9/13/68, Legat made certain discreet inquiries of close contacts who were acquainted with the subject during his stay in Hong Kong. -C-

[redacted] the United States Information Service in Hong Kong, related that he was certain that the only reason for the subject's departure from Hong Kong was that ABC was cutting back and felt that there was not sufficient coverage to be afforded this area by them to warrant keeping a man based here. [redacted] stated that he took ABC's lack of providing a replacement for the subject as further evidence that it was only for business reasons that he was transferred from Hong Kong. -U-

[redacted] -C-

[redacted] of Special Branch, Hong Kong Police, is known by Legat to have quarreled with the subject over SB refusal to brief newsmen on the Hong Kong internal situation during the period of communist uprisings in Hong Kong. [redacted] however, advised Legat on 12/4/68 that he respected the subject's integrity and had never considered him a security risk. -U-

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category [illegible]
Date of Declassification Indefinite

The foregoing is for information of the Bureau, New York and WFO to assist in evaluation of future contact. -C-

REC-21

98

7 - Bureau
(1-Foreign Liaison)
(2-New York)(134-3315)
(2-WFO)

DEC 17 1968

DEC 23 1968

12-17 Sent to NY with 2-cc of letter
12-17 Sent to WFO with 2-cc of letter
12-17-68
ECP/ck

CONFIDENTIAL

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 12/10/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315) (RUC)

SUBJECT: CONF. INFT.
[redacted]
(OO: WASHINGTON FIELD)

CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCE:

WFO letter, 11/6/68, captioned as above.

ENCLOSURES TO WASHINGTON FIELD (19):

The below enclosures are pertinent serials of this investigation which will assist WFO in evaluating informant:

1. One copy of FBI Identification Record #3193D, dated 11/22/68, concerning subject.

   One Xerox copy of the following:

2. NYlet to the Bureau, 11/4/58.
3. Bulet to NY, 11/21/58.
4. Bulet to NY, 12/2/58.
5. NYlet to the Bureau, 4/27/59.
6. NYlet to the Bureau, 8/19/59.
7. NYlet to the Bureau, 12/7/59.
8. NYlet to the Bureau, 12/11/59.
9. NYlet to the Bureau, 4/1/60.
10. NYlet to the Bureau, 8/1/60.
11. CIA memorandum, dated 9/2/60.
12. NYlet to the Bureau, 12/9/60.

Classified by 6136 [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 [illegible]
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC 58
105-28333-97
6 DEC 11 1968

SOVIET SECTION

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Washington Field (105-8906) (Encls. 19) (RM)
1 - New York (AVM)
BJF:dje
(5)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEC 17 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

13. NYlet to the Bureau, 7/13/61.
14. NYlet to the Bureau, 3/27/61.
15. NYlet to the Bureau, 12/6/61.
16. Bulet to NY, 2/26/64, with CIA enclosure dated 2/12/64.
17. NY "Post" newspaper clipping, dated 9/30/65.
18. NY "Herald Tribune" newspaper clipping, dated 10/1/65.
19. NYO memo from SA JOHN J. SCHWARTZ, dated 9/11/68, captioned "[redacted]IS - R".

Captioned informant telephonically contacted the NYO on 12/3/68, at which time he requested information concerning the whereabouts of WILFRED G. BURCHETT, who is the Southeast Asia correspondent for the "National Guardian". Informant indicated he desired to have BURCHETT make an appearance on an American Broadcasting Company (ABC) interview type show. Informant was told that BURCHETT's NYC address was not available. During the course of this contact informant stated he could be reached in Washington, D.C., at telephone number 393-7700, Ext. 224.

It is noted that on 2/27/59, a Security Flash Notice was placed with the Identification Division against informant's name. It is being left to the discretion of Washington Field as to the desirability of retaining or removing this notice based on an evaluation of the informant.

The enclosure, Bulet to NY, 2/26/64, indicated that upon subject's return to NY a photograph of "VYACHESLAV ALEKSANDROVICH KUSKOV" be exhibited to him to determine whether this is the Soviet informant described as "VYACHSLAV KISLOV" who was in contact with him in Moscow. It is noted that KUSKOV was one of a number of Soviet "tourists", who according to the US Department of State, was to attend a Symposium on Results of International Geophysical Year at Los Angeles, 1963 (NY file 105-62912).

It is noted that there is no indication that KUSKOV did come to the US for the above symposium. NYO cannot locate a photograph of this individual.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: 11/6/68

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-8906) (P)

SUBJECT: CONF. INFT. [redacted]

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Re NY letter, 9/19/68, which reported in part that the captioned source may be re-assigned as a correspondent in Washington, D. C. -U-

On 10/7/68, [redacted] reported that [redacted] had informed OLEG D. KALUGIN that he is now assigned to Washington. Arrangements were made to get together for lunch. -U-

New York is requested to verify the source's current assignment to Washington and, if possible, ascertain his address and telephone number. In addition, since WFO contemplates a thorough and detailed interview of the source, it is requested that New York forward to WFO copies of all pertinent serials which would assist in evaluating his relationship with Soviets as well as with the Bureau. -U-

EX 110

REC-33

105-28333-95

12 NOV 7 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

2 - Bureau
2 - New York (134-3315) (RM)
1 - WFO

ETT:vtp
(5)

56 NOV 14 1968

Classified by 6136/rcr
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

REC-50

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 9/19/68

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)(ADM)

CONF. INFT.

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Captioned individual was interviewed on 9/13/68, by SAS EDWARD F. GAMBER and BERNARD J. FITZGERALD. At this time, he advised that he was recalled from his assignment as a Correspondent for the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) in Hong Kong and would be re-assigned as a general correspondent in either New York or WDC. -U-

During interview, this informant advised that while in Hong Kong, he associated with both Russian and Chinese individuals and was acquainted with SA DANIEL GROVES, Legat in Hong Kong, and JACK STINT, a CIA representative in Hong Kong. -U-

Hong Kong
U.S.S.R.

[redacted] advised that he and his wife visited the Soviet ship "Bikal" on 4 or 5 occasions while it was in Hong Kong and they entertained 2 Russian engineers by the name of F. GOURIEV and PAVEL DMITRIEV on one occasion in their home after having met them aboard the Russian ship. -C-

BRIAN SLEVIN [redacted] further advised that he and [redacted] Chief of the Special Branch, Hong Kong Police, never saw eye-to-eye. He also said that TED COWAN of British Intelligence, Special Branch, in Hong Kong mentioned to him that he was being recalled by ABC for security reasons. -U-

CONFIDENTIAL

REC-40

105-28333-94

②- Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (RM)
1 - New York

EX-101

EFG:htc
(5)

SEP 20 1968

SOVIET SECTION

Legat Hong Kong

10/11/68

Classified by 6136/mm
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OCT 1968

Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

All of the above information came forth as [redacted] was expressing his inability to understand why ABC had recalled him from Hong Kong. It was not possible to explore in depth the associations and activities of [redacted] during his assignment in Hong Kong due to the short duration of the interview. However, this former informant expressed a continued willingness to cooperate with the Bureau to furnish information on a confidential basis. -U-

On 9/17/68, [redacted] telephonically advised that he would, in all probability, be assigned in WDC and that he would be going there during the latter part of that week. He also advised that while previously in WDC during the week of 9/9/68, he telephonically contacted OLEG KALUGIN (KGB employee) and VLADIMIR BOGACHEV (GRU employee), both of whom are Soviets of interest to WFO. -C-

Depending upon the location at which [redacted] is eventually assigned, it is believed that he should be further interviewed for the purpose of obtaining information of interest to the Bureau developed by him during the course of his assignment in Hong Kong, as well as for the purpose of evaluating his informant potential on a current basis. The Bureau and WFO will be advised when informant's new assignment becomes known. However, should WFO become aware of informant's presence in WDC and they desire to establish contact with him, this should be done UACB. -C-

CONFIDENTIAL

ok
fmt
9-27-68

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: ~~1/5/67~~ 1-5-68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315) (ADM)

SUBJECT: [redacted] [redacted]

ReNYlets 1/19/67 and 11/6/67.

[redacted] was interviewed on 11/2 - 3/67 by SA EDWARD F. GAMBER upon his return from Hong Kong for a three-week tour with other American Broadcasting Company foreign correspondents. -(U)-

During the course of this interview, [redacted] indicated that he has been in contact with SA DANIEL GROVE, Legat in Hong Kong and expressed a very high opinion of SA GROVE. He indicated that he intended to maintain contact with SA GROVE and assist him in any way possible. -(U)-

Since [redacted] is in contact with the Legat at Hong Kong, the NYO feels that the Security Flash Notice in the Identification Division should not be removed at this time. -(U)-

This office will re-evaluate the desirability of removing this Flash Notice in January, 1969, unless notified that it has been removed prior to this time. (U)

EX-PROC.

30

REC-31 105-28333-93

22 JAN ~~10~~ 12 1968

DIVISION ONE

10 ②-Bureau (RM)
1-New York

REB:pem
(3)

Classified by 6134-...
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

54 JAN 1 1968

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 11/6/67

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)(ADM)

C CONF. INFT.

SUBJECT: [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

D.J. Brennan

On 11/2 and 3/67, [redacted] was interviewed by SA EDWARD F. GAMBER after he contacted the NYO. [redacted] is currently in the US in connection with his employment as American Broadcasting Company correspondent in Hong Kong. At the time he contacted this office, he had been in the US for approximately 3 weeks on tour throughout the US with other American Broadcasting Company (ABC) foreign correspondents. He was to spend very few days in NYC and expected to be returning to Hong Kong on 11/4/67. -U-

[redacted] said that he has been in contact with SA DANIEL GROVE, Legat in Hong Kong, and has found GROVE to be a very capable, efficient and pleasant person to deal with. Over the years, [redacted] has always compared the Bureau and its employees with CIA and its employees. In the case of SA GROVE, [redacted] made a comparison with employees of CIA with whom he is acquainted in Hong Kong and in the opinion of this former informant, GROVE is heads and shoulders above any of CIA's representatives in Hong Kong. [redacted] said that in his opinion, GROVE had established excellent relations with many people in Hong Kong, and GROVE is apparently respected in the position he holds there. -U-

[redacted] again expressed his very definite preference for dealing with the Bureau rather than CIA in furnishing any information which might come to his attention in the course of his activities in behalf of the American Broadcasting Company. -U-

Although [redacted] had some brief contact with Soviet nationals in the NYC area during a visit to the United Nations and the Tass News Agency offices, his contacts were very brief and did not result in his obtaining any information of unusual interest. -C-

CONFIDENTIAL

EXEC - DIR - SEC

3

105-28333-92

Submitted for the Bureau's information.

EX-113

Classified by
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NOV 1967

2 - Bureau (RM) - 1 cc filed in personnel file of SA Grove.
1 - New York

EFG:htc
(3)

SOVIET SECTION

6 NOV 24 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 1/19/67

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315) (ADM)

SUBJECT: ~~CONF. INFT.~~
[redacted]

[redacted]

ReBulet to Legat, Hong Kong, 9/14/66, and NY let, 1/31/66.

Security Flash Notice currently placed in the Identification Division should not be removed at this time in the opinion of this office inasmuch as Legat, Hong Kong, is apparently in contact with [redacted]. It would appear that any decision concerning the removal of this Flash Notice should be made by Legat, Hong Kong, or the Bureau in the light of this former informant's current contact with Bureau personnel. (U)

This office will re-evaluate the desirability of removing this Flash Notice in ~~January, 1968,~~ unless notified that the Flash Notice has been removed prior to that time. (U)

OK
1-26-67

D

[redacted]

REC 13 EX-103

105-28333-91

JAN 20 1967

Classified by 6136/rer
Exempt from GDS Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SOVIET

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York

EFG:htc
(3)

67 JAN [illegible] 1967

Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTENTION: CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

DATE: 8/29/66

FROM : LEGAT, HONG KONG (134-0)

SUBJECT: SAM A. JAFFE
SOURCE OF INFORMATION

Captioned subject is the American Broadcasting Company's China-Southeast Asia News Correspondent based in Hong Kong. JAFFE has indicated a very friendly attitude towards the Bureau and personnel of the New York Office. Unless certain facts militate to the contrary, it is expected that Legat will become better acquainted with JAFFE through mutual friends.

The Bureau is requested to advise whether there is any information in Bufiles which would make it inadvisable for Legat to have contact with JAFFE.

EX-PROC.

REC 22

③ - Bureau
(1 - Foreign Liaison)
1 - Hong Kong
DAG/djw
(4)

ack 9-14-66
JBC: smg
1 cc detached
Crime Research Sec.

105- -90

3 SEP 7 1966

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legat, Hong Kong REC 22 9-14-66

Director, FBI (105-28333) — 90

CONFIDENTIAL

SAM A. JAFFE
SOURCE OF INFORMATION

Reurlet 8-29-66.

It will be permissible for you to establish contact with Jaffe; however, you should be most discreet and circumspect in your dealings with him. -U-

For your information, Jaffe has served in the past as a double agent for the FBI and reported to Agents in the New York Office. He previously reported that the KGB very probably attempted to recruit him late in 1962. -C-

Jaffe has been employed in the news media field and has worked for International News Service, the United Nations Secretariat, Time, Inc., as a researcher for "Life" magazine, "The Nation" and for the Columbia Broadcasting System prior to his employment with the American Broadcasting Company. He was formerly the ABC representative in Moscow but he was expelled from Russia in October, 1965, reportedly due to a report emanating from ABC indicating that a power struggle in the Kremlin might result in a shake up of the Soviet leadership. -U-

Jaffe has had numerous contacts with Soviet officials in the past; however, he has reported his activities to this Bureau. He was last contacted by Agents of the New York Office on 12-2-65. -C- CONFIDENTIAL

For the information of the New York Office, one copy of referenced Legat letter is attached. -U-

1 - New York - Enclosure

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)

TBC:smg
(7)

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAILED 7
SEP 16 1966
COMM-FBI
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC'D-READING ROOM
F B I
SEP 14 4 52 PM '66

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt [illegible]
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : SAC (134-3315) (ADM)

DATE: 4/4/67

FROM : SA JOHN J. SCHWARTZ (34)

SUBJECT: SAM A. JAFFE
[redacted]

SECRET

Information contained herein was obtained from [redacted] on dates indicated by SA JUELL R. NESS and Mr. THOMAS RYAN of the Central Intelligence Agency. [redacted] is a confidential informant who is in a position to furnish reliable information but contact with whom has been insufficient to determine the reliability of his information. -S-

There should be no dissemination of the contents of this memorandum and information from [redacted] outside of the Bureau without Bureau authorization. -S-

In the event KGB code names appear in this memorandum, they are not to be further disseminated. -S-

The classification given any communication prepared for dissemination outside the Bureau containing information from [redacted] will depend upon the nature and content of such information, each case standing on its own merits. Under no circumstances should a classification of less than "Confidential" be utilized. -S-

CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM [redacted] AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS HIGHLY SENSITIVE INFORMANT. -S-

1-Bureau (105-28333)
2-Bureau (105-162125) ([redacted])
1-New York (65-24479) ([redacted])
1-New York (Tickler)
1-New York (134-3315) (ADM)

105-28333

NOT RECORDED
41 APR 7 1967

JJS:mfw
(6)

Classified by 6136 pol
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

173
4 APR 13 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SECRET

[redacted] source advised that the American correspondent, SAM JAFFE, was approached by the KGB in Moscow. However, he did not know the details concerning this operation. -S-

Source stated that he did not know if the KGB was successful in recruiting JAFFE; however, recently, YEVGENIY N. ALESHIN made the comment that when SAM JAFFE was in Moscow, he personally controlled all JAFFE's actions and knew all the details concerning JAFFE's activity. He concluded his comment concerning JAFFE by stating that he regarded SAM JAFFE as a hoax. ALESHIN, presently acting as Security Officer at the NY Residency, made the recommendation that it would be a waste of time trying to direct a KGB operation against JAFFE. -S-

Source stated that he noted that towards the end of 1966, SAM JAFFE visited U THANT, and during a TV interview questioned U THANT about China. -S-

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STAT_ ... RNMENT

Memo... lum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 1/31/66

CONFIDENTIAL

2-10-93 [illegible]

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: CONF... [redacted] — Samuel Adason Jaffe

3 Tran pull in circ.
Final File (only this to make file)

Re NY letter, 12/9/65.

[redacted] was not in contact with this office after 12/2/65. As the Bureau has been advised, this informant intended to travel to the West Coast of the U.S. and return to NYC on 12/20/65. He apparently did return to NYC but was involved in participation on the American Broadcasting Corp.'s year end news show, which involved travel on the part of informant in a group of ABC correspondents throughout the U.S. Several phone calls have been made to the American Broadcasting Corp. in an effort to contact this former informant, but on each occasion he was found not to be in NYC. It is known that he was in Washington, D.C. over the weekend of 1/15-16/66 and presumably he is now enroute to his new assignment in Hong Kong. When last contacted, he advised that he would have to proceed to Hong Kong during the latter part of January 1966 and presumably would not be back in the NYC area for approximately one year. -U-

In view of [redacted] assignment overseas and his past association with Soviet nationals, as well as his assignment in Moscow, Security Flash Notice currently placed in the Identification Division will be continued for one more year. After thepassage of another year, the wisdom of continuing this Security Flash Notice will be evaluated. -C-

Classified by 6136/con
Exempt from GDS Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

CONFIDENTIAL

REC 1 105-28333-89

14 FEB 2 1966

1-D
2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (ADM)

EFG:blc
(3)

SOV. SECTION

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-86457) 1/28/66

SAC, NEW YORK (105-40635) (P)

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]
(00: WFO)

ReWFOlet and LHM, 1/25/66.

[redacted] is unavailable for interview. He is now assigned to Hong Kong. When he will return to the US is unknown. -U-

By separate communication, NY will submit the results of KALUGIN's recent trip to NYC. -C-

3 - Bureau (RM)
(1 - 105-28333) (JAFFE)
3 - Washington Field (105-35316) (RM)
(1 - 105-8906) (JAFFE)
1 - New York (134-3315)
1 - New York

TEB:kpm
(8)

105-28333-

NOT RECORDED
183 FEB 2 1966

Classified by 6136/RGY
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

CONFIDENTIAL

53 FEB 8 1966

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Wick
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Russia's Changing, Says ABC Newsman

File

By Rick Friedman

A short while back, Sam Jaffe, American Broadcasting Company correspondent, was expelled from Moscow.

A short while from now, he'll be reporting for ABC out of Hong Kong with hopes of getting into Red China.

But for the moment, he's in the United States between assignments, looking back on his past four years in the Soviet Union.

Newsman Jaffe *made* news this past Fall when he was asked to leave Russia because John Scali, ABC diplomatic correspondent in Washington, had reported an imminent shake-up in the Russian hierarchy. Russia responded by sending Jaffe home and by cancelling a visa for George Watson, who was to replace him.

Sam had already been scheduled to leave Moscow on Dec. 1 for a vacation in the United States before his Hong Kong assignment.

ABC had both a Russian translator and a Russian cameraman working in the Moscow bureau. The network was told it could keep both of them on the payroll and keep their rented apartment in the city.

"They didn't kick out the network," Sam explained. "They asked me to leave; they wouldn't let George Watson in. But they gave ABC the impression we might be allowed to put a news correspondent back in Moscow in anywhere from three to six months."

Changes for Better

Looking back over the past four years, Sam Jaffe said Moscow changed in that time. "Maybe not as quickly as we'd like it to," he added. "But for the better.

"Today, the people know more about the outside world than they did four years ago. The Soviets are no longer jamming the Voice of America or the Russian-language beamings of the British Broadcasting Company. But Radio Liberty is still being jammed.

"There was nothing in the newspaper about my expulsion. But the customs officer at the airport knew all about it. He heard the news on the Voice of America.

"More and more, the Soviet citizens, particularly the students you make friends with, tell you what's going on.

"You see more criticism of the Soviet Union. Young people write in to the newspaper complaining about the lack of consumer goods and their letters are printed. The press itself gets critical of aspects of the government."

Sam said that there was no direct censorship of printed material written by foreign correspondents. But permission was still needed for shooting television film. And undeveloped photographs couldn't leave the country. "They make you develop them there and they screen them," Sam said.

He added that Russia was letting more and more foreign cameramen in to work for the networks.

105-[illegible]

NOT RECORDED
191 FEB 25 1966

Editor & Publisher
January 15, 1966
Page 30

Copy to [illegible]
by routing slip for
☑ Info ☐ Action
date 2-24-66
by [illegible]

Also, that the Soviet newsmen are befriending American newsmen. "Many of our tips come from them," Sam went on. "In some cases, of course, the tips are deliberately planted by the government itself.

"We didn't feel any tightening of restrictions because of the Viet Nam crisis even though we got the official propaganda line about the United States being the aggressor in Asia."

Sam said the Soviets were pretty good about letting foreign newsmen travel around the country. But the new leaders didn't travel as much as the ousted premier, Nikita Khrushchev, and generated less copy.

Knew Nikita

Sam spoke wistfully of the days when he covered Khrushchev, whom the ABC correspondent got to know well.

On one occasion, Khrushchev singled him out at an Austrian Embassy reception in Moscow. The Russian leader called Jaffe out of a crowd of diplomats and raised his glass in a toast to the newsman. Noticing that Jaffe's glass was empty, Khrushchev filled it from his own, raised his glass again and said: "My best wishes to you."

It was Jaffe who later scored a world newsbeat on the ouster of Khrushchev, communicating the news by a cryptic Moscow-to-New York telephone call to ABC.

"Brezhnev and Kosygin, the new leaders, play it close to the vest," Sam said. "After Khrushchev's fall, Moscow was a lot duller for us.

"Khrushchev was good copy. He talked off the top of his head. But Brezhnov and Kosygin are more sophisticated and they don't talk much. So it takes more time to get stories on what the government is up to."

Knows Far East

The 36-year-old Jaffe is looking forward to his new assignment in the Far East, an area he knows well.

As a 15-year-old Merchant seaman during World War II, he sailed the South Pacific. After the war, he spent four months roaming Japan.

Back in the United States, Sam studied Far Eastern Affairs at the University of California in Berkeley, then worked a year in San Francisco as reporter-rewrite man for International News Service. While there, he was dramatized on television's "The Big Story" for solving a murder.

When the Korean War broke out, Sam went into the Marines as a combat correspondent. Following Korea, he became a staffer for *Life* magazine and researched the religions of Asia for a series called "The World's Great Religions."

Sam made another swing through Asia in 1955 for the *Nation* magazine, covering the Asian-African Conference in Indonesia. It was there he got an exclusive interview with Chou En-Lai, the first given a western correspondent since the Chinese Revolution.

Later, Jaffe was one of 18 newsmen invited to visit Communist China. The trip was called off because of opposition to it from the U.S. government.

"I'd still like to get into Red China," Sam said. "When I interviewed Chou, the Chinese were worried I would editorialize. I used a question-and-answer format and they were surprised and pleased that I didn't editorialize.

"They asked me what they could do for me. I answered that I wanted to go to Red China. They told me to wait because they weren't ready yet."

Sam Jaffe joined ABC in September, 1961, and was appointed Moscow correspondent in November of that year.

Previous to ABC, he spent six years with the Columbia Broadcasting Company, covering such stories as the Moscow trial of Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot; the first attempted coup d'etat of Nasser; and the kidnapping of the Weinberger baby in New York.

In June, 1963, Sam married Elizabeth Jeune Georgeson of New Zealand in Moscow's Palace of Marriages. A daughter, Deborah, was born in Moscow in March, 1965.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333)

DATE: DEC 9 1965

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315) (ADM.)

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] info

SUBJECT: [redacted]
CONF. INFT.

[redacted] was interviewed on 12/2/65, by SAS JUELL R. NESS and EDWARD F. GAMBER, under more favorable circumstances than the interview conducted with him on the evening of 11/29/65. During this interview, this former informant furnished information concerning some of his Soviet contacts, a number of whom are presently in the US and are of interest to the Bureau and some of whom may be in the US in the future. This information is being disseminated to appropriate files. -(C)-

The informant is looking forward to his forthcoming assignment as the ABC correspondent in Hong Kong. During his assignment there, he hopes to be able to succeed in gaining entrance into Red China for the purpose of obtaining information to be used through news media. -(U)-

Informant is currently on the West Coast of the US and should return to the NY area on approximately 12/20/65. Efforts will be made to conduct further interviews with informant upon his return to the NYC area. -(U)-

Classified by 6136 [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

CONFIDENTIAL

105-2 [illegible] - 88

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York

EFG:mab
(3)

REC-67

15 DEC 9 1965

EX-107

179
DEC 1 [illegible] 1965

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-86457) 1/25/66

SAC, WFO (105-35316) (P)

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]
(OO:WFO)

ReNYlet to Bureau, 12/9/65, captioned as above.

Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau and two copies for New York, of a LHM, dated and captioned as above, which sets forth information concerning contact between SAM JAFFE ([redacted]) and subject. -C-

It is noted that SAM JAFFE is the subject of closed WFO file 105-8906 (Bufile 105-28333; NY file 134-3315), and information has been previously furnished to the Bureau by [redacted] -C-

[redacted] -C-

Relet set forth the results of an interview with [redacted] on 12/2/65, and therein it was noted he was told by ANATOLI KACHEV, Number 5 man in the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, that if there was anything the Soviets could do for informant, OLEG KALUGIN was in Washington, D. C. The informant then went on to say that he was acquainted with KALUGIN. -C-

Classified by 6136 [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

3 - Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1- 105-28333) (JAFFE)
2 - New York (Enc. 2) ([illegible])
(1- 105-40635) ([redacted])
(1- 134-3315) (JAFFE)
2 - WFO
(1- 105-8906) (JAFFE)

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

NOT RECORDED
178 JAN 27 1966

ORIGINAL FILED IN

50 FEB 1 1966

ENCLOSURE

NYO is requested to consider the advisability of contacting [redacted] [redacted] when available for any information concerning the projected meeting mentioned in the LHM on 1/13/68 or 1/20/68. If such interview is deemed advisable, discretion should be exercised in any contact with [redacted] to avoid divulging the identity of [redacted]. -U-

The first confidential source mentioned in the enclosed LHM is [redacted]. -C-

The second confidential source mentioned in the LHM is [redacted]. -C-

The LHM is classified "Confidential" because it contains information reflecting an investigative interest in a representative of a foreign diplomatic establishment and information from [redacted], an informant of continuing value. It is also so classified because it contains information from [redacted], a confidential source, the unauthorized disclosure of whom would be detrimental to the best interest of the national defense. -C-

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

Washington, D. C. 20535

January 25, 1966

OLEG D. KALUGIN
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

On January 16, 1966, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, learned that Sam Jaffe of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) was in contact with Oleg D. Kalugin. According to the source, Jaffe related that he spent the weekend in Washington, D. C., having come down from New York City for a breakfast engagement with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Jaffe said that Rusk was away and he was, therefore, represented by Under Secretary of State George Ball. -C-

Jaffe advised Kalugin that he would return to New York City on January 17, 1966, but that he would return to Washington, D. C., on either Wednesday, January 19, 1966, or Thursday, January 20, 1966, indicating he would pass through on his way to California. Kalugin suggested they get together for lunch at that time, and Jaffe said he would let Kalugin know when he is available. -C-

The source advised that Jaffe inquired as to the chances of ABC getting back there, which the source interpreted as referring to the Soviets issuing a visa to an ABC correspondent, and Kalugin replied that they would discuss it at the luncheon engagement. -C-

The November, 1965, issue of the "Diplomatic List," published by the United States Department of State (USDS), lists Oleg D. Kalugin as a Second Secretary (Press), Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington, D. C. -U-

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 6036/[illegible] 2+3
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

OLEG D. KALUGIN

A second confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in early 1962 that Oleg D. Kalugin is affiliated with the Committee for State Security (KGB). -C-

Sam Jaffe, a representative of ABC, was formerly the Moscow correspondent for ABC until his expulsion from the Soviet Union in October, 1965, which received widespread publicity in American newspapers. -U-

The August, 1965, Telephone Directory for the USDS lists Dean Rusk as Secretary of State and George W. Ball as Under Secretary of State. -U-

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 12/2/65

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315) CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: CONF. INFT.
[redacted]
IS - R

On 11/30/65, [redacted] was interviewed by SAS JUELL R. NESS and EDWARD F. GAMBER. This interview was of comparatively short duration and throughout the interview, this former informant received numerous phone calls from officials of the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and individuals in the newspaper, TV and radio industries. The interview was not satisfactory in terms of obtaining any detailed information of specific interest to the Bureau concerning Soviet nationals. An appointment was made with this former informant for the evening of 11/26/65, and informant was unable to keep this appointment due to demands made upon his time by ABC officials. He has been in the US for approximately 3 weeks and on 12/4/65, he is leaving for the West Coast of the US, expecting to return to NYC on or about 12/20/65. Efforts are being made to arrange for further interview of [redacted] however, it should be noted that there is no pending specific investigative matter of an important nature concerning which he should be interviewed which has come to the attention of this office. -C-

This former informant did talk at some length concerning his expulsion from the Soviet Union. He pointed out that he advised officials of ABC in NYC on a number of occasions that ABC's Washington Diplomatic Correspondent JOHN SCALI was in error when he predicted a shake-up of the Soviet leadership as a result of a power struggle in the Kremlin. He said that when he received notice of his expulsion from the Soviet Union, he found that the Soviets were almost apologetic as far as he was concerned and in a contact with

(2) - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 6136 [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

EFG:htc
(3)

REC 30 105- [illegible] 89

EX 107

9 DEC 3 1965

SOVIET SECTION

DEC 14 1965

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

LEONID ZAMAYATIN, Chief of the Press Office of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, he was treated most cordially. When this former informant's exit visa was finally issued, he found that it was good for a period of in excess of a week after the seven day period in which he was to depart from the Soviet Union. -C-

While [redacted] furnished some information about Soviet nationals of interest to the Bureau, none of this information was of such a nature as to warrant dissemination and it will be appropriately channeled to files in the NYO. -C-

At such time as [redacted] is available for interview, information furnished by him will be forwarded to the Bureau. -U-

Submitted for information.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 1/25/65

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

O CONF. INFT. CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: [redacted]

On 1/16/65, [redacted] telephonically contacted this office to advise that he was currently in the US in connection with year end news roundup activities for the American Broadcasting Corporation. He advised that he had been in the US since Christmas Eve but had been very busy in connection with business matters and he had been unable to contact the NYO earlier. He explained that he spent in excess of two weeks traveling around the US making speeches with other American Broadcasting Corporation correspondents. -U-

Informant furnished some information during ~~the~~ personal interview on 1/18/65, concerning YURI N. VINOGRADOV, Personnel Officer at the UN Secretariat, with whom he has become very friendly. Informant explained that he has had occasion to see VINOGRADOV often in Moscow prior to VINOGRADOV's assignment to the US and he has visited in VINOGRADOV's home. -C-

Informant also furnished some information relating to a visit which he had with ALEKSANDR N. DRUZHININ, Radio Moscow correspondent in the US; STANISLAV N. KONDRASHOV, Izvestia correspondent in the US and GEORGI A. KUZNETSOV, Trud correspondent in the US, with whom he has visited on one occasion while in NYC. -C-

In addition, informant furnished some information about two Soviet nationals formerly assigned to the UN, namely VADIM A. BOGOSLOVSKI and NIKOLAI S. KALININ. According to informant, BOGOSLOVSKI is now a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and will have no further contact with informant, and KALININ is assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Vienna. -C-

CONFIDENTIAL

Recorded: Place cc 105-48607-re [redacted] 105-32278 re [redacted]

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York

cc 105-112457 [redacted]
105-102178 [redacted]
105-102751

-86

EFG:chm
(3)

6 JAN 26 1965

XEROX

FEB 3 1965

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Classified by 6134
Exempt from GDS, Category
Declassification Indefinite

FEB 4 1965

Informant also furnished his observations with respect to efforts being made to change the image of the KGB in the Soviet Union in a manner which might compare it with the image of the FBI and law enforcement agencies in the US. -C-

All of the above information has been disseminated to appropriate files. -C-

Interview with informant was of less than one hour duration and it is certain that informant would be able to furnish much additional information about Soviet nationals as a result of his service in Moscow, if time permitted. Informant was very cooperative and it can be expected that his cooperation will be forthcoming in the future when he returns to the US. -C-

Informant left the US on 1/20/65, to return to Moscow where he will spend one more year as the correspondent for the American Broadcasting Corporation. It can be expected that he will contact this office when he returns to the US at the end of 1965. -C-

Submitted for information.

5-127 (Rev. 5-3-63)

1 - Miss Triplett
1 - Mr. Putman

SAC, San Francisco (105-18070) 11-26-65

Director, FBI (105-141420)

Personal Attention

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

[redacted], a most sensitive and reliable source, advised that

captioned subject (individual or organization) of

Stanford, California, (address) was

in contact with Lucy Golovanov (his wife) (individual or organization, address)

in Moscow

during October, 1965 (month, year).

Classified by 6136/CCL
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

The foregoing and the following INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM [redacted] IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE BUREAU AND SHOULD NOT BE SET OUT IN ANY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT. INFORMATION FROM THIS INFORMANT SHOULD BE UTILIZED FOR LEAD PURPOSES ONLY AND ANY STATEMENT CONCERNING THE COVERAGE IN EFFECT IN THIS INSTANCE MUST BE AVOIDED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THE SUBJECT OR ANY UNAUTHORIZED PERSON BECOME AWARE THAT WE HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CONTACT.

According to the informant, subject advised that Sam Jaffe is a mutual friend of his and Professor Shramm of Stanford University. Subject was shocked by the news that Jaffe, an ABC news correspondent, had been told to leave the USSR because of some broadcast. He hopes to see Jaffe in the U. S. and talk to him about the incident. Subject was apparently formerly associated with RadioMoscow. -C-

For information of San Francisco Jaffe is a former informant of the NYO. New York should be alert to any contacts between subject and Jaffe so that any pertinent information may be developed. -C-

2 - New York (105-74004)
1 - New York File (134-3315)
1 - 105-28333
FSP:cls (9)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT RECORDED
170 NOV 29 1965

[redacted]

ORIGINAL FILED IN

1 - R. E. Triplett
1 - J. P. Lee (re Jaffee)
1 - Mr. Linton (re Jaffee)

SAC, New York

March 2, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

[redacted]

[redacted], a most sensitive and reliable source, has advised that Irving Kahn of Abraham and Company, Room 700, 120 Broadway, New York, New York, was in contact with V. D. Kazakevich, aka "Kaz," during June, August and November, 1964. From the nature of these contacts, it was apparent that these individuals are in contact with each other frequently. Although Kahn has criticized the U.S.S.R. for not sending more visitors to the U.S., he appears to be pro-Soviet. -C-

Identify subject, conduct background investigation, check office indices and make recommendation regarding additional investigation and interview. -U-

Since information from [redacted] indicates that subject has traveled abroad, after background data has been determined request Washington Field to check records of Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State regarding subject and his wife. -U-

Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

THE FOREGOING AND THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM [redacted] IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE BUREAU AND SHOULD NOT BE SET OUT IN ANY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT. INFORMATION FROM THIS INFORMANT SHOULD BE UTILIZED FOR LEAD PURPOSES ONLY AND ANY STATEMENT CONCERNING THE COVERAGE IN EFFECT IN THIS INSTANCE MUST BE AVOIDED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THE SUBJECT OR ANY UNAUTHORIZED PERSON BECOME AWARE THAT WE HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THESE CONTACTS. -C-

During June, 1964, Kahn advised Kazakevich, Moscow, U.S.S.R., that his friend, Professor Sterling Spero, who had just retired as Dean of the School of Government, New York University, expected to be in Moscow from July 30th to August 4th and would like to see Kazakevich regarding the structure and conduct of government institutions. Kahn requested Kazakevich to make inquiry at Intourist as to where Spero could be located.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT RECORDED
MAR 3 1965

Kahn informed Kazakevich that he and his wife would be flying to London on [illegible] 25th with a "plane full of Security Analysts" [illegible] spend a month visiting large corporations in England, France, Belgium, West Germany and Spain. If Kazakevich would be in any of these countries, Kahn would make a special [illegible] see him.

70 MAR [illegible] 1965

CONF. INFT.

105-28333 ([redacted])

SEE NOTE ON PAGE THREE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

In August, 1964, Kahn told Kazakevich that Sterling Spero probably would not meet him in Moscow. Spero had a heart attack in Berlin and planned to return to New York. Kahn indicated that Phil Baum had told him that he had enjoyed his visit with Kazakevich. In November, 1964, Kahn informed Kazakevich that he had visited Sterling Spero in the hospital in Berlin. Spero was then better and back in New York. -C-

During the contact in June, 1964, subject wanted to know whether Kazakevich ever saw his cousin, Sam Jaffee, representative of ABC-Paramount. In August, 1964, subject mentioned his cousin, Sam Jaffee, again stating that Jaffee represented WABC in Moscow. He wished that Kazakevich could visit Jaffee. Kahn told Kazakevich that Jaffee is married to a young girl from New Zealand and resides in Moscow. -C-

Sam Jaffee is undoubtedly identical with Samuel Jaffee, subject of urfile 134-3315. -C-

During a contact in August, 1964, Kahn answered what was believed to be a previous inquiry from Kazakevich regarding an unidentified individual. Kahn told Kazakevich that he did not know "him" but believed that he was then in charge of the International Affairs Committee in Maslow's (not further identified) office. -C-

In November, 1964, Kahn reported to Kazakevich regarding the trip he and his wife, Ruth, had to Europe with a group of financial analysts. They flew to London, Brussels, Dusseldorf, Berlin, Frankfurt, Vienna, Madrid, Paris, and Amsterdam and spent about a month visiting corporate managements and meeting with bankers. -C-

Kahn told Kazakevich in June, 1964, that American impressions of Russia were improving but the Russians would get good out of a large exchange of visitors. In August, 1964, Kahn urged the Russians to let the Soviets travel to the U.S. He thought such travel would result in obtaining good will and the visitors could persuade influential Americans that the U.S.S.R. does not want to widen their borders or to make other countries accept communism. -C-

Kahn assured Kazakevich that the Soviets could call upon the U.S. to repeat the material help and military aid given during World War II if they needed help against aggressor Eastern nations. Kahn indicated that he had "long felt" that the U.S.S.R. had no plans for military conquest. -C-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

In November, 1964, Kahn criticized Soviet press relations alleging that the outside world has come to believe many myths about Soviet governmental machinery. He suggested that they make an effort to explain how it really works to counteract the Western view of "strictly cloak and dagger." He agreed with Kazakevich that it is extremely important for the Soviets to send a serious economist to America on a regular basis for more could be accomplished by private dinners and conversations than at formal affairs. Kahn implied that he believed that most of the money needed to bring "your people over here" could be found in the U.S. -C-

V. D. Kazakevich is undoubtedly identical with Vladimir D. Kazakevich, subject of urfile 100-54684. -C-

Additional information from [redacted] shows that subject's wife, Ruth, had a slight stroke in April, 1963, has fully recovered and works with emotionally disturbed children. Their oldest son, Don, 29 years old, was to move to Minneapolis, Minnesota, in the fall of 1964 where he was to become an assistant professor in differential geometry. Don and his wife, Phyllis, have two children: Tamar and Jeremy. Phyllis has a Ph.D. in biophysics and worked in a laboratory in Princeton, New Jersey. The second son, Alan, 26 years old, graduated from Columbia University in 1959 and is in business with his father. The youngest son, Tom, 22 years old, had just graduated from Cornell in 1964 and planned to enter Columbia School of Business. -C-

An extra copy of this communication is being furnished for urfile 134-3315 on Samuel Jaffee. -C-

Results of indices check on subject will be sent by separate communication. -C-

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: [redacted]; [redacted]. Kahn is cousin of individual who acted as a double agent for the Bureau in the past and is now in Moscow as American Broadcasting Company correspondent. [redacted], ac[redacted], i[redacted]. Kahn is believed to be identical with individual employed by Carl M. Leob, Rhodes and Co., Brokers, where he was well regarded but had dealings with a company which constructed radio equipment for Axel Wheeler-Hill in Duquesne espionage ring in 1941. He had an amateur radio operator's license at that time.

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-118599)

10/ /65

OCT 20 1965

SAC, WFO (105-52614) (P)

[redacted]
(OO:WFO)

CONFIDENTIAL

ReWFOlet 6/7/65, captioned "[redacted] CS - R" (Bufile 134-10811).

Enclosed for the Bureau are seven copies of a LHM dated as above, captioned "YURI I. BOBRAKOV, IS - R", together with a like number of Evaluation Memos. Enclosed for NYO are three copies of the LHM. These memoranda are classified "Confidential" inasmuch as they indicate our interest in a foreign diplomat, and the substantive LHM is also classified to protect the identity of a Source of continuing value. -(C)-

It was noted in relet that JOHN ALFRED SCALI, American Broadcasting Company (ABC), had stated that it appeared he might again be in the good graces of the Soviet Embassy, inasmuch as he had received an invitation to an anniversary celebration at the Embassy. -(U)-

[redacted] advised on 9/20/65, that one GEORGE WATSON, who was preparing for a trip to the USSR, invited YURI I. BOBRAKOV (a Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, WDC) to have lunch on 9/21/65, at a local restaurant with WATSON and JOHN SCALI. -(C)-

SCALI telephoned WFO on the morning of 9/21/65, and advised that he was to have lunch with BOBRAKOV on that date. -(C)-

SCALI was interviewed on 9/22/65, by SAs TOLLEF JACOBSON, JR. and JOHN A. VAN WAGENEN, at which time he furnished the information which is attributed to a Confidential Source in the enclosed LHM. -(U)-

④- Bureau (Enc 7)
    (1 - 134-10811) [redacted]
    (1 - 105-23333) (Jaffe)
2 - New York (105-60384) (Enc 3) (RM)
    (1 - 134-3215) (Jaffe)
3 - WFO
    (1 - 134-2301) [redacted]
    (1 - 105-[illegible]06) (Jaffe)

TJ:mmt

57 OCT 29 1965

NOT RECORDED
165 OCT 25 1965

Classified by
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

SCALI advised that GEORGE WATSON, an ABC News Correspondent, was scheduled to begin an assignment in Moscow, USSR, 11/1/65. He said that in connection with this forthcoming assignment, WATSON had some contact with the Soviet Embassy and had met BOBRAKOV a couple of times. He said that BOBRAKOV indicated to WATSON that he was interested in meeting some other member of the ABC Staff, and, in particular, was interested in meeting SCALI. Consequently, SCALI, WATSON, and BOBRAKOV met for lunch at Paul Young's Restaurant, Washington, D. C., on 9/21/65. SCALI said that for the first ten minutes or so BOBRAKOV directed his conversation to WATSON, whom he had met before and who was scheduled to go to Moscow. -(-

Thereafter, BOBRAKOV engaged in conversation with SCALI. SCALI said, that aside from the points mentioned in the enclosed LHM concerning MLF and the danger of Germany's obtaining nuclear weapons, BOBRAKOV seemed merely to be scouting him or sizing him up during the lunch. SCALI could not detect any effort on BOBRAKOV's part to seek any particular type of information. SCALI said he pointed out to BOBRAKOV the unusual situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves on the same side at the U. N. Security Council, endeavoring to keep the peace. SCALI pointed out to BOBRAKOV that this seems to him to be a rather historic moment. SCALI thought BOBRAKOV might pursue this matter further and enter into a discussion of Red China, but he did not do so. -(-

In their discussion of BOBRAKOV's wife's paintings, SCALI suggested to BOBRAKOV that his wife might stage a show of her own in which she would exhibit those paintings by a Soviet artist painting in the U. S. BOBRAKOV replied that his wife might do so and suggested that possibly SCALI should see some of his wife's paintings. SCALI told BOBRAKOV he would be very happy to see them. -(-

In discussing BOBRAKOV's lack of humor, SCALI mentioned that at PAUL YOUNG's, where they were having lunch, there are bulletins of stock market quotations on each table, and SCALI made a jocular remark to BOBRAKOV to the effect that this had been arranged in BOBRAKOV's honor. BOBRAKOV

CONFIDENTIAL

asked SCALI and WATSON whether they owned stock, and in the ensuing conversation, SCALI remarked that he would like to buy some stock in Soviet industries, but only in those industries in which the profit motive is now being introduced. BOBRAKOV, according to SCALI, immediately responded that there has always been a use of the profit motive in the Soviet Union, and proceeded to engage in serious conversation on this point. -(-

SCALI mentioned that when he happened to see BOBRAKOV again on the evening of 9/21/65, at the celebration at the Czech Embassy, he noticed that BOBRAKOV seemed to know quite a number of American reporters, including BERNARD GWERTZMAN of the Washington Evening Star and FRANCIS LARA of Agence France-Presse. -(-

SCALI also stated that several months ago, he had lunch with ALEKSANDR I. ZINCHUK (Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.), on which occasion they engaged in conversation of a general nature. SCALI said he initiated at this lunch contact with ZINCHUK inasmuch as he had found he was missing details of some news stories because of the limitation of his contacts with Soviet representatives. -(-

SCALI was requested to advise WFO in the event he is contacted by the Soviets in the future. -U-

In connection with the above information from SCALI to the effect that GEORGE WATSON was scheduled to begin his assignment for ABC in Moscow on 11/1/65, it is noted that [redacted] advised on 9/27/65, that GEORGE WATSON had been told that word had been received from Moscow that WATSON's visa was cancelled. The informant did not know the reason for this cancellation. -U-

[redacted] advised on 9/27/65, that he had learned that WATSON was considerably upset by the cancellation of his visa and was endeavoring to ascertain the reason. It was the informant's understanding that WATSON's visa had been approved for some time and that WATSON's belongings had been prepared for shipment to Moscow. The informant stated that WATSON had not yet succeeded in ascertaining from the Soviet Consular

Office or the Soviet Embassy Press Office what the reason was, but that BORIS N. SEDOV (a Second Secretary in the Soviet Embassy Press Office) reportedly suggested the possibility that it might have something to do with some "bad thing" which SAM JAFFE did in Moscow. -C-

In connection with the above, it is noted that the 9/20/65 issue of "Newsweek" on page 90 contained an article captioned "Covering the USSR" which described difficulties encountered by American television crews making films in the Soviet Union. The article stated in part that the situation had improved vastly since 1963, but that "Russian fear of the Exposé still occasionally approaches the ludicrous. ABC's SAM JAFFE had a lengthy argument with officials who wanted to cut a scene in a film about Soviet women because one mother had a bookcase containing a book titled "To a Better Life." The woman's life, the Soviets insisted, 'was alright as it was.' " -U-

The same "Newsweek" article stated that American television companies operating in the USSR had to pay fees for "assistants" who were often superfluous advisers, and that "fees" for hiring equipment and crews making a film and retaining exclusive distribution rights can run into big money. The article stated that "ABC's JAFFE says Russian 'assistance' in covering the Soviet-American track meet this summer cost the network more than $12,000 ...." -U-

Further in connection with the above-mentioned cancellation of WATSON's visa, it is noted that the Washington Post for 10/2/65, contained a radio-television column by LAWRENCE LAURENT captioned "Getting Boots from Soviets is Fashionable for Networks," in which LAURENT stated that SAM JAFFE of ABC had been told that he was no longer welcome in Moscow. LAURENT's column stated in part "What did JAFFE do? He was adjudged guilty of a report delivered September 15, from Washington, by ABC News Diplomatic Correspondent, JOHN SCALI. JOHN had reported that a shake up was expected in the Soviet hierarchy. -U-

"After protests from ABC, Soviet Officials decided that JAFFE had been dismissed because of his failure to rebut the SCALI report. -(U)-

"ABC Officials pointed to two JAFFE broadcasts on September 16. Each had reported Moscow denials of the SCALI story. -(U)-

"The Soviets did not close down the ABC bureau in Moscow. A camera crew, a translater, and a chauffer are still there, but there is no correspondent. -(U)-

"JAFFE was already scheduled to leave Moscow, Dec. 1, to become ABC News' Hong Kong bureau chief. The Russians had already approved a visa for his replacement, GEORGE WATSON of the Washington bureau. Approval of WATSON was cancelled...." The article goes on to discuss other instances of expulsion of T. V. commentators from Moscow for various reasons. -(U)-

It is further noted that an article on page A-11 of the 10/1/65, "Washington Post and Times Herald" stated that the Soviet Government attributed SAM JAFFE's expulsion to "What it termed false reports on the Soviet Union." The article continued, "This apparently referred to a report by ABC's Washington Diplomatic Correspondent, JOHN SCALI, saying that a power struggle in the Kremlin might result in a shake up of the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Foreign Ministry reportedly indicated JAFFE would not have been expelled if ABC had carried the Ministry's denial of SCALI's report." -(U)-

One copy of this letter and one copy of the LHM are being furnished to NYO in view of its interest in JAFFE. -(U)-

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OCT 20 1965

[redacted]

The August, 1965, "Diplomatic List" lists Yuri I. Bobrakov as a Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.

A Confidential Source advised on September 22, 1965, that on the preceding day, he had met with Bobrakov and engaged in conversation with him. Source stated that Bobrakov seemed mainly to be interested in getting across the idea that the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) is a bad idea and is a stumbling block which is holding up agreement at Geneva on disarmament. He said further that Bobrakov expressed considerable concern over the danger of Germany's obtaining nuclear weapons. The Source said he pointed out to Bobrakov the unusual situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union currently found themselves on the same side at the United Nations Security Council, endeavoring to keep the peace.

Bobrakov, however, had no comment on this point.

Bobrakov told the Source that his wife is an artist, who now has about twenty of her own paintings, most of which she has done while in the United States.

In the opinion of the Source, Bobrakov is not very suave or adept at conversation and may be somewhat uncomfortable in dealing with Americans. Source also gained the impression that Bobrakov's sense of humor is almost nonexistent.

Source stated that Bobrakov attended a reception at the Embassy of Czechoslovakia on the evening of September 21, 1965.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Classified by 6136 [illegible]
Exempt from GDS, Category [illegible]
Date of Declassification [illegible]

105-[illegible]

ENCLOSURE 105-[illegible]-118597

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OCT 20 1965

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

0-20 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele Room
Holmes
Gandy

5

UPI-43

ADD ABC, MOSCOW (UPI-17)

JAFFE WAS SUMMONED TO THE SOVIET MINISTRY TODAY AND GIVEN THE ORDER TO LEAVE.

HE LATER TOLD REPORTERS IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE RUSSIANS HAD ORDERED THE BUREAU CLOSED OR MERELY HIS EXPULSION. BUT HE SAID HIS EXPULSION WOULD IN EFFECT BE CLOSING DOWN THE BUREAU.

IT WAS UNDERSTOOD A VISA HAD BEEN DENIED FOR JAFFE'S SCHEDULED SUCCESSOR AS MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT. JAFFE HAD PLANNED TO LEAVE MOSCOW IN DECEMBER FOR REASSIGNMENT.

9/30--TD1054AED

105-28333 A
NOT RECORDED
181 OCT 5 1965

File
105
Sam Jaffe

193

WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

0-19 (Rev.-12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont ✓
Mohr
DeLoach ✓
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele Room
Holmes
Gandy

Associated Press.

Expelled

In Moscow the Soviet government yesterday ordered American Broadcasting Co. correspondent Sam Jaffe (above) to leave because of what it termed false reports on the Soviet Union. This apparently referred to a report by ABC's Washington diplomatic correspondent, John Scali, saying that a power struggle in the Kremlin might result in a shake-up of the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Foreign Ministry reportedly indicated Jaffe would not have been expelled if ABC had carried the Ministry's denial of Scali's report.

File

105 — File

105-28333

NOT RECORDED
184 OCT 5 1965

The Washington Post and Times Herald A11
The Washington Daily News
The Evening Star
New York Herald Tribune
New York Journal-American
New York Daily News
New York Post
The New York Times
The Baltimore Sun
The Worker
The New Leader
The Wall Street Journal
The National Observer
People's World
Date OCT 1 1965

193

SPECIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NAME: JAFFE, Samuel Adison

DATE/POB: 19 June 1926; Unknown

RESIDENCE: 34 East Sixty-second Street, New York, New York

OCC: CBS News (Reporter), 485 Madison Avenue, New York

Former: North American Newspaper Alliance, San Francisco, California
Live Magazine, New York City and Washington, D. C.

EDUC: Drew School
University of California (Majored in English)

No Investigation Conducted by FBI
Pertinent to your inquiry.
This is the result of your request for an
FBI file check only and is not to be
considered as a clearance.

Your agency has all pertinent information available to this Bureau.

105-28333-

NOT RECORDED
4 OCT 28 1965

Original sent back to
CIA by liaison 10-27-65
10-27-65 RMK/pds

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

file 5/ont

105-28333

CONFIDENTIAL

379

380

1 - M. E. Triplett

SAC, San Francisco March 5, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI PERSONAL ATTENTION

[redacted]
IS - R
(OO: San Francisco)

[redacted]
IS - R
(OO: San Francisco)

[redacted]
IS - R
LA file 100-56976
SF file 105-6503
WFO file 100-35023
Bufile 100-420694
(OO: Los Angeles)

[redacted] (C)

According to the informant, Miriam Goldina, 1524 Cassie Place, Hollywood, California, contacted Dr. Mariya Iosifovna Goldina, Stasopenkovskiy Pereulok, 3/1, Apt. 32, Moscow, U.S.S.R., during June, 1964, stating that she would send instructions on the use of "DIO-PAL" and "KARAGAGAN" (calcium powders ?) when she received them from the pharmacist. She implied that she had already sent these (powders ?) to Dr. Goldina. She stated that her son would deliver them (more powders ?) to Dr. Goldina. (C)

The son would be at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, Dubna, from August 5 through 15, 1964, and then in Moscow and possibly the Caucasus. ([redacted]) (C)

Bufiles reveal that Miriam Goldina's son, Charles Zemach, and her daughter-in-law, Mary St. John Zemach, were both employed by the Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California, in 1958. 105-28333 (C)

4 - Los Angeles - PERSONAL ATTENTION
3 - Washington Field - ~~PERSONAL ATTENTION~~
1 - New York (For Information) PERSONAL ATTENTION
MET:met
(17)
① - 105-28333 (Samuel Adason Jaffee)

NOT RECORDED
110 MAR 11 1965

SEE NOTE ON PAGE THREE

DUPLICATE YELLOW

Classified by 105-28333
Exempt from GDS Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite
6/30/80

CONFIDENTIAL

Treat as Yellow

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 105-138866-2

MAR 12 1965

Letter to SAC, San Francisco
RE: [redacted] (100-428694)

CONFIDENTIAL

Since it appears as if Charles Zemach was to travel to the U.S.S.R. and to contact his relatives there, San Francisco should conduct investigations of Charles Zemach and Mary St. John Zemach to determine whether they are engaged in activities inimical to the security of the United States. Investigation should include determination of their employment, whether they have access to classified data or restricted areas and whether they have traveled to the U.S.S.R. After investigation, make recommendations regarding interviews. Results of investigations should be submitted in a form suitable for dissemination. -C-

Los Angeles should reopen the case on Miriam Zemach to determine whether she has traveled to the U.S.S.R. recently and whether she is engaged in activities inimical to the security of the United States. Make recommendation regarding an interview. Submit results of investigation in a form suitable for dissemination. -C-

San Francisco and Los Angeles should request Washington Field to check records of Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State regarding subjects. -C-

The following additional information is submitted for your information in connection with these investigations. -C-

[redacted] has advised that during the above-mentioned contact in June, 1964, Miriam Goldina implied that she had been in the U.S.S.R. recently. She indicated that Nyusya (LNU) would go to a rest home and Fanechka (LNU), Dr. Goldina and Misha (LNU) would go to a dacha. -C-

Miriam complained to Dr. Goldina that work was slack in the film industry in the U.S., she had changed agents and would like to have a Soviet invitation to play a film role. She declared that her focus is on making money and a trip to the U.S.S.R. -C-

Subject Miriam Goldina asked Dr. Goldina for the "receipt" of hair-removing medication for Fanechka's niece (unidentified) which she sent with Rosa Vaneteg. -C- [redacted] Item

The informant has advised that Roza Vaneteg, is believed to have been a U.S. tourist who visited the U.S.S.R. Bufiles contain no record of Rosa Vaneteg or Dr. Mariya Iosifovna Goldina. -C-

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to SAC, San Francisco
RE: [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] (100-420694)

CONFIDENTIAL

According to [redacted], Miriam Goldina-Zemack (believed to be subject Miriam Goldina), while touring the U.S.S.R. in 1963, contacted Miriam Green of New York City and Rose Goris of Hollywood, California. During the contact with Goris, Goldina-Zemack mentioned that Sam Saffe's nephew, Sam Saffe, "works at ABC." ([redacted]) -C-

Due to lack of identifying data, it is impossible to determine whether Bufiles contain information identifiable with Miriam Green. Bufiles contain no record of Rose Goris. -C-

Sam Saffe is believed to be identical with Samuel Charles Jaffee (NY file 100-100783, LA file 100-34525). Sam Saffe's nephew who works for ABC is believed to be identical with Samuel Adason Jaffee (NY file 134-3315). (100-376393;105-28333) -C-

Reference is made to New York letter to Bureau dated 9-13-60, copy of which was sent to Los Angeles, and Los Angeles letter to Bureau dated 10-28-60 captioned "[redacted] (LA file 100-60043), which contain information regarding Miriam Goldina. (100-410283-21,23) -C-

Bufiles reveal that the name of Miriam Goldina, 340 West 56th Street, New York City, Circle 6-0629, appeared in the 1955 and 1957 address books of William Arthur Voyce (SF file 105-4674), who was employed as a translator by the Amtorg Trading Corporation, New York, New York, 1935-40. The case on Voyce was closed in 1960 by San Francisco when investigation failed to reveal additional derogatory information. -C-
(105-50215-37)

One copy of this letter is being furnished to New York in view of their interest in Samuel Adason Jaffee. -C-

NOTE: Information taken from [redacted]. Xerox copies of additional information in Bufiles re Miriam Goldina have been sent to LA by Form 0-7. Investigation of Miriam Goldina (Zemach) and Charles Zemach was instigated in 1958 based upon information to effect Miriam Goldina had contacted Isidore Needleman re getting passport. At that time she admitted having been a member of cultural branch of CP twelve years ago and was worried regarding investigation to be conducted on her daughter-in-law. Investigations were closed when it was determined that neither her son nor daughter-in-law had access to classified information. Soviets are now undoubtedly aware of their employment and fact that they have relatives in USSR. Laboratory has advised that they have no knowledge regarding powders mentioned in correspondence. -C-

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-108

UNITED STATES GO NMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-28333) DATE: 1/15/65

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (134-3315)

SUBJECT: CONF. INFT. [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] continues to be assigned to Moscow as the American Broadcasting System correspondent there. Accordingly, Security Flash Notice presently posted at the Bureau will not be removed at this time.

OK
1-19-65

2- Bureau (RM)
1- New York
EFG/mbl
(3)

d

105-28333-85

REC 61

18 JAN 18 1965

C [redacted]

EX-103

SOVIET SECTION

114

58 JAN 21 1965

~~Classified by~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category~~
Date of Declassification Indefinite

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

1366, 1367

1369

1371 THRU 1374

1379

1381

1384 THRU 1393

1400, 1400X

1402, 1403

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 19 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SB

Sensitive

SUBJECT: SSC Request Dated February 19, 1976

Attached is a letter from the SSC dated February 19, 1976. Please arrange for an appropriate response.

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

ST-101 REC-50 62-116395-1403

FEB 26 1976

ENCLOSURE

cc: Paul Daly

84 MAR 2 1976

FEB 19 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Request Dated February 19, 1976

Attached is a letter from the SSC dated February 19, 1976. Please arrange for an appropriate response.

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, J[illegible]ENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 19, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Select Committee requests delivery of certain materials pertaining to the Secret Army Organization and the role of an FBI informant therein, which materials have been identified to the FBI by Mr. Sam Bouchard of the Committee staff.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP 2 ALM/EHL

RECEIVED
FEB 19 1976

62-116395-1403

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 17 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SB

SUBJECT: SSC Letter Dated February 17, 1976

Sensitivity

Attached is a letter from the SSC indicating that the Committee will make available for review by persons from the Department those draft reports which relate to activities by the Department. The purpose of that review would be to identify any classification or similar problems in the draft reports. Two draft reports are presently ready for review.

Please designate appropriate persons from the Bureau to review these reports and to advise the Committee as to classification or similar problems.

See Memo W A Branigan to W.R. Wannall 2/16/76 re Mail Intercepts SPL/emd

See Memo J.G. Deegan to T.W. Leavitt 3/1/76 re Informants EPG:kAN/cdp

2/19/76 { Lee advised re mail openings
[illegible] Newman advised re infts

2/18/76 called Bob Kelley and Mark Gitenstein SSC to arrange review at FBIHQ

2/19/76 called Fred Baron SSC same purpose

2/19/76 FAO Schwarz stated SSC would allow review only in their space

ENCLOSURE

REC-50 62-116395-1402

ST-101

MDR 16

FEB 26 1976

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

FEB 19 1976

cc: Paul Daly

5-TJM

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 MAR 2 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Letter Dated February 17, 1976

Attached is a letter from the SSC indicating that the Committee will make available for review by persons from the Department those draft reports which relate to activities by the Department. The purpose of that review would be to identify any classification or similar problems in the draft reports. Two draft reports are presently ready for review.

Please designate appropriate persons from the Bureau to review these reports and to advise the Committee as to classification or similar problems.

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SPa ALM/EHL

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 17, 1976

Michael Shaheen, Jr.
Counsel
Office of Professional Responsibility
Department of Justice (Room 4313)
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mike:

This will confirm our telephone conversation concerning the procedure whereby we will make available to you, or your designee, copies of draft reports relating to the Justice Department. As we discussed, the purpose is so that any classification (or other such problems, e.g., the identity of informers) which may be inadvertently raised in our reports can be identified.

The first two drafts relating to the FBI are ready. They are:

1. "The Use of Informers in FBI Domestic Investigations"; and

2. "Domestic CIA and FBI Mail Opening Programs". (Substantial portions of which relate to the FBI.)

I would appreciate it if someone very promptly could contact Frederick D. Baron, my assistant (224-1746), who will arrange the details of location and time for the review.

Sincerely yours,

Fritz

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHU

62-116395-40

ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED
FEB 17 1976

MDR 16

February 12, 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Mr. William H. Lawrence
314 Swiss Pine Lake Drive
Spruce Pine, North Carolina 28777

Dear Bill:

Senstudy

Thank you very much for the two letters you sent to Jim Adams about the remarks made by Senator Morgan. I have seen him briefly since he made these remarks and plan to see him next week again to talk over the reason for these remarks at some length. As noted in his response to you, apparently he has come to this feeling as a result of the so-called "unchallenged" matters which he has had reported to him as a member of the Senate Select Committee. It is true that some mistakes of the Bureau were brought out, but the over-all performance of the Bureau has, as you said, been well above that which could even be expected of us and certainly has been most contributory to the safety of this nation throughout the years. To categorize us as "rotten to the core" and to indicate that we are a great threat to the United States miss the mark tremendously and are completely without foundation. I will so inform him, but apparently he has made up his mind and there is little likelihood that we will have a convert.

Again, thank you and I hope that you persist in your efforts to come to our support when our credibility has been attacked.

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 8:5 AM
DATE 2-17-76
BY

REC-13

62-116395-1400

NOT RECORDED

Sincerely,

46 APR 14 1976

/s/ Clarence

FEB 19 1976

CMK:EDM (3)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

Copy made for Corres.
and Tours Section

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

2/27/76

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

84 APR 16 1976

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: February 12, 1976

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The memorandum of W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, captioned as above and dated February 6, 1976, briefly reviewed a speech made on the floor of the Senate by Senator Frank Church. The speech was entitled "Government Adherence to the Law: A Call For a Temporary Special Prosecutor on Intelligence Abuses." This memorandum stated the subject of a special procecutor would be the subject of a separate memorandum prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel.

As you may recall, in a November 28, 1975, memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, captioned "Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975, S.495, 94th Congress, 1st Session," we deferred to the Department the question of whether there should be a special prosecutor as envisioned by that bill.

On Friday, February 6, 1976, the Attorney General of the United States testified before the Senate Government Operations Committee. The Attorney General stated he did not agree with Senator Church's proposal that a special prosecutor should be appointed to investigate past activities of the CIA and the FBI.

RECOMMENDATION:

ST-101 REC-50 62-116395-1400

For information.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Miller

JDM:mcz
(8)

FEB 24 1976

NDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 MAR 1 1976

PLAINTEXT TELETYPE NITEL

2-23-76

1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

TO SAC BOSTON

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENSTUDY 75

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP8 ALM/EHL

REBUCAL 2-23-76.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT SA FRANCIS T. LEONARD BE MADE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., FOR INTERVIEW BY THAT COMMITTEE ON 2-25-76. THE INTERVIEW WILL CONCERN HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE BUREAU'S INVESTIGATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, AND STANLEY DAVID LEVISON. SA LEONARD SHOULD ARRANGE TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON IN TIME TO BE BRIEFED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISION AT 9:00 A.M., 2-25-76, IN ROOM 3658, JEH BUILDING.

REC-50 62-116395-1393

20 FEB 24 1976

ST 104

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 23 1976
1000P SSP
TELETYPE

1 - Personnel File SA Francis T. Leonard

NOTE: Michael Epstein, Senate Select Committee staff member, made the request for the interview of Leonard. This communication will serve as approval for the waiver of existing employment agreement signed by SA Leonard for purposes of this interview. Referenced phone call alerted ASAC Richard Strain of this request.

RECEIVED FEB 23 4 00 PM 1976

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

PVD:dkg (10)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

FEB 26 1976

- Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)

PLAINTEXT TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

FEBRUARY 23, 1976

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

8

TO SAC SALT LAKE CITY

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED THAT FORMER SPECIAL AGENT (SA) STEVEN L. CHRISTENSEN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR STAFF INTERVIEW CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION. BUREAU RECORDS INDICATE LAST KNOWN ADDRESS FOR THIS FORMER EMPLOYEE TO BE POST OFFICE BOX 2, KANOSH, UTAH.

SAC OR ASAC, SALT LAKE CITY, IS REQUESTED TO PERSONALLY CONTACT FORMER SA CHRISTENSEN AND ADVISE HIM OF SSC DESIRE TO INTERVIEW HIM. HE SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT, IF SSC INITIATES CONTACT, FORMER SA CHRISTENSEN BEFORE CONSENTING TO INTERVIEW SHOULD CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL TO BE ADVISED OF HIS RIGHTS, THE PARAMETERS OF THE PROPOSED INTERVIEW AND TO SECURE A RELEASE FROM HIS CONFIDENTIALITY

ALL INF... HEREIN IS ... DATE 3-7-94 BY 9803 RDD/KSR (JFK)

REC-50 62-116395-1392

ST 104

FEB 24 1976

1 - SAN DIEGO (AIRMAIL)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TJM:lhb|hb
(9)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 23 1976
EMS 530 PM
TELETYPE

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO : 1975 O - 594-120

84 FEB 25 1976

AGREEMENT. HEADQUARTERS SHOULD BE ADVISED BY TELETYPE AFTER FORMER SA CHRISTENSEN HAS BEEN CONTACTED IN LINE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS. IF THIS FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER RESIDES IN THE SALT LAKE CITY TERRITORY OR IS TEMPORARILY AWAY, A LEAD, FOLLOWING THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, SHOULD BE SENT TO APPROPRIATE OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH A COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DESIGNATED FOR HEADQUARTERS.

COPY AIRMAILED TO SAN DIEGO.

NOTE:

Referenced Bureau teletype 5/2/75 was a general instruction to all SAC's concerning the SSC inquiry into this Bureau'soperations and this Bureau's cooperation with that body. Former SA Christensen was the handling Agent for former Bureau informant Howard Berry Godfrey, who furnished this Bureau considerable information concerning the Secret Army Organization (SAO). Bureau investigation of the SAO has recently been receiving considerable publicity in the San Diego press.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : R. L. Shackelford RLS

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J.B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (1 - Mr. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/17/76

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. S. Mignosa
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

PURPOSE:

To advise that Senate Select Committee (SSC) Executive Session was held on 2/13/76, where the role of the FBI in past "domestic intelligence investigations" as well as the role that the FBI should play in intelligence type investigations of domestic subversive organizations in the future was discussed. SSC requested copy of instructions sent to field by FBIHQ regarding Privacy Act matters which has a bearing on investigations of domestic groups.

DETAILS:

Reference is made to Cregar to Mr. Wannall memorandum dated 2/9/76, concerning SSC Executive Session held on 2/6/76, at which time it was decided that an additional Executive Session would be held at a future date, regarding "domestic intelligence investigations."

An SSC Executive Session was held from approximately 10:55 a.m., until 12:45 p.m., 2/13/76. Representing the SSC were Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwartz, Jr., who acted as Chairman, John Elliff, Mark Gitenstein and Michael Epstein. No U.S. Senators were present. Bureau representatives offering testimony were Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, Inspector-Deputy Assistant Director Hunter E. Helgeson, Section Chiefs Joseph G. Deegan and Robert L. Shackelford of the Intelligence Division and Inspector John B. Hotis, Legal Counsel Division.

ST-104
REC-50
62-116395-1394
FEB 24 1976

At the outset of the Session, Mr. Schwartz explained that this was a continuation of the Executive Session on 2/6/76 in an effort to assist the SSC in drafting legislation outlining the Bureau's responsibility for domestic intelligence investigations which goes beyond criminal investigations. He noted that at the closing of the past Executive Session, Mr. Shackelford had stated the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA)

62-116395

GJL:rsm
(11)

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

CONTINUED - OVER

84 FEB 25 1976

and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) had been involved in planning or organizing numerous large demonstrations in the country and he desired to continue this discussion. A list of major demonstrations with resulting damages and arrests which occurred in the U.S. during the past ten years involving subversive groups was furnished by Mr. Shackelford. A discussion followed regarding the role of the FBI in gathering intelligence information concerning the demonstrations as well as the dissemination of the information which had been obtained. Mr. Schwartz questioned the authority of the FBI in investigating infiltrated groups such as the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) and the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) even though both groups were either dominated or influenced by the CPUSA or the SWP.

A discussion then followed as to what effect the enactment of the Privacy Act has on the investigation by the FBI of domestic subversive groups. A request was made concerning instructions which have been sent to the field by FBIHQ concerning this matter.

The Session then turned to investigation of extremist groups and the use of informants in these groups to obtain advance information to prevent acts of violence. Specific cases of this type were read into the record by Mr. Deegan. Mr. Gitenstein questioned the authority of the Bureau to place informants into these extremist groups without the ingredient of violence present.

This Executive Session was adjourned at approximately 12:45 p.m. and no request was made at that time for another Executive Session.

OBSERVATIONS:

From statements made by Mr. Schwartz and other SSC staff members present, with the possible exception of Mr. Mark Gitenstein, it appeared that these individuals continue to be opposed to legislation authorizing Bureau investigations in the domestic intelligence area unless the threat of violence is imminent. Mr. Gitenstein in his discussion concerning the use of informants in extremist groups appeared to want to include in the record acts of violence which have been prevented because of infiltration by informants in these groups. It does appear, therefore, that he may be more favorably inclined towards the Bureau's position in these matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the SSC Unit, Intelligence Division, communicate with a member of the SSC staff regarding Privacy Act material and/or instructions desired by the Committee.

REC-100 62-116395-1390

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

December 19, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. T. J. Seabaugh
1 - Mr. J. D. Powell

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is to call to your attention a most serious breach of the confidentiality that must be afforded the material and information that this Bureau has furnished to the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Enclosed for your approval and delivery, preferably to SSC Chairman Senator Frank Church personally, is a memorandum which sets forth this incident in detail for the SSC, states the seriousness with which this matter is viewed and which requests the SSC to advise whether they did, in fact, publicly disclose the identity of former FBI informant George F. Dorsett as alleged and if so, the basis for such disclosure.

George F. Dorsett was an FBI informant from January, 1959, to October, 1970. He was discontinued as an informant when his activity in the Klan ceased, at which time his relationship with the Bureau continued to be excellent. He has not been disclosed publicly as an FBI informant. Dorsett did in fact separate from the United Klans of America (UKA) and form the Confederate Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (CKKKK). He formed the CKKKK on his own initiative; however, we utilized this opposing Klan organization through Dorsett as a means of disrupting and causing confusion and dissension within the Klan.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Charlotte
1 - 137-4853

JDP:lek (16)

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

SEE NOT PG 3

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/ENL

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

NOT DELIVERED TO SSC.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 MAR 3 1 1976

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

The handling agent assisted Dorsett in preparing a letter announcing his resignation from the UKA and his formation of the CKKKK. This letter invited Dorsett's friends in the Klan to join him in the CKKKK. A total of 41 chapters of the CKKKK were chartered; however, all of them did not become effective operating chapters.

The documents delivered to the SSC were excised to delete Dorsett's name as an informant. Charlotte airtel dated August 22, 1967, and C. D. Brennan memorandum to W. C. Sullivan dated August 24, 1967, set forth the recommendation and approval for the mailing of a letter from Dorsett to all Klan units in North Carolina announcing his resignation from the UKA and the formation of the CKKKK. Dorsett's name is deleted from these documents; however, it is clear that the informant was preparing the letter. Charlotte airtel to the Director September 13, 1967, refers to the August 22, 1967, Charlotte airtel and states that the referenced airtel recommended Bureau approval for a letter to be mailed over the signature of Reverend George F. Dorsett under the above conditions. Dorsett's name is not deleted from this document. From the above documents Dorsett's identity can readily be established as the FBI informant.

In the December 6, 1975, issue of the "Charlotte Observer" a daily Charlotte, North Carolina, morning newspaper there is a front page article captioned "FBI Started 41 North Carolina Klan Units, Morgan Says." In this article, North Carolina Senator Robert Morgan, member of the SSC, said the FBI organized 41 KKK units in North Carolina during the 1960's as part of its campaign against the white supremacist group. Morgan was also quoted as saying, "The vast majority of people in the Klan in North Carolina were law-abiding citizens.

The Attorney General

There may have been some violence, but we're not even sure about that now." Morgan is further quoted as saying, "There is nothing basically wrong with having an informer in any organization but when these informers do more than just listen, when they instigate trouble, that's wrong." Morgan also said the FBI financed the operations of the Federally organized Klaverns.

As set forth in the enclosed memorandum, Mr. Dorsett was interviewed on December 12, 1975, by Charlotte, North Carolina, FBI Agents at which time he expressed his concern for his personal safety and for his family as well, as well as concern for the safety of his personal property.

As stated above this matter is considered to be a most serious breach of the confidentiality that must be afforded the material and information that this Bureau has furnished to the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It is respectfully requested that the enclosed memorandum be delivered to Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the SSC, personally. Please advise what action is taken concerning this matter.

NOTE:

See Memorandum J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall, prepared by JDP:lek, dated 12/16/75.

LHM NOT DELIVERED
TO SSC PER STEVEN
BLACKHURST, DEP. SPECIAL
COUNSEL FOR INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATION, USDJ, PER INSTRUCTIONS
OF DAG TYLER.
3.23.76

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson

62-116395

December 19, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. T. J. Seabaugh
1 - Mr. J. D. Powell

This is to call attention to the following incident which is a most serious breach of the confidentiality that must be afforded the material and information that this Bureau has furnished to the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

The December 10, 1975, issue of the "Greensboro Daily News," Greensboro, North Carolina, contains on page one an article captioned "Greensboro Man Named As FBI Klan Informant," by Jack Betts, Daily News Washington Bureau. The article states in part:

"Washington - A Greensboro man long active in the Ku Klux Klan has been identified as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's campaign to disrupt the KKK in North Carolina during the latter 1960's.

"A Senate Intelligence Committee source said Tuesday that George F. Dorsett, former Imperial Kludd (National Chaplain) of the United Klans of America, was a paid FBI informant who, with the FBI's assistance, broke away from the Klan in 1967 to form a rival group.

"The source said Dorsett was named in FBI documents obtained by the committee as the man whom the bureau had recruited to spy on the United Klan.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL
MDR 16

1 - Charlotte

1 - 137-4853 (George F. Dorsett)

JDP:lek (15) lek

SEE NOTE PAGE 5

SEE NOTE PG 5

62-116395-137

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

RE: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

"FBI documents obtained by the committee indicate that Dorsett, who was disenchanted with KKK Grand Dragon J. Robert Jones of Granite Quarry and with Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton of Tuscaloosa, Ala., was encouraged by the FBI to leave the Klan in the summer of 1967 and form the Confederate Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The FBI helped Dorsett draft letters recruiting for the new group, according to the committee source.

"According to the documents, the FBI's plan was to harass the KKK and to dilute the influence of the United Klans and to keep closer tabs on the new group.

"Sen. Robert Morgan, D. N.C., a member of the committee said last week that charters for some 41 new Klaverns or chapters of the Confederate Klan were issued, but that not all charters resulted in active new Klan groups."

A review of material delivered to the staff of the Committee has determined that Committee Staff Member Barbara Banoff accepted on August 28, 1975, copies of 212 serials relating to White Hate matters under the COINTELPRO requests of the Committee. The following documents were included among these 212 serials:

Airtel from SAC, Charlotte, to Director, FBI, dated May 9, 1967. (157-9-8-100)

Airtel from SAC, Charlotte, to Director, FBI, dated May 31, 1967. (157-9-8-102)

RE: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Airtel from SAC, Birmingham, to Director, FBI, dated June 14, 1967. (157-9-8-107)

Airtel from Director, FBI, to SACs, Charlotte, Atlanta and Birmingham, dated June 20, 1967. (157-9-8-110)

Airtel from SAC, Charlotte, to Director, FBI, dated June 14, 1967. (157-9-8-110)

Airtel from SAC, Charlotte, to Director, FBI, dated June 28, 1967. (157-9-8-115)

Airtel from SAC, Charlotte, to Director, FBI, dated June 23, 1967. (157-9-8-113)

Airtel from Director, FBI, to SACs, Atlanta and Charlotte, dated June 29, 1967. (157-9-8-114)

Airtel from Director, FBI, to SAC, Charlotte, dated August 25, 1967. (157-9-8-126)

Airtel from SAC, Charlotte, to Director, FBI, dated August 22, 1967. (157-9-8-126)

Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated August 24, 1967. (157-9-8-127)

Airtel from SAC, Charlotte, to Director, FBI, dated September 13, 1967. (157-9-8-128)

All of the above communications are captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security, Disruption of Hate Groups (United Klans of America, Inc., North Carolina)."

RE: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Letter from SAC, Charlotte, to Director, FBI, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security, Disruption of Hate Groups (Confederate Knights of the Ku Klux Klan), Charlotte Division," dated January 30, 1969. (157-9-8-151)

Airtel from Director, FBI, to SAC, Charlotte, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of Hate Groups, Internal Security, Racial Matters (Klan)," dated September 25, 1967. (157-9-8-129)

A careful reading and comparison of these documents would lead to the identity of Dorsett as an FBI informant in the manner described in the above article. The factual material set forth in the article is contained in the above documents. It is noted that the documents as delivered to the Committee do not identify Mr. Dorsett as an FBI informant; however, his identity can be deduced from the combined documents. Our records do not indicate that Mr. Dorsett's identity as an informant has been disclosed in any other manner. Mr. Dorsett was interviewed by FBI Agents of the Charlotte, North Carolina, FBI Office on December 12, 1975. Mr. Dorsett stated that he felt "betrayed" by his government concerning the public disclosure in the news media of his identity as an FBI source. He recalled that he had always been assured that his identity would always remain confidential and known only to the FBI. He further stated that as a result of the public disclosure of his identity as an FBI source in the "Greensboro Daily News" on December 10, 1975, he has experienced great consternation among his close friends and members of his family. He has received harassing telephone calls. During one of these calls the caller stated, "Tell that pimp to get his casket ready." Mr. Dorsett expressed his concern for the personal safety of himself and members of his family, as well as concern for the safety of his residence and personal property.

RE: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

The disclosure of the identity of FBI informants places these informants' lives in serious jeopardy as well as subjecting them and their families to the likelihood of embarrassment and harassment within their communities. Such disclosures have a most serious and detrimental effect on other informants, who have just cause to question the security of their past or present association with the FBI. Persons who might otherwise be inclined to furnish information to the FBI, expecting their cooperation to be kept in confidence, are reluctant to do so when they see such violations of the sanctity of FBI files and information.

The FBI has endeavored to cooperate fully and candidly in making available to the Committee the documents and information requested by the Committee. We have insisted that the confidentiality of informants be maintained. In view of this most serious breach of the confidentiality of information furnished by the FBI to the Committee and in an effort to determine the nature of it, you are requested to advise whether the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence or any member or staff member thereof, is responsible for the public disclosure of former FBI informant George F. Dorsett as alleged and if so, the basis for such disclosure.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

See memorandum J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall prepared by JDP:lek, dated 12/16/75.

NOT DELIVERED TO SSC PER STEVEN BLACKHURST, DEP. SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION ON SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS OF DAG TYLER

3·23·76

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC/TJM

DATE: 2/13/76

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

By memorandum dated 12/19/75, you were advised of a serious breach of confidentiality in the handling of FBI documents that had been delivered to the SSC. This memorandum detailed the disclosure in the North Carolina press of former FBI informant George F. Dorsett and specifically attributed the disclosure to Bureau documents delivered to the SSC. The memorandum also enclosed a memorandum for delivery to SSC Chairman Senator Frank Church detailing the above incident. (Copies of both memoranda are attached).

In view of the Director's scheduled conference 2/17/76, with Senator Robert Morgan of North Carolina, who is a member of the SSC, efforts were made on 2/9/76 to determine whether the above memorandum had been delivered to Senator Church. It was ascertained that the memorandum had not been delivered but that the Deputy Attorney General then had the matter under consideration.

On 2/13/76, Steven Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, advised that the Deputy Attorney General had, that morning, instructed that the Department prepare a letter to Senator Church detailing the incident as set forth in the above memorandum that had been prepared by the Bureau for delivery to Senator Church. According to Blackhurst, the Department communication, which has not as yet been approved, concluded by asking Senator Church whether or not the SSC was responsible for leaking documents disclosing the identity of Dorsett and, if so, what action the SSC intends to take to prevent similar disclosures in the future. Blackhurst added that a copy of his communication is being designated for the Bureau but he did not know whether the communication would reach the Bureau prior to the Director's meeting with Senator Morgan. Upon approval, he will telephonically advise Bureau.

Enclosures

62-116395

TJM:mjg
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

REC-53 62-116395-1390

ST 104

FEB 24 1976

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

~~84 FEB 25 1976~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC)
62-116395

ACTION:

None. Above is submitted for information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. [illegible] A. Mintz
(1 [illegible]r. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

TO SACs BUTTE
MINNEAPOLIS
SEATTLE

FEBRUARY 19, 1976

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff
1 - Mr. J. P. Graham

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

BY LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 11, 1976, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) REQUESTED THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE FOR SSC STAFF MEMBERS TO INTERVIEW FBI PERSONNEL WHO AUTHORED CERTAIN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (COINTELPRO) DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ALLEGED FBI INVOLVEMENT IN "GANG WAR" BETWEEN THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) AND THE US ORGANIZATION.

THESE PERSONS ARE:

BUTTE DIVISION - SPECIAL AGENT (SA) ROY L. BURNS, ASSIGNED TO BILLINGS, MONTANA, RESIDENT AGENCY, (DOCUMENTS AUTHORED WHILE ASSIGNED SAN DIEGO);

MINNEAPOLIS DIVISION - ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (ASAC) WILLIAM D. NEUMANN, (DOCUMENTS AUTHORED WHILE ASSIGNED FBI HEADQUARTERS (FBIHQ);

EX-116 REC-50 62-116395-1389

FEB 23 1976

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 1 1976
ENS 93
TELETYPE

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

JPG:eks
(10)

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/ETH

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SEATTLE DIVISION - SA LEROY W. SHEETS (RETIRED), LAST ADDRESS BELIEVED TO BE 5825 - 72ND STREET, N. E., MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON, (DOCUMENTS AUTHORED WHILE ASSIGNED LOS ANGELES).

BUTTE AND MINNEAPOLIS SHOULD ADVISE INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES THAT IF CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC SO THAT RELEASE FROM CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERVIEW CAN BE EFFECTED.

SEATTLE SHOULD CONTACT FORMER SA SHEETS, ALERT HIM TO ANTICIPATED SSC STAFF INTERVIEW AND ADVISE HIM TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION SO THAT HE CAN BE RELEASED FROM CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT AND PARAMETERS OF INTERVIEW OUTLINED TO HIM. CONTACT WITH SHEETS TO BE HANDLED BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR. IF SHEETS NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

NOTE:

Referenced SSC letter indicated that certain portions of Bureau memoranda and airtels may be quoted in the SSC's final report on FBI intelligence operations and that the SSC was seeking to take the testimony of persons whose memoranda and statements might be quoted in that report. The memoranda referred to in referenced SSC letter pertain to the FBI's role in the "gang war" between the BPP and the US Organization. By telephone call 2/18/76, the SSC also requested the author of SAC, Los Angeles, airtel to Director, FBI, 5/26/70, under the same caption as above memoranda. The author of this communication was determined to be Supervisor Richard W. Held, currently assigned to FBIHQ. Mr. Held, who is in an official travel status until the first week of March, has been advised of the SSC's desire to interview him. By airtel, Minneapolis and Butte will be furnished copies of documents written by Mr. Neumann and Mr. Burns, respectively.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 2/2/76

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY 5P2ALM/EHL

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

At 2:45 p.m. on 1/27/76, Michael Epstein, Staff Member of captioned Committee, requested that Harold N. Bassett, Assistant Director of the Inspection Division, or some other Bureau official familiar with inspection procedures be made available for a briefing with that Committee on 1/28/76 and to appear in executive session at 10 a.m. on 1/29/76. The topic of the briefing and testimony will be the Bureau's inspection procedures.

Epstein contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 1/28/76 and indicated he would desire that the briefing take place in the Committee's space at 1:30 p.m. on this date. He stated it would not be necessary for Assistant Director Bassett to be familiar with any particular matters reviewed by the Inspection Division but rather address, in general, the inspection policies and procedures. Epstein stated the executive session which was to begin at 10 a.m. on 1/29/76 would consist of Assistant Director Bassett and former Acting Associate Director W. Mark Felt appearing in a panel arrangement. Assistant Director Bassett would be asked questions at the executive session concerning inspection procedures.

Scheduled to follow Assistant Director Bassett as witnesses before the Committee in that same executive session at 11 a.m. are Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., in his role as Counsel on Professional Responsibility and Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration.

On 1/28/76, Epstein advised SA Daly that Assistant Director Bassett's appearance in executive session before that Committee was being rescheduled for 2 p.m. on 1/29/76 because of a schedule conflict. He subsequently advised that the Staff briefing had to be postponed because Epstein determined he had a prior commitment. Epstein, in the late afternoon of 1/28/76,

EX-116 REC-50 62-116395-1388

1 - Mr. Mintz
~~1 - Mr. Adams~~
~~1 - Mr. Callahan~~
1 - Mr. Bassett

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

5 FEB 13 1976

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:lad
(10)

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 FEB 25 1976

advised that he had to again postpone the executive session testimony of Assistant Director Bassett because of scheduling conflicts and that the testimony would be sometime during the week of 2/2/76. He could not give a definite time nor assure that the testimony would take place during that week.

On the morning of 1/29/76, Epstein requested that Assistant Director Bassett appear in executive session at 2 p.m. on 2/3/76 to give his requested testimony. After consultation with Assistant Director Bassett, Epstein was advised that Assistant Director Bassett had delayed his departure from Washington, D. C., to conduct Bureau business in order to be available for testimony and that on two separate occasions the Committee had found it necessary to reschedule his testimony. He was advised that Assistant Director Bassett would be available during the week of 2/9/76 and that we requested he be given the opportunity to testify during that week or some other mutually agreeable time. Epstein stated that it was the intention of the Committee to go forward on 2/3/76 without Assistant Director Bassett and mentioned that former Acting Associate Director W. Mark Felt who had been head of the Bureau's Inspection Division would be available to testify concerning this matter. It was pointed out to Epstein that Mr. Felt is no longer with the FBI and is not in a position to act as spokesman for Bureau inspection policies and procedures which are currently in existence under Director Kelley. Epstein again indicated that the Committee would go on without a Bureau representative.

John T. Elliff, Director of the Domestic Task Force of the Senate Select Committee, was immediately contacted and advised of Epstein's decision and the background concerning this matter. Elliff was advised that the Committee certainly would want all the information available concerning inspection procedures in the Bureau to get a fair picture of this area of Bureau operations. Elliff agreed and stated he would insure Assistant Director Bassett would be given the opportunity to testify as to the Bureau's current inspection procedures and policies. This testimony, however, may not be at the same time as the appearance of W. Mark Felt, et al.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 28 1976

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 12 SD PLAIN

5:54PM JANUARY 28, 1976 URGENT ASC

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM SAN DIEGO (66-1714)

ATTN: INTD AND LEGAL COUNSEL

SENSTUDY 75

RE SAN DIEGO TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU JANUARY 27, 1976.

THE SAN DIEGO UNION NEWSPAPER OF JANUARY 28, 1976, CONTAINS AN ARTICLE STATING CITY COUNCILMAN FLOYD MORROW WILL ON JANUARY 29, 1976, PROPOSE A COUNCIL RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE CONDUCT HEARINGS IN SAN DIEGO TO HEAR LOCAL WITNESSES IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT DISCLOSURES THAT THE FBI "PROMOTED VIOLENT DISRUPTION OF BLACK GROUPS AND POLITICAL DISSIDENTS" IN SAN DIEGO DURING THE LATE 1960S AND EARLY 1970S. THE RESOLUTION WILL REQUEST THAT THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SENATE COMMITTEE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION GAINED BY THE PANEL IN ITS HEARINGS.

THE ARTICLE FURTHER STATES THAT SAN DIEGO CITY COUNCILMAN LEON WILLIAMS MET FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR IN SAN DIEGO ON JANUARY 27, 1976, WITH SENATE INVESTIGATOR ARTHUR JEFFERSON

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/ETC

EX-116

REC-50 62-116395 - 1389

5 - [illegible]

4 FEB ~~13~~ 18 1976

11 - LEGAL COUNSEL

84 FEB 25 1976

REVIEWING FBI ATTEMPTS TO DISRUPT BLACK NATIONALIST GROUPS. WILLIAMS ALLEGEDLY TOLD JEFFERSON OF HIS ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE A FEUD BETWEEN THE BLACK PANTHERS AND US IN SAN DIEGO IN 1969. WILLIAMS STATES HE WAS INFORMED BY TWO CITY OFFICIALS, FORMER POLICE CHIEF O.J. ROED AND FORMER CITY MANAGER WALTER HAHN, THAT THE BLACK PANTHERS PLANNED TO ASSASSINATE HIM AND INFORMATION ABOUT THE PLOT HAD BEEN FURNISHED BY THE FBI. ROED AND HAHN ARE REPORTED IN THE ARTICLE AS NOT RECALLING THE MEETING OR TELLING WILLIAMS OF A DEATH PLOT AGAINST HIM.

WILLIAMS INDICATES THAT UPON BEING SO ADVISED BY ROED AND HAHN, HE NOTIFIED COUNCILMAN FLOYD MORROW AND MORROW HAS STATED HE RECALLS BEING SO ADVISED.

THE ARTICLE STATES JEFFERSON DEPARTED SAN DIEGO FOR LOS ANGELES ON JANUARY 27, 1976, AND EXPECTS TO PROBE FBI

PAGE THREE

SD 66-1714

ACTIVITIES IN LOS ANGELES WHERE "TWO MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY WERE KILLED DURING A SHOOT OUT WITH US MEMBERS ON THE UCLA CAMPUS IN JANUARY, 1969."

END.

VLN FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE TEL

NR012. CLR

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore, Jr.

The Attorney General

February 18, 1976

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. E. F. Glenn

SAN DIEGO OPERATIONS

ORIGINAL FILED IN

You were previously advised by my letter dated January 23, 1976, of recent allegations against the FBI relating to the Secret Army Organization (SAO) that appeared in a series of articles beginning January 11, 1976, in the "San Diego Union" Newspaper. These articles alleged the FBI created and financed the SAO and controlled the activities of this group through an informant, Howard Barry Godfrey, who was a leader of this organization. You were also advised the inquiry being conducted concerning these allegations had thus far indicated they were unfounded.

This is to advise you that our inquiry into this matter has been completed. This inquiry which included a review of all pertinent court records and FBI Headquarters and San Diego Field Office files reveals allegations against the FBI, concerning our investigation of the SAO, are without merit and clearly shows the FBI did not organize, control, or finance the SAO. Information we received concerning illegal activities conducted or planned by the SAO was immediately disseminated to appropriate law enforcement agencies.

In the above-mentioned series of articles there were certain allegations made by former SAO members and associates when interviewed by newspaper reporter Patrick Dillon. These individuals previously expressed a desire to the news media to discredit Godfrey, or had been found guilty following legal proceedings in which Godfrey was an important witness. Allegations made by them to Mr. Dillon included:

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED

144 FEB [illegible]

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75 Project)

EFG:lek
(12)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

DUPLICATE YELLOW

57 FEB 25 1976

(1) Godfrey assigned SAO members to kidnap antiwar demonstrators during the 1972 Republican National Convention planned for San Diego, (2) Godfrey threatened and pressured SAO members into committing acts of violence, (3) Godfrey was involved in criminal acts which included breaking into school offices, firebombing vehicles, and making threatening calls.

One individual who made allegations against Godfrey, when interviewed by Mr. Dillon, also testified during the trial of an SAO member that he was responsible for the sale of between $10,000 and $20,000 worth of weapons and explosives to Godfrey. This person later entered a guilty plea in court, State of California, for the charge of perjury in connection with this testimony.

The extensive review of pertinent FBI and court documents, mentioned above, produced no information to substantiate or refute these allegations. However, it should be noted no information to document or substantiate these allegations has been produced.

In view of the above we contemplate no further inquiry in this matter.

NOTE:

By letter dated 1/23/76, the Attorney General was advised of articles appearing in "San Diego Union" Newspaper alleging Bureau organized, financed and controlled the SAO. The Attorney General was advised preliminary inquiries determined there was no basis for allegations, however, additional inquiries were being conducted. Instant letter is follow-up letter to advise Attorney General of results of additional inquiries.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. Jenkins

DATE: 2-6-76

FROM : J. J. McDermott

SUBJECT: COST DATA - JANUARY 1976
SENSTUDY AND HOUSTUDY

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Due to the fact that this matter is being handled in Records Section through normal mail processing procedures, it is most difficult to determine which specific individual(s) may have typed a certain card or abstract, searched a particular name, reviewed a particular file, etc. Therefore, names of individuals have not been given. In some instances, a specific number of individuals involved may be known and, where applicable, this has been shown. But in some units it is impossible to know even how many persons performed the work relative to a specific subject. All that can be given in some cases is the estimated number of hours in a particular grade or level based on production figures relating to this matter.

SENSTUDY

No. Personnel	Grade	Salary	Man-Hours	Agent/Clerical
8	GS-3	$ 7,102	5 1/4	C
1	GS-4	8,508	1/2	C
*	GS-6	9,946	133 1/4	C
1	GS-6	10,610	1/2	C
2	GS-6	11,606	2	C
1	GS-8	15,071	8	C
1	GS-15	37,573	8	A

REC-48

*Cannot be accurately determined

EX-116

62-116395-1386

HOUSTUDY

FEB 10 1976

No. Personnel	Grade	Salary	Man-Hours	Agent/Clerical
2	GS-3	7,102	1 3/4	C
1	GS-6	10,610	1/2	C

Costs incurred in the Communications Section are negligible.

RECOMMENDATION: Refer to the Administrative Division.

WLB:bpr
(5)

FEB 13 1976

67 FEB 26 1976

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5-113a (Rev. 3-21-73)

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mack
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Leavitt
Intelligence Division

1-Mr. Deegan
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Tansey

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/28/76

Attached from San Diego pertains to Senstudy '75 and current activity of Senate Select Committee (SSC) investigators probing charges the FBI promoted guerrilla-type warfare against blacks and political dissidents in the San Diego and Los Angeles areas during the late 1960's and early 1970's.

San Diego "Union" newspaper 1/28/76 indicates City Councilman Floyd Morrow will propose council resolution on 1/29/76 requesting SSC conduct hearings and have representative from city of San Diego on the "Senate Committee" to obtain data gained by the panel in its hearings. It is also reported SSC investigator Arthur Jefferson departed San Diego for Los Angeles on 1/27/76. He is going to probe FBI activities pertaining to two rival black extremist groups. This involved killing of two Black Panther Party (BPP) members during shootout with US members on UCLA campus in 1/69.

The "Union" article also states City Councilman Leon Williams met for more than an hour 1/27/76 with Jefferson and told Jefferson he attempted to mediate a feud between BPP and US in San Diego in 1969. Williams claimed he was informed by two city officials, the former police Chief and the former city manager, that FBI told them BPP planned to assassinate Williams. The article indicates the former police chief

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

FAD:dsh

CONTINUED - OVER

and the former city manager both deny making such statement to Williams. Williams claims he told Councilman Morrow at the time and Morrow claims he recalls being so advised.

SAC Ronald L. Maley, San Diego, telephonically contacted by Intelligence Division Night Supervisor F. Anthony Tansey, stated San Diego FBI personnel knowledgeable of facts do not recall any such incident or notice to former officials or Williams; and, if FBI had knowledge of such a plot, all knowledgeable employees believe Williams, himself, would have been notified directly.

San Diego is currently reviewing pertinent files for any information to prove or disprove Williams' statement and a teletype will be submitted with pertinent facts on 1/29/76.

Upon receipt of the teletype from San Diego, you will be advised whether or not San Diego did have knowledge of any plot against Williams and whether anyone, including Williams, was alerted to such information.

WRW/FAT

JCD

WRW

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. CregarNITEL
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Miller

PLAINTEXT TELETYPE

2/12/76

TO: ADIC, NEW YORK

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

SENSTUDY 75

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

SA DANIEL A. FLYNN GAVE DEPOSITION ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1975, TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. JAMES DICK, COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBER, DESIRES TO HAVE SA FLYNN ATTEST TO THE ACCURACY OF DEPOSITION BEFORE NOTARY PUBLIC. MR. DICK WILL CONTACT SA FLYNN IN THE NEW YORK OFFICE AND MAKE ARRANGEMENTS IN THIS REGARD. BUREAU APPROVAL IS GRANTED FOR SA FLYNN TO ATTEST TO THE ACCURACY OF THE DEPOSITION.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 12 1976
EMS 8:24PM
TELETYPE

1 - Personnel File - SA Daniel A. Flynn

REC-65 62-116395 - 1385

ST 112

FEB 18 1976

NOTE: On 2/11/76, James Dick, Staff Member of the Senate Select Committee, advised SA Flynn (NYO) gave deposition on 9/10/75 on the subject of mail openings. The deposition was not under oath. Dick requested SA Flynn attest to accuracy of his deposition before a notary public. SA Flynn furnished a summary of his deposition to the Bureau which was furnished to the Department and the White House by memorandum dated 10/1/75.

JDM/PVD:lad LAD
(10)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

84 FEB 25 1976

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

NCO/Pickett
Rm 9170 5/6/99
Section 3
11/8/00

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore, Jr.

Mr. W. R. Wannall

2/10/76

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegen
1 - Mr. E. F. Glenn

J. G. Deegan

SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION
(SAO)
EXTREMIST MATTER

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

5

In previous memorandum J. G. Deegan to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 1/30/76, captioned as above, the allegations against the FBI and former informant Howard Barry Godfrey were refuted. These allegations appeared primarily in the "San Diego Union" Newspaper in a series of articles written by Patrick Dillon, which commenced 1/11/76. Allegations included: The SAO was an extension of the Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), the FBI gave Godfrey between $10,000 and $20,000 worth of explosives and weapons for use by the SAO, Godfrey paid SAO expenses, the SAO was used by the FBI to disrupt antiwar demonstrators and get local activists on the run, the FBI organized, financed and controlled the SAO, and Godfrey conspired and attempted to commit murder.

Instant memorandum relates to certain allegations made by former SAO members and associates when interviewed by newspaper reporter Dillon in preparation of the above-mentioned series of articles. Extensive review of all pertinent Bureau and San Diego Field Office files as well as pertinent transcripts of court and grand jury proceedings regarding SAO members has produced no information to either substantiate or refute the allegations. Allegations included:
(1) Godfrey assigned SAO members to kidnap antiwar demonstrators during the 1972 Republican National Convention planned for San Diego,
(2) Godfrey threatened and pressured SAO members into committing acts of violence,
(3) Godfrey was involved in criminal acts which included breaking into school offices, firebombing vehicles, and making threatening calls,

ORIGINAL FILED IN 157-2337-133

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75 Project)

62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
46 FEB 23 1976

EFG:eks (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

FEB 25 1976

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Secret Army Organization (SAO)

(4) Godfrey had an obsession with regard to long haired, New Left types. He talked of bombing them with an airplane, dropping mortar rounds on them, and beating them up.

These allegations were made by individuals who had previously expressed a desire to the news media to discredit Godfrey and those who were found guilty following legal proceedings in which Godfrey was an important witness. Additional inquiry is not warranted since information to document or substantiate these allegations has not been produced and all available files and documents have been reviewed.

In a letter dated 1/21/76, the Attorney General (AG) was advised that the FBI was conducting an inquiry into allegations that the Bureau acted improperly while investigating the SAO. The AG will be advised of results of the inquiry into all allegations by separate communication.

A work paper containing all back-up material regarding the allegations made and the results of transcript reviews and the review of Bureau and San Diego Field Office files has been prepared and made available to the External Affairs Division.

ACTION:

None. For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

Mr. W. R. Wannall

2/10/76

F. J. Cassidy

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

COINTELPROS

This is to advise of our interpretation of analytical information relating to our discontinued Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros) prepared by the Senate Select Committee (SSC).

On 2/2/76 the Department made available for our review a number of FBI documents the SSC intends to publish in connection with its forthcoming report. Included with the material were three SSC prepared charts (copies attached) analyzing the same five basic domestic Cointelpros which were reviewed in 1974 by the Department Study Committee on FBI Cointelpros (Petersen Committee). The statistics utilized by the SSC in compiling the charts differ from those reported by the Petersen Committee, and the SSC has also established different categories for characterizing Cointelpro actions than used in the Petersen report. The following is a description of the three SSC charts.

1. Cointelpro Composite (SSC Exhibit 10). This chart lists seven basic categories for the 2,679 total Cointelpro actions tabulated by the SSC, it being noted this is 310 more actions than calculated by the Petersen Committee. The first three categories, (1) Attacks on Speaking, Teaching, Writing, and Meeting; (2) Interference w/Personal and Economic Rights; and (3) Abuse of Government Processes, place approximately 925 of the Cointelpro actions in an area indicating FBI violation of constitutional rights with possible criminal and civil liability. The fourth category, Third Party Hostile,

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-[illegible]

Enclosures
62-116009

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)

[illegible]

DR/AGP:lfj
(11)

ENCLOSURE

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

NOT RECORDED
46 FEB 23 1976

112

70 FEB 25 1976

3

apparently indicates Cointelpro actions directed to cause hostile action to a target, probably by third parties. Categories 5 and 6, Factionalization and Propaganda, represent approximately 1,550 of the total actions, appear to relate to efforts of the FBI to cause dissension within organizations or to expose through publicity the activities of a targeted group or individual. The seventh category, Cominfil, undoubtedly is a reference to FBI efforts to expose or disrupt communist efforts to infiltrate a noncommunist organization, it being noted this category is only tabulated for the Communist Party, USA, Program.

The SSC categories differ from those of the Petersen report in that the first three clearly are in terms indicating a violation of First Amendment rights with possible criminal and/or civil liability. The four other categories do not necessarily indicate criminal or civil wrongdoing, but probably indicate actions outside the charter of the FBI. Regarding the Cominfil category, the SSC has been critical of our use of "Communist Infiltration" which the Committee views as a pretext for such investigations as those involving the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Martin Luther King, Poor Peoples March, and Women's Liberation Movement.

2. Cointelpro Categories by Program (SSC Exhibit 11). This chart consists of five individual charts representing the basic domestic Cointelpros and graphically illustrates the characterizations of actions conducted in each program.

The five charts illustrate the differences in the figures for Cointelpro actions as tabulated by the Petersen Committee and the SSC. These are as follows.

CONTINUED - OVER

Program	Petersen	SSC	Percent Difference
CPUSA	1388	1636	17.8
SWP	46	57	23.8
White Hate	255	287	12.5
Black Nationalist	362	379	4.9
New Left	289	291	1.0
Totals	2340	2650	13.24

3. Cointelpro Activity (SSC Exhibit 22). This chart endeavors to tabulate the number of Cointelpro actions for each program on a quarterly basis for each year from 1956 to 1971. The chart indicates approximately 60 percent of all Cointelpro actions were conducted in the Communist Party Program which in two quarters reached approximately 75 actions and which was most active during the period 1960 to 1967. The chart also indicates all the programs except the Black Nationalist commenced to taper down in terms of actions beginning in or before 1969. The Black Nationalist Cointelpro was active up until 1971 with some 40 actions effected in the last quarter of 1970.

OBSERVATIONS:

While the Petersen Committee report attempted to place Cointelpro activity in 12 descriptive categories, the SSC, according to the Cointelpro composite chart, obviously is endeavoring to characterize the actions to highlight alleged abuses and possible criminal or civil liability. Categories 1, 2 and 3 place approximately

CONTINUED - OVER

34 percent of all Cointelpro actions within areas of constitutional or statutory violation, obviously indicating possible criminal or civil liability. This indicates the thrust of the forthcoming SSC report, as relates to our discontinued Cointelpros, will either criticize the Petersen Committee report as an inadequate review or one possibly based on incomplete information. The SSC very likely intends to dispute the Petersen Committee report conclusion that the "overwhelming bulk of these activities were clearly legitimate and proper undertakings, within the scope of the FBI's ongoing responsibilities," and to characterize the activities as criminal or civil violations of individual rights or outside the mandate or charter of the FBI.

We may expect the SSC, in its forthcoming report, as was done in public hearings, to highlight FBI Cointelpro abuses using selected documentation from FBI files to support its conclusion. It is likely the SSC will recommend legislation to preclude future Cointelpro-type activities and it is possible it will recommend criminal or civil prosecutions. As was done with the Petersen Committee report, the subjective characterization of an action as falling within one of several arbitrarily described categories is not only a matter of individual interpretation, but raises questions which cannot be objectively answered. Whether or not these actions are truly thought to be prosecutable offenses, the innuendo arising from their characterization is in itself damaging.

ACTION:

None. For information.

EX. 10 11/8
TAB 7 P.162

COINTELPRO COMPOSITE

TOTAL 2679 (2340)



EXHIBIT 10

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/BHC

EX 11 11/8
P-16332
TAB 7

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2 ALM/LHL

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

EXHIBIT 11











EX-22
P.1648
TAB 7

11/8

EXHIBIT 22

Cointelpro Activity



MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. [illegible] Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/9/76

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. S. Mignosa
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

PURPOSE:

To advise that, at Senate Select Committee (SSC) Executive Session concerning "Domestic Intelligence Investigations" held 2/6/76, it was decided that an additional Executive Session would be scheduled for a future date to more fully discuss the role FBI should play in intelligence-type investigations of domestic organizations and citizens believed to pose long-range threat to internal security of country.

DETAILS:

Reference is made to my memorandum 2/2/76 advising that Bureau representatives would appear at SSC Executive Session concerning "Domestic Intelligence Investigations" on 2/6/76.

Above SSC Executive Session was held as scheduled between the approximate hours 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. Representing the SSC were Senators Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan who were accompanied by numerous SSC Staff personnel. Bureau representatives offering sworn testimony at this Session were Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, Inspector-Deputy Assistant Director Hunter E. Helgeson, Section Chiefs Joseph G. Deegan, Sebastian S. Mignosa and Robert L. Shackelford, all of the Intelligence Division, and Inspector John B. Hotis, Legal Counsel Division.

REC-43 62-116395-1384

EX-104

23 FEB 18 1976

62-116395

MDR 16

TJM:lhb/hb
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

5-

CONTINUED - OVER

84 FEB 23 1976

Senator Mondale explained at the outset that the purpose of the Session was for Bureau representatives to furnish information which would assist the SSC in drafting legislation outlining Bureau responsibilities in the domestic intelligence area. He requested that Bureau representatives highlight operations in this field and support, by specific examples, why the Bureau believes there is a continuing need for this type investigation.

Between the approximate hours 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, Bureau representatives offered statements and answered questions concerning the following topics: suggested legislation based on both the "Stone" language and the proposed Attorney General guidelines; definition of Governmental interests as basis for "Domestic Intelligence Investigations;" extent of terrorist activity (both foreign and domestic oriented) in this country; value of intelligence-type investigations in deterring terrorist activity; and assessment of potential for terrorist activity during the forthcoming year.

At approximately 12:00 noon, Senators Mondale and Morgan departed because of other commitments. Before departing, Senator Mondale stated he believed the Session to be helpful but noted the discussion had not included intelligence investigations of so-called subversive domestic organizations and individuals who do not appear to pose an immediate threat to this country's internal security. Senator Mondale proposed, and it was agreed, that discussion in this area would continue with Staff Members during the week of 2/9-13/76 and conclude with another Executive Session at a date yet to be decided subsequent to 2/13/76.

CONTINUED - OVER

Upon Senator Mondale's departure, SSC Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwartz, Jr., acted as chairman. Mr. Shackelford read into the record a statement concerning the need for continued Bureau investigations of domestic organizations and individuals calling for illegal overthrow of the Government even though the threat is not imminent. Following numerous questions and answers in this area, the Session was adjourned at 1:00 p.m., with no date set for further discussion.

OBSERVATIONS:

While present, Senator Mondale from his comments appeared to acknowledge that in any proposed legislation some verbiage would have to be included allowing for investigations in the domestic intelligence area. He seemed most concerned, however, and expressed cognizance of the difficulty in drafting legislation permitting such investigations yet preventing investigations based upon political beliefs and also preventing the FBI from being misused by Government officials at some future date in this sensitive area. Senator Morgan verbally claimed he recognized the need for intelligence-type investigations but only when violence was present. He further declared that, in investigations of organizations calling for violence, such investigations should be limited only to that segment of the organization which actually participated in or advocated violence. Senator Morgan was critical of Bureau investigations of the Klan and certain COINTELPRO actions against Martin Luther King, Jr., and other segments of the black nationalist movement. He was also critical of current Bureau leadership and expressed the belief this

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

leadership should be replaced as it follows the traditions established by Mr. Hoover. From statements made by Mr. Schwartz, supra, and other SSC Staff Members present, with the possible exception of Mr. Mark Gitenstein, it would appear these individuals are unalterably opposed to legislation authorizing Bureau investigations in the domestic intelligence area unless the threat of violence is imminent.

RECOMMENDATION:

discussion held 2/13/76 PVJ

That Legal Counsel Division, upon approach by SSC Staff Members, arrange for proposed informal discussion during week of 2/9-13/76, and determine the date of proposed second session of SSC Executive Hearing concerning "Domestic Intelligence Investigations."

TJM WRW K

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ✓
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ✓
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/ju

DATE: 2/6/76

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This memorandum briefly reviews the speech made on the floor of the Senate by Senator Frank Church entitled "Government Adherence to the Law: A Call for a Temporary Special Prosecutor on Intelligence Abuses." The speech (attached) received some press coverage, most of which dealt with Senator Church's proposal that a special prosecutor be designated to look into the so-called intelligence abuses.

In brief, the statement by Senator Church reviews that information which was the subject of testimony by the majority and minority counsels of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) before the full Committee on 11/18/75. No new so-called abuses were identified by Senator Church and the speech was merely a rehash of those activities conducted by the intelligence community over the years which the SSC now describes as abuses. Specifically, the Church statement makes reference to the following:

COINTELPRO:

REC-112 62-116395-1381

The COINTEL Program has been the subject of extensive press inquiries and many documents have been made public under the Freedom of Information Act. It was the subject of an extensive investigation by the Department of Justice. The Bureau made all COINTEL files available for the Department's review. Its investigation culminated in a report by former Assistant Attorney General Petersen which concluded that "the overwhelming bulk of the activities carried out under the Program (COINTEL) were legitimate and proper intelligence and investigative practices and techniques."

FEB 17 1976

62-116395

WOC:mjg
(7)

1 - ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP 2 ALM/EHL

84 FEB 25 1976

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR:

Senator Church's allegations concerning the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., are replete with inaccuracies, untruths, half-truths, exaggerations, distortions and opinions masquerading as facts. The Senator's allegations illustrate his disregard for facts as duly sworn to and documented (the testimony of Mr. Adams on 11/19/75) preferring instead to persist in certain fixations and preconceptions of the SSC Staff. The entire King matter is currently under intensive Departmental review which includes Departmental access to all FBI files.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE:

This refers to the fact that in 1969, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) established a special staff used to gather intelligence on dissident groups. The legitimacy of this procedure is something for the IRS to answer.

OPERATION CHAOS:

Senator Church criticizes the special operation group formed in CIA to explore possible ties between hostile foreign nations and domestic dissent within the U. S. CIA's defense to this operation has been the fact that they were doing this in response to direct instructions from the President.

ILLEGAL MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS:

Much has appeared in the press regarding the so-called illegal mail opening programs conducted by both CIA and FBI. This is currently the subject of a very intensive investigation by the Department of Justice and both the FBI and CIA are cooperating with Departmental attorneys in an effort to determine whether there is any criminal culpability on the part of FBI and CIA employees.

CONTINUED - OVER

THE HUSTON PLAN:

Here again, considerable information has appeared in the press regarding the Huston Plan. This Plan originated in the White House during former President Nixon's administration. After a series of meetings which culminated in an implementing order from the White House, Mr. Hoover objected to the Attorney General which resulted in the White House recalling the implementing letter.

NSA WATCH LIST:

The NSA Watch List also has been the subject of some press coverage. It involves a list of American citizens maintained by the National Security Agency for the purpose of monitoring messages carried over international communications. This procedure is also the subject of a current investigation by the Department.

The call for a temporary prosecutor by Senator Church is not being addressed in this memorandum but will be the subject of a separate memorandum prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel.

ACTION:

For information.

Per

GOVERNMENT ADHERENCE TO THE LAW:

A CALL FOR A TEMPORARY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ON INTELLIGENCE ABUSES

By

Senator Frank Church

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

A year ago the Select Committee on Intelligence began its investigation of the American intelligence service. Since then, the road we have traveled has been long and hard. But now the end of the journey is near. Soon the Committee will present its final recommendations.

We have sat neither as judges nor jurors in this inquiry. It has not been our function to act as a Grand Jury. Our purpose, rather, has been to obtain information to aid the legislative process. In particular, we have sought the knowledge and understanding, based on a close review of intelligence activities over the past three decades, which could help us develop sound legislative remedies to reform the intelligence agencies and prevent abuses of power in the future.

The criminal investigation and prosecution of officials within the intelligence service who may have violated the law is not the task of this, or any other, Congressional committee. Yet all Members of Congress, and the citizens they represent, should be concerned that justice takes its proper and impartial course in this matter.

The Senate Select Committee has spent the better part of a year ferreting out the facts and has established that many laws have indeed been violated. The list is extensive:

From 1956 to 1971, the Federal Bureau of Investigation carried out five counterintelligence programs, or "COINTELPROs," against a variety of organizations involved in peaceful protest. Among these organizations were the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, most black student groups, and various antiwar groups.

62-116395-1381

ENCLOSURE

The FBI program against the New Left was the most wide-sweeping of all. Its targets included underground newspapers, students protesting various university policies, the antiwar Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy, and several colleges and universities.

The FBI tactics included the use of anonymous letters and telephone calls designed to disrupt families, friendships, careers, and organizations; the use of agents provocateurs to sow dissension and fragment groups; the dissemination of fake information about individuals to employers, credit bureaus, and creditors; the instigation of tax investigations against certain citizens for harassment purposes, alone; the investigation of the private life of group leaders for whispering to the press; and an almost endless list of equally deplorable assaults on First Amendment rights.

From 1962 until his death, Dr. Martin Luther King was the target of a vicious campaign by the FBI to discredit him as the most prominent black activist in America. The full array of the Bureau's sophisticated devices of technical surveillance was turned against Dr. King. He was illegally bugged, tapped, and followed. Information on his private life was then delivered by agents of the FBI to clergymen, Members of Congress, the White House, United States Ambassadors, newsmen, the National Science Foundation, and the British Government, among others. Agents were sent to colleges to persuade them not to grant Dr. King honorary degrees.

Information obtained from microphone coverage of Dr. King was hand-carried to prominent clergymen throughout the country. As one agent recalls:

> [Hoover] sent me...to talk to an Episcopalian Bishop. He instructed me to tell this Episcopalian Bishop, who had been speaking for King ...all sorts of details. It was not a pleasant assignment. But it was an order, an instruction, and I did go.....[The Bishop] led me to believe that we could have done a much more honorable thing if we had stayed in Washington and not carried that tale out there, and I'm inclined to think that he was right.

Thirty-four days before Dr. King was to fly to Norway to receive the highest honor an American can earn, the Nobel Prize for Peace, the Federal Bureau of Investigation even sent him a message urging him to take his own life. The unsigned note read:

> King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is. You have just 34 days in which to do it. (This exact number has been selected for a specific reason.) It has definite practical significance. You are done. There is but one way out for you.

The FBI has engaged in a host of other questionable activities, including the collection of intelligence on critics and political opponents of incumbent Presidents.

In 1969, the Internal Revenue Service established a Special Service Staff (SSS). For the next five years the SS Staff was used by the IRS and, indirectly, the FBI to gather intelligence on dissident groups. Its 11,458 files included dossiers on anti-war leaders, black political leaders, writers, labor organizers, tax reform groups, civil rights groups, women's liberation groups, clergymen, and many more.

In 1967, a Special Operations Group was formed in the Central Intelligence Agency. Its purpose was to explore possible ties between hostile foreign nations and domestic dissent within the United States. The project received the codename "Operation CHAOS." Over a six-year period, CHAOS accumulated more than 13,000 files, including 7,200 on American citizens. Through this program the CIA became a storehouse for the stockpiling of large quantities of data on citizens of this country.

From 1940 to 1973, various illegal mail-opening programs were conducted intermittently by the CIA and the FBI. The CIA program ran -- off and on -- from 1952 to 1973, and involved the opening of mail to and from American citizens. This mail was intercepted in five major cities within the United States, with the larges operation taking place in New York City. In that metropolis alone, 9,000 letters were opened and read by CIA agents in the [illegible] year of the program. Among the individuals and organizations whose mail was examined were Arthur Burns, Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., Richard Nixon, Senators Humphrey and Kennedy, the Ford Foundation, Harvard University, and the Rockefeller Foundation.

The FBI mail-opening program ran from 1940 to 1966, with Federal agents in seven American cities reading and photographing letters written by citizens of the United States. The FBI also cooperated with the CIA mail program in New York City, receiving copies of more than 50,000 intercepted letters from the Agency between 1958 and 1973. Military intelligence units shared the CIA take, too.

In the Summer of 1970, the so-called Huston Plan was drafted for and approved by the President. Based on a sweeping review of intelligence collection methods prepared by officials of the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the separate military service units, the Huston Plan contained a series of illegal proposals. The Plan, approved by President Nixon, invested the intelligence agencies with Presidential authority to monitor the international communications of U.S. citizens; intensify the electronic surveillance of domestic dissidents; read the mail of American citizens; break into the homes of domestic dissenters; and increase the coverage of college students.

Although the Plan was rescinded five days after its initial approval, several of the programs continued -- just as they had gone on before the Presidential annointment. They had a life of their own, apart from higher authority. The CIA mail program is but one example.

Among the programs approved by the President in the Huston Plan was a "watch list" maintained on American citizens by the National Security Agency. Messages carried over international communications facilities which were to, from, or about individuals whose names appeared on the watch list were automatically sorted out and monitored by NSA computers. The messages were also disseminated to the CIA, the FBI, and the Secret Service. Throughout the 1960's and early 1970's, over 16,000 American names were placed on the NSA watch list.

Moreover, since 1945, three international telegraph companies provided the United States Government with copies of telegrams sent abroad by American citizens. This program was turned over to the National Security Agency, when that agency was established in 1952 and it became known as "Operation SHAMROCK." American names on the NSA watch list served as computer indexes or signals for the private companies to sort from their large volume of messages those which were of interest to the government. These messages were then circulated to the Bureau and the CIA.

This is, by no means, a comprehensive list of unlawful conduct by the intelligence agencies. The possibility of perjury by intelligence officers before the Congress is not the least of several questions which have yet to be resolved by a thorough investigation of the evidence. This is an issue of utmost importance, since the Congress cannot hope to arrive at useful remedial legislation on the intelligence service -- or any other public policy concern -- if it is not told the truth.

The issue, then, is not whether laws have been violated, but rather when and how justice will be served. The "when" ought to be as soon as possible; the "how" is a more tangled problem.

An argument can be made in favor of allowing the usual processes and institutions to take their course. The Justice Department has begun to conduct criminal investigations of several cases uncovered by the Rockefeller Commission and the committees of Congress. It can be argued that these investigations should not be interrupted since they have already begun.

Certainly, the present Attorney General is a man of integrity. He has voiced his concern several times over regarding the abuses which have come to light through the investigations of the past year. He has been helpful to the Select Committee by providing documents and other information. I have full confidence in his good intentions and his respect for the law.

Nonetheless, the Attorney General faces an unfortunate dilemma. Since the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a subdivision of the Justice Department, it lies within the administrative responsibility of the Attorney General. He is thus placed in a position of investigating the very house over which he must preside.

It is not only the actuality of impartiality which is at stake. The appearance of impartiality is just as important. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice provide that a prosecuting officer should have no conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest. As Chesterfield Smith, past president of the ABA, has noted, "Under the Standards, it would be improper for an investigation...of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government to be conducted by a prosecutor subject to the direction and control of the President."

The fact that the FBI is a part of the Justice Department is not the only troubling aspect of this situation -- though it is serious enough since, over the years, senior FBI officials and Justice personnel have had close contact in their daily work and have shared knowledge of the dubious activities brought to light by the Select Committee inquiry. The Justice Department and the CIA have also had a unique relationship. A secret agreement between the two was in effect for twenty years which exempted the Agency from the usual requirements of reporting to Justice any violations of the law among CIA personnel.

Moreover, it is the Justice Department which is supposed to represent intelligence officials who may be sued for civil damages as a consequence of the disclosures brought about by the Congressional investigations. How can the Justice Department investigate and prosecute these officials, on the one hand, and defend their interests in civil suits on the other? It just will not work.

It is obvious that the public is deeply troubled by the findings of the investigations into the intelligence service. In a recent Harris Survey, 80 percent of those interviewed agreed "it was wrong for the FBI to send a note to Martin Luther King suggesting that he commit suicide." 74 Percent agreed "it was wrong for the CIA to work out a deal with Mafia characters to try to assassinate Castro." And 61 percent agreed "it was a violation of basic rights for the CIA and FBI to conduct spying on prominent Americans here at home."

The government must move decisively. To avoid charges of a whitewash, it is in the best interests of the Justice Department to disqualify itself in this case.

What is vital now is to guarantee a full, thorough and independent investigation. A special prosecutor should be enlisted for this purpose, and given sufficient authority to fully perform the task.

Last year, the American Bar Association Committee to Study Federal Law Enforcement Agencies addressed itself in a preliminary report to the question of a special prosecutor. The Committee rejected the establishment of a permanent special prosecutor, but noted that "the public must be assured that crimes committed in high places will be investigated and prosecuted fearlessly and with integrity." To this end, the ABA Committee properly concluded:

> There may be exceptional circumstances requiring a special prosecutor from outside the Department of Justice who is not dependent on the Attorney General or the President for future promotion or other preferment. The primary obligation to appoint such an attorney should reside in the Attorney General.

The relationship between the Justice Department and the intelligence service unquestionably presents us with an exceptional circumstance.

The person chosen to perform the task of special prosecutor must possess the same impartiality and strength of resolution which Leon Jaworski demonstrated during his appearance before a committee of Congress in 1973. The following exchange occurred that year in hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:

> Senator Tunney. So as I understand your statement today, you feel that if there is evidence of criminal activity which is indictable, that you would be prepared to move ahead with an investigation and indictments despite the fact that the defendants involved might be prepared to claim that national security required them to do what they did?
>
> Mr. Jaworski. That is right, sir. And they would have the burden of sustaining that position. I would not assume the burden. I would contest it.

The special prosecutor, moreover, should be imbued with the same faith in the law that possessed John Adams, who knew that the law "without any regard to persons, commands that which is good and punishes evil in all, whether rich or poor, high or low -- 'tis deaf, inexorable, inflexible."

The basic machinery of a special prosecutor's office is already in place as a legacy of the Watergate affair. It should not be too difficult to modify this machinery in the appropriate manner to carry out the investigation of unlawfulness in the intelligence agencies.

It may be argued that we should concentrate on the reform of the intelligence agencies for the future, not on the punishment of individuals for misdeeds of the past. This is a beguiling argument. But the truth is that we can ill-afford to overlook the lawlessness of the past if we wish to avoid a repetition in the future. As two scholars from the Center for National Security Studies, Jerry J. Berman and Morton H. Halperin, noted in a recent New York Times article:

> One key element in bringing the intelligence agencies under democratic control is to insure that officials of intelligence agencies are prosecuted when they violate the law. Unless there is a thorough investigation by an impartial prosecutor followed by indictments and a report, the threat of criminal penalties will not deter future abuses.

I find it utterly deplorable that the President in his State of the Union message failed completely to say even a word about the need to make our intelligence agencies obey the law. As the journalist Anthony Lewis has commented, "It is easy to denounce private crime, as Mr. Ford did. But it is more important, now, for Government to commit itself to law."

And so I must conclude that, in the present situation, resort to a temporary special prosecutor is both proper and necessary. Leon Jaworski, a former Special Prosecutor himself, and others in the legal community agree with this conclusion.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

January 29, 1976

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 20, 1976, requesting access to or delivery of specified FBI materials.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum in response to Item 1 of referenced request. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum for your records.

Enclosures (2)

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SFP:lhb lhb
(9)

REC- 112

62-116395-1379

FEB 19 1976

3 ENCLOSURE

WOC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____ MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 FEB 23 1976

GPO 954-546

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

January 29, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 20, 1976.

Item 1 of referenced letter requested access to all material furnished to the FBI "by the CIA from a source known to the FBI as 'COLGS' and who was handled as a source under the heading 'racial extremist matters.'" It was indicated in Item 1 that CIA had already given the Committee Staff access to the material in its possession relating to this source.

In view of the Third Agency considerations present, this request was discussed on January 23, 1976, by a representative of this Bureau with Mr. Walter Elder of the CIA Review Staff. Mr. Elder advised that CIA had no record of "COLGS" but that it did have information concerning "CLOGS," the cryptonym for an individual who was a source of CIA. During the period 1970-1971, CIA furnished to the FBI approximately 30 memoranda containing information from "CLOGS." According to Elder, the SSC has seen everything which CIA has in its files concerning "CLOGS," including the approximate 30 memoranda which CIA had furnished to the FBI. Elder expressed the preference that this Bureau respond to the referenced request by referring the SSC back to CIA.

FBI files contain a single reference to "CLOGS," that being a CIA memorandum dated May 17, 1971, indicating "CLOGS" to be a CIA source.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395 -

SFP:lhb|hb
(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

On January 26, 1976, Special Agent Seymor Fred Phillips of this Bureau conferred with Mr. John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, and told Elliff of our findings both as to what our files contained and what Elder had told us. Inquiry was made of Elliff as to the necessity or pertinence of the SSC requesting of the FBI access to materials which CIA had furnished to the FBI inasmuch as the SSC had already had access to such material at CIA. Mention was made of the Third Agency consideration which Elliff indicated he was cognizant of, but he stated the SSC's purpose in making the request was in the form of a double check to insure the SSC gained access to all of the material it desired.

It was explained to Elliff that this request, in light of the factors involved, would place an undue burden on the FBI as there might not be any way to retrieve the information it was requesting to see. This point was emphasized by the fact that FBI indices contained only a single reference to "CI/OS," that referred to above.

Elliff responded that he would check with the member of the SSC Staff handling this matter and further advise.

On January 27, 1976, Elliff advised Phillips that he had checked out the matter and, in view of all the factors present, it would be unnecessary for the Bureau to take any further action on Item 1 of the January 20, 1976, request other than to submit the instant memorandum.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Contact with Elder at CIA was by Supervisor Andrew J. Duffin of the Senstudy 75 Project.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/29/76

Caption of Document: U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC).
(SSC Letter 1/20/76, Item 1)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: J. O. Stassmier Date: 2/3/76

Received by: Lipsey Oster

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

- 116395 - 1379

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

1/29/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC request 1/20/76, Item 1

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence Activities, Domestic
Civil Unrest

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Information requested regarding "Clogs," a source handled under heading "Racial Extremist Matters." Request withdrawn as handled by CIA previously.

MDR
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP3ALM/EHC

62-116395

AJD:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-28

3791 (6.75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-1379

274-10064

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 12 1976

5
SB

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Request for Interviews of Additional FBI Agents

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting the names of the authors of various FBI memoranda and that the SSC be allowed to interview these individuals. Please arrange for an appropriate and prompt response.

A similar request from the SSC concerning the authors of a memorandum from the Chicago field office is expected shortly.

2/13/76 - assigned Graham

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

cc: Paul Daly

ENCLOSURE

ENCL BEHIND FILE

REC-100 62-116395-1374

FEB 18 1976

LEGAL COUNSEL

5-DM

84 MAR 23 1976

FEB 12 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Request for Interviews of Additional FBI Agents

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting the names of the authors of various FBI memoranda and that the SSC be allowed to interview these individuals. Please arrange for an appropriate and prompt response.

A similar request from the SSC concerning the authors of a memorandum from the Chicago field office is expected shortly.

MDR16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

cc: Paul Daly

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 11, 1976

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the United States
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As a part of the Select Committee on Intelligence's preparation of a final report on FBI intelligence operations, we are seeking to take the testimony of persons whose memoranda and statements might be quoted in that report.

In our investigation into the FBI's role in the "gang war" between the Black Panther Party and the U. S. organization, certain portions of Bureau Memoranda and Airtels may be quoted. The following is a list of these documents. Actual copies, received by the Select Committee from the FBI, are also enclosed.

Memorandum SAC, Los Angeles to Director FBI 11/29/68
Memorandum Director, FBI to SAC Los Angeles 10/31/68
Memorandum SAC, Los Angeles to Director, FBI 3/17/69
Memorandum SAC, San Diego to Director, FBI 6/5/69
Memorandum SAC, San Diego to Director, FBI 6/6/69
Memorandum SAC, Los Angeles to Director, FBI 9/3/69
Memorandum SAC, San Diego to Director, FBI 9/18/69
Memorandum SAC, San Diego to Director, FBI 10/6/69
Memorandum SAC, San Diego to Director, FBI 11/10/69
Memorandum SAC, San Diego to Director, FBI 12/3/69
Memorandum SAC, San Diego to Director, FBI 11/12/69

The Select Committee staff would greatly appreciate your forwarding to us the names of the FBI personnel responsible for the preparation of these Bureau memoranda. We would also greatly appreciate your making the necessary arrangements for Select Committee staff to be able to interview these persons.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

RECEIVED
FEB 11 1976

Yours very truly,

Frank Church
Frank Church
Chairman

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/12/76

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2ALM

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Purpose of this memorandum is to advise of delivery of the attached documents to the captioned committee on authorization of Mr. Steven Blackhurst, Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice.

By way of background, the SSC previously requested access to all Bureau materials in the Martin Luther King, Jr., file relating to the Poor People's Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, from 1/1 - 4/4/68, as well as all materials in the latter two files pertaining to King for the same period.

A partial proffer of materials requested was made available to SSC Staff Member Michael T. Epstein for review on 2/9/76.

The attached documents were thereafter designated by Epstein for delivery to the SSC. On 2/9/76 Mr. Steven Blackhurst, Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice orally authorized SA Seymor F. Phillips to make delivery of the requested items to the SSC. It should be noted the Department by memorandum dated 1/27/76 was furnished a complete set of the documents from which Epstein selected those to be delivered on 2/9/76.

REC-100 62-116395-1373

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

FEB 17 1976

PEN

ENCLOSURE

62-116395

Enclosures

ENCL BEHIND FILE

ENCL BEHIND FILE

PEN:adn
(4)

84 MAR 4 1976

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW/HPL

DATE: 2/12/76

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. J. Duffin

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Mr. Gallagher

On 2/10/76, Supervisor Jack Hagerty, Tampa Division, telephonically advised Senstudy Project that one Jack Bauman, 600 Lake Martha Drive, N. E., Winter Haven, Florida, had received a subpoena to appear before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSC) on 2/19/76.

For background information, Bauman, an ex-CIA employee, was a witness for the Government during the Watergate investigation and was interviewed extensively by the Bureau during same. Due to a serious heart condition, he did not travel to Washington to testify in 1973, but then AUSA Earl Silbert, Washington, D. C., flew to Florida for Bauman's deposition.

Prior to Bauman's scheduled appearance before the SSC, Michael Madigan, an SSC Staff Member, and Jack Dempsey of CIA's Review Staff (CIA's Senstudy Project counterpart) are to interview Bauman at his residence in Florida in the presence of his attorney, Wallace L. Storey. In this regard, Bauman has requested SA Brooke D. Roberts of Lakeland, Florida, RA (who interviewed Bauman during Watergate) presence during this interview, along with any documents which may refresh his (Bauman's) recollection of prior statements as his memory is failing.

REC-100 62-116395-1372

Hagerty desired to know whether or not Roberts should sit in on upcoming interview and have FD-302 of his prior interview of Bauman available.

FEB 13 1976

62-116395

AJD:lhb|hb
(5)

MDR 16

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

84 FEB 25 1976

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

SA Andrew J. Duffin, through Mr. Walter Elder, CIA Review Staff, on 2/10/76, determined that CIA was in fact to participate in an interview of Bauman with an SSC Staff Member in the near future. He is to be interviewed regarding his prior contact with E. Howard Hunt and Project Merry Mack, acronym for CIA's efforts to prevent any electronic penetration of their building during its construction. CIA hopes that interview will negate the necessity of Bauman having to answer SSC subpoena, as they feel it will show he will not be the "hot" witness that SSC anticipates.

Subsequently, Hagerty was advised of above and that Roberts should not participate in interview, as it was an SSC interview and only concerned them and CIA.

ACTION:

None. For information.

AJD

WRW

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 10 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
SB Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request
dated February 4, 1976

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated February 4, 1976. It is my understanding that the FBI has already declassified the documents in question and that this letter is for record keeping purposes only.

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

cc: Paul Daly

ENCLOSURE

REC-100 62-116395-1371

FEB 17 1976

84 MAR 23 1976

FEB 10 1976

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request
dated February 4, 1976

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated February 4, 1976. It is my understanding that the FBI has already declassified the documents in question and that this letter is for record keeping purposes only.

cc: Paul Daly

MDR 16

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 4, 1976

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Select Committee requests that those documents which are to be exhibits to the public hearings on domestic intelligence activities be declassified for public release.

These exhibits have been submitted to Mr. William O.Cregar of the Bureau and the previously agreed upon criteria are being used in the excision process.

Your cooperation in this matter is again appreciated.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

MDR 16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

RECEIVED
FEB 9 1976
10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1371

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Daly

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 2/9/76

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Shackelford
1 - Mr. Grigalus
1 - Mr. Newman

FROM : J.G. Deegan

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY '75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J.B. Adams dated 1/29/76 (copy attached) recorded authority for Inspector-Deputy Assistant Director Hunter E. Helgeson, Number One Man Homer A. Newman, Jr., IS-1 Section, and Unit Chief Edward P. Grigalus, IS-2 Section, Intelligence Division, to appear to give a deposition before Staff Member Robert Kelly of captioned Committee. This deposition would be for the purpose of further elaborating on information previously furnished to the Committee regarding the handling of security and extremist informants.

As was previously agreed, Mr. Kelly telephonically advised Supervisor Newman on 2/6/76 that this deposition would be taken in Room G-308 of the Dirksen Building at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, 2/10/76.

He indicated that the purpose of this deposition was merely to clarify certain points in connection with information previously furnished regarding security and extremist informants. These areas were indicated as being: (1) explanation of the difference between confidential sources, informants and panel sources; (2) statistics as to the number of confidential sources as of 6/30/75 compared with some available figure, if possible 1971; (3) what problems are being encountered in connection with the utilization of confidential sources in view of the Privacy Acts; (4) an explanation of American Legion Contact Program and Plant Informant Program, background on these programs and the dates they were in existence; (5) a brief explanation of how informants are paid, i.e., paid on authority of the SAC as opposed to FBIHQ approval of pay-

REC-100 62-116395-1369

FEB 12 1976

Enclosures
HAN:tdp (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

84 FEB 23 1976

ments and whether there is a limit on the amount FBIHQ can approve, and (6) bring for review a teletype to all SACs dated 12/23/74 (see attached) dealing with the conduct of informants.

If approved, the employees as indicated above will appear as requested and furnish the deposition regarding the above numerated areas of informant operations.

This matter has been coordinated with the Legal Counsel Division.

ACTION:

For approval.

No NEED FOR Representive from L.C.D. to be present per MR. HELGESON ON 2/6/76 JEF

JAM
JEF

WRW

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandu

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - M Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 1/29/76

1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

OM : Legal Counsel

BJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Robert Kelly, Staff Member of captioned Committee, requested that the Bureau make available a representative or representatives to give a deposition to captioned Committee concerning security ~~in~~ and extremist informant matters. Kelly suggested that SA Edward P. Grigalus and SA Homer A. Newman, Jr., would be the Bureau's witnesses who would logically have the information the Committee is seeking through this deposition.

In this regard, SAs Grigalus and Newman have previously briefed Mr. Kelly concerning Bureau informant matters. Kelly stated that as soon as the Bureau witness or witnesses have been determined, he would furnish additional details concerning the type of information he desires to be furnished in the deposition.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division designate the appropriate Bureau witness or witnesses to give a deposition concerning informant matters.

Representative of Legal Counsel will attend if necessary.

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION: HEH:enm 2/2/76

Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director Hunter E. Helgeson, #1 Man Homer A. Newman, Jr., IS-1 Section; and Unit Chief Edward P. Grigalus, IS-2 Section, Intelligence Division, will be available for depositions in this matter.

PVD:lad
(7)

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1369

CODE TELETYPE

1 - Mr. Adams
URGENT
1 - All Assistant Directors
DECEMBER 23, 1974
1 - Mr. Shackelford
1 - Mr. Grigalus

TO: ALL SACS

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES OF EMPLOYEES.

BY MEMORANDUM TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE, DATED DECEMBER 5, 1973, CAPTIONED "CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES OF EMPLOYEES," YOU WERE ADVISED THAT AS MEMBERS OF A FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY, FBI EMPLOYEES MUST AT ALL TIMES ZEALOUSLY GUARD AND DEFEND THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES GUARANTEED TO ALL INDIVIDUALS BY THE CONSTITUTION. FBI EMPLOYEES WERE REMINDED THAT THEY MUST NOT ENGAGE IN ANY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY WHICH COULD ABRIDGE THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED TO A CITIZEN OF THE U.S. BY THE CONSTITUTION AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL EMPLOYEES OF THE FBI ENGAGE IN ANY CONDUCT WHICH MAY RESULT IN DEFAMING THE CHARACTER, REPUTATION, INTEGRITY OR DIGNITY OF ANY CITIZEN OR ORGANIZATION OF CITIZENS OF THE U.S.

YOU ARE REMINDED THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS RELATE TO BUREAU INFORMANTS IN INTERNAL SECURITY FIELD AND NO INFORMANT SHOULD BE OPERATED IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD BE IN CONTRADICTION OF SUCH INSTRUCTIONS.

EPG:djr
(13)

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1369

THESE PRINCIPLES MUST BE KEPT IN MIND BY YOU AT ALL TIMES. AGAIN, THE SPIRIT AS WELL AS THE LETTER OF THE LAW IS OUR GOAL.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B[illegible]dams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. S. Mignosa
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 1/29/76

FROM : W. O. Cregar WOC

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

wrw/SSm

At the request of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), a briefing session was held between SSC Staff Members and representatives of this Bureau at FBIHQ on 1/28/76 during the approximate hours 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. The purpose of this briefing was to have SSC Staff Members advise the Bureau of the nature of subject matters to be discussed at the SSC Executive Session scheduled to be held 2/2/76 at 10:00 a.m., concerning the subject matter "Domestic Intelligence Investigations." Representing the SSC were John Elliff, Mark Gitenstein and Michael Epstein. Bureau representatives included Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, Branch Chiefs Thomas W. Leavitt and Hunter E. Helgeson, Section Chiefs Joseph G. Deegan, Robert L. Shackelford, Sebastian S. Mignosa and Supervisors Homer A. Newman, David Ryan, Arthur G. Pote, Andrew J. Duffin, Donald J. McGorty, Don K. Pettus and Thomas J. McNiff, all of the Intelligence Division, and Special Agent John B. Hotis, Legal Counsel Division.

John Elliff advised that it is expected that the Bureau will, at the Executive Session, open with a prepared statement concerning the potential for violence in this country principally as it pertains to the forthcoming bicentennial celebration as recently publicized by Bureau officials. He then stated topics to be discussed at this scheduled Executive Session will fall into the following four general areas:

62-116395-1367

REC-100

FEB 17 1976

62-116395

TJM:lhb lhb
(12)

MDR 16

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/00 BY SP-2ALM/ETH

5-17

84 FEB 23 1976

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

(1) The type of material upon which FBI bases its assessment of potential for terrorist violence.

(2) Investigative techniques and intelligence gathering activities utilized by the Bureau to collect material upon which above assessments are based.

(3) Examples whereby Bureau intelligence investigations in the past have been responsible for uncovering information subsequently used by this Bureau to prevent violence.

(4) Ultimate threat, as compared to the immediate threat, which basic revolutionary organizations pose to the security of this country.*

Elliff offered that none of the above areas have been prejudged by SSC Members and stated that substantial differences exist in these areas among Senators composing the SSC.

Mark Gitenstein then noted that this Bureau has furnished the SSC with documents pertaining to a number of examples where information, developed as a result of intelligence investigations, was responsible for initiating preventive-type action. He requested, if possible, additional examples of a substantive nature which would help establish the necessity for intelligence investigations. Additionally, he requested further delivery of documents helping to clarify Bureau actions in four of the previously furnished preventive-type actions referred to above.

Handled with [illegible] Mr [illegible] SSR [illegible]

CONTINUED - OVER

* Meeting scheduled for afternoon of 1/29/76 by Intelligence Division to formulate Bureau's position in above four general areas.

Elliff also requested that, in preparation of the forthcoming Executive Session, the SSC be furnished with statistics covering the number of bombings which occurred in this country for as far back as 10 years, if such information is available.

Elliff concluded by saying that he intends to present, on 1/29/76, to SSC Members a typed agenda for the scheduled Executive Session and, when approved, he will furnish the Bureau a copy of same on 1/30/76.

OBSERVATIONS:

A large segment of the above briefing was consumed by Elliff expounding on his personal views (and Bureau rebuttal thereto, where applicable) concerning domestic intelligence investigations. Elliff stated that such investigations should only be conducted when a criminal violation or a distinct potential for same is present. For this reason he believes that informants should not be targeted against domestic organizations or individuals unless the potential for criminal violence is present, and that investigations of domestic organizations and individuals should be removed from the Bureau's Intelligence Division and transferred to the Bureau's General Investigative Division. The Intelligence Division would then become the Counterintelligence Division and would handle only intelligence investigations having foreign ramifications which he said would include the Communist Party but not organizations such as the Socialist Worker's Party. Continuing, he stated his belief that valuable intelligence-type information concerning domestic organizations and individuals would

CONTINUED - OVER

naturally flow from our criminal investigations in these areas. With regard to determining the potential for civil unrest, Elliff postured that accurate information in this field could be obtained through overt contact with civic leaders and not through covert use of informants. To support the latter position, Elliff quoted unnamed former officials of the now defunct Interdepartment Information Unit (IDIU) who readily stated the majority of the Bureau information furnished that Unit emanated from public sources. In essence, Elliff made the observation that he was opposed to domestic intelligence-type investigations as currently conducted by this Bureau and he advocated that any investigation of a domestic organization or individual be based upon criminal statute. It was noted that Elliff, though not equating "potential" with probable cause, had difficulty specifically defining "potential" in the above context.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Legal Counsel Division maintain close liaison with John Elliff to obtain formal copy of approved agenda for scheduled 2/2/76 SSC Executive Session.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

(2) That representatives of Intelligence Division, in concert with Legal Counsel Division, prepare requested opening statement concerning potential for violence in this country to be used at above Executive Session.

(3) That IS-1 Section, Intelligence Division, deliver to Senstudy Unit for referral to SSC documentary material requested concerning four preventive-type cases mentioned above. Identity of specific cases will be furnished separately to IS-1.

(4) That CI-3 Section, Intelligence Division, deliver to Senstudy Unit for referral to SSC statistical information concerning the number of bombings in this country for as many years as such information is readily available but not to exceed 10 years.

JAM

wrw

William H. Lawrence
314 Swiss Pine Lake Dr.
Spruce Pine, N.C. 28777
February 7, 1976

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2ALM/EHL

Mr. James B. Adams
Deputy Associate Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Mr. Adams:

RE: ~~Criticisms of FBI By~~ U.S. Senator,
Robert B Morgan of North Carolina

Reference my letter of January 23,1976 addressed to you and enclosing data concerningpublicly uttered adverse remarks about the FBI made by U.S. Senator Robert B.Morgan(D),N.C., on January 15,1976 before the Asheville,N.C.Chamber of Commerse, and my letter of rebuttal to Senator Morgan dated January 24.

Since then the "Asheville Citizen" Asheville N.C. printed a portion of my rebuttal in its January 30,1976 issue, in an article titled:"Retired Agent Questions Morgan's FBI position". A copy of this news item is enclosed.

Also I've received replies from U.S. Senator Jesse Helms, (R),N.C. and from U.S.Representative, Roy A.Taylor, (D),N.C. who represents the Eleventh Congressional District and which includes the Ashevill and Spruce Pine areas. I'm enclosing copies of their replies which you will find are supportive and encouraging. In fact, Mr. Taylor went out of his way to support the FBI in his remarks of January 22,1976 in the Congressional Record. Acopy of his remarks is also enclosed.

Finally, on February 5, 1976 I received a reply from Senator Morgan,dated February 3,1976 which was less than favorable. A copy of his letter is enclosed. Today I am replying to Mr. Morgan in the form of a letter to him dated February 7, a copy of which I'm enclosing for you.

These efforts may prove to have been in vain- but if one convictions as I have and fails to take a stand, he is more remiss than one who is neutral or who has no convictions at all.

With friends like Jesse Helms and Roy A. Taylor let's not give up hope.

sincerely,
William H Lawrence
William H. Lawrence

Enclosures

67- 10 MAR 16 1976

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 APR 14 1976

FEB 19 1976

6 ENCLOSURE

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

CORRESPONDENCE

84 APR 16 1976

William H. Lawrence
314 Swiss Pine Lake Dr.
Spruce Pine, N.C 28777
February 7, 1976

Mr. Robert Morgan,
U.S. Senator, North Carolina
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C. 20510

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Dear Senator Morgan:

Reference my letter to you dated January 24, 1976 and your thoughtful and sincere reply dated February 3, 1976.

I can appreciate your due concern with what you sincerely believe to be past abuses and errors of the FBI. I'm sure you have heard some sordid testimony, and I'll be the first to agree that the FBI has had its faults when compared with some theoretical perfedtion.

I submit, however, that you heard only the worst, the most glaring and most shocking incidents which can only represent the most infinitesemal number of cases, taken from hundreds of thousands of investigations. Much of the testimony heard by you emanated from disgruntled, sometimes disillusioned and less than candid individuals, many of whose sense of values and objectivity has changed, for various reasons, with the passing of time.

What you didn't hear was the testimony of thousands of selfless citizens, many of whom risked their lives and personal safety to work undercover or semi-covertly in a sincere effort to assist the FBI in protecting this country, it citizens and their civil liberties.

You didn't hear of the interminable and consistent FBI investigations which scrupulously went the extra steps to protect the legal rights of individuals under investigation. Nor did you hear the testimony of thousands of fearful and concerned citizens, parents and other close relatives of persons whose warped minds and actions were aimed at destroying our government and thereby the civil liberties of their victims, both black and white.

From a philosophical as well as a prag matic standpoint perhaps we can agree that the potential harm to privacy must be weighed against the necessity for law enforcement action in relation to social and security needs at any given time.

If only one or the other of these interests is to be considered to the exclusion of the others irrationality results---and, should this irrationality persist protractedly, in either direction, our nation would tend to tyranny, namely, that of anarchy on the one side or tyranny of police agencies on the other.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-

This might be termed a balancing approach, an approach which has been unrecognized by many of the FBI's Critics.

Moreover, in an effort to balance the right of protection from violations of privacy against other rights don't we have to decide, among other things, how much law enforcement agencies should be allowed to infringe on the privacy of suspects in order to protect the privacy---and all the rights--- of other citizens---above all the rights of those latter citizens not to be victimized by law breakers and/or politically or revolutionary motivated suspects? This is a major dilemma.

I'm not opposed to Congessional guidelines or oversight of the intelligence agencies. But oversight and guidelines are fraught with problems. For example, is it possible for our current or future Congessmen to clearly and decisively predict conditions which may confront the FBI and CIA years or even months from now? For this reason alone some flexibility is paramount.

Another perplexing issue comes to mind. Will Congress be accountable if it is the ultimate judge or decision maker for our intelligence and counter-intelligence operations?

In raising these questions I'm confident that Congress will ulimately pass some guideline legislation for our intelligence agenciesand will include therein a certain amount of oversight provisions stipulating some sort of prior restraint on proposed tactics or intelligence strategies.

With this in mind we have to recognize that internationally there has always been a need for this country to learn things that people would not ordinarily tell a foreigner---or that domestically, there are things that a criminal or revolutionary would not ordinarily tell a public official; nor would this type person lay his or her activities bare to public scrutiny. It follows thatthese natural manifestations of reluctance and secrecy has always implied the use of extraordinary, ofter covert investigative means. Therefore, can we have that desirable degree of and quantity of oversight without jeapordizing, ofter in advance, major intelligence efforts?

Can certain necessary operations be taken if public officials, especially elected officials, must stand up and take responsibility for them---or for the failure to take them?

In reality anyone who knows about an intelligence operation in advance will have, in effect, a Veto over it. For the simple decision taken by oneself that "for the country's good" a plan must be made public, will automatically scuttle it.

Moreover, there will be situations when a group of elected officials will be charged with deciding, often after only short emergency briefings, squeezed in between other important and distracting public business, whether to approve or disapprove some audacious emergency covert operation. And, will they want to publicly accept responsibility if their decision proves to be wrong? This is a sincere and searching question.

Isn't our main paradox perhaps that of the imperfection of human beings— and, therefore, human institutuions which means that we never get the choice between pure virtue and pure vice?

This is particularly true in the intelligence field. The system must be realistically viewed as a proximate solution to an insoluble problem.

There has always been and there always will be some sin, some wrongdoing and some errors of judgement in high places, including intelligence agencies. But it follows that the same imperfections exist and will continue to exist in the remainder of society. It is illusory to wait for a perfect solution. There is none.

Once we can agree on this, those of us of goodwill and perseverence can fight for the better ca